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The Basque nationalist movement: a case study in modernization and ethnic conflict.

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THE BASQUE NATIONALIST MOVEMENT: A CASE STUDY IN
MODERNIZATION AND ETHNIC CONFLICT

A Dissertation Presented

By

Milton Manuel da Silva

Submitted to the Graduate School of the
University of Massachusetts in
partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

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
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
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
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The aftermath of World War II gave rise to an extensive literature on political development and nation-building. Using the European nation-state as the model for social and political organization, this literature proceeded to discuss and analyze in a fairly optimistic fashion the processes conducive to nation-building. It was assumed that economic and technological developments would force peoples into new and inescapable contacts and thus bring about a new identity. As of late, however, it has become increasingly evident that "traditional" cultural groups have been able to withstand, and even actively oppose, amalgamation or assimilation into larger cultural groups. Rather than following the path toward political integration, as postulated by the literature on nation-building, ethnic groups seem to have instead reasserted what is perceived to be their culture.

It was out of this lack of correspondence between theory and fact that the interest for this dissertation on the Basques grew. In spite of the fact that the Basques have been associated with both the Spanish and French States for centuries and have been assimilated into the languages of these two states, they continue to manifest separatist tendencies and refuse to identify with the

Spanish or French States. In fact, during the past decade there has been a resurgence of Basque nationalism on both sides of the border.

The case of the Basques casts serious doubt on the thesis which argues that an increase in social communications, economic development, or even assimilation into the predominant language will lead to identification with the State, or with the predominant culture, and the subsequent loss of ethnic identity.

I would like to express my gratitude to several people without whose help and cooperation, in the form of professional advice and moral support, this dissertation would have turned out to be a more difficult task. My deepest gratitude goes to Professor Howard J. Wiarda, from the Political Science Department of the University of Massachusetts, for his willingness to supervise this dissertation and whose help, in the form of editorial corrections and suggestions of substantive issues, this dissertation would have been a less readable manuscript. His moral support and encouraging comments served as a source of inspiration and thus made it less of a chore. Many thanks.

Both Professors Ferenc A. Vali, from the Department of Political Science, and Milton M. Gordon, from the Department of Sociology, also have my appreciation for their willingness to spend part of their busy schedules

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Many thanks are due to Professor Walker Connor, from the State University of New York at Brockport, my former teacher, who motivated my interests in the field of political science and whose encouragement during my undergraduate and graduate student years helped me to soften the rough spots that one encounters during one's student years. I am also grateful for his willingness in lending me, during the course of my work on this dissertation, some of his unpublished manuscripts in the area of nationalism.

Many thanks also go to Professor William A. Douglass, of the Basque Studies Center of the University of Nevada, Reno, for making available to me the facilities of that Center in which a substantial part of the research for this dissertation was done. Subsequently we wrote together an article on Basque nationalism. My appreciation also goes to Professor Juan J. Linz, from the Department of Sociology of Yale University, who very willingly sent me some of his unpublished manuscripts on Spanish politics from which I gathered very valuable information.

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CHAPTER I

THE PROBLEM: SOME THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES

The fundamental importance of ethnic nationalism is attested by the recent resurgence of separatist movements in some European countries and throughout Asia and Africa.¹ The optimism that accompanied the end of colonialism, with the subsequent independence of the new states, has been deflated by the growing antagonism between ethnic groups and the existing multiethnic states. Biafra and Bangladesh

¹For a discussion of separatist movements throughout the globe see, Walker Connor, "Self-Determination: The New Phase," World Politics, XX (October, 1967), pp. 30-35. For more detailed case studies of separatist movements in Southeast Asia, Wales, Scotland, Brittany, Quebec and Africa, see: Walker Connor, "Ethnology and the Peace of South Asia," World Politics, XXII (October, 1969), pp. 51-56; E. Hudson Davies, "Welsh Nationalism," Political Quarterly, XXXIX (July-September, 1968), pp. 322-332; John E. Schwartz, "The Scottish National Party: Non-Violent Separatism and Theories of Violence," World Politics, XXII (July, 1970), pp. 496-517; J. E. S. Hayward, "From Functional Regionalism to Functional Representation in France: The Battle of Brittany," Political Studies, XVII (March 1969), pp. 48-75; Frank L. Wilson, "French Canadian Separatism," Western Political Quarterly, XX (March, 1967), pp. 116-132; Erwin C. Hargrove, "Nationality, Values, and Change: Young Elites in French Canada," Comparative Politics, 2 (April, 1970), pp. 473-499; Ali A. Mazrui, "Violent Contiguity and the Politics of Retribalization in Africa," Journal of International Affairs, 23 (1969); and William John Hanna, Judith Lynne Hanna, "Influence and Influentials in Two Urban-Centered African Communities," Comparative Politics, 2 (October, 1969), pp. 17-40. For a more theoretical discussion on the question of ethnicity and ethnic conflict see: Robert Melson and Howard Wolpe, "Modernization and the Politics of Communalism: A Theoretical Perspective," The American Political Science Review, LXIV (December, 1970), pp. 1112-1130; Donald L. Horowitz, "Multiracial Politics in the New States: Toward a Theory of Conflict," unpublished paper.

exemplify the most recent dramatic cases. Ethnic nationalism seems to be on the rise despite the fact that much of the early literature on political development and nation-building had emphasized the centripetal process of "homogenization."²

In view of the fact that "of the total 132 contemporary states, only 12 (9.1%) can be aptly described as essentially homogeneous from an ethnic point of view,"³ it becomes imperative that scholars re-examine and reconsider some of the earlier assumptions and explanations regarding the nature of political development and national integration.⁴

While much of the attention on national integration has focused on the "developing" countries, this problem, however, is not limited to Africa or Asia, as witnessed by the recent nationalistic manifestations of the Welsh, the Scots, the Bretons,⁵ French Canadians,

²Samuel P. Huntington, "The Change to Change: Modernization, Development and Politics," Comparative Politics, 3 (April, 1971). This article is an incisive discussion of the literature on modernization and political development.

³Walker Connor, "Nation-Building or Nation-Destroying?", World Politics, 24 (April, 1972).

⁴Since the concept of integration has been used in a variety of ways, throughout this study the concept of political or national integration will be used in the following sense: "The process of bringing together culturally and socially discrete groups into a single territorial unit and the establishment of national identity...." Myron Weiner, "Political Integration and Political Development," in Jason L. Finkle and Richard W. Gable (eds.), Political Development and Social Change. New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1966, p. 551.

⁵For a discussion of the question of ethnicity in an urban setting see: Nathan Glazer and Daniel Patrick Moynihan, Beyond the Melting Pot (Cambridge, Mass.: The M.I.T. Press, 1970).

some Eastern European Countries and the Soviet Union.⁶

In this study of the Basques, I shall proceed to discuss Basque nationalism by using some of the literature on political development and nation-building as my point of departure. While the Basques may not be considered unique in so far as ethnic nationalism is concerned, their socio-economic situation exhibits marked differences from other minority groups which have also made demands for some type of political autonomy or independence. Thus, they make an appropriate case study which may suggest some theoretical insight into the question of ethnic nationalism. And, more importantly, there has been no comprehensive study of Basque nationalism.

The case of the Basques is one to which one cannot attribute demands for autonomy to a lack of economic development, economic neglect, or economic exploitation. In fact, within the Spanish society, they may be considered a privileged group. Within Spain, the Basque region is one of the more economically developed areas. Moreover, in comparison with ethnic groups in Africa and Asia, the Basques have been incorporated into two states--the Spanish and

⁶ Brzezinski, for example, argues that "a very special and particularly perplexing kind of dissent (within the Soviet Union) is posed by increasing restlessness among the Soviet Union's non-Russian nations." He further notes that "the political significance of this phenomenon has largely been ignored by American scholars of Soviet affairs." Zbigniew Brzezinski, Between Two Ages: America's Role in the Technetronic Era (New York: The Viking Press, 1970), p. 161.

French states--for centuries, and the cultural differences between them and the surrounding populations are not as sharp as the differences that one might find between groups in some of the Afro-Asian states. For centuries, there has been contact between the Basques and the surrounding populations. As will be discussed below, according to some indices one would tend to think that the Basques had become assimilated into their respective states - France and Spain.

The emergence of the states of Africa and Asia as independent political units gave rise to a vast and variegated body of literature on what has come to be known as political development, nation-building, and/or political integration.⁷

⁷See: Gabriel A. Almond and James S. Coleman, The Politics of the Developing Areas, (Princeton, 1960); Gabriel A. Almond and G. Bingham Powell, Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach, (Boston, 1966); David E. Apter, The Politics of Modernization, (Chicago: U. of Chicago Press, 1967); David E. Apter, The Political Kingdom of Uganda: A Study in Bureaucratic Nationalism, (Princeton, 1961); Willard A. Belling and George O. Totten (eds.), Developing Nations: Quest for a Model, (New York, 1970); James S. Coleman and Carl G. Rosberg, Jr., (eds.), Political Parties and National Integration in Tropical Africa, (Berkeley, 1964); C.E. Black, The Dynamics of Modernization, (New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1966); Karl W. Deutsch, "Social Mobilization and Political Development," The American Political Science Review, 55 (September 1961), pp. 493-514; Karl W. Deutsch and William J. Foltz (eds.), Nation-Building, (New York: Atherton Press, 1966); Rupert Emerson, From Empire to Nation, (Boston: Beacon Press, 1960); Jason L. Finkle and Richard W. Gable, (eds.), Political Development and Social Change, (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1966); Philip E. Jacobs and James V. Toscano, (eds.), The Integration of Political Communities, (Philadelphia, 1966) Joseph LaPalombara and Myron Weiner, (eds.), Political Parties and Political Development, (Princeton, 1966); Martin Seymour Lipset, The First New Nation: The United States in Historical and Comparative Perspective, (New York, 1963); Lucian Pye, (ed.),

Collectively, these concepts are at times used under the rubric of modernization. There occurred a renewed interest among political scientists in problems of political integration. Since, in the words of Lucian Pye, "political scientists were intellectually ill-prepared for the collapse of empires and the formation of new states,"⁸ scholars, particularly American scholars, felt compelled to devise models and postulate hypotheses which would help to explain the process of national integration. Many of these studies were both of a descriptive and prescriptive nature. In devising models of the integrated political system, and drawing from the European experience, students of political development thus hoped that political leaders of the "developing" societies would be able to abstract some guide lines which would help them to implement policies to bring about national unity or political integration.⁹

Communications and Political Development, (Princeton, 1963); Lucian Pye, Aspects of Political Development, (Boston, 1966); Robert E. Ward and Dankwart A. Rustow (eds.), The Political Modernization of Japan and Turkey, (Princeton, 1964); Aristide R. Zolberg, "Patterns of National Integration," The Journal of Modern African Studies, 5 (December, 1967) pp. 449-467.

⁸Lucian Pye, "The Formation of New States," in Ithiel de Sola Pool (ed.), Contemporary Political Science: Toward Empirical Theory (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1967), p. 183.

⁹As Walker Connor has pointed out, much of the literature in this area assumes that a high degree of social engineering is possible. Both Lucian Pye and Ithiel de Sola Pool take this view. The following quotation from Lucian Pye illustrates the point: "...the widely recognized problem of creating political consensus in most of the new states is in part one of building new and more universal means of

While the author realizes the difficulty of classifying all the literature on political development and nation-building in one capsule, he believes, however, that underlying much of this literature are certain broad assumptions, sometimes implicit and sometimes explicit, regarding the nature of political development. It is assumed, for example, that economic and technological changes will ultimately eliminate sectional and ethnic differences, within a political unit, with the attendant result of bringing about a more politically cohesive society. Secondly, there is the assumption that political integration (integration of various ethnic groups into a larger political whole) is a desirable goal, and conversely, the assumption that cultural self-assertion is somehow "backward" or, to use Aristide Zolberg's words, to view the "persistence of distinct sub-national identities...as quaint sports...or pathological cases if they appear to be a source of recurrent conflict."¹⁰

national communications and transportation so that all segments of the society can become more closely involved with each other.", Pye, op. cit., p. 10. Also, Ithiel de Sola Pool, "The Role of Communications in the Process of Modernization and Technological Change," UNESCO Document, SS/NAC/1960/18. Karl W. Deutsch also expresses the possibility for social engineering: "Too often men have viewed language and nationality superficially as an accident, or accepted them submissively as fate. In fact they are neither accident nor fate, but the outcome of a discernible process; as soon as we begin to make the process visible, we are beginning to change it." Nationalism and Social Communications: An Inquiry Into the Foundations of Nationality, (Cambridge, 1966), p. 164.

¹⁰Aristide R. Zolberg, "Patterns of National Integration", The Journal of Modern African Studies, 5 (December, 1967), p. 451.

Consequently, in studies ostensibly dealing with political development and national integration, the phenomenon of ethnic nationalism has been in some cases completely overlooked and in other cases has been given only peripheral consideration or looked at as a negative variable to be eventually overcome. Instead much attention is paid to such social processes as urbanization, industrial development, the rate of literacy growth and the role of groups such as the military, political parties or the bureaucracy.¹¹ The reason for this lack of concern with the ethnic issue stems from the assumption--seemingly taken for granted--that the process of modernization moves progressively and unilinearly "toward an interdependence among politically organized societies and toward an ultimate integration of societies." It is even assumed that at some point societies will become "so homogeneous as to be capable of forming a world state."¹²

For some writers the key obstacle to national integration is essentially one stemming from a lack of communications.¹³

¹¹Connor, op. cit.

¹²Black, op. cit., p. 155. Also, A.F.K. Organski, The Stages of Political Development (New York: Knopf, 1965).

¹³Communications will be defined here in a very broad sense, that is, anything that promotes contact, direct or indirect, between the different groups of a given plural society. These contacts may take the form of trade between different regions, the movement of populations from a rural setting to an urban setting and improved methods of transportation which may facilitate greater geographical mobility for a given population. For a discussion of the concept of "plural society" see: Leo Kuper and M.G. Smith (eds.), Pluralism in Africa (Berkeley, 1960).

In Pye's words:

. . .the widely recognized problem of creating political consensus in most of the new states, is in part one of building new and more universal means of national communications, of establishing more effective channels of communications and transportation so that all segments of the society can become more closely involved with each other.¹⁴

Another writer, James Coleman, also emphasizes the crucial role of communications in the process of national integration: "the problem of integration and building consensus in African territorial political systems is largely a problem of developing patterns of communications."¹⁵

The most systematic treatment of the role of communications in the process of nation-building has been given by Karl W. Deutsch in Nationalism and Social Communications.¹⁶ In this work he conceptualizes the political

¹⁴Pye, op. cit., p. 10.

¹⁵James S. Coleman, "The Politics of Sub-Saharan Africa," The Politics of the Developing Areas, p. 345. Before proceeding any further, I should indicate that the question of national integration is not a new one within the social sciences. Both anthropologists and sociologists have theorized on this question, but under a different name, i.e., assimilation. But in contrast to earlier works by anthropologists and sociologists, the more recent works of political scientists have put greater stress on the process of integration, as opposed to the mere description of plural societies. In other words, it seems that political scientists have been more concerned with the dynamic processes of change. For works on assimilation and plural societies see: Ronald Cohen and John Middleton (eds.), From Tribe to Nation (Scranton, Pa.; Chandler Publishing Co., 1970); J.S. Furnivall, Colonial Policy and Practice (London, 1948); Milton M. Gordon, Assimilation in American Life (New York: Oxford University Press, 1964); M.G. Smith, The Plural Society in the British West Indies (Berkeley, 1965).

¹⁶Deutsch, op. cit.

community in terms of a network of communications. In Deutsch's functional definition of nationalism, what counts "is not the presence or absence of any particular variables, but the presence of sufficient communications facilities."¹⁷ In this work Professor Deutsch also devises an elaborate model by which a series of quantitative tests would indicate (if possible predict) the direction that a plural society might take. Are the peoples of a given political unit moving further apart or are they coming closer together? Is assimilation or differentiation taking place?¹⁸ According to Professor Deutsch's model, we may be able to answer these questions by observing the pattern of communications and more economic activity," he says, "then people begin to think of themselves as a country."¹⁹

The process by which communications will be set in motion has been defined by Deutsch as "social mobilization." Social mobilization is the process by which "major clusters

¹⁷Ibid., p. 99.

¹⁸Deutsch uses the concept of assimilation to denote the process by which the members of a minority group learn and accept the language of the dominant group of a plural society. As used by Deutsch, the concept means more than the mere process of learning a new language. It also means that the population being assimilated is accepting a new culture. "Assimilation in language and culture involves the learning of many new habits, and the unlearning of many old ones." Nationalism and Social Communications, p. 125.

¹⁹Deutsch, Nationalism and Its Alternatives (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1969), p. 6.

of old social, economic and psychological commitments are eroded or broken and people become available for new patterns of socialization and behavior."²⁰ Communications then, is the by-product of socio-economic processes. Economic growth, and the corresponding social changes that go along with it, become very significant in this process. "Within any geographical setting, and any population," he says, "economic and social and technological developments mobilize individuals for relatively more intense communications."²¹ It is assumed that political community will follow economic development and the development of the communications network. "The rise of industrialism and the modern market economy," offers "economic and psychological rewards for successful group alignments to tense and insecure individuals...taught to hunger for success."²² Once this process is initiated, "the stage is set for the rise of the political movement of modern nationalism-- that is, for the effort to convert the channels of culture into storm ladders for masses of individuals to social and economic advancement."²³ In view of these statements one conjures up the image of the

²⁰Deutsch __., "Social Mobilization and Political Development," The American Political Science Review, 55 (September, 1961), pp. 493-514.

²¹Nationalism and Social Communications, p. 126.

²²Ibid., p. 101.

²³Ibid., p. 103.

nationalist as that of the rational economic man. Among other things, this leaves completely out of the picture the nationalist fanatic who may be willing to put up with all kinds of economic hardship in order to achieve his goals.

While one may not be able to deny the impact of economic variables on the rise of nationalism, Professor Deutsch's functional definition of nationality, and consequently nationalism, in terms of communications, does not seem to be adequate in order to distinguish the modern nation-state from other communities. Nationality, in Professor Deutsch's view, is "an alignment of large members of individuals from the middle and lower classes linked to regional centers and leading social groups by channels of social communication and economic intercourse."²⁴ According to this definition, one cannot make a distinction between the political organization of the feudal period and the modern nation-state. This definition is applicable to both.

The stress on communications facilities and the lack of concern for the "presence or absence of any particular variables" prevents one from making qualitative distinctions on the communications content which may tell us more about the nature of social relationships than simply the amount of communications.

Deutsch, along with the other students of political development who make use of the tradition-modernity model,

²⁴Ibid., p. 101.

also seems to assume that the process of national integration is unilinear and irreversible. It is presumed that once the process of "social mobilization" gets under way, one should witness the continual growth of modernity and the concomitant decline of the traditional sector of society. It is also assumed that the end result will be approximately the same for all states. Faced with the forces of modernity, the traditional sectors will disintegrate or shrink. "The changes associated with social mobilization," he says, "tend to weaken custom and tradition."²⁵ Consequently, the decline of the traditional societies will force people to express the "need for new patterns of group affiliation and the new images of personal identity."²⁶ The logic of Deutsch's argument seems to indicate that individuals whose loyalty, and identification, had been linked to traditional society would switch their loyalty to the new emerging state. Thus in his study of Africa, Coleman also makes the assertion that "the processes of urbanization, commercialization and Western education have furthered the widening of perspectives, accelerated social mobility, created new reference groups, as well as a nationally-minded educated

²⁵Deutsch, "Social Mobilization and Political Development", p. 493.

²⁶Deutsch, "Social Mobilization and Political Development", p. 494.

class"²⁷ Reference will be made again to this point below.

In a later work by Deutsch, Nationalism and Its Alternatives,²⁸ it was indicated that there is a critical balance between the process of assimilation and the rate of "social mobilization." Since "social mobilization" is a faster process than assimilation, it is probable that assimilation might not take place, but instead ethnic conflict and further differentiation might occur. In order for assimilation to occur, that is, the growth of political community, "the ability to communicate over wide-ranges of subject [should be] spreading faster among men than is necessitated by their working together directly."²⁹ In other words, assimilation occurs if the ability to communicate grows faster than the need to communicate. Differentiation will occur "if the need outruns the ability."³⁰ This suggests then, that assimilation into a new language or culture may be taking place for reasons other than social mobilization. But in the context of Deutsch's work this seems to raise a problem. We saw earlier that the process of assimilation seemed to be inextricably linked to the process of social mobilization. It is as a result of the

²⁷Coleman, The Politics of the Developing Areas, p. 367.

²⁸See note 17.

²⁹Nationalism and Social Communications, p. 125.

³⁰Ibid.

process of social mobilization that different peoples are thrown into contacts with each other and exposed to the values of the market economy. This seems to suggest that the process of social mobilization occurs prior to the process of assimilation, for without some degree of communications, there can be no assimilation, and without social mobilization it would seem that social communications would be minimal. But then to say that assimilation must stay ahead of social mobilization, is in essence to admit that "social mobilization" is not too much of an explanatory concept in so far as assimilation is concerned. Moreover, "social mobilization" does not seem to explain differentiation either because differentiation is the condition of plural societies. Yet, in Deutsch's view, "social mobilization" remains a "fundamental process" underlying assimilation or differentiation.

A further ambiguity in Deutsch's scheme, is the relationship between communications and what he calls "complementarity."³¹ At times the latter concept is equated with "communicative efficiency,"³² and at other times it is implied to be a quality or predisposition in individuals which permits them to communicate more efficiently. "Peoples are held together 'from within' ", he says, "by this communicative efficiency, the complementarity of facilities acquired by their members."³³ Later, the concept of "ethnic complementarity"

³¹Ibid., p. 96.

³²Ibid.

³³Nationalism and Its Alternatives, p. 98.

is introduced. This, he says, "is the complementarity that makes a people."³⁴ This does not seem to be very much different from the old concept of ethnicity. At any rate, it seems that the communications model is unable to explain the concept of "ethnic complementarity".

The assertion that "complementarity is greater if it permits individuals to communicate efficiently no matter how often they change their residence or occupations,"³⁵ seems to make "complementarity" a precondition before communications can take place. Finally, making reference to Herman Finer, Deutsch indicates that "complementarity may be that elusive property of individuals which... 'makes society cohere', or which in our terminology makes it a community."³⁶ This statement introduces great complications into Deutsch's model. If it be admitted that "complementarity" is a quality which permits people to communicate more efficiently, then one is no longer explaining the existence of the community, or the growth of community, in terms of communications, but, on the contrary, explaining communications in terms of "ethnic complementarity".

In order to distinguish the communications that take place among a people who possess "ethnic complementarity"

³⁴Ibid.

³⁵Ibid., p. 100.

³⁶Nationalism and Social Communications, p. 100.

from those communications that take place among people of the same profession, Deutsch introduces the concept of "vocational complementarity", that is, the ability to communicate that exists among people of a given profession. But if it is maintained, as Deutsch³⁷ says, that an individual belonging to a particular profession can communicate more efficiently over a wide range of subjects with an individual who possesses the same "ethnic complementarity" than with his fellow specialists, then, once again, the logic of the argument seems to lead one to conclude that communications per se may not be that relevant in eradicating ethnic boundaries.

The theoretical problems discussed above cast serious doubt on the tendency to refer to the Western-educated elite (within the developing countries) as a nationally-minded class as if it were a monolith. That an intellectual gap exists between the Western-educated elites and their villagers seems obvious enough. But what is not so obvious is that this gap is the principal obstacle on the path of political integration, as it is sometimes maintained.³⁸ To this writer, research in this area has not really established this point. Further analyses of this question

³⁷Ibid., p. 98.

³⁸Richard R. Fagen, Politics and Communications (Boston: Little, Brown, 1966); Lucian Pye, Politics, Personality, and Nation-Building (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962).

seem to reveal instead that those most exposed to communications and "universalist" values do not seem to be as nationally-minded as previously assumed.³⁹ They seem to continue to view political activity through "tribal" or ethnic glasses. As Ali Mazrui has pointed out in making reference to Africa, students of political development and national integration have not "adequately differentiated between tribalism as a way of life and tribalism as loyalty to his ethnic group. A person could adopt almost an entirely Western way of life, yet retain great love and loyalty to his ethnic group."⁴⁰ It seems, however, that in studies of Afro-Asian societies the existence of a Western-educated elite as a nationally-minded class has been assumed rather than demonstrated. As one study⁴¹ has cogently argued, the dichotomous tradition-modernity model, which has often guided research in this area, has dismissed other theoretical possibilities.

While the present writer does not wish to denigrate the role of communications in the growth of cultural diffusion and political change, it would seem, however, that communications alone are not enough in order to bring about national integration. As we shall see in this case study,

³⁹Donald L. Horowitz, see note 1.

⁴⁰Ali A. Mazrui, "Violent Contiguity and the Politics of Retribalization in Africa," Journal of International Affairs, 23 (1969), p. 93.

⁴¹Robert Melson and Howard Wolpe, see note 1.

Basque nationalism has persisted--in fact, it has become more intensive--despite linguistic assimilation, the growth of communications, and economic development. In the case of the Basques, it has been precisely those people most exposed to modernity and cultural interchange who have become the most articulate spokesmen of Basque nationalism.

The Plan of the Study

With the theoretical literature described above as our point of departure, in the chapters that follow, I will discuss the origins and the development of Basque nationalism from the beginning of the nineteenth century to the present. The materials for this study have come primarily from primary and secondary documentary sources. Although this writer has been in the Basque region and has talked to people from various social circles of the Basque population, due to political reasons a systematic opinion survey of the present Basque population on the subject of nationalism is impossible at this time. Nevertheless, my travels in the Basque region in the summer of 1971 were still valuable for the purposes of this study since it enabled this writer to observe closely the sentiment of Basque identity which seemed to be very much alive throughout the region.

Even though there is no systematic study of Basque nationalism, this writer was able to find a wealth of information on this subject consisting of books, pamphlets and general histories of the Basque region. From these

sources I have extracted the information for this study. All translations from Spanish and French into English have been made by this writer.

In the discussion that follows, I will discuss the emergence of Basque nationalism in a chronological sense and in the process make reference to the socio-economic and cultural conditions underlying the emergence of Basque nationalism. In the last two chapters the various components of Basque nationalism will be analyzed and then an effort will be made to relate the Basque case to the theoretical issues raised in the first chapter.

CHAPTER II

THE BASQUES AND THEIR RELATIONSHIP WITH THE SPANISH AND FRENCH STATES: AN HISTORICAL OVERVIEW

The Basque country (known to the Basques as *euskal-erria* or Basque nation)⁴² consists of seven small provinces, the larger four of which are located in northeastern Spain (Vizcaya, Alava, Guipuzcoa, and Navarra), and the other three (Labourd, Basse-Navarre and Soule) lie along southwestern France on the Spanish-French border. The total population of this area is over 2,000,000 people, most of whom live within the Spanish State.⁴³ With respect to physical size this is a relatively small area. It consists of approximately 20,000 Km², with approximately 17,000 Km² within the Spanish State.

TABLE I
POPULATION OF THE SPANISH BASQUE REGION

Province	Population	No. of Km ²	Persons per Km ²
Alava	182,916	3,047	46
Guipuzcoa	598,224	1,997	240
Navarra	432,439	10,421	39
Vizcaya	971,029	2,217	340
Total	2,184,608	17,682	123

Source: Banco de Bilbao, Renta Nacional de Espana y su Distribucion Provincial, (Bilbao, 1967).

⁴²The modern name of the Basque country, coined by Sabino de Arana, the founder of the Basque nationalist movement, is Euzcadi.

⁴³There are many non-Basque people included in these

Of the whole population it has been estimated that probably only one third can be considered culturally Basque, if one takes the ability to speak the Basque language (known to the Basques as euskera) as an index of Basque culture. It is estimated that on the French side approximately 90,000 speak euskera and 600,000 on the Spanish side;⁴⁴ and in Spain, the euskera-speaking population is further reduced to the provinces of Vizcaya and Guipuzcoa. In the provinces of Alava and Navarra, particularly in the southern fringes, it seems that the language has just about disappeared as a normal means of communication.⁴⁵

The Spanish provinces have become much more assimilated into Spanish culture than have the French provinces into French culture. To the superficial observer it might look as though the Spanish provinces are no longer Basque. But

population figures, particularly on the Spanish side. It is difficult to get an accurate account of the Basques for neither the Spanish or French governments make any ethnic distinctions in their population census. Because of the industry of the area, throughout this century, the provinces of Vizcaya and Guipuzcoa have attracted labor migrants from other areas of Spain. See: J. Domingo Arana, Hombre, Raza, Nacionalidad, Universalidad, presente y futuro del Pueblo Vasco (Bilbao: Editorial Ercilla-Libras) p. 13; A.G. Barbancho, "Los movimientos migratorios en Espana," Revista de Estudios Agro-Sociales, No. 43 (1963); E. Goyheneche, Notre Terre Basque (Bayonne: Editions Ikas, 1961) p. 17; J. Nadal, La Poblacion Espanola (Barcelona: Ediciones Ariel, 1966), p. 194.

⁴⁴Manuel de Lecuona, Literatura Oral Vasca (San Sebastian: Editorial Aunamendi, 1964), p. 8.

⁴⁵Geografia Historica de la lengua Vasca, (several authors but no editor), (San Sebastian: Editorial Aunamendi, 1960), p. 10.

paradoxically enough, it has been in the Spanish provinces that the most serious and militant attempts have been made at reviving Basque culture and the Basque language. And today, the Spanish Basque provinces still remain the center of Basque nationalist activities. A perusal of the publications on the Basques will reveal the predominance of Spanish-Basque writers and Spanish-Basque publishing houses.

Economically speaking, there are vast differences between the Basques north of the Pyrenees and those south of the Pyrenees. The French Basque region is considered an economically depressed area without any significant modern industries.⁴⁶ By contrast, the Spanish Basque provinces make up one of the most heavily industrialized regions of Spain, particularly the provinces of Vizcaya and Guipuzcoa which have a long tradition of mining industry.⁴⁷ There are large deposits of iron-ore in this area. Bilbao, the

⁴⁶Barzanti, Sergio, The Underdeveloped Areas Within the Common Market (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965).

⁴⁷In 1966, for example, the three Basque provinces of Vizcaya, Alava, and Guipuzcoa, along with the four provinces of Catalonia whose population is approximately 14.4% of the total Spanish population, produced 24.9% of the Spanish national income. See: Juan Linz, "Within-Nation Differences and Comparisons: The Eight Spains," in Richard L. Merritt and Stein Rokkan (eds.), Comparing Nations: The Use of Quantitative Data in Cross-National Research (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), p. 200. Writing about Spain in 1943, Gerald Brennan refers to the Basque provinces as "the satisfied areas of Spain--the only ones, apart from a few irrigated districts in the southwest, where one can say that there is no social problems." The Spanish Labyrinth (Cambridge, England, 1943), p. 97.

capital city of Vizcaya, is considered as one of the major financial and shipping centers of Spain. Both Vizcaya and Guipuzcoa are among the highest per capita income provinces of Spain.⁴⁸

Because the Basque region did not experience the feudal system of organization, this area has been devoid of a large class of large landowners. Land has been fairly evenly distributed in this area and the pattern of land distribution has also been fairly stable. One of the reasons for this stability in land distribution lies in the old Basque custom which stipulates that the Basque baserriak (farmsteads) must pass intact to an offspring selected by the parents.⁴⁹ It may not necessarily be the eldest. Consequently, there has been no parcelling out of land into miniature farms such as in other areas of Spain.

Although it is assumed that the Basques have inhabited the hills of the Pyrenees since time immemorial, to this day the Basques as a people and as a cultural group have remained an enigma to both anthropologists and ethnologists.⁵⁰

⁴⁸Stanley F. Payne, Franco's Spain (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1967), p. 85.

⁴⁹William A. Douglass, "Rural Exodus in Two Spanish Basque Villages: A Cultural Explanation," (December 15, 1969), p. 11, unpublished paper.

⁵⁰Morton Levine refers to them as "the most distinctive linguistic-ethnic enclave in Europe." "The Basques," Natural History, LXXVI, (April, 1967), p. 45. Another writer indicates that the Basques have been considered by anthropologists as the "bldest people of Europe." "It is believed that the Basque people are the only living representatives of

Philologists, anthropologists, and thenologists have long studied the Basques as a distinct cultural group but have remained puzzled, as well as fascinated, as to their origins, the origin of their language and their relationships to other European peoples.⁵¹ The Basques themselves seem to have taken pride in the notion that they are a mystery. This is expressed in an old Basque saying: "The Basques are like an honest woman, they have no history."

It seems that with the exception of a few vague references by some Roman Writers, particularly Strabo and Livy who mention a people by the name of Vascones and whose

prehistoric European man." Herbert Pierrepont Houghton, An Introduction to the Basque Language: Labourdin Dialect (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1961), p. 1. "There are few races on the face of the earth," says another writer, "whose origin so little is known." Rodney Gallop, A Book of the Basques (London: Macmillan and Co., 1930), p. 2, hereafter quoted as A Book of the Basques. For a study of the achievement motive among the Basques, see Leonard Kasdan, "Family Structure, Migration and the Entrepreneur," Comparative Studies in Society and History, 7 (October, 1964/July, 1965).

