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# A history of the north of England from 1000 to 1135.

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A HISTORY OF THE NORTH OF ENGLAND FROM 1000 TO 1135

A Dissertation Presented

By

WILLIAM EARL KAPELLE

Submitted to the Graduate School of the  
University of Massachusetts  
in partial fulfillment of the requirements  
for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

December

1974

History

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A Dissertation

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December 1974

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## A HISTORY OF THE NORTH OF ENGLAND FROM 1000 TO 1135

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Directed by: Dr. Archibald R. Lewis

In historiographical terms the most significant contribution of this study is to demonstrate that English medieval history cannot be written solely from the standpoint of the king. The history of the North from 1000 to 1135 shows that court-centered history obscures the continuity and importance of regional problems and gives too much prominence to the king as a causative factor. Both before and after the Conquest, in fact, northern history proceeded from the interaction between the northern nobility and the king. Prior to 1080, it was dominated by a clash between the two parties. Politically, the northern nobility consisted of two groups, the men of York and the Northumbrians, and both groups had become distrustful of the king by 1065 because of royal attempts to govern the North through unpopular earls who threatened local privileges. The northerners' attempts to resist these earls led to conflict which culminated in the great northern revolt of 1065 and which seriously undermined the unity of the Anglo-Saxon kingdom. Moreover, this conflict did not end in 1066. As a result of his initial dealings with the North, William the Conqueror appeared to pose the same threat as his predecessors, and the northerners resisted him accordingly. The general northern revolts of 1067-1070 and the Northumbrian revolts of 1074 and 1080 were a direct extension of pre-Conquest northern resistance to the king, and the only novel element in these events was the

solution that William ultimately imposed, the destruction of the native nobilities of Yorkshire and Northumbria in 1069-70 and 1080 respectively.

These measures ended northern opposition to royal government, but they did not give William the Conqueror or Rufus control of the North because their power above the Humber was directly limited by their own nobles. Much of northwestern England and southwestern Scotland was unattractive to the Conqueror's barons, and they would not settle there. This factor restricted Norman settlement to Yorkshire, Durham, and southern Lancashire, and even in these shires the Normans either destroyed the manorial regime of the North or imposed new burdens on the peasants in an attempt to increase the value of their new estates. The limited extent of Norman settlement put the Normans in a weak position. Both the Conqueror and Rufus had to deal with the Scots through diplomacy and demonstrations in force because there were no local Norman landholding classes in Cumberland and Northumberland, and the Normans already in the North had difficulty redeveloping Yorkshire and settling above the Tyne because they had little protection against raids from the West. Indeed, this situation did not improve until after 1100 when Henry I brought to England a new group of nobles who were willing to take lands in the Northwest. Their settlement in Cumberland and in Galloway under Earl David provided the basis for the security which allowed the spread of Norman settlement along the east coast plain into Northumberland and Lothian and the subsequent development of the Anglo-Norman society which characterized both the North and southern Scotland during the High Middle Ages.



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- EHR English Historical Review
- ESC Early Scottish Charters Prior to A.D. 1153, ed. A. C. Lawrie (Glasgow, 1905).
- ESSH Early Sources of Scottish History, A.D. 500 to 1286, ed. and trans. A. O. Anderson (2 vols.; Edinburgh, 1922).
- EYC Early Yorkshire Charters, ed. W. Farrer and C. T. Clay (10 vols., Yorkshire Archaeological Society Record Series, Extra Series; Edinburgh, 1913-55). In progress.
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
- Pipe Rolls                    The Great Rolls of the Pipe of the Reigns of Henry II, Richard, and John (multi-volume, Pipe Roll Society; London, 1884-1955).
- RRA-N, I and II              Regesta Regum Anglo-Normannorum, 1066-1154, Vol. I: Regesta Willelmi Conquestoris Et Willelmi Rufi, 1066-1100, ed. H. W. C. Davis (Oxford, 1913); Vol. II: Regesta Henrici Primi, ed. C. Johnson and H. A. Cronne (Oxford, 1956).
- RRS, I and II                 Regesta Regum Scottorum, Vol. I: The Acts of Malcolm IV, King of Scots, 1153-1165, ed. G. W. S. Barrow (Edinburgh, 1960); Vol. II: The Acts of William I, King of Scots, 1165-1214, ed. G. W. S. Barrow with W. W. Scott (Edinburgh, 1971).
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- Symeon of Durham, HR        Historia Regum, Vol. II of Symeonis Monachi Opera Omnia, ed. T. Arnold (2 vols., Rolls Series, Vol. LXXV; London, 1882-85).
- Scottish Annals               Scottish Annals From English Chronicles, A.D. 500 to 1286, trans. A. O. Anderson (London, 1908).
- TCWAAS                        Transactions of the Cumberland and Westmorland Antiquarian and Archaeological Society
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## C H A P T E R I

### THE DANES OF YORK AND THE HOUSE OF BAMBURGH

One of the basic problems in the history of the Norman Conquest is why the Northumbrians and the men of York resisted the Normans with such self-destructive tenacity, and despite the importance of this question, it has not received much attention in this century. The reasons for this are obscure. It may be partially the result of the conviction that the South is the only really important part of England. Also a close study of the northern resistance to William the Conqueror inevitably discloses that he made at least two blunders in dealing with the North and that he only rescued himself from the results of these mistakes by genocide. Such discoveries fit poorly into the current picture of William's efficiency. Finally, it may be true that the behavior of the northerners in the face of the Conquest actually reveals a distressing exception to the "precocious" unity of Anglo-Saxon England. The idea of backwoods Northerners being so impertinent as not to appreciate the splendid unity offered them by the West Saxon kings with their shires, fyrd, and Danegeld is undoubtedly as unpalatable to some historians as the picture of William the Bastard making mistakes is to others. In any case, in most accounts of the Norman Conquest, the men from beyond the Humber come on stage long enough to "revolt" a few times. They do this out of conservatism, fail miserably, and are heard from no more.

Such will not be the case in the following pages. The behavior of the Northumbrians and the Yorkshire men during the reign of William the Conqueror is inexplicable if it is separated from their pre-Conquest



Map 1. Political Divisions of the North in 1000


political experience. William won Hastings, but his victory did not wipe out the past. The men of the North in the 1060's and 70's acted as much in response to past realities as to the new reality of the Normans. This chapter will begin the investigation of their past. The basic question which must be answered is whether there was a political side to the cultural regionalism of the North in Anglo-Saxon times. Put in another way, the question is: Was northern separatism a political force? To answer this question, this chapter will discuss the more important aspects of northern geopolitics and reconstruct the history of the North from the second period of Danish invasions to the beginning of the reign of Edward the Confessor. It is necessary to go back this far because the history of the North during this period has never been properly understood, and some important insights of earlier scholars have been largely ignored.<sup>1</sup>

The first question concerns the extent of the North. What were the bounds of this region? To the unwary this may seem an easy enough question. In the eleventh century the North consisted, more or less, of the present counties of Yorkshire, Durham, and Northumberland on the east plus Lancashire and the southern parts of Cumberland and Westmorland on the west. With one exception, the northern parts of the latter counties were included in the kingdom of Strathclyde or Cumbria.<sup>2</sup>

This definition is fairly accurate in a political sense, but it is necessary to go beyond politics to adequately define the North. In few parts of Anglo-Saxon England was geography more important than in this region. This was true largely because of its negative effects. Northern landforms hindered internal communications, limited agricultural




Map 2. Northern Geographical Names



possibilities, and left what good land there was open to invasion. Indeed, in only one direction did the North have imposing natural defenses: towards the south. The Humber has been said to mark a line of very ancient division among the Anglo-Saxons,<sup>3</sup> and a concrete example of this is the fact that prior to the Danish invasions, the power of the Bretwalda did not usually cross the Humber unless this position was occupied by the Northumbrian king.<sup>4</sup> The importance of the Humber as a dividing line probably came from the fact that for most purposes the North was nearly a separate island during this period. The Humber comes far inland before turning north towards York, and its function as a barrier to land travel was taken over west of the turn by the swamps along the lower Ouse. West of the mountains, the peatmoss bogs along the Mersey formed an effective barrier between Lancashire and Cheshire.<sup>5</sup> The only good land routes to the Midlands were between the Ouse swamps and the Pennine foothills on the east and through the Manchester area on the west, but both these passages are crossed by transverse rivers and were easily defended against an invading army. Moreover, it is known that these roads north were very bad in the early twelfth century, even for small groups of travellers, and that York's main connection with southern England was by ship either up the Trent to Lincoln or down the east coast.<sup>6</sup>

The North was, therefore, cut off from easy communications with the South. It was, unfortunately, more cut-up internally. Beginning in the south, the Pennines run north between the Humber and the Mersey and continue all the way to the Tyne Gap. In Cumberland they are flanked by the Lake District, the highest and wildest area in northern England.

Map 3. Sketch Map of the Terrain of the North



The Tyne Gap runs from the head of the Solway Firth to the North Sea, but north of it rises another range of hills which merge into the Southern Highlands of Scotland. These highlands stretch from Galloway on the west all the way across southern Scotland and reach the North Sea between Lothian and Tweeddale.

Although these upland regions are not of awe-inspiring height and can be crossed by a number of routes, they effectively divided the North into three areas: the east coast plain, the west coast plain with the Vale of Eden, and the uplands themselves. These mountains and hills functioned as a serious barrier to communications between the coastal plains and were agriculturally marginal. Except where pierced by river valleys such as the Vale of Eden or the Tweed-Teviot system, much of the uplands was only useful as summer pasture for the settlements in the valleys. Consequently a big slice of the North running from top to bottom was lightly exploited, nearly empty land. Unfortunately in the Middle Ages, the usual corollary of low settlement density, pastoralism, and poor communications was a "free-zone," that is, an area which was normally beyond the control of local forces of law and order and became the refuge for the peasant's primeval enemy, the wolf, and his societal enemy, the outlaw. Such was certainly the case in the North of England, as will be seen later.

Thus the North was rather different from its outlines on a political map. It was cut off from the South and had a dangerous and unproductive "free-zone" running up its middle. In fact, for most purposes the North consisted of the two coastal plains, and of these the one on the east was by far the more important. It runs north through the Vale



of York, eastern Durham and Northumberland to Tweeddale. Above this rich area (the Merse) it is broken by the Lammermuirs, the eastern end of the Southern Highlands, but reappears in Lothian and broadens into the Midland Valley of Scotland. West of the Pennines, there was a poorer, smaller plain which reached from the Mersey bogs north through western Lancashire, around the Cumberland coast to the Vale of Eden, and finally west into Galloway south of the Southern Highlands.

The east coast plain, which was the most developed part of northern England, was a land of moderate rainfall, indifferent to good soils, and village agriculture, and potentially it could carry a large peasant population. The western plain was smaller and wetter. Its inhabitants practiced mixed agriculture and usually lived in hamlets. Both these areas were dangerously open to invasion from the north and the sea. The Southern Highlands of Scotland could be crossed in the west either by Annandale or Nithsdale, routes which linked Clydesdale with the Galwegian plain and thence to Cumberland. In the east there were two routes between Lothian and Tweeddale: by Lauderdale or the coast road. Lothian itself had no natural frontiers except to the south. Finally, the long coasts of the North had traditionally stood open to sea-borne invasion, pre-eminently by the Tyne and Humber-Ouse system, but also from the Irish Sea up the rivers and creeks of the West.

The North was not a single natural region. Its geography divided it into three regions and left the most important of these open to invasion. This emphasis on the negative aspects of the subject may seem to some excessive, but it is appropriate given the history of the lands beyond the Humber. In reading most accounts of the Norman Conquest, one gets

the vague impression that Anglo-Saxon England was an ancient kingdom. In fact, it was not in the North. Prior to the Danish invasions of the ninth century the kingdom of Northumbria had existed above the Humber. It was one of the original Anglo-Saxon kingdoms and had stretched from the Humber north along the eastern plain across the Lammermuirs into Lothian, probably all the way to the Firth of Forth. During their days of greatest power, the Northumbrian kings had also extended their rule over the Pennines into Cumberland, Lancashire, and the Galwegian coastal plain. In the ninth and tenth centuries, however, there occurred a series of changes which were catastrophic from a Northumbrian point of view. These can not be considered in detail, but their main outline is necessary for a clear understanding of the North. What happened was not without irony. The Northumbrians, once sea-borne invaders, were unable to withstand the attacks of the Danes who conquered Yorkshire and probably much of the land between the Tyne and the Tees and set up their own kingdom. The Northumbrians living above the Tyne kept their independence but were militarily at a disadvantage against their northern neighbors after the loss of Yorkshire. In the tenth century, their fortunes continued to decline. From at least 900, the Strathclyde Britons (the Cumbrians) expanded south over the Southern Highlands and gained control of Cumberland and probably Lancashire.<sup>7</sup> Sometime during the same century, probably ca. 973, the Scots took control of Lothian, and perhaps Tweeddale, the northernmost provinces of the defunct kingdom.<sup>8</sup> Meanwhile the Danish kingdom of York had been replaced by a Norwegian kingdom, and the rump of Northumbria, the lands between the Tyne and the Tweed with the northern part of Durham, endured--perhaps because it was

the most worthless part of the eastern plain. In 954, all this turmoil finally stopped; after several abortive attempts the king of Wessex annexed York and Northumbria (the land between the Tees and the Tweed).

This was only a little over a century before the Norman Conquest. The question is to what extent the kings succeeded after this date in incorporating the North into their kingdom despite the rather major distractions of the second wave of Danish invasions, the period of Danish kings, and the political crises of Edward the Confessor's reign, and although there are several points of view from which this question could be approached, the initial requirement is precise language. The North was not a homogeneous region either geographically or ethnically. Nonetheless, the term "Northumbrians" is usually used to refer to the inhabitants of the modern counties of Yorkshire, Durham, and Northumberland. Sometimes, however, it only means the inhabitants of any one of these areas. This usage reflects the original meaning of "Northumbrians" and also southern English usage in the twelfth century; it also leads to unwarranted vagueness and false conclusions. Hereafter northern usage will be followed. "Northumbrians" will refer to the people living between the Tweed and the Tees. If it is necessary to single out the people between the Tyne and the Tees, they will be called the "men of St. Cuthbert," the "men of Durham," etc. The inhabitants of Yorkshire will be called the "Yorkshire men." "Northerners" will refer to all the peoples between the Humber and the Tweed. These terms may seem somewhat ponderous, but they will clarify the following discussion. It will also be best to consider Yorkshire and Northumberland separately.

Yorkshire was a large, complex area which ran roughly from the Humber to the Tees with a substantial extension south of the line of the Humber on the southwest. The shire also contained a great deal of the Pennines, and the northern part of Lancashire (the part above the Ribble) was linked administratively to York.

It is an easy enough task to point out the cultural peculiarities of Yorkshire east of the Pennines. The dialect spoken by the natives was unintelligible to men from southern England.<sup>9</sup> In the Pennine foothills on the west remnants of both the Northumbrian aristocracy and the traditional social structure of the North survived the Danish invasions.<sup>10</sup> Most scholars would add that these invasions and the subsequent Danish settlement had produced a distinctive society in the eastern part of the shire. This point will be discussed later. For the moment it can be safely said that at least a Danish aristocracy had been created in Yorkshire, and that the area was part of the Danelaw. Indeed, miscellaneous examples of Danish influence can be cited, such as its distinctive body of customary law, its system of monetary reckoning, and the names of the agricultural tenements of its peasants.<sup>11</sup> The fact that many of the Yorkshire peasants were relatively free and that the manor (in a southern sense) was not common in the county has also been ascribed to Danish influence,<sup>12</sup> but even though this attribution is doubtful, the basic phenomenon is not.

The political position of Yorkshire within the kingdom was also somewhat unusual. In particular, the power of the king appears to have been less in this shire than south of the Humber. He had demesne lands in Yorkshire, but they were small in comparison with those of the earl



who also had the homage of most of the small thegns.<sup>13</sup> These two factors limited the king's authority, but he still had important rights. The king appointed the earls of the shire and the archbishop; these prerogatives were exercised. He also received the pleas of the crown and heriots of important thegns,<sup>14</sup> and despite the fact that his power of enacting new laws was supposedly limited by Edgar's grant of legal autonomy to the northern Danelaw in 962 in return for their loyalty, it is doubtful if later kings felt bound by this provision.<sup>15</sup> In conclusion, it has been said that the king's power in Yorkshire was essentially that of an overlord,<sup>16</sup> but this is an understatement. The Anglo-Saxon kings had important rights in the shire and tried to exercise them. What is uncertain is how well they succeeded.<sup>17</sup>

Northumbria (Bernicia) was as exotic as Yorkshire in its own way. The earldom stretched from the Tees to the Tweed between the central hills and the North Sea. This area had been spared significant Danish settlement and had an Anglian population similar to the one in Lothian across the Tweed.<sup>18</sup> Perhaps as a result of these factors, the structure of the society of these people was somewhat archaic and rather peculiar. It is becoming increasingly clear, in particular, that their culture had a definite resemblance to the cultures of both the Lowland Scots and the Welsh,<sup>19</sup> and some of the details of this social organization will be discussed later. For the moment, however, it is enough to say that in this area the demands of lordship were not as extreme as in southern England and still had something of a public character. The nobility does not seem to have been numerous, and the peasants were lightly



exploited. In fact, Northumberland was so peculiar that it stood outside the recognized three-fold division of English law.<sup>20</sup>

This last point raises a very important question: In what sense was Northumberland part of the kingdom? If it really had been regarded as being part of the kingdom in a normal sense, one would expect to find scholars speaking of a four-fold law system in Anglo-Saxon England. This may seem a pedantic point, and it would be if other evidence did not point in the same direction. Either during or shortly after Earl Mowbray's rebellion in 1095, Rufus granted some charters to the St. Albans monks at Tynemouth. In one of these he confirmed all their possessions and customs In nort de Tyne et in suth de Tyne et in Anglia ("to the north and to the south of the Tyne and in England").<sup>21</sup> This phrase draws a clear distinction between "England" and the lands above the Tees (Northumbria). If the charter is a forgery, this usage would still be significant. If the phrase is a formula, it represents Anglo-Saxon conditions. In some sense there was a distinction between Northumbria and England.

This idea is strikingly confirmed by Domesday Book which literally stops at the Tees; no part of Northumbria is described in its folios. This fact has never been adequately explained. Scholars have suggested that it was left out either because it was too devastated to be worth anything to the king or because the natives were hostile,<sup>22</sup> but neither of these explanations will do. Yorkshire was surveyed, yet it had been devastated very thoroughly. At the time of the survey, Northumberland had both a Norman earl and bishop who could have given adequate protection to the judges if such had been necessary. In fact, Domesday

confirms in a negative sense the distinction drawn in Rufus's charter: England and Northumberland were different.

The same idea is found in the Dialogue of the Exchequer. It says that the counties which belonged to the king "of ancient right" paid their dues to the king by blanchéd farm but those acquired "through some incidental cause" paid by tale. This second group comprised Sussex, Shropshire, Cumberland, and Northumberland.<sup>23</sup>

It would be possible to attempt to explain the difference between England and Northumbria by inferences drawn from the supposed purpose of Domesday or similar types of logic based on the Dialogue of the Exchequer, but this is unnecessary because there is safer evidence which requires no long line of sequential reasoning. The difference amounted to the fact that north of the Tees the king was literally the overlord and had no direct powers. There is no evidence, for instance, that the king had any demesne lands in Northumberland prior to the suppression of the earldom, and before the reign of William the Conqueror, there were no royal mints or burghs in the area. It was unshired and, as mentioned earlier, stood outside the recognized bodies of law. No royal writs or charters survive which relate to Northumberland, and it is clear that the kings did not have the power to make them.<sup>24</sup> Finally, and this is the crucial point, the king lacked the power of appointment beyond the Tees until very late. No bishop of Durham was chosen by the king until Siward was earl; and, even after this, the choice seems to have lain with the earl more than with the king. Twelfth-century Durham tradition suggests that before this the bishop was elected by the clerks of the church.<sup>25</sup> With one possible exception, the earls of Northumberland were

also not chosen by the king. From at least 954 they were all members of one family, the house of Bamburgh; and the family itself probably goes further back into the tenth century.<sup>26</sup> The house of Bamburgh to all intents and purposes ruled Northumberland, and it will be suggested later that they paid no tribute to the king.<sup>27</sup>

This is an interesting discovery: Royal power was very limited above the Tees. In Yorkshire it was somewhat stronger but still weak in comparison to the South. This situation undoubtedly went back to the submission of the North to King Eadred in 954; perhaps it was the price of Danish and Northumbrian submission. If so, the earls of Northumberland got a far better deal than the Danes of York. The important fact, for the purpose of this discussion, is that royal weakness in the North persisted well into the eleventh century. Politically the North had not been well-integrated into the rest of the kingdom. It must have been difficult for the king to exercise control in York, and nearly impossible for him to do so in Northumbria.

The real question is whether this was politically important. Was there political expression of the regional identity of the North? Did the Danish aristocracy of York want out of the kingdom or did the house of Bamburgh resent the overlordship of the house of Wessex? If neither of these situations existed, royal weakness in the North only meant that the kings received less money from the area than they might have and there was no northern separatism. Actually, the question of Northumberland can be dismissed for the moment. Prior to 1016 there is no sign that the earls were unhappy with their position within the kingdom. Northumberland had had a bad time before 954 when it was caught between

the Vikings of York, the Scots, and the Cumbrians, and the earls must have valued royal support.

In Yorkshire things were different. There are some signs that the inhabitants cherished memories of independence, but unfortunately, there is no contemporary evidence on this question which is very explicit. A thirteenth-century chronicle does say that the Yorkshire men disliked the idea of Athelstan being their king and taking tribute and that in 966 Edgar feared a separatist movement in the North.<sup>28</sup> This chronicle is not, however, particularly trustworthy, and these statements, found nowhere else, are doubtful evidence. They are not, on the other hand, at all inconsistent with certain other things known about Yorkshire after 954. All of the archbishops of the city after Wulfstan I, in the mid-tenth century, came from south of the Humber, most of them from the eastern Danelaw, and this should be understood as an attempt to provide archbishops able to deal with the Danish inhabitants but unlikely to work for local independence.<sup>29</sup> A number of these men also held a southern bishopric in plurality, and this may have been another way to ensure their loyalty, although the poverty of York could also have been a reason.<sup>30</sup>

This same lack of trust in natives is found with respect to the earls of Yorkshire. Before 1016, two of the earls, Osulf and Uhtred, were members of the Bamburgh family; and two others, Oslac and Ælfhelm, were from south of the Humber. Only Thored may have been a local man,<sup>31</sup> but it is equally possible that he was Oslac's son. These appointments of archbishops and earls indicate that the kings feared giving the Yorkshire men local leadership, and there are signs that even outsiders



could not necessarily be trusted beyond the Humber. In 975 Earl Oslac was banished from the kingdom. In ca. 992 Earl Thored disappeared without explanation, and in 1006 Earl Ælfhelm was killed at court and his sons blinded.<sup>32</sup> No reasons for any of these events are given in the Chronicle, but it was certainly a suspicious mortality rate.

The impression that the men of York could not be trusted is strengthened by certain aspects of the second period of Danish invasions. In particular, the North and the Danish Five Boroughs just to the south were left almost untouched through thirty-six years of raids. Furthermore, on the one occasion when the Danes did trouble the North, the men of York behaved rather suspiciously. In 993 when the Danes sacked Bamburgh and, after entering the Humber, plundered Lindsey (the northern part of Lincolnshire) and the East Riding of Yorkshire, the northerners did raise an army, but it would not fight the Danes. The Anglo-Saxon Chronicle says that this happened because the leaders of the army fled,<sup>33</sup> and Florence of Worcester adds that they fled "because they were Danes on the father's side."<sup>34</sup> Probably Florence was right. After 993 the Danes did not return to the North until 1013, and this twenty-year interval could not have been the result of chance. Swein must have thought that the inhabitants of the northern Danelaw were already sympathetic to his cause for otherwise he would have raided them. He might, of course, have been deceiving himself, but the event proved otherwise. When he sailed up the Humber and Trent to Gainsborough in 1013, the North immediately submitted to him. Uhtred of Northumbria led the way, and he was followed by the Danes of the Five Boroughs, those of Lindsey, and finally all Danes living north of Watling Street. Swein



then moved south and only began to harry the countryside after he passed Watling Street.<sup>35</sup> The men of York had not fought one battle to oppose him.

It is difficult to be sure how much to make of this. The submission of 1013 is not particularly significant; by then the kingdom was falling apart. Swein's sparing of the northern Danelaw means more, and it fits quite nicely with the Anglo-Saxon kings' lack of trust in the Yorkshire men as shown in their appointments to the archbishopric and earldom. Probably the correct conclusion is that the Danish aristocracy was separatist, although it is possible that they may have been simply unreliable against the Danes. At least they do not seem to have actively aided the invaders.

This second suggestion probably gives the Danes of York too much credit, however, because Ethelred had strong political support in the North. Earl Uhtred of Northumbria was loyal to the king until 1013, and he may have kept the Danes quiet. Indeed, this was probably why Ethelred had advanced him in the world. Uhtred was the son of Earl Waltheof of Northumbria of whom nothing is known other than the bare fact of his existence and that he was an old man by 1006. In that year, Malcolm II, king of Scots, invaded Northumbria and, after the usual harrying, besieged the newly founded episcopal city of Durham. This was clearly a serious situation for the Danes were raiding southern England at the time and Ethelred could send no help.<sup>36</sup> Earl Waltheof, who stayed in Bamburgh, did nothing, and Malcolm may have been well on his way towards taking the city. At this point, however, Uhtred, who had some interest in the matter, intervened. He had married Bishop Aldhun's daughter and

held, as a result, a number of estates belonging to the church of Durham. It would seem, in fact, that he was the bishop's insurance policy, and the bishop's prudence was rewarded. Uhtred called together an army from both Northumbria and Yorkshire and defeated the Scots.<sup>37</sup>

The sequel gives some interesting insights into northern culture and politics. Uhtred was proud of his victory and brought trophies home with him. The heads of the Scots were cut off, washed and neatly groomed, and put up on poles around the city walls. The women who had cleaned the heads were each given a cow for their services. He also received a reward for his victory. Ethelred was pleased and allowed him to succeed his father as earl, even though the latter was still alive. Furthermore, the king also gave Uhtred the earldom of Yorkshire which he had just made vacant by killing Earl Ælfhelm.<sup>38</sup> Ethelred apparently felt that Uhtred was more reliable than Ælfhelm. Soon after receiving this honor, Uhtred dismissed his first wife, the daughter of the bishop of Durham, and married Sige, the daughter of a rich citizen of York, Styr, son of Ulf. This incident is usually used to show the loose marriage customs of the northerners, but it has a second meaning. By the marriage, Uhtred was trying to gain local political support south of the Tees. This is made quite clear by the fact that the bishop of Durham sent Uhtred's ex-wife south also and married her to an important Yorkshire thegn.<sup>39</sup> Bishop Aldhun and Uhtred were still working together, and the object was to make sure that Uhtred could successfully rule Yorkshire.

He must have been able to do this, although there are no details. The De Obsessione Dunelmi does say that Uhtred was quite successful in

war after becoming earl, but it does not name his enemies. The only information it does give is a story, somewhat confused in its details, about how Uhtred refused to desert Ethelred in favor of Swein,<sup>40</sup> and this was apparently true for Ethelred gave Uhtred his own daughter, Elfgiva, in marriage.<sup>41</sup> This is a sure sign that the king valued Uhtred's support. Little else is known about Uhtred after this except that in 1013, he submitted to Swein, but by then everyone was going over to the Danes. When Swein died in 1014, Uhtred did not support his son Cnut. Rather, he seems to have gone back to Ethelred's side for the king's expedition into Lindsey in 1014 would have been very dangerous if Uhtred were hostile.<sup>42</sup> Perhaps the earl took part. In any case, he campaigned with Ethelred's son, Edmund Ironside, in 1016 in Cheshire and the surrounding shires. This was Uhtred's only known campaign in direct support of the royal house, and it is probably significant that it occurred the year after the two chief Danish thegns of the Seven Bor-oughs had been killed. Edmund had installed himself in their place,<sup>43</sup> and this change probably freed Uhtred for operations to the south. Unfortunately, in the middle of this campaign Cnut moved north and invaded Yorkshire, and he was too strong for Uhtred to fight: Wessex had already submitted to him and Earl Eadric was his ally. Uhtred "submitted then out of necessity," but he was assassinated when he went to meet Cnut who then made a Norwegian, Eric of Hlathir, earl of York-shire.<sup>44</sup>

This is the end of the story as it is usually told. The sources for Cnut's reign in general are bad, and for the North they are almost nonexistent. There is, however, one curious tale which does come out of

Waltheof  
e. of Northumbria




Table 1. Geneology of the earls of Northumbria



these years; and, if properly understood, it throws a great deal of light on both Uhtred's role as earl of York and on Northumberland after 1016. This is, of course, the famous Northumbrian blood feud. In its baldest form the story goes as follows. Uhtred obtained his second wife, the daughter of Styr, son of Ulf, at a price: He had to kill Styr's enemy Thurbrand. Uhtred, however, was not able to do this, although he must have tried. At least Thurbrand came to hate Uhtred and killed him when the earl arrived to submit to Cnut in 1016. Eadulf Cudel, Uhtred's brother, then became earl of Northumberland and ruled for a short time. He was followed by Earl Ealdred, Uhtred's son by Bishop Aldhun's daughter. Ealdred avenged his father's death by killing Thurbrand, but he was later killed in a particularly underhanded fashion by Thurbrand's son Carl. The two had made peace and promised to go to Rome together, but when their departure was delayed by a storm, Carl took Ealdred to his hall and, after entertaining him, killed the Northumbrian earl in the woods. This crime was not avenged by Ealdred's half brother Eadulf, who next became earl of Northumberland, apparently because he was killed in 1041 by Siward, and justice waited until the 1070's when Siward's son Waltheof, grandson of Earl Ealdred through his mother, had his soldiers kill most of Carl's sons and grandsons who were assembled for a banquet near York.<sup>45</sup>

All this is very curious even as it stands, and few historians have been able to omit the story from their accounts of the North. Usually it is employed to show the barbarity of the Northumbrians, but it actually has a significance beyond this point. The story was not written down until around 1100, by which time its general meaning had been



forgotten and only the memory of the major events remained.<sup>46</sup> Its details, however, suggest that the original events were not a straightforward blood feud at all, and Thurbrand is the starting point of this interpretation. On the face of the matter, he is a suspicious figure because, in addition to being a rich and powerful Dane who lived in York, he bore the title of "hold," in northern law the Danish equivalent of a king's high-reeve, and this point raises the possibility that he was the leader of the Danes of York. Thurbrand is also said to have been the enemy of Styr, son of Ulf, a rich citizen of York,<sup>47</sup> and although it has been generally assumed that this was some personal rivalry, such was not the case. A source, distinct from the blood feud sources, records Styr's gift of some land to Bishop Aldhun, and the details of this transaction clarify what was actually happening. Styr made the grant when Ethelred was in York. Part of the land had belonged to Styr, and he gave it to Durham with the king's permission. The rest Styr purchased. In the course of the transfer Styr is described as unius de melioribus suis (i.e. of Ethelred).<sup>48</sup> He was, then, an important supporter of the king; this turns things around. When Uhtred married Styr's daughter, he was not simply trying to gain political support in Yorkshire; rather, he was allying with Styr, another supporter of Ethelred, against Thurbrand. This was the meaning of Uhtred's promise to kill Thurbrand, and the probability is that Thurbrand was the local Danish leader in York. Moreover, Styr's "gift" of land to Aldhun supports the idea that Aldhun was working with Uhtred. The Northumbrian "blood feud" actually had its origin in Uhtred's attempt to control the Danes of Yorkshire who were sympathetic to Swein and Cnut.

Uhtred's death proves the point. The fullest account of this is in the De Obsessione Dunelmi. It says that Uhtred was ambushed by Thurbrand as he was on his way to make peace with Cnut, but the details of the story give the event a different appearance. For the deed, Thurbrand used some of Cnut's soldiers whom he hid behind a curtain in the hall which must have been the meeting place between Cnut and Uhtred. Upon Uhtred's entry, the soldiers jumped out and killed him.<sup>49</sup> This was more than a personal feud. The use of Cnut's soldiers implies his consent as does the fact that the killing was done literally under Cnut's nose with no ill effects for Thurbrand--despite the fact that Cnut had given Uhtred a safe-conduct.<sup>50</sup> Furthermore, the De Primo Saxonum Adventu says the killing was done per voluntatem Cnutonis regis.<sup>51</sup> Cnut clearly was as responsible for the killing as Thurbrand. Finally, the idea that this was a feud is reduced to absurdity by the fact that Uhtred was not the only man killed that day: Forty important Northumbrians who had come with him were slaughtered.<sup>52</sup> The incident was, in fact, an attempt by the Danes of York and Cnut to destroy Ethelred's main political and military support in the North by annihilating the nobility of Northumberland. The implications of this are clear. The Anglo-Saxon kings had not mistrusted the Danes of York without reason. They could not be trusted in the face of a Danish invasion and were probably a center of plots and intrigues in peaceful times. In this sense northern separatism existed by 1016. What this reconstruction shows with equal clarity is that until 1016 the earls of Northumberland were loyal to the kings despite the small power which the kings had above the Tees. They were

not separatist, and this is not surprising given the enemies they faced on all sides.

The next major problem is to determine what happened in the North between 1016 and 1041. It is not even clear who was earl of York for part of this period. In 1016 Cnut appointed one of his generals, Eric of Hlathir, earl; but his last genuine signature as dux is found in 1023. There is then a ten-year interval between this date and 1033 when Earl Siward first witnesses a charter, and it is not known who was earl between these dates in York.<sup>53</sup> In Northumberland the situation is about as unclear, despite the fact that the names of the earls are known. After Uhtred was killed, his brother Eadulf Cudel became earl. He lived only a short time and was followed in turn by Ealdred and Eadulf, sons of Uhtred. These earls supposedly ruled in subordination to the Yorkshire earls,<sup>54</sup> but what little is known about them makes this idea questionable.

Eadulf Cudel, the first earl, is said to have been lazy and timid,<sup>55</sup> but this is probably a monk's reconstruction of his character based on his only known act, the cession of Lothian. After becoming earl he is said to have given Lothian to the Scots because he feared that they would take revenge on him for Uhtred's victory over them. In return for Lothian, Eadulf received a "firm peace" with the Scots.<sup>56</sup> The meaning of this story is far from clear for two reasons. First, King Edgar supposedly had already given Lothian to King Kenneth of Scotland in ca.973, and second, in 1018 Malcolm II again invaded the North and annihilated a Northumbrian army drawn from between the Tees and the Tweed at Carham, a ford over the Tweed.<sup>57</sup> Since the account of Edgar's cession of Lothian

has been generally accepted,<sup>58</sup> and since the accounts of Eadulf's cession of Lothian and the battle of Carham deserve quite as much credence as it, the problem is to fit the stories together without arbitrarily dismissing one or more of them. One way of doing this is to assume that Uhtred recovered part of Lothian after defeating Malcolm II in 1006 and that Eadulf Cudel ceded this land to the Scots. M. O. Anderson, who suggested this solution, which is quite possible, also believed that Eadulf had gone over to the Scots and that this was the reason he gave up the land,<sup>59</sup> but there is no evidence to support this idea. In fact, there was a tradition in Durham in the early twelfth century that a Northumbrian earl had led the defeated northern army at Carham,<sup>60</sup> and this suggests the less elaborate idea that it was Eadulf who lost the battle of Carham and, after the defeat, "ceded" Lothian to the Scots. Presumably, the land which he gave up was either some part of Lothian recovered by his brother or a section of the province (perhaps Tweeddale) which the Scots had not obtained in 973.

Earl Eadulf gave up some land to the Scots because they had beaten him badly. This solution is probably correct as far as it goes, but the incident still raises questions. Why should the earl have been particularly fearful after his defeat? He ought to have been able to expect royal help in this circumstance, but it is known that Cnut did not make a countermove in the North for at least nine years. Why did he delay? In any case, how could Eadulf give up land without the king's agreement? Finally, why was there no contingent from Yorkshire at the battle of Carham? It was foolish for the men of Northumberland alone to fight the Scots if they could avoid it.



These are serious questions. Their immediate implication is that some important aspects of the northern political situation after 1016 are still hidden, and this impression is strengthened by the next known incident. After Eadulf Cudel's death, his nephew Ealdred became earl. He killed Thurbrand, his father's killer, and was killed in turn by Carl, Thurbrand's son, in 1038. This is the blood feud story again. It was shown earlier that the origins of this affair lay in the contest between Thurbrand and Uhtred for control of Yorkshire, and the question now is whether these killings (the second and third) represent a blood feud or whether the original contest continued under Carl and Ealdred.

Again the details of the story combined with outside evidence show that the latter was the case. This is initially suggested by the fact that the slaughter should have ended with Ealdred's killing of Thurbrand. He had taken an eye for an eye and ought to have been content; the same should have been true of Carl. This was emphatically not the case for the level of murderous activity increased. Not only did Carl attempt to kill Ealdred, but Ealdred tried to kill Carl. The conflict is described in terms which sound like guerilla war. They plotted against each other, harassed each other with tricks, and lay in ambush for each other.<sup>61</sup> This apparently went on for quite some time until Carl succeeded through the stratagem mentioned earlier. Eadulf, Ealdred's half brother, then became earl.

It might be objected, of course, that Northerners took their feuds very seriously and that this explains both the continuation of the killings and the intensity of the attempts, but such an objection could not be sustained. For this incident to be regarded as normal in northern



society, one would need to cite other examples of the same sort of thing, and other examples do not exist. Furthermore, it is clear that Carl's true identity had been forgotten by the time the story was written down. As mentioned earlier, there is a ten-year gap between Earl Eric, who last witnessed a charter in 1023, and Earl Siward.<sup>62</sup> It happens, however, that a certain Karl minister began to witness in 1024, the very next year after Eric's disappearance, and continued to witness until 1045.<sup>63</sup> This man was undoubtedly identical with the Carl who fought Ealdred, and he was Cnut's earl or sheriff of York until Siward superseded him in 1033. After that, he seems to have occupied a subordinate position for he continued to witness charters--almost always in the company of Siward--until 1045. The fact that he is not named in the Northumbrian earl-lists is not significant. They do not deign to mention any earl of York between Oslac and Siward. If this identification is accepted, the "feud" between Ealdred and Carl becomes a feud between the earl of Northumberland and the earl of York. One wonders what Cnut would have thought.

Actually, once charter evidence is brought into the discussion the whole problem vanishes. Carl probably was earl of York. The most interesting thing however, is that Eadulf Cudel, Ealdred, and Eadulf did not witness royal charters.<sup>64</sup> None of them signed as earl or anything else. It may be objected that not enough charters survive for this to be valid; but this is groundless. The earls of York as well as Carl witnessed a substantial number of charters during this period, and the immediate predecessors of Eadulf Cudel witnessed surviving charters. Earl Waltheof witnessed one, and Uhtred witnessed five despite the Danish invasions.<sup>65</sup>

The only explanation for this is that these three earls did not come to court; if they did not come to court, they were in revolt. The plotting and ambushing between Carl and Ealdred was a minor war between Cnut's representative in the North and the earls of Northumberland. There was no northern blood feud.

This conclusion greatly clarifies the history of the North after 1016. By this date there was probably already hostility between the Northumbrians and the northern Danes, and the murder of Uhtred and the nobles of Northumberland plus the prospect of a Danish monarchy produced a revolt beyond the Tees. The term revolt, however, must be used with caution. Uhtred's successors probably refused to make a formal submission to Cnut and, given the tenuous bond between Northumberland and the king, the earls may not have viewed their action as a revolt at all. In the long run, of course, this was a hopeless policy because Northumberland could not stand alone.

On the one hand, they faced the hostility of Carl. On the other, they had to withstand the Scots who were all too ready to take advantage of the situation. When Malcolm II invaded in 1018, Eadulf Cudel had to fight him without support from the South and lost badly. Because of the revolt, Eadulf could expect no avenging expedition and had to give up "Lothian." He may even have made some submission to Malcolm--but there is no proof of this.<sup>66</sup> The defeat at Carham also put the clerks of St. Cuthbert (of Durham) in a difficult position. Bishop Aldhun died of shock after learning of the slaughter, and the clerks were unable to elect a successor for over two years. The traditional explanation for this is that none of them wished to become a monk, a requirement for

being bishop of Durham.<sup>67</sup> In fact, they probably could not decide whether Carl or the earl of Northumberland was more dangerous. In the end they chose a man from outside their circle, an obscure priest named Edmund who could take the blame for the false moves which appeared inevitable while the clerks rode out the storm.<sup>68</sup> The office of bishop was forced on him, and he was sent south to get Cnut's approval for his consecration.<sup>69</sup> He was the first bishop of Durham known to have sought royal approval.

Edmund proved to be a good bishop, but the clerks' fears had not been imaginary. After Eadulf Cudel's death, Ealdred and Carl fought for some years. Probably Carl made occasional forays into Northumberland, and Ealdred hid in the hills until he went home. This lasted until an unspecified date when the two became "sworn brothers,"<sup>70</sup> supposedly at the urging of friends. Swearing brotherhood, it should be pointed out, was the northern equivalent of a peace treaty. The most likely explanation for this reconciliation was Cnut's northern expedition. This is a shadowy affair, but at some time between ca. 1027 and ca. 1031, the king came north and received the submission of Malcolm II and two northern sub-kings.<sup>71</sup> No one is likely to have been eager to fight Cnut at this time, and Ealdred probably also submitted to him and became Carl's sworn brother. While the king was in the North, he gave Edmund some land;<sup>72</sup> he would hardly have done so if Ealdred was still in revolt. There was then a period in the 1030's when Ealdred acknowledged Cnut's overlordship. It ended in 1038 with Carl's murder of the earl.

His brother Eadulf then became earl and went back into revolt. The immediate results of this were similar to those faced by Eadulf Cudel in

1018: The Scots took advantage of the weakness of the earl. In 1040 (?) King Duncan invaded the North, and this time the Northumbrians did not try to meet him in the field. The Battle of Carham was not to be repeated. They probably retreated to their fortified places, churchyards, and into the hills. Duncan moved south and besieged Durham, but he was defeated by the Northumbrians who had taken refuge in the city and fled losing many men.<sup>73</sup> Eadulf probably had directed the defense of Durham, and after this success he was "exalted with pride" and ravaged the land of the Galwegians who had undoubtedly taken part in Duncan's expedition.<sup>74</sup> Still, his pride notwithstanding, he must have been aware of the weakness of his position because he opened some sort of negotiations with Hardacnut, the English king, and went south to see him in 1041 under the king's safe-conduct. Unfortunately for Eadulf, however, Hardacnut's promise was no better than Cnut's had been for Uhtred. The king betrayed Eadulf, and he was killed by Siward, the earl of York.<sup>75</sup> Thus died the last earl of the house of Bamburgh through the male line--betrayed by a Dane and killed by a Dane in circumstances remarkably similar to those in which his brother and father had died.

The family itself was not extinct for there was one more son of Earl Uhtred alive, Cospatric, and he may have proclaimed himself earl, although the northern earl-lists say that he did not. They assert that upon the murder of Eadulf, Siward became earl of all of Northumbria from the Humber to the Tweed, thus adding Northumberland to Yorkshire.<sup>76</sup> A hitherto ignored source, however, shows that Siward's acquisition of the land between the Tees and Tweed was not that simple or immediate. The defiance of the Northumbrians continued for another year or two, probably



under Cospatric's leadership. The murder of Eadulf was no more effective in reducing Northumberland than had been the murders of Uhtred and Ealdred. Finally in 1042 or 1043, Siward had to invade Northumberland and waste the countryside to gain control of the province.<sup>77</sup> This worked, and Cospatric probably fled to Scotland.

The conclusions to be drawn from this reconstruction of northern history up to 1043 are startling. It is clear that it is a mistake to assume that the North was in any sense united by this date or to talk of some generalized northern "separatism." Separatism there certainly was, but its content varied between Yorkshire and Northumberland. Its seriousness depended upon who was king and who, if anybody, was invading the kingdom. Ultimately these political feelings probably went back to cultural differences and past political experience. The men from above the Tees certainly hated and feared the Danes, and they had good reason to feel this way. The Yorkshire Danes, for their part, had not been loyal to the West Saxon kings during the invasions of Swein and Cnut. They had only been kept within the kingdom by Earl Uhtred. There was a Danish separatism which was important--at least when Danes were invading. Finally, at the beginning of Edward the Confessor's reign, Northumberland was a conquered province. This cannot be explained away. The Northumbrians had gone into revolt when Uhtred was killed. Two more of their earls had been killed by Danes, and they had only been brought back within the kingdom by conquest. Separatism above the Tees existed by 1043, and it is very doubtful if the accession of Edward did anything to quiet it. He may have been a member of the royal house of Wessex, but

Siward was their earl. He undoubtedly loomed larger, and he was a conquering Dane.

## CHAPTER I

- <sup>1</sup>In many respects the best account is still the one in J. H. Hinde, A History of Northumberland in Three Parts, Part I (Newcastle-upon-Tyne, 1858).
- <sup>2</sup>See D. P. Kirby, "Strathclyde and Cumbria: A Survey of Historical Development to 1092," TCWAAS, N.S., LXII (1962), 77-94; P. A. Wilson, "On the Use of the Terms 'Strathclyde' and 'Cumbria,'" TCWAAS, N.S., LXVI (1966), 57-92.
- <sup>3</sup>F. M. Stenton, Anglo-Saxon England (3rd ed.; Oxford, 1971), pp. 33-34.
- <sup>4</sup>D. Whitelock, "The Dealings of the Kings of England with Northumbria in the Tenth and Eleventh Centuries," in The Anglo-Saxons: Studies in Some Aspects of Their History and Culture Presented to Bruce Dickins, ed. P. Clemoes (London, 1959), p. 70.
- <sup>5</sup>T. W. Freeman, H. B. Rodgers, and R. H. Kinvig, Lancashire, Cheshire, and the Isle of Man (London, 1966), pp. 27-28.
- <sup>6</sup>D. Nicholl, Thurstan Archbishop of York (1114-1140) (York, 1964), pp. 16-17.
- <sup>7</sup>Wilson, "The Terms 'Strathclyde' and 'Cumbria,'" pp. 73-74.
- <sup>8</sup>See M. O. Anderson, "Lothian and the Early Scottish Kings," SHR, XXXIX (1960), 98-110; G. W. S. Barrow, "The Anglo-Scottish Border," Northern History, I (1966), 32-35.
- <sup>9</sup>Willelmi Malmesbiriensis Monachi De Gestis Pontificum Anglorum Libri Quinque, ed. N. E. S. A. Hamilton (Rolls Series, Vol. LII; London, 1870), p. 209.
- <sup>10</sup>J. E. A. Jolliffe, "Northumbrian Institutions," EHR, XLI (1926), 31; Stenton, Anglo-Saxon England, p. 91.
- <sup>11</sup>Idem, "The Danes in England," Proceedings of the British Academy, XIII (1927), 233-38.
- <sup>12</sup>Ibid., pp. 216-18.
- <sup>13</sup>W. Farrer, "Introduction to the Yorkshire Domesday," in The Victoria History of the County of York, ed. W. Page, II (London, 1912), 134.
- <sup>14</sup>Stenton, "The Danes in England," p. 243.

- <sup>15</sup> Ibid., pp. 244-46; B. Wilkinson, "Northumbrian Separatism in 1065-1066," Bulletin of the John Rylands Library, XXIII (1939), 504, n. 2.
- <sup>16</sup> Stenton, "The Danes in England," p. 243.
- <sup>17</sup> E. John, Orbis Britanniae and Other Studies ([Leicester], 1966), p. 46.
- <sup>18</sup> R. L. G. Ritchie, The Normans in Scotland (Edinburgh, 1954), pp. 27, 29.
- <sup>19</sup> See Jolliffe, "Northumbrian Institutions," pp. 1-42; W. Rees, "Survivals of Ancient Celtic Custom in Medieval England," in Angles and Britons: O'Donnell Lectures, ed. H. Lewis (Cardiff, 1963), pp. 148-68; G. W. S. Barrow, "Northern English Society in the Early Middle Ages," Northern History, IV (1969), 1-28.
- <sup>20</sup> Stenton, Anglo-Saxon England, pp. 505-506.
- <sup>21</sup> H. H. E. Craster, The Parish of Tynemouth, Vol. VIII of A History of Northumberland (Newcastle-upon-Tyne, 1907), p. 52.
- <sup>22</sup> G. T. Lapsley, The County Palatine of Durham (New York, 1900), pp. 25-27.
- <sup>23</sup> English Historical Documents, Vol. II, 1042-1189, ed. D. C. Douglas and G. W. Greenway (London, 1953), p. 517.
- <sup>24</sup> See Anglo-Saxon Charters, comp. P. H. Sawyer (London, 1968), *passim*; John, Orbis Britanniae, p. 62.
- <sup>25</sup> F. Barlow, The English Church, 1000-1066: A Constitutional History (London, 1963), p. 105. Sometime between 1020 and 1023 Bishop Edmund sought Cnut's approval for his election, but this was after the fact. The first bishop to be dependent (apparently) on royal approval was his successor Eadred. In 1042 he is said to have purchased the bishopric. Symeon of Durham, Historia Ecclesiae Dunhelmensis, in Symeonis Monachi Opera Omnia, ed. T. Arnold (2 vols., Rolls Series, Vol. LXXV; London, 1882-85), I, 86, 91.
- <sup>26</sup> Consult the earl-lists in Symeon of Durham, Historia Regum, in ibid., II, 197-98; in the De Primo Saxonum Adventu, in ibid., pp. 382-83; and in the De Obsessione Dunelmi, in ibid., I, 215-18. The list in the De Primo Saxonum Adventu, p. 383, does suggest that Earl Eadulf Evil-child was appointed, but he is not mentioned at all in the other sources. Stenton, Anglo-Saxon England, pp. 417-18.
- <sup>27</sup> See below, p. 152-53.



- <sup>28</sup>The Chronicle Attributed to John of Wallingford, ed. R. Vaughan, The Camden Miscellany, XXI (1958), 45, 54; Whitelock, "Dealings with Northumbria," pp. 71, 77.
- <sup>29</sup>Ibid., pp. 72-76.
- <sup>30</sup>Ibid., p. 73.
- <sup>31</sup>Ibid., pp. 77-82, on Thored see pp. 78-79.
- <sup>32</sup>Ibid., p. 80; The Anglo-Saxon Chronicle, ed. D. Whitelock with D. C. Douglas and S. Tucker (New Brunswick; 1961), s.a. 975 ABCDE, p. 78; s.a. 1006 CDE, p. 87.
- <sup>33</sup>Ibid., s.a. 993 CDE, p. 83.
- <sup>34</sup>Florentii Wigorniensis Monachi Chronicon Ex Chronicis, ed. B. Thorpe (2 vols., English Historical Society; London, 1848-49), I, 150-51.
- <sup>35</sup>Anglo-Saxon Chronicle, s.a. 1013 CDE, p. 92.
- <sup>36</sup>Ibid., s.a. 1006 CDE, p. 87.
- <sup>37</sup>De Obsessione Dunelmi, pp. 215-16.
- <sup>38</sup>Anglo-Saxon Chronicle, s.a. 1006 CDE, p. 87.
- <sup>39</sup>De Obsessione Dunelmi, pp. 216-17.
- <sup>40</sup>Ibid., pp. 217-18.
- <sup>41</sup>Ibid.
- <sup>42</sup>Anglo-Saxon Chronicle, s.a. 1014 CDE, p. 93.
- <sup>43</sup>Ibid., s.a. 1015 CDE, p. 94; s.a. 1016 CDE, pp. 94-95.
- <sup>44</sup>Ibid.; De Obsessione Dunelmi, p. 218.
- <sup>45</sup>Ibid., pp. 216, 218-19. With some differences of detail, this story is also found in the De Primo Saxonum Adventu, p. 383; and in Symeon of Durham, HR, pp. 197-98.
- <sup>46</sup>Whitelock, "Dealings with Northumbria," p. 82.
- <sup>47</sup>Symeon of Durham, HR, p. 147; De Obsessione Dunelmi, pp. 216-17; English Historical Documents, Vol. I, c. 500-1042, ed. D. Whitelock (London, 1955), p. 433.

- <sup>48</sup> Symeon of Durham, HDE, p. 83; Historia de Sancto Cuthberto, in Symeon of Durham, Opera Omnia, I, 213-14; H. H. E. Craster, "The Red Book of Durham," EHR, XL (1925), 526.
- <sup>49</sup> De Obsessione Dunelmi, p. 218.
- <sup>50</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>51</sup> De Primo Saxonum Adventu, p. 383. The account in Symeon of Durham, HR, p. 197, says it was done permittente Cnut, while Florence of Worcester, I, 172, combines both accounts.
- <sup>52</sup> De Obsessione Dunelmi, p. 218.
- <sup>53</sup> Whitelock, "Dealings with Northumbria," pp. 82-83.
- <sup>54</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>55</sup> De Obsessione Dunelmi, pp. 218-19.
- <sup>56</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>57</sup> De Primo Saxonum Adventu, p. 382. Symeon of Durham, HDE, p. 84; HR, pp. 155-56. Annales Lindisfarnenses et Dunelmenses, ed. G. H. Pertz (MGH, SS, Vol. XIX; Hanover, 1866), s.a. 1018, p. 507.
- <sup>58</sup> See Barrow, "The Border," p. 34; Anderson, "Lothian," pp. 104-10.
- <sup>59</sup> Ibid., p. 111. Barrow, "The Border," p. 34, did not believe that Carham was important in determining the border, nor did he explain the story of Eadulf Cudel's cession. He thought that the Scots already controlled most of Lothian by 973 and that Edgar's cession merely recognized this state of affairs.
- <sup>60</sup> The account in Symeon of Durham's HR, pp. 155-56, says that Uhtred led the Northumbrian army. This is clearly wrong, but probably represents a tradition that a son of Earl Waltheof was beaten at Carham. The oldest account of the battle is in the Annales Dunelmenses, s.a. 1018, p. 507, which mentions no earl at all.
- <sup>61</sup> De Obsessione Dunelmi, p. 219.
- <sup>62</sup> Whitelock, "Dealings with Northumbria," p. 83.
- <sup>63</sup> Codex Diplomaticus Aevi Saxonici, ed. J. M. Kemble (London, 1839-48), No. 741 et passim to Nos. 780 and 781.
- <sup>64</sup> Ibid., No. 742, is witnessed by an Eadredus dux, but this charter is spurious, Anglo-Saxon Charters, comp. Sawyer, No. 1221.

- <sup>65</sup> Codex Diplomaticus, Nos. 687, 719, 1306, 1308, 1309, 1310.
- <sup>66</sup> Anderson, "Lothian," p. 111.
- <sup>67</sup> Symeon of Durham, HDE, p. 85.
- <sup>68</sup> Ibid., pp. 85-86; Barlow, The English Church, p. 230.
- <sup>69</sup> Symeon of Durham, HDE, p. 86.
- <sup>70</sup> De Obsessione Dunelmi, p. 219.
- <sup>71</sup> Anglo-Saxon Chronicle, s.a. 1031 DEF, p. 101. This account links the Scottish expedition with Cnut's journey to Rome, but the latter took place in 1027, ibid., n. 5. This does not necessarily mean that the Scottish expedition is misdated.
- <sup>72</sup> Historia de Sancto Cuthberto, p. 213.
- <sup>73</sup> Symeon of Durham, HDE, pp. 90-91.
- <sup>74</sup> Early Sources of Scottish History, A.D. 500 to 1286, comp. and trans. A. O. Anderson (2 vols.; Edinburgh, 1922), I, 583. The people who were the object of this raid were actually called Brittones rather than Galwegians, Symeon of Durham, HR, p. 198.
- <sup>75</sup> Anglo-Saxon Chronicle, s.a. 1041 CD, p. 106; Symeon of Durham, HDE, p. 91; HR, p. 198.
- <sup>76</sup> Ibid., pp. 197-98.
- <sup>77</sup> Annales Dunelmenses, s.a. 1043, p. 508.

## C H A P T E R   I I

## EARL SIWARD AND THE SCOTS

Earl Siward was the last great earl of the North before the debacle of the 1060's, and there is consequently a strong temptation to picture him as a primitive monolith which stood for the traditional order of government above the Humber. But such a treatment of the earl would be false for Siward cannot be used as a general symbol for the old political arrangements of northern England. He was in reality originally an outsider, and the years of his power brought no real solution to the problems of the North. At best, in fact, he only kept his earldom quiet while in some ways he created new difficulties.

This was the case because Siward was hardly an ideal earl from the English king's point of view. There is, of course, no direct evidence which discloses what Edward the Confessor thought about northern problems in the 1040's, but the following reconstruction seems to be in accord with the facts. At the beginning of Edward's reign, the political and military situation in the North could not have appeared promising. The history of the region before 1042 had shown that three basic problems existed. The most serious of these was the fact that the Danish section of the population of Yorkshire was not loyal to Ethelred, and it was doubtful if Edward could expect any greater devotion from them should the kingdom be threatened by renewed Danish invasions. In Ethelred's days, these Danes had only been kept in check by the power of Uhtred, earl of Northumbria and York, but Edward could expect no such support for Northumbria was a conquered and hostile province in 1042. The king



could not balance Danes with Northumbrians and loyal elements within Yorkshire. Thurbrand, Carl, and Siward had made this impossible. Finally, the Scots were becoming a serious threat to the peace and prosperity of northern England. They had invaded three times since 1000. On each occasion they had been able to take advantage of English distraction which stemmed from either the Danish invasions or the rebellion of the Northumbrian earls. The ultimate aim of these incursions was the annexation of Northumbrian lands, and this hope was not beyond possible fulfillment.

Viewed in this context, Siward was something of an embarrassment to the king. He was a Danish parvenu similar to Earl Godwin of Wessex and had risen to power under Cnut and his sons. Siward had become earl of Yorkshire in ca. 1033 and had added Northumberland to his earldom by conquest in ca. 1042. When Edward became king in 1042, Siward, along with the other great earls, was one of the political realities which the king had to accept. It was beyond the king's power to remove him, even if such a course of action seemed desirable, and on the level of high politics, it probably did not. If Siward could have been dispossessed, his fall would only have increased the power of the other earls, a most undesirable result. The difficulty with keeping the northern earl, however, was that there was only a partial correspondence between his self-interest and that of the king. He was both an ambitious new man and a Dane who was mainly interested in maintaining his own position. Being Danish and a holdover from Cnut's reign, he was undoubtedly popular in York and perhaps found it easier to govern that shire than had most of his predecessors. This might seem to be to his credit except that this

aptness itself raised a question: How would Siward react if a Danish fleet sailed up the Humber? Such an occurrence was not at all impossible, and it is hard to see any reason for believing that Siward would have been loyal to Edward in this circumstance. Furthermore, a wise counselor could have pointed out to the king that it would be prudent to give the Northumbrians an earl from their native house and thus reestablish the traditional relationship with the province, but this was impossible. Siward could not be deprived of a major portion of his earldom. The only point, in fact, at which there was any real correspondence between the king's interest and the earl's was on the Scottish problem. Siward was determined to keep the Scots out of his earldom and devoted a sustained effort to this end.

Given these factors, it should not be surprising that Siward made no significant contribution to solving the major internal political problems of the North. Probably they were beyond solution in any case, and there were some advantages in the situation from the standpoint of court politics--provided there were no Viking attacks. Siward's unpopularity above the Tees meant that the earl was not as powerful as the extent of his lands suggested and that one of his main concerns was to keep Northumbria quiet. This limited his freedom of action and was the reason he was not too deeply involved in southern politics. It was not, as has been suggested, that he was "uninterested" in southern affairs.<sup>1</sup> Siward faced serious problems in the North and, as a result, was usually loyal to the king.

Put in terms of policy, the requirements for governing the North must have been clear. Siward had to keep watch on the Danes of York,

make sure that the Northumbrian rebellion did not flare-up again, and thwart Scottish raids. To accomplish these tasks, it was necessary that he be strong. This meant in concrete terms that Siward had to be rich enough to maintain a large band of professional warriors (housecarls),<sup>2</sup> and apparently the resources of the earldom were not sufficient for this because the king gave him extra lands in the South. Siward held Northamptonshire from (probably) the early 1040's, and he acquired the neighboring shire of Huntingdon in the early 1050's.<sup>3</sup> Although the possession of this Midland earldom may have been intended in part to insure the earl's loyalty, the additional revenues which these shires yielded allowed him successfully to dominate the North. How close and how obvious to the northerners this relationship was will be seen later.

