

1-1-1981

# The Potosi Mita under Hapsburg administration : the seventeenth century.

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
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312066013491009

THE POTOSI MITA UNDER HAPSBURG ADMINISTRATION.  
THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY.

A Dissertation Presented

By

JEFFREY AUSTIN COLE

Submitted to the Graduate School of the  
University of Massachusetts in partial fulfillment  
of the requirements for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

May 1981

Department of History

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for Marilyn

## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The writing of a doctoral dissertation is at once a very gratifying and maturing experience. I set out, nearly three years ago, with a much-inflated impression of myself and with great pretensions. Those feelings were only enhanced by the receipt of an ICA research fellowship and the accompanying status of being a "Fulbright Scholar." Very quickly, however, I learned that my own work would depend, ultimately, upon the efforts of librarians, archivists, government officials, colleagues, friends and my wife, Marilyn. Thus, now that the thesis is nearly completed, I have many, many people to thank.

Professor Nina M. Scott, Fulbright Advisor for the University of Massachusetts, herded me through the compilation of the grant proposal and championed my cause thereafter. I also thank Professors Jerome King, George Armelagos and Donald Black, who served on the University's Fulbright Screening Committee.

Professor Emeritus Lewis Hanke taught me what it was like to be a mitayo during the three years that I served as his assistant. He is also responsible for pointing me toward the Potosí mita as a topic, providing me with

copies of many important publications and offering me continual encouragement. Dr. Pauline Collins, Latin American Bibliographer for the University of Massachusetts Library, is a godsend. She located many obscure sources, sent me notices of recent publications and she kept me abreast of the uncertain fate of the Library tower while I was in Bolivia. Professor Peter J. Bakewell, of the University of New Mexico, provided many helpful comments on my project at its inception and advice on conducting research in Sucre and Potosí.

Archival research in South America would have been impossible had it not been for the assistance, spiritual as well as financial, offered by the Fulbright and USICA offices there. I am especially grateful to Mrs. Cecilia Córdova, CAO Dr. Peter DeShazo and ACAO Dr. John Dwyer of USICA/La Paz. John and Rosa Dwyer invited Marilyn and me for a weekend, and then supported us for nearly two weeks during the golpe of November 1, 1979. In Lima, CAO Dr. Frank P. Florey and Fulbright Director Marcia Paredes were most helpful during our brief visit to Peru. In Argentina, we received the aid and the friendship of Ana Maria Carossino, and Mirta and Domingo Berreuta, of the beleaguered Fulbright Commission.

Dr. Alberto Crespo R., Director of the Archivo de La Paz and the Biblioteca de la Universidad Mayor San Andrés, was gracious enough to invite me to his home for an



afternoon of lively conversation about the mita, and to provide me with bibliographic aids that greatly facilitated my investigation in Bolivia. Mario Chacón Torres, Director of the Archivo Histórico de Potosí, was a warm host on both of our visits to the Villa Imperial. Inge Marie Harman and Roger Rasnake, of Cornell University and veteranos of the Bolivian campaign long before we arrived, saved us from many pitfalls with their advice and counsel. Dr. Carlos J. Díaz Rementería, of the Universidad de Sevilla, was our guardian angel in Sucre and later shared his 2-habitación apartment with us in Buenos Aires. He is a very good friend.

Dr. Gunnar Mendoza L., Director of the Archivo Nacional de Bolivia and the Biblioteca Nacional de Bolivia, is a light in the archival darkness. The ANB and the BNB are by far the best-run and best-organized repositories of documentation that I have worked in. I must confess that, because I worked in Sucre first, I did not immediately appreciate my good fortune. But I am now a devoted fan, and I look forward to my next visit. Dr. Mendoza was also a cordial host to Marilyn and me. I would like to thank everyone at the ANB and the BNB, and especially the Subdirectora, Martha Mendoza.

In Peru, Graciela Sánchez Cerro, Director of the Oficina de Investigaciones in the Biblioteca Nacional, and Mario Cárdenas, Director of the Oficina del Archivo

Histórico in the Archivo General de la Nación, were both very kind to make their collections available when we descended on Lima unannounced. In Argentina, I thank Dr. César A. García Belsunce, Director of the Archivo General de la Nación, and the entire staff of that institution for their assistance and patience.

I would also like to acknowledge the support and encouragement offered by Frank H. McCracken, Jr., Marilyn's employer. Not only did Frank allow her a year's leave to accompany me to South America, he has tolerated the impact that the last two months have had on both of us.

My dissertation committee has held in their despite my monthly barrages of chapters and notes, and my whirlwind trips to Amherst. Professors Jane M. Loy, Miriam U. Chrisman and Donald A. Proulx have survived three drafts of this thesis, and they have made important contributions to its form and content. They have offered me only their encouragement and assistance.

Professor Robert A. Potash has shown an unusual willingness to explore new territory by directing a dissertation that concerns neither nineteenth century Mexico nor twentieth century Argentina. His greatest contribution, however, came in the years preceding the thesis, when he instilled the self-discipline and high standards that were necessary to produce this huge volume.

But the most credit must go, inevitably, to Marilyn. She has supported me this last year, and thus has allowed me to devote all of my time to writing. She tolerated the fourteen-hour plane, train and--especially--bus trips; panza; Buenos Aires in the heat and humidity of February; and the "slings and arrows" of Spanish and Latin American male chauvinism. To leave her position as a respected systems analyst to become "la mujer de Jeff" required understanding beyond the call of duty. This is, therefore, our dissertation.

Concord, Massachusetts  
April 24, 1981

ABSTRACT

The Potosí Mita under Hapsburg Administration.

The Seventeenth Century.

(May, 1981)

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Directed by: Professor Robert A. Potash

The mita was a draft Indian labor system that Viceroy Francisco de Toledo developed in 1573 for the silver industry at Potosí (in colonial Upper Peru; current-day Bolivia). For a brief period the mita served, in combination with the introduction of amalgamation technology, stockpiles of previously unrefinable ore and a large capital investment by the mine and mill owners (azogueros) to cause a boom in production.

By 1600, however, the stockpiles of ore had been exhausted and the boom had given way to decreasing levels of silver production at Potosí. The Indians who were serving in the mita (mitayos) had become more important to the industry, because they were now the principal means of obtaining ore, but their condition had deteriorated. As

their own profits fell, the Indians began to flee from Potosí and from the provinces that were subject to the mita. Their migration, which was caused by tribute requirements and other labor obligations as well, disrupted the social, economic and political order that the Spanish were trying to impose upon the Indians. Their method of resisting the invaders was passive, but the Indians were neither conquered nor submissive victims of the mita.

The group that was caught between the continuing demand for mitayos at Potosí and the decreasing number of Indians in the provinces was the caciques (Indian nobles). They were the key to the entire system, because they delivered the Indians to the mines and the mills. At first the caciques were able to meet their quotas by abridging the legal restrictions on the recruitment of the mitayos. But in the early seventeenth century they found themselves fined for the growing number of Indians that they were unable to deliver, and a new form of mita service was founded: service in silver, ostensibly to hire substitutes. By 1630, between one-third and one-half of the total delivery of mitayos to Potosí was made in money. The azogueros used some of the silver they received from the caciques for operating funds, rather than to hire laborers. The mita therefore became a capital subsidy as well as forced labor system.

The Hapsburg government of colonial Peru opposed the

new form of mita service because it was an unauthorized arrangement between the azogueros and the caciques to which it was not a party. The crown's ability to counter the de facto mita was restricted, however, by its isolation in Spain, by the time that was consumed by trans-Atlantic correspondence and by its own bureaucracy. The viceroys who were stationed in Lima were plagued by similar problems, and they depended upon the President of the Audiencia de Charcas and the Corregidor de Potosí to administer the mita on a daily basis. A constant interplay of personal and professional jealousies among these officials, the viceroy's reluctance to innovate and the contradictory orders that were issued from Lima and Madrid complicated the government's efforts to reform the mita to the point of near-total ineffectiveness.

In 1670, the Viceroy Conde de Lemos determined that the system could not be purged of the azogueros' misuse of mita service in silver and the other abuses that stemmed from it, and he proposed that the system be abolished. The crown was reluctant to accept the loss of revenue that such an act would have entailed, and instead it ordered a total reformation of the mita. That program was executed during the 1680s, under the Viceroy Duque de la Palata. It too failed, because it was based on an untenable premise: that the Toledan mita could be re-established despite 110 years of economic, political and demographic change in Peru.

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## C H A P T E R I

### INTRODUCTION

The mita was a draft labor system developed by Viceroy Francisco de Toledo in 1573 to meet the labor requirements of the silver mining center at Potosí. Indians from the far reaches of Upper Peru were compelled to travel to Potosí and serve a year working in the mines and refining mills there. The system continued, with various modifications, until it was abolished by the Cortes de Cádiz in 1812. This study concerns the mita during the seventeenth century, when Potosí was a jewel in the Hapsburg crown.<sup>1</sup>

Toledo designed the mita to meet the specific needs and goals of his viceroyalty, including the consolidation of royal dominion in a rebellious realm and the protection of the crown's economic interests. Over the next century and a quarter the Peruvian economy diversified, the realities of silver production altered, and the demographic landscape changed. In concert with those developments the mita evolved, most often through local, extralegal, adaptations. The mita of 1680 bore little resemblance to that of 1580. The story of its metamorphosis, and of the

Hapsburg government's efforts to administer the system, shed an interesting light on the history of seventeenth century Peru.

### Historiography

Bitter debate swirled about the mita during most of its 239-year history. The system was identified by its enemies as a form of servitude worse than slavery, and was accused of depopulating the provinces subject to it. The mita's supporters denied that it was responsible for the demographic decline in Upper Peru and defended draft labor on the premise that the Spanish Empire depended upon Potosí silver for its survival.

Despite its importance to the Black Legend-White Legend controversy, the mita has not received the careful historical analysis it requires.<sup>2</sup> Too often modern essays have merely parroted the contemporary debates waged during the colonial period. Only a few objective articles have been written on the mita, and although some larger studies have considered the system, no monograph has yet been produced on the subject.

Modern study of the mita began with Jorge Basadre's 1937 article, "El Régimen de la Mita." Basadre scanned the history of the system from 1573 to 1812 in forty short pages. The Potosí mita, moreover, was only one of many he discussed, for mitas were also established for other

enterprises that required large contingents of Indian labor. While it was a pioneering study, therefore, Basadre's article could offer only a glimpse of the institution at Potosí.<sup>3</sup>

Basadre made a number of very important points. He argued, for example, that the mita was merely one of many factors that contributed to the depopulation of Upper Peru during the colonial period. He also demonstrated that Toledo did not create the mita, but institutionalized labor practices which were extant upon his arrival in Peru. Finally, Basadre showed a keen appreciation for the difference between law and reality in his discussion of the services the Indians performed for encomenderos. But when he described the Potosí mita, Basadre's argument became rigid and considerably weaker. Evidence from the sixteenth, seventeenth and eighteenth centuries was interspersed, implying that the mita's form was static. Basadre relied almost exclusively upon the Recopilación de las leyes of 1680 and viceregal memoirs for his information on the mita. The use of those official sources resulted in a sketch that was more of a blueprint than a portrait.<sup>4</sup>

Many of the shortcomings of Basadre's "Régimen" were overcome by Alberto Crespo Rodas in his 1955 article, "La 'Mita' de Potosí." Crespo was the first to limit his study to the mita at Potosí, and he further confined his scope to the institution during the seventeenth century. Using

manuscript documentation from the Archivo General de Indias (AGI) in Sevilla, Crespo began to add flesh to the "bare bones" description that Basadre had presented some eighteen years earlier.<sup>5</sup>

Crespo concluded that Basadre had been correct in asserting that the population decline in Upper Peru was not caused by mitayo death in the mines at Potosí. Instead, he argued that the mita contributed to the social and economic disruption of the region. Aware that this view might be construed by some as an apology for the system, Crespo was quick to point to the abuses--corporal and financial--endemic to the mita. He argued, however, that the Indians did not tolerate mistreatment and non-payment of their wages, but fled from the mita, leaving their caciques to bear the brunt of abuse. Crespo therefore introduced the concept that the Indians were active opponents of the mita, rather than passive victims of it.<sup>6</sup>

Crespo has said that his research base was minimal; that he used only enough documentation to suggest the form of the seventeenth century mita.<sup>7</sup> Nevertheless, his investigation of the de facto mita, including the means used by the Indians to protect themselves from abuses, was an important contribution.

The Proceedings of the Sixth International Congress on Mining (León, 1970) included many valuable short studies on the mita, or subjects closely related to it. Of particular

interest are Alberto Crespo's article on the recruitment of mitayos; Juan Pérez de Tudela y Bueso's essay on the moral issues raised by the mita; and Ramón Ezquerro Abadía's survey of the problems that plagued the system during the eighteenth century.<sup>8</sup>

Crespo's study reinforced the concepts that he had set forth in his 1955 article. His comments on the provinces from which the mitayos came, however, added a little more detail to that earlier description. Crespo noted that the provinces included in the seventeenth century mita were all altiplano regions, sharing Potosí's high altitude and cold climate. He argued that their selection by Viceroy Toledo had been based on a contemporary understanding that changes in altitude had very negative effects on the Indians' health.<sup>9</sup> This would suggest that Toledo designed the mita with an eye toward minimizing its impact on the Indian population.

Juan Pérez de Tudela differed sharply with that conclusion. He accused the Spanish crown of premeditated cruelty in subjecting the Indians to mita service at Potosí. Focusing on the sixteenth century, Pérez argued that the demographic disaster in the Caribbean should have been sufficient to convince the crown that mining was deadly for the Indians. Forced Indian labor was permitted in Peru, he said, because the crown pushed aside questions of conscience in favor of riches. Hapsburg kings merely

pretended innocence by emitting lofty proclamations for the conservation of the Indians, and later decrying any failure to comply with their "wishes." Meanwhile, Pérez argued, they assured non-compliance with their proclamations by forfeiting real decision-making to local government officials; they knew that their representatives in Peru would yield to the pressures exerted upon them by the mining interests there.<sup>10</sup>

Pérez de Tudela's article is an example of the recent studies that have failed to escape the polemics of the colonial debate over the mita. He is heir to a long line of quasi-historians who have argued that there was a conspiracy between the crown and its colonists to profit from the extermination of the Indians. The conspiracy approach is unrealistic, for reasons that will become apparent below, and has been attacked with equal hyperbole by David Pereyra and others:<sup>11</sup> Such studies are not the products of objective investigations, and should not be the bases of future scholarship. They do, however, suggest topics worthy of greater attention: a) the relative power of the crown and colonists to affect local practice; b) the gap between legal ideals and reality, and the reasons for it; and c) the relationship between government officials in Spain and those in America.

Ramón Ezquerro Abadía touched upon these topics in his survey of the problems that were characteristic of the



eighteenth century mita. In a prefatory discussion of the 1600s, he described the mid-century battle between Hapsburg officials and the azogueros (mine and mill owners) at Potosí over abuses that had appeared in the mita--mistreatment of mitayos and indios de faltriguera (money that the Indians sent to Potosí to hire substitutes in their place, but used by the azogueros for their own purposes). Ezquerria blamed the deterioration of the mita on the effects of time and the continual exploitation of the cerro. The azogueros, he said, had mistreated mitayos and engaged in fraud in a vain attempt to protect their profits. The Indians, in turn, had responded to the increased pressure on them by running away.<sup>12</sup>

According to Ezquerria, a conflict over the mita was also waged within the ranks of Hapsburg government. Most officials believed that production at Potosí had fallen, and abuses had appeared, because of mismanagement; that the mita and production could both be restored to earlier levels if government administration of the system were improved. By the mid-seventeenth century, however, other officials had come to argue that the mita was fatally flawed, or obsolete, and should be abolished. The most serious effort to extinguish the mita, led by the Viceroy Conde de Lemos in 1670, was defeated by the crown's reluctance to live without Potosí silver, and its belief that the system could be revitalized. An attempt to regenerate the mita followed,

under the direction of the Viceroy Duque de la Palata. It too was unsuccessful, overcome by the opposition of economic interests that were hurt by Palata's reforms and the lack of a consensus within the government.<sup>13</sup> Clearly, there was no colonist-government conspiracy to kill off the Indians.

While there has been no monograph on the mita, it has been treated within larger studies. One of the earliest was Gwendolin Ballantine Cobb's dissertation, "Potosí and Huancavelica. Economic Bases of Peru, 1545-1640" (University of California, Berkeley, 1947). Cobb briefly considered the mita systems at both mining centers within the larger context of silver and mercury production. Because she conducted her research during World War II, Cobb had to rely entirely upon secondary literature and published primary sources. As a summary of that material her dissertation is useful, but it is uncomfortably vague at many junctures and includes some basic mistakes. For example, Cobb said that "because of the weight of unaccustomed heavy mine work the native population declined."<sup>14</sup> This is undoubtedly true, but the degree to which it is correct, and other factors that contributed to depopulation, should have been noted. She also said that the 1578 repartimiento de la mita for Potosí was Toledo's first, when it was actually his third.<sup>15</sup> These weaknesses are understandable given the early date of the dissertation

and the circumstances under which it was written. It is unfortunate that they were not corrected before the work was published in Bolivia in 1977.<sup>16</sup>

One of the better, longer, works on the question of Indian labor at Potosí is Garrick Wilson Holmes' M.A. thesis, "The Indian Miner in Colonial Potosí. Sketch for a Study of Urbanization in the Andes" (Columbia University, 1959). As an anthropologist, Holmes was concerned with the reasons why a mining proletariat did not develop at Potosí, and why Indians there did not work any harder than their immediate survival required. He explored both mita and minga (volunteer) labor in his search for the reason why the latter did not supplant the former. Holmes' focus was on urbanization and acculturation as phenomena, but he conceded that both processes would eventually have to be studied within a chronological framework: ". . . the paradoxes of the process of Indian acculturation in Potosí can be resolved only by relating that process to the general historical evolution of this remarkable city."<sup>17</sup>

Holmes' thesis, like Cobb's dissertation, was based on secondary and published primary sources. It was written, however, with unusual imagination and insight. One is especially struck by his consideration of the Indian as an active element; building upon the lead of Alberto Crespo, Holmes argued that the Indians were knowledgeable of the value of silver, alert and quick to exploit economic

opportunities or evade oppressive obligations. His fresh approach extended to the issue of population decline as well. Holmes asked why the provinces failed to meet their mita quotas, not whether the mita had caused their depopulation. New questions always spark new answers, and his investigation resulted in a long list of reasons; the mita was only a minor factor among many. He postulated, furthermore, that the lines of causality between the failure to comply with mita quotas and depopulation ran in both directions at the same time.<sup>18</sup>

Regrettably, Holmes did not pursue the questions he raised in his thesis in a doctoral dissertation. His little-known and under-utilized study was, nevertheless, an important contribution to our understanding of Indian labor at Potosí. It is now the historian's responsibility to investigate the themes and subjects the anthropologist has identified for him.

There has been no monograph on the mita largely because of the amount of source material available on the subject. One of the authors who might have been expected to write such a work is Alberto Crespo. In his 1970 article, however, he said that the volume of documentation was simply too vast for him to consider a full-fledged assault on the mita. Crespo lamented that he would have to content himself with accomplishing a little at a time.<sup>19</sup>

Another historian from whom a monograph has been

expected is Marie Helmer. Over the years Helmer has published a number of documents and brief articles about Potosí, and she planned to write a comprehensive work on the mita. Her outline proposed a thorough investigation of the system for the entire colonial period. The promised study has not appeared; the enormity of the task has probably prevented its completion.<sup>20</sup>

Silvio Zavala has spent a lifetime compiling notes and collecting documents on Indian labor in colonial Peru, and he has published many books and articles on various aspects of the Spanish-Indian relationship. During the last three years his research notes on forced labor in Peru have appeared in a three volume work entitled El servicio personal de los indios en el Perú, with one tome for each of the sixteenth, seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.<sup>21</sup> Zavala has drawn together many useful sources from Spain, Peru and elsewhere in an exhaustive collection of "extractos." The volumes do not represent the long-awaited monograph, however, but rather a chronological presentation of notes, with commentary and synthesis kept to a minimum. The result is a hybrid--something between a primary and a secondary source--which is an extremely valuable research tool.<sup>22</sup>

The seventeenth century volume holds some traps for the unsuspecting investigator. Zavala has employed a few anonymous, undated, memoriales and relaciones in his section

on the 1601 and 1609 cédulas that forbade Indian personal service. The originals of some of those documents are in the Archivo General de Indias, dated and signed fifty years after the two cédulas were issued.<sup>23</sup> Scholars who use the Zavala volumes must, therefore, take care to check the ultimate source of the information they employ, especially when the document in question has been dated by context.

The need for a monograph on the mita, and for more study of all aspects of Potosí's history, was clear in D. A. Brading and Harry E. Cross' 1972 article, "Colonial Silver Mining: Mexico and Peru."<sup>24</sup> Brading and Cross applied Mexican-derived concepts to the Peruvian case to demonstrate our relative ignorance of the latter example, and issued a clarion call for more research in the Andean area.

Brading and Cross were puzzled why repartimiento labor mining was replaced by volunteer labor in Mexico after the middle of the seventeenth century, but continued at Potosí. They hypothesized that the reason probably lay with the differences in geography, geology and the nature of the Indians who lived in the two realms. The authors also noted that volunteer Indian labor did gravitate to Potosí in the period before Toledo, and identified the mita as a state subsidy that permitted silver production in Peru to soar beyond that in Mexico.<sup>25</sup> Like Holmes, however, they could not understand why a class of Indian miners failed to

develop at Potosí.<sup>26</sup>

In the ten years since the Brading and Cross article, Potosí and the mita have attracted the attention of a small group of investigators. Many of the themes suggested by that essay, and earlier studies, have received in-depth analysis, as scholars have begun to exploit the wealth of documentation that is available. Research has been greatly facilitated by the appearance of bibliographic and archival aids by Gunnar Mendoza L., Lewis Hanke and Celso Rodríguez, René Arze Aguirre, Mario Chacón Torres, José Vázquez Machicado and others. These guides have been complemented by recent editions of contemporary works by Bartolomé Arzáns de Orsúa y Vela, Luis Capoche, Juan de Solórzano Pereira and Vicente Cañete y Domínguez.<sup>27</sup>

In their approach to the manuscript documentation, investigators have chosen either to write limited studies based on a small part of the source material, or broad essays based on a sampling of sources. An example of the first kind of study is the tesis de licenciatura by Teresa Cañedo-Arguelles Fabrega, "Efectos de Potosí en la estructura de una provincia mitaya: Pacajes a mediados del siglo XVII" (Universidad de Sevilla, 1976). Using manuscripts from the Escribanía section of the Archivo General de Indias, Cañedo-Arguelles delved directly into the question of the mita's impact on the obligated provinces. Like Crespo, she concluded that Indian flight, not death in

the mines, was the principal effect of the Potosí mita on Pacajes. Indian flight, in turn, caused economic and social disruption, and led to fundamental changes in the political institutions of the province.<sup>28</sup>

Of special interest is Cañedo-Arguelles' description of the caciques' role in the mita. The azogueros held them responsible for delivering mitayos to Potosí, both in person and in silver. The latter form of service, she said, grew out of the fines levied by the azogueros when caciques proved unable to meet their quotas in persons. Mita service in silver was caused, in part, by the depopulation of the province, for which the mita was partially responsible.<sup>29</sup> In the case of Pacajes, therefore, Holmes' suggestion that falling compliance with mita quotas and depopulation were linked by causal ties in both directions seems to have been true.

Cañedo-Arguelles offered her thesis as one case study from which questions and themes could be drawn for future investigations. She noted that more such limited studies would be necessary to construct a mosaic portrait of the mita as a whole.<sup>30</sup>

An example of the second kind of study is Nicolás Sánchez-Albornoz' 1978 volume, Indios y tributos en el Alto Perú.<sup>31</sup> The Potosí mita was discussed only briefly, but the author made a valuable contribution by incorporating source material from pleitos, informaciones and testimonios



in which Indians were witnesses. However altered by translators and the form of questioning, these sources are the closest we will come to the Indians' own story of life under the mita and similar labor requirements.<sup>32</sup> One of the most important sources was included by Sánchez-Albornoz as an appendix: the questioning of capitanes enteradores de la mita in 1690 by the Conde de Canillas, Corregidor de Potosí.<sup>33</sup>

Sánchez-Albornoz approached the issue of depopulation in Upper Peru from a quantitative angle. He compared the results of the 1573 and 1683 general censi conducted by Francisco de Toledo and the Duque de la Palata, respectively. Ten provinces were included in both counts, and Sánchez-Albornoz' comparison of the two censi suggested a net population loss within them of 40 per cent, which he considered modest. He said his findings lent credence to Noble David Cook's conclusion that the southeastern section of modern Peru, which included some of the more populous mita provinces, suffered less population loss during the colonial period than the remainder of the realm.<sup>34</sup> Sánchez-Albornoz' quantitative investigation shared the problems inherent in numerical studies. Most importantly, he could not adequately compensate for Indian migration within or without the ten provinces. Fortunately, he understood the limitations of his comparison, and cautioned the reader that his findings were highly tentative.<sup>35</sup>

The studies described here have all touched upon the Potosí mita or some aspect of it. Most have been concerned with the demographic ramifications of the system. They have also suggested a number of themes worthy of future attention. For one, it seems evident that the mita did not perform as it was designed, but changed with time, interacting with developments at Potosí and in the provinces. Second, there was no conspiracy between the Hapsburg government and the colonists to exterminate the Indians. On the contrary, the colonists and the government competed with one another, and within their ranks, for control of Indian labor. The Indians, moreover, were as active as any group in protecting their interests.

With the number of interested groups involved in the mita, the importance of considering the system both at Potosí and in the provinces, and the amount of documentation available on the subject, it is clear that no one study could adequately address all of the issues involved for the entire colonial period. Indeed, the most valuable studies to date have been those that have limited their scope and their conclusions to the materials upon which they were based.

Fortunately, a number of investigations are either currently in progress or have recently been completed. Peter Bakewell is engaged in an overview of Potosí from 1545 to 1650, and will discuss the mita in an extensive

chapter on Indian labor.<sup>36</sup> Brian M. Evans is applying his skills as a demographer to an investigation of the general census of 1683, and the concomitant issues of depopulation and Indian migration.<sup>37</sup> Enrique Tandeter has just completed a dissertation on the late-eighteenth century mita, from an economic perspective.<sup>38</sup> Catherine J. Julien is involved with the "Re-use of Inca Recruitment Practices in the Potosí Mita."<sup>39</sup> Finally, Ann Zulawski has begun work on a dissertation that will consider competition for Indian labor between Potosí and other sections of the Peruvian economy during the seventeenth century.<sup>40</sup> These studies, by scholars from various fields, employing their respective skills, give promise that a mosaic history of the Potosí mita will soon be available.

#### Goals, Sources and Methods

Where does this dissertation fit into the mosaic? I hope that it will serve as the framework upon which the pieces for the seventeenth century will be hung, or at least as a guide to how they should be arranged. At the same time, because this study covers a large segment of the colonial period--it includes a background chapter on the sixteenth century as well--it represents the first monograph on the Potosí mita.

My research began with two very general goals: a) to determine what the mita was really like; and b) to discover

the role of the Hapsburg government in its history. The seventeenth century was chosen for a pair of reasons. The first was the quantity and quality of available source material. Eight legajos of expedientes on the mita, from the period 1633-1700, were available on microfilm in the University of Massachusetts, Amherst, Library (AGI, Charcas 266-273).<sup>41</sup> Other major collections, principally the records of the Audiencia de Charcas and the Cabildo de Potosí, were accessible in the Archivo Nacional de Bolivia (ANB) and the Biblioteca Nacional de Bolivia (BNB) in Sucre.<sup>42</sup> Manuscript materials were also consulted in the Archivo Histórico de Potosí (AHP); the Archivo General de la Nación, Buenos Aires (AGN); the Archivo General de la Nación, Lima (AGNP); and the Biblioteca Nacional del Perú, Lima (BNP).<sup>43</sup> Not only was there a sufficient amount of documentation, it was diverse enough to permit a multi-dimensional investigation. The microfilm was particularly strong with regard to official correspondence, and it revealed the processes by which government policy was determined. The Archivo Nacional de Bolivia held similar material for the period 1600-1633, and the Archivo General de la Nación, Buenos Aires for the mid-1640s. The South American archives also contained the pleitos, testimonios and informaciones that provided insights into the mita as it actually functioned, not as it was intended to function. Silvio Zavala's volumes were another important source of

information, for he summarized documents from the Biblioteca Nacional in Madrid that I would not otherwise have had available.

The second reason this dissertation is limited to the seventeenth century is my desire to present the multi-dimensional view of the mita that the documentation permits. To attempt such a study for the entire colonial period was unrealistic, given the amount of material, so the period for which the sources were strongest was selected. The time frame--a century--is still large enough to allow the formulation of general conclusions about the Potosí mita.

I have employed qualitative methodology almost exclusively. Quantitative history serves best to test the traditional view of a subject, and to raise new questions. In this instance there was no traditional view to modify, for the qualitative history had yet to be written. Moreover, it became clear very early in my research that the quantitative data produced during the seventeenth century were highly biased. The groups and the officials who produced the statistical material manipulated it to enhance their own positions. The biases of those who produced the figures had to be determined before the data could be used. The quantitative evidence is abundant, and available, and when it is used carefully it will add to our knowledge of the mita.<sup>44</sup> But the qualitative history

had to come first, and although it may be out of fashion, it was the goal of the present dissertation.

As the preceding discussion suggests, I hold no illusions that this study will be the final word on the Potosí mita. I intend to continue working on the subject, including use of the quantitative data. I expect, however, that this thesis will prove useful to other investigators who are interested in a particular period in Potosí's history, or some aspect of the mita. I have, therefore, taken great pains to document my sources. Whenever possible, I have included a summary of the manuscript materials in the notes (see Table 1 for a list of the abbreviations employed in them). The summaries are based, in the case of the ANB and BNB, on the MC catalogue (described in Table 1); those for the AGNP, AHP and BNP are from the card catalogues in those institutions; and those for the AGI and AGN are taken directly from the documents themselves (usually a secretary's abstract, on the envelope). It is my hope that these citations will aid other researchers in locating primary source materials for their own investigations.

The notes are an important part of this study, but they are also very long and detailed. I have chosen, therefore, to include them at the end of each chapter. The casual reader will not be distracted from the narrative, but the more interested, or doubting, reader will still have them

close at hand.

The chapters that follow are divided by chronological period, so that the metamorphosis of the mita may be followed, as well as the Hapsburg government's response to its changing form. A summary is provided at the end of each chapter. Chapter VIII ("Conclusions") will offer general comments on the mita as a whole, and discuss the implications of this dissertation for the history of Potosí and of the Hapsburg dynasty's efforts to administer its American colonies.

TABLE 1

## ABBREVIATIONS EMPLOYED IN THE CHAPTER NOTES

AGI	Archivo General de Indias, Sevilla, Spain.
AGN	Archivo General de la Nación, Buenos Aires, Argentina.
AGNP	Archivo General de la Nación, Lima, Peru.
C	Cuaderno.
AHP	Archivo Histórico de Potosí, Potosí, Bolivia.
CR	Cajas Reales.
ANB	Archivo Nacional de Bolivia, Sucre, Bolivia.
ACh.LA	Audiencia de Charcas. Libros de acuerdos.
C	Audiencia de Charcas. Correspondencia.
CRC	Audiencia de Charcas. Cédulas reales. Copiador.
EC	Audiencia de Charcas. Expedientes.
M	Minas.
RC	Audiencia de Charcas. Reales cédulas.
BNB	Biblioteca Nacional de Bolivia, Sucre, Bolivia.
CPLA	Colecciones particulares de manuscritos, Rück, Cabildo de Potosí. Libros de acuerdos.
MSS	Colecciones particulares de manuscritos, Rück, Manuscritos de Pedro Vicente Cañete.
BNP	Biblioteca Nacional del Perú, Lima, Peru
MC	Mendoza L., Gunnar. "Guía de documentos en el Archivo Nacional de Bolivia y la Biblioteca Nacional de Bolivia para el estudio de la minería en Bolivia durante el coloniaje, años 1549-1825." Unpublished typescript. Sucre, 1962.
MOM	Mendoza L., Gunnar. "Guía de documentos en el Archivo Nacional de Bolivia y la Biblioteca Nacional de Bolivia para el estudio de la mano de obra minera durante el coloniaje, años 1549-1825." Unpublished typescript. Sucre, 1962.



Notes for Chapter I

1. The reader is directed to the appendices for a glossary of Spanish and Quechua words used in this study, and a list of "Viceroys of Peru, 1544-1705."
2. For an introduction to the Black Legend-White Legend controversy, see Benjamin Keen, "The Black Legend Revisited: Assumptions and Realities," The Hispanic American Historical Review, XLIX (Durham, 1969), 703-719; Lewis Hanke, "A Modest Proposal for a Moratorium on Grand Generalizations: Some thoughts on the Black Legend," Ibid., LI (Durham, 1971), 112-127; and Benjamin Keen, "The White Legend Revisited: A Reply to Professor Hanke's 'Modest Proposal,'" Ibid., 431-446.
3. Jorge Basadre, "El Régimen de la Mita," Letras, no. 8 (Lima, 1937), 325-364.
4. Ibid., 326, 333, 338, 351, 351, 352-353, 358-361.
5. Alberto Crespo Rodas, "La 'Mita' de Potosí," Revista Histórica, XXII (Lima, 1955-1956), 169-182.
6. Ibid., 169, 176-177.
7. Personal conversation, La Paz, September, 1979.
8. La minería hispana e iberoamericana. Contribución a su investigación histórica (Vol. I of Ponencias del VI Congreso Internacional de Minería; León: Cátedra de San Isidoro, 1970). Articles of interest: a) Ciriaco Pérez Bustamante, "Las minas en los grandes geógrafos del período hispánico," 295-306; b) Paulino Castañeda Delgado, "El tema de las minas en la ética colonial española," 330-354; c) Juan Pérez de Tudela y Bueso, "El problema moral en el trabajo minero del indio (siglos XVI y XVII)," 355-371; d) Demetrio Ramos, "Ordenación de la minería en hispanoamérica durante la época provincial (siglos XVI, XVII y XVIII)," 373-397; e) Lewis Hanke, "The Social History of Potosí," 451-465; f) Alberto Crespo R., "El reclutamiento y los viajes en la 'Mita' del cerro de Potosí," 467-482; g) Ramón Ezquerria Abadía, "Problemas de la mita de Potosí en el siglo XVIII," 483-511; h) Manuel Ballesteros-Gaibrois, "Notas sobre el trabajo minero en los Andes, con especial referencia a Potosí (s. XVI y ss.)," 529-557; i) Guillermo Lohmann Villena, "La minería en el marco del virreinato peruano. Invenciones, sistemas, técnicas y organización industrial," 639-655; j) Daniel

Alonso Rodríguez-Rivas, "La legislación minera hispano-colonial y la intrusión de labores," 657-668; and k) José Tudela de la Orden, "La minería y la metalurgia de la América española en los manuscritos de las bibliotecas de España," 680-689.

9. Crespo, "Reclutamiento," 471.

10. Pérez de Tudela, 358, 360, 356-357.

11. Carlos Pereyra, "La mita peruana en el calumnioso prólogo de las 'Noticias secretas,'" Revista de Indias, II, no. 6 (Madrid, 1941), 5-37.

12. Ezquerria Abadía, 484-496.

13. Ibid., 487-495.

14. Gwendolin Ballantine Cobb, "Potosí and Huancavelica. Economic Bases of Peru, 1545-1640" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, Berkeley, 1947), 63. See note 16 for a published edition in Spanish.

15. Ibid., 68.

16. Gwendolin Ballantine Cobb, Potosí y Huancavelica. Bases económicas, 1545-1640, trans. by Jorge Muñoz Reyes (La Paz: Academia Boliviana de la Historia, 1977). Two articles by Cobb were based upon parts of her dissertation: a) "Potosí, a South American Mining Frontier," Greater America: Essays in Honor of Herbert Eugene Bolton (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1945), 39-58; and b) "Supply and Transportation for the Potosí Mines, 1545-1640," The Hispanic American Historical Review, XXIX (Durham, 1949), 25-45.

17. Garrick Wilson Holmes, "The Indian Miner in Colonial Potosí. Sketch for a Study of Urbanization in the Andes" (unpublished M.A. thesis, Columbia University, 1959), iv.

18. Ibid., 58-65, 119-124.

19. Crespo, "Reclutamiento," 468. This sentiment was echoed by Peter Bakewell, "Technological Change in Potosí: The Silver Boom of the 1570's," Jahrbuch für Geschichte von Staat, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft Lateinamerikas, Band 14 (Köln und Wien, 1977), 57-58.

20. Marie Helmer, "Comércio e contrabando entre Bahía

e Potosí no século XVI," *Revista de História*, XV (São Paulo, 1953), 195-210; "La encomienda à Potosí d'après un document inédit," Proceedings of the XXXth International Congress of Americanists, XXXVI (Cambridge, England, 1952), 235-238; and "Un tipo social: el 'minero' de Potosí," Revista de Indias, XVI, no. 63 (Madrid, 1956), 85-92. I saw a copy of her plan of study for the mita while working in the ANB.

21. Silvio Zavala, El servicio personal de los indios en el Perú (3 vols.; México: El Colegio de Mexico, 1978-1980).

22. A discussion of the themes and conclusions in the first two volumes would take up too much time and space here. The reader is directed to the arguments and notes in subsequent chapters for comments on Zavala's contribution.

23. Two documents that I have been able to identify are: a) "Papel del P. Rabelo sobre si se podría quitar en Potosí la mita de los indios, reduciéndola a que sólo trabajasen en las minas los que voluntariamente quisiesen" (Biblioteca Nacional, Madrid, Ms. 19699/30), discussed in Zavala, Servicio personal, II, 41-43. The paper was sent to the crown by the Viceroy Conde de Santisteban with his letter of Lima, 20.VII.1663 (AGI, Charcas 267, no. 35, 1 f.) and two others under the general title of "Discursos que han dado algunos celosos del servicio de su Mag.<sup>d</sup> sobre el entero de la Mita de Potosi" (AGI, Charcas 267, no. 35A, 11 fs.); and b) "Lo que se ofrece decir para que las numeraciones de indios se hagan y en ellas no haya defraudación o por lo menos poca" (Biblioteca Nacional, Madrid, Ms. 19699/30, papel tercero), discussed in Zavala, Servicio personal, II, 43-44. This paper was written by President Pedro Vázquez de Velasco of the Audiencia de Charcas, probably in 1662 while he was in Lima consulting with Viceroy Santisteban (AGI, Charcas 267, no. 37B, "Copia de carta descrita al Virrey del Peru por el Doctor Don Pedro Vazquez de Velasco Presidente de los charcas sobre la numeracion de los Yndios=es Parecer que dio en Lima," sin fecha, 4 fs.). I am in the process of verifying the identify of other undated documents that Zavala employed in his discussion of the 1609 cédula banning personal service.

24. D. A. Brading and Harry E. Cross, "Colonial Silver Mining: Mexico and Peru," The Hispanic American Historical Review, LII (Durham, 1972), 545-579.

25. Ibid., 548-549, 557, 558-560.

26. Ibid., 557.

27. Rather than reproduce a list of bibliographic aids and archival guides here, the reader is directed to the first section of the Selected Bibliography. The contemporary sources are: a) Bartolomé Arzáns de Orsúa y Vela, Historia de la Villa Imperial de Potosí, ed. by Lewis Hanke and Gunnar Mendoza L. (4 vols; Providence: Brown University Press, 1965); b) Luis Capoche, Relación general de la Villa Imperial de Potosí (1585), ed. by Lewis Hanke, Biblioteca de Autores Españoles, no. 122 (Madrid: Ediciones Atlas, 1959); c) Juan de Solórzano Pereira, Politica Indiana (1648), ed. by Francisco Ramiro de Valenzuela, Biblioteca de Autores Españoles, nos. 252-256 (5 vols.; Madrid: Ediciones Atlas, 1972); and d) Vicente Cañete y Domínguez, Descripción geográfica, histórica, física y natural de la Villa Imperial y rico cerro de Potosí (1789) (Potosí, 1952).

28. Teresa Cañedo-Arguelles Fabrega, "Efectos de Potosí en la estructura de una provincia mitaya: Pacajes a madiados del siglo XVII" (unpublished tesis de licenciatura, Universidad de Sevilla, 1976), 130-134.

29. Ibid., 35-50.

30. Ibid., 4.

31. Nicolás Sánchez-Albornoz, Indios y tributos en el Alto Perú (Lima: Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, 1978).

32. Ibid., 13.

33. Ibid., 113-149. The original is housed in the AGN, Sala XIII, 23.10.2.

34. Ibid., 19-20, 26-34; Noble David Cook, "The Indian Population of Peru, 1570-1620" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Texas, Austin, 1973). Cook is one of many who have taken on the task of correcting the mistakes made by George Kubler, "The Quechua in the Colonial World," Handbook of South American Indians, ed. by Julian H. Steward, Smithsonian Institution, Bureau of American Ethnology, Bulletin No. 43 (New York: Cooper Square Publishers, 1946), 331-410. Another is Henry F. Dobyns, "An Outline of Andean Epidemic History to 1720," Bulletin of the History of Medicine, XXXVII, No. 6 (1963), 493-515. Dobyns demonstrates that disease had an enormous negative impact on the Indian population of colonial Peru.

35. Sánchez-Albornoz, 25.
36. Personal correspondence, 1979-1980.
37. Personal correspondence, 1979. See Brian Evan's essay on the materials available for a study of the 1683 general census in the AGN, in the Guía de las fuentes en Hispanoamérica para el estudio de la administración virreinal española en México y en el Perú, 1535-1700, ed. by Lewis Hanke, Gunnar Mendoza L., and Celso Rodríguez (Washington, D.C.: Secretaría General, Organización de los Estados Americanos, 1980), 24-32.
38. Conversation with Juan Carlos Garavaglia in Sucre, October, 1979; also mentioned in correspondence with Peter Bakewell. Herbert Klein told me in December, 1980, that he had received a copy of the dissertation.
39. See the notes from the 1979 meeting of the American Historical Association (New York), in The Hispanic American Historical Review, LX (Durham, 1980), 373, for a description of the paper that Catherine Julien presented before the Andean Studies Committee.
40. Personal correspondence, 1980-1981.
41. The University of Massachusetts, Amherst, Library holds a large collection of microfilm on the Hapsburg period from the AGI, thanks to the efforts of Lewis Hanke and Celso Rodríguez. For a complete listing of the microfilmed materials, see their Guía de las fuentes en el Archivo General de Indias para el estudio de la administración virreinal española en México y en el Perú, 1535-1700 (3 vols.; Cologne: Böhlau Verlag, 1977).
42. The ANB and BNB collections have been completely catalogued by Gunnar Mendoza L. See the entries under his name in the first section of the Selected Bibliography for the catalogues that pertain to Indian labor in the Potosí mines.
43. I discovered, once back from South America, that most of the materials employed in this study were described by Gunnar Mendoza in footnotes in Arzáns, Historia, II, 366-367.
44. Holmes, 105, discusses some disastrous early attempts to use figures produced during the colonial period. For a specific example, see Bailey W. Diffie, "Estimates of Potosí Mineral Production, 1545-1555," The Hispanic

American Historical Review, XX (Durham, 1940), 275-282. Lewis Hanke, "Luis Capoché and the History of Potosí, 1545-1585," Inter-American Economic Affairs, XII, No. 2 (1958), 26, discusses exaggeration in general; and on pages 22 and 25 he comments on the tendencies of the azogueros in particular. Marie Helmer, "Un tipo social: el 'minero' de Potosí," 85-86, says that miners habitually lamented their condition.

## C H A P T E R    I I

### BACKGROUND:    THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY

Before embarking on a discussion of the mita in the seventeenth century, it is important to understand why the system was established, what function it was designed to perform, and how it actually worked during the sixteenth century. The original mita is more than a point of departure; it also serves as a backdrop against which the changes of the subsequent one hundred years may be kept in perspective.

When Francisco de Toledo founded the Potosí mita in 1573, it reflected the realities of the time. For a brief period the system served, together with a new technology, a massive capital investment and an abundance of high grade ore, to cause a production boom at Potosí. Thereafter the realities of silver mining changed for the worse, and the nature of the mita began to change. By the turn of the seventeenth century it was already very different from the system that Toledo had established twenty-seven years earlier.

### Origins

When silver mining began at Potosí in 1545, the Spanish experience in America was already fifty years old. In the Caribbean, Mexico, and then Peru, conquest had quickly given way to a struggle between the crown and colonists for control of Indian labor. The Indies had proven more easily conquered than colonized; royal sovereignty was more easily claimed than exercised.<sup>1</sup>

Spanish kings and their officials had rewarded the victorious conquistadores with grants in encomienda. The encomenderos received royal tribute in exchange for their military, religious and jurisdictional supervision of the natives. In the Caribbean they had forced the Indians to work in their mining ventures. The crown responded in 1512 with the Laws of Burgos, restricting such activities, but the royal prohibitions had little effect. Excessive work combined with epidemic disease and other factors to decimate the native population.<sup>2</sup>

With the conquest of Mexico, and later Peru, the Spanish crown was provided with another chance at colonization. Chastened by the Caribbean fiasco, and determined not to repeat it, Charles I issued a royal cédula in 1526 that prohibited forced Indian labor in mining, "because our principal intention has always been, and continues to be, that the Indians be spared such work so that they might be



conserved . . . and converted to our Catholic faith."<sup>3</sup>

Royal protection of the Indians was based on more than humanitarian concern for their survival and their souls. Legal restrictions on the encomenderos' use of the Indians were also meant to protect the crown's economic and political interests. Indian labor was the key to economic gain in the colonies, and the encomenderos were busily establishing themselves as feudal lords, with the Indians as their serfs.<sup>4</sup> When Charles I identified the Indians as his free christian vassals he hoped to discredit and frustrate the encomenderos' efforts to monopolize access to their labor.<sup>5</sup>

The crown was isolated temporally as well as geographically by the Atlantic Ocean. It lacked both armed force and the ability to respond to events quickly. The use of legal sanctions was one of the few means at its disposal in the battle with the encomenderos. Another method it employed was the encouragement of divisions between soldados and encomenderos, and between secular and ecclesiastical interests.<sup>6</sup> Intra-colonist conflict meant recourse to the king's courts, and a role for royal officials.

Thus, despite their ineffectiveness, cédulas concerning Indian labor continued to appear. In 1536 Charles I reiterated his earlier stand on the treatment of the Indians in his orders for the Adelantado of Peru, Francisco

Pizarro.<sup>7</sup> Pizarro had warned, a year before, that the encomenderos would not give up the services performed for them by the Indians, and bluntly suggested that royal efforts to enforce earlier edicts would lead to armed resistance.<sup>8</sup> The King was not dissuaded. His Queen encouraged the Bishop of Cuzco to champion the Indians' cause, and when Cristóbal Vaca de Castro was sent to govern Peru in 1540, Charles I ordered him to ensure that the Indians did not work in the mines against their will. A year later Vaca de Castro received yet another directive confirming the contents of the 1526 cédula, and urging him to enforce that order.<sup>9</sup>

Royal orders against forced Indian labor in the mines did not mean that the crown wanted mining to stop. It was very much interested in the continuation of mining operations, for it received a percentage of production in the quinto real (royal fifth).<sup>10</sup> Thus, Vaca de Castro was also instructed:

In those towns that are under our control, where there are gold or silver mines, you are to determine, with the governor and other government officials, how best to exploit them, in a manner that will enrich the royal treasury without burdening the natives. This should be accomplished with all appropriate diligence, as it is a matter of great concern to the royal cause.<sup>11</sup>

Charles I had a penchant for lofty goals and universal dicta, but his directives were more than idealistic dreams. They were also part of his government mechanism.<sup>12</sup> Because

he was so far from Mexico and Peru, Charles could not hope to rule them as he did Castilla.<sup>13</sup> Leaving the day-to-day decisions to his representatives in America--and providing them with the requisite authority--was necessary in a pragmatic sense. Because he was removed from a direct administrative role, the King had to make his orders more forceful, even exaggerated, so they would have an impact even after they were modified by local government officials. In many cases, therefore, the original cédulas took on the outward appearance of inconsistency; orders for the protection of the Indians were issued concurrently with orders for increased mining output.<sup>14</sup>

Juggling these diverse orders was the responsibility of government officials in America. Their task was to determine the true intentions of their king, and act accordingly. For Vaca de Castro and his successors in Peru, it was clear that protection of the Indians was secondary to increased mineral production. The problem was how to work the mines without forced Indian labor, either by some means of persuasion short of force, or through the use of imported Black slaves.<sup>15</sup> Vaca de Castro interpreted his orders to mean that encomienda Indians could voluntarily work in the mines of encomenderos other than their own, as long as they were well-treated and received food and shelter.<sup>16</sup>

The New Laws of 1542 were another attempt by the crown

to limit the exploitation of the Indians by Spanish colonists. Indian personal service--tribute obligations met in labor--for encomenderos was banned outright. The encomenderos had come to enjoy the services of Indians in their homes, while traveling and in any number of economic enterprises. The language contained in the New Laws was bold and straightforward, a sign that the crown was worried about the advances made by the encomenderos and aware that its previous directives had been ineffective. As with other legislation, the enforcement of the New Laws was left to government officials stationed in Lima.<sup>17</sup>

By the time the New Laws arrived in Peru, Potosí had been discovered, in 1544. The new mining center presented a unique set of circumstances which required administration tailored to its realities; lessons learned elsewhere would have little meaning there. Potosí differed from other mining zones primarily in geography and climate. Situated 4,000 meters above sea level on the Andean altiplano, the cerro was 1,000 kilometers from any large pre-hispanic population center, and more than twice that far from Lima. The countryside was barren, with little vegetation for twenty-five kilometers in any direction.<sup>18</sup> Water was scarce nine months of the year and torrential rains plagued the remaining three. Extreme weather--cold, heat, wind and thunderstorms--was commonplace.<sup>19</sup> Indeed, the environment was so inhospitable that had it not been for the discovery

of silver, Potosí would have remained a desert.<sup>20</sup>

Geographical and meteorological extremes were overcome because the cerro held the largest, purest, silver lode in history.<sup>21</sup> The Spaniards' craving for the metal was so keen that they were drawn to Potosí like bees to honey.<sup>22</sup> Indians arrived in even larger numbers; they were no less appreciative of the value of silver. A year after its discovery, a boomtown at the base of Potosí held 170 Spaniards and 3,000 Indians. Two years later, when the villa of Potosí was officially founded, its residents numbered 14,000 (the population of a European city of the day).<sup>23</sup>

For its sustenance, Potosí depended upon outlying valley regions, such as Chuquisaca. Goods brought in from 100 or 150 kilometers away commanded astronomical prices, but the profits of the early years made them nonetheless affordable. As the villa's population grew toward 100,000 souls, transport and agriculture developed into lucrative support industries.<sup>24</sup>

During the early years at Potosí, the Indians dominated every phase of silver production, as they did at Porco.<sup>25</sup> Spanish efforts at smelting failed; their European methods were frustrated by the altitude. Conversely, Indian technicians using the pre-hispanic guayra (wind oven) skillfully coaxed molten silver from the rich tacana ore.<sup>26</sup> At one point there were as many as

15,000 guayras in operation.<sup>27</sup> Indian labor was provided, in part, by yanaconas--Indian artisans who had been displaced by the conquest and were free to come to Potosí.<sup>28</sup> Hatunrunas--rural Indians who provided personal service in lieu of tribute--worked in the mines as well.<sup>29</sup> Other Indians were sent by their caciques or encomenderos to earn enough silver to pay their village's tribute quota.<sup>30</sup> This practice was eventually halted when the Indians failed to return home after their period of service was completed.<sup>31</sup>

Indian laborers at Potosí usually worked for Spanish mine-owners in exchange for a percentage of the silver they produced.<sup>32</sup> The Spaniards' contribution to production was therefore limited to their legal ownership of the mines, and their determination to profit by them.<sup>33</sup> Legal title was no small factor, however, for in practice only the Spaniards were able to fend off legal challenges and protect their claims against interlopers in the courts.<sup>34</sup>

The inhabitants of Potosí would come to be known not only for their number, but for their bellicosity. Many who came into the silver producing region were soldados who had not received an encomienda and had no other enterprise from which to derive their livelihood. These individuals encouraged differences between rival groups of miners, hoping to spark an armed confrontation during which they could rob and plunder.<sup>35</sup>

Developments at Potosí, and in Peru generally, ran

counter to the letter and the intent of the New Laws. An overzealous Viceroy Blasco Núñez de Vela (1544-1546) tried, nevertheless, to implement them without any modification whatsoever. His actions provoked an armed insurrection in 1546 led by Gonzalo Pizarro. The Viceroy was killed, and the realm lapsed into two years of civil war.<sup>36</sup> Potosí was plundered continually by factions needing funds; Gonzalo Pizarro's field commander, Francisco Carvajal, took 700,000 pesos in just one raid.<sup>37</sup> In the end, the royalist forces were able to quell the uprising, and Pizarro and his comrades were executed.

Peace was restored under the direction of Pedro de La Gasca, President of the Audiencia de Lima.<sup>38</sup> Hapsburg officials had weathered the civil war, but they now had to cope with the aftermath. The Indians had suffered death and displacement, their agricultural activities had been disrupted, and mange was epidemic among their llamas.<sup>39</sup> The condition of Peru demanded a cautious balancing of royal intentions and local realities with regard to the encomienda and Indian labor in the mines. Unbridled execution of a crown order had led to violence once, and might well again.

La Gasca sent Juan Polo de Ondegardo to Charcas in 1549 to establish tribute quotas and do whatever he could to limit the domination of the Indians by the encomenderos.<sup>40</sup> The President ordered Polo to enforce the crown's order

that no encomienda Indians be sent to the mines, and that those who were already at Potosí be sent home.<sup>41</sup> When he arrived in the villa, Polo found seventy-two contingents of sixty-five to seventy-five hatunrunas working in the cerro, most of them from the altiplano. In response to La Gasca's order that they return home, the Indians claimed that they were not working at Potosí against their will, and that they would not return home. Their caciques balked when Polo suggested that they had been manipulated by their encomenderos in the formulation of their answers. The caciques argued that the Indians were working at Potosí to raise the money to pay their tribute, and that they were much better off than their counterparts at home.<sup>42</sup>

In 1550, the crown reiterated its order that the Indians were not to serve at Potosí against their will, and that no encomienda Indians were to be sent to the mining centers. La Gasca had returned to Spain to argue against the earlier cédulas banning personal service. Viceroy Antonio de Mendoza (1551-1552) realized that enforcement of such orders was virtually impossible. He delayed action on the 1550 edict until he could send his son Francisco to Potosí to investigate the situation there, and then to Spain to argue against its execution.<sup>43</sup>

When the Viceroy fell ill in 1552, the Audiencia de Lima decided to comply with the crown's 1550 order. It drew up a decree and presented it to Mendoza for his signature. He



refused, noting that La Gasca had gone to Spain to argue against such measures; until the crown responded to his positions, the Viceroy contended, no action should be taken. Despite Mendoza's opposition, the Audiencia published its order, and just as the Viceroy had feared, the realm responded with overwhelming opposition. Francisco Hernández Girón led a short-lived revolt that ended in the deaths of 500 Spaniards and 2,000 Indians.<sup>44</sup>

Antonio de Mendoza died in July of 1552, and the Audiencia de Lima assumed command in his stead. Shortly thereafter it received another cédula ordering an end to personal service, but having learned its lesson, the Audiencia chose to suspend the order. In 1554 the crown conceded defeat and retracted its previous directives against personal service.<sup>45</sup>

The goals included in the New Laws and the other cédulas were not discarded. They were put aside until some future opportunity made their realization possible. This shift in the crown's position is clear in the instructions it provided the Marqués de Cañete in 1555. As the new Viceroy of Peru, Cañete was ordered to do whatever he could to end personal service and Indian labor in the mines, but he was not to go so far as to provoke another rebellion.<sup>46</sup>

The crown yielded ground in other ways. In 1551 it agreed to allow volunteer Indian labor in the mines, as

long as no encomendero-miner employed his own Indians. Each encomendero was to divide his Indians' tribute requirement among their caciques on a pro-rated basis. The caciques would then muster the Indians necessary to raise the silver to pay their percentage. They, or their representatives, would take the Indians to Potosí, where they would extract the ore, refine it in their guayras, and return home with the silver.<sup>47</sup>

This alteration of royal policy may seem minor, but it carried important ramifications. First, the crown permitted Indian labor in mining for the first time, overcoming its earlier objections based on the Caribbean experience. Second, Indians working in the mines to meet their tribute quotas were no longer officially performing personal service and were thereby removed from the struggle between the crown and the encomenderos. Third, it was now the caciques' responsibility to force the Indians to work in the mines, should force be required.<sup>48</sup> Finally, the crown had given ground and thus would bargain from a weaker position in the future.

Another royal concession came in a 1552 cédula that permitted forced labor in activities which were in the common interest. This determination was based on reports from Peru that the Indians were the natural enemies of work. The text of the order read:

. . . the Indians of that province [Peru] are prone to vice and do not care to work. Therefore, they lack means and are poor. Be certain that Indian officials perform their duties; that those Indians who have fields work them. Others are to be compelled to work in public activities in the countryside and the cities, but only with justice, payment and the provision that the work shall be moderate.<sup>49</sup>

Mining was not included among the activities in which the Indians could be made to work, but since the 1551 cédula had already accepted Indian labor in the mines--albeit with various restrictions--once service in the mines could be construed to be in the common interest, then it would take only a minor shift to extend the 1552 order to mineral production.

Two other developments in the decade from 1555 to 1566 are important to note. The first is the ascension to the throne, in 1556, of Phillip II. The new King was more concerned with royal finances than Charles I had been, and less tolerant of those who questioned his sovereignty. Charles may have allowed Bartolomé de las Casas to publish his Very Brief Account because of its usefulness in the battle with the encomenderos, but it would only have appeared while he was on the throne.<sup>50</sup>

Second, the Audiencia de Charcas (also known as the Audiencia de La Plata) was founded in 1559. A high court of appeals was placed within 170 kilometers of Potosí, the realm's economic center of gravity.<sup>51</sup> With the Audiencia's establishment, the Corregidor de La Plata was transferred to

Potosí, bringing the villa under direct royal administration for the first time. La Plata's dominion over Potosí was lessened, however, when the villa's residents purchased their administrative independence from the crown for 79,000 assayed pesos.<sup>52</sup>

These developments were important because Potosí silver production began to suffer severe problems during the 1560s, particularly from 1566 forward.<sup>53</sup> Phillip II's approach to forced labor, the location of his government officials, and his concern for royal revenue were all to affect the government's response to the production crisis at Potosí.

The high grade tacana ore, suitable for smelting in the guayras, was depleted. Attempts to introduce amalgamation processing--developed by Bartolomé de Medina in Mexico in 1554--failed at Potosí because of the altitude.<sup>54</sup> The mines grew ever deeper, and the work done by the Indians became more demanding. One visitor described the work inside the cerro this way:

. . . the work of descending and ascending in the mines is very great, as the Indians have to retrieve the raw metal and discarded rock and bring it to the surface. There is no other way to extract the ore; not in carts or any other fashion. All the weight falls on the arms, because the ladders are made of wooden bars joined with rawhide rope, and progress is made from one bar to the next by pulling oneself up by the arms. It is not difficult, even for one who has not seen it for himself, to appreciate how excessive this work is. Nevertheless, the Indians are exceptionally skilled at it, and seem to do it quite easily and happily.<sup>55</sup>

The Indians' happiness with their tasks is questionable. Their willingness to work in the mines depended upon their personal profits. Deeper mines meant less ore produced in a day and therefore less silver. Because the Indians worked for a percentage of production, that meant less profit for them. Many left Potosí to work elsewhere; others remained in the villa, but occupied themselves in other activities. President Juan de Matienzo of the Audiencia de Charcas wrote the crown in 1561 that of some 20,000 Indians living in Potosí, only 300 were working in the mines--a dramatic decline from the 5,000 hatunrunas counted by Polo de Ondegardo a decade earlier.<sup>56</sup>

Meanwhile, Hapsburg administrators had grown accustomed to Potosí silver.<sup>57</sup> Official production for the first twenty years had exceeded 76 million pesos. Royal quintos were generally 300,000 to 400,000 pesos per year. As contraband consumed one-half to two-thirds of actual production, total output was probably double or treble that figure.<sup>58</sup> By any measure, Potosí was the economic backbone of Peru, and Peru was the most important financial base of the Spanish Empire. Therefore, when a shortage of labor developed at Potosí, it was of major concern to the government, as well as to the miners.

Labor shortages were met elsewhere with Black slaves. In the Caribbean, Brazil and lowland Peru, Blacks filled a labor vacuum in activities from sugar production to gold

mining.<sup>59</sup> At Potosí they were not a viable alternative. The cost of their importation would have had to have been carried by the miners, who were not economically prepared to do so. The slaves would have had to have come from Brazil via the Rio de la Plata and Tucumán, an illegal channel of contraband to Buenos Aires. The crown did not want to encourage traffic along that route. Blacks were also thought to be physically unprepared to withstand the rigors of Potosí's altitude and climate, let alone the work of carrying ore out of the mines on their backs. Altiplano Indians, by contrast, were biologically adapted to the villa's environment.<sup>60</sup>

As the tacana ore ran out, Spanish miners hoped to compensate for less and lower quality ore with more Indians, but the Indians no longer cared to work in the Potosí mines. Harder work for less profit held as little attraction for them as it did for anyone. Their refusal to work was portrayed by the miners, however, as laziness and a natural aversion to gainful employment.

Government officials suggested various means to coerce the Indians back into the mines. La Gasca and Gabriel de Rojas proposed that all tribute be demanded in silver, thereby forcing the Indians to work in the mines to obtain the metal.<sup>61</sup> The miners themselves, supported by President Matienzo and others, pressed for some form of draft labor. Matienzo noted that the crown had allowed for forced labor

in other endeavors by its 1552 cédula.<sup>62</sup> Throughout the realm tindarunas presented themselves at city plazas to be hired for public works and for large agricultural enterprises. The Indians called their periods of service "mitas," recalling the Inca m'ita. Provisions for good treatment and payment of the Indians, Matienzo argued, removed their labor from the status of personal service.<sup>63</sup>

The President asked Phillip II to permit the recruitment of tindarunas for the mines at Porco and Potosí. His proposal was prefaced by an unflattering portrayal of the Indians as lazy, stupid, enemies of work. Matienzo said it was not only legitimate to compel them to work--provided that they were paid and stayed close to home--the crown and its officials were obligated to force them to work, for their own benefit and that of the public good. He dismissed any doubts based on the dangers of mining with promises that tunnels (then under construction) and new ladders would improve conditions significantly.<sup>64</sup>

Matienzo suggested that one-tenth of the Indians in Charcas, Chucuito and the Collao serve both at Potosí and at Porco. Some would work in the mines and receive three tomines per day in wages; others would work in support activities and earn less. Because of the distance from their homes to Potosí, the Indians would remain in the villa for a year and then return home, to be replaced by another contingent. Some 1,500 Indians would be sent to Potosí, and

another 800 to Porco.<sup>65</sup>

The President of the Audiencia de Lima, Lope García de Castro, sent a similar proposal to the crown in 1565, after the 1552 cédula and another edict of 1563 had softened the crown's earlier opposition to personal service and Indian labor in the mines. He argued that forced labor would only be a temporary measure, and would soon be unnecessary. The Indians could be made to work, he added, as long as they were treated well, and enjoyed a profit.<sup>66</sup>

Nevertheless, the crown turned down Matienzo's request for permission to import Indians from Cuzco and Chucuito in a 1566 cédula. The distances involved, reports of harsh working conditions in the mining centers, and falling silver production at Potosí may have been responsible for the denial. The language of the order offered little explanation:

In reference to what you [Matienzo and the Audiencia as a whole] say about the mines of Potosí and Porco needing Indians and able persons to assist in their exploitation; and that many Indians could be brought from the provinces of Cuzco and Chucuito, which could be of great significance to the royal quintos and the general good, of Spaniards and Indians alike--here it has appeared that it is not convenient to do so, for it is against our royal intention; therefore, you should guard and ensure compliance with our previous cédulas and provisions on the subject, without any novelty whatsoever.<sup>67</sup>

Whatever the reason for the crown's refusal to allow the importation of Indian laborers from around Lake Titicaca, the answer was "no." The issue was not dead, however.



As a matter of fact, there was already such a system in place at Huamanga. In 1562 Polo de Ondegardo ordered the caciques of that province to provide him with 700 Indians. These were distributed among local miners each Monday, at a central plaza, for periods of one week at a time. On Saturday the Indians were paid directly by the miners for their weeks' labors.<sup>68</sup>

When Phillip II assembled a junta in 1568 to consider means "to centralize royal authority and make it more effective, and to increase substantially the flow of revenue by stimulating the production of precious metals," the question of draft labor for Potosí was raised again. Francisco de Toledo was a member of that junta, and soon thereafter he was sent to Peru as Viceroy.<sup>69</sup>

#### Viceroy Francisco de Toledo

Toledo arrived in Peru in 1569 with a clearly defined mission: to establish crown dominion in an unruly realm and to organize all aspects of revenue production.<sup>70</sup> His instructions concerning Indian labor in the mines read:

Presupposed that the mines of Peru cannot be worked by Spaniards, for those who are there will not work in them voluntarily; and it is said that slaves cannot work in them either, owing to the nature and coldness of the land; and thus it is necessary to occupy Indians--while these are not to be forced nor compelled, as had already been ordered, they must be attracted with all just and reasonable means, so that there will be the required number of laborers for the mines. To this end, it appears that great care must be given to the aggregation of

large numbers of Indians in nearby towns and landholdings, so that they might more easily apply themselves to the work involved.

The Indians were to be well-paid and well-treated; they were to work reasonable hours; and they were not to be detained once their shift had been completed. Good conditions and ample profits would ostensibly attract the required number of Indian laborers; the use of force or compulsion was specifically banned.<sup>71</sup>

The solution of Potosí's problems was only one part of a comprehensive viceregal program. Central to Toledo's effort was the final legitimization of the Hapsburg claim to sovereignty in Peru. Indeed, the conquest was still incomplete, for Manco Inca continued to hold out. Not until 1572 were the forces of Vilcabamba finally overcome.<sup>72</sup>

Toledo confirmed the crown's right to rule Peru with a three-pronged campaign. "First, he inspired the composition of a treatise against Las Casas; second, he embarked upon an investigation of the justice of Inca rule by collecting the so-called Informaciones; and finally, he arranged for the preparation of a 'true' history of Peru's past by Pedro Sarmiento de Gamboa."<sup>73</sup> The Incas were deemed usurpers and tyrants; the conquest had freed the Indians and brought them the true faith. Divine Providence, Sarmiento de Gamboa determined, had guided Peru into the care of the Spanish crown.<sup>74</sup>

Concurrent with the consolidation of Spanish sovereignty was the replacement of the Inca life-style with a more hispanized existence.<sup>75</sup> A general census, conducted by Toledo, found 1,067,696 Indians within 614 ayllus (excluding the areas of the Rio de la Plata, Chile, Quito and Tucumán). Of these, 277,697 were able-bodied men subject to tribute. The Indians were settled in new villages to facilitate control, collection of tribute, and religious instruction.<sup>76</sup> Members of one or more ayllus were settled in one of two parcialidades--hanansaya and hurinsaya--and each parcialidad was governed by an Indian gobernador and other caciques.

The settlement of Indians in new villages had been proposed by La Gasca as early as 1550 and was underway by 1567, but under Toledo the program became extensive.<sup>77</sup> This pattern was characteristic of his viceroyalty--the use of extant policies and practices in a larger, more organized fashion.

Another of Toledo's goals was the eradication of the encomienda. The crown continued to fret about the prospect of feudal kingdoms headed by the encomenderos. Previous efforts to control them had enjoyed very little success. Toledo's approach centered on the direct administration of the rural provinces with corregidores de indios. These officials were assigned the administrative, jurisdictional and fiscal duties previously left to the encomenderos. The

Viceroy Marqués de Cañete (1556-1560) had been the first to try to introduce corregidores de indios, but the opposition of the encomenderos had forced him to recall all but those for Chucuito and Chíncha. In 1565, Governor García de Castro revived the idea, and despite little headway, the program was ongoing when Toledo arrived in Peru. Under his leadership, corregidores were again sent to all corners of the realm. Toledo named prominent soldados to the newly-created posts, thereby using the encomendero-soldado rivalry to further the government's aims.<sup>78</sup>

All of these programs were carried out during Toledo's entire viceroyalty. There was little doubt that the crown supported each of them. The solution of the labor shortage at Potosí was more troublesome. Toledo, like his predecessors, found himself faced with a dilemma: the crown wanted work in the mines to be voluntary and paid, but the lack of Indians willing to hire themselves out made force labor appear to be unavoidable.<sup>79</sup> Subtle means of persuasion had not been sufficient. In October, 1570, the Viceroy called a junta in Lima to consider the pros and cons of a forced labor system for Potosí. In the group were the Archbishop of Lima, Gerónimo de Loaysa; the Dean of Lima, Pedro Muñiz; and President Juan de Matienzo. It said

. . . that legitimately, and without injury to the Indians, His Majesty, and in his name his viceroy, could compel the Indians, in a determined number, to work in the mines at Potosí and elsewhere in Peru, given certain provisions for their good

treatment, adequate and assured compensation, and moderate work.<sup>80</sup>

The junta's decision reflected the terms of the crown's earlier position on forced labor for non-mining ventures. The extension of its provisions to Potosí may well have been facilitated by Matienzo's argument that the Indians were already working in any number of legal and illegal activities for the colonists, and that their labor would better be employed in service to the crown.<sup>81</sup>

Despite the junta's determination, Viceroy Toledo embarked upon a five year visita of Peru still bothered by doubts about forced labor.<sup>82</sup> At Huamanga he found Polo de Ondegardo's system going strong. Impressed by its success, he consented to its continuation, but added ordinances for good treatment, adequate payment, and religious instruction of the Indians; and exaction of royal quintos--to bring the system into line with the junta's ruling.<sup>83</sup> By the time he left Huamanga, therefore, Toledo was not only armed with the junta's assurances that draft labor at Potosí would be justified, he had also seen a smaller system at work.

While Toledo was in Cuzco, developments at Potosí took a dramatic turn for the better. Pedro Fernández de Velasco perfected a patio (amalgamation) process that overcame the difficulties presented by Potosí's elevation. Toledo called him to Cuzco to demonstrate his method; encouraged

by the results, the Viceroy moved on to Potosí, arriving in December of 1572.<sup>84</sup>

Once in Potosí, Toledo's attention was immediately drawn to the large piles of desmontes left by twenty-eight years of mining. These were composed of ore that had eluded the guayra's capabilities, but was suitable for amalgamation processing. Toledo believed that the combination of desmontes and quicksilver ensured the rejuvenation of silver production at Potosí. The potosinos were not so certain. Their reluctance to commit themselves and their capital to the construction of mercury-using mills was linked to the labor question. Technological gains, and available stockpiles of ore, were of little value unless there were Indians to work in the mines and mills.<sup>85</sup>

Any remaining doubts that Toledo had about forced labor were removed by the promise of fabulous production and his need to persuade the potosinos to build the requisite mills. The Viceroy entered into a pact with them: they would build the mills at their own expense; he would provide mercury and guarantee an Indian labor force, both at reasonable cost. For its part the government would receive one-fifth of the silver produced, a profit on mercury sold in the villa, and other tax revenues. Mill and mine owners (who would come to be known as azogueros) would keep four-fifths of production less costs.<sup>86</sup>

Toledo assured the government a means of controlling

production at Potosí with a royal monopoly on mercury.<sup>87</sup> He considered claiming exclusive rights to the desmontes, but opted for mercury because he felt it would be more easily monitored.<sup>88</sup> Royal orders to find mercury deposits in Peru had followed the invention of the amalgamation method, and they had led to the discovery and exploitation of Huancavelica after 1566. The Viceroy expropriated the mines there and he prohibited the production of mercury elsewhere in Peru.<sup>89</sup>

Toledo's guaranteed labor force meant the establishment of the mita at Potosí. He did not create the system; nor did he resurrect an Inca one. Rather, he marshaled the ideas and practices which were extant upon his arrival. Toledo's mita was a descendent of the Inca m'ita, but via the systems that required hatunrunas and tindarunas to work for the Spaniards.<sup>90</sup> The Viceroy's system followed the proposals of Juan de Matienzo closely, and it resembled the system founded at Huamanga by Polo de Ondegardo.

The first repartimiento de la mita for Potosí was drawn up in 1573.<sup>91</sup> Toledo noted that the Indians had been accustomed to serving one year shifts at Potosí, but had stopped doing so when the tacana was depleted. He now obliged their caciques and corregidores to send them once again, and he based each province's quota on its pre-hispanic population. Some 1,300 Indians were required from the provinces around La Paz; 500 were to come from

Chucuito; and various other amounts for provinces as far away as Canas y Canches, and as close as Porco. The regions so obligated shared Potosí's altitude and climate. They were the closest to the villa that were also under crown control. Other provinces that were on the frontier with unconquered Indians, or of lower elevation, were spared.<sup>92</sup> A total of 4,300 mitayos were brought to Potosí to swell the ranks of 4,200 resident Indians, hatunrunas who had not returned home, and 900 yanacunas. Of the mitayos, 3,738 were assigned to work in the mines and the mills, in three shifts of 1,430 at a time.<sup>93</sup> In addition, the Corregidor de Potosí was empowered to assign up to 1,000 Indians more to those who required their assistance, on the premise that the profits generated by amalgamation processing would cause them to work gladly. The remainder were free to rest or engage themselves in personal enterprise.<sup>94</sup>

Toledo then went to La Plata, where he drew together and published his ordinances in 1574. When he returned to Potosí, he was confronted by caciques complaining that the Corregidor was assigning more than the 1,000 Indians he was permitted, and not on a pro-rated basis. The azogueros preferred some Indians to others, and while some groups found themselves working constantly, others were left idle. The caciques argued that the one-third fraction should be strictly enforced, and that the number required from each province should be based on the census conducted by Toledo



during his visita.<sup>95</sup>

In response to the increased demand for mitayos, and the problems identified by the caciques, Toledo devised a second repartimiento de la mita in 1575. This time he drew varying percentages of Indians, based on his census, from the provinces, depending upon their distance from Potosí. Seventeen per cent was required from the region around La Plata; 16 per cent from around La Paz; 15 per cent from the vicinity of Cuzco; and 13 per cent from Canas y Canches. Within each of three shifts, 615 Indians were assigned to labor in the mines and 2,498 to the mills, either in construction or refining.<sup>96</sup> Others, assigned to support activities, brought the total to about 4,000.<sup>97</sup>

Two years later, with some of the mills having been completed and others abandoned, some azogueros required more mitayos while others no longer needed them. A third repartimiento was drafted, this time in Lima. Toledo based the distribution of mitayos on information provided by local government officials and individuals, including the results of a thorough visita conducted by Matienzo in 1577.<sup>98</sup> The mita gruesa (total) grew to 14,296 Indians, with three mitas ordinarias (shifts) of 4,426. To meet these larger numbers the provinces of Paucartambo, Chumbivilcas and los Collaguas were added.<sup>99</sup> Uros were now obligated to serve at 11 per cent, but with the provision that two serve for every one assigned--Uros were very

uncooperative. Within each of the mitas ordinarias, 1,119 Indians went to the mines; 3,073 went to the mills; and the remainder were assigned to deserving soldados, most of them at Porco.<sup>100</sup> The 1578 repartimiento de la mita was revised in 1580, after irregularities in the distribution had become apparent, but the changes were never implemented.<sup>101</sup>

Toledo's priority was on providing ample numbers of Indians to work at Potosí, but he was also concerned that the mita be attractive to the Indians.<sup>102</sup> His ordinances governed almost every aspect of mita service. Mitayos were to serve one year, after which they would return home. While in the villa a mitayo would work one week and then receive two weeks rest. Each Monday those included in the mita ordinaria were to present themselves at Guayna (a smaller hill at the base of the cerro) for distribution. That afternoon they would ascend to the mines or go to the mills. Work would then continue until Saturday evening, when the mitayos would be paid their wages for the week.<sup>103</sup> Indians in the mines would earn three and one-half reales per day; those in the mills, two and three-quarters reales.<sup>104</sup> No quotas were allowed.<sup>105</sup> Half-wages were to be paid for every day of travel from the home province to Potosí, based on a fixed number of leagues per day.<sup>106</sup> In the villa, Indians were to live in their province's ranchería; segregation was meant to protect them from the designs of Spaniards, mestizos, Blacks and others.<sup>107</sup>

Two veedores and an alcalde mayor de minas were to assist a protector de naturales and capitanes de la mita in overseeing work in the mines and mills, and ensuring that the mitayos were not mistreated.<sup>108</sup>

The Indians were provided with other incentives. They were taught the patio process; and one-third of the ore suitable for smelting in guayras was to be distributed to them, so the art would not be lost and their profits would be augmented.<sup>109</sup> The right of capcha permitted the mitayos to work the mines for their own benefit from Saturday night to Monday morning. The ore they produced, and that which they secreted out of the mines during the week, was traded in the ghatu plaza. This traffic in raw silver came to be known as rescates and was the exclusive domain of the Indians.<sup>110</sup>

Mitayos from Cuzco or Chucuito had to travel for two months, and walk well over 1,000 kilometers, to reach Potosí. They had willingly covered the distance in earlier years, when great profits awaited the end of their trek. Wages, travel allowances (leguas), capcha rights and rescates were all meant to restore the economic incentive for the Indians to come and work at Potosí again.<sup>111</sup>

The responsibility for delivering a province's quota of mitayos lay, according to Toledo's design, with the corregidor of the province. The Corregidor de Potosí, in turn, was in charge of the overall entero (delivery; also

compliance). In practice, however, the corregidores held caciques accountable, for while they had little real power over the Indians, the caciques were quite effective. The caciques occupied a focal position, where the Spanish and Indian republics intersected, and they were the crucial link in the mita's delivery mechanism.<sup>112</sup>

The importance of the caciques' job stemmed from the communal nature of the mita. It was the obligation of the parcialidades and villages, not of individual Indians.<sup>113</sup> As the size of the resident population changed, usually downward, the mita quota remained the same, until the viceroy could be persuaded to conduct a revisita. Thus, when the number of Indians in a village declined, the pressure on the caciques in that village to meet their obligations increased.

Throughout the 1570s, and especially after 1575, the combination of desmontes, mercury and mitayos met all of Toledo's expectations, and Potosí enjoyed a renaissance. When Matienzo visited the villa in 1577, he marvelled at the transformation that had taken place. The Spanish population of Potosí had increased ten-fold from 200 to 2,000; the number of Indians now exceeded 20,000. The azogueros, the Indians and the crown were all making handsome profits, thanks to the Toledan production formula.<sup>114</sup>

Despite the rebirth of Potosí, the mita was opposed

from the outset--by those who competed with the mining center for Indian labor. An increasing number of Spaniards in Peru combined with a declining number of Indians to create a fierce competition for their services. Among the azogueros' competitors were the encomenderos, priests, chácara and obraje owners, and the same corregidores and caciques who were responsible for compliance with mita obligations. These groups were joined in their opposition to the mita by the Audiencias of Lima and Charcas. The Lima court had been infuriated by Toledo's expropriation of Huancavelica, for its members had been interested parties there. The Audiencia de Charcas was involved in agricultural activities in Chuquisaca and had been denied, by Toledo, any interest in mining whatsoever.<sup>115</sup>

The voices of opposition, therefore, reached the crown via official and private correspondence. The evils of mita service were exaggerated by its enemies, while its role in the rejuvenation of Potosí was downplayed. These manifestations were effective enough to prevent confirmation of the mita by the Council of the Indies and the crown, despite Toledo's continual requests for approval. The Viceroy told the Council in 1576, after it had undertaken an investigation of the system, that without the mita there would be no Potosí, and without Potosí no Peru. In 1578 he challenged the crown to consider whether it was prepared to do without the income it received from Potosí. The

Council never countermanded the Viceroy, but it refused to grant him royal affirmation of his actions. Toledo reiterated his reasons for establishing the Potosí mita in his memoriales (1581):

It has been necessary on the one hand to make the Indians work, so they will not be lazy . . . and on the other to regulate and increase their wages, and ensure the payment of them . . . and to make known who is to distribute the Indians to these labors. In the past, audiencias, corregidores, treasury officials and alcaldes--and even the same encomenderos who benefit from their service--have done this. They have done so without title from His Majesty . . . they have taken those they desired, and paid what they liked--often nothing at all. To end such practices it was necessary for me to prohibit the assignment of Indians by anyone but the viceroy, in the name of His Majesty. To do this, a record was made in all the realm and cities of it, of the quantity of Indians in each province, and those that could with the least trouble come and serve in the cities and mining centers.

Clearly, Toledo felt he was bound by the need for forced Indian labor, but the sentiment that is strongest in this statement is the belief, noted earlier with regard to Matienzo, that forced labor was a reality, and one that should be turned to the advantage of the crown.<sup>116</sup>

The question arises whether the mita was necessary at all. Given the profits generated by mercury and desmontes, would enough volunteer labor have gravitated to Potosí as it had earlier? The mita was necessary, first as an incentive and guarantee for potosinos--so they would build the mills and commit themselves to silver production on a long-term basis. Second, one-third of the mitayos worked

in the mines as apiris, producing ore to supplement the desmontes; others were used to build the mills. While there were sufficient numbers of Indians in Potosí before Toledo arrived to meet the miners' needs, they were not willing to work as apiris for the wages they received.<sup>117</sup>

The mita served other functions as well. It was also a recruiting mechanism. As Indians came to Potosí in the mita, many found that the opportunities for individual profit had been restored and stayed on after their year of service was completed. Others fell into debt and were forced to continue working as debt-peons.<sup>118</sup> The number of mingas at Potosí was increased through both these means. Mitayos also brought products from their home provinces to sell or trade at Potosí. The mita was therefore important to the commerce of the villa.<sup>119</sup>

The role that the mitayos increasingly came to play, once the desmontes began to dwindle, was as apiris. Juan de Matienzo observed that the desmontes were already gone when reported on Potosí in 1577. The Indians were then removing piles of discarded ore from within the cerro for refining in the mills.<sup>120</sup> The one-third of the mitayos who were originally assigned to the mines was gradually expanded during the next two decades until nearly all of them were compelled to work in the cerro. Mingas assumed their places outside, but they refused to serve as apiris.<sup>121</sup> The seventeenth century would bring still more changes.

Ten years after Toledo had first set foot in Peru, Potosí was an industrial center. Everything from the extraction of ore to the minting of silver coins was performed there.<sup>122</sup> The introduction of amalgamation processing had saved Potosí; the desmontes, mercury and the mita had fueled a spectacular increase in silver production.<sup>123</sup> Industrialization gave birth to a series of fundamental changes. The first was the marriage of Potosí with Huancavelica. Silver production was now dependent upon adequate supplies of quicksilver; and a mercury lifeline was created, overland from Huancavelica to Chíncha, by sea to Arica, and overland again to Potosí.<sup>124</sup>

Second, the azogueros were now interested in the Potosí mines on a long-term basis.<sup>125</sup> They had invested 3 million pesos in the construction of 132 mills.<sup>126</sup> As property owners, the azogueros were no longer low-investment, low-risk miners, but businessmen with interests to protect.<sup>127</sup>

Third, production was now dependent on water, and subject to vacillations in a climate notorious for its all-or-nothing rainfall.<sup>128</sup> Reservoirs were built to minimize the effects of nature, but these came at a high cost: 300,000 pesos for Cari cari and San Pablo alone; and 280,000 pesos for five other lagunas.<sup>129</sup>

Fourth, and the effect that is most significant,



control of production was removed from the Indians. Despite all their perquisites, the Indians were now merely wage earners. Silver production was now controlled by the crown and the azogueros.<sup>130</sup> Removed as interested parties, the Indians were nevertheless crucial to continued production at Potosí. The crown and the azogueros relied on the caciques to deliver mitayo laborers. The Indians, however, would cooperate only as long as their wages, capcha rights and rescates were sufficient to compensate them for their hard work. When the Indians' profits fell for a second time, they would have little reason to comply with their mita obligations. When that happened, the crown, the azogueros and even the caciques would discover just how difficult it was to force them to work.

#### 1580 to 1600: The Mita after Toledo

The problems that plagued the mita in the seventeenth century began during the 1580s and 1590s. As soon as the desmontes were exhausted, and the boom of the 1570s ended, weaknesses in the mita's design began to manifest themselves.<sup>131</sup> Silver production fell markedly and compliance with the mita fell with it, each feeding on the other. The Indians and the azogueros reacted to the changing circumstances by protecting themselves as best they could. Hapsburg officials, in turn, responded to their actions in a vain attempt to maintain some degree of

control over the situation.

Without the desmontes, the mills had to rely entirely on newly-mined ore. More and more mitayos were forced to enter the mines. The one-third formula used by Toledo yielded to three-quarters and more.<sup>132</sup> Mitayos were now a critical element in the production formula; but their increased importance was accompanied by worsening working conditions.

The mines plunged deeper, the work grew respectively harder, and accidents became more common. Indians were buried in cave-ins, they suffered broken limbs in falls, and a respiratory disease--pneumoconiosis--became an occupational hazard.<sup>133</sup> Father Acosta described life within the cerro this way:

They labor in these mines in perpetual darkness, not knowing day from night. And since the sun never penetrates to these places, they are not only always dark but very cold, and the air is very thick and alien to the nature of men, so that those who enter for the first time get as sick as at sea--which happened to me in one of these mines, where I felt a pain at the heart, and a churning in the stomach. The miners [apiris] always carry candles to light their way, and they divide their labor in such a way that some work by day and rest by night and others by night and rest by day. The ore is generally hard as flint, and they break it up with iron bars. They carry the ore on their backs up ladders made of three cords of twisted rawhide joined by pieces of wood that serve as rungs, so that one man can climb up and another man down at the same time. These ladders are twenty meters long, and at the top and bottom of each there is a wooden platform where the men can rest, because there are so many ladders to climb. Each man usually carries on his back a load of twenty-five kilograms of silver ore tied in a cloth, knapsack fashion; thus they ascend, three at

a time. The one who goes first carries a candle tied to this thumb, . . . thus, holding on with both hands, they climb that great distance, often more than 300 meters--a fearful thing, the mere thought of which inspires dread.<sup>134</sup>

Toledo had ordered a maximum of two trips per day, but as many as twenty-five were made. During the 1590s the common tarea (quota) was nineteen montones (mounds) in a day. Quotas had also been prohibited by Toledo, but they were the rule rather than the exception.<sup>135</sup>

Springs flooded many of the richer mines. Some had to be abandoned, but others were worked by mitayos in knee-deep water. This practice was also illegal, but continued nonetheless, and pneumonia struck the Indians working under such conditions.<sup>136</sup>

Deteriorating working conditions were bad enough, but Indians were further oppressed by their treatment at the hands of mayordomos and pongos. Mitayos were whipped, beaten, struck with rocks, made to carry heavy loads on their backs, and forced to work day and night, and on Sunday.<sup>137</sup> The Indians no longer received two weeks of rest for every one they worked. Of the mitayos who were "resting" nearly a thousand were obliged to serve as meses; and offer their services in supply trains, reservoir maintenance, and other support activities. The one-to-three relationship between the mita ordinaria and the mita gruesa collapsed.<sup>138</sup>

Ill-treatment and increased pressures on the mitayos

were caused by the azogueros' financial woes. They were squeezed by rising production costs and less and lower-quality ore. Many had over-extended themselves by pouring their profits into construction, or had otherwise spent the money they made during the boom years. The azogueros now found themselves pressed for capital, and the cost of mercury was the principal reason. The price per quintal had not changed appreciably, but more of it was needed to refine the less-rich ore. Other elements--the transport of ore from the mines to the mills, wood, salt, copper, etc.--also cost more; and volunteer labor commanded nearly nine pesos per week by century's end.<sup>139</sup>

The azogueros petitioned the government for more mitayos, lower-priced mercury, and a reduction of the quinto to the diezmo (10 per cent of production).<sup>140</sup> Meanwhile, they tried to compensate for rising production costs by demanding more of the mitayos while paying them less. Travel allowances were not paid, and wages were withheld in part or in their entirety.<sup>141</sup> Capcha perquisites and the rescates trade were attacked, as the azogueros charged that the Indians were stealing the rich ore--either by sneaking it out of the mines during the week or stockpiling it until Sunday when they could take it for themselves--and leaving the mills with the inferior metales.<sup>142</sup>

The pressure on the Indians may have been caused by the azogueros' financial problems, but it was encouraged by

by the communal basis of the mita. There was little reason for an azoguero to treat his mitayos well, for if one were injured or died, he was soon replaced with another.<sup>143</sup>

Some azogueros also balanced higher production costs by selling, or renting, a portion of the Indians assigned to them. The best workers were selected and kept; those that were old, feeble or uncooperative were sent to other mines, chácaras, obrajes and elsewhere. The demand for Indian labor was such that these Indians brought 150 pesos apiece or more. Some azogueros produced no silver at all, but lived off the income generated by the sale and rental of their mitayos.<sup>144</sup>

In response to the worsening conditions in the mines, the Indians used every available means to avoid the mita. Some evaded future service by staying in Potosí once their year's obligation had been met, for the villa was exempted from mita recruitment. Others escaped to cities, chácaras, distant valleys and other mining areas--Salinas and Aullagas in particular. Fewer than half returned to their pueblos.<sup>145</sup>

Those who did go home found oppression similar to what they had suffered in Potosí. Indians living in the pueblos were forced to work for caciques, corregidores and priests in transport, agriculture, animal husbandry and small industry. They had to buy goods they did not need, and pay taxes and tribute to boot. They received little or

nothing in return, and so fled to avoid the work required in the pueblos and future mita service at Potosí.

Returning mitayos often discovered that their lands and homes had been sold while they were away. With little or no property to bind them, they were free to move to where the work was better and their responsibilities were fewer. Some went completely outside the colonized zone, and joined the ranks of the unconquered "infidels."<sup>146</sup>

Indian migration was unwittingly encouraged by Toledo's attempt to make the mita less burdensome for the Indians. He provided for two months' notice to those selected for the next mita contingent, so they could put their affairs in order. The warning actually gave them time to escape.<sup>147</sup> Once absent from his pueblo, moreover, an Indian became a forastero--a non-landed outsider whose lack of property freed him from mita, tribute and tax obligations--even if he moved from one mita province to another.<sup>148</sup>

Designed to lessen the weight of the mita on the Indians, these provisions hampered its effectiveness. As the Indians fled from their pueblos, and failed to return to them, those originarios who remained were obliged to support their villages' responsibilities. The increased pressure on them encouraged them to join the exodus.<sup>149</sup> At Potosí, fewer mitayos arrived from the depleted provinces, forcing those already there to serve longer, and causing them to flee from the villa.

As the increased demand for Indian labor at Potosí was met with decreasing numbers of mitayos, the azogueros focused their wrath on the caciques. They were whipped, beaten, imprisoned, humiliated in public, and forced to hire two mingas for every mitayo they failed to deliver.<sup>150</sup> To protect themselves, the caciques forced their Indians to serve more often than once every seven years, denied them rest, and brought older and younger men than the draft allowed.<sup>151</sup> The result was more pressure on the mitayos at Potosí and originarios in the provinces, and thus the acceleration of Indian flight.