See also: Julio Caro Baroja, Los Vascos (Madrid: Ediciones Minotauro, 1958). Baroja treats in great detail the communal organization of the Basques, their customs and system of agriculture. Another work by the same author, but more of a historical nature, which discusses the violent relations among the Basques at the beginnings of the Middle Ages, is Vasconiana (Madrid: Ediciones Minotauro, 1957). For a detailed study of a Basque village, see William A. Douglass, Death in Murelaga (Seattle, Washington: The University of Washington Press, 1969). William Douglass indicates that the Basques considered other Spaniards living in that particular village as "foreigners", and that they were quite conscious of the differences between themselves and other Spaniards.

⁵¹For a review of the hypotheses regarding the origin of the Basques and their language, see A Book of the Basques, pp. 3-13.

language they considered "barbarous and not to be borne,"⁵²
 "There is no historical documentation which deals directly
 with the Basques prior to the Middle Ages."⁵³

According to Rodney Gallop, the Vascones originally
 inhabited the banks of the Ebro River around the Calahorra
 region. And in his opinion, "there is reason to believe
 that the Vascones were reduced to submission [by the
 Romans] in the second century B. C."⁵⁴ But on the other
 hand, Gallop argues that it is very difficult to identify
 the old Vascones with the modern Basques because in the
 twelfth century the word Vascones was broken into two forms:
Bascli or Basculi and Gasconi. These two forms later
 became known as the Basques and the Gascons.⁵⁵

What seems most striking about the Basques and what
 distinguishes them most apparently from the surrounding
 populations is not the mystery regarding their origin or
 their physical characteristics--although they are supposedly
 taller and have a fairer complexion than that of the

⁵²Rodney A. Gallop, "The Problem of the Basques,"
Nineteenth Century, 108 (July/December, 1930), p. 493,
 hereafter as "The Problem of the Basques".

⁵³Morton Levine, "Basque Isolation: Fact or Problem?"
Sumposium on Community Studies in Anthropology. Proceedings
 of the 1963 Annual Spring Meeting of the American Ethnological
 Society (University of Washington Press, 1963), p. 21.

⁵⁴"The Problem of the Basques," p. 493.

⁵⁵The name that the Basques give themselves is
eskualdunak or euskaldunak. It hardly resembles the
 Spanish word by which they are known - Vascos.

surrounding population-but their language.⁵⁶ Despite the fact that it has borrowed from other languages such as French and Spanish, its structure is such that scholars have come to the conclusion that it is not an Indo-European language. It is not a unified language and is characterized as being highly agglutinative. There is no uniform system of writing throughout the Basque region. The first linguistic map of the area was devised by Prince Lucien Bonaparte in the nineteenth century, who divided the language into eight major dialects.⁵⁷ But it seems that even the major dialects can be subdivided into subdialects. The fact that students of the Basque language still use Bonaparte's classification, indicates that the structure

⁵⁶Studies on the Basque language abound. But for the English readers and non-philologists, I would recommend Antonio Tovar, The Basque Language (Philadelphia: University of Philadelphia Press, 1957). This is one of the more concise studies that I found. For those interested in learning some Basque, there are two short English manuals which might be of interest: J. Eiguren, How to Learn to Speak Basque (Homedale, Idaho, 1969), and Herbert Pierrepont Houghton's book, cited above. For the more scholarly inclined individual with philological interests, the following books might be helpful: Louis Lucien Bonaparte, Le verbe basque, (London, 1869); Julio Caro Baroja, Materiales para una historia de la lengua vasca en su relacion con la latina (Salamanca: University of Salamanca, 1945); A. Campion, Gramatica de los quatro dialectos literarios de la lengua euskera (Tolosa: 1884); Henri Gavel, Grammaire Basque (Bayonne: 1929); Wilhelm Humboldt, Los Primitivos Habitantes de Espana (Madrid: Libreria de Jose Anllo, 1879, translated from the German by D. Ramon Ortega y Frias); Bernardo Estornes Lasa, Sobre historia y origenes de la lengua vasca (San Sebastian: Editorial Aunamendi, 1967); I. Lopez Mendizabal, La Lengua Vasca (2nd., ed.), (Buenos Aires, 1949).

⁵⁷See note 56.

of the language has not changed significantly. "Even in the most recent books," says Tovar, "there is repeated the ...diagram of dialects set forth by [Bonaparte]."58

As a written language, Basque is of recent origin. The first example of written Basque is dated to 1530, and the first work entirely printed in Basque appeared in 1545.⁵⁹

Until the end of the eighteenth century, there was little written in Basque except for some religious works and some biblical translations.⁶⁰ Tovar indicates that it was not until the latter part of the eighteenth century with the publication of Manuel de Larramendi's El Imposible Vencido (The Impossible Vanquished), considered the first Basque grammar, that a greater interest was shown in the study of the Basque language.⁶¹

While we may witness a great interest in the study of the Basque language, particularly from the latter part of the eighteenth century to the present, Basque as a spoken language seems to have continued its decline. In the words

⁵⁸Tovar, op. cit., p. 106. Tovar further points out that the "personality of the dialects [is not known] sufficiently so as to determine to what degree they are the consequences of a differentiation of a possible 'common Basque'." p. 108.

⁵⁹This was a book of verse by Bernard Detchepare, Lingua Vasorum Primitiae (Bordeaux, 1545). Reference to this work is made in A Book of the Basques, p. 74.

⁶⁰Luis Michelena, Historia de la Literatura Vasca (Madrid: Ediciones Minotauro, 1960).

⁶¹Tovar, op. cit., p. 25.

of Antonio Tovar, "A present-day literary history of the Basque people has apparently not yet come alive."⁶² Despite the efforts of some Basque academicians and nationalists, one is left with the feeling that euskera is destined to suffer the same fate that has befallen such languages as Gaelic and Welsh. According to one study, the instances in which one may find a person that speaks only Basque are extremely rare.⁶³

Before the emergence of the political kingdoms of the Iberian Peninsula and the monarchies of France and England, knowledge about the Basques and their political form of organization is rather meager. There is evidence, however, that the Basques did come into contact with the invaders of this area, such as the Romans, the Visigoths, and later the Arabs.⁶⁴ Their historical isolation has not been complete. In each case, however, Basque resistance--which later became legendary--to external political forces seems to have been successful. Further evidence of their semi-isolated situation is borne out by the fact that it was not until the twelfth century that they were finally converted to

⁶²Ibid., p. 33.

⁶³Geografia historica de la lengua vasca, p. 17.

⁶⁴A Book of the Basques; Joaquin Arbeloa, Los origenes del Reino de Navarra (San Sebastian: Editorial Aunamendi, 1969); P.S. Ormond, The Basques and Their Country (London: Butler and Tanner Ltd., 1925).

Christianity. But before their conversion was achieved, they provided the Church with a few martyrs. The reputation for ferocity against the Christians acquired by the people of the Pyrenees seems to have motivated some pious missionaries to go to this area with the expectation that they would acquire the status of martyrdom. In 1179, for example, the Basque region was supposedly excommunicated for cruelty practiced against the Christians.⁶⁵ Earlier, in 778, the Basques had made a name for themselves by supposedly eliminating the rear guard of Charlemagne's army. This gave rise to the famous Chanson de Roland.

While some historical studies indicate that usually the Basques joined forces to expel invaders of the region, it seems that the whole Basque region was never under the complete control of one monarch. It is difficult to refer to a historical Basque state--notwithstanding the assertions of the nationalists--for historical evidence does not seem to allow such a conclusion. In so far as historical documentation is correct, from the ninth to the sixteenth centuries, the Basques were dispersed under several political units.⁶⁶ It was only under Sancho El Mayor (999-1035)

⁶⁵"The Problem of the Basques," p. 494.

⁶⁶"The Basques," says a Basque writer, "just like the Greeks in their golden age, formed various independent states and conducted separate international agreements. Although united by blood, culture and language, they preserved for several centuries their mutual political independence." See: Luis de Ibarra Enziondo, El nacionalismo vasco en la paz y en la guerra, Ediciones Alderdi, (n.d.), note 6, p. 14.

that a political kingdom encompassing nearly all the Basques came into existence.⁶⁷ Aside from this short-lived kingdom, the political organization of the Basques, by and large, has consisted of small counties and republics which supposedly engaged in frequent "sanguinary warfare amongst themselves."⁶⁸ With the partition of the kingdom of Navarra by Sancho El Mayor amongst his four sons, the nearest thing to a political unit encompassing all the Basques came to an end. After 1035, political consolidation of the area became increasingly difficult because Sancho's sons became actively involved with the dynastic struggles of the region.⁶⁹

By the twelfth century the old Kingdom of Navarra had been reduced in size to an area approximating present-day Navarra and the French Basse-Navarre. The present day Spanish Basque provinces of Vizcaya, Alava, and Guipuzcoa came gradually under the influence of the Crown of Castile which they recognized as their seigneur by the fourteenth century. The French provinces of Labourd in the west and Soule in the east passed gradually under the influence of the French Crown. Their submission to France was finally

⁶⁷See: Anacleto Ortueta, Sancho El Mayor, Rey de los Vascos (Buenos Aires: Editorial Vasca Ekin, 1963); Nabarra y la unidad politica vasca (Barcelona: J. Horta, 1931); Bernardo Estornes Lasa, Historia del Pais Basko (Zarauz: Editorial vasca, 1933); Justo Perez de Urbel, Sancho El Mayor de Navarra (Madrid: Espasa Calpe, 1950).

⁶⁸The Problem of the Basques," p. 495.

⁶⁹Philippe Veyrin, Les Basques (Paris: B. Arthaud, 1947).

achieved by 1450. Finally the kingdom of Navarra went out of political existence when Ferdinand of Aragon conquered it in 1512. The remaining part of that kingdom, Basse-Navarre, was eventually annexed to the French Crown via the person of Henry IV (of Navarra) who became the French King, thus bringing to an end the political sovereignty of the Basques. For all intents and purposes, the Basques were not living under two different political orbits-- the French and Castilian Crowns.

The loss of political sovereignty, however, did not mean the end of all political autonomy.⁷⁰ In both Spain and France, the Basques retained considerable autonomy with respect to their local affairs and even external relationships. Both the Castilian and the French Crowns were viewed by the Basques more as allies than political overlords. The Spanish-French border, in so far as the Basques were concerned, was non-existent. The Basques continued their relationships; and it seems that as late as early twentieth century they continued to make pacts amongst themselves, known as faceries,⁷¹ regulating the usage of water and

⁷⁰In a work published in 1963, Maria Puy Huici Goni argues that despite the fact that Navarra lost its king, nevertheless, it continued to have an independent existence, under the Crown of Castile, regarding its internal life: "Nada cambio, pues, en la Constitucion del pequeno reino, aunque abunde la creencia falsa de que el Estado Navarro desaparecio en 1512." Las Cortes de Navarra durante la Edad Moderna (Madrid: Ediciones Rialp, 1963).

⁷¹Jaime Vives Vicens, An Economic History of Spain (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969), p. 151.

pastures in the region.

The local autonomy of the Basques was recognized by the central governments in the form of fors in France and fueros in Spain.⁷² It was these charters which regulated the relationships between the Basques and their respective monarchs. It seems that political suzerainty of the monarchs over the Basques was purely nominal. Making reference to the relationship between the Spanish Basques and the Castilian Crown, Gallop says that "beneath the famous tree of Guernica the kings of Spain swore to observe the fueros of Vizcaya."⁷³ The recognition of autonomy by the Castilian

⁷²During the nineteenth century, the origins of the fueros became a point of contention between the central government and the Basque provinces. The central government and the advocates of centralization advanced the thesis that the fueros were privileges granted by the Monarchy, while the Basques claimed that they were rights inherent in the Basque communities and consequently could not be modified without their consent: Jose de Aralar, Los Adversarios de la libertad vasca desde 1794 a 1829 (Buenos Aires: Editorial Vasca Ekin, 1944); Gregorio de Balparda, Historia Critica de Vizcaya y de sus Fueros (Madrid, 1922); Jaime Ignacio del Burgo, Origen y Fundamento del Regimen foral de Navarra (Pamplona: Editorial Aranzadi, 1968); Salvador de Madariaga, Memorias de un Federalista (Buenos Aires: Editorial Sudamericana, 1967); Rafael de Navascues, Observaciones sobre los Fueros de Vizcaya (Madrid: Imprenta de Espinosa y Compania, 1850); J. M. Orense, Los Fueros (Madrid: 1859); N. Vicario de la Pena, Derecho Consuetudinario de Vizcaya (Madrid: Imprenta del Asilo de Hurefanos del Sagrado Corazon de Jesus, 1901); Ramon Menendez Pidal, The Spaniards and Their History (New York: W. W. Norton and Co., Inc., 1950); Liborio de Ramery Zuzuarregui, El Liberalismo y los Fueros Bascongados (Madrid: Imprenta de San Francisco de Sales, 1869).

⁷³The Problem of the Basques," p. 495.

Crown is further evinced by the fact that Navarra was given a vice-roy--the only vice-roy outside the American Empire--which was recognized as a quazi-constitutional monarch. Navarra, for example, up to 1841, allowed no judicial appeal beyond the borders of the province. "To the foral provinces," says Carr, "their attachment to Spain was a contract dependent on the maintenance of their liberties and economic advantages."⁷⁴

In Spain the internal affairs of the provinces were governed by broadly chosen juntas generales which in turn chose diputaciones forales. In France these were known as etats. The point of contact between the Crown and the Basques consisted in a representative of the King sent to attend the meetings of the local assemblies; in Spain the corregidor and in France the intendant. Although the representative of the King could summon the assemblies into session, no order of the King, however, was valid without the assent of the local assemblies. In Spain this practice, which lasted up to 1841, was known as the pase foral.

At a time when Western Europe was governed by feudal relationships, the Basques were ostensibly practicing some type of agrarian democracy. In both Spain and France they

⁷⁴Carr, op. cit., p. 63. This book gives a very extensive chronological discussion of nineteenth century Spanish history and contains a very valuable bibliographic index.

were considered free men. Ormond, for example, in discussing the democratic character of Basque society points out that the Basque dialects have no words for kings, vassals, counts, serfs, and barons.⁷⁵ The aristocracy which eventually emerged in this area did not seem to enjoy the privileges that were enjoyed by other aristocratic classes in other parts of the Peninsula and in France. In contrast to other parts of France, Labourd and Sould had no system of servitude. Making reference to the French Basques before the French Revolution of 1789 took place, Gallop observes that "in comparison with the rest of France, the Basques were well off. They were free men in the midst of a nation of serfs, and their financial burdens were as nothing compared with the load that crushed the life out of the French peasant."⁷⁶

In the provinces of Vizcaya and Guipuzcoa, every inhabitant was considered a nobleman. In the fuero of Vizcaya, a section is found proclaiming the nobility of all the inhabitants of the province: "All the natives and inhabitants of this segnory are notoriously noble, not

⁷⁵Ormond, op. cit., p. 132. Travelling through the Basque region in early nineteenth century, George Borrow makes the observation that "no people on earth are prouder than the Basques, but theirs is a kind of republican pride. They have no nobility amongst them, and no one will acknowledge a superior. The poorest car man is as proud as the governor of Tolosa." The Bible in Spain (London: J. M. Dent and Sons Ltd., 1906), pp. 341-342.

⁷⁶A Book of the Basques, p. 18.

only in Vizcaya, but outside, on the solitary condition of proving that they are sons of Vizcayan parents."⁷⁷ Nobility was granted allegedly on the grounds that these areas had not been conquered by the Arabs. The belief that the Basques were noble eventually spread throughout the Basque region.⁷⁸

As a result of the rights conferred by the fueros, the Basques controlled their budgets, were exempted from taxation by the Crown and from conscription into the army to fight in areas outside of the Basque region. The Spanish army could not enter the region without consulting first with the diputaciones forales. Persons from outside of the region were not allowed to hold public office. In some instances the Basques were treated by the Castilian Crown as a foreign power. The Spanish Basque provinces were included in the embargo which denied foreign powers commercial access to the Spanish-American Empire. The Basque provinces had custom houses along the Ebro River (this river separates the Basque region from Castile) which taxed in-coming Spanish goods. In the area of foreign affairs, they maintained consuls in the Low Countries and conducted treaties with foreign governments.⁷⁹

⁷⁷Quoted in Ormond, op. cit., p. 132.

⁷⁸Americo Castro, Los Espanoles; como llegaron a serlo (Madrid: Taurus, 1965), p. 15.

⁷⁹Manuel de Irujo, Inglaterra y los Vascos (Buenos Aires: Editorial Vasca Ekin, 1945).

Needless to say, this arrangement was not completely satisfactory to both the Castilian and French Crowns bent on pursuing a policy of ~~aggrandizement~~ and consolidation of their power. The existence of Basque autonomy became increasingly viewed with suspicion by both the French and Castilian Crowns, each suspecting that the other might seduce the Basques into secession.⁸⁰ It seems that this suspicion continued throughout the nineteenth century. Neither government felt that it could take the political loyalty of the Basques for granted. Nevertheless, despite gradual attempts to curb the fueros, they continued to be practiced in France up to the revolution of 1789, and in Spain up to the middle of the nineteenth century.

The last vestiges of Basque autonomy under the French Crown were swept away by the administrative reforms brought about by the French Revolution.⁸¹ Although the French Basques protested in the form of sporadic armed resistance and in the form of petitions to the National Assembly, they were too weak to stop the avalanche set in motion by the revolution. Their fors were abrogated and the Pays Basque

⁸⁰In the Franco-Spanish War of 1793-95, the deputation of Guipuzcoa declared itself neutral and it seems that some circles were thinking in terms of secession. In the Peace of Basilea (July 22, 1795), the French supposedly insisted on a promise from the Spaniards indicating that the Basques would not participate in a war against France. Aralar, op. cit., p. 15.

⁸¹Joseph Nogaret, Petit Histoire du Pays Basque Francais (Bayonne, France: A. Foltzer, 1923).

was incorporated into the department of Basse-Pyrenees with the government seat located in Pau. Besides the abrogation of the fors, the French Revolution had other social side effects in the French Basque region. The arm of the central government could now reach into the Basque community and reform some of the old Basque customs which the Paris government considered antiquated. For example, the law prescribing the equal division of a father's land among all his children did away with the Basque custom of passing the farmstead intact to one of the offspring. Basque place names were changed and replaced with French names.

Initially, however, it seems that the Basques reacted favorably to the French Revolution. The National Assembly gave the Basque language official status in the Basque region, a calendar was published in Basque, and there was the rumor that the Paris government was planning to create a Basque state across the Pyrenees under the protectorate of France.⁸² But Basque expectations were soon deflated when the more extreme aspects of the revolution became manifest, particularly toward Catholicism, and when it became apparent that the revolution did not bring them greater liberty, but instead brought about greater centralization.

⁸²Veyrin, op. cit., p. 186.

The historical relationship between the Basques of Spain and the Spanish State is far more complicated than that of the French Basques and the French State. Because of their size and their relative economic importance, the Basques of Spain have played a far more significant role in Spanish history.⁸³ In French history, however, one has to make quite an effort in order to find the contribution of Basque figures. But a perusal of Spanish history will soon reveal the extent to which the Spanish Basques have been actively involved in great historical Spanish events, such as the Reconquista and the expansion of the Spanish-American Empire, thus leading one to conclude that the Basques have long identified with the Spanish State. Yet, it has been in Spain that the question of Basque autonomy has been a prolonged bone of contention between the central

⁸³Juan Sebastian Elcano, who circumnavigated the globe, was a Basque; Francisco de Vitoria, a Jesuit and a theoretician of international law, was also a Basque; Churrúa, another Basque, faced Nelson at Trafalgar. The Jesuit Order owes its founding to the Basques, particularly St. Ignatius Loyola who founded the order. During Phillip II's attempt to conquer England, the Basques contributed more galleons than the Castilians. Equally significant was the Basque contribution in the colonization of the Spanish-American Empire. The territory forming the colony of Rio de la Plata was given the name of Nueva Vizcaya, named after the Basque province of Vizcaya. See Antonio Ramos Oliveria, Politics, Economics and Men of Modern Spain, 1808-1946 (London: Victor Gallancz Ltd., 1946), p. 405; See also Diario de Areitio, Los vascos en la historia de Espana (Bilbao, 1959). When Spanish historians discuss Basque nationalism, they keep referring to the Basque contribution to Spanish history in order to deny their separatist claims.

government and the Basque provinces. This controversy lasted throughout the nineteenth century reaching its climax during the second Spanish Republic (1931-1936) when the three Basque provinces of Vizcaya, Alava, and Guipuzcoa were given a statute of autonomy by the government of the Republic.

Although historical writings indicate that some Spanish Basques had long lamented the gradual erosion of Basque culture and the growing influence of the Castilian language, it was with the advent of the liberal constitution of 1812 (the Cadiz Constitution) and after the death of Ferdinand VII in 1833, that vasquismo⁸⁴ began to grow as a political movement. From 1812 onwards, the question of Basque autonomy became a salient issue in Spanish politics. For some students of Spanish politics, Basque autonomy "remained as the main political challenge to nineteenth century liberalism,"⁸⁵ particularly in view of the Basque willingness to take up arms against the Madrid government whenever the occasion seemed propitious. Basque autonomy became further complicated partly due to the fact that it became highly entwined with Spanish dynastic politics during the first half of the nineteenth century.

⁸⁴This term is sometimes used to refer to Basque sentiment for Home Rule.

⁸⁵Carr, op. cit., p. 67.

From 1820 to 1876, the classical era of pronunciamentos,⁸⁶ the government in Madrid never remained stable enough to carry out a consistent policy regarding the reform of the Basque fueros. As we shall see below, the issue of Basque autonomy was kept alive not only by the desire of the Basques to keep their fueros, but also by the vicissitudes of Spanish politics. To use a modern cliché, the question of Basque autonomy became a political football, exploited by both the Basques and the Madrid government. Political factions, in power and out of power, frequently used the issue of Basque autonomy as bait in order to get Basque support. This was particularly evident during the Carlist wars and again during the second Spanish Republic; in return for their support of the Republic, the Basques were rewarded with a statute of autonomy in 1936.

Before proceeding to discuss in greater detail the issue of Basque autonomy between 1812 and 1876, a brief review of the question of Spanish political integration is in order, so as to place the issue of Basque autonomy within the larger context of Spanish political centralization. One cannot be discussed without the other.

Although some Spanish historians⁸⁷ are never tired of reminding us that Spain was the first European nation-state

⁸⁶Between 1814 and 1923, there were reported 43 pronunciamentos in Spain. Oliveira, op. cit., p. 40.

⁸⁷Madariaga, Oliveira, and Pidal.

to arise out of the medieval order, further analysis leads one to qualify such assertion.⁸⁸ While one may grant that Spain was the first European state to emerge out of the medieval order, the social solidarity of this state is questionable. Although Spain was formally unified through the marriage of Ferdinand and Isabela in the fifteenth century, the traditional kingdoms of the Peninsula retained their separate legal and administrative systems.⁸⁹ It seems that unification of the area did not go very much beyond the demands of religious uniformity. As later became evident, the Church and not the monarchy "was the unifying institution of Spain."⁹⁰ Even when Phillip II inherited the Portuguese Crown, it seems that no serious attempt was made to incorporate Portugal into the Castilian Crown. The Portuguese administration remained intact and in Portuguese hands, a fact later deplored by some Spanish historians.⁹¹ Despite the efforts of Phillip II to unify Spain, he was later castigated by Spanish historians for not having brought about the unification of the Peninsula when he had

⁸⁸For an interesting essay on Spanish nationalism see: Stanley G. Payne, "Spanish Nationalism in the Twentieth Century," Review of Politics, 26 (July, 1964), pp. 403-422, hereafter quoted as "Spanish Nationalism".

⁸⁹Rafael Altamira, A History of Spain (New York: D. Van Nostrand Co., Inc., 1949).

⁹⁰"Spanish Nationalism," p. 404.

⁹¹Madariaga, Spain.

the power and the opportunity to do so. Thus, one historian comments that Phillip II created the modern Castilian State, but not the modern Spanish State:

Neither in their minds nor in that of their collaborators occurred the idea to instill in all Spaniards the notion of state unity, of whatever kind. Charles and Phillip, it must be granted, organized the modern Castilian State, but not the modern Spanish State. But in so doing, however, they accentuated the obstacles that arose in the making of Spain. Because they placed Castile as the central political axis of the monarchy and the fiscal basis of it, and transformed the other peninsular states into mere satellites of no more significance than the other European states inserted into the general framework of their large empire... It is enormous the responsibility of Charles V and Phillip II in their negligence to unite Spain.⁹²

It seems that the feeling of nationhood under the Spanish monarchy remained rather fragile. According to Payne, "the country never became fully integrated, economically, socially or politically"⁹³ As a consequence, nationalism in Spain has never manifested itself with the same degree of passion and devotion that it has in Germany or France. Payne even goes so far as to suggest that we cannot speak of Spanish nationalism until the twentieth century. It might not be too far fetched to say that one could refer to Spain as a nation during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries--and in some instances during the nineteenth century--in the same way that we refer to Nigeria or the

⁹²Claudio Sanchez Albornoz, Espana: un enigma historico (2nd., ed.) (Buenos Aires: Editorial Sudamericana, 1962), pp. 479-480.

⁹³"Spanish Nationalism," p. 404.

Congo today as a nation. It existed in a formal sense.⁹⁴ For peripheral Spain, however, the Spanish nation became identified with Castile. Even today it is not uncommon to hear Valencianos and Galicians say that the Castilians control everything. This is amusing because Franco is not Castilian but Galician.

⁹⁴Oliveira refers to this lack of social solidarity thus: "The nineteenth century--which still continues in Spain-- has been unjustly severe to the classical Spanish Monarchy. This severity is due to the false assumption that fifteenth century Spain was a nation which had developed biologically, so to speak, with no outward accident.", p. 357. Oliveira, as well as other Spanish historians, while acknowledging the particularisms of Spain, at the same time refuse to give any legitimacy to Basque or Catalan nationalism. Making reference to Catalonia, he says, "Catalonia had to continue to be Spanish because history ordained so.", p. 361. Madariaga, too, refuses to give Basque nationalism any legitimacy by persistently maintaining that Basque nationalist sentiment is nothing more than an extreme manifestation of the particularism of the Spanish "character": "We have no right to be surprised. We know that this dispersive and disruptive tendency is a typical feature of the Spanish character, and we have found the Basque to be the quintessence of the Spaniard." Spain, p. 179. Madariaga even goes so far as to deny the legitimacy for the political existence of the Portuguese nation-state: "A double wall of pride..., on the Portuguese side, ... , prevents a clear understanding of a reality which in its essentials is simple enough. So simple, indeed, as to amount to a repetition of the Catalan reality: The Portuguese is a Spaniard with his back to Castile and his eyes on the Atlantic Sea.", Spain, p. 185. Pidal also tries to get around Basque nationalism by attributing it to the "character" of the Iberians: "The greater localism in Spain does not depend upon a multitude of ethnic-geographical reasons, but on the contrary, on a uniform psychological condition; it depends upon the original exclusive character of the Iberians already noted by the authors of antiquity." The Spaniards and Their History, p. 77. Rather than acknowledging Basque or Catalan nationalism, Pidal placed the source of the problem elsewhere: "The provincialist or federalist movement is upheld and encouraged by some foreign countries that are interested in keeping Spain weak." Ibid., pp. 89-90.

The weak political centralization of Spain is further evidenced by the fact that as late as 1812 (when the Cadiz Constitution was promulgated) the country was divided into nine kingdoms, two principados, one senorio, sixteen provinces, and two Basque provinces (Alava and Guipuzcoa) known as the "exempted provinces."⁹⁵

The famous liberal constitution of 1812, written and promulgated when the Spaniards were trying to expel the French from the Iberian Peninsula, tried to bring an end to most aspects of the ancien regime through a series of far-reaching political and social reforms which envisioned the centralization of Spain along the lines of the French model. The Spanish liberals were trying to do in 1812 what the French had done after the Revolution of 1789. In the first place the traditional administrative division of Spain along with the privileges of particular regions would be abolished and replaced with a uniform legal and administrative system. Secondly, and perhaps most importantly,

⁹⁵The kingdoms were: Andalucia, Aragon, Cordoba, Galicia, Granada, Jaen, Murcia, Valencia, y Navarra. The principados: Asturias, and Catalonia. The senorio: Vizcaya. The sixteen provinces: Avila, Burgos, Zamora, Ciudad Real, Cuenca, Extremadura, Guadalajara, Leon, Madrid, Palencia, Salamanca, Segovia, Soria, Toledo, Toro y Valladolid. The two exempted provinces were: Alava and Guipuzcoa. Although the Navarrese are also Basques, due to the traditional status of Navarra as a kingdom, whenever official documents refer to the Basque region, Navarra is always mentioned separately: Las Provincias Vascongadas y Navarra. Pio Zabala, Historia de Espana (I), (Barcelona: Sucesores de Juan Gili, 1930), p. 177.

Spain would be governed under a constitutional monarchy in the person of Ferdinand VII.

The constitution of 1812⁹⁶ and the ideas expressed in it set the stage for the political conflicts--sometimes violent--that were to plague Spanish politics throughout the first half of the nineteenth century--until 1876.

Initially the constitution of 1812 was accepted by the diputaciones forales of the Basque region, although not without some protestations. At first sight this seems puzzling particularly in view of the fact that this constitution called for greater centralization, thus eventually doing away with the foral liberties of the Basques. On the other hand, the behavior of the Basque diputaciones does not seem totally contradictory if one considers it in terms of strategy. First of all the French were occupying the Basque region. Although it seems that in 1808 they had promised to respect the Basque fueros,⁹⁷ by 1810, however, they reduced the region into one administrative unit and placed it under military rule. The Basques acted swiftly in the form of armed resistance. In light of these conditions

⁹⁶For a collection of Spanish constitutions see: Arnald R. Verduin, Manual of Spanish Constitutions 1808-1931 (Ypsilanti, Michigan: Union of Lithoprinters, 1941).

⁹⁷There were some French politicians who suggested to Napoleon to annex the Spanish Basque provinces to the French Basque region and make a protectorate of it with the name of La Nouvelle Phenicie. M. Sacx, Bayonne et le Pays Basque (Bayonne, France: Collection Ikas, 1968), p. 151.

continued French occupation seemed a greater threat to Basque autonomy than the newly drafted constitution, and a return of the Spanish monarchy in the person of Ferdinand VII who, on his way to France in 1808, had promised the Basques that he would respect their fueros.⁹⁸ Moreover, while the 1812 constitution called for political centralization, at the same time, it allowed for a certain degree of administrative autonomy. For example, mayors would be popularly elected, the municipality would control the police, the primary schools, collect taxes, and have responsibility for road maintenance and construction. For Basque liberals the constitution of 1812 simply made uniform throughout Spain what the Basques had been practicing for centuries.⁹⁹ In fact, some Basque diputaciones expressed the belief that the constitution of 1812 embodied the spirit of the Basque fueros.

The reforms envisioned by this constitution were never fully implemented. As soon as Ferdinand returned to Spain (1814), he abolished the constitution along with the major legislation that the Cortes of Cadiz had enacted, and subsequently, attempted to re-institute the old regime. On

⁹⁸Maximiliano Garcia Venero, Historia del Nacionalismo Vasco 1793-1936 (Madrid: Editora Nacional, 1945). This is a valuable work on Basque nationalism for it contains reprints of most of the royal decrees regarding the Basque region. The book is marred, however, by its polemical nature.

⁹⁹Balparda took this view. Gregorio de Balparda, Federalismo? Feudalismo! (Bilbao: 1931.)

his return Ferdinand also announced that he would observe and respect the Basque fueros.¹⁰⁰

By 1815, however, Ferdinand's ministers were showing dissatisfaction with the existing Basque fueros and complaining that the Basques were not complying with the Crown on some policies, particularly in the area of contraband.¹⁰¹ The possibility of moving the Spanish custom houses to the French-Spanish border and to the Basque ports

¹⁰⁰For a copy of the decree see, Venero, p. 143.

¹⁰¹The report of a Junta of Madrid assembled to investigate "the abuses of the royal revenues in the Basque Provinces," made the following comments: "The adoration in which the privileges and Fueros of the Basque Provinces are held by the inhabitants is well known, by which for many years the royal authority, as well as the high tribunals of the kingdom, have experienced great disrespect. It would appear as if the permanent deputations of these provinces had been established to oppose the measures of the government. There is nothing in common with the rest of the provinces in Spain. The laws are distinct; the commerce free; the contributions almost nothing; the custom-houses profitless; the officers opposed in the execution of their duty--are maintained at great expense, and almost useless; the nobility has become universal and self-created; and in fact they have taken the government into their own hands.

The Peninsula appears open to all their commerce, and negotiations; and without doubt they enjoy greater advantages than the rest of the kingdom, being exempt from the contributions of Castil, and the general tax of the Crown of Aragon, from ordinary services, from general contributions, from provincial rents, and from contributions and donations which have been so heavy since the French Revolution. And even in the tithes and ecclesiastical contributions, they have paid almost nothing to the State from which they receive protection. They have been free from conscription, militia, from providing military stores, barracks, baggage, enlistment for the marine service, and in fact from every other tax or service for war." Quoted in Francis Duncan, The English in Spain (London: John Murray, 1877), p. 167-170.

was already being discussed. There were further complaints that illicit commerce was damaging Castilian trade.