Fortified with a private army which may have contained as many as two to three hundred housecarls, Siward governed his earldom successfully.<sup>4</sup> In Yorkshire the nobility was presumably receptive to his rule. In Northumbria he may have had more difficulties, but there he made an attempt to appease local feelings by marrying Ælfleda, a daughter of Earl Ealdred.<sup>5</sup> The latter, who had been Uhtred's eldest son, had himself only begotten daughters, and since Northumbrian women could inherit land, it is nearly certain that by his marriage Siward acquired part of the lands of her family.<sup>6</sup> More than this, he also probably obtained some legitimacy as earl in the eyes of the Northumbrians, although there is a possibility that the Northumbrian earls followed the Scottish rule of succession by which brother succeeded brother.<sup>7</sup> If this was the case, Cospatric, Uhtred's youngest son, would have had a better claim to be earl than Siward.

It is even possible that Siward's attempts to reconcile the Northumbrians went so far as to concede to Cospatric a subordinate position in the government of the earldom for evidence certainly exists that the latter was important in local affairs, perhaps before 1056; and he may have worked in conjunction with Siward. This question will be discussed later; but whatever the truth, Siward clearly did attempt to ally himself with the native house of Bamburgh. He had by Ælfleda, who was evidently his second wife, a son whom he named Waltheof in honor of the boy's maternal great-grandfather, and some fifty years later there was a tradition at Durham that Siward had given to Waltheof, presumably as a child, the earldom of Northumbria with the boundaries which it had had in Ealdred's day.<sup>8</sup> If this story is true, Siward may have intended that his eldest son, Osbeorn, should become earl of York which Ealdred had not controlled, and this would amount to a tacit admission that it was proper for a Dane to rule York and a Northumbrian to rule Northumbria. The division never seems to have occurred, but it is indisputable that Waltheof thought he was a member of the house of Bamburgh by the time he reached maturity.<sup>9</sup>

The success of Siward's attempts to identify himself with the Bamburgh family is difficult to establish. He faced only shadowy opposition in Northumbria, but this can be explained as easily on the basis of his military strength as on the basis of his marriage. From 900 years after the event, his marriage seems prudent; to Northumbrians at the time, on the other hand, it may have appeared the brash move of a parvenu bent on acquiring a local name.



The sensibilities of the Northumbrian nobles are unfortunately lost beyond recall, but in another area it is quite clear that Siward's actions struck the natives as being highhanded and aroused resentment. He offended the most powerful body of men in the North, the clerks of St. Cuthbert, and their feelings are part of the historical record. These clerks constituted a privileged corporation which tended to control the bishopric of Durham in most respects. They elected the bishop, who was usually one of their number, and carried out the more important functions of the cathedral church. Being also essentially secular canons who held property and married, they occupied a unique position in Northumbrian society which insured their inordinate prestige. Some of these clerks were known descendants of the original porters of the holy body of St. Cuthbert.<sup>10</sup> This uncorrupted corpse was the most precious relic in the North and the most powerful talisman between the Humber and the Orkneys. During the original Danish invasions, these porters had cared for the body after the destruction of Lindisfarne and had trekked all over the North with it before finally reestablishing the bishopric at Chester-le-Street.<sup>11</sup> The clerks were thus not only rich and powerful; they were also a direct link with the pre-Viking past of the North.

Siward offended these men in two ways. First, he appropriated some of their lands. Earlier in the century Bishop Aldhun had given Uhtred several of the church's villages when the latter had married his daughter. After becoming earl, Siward claimed these villages in the name of his wife who was an offspring of this marriage.<sup>12</sup> The clerks were angry over this act, but there was little they could do to oppose it. Other northern earls had taken church lands. What was far more serious was

that Siward and Edward threatened the ancient privileges of the clerks themselves. Hitherto they had elected their bishop who traditionally had been either one of their number or at least a northern cleric, but this changed in 1042. In that year Bishop Edmund went south to visit King Hardacnut at Gloucester. The reason for the visit was not recorded although it was probably connected with Siward's recent conquest of Northumbria. The Durham church is unlikely to have come through the complicated politics of the years after 1018 uncompromised; and, no doubt, Edmund needed to explain some of his past actions. During the early eleventh century, however, it had become risky for important Northumbrians to go south, and this turned out to be true again for Edmund died while visiting the king.<sup>13</sup> The sources do not suggest any foul play, but certainly Bishop Edmund's death was exceedingly convenient for Hardacnut and Siward in that it opened the way to the establishment of royal control over the bishopric of Durham. The clerks may have gone through the usual election process to choose a new bishop, but the sources do not explicitly say this. Rather, they report that Eadred, the principal clerk, bought the bishopric from the king with the church's money, and apparently this was an innovation.<sup>14</sup> The first step in the clerks' downfall had been Edmund's trip south in 1020-21 to seek Cnut's approval for his consecration. This was the second step: The clerks now had to pay for the privilege of electing their bishop.

The end followed quickly--perhaps suspiciously soon. Eadred sickened after purchasing the bishopric and died within ten months.<sup>15</sup> This time the clerks did not select his successor. It is possible that they lacked the money to buy the freedom to elect a second bishop after such

a short interval. In any case, King Edward and Siward used the opportunity of Eadred's death to control the selection of his successor and to install Durham's first non-northern bishop. In 1020-21, Bishop Edmund had brought north some monks from Peterborough to instruct him in the monastic vows which he had taken to become bishop, and Æthelric, the new bishop, was one of these monks. One source says explicitly that Edward appointed him bishop.<sup>16</sup> In a way it was a reasonable choice since Æthelric had lived at Durham for twenty years and was familiar with northern customs and men. But on the other hand, the method of his elevation was bound to arouse resentment.

Indeed, his appointment was a frontal attack on the privileges and freedom of the clerks, and they viewed it as such. They despised him both for being an outsider and for having been elected against their will, and Æthelric in turn made the situation worse by extending the attack on the clerks' powers. He directly reduced their administrative role by granting the most powerful position in the church government after his own to his brother Æthelwine, who had also been a monk at Peterborough and had come to Durham during Edmund's episcopate.<sup>17</sup> Not surprisingly these innovations were too much for the clerks to bear, and in 1045 or 1046 they rebelled against Æthelric and drove him out of Durham. But this did not restore their freedom for long because the bishop sought out Siward and obtained his support against the clerks. The earl then forced the latter to take back the bishop, a reconciliation not accomplished through negotiations and compromise. Instead, the clerks yielded only through fear of Siward's power, and Æthelric remained their bishop until after Siward's death.<sup>18</sup> To this extent the policy had been

successful, but its wisdom is debatable. From this time on, Siward certainly could count on the support of the bishop in governing Northumbria, and this must have been his main concern. Yet the clerks were unreconciled to their loss of power and their domination by southern monks; and Siward, who was responsible for this situation, must have been very unpopular at Durham. Furthermore, he had left the clerks with their local prestige undiminished, and this was a dangerous oversight because they were destined to use it to overturn his successor who continued Siward's church policy.

While Siward lived, however, his control over both the church of Durham and the house of Bamburgh remained firm, and this left him free to deal with the threat posed by the Scots to the North. In fact, this was probably his major concern, and to understand this aspect of his rule, it must be realized that the necessity of keeping the Scots out of Northumbria was not a traditional problem of northern government. Rather, the threat from the Scots had greatly increased during the first three and one-half decades of the eleventh century as the result of a basic shift in northern power relationships which was one of the fundamental steps in the formation of the Anglo-Scottish border.

Siward was confronted by a novel and dangerous situation. For perhaps one hundred and twenty years, the main threat to the North had lain in the West. Throughout the tenth century the lands between the Humber and the Forth had had a dangerous western border which had come into being early in the tenth century with the expansion of the British kingdom of Strathclyde or Cumbria. This development has been traditionally either ignored or not dealt with as part of the general history of



northern Britain even though its general outlines, at least, are fairly clear. Around the year 900 the Cumbrians (as they called themselves) began to expand out of Clydesdale toward the south. They crossed the Southern Highlands of Scotland and took control of the Galwegian coastal plain on both sides of the Solway Firth and the Vale of Eden. At its height, their kingdom apparently reached from the head of Loch Lomond at least to the Rere Cross of Stainmore in the North Riding of Yorkshire,<sup>19</sup> and there is some evidence that it may have stretched as far south as the Mersey.<sup>20</sup> Thus there suddenly appeared a western kingdom in northern Britain which comprised all of the west coast plain and a large portion of the uplands. The established political powers which were located on the east coast plain, the Danes of York, the house of Bamburgh, and the Scots, would probably have found this development sufficiently bothersome since there is no reason to believe that the Cumbrians were any better neighbors than their southern cousins the Welsh; but in fact, the expansion of the Cumbrians represented only the initial disintegration of society on the west coast plain for during this same period Norwegian Vikings from Ireland began to settle along the eastern shores of the Irish Sea from Galloway as far south as the Wirral Peninsula below the Mersey.<sup>21</sup> The results of this invasion on the Cumbrians as a people and on their kingdom itself are exceedingly obscure. The Norwegians had been subject to Irish influence before settling in Britain and ultimately merged with the native Britons to produce the people known in the twelfth century as the Galwegians.<sup>22</sup> It is clear, nevertheless, that the kingdom of the Cumbrians survived the influx of Vikings to some extent and that the Cumbrians continued to maintain a line of

kings of their own who are intermittently recorded down to 1018, although we cannot be sure how real their power was. What is certain is that the Norwegians of the Irish Sea region freely used the Tyne Gap, the Vale of Eden-Stainmore route, and the Wirral Peninsula--all theoretically within Cumbria except perhaps the latter--as passages by which to plunder the Northumbrians, the Danes of York, and the English Midlands. Ultimately they were even able to overwhelm the Danish kingdom of York and set up their own state there.<sup>23</sup>

The significance of these developments in the present context is that the incursions from the West became so serious that it was necessary for any ruler wishing to control the North's eastern plain to dominate the invasion routes through Cumbria which these marauders used, and one of the ways of doing this was to obtain the alliance or submission of the Cumbrian kings themselves. Their cooperation was useful against the Irish Sea Vikings, although it is unclear whether this was because they had enough power partially to control the movement of the Vikings through their kingdom or whether it was simply desirable that they not come raiding through the hills in alliance with the Vikings. Be this as it may, the direct relationship between security in the East, on the one hand, and the control of the invasion routes from the West coupled with the submission of the Cumbrian kings, on the other, is clear in tenth-century Anglo-Saxon sources. When the Norwegian incursions first assumed serious proportions in the early tenth century, the powers of the North tried to meet the threat by banding together. Æthelflaed of Mercia allied with the Cumbrians and the Scots against these new Vikings, and even the Danes of York sought her protection. In addition to

aiding these allies actively, Æthelflaed also built fortresses at Chester, Eddisbury, and Runcorn to protect her northwestern frontier, and after King Edward took direct control of Mercia in 918, he followed a similar policy. He built a number of boroughs in Cheshire and Derby, including the ones at Manchester, Bakewell, and Thelwell, fortresses which seem clearly designed to secure the invasion routes from the Irish Sea littoral into the Midlands and to dominate the southern routes east into Yorkshire, and he also attempted to gain the same ends by diplomatic activity. After he had built Bakewell in 920, the king of the Strathclyde Welsh (the Cumbrians), the king of Scots, and the rulers of York and Bamburgh all came to him and "chose him as father and lord."<sup>24</sup> Presumably this meant that they would cooperate in maintaining the peace of the North and deny passage through their lands to the Irish Sea Vikings.

The same sequence of events was repeated under Athelstan during the 920's and 930's. After he took control of the Viking kingdom of York in 927, he moved immediately to secure the western borders of his new province by crossing the Pennines. Athelstan met the kings of the North at "Eamont" in the Vale of Eden, which apparently marked the eastern border of the Cumbrian kingdom, and there the kings of the Cumbrians, the Welsh, and the Scots plus the rulers of Bamburgh made peace with him.<sup>25</sup> This agreement did not last for long, however; and in 934 Athelstan invaded Scotland. On this occasion, the chronicles concentrate their attention on his war against Constantine, the Scottish king, but it is clear that this expedition also included operations against the Cumbrians because in the same year Athelstan purchased Amounderness, a large section of

Lancashire above the Ribble, from the Vikings and gave it to the archbishop of York.<sup>26</sup> Amounderness dominated the western end of the Aire Gap, the easiest passage between the Irish Sea and York, and control of this route was necessary for the defense of York. Later, when the ascendancy in the North which Athelstan won by the campaign of 934 and his victory at Brunanburh in 937 ended with his death, his successor Edmund had to retrace the latter's steps, and his attempt to do so provides perhaps the clearest example of the importance of pacifying the West. In 944 Edmund came north and drove out the Norwegian kings of York. Then in the next year he crossed the Pennines into Cumbria, ravaged the countryside, and gave the kingdom of the Cumbrians to Malcolm, the king of Scots, on the condition that the latter be his ally.<sup>27</sup> This ambitious attempt to solve the problem of the North's western border unfortunately seems to have led to no permanent results for there is no evidence that Malcolm's control over Cumbria was anything more than nominal, and the native line of Cumbrian kings was in power again within a generation.<sup>28</sup> Indeed, well before that in 954 Eric Bloodaxe, the last Norwegian king of York, was killed in battle on the heights of Stainmore, the gateway to York from the head of the Vale of Eden, and although the account of this event does not disclose whether Eric was retreating or trying to regain his lost kingdom, neither possibility suggests that there was much reality in Scottish control over Cumbria.<sup>29</sup>

After this date, the power of the Vikings of the Irish Sea littoral began to decline. This was a slow process, however, which lasted into the twelfth century, and incidents still continued to occur which show that the western border had not yet lost all its threat. In 966, for



instance, a Yorkshire noble ravaged Westmorland, undoubtedly in response to raids over Stainmore,<sup>30</sup> and six years later Kenneth II harried Cumbria all the way to its southern border.<sup>31</sup> The sequel shows that the mechanics of the western border had not changed. Kenneth's expedition presumably gave him some control over the northern end of the western frontier; and, probably as a result, King Edgar "granted" him Lothian a year later.<sup>32</sup> Evidently it was still necessary to control the West in order to hold the eastern plain. In fact, another incident which occurred in 973 confirms this fact. During the summer King Edgar brought his navy north to Chester where he received the submissions of six northern kings including the Cumbrian monarch,<sup>33</sup> and it should also be noted that even at this date Edgar may have been on the border of Cumbria when in Chester. The Scottish chronicle which describes Kenneth's invasion of the year before says that he ravaged Cumbria all the way to the Dee, the river upon which Chester stands, and if this statement is correct, Cumbria still included Lancashire.<sup>34</sup> Finally, in the year 1000 King Ethelred harried Cumbria while his fleet wasted the Isle of Man. Given the threat from the Danes which Ethelred faced, this expedition is again proof that the western Vikings were still dangerous and had been raiding the North. Moreover, it may also be significant that the earliest indication that the English held southern Lancashire comes from the will of Wulfric Spot which dates from 1002-1004, at most four years later than Ethelred's invasion of Cumbria.<sup>35</sup>

The existence of this dangerous western border was a crucial element in the relations between the Scots and the English during most of the tenth century because the Scots were themselves threatened by the

Cumbrian kings and the western Vikings. Even as late as 971, for example, Kenneth II's predecessor was killed by the Cumbrians, and Kenneth's invasion of their kingdom was apparently launched in revenge.<sup>36</sup> The corollary of this threat was that throughout most of the tenth century, Anglo-Scottish, or at least Northumbrian-Scottish relations, were usually good. The only exception to this is the reign of Constantine II (903-43) who certainly invaded the North once in alliance with the Vikings, and perhaps three times. But even his credentials as a militant opponent of "Englishmen" are diminished by the fact that during the 910's he had defended the Northumbrians against the Irish Sea Vikings and submitted to Edward.<sup>37</sup> The usual relationship was in fact one of friendship. The submissions of the Scottish kings to Edward, Athelstan, Edmund, and Edgar were essentially alliances against the extension of Viking power through the "kingdom" of Cumbria or against the Cumbrians themselves.<sup>38</sup> There were no invasions of the North by the Scottish kings after Constantine's death, nor were there Anglo-Saxon expeditions into Scotland.

This situation changed radically after 1000 for between this date and the 1060's most of the elements which were to characterize the northern border during the High Middle Ages came into being. The first sign of this transformation took place in 1006 when Malcolm II invaded Northumbria and tried to take Durham. This was the first Scottish invasion of the North in over fifty years, and it probably came as a shock to the aging Earl Waltheof who was unable to deal with the situation.<sup>39</sup> Why Malcolm invaded is problematical, but the general political context which made his attack possible is clear. The Cumbrians and the western

Vikings, while not without power, were no longer the overwhelming threat that they had been. Furthermore, both the Northumbrian earl and the Anglo-Saxon king were now completely distracted by the Danish invasions. These factors gave Malcolm II a freedom of action which his predecessors had not had, and he used it to try to take over Northumbria. Furthermore, after the invasion of 1006 failed, Malcolm did not give up the new policy, which is a clear indication that his invasion had not been the result of whim. In 1018 he moved south again, this time presumably in alliance with the Cumbrian king, and won the battle of Carham; and the results of this victory were grave in the long run because they produced a further shift in the power relationships in the North.<sup>40</sup> Carham perhaps resulted in the advance of Malcolm's frontier in Lothian as was suggested earlier, but its real importance lay in the West for Owen the Bald, king of Strathclyde (Cumbria) died in the battle. He was the last of his line. With his death, Malcolm was able to extend his rule over at least the eastern part of the Cumbrian kingdom, and it is likely that he installed his brother as ruler of the area.<sup>41</sup> This must have involved fighting and explains why Malcolm did not exploit his victory at Carham by further raids in Northumbria after 1018. The stakes in the West were ultimately higher because, with control of Cumbria, Malcolm would have access to at least three important routes between west and east (that from the upper Clyde down the Tweed, the Tyne Gap, and the Stainmore passage) and a host of secondary routes which in effect turned the flank of the North of England. Scottish control of the West thus offered the hope of control of the East, and the first attempt at the fulfillment of this hope was not long delayed. Malcolm's grandson

Duncan was the first king of Scots to utilize his position as king of the Cumbrians to attack Northumbria when he invaded and besieged Durham in 1040. The fact that he had led the Cumbrians over the border, in addition to his own Scots, is shown by Earl Eadulf's reprisal: He ravaged Cumbria after Duncan's defeat.<sup>42</sup>

This was the basic geopolitical problem which Siward faced. With the Scots in control of Cumbria, their king could lead an army over the Tweed in a frontal attack on the earldom while sending the Cumbrians east through the hills to raid and disrupt communications, and such tactics could place the Northumbrians in an extremely perilous position. Indeed, ultimately they could lead to Scottish control of Northumbria. Consequently, the possibility that Duncan's invasion of 1040, the first of this type, might be repeated had to be forestalled, and Siward applied his energies to the task. Apparently he followed a two-fold policy which consisted of expansion in the West to close the major invasion routes combined with an attempt to put the Scottish king in a dependent position. No chronicler, of course, says that these were Siward's intentions, but his recorded actions indicate that this was the case. To a certain extent, moreover, this was an opportunistic policy; for as a result of circumstances which he had had no hand in creating, Siward possessed the perfect means with which to interfere in Scottish affairs: He could make use of Malcolm Canmore, the son of King Duncan.

That this possibility existed was a direct result of the imperfections of the Scottish political system and specifically of the succession crisis which followed the death of Malcolm II, the great-grandfather of Malcolm Canmore. Malcolm II (1005-1034) had been a very powerful



king. He had invaded the North twice, and after 1018 his rule, which encompassed Lothian as far as the Tweed and Cumbria in addition to Scotland, had stretched further south than that of any of his predecessors. During his later years, moreover, neither the earls of Bamburgh, who were usually in revolt against Cnut, nor the great Danish king himself made any serious attempt to push back his power.<sup>43</sup> Nevertheless, the last part of his reign was filled with turmoil and battle, and although it is impossible to be certain of the reason for this, it seems likely that the basic difficulty stemmed from the fact that Malcolm had no male heir. However, his only daughter, named Bethoc ("Birchtree"), had married Crinan the thegn, the abbot of Dunkeld, by whom she had two sons, Duncan and Maldred.<sup>44</sup> This situation led to trouble, but Malcolm's role in it is uncertain. It is possible that he desired that his grandson Duncan should succeed him, and if this was the case, he was violating customary practice for it was usual in Scotland for a king to be succeeded by his brother or his cousin. What seems more likely, however, is that Malcolm's potential successors by the traditional rule were encouraged by his lack of an heir to hasten his death. Since he had no son, he could be killed without fear. There would be no one seeking vengeance and the throne ten or twenty years after the deed. But if this second hypothesis is true, Malcolm's relatives gravely misjudged him; by the time of his death in 1034 he had managed to exterminate nearly all of the possible claimants to the throne aside from his own grandsons. The king had had either a brother or a second cousin named Boite of whom little is known except that he seems to have predeceased Malcolm, but he left behind a son and a daughter. In 1032 the

daughter's husband, Gillacomgain, the mormaer of Moray, was burned to death, probably by Malcolm or his agents, and a year later Malcolm himself killed Boite's son.<sup>45</sup> These two incidents neutralized the descendants of Boite, but Malcolm was still not secure for in 1034 he died after defeating an unnamed enemy. This event is very obscure, but an Irish chronicle records that Suibne, son of Kenneth, king of the Galwegians, also died in the same year. Given the events of 1032 and 1033 and the common patronymic of Malcolm II and Suibne, this was not coincidence. Suibne, who was probably a brother of Malcolm II and who had ruled Cumbria for the king, must have died in battle against his brother in 1034.<sup>46</sup> In any case, Malcolm II's murderous ways were quite successful. By 1034 only his own grandsons and Groch, Boite's daughter, were still alive; and Duncan, his eldest grandson, was therefore able to become king without opposition. He then reigned until 1040 when, after his unsuccessful invasion of Northumbria, he was killed by Macbeth, the mormaer of Moray, who himself had married Groch.<sup>47</sup> Once he was in power, someone, probably Crinan, Duncan's father, sent the dead king's sons out of the country.<sup>48</sup>

Thus Malcolm fell into Siward's hands, and he may not have been alone. A late source says that at this time Siward received a number of other refugee Scottish nobles,<sup>49</sup> and certainly Duncan's younger brother Maldred could not have felt secure in Scotland and probably came south. This is particularly likely because he had married a daughter of Earl Uhtred and would have been among relatives south of the Tweed,<sup>50</sup> and, as a matter of fact, in later years Maldred's son, Cospatric, seems to have thought of himself as a Northumbrian which would be understandable if he

had been reared among his mother's people while his father was in exile. It is even possible that Crinan himself came south although there is no direct evidence for this. At any rate, the usefulness from Siward's point of view of Malcolm, Maldred, and whatever other Scots were in Northumbria was two-fold. Ultimately either Maldred or Malcolm could be used for direct intervention in Scotland since they both had claims to the throne. Short of this, Siward could use their presence in Northumbria to control Macbeth simply by threatening to allow them to come over the border with a Northumbrian army if Macbeth caused trouble. It was a comfortable position for the earl of Northumbria to be in, and Siward's ability to threaten Macbeth was perhaps the reason why the latter failed to imitate his two predecessors by launching a major invasion of the North. Macbeth only raided the North, and his relative restraint was certainly not due to his insecurity within Scotland itself. No matter what one may think of the validity of his claim to the throne, he feared no rivals when he made his pilgrimage to Rome,<sup>51</sup> and this security could only have been possible if he had reached some understanding with Siward.

In addition to the diplomatic leverage which Maldred and Malcolm supplied, there were other possibilities in the situation which were perhaps more important. Malcolm must have been a boy in the early 1040's and consequently of little immediate use to Siward in the diplomatic game. Maldred was older and his claim to the throne undoubtedly took precedence over his nephew's, but Malcolm had another importance.<sup>52</sup> Fordun says that Duncan had given Cumbria to Malcolm, and this statement may have some basis in fact--Fordun's general unreliability on Cumbrian


affairs notwithstanding.<sup>53</sup> Florence of Worcester refers to Malcolm as the son of the king of the Cumbrians, and this is a suspicious title to apply to Duncan.<sup>54</sup> The latter had been, of course, their king, but "king of Scots" or some equivalent would have been a more appropriate title for him. In fact, Florence's choice of this unlikely title to describe Malcolm's father probably represents what seemed important about him to the English. If Duncan had been king of the Cumbrians, then Malcolm was his heir from an English point of view. This was significant because there is evidence that Siward had taken over Cumberland, the area south of the Solway. If Siward felt the necessity for a legal title to these lands, Malcolm could grant it as the "heir" to the Cumbrian kingdom. This may, in fact, have been Siward's price for supporting the cause of Malcolm and Maldred.

The evidence that Siward expanded into Cumberland comes from a unique charter which dates certainly from 1041 X 1065 and probably from 1041 X 1055.<sup>55</sup> The charter was granted by Cospatric, the third son of Earl Uhtred, to Thorfinn mac Thore and concerns certain property rights, judicial privileges, and fiscal exemptions in Allerdale, roughly the northwestern section of the modern county of Cumberland. The address of the charter contains the most significant piece of information. Cospatric greets the men "dwelling in all the lands that were Cumbrian,"<sup>56</sup> and this establishes that by the time of the grant, the lands south of the Solway were no longer part of the kingdom of Cumbria. The nature of the charter is in accordance with this; and indeed, this change in lordship must have been the occasion for the making of the charter. Apparently it is a confirmation of rights already held by Thorfinn and



probably held by his father Thore before him.<sup>57</sup> Cospatric confirms and perhaps extends Thorfinn's holdings. This is just the type of document one would expect to find relating to lands which had been transferred from one kingdom to another for the local landholders would naturally want the new rulers to recognize the legitimacy of their tenures. It is also clear that the ultimate lord of this area was the English king. Although Cospatric was a great lord in Cumberland and confirms Thorfinn's possessions without mentioning anyone else's permission, Earl Siward had granted peace, i.e. protection, to Thorfinn,<sup>58</sup> and this establishes that Siward had the general lordship of the area. Furthermore, Cospatric was geldfree as were a number of other local landholders, and he extends the same privilege to Thorfinn and his retainers.<sup>59</sup> Such a concern with not paying geld is only explicable if the English king was the ultimate lord of Allerdale, and this is an important point because it negates any suggestion that these lands were held by Cospatric under the Scottish king.<sup>60</sup>

It has also been thought that this charter contains evidence that Anglo-Saxon control of this area dated from before Siward's time because it mentions rights which Thore and two other men had had "in the days of Eadred." "Eadred" has been identified with Earl "Ealdred," but there is no real justification for this hypothesis on linguistic grounds.<sup>61</sup> In any case, Earl Ealdred spent most of his time in rebellion against Cnut, and it is very unlikely that he was able to wrest this land from the Scots. Siward was the first earl in the eleventh century who had the power to make this transfer. Perhaps taking advantage of Earl Eadulf's ravaging of this area and of his control over Malcolm, Siward had pushed



Map 4. Political Divisions of the North in 1056

through the Tyne Gap and annexed Cumberland. The area was then linked ecclesiastically to England. Archbishop Kynsige of York (1051-60) is said to have ordained two bishops of "Glasgow" while at York, and the sphere of operations of these bishops must have been in Siward's newly won lands in the West.<sup>62</sup> By this expansion Siward had in one stroke closed the two best invasion routes from the West, Stainmore and the Tyne Gap. This was an important rectification of the northern frontier and meant increased protection for both Yorkshire and Durham. The acquisition of Cumberland also had a secondary advantage. The Cospatric who granted the charter seems to have been identical with Earl Uhtred's youngest son.<sup>63</sup> Siward had apparently put him in charge of the area and thereby paid off, at least partially, old grievances.

These were important gains. They offset the Scottish annexation of the old kingdom of Cumbria and perhaps blunted the resentment of the house of Bamburgh. It is regrettable that the charter cannot be more closely dated than 1041 X 1065.<sup>64</sup> It only shows that Siward had controlled Cumberland at some time and does not disclose when he took it over. As a result, the chronological position of Siward's westward expansion in the development of his Scottish "policy" cannot be determined. The general direction of his relations with Scotland is quite clear from the mid 1040's, however; and the charter may well come from these years. Control over the invasion routes from the West would seem to be a precondition for any active intervention inside Scotland, and Siward led his first army over the Tweed in 1045 or 1046.<sup>65</sup> This expedition is not described in detail in the chronicle which mentions it, but it seems to have been an exact parallel of the famous invasion of

1054 except that it failed. Siward had apparently decided to make his own king of Scotland, a policy which would theoretically insure good relations with the northern kingdom and peace for the North. The account of the expedition, however, does not name Siward's candidate for the Scottish throne, although it was probably Maldred, Duncan's younger brother,<sup>66</sup> and the sequence of events is also difficult to reconstruct. It would seem that Siward had the support of a party of Scots led by Crinan, the father of Duncan and Maldred, but it is unclear whether Crinan invaded Scotland from Northumberland, or whether he was already in Scotland and rose in revolt against Macbeth. Probably the latter was the case, and the revolt was to be coordinated with Siward's invasion. But if this was the hope, it failed, for Crinan met Macbeth in battle and was slain. Siward subsequently led an army into Scotland and drove out Macbeth according to the chronicle, and probably this means that Macbeth fled into Moray in the face of Siward's advance. The earl then raised Maldred to the throne and returned to Northumberland.<sup>67</sup> He may have thought that he had accomplished his aim, or he may have found it impossible to stay above the Tweed. Successful invasions of Scotland normally required a supply fleet because it seems that it was all but impossible for an English army to live off the Scottish countryside for long, and there is no indication that Siward had one on this occasion.<sup>68</sup> In any case, once he was gone, Macbeth returned and recovered the kingdom.<sup>69</sup> The fate of Siward's king is unrecorded.

The likelihood is that this king, who was probably Maldred, was killed because Siward waited some eight years before he invaded again. If Malcolm had been born in ca. 1031, he would have reached the age of



twenty-three by this time (1054), a prime age to try for a throne which had to be won through battle. Certainly relations with Scotland did not improve during these years. Scottish border raids on the North either began or continued after 1046.<sup>70</sup> There must then have been a period of quiet around 1050 during which Macbeth is said to have gone to Rome, but this peace did not outlast his pilgrimage for in 1052 Macbeth received the Normans who had been expelled from England as a result of Earl Godwin's restoration and took them into his own service.<sup>71</sup> Macbeth's employment of mercenaries who could only be profitably used against Siward shows that the situation was becoming serious again, and it probably means that he was raiding the North. This, at least, is implied by the events of 1053. In that year Siward went to Scotland and made some agreement with Macbeth, and it is even possible that this was a full-scale invasion although the evidence for supposing so is not very satisfactory. In any case, Macbeth soon broke the agreement and continued to raid the North.<sup>72</sup>

Thus the stage was set for Siward's famous invasion of Scotland. In 1054 the earl collected an army from the North which was reinforced by a group of King Edward's housecarls and by a contingent from Cumberland led by Dolfin, Thorfinn's son, and he also obtained a fleet which could bring supplies to the army.<sup>73</sup> The object of the expedition was to put Duncan's son Malcolm on the Scottish throne, and both Edward and Siward must have hoped that once king he would end the hostility which had characterized the northern border since 1006. To achieve this end, Siward moved north and defeated Macbeth on the Day of the Seven Sleepers (July 27). The encounter was apparently a pitched battle in which many

Scots and all of Macbeth's Norman mercenaries were killed. On his side Siward lost a number of his own and the king's housecarls,<sup>74</sup> and even though Macbeth himself escaped to Moray where he managed to survive for three anticlimactic years, Siward's victory had been complete enough for Malcolm to become king. The oldest accounts say no more; in fact, they even omit any mention that Malcolm replaced Macbeth. Florence of Worcester, however, says that King Edward had ordered Siward both to make the expedition and to establish Malcolm as king.<sup>75</sup> Both statements are undoubtedly true in a simple descriptive sense, but it is inaccurate to give them a twelfth-century "feudal" meaning.<sup>76</sup> The Normans would do this soon enough. Malcolm was king of Scots by inheritance and battle; his obligation to King Edward rested solely on gratitude.

After defeating Macbeth, Siward returned to England carrying with him a great amount of booty and probably under the impression that his expedition had been a success. The next year he died at York and was buried there in the monastery which he had built and dedicated to St. Olaf. His bones were thus to be protected down through the ages by a fellow Scandinavian, an arrangement which suggests that the earl had remained at heart a Dane to his death. The stories of his physical prowess which are based on this aspect of his character supported by Shakespeare's version of his war against Macbeth give Siward heroic stature. He stands out as the last great earl of the North; in the hands of the romantic he becomes one of the last Vikings.<sup>77</sup> All this makes it very difficult to reach an accurate appraisal of his importance. If one's view is limited just to his lifetime, Siward must be portrayed as a successful earl because he ruled Yorkshire without any known

problems from ca. 1033 to 1055 and because he ended the revolt of the house of Bamburgh. The period of his strong rule gave the North a chance to recover from the turmoil of the preceding period and perhaps resulted in the creation of some bonds with the South. This was certainly the case with the church of Durham where Siward had curtailed traditional liberties and installed its first southern bishop. Furthermore, he made concrete moves to blunt the growing threat from the Scots by the annexation of Cumberland which provided protection to Yorkshire and Durham from hostile raids out of the West and by his support of Malcolm Canmore which seemed to promise a period of good relations with the Scots.

This is an impressive list of accomplishments, but it must be noted that according to later tradition Siward was descended from a line of bears.<sup>78</sup> The attribution of this ancestry to the earl may be a direct reference to his physical strength. Indeed, this was almost certainly the original intention, but Siward's descent from bears can be interpreted in another way: Siward ruled like a bear. He was formidable but lacked insight, and most of his policies depended on force or its threat. He had imposed an outsider on the clerks of Durham, and they resented it. He had become earl of Northumbria by wasting the countryside, and neither his marriage into the house of Bamburgh nor his accommodation with Cospatric, the heir of this family, won the goodwill of the Northumbrians. According to later tradition they revolted against Siward while he was invading Scotland in 1054, and while this story should probably not be accepted as literally true, it does rest ultimately on the memory of his unpopularity above the Tees.<sup>79</sup> Siward's

rule did nothing to end dissatisfaction in Northumbria; in fact, his actions fed it.

Much the same thing can be said with respect to Anglo-Scottish relations. Siward's policies did not lead to a stabilization of the border. The situation deteriorated as a result of his acts. Even though Macbeth may have been a threat to the North, he was a peaceful neighbor in comparison to the ruler whom Siward had raised up in his place. Malcolm Canmore's loyalty to his English benefactors lasted exactly as long as he potentially needed their help. After this need had passed, he became a greater threat to the North than any of his predecessors had been, and during the next forty years he repeatedly led armies over the border. If Siward's support of Malcolm is judged by its results, it turned out to be a grave mistake. It brought no security to the North, only Scottish armies which pillaged and enslaved the northern peasants.

Finally, the defeat of Macbeth had been won at a high price. In the battle had died Dolfin, Thorfinn's son; Siward, earl Siward's sister's son; and Osbeorn, the earl's eldest son.<sup>80</sup> With their deaths three potential leaders of the next generation had been removed; and, in particular, the losses of the younger Siward and Osbeorn seriously threatened the future of Siward's family. When the old earl died in the following year, he left no adult heir to become earl and defend the holdings and position of his family. This not only threatened the interests of Siward's one surviving son, the young Waltheof, but it also opened the way for a disastrous experiment in the governing of the North, an experiment which ultimately culminated in the harrying of the North by William the Conqueror in 1069.



## CHAPTER II

<sup>1</sup>F. Barlow, Edward the Confessor (Berkeley, 1970), p. 89.

<sup>2</sup>That Siward maintained a body of housecarls is shown by the fact that some of them were killed in his battle with Macbeth, Anglo-Saxon Chronicle, s.a. 1054 D, p. 129.

<sup>3</sup>ESSH, I, 595, n. 2; E. A. Freeman, The History of the Norman Conquest (6 vols., Rev. Am. ed.; Oxford, 1873-79), II, 376-77.

<sup>4</sup>This figure is conjectural, of course; but in 1065 the northern rebels killed over two hundred of Tostig's retainers. If this figure can be taken seriously, it suggests that Tostig had a body of retainers which numbered over two hundred men, and Siward is unlikely to have had a smaller body of men, Florence of Worcester, I, 223.

<sup>5</sup>De Obsessione Dunelmi, p. 219.

<sup>6</sup>See the descent of the lands which Bishop Aldhun gave to Earl Uhtred with his daughter in ibid., pp. 215-17, 219-20.

<sup>7</sup>There is not enough evidence to tell how the earldom descended from one member of the house of Bamburgh to another prior to the eleventh century. The succession after 1000 is highly suggestive, however. Earl Waltheof was followed by his son Uhtred, and Uhtred was succeeded, not by his son Ealdred, but by his brother Eadulf Cudel. After the latter died, the earldom passed in turn to two of Uhtred's sons, Ealdred and Eadulf. His third son, Cospatric, did not become earl, but the chronicler who records this fact clearly assumed that it would have been normal for Cospatric to have been earl in his turn. On the basis of this evidence it can be concluded that these two generations did not follow the rule of primogeniture, ibid., passim; De Primo Saxonum Adventu, pp. 382-83; Symeon of Durham, HR, pp. 197-98.

<sup>8</sup>De Obsessione Dunelmi, pp. 219-20. The northern earl-lists do not mention Siward's elder son, Osbeorn, and this presumably means that he had a different mother than Waltheof who is frequently mentioned.

<sup>9</sup>This is shown by the fact that Waltheof continued the blood feud when he became earl, but from the side of the house of Bamburgh. He had some of his henchmen kill a number of the sons and grandsons of Carl, ibid., p. 219.

<sup>10</sup>Symeon of Durham, HDE, pp. 79-80.

<sup>11</sup>See ibid., pp. 56ff.

<sup>12</sup>De Obsessione Dunelmi, pp. 219-20.

- 13 Symeon of Durham, HDE, p. 91; HR, p. 162. The Annales Dunelmenses, s.a. 1043, p. 508, says that this visit took place in 1043.
- 14 Symeon of Durham, HDE, p. 91; HR, p. 162.
- 15 Idem, HDE, p. 91; HR, p. 162.
- 16 Idem, HDE, p. 86; Craster, "The Red Book of Durham," p. 528. The absolute chronology of the death of Edmund, the appointment of Eadred, and the succession of Æthelric varies somewhat in the sources. Both Symeon's HDE, p. 91, and the HR, p. 162 (but see pp. 162-63), seem to agree that Edmund died in 1042 and that Eadred was then bishop for ten months. The major discrepancy concerns the date when Æthelric became bishop. The HDE, p. 91, says this occurred in 1042, while the HR, pp. 162-63, says 1043. The latter may be following the Annales Dunelmenses, s.a. 1043, p. 508, which states that all these events took place in 1043 along with Siward's invasion of Northumbria. The Anglo-Saxon Chronicle, s.a. 1041 D, p. 106, on the other hand, seems to say that Æthelric became bishop in 1041. This entry is, however, unclear and is only in the D version of the chronicle, ibid., p. 106, n. 6. Furthermore, all the Durham sources do agree that Æthelric only became bishop after Hardacnut's death in June of 1042.
- 17 Symeon of Durham, HDE, p. 91.
- 18 Ibid.
- 19 Kirby, "Strathclyde and Cumbria," p. 86; Wilson, "The Terms 'Strathclyde' and 'Cumbria,'" pp. 71-74; Barrow, "The Border," p. 24.
- 20 See Wilson, "The Terms 'Strathclyde' and 'Cumbria,'" pp. 71-74; Kirby, "Strathclyde and Cumbria," p. 88.
- 21 Stenton, Anglo-Saxon England, pp. 331-32.
- 22 Wilson, "The Terms 'Strathclyde' and 'Cumbria,'" pp. 90-91.
- 23 F. T. Wainwright, "Æthelflæd Lady of the Mercians," in The Anglo-Saxons, ed. Clemons, p. 63; Stenton, Anglo-Saxon England, pp. 332-33.
- 24 Ibid.; Wainwright, "Æthelflæd," pp. 63-66; Anglo-Saxon Chronicle, s.a. 919 (922) A, p. 67; s.a. 920 (923) A, pp. 67-68.
- 25 Ibid., s.a. 927 (926) D, pp. 68-69, n. 1.
- 26 EHD, I, 506.
- 27 Anglo-Saxon Chronicle, s.a. 944 ABCD, p. 71; s.a. 945 ABCD, p. 72.

28. Barrow, "The Border," p. 24; A. M. Armstrong et al., The Place Names of Cumberland, Pt. III (English Place-Name Society, Vol. XXII; Cambridge, 1952), p. xxvi. The reconstruction of Cumbrian history after 945 found in Kirby, "Strathclyde and Cumbria," pp. 84-92, is based mainly on Fordun and cannot be trusted.
29. Stenton, Anglo-Saxon England, pp. 361-63.
30. Anglo-Saxon Chronicle, s.a. 966 DEF, p. 76; F. M. Stenton, "Pre-Conquest Westmorland," in Preparatory to Anglo-Saxon England; Being the Collected Papers of Frank Merry Stenton, ed. D. M. Stenton (Oxford, 1970), pp. 218-19, argued that this raid was "an act of private violence," but this seems unlikely given the general nature of the North's western frontier.
31. A. O. Anderson, "Anglo-Scottish Relations from Constantine II to William," SHR, XLII (1963), 4-5.
32. The grant is recorded in the De Primo Saxonum Adventu, p. 382.
33. Anglo-Saxon Chronicle, s.a. 973 (972) DE, p. 77; Armstrong, Place Names of Cumberland, p. xxvi.
34. Anderson, "Anglo-Scottish Relations," pp. 4-5.
35. Anglo-Saxon Chronicle, s.a. 1000 CDE, p. 85; EHD, I, 541-42. The idea that the English had lost control of Lancashire after Athelstan's death is supported by the fact that the archbishops of York did not maintain their possession of Amounderness.
36. Anderson, "Anglo-Scottish Relations," p. 5.
37. Ibid., pp. 2-4; 2, n. 2.
38. Ibid., pp. 2-5. Anderson, however, emphasizes (p. 5) that the Scots accepted a subordinate position in the alliance with the Anglo-Saxon kings after 945 in order to keep Cumbria. This suggestion seems very unlikely since there is no good evidence that they actually controlled Cumbria.
39. De Obsessione Dunelmi, pp. 215-16.
40. Symeon of Durham, HDE, p. 84; HR, pp. 155-56.
41. Ibid.; Barrow, "The Border," pp. 24-25. The suggestion that Malcolm made his brother the ruler of Cumbria depends upon a rather ambiguous notice in an Irish chronicle. The Tigernach Annals, in ESSH, I, s.a. [1034], 578, record that in 1034 "Suibne, Kenneth's son, king of the Galwegians died." Suibne, son of Kenneth, has not been connected with the family of Malcolm, son of Kenneth, or even of Boite, son of



Kenneth, because he is called the king of the Galwegians. No other source mentions him; and, on the face of it, it seems only a remote possibility that a brother or cousin of Malcolm II would be ruler of this distant area. Such a view would be justified, except that it probably rests upon an anachronism. In the early twelfth century the term "Galwegians" covered all the people living in Clydesdale and the lands to the west and south, Wilson, "The Terms 'Strathclyde' and 'Cumbria,'" pp. 90-91. If this is the usage of the Tigernach Annals, then Suibne was the ruler of the Cumbrians. It might be objected, of course, that this is a very early example of the use of the term "Galwegians" to cover Cumbrians, but this can be answered with the suggestion that the latter would look like Galwegians (the Gall-gael) to the Irish earlier than to the Scots given the initial coastal settlement of the Irish Sea Vikings. Furthermore, there is really no good evidence for the separate existence of a Galwegian kingdom. It is then likely that Suibne ruled the Cumbrians, and there is no good reason for not identifying him with the Scottish royal house.

<sup>42</sup> Symeon of Durham, HDE, pp. 90-91; HR, p. 198. The sequence of events is conjectural. Anderson, "Anglo-Scottish Relations," p. 9, says that Eadulf attacked Cumbria first and that Duncan raided in retaliation. This is not impossible, but it is unlikely. It is difficult to imagine any motive for Eadulf's raid other than revenge given the poverty of Cumbria. Furthermore, it is very improbable that Eadulf would engage in provocative actions while he was already in revolt against the English king.

<sup>43</sup> Cnut's "Scottish expedition" is mentioned in the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle, s.a. 1031, DEF, p. 101, where it is misdated and described in the vaguest terms. There is no mention of any fighting, and the entry is scant proof for anything more elaborate than a trip north by Cnut through which he obtained a nominal Scottish submission. Furthermore, Malcolm broke this agreement quickly, ibid. There is no record that Cnut took any action in response, and this is not surprising given the situation in Northumbria. There is also a possibility that the Northumbrian earls had allied with Malcolm. This hypothesis would greatly simplify the political history of the North during this period, but the only evidence which points in this direction is the marriage of Malcolm's grandson Maldred to a daughter of Earl Uhtred, supposedly before 1018, De Obsessione Dunelmi, p. 216.

<sup>44</sup> Prose and Verse Chronicles inserted in the Chronicle of Melrose, in ESSH, I, s.aa. 1003 and 1034, 576-77.

<sup>45</sup> Annals of Ulster, in ibid., s.aa. 1032 and 1033, p. 571. It is equally possible that Macbeth killed Gillacomgain, since Macbeth's father had been killed by Gillacomgain and the latter's brother, Tigernach Annals, s.a. 1020, p. 551. This alternative would not mean, however, that the killing was not done in Malcolm's interest. In any case, Macbeth's marriage to Gillacomgain's widow probably means that he had no part in the killing of her husband.



<sup>46</sup>Prose and Verse Chronicles, s.a. 1003, p. 576; Tigernach Annals, s.a. 1034, p. 578; see supra, n. 41.

<sup>47</sup>Chronicle of the Kings of Scotland, ESSH, I, s.a. 1040, 581.

<sup>48</sup>See ibid., p. 576, n. 7; and Anderson, "Anglo-Scottish Relations," p. 9, for a discussion of these points. Fordun says that Duncan had married a kinswoman of Siward, Johannis de Fordun, Chronica Gentis Scotorum, ed. and trans. W. F. Skene (2 vols., Historians of Scotland, Vols. I and IV; Edinburgh, 1871-72), I, 187. While this statement is commonly accepted, it has no contemporary support and is probably untrue.

<sup>49</sup>Ritchie, Normans in Scotland, p. 4, n. 1.

<sup>50</sup>The three main Northumbrian sources all say that Uhtred gave his daughter by his third wife, Ethelred's daughter, to Maldred, De Obsessione Dunelmi, p. 216; De Primo Saxonum Adventu, p. 383; Symeon of Durham, HR, p. 194.

<sup>51</sup>The Chronicle of Melrose, ed. A. O. Anderson and M. O. Anderson (Studies in Economics and Political Science, No. 100; London, 1936), s.a. 1050, p. 23.

<sup>52</sup>Ritchie, Normans in Scotland, p. 4, n. 1.

<sup>53</sup>Fordun, I, 187.

<sup>54</sup>Florence of Worcester, I, 212.

<sup>55</sup>See Anglo-Saxon Writs, ed. F. E. Harmer (Manchester, 1952), pp. 419-24, 531-36, for the text, notes, and bibliography. See also H. W. C. Davis, "Cumberland Before the Norman Conquest," EHR, XX (1905), 61-65. For the alternative (Scottish) interpretation consult ESSH, II, 37; and J. C. Hodgson, The Parish of Edlingham, The Parish of Felton, The Parish of Brinkburn, Vol. VII of A History of Northumberland (Newcastle-upon-Tyne, 1904), pp. 24-26.

<sup>56</sup>Anglo-Saxon Writs, pp. 423-24.

<sup>57</sup>Ibid.; Davis, "Cumberland," pp. 62-63.

<sup>58</sup>Anglo-Saxon Writs, pp. 423-24.

<sup>59</sup>Ibid.

<sup>60</sup>See ESSH, II, 37; Hodgson, The Parish of Edlingham, pp. 24-26.

<sup>61</sup>Anglo-Saxon Writs, pp. 423-24, 559.

<sup>62</sup> Hugh the Chantor, The History of the Church of York, 1066-1127, trans. C. Johnson (London, 1961), p. 32. As early as King David's Cumbrian inquisition, the bishopric of Glasgow is equated with the kingdom of the Cumbrians, Wilson, "The Terms 'Strathclyde' and 'Cumbria,'" p. 85. This seems to have preceded the later "inflated" territorial claims of the bishops of Glasgow, ibid., p. 83. This early identification of Glasgow with Cumbria is probably the reason why Hugh calls these men bishops of Glasgow. In a sense he is guilty of an anachronism. Although he does regard this church as being the predecessor of the revived bishopric of David's time, its ultimate fate fits a church centered in Cumberland much better than one located at Glasgow. Hugh says that after these two bishops, the church was destroyed (i.e. rendered vacant) by war, ibid. This war should be identified with Malcolm's reconquest of Cumberland in 1061 or later in the decade, Hugh the Chantor, p. 32.

<sup>63</sup> Anglo-Saxon Writs, p. 562. The identification of this Cospatric with Uhtred's youngest son is generally accepted by English historians. It is ultimately based on the arguments of Davis, "Cumberland," pp. 63-65.

<sup>64</sup> Siward died in 1055, but the passage in which he is mentioned is defective. It is impossible to tell on its basis whether he was alive or not when the grant was made, see Anglo-Saxon Writs, p. 534. It might be observed, however, that it is hard to imagine what good a dead earl's protection would have been to Thorfinn.

<sup>65</sup> Annales Dunelmenses, s.a. 1046, p. 508.

<sup>66</sup> Ibid.

<sup>67</sup> Ibid.; Tigernach Annals, s.a. [1045], p. 583, and n. 6, n. 7.

<sup>68</sup> The use of fleets on invasions of Scotland was common. Athelstan had one in 934, as did Siward in 1054, and William in 1072, Anglo-Saxon Chronicle, s.a. 934 ABCDEF, p. 69; s.a. 1054 D, p. 129; s.a. 1072 DE, p. 154. When William Rufus invaded Scotland in 1091, his fleet was wrecked in a storm, and, probably as a result of this, his army suffered from a lack of provisions, Florence of Worcester, II, 28.

<sup>69</sup> Annales Dunelmenses, s.a. 1046, p. 508.

<sup>70</sup> Geffrei Gaimar, L'estorie des Engles, ed. and trans. T. D. Hardy and C. T. Martin, I (Rolls Series, Vol. XCI; London, 1888), ll. 5045-46. Whitelock, "Dealings with Northumbria," p. 86, n. 4, says that Gaimar was using a lost northern source at this point.

<sup>71</sup> Florence of Worcester, I, 210.

<sup>72</sup> Gaimar, ll. 5043-46. Gaimar is the best source for Siward's trip to Scotland in 1053, and he does not mention any fighting. On the other

hand, Henry of Huntingdon describes two military expeditions. The first was supposedly led by Siward's son Osbeorn who was killed. The second was Siward's successful expedition, Henrici . . . Huntendunensis Historia Anglorum, ed. T. Arnold (Rolls Series, LXXIV; London, 1874), p. 194.

<sup>73</sup>Anglo-Saxon Chronicle, s.a. 1054 CD, p. 129; Annals of Ulster, p. 593, and n. 2.

<sup>74</sup>Anglo-Saxon Chronicle, s.a. 1054 CD, p. 129; Florence of Worcester, I, 212.

<sup>75</sup>Ibid.

<sup>76</sup>See Anderson, "Anglo-Scottish Relations," p. 10, where Malcolm is portrayed as Edward's vassal.

<sup>77</sup>See Ritchie, Normans in Scotland, pp. 4, 7.

<sup>78</sup>Life of Waltheof, in ESSH, I, 597, n.

<sup>79</sup>Ibid., p. 594, n. This account contains bald errors. The Scottish king whom Siward aids is named Donald. He is a combination of Duncan, Malcolm, and the latter's brother Donald, all in one. Furthermore, this account asserts that the Northumbrian rebels killed Siward's son Osbeorn.

<sup>80</sup>Anglo-Saxon Chronicle, s.a. 1054 CD, p. 129; Annals of Ulster, s.a. 1054, p. 593.

CHAPTER III  
THE STRUCTURE OF NORTHERN SOCIETY

The obstacles involved in forming a picture of northern society prior to the Norman Conquest are great in general and on some points insurmountable. There are few pre-Conquest charters, and they are not very informative. Domesday Book would seem to offer an unexampled window into the last phase of Anglo-Saxon society in the North, but it is in reality a treacherous glass. The survey was made twenty years after the Battle of Hastings by foreigners who did not understand everything which they were recording and whose interest in conditions TRE (i.e. in 1066) was strictly limited to the question of who held what "manor" at that date. As a result, Domesday only provides a one-dimensional picture of landholding under King Edward and hides what, if any, arrangements the Anglo-Saxon landowners had made with respect to their lands. Because of the terms of the inquest, then, Domesday can contribute little to the discussion of whether "feudalism" existed in the North prior to the Conquest, and on other basic questions, which one might legitimately ask, it is almost as uncooperative. The description of Yorkshire is terse and uninformative; there are few double entries and no important statement of local customs of the sort which are so informative for other parts of England. Worse than this, beyond Yorkshire Domesday fails by degrees. Southern Lancashire is described in general and unsatisfactory terms while the sections on northern Lancashire are little more than a geld list, and Northumbria is not described at all. Aside from the light cast by occasional charters, conditions above the



Tees are obscure until the compilation of Boldon Book, a custumal of the lands of the bishop of Durham made in 1183, and the beginning of the inquisitions post Mortem in the thirteenth century.

These are rather unpromising materials, but they have been the object of a long tradition of scholarship devoted to the explanation of northern society and the Norman Conquest's impact on it. While part of this research has been a reflection of local antiquarian interest, it has also attracted the attention of scholars of the stature of F. W. Maitland, J. E. A. Jolliffe, and Sir Frank Stenton in addition to the more recent work of G. W. S. Barrow and William Rees.<sup>1</sup> The principal reason for this interest concerns what may be termed the "survivals." In general, survivals are strange tenures such as thanage and drengage, unusual renders like cornage, and distinctive traditions of peasant custom, which have few clear parallels in the rest of England after the Conquest. They first appear in Domesday's description of southern Lancashire and then in more detail in Boldon Book and the various thirteenth-century surveys. It is usually assumed that these survivals represent direct fragments of pre-1066 northern society and that, if only they can be put together correctly, they will yield at least a general picture of this society. This assumption may well be correct; certainly the method of arguing backwards from the known to the unknown is a tool commonly used by Anglo-Saxon and other historians. Still it is somewhat disquieting since in any such argument it is the presuppositions which govern both the selection of the survival and its meaning. These are usually, of course, both clear and logical--if perhaps subject to debate--but often in the North they include basic ethnic suppositions such as, for

example, that some particular custom is distinctively Celtic, Anglo-Saxon, or Danish. Ideas of this nature, particularly if they are coupled with the endless hypotheses of place-name studies, can easily take a historian from the surveys of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries back, not merely to the state of northern society on the eve of the Conquest, but into far earlier times when the Angles and Celts were struggling for mastery of the province of Upper Britain in the post-Roman period or, in one notable case, back to the days before the Celts themselves came to Britain.<sup>2</sup> In the face of such majestic chains of reason and supposition, one can only say that this chapter will be principally concerned with the investigation of the structure of northern society during the last years of the Anglo-Saxon kingdom and will venture into the years before the Venerable Bede only under duress.

The inquiry must begin with Maitland. In 1890 he published an important article dealing with the survivals and argued that the thanes and drengs who could be found in Lancashire and Northumbria in the twelfth century and later were lineal descendants of pre-Conquest ministri and equites similar to Bishop Oswald's ridingmen and that the confusion of tenurial custom which existed in the North after the Conquest was the result of the imposition of knight service on the old Anglo-Saxon tenures.<sup>3</sup> Although these conclusions have not been completely accepted, they were extremely important because they pointed in the right direction for further research and stimulated the labyrinthine mind of Jolliffe. He, in turn, created, for all practical purposes single-handedly, the current picture of Northumbrian society. But before he could do this, another ingredient was necessary besides the

existence of survivals above the Tees and west of the Pennines; this was what may be called the Yorkshire moat. In a very real sense, the Yorkshire moat in its various guises, has made possible the world of Northumbrian scholarship, and Sir Frank Stenton began its excavation in 1910. In that year he published a very good essay entitled "Types of Manorial Structure in the Northern Danelaw." From the title one would assume that the work covered the Five Boroughs and Yorkshire, but such was not exactly the case. Stenton did use Yorkshire Domesday for some important pieces of evidence for his construct of Danelaw society, but on the second page of his essay he cut Yorkshire loose with the assertion "that the harrying of Yorkshire in 1069 makes it impossible to argue with security from 1086 to the conditions of the Confessor's day. . . ." <sup>4</sup> Stenton was later to change his mind and fill the moat with Danes, but the essential principle with respect to Northumbria did not change. Whether basically unknowable or populated by Danes, Yorkshire did not have to be studied with the lands to the north and west. This meant in practice that any reconstruction of Northumbrian society based on the twelfth and thirteenth-century survivals did not have to be squared with Yorkshire Domesday.

The importance of this freedom was immense for Jolliffe. In 1926 he devoted forty-two pages of his most abstruse prose to explaining the nature of Northumbrian institutions both before and after 1066. This essay, although very hard to follow at points, covered most of the relevant evidence and was brilliant in its arguments and conclusions. The general effect which it makes is monumental, and it has never been seriously challenged. The reason for this is probably his method of

investigation. Jolliffe purposed to start at the bottom of society and work up. This meant that he submerged himself in the disjointed details of the twelfth and thirteenth-century surveys and customals, where no one was likely to follow, isolated the survivals, and combined them in a convincing picture of Northumbrian society. To do this, he assumed that peasant custom was functional in terms of the society within which it existed and that one could deduce the general structure of a "primitive" society from its body of custom.<sup>5</sup> Thanks to the Yorkshire moat, he could do this without worrying about the intractable folios of Yorkshire Domesday which, if nothing else, are an embodiment of the opposite principle that society is organized from the top down.<sup>6</sup>

Beyond questions of methodology, Jolliffe's main supposition was that the "manor" did not exist in Northumbria and Lancashire prior to the Conquest and that the vill was the basis of northern society. By the "manor," Jolliffe meant a village held by a mense tenant which contained an internal demesne worked by the local peasants for the benefit of the holder of the village.<sup>7</sup> He investigated the subject of peasant custom from the Mersey to the Tweed and found that the obligations borne by the peasants were inadequate for demesne cultivation on a large scale. The northern bonder, a term which may have meant no more than "villager," did indeed owe agricultural labor to his lord, but it was light and seasonal in character, designed to supplement the lord's demesne farming at critical times during the agricultural year. The bonder would usually be required to do one or two days' ploughing, perhaps some harrowing, and almost invariably three or four boon-days in autumn. In addition, the peasants commonly helped cut the hay, carted



hay, grain, and the millstone when necessary, and did specified amounts of structural work around the lord's hall and the mill. These obligations were by no means trivial, but they did not include week-work and left the northern peasant free to do his own work for most of the year. The real burden of the peasants, at least on the east coast plain, lay in their renders of grain, malt, and chickens and their "payments," originally in kind, for feasts, pannage, and cornage (a cattle render).<sup>8</sup> These renders and services were forinsec (outside) in the sense that they were rendered, not to a demesne or to a manor house within the vill, but to a lord's hall with an attached demesne which was exterior to the vill. That is to say, groups of these bondage vills were dependent upon a lord's hall. They supported a central demesne with their labor services, intercommoned on the waste, and formed a jurisdictional unit. Such an agglomeration of unmanorialized, bondage vills around a central demesne and hall, Jolliffe called a "shire," and he argued that this type of organization (hereafter called the "shire system") was general throughout all the lands of the old Northumbrian kingdom in 1066 except for the bulk of Yorkshire where it had been destroyed by the Danes.<sup>9</sup>

He further thought that the renders and services by which the peasants supported the lord of the shire were originally (and inferentially as late as 1066) communal responsibilities, and that they were more like renders to a pre-feudal prince than payments of rent to a landlord. The bonders' obligations were originally "public" duties. He owed them as a member of the community, and they did not depend on the amount of land which he held.<sup>10</sup> Jolliffe held that prior to 1066 Northumbria lacked a well-developed theory of ownership (by which he seems to have meant

mense ownership?) and that the intermediate tenures of thanage and drengage were ministerial in nature.<sup>11</sup> To the Normans, the thanes and drengs, who were sometimes associated with bondage vills, seemed to stand between these vills and the lord of the shire, to hold the vills, as it were; but Jolliffe was at pains to argue that before the arrival of the Normans the thanes and drengs did not hold the vills or intercept any of the bonders' dues and services. They held land within the vill, not the whole vill, and were responsible for supervising the collection of the renders in kind and the performance of the forinsec labor services.<sup>12</sup> They were thus essentially stewards, necessary for superintending the widely dispersed villages to the shire, but persons of no great consequence who could not be considered proto-feudal nobles as Maitland had done.