The year 1590 brought yet another cause of the downfall of the Toledan mita. The realm was visited by a series of epidemics--smallpox, measles, influenza and typhus. Many pueblos were completely destroyed, and Potosí--normally spared the effects of epidemic disease because of its altitude and cold climate--was hit hard.<sup>152</sup>

By the end of the sixteenth century the original form of the mita had broken down completely. Travel allowances were not paid, quotas were common, and wages were withheld. Indians and their caciques were beaten, whipped and otherwise abused. The fractions employed by Toledo--one-seventh (for example) from a province, one-third of the mita gruesa for the mita ordinaria, and one-third of the mitayos for the mines--crumbled. Every provision for the adequate payment and good treatment of the mitayos was

routinely disobeyed. At the same time, conditions in the mines were worse and the countryside was less able to support mita recruitment.<sup>153</sup>

Another technological breakthrough was needed. Hopes were raised when the beneficio del hierro ("iron method") was invented by Carlos Corzo in the late 1580s, but mercury interest groups were able to delay crown approval for its use by complaining that their profits would be hurt. But even when the Corzo method was introduced, in the last years of the sixteenth century, it could not reverse the overall downward trend of Potosí silver production.<sup>154</sup>

Hapsburg officials responded to the mita's problems in disjointed fashion, from many different directions, and clashed with one another over how best to act. Corregidores de Potosí were responsible for overseeing compliance with mita obligations, and maximizing silver production. They supported the azogueros in their quest for a lower mercury price and the exaction of the diezmo. They also were active in pressuring the caciques to deliver their full quotas of mitayos, and tried to subjugate the provincial corregidores, whom they blamed--along with the caciques--for the failure to meet their mita obligations.<sup>155</sup>

The Audiencia de Charcas was charged by the crown with monitoring abuses, and ensuring that the mitayos were treated well and received their wages.<sup>156</sup> Except for Matienzo, the Audiencia opposed the mita from the start,



and it supported the agricultural interests that competed with Potosí for Indian labor. The oidores viewed the azogueros as haughty, unruly, greedy and disloyal; and they blamed them--their greed and vicious treatment of the Indians--for the mita's failings.<sup>157</sup> The Audiencia tried to win a lower mercury price for Potosí, with the hope that cheaper mercury would lessen the pressure that the azogueros exerted on the mitayos.<sup>158</sup> It resisted every effort by the Corregidor to bring the mita under his exclusive control.<sup>159</sup>

Toledo's successors in the viceroy's position pointed to flaws in the mita's design rather than blame any one group for its shortcomings. Viceroy Martín Enríquez (1581-1583) felt that Toledo had over-stepped the bounds of his instructions by establishing the Potosí mita.<sup>160</sup> The Viceroy Conde de Villar (1585-1590) and the second Viceroy Marqués de Cañete (1590-1596) bemoaned Toledo's lack of foresight.<sup>161</sup> Despite their belief that the mita was flawed, these viceroys did not question its importance. They understood that the future of Peru depended on Potosí, and Potosí depended on the mita. They sought to repair or replace those parts of the system that they believed were responsible for its demise. They tried, in essence, to re-design the mita in light of contemporary realities.<sup>162</sup>

Enríquez hoped to overcome the difficulties presented by Toledo's 1578 repartimiento de la mita. His distribution (1582) included 4,453 Indians in the mita ordinaria, of

which 1,369 were assigned to the mines, 2,047 to the mills, and 222 to ore-washing facilities. The remaining 195 were lost when complaints led to the lowering of quotas for some provinces. Of those "resting," 1,070 were obliged to serve as meses in support activities and public works. Enríquez was careful to provide Indians only to those who were legitimately involved in silver production. He turned down the suggestion of Diego López de Zúñiga, Alcalde de Lima, that the mita gruesa be composed of only two parts, so that each mita ordinaria might cover all the activities that required Indian laborers.<sup>163</sup>

When Martín Enríquez died in March of 1583, he was replaced with the Conde de Villar. The new Viceroy convened a junta in 1586 to discuss the crisis at Potosí, and particularly the difficulties with the mita. The junta's members included López de Zúñiga, Father Acosta, and Martín García de Loyola. It focused on the problems of increased costs and the controversy surrounding rescates. It agreed to recommend to the crown that the quinto be lowered to the octavo or diezmo, and to lower the price of mercury by ten pesos to seventy-five per quintal for the first 6,000 to 7,000 quintales used at Potosí each year. But despite the legitimacy of some of the arguments linking rescates and capcha with the theft of ore by Indians, the junta ruled that the ghatu's activities were necessary to keep an Indian work force at Potosí. As the mita was a necessary

evil, so too was the theft of rich ore by the Indians for sale in the ghatu plaza.<sup>164</sup>

The junta hoped to ease the pressure on the mitayos by adjusting other production elements. The Conde de Villar considered, meanwhile, a more extensive alteration of the mita. The Audiencia de Charcas had suggested that a resident Indian labor force be created for Potosí.<sup>165</sup> The Viceroy's instructions had allowed him to implement such a program if he believed it worthwhile.<sup>166</sup> Proponents of the idea argued that a resident labor force would eliminate the problems caused by shuttling the Indians back and forth across the altiplano, and that it would end the disruption caused by the recruitment of mitayos in the provinces. Opponents argued that provisioning such a large resident population would be difficult, and that the Indians chosen to live and serve at Potosí would be little more than slaves. The Viceroy finally decided against the idea, for he felt that the Indians would be aggrieved--and run away.<sup>167</sup> Thus, when the Conde published his repartimiento de la mita in 1588, little had been changed from that of his predecessor: the mita ordinaria included 4,143 Indians, and 13,016 made up the mita gruesa.<sup>168</sup>

Throughout the 1580s the crown refused to confirm the establishment of the Potosí mita. In 1584 Phillip II gave hesitant consent to other mitas, but he withheld it from that at Potosí. His approval did not come until 1589,

sixteen years after the system was inaugurated. Villar was then told to follow Toledo's program for sending Indians to work in the mines at Potosí; all earlier cédulas and provisions to the contrary were superseded. Royal consent for the mita was predicated on the therapeutic value of work for the otherwise lazy and frivolous Indians; and it was contingent upon their good treatment, religious instruction and general conservation.<sup>169</sup> The crown's support really came, however, in exchange for the revenue generated by the 1570s boom.<sup>170</sup>

The mita was assigned more than its fair share of the credit for the increase in silver production at Potosí. The desmontes, mercury and a huge capital infusion were more important. The mita was a part of the success story, but to assign it responsibility for Potosí's resurgence was a gross overstatement. It is ironic that royal support for the mita came at a time when it was failing, and government officials in Peru were scrambling to hold it together.

Phillip II's confirmation of the mita was followed in 1590 by the epidemics of that year and an acceleration of the production crisis at Potosí. Black slaves from Brazil and a resident mitayo labor force received renewed interest as alternatives to the mita. Indeed, the crown granted permission to import Blacks for Potosí on a limited and experimental basis.<sup>171</sup>

Peru also received a new Viceroy in 1590--the second Marqués de Cañete. He wrote the crown in 1592 that he believed that Toledo's mita required a major reformation.<sup>172</sup> The Audiencia de Charcas had called for the forced resettlement of Indians in their pueblos, and he agreed, noting that many Indians were absent from their homes to evade mita and other obligations.<sup>173</sup> In 1593 the Viceroy petitioned the crown to lower mercury and food prices for Potosí, and grant other concessions that would return profitability to silver production there. Meanwhile, he drafted fifty-five ordinances, to be implemented by Oidor Juan Díaz de Lopidana of the Audiencia de Charcas. The Oidor had gone to Potosí at Cañete's behest, to determine whether a new repartimiento de la mita was needed, and to investigate the general situation there. The new ordinances were issued in response to his recommendations. Cañete reiterated his predecessors' prohibitions of the sale or rental of mitayos, their use in other activities than those to which they were assigned, and other means used by the azogueros to adapt the mita to their personal needs. He also banned the extraction of ore from the cerro from Saturday evening to Monday morning, effectively ending capcha--a measure meant to halt the theft of rich ore by the Indians.<sup>174</sup>

Cañete's ordinances are impressive in their number and scope, but they had little effect on the situation at

Potosí. By 1595 the Viceroy had given up on the villa and its residents. He wrote the crown that the mines were so deep and the ore was so poor that the government would do better to promote other mining centers instead. The azogueros, he reported, now forced the Indians to work beyond their physical limitations, in a desperate attempt to cover their production costs. The government could not prevent the azogueros' abuse of the Indians; the more it tried to govern Potosí the more ungovernable the place became.<sup>175</sup>

Viceroy Luis de Velasco (1596-1604) received his instructions in 1595. Potosí, he was told, was the "nervio principal" of Peru and demanded his special attention.<sup>176</sup> The crown had not yet received Cañete's assessment. A year later Velasco received a separate set of orders concerning the royal treasury, in which mercury problems were the central issue.<sup>177</sup> The use of quicksilver was down at Potosí; the crown was not worried about the stockpile of unsold mercury, but it missed the silver that could have been produced with it. Velasco was told to reduce the price to sixty pesos per quintal, with deferred payment if necessary. He was also ordered to assign more Indians to Potosí, but only to verified mine and mill owners.<sup>178</sup>

The Viceroy's instructions called, nevertheless, for the eventual abolition of the mita. The crown supported the Audiencia de Charcas' concept of a resident labor force,

and encouraged Velasco to settle Indians in the vicinity of Potosí by providing them with land in nearby valleys. The transition to a resident labor force was to be gradual because of the difficulty of the task. Direction of the settlement program was to be entrusted to the Corregidor de Potosí; the Audiencia de Charcas was not to interfere.<sup>179</sup> So while steps were to be taken to increase silver production in the short run--primarily a reduction in the price of mercury--the crown expressed its hope that the mita could eventually be phased out of existence.

After an extensive investigation, including a visita and other information gathering, Velasco issued his repartimiento de la mita and a series of ordinances in 1599. He included 4,634 Indians in the mita ordinaria, in accordance with the crown's instruction that he assign more Indians to Potosí.<sup>180</sup> His twenty-six ordinances focused on the sale or rental of mines and mills; no such arrangements were permitted, and in no way was an azoguero to receive in money what was allotted to him in labor. The Viceroy's ordinances were added to those of Toledo and Cañete and superseded any that were not consistent with his own.<sup>181</sup>

Luis de Velasco was the last viceroy to rule Peru in the sixteenth century, and the first to govern it during the seventeenth. No sooner had he published his repartimiento and ordinances than the crown and Council of the Indies responded to Cañete's indictment of Potosí, and

other complaints about the mita, with a cédula ordering the abolition of the system. Velasco's response to that order and its impact on silver production at Potosí will open the story of the mita in the seventeenth century.

### Summary

For the first twenty years of silver mining at Potosí--the center's most productive period--the mita was unnecessary. From 1545 to the 1560s, volunteer Indian laborers flocked to Potosí; and once there they dominated every stage of production, from the mining of ore to refining the silver in their guayras. The Spanish miners' contribution was therefore limited to legal ownership of the mines and protection of their claims against interlopers. The miners began to press for forced Indian labor only after falling ore quality had lowered the Indians' profits, and they refused to work voluntarily.

The Spanish crown opposed forced Indian labor in mining for a combination of reasons. First, it did not want to repeat the demographic disaster that had characterized its initial colonization efforts in the Caribbean. Charles I and Phillip II understood that the long-term value of their American realms lay with their Indian vassals. Second, the crown was locked into a mortal struggle with its own colonists for control of Indian labor, primarily with the encomenderos. Clearly in the weaker position, the crown



ordered legal restrictions on the colonists' access to Indian labor to protect its economic interests, as well as the Indians themselves. While royal directives were rarely obeyed, they indirectly furthered the crown's cause by providing local government officials with legal leverage over the colonists. Meanwhile, the crown ensured its representatives use of that leverage by playing groups of colonists--soldados and encomenderos for example--against one another. Disputes were settled by government officials or in the king's courts.

The crown's position in the colonization process was analogous to the Spanish miners' position at Potosí. Both maintained a degree of control via legal channels, but in truth the Indians were in charge at Potosí, and the colonists in Peru (as far as the Indians permitted them to be).

The economic crisis at Potosí in the 1560s created a problem for the miners and the crown alike. The miners' profits fell, and they looked to restore their earnings to earlier levels with forced Indian labor. The government had grown accustomed to receiving Potosí silver, and had a vested interest in the future of the mining center. Draft Indian labor had proven necessary in other sectors of the Peruvian economy, and had been permitted by the crown. Royal opposition to forced labor for the mines was stronger, however, because the crown feared both the

effect of such a system on the Indians and the concession of more power to the miners. The risks simply outweighed the potential benefits, and the crown refused to permit draft Indian labor at Potosí.

The relationship between the risks and the potential benefits changed soon after Viceroy Francisco de Toledo arrived in Peru. An amalgamation process suitable to Potosí's unique environment was perfected that made the desmontes produced during the preceding quarter-century a bonanza of easily accessible ore. The prospects for spectacular levels of silver production at Potosí--and thus greatly increased quintos reales--caused Toledo to break with the crown's position against forced labor for the mines. The desmontes and amalgamation technology were only two parts of a four-part production formula, however, and labor and capital were still needed. To convince the potosinos to invest their capital in new refining mills--to secure the fourth element in the formula--the Viceroy had to guarantee them a large Indian labor force. The mita was founded, therefore, not only as the third part of the Toledan formula, but also as part of his agreement with the potosinos to provide the fourth.

The crown withheld royal consent from the mita because it was afraid that Toledo had created another privileged interest group, like the encomenderos, and unsure that his provisions for the protection of the mitayos would be

sufficient. When the boom of the 1570s convinced Phillip II that the Toledan formula had worked, he put aside his earlier doubts and endorsed the mita.

Unfortunately for all concerned, the Toledan miracle lasted only as long as the desmontes. As the boom of the 1570s fizzled, the azogueros, the crown and the Indians all scrambled to protect their interests at the expense of the others. The mitayos had enjoyed substantial profits during the boom, but they soon found themselves forced to work in the mines rather than in the mills, and treated more harshly. As their earnings fell, and mistreatment became more prevalent, the Indians began to flee from Potosí and from their pueblos to avoid mita service. The remaining Indians had to serve more often, increasing the pressure on the mitayos and contributing to more Indian flight. Indian migration and the decline of the mita fueled one another in a vicious circle. The provinces were not depopulated by the mita. Rather, the mita contributed to the demographic disruption of the realm, and suffered by it as well.

The group that was caught between Indian flight and increased azoguero demand for mitayos was the caciques. They were the key to the entire system, for they delivered the mitayos to Potosí. The caciques kept the mita going throughout the 1580s and the 1590s, because they ignored the guidelines established by Toledo--to spare themselves the temporal reprisals of angry azogueros.

By 1600 the mita had begun to evolve, in concert with developments at Potosí and in the provinces. The vehicle of that evolution was the caciques. As long as they were able to appease the demands of the azogueros, and still maintain control over the Indians, the mita--the de facto mita--could continue.

The crown could do very little to prevent the transformation of the mita. The limitations of its control over Potosí were very clear. Government officials, however, began to explore alternatives to the system, and the crown lent its support to the concept of a resident labor force to replace the mita. But the crown had permitted the creation of another privileged sector of Peruvian society--the azogueros. It would have to contend with them as well as the encomenderos in any future efforts to limit the colonists' access to Indian labor.

Notes for Chapter II

1. Robert G. Keith, "Encomienda, Hacienda and Corregimiento in Spanish America: A Structural Analysis," The Hispanic American Historical Review, LI (Durham, 1971), 440. Keith notes that the crown had just finished battling with a strong and independent nobility in Spain, and did not relish the idea that another might be created in America. For the dissolution of unity after conquest, see Charles Gibson, The Inca Concept of Sovereignty and the Spanish Administration in Peru, The University of Texas Institute of Latin American Studies, IV (Austin: The University of Texas Press, 1948), 101.
2. Ramos, 375, for a discussion of the Laws of Burgos; and Castañeda Delgado, 334, for the decimation of the native population in the Caribbean.
3. Castañeda Delgado, 334 (based on AGI, Indiferente General 421, Book 12, f. 4); my translation. All quotes in this dissertation, unless otherwise noted, are my translations. See, also, Crespo, "La 'Mita,'" 170.
4. Keith, 440.
5. Zavala, Servicio personal, I, 5-6. For the suggestion that Peru was too large and too complex to administer effectively, see Lewis Hanke and Celso Rodríguez, eds., Los virreyes españoles en América durante el gobierno de la Casa de Austria, Biblioteca de Autores Españoles, nos. 273-277, 280-286 (12 vols.; Madrid: Ediciones Atlas, 1978-1980), Perú I (no. 280), 72.
6. Keith, 441-443.
7. Zavala, Servicio personal, I, 5.
8. Ibid., 4.
9. Ibid., 6, for the 1540 order; Castañeda Delgado, 335, for the 1541 edict.
10. Cobb, "Potosí and Huancavelica," 8. The quinto was established in America in 1504. Although literally one-fifth of production, the quinto was collected in fractions from one-tenth to one-fifth.
11. Zavala, Servicio personal, I, 6.

12. Keen, "The Black Legend Revisited," 703-704.
13. Ramos, 378.
14. John Leddy Phelan, "Authority and Flexibility in the Spanish Imperial Bureaucracy," Administrative Science Quarterly, V (Ithaca, 1960), 7-65, offers another hypothesis to explain the inconsistency of royal orders. The thesis is developed further in his The Kingdom of Quito in the Seventeenth Century (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1967). I will discuss his thesis in Chapter VIII.
15. Pérez de Tudela, 360, for the priorities being clear, and 365-367 for the local officials having to make the hard decisions. Ramos, 375-376, says that uncertainty was at the root of royal inaction. Cobb, "Potosí and Huancavelica," 5-6, notes that Peruvian mining legislation was at first left to the Audiencia de Lima.
16. Zavala, Servicio personal, I, 9-11. Summary: Anyone who hoped to use Indians in his mining operations was required to bring them before the Governor or his assistant, so that they might be asked whether they were working voluntarily. At the mines, the Indians were not to sleep under the stars, but had to be provided with a roof and a bed. They were to eat with two hours of daylight remaining. Amounts of meat and flour per Indian per day were dictated, as well as provisions of coca. Indians were not to be whipped. Once they arrived in the mining zone, the Indians were to register with the local magistrate and four months thereafter they were to return home. From December 15 to April 15 no mining was permitted, as the summer rains made the rivers too dangerous to work. The Indians were not to come more than sixty leagues to work in the mines. Indians from warm regions were not to work in cold regions, and vice versa.
17. Arzáns, Historia, I, 43-46.
18. Cobb, "Supply and Transportation," 26, says the distance was six leagues. On page 25 she notes that pasturage requirements made the villa even more remote, for llama trains had to move from one grassy valley to another.
19. Arzáns, Historia, I, 38, for the effects of the cold, and how it almost prevented the first attempts to settle at Potosí.
20. Pedro Ramírez del Aguila, Noticias políticas de

Indias (1639), transcribed by Jaime Urioste Arana (Sucre, 1978), 81-82. For a general description of Potosí, see José de la Riva Agüero, ed., "Descripción anónima del Perú y de Lima a principios del siglo XVII, compuesta por un judío portugués y dirigida a los estados de Holanda," Revista Histórica, XXI (Lima, 1954), 30-31. Capoche, 77, says that silver was placed at Potosí to lure the Spanish into the region. Lewis Hanke comments on that statement in "Luis Capoche," 44.

21. Modesto Bargalló, La minería y la metalurgia en la América española durante la época colonial (México y Buenos Aires: Fondo de Cultural Económica, 1955), 74.

22. Capoche, 77.

23. Holmes, 9-12; Arzáns, Historia, I, 42.

24. Cobb, "Potosí . . . Frontier," 43, says that charcoal was an especially lucrative sideline. See, also, R. C. Padden's "Introduction" to Tales of Potosí, by Bartolomé Arzáns de Orsúa y Vela, ed. by R. C. Padden, trans. by Frances M. López-Morillas (Providence: Brown University Press, 1975), xvi. Padden's "Introduction" is an excellent short history of the villa of Potosí and will be noted hereafter as "Padden, . . . ."

25. Holmes, 8; Brading and Cross, 553-554. The mines at Porco were worked during the pre-conquest period, and the Spanish became involved there in 1538.

26. Padden, xiv-xv.

27. Nicolás Matías del Campo y de la Rynaga, Memorial apologético, histórico, jurídico y político (Lima, 1672), 11. This volume is housed in the library of the Sociedad Geográfica "Sucre," Sucre, Bolivia; it is catalogued in the ANB/BNB catalogues as MC 969a and MOM 654. Lewis Hanke, in a note on pages 253-254 of Arzáns, Historia, II, says other copies are in the British Museum (Add. Ms. 17,583. No. I, f. 7-107) and Biblioteca de Palacio, Madrid (Ms. 1571); both are manuscripts and are 300 fs. in length. Another printed copy is in the Wiedner Library at Harvard University.

28. Cobb, "Potosí . . . Frontier," 47; "Potosí and Huancavelica," 63-64; Holmes, 35-37; Capoche, 134-135; Nicolás del Benino, "Relación muy particular del cerro y minas de Potosí y de su calidad y labores, por Nicolás del Benino, dirigida a don Francisco de Toledo, virrey del

- Perú, en 1573," Relaciones geográficas de Indias.--Perú, ed. by Marcos Jiménez de la Espada, Biblioteca de Autores Españoles, no. 183 (Madrid: Ediciones Atlas, 1965), 365-366; "Descripción de la villa y minas de Potosí. Año de 1603," Relaciones geográficas de Indias.--Perú, 473.
29. Holmes, 20.
30. AGI, Charcas 270, no. 33C, "Libro y relacion sumaria Que de orden del Ex<sup>mo</sup> señor Duque de la Palata Principe de Massa Cavallero de orden de Alcantara de los consejos de estado y guerra de su M. su virey Y governador y capitan general de estos reinos Y Provincias del Peru ... De todo lo obrado en el [reyno del Perú] , assi por el dho señor Duque Como por los demas ministros de su M. que entendieron en la numeracion general de los Yndios del dho reyno que en Virtud de Zedulas suias Se hisso el ano pasado de 1684 = ... Y de todo lo que de la dha numeracion a resultado en Veneficio de su M. y de la causa publica en la reintegracion de la Mita de Yndios de la rivera y Minerales de Potosi que fue el principal motivo que tubo para darse hacer ...," f. 2v. This book was written by Contador Pedro Antonio del Castillo, and will be noted hereafter as "Castillo (AGI, Charcas 270, no. 33C), . . . ." See, also, Brading and Cross, 558-560.
31. Zavala, Servicio personal, I, 40, 43-45.
32. Capoche, 108-109.
33. Holmes, 14, notes that motivation on the part of the Spaniards equalled a fierce compulsion for riches.
34. Legally, Indians had equal rights with Spaniards but in practice they could not compete. See Cobb, "Potosí and Huancavelica," 8-9, for a discussion of the legal rights of the Indians with regard to mining.
35. Ibid., iv-v, 16. Arzáns' Historia, and the Tales of Potosí edition, are both replete with examples of everyday violence at Potosí.
36. J. H. Parry, The Spanish Seaborne Empire (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1966), 175-185; Padden, xvii; Arzáns, Historia, I, 46-62.
37. Joseph Baquijano y Carrillo, "Historia del descubrimiento del cerro de Potosí, fundación de su Imperial Villa, sus progresos y actual estado," Mercurio Peruano, VII, no. 211 (Lima, 10 de enero de 1793), 32.



38. Alejandro Málaga Medina, "El Virrey Don Francisco de Toledo y la reglamentación del tributo en el virreinato del Perú," Anuario de Estudios Americanos, XXIX (Sevilla, 1972), 602.
39. Keen, "The Black Legend," 703-711; Holmes, 25-27.
40. Holmes, 33.
41. Zavala, Servicio personal, I, 13; Holmes, 21-23.
42. Helmer, "La encomienda," 235-238; Holmes (one the basis of that article), 24-27.
43. Zavala, Servicio personal, I, 15-18; Capoche 159-160; Hanke and Rodríguez, Los virreyes, Perú I, 37-38; Arzáns, Historia, I, 73-74.
44. Zavala, Servicio personal, I, 20, based on the relación of Fiscal Juan Fernández of the Audiencia de Lima; Arzáns, Historia, I, 79-94.
45. Zavala, Servicio personal, I, 18-19, 21.
46. Ibid., 21-22.
47. Holmes, 30-31; Cobb, "Potosí and Huancavelica," 63-64.
48. So noted by the Archbishop of Lima, about 1551 (see Zavala, Servicio personal, I, 17).
49. Ibid., 18; Crespo, "La 'Mita,'" 170, for a brief discussion of Indian stoicism.
50. Keen, "The Black Legend," 703-704.
51. Gunnar Mendoza notes that the Audiencia was officially founded in 1561, but the cédulas establishing the court were issued in 1559 (Arzáns, Historia, I, 112, note 1). Cobb, "Potosí and Huancavelica," 21, uses the 1561 date.
52. Baquijano y Carrillo, 34, says 122,000 pesos; Hanke and Rodríguez, Los virreyes, Perú I, 56-57, place the figure at 79,000 assayed pesos. For another source that says 79,000 pesos, see ANB, M 3, no. 17, "Información hecha ante esta Real Audiencia con motivo de la solicitud presentada por don Juan de Ayala y Figueroa, procurador de Potosí, pidiendo que en merito a los servicios prestados

por dicha villa al rey y a estar ahora sus vecinos pobres y las labores de minas descaesidas, los quintos reales se reduzcan al diezmo, el azogue se venda al costo y los vecinos sean relevados perpetuamente de pagar alcabalas," Potosí, 1609-1610, 52 fs. (MC 559a). The 1603 "Descripción de la villa y minas de Potosí," 373, put the sum at 71,000 pesos.

53. Padden, xvii-xviii; Holmes, 45-47; Arzáns, Historia, I, 108-111, says God was upset with Potosí's residents and lessened the quality of the ore to punish them.

54. Brading and Cross, 552 (discovery only); Lohmann Villena, "La minería," 645; Zavala, Servicio personal, I, 23, notes that the invention did cause a search for mercury deposits in Peru. See Guillermo Lohmann Villena, Las minas de Huancavelica en los siglos XVI y XVII (Sevilla, 1949) and Arthur P. Whitaker, The Huancavelica Mercury Mine. A Contribution to the History of the Bourbon Renaissance in the Spanish Empire (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1941) for the two basic sources on Huancavelica. See, too, Cobb, "Potosí and Huancavelica," or the edition in Spanish, Potosí y Huancavelica.

55. Benino, 368-369.

56. Holmes, 45-47; Cobb, "Potosí and Huancavelica," 65; Juan de Matienzo to the crown, La Plata, 20.X.1561, La Audiencia de Charcas. Correspondencia de presidentes y oidores, ed. by Roberto Levillier (3 vols.; Madrid: Imprenta de Juan Pueyo, 1918-1922), I, 57.

57. Padden, xvii-xviii.

58. The 76 million peso figure began with José de Acosta, Historia natural y moral de las Indias (Sevilla, 1590), as Diffie, 278-279, has shown. Acosta's Historia is included in Obras de P. José de Acosta, ed. by Francisco Mateos, Biblioteca de Autores Españoles, no. 73 (Madrid: Ediciones Atlas, 1954); the cited information is on page 98. The 76 million figure is reproduced in AGI, Charcas 268, no. 36, "Relacion o ressumen de las rraciones y pareceres que sse han dado sobre que sse quitte y cesse la mitta forzada de yndios para las minas de el Zerro de Potossi=" by Relator Andrés Miguel de Angulo, 3.V.1673, 9 fs. (hereafter "Angulo (AGI, Charcas 268, no. 36)"); AGI, Charcas 268, nos. 69A & 69B, Propuesta, y parecer, que hace y ofrece al Excelentísimo Señor Doctor Melchor de Liñán y Cisneros ... sobre el mejor cumplimiento de la cédula de

de Su Magestad de 8 de julio del año de 1676, by Asesor Francisco de Valera, Lima, 1680, 27 fs. (hereafter, "Valera (AGI, Charcas 268, nos. 69A & 69B)"); and AGI, Charcas 268, no. 70B, the Gremio de azogueros to the crown, s. f., 8 fs. The number of years was manipulated by Sebastián de Sandoval y Guzmán, Pretensiones de la Villa Imperial de Potosí (Madrid, 1634), 25-26, as Diffie also noted. A copy of Pretensiones is housed in the BNB. See, also, Cobb, "Potosí and Huancavelica," 148; and Lohmann Villena, "La minería," 640-642. For official production figures, see Peter J. Bakewell, "Registered Silver Production in the Potosí District, 1550-1735," Jahrbuch für Geschichte von Staat, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft Lateinamerikas, Band 12 (Köln und Wien, 1975), 57-77. For estimates of contraband, see Baquijano y Carrillo, no. 214 (20 de enero de 1793), 57; and Cobb, "Potosí and Huancavelica," 144. Zavala, Servicio personal, I, 56, reproduces Juan de Matienzo's claim that total production was about 1.5 million pesos per year, with royal quintos worth one-fifth of that amount. Cobb, "Potosí and Huancavelica," 12, carries Acosta's estimate of 1.5 million in quintos alone. Baquijano y Carrillo, no. 212 (13 de enero de 1793), 35, lists royal revenue in 1572 as 216,517 pesos, when silver production at Potosí had fallen to a pre-amalgamation low.

59. La Gasca, back in Spain, argued for the use of Black slaves in the Peruvian mines; he and Cañete both asked that they be introduced for low-elevation mines (Zavala, Servicio personal, I, 20-21, 24-25).

60. Black unfitness for work at Potosí was determined early. The Conde de Nieva and García de Castro both said they were physically unprepared (Zavala, Servicio personal, I, 34 and 39, respectively). It is probably a myth, for Blacks were used in large numbers in the royal mint during the eighteenth century. Logistical and financial problems were probably the true reasons why the viceroys opposed the idea. See Holmes, 17-20, for a biological profile of the Andean Indian, and the suggestion that Blacks were capable of working in the cerro.

61. Zavala, Servicio personal, I, 29; Málaga Medina, 603-604.

62. Zavala, Servicio personal, I, 18.

63. Holmes, 32-34; Basadre, "El Régimen," 326-327, sees this as the first of two steps, the second being the establishment of the mita. M'ita is a Quechua word

meaning shift, or time of service. It was used by the hatunrunas and tindarunas to designate their work periods. Matienzo used the word "mita" in the same way (Zavala, Servicio personal, I, 53-54).

64. Juan de Matienzo, Gobierno del Perú (1567), ed. by Guillermo Lohmann Villena (Lima and Paris, 1967), 63-66, 132-138, 138-156; Zavala, Servicio personal, I, 51-52, 55-56; Cañete y Domínguez, 100.

65. Zavala, Servicio personal, I, 55-56.

66. Ibid., 33-34, for the 1563 cédula; and pages 39-40 for a discussion of President Lope García de Castro's letter to the crown of 15.I.1565.

67. Royal cédula to the Audiencia de Charcas, Bosque de Segovia, 1.X.1556, Audiencia de Charcas. Correspondencia (ed. by Levillier), II, 464.

68. Zavala, Servicio personal, I, 30. Some of the Indians were assigned to non-mining aspects of production.

69. Padden, xvii-xviii; Zavala, Servicio personal, I, 42 (the call for a junta also had to do with the Indians taken prisoner in war and then enslaved), and 63 (for a discussion of the junta itself). The quote is from page xvii of Padden.

70. Lewis Hanke, "Viceroy Francisco de Toledo and the Just Titles of Spain to the Inca Empire," The Americas, III (Washington, D.C., 1946), 3; Zavala, Servicio personal, I, 63.

71. Campo y de la Rynaga, 13-14; the quote is on page 13. It is also in Zavala, Servicio personal, II, 117.

72. John H. Rowe, "The Incas under Spanish Colonial Institutions," The Hispanic American Historical Review, XXXVII (Durham, 1957), 155. Rowe notes "the insecurity of the Spanish hold on the native population." Many Indians, the Chiriguanaes of Charcas for example, were not conquered until later centuries.

73. Hanke, "Viceroy Toledo," 5.

74. Gibson, The Inca Concept of Sovereignty, 108-114, likens Toledo to a second Pachacutec.

75. Parry, 188-189.

76. Baquijano y Carrillo, no. 212 (13 de enero de 1793), 37; Málaga Medina, 611; Holmes, 51; and Padden, xix. All of these draw upon the "letter" from the Conde de Lemos to the crown, Lima, 4.VII.1670. The "letter" is actually a discourse: AGI, Charcas 268, no. 15, "Discurso y Informe del Virrey conde de Lemos sobre que se escusen las Mitas forzadas de los In<sup>os</sup> que remite con su carta de 4 de jullio de 670," 22 fs.; the letter itself is AGI, Charcas 268, no. 16, the Conde de Lemos to the crown, Lima, 4.VII.1670, 3 fs. The discourse has been published in Pareceres jurídicos en asuntos de Indias (1601-1718), ed. by Rubén Vargas Ugarte (Lima, 1951), 155-165; and in Hanke and Rodríguez, Los virreyes, Perú IV (no. 283), 276-289.
77. Zavala, Servicio personal, I, 14-15, for La Gasca; and page 50 for García de Castro, who continued the reducción program.
78. Parry, 189-190, offers an unflattering overview on corregidores de indios; Rowe, "The Incas under Spanish Colonial Institutions," 161-163, provides a more extensive description.
79. Zavala, Servicio personal, I, 64.
80. Campo y de la Rynaga, 15; Acosta was also of this opinion. See Zavala, Servicio personal, I, 68, for the Audiencia's report to the crown. Padden, xix, provides a general account.
81. Holmes, 21-23, based on Matienzo (Buenos Aires, 1910, edition, 30); Zavala, Servicio personal, I, 64-65.
82. Bakewell, "Technological Change," 60, says that Toledo was hesitant but had been ordered in a 28.IX.1568 royal letter to use forced labor. Cañete y Domínguez, 100, agrees that he was so ordered, based on Solórzano Pereira (Biblioteca de Autores Españoles edition, I, 269).
83. Zavala, Servicio personal, I, 68-69.
84. Campo y de la Rynaga, 16; Capoche, 116; Bargalló, 136-137; Padden, xxi; Brading and Cross, 553-554; Lohmann Villena, "La minería," 645; Cobb, "Potosí and Huancavelica," ii-iii (she says that Toledo was fortunate that amalgamation came along when it did); Arzáns, Historia, I, 145-155, for all of Toledo's work at Potosí.
85. Bakewell, "Technological Change," 60-61, notes the

comparative economics. The investment made in the new mills required assurances that production would be profitable even after the desmontes were exhausted. Valera (AGI, Charcas 268, nos. 69A & 69B--see note 58), 7, says labor had to be guaranteed.

86. AGN, Sala IX, 6-2-5, no. 11, a lengthy información by the Gremio de azogueros, 1642-1643, 41 fs.; the cited passage is on f. 22v. Other provisions were made to entice the potosinos, including the guarantee that they would not be jailed for debts. Alberto Crespo R., La guerra entre Vicuñas y Vascongados (Potosí, 1622-1625) (Lima, 1956), 42, says:

"Cuando el virrey Toledo estuvo en Potosí los mineros le manifestaron que sólo podrían afrontar los crecidos gastos que les demandaría el cambio del método de fundición al de azogue, si les eran acordadas especiales facilidades. El virrey accedió a las fundamentales, la de la mita y la de reforzar la inmunidad en caso de deudas."

See Chapter III for the azogueros' efforts to protect the latter right in the early seventeenth century.

87. Zavala, Servicio personal, I, 70, for Toledo's letter to the crown from Cuzco on 25.III.1571. Toledo had already decided that the mercury mines at Huancavelica would have to be worked by mitayos.

88. Bakewell, "Technological Change," 66; Hanke and Rodríguez, Los virreyes, Perú I (no. 280), 145-147, for Toledo's comments in his memoriales (see note 124).

89. Zavala, Servicio personal, I, 70.

90. Holmes, 48. For the irony of Toledo employing an Inca system while discrediting the Inca claim to sovereignty in Peru, see Hanke, "Viceroy Toledo," 18-19.

91. No subject, with reference to the mita, has caused more confusion than the number and nature of the three repartimientos de la mita conducted by Toledo himself. Cañete y Domínguez, 100-101, notes that Valenzuela, Agia and others were confused. Holmes, 52-53 (after Antonio de León Pinelo, El paraíso en el nuevo mundo (1650), ed. by Raul Porras Barrenechea (2 vols.; Lima, 1943), II, 337) identified all three: the first conducted in 1573; the second in 1575; and the third in 1578. Even the historical summary drawn together at the end of the seventeenth century for the Council of the Indies (AGI, Charcas 273,

no. 21, Madrid, 1.II.1697, 28 fs.), based in part on Angulo (AGI, Charcas 268, no. 36--see note 58), is uncertain about how many repartimientos there were and when they were done. AGI, Charcas 267, no. 16, the Archbishop of Lima to the crown, Lima, 30.XII.1661, 13 fs., says there were two Toledan repartimientos: a) the first on 10.IV.1573, including 3,733 Indians; and b) the second on 9.VIII.1575, including 3,093 Indians. Further difficulties concern the areas that were subject to the Potosí mita, for those that were obligated in the seventeenth century were not necessarily those involved under Toledo (see note 92, below).

An entire volume could be written about the various routes of misinformation about the mita through primary and secondary sources. Rather than note each instance where an author is mistaken, the reader is asked to accept this summary of two primary sources that I believe to be trustworthy: a) the "caveza del rrepartimiento xeneral que hizo El señor Virrey Don francisco de toledo . . .," copied by Escrivano Luis Maldonado in the 1660s for Superintendent of the mita Francisco de la Cruz (AGI, Charcas 266, no. 45J, "Testimj<sup>o</sup> De los Indios q<sup>e</sup> Repartio el S<sup>or</sup> Don fr<sup>co</sup> de Toledo = num<sup>o</sup> 10 - Y testimj<sup>o</sup> de los excessos que reconocio en su execucion No 11," 12 fs.); and b) a history of the mita written by Castillo as a preface to the tome on the Duque de la Palata's general census and repartimiento de la mita (AGI, Charcas 270, no. 33C--see note 30).

92. AGI, Charcas 266, no. 45J (see note 91), 3-4v; Capoche, 135. Crespo, "Reclutamiento," 471, questioned why Lipez was not included in the mita. The answer, I believe, is that Lipez was a frontier province; the exemption of regions on the fringe with unconquered Indians is documented throughout two legajos from the AGN: a) Sala IX, 10-3-7, "Representaciones y quejas de las provincias, La Paz, Tomina, Pilaya, Mizque, Omasuyo, 1689-1690;" and b) Sala XIII, Legajo 73, "Representaciones y quejas de las provincias, Porco, Chayanta, Tarija, Paria, Carangas, 1689-1690." Both legajos resulted from the inclusion of new areas under the mita, and other reforms introduced by the Viceroy Duque de la Palata; see Chapter VII for more on these complaints. The respondents to a 7.X.1660 cédula asking for information about the mita noted that frontier provinces had been spared (AGI, Charcas 267, no. 16--see note 91; and no. 25, Bartolomé de Salazar to the crown, 8.IV.1662, 12 fs.). Gunnar Mendoza contradicts Arzáns' statement that fourteen provinces were obligated to the Potosí mita, in Arzáns, Historia, II, 52, note 4:

"4. Salvo el efímero aumento de provincias mitarias hecho por el virrey duque de la Palata por su provisión de Lima, 1688.XII.2, esas provincias fueron, desde el establecimiento hasta la extinción de la mita las 16 siguientes, comprendidas dentro de los territorios actuales de Bolivia y Perú:

Asángaro, Canas y Canchis, Carangas, Cochabamba, Chayanta, Chichas, Chucuito, Lampa, Pacajes, Paria, Paucarcolla, Porco, Quispicanchi, Sicasica, Tinta, Umasuyo (actualmente Omasuyos), (Mendoza, 'Mano de obra minera,' no. 473, f. 171v).  
[M]"

Despite what Dr. Mendoza said, however, the provinces that were included in the Potosí mita did change over time, as the two AGN legajos attest. Another who lists the mita provinces is Manuel Ballesteros Gaibrois, Descubrimiento y fundación del Potosí (Zaragoza: Delegación de Educación Nacional, 1950), 32. He says the provinces obligated were "Tarifa, Porco, Chayanta, Paria, Carangas, Cochabamba, Berenguela de Pacajes, Chucuyto, Paucarcallo o Puno, Lampa, Asangeto (o Azangaro y Asillo), Canai y Cauches, Omasuyos, Carvaja y Quipicauchi." He bases his list of fourteen on the "Curco histórico cronológico legal de el progreso y estado de las minas del cerro de Potosí," (Biblioteca Nacional de Madrid, Ms. 6225). The division of provinces in Map 3 is based on the map in Crespo, "Reclutamiento," 481, and should be considered tentative.

93. AGI, Charcas 266, no. 45J (see note 91), 11v.

94. Castillo (AGI, Charcas 270, no. 33C--see note 30), 3v.

95. Ibid., 4-4v.

96. AGI, Charcas 266, no. 45J (see note 91), 11v-12; Castillo (AGI, Charcas 270, no. 33C--see note 30), 5-6; Arzáns, Historia, I, 157-158, says 4,000 Indians were involved in the construction of mills in December of 1574, and on page 171 he adds that mills and reservoirs were already completed by 1577.

97. Zavala, Servicio personal, I, 103.

98. Ibid.

99. Castillo (AGI, Charcas 270, no. 33C--see note 30), 7-7v; the addition of three provinces would bring the total to seventeen.



100. Ibid.; Holmes, 83-84. Valera (AGI, Charcas 268, nos. 69A & 69B--see note 58), 8, says 3,093 Indians in 1575; as did the Archbishop of Lima (AGI, Charcas 267, no. 16--see note 91).
101. Cañete y Domínguez, 101.
102. Rowe, "The Incas under Spanish Colonial Institutions," 171.
103. See the discussion of Toledo's ordinances in Zavala, Servicio personal, I, 118-122. The remainder of this dissertation addresses the issue of compliance with the Viceroy's guidelines.
104. Ibid., 103; Capoche, 145; Bakewell, "Technological Change," 65, on the intention of Toledo.
105. Cobb, "Potosí and Huancavelica," 71.
106. Crespo, "La 'Mita,'" 172-173, says five pesos were paid for one month on the road. See Cañete y Domínguez, 105-106, for a look back from the eighteenth century.
107. Capoche, 140-141; AGI, Charcas 266, no. 45J (see note 91), 7, says segregation was also used to distribute priests for the religious instruction of the Indians.
108. AGI, Charcas 266, no. 45J (see note 91), 7v; Zavala, Servicio personal, I, 89, for the instructions provided to veedores; and 103 for Matienzo's description of how these officials were paid with money deducted from the Indians' pay. Matienzo's comments are included in his letter to the crown, Potosí, 23.XII.1577, Audiencia de Charcas. Correspondencia (ed. by Levillier), I, 455-465.
109. Bakewell, "Technological Change," 65, for the instruction of Indians in amalgamation processing; Zavala, Servicio personal, I, 159-160, for García de Loyola's 1581 account, with mention of the distribution of rich ore for the guayras.
110. Cobb, "Potosí . . . Frontier," 47; Basadre, "El Régimen," 345-346; Holmes, 84-88; Cobb, "Potosí and Huancavelica," 12-13, for the establishment of the mint and theft of ore; Zavala, Servicio personal, I, 85.
111. Antonio de Ayanz, "Breve Relación de los agravios que reciben los indios que ay desde cerca del Cuzco hasta

Potosí, hecha por personas de mucha experiencia y buena conciencia y desapasionadas de todo interés temporal y que solamente desean no sea Dios N. S. tan ofendido con tantos daños como los indios resciven en sus almas y haziendas y que la conciencia de Su Magestad se descargue mejor y sus Reales Rentas no sean defraudados en nada sino que antes bayan siempre en continuación (1596)," Pareceres jurídicos (ed. by Vargas Ugarte), 36-37; Kubler, 372; Brading and Cross, 558-560.

112. Crespo, "Reclutamiento," 473-474, for Spanish reliance on the caciques; "La 'Mita,'" 179-180; Holmes, 95-99.

113. Parry, 188-189; Málaga Medina, 611-612.

114. Zavala, Servicio personal, I, 103; Matienzo to the crown, Potosí, 23.XII.1577 (see note 108).

115. Hanke, "Luis Capoche," 37, for Father Rodrigo de Loaysa's comment that Indians were like Sardines--not that they were packed close together, but that everyone wanted them. Zavala, Servicio personal, I, 64-65, for Toledo's 1570 letter noting all the activities that the Indians worked in; and page 72 for the Church being the worst oppressor of the Indians. For the two Audiencias, see Bakewell, "Technological Change," 64; and Capoche, 135. Cobb, "Potosí and Huancavelica," 66-67, discusses the cause of the Audiencia de Charcas' opposition; and on pages 43, 66-67, she delves into the reasons for the Audiencia de Lima's unhappiness over the expropriation of Huancavelica. See Zavala, Servicio personal, I, 101, for a letter of the President of the Audiencia de Charcas expressing his disapproval of the course of events at Potosí.

116. Zavala, Servicio personal, I, 82, 93-94, 97-99, 99-100 (1576 correspondence), 103-104 (1578 statement); Campo y de la Rynaga, 17, quotes a 1575 letter from the Council of the Indies giving encouragement:

"Para la claridad que pedis se haga de lo que aveis proveido en la ocupacion de los Indios en las minas por ser cōtra lo que por nos está mandado; y á que se os respondiō lo auia desproveido bien, se ha hecho por la Cedula q̄ os mandō embiar por esta, que es en conformidad de lo que tenemos prouenido para la Nueva España, y otras partes de las nuestras Indias, hareis que se guarde como cosa que ha parecido acá ser justificada, y de que no se seguirá daño a los Indios. Y si otra cosa tuuieredes entendido al contrario, no dareis auiso para que se

prouea."

This quote is also in Zavala, Servicio personal, II, 117 (from Gaspar Escalona y Aguero, Arcae limensis Gazophilatium regium perubicum (2 vols.; Madrid, 1647), I, part 1, chapter 16, 49); the date of the letter is 17.X. 1575. See, also, Castañeda Delgado, 337. The quote in the text is from Holmes, 50 (his translation, from Colección de documentos inéditos relativos al descubrimiento, conquista y colonización de las posesiones españolas en América y Oceanía, sacados, en su mayor parte, del Real Archivo de Indias, ed. by Joaquín F. Pacheco, Francisco de Cárdenas, and Luis Torres de Mendoza (42 vols.; Madrid, 1864-1884), VI, 540-541). Zavala, Servicio personal, I, 78-79, carries Toledo's belief that the mita was an anti-personal service instrument.

117. See Bargalló, 74-75, for López de Velasco's 1571 description.

118. Pereyra, 17-19, for the mita as a recruiting device; Holmes, 106, for debt-peonage.

119. Oidor Arias de Ugarte to the crown, Potosí, 28.II. 1599, Audiencia de Charcas. Correspondencia (ed. by Levillier), III, 356-362; Cobb, "Potosí and Huancavelica," 31-32 (based on that letter).

120. Zavala, Servicio personal, I, 103; Matienzo to the crown, Potosí, 23.XII.1577 (see note 108).

121. "Descripción de la villa y minas de Potosí," 372-385; a list of those working at Potosí, by category, is on Ibid., 377-378 (and reproduced in Chapter III): 4,000 mitayos were assigned to mines in 1603; 600 to the mills.

122. Bakewell, "Technological Change," 65; Zavala, Servicio personal, I, 75; Brading and Cross, 546, compare silver production to sugar production--as industries.

123. Ballesteros Gaibrois, Descubrimiento, 37-38; Bakewell, "Technological Change," 57-59; Capoche, 147.

124. Zavala, Servicio personal, I, 75, 87; Cobb, "Supply and Transportation," 37-41; Brading and Cross, 563-564 (563 is a graph showing a correlation between production at Huancavelica and silver production); Hanke and Rodríguez, Los virreyes, Perú I (no. 280), 144, for Toledo's comments in his memoriales (from "Memoriales del Virrey Francisco de Toledo a S.M. en que hace relación de todos sus servicios," sin fecha, AGI, Indiferente General

1373).

125. Bakewell, "Technological Change," 65.

126. Baquijano y Carrillo, no. 212 (13 de enero de 1793), 36.

127. Bakewell, "Technological Change," 60-61 for the potosinos' reluctance; and page 65 for Toledo's note of that fact.

128. Capoche, 79, 110; Ballesteros Gaibrois, Descubrimiento, 39-41.

129. Baquijano y Carrillo, no. 212 (13 de enero de 1793), 36; Brading and Cross, 553-554 (based on Arzáns, Historia, I, 157-168; and Cañete y Domínguez, 90-93) say the possible cost was 3 million pesos for twenty reservoirs (lagunas).

130. Bakewell, "Technological Change," 77, argues that the Indians' removal from an interested position was caused by their lack of technological and capital means. I have a feeling, based on the fate of propertied Indians and caciques during the seventeenth century, that Indians may well have been wary of tying themselves down via ownership of an amalgamation mill.

131. Campo y de la Rynaga, 20, says that 1582 was the very last year of the boom.

132. "Descripción de la villa y minas de Potosí," 377.

133. ANB, M 125, no. 13, "Competencia de jurisdicción suscitada entre don Francisco Sarmiento de Mendoza y el capitán Pedro de Montalvo, corregidor y alcalde mayor de minas de Potosí, respectivamente, sobre los autos del hundimiento y la muerte de unos indios en el socavón del veinticuatro Juan Bautista de Jáuregui," 1652-1656, 72 fs. (MC 859; MOM 637). Fs. 217-226 (the legajo has a running pagination) carry fifteen cases from the 1590s, that were used as precedents. See Lewis Hanke, The Imperial City of Potosí. An Unwritten Chapter in the History of Spanish America (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1956), 25, for a discussion of pneumoconiosis. Also, Arias de Ugarte to the crown, Potosí, 28.II.1599 (see note 119); and Cepeda to the crown, La Plata, 27.XII.1582, Audiencia de Charcas. Correspondencia (ed. by Levillier), II, 30-41.

134. Holmes, 72; his translation (based on Grimston

and Keen). See Bargalló, 89-90, for the version in Spanish. Distances have been converted to their metric equivalents.

135. Holmes, 73-74, for Toledo's order versus twenty-five loads per day; ANB, M 125, no. 13 (see note 133), 217-226, for nineteen montones as a daily quota. Also, Cañete y Domínguez, 111-112; and Arias de Ugarte to the crown, Potosí, 28.II.1599 (see note 119).

136. Holmes, 73.

137. Ibid., 75; ANB M 125, no. 13 (see note 133), 217-226; Arias de Ugarte to the crown, Potosí, 28.II.1599 (see note 119); "Memoria gubernativa del Conde del Villardompardo," s.f. (c. 1592), Los virreyes (ed. by Hanke and Rodríguez), Perú I (no. 280), 210, 211-212 (from AGI, Patronato 190, ramo 43). Capoche says that fifty Indians died each year (Zavala, Servicio personal, I, 164-165).

138. Capoche, 141-143, for Enríquez' repartimiento de la mita; the Fiscal to the crown, La Plata, 5.III.1599, Audiencia de Charcas. Correspondencia (ed. by Levillier), III, 369.

139. The Audiencia to the crown, La Plata, 25.II.1589, Audiencia de Charcas. Correspondencia (ed. by Levillier), II, 422-434; the Audiencia to the crown, La Plata, 5.III.1590, Ibid., III, 40-74; Zavala, Servicio personal, I, 183, for Cañete to the crown (1593); "Instrucción al virrey del Perú don Luis de Velasco sobre hacienda," 11.VIII.1596, Los virreyes (ed. by Hanke and Rodríguez), Perú II (no. 281), 32-37 (from AGI, Indiferente 606, fs. 15v-25), for 1596 mercury statistics; ANB, M 3, no. 17 (see note 52).

140. For example, see the comments of the Audiencia de Charcas, Cepeda to the crown, La Plata, 9.XII.1586, Audiencia de Charcas. Correspondencia (ed. by Levillier), II, 254-272, and especially 258. For the azogueros' side of the story, see AGN, Sala IX, 6-2-5, no. 11 (see note 86); and ANB, M 3, no. 17 (see note 133).

141. Zavala, Servicio personal, I, 165-166.

142. Ibid., 163-164 (Zárate); Joseph M. Barnadas, "Una polémica colonial: Potosí, 1579-1584," Jahrbuch für Geschichte von Staat, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft Lateinamerikas, Band 10 (Köln und Wien, 1973), 16-70, for a comprehensive treatment of the ghatu controversy;

Capoche, 150-158, 160-167.

143. Málaga Medina, 611-612, on problems inherent in communal taxation; Cobb, "Potosí and Huancavelica," 89; Capoche, 109, says that mingas were treated better than mitayos; Zavala, Servicio personal, I, 160, for a letter on abuse by a protector de naturales.

144. Zavala, Servicio personal, I, 149-150, for Lopidana's report of 1586; Capoche, 167-168; Zavala, Servicio personal, I, 151-152, 157-158; Lopidana to the crown, Potosí, 19.II.1586, Audiencia de Charcas. Correspondencia (ed. by Levillier), II, 241-244; Cobb, "Potosí and Huancavelica," 83; Holmes, 83-84, for illegal means used by azogueros.

145. Capoche, 158; Rowe, "The Incas under Spanish Colonial Institutions," 175; Cobb, "Potosí and Huancavelica," 78-79 (from Loaysa), 81; Tovar y Montalvo to the crown, La Plata, 20.II.1595, Audiencia de Charcas. Correspondencia (ed. by Levillier), II, 247-258; Lohmann Villena, "La minería," 654-655; Parry, 174-175 for use of every available means.

146. Ayanz (see note 111), 36, 44-55, 39, 43; Cobb, "Potosí and Huancavelica," 83. There were advantages to not owning immovable property.

147. Crespo, "Reclutamiento," 476-477; "La 'Mita,'" 169; Basadre, "El Régimen," 344, for the two month notice.

148. Rowe, "The Incas under Spanish Colonial Institutions," 175.

149. The Audiencia to the crown, La Plata, 17.II.1584, Audiencia de Charcas. Correspondencia (ed. by Levillier), II, 92-112; Sánchez-Albornoz, 92-95.

150. Cobb, "Potosí and Huancavelica," 89-90; Zavala, Servicio personal, I, 181.

151. Zavala, Servicio personal, I, 148.

152. Cepeda to the crown, La Plata, 28.II.1590, Audiencia de Charcas. Correspondencia (ed. by Levillier), III, 19-30; Cepeda to the crown, La Plata, 2.VII.1590, Ibid., 82-92; Dobyms, 501-505; Zavala, Servicio personal, I, 151, 177-178; Cobb, "Potosí and Huancavelica," 81-82.

153. For estimates of population loss made by colonial

period sources, see Cañete y Domínguez, 116.

154. Matienzo to the crown, Potosí, 30.I.1578, Audiencia de Charcas. Correspondencia (ed. by Levillier), I, 468-469, 471-472; Cepeda to the crown, 19.II.1588, Ibid., 381-389 (for the mercury interests' blocking of the Corzo method); Cepeda to the crown, La Plata, 2.VII.1590, Ibid., III, 82-92, for more on Corzo.

155. The Audiencia to the crown, La Plata, 17.II.1584 (see note 149); Zavala, Servicio personal, I, 73.

156. Ravanal to the crown, La Plata, 3.XI.1576, Audiencia de Charcas. Correspondencia (ed. by Levillier), I, 423-429; the Audiencia to the crown, La Plata, 26.II.1585; Ibid., II, 200-202; Zavala, Servicio personal, I, 147-148.

157. Zavala, Servicio personal, I, 73, 101; the Audiencia to the crown, La Plata, 26.II.1585 (see note 156); Fiscal Tellez to the crown, La Plata, 10.II.1586, Audiencia de Charcas. Correspondencia (ed. by Levillier), II, 232-238; Cepeda to the crown, La Plata, 9.XII.1586, Ibid., 254-272; Cepeda to the crown, La Plata, 13.I.1588, Ibid., 314-341; Fiscal Ruano to the crown, La Plata, 1.III.1588, Ibid., 407-415.

158. For example, Cepeda to the crown, La Plata, 1.X.1592, Ibid., III, 153-161; and Fiscal Tovar y Montalvo to the crown, La Plata, 20.II.1595, Ibid., 247-258.

159. The Audiencia to the crown, La Plata, 17.II.1584 (see note 149), for opposition to the Corregidor's bid for power; Cepeda to the crown, La Plata, 1.I.1585, Ibid., 125-131, as well; Zavala, Servicio personal, I, 151-152.

160. Hanke and Rodríguez, Los virreyes, Perú I (no. 280), 159.

161. Zavala, Servicio personal, I, 182, for Cañete.

162. The Toledan viceroyalty is later seen as a golden epoch (noted by Holmes, 45-47).

163. Capoche, 141-144; "Carta del virrey (Enríquez) en la cual hace relación a S.M. de todas las que anteriormente había escrito," 17.II.1583, Los virreyes (ed. by Hanke and Rodríguez), Perú I (no. 280), 181-182 (from AGI, Lima 30), for Enríquez' belief that law was ineffective.

164. Zavala, Servicio personal, I, 167-168.
165. Ibid., 157-158, 166-167; Cepeda to the crown, La Plata, 27.XII.1582 (see note 133); Cobb, "Potosí and Huancavelica," 89-90.
166. Zavala, Servicio personal, I, 166-167.
167. Ibid., 169-172; Cepeda to the crown, La Plata, 10.II.1588, Audiencia de Charcas. Correspondencia (ed. by Levillier), II, 368-380, for the call for new reducciones.
168. Cañete y Domínguez, 102; ANB, ACh.LA 14, fs. 89-89v, "Copia simple del parecer de la audiencia de La Plata, en la información de servicios de Hernando Ortiz de Vargas--Repartimiento general de la mita de Potosí por comisión del virrey conde de Villar; contador de la caja de granos del mismo servicio; tesorero de la Casa de la Moneda (MOM description)," La Plata, 12.I.1620 (MC 602; MOM 524).
169. Cañete y Domínguez, 100; Zavala, Servicio personal, I, 168, 172, 174; Campo y de la Rynaga, 18, for 1584--Holmes, 48, too; Parry, 191, says that forced labor was given the go-ahead as a temporary means to get Indians into the cities and other zones controlled by the Spanish. For 1588, Campo y de la Rynaga, 19; also Zavala, Servicio personal, II, 118.
170. Zavala, Servicio personal, I, 174.
171. Ibid., 179, on García de Mendoza; Cobb, "Potosí and Huancavelica," 81-82, for a general discussion and 193-196 for Francisco de Vitoria's earlier exploits in the Black slave trade; Helmer, "Comércio e contrabando," 197; Lewis Hanke, "The Portuguese in Spanish America, with Special Reference to the Villa Imperial de Potosí," Revista de Historia de América, LI (junio de 1961), 7-8; Cepeda to the crown, La Plata, 1.X.1592, Audiencia de Charcas. Correspondencia (ed. by Levillier), III, 153-161; Cepeda to the crown, La Plata, 12.III.1593, Ibid., 162-181.
172. Zavala, Servicio personal, I, 187-188; "Instrucciones al Marqués de Cañete," 1.XI.1591, Los virreyes (ed. by Hanke and Rodríguez), Perú I (no. 280), 262 (from AGI, Indiferente 433, tomo II, 37v-46).
173. Cepeda to the crown, La Plata, 10.II.1588 (see note 167), for the Audiencia's position in 1588.



174. Zavala, Servicio personal, I, 187-188, 193-195, 195-196 (1594 order against the sale of Indians); Cobb, "Potosí and Huancavelica," 90-91; "Carta del Virrey Velasco a S.M. sobre la residencia del Marqués de Cañete," 28.IV.1601, Los virreyes (ed. by Hanke and Rodríguez), Perú I (no. 280), 284-290 (from AGI, Lima 34), for Velasco on his predecessor's assignment of mitayos to his servants and brother-in-law--while banning illegalities for others, Cañete was committing his own.
175. Zavala, Servicio personal, I, 196.
176. "Instrucción al virrey don Luis de Velasco que pasa al Perú," 22.VII.1595, Los virreyes (ed. by Hanke and Rodríguez), Perú II (no. 281), 31 (from AGI, Lima 570, book XV, fs. 198-218v); Campo y de la Rynaga, 20; Capoche, 115, had agreed.
177. "Instrucción al virrey don Luis de Velasco," (see note 176), 32.
178. Ibid., 32-37.
179. Ibid., 37-40; Cobb, "Potosí and Huancavelica," 96-97; Hanke, Imperial City, 25-26, for Velasco's 1597 complaint about lawyers and ecclesiastics and their interfering ways.
180. Valera (AGI, Charcas 268, nos. 69A & 69B--see note 58), 8; Angulo (AGI, Charcas 268, no. 36--see note 58), 2. Both sources simply list the number involved as 4,634. The Archbishop of Lima (AGI, Charcas 267, no. 16--see note 91) gave this figure as well. Velasco said that he assigned his repartimiento to "doctor arias de vgarate," BNB, MSS 2, "Provisión del Virrey: El corregidor de Potosí deposite en don Pedro Zores de Ulloa 30 indios más de los que tiene por el repartimiento general, para ocuparlos en sus minas," Lima, 10.II.1601 (MC 452; MOM 423).
181. Zavala, Servicio personal, I, 201-206; AGI, Lima 34, no. 5, "Ordenanzas hechas por el Virrey Don Luis de Velasco en 31 de agosto de 1599, que se han de guardar en el cerro y minas de Potosí," 7 fs. (transcription provided by Lewis Hanke).

### C H A P T E R    I I I

1600 TO 1633

The mita at Potosí had begun to change within a decade of its establishment by Viceroy Francisco de Toledo. The system was forced to evolve by Indian migration in the provinces and declining silver production at Potosí, the latter caused by the depletion of the desmontes. In turn, the mita contributed to Indian flight from Potosí and the obligated villages. Before 1600, the mita's metamorphosis was confined to the assignment of more mitayos to the mines, and the caciques and azogueros' failure to comply with Toledo's restrictions on their recruitment and treatment. During the first third of the seventeenth century a more fundamental change in the mita would become necessary.

Hapsburg government had been unable to prevent the transformation of the mita during the last years of the sixteenth century. In 1601 the crown responded to its weakened position vis-à-vis the encomenderos and azogueros by issuing a cédula banning Indian personal service for the former and abolishing the mita. Viceroy Luis de Velasco's response to that order opens the history of the government's seventeenth century struggle to control the

de facto mita.

Viceroy Velasco and the 1601 Cédula

Viceroy Luis de Velasco was aware of the vast differences between Toledo's original design and the de facto mita. He, like his predecessors, hoped to close that gap with more effective administration of the system. In the first years of the seventeenth century, the Viceroy sent detailed instructions to government officials--from the corregidores de indios in the provinces to the veedores and alcalde mayor de minas at Potosí--to do everything in their power to make the mita function as it was supposed to.<sup>1</sup> These orders were to be as ineffective as the ones they were meant to reinforce.

Meanwhile, the crown had grown troubled by the reports it had received from Cañete, Velasco and others about the plight of Indian workers in Peru, and the growing independence of the colonists. On November 24, 1601 Phillip III responded with a cédula banning Indian personal service, including the mita. Services rendered individuals were flatly prohibited; the order was another volley in the royal crusade against the encomenderos.<sup>2</sup>

The 1601 directive was less drastic where draft Indian labor for public enterprises was concerned. Those services were to continue, but without the overt coercion of mita obligations. Thenceforward, Indians would be obliged merely

to report to central locations for employment, and they would be joined there by indolent Spaniards, Blacks, mestizos, mulatos and zambaigos.<sup>3</sup> To facilitate their participation in public enterprises, the crown ordered that the Indians be settled near the activities that required their labor, so that travel to and from work would not be a burden on them.<sup>4</sup> Phillip III's call was therefore for a resumption of the old system of tindarunas, with the inclusion of non-Indians and elements of the resident labor force plan as well.

The mines received even greater dispensation. The crown conceded that gold, silver and mercury production were fundamental to the survival of the Spanish Empire, and that some mines could not be worked by anyone but the Indians. Miners were therefore provided with one year to acquire slaves or volunteer labor, including those who would be compelled to report for hiring in the mining areas. The edict also provided the means to continue mineral production while the mining mitas were replaced. At Potosí, an inspection of the city and its vicinity would determine whether there were 15,000 Indians available--enough to comprise three shifts of 5,000 each. If so, Velasco was to assign them to labor in the mines for the transitional year; if not, the mita could continue for that period.<sup>5</sup>

The 1601 cédula included no major reforms of the mita because the system was ostensibly to be abolished. The

provisions for mita labor that were included in the order simply reiterated earlier royal and viceregal directives: only mine and mill owners were to receive mitayos, and they were not to be rented, sold or transferred in any way; adequate wages, good treatment and health care were to be provided; travel allowances were to be paid on the basis of six leagues traveled in one day; corregidores were responsible for the delivery of mitayos; and caciques were not to be punished for incomplete quotas.<sup>6</sup>

Despite the language of the cédula, the crown did not expect to abolish the mita. Rather, it hoped to keep the colonists--both the encomenderos and the azogueros--from completely subjugating the Indians for their personal profit. Indeed, the twenty-fifth and final chapter of the order instructed the Viceroy to consult with experienced and knowledgeable persons and make any modifications that he deemed necessary. It was therefore less a directive than a list of suggestions; a rough draft that Velasco was to edit into effective policy. The cédula was also an arsenal, from which the Viceroy would choose those weapons that were necessary to battle the encomenderos and azogueros while protecting the crown's economic interests.<sup>7</sup>

Velasco understood the intent behind the order, and he also realized that any effort to enforce the cédula in full would throw the realm into armed rebellion, and destroy any chance of ever attaining the crown's objectives. Thus, he

suspended adoption of the order in October of 1602, until it could be studied by local government officials. His decision was in keeping with a second royal order of November 24, 1601 that counseled against the enforcement of the first if a violent response was to be anticipated.<sup>8</sup> The Council of the Indies accepted Velasco's suspension of the cédula in February of the following year.<sup>9</sup>

In 1603 the Viceroy initiated an enquiry into the prospects for implementing various sections of the 1601 order. In the process he solicited the advice of a number of advisers, including Dean Pedro Muñiz, Father Miguel de Agia, Jesuit Father Alonso Mesía Venegas, Father Gerónimo Valera, Father Francisco de Sosa and Father Feliciano de Vega.<sup>10</sup>

The written opinions of Agia, Muñiz and Mesía have survived the centuries. Because the Viceroy had been afforded the power to modify the cédula, these counselors discussed each part of the edict separately. They supported those sections that they believed were valuable and rejected others that they considered unrealistic or unadvisable.

Miguel de Agia broke his essay into three parts. In the first he considered the crown's intentions; in the second, the cédula's justness; and in the third, the Viceroy's responsibilities with regard to its implementation. He argued that the crown wanted to halt the abuses suffered by the Indians, not necessarily to abolish the Potosí mita

and other forms of repartimiento labor. Personal services for the encomenderos had been rightfully banned, but draft labor was necessary for many public activities. Agia felt, moreover, that the well-being of the republic came before that of the Indians, for unless they worked the republic could not be sustained; and the Indians would not work voluntarily.<sup>11</sup>

The crown's requirement that the Indians report to public places for hiring was just, in Agia's opinion, because the Indians would be spared the evils of laziness, Spaniards and others were also included, and the duties to be performed were for the public good. Furthermore, the crown had the right to oblige its vassals to work. German princes, he noted, assigned their subjects to labor in gold, silver and copper mines, and nobody questioned their right to do so.

Agia said that Indian service in the mines at Potosí was permissible because it was not mortally dangerous. Mingas, he argued, would not have hired themselves out in large numbers if it were. The problems with the mita had arisen from the distances that the Indians had to travel to reach Potosí and the length of time they were away from their pueblos. The alternatives to the mita suggested by the cédula, however, were not viable. If all Peruvian mines were worked by slaves, 80,000 Blacks would be needed; a resident labor force at Potosí would entail 40,000

Indians and their families. Provisioning that large a population would be difficult, if not impossible. Agia therefore urged the maintenance of the Potosí mita, with a modified resident labor force program to ease the problems created by travel to and from the villa.

Agia was less happy about the situation at Huancavelica, for most of the Indians who were assigned to the mercury mines died. He tried to compare their obligation to armed service in wartime, but his argument in support of the mita at Huancavelica was half-hearted. Indeed, after visiting the main tunnel there in 1603 he issued a retraction of that lukewarm affirmation. Agia then called for an end to all work in the main tunnel, and argued for the exploitation of other nearby mines in its place. But the Potosí mita was not mentioned in that retraction.<sup>12</sup>

Pedro Muñiz offered Velasco a very different point of view. He argued that no one--Indian or Black--should be forced to labor in the mines against his will. Black slaves were actually less prepared to work in the mines than the Indians, he said, and would die quickly if assigned to them. While Indian service in the mitas at Huancavelica--except the main tunnel--and Potosí was not fatal for all, it was nevertheless reprehensible and unnecessary. Potosí silver was not indispensable, Muñiz argued, for Spain had carried on the war against heresy long before the cerro was discovered.<sup>13</sup>



Alonso Mesía Venegas advised the Viceroy to suspend the cédula indefinitely, for in his view its execution would cause more harm than the mita itself. He believed, unlike Muñiz, that the Empire--and Catholicism in general--depended upon Potosí, and Potosí upon the mita. The system needed repair, he conceded, but its abolition would bring the entire economic structure of the realm to the ground; and once lost it would be irrecoverable. Like Agia, Mesía said that no other labor procurement system could take the place of the mita. Black slaves, volunteers and a resident labor force were all unrealistic: Blacks would cost too much, and the azogueros could not afford them; a resident labor force would be plagued by provisioning problems, and the Indians would run away anyway.<sup>14</sup>

Mesía saw value in the selective application of specific chapters of the 1601 cédula, and he argued that the twenty-fifth chapter gave the Viceroy carte blanche to modify the mita. Velasco could therefore act to solve the problems of travel, the non-payment of travel allowances, high food prices and the excessive tribute the mitayos paid, without destroying the economic foundation of the Catholic world.

Velasco's subsequent actions followed Mesía's counsel closely. Beginning in October, 1603, the Viceroy ordered a series of reforms for the mita, most of them based on sections of the 1601 order.<sup>15</sup> He decreed that travel

allowances be paid on the bases of one real and five leagues per day.<sup>16</sup> He exempted the eldest legitimate son of each cacique principal from tribute and the mita, and his other legitimate sons from the mita.<sup>17</sup> The number of exempted artisans in each village was narrowed down, for positions had been created simply to evade mita service.<sup>18</sup> Once they were in Potosí, the Indians were not to be sold, loaned, transferred in the sales or rentals of mines and mills, or in any other way.<sup>19</sup> Finally, the Indians were not to be used as beasts of burden.<sup>20</sup>

Velasco also extended a 1596 plan for mita deliveries from Chucuito to other obligated provinces. All the mitayos from a province were now to come to Potosí as a unit, leaving from a designated place on the same day. A list of those included in the contingent was to be prepared in triplicate, with the names, ages and ayllus of the Indians specified. A copy was to be carried to Potosí by a capitán enterador de la mita, selected by the corregidor of the province to escort the year's contingent. The corregidores were held responsible for the despatch of the mitayos, and the Corregidor de Potosí was provided with powers over his provincial colleagues, so that he might monitor their compliance with their mita obligations. After a year in Potosí the entire squadron of mitayos was to be sent home by the Corregidor de Potosí, again under the capitán enterador and accompanied by a list.<sup>21</sup>

The Viceroy hoped that these reforms would relieve some of the pressure on the Indians and their caciques, and resolve the most troublesome aspect of the Potosí mita--travel to and from the villa. More extensive alterations were considered imprudent, given the economic dependence of Peru on Potosí, and the prospects for violence should Velasco attempt to enforce the 1601 cédula in its original form.

The investigation of the mita that preceded Velasco's reforms had reinforced the basic fact that the mita was crucial to the survival of Potosí silver production, and so to the future of the Hapsburg Empire. The 1601 edict had offered only time-worn alternatives to the mita, which were no more viable in 1603 than they had been in the sixteenth century. The counselors who submitted written opinions on the cédula could offer no alternatives that were any more realistic. Had one existed, Toledo would not have been forced to establish the mita in the first place. The generation since its inauguration--especially with the exhaustion of the desmontes by 1582--had made it all the more necessary. Thus, the mita emerged from the Viceroy's scrutiny more firmly entrenched than ever.

Silvio Zavala has likened the 1601 cédula to the New Laws of 1542. He feels they were both unable to overcome the fundamental contradiction between Indian liberty and the need for forced Indian labor.<sup>22</sup> Juan Pérez de Tudela

agrees with the seventeenth century jurist Juan de Solórzano Pereira that the contradiction was between republicanism and despotism.<sup>23</sup> On the functional level, however, there was no contradiction. Phillip III and the Council of the Indies employed "Indian liberty" and "the public good" to justify the abolition of the services performed by the Indians for the colonists while preserving those that benefited society as a whole--and thus the crown. Access to forced Indian labor was thereby declared to be a state monopoly.

The legal foundation of the 1601 cédula was sound, but it could not be implemented because of the prevailing power balance in Peru. Not only was the order opposed by the powerful encomenderos, but by the azogueros of Potosí as well. Faced with the prospect of their united opposition, Velasco chose limited gain over total defeat. His inability to make even his few reforms effective, however, is clear when one looks at the de facto mita.

#### The de facto Mita

While the crown drafted its 1601 cédula, and as the Viceroy investigated the Potosí mita, the processes that had begun in the late sixteenth century--the shifting of mitayos from the mills to the mines, and the deterioration of their working conditions--continued. Soon thereafter, the mita began to change into a system that was totally

different from anything that Toledo had imagined.

At first glance the number of mitayos working at Potosí seems to belie the importance assigned to them by the crown and viceregal officials. The mitayos were only a small fraction of the total work force at Potosí, as this anonymous 1603 description--quite possibly from the Velasco enquiry--reveals:

4,000	<u>mitayos</u> worked in the mines of the <u>cerro</u>
600	<u>mingas</u> did the same
400	or more <u>mingas</u> were involved in cleaning the ore--young men who earned one <u>peso</u> per day
1,000	Indians (men and women) sorted the ore at the mine entrances
600	<u>mitayos</u> worked in the mills
4,000	<u>mingas</u> worked in the mills, for seven <u>reales</u> per day
3,000	Indians (men and women) refined <u>lamas</u> for one <u>peso</u> per day
320	Indians worked with llamas, carrying the ore from the mines to the mills
180	Indians brought salt to Potosí
1,000	<u>mingas</u> brought salt
1,000	Indian merchants brought wood
1,000	Indians brought firewood
500	Indians brought llama dung for fuel
200	Indians brought llama dung for fuel--for use in melting the <u>lamas</u>
1,000	Indians made and brought charcoal
200	Indians made candles
19,000	Indians were therefore working in the larger silver production industry

To these 19,000 should be added the 10,000 Indians who were engaged in bringing food from Tomina, Cochabamba, Petantora, Chuquisaca and elsewhere; families; and 30,000 other Indian residents of Potosí.<sup>24</sup> Well over 60,000 Indians lived in the villa--a 1611 census counted 76,000.<sup>25</sup> Less than a third were involved in any way with mining, and only

one-quarter of those were mitayos.

The mitayos were more important, however, than their relative numbers suggested. Of the 4,600 mitayos included in the 1603 description, 4,000 worked in the cerro. As apiris, they produced the ore upon which the well-being of everyone else depended. The Indian labor problem at Potosí was not caused by a lack of Indians, but of those who were willing to enter the mines and haul silver ore up the long rawhide ladders to the surface. The 600 mingas who worked in the mines demanded twelve reales per day; skilled pick-and-axe men commanded as much as twenty-four reales per day. The mitayos were paid a paltry two and one-half pesos per week, from which a half-peso was deducted to pay the veedores and alcalde mayor de minas. Thus, while the mita was crucial to the extraction of ore, it was also an important subsidy, saving the azogueros the expense of hiring mingas, less two and one-half pesos per mitayo.<sup>26</sup>

The increased importance of the mitayos was not accompanied by a concomitant improvement in their status, however. Working conditions were bad and their treatment worse. Royal and viceregal orders, including Velasco's most recent reforms, were constantly disobeyed. Mitayos were forced to produce fixed quotas of montones or suffer whippings, other physical abuse, extended service, or a cut in pay.<sup>27</sup> They were beaten with clubs, swords and rocks. A case in point was Alonso Pucho, whose bag of ore

sprung a leak while he was carrying it to a mill. He was punished with blows to his head and legs. Another mitayo, Juan Azero, was forced to work in an unbuttressed tunnel. A cave-in smashed his leg and he died in the hospital.<sup>28</sup>

Indians who were hurt while serving in the mita were supposed to be paid two reales per day while they were in the hospital. In truth, they were forced to hire mingas to take their place, even after the Audiencia de Charcas ruled, in 1615, that injured and dead mitayos were not to be replaced under any circumstances. If they died, their wives and children were forced to hire a substitute or serve in their stead. Hospitalized mitayos and their families were also preyed upon by priests, who charged exorbitant sums for religious services and demanded devastating compensation for funerals.<sup>29</sup>

Food costs at Potosí were so high that the two pesos a mitayo earned in a week were insufficient to cover his needs. Only by working as mingas during their occasional weeks off could the mitayos hope to feed themselves and their families. Rescates were now illegal and suppressed, and those Indians who were involved had to compete with Spaniards and mixed-bloods. The Protector de naturales of Potosí sent petition after petition to Lima asking for lower food prices; but his efforts were fruitless. Desperate for food, the Indians often resorted to eating their own llamas.<sup>30</sup>

Under circumstances such as these it is hardly surprising that the Indians continued to flee from the mita, either from Potosí or from their villages. As in the sixteenth century, however, the mita was only one of the reasons why the Indians abandoned their pueblos. The mistreatment of the Indians by their caciques and corregidores was also responsible for their migration.<sup>31</sup> Disease took its toll on the natives as well. The Indians were still recovering from the 1590s epidemics when Cuzco was struck by diphtheria in 1614, with a serious loss of life.<sup>32</sup> Measles and smallpox made their way to Potosí in 1619 and 1628, respectively.<sup>33</sup> As the number of originarios in the villages fell, those who remained were forced to meet the obligations of those who had died or run away.<sup>34</sup>

The extent to which the provinces were depopulated was clouded by the deception practiced by the caciques, priests, corregidores, chacareros and others. President Luis Maldonado de Torres of the Audiencia de Charcas claimed that nearly a third of the Indians in any province could be hidden during a revisita.<sup>35</sup> Apparently that is what happened in Sipe-sipe in 1606. The Corregidor de Cochabamba conducted a census that determined a severe population loss, and he asked the viceroy to lower the mita obligation of the pueblo accordingly. The Corregidor de Potosí claimed that the revisita had not reflected the true resident population of the village, and argued against any adjustment



Sipe-sipe's mita obligation.<sup>36</sup> A 1619 memorial by Juan Ortiz de Cervantes claimed that the corregidores were particularly adept at falsifying population figures, but his list of perpetrators was long enough to cover anyone living in the provinces.<sup>37</sup> The 1601 cédula had been correct when it asserted that everyone depended upon the Indians for their welfare.<sup>38</sup>

The Indians practiced the art of deception as well. When the Viceroy Príncipe de Esquilache (1615-1621) looked into the cause of an unusually high female birth rate in the obligated provinces, he discovered that boys were being baptized as girls to save them from future mita service.<sup>39</sup> The number of forasteros living in the pueblos, and on rural chácaras, was rarely--if ever--disclosed.

The number of Indians lost to the mita because of death, flight or deception was as unclear at the time, therefore, as it is now; and it was the subject of continual controversy between provincial and potosino interests. The corregidores and caciques claimed that there were not enough Indians to send to Potosí in the mita. The azogueros accused the provincial interests of pure deception, and denied that there had been any depopulation at all. There was sufficient evidence on both sides of the question to give both factions' claims an air of credibility.

The controversy over the depopulation of the provinces

reflected the competition for Indian labor between Potosí and those in the provinces who needed it as well. Thus, depopulation was not the real issue, but the rhetorical tool used by the provincial interests against the mita. With the discovery of rich deposits of silver at Oruro in 1606, Potosí was faced with a special kind of competitor. The initial purity of the ore at Oruro, and the ease with which it was extracted, attracted Indians from all over Upper Peru, including--according to the Cabildo de Potosí --some runaway mitayos from Potosí.<sup>40</sup>

The Cabildo, which was controlled by the azogueros and reflected their interests, claimed that mercury and Indians were being diverted from Potosí to support the new mining center.<sup>41</sup> More specifically, the azogueros charged that Oruro had been responsible for the failure of 560 mitayos to come from Pacajes and Omasuyos in 1609.<sup>42</sup> Competition from Oruro was a serious, but short-term, threat to Potosí. Hurt by the denial of mita labor and mercury by the Viceroy Marqués de Montesclaros (1607-1615), the mines there were played out by 1612.<sup>43</sup>

The battle for Indian labor pitted provincial interests against the azogueros, and Oruro against Potosí. The caciques and corregidores were provincial interests who were also responsible for delivering mitayos to Potosí. The corregidores successfully evaded the efforts of the viceroys and Corregidores de Potosí to hold them responsible

for mita deliveries, and left the caciques to deal with the azogueros at Potosí and other economic interests in the provinces. The difficulties faced by the caciques are illustrated by a number of examples from the period.

In 1608 the cacique principal of Puna (Porco), Francisco Michaca, complained to the Audiencia de Charcas that Pedro Andrada Sotomayor was retaining four Indians from his village on a chácara, for the purpose of renting them at Potosí. A local judge had ordered that the Indians be returned to the cacique, but Andrada responded with evidence that the four had lived on his chácara for thirty years. Velasco and the Viceroy Conde de Monterrey (1604-1606) had both ordered that an Indian who was resident in one place for ten years could not be returned to his original pueblo against his wishes. Andrada denied that he had any intention of renting the Indians.<sup>44</sup>

Although the Audiencia's decision is not known, the ability of a chacarero to frustrate the efforts of a cacique is quite clear.

The capitán enterador for the province of Pacajes, Gabriel Fernández Guarache, was frustrated in his attempt to deliver the mita contingent for 1634 by the Corregidor de La Paz. The cacique spent most of 1633 rounding up Indians, identifying them with the help of other caciques, and holding them in a La Paz jail. He acquired a commission to conduct the reducción and hired a Spanish

reductor with his own funds. The Corregidor de La Paz, however, refused to honor the commission and set the entire group of Indians free. Once they were loose they fled to even more remote areas. Fernández Guarache then asked that he be allowed to resign.<sup>45</sup>

The number of Indians available for shipment to Potosí was also restricted by the assignment of mitayos to other endeavors. The Jesuit colleges at Juli and Arequipa, for example, enjoyed the services of Indians on their chácaras. They had obtained the rights to those Indians when lands were acquired from private grantees. Throughout the seventeenth century the Jesuits won exceptions to royal orders banning personal service and successfully fought the efforts of caciques to include their Indians in Potosí mita contingents.<sup>46</sup>

The caciques were willing to do legal battle over just a few Indians, such was the value of each. Pedro Uychu of Tinquipaya (Porco) complained in 1610 when he was obliged to deliver four more Indians than Viceroy Velasco had required. Twenty-five Indians was the traditional quota from his pueblo, with sixteen coming from his parcialidad and nine from the other. A revisita had determined a total population increase of nine Indians, warranting one more mitayo from the village. But when a new repartimiento de la mita was published in 1610 (that of the Marqués de Montesclaros), he found himself obligated to send twenty of

the total of twenty-six.<sup>47</sup>

Uychu's case was unusual in that his pueblo had experienced an increase in population. More common were the villages that were only lightly inhabited, their residents either absent or having moved away. The Indians were accustomed to traveling, with economic enterprises spread throughout various ecological zones, and they resisted any effort to keep them in one place all year round. The obligations imposed on the Indians by their caciques and corregidores made life in the pueblos even less attractive. Religious indoctrination by priests, and their prevention of pre-hispanic sexual practices, were also very unpopular with the Indians.

One priest, Pedro Ramírez del Aguila, wrote the Corregidor de Potosí in 1629 that his village of Tacobamba was supposed to hold 200 Indians, but only he, a lieutenant of the Corregidor de Porco, a few alcaldes and other caciques lived there. The Indians, he said, were all off working lands, tending to livestock, or run away to distant valleys and beyond.<sup>48</sup> Another priest, Luis de Vega, was accused of burning the pre-hispanic village of Tolapampa in 1616 to force its residents to live in his pueblo.<sup>49</sup>

The difficulties involved in the delivery of mitayos had earlier led to the abridgement of the Toledan ordinances by the caciques. Indians who were too old or too young were forced to serve in the mita, and some mitayos

were kept at Potosí for years at a time. By the early 1600s even those abuses were unable to fill the quotas that the caciques were held responsible for. When they could no longer meet their obligations the Corregidor de Potosí began to fine the caciques. At first nine, and later seven and one-half pesos, were collected for every mitayo the caciques failed to deliver in person, so a minga could be hired in his place. The caciques were also forced to pay when the azogueros rejected the Indians they did deliver, as unfit for service. From these two exactions came a new form of mita delivery: the entero en plata, or mita service in silver.<sup>50</sup>

President Maldonado de Torres noted in 1606 that the azogueros were already accustomed to receiving service in silver, and two years later he estimated that 20 per cent of the mita was delivered in that form.<sup>51</sup> Ramírez del Aguila said, in 1629, that his village routinely "served in silver." He claimed that the caciques spent all their time chasing Indians to collect the money with which to make the payment. The Corregidor de Potosí, Rafael Ortiz de Sotomayor, lowered the sum from nine to seven and a half pesos to force the azogueros to pay the mingas hired with the money the same two and one-half pesos per week that they paid the mitayos. Some azogueros had apparently begun to reject Indians simply because receipt of service in silver saved them the mitayos' wages for the week.<sup>52</sup>

The fraction of the mita that arrived in Potosí in the form of silver grew over time to rather significant proportions. A source from the second decade of the seventeenth century breaks the various mita deliveries into their component parts:

1. The pueblos of Machacopoata, Aymaya and others in Charcas come in their entirety, half in person and half in silver with which to hire replacements for those who chose not to come.
2. The Quillacas, Asanaques, Uruquillas, Aullagas and Punas come in silver; only the Punas provide some in person; the Uruquillas are lacking two-thirds because their villages are destroyed and the caciques have no control; the Quillacas fail to deliver a third.
3. The Carangas arrive in silver primarily, and few in person; this province is destroyed by flight on the part of the Indians, and the caciques spend a lot of time looking for Indians from whom to collect the silver necessary for the entero.
4. The Chayantas and Sacacas come in person; those of Santiago del Paso and Tinquipaya comply in silver, and lack one-half.
5. The Cochabambas, Tapacarís y Casayas, Capinotas, Toledos and Cipicipis come in silver; the Cipicipis and Tapacarís lack one-half.
6. The corregimiento of Umasuyo sends mostly persons, a sixth or seventh in silver, and the pueblo of Pucarani fails usually to send two-thirds.
7. The Copacabanas of the same corregimiento come in person, save for a sixth or seventh in silver.
8. The corregimiento of Caracollo y Cicacica complies in person, and a sixth or seventh in silver.
9. The corregimiento of Pacajes complies in person, and a seventh or eighth in silver.
10. The province of Chucuito complies in person, save for a seventh or eighth in silver.
11. The corregimiento of Cabana y Cabanilla comes mostly in silver; the pueblos of Cabana and Cabanilla and Hicasio do not send one for every six that are obligated, and with an obligation of 300 they send less than 30.
12. The corregimiento of Paucarcolla comes half in silver, half in person, save for the pueblo of Capachica which is in the same condition as Cabana and Cabanilla, and that of Puno usually fails to send one-third.
13. The corregimiento of Asangaro y Asillo complies in person, less a sixth or seventh that comes in silver, and the pueblo of Asangaro is losing population and that of

Arapa is already broken down. 14. The Oruros and Hunoas (who although they are in the corregimiento of Cabana y Cabanilla, because they are of the Canas nation, have their own capitán) comply in person two-thirds of the time and the rest in silver, and they are always missing. 15. Another four pueblos of Canas, in the same corregimiento but under another capitán, come in person, less a fifth or sixth that come in silver; and in this way also come those from the corregimiento of Quispicancha. 16. The corregimiento of Canas y Canches comes in person, less a sixth or a seventh part that complies in silver.

On the basis of this report, Silvio Zavala estimates that half of the effective mita was delivered in silver and half in person, while an eighth or ninth was not delivered at all.<sup>53</sup> A 1620 cédula, responding to figures submitted by Contador Alonso Martínez de Pastrana, also claimed that over one-third of the mita arrived in Potosí in the form of silver.<sup>54</sup> In 1626 the crown asked the Viceroy Marqués de Guadalcazar (1622-1629) whether another report that only 800 of 4,000 mitayos served in person was true.<sup>55</sup>

Whatever the true fraction of the mita delivered in silver--one-third or one-half--the amount of money involved was substantial. A cacique who was obligated to deliver twenty Indians each week would have to pay seventy-five pesos if half of them were delivered in silver. One can understand why Fernández Guarache asked that he be allowed to resign when it became clear that he would not be able to meet his province's quota in persons. Those who did comply with their obligations requested prizes from the crown, for accomplishing the impossible. Other caciques responded



to the news that they had been named to serve as capitanes de la mita by joining the Indians in fleeing from their home provinces.<sup>56</sup>

### Service in Silver and the Azogueros

The emergence of mita service in silver was encouraged by developments at Potosí as well as in the provinces. From 1600 to 1633, the azogueros suffered setbacks in aspects of silver production that were outside their control: water and mercury. There were minor technological gains in 1602 and 1603 involving the use of small ovens and copper, and an innovation in 1621 that reduced the number of mingas required in the mills, but these discoveries were unable to reverse the overall decline in the azogueros' fortunes.<sup>57</sup> The delivery of silver by the caciques to meet their mita obligations provided the azogueros with a badly needed source of capital at a time when their own reserves were exhausted.

The closing of the main tunnel at Huancavelica, in accordance with the suggestions of Agia and others, had aggravated an already tight supply of mercury. Quicksilver became scarce just as ore quality at Potosí took another turn for the worse.<sup>58</sup> The mercury shortage was then joined, in 1608, by the effects of a severe drought.<sup>59</sup> The azogueros again asked the crown to lower the price of mercury and reduce the quinto to the diezmo, and warned

that they were spending their personal fortunes to keep the mills in production; unless aid was forthcoming--either from God or the King--they would soon go bankrupt and Potosí would collapse.<sup>60</sup>

While the azogueros clearly exaggerated their plight, to convince the crown to grant them more assistance, their position had deteriorated. The best indication of that fact was their loss of control over capital to silver merchants (mercaderes de plata) and moneylenders (aviadores). As early as 1602 many of the azogueros were unable to repay the loans they contracted to allow them to purchase mercury upon its arrival from Huancavelica. Although they were protected by Toledan and royal provisions from imprisonment for debts, some of the azogueros had renounced that right to secure an agreement with a merchant or money lender. As more and more of its members found themselves jailed, the Gremio de azogueros petitioned Velasco to extend their immunity to cases where the right had been waived. After considerable vacillation, and interim decisions by the Corregidor de Potosí and his lieutenants, the Viceroy ordered the extention of immunity to cases where it was renounced, but he refused to make the order retroactive. Soon thereafter, he permitted the royal treasury officials at Potosí to rent an azoguero's mills to satisfy his creditors. The Viceroy agreed to the inclusion of the azogueros' mitayos in the rental

agreement.<sup>61</sup>

There are other signs that the azogueros were in dire financial straits. In 1603, for example, Mesía argued that only eight of them had the means to buy Black slaves.<sup>62</sup> When the Gremio voted to construct new reservoirs and aqueducts after the 1608 drought, many of the azogueros failed to make their promised contributions. The attempt to collect those donations caused one of the few intra-Gremio squabbles of the seventeenth century.<sup>63</sup>

The glory years for the azogueros were clearly past. Their battle for protection from imprisonment for debts was a struggle to retain their privileged status in the face of their diminished importance; the silver merchants and moneylenders had replaced them as the financial backbone of Potosí. The azogueros could no longer base their claim to privileges on Potosí's future production of silver. Now they pointed to their past service and current need.<sup>64</sup>

When the Cabildo de Potosí sent Cristóbal de Molina to Lima in 1608 to argue against Oruro's request for mitayos, he asked Viceroy Montesclaros to grant a reduction in the price of mercury and other concessions. Molina was followed in 1609 by Diego Caveza de Vaca, who presented the Viceroy with a statement outlining the azogueros' difficulties with water, mercury, poor ore and the mita. The solution of problems with water and ore were obviously beyond the Marqués' capabilities. Processions and prayers

called upon heaven for rain, and plans were made to bring water from Tabacoñuño. The royal share of production, the delivery of mitayos, and the price and availability of mercury, however, were all matters that the Viceroy could influence.<sup>65</sup>

When the azogueros requested Montesclaros' permission to send a procurador to Spain, he asked them to consolidate their position. They responded with these seven points:

Their financial difficulties were now caused by past debts and production costs that outran profits. The burden of old debts needed to be lifted.

There were not enough mitayos. The corregidores and priests conspired to strangle the mita, so that the Indians would be free to work in their enterprises.

The Indians were spread far and wide, for the corregidores had failed to keep them in the pueblos.

The Viceroy's order that Oruro was not to divert mitayos from Potosí had not been enforced, and the failure to do so was dangerous for the future of silver production at Potosí.

Mercury was absolutely crucial and had to be readily available at Potosí. A reserve of quicksilver was therefore necessary.

In recognition of the azogueros' previous service to the crown, the quinto should be lowered to the diezmo, as had been done in New Spain. Mercury, moreover, should be distributed at Potosí at cost.

The mitayos should work on feast days. The priests preyed upon the Indians to collect money for their festivals, which always ended in drunken spectacles. It was better for the Indians to work than get drunk.

Lest the Viceroy or the crown take their arguments lightly, the azogueros again warned that unless their needs were met

silver production at Potosí would come to an end. They even threatened that the cerro might fall into the hands of the Protestants!<sup>66</sup>

The threat that Potosí would collapse without further concessions was the key to the azogueros' bargaining position. They were, to an extent, holding the cerro for ransom. The azogueros continued to apply pressure for more government assistance. They sent yet another petition to Lima in 1610, in which they asked that the quinto be reduced to the diezmo and that mercury be sold at cost. They now called for the mitayos to work on Mondays rather than on feast days, and added a request that alcabalas be abolished.<sup>67</sup> In 1612 the Gremio sent Juan de Ibarra to Spain to plead the azogueros' case before the crown and the Council of the Indies; and in 1616 it despatched Juan de Ayala to Lima.<sup>68</sup> Finally, in 1617, the azogueros asked the Príncipe de Esquilache to assist them in their efforts to restore the mita, and the Toledan production formula in general, to earlier levels.<sup>69</sup>

Montesclaros was responsive to the azogueros' demand that they retain exclusive access to mercury and mitayo labor. The Viceroy denied Oruro's request for mercury in 1608, and in 1612 he prohibited the assignment of mitayos to new mining centers, including Oruro.<sup>70</sup> Thus, old azoguero privileges were upheld, but despite the efforts of a parade of Cabildo and Gremio procuradores, and threats

that Potosí would collapse without further aid, no new concessions were granted.