Subsequently, in a royal decree of 1818 addressed to the Basque provinces, there appeared a clause which was used later as a tool to justify the central government's power in clipping some of the Basque fueros. Making reference to the fueros, this clause implicitly expressed the view that the fueros were not rights but privileges given by the Crown: "The fueros that were abolished by the [Cadiz] Cortes, obeyed and respected by that Province [Vizcaya], and later reinstated by His Majesty, always carry the implicit clause of without prejudice to the general interests of the nation, the national unity, and the royal privileges of the supreme sovereign authority."¹⁰²

Later, in 1818, the Crown demanded that the Basque provinces make a greater contribution to the military needs of the country, beyond that allowed by the fueros. The diputaciones forales reacted negatively to this suggestion and instead asked for a four-year delaying period.

As a result of a coup d'etat led by General Riego (1820), and supported by the liberals, the constitution of 1812 was imposed on Ferdinand. The victors of 1820 did not waste any time in carrying out some of the reforms anticipated in 1812, and proceeded to abolish some of the

¹⁰²Quoted in Venero, op. cit., p. 146.

Basque fueros. The diputaciones forales were changed into diputaciones constitucionales, and the custom houses were moved to the Spanish-French border. In addition, the Basques would also be subject to military conscription in the same manner that other Spaniards were. However, the regime brought to power by General Riego was short-lived. By 1823, with the help of French forces (the 100,000 Sons of St. Louis) under the command of General Angouleme, Ferdinand and the coalition supporting him was to defeat the liberals and once again establish his rule. During the struggle between the liberals and the traditional forces, the conservatives supporting Ferdinand presented themselves as the protectors of the Basque fueros. In the Basque region an attempt was made to connect the fueros with the altar and the throne, an association which lasted throughout the nineteenth century.¹⁰³

Once Ferdinand had consolidated his power, he annulled many of the reforms instituted by the previous regime, including the reforms regarding the Basque fueros. In order

¹⁰³As a result of this association, the Basques have been labelled as reactionary: "Pero nadie ignora que el meollo, cogollo, raiz de la intolerancia espanola es el vasco. El clero vasco ha sido siempre el inspirador de la tendencia dura." Madariaga, Memorias de un federalista, p. 172. Basque nationalism is but the extreme form of this solicitude of the Basque priests to keep unpolluted by liberalism, socialism...and the rest, by far the most reactionary region of Spain." Madariaga, Spain, p. 179. "The Carlists were not fighting for their local liberties, or political privileges, but in order to deprive other Spaniards of liberty, to impose absolutism on the whole of Spain," says Oliveira, p. 407.

to elicit the continued support of the Basques, he removed the custom houses once again from the Spanish-French border to the Castilian border. Despite this action, however, the Crown continued to insist that the fueros were privileges given by the Crown and, consequently, could also be taken away or modified by the Crown: "The Fueros as well as the privileges are mere royal concessions, and are subject, consequently, to modifications."¹⁰⁴

The most intense confrontation between the Basques and the Spanish state occurred after the death of Ferdinand in 1833. For six years the Basque region along with portions of Aragon and Catalonia confronted the Madrid government in a war that left the region nearly devastated. Initially the war, known as the first Carlist War, began as a dynastic struggle between the supporters of Don Carlos VI, brother of Ferdinand, and the supporters of Isabela II, daughter of Ferdinand, under the regency of Maria Cristina, wife of Ferdinand and mother of Isabela.¹⁰⁵ Although it

¹⁰⁴Quoted in Venero, op. cit., p. 152.

¹⁰⁵For a general discussion of Carlismo, the name by which the movement to place Don Carlos VI and his successors on the Spanish throne became known, see Carr, pp. 155-196. For a discussion of the ideological basis of Carlismo see: Santiago Galindo Herrero, Breve historia del tradicionalismo espanol (Madrid: Publicaciones Espanolas, 1954). R. Oyarzun, Historia del Carlismo (Madrid: Ediciones Minotauro, 1930); John N. Schumacher, "Integrism: A Study in Nineteenth-Century Spanish Politico-Religious Thought," Catholic Historical Review, 48 (October, 1962), pp. 343-64. For a discussion of the Carlist Wars see: Edgar Holt, The Carlist Wars in Spain, (Chester Springs, Pa.: Dufour Editions, 1967; Antonio Pirala y Criado, Historia de la guerra civil y de los partidos liberal y carlista, Madrid: 1868.

seems that at the outbreak of the war the fueros were not mentioned, as the war progressed, it became evident that Basque participation in the war was based on the fear that the regime of Maria Cristina intended to abolish the fueros. This fear had some justification for on November 30, 1833, General Federico Castanon, in charge of an army base in the north, in Tolosa, gave an order abolishing the fueros of Vizcaya and Alava in retaliation for their participation in the insurrection against the Madrid government. Another incident reinforced the suspicions of the Basques. It seems that in 1834 a crystino commander stationed in the north sent a message to the Madrid government suggesting, as a tactical move, that in order to bring the war to an immediate end, the government should declare its intention to uphold the fueros, and thus deprive Don Carlos of the support in the northern provinces. Allegedly this message fell into Carlist hands "which made a firebrand out of it by pointing out to the troops that the officials of the queen were planning to abolish the foral institutions, although they might respect the fueros temporarily. But the fueros would be destroyed once the enthusiasm of the Basques for Don Carlos subsided."¹⁰⁶ Don Carlos tried to increase his popularity among the Basques by exploiting their sensitivity regarding the fueros. "In September

¹⁰⁶Quoted in Venero, op. cit., p. 164.

[1834_7] he went to Guernica, where in 1476 Ferdinand and Isabel had taken the oath to preserve the fueros under the historic oak-tree."¹⁰⁷ And there he also took an oath to uphold the fueros.

In order to allay the Basque suspicions, and to separate the cause of Don Carlos from that of the fueros, General Baldomero Espartero, commander of the crístico forces in the northern provinces, sent a message to the Basques, on May 19, 1837, declaring that the government had no intention of abolishing the fueros. "Basques, those who do not cease to deceive you, tell you that you are fighting for the defense of your fueros, but do not believe it. As the general in command of the armed forces of the Queen and in the name of the Government, I promise that these fueros that you feared to lose will be conserved and there never was any thought to abolish them."¹⁰⁸

Notwithstanding the promise of Espartero, the constitution of 1837, the byproduct of the 1836 revolution led by the radical liberals, anticipated the abolition of all local privileges and fueros.

By 1839, however, it had become evident that the Madrid government had acquired enough strength to crush the Carlist insurrection. This, plus the political bickerings¹⁰⁹ in

¹⁰⁷Quoted in Venero, op. cit., p. 164.

¹⁰⁸Holt, op. cit., p. 69.

¹⁰⁹Carr, op. cit., pp. 191-192; Duncan, op. cit., p. 244.

the Carlist camp and a desire for peace, coupled with a promise by Espartero to respect the fueros, induced the Basque contingents to lay down their arms. The Peace of Vergara of August, 1839, finally brought the war to a formal conclusion. Espartero's promise to the Basques was expressed, in a qualified manner, in Article I of the Pact of Vergara: "General don Baldomero Espartero will recommend with great interest to the Government his offer to formally submit before the Cortes the concession or modification of the fueros."¹¹⁰

Subsequently, in September of 1839, the subject of the fueros was discussed in the Cortes in which the Progressives had a majority.¹¹¹ It seems that they were ready to abolish the fueros once and for all. But the cabinet, taking into consideration Espartero's promise to the Basques, and his growing political influence, finally settled for a compromise which recognized the fueros in so far as they were not prejudicial to the constitutional unity of the monarchy. A later date was set for specific reforms regarding the fueros. A royal decree of November 16, 1839, allowed the Basques to reconvene their local assemblies in the manner consistent with their fueros. This decree presented Maria Cristina as the protector of the Basque fueros.

¹¹⁰Quoted in Venero, op. cit., p. 180.

¹¹¹Zabala, op. cit., p. 377.

The regime of Maria Cristina which had indicated sympathy for the Basque fueros did not remain in power long enough to work out a final settlement with the Basques. Political fortunes in Madrid changed once again, thus bringing some radical Progressives into power who were convinced that "a liberal constitution for all Spaniards left the foral liberties as an archaic and unnecessary conservative vestige."¹¹² A revolution initiated in the provinces in 1840, and led by the Progressives with the support of Espartero, forced Maria Cristina to abdicate as the Queen Regent and left Espartero as head of the new government.¹¹³ From her place of exile in France, Maria Cristina sent a telegram to the Basque diputaciones in which she praised the Basques, who not too long ago had supported a war against her, portrayed herself as the protector of the fueros and asked for their support in her

¹¹²Carr, op. cit., p. 220.

¹¹³The immediate cause for this pronunciamento stemmed from the political differences between the Progressives and the Moderates over a proposal of the Moderates to reform the local governments. Because of the patronage available through the local governments, and thus control of elections, each party in power wished to control local government, or reform to its own political advantage. In early 1840, the Moderates found themselves in power and decided to reorganize the local governments in order to undercut the power of the Progressives, particularly in the large towns. The Progressives, normally advocates of centralization, now found themselves in a position in which they had to defend the autonomy of the municipality. In order to stop the reform proposed by the Moderates, they staged a revolution supported by Espartero. Carr, op. cit., pp 210-218.

struggle against Espartero.

In the meantime, the local notables of the Basque provinces were becoming suspicious about the Espartero government which included representatives of the anti-foralist tradition. At a meeting of the Cortes in June, 1841, the subject of the fueros had been brought up for discussion, particularly the share of the Basque contribution to national revenue. A law passed by the Cortes on August 16, 1841, stripping Navarra of her fueros reinforced the suspicions of the other three provinces that the days of the fueros were numbered.¹¹⁴ Subsequently, in September, 1841, the Basque provinces supported an attempted insurrection against the Madrid government, led by General O'Donnell, an opponent of Espartero. Once again, the Basques lost. As a punishment for their support of the insurrection, Espartero issued a decree abolishing the most important aspects of the fueros; each province would have a jefe politico, appointed by the central government, who would be the superior political authority within the province. The custom houses would be removed from the interior and placed at Basque ports and at the Spanish-French border, and the Basques would be subject to military conscription.¹¹⁵ For the advocates of centralization, this was a victory.

¹¹⁴For a copy of the text of this law see Venero (1st ed.), p. 101.

¹¹⁵See Venero, op. cit., pp. 196-197.

From 1843 to 1876, despite the turnover of governments and constitutions, no significant modifications were made regarding the fueros. The coalition which overthrew Espartero in July, 1843, and brought back Maria Cristina as the Queen Regent, by and large accepted the modifications which the Espartero government had instituted, although it seems that the Basques were expecting some radical modifications. Instead the new government gave the juntas generales some autonomy regarding economic matters and abolished the office of jefe politicos.

In a manifesto drafted in 1850 by local Basque notables, again under the famous tree of Guernica, they expressed disappointment with the policies of the central government regarding the modification of the fueros:

We believe that a great number of the policies introduced since the revolution of 1840 are another example of the violations of the law of October 25, and consequently, many examples of illegitimate acts, as a result of which, in justice, we should be given immediate reparations.¹¹⁶

Among other things, this document suggested that the Basques should present a unified front to the central government and follow, under the existing circumstances, the only rational course open to them:

To negotiate, and negotiate with dexterity and foresight is the only rational approach that the Basques must follow in order to salvage from ruin the sacred objects of their

¹¹⁶Quoted in Venero, op. cit., p. 199.

cult. It was in this manner that our forefathers, whose government consisted in a constant negotiation with the central Power, worked on critical issues. Because our position is more critical, and the interest, whose fate shall be decided shortly, is far more transcendental and grave, it is incumbent upon us, their sons, to work with a double effort.

Unity, and we shall be strong.¹¹⁷

Although this document also expresses a conciliatory attitude and the realization that things had changed, and, consequently, the acceptance that the pre-1839 foral liberties could not be reinstated, nevertheless the Basques continued an intense protest in the form of petitions to the central government and the presentation of amendments in the Cortes by Basque deputies, which sometimes caused acrimonious debates, and sometimes by the obstruction of government policies. For example, during the 1859-1860 African War, the Basque provincial assemblies and the central government struggled for several months over the contribution, in men and money, that the Basques should make to this war. General Leopoldo O'Donnell, at the time head of the government, retaliated by issuing a decree (July 7, 1860) forbidding the juntas generales from meeting without the permission of the governor of the respective province.

During the debate of the Ley de Presupuestos, in the Cortes of 1864, the Basque senators introduced an amendment which, if adopted, would have the effect of restoring the

¹¹⁷Ibid., p. 201.

pre-1839 foral liberties. The introduction of this amendment stimulated a heated debate between Sanchez Silva, a senator from Seville, and two Basque senators, Pedro de Egana and Joaquin de Barroeta-Aldamar. Both sides appealed to extensive historical documentation to support or refute the source of the fueros. The debate seemed to have reached its most heated point, however, when Egana, the senator from Alava, referred to the Basques as a nationality:

That [foral] structure which has lasted undisturbed for a thousand years, has withstood the violent political storms which have demolished empires, overthrown monarchies and even destroyed nationalities of great strength; meanwhile that poor remote place has preserved intact that nationality which in the eyes of Mr. Sanchez Silva does not deserve respect nor worthy of retaining the unfortunate fueros.¹¹⁸

Egana's use of the word nationality elicited a response from the President of the Council of Ministers, Alejandro Mon, who argued that the Spanish government did not "recognize any nationality other than the Spanish nationality," and that any other nationality, whatever its form, the Government would reject.¹¹⁹

The chaotic state of Spanish politics between 1868 and 1876¹²⁰ presented the Basques once again with the opportunity

¹¹⁸Quoted in Venero, op cit., p. 212.

¹¹⁹Ibid.

¹²⁰There was a revolution on September 19, 1868, which overthrew Isabela II from the Spanish throne. This was followed by an indecisive government which reinstated the monarchy in October 30, 1870 in the person of Amadeo I

of placing someone in the Madrid government sympathetic towards their fueros. When the Carlists made their last major effort to place their candidate, Don Carlos VII, on the Spanish throne, the Basques again took up arms for the Carlist cause. This war, known as the second Carlist War (1872-1876), brought defeat to the Basques and the Carlists whose candidate left Spain never to return again.

Although the war ended in defeat for the Basques, the fuerrista sentiment continued unabated. In the national elections for the Cortes (January 20, 1876), the Basque candidates supporting the fueros emerged triumphant.¹²¹ It seems that they were determined to salvage in the Cortes what they had lost on the battlefield. When the subject of the fueros was introduced in the Cortes for discussion, a Basque deputy from Alava, Mateo Benigno de Maraza, made a last appeal to the Congress imploring it to spare the Basque fueros. Their abolition, he said, would mean the ruin "and the desolation of the unfortunate Basque country, so eminently Spanish and so eminently monarchic...; you are going to ruin and destroy the country designated by

of Savoy. But Amadeo abdicated in 1873, and the Republic was proclaimed. In the following year, December 29, 1874, the Republic was overthrown, and the Bourbon Monarchy was called back in the person of Alfonso XII, son of Isabela. From 1876 to 1923, there was a period of relative stability in Spanish politics.

¹²¹Javier de Ybarra Berge, Politica Nacional en Vizcaya (Madrid: Instituto de Estudios Politicos, 1948), p. 25.

Providence to be the impregnable bulwark of the motherland and the progressive sentry of its independence which, in the fulfillment of these sacrosanct duties, has always been the model of pure loyalty to its kings."¹²²

Another Basque deputy, Martin Garmendia, from Tolosa, tried to persuade his fellow deputies to preserve the fueros, for the Basques viewed them as if they were "a truly idolatrous cult." Instead other deputies replied that the Basques were "traitors to the Motherland."¹²³

On July 21, 1876, a law was finally promulgated by the Crown stipulating the relationship between the Basque provinces and the central government. As indicated by Article I of this law,¹²⁴ the general laws of Spain would also be applicable to the Basque provinces. Article IV seemingly made a concession to the Basques--thus leading some to believe that the pase foral might be established--by authorizing the government "to resolve with the consent of the provinces of Alava, Guipuzcoa, and Vizcaya, whenever appropriate, all the reforms that their traditional foral organizations required, so that the welfare of the Basques, good government, and the security of the nation would be ensured."¹²⁵

¹²²Quoted in Venero, op. cit., p. 227.

¹²³Berge, op. cit., p. 37.

¹²⁴For text see Venero, op. cit., p. 228.

¹²⁵Ibid.

The Basque diputaciones reacted negatively to this legislation. At a meeting in San Sebastian (the capital city of Guipuzcoa) on September 11, 1876, the junta of Guipuzcoa agreed to appeal to "His Majesty and the high officers of the State, now and whenever required, to petition for the revocation of the law." Insofar as they were concerned, their "sacred rights remained intact as ever." In a secret meeting, the diputacion of Vizcaya agreed not to cooperate "directly nor indirectly with the Government in the execution of the law."¹²⁶ Alava followed the behavior of the other two provinces. On September 17 and 18, the diputaciones of the three provinces met privately in order to discuss the adoption of a common strategy to resist the law. "The meeting of Vitoria [the capital of Alava_]", says Venero, "was the first precedent of a systematic concerted action which had never been realized until that time."¹²⁷ After this meeting, the diputaciones sent delegates to Madrid to persuade Canovas del Castillo, head of the government, to have the law repealed. After some heated argumentation, Canovas allegedly threatened to declare the provinces under martial law, if the diputaciones persisted with their obstructionist tactics. Because of their continued resistance, and their refusal to share the costs

¹²⁶Quoted in Venero, op. cit., pp. 230-231.

¹²⁷Venero, op. cit., p. 231.

of maintaining a military force left in the area after the end of the Carlist War, Canovas dissolved the diputaciones and selected a provisional body of judges to take their place. On May 5, 1877, Vizcaya was put under the complete control of Madrid. This was later changed by the royal decree of February 28, 1878.¹²⁸

The royal decree finally settled and spelled out in detail the rules which would govern the relationship between the Basques and the Spanish State. The ideas expressed in this decree gave rise to what became known as the concierto economico. This was an arrangement by which the Basques would contribute to the Spanish national treasury a fixed amount of revenue, to be negotiated from time to time between each individual province and the central government, but would leave each province free to apportion its taxes among its inhabitants in any way it wished. Under this arrangement, the Basque provinces were given some form of administrative autonomy. For years the province of Vizcaya did not have direct taxes on property and industry. This arrangement lasted up to the 1930's.

The conflict discussed above between the Basques and the Madrid government sets the stage for the later emergence of the Basque nationalist movement. Although there was persistent conflict between the Basques and the central government finally ending with the abolition of the fueros

¹²⁸For a copy of the text, see Venero, op. cit., p. 633.

in 1876, it would be premature to characterize the activities of the Basques during this period as full-fledged nationalism. With very few and isolated exceptions does one find evidence that the Basque provinces considered outright separation from Spain. While it is undeniable that the Basques considered themselves distinct from the rest of the surrounding populations, nevertheless, they struggled to preserve their fueros within the structure of the Spanish State. They tried to accomplish this by supporting the traditional view of the Spanish monarchy. As articulated by the ideologue of Spanish traditionalism, this would mean a Catholic Spain with

...a king who both rules and governs; a true Cortes in the Spanish tradition, decentralization, and a real life of the municipality and of the province; and above all, the Catholic spirit living in the institutions, in the laws, in the customs....¹²⁹

This view "looked to the medieval Spanish monarchy, limited by the fueros and the people."¹³⁰ By refusing to accept the legitimacy of the new order, the Basques in a sense were reacting negatively to the forces of modernization. Between 1812 and 1876, they fought the forces of political integration.

The process of political integration had the paradoxical effect of introducing disintegrating forces of a new

¹²⁹Antonio Aparisi y Guijarro, Obras (Madrid, 1873), III, p. 341.

¹³⁰Schumacher, op. cit., p. 344.

dimension into Spanish politics. The centralizing policies of the Madrid government, along with Carlist Wars, had the effect of popularizing the Basque fueros which might have been taken for granted up to that time--with the simultaneous effect of making the Basques further conscious of their perceived uniqueness. Thus, modernization, in this particular case, had the paradoxical effect of bringing about greater political integration and at the same time reviving and reinvigorating tradition, aspects of which had been nearly forgotten. It is from this period onwards that a plethora of works began to appear romanticizing and defending the historical roots of the Basque fueros.

C H A P T E R I I I

THE EMERGENCE OF SPANISH BASQUE NATIONALISM

Although fueros had remained alive after the abolition of the fueros in 1876, it seems that by the end of the nineteenth century many segments of the Basque population had reconciled themselves to the idea of the concierto economico. While lip service was paid to the fueros, none of the major political groupings of the Basque region, with the exception of the Integralist Party, advocated a return to the pre-1839 political relationship between the Basques and the Spanish State.

The erosion of the Basque culture and language had continued its relentless course. Consequently, by the end of the century, Spanish Basques were confronted with the fact that with stunning rapidity they had lost the fueros; and their culture was under attack in their very homeland. The attraction of large numbers of labor migrants to the Basque region, particularly Vizcaya and Guipuzcoa, due to the rapid industrialization of this area, had given rise to a situation in which the Basques found themselves a minority in their own urban centers; and the Basque language was rarely heard in the streets of Bilbao and San Sebastian. It has been estimated that by 1899 approximately 70 per cent of the population of Bilbao was non-Basque.¹³¹ One writer

¹³¹Pedro de Basaldua, El Libertador Vasco (Buenos Aires:

makes the observation that by the end of the nineteenth century the upper classes of the Basque region had become "fastened to their *españolissimo*." "The educated and cultural circles of the area," says the same writer, "had become alienated from Basque patriotism," and this alienation was reinforced by the existing political parties of the region."¹³²

By the end of the century, the speaking of Basque had been reduced to coastal fishing villages and to rural districts. Famous Basque intellectuals, such as Unamuno and Maeztu, well-known figures of the generation of 1898, wrote their works in Castilian and not in Basque.

It was out of this background that Sabino de Arana Goiri, a young lawyer, son of an industrialist family from Bilbao, launched the Basque nationalist movement with his publication of Bizkaya por su independencia in 1893, the object of which was, to use his words, to teach the Bizkainos "the history of their motherland," and to awaken his "compatriots who disgracefully ignored the language of their race."¹³³

Editorial Vasca Ekin, 1953), p. 127. This work, written by a nationalist, is a biography of Arana but contains much general information on the politics of the Basque region at the end of the nineteenth century.

¹³²Sabino de Arana Goiri, Obras Completas (Buenos Aires: Editorial Vasca Ekin, 1965), p. 16. This work edited by a nationalist whose name is not divulged, has an extensive introductory essay discussing the formation of the PNV and the subsequent development of Basque nationalism.

¹³³ _____, Bizkaya por su independencia

Prior to this publication, Arana had spent some years in Barcelona where he studied at the University of that city, and had come into contact with the Catalan cultural revival which was flourishing at that time. It seems that it was during his stay in Catalonia that he became fully converted to the idea of organizing a Basque nationalist movement. Subsequently, Arana submerged himself in the study of Basque history and the Basque language, which he could not speak. Starting with 1877, he published several works in philology¹³⁴ in which he expressed his ambition to unify the Basque language and purify it by dropping the borrowed "foreign" words: Spanish and French. Arana set himself the task of arousing the interest of the Basques in their language and culture which, as he realized, was fast disappearing. "I was born to witness your death."¹³⁵

Between 1890 and 1903, Arana devoted his life and his energy to the cause of Euzkadi,¹³⁶ a term which he coined to refer to an independent Basque nation; and laid the ground work for the political organization of Basque nationalism with the founding of the Partido Nacionalista Vasco (PNV)

(Bilbao: Editorial Verdes Achirica, 1932), p. 45.

¹³⁴Arana Goiri, op. cit., p. 82.

¹³⁵Arana Goiri, op. cit., p. 26.

¹³⁶The exact date as to when this term was first used is not clear. But it seems that it came into regular usage after 1904 when a periodical entitled Euzkadi appeared that year.

in 1894. As discussed previously, the question of Basque autonomy was not new in the Basque region. What was new in Arana's writings was his nationalistic point of view. He carried the fuerrista position to its logical conclusion.

Arana's writings are tinged with what appears to be a "racist"¹³⁷ view which deplores the marriage of Basques with non-Basques. The preservation of the Basques as a "race" appeared as one of the main tenets of his ideology. Contempt for other Spaniards, whom he pejoratively referred to as "maketos", is interspersed throughout his writings. Frequent use of the phrase "invasion of maketos" was made by Arana and his cohorts to describe the migration of other Spaniards to the Basque region. It was on ethnic grounds that Arana, as well as later nationalists, made his case for Basque nationalism. Later Unamuno described this pre-occupation with "racial" purity as "absurd racial virginity."¹³⁸ For this and for his general views on Basque nationalism, he was castigated by the nationalists.

Although Arana evoked a responsive chord among some segments of the urban sectors, students and members of the clergy, his following remained small.¹³⁹ He faced apathy

¹³⁷The concept of "race" as used by the nationalists is not clear. It is sometimes used to denote something cultural and at other times something "racial".

¹³⁸Quoted in Carr, op. cit., p. 556.

¹³⁹Right after he published Bizkaya por su independencia, a group of people from Bilbao gave him a dinner in a place known as Caserio Larrazabal where they asked him to explain

in the rural areas and hostility from Basque industrialists who, with very few exceptions, never associated with Basque nationalism.

Initially Basque nationalism was limited to the province of Vizcaya, Arana's home province. When he published Bizcaya por su independencia, he concentrated on defending what he conceived to be the historical rights of that province, although reference was also made to the Basque region as a whole. But because initially he addressed himself mainly to the independence of Vizcaya, early Basque nationalism was also referred to as bizkaitarrismo. It was not until after his death that his ideas began to find support in the other three provinces. It is interesting to note that in the following thirteen articles elucidating the ideological basis of the (PNV) the Basque localism that was expressed during the Carlist wars is maintained, although Arana tried to discredit and disassociate himself from Carlism¹⁴⁰ for, in his opinion, Carlism had been responsible for the loss of the fueros. The government of a future Euzkadi would consist of a confederation in which each province would retain its traditional autonomy. The two main tenets of the party's

his ideas. For the nationalists, this event became known as el Juramento Larrazabal and is given as the date that marks the beginning of Basque nationalism.

¹⁴⁰Sabino de Arana Goiri, El Partido Carlista y los Fueros Vasco-Navarros (Bilbao, 1897).

ideology were "God and the Old Laws" (Jaungoikua eta Lagi Zarra):

Article 1--Bizcaya, upon entering a Republican confederacy, does so according to the acceptance of the political doctrine expounded by Arana Goiri' tar Sabino (Sabino Arana Goiri) in the slogan Jaungoikua eta Lagi Zarra, which is explained in the following articles.

Article 2--Juan-Goikua--Bizcaya will be Catholic, Apostolic, and Roman in all aspects of its internal affairs and its relations with other peoples.

Article 3--Lagi-Zarra-Bizcaya will be freely reconstituted. It will reestablish, with complete integrity, the essence of its traditional laws, called Fueros. It will restore the good practices and customs of its predecessors. It will be constituted, if not exclusively, then principally, of families of the Basque race. It will establish Basque as its official language.

Article 4--Eta-Bizcaya will be established upon perfect harmony and accord between the religious and the political orders, between the divine and the human.

Article 5--Distinction between Juan-Goikua and Lagi Zarra Bizcaya will be established with a clear and marked distinction between the religious and political orders, between ecclesiastical and civil.

Article 6--Precedence of Juan-Goikua over Lagi Zarra Bizcaya will be established with a complete and unconditional subordination of the political to the religious, of the State to the Church.

Article 7--Confederation--Since Bizcaya is by race, language, faith, character, and custom a sister of Alava, Benabarra (Basse-Navarre), Guipuzcoa, Labourdi, Navarra, and Zuberoa (soule), it will become allied or confederated with these six peoples to form a whole called Euskalerrria, but without surrendering its particular autonomy. This doctrine will be expressed in the following principle: Bizcaya libre en Euskalerrria libre (Free Bizcaya in a Free Basque country).

Article 8--The Basque confederation will be formed by all of the Basque states with each entering willingly and with all having the same rights in the formation of its (the confederation) foundations.

Article 9--The necessary basis for a solid and durable national unity are: unity of race as far as is possible, and Catholic unity.

Article 10--The essential basis to insure that the Basque states entering the union will retain equal autonomy and identical faculties are: freedom to secede, and equality of obligations and rights within the confederation.

Article 11--Once the confederation is established, each member state will have the same rights and identical obligations.

Article 12--The Confederation will unite its members solely in the terms of the social order and international relations; in all other aspects each will maintain its traditional absolute independence.

Article 13--All of the articles in this document and political doctrine are irrevocable.¹⁴¹

Judging from this text, an independent Euzkadi would be a loose Confederation in which the provinces would retain considerable autonomy.

The fact that the Spanish political regime at this time allowed a considerable amount of political freedom, universal male suffrage had been established in 1890, the nationalists were free to propagate their ideas and to organize. To this fact one might attribute the low incidence of violence associated with Basque nationalism during these years. Between 1890 and 1930 Basque nationalism was devoid

¹⁴¹Reproduced in Venero (1945 edition), pp. 244-245.

of the use of violence either in the form of assassinations or riots. Of course this fact could also have been due to the lack of intense nationalist sentiment among the Basque population.

During the 1890's Spain was having difficulties with the remnants of her overseas empire; and Arana, in his writings, delighted in this fact. His support for the overseas rebellion coupled with his views on Basque nationalism, plus his virulent attacks on public figures, led to his arrest in 1895. His arrest was not so much due to his views on nationalism as to his verbal attacks on the mayor of Bilbao. While he stayed in incarceration for the period of one month, the government brought action against the Basque Center, the headquarters of the Party, and demanded its closure. It seems that the immediate reason for the closure of the Basque Center by the government was the publication of an article in the Party's paper, the Bizkaitarra, entitled, "La invasion maketa en Guipuzcoa."¹⁴² This article so offended the military officers of the area that they planned to seize the headquarters of the Party. This was the first confrontation between the government and Basque nationalism. Arana took responsibility for the article and was given another four months in prison.

Initially Arana addressed himself to the people of

¹⁴²Venero, op. cit., p. 290. Unless otherwise indicated, references to Venero's work are made to the 1968 edition.

the Basque urban centers. But apparently he was not getting very much reaction from them, for in 1896, he decided to concentrate on the Basque peasants instead. To this end he began to write calendars and religious songs in euskera. In August of 1897 he started another paper, Baserritarra, directed primarily at the peasants.¹⁴³ In this paper he exhorted Basque workers not to support socialism gaining adherents among the workers of the mines of Bilbao, for in his view, it was a Spanish organization. For Arana the "foreign domination" was more odious than the "bourgeois domination"¹⁴⁴

In 1897 Arana, with the members of the governing committee of the Basque Center, decided to dissolve the organization, which had been closed by the government since 1895, and adopt instead a more low-keyed approach in their propaganda.¹⁴⁵ This was done in order to avoid government persecution, which had become more sensitive to the propaganda of the nationalists largely due to the overseas rebellion. In his writings Arana praised both the Cubans and the Philipinos. Consequently, he and his followers decided to form cultural and Catholic organizations under the cover of which nationalist objectives would be pursued.

¹⁴³Ibid., p. 293.

¹⁴⁴Quoted in Ibid., p. 294.

¹⁴⁵Basaldua, op. cit., p. 110.

The results of the elections of August 1898, for the provincial deputation, indicated that popular support for the ideas of Arana was more widespread than had been apparent. This was the year in which Spain had been defeated by the United States and lost the last vestiges of her empire. Passions were running high in Spain; and some groups made ready to take up arms against the government, including the Carlists whom Arana dissuaded from taking such action. Despite Arana's support for the overseas rebels, he was elected to the diputacion provincial in 1898.¹⁴⁶ This was the first time that Basque nationalism had competed for public office. In the following year five nationalists were elected to the municipal government of Bilbao.¹⁴⁷ Nationalists were also elected in other municipalities.

The electoral success of the nationalists in Bilbao, plus a new government in Madrid headed by Francisco Silvela which included members favorable to the idea of regionalism, produced optimism among the nationalists who decided to form another Batzoki (Basque Center). This time it was decided that the Party's propaganda should take a moderate tone: "The designation of nationalism should be concealed; but the

¹⁴⁶Ibid., p. 117.

¹⁴⁷Javier de Ybarra y Berge, Politica Nacional en Vizcaya (Madrid: Instituto de Estudios Politicos, 1948), p. 199. This book contains a wealth of information on the local politics of Vizcaya and the relationship between the industrialists of the region and the central government.

Center should function as a propaganda instrument. This would be carried out by a choral group known as Euskerrria and folkloric dancing groups."¹⁴⁸ The Center was inaugurated on April 23, 1899. On June 4, 1899, the first issue of a nationalist daily, El Correo Vasco, was published. This paper was not very successful. It only sold 134 copies.¹⁴⁹ This was followed in 1901 with the publication of a weekly, Euzkadi, of which four copies were sold. In October of 1901 another weekly appeared, La Patria, which continued to be published up to the 1930's. Although this paper disclaimed any association with Basque nationalism in order to avoid government harassment, it was actually maintained by Arana and his brother, Luis Arana.¹⁵⁰

In March of 1902 Arana once again confronted the Madrid government and was arrested, tried, and imprisoned for sending a telegram to President Roosevelt congratulating him for granting independence to Cuba:

Roosevelt, President of the United States.
Washington. The Basque Nationalist Party
congratulates the noble federation over which
you preside for having granted independence to
Cuba which had previously been liberated from
slavery. This magnanimous and just example
given by your powerful states is unknown and
unheard of in the history of European powers,
particularly Latin powers. If Europe followed
this example, the Basque nation, the oldest

¹⁴⁸Venero, op. cit., p. 302.