Such was Jolliffe's picture of Northumbrian society. Above the Tees and west of the mountains the countryside was filled in 1066 with shires, large numbers of bondage vills dependent upon a central caput. These shires were inhabited by a very small number of great nobles, a ministerial lower nobility composed of thanes and drengs, and a peasantry which consisted of bonders who still possessed many of the attributes of freemen.<sup>13</sup> Thanks to Jolliffe's mastery of the evidence and his arguments, this is a convincing construct, but it must be emphasized that it is just that, a logical construct. With the ambiguous exception of the Domesday description of Lancashire which the Normans clearly bungled, it touches no evidence from before the coming of the Normans. This does not mean, of course, that it is incorrect (and Jolliffe's treatment of northern peasant custom seems unassailable), but it does

mean that his theory needs two things to be convincing which a simple, direct argument from a body of evidence does not need: Jolliffe required theories which would explain the origin of these institutions and their decline. The first he provided in the closing pages of his essay where he noted a number of parallels between Northumbrian and Welsh custom and suggested that the unique nature of Northumbrian society had its origin in an extensive mingling of Celt and Angle during the early Middle Ages. Indeed, he thought that in the West this was probably the result of the direct annexation of Celtic principalities by the conquering Angles.<sup>14</sup> This theory of Celtic influence on the formation of Northumbria would adequately explain why the North of England was not like the South where all the Celts had supposedly fled or been killed, but his picture of northern society still needed a theory of decline which would put it in direct contact with the evidence from after the Conquest upon which all his arguments backwards were ultimately based. This was necessary because few examples of functioning shires are found in the surveys and inquisitions. They are, however, filled with groups of villages which rather look like sections or fragments of vanished shires, and to connect these shire-segments with the hypothetical functioning shires of 1066, Jolliffe developed a theory of "truncation." Baldly put, the Normans truncated the shires. Although they did this in a number of ways, two stand out. The Normans had a well-developed sense of mense ownership; and, therefore, grants of the old dependent vills by the tenants-in-chief to their vassals disrupted the traditional system of forinsec works and dues within the shires.<sup>15</sup> Later, the growth of demesne farming during the twelfth century prompted lords to concentrate their

energy on parts of the old shires and to liquidate their immediate hold on the more remote villages whose services and renders were no longer profitable.<sup>16</sup> These two mechanisms were largely responsible for the fragmentation of the shires and connect Jolliffe's model of Northumbrian society before 1066 with the evidence of the later Middle Ages.

Given the nature of the evidence, Jolliffe's delineation of Northumbrian society is brilliant. His argument from the High Medieval survivals back to the Anglo-Saxon period are convincing, and his theory of truncation is certainly plausible. His conclusions have not, however, become common in the textbooks,<sup>17</sup> and this is rather curious. One would think, on the face of the matter, that the more interesting parts of his work would be his general picture of Northumbrian society and his ideas on the impact of the Normans on this system since both are unusual in comparison with southern England, but this has not been the case. There has been only one serious attempt to test Jolliffe's ideas in the light of the history of an individual shire (Blackburnshire),<sup>18</sup> and for the rest, the attention of scholars has been turned elsewhere. In particular, they have been interested in pursuing Jolliffe's theory on the origin of Northumbrian institutions. He thought that the Celts of northern Britain had played a significant part in the formation of Northumbrian society because of a number of parallels which he saw between Northumbrian and Welsh customs in the High Middle Ages and which he believed could not have been the result of the independent development of the two societies. He suggested a number of specific examples of such parallels, but he did not argue his point in detail, probably because he thought the similarity obvious.<sup>19</sup> That it certainly should have been obvious--



at least from a certain point of view--has emerged from the recent discussion of this theme by William Rees and G. W. S. Barrow who have worked out the points which follow. These may appear somewhat tangential to the subject of northern society, but the quest for Celtic universals has become so involved with the question of Northumbrian institutions that these comparisons must be discussed.

They are, in fact, impressive. The bondmen of the Welsh commotes owed their prince renders and services which were strikingly similar to those owed by the northern bonders to the lord of the shire. They gave renders of food for feasts (the gwestfa) twice a year as did the northern bonders on the east coast plain. They had to support the local serjeants of the peace (the cais) by giving them lodging and food (the cylch cais). This same duty lay on many of the bonders of the northern counties where a very similar system of serjeants of the peace existed. The Welsh bondmen and a number of the peasants in Durham owed virtually identical structural works for the building of the lord's hall, chamber, and auxiliary buildings, and in both places they often had to feed the lord's horse and dogs. Finally, at least in certain lordships in eastern Wales, the inhabitants were burdened with commorth, a cattle render paid every second or third year, and this custom is said to have been a nearly exact parallel to the cornage and other allied cattle payments which were made in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries by many of the bondage vills, Norman mense lordships, and even baronies in the lands north of the Tees and the Ribble.<sup>20</sup> These points of comparison do indeed establish the marked similarity between Northumbrian and Welsh custom which Jolliffe originally pointed out. In fact, aside from the

northern bonder's obligation to help maintain the mill of the shire, the only significant segment of his burdens which has found no place in the comparison with Welsh custom is his seasonal agricultural works, but it now seems possible that even these should be included. Jolliffe thought that the Welsh maerdref, that is, the prince's demesne land within the commote which was cultivated by the bondsmen of the dependent hamlets, only developed in the course of the thirteenth century.<sup>21</sup> Glanville R. J. Jones, however, has argued with great determination and some force that the development of both agricultural bond hamlets and of the prince's maerdref took place much earlier in Wales than has been commonly thought; and, if he is correct, the shire and the commote become nearly identical institutions through which a dispersed peasantry supported a prince by renders in kind and seasonal works.<sup>22</sup>

Such a conclusion would not be a matter of mere antiquarian interest. If the shire and the commote are essentially the same institution as the parallels between the two seem to indicate, one would think that the shire must have been originally a Celtic institution. And, whether or not one accepts Jones's further argument that this institution, the discrete estate, actually goes back to pre-Roman times,<sup>23</sup> one can at least no longer continue picturing the Anglo-Saxons as exterminating every last Celt who did not flee to the hills and mountains of western Britain. This, of course, is the intellectual prize to be won by the rather tedious comparisons of peasant customs. If the method is valid, it offers the possibility of modifying the idea that in its origin England was purely Germanic and uncorrupted by any Celtic "element." The potential importance of this conclusion, in turn, explains why

historians have concentrated on the first part of Jolliffe's theory without really questioning his basic picture of Northumbrian society. The latter is altogether too convenient, not to mention too complex, to be tinkered with in this day when the professional Celts, or in the case of Jones, the pre-Celts, are demanding their due in the making of England.

Recently, moreover, the scope of this discussion has been enlarged by the inclusion of Scotland, and here the object is the same: To clarify the nature of ancient Celtic institutional arrangements by the isolation and comparison of survivals. Hitherto, this land has been largely protected from such comparisons, even when they seem quite obvious, by the assumption that Northumbria was entirely Germanic in its structure.<sup>24</sup> This idea is, however, unwarranted, and G. W. S. Barrow has recently been able to point out a number of specific parallels between Scottish and Northumbrian institutions as a result of the vantage point which he has acquired from his work editing the charters of Malcolm IV and William the Lion. With respect to eastern Lothian and the Merse, of course, this is not basically surprising. Both had been part of the Northumbrian kingdom, and Jolliffe himself thought that their institutional make-up was the same as that to the south. Thanes and drengs formed the nobility in this area, and the tenure of the drengs, at least, was ministerial. The thanes of Lothian held shires, and the few examples of early peasant custom which survive from this region show a system of works and renders nearly identical with that found in Northumbria.<sup>25</sup> In addition to re-emphasizing these points, Barrow's contribution has been the observation that the similarities did not stop on the borders of ancient Northumbria. In West Lothian,

eastern Stirling, and throughout eastern Scotland generally up to Ross, the native nobility below the earls consisted of thanes in the twelfth and later centuries. These thanes held areas called "shires" from the king by a tenure which seems to have closely resembled the feudal tenure of fee-farm, and their shires were often identical with the parish. These points are revealing because in Northumbria the thanes were also classed by the Normans with the tenants in fee-farm, and the shires had apparently once been identical with the parish. Barrow further noted that a substantial number of the names of the shires above the Forth were of an early type; and, although the evidence on the thanes is admittedly not very detailed, he was unable to find significant differences between them and the Northumbrian thanes discussed by Jolliffe.<sup>26</sup> There was, then, an apparent structural similarity, at least on the upper levels, between eastern Scotland and Northumbria, and the possibility that this was due to common origins is supported by certain revenues of the Scottish king. He had traditionally the right to collect two nearly universal tributes which were the mainstay of his government and which seem to have their parallels both in the North of England and in Wales. Throughout Scotland north of the Forth and the lands of the defunct kingdom of Strathclyde, the king received cain either every year or once every several years. The cain was a food render which in the West consisted of cows, pigs, and cheese; and Barrow argued that it was the Scottish equivalent of cornage, the cattle render which many of the Northumbrian bondage vills owed. The second great tribute of the Scottish king was coneveh. It was found in eastern Scotland, including Lothian, and consisted of feasts owed to the king by the populace. Not



surprisingly, Barrow saw in it a parallel with the feasts which a number of the bondage vills and drengages in Northumbria and Lothian owed under the name of waiting.<sup>27</sup>

Barrow concluded his discussion of these points by suggesting that the king of Scotland's cain and coneveh, the king of England's cornage and waiting, and the Welsh prince's commorth and gwestfa--not to mention the king of Man's pecunia (cattle) and acconeuez (coneveh?)--represented a common system of renders and by asking what the relationship was between these hospitality dues which appear to have been so widespread in highland Britain.<sup>28</sup> He did not formally answer this question--just as he did not answer similar questions, which he posed, about the relationships between the Scottish thanes and the Northumbrian thanes, between cain and cornage, or between the system of serjeants of the peace in Scottish Strathclyde and its counterpart in the North of England--but the general terms of his discussion would seem to make one answer inevitable: A theory of radical Celtic origins for the institutional structure of the highland zone.<sup>29</sup>

What began as a fairly harmless discussion of the survivals of pre-Conquest Northumbrian society has in the end produced some rather sweeping conclusions. One is being asked to see in the survivals the fag end of an old royal support system which remained in operation in Wales and Scotland as late as the twelfth and thirteenth centuries and which survived in Northumbria in a recognizable form as late as the Norman Conquest. Up to this date, the structure of society in northern Britain was basically uniform on its upper levels. The countryside of both eastern Scotland and Northumbria was divided into shires held by thanes

above the Tweed and by "lords of the shire" south of this river. These men rendered the great hospitality dues to the king and directly supported the local police just as the men of the Welsh commotes did these things for their prince. Such is the picture yielded by Northumbrian scholarship and its offshoot, the search for Celtic universals. It is all very symmetrical and rather majestic.

The question, of course, is whether one can accept it, and it is to be feared that one cannot. There are two reasons for this. In the first place, the comparisons of custom upon which this edifice is raised are over-generalized and ignore certain major difficulties. The cain of eastern Scotland, for instance, was a general food render, principally of grain, not a cow render like cornage.<sup>30</sup> This blocks its identification with cornage, even if the latter was a commutation of old food renders as Rees thought, because there was actually a well-developed system of grain renders in Durham and Northumberland which ran parallel with cornage.<sup>31</sup> Should one conclude that there had been two systems of food tribute in Northumbria or that Rees was wrong about cornage? The latter alternative seems more likely since it is simpler to equate the Northumbrian grain renders with cain, but this does not solve all the problems. Cornage would need a new explanation. The question of why there is no sign of royal cain, cornage, or even peasant grain renders in Lothian and the Merse would still remain.<sup>32</sup> Theoretically this area should provide institutional links between Northumbria and Scotland, yet it does not. Waiting is also a problem because it is not altogether clear that it was really as common in Northumbria as these discussions imply.<sup>33</sup> Finally, commorth was not a general obligation which ran

parallel with gwestfa in Wales but was restricted to certain lordships along the border.<sup>34</sup> These are serious difficulties. They do not necessarily mean that the attempts to compare Scottish, Northumbrian, and Welsh customs are ultimately wrong, but they do weaken the comparisons by destroying the symmetry upon which they mainly depend for their force.

The second reason why this picture cannot be accepted is that these comparisons are either directly or indirectly based upon Jolliffe. His reconstruction of Northumbrian society has gone unquestioned on account of its convenience and complexity, but there is reason to believe that it is defective because of his basic approach, that is, his endeavor to reconstruct Northumbrian society from the bottom up. As a result of this, he almost completely ignored the place in society of the men who held the shires, his "lords of the shire," and consequently produced an artificially primitive (pre-feudal) impression of Northumbrian society. Furthermore, it is essentially a frozen system which he described. There are no mechanisms for change in this society, and it survives unaltered down to its truncation by the Normans. Both of these are serious flaws. On a theoretical level they limit the validity of his conclusions, and they may be responsible for the difficulties encountered in the comparison of custom. In particular, a theory of institutional divergence might clarify the situation, but this is just what Jolliffe's denial of change precludes.

It is one thing, however, to say that Jolliffe is probably wrong; it is quite another to show where. It seems unlikely that these difficulties can be cleared up and a theory of institutional divergence

supplied simply by reworking the material which he covered. Many of his conclusions seem indisputable, and the real problem is that his evidence is, in effect, one-dimensional. This limitation is inescapable unless some earlier information can be brought to bear on these subjects, and it is here that the Yorkshire moat becomes a matter of the first importance. If the society which existed in Yorkshire in 1066 was not radically different from the one above the Tees, Domesday's description of Yorkshire can be used to supplement and check Jolliffe's reconstruction of Northumbrian society before the Conquest. If, on the other hand, the Danes seriously altered society south of the Tees, this comparison would be impossible in a meaningful sense.

In other words, it must be determined if the Yorkshire moat will hold water, and at the beginning it may be noted that the concept itself is rather suspicious. This chasm is altogether too convenient for both Northumbrian historians and students of the Danelaw. It allows the former to argue backwards from High Medieval evidence without any worry that their constructs will be threatened by Yorkshire Domesday, and it permits the latter to ascribe institutions to the Danes without bothering to consider parallel institutions above the Tees. In the face of such wondrous utility, one might well ask for evidence, and it is at this point that the question becomes very curious. The disquieting truth is that Domesday has been used as the principal "direct" proof throughout the Danelaw that the Danes had altered the structure of society. The reason for this is twofold. On the one hand, there is practically no evidence which discloses what effect the Danes had had on native English society prior to 1066; but, on the other hand, eastern



England appears to be rather different from the western Midlands and Wessex when these regions are described in Domesday. In particular, the East is characterized by the soke and by sokemen. Logically, of course, the restriction of this institution and social group to eastern England proves absolutely nothing since this region might have been distinctive prior to the arrival of the Danes, and since Northumbria, which might have had a similar structure, is not described in Domesday. This last point is of particular importance because it is doubtful if the Tees had ever formed a boundary between Durham and Yorkshire, but the distribution of the soke as it appears in Domesday has nonetheless created the presumption that the Danes were in fact responsible for the differences between the Danelaw and the rest of England. Furthermore, this presumption has been strengthened as the impact of the Danes on the place-names, personal nomenclature, and customary law of eastern England has been worked out. Within these realms their influence, whether direct or indirect, was certainly great, and this makes it easier to believe that they influenced the basic framework of society as well.<sup>35</sup>

In terms of the structure of society, the question of the Danish impact on eastern England can be limited to the territorial soke. Was it a Scandinavian creation or a native institution which had survived the ninth century? Generally speaking, sokes were estates which consisted of a main village with dependent pieces of property called berewicks and sokelands. The larger territorial sokes covered wide stretches of countryside, and the berewicks and sokelands might be either complete villages or only parts of a village. The resemblance between this type of estate and the Northumbrian shire is obvious, but the identification

of the two has been barred by the idea that the sokes were Danish. In its modern form this hypothesis is mainly the work of Sir Frank Stenton. On the one hand, his definition of the soke as an institution would preclude such an identification. He admitted that in some sokes the sokemen owed their lord light agricultural services such as mowing or helping with the harvest which were survivals of pre-manorial conditions and were not "derogatory."<sup>36</sup>

But in general it would seem that the tenant within a soke held his land by suit of court and a money rent. . . .

The territorial sokes of the eleventh century rest upon a great body of custom constraining a lord's dependents, free and unfree, to seek his court, his mill, his fold, his church, to the exclusion of all competing institutions.<sup>37</sup>

The emphasis here is on the idea that the sokes were held together by suit, rents, and nonderogatory service; in 1927 he would call it "honorable" service.<sup>38</sup> Sokes were basically jurisdictional units which could not be confused with shires. The main purpose of this definition, however, was not to differentiate sokes and shires, although it incidentally did this. Rather, the nature of the sokes after 1066 had to be in accordance with their origins which Stenton saw as the direct result of the Danish settlement. He envisaged the Danish invasions as having been a folk migration of free and equal peasant warriors "at least comparable in scale to the later movement from which the duchy of Normandy arose."<sup>39</sup> In fact, he thought that they had come in massive numbers and that the territorial sokes had resulted "from the settlement of the rank and file of the Danish armies around the men who had led them in the invasion."<sup>40</sup> The sokelands were the estates which these free warriors had occupied; and, for obvious reasons, it would not do to have their supposed

descendants, the sokemen, burdened with services inappropriate to their rank. Thus the Danes came to occupy the Yorkshire moat and the lands to the south. There was, as Stenton admitted, no direct proof for this hypothesis,<sup>41</sup> but his prestige was such that it has been accepted, nevertheless. It meant, of course, that Domesday could be taken at face value as describing a society basically altered by a large influx of Danes.

It would be unjust and inaccurate, however, to lay the burden for the creation of this intellectual chasm across the face of England solely on Stenton because initially Jolliffe concurred completely. In his work on Northumbria, he investigated the question of whether shire survivals existed in Yorkshire, and he found several examples of them in the West Riding and the western part of the North Riding. These will be discussed in detail later, but for the moment it is their distribution which is important. The existence of shire survivals in western Yorkshire and their absence from the Vale of York and the East Riding led Jolliffe to conclude that:

The line at which . . . [Northumbrian] custom stops is not an early Anglo-Celtic frontier, but a Danish one, that of the kingdom of Anlaf which destroyed Deira, and the break is too abrupt to leave its meaning doubtful.<sup>42</sup>

In other words, the Danes destroyed the shire system throughout most of Yorkshire. Somewhat later, however, Jolliffe modified this position. In an interpretive essay published in 1934 he argued that the territorial sokes were not of Danish origin, that both sokes and Northumbrian shires were analogous institutions arising from the pre-feudal stage of Anglo-Saxon society, and that the bonds of suit, rent, and service which held

the sokes together were ancient royal dues.<sup>43</sup> It must be noted that this was not exactly the same thing as saying that the soke and the shire were the same institution; rather, they were both relics of the "era of the folk" and had originally served the same end.<sup>44</sup> The implication was that Domesday still did not describe Northumbrian institutions.

That this position came very close to enjoying the best of both worlds did not become a serious problem for Jolliffe's explanation of the soke has been largely ignored. This is unfortunate because he was more right than wrong, but it is understandable. His arguments on Yorkshire were either general or ill-conceived, and it took more than them to drive the cohorts of Danish sokemen out of Yorkshire.<sup>45</sup> Recently, however, a good deal of work has been done which supports the general idea that the territorial soke was an Anglo-Saxon (or Anglo-Celtic) institution. P. H. Sawyer has shown that the Danish armies numbered between two and three hundred men rather than in the thousands, and he has suggested ways in which a dominant aristocracy of relatively small size could affect place-names and law in the way that the Danes did.<sup>46</sup> This discovery is of fundamental importance because it destroys the idea that the Danish invasions represented a folk migration and deprives the sokemen of most of their hypothetical Danish forefathers. Even more to the point, however, has been the work of R. H. C. Davis who has investigated the socage customs of East Anglia which the Danes are usually regarded as having introduced. He would translate "soke," not as "jurisdiction," but as "customs which the aforesaid land owes the king."<sup>47</sup> These customs consisted of hidage, wardpenny, and foddercorn in addition



to mowing services, relief, and gersum,<sup>48</sup> and Davis was able to show that sokeland, the land burdened with these services, was pre-Danish in its origin.

It is the relic of a period when the land was divided into districts covering several villages, which were administered from a common center and provided the king with his "feorm" or food rents.<sup>49</sup>

He thought that this system had once been much like the Northumbrian shires, the lathes of Kent, or the Welsh commotes but that its outlines had been obscured by the commutation of the renders and by royal grants to the nobles and the Church of the dues and services which the soke-lands produced.<sup>50</sup>

Davis did his work before Sawyer, and it is therefore understandable why he did not feel that his conclusion that the sokeland was Anglo-Saxon could be extended to the northern Danelaw.<sup>51</sup> He still faced the concept of the Danish invasion as a folk migration and the very real presence of the invasion's latter-day outriders, the philologists; while they, in turn, were now burdened with the necessity of explaining why sokeland was Danish in one area and Anglo-Saxon in another. This has never been done, and the only important extension of the discussion beyond certain attacks on Sawyer's theories on the formation of place-names<sup>52</sup> has been the work of G. R. J. Jones. His interest in the matter has been unique in that he has been trying to establish the Celtic origins of the "discrete estate." The soke is a regional example of the discrete estate, as is the shire, and Jones has argued that the sokes in Yorkshire were formed when the Celts subjugated the pre-Celtic population of the area.<sup>53</sup> If one could be sure that this idea is correct, it

would immediately reduce the theory of a Danish origin of the sokes to nonsense and make their identification as an Anglo-Saxon institution a secondary matter, the result of Anglo-Saxons replacing Celts as the lords of these estates. Unfortunately, Jones has very little evidence to work with, and his arguments are of necessity extremely tenuous.<sup>54</sup> They cannot be taken as established, although they may be correct. One immediate result, however, of his determination to prove the Celtic origin of the discrete estate has been his discussion of the Danish place-names of Yorkshire. He has argued persuasively that most of them were the result of the renaming of Anglo-Saxon villages by the Danes rather than new creations, and he has hypothesized that the important Danish leaders took over the soke centers and granted out the dependent villages to their followers from whom most of the by-names with a personal name for a first element were derived.<sup>55</sup> This last point is particularly important because it provides a reasonable explanation for the aristocratic implications of the numerous by-names of eastern England which have never been adequately accounted for on the basis of a mass migration of free and equal warriors.<sup>56</sup> Furthermore, it would account for the fact that the main villages of the Danelaw sokes have an embarrassing tendency to have English names.<sup>57</sup>

Taken together, the work of Sawyer, Davis, and Jones strongly suggests that the Danes did not significantly alter the institutional structure of the Danelaw and that the soke was an Anglo-Saxon institution. This is in accord with the latest research on the Danes in Normandy which has produced similar conclusions,<sup>58</sup> and it provides new support for Jolliffe's idea that the soke and the shire were analogous

institutions. Unfortunately, this does not settle the issue. With it established that the soke is probably a native institution, it becomes important to determine whether Jolliffe's concept of analogy is correct, or whether this idea is only a smoke screen, a new version of the Yorkshire moat which will save the primitive simplicity of Northumbria while dragging the Danelaw into the realm of the Anglo-Saxon "folk." Certainly the history of the Northumbrian kingdom provides no basis for assuming that Yorkshire was different in its institutional make-up from the lands above the Tees once the influence of the Danes is discounted, and two things are immediately apparent which indicate that the distinction might be groundless. First, there are examples of sokes in Yorkshire being called "shires." Both Howden and (North) Allerton were called shires, and so were Hallam and Sowerby, a division of the Wakefield soke.<sup>59</sup> Second, this suspicious verbal identification of sokes and shires is matched by an even more curious phenomenon on the level of peasant custom. While Yorkshire is not blessed with numerous documents disclosing the nature of local peasant custom, occasional examples do appear in the late twelfth and thirteenth centuries, and these are quite significant. The earliest instances are in the Templars' Inquest of 1185, a document roughly contemporaneous with Boldon Book, and one set of these customs, those of Temple Newsham in the West Riding, reveals a very important point. Here the peasants, who held either one or two bovates each, paid yearly 30d. per bovatate rent (?), 2 hens and 20 eggs, and during the course of the year they ploughed and harrowed for four days, mowed and made hay one day, and did four boon-days in autumn. In addition to this, they were responsible for repairing the millpond,

bringing new millstones to the village, and washing and shearing the sheep for two days.<sup>60</sup> These customs are interesting in several respects, and the first thing to be noted is that they were not unique. The Templars' Inquest reveals that similar customs were followed at Skelton and Colton, both in the West Riding, and at Alwarthorpe in the East Riding.<sup>61</sup> Moreover, the thirteenth-century inquisitions post Mortem show in more detail that services of the same type were rendered at Harewood in the West Riding, at Kirkby Moorside in the North Riding, and at Burton Agnes in the East Riding.<sup>62</sup> Other examples of the same customary tradition could be cited, but the point of these examples is not to fill thirteenth-century Yorkshire with villages where the peasants followed these customs. Such a picture would be very inaccurate because the harrying of 1069 had destroyed many of the old villages. These lands were re-developed during the twelfth century on easy terms.<sup>63</sup> This process and commutation produced a preponderance of rent tenures by the thirteenth century, but the wide dispersal and uniformity of the system of services exemplified by those at Temple Newsham probably mean that these had been the normal customary system before 1069. Jolliffe unaccountably did not investigate this point although it is a matter of primary importance. His picture of Northumbrian society was based on peasant custom and the renders which it yielded, yet the peasants of Yorkshire apparently had been under a very similar system. Except for the grain renders and cornage of the Northumbrian bonder, his services are matched point by point by those of the Yorkshire villein. Both were limited to specific tasks at critical times during the year, and neither were subject to week-work.



These points are not conclusive, but the occasional verbal identification of sokes and shires and the probable existence of a common system of customary labor on either side of the Tees before 1069 certainly make Jolliffe's idea that sokes and shires were only analogous open to doubt. In terms of evidence, as opposed to utility, he held this position as a result of his original work on Northumbria which had led him to negative conclusions:

In Yorkshire the system seems to have vanished altogether from the central plain. There is no clear evidence that Howdenshire or Allertonshire were shires in more than name, and on the east the most southern drengage was at Marske, near Middlesbrough. In the west, however, drengage tenures survive in the honour of Richmond, and a number of vills are burdened with forinsec works. The same is true in a less [sic] degree of the soke of Knaresborough, the manor of Thorpe Arch, and the district of Leeds, while cornage is still paid in the fee of Bowes Castle.<sup>64</sup>

This distribution of shire survivals was the basis for Jolliffe's initial conclusion that the Danes had destroyed the shire system in Yorkshire, and when he later perceived the similarity between the soke and the shire, it stood in the way of the obvious solution of the problem: The complete identification of the two institutions. His examples of surviving shire customs, principally forinsec labor dues, were few and restricted to western Yorkshire, and because of this--if for no other reason--sokes and shires could not be the same. In actuality, however, this distribution is false. For whatever reason, Jolliffe minimized the examples of Northumbrian custom which he found and failed to discover a considerable body of additional evidence.

In the first place, Northumbrian custom was more common in the western part of the shire than Jolliffe's brief discussion would indicate. As late as the thirteenth century, a number of dependent estates were

linked to their manorial centers by forinsec agricultural works which were similar to those rendered by Northumbrian bondage vills to the shire centers, and frequently these works still rested on the vill as a whole, rather than on the individual tenants. The men of Burneston, for example, owed forinsec ploughing and reaping at Carthorpe, and the inhabitants of Lofthouse rendered similar works at the manor of Harewood:

The whole township of Lofthus ought to find three boonworks with three ploughs yearly at the lord's food . . . and also thirty-three reapers in autumn for one day at the lord's food . . . .<sup>65</sup>

Harewood also received these services from the dependent estates of Newhall and Stubb House, but in these cases the old bondage dues had been attached to the mense tenures by 1263, the date of the survey.<sup>66</sup> Jolliffe did not note either of these instances, nor did he find that the men of Denton owed ploughing and reaping services at Otley as late as 1315 or that five vills owed similar services at Ripon.<sup>67</sup> These were important omissions, but the soke of Knaresborough is, perhaps, the best example of his failure to follow his own leads. He knew of three vills burdened with forinsec works in this estate. Actually, however, eighteen vills seem to have owed boon-works at Knaresborough, and the old obligation of feeding the lord's dogs, which was characteristic of many Durham villages, was still in force.<sup>68</sup> Finally, the sokemen of Sheffield did hunting and forest services which may have been similar (it is impossible to be certain) to those found in western Durham.<sup>69</sup>

When combined with Jolliffe's examples, these instances of forinsec works establish that shire customs were far from uncommon in western Yorkshire, but the really important point is that his distinction

between the west and the rest of the shire will not stand. There are examples of surviving shire customs in the south and the east. It is true that they seem to be less numerous than in the west, yet they have a significance beyond their numbers for there is reason to believe that the harrying was more severe in the Vale of York, the eastern part of the North Riding, and the East Riding than on the flanks of the Pennines whence so many of the western survivals come.<sup>70</sup> The examples themselves are of several sorts. On the one hand, there were household rents and forinsec agricultural services which must have had their origin in a vanished shire at Kirkby Moorside in the East Riding.<sup>71</sup> On the other hand, a number of Norman mense tenures bore incidents which had once lain on bondage vills or tenures in drengage. In the far south of the shire, the manor of Stainton was held of the castle of Tickhill by knight service, yet all the men of the manor, free and unfree, had to plough for ten days on the demesne of the castle.<sup>72</sup> This is the sole case in Yorkshire of a type of tenure more common further north which was the result of knight service being imposed on an old bondage vill, but analogous tenures on a lower level existed in the eastern part of the county. In 1255 Osbert de Bolbec held his manor at Levisham in the Vale of Pickering by rent, suit to court, and by harrowing at Pickering castle.<sup>73</sup> Jolliffe failed to notice either of these tenures, and this was a serious omission because the twelfth-century charters show that such tenures as that at Levisham were more common than the later inquiries indicate. The earliest example comes from ca. 1120-1128 when Aschetin de Hawsker received Normanby and Hawsker from the abbot of Whitby to hold by paying 24s. rent and by doing one boon-ploughing and

one autumn boon-day each year, and similar tenures are recorded later in the century at Guisborough, at Welbury in the Vale of York, and at Sixtendale in the East Riding.<sup>74</sup> Finally, there is the question of drengs. Their tenure was an integral part of shire organization, and Jolliffe argued that the survival of drengage in an area indicated that a shire had existed there.<sup>75</sup> In this reasoning he was correct, but he also maintained that the southern most drengage in Yorkshire was at Marske on the northeast coast. This is not true. Deep in the East Riding three drengs survived into the thirteenth century at Burton Agnes, and several others could be found during this period at Driffield and apparently in Howdenshire.<sup>76</sup>

In the face of these examples of forinsec services and drengs, Jolliffe's distribution crumbles. Shire customs were more numerous than he thought and were not restricted just to the west of the shire. When combined with the fact that the general system of customary labor prior to 1069 closely resembled the one followed in Northumbria, this discovery strongly indicates that such customs represented the predominant system before the Norman Conquest, and this hypothesis greatly increases the probability that the obvious equation of sokes and shires is correct. In actuality, one does not need to speak in terms of probability because a number of the examples discussed above show that the dependent members of the territorial sokes, the berewicks and sokelands, were linked to the soke-center by the same type of seasonal agricultural services as those which tied the bondage villis to the shire-center. Of course, by the time of Domesday the tenurial arrangements in the county had been disrupted by the harrying, the allocation of lands to the Normans, and by an arbitrary



reclassification of sokelands as berewicks, and these factors create a degree of ambiguity.<sup>77</sup> But the relationships involved are still clear. Denton had been a berewick of Otley in 1086; in 1315 the inhabitants of the vill still performed one day's ploughing and one day's reaping at Otley.<sup>78</sup> Ledeston had been a berewick of Kippax in 1086; in the early thirteenth century it owed forinsec ploughing at Kippax.<sup>79</sup> Levisham, on the other hand, had been sokeland of Pickering in the eleventh century; it did harrowing at Pickering in 1255.<sup>80</sup> Hawsker had also been sokeland in 1086, and it rendered a day's ploughing and reaping at its old soke-center of Whitby in the 1120's.<sup>81</sup> Three of the five vills which owed ploughing and reaping services to Ripon were classified as either berewicks or sokelands in Domesday,<sup>82</sup> and the same forinsec dependence existed in the manor of Knaresborough. The post-Conquest manor was a combination of the old sokes of Aldborough and Knaresborough. Seven of the nineteen vills which did boon-works had been either berewicks or sokelands in 1086, and the remainder are either not in Domesday or are deceptively listed with a miscellaneous group of king's thegns.<sup>83</sup>

The soke and the Northumbrian shire were the same institution. This idea may sound somewhat radical, but it is in complete accord with Davis's work on East Anglia and provides a foundation for Jones's idea that the Danes mainly took over existing villages. Furthermore, it is not even really in basic conflict with the work of Stenton except on the question of the origin of the sokes. The bulk of his work can endure the idea of an English origin of this institution, and his assertion that the greater sokes were held together by money rents in addition to the several types of suit can be explained as the result of the commutation of

old dues. The most serious objection to this interpretation would come, in fact, from Northumbrian scholars who would probably raise at least three basic questions, and these must be discussed for the answers to these questions will complete the destruction of the Yorkshire moat and as a result seriously change Jolliffe's picture of Northumbrian society.

The questions revolve around the fact that, although the general nature of peasant custom and the forinsec dependence of sokeland are indeed reminiscent of Northumbrian custom, certain other equally characteristic marks of the shire system do not appear in Yorkshire. It might be pointed out, for instance, that Domesday only records four drengs in Yorkshire and that such individuals should be much more common if the shire system existed south of the Tees,<sup>84</sup> but this objection would be wrong on two counts. In the first place, the Domesday commissioners were only interested in putting on record who "owned" any particular manor in 1066, not who may have been in possession, so that drengs, who did not have a freehold according to Jolliffe, would not have been recorded under 1066. Second, Domesday does record men in possession in 1086 and should note any drengs, but its description of southern Lancashire uses the terms "thane" and "dreng" interchangeably which means that it is entirely possible that the small thanes listed in Yorkshire in 1086 were of the same ministerial class as those in Lancashire.<sup>85</sup> This possibility is supported by three things. First, the four drengs mentioned in Yorkshire are recorded in the very first folio before any mention of thanes, and this suggests that the clerks decided to abandon the uncouth title of "dreng" at this point in favor of the more familiar "thane." Second, the small Yorkshire thanes paid the same relief, 40s.,

as the thanes and drengs of Lancashire.<sup>86</sup> These are important considerations, but the most significant piece of evidence is a long list of some 328 small manors included under the land of the king. These manors form a compact group at the end of the description of the king's larger estates and were predominantly small, generally ranging in size from one-half carucate to five carucates. They had been held by named individuals in 1066, and on the basis of the text there seems no clear reason why they were not listed with the king's thanes.<sup>87</sup> Their absence from this section might be explained, of course, by the hypothesis that these manors had not been part of the king's demesne before the Conquest and that they were confiscated estates, but this explanation cannot be true. One of the most important characteristics of the ministerial thanes and drengs on the royal demesne in Lancashire in 1066 was that they paid rent for their "manors,"<sup>88</sup> and the same was true of the small thanes on the royal demesne in Yorkshire. This is clear from the values ascribed to their manors for 1066. These do not represent a real sequence of numbers such as would be produced by even a rough estimation of the yearly value of 328 manors which varied in size and were scattered over the face of the county. Rather, their values in all but an insignificant minority of cases are directly proportional to the number of ploughlands which they contained. Their values were based on the ratios of 5s., 6s. 8d., and 8s. per ploughland or simple multiples and fractions of each figure.<sup>89</sup> This phenomenon is without parallel in Yorkshire except for a group of royal and comital manors which were valued at the figure of £56,<sup>90</sup> and these figures clearly represent a traditional feorm or rent. The men who held these manors were then the



equivalent of the ministerial thanes of the West, and the idea that there were no drengs in Yorkshire is specious.

A determined Northumbrian scholar, however, might still not assent, despite the discovery of over 300 ministerial nobles south of the Tees, and demand to know if the peasants of Yorkshire made the grain renders and cornage payments which were common in Northumbrian bondage vills. These would be serious questions. If the institutional structure of Northumbria was fairly uniform, there should be traces of grain renders and cornage south of the Tees, and neither are found in any number in the custumals and inquisitions. They contain only two examples of peasants burdened with grain renders and but one instance of the payment of cornage (cougeld).<sup>91</sup> But at least in the case of the first of these, the grain renders, this is entirely a question of appearance, an impression analogous to Jolliffe's ideas about the distribution of forinsec labor dues and drengs, and just as devoid of substance. For once literary evidence can throw light on this discussion. The Chronica . . . de Melsa contains a curious story that when King Athelstan returned from his Scottish expedition, he gave the church of Beverley the right to collect four traves of grain, apparently oats, from each working plough in the East Riding. This render was called hestercorn (hestornes). Its collection was a royal right, and its original purpose had been to provide food for the king's horses.<sup>92</sup> This last statement, of course, may only reflect the chronicler's dislike of oats, but the main idea of the account is very interesting. The grain renders above the Tees were of royal origin,<sup>93</sup> and this story would prove that similar renders had existed in Yorkshire and explain what had happened to them. Of course,



the account itself might be doubted, but the Chronica . . . de Melsa is a serious, if late, source which embodies local material in addition to the works of earlier historians.<sup>94</sup> Furthermore, the matter does not rest solely on its authority. The Hospital of St. Peter of York had a similar tradition that Athelstan granted to the church of York the right to collect one trave of corn from each plough in the province of York.<sup>95</sup> This right passed to the hospital after the Conquest, and both its existence and the existence of Beverley's grain renders are established by later evidence. Beverley's right to its traves was confirmed by both Henry I and Stephen, and St. Peter's traves were confirmed by William Rufus.<sup>96</sup> These charters show that a comprehensive system of grain renders, which probably had consisted of one trave of corn and four traves of oats from each plough, had existed in Yorkshire, and they strongly suggest that the stories about Athelstan granting already existing renders to the Church should be taken seriously. Moreover, both the method of assessment and the political situation in Yorkshire during the tenth century point in the same direction. The levying of the dues on the basis of the working plough looks very ancient, and certainly neither Athelstan nor his immediate successors possessed enough power in Yorkshire to impose a new general tribute for the support of the Church. The most likely hypothesis is, then, that either Athelstan or one of the other early kings of Wessex to hold power in the North granted out to the Church the old royal grain renders which the kings of Northumbria had once received and which the Danish kings of York had continued to collect.<sup>97</sup> These renders in kind would not have seemed very useful to the descendants of Alfred who never showed any great taste for staying

in Yorkshire, and the Church in Yorkshire clearly needed to be re-endowed after its near destruction at the hands of the Danes.

This leaves the question of cornage, the most debated of all North-umbrian survivals. Its absence from Yorkshire is absolute except at Bowes castle, and no evidence of any sort hints that it has gone unnoticed like the grain renders. Yet this is not as serious a problem as it might appear. The cumulative weight of the argument has become great; and, if there is no evidence of cornage in Yorkshire, there is also no sign of it in southern Lancashire which was clearly a land of shires in 1066. The nonexistence of cornage in the latter area lessens the weight of this objection, and in an indirect way it suggests a solution to the problem. Most of the traditional discussions of cornage have concentrated on the question of what the nature of the due was which has inevitably involved a heavy reliance on late twelfth and thirteenth-century evidence. By this time, however, cornage had assumed different forms; and, not surprisingly, the fruits of this approach have been an ever lengthening list of definitions whose current major representatives are Jolliffe's idea that it was a pasture due analogous to pannage and Rees's theory that it was the equivalent of commorth, a Welsh cow tribute paid in lieu of old food renders.<sup>98</sup> The difficulty with such definitions is that they ignore an important aspect of the early evidence in their determination to elucidate the inner nature of the due. The only recent scholar to escape this error is Barrow who accepted Rees's position and further argued that cornage and the king of Scotland's cain were the same render.<sup>99</sup> This equation represents a major advance, whether it is true or not, because it emphasizes an important aspect of cornage

which usually is obscured in the discussion of thirteenth-century details and Celtic parallels: In its earliest appearances the cornage of northern England was a royal due. The first pipe roll, Henry I's for 1130, shows that cornage was paid to the king in Westmorland and Cumberland, and Henry II's rolls disclose that cornage was a royal due in Northumberland.<sup>100</sup> In Yorkshire and Lancashire, on the other hand, neither Henry I nor Henry II received cornage, and the sum which Henry I obtained from Durham in 1130 apparently came to him because he had custody of the temporalities of the bishopric, not as a royal right.<sup>101</sup> Furthermore, the situation was even more complex than this because there is contemporary evidence that Durham had paid cornage to the king at an earlier date in Henry I's reign, and later sources show that cornage payments were made in northern Lancashire and at Bowes despite the fact that they did not reach the king.<sup>102</sup> As it first appears, then, cornage was predominantly but not exclusively a royal due. It went to the king in the four northernmost counties. In Yorkshire and Lancashire it either did not exist or was found only on the manorial level. This distribution of the right to receive cornage is very curious for it corresponds with the northern limit of the geld in 1066. Most of Cumberland and Westmorland were not under the English king at that date, and Northumbria paid no geld. Yorkshire and Lancashire both did. This is surely significant and suggests that cornage was either an old Northumbrian tribute or perhaps even an ancient royal tribute of the North. It is difficult to tell for certain which it was because there is little evidence that it existed in Lothian.<sup>103</sup> If it did not, as seems most likely, this would suggest that cornage was imposed in the last half of the tenth century after Lothian



had been lost. In any case, this hypothesis explains its earliest names which were not "cornage" at all but rather the "geld of animals" or the "geld of cows" in the West and the "cornage of animals" in the East.<sup>104</sup> Cornage was the cow tax, not some primitive render attached to the bondage vills. Presumably it had been a general tribute above the Humber, but when the geld was laid on Yorkshire and Lancashire, it was either extinguished in these areas or became a manorial render. Free from the pressure of the geld, it survived in Northumbria and fell to the king when Rufus took over the earldom. Subsequently Henry I granted the cornage between the Tyne and the Tees to the bishop and monks of Durham.<sup>105</sup>

If this theory is correct, the absence of cornage in Yorkshire is only an indication that the Anglo-Saxon kings had more power there than in Northumbria, and the subject has no particular bearing on whether the soke and the shire were the same institution. In fact, the conclusion that they were the same seems inescapable. This means, in turn, that there is no basis for the assumption that Yorkshire was radically different from Northumbria and that its description in Domesday can be used to check Jolliffe's picture of society above the Tees. But with this determined, it becomes immediately obvious why it was necessary for him to create an institutional discontinuity between Northumbria and Yorkshire. The Yorkshire section of Domesday may not be a mine of information, but it is clear on a number of very basic things which reveal the limitations of Jolliffe's attempt to construct a picture of Northumbrian society from a selective use of late peasant custom. Three things stand out. First, the peasantry of Yorkshire was divided into the three usual classes of eastern England, sokemen, villeins, and borders,<sup>106</sup> and this



makes it very unlikely that Jolliffe's assumption that the Northumbrian peasantry consisted only of "bonders" before 1066 is correct. There is no reason why the class divisions which existed in Yorkshire should have stopped at the Tees. Second, Yorkshire was also the home of a numerous class of landowners who ranged in importance from very great nobles to quite humble men with only a few bovates each. And although these men cannot be counted or the extent of their holdings computed except in a few cases due to the way in which their names were recorded in Domesday,<sup>107</sup> it is still clear that Jolliffe's elusive "lord of the shire" finds only a few peers among them. Third, despite the equation of soke and shire, one cannot say that Yorkshire in 1066 lay under the shire system as Jolliffe pictured it in Northumbria. Sokes there are. The incidents of peasant custom clearly have their origin and rationale in the shire. But the great territorial sokes stand out like islands in a sea of smaller holdings; they do not cover the shire from border to border as Jolliffe would have the shires do above the Tees. The intervening spaces are filled with all sizes of smaller sokes, some of which contain nothing more than a village with perhaps a single berewick or an attached piece of sokeland, and there are also many holdings which consist of only a single village or of part of a village with no dependent berewicks or sokelands. In terms of percentages, the sokes (the linked entries of the geographers) account for 64 percent of the entries in Yorkshire; the single holdings amount to 36 percent.<sup>108</sup> In other words, although the soke is characteristic of landholding in Yorkshire, it varied in size and shared the countryside with a large minority of unitary holdings. The latter and the smaller sokes are explicable in terms of a decayed and

fragmented shire system, but they do not conform to the primitive simplicity of landholding which Jolliffe claimed existed in Northumbria before the Normans "truncated" the shires. Rather, they show that Northumbrian landholding had become complex long before 1066 and that the lands beyond the Tees had not remained some sort of game preserve for a timeless Anglo-Celtic society.

Jolliffe himself seems to have gotten the concept of Northumbria as a land of large shires from Domesday's description of Lancashire as confirmed by the western portion of the early thirteenth-century Inquest of Knights.<sup>109</sup> These do indeed show that above the Ribble the vill was the basis of society and that these vills were grouped together in large shires which covered the countryside. Earl Tostig's pre-Conquest manor of Preston in Amounderness had contained some sixty-two dependent villages, and his estate of Halton further north had included twenty-two dependent villages. Other manors in the area in 1066 contained twenty-seven, sixteen, and fourteen villages, and holdings made up of a single village or part of a village seem to be entirely absent.<sup>110</sup> These shires of northern Lancashire were truly "princely" shires, and apparently the five hundreds south of the Ribble, which belonged almost entirely to the king, were similar units.<sup>111</sup> The West was, then, full of large constellations of villages which belonged mainly either to the king or the earl and which provided Jolliffe's model. Yet it is doubtful if they were anything more than a local phenomenon. It was shown earlier that Lancashire with the adjoining parts of Westmorland and Cumberland was a late conquest from the kingdom of Strathclyde, and the pattern of landholding which existed there in 1066 is just what one

would expect to find in a recently conquered area. Arrangements were simple, and the claims of the king were still strong. Furthermore, it might be hazarded that if primitive simplicity existed anywhere in Britain in 1066 south of the Highlands of Scotland, the lands of the old kingdom of Strathclyde were the place to find it.

There exists no warrant whatsoever to carry groupings of this size over the mountains as the normal form of tenurial pattern, but this is exactly what Jolliffe did.<sup>112</sup> He explained the smaller shires which appear in Northumbrian documents of the twelfth and thirteenth century as "truncated" fragments of large shires which had existed in 1066 and which had been universal at that date.<sup>113</sup> Furthermore, he ignored any evidence which indicated that Northumbrian society had become complex before 1066 and was similar to Yorkshire. The process through which the bishops of Durham acquired their estates, for instance, is known to a certain extent and could only in the short run have brought diversity to the shires between the Tees and the Tyne. Aside from three royal grants which apparently consisted of a full shire each or of several shires, the bishops were granted villages and small groups of villages by the local nobility, and they purchased groups of villages from the various Scandinavian kings of York and Durham. Some of the estates which were given to them by nobles had been originally purchased by the nobles, and the bishops further complicated the system of landholding by "leasing" assemblages of villages to members of the Northumbrian nobility.<sup>114</sup> In one notable case, a bishop even gave away a number of estates with his daughter in marriage; and, although the marriage did not last, several of the villages became hereditary possessions of the woman's descendants



by a later husband.<sup>115</sup> Transactions of this sort are incompatible with the social system which Jolliffe posited in Northumbria. There is no mention of them in his discussion of Northumbrian society, nor did he consider the peasant groups which existed in Durham in the twelfth century. Boldon Book shows that they were divided into the three broad classes of molmen (firmars), bonders (villeins), and cottars. The similarities between the bonders, the most numerous class, and the villeins of Yorkshire were pointed out earlier, and it seems that a like identification can be made between the molmen and the sokemen. Molmen were perhaps former freemen; certainly they were distinct from the Anglo-Norman firmars with whom they have usually been confused.<sup>116</sup> They were not essentially rent-payers like the latter. Several villages were populated exclusively by molmen, and in a number of others they constituted a normal segment of the peasant population alongside the bonders and cottars.<sup>117</sup> These men held bovates and performed agricultural services which were usually lighter than those of the villeins and were remarkably like those done by some of the sokemen in Yorkshire.<sup>118</sup> Jolliffe seems to have thought that the creation of these peasant groups above the Tees had occurred after 1066,<sup>119</sup> but given the parallels between the molmen and bonders of Durham and the sokemen and villeins of Yorkshire, this is quite doubtful.

In the face of these considerations, it must be concluded that his picture of northern society was over simplified. His work on peasant custom seems to be sound. But the shires had been "truncated," and social diversity had developed long before 1066. Had Domesday reached to the Tweed, it would probably have disclosed a society much like the



one which existed in Yorkshire. Northumbria would have appeared poorer, no doubt. Perhaps its villages would have been divided between different lords less frequently than those in Yorkshire,<sup>120</sup> but the same social groups and the same basic patterns of landholding would have appeared. Were it not for the difficulties introduced into the study of English institutions by the Danes, this conclusion would have been worked out long ago on the basis of the general similarity between the soke and the shire. That this was not done has been unfortunate. The institutional structure of the North has been obscured by attempts to divine patterns of ethnic institutions, and the actual indications concerning the evolution of northern society which lie in the shire fragments have been ignored except by Jolliffe.

These fragments, in fact, provide important hints respective to the evolution of the North's institutions. It is curious, for instance, that Jolliffe's three clearest examples of shires, the Norham-Islandshire complex, Bedlingtonshire, and Heighingtonshire, all belonged to the Church. This was evidently not the result of the fact that the Church was the only known pre-Conquest landowner to survive the Conquest above the Tees for the same pattern is observable in Yorkshire. In 1066 the great territorial sokes belonged almost exclusively to the king, the Church, and the men who had been earls, were earls, or could be expected to become earls. This is suspicious, and it is matched by another singular phenomenon. By the time of Boldon Book, Heighingtonshire and Bedlingtonshire both consisted of six villages. Two examples, of course, are not very significant, and Norhamshire only comprised ten villages at this time.<sup>121</sup> But a later survey which includes Islandshire with

Northhamshire sets the figure for both at either twenty-four or twenty-six.<sup>122</sup>

If the true number was the former, one might guess that a shire consisted of either six or twelve villages; and, somewhat surprisingly, this figure can be confirmed. All that is necessary is enough encouragement to begin the tedious work of counting villages. When Cnut gave Staindrop cum suis appendiciis to St. Cuthbert, it consisted of twelve vills and was presumably a shire. The lands which Bishop Aldhun "leased" to three earls contained twenty-four villages, and Athelstan's gift of South Wearmouth was made up of twelve vills. Even earlier (900-915), Bishop Cutheard "leased" Easington with either eleven or twelve vills to a noble.<sup>123</sup> These examples show that the Northumbrian shire was probably a unit of twelve vills or its multiple, but the truly amazing thing is that this unit did not stop at the Tees. If one goes to the trouble to count the berewicks and sokelands of the large territorial sokes in Yorkshire, the same number appears with majestic regularity.<sup>124</sup>

TABLE 2

## The Composition of Large Territorial Sokes in Yorkshire

Soke	Berewicks	Sokelands	Total	Holder TRE
Aldborough	3	8	12	King Edward
Easingwold	1	10	12	Earl Morcar
Falsgrave	1	21	23	Tostig
Grindleton	12	-	13	Earl Tostig
Howden	-	24	25	King Edward
Kilnsea	-	11	12	Morcar
Kirkby Moorside	4	8	13	Orm
Knaresborough	11	-	12	King Edward
Lofthouse	-	12	13	Earl Siward

TABLE 2--Continued

Soke	Berewicks	Sokelands	Total	Holder TRE
Mappleton	-	11	12	Morcar
Northallerton	11	24	36	Earl Edwin
Pickering	4	18	23	Morcar
Ripon	16	7 or 8	23 or 24	Abp. of York
Sherburn	[23]	-	[24]	Abp. of York
Tanshelf	5?	6?	12	King Edward
Wakefield	9 or 9	14 or 38	24 or 48	King Edward
Weaverthorpe	3	8	12	Abp. of York
Whitby	1	11	13	Earl Siward
Withernsea	-	11	12	Morcar

This list is not all inclusive. There were several large sokes which do not fit the pattern such as Coinisborough (28) and Gilling (31), and the smaller sokes based on the unit of six have been left out.<sup>125</sup> But there are enough examples here to show that the big sokes of Yorkshire were based on the unit of twelve.

This is an interesting discovery. Numerologists can be expected to have their own suggestions on its meaning, but its significance probably reaches no further than the mundane fact that there are twelve months in the year, and that this would seem a natural unit to an agricultural people. Twelve villages made a shire above the Tees. A soke center with eleven berewicks and sokelands made a soke in Yorkshire. The berewicks and sokelands were not always complete vills in 1086. But they usually were, and the exceptions probably had been in the past. The unit of twelve villages was evidently very ancient. Both Ripon and the Norham-Islandshire complex were pre-Danish possessions of the Church. Neither the tax assessment for the Danegeld, the carucates, nor the specifics of landlord right, the berewicks and sokelands, bear any clear relationship

to it in Yorkshire. They play across the face of the units of twelve in an arbitrary fashion which bespeaks the needs and judgments of later ages. The unit itself is probably a relic of the days when taxation went by the village. In Durham this system survived in a number of villages into the late twelfth century, and Jolliffe has argued convincingly that assessment by the village had once been the rule. The principal and oldest burden which lay upon the villages was, of course, the system of renders in kind and the hospitality dues,<sup>126</sup> the English equivalent of the Scottish cain and coneveh, and the grouping of villages in units of twelve had in all likelihood been connected with this system. Such groups may have been the basis for seasonal progresses through the kingdom four times a year with a stop of, say, three days in each shire to eat the food and dispense justice. Alternately, they could have provided the court a regular supply of food in conjunction with the carting dues which lay upon the villages. Other arrangements would also have been possible, but it is the general insight into the early function of the shire which is important.

Originally the shires had been nothing more than arbitrary administrative districts of the royal support system of the Northumbrian kingdom. They were the mechanism through which food and (later?) customary labor were extracted from the peasantry for the support of the king and his warriors, and they were not originally "Celtic principalities," although they might have been "Celtic" administrative units which the Northumbrians took over as the basis of their kingdom. Davis has argued that the sokelands of East Anglia were a relic of a pre-hundredal royal support system,<sup>127</sup> and the Northumbrian shires were probably analogous



units. Above the Tees, the power of the kings of Wessex was never great enough to impose the hundred or the wapentake, and the old shires persisted in altered form down to the High Middle Ages. In Yorkshire, however, the new institutions were introduced presumably after the destruction of the Norwegian kingdom, and the shires of the area lost their judicial functions. They had also, it seems, been renamed "sokes" by the Danes, but this was not a very serious change, although it has clouded the issue. Later in Scandinavia, sokn meant "parish" which was, of course, exactly what the shires had been in an ecclesiastical sense.<sup>128</sup> Furthermore, the original nature of the Northumbrian shire was curiously enough not forgotten in Yorkshire. There are occasional examples from after 1066 of wapentakes being called "shires."<sup>129</sup>

If this explanation of the shire is correct, it has important implications concerning the manorial structure of the North. Under the system of landholding and rights which first appear in Yorkshire in 1066 and are later explained in more detail for the North generally, the king received the old renders and works, which had characterized the shire system, from the great sokes and smaller estates of the royal demesne. Perhaps the sokes held by the earls should also be considered part of the ancient demesne, but on the lands of the Church and the nobility these same renders and works went to the landowner, not to the king. They had been submerged to the manorial level: The right to exact them from the peasants constituted the normal prerogative of the landowner in the North. In a very real sense, these rights were the manor between the Humber and the Tweed, and the work of Eric John on the land tenure of early Anglo-Saxon England explains how this had come to be. He would

define the grant of an estate as Bookland, not as the grant of the land of the estate itself, but as the grant of the right to collect the royal feorm which the peasants owed the king. These grants were made in perpetuity and originally only went to the Church. By Bede's time, however, the nobility, which had hitherto only had a life interest in estates, began to obtain Bookland, and this type of tenure later became the common way in which land was held.<sup>130</sup> The significance of this subject lies in the fact that the Northumbrian feorm must have consisted of the dues and services produced by the shires. If this identification is correct, grants of Bookland provided the mechanism by which the old royal rights of the shire devolved to the landlords of the Northumbrian kingdom and became the basic manorial rights of the North.

This hypothesis does two important things. First, it provides a theoretical background for the landholding patterns of Yorkshire in 1066. The original grants of Bookland were probably shires or simple parts of one. Over time, however, the normal mechanisms of Anglo-Saxon land transfer, buying and selling, division among heirs, and gifts to the Church in addition to seizure by the Vikings in Yorkshire and Durham would produce the complex and fragmented estates of all sizes which the nobility held in 1066.<sup>131</sup> The Church, on the other hand, neither divided nor sold, although it was sometimes robbed, so that its shires endured much longer than those of the nobility, and the great sokes of the king and the earls were unalienated sections of the old shire system. The smaller estates held by the king and the Church were obtained from the nobility by donation, purchase, and forfeiture for sin in the case of the latter, and presumably by confiscation in the case of the king.<sup>132</sup>

Second, this hypothesis partially explains why the comparisons of Northumbrian, Welsh, and Scottish customs tend to be inexact. In the early Middle Ages, functionally similar royal support systems had existed in all three areas, but their development over time was very different. The Welsh system lasted intact into the thirteenth century still providing the Welsh princes with food, lodging, and local police. In Northumbria, the shire system was submerged to the manorial level by Bookland except on the royal demesne and came to support the nobility and the Church instead of the king. Subsequently, new burdens, the king's three works and the geld, were imposed upon Yorkshire, and there are vague traces from after the Conquest that the Northumbrian earls had created a similar system for Northumbria which consisted of army service, fortress repair, and cornage.<sup>133</sup> The Scottish system met a rather different fate. Like the one in Wales, it lasted into the twelfth and thirteenth centuries although its character had changed by this time. The kings still received their cain and coneveh, but the Scots who did not develop a tenure comparable to Bookland had achieved the same end by other means. The thanes and earls, theoretically officials of the king, had in fact become hereditary, and they each took a "cut" (cuit) of the renders which in a diminished form eventually reached the king. Thus the Scottish royal support system maintained both the king and the nobility by the twelfth century.<sup>134</sup> Given these different histories, it is quite understandable why the comparisons which were discussed earlier are often misleading. Such a method of institutional investigation is possible, but future attempts will have to be considerably more sophisticated since, even if it is assumed that these three systems were once

similar, their divergence was very early. Moreover, there is only very slender evidence that the systems really had a common origin and were not the result of the "parallel growth" which Jolliffe thought so unlikely. The latter is not an impossibility. Finally, the question of the Anglo-Saxon feorm must be taken into consideration. In particular, it will have to be determined whether the shire system of Northumbria was really unique in Anglo-Saxon England or whether its outlines are only clearer because of the backwardness of the North.

In conclusion, one very dark subject remains. It seems certain that northern society was far more complex in 1066 than Jolliffe thought and that the existence of Bookland in the North was a major cause of this complexity. The latter was also responsible, in part, for the institutional divergence of the North from Scotland and Wales, but it does not completely explain landholding as it existed at the time of Domesday Book. In his early work on landholding in the Danelaw, Stenton found that estates were divided between two types of land, inland and sokeland. The former comprised lands described in Domesday as being manors or berewicks and meant that the soil belonged to the lord of the estate. Sokeland, on the other hand, was owned by the person who occupied it, presumably a sokeman, and the lord only had jurisdiction over this land.<sup>135</sup> One might, of course, take issue with this generalized concept of jurisdiction and say instead that the sokemen paid the old royal dues to the lord of the estate, but this does not abolish the distinction between inland, the origin of which is uncertain, and sokeland, which was Bookland. Nor was this distinction in its essence the result of some formula imposed on the Danelaw by the Normans. One may suspect



that Domesday's employment of the term "inland" represented a southern usage, but the same categories were used in a pre-Conquest survey of some estates of the archbishop of York. The survey was made ca. 1030 and covers the sokes of Ripon, Otley, and Sherburn. It seems to be based on the assumption that the lands of these estates were either agenland or socnland. Agenland, moreover, apparently consisted of inlande (demesne land in the strict sense?) and werocland, a term otherwise unknown.<sup>136</sup> The distinction between agenland and socnland would seem to be the same as Domesday's distinction between inland and sokeland, or the distinction between inland and gesette land found in the Tidenham survey which has recently been discussed by J. F. McGovern. He thought that the gesette land was property held only by Bookright and that inland was held by some inferior tenure as well.<sup>137</sup> This may be true, but one wonders if the emphasis is correct. From Bookland a lord received soke, the royal dues. Stenton thought that a lord actually owned his inland, the pre-Conquest agenland or the "land which belonged to the hall" in a variant formula of Domesday.<sup>138</sup> If this explanation is right, and it certainly seems to be, then one would suppose that a lord would have a great deal more control over and profit from this sort of land. Furthermore, there is a strong possibility that the differences between peasants were somehow correlated with these tenures. In two instances Domesday gives the TRE population of sokes in Yorkshire. In Northallerton and its berewicks there were 66 villeins in 1066, and its sokelands were populated by 116 sokemen. At Falsgrave, the other example, the population of the inland is not given, but it is recorded that there were 108 sokemen on the sokeland.<sup>139</sup> If these two entries are representative,

one could conclude that villeins lived on inland and sokemen on sokeland. Such a conclusion would be a major step towards bringing the discussion of Anglo-Saxon land law into contact with the social structure of the kingdom, but it can only be stated as a possibility. One and a half examples are not enough to prove it; and, in any case, there remains the question of inland itself. Was it some old secondary tenure, as old or older than Bookland, or was it a new development, an intensive form of noble ownership which had emerged in the tenth century, perhaps connected with sake and soke?