The azogueros' use of mita service in silver allowed them to survive the production crises of the early seventeenth century despite their failure to win the new concessions. They not only used the money the caciques delivered to hire substitutes, but also to pay operating costs and their personal expenses. Money that was not used to hire a minga was called an "indio de faltriguera," or "pocket Indian." The azogueros claimed, in their petitions, that they were spending more to produce silver than they gained in profits. While their profit margin had grown smaller, their claim that they were supporting production with their own fortunes was untrue. They were still making a profit, but only via illegal means. Misuse of service in silver, the rental or sale of mitayos, and contraband were the principal means the azogueros used to ensure that their costs remained less than their gross profits.<sup>71</sup>

The continued profitability of silver production for the azogueros is demonstrated by their response to two crises of the 1620s. The first was a "civil war" between the predominantly Basque azogueros and an alliance of other Spaniards and Creoles--known as the Vicuñas because of their vicuña-skin hats. The struggle had its roots in the late sixteenth century, when the Basques had established themselves as the largest single force within the Gremio

de azogueros and the Cabildo de Potosí. Their political control of Potosí was resented by the Vicuñas. As their economic fortunes declined in the early years of the seventeenth century, the Basque azogueros moved to monopolize the control of the larger mines at the expense of other groups. The Vicuñas tried to block their move through a legal attack on the Basques' control of the Cabildo and other legal means, but when those efforts failed they resorted to force of arms. Hostilities smoldered from 1615 onward, bursting into violent confrontation in 1622. After three years of intermittent warfare a fragile peace was finally re-gained only through mutual exhaustion. Because no victory had been won, however, violence continued to flare from time to time.<sup>72</sup>

No sooner had the "civil war" at Potosí calmed down than the villa was inundated by a disastrous flood. After the droughts of the early 1600s, and with the construction of new aqueducts and reservoirs, water had not been a great problem. But on March 15, 1626, the largest of the lagunas, Cari cari, collapsed. Water rushed down on the mills and villa, and the destruction was catastrophic. With the help of government loans of mercury, a reduction of the quinto for a short while, and the assignment of Porco's mitayos to reconstruction, however, the azogueros were able to rebuild their mills.<sup>73</sup>

Both the "civil war" and the flood disrupted silver

production, but they did not end it. The azogueros' response to those crises demonstrates that silver mining at Potosí was still a profitable undertaking. The battle between the Basques and the Vicuñas for control of the villa would not have been waged had there been nothing to fight for. The mills would not have been rebuilt after the flood unless there were prospects for future profits. Had the silver industry really been on the verge of collapse, as the azogueros claimed, surely the events of the 1620s would have brought it down.

The emergence of mita service in silver provided the azogueros with an element of flexibility in an increasingly inflexible and hostile environment. The mita was therefore an unofficial capital subsidy as well as a forced labor system. The azogueros' misuse of service in silver--not to be confused with their mistreatment of mitayos who served in person--and their involvement in contraband allowed them to make a profit despite the crown's refusal to grant them new concessions. At the same time their participation in those illegal activities was responsible for their inability to secure further aid from the government.

#### The Government and the de facto Mita

The crown's position vis-à-vis the azogueros was eroded further by the appearance of mita service in silver. The



new form of the mita was an unauthorized arrangement between the azogueros and the caciques to which it was not a party. Government officials in Lima and Madrid, moreover, were unable to determine whether the money delivered by the caciques was used to further silver production or for the private aims of the azogueros. As with earlier changes in the de facto mita, however, the crown could only condemn service in silver as an abuse of the Toledan system, and await an opportunity to counter it on a functional level.

The crown conceded its relative weakness with regard to the encomenderos and the azogueros in 1609, in its second cédula on Indian personal service. All of the goals of the 1601 edict were preserved, but Phillip III instructed the Marqués de Montesclaros to delay their implementation until the prospects for their realization were more promising.<sup>74</sup>

The azogueros' requests for new concessions presented the crown with a dilemma. Each of their proposed measures would have lessened its share of silver production without any firm guarantee that the azogueros would use the aid to increase production. The King did not want to grant the concessions if they would only enhance the azogueros' position at his expense, but he also worried that their warnings about Potosí's imminent collapse might be true. He denied their requests to punish them for their misuse of the mita; and because Potosí did not break down as they

had threatened, the King was convinced that his denial of aid had been correct. But because no new concessions were forthcoming, the azogueros grew ever more dependent upon their misuse of service in silver and other illegal practices.

Viceregal efforts to counter the azogueros' abuses were ineffective for a number of reasons. One was the isolation of the viceroys in Lima. Luis de Velasco's successors did not venture to Upper Peru, but relied upon officials in La Plata and Potosí to administer the mita. The Conde de Monterrey died before he was able to visit the realm. The Marqués de Montesclaros traveled only as far as Huancavelica, arriving in 1608. He found that mining center plagued by similar problems as those at Potosí, and abandoned his plans to increase mercury production there. He chose instead to confirm President Maldonado de Torres' order that new deposits of mercury be discovered and exploited for use at Potosí.<sup>75</sup> The Príncipe de Esquilache and Marqués de Guadalcazar both followed precedent, and did not go to Charcas.

The removal of the viceroys from the everyday reality of Potosí silver production caused them to depend upon governing techniques much like those that were used by the crown; and it resulted in greater opportunities for delay and confusion. An order issued by the king would be modified in Lima to conform to the viceroy's view of its

propriety and chances for success. As noted with regard to the 1601 cédula, the crown and the Council of the Indies expected that to happen. But once the viceroys began to direct the mita from Lima, their own provisions, as well as the adjusted orders of the crown, were subjected to similar modifications by government officials at Potosí. Thus, not only were the crown's orders vulnerable to wider interpretations of their intent and the extent to which they could be executed, the procedure also took years to complete. The result was even greater isolation of the crown and the Council, and the complication of Hapsburg administration of the mita.

The assignment of responsibility for the mita to officials in Charcas might not have been so significant had authority accompanied responsibility. But the viceroys insisted that they remain in the position of authority where the mita was concerned. Luis de Velasco held to Toledo's premise that only the viceroy, in the name of the crown, could force the Indians to work in the mines. His personal involvement ranged from making broad policy decisions to minor adjustments of his repartimiento to reward or punish individual azogeros.<sup>76</sup> The Conde de Monterrey expressed his intention to continue at the head of the mita in a direct order issued to the Audiencia de Charcas not to meddle in mita matters.<sup>77</sup>

Monterrey's successors reaffirmed his insistence on

viceregal supremacy. The Príncipe de Esquilache, for example, ordered the Audiencia de Charcas not to hear the appeals of the azogueros he had denied Indians in his repartimiento.<sup>78</sup> But the viceroys, despite their expressed intentions, were unable to exercise the authority they so ardently protected. Apart from the problems caused by distance and their reliance on local officials, they were distracted by their other responsibilities. The Marqués de Guadalcazar had to contend with civil strife at Potosí, Dutch attacks on the port of Callao, Indian wars, drought and famine--as well as the Potosí mita.<sup>79</sup>

A second cause of viceregal ineffectiveness was the fact that ultimate authority really rested with the crown. There were, therefore, two centers of authority: one in Lima and the other in Madrid. The former was more immediate while the latter was theoretically superior. An official who disagreed with a viceroy could appeal to the crown; one who disapproved of a royal order could argue for its suspension by the viceroy. No decision was ever final, and there was little incentive to come to an accomodation with other sectors of government. Finally, orders could come from either center of authority, or both, and could therefore be inconsistent and contradictory.

A third reason for viceregal ineffectiveness was the means used to administer the mita from a distance. The crown divided the responsibility for overseeing the mita

among the various government officials at Potosí and in La Plata. The Audiencia de Charcas was assigned the task of protecting the Indians from abuse, but only by reporting incidents of mistreatment to the viceroy. The viceroys held presidents of the Audiencia responsible for directing the shipment of refined silver from Potosí, distributing mercury from the royal warehouses, and drafting their repartimientos de la mita. Corregidores de Potosí were assigned to the daily administration of the mita and the supervision of the provinces' compliance with their mita obligations. The division of responsibility was deemed necessary to ensure that the viceroys and the crown would receive information from more than one source, and to prevent the azogueros from subverting the officials who were sent to govern Potosí.<sup>80</sup>

Competition among officials was encouraged by the design of Hapsburg bureaucracy, but in the case of the mita the division of duties further compromised the government's ability to administer the system. As greater problems developed at Potosí from 1600 to 1633, professional jealousies and the protection of personal interests by officials combined to foment conflicts that went beyond healthy competition. Feelings were particularly bitter between the Audiencia de Charcas and government officials in Lima. Traditional rivalries between La Plata and Lima had been heightened when Velasco selected the Corregidor de

Potosí, an official who was subordinate to the Audiencia within the legal hierarchy, as his personal representative in mita matters; and Monterrey's order to the court not to meddle added insult to injury.<sup>81</sup> The Audiencia responded that it would continue to protect the Indians, for the crown had instructed it to do so.<sup>82</sup> La Plata, it argued, was much closer to Potosí than Lima, and the court's proximity to the cerro guaranteed the quick resolution of mining disputes and an ongoing concern for the mitayos. Government officials in Lima, the Audiencia charged, cared only about the amount of silver they sent to Spain.<sup>83</sup>

When the Conde de Monterrey died after only a year in Peru, the Audiencia de Lima claimed the right, in accordance with a 1550 cédula, to govern the realm until the arrival of his successor. The Audiencias of Charcas and Quito replied to the Audiencia de Lima's pretension that they were its equals and would administer their respective territories. Both courts were dismayed when the crown backed the Audiencia de Lima in an order of November 20, 1606.<sup>84</sup> That was not the end of the matter, however.

The silver deposits at Oruro were discovered in 1606 as well, and by the time the crown's order arrived in Peru, Oruro and Potosí had become pawns in the struggle between the Audiencias of Lima and Charcas. The former supported the new center's request for mercury and mita labor; the latter argued that only Potosí should receive

government assistance. The Marqués de Montesclaros adopted the Audiencia de Lima's stance when he arrived in Peru, and he ordered the Audiencia de Charcas to obey his ban on the delivery of mitayos or mercury to Oruro.<sup>85</sup>

The Viceroy fined the Audiencia de Charcas 1,000 pesos in gold per member when it continued to oppose his orders. Undaunted, the court argued for the sustenance of Oruro in its correspondence with the crown.<sup>86</sup> It claimed that the new mining center was the heir apparent to a failing Potosí, and should be assisted with mercury and a mita of its own.<sup>87</sup> The Audiencia's support for Oruro, it claimed, was a courageous defense of the crown's interests--royal quintos and other tax revenue there had totaled 106,796 pesos during the first six months of production; and the sale of offices in the new villa of San Phelipe de Austria would net its namesake another 109,800 pesos.<sup>88</sup>

Other government officials joined in the battle over Oruro. The Cabildo de Potosí, as one would expect, opposed the new mining center, and its representatives--Molina and Caveza de Vaca--were instrumental in winning Montesclaros' rulings against concessions for Oruro. The Corregidor de Potosí was also pro-azoguero and anti-Oruro. When he sent judges to San Phelipe to retrieve the Indians who had gone there from Potosí, however, the Audiencia de Charcas suspended their powers.<sup>89</sup> In retaliation for his alliance with the Audiencia's limeño enemies, moreover, it withdrew

the commissions of the judges the Corregidor had sent to increase the number of mitayos delivered from the provinces.<sup>90</sup> The Audiencia's right to suspend the Corregidor's commissions was hotly contested by officials in Potosí, La Plata, Oruro, Lima and Madrid, but the most important effect of its actions was that provincial corregidores and economic interests found themselves with an important ally in their effort to keep their Indians from being taken off to serve at Potosí in the mita.

The clearest indication of the viceroys' inability to administer the mita from Lima was the constant stream of their reiterated, and disobeyed, orders. In 1616, for example, the Príncipe de Esquilache reissued Velasco's 1603 provision for the delivery of mitayos, as it was being ignored.<sup>91</sup> The Marqués de Guadalcázar was compelled to repeat Velasco and Cañete's orders that the mitayos were to work only in those activities to which they had been assigned.<sup>92</sup> All of the viceroys ordered the azogueros to pay the Indians their travel allowances, but they were never paid.<sup>93</sup>

Indeed, it seemed as though the only impact a viceregal order could have was the opposite of that which had been intended. The Príncipe de Esquilache found it necessary to revoke Velasco's order empowering the royal officials at Potosí to rent mills to pay the azogueros' debts. He noted that other creditors were always paid before the crown, and



that some azogueros had indebted themselves to the crown simply to allow the rental of their mills, and thus the Indians assigned to them.<sup>94</sup>

The viceroys were very much aware of the limitations of their power over the Indians and the azogueros. When the crown pressed the Príncipe de Esquilache to begin establishing a resident work force at Potosí in 1619, he responded that there was no way the required number of Indians could be settled, with the required lands, near the villa. He said that a total of 38,241 laborers would be needed, and allowing for four-person families the total Indian population would reach 191,205. The Council of the Indies argued that an exemption from tribute would attract the Indians to Potosí, but the Viceroy pointed to the much cleverer means they already used to keep from serving in the mita or paying tribute.<sup>95</sup> Another cédula of 1619 instructed the azogueros to pay the veedores and alcalde mayor de minas, rather than deducting the half-peso per week from the mitayos' wages. Esquilache suspended that order, noting that the azogueros would reject any attempt to enforce it.<sup>96</sup>

The Marqués de Guadalcazar received a royal cédula in 1621 that ordered him to abolish service in silver. He realized that execution of the order was impossible given the extent of the abuse and the violence engulfing Potosí. He tried, instead, to increase the percentage of the mita

that was delivered in person, and so empowered the Corregidor de Potosí to suspend and replace any corregidor who failed to comply with his mita obligations.<sup>97</sup>

Royal and viceregal orders were reissued to remind their recipients of the goals toward which they were supposed to be striving. Viceregal directives, like the crown's cédulas, were also designed to increase the ability of local officials to control those who were living under their jurisdiction. Thus, as with the kings' orders, the viceroys' edicts were at times exaggerated so that the goal of the order might survive its modification by officials at the local level. One of the keystones to the viceroys' directives on the mita was their insistence that the Toledan system was still viable, and that any departure for its tenets was an abuse of the mita.

In reality this "official" position was untenable, but as an administrative tool it was employed with some success. Each time a new repartimiento de la mita was published some azogueros found themselves denied mitayos for their misuse of service in silver and other abuses. Both Velasco and Esquilache spoke of having deprived guilty azogueros.<sup>98</sup> The assignment of mitayos to the azogueros therefore acquired a similarity to the granting of encomiendas, for the grantees received the Indians in recognition of their past performance. The azogueros did not immediately protest this shift away from the concept that the mita was part of

their pact with Francisco de Toledo, because they had adopted the same tenor in their petitions to the crown for new concessions; and because those who lost their mitayos were few, and were usually able to secure Indians in one way or another.

An example of the relationship between the viceroys in Lima and officials in Potosí is that of the Marqués de Montesclaros and President Maldonado de Torres. Maldonado was not involved in the Audiencia de Charcas' battle with the Viceroy because, after 1604, he spent most of his time in Potosí, overseeing the despatch of silver and the distribution of mercury to the azogueros.<sup>99</sup> He supported Potosí against the Audiencia on the question of aid for Oruro, and he wrote his oidores that mercury and Indians were indeed being diverted to the new mining center.<sup>100</sup> The President was greatly appreciated by the azogueros for his flexibility and understanding; when he prepared to leave the villa in 1607, for example, the Cabildo begged him to stay.<sup>101</sup>

Maldonado proposed a series of mining ordinances in 1608 that would have greatly assisted the azogueros.<sup>102</sup> The Viceroy was impressed with the thorough knowledge of silver production that they demonstrated, but he was not prepared to adopt the new guidelines. When the crown's second cédula on Indian personal service arrived in 1610, however, Montesclaros empowered Maldonado to investigate

the prospects for its implementation. The President brought a junta together in March to consider the crown's plan for the replacement of the mita with a resident labor force, but it could reach no firm resolution. The junta disbanded with promises to provide Maldonado with written position papers on the matter.<sup>103</sup>

Two of those papers have survived. One was authored by the Jesuits of Potosí. It reviewed the evils of the mita as the Fathers knew them in 1610, but argued against the introduction of any major novelties. Although they were attracted to the concept that voluntary labor might someday replace the mita, the Jesuits believed that the resident labor force plan was unrealistic. They suggested that the crown order the repopulation of the provinces that were obligated to the mita instead, so that the weight of the system would fall on the shoulders of more Indians.<sup>104</sup>

A second paper is identifiable only by those who signed it: Juan Martínez de Mecoleta, Juan María Dávalos de Castillo, Juan Núñez de Ovando, Pedro de Verástegui and Fernando Joan de Ibarra. These gentlemen were all members of the Cabildo de Potosí, and as one might expect, they also supported the continuation of the status quo.<sup>105</sup>

Maldonado's investigation of the 1609 cédula repeated the process that Velasco had undertaken in 1603, in response to the 1601 edict, and it arrived at the same conclusion:

the mita was necessary and irreplaceable. In keeping with that decision, the President prepared a new repartimiento in June of 1610 that involved no major changes of the system; the mita ordinaria included 4,413 Indians.<sup>106</sup>

When the Príncipe de Esquilache published his repartimiento in 1618, the only changes he had made were to limit the number of mitayos assigned to the soldados (to 200) and to reserve some 200 others for use in future adjustments caused by complaints or unforeseen need. His mita ordinaria totaled 4,294.<sup>107</sup> The Marqués de Guadalcazar followed the lead of his predecessors in 1624, and assigned the responsibility for his repartimiento to President Diego de Portugal of the Audiencia de Charcas. On that occasion the mita ordinaria was reduced to 4,175 Indians--3,982 for the azogueros and 283 for the soldados.<sup>108</sup>

None of these repartimientos gave any indication that mita service in silver existed, and the first two ignored the fact that the provinces were having a difficult time supporting the system. Everyone knew that the number of Indians an azoguero really had, or how he used them, bore little resemblance to the number of Indians he received on paper. These repartimientos simply ensured that the status quo would not be disturbed.

President Portugal's repartimiento, however, did show some signs that the originario population of the provinces was no longer able to support a 4,000-Indian mita ordinaria.

The Indians who habitually failed to come to Potosí were now distributed among all of the azogueros, so they would all share some of the burden of the missing and uncooperative ayllus. The meses, who had earlier been assigned to support activities in and around Potosí, now found themselves included in the contingents that were sent to the mines and the mills.<sup>109</sup>

The government's efforts to reverse the effects of Indian migration had been as unsuccessful as its attempts to control the azogueros. Velasco had been encouraged by the crown to return the forasteros to their villages, and the Marqués de Montesclaros received very explicit orders to do so in 1607. The Marqués ordered two oidores of the Audiencia de Charcas to conduct the reducciones, but they refused; the task, they argued, was impossible for two men to perform.<sup>110</sup> The Príncipe de Esquilache ordered the forasteros in La Plata and at Potosí either to return home or serve in the mita, but most of them did neither. Because no local official took an interest in the matter the Viceroy's order had little effect.<sup>111</sup> In 1623 the Marqués de Guadalcazar told President Portugal to have each corregidor hold the forasteros who were living in his district until their own corregidores or caciques could come for them.<sup>112</sup> Like the earlier edicts, this last directive was thoroughly unenforceable.

Guadalcazar was convinced, nevertheless, that the Indian

population of the pueblos would not support the mita at its current levels for very long. He wrote the crown that the quotas demanded of the provinces should be reduced to one-seventh of their originario population, no matter what the effect on silver production at Potosí might be. He received the King's permission to proceed, but because he feared that the azogueros might revolt if the downward revisions were implemented all at once, the Marqués waited for the pueblos to request revisitas before lowering their quotas. Seven such revisitas were conducted during the last years of his viceroyalty, and the mita obligations of Caquiavire, Macha and other villages were lowered. The mita ordinaria was reduced by a total of 147 Indians.<sup>113</sup>

The Marqués de Guadalcazar was replaced in 1629 by the Conde de Chinchón (1629-1639). Phillip IV sent the new Viceroy a cédula on February 18, 1631 that ordered him to determine whether mita obligation should be extended to more provinces. A 1630 memorial had claimed that one-third of the Indian population in the mita provinces had been lost since Toledo's viceroyalty. The crown was now convinced that the reducciones that it had so often ordered were impossible and that a resident labor force was also unrealistic. The Conde was instructed to sell the lands that had been left by the long-absent Indians.<sup>114</sup> Chinchón was reluctant to concede defeat on the reducciones, however, and he responded that there already were not enough lands

on which to settle the few Indians who were returning to their pueblos. He warned that the sale of their lands would permanently remove any possibility of resettling the Indians in their villages in the future, but the crown insisted that the Viceroy comply with its earlier order in another of 1634.<sup>115</sup> The Conde de Chinchón was therefore faced with the need to develop another means for reconciling Potosí's insatiable demand for mitayos and the depleted originario population in the provinces.

#### Summary

The seventeenth century opened with a royal order to abolish the mita, included in the crown's 1601 cédula banning Indian personal service. The edict came in response to the King's deteriorating position vis-à-vis the colonists, both the encomenderos and the azogueros, and it was meant to strengthen Viceroy Velasco's ability to combat those powerful Peruvian interest groups. The mita, in fact, was never really threatened. Indeed, the investigation conducted by Velasco in 1603 underscored Peru's dependence upon Potosí silver production, and Potosí's dependence on the mita.

Mitayos constituted only a small percentage of the total Indian labor force at Potosí, but they were the most important workers there. The mitayos toiled inside the cerro as apiris, hauling silver ore out of the mines for



refining in the amalgamation mills. Mingas worked voluntarily in the mills and in support activities, but they would rarely do the work that the mitayos were forced to perform; and when they did, they demanded very high wages.

The mitayos' increased importance was not reflected in their working conditions. Indeed, the work inside the mines was harder than ever, and they were seriously mistreated as well. The mitayos' wages were insufficient to meet their needs, let alone to make service in the mita attractive to them. The perquisites that Toledo had provided for that purpose, and his provisions for their good treatment, were now things of the past. In response to their deteriorating situation, the Indians fled from the mita.

Indian migration was also caused by their flight from the provinces to escape the oppression they suffered at the hands of their caciques, priests and corregidores. Viceregal immunity from taxation and mita obligation for forasteros, the growing need for labor on chácaras and in other enterprises, and the opening of new mining centers also caused the Indians to leave their pueblos. Many migrated to completely outside the provinces obligated to the Potosí mita. The economic interests that competed with the azogueros for Indian labor blamed the mita for depopulating the provinces, but it was only one of many

causes. The magnitude of the demographic decline in the mita provinces is unclear, moreover, because of the deception practiced by the provincial interests, the failure to include forasteros in censi, and the various means used by the Indians to evade their obligations.

The caciques were the key to the mita, as they had been in the sixteenth century. The developments in the provinces and at Potosí from 1600 to 1633 made it even more difficult for them to deliver mitayos to the azogueros than before. The methods they had used earlier--keeping Indians at Potosí longer than was permitted, bringing old men and boys to serve in the mita, etc.--were no longer adequate by the early 1600s. The caciques were fined nine, and later seven and one-half, pesos for every Indian they could not deliver in person, ostensibly so that a minga could be hired in his place.

The azogueros' efforts to maintain their profits in the face of production crises--caused by mercury and water shortages, and lower-quality ore--coincided with the caciques' difficulties with the delivery of mitayos. A marriage of the azogueros' need for capital and the caciques' payment of fines led to a new form of the mita: service in silver. The azogueros used some of the money they collected from the caciques to hire mingas, but they also used some to defray production costs and other expenses. The mita, therefore, became something more than a

draft labor system. It was now an unofficial capital subsidy as well. By 1630, the percentage of the mita that the azogueros received in silver had grown to between one-third and one-half of the total entero.

Service in silver could not be stopped by the Hapsburg government. The crown's relative powerlessness to affect developments in Peru was admitted in its second cédula on personal service in 1609. Not only did the King suffer the effects of spatial isolation, however, he also found himself atop an ever more complicated colonial bureaucracy. The viceroys in Lima were also ineffective, in part because they depended upon government officials in Charcas to administer the mita, and employed the same techniques to rule Potosí from afar that the crown used to govern the Indies: exaggerated legal demands, and the division of responsibilities among local officials. A second tier of bureaucratic flexibility was created, and authority was divided between Lima and Madrid. The viceroys' efforts were also compromised by the vigorous infighting between the Audiencia de Charcas and other government officials.

The government was also unable to conduct new reducciones, or otherwise control the Indians who lived in Upper Peru. The crown's plan for the establishment of a resident work force at Potosí to replace the mita was deemed impossible to execute as well. But some means were needed to solve the problems created by the inability of

the provinces to support the system.

The viceroys' direction of the mita from Lima, and thus their dependence on the officials stationed at Potosí, caused their orders to become exaggerated, so they could withstand modification at the local level. One of the official positions the viceroys' adopted for that purpose was that the Toledan mita was still viable, and that any digression from its tenets represented an abuse. On the basis of that stance the viceroys removed mitayos from some of the azogueros for their indulgence in "pocket Indians" and other abuses. The azogueros did not quickly challenge the viceroys on the issue because their directives were generally defused in practice by the presidents of Charcas and corregidores de Potosí. Those officials were the buffer between viceregal orders and potosino reality that allowed the de facto mita to continue despite the viceroys' "official" position.

Notes for Chapter III

1. BNB, MSS 2, fs. 152-153v, "Provisión del virrey (Velasco): Los corregidores de cuyos partidos van indios a las minas de Potosí tengan el mayor cuidado en remitirlos conforme a lo ordenado aquí, de manera que no haya fraudes, atrasos ni fallas," Los Reyes, 30.VI.1601 (MC 453; MOM 424); BNB, NSS 2, fs. 1-5v, "Provisión librada por Velasco, disponiendo que para la buena labor y estabilidad de las minas del Cerro de Potosí y su conservación el alcalde mayor de minas y los veedores asistan personalmente al trabajo de día y de noche so pena de privación de sus oficios y de 500 pesos de oro para el corregidor que no lo hiciese cumplir," Los Reyes, 14.III.1601 (MC448; MOM 420).
2. The cédula is discussed at length in Zavala, Servicio personal, II, 3-4.
3. Castañeda Delgado, 338; Zavala, Servicio personal, 3, 5; Alfonso Mesía Venegas, "Memorial ... sobre la Cédula del servicio personal de los indios. 1603," Pareceres jurídicos (ed. by Vargas Ugarte), 95, says the practice was current in Spain.
4. Zavala, Servicio personal, II, 4.
5. Ibid., 4-5.
6. Ibid., 5.
7. Ibid.; K. V. Fox, "Pedro Muñiz, Dean of Lima, and the Indian Labor Question (1603)," The Hispanic American Historical Review, XLII (Durham, 1962), 64.
8. Zavala, Servicio personal, II, 5-6; Campo y de la Rynaga, 23, says the orders to suspend were secret, and Pérez de Tudela, 367, agrees (on the basis of Solórzano Pereira, I, 270--Biblioteca de Autores Españoles edition: "43. Y aunque por la otra de 24. de Noviembre del mismo año, que llaman del Servicio personal, cap. 13. y cap. 15. se quiso alterar esta forma, y se mandó señalar término de dos años á los mineros, para que dentro dél se proveyesen de esclavos, y de gente de servicio para el beneficio de las minas, viendo que esto, aunque era facil de decir, havia de ser dificil de executar, y parcticar, se le embió orden secreta para que la suspendiese: Si hallase que de ello podian resultar inconvenientes, ó que

las minas no se podrian labrar suficientemente con esclavos, ó Indios voluntarios, porque la Real voluntad no era que esta labor cesase, pues no se juzgaba por menos necesaria á la Republica, que la de la labranza, ó crianza.)  
Fox, 65, says that the "general sentiment" was against it.

9. Campo y de la Rynaga, 26.

10. Ibid., 25, for the list of contributors.

11. See Zavala, Servicio personal, II, 17-22, for a thorough assessment of Agia; Vargas Ugarte, Pareceres jurídicos, 21, includes some mention of Agia in his introduction to Mesía Venegas' arguments.

12. The text of Agia's retraction is included at the end of Campo y de la Rynaga.

13. Fox, 65-69, for his commentary; 86-88 for an outline of Muñiz' paper; and 75-86 for a transcription of it.

14. Mesía Venegas (see note 3), 94-123. See Fox, 71, for a discussion of the axiom that the mita was necessary for the survival of Catholicism.

15. The orders included in notes 16, 19, and 20, below, all refer to the 1601 cédula.

16. BNB, MSS 2, fs. 153-154v, "Provisión de don Luis de Velasco, virrey del Perú: El corregidor de Potosí y los de las demás provincias de donde fueren indios a las minas hagan pagar a éstos lo que les corresponda tanto para la ida como para la vuelta," Lima, 14.XI.1603 (MC 475; MOM 438). See, also, Zavala, Servicio personal, II, 8-9.

17. ANB, EC 1689-31, fs. 423-424, "Provisión del virrey: Según la ordenanza del virrey Toledo, solamente el hijo legítimo mayor del cacique principal sea reservado del tributo y la mita; solamente los demás hijos legítimos del cacique principal sean reservados de la mita; y ningún otro indio, aunque sea hijo de segunda persona o de cacique de huaranca, pisca pachaca y pachaca sea reservado del tributo ni la mita," Lima, 3.XII.1603 (MC 476a; MOM 440). See, also, Zavala, Servicio personal, II, 9.

18. BNB, MSS 2, fs. 168-168v, "Provisión librada por don Luis de Velasco, virrey del Perú, para que en cada pueblo que hubiere de 200 indios para abajo estén

reservados de mita solamente un oficial de sastre, otro zapatero, otro tintorero de lana y otro sillero que trabajen con tiendas públicas, y en los pueblos de 200 indios para arriba a dos de cada uno de los oficios mencionados," Los Reyes, 5.XI.1603 (MC 472; MOM 436). See, also, Zavala, Servicio personal, II, 9-10.

19. BNB, MSS 2, fs. 147-148v, "Provisión de don Luis de Velasco, virrey del Perú: en conformidad a la real cédula que es notoria, las personas a quienes están repartidos indios para las minas de Potosí no puedan traspasarlos, ni hacer donación de ellos, ni venderlos, ni enajenarlos en ninguna forma, ni prestarlos, y si hiciere lo contrario los indios se dan por vacos desde luego, y se comete al corregidor de Potosí ejecutar en las personas y bienes de los contraventores las penas señaladas," Lima, 14.XI.1603 (MC 474a; MOM 437).

20. BNB, MSS 2, fs. 158-158v, "Provisión del virrey: no se carguen los indios en este reino," Lima, 14.XI.1603 (MC 476; MOM 439).

21. BNB, MSS 2, fs. 135-139v, "Provisión librada por don Luis de Velasco, virrey del Perú, para que la que se expidió en 1596.XI.1 estableciendo la orden que se había de tener con los indios de la provincia de Chucuito que van a la mita de Potosí, que aquí se inserta, se guarde y cumpla con todos los indios de mita de Potosí," Los Reyes, 10.IV.1603 (MC 468; MOM 433). This order followed an earlier exhortation for corregidores to follow the program established for Chucuito: BNB, MSS 2, fs. 182-183v, "Provisión del virrey: Los corregidores de cuyos partidos van indios a las minas de Potosí tengan el mayor cuidado en remitirlos conforme a lo ordenado aquí, de manera que no haya fraudes, atrasos, ni fallas," Los Reyes, 30.VI.1601 (MC 453; MOM 424).

22. Zavala, Servicio personal, II, 3.

23. Pérez de Tudela, 368 (based on Solórzano Pereira, I, 262-271--Biblioteca de Autores Españoles edition).

24. "Descripción de la villa y minas de Potosí," 377-378. The 1601 cédula had called for such a profile. The figures included here correlate with the 1611 census at Potosí: 160,000 inhabitants, including 76,000 Indians (Baquijano y Carrillo, no. 212 (13 de enero de 1793), 37-38). Padden, xx, interprets these figures differently; he does not include the 19,000 among the 30,000 total, and therefore derives an Indian population of 79,000. He also

notes the 1611 figures from Baquijano y Carrillo, on page xiii. Zavala, Servicio personal, II, 6, includes an undated profile by Felipe Fernández de Santillán:

140	--	mill owners
80	--	mine owners
280	--	employees of mills
2	--	<u>mayordomos</u> per mill
100	--	miners oversee Indians
200	--	Spaniards involved in <u>rescates</u>
80	--	involved in carting ore
200	--	merchants
200	--	officials (or artisans)
500	--	foreign merchants
13,000	--	<u>indios de obligación</u> ( <u>mitayos</u> )

Unfortunately, this list must be considered incomplete, for mingas are not included. Baquijano y Carrillo's 1611 figures include 3,000 Spaniards; 35,000 Creoles; 40,000 Europeans; 6,000 mulatos, zambos, and negros. Pedro de Lodeña, Corregidor de Potosí, won a royal order in 1602 to castigate 4,000 "gente suelta y valdia": ANB, CRC 292, "Copia de una cédula real dirigida a la Audiencia de La Plata: Favorézcase a don Pedro de Ludueña, corregidor de Potosí, en el castigo de la gente suelta que hay en la villa, así como lo demás tocante a la administración de justicia y buena marcha de las minas, en vez de irle a la mano como suele," Tordesillas, 22.II.1602 (MC 456). The 1603 "Descripción de la villa y minas de Potosí" lists 6,000 Spaniards: 4,000 male and 2,000 female.

25. Baquijano y Carrillo, no. 212 (13 de enero de 1793), 37-38.

26. For mitayo wages, see the "Descripción de la villa y minas de Potosí," 384, among others. Pérez Bustamante quotes extensively from the account of the Carmelite Vázquez de Espinosa, who visited Peru between 1617 and 1619; see 302-303, for the passage on Potosí, including the wages paid to mitayos and mingas. "Pareceres de los Padres de la Compañía de Jesús de Potosí. 1610," Pareceres jurídicos (ed. by Vargas Ugarte), 120, says that mingas earned nine pesos per week until Corregidor Ortiz de Sotomayor reduced the sum to seven and one-half. That action, the Jesuits contended, had reduced the number who were willing to serve in the mines from 1,200 to 600. Another reason why service in the mines was unpopular was that the tunnel owners charged passage for Indians to enter the cerro through them. BNB, CPLA 12, fs. 353-354v, "Título de veedor del cerro de Potosí provisto por el



virrey marqués de Montesclaros en favor de Cristóbal Jiménez de Arandia," Lima, 20.X.1610 (MC 557ñ; MOM 499), for comments on the fact that miners forced their Indians to climb down through long shafts rather than pay for them to enter the mines via the tunnels.

27. Zavala, Servicio personal, II, 13-17; Mesía Venegas, Pareceres jurídicos (ed. by Vargas Ugarte), 113.

28. ANB, M 125, no. 13 (see note 133, Chapter II), fs. 226v-232 carry cases of abuse in the cerro from 1600 to 1628, including the two examples cited.

29. BNB, MSS 2, f. 138 (see note 21), for Velasco's comments on priests who took all of the Indians' possessions to pay for funerals and masses on their behalf. For the 1615 decision that sick and dead mitayos were not to be replaced, BNB, CPLA 14, f. 147v, "Capítulo de acuerdo del cabildo de Potosí: Que Juan Altamirano, escribano de este cabildo, vaya a La Plata y suplique ante la audiencia de la provisión por ella expedida a solicitud del protector de naturales de esta villa para que se rebajen del número de mitayos que sirven en las labores de minas los muertos y enfermos, pues ello acarrearía la total destrucción del trabajo," Potosí, 16.X.1615 (MC 580; MOM 513). For Guadalcazar's approval, two sources: a) BNB, MSS 7, fs. 56-66, "Provisión librada por el marqués de Guadalcazar, virrey del Perú, a petición de don Antonio Cerón, protector de naturales de Potosí, para que el corregidor de dicha villa no consienta que habiendo enfermado o lastimándose algún mitayo quedando imposibilitado, el azoguero reclame otro indio en lugar del primero ni que éste pague algo para mingar otro indio, quedando la falta a cuenta del azoguero hasta la venida de una nueva mita; y que el mitayo que hubiese lastimado en la mina el dueño de ésta le dé dos reales al día hasta que se cure," Los Reyes, 9.II.1626 (MC 624; MOM 539); and b) BNB, MSS 7, fs. 74-78v, "Provisión librada por el marqués de Guadalcazar, virrey del Perú, para que no obstante lo alegado por el procurador general de Potosí a nombre de los azogueros de dicha villa, se cumpla la provisión del dicho marqués, de 1626.II.9, inserta, sobre lo que se ha de hacer cuando un mitayo enferma o se lastima en la mina, así como la del virrey Toledo, de Potosí, 2.II.1574, asimismo inserta, para que ni aún con indios de huelga se suplan las faltas de los enfermos y lastimados, quedando los capitanes de la mita obligados a suplirlos con los indios que les están repartidos," Los Reyes, 13.XI.1626 (MC 637; MOM 548). See Zavala, Servicio personal, II, 34, for President Maldonado's proposed ordinances to combat these problems, in 1608.

30. For rescates, see Zavala, Servicio personal, II, 34. For early problems with food costs, ANB, M 122, no. 9, "Francisco Pérez de la Rinaga, protector general de los naturales en Potosí, a nombre de los indios mitayos que asistan en dicha villa, sobre que los mercaderes de harina la vendan por menudo," Potosí, 7-11.XI.1603, 22 fs. (MC 473). But when flour was scarce the Indians were the last ones to get it: BNB, CPLA 13, fs. 342-342v, "Capítulo de acuerdo del cabildo de Potosí: Que a los indios no se les venda en la plaza ni en las rancherías pan de trigo rebazo" (the Indians were said to be able to live on chuño and corn, unlike Spaniards and Creoles), Potosí, 3.XII.1610 (MC 557r). For Indians eating llamas, BNB, CPLA 16, f. 3lv, "Capítulo de acuerdo del cabildo de Potosí: Que el corregidor de esta villa confirme a Juan Vázquez de Castro para que con vara de justicia procure el cumplimiento de la ordenanza por la que se prohíbe la matanza de llamas que suelen hacer los indios que residen en esta villa, de donde siguen grandes inconvenientes para los trajines y particularmente para el de los metales de esta villa," Potosí, 8.VI.1618 (MC 596; MOM 520).

31. "Relación del Señor Virrey Don Luis de Velasco al Señor Conde de Monterrey sobre el estado del Perú," 28.XI.1604, Los virreyes (ed. by Hanke and Rodríguez), Perú II (no. 281), 52 (from the manuscript in the Real Academia de la Historia, Colección Muñoz, XXII, fs. 54-71v).

32. Dobyns, 509.

33. BNB, CPLA 16, f. 147, "Capítulo de acuerdo del cabildo de Potosí: Se nombre a los capitulares Luis Hurtado de Mendoza, alcalde ordinario, y Pedro de Ballesteros, veinticuatro, por diputados para que acudan junto con don Francisco Sarmiento de Sotomayor, corregidor de esta villa, a la cura y regalo de los indios de mita con motivo de la actual epidemia de sarampión," Potosí, 1.VIII.1619 (MC 598; MOM 521); BNB, CPLA 18, fs. 279v-280, "Capítulo de acuerdo del cabildo de Potosí: Nómbranse diputados para que distribuyan azúcar, carnero, pasas, pan, chuño y papas a los indios enfermos de viruela que hay en las parroquias de esta villa," Potosí, 4.IV.1628 (MC 652; MOM 557).

34. Castillo (AGI, Charcas 270, no. 33C--see note 30, Chapter II), 11, for comments on the 1617 order of the Príncipe de Esquilache meant to counter Indian absence from home pueblos; Zavala, Servicio personal, II, 27-28, for fugitives hidden on chácaras. Also, BNB, CPLA 12, fs. 241-243v, "Acuerdo del cabildo de Potosí: Habiendo el

corregidor don Rafael Ortiz de Sotomayor propuesto la resistencia que hacen los corregidores, caciques y principales de indios al entero de la mita del Cerro de esta villa, se resolvió pedir al virrey y al presidente de la audiencia de Charcas pongan remedio a ello," Potosí, 19.IX.1609 (MC 544; MOM 490).

35. ANB, M 123, no. 2, "Carta de su presidente, el licenciado Alonso Maldonado de Torres, a esta Real Audiencia: Este tribunal debe favorecer en todo a que la mita de Potosí se mantenga sin disminución alguna," Potosí, 12.XII.1606 (MC 498a; MOM 455), 2 fs. Maldonado said that revisitas were so fraught with fraud that it was better not to permit them.

36. ANB, C 1022, "Carta de don Pedro Lodeña, corregidor de Potosí, a esta Audiencia: Señala los inconvenientes que para el trabajo del cerro se siguen de la rebaja de mitayos como la de esta audiencia ha ordenado en los indios de Sipesipe, provincia de Cochabamba," Potosí, 29.XI.1606, 1 f. (MC 496; MOM 454). ANB, M 123, no. 2 (see note 35) was written in support of this letter.

37. Cited in Campo y de la Rynaga, 57-61.

38. Basadre, "El Régimen," 325, includes this quote from the 1601 cédula (my translation): "That inasmuch as the Indians are useful to everyone, and for everyone, everyone must look after them and their conservation, for everything will cease without them . . . ."

39. Cobb, "Potosí and Huancavelica," 98.

40. BNB, CPLA 12, fs. 241-243v, "Acuerdo del cabildo: Ante la inminente ruina de estas labores de minas por la falta de mitayos, por las razones que se enumeran, envíense algunos regidores ante el presidente de la audiencia de Charcas por el remedio y escríbase sobre lo mismo al virrey del Perú," Potosí, 19.IX.1609 (MC 543; MOM 489); BNB, CPLA 12, f. 251v, "Capítulo de acuerdo del cabildo de Potosí: Que se escriba al presidente de la audiencia de Charcas y al fiscal sobre la retención de los indios de mita de esta Villa en Oruro," Potosí, 21.X.1609 (MC 546; MOM 492). For Oruro's ability to repulse the Cabildo's own efforts, BNB, CPLA 12, f. 142, "Acuerdo del cabildo de Potosí: Que se pida a la audiencia de Charcas provisión para traer preso a esta Villa a Juan de la Portilla Aguero, teniente de corregidor de Oruro, por la resistencia opuesta a Pedro González de Menera, juez de comisión para sacar los indios de mita de esta Villa

retenidos en ese asiento," Potosí, 3.X.1608 (MC 535a; MOM 474).

41. For an in-depth look at the politics of Potosí, including the azogueros' hold on the Cabildo, see Crespo R., La guerra entre Vicuñas y Vascongados.

42. BNB, CPLA 12, fs. 241-243v (see note 40).

43. Campo y de la Rynaga, 27, for the mines playing out by 1612. Viceroy Montesclaros was responsible for denying Oruro access to mitayos and mercury; see ANB, M 86, no. 10, "Carta de esta Real Audiencia al rey en su real consejo de las Indias: El marqués de Montesclaros, virrey del Perú, ha resuelto avocar a sí todos los asuntos del Cerro de Potosí como cosa de gobierno, con desmedro de la jurisdicción de esta audiencia y daño de las partes por las distancia; también ha prohibido socorrer a las minas de Oruro con azogue," La Plata, 17.III.1608 (MC 523). Campo y de la Rynaga, 26, says that the Viceroy was ordered by the crown, in 1607 and again in 1611, not to permit the employment of mitayos at Oruro. Zavala, Servicio personal, II, 50, says that Montesclaros banned mitas for new mining zones in 1612, including Oruro.

44. ANB, M 131, no. 1, "Recurso ante la audiencia de La Plata. Don Francisco Michaca, cacique de Puna, provincia de Porco, sobre unos indios de dicho pueblo a quienes retiene injustamente en su chacra don Pedro Andrada Sotomayor y pretende mingarlos para las minas del cerro de Potosí," 21.II.-14.XI.1608, 13 fs. (MC 535i; MOM 476).

45. ANB, M 123, no. 11, "Don Gabriel Fernández Guarachi, indio, capitán general para el entero de la mita de Potosí en 1634, sobre los impedimentos que don Antonio Mogollón de Ribera, corregidor de La Paz, le opuso por sus particulares intereses al cumplimiento de dicha comisión en la provincia de Pacajes," La Paz, La Plata, and Caquiaviri, 2.VIII-24.XII.1633, 30 fs. (MC 683; MOM 569).

46. ANB, EC 1762-16, "Recurso a la audiencia de Charcas: El padre Fernando Doncel, de la Compañía de Jesús de la Plata, y a nombre de los colegios de Arequipa y Juli, sobre que se les ampare en la posesión de indios yanaconas exentos de la mita de Potosí que gozan por provisiones vicerreales, para sus haciendas del Collao," 1589-1696, 101 fs. (MC 1136a).

47. ANB, M 123, no. 5, "Don Pedro Uychu, cacique del

pueblo de Tinguipaya, provincia de Porco, sobre que no se le compela a dar más de los veintecinco indios de mita para el cerro de Potosí que señalo a dicho pueblo el virrey (Velasco)," Porco, 31.VIII-24.IX.1610, 8 fs. (MC 560a; MOM 502).

48. Ramírez del Aguila, 118-120, for his transcription of his 1629 letter. The Jesuits of Potosí, in 1610, said that one pueblo of 800 held a mere 14, "Pareceres de los Padres" (see note 26), 120.

49. ANB, C 1215, "Memorial de Luis de Vega, cura vicario del asiento de Tomahavi, provincia de Porco, a la audiencia de Charcas: Contra la acusación de haber él quemado las casas de los indios acarapis y sibaruyus de Tolapampa, para obligarlos a reducirse al pueblo de Tomahavi," Tomahavi, 13.XI.1616, 8 fs. (MC 586a; MOM 517a). In his zeal, Vega says of the Potosí mita:

"Para la mita de Potosí los llevan 20 leguas. pierdan su hazienda y libertad, q<sup>e</sup> es inestimable, se ahorcan por no yr alla. se depeñan, toman veneno, y se echan en los rios, malpazen las preñados por estos caminos y otros mil daños. y no es lejos ni caro. y para venir a missa 1. legua o dos es lejos ...."

50. For the origin of mita service in silver, see Zavala, Servicio personal, II, 69. His information comes from an anonymous and undated paper entitled "De la mita de Potosí, y reducciones del Reino." The paper is published in a Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Relations edition, Livro Primeiro do Governo do Brasil, 1607-1633 (Rio de Janeiro: Departamento de Imprensa Nacional, 1958), 7-28. A margin note on the document says it was obtained from "Dom Rafael Ortis." Don Rafael Ortiz de Sotomayor was Corregidor de Potosí from 1608 to 1617, and from the context of the paper I believe it was produced during his tenure (the Príncipe de Esquilache is said to be the most recent viceroy). Zavala discusses the paper on II, 67-70. A 1620 cédula against the entero en plata said it responded to Contador Alonso Martínez de Pastrana's report; perhaps he was the author of the paper. The 1620 edict is noted in note 54, below.

51. ANB, M 123, no. 2 (see note 35); and Zavala, Servicio personal, II, 32, respectively.

52. Ramírez del Aguila, 118-120; Jesuits of Potosí, "Pareceres de los Padres" (see note 26), 120. Both sources note the cause of the reduction from nine pesos per week.

53. This is the source described in note 50. The quoted passage is from Zavala, Servicio personal, II, 68-69.

54. BNB, MSS 5, fs. 251v-253, "Cédula real a la audiencia de Charcas: Informe al virrey sobre lo que el visitador Alonso Martínez de Pastrana propone que para remediar la pobreza de los metales y la falta de mitayos, respectivamente, se hagan seis socavones que atraviesen el cerro de parte a parte, y se quiten los mitayos y se encarcele a los señores de minas e ingenios que reciben de los indios siete pesos semanales para no trabajar en las minas . . .," Madrid, 15.VII.1620 (MC 603; MOM 525). Another copy of the order is AGI, Charcas 266, no. 25B, "tanto de el Cap<sup>o</sup> de Carta de Su Mag<sup>d</sup> al Principe de esquilache virey sobre Los indios de plata de Potossi," 2 fs., of the same date. See, also, Zavala, Servicio personal, II, 119 (based on Escalona y Aguëro--see note 116, Chapter II). Crespo, Guerra, 19, cites a letter from Francisco Sarmiento de Sotomayor to the crown, Potosí, 9.V.1619 (AGI, Charcas 52), that claims that one-third of the mitayos were missing.

55. Zavala, Servicio personal, II, 79-80.

56. Castillo (AGI, Charcas 270, no. 33C--see note 30, Chapter II), 8, says that the entire population of Condes, some 1,240 Indians, failed to come in the mita. They were joined, he says, by Moromoros, Chachacas and Ancocabas. I have seen two instances where caciques sought compensation for their service as capitanes: a) ANB, ACh.LA 14, fs. 14v-15, "Parecer de la Audiencia de La Plata en la información de servicios de don Antonio Peraza de Ayala y Rojas de Gomera, gobernador de la provincia de Chucuito," La Plata, 23.XI.1601 (MC 454; MOM 426); and b) AGNP, Derecho Indiano, C. 79, "Testimonio de los autos seguidos por D. Blas Ignacio Catacora, Cacique principal de Acora en la provincia de Chucuito, a fin de que se le acordasen las gracias y premios a que sus mayores se habían hecho acreedores por sus servicios al Rey, y su continua asistencia a la pesada mita de Potosí," (incomplete), 1625, 152 fs.

57. ANB, C 799, "Capítulo de carta de la Audiencia de La Plata al virrey del Perú: Se espera un acrecentamiento en la saca de metales de Potosí en razón de un nuevo beneficio de los metales negrillaos en que han venido a dar algunos mineros," La Plata, 26.XII.1602, 1 f. (MC 464); ANB, C 866, "Capítulo de carta de esta Audiencia al virrey del Perú: Aunque los metales de Potosí no tienen la riqueza que solían tener no hay disminución en los quintos reales, gracias a los nuevos procedimientos de beneficio

como el del cobre y la cal, a los que se da toda ayuda," La Plata, 26.XII.1603, 1 f. (MC 476b); BNB, CPLA 16, f. 314, "Capítulo de acuerdo del cabildo de Potosí: Se nombran al alcalde ordinario Salvador de Campos y al veinticuatro Antonio de Rueda como diputados para que informen sobre el nuevo cedazo de cerner metales ofrecido por Gonzalo Atúnez," Potosí, 8.V.1621 (MC 604a; MOM 525a).

58. Arias de Ugarte to the crown, La Plata, 10.XI.1600, Audiencia de Charcas. Correspondencia (ed. by Levillier), III, 457-459.

59. For the azogueros' response to the drought, BNB, CPLA 12, fs. 263v-264, "Capítulo de acuerdo del cabildo de Potosí: Habiéndose quejado los azogueros del rigor con que se les cobra lo que deben dar para la obra de las lagunas de Tabacoñuno, se nombran diputados que lo vean," Potosí, 20.XI.1609 (MC 549). The President of the Audiencia commented on the shortage of water in ANB, M 3, no. 15, "Carta de su presidente, el licenciado Alonso Maldonado de Torres, estante en Potosí, a esta Real Audiencia: Los ingresos de real hacienda están quebrantados en Potosí por falta de agua y azogue con que hacer funcionar los ingenios y beneficiar los metales," Potosí, 8.I.1609, 1 f. (MC 508). The following day he reported that the water was all gone: ANB, M 3, no. 16, "Carta de su presidente, el licenciado Alonso Maldonado de Torres, asistente en Potosí, a esta Real Audiencia: La escasez de agua para los ingenios es absoluta," Potosí, 9.I.1609, 1 f. (MC 539). Arzáns, Historia, I, 262-265, says that the drought took place in 1606.

60. These claims were made continually. They are included in BNB, CPLA 12, fs. 139-140v, "Acta de cabildo abierto celebrado en Potosí para ver lo que se ha de hacer en vista de que de seis años a esta parte los metales del Cerro Rico son de ley tan pobre que no alcanza su valor a cubrir los costos," Potosí, 30.IX.1608 (MC 535); and BNB, CPLA 12, fs. 144-145v, "Acuerdo del cabildo de Potosí: Sobre una petición de los azogueros para que se busque remedio a la ruina que amenaza a las labores mineras por la disminución de la riqueza del Cerro y otras causas," Potosí, 14.X.1608 (MC 535b). Nearly a decade later the problems had not changed: BNB, CPLA 15, fs. 346-348v, "Acuerdo del cabildo: Escribábase al virrey encareciendo la necesidad y urgencia de proveer lo conveniente ante la decadencia actual del servicio de mita que señalen los azogueros en memorial inserto, presentando ante este cabildo y amenaza para en definitiva las labores mineras de esta villa," Potosí, 29.VII.1617 (MC 590; MOM 518).

For more on the azogueros' problems with mercury, see AHP, CR 153, fs. 83v-85, "Carta del s<sup>r</sup> Presidente Don Di<sup>o</sup> de Portugal. escrita a nos Los Juezes/ oficiales De la Hazienda de Su Mag<sup>d</sup> desta Villa impl<sup>l</sup> de Potosi en Veinti cinco de novi.<sup>e</sup> de mill seis<sup>o</sup>s y diez y siete a<sup>o</sup>s," La Plata, 25.XI.1617.

61. ANB, M 143, "Representación dirigida a esta real audiencia por ... los azogueros de Potosí, sobre que se les guarde el privilegio de no poder estar presos ni rematarse sus bienes por deudas aunque hubiera precedido cualquier renunciación de esos privilegios," Potosí, 28.X.1602, 1 f. (MC 462); BNB, MSS 2, fs. 119-128, "Contra<sup>u</sup> dición suscitada entre los mercaderes y los dueños de minas e ingenios de Potosí sobre el cumplimiento de la provisión librada por don Luis de Velasco, virrey del Perú, para que estos últimos no puedan ser presos por deudas aunque en las obligaciones hayan renunciado al privilegio que en esta razón les estaba concedido," Potosí, 7.IV-9.V. 1603 (MC 468a); BNB, MSS 2, fs. 181-181v, "Testimonio autorizado de un capítulo de carta escrita por don Luis de Velasco, virrey del Perú, a don Pedro de Lodeña, corregidor de Potosí: Cómo se comprenderá el privilegio de que gozan los dueños de minas de Potosí para no ser presos por deudas," Lima, 14.V.1603 (MC 469a); BNB, MSS 2, fs. 143-144, "Provisión de don Luis de Velasco, virrey del Perú: Los privilegios concedidos a los dueños de minas e ingenios de Potosí para no ser presos por deudas a pesar de cualesquiera renunciaciones en contrario, se entiendan desde la fecha en que se pregonaran en dicha villa," Lima, 16.VI.1603 (MC 469b). For permission to rent mills and mines, BNB, MSS 2, fs. 140-142v, "Provisión librada por don Luis de Velasco, virrey del Perú, dando licencia a don Luis Dávalos de Ayala para poder arrendar el ingenio y minas que tiene en Potosí durante cuatro años y pagar la deuda que reconoce a doña Blanca de Montoya, y para que a los arrendatarios se les acuda con los mitayos que en el repartimiento general hecho por este virrey se aplicaron a dichas haciendas," Los Reyes, 9.V.1603 (MC 469; MOM 434).

62. Mesía Venegas (see note 3), 96.

63. BNB, CPLA 12, fs. 263v-264 (see note 59).

64. BNB, MSS 2, fs. 119-128 (see note 61).

65. BNB, CPLA 12, fs. 80v-82, "Acuerdo del cabildo: Habiendo pedido el corregidor licenciado Juan de Ibarra se nombre procurador de esta Villa ante el Virrey para cosas



tocantes a las minas, se eligió por voto a Cristóbal de Molina, tesorero de estas cajas reales," Potosí, 11.I.1608 (MC 518; MOM 466); BNB, CPLA 12, fs. 168-169, "Cabildo abierto de los azogueros convocado para conferir sobre el remedio a la falta de la mita y de azogue para las labores mineras de esta Villa," Potosí, 11.XII.1608 (MC 535f; MOM 478); BNB, CPLA 12, fs. 189v-190, "Acuerdo del cabildo: Vista la necesidad de que vaya un procurador a representar al virrey el perjuicio de la falta de azogue se determinó convocar a cabildo abierto para elegir procurador general ante el virrey a pedir remedio para la ruina de las labores mineras por la falta de la ley de los metales, de la mita y del azogue," Potosí, 25.I.1609 (MC 540b; MOM 480). For the azogueros' determination to get water, in one way or another: BNB, CPLA 12, fs. 94v, 98 and 102, "Capítulos de acuerdos del cabildo de Potosí: En vista de la sequía y falta de agua en las lagunas para la molienda de los metales, tómense las providencias necesarias para hacer procesiones y rogativas," Potosí, 21.II, 11.II, and 14.III. 1608 (MC 521); and BNB, CPLA 12, f. 208, "Capítulo de acuerdo del cabildo de Potosí: Que en vista de la escasez de agua en las lagunas para la molienda de los metales, se trate con el presidente de la audiencia de Charcas, los oficiales reales, los azogueros y demás interesados en la molienda, la traída del agua de las lagunas de Tabacoñño," Potosí, 6.III.1609 (MC 541b). See, also, the sources cited in note 59.

66. BNB, CPLA 12, fs. 158-164, "Cabildo abierto reunido para responder a la carta (inserta) recibida del marqués de Montesclaros, virrey del Perú, de Lima, 1608.XI.1, en respuesta a la que este cabildo le escribió (asimismo inserta) en 1608.IX.1 sobre el empobrecimiento de los minerales del Cerro," Potosí, 5.XII.1608 (MC 535e; MOM 477). The threat that the cerro might come into the hands of the Protestants was inserted for shock value, and was born of the azogueros' long-held contention that Potosí silver financed the Spanish crown's defense of Catholicism against the heretics.

67. ANB, M 3, no. 17 (see note 52, Chapter II).

68. BNB, CPLA 15, fs. 211-211v, "Acuerdo del cabildo: Se elige procurador general de esta villa ante el virrey (Esquilache) a don Juan de Ayala Figueroa para cosas tocantes a la labor minera y particular a la mita," Potosí, 11.V.1616 (MC 583; MOM 515). For mention of Ibarra, see BNB, CPLA 12, fs. 80v-82 (see note 65); and Sandoval y Guzmán, 20-21.

69. BNB, CPLA 15, fs. 346-348v (see note 60).

70. See the sources cited in note 43.

71. For the azogueros' involvement in contraband, see Helmer, "Comércio e contrabando"; and Hanke, "The Portuguese," 27. The Audiencia de Charcas said that they could make 150 pesos for every Indian they rented in a year: ANB, M 123, no. 3, "Carta de esta audiencia al rey en su consejo de Indias: De los arriendos de minas e ingenios en Potosí y de los envíos de jueces de comisión a las provincias de mita se siguen graves daños para los naturales que es menester remediar; en nueve meses las minas de Oruro han producido doscientos mil pesos ensayados a su Magestad," La Plata, 13.III.1608 (MC 522; MOM 468). Juan de Ayala was prosecuted for renting Indians in 1621, for a reported 112 pesos apiece (seventy-five were rented): BNB MSS 3, fs. 59v-60, "Cédula real a don Diego de Portugal, presidente de la audiencia de La Plata: Que informe sobre el estado de la causa seguida contra don Juan Ayala por arriendo de indios de mita contra lo dispuesto en esta materia, y se cele estrictamente el cumplimiento de las ordenanzas y disposiciones que prohíben tales arrendamientos," Madrid, 14.IX.1621 (MC 606; MOM 527). See, also, the "Relación del Príncipe de Esquilache," Los virreyes (ed. by Hanke and Rodríguez), Perú II (no. 281), 164 (from Biblioteca Nacional, Ms. 3078; it is undated, but responds to a cédula of 1620). Sánchez-Albornoz, 71, notes the transformation of the mita in general terms:

"Los titulares de las minas no siempre vieron con malos ojos la sustitución de trabajadores manuales por dinero, de las mitas personales por los indios de plata o de faltriquera. Disfrutaban así de una renta segura sin los inconvenientes de la mineración, o por lo menos les entraba numerario para reclutar indios de minga--más efectivos--quienes se contrataban a cambio de un salario. La mita comenzaba, pues, a tornarse un tributo pecuniario en favor de un grupo económico privilegiado o una contribución de las comunidades indígenas al abaratamiento de los costos de producción del cerro de Potosí. De esa manera se cubría parte de los salarios insumidos por la explotación."

He refers, however, to the period of the 1660s, and the transformation started much earlier than he suggests.

72. The best source on the "civil war" is Crespo, Guerra entre Vicuñas y Vascongados. Arzáns, Historia, includes information on inter-national battles throughout the work. I have relied, for this brief summary, on Padden, xxvii-xxviii. An example of the continuing violence took place in 1628, when a miner and his men caved in the the mine of another; the Indian barretero sued them for the

restitution--his tools had been buried in the cave-in (ANB, M 125, no. 13--see note 133, Chapter II--f. 232v).

73. BNB, MSS 7, fs. 71-72, "Provisión del marqués de Guadalcazar, virrey del Perú: El corregidor de Potosí reparta por via de depósito a los dueños de los ingenios que recibieron mayor daño en la inundación de la laguna de Caricari en 15 de marzo de este año todos los indios que hubieren vacado legitimamente y vacaren de aqui adelante comenzando por los ingenios más necesitados y que hubiesen comenzado ya a reedificarse, hasta ponerlos en el mismo estado que tenían antes de la reventazón," Lima, 6.V.1626 (MC 627; MOM 540); AHP, CR 201, fs. 40-45, "Provisión del Govi<sup>o</sup> p<sup>a</sup> El socorro de azogue por la inundacion de la Laguna" (by the Marqués de Guadalcazar), Los Reyes, 30.V.1626 (a copy); BNB, CPLA 18, fs. 19-19v, "Capítulo de acuerdo del cabildo de Potosí: vióse la petición de Cristóbal del Salto, procurador general, para que se suplique a la audiencia de La Plata suspenda la ejecución de las sentencias pecuniarias y de prisión pendientes contra azogueros de esta villa en causas criminales de maltratamientos y muertes de indios en las minas de Potosí, por hundimiento y sueltos que han caido de lo alto, en consideración de los grandes trabajos y pérdidas que han sobrevenido esta república por la inundación de la laguna de Caricari," Potosí, 5.VI.1626 (MC 629; MOM 541). This last request was not granted.

74. Zavala, Servicio personal, II, 36-40; Cobb, "Potosí and Huancavelica," 96-97; and Pereyra, 19.

75. BNB, CPLA 12, fs. 135v-136v, "Provisión del virrey: Apruébase el auto inserto, de Potosí, 1608.VI.28, del licenciado Maldonado de Torres, presidente de la audiencia de Charcas, para que ante la declinación de las minas de azogue de Huancavelica y la falta de este ingrediente todos los que sepan de minas de azogue las descubran," Lima, 9.VIII.1608 (MC 534; MOM 473).

76. BNB, MSS 2, fs. 65-69v (see note 180, Chapter II); BNB, MSS 2, fs. 81-81v, "Provisión librada por don Luis de Velasco, virrey del Perú, para que el corregidor de Potosí dé sin lugar a queja los 10 indios de mita que se han señalado a Leandro de Valencia para el trabajo de las minas que éste tiene en la veta Rica," Lima, 12.V.1602 (MC 457; MOM 428).

77. ANB, M 122, no. 10, "Carta del Virrey a la Audiencia de Charcas: Los asuntos de la mita de Potosí corresponden privativamente al virrey y esa a sólo resolverá

cuando de la tardanza se siga peligro, y con calidad de por ahora," Callao, 30.VI.1605, 1 f. (MC 491; MOM 451).

78. Esquilache relates the contents of his order in his "Relación" (see note 71), 163-164.

79. Cobb, "Potosí and Huancavelica," 101-102; and the "Razón del estado en que el Marqués de Guadalcazar deja el gobierno del Perú al Virrey Conde de Chinchón, la cual se divide en cuatro materias que son las principales a que se reduce la correspondencia con el Consejo de las Indias," 14.XII.1628, Los virreyes (ed. by Hanke and Rodríguez), Perú II, 249-273 (from Real Academia de la Historia, Colección Mata Linares, vol. XLIV, fs. 56-74v).

80. Examples of the division of responsibilities, and its effects, follow in the text and in the notes.

81. For an overview of the correspondence between Luis de Velasco and Corregidor Pedro de Lodeña, see BNB, MSS 2, fs. 179-180v, "Testimonio autorizado de capítulos de cartas misivas escritas en Lima a 1603.VI.6, Lima a 1603.VII.1, Lima a 1603.VIII.1, Lima a 1603.IX.1, y Lima a 1604.V.I por don Luis de Velasco, virrey del Perú, a don Pedro de Lodeña, corregidor de Potosí encareciendo que las mitas de indios para el trabajo del Cerro anden cumplidas y que se castigue rigurosamente a los corregidores que omitieron hacer lo que les toca al respecto," Lima, 16.VI.1603-1.V.1604 (the testimonio is dated 18.VI.1605) (MC 487; MOM 448). See note 77 for Monterrey's letter to the Audiencia de Charcas.

82. ANB, M 122, no. 11, fs. 273-274, "Carta de la audiencia de Charcas al virrey: A esta audiencia corresponde por reales cédulas el amparo y defensa de los indios de mita de Potosí y a ello acude cuando se ofrece," La Plata, 1.VIII.1605 (MC 492; MOM 452).

83. Ibid.; and ANB, M 123, no. 3 (see note 71).

84. Engel Sluiter, ed., "Francisco López de Caravantes' Historical Sketch of Fiscal Administration in Colonial Peru, 1533-1618," The Hispanic American Historical Review, XXV (Durham, 1945), 243.

85. ANB, M 86, no. 10 (see note 43).

86. ANB, C 1083, "Tanto simple de capítulo de carta de esta audiencia al rey: justifica la fundación de Oruro, no habiendo razón para decir que la fundación de Oruro ha

damnificado a Potosí, porque se hizo con la gente suelta de esta villa y en cumplimiento de disposiciones de su magestad para sacar a esa gente de allí," La Plata, 15 and 20.II.1608, 1 f. (MC 533).

87. ANB, M 86, no. 2, "Carta de esta Real Audiencia a su presidente el licenciado Alonso Maldonado de Torres asistente en Potosí: Dada la gran riqueza de las minas de Oruro, convendría asignarles una razonable cantidad de indios," La Plata, 19.IV.1607, 1 f. (MC 517; MOM 459).

88. ANB, C 1072, "Carta de la audiencia de La Plata al Consejo de Indias: A pesar de la enorme riqueza de las minas nuevas de Oruro no se les ha asignado para la labor y menos se ha quitado un solo mitayo a Potosí, siendo inexactas las informaciones que en contrario se hubiese enviado de dicha villa," La Plata, 6.XII.1607, 3 fs. (MC 515; MOM 465). The amount of revenue generated was up to 200,000 pesos after nine months, according to ANB, M 123, no. 3 (see note 71). See, also, ANB, Minas complemento, "Carta de esta Real Audiencia de La Plata al Consejo de Indias: Se ha provisto auto para que los mitayos de Potosí no puedan desviarse al trabajo de las minas nuevamente descubiertas en Oruro," La Plata, 13.III.1607, 3 fs. (MC 501; MOM 458).

89. See note 40 for the pressures that eventuated in the Corregidor sending judges to Oruro to retrieve Indians. For the Audiencia's suspension of one judge's commission, BNB, CPLA 12, fs. 293-293v, "Acuerdo del cabildo: Suplíquese del auto de la Audiencia de Charcas para que don Juan de Zúñiga cese en su comisión de sacar de Oruro a los mitayos de esta Villa, y escribase al Virrey sobre lo mismo," Potosí, 23.IV.1610 (MC 557g; MOM 497).

90. BNB, CPLA 12, fs. 54-54v, "Capítulo de acuerdo del cabildo de Potosí: Nómbrase al contador Juan Martínez de Mecolaeta para que contradiga en nombre de este cabildo ante al audiencia de La Plata el auto provista por dicho tribunal suspendiendo a los comisionados que el corregidor de esta villa había enviado contra los corregidores de diferentes partidos para el despacho de los indios de mita en vista de los muchos que faltan," Potosí, 31.VIII.1607 (MC 507a).

91. BNB, MSS 9, fs. 294-311v, "Provisión del virrey al gobernador de la provincia de Chucuito y a los corregidores de las demás provincias mitarias: Vean y cumplan las provisiones y cartas insertas so pena de suspensión, para el puntual entero de la mita de Potosí,"

Lima, 20.III.1616 (MC 589); this is a copy from 9.X.1790.

92. BNB, MSS 7, fs. 79-80, "Provisión librada por el marqués de Guadalcazar, virrey del Perú, para que en vista de los grandes inconvenientes que resultan de arrendarse minas e ingenios en Potosí, tanto para la saca y beneficio del metal como para el menoscabo de los reales quintos y el mal uso de los indios de mita que son vendidos por los arrendarios a otras personas para trabajos ajenos, no se hagan más los arrendamientos sin expreso consentimiento de este gobierno," Los Reyes, 30.IX.1626 (MC 633; MOM 544). This was in keeping with royal orders: BNB, MSS 3, fs. 59-59v, "Real cédula al presidente Portugal de la audiencia de Charcas: Sabiéndose que de Potosí se sacan muchos indios de mita a otras partes despoblando minas e ingenios en el Cerro y la Ribera, cumplase la ordenanza del virrey Toledo tocante a este punto," Madrid, 28.V.1621 (MC 605; MOM 526).

93. For two examples: the "Relación del Príncipe de Esquilache" (see note 71), 161; and ANB, RC 325, "Carta del marqués de Guadalcazar, virrey del Perú a la Audiencia de La Plata: Con copia, inclusa, del real cédula de Madrid, 1627.I.13, a dicho virrey, ordenándole que haga pagar, sin observación a los mitayos de Potosí los leguajes de ida y vuelta," Lima, 13.XI.1627, 4 fs. (MC 655; MOM 560). The cédula referred to in the second is BNB, MSS 5, fs. 230v-231v, "Copia de real cédula al virrey del Perú marqués de Guadalcazar: Páguese a los indios de mita de Potosí sus jornales de ida y vuelta en cumplimiento de las cédulas reales de 1609.V.26 y 1618.XII.10, no obstante lo arguido por el corregidor Sarmiento de Sotomayor y los azogeros en carta de 1621.III.17," Madrid, 13.I.1627 (MC 644; MOM 551).

94. "Relación del Príncipe de Esquilache" (see note 71), 166. This order was later reinforced by the Marqués de Guadalcazar (see note 92 for BNB, MSS 7, fs. 79-80), after the crown had ordered Toledo's ordinance against mill rentals followed (see note 92 for the cédula as well). See note 71 for what happened in the specific case of Juan de Ayala.

95. "Relación del Príncipe de Esquilache" (see note 71), 160. For comments on the Viceroy's statement, see Zavala, Servicio personal, II, 71; and Cobb, "Potosí and Huancavelica, 98.

96. "Relación del Príncipe de Esquilache" (see note 71), 161.

97. BNB, MSS 7, fs. 45-46, "Provisión del marqués de Guadalcázar, virrey del Perú, a don Felipe Manrique, corregidor de Potosí: En cumplimiento de la provisión de ... inserta, los corregidores remisos en el envío de la mita de Potosí sean suspendidos y se envíen en su lugar a personas que lo hagan," Los Reyes, 22.XII.1622 (MC 609; MOM 528); BNB, MSS 7, fs. 47-49, "Provisión del marqués de Guadalcázar, virrey del Perú: Reitera la de 1622.XII.22 sobre la exactitud en el envío de la mita a Potosí por los corregidores encargados de ello," Los Reyes, 10.II.1624 (MC 614; MOM 532). For an example of the process, see BNB, CPLA 18, fs. 40v-52, "Diligencias relativas a la designación del capitán Juan Serrano de Amalgro como corregidor de la provincia de los Carangas en sustitución de don Pedro Díaz de Alvarado que ha resultado culpado en la quiebra de la mita de dicha provincia," Potosí, 16.VIII.1626 (MC 639; MOM 550); and BNB, CPLA 18, fs. 37-37v, "Acuerdo del cabildo: Recibase por corregidor de la provincia de los Carangas a Juan Serrano de Amalgro con quien el factor Bartolomé Astete de Ulloa, corregidor de esta Villa, sustituyó a don Pedro Díaz de Alvarado, depuesto en virtud de las provisiones del virrey, por la quiebra que hay en la mita de esa provincia," Potosí, 9.IX.1626 (MC 632; MOM 543). Guadalcázar also provided Felipe with very explicit orders about how he was to conduct his duties as Corregidor de Potosí--AGI, Lima 39, vol. 2 (transcript provided by Lewis Hanke). Castillo (AGI, Charcas 270, no. 33C--see note 30, Chapter II), 12-12v, says that Guadalcázar also sent Juan de Sandoval and Suero Vigil to assist in the delivery of mitayos from the provinces of Quispicanchi, Canas y Canches, Asangaro, Cavana, Paucarcolla, Omasuyo, Pacajes, Caracollo, Cochabamba, Paria and others. The suspension of provincial corregidores for their failure to comply with their mita was also ordered by the Príncipe de Esquilache, in an order of 20.III.1616 (see note 91).

98. For Velasco, BNB, MSS 2, fs. 147-148v (see note 19); and for Esquilache, his "Relación" (see note 71), 164.

99. For letters by Maldonado on the shipment of the carta cuenta, see ANB, C 896, "Tanto simple de una carta dirigida a esta audiencia por su presidente, licenciado Alonso Maldonado de Torres, asistente en Potosí: la carta cuenta de la plata que se despacha a su magestad se ha cerrado con un incremento sobre la del año pasado," Potosí, 6.IV.1604, 1 f. (MC 483); ANB, C 898, "Carta escrita a esta Audiencia por su presidente, licenciado Alonso Maldonado de Torres, asistente en Potosí: Al trajinero para Arica se han entregado más de 120 barras de plata con un valor de

más de 50.000-pesos ensayados con destino a España," Potosí, 12.IV.1604, 1 f. (MC 485).

100. ANB, M 123, no. 2 (see note 35).

101. BNB, CPLA 12, f. 53, "Capítulo de acuerdo del cabildo de Potosí: Que se suplique al licenciado Alonso Maldonado de Torres, presidente de la audiencia de La Plata que postergue su retorno a la ciudad de La Plata por los graves negocios de minas que están pendientes en esta villa," Potosí, 21.VIII.1607 (MC 506).

102. Zavala, Servicio personal, II, 32-35.

103. Ibid., 45-50.

104. "Pareceres de los Padres de la Compañía de Jesús de Potosí. 1610" (see note 26), 116-131; Vargas Ugarte's commentary on the paper is on page 22 of Pareceres jurídicos. See, also, Zavala, Servicio personal, II, 45-48.

105. Zavala, Servicio personal, II, 49. Martínez de Mocolaeta, for example, was second to Molina in the voting for procurador in 1607 (BNB, CPLA 12, fs. 80v-82--see note 65); and he was sent to La Plata in that year to argue against the Audiencia de Charcas' suspensions of the Corregidor de Potosí's judges (BNB, CPLA 12, fs. 54-54v--see note 90).

106. Angulo (AGI, Charcas 268, no. 36--see note 58, Chapter II), 2, lists 4,413 with the repartimiento done on 16.VI.1610. His figure, and the same information in Valera (AGI, Charcas 268, nos. 69A & 69B--see note 58, Chapter II), 8, are both based, I believe, on the Archbishop of Lima's letter to the crown of Lima, 30.XII.1661 (AGI, Charcas 267, no. 16--see note 91, Chapter II). Cañete y Domínguez, 102, is mistaken in saying that the repartimiento was conducted in 1602. A copy of the 1610 repartimiento is apparently housed in the Bibliotheque Nationale, Paris (Ms. Espagnols 175, fs. 257-301)--noted in Hanke and Rodríguez, Los virreyes, Perú II (no. 281), 89, note "(10)." The University of Massachusetts, Amherst, Library has ordered a copy of that document, on microfilm, and at this date (April, 1981) it has not yet arrived.

107. Angulo (AGI, Charcas 268, no. 36--see note 58, Chapter II), 2v; Valera (AGI, Charcas 268, nos. 69A & 69B--see note 58, Chapter II), 8; and the Archbishop of Lima (AGI, Charcas 267, no. 16--see note 91, Chapter II), 2,



all agree that the figure is 4,294 Indians, with the repartimiento done on 21.X.1618--the first two sources based, I believe, on the third. Cañete y Domínguez, 102, says the same. The "Relación del Príncipe de Esquilache" (see note 71), 162-163, only mentions that he had done a repartimiento in 1618 and that he had made only the two changes in the form of the distribution. Cobb, "Potosí and Huancavelica," 100-101, comments on his report of the repartimiento in his "Relación." Another source of the same information is AGI, Charcas 267, no. 22A, "Capitulo de Carta q<sup>e</sup> escribió el principe De esquilache siendo birrey del piru a su majestad," 3 fs. (a copy from the year 1662); in the margin of the first page is "Da q<sup>ta</sup> el Virrey de como a hecho el Repartim<sup>to</sup> gen<sup>l</sup> de potossi y q<sup>e</sup> a salido a satisfacion." I know of no surviving copy of the 1618 repartimiento de la mita, but expect that there is one.

108. AHP, CR 201, last item, a partial copy of the 1624 repartimiento de la mita conducted by President Diego de Portugal of the Audiencia de Charcas, with pages missing at the beginning and at the end. The figures for the distribution of the mitayos are complete, however, and the adjustments of the repartimiento that were required in light of mathematical mistakes made by the President are also documented. Angulo (AGI, Charcas 268, no. 36--see note 58, Chapter II), 2v, and Valera (AGI, Charcas 268, nos. 69A & 69B--see note 58, Chapter II), 8, both say that Guadalcazar did not conduct a repartimiento.

109. AHP, CR 201, last item (see note 108).

110. Campo y de la Rynaga, 80-83. Zavala, Servicio personal, II, 27-28, says that the reducción effort began with the Conde de Monterrey. Sandoval y Guzmán, 20v, notes the 1607 order to the Marqués de Montesclaros. For his orders to the oidores and their response, see ANB, C 1160, "Carta de esta audiencia al rey en respuesta a real cédula de 1610.IX.7: la razón para que los indios se huyan de sus pueblos a esconderse en chacras, quebradas y uaycos son los malos tratamientos y trabajo intolerable de las minas de Potosí y otras partes y los que asimismo les hacen sus caciques, corregidores y curas doctrineros," La Plata, 17.II.1611, 1 f. (MC 561; MOM 504); the information on the Viceroy's order and their answer is on f. 5v. See, also, the "Billete que escribió el Príncipe de Esquilache al Marqués de Montesclaros pidiéndole que por escrito le diese relación del estado en que dejaba el reino del Perú, y lo que a él le respondió," 11.V.1616, Los virreyes (ed. by Hanke and Rodríguez), Perú II (no. 281), 139-140 (from

the manuscript in the Universidad de Sevilla, Colección de manuscritos del Risco, vol. XXII, fs. 114-121), for the Marqués' comments on the impossibility of compliance with the crown's orders.

111. BNB, CPLA 15, fs. 249v-350v, "Acuerdo del cabildo: Sobre el cumplimiento de la orden del virrey para que se echen a minas y reduzcan a sus repartimientos los indios forasteros, aquerenciados y vecinados en La Plata y en Potosí," Potosí, 2.VIII.1617 (MC 591; MOM 519).

112. Castillo (AGI, Charcas 270, no. 33C--see note 30, Chapter II), 12.

113. Ibid., 12v, for the seven revisitas and the total of 147 Indians so lost to the mita ordinaria. For the specific mention of Caquiaviri, Macha and other pueblos, BNB, CPLA 18, f. 203, "Acuerdo del cabildo: Véanse los papeles de las rebajas de indios de mita de los pueblos de Caquiaviri, Macha y otros, ordenadas por el virrey marqués de Guadalcazar, y háganse las reclamaciones que convengan," Potosí, 9.IX.1627 (MC 649; MOM 554).

114. Zavala, Servicio personal, II, 95; Campo y de la Rynaga, 84. Viceroy Velasco, Monterrey and Esquilache actually hampered the reducciones. Velasco and Monterrey both ordered that an Indian who was absent from his pueblo for ten years could remain where he lived if he wished (these orders are included in ANB, M 113, no. 1--see note 44). Esquilache prohibited judges from chasing forasteros who had gone outside the mita provinces, and so encouraged flight to outlying chácaras (BNB, CPLA 16, fs. 169-169v, "Acuerdo del cabildo: Viéndose la proposición inserta, presentada por los azogueros sobre los nuevos inconvenientes contra el entero de la mita, se resolvió remitir la proposición al virrey para que provea remedio," Potosí, 3.XI.1619 (MC 600; MOM 523)--the order is mentioned on f. 169; Castillo (AGI, Charcas 270, no. 33C--see note 30, Chapter II), 17-17v, says the order was dated 15.III.1617). These viceregal directives were issued in a spirit of fairness, both for the Indians and their new employers, but like Toledo's earlier protection of forasteros, they added to Indian migration away from mita service.

115. Campo y de la Rynaga, 85; and Zavala, Servicio personal, II, 119.

## C H A P T E R    I V

1633 TO 1648

The appearance of mita service in silver and the creation of a viceregal bureaucratic mechanism to administer the system from Lima were the major developments of the first third of the seventeenth century. During the subsequent fifteen years the consequences of those two developments were to be profound.

The Viceroy Conde de Chinchón broke with tradition in 1633 to send an outsider to conduct his repartimiento de la mita. The flexibility theretofore afforded to the mita by assigning that task to the presidents of Charcas, and having the corregidores de Potosí administer the mita on a daily basis, was eliminated. The result was a collision of the de facto mita with unmodified viceregal orders, and a battle between the azogueros and the President of Charcas on one side, and the Viceroy and his representative on the other.

The crown and its Council of the Indies were too isolated by distance, time and bureaucracy to play any other role in the struggle than as referees. The conflict at Potosí produced hyperbolic charges and counter-charges

however, and the crown was unable to determine what was really happening in Peru. It had no choice, therefore, but to leave rectification of the controversy to Chinchón's successor, the Marqués de Mancera (1639-1648).

The same difficulties that prevented the crown from determining the true situation at Potosí make quantitative observations about the mita from 1633 to 1648 extremely precarious. For example, the azogueros claimed that the effective mita ordinaria in 1636 was only 1,500 Indians.<sup>1</sup> Ten years later they set the figure at 2,600 and said that things had gotten worse.<sup>2</sup> To understand what was going on, therefore, one must keep a keen eye out for the arguments behind the numbers, and the reasons behind the arguments.

### The Azogueros

The status of the azogueros is especially difficult to ascertain. On the one hand the Cabildo de Potosí was able to provide a procurador, Sebastián de Sandoval y Guzmán, with ample funds to publish his arguments on Potosí's behalf before the Council of the Indies. On the other hand the azogueros claimed that they were near ruin and needed further crown assistance if silver production were to continue.

Sandoval y Guzmán's Pretensiones de la Villa Imperial de Potosí were published in Madrid in 1634.<sup>3</sup> The first section

of the work proposed means to improve silver production at Potosí; the remainder concerned viniculture and other matters. The essay on mining was the azogueros' official response to the viceroys' position that mitayos should be distributed on the basis of merit. At the same time, they continued to argue that their right to receive government assistance was based on their history of service to the crown. That sentiment was expressed in Sandoval's opening letter to the President of the Council of the Indies:

[Potosí,] which until recently has supported the the full weight of the Monarchy with its great riches, now places itself humbly at the feet of Your Excellency, needing your protection and asking for justice.

The Potosí silver industry deserved consideration because of its past service, and it required justice if it were to continue to serve. The shift in the basis for the azogueros' privileges, apparent in their arguments against Oruro and their imprisonment for debts, was now formalized by Sandoval y Guzmán.<sup>4</sup>

The procurador proposed four innovations for the mining sector, which he argued would contribute to the regeneration of Potosí, and therefore Peru: a) the reduction of the quinto to the diezmo; b) the execution of a reducción general; c) the distribution of mercury at cost and on credit; and d) the formation of a Consulado de azogueros.<sup>5</sup> Sandoval's arguments in support of these proposals were both legal and pragmatic, and thoroughly

explored the relationship between the crown and its vassals at Potosí.

The procurador predicated the reduction of the quinto on a combination of fairness and the azogueros' inability to pay the 20 per cent tax.<sup>6</sup> He noted that Phillip III had ordered that mining centers should remit one-fifteenth of production during their initial ten years in existence, one-tenth during the second ten years, and one-fifth thereafter.<sup>7</sup> Potosí had not benefited by the King's cédula because it had been discovered in 1545, long before Phillip III came to the throne; it was only fair, Sandoval argued, that it should benefit now.<sup>8</sup> Furthermore, the recently discovered mines at Castro Virreyna and Nueva Potosí were paying only the diezmo, and Potosí deserved to be treated as well as those less-important centers.<sup>9</sup>

Sandoval said that the legal means for Potosí's payment of the diezmo already existed. Phillip II had ordered that no more than one-tenth or one-twelfth of production be taken by the government if ore quality was below twelve ounces per quintal. The cédula in question had been issued for Spain, but it applied to Peru because it was included in the Recopilación de leyes that was sent to the entire hispanic world.<sup>10</sup> The current ore at Potosí, he noted, was no richer than five or seven ounces per quintal.<sup>11</sup>

Not only should the quinto be lowered, Sandoval argued,

but production costs should be subtracted before the crown's share was determined. King John I of Portugal had already ruled that costs be deducted before his percentage was exacted, and Spanish monarchs were always better to their subjects than other sovereigns. It would not do the crown well to be bettered in this instance.<sup>12</sup>

Sandoval assured the Council that any revenue lost by lowering the quinto would quickly be made up through expanded silver production. To begin with, the quintos currently sent to Spain were not as significant as they appeared. Of one million pesos despatched from Potosí, only 670,000 were derived from exaction of the quinto real; the remainder came from the sale of mercury, the quintos from other mines, alcabalas and the sale of public offices.<sup>13</sup> The change to the diezmo would permit the refining of desmontes, and thus every stone that contained silver would be milled, new exploration would take place, the Indians would return to Potosí voluntarily, and the boom of the 1570s would be repeated. Increased production would more than offset the 335,000 pesos lost by lowering the quinto to the diezmo. The alternative, the procurador warned, was the irrecoverable loss of Potosí.<sup>14</sup>

Sandoval did not mention that Potosí had one advantage that other mining centers did not: mitayos. His inclusion of increased mercury sales among the factors that would supplant lost quintos is interesting in light of the fact

that his third proposal was for mercury to be sold at cost. Moreover, his argument that the Indians would return voluntarily was inconsistent with his second proposal that new reducciones be conducted to augment the delivery of mitayos. Clearly, he was prepared for the possibility that the entire package might not be adopted.

Sandoval and the azogueros requested that a reducción be conducted in the entire realm, but said that they would accept one that was limited to the provinces that were obligated to the Potosí mita.<sup>15</sup> The crown had pursued that goal since the first years of the century, the procurador noted, but the viceroys had stifled its execution because they believed the task was impossible.<sup>16</sup> They had feared that officials of sufficient ability and disinterest were not available in Peru, and that less-competent judges sent to undertake the reducciones would prey upon the Indians like those that the Corregidor de Potosí sent to ensure that mita quotas were met.<sup>17</sup> If the resettlement program were not completed correctly, and fewer Indians were counted than actually existed, those quotas would have to be lowered.<sup>18</sup> The viceroys had also argued that chacareros would oppose the process, to protect the Indians who worked on their chacaras; if they were unable to corrupt the judges, they would resort to violence.<sup>19</sup> The viceroys had also worried that food production would suffer if the Indians were removed from those agricultural enterprises.<sup>20</sup>



The procurador said that other viceregal reservations had centered on the Indians themselves. The pueblos had no attraction for them, and without their cooperation the resettlement of the villages would be impossible. The Indians currently left their pueblos, he said, because of the mistreatment they received from their caciques, priests and corregidores. Many owed considerable sums in past tribute (rezagos), which would be demanded should they return to their homes. Finally, lands were not available for the Indians who did return to settle on, as they had been sold to Spaniards.<sup>21</sup>

Sandoval admitted the validity of the arguments that the viceroys had given for not undertaking the reducción general, but he argued that its execution was nonetheless imperative. There was no alternative if Peru were to return to its former prosperity. The program could be successfully completed through a combination of fairness and diligence, he said, as fairness would justify its execution and hard work would ensure its conclusion. It was unfair, for example, that chacareros who illegally availed themselves of Indian labor should continue to receive their services. It was also unfair that those Indians who were living in their original pueblos should bear the weight of obligations that were intended for many more. Again, diligence in the conduct of the reducciones would ensure their completion despite all the obstacles.<sup>22</sup>

Sandoval did not include the Potosí mita among the factors that he blamed for the Indians' flight from their pueblos. Nor did he identify the agricultural duties to which they were assigned by the caciques and corregidores. The Indians were accustomed to mining and agricultural service, he argued, because they had performed both under the Incas. Indian migration was caused by their forced participation in activities that were new to them, and those that kept them from their wives, families and homes. They liked to live on chácaras, he noted, because they received a plot of land and stayed with their families.<sup>23</sup>

Measures were therefore necessary to make life in the pueblos more attractive than it was anywhere else. The Indians' debts needed to be pardoned; their tribute waived while they were serving in the mita; and their lands, even if they were legally held by Spaniards, would have to be returned to them. Once the pueblos were repopulated, the procurador argued, the weight of the Indians' obligations would no longer be excessive, for more of them would bear that weight.<sup>24</sup>

Sandoval said that the reducciones were prerequisite to the conservation of Peru. Even if the mita had to be constricted as a result, justice demanded that they be done. The azogeros had called for the reducciones because they were confident that the large numbers of Indians that were scattered throughout the provinces would be documented.

The caciques and corregidores had called for them to prove that the provinces were devoid of Indians. This was the crown's opportunity, Sandoval concluded, to prove who was right.<sup>25</sup>

The third proposal that Sandoval y Guzmán put before the Council of the Indies was that mercury be provided to the azogueros at cost and on credit. Quicksilver had originally been distributed on credit, he said, but debts that the azogueros incurred during the sixteenth century had prompted the crown to order that it be sold only for cash. The procurador's arguments in support of this proposal were almost wholly pragmatic. He noted that President [sic, Oidor] Diego Muñoz de Cuéllar had allowed the distribution of mercury on credit in 1630, and silver production had climbed to three and one-half million pesos. While it was true that the azogueros owed the crown one and one-half million, they had paid back much more than that, and had contributed sixty million pesos in quintos since the introduction of amalgamation technology in the 1570s. Their debt would never be collected, he added, if they went bankrupt. The azogueros' needs were also a reason to grant the third request; Sandoval said they were too poor to pay for the mercury when it arrived, and had no one to borrow from. They were deserving, furthermore, by virtue of their hard work and sacrifice; for every forty marks of silver they produced, they spent sixty on

materials and labor.<sup>26</sup>

Sandoval manipulated silver production figures to arrive at the sixty million peso total for the crown's quintos. He left out all mention of moneylenders, mita service in silver, or "pocket Indians." Bailey Diffie has suggested that Sandoval's misuse of the production figures might be excused as "lawyer's licence."<sup>27</sup> It is more significant than that, however. Sandoval y Guzmán was playing two games concurrently. On the pragmatic level, the reduction of the quinto to the diezmo would have increased the azogueros' profits; the reducción general would have augmented the delivery of mitayos--in person and in silver; and the distribution of mercury on credit would have allowed the azogueros to declare their financial independence from the moneylenders and silver merchants. The proposals were therefore designed to return control of silver production to the azogueros--to free them from their dependence upon other groups and interests. But to win those concessions from the crown Sandoval had to convince the Council of the Indies that the concessions would also benefit the royal cause, and that the azogueros were deserving of more government assistance. The manipulation of the production figures was part of that process, as was the omission of all mention of the azogueros' misuse of mita service in silver.

The procurador's fourth proposal was that a Consulado

de azogueros be established. That body would have made the azogueros self-governing, and so have freed them from the bothersome meddling of the Audiencia de Charcas in their affairs. Sandoval argued that the Consulado would relieve the tensions caused by the Audiencia's interference in mining matters that it did not understand. Once they were freed from the court's unsympathetic and erratic decisions the azogueros would be able to concentrate on production.<sup>28</sup> Perhaps the phrase should have been "free to concentrate on their profits."

Each of Sandoval's proposals was supported with legal and pragmatic reasons why it should be granted. The crown was assured that it would not lose revenue by granting the new concessions, but would lose Potosí if it failed to do so. Other petitions submitted by the Gremio de azogueros in the past had carried similar warnings that the failure to act would bring the quick and irreversible ruin of Potosí. Yet despite their threats, the quintos flowed from year to year--albeit in smaller amounts--and the oft-promised demise of Potosí never materialized. Why would the crown believe the azogueros in 1634 when it had not before? Did it really risk anything by not acting at all? What did it risk if it did provide the azogueros more aid?

Sandoval y Guzmán's proposals, like the petitions that preceded them, served to counter the reports of azoguero

abuses the crown received from their enemies, and were therefore necessary to prevent the King from ordering measures that might have hurt them. Despite its isolation and relative powerlessness, the crown could--at any moment --order the abolition of the mita or cut off the azogueros' supply of mercury. Thus, more than the success of the new proposals hinged on their ability to convince the crown that they were loyal, industrious and valuable subjects. Indeed, there was nothing in the procurador's work to suggest that the azogueros were involved in any abuses at all. If they were unable to persuade the crown totally of their merit and need, the azogueros could at least keep it off-balance. Royal uncertainty in Madrid furthered the preservation of the status quo. Assuming that the azogueros were not operating their mills at a loss, the status quo was preferable to a government campaign against "pocket Indians," and other modifications of the mita that were now integral parts of the system.

Unfortunately for Sandoval and the azogueros, however, the real threat to the de facto mita was not to come from Madrid, but from Lima. The Marqués de Guadalcazar had started to reduce mita obligations, based on revisitas, and the viceroys had begun to deny mitayos to the azogueros for their involvement in abuses. But because the viceroys had left the local administration of the mita to the presidents of Charcas and the corregidores de Potosí, the

impact of those developments had been lessened in practice. Most azogueros were able to use their personal influence to retain their mitayos whether they were involved in misuse or not.<sup>29</sup> That situation changed dramatically in 1633. While the procurador was in Madrid singing their praises, the azogueros were under attack at home by a direct viceregal assault on the de facto mita.