¹⁴⁹Ibid.

¹⁵⁰Ibid., p. 304.

people of Europe who have enjoyed centuries of liberty, and whose constitution has been praised in the United States, would also be free.--Arana Goiri.¹⁵¹

In view of the lack of enthusiasm that Arana seemed to be encountering for his nationalist doctrine, by 1902 he was beginning to have second doubts about the development of Basque nationalism. He seemed to have accepted the conclusion that the Basques had become too far assimilated into Spanish culture. It was his opinion that before long the Basques, as a distinct group, would disappear.¹⁵² His health was also deteriorating. Consequently, he argued that under the circumstances the best course for the Basques would be to acquire some degree of autonomy within the Spanish State. According to an article published in La Patria, he had decided to form a "new Basque party which would work for the well being of [the Basque country] within the Spanish State, and within the existing legal system, but which would offer general guide lines for the reorganization of the Spanish State and particular ones for the [Basque country]." ¹⁵³

The object of the new Party would be to work for "greatest autonomy possible within the Spanish State and at the same time the most appropriate to the Basque character

¹⁵¹ Reprinted in Venero, op. cit., p. 304.

¹⁵² Basaldua, op. cit., p. 139.

¹⁵³ La Patria, July 22, 1902.

and to modern times."¹⁵⁴ Following the footsteps of the movement for Home Rule in Catalonia, which at this time had acquired great momentum, he would name the new organization the Liga de vascos espanolistas. On August 24, 1902, La Patria, with an exhortation to all Basques to gather around the "Sacred Tree [the tree of Guernica_7]", a symbol of their "glorious and happy past"¹⁵⁵ announced the formation of the new organization. There were some indications that Arana's change was purely tactical¹⁵⁶ in order to avoid government persecution and to get the support of those groups which desired some degree of autonomy, such as the Carlists, but were unwilling to go as far as Arana. In view of the fact that the Lliga Regionalista of Catalonia seemed to be getting some concessions through parliamentary means, presumably, Arana believed that a similar strategy by the Basques would be far more effective.

For the provincial elections of 1903, the nationalists presented six candidates; but only two were elected. But for the Cortes elections of April, 1903, they did not present any candidates. In Guernica the millionaire Sota y Llano, a supporter of Basque nationalism, ran for office but was defeated.¹⁵⁷ The results of these elections once

¹⁵⁴Ibid.

¹⁵⁵Ibid., August 24, 1902.

¹⁵⁶See Engracio de Aranzadi, Ereintza (Zarauz, 1935).

¹⁵⁷Venero, op. cit., p. 310.

again led Arana to believe that Basque nationalism was in the throes of extinction. Even though he had established the ideological foundations of the movement and had acquired some followers, Basque nationalism had not spread to any significant degree beyond the confines of Vizcaya. On November 25, 1903, after having dedicated his life to the cause of Basque nationalism, Arana died from Adisson's disease. He provided Basque nationalism with its first martyr. After his death, Angel de Zambala Azumis assumed political leadership of the movement.

From the year of Arana's death to the 1930's, the Party gradually grew in numbers, spread to the other three provinces, and eventually acquired respectability as evidenced by its subsequent gradual successes in electoral politics.

Under the ideological leadership of Engracio de Aranzadi, the Party began to develop a cult of personality around Arana, later described by nationalists as El Libertador Vasco. An intensive propaganda campaign was also launched. In 1904 the Basque Youth Movement was founded in Vizcaya under the leadership of Luis Urrengoeche. In the following year, on April 29, 1905, the new leader of the Party, Angel de Zambala Azumis, issued a Party directive discussing the ideological position of the Party vis-a-vis other political parties and exhorting Party followers not to confuse the political objectives of the

(PNV) with the objectives of the other political parties. In their efforts to spread beyond the province of Vizcaya, the nationalists began to make contacts with the other three provinces in order to establish Basque Centers there. In 1904 the first Basque Center was opened in the province of Guipuzcoa. This was followed three years later with the inauguration of another center in Alava and another one, two years later, in Navarra. By 1910, the Party had branches in all of the four Basque provinces. Despite strong opposition from the tycoons of the region and the recently created nobility,¹⁵⁸ between 1903 and 1923 the Party became a serious political force in the Basque region, particularly in the province of Vizcaya where, in 1918, it had acquired enough of a following enabling it to get control of the provincial deputation. Vizcaya remained, down to the 1930's, the bastion of Basque nationalism and continued to provide the leading personalities of the Party starting with Arana.

In their efforts to revive Basque culture, the nationalists began to address themselves to a group which, particularly in the rural areas, had been regarded as the protector of whatever was left of Basque culture, that is,

¹⁵⁸The Basque industrialists seemed to have fruitful relations with the Madrid governments which they, along with the textile interests of Catalonia and the agrarian interests of Castile, successfully pressured for a policy of protectionism. See Puges, M., Como triunfo el proteccionismo en Espana (Barcelona: Editorial Juvenal, 1931).

the clergy. Along with this approach the Party also concentrated on building an electoral base in the rural areas. Although the Party had support in the provincial capitals, from which the leadership of the Party came, its electoral success in these area, specifically Bilbao and San Sebastian, would be limited by the fact that these two capitals contained large numbers of people who were non-Basques, and consequently, hostile to the movement. It seems that right after the death of Arana some segments of the clergy, either in overt or covert fashion, began to give support to the Party, a support which was destined to increase in subsequent years.¹⁵⁹ It was a member of the clergy, Reverend Ibero, who in 1906 published the following pamphlet in order to explain and popularize the ideology of

¹⁵⁹It seems that the connection between the fueros, God, and the clergy had always been close. During the course of a sermon in Guernica, on July 21, 1895, to commemorate the loss of the fueros, Rev. Resurrecion Maria de Azkue admonished the Basques never to forget their fueros: Cuales son las armas de nuestro pueblo? No penseis que vais a encontrar nuestro Roble en imagens de piedra. No existe en estas. Aparece muerto. Nosotros lo queremos con vida. Sabeis donde esta, muy vivo, mas que en parte alguna, el Roble de Guernica? Es en los corazones de los autenticos euskaldunes donde tiene raices mas hondas que en su tierra natal.

Escudrinad, vascongados amantes del Arbol, vuestro corazon; mirad bien ese Roble; lo teneis ahi mismo. Esta en brazos de una cruz; la Cruz de Jesus tiene abrazada, con grande carino nuestro Arbol. Con razon le llamamos Arbol santo. En la Cruz esta representado Dios; en el Arbol, la ley vieja, y en este senal de patriotismo que tenemos dentro del corazon, Dios y el Fuero.

Vascongados! Amad sin medida vuestro Roble; amad sin medida vuestra ley. Pues amando el Arbol conseguis introducir la Cruz en el Corazon y amando la ley amais al mismo Dios. Quoted in Venero, op. cit., p. 287.

nationalism. This pamphlet, entitled Ami Vasco, deserves to be quoted at length for it became one of the chief ideological statements of Basque nationalism:

49--What is Basque nationalism? It is the political system which defends the right of the Basque race to live independent from any other race.

50--What is the basis for this system? The distinction that exists between the Basque race and the other races of the world.

51--Is that distinction certain? Indeed it is; so much so that no man of a sound mind and median culture would dare to deny it.

52--How can you prove it? With a sound and irrefutable argument which is possible for anyone to reach. In effect, I said previously that differences between races is proved by the differences between languages. Since the Basque language differs radically from all the other languages, therefore, the race is also different from all the others.

57--Does one infer from what you said that the Basque is not genetically Spanish? Yes sir. Just as one can equally infer that he is not French, nor English, nor German, nor Russian, nor Hungarian, nor Turk, nor Greek, etc. To assert that the Basque is Spanish is to commit a triple error: ethnic, geographic, and political.

59--Has the Basque race, distinct from all the others, maintained up to the present its integrity and purity? Yes sir. If it had mixed with others, and in view of the fact that it is so small, it most certainly would have been absorbed by the others and at this time there would not even exist a memory of the Basque language. Likewise, the mixture of races should easily be seen in the Basque language. But one does not find any traces of French, Spanish, Celt, German, nor from any of the other European languages. One must conclude, consequently, that the Basque race has maintained its purity up to the present.

61--Is the right of the Basques to live independent from other peoples based solely on the difference that exists between their race and the others? No. It is also based on the exercise of that right which the Basques enjoyed for centuries until it was taken away from them.

66--When did the Basque states lose their independence? Those on the other side of the Pyrenees in 1789 during the French Revolution. Those on this side of the Pyrenees, much later, in 1839.

89--What are the objectives of nationalism? To re-establish the state of affairs in which the Basque states found themselves prior to 1839 and, without reducing the liberty of any one of them, to form amongst themselves a federation to protect the Basque race and its rights.

93--Is the Basque Nationalist Party a party fundamentally Catholic? Yes sir. The Party wants for Euzkadi Catholic unity with all its consequences, foremost and above all, the Jaun-Goikua [God], an Euzkadi devoted to God such as it was before its fall in 1839. There is no doubt on this point. If the Basque Nationalist Party had a choice between an Euzkadi with its rights but divorced from Christ, and one such as today and loyal to Christ, it would choose the latter.

104--Your reasoning is such that there is no choice but to accept your conclusions. But there is still a more powerful argument. Here it is: Euzkadi is Christian; Euzkadi believes in God....¹⁶⁰

Reverend Ibero had earlier encountered difficulties with the government for allegedly preached in a sermon, in Pamplona the capital of Navarra, the "exterminio de todos liberales."¹⁶¹ A publication of the Boletin Oficial del

¹⁶⁰Evangelista de Ibero (Rev.), Ami Vasco (Buenos Aires: Editorial Vasca Ekin, 1957).

¹⁶¹Ibid., p. 6.

Obispado, 1910, indicating that Basque names would be acceptable in the Church's registry is further indication that in their campaign to revive Basque culture the nationalists were gaining adherents among the clergy. In 1921 a group of Basque priests founded the Jaungoikua-Zola Baskuna, devoted to the instruction of Basque.¹⁶²

To the Basques, particularly the clergy, socialism and liberalism had become identified as anti-Christian and, therefore, anti-Basque. This, of course, was part and parcel of the Carlist ideology which had characterized every liberal as anti-Catholic since the Cadiz constitution of 1812. It should be added that among some segments of the population of Navarra such ideology still exists. It has been argued that the Basque clergy saw in the nationalist movement and in the revival of Basque culture a means to isolate the Basques from the influence of liberalism:

"Don't teach your sons Castilian, the language of liberalism."¹⁶³

The emergence of socialism among the mine and shipyard workers of Bilbao, in the latter part of the nineteenth century, gave rise to a situation which might have enabled the socialists to control local government (Bilbao) at the expense of both the nationalists and the established liberal and conservative groups. This fear on the part of the

¹⁶²Gabriel Jackson, The Spanish Republic and the Civil War 1931-1939 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965), p. 16.

¹⁶³Quoted in Cary op. cit., p. 558.

"establishment" of the Bilbao area was particularly manifest during the preparations for the general elections for the Cortes in 1907. There was fear that a split of the vote between the nationalist candidate, Pedro Anitua, and the candidate of the "establishment", Fernando Maria de Ybarra, an industrial tycoon, might give the seat of Bilbao to the socialist candidate, Pabo Iglesias, whom the fueristas regarded as a rabble rouser. The following quotation from a letter of a fuerista urging the nationalists to support Ybarra, illustrates the dismay of some fueristas at the idea of having a socialist representing Bilbao in the Cortes:

It has been brought to my attention that the Party (PNV) has decided to present its own candidate about whose personality I have nothing but praise. I also fully realize that such a project is motivated by an excessive zeal to maintain the purity of our doctrines. But I must also point out that under the present circumstances we must make all kinds of sacrifices in order to prevent sectarianism, the enemy of our race and laws, the standard-bearer of the breakers of our social institutions, the possibility of being elected. I consider it a small sacrifice for the nationalists and the orthodox fueristas to support Mr. Ybarra. I believe that it would be a shame for Bilbao and Vizcaya to elect to the Cortes to the first time, a representative of that party [Socialist_7, an enemy of all that which is sacred and dear to us. It is for this reason that I appeal to you and the Party to accept and support the candidacy of D. Fernando Maria de Ybarra.¹⁶⁴

There were some moderate nationalists who would rather have seen Ybarra elected than a socialist. And some of them

¹⁶⁴Ybarra Y Berge, op. cit., pp. 276-277.

did support Ybarra rather than their own candidate, as a result of which they were expelled from the Party. Ybarra was elected.

Antonio Maura's proposal (Maura was Prime Minister) to the Cortes of 1907 to reform local government, to make local governments more independent of the central government, helped¹⁶⁵ to spark the revival of fuerista sentiment in the Basque region. Judging from the behavior of the provincial deputations, fuerista sentiment was not dead as it had apparently appeared to many people of the region. On November 28, 1907, representatives from the provincial deputations of Alava, Guipuzcoa, and Vizcaya met to draft a proposal which would, if accepted by the government in Madrid, restore the foral regime of the Basque provinces. Among other things, the final draft of this proposal asked for the repeal of the 1876 law, which had finally abolished the fueros, and the "absolute restitution of [their] old regime." In order to accomplish this end, "the deputations of the Basque provinces and of the municipalities should constitute themselves and function in accord with their traditional usages and customs."¹⁶⁶ Fuerismo was back in

¹⁶⁵Carr indicates that the reform of local government had long been an issue in Spanish politics. Between 1882 and 1932, 20 proposals to reform local government were presented to the Cortes, p. 375. For a discussion of local government see, H. Puget Le Gouvernement Local en Espagne (Paris, 1920); A. Posada, La evolucion legislativa del regimen local (Madrid, 1910).

¹⁶⁶For a copy of this proposal see Ybarra y Berge, op. cit., p. 627.

politics again. Maura while desirous of government reform, his pet project to eliminate the corrupt system of caciquismo¹⁶⁷ by which elections were manipulated by the Ministry of the Interior in Madrid, would have nothing to do with this question. Moreover, he argued, if he ever gave any support to such proposal, he would bring upon himself the wrath of the liberals who were not very enthusiastic about his proposed local government reform since they viewed it as a tactic by the conservatives to eliminate liberal electorate strength. He replied that under the circumstances the Basques should be content with the status quo and the preservation of their concierto economico.¹⁶⁸

Apparently the nationalists did not involve themselves with this proposal put forth by the fueristas whom at this time they seemed to regard as their erstwhile opponents. Nevertheless, one might infer that this renewed interest in fuerismo could not but help the cause of the nationalists who continually maintained that the Basques lost their independence in 1839 after the conclusion of the first Carlist War.

During the municipal elections of Bilbao, 1909, the nationalists captured 8 seats out of a total of 23. They

¹⁶⁷For a discussion caciquismo, see Joaquin Costa, Oligarquia y caciquismo (Madrid, 1902).

¹⁶⁸Ybarra y Berge, op. cit., p. 285.

held the largest bloc of votes within the council. Jose Horn, a nationalist, was appointed mayor of Bilbao. The growing success of the nationalists, along with the growing strength of the socialists, led the conservative forces of the area, most of whom came from the banking and industrial sectors and who had dominated politics in the area, to formally organize a conservative party which would combat both the nationalists and the socialists in electoral politics.¹⁶⁹ Before the establishment of the conservative party, there had been some plans to form a Catholic party; but these plans failed. Leading the efforts to establish a local wing of the conservative party was Fernando Maria Ybarra, who became the local chief of the Party on June 30, 1909, when the Party was finally established. This event was honored with a visit of Antonio Maura, leader of the Conservatives and also Prime Minister. This was followed with the formation of a local wing of the Liberal Party in January of 1910.

Besides the fuerista sentiment already alluded to, another issue which helped to radicalize political life in the Basque region was the clerical issue introduced into politics by the Liberals in 1910 under the leadership of Jose Canalejas.¹⁷⁰ During the Restoration period, the

¹⁶⁹Ibid., pp. 313-319.

¹⁷⁰For a discussion of this issue and the Liberal Party, see Daniel Lopez (ed.), El Partido Liberal (Madrid, 1912).

number of religious orders had proliferated in Spain. In 1910 the Liberals mad an issue out of this by introducing legislation, Ley de Condado, which would require the religious orders to register just like any other organizations and would prevent the further growth of them without the permission of the government. To the Church and its supporters, this was a violation of the Concordat and an impingment on the Church's freedom. On July 10, 1910, Canalejas suspended diplomatic relations with the Vatican. This action caused such a fury in the Basque region that, in the words of Carr, "Basque Catholics threatened civil war...."¹⁷¹ Ybarra, a Basque industrialist, sent his personal secretary to Rome to inquire about what to do regarding the government's legislation.¹⁷²

The Basque nationalists along with other Catholic groups of the Basque region planned a demonstration in order to dissuade the government from carrying through the proposed legislation. The government forbade such a demonstration, declared Bilbao under martial law, and sent troops to the area.

The general events surrounding national politics

See also D. Sevilla Andres, Canalejas (Barcelona, 1956); and M. Fernandez Almagro, Historia del reinado de D. Alfonso XIII (Barcelona, 1934).

¹⁷¹Carr, op. cit., p. 492.

¹⁷²Ybarra y Berge discusses at length the negative reactions of the Basque industrialists to this law, pp. 347-348.

such as the revival of anti-clericalism, with the subsequent reactions in the Basque region from right-wing groups, plus the emergence of fuerismo, presented the Party with some problems. It would have to compete with other groups such as the Carlists and other Catholic groups. But the Party's support for the Church, a revered institution in the Basque region, and its association with right-wing groups, unwittingly meant support for the monarchy. But republicanism was one of the Party's main tenets. For a group within the Party the recent growing confessionality of the Party and its attempts to appeal to right-wing groups, was taken with strong reservations. Consequently, this secularly oriented minority decided at the end of 1910 to leave the Party and form a new group with the motto of Aberri eta Askatasuna (Fatherland and Liberty) and founded a paper entitled Askatasuna. Its headquarters became known as the Centro Nacionalista Republicano Vasco.¹⁷³ This group which never acquired too much of a following represented the Left in Basque nationalism.

The growing appeal of socialism to the mine and shipyard workers of Bilbao, most of whom were from the outside of the Basque region, motivated the (PNV) with the help of the clergy to found a Basque Catholic workers organization which would be affiliated with the Party.

¹⁷³Venero, op. cit., pp. 340-341.

This occurred in 1911 with the formation of the Solidaridad de Obreros Vascos (SOV).¹⁷⁴ To this organization came a number of small Catholic labor unions which had existed in the Basque country for some time.¹⁷⁵ But it seems that the predominant group within this organization was the white collar workers of Bilbao. Although originally Basque industrialists, with very few exceptions, they did not support the nationalists whom they regarded as "rebeldes burgueses";¹⁷⁶ apparently some industrialists eventually came to the support of the Basque labor unions which eschewed the notion of class struggle. Needless to say, for this posture they became the object of disdain for socialist and anarchist labor unions.¹⁷⁷ The social philosophy of the (PNV) was basically a conservative Catholic social philosophy derived from the encyclicals of Pope Leo XIII.

The period between 1913 and 1923 was a time of social and political turmoil in Spain. The political coalition which had governed Spain since the Restoration in 1876

¹⁷⁴Euzko Langileen Alkartasuna (Solidaridad de Obreros Vascos), (Biarritz, 1961).

¹⁷⁵Juan N. Garcia-Nieto, El sindicalismo cristiano en Espana; notas sobre su origen y evolucion hasta 1936. (Bilbao: Universidad de Deusto, Instituto de Estudios Economico-Sociales, 1960). For a list of Catholic labor organizations in the Basque region at the turn of this century see, Estadistica de las Asociaciones Catolicas de obreros de Espana en 1 de mayo de 1907 (Madrid: Consejo Nacional de las Asociaciones Catolicas, 1907).

¹⁷⁶Ybarra y Berge, op. cit., p. 465.

¹⁷⁷The socialist labor unions labelled them as "amarillos."

was beginning to disintegrate and seemed unable to deal with the new political forces making demands on the political system.¹⁷⁸ There were sporadic strikes followed by social disturbances and, by the end of the decade, particularly after World War I, persistent government crises. Regionalism in both Catalonia and the Basque region became increasingly militant. In the province of Vizcaya, the nationalists gained control of the provincial deputation. Following the footsteps of Catalonia which had already been given a statute to form a Mancomunidad (1913), the (PNV) just before the provincial elections had issued a manifesto also asking for a Mancomunidad for the Basque provinces. Although nationalist sentiment was not as intense in the other three provinces as it was in Vizcaya, there is no question that sentiment for some form of Home Rule was widespread throughout the Basque region. For example, at a meeting in Vitoria, the capital city of Alava, in July of 1917, the provincial deputations of Alava, Guipuzcoa, and Vizcaya met to discuss plans to write a proposal to be submitted to the government to grant local autonomy. The final version of the proposal asked for complete autonomy, insofar as the domestic affairs of the provinces were concerned, but would leave the power to deal with foreign affairs in the Spanish State. Essentially, some kind of a

¹⁷⁸For a discussion of this period see Carr, op. cit., pp. 489-558.

federal relationship. This proposal submitted to the government on December 17, 1917, was shelved, as several before, for further consideration. The initiative for this proposal had come from Vizcaya where the nationalists were displaying new confidence as the result of their electoral success in the recent elections.

In the following year during the general elections for the Cortes, the nationalists elected seven deputies, four of which were elected in Vizcaya. On October 25, 1918, the Basque nationalist deputies, in commemoration of the loss of the fueros on October 25, 1839, sent a telegram to President Wilson:

At the LXXIX anniversary of the abrogation of the Spanish government of the independence of the Basque nation, those undersigned deputies and senators of the Spanish Parliament mindful of their responsibilities in the name of the Basque nation, give greetings to the President of the United States of America who has established the basis for the future peace of the world based on the right of every nationality, small or large, to live in whatever form it wishes. These bases, which were accepted by all the belligerent states, we would like to see promptly applied as required by the interests of justice and collective freedom.¹⁷⁹

A similar telegram was sent to Clemenceau. This was not the first time that the nationalists had tried to get international attention for their cause. As will be recalled, Arana had done a similar thing when he sent a telegram to the American

¹⁷⁹Reprinted in Venero, op. cit., p. 395.

President in 1902 when Cuba was given its independence. And in 1916 the Basque nationalists had sent delegates to the Conference des Nationalites in Lausanne. But prior to 1936 it seems that the Basques did not make too much of an effort to give their cause international recognition. Such efforts came only after 1939, as a result of the dramatic events surrounding the Spanish Civil War when they were defeated along with the Republican forces.

This telegram sent to Wilson and Clemenceau caused great consternation within the Cortes. Victor Pradera, a Traditionalist from Navarra who down to 1936 remained one of the more outspoken defenders of Spanish unity within the Basque region, launched an attack on the nationalists and tried to use historical evidence to refute their separatist claims. As to the question of a Basque ethnicity, Pradera chided them over the fact that so many of the Basque nationalists were not of Basque descent:

I have maintained that race is not the criterion for nationality; but you have persistently maintained the contrary. Using your own argument, I ask you: Where is your race? Italians, but no Basques; Frenchmen, but no Basques; Germans, but no Basques; and Spaniards who have abandoned their fathers and mothers. How can you represent the race whose existence you maintain?¹⁸⁰

¹⁸⁰Quoted in Ibid., Jose Horn, a senator from Vizcaya, was of German descent; Pedro de Chalbaud, another senator from Vizcaya, was of French ancestry; and Arturo Campion from Navarra was of Italian ancestry. "This reflects the nationalists dilemma that much of the population of the Basque country, including many ardent nationalists, possessed shaky geneological claims to Basque descent. This fact

Following the behavior of their brethern, on December 30, 1918, a meeting of Navarrese mayors, deputies, and provincial deputies took place in Pamplona, the capital city of Navarra, in which a proposal for autonomy was approved:

Seeing that Navarra's aspirations for the restitution of its foral institutions remain as firm as ever, and in light of the present government's recognition of the possibility of granting autonomy to the various regions, this Assembly considers it appropriate at this time for the deputation to bring once again to the attention of the government Navarra's desire to have its moral faculties restored by repealing all laws which contravene them. Without breaking from Spain, Navarra desires to retain the special characteristics of its ancient kingdom but adapted to actual conditions and in harmony with those spheres within the purview of the power of the Spanish State.¹⁸¹

As illustrated by this statement, the demands of Navarra were nothing more than old fuerismo in a modified form. There was nothing radical about this proposal. Underlying it the political unity of Spain was accepted. This was an assumption which the nationalists did not accept. As we shall see later, Navarra followed a different path and disassociated itself from the other three provinces when a

lends substance to the somewhat jocular criticism that in order to be a confirmed Basque nationalist one must possess at least one non-Basque last name or be ignorant of the Basque language." William A. Douglass and Milton M. da Silva, "Basque Nationalism," in Oriol Pi Sunyer (ed.), The Limits of Integration: Ethnicity and Nationalism in Modern Europe. Research Report No. 9, Department of Anthropology, University of Massachusetts, October, 1971, p. 182.

¹⁸¹Reprinted in Venero, op. cit., p. 400.

statute of autonomy was finally given in October of 1936.

The recent manifestation for local autonomy on the part of the Basques and Catalonia led the government of Romanones, in 1919, to appoint an extra-parliamentary committee to investigate this problem and come up with some proposal. After some deliberation, this committee presented a proposal which would grant autonomy to the Basque provinces within the Spanish State.¹⁸² Among the items enumerated in this proposal, the Basque language would be given official status and would become a requirement for public employment in the Basque region. As to military service, a sensitive issue in the Basque provinces, the Basques would be obligated to serve in the Spanish military just as any other Spaniards; but the provinces would have the option of deciding on the form of recruitment. Consonant with one of the traditional Basque fueros, Basque servicemen would be stationed in their provinces except in cases of war. To the more extreme nationalists, this proposal was not satisfactory, because it proceeded on the assumption that the Basques were a mere region of Spain a view which Arana had rejected.

Apparently there was a group within the party who had come to the conclusion that under the circumstances the more realistic thing to do would be to accept the fuera

¹⁸²For a copy of the proposal see Venero, op. cit., pp. 401-404.

view and speak in terms of regionalism rather than nationalism. Whether this view was being accepted merely as a tactic or whether it was sincerely believed, is difficult to tell although there is evidence that a change in ideology was taking place. It seems that some members of the Party were beginning to believe that the cause of nationalism had not gone very much beyond what it was when Arana founded the Party in 1894. Consequently, the Party seemed to be moving to a position close to that of Cambo in Catalonia, that is, regionalism. This was the conclusion reached by someone familiar with the activities of the Party at that time:

The Basque Nationalist Party is losing its cohesion and aggressiveness. It is becoming factionalized and coming apart. One of its factions is espousing a more tolerant view of Spain and of the Spanish State. At this moment a few men of good sense are in the process of writing a manifesto of separation. They declare themselves to be avid supporters of the Basque language and the cultural life of the Basque people, but they are willing to live within Spain and even some say that they are among the erstwhile supporters of the king. They are about to form a fuerista party similar to the one that existed before. This turn of events is a return to an ancient cause.¹⁸³

The same writer also makes the interesting insight regarding Basque nationalism by indicating that one of the reasons for the slow development of Basque nationalism was the fact that it had not been suppressed enough:

¹⁸³Joaquin Adan, La obra postuma de Joaquin Adan (Bilbao: Editorial Vizcaina, 1938), p. 102.

Basque nationalism is the least persecuted of all nationalisms. It has not been intertwined with religious struggles and neither has it been subjected to the sword, such as the Irish case. The reactions of the public authorities had consisted in the mere closure of a few clubs, censure of a few publications, and a few shots by the security guards.¹⁸⁴

This shift in attitude was not acceptable to all members of the Party and to the youth organizations. These developments led to another schism within the Party; but this time it was led by the ideological purists under the leadership of Sabino Arana's brother, Luis de Arana, who had helped to found the Partido Nacionalista Vasco.¹⁸⁵ Since Primo de Rivera¹⁸⁶ disbanded all political organizations during his dictatorship, not very much is known about the political activities of both groups during the 1920's, although they continued their propaganda campaign at a different level through cultural organizations.

The social and political disintegration which seemed to have been taking place within Spain was brought to a halt

¹⁸⁴Ibid., p. 103.

¹⁸⁵Luis de Arana Goiri, Formulario de los principios esenciales y basicos del primitivo nacionalismo vasco, contenidos en el lema Jaun-Goikua eta Lagi-Zarra (Bilbao: Artes Graficas Grijelmo, S.A., 1932.)

¹⁸⁶For a brief discussion of the Union Patriotica, Primo de Rivera's party, see Juan J. Linz, "From Falange to Movimiento-Organizacion: The Spanish Single Party and the Franco Regime, 1936-1968," in Samuel P. Huntington and Clement H. Moore (eds.) Authoritarian Politics in Modern Society (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1970), p. 131.

along with all political activities in 1923. On September 13 of that year General Primo de Rivera led a successful coup d'etat which brought the regime which had governed Spain since the Restoration to an end. Subsequently, all political parties were dissolved along with all the provincial deputations. The only political organization allowed to function was the Union Patriotica founded by the supporters of Primo de Rivera. Although the Basque provincial deputations were dissolved, along with the deputations of the other provinces, he kept the concierto economico as a result of which he received the support of the Basque industrialists.

Paradoxical as it might seem, and judging from the events of 1931, Basque nationalism seemed to have flourished under the dictatorship of Primo de Rivera. Although he forbade the publication of nationalist periodicals and newspapers, apparently he closed his eyes to their cultural activities. It was during his regime that the Basque language was given recognition by the Real Academia Espanola. Because political manifestations of Basque nationalism were not allowed, the nationalists concentrated their efforts in religious and cultural festivities. Theatrical groups such as Naski travelled throughout the region performing Basque plays; and Pizkundia, a publishing house devoted exclusively to Basque publications, was also founded.¹⁸⁷ This is a tactic

¹⁸⁷Venero, op. cit., p. 444.

which was adopted years later under the Franco regime.

The growth of nationalism in the Basque region proceeded simultaneously with efforts at cultural revival. As we recall, Arana himself had started his nationalistic activities by immersing himself in philological studies. It must be emphasized, however, that many of those engaged in the efforts to revive Basque culture and language did not necessarily share the political objectives of the nationalists although they collaborated in this endeavour.

Starting with the latter part of the nineteenth century, the Basque region experienced a romantic movement which manifested itself in Basque historical studies with the end result of mythologizing much of Basque history:

The country was experiencing a pseudo-historic romantic movement which constructed legendary traditions with supposed heroic feats of the ancient Basques such as their rivalry with the Romans but never conquered by them, the feat of Roncevalles, medieval horrors, and popular creeds.¹⁸⁸

The Basques were portrayed as a fiercely independent and democratic people whose history had been one of persistent struggle to preserve their independence and liberties. But with the establishment of such scholarly journals as La Revista Internacional de Estudios Vascos (1907), and Eusko-Folklore (1923), Basque studies were put within a

¹⁸⁸Luis Michelena, Historia de la Literatura Vasca (Madrid: Ediciones Minotauro, 1960), p. 136. This work discusses the historical development of Basque literature both in Spain and France.

more rigorous setting.

This romantic movement had its precursor in the person of Jose Maria Yparraguirre who, in the late 1850's and early 1860's, romanticized, in the form of popular songs, the loss of the Basque fueros.¹⁸⁹ It must be added that this was done with the support of the provincial deputations which in the later years of his life gave him a pension.

This interest in the revival of Basque culture was also shown by the governmental bodies of the region. In 1888, for example, the Diputacion de Vizcaya finally created a chair of Basque studies, a project which had long been discussed by Basque academicians. Resurreccion Maria de Azkue, a doyen of Basque studies, particularly the language, became the first catedratico. Both Miguel de Unamuno and Sabino Arana applied for this position.

Judging from the short duration of the periodicals which were founded during this period,¹⁹⁰ it seems that the sentiment to revive the language and the culture was not widespread. Much of this effort and sentiment did not go beyond academic circles. In contrast to the rise of

¹⁸⁹Yparraguirre wrote the Guernicacao Arbola (The Tree of Guernica)--this is the tree under which the kings of Castile used to take the oath to respect the Basque fueros--which eventually became a national anthem for the Basques.

¹⁹⁰Revista de Vizcaya (Bilbao, 1885-1889); Revista de las Provincias Euskeras (Vitoria, 1878-1880); Revista Euskera (Pamplona, 1878-1883); Euskal-erria (San Sebastian, 1880-1917).

nationalism in Catalonia, Basque nationalism was not preceded by a literary renaissance. And one of the early objectives of the Party was precisely to do this: to get the Basques to become more interested in speaking and writing euskera. The pattern of the rise of Basque nationalism has not followed very closely the pattern of other nationalist movements. That is, first there is a cultural revival which is later followed by political nationalism.¹⁹¹

The efforts at cultural revival, as opposed to political nationalism, was pursued by Basques on both sides of the Spanish-French border. For example, at the Congreso de Euskeristas Para La Unificacion de la Ortografia, held on September 16, 1901, in Hendaya, Basques from both sides of the border participated. Both sides were also present at the founding of the Federacion de Literatura Vasca, November 8, 1901, to which the Canon of the Cathedral of Bayonne was elected president and Sabino de Arana vice president. This collaboration has continued down to the present. It seems that the French region has produced a richer literary tradition (in Basque) than the Spanish region.¹⁹²

¹⁹¹"In most cases...the national revival began as a purely cultural movement....Elsewhere, nearly always the first symptoms of the new age was an eager delving into national history and philology, the collection of legends and folk-lore, the compilation of grammars and textbooks." C.A. Macartney, National States and National Minorities (London, 1934), p. 94.