## CHAPTER III

<sup>1</sup>F. W. Maitland, "Northumbrian Tenures," EHR, V (1890), 625-33; Jolliffe, "Northumbrian Institutions," pp. 1-42; F. M. Stenton, "Types of Manorial Structure in the Northern Danelaw," in Oxford Studies in Social and Legal History, ed. P. Vinogradoff, II (Oxford, 1910), 1-93; idem, "The Danes in England," pp. 203-46; Preparatory to Anglo-Saxon England, ed. D. M. Stenton, pp. vii-xiv, for a bibliography of his works; Barrow, "Northern English Society," pp. 1-28; Rees, "Ancient Celtic Custom," pp. 148-68. See also G. W. S. Barrow, The Kingdom of the Scots: Government, Church, and Society from the Eleventh to the Fourteenth Century (London, 1973), pp. 7-68. This book is principally a collection of his previously published articles, but its first chapter ("Pre-feudal Scotland: shires and thanes") is a new discussion of many of the questions investigated in the following pages. Regrettably, it appeared too late to be utilized in the composition of this chapter. Its importance is such, however, that occasional references to it have been added to the notes.

<sup>2</sup>For the most blatant examples of this approach, see Rees, "Ancient Celtic Custom," pp. 148-68, and G. R. J. Jones, "Basic Patterns of Settlement Distribution in Northern England," Advancement of Science, XVIII (1961), 192-200.

<sup>3</sup>Maitland, "Northumbrian Tenures," p. 632; idem, Domesday Book and Beyond (Cambridge, 1897), pp. 308-309.

<sup>4</sup>Stenton, "The Northern Danelaw," p. 4.

<sup>5</sup>Jolliffe, "Northumbrian Institutions," p. 4.

<sup>6</sup>See ibid., pp. 31, 42.

<sup>7</sup>Ibid., pp. 2, 5.

<sup>8</sup>Ibid., pp. 4-11, 14.

<sup>9</sup>Ibid., pp. 2, 5, 12-14, 31-32, 36-37.

<sup>10</sup>Ibid., pp. 6-8, 10-11, 14.

<sup>11</sup>Ibid., p. 5.

<sup>12</sup>Ibid., pp. 15-25.

<sup>13</sup>For a discussion of the legal position of the northern border see ibid., pp. 38-40; and Barrow, "Northern English Society," pp. 12-13.

<sup>14</sup>Jolliffe, "Northumbrian Institutions," pp. 2, 40-42.

- <sup>15</sup> Ibid., pp. 24-26.
- <sup>16</sup> Ibid., pp. 25-29.
- <sup>17</sup> Barrow, "Northern English Society," p. 17.
- <sup>18</sup> R. B. Smith, Blackburnshire: A Study in Early Lancashire History (Leicester University, Department of English Local History, Occasional Papers, No. 15; Leicester, 1961).
- <sup>19</sup> Jolliffe, "Northumbrian Institutions," pp. 20, 40-42.
- <sup>20</sup> Rees, "Ancient Celtic Custom," pp. 153-68; Barrow, "Northern English Society," pp. 9-17.
- <sup>21</sup> Jolliffe, "Northumbrian Institutions," pp. 40-41.
- <sup>22</sup> G. R. J. Jones, "The Tribal System in Wales: A Re-assessment in the Light of Settlement Studies, Welsh History Review, I (1961), 111-32; idem, "Settlement Distribution in Northern England," pp. 194-96.
- <sup>23</sup> For a discussion, see S. Applebaum, "Roman Britain," in Vol. I.II of The Agrarian History of England and Wales, ed. H. P. R. Finberg (Cambridge, 1972), pp. 264-65.
- <sup>24</sup> W. F. Skene, Celtic Scotland: a History of Ancient Alban (3 vols., 2nd ed.; Edinburgh, 1886-90), III, 281. See his comment on thanage.
- <sup>25</sup> Jolliffe, "Northumbrian Institutions," pp. 30-31; Barrow, "Northern English Society," p. 18; idem, "Rural Settlement in Central and Eastern Scotland: The Medieval Evidence," Scottish Studies, VI (1962), 124-25. The services of the peasants at Fishwick and at Kelso were both recorded in the late thirteenth century. The Priory of Coldingham, ed. J. Raine (Surtees Society, Vol. XII; Durham, 1841) p. lxxxvii; Liber S. Marie de Calchou, 1113-1567, ed. C. Innes (2 vols., Bannatyne Club; Edinburgh, 1846), II, 461. The principal difference between these services and those found south of the Tweed is the apparent absence of grain renders and cornage at Fishwick and Kelso.
- <sup>26</sup> The Acts of Malcolm IV: King of Scots, 1153-1165, ed. G. W. S. Barrow, Vol. I of the Regesta Regum Scottorum (Edinburgh, 1960), p. 46; idem, "Northern English Society," p. 18. See also idem, The Kingdom of Scots, pp. 28-68, for an extended discussion of these points.
- <sup>27</sup> Idem, "Northern English Society," pp. 18-22.
- <sup>28</sup> Ibid., p. 22.
- <sup>29</sup> Ibid., pp. 18, 20, 22-23. In his most recent discussion of this question, Barrow seems to accept this theory, The Kingdom of Scots, pp. 13, 25, 64.



<sup>30</sup>This is a rather curious subject because it is very hard to see why Barrow chose the cain of southwestern Scotland as representative of cain in general. In this area it was predominantly a livestock render, idem, "Northern English Society," pp. 18-19; but in eastern Scotland this was not the case. Throughout the oldest part of the kingdom the cain generally consisted of oats, malt, and cheese in addition to hides and tallow. See RRS, I, Nos. 57, 118, 195, 243, 245. It is possible that Barrow was encouraged to generalize the cain of the Southwest by his identification of certain livestock renders which the king received in Lothian and the Merse with cain, but this identification is utterly conjectural. These renders are never connected with cain in the charters, The Acts of William I: King of Scots, 1165-1214, ed. G. W. S. Barrow, Vol. II of the Regesta Regum Scottorum (Edinburgh, 1971), p. 52.

<sup>31</sup>See Jolliffe, "Northumbrian Institutions," pp. 10-11.

<sup>32</sup>See RRS, II, 52; Skene, Celtic Scotland, III, 228-29.

<sup>33</sup>Both Jolliffe, "Northumbrian Institutions," p. 11; and Barrow, "Northern English Society," p. 15, speak as if waiting were a common obligation in Northumbria; but, in fact, their evidence for its existence is very limited. In particular, it is mentioned only four times in Boldon Book, "Text to the Boldon Book," ed. G. T. Lapsley, in The Victoria History of the County of Durham, ed. W. Page, I (London, 1905), 227.

<sup>34</sup>Rees, "Ancient Celtic Custom," pp. 157-58, 166 map.

<sup>35</sup>For a discussion of this subject see Stenton, "The Danes in England," pp. 233-36. Cf. G. R. J. Jones, "Early Territorial Organization in Northern England and Its Bearing on the Scandinavian Settlement," in The Fourth Viking Congress, ed. A. Small (Aberdeen University Studies, No. 149; Edinburgh, 1967), pp. 67-70.

<sup>36</sup>Documents Illustrative of the Social and Economic History of the Danelaw, ed. F. M. Stenton (Records of the Social and Economic History of England and Wales, Vol. V; London, 1920), pp. cix-cx.

<sup>37</sup>Ibid., p. cx.

<sup>38</sup>Stenton, "The Danes in England," p. 218.

<sup>39</sup>Ibid., p. 233.

<sup>40</sup>Ibid., pp. 217-18.

<sup>41</sup>Ibid.

<sup>42</sup>Jolliffe, "Northumbrian Institutions," p. 42.

- <sup>43</sup>J. E. A. Jolliffe, "The Era of the Folk in English History," in Oxford Essays in Medieval History Presented to Herbert Edward Salter, ed. F. M. Powicke (Oxford, 1934), pp. 18-19.
- <sup>44</sup>Ibid.
- <sup>45</sup>Ibid., pp. 19-26, he argued that the Danes were not responsible for the assessment of Yorkshire in ploughlands, and this theory, which may well be correct, has attracted little notice.
- <sup>46</sup>P. H. Sawyer, "The Density of the Danish Settlement in England," University of Birmingham Historical Journal, VI (1958), 1-17. See Jones, "The Scandinavian Settlement," pp. 70-71; and H. P. R. Finberg, "Anglo-Saxon England to 1042," in Vol. I.II of The Agrarian History of England, ed. idem, p. 469; G. Jones, A History of the Vikings (London, 1968), p. 218, n.
- <sup>47</sup>The Kalendar of Abbot Samson of Bury St. Edwards, ed. R. H. C. Davis (Camden Society, 3rd Ser., Vol. LXXXIV; London, 1954), p. xl.
- <sup>48</sup>Ibid., pp. xxx-xxxvii.
- <sup>49</sup>Ibid., pp. xlvi-xlvii.
- <sup>50</sup>Ibid., pp. xlv-xlvii.
- <sup>51</sup>Ibid., p. xlvi.
- <sup>52</sup>See K. Cameron, "Scandinavian Settlement in the Territory of the Five Boroughs: The Place-Name Evidence Part III, the Grimston-Hybrids," in England Before the Conquest: Studies in Primary Sources Presented to Dorothy Whitelock, ed. P. Clemons and K. Hughes (Cambridge, 1971), pp. 147-64.
- <sup>53</sup>Jones, "The Scandinavian Settlement," pp. 77-79; idem, "Settlement Distribution in Northern England," pp. 196-200.
- <sup>54</sup>See Applebaum, "Roman Britain," pp. 48-55, 264-65.
- <sup>55</sup>Jones, "The Scandinavian Settlement," pp. 76-83.
- <sup>56</sup>Ibid., pp. 83-84. Cf. Cameron, "The Grimston-Hybrids," pp. 162-63.
- <sup>57</sup>Stenton, "The Danes in England," p. 210, n.
- <sup>58</sup>L. Musset, Les invasions: le second assaut contre l'Europe chrétienne (Paris, 1965), pp. 253-60. Barrow completely rejects the theory that soke were Danish, The Kingdom of Scots, pp. 27, 56.

- <sup>59</sup>Early Yorkshire Charters, ed. W. Farrer and C. T. Clay (10 vols., Yorkshire Archaeological Society Record Series, Extra Series, In progress; Edinburgh, 1913-55), II, viii.
- <sup>60</sup>Records of the Templars in England in the Twelfth Century: The Inquest of 1185 . . ., ed. B. A. Lees (Records of the Social and Economic History of England and Wales, Vol. IX; London, 1935), pp. 117-18.
- <sup>61</sup>Ibid., pp. 118, 123-24, 126.
- <sup>62</sup>Yorkshire Inquisitions, ed. W. Brown (3 vols., Yorkshire Archaeological and Topographical Association, Record Series, Vols. XII, XXIII, XXXI; Leeds, 1891-1902), I, Nos. LIV, LVI, CXXXI.
- <sup>63</sup>See T. M. A. Bishop, "The Distribution of Manorial Demesne in the Vale of York," EHR, XLIX (1934), 386-406.
- <sup>64</sup>Jolliffe, "Northumbrian Institutions," p. 31.
- <sup>65</sup>YI, I, 4, and No. LIV.
- <sup>66</sup>Ibid.
- <sup>67</sup>Kirkby's Inquest, ed. R. H. Skaife (Surtees Society, Vol. XLIX; Durham, 1867), pp. 411, 435-37.
- <sup>68</sup>Jolliffe, "Northumbrian Institutions," p. 31, n. 4; Calendar of Inquisitions Post Mortem, ed. J. E. E. Sharp, III (Public Record Office; London, 1912), 472-73; YI, III, No. LXXXV.
- <sup>69</sup>EYC, III, No. 1276.
- <sup>70</sup>Infra, pp. 212, 272.
- <sup>71</sup>YI, I, No. CXXXI.
- <sup>72</sup>Ibid., No. CII.
- <sup>73</sup>Ibid., No. XLIII.
- <sup>74</sup>EYC, II, Nos. 883, 755, 712, 847.
- <sup>75</sup>Jolliffe, "Northumbrian Institutions," pp. 21-22, 25.
- <sup>76</sup>YI, I, Nos. LVI, LXXV; EYC, II, No. 980.
- <sup>77</sup>Infra, pp. 289-90.
- <sup>78</sup>Kirkby's Inquest, p. 411; Domesday Book, seu liber censualis Willelmi Primi . . ., ed. H. Ellis, I (Record Commission; London, 1816), fol. 303b.

<sup>79</sup>YI, I, No. XLV; Domesday, fol. 315.

<sup>80</sup>Ibid., fol. 299; YI, I, No. XLIII.

<sup>81</sup>EYC, II, No. 883; Domesday, fol. 305.

<sup>82</sup>Kirkby's Inquest, pp. 435-37; Domesday, fol. 303b.

<sup>83</sup>Calendar of Inquisitions Post Mortem, III, 472-73; Domesday, fols. 299b-300, 301b; YI, III, No. LXXXV.

<sup>84</sup>Domesday, fol. 298. Barrow tries to forestall this objection by equating sokemen and drengs, The Kingdom of Scots, pp. 14-15, 27; but this theory is incorrect.

<sup>85</sup>Domesday, fols. 269b-70.

<sup>86</sup>Ibid., fols. 269b, 298b.

<sup>87</sup>Ibid., fols. 300-301b. The figure of 328 manors was reached by counting the manors listed in the text. Sokeland was excluded from the count as was material from the summary which Farrer added to the text.

<sup>88</sup>Ibid., fol. 269b.

<sup>89</sup>Ibid., fols. 300-301b. The values are given for 149 of the 328 manors. In 132 cases (88.6%) the relationship between the value and the number of ploughlands is expressed by one of the ratios mentioned in the text or by simple multiples and fractions of these ratios:

Value per ploughland	Number of instances	Value	Number	Value	Number
3s.4d.	2	2s.6d.	1	11d.	1
6s.8d.	19	5s.	20	3s.	2
13s.4d.	6	10s.	37	6s.	5
2s.	2	15s.	6	12s.	1
4s.	4	20s.	20	2s.8d.	1
8s.	7	30s.	1	3s.2d.	1
16s.	2	40s.	2	5s.8d.	1
32s.	4			7s.6d.	2
				8s.4d.	1
				11s.5d.	1

<sup>90</sup>Farrer, "Introduction to the Yorkshire Domesday," p. 147.

<sup>91</sup>Grain renders are recorded at Drax and at Buttercrambe, YI, I, Nos. CVII, CXXXI. Cougeld was paid in the fee of Bowes castle, ibid., No. CXXX.



- <sup>92</sup>Chronica Monasterii de Melsa . . . Auctore Thoma de Burton, ed. E. A. Bond (3 vols., Rolls Series, Vol. XLIII; London, 1866-68), II, 236; EYC, I, 95, n.
- <sup>93</sup>Jolliffe, "Northumbrian Institutions," pp. 11-12.
- <sup>94</sup>See Chronica de Melsa, I, lxx-lxxxii.
- <sup>95</sup>EYC, I, 141, n.
- <sup>96</sup>Ibid., Nos. 97, 99, 166, 176; II, No. 1196.
- <sup>97</sup>The Danes in Normandy seem to have maintained many of the old Carolingian fiscal exactions, see Musset, Les invasions, pp. 253-54.
- <sup>98</sup>Jolliffe, "Northumbrian Institutions," p. 14; Rees, "Ancient Celtic Custom," pp. 160-62. The literature on cornage is extensive. In addition to the work of Jolliffe and Rees, the following discussions are relevant: Barrow, "Northern English Society," pp. 14-15, 18-20; G. T. Lapsley, "Cornage and Drengage," AHR, IX (1904), 670-95; Maitland, "Northumbrian Tenures," pp. 625-33; N. Neilson, "Customary Rents," in Oxford Studies, ed. Vinogradoff, II, 120-24; R. R. Reid, "Barony and Thanage," EHR, XXXV (1920), 185-87; J. H. Round, The Commune of London (Westminster, 1899), pp. 278-89; J. Wilson, "Introduction to the Cumberland Domesday," in The Victoria History of the County of Cumberland, ed. idem, I (London, 1901), 312-26.
- <sup>99</sup>Barrow, "Northern English Society," pp. 14-15, 18-20, 22. Actually this identification is not new. Reid equated cain and cornage in 1920, "Barony and Thanage," p. 185; and Wilson apparently thought something similar in 1901, "Introduction to the Cumberland Domesday," pp. 315-16.
- <sup>100</sup>Magnum Rotulum Scaccarii, Vel Magnum Rotulum Pipae De Anno Tricesimo-Primo Regni Henrici Primi, ed. J. Hunter (Record Commission; n.p., 1833), pp. 141, 143; Barrow, "Northern English Society," p. 15, n. 59.
- <sup>101</sup>Ibid., n. 60; Pipe Roll of 31 Henry I, p. 131.
- <sup>102</sup>Barrow, "Northern English Society," p. 15; YI, I, No. CXXX. Coumale and betincou were paid at Skerton, Lancashire Inquests, Extents, and Feudal Aids, ed. W. Farrer (3 vols., The Record Society of Lancashire and Cheshire, Vols. XLVIII, LIV, LXX; Liverpool, 1903-1915), I, No. CXLIII. For similar payments at Overton and Singleton, see ibid., No. LXXVII; II, No. XCVI; III, No. CCXXII.
- <sup>103</sup>Barrow, "Northern English Society," p. 18.
- <sup>104</sup>Regesta Henrici Primi, ed. C. Johnson and H. A. Cronne, Vol. II of the Regesta Regum Anglo-Normannorum (Oxford, 1956), No. 1491; Pipe

- Roll of 31 Henry I, pp. 131, 141, 143. Neilson suggested that cornage was a royal render co-ordinate with the geld or the Northumbrian equivalent of the geld, "Customary Rents," pp. 120-22; but this attractive hypothesis is probably not correct since cornage was found as a manorial payment in Lancashire where the geld was paid in 1066.
- 105 RRA-N, II, No. 1586, records Henry I granting the cornage of Bortona to the monks of Durham.
- 106 The Domesday Geography of Northern England, ed. H. C. Darby and I. S. Maxwell (Cambridge, 1962), p. 501.
- 107 Farrer, "Introduction to the Yorkshire Domesday," pp. 145-46.
- 108 R. W. Finn, Domesday Studies: The Norman Conquest and Its Effects on the Economy, 1066-86 (n.p.; 1971), p. 93.
- 109 Jolliffe, "Northumbrian Institutions," pp. 2-3.
- 110 Domesday, fols. 301b-302.
- 111 Ibid., fols. 269b-70.
- 112 Jolliffe, "Northumbrian Institutions," pp. 3-4.
- 113 Ibid., pp. 25-28.
- 114 E. Craster, "The Patrimony of St. Cuthbert," EHR, LXIX (1954), 188-96.
- 115 De Obsessione Dunelmi, pp. 215-20.
- 116 G. T. Lapsley, "Introduction to the Boldon Book," in The Victoria History of the County of Durham, ed. Page, I, 279-82; Lapsley, "Cornage and Drengage," p. 282. The clerks who wrote Boldon Book seem to have called the molmen "firmars." Molmen are mentioned once at Newton by Boldon. This entry comes near the beginning of the survey; thereafter firmars appear. They are burdened with the same type of services as the molmen and do not constitute a different peasant group, Boldon Book, p. 328.
- 117 Four villages, Newton by Boldon, Wardon, Morton, and Carlton, were inhabited exclusively by firmars, Boldon Book, pp. 328-29, 338. In seven vills, South Sherburn, Sedgfield, Norton, Stockton, Cokerton, Blackwell, and Redworth, they were found alongside villeins and cottars, ibid., pp. 330-31, 337-38, 340.
- 118 The labor services of sokemen generally receive little emphasis, probably because they complicate the usual picture of sokemen as free peasants. Actually, a favored legal position and labor services were not necessarily incompatible, and the thirteenth-century inquisitions

show that such obligations lay upon sokemen in Yorkshire. They are mentioned in general in the sokes of Snayth and Driffield, YI, I, Nos. XLV, LXXV; and are described in detail at Pocklington. Here the sokemen paid 20d. rent a year for each bovate and owed suit to their lord's mill and court. These are Stenton's "honorable" dues. They also, however, ploughed twice a year, harrowed two times, and hoed for one day. In autumn they did two boon-days, cut the hay for two days, and made two cartings, ibid., No. XLVIII. The curious thing about these obligations in the present context is that they have a remarkable parallel in the services of the firmars of Sedgefield in Durham:

Also there are. . .20 firmars, every man of whom holds three bovates and renders 5 shillings and ploughs and harrows half an acre, and finds 2 men for mowing 2 days, and the same number for raking and piling hay, and 1 cart for 2 days for carrying corn and hay in the same manner. And all the firmars do 4 boon-days in autumn with their entire household except the housewife. Boldon Book, p. 330.

The services of these firmars were nearly the same as those of the sokemen at Pocklington, and this suggests that the major difference between the Northumbrian firmar (molman) and the sokeman was a matter of names.

119 Jolliffe, "Northumbrian Institutions," pp. 4-5.

120 There does seem to be a notable tendency for villages granted to Durham to be undivided, see Historia de Sancto Cuthberto, pp. 208-13.

121 Boldon Book, pp. 331-32, 339-40.

122 Liber Feodorum: The Book of Fees Commonly Called Testa De Nevill, ed. H. C. M. Lyte, I (Public Record Office; London, 1920), 26-28. The difficulty in determining the correct number is due to the fact that, although 24 villages are listed, both Norham and Fenwick are not included.

123 Historia de Sancto Cuthberto, pp. 208, 211, 213.

124 Except for Howden, these figures are based on the text, not on the summary. They disagree with Farrer's figures, "Introduction to the Yorkshire Domesday," p. 147. He felt competent to adjudicate between the text and the summary, but this would seem to be a hazardous endeavor since the reasons why these two sections differed are unknown. Consequently the figures are based on either the text or the summary, and the two are not combined except for Wakefield. In the case of villages divided between a berewick and sokeland, each property has been counted separately.

The figures for three of the sokes require some comment. The text gives 24 places for Wakefield in the main entry describing the estate, Domesday, fol. 299b; but if the 18 other pieces of sokeland which are recorded only in the summary are combined with 4 properties whose status as sokeland or thaneland was uncertain and with 2 pieces of sokeland which were added after the conclusion of the main entry, then the total



would be 48, ibid., fols. 379b, 299b. Sherburn's berewicks are not named in either the text or the summary, but Farrer identified them as 23 places mentioned in later documents, ibid., p. 210, n. 4. Finally, Tanshelf is a problem. The main entry names only 4 places, ibid., fol. 316b; and the rest of the soke is described in isolated entries mixed with the rest of Ilbert's land. These would bring the total to 12 if two villages, Notone and Cevet, which seem to have been independent manors (each had a hall, the normal mark of manorial status in Yorkshire) are excluded, ibid., fol. 317.

125 Ibid., fols. 309, 321. They had been held respectively by Earl Harold and Earl Edwin.

126 Jolliffe, "Northumbrian Institutions," pp. 10-11.

127 The Kalendar of Abbot Samson, ed. Davis, pp. xxx, xliii-xliv, xlvi-xlvii. See Barrow, The Kingdom of Scots, p. 25, for a similar explanation.

128 Stenton, "The Danes in England," p. 216, n. 1.

129 EYC, II, viii. Caro wapentake was called Burgshire. Bulmer was called Bulmershire, and Craven, Cravenshire. Furthermore, the honor of Richmond was made up of Gillingshire and Langershire.

130 John, Orbis Britanniae, pp. 69-70, 104, 108, 114, 117.

131 Landholding had clearly become both fluid and complicated by 1066. In particular, the claims mention the case of Asa. She had been married to Bernulf but had held the lands which she had brought with her into the marriage so completely that he could not give them away, sell them, or forfeit them. Furthermore, when they separated, she kept her family lands. This example shows the reality of female inheritance in the North, and the prohibitions which limited Bernulf's control over her land suggest that the possibility of alienation was not unlikely. Domesday, fol. 373.

132 See Archbishop Oswald's survey of some of the lands of York, EHD, I, 521. At the end of the survey it is recorded that Archbishop Oscetel obtained Helperby and its soke "in compensation for illicit cohabitation," ibid.

133 Domesday, fol. 298. The question of the general burdens which lay across Northumbrian society is very obscure. No pre-Conquest documents show whether the king's three burdens existed above the Tees, but a charter from 1137 suggests that a similar system had been in force. In that year Edgar, son of Cospatric, confirmed a piece of land to Ralph de Merlay to be held in frank marriage freely exceptis tribus serviciis, videlicet cumunis excersitus in Comitatu, et cornagio, et comune opus castelli in Comitatu, Lapsley, "Cornage and Drengage," p. 679. Furthermore, sometime between 1139 and 1152, Earl Henry freed Tynemouth Priory



from work on the castle of Newcastle and from army and escort (?) service (quiti ab omni exercitu et equitatu), RRS, I, No. 28; see also No. 43.

<sup>134</sup>See K. Jackson, The Gaelic Notes in the Book of Deer (Cambridge, 1972), pp. 88-96, 117-22.

<sup>135</sup>Stenton, "The Northern Danelaw," pp. 11, 13, 14, 50.

<sup>136</sup>This survey is printed with a translation, notes, and bibliography in Anglo-Saxon Charters, ed. A. J. Robertson (2nd ed.; Cambridge, 1956), No. LXXXIV, and pp. 413-16.

<sup>137</sup>J. F. McGovern, "The Meaning of 'Gesette land' in Anglo-Saxon Land Tenure," Speculum, XLVI (1971), 590-91.

<sup>138</sup>Stenton, "The Northern Danelaw," p. 50.

<sup>139</sup>Domesday, fol. 299.

## CHAPTER IV

## THE RULE OF TOSTIG AND THE DESTRUCTION OF THE NOBLES OF YORK

In the North there is a unity to the fifteen years which follow 1055. The cohesiveness is provided by the somber theme of the breakdown of royal government above the Humber and the attendant rush of the northern thegns to destruction. The development and tragic dimensions of these events could perhaps have been captured in heroic verse, but no known saga-maker recorded the fate of the men of the North and the blindness which brought them to it. Only disjointed or partially informed chronicle accounts of these events survive, and the monks who wrote them were not able to explain in any detail what happened in the North. Their attention was fixed on the career of William the Conqueror. The way was thus opened to the conventional, William centered accounts of northern resistance to the Norman Conquest. Such reconstructions have their value, but with the life of William as their focus, they tend to isolate events in the North from each other and to obscure their meaning. This court-centered point of view creates its own system of causation and emphasizes the connection between the coming of the Normans and the outbreak of rebellion above the Humber.

The connection did, of course, exist, but the region-based narrative of the preceding chapters has established that royal government in the North was beset by serious problems long before 1066 and that Earl Siward did nothing to improve the situation. This chapter will show that an attempt was made to solve some of these problems on the governmental level in the decade from 1055 to 1065 and that this attempt not

only brought about the collapse of royal authority in the North by 1065 but also was largely responsible for northern resistance to the Norman Conquest. The biographer of Edward the Confessor may well have been correct when he linked the expulsion of Earl Tostig from his earldom with the beginning of Edward's physical decline.<sup>1</sup> The old king knew his realm well enough to see the significance of Tostig's failure. It is this failure which links together the years immediately before and after 1066 in the North. Tostig turned traditional resentments and passive disloyalty into actual rebellion and thus created a very difficult political situation which in the end made a peaceful extension of Norman power over the North impossible. After 1065 the northern thegns revolted as much because of what had happened to them before the arrival of the Normans as because of what William actually did to them. Their ultimate fear was that their antique world was in jeopardy, and they resisted William with methods appropriate to that world. These came so near to success that they provoked the harrying of the North in 1069.

The immediate origin of this sequence of events dates from the deaths of Osbeorn in 1054 and Siward in 1055 because these deaths made possible a most unfortunate decision respecting the succession of the earldom. Hitherto, northern earls had possessed certain definite attributes of family or ethnic origin, depending on whether they were earls of Northumbria or York. This is perhaps clearest in the case of the former which had earls from the house of Bamburgh until Siward and where even after this date the old ruling family maintained its local position. In Yorkshire the situation was somewhat more complex, yet even here the earls fell into clearly defined groups prior to 1055. With the exception

of Earl Ælfhelm, who was from Mercia, they were either Anglo-Danes and Scandinavians or, less frequently, members of the house of Bamburgh.<sup>2</sup> Never had a West Saxon held direct rule in either province. This changed in 1055 with the appointment of Tostig, Earl Godwin's third son, as earl in preference to Waltheof, Siward's young son, or Cospatric, the eldest surviving representative of the Bamburgh family. The only thing Danish about Tostig was his name, and he had no known connection with the old ruling family of Northumbria. He was, consequently, a complete outsider in the North, and his appointment was in that sense revolutionary. Because of this aspect of the situation, the choice of Tostig stands in serious need of explanation, but on this critical point, there is no direct evidence. It is often assumed that his appointment represented an attempt to integrate the North more closely into the Anglo-Saxon kingdom.<sup>3</sup> There may well be some truth in this idea, and it undoubtedly appeared so to the northerners. Tostig could hardly have been expected to share their point of view. But this may have been more a result than a preconceived intention for it is quite possible that the choice of Tostig represented merely a shortsighted attempt at family aggrandizement by the house of Godwin. By the reign of Edward the Confessor, the earldoms of the Eastern Midlands and East Anglia were commonly given to younger members of the families of the earls of Wessex and Mercia,<sup>4</sup> and the appointment of Tostig may have been simply the application of this policy to the North. Tostig was the brother of Earl Harold of Wessex and of the queen, and his acquisition of the North probably represented a major victory over the family of Earl Leofric of Mercia whose eldest son Ælfgar was exiled at this time, apparently because he too wished to



follow Siward. Ælfgar had been earl of East Anglia, and at least part of his earldom passed to Gyrrh, the next youngest son of Godwin.<sup>5</sup> If this explanation of the elevation of Tostig to the northern earldom is correct, his appointment was probably devoid--at least initially--of any other significance.

Be this as it may, Tostig was an unfortunate choice and must have found himself in an unenviable position. He could not have been certain how the northerners would react to their first southern earl, and he was in a weaker position than his immediate predecessors. It is true that had Osbeorn lived and become earl, he would probably have inherited his father's unpopularity above the Tees, yet he would have had, at least, the support of the Yorkshiremen. This had allowed Siward to rule and keep Northumbria quiet. Tostig, on the other hand, fell heir to the problems left by Siward but lacked any important local support above the Humber. Indeed, his effectiveness as earl probably rested on the internal divisions among the northerners and on his own warband which by 1065 numbered over two hundred housecarls.<sup>6</sup> This was a very impressive force, probably the mainstay of his government. Of course, to maintain such an army was an expensive proposition; and, like Siward before him, Tostig held southern counties as part of his earldom to help defray the cost. From 1055 he was earl of Northampton and probably of Huntingdon as well, and there is evidence that he also held Nottinghamshire.<sup>7</sup> As a result of these possessions, Tostig must have been formidable, even though he was an outsider.

Furthermore, there was one immediate advantage which the new earl enjoyed because he was not from the North. The converse of not having

local partisans was the absence of local enemies. Tostig had a freedom of maneuver greater than that of his immediate predecessors, and he used it to try to disarm potential sources of opposition. He entrusted the actual government of the earldom to a local Yorkshire thegn, Copsig,<sup>8</sup> who does not appear to have been linked either to Siward's family or to the house of Bamburgh. Copsig would have been familiar with local problems and customs and may have acted as a buffer between the northern nobility and Tostig. If such was the case, Copsig's appointment was a prudent decision which minimized friction. Tostig may also have tried to improve relations with the clerks of Durham. Certainly by the time of Symeon of Durham, it was thought that Tostig had held St. Cuthbert's church in great veneration and had given gifts to the church. It is also known that Copsig gave several estates in Yorkshire to Durham during this period.<sup>9</sup> Since under normal conditions the giving of land and ornaments was the surest way of winning the gratitude of clerks and monks, these gifts probably represent an attempt to conciliate the clerks of Durham. They were clearly not deathbed bequests.

It is doubtful, however, if this attempt was successful. The Church normally held one thing dearer than property: its privileges. These were what was at issue in the North, and on this point Tostig did not abandon Siward's policy. In 1056 Bishop Æthelric resigned Durham and returned to Peterborough, whence he had come some thirty-six years before. Two explanations for this rather unusual act survive. One source says that he gave up the bishopric because he was weak (i.e. he had no local support) and could not properly defend the church's liberty against unnamed evil men.<sup>10</sup> The other account asserts that he robbed

the church of a buried treasure and absconded to Peterborough.<sup>11</sup> Whatever the truth of the matter was, both accounts show that Æthelric was extremely unpopular in Durham. It is also probably significant that he chose to relinquish the bishopric the year after Siward's death. Æthelric had only kept his position at Durham by means of Siward's power; and, with the death of the earl, he may have found his position untenable. It is even possible that Tostig refused to support him against the clerks. This would be compatible with the first of the two versions of his resignation and would be consistent with Tostig's gifts to the church. If this was the case, the earl clearly misjudged the situation, however, for he did not allow the clerks to elect Æthelric's successor. Rather, Tostig chose the new bishop, and he selected Æthelwine, Æthelric's brother,<sup>12</sup> who was destined to be unpopular for the same reasons that his brother had been. The new bishop was an outsider who had not been chosen by the clerks; in time he too would be branded a thief. Tostig did not win the goodwill of the clerks of Durham by this appointment.

Although this was to prove to be a dangerous mistake later, in the years following 1055 the feelings of the Durham clerks probably seemed a distinctly secondary problem to Tostig. He had much more immediate difficulties with the Scots. During the late 1050's, King Malcolm ceased to be an English client king and became a threat to the North worthy of his ancestors. The quickness of this reversal was partially the result of his success in consolidating his position in Scotland. In 1054 Siward had placed him in possession only of southern Scotland. Macbeth had escaped the battle and retreated to Moray, his native province, where he

held out for three more years. Malcolm was able, however, to kill him in 1057, and early in the following year he killed Lulach, Macbeth's stepson, who had been proclaimed king after Macbeth's death.<sup>13</sup> Thus by 1058 Malcolm had eliminated all his immediate rivals and was free to begin raiding the North of England. Certain domestic factors, which stemmed from the nature of Scottish society, probably urged him to make this decision. The Scots seem to have viewed an invasion of the North principally as an occasion for the forcible transfer of property: They came over the Tweed and out of the hills to steal cattle, take slaves, and collect general booty. A king who could successfully lead such bloodthirsty shopping trips gained not only wealth and prestige at home but probably also found it easier to govern. Malcolm II had launched his reign with an invasion of England, and his grandson Duncan had done the same within six years of becoming king. When Malcolm began to raid the North, he was, in a sense, only responding to the necessities of a poor kingdom and of a political system based on a warrior king.

These general considerations are undoubtedly important in explaining why Malcolm suddenly turned on his English supporters. He was not a mere ingrate whom Siward had completely misjudged. Still, there were probably more concrete factors which urged him to come over the border. In particular, the Scottish king had a "just" grievance and was faced with a very promising chance to right it. The grievance was, of course, English possession of the southern part of the Cumbrian kingdom. There was no reason why Malcolm should accept this diminution of his ancestral lands once his need for English help had passed. This need ended with the deaths of Macbeth and Lulach, and Malcolm could attempt its



reconquest. This was the flaw in Earl Siward's Scottish policy. Perhaps the dead earl had seen it and had thought that a strong earl, such as his son, would be able to thwart Scottish efforts to reclaim Cumberland. If such had been his hope, it was not unrealistic because the only major victory which the Scots had won against the northern English had been at Carham where they had faced only the men from above the Tees. After 1055, however, the situation in the North was very different from any that Siward is likely to have envisaged. The North had a West Saxon earl, and it must have been problematical whether he would be able to resist the Scots. In fact, the possibility that the divisions between Tostig and the men of his earldom would weaken English resistance was probably a strong inducement for Malcolm to come over the border.

The incursions began in 1058 or early in 1059 and were evidently small raids, perhaps designed to test Tostig.<sup>14</sup> If such was their intention, the earl's response must have been encouraging to Malcolm. Tostig did not reply with raids on Scotland as might have been expected; rather, he chose to negotiate. In 1059 Æthelwine, bishop of Durham, Kynsige, the archbishop of York, and the earl journeyed to Scotland and induced Malcolm to come south with them to parley with Edward. Although this collection of dignitaries may have been designed to flatter the vanity of the young king, it could equally well be viewed as an expression of weakness. The English clearly hoped to pacify Malcolm by diplomacy rather than by war. They brought him over the Tweed, and he met Edward somewhere in the North, perhaps at York. The issues which were discussed at this meeting are not known, but it is likely that Malcolm wanted the return of Cumberland. This demand, if in fact made, was

frustrated. Edward gave him rich presents and treated him with honor, but there is no word in the sources that Malcolm received anything more substantial. Tostig was actually the only one who profited from this meeting because it produced a peace treaty. The king and the earl became sworn brothers, and Malcolm may even have given hostages for his good behavior.<sup>15</sup> The meeting of 1059 was diplomatically a victory for the English. Tostig had won peace for the North, and Malcolm must have gone home with his aims unfulfilled.

At least, this is the simplest explanation for what followed. Tostig evidently thought that his sworn brotherhood with Malcolm could be relied upon for in 1061 he traveled to Rome with Aldred, the new archbishop of York. The North was thus deprived of its two principal leaders, and Malcolm took the opportunity to show how happy he was with the 1059 agreement. He launched a frontal attack over the Tweed, the type of invasion which had become increasingly common as the eleventh century progressed. The Scots laid waste Northumberland and took slaves. It is reported that they even ravaged Lindisfarne, and there is circumstantial evidence that Malcolm crossed the Tyne and harried Durham before withdrawing.<sup>16</sup> This invasion is described in only the vaguest terms, but probably the violation of Lindisfarne shows that it was the kind of double invasion from the north and west which Siward had feared. This cannot be established conclusively, but it is very likely. During later invasions, the Scots usually tried to respect the major holy places of the North, but the Cumbrians honored no such restraint. If this supposition is correct, the invasion of 1061 shows the tactical limitations of Siward's annexation of Cumberland. Possession of the

western end of the Tyne Gap did not protect the lands above the Tyne against raids from the west.

What Malcolm hoped to gain by this incursion is not disclosed by the chronicle account, but other evidence suggests that his aim was to recover Cumberland and that he succeeded. This is, of course, a reasonable hypothesis, and it is also the easiest way of explaining the few things known about the West through the year 1070. As was discussed earlier, Cospatric's charter established that Siward had held power over Cumberland, but the document itself may date from after Siward's death in 1055. Theoretically it could come from as late as 1064 when Cospatric, the grantor, was killed,<sup>17</sup> and if this were the case, it would be impossible to hold that Malcolm had recovered Cumberland in 1061. But such a late date is, in fact, unlikely because there is evidence that the West had been invaded and conquered prior to 1065. Parts of northern Lancashire and the southern sections of Cumberland and Westmorland were surveyed in Domesday, and by this time the villages in the area were in a derelict condition. The ravaging of this region, however, cannot be ascribed to any of the post-1066 disturbances; and, in any case, Domesday suggests that these lands were already waste in 1066. Tostig had held most of them before the revolt of 1065, yet they did not pass to his successor Earl Morcar. Tostig was still recorded as their lord in 1066; and since Tostig actually held nothing by that date,<sup>18</sup> this must mean that the lands were already derelict when Morcar became earl. Given this conclusion, it has been suggested that these estates were plundered in the revolt against Tostig in 1065, but this explanation cannot be sustained because the accounts of the revolt do not indicate that the

rebels did anything more than kill Tostig's housecarls and rob his treasury before marching south.<sup>19</sup> With the dismissal of this suggestion, it becomes necessary to assume that northern Lancashire was wasted prior to 1065--but after 1055 when Tostig became earl. Given these time limits, the most likely hypothesis is that the area was devastated in the course of an invasion of Cumberland. The occurrence of such an invasion cannot be doubted. Hugh the Chantor records that Siward's western bishopric was destroyed in war, and since the number of Malcolm's invasions was well remembered in the North, this incursion into Cumberland must be identical with Malcolm's first major invasion of the North in 1061.<sup>20</sup> When Malcolm launched his second invasion in 1070, he used Cumberland as his base and attacked Yorkshire over Stainmore. The chronicle which describes this incident says explicitly that Malcolm held Cumberland at this time.<sup>21</sup>

In 1061, then, Malcolm invaded to regain Cumberland, and he struck while Tostig and the archbishop were on their trip to Rome. The North was thus leaderless, and there is no word that Malcolm met any organized opposition. He invaded Northumberland, ravaged as far south as Durham, and then moved up the Tyne Gap to take over Cumberland. During this last stage of the campaign, northern Lancashire was wasted to such an extent that many of the estates there remained without a lord until after the Norman Conquest.

Late that year or early in 1062, Tostig returned from Rome and found Malcolm in possession of Cumberland. The situation clearly called for military reprisals, but none was forthcoming. The earl's reaction was astonishing: He accepted the loss of Cumberland, and at some date



prior to the fall of 1065, probably in 1062, he went to Scotland and made peace with Malcolm.<sup>22</sup> The agreement, which was a serious setback for the security of the North, left the Scots in possession of Cumberland and marked the abandonment of Siward's efforts to give the North a defensible border. Malcolm's frontier on Stainmore was now within two days' ride of York, and the Tyne Gap stood open. With Cumberland the Scottish king gained the tactical advantage along the border, and he was destined to keep it for thirty years.

The poor defensive position which characterized the North during the reign of William the Conqueror had its immediate origin in Tostig's failure to defend the North. Since the importance of this failure was probably obvious at the time, Tostig's inactivity requires explanation. At no time did he invade Scotland. Every incident along the border shows the earl temporizing and negotiating, and given the fact that his later exploits reveal, if nothing else, that he was a vigorous and warlike man, his refusal to oppose Malcolm is mysterious. It cannot be explained by the idea that the northerners accepted the validity of the Scottish claim to Cumberland or by the hypothesis that Tostig made expeditions against the Scots which went unrecorded because of the failure of the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle for the years 1062 and 1064.<sup>23</sup> In lieu of these two possibilities, the most likely explanation of his inactivity must be that his hold on the North was too insecure to risk an invasion of Scotland. If this hypothesis is correct, the earl's unpopularity existed as early as 1058-59, at most four years after he became earl.

This in turn suggests that Tostig was unpopular in the North from the time of his appointment. This idea, of course, is not basically

surprising given the fact that he was an outsider who lacked any claim to traditional loyalties, but it does provide guidance for the interpretation of the events of 1063 and 1064. This is necessary because in the chronicles the revolt which unseated Tostig in 1065 stands out starkly with little background. It appears unconnected with the historic problems of northern government and is explained as the result of tyrannical acts committed by Tostig.<sup>24</sup> A number of such acts are specified, but the real question is whether the chroniclers have gotten the sequence of causation right. If Tostig's unpopularity really dates from the early days of his rule, then his "tyranny" actually may have been the result of his attempt to govern a restive nobility.

This hypothesis clarifies one of the most outstanding charges made against the earl. Florence of Worcester says that the northerners rose against Tostig to avenge his treacherous murder of three important Northumbrian nobles. In 1063 he had Gamel, son of Orm, and Ulf, son of Dolfin, assassinated in his own chamber at York while the two were visiting him under a safe conduct, and these deeds were followed in 1064 by the murder of Cospatric at the king's Christmas court. This murder was supposedly planned by the queen, Tostig's sister, in the interest of her brother.<sup>25</sup> As the account stands, the meaning of these events is not clear, but when the identities of the dead thegns are considered in the light of Tostig's unpopularity, a rather different picture emerges. The Cospatric killed at court was Earl Uhtred's youngest son and Earl Siward's collaborator in Cumberland.<sup>26</sup> By the 1060's he was the eldest surviving member of the house of Bamburgh and, as such, had a good claim to be earl of Northumbria. The other two thegns were apparently his

associates. Gamel's father Orm had married a sister of Cospatric's, and a "Gamel" is mentioned among Cospatric's relatives and thegns in his Cumbrian charter.<sup>27</sup> Ulf, son of Dolfin, is probably to be identified as the son of the Dolfin who died fighting Macbeth in 1054 and who was himself the son of Thorfinn, the recipient of Cospatric's charter. These men were the natural leaders of Northumbrian opposition to Tostig's rule, and their murders were exact parallels to Thurbrand's murder of Uhtred, Carl's murder of Ealdred, and Siward's murder of Eadulf. Tostig clearly feared the rivalry of the house of Bamburgh and chose the usual method of stifling Northumbrian separatism when he killed Cospatric, the last of Uhtred's unfortunate sons. It was ultimately, of course, a foolish thing to do. Murder may have been the only convenient way of dealing with the Bamburgh family, but separatism above the Tees had had its origin in Uhtred's murder and had been fed by the murder of Ealdred. Cospatric's death at the king's court was sufficient reason for the Northumbrians to revolt.

This is clear enough, but it leaves the question of why the men of York supported the rebellion. The accounts of the event indicate that the North generally rose against Tostig, even though the Northumbrians may have led the way. This is a problem because the union of Northumbrians and Yorkshiremen to achieve a common goal was without historical parallel. It might be, of course, that Tostig's general unpopularity above the Humber was sufficient to induce the men of York to join the revolt or that the charge made in the earliest biography of Edward the Confessor applies to Yorkshire. The foreign cleric who wrote this work asserts that the northerners revolted because of the severity of Tostig's



law enforcement. He provides a frightening picture of the lack of security which existed on the northern roads and implies that the nobles who led the revolt had themselves lived by robbery and were aggrieved because Tostig had limited their opportunities to practice their occupation.<sup>28</sup> This would be a convenient explanation for the revolt in Yorkshire, but, unfortunately, its details cannot be accepted. First, it is difficult to believe that the harsh treatment of highwaymen produced the kind of popular revolt which drove out Tostig, particularly since the same account says that Siward had also been a stern enforcer of the law.<sup>29</sup> Second, if this explanation were accepted, Tostig would appear blameless of causing the revolt. Such a conclusion is suspicious because the biographer tends to be generally partial to the earl.<sup>30</sup> Finally, it is doubtful if the writer actually understood the true origin of the brigandage which afflicted the North. It will be suggested later that this was one of the results of the loss of Cumberland.

Despite these objections, there still may be some truth in this explanation. At a later point in his narrative, Edward's biographer says essentially that many men charged that Tostig had used the courts to make money.<sup>31</sup> When put this way, the picture of Tostig as the severe and unpopular defender of justice begins to make more sense, for similar accusations are found in other accounts of the revolt. The Anglo-Saxon Chronicle says that Tostig was expelled ". . . because first he robbed God, and all those who were less powerful than himself he deprived of life and land."<sup>32</sup> This may mean that he administered justice and levied fines arbitrarily, but it probably refers to the charge found in Florence of Worcester who says that the Northumbrians (in this case, everyone



above the Humber) revolted because Tostig had collected enormous taxes contrary to custom throughout the North.<sup>33</sup> Here is the real cause for the revolt. Taxation reached enough people to produce the type of popular uprising which overturned the earl.

Direct evidence on northern taxation is slight, needless to say, but it is clear enough to show how Tostig found it easy to overtax the northerners and that such an attempt was a serious transgression of their privileges. The northern fiscal system survived unaltered into the Norman period as a result of the successful revolt of 1065, and an inspection of it shows that the northern tax assessment was much lower than that of the rest of England. The earliest clue to this comes from the Domesday description of southern Lancashire which contains the curious statement that six carucates equaled one hide in this area.<sup>34</sup> This equation has usually been treated as an anomaly. Hides and carucates were artificial measures of fiscal assessment, and the two are usually regarded as equivalent terms. Theoretically, one carucate paid as much tax as one hide, hence the absurdity of six carucates paying the same tax as one hide. Unless the carucates of southern Lancashire were exceptionally small, this region had an extremely beneficial assessment. It might be suggested that this light tax burden was due to the fact that the area had been part of Edward's demesne in 1065, but this explanation cannot be sustained. Actually, this same equation was more widespread than Domesday admits. William Farrer has shown that in the twelfth century it was in use not only in southern Lancashire but also in northern Lancashire with the adjacent parts of Cumberland and Westmorland, in Yorkshire, and in Durham. All these areas paid geld as part of Yorkshire

at the rate of 4d. for each carucate; six carucates thus produced 2s. In the rest of England either one carucate or one hide yielded 2s.<sup>35</sup> Northumberland may not have paid taxes even at the low rate found in the rest of the North; it had never been assessed in either carucates or hides and thus stood completely outside the Anglo-Saxon fiscal system.<sup>36</sup> In any case, the North carried a much lighter tax burden than the rest of the kingdom.

This low assessment probably originated when the Norwegian kingdom of York was annexed by Wessex;<sup>37</sup> along with legal autonomy, it was the price of the North's submission. At the time this would have seemed a reasonable compromise, but northern tax privileges must soon have hardened into custom. They were, perhaps, regularized by Cnut,<sup>38</sup> and they survived until Tostig's day as one of the most important distinctions between the North and the rest of the kingdom. In a sense they must have stood out as glaring inconsistencies in the Anglo-Saxon tax structure, but it is doubtful if any theoretical preference in favor of equal fiscal burdens prompted the earl to attack these arrangements. His motive was entirely practical. Because of his unpopularity, Tostig needed larger sums of money than those which were available from traditional sources. Specifically, the money was necessary to support the private army upon which his rule depended. As he was harassed by the Scots and the house of Bamburgh, his expenditures could only have increased so that they led him, on the one hand, to put pressure on the judicial system to produce more fines and confiscations, and, on the other, to levy higher taxes contrary to custom. It was this attack on the fiscal privileges of the North which united the Yorkshiresmen with

the Northumbrians and produced the popular support for the revolt of 1065.

The uprising itself was heralded by the clerks of Durham. They were no happier with Bishop Æthelwine than they had been with his brother. In particular, they feared that he too would rob their church for the benefit of Peterborough, and a localist party had developed to forestall this. The leader of the group was Elfred, son of Westou, who, in addition to protecting the sacred ornaments of the church, had become the great scourge of the ancient churchyards of the North. Presumably the clerks had had to endure sophisticated gibes from their southern bishops concerning Durham's poverty in the matter of sacred relics. In any case, Elfred had devoted great energy to digging up the bodies of important northern ecclesiastics and transporting the bones to Durham for proper display. Until the spring of 1065, his activities had been a natural and harmless reaction to cultural chauvinism, but in March of that year, they assumed a political dimension. Some two and one half months after the betrayal and murder of Cospatric, Elfred brought forth the body of King Oswin, who had suffered a similar fate in the seventh century.<sup>39</sup> The parallel between Cospatric and Oswin was obvious, and the public display of the latter's body at Durham was clearly an attempt by the clerks to incite their flock to revolt. Thus would Tostig pay for his and Siward's infringement of the privileges of St. Cuthbert.

St. Oswin was unearthed in March of 1065; once the harvest was in, the North rose in revolt utilizing the customary northern tactic for resisting oppression: the sudden raid. Despite this traditional element in their tactics, the precision of the revolt suggests that it was

the result of a carefully framed conspiracy. On the third of October, a group of insurgent thegns entered York by surprise and took the city. The leaders of this force are otherwise unknown, which probably indicates that they were from above the Tees, but in any case, they had chosen a good moment to strike for Tostig was absent from the North. The men of York immediately joined the Northumbrians, and together they killed the leaders of Tostig's housecarls as the latter tried to escape the city. This deed probably destroyed the command structure of Tostig's men, and on the next day the rebels were able to kill some two hundred of his retainers in Yorkshire and to take all of the earl's treasure, money, and weapons.<sup>40</sup>

After destroying the hated tools of Tostig's rule, the rebels met together and outlawed the earl. They then invited Morcar, the younger brother of Earl Edwin of Mercia, to be their new earl; and, with him at their head, they began to march south.<sup>41</sup> This decision to go south, more than anything else, distinguishes the revolt of 1065 from the later revolts in the North and shows that the rebels had competent, if unnamed, leadership. In a sense, it was an attempt to force King Edward to accept the revolution;<sup>42</sup> the northerners were not so foolish as to stage a local revolt and then wait for the king to ratify their deeds. This aspect of the affair is clear, but their destination and their behavior show that they also viewed the trip south as an integral part of the original revolt. They had already destroyed Tostig's power above the Humber; it was necessary to do the same thing in the South. The rebels apparently crossed the Humber and marched to Lincoln where they slaughtered more of Tostig's retainers.<sup>43</sup> They were joined then by groups of



men from Lincolnshire, Nottinghamshire, and Derbyshire, and the whole force moved on to Northampton. Here Morcar's brother Edwin met them with an army drawn from his earldom and some Welsh auxiliaries. The rebels now constituted a formidable force and negotiations were opened with the king through Earl Harold, Tostig's brother. In the meantime, however, the northerners set about a systematic plundering of Northamptonshire which had formed part of the earldom of both Siward and Tostig and was now made to pay for the strength it had given to the northern earls. The northern thegns were not oblivious to the relationship between wealth and power. They enslaved hundreds of the men of the area and stole thousands of head of cattle. Perhaps more significant than this, however, was the fact that they killed many of the natives, burned their houses, and destroyed their winter supply of corn.<sup>44</sup> These deeds could not have enriched anyone and were clearly designed to impoverish the area. Finally towards the end of the month, the king agreed to accept the results of the revolt. He could not fight the rebels for a number of reasons, and he consented, therefore, to the appointment of Morcar as earl. Earl Harold did not oppose the replacement of his brother and swore to uphold the settlement. In addition to this, he--presumably in the name of the king--renewed the law of Cnut.<sup>45</sup> This meant that Tostig's attempt to overthrow the fiscal privileges of the North was abandoned.

Thus the experiment of the first southern earl of the North ended in disaster. Tostig had failed in his two principal tasks. He had neither maintained the northern border nor succeeded in governing his earldom. His murders and attack on the fiscal system of the North had

created such an outrage above the Humber that for once the North had united. The successful revolt which followed ended his rule and its abuses, but it left a legacy of mistrust which weakened the Anglo-Saxon kingdom in the last year of its existence and which lasted into the early years of the Norman Conquest to stand in the path of a peaceful extension of William's rule over the North. For ten years prior to 1065 the northerners had had the experience of being under what was to them a foreign earl who had tried to alter their customs. They did not forget this with the coming of the Normans and were on their guard.

Hitherto, the clarity of this connection has not been generally recognized for at least two reasons. First, no one has understood the nature of Tostig's misrule, and consequently the revolt of 1065 has appeared to be the result of straightforward greed and tyranny. The preceding narrative has shown, however, that the real cause for the revolt was Tostig's attempt to govern the North in the face of northern resistance. Second, the northerners' choice of Morcar as their earl has been misinterpreted. It has been maintained that their selection of a Mercian indicated that they knew that the North could no longer stand alone and that they "were apparently fully conscious of the strong political bonds which bound them to the rest of England."<sup>46</sup> This ingenious theory saves the unity of Anglo-Saxon England from the bodies and devastation of 1065 by emphasizing the fact that the rebels sought the king's approval of their new earl and by asserting that their very choice of Morcar served to restore the unity of the kingdom.<sup>47</sup> On a constitutional level this theory may not be entirely specious, but it cannot be based on the North's choice of Morcar which is adequately explained on

the basis of northern politics. The difficulty which the northerners faced in 1065 was that the revolt had been made by both the men of York and the Northumbrians. This made it impossible to choose one of the two available northern candidates and still maintain the unity which was necessary to intimidate Edward the Confessor. The Northumbrians would not have willingly accepted Siward's son Waltheof, nor would the Yorkshire men have been likely to accept Osulf, son of Earl Eadulf, the current representative of the house of Bamburgh. Past antagonism stretching back at least to the days of Earl Uhtred and Thurbrand blocked either man. Given this impasse, the northerners could only compromise and choose an outsider. Morcar had no discernible connection with either northern family, and his family had its own differences with the house of Godwin. He was, therefore, a perfect compromise and his selection left room for an accommodation of the local men which clearly indicates what forces were at work. Osulf of Bamburgh was given the rule of Northumbria under Morcar, and Waltheof was apparently given Northampton and Huntingdon.<sup>48</sup> Thus the choice of Morcar only indicates the paramount nature of local concerns.

The revolt of 1065 was then a conservative reaction to innovation and had brought back to power the traditional ruling family of Northumbria and Siward's son. The events of the early months of 1066 show that it had also created new difficulties for government in the North. With the death of Edward the Confessor in January, Harold, Tostig's elder brother, became king, but the northerners at first refused to accept him. Their motivation was apparently fear. The source which describes this incident, although somewhat general and rhetorical, says

explicitly that they feared being dominated by the South, and the existence of this fear is shown by two Yorkshire coin hoards which were buried at the accession of Harold.<sup>49</sup> Evidently the northerners thought that they could expect no better treatment from Harold than they had received from Tostig. Given the succession crisis which the king faced, this fear was undoubtedly groundless, but he had, nonetheless, to make a special trip to York to reassure the northerners. Even though he accomplished this by Easter,<sup>50</sup> the incident must still have been very disquieting. The North had threatened, at the very least, to withhold its support from the king, and the whole affair showed that Morcar, who was loyal to Harold, had little control over the men of his new earldom.<sup>51</sup>

Still, no matter how fragile the situation above the Humber may have been, the first attack on it came from a highly surprising source, given the host of potential invaders who were lurking around the North Sea and the English Channel in the spring of 1066. Upon his exile, Tostig had gone to Flanders, where his father-in-law was count, and he had spent the winter there gathering a fleet for an invasion of England.<sup>52</sup> What he hoped to accomplish with this force is conjectural. It is conceivable that he was working with either Duke William of Normandy, his brother-in-law, or with King Harold Hardrada of Norway, both of whom intended to conquer England. But there is no real evidence to support either alternative, and it is hard to see how his recorded exploits could have helped either of them--except, perhaps, as a diversion. This is, of course, possible, but it seems more likely that Tostig was working only for himself. He was a bold man; both his successful attempt to



intimidate the Pope on his trip to Rome in 1061 and his unsuccessful attempt to govern the North show this clearly. The coming year offered rewards for such men, and Tostig probably intended to try his luck.

Early in May he descended on the Isle of Wight and extorted money and provisions from the islanders. He then sailed east to Sandwich, where he impressed some sailors; and, upon the approach of King Harold, he moved up the coast and entered the Humber, which was apparently the object of his expedition. Certainly it was not necessary to come this far north simply for plunder. Tostig's force is said to have numbered sixty ships; and, if this is true, it was clearly large enough to be dangerous to local forces.<sup>53</sup> Such was undoubtedly its purpose. Tostig's foray was not as ridiculous as it usually appears when historians employ it as the curtain raiser for the great invasions of 1066. The real parallels of this expedition lay in the Anglo-Saxon past. Twice during the reign of Edward the Confessor, Ælfgar, the father of Edwin and Morcar, had been exiled and had won reinstatement in his earldom by invading England with forces gathered in Wales and Dublin.<sup>54</sup> The principle involved was that if an outcast could wreak enough havoc, the king would be likely to buy him off by giving him back his lands and offices. This must have been Tostig's intention in 1066: He would regain his lost northern earldom by raiding it. Unfortunately for the success of this plan, his arrival in the Humber was anticipated by Earls Edwin and Morcar who were, after all, the sons of the last successful practitioner of this Anglo-Saxon protection racket. Tostig landed his men in Lindsey and burned several villages, but before he could become a real terror to the countryside, Edwin and perhaps Morcar came up and drove him out of

the area. Most of his Flemish ships then deserted him, and he escaped to Scotland with only twelve ships.<sup>55</sup>

There Tostig became involved in a much more promising invasion of the North. Despite the fact that King Malcolm supported him and his remaining men over the summer, the complete failure of his own expedition must have left him with few prospects for the future beyond small-scale piracy. King Harold Hardrada of Norway was, however, planning to invade England that autumn, and, if subsequent events are a true indication of the king's original plans, he had use for an ex-earl of the North. Harold Hardrada intended to invade Yorkshire and use it as a base for the conquest of the rest of the kingdom. The employment of this essentially tenth-century scheme, which not even Swein and Cnut had used until after they had spent years pulverizing English resistance, may have been due to bold antiquarianism on the part of the Norwegian king, but it was more probably the result of a very contemporary understanding that conditions in the North were far worse than they had been in Ethelred's day. In any case, Tostig agreed to join this expedition, perhaps through the intermediacy of Copsig, his old associate in governing the North, who had already raised a fleet in the Orkneys.<sup>56</sup> This proved to be Tostig's final blunder.