Visitador Juan de Caravajal y Sandi

The Conde de Chinchón decided not to leave his repartimiento de la mita to the President of Charcas. Instead, he assigned the responsibility for it to Visitador Juan de Caravajal y Sandi. Caravajal arrived in Peru in 1633 to conduct visitas of the Audiencias of Lima and Charcas, and he began with the more difficult--the Audiencia de Charcas. Upper Peru contained the richest provinces in South America, but it was inhabited by colonists renown for their irreverence and independence. Like other visitadores, Caravajal faced the role of Daniel in the lions' den, for visitadores were so unpopular that usually antagonistic groups closed ranks against them.<sup>30</sup> The Marqués de Montesclaros had likened a visita to a gust of wind that stirs up the rubbish in the streets but accomplishes little else.<sup>31</sup> That would not be the case in this instance.

Chinchón was discouraged by the failure of his efforts to complete a reducción general, and the crown had ordered

him to abandon the program and sell the vacated lands. The solution for falling mita deliveries that the crown had pursued since the viceroyalty of Luis de Velasco had been put to rest by the viceroys' arguments that the reducciones were impossible to execute. Chinchón therefore had to find a new means to reconcile the falling originario population in the provinces and the labor needs of Potosí. He found the bases for a solution in the concept that mitayos should be assigned on the basis of merit, and the azogueros' widespread misuse of mita service in silver. The Viceroy instructed Juan de Caravajal to employ misuse of the mita as his central criterion for determining which azogueros would receive mitayos and which would not. Chinchón believed that misuse was so pervasive that once those azogueros who were guilty of abuse had been stripped of their Indians, there would be plenty of mitayos for the remainder.<sup>32</sup>

Chinchón's decision was a compromise born of viceregal inability to control the Indians--an accommodation with the reality that reducciones were impossible. Had that decision been implemented by the president of Charcas, its effects might have been minimal. Upon his arrival in Potosí, however, Visitador Caravajal began to enforce the Viceroy's instructions without any modifications at all.

Caravajal denied mitayos to the owners of twenty-nine of the one-hundred mills at Potosí.<sup>33</sup> He did not lower the



mita ordinaria by an significant amount, however; his weekly total came to 4,115 Indians. He ordered that travel allowances be paid, and he abolished the subtraction of the half-peso from the mitayos' wages to pay the veedores and the alcalde mayor de minas.<sup>34</sup>

The Gremio de azogueros was infuriated. The changes that Caravajal had made in the assignment of the mitayos, on paper, were not very great; and in truth the mills that were denied Indians had not been in production for some time. It was the functional impact of the Visitador's repartimiento that caused the azogueros' outcry. The mitayos were assigned in complete ayllus or pueblos, so that their service in person would be more tolerable. President Portugal had spread the Indians around, so that every azoguero would share the burden of those ayllus that did not come in the mita at all. Caravajal's order meant that some of the azogueros would receive entire squadrons of Indians who normally complied with their obligations, while others would receive contingents that were composed of those who had not appeared in Potosí for decades.<sup>35</sup>

Three more important reasons for the azogueros' unhappiness with the new repartimiento were: a) their acceptance of the distribution would mean their capitulation on the issue of the removal of mitayos from azogueros for misuse, and thus their confession that abuses existed; b) the assignment of mitayos in complete ayllus disrupted

the arrangements between the azogueros and caciques for the delivery of service in silver; and c) the owners of the twenty-nine mills also owned active mills, and they were used to having twice as many mitayos--in silver and in person--as they would now receive. The Caravajal repartimiento was unacceptable to the azogueros, but they could not condemn it for these reasons. They therefore resorted to their traditional bargaining position.

The azogueros complained to Chinchón that the new repartimiento would seriously lower silver production, and that it would impair their ability to keep the Potosí silver industry in business. The Viceroy was not moved by their appeals. He had expected their complaints, and the outcry seemed to confirm that the medicine that he had prescribed was having its intended effect. Nevertheless, he instructed the Visitador to soothe any legitimate grievances by adjusting the repartimiento when Indians became available because of future azoguero abuses, death, or the sale of their mills.<sup>36</sup>

Chinchón ordered the Audiencia de Charcas not to consider the azogueros' appeals. He told the court that the mita was not their concern, for the assignment of the mitayos to the azogueros was a privilege granted by the crown which could be revoked at any time for abuses on the part of the grantees. The azogueros, he said, had no right to receive mitayos, and could therefore lose access

to them without recourse to the legal system. The Viceroy's order repeated earlier such directives sent by his predecessors to the Audiencia de Charcas, but the precaution is nonetheless interesting in light of the traditional animosity between the court and the azogueros.<sup>37</sup>

The Council of the Indies' role in the controversy was limited to its service as a referee between the azogueros and the Visitador. The Council was too isolated to participate in a more direct manner, but it still represented an authority superior to the Viceroy. It could not force Chinchón to act as it wished, but it could discredit his actions. Both sides of the battle understood that, and they wrote to Madrid with explanations of their positions. Early in 1636, Caravajal told the crown and the Council that Potosí's problems were not his doing, but the result of maladministration at the local level. He charged that the President of Charcas and Corregidor de Potosí were immersed in personal business ventures that compromised their effectiveness as representatives of the crown. Their letters, he warned, were not to be trusted.<sup>38</sup>

The Council was flooded with the azogueros' complaints about Juan de Caravajal. They arrived just as the body was considering Sandoval y Guzmán's proposals and another azoguero memorial written by Gregorio de Obiando Luzón. One azoguero who complained was Pedro de Andrade Sotomayor. His fifty-mitayo share of the Portugal repartimiento had

been pared down to forty. Caravajal claimed that Andrade had indulged in misuse, and that his mill had been unlicensed.<sup>39</sup> Another who protested was Gerónimo Garavito. Caravajal countered his complaint with the charge that he had neither a mill nor honor to lose in the repartimiento, but was merely a bookkeeper who received mitayos for his services as a procurador of the Gremio de azogueros.<sup>40</sup>

The Visitador's characterization of the azogueros as greedy and disloyal did not correlate with their own manifestations of sacrifice and faithful service to the crown. The Council was unable to clearly determine what was happening at Potosí, so it ordered the Conde de Chinchón to investigate the situation there and then act accordingly. On April 6, 1631, Phillip IV signed a cédula instructing the Viceroy to resolve the difficulties that had arisen because of Caravajal's repartimiento, and he strongly suggested that another be conducted to replace that distribution of the mitayos.<sup>41</sup>

In the meantime, the azogueros had found a champion in President Juan de Lizarazu of the Audiencia de Charcas. Like many of his predecessors, Lizarazu participated in the daily administration of silver production at Potosí, and he supported the azogueros on mercury questions and in their efforts to win new concessions from the crown. The President offered the crown and Council his own solution

for the problems created by Caravajal's repartimiento: the assignment of all aspects of Potosí silver production to the President of Charcas. Lizarazu argued that the administration of the silver industry depended upon four elements: a) the delivery of mitayos; b) the use to which those Indians were put; c) the conservation of the mills; and d) the distribution of mercury. Practical experience, he said, was needed to understand and successfully direct each of those factors. The crown and the Viceroy both lacked the necessary experience, and decisions reached in Madrid and Lima took too long to implement. Although his bid for presidential control of Potosí production was not successful, Lizarazu's arguments would play a role in the future of the mita.<sup>42</sup>

The President's more immediate problem was that Juan de Caravajal was still in Charcas. The Visitador's uncompromising demeanor and Lizarazu's strong personality did not go together very well. The latter chafed under the former's usurpation of his powers while in Charcas, and he resented the charges that he and his Audiencia were corrupt and incompetent. The two officials clashed openly in 1636, over Lizarazu's plan for the distribution of mercury on credit to the azogueros. At issue was the President's abridgement of the crown's ban on such arrangements--his flexibility based on experience--versus Caravajal's demand that royal orders be followed to the

letter.

Lizarazu had ordered that 1,500 quintales of mercury be distributed from the royal stores, with payment deferred from April until June. If payment was not made at that time the azoguero forfeited all access to his mitayos until his debt was covered; and anyone who settled his account received the use of those Indians in the interim. Andrés de Sandoval had been one of those who was unable to pay for his mercury, and his mitayos were therefore transferred to Juan Manuel. At that juncture the Visitador intervened, removing thirty-four Indians from both Sandoval and Manuel. Apparently the agreement had provided for some sort of payment to the azoguero, for Caravajal treated it as misuse of the mitayos. Without his Indians, Sandoval was unable to raise the money to cancel his debt, and Juan Manuel lost the money he had paid to settle the former's account. The royal treasury officials in Potosí had opposed the distribution plan, and so sided with Caravajal against Lizarazu. The Viceroy ordered the President's program terminated, and he decreed that mercury be provided to the azogueros only when they could pay for it in cash.<sup>43</sup>

Lizarazu lost the battle over Andrés de Sandoval, and his plan for presidential control of silver production was turned down as well, but he did outlast Juan de Caravajal y Sandi.<sup>44</sup> In 1638, Chinchón recalled the Visitador and

ordered him to begin his inspection of the Audiencia de Lima. Lizarazu would enjoy only a brief respite, however, for he would soon have to contend with another visitador, Juan de Palacios.<sup>45</sup>

With Caravajal safely back in Lima, Lizarazu resumed his efforts on behalf of the azogueros. In 1638 he wrote to the crown and the Council of the Indies to suggest how he believed the April 6, 1636 cédula should be implemented. The order provided for a six-month period during which the Viceroy was supposed to hear the azogueros' complaints. Lizarazu said that they were unable to travel to Lima--a distance equal to that from Madrid to Rome--for lack of means, and they held no hope of recompense should they find the means. Chinchón was responsible for their plight, he noted, and they had no desire to ever see Caravajal again.<sup>46</sup>

The President preferred the alternative offered by the cédula: a new repartimiento. He suggested that the new distribution follow three guidelines: a) fixed quotas of mitayos for the mills based on their number of stamping mechanisms; b) a total of 300 mitayos for the soldados; and c) a provision that no azoguero could own more than two mills. These parameters, Lizarazu argued, would ensure that the Indians were distributed fairly, to as many recipients as possible.<sup>47</sup>

The azogueros supported the President's plan in their own correspondence with the crown; and they reiterated

their reasons for not traveling to Lima. Their support of Lizarazu's proposal was born of their hope that its adoption by the Council would mean the restoration of the status quo ante--merit played no part in the proposed repartimiento. Indeed, the azogueros asked the crown to reinstate the 1624 repartimiento until the new one was completed.<sup>48</sup>

Lizarazu's arguments and his three-point program won him the confidence of the Viceroy, who had grown disgusted with Juan de Caravajal. Chinchón would later note that while it was generally impossible to please everyone, the Visitador had managed to alienate almost everybody.<sup>49</sup> Lizarazu and Chinchón corresponded throughout 1639 on a remedy for the problems that Caravajal had left in his wake. On March 29, the Viceroy empowered the President to make adjustments in the 1633 repartimiento. Lizarazu responded that adjustments would not be sufficient; that more fundamental changes would be required. He openly argued that the azogueros' misuse of the mita had been a necessary and natural result of declining ore quality and rising production costs; that it was not an abuse, and should not be the basis for deciding which azogueros should receive mitayos. More specifically, Lizarazu said that the rental of a mitayo by one azoguero from another was not the rental of the Indian, but of his labor. The legal distinction, the President noted, was the very one



upon which the mita had been founded.<sup>50</sup> This discussion of the relationship between the de facto and Toledan mitas was not included in Lizarazu's explanation to the crown for his refusal to accept Chinchón's commission.<sup>51</sup> Perhaps he understood that the Viceroy was prepared to be told the truth, but that such an argument would probably hurt the azogueros' chances of winning new concessions from Madrid.

The Conde de Chinchón left the responsibility for any further efforts to comply with the April 6, 1636 cédula to his successor, the Marqués de Mancera. He counseled Mancera, however, that he should reinstate the 1624 repartimiento if he did not devise one of his own. The greatest problem facing the Marqués, he said, was the discovery of some means with which to rectify the falling originario population in the provinces and the labor demands of the azogueros. Some had suggested that forasteros should be included in the mita, but Chinchón disagreed. He argued that they would probably migrate further away, into "infidel" lands, if any such effort were made.<sup>52</sup>

By 1639 the Council of the Indies was thoroughly confused, frustrated and worried. Its efforts to gather information on the Caravajal visita and its investigation into the prospects for Sandoval's four proposals had been thwarted by the vehemence of the charges that were made in the azoguero-Visitador struggle. From 1636 forward the Council tried to employ the Audiencia de Charcas as a

relatively unbiased source of information.<sup>53</sup> As one would expect, the Audiencia did not care for Sandoval's proposal that a Consulado de azogueros be formed. The oidores delayed their response to the crown's query on the subject as long as possible, and submitted its opinion only after the Gremio de azogueros demanded that it do so. Following the lead of Fiscal Sebastián de Alarcón, the Audiencia argued that abuses would increase under azoguero self-rule and counseled the Council not to allow the establishment of the Consulado.<sup>54</sup>

In 1639 the crown asked the Audiencia how the azogueros could call for the construction of more mills at Potosí when Caravajal had closed twenty-nine of them; and whether the Indians should be transferred in mill rentals, despite the many laws prohibiting that practice. The azogueros had claimed that the inclusion of mitayos was necessary given current production realities.<sup>55</sup>

The crown and the Council were vainly searching for some common ground in the correspondence they received from Peru. They had earlier deferred judgement to Chinchón, but he had not resolved the problems created by Caravajal. Three and a half years later they had no other option but to reissue the April 6, 1636 cédula to the Marqués de Mancera; the order was dated December 7, 1639.<sup>56</sup>

The Council's support for a new repartimiento was made more explicit in the 1639 directive, however. Mancera

was urged to conduct the new repartimiento in accordance with President Lizarazu's three guidelines, and to include at least 5,000 Indians in the mita ordinaria.<sup>57</sup> The crown was concerned that the azogueros' warnings that Potosí would soon collapse if assistance were not provided might be true. It chose to offer that aid in the form of more mitayos, rather than selling mercury at cost or lowering the quinto to the diezmo, both of which would have cut into royal revenue.

#### The Marqués de Mancera

Despite the vehemence of the Council's 1639 order and Chinchón's suggestion that a new repartimiento be completed, the Marqués de Mancera did not move quickly to resolve the problems surrounding the mita. Instead, he studied the situation at length, balancing his instructions and the counsel of his predecessor against his own investigation of the status quo at Potosí. Like his predecessors, the Viceroy did not go to Charcas himself, but depended upon written reports from the officials who were stationed there.

Mancera did act quickly on minor measures for Potosí that simply required his implementation of standing orders or whose effects were temporary. In October of 1640, for example, he reiterated the Conde de Chinchón's order that Chucuito be represented by one capitán enterador for each

pueblo.<sup>58</sup> Early in 1641 he permitted the short-term exaction of the diezmo at Potosí to boost silver production for the upcoming carta cuenta of March 15.<sup>59</sup> That measure showed a degree of willingness to innovate to solve the problems of falling silver production, but it was also motivated by the Viceroy's desire to show an improvement in silver output under his administration. The azogueros were encouraged, but their hopes that Mancera would soon issue a new repartimiento de la mita were not to be fulfilled.

By 1642, the azogueros were frustrated with Mancera's inaction, besieged by a new shortage of mercury and plagued by Visitador Juan de Palacios. The Gremio and the new President of Charcas, Dionisio Pérez Manrique, both complained to the Viceroy that Palacios was overzealous in his efforts to collect past mercury debts. The current year's supply of quicksilver had not arrived until February 5, and the carta cuenta was scheduled to depart in March. Faced with the Visitador's unrealistic demands, the azogueros reported, many of their comrades had followed the Indians' example and fled from the villa.<sup>60</sup>

The one bright spot for the azogueros was the assistance they received from President Pérez Manrique. He gave them the same support, where the distribution of mercury and their petitions were concerned, as Lizarazu had. Pérez Manrique warned Mancera that only three or four of the azogueros could afford to pay cash for mercury when it

arrived; and that Palacios' collection of debts would ruin the silver industry if he were allowed to persist.<sup>61</sup> The Gremio informed the Marqués on October 8, 1642, that it was confident that Pérez Manrique would rectify all of the azogueros' problems if he were provided the opportunity.<sup>62</sup> The Viceroy responded that the President would indeed be empowered to adjust the 1633 repartimiento de la mita to their satisfaction.<sup>63</sup>

Mancera signed the requisite order and sent it to Pérez Manrique on December 1, 1642. By that time the situation at Potosí had altered dramatically. The alliance between the azogueros and the presidency of Charcas had broken down when the President assigned the enforcement of orders to punish three azogueros for their misuse of the mita to his brother Pedro.<sup>64</sup> Pérez Manrique had apparently not adopted Lizarazu's position that misuse was a natural result of fluctuating mining fortunes. His brother had taken seventy mitayos from the three azogueros and assigned half of them to a soldado, Francisco Mexía, in addition to the twenty-four he already received.<sup>65</sup>

The Gremio de azogueros responded to Pedro Pérez Manrique's actions on the night of October 26. It met in an open forum, with Corregidor Juan Vázquez de Acuña presiding. The azogueros complained that the ore they mined and refined was no longer rich; that production costs had increased; that there was not enough labor--only 2,600

of 4,116 mitayos included in the last repartimiento really served; that the crown continued to demand the quinto; that they had no assets left; and that their enemies had prevented them from obtaining new aid from the crown with their endless, insidious, reports. There was no hope for government assistance and no appreciation of their past service to the crown. Their years of sacrifice had been rewarded, the azogueros cried, with the removal of their mitayos because they had not been used correctly.<sup>66</sup>

The azogueros drafted a statement encompassing all of their complaints and problems. That document reflected the arguments that Sandoval y Guzmán had presented before the Council of the Indies, but the procurador's logic failed them where the removal of mitayos for abuse was concerned. They had to fall back, therefore, on their most effective bargaining tactic. The azogueros presented the Corregidor with the rights to their mitayos, and challenged him to distribute them to those who could better employ them in service to the crown. Why, they asked, should they prolong the now inevitable demise of Potosí? Vázquez de Acuña refused to accept the azogueros' dejación, and the meeting disbanded without a final resolution.<sup>67</sup>

The dejación and the Corregidor's refusal to permit it were a ploy to pressure the Viceroy to act on the azogueros' behalf. If future attacks for misuse were to be prevented, then a new repartimiento, based on Lizarazu's non-merit

guidelines, was absolutely crucial. The process was complicated, however, when the soldados and miners, led by Pedro Pérez Manrique, offered to assume responsibility for Potosí silver production in the place of the azogueros. The azogueros then warned that any attempt to assign their "available" mitayos to the soldados would mean serious trouble. Indeed, even without such a move, the soldados and azogueros met in an armed confrontation in the center of Potosí on November 30, 1642. Azogueros Juan Antonio Muñoz de Cuéllar was killed, and two soldados and a miner were wounded.<sup>68</sup>

President Pérez Manrique and the Audiencia de Charcas reacted to the dejación in La Plata on November 29. They ordered the azogueros to meet and decide upon a more appropriate means to represent their displeasure than the abandonment of their mitayos. On December 2, the Gremio met again, to draw up its reply to the Audiencia. The azogueros asked what a soldado was going to do with more than sixty mitayos. They argued that they had invested some 30,000 to 40,000 pesos each in their mills, and would not have done so had it not been for Toledo's pledge that mitayo labor would be provided. Thus, the azogueros established their claim that the receipt of mitayos was their right, not a privilege. The Gremio voted to send seven deputies to La Plata, to carry its response to the Audiencia's order, and then to Lima to argue its case before

the Viceroy himself.<sup>69</sup>

Meanwhile, Pedro Pérez Manrique had journeyed to La Plata to confer with his brother.<sup>70</sup> The Audiencia met on December 2, 1642 to consider the situation at Potosí, and the President explained to the oidores that his brother's actions had been taken on his orders. The directives of October 26 were issued to castigate individual azogueros for misuse, specifically "pocket Indians." The legal basis for Pedro Pérez Manrique's actions and the exact nature of the soldados' offer had been unclear to the azogueros, the President argued, and rumors had given rise to the violence. The Audiencia voted to send the question of the dejación to the Marqués de Mancera for resolution, and to despatch President Pérez Manrique to Potosí to settle matters down there.<sup>71</sup> He left for the villa the following day.

On the road to Potosí, Dionisio Pérez Manrique met the Gremio de azogueros' seven deputies. When he learned of their mission, and especially their intention to argue before the Viceroy, he dashed off a quick letter to his oidores. The President asked them not to be persuaded by the deputies' portrayal of the events in Potosí, and not to allow them to go on to Lima. His concern was caused by his fear that he had made a grave mistake by leaving the execution of his orders to his brother. In the letter, Pérez Manrique confessed that he had erred in assigning the mitayos to Mexía. He said that he had thought that the



soldado was an azoguero. Mexía's discoveries of silver deposits at Potosí were legendary, however, and the additional Indians would no doubt be used to uncover new veins of rich ore. The President promised, finally, to be more careful in the future.<sup>72</sup>

From Potosí, on December 6, Pérez Manrique reported that the azogueros who were leading the dejación were those he had denied mitayos in October. Most of the azogueros, he claimed, were not involved in the maneuver. He also ordered the oidores to send the Gremio's deputies back to Potosí; one could stay as their representative, but the other six had to work in their mills to pay their debts to the crown.<sup>73</sup>

The President wrote to the Audiencia again the next day. He denied all wrongdoing on his part or that of his brother. For the first time the source of the problems came to light. The azogueros charged that Pedro had collected two pesos from each of the soldados for his services on their behalf. Pérez Manrique said that the azogueros' initial reports of a military confrontation between themselves and the soldados had been overblown. They had claimed that the soldados marched on the central plaza in columns of three, with the intention of razing the villa, but the President said that was not so. He instructed the oidores to leave the resolution of the dejación to the viceroy, and he was joined by the azogueros

in that regard.<sup>74</sup>

President Pérez Manrique gathered the azogueros together on December 9 to promise that he would do nothing about the dejación until he received word from Mancera or the crown. With these assurances--and the knowledge that the Viceroy would have to respond to their complaints--the azogueros agreed to recall their deputies from La Plata as he requested.<sup>75</sup>

Once the issue of the dejación had been eliminated--by the end of March, 1643--Pérez Manrique and the azogueros were again working together. Nothing more was ever said about the events of November and December of the previous year. Under the President's direction the azogueros drew up another petition for the Viceroy. The document included material from 1642 and 1643, and generally repeated the requests made by Sandoval y Guzmán in his Pretensiones: the quinto needed to be reduced to the diezmo; mercury sold at cost; and a Consulado de azogueros formed. The azogueros also asked for an increase in the mita ordinaria to 6,000 Indians. This last point may seem out of step with reality, but it effectively pressed the issue of the repartimiento without mentioning Caravajal or reducciones; Mancera was known to consider the latter impossible.<sup>76</sup>

Pérez Manrique supported the azogueros' petition with letters to the crown, and later, by gathering supporting testimony from the religious orders of Potosí that the

villa's silver industry was indeed near ruin as the azogueros claimed.<sup>77</sup> The President argued that mercury should be distributed at cost, that the diezmo should replace the quinto, and that the azogueros should be allowed ten years during which to pay their debts to the crown for mercury they had received on credit. Those debts, he added, would have to be adjusted in light of the azogueros' overpayment for quicksilver from 1609 to 1631; they now claimed that they had paid ten pesos per quintal too much because the crown's 1609 order to distribute mercury at cost had not been obeyed.<sup>78</sup>

Other government officials joined Pérez Manrique in supporting the azogueros' requests. The Corregidor de Potosí, Blas Robles de Salzedo, wrote to Mancera on May 30, 1643. He said that the best way to improve upon mita deliveries was to include the forasteros, from their current places of residence. The effective mita ordinaria had fallen to 2,934 Indians, the Corregidor noted, with 2,693 of those going to the azogueros and 241 to the soldados. The 1,088 that were missing, he argued, could be regained with the inclusion of the forasteros.<sup>79</sup>

Despite the support of Pérez Manrique, Blas Robles de Salzedo and the religious orders, however, the Marqués de Mancera was not moved by the azogueros' petitions. He had begun to distrust them and their motives, and he accused them of greatly exaggerating their plight.<sup>80</sup> Part of the

reason for the Viceroy's demeanor was the ongoing denunciation of one azoguero by another for his misuse of mitayos. Azoguero unity had been fractured by an intra-Gremio struggle between the few azogueros who had benefited by the 1633 repartimiento and the others, who had been hurt.<sup>81</sup> The charges of abuse raised questions about the azogueros' credibility and merit at the very moment that Mancera was weighing his response to their requests. The Viceroy sent ex-Corregidor Juan Vázquez de Acuña back to Potosí to conduct a visita, and he ordered the Gremio de azogueros to send a representative to Lima.<sup>82</sup>

In September, 1643, the azogueros answered Mancera's criticism and his order to despatch a representative. They said their economic difficulties had made the collection of seven pesos apiece, to pay the soldado who carried their petition to Lima, very difficult; they could not afford to support an emissary. The azogueros also heightened the stakes on the mercury issue. They claimed that they owed the crown 400,000 pesos, and that their overpayment for quicksilver had amounted to two million. They told the Viceroy that they would not demand immediate payment of the 1,600,000-peso balance if mercury were provided to them at cost!<sup>83</sup>

On December 1, 1643, the azogueros wrote to Mancera again, to complain that their requests had not been

answered. They said that they were pleased with Blas Robles de Salzedo and glad that Vázquez de Acuña was taking only public testimony in his visita. Robles had improved the mita ordinaria, they reported, by 163 Indians. They were still having problems with mercury, however, and the next carta cuenta would suffer as a result.<sup>84</sup>

The azogueros' prediction was to come true, for in January of 1644 both Robles and Pérez Manrique reported that the carta cuenta would indeed be lower than the last, because of the problems with mercury and the azogueros' debts. The officials explained that in order to pay their debts, the azogueros had to sell the mercury that was allotted to them, less 16 per cent interest on the loans they contracted to buy it when it arrived. They then had very little quicksilver to use in their mills.<sup>85</sup> Mancera had already chided Pérez Manrique once for defeatism; his earlier predictions that the carta cuenta would be low were met with a viceregal lecture that a government official's duty was to perform the impossible.<sup>86</sup>

The Marqués answered the azogueros' September letter on January 1, 1644. He told them to name someone already in Lima to represent them if they would not afford to send a deputy. He was preparing the new repartimiento de la mita, considering their requests and ruling on matters left from Chinchón's viceroyalty, he said, and it would do them well to be represented.<sup>87</sup> The azogueros understood the Viceroy's

message, and they sent deputy Phelipe de Bolívar to Lima at once.<sup>88</sup>

Mancera took two more years to develop the new repartimiento. The delay was caused by the need to conduct a census in the obligated provinces, for the Viceroy doubted that there were enough Indians to meet Potosí's requirements. Should the enumeration demonstrate that there were too few, then new provinces would have to be added or the mita ordinaria reduced. The census showed, however, that there were sufficient Indians in the sixteen provinces and the Marqués proceeded. He maintained the quotas included in the 1633 repartimiento--a total of 4,116--but added to that figure the 380 mitayos previously assigned to the mines at Porco and one-tenth of the yanaconas living in the obligated provinces (about 700 per week). The mita ordinaria was thereby increased to 5,196 Indians, with the azogueros receiving 4,636 mitayos and the soldados 440.<sup>89</sup>

Unsure about the feasibility of his distribution, the Viceroy sent a draft of it to Potosí for comments. He instructed the Corregidor to obtain the azogueros' response in an open forum.<sup>90</sup> This gesture of renewed cooperation between the azogueros and the Viceroy was to be undermined by the variety of responses that he received in return.

The requested meeting took place on July 29, 1646, with most of the azogueros responding to the repartimiento

favorably. The 5,196 Indians would be sufficient, they said, if all of them served; but that was a problem. Only 2,600 mitayos were currently working at Potosí, and only 80 of the 380 who were assigned to Porco. The azogueros were particularly unsure about the dependability of the yanaconas. They expressed their continued concern that whatever the number of mitayos, they should be distributed fairly, on the basis of each mill's production capabilities (that is, not on the basis of merit). Each azoguero's contingent, they added, should be formed with the various ayllus' records of compliance in mind.<sup>91</sup>

Azoguero Pedro de Vallesteros wrote separately that the types of Indians assigned to each azoguero were as important as their total number. It was better, he said, to assign the ayllus as units, however, than split them up as Diego de Portugal had done in 1624.<sup>92</sup>

The royal treasury officials counseled that a visita of the cerro and the mills was needed to determine who should receive the mitayos. They noted one case in particular, the Barriales mill, where no silver had been produced for many years. The mitayos that were assigned to it were rented, and the proceeds were used to support the azoguero--a nun.<sup>93</sup> The royal officials were holding, therefore, to the importance of ensuring that azogueros who were guilty of misuse were not provided with mitayos.

Corregidor Juan de Velarde confessed that he was

worried about the proposed distribution. Some of the azogueros who were highly favored were known to be involved in misuse, he said, and others who were conscientious and received fewer Indians would surely object. Velarde suggested that the royal officials draw up a list of those who had complied with their duties and obligations; unless the meritorious received the mitayos, he warned, the villa would be overcome by recriminations.<sup>94</sup> From the azogueros' comments it is clear that the Corregidor did not show them the details of the proposed repartimiento. His insistence that the distribution of mitayos be based on merit, echoed by the royal officials, worked to nullify the azogueros' demand that they be assigned according to each mill's production capability.

This motley response to the repartimiento by the azogueros and government officials in Potosí raised new questions in the Viceroy's mind. Mancera sent back a list of four queries, which he asked the azogueros to answer: a) which mills were totally destroyed, and how long had they been out of production? b) which ayllus were good, which were bad, and which were mediocre? c) what problems could be expected if the forasteros in the provinces were obliged to make up the difference between 2,600 and 4,116 mitayos, and how could they be overcome? and d) why did no more than eighty mitayos appear at Porco?<sup>95</sup>

These questions were asked without the benefit of the



Corregidor's visita of the cerro and the mills, conducted with Carlos de Oviedo in August of 1646. Velarde included the results of that inspection with a letter to the Marqués of August 31 concerning the failure of provincial corregidores to improve upon their deliveries of mitayos. The contingent from Chucuito, he noted, had not arrived at all, Paria's group was doubtful, and rezagos for both were inevitable.<sup>96</sup>

The azogueros wrote to Mancera the same day that he wrote to them, September 1, 1646. They asked him not to be persuaded by the opinions of five or six azogueros who had benefited by the Caravajal repartimiento and hoped to prevent the new one by spreading lies about their colleagues in the Gremio. They noted that the Council of the Indies had not confirmed the 1633 distribution of mitayos, and they argued that the sooner it was replaced the better.<sup>97</sup>

On October 3, 1646, the azogueros answered the four questions the Viceroy had put to them in his letter of September 1. They replied that the Velarde-Oviedo visita should be the basis for distributing the mitayos. The determination of which ayllus were good, bad or mediocre was difficult, for the Indians were delivered according to their pueblos; the azogueros sent a list based on each pueblo's history of compliance. The inclusion of forasteros would be beneficial, they said, because the census had shown that there were plenty of them in the provinces. The Gremio

suggested that the forasteros be obliged to serve in the mita from their places of residence, under the direction of local government officials.<sup>98</sup>

The azogueros argued, however, that strict penalties would be required to keep priests and corregidores from protecting the forasteros for use in their own schemes. They believed, furthermore, that the 5,000 mitayos included in the Viceroy's repartimiento would probably result in an effective mita ordinaria of 4,000 Indians, but that that number would be sufficient. The 300 mitayos who failed to arrive at Porco were irrecoverable, because Porco drew upon the same geographic area as Potosí. If the 2,600 current mitayos were joined by 700 yanaconas and 1,700 forasteros, the azogueros thought, then the mita could be successful once again.<sup>99</sup>

The Marqués de Mancera was looking for a consensus where there was none, and perfection where it was not possible. Administration of the mita from Lima was proving to be as difficult as trying to govern Peru from Madrid. The more information the Viceroy received, the less consistent it became. The royal treasury officials did not help his indecisiveness when they alleged that the crown's quintos were low because the azogueros were heavily involved with "pocket Indians." They charged, moreover, that the azogueros mistreated the Indians so that they would leave Potosí, and then demanded service in silver from the

caciques. Their inspection of the cerro and the mills, the officials said, had shown that most of the azogueros were refining desmontes, if anything at all, simply to present the appearance of production.<sup>100</sup>

The treasury officials' report did not correlate with Corregidor Velarde's contention that the azogueros were trying to hire mingas with the money they received from the caciques, but that they could not find enough Indians who were willing to work in the mines. These comments were included in Velarde's letter to the Viceroy of October 31, 1646, which served as the cover for the azogueros' answers to his four questions.<sup>101</sup>

By the end of 1646, Mancera was thoroughly frustrated and vindictive. The crown's quintos, the royal officials reported, were down by 43,000 pesos despite the Marqués' suspension of the collection of mercury debts until the crown could rule on the azogueros' overpayment for mercury from 1609 to 1631.<sup>102</sup> The Viceroy was particularly upset with the reports he received that the azogueros were using mita service in silver for their own purposes, and the Corregidor's statement that mita quotas were impossible to meet.<sup>103</sup> The crown was at war and needed money, Mancera argued, and thus anyone who did not labor to raise that money was a traitor; the azogueros' use of "pocket Indians" was not just an abuse, it was treason. The Marqués laid down the law:

Those who merit assistance will receive it; those who do not, will not. And for now, the proof of who qualifies and who does not will be based on two factors: the first is the punctual payment for mercury; the second is the improvement of the royal quintos--not only must they not go any lower, they must return to earlier levels. Any of you who fails me in this regard, I assure you, will feel my response personally, and in his pocketbook.<sup>104</sup>

The Gremio de azogueros asked Mancera to implement his repartimiento on November 1, 1646, and he promised, on November 30, that they would not have to wait long--he would finish it once the end-of-the-month correspondence had been despatched; he did not.<sup>105</sup> The Viceroy's warning to the azogueros suggests the probable cause of his inaction on the matter. He had rejected their argument that the receipt of mitayos was their right, by virtue of their pact with Francisco de Toledo. He was now an ardent believer in the use of merit as the basis of the repartimiento; and he did not believe that the azogueros were deserving of his assistance. The royal officials reported, in April of 1647, that "pocket Indians" had again caused a very low carta cuenta to be sent from Potosí.<sup>106</sup> The report may well have been the final nail in the repartimiento's coffin.

In his relación for the Viceroy Conde de Salvatierra (1648-1655), Mancera related his experiences with the azogueros. He said that he had tried to help them, but without success. They habitually exaggerated their problems; each year they said they were near ruin, but the

quintos came nonetheless. His efforts toward a new repartimiento had stalled, he said, because the information he had received from Potosí was untrustworthy, and fairness in the distribution was absolutely fundamental. He had decided, therefore, that it would be better to leave the azogueros with the hope that a new repartimiento would be completed than to risk doing it wrong.<sup>107</sup>

Thus, the azogueros did not get their new repartimiento, and their attempt to impose their view of the mita on the Marqués de Mancera had failed as well. The struggle over the conceptual basis of the mita--whether it was their right or a privilege--had important temporal consequences, for not only did the azogueros fail to obtain new concessions, they were unable to reverse the damage that had been done by Juan de Caravajal in 1633.

#### The de facto Mita

The fifteen years from 1633 to 1648 were dominated by the political machinations concerning the repartimiento. Viceregal administration did little to improve the faltering delivery of mitayos, but it did evidence some movement away from the belief that the corregidores could be held accountable for the failure of the Indians to arrive in Potosí.

In 1634, for example, the Conde de Chinchón ordered that each pueblo in Chucuito was to be represented by its

own capitán enterador. The Viceroy hoped that the dispersion of the capitán's duties would increase the province's compliance with its mita obligation, but it did not.<sup>108</sup> Juan de Caravajal reported, in 1636, that only 600 of the 1,800 mitayos required from Chucuito were actually present in Potosí. The quotas from the other provinces, he added, were unfilled as well. The Visitador held the corregidores, priests and caciques responsible. He said that they drove the originarios from their pueblos to make room for the forasteros they used in their own enterprises.<sup>109</sup>

That same year, Lizarazu claimed that there were more Indians in the provinces than ever. He said they were only spread wider than before, and that they had learned to evade the mita. The President called for the inclusion of yanaconas and forasteros in the mita, and for grave penalties to be applied to corregidores and priests who harbored runaway Indians. The priests, he said, should not be granted continuance after three years unless their cooperation with the mita was documented by the Corregidor de Potosí. Corregidores should serve perpetually--a decade at least--rather than the present two or three year term. Lizarazu argued that the economic activities they used to recover the initial cost of their offices would be run with moderation if their tenure were longer.<sup>110</sup>

After Caravajal departed Potosí in 1638, Corregidor

José Sáez de Elorduy and President Lizarazu agreed to send Diego Núñez de Ovando to oversee the delivery of mitayos from Canas y Canches, Carabaya, Chucuito, La Recaja, Omasuyo, Pacajes, Paria and Paucarcolla. Their decision was in accordance with an order from Chinchón that the Corregidor do whatever he deemed was necessary to increase provincial compliance with mita quotas.

A more persuasive indication that the caciques were unable--or perhaps unwilling--to deliver their full contingents of mitayos was included in the azogueros' reply to Mancera's second set of questions. After they had expressed their concerns about the inclusion of the forasteros and yanaconas in the mita, they argued that every mitayo should serve in person. The azogueros said that the caciques no longer delivered the silver that they collected from the Indians for the purpose of meeting their mita quotas, but kept it for themselves.<sup>112</sup> The azogueros no doubt expected that they would be able to retain some access to service in silver extralegally, but their confession that the de facto mita was no longer meeting their needs was important. Velarde's reference to the inevitability of rezagos de mita for Paria and Chucuito in 1646 was another sign that the caciques were no longer satisfying the demands of the azogueros.<sup>113</sup>

In addition to the traditional difficulties that the caciques faced in delivering the mitayos to Potosí,

they were now hindered, as Lizarazu suggested, by the Indians' growing ability to evade mita service. An example is the case of the Carrillo brothers.

From 1638 to 1640 Antonio and Agustín Carrillo held the capitán enterador from Potobamba at bay with the claim that they were mestizos, and therefore exempted from mita service. The two lived in Potobamba and their father was an Indian, but their mother was a mestiza. The case was ultimately brought before the Audiencia de Charcas, where the Fiscal counseled that a ruling in favor of the Carrillos would destroy the mita, for the judicial system would soon be clogged by the petitions of Indians claiming some degree of Spanish ancestry. He noted that the two looked, dressed and lived as Indians. The Audiencia rejected this ethnological definition of "Indian-ness" and voted to prevent the caciques of Potobamba from including the Carrillos in future mita deliveries.<sup>114</sup> A century of miscegenation since the conquest of Peru had created a new problem for the mita: just who was an Indian?

In another case, the gobernador and capitán enterador of Santiago de Yanaoca, Fernando Surco, accused Pedro Alata Arusi of changing his name to Pedro Gualpa and his place of origin to Oruro to evade mita service. Surco chased Pedro down after he had fled from Potosí after only a few days working in the cerro, and had him jailed pending a



decision by the Audiencia de Charcas. Pedro said that he had been born in Oruro and later moved to the estancia of González Picón at the age of seven, after his parents had died. Evidence on both sides of the dispute showed that he had then been entrusted to Domingo Arusi and raised along with his three sons. Arusi was originally from Santiago de Yanaoca, and served in the mita from the estancia; when his sons came of age they too traveled to Potosí from there. Pedro fled from Potosí after his first taste of mita service, and when he was captured by Surco he challenged the legal basis for his obligation. Despite serious questions concerning his true origin--he changed his birthplace to Arequipa during the course of the litigation --the Audiencia ruled that his adoption by Domingo Arusi did not oblige him to serve in the mita.<sup>115</sup>

As in the first third of the seventeenth century, the caciques who managed to deliver their full quotas in spite of the obstacles were rewarded. In 1640, for example, Fernando Ayra de Arriutu's family won a coat-of-arms and the right to carry a sword in recognition of three generations of faithful service as caciques and capitanes enteradores de la mita.<sup>116</sup>

More common were the capitanes who could not comply with their responsibilities. In 1646 the Corregidores of Colquemarca, Desaguadero, Chayanta and Paria all reported that the mita contingents from their provinces could not

be delivered because the capitanes had followed the Indians in flight from their obligations.<sup>117</sup> Corregidor Juan de Velarde wrote Mancera, also in 1647, that the only provinces that were sending any mitayos in person were Canas y Canches, Collao, Asangaro y Asillo, Paucarcolla, Chucuito, Omasuyo, Pacajes and Chayanta--eight in all.<sup>118</sup>

The azogueros' struggle with the government over the mita was focused on service in silver, not their treatment of the mitayos who served in person. Therefore, while a great deal of attention had been paid to the mitayos' working conditions during the first fifty years of the system's existence, reports about the life of mitayos at Potosí from 1633 to 1648 are virtually non-existent. One in-depth description was produced in 1639 by Father Pedro Ramírez del Aguila. He reported that the Spanish section of Potosí was ringed by the Indians' parroquias, one for each of the provinces subject to the mita. Each parroquia was governed by a capitán, gobernador and other caciques.

The caciques and Indians change each year, each change being called a mita. This change-over is the source of the problems, pressures and extortions that afflict these poor Indians. The Spaniards pressure them to come; the Indians resist. A thousand injustices are perpetrated involving supposed deliveries in person and others in silver, which end up in the pockets of the miners, paid or taken at times with force from the Indians who do not owe it. All of these tricks and illegalities give vent to legal confrontations. Most every Monday some of the caciques are punished in the plazas, the women and children of the fugitives are imprisoned, and the mitayos are all in an eternal state of chaos and confusion, pain and work . . . at the top of Guayna

each Monday the Indians that have to work that week come together with the Corregidor, veedores, miners and owners, and the capitanes obligated to deliver the Indians. The group is a small army of eight to ten thousand persons. The entire day is taken up by the distribution. Indians sit about on the ground, on millstones or wheels, in their respective fields, that are corrals, divided by province. Once the distribution is finished and the Indians have been assigned, the barreteros and apiris climb the cerro, most of them drunk from the day's drinking and perplexed by the effects of the chicha. They work all week, day and night, three or four hundred meters below the ground, more or less. Once at work they do it with apparent pleasure, smiling as though they were at a fiesta. The risks that these mines hold for one's life are great, from falls or cave-ins, which many times have buried two or three hundred. Because of the many miracles granted by Our Lady these have escaped, but there usually are some broken limbs, deaths and wounds despite the considerable effort to maintain safe working conditions by the miners, veedores and the alcalde mayor de minas. It is impossible to prevent all such accidents because the cerro has been mined infinitely with tunnels, shafts, wells . . . it is like a sieve. Four or five thousand work inside the mines all week, and then return down the sides of the cerro on Saturday. They carry candles in what appears to be a long procession. On Sunday morning they are gathered by the priests for religious instruction and mass, but most of them are drunk and tired and the effort is not very successful. After mass the Indians are paid their wages--mitayos receive two and one-half pesos; mingas are paid seven and one-half--and immediately spent it all on alcohol.<sup>119</sup>

From other, fragmentary, evidence it is apparent that the mitayos continued to face problems with disease, short food supplies and the high cost of necessities.<sup>120</sup> In the mid-1630s the mitayos complained loudly when the price of candles doubled, for they were now obliged to buy their own.<sup>121</sup> It is difficult, however, to say whether Ramírez' description of Potosí was based on his personal experiences

or borrowed from other accounts. His passage concerning work inside the cerro, for instance, is very similar to Father Acosta's sixteenth century account; and his 4,000 to 5,000 total for the Indians working in the mines is higher than a mita ordinaria of 2,600 would have permitted. For want of another view of life at Potosí for this period, therefore, Ramírez' report is as undependable as it is invaluable.

#### Summary

In 1634 Sebastián de Sandoval y Guzmán, procurador general of the Cabildo de Potosí, published a series of Pretensiones in Madrid, including: a) the lowering of the quinto to the diezmo; b) the execution of a reducción general; c) the distribution of mercury on credit and at cost; and d) the formation of a Consulado de azogueros. Sandoval's arguments in support of these four proposals did not mention the azogueros' misuse of service in silver or other unauthorized aspects of the de facto mita, because to win the new concessions from the crown they had to appear both needy and righteous. The requests were, in part, an azoguero attempt to regain control of the silver industry at Potosí. They were also meant to keep the crown from believing the azogueros' enemies. As Sandoval y Guzmán was arguing their case before the Council of the Indies, however, the azogueros were under attack at home

for their misuse of the mita.

The Viceroy Conde de Chinchón decided not to leave his repartimiento de la mita to the President of Charcas, but assigned it to Visitador Juan de Caravajal y Sandi. The Viceroy had decided upon a new means for aligning the mita with the falling originario population in the provinces; he told Caravajal to use misuse of the mita as his central criterion for granting or denying mitayos to the azogueros. Chinchón believed that misuse was so extensive at Potosí that the number of azogueros who received Indians, and so the number of mitayos required, could be greatly reduced in this fashion.

Caravajal did not lower the total number of mitayos, but he did implement basic changes that seriously threatened the de facto mita. Indians were assigned to the azogueros in complete ayllus or pueblos, and twenty-nine mills were denied all access to mitayo labor. Those alterations disrupted service in silver arrangements and reduced the total number of mitayos that some of the azogueros received by virtue of their ownership of more than one mill. More fundamentally, the azogueros' acceptance of the repartimiento would have meant their capitulation to the viceroys' position that the mita was a privilege. They argued that their receipt of mita labor was their right, under the terms of their pact with Toledo.

Those were the real reasons for the azogueros'

opposition to the 1633 repartimiento, but they could not argue against it on those bases. Instead, they had to employ their traditional argument that silver production would be hurt, and so royal income, and that Potosí might collapse because of the meddling of an ignorant government official.

The azogueros' complaints received short shrift in Lima, so they were sent to the Council of the Indies, which tried to serve as a referee in the battle between Caravajal and the azogueros. Because the combatants argued on two completely different levels--the Visitador accusing the azogueros of abuse and they warning that Potosí silver production would be lost forever--there was no common ground upon which the Council could base a decision. It therefore left the resolution of the conflict to the Viceroy, but suggested that he conduct a new repartimiento. Despite some cooperation between Chinchón and President Lizarazu--the azogueros' advocate--the two officials were at odds over the implementation of the Council's order. The President wanted to conduct a new repartimiento, with no provision for the distribution of mitayos according to merit, while the Viceroy merely wanted Lizarazu to adjust the 1633 repartimiento. Their disagreement ended in a stalemate.

The Council of the Indies then ordered the Marqués de Mancera to conduct a new repartimiento, according to

Lizarazu's guidelines. Mancera moved slowly, weighing his instructions and the counsel of his predecessor against his own investigation of the situation at Potosí. In the meantime, the azogueros had to withstand an attempt by the new President of Charcas, Dionisio Pérez Manrique, to remove some mitayos from three azogueros for misuse. Pérez Manrique, unlike Lizarazu, did not believe that misuse of the mita was a natural result of fluctuating mining fortunes. The azogueros countered the President's move with a dejación of their mitayos, essentially shutting down the silver industry. The dejación was also meant to force the Viceroy to conduct a new repartimiento. It apparently succeeded in bringing Pérez Manrique back into line, but Mancera continued to move very slowly toward completion of the new repartimiento. The project was delayed for two years because he had doubts that there were enough Indians in the provinces to support the mita. His investigation discovered, however, that there were sufficient numbers, and he drew up a 5,196 Indian mita ordinaria: the 4,116 previously included by Caravajal; 380 mitayos theretofore assigned to Porco; and 700 yanaconas.

That might have been the end of the repartimiento problem, but the Viceroy then sent his proposed distribution to Potosí for prior comment. The azogueros responded only to the total numbers of Indians involved, and raised some

questions about the assignment of mitayos in complete ayllus and the prospects for the inclusion of yanaconas. Corregidor Velarde was concerned about the implementation of the repartimiento, because some azogueros who were heavily involved in misuse of the mita were favored in the distribution. He argued that the mitayos should be assigned on the basis of merit--a sentiment that was repeated by the royal treasury officials--and so countered the azogueros' arguments to the contrary.

The uneven response to the suggested repartimiento caused Mancera to delay its execution, at first with more questions--including the possibility of incorporating the forasteros. Then charges of abuse leveled by some of the azogueros against others, general confusion in the correspondence between Potosí and Lima, and falling carta cuenta shipments combined to frustrate the Marqués. He decided that only the meritorious should receive mitayos, and because he could not determine who they were, he left the problem of the repartimiento to his successor.

Meanwhile, the caciques were proving less able to deliver their quotas of mitayos, in person or in silver. The azogueros claimed, in their correspondence with the Viceroy, that the caciques no longer delivered the money they collected from the Indians. In fact, they were unable to raise enough money, and because rezagos de mita were now demanded, each year's failures were added to the next



year's obligation to compound their difficulties. The caciques were prevented from meeting their quotas by the falling originario population in the provinces, the increased demand for Indian labor in them, and the growing ability of the Indians to evade mita service.

In the battle between Lima and Potosí over the conceptual basis of the mita the Indians who served in person were virtually forgotten. The struggle was not over how the azogueros treated the mitayos who worked for them, but how they used those mitayos--especially the ones who arrived in Potosí in the form of silver.

Notes for Chapter IV

1. Baquijano y Carrillo, no. 212 (13 de enero de 1793), 40, related the contents of a "Memorial presentado al REY por los Azogueros de Potosí en 12 de Octubre de 636"; they claimed that 208,000 Indians were hidden by caciques; with 1,500 mitayos they had produced 617,517 pesos in quintos, and it followed that with 4,679 Indians the crown's income would rise to 1,924,183 pesos per year. This is a good example of the manipulation of quantitative material by contemporaries.

2. AGN, Sala IX, 6-2-5, no. 17, the Gremio de azogueros to the Marqués de Mancera, Potosí, 29.VII.1646, 2 fs. See Castillo (AGI, Charcas 270, no. 33C--see note 30, Chapter II), 15, for Corregidor Blas Robles de Salzedo's figures for 1643: 2,934 effective mitayos, with 2,693 for the azogueros and 241 for the soldados. The Gremio's 1642-1643 información (see note 86, Chapter II) said the effective mita ordinaria was only 2,134.

3. See note 58, Chapter II, for the first citation of Sandoval y Guzmán. I used the copy in the BNB, Moreno Collection. Hanke, in a note in Arzáns, Historia, II, 57, says there is also a copy in the Brown University Library. See Zavala, Servicio personal, II, 98-103, for another discussion of Pretensiones.

4. Sandoval y Guzmán's letter to President Don Garcia de Haro y Avellaneda, Conde de Castrillo, is dated Madrid, 3.VII.1634 and included on fs. ii-ii verso of Pretensiones (the quote is on f. ii).

5. These four proposals are listed first on Sandoval y Guzmán, 1. The work is indexed between the opening letter and f. 1. The second part of Pretensiones carries three proposals that deal with matters other than mining:

- 1) "Que no deven ser compelidos los Señores de viñas, que estan en los valles de Pilaya y Paspaya, y otros circunvezinos a Potosí, à que paguen a Su Magestad cada año à dos por ciento del vino que cogen"
- 2) "Que no puede Su Magestad acrecentar en la villa de Potosi el oficio de Provincial de la Hermandad que se ha mādado vender"
- 3) "Que no se deven mandar quintar las perlas y joyas que ay en la villa de Potosi"

6. Ibid., 1-4. The entire section on the quinto runs from 1 to 33v.
7. Ibid., 5-6.
8. Ibid., 15-15v.
9. Ibid., 16.
10. Ibid., 24-25.
11. Ibid., 10-10v.
12. Ibid., 6, 6v. The law in question is Ley 8 of his "Ordenamiento Real."
13. Ibid., 28.
14. Ibid., 30-31v.
15. Ibid., 34. The section on the reducción general runs from 34 to 62v.
16. Ibid., 34-35.
17. Ibid., 35-36, 39.
18. Ibid., 40v.
19. Ibid., 37.
20. Ibid., 37v.
21. Ibid., 37v-39v.
22. Ibid., 41v-42, 46v-47; each of these problems is overcome on 42v to 62v.
23. Ibid., 50-54v.
24. Ibid., 55v-60.
25. Ibid., 60v-62v. The statement that justice demanded that the mita be lowered if the reducciones showed that there were too few Indians is first made on 41v.
26. Ibid., 63-65.
27. Diffie, 282.

28. Sandoval y Guzmán, 65v-66.
29. For a similar comment see Holmes, 83-84.
30. Céspedes del Castillo, 31-32, 35 (for alliances of usually antagonistic groups against visitadores), 35-37 (for the lions' den analogy).
31. Hanke and Rodríguez, Los virreyes, Perú II (no. 281), 90 (from Aurelio Miró Quesada Sosa, El primer virrey-poeta en América: Don Juan de Mendoza, Marqués de Montesclaros (Madrid: Editorial Gredos, 1962), 146).
32. BNB, CPLA 20, fs. 359v-360v, "Sobrecarta de la comisión despachada por el conde de Chinchón, virrey del Perú, en Lima, 1635.X.30, a don Juan de Carvajal y Sandi, visitador de la audiencia de La Plata, para que habiendo hecho con toda integridad y conocimiento el repartimiento general de los indios de mita de Potosí según comisión que se le despachó en 1632.X.1 ahora, con la inteligencia que tiene de la materia de los indios vacos a los señores de minas e ingenios que mejor los merezcan, y quite y modere a los que crea conveniente, con calidad de confirmación por el virrey y con inhibición total de la audiencia de La Plata," Lima, 30.X.1635 (MC 700; MOM 584).
33. Angulo (AGI, Charcas 268, no. 36--see note 58, Chapter II), 2v, says twenty-eight dueños were deprived, while Valera (AGI, Charcas 268, nos. 69A & 69B--see note 58, Chapter II), 9, says twenty-eight cabezas de ingenio. For the twenty-nine mills figure, AGI, Charcas 266, no. 2, Bartolomé Astete de Ulloa to the crown, Callao de Lima, 12.V.1634, 2 fs.
34. The terms of the repartimiento are included in the "Relación del estado en que deja el gobierno de estos reinos del Perú el Conde de Salvatierra al Virrey Conde de Alba de Aliste," 22.III.1655, Los virreyes (ed. by Hanke and Rodríguez), Perú IV (no. 283), 38-40 (based on José Toribio Polo, Memorias de los virreyes del Perú: Marqués de Mancera y Conde de Salvatierra (Lima, 1899); and Angel de Altolaquirre y Duvale, ed., Colección de las Memorias o Relaciones que escribieron los virreyes del Perú acerca del estado en que dejaban las cosas generales del reino (Madrid, 1930)). Angulo (AGI, Charcas 268, no. 36--see note 58, Chapter II), 2v, for 4,115 Indians involved in a repartimiento of 3.IX.1633; also the Archbishop of Lima (AGI, Charcas 267, no. 16--see note 91, Chapter II), 2. Crespo, "La 'Mita,'" 180-181 is mistaken in taking the mita ordinaria for the mita gruesa. AGI, Charcas 267, no. 37,

President Pedro Vázquez de Velasco (of the Audiencia de Charcas) to the crown, 20.IV.1664, 5 fs., says the total (mita gruesa) was 12,400 Indians. Also, AGI, Charcas 266, no. 2A, "Copia de un cap<sup>o</sup> de Carta del Lic.do don Juan de Carabajal y sandi Vissr de la auda de Los Charcas del 15 de marco 1634," 15.III.1634, 1 f.; and "Relación del Estado en que el Conde de Chinchón deja el gobierno del Perú al Marqués de Mancera," 26.I.1640, Los virreyes (ed. by Hanke and Rodríguez), Perú III (no. 282), 56 (from Biblioteca Nacional, Madrid, Ms. 3080), where the abolition of granos is discussed.

35. President Juan de Lizarazu (of Charcas) comments on the fact that ayllus were assigned as units in AGI, Charcas 266, no. 10, "Consulta en que el Presidente de La Plata advierte que aunque V. mag.<sup>d</sup> mando que se oyese a los acogueros de potossi sobre el agravio de averles quitado los yndios Don Juan de caravaxal no ha sido esto posible propone que el verdadero desagravio a de nacer de la mano de V. mag.<sup>d</sup> y en la forma que puede y deve acersse," 1.III.1638, 2 fs. For the azogueros' later comments on the differences between ayllus, see AGN, Sala IX, 6-2-5, no. 17, the Gremio de azogueros to the Marqués de Mancera, Potosí, 29.VII.1646, 2 fs.; and AGN, Sala IX, 6-2-5, no. 18, Pedro de Vallesteros to the Marqués de Mancera, Potosí, 31.VII.1646, 2 fs.

36. AGI, Charcas 266, no. 1, Chinchón to the crown, Lima, 9.IV.1634, 2 fs.; AGI, Charcas 266, no. 2 (see note 33); and BNB, CPLA 20, fs. 359-360v (see note 32).

37. BNB, CPLA 20, fs. 359-360v (see note 32).

38. AGI, Charcas 266, no. 8, Juan de Caravajal y Sandi to the crown, 18.III.1636, 2 fs.

39. AGI, Charcas 266, no. 4, Juan de Caravajal y Sandi to the crown, 25.II.1635, 1 f. For Andrade's side of the story, AGI, Charcas 266, no. 4A, the disposition of Don Pedro de Andrade Sotomayor, 31.I.1635, 34 fs.

40. AGI, Charcas 266, no. 3, Juan de Caravajal y Sandi to the crown, 25.II.1635, 1 f., for the Visitador's comments on the repartimiento as a whole and Gerónimo Garavito in particular.

41. AGI, Charcas 266, the crown to the Conde de Chinchón, 6.IV.1636, 1 f.; and AGI, Charcas 266, no. 39A, the crown to the Conde de Chinchón, 6.IV.1636, 1 f.; the two are identical.

42. For the Cabildo's appreciation of Lizarazu's aid, BNB, CPLA 20, fs. 180-180v, "Capítulo de acuerdo del cabildo de Potosí: Que se suplique a don Juan de Lizarazu, presidente de la audiencia de Charcas en comisión en esta Villa, que no retorne aún a la ciudad de La Plata por lo necesaria que es aquí su presencia para los asuntos de minas," Potosí, 22.III.1635 (MC 695a). For Lizarazu's bid for presidential control of the Potosí silver industry, AGI, Charcas 266, no. 7, "Consulta en que Se Proponen Las Racones que ay Paraque al Pressidente de La Plata se le encargue y Cometa Todo Lo que mira al entero de la Mita de Potossí vsso de los yndios Conserbacion de los yngenios y distribucion de los Azogues, Prenobando con el especial Cedula Lo que en esta Parte esta mandado en otras," sent to the crown (probably with AGI, Charcas 266, no. 10--see note 35) and dated 1.III.1636.
43. For information on the plan, ANB, M 114, no. 4, 2 f., "Testimonio de una provisión del conde de Chinchón, virrey del Perú, aprobando la conducta de los oficiales reales de Potosí en la contradicción que hicieron al presidente de esta Real Audiencia para que sólo al contado se diese azogue a los azogueros de Potosi y revocando la multa de dos mil pesos que se les imputó por dicha contradicción," Lima, 12.VI.1636 (MC 712). For Lizarazu's complaints about Caravajal, and information on what happened when the loan could not be repaid, see AGI, Charcas 266, no. 9, President Juan de Lizarazu to the crown, 1.III.1637.
44. Corregidor de Potosí Blas Robles de Salzedo wrote the Marqués de Mancera about Andres de Sandoval on 1.IX. 1643 (AGN, Sala IX, 6-2-5, no. 43, 1 f.); Sandoval was still looking for recompense years after Juan de Caravajal had stripped him of his 34 mitayos.
45. Céspedes del Castillo, 31-32.
46. AGI, Charcas 266, no. 10 (see note 35).
47. Ibid.
48. AGI, Charcas 266, no. 11, "Potossi supp<sup>ca</sup> a VM se serba de mandar a algun ministro de las provy<sup>as</sup> satisfaga a los agraviados en el Ultimo Repartimy<sup>to</sup> que por no averlo hecho el Virey aunque VM se lo tiene mandado. y recusamos a don Ju<sup>n</sup> de carbajal suplicando a VM le mude a otro consejo o le ocupe en otras cosas," Potosí, 17.III.1638, 1 f.
49. Chinchón, "Relación" (see note 34), 48-49.

50. AGI, Charcas 266, no. 12, "Copia de carta escrita por el conde de chinchon al press.te de la Platta don Juan de Licaracu," Lima, 30.III.1639 and "Copia de Carta del Press.te escrita al Conde de chinchon en Repuesta de la de arriba," Potosí, 12.VI.1639, 4 fs. total. The order that empowered Lizarazu to alter the repartimiento is attached, dated 6.III.1639, on fs. 3-4.

51. AGI, Charcas 266, no. 13, President Juan de Lizarazu to the crown, Potosí, 12.VI.1639, 1 f.

52. Chinchón, "Relación" (see note 34), 48-49, 56-57, 60-61, and 64 for comments on the mita. Mancera was not content with the amount of information in the "Relación," however, and asked for more in May, 1640 (the Marqués de Mancera to the Conde de Chinchón, "Un informe veraz sobre la situacion del virreinato en 1640," ed. by Guillermo Lohmann Villena, Revista Histórica, XXIII (Lima, 1957), 278-295). Pereyra, 24-25, says that some had suggested that yanaconas and forasteros be included in the new repartimiento. Mancera notes Chinchón's suggestion in his own "Relación del estado del gobierno del Perú que hace el Marqués de Mancera al Virrey Conde de Salvatierra," 8.X.1648, Los virreyes (ed. by Hanke and Rodríguez), Perú III (no. 282), 148 (from the printed version in the British Museum).

53. ANB, RC 335, "Copia simple de real cédula dirigida a la audiencia de La Plata: Informe con su parecer sobre si convendría que los azogueros de Potosí paguen solamente el diezmo de los metales que sacan, o el quinto deducidas costas, o el quinto de los metales ricos de minas nuevas y el diezmo o duodécimo de los metales pobres de minas antiguas, según pide a nombre del gremio el doctor don Sebastián de Sandoval y Guzmán," Madrid, 4.XII.1635 (MC 703). The crown would later ask the age-old question about Black slaves again, ANB, RC 392, "Tanto simple de real cédula dirigida a esta real audiencia: ordénasele informe sobre si conviene traer a estas provincias esclavos negros para el beneficio de las minas y la labor de los campos," Zaragoza, 12.X.1645 (MC 764; MOM 615). Arzáns, Historia, II, 57, mentions two cédulas by Phillip IV benefiting the azogueros which came in response to Sandoval y Guzmán's efforts on their behalf: a) a 9.X.1635 order that azogueros could not be jailed for debts owed to the Real Hazienda; and b) a 15.X.1635 order that debts would not prevent the azogueros from obtaining government positions.

54. ANB, RC 356, "Expediente relativo a las diligencias practicadas en la real audiencia de La Plata con motivo de

la petición hecha por don Lópe de Andrade Sotomayor como procurador general de la villa de Potosí y a nombre del gremio de azogueros de ella, para que en cumplimiento de la real cédula de Madrid, 1635.XII.4, anexa, esta real audiencia informe acerca de la pretensión de dicha villa y del gremio de azogueros sobre que haya consulado en que se determinen los pleitos de minas que se ofrecieren en Potosí, por evitar costas y gastos y ahorrar el tiempo," 1637, 5 fs. (MC 717).

55. ANB, RC 383, "Real cédula a esta Real Audiencia para que informe sobre si convendría dar paso a la petición de Gerónimo Garavito, procurador general del gremio de azogueros de Potosí en la corte de Madrid, para que los indios de mita asignados a un ingenio pasen junto con la cosa a manos del arrendatario de dicha hacienda," Madrid, 16.IV.1639, 2 fs. (MC 731; MOM 594); ANB, RC 389, "Copia simple de real cédula dirigida a esta audiencia: Informe con su parecer sobre la petición que Gerónimo Garavito procurador general del gremio de azogueros de Potosí, hace para que cualquiera pueda fabricar ingenios en dicha villa por la utilidad que se sigue a la real hacienda, teniendose presente que el licenciado don Juan de Carvajal y Sandi, visitador que fue de esta audiencia, hizo despoblar algunos ingenios con pretexto de no ser necesarios," Madrid, 16.IV.1639, 1 f. (MC 727).

56. AGI, Charcas 266, includes two copies of the order: no. 16B (a copy made for Juan de Solórzano Pereira in 1654) and no. 39B, which appears to be the original; both are 2 fs. in length. The order was also included in AGI, Charcas 266, no. 20B, "Cedula del repartim.<sup>to</sup>," with a letter from President Nestares Marín to the crown, 30.V.1652, and other extracts supporting the distribution of mitayos on the basis of stamping mechanisms (mazos), 4 fs. total; this may be a draft of AGI, Charcas 268, no. 70C, "Testim<sup>o</sup> sobre el repartim<sup>to</sup> General de Indios de las Minas," 4.II.1679, 7 fs., which includes an order to Corregidor de Potosí Sarmiento de Mendoza of 8.XI.1653 to implement the terms of the 7.XII.1639 cédula; AGI, Charcas 266, no. 20B could also be a draft of that 1653 order (which will be discussed in Chapter V).

57. In addition to the sources in note 56: Castillo (AGI, Charcas 270, no. 33C--see note 30, Chapter II), 15v, gives the 5,000 Indian figure; Valera (AGI, Charcas 268, nos. 69A & 69B--see note 58, Chapter II), 10, relates the 7.XII.1639 order and Lizarazu's three guidelines.

58. ANB, M 125, no. 3, "Provisión del virrey: La



capitanía de la mita de la provincia de Chucuito se divida entre los caciques de los diferentes pueblos de la dicha provincia," Lima, 10.X.1640, 7 fs. (MC 743; MOM 597).

59. AHP, CR 286, fs. 94-94v, "Proviission del s.or Marques de mancera para que se quinte la plata labrada En esta Villa Al diezmo desde el dia de Pub.cion hasta quines de Marco deste Press.te Año de mill y seis cientos Y quarenta y Vno," Los Reyes, 3.I.1641.

60. AGN, Sala IX, 6-2-5, no. 5, the Gremio de azogueros to the Marqués de Mancera, Potosí, 5.II.1642, 1 f. The azogueros said their report was meant to support that of Pérez Manrique. See, also, AGN, Sala IX, 6-2-5, no. 9, the Gremio de azogueros to the Marqués de Mancera, Potosí, 6.II.1642, 1 f., which is a general statement about how bad things are at Potosí.

61. AGN, Sala IX, 6-2-5, no. 7, President Dionisio Pérez Manrique to the Marqués de Mancera, Potosí, 6.X.1642, 2 fs. The azogueros' 1642-1643 información (AGN, Sala IX, 6-2-5, no. 11--see note 86, Chapter II) includes lengthy testimony by the azogueros, from March and April of 1642, that the President had personally underwritten some azogueros who were unable to secure loans from moneylenders or silver merchants.

62. AGN, Sala IX, 6-2-5, no. 1, the Deputies of the Gremio de azogueros to the Marqués de Mancera, Potosí, 8.X.1642, 1 f.

63. AGN, Sala IX, 6-2-5, no. 4, the Marqués de Mancera to the Gremio de azogueros, Lima, 1.XII.1642, 1 f. (draft).

64. ANB, M 125, no. 5, "Acta en testimonio, de un cabildo celebrado por el gremio de los azogueros de Potosí con presencia del general don Juan Vázquez de Acuña, corregidor de dicha villa: En consideración a la pobreza actual de los metales, a los gastos excesivos de azogue, mineros, capatazes, herramientas y otros inconvenientes, el gremio resuelve suspender las labores y hacer dejación de los indios mitayos," Potosí, 26.X.1642, 8 fs. (MC 746; MOM 601). Gunnar Mendoza relates the events surrounding the dejación in a note in Arzáns, Historia, II, 90; he refers to "Minas catálogo 418, 420-425" in that note--it would seem that the numeration of the ANB/BNB catalogues has changed since the Arzáns Historia was published.

65. ANB, M 125, no. 6, "Carta del gremio de azogueros de Potosí a esta Real Audiencia: Informa que los azogueros

en cabildo de octubre 26 hicieron dejación de los indios de mita por el mal repartimiento que de éstos pretendía hacer don Pedro Manrique, hermano de don Dionisio Manrique, presidente de esta Real Audiencia," Potosí, 2.XII.1642, 2 fs. (MC 749; MOM 603).

66. ANB, M 125, no. 5 (see note 64).

67. Ibid.

68. ANB, ACh.LA 7, no. 42, "Acuerdo de la audiencia de Charcas: Se vió una proposición del doctor don Dionisio Pérez Manrique, gobernador-presidente de esta audiencia, en orden a la dejación que los azogueros han ofrecido hacer de los indios mitayos agraviándose del castigo que dicho gobernador había impuesto en algunos de ese gremio por el mal uso de los indios llamados de faltriguera," La Plata, 2.XII.1642, 4 fs. (MC 750; MOM 604).

69. ANB, M 125, no. 6 (see note 65).

70. Ibid.

71. ANB, ACh.LA 7, no. 42 (see note 68).

72. ANB, M 125, no. 7, "Carta de su presidente, don Dionisio Manrique, a esta Real Audiencia, desde el camino a Potosí: El tribunal no debe dejarse sorprender por los diputados del gremio de azogueros de dicha villa que vienen a representar supuestos excesos del mencionado don Dionisio en el repartimiento de los indios de mita," El Terrado, 3.XII.1642, 2 fs. (MC 750a; MOM 606).

73. ANB, M 125, no. 8, "Carta de su presidente-gobernador, don Dionisio Pérez Manrique, asistente en Potosí, a esta real Audiencia: Da noticias sobre el estado en que se encuentra esa villa despues de los altercados que promovieron los azogueros en el asunto de los indios de mita. Incluye un auto para que se los notifique a los siete diputados del gremio de azogueros que vinieron a esta ciudad de La Plata a presentar sus quejas a la Audiencia, para que comparezcan en Potosí, como deudores de la real hacienda por azogues, a seguir en sus labores de minas para afianzar sus deudas," Potosí, 6.XII.1642, 3 fs. (MC 751; MOM 607).

74. ANB, M 125, no. 9, "Carta de su presidente, don Dionisio Pérez Manrique, estante en Potosí, a esta Real Audiencia: Desmiente la especie de que el propósito de los mineros y soldados el día de su encuentro con los

azogueros fue destruir la villa de Potosí; desmiente, asimismo, algunos cargos levantados por los azogueros contra su hermano don Pedro Manrique," Potosí, 7.XII.1642, 2 fs. (MC 752; MOM 608). For the azogueros' request, ANB, M 125, no. 10, "Carta del gremio de azogueros de Potosí a la audiencia de Charcas: En cabildo del gremio se acordó solicitar no se innove en la dejación que él ha hecho de los indios de mita mientras por el rey o el virrey se provee lo que más convenga," Potosí, 10.XII.1642, 3 fs. (MC 753; MOM 609).

75. ANB, M 125, no. 10 (see note 74).

76. AGN, Sala IX, 6-2-5, no. 11 (see note 86, Chapter II). AGN, Sala IX, 6-2-5, no. 2, is an undated petition along the same lines as the 1642-1643 información; it is 2 fs. long and entitled "Petission del gremio de los azogueros de esta Villa, Para que su ex.<sup>a</sup> probea lo que fuere servido en aquello que solo pende de su Voluntad, que en quanto a los demas, en que puede obrar Don Dionisio mi Señor se estan haziendo Las diligencias con todo cuydado ...."

77. AGN, Sala IX, 6-2-5, no. 12, "Información" before President Dionisio Pérez Manrique, including testimony by the religious orders of Potosí supporting the Gremio de azogueros' request for assistance, Potosí, 25.VIII.1643, 14 fs. For Pérez Manrique's correspondence, AGN, Sala IX, 6-2-5, no. 10 (see note 74); and AGN, Sala IX, 6-2-5, no. 45, for what appears to be a letter from Pérez Manrique to the Marqués de Mancera (so noted by the Viceroy's secretary on the letter), Potosí, 8.IX.1643, 4 fs. (unsigned).

78. AGN, Sala IX, 6-2-5, no. 45 (see note 77); AGI, Charcas 266, no. 14, "Consulta del consejo de 16 de Abril de 650 sobre la pretension de los Acogueros de Potossi," Madrid, 16.IV.1650, 9 fs.

79. Castillo (AGI, Charcas 270, no. 33C--see note 30, Chapter II), 15.

80. AGN, Sala IX, 6-2-5, no. 48, the Marqués de Mancera to the Gremio de azogueros, Lima, 1.XI.1643, 2 fs. (draft; in the Viceroy's hand?).

81. One such denunciation, undated however, is AGN, Sala IX, 6-2-5, no. 44, Christóval de Castañeda to the Marqués de Mancera, 1 f. His position is supported by AGN, Sala IX, 6-2-5, no. 42, the Gremio de azogueros to the Marqués de Mancera, Potosí, 1.XII.1643, 1 f. The Viceroy

comments on the situation in AGN, Sala IX, 6-2-5, no. 38, 2 fs., the Marqués de Mancera to the Gremio de azogueros, Lima, 1.I.1644, 2 fs. (draft); this letter answered their note of 1.XII.1643 (AGN, Sala IX, 6-2-5, no. 37--see note 82).

82. AGN, Sala IX, 6-2-5, no. 37, the Gremio de azogueros to the Marqués de Mancera, Potosí, 1.XII.1643, 3 fs. The arrival of the Visitador was one of many items noted in a letter describing the gamut of difficulties plaguing the azogueros.

83. AGN, Sala IX, 6-2-5, no. 47, the Deputies of the Gremio de azogueros to the Marqués de Mancera, Potosí, IX.1643 (the day is not provided), 2 fs.

84. AGN, Sala IX, 6-2-5, no. 37 (see note 82).

85. AGN, Sala IX, 6-2-5, no. 35, Corregidor Blas Robles de Salzedo to the Marqués de Mancera, Potosí, 31.I.1644, 2 fs.; AGN, Sala IX, 6-2-5, no. 36, President Don Dionisio Pérez Manrique to the Marqués de Mancera, Potosí, 31.I.1644, 2 fs.

86. AGN, Sala IX, 6-2-5, no. 16, the Marqués de Mancera to President Dionisio Pérez Manrique, Lima, 1.I.1644, 4 fs. (draft).

87. AGN, Sala IX, 6-2-5, no. 38 (see note 81).

88. AGN, Sala IX, 6-2-5, no. 39, the Marqués de Mancera to the Gremio de azogueros and Corregidor de Potosí, Lima, 30.VI.1646, 10 fs. The twenty pages include drafts of the Viceroy's letters and a copy of the tentative repartimiento de la mita. Bolívar is mentioned in the letter to the Gremio; he also figures in Mancera's "Relación" (see note 52), 149.

89. Castillo (AGI, Charcas 270, no. 33C--see note 30, Chapter II), 15v, mentions a letter of 30.VI.1646 which stated that the census had been ordered, including the yanaconas and forasteros. The results are to be found in AGN, Sala IX, 17-1-4. The letter noted by Castillo is, most likely, AGN, Sala IX, 6-2-5, no. 39 (see note 88). Valera (AGI, Charcas 268, nos. 69A & 69B--see note 58, Chapter II), 11, says that Mancera ordered reports from provincial corregidores on the number and condition of the Indians in their jurisdictions. Zavala, Servicio personal, II, 109, says that Felipe de Bolívar presented the Marqués de Mancera with a document entitled "Padrones de

los indios naturales, forasteros y anaconas con distinción de provincias tocantes al repartimiento general de mita de Potosí"; he says it is from the AGN, Padrones, 1623-1646, 21-1-3, but the legajo of padrones for 1623-1646 in Sala IX is numbered 20-4-4, as Nicolás Sánchez-Albornoz notes in a forthcoming article on "Migraciones internas en el Alto Perú. El saldo acumulado en 1646" (provided by the author). Zavala provides the province-by-province breakdown, and Sánchez-Albornoz analyzes the data further. The totals came to 45,302 originarios; 15,446 forasteros; and 10,086 yanaconas. Mancera, in his "Relación" (see note 52), 149, says that there were enough Indians to support the repartimiento; Zavala, II, 112, takes exception and says that the figures show an insufficient Indian base for the repartimiento. The census was presented to the Viceroy with prefatory remarks that many corregidores had under-represented the Indians within their jurisdictions and that others had not complied with their orders to send an accounting (Zavala, II, 109); perhaps Mancera's decision that there were enough Indians was based on his belief that the official figures were a minimal estimate of the true Indian population in the provinces. Sánchez-Albornoz' forthcoming article will have more to say about the 1640s census, and its ramifications. For the terms of the repartimiento, AGN, Sala IX, 6-2-5, no. 39 (see note 88).

90. Mancera notes his order in his "Relación" (see note 52), 159. Valera (AGI, Charcas 268, nos. 69A & 69B--see note 58, Chapter II), 11, also says that the meeting was ordered by the Viceroy. AGN, Sala IX, no. 39 (see note 88) includes the notes sent to the Corregidor and the Gremio, as well as the tentative repartimiento.

91. AGN, Sala IX, 6-2-5, no. 17 (see note 35). It would seem, judging by the azogueros' response, that they were privy only to the totals involved in the tentative repartimiento.

92. AGN, Sala IX, 6-2-5, no. 18 (see note 35). For the Viceroy's acknowledgement, AGN, Sala IX, 6-2-5, no. 19, the Marqués de Mancera to Pedro de Vallesteros, Lima, 31.VIII.1646 (draft), 1 f.

93. AGN, Sala IX, 6-2-5, no. 40, the Oficiales reales to the Marqués de Mancera, Potosí, 31.VII.1646, 2 fs.

94. AGN, Sala IX, 6-2-5, no. 29, Corregidor Juan de Velarde to the Marqués de Mancera, Potosí, 31.VII.1646, 2 fs.

95. AGN, Sala IX, 6-2-5, no. 22, the Marqués de Mancera to the Gremio de azogueros, Lima, 1.IX.1646; and the azogueros' reply, Potosí, 3.X.1646 (the originals, the latter beginning where the former leaves off), 6 fs. total. A draft of the Viceroy's letter is AGN, Sala IX, 6-2-5, no. 13, Lima, 1.IX.1646, 2 fs.
96. AGN, Sala IX, 6-2-5, no. 28, Corregidor Juan de Velarde to the Marqués de Mancera, Potosí, 31.VIII.1646, 2 fs. Velarde says that he is including a copy of his latest visita for the Viceroy to use in the formulation of the new repartimiento. As the visita was sent on the last day of August, and Mancera's tentative repartimiento was sent on September 1, the Viceroy could not have seen it before his letter to the Gremio and his instructions for the Corregidor were despatched.
97. AGN, Sala IX, 6-2-5, no. 23, the Gremio de azogueros to the Marqués de Mancera, Potosí, 1.IX.1646, 3 fs.
98. AGN, Sala IX, 6-2-5, no. 22 (see note 95). The list of good, bad and mediocre pueblos is AGN, Sala IX, 6-2-5, no. 3, "Mem<sup>l</sup> de las Provincias Y Pueblos qe estan, obligados a emuiar, Yndios Para la mita del cerro de Potossi con distincion de quales Son buenos medianos Y malos," 2 fs.
99. AGN, Sala IX, 6-2-5, no. 22 (see note 95).
100. AGN, Sala IX, 6-2-5, no. 20, the Oficiales reales to the Marqués de Mancera, Potosí, 31.X.1646, 3 fs.
101. AGN, Sala IX, 6-2-5, no. 21, Corregidor Juan de Velarde to the Marqués de Mancera, Potosí, 31.X.1646, 2 fs.
102. Baquijano y Carrillo, no. 212 (13 de enero de 1793), 39. The 43,000 pesos figure is included in the Royal Officials' letter of 31.X.1646 (AGN, Sala IX, 6-2-5, no. 20--see note 100). Mancera discusses the overpayment issue, and his actions on it, in his "Relación" (see note 52), 148; he says the amount of the overpayment was really 5 pesos, 6 tomines, per quintal. The Viceroy's letter, which includes the 43,000 pesos figure (actually 43,900) is AGN, Sala IX, 6-2-5, no. 26, the Marqués de Mancera to the Gremio de azogueros, Surco, 31.X.1646, 3 fs. (draft).
103. AGN, Sala IX, 6-2-5, no. 33, the Marqués de Mancera to Corregidor Juan de Velarde, Lima, 30.XI.1646, 2 fs., for the Viceroy's unhappiness with Velarde.

104. AGN, Sala IX, 6-2-5, no. 26 (see note 102).
105. For the azogueros' request, AGN, Sala IX, 6-2-5, no. 24, the Gremio de azogueros to the Marqués de Mancera, Potosí, 1.XI.1646, 2 fs. The Viceroy's response is AGN, Sala IX, 6-2-5, no. 25, the Marqués de Mancera to the Gremio de azogueros, Lima, 20.XI.1646, 1 f.
106. AGI, Charcas 267, no. 1, the Oficiales reales to the crown, Potosí, 10.IV.1647, 3 fs.; I assume a similar report was sent to the Viceroy.
107. Mancera's "Relación" (see note 52), 140, 148-150, 160-161, for material on the mita. Valera (AGI, Charcas 268, nos. 69A & 69B--see note 58, Chapter II), 11, says that Mancera believed it would be better to have an incoming viceroy implement a repartimiento than an outgoing one. Bartolomé de Salazar, who would later serve as President of Charcas and Superintendent of the mita, was Asesor under Mancera, and told the crown in 1662 that the repartimiento had been ready to be put "en limpio" when notice of Salvatierra's imminent arrival reached Mancera (AGI, Charcas 267, no. 24, Bartolomé de Salazar to the crown, Potosí, 1.IV.1662, 15 fs.).
108. From Mancera's confirmation of that order, ANB, M 125, no. 3 (see note 58).
109. AGI, Charcas 266, no. 8 (see note 38).
110. AGI, Charcas 266, no. 6, "Consulta en que Se Proponen Los Remedios mas eficaces que ay para el entero de la mita del Zerro de Potossi" (President Juan de Lizarazu to the crown), 1.III.1636, 2 fs.
111. AHP, CR 264, f. 178v, "Capítulo de Carta del s.<sup>r</sup> ViRey conde de chinchon Sobre La mita al contt.<sup>r</sup> Corregor Joseph Saez de Elorduy," Lima, 4.IV.1638; ANB, M 125, no. 1, "Título conferido por José Sáez de Elorduy, corregidor de Potosí, al maestro de campo Diego Núñez de Ovando para el entero de la mita en los corregimientos de Canes y Canches, Carabaya, Chucuito, Larecaja, Omasuyo, Pacajes, Paria y Paucarcolla," Potosí, 5.I.1640, 3 fs. (MC 733; MOM 596).
112. AGN, Sala IX, 6-2-5, no. 22 (see note 95).
113. AGN, Sala IX, 6-2-5, no. 28 (see note 96).
114. ANB, M 125, no. 2, Antonio Carrillo y sus

hermanos, naturales del pueblo de Potobamba, provincia de Porco, sobre que se les declare exentos de la mita en razón de ser mestizos y no indios," Porco, 1603-c. 1638, 31 fs. (MC 742; MOM 598).

115. ANB, M 125, no. 11, "Don Fernando Surco, gobernador del pueblo de Santiago de Yanaoca, provincia de Canas y Canches, capitán enterador de la mita de Potosí, contra Pedro Alata Arusi, indio originario de dicho pueblo, que pretende eximirse de la mita cambiándose el nombre de Pedro Huallpa y diciendo ser natural de la villa de Oruro," La Plata, 27.III-21.IV.1643, 16 fs. (MC 757; MOM 612).

116. Ramírez del Aguila, 82-84.

117. ANB, C 1463, "Cédula real expedida en favor de don Fernando Ayra de Arriutu, cacique principal y gobernador del pueblo de Copoata [sic--G.M.] parcialidad de Hurinsaya, provincia de Chayanta: En atención a los servicios prestados por él y sus antecesores a la corona española en la mita de Potosí y otras cosas, se otrogara a Ayra y sus descendientes el escudo de armas que ha pedido," Madrid, 4.V.1640, 5 fs. (MC 735a; MOM 596a).

118. AGN, Sala IX, 6-2-5, no. 29, Corregidor Juan de Velarde to the Marqués de Mancera, Potosí, 31.VII.1646, 2 fs., for a discussion of Chayanta. For Colquemarca, AGN, Sala IX, 6-2-5, no. 32, Don Antonio de Toledo Pimentel to the Corregidor de Potosí, Colquemarca, 22.VI.1646, 1 f. For Paria, AGN, Sala IX, 6-2-5, no. 15, testimonio by Diego Pacheco de Chaves, Escrivano, of actions taken to shore up the mita deliveries from the province of Paria, Potosí, 31.VIII.1646, 1 f. For Desaguadero, AGN, Sala IX, 6-2-5, no. 31, Don Augustín de Sobranis to Corregidor Juan de Velarde, Desaguadero, 20.VII.1646, 2 fs.

119. AGN, Sala IX, 6-2-5, no. 21, Corregidor Juan de Velarde to the Marqués de Mancera, Potosí, 31.X.1646, 2 fs.

120. BNB, CPLA 20, fs. 8-8v, "Capítulo de acuerdo del cabildo de Potosí: El juez nombrado para ello haga cumplir la ordenanza en lo pedido por Cristóbal del Salto, Juan Dávila, Juan Ruiz Caballero, Gaspar Garrido, Francisco García Barroso y Blas de Espinosa, dueños de ganado de llamas que hacen la baja de metales del Cerro, para remediar los robos que padecen," Potosí, 4.IV.1634 (MC 684a); the Indians were stealing llamas for food. For more on disease, BNB, CPLA 20, fs. 332 and 334v, "Capítulos de acuerdos del cabildo de Potosí: Que se vea lo conveniente en la solicitud de don Pedro Calderón y Contreras, protector de los



naturales de esta Villa, sobre que se provea remedio urgente para la cura y regalo de los indios de las rancherías que desde hace algunas semanas están apestados de bubillas, sarampión, tabardillo y dolor de costado," Potosí, 20 and 24.X.1635 (MC 701; MOM 586). Lorenzo Layme, an Indian from Chucuito, claimed he had served in the mita for over forty years, all the time resident in Potosí: BNB, CPLA 20, fs. 210-210v, "Capítulo de acuerdo del cabildo de Potosí: Deniégase la solicitud (inserta) de Lorenzo Layme, indio de la provincia de Chucuito, para que en consideración a su edad y sus servicios y de su familia en la mita de Potosí, se le exceptúe de la ordenanza para el cierre de las chicherías de esta Villa," Potosí, 1635 (MC 695f; MOM 580).

121. BNB, CPLA 20, fs. 285v-286, 327v, "Capítulo de acuerdo del cabildo de Potosí: Sobre la denuncia hecha por don Juan Quispe y don Felipe Sapaná, indios de Jatuncolla, candeleros, contra algunos mercaderes por estanco y encarecimiento del cebo y la grasa en perjuicio de la república y de las labores del Cerro," Potosí, 9.IX.1635 (MC 699; MOM 583); BNB, CPLA 20, fs. 422v-423, "Capítulo de acuerdo del cabildo de Potosí: Sobre que con motivo de la escasez de cebo para hacer candelas en esta Villa, los indios candeleros están atravesando ese material y fabricando velas de mala calidad," Potosí, 7.III.1636 (MC 710; MOM 591).

## C H A P T E R   V

1648 TO 1666

In the wake of Mancera's decision not to issue a new repartimiento de la mita, the Council of the Indies tried again to break the impasse between the Gremio de azogueros and the viceregal administration in Lima. Beginning in the early 1650s, the Council issued a comprehensive program, including both reforms and a new repartimiento, which it hoped would meet the legitimate needs of the azogueros without condoning their involvement in abuses.

The fate of the Council's program in Peru is further testimony to the frustrations of administering the mita from afar. Because a series of viceroys in Lima found the Council's program counter to their conception of what should be done at Potosí, or feared the repercussions of it, they postponed its implementation. Meanwhile, in Potosí, corregidores de Potosí and presidents of Charcas, moved by varying mixtures of personal and professional jealousies, worked at cross-purposes.

While the government proved incapable of answering the crisis over the mita, the caciques who bore the brunt of the system's disintegration responded to the increasingly

violent means used by the azogueros against them with complaints to the government and flight from the provinces.

### The Council of the Indies' Program

The Council of the Indies, in its capacity as referee, responded to Mancera's decision not to issue a new repartimiento during the early 1650s. It developed a two-part program which it hoped would appease the azogueros, protect the crown's economic interests, and ensure that the Indians were not mistreated. The Council was trying to find a middle road that would break the stalemate that had resulted from the Marqués' efforts.

The first step was taken on April 28, 1650, when the crown despatched a cédula ordering a new repartimiento, to be based on a census and reducciones in the sixteen obligated provinces. The Council considered the April 28 order to be a concession to the azogueros, for it complied with Sandoval y Guzmán's second proposal.<sup>1</sup> The directive was complemented by a simultaneous edict suspending the collection of mercury debts incurred from 1609 to 1631 while the matter of azoguero overpayment was debated by the Council.<sup>2</sup> The second part of the program began with a May 6, 1651 order banning "pocket Indians." The concessions that were granted in 1650, the Council argued, had removed any need on the part of the azogueros to engage in misuse of the mita.<sup>3</sup>

The Council of the Indies had constructed its program after carefully analyzing Sandoval y Guzmán's four proposals, other azoguero petitions and government correspondence on the mita.<sup>4</sup> Those materials had emphasized both the importance of the system for the production of royal revenue and the extent of the abuses that permeated the mita. The two-part program was a balanced effort to minimize the abuses while maximizing silver production at Potosí.

The two orders also showed a renewed concern about the justness of the mita. The question had been raised anew by Juan de Solórzano Pereira in his 1648 opus, Política Indiana. Solórzano had extensive experience in America, including service at Huancavelica under the Viceroy Conde de Chinchón, and he had served on the Council of the Indies from 1629 to 1644. His was one of the great legal minds of the day, but Solórzano was unable to determine definitively whether the mita was just. Instead, he fell back on the traditional method of presenting affirmative and negative arguments:

#### Affirmative

The parity of mine work and agricultural work; if the Indians could be rightfully assigned to the fields then they could be assigned to the mines.

The need of the public good, which in Peru depended upon gold and silver production. The Indians were the best-suited for mine work (compared to the Spanish, Blacks and mixed-bloods).

Princes could rightfully require that their vassals work in the mines to augment their royal treasury.

Historically, monarchs had required their vassals to work for them.

Service in dangerous occupations was permissible where death was not certain, as during times of war.

Such service was the custom in the Americas, from their first discovery.

#### Negative

The incompatibility of Indian liberty and their good treatment with their service in the mines. Such work was normally left to criminals.

Indian service was not justifiable when the work was strange to them, or when it was intolerable.

Indians were subjected to great dangers and suffering in the mines.

There was no difference between the Indians' service and that of slaves during Roman days.

Indeed, the condition of the Indians was worse, for they had committed no offense for which to atone.

Personal service for encomenderos had been banned because of abuses; so it should be for the azogueros.

The Indians were prohibited from pearl diving because of the dangers involved. In addition, the republic was not supported by mita labor, but was being destroyed by it.

For all of the orders allowing such labor there were many others that banned it.

The questions that Solórzano raised about the mita in 1648 had been asked at its inception, and they were debated by the Velasco junta in 1603. During the intervening

half-century they had not received a great deal of attention, until the azogueros-viceroys struggle over the conceptual basis of the mita brought them to the fore once again. The legal foundation for the system was well established, as Solórzano's lists attest. The question of its justification, however, was more difficult. Solórzano leaned toward the negative, but he offered no clear statement one way or the other. He was torn between the crown's continuing need for silver and the abuses that pervaded the mita. He suggested, simply, that the mines be worked, wherever possible, by slaves, criminals and volunteers. The Council of the Indies' dual-fold program reflected that same dialectic.<sup>5</sup>

If he was unable to determine whether the mita was just, Solórzano did create the device for measuring the "justness" factor: as long as the benefits of mining outweighed the evils wrought by the mita, the system would be justifiable. The balance between evils and benefits, however, was subject to differing interpretations based on varying conceptions of the mita--one in Lima, one at Potosí, and still another in Madrid. From 1648 to 1666, the azogueros' de facto mita and the viceroys' "official" mita were still battling for supremacy.

#### The Council's Program in Peru

The balanced program devised by the Council of the

Indies would have to survive both the bureaucratic process and the Potosí-Lima confrontation if it were going to be effective. The program's first stop in Peru was at Lima, where it was received by the Viceroy Conde de Salvatierra. The Conde was aware of the problems that the Marqués de Mancera had faced with regard to the azogueros, and so he declined to carry out the April 28, 1650 cédula. He offered two reasons for not implementing the Council's order for a new repartimiento: first, he doubted that the azogueros deserved assistance, for their abuse of the mita was epidemic--of only 2,600 mitayos delivered each week, over 1,600 were "pocket Indians"--and unstoppable; and second, he doubted that reducciones, now prerequisite to any new repartimiento, could be completed successfully. The experiences of his predecessors, Salvatierra noted, had demonstrated the futility of such efforts.<sup>6</sup> A third, though unarticulated, cause for the Conde's refusal was his fear that Potosí silver production might collapse if any significant novelties were attempted. As the chief royal official in the realm, Salvatierra, not the Council, would be held responsible for the cédula's consequences. He was aware that a viceroy's performance in office was measured, to a very large extent, by the amount of royal revenue that was produced during his tenure.

Potosí was still the source of a large part of the silver Peru despatched to Spain each year, though it was no

longer the producer that it had once been. During 1651 the villa suffered through a four-month drought that lowered silver output from the already deficient levels of the late 1640s.<sup>7</sup> Salvatierra was afraid that Potosí was doomed, and he resolved to allow it to die a slow death rather than risk bringing on its complete demise during his viceroyalty.<sup>8</sup>

The Viceroy took limited actions, however, to keep Potosí going for as long as he would be held accountable for it. On October 29, 1652, he empowered the Corregidor de Potosí, Francisco Sarmiento de Mendoza, to suspend and replace any corregidor who failed to assist in the despatch of mitayos to Potosí.<sup>9</sup> The following August, he exhorted the provincial corregidores to return the Indians who were hiding in the valleys or elsewhere to their pueblos, and to include them in the mita.<sup>10</sup> These were the traditional, time-worn, measures that his predecessors had used.