¹⁹²Luis Michelena, "La Literatura en Lengua Vasca," La Gran Enciclopedia Vasca (Bilbao, 1968), p. 10.

These efforts to revive the culture culminated in 1918 when the deputations of the Basque provinces, with the help and support of the PNV sponsored the First Congress of Basque Studies held at Onate. Although nationalists were present at this congress, the participants consisted of people of diverse political leanings.¹⁹³ The congress was honored with the presence of Alfonso XIII who was named honorary president of the governing board. From this congress the Sociedad de Estudios Vascos and the Academia de la Lengua Vasca emerged.

Viewed retrospectively, the Basque culture was too far gone for a successful resuscitation. In the words of Carr as late as the 1930's--and one might add up to now--Basque nationalism had "produced no literature even remotely comparable with that of the Catalan Renaissance."¹⁹⁴ This is not to mean that there are no literary figures in the Basque region. On the contrary, the Basque region has produced much literature; but most of it written in Spanish. Pio Baroja, has written profusely about the Basques, but all of it in Spanish. Both Unamuno and Maeztu, titans of the

¹⁹³Primer Congreso de Estudios Vascos, (Bilbao: Bilbaina de Artes Graficas, 1919). It was one of the main objectives of this congress to place the study of the Basque language on a more "scientific" level. A list of 774 persons attending this congress reveals that most of them were from urban centers and middle class background. Reading the papers presented at this congress one gets the impression that the feeling of Basque identity was quite strong.

¹⁹⁴Carr, op. cit., p. 556.

generation of '98, wrote their works in Spanish.

Although Basque nationalism found followers among some Carlists and persons from Carlist families--Arana's family had supported the Carlist wars--it was essentially a new radical political force in the Basque region. As we saw in our discussion of Carlismo, it did not advance political separatism from Spain. It was essentially a conservative movement trying to preserve the traditional institutional arrangements of the Spanish Monarchy and thus, preserve the traditional Basque local liberties, a phenomenon which had also occurred in other European countries when modernization and state centralization got under way. In contradistinction to Basque nationalism, Carlismo can properly be called a regional movement which presupposes the existence of the larger Spanish nation. In a way the fueristas had a double nationalism: one Spanish and one Basque.¹⁹⁵ The fueristas, while very much suspicious of the power of the central government, and also concerned with the preservation of the Basque language, nevertheless, objected to the political objectives of the nationalists. Among representatives of the fuerista view, one finds Victor Pradera, an avid defender of the traditional

¹⁹⁵It should be pointed out that many Spaniards make a distinction between "la patria chica" and "la patria grande". The former refers to the region and the latter to the whole of Spain. But, as many Spaniards say, in many cases the "patria Chica" is the one that counts.

prerogatives of the provinces; but who, at the same time, persistently castigated the political doctrine of the nationalists and their vitriolic attacks on Spain. To the Carlists the political unity of Spain was not in question.

All in all there is no question that sentiment for some degree of autonomy continued to exist in the Basque region. However, not all such sentiment could be labelled nationalistic for the reasons discussed above.

C H A P T E R I V

BASQUE NATIONALISM AND THE SECOND SPANISH REPUBLIC 1931-1939

With the resignation of General Primo de Rivera on January 28, 1930, as dictator of Spain, and the subsequent proclamation of the Second Spanish Republic on April 14, 1931, a new era in Spanish politics began. This era offered new possibilities to Basque nationalism since the political freedom of the new republic would allow the nationalists to openly proselytize for their cause. Apparently Basque nationalism had suffered less under the dictatorship of Primo de Rivera than might have been expected. No sooner had the Republic been proclaimed than the nationalists immediately began to mobilize their forces and to discuss the possibility of demanding a statute of autonomy from the new government and immediately assumed that the new Republic would be federal. In order to mobilize their supporters, the nationalists called for a rally to take place in Guernica on April 17, 1931. But the new government forbade such a rally for fear that the Basques might follow the example of the Catalans who, under the leadership of Francisco Macia, had proclaimed a Catalan State (April 14) within the Spanish Republic.

On April 19, 1931, the Partido Nacionalista Vasco issued a manifesto recognizing and supporting the Republic

and expressing the aspirations of the Basque municipalities for the restitution of their traditional liberties.¹⁹⁶ It was expected that the new regime would be more responsive to the demands for autonomy than the previous governments, under the monarchy. But it later became apparent that the new regime was almost as reluctant as the governments of the monarchy to hand out statutes of autonomy. Furthermore, while Article II of the constitution of the Republic made provisions for regional autonomy,¹⁹⁷ which if applied to all regions or provinces would lead to a federal republic, the new republicans were as unwilling as their predecessors to recognize the Basques as a nation. It must also be noted that the leadership of the PNV did not call for outright independence either but for autonomy within the Spanish Republic. But one may conjecture that autonomy was only a step in the direction of eventual political independence.

Jose Antonio de Aguirre y Lecube, a young lawyer from an industrialist family of Bilbao who had been elected mayor of the town of Guecho during the April 12, 1931, municipal

¹⁹⁶For a copy of the text see Venero, op. cit., p. 478.

¹⁹⁷The constitution of the Second Spanish Republic was promulgated on December 9, 1931. Article II read as follows: "If one or several contiguous provinces with common historical, cultural, and economic characteristics agree to organize as an autonomous region, in order to form a political and administrative nucleus within the Spanish State, they shall present their charter according to the provisions of Article 12." For a collection of Spanish constitutions see Arnold Verduin (ed.), Manual of Spanish Constitutions 1808-1931 (Ypsilandi, Michigan: University of Lithoprinters, 1941).

elections, assumed leadership of Basque nationalism with the advent of the Republic. Aguirre had a long record of social activism and was popularly known as a leading soccer player in the Basque region. He had founded the Sociedad Eusko-Maitesuna (Basque Youth Organization) and was former president of the influential Accion Catolica de Vizcaya.¹⁹⁸ His religiosity and social work with the Catholic organizations of the region undoubtedly made him a strategic candidate to lead Basque nationalism for he probably had more contacts with the clergy of the region--in the Basque country very close to the parishoners and respected by them (in contrast to most of Spain)--than any of the other leading members of the Party, and thus, maintaining the Party's identification with the Church.

Under his leadership, the Party initiated an intensive campaign in order to bring Navarra under the orbit of Basque nationalism. Several meetings and rallies were held in Navarra in order to popularize nationalism in that province. Aguirre chose Navarra as his electoral district when he campaigned for the constituent Cortes of 1931. Despite these efforts, Navarra continued to be the home base of Carlismo. But the fear that the new Cortes might be composed of a leftist majority which within the context of Spanish politics would mean an avalanche of anticlericalism,

¹⁹⁸For a short bibliography on Aguirre see Pedro de Basaldua, En Defensa de la Verdad (Buenos Aires: Editorial Vasca Ekin, 1956).

motivated the Carlists to join the nationalists in an electoral alliance for the coming general elections. In return the nationalists were able to elicit support for an autonomy statute.

After these initial agreements, the Society of Basque Studies was entrusted with the responsibility of writing up the proposal for Basque autonomy which was later approved at an assembly of Basque municipalities held in Estella (the old Carlist capital) on June 16, 1931.¹⁹⁹ The Carlists accepted this proposal with less than rampant enthusiasm. While the nationalists viewed the coming elections for the Cortes as a plebescite for or against the formation of a Basque state, the Navarrese looked upon the statute as a "Catholic-fuerista coalition for the defense of the high interests of the Church, full restitution of the fueros, and the statute which Navarra may approve."²⁰⁰ As a concession to the Carlists, an article was included in the proposed statute stipulating that within the Basque region relations between Church and State would be governed by a Concordat to be negotiated by the Basque provinces and the Vatican. Furthermore, all the educational institutions of the Basque country would pass under the complete control

¹⁹⁹This statute became known as the Estatuto General del Estado Vasco. For a copy see Venero, op. cit., p. 639.

²⁰⁰Jose Antonio de Aguirre y Lecube, Entre la libertad y la revolucion 1930-1935 (Bilbao: Verdes, n.d.), p. 92.

of the Basque provinces. This aspect of the proposed statute, which later became a point of contention between the central government (composed of a republican-socialist coalition) and the Basques, aroused the anticlerical feelings of the socialists who felt that "Spain (could) not tolerate the territory [the Basque country] turning itself into a Vaticanist Gibraltar."²⁰¹

The general elections for the constituent Cortes (June 16, 1931) produced a republican-socialist majority. These elections also produced a relative success for the nationalists. Out of 17 seats in the Basque country, they captured 13.²⁰² The other four remaining seats were split

²⁰¹El Socialista, June 30, 1931. It seems that earlier Indalecio Prieto, the leader of the Socialists of Bilbao, had indicated that only the Leftists regions would be given autonomy. See Juan de Iturralde (Padre Juan de Usabiaga is the real name), El catolicismo y la cruzada de Franco (Bayonne, France: Editorial Egui-Indarra, 1956), I, p. 60.

²⁰²Composition of the Constituent Cortes elected June, 1931:

Party	Seats
PSOE (Spanish Socialist Party)	105
Esquerra (Catalan Left)	34
Accion Republicana	24
Organi. Regional Gallega Autonoma (Orga)	14
Radical Socialists	50
Republicans on different coalitions	62
Partido Federal	10
Progresistas	8
Intellectuals at the service of the Republic	10
Derecha Republicana	13
Republicano Liberal Democrata	2
Derecha Liberal Republicana	6
Partido Radical	70
Lliga Regionalista (Catalan Right)	2
Partido Nacionalista Vasco	13
Independents of the Center-Right and Right	13

between republicans and socialists. These elections also indicated that the nationalists had displaced the Carlist influence from both Vizcaya and Guipuzcoa. Neither one of these provinces voted for traditionalist candidates. And in Navarra, Aguirre was elected.

Two days before the opening of the Cortes, the nationalist-traditionalist group held a rally in the town of Guernica (the symbol of Basque liberties) where the nationalists made a pledge to fight for the autonomy of Euzkadi within the Cortes. Among the deputies elected to the Cortes was Canon Antonio Pildain from Guipuzcoa who at this meeting referred to the Basque country as the "Irelanda de Occidente" and to Aguirre as their O'Connell.²⁰³

Among the first items to be discussed by the constituent Cortes, which started its first session on July 14, 1931, was an old and sensitive question in Spanish politics: namely, the position of the Catholic Church in Spanish society. When Article 26 of the new constitution came before the floor

Agrarios	24
Accion Nacional	3
Renovacion Espanola	2
Tradicionalistas (Carlists)	2
Unidentified	3
Total	<u>470</u>

Source: Juan Linz, "The Party System in Spain: Past and Future", p. 260. Cited in the previous chapter.

²⁰³Quoted in Richard A. H. Robinson, The Origins of of Franco's Spain 1931-1936 (Pittsburg: University of Pittsburg Press, 1970).

for debate, the first fury within the new Cortes took place. According to this Article the Catholic Church would lose all the privileges that it had enjoyed under the monarchy. The traditional government budget for the Church would be eliminated within two years, religious orders would have to register as any other secular organizations and would be allowed only as much property as required for their survival. Furthermore, Church property would be taxed and the educational activities of the Church would cease.

This issue brought the Basques into the first conflict with the new government. Because of their intense opposition to this Article, the Basque deputies were labelled by their fellow deputies as "cavemen".²⁰⁴ In the Basque region there were some demonstrations against the new government; and the Basque press, most of which was in Catholic hands, launched a virulent attack on the government for which the government suspended most of the newspapers. The Basque deputies walked out of the Cortes.

The proposed statute for autonomy was finally presented to the government by a Basque delegation in September 1931. The religious clause in that document was not acceptable to the government which appointed a committee to revise it. The revised statute, ready by January of 1932, omitted the possibility of a Basque concordat with the Vatican and gave

²⁰⁴Ibid.

the central government greater control in the areas of public education.²⁰⁵ The traditionalists immediately refused to accept the revised document which they referred to as "Godless". The traditionalist press proceeded to attack it and offered 5,000 pesetas to any person who could find the name of God mentioned in it.²⁰⁶ The gap between the traditionalists and the nationalists was further widened when the members of the old Integralist Party and the Carlists met in Pamplona on January 6, 1932, and joined forces to defend the Church and traditional Spain. As a result of this meeting, the Comunion Tradicionalista Carlista emerged which supported restitution of the fueros but rejected the idea of a single statute for the Basque region for that was considered a contrafuero.²⁰⁷ Nevertheless, despite their opposition to the statute, at a meeting of Basque municipalities held in Navarra on January 31 to decide as to whether or not a single statute was acceptable to all the provinces, a majority of the Navarrese municipalities

²⁰⁵The article regarding the Concordat with the Vatican contradicted Article 26 of the Spanish constitution which read as follows: "All religious denominations shall be considered associations subject to special laws. The state, regions, provinces, and municipalities may not maintain, favour, and subsidize financially, churches or religious associations and institutions." Verduin, op. cit., p. 88.

²⁰⁶Aguirre, Entre la libertad y la revolucion, p. 93; Iturralde, I, p. 242.

²⁰⁷Santiago Galindo de Herrero, Los Partidos Monarquicos Bajo la Segunda Republica, (Madrid: Ediciones Rialp, 1956), pp. 129-131.

decided for a single statute.²⁰⁸

Meanwhile, the traditionalists continued their campaign to change Navarrese opinion to vote against the statute. In order to counteract the propaganda of the traditionalists, the Navarrese deputation issued a statement on June 6 asking the municipalities to accept the statute and indicating that there was no reason to fear the loss of the traditional personality of Navarra.²⁰⁹ The subsequent vote taken on June 16, 1932, to approve the statute, revealed that the traditionalists had been able to change the opinion of a substantial number of municipalities. When the municipalities gathered in Pamplona to take a vote on the statute, they encountered such slogans as "Fueros, yes! Estatute, no!" The leader of the integralists, Juan de Alazabal, referred to the nationalists thus: "Oh, if St. Peter the Apostle were living in these times, what epistles he would write against certain Catholics."²¹⁰ When a vote was finally taken, the Navarrese municipalities rejected the statute by a vote of 123 to 109 while 35 municipalities abstained. It was approved overwhelmingly by the municipalities of Vizcaya

²⁰⁸Jaime Ignacio del Burgo, Origen y Fundamento del Regimen Foral de Navarra (Pamplona: Editorial Aranzadi, 1968), p. 472. This work gives a very extensive discussion of the legal relationship between the Spanish State and Navarra up to the present.

²⁰⁹Ibid.

²¹⁰Quoted in Robinson, op. cit., p. 92.

and Guipuzcoa while only 51 of the municipalities of Alava accepted it with 15 abstaining and 11 voting against it.²¹¹ Making a comparison again with Ireland, the nationalist Manuel Irujo Ollo referred to Navarra as their Ulster.²¹² Despite the rejection of the statute by the Navarrese, the nationalists had made substantial inroads into Navarra which had remained in the periphery of Basque nationalism. Without the acquiescence of Navarra, some of the municipalities of Alava began to manifest doubt regarding the acceptance of a single statute for it was feared that without Navarra Alava would become a satellite of the two richer industrial provinces. Consequently, on June 26 a traditionalist Alavese deputy, Jose L. Oriol y Uriguren, called a meeting of Alavese mayors to discuss the implications of the statute and explain the reasons for Alava's reluctance to accept it.²¹³ The Carlists concentrated their propaganda efforts on Alava in order to wrest control of that province from the nationalists. Along with the Monarchists they also launched a vituperative campaign against the nationalists and in August of 1932 produced a document revealing a Nationalist-Communist-Jewish-Masonic plot to destroy the Catholic Church.²¹⁴ The PNV was able to get the help of

²¹¹See Table in the Appendix.

²¹²Joaquin Arraras, Historia de la Segunda Republica Espanola (Madrid: Editora Nacional, 1964), I, p. 388.

²¹³Quoted in Ibid., p. 388.

²¹⁴Robinson, op. cit., p. 146.

the bishops of Vitoria and Pamplona to indicate that the document had no foundation. This marked the end of the coalition between the nationalists and the Navarrese, although there were substantial supporters of nationalism within Navarra. Under the circumstances, Aguirre decided that the association with the traditionalists was more of a burden than a benefit, and consequently, proceeded to organize to hold a plebescite with or without Navarra. When the government approved a statute of autonomy for Catalonia in September of 1932, the nationalists felt confident that a Basque statute would soon also be granted. Since they had lost the support of the traditionalists, the nationalists now concentrated in maintaining a good rapport with the government in Madrid. But the political ideologies and factions within parliament and the Basque region were such that the nationalists were bound to get into conflict with the government. If they became too close to the traditionalists, they would invite the displeasure of the government in Madrid. On the other hand, if they became too close to the central government, the traditionalists would accuse them of supporting a government dedicated to the destruction of the Catholic Church. Consequently, when the municipal elections of April of 1933 were held, the nationalists decided to campaign alone and won twice as many seats as the other parties.

Meanwhile, another event occurred which once again

brought the Basque region, along with the PNV, into conflict with the central government. In May of 1933, the Cortes passed the Law of Congregations which would implement Article 26 of the constitution. As a result of this law, all Church property would be nationalized, although the Church could continue to make use of it, Catholic secondary education would cease by October of that year and all Catholic primary education would cease in the following December. As might have been expected, this caused tremendous consternation among Catholic groups. Allegedly some bishops had threatened to excommunicate those deputies who voted for the law but were dissuaded from such action by the papal nuncio, Bishop Tedeschini.²¹⁵ The Catholic deputies published a manifesto, signed by the Basque deputies, calling "all citizens of good faith who view with deep sadness the ruin of their country, irresponsibly managed by foreign powers of the Masonic sects and the Socialist International."²¹⁶ This was followed by a pastoral letter issued by the Spanish bishops to remind the faithful that attendance at lay schools was contrary to canon law. On June 3, Pope Pius XI issued an Encyclical, Dilectissimi Nobis, asking all the Catholics to oppose the

²¹⁵Gabriel Jackson, The Spanish Republic and the Civil War 1931-1939 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965), p. 106.

²¹⁶E1 Debate, June 4, 1933.

law by "all the legitimate means which Natural Law and (civil) legislation allow them," and exhorting them to support Catholic Action (Accion Catolica) "for the defense of the Faith and to ward off the dangers which threaten civil society." Catholics began to organize to boycott lay schools.²¹⁷ This put the Basque nationalists into a difficult position. Morally and in view of the position of the Vatican, they had no choice but to oppose the government. From a political view point they would have alienated large segments of the Basque population had they not protested against this legislation. While they could use this issue to mobilize the Basque population behind them at the same time they could alienate that very same Cortes majority from who they would need approval in order to get autonomy. At any rate, within the Cortes they were in the forefront amongst those protesting against the Law of Congregations.

According to the Basques, the law not only violated their consciences, but was also an infringement on Basque liberties. To them the educational concept of the republican state, as manifested in the Law of Congregations, was one of etatism and therefore "pure facism".²¹⁸ On this issue there was solidarity between the traditionalists and the nationalists. To the nationalists, and the clergy

²¹⁷ Ibid., July 1, 1933.

²¹⁸ Debates de Secciones de las Cortes Constituyentes (DSCC), March 29, 1933. The Library of Congress has twenty-five volumes.

supporting them, the recent religious legislation convinced them that the need for Basque autonomy was greater than ever. The uniform applicability of this law throughout Spain was simply a new form of centralization.²¹⁹ Nevertheless, they were willing to work with the government for some kind of negotiated solution regarding the Basque provinces.²²⁰ The traditionalists on the other hand were ready and willing to take up arms against the laic republic. As a result of the recent religious legislation, some of the traditionalists were once again willing to collaborate with the nationalists for the coming general elections (November 19, 1933) for the Cortes. The traditionalist, Jose Maria de Urquijo owner of the Gaceta del Norte, had approached the nationalists on this question and promised them that he would call off the traditionalist propaganda in Alava and support the efforts for the plebescite on the condition that the nationalists form a Catholic coalition with the traditionalists for the coming elections. The nationalists refused this approach for they feared that it

²¹⁹It seems that for some members of the Basque clergy nationalism had become a means to preserve the religiosity of the Basque country. For example, in 1932 a priest had written to Aguirre to tell him that there was "no redemption save nationalism", and another one had written: "You must not abandon your leadership of the Basque Israel for which God has appointed you." Iturralde, I, op. cit., p. 426.

²²⁰The Basque nationalists were confronted with a paradoxical situation. Ideologically the PNV belonged on the Right, but yet it was from the Left that they expected a statute of autonomy.

might dilute their support to the advantage of the traditionalists. Moreover, the results of the municipal elections of April of that year had made them pretty confident that they could stand alone. The traditionalists, subsequently, continued their campaign against the plebiscite and helped to spread the rumor that it would be unlawful for a Catholic to vote for a statute given by the laic republic for this action would be tantamount to recognizing the legitimacy of an anticlerical government. Bishop Mateo Mugica of Vitoria was finally asked to decide on this issue--in 1932 the bishops of Vitoria and Pamplona had been approached on this question but they remained neutral--and declared that there was no incompatibility between voting for the statute and protesting against the Law of Congregations. In order to allay the fears of his parishoners, Bishop Mugica was one of the first voters to vote for the statute on November 5, 1933.²²¹ This act, which could not be interpreted other than a political act, was highly resented by the Carlists who later, after the war began in 1936, harrassed him and had him under virtual house arrest in his episcopal palace.

Despite opposition by the socialists who asked their voters to abstain and the advice of the traditionalists to their followers to vote against the statute, and their

²²¹Venero, op. cit., p. 533.

allegations suggesting that the statute would be harmful to the Basque economy,²²² the results produced a victory for the nationalists. Out of a total electorate of 489,887 voters, 411,756 approved the statute, 14,196 voted against it, and 63,935 abstained. Again overwhelming support had come from Vizcays and Guipuzcoa where the electorate approved the statute by 88.4 per cent and 89.7 per cent majorities. In Alava only 46 per cent voted for it, while 11 per cent voted against and 43 per cent abstained.²²³

The general elections of November 19, 1933, had produced a Center-Right majority in the new Cortes.²²⁴ Although the nationalists lost one seat in these elections, they remained large enough (12) to form a minority within the Cortes. With a majority in the new Cortes ideologically close to them, plus the results of the plebiscite, the nationalists felt confident that the new government would finally grant the statute of autonomy. It soon became apparent that the new Cortes in which the CEDA²²⁵ group had a majority was not willing to discuss regional autonomy

²²²Arraras, II, op. cit., p. 264.

²²³White Paper of the Basque Government, (Paris, 1956) p. 39. See also Arnold Toynbee, "The Spanish Background of the War in Spain," Survey of International Affairs, Vol. 2, 1937, p. 40.

²²⁴See Robinson, op. cit., p. 149.

²²⁵CEDA stands for Confederacion Espanola de Derechas Autonomas led by Gil Robles.

but instead wanted to stop the political disintegration of Spain. The committee appointed by the Cortes to study the results of the Basque plebiscite proposed another plebiscite on the grounds that Alava's majority did not meet the constitutional requirement of a 2/3 majority. The nationalists opposed the idea of another plebiscite and interpreted Alava's abstentions as support for autonomy.²²⁶ But by April of 1934, the committee in charge of the statute (with a Rightist majority) blocked further action on that question. For all intents and purposes, the Basque statute for autonomy was buried in the new Cortes from whom the nationalists had expected a better reception. Gil Robles, the leader of CEDA, although willing to grant some kind of administrative autonomy, viewed political autonomy as out of the question.²²⁷ As a result of this new turn of events, the nationalists began to look to the Left and indicated that they would not support the new government.

In the meantime, political life in Spain was becoming further radicalized and polarized between Right and Left. There was great fear and uncertainty as to the political future of Spain. The Left was disappointed and embittered over the fact that it had lost its majority. Their bitterness was reinforced with the actions of the new Cortes.

²²⁶DSCC, February 8, 9, 1934.

²²⁷J. M. Gil Robles, "The Spanish Republic and Basque Independence," The Tablet, June 19, 1937, pp. 876-877.

No sooner had the new Cortes met than the new majority began to modify and repeal some of the legislation of the previous Cortes. The Law of Congregations was ignored and the Church schools continued to operate. Agrarian reform which had been initiated under the constituent Cortes came to a standstill. Agricultural wages were reduced. Some of the property of the orders which had been confiscated by the previous government was restored to the Church. General Sanjurjo, who had plotted to overthrow the Republic in 1932, was acquitted by the new Cortes. To the Left these actions made it appear as though a Right-wing coup was in the offing or that Spain might follow the example of Germany where the legislature had voted a dictator into power. Consequently, the Left now began to think in terms of revolutionary activity. Largo Caballero, the leader of the Socialist Party who had participated in the previous government, was being impelled by his followers to think in terms of revolutionary rather than evolutionary change. (Caballero had collaborated with Primo de Rivera during the 1920's). The relative peace which had existed in Spain between 1931 and 1933 began to give way to violent acts such as assassinations, demonstrations, and strikes. Frequent shoot-outs between different political groups were not uncommon in the streets of major cities. Arrests of Leftist deputies were also not uncommon on the grounds that they were collaborating in the strikes and inciting rebellion.

Consequently, the Right, too, began to believe that Spain was in the throes of a Bolshevik revolution. This fear was reinforced when in October of 1934 the mine workers of Asturias rebelled and took over that province. Within a few days this rebellion was crushed by army units under the command of Franco.²²⁸

Although the leadership of the PNV had indicated that it would not use violence in order to get autonomy, by 1934 some segments within the Party were willing to resort to violence. One such group was known as the aberrianos led by Gallestegui, the leader of the Mendigoitzales, a mountain-climbing group which was turning itself into a para-military organization. While the leadership of the Party kept its affiliate organizations under control, by 1934 they, too, were beginning to manifest a new degree of militancy towards the government's procrastination regarding Basque autonomy. During the summer of 1934, the Basques and the government came into deadlock over the question of taxation. The government was going to introduce a Law of Municipalities which would regulate taxation throughout Spain. If this law were applied to the Basque region, the local towns' taxes (consumos) on wines would be abolished depriving many Basque municipalities of one of their

²²⁸For a discussion of the issues that confronted the Second Spanish Republic see Stanley G. Payne, The Spanish Revolution (New York: W.W. Norton and Co., 1970).

primary sources of revenue.²²⁹ To the Basques this was a violation of their traditional privileges regulated by the concierto economico, which, in their view, the government could not modify or change without their consent.

Legislation regarding taxation would have to be negotiated between the central government and representatives of the provincial deputations. The Basques decided to hold elections in order to elect delegations to go to Madrid to negotiate with the government on this issue. The government reacted by forbidding such elections and sent troops to Bilbao, Vitoria, and San Sebastian to make sure that no elections would take place. Some towns, however, defied the government and held elections as originally planned. Subsequently, the government ordered the arrest of several mayors. Government troops occupied some town halls and some roads were blocked to prevent the nationalists from the several provinces from meeting and planning demonstrations. Even the Basque parliamentary deputies were harrassed by the police.²³⁰

The gap between the Basque nationalists and the Right continued to widen, and the Left, particularly the Republicans and the Socialists, now began to support the Basques in order to get their support. Indalecio Prieto, the leader of the socialists of Bilbao, who not too long

²²⁹Jackson, op. cit., p. 141.

²³⁰Arraras, II, op. cit., p. 389.

before (1933) had exhorted his followers not to vote for the autonomy statute, now became an avid supporter of the Basque nationalists. At a meeting of the PNV held in San Sebastian on November 11, 1934, members of Leftist groups were present and gave their "total support to the autonomist movement of the Basque municipalities and to the attainment of the statute as a solution to all problems, if the nationalists participated in the revolution, deemed necessary."²³¹

In return Aguirre declared that in case the Right tried to impose a dictatorship or to reinstitute the Monarchy, "the Basque Nationalist Party would oppose those institutions with all its strength; and if the occasion should arise," he said, the Party would take "measures to meet the circumstances of the moment."²³²

The Leftists were not very satisfied with such an equivocal stand. While Leftist groups seemed ready to take up arms against the government, the Basque nationalist leadership would not go beyond committing itself to defend the existing Republic. The association of the nationalists with elements of the Left was not welcomed by all members of the Party, a fact which caused some dissention. Consequently, in October of 1934 a group of Alavese nationalists broke away from the Party and formed the

²³¹Ibid., p. 401.

²³²Ibid.

Derecha Autonoma Vasca.

Increasingly the nationalists seemed to be taking a position of aloofness from the great issues disturbing Spanish politics. In the course of an interview with the ABC of Madrid on June 13, 1934, Aguirre had declared that the Basques were "neither with the Left nor the Right; [they] were simply autonomists." And when in the fall of 1934 Spain was afflicted with a series of strikes, Aguirre told the government that the Party would not encourage rebellion "but neither would [it] lift a finger to help the government."²³³ The seeming indifference of the nationalists as to what was happening within Spain elicited such hostility from CEDA to the point that Calvo Sotelo and Aguirre came to blows within the Cortes in October 1934. From this point onwards the hostility increased. As of 1934, it had become clear to the nationalists that a statute of autonomy granted by the Right was out of the question. In the meantime the CEDA group was trying to gain adherents within the Basque region by concentrating on the defense of the concierto economico and helping to spread the rumor that a statute of autonomy would be disastrous to the Basque economy. This hostility from the CEDA group had the attendant result of pushing the PNV further to the Left from which it expected a better hearing and a political solution for the Basque provinces.

²³³Robinson, op. cit., p. 191.

The continuing shift to the Right by the Cortes majority led President Alcala-Zamora to call for new elections with the expectation that a moderate majority would be produced, a majority which might be able to govern the country and acceptable to both the Right and the Left. Contrary to Alcala-Zamora's expectations, the new elections produced another extremist majority. The Popular Front, consisting of Socialists, the Republican Left, the Republican Union, and the Communists, which was formed for the purpose of campaigning for these elections, won a majority of the seats. Out of a total of 453 seats, the Popular Front controlled 257 seats²³⁴--more than what it needed in order to control the Cortes.

Although the PNV had indicated support for the Popular Front, which in its election campaign had promised autonomy for the regions, the Party decided to run independently of both Right and Left. But the PNV lost two seats in Bilbao, thus ending up with a total of 10 seats.

This new majority produced panic on the Right. The Cortes of February 1936, following the behaviour of the Cortes elected in the fall of 1933, began to modify and repeal some of the acts of the previous government. Among the first acts of the new government was a decree of general amnesty setting free those put into prison for political

²³⁴For a discussion of the Popular Front elections see Jackson, op. cit., pp. 184-195.

reasons. Approximately 30,000 political prisoners were set free.²³⁵ Among these prisoners were a great number of Socialists and Anarchists who decided to take the law into their own hands by shooting those whom they thought responsible for their arrests. In Southwestern Spain the euphoria produced by the new majority led the peasants to seize lands and engage in Church burning, not an uncommon incident in Southern Spain. To the Right these incidents brought back memories of the Asturias strike of 1934 when the workers seized the province. According to Hugh Thomas, "it now seemed [to the middle class] that almost anything, even a military dictatorship, was preferable to the continuation of the present political disintegration."²³⁶ Consequently, the army was asked by some leaders of the Right, among them Gil Robles, to declare martial law. Franco supposedly approached the Prime Minister, Portela Valladares, to ask him to declare a state of emergency and prevent the Left from assuming power.

The actions of the government against Right-wing generals, in the form of early retirement or transfers alienated that very same group which might have been able to keep order in

²³⁵Jackson, op. cit., p. 181.

²³⁶Hugh Thomas, The Spanish Civil War (New York: Harper and Row, 1961), p. 81. For other accounts of the civil war see Frank Jellinek, The Civil War in Spain (London: Victor Gallancz, 1938); Franz Borkenau, The Spanish Cockpit (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1963).

the Republic. The plot, which had been planned by General Sanjurjo who was in exile in Portugal; General Mola in charge of the troops in Pamplona; and Generals Goded, Cabanellas and Queipo de Llano came to its fruition on July 18, 1936, when the insurrection, with the support of Right-wing groups, began.²³⁷ This led to the Spanish Civil War which lasted until 1939.

Although on July 19 Euzkadi indicated the support of the Basque nationalists for the Republic in "la lucha entre la ciudadanía y el fascismo," there was disagreement amongst the nationalists as to the exact course that the Basques should follow and the nature of their support for the Republic. Some were of the opinion that the Basques should declare their independence while others, such as Luis Arana, brother of the founder of Basque nationalism, maintained that the Basques should concentrate on defending themselves:

The Basque nationalists should not unite with the Spanish democrats nor with the dictatorial ones but concentrate in assuming command of Vizcaya, and in the rest of the Basque country, in order to maintain peace. The others should take care of themselves and the Basques should take care of the Basques.²³⁸

²³⁷Thomas, op. cit., p. 117.

²³⁸Quoted in Venero, op. cit., p. 574. Throughout the civil war, the Basques maintained their own army, the Gudaris. When in September of 1936 Largo Caballero suggested that the Basque provinces be united with Santander for military purposes, the Basques refused: "No tenemos mas remedio que protestar energicamente y no

It seems that the Republican government itself was not very sure about the loyalty of the Basques. Besides the fear that the Basques might use the occasion to declare themselves independent, there was also the fear that they might reach some kind of an arrangement with the insurgents.