The Norwegian fleet came west in late August or early September. It stopped at the Orkneys where Harold was joined by a force led by the earl of these islands and by a group of Irish Sea Vikings. Then it moved down the east coast of Scotland where it was met by Tostig, who became the vassal of the Norwegian king. The fleet now numbered perhaps three hundred vessels, and its prospects for initial success were

good.<sup>57</sup> King Harold of England was in the South waiting for Duke William's invasion, and the North was apparently unguarded. Harold Hardrada and Tostig were able, therefore, to sail down the coast, enter the Humber by surprise, and disembark their forces without meeting any opposition.<sup>58</sup> This suggests that Morcar was not in the North at the time, but there may be another explanation. Specifically, there is probably a minor lacuna in the chronicles at this point. None of them say how long the Norwegians were in the vicinity of York before the battle of Fulford Bridge, nor do they explain in any detail what transpired during that time. This is an important omission because it hides the reaction of the northerners to the Norwegian invasion. The little evidence which does bear on this point is discontinuous and perhaps contradictory. Symeon of Durham says that Harold Hardrada took York by force before he fought Edwin and Morcar,<sup>59</sup> but the C version of the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle seems to suggest that the Norwegians only entered York after this battle. It implies that the earls were not in York when the Norwegians landed and that they assembled their army in Mercia.<sup>60</sup> If the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle is correct on these points, the men of York made no attempt to oppose the invasion, and this, in turn, could explain the precipitate reactions of the earls and the king when they learned of the arrival of Harold Hardrada. They faced not simply an invasion by the greatest warrior in Christendom, but an invasion which had received local support in the North.

This interpretation is not beyond question, but the invasion of the Norwegians certainly did become this specter before much time had passed. When King Harold learned of their landing, he immediately began to move

North. In the meantime, however, Edwin and Morcar gathered an army and, without waiting for the arrival of the king, engaged the Norwegians in battle at Fulford Bridge outside York on September 20, 1066. This was a reckless decision for which the only justification could have been to prevent Harold Hardrada from consolidating his position, but, in fact, it produced the opposite result. After what is said to have been a long, hard fight, the Norwegian king routed the earls, who, in their flight, lost more men to the river Ouse than they had to Harold in the battle. After this illustration of his power, Harold Hardrada entered York and allied with the Yorkshire men. They agreed to help him conquer the kingdom by going south with his army. They also gave the Norwegians provisions and exchanged hostages with them.<sup>61</sup> The full implementation of this alliance was averted, however, by King Harold of England, who was already nearing the North with an army. He reached Tadcaster by Sunday, September 24, and advanced through York the next day. The Norwegians had had no news of his coming and had gone east of the city to Stamford Bridge to receive hostages from the outlying parts of the shire. Harold was thus able to catch them by surprise away from their ships and to bring them to battle. In the fight which followed he won a complete victory. Both Harold Hardrada and Tostig were killed, and twenty ships were sufficient to carry away the surviving Norwegians.<sup>62</sup>

With this victory Harold ended the immediate threat to his rule in the North and proved his ability as a military commander, but from the standpoint of the history of the North, these events have a different significance. Harold Hardrada's plan, despite its anachronism, had been basically correct. After at most one battle, and perhaps from his



arrival, the men of York had joined his attempt to conquer England. Given an alternative, they no longer saw a need to be governed by the West Saxon monarchy. This was the legacy of Tostig's attack upon the customs of the North. By 1066 political northern separatism existed, and Harold's victory at Stamford Bridge did nothing to end it.

Had Harold enjoyed a long reign, he might have improved the situation through moderate rule. In the days of Ethelred, ethnic factors may have been partially responsible for the preference of the men of York for the cause of Swein and Cnut, but since that time the problems of the North had been basically political: the revolt of the Bamburgh earls, the unpopular rule of Siward in Northumbria, and finally Tostig's attempt to govern the North. The northerners had allied with Harold Hardrada not because he was Scandinavian, but because they distrusted government from the South. Since this was essentially a political problem, Harold might have been able to quiet northern fears. But this is only speculation. What Harold in fact did before he left York was more prosaic. Morcar had failed either to control or defend Yorkshire, and Harold apparently entrusted the shire to Mearleswein, an important noble in the northern Danelaw.<sup>63</sup> The source which says this is not beyond question, but it is probably correct. Despite the fact that Morcar is called an earl in the chronicles after September of 1066, he never again is connected with anything that happened in the North. This probably means that he had no power above the Humber. Certainly all the northern revolts were led by local nobles.

After making this change, Harold went south to face Duke William of Normandy, who had landed while Harold was on his northern campaign.

On October 14, the duke completely defeated Harold's army at Hastings, and King Harold himself disappeared into the realm of legend. With him went any chance that the problems of the North would find a peaceful solution. During the remaining months of 1066, William consolidated his position in the South by receiving the submissions of the earls, of most of the important churchmen, and of London; and on Christmas day, Archbishop Aldred of York crowned him as the successor of the Anglo-Saxon kings. This meant disaster for the North. By becoming the "legitimate" king, William inherited all the problems of northern government which had been created before his arrival, but at the same time he lacked the necessary knowledge, if not the will, to deal with them.

This is clear from his initial northern appointment. Before returning to Normandy in March of 1067, William made his first attempt to provide government for the North, and a worse choice is difficult to imagine. He gave the earldom of Northumbria to Copsig, Tostig's old associate, who had submitted to William at Barking in early 1067.<sup>64</sup> This was an incredible decision: Copsig had been an agent of Tostig's government and had taken part in the earl's invasion of 1066. Furthermore, if the stories of Tostig meeting Harold Hardrada at the mouth of the Tyne are true, Copsig had probably supported himself by piracy at the expense of the very men whom he was now called upon to govern.<sup>65</sup> Any one of these deeds was enough to make Copsig unpopular in the North, and it is exceedingly difficult to imagine what William thought he was doing. To make any sense out of the situation at all, it is necessary to posit that Osulf, who had held Northumbria under Morcar, had refused to submit to William and that Morcar was no longer the earl of the North. Otherwise, the

appointment of a new earl would have been a direct provocation to both the Northumbrians and to Morcar. Beyond this only conjecture is possible. Perhaps the most likely explanation is that William was trying to be conciliatory by sending a near native to be earl, but that he had inaccurate knowledge of the revolt of 1065 which came from Tostig. The latter had spent the winter of 1065-1066 in Flanders where he could have been in communication with Duke William. Tostig is said to have charged in another context that the northern revolt had been the result of a conspiracy headed by his brother Harold;<sup>66</sup> and, if William believed this, the appointment of Copsig would not have seemed absurd. On the other hand, Copsig himself may have been partially responsible for the decision. He was clearly adept at survival having lived through the revolt of 1065, Tostig's invasion of 1066, and probably the Battle of Stamford Bridge; there is no knowing what a man of his talents may have told the new king.

Whatever role misinformation may have played in making Copsig earl, it clearly did not affect his own behavior for he had no illusions about the necessities of his government. In early February 1067, he came north with a band of retainers and took the traditional first step towards establishing one's rule above the Tees: He sought out Osulf, the current representative of the house of Bamburgh. His intention was probably to kill or capture Osulf, but this failed. Copsig only succeeded in driving him into the hills where he began to gather an army.<sup>67</sup> This was undoubtedly easy. The return of Copsig convinced the Northumbrians, if they had any doubts in the first place, that they could expect no better treatment from William than they had received from

Edward the Confessor. The new earl had crossed the Tees as an invader in the direct tradition of other Yorkshire men who would have ruled Northumbria--Thurbrand, Carl, and Siward--and more recently, of course, Tostig. Within five weeks, therefore, Osulf was able to raise an army with which to administer the equally traditional solution to the problem. On March 12, he surprised Copsig at a banquet in Newburn. The earl tried to save himself by fleeing to a church, but the Northumbrians set the church on fire. When Copsig was at last forced out, Osulf cut off his head.<sup>68</sup>

The sending of Copsig into Northumbria had been clearly a mistake both for the earl, who had lost his life, and for William, whose authority had been flouted. The earl's personal unpopularity and his attack on Osulf were undoubtedly the major causes of the revolt, but certain factors suggest that something else may have been involved. There is a distinct possibility that the Northumbrian revolt of 1067 was an echo of the revolt of 1065 in a second way. William the Conqueror's most pressing need in early 1067 was booty. His mercenary army had not followed him to England just because they believed in the validity of his claim to the throne. He needed money to pay off his soldiers, and in 1067 he levied a heavy geld to supply it.<sup>69</sup> The collection of this money from Northumbria must have been Copsig's first responsibility; indeed, the promise that he could collect it may have been the chief factor which prompted William to appoint him earl. Copsig had, after all, substantial experience in extracting money from the North. No source says that the Northumbrians rose against the earl because of the tax, but this may well have been an important factor in their revolt. The two events were



separated by only a short period of time. William imposed the tax some-time between Christmas of 1066 and his return to Normandy around February 21, 1067. Copsig went north in mid-February and was killed about five weeks later on March 12. The Northumbrians had revolted in 1065 in part over unjust taxes, and they threatened to do the same in 1072-74 over another attempt to collect taxes above the Tees.<sup>70</sup> Furthermore, the geld of 1067 struck the North as being outrageous. The version of the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle written at York, after noting that William had promised to rule in the manner of his best predecessors, says: "All the same he laid taxes on the people very severely."<sup>71</sup> The Peterborough version, on the other hand, mentions this tax in a matter of fact way and only in passing.<sup>72</sup> Given these factors, it is quite possible that William's first geld provided the Northumbrians with an example of Norman tyranny which was quite as frightening as the return of Copsig and just as reminiscent of the rule of Tostig.

From two points of view, then, William's dealings with the North must have raised the specter of Tostig's attack on the privileges of the North, and it is no wonder that Osulf was able to move through the Northumbrian countryside at the head of a small army without anyone warning Copsig of his approach. As at York in 1065, the sympathies of the people were with the rebels. Ironically, however, William was spared the full consequences of his mistakes by events in Northumbria itself. The killing of Copsig marked the beginning of a revolt which was directly analogous to the one which had occurred in 1016, but this withdrawal from William's lordship soon ended in an ignominious fashion. In the fall of 1067, Osulf, who was evidently trying to maintain the

normal functions of government, was killed while attempting to bring an outlaw to justice,<sup>73</sup> and this event gave William the opportunity to reestablish his authority above the Tees without military intervention. Upon his return from Normandy in December, the king sold the earldom of Northumbria to Cospatric, son of Maldred, who was an adventurer appallingly suited to the chaos which was now developing above the Humber. His father Maldred had been the brother of King Duncan of Scotland, the father of Malcolm III, and his mother had been a daughter of Earl Uhtred and his third wife, a daughter of King Ethelred.<sup>74</sup> Cospatric himself was, consequently, closely connected with both Scotland and Northumbria, and it is impossible to say which connection he valued more. In any case, he was able to go north and establish himself as earl, theoretically under the lordship of William.

The fact that the king had sold him the earldom probably indicates that William was uncertain whether he could extract a regular income from Northumbria, and the events of 1068 show that this fear was not without foundation for the same sequence of taxation and revolt occurred as in 1067 except on a wider scale and unobscured by other factors. William levied his second geld at some date between early December 1067 and late March of 1068.<sup>75</sup> In the spring Edwin and Morcar revolted, and the northerners joined with them. Indeed, the North is said to have been the main center of trouble in 1068,<sup>76</sup> and the current geld was probably responsible for this. One of the basic laws of northern political behavior was that it took a specific outrage to bring the northern thegns into the field. This had been true of every revolt since the first cause célèbre, the murder of Uhtred in 1016, and it continued to

be true through the last northern revolt in 1080. Only in 1068 do the chronicles make the North rise spontaneously. Since this is at variance with their usual behavior and since it is clear that William's government and soldiers had left the North untouched until this point, the most probable explanation is that the king's demands for money provided the northerners with the necessary concrete example of Norman tyranny.

The revolt which actually materialized was entirely in accordance with this explanation. It was essentially negative, a rejection of William's power, and did not, at least in its initial stages, represent an attempt to drive the Normans out of England. The Anglo-Saxon Chronicle's laconic description of the beginning of the rebellion caught its spirit accurately: "Then the king was informed that the people in the North were gathered together and meant to make a stand against him if he came."<sup>77</sup> William was faced in the spring of 1068 with a general revolt of the North which aimed at denying his authority. The situation was particularly ominous because the rising was led by the existing governmental authorities above the Humber, Cospatric, his new earl of Northumbria, and Merleswein, both of whom apparently preferred battle to trying to tax the men of their earldoms. The only important man in the North known to have opposed the revolt was Archbishop Aldred who had had first-hand experience with William's power, but he could do nothing.<sup>78</sup> The rebels knew, of course, that the king would indeed come North and made preparations against the event. It was probably decided to hold the Humber-Aire line, a tactic which could deny William access to most of the North and which certainly was followed in 1069,<sup>79</sup> but beyond this their plans are a matter of conjecture. They may have thought that they



could withstand the Conqueror with the help of Mercia; this alliance had worked against Edward the Confessor in 1065. Furthermore, Edgar the Atheling had escaped from William's control by the spring of 1068, and there may have been those who wished to crown him king. Alternatively, the northerners may have hoped for foreign aid. English malcontents had been seeking the intervention of King Swein of Denmark, who had a claim to the throne; and King Malcolm of Scotland seems to have been planning an invasion of the North for the summer of 1068.<sup>80</sup> In actuality none of these possibilities materialized. While the northern thegns, posturing in heroic fashion, lived in tents to avoid the enervating effects of houses and fortified suitable places along the Humber and in the swamps and woods of the West Riding, William acted quickly. Any military calculations of the northerners which were based either on their revolt against Edward or on a memory of the long campaigns of Ethelred's reign were soon proved false. The king first went to Warwick where he built a castle, which induced Edwin and Morcar to abandon the revolt. He then advanced to Nottingham and erected a second castle. These two successes demoralized the northerners, who were now without domestic allies and found the king bearing down upon them. Cospatric, Mærleswein, and Edgar the Atheling fled to Scotland with a number of important thegns, and the men of York submitted to the king, who entered the city and raised a castle within its walls.<sup>81</sup> Thus without a single battle, William had overcome the revolt of 1068. It had been a fiasco, and the northerners' brave talk of the springtime about standing against the king had only resulted in the exile of their native leaders and the imposition of



direct Norman rule by midsummer. They had been shown to be militarily ineffective, and William's triumph seemed complete.

These were the lessons which the revolt of 1068 seemed to teach, but both were in reality deceptive. The only thing accomplished by William in 1068 was to set the stage for the debacle of 1069. Such military power as existed in the North had not been destroyed. The northerners had submitted because their allies had deserted them. In these circumstances, they judged it wise to recognize the king and thereby avoid the reprisals which would follow a military defeat,<sup>82</sup> but they had not been cowed. The fact that they had refused to meet William in the field was as much the result of their conception of warfare as of the size of his army or his military reputation. Although the northerners would occasionally fight regular battles as at Carham in 1018, their taste usually ran to rural ambushes, raids, and surprise attacks on settlements. The history of the North after 1000 establishes this beyond dispute. While such tactics may have struck the Normans as treachery incarnate, they were an effective adaptation to the small population and broken terrain of the North. No invader with a large army was likely to stay in the North for long, and upon his departure, the thegns who had been skulking in the woods and hills could re-emerge and follow the tactics used by Osulf in 1067 or by the northern rebels in 1065. The employment of such means of resistance was in turn the reason why so many members of the house of Bamburgh had been killed through treachery by men wishing to govern the North; false promises were literally the only means with which to catch them. In 1068 William himself may have tried to employ this device. While in York, he sent the bishop of

Durham to Scotland to make a peace treaty and probably to get Malcolm to disgorge the leaders of the northern revolt who had taken refuge in Lothian, or more probably in Cumberland, but despite the assertion of Ordericus Vitalis that Malcolm swore fealty to William through ambassadors,<sup>83</sup> the wine of Durham clearly failed to accomplish very much. Malcolm did not expell the northerners, and Cospatric, Mærleswein, and Edgar the Atheling remained at large to lead future revolts.

They were a threat because William's success in 1068 provided the provocation for renewed insurrection. The revolt of 1068 had been the result of William's failure to govern the North through its native leaders. They had, in fact, led the resistance to the king, and this left him with no realistic alternative but to replace them with Normans. Consequently, he built a castle, garrisoned it with five hundred picked men under William Malet, and entrusted the government of Yorkshire to Robert fitz-Richard.<sup>84</sup> This decision was understandable given the situation, but it led to disaster nonetheless. The imposition of direct Norman rule coupled with the gelds of 1067 and 1068 must have struck the men of York as a direct parallel to the government of Tostig. Furthermore, the Normans apparently acted rapaciously. Dark rumors come out of this period about the imprisonment of Yorkshire thegns and the confiscation of their estates, and these stories apparently have some basis in fact for William Malet, the governor of York castle, definitely had acquired estates in the shire before the fall of 1069. In addition to this, the same general picture of Norman behavior is suggested by the existence of an immense treasure inside York castle by autumn.<sup>85</sup> This money had clearly been extracted from the surrounding countryside, and

its collection coupled with the taking of native lands by whatever means was short-sighted and provocative.

The actual spark which set off the new revolt occurred in Northumbria. By the winter of 1068, Norman control of Yorkshire must have seemed secure enough for William to make an attempt to bring the lands above the Tees under his control, and to accomplish this he appointed a new earl, Robert de Comines, and sent him North with seven hundred men. In January Robert and his men crossed the Tees and entered Durham where they killed and plundered peasants who were unlucky enough to be in their path. This must have confirmed the worst fears of the residents of Durham concerning the real meaning of the Norman Conquest, and they devised a stratagem to deal with the invaders. As Robert approached, they left the city and hid in the surrounding countryside, and despite the fact that Bishop Æthelwine warned him upon his arrival that the Northumbrians were laying a trap, he took no notice, perhaps feeling that William's easy triumph at York the previous summer had shown the mettle of the northerners. In any case, Robert entered the city and allowed his men to plunder the houses, which was probably what the Northumbrians had hoped would happen. After night had fallen, the natives assembled and broke through the town's gates without warning. By this time the Frenchmen were scattered throughout the city, undoubtedly in a state of complete disarray. Exhausted by the day's plundering, confused and disorganized in a strange, dark town they could offer no effective resistance, and the Northumbrians slaughtered them all except for one or two survivors: Earl Robert himself was cut down in

traditional fashion as he tried to escape the burning house in which he had sought refuge.<sup>86</sup>

The successful massacre of the Norman force at Durham signaled the beginning of the last general rising of the North, and the Normans were now to learn the maddening nature of northern tactics. A band of rebels caught Robert fitz-Richard, the governor of York, away from the protection of York castle and killed him and a group of his retainers. This left the castle garrison as the last Norman force above the Humber, and they were in the greatest jeopardy. Cospatric, M rleswein, and Edgar the Atheling had returned from Scotland with the beginning of the insurrection, and they moved on York with an army, which was soon strengthened by Archil, the greatest Yorkshire thegn, and the four sons of Carl.<sup>87</sup> The presence of Cospatric and the sons of Carl in the same army was of the gravest significance. Carl had killed Ealdred, Cospatric's uncle; Carl's father Thurbrand had killed Uhtred, Cospatric's grandfather. The union of men who had every reason to hate one another was an appalling indication of the degree of northern hostility to the Normans, and William Malet quickly felt its force. The rebels entered York and, in alliance with the men of the city, besieged the castle whose defenders sent word to William that unless they were relieved, they would suffer the fate of Robert de Comines and Robert fitz-Richard. The king responded to this threat as quickly as he had to the revolt of 1068. He moved north and surprised the besiegers within the city walls before the castle fell. There followed a shadowy encounter between the king and the northerners in the streets which ended in the relief of the castle and the flight of the rebels. Either as part of this battle or after



its conclusion, the Normans ravaged the city and plundered the churches.<sup>88</sup>

The chronicles describe this expedition as a victory for the king, but actually his success was only partial. He had kept possession of York and inflicted a tactical defeat on the northerners. To strengthen his hold on the city, William stayed there for eight days and built a second castle, which he entrusted to William Fitz-Osbern.<sup>89</sup> The choice of this man, perhaps William's most trusted and capable subordinate, probably indicates that the king realized the limitations of his recent victory. It had produced no political agreement with the northerners, and they were still in revolt. All their important leaders had escaped the battle in the city, and they had only retreated to the hills with their men to await the departure of William. This came soon enough, leaving William Fitz-Osbern waiting for the counterattack of the rebels. He, however, was a more formidable opponent than either Robert de Comines or Robert Fitz-Richard had been, and he probably had the further advantage of knowing what to expect from the northerners who had already conducted four surprise attacks on cities or towns since 1065. When they did indeed try to repeat this tactic, William Fitz-Osbern was not caught unprepared. They assembled in the hills sometime after Easter, intending to renew the siege of the castles, but before they could reach the city, he caught them in the open and defeated them.<sup>90</sup>

This victory relieved the immediate pressure on York, but it did not end the revolt, whose leaders were still free and commanding the survivors of the two recent defeats. Indeed, the realization must have been growing among the Norman leaders that they were facing a basically

impossible situation in the North. Their defeats of the rebels had neither destroyed the latter's military strength nor proven their tactics unworkable. After each defeat, the northerners had only retreated to lurk in the hills awaiting a new Norman mistake, and the mechanics of this situation are probably illustrated by the behavior of the Norman force which William sent to avenge the killing of Earl Robert de Comines and his men. This army left York in the late spring or summer and advanced as far as Northallerton in the North Riding of Yorkshire. Here the Normans were surrounded by a dense fog which prompted an immediate retreat to York. Symeon of Durham says that St. Cuthbert had sent this fog to protect the men of Durham and that the Normans realized its supernatural origin.<sup>91</sup> In fact, they must have feared an attack by the northerners in the fog; and whether such was likely is beside the point. In an open field on a clear day the Normans did not fear the rebels; when conditions were otherwise, they did.

The main hope of the northerners by this time was probably that they would receive outside aid. It must have been known in the North by the summer of 1069 that King Swein of Denmark was planning to send an expedition to England that fall. His ambition to claim the English throne had been encouraged by English money, and it is likely that much of it had come from the North.<sup>92</sup> All that the northerners had to do was to hide in the hills until autumn when they could emerge with a good chance of driving the Normans from the North. They presumably thought that Swein would go on to defeat William later, perhaps after several years of war on the model of the fighting of Ethelred's days.

Unfortunately for the North, only the first part of this plan worked. The Danish fleet duly arrived in the fall led by Swein's brother Osbeorn and two of the king's sons. It consisted of two hundred and forty ships and included warriors from Poland, Saxony, and Frisia in addition to Danes. Theoretically, this was a force large enough to challenge William the Conqueror himself, particularly given the English allies which it would assuredly find, but this possibility was mocked by subsequent events. The Danes had come to England to fight an antique campaign. They slowly plundered their way up the coast and entered the Humber on September 8. By this time their sluggishness had destroyed any chance of surprise, one of the main advantages of a sea-borne attack, and William had been able to warn his men in York of their approach. As it turned out, the advance knowledge did not save York, but the Danes' aversion to pressing an advantage was an ill omen for the North, nonetheless. The northern rebels also knew that the Danes were coming, and Edgar the Atheling, Merleswein, and Waltheof, Siward's son, had gathered a fleet of their own from unknown sources. They too evidently thought that sea-borne raids offered the best hope of beating William, and the initial encounter seemed to confirm this idea. Upon the arrival of the Danes in the Humber, the rebels joined them. Archbishop Aldred died of shock. He was the man who had crowned William and presumably foresaw the destruction to come. The Danes waited several days in the Humber to give Cospatric with the Northumbrians and a group of rebels from Yorkshire, led by Archil and the sons of Carl, time to join the main force. When this was accomplished, the composite host moved up the estuary towards the city. As they approached, the Normans fired the houses near

the castles which they feared might be used to fill up the ditches around the castles, but they did their work too well for the flames spread to the rest of the city and York burned. The next day the Danes and rebels marched into the still burning city with the leaders of the North in the van. They caught the Normans in the streets, and the outcome was as decisive as in Durham in January. The entire Norman force was either killed or captured.<sup>93</sup>

To understand the strange and awesome events which followed this victory, it is necessary to put aside hindsight. Neither the northerners nor the Danes knew that they were soon to be the object of William the Conqueror's most brutal campaign. Furthermore, there is no evidence that the Danes had come to England to fight a major battle with William in the fall of 1069. Had that been their intention, it would have been far simpler to land in southern England and offer battle. The taking of York had cost time and men, and it had brought them no immediate accretion of strength. The destruction of William's power above the Humber had satisfied the immediate aims of the rebels. The Northumbrians are known to have gone home for the winter,<sup>94</sup> and it is likely that the Yorkshire men did the same. The Danes were thus left in possession of York, and this had probably been their goal from the beginning. They had come to England to destroy Norman power in the North and to establish a base there for the subsequent conquest of the rest of the kingdom. This is the simplest and most reasonable explanation for their actions, and it is supported by the fact that King Swein did arrive in the Humber in the spring, intending to launch a campaign.<sup>95</sup> He found then that he was too late and that his expeditionary force was in a pitiable



condition. The reason for this was simple and only partially the result of the acts of William the Conqueror: The cost of taking York had been too high. Because of the fire which the Normans had set, the city had been nearly destroyed, and this had put the Danes in a bad position. With York intact, they could have shut themselves up behind its walls and snugly waited for spring, and William could have done little. To besiege the city would have required that the Normans spend the winter in the open, which would probably have broken their health and which would have failed in any case, given Danish control of the Ouse and Humber. To take York by assault would have been extremely dangerous. The Danes and the northerners were equal--if not superior--to the Normans in hand-to-hand fighting. But for the burning of York, William would have faced these grim alternatives.

As it was, the plans of the Danes were seriously upset. October and William the Conqueror were both advancing against them, and their behavior, which seems so aimless in the pages of Ordericus Vitalis, was largely the result of this quandary. They needed a place to spend the winter, but William would not give them time to establish one. Initially they tried to salvage as much of their original plan as possible by going down to the Isle of Axholme at the head of the Humber and fortifying it as a base for the winter. This attempt was frustrated by William, however, who had launched a late fall campaign. The destruction of York had given him a chance to fight the Danes in the open, and he had seized this opportunity with the fury and vindictiveness of a man who has narrowly escaped a fight for his life. William reached Lindsey with an army before the Danes' fortifications were complete, and he was

consequently able to enter the swamps and drive them back across the Humber into Yorkshire. This defeat did not make them desist from their plan, however. Once the king had left the area to deal with a secondary revolt in Staffordshire, the Danes recrossed the Humber and moved into Lindsey to establish a camp. There a Norman force, which the king had left behind, fell upon them by surprise and dispersed them for a second time.<sup>96</sup>

These two encounters were a serious setback for the Danes who still lacked a winter base, and they must have made it obvious to William that they had no intention of fighting a major battle. The possibilities opened to him by this knowledge meant doom for the North. After being driven out of Lindsey, the Danes had returned to Yorkshire, and it was rumored that they intended to reoccupy York. This was an admission that their situation had become very serious, and William, who had returned from the West, followed them into the North. The Yorkshire men were not caught entirely unprepared by this development, however. They occupied the northern bank of the river Aire and held it against the Normans for three weeks. Perhaps they thought they could hold this position all winter although it is more likely that the Aire represented an extemporized line of defense. Neither the northerners nor the Danes seem to have made any preparations in case the Normans crossed the river, and when this occurred, all organized resistance disappeared. William forded the Aire far upstream and moved directly on York through the hills. By the time he arrived, the Danes had abandoned the indefensible city and were apparently lying in the Humber aboard their ships;<sup>97</sup> they were now in an untenable position. William's relentless pressure had

made it impossible for them to establish a base either north or south of the Humber, and it was now winter. They could not go home, nor would they fight. Given these circumstances, Osbeorn, the Danish leader, admitted his defeat and came to an agreement with William. The king gave him money and promised that the Danes could forage along the coasts of the North; Osbeorn promised to depart in the spring without fighting.

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This ignominious conclusion to the Danish invasion left the North exposed to the full fury of William the Conqueror's wrath. The rebels had evidently retreated to the hills when the king crossed the Aire, assuming, no doubt, that this invasion would lead to no more permanent results than his earlier trips north had. William could be expected to rebuild the castles, but with the coming of spring, they could issue from their dens to attack them, probably in alliance with the Danes who might have forgotten by then their promise to go home. If the northerners reasoned in this way, they were completely mistaken for William the Conqueror was not to be tricked again. He had learned the nature of northern tactics from the revolts of 1068 and 1069, and he now adopted a plan which would make it impossible for the North to revolt after his departure. Leaving detachments to watch the movements of the Danes and to repair the castles, he entered the hills to hunt down and kill the rebels. The success of this operation may have been strictly limited by the latter's knowledge of the terrain of the North, but this made little difference in the long run because the main Norman effort was reserved for the peasants who were completely unprotected with their leaders hiding and the Danes neutralized. William sent groups of soldiers

throughout the Vale of York and the major river valleys with orders to harry the peasants, and it was this ghastly tactic which finally brought "peace" to the North. The Normans massacred many peasants outright, but the large number who must have escaped were ultimately doomed as completely. The soldiers burned the villages and the grain from the last harvest; they also made certain that no crop would be planted in the spring by destroying the plows and other tools of the peasants and by wantonly slaughtering the livestock.<sup>99</sup>

The most intense destruction took place in Yorkshire, but the Northumbrians did not escape completely. William held a macabre Christmas court in the burnt-out shell of York to which he had brought all the visible paraphernalia of his kingship to symbolize the legitimacy of the continuing slaughter. He then dislodged a group of rebels from Holderness and moved to the Tees where he received the submissions of Cospatric and Waltheof. The termination of their defiance did not save the Northumbrians, however. William crossed the river with the intention of wasting the countryside, but the situation in Durham was somewhat different than it had been in Yorkshire. The villages were empty. The peasants, knowing what to expect from the Normans, had escaped to the hills and forests with their herds and moveable property, and the bishop and clerks had fled to Lindisfarne leaving Durham deserted. William was consequently unable to destroy native society above the Tees as completely as in Yorkshire. The Normans did march in two major groups through eastern and central Durham to the Tyne where they destroyed Jarrow. Then they devastated the Tyne valley and perhaps southern Northumberland as far west as Hexham, but their impact on this sparsely



populated land was too small to warrant a long stay. Sometime in January, William led his army back to the Tees by way of the Roman road through the Pennine foothills and continued on to York. There he garrisoned the castles and made arrangements for the government of the North before striking west over the Pennines to harry Cheshire.<sup>100</sup>

When the spring of 1070 arrived, the northern rebels did not emerge from the hills to continue their revolt. They had resisted the Norman Conquest because they had feared a basic redefinition of the relationship between the North and the king. This fear had its origin in Tostig's murders and taxes, and it had been intensified by William's appointment of Copsig, by his gelds, and by the imposition of direct Norman rule in 1068. In 1070 this fear was no longer important. The harrying of the North had been an attempt to produce an artificial famine, and it had succeeded. Few details survive, as might be expected, but it is still clear in general what happened. The chronicles agree that there was no food in the North for those who lived through the actual military operations of the winter of 1069-70.<sup>101</sup> Some of the greater nobles survived, of course, but the mass of the peasantry faced a grim future in which mechanisms let loose by the harrying continued the destruction long after William had left. After eating their domestic animals and horses, some peasants sold themselves into slavery to avoid starvation. Others joined the bands of "outlaws" which formed in the free-zone and plundered villages which had escaped the Normans. Many starved to death; and, according to Symeon of Durham, the roads and huts of the North were littered with decaying bodies which spread disease among the living. There is even evidence that the harrying upset the

balance between human society and nature so that the wolves came down from the hills to feast on the bounty of William the Conqueror.<sup>102</sup> Substantial numbers of northerners apparently tried to escape this nightmarish world by fleeing to the South and perhaps to Scotland. Their presence is recorded as far away as Evesham, but this expedient did little good for many died or became slaves nonetheless.<sup>103</sup> These conditions ensured that the North would never again threaten William's control of England. He had solved the political problem of the North by destroying native society in Yorkshire and by severely damaging it in Durham.

## Chapter IV

- <sup>1</sup>Vita Ædwardi Regis, ed. and trans. F. Barlow (London, 1962), p. 53.
- <sup>2</sup>Whitelock, "Dealings with Northumbria," pp. 77-83.
- <sup>3</sup>Ibid., pp. 83-84; Barlow, Edward the Confessor, p. 194.
- <sup>4</sup>Freeman, The Norman Conquest, II, 375-77.
- <sup>5</sup>Barlow, Edward the Confessor, pp. 193-94.
- <sup>6</sup>Florence of Worcester, I, 223.
- <sup>7</sup>ESSH, I, 595-96n; Anglo-Saxon Writs, pp. 418, 575; Freeman, The Norman Conquest, II, 376-77. There is a possibility that Tostig also was earl of Lincolnshire. This is suggested by the presence of a large number of his retainers in Lincoln in 1065, Vita Ædwardi, p. 51.
- <sup>8</sup>Symeon of Durham, HDE, p. 97.
- <sup>9</sup>Ibid., pp. 94-95, 101.
- <sup>10</sup>Anglo-Saxon Chronicle, s.a. 1056 D, p. 132; Craster, "The Red Book of Durham," p. 528.
- <sup>11</sup>Symeon of Durham, HDE, p. 92.
- <sup>12</sup>Ibid.
- <sup>13</sup>Chronicle of the Kings of Scotland, s.a. 1057-58 D, pp. 600, 602-603.
- <sup>14</sup>Vita Ædwardi, p. 43; Gaimar, ll. 5085-86.
- <sup>15</sup>Ibid., ll. 5085-97; Symeon of Durham, HR, p. 174; Vita Ædwardi, p. 43. Ritchie, Normans in Scotland, p. 16, assigns this meeting between Malcolm and Edward to ca. 1062, apparently on the authority of Gaimar, but this is incorrect. Gaimar actually places this meeting before Tostig's trip to Rome in 1061, ll. 5087-99; and Symeon of Durham says that it took place in 1058, HR, p. 174. Finally, Archbishop Kynsige of York, who participated in these negotiations according to both Gaimar and Symeon, died in December of 1060, Anglo-Saxon Chronicle, s.a. 1060 D, p. 135. The date when Malcolm gave hostages to the English was not recorded, but it was probably also in 1058, Vita Ædwardi, p. 43.
- <sup>16</sup>Symeon of Durham, HR, pp. 174-75. De Obsessione Dunelmi, p. 220, mentions in general terms warfare and the devastation of certain Durham estates while Tostig was earl. This probably refers to Malcolm's invasion of 1061 since it is unlikely, although not impossible, that the Scottish raids before 1058 reached this far south.

<sup>17</sup> Florence of Worcester, I, 223.

<sup>18</sup> Domesday, fols. 301b-302.

<sup>19</sup> W. Farrer, "Introduction to the Lancashire Domesday," in The Victoria History of the County of Lancaster, ed. W. Farrer and J. Brownbill, I (London, 1906), 271. Neither the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle, s.a. 1065 CDE, pp. 137-38, nor Florence of Worcester, I, 223, mention any devastation of Tostig's estates. The only source which mentions such destruction is the Vita Ædwardi, p. 50, and it is highly biased in favor of Tostig and attempts to show the rebels in the worst possible light. Its evidence is, therefore, doubtful when unsupported by the other sources.

<sup>20</sup> Hugh the Chantor, p. 32; Symeon of Durham, HR, pp. 221-22.

<sup>21</sup> Ibid., p. 191.

<sup>22</sup> Gaimar, ll. 5115-22, says that Tostig went to Scotland after his return from Rome. This would put his visit in 1062 except for the fact that Gaimar also says that the revolt of 1065 took place upon Tostig's return.

<sup>23</sup> Symeon of Durham stands in the way of either suggestion. He had sources for northern history which were independent of the southern chronicles, and they would have mentioned any invasion of Scotland by Tostig. He also asserts that Malcolm held Cumberland unjustly in 1070, HR, p. 191.

<sup>24</sup> See Wilkinson, "Northumbrian Separatism," p. 508, for such an approach.

<sup>25</sup> Florence of Worcester, I, 223.

<sup>26</sup> Davis, "Cumberland," pp. 63-65. Barlow, Edward the Confessor, p. 235, n. 3, questions this identification, but his doubt is unjustified. The position of the house of Bamburgh was of sufficient importance for Cospatric, even in his old age, to be a threat to Tostig's government.

<sup>27</sup> Vita Ædwardi, p. 50, n. 4; Anglo-Saxon Writs, pp. 423-24.

<sup>28</sup> Vita Ædwardi, pp. 50-51.

<sup>29</sup> Ibid.

<sup>30</sup> Barlow, Edward the Confessor, pp. 298-99.

<sup>31</sup> Vita Ædwardi, p. 53.

<sup>32</sup> Anglo-Saxon Chronicle, s.a. 1065 C, p. 138.



33 Florence of Worcester, I, 223.

34 Domesday, fol. 269b.

35 Ibid.; Farrer, "Introduction to the Yorkshire Domesday," pp. 139-41; F. M. Stenton, "Introduction to the Domesday Survey of Lincolnshire," in The Lincolnshire Domesday, by C. W. Foster et al. (Lincoln Record Series, Vol. XIX; Horncastle, 1924), p. x.

36 J. E. A. Jolliffe, "A Survey of Fiscal Tenements," Economic History Review, VI (1936), 161-62, 171 map.

37 This was Farrer's original opinion, "Introduction to the Yorkshire Domesday," p. 139. Subsequently, he held that this low assessment was a post-Conquest attempt to ease the tax burden on the lands harried in 1069, EYC, I, x. This is an attractive hypothesis, but there seems to be no evidence which supports it. No tax reduction is mentioned in the folios of the Yorkshire Domesday, nor would such a theory explain the general low assessment of all the North. Farrer himself eventually abandoned or became uncertain of this theory of Norman reassessment, R. Lennard, "The Origin of the Fiscal Carucate," Economic History Review, XIV (1944), 57. In fact, it seems likely that this low assessment was very old. As late as the twelfth century Northumberland had not been assessed in carucates, Jolliffe, "Fiscal Tenements," pp. 161-62, 171; and in the tenth century the men of York are said to have urged Guthred to revolt against Athelstan because they had always had their own king and had never paid tribute to a southern king, John of Wallingford, p. 45. See Whitelock, "Dealings with Northumbria," p. 71. If this story represents an accurate tradition, it is unlikely that the kings of Wessex would have found it politically expedient to burden the North with heavy taxes once they took over the area. They would have been much more likely to allow the pre-Danish tax system to stand, Stenton, "The Northern Danelaw," p. 90, n. 2. The territorial extent of this low assessment did, in fact, generally correspond with the limits of the Norwegian kingdom of York, and Jolliffe has argued that this fiscal system was a survival from the days of the old Northumbrian kingdom, "The Era of the Folk," pp. 20-25. This idea is probably basically correct, but there is an additional possibility that Cnut regularized the system, Stenton, "The Northern Danelaw," pp. 86-90.

38 Ibid.

39 Symeon of Durham, HDE, pp. 87-89; Craster, The Parish of Tynemouth, pp. 41-42. The Durham version of this story is to be preferred.

40 Anglo-Saxon Chronicle, s.a. 1065 CD, pp. 137-38; Florence of Worcester, I, 223.

41 Anglo-Saxon Chronicle, s.a. 1065 D, p. 138.

- <sup>42</sup>Wilkinson, "Northumbrian Separatism," pp. 510-11.
- <sup>43</sup>Vita Ædwardi, p. 51; Barlow, Edward the Confessor, p. 236. If Tostig was, in fact, earl of Lincolnshire, the slaughter of his retainers there may represent a local revolt rather than an invasion of the northern rebels.
- <sup>44</sup>Anglo-Saxon Chronicle, s.a. 1065 DE, p. 138.
- <sup>45</sup>Barlow, Edward the Confessor, pp. 237-39; Anglo-Saxon Chronicle, s.a. 1065 D, p. 138.
- <sup>46</sup>Wilkinson, "Northumbrian Separatism," pp. 509, 515.
- <sup>47</sup>Ibid., pp. 509-15.
- <sup>48</sup>Symeon of Durham, HR, p. 198; De Primo Saxonum Adventu, p. 383; Barlow, Edward the Confessor, p. 194, n. 3. Actually, the idea that Waltheof was earl of Northamptonshire is somewhat conjectural. He may have been sub-earl of Yorkshire.
- <sup>49</sup>William of Malmesbury, Vita Wulfstani, ed. R. R. Darlington (Royal Historical Society, Vol. XL; London, 1928), pp. 22-23; M. Dolley, The Norman Conquest and the English Coinage (London, 1966), p. 37.
- <sup>50</sup>William of Malmesbury, Vita Wulfstani, pp. 22-23; Anglo-Saxon Chronicle, s.a. 1066 CD, p. 140.
- <sup>51</sup>See Barlow, Edward the Confessor, pp. 243-44, for the alliance between the two families.
- <sup>52</sup>Anglo-Saxon Chronicle, s.a. 1065 D, p. 138; s.a. 1066 D, p. 140.
- <sup>53</sup>Ibid., CDE, pp. 140-41; Florence of Worcester, I, 225.
- <sup>54</sup>Anglo-Saxon Chronicle, s.a. 1055 CD, pp. 130-31; s.a. 1058 D, p. 134.
- <sup>55</sup>Ibid., s.a. 1066 CDE, p. 141; Florence of Worcester, I, 225; Gaimar, II. 5159-93.
- <sup>56</sup>Anglo-Saxon Chronicle, s.a. 1066 C, p. 142; Stenton, Anglo-Saxon England, p. 587.
- <sup>57</sup>Anglo-Saxon Chronicle, s.a. 1066 CD, pp. 141-43; Florence of Worcester, I, 225-26.
- <sup>58</sup>Ibid.; Anglo-Saxon Chronicle, s.a. 1065 CD, pp. 141-43.
- <sup>59</sup>Symeon of Durham, HR, p. 180.

- <sup>60</sup> Anglo-Saxon Chronicle, s.a. 1066 C, p. 143. The text is ambiguous; it says that ". . . Earl Edwin and Earl Morcar assembled from their earldom as large a force as they could muster." Several interpretations could be put on this passage, but perhaps the most likely one is that "their earldom" refers to Mercia, the traditional earldom of their family. Gaimar says that they had an army drawn from seven shires which hardly suggests that they had as large a force as they could theoretically raise, l. 5214.
- <sup>61</sup> Anglo-Saxon Chronicle, s.a. 1066 C, pp. 143-44.
- <sup>62</sup> Ibid., CD, pp. 141-43; Florence of Worcester, I, 226-27.
- <sup>63</sup> Gaimar, ll. 5252-55.
- <sup>64</sup> Guillaume de Poitiers, Histoire de Guillaume le conquerant, ed. R. Foreville (Les classiques de l'histoire de France au moyen age, Vol. XXIII; Paris, 1952), p. 236; Symeon of Durham, HR, p. 198.
- <sup>65</sup> Anglo-Saxon Chronicle, s.a. 1066 C, p. 142.
- <sup>66</sup> Vita Edwardi, pp. 52-53.
- <sup>67</sup> Symeon of Durham, HR, p. 198; HDE, pp. 97-98.
- <sup>68</sup> Idem, HR, p. 198.
- <sup>69</sup> Anglo-Saxon Chronicle, s.a. 1066 DE, pp. 142, 145.
- <sup>70</sup> Ibid.; Symeon of Durham, HR, p. 198. See pp. 215-16.
- <sup>71</sup> Anglo-Saxon Chronicle, s.a. 1066 D, p. 145.
- <sup>72</sup> Ibid., E, p. 142; see pp. xiv-xvii, for a discussion of these versions of the text.
- <sup>73</sup> Symeon of Durham, HR, p. 199.
- <sup>74</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>75</sup> Anglo-Saxon Chronicle, s.a. 1067 D, p. 146; Florence of Worcester, II, 2.
- <sup>76</sup> Orderici Vitalis . . . Historiae Ecclesiasticae Libri Tredecim, ed. A. le Prevost (Société de l'Histoire de France, Nos. 13, 22, 39, 69, and 79; Paris, 1838-55), II, 182-84; The Ecclesiastical History of Orderic Vitalis, ed. M. Chibnall (3 vols., Vols. II-IV of the projected work; Oxford, 1969-73), II, 214-18. In subsequent references to Orderic, Prevost's edition will be cited first; and, when available, a reference to Chibnall's edition will be given second. Latin quotations will be taken from Chibnall.



- 77 Anglo-Saxon Chronicle, s.a. 1067 D, p. 148.
- 78 Ordericus Vitalis, II, 184; II, 216. The implication of Cospatic and Mærleswein in the revolt is shown by their flight to Scotland after its collapse, Anglo-Saxon Chronicle, s.a. 1067 D, pp. 146-48; Florence of Worcester, II, 2.
- 79 This is presumably the meaning of Ordericus Vitalis, II, 184; II, 216.
- 80 Ibid., II, 185; II, 218. Guillaume de Poitiers, p. 265.
- 81 Anglo-Saxon Chronicle, s.a. 1067 D, p. 148; Florence of Worcester, II, 2. Ordericus Vitalis, II, 184-85; II, 218.
- 82 Ibid., II, 185; II, 218.
- 83 Ibid., II, 185; II, 218.
- 84 Ibid., II, 185, 187; II, 218, 222. Florence of Worcester, II, 2.
- 85 Anglo-Saxon Chronicle, s.a. 1069 DE, pp. 149-50; Gaimar, 11. 5380-402; Domesday, fols. 373-74.
- 86 Symeon of Durham, HR, pp. 186-87; HDE, pp. 98-99. Anglo-Saxon Chronicle, s.a. 1068 DE, p. 149.
- 87 Ordericus Vitalis, II, 187-88; II, 222.
- 88 Ibid., II, 187-88; II, 222. Anglo-Saxon Chronicle, s.a. 1068 DE, p. 149.
- 89 Ordericus Vitalis, II, 188; II, 222.
- 90 Rursus Angli post regis discessum contra utrunque praesidium congregati sunt: sed Guillelmo comite cum suis uiriliter in quadam ualle dimicante non praualerunt, sed pluribus eorum captis seu trucidatis alii fuga mortem distulerunt, ibid. If this passage is accepted as it stands, one must suppose that the rebels reassembled with the intention of attacking the castles but that William fitz-Osbern defeated them before they reached the city. Alternatively, this sentence might mean that the rebels in fact reimposed the siege but that they were driven away and defeated after leaving the city. The former interpretation was adopted in the text. In her edition of Ordericus, Chibnall suggests that ualle is a mistake for uallo, "since the text implies fighting in the city," ibid., and she translates the clause in question in accordance with this emendation, "but they [the rebels] could not prevail against Earl William and his men who engaged them hotly in one of the baileys . . .," ibid., p. 223.



- 91 Symeon of Durham, HDE, pp. 99-100. The date of this expedition is uncertain, but it probably occurred after William fitz-Osbern's victory over the rebels.
- 92 Ordericus Vitalis, II, 190; II, 224-26.
- 93 Ibid., II, 191-92; II, 226-28. Anglo-Saxon Chronicle, s.a. 1069 DE, pp. 149-50; Symeon of Durham, HR, pp. 187-88; Florence of Worcester, II, 3-4.
- 94 Symeon of Durham, HR, p. 188.
- 95 Anglo-Saxon Chronicle, s.a. 1070 E, p. 151.
- 96 Ordericus Vitalis, II, 192-94; II, 228-30.
- 97 Ibid., II, 195; II, 230. The suggestion made by F. M. Stenton, Anglo-Saxon England, p. 604, that William repeated the tactic which had won him London by devastating a path north and west of York is incorrect. It contradicts Ordericus Vitalis, II, 195; II, 230; and would not have worked, in any case, since the Danes controlled the Humber.
- 98 Florence of Worcester, II, 4.
- 99 Ordericus Vitalis, II, 195-96; II, 230-32. Anglo-Saxon Chronicle, s.a. 1069 DE, p. 150; Florence of Worcester, II, 4.
- 100 Ordericus Vitalis, II, 196-97; II, 232-34. Symeon of Durham, HR, p. 189; The Priory of Hexham, ed. J. Raine (Surtees Society, Vol. XLIV; Durham, 1864), p. viii. Orderic Vitalis says that after Christmas William pursued a band of rebels who had hidden in angulo quodam regionis latitare, mari uel paludibus undique munito. Vnicus aditus per solidum intromittit: latitudine tantum uiginti pedum patens, II, 196-97; II, 232. The rebels' lair has been taken to be Tod Point at the mouth of the Tees, ibid., n. 3; but this identification is incorrect. As the king approached their base, the rebels fled; and he followed them to the Tees auia perrumpit: quorum asperitas interdum peditem eum ire compellit, ibid. This is not the description of a ride down the south bank of the Tees, but it would fit a march from the East Riding across the North York Moors to the Tees very well. Probably the rebels had been established in Holderness. Chibnall translates in angulo quodam regionis as "in a narrow neck of land," ibid., p. 233; and either her translation or the more literal "in a certain corner of the province" apply perfectly to Holderness which was nearly an island in this period. It was cut off from the rest of the East Riding by the marshes along the River Hull and by the upper reaches of the river which almost reached the sea in the neighborhood of Lisset and Gransmoor, and it was only accessible through the vicinity of Skipsea, M. Beresford, New Towns of the Middle Ages: Town Plantation in England, Wales and Gascony (New York, 1967), p. 514.

101 Anglo-Saxon Chronicle, s.a. 1070 D, p. 151; Florence of Worcester, II, 4; Symeon of Durham, HR, p. 188.

102 Ibid.

103 Chronicon Abbatiae De Evesham, ed. W. D. Macray (Rolls Series, Vol. XXIX; London, 1863), pp. 90-91.

CHAPTER V  
GOVERNMENT BY PUNITIVE EXPEDITION

Under the very eyes of the Danes who wintered in the Humber, Yorkshire had been turned into a waste land. Upon the arrival of spring, this force, probably demoralized by its lack of success and certainly half starved as a result of the Norman tactics, was no longer a dangerous fighting force.<sup>1</sup> Furthermore, no native army reappeared to try to capture the castles in York. To this extent the harrying of the North was a complete success; it had ended the last significant threat to William's possession of the Anglo-Saxon crown. Yet one must be careful not to exaggerate the effects of this event despite the overwhelming impression which it leaves. William had done his best to destroy native society in Yorkshire. This had solved his immediate problem during the winter of 1069, and it had certain "beneficial" implications from his point of view for the future. Yorkshire could no longer be used as a base for a Scandinavian attack on the rest of the kingdom. This unhappy shire could not even support its own inhabitants. Furthermore, Yorkshire could now be integrated into the Anglo-Norman kingdom in a way in which the old earldom had never been. The earldom itself was, of course, suppressed, and the royal demesne was soon bloated with confiscated estates to provide the sheriffs, who now administered the shire, with a sound financial base.<sup>2</sup> These were important considerations, but other less hopeful aspects of the situation were just as pertinent, if not more so, in the years following 1070. For one thing, despite the fact that the men of York were now just as dead as the heroic age, it is

clear that it took a number of years before either of these truths gained currency across the North Sea. The harrying of the North notwithstanding, Scandinavians would still dream from time to time of reenacting antique feats of plunder and pillage in England, and some actually would come to try. Moreover, if it was true that the men of York could not support many invading Danes, it was equally true that they could not support very many Normans. In 1070 the redevelopment of Yorkshire lay many years in the future.

Indeed, the situation in the North was more complex than it is usually made to appear. The harrying of the North established William as the most powerful and feared dispenser of political authority in the North, but it did not give him complete control or render his authority unassailable. His power was limited and his authority open to attack because the old political and military realities of the North reasserted themselves in 1070 and the years which followed. Furthermore, William seems to have realized this to some extent. At least this is suggested by the two appointments which he made in the North in 1070.

The archbishopric of York and the earldom of Northumbria were vacant, and the king filled both positions during the course of the year. To the first he appointed Thomas, a canon from Bayeux and a protégé of Bishop Odo, the king's half brother.<sup>3</sup> Thomas did not, however, succeed to all the old privileges and liberties of the position. Rather, Lanfranc, the archbishop of Canterbury, made a successful attempt with the king's support to limit Thomas's freedom by demanding a profession of obedience from him. This demand and its repetition at the consecration of later archbishops of York led to a bitter controversy between



York and Canterbury which lasted into the twelfth century. The later stages in this dispute, which were marked by polemics and forgeries, form a rather unedifying episode in ecclesiastical politics, but in the beginning serious issues were involved concerning the general nature of the Church in England.<sup>4</sup> Furthermore, the question had important political implications in 1070. Hugh the Chantor, the early twelfth-century historian of York, asserted that Lanfranc defended his demand for a profession of obedience from Thomas before the king with the argument that:

It was expedient for the unity and solidarity of the kingdom that all Britain should be subject to one primate; it might otherwise happen, in the king's time or in that of one of his successors, that some one of the Danes, Norwegians or Scots, who used to sail up to York in their attacks on the realm, might be made king by the archbishop of York, and the fickle and treacherous Yorkshire men, and the kingdom disturbed and divided.<sup>5</sup>

Lanfranc's argument was not simply a device to further his own ecclesiastical aggrandizement. It was based on a real possibility. The Danes actually took York in 1075, and in 1085 they prepared an expeditionary force which caused William the Conqueror great anxiety.<sup>6</sup> Moreover, in 1070, the very year of Thomas's appointment, there had occurred an event which had serious implications in this connection. In the spring King Swein entered the Humber to take command of his fleet. He apparently disavowed the promise which Earl Osbeorn had made the previous winter to depart England in peace; and, in the words of the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle, "the local people came to meet him and made a truce with him--they expected that he was going to conquer the country."<sup>7</sup> Some four or five months after the harrying of Yorkshire, the men of York were still prepared to receive a Danish invader; and, although nothing serious

happened in 1070, the incident shows that Lanfranc's fear that the Normans could not keep the Danes out of Yorkshire had some foundation.

Norman weakness in the North is shown even more clearly in William's other appointment in 1070. Sometime after Christmas of 1069, he had received the submissions of Cospatric and Waltheof on the banks of the Tees; and presumably around this time, he reinstated the former as earl of Northumbria.<sup>8</sup> This act of forgiveness was quite uncharacteristic of the Conqueror's dealings with landed English rebels, and it was a sign that he had no realistic hope of depriving Cospatric of power or controlling Northumbria. William cannot have had much faith in Cospatric who had been in rebellion since he purchased the earldom from the king in 1068. In 1070, however, the castles at York were the de facto northern limit of William's realm, and fifty miles of empty countryside separated them from Durham.<sup>9</sup> Even kings of the stature of Cnut had had trouble governing Northumbria, and the harrying made this task doubly difficult for William. He could not play the old game of using the men of York to keep the Northumbrians in check, and in these circumstances he was forced to recognize Cospatric, the current representative of the house of Bamburgh, as earl. This decision may have been distasteful to the king, but the establishment of some agreement with Cospatric, no matter how hollow it was, was far preferable to the alternative of Cospatric submitting to his cousin Malcolm Canmore or ambushing some new Norman earl.

The difficulty of exercising power beyond York led William to maintain the Northumbrian earldom; but there was a dark side to this situation for the Northumbrians. The ruin of Yorkshire may have insulated

them from Norman power, but it also left them to face the Scots alone. This too became obvious in 1070 when Malcolm launched his second invasion of the North. He was still in possession of Cumberland, which had been lost by Tostig in 1061; and he now showed how this flanking position could be used against the English. Sometime during the summer, the Scottish king led an army, probably mainly composed of Galwegians, into Cumberland. This force then moved up the Vale of Eden, across Stainmore, and down into Teesdale where it began to plunder the countryside.<sup>10</sup>

Malcolm's intentions on this occasion, as on most others, are rather obscure. It is possible that his invasions were only large raids conducted to gain booty and slaves. Yet this idea, whose principal recent exponent was R. L. G. Ritchie, has been rejected by J. Le Patourel in general terms, and especially in the case of the invasion of 1070 it seems difficult to sustain.<sup>11</sup> Malcolm's armies did undoubtedly come for plunder, but if this was the only consideration, the 1070 invasion was quite ill-conceived. Yorkshire had already been wasted by the Normans, and the Scots could have gotten more booty further north. Indeed, the route which Malcolm's army took during the first stage of the invasion and the fact that this was the only known Scottish invasion between 1000 and 1200 which originated solely in the West were both highly unusual. Most Scottish invasions included as their main element a thrust over the Tweed. In 1070 Northumbria was left untouched at first. Given the configuration of the border, this must have been intentional, and it probably means that Malcolm hoped to isolate Northumbria further by completing the destruction of the North Riding. Perhaps he hoped to detach the earldom once he had shown the Northumbrians

that he could conduct a campaign in Yorkshire. Cospatric was, after all, his cousin.

Initially the invasion went fairly well. The Scots plundered and burned down the south side of Teesdale and moved east into Cleveland which they also wasted. The Normans apparently did nothing; but after Malcolm was in Cleveland, something went wrong with his plans, although exactly what is not known. The Scots crossed the Tees into Hartness and began to ravage up the coast towards Wearmouth.<sup>12</sup> This was a violation of Cospatric's earldom, and it destroyed any chance of Malcolm reaching an understanding with the earl. It also put the expedition's booty in jeopardy. From either the standpoint of politics or plunder, the Scottish attack on Durham was illogical, and one can only suggest that perhaps Malcolm's army had gotten out of control. This was always a danger with a Scottish army, particularly for one with Galwegians in it, and the king's soldiers may have gone into Durham to find more abundant booty or simply to obtain food. In any case, Cospatric immediately struck back. He did not, to be sure, elect to meet the Scots in the field for he was in no position to repeat the deeds of Uhtred or even Eadulf which had resulted in the decoration of Durham's walls with the severed heads of defeated Scots. His reaction was more prosaic. Cospatric led a counter raid up the Tyne gap into Cumberland where he stole the booty which Malcolm had gathered in Teesdale and sent back over Stainmore. This raid enraged Malcolm who, in retaliation, now ordered his men to kill or enslave everyone who fell into their power. It would seem that the Scottish king viewed Cospatric's conduct as a breach of faith in some sense, but alternatively he may only have



reacted in frustration because whatever political aims he may have had were now impossible.<sup>13</sup> The enmity between Malcolm and Cospatric reduced the 1070 invasion to the status of a raid. The Galwegians committed what were to become the usual atrocities and filled Scotland with English slaves. Cospatric harassed them with sallies from Bamburgh and remained William's earl.<sup>14</sup>

This in itself is somewhat curious. It is doubtful if it can be explained on the basis of some hypothetical loyalty which the earl felt towards William. Perhaps Cospatric simply feared Malcolm more than he did William even though he and the Scottish king were first cousins and the earl had spent time in Malcolm's court. Alternatively, Cospatric's behavior may reflect the strength of the political bond which united Northumbria with the Anglo-Saxon crown, particularly when the Northumbrians were faced with Galwegians. There really is not sufficient evidence to draw a conclusion. What is clear is that Cospatric was in a difficult situation because the destruction of Yorkshire made a defense of the North impossible. There was no longer any chance of obtaining reinforcements from Yorkshire with which to beat back the Scots, and the only other source of aid, a royal expedition, could not make good this deficiency. Even if the king found it convenient to send an army north, it would inevitably arrive too late.

Indeed, it is very hard to make sense out of Cospatric's political position between 1070 and 1072. His recorded acts, although scanty, seem to have been proper. In 1070 he defended his earldom whatever he may have been plotting, and in 1071 he followed William's orders concerning the bishopric of Durham. Bishop Æthelwine, who had become

bishop under Tostig, had been outlawed late in 1069, and in 1071 William gave the bishopric to Walcher, a secular priest from Lotharingia, whom the king had invited to England to fill the post.<sup>15</sup> This was another sign that Northumbria was not really subdued. It was not secure enough to be used as patronage for one of the king's faithful clerks. William did what he could, of course, to get Walcher started. He sent the bishop to York under the care of a housecarl named Eilaf with an imposing group of magnates and ordered Cospatric to conduct him on to Durham; the earl complied.<sup>16</sup> There was also, however, another side to Cospatric's behavior. In particular, it would seem that the king's enemies were not necessarily his enemies. Several of the leaders of the revolts against William were still at large, and they were using the Northumbrian ports. In 1070 Edgar the Atheling, Siward Barn, and Merleswein were at Wearmouth with a considerable body of followers, and Bishop Æthelwine took ship for Flanders from the same port several months after he was outlawed.<sup>17</sup> All these men eventually joined Malcolm in Scotland, and the next year Siward Barn and Bishop Æthelwine with a large body of men came south again and joined Hereward on Ely.<sup>18</sup> To do this, they almost certainly stopped along the Northumbria coast, and although the brief descriptions of these movements do not connect them in any way with Cospatric, it is very difficult to believe that these old allies of the earl were sailing up and down the coast of his earldom without at least his tacit consent.