One of the effects of Salvatierra's decision not to execute the 1650 cédula was that local government officials at Potosí took it upon themselves to solve the silver industry's problems. Unfortunately, Corregidor Sarmiento de Mendoza and President Francisco Nestares Marín of the Audiencia de Charcas did not agree on a course of action. Nestares did not play a supportive role where the azogueros were concerned because he was also a visitador, with orders to collect outstanding mercury debts and to implement the



1651 royal order to ban "pocket Indians."<sup>11</sup> His duties as Visitador placed him in marked opposition to the Gremio. Sarmiento de Mendoza, on the other hand, championed the azogueros' cause, in much the same way that President Lizarazu had done.

The Council of the Indies was worried about the future of Potosí silver production. When the Viceroy refused to implement the 1650 cédula, it decided to bypass Lima entirely and assign the matter to Sarmiento de Mendoza. In a cédula of November 8, 1653, the crown ordered the Corregidor to conduct the new repartimiento according to Lizarazu's three guidelines. Nestares Marín was instructed to guard against abuses and the Viceroy was told only to assist each official in his duties.<sup>12</sup> The Council was aware that there would be some antipathy between Sarmiento and Nestares. In traditional fashion, it relied upon their antagonism to ensure that each would execute his orders to the best of his abilities.<sup>13</sup>

Sarmiento approached his duties with a conception of the mita much like Lizarazu's. He believed that abuses had been caused by rising prices for mercury and other production costs. He opposed the closing of a mill because its owner had engaged in misuse; he felt that it was better to punish the azoguero in some other way and to keep the mill in production. Sarmiento's repartimiento plan followed Lizarazu's guidelines closely: a) no owner would

be allowed to have more than two mills; b) five mitayos would be assigned for each stamping mechanism; and c) those mills that were owned by widows or children would be rented to worthy individuals for two years at a time.<sup>14</sup>

To increase the now-depleted pool of mitayos, the Corregidor suggested that a census be conducted by a group of specially-empowered judges. Once all the Indians had been counted, then everyone--originarios, forasteros and yanaconas--would serve in the mita. They would, however, have the option of serving in person or remitting four and one-half pesos per week in silver. The inclusion of the previously-exempted Indians, and the legitimization of service in silver, he said, would make a 4,000-Indian mita ordinaria possible without overly burdening anyone. The need for reducciones, moreover, would be eliminated.<sup>15</sup>

Sarmiento borrowed upon extant theory to design his repartimiento, but he also included some original ideas of his own. His most ambitious suggestion was that the Corregidor de Potosí administer the mita without any interference from the Viceroy or the Audiencia de Charcas. Sarmiento claimed that the Conde de Salvatierra's reluctance to implement the Council's program was caused by his economic interests, which competed with Potosí for Indian labor. The Audiencia was a long-standing enemy of the mita.<sup>16</sup> The Corregidor proposed another new idea to the Gremio de azogueros: that provincial corregidores be

forced to pay the rezagos de mita that were incurred during their terms in office. He shelved the plan when the azogueros doubted that the corregidores had the resources required to pay the sums that were involved.<sup>17</sup>

President Nestares Marín was unhappy with the crown's decision to assign the repartimiento to Sarmiento de Mendoza. He accused the Corregidor of wrecking the mita during the preceding three years, through mismanagement and his tolerance of abuses. Nestares asked the Council to name Gerónimo Luis de Cabrera in Sarmiento's place. The President's letter had little immediate impact, however, since it was lost in a shipwreck with most of the government's correspondence for 1654, and a copy had to be sent to Spain in 1658.<sup>18</sup>

Nestares did not have to worry about Sarmiento's plans for a repartimiento, for the Viceroy had already intervened to prevent its completion. In May, 1654, Salvatierra ordered the Corregidor to suspend all action on the 1653 cédula until the arrival of his successor. The Viceroy's suspension of the 1653 order, which had been meant to circumvent his opposition to the Council's program, points to the role of the bureaucratic hierarchy in frustrating the Council's efforts to resolve the outstanding problems with the Potosí mita.<sup>19</sup>

Salvatierra not only bequeathed the political liability of the proposed repartimiento to his successor, he also

confused the issue of who was responsible for the two-part program with a last-minute directive to Nestares Marín that he take control of the mita.<sup>20</sup> This brought vehement complaints from Sarmiento to Lima and Madrid, and fueled his 1655 broadside against the President-Visitador. The Corregidor accused Nestares of engaging in misuse of the mita to pay the costs of his visita and to collect the azogueros' mercury debts. Sarmiento charged that he had held back travel allowances to pay Chucuito's back taxes, rented mills and mitayos, and assigned the veedores and the alcalde de minas four "pocket Indians" each in lieu of wages; he had also blocked the Corregidor's attempts to hold provincial corregidores accountable for mita deliveries.<sup>21</sup> Whatever the degree of truth in Sarmiento's claims, the conflict between the two officials had clearly gone beyond productive competition.

Gaspar González Pavón, a government official with many years of experience at Potosí and in Tucumán, wrote to Lima on May 26, 1655 that the personal and professional squabbling between Sarmiento and Nestares had rendered them ineffective as representatives of the crown. He asked the Viceroy Conde de Alba (1655-1661) to send someone else to supervise the mita--a superintendent that would be superior to both Sarmiento and Nestares Marín.<sup>22</sup> The Corregidor asked the new Viceroy to assume that role himself.<sup>23</sup>

The Conde de Alba and Francisco de la Cruz

The arrival of the Conde de Alba in Peru did not speed progress toward the new repartimiento. Like Salvatierra, the new Viceroy ordered Sarmiento to act swiftly against uncooperative corregidores, but he held off on resolution of the proposed repartimiento until he could study what Mancera had done during the 1640s.<sup>24</sup>

The Corregidor wrote to Alba often during 1655 and 1656, with his suggestions on how best to realize the aims of the 1653 cédula.<sup>25</sup> In addition to repeating his earlier sentiments about the repartimiento, he noted the difficulties that were presented by the Príncipe de Esquilache's order, of 1617, that Indians who had been absent from their pueblos for more than ten years could not be returned home against their wishes. That directive had fallen into disuse, but it had been revived by the Conde de Salvatierra after the caciques of Pacajes descended upon Altos de Arica to gather up the Indians that had left their province.<sup>26</sup>

Sarmiento also expanded upon his earlier comments that service in silver was a necessary part of the mita. He again suggested that the remittance be reduced to four and one-half pesos per week, with the azogueros contributing the balance of the seven peso minga wage. The veedores and the capitán mayor de la mita, he added, should oversee

the hiring of the mingas, and none of the money should go to the azogueros themselves.<sup>27</sup>

Despite the Corregidor's insistence that the new repartimiento was long overdue, the Conde de Alba made no movement toward its execution. Sarmiento was not the only one who was impatient. The Council of the Indies sent yet another cédula to the Viceroy on April 18, 1657, ordering him to conduct the repartimiento and to abolish "pocket Indians." The Council said that it had been moved to repeat its earlier orders by reports from Nestares Marín and the royal officials at Potosí that no action had been taken on its previous directives.<sup>28</sup>

The Conde de Alba had been persuaded by Salvatierra's "dying patient" analogy, and he was disinclined to introduce any novelties at Potosí.<sup>29</sup> He responded to the 1657 order with a delaying tactic meant to force the Council to assume responsibility for the implementation of its program with a direct order. The Viceroy was uncertain, he said, who was supposed to do the repartimiento. The 1653 cédula had named Sarmiento de Mendoza, but an April 18, 1656 order said that Nestares Marín should be responsible. Alba said that he thought it would be best to name someone other than the Corregidor or the President to draft the repartimiento, which Sarmiento would then implement and Nestares monitor.<sup>30</sup>

While Alba waited for the Council to respond to his

query, he began preliminary preparations based on his belief that a third party should conduct the repartimiento. He brought the Audiencia de Lima together in an Acuerdo consultivo on August 26, 1658 to determine the best course of action. After reviewing the arguments of Sarmiento de Mendoza and Nestares Marín, and hearing the views of Protector Diego de León Pinelo and the Fiscal, the Acuerdo voted to send an emissary to investigate the situation at Potosí and then to conduct the repartimiento. The Viceroy chose Francisco de la Cruz, Bishop-elect of Santa Marta, for that assignment.<sup>31</sup>

The Conde provided Cruz with extraordinary powers as Superintendent of the mita which ostensibly placed him well above President Nestares Marín and the new Corregidor de Potosí, Gómez Dávila.<sup>32</sup> His apparent authority was curtailed, however, by secret instructions. Publicly Cruz was free to act as he deemed necessary; privately he was ordered only to gather information. Any action was to await viceregal consent, and no azoguero was to be punished for misuse of the mita until the repartimiento was finished.<sup>33</sup> The Viceroy wanted Cruz to be spared any interference from local officials at Potosí, but he did not want him to implement the anti-abuse section of the Council's program until the azogeros' reasons for engaging in abuse were removed. Alba also wanted to delay action until the Council's reply to his query was received.

Cruz set forth for Potosí immediately, and he arrived in the villa on May 20, 1659. On the twenty-ninth he called the azogueros and the local officials together to explain his mission. His message was unmistakable: the new repartimiento would have no place for service in silver, and all of the abuses that had stemmed from it, including the mistreatment of mitayos and their caciques.<sup>34</sup> Sarmiento's arguments in favor of service in silver had apparently not impressed the Conde de Alba.

The Superintendent then began to collect the information that was required for the new repartimiento. The kinds of material he gathered also suggested that Lizarazu's three guidelines had been replaced by the viceregal position that mitayos should be distributed on the basis of merit. Cruz ordered the silver merchants to report on the number of silver bars produced by each azoguero during the preceding ten years, and he told the veedores to conduct a visita of the mills and the cerro.<sup>35</sup>

The Bishop-elect then broke with his secret orders to send three judges of his own to conduct a census in the sixteen obligated and fourteen exempted provinces of Upper Peru. This step was taken, he explained to the crown, because he had encountered very few Indians in the mita provinces while he was en route to Potosí. If the mita were to be revived, then more provinces would have to be added. His letter to Madrid was sent by way of Buenos



Aires, as a quick reply would be needed if his suggestions were to be incorporated into the new repartimiento.<sup>36</sup>

Although Cruz had changed the criteria for both the distribution of the mitayos and where they were to come from, he had maintained a balance between assistance for the azogueros and the elimination of misuse. The extension of mita obligation to more provinces would benefit the azogueros; the abolition of service in silver would benefit the Indians and their caciques; and both measures would contribute to an increase in silver production.<sup>37</sup> Thus, while the means had been changed, the object of the Council of the Indies' program had been preserved.

Cruz would soon abandon his balanced approach, however. A new element in the relationship between the benefits and the evils resulting from the mita would cause him to launch an attack on misuse while the new repartimiento was still in the preparatory stage. Cruz was moved by the desolation of the pueblos he had passed through on his way to Potosí, but he was particularly horrified by what he had discovered once he arrived. His initial enquiries revealed that the sums collected by the azogueros for service in silver came to 587,000 pesos per year, while the crown's quintos had fallen to 300,000.<sup>38</sup> More importantly, he found that to extract some 11,000 pesos per week from the capitanes enteradores, the azogueros were employing torture, including the hanging of the caciques by their hair, beatings and

whippings.<sup>39</sup> To save themselves from such treatment, the caciques were selling their property, and their wives and children into slavery.<sup>40</sup> Cruz also learned of one cacique who had hung himself upon hearing that he was to serve as a capitán enterador, and of the practice of maiming male children to keep them from serving the mita.<sup>41</sup> He determined that all but a dozen of the azogueros were involved in these abuses--both fraud and the mistreatment of the caciques.<sup>42</sup> The torture of the caciques was a new factor which joined the depopulation of the provinces and the misuse of the mita by the azogueros on the negative side of Solórzano Pereira's justness equation.

The crimes that were committed by the azogueros, Cruz reported, did not end with torture and fraud. They were also involved in Indian slavery--selling Indians in Lipéz for 250 pesos each--and they were carrying on a thriving contraband trade with the Hollanders via Buenos Aires. Not only were the azogueros merciless sadists, he cried, they were defrauding their King to aid his enemies!<sup>43</sup>

Thus, in Solórzano Pereira's terms, Cruz had decided that the evils that were wrought by the mita far outweighed the benefits produced by the silver industry at Potosí. Indeed, he believed that the relationship was now so far out of balance that he felt compelled to abandon the Council's balanced approach and immediately relieve the Indians of the oppression they suffered under the system.<sup>44</sup>

On June 4, 1659, Cruz ordered all service in silver halted. He instructed the capitanes enteradores that they were to deliver mitayos in person only. The Superintendent had to qualify that order, however, in the face of adamant complaints by the azogueros that silver that had been sent to hire mingas would now end up in the pockets of the caciques. In a clarification issued on July 1, Cruz ordered the capitanes to hire substitutes for those Indians who had chosen not to serve in person, and had sent money to Potosí for that purpose.<sup>45</sup> The Conde de Alva was persuaded by Cruz' arguments for the June 4 order, and he issued his own directive that service in silver be stopped. Thus, in November of 1659 the ban was again enforced; not only were the capitanes not to deliver mitayos in silver, they were not to be held responsible for any more Indians than they received from their corregidores in their home provinces.<sup>46</sup> Rezagos de mita were outlawed as well, in accordance with two sixteenth century provisions by Cañete and Velasco.<sup>47</sup> Thenceforward, the mitayos who arrived in Potosí would be distributed to the azogueros on a pro-rated basis.<sup>48</sup> In December, Cruz underscored the government's insistence that corregidores, and not the caciques, were to be held accountable for the failure to send Indians in the mita. If the azogueros had a complaint, he told them, then the Corregidor de Potosí could, at their expense, send a judge to investigate the regional corregidor who was at

fault.<sup>49</sup>

More orders were forthcoming in February of 1660. On the third, Cruz prohibited the use of corporal punishment against the caciques.<sup>50</sup> On the eighteenth, he reinforced the ban on mita service in silver, this time adding that the capitanes did not have to replace mitayos who were injured while working or those who were driven away by the azogueros.<sup>51</sup>

Although Cruz had abandoned his plans to conduct the repartimiento, the Viceroy had not. Alba probably felt he would have to compensate for the damage done to the azogueros' production capabilities by Cruz' anti-abuse campaign. The Conde ordered the Superintendent to return to Lima; Alba would then draft the repartimiento himself, based on reports he would receive from parish priests in all thirty of the provinces.<sup>52</sup> Cruz did not approve of the Viceroy's plan. He said that most of the priests were idiots, and that they were engaged in economic pursuits of their own which would compromise the reliability of their reports.<sup>53</sup>

The azogueros' first response to Cruz' actions was their request that he reconsider his orders. They warned him that his actions would have dire consequences.<sup>54</sup> He did qualify his June 4, 1659 order, as noted above, but once the Viceroy had reinforced his stance on service in silver, Cruz refused to listen to the azogueros' protests.

They also complained to the Conde de Alba, through the Corregidor, that the Superintendent was trampling on Gómez Dávila's jurisdiction and jeopardizing the villa's very existence with his ignorant demands. The Viceroy stood behind Cruz, however, and answered the Corregidor's complaint by naming the Superintendent Judge of Appeals in all matters concerning the mita.<sup>55</sup>

Rebuffed by the Viceroy and Cruz, the azogueros chose the only course of action that was still open to them. On the night of April 23, 1660, they slipped poison into his chocolate; he went to bed in perfect health and died in his sleep. President Nestares Marín died the same evening, quite possibly murdered by the same means.<sup>56</sup>

Cruz' anti-abuse campaign had threatened the azogueros on both the conceptual and functional levels, because he was in Potosí to enforce his directives. They had responded by exercising their ultimate power advantage--violence. The Superintendent's death only halted the government's attack on misuse temporarily, however, for another official soon replaced both Nestares and Cruz, and sought to implement the Council of the Indies' program. Before we consider his fate, a brief look at the de facto mita is in order.

#### The de facto Mita

Francisco de la Cruz painted a very grim portrait of the mita in his correspondence with Alba and the crown.

His description of the system was largely an extrapolation from his limited personal experiences. His assertion that the provinces were depopulated, for example, was based on what he had seen while traveling from Lima to Potosí. He attempted to prevent the torture of the caciques after he had personally witnessed various instances. From these particular observations he had concluded that: a) the provinces were depopulated; b) the caciques bore an impossible burden as capitanes enteradores; c) the mita had degenerated to the point where the crown lost more from the system than it gained; and d) the azogueros did not deserve royal assistance.

Despite the limited bases for Cruz' conclusions they were essentially correct. The question of depopulation in the provinces, and the mita's relationship to that phenomenon, were also discussed by the Alcalde de Lima, Juan de Padilla, in his 1657 memorial on Indian labor in Peru.<sup>57</sup> The Council of the Indies asked viceregal officials in Lima and in Charcas to comment on Padilla's memorial in a series of orders of October 7, 1660. The respondents, who included the Archbishop of Lima, Sarmiento de Mendoza (now an oidor of the Audiencia de Lima), Fiscal Nicolás de Polanco and others, all agreed that the provinces were depopulated. They believed that the Indian exodus to the cities and outlying areas had been the principal cause, and that Indian flight had resulted from the forced labor

demands made by the corregidores, caciques and priests in the provinces, as well as the rigors of mita service and the mistreatment of mitayos by the azogueros. The sale of lands under the Conde de Chinchón, which had continued in the viceroyalty of the Marqués de Mancera, had caused irreparable harm, they said, because the Indians had not only been left without lands for their crops, their pueblos were now inhabited by Spaniards and mixed-bloods. The respondents also blamed legal loopholes--the exemption from tribute that Toledo had afforded the forasteros and the ten-year exemption from resettlement ordered by the Príncipe de Esquilache; the protection provided to the Indians by the chacareros; and the harboring of fugitives by local priests. The death of mitayos in the mines at Potosí was not a major factor in the depopulation of the obligated provinces; the mita was only one of many reasons the Indians had migrated away from their pueblos.<sup>58</sup>

The Conde de Alba was instructed by the October 7, 1660 orders to develop a program to counter the problems that the respondents identified. But by the time the Viceroy called the group together on May 20, 1661, he had already learned that he would soon be replaced by the Conde de Santisteban (1661-1666).<sup>59</sup> He passed the responsibility for compliance with the Council's directive on to the new Viceroy, as well as the burden of the still undone repartimiento de la mita.

The officials who replied to the Padilla memorial may not have blamed the mita for depopulating the provinces, but it is clear that the system had had an effect on the pueblos that were obligated to it, and that the situation in the provinces had also had an impact on the mita. The caciques had started to deliver incomplete quotas of mitayos during the 1600-1633 period, and they had faced increasing difficulties thereafter. Even the repartimiento drafted by Caravajal y Sandi in 1633 demanded only a few Indians less than Francisco de Toledo had included in his last distribution in 1578. Then, with the introduction of rezagos de mita by the 1640s, the burden of delivering mitayos--in person and in silver--was compounded by each year's failures.<sup>60</sup>

The caciques of Pacajes complained to the crown about their plight in 1657. They charged that the azogueros were using torture, humiliation and extortion to squeeze silver from them. Under that kind of pressure, many of their comrades had fled from their provinces or committed suicide. They asked that the position of capitán general for their province be abolished, as had been done for Chucuito, and that capitanes be named for each of the pueblos, so that the economic burden of mita service in silver would be distributed among them.<sup>61</sup>

The capitanes of all sixteen obligated provinces combined forces on January 23, 1660 to ask the crown for



relief from the abuses that they suffered at the hands of the azogueros. The caciques charged that the azogueros were not content just to torture them, but also jailed their wives and children, and mistreated them while they were being held. Four years later the Protector general sent the crown a pair of petitions that offered specific examples of the mistreatment of the caciques' families by the azogueros: the cacique principal and gobernador of Calcha, Domingo Yelma, claimed that he had been whipped, and his wife and children jailed, because he was unable to meet his mita quota in silver; and Ignacio Blas said that he had sold everything he owned to raise 1,100 pesos of a 2,000 peso debt for rezagos de mita, but that because he could not deliver the remaining 900 pesos his wife and children had been jailed for three years.<sup>62</sup>

Other reports of the mistreatment of capitanes by the azogueros reached the Condes de Salvatierra and Alva.<sup>63</sup> One cacique who was able to meet his obligations was Gabriel Fernández Guarache--the same cacique who had so much trouble with the Corregidor de La Paz in 1633. Fernández Guarache was named to be capitán general for Pacajes ten times between 1628 and 1660, and often he was chosen after another cacique had fled from the province. He alone had the personal wealth and property necessary to be capitán--his wealth permitted him to meet the service in silver obligation of the province and his property kept him

from fleeing with the others.<sup>64</sup>

The sum of silver required from Pacajes was enormous. The quota for two villages alone came to 16,408 pesos per year, and the total for the province was just under 50,000 pesos.<sup>65</sup> The province of Porco contributed between 65,000 and 70,000 pesos per year.<sup>66</sup> Francisco de la Cruz reported that 50,000 pesos for a province was quite common, and given the figures for Pacajes and Porco, his total of 600,000 pesos per year in mita service in silver is quite plausible.<sup>67</sup>

Not all of the silver delivered in the mita came out of the caciques' pockets, however. Padilla said that many of the miners in recently discovered zones were willing to pay the Indians' service in silver obligation in return for their services.<sup>68</sup> Fernández Guarache's province had a similar means of raising the money: indios maharaques. When the mitayos from Pacajes came together at Topoco each year for despatch to Potosí, they were offered for hire to anyone who needed Indian labor. The caciques, or often the Indians themselves, would contract out their services for a payment of 150 pesos and the cancellation of their tribute requirements. The indios maharaques also received two reales per day in wages, and the tenure of the contract was one year.<sup>69</sup>

In 1662, the chaplain of Caquiavire estimated that there were 500 indios maharaques working at Merenguela (a

mining center) alone. For most of them the decision to work for someone in Pacajes, rather than go to Potosí in the mita, was their choice of the lesser of two evils. The 150 pesos covered their service in silver obligation for twenty weeks (a mitayo was supposed to work a total of four months) and they were spared the trip.<sup>70</sup> Similar arrangements were probably common elsewhere as well. The treatment of the caciques at Potosí would suggest, however, that even these means, and the caciques' personal resources, were insufficient to meet the demands of the azogueros.

The extent to which the mita was delivered in silver is also suggested by a comparison of various officials' and individuals' accounts from the period 1650-1655, as shown on Table 2. It appears that total mita service averaged about 2,000 Indians per week, with roughly half of that amount being "Indians in silver." Moreover, the total number of mitayos serving at Potosí seems to have fallen gradually over the fifteen year period, with a sharper fall in 1659 and 1660 caused by Cruz' actions with regard to service in silver.

One cannot base too many conclusions on the data in Table 2 because the true relationship between mita service in silver and "pocket Indians" remains cloudy. Many officials began to use the terms interchangeably. Cruz and González Pavón both argued that very few mingas were

TABLE 2  
ESTIMATED MITA SERVICE, 1651-1665<sup>71</sup>

YEAR	SOURCE	TOTAL MITAYOS	MITAYOS IN PERSON	MITAYOS IN SILVER
1651 <sup>a</sup>	Council of the Indies	2,800		
1651 <sup>b</sup>	Salvatierra		1,300	1,600
1651 <sup>c</sup>	Sarmiento de Mendoza	2,600		
1654 <sup>d</sup>	Sarmiento de Mendoza	2,778		558
1654 <sup>e</sup>	Sarmiento (unofficial)			1,100
1655 <sup>f</sup>	Salvatierra	2,000		
1658 <sup>g</sup>	González Pavón		1,500	2,000
1659 <sup>h</sup>	Francisco de la Cruz			1,600
1659 <sup>i</sup>	Bartolomé de Salazar	2,580		
1660 <sup>j</sup>	Salazar and the Archbishop of Lima	2,447	1,294	
1660 <sup>k</sup>	Acarete du Biscay	2,300		
1660 <sup>l</sup>	Conde de Alva		400	
1660 <sup>m</sup>	Bartolomé de Salazar	1,603		
1661 <sup>n</sup>	Salazar and the Archbishop of Lima		1,252	882
1662 <sup>o</sup>	Bartolomé de Salazar	2,000		
1662 <sup>p</sup>	Bartolomé de Salazar		2,306	957
1663 <sup>q</sup>	Vázquez de Velasco		1,449 (plus 286 for the mills)	
1664 <sup>r</sup>	Vázquez de Velasco	1,670 (plus 310 for the mills)		
1664 <sup>s</sup>	the <u>azogueros</u>	1,800		
1665 <sup>t</sup>	Guerrero de Luna	2,000		

hired with the money that was remitted for service in silver, but later sources suggest just the opposite.<sup>72</sup> More specific statements are impossible because the real uses to which the silver was put was a secret that was carefully guarded by the azogueros.

Another indication that the caciques were no longer capable of meeting the azogueros' demands is the appearance of Indian collectors (sacadores). The azogueros hired these collectors to gather money from the caciques, and paid them a percentage of the silver that they were able to produce.<sup>73</sup> The methods the collectors used, and their abuse of their contracts with the azogueros, can only be surmised. But it is clear that the caciques were no longer a dependable vehicle for the delivery of mitayos, as far as the azogueros were concerned. The Corregidor de Potosí did his part to pressure the caciques by sending judges against them, at their expense, to collect rezagos de mita.<sup>74</sup>

Life for the mitayos who served in person had changed very little from what it had been at the beginning of the century. They were still paid less, for example, if they failed to meet a quota--now twelve bags of ore per day.<sup>75</sup> Padilla noted that the mitayos were also forced to work both day and night, and that they were often used to drain water from flooded mines.<sup>76</sup> Other than his memorial, however, the sources for this period are silent on the

subject of mitayos in person, for the most part.

Table 2 includes figures for the 1660s as well as for the 1650s. It indicates that the decline in the total number of mitayos at Potosí was not reversed after Cruz' death. This discussion of the de facto mita has suggested that the abuses that he attacked outlived him also. Cruz' successors had little more success than he when they were confronted with the realities of the mita. Yet each new superintendent believed that he would succeed where others had failed; each learned from experience that the mita was virtually uncontrollable.

#### Administration of the Mita after Cruz

Francisco de la Cruz' demise had a profound effect on the mita. For one thing, his murder convinced the Conde de Alba that all of his reports about the azogueros had been true.<sup>77</sup> In a letter to the crown of July 3, 1660, the Viceroy adopted Cruz' argument that the mita now wrought more harm than good. He noted, for comparison, that the mines at San Antonio Esquilache (in Chucuito) had produced 400,000 pesos in quintos that year without any mitayos; Potosí had yielded some 100,000 pesos less, despite the hellish mistreatment of the Indians and caciques there by the azogueros.<sup>78</sup>

The Viceroy acted quickly to preserve what Cruz had accomplished, and to keep the azogueros from returning to

business as usual. He ordered Bartolomé de Salazar to leave his post at Huancavelica and assume the offices of President of Charcas and Superintendent of the mita.<sup>79</sup> Alba's antipathy toward the azogueros manifested itself in Salazar's commission. First, he explicitly restricted the census, upon which the new repartimiento would be based, to the sixteen provinces that were already subject to the mita. Second, he ordered Salazar to collect all service in silver and hire the mingas with the money himself. The Conde now placed the measures to relieve the Indians' suffering far above providing assistance to the azogueros. His repartimiento, he said, would affect one-seventh of the originario population in the sixteen provinces, no matter how small that number might be. He had concluded that the azogueros deserved no more.<sup>80</sup>

Bartolomé de Salazar drew different lessons from the Cruz visita than Alba. His experience at Huancavelica had accustomed him to the realities of mining, and once he arrived in Potosí--on November 7, 1660--he was able to see the need for a new repartimiento. He agreed that abuses would have to be curtailed, but he believed that his efforts in that regard would have to wait until the repartimiento had revitalized the mita. Cruz, he said, had destroyed one house before building another; his anti-abuse campaign had reduced the total delivery of mitayos to 1,603, and so had worsened the production crisis

rather than alleviating it. Salazar pointed to many ways that he believed Cruz might have been more effective, if less spectacular. He expected that he would be more successful.<sup>81</sup>

It is interesting that the azogueros shared the new Superintendent's assessment. They agreed that Cruz had not been malicious; he had simply represented ignorance run rampant. Salazar, they noted, seemed to be more realistic, and they held great hopes that Potosí would slowly recover under his guidance.<sup>82</sup>

The Conde de Alba and President-Superintendent Salazar were therefore at odds about what they expected to happen at Potosí. The Viceroy was looking to punish the azogueros for their crimes, while the President was trying to revitalize silver production in the villa. The immediate object of their disagreement was the pre-repartimiento census; Cruz had already launched the attack on misuse of the mita. The officials' argument over the census was an obstacle in the path to the repartimiento itself. The Conde wanted the census to be conducted by two judges, within the sixteen obligated provinces. Salazar, holding to his contention that the repartimiento should contribute to the recovery of Potosí, counseled the Viceroy that more provinces would be needed if the mita ordinaria were to include a sufficient number of Indians. Nor did he approve of assigning the census to two judges.<sup>83</sup> The President



based his opinion on the fate of the three judges that Cruz had sent out for that purpose. They had been overwhelmed by bribery, deception and their own incompetence. The payment of the judges was another problem, Salazar argued, for the total cost of the census would come to 66,600 pesos, and neither the azogueros nor the government could afford to pay that sum. He asked Alba to reconsider his orders in conference with Sarmiento de Mendoza and Alarcón, both of whom were now stationed in Lima, and he strongly suggested that the provincial corregidores conduct the census in all thirty of the provinces.<sup>84</sup>

The struggle between Salazar and Alba was fought with bureaucratic maneuvers. The President's letter to the Viceroy was dated December 1, 1660. The Conde responded, after an Acuerdo consultivo of February 3, 1661, that all thirty provinces would now be included, but that the census would be conducted by local priests. Salazar replied that the new plan would be disastrous, because the priests could not be trusted. Alba called another Acuerdo for April 29, and then sent the President an ambiguous instruction that could be interpreted to mean that Salazar could do as he wished, or do nothing at all. He was therefore compelled to ask for a clarification, which he did on June 1. By that time he had learned that the Viceroy's successor, the Conde de Santisteban, was on his way to Peru, so he

also wrote to Santisteban with his analysis on the matter as it then stood. On July 1, Alba decided to allow the President to do as he wished, and he sent Salazar the requisite orders on July 3, 1661.<sup>85</sup> The Conde de Alba acceded to Salazar's requests only after he had delayed the execution of the census for almost a year, and only after it was clear that the President's plan would be conducted under his successor.

Salazar quickly prepared the orders for the provincial corregidores to undertake the census, and despatched them to all thirty provinces. No sooner had they been sent than he received new instructions, from the Conde de Santisteban, to suspend action on the July 3 directive. The new Viceroy wanted the census to be conducted by two oidores from the Audiencia de Charcas, during the course of a visita general of the sixteen obligated provinces; the fourteen others were not to be included.<sup>86</sup>

The President suspended Santisteban's order and wrote to the Viceroy that there were a host of reasons why the oidores were incapable of performing the duties that he had assigned to them. He also expressed his displeasure with the Conde's decision to limit the census to only sixteen provinces. Santisteban replied to Salazar's critique on September 30, 1661. He said that the matter would be studied further, and that a decision would be forthcoming. When Salazar pressed him for a decision in

November he was scolded for his haste. The Viceroy told him that a decision on the census had been postponed until the arrival of Pedro Vázquez de Velasco, the next President-Superintendent. When Vázquez arrived in Potosí, Santisteban promised, then Salazar could return to Lima and participate in the final deliberations on the census.<sup>87</sup>

The Conde de Alba had successfully postponed action on the new repartimiento until the arrival of the Conde de Santisteban by frustrating Salazar's efforts to conduct a census. He had been convinced by Cruz' accounts, and especially by his murder, that the azogueros did not deserve the new repartimiento. Santisteban was no more enthusiastic about coming to the Gremio's aid than his predecessor, and he was using another bureaucratic ploy to delay his consideration of the census, and ultimately the repartimiento.

The Viceroy's decision to wait for Vázquez de Velasco effectively postponed a resolution of the questions about the census for two years. The President-elect was detained in Quito, where he was President of the Audiencia, by charges lodged against him by the Bishop. He would not arrive in Potosí until August of 1663.<sup>88</sup>

The delay also had a serious impact on Salazar's enthusiasm for the repartimiento. His change of heart resulted from his realization that he could not comply with his orders or improve the situation at Potosí. A

drought had stopped the mills from December 18, 1660 to February 6, 1661.<sup>89</sup> Corregidor Gómez Davila steadfastly refused to cooperate with him. His efforts to oversee the hiring of mingas with the money collected for mita service in silver, moreover, were disastrous--ruined by confusion at Guayna and his inability to communicate directly with the capitanes enteradores.<sup>90</sup>

The President was dishearted, as well, by the difficulties he faced in determining the true situation at Potosí. Despite his presence in the villa, he could not discover how many Indians were actually working in the cerro. Trying to count them, he said, was like counting bees in a hive, and nobody would testify against those azogueros who were involved in "pocket Indians" and other forms of misuse. The veedores and the alcalde de minas were afraid to act against wrongdoers because they would be open to revenge. Everyone in Potosí knew what happened to someone who pressed too hard against abuses; the means that had been used to dispose of Cruz and Nestares Marín were public knowledge.<sup>91</sup>

Meanwhile, in Lima, Fiscal Nicolás de Polanco raised grave questions about the propriety of a census. He said that the costs and risks of such a venture were very high in comparison to the potential gains. Should the sixteen provinces not hold enough Indians, then the mita would have to be halved or obligation would have to be extended to

more provinces. The addition of new areas would be hampered, he warned, by the novelty of the action, the exemption from resettlement after ten years and the logistics of a thirty-province mita. A new repartimiento would also drag the Indians away from more profitable mining centers in their own provinces and from agricultural activities which were as important to the economic health of Peru as Potosí silver production. Polanco supported the execution of a repartimiento that was limited to the sixteen traditional provinces, and he suggested that the Conde de Santisteban find a means to implement the new distribution of mitayos without conducting a census.<sup>92</sup>

The Viceroy was impressed by Polanco's discourse on the difficulties involved with the census, and the Fiscal's arguments were now echoed by President Salazar.<sup>93</sup> The Conde began to explore alternatives to a census-based repartimiento de la mita. Where Alva had decided to tailor the mita to the originario population in the sixteen provinces, Santisteban sought to adapt the de facto mita to the needs of the crown. On August 20, 1663, he wrote to the Council of the Indies with a rationalization of service in silver--comparing it to the recruiting of soldiers in Spain during wartime. He sent along three papers, without identifying their authors, that weighed the pros and cons of mita service in silver, and the possibility of a total delivery of mitayos in money.<sup>94</sup>

Another who responded to Santisteban's questions about service in silver was Pedro Vázquez de Velasco. The President had finally escaped from the grasp of the Bishop of Quito, and he was in Lima by November of 1662.<sup>95</sup> There he conferred with the Viceroy on the problems surrounding the execution of a census, and thus the repartimiento.<sup>96</sup> He had recently completed a census in Quito, where he had included forasteros and yanaconas in various mitas, and he felt that he would also be able to overcome the difficulties that Nicolás de Polanco had described. The Viceroy decided to let him try, and Vázquez de Velasco left Callao for Potosí on February 11, 1663.<sup>97</sup>

When the new Superintendent finally arrived in the villa in August, he found the mining industry in a shambles. The total number of mitayos, he reported, was down to a mere 1,449--plus 286 for the mills--and only 500 Indians were actually working in the cerro. Vázquez charged that Salazar had understated the extent of Potosí's degeneration, and that he had included fifteen months of silver production in the last carta cuenta.<sup>98</sup> Salazar had apparently indulged in a favorite pastime of Hapsburg administrators: the protection of one's reputation by adjustment of official production figures during his term of office.

Despite his initial outrage, Vázquez de Velasco was determined to save Potosí. He looked to accomplish that

feat with a fresh approach to government there. He informed the azogueros that their past involvement with misuse of the mita, and all past difficulties in general, would be forgotten. Furthermore, he would not act against those who were currently engaged in misuse until he had completed the new repartimiento, and he would then be lenient toward the first offense. Thenceforward, however, they were to keep careful records of the Indians that they received, both in person and in silver, and the use to which they were put.<sup>99</sup> Vázquez had seen a glimmer of hope for the new repartimiento when the Corregidor de Chayanta delivered 1,100 Indians, after conducting an extensive reducción in his province.<sup>100</sup> At the same time, he wrote to the Viceroy to confess that Potosí's recovery would take longer than he had originally predicted.<sup>101</sup>

During the latter half of 1663, Vázquez de Velasco corresponded with Santisteban about how best to conduct the census. The President suggested that priests be used in all thirty provinces, under the general direction of the Archbishops of Lima and Charcas.<sup>102</sup> On January 31, 1644, he again urged that a prompt decision on the matter be reached, for while he had been able to raise the number of mitayos to 1,670 per week, his success at Potosí would ultimately depend upon the repartimiento.<sup>103</sup> The azogueros warned the Viceroy that Potosí would collapse within two years if the new repartimiento were not completed soon.<sup>104</sup>

The President sent a comprehensive repartimiento plan to the Viceroy on February 2, 1664. He now wanted to include only the Indians in the sixteen provinces, and those in the fourteen others who had migrated out of them. The provincial corregidores were to conduct the census, and the new mita would not distinguish among the forasteros, yanaconas and originarios. The new plan was predicated upon the Viceroy's ability to order its execution on his own authority; Vázquez said that the census could no longer wait for another crown directive.<sup>105</sup> On March 3, he again warned that silver production at Potosí would soon collapse if action were not taken immediately.<sup>106</sup>

The azogueros reinforced Vázquez de Velasco's exhortations with petitions that underscored Potosí's economic and military importance to Peru. They were sensitive to the villa's diminishing role as a silver producer, and so they promoted its importance as a consumer of goods produced in Charcas and its strategic location half-way between Lima and Buenos Aires.<sup>107</sup>

Bartolomé de Salazar, who had earlier joined Nicolás de Polanco in raising doubts about the feasibility of a census, now pressed for an immediate enumeration and repartimiento. He said that the questions that had been raised about the dependability of the corregidores mattered little when compared to the urgency of the situation.<sup>108</sup>



The Viceroy refused to proceed, however, for he said that he had only been ordered to conduct a repartimiento, and did not have the authorization to undertake a census. He wrote to the Council of the Indies to request permission to follow Vázquez de Velasco's suggestions, and he added that he would act anyway if he did not receive a prompt reply.<sup>109</sup>

While Santisteban waited for word from Madrid, Vázquez de Velasco--like Bartolomé de Salazar before him--grew disheartened and frustrated. He was painfully annoyed by the new Corregidor, Guerrero de Luna. Despite Vázquez' insistence that he put the crown's interests before his own, Guerrero had set up gambling in his home for the azogueros. The President was not upset that the azogueros were gambling, but that they paid for their losses with mercury and "pocket Indians." The Corregidor was therefore encouraging the abuses that Vázquez was trying to end. The President asked that his and the Corregidor's positions be merged, to eliminate such problems in the future, and that the joint position be awarded to someone else.<sup>110</sup>

Guerrero countered Vázquez' charges with manifestations of his innocence and the claim that his efforts to augment provincial compliance with mita obligations had been compromised by the President's meddling. He claimed that he could have doubled the effective mita ordinaria had he been free to act on his own.<sup>111</sup>

Meanwhile, Viceroy Santisteban was again looking for an

ve to a census-based repartimiento. In 1665 he  
 uez de Velasco a plan that called for 1,000 mitayos  
 from the sixteen obligated provinces, and another  
 n the fourteen theretofore exempted provinces who  
 e the option of serving in person or remitting two  
 alf pesos per week for a year. Originarios,  
 yand forasteros were all included on an equal  
 hose who served in person would work more often  
 eek in three, but the actual ratio of work to  
 reft open. All service in silver from the fourteen  
 pwould be matched by the azogueros, and mingas  
 wired for five pesos per week. All workers,  
 witayos or mingas, would be distributed equally  
 aazogueros. Should the new mita not revitalize  
 th silver industry, then the quinto would be  
 lThe Viceroy suspended all discussion of the  
 cel this new plan could be considered by Vázquez  
 an, 112

resident did not hold out much hope for the plan.  
 He referred a program consisting of a census and a  
repto, but his ultimate conclusion was that the  
mita be abolished altogether. He argued that the  
 potains from a new repartimiento--however it was  
 reere simply not worth the costs. Misuse of the  
mita only way the azogueros could make a profit at  
 Potsaid, and it was therefore impossible to prevent.

The evils wrought by the mita would not be solved by the completion of the new plan, or the implementation of a census-based repartimiento. Only the abolition of the mita, Vázquez counseled, could accomplish that goal. The crown would lose little, he added, for the quintos it received from Potosí were no longer significant.<sup>113</sup>

Fiscal Juan Baptista Moreto de Espinosa was another who responded to Santisteban's 1665 plan. He found as many problems with it as Vázquez de Velasco. By the time he had devised a step-by-step plan for its implementation, furthermore, it was so unwieldy that it presented even greater difficulties than the census it was meant to replace.<sup>114</sup>

The Conde de Santisteban died on March 16, 1666, before he could receive the opinions of Vázquez and Baptista. His death effectively ended all discussion of the new plan. The Audiencia de Lima, following established practice, assumed direction of the realm until the arrival of his successor, the Conde de Lemos (1667-1672).<sup>115</sup> It was the Audiencia that received Vázquez' call for the abolition of the mita. It also received an order from the Council of the Indies and Queen Mariana--Phillip IV had died on September 17, 1665--permitting the Viceroy to act in any way he wished.<sup>116</sup> The Audiencia could therefore have legally pursued the matter of the repartimiento, but it was no more inclined to assume the responsibility for it than

Viceroy Salvatierra, Alba and Santisteban. The Audiencia chose to leave the entire affair to the Conde de Lemos.<sup>117</sup>

### Summary

From 1648 to 1666, Hapsburg officials spent a great deal of time and effort on the mita. They accomplished very little because the Council of the Indies, the viceroys and the local officials in Potosí were often working at cross-purposes. The Council of the Indies tried to implement a two part program involving both a new repartimiento and the abolition of misuse. The program contained assistance for the azogueros and the Indians, and it required a balanced execution of its tenets for it to succeed.

Viceroy Salvatierra, Alba and Santisteban--and the Audiencia de Lima as interim head of government--did not implement the Council's program for three reasons: first, they doubted that the azogueros deserved further government assistance, given the extent of their misuse of the mita; second, they doubted that the prerequisites for a new repartimiento--first reducciones and then only a census--could be conducted successfully; and third, they would have been held responsible for any negative consequences of their execution of the Council's orders.

For fear of making things worse at Potosí, therefore, each viceroy did his utmost to pass the responsibility for

compliance with the Council's directives on to his successor. Meanwhile, he presented the appearance of action by collecting information and making short-term decisions of little consequence.

President Nestares Marín and Corregidor Sarmiento de Mendoza pressured the Conde de Salvatierra to comply with separate sections of the Council's program, and they were later assigned the responsibility for implementing that program when the Council of the Indies grew tired of the Viceroy's obstinacy. Their effectiveness was diminished by the division of responsibility for the program between them, and their personal antipathy toward one another. The two halves of the Council's program were then reunited, by the Conde de Alva, and assigned to Superintendent Francisco de la Cruz; but Alva refused to allow Cruz a free hand, despite his apparent authority to do as he deemed necessary.

Cruz was shocked by what he encountered in the mita provinces and outraged by what he discovered at Potosí. The provinces, he reported, were so thoroughly depopulated that the caciques were unable to meet their mita quotas in persons or in silver. The azogueros, supported by the Corregidor de Potosí, demanded mita deliveries according to the 1633 repartimiento, and they used collectors, torture, extortion and other abuses to squeeze as much silver from the caciques as they could possibly produce.

The mistreatment of the caciques by the azogueros, the extent to which they were involved in misuse of the mita, and their illegal trade with the crown's Dutch enemies caused the Superintendent to abandon the Council's balanced program and launch an attack on the de facto mita.

Cruz struck against the azogueros' misuse of service in silver and their mistreatment of the caciques by demanding that they conform to the tenets of the Toledan mita. He abolished service in silver and rezagos de mita, and he ordered that the caciques were not to be held responsible for their provinces' inability to meet unrealistic mita quotas. The azogueros complained that Cruz' direct enforcement of the viceregal position that the Toledan mita was still viable was itself unrealistic, and that he would destroy the Potosí silver industry if he were allowed to continue. When their protests were ignored, they killed Cruz and President Nestares Marín.

Cruz' reports to the Conde de Alba, and especially his murder, further dissuaded the Viceroy from assisting the azogueros. In Solórzano Pereira's terms, the Superintendent and the Viceroy concluded that the mita was no longer justifiable--that the abuses it generated far outweighed the benefits of Potosí silver production. Alba did not act to abolish the mita, but he did prevent Bartolomé de Salazar from making any progress toward a new repartimiento.

The Conde de Santisteban looked for some means to tailor the mita to current realities: the extension of obligation to more provinces; the legitimization of service in silver; the inclusion of forasteros and yanaconas; or a combination of all three. He hoped to restructure the de facto mita so that it might continue to meet the legitimate needs of the azogueros without generating the abuses that Francisco de la Cruz had documented. The implementation of alternatives to the standard mita, however, presented as many problems as the execution of the Council of the Indies' program.

Santisteban was also kept from developing an alternative by an overzealous and overconfident President Vázquez de Velasco. He had conducted a census and had reformed mitas in Quito, and he believed that he would be able to do the same in Charcas. Vázquez learned very quickly, however, that the problems at Potosí were unlike any he had encountered elsewhere. By 1666 the President had resolved that the abuses that were plaguing the Potosí mita could not be eliminated without abolishing the system, and he began a concerted drive toward that goal. He too had concluded that the mita now caused more harm than good--that it was unjust.

Notes for Chapter V

1. AGI, Charcas 266, no. 19C, "Cedula q<sup>e</sup> se cometio al Conde de Salv<sup>a</sup> Virey p<sup>a</sup> la reduccion de los Indios," 28.IV.1650, 2 fs.
2. BNB, MSS 4, fs. 466-470, "Real cédula al conde de Salvatierra, virrey del Perú: Sobre lo que ha de hacer en cuanto a la pretensión del gremio de azogueros de la villa de Potosí de que se les vuelva el exceso que por error habían pagado demás en el precio del azogue desde 1609 hasta 1631 o que se impuse a cuenta de ese exceso lo que deben de azogueros retrasados," Aranjuez, 28.IV.1650 (MC 806).
3. AGI, Charcas 266, no. 15, the President of Charcas, Francisco de Nestares Marín, to the crown, Potosí, 30.V. 1652, 2 fs. This letter discusses the Council's order at length, including the motivation for it. Nestares was responsible for its execution in Potosí.
4. AGI, Charcas 266, no. 14, "Consulta del consejo de 16 de Abril sobre la pretension de los Acogueros de Potossi," Madrid, 16.IV.1650, 9 fs.
5. See note 27, Chapter I, for the first citation of Solórzano Pereira's Política Indiana. The summary included here is drawn primarily from Castañeda Delgado, 345-349. Arguments in the affirmative, in Solórzano's discussion of the good and bad of the mita, are found, in the Biblioteca de Autores Españoles edition, on I, 261-271; arguments in the negative are on pages 272-288. Solórzano's observations on the question are on I, 289-314.
6. Salvatierra's response is included in AGI, Charcas 266, no. 30D, "Copia de la carta que el Virrey Conde de salvatierra escribió a S Mg.<sup>d</sup> en 2 de 7<sup>re</sup> de 1651 Respondiendo a la cedula de 28 de Abril de 650 en que se le m<sup>do</sup> cuydase del entero de los Yndios de la mita de Potossi y q<sup>e</sup> se hiciesen reducciones de ellos," Los Reyes, 2.IX. 1651, 3 fs. For his "Relación" and his later comments on the cédula, see note 34, Chapter IV; the comments on the 1650 edict are on page 41. An overview for everything in this chapter is the "Relación que hizo la real audiencia y la cancillería de los reyes de su gobierno vacante por la muerte del Virrey Conde de Santisteban al Conde de Lemos, su sucesor," 15.XI.1667, Los virreyes (ed. by Hanke and Rodríguez), Perú IV (no. 283), 205-209 (from Biblioteca



Nacional, Madrid, Ms. 3122); this is chapter 38 of the "Relación." A copy of chapter 38 is AGI, Charcas 267, no. 56A, "Copia de cap.<sup>o</sup> de la RON que la Aud.a de Lima entrego al Virrey Conde de Lemos, del estado de las Prov.as del Peru, que trata de lo tocante a la Mita de Potossi," 4 fs. Zavala, Servicio personal, II, 147-148, relates the content of chapter 38, and on page 148 sums his discussion with:

"Esta relación muestra a qué grado de incapacidad de acción había llegado la administración indiana de la Casa de Austria en esta época, si bien se trataba de un período de gobierno interino en el que se hacía sentir el ascendiente de los letrados. Es notable el número de consultas y papeles de las Audiencias de Los Reyes y La Plata mientras el grave problema ocasionado por la disminución de los indios que acudían a la mita de Potosí seguía pendiente. No sólo la altamagistratura indiana ocasionaba esta tardanza sino también la de España, que finalmente, ante la variedad de las opiniones, remitía todo sin nueva resolución a las autoridades del Perú. Se esperaba del nuevo gobernante que llegaba que tomaría las decisiones que tanto se habían demorado."

See, also, Valera (AGI, Charcas 268, nos. 69A & 69B--see note 58, Chapter II), 12, which is based on the Audiencia's "Relación."

7. BNB, CPLA 24, fs. 480-482, "Acuerdo del cabildo de Potosí: Sobre lo propuesto por don Luís de Sotomayor Pimentel, caballero de la orden de Santiago, corregidor de esta villa, para remedio de la falta de lluvias que tiene parada la ribera de ingenios desde agosto pasado y promueve, entre otros daños, la deserción de indios mitayos," Potosí, 13.XII.1651 (MC 832; MOM 630). As the summary suggests, one of the problems caused by the drought was that azogueros were unable to pay their mitayos, and the Indians left the villa in search of employment.

8. Salvatierra, "Relación" (see note 34, Chapter IV), 41.

9. AGI, Charcas 266, no. 19B, "Provisión de gobierno para suspender a los Corregidores el de Potossi," 29.X.1652, 4 fs. Sarmiento de Mendoza's compliance with that order is discussed in AGI, Charcas 266, no. 24A, an undated and untitled addendum to no. 24, Corregidor Sarmiento de Mendoza to the crown, Potosí, 30.IX.1654, 5 fs. See, also, AGI, Charcas 266, no. 28, "testim<sup>o</sup> de las dilig<sup>s</sup> q<sup>e</sup> se an hecho en el buen entero de la mita desde q<sup>e</sup> es Corrr el d<sup>or</sup> dn frco Sarmto," sin fecha, 7 fs.

10. AGI, Charcas 266, no. 30A, "Copia de la carta que se escrivio a los Corregies que enteran la mta de potosi que se les envio en tienpo del Gobierno del conde de salvatierra virey destos rreynos," 31.VIII.1653, 2 fs.
11. AGI, Charcas 266, no. 15 (see note 3); this letter also discusses a cédula of 30.V.1651 which proposed that the Corregidor de Potosí conduct yearly repartimientos. Nestares had to power to suspend the order if he considered it "inconveniente," and he did.
12. AGI, Charcas 266, no. 39D, "Al Correx<sup>OR</sup> de la Villa Imperial del Potosí que vea la cedula arriva inserta en que se dispone la forma que se a de observar en el repartim<sup>i</sup>ento de Los In.<sup>OS</sup> de mita de aquel Cerro y la guarde y cumpla executandola en la conform<sup>d</sup> que se le advierte," 8.XI.1653, 2 fs. See, also, AGI, Charcas 268, no. 70C (see note 56, Chapter IV). For Sarmiento de Mendoza's response, AGI, Charcas 266, no. 20C, "Discursso breve que hace El Docttor Don franco sarmiento de mendoca oydor de lima corregidor de la ciudad de la platta y Villa ynperial de pottossi teniente de capp.<sup>an</sup> General de la provincia de los charcas sobre el reparttim.<sup>to</sup> General de los yndios de la mitta y zerro de pottossi que su mag.<sup>d</sup> fue servido de cometterle Cuya Zedula recibio en esta ultima ocacion de Armada en dha Villa de pottossi a Ultimo de Abrill de mill y seiscientos y cinquenta y quattro y por horden de el Ex.<sup>mo</sup> señor conde de salbattierra esta suspendido El que haga El dho reparttimiento asta la llegada del s.<sup>r</sup> Conde de alba que Viene por Nuevo Virrey," 1654, 12 fs. Nestares Marín's orders are AGI, Charcas 266, no. 26B, "Copia de una cedula de su Mg.<sup>d</sup> de 8 de novire de 1653 en q.<sup>e</sup> se avico al Presste de la Audiã de los charcas lo q<sup>e</sup> se ordenava, en quanto al repartim<sup>to</sup> de los Indios de mita del zerro de Pottosi, concediendole Juridicion p<sup>a</sup> la Aberiguacion de los excesos q<sup>e</sup> cometiesen en ellos," 8.XI.1653, 4 fs.
13. Gaspar González Pavón refers to the system of playing the Corregidor against the President in AGI, Charcas 267, no. 3A, "Copia de carta escrita al Virrey Conde de Alba de aliste" (by Gaspar González Pavón), Potosí, 26.IV.1655, 1 f.
14. AGI, Charcas 266, no. 20C (see note 12).
15. Ibid.
16. AGI, Charcas 266, no. 19, Corregidor Sarmiento de Mendoza to the crown, Potosí, 31.VII.1654, 3 fs. This letter was written the same day that Sarmiento informed the

crown that the Conde de Salvatierra had suspended activity on the new repartimiento, so his comments about the Viceroy's interference were timely. Sarmiento's sentiments can also be found in AGI, Charcas 266, no. 24, Corregidor Sarmiento de Mendoza to the crown, Potosí, 30.IX.1654, 5 fs.; this letter responds to Salvatierra's decision to assign President Nestares Marín a role in the mita.

17. AGI, Charcas 266, no. 30E, "Propon qe el Corrr de Potossi hico al Gremio de Azogueros sobre diferentes cossas del remedio de la mita," Potosí, 23.X.1654, 17 fs. The document includes the azogueros' discussion of Sarmiento de Mendoza's various proposals.

18. AGI, Charcas 266, no. 22, "el presidentte de los charcas sobre El Repartimiento de los Yndios de mita del cerro Rico de Pottossi" (Francisco Nestares Marín to the crown), Potosí, 30.VIII.1654, 2 fs. The letter was sent with others that "se perdieron en el naufragio de la cappno del Mar del sur"; a copy was sent with another letter of 8.II.1658. Sarmiento de Mendoza answers the charges made by Nestares Marín in AGI, Charcas 266, no. 25, Corregidor Sarmiento de Mendoza to the crown, Potosí, 30.IX.1654, 6 fs.; he notes that Don Gerónimo Luiz de Cabrera is eighty years old and his jurisdiction of Chucuito is one of the worst when it comes to sending mitayos.

19. AGI, Charcas 266, no. 20A, "Capi de carta q.e le escrivo el virei p<sup>a</sup> qe no hiciese el repartimto asta qe llegase alba" (an escrivano's report to Sarmiento de Mendoza on the contents of two viceregal letters to him of 31.V.1654), 2 fs. Sarmiento de Mendoza's response, as observed in note 12, is AGI, Charcas 266, no. 20.

20. Sarmiento de Mendoza's response, as observed in note 16, is AGI, Charcas 266, no. 24. The Conde de Alba discussed the order in a discourse on the mita written in Lima on 13.XII.1661 (AGI, Charcas 267, no. 31A, 14 fs.).

21. The broadside is AGI, Charcas 266, no. 26, Corregidor Sarmiento de Mendoza to the crown, Potosí, 31.V.1655, 2 fs. For charges that Nestares permitted a relative to engage in abuse, see AGI, Charcas 266, no. 32F, "Tantto de la carta que El Correg.or de potossi Don franco sarmiento de mendoca escrivo al conde de alva Virrey del peru sobre El mal Usso de los yndios de mita que a Yntroducido El presidente de los charcas," Potosí, 31.VII.1655, 3 fs. For Sarmiento's charge that Nestares was in league with the moneylenders, see AGI, Charcas 266, no. 32H, "Tantto de la 2. Cartta que se remittio al Virrey conde de alva por El

Docttor Don fran.<sup>co</sup> sarmiento de mendoza Corregidor de Pottossi," Potosí, 31.VII.1665, 3 fs. AGI, Charcas 266, no. 18, is an anonymous indictment of the President entitled "Danos y menos cavos q<sup>e</sup> ha causado la visita que ha hecho y continúe el Dr Don francisco de Nestares Marin Presidente de los charcas assi en la hacienda R.<sup>l</sup> como en lo universal del Reyno en general y particular de el con el computo del aum.<sup>to</sup> que por relacion del mismo Press.<sup>te</sup> ha valido la visita y cobranças que ha hecho de las caxas R.<sup>es</sup> hasta ultimo de Jullio de 1654 años que es como se sigue . . .," 6 fs. Superintendent of the mita Francisco de la Cruz, on 14.IV.1660, said that Nestares Marin had withheld travel allowances to pay Chucuito's rezagos (AGI, Charcas 266, no. 57, "Plata que entra en la Caja R.<sup>l</sup> devida a Los yndios de chucuyto por Venida y buelta a esta Villa q<sup>e</sup> parecese les deve Restituir y la razon de ello," Potosí, 14.IV.1660, 1 f.).

22. AGI, Charcas 267, no. 3A (see note 13); and AGI, Charcas 266, no. 59, second item, "Copia de carta escrita al Conde de Alba de aleste Virrey del peru" (by Gaspar González Pavón), Potosí, 31.VII.1655, 1 f.

23. AGI, Charcas 266, no. 32K, "Tanto de la Carta que el correg.<sup>r</sup> de Pottossi don franco sarmto de mendoca escrivio al conde de alva Virrey del peru sobre que combiene que su ex.<sup>a</sup> benga a potossi. con la cedula de Su mag<sup>d</sup> que asi lo mando a su antecesor El Conde de salvatierra," Potosí, 31.VIII.1655, 4 fs. The 1650 order said that the Conde de Salvatierra could go to Potosí if he believed it would help matters there.

24. For orders to act against corregidores: AHP, CR 339, f. 120, "Carta del Señor Virrey escrita a los offis R<sup>s</sup> de esta Vi<sup>a</sup> sobre la ex<sup>on</sup> en recevir las fi<sup>as</sup> de los Correg.<sup>es</sup> que se nombran en lugar de los suspendidos por el mal entero de la mita," Lima, 30.IX.1655 (a copy). For Alba's delay of the repartimiento, AGI, Charcas 267, no. 17A, "Tanto de la carta que escrivio el S<sup>r</sup> Virrey Conde de Alba al S<sup>r</sup> D.<sup>or</sup> franco Sarmiento de Mendoca Sobre el Repartimiento de los Yndios de Potossi que su Mag<sup>d</sup> le avia cometido," Lima, 31.V.1655, 1 f. For Sarmiento's later retrospective, AGI, Charcas 267, no. 19, Oidor Sarmiento de Mendoza to the crown, Lima, 10.I.1662, 14 fs.

25. AGI, Charcas 266, no. 32E, "Tantto de la carta que Don fran<sup>co</sup> sarmiento de mendoza Corregidor de pottossi escrivio al Virrey Conde alva Sobre que ponga remedio en lo que combiene por que no se pierda Pottossi," Potosí, 31.XII.1655, 1 f.; AGI, Charcas 266, no. 36C, Corregidor

Sarmiento de Mendoza to the Conde de Alba, Potosí, 30.IX. 1656, 4 fs.

26. AGI, Charcas 266, no. 32D, "Autos sobre que no se entienda Con Indios de mita Los Provnes de los diez Años," 17 fs.; the orders of Esquilache and Salvatierra are both included. Deliberations in Potosí on the matter take place in February and March, 1656. Castillo (AGI, Charcas 270, no. 33C--see note 30, Chapter II), 17-17v, notes the problems caused by the ten-year orders. Another order to the same effect, though it was not mentioned in the correspondence between Sarmiento de Mendoza and Alba, is AGN, Colección Biblioteca Nacional, legajo 181, "Real Cédula para que los indios que están dispersos, pasados veinte años, puedan connaturalizarse en el paraje donde habitan," 4.II.1655 (two copies), 5 fs.

27. AGI, Charcas 266, no. 32F (see note 21); and AGI, Charcas 266, no. 36C (see note 25). No. 36C mentions a role for a capitán mayor de la mita, and he plays a part in the deliberations in AGI, Charcas 266, no. 32D. This is the first mention of such an official, and I do not know when the first capitán mayor was named. The Conde de Alba, in AGI, Charcas 267, no. 31A (see note 20) later said that Superintendent Francisco de la Cruz had requested such a position be established, but that there were problems with funding. The position of capitán mayor de la mita, I can only suggest, may have been created by the Corregidor de Potosí to relieve himself of the day-to-day administration of the mita.

28. The cédula is AGI, Charcas 266, no. 39C, "Al Virrey del Perú, encargandole el cumplimiento de las cédulas arriba insertas que tratan de la Justificacion conque se deve hacer el repartimto de los Indios de mita de Potossi y el rem.<sup>o</sup> de los excessos q.<sup>e</sup> se cometen con el abusso de los que llaman de faltriquera," 18.IV.1657, 2 fs. The Corregidor's effectiveness may have been hampered by his involvement in a jurisdictional dispute with Alcalde mayor de minas Pedro de Montalvo during 1656 (see note 133, Chapter II).

29. The Council of the Indies' deliberations, in anticipation of the 1657 cédula, noted that the Viceroy was dragging his feet on the matter of the repartimiento (AGI, Charcas 266, no. 35, 1 f.).

30. For Alba's response, see AGI, Charcas 266, no. 39, the Conde de Alba to the crown, Lima, 22.VIII.1658, 2 fs. See, also, his "Relación que el Conde de Alba hace del

estado del Perú al Excmo. Sr. Conde de Santisteban, su sucesor en los cargos de Virrey de estos reinos," 9.I.1662, Los virreyes (ed. by Hanke and Rodríguez), Perú IV (no. 283), 119 (from AGI, Lima 61); Valera (AGI, Charcas 268, nos. 69A & 69B--see note 58, Chapter II), 13-15; and Castillo (AGI, Charcas 270, no. 33C--see note 30, Chapter II), 18v-19.

31. AGI, Charcas 266, no. 64A, "Testim.<sup>o</sup> de las clausulas contenidas en el Acuerdo consultivo que tuvo el Virrey Conde de Alba en 26 de Agosto de 1658 en orden a los preparatorios del repartimiento general que cometio al Reverendo P<sup>e</sup> Mro fr. Francisco de la Cruz Obpo electo de Santa Marta," 4 fs. The sources cited in note 30 also refer to the Acuerdo and its deliberations. Angulo (AGI, Charcas 268, no. 36--see note 58, Chapter II), 2v, notes Alba and Cruz in passing.

32. BNB, CPLA 26, fs. 143-149, "Provisión del virrey conde de Alba, de acuerdo con los antecedentes que se insertan, se haga nuevo repartimiento de los indios de mita de Potosí según el orden al efecto aprobada, designándose por juez comisario para que vaya a Potosí y haga dicho repartimiento a don fray Francisco de la Cruz," Lima, 8.X. 1658 (MC 866; MOM 640).

33. All the orders are included in AGI, Charcas 267, no. 9B, the Conde de Alba to the crown, Lima, 3.VII.1660, 4 fs. The secret orders of 25.IV.1659 are AGI, Charcas 267, no. 9E, 1 f. See, also, AGI, Charcas 267, no. 15A, "Testimonio de las Ynstrucciones Publicas y secretas qe dio el Conde de Alba a D fray fran<sup>co</sup> de la cruz y Don Bar.<sup>me</sup> de Salazar sobre el Repartimiento general de la Mita de Potossi y lo resuelto por el Conde de Santisteban con consulta del Acuerdo de la Audiencia de Lima para la suspencion de esta comission hasta que llegue D.<sup>n</sup> Pedro Vazquez de Velasco Pres<sup>te</sup> de la de los charcas," 52 fs. The Viceroy's decision not to punish anyone until after the repartimiento was completed is mentioned in his retrospective, AGI, Charcas 267, no. 31A (see note 20).

34. AGI, Charcas 266, no. 41, Superintendent Francisco de la Cruz to the crown "Sobre lo obrado en El desagrabio de los In<sup>os</sup> de la mita de Potosí," Potosí, 3.VI.1659, 6 fs.

35. Ibid.

36. AGI, Charcas 267, no. 8A, Superintendent Francisco de la Cruz to the crown, Potosí, 11.VI.1659, 4 fs. That this action was against orders, AGI, Charcas 267, no. 31A

(see note 20).

37. AGI, Charcas 266, no. 58A, "Prim.<sup>r</sup> Informe Al conde de Alva sobre Las esperas q<sup>e</sup> pretende El Gremio de Acogueros de la Va Imperial de Potosi En Lo que deven de Acogues a su Mag<sup>d</sup>" (by Francisco de la Cruz), Potosí, 23.VII.1659, 3 fs.; AGI, Charcas 266, no. 58B, "2<sup>do</sup> Informe Al Conde de Alva Sobre las esperas q<sup>e</sup> Pretende el Gremio de Azogueros De La Villa Imperial de Potosi" (by Francisco de la Cruz), Potosí, 1.X.1659, 3 fs.

38. AGI, Charcas 266, no. 41 (see note 34). Crespo, "La 'Mita,'" 177, says 308,547 in quintos and 700,000 indios de faltriquera. John Lynch, Spain under the Hapsburgs, Vol. II: Spain and America, 1598-1700 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1969), 220, says that the relationship was 400,000 to 700,000; his figures come, ultimately, from Alba's "Relación" (see note 30), 120. Francisco used "indios de faltriquera" and "entero en plata" interchangeably, so the reader should beware the terms involved.

39. For the 11,000 pesos per week figure, AGI, Charcas 266, no. 49, Superintendent Francisco de la Cruz to the crown, Potosí, 1.IV.1660, 2 fs. For the use of torture, AGI, Charcas 266, no. 52, Superintendent Francisco de la Cruz to the crown, Potosí, 15.IV.1660, 1 f. (the same source used by Crespo, "La 'Mita,'" 179-180).

40. AGI, Charcas 266, no. 49 (see note 39).

41. For hangings, AGI, Charcas 266, no. 43B, "Certifi cacion de un Cazique q<sup>e</sup> se aorco" (Father García de Vargas to "vra Ill<sup>ma</sup>"), Toledo, 4.II.1660, 2 fs. Cruz' mark is on the certification. For maiming male children, AGI, Charcas 266, no. 42, "Los caciques y principales de las Prov,<sup>as</sup> que mitan a Pottosi" to the crown, Potosí, 15.IV.1660, 3 fs.

42. AGI, Charcas 266, no. 41 (see note 34).

43. For the sale of Indians, AGI, Charcas 266, no. 55, Superintendent Francisco de la Cruz to the crown, Potosí, 14.IV.1660, 1 f., describing "Excesos graves que se cometen en la Provincia de lipez Comparando Y Vendiendo los Indios publicamente y Remedio que pide." Sarmiento de Mendoza noted this problem in AGI, Charcas 266, no. 28 (see note 9). For contraband, AGI, Charcas 266, no. 56, Superintendent Francisco de la Cruz to the crown, Potosí, 14.IV.1660, 1 f., describing "Extravios de quintos y Plata Por Buenos

ayres. Y como no a tenido reparo con los ordenes del Govyn<sup>o</sup> Y nececita de los de V.M. por la distancia grande que ay de lima al Puerto." President Nestares Marín was ordered by Alba to combat contraband on 4.I.1660; ANB, C 1762, "Carta del virrey al presidente Nestares Marín: Ante la frecuencia de noticias sobre el contrabando de plata por Buenos Aires, adóptense las providencias del caso," Lima, 4.I.1660, 2 fs. (MC 874); the notices may have come from Francisco de la Cruz.

44. For a Cruz retrospective, see AGI, Charcas 266, no. 46, Superintendent Francisco de la Cruz to the crown, Potosí, 17.II.1660, 3 fs.; "Da qta por menor de lo que obro pra remedio de los excesos que se cometian en el entero de los In<sup>os</sup> de mita de Pottosi, y repartim<sup>to</sup> qe de ellos se hace, y de las molestias y bexaciones qe los dhos Indios recibian de las Justicias y de los mineros, y remite Testim<sup>o</sup> de los autos que s<sup>re</sup> ello hico." AGI, Charcas 266, no. 49 (see note 39) is another look back by Cruz. Valera (AGI, Charcas 268, nos. 69A & 69B--see note 58, Chapter II), 13-14, is perceptive when he says that Cruz began where he should have finished.

45. AGI, Charcas 267, no. 8C, "Testim.<sup>o</sup> del auto de su senoria" (Francisco de la Cruz), Potosí, 1.VII.1659, 2 fs.; the June 4 order is related in this clarification. Zavala, Servicio personal, II, 139, says:

"El virrey Conde de Alba de Liste envió a Potosí como juez de comisión a fray Francisco de la Cruz, O.P., que en 1652 había sido presentado para el Obispado de Santa Marta. El comisionado promulgó auto para que el entero de la mita se hiciese en persona. Los mineros se opusieron y fray Francisco revocó el auto. Informó al virrey, por carta escrita en Potosí el 2 de agosto de 1659, que los indios de faltriquera montaban al año 600,000 pesos y los quintos reales apenas alcanzaban a 400,000. De la provincia de Porco se enviaban 60,000 pesos al año a Potosí. El virrey, en 2 de marzo de 1660, informó al rey que había mandado empadronar y reducir los indios de las provincias que mitaban a Potosí y los que estaban en la comarca. Pretendía reforzar aquella mita." (based on Rubén Vargas Ugarte, Historia General del Perú (10 vols.; Lima, 1966-1971), III, 289-292).

46. AGI, Charcas 266, no. 53B, "Autto para que no obliguen los curacas y capittanes a enterar mas yndios que los que les hubieren entregado en sus provinziias" (by Superintendent Francisco de la Cruz), Potosí, 3.XI.1659,



3 fs.; AGI, Charcas 266, no. 45F, "Testimio del Auto en que se da forma para el entero y Prorrata" (by Superintendent Francisco de la Cruz), Potosí, 3.XI.1659, 3 fs.

47. AGI, Charcas 266, no. 53, Superintendent Francisco de la Cruz to the crown, Potosí, 14.IV.1660, 2 fs.; "Representase a V.M. como se a Reformado el abuso de apre<sup>u</sup>miar a los capitanes enteradores por lo q<sup>e</sup> no devian enterar y medio de su execucion." See, also, AGI, Charcas 267, no. 31A (see note 20), for Alba's basing of the order on precedents set by Cañete and Velasco.

48. AGI, Charcas 266, no. 51A, "Autto para que los Yndios no paguen Ressagos" (by Superintendent Francisco de la Cruz), Potosí, 3.XI.1659, 6 fs.; AGI, Charcas 266, no. 51, Superintendent Francisco de la Cruz to the crown, Potosí, 14.IV.1660, 1 f. ("Que los Indios no deven pagar rezagos. Y lo que en esto se a hecho--Con testimonio").

49. AGI, Charcas 266, no. 45D, "Testimonio del Auto para que los diputados pidan se despachen jueces" (by Superintendent Francisco de la Cruz), Potosí, 8.XII.1659, 6 fs. Also, Cruz' exhortation of the Corregidor, AGI, Charcas 266, no. 45E, "Testimonio del exssotatorio Con la Repuesta del Corregidor," Potosí, 12 and 14.I.1660, 5 fs. total.

50. AGI, Charcas 266, no. 45I, "Auto para que se oyga a los Indios en justicia y no se execute desta forma en ellos pena corporal" (by Superintendent Francisco de la Cruz), Tarapaya, 3.II.1660, 1 f.; AGI, Charcas 266, no. 52A, "Auto. Paraque contra los caciques se proceda conforme a de<sup>o</sup> sin llegar a pena corporal" (by Superintendent Francisco de la Cruz), Tarapaya, 3.II.1660, 2 fs.

51. AGI, Charcas 266, no. 50B, "Auto para que los indios no enteren en platta sino en perssona y La dilixencia que con ellos se hico" (Superintendent Francisco de la Cruz), Potosí, 18.II.1660, 8 fs. Penalties are included in AGI, Charcas 266, no. 50A, "Auto en que se rrefieren las penas contra los que reciben en plata Los indios de mita con su publicación y dilixencias que se hicieron," Potosí, 1.III.1660, 6 fs.

52. AGI, Charcas 267, no. 9A, the Conde de Alba to the crown, Lima, 2.III.1660, 4 fs.; "Da q<sup>ta</sup> de las dilig<sup>as</sup> que se han comenzado a hacer sobre el repartimto genl de los In<sup>os</sup> de Potosi, la forma conque se procede y la quexa de los Interesados por haver quitado los In<sup>os</sup> que llaman de

faltriguera." See, too, AGI, Charcas 267, no. 31A (see note 20) for the Viceroy's decision to have priests do the census. Deliberations on the repartimiento were also going to include representatives of the azogueros and Inquisitor Juan de Ybarra.

53. For his quote that priests were idiots, AGI, Charcas 266, no. 43, Superintendent Francisco de la Cruz to the crown, Potosí, 14.II.1660, 2 fs. For the need to include more provinces--at least those Indians who had fled from the mita provinces--AGI, Charcas 266, no. 48, Superintendent Francisco de la Cruz to the crown, Potosí, 14.IV.1660, 3 fs.; "Representase a V.M. Los incombenientes de no hazer mita los Indios que adquieren Domicilio fuera de su naturaleza."

54. AGI, Charcas 267, no. 8B, "Testimonio de la Peticion del gremio de azogueros" (to Francisco de la Cruz), Potosí, 1.VII.1659, 2 fs.; AGI, Charcas 266, no. 45C, "Testimonio De la Peticion del gremio, y auto en racon del salario de los jueces" (to and by Francisco de la Cruz, respectively), Potosí, 17.XII.1659, 4 fs. total.

55. AGI, Charcas 267, no. 9C, decree of the Conde de Alba, Lima, 1.XII.1659, 2 fs. His letter to Cruz is AGI, Charcas 267, no. 9D, "Copia de carta que escrivio El Conde de Alva mi s<sup>r</sup> Virrey del Peru al M.R.P. Mro. fray fran<sup>co</sup> de la cruz obispo de santa marta en 1.<sup>o</sup> de Diciembre de 1659," 1 f. But Cruz' public orders were again curtailed by secret orders, AGI, Charcas 267, no. 9F, "Segunda Ynstrucion secreta que el M R P M fr. fran.<sup>co</sup> de la Cruz de la orden de Predicadores ha de observar para el usso de sus comissions, y espezialmente la que se le remite en este chasque, que sale de esta Ciudad oy dos de Diziembre de mil seiscientos y cinquenta y nueve," 2 fs. See, too, AGI, Charcas 267, no. 15A (see note 33). Cruz was to act only with Alba's consent.

56. AGI, Charcas 267, no. 9B (see note 33); and AGI, Charcas 267, no. 3, Gaspar González Pavón to the crown, Potosí, 30.IV. and 10.V.1660, 4 fs. Arzáns, Historia, II, 128-133 discusses an earlier attempt, in 1651, to kill Nestares Marín with poison; on II, 187-194 he notes the deaths of the two officials. The author of the Dominican contribution to the Conde de Lemos' proposal that the mita be abolished (in 1670) said he was in Potosí at the time Cruz was there. He noted that the azogueros first tried to burn Cruz' house down, and later killed him. On the Tuesday following the murder indios de faltriguera were again demanded by the azogueros, and caciques who refused

to comply were jailed (AGI, Charcas 268, no. 15E, sin fecha, 2 fs.). AGI, Charcas 268, no. 49, Father Vicente Vitor, O.P., to the crown, Cádiz, 2.IV.1676, 9 fs., says that the "voz pública" was that Cruz had been poisoned, the venom slipped into his chocolate.

57. Padilla's discourse is AGI, Charcas 266, no. 37A, "Papel de apuntamientos que remite el Alcalde, Don Juan de Padilla Con su carta de 20 de Julio de 657 sobre los Trabajos qe padecen los In<sup>os</sup> = asi en lo espiritual como en lo temporal," 20 fs. His letter is AGI, Charcas 266, no. 27, Juan de Padilla to the crown, Lima, 20.VII.1657, 1 f. This discourse is published in Rubén Vargas Ugarte, Historia General del Perú (10 vols., Lima, 1966-1971), III, 391-420.

58. For the Council's orders to Alba, AGI, Charcas 266, no. 37B, "Decreto del C<sup>o</sup> con vista de la carta de D Jun de Padilla de 20 de julio de 657," Madrid, 3.IX.1660, 1 f. More action was taken in the Council on 22.IX.1660; AGI, Charcas 267, no. 6, "En El consejo a 22 de sep.re de 1660: Decreto del g.<sup>o</sup> sobre los despachos qe se an de dar cerca del repartim<sup>to</sup> General de los In<sup>os</sup> de Mita su fha de 22 de Septt<sup>re</sup> de 1660, 1 f. The cédula sent to the Audiencia de Charcas is ANB, RC 438, "Copia de real cédula dirigida a esta Audiencia de La Plata: Enviése relación de los abusos que en perjuicio de los indios de mita cometen los corregidores y demás encargados de ella, en perjuicio de ese servicio," Madrid, 7.X.1660, 3 fs. (MC 879; MOM 643). The Archbishop's response is AGI, Charcas 267, no. 16 (see note 91, Chapter II). Sarmiento de Mendoza wrote the response for the Audiencia de Lima (AGI, Charcas 267, no. 19, Lima, 10.I.1662, 14 fs.) but the other oidores would not sign it when it was finished; Sarmiento explained what had happened in AGI, Charcas 267, no. 17, Oidor Sarmiento de Mendoza to the crown, Lima, 31.XII.1661, 1 f. Bartolomé de Salazar answered as President of Charcas in AGI, Charcas 267, no. 25, Bartolomé de Salazar to the crown, 8.IV.1662, 12 fs.; the Audiencia's official answer is AGI, Charcas 267, no. 28, Bartolomé de Salazar to the crown, Potosí, 29.IV.1662, 7 fs. Oidor de Lima Sebastián de Alarcón wrote the crown about the mita in AGI, Charcas 267, no. 21, Lima, 20.II.1662, 3 fs. The Fiscal de Lima, Nicolás Polanco de Santillana, wrote the crown on the problems with a prerequisite census in AGI, Charcas 267, no. 22, Lima, 20.II.1662, 9 fs. These last two letters may well have been in response to the cédula, given the fact that Alarcón and Polanco refused to sign Sarmiento de Mendoza's missive. AGI, Charcas 267, no. 10, is a brief note by Juan de Subica, Madrid, 22.IV.1661, that he is

is collecting material to write a relación on the mita. The letters of Francisco de la Cruz were a major part of the material, so we might assume that Cruz' death led to some soul-searching in Spain.

59. See Alba's "Relación" (see note 30), 118-119.

60. For examples of the corregidores' abuse of Indians, see AGI, Charcas 267, no. 37N, Don Juan Copa to the crown, Tolapampa, 1.V.1664, 1 f.; "Dize es Gov.<sup>or</sup> de aq.<sup>l</sup> Pueblo y que de los agravios que reciben los In.<sup>os</sup> de sus Correg.<sup>or</sup> haciendoles comparar lo que no an menester y prendiendoles p.<sup>a</sup> cobrar el precio Resulta retirarse a despoblado dejando yernos los lugares y la Mita conque ambas cosas se destruyran si no se pone Rem.<sup>o</sup> En ello"; and AGI, Charcas 267, no. 37N, "Los Gov.<sup>res</sup> y caciq.<sup>s</sup> de aq.<sup>l</sup> Pueblo y del de tolapampa" to the crown, Tomahave, 20.V.1664, 2 fs.; "Refieren los agravios que reciben de los Correg.<sup>res</sup> los q.<sup>les</sup> les hazn comprar por fuerca y a precios muy suvidos los generos que comercian y si ocurren a la Aud.<sup>a</sup> les prenden y molestan y les venden las hazdas para conseguir sus grangerias como sucedio con D. P.<sup>o</sup> De Cartaxna Bravo de Paredes su Correg.<sup>r</sup> En la feria de unas mulas; de que resulta q.<sup>e</sup> prosigan en nra sta fee retirandose a la ydolatria y no hava quien sque metales y perdiendoselos quint.<sup>s</sup> y supp.<sup>can</sup> se provea de Rem.<sup>o</sup>" For a comprehensive treatment of the mita's impact on a province, in concert with internal factors, see Cañedo-Arguelles' study of Pacajes. Her thesis is based on documents in the AGI, Escribanía 868a. Hanke, in notes on pages 253-254 of Arzáns, Historia, II, says that Escribanía 868 includes a 911-folio complaint by Gabriel Fernández Guarache from 1663.

61. Cañedo-Arguelles, 71-74. An earlier request was made in 1648, but the azogueros were able to block the move to abolish the capitán general position.

62. For the caciques' 1660 petition, AGI, Charcas 266, no. 42 (see note 41). For the 1664 petitions, Zavala, Servicio personal, II, 146-146.

63. See their relaciones (described in notes 6 and 30, respectively), pages 40 and 120, respectively.

64. Cañedo-Arguelles, 57-59.

65. Ibid., 60-64.

66. AGI, Charcas 267, no. 43, President of Charcas

Pedro Vázquez de Velasco to the Conde de Santisteban, Potosí, 20.I.1665, 17 fs. See, too, the quote from Zavala, Servicio personal, II, 139, included in note 45.

67. AGI, Charcas 266, no. 53 (see note 53). For an example of a cacique who was spared such problems, legally if not really, ANB, M 125, no. 17, "Don Felipe Choquetijlla, indio principal del pueblo de Oropeza de los Quillacas, provincia de Paria, sobre que le guarden los privilegios por los cuales está reservado del oficio de capitán enterador de la mita de Potosí y de otros servicios," Paria, 29.X.1652-31.XII.1666, 26 fs. (MC 934; MOM 649a).

68. Padilla (AGI, Charcas 266, no. 37A--see note 57), 7v (Vargas Ugarte transcription, page 401).

69. Cañedo-Arguelles, 93-96; Fernández Guarache was also engaged in wine and coca transport to raise money for the delivery of the mita (page 67).

70. Ibid., 97.

71. Sources for Table 2; "Estimated Mita Service":

a. AGI, Charcas 266, no. 19C (see note 1).

b. AGI, Charcas 266, no. 30D (see note 6).

c. AGI, Charcas 266, no. 19D, "Resumen de la Vissita de minas y ingenios hecha por d. fran.<sup>co</sup> Sarmiento Oydor de la Ciudad de los Reyes Y Correg.<sup>r</sup> de Potosí," 4.VII.1654, 2 fs.

d. AGI, Charcas 266, no. 19A, "Testimonio de los Yndios que enteraban siendo Correg.<sup>r</sup> d. fran.<sup>co</sup> sarmiento que eran 2660," 1651, 2 fs.

e. Ibid.

f. Salvatierra, "Relación" (see note 34, Chapter II), 40.

g. ANB, M 125, no. 14 (see note 72).

h. AGI, Charcas 266, no. 41 (see note 34).

i. AGI, Charcas 266, no. 60B (see note 81).

j. AGI, Charcas 267, nos. 16 and 25 (see note 91, Chapter II; and 58, respectively).

k. Acarete du Biscay, "An Account of a Voyage up the River de la Plata and thence over Land to Peru (c. 1660)," Colonial Travelers in Latin America, ed. by Irving A. Leonard (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1972), 137-138.

l. AGI, Charcas 267, no. 9B (see note 33).

m. AGI, Charcas 266, no. 60B (see note 81).

n. AGI, Charcas 267, nos. 16 and 25 (see note 91, Chapter II; and 58, respectively).

- o. AGI, Charcas 267, no. 29 (see note 93).
- p. Ibid.
- q. AGI, Charcas 267, no. 37E (see note 100).
- r. AGI, Charcas 267, no. 37LL, President Vázquez de Velasco to the Conde de Santisteban, 3.III.1664, 2 fs. (a copy).
- s. AGI, Charcas 267, no. 36 (see note 107).
- t. AGI, Charcas 267, no. 46 (see note 111).

72. For González Pavón, ANB, M 125, no. 14, "Copia de un memorial que el licenciado Gaspar González Pavón escribió, de Potosí a España, a don Gómez Dávila, corregidor provisto para dicha villa: Refiérele principalmente al régimen de la mita," Potosí, 25.I.1658, 10 fs. (MC 864; MOM 639). For Cruz, AGI, Charcas 266, no. 46 (see note 44).

73. ANB, M 125, no. 14 (see note 72); AGI, Charcas 266, no. 20C (see note 12); and Salvatierra's "Relación" (see note 34, Chapter IV), 36-37. Sarmiento (AGI, Charcas 266, no. 24A--see note 9) and González Pavón (ANB, M 125, no. 14--see note 72) both say that Tuesday was the day of reckoning for "pocket Indians."

74. AGI, Charcas 266, no. 46 (see note 44).

75. Cañedo-Arguelles, 47. For wages being withheld, AGI, Charcas 267, no. 43 (see note 66). For what happened when a cave-in occurred, see ANB, M 125, no. 13 (see note 133, Chapter II).

76. Padilla (AGI, Charcas 266, no. 37A--see note 57), 8 (Vargas Ugarte transcription, 401).

77. AGI, Charcas 267, no. 9B (see note 33). For Alba's indictment of Gómez Dávila, AGI, Charcas 267, no. 9G, "Copia de Un Capitulo de carta de el Conde de Alva de Aliste de 28 de Mayo de 1660 que es del N.º 17 tocante a los procedimientos de Don Gomez Davila Correg<sup>OR</sup> de Potosi," 1 f.

78. AGI, Charcas 267, no. 9B (see note 33).

79. For Salazar's discussion of the letter sent to him on 24.V.1660, AGI, Charcas 267, no. 24, President Bartolomé de Salazar to the crown, Potosí, 1.IV.1662, 15 fs. For his comments on his commission and its contents, AGI, Charcas 266, no. 60A, "Copia de la Carta que el D.<sup>OR</sup> Don Bartolome de Salazar Oidor de la R<sup>l</sup> Audiencia de Lima y Press.te de la de los charcas escribió al Conde de Alba Virrey del Perú

en 1<sup>o</sup> de Diciembre de 1660 a<sup>o</sup>s," Potosí, 1.XII.1660, 7 fs. See, also, AGI, Charcas 267, no. 15A (see note 33). Angulo (AGI, Charcas 268, no. 36--see note 58, Chapter II), 2v-2, discusses Salazar's experiences.

80. AGI, Charcas 266, no. 60A (see note 79); and AGI, Charcas 267, no. 28 (see note 58).

81. AGI, Charcas 266, no. 60B, "Copia de la carta que el D.<sup>or</sup> Don Bartolome de Salazar Oidor de la R<sup>l</sup> Audiencia de Lima Press.te de la de los charcas escrivio al S Conde de Alva Virrey del Peru en 30 de Novy.re de 1660 a<sup>o</sup>s," Potosí, 30.XI.1660, 6 fs. His arrival is noted, as well, in AGI, Charcas 267, no. 12, President Bartolomé de Salazar to the crown, Potosí, 1.VI.1661, 4 fs.

82. AGI, Charcas 267, no. 41B, the Deputies of the Gremio de azogueros to the crown, Potosí, 17.XII.1660, 2 fs. The Protector de los naturales agreed; AGI, Charcas 266, no. 61, Christóval Laredo Trevino to the crown, Potosí, 14.XII.1660, 2 fs. (that Salazar was better than Cruz had been).

83. Alba's plan was contained in Salazar's commission, which is described in AGI, Charcas 266, no. 60A (see note 79) and the same questions were put to the crown in AGI, Charcas 266, no. 60, President Salazar to the crown, Potosí, 13.XII.1660, 3 fs.; a comprehensive report on his activities in Potosí.

84. AGI, Charcas 266, no. 60A (see note 79).

85. This entire course of events is included in AGI, Charcas 267, no. 24 (see note 79). Valera (AGI, Charcas 268, nos. 69A & 69B--see note 58, Chapter II), 17, is an overview as well. Castillo (AGI, Charcas 270, no. 33C--see note 30, Chapter II), 19v-20, says the O.K. for twenty-nine provinces came on 3.II.1661. In AGI, Charcas 267, no. 11, President Salazar to the crown, Potosí, 3.VI.1661, 5 fs., the President says he received the go-ahead on 3.III.1661, but that it came with other orders to suspend all action and that the 26.V.1661 letter stuck with the idea of using priests--though permitting him to name some corregidores if he wished. For the Conde de Alba's side of the story, see his retrospective, AGI, Charcas 267, no. 18, the Conde de Alba to the crown, Lima, 2.I.1662, 3 fs.

86. AGI, Charcas 267, no. 24 (see note 79); AGI, Charcas 267, no. 15A (see note 33); and Castillo (AGI, Charcas 270,

no. 33C--see note 30, Chapter II), 20-20v.

87. AGI, Charcas 267, no. 34, President Bartolomé de Salazar to the crown, Potosí, 9.V.1663, 2 fs.; Salazar relates the contents of the 1662 correspondence, as well as his current thoughts on the mita. In AGI, Charcas 267, no. 24 (see note 79) he cleans his hands of the entire affair; he says the whole matter would have been settled had he been able to proceed with his plan. See, also, AGI, Charcas 267, no. 15A (see note 33).

88. For the cause of the delay, AGI, Charcas 267, no. 32, President Pedro Vázquez de Velasco to the crown, Lima, 21.XI.1662, 2 fs. For his arrival in Potosí, AGI, Charcas 267, no. 37D, President Vázquez de Velasco to the Conde de Santisteban, Potosí, 31.VIII.1663, 9 fs. (a copy).

89. AGI, Charcas 266, no. 63, Christóval Laredo Trevino to the crown, Potosí, 31.V.1661, 2 fs.; AGI, Charcas 267, no. 12, President Bartolomé de Salazar to the crown, Potosí, 1.VI.1661, 4 fs.

90. AGI, Charcas 267, no. 28 (see note 58).

91. Ibid.

92. AGI, Charcas 267, no. 22 (see note 58).

93. Salazar's remarks are included in AGI, Charcas 267, no. 28 (see note 58). For Santisteban's comments on the situation, AGI, Charcas 267, no. 23, the Conde de Santisteban to the crown, Lima, 23.III.1662, 2 fs. For more from President Salazar, AGI, Charcas 267, no. 29, President Bartolomé de Salazar to the crown, Potosí, 23.V.1662, 3 fs.

94. AGI, Charcas 267, no. 35, the Conde de Santisteban to the crown, Lima, 20.VII.1663, 1 f. The three discourses are included as AGI, Charcas 267, no. 35A, "Discursos que han dado algunos celosos del servicio de su Mag.<sup>d</sup> sobre el entero de la Mita de Potosí," 11 fs. As I pointed out in note 23, Chapter I, the second of the three discourses is that written by P. Rabelo (Biblioteca Nacional, Madrid, Ms. 19699/30), and discussed by Zavala, Servicio personal, II, 41-43. The third discourse is also in Zavala, on page 110, and discussed in an examination of material from the 1640s; it too comes from the Biblioteca Nacional Madrid, Ms. 19699--it is the second item in that document. I have been unable to determine the author, but two possibilities are Sarmiento de Mendoza and Gabriel Fernández Guarache.



The first discourse was put before the Audiencia de Lima by the Conde de Santisteban late in 1661; AGI, Charcas 267, no. 20A, "Copia de los Ynformes que en Virtud de horden del Conde de Santisteban virrey del Peru hicieron Diferentes Ministros de la Audiencia de Lima sobre la forma de Contribuir al entero de la Mita de Potossi," 48 fs. (the transcription is dated 13.II.1662, but the process took place late in 1661). According to AGI, Charcas 267, no. 20, the Conde de Santisteban to the crown, Lima, 10.I.1662, 1 f., and margin notes on no. 20A, the respondents were: Oidores Sebastián de Alarcón, Francisco Sarmiento de Mendoza, Bernardo de Yturricarra, Bernardo de Figueroa, Thomas Berjon, and Juan de Retuerta; the Alcalde de corte Juan de Padilla; Inquisitor Albaro de Ybarra; and Protector general Diego de León Pinelo--all responding to a proposal offered by a "sugeto mui celosso." Another copy of the first discourse is AGI, Charcas 268, no. 15A, 1 f. (an abbreviated form); and Ibarra's response is AGI, Charcas 268, no. 15B; both items were sent to the crown in 1670 with the Conde de Lemos' July 4 discourse arguing for the abolition of the mita (see note 76, Chapter II). More work with the three discourses will be necessary before I am able to identify the authors of the first and third. The question of a possible institutionalization of mita service in silver is one that deserves more attention in the future. See note 97, below, for more on this issue.

95. AGI, Charcas 267, no. 32 (see note 88).

96. AGI, Charcas 267, nos. 37J and 37K (37K is the last page of the document), "Tanto de un parecer que dio el D<sup>or</sup> Don Pedro Vazquez de Velasco Presidente de los Charcas al conde de santistevan Virrey del Peru estando dho Presste en Lima sobre la numeracion de los Yndios de mita de Potosí," Lima, 31.I.1663, 3 fs.