In order to make sure that the Basques would continue to support the Republic, in September 1936 Largo Caballero, then Prime Minister, supposedly offered Aguirre a post in his cabinet. The Basques refused to accept a post in the Republican government unless they were granted a statute of autonomy. It is reported that an agreement was reached whereby Aguirre would become Minister of Public Works in return for a statute of autonomy. Aguirre allegedly refused the post on the grounds that he disapproved of Communist participation in the government.²³⁹ Instead, Manuel de Irujo, a Basque nationalist from Guipuzcoa, became Minister without portfolio. On October 1, 1936, the beleaguered Republican government granted the Basques autonomy. The presence of a Basque nationalist in the government emphasized the support of the Basques for the Republic.

By the time the statute was granted most of the Basque

aceptarla, porque la demarcacion de guerra debe ser Guipuzcoa, Vizcaya, Alava y Navarra (estas dos provincias las consideramos objeto principal de nuestra conquista), quedando Santander unido a Asturias a quien el ministro de guerra espanol crea oportuno." Iturralde, II, p. 196.

²³⁹Venero, op. cit., p. 591.

country had already fallen into insurgent hands. Navarra, where General Mola had planned the insurrection with the help of the Carlists, was among the first places to initiate the rebellion. In Alava the regiment of Vitoria took that city on July 19 without any great efforts. By September Guipuzcoa, in which a great deal of fighting took place, had also fallen to the insurgents. The nationalists evacuated this area and retreated to Vizcaya where they fought until June 19, 1937.²⁴⁰

After the statute of autonomy was granted, a General Council for the Basque provinces, with representatives from the three provinces which had approved the statute in the plebiscite of November 1933, was formed and a Basque government was formed with Aguirre as President (lendakari). It was a coalition government consisting of four nationalists, one member from the Accion Nacionalista Vasca, three Socialists, one Left Republican, and a Communist.²⁴¹ This government mobilized the population of Vizcaya, kept order in that province, and conducted the war against the Franco forces. The Basque Autonomous government hastily improvised a small army, the Gudaris, which was attended by a Corps of Almoners consisting of a hundred priests.²⁴² On November 30

²⁴⁰For an account of the Civil War in the Basque provinces see George L. Steer, The Tree of Guernica (London: Hodder and Staughton Ltd., 1938.)

²⁴¹Venero, op. cit., p. 599.

²⁴²Le Clerge Basque, Paris 1938. This work gives an

a Basque offensive was launched to take back Alava. The Gudaris equipped with antiquated artillery bought from the Soviet Union, were no match for the forces of Franco supported by Italian troops and the German Condor Legion. The only Basque offensive ended in a defeat.²⁴³ The Basque troops retreated back to Vizcaya where they put up a successful resistance until June 19, 1937, when the Franco forces overran that province.²⁴⁴ After the fall of Vizcaya, the Basque government retreated to the neighboring province of Santander where it set up its own administration in Santona and continued to fight until August. When the

account of the Basque clergy during the Civil War and answers the charges brought against them by the Spanish hierarchy.

²⁴³Luis Maria de Lojendio, Operaciones Militares de la Guerra de Espana, 1936-1939 (Madrid, 1940), p. 244. See also Steer, op. cit. This is probably the best journalistic account of the Basque provinces during the Civil War.

²⁴⁴On April 26, 1937, the German Air Force bombed the old Basque town of Guernica (symbol of Basque liberties) and machinegunned the population. This incident was given extensive international coverage and motivated Picasso to produce a painting, entitled "Guernica", dramatizing the destruction of that town. It became a famous painting. The clergy of the town wrote to the Vatican to describe the senseless air bombing of the town. After unsuccessful efforts to see the Pope, the two Basque priests who carried the letter to Rome were finally given an audience with Cardinal Pacelli who remarked that "The Church was persecuted in Barcelona," and "showed them the door."

As a consequence of the bombing of Guernica, "the Basque Government in exile attempted to bring a case against Germany at the Nuremberg War Crimes Tribunal. The attempt was unsuccessful, since no events which occurred before 1939 were taken into account at Nuremberg." Thomas, op. cit., p. 420.

situation had become hopeless, Juan de Axuriaguerra, leader of the PNV since Aguirre had become president of Euzkadi, negotiated a Basque surrender on August 22 with the Italian troops under the command of General Mancini.²⁴⁵ As part of the surrender agreement, the Basques were promised that they could evacuate the area and leave for France on British ships that were waiting in the harbor of Santona. On hearing this news, Franco's officers became furious and immediately sent troops to the area to prevent the escape of the Basques. Those that were already in the ships were ordered to disembark and arrested. Aguirre had already left by plane for France.

The support of the Basque clergy of the provinces of Vizcaya and Guipuzcoa for the Basque nationalists and, consequently, for the Republic raised some moral questions within the hierarchy of the Spanish Catholic Church. The clergy of these provinces refused to obey the collective letter of the Spanish Bishops (July 1, 1937) in which the Spanish hierarchy explained the reasons for their support of the insurgent forces, and reprimanded the Basque clergy

²⁴⁵Ibid., p. 420. Aguirre has indicated that earlier in 1937 Mussolini had suggested that the Basques surrender to the Italian troops and that then a separate peace treaty would be negotiated between the Basque government and the Italians with the possibility of making Euzkadi a protectorate of the Italian government. Aguirre referred to this as a "picturesque proposal of an Italian protectorate over the Basques." Jose Antonio de Aguirre y Lecube, Escape via Berlin (New York: The Macmillan Co.,) p. 52.

for not having followed the "word of the Church."²⁴⁶ The Basque clergy maintained that its position was morally sound since they had seen no reason to support a rebellion against a lawfully instituted government.²⁴⁷ The fact that one of the most Catholic areas of Spain supported the Republic was an embarrassing situation for the hierarchy which maintained that it was fighting the forces of Bolshevism. As a consequence of their support for Basque nationalism, members of the Basque clergy were later arrested, some were shot, and some had to go into exile.²⁴⁸ Eventually the Primate of Spain, Cardinal Goma, intervened and asked Franco to put a stop to these actions. One of the Basque Bishops, Dr. Mateo Mugica, never signed the collective letter and defended the position of the Basque clergy as a result of which he was intimidated and threatened by the Carlists who referred to him as a "red-separatist".²⁴⁹ Before the war was over, he left Spain and went to France into exile.

The lack of prolonged resistance in Alava and the support for the insurrection in Navarra did not necessarily mean support for the Franco forces or that these provinces had all of a sudden become indifferent to the question of

²⁴⁶Thomas, op. cit., p. 450.

²⁴⁷The theological position of the Basques is discussed in great depth in Iturralde, II.

²⁴⁸See Le Clerge Basque, pp. 94-107, and Inaki de Aberriroyen, Sept Mois and Sept Jours dans l'Espagne de Franco (Paris, 1938).

²⁴⁹Jackson, op. cit., p. 377.

local autonomy. On the contrary, once the insurrection began, the Navarrese immediately started to take steps to reinstitute their old fueros. The Navarrese were fighting not to bring back the Alfonsine monarchy the legitimacy of which they had never accepted nor to put Franco into power but to reinstitute the monarchy of traditional Spain.²⁵⁰ And by August of 1936 the deputacion foral of Navarra began to take steps toward this end. "On August 11, 1936, the Superior Committee on Education of Navarra, created by Law 22 in 1828 of the Cortes of the Kingdom was established. The deputacion affirmed that it would pursue its announced objectives to restore in its entirety the foral regime insofar as it affected the organization of primary education in Navarra."²⁵¹

This deputacion had also formed some ambitious plans for social and agricultural reform for which the Juntas de Reforma Agraria y Reformas Sociales had been created. But in 1940 these were ordered to be dissolved and the anticipated

²⁵⁰In a manifesto issued by Carlos Alfonso, June 29, 1934, emphasis was put on the traditional political organization of Spain. He asked for the "establishment of the traditional Monarchy with its essential characteristics: catholic, frugal, federative, hereditary, and legitimate, and consequently, fundamentally opposed to the liberal, democratic, parliamentary, centralized, and constitutional Monarchy. The federative affirmation implies the restoration of all the regions with their fueros, liberties, exemptions, usages, and customs and the guarrantly of the pase foral." This was a call for the return of the pre-1839 relationship between the Spanish State and the regions. Quoted in Galindo Herrero, pp. 240, 241.

²⁵¹del Burgo, op. cit., p. 475.

reforms were never carried out. After the war, the government in Madrid respected only the concierto economico which had existed since 1876 and would not entertain any further suggestions to reinstitute the traditional foral regime: "The outcome of the three years of war and of the subsequent reorganization of the machinery of the state did not show any positive results. Only in the sphere of primary education, thanks to the laborious efforts of the Superior Committee on Education, did an authentic restitution of the fueros take place."²⁵²

The fact that the Navarrese fought with the Franco forces has not made them any less suspicious of the power of the central government. They have remained ever suspicious of the power of the Madrid government and continue to maintain that the law of 1841, by which General Espartero modified the fueros of Navarra to which they refer as la ley paccionada, was a contract between the central government and the Navarrese which cannot be modified without their consent. Alava also has retained the concierto economico.²⁵³ This was ~~his~~ reward for its lack of resistance to the insurrection. It seems that when the insurrection began the Basque nationalists in these provinces did not even

²⁵²Ibid., p. 477.

²⁵³For a discussion of the concierto economico with Alava, see Jose Badia La-Calle, El Concierto Economico con Alava (Bilbao: Editorial Deusto, 1965).

try to resist for they realized that the odds against them were so great as to make it a hopeless venture. The regiment in the city of Vitoria had supported the insurrection and immediately took the city. In the provinces of Guipuzcoa and Vizcaya the local regiments had planned also to support the insurrection but were caught in time and put under arrest by the committees of local defense.

As the civil war came to an end in the Basque provinces of Vizcaya and Guipuzcoa, those provinces were stripped of their concierto economico and a great number of Basques were either imprisoned or shot. Those that could escape went into exile into France and from there went to Latin America where they have maintained Basque Centers in Buenos Aires, Caracas, Santiago, and Mexico City from which they have carried on an anti-Franco campaign. In the Basque provinces, particularly in Vizcaya and Guipuzcoa, all manifestations of Basque culture were forbidden, including the speaking of Basque by the clergy at Church services. The central government "embarked on a deliberate policy of imposing the Castilian language and banning or ostracizing the local language outlawing its use in the administration, education, mass media, translations...as well as making impossible any association that directly would foster the national sentiment."²⁵⁴

²⁵⁴Juan L. Linz, "Opposition in and Under an Authoritarian Regime: The Case of Spain", unpublished paper, p. 59.

C H A P T E R V

THE RESURGENCE OF THE BASQUE QUESTION

Between 1945 and the early 1950's, the exiled Basque government lived with the expectation that the Franco regime would soon collapse under the pressure of the allied forces which, they believed, would not tolerate a regime that had come into power with the help of those regimes which had just been defeated in the war. In 1945 the political groups of the Basque region in exile reached an agreement in Bayonne, France, called El Pacto de Bayonne. This agreement was to advise the Euzkadi government and coordinate their struggle against the Franco regime.²⁵⁵ But, as it later turned out, the initial ostracism of the Franco regime by the allied forces, plus Franco's efforts in staying out of World War II, apparently had the effect of mobilizing support for Franco²⁵⁶--or at least silencing much of the opposition.

International events also seemed to have worked in favor of the Franco regime. The amity which had developed between the United States and the Soviet Union during the

²⁵⁵Euzko Deya (Oficina Prensa Euzkadi), March/April, 1966, p. 4. This is an information bulletin published by the Basque government in exile.

²⁵⁶For a discussion of the Franco regime see Arthur P. Whitaker, Spain and the Defense of the West, (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962).

war soon turned into enmity with favorable consequences for Franco. In its search for allies in the diplomatic campaign to hold back the Soviet Union, strategic considerations forced the United States to change its earlier position on the Franco regime. The United States changed its policy of ostracism to one of soliciting Franco's support in the cold war struggle. The recognition of the Franco regime by the United States in 1951 signalled the deathknell to the Basque nationalists' expectations of returning to Spain. Spain had now become an ally of the United States, and indirectly linked to NATO depriving the Basques and other republican groups in exile the support from the major Western liberal democracies which they might have otherwise received. Subsequently, the Basque nationalists in exile had to reconcile themselves with the fact that the Franco regime seemed well established and gaining in international respectability. Nevertheless, they maintained their propaganda campaign against Franco and have kept in touch with a small Basque underground.²⁵⁷

Although after the civil war and up to the late 1950's the PNV continued to be the main spokesman for Basque nationalism, several organizations have emerged to challenge

²⁵⁷ There is some evidence that the PNV has some underground cadres throughout the provinces of Guipuzcoa and Vizcaya. The New York Times, May 1, 1967, p. 22. Although it seems that the PNV receives some financial support from some wealthy Basques within Spain, this writer has not come across specific documentation. See Whitaker, pp. 361-362.

its leadership during the past decade. Presently there are approximately eight organizations which represent various shades of Basque nationalism.²⁵⁸

Until the 1960's, the activities of Basque nationalism, sponsored primarily by the PNV in exile, did not go very much beyond the occasional sponsoring of folkloric festivals; the distribution of nationalist literature within the Basque region; and the gathering of information regarding the conditions of the Basques under the Franco regime. The Franco government has not hesitated to suppress ostensibly cultural and religious activities on the suspicion that such activities are motivated by nationalistic considerations and organized by the Basque underground. The Aberri Eguna, the Basque patriots day, is celebrated on Easter Sunday. The nationalists in exile in turn have exploited the reactions of the regime by pointing out that the government is engaged in "cultural genocide." The argument of the nationalists has some credence for they can point out that other regions are allowed to manifest their cultural peculiarities but only the Basques have been singled out for suppression.

Overseas, particularly in the United States²⁵⁹ and

²⁵⁸The Partido Nacionalista Vasco, Accion Vasca, ETA, Frente Nacional Vasco, Partido Comunista de Euzkadi, Enbata, Accion Social Democratica Vasca and the Movimiento de Sacerdotes Vascos. It is the opinion of this writer that some of these organizations are mere paper or office organizations.

²⁵⁹The Basque communities of the United States are

in some of the Latin American countries, Basque Centers have been founded with the objective of keeping Basque identity alive through Basque festivals and publications. In these organizations both Spanish and French Basques collaborate. There are two Basque publishing houses in Latin America, Buenos Aires and Caracas, that publish exclusively nationalist literature or literature discussing cultural themes of the Basque country. Some of this literature is then sent to the PNV organization in Bayonne, France, which is then smuggled into Spain.

During the 1960's a new wave of protest and nationalist activity, corresponding with the increase in the centralizing of power and the increased international respectability of the Franco regime, began to manifest itself in the Basque region in the form of labor strikes, demonstrations by the clergy, some occasional violent actions such as bomb explosions and gun battles with the Spanish police. Although the PNV has given moral support to some of these activities, they have been planned by groups unaffiliated with it. The new militant activism has been initiated by a radical group known as Euzkadi ta Askatasuna, ETA (Basque Nation and Liberty), which split in 1959 from Euzko Gastedi, a nationalist youth organization affiliated with the PNV. ETA, which calls for an "Euzkadi independiente y socialista" (a socialist and independent Euzkadi),

found mainly in Nevada, Idaho, and California.

apparently split from the PNV over the question of the tactics that should be pursued by the Party.²⁶⁰ Apparently the members of ETA had come to the conclusion that the PNV had become ossified and ineffective in its approach. Consequently, ETA has adopted a more radical and dramatic approach. Its occasional handbills indicate that ETA has adopted some brand of Marxism as its social ideology. In contrast to the PNV, ETA does not claim to speak just for the Spanish Basques but for the French Basques as well. Among its professed goals is the unification of all the Basques in an eventual European Federation of nations. There are some indications that the membership of ETA does not consist exclusively of Spanish Basques, but also includes French Basques.²⁶¹ In this respect ETA is quite a departure from the PNV which is quite conservative and bourgeois in its social orientation and claims to speak only for the Spanish Basques.

Due to the secrecy in which this organization works, its exact membership is not known. But the arrests made by the Spanish police of alleged members of ETA indicate that the membership is fairly young, between the ages of 18 and 30 years old. In contrast to the activities of the PNV, ETA has not hesitated to resort to violence as a result of

²⁶⁰See the interview with ETA members published in the Paris-Match, August 17, 1968, p. 6.

²⁶¹Zutik, April, 1965. This is an ETA publication.

which it has received all kinds of attention, particularly in the latter part of the 1960's, thus making Basque nationalism once again one of the more sensitive topics in Spanish politics. The radical activities of ETA apparently were not approved by the whole membership for in 1966 a split occurred giving rise to another group known as ETA-Berri (New ETA) favoring a more moderate approach.²⁶² It seems that it has been the ETA-Zarra, (Old ETA), which has been responsible for the radical forms of activism in the latter part of the 1960's. While the PNV still claims the following and support of broad segments of the Basque population, ETA during its short period of existence has emerged as the leading nationalist group, and recently has done more than the other organizations in bringing to the attention of the international press the question of Basque nationalism which had seemed nearly forgotten. ETA's activities became so persistent that by the end of the 1960's the government in Madrid had launched an intensive campaign in order to crush it.²⁶³ The hunt for ETA members

²⁶²The Economist, V, 237, (December 12, 1967), p. 35.

²⁶³In 1968 Pueblo, the paper of the official labor unions, began to discuss the question of Basque nationalism making particular reference to ETA. According to the articles in Pueblo, ETA members were coming primarily from urban environments and not from fishing villages or peasant communities. The whole emphasis of the Pueblo articles was to show that ETA was an atheist and Marxist organization and thus, contrary to Basque traditions. Pueblo, September 27, 1968, p. 6. By 1969 the police were claiming the "total desmantelamiento de la ETA." Pueblo, March 25, 1969, p. 9.

became particularly intensive after the assassination of the chief of the secret police of Guipuzcoa, Meliton de Manzanos, in 1968. According to the ETA publication, Zutik, Manzanos was not assassinated but executed for his "crimes" against Basque nationalists.²⁶⁴

The Trial

The assassination of Meliton Manzanos gave rise to the most spectacular and dramatic incident surrounding Basque nationalism since the Civil War. The sixteen members of ETA suspected of having planned the assassination were finally put on trial (the military tribunal of Burgos) in December 1970. On the day before the trial, December 1, 1970, a group from ETA kidnapped a West German consul, Eugen Beihel, from San Sebastian and announced that they intended to keep him as ransom during the course of the trial. This incident, which focused the attention of the international press on the sixteen accused ETA members--who otherwise might not have received as much attention had not this incident occurred--probably confronted the Franco regime with one of its biggest crisis since the end of the Civil War. There were strikes and demonstrations in the Basque region, particularly in Guipuzcoa and Vizcaya. A state of martial law was declared in the province of Guipuzcoa, and police reinforcements were sent to the area. There was

²⁶⁴Zutik, September 1968.

dissension within the army leadership and the cabinet over the course of action that the regime should take.²⁶⁵

Some senior members of the officer corps resented the fact that a military tribunal should handle this problem since, in their view, this would only serve to discredit the army before the eyes of the public, while others felt that the regime should show no mercy and adopt a get-tough policy. This incident, along with the international publicity that it received, was particularly embarrassing to the regime which in the latter part of the 1960's had begun to emphasize its "liberal" tendencies with an eye to closer relationships with the Common Market.

Within a few days the international press focused on Spain and the trial of the Basques. What had begun as a trial of sixteen ETA members accused of the assassination of a public official became overnight a trial of Basque nationalism. Since the Civil War, probably no incident has done more for the cause of Basque nationalism than the kidnapping of Eugen Beihel. One day before the verdict was

²⁶⁵The trial was given extensive coverage in the New York Times, Le Monde, and ABC (Madrid). Richard Eder of the New York Times wrote several comprehensive articles on the Basques in general and on the trial. See The New York Times, November 28, 1970, p. 3; December 3, 1970, p. 6; December 6, 1970, p. 3; December 7, 1970, p. 2; December 9, 1970, p. 29; December 12, 1970, p. 12; December 17, 1970, p.3. The Christian Science Monitor also gave a fairly good coverage of the trial in its December 1970 issue. See particularly the article of Richard Mowrer in the December 23, 1970, issue, p. 1.

announced ETA freed Beihel. It had made its point. On December 28, 1970, the verdict was announced: six of the accused were given death sentences and the others, amongst whom there were two priests, were given long periods of imprisonment.²⁶⁶ After a cabinet meeting on December 30, it was decided to commute the death sentences.²⁶⁷ The decision was announced on New Year's Eve when Franco delivered his message to the nation.

Judging from the news releases from the area, segments of the population viewed the accused more as martyrs rather than criminals. While ETA was seen as an extremist organization and the action regarding consul Beihel was not condoned, nevertheless, there seemed to be broad support for the accused. Both the bishops of Bilbao and San Sabastian asked for clemency and issued pastoral letters before the trial began, asking for a trial before a civilian tribunal. These pastorals angered the regime which, through the Ministry of Justice, issued a statement accusing the bishops of "prejudging court decisions which (had) not yet been made" and of "comparing criminal violence, which is punishable by law, with the punishment imposed by law."²⁶⁸

The accused were defended by Basque lawyers, such as Juan Maria Bandres, some of whom consider themselves Basque

²⁶⁶The New York Times, December 29, 1970, p. 1.

²⁶⁷Ibid., December 31, 1970, p. 1.

²⁶⁸The Spanish Episcopal Conference meeting in Madrid

nationalists and hold the sentiment that there exists a Basque nation which has lived under oppression since 1939.²⁶⁹ While it appears that many segments of the Basque population do not approve of ETA's methods, nevertheless, they do not seem to question its objectives. A Basque priest from the Basque community of Idaho, although deploring the "methods and philosophy of ETA" which he considered against everything that is Basque, added that "you don't make a revolution with rosaries."²⁷⁰

The Church

Along with ETA, the Basque lower clergy has also been in the forefront of protest in the latter part of the 1960's. They have participated in strikes, demonstrations and have allegedly given sanctuary to members of ETA pursued by the Spanish police. By virtue of its position, the clergy has a greater leeway to act than strictly political groups. However, the activities of the Basque clergy have raised some sensitive issues between the government and the Church which, up until recently, had been one of the

at this time, supported the pastorals of the bishops of Santander and San Sebastian and also asked for clemency. ABC (Madrid), December 3, 1970, p. 21. Also Keesing's Contemporary Archives, January 23-30, 1971, p. 24406.

²⁶⁹The New York Times, December 15, 1970, p. 6.

²⁷⁰Ibid., December 20, 1970, p. 18.

central institutional pillars of the regime.²⁷¹ It must be emphasized that clergy support for Basque nationalism is an indirect kind of support. This was also the case during the 1930's. Members of the clergy were never formally affiliated with the PNV, which did not allow membership for members of the clergy. Consequently, the protests of the Basque clergy are addressed to what they perceive to be violations of human rights. But this had not prevented the civil authorities from arresting some of them, an action which deliberately violates the Concordat. Under the rules of the Concordat signed by the Vatican and the Spanish government, a member of the clergy cannot be arrested without the permission of his bishop.

The activities of the clergy seem to parallel the activities of ETA. The clergy began to speak out against acts of torture committed by the Spanish police against imprisoned Basque nationalists. On August 3, 1968, the day after the assassination of Manzananas, the Guardia Civil surrounded the Benedictine Abbey of Lazcano, Guipuzcoa, and searched the area, for it was believed that the monks were giving sanctuary to ETA members.²⁷²

The actions of the lower clergy eventually brought them

²⁷¹On the relationship between the Church and the Franco regime see William Ebenstein, Church and State in Franco Spain (Princeton: Center of International Studies, 1960).

²⁷²The New York Times, November 4, 1968.

into conflict with the hierarchy, which did not heed the clergy's demands that it publicly denounce the repressive actions of torture against ETA political prisoners. In the eyes of the more radical members of the lower clergy, the hierarchy was collaborating and compromising with the regime and ignoring what they consider the injustices done to the Basque people. Faced with seeming indifference from their bishop, a group of priests from Bilbao finally appealed to the Vatican on November 4, 1968. A letter was sent to Pope Paul VI discussing the political conditions of the Basque country and the grievances of the Basque people. After making a case that the Basques were a nation divided "between two states, without any proper relations between the two areas, without a proper bases for government, development and communal living," they then deplored the fact that the Spanish Church was systematically involved in the process of Castilianization because it only recognized Castilian as the official language of the Church.²⁷³ The letter was a plea for the recognition of the Basque people as a distinct ethnic group. Some priests have gone so far as to call for an "indigenous" Church and a Basque Episcopal Conference.²⁷⁴ While the clergy addresses itself

²⁷³"A Nuestro B.P. Paulo VI, contodo respecto un grupo de sacerdotes vascos de Vizcaya." Bilbao, November 4, 1968.

²⁷⁴On November 11, 1968, 60 priests staged a sit in at the seminary of Derio and sent a letter to their bishop in which they accused the Church of being wedded to a "sistema politico-fascista militarista." Among other things,

to the violations of human rights, there seems little question that their immediate interests are the fate of the Basques as a people. This was made very explicit in a letter signed by 500 priests and sent to the Spanish Episcopal Conference in 1969:

The sensitivity of nations and ethnic groups is such, insofar as their ethnic or national consciousness is concerned that we believe it difficult to resolve the problem without a recognition of their personality and the rights that belong to them.²⁷⁵

On May 4, 1969, after considerable pressure from his clergy, the Bishop of Bilbao, Jose Maria Cirarda, finally issued a pastoral letter taking note of what was happening within the Basque region and calling attention to the fact that the "Concordat had been violated, more than once, in these events".²⁷⁶ For some members of the lower clergy, this pastoral letter was too mild. Subsequently, a group of exiled priests in France sent Cirarda an open letter accusing him of lack of moral leadership and of failure to

they criticized the Church for supporting a regime engaged in "repression dirigida a la disolucion de la etnia vasca al aniquilamiento de la cultura del pueblo trabajador vasco." During 1968 and 1969 the clergy became so active that some of the newspapers in the North began to refer to their behavior as "guerrillismo clerical." Hierro, December 20, 1968, p.4.

²⁷⁵Alderdi, March/April, 1969, p. 10. This is a publication of the PNV.

²⁷⁶"Exhortacion Pastoral," from Jose Maria de Cirarda, acting Bishop of Bilbao, May 4, 1969.

recognize the critical political situation existing within the Basque country. They asked him to resign and withdrew their obedience to him: "We do not want the Church that you keep and administer for it is an egoistic and sold Church, a collaborator with the oppressors of our people. Indeed, this assertion is scandalous, but it is not exaggerated nor false."²⁷⁷

Some people may interpret the actions of the Basque clergy as part of the larger international phenomenon regarding the concern for reform within the Catholic Church. With respect to the behavior of the Basque clergy the evidence does not seem to allow such an interpretation. In very rare instances has the issue of Church reform come up; and when it has come up, it has been in connection with the fact that the hierarchy has not taken the stand advocated by the clergy regarding the actions of the regime vis-a-vis Basque nationalists. It should also be noted that it has been in the Basque country and Catalonia, two areas with a history of sentiment for Home Rule, that segments of the clergy have publicly taken stands against the regime. In their public pronouncements, the Basque clergy has not shown so much concern with the rights of all Spaniards, but with the rights of the Basques; and in this endeavor, they have received the moral support of their fellow clergymen in

²⁷⁷Letter from a group of Basque priests to the Bishop of Bilbao, 1969.

the French Basque country.

Recent events surrounding the Spanish hierarchy and the place of the Catholic Church within the future regime of Spain suggest that the Basque clergy might have found a sympathetic hearing for their cause and that a future regime of Spain may well give the Basques some degree of official recognition. At a meeting of Church dignitaries and priests held in Madrid on September 17, 1971, several resolutions were passed which, in this writer's opinion, and given the traditional position of the Church under the Franco regime, should be characterized as radical departures from traditional Church policies. These resolutions asked for an independent Church, that is, Church dignitaries would no longer occupy government posts as they do now, such as representation in the Cortes and in the Council of the Realm; respect and protection of political rights; and most significantly, respect and liberty for the ethnic minorities of Spain.²⁷⁸ An official body of the Church has recognized the existence of ethnic minorities within Spain. Undoubtedly the Basque clergy along with the Catalan clergy must have had exercised a high degree of pressure in order to introduce the resolution regarding the status of the ethnic minorities. Another resolution which was introduced, but did not pass, asked the Spanish people to forgive the

²⁷⁸ABC, September 16 and September 24, 1971. See also La Croix, (Paris) September 18, 1971.

Church's partial stand (the almost unconditional support of the Franco forces) during the Civil War:

Consequently we humbly recognize and ask forgiveness for not having acted as agents of reconciliation in the midst of a people torn by a civil war fought among brothers.²⁷⁹

Public Opinion

Since we have no public opinion surveys of the Basque population regarding the extent and intensity of support for organized nationalist groups, it is difficult to make fast generalizations regarding the nature of the support and the degree of autonomy desired by most of the population. There is evidence, however, that there exists a body of middle class opinion which favors some degree of autonomy for the Basques within the Spanish State. One such group, formed within the Basque country, is the Accion Social Democratica Vasca which advocates democratization and decentralization of the Spanish State with a view toward a European Federation.²⁸⁰ According to this group the old exclusivist form of nationalism is outmoded and out of fashion. At the same time there seems to be a fairly large body of opinion within the Basque country which is very sensitive to the immigration of non-Basques to the Basque region. There is

²⁷⁹Quoted in Euzko Deya, September 20, 1970, p. 3.

²⁸⁰Jose Domingo Arana, Pueblo Vasco (Bilbao: Editorial Ercilla-Libras, 1968), p. 167. See also his Centralismo Politico y Regionalismo (Bilbao, 1966).

fear that through the process of intermarriage the Basque population may become diluted. Consequently, some Basques argue that in light of this possibility an effort should be made to assimilate non-Basques into the Basque community rather than vice-versa. Some argue that the Basques are the most European of the Iberian peoples; and, if Spain wants to change and become more Europeanized, it should follow the example of the Basques.²⁸¹ This is not a new argument. Decades earlier a Basque writer of centralist tendencies, Maeztu of the Generation of 1898, had already made the argument that if Spain wanted to industrialize it should study the Basques and follow their example. It seems that the Accion Democratica Vasca is willing to accept the notion of one Spain but with regional and cultural diversity. Decentralization would be the cure for many of the social and political problems of Spain. This, too, is an old argument in Spanish politics.

Although the Carlists are still in existence, and presumably still have their organization, the Communion Tradicionalista which officially does not exist, the lack of information regarding this group does not permit one to assess the extent to which it could become a serious political force in future political changes in Spain. Despite the fact that the Franco regime allowed Navarra to

²⁸¹Jorge de Oteiza, Quosque Tandem (Ensayo del interpretacion estetica del alma vasca.) San Sebastian: Editorial Aunamendi, 1963.

keep its concierto economico, a reward for its help during the Civil War, the Carlists have never been too satisfied with the Franco regime. Their hopes that Franco might select a Carlist pretender to sit on the Spanish throne were deflated when Franco finally made his decision to select Juan Carlos as the future King of Spain. It seems difficult to conceive that the Carlists seriously entertained the possibility that a Carlist pretender might inherit the Spanish throne. At any rate, with the Franco regime approaching its end, the Carlists, too, have begun to show their dissatisfaction with the Madrid government. At a Carlist meeting held in Pamplona on December 20, 1968, Prince Carlos Hugo de Bourbon-Parma appeared. But the government in Madrid viewed this with some displeasure and asked him to leave Spain.²⁸² Prince Carlos Hugo is a French citizen. As a result of this incident, there were clashes between the police and Carlists in Pamplona. Grupo de Accion Carlista, a splinter group from the old Carlist organization, supports Carlos Hugo, but beyond this not very much is known about its size or its social ideology or whether or not there is any collaboration with ETA.²⁸³ There was in Navarra a small nationalist group, Iratxe, (Movimiento Nacionalista Navarro), but it fused with ETA in 1965.

²⁸²Keesing's Contemporary Archives, January 1-11, 1968 p. 23112.

²⁸³Le Monde, January 2, 1971.

At the cultural level there seems to be a growing interest in the Basque language and Basque cultural activities. Apparently through the efforts of ETA some ikastolas (Basque schools) have sprung up in the Basque country. But this interest with Basque schools seems to have broad support. El Alcazar reported in 1958 that there was great interest in the Basque language.²⁸⁴ In 1968 an article published in Hierro indicated that much more is written in Basque now than ever before. The article comments further that "It is about to be realized the beautiful enterprise of establishing bilingualism in the schools. It should be pointed out, in passing," the article read, "that there exists almost a hundred schools in Vizcaya and Guipuzcoa, a number which never existed before in the Basque country."²⁸⁵ A new literature prize for works in Basque has also been established: the Premio Nacional de Literatura Jose Maria Iparraguirre. And in 1967, the Diputacion de Navarra approved a plan to teach Basque a half an hour per day in the schools of that province.²⁸⁶

A recent survey has revealed some significant information regarding the Basque language. It seems that far more people speak Basque than had been supposed. For example, it was

²⁸⁴El Alcazar, December 17, 1958.

²⁸⁵Hierro (Bilbao), November 12, 1968.