In 1072 William the Conqueror tried to put an end to all this ambiguity and chaos in the North. He had been unable to respond to Malcolm's invasion for two years because of troubles in the fens with the remnants

of King Swein's fleet and with the English rebels on Ely. In 1072, however, all these difficulties were past, and some sort of action above the Tees was necessary as the last step in the consolidation of his power over the Anglo-Saxon kingdom.<sup>19</sup> This is obvious, but exactly what he hoped to accomplish is not so self-evident. Undoubtedly he wanted to punish Malcolm for his invasion or invasions and to force him to abandon his policy of harboring Anglo-Saxon rebels and allowing them to use his kingdom as a base for operations in England. The latter aim would involve the creation of some political understanding with Malcolm, but beyond this point William's intentions are not known. Indeed, Ritchie has asserted that the preceding objectives constituted his only aims and that William had no intention of conquering Scotland in 1072. This may be correct, but it must be noted that Ritchie's argument depends entirely upon such inherent difficulties in conquering Scotland as the lay of the land, the distances involved, and the absence of strong points which had to be defended.<sup>20</sup> These considerations were probably irrelevant to William's intentions in the summer of 1072. The king did not know that Malcolm would refuse battle, nor can it be assumed that he was well informed on the geography of Scotland. In fact, there is simply not enough evidence to say with any certainty how ambitious William's plans were in 1072, and the idea that he wished to conquer Scotland is just as likely as its opposite.

If, however, William did hope to accomplish great things in 1072, these plans did not last long. During the summer he collected an army of cavalry and a fleet, and after mid August he began to move north along the east coast. With him was Eadric the Wild, presumably to act

as a technical adviser on how to deal with Celts. The fleet was perhaps intended to bring supplies, but on this occasion it is also likely that its purpose was to act against Anglo-Saxon "pirates" in the Scottish ports. At all events, the invasion went smoothly but not too successfully. William crossed into Lothian, but apparently Malcolm refused battle. Presumably with the Scots withdrawing before them, the Normans marched through Lothian and crossed the Forth into Scotland proper where they "found nothing that they were any better for," a commentary on the poverty or at least pastoralism of the northern realm, and by this time William was probably feeling somewhat frustrated and exposed.<sup>21</sup> His fleet may have had some success against the pirates, but otherwise he had accomplished nothing. Even though he had penetrated into Fife, there had been no battle. His army had collected little plunder, and he was by now some 230 to 250 miles from York, his nearest base. Indeed, his position was perilous for behind him all the way to the North Riding the dales of northern Britain lay athwart his line of retreat, and it was Malcolm who was king of the heads of these dales, a sobering lesson in geography. Furthermore, autumn was advancing, and under these circumstances, William chose to negotiate.<sup>22</sup> The two kings met at Abernethy where they came to an understanding. Malcolm accepted William as his overlord by doing homage, gave hostages, probably including Duncan his eldest son, and apparently promised to expel Edgar the Atheling, his brother-in-law, and other prominent English rebels.<sup>23</sup> For his part, William withdrew from Scotland after promising, no doubt, to respect Malcolm's borders.



This agreement may have fallen short of the Conqueror's expectations, but it had its value nevertheless. On his way south, the king plucked its first fruits, that is to say, Cospatric. Once back in Northumbria he deprived the earl of his office on the charges that the latter had been involved in planning the death of Earl Robert in 1069 and that he had helped kill Normans at York later in the same year, deeds which had presumably been forgiven on the banks of the Tees two years earlier.<sup>24</sup> Prior to William's agreement with Malcolm, the deprivation of Cospatric might have had serious repercussions, but in the late fall of 1072 it provoked no native uprising or Scottish invasion in support of the earl. Because of the Conqueror's agreement with Malcolm, Cospatric could not even stay at the Scottish court, as was his custom, and had to go into exile in Flanders.<sup>25</sup> William did not, however, change his policy with respect to the earldom at this time. His expedition had been an impressive demonstration of his power which had won him the submission of Malcolm and had allowed him to expel Cospatric. His actual control of the North depended upon his presence there, and William could not stay, even if he wanted to, because there was not enough food in southern Northumberland to support his troops.<sup>26</sup> In these circumstances he could do nothing radical, so he appointed another native earl. His choice fell on Waltheof, Siward's younger son, whose mother had been a daughter of Earl Uhtred.<sup>27</sup> Waltheof was thus, like Cospatric, related to the house of Bamburgh through the female line and could be expected to possess personal authority in Northumbria because of this fact. It is even possible that his appointment had been contemplated for some time. Alone among Edward's earls, he had enjoyed

lasting favor from William. Waltheof had been allowed to keep his father's old earldom of Huntingdon and Northampton, and he had been accorded the unparalleled privilege for an Anglo-Saxon of marrying within the Conqueror's family. His wife was Judith, the daughter of William's sister Adelaide.<sup>28</sup> Waltheof had not been permitted these honors for no reason; they were probably intended to insure that the new earl of the Northumbrians would be a faithful adherent of the king.

William may have crossed the Tyne on his way south satisfied. It can be argued either way. In a sense his achievement was superficial, but the limits of the possible were rather narrow in the North in the 1070's. With Yorkshire a waste land and in the absence of a numerous group of Norman landholders above the Tees, his power was very limited. As it was, he had obtained Malcolm's homage, gotten his enemies expelled from Scotland, and installed a new earl who was bound to him by strong ties. All these arrangements fell apart within three years, as it turned out, but it is difficult to imagine what else William could have done. It is even possible that he realized the fragile nature of the situation for he did not pass into Yorkshire before he had left behind something more substantial than the promises of Malcolm and the loyalty of Waltheof. His army stopped in Durham and built Bishop Walcher a castle where he could find relief if the natives proved recalcitrant.<sup>29</sup> Even this turned out to be a failure in the end but through no fault of William who crossed the Tees never to return.

One can hardly blame the Conqueror. It must not have been pleasant for him to be faced with problems whose insolubility was primarily the result of his own deeds. The church at Durham even had a tradition,

which had been turned into a miracle story by Symeon's time, that William had crossed the Tees at a dead run that fall through fear of St. Cuthbert or, more specifically, through dread of damnation. It is tempting to see in this story a reflection of the fact that in 1072 William came to understand the consequences of his acts.<sup>30</sup> Alternatively, the story may only mean that St. Cuthbert's monks believed that he should have understood and feared for his soul. They knew about the harrying.

Indeed, they undoubtedly knew more than their historian, Symeon of Durham, chose to explain in detail. His special concern was the history of St. Cuthbert's church and, to a lesser extent, important events which had occurred in the North. These were interests which could exclude much, yet even in his works there are hints that conditions were far worse than political and military events alone would indicate. Specifically, one might wonder what he meant when he said that William built Durham castle so that Walcher and his men would have protection ab incursantibus.<sup>31</sup> Obviously this phrase might refer to Scottish invasions or even to the type of raid characteristic of northern rebellion, and perhaps one of these was his meaning. It is also possible, however, that by this vague phrase Symeon sought to indicate a more mundane reality of the last decades of the eleventh century, a reality which has escaped historians because it did not often fall within the categories of events of interest to the chroniclers and which received, therefore, only a scant description. Individually, the notices of this phenomenon are not too informative, although some are highly suggestive. If they are combined, they show that one of the most serious results of the

Conquest on the North was an intensification of the threat from the free-zone to the agricultural communities of the east coast plain. That is to say, the number of "outlaws" increased dramatically, and to understand this development, it will be necessary to return to the years before 1066.

As late as the reign of Edward the Confessor, one of the North's outstanding problems was the large-scale brigandage made possible by the wild conditions of the free-zone. Robbers were so numerous that travelers went in groups of twenty to thirty men and still found no security when Siward was earl, and Tostig is said to have made war on these brigands with some success.<sup>32</sup> The only specific example of the latter's law and order campaign, however, shows that the problem had wider dimensions than just the inherent lawlessness of the Northumbrians. On one occasion Tostig captured a notorious "outlaw," nomine Aldan-hamel, who had been plundering, burning, and killing in Northumbria for a long time; and after his capture, Aldan-hamel's family and friends tried to ransom him, but to no avail.<sup>33</sup> This is hardly an account of the bringing to justice of a common highwayman. The uncouth name, which is presumably a mangled version of a Norse or perhaps Anglo-Saxon original, his crimes, which seem in fact to have been raids, and the attempted ransom indicate that this outlaw was in reality a man of some standing from the hills or from the West who had lived by raiding Northumbria.

If this interpretation is correct, it has extremely important implications for northern history during the eleventh and early twelfth centuries because it suggests that the famed lawlessness of the North was produced in part by predatory incursions of the inhabitants of the



shores of the Irish Sea and of the hills of the northern free-zone. Such raids would provide a reasonable explanation for the formidable level of brigandage which had existed under Siward, and Tostig's war against the "robbers" could be understood as an attempt to thwart raids from the West.<sup>34</sup> In fact, this idea fits in very well with two pieces of information which have survived from this period. First, in 1065 Tostig held nearly all of northern Lancashire with the adjoining parts of southern Westmorland and Cumberland south of the mountains, and he had probably held the great sokes centered on Gilling and Catterick opposite Stainmore.<sup>35</sup> These two groups of estates commanded the most important routes south and east from Cumberland and were probably intended as a barrier against raids. Second, this explanation is supported by the only contemporary description of Tostig's campaigns against the "Scots."

[They] harassed him often with raids rather than war. But this irresolute and fickle race of men, better in woods than on the plain, and trusting more to flight than to manly boldness in battle, Tostig, sparing his own men, wore down as much by cunning schemes as by martial courage and military campaigns.<sup>36</sup>

The Scots, by which this writer probably meant Galwegians, raided the North, and Tostig replied with the ambushes and stratagems appropriate to this kind of warfare.

Although the information on these raids is very general, it is unlikely that they were restricted to Yorkshire's border with Cumbria. Aldan-hamel had been active above the Tees, and this is not surprising because Northumbria's western border was rather different from what it is usually conceived as being. From the standpoint of Northumbria, a good border was a frontier which lay far back in the hills on a line

similar to that which existed in the thirteenth century.<sup>37</sup> With such a line, the Northumbrians would have some protection against raids from the west and certainly warning of their approach, but in this period they did not enjoy these advantages. Twelfth-century evidence indicates that the Cumbrians had expanded far to the east in the days of their power and that the Northumbrians' border with their descendants, the Galwegians, was a north-south line. During the reign of King David, all the inhabitants of Scotland south and west of the Clyde were known as Galwegians, and according to G. W. S. Barrow, Galloway "in its widest sense" comprised all of Scotland south of the Clyde and west of Teviotdale.<sup>38</sup> Moreover, Barrow's definition is probably somewhat conservative. Jocelyn of Furness says that Cumbria ran from sea to sea like Hadrian's wall, and this outrageous statement contains some truth.<sup>39</sup> Jocelyn was presumably thinking of mid-twelfth-century conditions when he wrote, and there is a way to confirm his statement in part for he also says that St. Kentigern's bishopric, Glasgow, was coterminous with the kingdom.<sup>40</sup> This is significant because David's Cumbrian inquisition makes the same identification between Cumbria and Glasgow and adds that the former lay inter Angliam et Scotiam.<sup>41</sup> Moreover, this inter was not restricted to the West. In the early twelfth century Teviotdale was apparently subject to Glasgow.<sup>42</sup> This does not, of course, bring Cumbria quite to the North Sea, but it does in general confirm Jocelyn's conception of the extent of Cumbria. Furthermore, three aspects of the feudal history of the northern end of the free-zone amplify his conception. First, despite Rufus's conquest of Cumberland in 1092, Gilsland, which was centered on the western end of the Tyne gap, remained subject to the

Scottish king until the reign of Henry II.<sup>43</sup> Second, there is no evidence whatsoever that North Tynedale was part of England until the reign of Henry I at the earliest and more probably the reign of Henry II; and third, the barony of Langley, which occupied the South Tyne west of Corbridge, was a creation of Henry II's.<sup>44</sup> The North of England was, then, much smaller and less defensible than is usually assumed. Until 1092 Northumbria's border with Cumbria probably ran north from the Rere Cross on Stainmore to the Tweed and included on the Cumbrian side the bulk of the northern free-zone, and even after this date the Scots held a large salient which protruded down to the South Tyne.<sup>45</sup> As late as the reign of Henry II, Northumbria consisted of the eastern coastal plain with the immediately adjoining hills. Corbridge and Hexham stood on the border. Given this north-south frontier, Aldan-hamel's career of plundering and burning would not have required exceptional energy on his part. He need not have lived outside the modern boundaries of Northumberland.

There are signs that a border with this configuration must always have been a source of danger for the Northumbrians during times of internal weakness or rebellion. Earl Eadulf had had to ravage the Cumbrians during his rebellion against Cnut; and Tostig, whose rule was unpopular, had struggled against raids from the West.<sup>46</sup> But after 1066 this problem became even more serious because the Norman Conquest distracted and weakened the traditional governmental powers on the east coast plain to a degree unparalleled since the ninth century. Unheard of events occurred in the North. In 1068 "Earl" Osulf of Bamburgh, the killer of Copsig, was actually killed by an outlaw; and when Bishop Æthelwine and

his men tried to return to Durham in 1070 from Lindisfarne where they had fled to escape William, despite their numbers and the presence of St. Cuthbert's body they were plundered and harassed by a certain Gilmichael, quidam ultra amen Tinam praepotens.<sup>47</sup> Later in the same year, Malcolm raided the North Riding and Durham from Cumberland, a tactic which had no recorded parallel since the days of Norwegian power in the North.

The harrying added a new dimension to this problem because with the destruction of stable society in Yorkshire "robbers" appeared below the Tees. Probably most of them were native Yorkshire men who had taken to brigandage to avoid either starvation or William's "forgiveness," but whatever their origin, they constituted a serious problem. Symeon of Durham says that throughout the 1070's travel across the empty countryside which separated Durham and York was extremely dangerous on account of outlaws and wolves, which, incidentally, faced the same problem of survival as the nobles once the peasants and their animals were destroyed; and there are other accounts which confirm Symeon's information.<sup>48</sup> The founders of Selby, which was only ten miles from York, were harassed by outlaws who lived in the woods during the 1070's, and Hugh fitz Baldric, the sheriff of Yorkshire, is said to have had to travel around the shire with a small army because there were still hostile Anglo-Saxons at large.<sup>49</sup> Finally, the monks at Whitby had trouble with outlaws during the 1070's and were so regularly robbed by outlaws from the woods as late as the reign of William Rufus that they tried to settle elsewhere.<sup>50</sup>



These examples show that brigandage was a serious and enduring problem in the aftermath of the harrying. The surviving peasants must have enjoyed little security. Furthermore, Domesday shows that the notices of rapine which found their way into the chronicles do not give the true dimensions of the problem. One of the most curious features of this document's Yorkshire folios is its account of the Pennines and Lancashire above the Ribble. These have been interpreted as showing that Yorkshire west of roughly the 400 foot line and the adjacent parts of northern Lancashire were almost entirely uninhabited in 1086, but such a view is mistaken.<sup>51</sup> The Normans did not actually survey many of the Pennine villages and all of northern Lancashire, and the most likely explanation for this is that they really did not control these areas.<sup>52</sup> Indeed, there is narrative evidence for this hypothesis. During the early 1070's Archbishop Thomas of York had Bishop Wulfstan of Worcester perform episcopal functions in parts of his diocese because these areas were still unsubdued, and the areas in question can only have been the West.<sup>53</sup>

This discovery completes the melancholy picture of the North in the years immediately after 1069. The harrying had, apparently, activated the southern free-zone by filling the hills with disinherited rebels turned outlaws, and the isolated examples of brigandage in the literary sources were only outliers, so to speak, of a much larger area which ran south from the Cumbrian border through the Pennines into northern Derbyshire and in which Norman power was not firmly established as late as the end of William's reign.<sup>54</sup> William had, then, won his crown at a terrible and lasting price for the North. Norman rule was restricted to

the east coast plain and to the western plain as a result of the harrying. Between there was brigandage. The harrying also made it extremely difficult to control Northumbria on a regular basis, and it made it impossible to keep the king of the Scots and the Cumbrians from raiding the North, particularly given the fact that the Cumbrian border was so far east. These were the basic problems which confronted Norman rule in the North during the rest of the eleventh century. They could not be solved until a numerous Norman aristocracy was established beyond the Humber which could control Northumbria and fight the Scots. Such a group could not be created until Yorkshire was redeveloped, and this took time both because of the magnitude of the task and because the danger to peasants from outlaws based in the free-zone had to be contained first. In the meantime, the events of northern history proceeded from an outré mixture of traditional problems in an acute form and Norman weakness. The North was violent and unstable, and it is no wonder that William never crossed the Tees again and came only once more to York. The Abernethy understanding could only fall apart.

Although this occurred by degrees between 1072 and 1080, the first signs of what was to come appeared in 1074. With the Abernethy agreement less than two years old, Edgar the Atheling sailed back to Scotland from Flanders with his followers, and it is unlikely that he came uninvited.<sup>55</sup> Malcolm had either decided that he could safely harbor his brother-in-law, or he was plotting to disrupt the North again. The latter would be the more likely of the alternatives if 1074 was also the year when Malcolm invited Cospatric to come to Scotland from Flanders and gave him the earldom of Dunbar in Lothian, an event which was

clearly a prelude to trouble in Northumbria. But although the return of Edgar and Cospatric would logically fit together, it is impossible to date the latter event with any precision.<sup>56</sup> It may have happened in 1074; but, in any case, the reception of Edgar by itself was a clear violation of the understanding between Malcolm and William and showed that the former had not been too impressed by the Conqueror in 1072. This incident did not, however, lead to any serious problems in the North because of two unforeseen events. While Edgar was in Scotland, the French king offered him a castle on the Channel from which he could harass William. Edgar accepted, but on his way south he lost all of his ships in a storm somewhere along the English coast. This disaster ended the Atheling's open opposition to the Conquest. He regained Scotland but now sought and obtained a reconciliation with William, presumably because he had lost too many followers to remain a plausible rebel.<sup>57</sup>

The Atheling's defection from the forces of disorder was not, however, very important. He had never been dangerous except on the theoretical level. Yet the events of 1074 still raise two rather curious questions. One might wonder, for instance, why Malcolm had risked William's displeasure for no apparent reason and how Edgar, despite shipwreck, his own incompetence, and the Normans, had managed to escape back to Scotland, particularly since some of his followers went on foot.<sup>58</sup> These questions, unfortunately, cannot be definitely answered, but this in itself suggests that some important aspect of the northern political situation in 1074 was not recorded in the chronicles. Even more curiously, the same problem is encountered in the events of 1075. In that year, Earl Waltheof of Northumbria, whom William had appointed

only three years previously, went into open revolt in company with the Breton earl of East Anglia and the Norman earl of Hereford. Given such a bizarre coalition, the motives of the rebels were bound to be rather disparate, but despite the fact that historians have realized this, no one has succeeded in producing a convincing explanation of why Waltheof joined the revolt.<sup>59</sup> This is not the fault of the historians who have studied the revolt, however. The difficulty stems directly from the primary Anglo-Norman chronicles whose writers either did not know why Waltheof had revolted or deliberately minimized his role in the affair because his headless corpse had begun to perform miracles, a sure sign of innocence.<sup>60</sup> The embellishment and outright fabrication which this point of view necessitated would not have been possible if the real reason for Waltheof's revolt had been current in the South in the late eleventh and early twelfth centuries.

Some important event or situation of 1073 or 1074 has been left out of the major chronicles. Only its ramifications, which together amount to the collapse of most of William's authority in the North, are visible. Fortunately this gap can be filled, although not with the exactitude which one might wish. Symeon of Durham knew what had happened, but he buried the event in one of St. Cuthbert's miracles in the defense of Northumbrian property where it has successfully eluded historians. This miracle shows that Waltheof had excellent reasons for joining the revolt of Earls Ralph and Roger; indeed, he had no choice at all. The reason for this was that William the Conqueror had blundered badly. Either in 1073 or more probably in 1074, he decided to levy a tribute or tax on Northumbria and sent a certain Ralph above the Tees to collect it.<sup>61</sup>



The miracle describes the imposition of this tax as uncustomary, and given the reaction of the Northumbrians to demands for money in the past, the result might have been easily anticipated. But these Northumbrians were on their best behavior in a miracle story; and, in any case, credit, especially credit for defying the king, belonged to St. Cuthbert. Kept alive by this necessity, Ralph went about his business levying the tribute, but on the night before it was to be collected, he foolishly dropped his guard and went to sleep. This, of course, gave Cuthbert his opening. He duly appeared to Ralph in a dream, chided him severely for taxing his flock, and intimated that he would not get away with it unscathed. Ralph awoke the next day "sick." He had lost all interest in gathering the tribute and only wished to escape Northumbria alive. After he had made appropriate signs of reverence to St. Cuthbert, this was granted to him. Upon his departure he regained his health, but, needless to say, he carried with him no money.<sup>62</sup>

Although Cuthbert was a powerful saint, this story must be a twelfth-century monk's way of saying that William had tried to tax Northumbria, probably believing that he had accomplished more in 1072 than he actually had, and that the Northumbrians had driven out the tax collectors. Waltheof was inevitably involved in this because either he had been a party to the expulsion of Ralph or he had failed to protect him. Either way, he was effectively in revolt against William. Furthermore, Waltheof made the now traditional Northumbrian gesture of defiance of southern authority. He sent a raiding party of Northumbrians over the Tees in search of the sons of Carl who were now to pay for their father's killing of Waltheof's grandfather on his mother's

side, Earl Ealdred. One might well wonder what Siward would have thought about all this. His son had changed sides in the old battle between Bamburgh and York, but this paradox did not save the sons and grandsons of Carl. The Northumbrians caught them at a banquet and killed most of them.<sup>63</sup>

The innuendoes of this deed may have been lost on the Normans, but its basic meaning was unmistakable. William's authority in the North had collapsed in 1074, and it was entirely his own fault given the Northumbrians' sensitivity on the question of tribute. Their behavior was entirely consistent with what they had done in 1065 and during the early revolts against William. The only question involved--and this is perhaps the reason why William felt it safe to levy the tax--is understanding how they had the effrontery to do it again, especially with the harrying only four years past. Furthermore, they were now faced with the same old difficulty as in past revolts. It was one thing to drive out the agents of an unpopular southern government; it was quite another to avoid paying for it.

This problem presumably bothered Waltheof, and he may have been more active in the events of 1074 and 1075 than one can gather from the chronicles. In particular, Edgar's return to Scotland and Malcolm's willingness to receive him with honor were probably connected with Waltheof's revolt and may represent the first steps in an unsuccessful attempt by the earl to obtain aid from this quarter. Waltheof is also likely to have been seriously involved in the planning of the revolt of 1075, if only because he stood in such great need of aid. His momentarily successful defiance of William can only have encouraged Ralph and

Roger, and he may even have convinced them to revolt rather than the opposite as the chronicles assert.<sup>64</sup> Finally, the rebel earls invited a Danish fleet to come to their aid, and although Ralph and Roger are expressly said to have been responsible for this, it is more likely that it was the work of Waltheof or at least accomplished through his intermediacy.<sup>65</sup>

In any case, a respectable coalition, which offered Waltheof more hope than he had had any right to anticipate in 1074, had been brought together by the spring of 1075. Unfortunately for the earl, it vanished as quickly as it had been formed. The rebels were undone by a failure to coordinate their actions which stretched from the English borderlands to Denmark. No one was on time in 1075 except William's representatives. The arrival of the Danes was delayed by a conflict between the sons of Swein Estrithson who had died in April of 1074.<sup>66</sup> Despite this rather major flaw in their plans, Ralph and Roger took the field anyway, but they were unable to unite their forces. Roger remained penned up in the West, and Ralph's revolt quickly contracted to the inside of his castle at Norwich which was besieged by William's forces for three months.<sup>67</sup> For his part, Waltheof, the victim, no doubt, of a growing sense of desperation, seems to have stayed in the North waiting for the Danes. Rumors were current, to be sure, that the North was in revolt, and Lanfranc ordered Walcher to be prepared for the arrival of the Danes.<sup>68</sup> Yet as the revolt in the South collapsed, Waltheof apparently remained inactive because he realized that the Northumbrians could not act alone, and when the failure of the Danes to arrive had clearly undone the revolt, he capitulated. According to one version of the Anglo-Saxon

Chronicle, the earl crossed to Normandy to seek William's pardon and offered the king "treasure," presumably the tribute which had been withheld in 1074. From Waltheof's point of view this sign of submission may have seemed sufficient atonement; but, if so, he was forgetting the fate of Earls Uhtred, Ealdred, and Eadulf. His was to be no different. William dissembled until they had returned to England and Waltheof's safe-conduct had presumably expired. Then he had the earl cast into prison.<sup>69</sup> About the same time the Danes finally arrived with a fleet of 200 ships. They could do nothing against the Normans by themselves; and, after a perfunctory cruise up the Humber to York where they sacked the cathedral, they left the kingdom.<sup>70</sup>

Thus the great coalition of 1075 faded away. Military events had made a mockery of the real danger which the alliance between the rebels and the Danes had posed, and William's authority was again unchallenged in the North. This was not the case, however, in Brittany whither Ralph de Gael, the ex-earl of Norfolk, had removed his revolt. A threatening situation was developing there,<sup>71</sup> and it was perhaps this circumstance which induced the king to treat the Northumbrians moderately. Waltheof, who had risen far too high in the royal favor to be forgiven, was beheaded; but the royal punitive expedition which might have been anticipated was not sent into the North.<sup>72</sup> By the next campaigning season William had a more pressing use for his soldiers than burning out Northumbrians, so they went unpunished for once. The king merely appointed a new earl, and his choice was as conciliatory as it could have been short of selecting another member of the house of Bamburgh, whose representatives had not been notable for their loyalty. No new Norman earl was



placed over the Northumbrians; rather, the king built upon the one pillar of public authority above the Tees which still stood. Bishop Walcher was allowed to buy the earldom.<sup>73</sup> He had remained both alive and loyal since his appointment in 1071, an impressive accomplishment for an outsider above the Tees; and his selection was the easiest solution to the problem of Northumbrian government in 1076 for anything else would have risked an incident. Furthermore, William seems to have made an attempt to bolster Walcher's prestige. He restored to Durham an old estate which had been lost, granted some new property, and confirmed the ancient laws and customs of the bishopric.<sup>74</sup> The latter presumably included a promise that Walcher's rule was not to be disturbed by any threat of royal taxation.

This makeshift arrangement functioned with some success for five years. It is, however, difficult to form a very clear impression of the nature of Walcher's government or its popularity with the Northumbrians. He was fondly remembered by later monks at Durham, and Symeon portrays him as an honest, upright man who diligently performed his episcopal duties.<sup>75</sup> Of course, the support which Walcher gave to the revival of monasticism in the North would be enough to account for this, although there is no compelling reason to believe that it does.<sup>76</sup> Rather, it seems likely that certain aspects of Walcher's character were edited out, so to speak. The bishop was clearly an exceptionally ambitious man. Why else would he have undertaken the care of St. Cuthbert's testy flock, not to mention the government of Northumbria? Furthermore, if he really did buy the earldom, one must suppose that he intended to get his money back. Walcher had not come into Northumbria just to be a good

bishop, even though he may have been one; and he was sufficiently political-minded to grasp the basic truth that to survive above the Tees he had to come to terms with the house of Bamburgh. From an early date he had adopted a certain Ligulf as his principal adviser. The latter was an important landowner who had retired to his Northumbrian estates in the face of the Conquest and who was married to a daughter of Earl Ealdred. He was, thus, like Cospatric and Waltheof, connected with the Bamburgh family, and his presence in the bishop's council must have provided a link with the native aristocracy. Indeed, Walcher is said to have performed no important secular act without his consent,<sup>77</sup> and this policy of accommodation and respect for Northumbrian tradition was probably responsible for Walcher's survival. It is also obvious, however, that there was another side to the bishop's government. Even Symeon of Durham does not suppress the fact that Walcher's household knights often plundered and occasionally killed the natives and that Walcher did nothing to stop them.<sup>78</sup> This was, needless to say, a very dangerous policy which could be expected to provoke the Northumbrians, and it is extremely difficult to account for it. The usual explanation, which is an extrapolation from Symeon, is that Walcher was simply incapable of controlling his soldiers, and this may have been the case.<sup>79</sup> Alternatively, Walcher's soldiers may have acted on the bishop's orders, conceivably in response to native opposition or out of arrogance, situations which Symeon would not have felt free to mention since either would have put the bishop in a bad light.

Whichever of these was actually the case, Walcher's government did arouse the resentment of the Northumbrians; and, even without the

misdeeds of his soldiers, this was probably only to be expected given the circumstances which had surrounded his acquisition of the earldom in 1075. William's conciliatory settlement of the rebellion of 1074-75 is unlikely to have impressed on them the inadvisability of defying Norman power, but it is impossible to tell how serious this problem was between 1075 and 1079. In the latter year, however, an event occurred which may have been prompted by the weakness of Walcher's government and which increased his difficulties with the Northumbrians. In August of 1079 Malcolm Canmore finally decided that it was safe to ignore the Abernethy agreement entirely and launched his third invasion of the North. Certain general considerations which had nothing to do with the North were undoubtedly involved in this decision. In 1077 Malcolm had defeated the ruler of Moray, his chief domestic rival, and this victory had freed him from internal dangers.<sup>80</sup> Furthermore, William the Conqueror was fighting his son Robert in northern France that summer and must have seemed only a very distant threat.<sup>81</sup> Malcolm probably also judged, however, that Walcher would be able to put up no serious resistance. Certainly this proved to be the case. In mid August the Scots came over the border and freely plundered Northumberland for about three weeks. During this time Walcher seems to have done nothing. He did not even launch counter raids as Cospatric had done in 1072, and the Scots were able to return home with many slaves and much booty.<sup>82</sup>

This invasion set the stage for the last outrage of the Northumbrians. Walcher's failure to provide even a nominal defense for Northumberland apparently ended his prestige; and by spring, Ligulf, Walcher's native collaborator, became uncooperative in council. He was the

natural leader of any resistance to Walcher, and this was, therefore, a serious development. Unfortunately, what occurred is obscure because the only coherent account of the incident, that of Florence of Worcester, explains it in terms of a personal conflict between Ligulf and two of Walcher's subordinates, his chaplain Leobwin and Gilbert, the bishop's kinsman who managed the secular government of the bishopric. According to Florence, Leobwin had been jealous of Ligulf for some time and decided to kill the latter after Ligulf had opposed him in the bishop's council.<sup>83</sup> Since Ligulf was the current link between the Bamburgh family and Northumbrian government, however, one may legitimately doubt whether the incident was this simple; but even if it was, the Northumbrians had lost too many members of the house of Bamburgh ever to believe that the event which followed was not an official act of Walcher's government.

A classic sequence ensued. Gilbert, who had agreed to do the deed, attacked Ligulf's hall by surprise in the night and killed him along with most of his household.<sup>84</sup> The use of this tactic should probably be understood as a sign that Walcher and his men were already faced with a serious situation, although it is theoretically possible that the arrogance of Gilbert and Leobwin was so great that they disregarded the obvious danger of what they had done. In either case, the murder of Ligulf had been a fatal mistake because whether or not the Northumbrians had been contemplating a revolt, they had now been provoked by the traditional act of oppression, the murder of a member of the house of Bamburgh by an agent of the king. Their reprisal was equally traditional. Walcher had shut himself up in Durham castle after the murder, but he



soon consented to a meeting with Ligulf's relatives at Gateshead which offered a convenient gathering place for Northumbrians from either side of the Tyne. Presumably he had been offered some hope that peace could be restored, but the meeting was in actuality a trap. When Walcher arrived at Gateshead with a hundred knights on May 14th, he found that the Northumbrians would come to no agreement. He then with some naïvete retired to the church, but it did no good. The Northumbrians first killed all of his retainers who had remained outside, then cut down Gilbert and the bishop when they tried to escape, and finally burned down the church to get at Leobwin. The killer of the bishop was Eadulf Rus, the son of Cospatric who had been killed by Tostig in 1064.<sup>85</sup>

In a fundamental sense the massacre at Gateshead was the last incident in Northumbrian history because the Northumbrian nobility had finally overreached itself. The rebels did go down to Durham where they besieged the castle, but they were unable to take it by assault and withdrew on the fourth day of the siege.<sup>86</sup> Probably they reasoned that the castle garrison was too small to be a serious threat; and, in any case, their major objective, the destruction of Walcher and the instruments of his government, was already accomplished. In 1080 as in past revolts, the Northumbrians had acted in response to a specific outrage. Once this was avenged, there was nothing else for them to do. They may even have reasoned with the events of 1075 in mind that the worst which they could expect would be the imposition of a new earl, and their failure to press the siege of the castle, which was within their means, may have been an attempt to limit the provocation which they gave the king.


If this was the case, it was a futile gesture. The Northumbrians were undone by their lack of imagination. After lifting the siege they had gone home.<sup>87</sup> This time William did not simply appoint a new earl. He had been doing that since 1067 when his first earl had been killed. In 1080, he made a determined attempt to take Northumbria in hand; and, even though the measures which followed are not known in detail, they seem to have been part of a comprehensive plan. First, the Northumbrians were punished for the killing of Walcher and his men. At some date during the summer, William's half brother Odo led an expedition into Northumbria to harry the countryside. No chronicler describes what transpired in any detail, but Odo's purpose seems to have been to kill Northumbrians. The Normans slaughtered and maimed both the guilty and the innocent, and they were apparently able to weaken the native nobility seriously, killing or driving into exile many of its members.<sup>88</sup> This was an extremely important event. It was the final solution to the old problem of governing the Northumbrians which stretched back to the days of Cnut's conquest of England. There would be no more native revolts above the Tees because in 1080 the Northumbrian nobility had joined the nobles of York.

Odo's expedition solved one aspect of the general political and military problem which the North posed, but it did little to insure that the Normans could keep control of the area. The Northumbrian nobility had at least demonstrated little inclination to go over to the Scots except in extremis, and with them gone, some action against Malcolm was clearly necessary. William met this need with a second expedition in 1080. In the fall, he sent his son Robert into Scotland with an army.

It has been asserted that the purpose of this move was entirely diplomatic, that it was a "demonstration in force" designed to bring about a reconciliation with Malcolm,<sup>89</sup> but there is no proof that this was the intention. William and Robert may have hoped for a decisive battle which would simplify the situation in the North, and all that is known for certain is that a battle did not take place. Robert led his army through Lothian to Falkirk where he met Malcolm. The Scottish king would not fight, and Robert was faced with the choice of chasing him further or negotiating. Robert chose the latter. The two men renewed the Abernethy agreement, and Malcolm gave more hostages for his good behavior. Then Robert returned to Northumbria nullo confecto negotio.<sup>90</sup> This phrase of Symeon's certainly suggests that the outcome of Robert's expedition was thought to be unsatisfactory.

Still, Robert had accomplished all that could be realistically hoped; and, like his father in 1072, he did not leave the Northumbrian landscape as he had found it. On his way south Robert stopped on the north side of the Tyne opposite Gateshead and built a new castle, the Newcastle as it would become in time. The erection of this castle had a multiple significance. On the one hand, its location across from the spot where Walcher and his men had been massacred stood as a warning to the remaining Northumbrians. On the other hand, it was a tangible sign that Norman England now extended to the Tyne. Some historians would also add that the location of this castle was an admission that the country north of the Tyne was debatable, or perhaps even Scottish,<sup>91</sup> but neither of these suppositions is true except perhaps in a military sense. Newcastle could defend Durham but not Northumberland.

Map 5. The Normans in the North





Yet this observation, despite its descriptive truth in 1080 and for many years to come, obscures the fact that Newcastle was probably intended as a base for the new regime which William created in Northumbria after the conclusion of the military operations of 1080. Robert had secured freedom for the North from major Scottish invasions, and Odo had crushed native opposition to Norman rule. These circumstances made it possible for William to integrate Northumbria more closely into the kingdom than it had been in the past by introducing Normans into the ecclesiastical and secular government of the earldom. Before the year was out, William de St. Calais, a trusted administrator of the king, obtained the bishopric of Durham; and around the same time, a certain Aubrey became earl of Northumbria.<sup>92</sup> For the latter to succeed, however, he needed a stronghold between Durham castle, which belonged to the bishop, and Bamburgh, the ancient fastness of the earls, which was nearly forty-five miles above Gateshead. Newcastle provided this. It was a secure bridgehead into Northumberland, the necessary preliminary to the exercise of political and military power above the Tyne.

Moreover, Newcastle did not stand alone. The expeditions and appointments of 1080 which brought the formal conquest of Northumbria were matched to the south by the beginnings of an assault on the free-zone. This was a task of the utmost importance because the creation of a strong North depended upon the extension of Norman control into the hills. Until this was accomplished, the peasants would still be subject to brigands, and it would not be too important who was earl or bishop. Indeed, this was strikingly illustrated in 1081(?) when William's new earl of Northumbria actually resigned the honor and went home because he

either could not control the earldom or thought it was worthless.<sup>93</sup> This curious incident forced William to appoint another earl, Robert de Mowbray, and confirmed the need for the policy, which had probably already begun, of establishing a series of compact fees at the mouths of the major breaks in the southern Pennines and in other places which were subject to the incursions of outlaws and pirates. Some of these fees were explicitly known as castleries, and all of them were exceptionally compact units. Their purpose was defensive in the sense that they were designed to control communications, and some of them, notably those which adjoined the hills, were intended as bases for expansion.<sup>94</sup> Furthermore, their lords usually possessed formidable judicial powers which included infangthief, the right to have a gallows, the right to the goods of condemned fugitives, the assize of bread and ale, and the return of writs except for pleas of the crown.<sup>95</sup> Taken together, these powers amounted to effective police power. They were all that a baron needed to be a terror to outlaws and robbers, and herein probably lay the principal day to day function of these fees. They were established to provide law and order in vulnerable districts. A castlery was not simply an area organized for the support of a castle; it was also the area subject to the castle.

The oldest of these units around the Pennines was in the south and probably dated back to the days when the marcher earldoms themselves had been formed. Henry de Ferrers' castlery of Tutbury dominated the roads which converged on Derby from the northwest and blocked the major river valleys of the southern end of the Pennines,<sup>96</sup> and there was a similar, although smaller, unit west of Nottingham where the holdings of William

Peveler, which may also have been a castlery, covered the city against the west.<sup>97</sup> These two fees had probably been formed in the early 1070's to secure communications around the southern end of the free-zone and to contain raids from this area. Hereward the Wake, it will be remembered, was killed by knights from Tutbury according to Gaimar.<sup>98</sup> They also presumably served as the direct archetype for the fees which William created in the North around 1080.

This late date for the establishment of the castleries and similar districts in Yorkshire may seem rather surprising, but it is apparently correct. W. E. Wightman has argued from the details of their description in Domesday that they were formed late in William's reign, probably as an aid to Robert de Mowbray, and his reasoning is convincing.<sup>99</sup> Moreover, Symeon of Durham specifically states that the countryside of Yorkshire remained uncultivated and empty for nine years after the harrying, and the most probable explanation for the passing of these conditions is that William had begun to create defensive districts at critical spots in the North in 1079-1080.<sup>100</sup>

Two castleries and three exceptionally large and compact fees were established to protect the lowlands of the North from the various threats which surrounded them. There was, on the one hand, the danger of piracy along the coast; and Holderness, the area most exposed to this danger, was given almost in its entirety to Drogo.<sup>101</sup> On the other hand, there was the more serious threat from the wild parts of Yorkshire, the fens and the mountains; and three large lordships, Tickhill, Pontefract, and Richmond, were established in settled regions which adjoined these areas. In the far south of the West Riding and in the neighboring parts

of Derbyshire and Nottinghamshire, Roger de Busli was given a compact fee (Tickhill) through which the roads from York passed south and which abutted three dangerous areas, the Pennines on the west, the fens at the head of the Humber on the east, and Sherwood forest on the southeast.<sup>102</sup> North of Roger's land stood Ilbert de Lacy's castlery of Pontefract. It stretched continuously from the Pennine foothills to the fens on either side of the Aire. Pontefract dominated not only all the roads running north-south, but also the entrance of the Aire gap which was the easiest passage through the Pennines from their southern end to the Tyne gap far to the north.<sup>103</sup> The next important passage through the mountains above the Aire gap was Stainmore in the North Riding, and it was blocked by Count Alan's castlery of Richmond, a solid block of 199 manors on the eastern slopes of the Pennines and the edge of the Vale of York.<sup>104</sup> Richmond, Pontefract, and Tickhill closed the easiest exits from the Pennines and together provided security for the Vale of York. In the West the functions of these fees and of Holderness were combined in the lordship of Roger of Poitou who held all of Lancashire between the Ribble and the Mersey along with the western flanks of the Pennines around the approaches to the Aire gap.<sup>105</sup> Roger's fee was in reality a military salient intruded between the free-zone and the Irish Sea pirates. Finally, by 1086 a new royal castle had been raised far up the Derwent valley at the Peak in Derbyshire.<sup>106</sup>

The creation of these lordships around the Pennines was the most important development which took place in the North in the 1080's because they offered the hope that the danger from the free-zone could be contained and ultimately destroyed. Unfortunately, however, the



daily activities of men such as Ilbert de Lacy or William Peverel, not to mention Earl Robert de Mowbray in the wilds of Northumberland, were not gaudy enough to attract the attention of the chroniclers, and nothing is known of them. Indeed, hardly anything at all happened in the North outside the ecclesiastical sphere between 1080 and 1087 according to the chronicles. There were no murders, revolts, or invasions, and Norman power was uncontested, at least during the daylight hours and away from the woods. The only exception to this was the threatened Danish invasion of 1085 which probably provoked the devastation of Holderness by the Normans, but in the end the Danes did not come.<sup>107</sup>

In fact, this rare period of peace even survived the Conqueror's death in 1087. The military activities connected with the baronial revolt of 1088 were limited to southern England, and even though Earl Robert and Bishop William were among the rebels, there were only minor repercussions in the North in a direct sense. Malcolm did not invade either because he was getting old or because he was waiting to see how Rufus would fare against the rebels, and Robert de Mowbray obtained a complete reconciliation with the king. Indeed, the only ones to suffer at all were William de St. Calais and the clerks of Durham. The former, who may have done some local raiding, was exiled as a result of the revolt, and the latter had to endure the fiscal tedium of one of Rufus's agents until the bishop's restoration three years later.<sup>108</sup> With this exception, the tranquility of the North remained unbroken until 1091 when open warfare with the Scots broke out.

This appearance of tranquility may be deceptive, however, because there is a possibility that the settlement of the baronial revolt of

1088 brought a basic change in royal policy in the North. Certainly there was need for a change from the Norman point of view. William the Conqueror had achieved the destruction of serious opposition to Norman rule in the North but little else, and when Rufus became king the Normans above the Humber were still in a weak and unsatisfactory position. With their settlement limited to below the Ribble in the West and probably to south of the Wansbeck in Northumberland,<sup>109</sup> they were potentially at the mercy of the Scots given the fact that the border was as disadvantageous as ever and that the redevelopment of Yorkshire had only begun despite the creation of castleries around the southern free-zone. This area itself was still for the most part unsubdued, and the peace of the North depended on the homage of Malcolm Canmore, a volatile substance.

These circumstances cannot have been pleasing to the Normans in the North. Ultimately they could only be solved by time, but in one respect, the danger which stemmed from the border, the situation could be improved quickly by a change of royal policy. Specifically, Rufus could disregard his father's understanding with Malcolm. Malcolm's homage to William has usually been considered from the standpoint of whether it compromised the "independence" of the Scottish kingdom, and this is unfortunate because the arrangement was as much in Malcolm's interest as in William's. The Scottish king did homage and thereby accepted a position of political subordination which meant little in practice; William, however, must have guaranteed him against general Norman aggression or infringements on the border. In fact, the meeting of 1080 is said to have included a definition of the border although its precise terms are

unknown.<sup>110</sup> This understanding was to Malcolm's advantage for it, in effect, froze the border and indirectly limited Norman settlement to areas which were not too exposed to the sudden eruptions of Scots and Galwegians. A breach with Malcolm was, therefore, in the interest of the northern nobles if they could be assured of royal support in the hostilities with the Scots which could follow, and it is likely that Rufus gave this promise in 1088. As a result of the baronial revolt of that year, the marcher lords seem to have obtained the abrogation of similar guarantees which William had given to the Welsh princes, and it is unlikely that the northern rebels, especially Robert de Mowbray and Roger of Poitou, would have been satisfied with less.<sup>111</sup>

This can only be offered as an hypothesis, however, because there is an important gap in the chronology of events in the North under Rufus. At some point the king resumed his father's policy of establishing well enfranchised lordships along the edges of the free-zone, but exactly when these baronies were created can only be guessed. In one instance, that of Skipton in Craven, this is not a serious problem.<sup>112</sup> Skipton stood at the head of the Aire, and although it was of great importance because it split the southern free-zone and insured direct communications with the West, its establishment had only internal significance. This was not the case with Rufus's other new baronies which were all on the Scottish border. In the West, he gave Ivo Taillebois a new lordship composed of Ewecross Wapentake, southern Westmorland, and southern Cumberland. These lands provided the basis for the later baronies of Burton in Lonsdale, Kendal, and Copeland, and if Furness was included, as is likely, they constituted a continuous strip of land

running from the northwestern exit of the Aire gap to the Irish Sea. Ivo's lands covered all the routes north into Cumbria and all the trails from northern Lancashire over the Pennines from the Aire gap northwards. If this land was given to Ivo prior to 1092, it originally formed a frontier castlery analogous to Richmond.<sup>113</sup> Rufus also created similar lordships along the east side of the Pennines. Guy de Balliol obtained upper Teesdale where he built Barnard Castle and the barony of Bywell in the Tyne valley.<sup>114</sup> Furthermore, it is possible, although not likely, that Rufus gave Redesdale to Robert de Umfraville who held this valley by the tenure of guarding or keeping it from the outlaws.<sup>115</sup> This was, of course, the purpose of Bywell and Barnard Castle also. These lordships blocked either the two or the three most obvious passages above Richmond from Cumbria into Northumbria and were of the utmost importance for protecting the coastal plain. Rufus's fees were, moreover, squarely on the Cumbrian border, or in the case of Ivo's lands, what was the border before 1092; and, if they were formed prior to 1092, they were a direct provocation to Malcolm Canmore and a sign that the spirit of Abernethy was dead.

This problem of timing is important because of the chain of events which began in 1091 and which led to great political changes in northern Britain. In that year Malcolm Canmore shattered the peace of the North by invading Northumbria, and the question is whether he did this for his own reasons, such as to aid Edgar the Atheling who had been deprived of his estates in Normandy, or whether he had been baited into it just as Rhys ap Tewdwr, the king of South Wales, was being baited in these same years by the marcher lords of Wales.<sup>116</sup> Probably the latter was the



case, although it is impossible to be certain. The invasion of 1091 was, at least, extraordinary. Not only did Malcolm invade Northumberland in May, a very bad time of year for an army to find provisions in the North, but he apparently hoped to take Durham, something not attempted by the Scots since Duncan's expedition in the 1040's and which, if successful, would have resulted in the collapse of Norman power above the Tees. The invasion of 1091 was a serious attack, not a raid or only a diplomatic gesture as has been suggested,<sup>117</sup> and it indicates that Malcolm either felt himself to be in an exceptionally strong position, which is unlikely, or that he had become alarmed at the growth of Norman power in the North. In either case, his bold stroke did not work, though the reasons for this are far from clear. The Scots entered Northumberland in May. They then moved south, by-passed or took Newcastle, and penetrated as far as central Durham. At this critical point, however, the oldest descriptions of these events become contradictory. The account which is usually followed, a summary of Malcolm's raids in the Historia Regum, says that Malcolm was confronted by a small group of knights at Chester-le-Street just north of Durham and quickly withdrew.<sup>118</sup>

Other sources, including a different passage in the Historia Regum itself, indicate that this is not what happened or, at least, not all that happened. The main narrative in the Historia Regum directly associates the failure of Malcolm's invasion with the arrival of William Rufus's retaliatory expedition in the North in the fall, and one of St. Cuthbert's miracles indirectly explains what took place.<sup>119</sup> It indicates that Durham was, in fact, besieged for some time in 1091, that the opposing knights did nothing to drive away the Scots, and that the

latter finally fled for no apparent reason.<sup>120</sup> The befuddlement of invading armies and of historians who would trace their movements was, of course, one of St. Cuthbert's most important abilities, but in this particular instance the writer goes too far. To complete the miracle, he adds that Bishop William was restored in the same hour as the one in which the Scots decamped.<sup>121</sup> The bishop's appearance out of nowhere would have been a miracle indeed; but, in fact, it is known from other sources that William de St. Calais was reinstated in the fall of 1091 by Rufus, his brothers, and a large Norman army which was on its way north to fight Malcolm.<sup>122</sup> They were the ones who saved Durham, and this in turn means that the Scots had stayed in Northumbria throughout the summer of 1091.

This was an ominous development, and even if Rufus had not been hitherto pursuing a policy hostile to the Scots, he now embarked on one. The English king had come north that fall with an army and a fleet to force a military decision, and when it became clear that the Scots had already retreated out of Northumbria, he moved after them into Lothian. Not unpredictably, this direct approach failed in 1091 just as it had in 1072 and in 1080. Malcolm would not give battle, and Rufus's chances of ever catching him were completely destroyed when he lost his supply fleet. The Norman army was soon cold and starving, and the invasion ended in the usual way. Malcolm and Rufus met in Lothian, perhaps with a well fed and properly clothed Scottish army lurking in the nearby hills, and negotiated a renewal of the Abernethy agreement through the intermediacy of Edgar the Atheling and Duke Robert. Malcolm swore fealty to Rufus, and the latter promised to return the twelve vills

which Malcolm had held under William the Conqueror. Then Rufus went south.<sup>123</sup>

This settlement did not end the matter, however. Rufus was apparently unhappy with the results of his invasion of Scotland,<sup>124</sup> and he may even have felt that he had made a fool of himself. In any case, the basic problem with the Scots still remained, and to solve this problem, he tried in 1092 a new tack which combined force with deceit. His first move was to conquer Cumberland. The expedition by which this was accomplished is described in little detail, but it seems to have been a well conceived effort to take and hold the area. In 1092 Rufus led an army north and drove out Dolfin, the lord who had ruled Cumberland. With this accomplished, the king had Carlisle restored and a castle built there. Furthermore, peasants with their families and livestock were brought in from the south to support the garrison.<sup>125</sup> Presumably this was necessary because the local inhabitants had not been able to practice settled agriculture on any scale with the Galwegians to the north and the back side of the free-zone to the east and south. The castle, town, and peasants were, then, a unit. Carlisle was a self-supporting military colony which would significantly improve the configuration of the northern border. It could close the Vale of Eden thereby protecting Yorkshire and Lancashire, and it could to some extent hinder movement through the Tyne gap.

These were, however, potentialities in 1092. At the time, Carlisle was only an isolated strong point whose lines of communication were unprotected and which could not defend itself for long. Indeed, its immediate use proved to be diplomatic rather than military. The

military colony at Carlisle functioned as either a bargaining point with Malcolm or as bait to bring him out into the open. This is evident from Malcolm's strange behavior in 1093. Despite the fact that the conquest of Carlisle is usually assumed to have been an act of naked aggression directed against Malcolm, he gave no sign for some time that he viewed it as such. He did not try to stop Rufus in 1092, nor did he invade the North during the normal campaigning season of 1093. Rather, in September of 1093 Malcolm came south peacefully, laid one of the foundation stones for Bishop William's new cathedral at Durham, and then went on to visit Rufus at Gloucester.<sup>126</sup> His behavior is puzzling, and this unusual restraint on his part must mean either that the situation was ambiguous in some sense or that an important factor has been misunderstood. Malcolm was not the man to come meekly to Rufus to ask for the return of Cumberland. Indeed, the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle says that he came south to demand that Rufus fulfill the terms of some agreement, and this agreement must have concerned Cumberland.<sup>127</sup> This suggestion, however, is no help unless one assumes that Rufus had promised to give back Cumberland, uncharacteristic behavior for the Red King but consistent with a transitory vow to reform himself which the king had made when he thought he was dying during the summer of 1093.<sup>128</sup>

This may account for Malcolm's forbearance. Yet it does not explain why Malcolm did nothing in 1092, and another hypothesis is more likely. Scholarship on these events has been marred by a basic error concerning the status of Cumberland. In 1092 Rufus had driven a noble named Dolfin out of Cumberland. The prevailing opinion is that this Dolfin was the eldest son of Earl Cospatric who had once been earl of



Northumbria and who was later earl of Dunbar under Malcolm, but there is no direct evidence whatsoever which supports the identification of the Cumbrian Dolfin with Cospatric's son.<sup>129</sup> It might be suggested about as plausibly that the Cumbrian Dolfin was a descendant of the Dolfin, son of Thor, apparently a Cumbrian noble, who had died fighting against Macbeth in 1054.<sup>130</sup> This point is important because the idea that Dolfin was Cospatric's son is the only support for the belief that Cumberland was under the Scottish king in 1092. The last date when this is known to have been true is 1070, and after that there is simply no information on the question, although it may be relevant that Malcolm's invasions of 1079 and 1091 do not seem to have included contingents from the West.<sup>131</sup> Furthermore, the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle says that Dolfin ruled the area--not that he held some official position from Malcolm or owed obedience to the Scottish king.<sup>132</sup>

The idea that Cumberland was Scottish is an assumption with no support but silence. The contrary hypothesis that it had fallen away from the Scottish kingdom at some date after 1070 and was ruled independently by a local noble does less violence to the Chronicle's description of the conquest of the area, and makes sense of the events from the fall of 1091 to the early winter of 1093. When the Abernethy agreement was renewed in Lothian in 1091, Rufus had undertaken to restore Cumberland, which was ruled by a native noble, to Malcolm. The twelve vills (shires?) which Florence says Rufus promised Malcolm probably represent Cumberland.<sup>133</sup> The next year Rufus did drive out Dolfin, and Malcolm had no reason to suppose that the English king would not honor the rest of the agreement. Of course, he did not. Consequently in the late summer

of 1093, Malcolm came south to demand that Rufus keep his promise. The chronicles, however, leave no doubt that Rufus behaved very badly on this occasion. The Chronicle says that he would not fulfill the agreement or even see Malcolm.<sup>134</sup> Florence adds that he demanded Malcolm's homage in court, presumably for Cumbria, and that Malcolm would not grant it except on the border.<sup>135</sup>

Malcolm had been tricked. Rufus was in possession of Cumberland, and if Malcolm could have it at all, it would be as a fief from William Rufus, an unacceptable condition. It is even possible that the whole incident had been contrived to humiliate the Scottish king or to drive him into making a blunder, and there is some support for this idea. Orderic Vitalis believed that the destruction of Malcolm Canmore was brought about by treachery although he laid the blame on Earl Robert de Mowbray rather than on Rufus.<sup>136</sup> In any event, Malcolm did make a serious mistake after his meeting with the English king. He returned to Scotland in a rage and collected an army even though it was late fall. Then sometime in early November, he invaded Northumberland probably with the ultimate intention of taking Carlisle, but his reaction had been anticipated. Earl Robert de Mowbray was waiting for him with an army in Northumberland, and this is an indication that the purpose of Rufus's retention of Carlisle had been to lure Malcolm south of the Tweed for it is very difficult to believe that Earl Robert normally kept--or could even afford to keep by himself--a large enough army on hand in mid November to fight the Scots in the field. Malcolm was entering a trap. The earl awaited the Scots south of the Aln, and after they had crossed the river, he fell on them by surprise. In the battle which followed,

the bulk of the Scottish army was either killed or drowned in the swollen river while trying to escape. Malcolm himself and Edward, his designated heir, were also killed.<sup>137</sup>

Thus William II's machinations reached a successful conclusion. Malcolm Canmore had finally given battle, and his death opened unusual possibilities to the English king and ultimately led to the passing of the old political structure of northern Britain. Judged from the standpoint of the events which followed, Malcolm appears to have been a man who had held back time by his own existence. Of course, this is both the nature of politics and an exaggeration.

In its immediate form the possibility which confronted Rufus was not unparalleled. Robert de Mowbray had killed the reigning king of Scots, his heir, and most of their army. This led to internal political conflicts in Scotland and gave the English king the opportunity to neutralize Scotland by backing contenders for the throne. In this sense the situation was similar to the one which had led to the establishment of Malcolm Canmore himself as king by Siward and Edward the Confessor, but circumstances were particularly promising in 1093. Malcolm had been prepared to ignore Scottish custom on the succession, which would have made his younger brother Donald Bane king after his death, by having himself immediately succeeded by Edward, his eldest son by Margaret.<sup>138</sup> The death of Edward and, more importantly given the number of sons of Malcolm and Margaret available, the destruction of Malcolm's army, which probably had included many of his closest supporters, made this impossible. Donald Bane, who had been alienated from his nephews by his brother's attempt to disinherit him, was consequently able to become king

late in 1093, and he insured that he would not be challenged by the sons of Malcolm and Margaret by expelling the Anglo-Saxons whom Malcolm had received during the Norman Conquest and who had presumably been an important source of his strength.<sup>139</sup> These disasters ruined the hopes of Malcolm's sons by Margaret and made Donald Bane a weaker king than his brother.

They also greatly improved the chances for success of Rufus's attempt to solve the Scottish problem--in so far as politics could solve it--by setting up his own king of Scots. Even before Donald Bane's purge of the Anglo-Saxons had driven Malcolm's sons by Margaret into William II's hands, he had had a suitable candidate for the Scottish throne. During the reign of William the Conqueror, Malcolm had given up Duncan, his eldest son by his first marriage, as a hostage. In 1093 Duncan was serving in Rufus's army, and his chances of ever becoming king were very small because he apparently had been declared a bastard and thereby removed from the line of succession to the Scottish throne as envisaged by "St." Margaret.<sup>140</sup> Duncan was, therefore, a perfect tool for Rufus, a candidate who would owe the Normans everything if he could be placed on the throne, and after his father's death Rufus accepted Duncan's homage and gave him an army with which to claim his inheritance.<sup>141</sup> The dispatch with which this was accomplished strongly suggests that this operation had been considered in advance. Between November 13th, the date of Malcolm's death, and Christmas, not in 1094 as is continually asserted, Duncan was able to raise his army, enter Scotland, and drive out his uncle Donald.<sup>142</sup> Rufus and Duncan had evidently been prepared for Malcolm's death, and the speed with which



Duncan was able to act perhaps indicates that he used the same soldiers as Robert de Mowbray had employed against Malcolm. The latter, of course, is only a suggestion; and, in any case, the attempt to set up a vassal king of Scots dependent on Norman arms was only momentarily successful. Soon after becoming king, Duncan lost most of his army in an ambush and continued to rule only on the condition that he not bring Anglo-Saxons or Frenchmen into Scotland to serve in his army. This stipulation rendered him powerless, and in 1094 he was killed by Donald who again became king.<sup>143</sup> This failure did not cause Rufus to abandon the plan, but it was three years before a new pretender could be sent over the border.

In the interval another event took place which revealed the ramifications in Northumbria of Malcolm's death and of the distracted conditions of the kingdom of the Scots. In 1095 Earl Robert de Mowbray revolted. This was an unparalleled event. No Norman had felt sufficiently at home in the North to revolt before, and the very possibility that the earl of Northumbria could consider breaking with the king depended on the absence of danger from Scotland. Furthermore, the same factor may have been ultimately responsible for his revolt in a direct sense. The early chronicles do not ascribe very intelligible motives to Robert, but there is one charter in existence which may contain the key to his behavior. It is the record of a concord made between the earl and the bishop of Durham in 1094 which shows that Rufus had extinguished the earl's judicial rights over St. Cuthbert's estates. If this charter is genuine, which it seems to be, it provides a sufficient motive for Robert's revolt.<sup>144</sup> Rufus had probably decided that he did not need

such a powerful Northumbrian earl with Duncan on the Scottish throne, and this hypothesis is supported by the fact that Robert did not hold Newcastle in 1095.<sup>145</sup> The earl refused to agree to this.