97. For Vázquez de Velasco's departure, AGI, Charcas 267, no. 34 (see note 87); Salazar's notation of the fact that he was en route. For his comments while in Lima, AGI, Charcas 267, no. 37B, "Copia de carta escrita al Virrey del Peru por el Doctor Don Pedro Vazquez de Velasco Presidente de los charcas sobre la numeracion de los Yndios=es Parecer que dio en Lima=," sin fecha, 4 fs. (see note 23, Chapter I for the fact that this piece is published in Zavala, Servicio personal, II, 43-44; it is a copy of Ms. 19699/30 third item, from the Biblioteca Nacional, Madrid; it is a companion, therefore, of the second and third discourses in AGI, Charcas 267, no. 35A (see note 94).

98. AGI, Charcas 267, no. 37D (see note 88).

99. Ibid., and AGI, Charcas 267, no. 37F, President Vázquez de Velasco to the Conde de Santisteban, Potosí, 31.X.1663, 2 fs. (a copy). Sánchez-Albornoz, 70, notes correspondence between Vázquez de Velasco and Fiscal Polanco de Santillana on the question of the census (from AGN, Sala XIII, 23.10.2) during 1663.
100. AGI, Charcas 267, no. 37E, President Vázquez de Velasco to the Conde de Santisteban, La Plata, 30.IX.1663, 2 fs. (a copy).
101. AGI, Charcas 267, no. 37F (see note 99).
102. AGI, Charcas 267, no. 37H, President Vázquez de Velasco to the Conde de Santisteban, La Plata, 30.XI.1663, 2 fs. (a copy).
103. AGI, Charcas 267, no. 37I, President Vázquez de Velasco to the Conde de Santisteban, Potosí, 31.I.1664, 1 f. (a copy).
104. AGI, Charcas 267, no. 41A, "Copia de la Carta que escribieron los Acogueros al Virrey" (Santisteban), Potosí, 31.I.1664, 3 fs.; AGI, Charcas 267, no. 41C, "Informe en que los Diputados del Gremio de los Acogueros de Potossi representan al Ex,<sup>mo</sup> señor conde de Santisteban Virrey de estos Reynos quatro puntos que miran a la conservacion y aumento de esta ymperial villa," Potosí, 25.II.1664, 4 fs.
105. AGI, Charcas 267, no. 37C, President Vázquez de Velasco to the Conde de Santisteban, "sobre la forma que da para hacer la numeracion de la mita del cerro y Rivera de la Villa de Potosi," Potosí, 2.II.1664, 5 fs. (a copy).
106. AGI, Charcas 267, no. 37L, President Vázquez de Velasco to the Conde de Santisteban, Potosí, 3.III.1664, 2 fs. (a copy). This letter was soon followed by AGI, Charcas 267, no. 37M, a copy of a list of the provinces responsible to the Potosí mita, the numbers of mitayos required from each, and those that actually arrived, Potosí, 31.III.1664, 3 fs. AGI, Charcas 267, no. 37, President Vázquez de Velasco to the crown, Potosí, 20.IV.1664, 5 fs., is a comprehensive report based on many of the letters cited in notes 88 to 105 (those with "AGI, Charcas 267, 37" and a letter), which were sent with it as supporting documentation.
107. AGI, Charcas 267, no. 41C (see note 104); AGI, Charcas 267, no. 41, the Deputies of the Gremio de azogueros

to the crown, Potosí, 21.XII.1664, 4 fs.; AGI, Charcas 267, no. 36, Procurador general de Potosí Francisco de Arracola y Diaguez to the crown, Potosí, 18.IV.1664, 3 fs.

108. AGI, Charcas 267, no. 38, Oidor Bartolomé de Salazar to the crown, Lima, 1.XI.1664, 2 fs.

109. AGI, Charcas 267, no. 39, the Conde de Santisteban to the crown, Lima, 11.XI.1664, 2 fs. In his discussion of the Conde de Lemos' 4.VII.1670 proposal that the mita be abolished (see note 76, Chapter II), Zavala, Servicio personal, II, 149, says that Santisteban timidly proposed the same to the crown in a letter of 16.XI.1664 (from AGI, Lima 66). This would confirm that the Viceroy's request for a direct order was a delaying tactic.

110. AGI, Charcas 267, no. 40, President Vázquez de Velasco to the crown, Potosí, 11.XII.1664, 4 fs.

111. AGI, Charcas 267, no. 45, Corregidor Gabriel Guerrero de Luna to the crown, Potosí, 11.II.1665, 1 f.; AGI, Charcas 267, no. 46, Corregidor Gabriel Guerrero de Luna to the crown, Potosí, 6.V.1665, 3 fs.

112. The plan is included on the first 2 fs. of AGI, Charcas 267, no. 48A, "Papel que remitió el Virrey al fiscal de lo Civil para que dijese lo que se le ofrecía," with the reply dated Lima, 15.VIII.1665. The total number of fs. is 21, with Fiscal Juan Baptista Moreto de Espinosa responding on the remaining 19. AGI, Charcas 267, no. 50A, is a hodge-podge of material by Vázquez de Velasco--most of it directed to the Conde de Santisteban--which includes his response to the plan in a copy of a letter of 3.IX.1665, 5 fs.

113. AGI, Charcas 267, no. 43, President Vázquez de Velasco to the Conde de Santisteban, Potosí, Potosí, 20.I.1665, 17 fs.; "Respuesta q<sup>e</sup> da el Presidente al Conde de Santesteban acerca de que deiga su parecer en Vnos puntos y medios que se proponen acerca del cerro de potosi su mita y evitas los daños q<sup>e</sup> se causan por los azogueros con Cuia ocasion responiendo refiere lo que padecen los indios y como por la mita de Potosi esta destruido este Reyno y sino se avide al remedio luego luego no ay que hacer caso del ...." For more, AGI, Charcas 267, no. 42, President Vázquez de Velasco to the crown, Potosí, 30.I.1665, 1 f.

114. AGI, Charcas 267, no. 48A (see note 112).

115. See note 6 for reference to the Audiencia de Lima's

"Relación" for the Conde de Lemos.

116. For the Council of the Indies' deliberations, AGI, Charcas 267, no. 49, "Cons.<sup>o</sup> A 12 de Novie 1665: Decreto Acordado del Conss.<sup>o</sup> a la Mita de Potossi," 1 f. AGI, Charcas 267, nos. 49A and 49B, are the orders sent to President Vázquez de Velasco, 1 f. each. The cédula that was sent to the Viceroy is AGI, Charcas 267, no. 56B, "Copia de Z.la de 12 de X.re de 1665 en que se respondió al Virrey del Peru lo que havia de executar cerca del Repartim.to de la Mita de Potossi y avisandole se ordenava al Press.te de los charcas asistiese en aq.lla Villa el tpo de su oblig.n," 12.XII.1665, 3 fs.; this order summarizes a number of positions held by government officials in Peru.

117. AGI, Charcas 267, no. 52, the Audiencia de Lima to the crown, Lima, 21.X.1666, 2 fs.; "Responde a la c.la de 12 de Diz<sup>e</sup> de 665 tocantes al repartimiento Gen<sup>l</sup> de la Villa de Potosi Ydize Yra disponiendo lo combeniente mientras llegara El Virey q<sup>e</sup> se esperaba." See, also, the Audiencia de Lima's "Relación" (see note 6), 205-208. Zavala, Servicio personal, II, 148, treats the Audiencia's handling of the 12.XII.1665 cédula this way:

"Al recibir esta cédula, la Audiencia (de los Reyes) la comunicó a la de La Plata, para que informase especialmente en los 14 puntos pendientes. En carta de 10 de septiembre de este año (de 1666), recibida el día 27, llegó la respuesta y tabla de los indios que en el último repartimiento se señalaron y los que hoy se enteran. La Audiencia de La Plata opinaba que se hiciera la numeración de los indios ajustándose la mita a la séptima parte de los que hubiere; que entonces se podría decir a qué ingenios se darían y el número a repartir a cada cual. La Audiencia de Lima estimó que esto no respondía a la pregunta sobre cuál era el arreglo posible sin hacer la numeración."

This is based on the Audiencia de Lima's "Relación" (see note 6), chapter 38. It also mentions that Vázquez' reply of 31.I.1666 was not an answer to the question posed, whether the non-census-based repartimiento was a good idea.

## C H A P T E R VI

1667 TO 1680

The viceroyalty of the Conde de Lemos holds a special place in the history of the Potosí mita, because he marked the centenary of the system's foundation with a vigorous viceregal attack on the mita's very existence. Lemos' attempt to abolish the mita had caused him to be regarded as an anomaly; as the one Spanish viceroy who placed the good of the Indians before silver production. The Conde de Lemos was no anomaly, however, and his approach to the Potosí mita was quite traditional. His decision that the system should be abolished, his reasons for it, and the fate of his proposal once it had been made clearly show that Lemos' were the logical result of patterns that were already present upon his arrival in Peru.

Perhaps as interesting as the question of abolition is the fate of the mita's key element: the caciques. From 1667 to 1680 they struggled to free themselves from the pressures put upon them by the azogueros, corregidores de Potosí, and a new tormentor--the Capitán mayor de la mita. The caciques also found new ways to disperse the obligation of service in silver among the residents of their provinces.

Indeed, a wealth of documentation on the caciques for this period adds greatly to our understanding of the de facto mita, and their place in it.

### The Conde de Lemos

The Viceroy Conde de Lemos took office on November 21, 1667. His official instructions included nothing unusual, and there was little reason to believe that he would break with the tradition of postponing action on the mita until the arrival of his successor. This Viceroy would prove different, however, for he would come to advocate openly the abolition of the Potosí mita.

Lemos did not set out to extinguish the mita. Like many of his predecessors he first sought to reform the system. After four months as Viceroy the enormity of that task was already apparent to him. The Audiencia de Lima's relación was highly pessimistic about the possibility of a new repartimiento, and the Viceroy's preliminary enquiries found nothing to dispute its assessment.<sup>1</sup> But Lemos believed that he would succeed where other viceroys had failed, much as Salazar and Vázquez de Velasco had thought that they would be able to overcome the problems that had stymied their predecessors.

The Conde wrote to the crown on March 4, 1668 to report that the solution of the problems surrounding the mita would require three steps:

The first is a visita of the mills, mines and other workings, and this can be completed by the President of Chuquisaca [La Plata] in two months. The second is the distribution of the Indians to the miners, according to the mines, mills and workings that they own. This I can do without leaving Lima. The third is the determination of the Indians in the provinces subject to the Potosí mita. This can only be accomplished by the Archbishop of Charcas, because the miners, the Indians and the government all lack the means to pay for a census. If Your Majesty, accepting this assessment of the situation, should name to that post an individual of sufficient age and intelligence, then I could adjust the mita to everyone's satisfaction within six months.<sup>2</sup>

The Viceroy's outline was drawn primarily from the advice of Juan de Ibarra, Visitador to the Audiencia de Lima. Ibarra warned Lemos that any attempt to return the Indians to their pueblos would be disastrous, and he argued that the inclusion of more provinces than the current sixteen would simply add to the abuses caused by service in silver. A census could be conducted in the sixteen provinces, he said, if ecclesiastical channels were used; and the government would save the 200,000 pesos in salaries that an enumeration would otherwise cost. The number of Indians included in the census would be sufficient, Ibarra believed, if those who lived at Potosí were included. One-seventh of the Indians would serve in the mita at any one time, and the mitayos would be assigned to the azogueros on a pro-rated basis. Should the number of Indians found by the ecclesiastical census not be sufficient, then the Visitador felt that the yanaconas in La Paz and

La Plata should be included as well.<sup>3</sup>

The Conde de Lemos presented Ibarra's plan to Madrid, in its entirety, in a letter of January 26, 1669. He argued that no alternative existed if a repartimiento were to be realized.<sup>4</sup> Because the means were novel and not provided for by any previous royal order, Lemos said that he would not proceed with the ecclesiastical census until the Queen gave her consent.

While the Viceroy and Ibarra concerned themselves with the prerequisite census, the need for a new repartimiento was underscored by Luis Antonio de Oviedo, the new Corregidor de Potosí. Oviedo had found 2,124-1/2 mitayos, of which 1,424 were serving in person and another 700-1/2 were delivered in silver. He counseled Lemos and the crown that silver production would be greatly improved if the number of Indians assigned to Potosí were increased. He defended the mita against those who claimed that it had depopulated the provinces, and he argued that service in silver was a necessary part of the system--if only until the new repartimiento was implemented.<sup>5</sup>

If Oviedo and Lemos were in agreement that a new repartimiento de la mita was needed, they disagreed on the day-to-day administration of the mita. The Corregidor was confronted with the practical limitations of government at Potosí and he was mindful of the fate of Francisco de la Cruz. The Viceroy's approach was based on legal



considerations and his experiences in the mining center at Puno. Lemos had gone to Puno in 1668 after it was wracked by Indian revolts, and he was dismayed by the treatment of the Indians working there.<sup>6</sup> The Conde was motivated by what he believed should be done at Potosí; the Corregidor was limited by what he thought could be done. Thus, when Lemos tried to institute three basic reforms of the mita late in 1669, he and Oviedo came into sharp conflict over the wisdom of their implementation.<sup>7</sup>

On November 4, 1669, Lemos decreed that the capitanes enteradores were not to be held responsible for more mitayos than those with which they had left their home provinces.<sup>8</sup> On December 3, he ordered that day-and-night work in the cerro be stopped and that quotas be eliminated; and that the Corregidor not despatch judges against the caciques for rezagos.<sup>9</sup> Each of the practices described by these three orders was patently illegal but historically common. Lemos told Oviedo that they could not be defended on the pretext that they were required to boost silver production. The conservation of the Indians, not Potosí silver, was the most important factor for the realm's survival.<sup>10</sup>

The Viceroy was further outraged by the fact that the azogueros treated the mitayos as though they were their personal property, and that they put their own interests before the crown's. But he had not yet given up on the

mita. Lemos explained to Oviedo that the mita would be just only as long as the mitayos' work did not lead to their destruction. The Viceroy's three reforms were therefore meant to ensure, in Solórzano Pereira's terms, that the good produced by the mita outweighed the evils that were caused by it. Only then would its continuation be justified.<sup>11</sup>

The Conde de Lemos was mindful that his performance as Viceroy would be judged, in part, by the level of silver production during his viceroyalty. Because he was aware that production at Potosí would probably decline with the execution of his reform directives, he defended his actions in a letter to the crown of December 16, 1669. Lemos told the Queen that the Indians were more oppressed than any people on the face of the earth; that it was not silver that Peru shipped to Spain, but the sweat and the blood of the Indians. Less government revenue justly earned, he contended, would be better than more silver unjustly gained.<sup>12</sup>

The Conde had overcome one of the reasons that his predecessors had not conducted a repartimiento. He explained, however, in follow-up arguments of January, 1670, that his reforms represented an alternative to the census-based repartimiento. Lemos said that he had concluded that a government census would be impossible to complete. He again suggested that Ibarra's plan for an

ecclesiastical census be adopted, and he asked the crown to at least confirm his three reform directives with royal cédulas. He identified the caciques as the key to the mita and blamed the undue pressures on them for the downfall of the system. His three orders, the Viceroy argued, were designed to lessen the burden on the caciques, and to relieve the mitayos as well.<sup>13</sup>

The reason that Lemos went to such pains to explain his actions lay with secret instructions that had been provided to him by the Conde de Peñaranda, President of the Council of the Indies, and Queen Mariana in 1667. Peñaranda had ordered the Viceroy to carry out the decisions that had been reached in the Council with regard to Potosí. Simply put, he was to abolish "pocket Indians," to include more provinces under mita obligation, and to reverse the pattern of deficit spending that had been set by his predecessors.<sup>14</sup> Queen Mariana had entrusted her conscience to the Conde de Lemos. She had ordered him to ensure the conservation of the Indians by freeing them from the oppression they suffered at the hands of the colonists. The Viceroy was therefore responsible for improving silver production at Potosí, through extension of mita obligation to more provinces and the elimination of misuse, while at the same time ending the mistreatment of the mitayos.<sup>15</sup>

By early 1670, Lemos had decided to put the alleviation of Indian suffering, in accordance with his orders from the

Queen, before the execution of his orders from Peñaranda. Like Francisco de la Cruz, the Viceroy had decided that the treatment of the Indians by the azogueros was more important than Potosí silver.

Lemos' three orders were Cruz' directives reincarnate, but the Viceroy was not in Potosí to answer for their execution. Corregidor Oviedo was there, and fearing the worst consequences, he refused to implement the Viceroy's reforms. He told Lemos that the orders would bring silver production to an instant halt, and he reminded the crown that Cruz had been killed for trying to do the same. In defense of his inaction, Oviedo argued that Potosí supported the entire realm; if it were to survive, a census and a repartimiento were needed. The Corregidor complained that the Viceroy was too heavily influenced by legalisms, and that he lacked the experience and understanding of mining that was required to govern Potosí. He suspended the Conde de Lemos' three orders, he said, because it was in the crown's interest that he do so.<sup>16</sup>

Oviedo had repeated every tenet of the potosino position on the mita. The Viceroy was incensed by his disobedience and ordered him either to execute the 1669 directives or resign as Corregidor. He chided Oviedo for supporting practices which were clearly illegal. The mita contract, Lemos argued, provided only that an Indian should work and that he receive a daily wage; if he did

not work then he was not to be paid. Rezagos de mita and "pocket Indians" were not part of the bargain.<sup>17</sup> The Viceroy ordered President Vázquez de Velasco to travel to Potosí, and once there to implement the three reforms. Should the Corregidor try to block their execution, Lemos added, then Vázquez was to arrest, suspend and ship him to Lima for trial.<sup>18</sup>

The Conde de Lemos' direct orders to Oviedo and to Vázquez de Velasco suggest an unwavering determination on his part. But the Viceroy was clearly worried about the repercussions of his actions. He wrote to the crown on February 7, 1670 about the contents of an azoguero memorial that claimed that Potosí would be destroyed by his directives. He asked the crown to decide whether his reforms complied with his secret instructions to guard the Queen's conscience:

In the secret instructions, and in other despatches that I have received from Her Majesty, I am told to unburden the royal conscience by following my own, and to aid this unfortunate people. In that regard, I am proceeding to remedy the many offenses that they suffer. If these reforms which I propose are not appropriate, please tell me what I must do, so that the tyranny suffered by these Indians does not weigh upon my conscience. Otherwise one must justly suppose that the rocks will soon burst open, with the blood of the Indians flowing from them.<sup>19</sup>

Lemos was still groping for an answer in April of 1670. He had returned to the possibility of conducting a census via ecclesiastical channels. The nominee for the position

of Archbishop of Charcas had died, and Lemos suggested that the crown appoint Juan de Ibarra in his stead. That would place the Visitador at the head of the church hierarchy, and thus in a position to oversee the census. The priests would not be told why they were reporting on their Indian charges, Lemos said, and he and Ibarra would be the only ones who would know what they were up to. The costs of a government census would be avoided, and the entire process could be completed quickly. The Viceroy asked that Ibarra also be named President of Charcas, and that he be empowered to appoint Corregidores de Potosí for as long as the regeneration of the Potosí mita required. The only danger, the Conde added, was that the azogueros might try to murder Ibarra, as they had Cruz.<sup>20</sup>

The Viceroy was attempting to comply with all of his secret orders--searching for some means to end the abuses pervading the Potosí mita without ending silver production there. His letter of April, 1670, threw the matter back to the Queen and the Council of the Indies. He had, by then, sent them a number of proposals--a series of alternatives--from which he hoped they would choose an appropriate course of action for him to follow.

Meanwhile, what little Lemos had accomplished on his own was being frustrated by the Corregidor de Potosí. In March, 1670, Oviedo finally published the orders that the Indians were not to work day and night, and that judges

were not to be sent to collect rezagos from the caciques. Vázquez de Velasco's insistence that Lemos' orders be implemented had forced Oviedo's hand, but he was still not beaten. The Corregidor ordered that all work in the cerro be halted at sundown, and he informed the Viceroy that he would send no more judges to the provinces at all, for the corregidores had no power to send the Indians in the mita. He then complained to the crown that Lemos' directives would bring on the demise of Potosí. His letter to Madrid was complemented by similar warnings from the Gremio de azogueros and the Cabildo de Potosí.<sup>21</sup>

Lemos accused Oviedo of intentionally misrepresenting his orders. He had ordered that no Indian should work both day and night, not that all work should cease at sundown. The Viceroy insisted that the Corregidor send judges against those corregidores who failed to cooperate with the delivery of mitayos. After months of debate, Oviedo and Lemos agreed that an Indian could work five hours during the day and another five at night. By then the Conde de Lemos had realized that any significant reforms were impossible as long as Oviedo was Corregidor.<sup>22</sup>

### Abolition?

The problems surrounding a census, the frustrations that Lemos suffered in his efforts to reform the behavior of the azogueros and Oviedo's refusal to cooperate with

him led the Viceroy to conclude that the abolition of the mita was the only means of ending the abuses that pervaded the system. He had followed the same route to that conclusion as President Vázquez de Velasco had traversed four years earlier: he had first tried to reform the mita; then, realizing that he could not control the system, he called for its abolition.

Lemos proposed the abolition of the mita in a letter to the crown of July 4, 1670. His arguments in support of the measure formed a twenty-one folio discourse, including a history of the mita since its formation by Francisco de Toledo. The paper focused on the problems that had overwhelmed Toledo's original design. The Conde said that the provinces were no longer able to support the system, because they had been deserted by the Indians; a process that had been accelerated by the Marqués de Mancera's sales of the Indians' lands during the 1640s. The decline in the population of the provinces had led to abuses such as constant service, "pocket Indians" and rezagos de mita. Lemos also provided graphic descriptions of the caciques' mistreatment of the mitayos, including their transport to Potosí in iron collars, dangling from the tails of horses. All previous efforts to reform the system had failed, he said, because viceregal orders were ignored by the azogueros and undermined by the corregidores de Potosí.<sup>23</sup>



The Viceroy did not question the legality of the mita as it had been designed to perform; he said that it was unjust in its current form. The system was also expendable, he argued, because those azogueros who had viable mining operations at Potosí would survive the abolition of the mita, and only those who depended on misuse would be hurt. The royal quintos had fallen to fewer than 400,000 pesos per year, he noted, and thus they no longer represented the significant sum that they had once been. Lemos assured the Queen, nevertheless, that her decision to abolish the mita would be divinely rewarded with discoveries of greater mineral wealth elsewhere in the Empire. Indeed, the Indians who were freed from mita service at Potosí would then be available to work at San Antonio de Esquilache, Carangas, Cailloma, Puno and other mining centers that were just coming into their prime. Production at those centers would increase, and royal revenue would rise as a result. Potosí's silver industry, meanwhile, would continue to function--albeit producing less silver than it had with mitayos.<sup>24</sup>

Lemos could only suggest that the crown should abolish the mita because he did not have the authority to disband it himself.<sup>25</sup> He probably would not have taken such an important step on his own in any case, for he went to great lengths to demonstrate that his proposal had widespread support in Peru. The Viceroy included, with his

letter and discourse of July 4, 1670, the minutes of a junta that was held on the third, in which the abolition of the mita had received the unanimous endorsement of government officials and clergy alike.<sup>26</sup>

The Conde also sent the crown the position papers that he had asked the religious communities of Lima to prepare in anticipation of the July 3 junta. An example is the contribution of the Bishop-elect of Concepción. He claimed that the Indians who were forced to serve in the mita were stripped of their liberty, that their assignment to the mines at Potosí was tantamount to their enslavement, and that their treatment was abominable. Mita service in silver, moreover, was equivalent to the payments that slaves made to their masters in lieu of personal service. In sum, the Bishop-elect argued that the Indians were subjected to a bondage worse than the Hebrews had endured in Egypt--the implication being that they would soon be delivered from their unjust condition by God if not by the Queen.<sup>27</sup>

Juan de Padilla wrote to the crown on July 7, 1670 with additional thoughts on the abolition of the mita. He noted that the system's negative consequences were spiritual as well as temporal: the Indians who served in the mita were killed or oppressed, but those who escaped via suicide or flight into "infidel" territory lost their souls. Padilla said that the Bishop of Arequipa had

certified that some 600,000 Indians had gone to live outside the area of Spanish colonization, and he reminded the Queen that the conquest of Peru had been justified by the christianization of the Indians.<sup>28</sup>

From Potosí on July 7 and August 9, 1670, President Vázquez de Velasco added his name to the list of those who were calling for abolition. He reiterated his arguments of four years earlier, which Lemos had echoed in the July 4 discourse. He asked the crown to accept the advice of its Viceroy and extinguish the mita. Vázquez also requested that he be permitted to leave Potosí. His position in favor of abolition was secret, and if it became public knowledge he would never get out of the villa alive.<sup>29</sup>

While the Conde de Lemos waited for the Queen's response to his proposal, he vented his anger and his frustration on Corregidor Oviedo. Following Ibarra's counsel that Oviedo was responsible for everything that was wrong at Potosí, from low quintos to the failure to implement his orders, the Viceroy replaced Oviedo with Diego de Ulloa. The new Corregidor arrived in Potosí on January 29, 1671. Lemos explained to the crown that the change had been necessary to clear up the misconceptions that Oviedo had fomented. Ulloa, he reported, had explained the true nature of the three reform directives to the azogueros, and now everyone was content. The Viceroy had also sent explanatory orders to the provincial corregidores

in the field.<sup>30</sup>

Lemos' three reforms of 1669 received the Council of the Indies' stamp of approval on December 31, 1671--two years after they had been issued. The Viceroy would never receive a reply to his call for the abolition of the mita, however. The time lag that was caused by Trans-Atlantic correspondence and bureaucratic delays had played important roles in preventing the realization of a new repartimiento de la mita since the 1630s. Now they contributed to saving the mita from abolition. Three months after Lemos had sent his July 4 proposal, the Council was only just responding to his early-1669 letters on the problems that were preventing the execution of a census. It would not debate the question of abolition until May of 1673.<sup>31</sup>

In October, 1670, the Council considered Juan de Ibarra's plan for a secret census conducted by priests in the sixteen mita provinces, and Oviedo's concurrent call for a thirty-province enumeration done by the corregidores and the priests. The Councilors favored the Ibarra plan, but they left the ultimate decision to Lemos. He had the matter at hand, they argued, and he could decide better than they. Thus, a cédula of November 7, 1670 instructed the Viceroy to do as he deemed fit, in conference with the Audiencia de Lima.<sup>32</sup>

By the time that the Conde de Lemos answered the

November 7 edict, it was September 18, 1671. He had sent his discourse on abolition more than year earlier. The Viceroy noted that the problems surrounding a census were still how many provinces to include, whom to name to conduct it, and how to pay them. He stood by his call for the abolition of the mita, but should the Council choose not to follow his suggestion, then Ibarra's plan was his second choice. Lemos sent the matter back to Madrid, and he was still waiting for a reply when he died on December 6, 1672.<sup>33</sup>

The Council of the Indies began its deliberations on Lemos' proposal that the mita be abolished in April, 1673. On the twelfth it decided to hold a consulta on the question, and on the nineteenth it ordered Relator Andrés de Angulo to prepare a relación of the Viceroy's discourse and all previous correspondence on the mita. After it had considered that material in May, the Council voted that abolition was a matter that only the Queen herself could decide. In other words, the Council did not want to take the responsibility for ordering the abolition of the mita any more than the Conde de Lemos.<sup>34</sup>

The dilemma of the royal conscience versus the crown's revenue had been passed from the Queen and Peñaranda to Lemos, then from the Viceroy to the Council, and finally, from the Council to the Queen. The Councilors suggested that a junta be formed, with members of the Council to be

joined by prominent theologians, so that all sides of the question would be debated. It noted that the mita appeared to have outlived its justification, and that it was now more harmful than beneficial.<sup>35</sup> On October 9, 1673, however, the Council abruptly halted the junta's enquiry. It then ordered the Conde de Castellar to investigate the situation in Peru in his capacity as Lemos' successor. Castellar was provided with the Angulo relación for his information, and he was instructed to determine, once in Peru, what course of action would be best, and then to report back to the Council.<sup>36</sup>

The reason for the Council's decision was not included in its order to Castellar. The suspension of the enquiry may have come in response to the news of Lemos' death, but it probably resulted from the Council's fear of the possible ramifications of abolition of the mita, and its inability to determine what was really happening in Peru, and thus to judge the rationale for abolition. Vázquez de Velasco and Lemos had both prefaced their calls for the abolition of the mita with the impossibility of reform, and the relatively low levels of crown revenue generated by the once-rich mines at Potosí. The validity of their arguments had been put in doubt by counter proposals and their own government reports.

Nicolás Matías del Campo y de la Rynaga issued a work in 1672 entitled Memorial apologético, histórico,

jurídico y político. He said that he was responding to an anti-mita memorial written by a friar. The structure of Campo's Memorial and the issues it considered, however, suggest that it was written to counter the Conde de Lemos' July 4, 1670 discourse. The unidentified friar may well have been an invention to protect Campo from viceregal retribution, for the work was published in Lima.<sup>37</sup>

Campo's Memorial was heavily indebted to Sandoval y Guzmán's Pretensiones of 1634, and it may best be characterized as a revision of that earlier work. Campo likened Peru to a sick patient, whom the doctors had failed to cure because they had applied mere half-measures. Some physicians (also unidentified) had recently decided, he said, that the disease (the abuses caused by the mita) was incurable and that the infected organ (the Potosí mita) would have to be removed. From a list of fifteen offenses that they blamed on the mita, they had come to these four conclusions:

I. That the distribution and assignment of the Indians to work at Potosí was unjust, and that it was counter to their natural liberty.

II. That the crown had aggrieved its royal conscience with the assignment of the Indians to the mines at Potosí.

III. That the mita, or repartimiento of the Indians for the cerro of Potosí, and the offenses of the azogeros, had destroyed and depopulated the provinces.

IV. That it was convenient, and the crown in defense of its conscience must, abolish and revoke

the repartimiento of the Indians to Potosí; and (in the case that that proposal were rejected) that it should assign them to other mining centers, leaving Potosí to be worked by volunteers who were resident there.<sup>38</sup>

Campo's arguments against each of these conclusions sought to ally the interests of the crown with those of the azogueros, against those of the advocates of the mita's extermination. His first Article maintained that the crown had an unquestionable right to order its vassals to work for it, and it defended the justness of the mita. The offenses that were currently plaguing the system, Campo argued, were not the fault of the crown or inherent in the mita; rather, they were the product of individual azogueros' malice. To doubt that the crown had a right to order mita service, or to question the justness of the system, he said, was disloyal and an affront to the royal family. The individual azogueros who were guilty of wrongdoing should be punished, but abolition would unjustly penalize the crown and the meritorious azogueros.<sup>39</sup>

Article II of the Memorial defended the mita against the charge that it had depopulated the provinces. Campo claimed that the priests, the corregidores and the caciques who advanced that notion were trying to blame the system for the damage that they had caused. He admitted that the mistreatment of mitayos by the azogueros had contributed to Indian migration, but as he had in Article I, Campo argued that the system could be reformed; that the abuses



that contributed to Indian flight could be purged from the mita without destroying it altogether.<sup>40</sup>

In Article III, Campo called for the continuation of the mita in recognition of Potosí's record of service to the crown, the azogueros' current needs, and the ill-effects that would come from shifting the Indians to other mines. He reiterated, therefore, all the tenets of the azogueros' long-standing position in defense of the mita save one: that the system was part of their pact with Viceroy Toledo. Perhaps Campo realized that the usefulness of that argument had been eroded by time and by the extent to which the azogueros misused mita service in silver. He employed the remainder of their position to the fullest: the transport of the Indians to other mining centers, he said, would add to the problems that were caused by Indian migration; and Potosí would collapse without mita labor. When Potosí fell, he warned, then Peru would fall; and when Peru fell, then Spain would fall; and when Spain fell, then Catholicism would fall; and then the world would be left at the mercy of the Protestants!<sup>41</sup>

Finally, in Article IV, Campo took on all fifteen of the abuses that the mita's enemies had used to construct their four conclusions. He made no effort to deny that the azogueros had engaged in the mistreatment of the Indians or in the misuse of the mita, but he argued once more that any abuses could be eliminated without abolishing

the system.<sup>42</sup>

Thus, the most important message included in the Campo Memorial was that reform was possible. The second most important point that it had to make was that Potosí would collapse without mita labor. Those arguments were supported, quite naturally, by the azogueros in their own complaints to the crown about Lemos' abolitionism.<sup>43</sup> But the strongest evidence supporting Campo's assertions came from Lemos himself, and his replacement Corregidor, Diego de Ulloa. Their efforts to demonstrate that they were complying with their orders to end abuse and raise silver production at Potosí were the cause of this ironic circumstance. In 1669, for example, Oviedo reported to Lemos that his diligence had raised the number of Indians working at Potosí to 3,424--both mitayos and mingas. Lemos relayed the Corregidor's report to the Council of the Indies, with one "minor" alteration: he claimed that the number of mitayos had reached 3,424--an apparent improvement of nearly 100 per cent.<sup>44</sup>

After Lemos had replaced Oviedo with Ulloa, the new Corregidor reported, in February of 1672, that he had raised the production of royal quintos significantly, and that he had abolished "pocket Indians." He attributed his success to his implementation of Lemos' three reform directives of 1669.<sup>45</sup> Pleased with Ulloa's progress, the Viceroy sent the good news on to the crown on April 26,

1672.<sup>46</sup>

The Conde de Lemos' reports of his actions countered what he had argued in his July 4 proposal: a) that reform of the mita was impossible and that abolition was necessary to end abuses; and b) that production at Potosí could not be improved and that the mining center was on its way out. The crown clearly appreciated the news of higher quintos, for the Queen sent Oviedo orders on June 10, 1673 to maintain the high level of silver production that Diego de Ulloa had reported.<sup>47</sup> Oviedo had been returned to office by virtue of a royal cédula, which he had been able to obtain via personal connections in the Council of the Indies.<sup>48</sup> The Queen's directive to the Corregidor was sent just two days after the Council had presented her with the case for the abolition of the mita. The two issues were therefore considered by her concurrently.<sup>49</sup>

It is even more ironic that Oviedo would later refute Lemos' claims. Upon his return to Potosí in April, 1673, he charged that Ulloa had manipulated production data, and that silver output had not been as high as he had reported. Oviedo said that the apparent rise in quintos had been derived by Ulloa's use of 1670 as the base year for his comparison. Production had been hindered that year by a severe drought and an eleven-month production period. Ore that had been stockpiled during 1670 was later milled in 1671 and 1672, the two years for which Ulloa claimed

credit. The carta cuenta for 1671 had included, moreover, thirteen months' worth of silver production; and that for 1672 had contained fifteen months' worth. The total work force had actually fallen, Oviedo added, to 2,664 Indians: 1,427 mitayos and 1,217 mingas.<sup>50</sup> The Condessa de Lemos and Diego de Ulloa defended the integrity of the late Viceroy's reports in May, 1673, but by the time their arguments had arrived in Madrid, the issue of abolition had already been placed in the hands of the Conde de Castellar.<sup>51</sup>

Despite his refutation of Lemos' claims, Oviedo may have contributed to the Council of the Indies' decision to postpone any action on the abolition of the mita. His reports to the Conde de Lemos and to the Council about the labor force at Potosí had indicated that the shortage of Indians was not as bad as the system's detractors had claimed, and that the mita was functioning better than they had charged. His reports differed from those of his predecessors because he included mingas as well as mitayos, and he divided the latter into those who served in person and those who served in silver (see Table 3).

The figures presented on Table 3 come from one source, and therefore only tentative conclusions should be drawn from them. Oviedo's combination of the totals for mitayos and mingas to determine the total work force is especially questionable, for the money that was sent as mita service in

TABLE 3  
 MITA SERVICE ACCORDING TO  
 CORREGIDOR OVIEDO, 1668-1673<sup>52</sup>

YEAR	MITAYOS IN PERSON	MITAYOS IN SILVER	TOTAL MITAYOS	MINGAS	TOTAL WORKERS
1668 <sup>a</sup>	1,424	700-1/2	2,124-1/2	899-1/2	3,025
1669 <sup>b</sup>	1,777-1/4	374-3/4	2,142	1,282	
1670 <sup>c</sup>			2,033	1,595	3,628
1670 <sup>d</sup>			1,830	1,061	
1673 <sup>e</sup>			1,427	1,217	2,644
1673 <sup>f</sup>			1,634	1,404	3,038

silver was used, at least in part, to hire mingas. A combination of his totals for mingas and mitayos in person would probably be a more accurate indication of the actual work force, and this would come to a bit more than his total for mitayos in 1668 and 1669. His figures for mingas were larger than the numbers for mitayos in silver for those two years, and this would suggest--to the historian and perhaps to the Council of the Indies as well--that some mining operations at Potosí were profitable enough to hire mingas, and that the azogueros were not as heavily involved in "pocket Indians" as their enemies charged.<sup>53</sup>

These suggestions must remain very speculative until more work can be completed with the quantitative source materials. They are offered here because the Council's decision to halt its consideration of the Conde de Lemos' proposal in 1673 may have been based, in part, on a similar interpretation of Corregidor Oviedo's reports.

The Campo Memorial, the reports of reform and higher silver production at Potosí and the azogueros' arguments combined to derail the abolition movement headed by the Conde de Lemos. They did not end discussion of the matter completely, but the element of doubt and confusion that they created in Madrid caused sufficient hesitation on the part of the Council of the Indies that it postponed a decision on the question of abolition until the Conde de Castellar could report from Peru.

Viceroy Castellar (1674-1678)  
and Liñán y Cisneros (1678-1681)

The Conde de Castellar assumed office on August 15, 1674. The Audiencia de Lima, which had ruled Peru since Lemos' death sixteen months earlier, reported to the new Viceroy that the mita was as it had been when his predecessor arrived in 1667. Lemos' three reform orders of 1669, it said, had been completely neutralized by Corregidor Oviedo.<sup>54</sup>

Castellar complied with his orders from the Council of the Indies and reported on the mita on February 2, 1675. He said that he had hoped to act quickly and decisively, but that he had been forced to suspend his efforts when he was unable to find anyone who would advocate the abolition of the mita. The officials who had served on the July 3, 1670 junta now claimed that they had been coerced by the Conde de Lemos. Given the circumstances, the Viceroy had decided that he had better not risk anything novel, and that he should keep the Potosí silver industry going with traditional, if imperfect, means--the mita.<sup>55</sup>

The Viceroy was perplexed by the unanimity of opinion in favor of the mita. The current regimen of government officials at Potosí showed uniform support for the system. Corregidor Oviedo recounted his earlier sentiments for the crown on November 1, 1674.<sup>56</sup> The new President of Charcas,

Bartolomé González de Poveda, wrote to Madrid in February, 1677, that he had found the mita, and the silver industry in general, to be in a terrible state, but that the azoqueros were doing their best to keep the center in production. He claimed that they hired as many mingas as there were mitayos.<sup>57</sup>

The Archbishop of Charcas, Melchor Liñán y Cisneros, sent the crown a proposal six days later that called for the mita to be returned to the status quo ante. Lemos' orders, he said, had cut silver production at Potosí in half, but the Indians had not benefited at all--only the caciques. The Archbishop suggested, moreover, that the 28,000 Indians who lived in the villa should be included in the mita, perhaps to work at night while the other mitayos were resting. They had no occupation at all at present, he said, and spent most of their time committing all manner of sins. If they did not like the work, then they would return to their pueblos, and the provinces would be repopulated.<sup>58</sup>

It seemed to Castellar and to the Council that the sentiment for the abolition of the mita had simply evaporated. Responding to the Viceroy's report of February, 1675, the crown issued two cédulas, on July 8 and November 16, 1676, ordering that the mita be maintained. The first order empowered the Viceroy to extend mita obligation to more provinces, after consultations with



President González de Poveda. The second order instructed Castellar to abolish "pocket Indians," in league with the new Corregidor de Potosí, Pedro Luis Enríquez.<sup>59</sup> The Council of the Indies had dusted off its dual-fold program of the 1650s.

Castellar's dislike for novelties extended beyond the question of abolition, however, and like Alba, Salvatierra, Santisteban and others, he approached the two-part program with great caution. In response to a May 18, 1676 cédula, which asked his opinion on a proposed pan-Peruvian census and an alcalde mayor de minas' report that the number of mitayos had fallen to 1,300, Castellar confessed that he did not like the idea of introducing anything new at Potosí, no matter what might be happening there.<sup>60</sup> On February 22, 1678, he replied to the July 8 and November 16, 1676 orders. The Viceroy said that all of the provinces were experiencing a shortage of Indian labor, and that the Indians who were taken from the fourteen exempted provinces to work at Potosí would be sorely missed by their current employers. He suspended the implementation of the two cédulas until he could collect the opinions of González de Poveda, Oviedo and Enríquez about their contents.<sup>61</sup> Oviedo and Enríquez answered Castellar's request for their comments on May 1 and June 2, 1678, respectively. The President replied in an informe of April 28.<sup>62</sup> But by the time their letters were received in Lima the Conde had been

replaced by Liñán y Cisneros, now Archbishop of Lima and Viceroy of Peru.

The Archbishop brought a unique background to his duties as Viceroy. For example, he was the first seventeenth century viceroy of Peru to have personally visited Potosí. His long experience in Charcas and his pro-mita discourses while the Archbishop there, gave every indication that he would be more decisive and more realistic than his predecessors in tackling the problems surrounding the system. On August 24, 1678, Liñán reported to the crown that he would soon complete his study of the various responses to the 1676 cédulas, and that he would then proceed as he deemed best. Attached to his letter was a long note by the Fiscal supporting the mita and arguing that it was both legal and just, as long as only one-seventh of the Indians served at any one time. The note referred directly to Nicolás Matías del Campo's 1672 Memorial.<sup>63</sup>

Oviedo and González de Poveda both argued for the extension of mita obligation to more provinces. Enríquez had only recently assumed the office of Corregidor de Potosí, and he deferred to their years of experience. Their arguments were reiterated for the Archbishop-Viceroy by his Asesor general, Francisco de Valera. He reduced the matter to six points, most of which revolved around the now familiar problems with the execution of a census: who to

name to conduct it; and how to pay them. Following the lead of González de Poveda, Valera argued that the census should be conducted in all thirty of the provinces by their corregidores and local priests, to save the cost of judges' salaries and to complete the process as quickly as possible. He also noted that the ten year exemption from resettlement would have to be eliminated, and he advocated the abolition of mita service in silver. The number of mitayos to be included in a new repartimiento would be determined by the Corregidor de Potosí and the President of Charcas in an in-depth visita of the mills and the cerro. The required number of Indians would then be drawn from one-seventh of the Indian population in the sixteen traditionally obligated provinces and any of the fourteen that were needed. In the event that more provinces were needed, then the villa of Potosí and the provinces of Yamparaez, Pilaya, Tomina and Chuquiauo would be the first to be included.<sup>64</sup>

Given the Viceroy's philosophical inclination in favor of the mita, the unanimity of support for the system in Charcas, and the Council's orders of 1676, it appeared that the long-promised repartimiento de la mita might finally come to fruition; but it did not. The cause this time was the Council of the Indies. In response to Liñán's earlier comments on the mita, the Council sent him a series of position papers on the system on September 13, 1678,

including the Conde de Lemos' discourse on abolition. The Archbishop was instructed to study them all, and to obtain the written opinions of the Audiencia de Charcas, González de Poveda, Oviedo and Enríquez.<sup>65</sup> The Council was having second thoughts about its 1676 orders, and because the 1678 cédula superseded those instructions, Liñán had to suspend the implementation of a new repartimiento until he could comply with the order.<sup>66</sup>

The azogueros and the government officials at Potosí were anxious that Liñán proceed in accordance with the 1676 orders. President González de Poveda complained to the Council of the Indies on April 11, 1679 that nothing had been done since he submitted his informe a year earlier.<sup>67</sup> The azogueros reported that the number of mitayos working at Potosí had fallen to 1,600, and they said that all the doubts about the feasibility of a census were ludicrous. Francisco de Toledo, they noted, had accomplished the original repartimientos de la mita all by himself.<sup>68</sup>

In August of 1679 the Archbishop-Viceroy and the Real Acuerdo decided that Lemos' 1669 reform orders should be observed until a new repartimiento was completed. Liñán also ruled that corregidores should send one-seventh of the Indian population in their provinces, including the forasteros and the yanaconas if the number of originarios was not sufficient. The capitanes enteradores were not to

deliver service in silver, he ordered, and they were not to be held responsible for any more Indians than those that they received from their corregidores. Liñán did not distribute these orders right away, however, but submitted them to the Fiscal, the Protector de naturales, and González de Poveda for their comments. He then suspended their execution when he learned, in April of 1680, that he would soon be replaced as Viceroy by the Duque de la Palata (1681-1689).<sup>69</sup>

The instruments of bureaucratic delay are by now painfully familiar. The Council of the Indies' wavering between the abolition of the mita and the reformation of the system was only the latest manifestation of the many pitfalls of administering Potosí from afar.

On April 21, 1679, the crown sent forth a cédula ordering Bishops and Archbishops to oversee reports on their jurisdictions by priests in the field. The cédula was not connected in any way with secular government. Was it the culmination of Juan de Ibarra and the Conde de Lemos' suggestion that priests conduct a secret census of the realm in preparation for a new repartimiento? As the Archbishop of Lima, even after Palata arrived in Peru, Liñán would participate in that process. The possibility is certainly intriguing, but for lack of further evidence it must remain just that: a possibility.<sup>70</sup>

Such was the state of Hapsburg administration of the

mita when the Viceroy Duque de la Palata arrived in Peru in 1681. While the various echelons of the government had debated the merits of the mita, considered its possible abolition and discussed the form of a new repartimiento, the caciques who made the system work had begun to fight back against the mita.

### The Caciques

In his letters to the crown of January, April and July, 1670, the Conde de Lemos identified the caciques as the key element in the mita, both in its design and its deterioration. He noted that he had received many complaints from them about how they were treated by the azogueros, and he described the violent methods that they employed to deliver Indians to Potosí.<sup>71</sup>

In earlier years, the caciques had responded to the pressure upon them through flight, suicide and legal complaints, the last with limited gain. From 1667 to 1680 they employed the legal machinery of Hapsburg government with remarkable success. The caciques' petitions and court challenges not only had an impact on viceregal policy toward the mita, they also affected the de facto system. The materials that were included with their legal arguments also provide further insights into the actual functioning of the Potosí mita.

Gabriel Fernández Guarache's efforts to ease the burden

of the mita on himself and other caciques in Pacajes influenced the Conde de Lemos and contributed to the Viceroy's decision to propose that the mita be abolished. In the mid-1660s, Fernández Guarache petitioned the government in Lima to resolve five points. First, he again requested that the position of capitán general for Pacajes be eliminated. Second, he asked that only one-seventh of the current Indian population in the sixteen obligated provinces be required to serve each year. As the capitán enterador for Pacajes he had been unable to deliver more than 176 Indians in person, and had been forced to pay for 1,000 fugitives in silver. Third, Fernández Guarache argued that the Indians should receive two weeks of rest for every one that they worked, and that they should not be forced to work both day and night. He said that the mistreatment of mitayos at Potosí had contributed to the labor shortage there. It had disabled many workers, and the stories that returning mitayos told to the uninitiated caused many of the latter to flee from their pueblos. Fourth, the Indians who were required to serve as meses were now assigned to the mines and the mills, rather than to the support activities that they had originally been used in. Fernández Guarache said that they should no longer be required to serve at all. Finally, he asked that the fines that were levied against the Indians for missing a day not exceed one day's wages.

A day's absence was currently met with a one peso fine, and thus an Indian who was absent for two days received nothing for the week at all. The mitayos were also fined, he said, when they failed to meet illegal quotas, and that too had to be stopped.<sup>72</sup>

The practices that Fernández Guarache described in his petition were those that the Conde de Lemos tried to prohibit with his 1669 reforms, and ultimately with his call for the abolition of the mita in 1670. The cacique's petition had been sent to the Council of the Indies by the Audiencia de Lima, and it was discussed by the Council on June 19, 1668. A royal order was then sent to the Viceroy and to the President of Charcas to act against the illegal practices that Fernández Guarache had described. That edict contributed to the Conde's decision to issue the 1669 reform directives.<sup>73</sup>

The Viceroy borrowed the cacique's logic when he prefaced the three reform orders. He said that the mita had been a solution for the problems of Toledo's day, but that it had given vent to new difficulties. The azogueros had so modified the Toledan system that the de facto mita no longer bore any resemblance to its original design. The Indians had fled from the oppression they suffered as mitayos, and they had left the caciques to bear the full weight of the mita--at seven pesos per Indian per week in silver. The Conde de Lemos' July 4 discourse also



followed this line of thought.<sup>74</sup>

Fernández Guarache's arguments continued to influence the government's approach to the mita even after Lemos died. In August of 1680, for example, the Council of the Indies considered his comments on the prospects for a general census and for reducciones. He maintained that the execution of reducciones would be an exercise in futility, because the provinces that were subjected to mita service were already completely destroyed. He noted, moreover, that the Indians did not have to be compelled to work in profitable silver mines. The reason that they were unwilling to serve at Potosí, Fernández Guarache argued, was that the center had ceased being profitable long ago. He claimed that only eight of the sixty-eight mills there were viable operations, and that most of the azogueros merely collected mita service in silver. The majority of the silver refined at Potosí, he added, came from surrounding mining zones.<sup>75</sup>

Gabriel Fernández Guarache's general portrayal of the mita is substantiated by the events in Paucarcolla from 1669 to 1673. The Corregidor of the province, Josef Ordóñez de Aguila, was a creature of the Conde de Lemos, and as such he gave unusual attention to his mita duties. Ordóñez was obligated to despatch a contingent of mitayos at the end of 1669 to serve at Potosí for two years--the province's distance from the villa had led to biennial

periods of service for the Indians of Paucarcolla. In October, Ordóñez ordered the caciques of the province to prepare lists of those who would serve from 1669 to 1671, and to make ready for their departure. The gobernadores of Puno and Ycho responded that they could not deliver the number of Indians that was required of them in person, and that their personal resources were no longer adequate to meet their obligations in silver. They asked that they be allowed to resign their positions. The Corregidor investigated the gobernadores' claims, found them to be true, and accepted their resignations.<sup>76</sup>

Four years later, Ordóñez began his preparations earlier. In April, 1673, he reported to the Audiencia de Charcas that he had jailed the cacique gobernador of Macari for a number of offenses, including the failure to carry out his mita responsibilities. Gerónimo Cajiamarca, the Corregidor charged, had run a series of illegal enterprises and conducted unlawful collections of silver from the residents of his pueblo, ostensibly to meet their tribute and mita obligations; the gobernador had then kept the money for himself. Ordóñez said that he had imprisoned Cajiamarca, but that he had posted 200 pesos bail and then disappeared.<sup>77</sup>

The despatch of the mitayos took place from Puno in November, 1673. Ordóñez named a Spaniard to accompany the troop to Potosí. The gobernador of the pueblo of

Paucarcolla provided him with five Indians; a sixth was to be picked up in Oruro en route to Potosí. The caciques of Puno and Ycho could not deliver anyone in person, but they entrusted him with 450 and 400 pesos, respectively. They said that they had collected the money through the rental of land to forasteros and yanaconas, and the sale of their own property and livestock. The gobernador of San Francisco de Tiquillaca provided two Indians in person and 300 pesos in lieu of the usual third from his pueblo. He too had raised the money through collections among the forasteros. The cacique of Capachica sent ten Indians in person.<sup>78</sup>

From this limited base of evidence it is apparent that the exempted Indians--forasteros and yanaconas--were not entirely free of mita obligation. The rent that they paid for their lands, and the collections that were demanded of them, went toward satisfying the mita quota from their pueblo of residence. They were, therefore, contributing to mita service in silver.

The pressure on the caciques to deliver mitayos, in person and in silver, is nowhere more evident than in their legal battle with Joseph Fernández Valencia, the Capitán mayor de la mita in Potosí. Fernández employed a combination of financial, corporal and psychological pressures to force the caciques to deliver as many mitayos as they possibly could.<sup>79</sup>

In 1677, the caciques launched a legal assault on the Capitán mayor, en masse. They charged that when they arrived in Potosí with their mitayos they had to pay him an illegal delivery tax, and that they were then imprisoned until other caciques bonded them. The caciques also claimed that they were forced to bring Fernández Valencia presents, in kind, from their provinces; that they had to lend him their mules whenever he wanted them; and that they had to contribute building materials for his mining operation, decorations for his parties and Indians to work in his mine.<sup>80</sup>

With the able assistance of the Protector de naturales of Potosí, the caciques argued their case before Corregidor Luis Antonio de Oviedo. Fernández Valencia defended the bonding of the caciques and his rigorous treatment of them as being necessary to ensure that they would comply with their obligations. He denied that he had required them to contribute to his personal enterprises. Oviedo was sympathetic toward the Capitán mayor's situation, and he ordered only a minor penalty that would have returned him to office after a short suspension.<sup>81</sup>

The caciques and the Protector then launched a second offensive, through appeals to the Audiencia de Charcas and the Viceroy. They added new charges to those that they had included in their first complaint: that Fernández forcibly sold wine and chicha to the Indians at Guayna each

Monday; that he forced the caciques to come to his home and bid him good day; that he used physical and verbal abuse against them that was not appropriate for nobles; that he forced them to work silver ore by hand while he held them in his jail; and that he prevented them from hearing mass while they were imprisoned. In the end, the evidence that the caciques accumulated against Fernández Valencia overwhelmed him and the Corregidor. The Capitán mayor was heavily fined and permanently stripped of his office. Gabriel Fernández Guarache had influenced the Viceroy of Peru and the Council of the Indies; the caciques as a group took on and defeated the immediate object of their difficulties at Potosí, the Capitán mayor de la mita.<sup>82</sup>

As the key pressure point in the mita, the caciques also had their problems with the Indians. They were by no means benevolent toward their charges, and they used many of the same methods against the Indians that the Corregidor de Potosí, the Capitán mayor de la mita, and the azogueros used in dealing with them. The Indians' response to oppression, as we have noted many times, was largely passive: flight from their home provinces. By 1680, however, some of them had also resorted to violence, and another apparently sought his revenge through the legal machinery of the Hapsburg administration.

In 1679, Bartolomé González, the capitán enterador for

Toropalca, Yura, Potobamba and Chaqui--all in the province of Porco--asked the Audiencia de Charcas to permit him to carry a sword and a dagger while he was performing his duties as capitán. González provided the court with testimony of the problems that he had faced in 1668 with four Indians who had refused to serve in the mita. They had answered his efforts to include them in a contingent of mitayos for Potosí by beating him up on one occasion and pelting him with sticks and stones on another. It is interesting that the number of witnesses that González brought forward to substantiate his case far outnumbered his attackers; they did not explain why they had failed to go to his rescue. The Audiencia nevertheless acceded to his request and granted him a license to carry arms to protect himself.<sup>83</sup>

The most compelling case involving the mita during this period is that of Francisco Sonco Cari versus the Corregidor de Asangaro, Francisco de Castro. Sonco Cari appeared before the Audiencia de Charcas in 1673, claimed that he was the cacique principal of Asillo, and charged that Castro was engaged in a number of abuses, including the misuse of mita labor. Sonco claimed that Castro had forced him to buy wine, mules and clothing at inflated prices; that he had forced other caciques to do the same; and that he was using mitayos in his pack trains and his other personal enterprises. Sonco brought a series of

witnesses before the Audiencia to corroborate his charges. The court was sufficiently impressed with the case against Castro that it sent a judge to Asangaro to investigate.<sup>84</sup>

The testimony that the judge gathered in the province was completely at odds with that which supported Sonco Cari's claims. Indeed, the caciques and the Indians of the pueblos of Asangaro and Asillo said that Sonco was not a cacique and that he never had been one. They claimed that he was a common Indian who had been sent to Potosí in the mita three or four years earlier. The other witnesses who had been involved in the preliminary hearings were unknown to the residents of the two pueblos. The judge ruled, therefore, that the charges against Corregidor Castro had been fabricated, and the Audiencia stood by his decision.<sup>85</sup>

The Sonco Cari versus Castro case has two possible explanations: a) that the charges were true but that the Corregidor managed to cover up the affair with pressure on the Indians and/or bribery of the judge; or b) that the charges were brought by a vengeful mitayo. The second is more probable, for while the charges may well have been based on some degree of fact--such practices were common--the Corregidor's ability to control the caciques and the Indians would have had to have been extraordinary to keep them quiet.<sup>86</sup> The documentation in the Audiencia's files held nothing to suggest that the judge had been corrupted

by the Corregidor. If Sonco Cari was a disgruntled mitayo, then the judicial process had been manipulated, if not entirely with success, by a common Indian against a provincial corregidor.

### Summary

Since 1633, the limitations of Hapsburg administration had prevented the completion of a new repartimiento de la mita. The time delays that were caused by trans-oceanic correspondence, the short viceregal terms in office, the viceroys' reluctance to innovate, the problems confronting a prerequisite census and the contradictory information that the government officials at Potosí produced had combined to postpone the execution of a repartimiento for decades.

While the government had wavered on how best to act, the gap between the Toledan mita and the de facto system had grown wider. Service in silver had become a major part of mita deliveries, the mistreatment of the caciques had grown more violent and the provinces had proven increasingly unable to support the mita. Finally, in the mid-1660s, President Vázquez de Velasco had concluded that the abuses that pervaded the system could not be prevented, and he had begun to call for the abolition of the mita.

From 1667 to 1680, the same governmental limitations



that had prevented the execution of a new repartimiento combined to frustrate first the reform efforts of the Conde de Lemos and then his call for the abolition of the mita. Indeed, his support for the system's extermination was a direct outgrowth of his frustrations vis-à-vis reform, and his realization that he could not otherwise alter the status quo at Potosí and alleviate the suffering of the Indians who were serving in the mita.

Lemos' proposal for the abolition of the mita, like Toledo's decision to establish the system a century before, drew upon existing opinions and responded to the condition of Peru as he found it. The Conde's reform package was drafted by Juan de Ibarra, and his July 4, 1670 discourse borrowed heavily from the arguments of Vázquez de Velasco and Fernández Guarache. A generation of anti-mita sentiments came to a climax during his viceroyalty. Lemos may have been unusually receptive to those sentiments because of Queen Mariana's concern for her conscience, but he was the vehicle of the abolition movement, not the source of it.

Juan de Ibarra played an important role throughout the period, from his proposal for the use of ecclesiastical channels to conduct a census to his support for the three reforms that Lemos ordered in 1669. He and the Viceroy looked upon the mita as a legal and a moral problem, quite apart from the realities of silver production. The reforms

that they championed were those that Francisco de la Cruz had died for ten years earlier. Corregidor Luis Antonio de Oviedo was faced with the realities of the mita full square, and he was mindful of what had happened the last time that reforms were attempted at Potosí. He was therefore reluctant to comply with the Viceroy's directives. The struggle that ensued between Oviedo and Lemos over the 1669 reforms was between what could and what should be done; between potosino realities and limeño plans; and between the de facto mita and the viceregal position that the Toledan system was still viable.

The proposal to abolish the mita was an act of last resort--a response to the impossibility of implementing reforms at Potosí, and to the falling levels of silver production there. Like his predecessors, the Conde de Lemos was disinclined to take action of major proportions without first obtaining the consent of the crown and the Council of the Indies. He proposed that the mita be abolished; he did not disband it himself. The Council sought to evade the responsibility for such a crucial decision by leaving it to the Queen alone. Its reluctance stemmed from Spain's need for revenue, which complicated the question of the mita's justness.

The downfall of the abolition proposal lay with the arguments upon which it was based: that reform of the system was impossible and that Potosí was no longer an

important producer of silver. Those points were countered by Nicolás Matías del Campo in his Memorial and by the azogueros in their correspondence with Madrid. Lemos' own reports that quintos were higher and that abuses were being eliminated by Diego de Ulloa confirmed what the enemies of abolition argued: that reform was possible and that production could be increased at Potosí. The Viceroy's desire to prove that he was a good administrator compromised his call for the alleviation of the Indians' suffering via the abolition of the mita.

Once the abolition proposal had been put to one side, the Council of the Indies issued a series of resolutions. First, it repeated its earlier call for both a new repartimiento and the abolition of "pocket Indians." Then, after Archbishop-Viceroy Liñán had begun to implement those orders, the Council asked him to reconsider his earlier position in support of the mita, and the Conde de Lemos' proposal for the abolition of the system. It is also possible that the Council then undertook to complete a census through ecclesiastical channels, as Juan de Ibarra had suggested. The vacillation at the Council's level clearly prohibited Liñán from pushing forward with a new census and repartimiento, when viceregal resistance to that process had been eliminated for the first time since the 1640s.

Almost lost in the question of the abolition of the

mita is the role of the caciques, both in the formation of government policy and in the de facto system. Long the key element in the mita--caught between the system as it had been designed and as it actually worked--the caciques now fought back against their deteriorating condition with petitions to the government and with court challenges. Gabriel Fernández Guarache's arguments of the mid-1660s played an important part in the development of Lemos' reform directives, and in his subsequent call for the abolition of the mita. The capitanes enteradores, as a group, defeated the Capitán mayor de la mita, Joseph Fernández Valencia.

Lest we come to pity them too much, because their access to the legal machinery was greater than that of common Indians, we must bear in mind that the caciques' treatment of the Indians was a mirror reflection of their treatment by the azogueros and the government officials at Potosí. Rather than absorbing all of the increased pressure on them, the caciques diffused that pressure downward onto the Indians. They developed, for example, a number of methods for collecting money from yanaconas, forasteros, widows and others, through land rentals and forced donations. Those Indians, who were legally exempted from mita service, nevertheless contributed to the service in silver deliveries from the pueblos where they lived.

Notes for Chapter VI

1. For the Audiencia de Lima's "Relación," and chapter 38 in particular, see note 6, Chapter V. For the Conde de Lemos' response to the Audiencia's "Relación," see note 2, below.
2. "El Conde de Lemos da cuenta a S.M. del estado en que halló el reino del Perú cuando entró a gobernarle y el remedio que ha comenzado a poner en las materias más principales de su gobierno," 4.III.1668, Los virreyes (ed. by Hanke and Rodríguez), Perú IV (no. 283), 271-273 (from the manuscripts in the Archivo de la Casa de Alba, Madrid, Caja 263-9; and AGI, Lima 67); the quote is on page 272. Lemos' response to chapter 38 of the Audiencia's "Relación" (see note 6, Chapter V) is AGI, Charcas 267, no. 54B, "Copia del Cap.<sup>o</sup> 38 de las advertencias que hizo el Virrey Conde de Lemos a la R.<sup>on</sup> del estado de las Prov.<sup>as</sup> del Peru que le entrego la Au.<sup>a</sup> de lima del Tpo. que las avia gobernado por falta de Virrey=", sin fecha, 2 fs. The complete response is also included in Los virreyes, Perú, IV, 251-271; it is entitled "Advertencias que hace el Conde de Lemos a la relación del estado del reino que le entregó la real Audiencia de Lima ...." (from AGI, Lima 466), and dated "c. 1668."
3. In addition to AGI, Charcas 267, no. 54B (see note 2), see Zavala, Servicio personal, II, 148-149, for a discussion of Ibarra's "Informe." For more on the problems surrounding a census, AGI, Charcas 268, no. 8, the Conde de Lemos to the crown, Lima, 13.I.1670, 3 fs.; "Refiere las dificultades que se ofrecieron en tpo del conde de Alva de Aliste cerca de la numeracion y repartimiento gen.<sup>l</sup> de los yndios de mita de Potosi y la que de nuevo se ofrece Ynsistiendo en lo mismo que Represento a VMg.<sup>d</sup> en el numerô 38 de las advertencias que hizo a la Relacion del estado del Reino q.<sup>e</sup> le entrego la R.<sup>l</sup> Audiencia." See note 2 for Lemos' "Advertencias."
4. AGI, Charcas 267, no. 56, the Conde de Lemos to the crown, Lima, 26.I.1669, 1 f.; "Da cuenta de la forma y modo, con que se puede ajustar la mita de Potosi, remitiendose al Num.<sup>o</sup> 38 de las advertencias de la Relaz,<sup>on</sup> del estado del Reino." See note 2 for Lemos' "Advertencias."
5. AGI, Charcas 267, nos. 56C and 56D (56D is the envelope), Corregidor Luis Antonio de Oviedo to the crown,

Potosí, 8.X.1668, 6 fs.; "Representa que el descaecim<sup>to</sup> de aquel Cerro y Acogueros no resulta de falta de metales ricos ni In.<sup>os</sup> ni de q<sup>e</sup> los Acogueros tengan mas de un Ingenio porq<sup>e</sup> de otro modo cesarian en la lavor de todos, ni tampoco es la causa los In.<sup>os</sup> que llaman de faltriguera, que sin dar otros no pag.n el dinero que Importan quedandose con el los enteradores. Y las Justicias y Curas con las personas para servirse dellos. Travajando los q.<sup>e</sup> sirven en la Mita sin ningun Intermedio de tpo para su descanso p.<sup>r</sup> que no abia reducido la mayor p.<sup>te</sup> de los que se pagan en plata a personal y en el ynterin que se hace repartim.<sup>to</sup> g.<sup>l</sup> convendra q<sup>e</sup> dejando reducidos los In.<sup>os</sup> Yanaconas q<sup>e</sup> no mitan y son los de Potosi mas de 17  $\varnothing$  ) al num<sup>o</sup> antiguo los demas se apliquen a la Mita Y despues se haga dho repartim,<sup>to</sup> entre todas las treynta Prov.<sup>as</sup> del Reyno Y que por ser estos puntos de tanta cons.<sup>on</sup> a embiado dos Diputados de los Acogueros a comunicarlos con el Virrey y le a escrito s.<sup>e</sup> ello para q<sup>e</sup> provea lo conv.<sup>te</sup> de quien lo espera por su buen zelo." AGI, Charcas 267, no. 54, is a set of three orders which accompanied the 8.X.1668 letter. Their cover reads: "Por estos autos consta de los Indios de cedula y mingas que havia en los Ingenios del Zerro, Los que alquilaban o, mingaban los azogueros, y Como los metales salen y se sacan de muy baxa ley que es todo lo que toca el Correxidor en su carta de arriba."

6. For information on the altercations at Puno, AGI, Charcas 267, no. 55, President Vázquez de Velasco to the crown, 29.XII.1668, 2 fs.; AGI, Charcas 268, no. 4, the Conde de Lemos to the crown, Lima, 6.XII.1669, 5 fs., "Da cuenta de lo que, â, proveydo y resuelto en orden al alivio de los Indios, y pondera la tirania y opresion con que usan dellos los Mineros de Potosi intentando por este medio acavarlos de alquiler en conveniencia suya, y no de la R<sup>l</sup> haz,<sup>da</sup> y las oras que, â, señalado para tratar de su conservacion, y desagravio por ser materia en que se deve poner la mayor atencion. In his letter, Vázquez de Velasco suggests that Lemos come to Potosí and personally conduct a visita; that suggestion was not followed. For more from the Viceroy, AGI, Charcas 268, no. 16, the Conde de Lemos to the crown, Lima, 4.VII.1670, 3 fs.; "Representa las extorssiones de los Yndios en las mitas forcadas de minas especialm.<sup>te</sup> en la de Potossi y quan aresgada esta La conciencia R<sup>l</sup> si no se executa el nuebo medio que propone y que lo a Comunicado con los prelados y personas mas doctas de la Ciudad que son del mismo sentir como consta de los recuados que acompañan esta."

7. Oviedo's opposition is noted in Zavala, Servicio

Personal, II, 149. Perhaps the best single source on the Lemos-Oviedo debate is AGI, Charcas 268, no. 21A, "RON de las cartas que a escripto Luis Ant.<sup>o</sup> de obiedo Correg<sup>or</sup> de Potosi tocantes a la mita y ordenes q<sup>e</sup> se le an embiado" (by the Conde de Lemos), 13.VIII.1670, 9 fs.

8. The order itself is AGI, Charcas 268, no. 5A, Los Reyes, 4.XI.1669, 1 f. (a copy). It is mentioned in AGI, Charcas 268, no. 5, the Conde de Lemos to the crown, Lima, 12.I.1670, 2 fs., "Da quenta de la resoluzion que, â, tomado sobre que a los Indios que enteran la mita de Potossi que llaman Capitanes Generales no les obligue el Correg<sup>or</sup> â, enterar por muertos y ausentes, y remite copia del auto que sobre esto mando publicar, y de la carta q.e escrivio al correg<sup>or</sup> de Potosi"; this letter is discussed by Ronald Escobedo Mansilla, El tributo indígena en el Perú (siglos XVI-XVII) (Pamplona: Ediciones Universidad de Navarra, 1979), 88-89 (from AGI, Lima 71--apparently a copy). AGI, Charcas 268, no. 10, the Conde de Lemos to the crown, Lima, 3.II.1670, 2 fs., is a follow-up letter explaining that he had also ordered that caciques were not to be punished under any circumstances, unless the azogeros could prove that they had been hurt by the caciques' actions. See, also, Zavala, Servicio personal, II, 149; Valera (AGI, Charcas 268, nos. 69A and 69B--see note 58, Chapter II), 22; and Ezquerria Abadía, 489-490, note 9bis. In AGI, Charcas 268, no. 4 (see note 6), Lemos says that he reached his decision in conference with Ibarra; he repeats that fact in AGI, Charcas 268, no. 5 (see above).

9. AGI, Charcas 268, no. 6A, the Conde de Lemos to Corregidor Luis Antonio de Oviedo, Lima, 3.XII.1669, 2 fs.; and AGI, Charcas 268, no. 7A, the Conde de Lemos to Corregidor Luis Antonio de Oviedo, 3.XII.1669, 1 f., respectively (both are copies). See, also, AGI, Charcas 268, no. 6, the Conde de Lemos to the crown, Lima, 12.I.1670, 1 f., "Que combendra se sirva Vmg.<sup>d</sup> de despachar cedula para que los mineros de Potosi no puedan obligar a los yndios a que trabajen continuamente de dia y de noche y remite copia de la carta que en esta Racon escrivio el correg<sup>or</sup> de aquella Villa"; and AGI, Charcas 268, no. 7, the Conde de Lemos to the crown, Lima, 12.I.1670, 1 f., "Que combendra despache Vmg.<sup>d</sup> cedula para que los corre<sup>g</sup>idores de Potosi y Gobernadores de Guancavelica no embien Jueces para enterar las mitas de años atrasados sino para el entero de cada mita pues tiene facultad para ellos." Ezquerria Abadía, 489-490, note 9bis, says that Lemos first ordered that Indians were not to work day and night on 26.VIII.1668. According to AGI, Charcas 268, no.

4 (see note 6), Ibarra was a party to these decisions as well as that noted in note 8.

10. AGI, Charcas 268, no. 6A (see note 9).

11. Ibid.; and AGI, Charcas 268, no. 4 (see note 6).

12. AGI, Charcas 268, no. 4 (see note 6). An order of 20.XII.1669 banned the payment of tribute for dead or absent Indians; AGI, Charcas 268, no. 9A, copy of an order by the Conde de Lemos, 20.XII.1669, 1 f. Zavala, Servicio personal, II, 148, says that the 20.XII.1669 order decreed that the entero de la mita was to be determined according to the last revisita, but my notes refer to taxes alone. Crespo, "La 'Mita,'" 181, notes all of this in passing.

13. For comments on the census, and that Oviedo had insisted on a government census in a letter of 4.X.1669, AGI, Charcas 268, no. 8 (see note 3). AGI, Charcas 268, nos. 5, 6, and 7 (see notes 8 and 9) all requested that cédulas be sent to confirm his orders of November and December, 1669.

14. "Instrucciones secretas del Conde de Peñaranda, Presidente del Consejo de Indias, al Conde de Lemos," sin fecha (c. 1667), Los virreyes (ed. by Hanke and Rodríguez), Perú IV (no. 283), 246 (from the manuscript in the Archivo de la Casa de Alba, Madrid, Lemos C. 263-1).

15. The Conde de Lemos refers to the Queen's instructions in his 4.VII.1670 discourse on abolition of the mita (see note 76, Chapter II); and in AGI, Charcas 268, no. 11, the Conde de Lemos to the crown, Lima, 7.II.1670, 2 fs., "Da cuenta de vn memorial que presento el Procurador del Gremio de Azogueros de Potosi diciendo se perdia aquella Villa si se ponía en execucion lo ordenado en alivio de los Yn.<sup>os</sup> de mita, Y supp.ca a VMg.d se sirva de embiar la resolucion de lo que en este punto hubiere de executar, y que en el ynterian hara se cumpla lo resuelto en los puntos que expresa."

16. AGI, Charcas 268, no. 21A (see note 7) includes a letter from Oviedo to Lemos of 6.I.1670 which warns the Viceroy that his orders will destroy Potosí; for Oviedo's correspondence with the crown, AGI, Charcas 267, nos. 58 and 58A (58A is the envelope), Luis Antonio de Oviedo y Herrera to the crown, Potosí, 12.III.1670, 3 fs. Because the Corregidor was aware that his opposition to Lemos might get him into trouble with the Council of the Indies he asked a friend--a secretary of the Council--to make



certain that his arguments received their due; AGI, Charcas 267, no. 59, Corregidor Oviedo y Herrera to Gabriel de Quiros, Potosí, 12.III.1670, 1 f. I determined what position Quiros held by referring to Ernst Schäfer, El Consejo Real y Supremo de las Indias: Su historia, organización y labor administrativa hasta la terminación de la Casa de Austria (2 vols.; Sevilla: Escuela de Estudios Hispanoamericanos, 1935-1947), I, 370. Oviedo included, with his letter to Quiros, an index of the papers he had sent to Madrid to bolster his case (AGI, Charcas 267, no. 59A, 1 f.).

17. AGI, Charcas 268, no. 10A, "Copia de Carta q<sup>e</sup> El Conde de lemos Virrey del Peru escrivio a D Luis Ant<sup>o</sup> de obiedo Correg<sup>r</sup> de Potossi," 33.II.1670, 3 fs.

18. AGI, Charcas 268, no. 10B, the Conde de Lemos to President Vázquez de Velasco, 3.II.1670, 2 fs. (a copy). Both this order and AGI, Charcas 268, no. 10A (see note 17), were products of deliberations which included Ibarra as a participant.

19. AGI, Charcas 268, no. 11 (see note 15).

20. AGI, Charcas 268, no. 14, the Conde de Lemos to the crown, Lima, 7.IV.1670, 4 fs.; "Refiere el Vnico medio q<sup>e</sup> se ofrece para conseguir el apuntam<sup>to</sup> general de la mita de Potossi con ocass<sup>n</sup> de la muerte de D Berndo de Ycaguirre obpo de Cuzco." President Vázquez de Velasco was to be kicked upstairs to the Council of the Indies; Lemos did not worry about what would happen to the Corregidor.

21. Corregidor Oviedo's report that he had implemented the orders was dated 10.III.1670 and included in AGI, Charcas 268, no. 21A (see note 7). Zavala, Servicio personal, II, 149, says the orders were promulgated on 9.III.1670. Supporting letters are: AGI, Charcas 268, no. 13, the Gremio de azogueros to the crown, Potosí, 19.III.1670, 3 fs.; and AGI, Charcas 268, no. 12, the Villa de Potosí to the crown, Potosí, 15.III.1670, 1 f.

22. AGI, Charcas 268, no. 21A (see note 7). The Corregidor's proposal came in a letter of 6.VI.1670, and the Viceroy's consent--reluctant consent--came on 8.VII.1670. Lemos may well have surrendered the battle because he had already proposed, in his 4.VII.1670 discourse (AGI, Charcas 268, no. 15--see note 76, Chapter II), that the mita be abolished.

23. AGI, Charcas 268, no. 15 (see note 76, Chapter II).

Valera (AGI, Charcas 268, nos. 69A & 69B--see note 58, Chapter II), 22, notes the discourse. Angulo (AGI, Charcas 268, no. 36--see note 58, Chapter II), 5v-7, analyzes the proposal (the reason the Angulo relación was ordered by the Council of the Indies).

24. See the sources cited in note 23.

25. So noted by President Vázquez de Velasco in AGI, Charcas 268, no. 20, President Vázquez de Velasco to the crown, 9.VIII.1670, 2 fs.; "Ponderalas grandes Vejazes que padecen los Inos de la mita de Potosi y lo que conv.<sup>e</sup> se quite sin envargo de haverse discurrido en el m.<sup>o</sup> de la nueva numeraz<sup>on</sup> dellos (pues no tiene nunca efecto) como lo propone el Virrey c<sup>de</sup> de lemos y lo escrivio a su antecesor el c.<sup>de</sup> de santistevan en la carta de q<sup>e</sup> remite copia."

26. The first page of AGI, Charcas 268, no. 15 (see note 76, Chapter II) is an "Indice de los Recaudos q.<sup>e</sup> la aconpañan el Informe y relacion q.<sup>e</sup> hace el Ex<sup>mo</sup> S<sup>r</sup> Conde de Lemos Virrey del Peru a su Mag.<sup>d</sup> en el R<sup>l</sup> Conss.<sup>o</sup> de las Indias"; and the items listed are included as AGI, Charcas 268, nos. 15A to 15J:

- 15A. "Papel del s<sup>r</sup> Conde de santistevan escrito and al s<sup>r</sup> Visitt<sup>or</sup> D. Alvaro de Ybarra y Su respuesta sobre si se devia mandar q.<sup>e</sup> los
- 15B. Indios de la mita de Potosi se enterasen en platta y no en persona por escusar la disminucion de las Prov.<sup>s</sup> y la vejacion y molestia q.<sup>e</sup> padecen en sus personas," 1 and 4 fs., respectively (see note 56, Chapter V).
- 15C. "Parecer de la Junta de desagravios en que concurrio el s<sup>r</sup> Arzobp<sup>o</sup> D. P<sup>o</sup> de Villagomez en conform.<sup>d</sup> de cedula de su Mag<sup>d</sup>," 1 f.
- 15D. "Parecer del señor obpo. electo de la concep<sup>n</sup>," 2 fs.
- 15E. "Parecer de la religion de S<sup>to</sup> Domingo," 2 fs. (see note 56, Chapter V).
- 15F. "Parecer de la religion de S<sup>n</sup> fran<sup>co</sup>," 2 fs.
- 15G. "Parecer de la religion de s<sup>n</sup> Agustin," 2 fs.
- 15H. "Parecer de la religion de la mrd," 2 fs.
- 15I. "Parecer de la Religion de la comp<sup>a</sup>," 2 fs.
- 15J. "Parecer del cavildo eclesiastico de Lima," 2 fs.

Pareceres jurídicos (ed. by Vargas Ugarte), 154, is a transcription of the Jesuit contribution (no. 15I). For more on the 3.VII.1670 junta, Zavala, Servicio personal, II, 149-150. Angulo (AGI, Charcas 268, no. 36--see note 58, Chapter II), 7-8, discusses these supporting papers.

27. AGI, Charcas 268, no. 15D (see note 26).
28. AGI, Charcas 268, no. 18, Juan de Padilla to the crown, Lima, 7.VII.1670, 1 f.; "Añade algunas conss.<sup>es</sup> a las que tuvo para conformarse con la proposs.<sup>n</sup> que haze el Virrey de q.<sup>e</sup> se quite la Mita de Potossi quando concurrio en la Junta q<sup>e</sup> cerca desto tuvo el Virrey"; Padilla was Alcalde del Crimen. Kubler, 347-350, says the yungas were habitable for the Indians because of the introduction of European crops and livestock. Crespo, "Reclutamiento," 474, discusses desertion of the sixteen obligated provinces by Indians fleeing from the mita and other obligations.
29. AGI, Charcas 268, no. 17, President Vázquez de Velasco to the crown, 7.VII.1670, 2 fs.; "En que da q.ta de lo obrado En el despacho de armda de este año de 670. Y que se haga la numeracion de yndios para la mita De Potosi." Actually, the 7.VII.1670 letter proposes either abolition or the completion of a new repartimiento based on a census. In AGI, Charcas 268, no. 20 (see note 25), written two days later, Vázquez de Velasco drops the alternative and supports abolition fully. Ezquerria Abadía, 489-490, note 9<sub>bis</sub>, says Vázquez de Velasco went to Potosí on the orders of Lemos, and supported abolition on the basis of what he witnesses there. In his 7.VII. 1670 letter, the President says that the azogueros were so upset with the reform directives of the Conde de Lemos that they threatened to stop payment for mercury and halt production. His personal intervention, he claimed, had kept the silver center from collapsing; he did not explain how he had accomplished that feat.
30. AGI, Charcas 268, no. 21, the Conde de Lemos to the crown, Los Reyes, 14.VIII.1670, 2 fs.; "Remite a V Mg.<sup>d</sup> relación de las cartas que a escripto el Correg.<sup>r</sup> de Potosí tocantes a la Mita y de las ordenes que se le an dado en alivio de los Indios con el parecer y motivos que an ocasionado a hacerle comparecer en esta Ciudad." The "relación," as noted in note 7, is AGI, Charcas 268, no. 21A. Ibarra's suggestion that Lemos replace Oviedo is AGI, Charcas 268, no. 21B, 1 f.; in the margin is a note that reads: "Hagase como parece al s<sup>r</sup> Visitador D Alvaro de Ybarra para cuio efecto se despachen los ordenes necesarios. Lima 15 de Agosto de 1670"; it carries the rubric of the Conde de Lemos.
31. AGI, Charcas 268, no. 23, the Council of the Indies to the Conde de Lemos, Madrid, 7.XI.1670, 2 fs.; "Respuesta al Virrey del Peru s<sup>e</sup> lo tocante al repartimto

Gen.<sup>1</sup> de la mita de Potossi." AGI, Charcas 268, nos. 25A, 25B and 25C are stray sheets of paper referring to the Council's deliberations and the decision it reached on 25.X.1670 to send the 7.XI.1670 order. For the debate on abolition of the mita in 1673, AGI, Charcas 268, no. 33, 1 f., "Conss 19 Abril 1673 X Llevense al Relor D Andres de Ango todos los papeles antiguos y modernos que huviere pertenecientes a la mita de el Potosi, para que saque en resumen vna Relacion de todas las razones y pareceres q<sup>e</sup> se han dado para que se cese la mita de el Potosi, resoluciones q<sup>e</sup> ha auido s<sup>re</sup> ello, para que con dha relacion se pase a hacer la Consta acordada en 12 de este mes y año." More from 1673: AGI, Charcas 268, nos. 33A and 33B (33B is the envelope), 3 fs., "Decreto de la Conss.ta que se a de hazer tocante a la mita de Potossi El mismo dia se puso otro p<sup>a</sup> q<sup>e</sup> D Andres de Ang.<sup>lo</sup> haga r.on de todos los pap.s pa formar esta consta que esta de ntro." The relación by Andrés de Angulo is AGI, Charcas 268, no. 36 (see note 58, Chapter II).

32. AGI, Charcas 268, no. 23 (see note 31); and AGI, Charcas 268, nos. 25A, 25B and 25C (see note 31).

33. AGI, Charcas 268, no. 24, the Conde de Lemos to the crown, Lima, 18.IX.1671, 2 fs., "Responde a la cedula de V Mg.<sup>d</sup> de 7 de Novyre de 670 sobre lo tocante al repartimto General de la mita de Potossi, haviendo lo comunicado con el Acuerdo de la Aud.a" AGI, Charcas 268, no. 25, is a 1 f. list of papers sent with the 18.IX.1671 letter. AGI, Charcas 268, no. 26, is a draft of the letter that the Council of the Indies sent to Queen Mariana relating the contents of the 7.XI.1670 cédula and Lemos' response of 18.IX.1671--it is incomplete. AGI, Charcas 268, no. 35, is another draft of the Council's letter; and the final draft is AGI, Charcas 268, no. 37, the Council of the Indies to the Queen, Madrid, 8.VI.1673, 21 fs., "Da q.ta a V Mg.<sup>d</sup> de lo q<sup>e</sup> ha escrito El Virrey del Peru y pareceres q<sup>e</sup> a remitido de difertes minos y comunidades de aquel Rey<sup>o</sup>, proponiendo se quiten las mitas forcadas de Inos Y en part<sup>r</sup> la de Potosi, reduziendolas a q<sup>e</sup> se travagen las minas con Voluntos para evitar los agravios q<sup>e</sup> se les hazen El conss<sup>o</sup> es de parecer q<sup>e</sup> para poder tomar resson en mata tan grave, se sirva V Mg.<sup>d</sup> de mandar formar Vna junta de los Mnos del, y de los Theologos q<sup>e</sup> el Presste nombrare y con lo q<sup>e</sup> se discurriere en Ella sobre este neg<sup>o</sup> en ambas facultades se consste a V Mg.<sup>d</sup> lo q<sup>e</sup> se offreziere." Valera (AGI, Charcas 268, nos. 69A & 69B--see note 58, Chapter II), 24, is mistaken in saying that Lemos died on 6.XII.1671.

34. AGI, Charcas 268, nos. 33, 33A, 33B, 36 (see note 31); and AGI, Charcas 268, nos. 26, 35, and 37 (see note 33).

35. AGI, Charcas 268, nos. 26, 35, and 37 (see note 33).

36. AGI, Charcas 268, no. 41, is the Council of the Indies' decision of 9.X.1673, 1 f.; "Escribase al sr Virrey Conde de Castellar enviandole relon hecha por el Rel<sup>or</sup> D. Andres de Angulo de lo qe en diferentes tiempos se ha escrito sre quitar la mita forzada de el Potosi, diciendole que tiniendolo presente infe lo qe en esta mata se le offreciere qe puede ser de el may<sup>or</sup> serv<sup>o</sup> de S. Mgd y bien de aquellos naturales Y por ahora se suspenda a la Consta qe estaba acordada cerca desto" (rubricado). AGI, Charcas 268, nos. 42 and 43 are two drafts (no. 43 is the final) of the Council's orders for Castellar, Madrid, 9.X.1673, 1 f. each. The Council's end-of-century summary (AGI, Charcas 273, no. 21--see note 91, Chapter II) said the order was dated 9.XII.1673. It was once thought that the Conde de Lemos had obtained a temporary suspension of the Potosí mita:

"Viceroy Luis de Velasco complained in 1597 that the greatest difficulty in the mines was the lack of Indian laborers on account of the constant opposition of ecclesiastics and lawyers. At one time in the second half of the seventeenth century Viceroy Conde de Lemos, a great friend of the Indians who carried on the Las Casas tradition, actually was able to obtain a temporary prohibition of the mita." (Lewis Hanke, The Imperial City of Potosí, 25-26); but the mita was not suspended.

37. See note 29, Chapter II, for the first citation of Campo y de la Rynaga's Memorial. It was addressed to Dr. Diego Hernández de Cardona y Córdova, Marqués de Santillán (Schäfer, I, 363, says the Marqués de Santillán was a member of the Council of the Indies between 17.XI.1671 and 1695), and therefore sent directly to the Council of the Indies for consideration. Zavala, Servicio personal, II, 150, notes the existence of Campo's work, but did not use it.

38. Campo y de la Rynaga, 4-5.

39. Ibid., 9-52.

40. Ibid., 53-92. Actually, each Article is paginated individually; the running pagination used in these notes is that in pencil on the copy in Sucre.

41. Ibid., 93-160.
42. Ibid., 161-221.
43. AGI, Charcas 268, no. 19, the Deputies of the Gremio de azogueros to the crown, Potosí, 8.VIII.1670, 2 fs.
44. Oviedo's breakdown of the Potosí work force is included in AGI, Charcas 267, nos. 56C and 56D (see note 5). The Conde de Lemos' mis-representation is AGI, Charcas 267, no. 57, the Conde de Lemos to the crown, 18.III.1669, 1 f.; a testimonio was included (AGI, Charcas 257, no. 57A, 1 f.) and it merely compares the number of Indians in 1669 to that in 1668. Zavala, Servicio personal, II, 149, follows Guillermo Lohmann Villena's lead and states that the number of mitayos was 3,424 (Guillermo Lohmann Villena, El Conde de Lemos, virrey del Perú (Madrid, 1946)). Ezquerria Abadía, 489-490, note 9bis, discusses the role of production in a government official's reputation.
45. AGI, Charcas 268, no. 28, Corregidor Diego de Ulloa Pereyra to the crown, Potosí, 4.II.1672, 2 fs. AGI, Charcas 268, no. 28A is his testimonio showing an increase in quintos of 12,374 pesos from 1670 to 1671, 1 f. AGI, Charcas 268, no. 29, is a cover sheet for both pieces. AGI, Charcas 268, nos. 31 and 32 (32 is the envelope), Corregidor Diego de Ulloa Pereyra to the crown, Potosí, 20.V.1673, 4 fs. repeated his earlier claims two years later. An interesting sideline to Ulloa's activities in Potosí is the effort of Escrivano Juan de Torres Domínguez to get paid for the extra duties he was assigned under the new magistrate: BNB, CPLA 30, fs. 69V-72v, "Testimonio de las diligencias seguidas ante el virrey de Lima y este cabildo de Potosí por Juan de Torres Domínguez, escribano de él, para que se le reconozcan, de penas de cámara y gastos de justicia, 400 pesos por su asistencia de todos los lunes en la mañana al sitio de Guayna al entero de los indios de mita," Potosí, 1677 (MC 1012; MOM 663); Torres' efforts were apparently insufficient, for he was still looking for recompense in 1686, ANB, M 146, "Diligencias hechas ante la audiencia de Charcas por Juan de Torres Domínguez, escribano del cabildo de Potosí, para que conforme a provisión vicerreal se le asigne un salario por su asistencia de los lunes en el sitio de Huayna al entero de la mita del Cerro," 1686, 28 fs. (the fifth through the sixteenth repeat the information in BNB, CPLA 30, fs. 69v-72v) (MC 1071a; MOM 679).
46. AGI, Charcas 268, no. 30, the Conde de Lemos to

the crown, Lima, 26.IV.1672, 1 f.; "Remite certificacion del aumto que han tenido en Potossi los RS quintos en el año de 1671 mediante el cumplimto que ha dado a los ordenes del Gobierno D. Diego de Ulloa a quien nombro por Correg.or de aquella Villa." The certification is AGI, Charcas 268, no. 30A, 1 f.; it is identical to AGI, Charcas 268, no. 28A (see note 45).

47. AGI, Charcas 268, no. 45A, a cédula of 10.VI.1673 sent to Corregidor Luis Antonio de Oviedo y Herrera by the Queen, on the basis of a favorable letter from the Conde de Lemos, "dandole noticia ... del aumento que tuvieron los quintos R.<sup>s</sup> en el tpo que sirvio aquel offiz.<sup>o</sup> D. Diego de Ulloa y encargandole cuyde de que tambien le tenga en el suyo," 1 f.

48. AGI, Charcas 268, no. 38, the Audiencia de Lima to the crown, Lima, 17.VI.1673, 1 f.; "Remite la carta que tubo del correg.or de Potossi D. Luis Antonio de Obiedo en que dio cuenta del estado de aquellas minas, con testim.<sup>o</sup> de la Vissita g.l q.<sup>e</sup> hico del cerro e ingenios." The copy of the letter is AGI, Charcas 268, no. 38A, "Copia de Carta de D luis Ant.<sup>o</sup> de obiedo y Herrera Correg.or de Potosi," 26.V.1673, 3 fs.; the statistical results of his visita are AGI, Charcas 268, no. 38B, 22.IV.1673, 2 fs. Oviedo's return to office is noted, as well, in the Audiencia de Lima's "Relación de la audiencia de Lima a su sucesor el Conde de Castellar," 1.VIII.1674, Los virreyes (ed. by Hanke and Rodríguez), Péru V (no. 284), 19-20 (from Biblioteca Nacional, Madrid, Ms. 3122, fs. 62-86v). See note 16 for Oviedo's personal contacts in the Council of the Indies, which probably helped him to regain his position as Corregidor de Potosí.

49. See note 33 for the Council's letter to the Queen, AGI, Charcas 268, no. 35.

50. AGI, Charcas 268, nos. 38, 38A, and 38B (see note 48); and AGI, Charcas 268, no. 40, Corregidor Luis Antonio de Oviedo y Herrera to the crown, Potosí, 6.IX.1673, 2 fs.; AGI, Charcas 268, no. 44, Corregidor Oviedo y Herrera to the crown, Potosí, 22.XI.1673, 2 fs., "Remite testim.<sup>o</sup> por donde consta el benefi.<sup>o</sup> que hallo en la visita Gen.<sup>l</sup> que hico de Ingenios y labores, Y dice a sido tanto el aumento en 7 meses al estado en que hallo el mineral que havia vuelto a ygualar al que tenia quando el Conde de lemos le despojo de aquel offi.<sup>o</sup>." The testimonio mentioned in AGI, Charcas 268, no. 44, is no. 44A (2 fs.).

51. AGI, Charcas 268, nos. 31 and 32 (see note 45). A

lengthier discussion of Ulloa's activities as Corregidor is AGI, Charcas 268, no. 32A, a series of orders from his tenure in office and testimonios underlining his diligence, 58 fs. The Condesa de Lemos' defense of her husband can be found in AGI, Charcas 268, nos. 34 and 34A: the Condesa de Lemos to the crown, Lima, 2.V.1673, 1 f.; and a financial statement substantiating her claim that quintos in 1672 were higher than they had been in 1671, 1 f., respectively.

52. Sources for Table 3; "Mita Service According to Corregidor Oviedo":

- a. AGI, Charcas 267, nos. 56C & 56D (see note 5).
- b. AGI, Charcas 268, no. 58B, 2 fs.; a testimonio of Oviedo's activities as Corregidor that he sent to the crown with AGI, Charcas 268, no. 58, Corregidor Obiedo to the crown, 25.III.1678, 2 fs.
- c. AGI, Charcas 267, nos. 58 & 58A (see note 16).
- d. AGI, Charcas 268, no. 21A (see note 7).
- e. AGI, Charcas 268, no. 38A (see note 48).
- f. AGI, Charcas 268, no. 44 (see note 50).