²⁸⁶See Diccionario de Legislacion Administrativa y Fiscal de Navarra, (Pamplona: Editorial Aranzadi, 1969), pp. 1118-19.

found that 82 per cent of the Spanish Basque rural population speak Basque, while 51 per cent of those of the urban areas speak it and 19 per cent of those in the big cities.²⁸⁷ But only 12 per cent of the whole Basque population can write in Basque.²⁸⁸ As indicated by the FOESSA survey, the use of Basque seems to vary with the amount of education and urbanization but not the interest in it. It was pointed out that the Basque middle class favors the learning of Basque as a second language. A survey of housewives further indicates that 40 per cent of them favored (very much) their children learning Basque while only 31 per cent believed it to be necessary that their children learn Basque.²⁸⁹ This attitude did not seem to vary with class. Another finding indicates that 71 per cent of the housewives preferred the Basque language for their children's comic books while 30 per cent preferred the use of Basque on radio and television and 36 per cent for movies.²⁹⁰ Thus, the result of this survey indicates that there exists a significant minority with interest in the perpetuation of the language an interest which should not be taken

²⁸⁷FOESSA, "Informe sociológico sobre la situación social de España". Directed by Amando de Miguel, Euroamerica, Fundacion FOESSA, 1970, p. 1304. I am thankful to Mr. Pedro Blasco, a fellow in Sociology at Yale for having brought this source to my attention.

²⁸⁸Ibid.

²⁸⁹Ibid., p. 1307

²⁹⁰Ibid., p. 1276.

lightly for the future development of Basque nationalism. If this interest has been able to survive under the Franco regime, one should expect its continued growth under a possible more liberal regime after Franco.

The French Basques

Far more significant in recent developments, however, is the changing attitude of the French Basques. Basque nationalist aspirations have come primarily from the Spanish Basques. But recently the French Basques, too, have begun to manifest nationalist aspirations. On April 15, 1963, a congress of nationalists met in D'Itxassou (in the French Basque region) to organize a nationalist organization. Enbata, the organization which emerged out of this congress, calls for a Basque state in which both Spanish and French Basques will live, but for the moment it will settle for the formation of a department consisting exclusively of the three traditional Basque provinces.²⁹¹ In such a department, Euzkera along with French would have official standing. Eventually all the Basques would be united under a European Federation. It is their belief that the future of Europe does not lie with the large state units but with the break up of such units and the emergence of a federation based on ethnic groups. Insofar as the members of Enbata are

²⁹¹For a discussion of the French Basque movement see Paul Serant, La France des Minorites (Paris: Editions Robert Laffont, 1965), pp. 158-189.

concerned, France as a political unit does not mean very much to them. Simon Haran, the Secretary General of Enbata, expressed this sentiment in the following terms:

I can already see against mee all those who refuse the path to independence, or who find scandalous even to speak about it, even relative independence, administrative, and cultural. I see them all, all those people, Basque or foreigners, to emerge in the defense of the French State. But hexagonal France is a myth. If you do away with the administration, the police, the army and the language not much of France will be left. If you expel from the Basque country the French or Spanish administration, police, and the army, what is there left?²⁹²

Some members of Enbata have suggested that a common market should be established between the French and the Spanish Basque region since the latter has enough capital to develop the whole region.

In contrast to the program of the PNV, Enbata seems to take a more pragmatic approach, and among its grievances one finds mention of specific economic problems such as lack of employment and lack of any significant industry.²⁹³ The Rev. Pierre Larzabal, considered as one of the militant nationalists of the French Basque region, is of the opinion that the French government has purposely kept industry out of this area in order to make it a tourist haven. Consequently, he feels, the young population of the area will be reduced

²⁹²Quoted in Ibid., pp. 167-168.

²⁹³Enbata (Bayonne, France), January, 1964.

to the status of "servants-waiters, maids, concierges."²⁹⁴ This area has a long history of emigration. Most of the Basque sheepherders of the American West have come from the French Basque country.

Although it seems that in the past the French government has ignored the Spanish Basques coming into the French region when pursued by the police, recently it has begun to show concern with Basque nationalist activities. It has asked Spanish Basques to stay away from the French Basque region and has offered them exile but in departments outside of the Basque region. French Basques have in turn protested the activities of the French government and demanded that Spanish Basques be allowed to stay in the French Basque country. In March of 1970, nine Spanish Basques went on a hunger strike in the Cathedral of Bayonne in order to protest the French Government's demands that they move away from that area. Instead the local clergy protested and replied that "Basques have a right to live in the Basque country."²⁹⁵

As of late, the French Government has also begun to take notice of the nationalist activities of the French Basques. Several members of Enbata, along with its secretary, Simon Haran, were given a month's imprisonment

²⁹⁴The New York Times, January 11, 1971, p. 8.

²⁹⁵Ibid., p. 3, March 31, 1970.

in September of 1971 for having organized a celebration for Aberri Eguna.²⁹⁶ The day of Aberri Eguna is a practice which was started by the Spanish Basque nationalists. Apparently there are no relationships between the PNV and Enbata; and the PNV seems very reticent toward the latter organization. There are good political reasons for the seeming lack of interest of the PNV for Enbata. Any show of support for Enbata could well mean their expulsion from France.

Certain themes in European politics seem to favor nationalism such as that of the Basques. It has become fashionable these days to speak of regionalism and decentralization both in France and Spain.²⁹⁷ At the 69th convention of the French Radical Party in December of 1970, the Party passed resolution demanding the end of state centralization and recognition of political and administrative autonomy for the regions and municipalities.²⁹⁸ The central government would retain the power to deal with broader European political issues and eventually become part of a federation known as the United States of Europe.

²⁹⁶Le Monde, September 25, 1971.

²⁹⁷For a discussion of regionalism in France see Robert Lafont, La Revolution Regionaliste (Paris: Gallimard, 1967); Lowell G. Noonan, France: The Politics of Continuity and Change (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1970), p. 166; Laurence Gladieux, "Regionalism in France", Public and International Affairs, I (1967), pp. 135-157.

²⁹⁸The New York Times, December 7, 1970, p. 4.

In Spain there has also been some discussion of regionalism and decentralization by public officials. In an interview given in 1966, The Ministro de Gobernacion discussed his support for decentralization which he felt was a necessity for the modern state.²⁹⁹ Even the Pueblo, the paper of the Spanish labor unions, has given some attention to the question of regionalism. In an article entitled, "De la Region a la Patria", it was argued that Spain would benefit by giving the several regions greater autonomy.³⁰⁰ It was the author's opinion that decentralization would bring about the "patriotizacion de las regiones." So far, however, regionalism has not become a question of national policy.

²⁹⁹Pueblo (Madrid), November 16, 1966, p. 11.

³⁰⁰Ibid.

C H A P T E R VI

ACCOUNTING FOR THE RISE OF BASQUE NATIONALISM: SOCIO-ECONOMIC DIMENSIONS

In the preceding chapters we have discussed the gradual growth and development of Basque nationalism. In this chapter we shall try to dissect the various components of the movement. We shall make an inquiry in the relationship between Basque nationalism and several variables which are sometimes given as responsible for the rise of ethnic nationalism. Among these variables we find the following: (1) the political structure of the state to which the ethnic minority belongs; (2) the economy of the society at large and the economy of the region where the ethnic minority has its home base; and, (3) the degree of assimilation and social mobilization. What relationships can we detect between these variables and nationalism? To put it differently: Are there any detectable variations between Basque nationalism and the political structure of the Spanish State, the degree of Basque assimilation, and the state of the national and regional economies? In addition, the following question is also pertinent: Is Basque nationalism essentially a class phenomenon?

Due to the lack of recent sociological studies in this area, our inferences regarding Basque nationalism and the variables described above must of necessity be somewhat inconclusive. A detailed public opinion survey of the

Basque country would possibly reveal to us a more precise picture and probably allow us to reach conclusions that the scope of the present study does not allow. But "in the absence of reliable survey data," says Donald Horowitz, one can still draw some inferences "from the timing of conflicts and the issues of political debate." What are the salient issues presented by the leaders of ethnic nationalism and what do they "consider worth fighting for"?³⁰¹ To be sure, this is a round about way of analysing our problem, but it is the only available at the moment.

Even though there is no detailed class breakdown of the support for the Partido Nacionalista Vasco (PNV), the general evidence available, and the writings of people familiar with the movement, suggest that support for the Party came primarily from the middle class, the peasant sector, and the members of the lower clergy. The religious hierarchy of the Basque region, including those of Basque descent with very few exceptions has not supported the political objectives of Basque nationalism. This is not surprising, particularly under the Franco regime, since Franco, under the terms of the Concordat, has the power to veto appointments by the Vatican.

The comments of observers of Basque nationalism and

³⁰¹Donald L. Horowitz, "Multiracial Politics in the New States: Toward a Theory of Conflict", in Robert J. Jackson and Michael Stein (eds.), Issues in Comparative Politics (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1971), p. 176.

the electoral statistics of the Basque region indicate that broad segments of the Basque population did not support all the objectives of the PNV. The Party never became the dominant party of the region. The largest percentage of the popular vote that it ever received was 46 per cent during the Cortes elections of 1933.³⁰² The national (Spanish) monarchist parties were able to elicit substantial support throughout the Basque region. Support for the national monarchist parties, however, should not be interpreted as acceptance of greater centralization from Madrid, but rather for the existing status quo, that is, for the concierto economico arrangement. It seems that some of the people who supported the status quo also considered themselves autonomists but not anti-Spanish as the nationalists did.³⁰³


The support of the middle classes and the peasant sector must be qualified for support from these groups varied within the various Basque provinces. Support for the Party was concentrated primarily in the provinces of Guipuzcoa and Vizcaya. Navarra and Alava were also autonomists but in the traditional medieval sense. Their localism did not seem to go beyond their province, whereas the nationalists wanted to create a cross-local identity

³⁰²Juan J. Linz, "Opposition in and Under an Authoritarian Regime: The Case of Spain," unpublished paper, p. 67. Hereafter quoted as "Opposition under an Authoritarian Regime."

³⁰³Ybarra, op cit., p. 461.

within the Basque provinces. While there is a feeling of Basque identity throughout the Basque region, at the same time, one also witnesses an extreme local identification with the traditional provinces and traditional institutions. For example, it is not uncommon to hear Basques refer to themselves as the Alaveses, the Navarros, and the Bizkainos. It could be argued that this attachment to pre-modern or pre-nationalist institutions has been an obstacle in the full development of Basque nationalism.

The history of the area indicates that two processes of integration or national identification have been at work. One might graphically represent these two processes in the following manner:



From the point of identification with the local province, we witness the process of the rise of Basque nationalism, and at the same time, a process going into the opposite direction, that is, Spanish identification. Curiously enough, it seems that it has been in the same provinces, Vizcaya and Guipuzcoa, where these two processes seem to

have gone the farthest.

The provinces of Alava and Navarra, primarily agricultural and rural during the 1930's, did not manifest the same degree of enthusiasm for Basque nationalism that the other two provinces did. But due to the fact that we find rural support for the Party in the provinces of Vizcaya and Guipuzcoa, one might have to conclude that the rural-urban variable might not have been that decisive in influencing the degree of support for the Party.

The very rich Basques, on the other hand, seemed to have supported the center, rather than the PNV. The position of the Basque very rich, such as industrialists and millionaires, is probably not unrelated to concrete policy issues, to their economic position in the Basque community and in the economy of Spain. "The point is hard to document," says Linz, "but it seems clear that a large part of the Bilbao business elite, which created giant steel mills, other industrial plants, and some of the most successful industrial and investment banks, remained aloof from the incipient nationalist movement."³⁰⁴ It seems that the Basque rich worked closely with the Madrid government from which they received protection for their industries in the form of tariffs and government contracts. For example,

³⁰⁴ Juan J. Linz, "Early State-Building and late peripheral nationalisms against the State: The case of Spain." Unpublished paper, p. 115. Hereafter cited as "Early State-Building."

the Sociedad Espanola de Construccion Naval, founded to construct ships for the Spanish Navy, was financed with Basque capital. This group of industrialists apparently became the nucleus of the parties of the Restoration in the region in the latter part of the nineteenth century. Some supported the Liberals and some gave their support for the Conservatives.³⁰⁵ These ties between the Bilbao financiers and the Madrid government, says Linz, have continued after the Civil War. "Leading business men and a small group of anti-Basque intellectuals of the region were among the main supporters of Franco; and a few of them were even in early, but not permanent, contact with the founders of Spanish Fascism, some of whom would occupy key positions under Franco."³⁰⁶ Linz further notes that there has been an interchange of personnel between Basque big industry and government positions. Basque finance and industry is national in scope rather than regional, thus another reason why it might view Basque nationalism as a threat.

The close contact between the Madrid government and the Basque industrialists began with the Restoration when it became a policy of the Crown to bestow titles of nobility on some Basque industrialists. A Basque defender of the Spanish cause in Vizcaya, makes reference to the Monarchy

³⁰⁵Ybarra, op. cit., p. 327.

³⁰⁶"Early State-Building," p. 116.

in these terms: "It would be unforgivable ingratitude to forget the care so many times demonstrated by the king's assiduous attention to those things that affected Vizcaya for which we should make great efforts to eagerly gather around the throne."³⁰⁷

It is not difficult to see how the Basque industrialists might have perceived Basque nationalism as a threat to their interests. First of all, the political objectives of the nationalists in all probability would have had drastic consequences for Basque industry. The protection, and the safe market, afforded these industries by the central government might have been lost. Secondly, the PNV threatened to displace this group as the center of political power in the region, particularly in the province of Vizcaya. There is some evidence which suggests that the Basque tycoons, through the system of caciquismo, pretty much controlled election results in some areas, both to the Cortes and to the local governments. Basque industrialists, such as Ybarra and Chevarri, were highly involved in political activities and frequently ran for public office. The PNV in all probability meant a challenge to this position. Ybarra indicates that there were bitter feuds between the PNV and the tycoons of Basque industry. In the words of a nationalist, this sector of Basque society, the industrialists, had been "devasquizado", that is it had

³⁰⁷Ybarra, op. cit., p. 327.

become Spanish or Castilianized. And as one might have expected, it was this sector which was concerned with the economic implications of Basque nationalism and not unmindful of the role of the Madrid government in the growth of Basque industry. Ybarra rejected what he considered the absurdity of the nationalists by pointing out the benefits of being tied to Spain: "So much wealth and so many benefits have accrued as a result of Vizcaya's relations and ties with the rest of Spain."³⁰⁸

The foregoing may allow one to conclude that the variable of class was not absent in the degree of support for Basque nationalism. But this conclusion cannot be carried too far and without qualification for, as we mentioned above, the PNV received support from various socio-economic groups: the middle class, the peasants, the industrial workers and the lower clergy. If one were to characterize the Party regarding its general orientation to socio-economic policies, therefore, one might characterize it as a conservative bourgeois party. Although Basque nationalism also had a left-wing group, the ANV, which concerned itself with socio-economic reforms and class issues, it never became a serious force in the Basque region. The parties of the Left, particularly the Socialist Party, with the exception of some urban centers, such as Bilbao, and in some mining towns, did not elicit

³⁰⁸ibid., p. 471.

much support from the Basques. It seems that the support that it received came primarily from non-Basque workers who had immigrated to the area. The PNV had created its own labor union, the Solidaridad de Trabajadores Vascos. The PNV scarcely concerned itself with class issues, but concentrated its efforts almost exclusively on the question of political autonomy.³⁰⁹

In a multi-national state the form of political organization has at times also been considered an important variable shaping or determining the rise of ethnic nationalism, for manifestation of ethnic nationalism may be interpreted as reactions to political oppression or to the lack of representation in the central national institutions.³¹⁰

The changes in the political structure of the Spanish State and the rise of Basque nationalism are not unrelated. This relationship, however, is no more satisfactory as a sufficient explanatory tool than class analysis. As discussed in the preceding chapters, we found that the rise of the Carlist movement (a pre-nationalist movement) was in part a reaction against the centralizing policies of the nineteenth century liberals. Up to this point the

³⁰⁹Jesus de Sarria, Ideologia del Nacionalismo Vasco (Bilbao: E. Verdes, 1918).

³¹⁰John E. E. Dalberg-Acton, The History of Freedom and Other Essays (London, 1907); Ernest Barker, National Character and the Factors in its Formation (London, 1927); Alfred Cobban, National Self-Determination (Chicago, 1949).

relationship between the Basque provinces and the Spanish State had been by and large devoid of conflict. Basque nationalism, in a sense, thus grew out of Carlism. Arana, for example, had come from a Carlist family. It was during the continuing conflict process between the Spanish State and the Basque defense of the fueros that the notion of nationality first began to be used. But Carlism remained attached to medieval institutions and very parochial in its political orientation. While the nationalists, too, made reference to the traditional institutions of the Basques, their argument stemmed chiefly from the belief that the Basques were a nationality different from the Spanish and, consequently, had a right to self-determination. The argument of the Carlists was essentially legalistic: namely, that the Spanish State could not unilaterally abrogate rights and customs of the local communities which had existed since time immemorial. Their demands consisted in the restoration of their traditional rights. The Basque nationalists went a step further by maintaining that the Basques, by virtue of being a different nationality, had a right to political independence.

Nowhere does one find evidence that the nationalists or the Carlists asked for greater participation in the central national institutions as a compensation for the loss of their local autonomy. Obviously, this would have been a remedy had the main issue been one of insuring greater

political participation for the Basques. Had such demands been made, one could have interpreted them as acceptance of the central political institutions, and the assumptions underlying them. But this was not the case nor was it the issue. The main concern of the nationalists was to arrest the assimilation process, which had been proceeding for centuries, or reverse it, and preserve the identity of the Basques as a people. There is a difference between this position and the demands of an ethnic group which desires greater participation in the social and political institutions of the state to which it belongs. This, by and large, has been the case of the ethnic minorities, both black and white, which have immigrated to the United States. Their willingness to become part of the American society was not necessarily reciprocated by the existing socio-political elite. Demands for greater participation may imply a willingness on the part of the ethnic minority to recognize the legitimacy of the existing political institutions. But if the primary concern of a given ethnic group is to preserve its identity, then the form of government under which it lives may be of little concern. In the case of the Basque nationalists, for example, they showed little concern for the central political institutions which they considered as a Spanish problem and only relevant to them to the extent that Basque political objectives could be advanced.

In journalistic accounts of Basque nationalism it is sometimes asserted that the reason for the lack of greater French Basque nationalism lies in the fact that they enjoy greater political freedom than the Spanish Basques.³¹¹ But a closer look at the problem does not give much credence to this interpretation. Spanish Basque nationalism emerged precisely at the time when Spain was governed by a fairly democratic political system. The regime brought about by the Restoration (1876-1923) was one of the more democratic political regimes in Spanish political history. "The legitimacy of the parties had been recognized, basic civil liberties--freedom of association (Law of 1887), of the press, and so forth--were respected and there was toleration of wide (but not perfect) freedom for some trade union movements."³¹² In short, Basque nationalism emerged in a period which gave the PNV open, relatively democratic, and almost "ideal" political conditions to function and proselytize followers. Again during the second Spanish Republic the PNV emerged with great vigor.

The notion that Spanish Basque nationalism has been a reaction to political oppression may have some credence

³¹¹The New York Times

³¹²Juan J. Linz, "The Party System in Spain Past and Future," in Seymour M. Lipset and Stein Rokkan (eds.) Party Systems and Voter Alignments (New York: The Free Press, 1967), p. 202. Linz's article is an excellent treatment of the party system under the Restoration.

with regard to the Franco regime and the regime of Primo de Rivera. But again, this interpretation can only be carried so far. Although Primo de Rivera suppressed the Basque political organizations--a policy adopted towards other political organizations throughout Spain--he, nevertheless, allowed, and even encouraged, the different regions to manifest their cultural distinctions. But to Primo de Rivera "regionalism meant folk-lore, country dancing, regional literature, and home crafts--politically safe, attractive to tourists, and a proof of diversity in unity."³¹³

It has been only recently, under the Franco regime, that severe policies have been adopted toward some of the Basque provinces: the abrogation of the concierto economico for the provinces of Vizcaya and Guipuzcoa, the prohibition of publications in euskera, and the use of euskera at Church services. With these exceptions, we have found no evidence that the Basques have been selected for any particular type of discrimination. And recently the regime has overlooked the increasing use of euskera in publications.³¹⁴ The authoritarianism experienced in the Basque region does

³¹³Carr, op. cit., p. 568.

³¹⁴There are now some newspapers in Vizcaya and Guipuzcoa which are printing some columns in euskera. See El Diario Vasco of San Sebastian, La Hoja de Lunes of Bilbao, and the Diario de Navarra of Pamplona. See also Chapter V of this dissertation, p. 156.

not seem to be any worse than in the other Spanish regions, although in the regions with strong regional sentiment, the government has been more sensitive to cultural activities for it interprets them as having a political content.

Traditionally the Spanish Basques have enjoyed greater autonomy than the French Basques. It was not until the Franco regime that the Spanish Basque provinces really began to experience the degree of control that the French Basques have experienced since 1789. It would indeed be difficult to attribute the rise of Basque nationalism simply to the lack of democratic freedoms or to political oppression.

Moreover, the recent nationalist aspirations of the French Basques further suggests that the form of political structure may not be that relevant in helping to explain the rise of ethnic nationalism in a multi-national state. Although there were some structural changes brought about with the advent of the Fifth French Republic, particularly regarding the organization of the central political institutions, the traditional administrative structure of the French state, remained basically the same. Other cases also suggest that the form of political organization of a given state and the rise of ethnic nationalism may have very little relationship. The Scots, the Welsh, and the French Canadians are cases in point; all of them live within democratic states.

It is also sometimes presumed that ethnic discord is the product of economic grievances resulting from the politically subordinate position of the ethnic minority. This assumption is replete in the literature on race relations.³¹⁵ But this explanation must also be taken with some skepticism, because we find variations in this area. With respect to the Basques, one of the striking facts of the Basque region is its relative economic advancement in comparison to the other provinces and to the Spanish national economy. This further suggests that political subordination of an ethnic group need not mean economic retardation.

The appearance of Basque nationalism coincided with the industrial development of the Basque region, particularly the provinces of Vizcaya and Guipuzcoa. In 1877 Spain produced 1.58 million tons of iron-ore, 1.04 million tons of which was produced in the province of Vizcaya alone. By 1900 Spain was producing 21.5 per cent of the world's output of iron-ore.³¹⁶ It had surpassed Italy, France, and Sweden. Of Spain's 252 iron-ore mines 106 were

³¹⁵Mohammed A. Nawawi, "Stagnation as a Basis of Regionalism," Asian Survey, IX, December 1969. In his study of Scottish nationalism John E. Schwartz also puts emphasis on this variable. For citation see p. 1 of Chapter I. See also Tamotsu Shibutani and Kian M. Kwan, Ethnic Stratification: A Comparative Approach (New York; 1965), pp. 168, 196-97, 380-82.

³¹⁶Ronald Chilcote, Spain's Iron and Steel Industry (Austin, Texas: Bureau of Business Research, University of Texas, 1968), pp. 20-23.

concentrated in Vizcaya and over 75 per cent of Spain's 12,000 miners were located in that province.³¹⁷ According to one study,³¹⁸ between 1875 and 1900, 9,500,000 tons of iron-ore were exported from Spain, thus bringing into the Basque region an average annual sum of 100 million pesetas making the Basque country the leading financial center of Spain. It was with the revenues from the exportation of iron-ore that Basque capitalists embarked on the industrial development of Vizcaya and Guipuzcoa. In 1902 the Altos Hornos de Vizcaya, an iron-steel joint stock company with a capital of 32 million pesetas, was founded.³¹⁹ Also by the turn of the century Basque capitalists became pioneers in the areas of electricity, financing hydroelectric projects, iron-steel, chemicals, cement and paper industries. Tolosa, the old capital of Guipuzcoa, became the paper capital of Spain. San Sebastian had the biggest cement factory in Spain.

At the end of the nineteenth century great strides were also made to expand the merchant marine of the region. According to Jaime Vives, from 1846 to 1902, Bilbao spent approximately 130 million pesetas buying foreign vessels

³¹⁷Ibid., p. 24.

³¹⁸Jaime Vicens Vives, An Economic History of Spain (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969), p. 663.

³¹⁹Ibid., p. 667.

so that by the end of the century 39 per cent of the total merchant marine of Spain was concentrated in Vizcaya.³²⁰

Basque entrepreneurial activities were not limited to the Basque region. In the area of finance the Basque banks began to spread their activities throughout Spain. They were particularly active in hydroelectric concerns and chemical factories. By 1908, 30 per cent of the total Spanish investments were Basque, thus making the Basque banks the single most important financial center of Spain.³²¹ After World War II, says Carr, Basque banks began "to play a part in the Spanish economy resembling that of the German banks."³²² The Basque influence in the Spanish economy gave rise to the following saying: "Todo para Espana y Espana para Euzkadi."³²³

Although Spain went through a "gold fever" in the early years of the Restoration, by 1887 the Spanish economy began to experience a depression. The loss of the remnants of the Spanish Empire apparently furthered this downward trend of the economy. But it seems that this trend was not equally felt throughout Spain. While on the whole the Spanish economy was going through a period of

³²⁰Ibid., p. 691.

³²¹Carr, op. cit., p. 435.

³²²Ibid., p. 406.

³²³Ramon Sierra Bustamente, Euzkadi de Sabino de Arana (Madrid: Editora Nacional, 1941), p. 248.

stagnancy, in the Basque region economic growth continued. The Basque provinces and Catalonia remained the dynamic centers of the Spanish economy. Illustrative of this growth is the fact that between 1900 and 1913, the production of steel in the Basque region expanded by 263 per cent, and between 1920 and 1930 by 235 per cent. "(T)his," says Carr, "was twice the rate of expansion of the world production 1900-50."³²⁴ The period under Primo de Rivera was also a relatively prosperous period. This was the age of the cement industry. And in 1929, "iron and steel production was twice that of 1917."³²⁵

TABLE 2

SPANISH PROVINCES LEADING IN PER CAPITA INCOME, 1967
(in thousand pesetas)

Province	1962	1967	Rank order	% Change
Madrid	36,796	66,545	1	80.85
Vizcaya	38,717	66,052	2	70.60
Guipuzcoa	35,902	65,673	3	82.92
Barcelona	35,288	62,615	4	77.44
Alava	30,503	62,027	5	103.35
Navarra	-----	53,503	6	-----
Spain	24,496	44,481		81.58

Source: Camara Oficial de Industria de Guipuzcoa, Estructura economica-industrial de Guipuzcoa y su evolucion Madrid, 1970, p. 212.

³²⁴Carr, op. cit., p. 407.

³²⁵ibid.

Basque nationalist activities during the 1960's also seemed to have been accompanied by a relatively high economic growth of the Spanish economy. The period between 1957 and 1967 was one of rapid economic expansion. "During this decade the Spanish economy grew at an annual average rate of 9 per cent, one of the highest in the Western world."³²⁶ The Basque provinces shared in this growth. With respect to per capita income, in 1967 the province of Vizcaya occupied second place and Guipuzcoa third place. As shown in Table 2, even Navarra, one of the less

TABLE 3

PER CAPITA DISPOSABLE INCOME OF THE BASQUE PROVINCES (1967)
(in thousand pesetas)

<u>Province</u>	<u>Disposable Income</u>	<u>Rank order</u>
Guipuzcoa	57,154	1
Vizcaya	54,545	2
Alava	53,028	3
Barcelona	52,377	4
Madrid	51,623	5
Navarra	47,266	6
Spain	39,789	

Source: Banco de Bilbao, Renta Nacional de Espana y su distribucion provincial, (Bilbao, 1967) p. 27.

³²⁶Charles W. Anderson, The Political Economy of Modern Spain (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1970), p. xiii. This work is probably the first systematic study of economic planning under the Franco regime.

industrialized provinces of Spain, had a per capita income above the national average of 44,481 pesetas. The per cent change in the province of Guipuzcoa was higher than the national average. This is the area which has been the center of intense nationalist activities during the latter part of the 1960's.

While the national increase in the net product was 104.65 per cent between 1962-67, in Guipuzcoa it increased by 109.63 per cent. Between 1955-67, the revenue in the Basque provinces increased by 62.9 per cent while nationally it increased by 6.3 per cent.³²⁷

When we look at the distribution of the disposable income, we also find that the Basque provinces rank higher than the national average. As indicated by the table, all of the Basque provinces have a disposable income higher than the national average. This table suggests that the Basques may not be unduly burdened with taxes, particularly when we compare them with the Madrid province which occupies first rank in terms of per capita income, but in terms of disposable per capita income is below all of the Basque provinces except Navarra.

Although these selected figures do not permit us to draw far-reaching conclusions regarding the relationship between ethnic nationalism and economic variables, they

³²⁷Camara Official de Industria de Guipuzcoa, Estructura economico-industrial de Guipuzcoa y su evolucion (Madrid, 1970), p. 34.

permit us to point out that the Basque economy has not been characterized by stagnancy and that its development has been superior to that of the national economy, thus giving the inhabitants of this region a per capita income higher than the national average. It would be more revealing, however, if we could find out the changes in the distribution of income in the area over a long period of time and to see how economic growth has affected this distribution.

The point to be made is that the economic picture of the Basque region for the period under discussion gives little credence to the hypothesis that attributes ethnic conflict, or ethnic nationalism, to perceptions of economic deprivation vis-a-vis other groups within the same society or to competition for economic resources. More importantly, it should be added, the propaganda of the nationalists scarcely touches on questions of economic grievances; and when it does, it is primarily to show that the Basques could do well by themselves.³²⁸ Basque industrialists were criticized by the nationalists not because of their wealth, or because they "exploited" the Basques, but because of their lack of enthusiasm for Basque nationalism.

If Basque industry and businesses were primarily owned by non-Basques, furthermore, one might still be able to make the argument that despite the relative economic

³²⁸See Andoni de Soraluze, Riqueza y Economía del País Vasco (Buenos Aires: Editorial Vasca Ekin, 1945).

advancement of the Basque region, the Basques perceived themselves as being exploited by "foreigners." But no such argument can be made for Basque industry and finance is owned by Basque capitalists. In addition, Linz has found that "the Native Basques rate businessmen more highly than do the non-native residents of this area."³²⁹

In his study of ethnic conflict in Africa and Asia, Donald Horowitz noticed a careerist component underlying the problem: namely, that a large part of the conflict stemmed from the competition between the members of the diverse ethnic groups for positions in the national bureaucracy and in the armed forces. "(T)here is hardly an ethnically-divided country," he says, "without its 'civil service', and often those companions, the 'police issue' and the 'armed services issue!'"³³⁰ In these countries, he says, for the educated middle classes these may be the only lucrative positions available since the private sector does not offer adequate opportunities to fulfill one's aspirations.

Without denying the influence of the careerist component in Basque nationalism, the selected evidence available and the industrialized nature of the Basque region does not allow us to emphasize this variable. The evidence available on the socio-economic background of some of the leaders of

³²⁹"Early State-Building", p. 102.

³³⁰Horowitz, op. cit., p. 173.

Basque nationalism, suggests that most of them were the products of an urban environment and that some of them were economically well-off, did not lack social status and could have pursued successful careers within the structure of Spanish society. Sabino de Arana, for example, the founder of the PNV, came from a fairly wealthy family from Bilbao which had made its fortune in the shipbuilding industry. His father owned the Compañia Euskalduna. Arana did not lack social status nor did he experience economic insecurity. The evidence on his socio-economic background points to the conclusion that--given the socio-economic structure of Spanish society at the end of the nineteenth century--he belonged to a privileged class. He was educated at a private Jesuit school at Orduna and from there went to the University of Barcelona to study law. He was wealthy enough so that he did not have to worry about employment, thus devoting his time and energies to the cause of Basque nationalism.³³¹

Aguirre, who became the leader of the Party during the 1930's and after 1936 president of the Euzkadi Government, also came from a well-to-do middle class background. Also educated at a private Jesuit school and with a law degree from the University of Deusto. He held an executive position in his family's business, a

³³¹See Basaldua op. cit.

chocolate factory. He had also been involved in social activities, as leader of Accion Catolica and founded a youth organization, the Eusko-Maitesuna.³³²

Manuel de Irujo, another leading personality of Basque nationalism, held a law degree, was on the board of directors in one of the paper factories of Tolosa, and helped to found several paper and hydroelectric enterprises.³³³ Telesforo de Monzon, who became a member of the Euzkadi Government, came from a wealthy and "distinguished family" of Guipuzcoa.³³⁴

Thus the picture that emerges regarding the socio-economic background of some of the leaders of Basque nationalism, is not one of bohemian or romantic revolutionaries or alienated intelligentsia, but rather, on the contrary, one of socially integrated stable family men who had achieved some degree of social success and who might even be characterized as members of the "establishment." They were close to, and participated in, the industrial and commercial world around them.

The continued development of the economy of the Basque region has offered the educated Basques opportunities to fulfill their career aspirations in the private sector

³³²En Defensa de la Verdad, Buenos Aires: Editorial Vasca Ekin, 1956, p. 120.

³³³A. de Lizarra, Los Vascos y la Republica Espanola (Buenos Aires: Ekin, 1944), p. 99.

³³⁴Aguirre, Entre la Libertad y la Revolucion, p. 503

rather than in the public bureaucracy. This may give rise to a curious situation. In a society where industrialism is unevenly distributed, we may find a high percentage of public officials, such as in the bureaucracy and the armed forces, coming from the least economically developed areas of the society. In his study of regional differences within Spain, Linz, found this pattern. He found "that Catalans and Basques are underrepresented in the Spanish top judiciary and particularly the Supreme Court." But this underrepresentation, he argues, is not due to any conscious policy of discrimination but "to the more rewarding alternatives open to a young lawyer in the industry or commerce of those regions."³³⁵ The law graduates of Castile, Galicia or Andalucia do not have as many alternatives as those of the Basque country and Catalonia.