Specific Northumbrian factors, however, do not explain the downfall of Robert. Had he been alone, he would probably have accepted the reduction of his privileges, but he seems to have been a member of a widespread conspiracy which involved many nobles, especially those of the Welsh border. Their aim was to overthrow Rufus, and the plot must have been formed early in 1094 before the great Welsh revolt of that year and while Duncan was still alive.<sup>146</sup> Once the Welsh revolted, however, most of the conspirators abandoned the plan--except for Robert de Mowbray. He stood no chance alone, and the most likely explanation for his defiance of the king is that he had been betrayed and that Rufus had decided to make an example of him. Robert was, after all, a very convenient "example" in 1095 because he had recently inherited the extremely wealthy estate of his uncle Geoffrey, bishop of Coutances.<sup>147</sup> By Easter of 1095, when he would not come to court, the earl was a marked man; and after he had failed to appear at Whitsuntide, Rufus led an army into Northumbria where he had little difficulty taking the earl's castles and capturing the earl himself. Only Bamburgh, which was held by Robert's wife, held out for long, and she eventually yielded when the besiegers threatened to mutilate her husband.<sup>148</sup>

Clearly times had changed, and perhaps the surviving Northumbrian nobles were amused. Rufus had easily suppressed the revolt despite the isolation of Northumbria. Robert's men had all been conveniently assembled in castles, and the opportunities which the North offered for

irregular warfare had been ignored, although this may not have been the earl's intention.<sup>149</sup> Furthermore, Robert de Mowbray survived the revolt, something which no Northumbrian earl, except for Cospatric, had managed to do in the eleventh century. The earl went off to a dungeon for the next thirty years. This commonplace baronial revolt had, however, a significance beyond its comparison with past revolts. The earldom had lost its regional political significance in 1080 when the Northumbrian nobility had been destroyed in the aftermath of the revolt against Walcher. Now it had lost its military utility. If the Scots had been so little to be feared that Robert could revolt, then Rufus had no need of a Northumbrian earl, and he did not appoint a new one. The earldom of Northumbria was abolished after this revolt, or taken into the king's hands as some Northumbrian monks liked to think.<sup>150</sup> The distinction made little real difference. The king took over the demesne of the earls, and henceforth, Northumberland would be ruled by sheriffs. This, of course, represented a fundamental change in the position which Northumbria had occupied within the kingdom. The suppression of the earldom ended, at least in theory, the administrative and judicial isolation of Northumbria except on the estates of St. Cuthbert, and it created the novel possibility that royal power could be directly exercised above the Tees by more prosaic means than the punitive expeditions and murders which had characterized relations between the northern earls and both the Anglo-Saxon and the Norman kings. In terms of the future, Rufus's failure to appoint a new earl destroyed the threat that a line of Norman earls would become intrenched above the Tees and pursue the independent policies of their predecessors.

With this said, it must also be noted that the finality of the situation depended upon the continued weakness of the Scots. Should a new leader of the stature of Malcolm III arise among them, they could force the revival of the earldom out of military necessity and perhaps even reverse Rufus's conquest of Cumberland. Indeed, these possibilities were apparent in 1095 for Rufus did not leave the North, or was not long gone, before he took steps to insure that the Scots would not become a threat to the North in the foreseeable future. By late August of 1095, if not earlier, he had begun his second attempt to establish a vassal king of Scots, and this endeavor was probably directly connected with his expedition against Earl Robert. This is established by a charter made at Norham on the 29th of August which records a land grant to Durham by Edgar, Malcolm III's third son by Margaret. The charter discloses that Rufus had already given Lothian and Scotland to Edgar, and it is likely that this involved something more tangible than the Red King's recognition of Edgar's right to be king and a symbolic investiture because the charter records Edgar's gift to Durham of two large estates in the Merse. Unless these gifts were anticipatory, which is unlikely, they indicate that Edgar already controlled the valley of the Tweed, and the most probable explanation for this is that Rufus or his agents had established Edgar above the Tweed after the fall of Bamburgh.<sup>151</sup> In 1095, then, Rufus could safely suppress the earldom because he had installed a new marcher lord beyond it. Furthermore, this time the plan worked despite the precedents against it. In 1097 Rufus was able to send Edgar the Atheling into Scotland with an army to put his nephew into possession of the rest of his kingdom, and for once



the Atheling acted effectively. He defeated Donald Bane in battle, drove him out of the kingdom, and then installed Edgar as king "in fealty to King William."<sup>152</sup> All this, of course, had been done before, but this time it led to important results. Contrary to any expectations which might have been based upon the fate of Duncan II or the perfidy of Malcolm III, King Edgar both survived and remained loyal to the Normans. While he reigned, the North lived in peace with the Scots, and during this period ties were established between the Scottish and Norman royal families which insured the continuance of peace for thirty years after Edgar's death. This abnormal period of peace, in turn, allowed the Normans to consolidate the hold on the North which they had already won and, in a very important sense, to extend their rule.

## Chapter V

- <sup>1</sup>Anglo-Saxon Chronicle, s.a. 1069 D, p. 150. The chapter title is taken from J. Scammel, "The Origin and Limitations of the Liberty of Durham," EHR, LXXXI (1966), 453.
- <sup>2</sup>Domesday, fols. 299-301b.
- <sup>3</sup>Florence of Worcester, II, 6.
- <sup>4</sup>See Z. N. Brooke, The English Church and the Papacy (Cambridge, 1931), pp. 112-26; R. W. Southern, "The Canterbury Forgeries," EHR, LXVIII (1958), 193-226.
- <sup>5</sup>Hugh the Chantor, p. 3.
- <sup>6</sup>Anglo-Saxon Chronicle, s.a. 1075 DE, pp. 157-58; s.a. 1085 E, p. 161.
- <sup>7</sup>Ibid., s.a. 1070 E, p. 151.
- <sup>8</sup>Ordericus Vitalis, II, 197; II, 232.
- <sup>9</sup>Symeon of Durham, HR, p. 188.
- <sup>10</sup>Ibid., p. 190. Symeon seems to say that Malcolm's raid occurred after the Danes had left the Humber. According to Florence of Worcester, II, 7, this happened around the time of the feast of St. John the Baptist (June 24th).
- <sup>11</sup>See Ritchie, Normans in Scotland, pp. 26-27; J. Le Patourel, "The Norman Conquest of Yorkshire," Northern History, VI (1971), 3. Later in this essay, ibid., p. 5, Le Patourel seems to reapproach Ritchie's interpretation.
- <sup>12</sup>Symeon of Durham, HR, pp. 190-91.
- <sup>13</sup>Ibid. The interpretation given in the text represents the most likely explanation for what happened, and it closely follows Symeon. There is, however, a slight possibility that events were not this simple because the course of events in this passage is somewhat unclear. Symeon brings the Scots all the way to Wearmouth and a meeting between Malcolm and Edgar the Atheling before he mentions Cospatric's raid: Inter has Scottorum vastationes ac rapinas, Gospatricus comes . . . Cumbreland invadit, ibid., p. 191. Malcolm then learns of the raid as he watches the church of Wearmouth burn and orders retaliations, ibid. If taken at face value, this means that Cospatric raided Cumberland after Malcolm had crossed the Tees, but the possibility cannot be completely discounted that Cospatric's foray took place earlier than this

for the meeting between Malcolm and Edgar may be fictitious. If this was the case, then it would be probable that Malcolm invaded Durham to punish Gospatric, a fact which Symeon would have suppressed because he was loath to admit that the Northumbrian earls had jurisdiction between the Tyne and the Tees.

- 14 Ibid., pp. 191-92.
- 15 Ibid., p. 195; HDE, pp. 105-106. Anglo-Saxon Chronicle, s.a. 1069 D, p. 150.
- 16 Symeon of Durham, HR, p. 195.
- 17 Ibid., p. 190; HDE, p. 105.
- 18 Anglo-Saxon Chronicle, s.a. 1071 D, p. 154.
- 19 Stenton, Anglo-Saxon England, p. 606.
- 20 Ritchie, Normans in Scotland, pp. 32-33.
- 21 Anglo-Saxon Chronicle, s.a. 1072 DE, pp. 154-55; Florence of Worcester, II, 9.
- 22 Ritchie, Normans in Scotland, p. 32.
- 23 Ibid., pp. 29, 33-34; Stenton, Anglo-Saxon England, p. 606; Anglo-Saxon Chronicle, s.a. 1072 DE, p. 155; Florence of Worcester, II, 9; Anderson, "Anglo-Scottish Relations," p. 11.
- 24 Symeon of Durham, HR, p. 196.
- 25 Ibid., p. 199.
- 26 "Vita Oswini Regis," in Miscellanea Biographica, ed. J. Raine (Surtees Society, Vol. VIII; London, 1838), pp. 20-21.
- 27 Symeon of Durham, HR, p. 199.
- 28 Stenton, Anglo-Saxon England, p. 610; F. Barlow, William I and the Norman Conquest (New York, 1967), p. 98.
- 29 Symeon of Durham, HR, pp. 199-200.
- 30 Idem, HDE, p. 106.
- 31 Idem, HR, pp. 199-206.
- 32 Vita Edwardi, p. 51.

33 "Capitula de Miraculis et Translationibus," in Symeon of Durham, Opera Omnia, I, 243.

34 Certainly the account of Tostig and the robbers cannot be accepted as it stands in the Vita Ædwardi, pp. 50-51. The author of this work was a foreign clerk who probably lacked enough knowledge of the North to put his information on northern brigandage into its proper context. Furthermore, he used what he did know about Tostig's efforts to establish peace in his earldom as the reason for the revolt of 1065. This, of course, was quite incorrect, supra, pp. 149-54.

35 Domesday, fols., 301b, 309, 310b, 332. In 1066, Earl Edwin held Gilling and Catterick, but they had probably been held by Tostig prior to the revolt of 1065.

36 Vita Ædwardi, p. 43.

37 See Barrow, "The Border," pp. 21-24, for the best recent discussion of the northern border.

38 RRS, I, 38; Wilson, "The Terms 'Strathclyde' and 'Cumbria,'" pp. 88, 90-91.

39 Jocelin of Furness, "Vita Kentegerni," in Lives of S. Ninian and S. Kentigern Compiled in the Twelfth Century, ed. A. P. Forbes (The Historians of Scotland, Vol. V; Edinburgh, 1874), p. 55.

40 Ibid. Wilson, "The Terms 'Strathclyde' and 'Cumbria,'" p. 83, tries to explain away the statements concerning the extent of Cumbria.

41 Ibid., p. 85; Early Scottish Charters prior to A.D. 1153, ed. A. C. Lawrie (Glasgow, 1905), No. 50.

42 Teviotdale had probably been subject to the bishop of the Cumbrians throughout the eleventh century and presumably earlier despite the fact that it is usually assumed that it had remained subject to Durham until ca. 1101. The view that Durham had kept Teviotdale through the period of Danish invasions and the subsequent expansion of the Cumbrians and the Scots rests on exceedingly bad evidence. There is, needless to say, no contemporary evidence which shows that the connection had survived the tenth century, and the proposition rests on early twelfth century evidence, see Kirby, "Strathclyde and Cumbria," p. 91; H. H. E. Craster, "A Contemporary Record of the Pontificate of Ranulf Flambard," Archaeologia Aeliana, 4th Ser., VII (1930), 37. Its main support is a passage in the first continuation of Symeon's HDE which says that Bishop Ranulf Flambard was unable to recover both Teviotdale and Carlisle, appendages of his bishopric, which had been lost to other bishops because of Ranulf's problems with Henry I, Symeon of Durham, HDE, Continuatio Prima, p. 139. At face value, this statement is plausible; but it, in fact, has its difficulties. The passage was not written until some forty years after the supposed loss of Teviotdale and



Carlisle, and with respect to the former, it is difficult to imagine to whom it was lost, for there is no evidence that there was either a bishop of Glasgow or of St. Andrews at the time, *ibid.*, p. xxiv; N. F. Shead, "The Origins of the Medieval Diocese of Glasgow," *SHR*, XLVIII (1969), 223. Neither the late date nor the imprecision of this passage inspire any confidence, and the impression that it cannot be trusted is strengthened by three writs from the 1090's which reveal that the inhabitants of Carlisle were loath to accept the jurisdiction of the bishop of Durham prior to Flambard's episcopate. These documents are unfortunately too general to disclose whether the difficulty stemmed from the preference of the Normans at Carlisle for the spiritual jurisdiction of York or from the repugnance of the natives to the jurisdiction of either York or Durham; but in either case, these writs show that the statement of Symeon's continuator cannot be taken at face value. For the writs, see Craster, "A Record of Flambard," pp. 37-39. Beyond his testimony, there are two other documents which are usually employed to show that Teviotdale was subject to Durham in this period. A confirmation of Durham's privileges made by Archbishop Thomas I (1070-1100) includes Teviotdale in Durham's diocese, but this document is a forgery, *The Historians of the Church of York and Its Archbishops*, ed. J. Raine, III (Rolls Series, Vol. LXXI; London, 1894), 17-20. There is also a prohibition from Archbishop Thomas II (1109-14) which forbids Algar the clerk from dispensing chrism and oil from Glasgow to the inhabitants of Teviotdale because their chrism and oil should have come from Durham, but this only establishes that Durham claimed Teviotdale, which is not in doubt, and that the claim was not accepted by the local priests, *ibid.*, p. 37; Craster, "A Record of Flambard," pp. 38-39; Shead, "The Origins of Glasgow," pp. 221-23.

There is, then, no real basis for the idea that Teviotdale was subject to Durham as late as 1100 other than the common conviction that nothing had basically changed in the North since the days of Bede, and there are, in fact, two stronger pieces of evidence for the contrary proposition. First, in the 1070's Aldwin and Turgot were prevented from refounding Melrose by Malcolm III because they jurare illi fidelitatem noluerunt, Symeon of Durham, *HDE*, p. 112; and Malcolm's readiness to defy Walcher's monks presumably means that this area, which was later included in Glasgow's diocese and which stood at the gateway from the West into the lower Tweed and Teviot, was already thought to be ecclesiastically part of Cumbria. Of course, a close scanner of boundaries might object that this does not establish that Teviotdale was part of Cumbria, only that the upper Tweed was; but David's Cumbrian inquisition shows that the two areas went together. This inquest was initiated to determine what property had traditionally belonged to Glasgow (presumably this term stood for the old bishopric of the Cumbrians, see Shead, "The Origins of Glasgow," p. 9), and it was based upon the assumption that all of "Glasgow's" lands had lain within Cumbria, *ESC*, No. 50. The boundaries of this region are not given; but if one may judge from the names of the jurors, it included a very wide area indeed. In addition to Oggo and Leysing, Cumbrenses iudices, who presumably came from the West, and Gille, son of Boet, the lord of the western end of the Tyne gap, they included two men with Northumbrian names, Ehtred, son of

Waltheof, and Halden, son of Eadulf, who presumably came from Teviotdale or perhaps Tynedale. This in itself is suspicious, but the really important point is established by the location of the lands which were said to have anciently belonged to "Glasgow." The jurors swore that it had possessed lands not only in Clydesdale and Galloway, as might have been expected, but also a number of estates in Teviotdale (Morebattle, Ancrum, Ashkirk, and Lillesleaf) and others in Tweeddale (Traquair, Peebles, Stobo, etc.) which, in effect, linked the holdings in Teviotdale with the church's western lands, *ibid.*; *EHD*, I, No. 54. Unless this inquisition is rejected, it puts the matter beyond doubt. In terms of these men's memories, Teviotdale was traditionally part of the Cumbrian bishopric, and this connection was probably the result of a political connection which had been formed during the years of Cumbrian power in the tenth century.

<sup>43</sup>Wilson, "Introduction to the Cumberland Domesday," p. 310.

<sup>44</sup>Barrow, *RRS*, I, 111, has conjectured that the king of Scots had a claim on Tynedale, and he is probably correct. The idea that this valley was English is an anachronistic assumption. There is no evidence for English overlordship between 1000 and 1100. After the latter date, there is a slight possibility that Henry I may have pushed English power up the North Tyne, *infra*, p. 333, although the valley may have remained Scottish until the late 1150's when Henry II opened the Tyne gap by taking over Gilesland and creating the barony of Langley, *Liber Feodorum*, p. 202. I. J. Sanders, *English Baronies: A Study in Their Origin and Descent, 1086-1327* (Oxford, 1960), p. 127. Even after this, the connection with England was nominal, Barrow, *RRS*, II, 54.

<sup>45</sup>Perhaps this is the explanation of how Galwegians in the Tyne valley who had been confounded by mists sent by Northumbrian saints could find themselves back home by the time the mists lifted.

<sup>46</sup>Symeon of Durham, *HR*, p. 198.

<sup>47</sup>*Idem*, *HDE*, p. 102.

<sup>48</sup>*Idem*, *HR*, p. 188.

<sup>49</sup>Freeman, *The Norman Conquest*, IV, n. Y, 540.

<sup>50</sup>*Cartularium Abbathiae de Whiteby*, ed. J. C. Atkinson (Surtees Society, Vol. LXIX; Durham, 1879), p. xxxviii.

<sup>51</sup>Darby, *Domesday Geography*, fig. 132, p. 449; T. A. M. Bishop, "The Norman Settlement of Yorkshire," in *Studies in Medieval History Presented to Frederick Maurice Powicke*, ed. R. W. Hunt et al. (Oxford, 1948), p. 2.

<sup>52</sup>Long ago William Farrer expressed doubt that Lancashire above the Ribble, which was surveyed with the West Riding, was ever visited during



the compilation of Domesday, and he drew a comparison between its description in Domesday and a geld book, "Introduction to the Lancashire Domesday," p. 273. More recently, W. E. Wightman has maintained that Domesday simply gives no information about the settlements in the Pennines, The Lacy Family in England and Normandy, 1066-1194 (Oxford, 1966), pp. 52-53; and similar reservations concerning the validity of Domesday's description of Craven and northern Lancashire have been expressed by Finn, The Norman Conquest and the Economy, p. 210; and by D. E. Greenway in Charters of the Honour of Mowbray, 1107-1191, ed. idem (Records of Social and Economic History, N. S., Vol. I; Oxford, 1972), p. xxi. There can be no reasonable doubt, of course, that many of the Pennine settlements were waste, but the idea that the uplands and the West were covered by great, unbroken bands of empty villis depends upon an unwarranted interpretation of a specific Domesday formula which only gives the name of the vill, its geld assessment, and its owners in 1066 and 1086. These entries have been interpreted as showing that such villis were unpopulated in 1086, Darby, Domesday Geography, p. 61; Bishop, "Norman Settlement," pp. 2, 6-7. But this is an exceedingly questionable inference. The information which Domesday provides in these instances is more likely to be simply incomplete for it amounts to no more than what would have been available from a list of geld liabilities. Furthermore, there must have been people in some of these villages because archaic examples of shire custom were found in some of them in the thirteenth century, Jolliffe, "Northumbrian Institutions," pp. 28-29, 31. There is, then, some truth in the views of Farrer and Wightman. Large portions of Domesday's account of western Yorkshire and northern Lancashire need not have been compiled any closer to the Pennines than York castle.

<sup>53</sup> William of Malmesbury, Gesta Pontificum, p. 285.

<sup>54</sup> F. M. Stenton, "Introduction to the Derbyshire Domesday," in The Victoria History of the County of Derby, ed. W. Page, I (London, 1905), 303-304; C. F. Slade, "Introduction to the Staffordshire Domesday," in The Victoria History of the County of Stafford, ed. L. M. Midgley, IV (London, 1959), 12.

<sup>55</sup> Anglo-Saxon Chronicle, s.a. 1074 D, p. 155.

<sup>56</sup> The difficulty in dating Cospatric's return to Scotland is the result of Symeon's vagueness. He notes Cospatric's flight to Flanders and then says that he returned post aliquantum tempus, Symeon of Durham, HR, p. 199. Inexplicably, Ritchie, Normans in Scotland, p. 26, states that Cospatric got the earldom of Dunbar from Malcolm prior to being reinstated as earl of Northumbria by William in 1070.

<sup>57</sup> Anglo-Saxon Chronicle, s.a. 1074 DE, pp. 155-56. See Douglas, William the Conqueror, p. 230, for a different interpretation.

<sup>58</sup> Anglo-Saxon Chronicle, s.a. 1074 D, p. 156.

<sup>59</sup>Stenton, Anglo-Saxon England, pp. 610-12; D. C. Douglas, William the Conqueror: The Norman Impact upon England (Berkeley, 1964), pp. 231-33; Barlow, William I, pp. 157-60.

<sup>60</sup>Specifically, the accounts of Florence of Worcester and Orderic Vitalis seem to have been influenced by this factor. Florence says that Waltheof only joined the conspiracy under pressure from the other two earls and that he afterwards threw himself on William's mercy as soon as possible, Florence of Worcester, II, 10. Orderic takes this line of explanation a step further by asserting that Waltheof refused to join the conspiracy at all but promised not to divulge its existence, Ordericus Vitalis, II, 260-62; II, 312-14. Neither of these accounts can be trusted on the question of Waltheof's involvement in the revolt. William of Malmesbury, who was himself undecided on this point, believed that the question of Waltheof's guilt was decided on nationalistic lines, the Anglo-Saxons being prepared to excuse his conduct, Willelmi Malmesbiriensis Monachi De Gestis Regum Anglorum, ed. W. Stubbs, II (Rolls Series, Vol. XC; London, 1889), pp. 312-13. Furthermore, the writers of the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle, which contains the oldest accounts of the revolt, betray no doubt concerning Waltheof's complicity in the revolt, Anglo-Saxon Chronicle, s.a. 1075 DE, p. 157.

<sup>61</sup>Symeon of Durham, HDE, p. 107. The miracle cannot be dated precisely. It is preceded by a short account of William's Scottish expedition of 1072, ibid., p. 106; and it is followed by a long description of Aldwin's monastic revival in the North, ibid., p. 108. The latter came north sometime in 1073 or 1074, D. Knowles, The Monastic Order in England (2nd ed.; Cambridge, 1963), p. 167. It would seem, then, that Ralph's visit occurred in one of these two years. J. Scammel has suggested that the incident took place in 1096, "The Liberty of Durham," p. 450, n. 2; but this is unlikely.

<sup>62</sup>Symeon of Durham, HDE, p. 107.

<sup>63</sup>Idem, HR, p. 200. This event is entered under 1073, but Symeon's narrative is a year behind the true date at this point. De Obsessione Dunelmi, p. 219.

<sup>64</sup>Anglo-Saxon Chronicle, s.a. 1075 DE, p. 157; Florence of Worcester, II, 10.

<sup>65</sup>Anglo-Saxon Chronicle, s.a. 1075 DE, p. 157. Waltheof was, of course, an Anglo-Dane; and if Anderson, ESSH, I, 598, n. 2, is correct, he was a cousin of the Danish king.

<sup>66</sup>Stenton, Anglo-Saxon England, p. 611.

<sup>67</sup>Ibid., pp. 611-12; Douglas, William the Conqueror, p. 232; J. Beeler, Warfare in England, 1066-1189 (Ithaca, 1966), pp. 48-49.

<sup>68</sup>Stenton, Anglo-Saxon England, p. 611.



- <sup>69</sup>The E-version of the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle, s.a. 1075, p. 157, does not mention the submission of Waltheof. It says only that the king arrested him upon his return to England. The D-version, ibid., however, mentions Waltheof's journey to Normandy and his submission, but it places them out of clear chronological order. The sequence is as follows. 1. The castle falls. 2. William returns to England and arrests Roger. 3. Waltheof goes to Normandy and confesses, but William does not arrest him until they are back in England.
- <sup>70</sup>Ibid., pp. 157-58.
- <sup>71</sup>See Douglas, William the Conqueror, pp. 233-35.
- <sup>72</sup>Anglo-Saxon Chronicle, s.a. 1076 DE, p. 158.
- <sup>73</sup>Symeon of Durham, HDE, p. 114; HR, p. 199. Rogeri De Wendover Chronica sive Flores Historiarum, ed. H. O. Coxe, II (English Historical Society; London, 1841), 17.
- <sup>74</sup>Symeon of Durham, HDE, pp. 108, 113.
- <sup>75</sup>Ibid., pp. 105-106, 113-14.
- <sup>76</sup>See ibid., pp. 108-13.
- <sup>77</sup>Idem, HR, p. 209; Florence of Worcester, II, 13-14.
- <sup>78</sup>Symeon of Durham, HDE, p. 114.
- <sup>79</sup>Ibid.; Ritchie, Normans in Scotland, p. 49; Stenton, Anglo-Saxon England, pp. 613-14; Douglas, William the Conqueror, p. 240.
- <sup>80</sup>Anglo-Saxon Chronicle, s.a. 1077 D, p. 159.
- <sup>81</sup>Ibid., s.a. 1079 DE, p. 159.
- <sup>82</sup>Ibid.; Florence of Worcester, II, 13.
- <sup>83</sup>Ibid., p. 14. Symeon of Durham repeats this story nearly verbatim in the HR, pp. 208-210. In the HDE, p. 114, however, he does not mention this incident, and the narrative of Walcher's murder, ibid., pp. 116-17, is somewhat vague on the question of the Northumbrians' motive.
- <sup>84</sup>Florence of Worcester, II, 14.
- <sup>85</sup>Ibid., pp. 14-16; Anglo-Saxon Chronicle, s.a. 1080 E, p. 160. De Primo Saxonum Adventu, p. 383, says that Eadulf Rus, son of Cospatric, killed Walcher. Symeon of Durham, however, has somewhat different details. In the HR, pp. 197-98, he names Eadulf as the killer but makes him the grandson of Cospatric. In the HDE, p. 115, the killer is an unidentified Waltheof.

<sup>86</sup>Ibid., pp. 117-18.

<sup>87</sup>Ibid., p. 118.

<sup>88</sup>The best description of Odo's expedition is in ibid. The statement that the Northumbrian nobility was severely reduced as a result of this expedition is based on the fate of Walcher's murderers which, although mentioned in the paragraph preceding Odo's expedition, is clearly connected with the latter. The incident is also briefly described by Florence who indicates that William led the army, Florence of Worcester, II, 16; and in Symeon of Durham, HR, p. 211.

<sup>89</sup>Ritchie, Normans in Scotland, p. 50. Ritchie relies heavily on the account in the Chronicon Monasterii de Abingdon, ed. J. Stevenson, II (Rolls Series, Vol. II; London, 1858), 9-10, for his interpretation. This description is rhetorical and is probably more of a "war story" of the abbot who went with Robert to Scotland than a straightforward account of what took place.

<sup>90</sup>Symeon of Durham, HR, p. 211.

<sup>91</sup>Douglas, William the Conqueror, p. 241; Ritchie, Normans in Scotland, p. 51.

<sup>92</sup>Symeon of Durham, HR, p. 199.

<sup>93</sup>Inde rex dedit illum honorem [the earldom] Albrico. Quo in rebus difficilibus parum valente, patriam que reverso . . ., ibid. Stenton, Anglo-Saxon England, p. 614, identifies Albricus with Aubrey de Coucy.

<sup>94</sup>Reid, "Barony and Thanage," p. 197; F. M. Stenton, The First Century of English Feudalism, 1066-1166 (2nd ed.; Oxford, 1961), pp. 194-96; Beeler, Warfare in England, p. 286; Le Patourel, "The Conquest of Yorkshire," pp. 425-26.

<sup>95</sup>J. C. Holt, The Northerners: A Study in the Reign of King John (Oxford, 1961), pp. 197-98; Reid, "Barony and Thanage," pp. 191-92.

<sup>96</sup>Beeler, Warfare in England, p. 287; Stenton, English Feudalism, p. 196.

<sup>97</sup>Ibid., p. 215; Beeler, Warfare in England, p. 38; F. M. Stenton, "Introduction to the Nottinghamshire Domesday," in The Victoria History of the County of Nottingham, ed. W. Page, I (London, 1906), 228.

<sup>98</sup>Gaimar, ll. 5682-92.

<sup>99</sup>Wightman, The Lacy Family, pp. 21-27.

<sup>100</sup>Symeon of Durham, HR, p. 188.

- 101 Domesday, fols. 323b-25.
- 102 Farrer, "Introduction to the Yorkshire Domesday," pp. 165-66; Stenton, "Introduction to the Nottinghamshire Domesday," p. 223.
- 103 Wightman, The Lacy Family, pp. 19-20.
- 104 Farrer, "Introduction to the Yorkshire Domesday," p. 156; Ritchie, Normans in Scotland, pp. 69-70.
- 105 Domesday, fols. 269b-70, 332.
- 106 Ibid., fol. 276; Stenton, "Introduction to the Derbyshire Domesday," pp. 303-304.
- 107 Anglo-Saxon Chronicle, s.a. 1085 E, p. 161.
- 108 See E. A. Freeman, The Reign of William Rufus and the Accession of Henry the First (Oxford, 1882), I, 28-32, 89-119. Cf. H. S. Offler, "The Tractate 'De Iniusta Vexactione Willelmi Episcopi Primi,'" EHR, LXVI (1951), 321-41.
- 109 No lands above the Ribble had been given to undertenants by 1086, Domesday, fols. 301b-302, 332. A few of the barons above the Tyne claimed that their tenures went back to the Conquest, and their lands were, for the most part, located in the valley of the Wansbeck or to the south, Liber Feodorum, pp. 200-203. It is questionable, however, whether these claims were valid, see Sanders, English Baronies, Bolam, p. 17; Morpeth, p. 65; Redesdale, p. 73; Alnwick, p. 103; Bothal, p. 107; Callerton, p. 109; Mitford, p. 131. See infra, pp. 315-17.
- 110 Ritchie, Normans in Scotland, p. 50.
- 111 L. H. Nelson, The Normans in South Wales, 1070-1171 (Austin, 1966), pp. 79-89.
- 112 Holt, The Northerners, p. 214.
- 113 Ibid. See W. Farrer, Records Relating to the Barony of Kendale, ed. J. F. Curwen, I (Cumberland and Westmorland Antiquarian and Archaeological Society, Record Series, Vol. IV; Kendal, 1923), viii-x. Farrer theorizes that this grant was made in 1091 or 1092, ibid., p. ix; but it may have been made as early as 1087-1088.
- 114 J. C. Hodgson, The Parish of Bywell St. Peter, Vol. VI of A History of Northumberland (Newcastle-upon-Tyne, 1902), pp. 18-19; Sanders, English Baronies, p. 25; Ritchie, Normans in Scotland, p. 148, n. 2.
- 115 The Umfraville's said that they had held Redesdale de antiquo feffamento, Liber Feodorum, p. 101. This is the basis for the idea that they were given this fee either by William I or Rufus, C. H. Hunter Blair, "The Early Castles of Northumberland," Archaeologia Aeliana, XXII



(1944), 135; Sanders, English Baronies, p. 73. In fact, this phrase could also apply to the reign of Henry I, see infra, pp. 325, 333.

116 Ritchie, Normans in Scotland, pp. 55-56; Freeman, William Rufus, I, 295-96; Anderson, "Anglo-Scottish Relations," p. 12; Nelson, The Normans in Wales, pp. 82-90.

117 Ritchie, Normans in Scotland, pp. 55-56.

118 Symeon of Durham, HR, pp. 221-22; Freeman, William Rufus, I, 296; Ritchie, Normans in Scotland, pp. 55-56; F. Barlow, The Feudal Kingdom of England, 1042-1216 (London, 1955), p. 155.

119 Although he is following the narrative of Florence of Worcester, II, 28, Symeon omits Florence's mention of the Scottish withdrawal and makes Rufus's invasion of Scotland follow Malcolm's invasion of the North with no break, HR, p. 218.

120 Capitula de Miraculis, II, 338-39. The army of knights may have come from southern England, Anglo-Saxon Chronicle, s.a. 1091 E, p. 169.

121 Capitula de Miraculis, II, 340-41.

122 Symeon of Durham, HR, p. 218.

123 Anglo-Saxon Chronicle, s.a. 1091 E, p. 169; Florence of Worcester, II, 28; Symeon of Durham, HR, p. 218. Ordericus Vitalis, III, 394-96; IV, 268-70, gives a very detailed account of the meeting of 1091 which Ritchie accepts, Normans in Scotland, pp. 56-57.

124 Ibid., p. 58.

125 Anglo-Saxon Chronicle, s.a. 1092 E, p. 169; Florence of Worcester, II, 30.

126 Symeon of Durham, HR, p. 218; Anglo-Saxon Chronicle, s.a. 1093 E, p. 170.

127 Ibid. Florence indicates that there had been some negotiations prior to Malcolm's journey to Gloucester and that the object of the meeting was to reestablish peace, II, 31.

128 Anglo-Saxon Chronicle, s.a. 1093 E, p. 170.

129 The idea that the Cumbrian Dolfín was Cospatric's son is commonly held both by English and Scottish historians, Freeman, William Rufus, I, 315; Scottish Annals from English Chronicles, A.D. 500 to 1286, comp. and trans. A. O. Anderson (London, 1908), p. 96, n. 7; Stenton, "Westmorland," p. 221; Ritchie, Normans in Scotland, p. 58; Anglo-Saxon Chronicle, p. 169, n. 6.

130 Supra, p. 67.



- 131 Symeon of Durham, HR, pp. 191, 221-22. Anglo-Saxon Chronicle, s.a. 1079 E, p. 159; s.a. 1091 E, p. 169. Florence of Worcester, II, 13, 28. Unfortunately, the descriptions of these two invasions are so general that this point cannot be stressed.
- 132 Anglo-Saxon Chronicle, s.a. 1093 E, p. 170.
- 133 Florence of Worcester, II, 28; Anderson, "Anglo-Scottish Relations," p. 10.
- 134 Anglo-Saxon Chronicle, s.a. 1093 E, p. 170.
- 135 Florence of Worcester, II, 31: [Rufus] insuper etiam illum ut, secundum iudicium tantum suorum baronum, in curia sua rectitudinem ei faceret, constringere voluit; sed id agere, nisi in regnorum suorum confiniis, ubi reges Scottorum erant soliti rectitudinem facere regibus Anglorum, et secundum iudicium primatum utriusque regni, nullo modo Malcolmus voluit. Cf. Anderson's translation in Scottish Annals, p. 110. He renders rectitudinem as "justice."
- 136 Ordericus Vitalis, III, 396-97; IV, 270.
- 137 Symeon of Durham, HR, p. 222; Anglo-Saxon Chronicle, s.a. 1093 E, p. 170.
- 138 Ibid.; A. A. M. Duncan, "The Earliest Scottish Charters," SHR, XXXVII (1958), 128.
- 139 Anglo-Saxon Chronicle, s.a. 1093 E, p. 170; Florence of Worcester, II, 32; William of Malmesbury, Gesta Regum, II, 308.
- 140 Duncan, "Earliest Charters," p. 128; William of Malmesbury, Gesta Regum, II, 476.
- 141 Anglo-Saxon Chronicle, s.a. 1093 E, p. 170; Florence of Worcester, II, 32; Duncan, "Earliest Charters," pp. 126-34.
- 142 The accepted chronology of these events is that Donald reigned for six months (mid November 1093 to mid May 1094) and that Duncan reigned for the next six months (to mid November 1094). These dates appear at the latest in the works of E. W. Robertson, Scotland under Her Early Kings, I, 158, cited by Freeman, William Rufus, II, 35-36. The difficulty with this chronology is that it flatly contradicts the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle which asserts that Duncan became king before Christmas of 1093, s.a. 1093 E, p. 170. Florence of Worcester agrees with the Chronicle, II, 32. Robertson apparently based his dates on Fordun who was wrong, but Freeman accepted them nonetheless because he did not believe there was time for Duncan to come north, beat Donald, and get ambushed before Christmas of 1093, William Rufus, II, 32-35. This, of course, is debatable, but the dates have persisted, nevertheless. Their only support other than repetition is the reign lengths given in the

Scottish regnal lists, see M. O. Anderson, Kings and Kingship in Early Scotland (Edinburgh, 1973), pp. 43-77, 235-90. These are divided into two groups, the X and Y groups, and certain members of the X group, specifically F, I, and K, give Donald and Duncan successive six-month reigns, ibid., pp. 276, 284, 289. The Y group's main representative, E, however, does not agree with this for it gives Duncan 6 months and Donald 3 years and 7 months, ibid., p. 255. Anderson could not accept the annihilation of Donald's first reign, ibid., p. 75, but E is probably closer to the truth than the members of the X group. The archetypes for both groups were composed in the mid twelfth century, ibid., p. 52; and there is no reason to prefer their authority to the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle and Florence, both nearly contemporary documents with the events in question. Furthermore, the regnal lists are demonstrably wrong on the length of the reign of Malcolm III, ibid., p. 49. Finally, it might be noted that Brechan's Prophecy, in ESSH, II, 91, has Malcolm succeeded by a king who reigns one month and 4 days, a regnal length which supports the chronology of the English sources.

143 Anglo-Saxon Chronicle, s.a. 1093 E, p. 170; s.a. 1094 E, p. 172. Florence of Worcester, II, 32, 35.

144 The charter is printed in the Feodarium Prioratus Dunelmensis, ed. W. Greenwell (Surtees Society, Vol. LVIII; Durham, 1872) II, lxxxii-iii. H. W. C. Davis accepts it as genuine, Regesta Willelmi Conquestoris et Willelmi Rufi, Vol. I of the Regesta Regum Anglo-Normannorum (Oxford, 1913), No. 345. Scammel, "The Liberty of Durham," p. 453, also accepts it.

145 There is disagreement on this matter. See Beeler, Warfare in England, pp. 68, 338, n. 59, for the various opinions on the subject. He thinks that Robert took control of Newcastle at the beginning of the revolt and that Rufus's first move after arriving in the North was to retake it, ibid., p. 68. This is not impossible, but it must be emphasized that neither the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle, s.a. 1095 E, p. 172, nor Florence of Worcester, II, 38, mentions a siege of Newcastle and that the two charters, RRA-N, I, Nos. 366, 367, made apud obsidionem Novi Castri which Beeler regards as proof of the siege, Warfare in England, p. 338, n. 59, probably refer to the siege castle built at Bamburgh. RRA-N, I, No. 363: Hoc autem factum est eo anno quo Rex Willelmus . . . fecit novem castellum ante Bebbanburgh super Robertum . . . .

146 Anglo-Saxon Chronicle, s.a. 1095 E, pp. 172-73; Florence of Worcester, II, 38; Ordericus Vitalis, III, 405-407; IV, 278-81. Beeler, Warfare in England, pp. 66-67; A. L. Poole, From Domesday Book to Magna Carta, 1087-1216 (2nd ed.; Oxford, 1955), p. 109.

147 Ordericus Vitalis, III, 406; IV, 278.

148 For the campaign see Beeler, Warfare in England, pp. 66-70.

149 According to the account of Orderic, Robert had planned to ambush the king, III, 407-408; IV, 280.

150 Symeon of Durham, HR, p. 199; De Primo Saxonum Adventu, p. 384.

151 ESC, Nos. XV, XVI. See Duncan, "Earliest Charters," pp. 102-18, 126-27, 136-37. The Vita Oswini, pp. 21-22, mentions an expedition which went into Scotland at some date between 1093 and 1097. Ritchie, Normans in Scotland, p. 65.

152 Anglo-Saxon Chronicle, s.a. 1097 E, p. 174. In this instance, the translation of Duncan has been followed, "Earliest Charters," p. 133. Florence of Worcester, II, 41.

## CHAPTER VI

## THE IMPACT OF THE NORMANS ON THE NORTHERN VILLAGE

The preceding narrative shows that the North was conquered in three stages and that the first two were completed by the death of William the Conqueror. At this date Norman nobles were established in southern Lancashire and along the east coast plain from the south of Yorkshire north through Durham into southern Northumberland. As yet they had not ventured in any numbers into northern and central Northumberland and northern Lancashire or into the Pennines, but on the plains their power was supreme--if not unchallenged along its northern edges and in the mountains. This chronology of their expansion is an important improvement upon traditional accounts of the subjugation of the North which make the establishment of Norman power automatically follow either the harrying of 1069 or the punitive expedition of 1080 and which ignore the territorial limits of this power even in the 1080's and 1090's. Furthermore, an understanding of the local importance of the house of Bamburgh and of the threats inherent in the North's western border make the extent of this expansion more understandable. Still, the foregoing account is traditional in a sense. It benefits from a regional point of view and from the inclusion of the pre-Conquest history of the North, but the process described is familiar in its general outlines. It is the narrative of the replacement of native landowners by Frenchmen and the consolidation of the latter's power by means of the castle, the Church, and the knight.



Aside from the slaughter, the establishment of this new aristocracy was the most important immediate result of the Conquest, and before the extension of Norman settlement into Cumberland and Northumberland can be profitably traced, it is necessary to take a closer look at the settlement of the Normans in Yorkshire and Durham from the standpoint of a basic question which is usually shunned: Did the Norman Conquest represent a straightforward substitution of one upper class for another, or did its effects reach deeper in the social hierarchy? Put in the parlance of Conquest studies, the basic problem is to determine whether these new landlords simply stepped into the shoes, so to speak, of their Anglo-Saxon predecessors and ran their new estates according to local custom or whether they made basic changes in the management and organization of their estates.

To those familiar with the general body of literature on the Norman Conquest, this will, of course, appear an unfruitful line of inquiry because it is generally assumed that the Normans were content to continue the level and type of agricultural exploitation which had existed in King Edward's day. Recent research has shown, to be sure, that they may perhaps have raised rents or demanded higher farms from their manors and that, on occasion, they may have increased the amount of labor which they received from peasants by insisting on strict definitions of services;<sup>1</sup> but these qualifications have not shaken the great unvoiced assumption that the greater Norman barons were basically gentlemen, i.e. that their greed did not cross class lines. Perhaps Frank Barlow best summed up this view on the subject in a recent appraisal of the effects of the Conquest:

The new landholders acquired all the rents and services which their predecessors had enjoyed. In an economic context the change of lords made little difference to the agricultural producers, the farmers and stock breeders. There were many rough actions and misunderstandings, there may occasionally have been new men with new ideas. Sometimes there was a determined effort to re-stock under-exploited estates. There may have been a general movement to require full economic rents. But the . . . major barons were mostly absentees. . . . They may have pressed heavily on their stewards, reeves, and other agents to increase revenue from their estates; but they had no revolutionary means of exploitation.<sup>2</sup>

This characterization of Norman economic behavior may be correct in general, but at least one recent historian, R. Welldon Finn, has held the opposite view that the Normans demanded increased labor dues from the peasants where possible.<sup>3</sup> And even if the prevailing view is an accurate description of the way in which the Normans dealt with their estates in southern and midland England, it is really only proof that they were reasonably satisfied with their new manors rather than a sign that they were either unwilling or unable to reorganize estates which did not meet their expectations. It is becoming increasingly clear, after all, that the greater Norman barons were mainly parvenus who were still quite concerned with enlarging their landed wealth,<sup>4</sup> and this characteristic makes it doubtful that they could necessarily be expected to respect peasant custom when it was not in their interest to do so. Specifically, one might wonder if the Normans behaved in the same way above the Humber as they had in the South since in the former region their new "manors" were at best lightly exploited relics of the shire system and more often were wholly or partially waste. Theoretically, they might be expected to have taken a rather different line in such circumstances, and there are, in fact, hints in the works of historians of the North that this was the case. These are vague and imprecise, but

they are useful as a balance to the prevailing opinion nonetheless. Stenton's early work on the estates of the northern Danelaw in the eleventh century led him to the belief that some "process" was occurring through which the greater sokes were breaking up and the smaller ones amalgamating:

to produce an intermediate type of estate, an estate forming an intermediate agrarian unit, in which the features characteristic of the later manorial economy might find room for development.<sup>5</sup>

What Sir Frank meant by "process" and "development" is not obvious, but they would, at least, seem to be open to the interpretation that the Normans were restructuring the sokes. The same conclusion is suggested by some of the work of T. A. M. Bishop. In 1934 he made a statistical study of the vills in the Vale of York and found that those vills with demesne land in 1301 had contained some population in 1086 while those vills with no demesne land in 1301 had been waste in 1086.<sup>6</sup> On the basis of this pattern he thought that:

The social depression which had been suffered after the conquest by the population of Yorkshire will account for the prevalence of a manorial institution in those vills where any population survived.<sup>7</sup>

This is a rather stronger statement than Stenton's although it is not clear whether Bishop thought that the Normans had introduced the manor into Yorkshire or whether he believed that they had simply continued it. The probability, however, is that he held the former view because he suggested in passing in this article that there might have been a "sudden and limited expansion of the manorial system within a short period after the conquest."<sup>8</sup> Certainly by 1948 he was of this opinion. In that year he stated this position clearly, albeit in a forbidding footnote on the next to the last page of his essay:

I assume that such burdens as the medieval peasantry of Yorkshire endured were fastened on them between the years 1069 and at latest 1100: the period of a rebellion, a punitive expedition, entry into possession by a foreign military caste, social degradation of the inhabitants in comparison with those of the rest of the northern Danelaw, compulsory migration, and the creation of conditions antecedent to the manorial system in a mild form.<sup>9</sup>

Finally, Jolliffe himself believed that the Normans introduced demesne farming in Northumbria during the twelfth century.<sup>10</sup> Of course, the opinions of all three of these scholars are invalidated to some extent by the fact that a "mild form" of manorialism had existed throughout Northumbria in 1066, but it is not certain that this discovery completely explains the phenomenon which they noted. Consequently, their views create a sufficiently strong prima facie case to justify pursuing this line of inquiry despite the general presumption that the Normans simply installed themselves in the economic structure which they found, caulked its seams, and preserved traditional forms of organization.

In the North this model has a certain unreality, in any case, because in many villages there was little of the traditional rural structure left for the Normans to respect. During the terrible winter of 1069-70, much of northern society was destroyed in Yorkshire and Durham, and an understanding of this must stand at the base of any realistic attempt to determine the nature of the Norman settlement of the North. Unfortunately, it is impossible to tell how great this destruction was above the Tees, but as late as the time of Domesday, the marks of harrying were still evident in Yorkshire where the countryside was studded with empty villages. Darby and Maxwell found that "over one-half of the vills of the North Riding and over one-third of those of the East and West Ridings were wholly or partially waste."<sup>11</sup> The remainder



of the villis had some population in 1086 but not necessarily as much as in 1066. Furthermore, these figures are too low because they include only those villis explicitly described as waste or as containing waste, but not those villis without recorded population yet not described as waste.<sup>12</sup> Other statistics in this vein could be easily supplied, but perhaps a more meaningful impression of the extent of the destruction can be gained from a comparison with Nottinghamshire. In 1086 there were more people living in Nottinghamshire than in any two of the three ridings of Yorkshire, and the population of that shire (5,573) was more than double the recorded population of either the East Riding (2,362), or the North Riding (2,014).<sup>13</sup> Plough teams show the same picture of desolation. The figure for Nottinghamshire (1,969) was more than twice as large as the figures for the East Riding (791) or the North Riding (847) and substantially in excess of the number recorded for the West Riding (1,292).<sup>14</sup>

These figures leave no doubt that the harrying of Yorkshire had been very effective, and they automatically exclude much of the shire from the bounds of any theory of Norman economic inertia. To be of value, many estates above the Humber had to be revived. But beyond this general point, the meaning of Domesday's figures is not so clear because it is not certain that they can be taken entirely at their face value. Some rebuilding had presumably taken place between 1070 and 1086, the date of Domesday's description, but this document's Yorkshire folios fail to give any intermediate value for manors between 1066 and 1086. This omission hides the original extent of the waste in 1070, and this in turn effectively screens the Normans' initial dealings with their new

estates and creates uncertainty with respect to Yorkshire's population in 1086. Theoretically, there are two major alternatives which could account for these figures: development in place or forced immigration. The population of the shire in 1086 could have been composed of survivors of the harrying and their children who had stayed in their ancestral villages and redeveloped them under their new Norman lords. If this was the case, there would be a direct relationship between conditions in 1070 and in 1086 except that the areas of waste would have shrunk somewhat by the later date. Alternatively, the Normans may have brought in immigrants from undevastated parts of the shire or from beyond its borders to revive completely depopulated villages. If this happened on any scale, there would be little connection between the situation in 1070 and that described in Domesday.

Two important attempts have been made to deal with this complex problem.<sup>15</sup> The first was offered by Bishop, who in 1948 suggested an ingenious theory based on the second of the two alternatives.<sup>16</sup> His ideas were buttressed by an impressive statistical analysis of Yorkshire Domesday, and they were revolutionary in the sense that, if accepted, they would have forced a re-evaluation of the stereotype of Norman economic behavior. Bishop began by pointing out that the distribution of waste villages was not uniform in 1086. In the lowlands there were both waste vills and inhabited vills, yet the higher parts of the shire, the Pennines, the Moors in the North Riding, and the Wolds, were covered by great, unbroken bands of uninhabited or waste vills.<sup>17</sup> The obvious inference from this uneven distribution of waste would be that the Normans had harried the highlands more effectively than the plains, but

Bishop did not draw this conclusion. Rather, he asserted that the Normans had only harried the plains and river valleys in 1069 and had not penetrated the Pennines, the Moors, or the Wolds. This assertion, for which, incidentally, he provided no proof, was the foundation of his theory.<sup>18</sup> If it were accepted, then one was compelled to suppose that there had been extensive population movements of some sort within Yorkshire between 1070 and 1086. In particular, Bishop argued that the Normans had made an attempt to revive agricultural production on the Yorkshire plain by initiating population movements from the unwasted highlands down onto the lowlands. The sporadic distribution of waste in the lower parts of the shire was a sign that certain vills had been redeveloped by their Norman lords--not that the Normans had spared an occasional vill in 1069-70, and the bands of waste in the uplands were the result of a forced exodus carried out by the Normans. Their motive for doing this was to increase their agricultural profits.<sup>19</sup> Bishop believed that this theory was supported by three things. First, there were a number of villages on the plain which contained a populated estate belonging to one Norman lord and a waste estate belonging to another lord. He rejected the possibility that the lord of the populated estate might have simply usurped all the peasants in a partially waste village and argued that such populated estates had been redeveloped by their lords.<sup>20</sup> Second, there were a number of other vills which contained excess plough teams in 1086 as compared to 1066 but whose values had fallen from 1066. Bishop believed that these vills were recently resettled and perhaps expanded.<sup>21</sup> Finally, and this was his major proof, he thought that as a general rule only those fiefs which

contained both upland and lowland holdings had recovered to any significant extent by 1086.<sup>22</sup>

This fascinating theory, which would dispel some of the obscurity which hangs over Yorkshire during the critical period from 1070 to 1086 and which hides the Norman settlement of the county, is unfortunately false. Darby and Maxwell have raised four main objections to it in their geographical analysis of Yorkshire Domesday.<sup>23</sup> First, it was not "intrinsically improbable," as Bishop thought, that the Normans had wasted the uplands. These settlements were more in need of subduing than the plain because of their remoteness.<sup>24</sup> Second, they pointed out that this theoretical consideration was supported by the Domesday returns from Cheshire. These give a value for each manor not only for 1066 and 1086, but also for the intermediate date when the Norman lord took possession, and these show that the Normans had harried both the uplands and the lowlands in this shire but that the uplands had not recovered as quickly as the lowlands.<sup>25</sup> Third, they were unable to substantiate Bishop's claim that only those individual fiefs had recovered which contained both lowland and upland vills.<sup>26</sup> And finally, they pointed out that there were occasionally great differences in population between two estates of a single lord which lay in the same village. Such instances dull the significance of the cases of unequal development of manors lying in the same vill but belonging to different lords which Bishop interpreted as a sign of colonization.<sup>27</sup>

These points are well taken and leave Bishop's theory quite doubtful.<sup>28</sup> Furthermore, the same conclusion is supported by the findings of this inquiry. Northern resistance to the Norman Conquest was based upon



hit-and-run tactics in which the woods and hills played a crucial role as concealed places of assembly and refuge. Their reduction was necessary for the Normans to control Yorkshire, and Orderic Vitalis specifically states that William pursued the rebels into the hills and woods during the winter of 1069.<sup>29</sup> It might still be doubted, of course, that the Normans did as thorough a job wasting the difficult country of the uplands as they did the plain, but the unbroken bands of seemingly uninhabited vills which appear in Domesday are to some degree an illusion, in any case, for they resulted from the failure of the Domesday clerks to obtain information on the specifics of population and waste for many of the Pennine villages.<sup>30</sup> They cannot, therefore, be taken at face value, and the most likely hypothesis is that there was a sporadic distribution of waste in the uplands just as there was on the plain. These considerations strike at the heart of Bishop's theory by showing that his assumption that the uplands had escaped the harrying is false and that the impression that they were without population in 1086 is doubtful.


Despite their objections to Bishop's theory, Darby and Maxwell concluded their discussion of this issue by suggesting that there might, indeed, have been some population movement from unwasted to wasted vills but that there was insufficient evidence to be certain.<sup>31</sup> That the latter was a serious reservation is shown by their failure to enlarge upon the question of what sort of redevelopment they themselves envisaged. Actually, their suggestion, although it saved the theoretical possibility of redevelopment, was a tacit admission that there was little sign of it. This may seem surprising but only from the standpoint of compartmentalized thinking. In terms of economics, there should have been

a movement underway by 1086 to revive the better land of Yorkshire; but in terms of the military situation, or perhaps more accurately the police situation, it is hard to see how such a movement could have made progress in much of Yorkshire. Until the last years of William the Conqueror and probably beyond, the Pennines and Moors were the seats of outlaw bands which were reenforced along the coast by pirates and in the northwest probably by raiders from over Stainmore. In these circumstances isolated colonists could have hoped for little security, and the most promising sites for redevelopment would have been those near still populated villas which could afford some protection. Not until the establishment of such defensive bulwarks as Richmond and Pontefract, which occurred late in William's reign, did these conditions begin to pass.<sup>32</sup> General efforts at redevelopment may then have begun; but, if so, they are unlikely to have made enough progress by 1086 to leave a clear mark in Domesday. The question, then, has been misconstrued. The Normans may have made an attempt to increase the amount of land under the plough, but only in those areas where it was fairly safe to do so, that is, in areas where there was a significant continuity of habitation.

Bishop himself uncovered the clue to what actually happened although he failed to interpret it correctly. In terms of the general statistics which were discussed earlier, Yorkshire was, indeed, in a destitute condition in 1086. Most of its villages were either waste or underpopulated, and only a few had come through the Conquest unchanged.<sup>33</sup> Bishop, however, pointed out that there were certain exceptions to this, the overstocked manors. These were villages in which the number of ploughs at work in 1086 exceeded the number of ploughlands (the land which could be

worked by one plough) traditionally ascribed to the vill. By inference, such vills also had a larger population in 1086 than in 1066. Bishop cited the example of Handsworth to illustrate this phenomenon. It had land for 7 ploughs, yet there were  $8\frac{1}{2}$  ploughs at Handsworth in 1086.<sup>34</sup> A substantial number of similar cases existed in Yorkshire at this date, despite the general condition of the shire, and they were very significant. Bishop, however, did not investigate them closely because his attention was attracted by another characteristic of Handsworth. Its value had fallen from £8 in 1066 to 40s. in 1086, and Bishop thought that this decline in value was important in terms of his theory of colonization and that it indicated that the 21 peasants at Handsworth were recent colonists who "had not yet advanced far in clearing and cultivation."<sup>35</sup> He further theorized that the excess teams here and in other vills of this type were either engaged in clearing or were transient and would in the future move to waste vills,<sup>36</sup> but this interpretation cannot be accepted. The values of manors in Yorkshire were subject to variation as a result of too many possible causes to be used as an index of the date of colonization,<sup>37</sup> and, in any case, the obvious inference from the excess team and a half is that the arable of the village had been expanded, not that there was a floating corps of ploughmen.

At one point in his article, Bishop raised the possibility of plotting the overstocked manors on a map, but he dismissed it because he was more concerned with the supposed relationship between upland waste and populated manors in the lowlands within individual fiefs.<sup>38</sup> Had he pursued the idea, however, he would have found the clearest signs which Domesday can provide of Norman estate development in Yorkshire during



Map 6. Distribution of Overstocked Manors in Yorkshire in 1986




the years 1070 to 1086. A map of the overstocked manors shows that these estates were distributed in a highly singular fashion across the face of the shire. They were not spread evenly over the plain or even limited to it as Bishop's theory would suggest that they should have been. Rather, great stretches of prime land in Holderness and much of the Vale of York were completely without them, and there were a number of them on the unrewarding soils of the Howardian and Hambleton Hills and in the Sandstone Hills. Moreover, the overstocked manors tended to stand in groups, not in isolation. The majority of these manors were located in four main areas: in the Aire valley and the land to the south, in Richmond below the Swale, and around the edge of the Southern Wolds plus a complex area which comprised the Howardian and Hambleton Hills with the valley of the upper Derwent and the adjoining fringes of the Vales of Pickering and York (hereafter called the "Howardian Hills and vicinity"). Nor is this tendency of the overstocked manors to be found in groups their only peculiarity. Domesday's description of the fief of Ilbert de Lacy consistently names his Anglo-Saxon subtenants in 1086. His fief was situated on either side of the Aire in the largest concentration of overstocked manors in the county, and the estates of his Anglo-Saxon tenants show nearly as strong a tendency to have excess teams as those of his Norman tenants. Finally, it should be noted that of the eighty overstocked manors in this area, sixty-seven had fallen in value.

The manors with excess ploughs were, then, concentrated in a few areas. In the one area where Anglo-Saxon subtenants are named, their estates also tended to be overstocked, and in the same area, which

contained the greatest number of such manors in the shire, there had been a general fall in value. Bishop's theory cannot explain these things, but they are explicable in terms of the hypothesis that the Normans restricted their efforts at redevelopment to only a few relatively secure areas. In a sense, "redevelopment" does not accurately describe the process which occurred. The areas where there were concentrations of manors with excess teams in 1086 were areas which had either not been harried in the winter of 1069 or which had not been ravaged so severely that the continuity of life had been broken. In these areas the Normans increased agricultural production in an attempt to augment their own wealth by expanding the arable of existing villages and probably by redeveloping nearby waste holdings. This is the meaning of the extra ploughs. Nor is there any need of an elaborate hypothesis to explain where the Normans got the peasant labor for this expansion. All discussions of this question have ignored the single most likely source of "colonists": the refugees. The harrying of the North displaced thousands of peasants by destroying their livestock, agricultural implements, and winter food supply--not to mention their seed corn for 1070--and set in motion a population movement which reached the Midlands and ultimately even Scotland. The object of this migration was to find food and probably the chance to sell themselves into slavery, a poor man's alternative to starvation, aside from brigandage, in a society which lacked credit mechanisms. Initially these refugees would have made for the undevastated parts of Yorkshire where the local Norman and Anglo-Saxon lords had first choice, so to speak. Presumably they selected the most desirable, young men and women in their teens and those with special

skills, and sent the rest on their way because the stream of starving peasants represented as much of a threat to the local economy, particularly to livestock, as an opportunity to acquire cheap labor. Probably, in fact, some small villages which had escaped the Normans were destroyed by their passage.

As compelling as this line of reasoning is, some index of continuity is, nevertheless, desirable as a support for the hypothesis that the concentrations of overstocked manors were located in areas which had not been too severely wasted in 1069 rather than in areas which had been completely redeveloped after that date. Since Domesday does not give any manorial values in Yorkshire for an intermediate date between 1066 and 1086, this problem cannot be approached directly, but rural churches served by resident priests can be used as an indirect source of this information because they are unlikely to have survived at a very much greater rate than the peasantry itself. This should be true irrespective of whether the Normans burned down churches in 1069. Actually they may have done so if the Yorkshire peasants followed the usual northern expedient in times of danger--flight to the churchyard with all the movable property which circumstances allowed. But even if the Normans resisted the temptation provided by such convenient gatherings, the relationship should still hold because it stems directly from the nature of churches as parasitic service institutions. With the destruction of the economy in an area, the disruption of normal patterns of life, and the death or dispersal of the inhabitants, the churches in the area would cease to exist because both their reason to be and their income would be gone. Furthermore, in a devastated area later colonized, a



Map 7. Distribution of Functioning Churches in Yorkshire in 1986



functioning church would be one of the last things to be created since the population would have to reach a fairly high level in terms of numbers and prosperity before a church could be supported. These considerations, of course, do not form a firm basis for statements about individual churches, but they are valid for groups of churches. Regions in which functioning churches were recorded in 1086 had either been spared or not too seriously disturbed in the harrying of the North. Therefore, the distribution of churches provides a general index of the continuity of local habitation.<sup>39</sup>

If overstocked manors were in fact located in areas which had not suffered overwhelming destruction, there should be a correlation between the number of overstocked manors in an area and the number of functioning churches there. High numbers of the former should be found with high numbers of the latter, and the opposite should also hold true. This relationship does exist. If the shire is divided into suitable areas suggested by the distribution of overstocked manors, topographical factors, and feudal geography, and if these areas are ranked according to the number of overstocked manors and functioning churches in each, a marked correspondence emerges (see Table 3 and compare "A" with "B").<sup>40</sup>

The correspondence between files "A" and "B" is close enough to establish that the relationship in question exists and to show that the areas where there were numerous overstocked manors had not been harried too severely. There is not, however, complete agreement between the two rankings. With the second position slight discrepancies begin to appear, although from the standpoint of the ranking of the overstocked manors, there is an exact correspondence through position six. This is not,

TABLE 3  
Overstocked Manors and Functioning Churches

Regions	M	C	A	B	A'	B'
I. Below the Aire	87	37	1	1	1	1
II. Above the Aire	23	14	3	3	3	3
III. Pennines	0	3	11	9	8	8
IV. Richmond	19	6	5	7	-	-
V. N. Vale of York	19	9	5	5	5	5
VI. S. Vale of York with H. Levels	14	7	6	6	6	6
VII. Howardian Hills and vicinity	39	16	2	2	2	2
VIII. Cleveland	5	7	8	6	-	-
IX. Vale of Pickering	13	5	7	8	7	7
X. N. Wolds	2	2	10	10	-	-
XI. S. Wolds	22	13	4	4	4	4
XII. Holderness	4	16	9	2	-	-

## Key:

M = The number of overstocked estates

C = The number of functioning churches

A = The ranking of the overstocked estates

B = The ranking of churches

A' and B' = The revised rankings of A and B, each corrected by the deletion of those areas harried twice in 1069-70.

therefore, a serious matter since the proposition at issue is only that there should be large numbers of functioning churches in areas which contained numerous overstocked manors, not that there should always be

large numbers of overstocked manors in areas where churches were numerous. Most of the discrepancies could be accounted for, in any case, as the result of the inevitable inaccuracies introduced into the rankings by the small numerical bases which appear towards the end of the ranks. Still, this explanation can hardly apply to Holderness which was ninth in overstocked manors but second in functioning churches. This difference is not due to some trick of the numbers, and it suggests an explanation for the discrepancies between the two rankings. They are the result of the simplicity of the model. Despite the prominence which the harrying of the North claims in a discussion of Yorkshire, various parts of the shire endured other episodes of destruction after 1069. Specifically, Holderness and the eastern part of the North Wolds had probably been devastated as late as 1085 in order to deny supplies to a threatened Danish invasion, and Richmond and Cleveland had been harried by the Scots in 1070.<sup>41</sup> Such incidents as these could be expected to introduce confusion into the basic data; and, if these areas are excluded from the rankings, a rather different result emerges: There is a perfect correspondence between both ranks for the seven areas wasted only once in 1068-70 (compare "A" with "B").