53. For evidence that mingas were hired with service in silver, AGI, Charcas 268, no. 50, Francisco Antonio Manzolo to the Conde de Medellín, Madrid, 22.IV.1676, 2 fs. Manzolo says that Oviedo had told him, while he was visiting Potosí, that the azogueros used the money they received in the mita to hire substitutes, at least part of the time. He said that the number of Indians working in the mines and mills was larger than the number in the repartimiento, and that some azogueros hired extra help if the ore they refined was of sufficient quality. The Conde de Medellín was President of the Council of the Indies from 1671 to 1679 (Schäfer, I, 352).

54. Audiencia de Lima, "Relación" (1674) (see note 48), 19-20. Zavala, Servicio personal, II, 151, discusses this section of the Audiencia's account as well.

55. The crown's response to Castellar's report includes his observations: AGI, Charcas 268, no. 51, "Copia de despacho de 16 de Novre de 1676 al Virrey del Peru en resp<sup>ta</sup> de lo que escribió s.<sup>e</sup> el estado en que se hallava el cerro de Potosi y repartim<sup>to</sup> Gen<sup>l</sup> de los In.<sup>os</sup> de mita del," 1 f. See, also, the Council's end-of-the-century summary (AGI, Charcas 273, no. 21--see note 91, Chapter II).

56. AGI, Charcas 268, no. 47, Corregidor Oviedo y Herrera to the crown, Potosí, 1.XI.1674, 2 fs. A financial



statement for 1674 is included with the letter (AGI, Charcas 268, no. 47A, 1 f.).

57. AGI, Charcas 268, no. 52, President Bartolomé González de Poveda to the crown, 22.II.1667, 1 f., "Da cuenta de el estado en q<sup>e</sup> se halla el cerro y mita de Potossi y pide su fomento." Corregidor Oviedo's various descriptions of the work force, in Table 3, and Manzolo's letter (see note 53), would seem to corroborate the President's statement about the azoqueros.

58. AGI, Charcas 268, no. 53, Melchor Arcobispo de La Plata to the crown, 28.II.1667, 3 fs. Part of Liñán's letter is reproduced as AGI, Charcas 268, no. 54, "Copia de Capitulo de carta que el D.<sup>or</sup> D. Melchor de Liñan siendo Arcobispo de los charcas escrivio al s.<sup>r</sup> Conde de Medellin en 28 de febr.<sup>o</sup> de 1677 tocante a los Alferazgos de los Indios, y mita de Potosi," 3 fs.

59. For the July 8 order, AGI, Charcas 268, no. 55, President González de Poveda to the crown, 30.I.1678, 1 f., "Avisa de el R<sup>o</sup> de la Cedula en q<sup>e</sup> se manda aumentar La mita de Potossi a mas pueblos." A copy of his reply to that order is AGI, Charcas 268, no. 60A, President González de Poveda to the crown, La Plata, 28.IV.1678, 17 fs., "Informe s.<sup>e</sup> lo que se puede prebenir para La ampliacion de la Mita de Potosi." For the November 16 directive, see AGI, Charcas 268, no. 51 (see note 56). For Castellar's treatment of both, AGI, Charcas 268, no. 57, the Conde de Castellar to the crown, Lima, 22.II.1678, 3 fs., "Responde a tres Zlas sobre la mita de Potosi dize lo que a obrado y estado de la materia y que en otra ocasion dara cuenta de lo que se ejecutare con conferencia del R<sup>l</sup> Acuerdo." The third order was that of 12.IX.1676--I do not know what it concerned--and all three directives came to him via Buenos Aires. Valera (AGI, Charcas 268, nos. 69A & 69B--see note 58, Chapter II), 24-25, discusses the two cédulas of 8.VII and 16.XI.1676; as does Holmes, 53 and 55; and the Council of the Indies' end-of-the-century summary (AGI, Charcas 273, no. 21--see note 91, Chapter II). Castillo (AGI, Charcas 270, no. 33C--see note 30, Chapter II), 23-24v, provides a transcription of the July 8 order.

60. AGI, Charcas 268, no. 56, the Conde de Castellar to the crown, Lima, 1.II.1678, 2 fs. The report cited was that of Alcalde mayor Thomás Martín de Ubidía, in a letter to the crown of 1.XI.1674; AGI, Charcas 268, no. 46, 2 fs.

61. AGI, Charcas 268, no. 57 (see note 59).

62. AGI, Charcas 268, no. 60A (see note 59). He noted that he had submitted that reply in AGI, Charcas 268, no. 60, President González de Poveda to the crown, La Plata, 1.VI.1678, 1 f. See, also, Valera (AGI, Charcas 268, nos. 69A & 69B--see note 58, Chapter II), 26.

63. AGI, Charcas 268, no. 61, Archbishop-Viceroy Liñán to the crown, Callao, 24.VIII.1678, 1 f., "El Arcobpo Virrey del Peru Avisa a VM de lo tocante a la Mita de Potossi."

64. Valera (AGI, Charcas 268, nos. 69A & 69B) is described in note 58, Chapter II. Corregidor Enríquez' response is AGI, Charcas 268, no. 68A, "Ynforme del Corregidor de Potosi, hecho al Virrey del Peru, sobre el repartimiento de los Yndios a las labores de Minas" (Pedro Luis Enríquez to the Viceroy, 2.VI.1678), 12 fs. For Oviedo y Herrera's remarks, AGI, Charcas 268, no. 58, Luis Antonio de Oviedo to the crown, 25.III.1678, 2 fs. He acknowledged receipt of the cédulas in AGI, Charcas 268, no. 58A, Luis Antonio de Oviedo y Herrera to Francisco Fernández de Madrigal, Potosí, 25.III.1678, 1 f. A dissenting opinion was that of Contador Sebastián de Collado, AGI, Charcas 268, no. 59, 1.V.1678, 1 f.; he argued that crown revenue would suffer if the mita was extended to more provinces, and suggested that yanaconas and forasteros in the sixteen provinces--plus 20,000 Indians living in Potosí--be included instead, with one-seventh of the total to serve in the mita each year. Collado's arguments are those which the Conde de Castellar relayed to the crown on 22.II.1678 (see note 59) so I would assume that the Viceroy was heavily influenced by the Contador's counsel.

65. AGI, Charcas 266, no. 14A, the crown to Archbishop-Viceroy Liñán y Cisneros, 13.IX.1678, 2 fs., "Al Virrey del Peru remitiendole copia de los ynformes y pareceres que ultimam.te se an dado cerca de Potosi para que pida los ynformes q.e se le ordena y con vista de todos informe de suerte que se pueda tomar resolucion en esta materia." The papers which were to be sent to Liñán are discussed by the Council of the Indies' Fiscal in AGI, Charcas 268, no. 66, 1 f.

66. AGI, Charcas 270, no. 3, Archbishop-Viceroy Liñán to the crown, 7.VIII.1681, 2 fs., "El Arzobispo Virrey del Peru Responde a la R.<sup>1</sup> Cedula de 13 de sep.<sup>e</sup> de 678 sobre los informes que se piden para resolver el punto de la mita de Potosi y dice el estado en que tenia la materia en virtud del que se le mando por la de 8 de jullio de 676 de

q.<sup>1</sup> dio cuenta en carta de 21 de Abril de 680." Liñán says that he articulated the status of the mita in his letter of 21.IV.1680, and that it was accompanied by the Valera paper. The Council of the Indies had hesitated on the extension of mita obligation to more provinces because of the Archbishop's opposition to Lemos' point of view. The 21.IV.1680 letter also announces the suspension of activities with regard to the July 8 order until the opinions of those named in the 13.IX.1678 order can be received and studied. The Archbishop-Viceroy also explains his actions in the "Relación que hizo de su gobierno Don Melchor de Liñán y Cisneros a su sucesor, el Duque de la Palata," 8.XII.1681, Los virreyes (ed. by Hanke and Rodríguez), Perú V (no. 284), 224-225 (from Biblioteca Nacional, Madrid, Ms. 3082). See, also, Zavala, Servicio personal, II, 174-175. See note 69, below, for more.

67. AGI, Charcas 268, no. 67, President González de Poveda to the crown, 11.IV.1679, 2 fs.

68. AGI, Charcas 268, no. 68, the Gremio de azogueros to the crown, Potosí, 1.V.1679, 2 fs.; and AGI, Charcas 268, no. 70A, the Gremio de azogueros to the crown, Potosí, 21.XI.1679, 2 fs. (mis-dated "28.XI.1679" on the envelope).

69. AGI, Charcas 268, no. 69, the Archbishop-Viceroy Liñán y Cisneros to the crown, 22.IV.1680, 3 fs., "Da cuenta del cuidado que a aplicado al remedio de la diminucion de Indios que padece la mita de Potosi de que remite Testimonio y el papel que a despuesto el D.<sup>OR</sup> DN franco de Valera su Asesor Gen.<sup>1</sup> sobre se estienda a mas Provias de las 16 señaladas." This is, most likely, the letter of April, 1680 Liñán refers to in AGI, Charcas 270, no. 3 (see note 66). The Council of the Indies' end-of-the-century summary (AGI, Charcas 273, no. 21--see note 91, Chapter II) says the issue of extension went to the Fiscal and Protector general, who opposed the idea. The Viceroy and Acuerdo decided, at that point, the summary says, to enforce Lemos' 1669 reform directives, but suspended all action when news of Palata's impending arrival reached Lima. The crown was unhappy about the delay, according to its letter to the Duque de la Palata of 28.V.1681; see Castillo (AGI, Charcas 270, no. 33C--see note 30, Chapter II), 25-32 for a transcription of that letter.

70. AGI, Charcas 270, no. 7A, "Copia de Cedula Gen.<sup>1</sup> que se despacho en 21 de Abril de 1679 a todos los Arcobispos y obpos de las Indias para que ymbiasen relación de las ciu,<sup>des</sup> Villas y Poblaciones que huviese en su diocesis," 1 f. The order reads, in its entirety:

"El Rey. Muy R., Inxpto P.<sup>e</sup> Arcobispo de la Iglesia metropolitana de la Ciu,<sup>d</sup> de los Reyes en las Provas del Peru mi Cons.<sup>o</sup> Virrey Gou,<sup>or</sup> y Cap,<sup>n</sup> de ellas en ynterim; por lo que combiene a mi seruicio, y al buen Gou,<sup>o</sup> de esas Prou,<sup>as</sup> que en mi Cons.<sup>o</sup> de las In,<sup>as</sup> aya noticia yndividual de las Ciu,<sup>des</sup> Villas y Poblaciones que huviere en el distrito de cada obispado, y la vecindad que tuviere cada una asi de espanoles como de In,<sup>os</sup> os ruego y encarguo embiese relacion de ello con toda distincion y claridad en la primera ocasion que se ofrezca; fha en Buen Retiro a Veinte y uno de Abril de mil y seiscientos y setenta y nueve años=Yo el Rey=Por m.<sup>do</sup> del Rey nro. s<sup>r</sup> D<sup>fr</sup>.co fernandez de Madrigal Señalada del Consejo="

I have seen two of the responses, by Bishops in America, to the order that they report on their districts: AGI, Charcas 270, no. 7, the Bishop of Asunción to the crown, 31.III.1682, 1 f., "En cumplimto de la orden que se le dio refiere las poblaciones que ay en aquella Prova asi de Espanoles como de Indios que todos componen 388666 almas"; AGI, Charcas 270, no. 11, the Bishop of Tucumán to the crown, 6.VI.1682, 3 fs., "Refiere las ciudades Villas y Pueblos que ay en aquel obispado, el estado que se halla cada vna y numero de havitadores que puedan tomar armas." President González de Poveda says that he believes such a report for Charcas cannot be successfully completed in AGI, Charcas 270, no. 1, President González de Poveda to the crown, La Plata, 20.VI.1681, 1 f.; but I have seen nothing more for the ecclesiastical census in Peru.

71. AGI, Charcas 268, no. 5 (see note 8); AGI, Charcas 268, no. 14 (see note 20); and AGI, Charcas 268, no. 15 (see note 76, Chapter II).

72. AGI, Charcas 267, no. 53, "Relación de lo que contiene el memorial Inlusso de D. Gabriel fernandez Guarache y Copia de z.<sup>la</sup> q.<sup>e</sup> se m.<sup>de</sup> juntar con el," 2 fs. There is no date on the relación, but on AGI, Charcas 267, no. 53A, Fernández Guarache's petition, 4 fs., is the note "En M<sup>d</sup> a 19 de Junio de 1668."

73. The route taken by the cacique's petition is explained in AGI, Charcas 267, no. 53 (see note 72), save for the date that it was sent back to Peru; that is taken from the note on AGI, Charcas 267, no. 53A (see note 72).

74. AGI, Charcas 267, no. 59A (see note 16) includes a letter "del Señor Virrey escrita sobre varias materias de la mita, y particularmente en lo tocante al Cap.<sup>n</sup> Gen.<sup>1</sup> de Pacajes." No. 59A is merely an index, so I do not know

what letter the citation refers to. Fernández Guarache's memorial is AGI, Charcas 267, no. 53A (see note 72) and Lemos' discourse is AGI, Charcas 268, no. 15 (see note 76, Chapter II). In any event, it seems clear that the Conde de Lemos was aware of the cacique's petition.

75. AGI, Charcas 268, no. 64, Juan Carlos Inga de Valladares to "Serenissimo Señor," Lima, sin fecha, 3 fs.; the letter was acted upon in the Council of the Indies on 29.VIII.1680; the envelope reads "Participando lo q.<sup>e</sup> ha llegado a entender en contra de lo q.<sup>e</sup> el Governador y casique principal de Jesus de Macha jurisdiccion de Berenquelilla ha escrito al consejo de Yndias, sobre el Padron gen.<sup>l</sup> de los naturales, y reduccion de ellos a sus Pueblos para la mita de Potosi, proponiendo grandes servicios con deshonor de los Pobres Indios sobre q.<sup>e</sup> incluye un Processo."

76. BNP, B575, "Paucarcolla. Autos sobre el despacho de la mita de Potosí e información de los caciques para su grand disipación. Villa de la Concepción, Octubre 24 de 1669. 7 ff. útiles y 1 de carátula."

77. ANB, C 1899a, "Carta de don Antonio Ordóñez del Aguila, corregidor de esta provincia, a la audiencia de Charcas: Que tiene preso a don Gerónimo Cajiamarca, cacique governador del pueblo de Macari en esta provincia por diversos excesos ... Entre los excesos la falta de cumplimiento en el entero de la mita de dicho pueblo para Potosí," Lampa, 8.IV.1673, 2 fs. (MC 972; MOM 655).

78. BNP, B585, "Despacho de la mita de Potosí. Puno, Noviembre de 1673. 5 ff. Notación de carátula al margen de la primera hoja."

79. ANB, M 125, no. 21, "Los indios mitayos del cerro de Potosí contra Joseph Fernández de Valencia, capitán mayor que fue de dicha mita, sobre los gravísimos excesos que cometió en el uso de su oficio," Potosí, 19.II.1677 to 29.VII.1679, 302 fs. (MC 1028; MOM 670). An adequate presentation of such a long and involved case as that between the capitanes enteradores and Capitán mayor de la mita is impossible in the space provided by the present study. This legal battle will be the subject of a future work, perhaps in conjunction with others involving caciques and government officials.

80. John Rowe mentions the pattern of bringing presents to the Capitán mayor in his "The Incas under Spanish Colonial Institutions," 174. He bases his comments on

Cañete y Domínguez, 108, and Vicente Mora Chimo Capac, "Manifiesto de los agravios, bexaciones, y molestias, que padecen los Indios del Reyno del Peru" (Madrid, 1732), 17. Cañete y Domínguez places the practice in a seventeenth century context, but does not date it precisely. I have not seen the 1732 "Manifiesto" and so cannot comment on its contents.

81. ANB, M 125, no. 21 (see note 79).

82. Ibid.

83. ANB, M 125, no. 20, "Don Bartolomé González, indio, capitán general enterador de la mita de los pueblos de Toropalca, Yura, Potobamba y Chaqui, provincia de Porco, sobre que se le permite traer daga y espada en el desempeño de su oficio en consideración a los excesos a que se encuentra expuesto," Porco, 19.VII.1679, 13 fs. (MC 1027; MOM 669).

84. ANB, M 125, no. 19, "Capítulos puestos por los indios del pueblo de Asillo, provincia de Asángaro, contra el maestro de campo don Francisco de Castro, corregidor de ella, por el mal uso de su oficio, y en particular por la distracción de indios de mita en provecho suyo," Asángaro, 6.III.1674, 60 fs. (MC 984; MOM 658).

85. Ibid.

86. For another example of the corregidor-Indian struggle, see ANB, EC 1677, no. 19, "Residencia que por comisión del marqués de Castellar, virrey del Perú, tomó don Francisco Bomonte y Robledo al maestro de campo don Alonso de Ortega y Robles, caballero de Santiago, corregidor que fue de la provincia de Sicasica, difunto, y a sus tenientes y ministros, 1677, 287 fs. (MC 1012a; MOM 664). Two of the questions asked of the Indians concerned the improper use of their labor and forced sales of merchandise. Nicolás Sanchez-Albornoz says that corregidores extracted service and money from the Indians under the "care" (Sánchez-Albornoz, 97):

"Malversación aparte, los entuertos mediante los cuales los corregidores y sus tenientes se enriquecían a expensas de los indios eran principalmente cuatro: repartimientos, trajines, confiscación de tierras y alquiler de peones. De ellos, el más común era el primero. Los detalles, mencionados al pasar, puesto que las preguntas no concernían este punto, no modifican cuanto se ha dicho de este abuso tantas veces."

## C H A P T E R VII

1680 TO 1700

A century of evolution in the de facto mita, and of the Hapsburg administration's continual attempts to keep pace with it, came to a head during the last two decades of the seventeenth century. The long-awaited and oft-postponed general census and repartimiento de la mita were finally completed during the 1680s under the direction of the Viceroy Duque de la Palata. Long-believed to be the solution to Potosí's declining fortunes, and the controversies swirling about the mita, the new repartimiento only served to enflame the passions of the azogueros and the provincial interests alike.

The Viceroy Conde de la Monclova responded to the hue and cry over Palata's program in 1692, with a repartimiento of his own. His distribution of mitayos won the approval of the Council of the Indies, but it did not end the controversy over the mita. Indeed, despite an outward appearance of government effectiveness during these twenty years, the mita continued to elude the viceroys' attempts to control it.

The Viceroy Duque de la Palata

When the Duque de la Palata was appointed Viceroy of Peru in 1680, Charles II told him to concentrate his efforts on the revitalization of the Potosí mita.<sup>1</sup> An October 25, 1680 cédula outlined the procedure that the Viceroy was to follow: after consultations with Liñán and González de Poveda, Palata was to design and then implement a comprehensive program for the restoration of the faltering mita deliveries.<sup>2</sup> The crown was frustrated by Castellar and Liñán's failure to carry out its earlier directives. Palata was a trusted royal advisor who had served on the junta that governed the Empire during the King's minority, and Charles was confident that he would comply with his instructions.<sup>3</sup>

Palata acknowledged the receipt of his orders and supporting materials from Chiclana on December 15, 1680.<sup>4</sup> Eleven months later, on November 7, 1681, he assumed office in Lima. Compliance with his orders was to require every one of his eight years as Viceroy. It had been nearly fifty years since the last repartimiento, and the chasm between the Toledan and de facto mitas was immense. Palata's task was not to reform the mita, therefore, but to re-establish it. In many respects he would have to serve as another Francisco de Toledo.

The Duque spent the first year of his viceroyalty



consulting with experienced officials and the Real Acuerdo about the mita. Not only did he request information from Liñán and González de Poveda, but also from Corregidor Enríquez, Contador Sebastián de Collado and the Archbishop of Charcas, Christóval de Castilla y Zamora. These men held varying opinions about the propriety of the mita and the reforms that were required to reinvigorate it.<sup>5</sup>

Liñán's defense of the mita in 1677--that it kept otherwise idle Indians busy--had been an important counterbalance to the Conde de Lemos' call for the abolition of the system. The Archbishop explained his performance as Viceroy in his relación, on December 8, 1681.<sup>6</sup> Palata asked him for any additional comments in June of 1682, and although he was about to leave on a visita of his archbishopric, Liñán set down a few impressions. He wrote that the question of the mita's justness was now moot, for the crown had repeatedly issued orders for its implementation and continuation. The focus of Palata's attention, he said, should be on the restoration of Potosí, and the key to that was a census. Liñán suggested that Enríquez, González de Poveda and the Bishop of Arequipa, Antonio de León, be named to conduct an enumeration in the sixteen traditionally obligated provinces. Their salaries could be paid by fines on the guilty corregidores and by collections among the azogeros.<sup>7</sup>

Liñán disagreed with those who thought that the fourteen

other provinces should be included in the census and the mita. He shared their belief that the sixteen provinces had been depopulated by Indian migration into the exempted provinces, but he thought that the inclusion of the latter would only drive the Indians further away, into unconquered regions. The Archbishop argued that the inclusion of the forasteros and the yanaconas who were residents of the sixteen provinces would probably suffice, given the reduced number of viable mills at Potosí, and he suggested that stiff penalties be imposed to prevent future outward migration. Only if the total population of the sixteen provinces was insufficient, he added, would he condone the inclusion of two or three more provinces under the mita.<sup>8</sup>

The Archbishop of Charcas agreed with Liñán that Potosí needed to be preserved, for the crown had a substantial investment in the large population, garrison, mint and royal treasury there. Like his predecessor, he said that it was not realistic to expect that silver production would ever return to sixteenth century levels. But Castilla y Zamora differed with Liñán on how best to provide the 2,000 Indian laborers that he believed were required. Rather than devise a means to include the fugitives who were living in the fourteen provinces, he said, those Indians who were found guilty of a civil offense--and who were currently punished with the lash or execution--should be sent to Potosí for four-, six- or

ten-year terms. These sentences would not constitute the enslavement of the Indians, but would be equivalent to the assignment of Spanish criminals to the galleys. The Indians and the azogueros alike would benefit, he argued, for the azogueros would not have to pay their workers and the Indians would be freed from mita service forever. The government stood to benefit as well, the Archbishop noted, because the problems that were caused by the Indians traveling to and from Potosí would be eliminated, as would be the criticism heaped upon Spain by other nations because of the mita. The Indians might later be required to pay two pesos per year apiece, however, should the abolition of the mita cause a lowering of the royal quintos.<sup>9</sup>

If the Viceroy opted to maintain the mita, Castilla y Zamora felt that the fourteen exempted provinces, the Indians who lived at Potosí, the forasteros and the yanaconas should all be included, to spread the obligation as thinly as possible. The prerequisite census, he argued, could be conducted by a committee within each of the provinces, composed of the corregidor, the local priests and the caciques.<sup>10</sup>

Further support for the incorporation of the forasteros in the mita on an equal footing with the originarios came from Contador Sebastián de Collado. He noted that the current system of secular and ecclesiastical revenue collection pitted the priests against the government's

tribute collection efforts and the recruitment of mitayos. The priests in the provinces received one peso per year for every forastero that they instructed, while their income for the originarios was not prorated. They did their best, therefore, to minimize the number of originarios in their midst, while welcoming forasteros with open arms. The problem was particularly acute at Potosí, he said, where 20,000 Indians basked in their exemption from the mita. Collado suggested that the Indians be deemed "natives" wherever they were found, and that one-seventh of them be sent to Potosí to serve in the mita.<sup>11</sup>

Corregidor Pedro Luis Enríquez provided Palata with a point-by-point defense of the mita against the claims that were made by the Conde de Lemos in his July 4, 1670 discourse. Enríquez argued that Lemos had lacked the necessary experience in mining affairs, and in the administration of the Indians, to draw the correct conclusions from the caciques' complaints about their treatment by the azogueros. Rigorous treatment of the Indians was required, the Corregidor maintained, because their nature was such that they obeyed only those whom they feared. The complaints that were made by the caciques, furthermore, were not caused by their mistreatment at Potosí, but by their desire to reserve the Indians for use in their own economic enterprises.<sup>12</sup>

Enrriquez also defended the mita against the charge that it had depopulated the provinces subject to it. His investigation of baptismal and death records, which he had obtained from the priests in Potosí, had shown that men died at the same rate as women--both at moderate levels--and that the number of children born in the villa was well over twice the number of adults who died. Because the women did not work in the mita, the equal death rates showed that the mitayos were not killed in the mines. The high birth rate discredited the claim that procreation was hurt by mita service.<sup>13</sup>

The Corregidor said that the reports accusing the azogueros of involvement with "pocket Indians" and other abuses were untrue. His latest visita had determined that there were 1,541 mitayos working in the mills and the mines, while the minga work force totaled 1,713. The high number of mingas, he concluded, proved that mita service in silver was being converted into substitute laborers. Enrriquez was indignant that officials in Lima could consider their counterparts at Potosí to be so inept that they would permit the kinds of horrible treatment that Lemos had described. Finally, he reminded Palata that Toledo had made a pact with the original azogueros, in which he had promised that mitayos would be sent to Potosí in perpetuity. The crown owed it to the azogueros, therefore, to continue the mita. It was also in the royal interest to

do so, for Potosí supported most of the other economic enterprises in Upper Peru, in one way or another.<sup>14</sup> Thus, the Corregidor had recounted the potosino position in support of the mita, in its entirety.

President González de Poveda had already responded to the 1678 cédula when the 1680 order arrived, and he felt no compulsion to cover old ground again. He and Palata exchanged correspondence throughout 1682, however, on the mechanics of a census and some possible changes in the mita's design. González de Poveda's arguments in favor of the use of the corregidores to conduct the census sufficiently persuaded the Viceroy that the latter asked him to draw up the guidelines for a corregidor-conducted enumeration.<sup>15</sup>

Palata also asked the President to comment on the idea that the mitayos be provided with a mill and a mine of their own at Potosí. The Viceroy understood that the voluntary labor force of the pre- and early-post-Toledo periods had been drawn by the profitability of mining for the Indians themselves. He was searching for a way to restore the economic incentive for the Indians that had evaporated by the end of the sixteenth century. Income from the mitayos' mine and mill would be used, according to the plan, to pay their tribute, rezagos de mita, service in silver, and any other debts that were incurred by the Indians or by their capitanes enteradores.<sup>16</sup>

On balance González de Poveda was attracted to the concept of a mitayos' mining operation, but he was hesitant because of the probable difficulties with its realization. He noted that the Indians had always had the legal right to discover and work their own mines, but that they had not by choice. There would be problems, moreover, with obtaining a mine in the first place, the day-to-day administration of the mill (i.e., finding someone to serve as the azoguero) and robberies of ore from the other mines and mills for the mitayos' mill. The capitanes enteradores stood to benefit the most from the proposal, he noted, and they would try to assign their Indians to their mill and mine rather than to those of the azogueros. In deference to the Viceroy, the President said that he would not object to suggesting the idea to the capitanes, to see whether they wanted to go forward with it.<sup>17</sup>

The mitayos' mining operation was never founded, for reasons that do not emerge from the documentation. Palata and González de Poveda's discussion of the possibility, however, points to an important theme in the Viceroy's approach: his attempt to return to the balance between the mitayos' work and their profits that was characteristic of the boom years of the 1570s. Indeed, as he proceeded with his investigation, and later with the reforms that he considered necessary, Palata showed more signs that he was trying to recapture the elusive magic of the Toledan

production formula. For example, the Viceroy had high hopes for a new method of silver refining that was both cheaper and quicker than the current process.<sup>18</sup>

Like Toledo, Palata drew upon the advice of those who were experienced in Indian administration and mining. Of all the written opinions, only that of Archbishop Castilla y Zamora suggested that the mita should be abolished. Everyone else agreed that it should continue, with the originarios and the forasteros to be included on an equal basis. The only remaining areas of disagreement were the number of provinces to be included and whom to name to conduct the prerequisite census.

While Palata and the Real Acuerdo were considering the logistics of a census and a new repartimiento, the Viceroy received another cédula from Charles II. The May 28, 1681 edict not only reinforced the October 25, 1680 directive, it made the decisions that had originally been left to the discretion of the Viceroy. The crown had been strongly moved by a printed memorial from the Gremio de azogueros warning that Potosí would soon collapse without the prompt resolution of the long-outstanding issues of the census and the repartimiento. The crown told Palata to follow González de Poveda's 1676 plan for a corregidor-conducted census in all thirty of the provinces, and to add any provinces that were needed to gain an effective mita ordinaria of 4,220 Indians.<sup>19</sup>



The 1681 cédula resolved any doubts as to whether the crown wanted the mita to continue, how many provinces to include in the census and whom should conduct it. It also showed the crown's displeasure that the Indians were able to avoid the mita and their tribute obligations by moving from one province to another. This royal disapproval lent support to the incorporation of the forasteros in the coming repartimiento, and it reinforced the determination to conduct the census in all thirty of the provinces. The Real Acuerdo voted, accordingly, to conduct the census on June 21, 1682. It then turned its attention to problems that could be anticipated with the inclusion of the forasteros, and to finding the means to prevent Indian migration from undercutting the mita in the future.<sup>20</sup>

The Viceroy reported to the crown about his plans for the census and the new repartimiento on December 15, 1682. He told the Council of the Indies that the fourteen theretofore exempted, as well as the sixteen obligated, provinces would indeed be included in the census. Then, if the number of Indians in the latter was insufficient to support the mita, he could add new areas without having to conduct a second population tally. The count in the fourteen provinces would also permit, he said, the final resolution of the question whether the Indians had actually migrated from the sixteen provinces to the fourteen or not.<sup>21</sup>

Palata was concerned, however, about the use of the corregidores to conduct the census. González de Poveda and the 1681 cédula had both said that the use of the corregidores would allow the enumeration to be completed quickly and at a minimal cost, but they were interested parties who might try to conceal the number of Indians in their provinces, and thus they were untrustworthy. The question was one of prime importance, Palata argued, for should the census not be well done, the impact on the royal treasury could be disastrous.<sup>22</sup>

Sometime after his December 15, 1682 letter, if not before, the Viceroy decided that there really was no alternative but to use the corregidores if the census and the repartimiento were to be completed before he left office. In anticipation of the problems inherent in a corregidor-conducted census, Palata issued orders on April 7, 1683, for the Bishops and Prelates to instruct their priests to report on the Indians who were under their care. He explained to the churchmen that he needed to have a clear understanding of Peruvian demographics if he were to adjust the Indians' tribute and mita obligations so that they would be exacted more fairly. To ensure that their accounts would be factual, Palata cautioned, the priests were not to be told why they were reporting on their Indian charges.<sup>23</sup>

An ecclesiastical census had been proposed by Juan de

Ibarra and the Conde de Lemos, and one was undertaken by the Archbishop-Viceroy. Another had been halted in Charcas after González de Poveda said that it would probably not be successful.<sup>24</sup> The Duque de la Palata now resurrected the idea to serve as a check on the reports that he would soon receive from the corregidores.<sup>25</sup>

Later, when the corregidor-conducted census was about to begin, Palata published a circular for the priests. He told them not to impede the government census for two reasons: a) so that those who were present in the pueblos would not have to carry the entire weight of obligations that were meant for many more; and b) so that those who were hidden or absent might pay "to Caesar that which is Caesar's." The Viceroy ordered the priests to provide the corregidores with any baptismal, confession or marriage records that might help them to comply with their instructions.<sup>26</sup>

Palata's reservations about the corregidores led him to build other safeguards into the general census as well. He announced that grave penalties would be applied to those who failed to carry out their orders or impeded the census by hiding Indians: Indian officials would not only lose their posts, they would become mitayos; Spaniards would forfeit their offices, encomiendas and any other privileges. Those who aided the census, by uncovering Indians who were not included on the corregidores' lists,

would be rewarded: Indians would be freed from all tribute and mita obligations, and named to cacicazgos; Spaniards would receive the services of one-seventh of the Indians.<sup>27</sup>

Printed instructions were sent to the corregidores in July of 1683, and the census was scheduled to begin on October 1, in all of the provinces at once. Originally it was to be completed in one year, later changed to two, after which the results were to be sent to Lima. Changes in mita quotas or tribute levels were not to be initiated locally, but were to await new orders from the Viceroy. All eighty-three of the provinces in Peru were now included in the census, for Palata had decided that an accurate demographic profile of the realm would make all of the government's programs more effective.<sup>28</sup>

The instructions that were sent to the corregidores were detailed and explicit. They were to draw up a series of lists based on sex, age, status and other factors. A sample entry was provided for their use as a model. The uniformity of response was necessary, the Viceroy said, so that the various individual reports that were submitted by the corregidores might be compiled into a larger volume by officials in Lima. The forasteros were permitted six months to decide whether they were going to return home or stay where they were resident. Those who did return to their pueblos were to receive lands if their own had been sold during their absence.<sup>29</sup>

Palata reported these developments to the Council of the Indies on August 21, 1683. He was confident that the general census would provide a good base upon which to determine the new repartimiento and the Indians' tribute obligations. The Council's Fiscal endorsed the Viceroy's plan with one qualification: that fiscales should be sent to monitor the activities of the corregidores, as had been done in New Spain. He concurred with Liñán's contention that the justness of the mita was no longer in question, because Liñán, González de Poveda and Enríquez had all argued that the temporal benefits of the mita for the Indians outweighed the corporal rigors that were characteristic of the system.<sup>30</sup>

On June 10, 1685, Palata wrote to Madrid with the news that the census was nearly completed; only a few valley regions and the area around Quito remained. He said that he had named two contadores, Joseph de Villegas and Pedro Antonio de Castillo, to compile the data that was being sent to Lima by the provincial corregidores. There had been a few problems, as some of the corregidores had not followed their instructions, but the Viceroy was certain that any and all difficulties would be overcome and that the census would be finished soon.<sup>31</sup>

Villegas reported to the crown that he had been assigned the responsibility for the thirty-three provinces of Upper Peru, which included the sixteen that were

subject to the mita and seventeen others that were not. The initial results, he said, suggested that there had been an overall increase in the number of Indians since Toledo's day. Disease had been less prevalent in Upper Peru than elsewhere in the realm, and Villegas believed that this had been the reason for the increase. Some confusion had resulted from the fact that many of the provinces had not been inspected since the 1573 census, and one hundred years had changed the demographic landscape considerably. Some pueblos had been founded, while others had disappeared. But the greatest problems had been caused by the corregidores who refused to follow their orders and prepare the lists that Palata had required. The adjustment of their tallies was delaying the completion of the total census.<sup>32</sup>

The Contador noted that an accurate profile of the Indian population was needed to protect the Indians from the caciques, and to protect the caciques from the Spanish; and that the success of the repartimiento hinged on the successful execution of the census. Accuracy was also important because such an enumeration would probably not be conducted again for some time to come.<sup>33</sup>

Ironically, the same day that Palata wrote to the crown--June 10, 1685--Charles II signed a cédula that withheld royal approval from the Viceroy's actions.<sup>34</sup> The Council of the Indies had consented to the execution of the census, but it said that it had reservations about the

means that he was employing. Since the use of the corregidores had been provided for by the 1681 cédula, this was not the true reason for the Council's reticence. Nine viceroys had feared the effects of such a census, it noted, because if few Indians were found, then both the mita and tribute levels would have to be constricted. Thus, it was its fear of the potential financial ramifications of the census that caused the Council to advise the crown to wait until the results of the enumeration were known before deciding whether to give its assent. Two Councilors--the Conde de Castellar and Joseph de Veytia--strongly disagreed. They argued that the Council should aid the census with a statement of support, not cripple it by withholding its affirmation.<sup>35</sup> But as had been the case when Toledo decided to establish the mita over a century earlier, the crown reserved judgement until it knew the outcome of Palata's program; it would support success, but not failure.

When the Viceroy received the crown's decision, in February of 1686, he was livid. He replied that his predecessors had not conducted the census because of their personal limitations, not any intrinsic difficulties with its execution. A government official was supposed to conquer tough problems, he argued; that was his job. Great things, Palata concluded, were never won without overcoming great problems.<sup>36</sup>

The crown's refusal to lend its support to the census did not stop it from being completed. Indeed, by the time that Palata responded to the 1685 cédula, the enumeration was nearly finished. On April 6, 1686, the Viceroy wrote to Madrid that he lacked only three reports. Some problems had been caused by the Indians' mobility, he noted, but everything for the provinces that were under the treasury in Lima was completed and new tribute levels would soon go into effect. The results for Upper Peru, however, were being delayed by its distance from Lima, the resultant lag in correspondence and a lack of uniformity in the corregidores' reports.<sup>37</sup>

Palata, like Toledo, was sufficiently confident of himself that he pushed forward despite the crown's doubts. He confessed, however, that he was uncertain that the government would be able to prevent Indian migration in the future. He had stripped the cover of "forastero" from the runaways, and he had doubled tribute levels and mita obligations for anyone who was absent from his native pueblo, but he feared that even these measures would not be sufficient to immobilize the Indians.<sup>38</sup>

As promised, the Viceroy soon began to issue reforms which were based on the census. On October 16, 1687, he published an "Arancel de jornales" that delineated the daily wages that the Indians were to receive in various enterprises and locations.<sup>39</sup> The new tribute levels for



for the provinces that were under the Lima treasury went into effect on Christmas Day, 1687.<sup>40</sup> The census was not completed in Upper Peru until 1688, but it was sufficiently close to its conclusion by March to permit Palata to begin work on the new repartimiento de la mita. He had planned to have the two contadores draw up a tentative distribution of the mitayos, but they were exhausted by their three-year struggle with the census and had fallen ill. The Viceroy was personally distracted by the aftermath of the October 20, 1687 earthquake, which had left the provinces of Guanta and Angaraes in a shambles. Palata therefore instructed Fiscal Juan González de Santiago, of the Audiencia de Lima, to compose the tentative repartimiento, based on the results of the census and any information that was available in Lima about the mills and the azogueros at Potosí.<sup>41</sup>

The Viceroy then sent the tentative repartimiento to La Plata and he assigned Archbishop (and ex-President) González de Poveda, Corregidor Enríquez and the new President of Charcas, Diego Christóval Mesía, the task of tailoring it to local realities. The committee of three was encouraged, moreover, to make some major adjustments of the Fiscal's plan.<sup>42</sup>

Palata was particularly bothered by González de Santiago's reference to a capitulation by Toledo to the Indians when he first established the mita. The Viceroy

felt that the mita was part of the Indians' natural obligation to work for their sovereign, not any agreement between them and Toledo. Neither did he believe that the one-seventh fraction constituted a strict quota, nor that two rest periods were absolutely required. He suggested that the existence of many resident mingas at Potosí made it unnecessary for the mitayos to work on their weeks off. One week's rest would be enough, he argued, if they actually rested. This would also ease the burden of the mita on the provinces, for one-third of the mita gruesa could remain at home rather than travel to Potosí--the aspect of the system that Palata felt was the most oppressive. Finally, the Fiscal had not included any more provinces than the original sixteen, and this the Viceroy considered to be an unwarranted reward for the disobedient fugitives.<sup>43</sup>

The committee's report to Palata on the repartimiento was despatched from La Plata on October 19, 1688. After numerous meetings and two consultations with the Viceroy, it had composed a repartimiento which reflected Palata's desires closely. Five provinces--La Recaja, Yamparaes, Tomina, Pilaya y Paspaya and Misque--were added, as was the parroquia of San Pedro in La Paz, and sixteen curatos and eighteen pueblos within the original sixteen provinces that had won exemption from the mita earlier in the century. From a population base of 56,046 tribute-paying

Indians, 2,829 were included in each of three mitas ordinarias, including the one that would remain at home while the other two served alternate weeks at Potosí. Fifty mitayos were assigned to each of fifty-seven mills--an increase of three mills over González de Santiago's distribution--and sixteen others were left without mita labor. The committee had considered the possibility of assigning a mix of thirty-four mitayos and sixteen mingas to all of the mills, but it decided against the idea because such a system would have been unmanageable and the azogueros' profit margin would have been hurt. The mitayos were assigned by the committee in complete ayllus or pueblos wherever possible, in accordance with a provision of the crown's 1681 cédula. The committee felt it was necessary, however, to assign to each azoguero a combination of originarios and forasteros, because the latter would have to learn their jobs from the former.<sup>44</sup>

The Viceroy accepted the committee's recommendations and on December 2, 1688, he issued an order for the incorporation of the newly-affected provinces and pueblos. The terms of the new repartimiento were sent to Potosí on January 29, 1689, and to the provinces on February 2. In addition to the provisions that were included in the committee's plan, Palata provided a one-year exemption from tribute for the mitayos following their year of

service and he reinforced his predecessors' prohibitions of mita service in silver. Finally, he placed the mita under the exclusive administration of the Corregidor de Potosí, Pedro Luis Enríquez.<sup>45</sup>

With the orders for the new repartimiento despatched, the Viceroy reported to the crown on February 19, 1689 that the entire program had been concluded. The census and the repartimiento that had so baffled each of his predecessors, since the Conde de Chinchón, were finished. Not only was the census completed, Palata noted, but the cost had been kept to a mere 20,000 pesos; 200,000 had been the estimate. He was pleased to report, moreover, that the number of tribute-paying Indians was greater than it had been a century before. Migration had caused the apparent depopulation of the sixteen provinces, he argued, for half of the Indians in Upper Peru had turned out to be forasteros. The Viceroy also said that he had ordered the compilation of a single tome on the census and the repartimiento, to serve as a guide the next time the program had to be executed.<sup>46</sup>

Palata was correct when he boasted that he had succeeded where others had failed. His willingness to press forward despite the crown's refusal to support his actions and his determination to finish the process before his successor arrived were unusual. But there were other reasons for his success. First, he had been provided with

direct, unequivocal orders to put the census and the new repartimiento before all other matters. The 1681 cédula had removed any doubt about the crown's support for the mita and it had answered the outstanding questions about the general census. The Council of the Indies' doubts were expressed only after the process was nearly done. Second, the Duque had profited by the advice of González de Poveda and Liñán, both of whom had extensive experience in Charcas and with the mita. Third, no one in Potosí was opposed to his program. Fourth, and perhaps more important than these other factors, Palata was Viceroy of Peru for eight years. Six of those years were required to complete the census in Upper Peru, after a year of preliminary investigation. Palata's viceroyalty was longer than the usual six years because his successor had died en route to Peru, and the search for a willing replacement had taken time. By the time that the Council decided to transfer the Conde de la Monclova from his post as Viceroy of New Spain, therefore, the Duque de la Palata had been afforded a bonus year or two, and had had the time to complete the repartimiento, rather than leave it to the whim of his successor.<sup>47</sup>

#### Developments in the de facto Mita

During the seven years that were required to design and execute the general census, the traditional battles

among the caciques, the corregidores, the azogueros, the priests and the Indians had continued. Those confrontations had underscored the need for a clear determination of the extant population in the provinces and the completion of a new repartimiento de la mita.

The caciques of Pacajes had objected to their role in the mita for what seemed to be an eternity. On August 6, 1681, they wrote to the crown to complain that the azogueros were still demanding that they deliver mitayos under the terms of the 1633 repartimiento, despite the fact that the tribute-paying population of their province had fallen from 10,675 to 1,510 Indians. The number of mitayos that was required from Pacajes, they argued, should be lowered accordingly. When this petition, and others like it, reached the Council of the Indies, they were put to one side. The Fiscal promised that the general census, then being undertaken, would solve all such problems. The Council may not have supported Palata's program, but it did expect his census to settle complaints such as that of the caciques of Pacajes.<sup>48</sup>

As we have seen, other caciques also had a difficult time delivering the quotas of mitayos that were demanded of them. Some of them went to extraordinary lengths over a single Indian. From 1682 to 1683, for example, the capitán enterador for Caquiavire (Pacajes), Francisco Quispi, tried unsuccessfully to extract Pasqual Guanca from

the San Francisco convent at Potosí. The Franciscans' president and procurador foiled Quispi's efforts with a series of legal ploys based on the pretense that because Guanca was married to the daughter of a yanacona, and Toledo had ordered that husbands were to live with their wives' ayllus, then he too should be considered a yanacona. Pasqual Guanca was released from the Capitán mayor de la mita's jail when his father-in-law pledged that he would produce him when a judgement was reached in the case. Corregidor Enríquez then ruled that Guanca should serve in the mita while the Audiencia de Charcas determined whether he was a yanacona, but by that time he was nowhere to be found. Quispi had to hire a minga for every week that Guanca was missing, and he appealed to the Audiencia to force the father-in-law to pay the cost of the substitute. The dispute went on for over a year, and although the final decision is not included in the documentation, the frustrations that Quispi suffered are testimony to the difficulties that the capitanes enteradores faced when they competed with other interests for Indians to deliver in the mita.<sup>49</sup>

If the capitanes had a difficult time delivering the originarios to Potosí, they were not shy about including the forasteros when they could. In 1680, the Corregidor de Porco ordered the caciques of Puna to leave Pedro Mamani alone. Mamani complained that he had been forced to

serve in the mita despite his being a forastero. The Corregidor's ruling did not end the matter, however, for Pedro Mamani had to petition the Audiencia de Charcas in 1684 to obtain a reinforcement of the earlier decision.<sup>50</sup>

The capitanes enteradores had their problems with other caciques as well. The capitán for Puna, Juan Bautista Catari, complained to the Audiencia de Charcas that gobernador Pedro Anava was diverting some mitayos for his own use, and that he was committing other abuses as well.<sup>51</sup> Bautista Catari was not alone. In 1690, on orders from the Viceroy Conde de la Monclova (1689-1705), Corregidor Enríquez questioned the capitanes about the problems that they faced in the delivery of the mitayos. To a man they charged that other caciques prevented them from bringing as many mitayos--in person and in silver--as they could otherwise have delivered. The caciques used some of the reserved Indians in their own enterprises, but they rented the majority to estancieros and chacareros in exchange for the Indians' mita service in silver and their tribute. The institution of indios maharaques (described in Chapter V) was not peculiar to Pacajes, therefore, but common in the sixteen obligated provinces. The lands that were left vacant by the Indians, the capitanes said, were rented to forasteros or sold to Spaniards. The sums of money that were raised by these means, they claimed, were well in excess of those that were



needed to meet their obligations, but the caciques kept much of the money for themselves.<sup>52</sup>

The testimony of the capitanes in 1690 lends credence to the suggestion offered in Chapter V: that the caciques were able to pass some of the financial burden of mita service in silver down onto the Indians who were living in their pueblos. Indeed, the capitanes also claimed that the caciques used collectors to gather service in silver and tribute contributions from the Indians who were absent from their villages.<sup>53</sup>

#### The Effects of the New Repartimiento

The completion of the census and the new repartimiento were significant accomplishments, and clearly they were needed. But the Duque de la Palata's claim to ultimate victory was premature. He had designed a new mita that would ostensibly return equity to service at Potosí and provide most of the azogueros there with an adequate, inexpensive, work force. Yet as Palata prepared for his return to Spain, he began to learn a central lesson of the Hapsburg administration of Peru: that which was planned in Lima was rarely what happened in Charcas.

The implementation of the new tribute levels and the reformed mita began in Upper Peru during 1689. The Indians were supposed to be sent to Potosí under the new repartimiento in June, and the new system was to be

operational by July 1.<sup>54</sup> Palata's reforms called for many practices that were novel, and he had included some regions under the mita for the first time. The detailed orders that he sent to the corregidores about the new tribute and mita requirements, like those for the census a few years earlier, stressed the themes of fairness and equality. From afar--from Lima--the process and the reforms seemed fair, and quite logical. In practice, however, the caciques and the Indians learned of the changes in their obligations in bits and pieces, and only months before those alterations were scheduled to go into effect. The tribute and mita quotas increased dramatically with the inclusion of the forasteros, and neither the Indians nor their caciques could see any benefits for them in the new regime. No sooner had Corregidor Enríquez sent out the new mita orders than the complaints about the repartimiento, the tribute levels and ultimately the census began to pour down off the altiplano and into Lima.<sup>55</sup>

The caciques, the corregidores and the priests argued, in unison, that the reforms that Palata was attempting to introduce were both unrealistic and impractical. The caciques were particularly upset with the incorporation of the forasteros, and they balked at the reduction of the mita to two shifts. The corregidores and the priests claimed that the Indians were emigrating, en masse, out of their provinces in terror.

One source of the problems was that the census was six years old by the time that the reforms that were based upon it were introduced. Many of the forasteros who had been included in the enumeration had moved away and some Indians now discovered that they had been included on lists in four or five different locations. Other Indians had died in the epidemics of the mid-1680s. The once-thriving mining center at Porco was now abandoned. But the caciques were nevertheless held responsible by their corregidores, and the corregidores by Corregidor Enríquez, for deliveries of mitayos and tribute that were based on the out-dated census.<sup>56</sup>

Greater difficulties stemmed from the inability of the caciques to control the forasteros, even when they were still living where they had been documented. The forasteros had no property to tie them down and no tradition of loyalty to anyone, and the first attempts by the caciques to subjugate them resulted in their prompt departure. Some forasteros who were living in the cities moved into the countryside; some in the country went into the cities; and some from each migrated into unconquered territory. If the caciques tried to follow the forasteros or if they tried to collect from the Indians who were absent from their pueblos, they then had to compete with the estancieros and chacareros for whom the Indians worked or other caciques who also laid claim to them. Thus, they

soon proved to be hopelessly incapable of meeting their new obligations, and their corregidores tossed them in jail to protect themselves from retribution. From their cells, the caciques pleaded with the Viceroy to allow them to resign.<sup>57</sup>

The imposition of mita obligation on the previously exempted frontier provinces created other problems. The Spanish residents of those areas complained that their safety was threatened, for the Indians who lived in their settlements served as a buffer between them and the enemy Indians. Each of the frontier provinces had been spared from mita service by Toledo for that reason, and their Spanish inhabitants pleaded with Palata to respect that precedent.<sup>58</sup>

In April of 1689, the Duque de la Palata tried to stem the tide of confusion and opposition that his reforms had caused with printed "Advertencias." He explained that no Indian was required to pay more tribute or serve in the mita more often than he had under Toledo's ordinances. The tribute and mita quotas for the pueblos had not increased per capita, he argued, for now the forasteros and the originarios would share the responsibilities of the villages in which they lived. The one week of rest in the mita was for the Indians' benefit as well, he said, because twenty Indians could now meet a pueblo's required ten per week; and ten others could therefore stay home

with their families and work their lands. The Viceroy also defended the incorporation of the forasteros in the mita--again from a sense of fairness--but he cut their tribute payments in half and he allowed a 40 per cent reduction in the number of mitayos that was required from a pueblo based on their number.<sup>59</sup>

The "Advertencias" did very little good. They were legal arguments to support earlier legalisms, and they simply confused matters further. The modifications of the tribute and mita obligations of the forasteros were not enough to quiet the voices of opposition.<sup>60</sup> The overwhelming reality that the "Advertencias" were unable to counter was that Palata's design and the de facto mita could not be reconciled. The Viceroy had banned service in silver and he had included the forasteros--albeit now at a reduced percentage. The caciques had to deliver their full contingents of mitayos in persons, including the forasteros over whom they exercised little or no control. The various means that they had developed over the previous ninety years to meet their obligations in silver were now obsolete. The caciques were the key to the mita in both its forms, but Palata's reforms had made it impossible for them to perform that role. With most of the caciques in jail or in hiding, the corregidores tried to take up the slack by using their Spanish or mestizo subordinates to deliver the mita, but they proved

just as unable as the caciques to deliver the required number of Indians to Potosí.

Other historians have argued that Palata's hard work was undermined by the weaknesses in the Hapsburg government or by his replacement by the Conde de la Monclova only a few months after his reforms were introduced. Palata had only been successful, however, to the point where theory had ended and implementation had begun. Then his claim to parity with Francisco de Toledo had faded. Toledo's mita, it should be remembered, "worked" only because three other production elements kept it from having to serve as a forced labor system. For Palata there was no technological breakthrough, and there were no piles of desmontes, and thus there was no 1680s boom to attract the Indians to Potosí. Other things had changed since the 1570s as well. Palata, unlike Toledo, had to contend with the increased abilities of the priests, the corregidores, the caciques and especially the Indians to protect their interests. Potosí, meanwhile, was no longer the economic monolith that it had once been.<sup>61</sup>

The Council of the Indies had reserved judgement on the census and the repartimiento until the results and the effects of the Viceroy's program were known. By 1689, that decision was beginning to look very propitious. When the Duque de la Palata boarded ship at Callao, he left Peru with the intention of personally defending his actions

in the Council against the complaints that had been leveled against them. He carried with him a copy of the volume that he had ordered to be compiled on the census and the repartimiento, a copy of his relación and other pertinent materials.<sup>62</sup> But while he was en route to Spain--in Portobelo, Panama--the Duque died.<sup>63</sup> His side of the story would have to be told, thereafter, by those documents alone.

The Council of the Indies did not have the opportunity to review Palata's materials until 1692. The ship that was carrying his possessions arrived in Cádiz late in 1690, but the late Viceroy's belongings were not brought ashore, despite the continual efforts of his secretary to obtain his papers. Early in 1692, however, the Council was able to obtain copies of the volume on the census and the repartimiento and Palata's relación from Contador Pedro Antonio de Castillo. Thus, by the time that the Council began its deliberations on the 1683 enumeration and the 1689 repartimiento, the Conde de la Monclova had been the Viceroy of Peru for two years.<sup>64</sup> Indeed, he had already reversed most of the reforms that his predecessor had tried to institute, and he had drastically reduced the number of Indians in the mita ordinaria at Potosí. Palata had been able to finish his repartimiento because of the delay in the arrival of a successor; the two years that the Council had to wait to see his records had provided

Monclova with ample time to disassemble it.

The Viceroy Conde de la Monclova

The Conde de la Monclova sent his first report from Peru on March 15, 1690. In addition to the problems that the realm was having with pirates, a mercury shortage and the aftermath of the 1689 earthquake, the new Viceroy noted the general commotion that had been caused by the 1683 census and the reforms of the Duque de la Palata. He did not elaborate, but he did show a marked aversion to the Potosí mita. Monclova questioned the need for draft labor in mining operations, for he had just come from New Spain where no such system existed. He argued, furthermore, that any man--whether an Indian or not--was destroyed more by one month of forced labor than by a year of voluntary, paid, work.<sup>65</sup>

When the news that a new Viceroy had arrived in Lima reached Upper Peru, the already hefty volume of complaints about Palata's program from the provinces increased.<sup>66</sup> Added to the themes that were characteristic of the earlier letters was a particular emphasis on the Indians' flight into the yungas. The priests were quick to point out that the loss of the Indians to "infidel" territory not only hurt the Peruvian economy, it also damaged the crown's claim that it was christianizing the Indians. The corregidores and their lieutenants reported that they had



been forced to resort to search-and-capture raids to round up the mitayos, often returning after dark to apparently deserted villages to pick up the handful of Indians who had hidden during the day. The corregidores also said that it was impossible for them to provide the forasteros who were returning to their pueblos with lands, as Palata had promised; the Spanish titleholders refused to vacate their properties unless they were paid for them.<sup>67</sup>

Interspersed among the common themes of the complaints from the priests, the caciques and the corregidores were some particularly poignant portrayals of the horrors of the mita. One priest recounted, after a round-up of his Indians for the mita, that one of the men that he had been instructing came before him and other priests in chains and screamed, "Look Fathers at the beneficent God that you have brought to our land!"<sup>68</sup>

The complaints from the provinces found a receptive ear in the Viceroy Conde de la Monclova, but the provincial groups were not the only ones that were unhappy with Palata's reforms. The Gremio de azogueros--the group that ostensibly stood to benefit the most from the new repartimiento--was also upset. The azogueros objected to the fact that sixteen mills had been denied mitayos, to the assignment of the Indians in complete ayllus and to the 2,829-Indian mita ordinaria. Like the other interests, the azogueros looked to Monclova to rectify what they

considered to be an unfair reformation of the mita.<sup>69</sup>

Did the azogueros have a reason to complain? Palata said that the effective mita ordinaria had fallen to 1,608 Indians before his changes were introduced.<sup>70</sup> An increase to 2,829 would seem, therefore, to be a significant improvement, but only from a distance.<sup>71</sup> The azogueros had argued for years that the number of mitayos at Potosí was low to prove the need for a census and a new repartimiento, all the time understating the number of mitayos that they received in silver. Corregidor Enríquez reported that 1,541 mitayos and 1,713 mingas were working in the mines and the mills in 1682, or a total work force of 3,253 Indians.<sup>72</sup> Assuming that the mingas were hired with the money that the caciques delivered for service in silver, then the 2,829 mitayos that Palata had provided for in his repartimiento represented a drop of 400 Indians, not an increase. The inclusion of the forasteros, whose inexperience and absenteeism were quickly apparent, combined with the lowered official mita ordinaria to drive the effective number of mitayos still lower. Furthermore, the ban on service in silver cut off an important source of capital and it prevented the azogueros from hiring skilled mingas with the mita in silver contributions. The azogueros were also left without any leverage to use against the capitanes enteradores.

With the complaints about Palata's census and his

reforms coming in from all quarters, Monclova called a junta to consider these issues for December 16, 1690.<sup>73</sup> The azogueros agreed to send Corregidor Enríquez, at a cost of 35,000 pesos, to represent their interests.<sup>74</sup> He was joined by Oidor Ximénez Lobaton, Oidor González de Santiago, Fiscal-Oidor Matías Lagúñez, Fiscal-Protector Marquéz, Luis Antonio de Oviedo and Contador Joseph de Urquiano.<sup>75</sup> The junta met thirty-three times from December 18, 1690 to May 12, 1691.<sup>76</sup> A relación was then prepared and later read to a larger group of officials, including other oidores, the alcaldes del crimen and other contadores, on the last day of May. Monclova then asked Lagúñez and Protector Pedro de Figueroa Dávila (who had replaced Marquéz) to draft proposals to deal with the problems that had been caused by Palata's program, which had been outlined in the relación. Figueroa's offering was read to the assembly in the three meetings that followed July 20. Lagúñez began to read his statement on August 3, but because it was 668 folios long, the Viceroy grew impatient and on August 7, ordered him to be brief. When Lagúñez refused, Monclova directed the monstrous missive to the relatores for editing.<sup>77</sup>

Lagúñez did summarize his thoughts, however, in a letter to the crown. He said that he had read all of the complaints about Palata's census and the subsequent reforms, and that he had considered the arrival of Monclova to be an

opportunity to correct the situation. Lagúñez accused the azogueros of pure deceit in their correspondence with Madrid, and of subjecting the unfortunate Indians to an oppression worse than slavery. Indeed, he said that if the mitayos were slaves, then the azogueros would treat them better, for they would then have an economic stake in their survival.<sup>78</sup>

The Viceroy was impressed with Lagúñez' arguments, if not with the length of his discourse, and he herded the assembly toward the adoption of these twelve proposals:

1. That the reforms of the Duque de la Palata, based on the general census, be reformed.
2. That the mita be based, until another decision on the matter was reached, on the 33,423 originarios in the sixteen provinces that were historically obligated to the mita.
3. That the same not be true for the 31,031 forasteros that were listed as residents of the sixteen provinces.
4. That the five additional provinces, the parroquia of San Pedro, the sixteen pueblos and the eighteen curatos be freed from mita obligation.
5. That a new census be conducted of the forasteros to determine the amount of tribute that they would pay, and that until that time they would pay the same amount as yanaconas, not to exceed seven pesos per year.
6. That the mita continue to be determined on the basis of one-seventh of the population that was subject to it.
7. That two weeks of rest be reinstated in the place of the one week introduced by the Duque de la Palata.
8. That in the place of fifty Indians for each mill, the sum of forty be provided, and therefore that thirty-four or thirty-five mills receive mitayos. That the decision as to which would receive them and which would not be based on information provided by experienced but disinterested persons.
9. That the figures included for the originarios in the Palata census remain the basis of government

- policy until local officials requested revisitas, and that such re-counts could be done individually and when needed.
10. That the daily wage for the mitayos be raised from four to five reales, and that payment be made for Mondays, bringing the total to thirty reales per week. Furthermore, that the sum required for service in silver be three pesos per week, and that the money be presented to the capitán enterador for his use in hiring a minga. That no "pocket Indians" be permitted.
  11. That the Indians be paid their travel allowances at the established rate.
  12. That the forty Indians assigned to each mill come from the same ayllu and pueblo whenever possible.<sup>79</sup>

These twelve points were sent to the Contador de retasas on April 24, 1692, and they were despatched in printed form to the provinces three days later.<sup>80</sup> The new repartimiento was drafted by the Contador as well, and it was issued as a general order on May 8, 1692. Following the instructions of the Viceroy and the guidelines that were provided by the twelve points, mita obligation fell only on the 31,707 originarios who were resident in the sixteen provinces. The resultant 1,367-Indian mita ordinaria was divided among the owners of thirty-four mills according to information that was provided by Enríquez, Oviedo and Ximénez Lobaton. Twenty-three mills were left without any mitayos at all. The remaining seven mitayos per week were assigned to the maintenance of the lagunas. Monclova also ordered that travel allowances were to be paid to the mitayos at the rate of two reales for every four leagues traveled, and he lowered the mingas' wage to the same thirty reales that the mitayos were to receive.<sup>81</sup>

The azogueros had protested when Palata assigned them 2,829 mitayos per week. They now found themselves with less than half that number, and with twenty-three of their mills denied any access to mitayos. This was hardly what they had in mind when they contributed 35,000 pesos to send Corregidor Enríquez to Lima. He took the precaution of breaking the bad news to them in a letter from Lima of April 28, 1692. One can only imagine what might have happened to him had he been in Potosí at the time. The Corregidor explained that the Viceroy and the junta had agreed with Lagúnez on four basic points: a) that the present generation of azogueros could not claim credit for the quintos that had been produced in the past; b) that the pretension that the azogueros worked only to serve the crown was absurd, because everyone worked for himself first; c) that the mitayos, and their low wages, had been a gift to them from the crown, not their right; and d) that the azogueros were not as indispensable as they believed. Enríquez said that Lagúnez thought that other mining centers were more important than Potosí, and that he had noted that they had no mitas. The Corregidor conceded that the azogueros would be hurt, especially by the increase in the mitayos' wage, but he insisted that he had been unable to prevent the reforms.<sup>82</sup>

Bartolomé de Arzáns would later write that the azogueros had misplaced their faith in putting it in

Enrriquez, but he did credit the Corregidor with preventing the complete abolition of the mita. According to Arzans, Monclova and Lagunez were determined to extinguish the system, and they had already agreed upon its abolition when Enrriquez convinced them that the impact of such an act on the royal treasury would be too great.<sup>83</sup>

The azogueros apparently learned of the assembly's decisions even before they received the Corregidor's letter, for on April 1, 1692, they proposed to the crown that Archbishop González de Poveda be named to replace Monclova as Viceroy.<sup>84</sup> On August 19, 1692, they complained to the latter that the thirty-real wage for the mitayos would ruin them financially.<sup>85</sup> The azogueros told Charles II that they would not be the only ones who would be hurt by the Viceroy's actions; his royal income would suffer as well, and the originarios would now have to bear the full weight of the mita while the disloyal forasteros would be unjustly freed from that obligation. Palata's six years of diligent effort had been undermined, they argued, by the ignorance of the government officials in Lima.<sup>86</sup>

Monclova sent Enrriquez back into the Potosí lions' den on June 10, 1692, with orders to enforce the assembly's resolutions. Arriving on October 26, the Corregidor also carried a secret commission that provided him with alter ego status to the Viceroy, and therefore with the power to adjust the repartimiento in any fashion that he deemed

was necessary. Enríquez published the terms of the April 27 edict, and he asked that the capitanes enteradores and the Gremio de azogueros respond to its twelve points. He also ordered the veedores and the Capitán mayor de la mita to report on the owners of the thirty-four mills that had been assigned mitayos and those of the twenty-three that had not.<sup>87</sup>

Enríquez found the capitanes and the azogueros locked in a struggle over which repartimiento they had to comply with. The azogueros insisted that Palata's quotas of mitayos be delivered, and when the capitanes failed to meet those levels, the azogueros demanded rezagos. The capitanes considered the Monclova repartimiento to be in effect, and they accused the azogueros of not paying the mitayos the increased wages to which they were entitled.<sup>88</sup>

The veedores and the Capitán mayor reported that the twenty-three mills that had been stripped of mitayos were owned by widows, absentees and others, and that they had a long history of abuses. The twenty-seven azogueros who owned the thirty-four mills, on the other hand, had viable refining operations and mines.<sup>89</sup> Thus, the decisions that Enríquez and the others had made in Lima, regarding which mills should receive the mitayos, were confirmed by the veedores and Capitán mayor's report.<sup>90</sup>

The Viceroy responded to the azogueros' August 19 memorial on October 22, 1692, by ordering that the twelve



points were to be obeyed without amendment. The Corregidor gathered the azogueros together on November 24, and he read them the Viceroy's letter. They responded that it was simply impossible to pay the increased wage to the mitayos. They would wait for a reply to the Archbishop's October 18 petition to Monclova on their behalf, they said, before commenting further.<sup>91</sup>

When González de Poveda died two days later, the azogueros understood that their chances for redemption had perished with him. They went to Enríquez and proposed a compromise: a twenty-four-real per week wage for the mitayos.<sup>92</sup> The Corregidor had already conferred with his advisors and concluded that thirty reales was unrealistic, so he accepted the azogueros' offer. Enríquez explained to Monclova that it would be unwise to force them to break the law by insisting that they comply with an impossible directive.<sup>93</sup>

The azogueros wrote to the crown on December 9, 1692 to report that they were still under siege by the ignorant government officials in Lima.<sup>94</sup> The royal treasury officials of Potosí found themselves in the peculiar position of supporting the azogueros in their complaint about the twenty-three mills that had been deprived of mitayos. The Viceroy had told them, the officials said, in a letter of May 29, 1692, that the collection of debts from the owners of the twenty-three mills would have to

wait until the shock of his reforms had been absorbed by the azogueros. The officials complained, nevertheless, that any stoppage of silver production in the twenty-three mills would permanently prevent them from collecting those debts.<sup>95</sup>

The azogueros got some relief in June of 1693, with the arrival of a new Corregidor de Potosí, the Conde de Velayos. He had been kept waiting in Lima for three years by Monclova, so that Enríquez might complete the process of introducing his reforms for the mita and the collection of tribute. The Viceroy's gambit had been important, for no sooner had Velayos arrived in Potosí than he began to parrot the azogueros' arguments. He reported to the crown that the azogueros treated the Indians very well, and that they paid the mitayos their wages promptly and without incident. The mita should be returned to the status quo ante, the Corregidor argued, because the number of Indians that Monclova had assigned was woefully inadequate. The caciques, the corregidores and the priests, he contended, had unduly influenced the Viceroy. The two-week rest period, for example, was not necessary; the mitayos currently worked during their off weeks as mingas, and quite voluntarily. The mills that Monclova had denied Indians, moreover, would cost the crown some 300,000 pesos in lost quintos every year that they were out of production.<sup>96</sup>

The Conde de la Monclova's attack on the azogueros, and on the de facto mita, was not over. In an interim report to the crown of August 15, 1692, the Viceroy had not only defended the twelve points of the April 27 order, he had proposed that the mita be abolished altogether. Monclova argued that Lagúñez had proven beyond any doubt that Potosí was no longer important enough to warrant the continuation of such an oppressive institution as the mita. The Viceroy left the final decision to the Council of the Indies and the King, but he strongly suggested that all of the problems that were caused by the mita could best be solved by its extermination. Included with his proposal was an account of his correspondence with Archbishop Liñán during the early part of 1692, which Monclova claimed showed a change of opinion on the Archbishop's part against the mita. This was particularly important because Liñán's arguments while Archbishop of Charcas had helped to defuse the abolition movement led by the Conde de Lemos fifteen years earlier.<sup>97</sup> The Viceroy repeated his call for the elimination of the mita when he sent the crown an account of Enríquez' activities at Potosí on October 21, 1693.<sup>98</sup>

The various post-Palata representations about the mita, from all sides of the issue, began to arrive in Madrid during 1693. In March, the Council's Fiscal responded to Monclova's March 15, 1690 comments on the commotion that had been generated by Palata's reforms. He suggested that

the Council adopt a wait-and-see attitude until further reports were received. The Fiscal was decidedly opposed to the mita, however, for he amplified the Viceroy's comment that there were no mining repartimientos in New Spain, and he dwelt at length on the unsavory means by which the Indians were dragged to Potosí and kept there.<sup>99</sup>

On April 2, 1694, the Council of the Indies ordered that all of the materials in its archives on the mita, from Liñán's viceroyalty forward, be brought together.<sup>100</sup> Soon thereafter, on July 13, Charles II responded to the azogueros' latest petition by ordering the Council to resolve the conflict between them and the Conde de la Monclova once and for all time.<sup>101</sup>

The decision that the Council faced was not whether it should confirm Palata's repartimiento or that of Monclova. Rather, once it had received the latter's August 15, 1692 report, it had to find a compromise between Palata's reformed mita and Monclova's proposal that the system be abolished. Given Charles' preoccupation with his quintos, which was more than evident in his July 13, 1694 edict, the Council decided to confirm the twelve points in Monclova's April 27, 1692 directive. The mita would continue, and thus the royal quintos, but at a lower level than Palata had provided for and hopefully free of the problems that his program had created.<sup>102</sup>

The Council of the Indies passed final judgement on the

the matter in January of 1697. The Viceroy's twelve points were transformed by the Councilors into nine of their own:

1. That the mitayos and the mingas were to receive the same wage, without exception.
2. That there was to be no service in silver.
3. That the substitutes were to be paid the same wage as the mitayos.
4. That the travel allowances were to be paid at the rate of one-half wages for four leagues traveled per day.
5. That half of the travel allowance was to be paid to the Indians upon their departure for Potosí.
6. That the mitayos were to be paid directly, before the Corregidor de Potosí and a notary.
7. That the royal treasury officials at Potosí were to maintain lists of the mitayos.
8. That the Indians were not to work beyond the hours or period of their obligation, under any pretense.
9. That once their year of obligation had been completed, the mitayos were to return home.<sup>103</sup>

A significant addition to this list was the Council's proposal that the office of Corregidor de Potosí no longer be sold. Enríquez' performance had made it clear, it said, that the post was too important to be trusted to the highest bidder. Those who had been nominated to fill the office in the future, the Council argued, should be reimbursed for the donations that they had made to win nomination; and in the future, the corregidores de Potosí should be named solely on the basis of ability.<sup>104</sup>

The crown sent the Council's rulings to Peru in a series of cédulas of February 18, 1697. The response to the nine points in Peru was generally positive, with the

exception of the first. The Audiencia de Charcas, the royal treasury officials and others noted that the mingas would not work for the lower wages that the mitayos received, and they argued that skilled laborers should be paid more than unskilled workers.<sup>105</sup>

Previous royal and viceregal decrees had been ignored in Charcas, and it would be a mistake to assume that the 1697 cédulas resolved all of the outstanding issues concerning the mita. Indeed, the Audiencia de Charcas said that the lowering of the mingas' wages really would mean very little, because the Indians were all paid according to quotas, not by the day. The azogueros were more unhappy than ever, for the two repartimientos of the preceding decade had disrupted the de facto mita to such an extent that confusion was the order of the day in the provinces.<sup>106</sup>

One problem that the Palata repartimiento had created was the involvement of non-caciques in the delivery of the mitayos. In 1693, for example, the caciques of Aymaya (Chayanta) complained to the Audiencia de Charcas that Monclova and Enríquez had required them to deliver more Indians to Potosí than they were accustomed to sending. Their corregidor had answered their protests to him by sending two judges to their village to round up the Indians for the mita. They and their men waited for Easter Sunday to strike. Once everyone was at mass, they blocked all the

means of escape from the church and began arresting the Indians. Many were chased up, down and around the altar itself, with the judges using the gated baptismal area as a jail for those that they had already captured. The caciques were outraged by the judges' behavior, and they said that it would be a very long time before the Indians returned to Aymaya, let alone went to mass.<sup>107</sup>

Another problem was the question of immunity from the mita for the forasteros. They had been involved in the system extralegally even before Palata incorporated them in his repartimiento, either in person or via contributions of money for service in silver. The exemption from mita obligation that Monclova had ordered for the forasteros on April 27, 1692, and which the Council had confirmed in the 1697 cédulas, took some time to take effect. In 1698, four forasteros who were residents of Paria--Alonso Chui, Pascual Parejava, Felipe Canasa and Alonso Choque--were taken to Potosí as mitayos by capitán enterador Martín Challapa. They were set free only after a protracted legal battle in the Audiencia de Charcas.<sup>108</sup>

On the whole, however, the reforms that the Conde de la Monclova introduced in 1692 created an official mita that was a miniature of the system that Toledo had founded 120 years earlier. With only thirty-four of the mills receiving the 1,367 mitayos each week, the ratio that Toledo had used was paralleled (he had assigned 4,000

Indians to 100 mills). More importantly, Monclova allowed the de facto mita to function once again. He permitted service in silver, he exempted the forasteros and he reduced the caciques' quotas of mitayos to levels that were possible to meet. The Viceroy did not destroy Palata's repartimiento; it was in the process of self-destructing when he arrived in Peru. Monclova tailored a new official mita to fit the realities of late-seventeenth century Upper Peru. In so doing, he guaranteed that the system would survive into the eighteenth century.<sup>109</sup>

#### Summary

The reign of Charles II has been characterized by some as the epitomy of Hapsburg decadence. The Council of the Indies is supposed to have been ineffective, the colonial bureaucracy is said to have been inept and corruption is alleged to have pervaded all the levels of the government. From the limited perspective that is provided by the administration's approach to the Potosí mita, however, the opposite seems to have been true. The Duque de la Palata completed an eighty-three province census, and he drew up a new repartimiento--a goal which had eluded nine of his predecessors. The Conde de la Monclova chaired a lengthy investigation of the problems that had been caused by Palata's program, and he designed a repartimiento of his own. The Council of the Indies studied both repartimientos



and it then produced a compromise solution of its own. The Hapsburg government of Peru functioned; it may not have solved all of the mita's problems, but it did a rather remarkable job.

The Duque de la Palata completed the general census through sheer persistence. His repartimiento, however, included too many novelties and it was implemented much too quickly. The changes that he introduced were complicated and largely misunderstood by the caciques and the Indians that they affected, and the speed with which the alterations were enforced created a crucible effect. The Indians' flight and the caciques' inability to deliver the mitayos in persons were accentuated. The abolition of service in silver and the inclusion of the forasteros had made it impossible for the caciques to meet their obligations at all.

Palata had been motivated by a sense of justice--of parity of the forasteros with the originarios--and direct royal orders to increase the number of mitayos that was serving at Potosí. His repartimiento incorporated those elements into its design. But because it was based on the premise that the Toledan mita could be re-established, the Palata repartimiento ignored the fact that the caciques made the system work. They delivered the Indians and the silver that met the obligations of their provinces. The inclusion of the forasteros and the ban on service in

silver might have made the mita more fair, but they also made it fail.

The Conde de la Monclova arrived in Peru after a successful tenure as Viceroy of New Spain. The lack of repartimiento labor for the mines of that realm led him to question the need for the Potosí mita. His initial doubts about the system were reinforced by the avalanche of complaints about Palata's reforms that was waiting for him upon his arrival. Those complaints were transformed by an equally unsympathetic Fiscal Lagúnez into a 668-folio indictment of the mita, and they eventuated in the Viceroy's twelve points of April 27, 1692. The official mita was reduced to a mere third of what it had been under Toledo, the forasteros were freed from mita obligation and service in silver was permitted. The caciques were again able to play their traditional role, and the mita lived on.

The twelve points were not the Conde's final statement on the mita, however. They were soon followed by his proposal that the system be abolished. Charles II assigned the Council of the Indies the responsibility for reconciling the azogueros' complaints about Monclova's actions and the Viceroy's call for the abolition of the mita. Because the King was concerned that his quintos from Potosí should continue, the Council chose to adopt the twelve points as a compromise between potosino interests and viceregal policy.

Notes for Chapter VII

1. "Relación de don Melchor de Navarra y Rocaful, Duque de la Palata, Príncipe de Mesa, Virrey del Perú, al Conde de la Monclova, su sucesor, del estado de los diversos asuntos sujetos a su gobierno desde 1680 a 1689," 18.XII.1689, Los virreyes (ed. by Hanke and Rodríguez), Perú VI (no. 285), 207 (from Biblioteca Nacional, Madrid, Ms. 19.139). Palata's "Relación" requires a volume and a half of the Hanke and Rodríguez series (Vols. Perú VI and VII); see Hanke's note on VI, 11, for the various texts of the document that are available. One that is not mentioned is that in the AGN, Colección de la Biblioteca Nacional, legajo 42.
2. The 25.X.1680 cédula is discussed by Palata in his letter to the crown of 21.VIII.1683, AGI, Charcas 270, no. 16, Lima, 21.VIII.1683, 10 fs., "Duppdo el Virrey del Peru. Da quenta à V.M. de haverse resuelto la numeracion g.<sup>l</sup> de los Indios deste Reyno, y la forma en que se á de executar por los correxidores, cada uno en su partido, como se expresa en los despachos, vando e instruion que se les á remitido para el acierto de la importancia deste negocio." This letter is reproduced in Palata's "Relación" (see note 1), VI, 217-229. A second royal order of 28.V.1681 reinforced the terms of the 25.X.1680 edict; the 25.X cédula is transcribed in Castillo (AGI, Charcas 270, no. 33C--see note 30, Chapter II), 25-32. The Council of the Indies' end-of-the-century summary (AGI, Charcas 273, no. 21--see note 91, Chapter II), 4v-5, says the order was dated 7.XI.1682.
3. For the frustration expressed by the crown, see the 28.V.1681 cédula, Castillo (AGI, Charcas 270, no. 33C--see note 30, Chapter II), 25-32. For background on the Duque de la Palata, see Margaret E. Crahan, "The Administration of Don Melchor de Navarra y Rocafull, Duque de la Palata: Viceroy of Peru, 1681-1689," The Americas, XXVII (Washington, D.C., 1971), 390.
4. AGI, Charcas 268, no. 70, the Duque de la Palata to Francisco Fernández de Madrigal, Chiclana, 15.XII.1680, 1 f. Chiclana de la frontera is just south of Cádiz. The recipient of the letter was secretary to the Council of the Indies (Schäfer, I, 364).
5. So noted by Palata in AGI, Charcas 270, no. 14, the Duque de la Palata to the crown, Lima, 15.XII.1682, 2 fs.; "El Virrey del Peru. Dupp.do Da quenta à V.M.

del estado que tiene el punto sobre la Mita de Potossi, y que con la primera ocasion podra avisar la resoluzion que se aya tomado en la materia." See, also, Palata's "Relación" (see note 1), VI, 221, for the Viceroy's later comments.

6. See note 66, Chapter VI, for Liñán's "Relación."

7. AGI, Charcas 270, no. 13A, "Copia de papel del ex.<sup>mo</sup> sr Duque de la Palata Virrey de estos Reynos al Arzobpo de Lima para que diga su vltimo parecer sobre la mita de potosi" and his response, sin fecha, 5 fs. (the date of Palata's request is on the first folio). The Archbishop's cover letter is AGI, Charcas 270, no. 13, Melchor Arzobispo de Lima to the crown, Lima, 27.XI.1682, 1 f.; "El Arcobispo de lima, en respuesta de lo que ultimamente se le ordeno por cedula de 25 de oct.<sup>re</sup> de 680 sre la mita de Potosi, y remite copia del Papel del Papel en que el virrey destos RNos Duque de la Palata le pidio su parecer y del que le dio en la materia."

8. Ibid.

9. AGI, Charcas 270, no. 6, Christóval Arzobispo de La Plata to the crown, La Plata, 28.II.1682, 6 fs.; "En cumplim.to de la z,<sup>la</sup> en que se le encargo informase lo que se le ofreciese sobre la mita de Potosi, refiere lo que en esta materia a discurrido, de que tiene remitido vn tanto al Virrey." The Archbishop is identified by Corregidor Pedro Luis Enríquez in AGI, Charcas 270, no. 5, Corregidor Enríquez to the crown, Potosí, 24.I.1682, 18 fs.

10. AGI, Charcas 270, no. 6 (see note 9).

11. AGI, Charcas 270, no. 10, Contador Sebastián de Collado to the crown, Lima, 11.V.1682, 6 fs.; "El Conttor Sebastian del Collado Juez que fue de las quantas finales de la R<sup>l</sup> Caja de Potossi Reppresenta los medios que parecen proporcionados p.<sup>a</sup> Conseguir la Reduccion de los Yndios a sus Pueblos, entero de las mitas de Potossi y Guancavelica, y aumento de la R<sup>l</sup> Hazda." Of special interest is the paragraph on f. 4:

" No es la Mayor Causa de la Dissipacion de los naturales de sus Pueblos, su falta, quanto que por no acudir a las Mitas de su obligacion an hecho fuga Y Transito de vnas Provincias a otras adonde los Recojen y Receptan por las Combenientes que tienen dellos, Y destos que llaman forasteros, cobran los curas a un pesso enssdo de Doctrina de donde es que muchos de los Pueblos expecialmte los que estan en

Valles se hallan faltos de sus naturales y copiosos de forasteros que por serlo se escusson de las mitas dellos, y los Curas tienen el Ynteres del dho Pessso enssdo y sus obenciones demas de su signodo por entero por cuya racon no curan de la Reducion de sus naturales, Y admiten a los forasteros de donde se a causado el Daño tan Yrreparable que se a seguido y experimenta -"

12. AGI, Charcas 270, no. 5 (see note 9). Supporting documentation for Enríquez' essay is AGI, Charcas 270, no. 9A, 80 fs. Margin notes:

- f. 2 "Testimonio de como los Yndios no vienen acollarados, ni atados a las colas de las mulas--sino voluntarios"
- f. 4 "Auto Para que los Yndios cappnes declaren la Plata qe traen para entero de los Yndios"
- f. 5 "testimonio de como estan Prohibidas Las carceles Privadas. Y se a executado assi La Pena en el transgresor"
- f. 6 "auto en qe Prohiva las carceles Privadas"
- f. 7 "Horden del conde de lemos Para Ymbiar jueces Por la mita"
- f. 9 "testim.º de como no biene mas Plata que de tres Pueblos de la Provincia de Paucarcollas Para el entero de la mita"
- f. 10 "testimonio de como no se les hace a los capitanes Enteradores mas cargo de yndios de los que traen en el Padron y que las Yndias solo sirven de llevarles de comer al cerro. y no a otro travajo Personl del yndio"
- f. 11 "testimonio de los Yndios E yndias que an muerto. y: de los barones y hembras que an nacido de un cose a esta parte"
- f. 13 "testimonio de como a los capitanes enteradores, no se les hace cargo de Los Parrafos que traen Los Padrones"
- f. 14 "testimonio de como no ay mas que vn capitan Gen.º que es el de la Provincia de Pacajes"
- f. 15 "Vissita del cerro de Potossi sus minas y labores"
- f. 38 "Vissita de Parrochias de 1678"
- f. 39 "Vissita de Parrochias de 1679"
- f. 40 "testimonio de Como los Yndios son Doctrinados Y enseñados"
- f. 41 "Autto Para que los Rezagos no se cobren en Plata sino con Yndios doblas"
- f. 42 "Autto Para que los capitanes declaren como esta mandado que los Rezagos se enteren en personas doblas y no en plata"

- f. 44 "testimonio de como no se cobran los Rezagos atrasados sino solo los de la mita Presente"
- f. 45 "testimonio de como en Presentadose certificass.on de Yndio muerto se mda sobrellevar Y que en enfermado el yndio se manda llevar al ospital R.l a curarlo y que el Ynteresado le de dos R.s cada dia"
- f. 46 "Autto Para que los yndios declaren si se le sobrellevan los muertos y enfermos"
- f. 48 "Auto Para que declaren si en algun Pueblo sirven las Yndias officios de Alcaldes"
- f. 50 "Testimonio de como se an dado descansos a los Yndios de Asangaro. Y de tapacari Y a otros Particulares"
- f. 52 "Auto Para q<sup>e</sup> los Yndios declaren si travajan dia y noche"
- f. 54 "testimonio de que los Metales que se Benefician en esta Rivera son de este cerro Rico Y no de los Minerales de afuera"
- f. 55 "Vissita gen<sup>l</sup> de los yngenios de Potosi y su jurisdiccio<sup>n</sup>"
- f. 69 "Autto para vissitar las minas del cerro de Potossi y Yngenios de su Rivera"
- f. 72 "Autto Para q<sup>e</sup> los yndios q<sup>e</sup> acaban sus mitas se buelban a sus pueblos"
- f. 74 "Autto para que los yndios se buelban a sus pueblos"
- f. 76 "Vissita del cerro e yngenios de guariguari jurisdiss<sup>on</sup> de Potossi"
- f. 80 "Autto para q<sup>e</sup> el capn"

A cover letter for this material is AGI, Charcas 270, no. 9, Corregidor Enríquez to the crown, Potosí, 15.IV.1682, 1 f.

13. AGI, Charcas 270, no. 5 (see note 9). The number of males who had died between 1677 and 1681 was 1,534, while the number born was 3,545. Some 1,226 females had died while 2,958 were born. These figures are provided on fs. 11-12 of AGI, Charcas 270, no. 9A (see note 12) as well.

14. AGI, Charcas 270, no. 5 (see note 9).

15. AGI, Charcas 270, no. 8, President González de Poveda to the crown, La Plata, 2.IV.1682, 1 f.; "Satisface a las cedula<sup>s</sup> en que se le ordenó diese su parecer sobre los puntos que contenian pertenecientes a la Mita de Potosi, y le remitiese al Virrey asistiendole a la execucion de lo que resultase Y embia el informe que á hecho en racon desto, de que dice remitio Dup.do al dho

Virrey como se le m.do" See, also: AGI, Charcas 270, no. 12, President González de Poveda to the crown, La Plata, 21.VIII.1682, 1 f., "Satisface a la vltima z, la que se embio tocante a la Mita de Potosi, Y remte copia del Ynforme que hico al Virrey Duque de la Palata, y instruccion que an de guardar los corregidores"; and AGI, Charcas 270, no. 4, President González de Poveda to the crown, La Plata, 24.XII.1681, 42 fs., "Ynforme sobre la mita de Potossi que haze el Presidente de la R.l Audiencia de la Plata de orden de V.M. y Respuesta a el papel del Conde de Lemos que hizo en 4 de Julio del año passado de 670 siendo Virrey de estos Reynos del Peru."

16. AGI, Charcas 270, no. 21A, "Ymforme sobre si combiene hazer participes a los yndios en la mita señalan doles mina e yngenio en Potosi," sent by President González Poveda to the Duque de la Palata, La Plata, 16.VIII.1682, 12 fs.; the prospect is also mentioned in AGI, Charcas 270, no. 12 (see note 15).

17. AGI, Charcas 270, no. 12A (see note 16).

18. Crahan, 397.

19. As I said in note 2, the letter is transcribed in Castillo (AGI, Charcas 270, no. 33C--see note 30, Chapter II), 25-32. The Gremio de azogueros' memorial is AGI, Charcas 268, no. 70B, sin fecha, 8 fs. Palata notes the tie between the two in AGI, Charcas 270, no. 14 (see note 5) and AGI, Charcas 270, no. 32, the Duque de la Palata to the crown, Lima, 19.II.1689, 4 fs., "No. 34. El Virrey del Peru. Da quenta a VMag.d de la reintegracion de la mita de Potosi en la forma que contiene el Despacho de que remite Copia, que es todo lo que a podido aplicasse de Indios a los Mineros é Ingenios de aq.lla Villa, y acompaña la consulta que se hizo por la Junta de Tres Ministros en la Ciudad de la Plata, y con vista de todo se dio este expediente: y para que VM tenga presente lo obrado en esta materia remite copia de la carta qe escribio por Agosto de 1683 en que dio notizia de hazerse la numeraz.on g.l para este efecto." See, also, the Viceroy's "Advertencias para la ejecución de los despachos de la nueva retasa y repartimiento de mitas de Potosí que han de tener presentes los corregidores y dar a entender a los indios," Lima, 29.IV.1689, contained in Palata's "Relación" (see note 1), VI, 231-239. Another copy of the "Advertencias" is BNB, MSS 4, fs. 301a-304, "Provisión del virrey (Palata): Advertencias para la ejecución de los despachos de la nueva retasa y repartimiento de mitas de Potosí, que han de tener presentes los corregidores y dar

a entender a los indios," Lima, 29.IV.1689 (MC 1093; MOM 681). The "Advertencias" are discussed by Zavala, Servicio personal, II, 183-186; and by Ezquerria Abadía, 492-495. The deliberations of the Real Acuerdo are outlined by Palata in his "Relación" (see note 1), VI, 221-229; and in Castillo (AGI, Charcas 270, no. 33C--see note 30, Chapter II), 32v-44.

20. Castillo (AGI, Charcas 270, no. 33C--see note 30, Chapter II), 45-49. The date of the Acuerdo's vote is given in Palata's "Advertencias" (see note 19).

21. AGI, Charcas 270, no. 14 (see note 5).

22. Ibid. Palata says that he participated in just such a fracaso in Naples. On that occasion the bungled census cost the Real Hazienda 80,000 ducats per year.

23. AGI, Charcas 270, no. 15, second item, "Copia de carta q.e el Duq.e de la Palata mi s.or escrivio á todos los obispos y Prelados deste Reyno para q.e encargasen á los curas y Doctrineros hiziessen Padron de los Indios de su filigressia y la remitiesen á sus Prelados en 7 de Abril 1683," 4 fs. The copy is signed by Joseph Bernal, the Viceroy's secretary. Palata's warning not to tell the priests why there were conducting the padron reads:

"No sera menester decir á los Curas el motibo porq<sup>e</sup> se les pide el Padron, porq<sup>e</sup> en publicandolo en las Provincias podra barrenarse la diligencia, y quedar inutiles las q<sup>e</sup> despues se han de seguir, y assi conviene q<sup>e</sup> esta Carta la tenga VS. reserbada para sí, y como vaya recibiendo los Padrones de los curas, me los remita para q<sup>e</sup> aqui me sirban de Libro mayor, por donde pueda reconocer las diligencias que hacen los Corregidores á quienes se ha de cometer la numeración por escusar gastos, que ni la R<sup>l</sup> Hacienda puede costear, ni fuera justo grabar con ellos á los Pueblos de cuyo alivio, y remedio se trata."

Ezquerria Abadía, 491-492, briefly notes this process.

24. AGI, Charcas 270, no. 1 (see note 70, Chapter VI).

25. AGI, Charcas 270, no. 15, second item (see note 23--especially the quote there).

26. AGN, Sala IX, 14-8-10, f. 244, "A los cvras de las provincias del Perv," Lima, 20.VII.1683 (by the Duque de la Palata), 1 f. See AGI, Charcas 270, no. 15, second item (see note 23) for the same sentiments. Also of value: AGI, Charcas 270, no. 16 (see note 2); and AGI,



Charcas 270, no. 18, the comments of the Fiscal of the Council of the Indies on that letter, Madrid, 18.V.1685, 3 fs.

27. AGI, Charcas 270, no. 13, first item, "Instrucción que han de guardar los Corregidores en la numeración general que se ha de hazer de los Indios, cada uno en su jurisdicción," by the Duque de la Plata, Lima, 24.VII.1683, 5 fs. See, also, AGN, Sala IX, 14-8-10, fs. 242-243, another instruction by the Duque de la Plata about the general census and those that might endanger its completion by hiding Indians, Lima, 24.VII.1683. Also of value is Palata's "Relación" (see note 1), VI, 227-228.

28. AGI, Charcas 270, no. 15, first item (see note 28); and AGN, Sala IX, 14-8-10, fs. 242-243 (see note 28). For the change to two years--which took place in August, 1683--see Palata's "Relación" (see note 1), VI, 228-229. Holmes, 55-56, describes Palata's decisions on the census and the repartimiento. The Viceroy's letter to the crown of 21.VIII.1683 (AGI, Charcas 270, no. 16--see note 2) also discusses this process. See, too, the Council of the Indies' end-of-the-century summary (AGI, Charcas 273, no. 21--see note 91, Chapter II); and AGI, Charcas 270, no. 32 (see note 19).

29. AGI, Charcas 270, no. 15, first item (see note 27).

30. AGI, Charcas 270, no. 16 (see note 2); AGI, Charcas 270, no. 18 (see note 26); and AGI, Charcas 270, no. 32 (see note 19).

31. AGI, Charcas 270, no. 20, the Duque de la Palata to the crown, Lima, 10.VI.1685, 1 f.; "El Virrey del Peru. Da cuenta à VMg.d del estado en que tiene la numeración general de los Indios, y remite el Informe que le hizo el contador Don Joseph de Villegas, de las dudas que se le ofrezcan en los autos de las numeraciones que se le han repartido para la retassa."

32. AGI, Charcas 270, no. 20A, "Copia del papel de dudas q.e Don Joseph de Villegas contador de retasas para la ordenaz.on de los Autos de la numeración g.l de los Indios," Lima, 12.VI.1685 (?--the copy is dated, by Bernal, 10.VI.1685), 10 fs. Villegas said that one of the other results of the census was that it appeared that there were more priests in some places than were necessary. Pereyra, 30-36, says that Peru had undergone a "transformación demográfica general."

33. AGI, Charcas 270, no. 20A (see note 32).

34. So noted by the Council of the Indies in its end-of-the-century summary (AGI, Charcas 273, no. 21--see note 91, Chapter II). Palata's response is AGI, Charcas 270, no. 21, the Duque de la Palata to the crown, Lima, 16.II.1686, 2 fs.; "El Virrey del Peru Representa lo que se le ofrezze con vista del Desp.<sup>o</sup> de S.M. de 10 de Junio del año pasado que trata de la Numerazion gral."

35. For the Council's reasons, AGI, Charcas 270, no. 19, the Council of the Indies to the crown, Madrid, 25.V. 1685, 2 fs.; "A 25 de Mayo 1685, acordada el mis<sup>o</sup> dia ... Pone en las R.s manos de V Mgd la carta adjunta del Duque de la Palata, en que da quenta de lo que hiva disponiendo en orden al mejor cobro de la mina de Potosi, Sobre que el Cons.<sup>o</sup> dice lo que se le ofrezze." In the margin is a sign and "Como parece al consejo," with a rubric.