In his studies of economic development, Albert Hirschman has also found a similar pattern:

The poorer sections of the country, where careers in industry and trade are not promising, often produce, for this reason, a majority of the country's successful politicians and thereby acquire influential spokesmen in the councils of government.³³⁶

If competition for public employment or careers in the armed services were issues in the Basque region, one might find a higher prestige given to these positions. In his

³³⁵"Early State-Building," p. 104.

³³⁶Albert O. Hirschman, The Strategy of Economic Development (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1958), p. 185.

survey of regional differences regarding occupational prestige, Linz found that in industrialized Spain businessmen were ranked higher than public servants and military men. "The relative prestige of public employment, or the army, in the different regions of Spain," he says, "appear clearly related to the over and under-recruitment of those elites in each region."³³⁷ In his survey of students' career preferences he found a high percentage (90 per cent) of those of San Sebastian, the capital city of Guipuzcoa, preferring to enter a career in the private sector, while in Ciudad Real, a provincial city, only 39 per cent made such a preference.³³⁸

Making reference to the linguistic issue which keeps cropping up in controversies involving ethnic discord, Horowitz concludes that "without the careerist incentives, there would be much less leadership for linguistic causes."³³⁹ In the Basque case, however, it seems to be difficult to link or relate the linguistic issue with the careerist component. To begin with most of the Basques are fluent in Castilian. When the PNV emerged, it was extremely rare to find a person that was not very fluent in Castilian. As for today, the discussion of this issue in the Basque country indicates that one no longer finds a person who

³³⁷"Early State Building," p. 95.

³³⁸Linz, "The Eight Spains," p. 304.

³³⁹Horowitz, op. cit., p. 175.

speaks only euskera, and apparently only a small percentage of the Basque population can read and write euskera.

Linz's survey of regional housewives who had learned first the regional language shows that the Basque region has the lowest percentage of those who came into contact first with the regional language and later learned Castilian.

TABLE 4

PERCENTAGE OF HOUSEWIVES WHO LEARNED FIRST
THE REGIONAL LANGUAGE TO:

Region	Understand	Speak	Read	Write
Balearic Islands	85	84	1	2
Galicia	75	76	4	3
Catalonia	54	53	14	13
Valencian Region	48	47	1	--
Basque country	41	40	10	9

Source: Juan J. Linz, "Early State-Building and Late Peripheral Nationalisms Against the State: The Case of Spain." Paper presented at the UNESCO Conference on Nation-Building, Normandie, August 1970, p. 86.

It might not be unreasonable to assume that the percentage among men probably is not any higher. It is interesting to notice, however, that although the Basque country is low in the percentage of those who learned first to understand and speak the language, it is relatively high in the percentage of those who learned to read and write. This might suggest that perhaps the local language is taken more seriously in this region, with the exception of

Catalonia, than in the other regions. That the attachment to the language is probably more sentimental than utilitarian is suggested by the fact that while 69 per cent of the housewives of the Basque country would like their children to learn Basque, only 31 per cent believed it to be necessary.

TABLE 5
ATTITUDES OF HOUSEWIVES TOWARD THEIR CHILDREN
SPEAKING THE REGIONAL LANGUAGE

Region	Would like (very much or fairly much) %	Believe it necessary (very much or fairly much) %	Difference
Catalonia	97	87	10
Balearic Islands	91	75	16
Valencian Region	78	50	28
Galicia	73	49	24
Basque country	69	31	38

Source: Juan J. Linz, "Early State-Building and Late Peripheral Nationalisms Against the State: The Case of Spain." Paper presented at the UNESCO Conference on Nation-Building, Normandie, August 1970, p. 85.

As the table shows, the Basque region has the lowest percentage of respondents that would like to have their children learn Basque, but the greatest percentage difference between those who felt that learning the regional language was necessary.³⁴⁰ In the Basque country knowledge of the

³⁴⁰These figures have another level of significance which shall be discussed in the next chapter.

language is not associated with the process of social mobility. One might suppose that if the housewives perceived the language to be an important asset for career purposes, one should have expected a greater percentage to have responded that it was necessary. By contrast, in Catalonia, where 87 per cent believed that it was necessary to learn the local language, knowing the local language seems to be associated with social mobility. "In Catalonia, the desire is associated somewhat with a higher social position, while in the Basque country the attachment to the vernacular seems to be stronger among the middle classes."³⁴¹ But in all regions Castilian seems to be preferred as the language to be used in the educational system, although this preference seems to be less marked in the Basque and Catalonia regions. The population of those favoring the local language in secondary education (the *bachillerato*) is also lower in the Basque region.

It is difficult to make a case that interest in the local language in the Basque region is primarily related to considerations of social mobility. In the first place, among the leaders of Basque nationalism those who could speak the local language were the exception rather than the rule, which meant that if euskera was made the official language of the Basque country or a requirement for employment in the public bureaucracy of the region, they, too, would have

³⁴¹"Early State-Building," p. 88.

to learn it. Secondly, the nationalists did not argue for the exclusive use of the Basque language but for bilingualism for the Basque region. In the Basque region it seems that the linguistic issue is primarily symbolic, and it seems to be primarily among members of the middle classes and the upper classes that one finds cultural or academic interest in the local language.

On the basis of the evidence available, in this chapter we have indicated that the growth of Basque nationalism has accompanied the economic growth of the Basque country. This does not mean, however, that economic deprivation may not be unrelated to the rise of ethnic nationalism. But economic variables may work in various ways. One may witness the case, such as the black population of the United States which has a lower socio-economic status than the white population, and give the aspirations for socio-economic betterment as one of the reasons underlying much of the recent wave of black nationalism, the assumption being that once socio-economic betterment has been achieved black nationalism should subside. On the other hand we may have a case such as the Basques in which socio-economic betterment in relation to the society in which they live may have the effect of reinforcing their cultural identity. Since the Basque region is economically more advanced than the rest of Spain, the Basques can point to this as a source of pride and exhibit feelings of

superiority when referring to the other regions of Spain and further maintain that the rest of the country is a burden on them, or that they have to support the rest of the country.³⁴² Albert Hirschman, for example, noticed this in his study of economic development:

The progressive sectors and regions of an underdeveloped economy are easily overimpressed with their own rate of development. At the same time, they set themselves apart from the less progressive sectors by creating a picture of the latter as lazy, bungling, intriguing, and generally hopeless. There seems to be a cliquishness about progress when it first appears that recalls the same phenomenon among adolescents.³⁴³

This does not mean that economic development or lack of it creates ethnicity, but it may reinforce it.

³⁴²Oliveira describes this attitude on the part of the Basque nationalists in these terms: "The non-Basque Spaniards living and working in the Basque Provinces were regarded with singular disdain by the nationalists, who rejected them as members of an inferior race, calling them maquetos.", p. 417. In an article in the New York Times (December 3, 1968), Richard Eder quoted a similar view from a young Basque: "We cannot carry Spain in our backs indefinitely. The Castilians, the Andalusians are uneducated and primitive and they are not really ready for democracy. As long as we tied to Spain, we shall have to endure their dictatorship.", p. 11.

³⁴³Hirschman, op. cit., p. 186.

CHAPTER VII

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

Basque nationalism, as discussed in this study, is the product of the unsuccessful efforts at nation-building in nineteenth century Spain. This is not to imply, however, that Basque ethnicity is the direct or immediate product of nineteenth century politics, for Basque identification, as discussed earlier, had long historical roots. But this identification had never coalesced into a nationalist movement until the latter part of the nineteenth century when nationalism had come into vogue throughout Europe and the principle of self-determination had acquired legitimacy.

Basque nationalism is partly a reaction to the crisis of political legitimacy that occurred in Spain with the advent of the nineteenth century. The Cadiz Constitution of 1812 which envisioned a centralized and secular state along the lines of the French model introduced conflict into Spanish society between the adherents of a traditional decentralized Spain organized around the Church and Throne and the proponents of the secular state. This conflict was further exacerbated by the dynastic struggles which occurred after the death of Ferdinand VII.

Under the political order envisioned by the 1812 constitution, the traditional autonomy of the Basque

provinces would come to an end; and the Basques would henceforth be submitted to the uniform rule of the Madrid government. Initially the Basque provinces reacted by taking up arms in the name of God and their traditional liberties, the fueros. This led to several violent conflicts (the Carlist Wars) culminating eventually (1876) in the almost complete loss of the fueros. The Madrid government allowed the Basque provinces to retain some degree of autonomy in their fiscal affairs.

Initially it seems that Carlismo was as much motivated by the desire to preserve the religious unity of Spain as by an anti-centralist sentiment, thus giving early Basque regionalism an almost religious fundamentalism flavor, an orientation retained by the Partido Nacionalista Vasco (PNV) which adopted as its slogan, "God and the Old Laws."

The initial reaction against the loss of the fueros subsided somewhat under the Restoration (1876-1923) with segments of the Basque population accepting the new state of affairs under the concierto economico. Carlismo's appeal was gradually reduced to the province of Navarra and to a lesser degree in the province of Alava.

From the 1890's onwards Basque opposition to the center, the Madrid government, was divided into three groups: those who supported the status quo under the concierto economico, the arrangement under which the provinces were given some degree of fiscal autonomy, those

who wanted the restitution of the medieval autonomy with a decentralized monarchy, the Carlists, and a later group, the nationalists, who claimed that the Basques had a right to political independence, basing their argument on the grounds that the Basques were a different ethnic group or "race". It was the nationalists that the Madrid government viewed as the greatest challenge and threat because initially their demands were viewed by the Madrid government as incompatible with the notion of a Spanish nation and a Spanish State and presented the possibility of reviving the Carlist sentiment which seemed to have remained dormant since 1876.

Basque nationalism was launched in the 1890's from an urban platform and led by urban people who made use of traditional Basque symbols. This was also the time when the Basque region, particularly the provinces of Vizcaya and Guipuzcoa, were going through a process of rapid economic change and industrialization. It has been in these two provinces that Basque nationalism has received its greatest support both from segments of the middle class and the peasantry. Undoubtedly the large influx of non-Basques coming into the Basque region looking for work was a factor helping the emergence of Basque nationalism, for it probably reminded the Basques of their fast disappearing identity, a phenomenon out of which they made great capital. Basque nationalism, then, was the

product of an urban setting, and led by people exposed to, and acquainted with, the forces of modernization.

Although initially the nationalists did not receive an enthusiastic reception to their ideas, they gradually acquired enough support so that by 1936, under the second Spanish Republic, the Basque provinces were given a statute of autonomy. The provinces of Alava and Navarra continued to remain in the periphery of Basque nationalism and oriented more to their medieval autonomy and institutions.

Basque autonomy under the Republic was short-lived. The Civil War that engulfed Spain between 1936-1939 once again brought the Basque provinces into open conflict with the central government. Those provinces that chose to fight with the Republic, Vizcaya, and Guipuzcoa, were stripped of all autonomy and submitted to the direct rule of Madrid while Navarra and Alava, which remained in Franco's camp once the war began, were allowed to retain their concierto economico. The end of the Spanish Civil War also brought to an end, with the force of arms, the conflict between the Basques and the central government which had begun in 1812.

As a result of the Civil War, the PNV had to go into exile into France, from where it has maintained a small underground network through which it has tried to keep the question of Basque autonomy alive. From 1939 to the early 1960's Basque opposition to Madrid was primarily

manifested by the exiles in Europe and Latin America. But after the 1960's we begin to see emergence of a Basque domestic opposition to the Madrid government manifested primarily by members of the Basque clergy and a new nationalist group composed primarily of young people in their twenties, Euzkadi ta Askatasuna (ETA) which had split from the youth wing of the Partido Nacionalista Vasco. This recent group which has emerged to challenge the leadership of the PNV has taken a more radical approach in its activities and is more secular in its political orientation than the PNV. It claims to adhere to a socialist ideology and believes that a solution to the Basque question lies in an independent Euzkadi in which both Spanish and French Basques shall live. ETA seems to be a radical departure from traditional Basque nationalism in that it seems to be strongly concerned with issues of socio-economic reform and claims to speak for all the Basques, not just the Spanish Basques, although apparently most of its membership comes from Spain and most of its activities have concentrated in Spain. As we recall, the PNV scarcely gave any attention to class issues and devoted its attention only to the Spanish Basques.

While it has been ETA which recently has made Basque nationalism a live issue and apparently their activities have received some type of local support, as evidenced by the fact that the local population has not been willing

to tell the local authorities the whereabouts of ETA members, it seems that the old PNV still claims the support of large segments of the Basque middle classes. Apparently ETA's methods and ideology seem objectionable to broad segments of the Basque population. In view of the religiosity of the Basque region, a highly secular political organization may fail to capture broad support. If we recall, the Accion Nacionalista Vasca (ANV), the Leftist organization of Basque nationalism, never acquired any significant following. On the other hand, with the Church's changing attitude towards the Left and its apparent willingness to engage in dialogue with Leftist groups, quite possibly a more Leftist oriented Basque nationalist party could emerge.

What are the future prospects of Basque nationalism and the prospects for some type of Basque autonomy? Recent events surrounding the Burgos trial of sixteen ETA members suggest that the present government of Spain is as opposed as ever to grant any official recognition to the ethnically plural nature of Spanish society, that is, to recognize the fact that the political entity known as Spain remains for significant members of the Spanish society a state rather than a nation. The government has launched a campaign to root out and eliminate ETA as a political organization.

The fate of Basque nationalism and autonomy will largely depend on the nature of the political regime that will succeed Franco. If a more liberal regime based on representative democracy follows Franco undoubtedly the PNV will emerge on the political scene and continue to demand some type of autonomy. A more liberal regime, however, will be no assurance that Basque autonomy will be forthcoming for, in the past, opposition to autonomy for the peripheral regions has been manifested by both liberal and conservative governments. In Catalonia the issue of local autonomy is still very much alive. Just recently, a group of Catalans, known as the Assembly of Catalonia, met secretly to discuss a strategy of opposition to the government. Among their demands they asked for the restitution of the Catalan Statute of autonomy given by the Republic in 1932.³⁴⁴

Despite the present government's seemingly inflexible position on the issue of autonomy for the periphery, there are some indications that some segments of the Spanish population may be willing to reach an accommodation with the Basques and the Catalans. The hierarchy of the Spanish Church, for example, just recently officially recognized the ethnic make up of Spanish society and asked the government respect the personality of the ethnic minorities of Spain.³⁴⁵ At the same time there is evidence

³⁴⁴The New York Times, November 9, 1971, p. 8.

³⁴⁵See note 278, Chapter V.

that the army and some of the Falangist groups are opposed to any notion of local autonomy. Their slogan remains: "Espana, Una y Grande."

Whatever the regime that succeeds Franco, the question of Basque and Catalan autonomy will continue to be a pernicious issue in Spanish politics. As Linz has well argued, "Spain today is a state for all Spaniards, a nation-state for a large part of the population, and only a state but not a nation for important minorities."³⁴⁶ Nation-building remains to be achieved in Spain despite four centuries of Castilianization. This example does not look optimistic for political leaders in some of the Afro-Asian countries who may have to live with weak political structures or face political fragmentation as witnessed in 1971 in the state of Pakistan.

Some Theoretical Implications

Nationalism is a complex subject. As suggested by this study, nationalist sentiment does not affect a whole population in a uniform pattern, nor does it seem to manifest itself in a uniform way. The overt manifestations of nationalist sentiment seem to vary from time to time. It does not seem to affect a self-differentiating group in the same manner. While a group of people may perceive themselves as having a common ethnic identity, it does not

³⁴⁶Linz, "Early State-Building", p. 14.

necessarily mean that all of them will manifest the same degree of nationalist sentiment. Some may be content with some degree of cultural autonomy or respect for the culture of the group by the society at large; to this group the label of cultural nationalists could be applied. Others may aspire to outright political independence, the logical conclusion of nationalist sentiment. These variations in the intensity of nationalist sentiment, within a given population and over periods of time, make it difficult to draw across-the-board generalizations on this subject. Some students of nationalism who have spent a great part of their lives devoted to this subject remained puzzled with many aspects of it.³⁴⁷

The complexity of this subject and the difficulty in dissecting it are compounded by the fact that this is an area in which we are dealing with a people's feelings and perceptions regarding themselves as a group, and their relationships with other self-differentiating groups. As aptly stated by a student of this subject, it is "the self-view of one's group and not the tangible characteristics that is the essence in determining the existence or

³⁴⁷One of the more prominent students of this subject, Carlton Hayes, ends one of his studies by concluding that "we really do not know what has given vogue to nationalism in modern times." Carlton J. H. Hayes, The Historical Evolution of Modern Nationalism (New York: Crowell-Collier-Macmillan, 1932), p. 302.

non-existence of a nation."³⁴⁸ Because nationalism is a matter of feeling, it is difficult to be perceived by the observer. "There is an understandable propensity," says the same writer, "when investigating a case of ethnic discord, to perceive the struggle in terms of its more readily discernable features."³⁴⁹ Thus what may be a manifestation of nationalism will be explained as a linguistic and/or religious problem, or in terms of grievances due to economic differentiation, if such differentiation exists, between the several groups living within the same state. Consequently, the temptation is to conclude that if the more readily perceived grievances are ameliorated or corrected, the problem will disappear or subside.

But the comparative literature suggests, says Walker Connor, that nationalist sentiment may persist unabated irrespective of the fact that the more tangible aspects of nationalism have virtually disappeared. For example, the "Irish nation persisted after the virtual disappearance of Gaelic, despite the pre-1920's slogans to describe Gaelic and Irish identity as inseparable." "National identity may survive substantial alterations in language, religion,

³⁴⁸Walker Connor, "Nation-Building or Nation-Destroying?", p. 25. To be published in the forthcoming Spring (1972) issue of World Politics.

³⁴⁹Ibid.

economic status or any other tangible manifestations of its culture."³⁵⁰ In the case of the Basques, the casual observer of the Basque region may find little tangible evidence of a Basque identity. The Basque language, for example, has long ceased to be a normal means of communication among the Basques. Moreover, the evidence on the background of the proponents of Basque nationalism indicates that a substantial number, if not most, were ignorant of the Basque language or only peripherally acquainted with it, thus suggesting that the presence or absence of the local language may have little relationship to the intensity of nationalist sentiments. This contrasts with Catalonia where one finds extensive use of the local language and a rich literary tradition in Catalan. At the same time students of Catalan nationalism have found that, while it has had a much broader source of support than Basque nationalism, it has not been as intensive and as exclusive as Basque nationalism.³⁵¹ Catalan nationalists have been willing to assimilate non-Catalans into Catalan society while Basque nationalists have traditionally refused to consider such ideas.

Relying primarily on the extensiveness of the use of the local language in order to measure the existence or

³⁵⁰Ibid.

³⁵¹Linz, "Early State-Building," p. 79.

non-existence of Basque nationalism, one would have to conclude that it did not exist, for, as we saw, euskera is hardly spoken by the Basques. A perusal of the Cortes debates on this issue reveals the extent to which non-Basque deputies, during the Restoration and the second Republic, kept maintaining that Basque nationalism, or the existence of a Basque nation, was untenable in view of the fact that the Basques could not really show a distinct culture from that of Spain and that their language hardly existed, and what existed was broken up in different dialects. Still on this theme, we have the case of Galicia (Franco's home region) where the local language is more widely spoken than in the Basque region, and yet nationalist aspirations hardly exist, although during the second Spanish Republic there was also some sentiment for some degree of local autonomy. However, it was never as extensive as that of Catalonia and the Basque country.

Cultural assimilation of a minority group into a larger cultural or ethnic group need not mean the loss of the previous ethnic identity. This phenomenon is borne out by the studies on assimilation in American society. In his study of assimilation in American life, Milton Gordon³⁵² has made some valuable distinctions regarding the process of assimilation and has devised a model which

³⁵²Milton M. Gordon, Assimilation in American Life (New York: Oxford University Press, 1964), pp. 66-67.

clarifies some of the theoretical shortcomings raised in the first chapter of this dissertation. Rather than discussing assimilation as an either or process, Milton Gordon breaks it down into seven processes which give rise to seven different types of assimilation which enable one to look at assimilation in terms of a continuum starting with cultural or behavioral assimilation and ending with civic assimilation. Civic assimilation might be looked upon as complete assimilation. (See Table 6).

With Milton Gordon's model it now becomes possible to measure the extent to which ethnically divided societies are approaching integration or, in Milton Gordon's terms, civic assimilation. According to the model an ethnic group may adopt the language and cultural traits of another group, the host society, and yet retain its ethnic identity. Although cultural or behavioral assimilation is apt to be the first type to occur, it does not necessarily mean that the other types will follow. The far more important type of assimilation is structural assimilation. This, according to Gordon, is "the keystone of the arch of assimilation."³⁵³ Once structural assimilation has taken place it means that the range of contacts between members of the ethnic group and the host society has expanded, such as contacts at the primary group level. From here martial assimilation

³⁵³Ibid., p. 81.

TABLE
THE ASSIMILATION VARIABLES

Subprocess or Condition	Type or Stage of Assimilation	Special Term
Change of cultural patterns to those of the host society	Cultural or behavioral assimilation	Acculturation
Large-scale entrance into cliques, clubs, and institutions of the host society, on primary group level	Structural assimilation	None
Large-scale intermarriage	Marital assimilation	Amalgamation
Development of a sense of peoplehood based exclusively on host society	Identificational assimilation	None
Absence of prejudice	Attitude receptional assimilation	None
Absence of discrimination	Behavioral receptional assimilation	None
Absence of value and power conflict	Civic assimilation	None

Source: Milton M. Gordon, Assimilation in American Life (New York: Oxford University Press, 1964), p. 71.

will follow and once this happens inevitably the remaining types will be achieved. With the achievement of civic assimilation, the ethnic group has acquired the identity of the host society.

The model does not imply that the processes of assimilation will take place in the same fashion in all societies that may contain several ethnic groups. The scope and the speed of these processes may differ from society to society and will undoubtedly depend on a variety of circumstances, the most important of which being the attitudes of the minority group towards the host society.

In the case of the Basques, there is little question that cultural or behavioral assimilation has taken place, but structural assimilation has not proceeded very far. The failure of structural assimilation, however, is not due to the refusal of Spanish society, but, on the contrary, to the refusal of the Basques to acquire a new identity which would make them indistinguishable from other Spaniards. Identificational assimilation has not been achieved. As discussed earlier, one of the primary objectives of the founders of the PNV was precisely to stop any further degree of assimilation. And this still remains as one of the goals of Basque nationalist groups.

In the first chapter of this study, we raised some of the theoretical issues discussed in the literature of political development and national integration. Some of

these theoretical issues served as the point of departure, or backdrop for this study on the question of Basque nationalism. We wanted to see if Basque nationalism deviated from, or conformed to, the theoretical postulates presented in the literature on political development. Now that we have completed our discussion of the rise and continued growth of Basque nationalism, a recapitulation of some of the issues raised earlier seems in order.

The literature on political development, on the role of communications in the process of national integration and on the general process of modernization has emphasized the end result of "homogenization." It was assumed that the process of modernization affects all cultures roughly in the same manner and that it was irreversible and unilinear. Consequently, states composed of diverse ethnic groups should eventually become nationally integrated. Traditional cultures would give way to the onslaught of modernization. It was further assumed that the changes associated with the process of modernization were of a systemic nature, that is, changes in one dimension implied changes in all the other dimensions of the system. It was believed that modernity would supplant tradition, thus the tendency to think in terms of the convergence of modern societies, since technologically speaking they are so much alike. As of late some of the writers on modernization and convergence theory, such as Samuel P.

Huntington, have reconsidered their earlier position. In a recent article Huntington recanted his early view on this subject and instead argued that "contrary to the common idea that modernization produces homogenization or convergence, it could be said that it may reinforce the distinctive characteristics of each society and thus, broaden the differences between societies rather than narrow them."³⁵⁴ Our case study also suggests that this is another possibility as opposed to the notion of convergence.

The first conclusion that emerges from our study is that the socio-economic processes associated with social mobilization which according to Deutsch will force people to look for "new patterns of group affiliation and new images of personal identity,"³⁵⁵ did not seem to bring about the attitudinal changes conducive to national integration. Instead the process of modernization that

³⁵⁴Samuel P. Huntington, "The Change to Change: Modernization, Development and Politics", Comparative Politics, Vol 3 (April, 1971), p. 298. Earlier, however, he and Brzezinski had maintained that "...industrialization and urbanization...give rise to a common culture found in all modern societies. The industrial process imposes uniformities in equipment, skills, techniques, and organization. Industrial culture is the same in Sverdlovsk and Detroit. Eventually this culture will produce similar institutions." See Zbigniew Brzezinski and Samuel P. Huntington, Political Power: U.S.A./U.S.S.R. (New York: The Viking Press, 1967), p. 10.

³⁵⁵Karl W. Deutsch, "Social Mobilization and Political Development," in Jason L. Finkle and Richard W. Gable (eds.) Political Development and Social Change (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1966), p. 205.

occurred in Spain and in the Basque country seemed to have had the effect of reinforcing the cultural differentiation of the Basques.

The thesis behind much of the literature on political development seems to overlook the point that in some cases nations had already coalesced and national identity had become established before the process of modernization got under way. As examples, one might cite Ireland, Portugal, Korea, and Japan. This suggests that societies need not go through the process of industrialization, and the other concomitant social processes known as modernization in order to become integrated, that is, to develop a national identity. In some cases the process of national integration developed prior to what has come to be known as modernization.

Two other interesting theoretical points emerge from our case study. First, it is generally believed that urbanization and the growth of the market economy also lead to the growth of secularization--thus one of the reasons for believing that modernity and tradition cannot coexist.³⁵⁶ But our study suggests that this need not be necessarily the case. Despite the fact that the Basque

³⁵⁶John H. Kautsky, for example, argues that modernization and secularization go together: "One could thus define the process of modernization," he says, "as one of secularization, but it also involves a great number of other interrelated factors." The Political Consequences of Modernization (New York: John Wiley and Sons Inc, 1972), p. 20.

country is one of the more industrialized regions of Spain, at the same time it also remains one of the most religious regions of the country.³⁵⁷ Other areas of Spain much more traditional in the organization of their economic life and much less acquainted with the modern aspects of contemporary life do not manifest the same degree of religiosity that one finds in the Basque country.

Second, it is also generally believed that political parties play the role of integrator in the process of nation-building, and in the literature on political parties the notion of integration looms large as one of the cardinal functions of parties.³⁵⁸ But the literature on political parties, however, has used as a model societies, such as the United States and European societies, which had already achieved a substantial degree of national integration. But in ethnically divided societies political parties may play just the opposite role. Rather than helping to bring about national integration, political parties instead seem to capitalize on ethnic differences and thus may become obstacles in the path of national integration. We must remember that the European nation-

³⁵⁷For an index of Basque religiosity see Linz, "Early State-Building," p. 135.

³⁵⁸See James S. Coleman and Carl G. Rosberg, Jr., (eds) Political Parties and National Integration in Tropical Africa (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1966); Joseph LaPalombara and Myron Weiner (eds), Political Parties and Political Development (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966).

states emerged, by and large, under authoritarian political systems where political parties in the modern sense were non-existent. For the Afro-Asian states, and for those European states that did not achieve national integration before the process of modernization got under way, and before democracy became a popular ideology, the process of national integration may endure for a long time and may not succeed. Instead we may witness further political fragmentation.

It seems to this writer that one of the weaknesses of the literature on political development and national integration stems from the fact that it has overly stressed the rational element in human behavior. It has looked upon man as primarily motivated by economic considerations. This view is particularly evident in Professor Deutsch's work on nationalism. In his work the nation seems to emerge as a trading company to satisfy the socio-economic aspirations of its members and thus he underestimates the possibility that men may act for goals other than socio-economic gain. To view nationalism as "an effort to convert the channels of culture into storm ladders for masses individual to social and economic advancement"³⁵⁹ is to view it as no more than an opportunistic movement. This overlooks the emotional attachment to cultural

³⁵⁹Karl W. Deutsch, Nationalism and Social Communications
p. 103.

traditions and group identification. If men were indeed this rational, and if a nation's existence was dependent on how well it satisfied the socio-economic aspirations of its members, we should be able to see the disintegration of nations as soon as socio-economic conditions worsened. But there is historical evidence which suggests, however, that it is precisely at periods of great social stress and economic deprivation that national leaders have been able to evoke the most intense degree of nationalism. Purely from an economic and personal gain point of view, it is difficult to explain why an American Jew, for example, gives any aid to the state of Israel, or even identifies with it. More importantly, the studies on nationalism indicate that nationalistic leaders hardly ever ask the question regarding the economic feasibility of the political units which they wish to govern, e.g., Bangladesh, Anguilla.³⁶⁰ This seems to be, in fact, among the last considerations. In the case of the Basques, some of the leading personalities of Basque nationalism lost much of their wealth as a result of their involvement with the movement.

As suggested by our study, the growth of modernity,

³⁶⁰For a good discussion on the relationship between economic variables see Walker Connor, "Nation-Destroying or Nation-Building?"; Rupert Emerson, From Empire to Nation (Boston: Beacon Press, 1969); and Walter Sulzbach, National Consciousness (Washington, D.C.: American Council on Public Affairs, 1943).

with its underlying process of social mobilization, need not mean the loss of traditional identities and the quest for new ones. To be sure, socio-economic changes have brought about changes in many aspects of traditional cultures but this does not mean the loss of group identity. Despite the fact that American society has gone through great technological changes since the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, this does not mean that Americans have gradually begun to lose their identity and are looking for a new one. The same could be said of European societies. The evidence seems to suggest that ethnic nationalism and group identity can accommodate itself rather well to economic-technological innovations. Some of our modern ideologies which have postulated universal outlooks, as opposed to national or parochial ones, have eventually become nationalized. Christianity, for example, which emerged as a universal religion recognizing all men without any distinctions was eventually appropriated by nationalism, and in some cases, such as Ireland, even reinforced nationalism. Paradoxical as it might seem, it is among segments of the Catholic clergy, exposed to universal values, that we may also find some of the more nationalistic people, as illustrated by segments of the Basque clergy. Nationalism has proved to be more powerful than religious affiliation. The same has happened to Marxism; it, too, has become nationalized. It may well

be, and the evidence available seems to suggest this direction, that political modernization, as Clifford Geertz has argued, "does not do away with ethnocentrism, it merely modernizes it."³⁶¹

³⁶¹Clifford Geertz, "The Integrative Revolution: Primordial Sentiment and Civil Politics in the New States", in Clifford Geertz (ed.), Old Societies and New States (New York: The Free Press, 1963), p. 154.

A P P E N D I X

TABLE 7
MUNICIPAL VOTE ON THE STATUTE OF AUTONOMY
JUNE 19, 1932

<u>Provinces</u>	<u>Yes Munici- palities</u>	<u>No Munici- palities</u>	<u>Abstentions</u>	<u>Total</u>
Alava	52	11	14	77
Guipuzcoa	84	2	3	89
Navarra	109	123	35	267
Vizcaya	109	1	6	116
Total	354	137	58	549

Source: F. Javier de Landaburu, La Causa del Pueblo Vasco (Paris: n.p., 1956), p. 13.

PLEBISCITE ON THE STATUTE OF AUTONOMY
NOVEMBER 5, 1933

Provinces	No. of Electors	Yes	No	Abstentions
Vizcaya	267,466	236,564	5,065	0
Guipuzcoa	166,365	149,177	2,436	248
Alava	56,056	26,015	6,695	109
Total	489,887	411,756	14,196	357

Source: F. Javier de Landaburu, La Causa del Pueblo Vasco, (n.p.), (Paris, 1956), p. 13.

TABLE 9

DISTRIBUTION OF THE POPULATION OF THE BASQUE COUNTRY AND
SELECTED AREAS OF SPAIN BY OCCUPATION (1970)


Regions	% of the pop. in agri. and fish	% in industry	% in services
Madrid	5	40	55
Barcelona	5	56	39
Pais Vasco	14	55	31
Extremadura	60	20	20
Galicia	67	15	18
Spain (total)	36	33	31

Source: FOESSA, 1970:172

TABLE 10
POPULATION OF THE FRENCH BASQUE REGION (1962)

Province	Population	Area	Persons per km ²
Labourd	152,000	800 km ²	190
Basse-Navarre	85,000	1,284 km ²	27
Soule	20,000	785 km ²	25
Total	207,000	2,869	72

Source: Zeruko Argia, January 11, 1970.



EU border



Pirineos



P. Cantabrico

B.P.

Basque Provinces



P. Vasco-Cantabrico

12

13


14



NORTHERN BASQUE COUNTRY (France)

- xxxxxxx Spanish-French Border
- - - - - Department of Basse-Pyrénées (France)
- Basque Country Area
- French Administrative Circumscriptions
- o o o o o boundary of Basque Country of France

BASQUE SPEAKING AREA FROM 16TH TO
20TH CENTURY (SPAIN)



- Basque-speaking Area in the 20th Century
- Basque-speaking Area in the 19th Century
- · - · - Basque-speaking Area from the 16th Century
to the 18th Century
- Boundary of the Basque Country of Spain
- xxxxxxx Spanish-French Border

Source: Julio Caro Baroja, Materialien para la historia de la lengua vasca (Salamanca: University of Salamanca 1945), p. 285.

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