36. AGI, Charcas 270, no. 21 (see note 34).

37. AGI, Charcas 270, no. 22, the Duque de la Palata to the crown, Lima, 6.IV.1686, 2 fs.; "El Virrey del Peru. Da quenta a V.M. del buen estado en que se halla la Numeracion g.l y acompaña un exemplar de la Provision de Retasa de las que se han de despachar, quedando hechas ya las de la Prov.a de Vilcas, Guaman, y dize lo que se le ofrezze en esta materia." The copy noted is AGI, Charcas 270, no. 22A, "Nueva Provicion de Retasa de Tributo que an de pagar los Indios del Repartimiento de Paio Marcas de la Prov.a de Vilcas guaman que estubieron encomendados en Don Juan Palomino como subzesor de Juan palomino y oy lo estan en la Rl hazienda por falta de subcecion," sin fecha, 25 fs. For another defense of the general census, AGI, Charcas 270, no. 26, the Duque de la Palata to the crown, Lima, 11.X.1687, 1 f.; "El Virrey del Peru. Representa à V.M: el estado en que se halla el expediente de la Numeración g.l de los Indios de las Provincias deste Reyno y que con el primer aviso remitirá un mapa de la conclusion y estado deste negocio." Though not perfect, Palata says the census has gone better than he had expected.

38. AGI, Charcas 270, no. 22 (see note 37).

39. "Aranzel de los jornales que se han de pagar a los indios assi voluntarios, Mingados, Alquileras, y agregados à las Haziendas de Españoles, como Mitayos, y de obligacion, en todo genero de trabajo. Mandado ordenar por el excelentissimo señor D. Melchor de Navarra, y Rocafull ... Duque de la Palata ... en virtud de Cedula de su Magestad

de 7, de Noviembre del Año passado de 680." The "Aranzel" is discussed by Zavala, Servicio personal, II, 178-180; and reproduced as an appendix on 207-213 (from the copy in the John Carter Brown Library, Providence; S 12b. Caja 1. No. 22). It is not dated save for the year (spaces left for handwritten dates are blank). Another copy is AGN, Sala IX, 14-8-10, fs. 28-44; that copy is dated Los Reyes, 16.X.1687.

40. Zavala, Servicio personal, II, 180-183.

41. AGI, Charcas 270, no. 27A, "Copia de Carta q.e el ex.mo s.or Duque de la Palata mi s.or escrivio al S.or Arzobispo de los charcas, para que juntandose con el Presste de aquella Rl Audiencia, y Correx.or de Potosi confiriesen la reparticion de los Yndios que deve hazerse a aquellos Azogueros conforme el estado de las haziendas de cada uno." Lima, 18.III.1688, 3 fs.; AGI, Charcas 270, no. 29, President Christóval Mesía to the crown, La Plata, 21.I.1689, 1 f., "Informa como estando en Potosi en el desp.o de Arm.dá el año pass.do de 1688 rrecivio orden del Virrey Duque de la Palata p.a q.e cerrada la carta q.e truse en su Comp.a a aq.lla ciu.d al Gen.l D. P.o Luis Enriquez correg.or de aq.lla Villa, para que con el Arcbpo D Bartholome Goncalvez de Poveda se formase una Junta de los tres para hacer el rrepartim.to de la Mita de Potosi (como se esecuto) de que p.r menor refiere que el Virrey da q.ta p.r ser a q.n toca, Y dize lo que ymportava poner este puntal a Potosi p.r el descaecim.to en qe se halla p.r falta de Inos"; AGI, Charcas 270, no. 31, the Duque de la Palata to the crown, Lima, 18.II.1689, 1 f., "el Virrey del Peru. Da quenta a VMag.d de lo que han travajado en el negocio de la Numeracion g.l los Contadores Don Joseph de Villegas, y Dn Pedro Antonio de castillo para que VMag.d los premie y tenga presentes en sus adelantamientos"; and AGI, Charcas 270, no. 32A, "Copia de la Consulta que hicieron al ex.mo s.or Duque de la Palata mi s.or los Ministros de la Junta de la Ciudad de la Plata con reconocimiento de todo lo obrado en la Numeracion g.l de los Indios para la reintegracion de la Mita de Potosi," La Plata, 19.X.1688, 6 fs. Palata notes that the census took longer than had been planned in his "Advertencias" (see note 19). Ezquerria Abadía, 492, discusses the impact of the earthquake.

42. Palata relates the work of the committee in his "Relación" (see note 1), VI, 230; and in AGI, Charcas 270, no. 32 (see note 19). See, too, AGI, Charcas 270, nos. 27 and 27A (see note 41). Mesía wrote the crown soon after his arrival that he believed the general census would solve Potosí's problems, and that he felt fifty mitayos

were needed for each mill--thirty to work in the cerro and twenty in the mill (AGI, Charcas 270, no. 24, President Christóval Mesía to the crown, La Plata, 10.III.1687, 2 fs.).

43. AGI, Charcas 270, no. 27A (see note 41).

44. AGI, Charcas 270, no. 32A (see note 41). The azogueros said fifty-seven of seventy-three mills received mitayos, in AGI, Charcas 271, no. 7B, the Deputies of the Gremio de azogueros to the crown, Potosí, 21.VIII.1692, 10 fs. Palata said 2,821 Indians were included in the mita ordinaria in AGI, Charcas 270, no. 32 (see note 19); and Crespo, "La 'Mita,'" 182, uses that figure. In his "Relación" (see note 1) Palata used the 2,829 Indians figure (VI, 230). NOTE: the transcription provided by Hanke and Rodríguez is incorrect; the figure "8" used to mark thousands has been replaced with a "0" and thus the 2,829 Indians in the mita ordinaria are mis-represented as 20,829. The Viceroy Conde de la Monclova would later note the areas added by Palata in AGI, Charcas 273, no. 4A, a declaration by the Conde de la Monclova, Los Reyes, 19.VII.1692, 2 fs. The Council of the Indies' end-of-the-century summary (AGI, Charcas 273, no. 21--see note 91, Chapter II) provides the total of 56,046 and a break-down of that figure. Ezquerria Abadía, 492, says that 2,829 Indians were included in the mita ordinaria and provides the newly added regions on 495-496. The mita ordinaria was not a strict one-third of one-seventh, as it had not been in Francisco de Toledo's repartimientos (see note 45 for the varying percentages). The three mills included in the repartimiento, over those identified by González de Santiago, included a second owned by Antonio de Guzmán Maldonado (AGI, Charcas 270, no. 32A--see note 41); he would later figure in a battle with the Corregidor de Potosí over his use of those mitayos: ANB, M 126, no. 6, "El capitán don Antonio de Guzmán Maldonado sobre los cuarenta indios de mita de su ingenio de Cantumarca, en la ribera de Potosí, que le ha quitado el conde de Velayos, corregidor de dicha villa," Potosí, 1.IV-19.V.1699, 91 fs. (MC 1148; MOM 694).

45. AGI, Charcas 270, no. 30, the Duque de la Palata's provisión of 29.I.1689 (in Los Reyes) for publication in Potosí, 40 fs.--the repartimiento itself. The terms of the repartimiento were included in BNB, MSS 4, fs. 442-449, "Provisión de don Melchor de Navarra y Rocafull, duque de la Palata, virrey del Perú: En cumplimiento de la real cédula de 1676.VII.8, se extiende la obligación de dar indios mitayos para las minas e ingenios de Potosí a los pueblos que hasta ahora estaban exentos y se señala el

orden general que en ese y otros puntos ha de tener este servicio," Lima, 2.XII.1688 (MC 1082; MOM 680). The percentages of Indians required depended upon their place of residence:

- 17 per cent (service once every six years)--all provinces within seventy leagues of Potosí: Cochabamba, Tarixa, Tomina, Pilaya, Misque, Yamparaes, Chayanta, Porco, Paria and Carangas
- 16 per cent (service once every six and one-half years)--areas around La Paz: Sicasica, Omasuyos, Pacajes, Chucuito and Paucarcolla
- 15 per cent (service once every seven years)--Asillo and Lampa
- 14 per cent (service once every seven years)--Canas y Canches

The Real Acuerdo gave the new repartimiento its stamp of approval on 13.I.1689, according to the Council of the Indies' end-of-the-century summary (AGI, Charcas 273, no. 21--see note 91, Chapter II).

46. AGI, Charcas 270, no. 32 (see note 19). Sánchez-Albornoz, 76-77, discusses this letter. See, also, the Council's end-of-the-century summary (AGI, Charcas 273, no. 21--see note 91, Chapter II). Crespo, "La 'Mita,'" 182, says the census showed the population had fallen. Basadre, "El Régimen," 352-353, notes that the decline in the population was clear in Palata's addition of forasteros and new provinces in the mita. Both Crespo and Basadre are correct, but one must bear in mind that Indian migration from the sixteen obligated provinces was, quite possibly, offset by an increase in the remaining provinces of Upper Peru. Sánchez-Albornoz, 26-34, compares the totals from Toledo's 1573 census and the 1683 count--for ten provinces--and concludes that there was a net drop from 161,095 to 93,331. We are, nevertheless, waiting for the definitive study of the 1683 enumeration. I hope that Brian Evans' work will clear up the questions that remain about it (see note 37, Chapter I). One must bear in mind, however, that Toledo's 1573 figures are probably inaccurate; just as the 1683 figures are.

47. Sánchez-Albornoz, 86-91, notes the comparative success of the Duque de la Palata. The Viceroy promised that the entire process would be completed by the time his successor arrived in AGI, Charcas 270, no. 27 (see note 41). For the chain of events which resulted in the nomination of the Conde de la Monclova as Viceroy of Peru, see Hanke and Rodríguez, Los virreyes, Perú VII (no. 286),

153-154 (based, primarily, on Antonio Domínguez Ortiz, "Un virreinato en venta," Mercurio Peruano, no. 453 (Lima, 1965), 43-51).

48. AGI, Charcas 270, no. 2, the caciques of Pacajes to the crown, 6.VIII.1681, 2 fs.; "Representan las vejaciones que reciben del gremio de los acogueros de Potosí, los quales ynstan en que el entero de la mita se haga por el ultimo repartimto que hico el año de 633 Dñ Jun de Carvajal, y sandi empadronando en aquel tpo mas de lo 675 Yndios tributarios, siendo asi que en la visita del año de 680 se hallaron 18510 y aunque an solicitado se les conceda revisita no lo an conseguido por las razones que expresan de q.e remiten tesam.o"; the 1680 revisita was conducted by "Mño de campo Juan Belasques de Ovando."

49. ANB, M 126, no. 1, "Pascual Huanca, indio originario del pueblo de Caquiaviri, provincia de Pacajes, sobre que don Francisco Quispi, enterador de la mita de dicho pueblo, no extraiga la impetrante del convento de San Francisco de Potosí, donde actualmente está sirviendo, para mandarlo a las labores del cerro," La Plata and Potosí, 23.VI.1683, 32 fs. (MC 1050; MOM 675). Sánchez-Albornoz, 92-95, comments on the protection afforded to runaway Indians by hacendados, and the agreements they reached with caciques; see note 52, below, as well.

50. ANB, M 126, no. 2, "Pedro Mamani, indio residente en el pueblo de Puna, provincia de Porco, sobre que se le exima de la mita de Potosí, tanto por haberla servido muchos años sin descanso como por no ser originario sino forastero en dicho pueblo," Porco, 1-20.V.1684, 4 fs. (MC 1060; MOM 676).

51. ANB, M 126, no. 3, "Capítulos puestos por don Juan Bautista Catari, indio, capitán enterador de la mita del pueblo de Puna, provincia de Porco, contra don Pedro Anava, indio, gobernador de dicho pueblo, por distracción de mitayos en provecho propio y otros excesos," Porco, 24.IV.1684, 5 fs. (MC 1064; MOM 677). For another case of similar import, see ANB, EC 1689, no. 31, "Capítulos puestos por Juan Choque Mamani contra don Martín Chui Fernández, gobernador del pueblo de Laja, corregimiento de Omasuyos, provincia de La Paz, por usurpación de tributos, census, arrendamientos de tierras, servicio personal y provechos de pulpería de los indios a su cargo ... Aumento de los mitayos del pueblo de Laja por esfuerzo del gobernador Fernández, f. 163, 229v. Privilegios de hijos de caciques con relación a la mita, f. 423, 424, 446," 1685-1689, 346 fs. (MC 1093a; MOM 682). In this instance,

the charges appear to have been brought by a disgruntled Indian who had been forcibly returned to his pueblo, and was then denied the cacique status he aspired to.

52. Sánchez-Albornoz, 99-107, discusses the complaints of the capitanes about caciques; and he provides a full transcription of the questions and answers as an appendix on pages 113-149 (from AGN, Sala XIII, 23-10-2). Zavala, Servicio personal, II, 190-193, also describes the testimony of the capitanes enteradores. The questioning took place in Potosí from 13-20.III.1690, and a traslado was produced on 24.III.1690 by Escrivano Juan de Torres.

53. Ibid.

54. This is noted many times in two bodies of complaints about the general census, tax reforms, and new repartimiento de la mita. Both are entitled "Representaciones y quejas ... 1689-1690," and are housed in the AGN (see note 92, Chapter II). The first is AGN, Sala IX, 10-3-7, 649 fs., and covers the provinces of La Paz, Tomina, Pilaya, Misque, Omasuyo and Cochabamba; the second is AGN, Sala XIII, legajo 73, last item, and includes material from Porco, Chayanta, Tarija, Paria and Carangas (its folios are numbers 477-597; a note on the last says that the material for Cuzco was removed because it pertained to the Audiencia de Lima--the remainder would have fallen under the Audiencia de Charcas--and the folios involved were 601-630. Dr. Horacio Villanueva Urteaga, Director of the Archivo Departamental de Cusco, told me in January, 1980, that he was transcribing complaints by rural priests about the general census from 1689 and 1690. The documentation he was using was from the AGI, Lima 471; it may well be that which was removed from the second volume). The arguments included in "Representaciones y quejas" are summarized by the Bishop of Cuzco in a letter to the Conde de la Monclova; AGI, Charcas 271, no. 8A, "Copia del informe, que se hizo al s.<sup>r</sup> Conde de la Monclova Virrey destos Reynos sobre la numeracion Gen.<sup>l</sup> del año de 683 y Mita de Potosi," Cuzco, 19.III.1691, 2 fs. A cover letter for this copy, sent to the crown, is AGI, Charcas 271, no. 8, Manuel Obispo de Cuzco to the crown, Cuzco, 3.X.1692, 1 f. In no. 8A the Bishop says that the corregidores botched the census; that many Indians had been counted many times; that new tax and mita obligations failed to take into account the demographic changes of six years; and that the Indians were fleeing to live with the infidels. The response to Palata's reforms requires much more attention than that which I can give it here; I have copious notes on the two AGN tomes, and suspect that others will be found,

for the second volume's folios are numbered "477" forward. Once Dr. Villanueva's material for Cuzco is reunited with the AGN documentation, I hope to produce a comprehensive study of the provincial response to the Palata reforms.

55. "Representaciones y quejas, 1689-1690" (see note 54). Palata notes the Corregidor's activities in his "Relación" (see note 1), VI, 230, as well. Sánchez-Albornoz, 77, comments on the over-reaction to novelties in colonial Peru generally, and in this instance; he says that such balanced, Solomon-like, solutions always provoke the enmity of everyone. Ezquerria Abadía, 492-495, identifies corregidores, priests and caciques as the enemies of the mita. The Council of the Indies' end-of-the-century summary (AGI, Charcas 273, no. 21--see note 91, Chapter II), gives an overview of the complaints; as does AGI, Charcas 271, no. 8A (see note 54).

56. "Representaciones y quejas, 1689-1690" (see note 54). The problem with the time delay is noted by Ezquerria Abadía, 492-495. Dobyns, 509-510, speaks of a measles epidemic in Ecuador and Peru between 1692 and 1694, but includes no mention of the pestes of the 1680s. The Bishop of Cuzco (AGI, Charcas 271, no. 8A--see note 54) says that eight to ten Indians died each day in every one of that city's parroquias during the epidemics.

57. "Representaciones y quejas, 1689-1690" (see note 54). Holmes, 56, notes that the inclusion of forasteros "was directly contrary to royal ordinance." Technically that is correct, but the crown had certainly opened the door to their incorporation with its 1681 cédula.

58. "Representaciones y quejas, 1689-1690" (see note 54).

59. See note 19 for the various sources for the "Advertencias." The Real Acuerdo voted, on 24.IV and 21.VII.1689, to uphold the Duque de la Palata's reforms, but to reduce the originarios' tribute by one-third and the forasteros' by one-half, according to the Council of the Indies' end-of-the-century summary (AGI, Charcas 273, no. 21--see note 91, Chapter II).

60. Palata observed that his "Advertencias" had been ineffective in his "Relación" (see note 1), VI, 238. His successor, the Conde de la Monclova, echoed that fact when he reversed many of Palata's reforms: BNB, MSS 4, fs. 279-287, "Provisión del virrey (Monclova): Señalase nuevo orden para el régimen de la mita de Potosí, abandonando el que



con motivo de la numeración general de indios de 1683, estableció el virrey duque de la Palata, por los numerosos inconvenientes que sobrevinieron en su aplicación," Lima, 27.IV.1692 (MC 1110; MOM 685).

61. Crahan, 412, claims that Palata's failures were caused by Hapsburg government structures; that he would have been more successful had he served under Charles III rather than Charles II. Ezquerria Abadía, 492-495, says that Palata's chances for success were seriously lowered by his replacement so soon after his reforms were introduced.

62. AGI, Charcas 270, no. 32 (see note 19).

63. AGI, Charcas 271, no. 1, Joseph Bernal to Antonio Ortiz de Otalora ("Señor Secretario"), Cádiz, 6.I.1692, 1 f. Schäfer, I, 371, identifies Ortiz de Otalora as secretary to the Council of the Indies. Bernal was the Duque de la Palata's secretary.

64. AGI, Charcas 271, no. 1B, Francisco Lorenzo de San Millan to "Señor Secretario" (Ortiz de Otalora), "de la Cap.na de Galeones," 29.XII.1-90, 1 f., "que luego que Rv<sup>o</sup> la que se le remitió para D. Joseph Bernal s.río que fue del Duque de la Palata, se la entrego y endandole el libro y pap.s que se le pedía lo remitira al Cons.<sup>o</sup> como se le ordeno"; AGI, Charcas 271, no. 1A, Joseph Bernal to "Señor Secretario," Cádiz, 30.XII.1690, 1 f., "Satisface a la que se le escribió sobre que entregase a D. fran.co de S.<sup>n</sup> Millan el libro y demas pap.s que el S.<sup>r</sup> Duque de la Palata dijo traya para el Cons.<sup>o</sup> de lo obrado para la reintegración de la mita de Potosí"; AGI, Charcas 271, no. 2, Joseph Bernal to "Señor Secretario," Cádiz, 19.I.1692, 1 f.; AGI, Charcas 271, no. 3, Joseph Bernal to "Señor Secretario," Cádiz, 26.I.1692, 1 f.; AGI, Charcas 271, no. 3A, Contador Pedro Antonio del Castillo to Joseph Bernal, Cádiz, 25.I.1692, 1 f.; AGI, Charcas 271, no. 4, Francisco Lorenzo de San Millan to "Señor Secretario," "Cap.na de Gal.es," 27.I.1692, 1 f.; and AGI, Charcas 271, no. 5, Francisco Lorenzo de San Millan to Antonio Ortiz de Otalora, Cádiz, 3.II.1692, 1 f. The first confirmation I have that the materials in question were in the possession of the Council of the Indies is AGI, Charcas 271, no. 9B, Pedro Antonio de Castillo to Diego de Villatoro, 1.XI.1692, 1 f.; he responds to a question of the previous evening whether there was a second tome on the general census; he says that there was only one by his hand, and that his copy was serving as a substitute for the original. See, also, AGI, Charcas 271, no. 9A, Joseph Bernal to Antonio Ortiz de

Otalora, Madrid, 27.X.1692, 1 f.; and AGI, Charcas 271, no. 9, Joseph Bernal to "Señor Secretario," Madrid, sin fecha, 1 f.

65. AGI, Charcas 270, no. 33, the Conde de la Monclova to the crown, Lima, 15.III.1690, 16 fs.; "El Virrey Conde de la Monclova da cuenta a VM de el estado General en que a hallado el Gobierno de estos Reinos y Provincias del Peru." The letter is transcribed and included in Virreinato peruano. Documentos para su historia. Colección de cartas de virreyes. Conde de la Monclova, ed. by Manuel Moreyra y Paz-Soldán and Guillermo Céspedes del Castillo (3 vols., Lima: Publicaciones del Instituto Histórico del Perú, 1954-1955), I, 15-23; the pertinent material is on pages 17-18. The letter is discussed by Zavala, Servicio personal, II, 189-190; and the Council of the Indies' end-of-the-century summary (AGI, Charcas 273, no. 21--see note 91, Chapter II). For the Council's Fiscal's response to the report, AGI, Charcas 270, no. 33A, Madrid, 27.III.1693, 4 fs.

66. The increase in complaints is noted by the Council in its end-of-the-century summary (AGI, Charcas 273, no. 21--see note 91, Chapter II). The azogueros observed that the complaints from the provinces were received by a sympathetic ear in AGI, Charcas 271, no. 7B (see note 44). Joseph Bernal said that many corregidores had suspended orders from Palata until the Conde de la Monclova could arrive in Peru (AGI, Charcas 271, no. 9--see note 64).

67. "Representaciones y quejas, 1689-1690" (see note 54); and the Bishop of Cuzco's letter of 19.III.1691 (AGI, Charcas 271, no. 8A--see note 54). Monclova included comments about these letters in his 27.IV.1692 reformation of the mita (BNB, MSS 4, fs. 279-287; see note 60).

68. AGN, Sala IX, 10-3-7 (one of two volumes of the "Representaciones y quejas, 1689-1690"--see note 54), 562-565v, Manuel de Ribero Leal to the Conde de la Monclova, Sipe-sipe, 11.XI.1690.

69. Holmes, 56, says that the azogueros were jubilant, but they were not. See AGI, Charcas 271, no. 7B (see note 44) for just one example of their unhappiness. The three officials who drew up the repartimiento (Enríquez, Mesía and González de Poveda) said the azogueros were upset with the changes they had made from the start (AGI, Charcas 270, no. 32A--see note 41).

70. AGI, Charcas 270, no. 32 (see note 19).

71. Ezquerria Abadía, 492, says that the committee of three (Enríquez, Mesía and González de Poveda) noted that the 2,829 Indians in the mita ordinaria represented an increase of 1,401-1/2 over the previous delivery of only 1,427-1/2. The Duque de la Palata included that comparison in his "Relación" (see note 1), VI, 230; as I noted in note 45, the transcription of numbers in the Hanke and Rodríguez copy is in error.
72. AGI, Charcas 270, no. 5 (see note 9).
73. BNB, MSS 4, fs. 279-287 (see note 60). See, also, AGI, Charcas 273, no. 3, the Conde de la Monclova to the crown, Lima, 31.XII.1691, 17 fs.; "El Virrey Conde de la Monclova Da cuenta a V.M. del estado en que hallo la Mita de Potosi, efectos que causó la Numeracion general de Indios que mando hacer su Antecesor y el estado que oy tiene vno y otro negocio, embiando vn papel firmado de los Relatores que asisten a la Junta que ha mandado formar sobre ambas materias por donde se reconocen mas individualmente."
74. BNB, MSS 4, fs. 279-287 (see note 60); Monclova says that the idea was the azogueros', and that they offered to pay. The azogueros, in AGI, Charcas 271, no. 7B (see note 44), contend that Monclova forced them to pay the 30,000 pesos to support Enríquez and 5,000 for his wife. Sánchez-Albornoz, 79-93, discusses the azogueros' appointment of Enríquez. Arzáns, Historia, II, 357-368, says that Enríquez went to Lima in early 1691 after a meeting with the azogueros; in AGI, Charcas 273, no. 3 (see note 73), the Viceroy says that he arrived at Callao in November of 1690. Ezquerria Abadía, 495-496, is even more confused, saying that Enríquez went to Lima after changes were made and that the azogueros wanted him to replace Monclova as viceroy (see note 84, below, for the azogueros' request that González de Poveda succeed to the post). Pedro Luis Enríquez was the Conde de Canillas, but for the sake of clarity I have stayed with his sir name.
75. AGI, Charcas 273, no. 21 (the Council of the Indies' end-of-the-century summary--see note 91 Chapter II).
76. BNB, MSS 4, fs. 279-287 (see note 60).
77. Lagúñez' and Figueroa's offerings are included in AGI, Charcas 272, as the first item: "Quaderno 2. Reducese á los escritos de Alegaciones que dieron el Fiscal de la Audiencia de Lima, y el Protector General de los Naturales de el Reyno de el Peru en defensa de los Yndios

pidiendo su alivio y desagravio." The tome is one of three; the first of which is in AGI, Charcas 271, last item, "Al Rey N<sup>ro</sup> Señor. En su R<sup>l</sup> Consejo de las Yndias. El Virrey de el Peru Conde de la Monclova - ... Remite Testimonio de lo dispuesto resuelto y executado sobre el entero de la Mita de Potosi y cobranza de tributos en las Provincias afectas â ella, y en las libres dividido en tres quadernos - quaderno 1<sup>o</sup> Contiene vn Memorial ajustado de los Autos de la Numeracion Gen.<sup>l</sup> que se executo de orden de el Virrey Duque de la Palata y de las representaciones hechas sobre los Despachos que dio en su virtud. Coordinado En la Junta que se formo para reconocerlos"; the third volume is included in AGI, Charcas 273, last item, "Quaderno 3<sup>o</sup> Comprehende los puntos que el Virrey propuso en la Junta para que los Ministros y Personas que la compusieron le dixessen su parecer. Y los que se le dieron. Y lo que con vista de ellos dixo el Arzobispo de Lima, y resolvió el Virrey en Despacho de 27 de Abril de 1692 y Repartimiento de Mita que se dispuso en conformidad de lo resuelto. Al fin de este quaderno está impreso el Despacho citado, y vn resumen que de el se hizo para que los Curas de Yndios lo diesen â entender a todos los de sus Dotrinas. Y la Carta en que el Virrey remite el Testimonio haziendo succinta relacion de lo que contiene. Y dize su parecer en algunos puntos graves que no se han determinado." Each of the three volumes is indexed, and those indices are transcribed in Guía de las fuentes en el Archivo General de Indias (ed. by Hanke and Rodríguez), I, 331-340. See, also, AGI, Charcas 273, no. 3 (see note 73); BNB, MSS 4, fs. 279-287 (see note 60); and AGI, Charcas 273, no. 4, the Conde de la Monclova to the crown, Lima, 15.VIII.1692, 14 fs., "El Virrey Conde de la Monclova Remite a VM. testimonios de todos los Papeles causados sobre el expediente que ha dado a las representaciones que se hicieron a su Antecessor y a el, luego que entró a gobernar tocantes a lo que se innovó en quanto a Tassas y Mitas en los Despachos que se dieron en virtud de la Num.on que se executó el año de 1683 haziendo relacion succinta de todo lo que contienen, y dice su parecer sobre algunos puntos que no se han determinado." Lagúñez' paper is also discussed by the Council of the Indies' end-of-the-century summary (AGI, Charcas 273, no. 21--see note 91. Chapter II). The condensed version is AGI, Charcas 273, no. 2, "Lic. D. Joseph de ... de Garrica ... y Lic. D. Ber.do Romero" to the Conde de la Monclova, Lima, 26.XII.1691, 35 fs.

78. AGI, Charcas 273, no. 5, Oidor Mathías Lagúñez to the crown, Lima, 15.IX.1692, 10 fs.; "El Lizenciado Don Mathias Lagunes Oidor de la Real Audiencia de Lima da cuenta

a V.M. de la defensa, que â hecho por la conservacion de los Yndios, i aquel Reyno contra los agravios, e injusticias de la Mita de Potosi remitiendo el papel que â escrito sobre ello."

79. These are listed in BNB, MSS 4, fs. 279-287; and in the Council of the Indies' end-of-the-century summary (AGI, Charcas 273, no. 21--see note 91, Chapter II). See, also, "Quaderno 3o" (see note 77).

80. AGN, Sala IX, 14-8-10, fs. 187-187v, for the original order of Lima, 24.IV.1692, by the Conde de la Monclova. BNB, MSS 4, fs. 279-287 (see note 60) is the printed provisi3n of 27.IV.1692. The latter is noted by Ezquerria Abadía, 495-496. The decisions involved are described in AGI, Charcas 273, no. 4A (see note 44). For the Archbishop of Lima's discussion of the process, AGI, Charcas 271, no. 6, Melchor Arzobispo de Lima to the crown, Lima, 1.IX.1692, 20 fs., "Refiere el expediente que se a dado en q.to al ajuste de la numeracion gen.l de In.os de que le dio pte el Virrey, para que dijese su sentir"; and "Quaderno 3o" (see note 77).

81. A copy of the repartimiento is BNB, MSS 31, fs. 37-53, "Repartimiento general de indios de mita para las minas e ingenios de Potosí hecho de orden del conde de la Monclova, virrey del Perú," Lima, 27.IV.1692 (MC 1111; MOM 686). For the general provisi3n by Monclova, dated 8.V.1692, AGN, Sala IX, 14-8-10, fs. 50-145v. Sánchez-Albornoz, 79-83, refers to the AGN document. For the ordinances that azogueros were to follow, BNB, MSS 31, fs. 53-64, "Provisi3n del virrey: Se detallan las ordenanzas con arreglo a las cuales se ha de hacer a los dueños de minas e ingenios de Potosí la distribuci3n de indios señalada en el repartimiento general de Lima, 1692.IV.27," Lima, 6.V.1692 (MC1112; MOM 687). See, also, AGI, Charcas 273, no. 4A (see note 44). In AGI, Charcas 273, no. 4 (see note 77), Monclova says that Enríquez, Ximénez Lobaton and Oviedo were assigned responsibility for deciding which mills would be assigned mitayos--based on their performance to date. The terms were also included in AGI, Charcas 271, no. 7D, Corregidor Enríquez to the Gremio de azogueros, Lima, 28.IV.1692, 2 fs.; and the Council of the Indies' end-of-the-century summary (AGI, Charcas 273, no. 21--see note 91, Chapter II). Zavala, Servicio personal, II, 196-197, works from the orders that were sent to Cochabamba; and he discusses the 27.IV.1692 document on pages II, 194-195. Holmes, 56, says that the mita was cut back to the originarios in all thirty provinces (based on Cañete y Domínguez), but in truth only those in the sixteen

provinces were obligated under Monclova's repartimiento.

82. AGI, Charcas 271, no. 7D (see note 81).

83. Arzáns, Historia, II, 363.

84. AGI, Charcas 271, no. 7A, "la republica de Potosi" to the crown, Potosí, 1.IV.1692, 2 fs.; "Sup.ca se ponga en el Gov.<sup>o</sup> superior de aquellos reynos a D. Bar.me Gonz.s de Poveda, Arcobpo de charcas, para reparo del descaecim.to de los minerales, por la practica y experiencias con que se hallava." Also, AGI, Charcas 271, no. 7, the Deputies of the Gremio de azogueros to the crown, Potosí, 20.IX. 1692, 6 fs.; "Refieren los daños que se yban experimentando con la entrada de los In.os de cedula de las Prov.as destinadas a las minas del Cerro y su Ribera." AGI, Charcas 271, no. 7B (see note 44), also expresses the azogueros' unhappiness with Lima-based government officials --during the viceroyalty of the Duque de la Palata.

85. The azogueros' memorial appears to be AGI, Charcas 271, no. 7C, the Gremio de azogueros to the Conde de la Monclova, Potosí, 19.VIII.1692, 4 fs. They describe their complaint in AGI, Charcas 273, no. 6, the Deputies of the Gremio de azogueros to the crown, Potosí, 9.XII.1693, 3 fs. (sent after their pleas to the Viceroy had been ignored). The Conde de la Monclova describes their petition in AGI, Charcas 273, no. 10, the Conde de la Monclova to the crown, Lima, 21.X.1693, 18 fs.; "El Virrey Conde de la Monclova Da quenta a V.M. de lo executado en Potosi sobre el entero y reparticion de la Mita de Minas e Ingenios de aquella rivera en conformidad de lo que resolvió en el Despacho impresso que viene remitido a. V.M. y embia testimonio de las diligencias hechas por el Conde de Canillas antes de dejar el cargo de Corregidor, y quedar exerciendole el Conde de Velayos su Succesor." Of particular concern was the increased jornal, but the azogueros presented Enríquez with a memorial dealing also with the payment of travel allowances, the shift back to two weeks rest, and the exclusion of forasteros (that they considered responsible for leaving the twenty-three mills without mitayo labor).

86. AGI, Charcas 271, no. 7B (see note 44).

87. AGI, Charcas 273, no. 4 (see note 77). For the Conde de la Monclova's outline of Enríquez' activities, and the date of his arrival, see AGI, Charcas 273, no. 10 (see note 85). Enríquez wrote the crown that everyone in Potosí was interested--directly or indirectly--in the mita; AGI, Charcas 271, no. 11, the Corregidor Conde de Canillas to

the crown, Potosí, 10.XII.1692, 3 fs. That letter also discussed his report to Viceroy Monclova (and included a copy of it); AGI, Charcas 271, no. 11B, the Conde de Canillas to the Conde de la Monclova, Potosí, 29.XI.1692, 5 fs. Enríquez' commission is AGI, Charcas 271, no. 11A, Lima, 7.VI.1692, 2 fs. (a copy). Sánchez-Albornoz, 79-83, discusses the complaints Enríquez faced when he returned to Potosí; as does the Council of the Indies' end-of-the-century summary (AGI, Charcas 273, no. 21--see note 91, Chapter II); and Arzáns, Historia, II, 364-365.

88. AGI, Charcas 271, no. 11B (see note 87).

89. AGI, Charcas 271, no. 11 (see note 87). Enríquez did move to collect the debts of the twenty-three mills: ANB, M 116, no. 5, "Testimonio de las diligencias que se obraron en Potosí en cumplimiento de la comisión que el conde de la Monclova, virrey de Lima, dio al conde de Canillas, corregidor de Potosí, con motivo del dictamen que expidió el licenciado don Matías Lagúnez, fiscal de la Real Audiencia de Lima, en la consulta hecha por los oficiales reales de dicha villa sobre la cobranza de las cantidades que en razón de plata y azogues están debiendo las veintitrés cabezas de ingenios que quedaron sin indios de mita en el último repartimiento que hizo el mencionado virrey," Potosí, 5.IV-8.V.1693, 20 fs. (MC 1114; MOM 688). This document is very useful because it provides a complete description of the relationship between silver merchants and azogeros; a profile of the owners of the twenty-three mills (confirming what the veedores and Capitán mayor de la mita had reported); and evidence that the royal treasury actually lost money when it rented mills to pay the debts of their owners.

90. AGI, Charcas 273, no. 4 (see note 77) for Enríquez' role in the original decision.

91. AGI, Charcas 273, no. 10 (see note 86), for the Viceroy's point of view. The azogeros' side of the story is AGI, Charcas 273, no. 6 (see note 85); and AGI, Charcas 271, no. 12, the Corregidor Conde de Canillas to the crown, Potosí, 10.XII.1692, 6 fs., provides the Corregidor's account. Enríquez sent along to the crown evidence that the azogeros were happy with the compromise (they denied that they were pleased) as AGI, Charcas 271, no. 12A, "Declaraciones de Los Acogueros de vde de Potosi cerca de Hallarse Gustosos con El Repartimiento de Yndios Por El ex.<sup>mo</sup> s.<sup>r</sup> Conde de la Monclova Virrey Gobernador Y Capp.<sup>an</sup> Gen.<sup>l</sup> de estos Reynos," sin fecha, 17 fs.; and AGI, Charcas 271, no. 12B, 5 fs. (the summary is dated 11.XII.1692, and

reads:

"Resumen de lo que Contienen las Declaraciones del testimonio de Las foxas siguientes a esta Para La mas Breve ynteligencia de estas --  
 Por dichas Declaraciones Consta aver trece Cavezas de Yngenios. mas Arrendadas Por la Real caja Por lo que deven a Su Magestad, Y otras de Azogueros que unas ni otras tienen Minas en que trabajan Por cuya rrazon an tenido arrendados Sus Yndios a otros cuyo Precio Perciven Parassi Consta assi mesmo de otras cinco cavezas quitadas a cinco Azogueros que las tenían duplicadas Y an quedado cada vno con vna  
 Consta que otras cinco cavezas de Yngenio cuyos dueños tienen Minas que daren sin repartimiento Por no aver alcansado a ellas el numero de Yndios en la Septima que se repartieron  
 Y Por lo rresuelto en el Punto, octavo de la Provisión ympresa de su excelencia Sobre las determinaciones de la Mita que e visto de que doy fee consta aver Mandado su excelencia se vengan Presentes. Para aComodarlos en qualquier accidente que sobrebenga  
 De suerte que las Partidas rreferidas componen Las veinte y tres cavezas de Yngenios que an quedado sin repartimiento. en el que tiene hecho su excelencia el Señor Virrey Conde de la Monclova. por las rrazones de susorreferidas Y assi Lo certifico en quanto Puedo, de mandato de su señoria el señor Conde de Canillas de torneros corregidor y Justicia mayor de esta villa rempitiendome a las dhas declaraciones en Potosí en once de diciembre de mill Y seiscientos y noventa y dos años")

More supporting evidence follows as AGI, Charcas 271, no. 12C, 4 fs.

92. AGI, Charcas 273, no. 10 (see note 85).

93. Ibid. The Viceroy relayed Enríquez' side of the story in this instance. See AGI, Charcas 271, nos. 11B and 12 (see notes 87 and 91, respectively), for Enríquez reports. The azogueros said the Corregidor had been the one who suggested the compromise (AGI, Charcas 273, no. 6--see note 85).

94. AGI, Charcas 273, no. 6 (see note 85).

95. AGI, Charcas 271, no. 10, the Oficiales reales de Potosí to the crown, Potosí, 10.XII.1692, 2 fs.; "Dan q.ta



haverse suspendido el repartimto de Indios de mita que hizo el Duque de la Palata, y del nuevo que ha hecho el Conde de la Monclova a 34 Ingenios excluyendo 24 de los que antes se hallavan con In.os de mita, y de las representaciones que le an hecho p.ra cobras los Acogues y otras resultas, y embian testim.º de lo q.e en esto les ordeno executar en en que estan entendiendo con poca esperanza de que se pueda conseguir." Monclova's letter to them is dealt with in AGI, Charcas 271, no. 10A, "Capitulo de carta" to the Oficiales reales de Potosí from the Conde de la Monclova, Lima, 29.V.1692, 1 f. The collection of debts did go forward, as shown by ANB, M 116, no. 5 (see note 89), but in 1693.

96. Principal source: AGI, Charcas 273, no. 7, the Conde de Velayos to the crown, Potosí, 4.X.1693, 3 fs.; "el Correg.or de la Va Ymp.l de Potosi teniente de Cappn general en el distrito de la Real Audiencia de la Plata, embia testimonio de averse recibido en este oficio. Y Ynforma el estado de la Mita de el cerro rrico de dha. v.a" For more, AGI, Charcas 273, no. 8, the Conde de Velayos to Antonio Ortiz de Otalora, Potosí, 5.X.1693, 1 f.; AGI, Charcas 273, no. 9, "Mem.a de las Personas qe estan sirvi endo La Press.a de Chile y Corregimiento de Potosi, y a las que estan dadas futuras de estos empleos," sin fecha, 2 fs. (the first two pages involve the testimonio of Velayo's arrival in Potosí on 14.VI.1693; the royal order providing him with the post was dated 5.IX.1686). Also of value is AGI, Charcas 273, no. 12, the Conde de Velayos to the crown, Potosí, 28.XII.1693, 5 fs.; "Refiere el estado de la Mita, y lo demas que se le ofrece." In 1699, the Conde de Velayos was involved in a legal battle with azoguero Antonio de Guzmán Maldonado when he deprived the latter of his mitayos for failure to pay some of them promptly (see note 44 for ANB, M 126, no. 6).

97. AGI, Charcas 273, no. 4 (see note 77). Ezquerria Abadía, 503, says that the Archbishop's change of heart was explained in a letter of 13.X.1692. See AGI, Charcas 271, no. 6 (see note 80) for Liñán's discussion of the juntas of 1690-1691; and "Quaderno 3º" (see note 77).

98. AGI, Charcas 273, no. 10 (see note 85).

99. AGI, Charcas 270, no. 33A (see note 65), for the Fiscal's comments in Madrid. The material arriving in Spain included AGI, Charcas 273, no. 14, "Los Caciques y enteradores de la Mita" to the crown, sin fecha (envelope has "1694"), 2 fs.; "Sup.can se confirme la resolucion que cerca del serv.º personal de los In.ºs de la mita de aquel

Cerro se a tomado por el Virrey Conde de la Monclova por ser en vtilidad de la R<sup>l</sup> corona, bien de los nat.<sup>s</sup> y de la causa pu.<sup>ca</sup> a que an asentido todos generalm.<sup>te</sup>" The date on the envelope probably refers to the year it was received by the Council of the Indies, for the same is true of AGI, Charcas 273, no. 15, the Gremio de azogueros to the crown, Potosí, sin fecha, 10 fs.; "Repres.<sup>ta</sup> los inconv.<sup>tes</sup> que se pueden seguir de executar la resolucion tomada por el Conde de la Monclova en q.to a la mita de Potosi, = Y sup.<sup>ca</sup> se de promptu providencia de forma que pueda llebar el desp.<sup>o</sup> el navio de aviso mandando al dho Conde, sobresea en todas las resoluciones que aya tomado y executado en todos los puntos de la mita, y que no ynnobe, ni altere la planta y repartim.<sup>to</sup> que dejo hecho el Duque de la Palata en lo respectibo a la Mita esto por aora y en el interin que con mas conocim.<sup>to</sup> y plena aberiguacion de los motibos que a podido tener el Conde de la Monclova, para alterar lo dispuesto por su antecesor se determine lo mas conv.<sup>te</sup>"

100. AGI, Charcas 273, no. 13, 1 f.; "Cons.<sup>o</sup> a 2 de Ab.<sup>l</sup> de 1694 Busquense todos los pap.<sup>s</sup> y informes del Arzobpo. Virrey y del Duque de la Pallata su suzesor, y del Pres.<sup>te</sup> de Charcas D. Bart.<sup>me</sup> Gonz.<sup>s</sup> de Poveda, del correx.<sup>r</sup> de Potosi D P.<sup>o</sup> Luis henrriq.<sup>s</sup> s.<sup>re</sup> la reintegrac.<sup>n</sup> de la Mittas de Potosi, y Juancavelica, y numerac.<sup>n</sup> gen.<sup>l</sup> de los Indios q.<sup>e</sup> dieron motivo a lo q.<sup>e</sup> en vno, y otro ejecuto el Virrey Duq.<sup>e</sup> de la Pallata, y todos se lleven luego al s.<sup>r</sup> fiscal con lo demas q.<sup>e</sup> aora vino, y viene en su poder" (rubricado). This is the entire document.

101. AGI, Charcas 273, no. 17, a royal decree sent to the Duque de Montalbo, Madrid, 13.VII.1694, 1 f.; "Decreto de su Mg.<sup>d</sup> ... Con los mem.<sup>s</sup> que cita de los Diputados del Gremio de Acogueros en que representan el perjuicio que resulta de la novedad de In.<sup>os</sup> de Mita." There are two memoriales: a) AGI, Charcas 273, no. 17A, the Gremio de azogueros to the crown, sin fecha, 2 fs., "Refieren que El Conde de la Monclova Virrey del Peru embaraza la practica y forma de Mita para las labores de la ribera de aquel cerro cuia planta con harto trabajo y desuelo hizo el Duque de la Palata, Y por q.<sup>e</sup> en esta suspens<sup>on</sup> es interesado VMg.<sup>d</sup> en los quintos, Suppa a VMg.<sup>d</sup> se sirva de mandar que en el interin que se Justifica su racon y la del Conde, se observe lo ya dispuesto por El Duque de la Palata"; and b) AGI, Charcas 273, no. 17B, the Deputies of the Gremio de azogueros to the crown, sin fecha, 2 fs. See, also, AGI, Charcas 273, no. 15 (see note 99).

102. For the minutes of the Council's deliberations, AGI, Charcas 273, no. 19B, 18.I.1697, 2 fs.:

- "Cisneros | Se continúe la mita q<sup>e</sup> el Indio q<sup>e</sup> no pueda servir no se le admita satisfac<sup>on</sup> en poca ni mucha cant<sup>d</sup> por excusarse y solo se le admita la excusa de ir a trabajar dando otro Yndio q<sup>e</sup> pueda **travaja** servir igualm<sup>te</sup> que los Salarios de los dias de trabajo y los de ida y Vuelta sean iguales a los Indios Voluntarios y tam<sup>n</sup> en el trabajo y q<sup>e</sup> los capitulos de la vltima Providencia dada p<sup>r</sup> Moncloba Se manden executar reduciendo y arreglando cada uno a todo lo q<sup>e</sup> pueda Ser de mas alivio y conveniencia de los Yndios Mitayos que q<sup>do</sup> esten enfermos se les asista y Cure con todo cuydado, Se guarden los Septenios Se apliquen a las Minas los delinquentes q<sup>e</sup> lo merecieren p<sup>r</sup> q<sup>e</sup> este num<sup>o</sup> de los de esta calidad menores las mitas; Y que no se Señalen Indios Mitayos a los que no tuvieren Minas en Vso, y q<sup>e</sup> no se reparta mas q<sup>e</sup> en las diez y Seis Provincias (lv:)
- Canero | No se quite la Mita Se den las mismas ordenes q<sup>e</sup> para Guancavelica, y se adapten a ellas los capitulos de las Providencias dadas por el Conde de la Moncloba
- Baraez | Se continúe la mita Sin diferencia de los Voluntarios y los estipendios del Viage iguales a los Jornales de los dias de Trabajo poniendo cota Solam<sup>te</sup> a las leguas q<sup>e</sup> han de caminar cada dia y se arreglen los capitulos a todo lo mas piadoso -
- Bustam<sup>te</sup> | Se quite La mita forzada Se envíen a Nueva españa 3  $\theta$  - quintales de Azogues
- Solorzano | Lo mismo
- Camargo | No se quite la mita se bage el salario del Voluntario a cinco R<sup>s</sup> Se iguale al Mitayo no haya tarea los Jornales de Viage a las Venida se les de la mit<sup>d</sup> luego y p<sup>ra</sup> Volberse se les pague todo al respecto de cinco R<sup>s</sup> Leguas se excuse la mita de la distancia de las 200 Leguas (2:) y las demas q<sup>e</sup> esten a esta distancia y se conforma con las modificaciones de la Junta
- Sierra | Se quite la mita, y si la huviere de haver sea en los Indios q<sup>e</sup> estan en Potosi, y las siete leguas en contorno
- [?] | No se quite y se igualen los salarios Se

hagan todas las prevenciones constes, y el Viage a las cinco leguas al dia y la mitad luego como viene y la extenssion de deniegue

Conss<sup>o</sup> 18 de en<sup>ro</sup> 1697" (This the entire document.) The search for a compromise is also described in AGI, Charcas 273, no. 21 (the Council's summary--see note 91, Chapter II); and Holmes, 56-57. As one might expect, given his anti-mita observations in AGI, Charcas 270, no. 33A (see note 65), the Fiscal was strongly in favor of abolition: AGI, Charcas 273, nos. 19 and 19A (no. 19 is the envelope), "Resp.ta del s.r fiscal con vista de los pap.s tocantes a los repartim.tos de In.os de Mita, y numoracion Gen.l que de ellos se hico en el Peru, los quales algunos an estado en poder del Ror Villar, y otros del Ror Ceballos, y asi sera bien se declare a q.n se an de entregar. y si su Alma fuere servido encomenderlos de nuevo," Madrid, 18.IV.1696, 5 fs. The Fiscal is Don Mateo de Tobar, and his opinion is a condensation of the abolitionist sentiments of the previous thirty years.

103. AGI, Charcas 273, no. 19C, "Reforma y prevenciones en los doce puntos," sin fecha, 2 fs.:

- "reser<sup>do</sup>
- 1o - Si han de correr las retasas
  - 2o - Si ~~los~~ Se han de quitar de las 16 Provincias las q<sup>e</sup> estan distantes. Se conserven por ahora en la misma conform<sup>d</sup> q<sup>e</sup> lo dispuso Moncloba.
  - 3o - Si han de correr en los forasteros, queda excluyda con el punto 2o.
  - 4o - Sobre las Seis Provincias nuevamte affectas excluydo
  - 5o - como se han de Volber a numerar los Indios, como lo dice Moncloba.
  - 6o - Se reduzca a la Septima como viene.
  - 7o - Si los Yndios han de tener dos Sem<sup>s</sup> Se confirma.
  - (lv:) 8a - Si han de Ser 50, o, 49 Ind<sup>s</sup> pra cada cabeza de Yngenios Sean 40 y Si por accte de Cesar Mina el numero de los 40 Se repartan con igualdad en las demas.
  - 9o Si convendrian las revissitas Corra y q<sup>to</sup> se haga de executar Sea con acuerdo del Govno Superior y ha de dar q<sup>ta</sup> dellas q<sup>e</sup> despachaze.
  - 10 Augm<sup>to</sup> de Salarios con el Voto
  - 11 faltriguera y con las prevenciones de

## Guancavelica

12 Leguage a 4 leguas Por dia  
y mitad de Jornal.

12 Los de Vn Lugar todos a vna Mina. (2:)  
Se conste qe el Govno de Potosi aunq<sup>e</sup> es de la  
Provision de SMgd no se Veneficie y que cessen todas  
las futuras volviendo las cantidades, o, dando otro  
ejemplo correspte al Servo porq<sup>e</sup> se les concedio la  
futura." (This is the entire document.)

The Council of the Indies' summary (AGI, Charcas 273, no. 21--see note 91, Chapter II) lists its decisions; and the resultant nine points are included in AGI, Charcas 273, no. 23, the Conde de la Monclova to the Audiencia de La Plata, Lima, 23.V.1698, 3 fs. (a copy). See, also, the sources included in note 105, below.

104. AGI, Charcas 273, no. 19C (see note 103); and the Council of the Indies' summary (AGI, Charcas 273, no. 21--see note 91, Chapter II).

105. AGI, Charcas 273, no. 23 (see note 103); AGI, Charcas 273, no. 23A, the crown to the Viceroy and the Audiencia de Lima, Madrid, 18.II.1697, 14 fs., "ordenan doles lo que han de executar en el repartim.to de la Mita de Potosi, y que den q.ta de lo que en ello obraren"; AGI, Charcas 273, no. 24, "Informe de el Corregidor y off.<sup>s</sup> R<sup>s</sup> de Potosi sobre los 9 puntos en alibio de los Indios mitayos de Potosi. q<sup>e</sup> comprehende la Cedula de 18 de feb.<sup>o</sup> de 697," Potosí, 7.VII.1698, 6 fs.; AGI, Charcas 273, no. 25, "Informe de la Aud.<sup>a</sup> de Charcas sobre Los nueve puntos, en alibio de los Indios mitayos de Potosi que Comprehende La Cedula de 18 de feb<sup>o</sup> de 1695 [sic]," La Plata, 16.VIII.1698, 10 fs.; AGI, Charcas 273, no. 26, "Informe de el Arcobispo de la Plata sobre los 9 puntos en alibio de los Indios Mitayos de Potosí que comprehende La cedula de 18 de feb<sup>o</sup> de 1697," Tomina de la frontera, 3.VII.1698, 3 fs.; AGI, Charcas 273, no. 29, the Oficiales reales de Potosí to the crown, Potosí, 14.IV.1699, 1 f., "Avisan del R,vo de la cedula que se embio tocante a la forma en que se havia de hacer el repartim.to de la Mita de Potosi y paga de los Jornales y dice obserbaran lo mandado segun las ordenes y las que les diese el Virrey y que hasta la fecha no lo havia determinado y que luego que llegase darian el devido cumplim.to; BNB, MSS 4, fs. 156-157, "Cédula real al corregidor de Potosí: Lo que se ha de observar para el bienestar de los indios y la marcha regular de las labores y el beneficio de minas e ingenios en la aplicación del nuevo orden adoptado para el régimen de la mita de esta villa," Madrid, 18.II.1697 (MC 1138; MOM 691); BNB, MSS 4, f. 155, "Cédula real a los oficiales reales de Potosí: Que

intervengan precisamente en la formación de padrones y en la paga de jornales de los indios de mita dentro del nuevo orden adoptado para el régimen de este servicio," Madrid, 18.II.1697 (MC 1137; MOM 692). A draft of the 18.II.1697 cover letter from the crown to the Conde de la Monclova is, I believe, AGI, Charcas 273, no. 27, 1 f.:

"Exmo sr

la

Con <sup>los dos</sup> ocasión de este Aviso remito á V.E. <sup>el</sup> pliegos inclusos en que Van despachos de Su Mg.<sup>d</sup> con las ordenes, en cumplimiento de lo Resuelto por Su Mg.<sup>d</sup> tocante al repartimiento de Indios para la Mita del Potosí; y lo que En ella se hà de observar; y asi se servirà V.E. mandar dirigir luego el del Gov Corregidor de aquella Villa q.<sup>e</sup> por la importancia de esta materia, ha parecido no dilatar el remitirlos a V.E.; y en la primera ocasion segura q.<sup>e</sup> se ofrezca, se embiarán los demas q.<sup>e</sup> ay causados, sobre (lv:) otras dependenzias; y con este motivo hago memoria a V.E. de mi oblig.on a su Servicio para que V.E. no excuse el mandarme DS ge a V.E. m<sup>s</sup> a<sup>s</sup> Como deseo. Md à 18 de febrero de 1697"

106. Ezquerria Abadía, 496-502, says nothing was really changed by either Palata or Monclova.

107. ANB, M 126, no. 4, "Recurso ante la audiencia de Charcas: Los caciques del pueblo de Aymaya, provincia de Chayanta, sobre la excesiva contribución que el Conde de Canillas, corregidor de Potosí, les exige según el nuevo ajustamiento de la mita del virrey conde de la Monclova," Aimaia and La Plata, 24.III-?.1693, 6 fs. (MC 1113; MOM 689). (The date of the Audiencia's ruling is obscured by a wax seal.)

108. ANB, M 126, no. 12, "Alonso Chui, Pascual Parejava, Felipe Canasa y Alonso Choque, indios originarios del pueblo de Tarasco, provincia de Asangaro, sobre que don Martín Challapa, capitán enterador de la mita del pueblo de Challacallo, provincia de Paria, los a traído indebidamente a servir en la mita de Potosí sin consideración a su calidad de forasteros," Paria, 10-12.XII.1698, 6 fs. (MC 1146; MOM 693).

109. For the investigation undertaken by Phillip V in the late 1720s and early 1730s, see Ezquerria Abadía's article. Two works he employs are: a) "Juicio, que sobre el aumento, conservación o extinción del servicio personal de la Mita q. embian las Provincias de Cochabamba, Chaianta,

Paria, Curangas, Tarija, Lampa, Paucarcolla, Azángaro, Asillo, Quipicancha, Sicasica, Tinta, Cangas, Pacajes, Chucuito y Omasuyo, para la labor del Mineral de Potosí y sus Viveras, hace el Lizdo. Dn. Joseph Casimiro Gómez García, Fiscal de la Rl. Audiencia de las Charcas," La Plata, 30.VII.1730 (a copy, from fs. 108-152 of Ms. 6.225, Biblioteca Nacional, Madrid, "Sobre la Mitta del Potosí y exclusión de Sangleyes de Philipinas."); and b) "Dn. Ygnacio Antonio del Castillo, Oydor de la real audiencia de La Plata, Provincia de los Charcas, da su parecer sobre la mita de Potosí, cumpliendo con el real orden de V. M. fechado en La Plata, a 9 de septiembre de 1728," (fs. 84-105 of the same manuscript; and therefore also a copy).

## C H A P T E R VIII

### CONCLUSIONS

Alberto Crespo was right. His suggestions about the nature of the mita at Potosí in the seventeenth century, which he advanced in his 1955 article, were correct. The system was not responsible for the demographic decline in Upper Peru, and the Indians were indeed able to escape their mita obligations by fleeing from Potosí and from their home pueblos. Thus, this dissertation is less a revision or refutation of previous knowledge about the mita than it is the confirmation and expansion of another historian's thesis.

The implications of this study of the Potosí mita go beyond our understanding of the system itself, however. The mita is more than a topic; it is also a tool which can be used to observe the patterns of Hapsburg government, and to examine the character of seventeenth century Peru in general. Certainly much more can be said about Potosí in the light of this dissertation. In fact, most of the questions that were raised by D. A. Brading and Harry E. Cross in 1972 can now be answered.

Let us look first at the three most over-worked queries



about the mita: a) did the work in the mines at Potosí actually kill the Indians? b) did the mita contribute to the depopulation of the provinces that were subject to it? and c) did the system cause Indian flight and social disruption in those provinces? The answer to all three questions is "yes," but it is the degree to which they were true that is really important. There is little doubt that some of the Indians who served in the mita at Potosí died in the mines. Mining is a dangerous occupation, and miners are killed in the course of their labors. But the death of mitayos in the mines at Potosí was not a significant demographic phenomenon--because the Indians did not permit it to be. They could escape from the mita too easily for it to have been a direct cause of the depopulation of the obligated provinces. The number of Indians that actually worked in the cerro during the seventeenth century, moreover, rarely exceeded 2,000. The mitayos were only a small fraction of the Indian population of Potosí, let alone Upper Peru.

The Indians migrated away from their home provinces to free themselves from mita service, tribute obligations and the oppression that they suffered under their corregidores, caciques and priests. Many of the Indians moved to areas that were completely outside the zone of Spanish colonization. Their abandonment of their pueblos was their most effective means of opposing their condition. Because

the Indians did not fight back with armed resistance, their opposition to the Spanish invaders was quiet and unspectacular. But we should not consider them conquered, or portray them as passive victims. Their flight did cause the depopulation of the sixteen obligated provinces, but it was the imposed lifestyle that they abandoned, and the imposed social order that they disrupted.

The questions of the mitayos' working conditions and the mita's responsibility for the demographic decline in the provinces were not the objects of the seventeenth century struggle over the system. They were, however, the rhetorical tools that the provincial interests used in their battle with the azogueros of Potosí for access to Indian labor. Those interests accused the azogueros of abusing the mitayos, and the mita of depopulating the provinces, with the hope of lowering the quotas that were required from their regions, or winning the system's abolition. The azogueros accused them--the corregidores, caciques, priests, chacareros and others--of strangling the mita and thus of undercutting the production of royal quintos. The battle was not over loyalty to the crown or the depopulation of the provinces; it was over who would receive the services of the Indians.

Once the real cause of the seventeenth century debate has been identified, then the de facto mita can be examined objectively, and two more of Brading and Cross'

questions may be answered: a) why did the Potosí mita persist until 1812, while repartimiento labor for the mines of New Spain disappeared during the seventeenth century? and b) why did a class of volunteer laborers not replace the mitayos (a question that was also asked by Garrick Wilson Holmes)? The reason why the mita continued throughout the seventeenth century was that it was both a necessary capital subsidy, in service in silver, and a means of forcing the Indians to work in the cerro against their will. Mita service in silver provided the azogueros with an ability to withstand water and mercury shortages, deteriorating ore quality and the crown's refusal to grant them any new concessions. Mita service in person was needed because, by the time that forced labor was required at Potosí in the 1580s, the mines were deep and the working conditions were appalling. Thus, the mita was not replaced by minga labor because part of it was service in silver, and the other part involved work that volunteers refused to do.

Silver production was the sole reason for Potosí's existence. The mita was therefore responsible for supporting the villa--its convents, its mint, its garrison and its large population--long after mining and silver refining there would otherwise have been unprofitable. The need for forced labor and a capital subsidy both stemmed, ultimately, from the high cost of living at

Potosí. The villa's geographic isolation and altitude meant that provisions were very expensive, and that volunteer workers required unusually high wages. Production costs were therefore higher at Potosí than they were elsewhere. Once mining was no longer profitable without the mita, Potosí was too important as an economic and strategic center to permit the abolition of the system upon which it was so dependent.

The mita did not, contrary to what Brading and Cross suggested, allow silver production at Potosí to soar. The boom of the 1570s was caused by a unique combination of desmontes, a new amalgamation technology, a large capital investment on the part of the potosinos and Indian labor. Once the desmontes were exhausted, the boom ended and the mita had to serve as a forced labor system for the first time. As it had been designed by Toledo it was unable to perform its intended function. The de facto mita did, however, keep the Potosí silver industry in business long after it would otherwise have collapsed.

A word of caution: Potosí does not represent the Peruvian norm. It was unique--geographically, geologically and in many other ways. Comparisons between New Spain and Peru should not be made on the basis of Potosí. Rather, those scholars who are looking for centers to compare with Guanajuato, Zacatecas or San Luis Potosí should turn their attention to Oruro, Puno, San Antonio de Esquilache, Castro

Virreyna, Porco and other Peruvian mining areas.

This dissertation also holds some implications for the theoretical model presented by John Leddy Phelan in his 1960 article, "Authority and Flexibility in the Spanish Imperial Bureaucracy." While a thorough discussion of the relationship between the model and the specific case of the Hapsburg administration of the mita would require more than the few pages allotted here, I would like to offer some tentative observations, with the promise that they will be developed more fully elsewhere.

Central to the Phelan model is the contention that the crown employed contradictory and mutually exclusive orders to maintain its authority over the colonial bureaucracy in America. The example he used in the "Authority and Flexibility" article was that of the Indian labor question in Mexico at the end of the sixteenth century. Phelan argued that the crown's incompatible orders for the protection of the Indians and for the promotion of mineral production were two such mutually exclusive orders. The official who received them, he said, was therefore compelled to determine what the true intentions of his sovereign were, and to enforce the orders to the extent that he believed they were applicable.

The local government official was therefore afforded a degree of flexibility by the crown to shape government policy to local circumstances, but he remained subject to

review--by visitadores, other government officials whose jurisdictions overlapped with his and ultimately by the residencia conducted at the end of his tenure--from above. Because he was unable to comply with all of his orders, Phelan noted, he remained vulnerable to dismissal or some other form of reprimand, and thus he remained attentive to the wishes of the crown.

The crown's cédulas were, in Hegelian terms, the thesis, and the official's response to them was the antithesis; the government policy that resulted from their exchange was, therefore, the synthesis. Phelan said that the continual thesis-antithesis interchange did more than maintain the crown's authority, that it also created a bureaucracy that was very conservative and very unreceptive to new ideas or reforms.

Certainly the 130 years of Hapsburg administration of the mita described in this dissertation have provided many examples of the bureaucratic processes that are outlined in the Phelan model. But there are also two or three areas where I believe the model might be modified. Again, my suggestions are speculative and tentative.

The incompatibility of the crown's orders had another purpose, which is not necessarily inconsistent with the one identified by Phelan. The simultaneous orders for the protection of the Indians and for the expansion of mineral production were also used, in the case of Peru, to advance

the crown's position vis-à-vis local interest groups. In his later work, The Kingdom of Quito in the Seventeenth Century (1967), Phelan argued that the bureaucracy was the local elite in America--that there was no equivalent to the medieval nobility that the crown had to contend with for supremacy, save for the bureaucrats themselves. In the jurisdiction of the Audiencia de Charcas, that was not so. The encomenderos (whom he dismisses in the case of Quito) and the azogueros were very much like the independent-minded nobility of medieval Europe, especially with regard to protecting their privileges.

The crown had created these American "nobles" in the course of its efforts to expand its Empire and to increase the economic benefits that it received from the colonization of America. In order to colonize the Indies, for example, the Catholic Kings had to rely upon a "conquer now, pay later" formula, whereby prominent conquistadores received encomiendas in exchange for their service to the crown. The struggle between the crown and the encomenderos that followed, during the sixteenth century, was not a struggle for justice, but the crown's effort to regain the ground that it had conceded to the encomenderos--to reassert the authority that it had lost with the granting of the earlier concessions.

In the case of Potosí and the mita, the crown had temporarily lost sight of its priorities. In a moment of

enthusiasm over the increased production of silver at Potosí during the 1570s, the crown dropped its long-held opposition to forced Indian labor in the mines and consented to the establishment of the mita. As a result, it conceded privileges to another group of colonists: the azogueros. They received mitayos, immunity from imprisonment for debts and other rights from Viceroy Francisco de Toledo in exchange for their capital investment in new amalgamation processing mills. As with the encomenderos, the government had to grant the azogueros concessions to win their cooperation. Unlike the encomienda, however, the mita was part of a partnership between the crown and the azogueros for the future. They would share the benefits of mita labor in the form of Potosí silver. The crown controlled mercury and the administration of the mita. The azogueros owned the mills and the mines.

Once the crown had confirmed Toledo's agreement with the azogueros, in 1589, it began to learn that the mita was not working as Toledo had said that it would. As the silver boom at Potosí faded, the azogueros began to turn the system to their advantage, by renting or selling the Indians that were assigned to them, and later by encouraging the appearance of the mita service in silver. The struggle that developed between the crown and the azogueros during the seventeenth century was a dispute



between partners over one's abuse of the agreement between them.

The crown struck back against both the encomenderos and the azogueros with its 1601 cédula banning Indian personal service for the former and abolishing the mita. The cédula was adamant and couched in absolute terms to permit the Viceroy, Luis de Velasco, to employ it as leverage over the colonists. It may have been meant to push him toward action, but it was primarily designed for employment against the local "nobility." The terms of the order clearly show that the crown's motivation was to limit individuals' access to Indian labor while preserving those forms of forced labor from which it benefited; and the inclusion of a chapter empowering the Viceroy to alter the edict as he deemed necessary demonstrates that it was not meant to move him alone.

The crown held the ultimate trump card with regard to the mita: its possible abolition. But because the crown was interested in silver production at Potosí, and the continued existence of the villa for fiscal and military purposes, that weapon was essentially useless. The abolition of the mita would have to be an act of last recourse; when the benefits of the mita were no longer worth the costs. The azogueros, in turn, held the cerro and the mills hostage, and they could use violence to prevent any serious attempt to reform the de facto mita.

Thus, it was the azogueros who were really in control at Potosí.

The crown had to rely upon its viceroys in Lima to fight its battles for it, because its geographical and temporal isolation in Spain prevented it from having any direct role in the administration of the mita. The viceroys were scarcely more effective than the crown, however, in controlling the behavior of the azogueros. They were hampered, in part, by the failure of the crown to concede them sufficient authority. As Phelan noted, there actually were two centers of authority, one in Lima and one in Madrid. The orders that were issued by these two centers were often contradictory and often served to neutralize one another.

The viceroys' effectiveness was also hurt by their own reliance upon "government by proxy" mechanisms, and the division of responsibility for the mita among various government officials in Charcas. That division was designed to prevent their subversion by the azogueros, and to ensure a steady flow of information to Lima and Madrid. The battles that were waged between the Audiencia de Charcas and viceregal officials in Lima, between the Audiencia and the corregidores de Potosí, between the presidents of Charcas and the corregidores de Potosí, and between everyone and any visitador who arrived in Charcas prevented those officials from performing the duties that

were assigned to them.

Perhaps the most important reason why the government could not respond to the development of the de facto mita was the refusal of the two centers of authority to assume responsibility for important decisions. Indeed, if there is a central reason why the Hapsburg government was not as effective as it might have been--within the limits of its power--it is that nobody would assume responsibility. The viceroys, for example, employed a myriad of bureaucratic delaying tactics when they feared that their execution of the Council of the Indies' two-part program would cause silver production at Potosí to fall, and they would be blamed. Then, when the Conde de Lemos proposed that the mita be abolished, the Council tried to pass the responsibility for the decision to the Queen, and later returned it to the viceregal office with the Conde de Castellar.

To sum, the Phelan model seems to need expansion to include the American "nobility" among those that strong, and often incompatible, orders were meant to control. It also needs to take into account, therefore, the relative powerlessness of the crown vis-à-vis its own colonists. Finally, the miniature versions of the system described by the model, which were used by the viceroys to direct their subordinates, require closer inspection as well.

One more observation: the degree of control that was

exercised over the Indians by the azogueros, the corregidores and the caciques has been overestimated. The position of the azogueros with regard to their mitayos was much the same as that between the crown and themselves. The azogueros' use of the caciques was also a parallel to the crown's use of its bureaucrats to keep some semblance of control over the colonists. The azogueros appear to have been more successful in their employment of the caciques, because their means of coercion were more effective: at first financial penalties and later physical torture.

The azogueros' need to resort to the physical abuse of the caciques demonstrates, however, the effectiveness of the Indians in evading their mita responsibilities. The azogueros exercised a degree of control over the Indians via the caciques; the crown exercised a degree of control over the azogueros via its bureaucrats; and the viceroys and the crown exercised a degree of control over the bureaucracy with their orders. When the Indians migrated away from their provinces, however, the azogueros and the government were forced to adapt to their action. It was the Indians, therefore, who were ultimately in control.

It is time for a few questions of my own, most of which I would have liked to have answered in this study but could not. First, I wonder what Indian labor was like at other mining centers in Peru. What were the

working conditions like? How much were the Indians paid? Did they exercise any direct control over production?

Second, I am curious who the original azogueros were, and how their ranks changed over time. How often did the mills change hands? Why were the Basques such a prominent group by the 1620s?

Third, what was the economic role of Potosí in the seventeenth century? Was it the force that had helped to create support industries and economic enterprises in the sixteenth century, and then was supported by them during the 1600s, via service in silver? Was Potosí a drain on the capital that was produced elsewhere in the realm in the seventeenth century?

Fourth, why did the caciques continue to meet the demands of the azogueros? Were they all, like Fernández Guarache, too heavily involved in personal enterprises of their own to leave their provinces and escape from service as capitanes enteradores?

Fifth, why did the chacareros and the estancieros not figure more prominently in the documentation on the Potosí mita? The complaints about the 1689 repartimiento and reforms were written by the caciques, corregidores and priests. Did the hacendados leave the complaining to them?

The answers to these questions, and many of the details about the seventeenth century mita, are to be

found in the local archives of Bolivia, Argentina and Peru (I know that the documentation exists for Oruro and Cochabamba) and in the wealth of material tucked away in the Archivo de Indias.

Answers will also come from careful work with the vast amount of quantitative material that is available on the Potosí mita. The analysis of visitas, testimonios, repartimientos and similar materials should help to determine, for example, the profit ratios of the azogueros; and it should allow more definitive statements about the uses to which the mitayos--in silver and in person--were put.

It is my sincere hope that this dissertation has provided the framework, the frame of reference, that will permit more specific work to be done. There will, no doubt, be many instances where I have erred. But even in the role of a stalking horse, I expect that this study will be useful to others.

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Charcas 271. Expedientes sobre la reintegración de la mita de Potosí y la numeración general de los indios, 1692.

Charcas 272. Alegaciones que se dieron el fiscal (Matías Lagúnez y Aguilar) de la Audiencia de Lima y el protector general de los naturales del reino del Perú en defensa de los indios, pidiendo su alivio y desagravio, 1692, 1,272 fs.

Charcas 273. Expedientes sobre la mita de Potosí, 1693 a 1699. Cartas y expedientes sobre como encontró la mita de Potosí el Conde de la Monclova cuando tomó posesión del virreinato, así como lo ejecutado durante estos años de su gobierno, 1691-1699, 468 fs.

For more complete descriptions of these legajos, see Lewis Hanke and Celso Rodríguez, eds., Guía de las fuentes en el Archivo General de Indias para el estudio de la administración virreinal española en México y en el Perú, 1535-1700 (3 vols.; Cologne: Böhlau Verlag, 1977), I, 328-341.

Archivo General de la Nación, Buenos Aires, Argentina (AGN). The following legajos from Salas IX and XIII were consulted:

SALA	TITLE	YEARS	LEGAJO
IX	Hacienda, Acuerdos de la Real	1611-1636	13-8-7
		1636-1661	13-8-8
		1667-1710	13-8-9
		1623-1671	20-4-4
IX	Lima y Buenos Aires.	1563-1784	15-2-4
	Ordenanzas de las Reales Audiencias de Charcas		
IX	Mendoza, Juan de (Marqués de Montesclaros). Ordenanzas.	1609	45-6-2
IX	Minas de Potosí. Código Carolino de Ordenanzas Reales		27-2-2 27-2-3
IX	Mita, ordenanzas de virreyes, Potosí	1683-1774	14-8-10
IX	Omasuyo, Representaciones y quejas de las provincias de La Paz, Tomina, Pilaya, Mizque	1689-1691	10-3-7
IX	Padrones de indios de Alto Perú	1676	45-5-10
IX	Pérez de Salazar, Alonso y Alfaro, Francisco de	1645-1686	17-1-4
		1611-1623	26-4-2
IX	Perú, virreinato de	1684-1755	17-1-6
IX	Potosí	1613-1750	6-2-5
IX	Provisiones, cédulas reales ordenes	1617-1796	25-4-32
IX	Reales cédulas, ordenes, provisiones, decretos	1664-1802	25-4-33
XIII	Representaciones y quejas de las provincias, Porco, Chayanta, Tarija, Paria y Carangas	1689-1690	73

Also consulted in the Archivo General de la Nación, Buenos Aires -- selected items from the Colección de la Biblioteca Nacional. Legajo 42 included an "Informe del duque de la Palata, virrey del Perú, á su sucesor el conde de la Moncloba, sobre la situación del virreinato," Lima, 18.XI.1689. Legajo 181 held: a) Real cédula para que los indios que están dispersos,

pasados veinte años, puedan connaturalizarse en el paraje donde habitan, etc., 4.II.1655, 5 fs.; b) Real provisión para que los indios del Perú que vayan á Tucumán puedan connaturalizarse allí, 4.II.1655, 4 fs.; and c) Real cédula para que con los indios que se van reduciendo se formen nuevos pueblos, 14.X.1687, 1 f.

Archivo General de la Nación, Lima, Peru (AGNP). Three items were of interest: a) Derecho Indiano, C. 79. Testimonio de los autos seguidos por D. Blas Ignacio Catacora, Cacique principal de Acora en la provincia de Chucuito, a fin de que se le acordasen las gracias y premios a que sus mayores se habían hecho acreedores por sus servicios al Rey, y su continua asistencia a la pesada mita de Potosí, expediente incompleto, 1625, 152 fs.; b) Derecho Indiano, C. 809. Fragmento de un expediente sobre revisita de indios de la Villa de Potosí, efectuada por el General D. Fernando de Torres Mesía, Conde de Velayos, Corregidor y Justicia Mayor de dicha Villa, 1693, 17 fs.; and c) Superior Gobierno, C. 92. Testimonio de un Real Acuerdo de Justicia, expedido por el Secretario de Cámara D. Andrés de Valsanz de la Real Audiencia de los Charcas, por el que se estableció que el Situado del Reyno de Chile, se despachara de las Cajas Reales de Potosí, y se remitiera en reales y no en ropa a los soldados, para que percibieran su paga en dinero, de los 212 mil ducados situados, para el ejército de aquel Reyno. Plata que se entregaría en Potosí, por intermedio de quien fuera con Poder del Ejército de Chile, 1688, 2 fs.

Archivo Histórico de Potosí, Potosí, Bolivia (AHP). These legajos were consulted:

Cajas Reales 47. Libro de tasas de Chuquito y otros pueblos, 1592-1604, 451 fs.

Cajas Reales 52. Libro de diligencias acerca del azogue, 1594-1618, 50 fs.

Cajas Reales 72. Padrón de los indios mitayos, 1600, 94 fs.

Cajas Reales 153. Libro real de acuerdos y diligencias tocantes a la real hacienda, 1614-1621, 182 fs.

Cajas Reales 201. Libro real de provisiones, títulos y tomas de razón, 1624-1629, 250 fs., incompleto.

Cajas Reales 336. Libro real de los bienes de difuntos, 1652-1694, 176 fs.

Cajas Reales 418. Libro real de provisiones que empieza a correr a quince de noviembre de este año

de mil seiscientos y sesenta y ocho, 1668-1678, 394 fs.

Cajas Reales 484. Padrón de indios tributarios de los distintos pueblos de la provincia de Porco, 1687-1688, ? fs.

Cajas Reales 503. Libro donde se sientan las cartas que escribe su magestad a esta caja y las del gobierno superior de este reino y las respuestas y satisfacción que se da a todo con las del tribunal de cuentas y santa cruzada, 1651-1674, 241 fs.

Archivo Nacional de Bolivia and Biblioteca Nacional de Bolivia, Sucre, Bolivia (ANB and BNB, respectively). For a thorough description of these institutions and the wealth of documentation they hold, see Gunnar Mendoza L., "Guía de fuentes inéditas en el Archivo Nacional de Bolivia para el estudio de la administración virreinal en el distrito de la Audiencia de Charcas, años 1537-1700," in Guía de las fuentes en Hispanoamérica para el estudio de la administración virreinal española en México y en el Perú, 1535-1700, ed. by Lewis Hanke, Gunnar Mendoza L., and Celso Rodríguez (Washington, D.C.: Secretaría General, Organización de los Estados Americanos, 1980), 46-257.

Biblioteca Nacional del Perú, Lima, Peru (BNP). These items were of interest:

B39. Testimonio de reales cédulas: 1º para que se envíen a Chile pobladores desde Potosí; 2º sobre la forma de procederse en la marca de los indios cautivos de Chile; 3º disposiciones acerca de la esclavitud; 4º instrucciones enviadas al Presidente interino de la Real Audiencia de La Plata, Juan Victorino Martínez; y 5º instrucciones al nuevo Gobernador de Huancavelica, Domingo Jáuregui, 1611-?, 12 fs.

B492. Reales provisiones expedidas en favor de los indios, Los Reyes, VI.1654, 4 fs.

B516. Memorial acerca de las mitas de los indios del Perú (por D. Pedro de Palacios Zerdan). Buenos Aires, I.XI.1664, 6 fs.

B575. Paucarcolla. Autos sobre el despacho de la mita de Potosí e información de los caciques para su gran disipación, Villa de Concepción, 24.X.1669, 7 fs.

B585. Despacho de la mita de Potosí, Puno, XI.1673, 5 fs.

B614. Relación de indios mitimaes de Huarochirí, Lima, 3.XII.1642, 2 fs.

B684. Expediente sobre la petición presentada por el Oidor de la Real Audiencia, Dn. Andrés de Villela a fin de que se practique una visita a las minas de la

jurisdicción de Lima y Chuquisaca, 1646, 12 fs.

B956. Cuaderno y padrón de los indios mitimaes de esta ciudad de Chucuito de la parcialidad de Hanansaya, etc., 1686, 1 f.

B1536. Cuaderno donde se asienta la plata que viene de Potosí, La Paz y Arequipa esta año de 1641, Lima, 8.VII.1641, 5 fs.

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## APPENDIX I

### GLOSSARY

- Acuerdo . . . . . a meeting of the Audiencia for the purpose of counseling the viceroy on a question of major import; also called an Acuerdo consultivo.
- alcabalas . . . . . sales taxes.
- alcalde mayor  
de minas . . . . . magistrate charged with mining matters.
- altiplano . . . . . high plain; the large flat plain between the ridges of the Andes.
- apiri . . . . . an Indian who worked in the mines, carrying ore out of them.
- Audiencia . . . . . High Court of Appeals within a geographic area, composed of a president and oidores (judges). That in Lima was chaired by the viceroy.
- aviadores . . . . . moneylenders.
- ayllu . . . . . clan group of Indians, based on a common ancestor (often legendary), with economic, social and political functions.
- azogueros . . . . . owners of amalgamation mills (from azogue--mercury), and mines.
- barreteros . . . . . workers who stripped ore from the walls of the mines with iron bars; usually well-paid mingas.
- Cabildo . . . . . town council.
- cacicazgo . . . . . a position as an Indian noble (cacique).

- cacique . . . . . Indian nobleman; natural lord.
- capcha . . . . . the right of mitayos to work in the mines at Potosí from Saturday evening until Monday morning, for their own profit.
- capitán de la mita . . . . . also capitán enterador: an Indian, usually a cacique, responsible for delivering a contingent of mitayos to Potosí. A capitán general de la mita was responsible for those from an entire province. Toledo provided for four "capitanes de la mita" to oversee work at Potosí.
- Capitán mayor de la mita . . . . . official, apparently subordinate to the Corregidor de Potosí, responsible for overseeing the delivery and assignment of mitayos to azogueros.
- carta cuenta . . . . . documented and armed shipment of silver from Potosí.
- cédula . . . . . royal edict.
- cerro . . . . . mountain; hill--especially the mountain of Potosí.
- chácara . . . . . farm; agricultural enterprise (modern chacra).
- chacarero . . . . . owner of a chácara.
- chicha . . . . . alcoholic drink made from fermented corn.
- chuño . . . . . freeze-dried potatoes.
- coca . . . . . a plant, the source of cocaine, from which leaves are taken, dried and chewed as a stimulant.
- conquistadores . . . . . conquerors.
- Consulado . . . . . a self-governing guild, which is empowered to settle disputes within its own membership.

- consulta . . . . . consultation; debate.
- corregidor . . . . . local magistrate; official responsible for tax collection, administration of justice, etc.
- contador . . . . . comptroller.
- dejación . . . . . abandonment; surrendering.
- desmontes . . . . . ore mined but not refined, because of its low quality, and placed in slag heaps.
- diezmo . . . . . one-tenth; a royal share of mineral production equal to 10 per cent.
- encomenderos . . . . . recipients of encomienda grants.
- encomienda . . . . . grant, temporary, of the right to collect royal tribute from vassals within a distinct geographic region. The encomendero was responsible for protecting the Indians under his jurisdiction, as well as providing for their religious instruction.
- entero . . . . . delivery; compliance. Really no good translation. The entero de la mita referred to the degree to which a province complied with its mita obligation; and to the total delivery of mitayos. Enterar was the verb. The entero en persona was the number of Indians delivered in persons; and the entero en plata was that which arrived in Potosí in the form of silver.
- escrivano . . . . . notary.
- estancia . . . . . ranch; livestock operation.
- estanciero . . . . . owners of an estancia.
- extractos . . . . . extracts.
- fiscal . . . . . official of the Audiencia or the Council of the Indies responsible for guarding the crown's interests, especially vis-à-vis royal revenue.

- forasteros . . . . "foreigners"; outsiders; the Indians who were absent from their original villages, and often resident in others.
- fracaso . . . . . disaster.
- ghatu . . . . . the plaza at Potosí where the Indians traded in unmarked and raw silver.
- gobernador . . . . . governor of a village, usually a cacique.
- granos . . . . . units of currency, small fractions of the circulating, un-assayed peso; the term was used at Potosí to identify the mitayos' contribution of one-half peso per week each to pay the veedores and alcalde mayor de minas.
- Gremio de  
azogueros . . . . . mine/mill owners guild at Potosí.
- guayra . . . . . small wind-using oven employed to refine the highest-quality silver ore at Potosí; the dominant technology before amalgamation was introduced.
- hacendado . . . . . owners of a landed estate.
- hanasaya . . . . . one of two parts of a village, each called a parcialidad and composed of members of one or more ayllus. The other parcialidad was hurinsaya.
- hatunruna . . . . . rural Indian who paid his tribute in labor.
- indios de  
faltriguera . . . . "pocket Indians"; those mitayos that were delivered in silver, ostensibly to hire substitute laborers, and used instead to cover production costs and the azogueros' personal expenses.
- informaciones . . . . bodies of testimony on a specific set of questions; usually used to document a legal case presented in a petition, report, etc.
- informe . . . . . an individual's report on an issue.

- jornal . . . . . daily wage.
- laguna . . . . . reservoir; lake.
- lamas . . . . . the ultimate residue of amalgamation processing; the composite of mercury and silver.
- legajo . . . . . corpus of documentation in an archive.
- leguas . . . . . travel allowances paid according to the number of leagues (literally, leguas) traveled per day to and from Potosí.
- limeño . . . . . pertaining to Lima; resident of Lima.
- mayordomo . . . . . overseer; foreman.
- mazo . . . . . stamping mechanism in a refining mill.
- memorial . . . . . personal account, report; espeically of one's tenure in office. Also, an account of historical nature.
- mercaderes  
de plata . . . . . silver merchants.
- meses . . . . . mitayos who were required to work on their weeks of "rest" in the repair of the reservoirs and in other public works; later sent into the mines and to the mills.
- mestizo . . . . . half-breed: half-Indian; half-Spaniard.
- metales . . . . . raw ore.
- minga . . . . . free, volunteer, Indian laborer.
- mita . . . . . turn, time of service, or system of draft labor in turns.
- mita gruesa . . . . . total number of Indians required to come to Potosí each year to serve in the mita.
- mita ordinaria . . . . . weekly number of mitayos; one-third of the mita gruesa (by design).

- mitayo . . . . . Indian serving in the mita.
- montón . . . . . pile.
- mulato . . . . . half-breed: half-Spaniard; half-Black.
- nervio principal . . . . . principal nerve; most important organ.
- obraje . . . . . factory; textile shop.
- octavo . . . . . one-eighth; royal share of mineral production at 12-1/2 per cent.
- oidor . . . . . judge on an Audiencia; "hearer."
- originario . . . . . Indian living in his original village.
- padron . . . . . census; population tally.
- parcialidad . . . . . half of a village; see hanansaya.
- parroquia . . . . . parish; neighborhood; each province involved in the Potosí mita had its own parroquia in the villa.
- pesos . . . . . coins; units of currency.
- pleitos . . . . . law suits; litigation; complaints.
- "pocket Indian" . . . . . see indio de faltriguera.
- pongo . . . . . Indian overseer; taskmaster.
- potosino . . . . . pertaining to Potosí; resident of Potosí.
- procurador . . . . . attorney; legal representative.
- protector . . . . . protector; official assigned the duty of advocating the Indians' position.
- quebrado . . . . . broken.
- quintal . . . . . unit of weight used for mercury and ore.
- quinto . . . . . one-fifth; royal share (quinto real) of production at 20 per cent of mineral output.

- ranchería . . . . . small settlement; also a synonym for parroquia in the potosino context.
- reales . . . . . units of currency equal to one-eighth of an assayed peso.
- Recopilación de las leyes . . . . . recompilation of laws.
- reducción . . . . . small pueblo to which Indians have been brought for resettlement; also the process by which they were gathered and settled. A reductor was the one who conducted the process. A reducción general was a comprehensive resettlement effort in a large geographical area.
- relación . . . . . report; summary; overview.
- relator . . . . . official responsible for writing brief summaries of material on a given subject (relaciones).
- repartimiento . . . . . assignment of Indians to work in an enterprise; the group of Indians so assigned. A repartimiento de la mita was the distribution of Indians to individual miners, soldados and azogueros.
- rescates . . . . . the bying and selling of raw silver in the ghatu plaza at Potosí.
- revisita . . . . . re-inspection; re-count of the population in an area.
- rezagos . . . . . debts owed for failure to pay tribute in earlier years; rezagos de mita were the debts owed by caciques because they had not met their quotas of mitayos in previous years.
- sacadores . . . . . Indian collectors used by the azogueros to gather money for service in silver from the caciques.
- soldados . . . . . Spaniards who had served in a military campaign, but who had not been rewarded with an encomienda grant.

- tacana . . . . . extremely rich ore.
- tarea . . . . . quota; daily task.
- testimonio . . . . . notarized copies of documents used to buttress a legal case, petition, government report, etc.
- tindaruna . . . . . Indian who was compelled to report to a central location for hiring.
- tomines . . . . . units of currency; parts of the common peso.
- veedores . . . . . officials charged with monitoring work inside the cerro at Potosí.
- vicuña . . . . . animal, camelid, native to Peru and Bolivia. The Vicuñas were an alliance of non-Basque Spaniards and Creoles involved in the "civil war" at Potosí during the 1620s.
- villa . . . . . usually a village, but used in connection with Potosí because it was known as the Villa Imperial after purchasing that title from the crown in the sixteenth century.
- visita . . . . . inspection.
- visitador . . . . . an outside official sent to inspect a particular area, group, official or institution.
- yanacona . . . . . Indian who was spared mita obligation by Toledo, but who had to pay tribute each year. Yanaconas were originally tradesmen who were displaced by the conquest, but the term was later used for Indians who were assigned to agricultural enterprises by Toledo, their descendents, and other Indians who adopted the name to escape mita service and other obligations.
- yungas . . . . . lowlands, on the eastern slope of the Andes.
- zambaigo . . . . . half-breed: half-Indian, half-Black.



## APPENDIX II

### VICEROYS OF PERU, 1544-1705

1. Blasco Núñez Vela assumed office on May 17, 1544 and died on January 1, 1546.
2. Antonio de Mendoza assumed office on November 12, 1551 and died on July 21, 1552.
3. Andrés Hurtado de Mendoza, Marqués de Cañete, assumed office on June 29, 1556 and died on September 14, 1560.
4. Diego López de Zúñiga y Velasco, Conde de Nieva, assumed office on February 11, 1561 and died on February 19, 1564.
5. Francisco de Toledo assumed office on October 30, 1569 and left it on May 1, 1581.
6. Martín Enríquez de Almansa assumed office on May 4, 1581 and left it on March 12, 1583.
7. Fernando de Torres y Portugal, Conde de Villar, assumed office on November 21, 1585 and left it on January 6, 1590.
8. García Hurtado de Mendoza, Marqués de Cañete, assumed office on January 6, 1590 and left it on April 4, 1596.
9. Luis de Velasco assumed office on June 23, 1596 and left it on December 8, 1604.
10. Gaspar de Zúñiga y Acevedo, Conde de Monterrey, assumed office on December 8, 1604 and died on February 10, 1606.

The Audiencia de Lima served as interim head of government from February 10, 1606 to December 21, 1607.

11. Juan de Mendoza y Luna, Marqués de Montesclaros, assumed office on December 22, 1607 and left it on December 18, 1615.
12. Francisco de Borja y Aragón, Príncipe de Esquilache, assumed office on December 18, 1615 and left it December 31, 1621.
13. Diego Fernández de Córdoba, Marqués de Guadalcazar, assumed office on July 25, 1622 and left it on January 14, 1629.
14. Luis Gerónimo Fernández de Cabrera y Bobadilla, Conde de Chinchón, assumed office on January 14, 1629 and left it on December 18, 1639.
15. Pedro de Toledo y Leiva, Marqués de Mancera, assumed office on December 18, 1639 and left it on September 20, 1648.
16. García Sarmiento de Sotomayor, Conde de Salvatierra, assumed office on September 20, 1648 and left it on February 24, 1655.
17. Luis Enríquez de Guzmán, Conde de Alba de Aliste, assumed office on February 24, 1655 and left it on July 30, 1661.
18. Diego de Benavides y de la Cueva, Conde de Santisteban, assumed office on July 30, 1661 and died on March 17, 1666.  
  
The Audiencia de Lima served as interim head of government from March 17, 1666 to November 21, 1667.
19. Pedro Fernández de Castro, Conde de Lemos, assumed office on November 21, 1667 and died on December 6, 1672.  
  
The Audiencia de Lima served as interim head of government from December 6, 1672 to August 15, 1674.
20. Baltasar de la Cueva Enríquez, Conde de Castellar, assumed office on August 15, 1674 and left it on July 7, 1678.

21. Melchor de Liñán y Cisneros assumed office on July 7, 1678 and left it on November 7, 1681.
22. Melchor de Navarra y Rocafull, Duque de la Palata, assumed office on November 7, 1681 and left it on August 15, 1689.
23. Melchor Portocarrero Lasso de la Vega, Conde de la Monclova, assumed office on August 15, 1689 and died on September 24, 1705.

Source: Lewis Hanke and Celso Rodríguez, eds., Los virreyes españoles en América durante el gobierno de la Casa de Austria, Biblioteca de Autores Españoles, nos. 273-277, 280-286 (12 vols.; Madrid: Ediciones Atlas, 1978-1980).

## APPENDIX III


### MAPS

NOTE: the following maps are drawn from Alberto Crespo R., "El reclutamiento y los viajes de la 'mita' del cerro de Potosí," La minería hispana e iberoamericana. Contribución a su investigación histórica (Vol. I of Ponencias del VI Congreso Internacional de Minería; León: Cátedra de San Isidoro, 1970), 481; Joseph M. Barnadas, Charcas. Orígenes históricos de una sociedad colonial (La Paz, 1973), 32/33, 216/217, 218/219, 244/245 and 266/267; and N. Sanson d Abbeville, "Le Perou et le cours de la Riviere Amazone, depuis les sources jusques a la Mer. Tires de Divers Autheurs et de diverses Relations. Par N Sanson d Abbeville Geogr ordre du Roy. A Paris. Chez Pierre Mariette Rue S Iacque a l'Esperance Avecq Privilege du Roy pour vingt Ans. 1656," U.S. Geographical Survey Library No. 10601, from the Map Division of the Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.

Each of the maps in the series of five is an enlargement of the inset on the previous one (marked in dotted lines). The boundaries on Map 3, "Provinces of Upper Peru," are from Crespo, and should be considered tentative.

MAP 2  
PRINCIPAL CITIES OF  
HAPSBURG PERU


Callao ● Lima (Los Reyes)  
● Huancavelica  
● Chinchá  
● Cuzco (Map 3)



● Arequipa ● La Paz  
Cochabamba ●  
● Oruro  
La Plata ●  
Potosí ●  
Porco ●

Arica ●

This map shows the principal cities of Hapsburg Peru. A vertical dashed line runs through the center, with a horizontal dashed line at the top and another at the bottom. The cities listed are Cuzco, Arequipa, La Paz, Cochabamba, Oruro, La Plata, Potosí, Porco, and Arica. A small island is shown between Arequipa and La Paz. A dashed line from Cuzco indicates its location relative to Map 3.







MAP 5  
 CITIES AND PUEBLOS OF  
 SOUTHEASTERN UPPER PERU