This agreement and its absence when the four fringe areas are included in the calculations can best be explained by the following hypothesis. In the winter of 1069 William only began to harry Yorkshire after he had crossed the Aire, and the land to the south of this river only suffered from the enforced stay of his army as it waited to force the line of the river. This undoubtedly produced a good deal of local destruction but far less than the harrying proper which only commenced

once the Normans were beyond the Aire and the Danes had retreated to their ships. The Normans then thoroughly wasted two great swathes of land judging from the survival of functioning churches. One included the Vale of York, Richmond, and much of the region above the Aire; and it ran an indeterminate distance into the Pennines. The other area comprised the Vale of Pickering, the Northern Wolds, and Cleveland. Aside from the south, the Howardian Hills, the Southern Wolds, and apparently Holderness escaped the full fury of the destruction.<sup>42</sup>

This hypothesis has much to recommend it. First, it is entirely in accord with what little is known from chronicles about the harrying. The first great band of destruction in central Yorkshire would have been produced by the systematic harrying which was conducted in December of 1069, and the second would have been the result of William's later movements.<sup>43</sup> Specifically, after Christmas the Conqueror moved east from York to dislodge a group of rebels from Holderness and then went north to the Tees, presumably along the coast.<sup>44</sup> During the course of this campaign, the Northern Wolds, the Vale of Pickering, and Cleveland would have been harried. Second, this reconstruction of the harrying is supported by a significant feature of Darby and Maxwell's maps of the waste in Yorkshire in 1086. These show that the waste in central Yorkshire above the Aire included a high degree of totally waste villages such as would have been produced by the methodical operations in December and that the waste in the east was more often only partial, a reflection apparently of William's haste to cross into Durham as winter deepened.<sup>45</sup> Finally, this theory accounts for the existence of a less heavily wasted strip of land running from the western end of the Moors down through the



Howardian Hills and the middle Derwent to the Southern Wolds and Holderness. This area was on the edge of both phases of the harrying but the direct object of neither.

Once the Norman armies had departed, peasants fled the blasted stretches of countryside, and many of them went initially to the less devastated regions. South of the Aire and in the other inland areas which had not suffered too greatly, some of their number were used by the Normans to expand agricultural production and to redevelop waste vills during the 1070's. Most were probably forced to move on. Those peasants, however, who had fled to the northern part of the shire and to Durham met a rather different fate. In the spring of 1070, Malcolm Canmore suddenly erupted into Yorkshire. He came over Stainmore and ravaged Teesdale and Cleveland before crossing into Durham.<sup>46</sup> Of course, by this time there was not too much left to plunder, and the Scots consoled themselves by turning the raid into a slaving expedition. This may even have been their intention from the beginning since the taking of slaves was a common feature of later Scottish raids. In any case, they were able to take advantage of the conditions created by the harrying to enslave large numbers of refugees who had assembled in some of the areas through which they passed, and Symeon of Durham believed that they were so successful that every Scottish household had the convenience of an English slave as a result of this expedition.<sup>47</sup> Perhaps many of the refugees were not unwilling to go. This last episode was, in turn, responsible for the failure of the relationship between overstocked manors and functioning churches to hold true on the northern edge of Yorkshire.

The Normans increased agricultural production by expanding the arable in localities where large segments of the native population had survived and which had been the object of population movements set off by the harrying. They may also have redeveloped waste villages near these secure areas, but they probably did not risk their oxen and seed in isolated attempts at reclamation until the 1080's at the earliest. Generally speaking, there is a fairly direct relationship between what happened in Yorkshire in 1069-1070 and the situation described in 1086. A complex form of development in place had occurred, and Domesday can be more or less taken at its word without the help of convoluted hypotheses.

This much is sufficiently clear, but it is imprecise in that it ignores the fundamental question of how the Normans organized their "increased agricultural production." This is a matter of overriding importance for understanding the significance of the Norman Conquest of the North. Whether this settlement represented merely the substitution of one landholding group for another, or whether its effects went deeper, ultimately depends on how the Normans obtained wealth from their new manors. In theory they had a clear choice. Either they could organize their expanded (and repopulated?) manors on the basis of shire custom and realize an increased revenue indirectly because the manorial population was now larger, or they could adopt a more direct system. In many cases the Normans apparently adopted the latter alternative. In the 1070's there was no compelling reason why they should stay within the limits of Northumbrian custom, and the evidence which has already been discussed shows clearly that they abandoned it in at least one basic respect. What occurred in the overstocked vills during the 1070's was

not predominantly an expansion of the area under the plough to meet the needs of a more numerous village community, although there were instances of this; it was in most cases a direct expansion or creation of demesne land for the benefit of the lord of the village. In 1086 there were some 220 overstocked manors in Yorkshire. Of these, 179 contained demesne land, and in one-third (60) of these, the ploughs belonging to the lord of the manor exactly accounted for the excess ploughs of the estate and were clearly recent intrusions. Moreover, if those overstocked manors in which the ploughs of the peasants were only one-half plough greater or smaller than the number of ploughlands attributed to the manor are added to this group, then the clear examples of manorialization increase from 33 1/3% to 44% of the overstocked manors containing demesne land. This group consisted of old bondage vills which had been manorialized by the Normans. The other overstocked manors with demesne are more complex than this group, but they had probably been subject to the same development. One of two conditions was found in them. Either the number of demesne ploughs exceeded the increase in the total number of ploughs (24 cases), or it was less than the total increase (72 cases). The former condition probably represents the expansion of a pre-existing demesne, and the latter is perhaps the result of a general enlargement of the arable with or without the creation of a new demesne. Alternatively, individual manors in either group could have been formed by the revival of waste villages. Finally, only 12 of the 41 manors which still lacked demesne in 1086 and were less valuable than the rest had been granted to undertenants by this date.

In Yorkshire, the Norman Conquest did not represent the simple substitution of one group of landholders for another. The Normans broke with northern tradition by increasing the amount of land which was tilled directly for their benefit. Probably this meant that they would be wealthier in time than their predecessors, but it also had immediate social ramifications because it was combined with a preference for one specific manorial form. At least this is suggested by what little can be learned from Domesday about a second aspect of the way in which they organized their estates. Of course, Domesday was not a customary, nor did it define the terms which it used to describe the peasants. But it seems to record a great social depression in Yorkshire which was principally marked by the almost complete disappearance of sokemen. There were, for instance, over three times as many sokemen in Nottinghamshire in 1086 as in all of Yorkshire, and the meaning of this comparison cannot be explained away by the suggestion that sokemen had not been numerous in Yorkshire in 1066.<sup>48</sup> The populations of two sokes, Northallerton and Falsgrave, are given for 1066, and these two estates contained more sokemen (224) at that date than the North and East Ridings combined in 1086.<sup>49</sup> The Yorkshire sokemen had almost vanished as a significant class. This was an important social change, but what is usually not pointed out is that the fall of those sokemen and even villeins, for that matter, who had lived through the harrying, was not as great as economic considerations alone might have dictated. In the years immediately after 1069 the problem which faced the burned out peasants was survival. There were too many people for the weakened agrarian economy to feed; and because of the slaughter of oxen and the destruction of



agricultural implements, recovery is not likely to have been rapid. Indeed, the situation may have worsened during the early 1070's until enough people starved to death or left for the economy to stabilize. In these circumstances the Normans could have set what terms they wished for the refugees, but they seem to have acted with some restraint. When the population of Yorkshire was finally recorded in 1086, there were no serfs at all in the shire and only a small number of bordars.<sup>50</sup> This is significant because it means that the Normans had not chosen to cultivate their new demesnes with either serfs or a naked use of hired labor. The only possible exception to this is the West Riding where bordars accounted for 33% of the population. This may mean that some of the survivors had been reduced to the status of bordars there, but this is uncertain. The percentage of bordars in the population is impressive in comparison with the percentages of bordars in the North and East Ridings, 16% and 19% respectively, but it is not much larger than the percentage in neighboring Derbyshire where bordars were 27% of the population.<sup>51</sup>

Throughout the North and East Ridings the bulk of the population consisted of villeins in 1086. This class made up 79% of the recorded population in the former and 73% in the latter. Even in the West Riding they were 54% of the population; and, if grouped with the sokemen, who were more common here than in the other two ridings, they and the sokemen were nearly twice as numerous as the bordars.<sup>52</sup> Given the forces let loose by the harrying, this preponderance of villeins was clearly artificial. If Domesday's employment of the term "villein" (villanus) was at all consistent with later northern usage, their existence had

been fostered by the Normans, and this phenomenon requires explanation. At the minimum, of course, it means that the Normans preferred to have their demesnes cultivated by the customary labor of villeins, the holders of one or two bovates presumably, rather than by either serfs or bordars. But beyond this obvious point, one is nearly in the dark on the basis of the Yorkshire evidence. Theoretically, the large numbers of villeins could be explained within the terms of Northumbrian society. The Normans had a greater need for peasant labor than their predecessors. Villeins yielded more free labor than either sokemen or bordars, so the Norman lords maintained surviving villeins and established indigent sokemen and villeins (and bordars?) as villeins. This line of reasoning could provide a rationale for groups of overstocked manors such as those of Hugh fitz Baldric which contained almost exclusively villeins, (1 sokeman, 385 villeins, and 7 bordars to be exact)<sup>53</sup> and could explain those numerous (72 out of 179) overstocked manors with demense which show an increase in the number of peasant ploughs. Both could be understood as attempts to increase the amount of customary labor available by the multiplication of the villein population.

This line of explanation may contain some truth, but a limited body of evidence indicates that the social depression of the Yorkshire peasantry may also have been the result of an arbitrary act of power and greed. A survey of Ripon, Otley, and Sherburn, estates of the archbishop of York, has survived from around the year 1030, and when its description of these estates is compared with their description in Domesday, radical changes are obvious. These are least pronounced at Ripon, where the two accounts substantially agree except for five pieces

of land which appear as sokeland in 1030 but as berewicks in 1086.<sup>54</sup> Given the size of the Ripon estate and the amount of time between the two surveys, this change might not be judged significant were it not for the fact that the same type of transformation reappears at Otley and Sherburn on a much greater scale. In 1030 the estate of Otley consisted of the head village and sixteen dependent villages. Otley and six of the villages were divided between agenland and sokeland, and the remaining ten villages were entirely sokeland.<sup>55</sup> By 1086, however, there was no sokeland dependent upon Otley. It and fourteen of the sixteen villages mentioned in 1030 are listed, but they are all described as berewicks.<sup>56</sup> The accounts of Sherburn reveal the same phenomenon. In the early survey it had twenty-two dependent villages and parts of twelve more villages. Six of these properties were divided between agenland and sokeland; the rest were entirely sokeland. Domesday, however, describes Sherburn as only having berewicks.<sup>57</sup> In both of these estates the rights of sokemen had been annulled. By 1086 their land belonged to the archbishop, and the Normans probably were responsible for this transformation of sokelands into berewicks. Furthermore, this act of tyranny seems to have affected the status of the peasants. Sherburn's population in 1086 consisted of 8 sokemen, 101 villeins, and 122 bordars.<sup>58</sup> The Normans did not simply preserve villeins and set up refuges as villeins; they created them by fiat.

There is a little evidence, moreover, that the Normans changed the nature of villeinage itself. The obligation to perform week-work was not one of the ancient burdens which lay upon the northern peasantry, but two examples of it are known in Yorkshire. At Carlton and East

Hardwick, dependent members of the manor of Tanshelf, the peasants who held bovates had to work two days a week during 47 weeks of the year and six days a week "during the five weeks of autumn" on the old central demesne at Tanshelf, and at Buttercrambe on the Derwent the bonders worked four days a week from Whitsunday to Martinmas.<sup>59</sup> These examples are unique, but they are disquieting, nonetheless, because they come from the two areas with the highest concentration of overstocked manors in 1086 and, in fact, from vills which themselves seem to have been overstocked.<sup>60</sup> This might be only coincidence, but it probably means that at least in these two instances the Normans had imposed heavier labor obligations on the villeins to make possible the cultivation of enlarged demesnes.

It was Bishop who first pointed out these examples of week-work in Yorkshire. He believed that the Normans had, indeed, imposed this obligation around Tanshelf (he did not discuss Buttercrambe), but he rejected an economic interpretation. Rather, he thought that it:

**must** be considered to have been imposed by an exceptional effort of social and economic oppression, from a motive other than that of mere economic exploitation: a motive presented by the strategic importance of the Aire crossing in the vicinity of Pontefract.<sup>61</sup>

Given only two examples of week-work in Yorkshire, this might seem a reasonable idea, particularly since Bishop had misinterpreted the evidence of an expansion of demesne farming, but even without this information Bishop's interpretation ignores the basic problem that week-work may have been more common at an earlier date than the thirteenth-century inquiries indicate. By this period labor services had been commuted into money payments to a great extent in Yorkshire, and it may be that



commutation hides old obligations to perform week-work. This is not just a theoretical possibility. Within a restricted area comparable obligations should have been commuted for roughly similar payments, although complete agreement could not be expected on account of the bargaining process and variation in the value of bovates, money, and labor. Furthermore, the payments made as commutation should stand in a close relationship to the money value of uncommuted villein services in cases where the services themselves were originally similar, provided, of course, that commutation had not been carried out too long ago. These considerations are important because of the dim light which they throw on commuted peasant custom in the vicinity of Buttercrambe. If these payments are compared with the combined value of the rent, renders in kind, and customary works of the villeins of Buttercrambe, a suspicious pattern emerges. In those manors which had contained demesne land in 1086, the payments ranged from 9s.2d. per bovate to 13s.4d. with the value of the rent, renders, and works at Buttercrambe (9s.11d.) falling well within these limits. The rate at the manor of Helmsley, however, where there had been no demesne in 1086, was only 5s., half the common rate of 10s. found in the vills which had been manorialized in 1086. This pattern shows that the obligations of the villeins of Buttercrambe were not unique in their scale, and it probably means that the Normans had imposed heavy labor duties on the peasants in the surrounding villages.

TABLE 4  
Bovate Rates in the Vicinity of Buttercrambe<sup>a</sup>

Date	Manor	Bovate Rate	Manorialized in 1086
1271-72	Burton-le-Willows	10s.	X
1282	Buttercrambe	(9s.11d.)	X
1258-59	Catton	9s.2d.	X
1285	Helmsley		
	West Newton (a member)	5s.	
	Pockeley (a member)	5s.	
1285	Howsham	10s.	X
1245-46	Skerpenbeck	10s.	X
1267-68	"	13s.4d.	X

<sup>a</sup>YI, I, Nos. VIII, XLVI, LX, LXXI; II, No. XXIX.

Unfortunately, this line of inquiry cannot be extended to the shire at large because of the uncertainties inherent in the method. Yet its results seem solid in the neighborhood of Buttercrambe, and this means that the general absence of week-work in the inquisitions is not necessarily significant. Indeed, this example and the mentality reflected in the social depression of the sokemen, the preference for villeins, and the expansion of demesnes make it likely that the two known examples of week-work were not "exceptional" acts of oppression. Rather, it looks more as if the first generation of Norman lords used their power to establish a seignorial regime which approximated the textbook manor and

which in many cases included the imposition of week-work on the villeins. That the Normans took this last step, of course, can only be stated as a probability on the basis of the Yorkshire evidence, but this is only to be expected given the agricultural history of the shire during the twelfth century. The creation of manors was a movement which was inevitably limited in its scope and duration. Only during the 1070's and early 1080's did conditions exist which made it possible to impose new burdens on the peasants of Yorkshire. Once these years of starvation and exodus had passed, the Norman lords no longer held the upper hand. If they were to redevelop their remaining waste estates, they had to attract peasants by offering them easy terms, and Bishop has shown that revival along these lines did take place in the long run.<sup>62</sup> One of its secondary effects was the encouragement of the widespread commutation which hides the older burdens of the Yorkshire peasantry.

What is needed to settle this question is some way of getting around the effects of thirteenth-century commutation; and although this is apparently impossible in Yorkshire, such is not the case in Durham. The agrarian history of the lands between Tyne and Tees is not so subject to this complication both because much of the land belonged to the church and because this area was not harried to the same extent as Yorkshire.<sup>63</sup> Only limited rebuilding was necessary above the Tees after the harrying; and, if a brief expansion of manorialism accompanied the Norman Conquest here, its chances of leaving traces in the records were much better than those of the parallel movement in Yorkshire. In particular, it should be visible in Boldon Book, Durham's twelfth-century

customal, which provides an incomparable chance for the study of northern peasant custom.

To be sure, the various scholars who have worked with this document have not discovered any development of this nature, but this is not decisive. The exclusion of Durham from Domesday precludes a straightforward collation of the manorial forms of 1086 and later peasant custom. There are no overstocked manors here to serve as the obvious starting point for an investigation. Furthermore, the scholars who have used this document have had their own concerns, and these have overpowered Boldon Book. G. T. Lapsley, for instance, was interested in the survivals, and he based his division of St. Cuthbert's villages into classes of forest, pastoral, and agricultural villages principally on the presence or absence of cornage.<sup>64</sup> Jolliffe followed a similar line. He was almost entirely preoccupied with the insight which the survivals in Boldon Book could throw on conditions in the North before 1066. Beyond this date his only interest lay in establishing a connection between the integral shires and the complex manorial forms found in later records. This led him to his theory of truncation and an unsupported assertion that demesne farming had increased in the twelfth century, accompanied around Durham by the imposition of week-work on the peasants.<sup>65</sup> Regrettably, he did not pursue this idea since it was only a logical necessity of his theory of truncation, not a question which basically concerned him. Finally, M. Postan, who ignored Jolliffe, based his analysis of Boldon Book on the false assumption that Durham had been manorialized on a Midland pattern since time immemorial, and this curious mistake led him to interpret Boldon Book backwards.<sup>66</sup>



Actually, the information on demesne farming in Boldon Book is one of its clearest aspects. The document is not, after all, a description of peasant farming or a self-conscious repository of ancient Northumbrian custom, even though information on both subjects can be derived from it. Boldon Book is an account of the manorial rights of the bishop, a list of the renders in kind, payments, and customary labor which he could claim each year from the manors he held directly and a record of the farms of manors held by tenants. Although at first sight this information represents a confusing maze with its welter of detail, if it is studied closely, certain general patterns become evident in the villas which were not at farm, and the most important of these was the distinction which existed between villages with a demesne and those without one. This was the critical factor which differentiated villages in twelfth-century Durham. General internal organization and peasant custom were correlated with the presence or absence of demesne land in a village except in late functioning shires such as Heighingtonshire.

There were, in fact, two systems for harnessing peasant labor for the support of the landlord in operation in Durham at the time of Boldon Book. The one which has traditionally attracted the most attention was a survival from the old shires, and it was usually found in villages which lacked demesne land. These villages were not completely uniform, of course, but Butterwick can stand as a fair example of the type.

Buterwyk [Butterwick] renders 32 shillings and 9 pence cornage and 1 milch cow and 8 scot-chalders of malt and the same of meal and the same of oats. And every plough[team] of the villeins ploughs and harrows 2 acres at Sedgefield. And the villeins do 4 boon-days for every house with 1 man. And they cart a tun of wine and the millstone of Sedgefield. The dreng keeps a dog and a horse and goes on the great hunt with 2 hunting-dogs and 5 ropes, and does suit of court and goes on errands.<sup>67</sup>

This was the classic bondage vill. Butterwick lacked a demesne, and its inhabitants, who were all apparently bonders aside from the dreng, performed light agricultural duties in another village. At the time of Boldon Book, seven other villages had the same characteristics, and six villages without drengs belonged to this type.<sup>68</sup> Moreover, the five villages which contained molmen (firmars) should be added to this group because their only distinction was the payment of a farm assessed on the bovate in lieu of the grain renders, cow render, and cornage payments which were made by the bonders in the other villages.<sup>69</sup> The only exception to this general rule that the custom of the shire was found in vills without demesnes was a small number of villages which had presumably been the centers of groups of bondage vills in days gone by. Aside from Heighington, they had been shorn of their dependent villages by 1183, but their internal arrangements still bore the mark of the shire. Demesnes were either small or defunct except in Heighingtonshire, and the peasants either paid compositions for part of the old dues or were subject to the usual heavy renders in kind and formalized but limited obligations to perform customary labor.<sup>70</sup>

This was hardly the case in the manors where the second customary tradition was followed. Despite the prominence which shire custom has claimed in most discussions of Boldon Book, by this date there were a number of villages in Durham with big demesnes, and in these villages a customary tradition, which was an integral part of extensive demesne cultivation and which had no discernible roots in Northumbrian custom, was in force. Villeins subject to this system of obligations performed

week-work, and the customs of the men of Boldon, where there was a demesne of four ploughs, typify the system:

In Boldona [Boldon] there are twenty-two villeins, everyone of whom holds 2 bovates of land of 30 acres . . . and works through the whole year three days in the week except Easter and Whitsunweek and thirteen days at Christmas. . . .<sup>71</sup>

There were also twelve cottars at Boldon who held twelve acres each and had to work two days a week throughout the year except on the three festivals mentioned above.<sup>72</sup> Altogether, the bishop had at his disposal ninety days of unpaid work each week throughout most of the year for the upkeep of the demesne at Boldon and for other manorial tasks. Nor was the situation at Boldon unique. The peasants in nineteen other villages were subject to the same customs as their fellows at Boldon,<sup>73</sup> and there were several other manors with large demesnes where the peasants did week-work also, although the obligations themselves were somewhat different from the three days a week required in the Boldon villages. In most of the other villages the villeins seem to have held only one bovate, and they worked two or three days a week from Lammas to Martinmas and one or two days a week during the remainder of the year.<sup>74</sup> Finally, there were three villages inhabited exclusively by cottars burdened with week-work.<sup>75</sup> Jolliffe dismissed all these villages in one brief and ambiguous sentence which hid both their number and their importance, and Lapsley classified most of them as pasture vills because their inhabitants paid cornage.<sup>76</sup> Only Postan accorded them their true importance, but he failed to understand their meaning.<sup>77</sup> In fact, the manors in which the villeins did week-work were the most heavily exploited manors in Durham. They accounted for most of the demesne land which was not at

farm and were subject to a regime which was diametrically opposed to the shire system customs followed in the villages without demesnes. The latter was predominantly a system which gathered in the products of peasant labor and only a limited amount of direct labor. The former yielded high amounts of free labor. This fundamental distinction divided the Durham peasantry.

Moreover, the line of cleavage ran even deeper than this discussion would suggest. There was no simple opposition of shire custom and week-work in St. Cuthbert's villages which might be explicable in terms of alternative systems for exploiting the peasants. Although the difference between the two customary traditions was real, the situation described in Boldon Book had another dimension, a dimension with implications of the gravest social importance. It is easy enough to read Boldon Book and find clear examples of bondage vills where the peasants were burdened with shire customs, but it is quite another thing to turn up equally clear examples of villages with demesnes and peasants burdened with week-work because the accounts of such manors are long and confusing and bear an obvious resemblance to the bondage vills. Again the situation in Boldon was typical:

[The villein] . . . does in autumn four boon-days at reaping with his entire household except the housewife . . . and they [the villeins] reap moreover 3 roods of oat-stubble . . . and harrow it. Every plough [team] of the villeins, also, ploughs 2 acres and harrows them, and then they have once . . . a dole . . . from the bishop, and for that week they are quit of work, but when they make the great boon-days they have a dole. And in their works they harrow when it is necessary, and they carry loads . . . and when they have carried them every man has a loaf of bread, and they mow one day at Hoctona [Houghton] . . . and then they have a dole. And every two villeins build one booth for the fair of St. Cuthbert. And when they are building lodges and carrying loads of wood they are quit of all other works.




The villeins in their work every year ought to make, if need be, a house 40 feet in length and 15 feet in breadth. . . .<sup>78</sup>

In addition to their week-work, all of these obligations rested upon the villeins of Boldon, and this is significant because these services were nearly a parallel of those of the villeins of Heighingtonshire, Jolliffe's standard example of shire custom, and of those found in less detail in the bondage vills.<sup>79</sup> Furthermore, the villeins of Boldon made the same renders as the peasants in bondage vills. They gave hens and eggs, wagon loads of wood, and cornage; even the old grain renders were present being represented by certain rents and an oat render.<sup>80</sup> This situation was typical of all the manors in which the peasants did week-work except for the three manors inhabited solely by cottars. In all instances the peasants were not subject just to week-work; they were burdened with all the renders and works of shire custom as well.

This underlayer of shire custom shows that the Boldon villages and the other villages with big demesnes had once been typical Northumbrian villages. Furthermore, it means that there were not only two customary traditions in Durham in the twelfth century but rather two distinct levels of peasant exploitation, and the heavier of the two, the manor with week-work, had been superimposed on the lighter, the Northumbrian bondage vill. In light of the expansion of demesne farming which the Normans initiated in Yorkshire, the explanation of this situation is all too obvious: Walcher and his men had manorialized the Boldon villages and imposed week-work on the peasants. Boldon Book records the impact of manorialization on the level of peasant custom in Durham, just as Domesday Book disclosed its general outline in terms of manorial

structure in Yorkshire. Furthermore, the two examples of week-work from Yorkshire link these two descriptions for they come from overstocked vills and exhibit the same combination of week-work and shire custom as the Durham examples.

Probably most of the Boldon villages and the other villages in this category had been devastated by the Normans in the course of William's march to the Tyne after Christmas of 1069. The uniformity of custom exhibited by the twenty Boldon villages is itself indicative of this because it is a sign of a recent, common origin. If they had been manorialized piecemeal, in separate acts of power, diversity would probably have been created, and the most likely occasion when they all could have been restructured was immediately after the harrying of the North. Of course, very little is known about where the Normans went above the Tees, but the rather peculiar distribution of villages with week-work does generally fit in with the few things which are known of William's movements. Orderic Vitalis says that William traveled to the Tees after driving some rebels out of Holderness,<sup>81</sup> and this probably means that he marched north through the eastern end of the Vale of Pickering, skirted the Moors along the coast, and crossed into Durham from Cleveland. With the Normans across the Tees, Symeon of Durham picks up the narrative. He says that William divided his force, that Durham was abandoned out of fear of the Norman advance, and that the church at Jarrow was burned.<sup>82</sup> Finally, Orderic concludes the episode with the information that the Normans returned to the Tees from Hexham through some very rugged country.<sup>83</sup> These details are meager but sufficient. It so happens that the villages with big demesnes and peasants who did week-work were not



B... Boldon villis  
 D... Other villis with demesne  
 N... Villis without demesne  
 f... Villis at farmor held by fractional knight service

scattered at random over the face of the county; they were predominantly arranged in north-south lines except in the area just south of the Tyne. In fact, they all lay on or near a hypothetical line of march running north from Preston on the Tees, dividing to pass on either side of the raised ground in eastern Durham before reuniting in the vicinity of Jarrow, and then running west towards Hexham. From Hexham the line runs south to the Tees either by the old Roman road through Ebchester and Langchester, or perhaps through the hills to the upper Wear valley and down this valley to the Roman road. The correspondence between the distribution of the manor in Durham and what is known of William's movements during the harrying is too exact to be coincidence. The villages with demesnes were the ones which the Normans destroyed in January of 1070.

What happened seems clear. The Durham peasants are known to have fled when the Normans crossed into the bishopric.<sup>84</sup> They consequently saved their lives and perhaps their oxen, but many faced a grim future nevertheless. The inhabitants of the devastated villages returned to find their food taken, their homes burned, and their tools destroyed. Somehow they had to rebuild and bring their fields back into production while avoiding starvation, and it is doubtful if they made much progress before Walcher and his knights appeared in 1071. He took advantage of their plight by setting up demesnes in the wasted villages and by imposing week-work on the peasants. In return, they received food, tools, and seed; and presumably the particular social mix in a given village--molmen, villeins, and cottars; villeins and cottars; or just cottars--reflects how desperate conditions were in that village in 1071. For



many--all the villeins and most of the cottars--week-work was the price of credit. This was the meaning of Symeon of Durham's statement that during this period many men "truly sold themselves into perpetual servitude, provided that they could maintain a certain miserable life."<sup>85</sup> Week-work not unreasonably appeared to be slavery to men accustomed to the light or indirect customs of the shire, especially since the two were combined.

This hypothesis lays a heavy burden on the shoulders of Bishop Walcher, but there really can be no doubt about his responsibility in the matter. Evidence from Northumberland is conclusive on this point. One can scan Jolliffe and other modern discussions of Northumbrian custom and find no examples of week-work above the Tyne. The peasants of Northumberland appear under the undisputed, although sometimes decrepit, sway of shire custom, and this seems quite reasonable since the Normans had little impact on this area before the reign of Henry I, and the creation of manors was a phenomenon associated with the years shortly after the Conquest. This picture is generally correct, but it is not entirely accurate. Despite the preponderance of shire custom, there were a few instances of peasants burdened with week-work above the Tyne. The bonders in at least four of Tynemouth's villages did two days of week-work except at Christmas, Easter, and Whitsuntide. The villeins of Grindon in Northumbria performed two days of work with a second man each week throughout the year,<sup>86</sup> and the bonders at Acklington, a member of the barony of Warkworth, were liable to three days of week-work.<sup>87</sup> These examples are not numerous enough to challenge Jolliffe's general picture of peasant custom in Northumberland, but they do have a direct

bearing on the introduction of the manor into Durham. They all exhibit the same underlayer of shire custom as the Boldon vills and the villages with week-work in Yorkshire, and this in itself suggests a Norman origin for the week-work. Moreover, they have one notable thing in common: They all were probably in Walcher's possession at some time between 1071 and 1080. Northumbria, of course, was one of the most ancient endowments of St. Cuthbert, and it would have fallen to Walcher as bishop in 1071. Warkworth and Tynemouth, on the other hand, were part of the demesne of the earl in this period,<sup>88</sup> but Walcher held this position also from 1075 to 1080 and was presumably in possession of these estates. He is, then, the single thread which unites the three anomalous examples of week-work from above the Tyne, and it must have been under his rule that these villages were manorialized.

Taken together, the evidence from Yorkshire, Durham, and Northumberland provides an insight into the sombre nature of the Norman Conquest of the North. The Normans did not simply dispossess a large number of Anglo-Saxon thanes and continue to collect the old revenues. Rather, they altered the manorial structure in many northern villages. Until the Conquest, the northern manor had consisted of the right to receive the old renders and customary works of the Northumbrian shire from a particular group of peasants. These were important rights and had served to support a numerous class of landowners in 1066, but they were predominantly an indirect system for drawing off wealth from the peasantry. They produced substantial renders in kind, a certain amount of general purpose work (errands, carting, the maintenance of the mill, etc.), and only a limited quantity of customary labor for the cultivation

of the lord's demesne. The Normans did not accept this system where they could avoid doing so. In the 1070's they had all the advantages over the peasants--superior force, judicial power, and supplies of grain and oxen--and they used this power to introduce a different manorial regime. Capitalizing on the desperate conditions which they themselves had created, they increased demesne cultivation and imposed week-work on the peasants where circumstances were favorable. These innovations were a radical departure from northern custom, particularly since week-work was simply added to the existing obligations. They meant that the holders of these manorialized villages would be wealthier than their predecessors and that the peasants would be poorer. The Norman settlement of the North was founded upon an exceptional act of economic brigandage, an act whose effects passed from generation to generation except in Yorkshire where widespread commutation intervened to ease the burden.

## Chapter VI

<sup>1</sup>R. Lennard, Rural England, 1086-1135 (Oxford, 1959), pp. 155-56; H. R. Loyn, Anglo-Saxon England and the Norman Conquest (London, 1962), p. 328.

<sup>2</sup>F. Barlow, "The Effects of the Norman Conquest," in The Norman Conquest: Its Setting and Impact, by D. Whitelock et al. (London, 1966), p. 135. Cf. Loyn, Anglo-Saxon England, p. 328; Douglas, William the Conqueror, p. 310; Stenton, Anglo-Saxon England, p. 480.

<sup>3</sup>Finn, The Norman Conquest and the Economy, pp. 5-6.

<sup>4</sup>See Le Patourel, "The Conquest of Yorkshire," pp. 17-19; Douglas, William the Conqueror, pp. 83-104; L. Musset, "Naissance de la Normandie," in Histoire de la Normandie, ed. M. de Bouard (Toulouse, 1970), pp. 122-25.

<sup>5</sup>Stenton, "The Northern Danelaw," p. 52.

<sup>6</sup>Bishop, "Manorial Demesne," pp. 405-406.

<sup>7</sup>Ibid.

<sup>8</sup>Ibid., p. 403.

<sup>9</sup>Idem, "The Norman Settlement," p. 13, n.2.

<sup>10</sup>Jolliffe, "Northumbrian Institutions," p. 25.

<sup>11</sup>Darby, Domesday Geography, p. 448; fig. 130, p. 445.

<sup>12</sup>Ibid., pp. 448-50; see fig. 131, p. 447; and fig. 132, p. 449.

<sup>13</sup>Ibid., p. 510.

<sup>14</sup>Ibid., p. 420.

<sup>15</sup>Actually there was a third attempt. In 1907 J. Beddoe and J. H. Rowe suggested that the Normans must have brought peasants into Yorkshire from their estates outside the county, "The Ethnology of West Yorkshire," Yorkshire Archaeological Journal, XIX (1907), 58. There is, however, no evidence of this.

<sup>16</sup>Bishop, "The Norman Settlement," pp. 1-14.

<sup>17</sup>Ibid., pp. 2-3.

<sup>18</sup>Ibid.



<sup>19</sup>Ibid., pp. 6-9.

<sup>20</sup>Ibid., pp. 3, 8-9.

<sup>21</sup>Ibid., p. 4.

<sup>22</sup>Ibid., p. 10. Bishop admitted that there were several exceptions to this rule, but he thought that they were the result of special circumstances. The prosperity of Hugh fitz Baldric's fief, for instance, was due to the fact that Hugh had utilized his position as sheriff to rustle the king's cattle and peasants, ibid., p. 11. William de Warrenne's estate of Conisborough was in good condition because it had not been devastated, ibid., p. 9; and the fiefs of Geoffrey de la Wirce and Roger de Busli in southern Yorkshire owed their prosperity to colonization from their owners' estates in Lincolnshire and Nottinghamshire, ibid., pp. 9-10.

<sup>23</sup>Darby, Domesday Geography, pp. 67-71, 145-50, 217-21, 450-54.

<sup>24</sup>Ibid., p. 453.

<sup>25</sup>Ibid.

<sup>26</sup>Ibid., pp. 451-53.

<sup>27</sup>Ibid., p. 451.

<sup>28</sup>Unaccountably, Finn apparently still accepts Bishop's theory, The Norman Conquest and the Economy, pp. 27-28.

<sup>29</sup>See supra, p. 182. Ipse vero in saltuosa quaedam et difficilime accessibilia loca contendit, et abditos illic hostes persequi sumopere studuit. Ordericus Vitalis, II, 195; II, 230.

<sup>30</sup>Supra, p. 212.

<sup>31</sup>Darby, Domesday Geography, pp. 71, 453-54.

<sup>32</sup>Supra, pp. 230-32.

<sup>33</sup>See Bishop, "The Norman Settlement," p. 3.

<sup>34</sup>Ibid., p. 4.

<sup>35</sup>Ibid.

<sup>36</sup>Ibid., p. 5.

<sup>37</sup>See Darby, Domesday Geography, pp. 40-44, 122-25, 197-200. Cf. Finn, The Norman Conquest and the Economy, pp. 6-18.

<sup>38</sup>Bishop, "The Norman Settlement," p. 4.

<sup>39</sup>The opinions of both Darby and Farrer are against this argument, but it must be pointed out that their pious assertions that all the churches in Yorkshire were not enumerated in Domesday are without positive foundation beyond their own unwillingness to admit the low position of the Christian religion in the shire in 1086. Darby, Domesday Geography, p. 425. Farrer, "Introduction to the Yorkshire Domesday," pp. 186, 190. In fact, the small number of churches recorded in Domesday is not suspicious. Many must have gone out of existence in 1069-70, and they had probably not been as numerous before this date as in southern England. Indeed, an account from Abingdon concerning the acquisition of a relic of St. Wilfrid in Yorkshire during the reign of Edward the Confessor says this explicitly ("where owing to the devastation hardly a church was to be found."), Barlow, The English Church, p. 176; Chronicon de Abingdon, II, 47.

<sup>40</sup>In the compilation of these figures, the following points should be mentioned. First, overstocked linked entries have been counted on the basis of their parts. It might be thought that this procedure would yield too high a result, but this is not a serious problem. Few linked entries were overstocked, and any error introduced by this method should not effect the relative standings of the areas too seriously. Second, Domesday makes three types of statements concerning churches in Yorkshire. Usually it says that there is a church and a priest in a village. At other times, however, it mentions only a church or a priest. These statements have been taken at face value in preparing the total for functioning churches in Yorkshire. The first and the third statements have been combined, but the second, the mention of a church with no specific reference to a priest, has been omitted from the calculations.

<sup>41</sup>Symeon of Durham, HR, p. 190; Anglo-Saxon Chronicle, s.a. 1085 E, p. 161. The chronicle does not say explicitly that Holderness was wasted, but given the courses of the last Scandinavian invasions, it is the single most likely area.

<sup>42</sup>See Darby, Domesday Geography, fig. 130, p. 445; fig. 131, p. 447; and fig. 132, p. 449. These maps seem to be open to the interpretation given above.

<sup>43</sup>Ordericus Vitalis, II, 195-96; II, 230-32.

<sup>44</sup>Ibid., II, 196-97; II, 232. See chap. IV, n.100.

<sup>45</sup>Darby, Domesday Geography, fig. 130, p. 445.

<sup>46</sup>Symeon of Durham, HR, pp. 190-92.

<sup>47</sup>Ibid.

- <sup>48</sup> Darby, Domesday Geography, p. 501.
- <sup>49</sup> Ibid.; Domesday, fol. 299.
- <sup>50</sup> Darby, Domesday Geography, p. 501.
- <sup>51</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>52</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>53</sup> Domesday, fols. 327-28.
- <sup>54</sup> Anglo-Saxon Charters, ed. Robertson, No. LXXXIV.; Domesday, fol. 303b.
- <sup>55</sup> Anglo-Saxon Charters, ed. Robertson, No. LXXXIV.
- <sup>56</sup> Domesday, fol. 303b.
- <sup>57</sup> Ibid., fol. 302b. These berewicks are not named. Anglo-Saxon Charters, ed. Robertson, No. LXXXIV.
- <sup>58</sup> Domesday, fol. 302b.
- <sup>59</sup> VI, I, Nos. XLV, CXXXI.
- <sup>60</sup> Domesday, fol. 327b. Carlton and East Hardwick were not separately surveyed in Domesday, but they were presumably included in the description of Tanshelf which was overstocked, ibid., fol. 316b.
- <sup>61</sup> Bishop, "The Norman Settlement," pp. 13-14.
- <sup>62</sup> See idem, "Manorial Demesne," pp. 403-406.
- <sup>63</sup> Supra, pp. 183-84.
- <sup>64</sup> Lapsley, "Introduction to Boldon Book," pp. 269-70.
- <sup>65</sup> Jolliffe, "Northumbrian Institutions," pp. 10, 25.
- <sup>66</sup> M. M. Postan, "The Chronology of Labour Services [a revised version]," in Essays on Medieval Agriculture and General Problems of the Medieval Economy, by M. M. Postan (Cambridge, 1973), pp. 95-96.
- <sup>67</sup> Boldon Book, p. 331.
- <sup>68</sup> The bondage vills similar to Butterwick listed in Boldon Book were Binchester, p. 331; Herrington, p. 337; Hutton, p. 337; Oxenhall, p. 338; Sheraton, p. 337; Uрath, p. 331; and West Aukland, p. 333. The bondage vills which apparently lacked drengs in Boldon Book were Braferton, p. 331; Iveston, p. 335; Little Burdon, p. 328; Lutrington, p. 333; Mainsforth, p. 330; and Tursdale, p. 330.

- 69 Boldon Book includes five clear examples of villages inhabited by molmen: Carlton, pp. 337-38; Morton, p. 329; Newton by Boldon, p. 328; Redworth, p. 340; and Wardon, p. 329.
- 70 The main representatives of this type of village in Boldon Book were Craucrook, p. 336; Great Usworth, pp. 336-37; the Heighingtonshire villages, pp. 339-40; Langchester, pp. 334-35; and Witton, p. 335. Stanhope, p. 334, perhaps also should be classed with this group.
- 71 Ibid., p. 327.
- 72 Ibid.
- 73 The Boldon villages were Cleadon and Whiteburn, ibid., p. 328; Easington and Thorpe, pp. 329-30; Hertburn, p. 337; Middleham and Cornford, p. 330; North Sherburn, Shadeford, and Cassop, pp. 329-30; Norton, p. 330; Preston, p. 337; Ryhope and Burdon, p. 328; Sedgfield, p. 330; Shotton, p. 329; Stockton, p. 337; and Wearmouth and Turnstall, p. 328. Whickham, pp. 335-36, may have been a Boldon vill.
- 74 The non-Boldon manors in which the villeins did week-work were Houghton, ibid., p. 339; New Ricknall, p. 338; and Whesoe, p. 339. Three of the Auklandshire villages, North Aukland, Escumbe, and Newton, ibid., pp. 340-41, also belonged to this group, but their descriptions are defective.
- 75 Houghton, ibid., p. 329; Little Coundon, p. 333; and Newbottle, pp. 328-29.
- 76 Lapsley, "Introduction to Boldon Book," pp. 269-70.
- 77 Postan, "Labour Services," p. 95.
- 78 Boldon Book, pp. 327-28.
- 79 Ibid., pp. 339-40; Jolliffe, "Northumbrian Institutions," pp. 8-9.
- 80 Ibid., p. 11; Boldon Book, pp. 327-28.
- 81 Ordericus Vitalis, II, 196-97; II, 233. See chap. IV, n.100.
- 82 Symeon of Durham, HR, p. 189.
- 83 General accounts of the Conquest frequently ignore the harrying of Durham. See Douglas, William the Conqueror, p. 220; Stenton, Anglo-Saxon England, p. 604; R. A. Brown, The Normans and the Norman Conquest (New York, 1968), p. 196. But there can be no doubt that William penetrated at least to the Tyne, Symeon of Durham, HR, p. 189, if not into southern Northumberland, The Priory of Hexham, p. viii; and a bungled passage in Ordericus must be interpreted in this light: Mense ianuario



rex Guillelmus Haugustaldam [Hexham] reuertebatur a Tesia, uia quae hactenus exercitui erat intemptata, qua crebo acutissima iuga et uallium humillimae sedes, cum uicinia serenitate uerna gaudet, niuibus compluuntur. II, 197; II, 234. The passage as it stands is nonsense because it is preceded by an account of William's march to the Tees and is followed by his arrival in York, ibid. Presumably Ordericus originally said that William returned to the Tees from Hexham, and some later copyist reversed Tesia and Haugustalda and regularized their endings. This interpretation seems to lie behind the accounts of two historians who have gone to the trouble to familiarize themselves with the northern sources, Barlow, William I, p. 93; Beeler, Warfare in England, p. 42.

<sup>84</sup> Symeon of Durham, HR, p. 189.

<sup>85</sup> Ibid., p. 188.

<sup>86</sup> Craster, The Parish of Tynemouth, pp. 319, 222-24, 330, 404; Boldon Book, p. 332.

<sup>87</sup> J. C. Hodgson, The Parish of Warkworth; The Parish of Shilbottle, Vol. V of A History of Northumberland (Newcastle-upon-Tyne, 1899), p. 363.

<sup>88</sup> Ibid., p. 19; Craster, The Parish of Tynemouth, pp. 41-47.

## CHAPTER VII

## HENRY I'S NEW MEN IN THE NORTH

It has been said that while Rufus won the North, Henry I consolidated Rufus's gains, and this is true in a descriptive sense.<sup>1</sup> Yet this distinction between the achievements of Rufus and Henry gives the establishment of Norman power in the Far North (Northumberland, Cumberland, and Westmorland) an air of continuity and inevitability which the process did not in reality possess. It would be more accurate to say that Rufus won certain short-term advantages which might easily have passed away and had, indeed, done so once and that due to several factors which had little to do with the North, Henry realized the potential in the situation which Rufus had left him. Even this statement, however, falls short of the truth in two important respects. Henry was, in fact, a "conqueror" in the North although he did it by proxy, and his consolidation resulted in a fundamental shift in northern power relationships in favor of Northumbria and the recreation of conditions not seen in the North since before the Viking invasions.

This appraisal of what happened in the North between 1100 and 1135 should not be understood as an attempt to minimize William Rufus's contribution to the creation of stability in the region. His accomplishments are clear enough, but they were limited to a specific area. The Red King's domain was diplomacy and war, and he had achieved nearly everything which could be hoped for, short of the conquest of Scotland, from these means. The building of the castle at Carlisle offered some protection to the lands to the south if only because any future Scottish

invasion would have as its first object the recapture of Cumberland. The ending of the Northumbrian earldom removed the threat that a line of Norman earls would pursue the semi-autonomous and sometimes rebellious policies which the isolation of Northumbria made possible, and the killing of Malcolm Canmore allowed Rufus to establish a friendly king of Scots. These were important improvements in the northern political situation, but it must be emphasized that this state of affairs was fragile and easily reversible. Siward, the last great warrior to rule the North before the coming of the Normans, had followed a policy remarkably similar to that of Rufus. He too had taken over Cumberland and installed his own king of Scots, Malcolm Canmore. This first attempt to pacify the Scots through good relations with their king had fallen apart as soon as Malcolm was secure in Scotland, and Edgar presented the same danger. It may be true, of course, that such a reversal was not a realistic possibility for the Scottish king prior to 1099. The accounts of Edgar the Atheling's expedition of 1097 which put Edgar on the Scottish throne say only that the Atheling drove out Donald Bane, not that the latter was captured or completely neutralized; and it is likely that King Edgar faced some opposition or at least potential danger from Donald between 1097 and 1099 when the latter was finally captured and blinded.<sup>2</sup> This circumstance insured Edgar's loyalty to Rufus until 1099, and it is not surprising that in that year the Scottish king consented to come south and carry the sword at Rufus's crown-wearing in London.<sup>3</sup> But no one could have known with any certainty that Edgar would remain faithful to the Normans. Due to Donald's xenophobic expulsion of the Anglo-Saxons, Edgar was perhaps less powerful than his

father. Yet he apparently brought some Anglo-Saxons back into Scotland with him, and there is no evidence that his rule was particularly weak because his subjects viewed him as a "usurper."<sup>4</sup> Had Edgar lived long enough to consolidate his position, he might well have come over the Tweed to waste Northumberland and demand the restoration of Carlisle. Rufus was, after all, no more of a convincing benefactor to Edgar than Siward and King Edward had been for his father.

Rufus's real failure in the North, however, did not spring from the paradox that he had sought peace with the Scots by supporting Duncan and then Edgar while he retained Cumberland. Rather, the flaw in his achievement lay in the fact that he apparently did very little to insure that Cumberland could be retained. It had been won by an army from the South, and Malcolm Canmore had been defeated and killed by another army specially brought north. Both of these incidents were part of a deliberate plan to lure Malcolm Canmore into the open and defeat him. They were hardly typical. The Normans' real strength in the North had been demonstrated more accurately in 1091 when Malcolm had been able to plunder Northumbria as far as the city of Durham and escape scot-free. Until a Norman aristocracy was established in the Far North, such raids could not be contained, and there is no evidence that Rufus took this step despite the fact that he had control of Cumberland for nine years and of Northumberland for five years. He did, to be sure, install sheriffs or analogous officers in the region. From 1095 Robert Picot was sheriff of Northumberland, and W. son of Theoderic and a mysterious "G." are addressed successively in writs referring to Carlisle.<sup>5</sup> Yet the identities of these three men are unknown, and although the writs in



question mention their barons and lieges, it is doubtful if these shadowy figures can be taken as evidence for the existence of a Norman landholding class in either area. If their inclusion in the addresses of these writs was not conventional, they were probably the armed retainers of the sheriffs. Even in the early thirteenth century when the Norman equivalent of the Mayflower syndrome was well established, none of the tenants-in-chief in Cumberland claimed that their families had gotten their lands before 1100, and despite the fact that some of their peers in Northumberland did assert that their ancestors had held post conquestum Anglie, it is utterly doubtful that their claims had any foundation.<sup>6</sup> The claim itself is anachronistic. No Norman could have gotten or kept land above the Tyne before the campaigns of 1080. Earl Robert de Mowbray might conceivably have created some baronies between ca. 1080 and 1095; but with the possible exception of Herbert de la Val, the first lord of Callerton, a small barony on the south coast, there is no evidence that any of Mowbray's men were reconciled with Rufus.<sup>7</sup> Moreover, none of the supposed early holders of the baronies in question is mentioned in or witnessed either King Edgar's grant to Durham or the several charters made by Rufus while he was in Northumberland in 1095.<sup>8</sup> The only exception to this is William de Morley, the first lord of Mitford, whom Gaimar mentions in his account of Mowbray's revolt. But Gaimar's description of this revolt is confused and at variance with the older accounts, and his story about Rufus besieging William de Morley is unsubstantiated by the other sources.<sup>9</sup> Furthermore, there is no mention of William de Morley or any other of the founding barons between 1095 and 1100, and this even includes Guy de Balliol, lord of Bywell, whose

descendants claimed that Rufus had given him the family lands.<sup>10</sup> Most of these men do appear in documents made after 1100, however; and this along with no mention of them before 1100 suggests that the thirteenth-century claims were inflated. With the probable exceptions of Bywell and Callerton and the possible exception of Mitford, none of the baronies in Northumberland originated before 1100. Combined with the evidence of the more modest Cumbrian barons, this means that the barons of Robert Picot, W. son of Theoderic, and "G." were the household knights of these officials. Circumstances in the North had not changed significantly from the 1080's when Bishop Walcher maintained a private army of over one hundred men and Bishop William de St. Calais is said to have kept a force of comparable size.<sup>11</sup> The Normans were still castlemen who lived in large groups behind their walls and ditches and subsisted on the tribute of sullen villagers. This is not a romantic image. When Bishop William de St. Calais died in 1096, a number of Durham peasants took the opportunity to decamp into Northumberland with their cattle. Others went into Yorkshire either to find refuge in the southern free-zone or, as seems more likely, to advance themselves by taking part in the redevelopment of the wasted countryside.<sup>12</sup>

When Henry became king, Norman settlement had scarcely advanced beyond its limits at the death of William the Conqueror. Above Durham which was probably fairly well in hand despite peasant dissatisfaction, Robert Picot controlled Newcastle, Tynemouth, and Bamburgh. In the West, someone held Carlisle for the king, but on either side of the mountains, the countryside--or whatever was left of it after the revolts and Scottish raids of the eleventh century--was unoccupied by Normans

except in Durham, where Agerius de Cornford appears by 1095, and perhaps in the very southernmost part of Northumberland.<sup>13</sup> The limited extent of Norman settlement in the North at this date is, in fact, surprising; and, although there was more involved than this, it was the result of the fact that the border counties were unattractive to the Normans given the brigandage which the free-zone and the configuration of the Cumbrian border made possible and the threat of Scottish invasions. These dangers had not passed away as if by magic. Even later in his reign when he had done much to pacify the North, King Henry enlarged his bodyguard when he crossed the Humber, and at least in 1100 there was no certainty that King Edgar would not resume the raids which had characterized Northumbrian-Scottish relations since the early years of the eleventh century.<sup>14</sup> The Scottish monarchy was not yet dependent upon the Normans in any fundamental sense, and there is no evidence of any Norman penetration into Scotland either as members of the court or as landholders before 1100.<sup>15</sup> Indeed, this is not surprising given the extent of Norman settlement in the border counties.

The accomplishments of Henry I in the North were to alter basically this set of circumstances. Due to the fortuitous conjunction of a number of factors of which the most obvious were Henry's own experiences during the 1090's, his political needs and methods after becoming king, and extremely good fortune with respect to the Scottish royal house, he was able to transform the scattered outposts of Norman power which Rufus had left behind into something quite different. When he died in 1135, the position of the Normans in Yorkshire had been consolidated, a Norman aristocracy had been installed in the border counties, and King David



had taken the first steps in establishing a Norman aristocracy in Lothian and Cumbria. These developments laid the foundations for the societies which existed in both the North and in southern Scotland during the High Middle Ages, and there was a unity to their formation. Unfortunately, however, the connection between these developments has been obscured by gaps between local studies, English history, and Scottish history. Indeed, this subject provides an appalling example of how modern points of view can annihilate the past. Because of this problem and because the basic factor which allowed Henry to settle Normans in the Far North lies outside medieval history as it is usually conceived, it will be necessary to reconstruct the outlines of this development piece by piece. This will involve leaving certain questions, such as the curtailment of the northern free-zone, in abeyance for a time, and it will necessitate, on occasion, studying the same evidence from different perspectives. This may prove somewhat tedious, but since the demands of "English" and "Scottish" history have succeeded in turning the question of the North into a malodorous onion, it can only be peeled layer by layer.

The easiest way to approach the problem initially is on the level of royal politics. Upon his accession, Henry I was not immediately secure. He had only become king through a seizure of the English crown which nullified his elder brother Robert's right to succeed Rufus, and he was not popular with the great Norman families with estates in both England and Normandy, who may have preferred Duke Robert to Henry and who certainly feared for their lands in the struggle which was to develop between the two brothers.<sup>16</sup> This combination of factors was



either dangerous or potentially so until 1106 and to a certain extent even later, and two of the ways in which Henry tried to strengthen himself were of extreme importance for the North. The more obvious of these was his marriage. Late in 1100 he took as his wife Maud, the daughter of Malcolm Canmore and Margaret, Edgar the Atheling's sister. Usually this marriage has been interpreted on a rather ethereal level. It has been seen as the symbolic beginning of a reconciliation of Normans and Anglo-Saxons; or, upon the assumption that Henry was disturbed by the theoretical weakness of his claim to the throne, it has been explained as an attempt by Henry to create a link between himself and Edward the Confessor.<sup>17</sup> Yet it is more likely that the immediate point of the marriage was diplomatic for it marked an alliance between Henry and Maud's family, and one need not have recourse to prophesies concerning the return of green trees or the like to explain its utility. The new king was a shrewd diplomat, and he was acutely conscious of the dangers which could threaten a state from its frontiers. Since the late 1080's he had been lurking around the western marches of Normandy, first as lord of the Cotentin and later as the protector of Domfront. At times he had been in close association with Robert of Bellême, a master in the art of frontier disruptions; and with Hugh the Fat, vicomte of Avranches and earl of Chester.<sup>18</sup> Both from experience and probably from his own dreams, Henry knew the threats to orderly government which could come from such areas, and his marriage with Maud must be understood in this context. It insured that Edgar, his most powerful neighbor in Britain, would not invade the North to recapture Carlisle or to support Duke Robert, and it performed the same function after Duke Robert was

captured and imprisoned. During his later continental wars, Henry was not distracted by Scottish invasions as his father and brother had been. The marriage insured that the relationship with the Scottish king which Rufus had established as the provider of armies would endure despite the fact that it was no longer a real necessity for the sons of Malcolm and Margaret.<sup>19</sup> When Edgar died in 1107, his younger brother Alexander became king "with King Henry's consent" but without the intervention of a Norman army, and he remained at peace with Henry.<sup>20</sup> In fact, the relationship may have become closer. Alexander married one of Henry's illegitimate daughters, and in 1114 he actually led an army, probably but not necessarily composed of Scots, in Henry's invasion of Wales.<sup>21</sup> Very little is known about this unparalleled incident, but it would seem to have prefigured the nature of English-Scottish relations after 1124. In that year David, Malcolm's youngest son, succeeded Alexander, and he, as will be discussed later, was bound by ties of taste, friendship, and patronage to Henry I. The result, then, of Henry's marriage to Maud was to give the North a long period of peace--in so far as kings could give peace in the North. For thirty-five years there were no Scottish invasions, a circumstance without parallel since 1000, and it was during these years that Normans settled in the border counties and under King David in southern Scotland. In fact, it was the latter's cooperation which made the movement possible because the northern free-zone could not be reduced without the help of the king of Scots.

Another of Henry's solutions to his early political problems had, moreover, a very direct influence on the settlement itself. His response to the disaffection of the greater Norman nobles was to create

a new nobility, that is, a party of nobles who owed their position in the upper reaches of society to him. This tactic was noted at the time by Orderic Vitalis, who, as a spokesman for the "old" nobility, asserted that Henry had raised these men from the dust; but despite the fact that this idea has passed from Orderic into modern accounts of Henry's reign as something of a commonplace, the creation of Henry's new nobles has not yet been the object of the comprehensive investigation which it needs.<sup>22</sup> In general terms, of course, the phenomenon is clear enough. His new men led his armies, kept his castles, and ran his government. He, in turn, rewarded them with the spoils of feudal government and with land. This was a matter of the greatest importance for the North because in 1100 there was more land above the Humber which could be granted out as patronage than in any other part of the kingdom. The border counties were largely unoccupied by Normans; and in Yorkshire, where William the Conqueror had installed his own supporters during the 1070's and 1080's, plenty of land was available from the royal demesne and forfeitures. To a remarkable degree, the Norman settlement of the North was the result of Henry giving land to his friends.

In Yorkshire the introduction of Henry's new men amounted to a minor tenurial revolution. Early in the reign, some of the established nobles received grants of land and privileges which appear to have been designed to win their loyalty and were probably local examples of the favoritism which such already established families as the Giffards, Clares, and Beaumonts enjoyed in the south.<sup>23</sup> Robert de Lacy, the lord of the castlery of Pontefract, for instance, had become sheriff of Yorkshire by 1102, and around the same time he obtained either the grant of

Bowland and Blackburnshire in Lancashire or the transformation of pre-existing mense tenures of these lands into tenancies-in-chief.<sup>24</sup> Henry also gave the soke of Bridlington to Walter de Gant, an important landholder in Lincolnshire and the East Riding, and he probably granted the great soke of Wakefield to William de Warenne, who already held Coinisborough and was earl of Surrey.<sup>25</sup> Robert, Walter, and William were all men whose support was well worth having, and their cultivation by the king to some extent blurs the line between the "old" and "new" nobility. It is still clear, however, that the real rewards went predominantly to men more closely connected to the king. Shortly after Tinchebrai, Henry gave Robert de Brus some 80 manors from the royal demesne, chiefly in Claro Wapentake, and another 13 estates which had been part of the Mortain fee, and between this date (1106) and ca. 1118, Nigel d'Aubigny, another new man, obtained the forfeited estate of Robert de Stuteville.<sup>26</sup> In Yorkshire this consisted of two large groups of manors, one centered on Kirkby Malzeard in the West Riding and the other stretching from Thirsk east into the Vale of Pickering.<sup>27</sup> These two grants were perhaps the most striking of Henry's creations, but there were a number of other instances of his reworking of the tenurial structure of the shire. Early in the reign, for example, Geoffrey fitz Pain, an important new man, obtained Warter, which had been royal demesne; and between 1115 and 1118 he was rewarded with the barony of Hunsingore.<sup>28</sup> The history of Pontefract, however, provides the most flagrant example of Henry's devices. The king's initial attempt to win Robert de Lacy's loyalty apparently failed, and Robert forfeited Pontefract for unknown reasons at some date between 1109 and 1118. Henry then gave the honor to Hugh



de la Val, presumably to insure his support in northern France; and when the latter died prior to 1129, the king gave Hugh's widow to William Maltravers, a prominent royal minion, and sold him the estate for a term of years.<sup>29</sup> Finally, the three mainstays of Henry's new regime in the North, Walter Espec, Eustace fitz John, and David, all became important landholders in Yorkshire. David, who was the youngest son of Malcolm Canmore, held Hallamshire (Sheffield).<sup>30</sup> Walter Espec and Eustace fitz John were Henry's northern justiciars. Walter was given a large barony around Kirkham and Helmsley; and Eustace, who was the farmer of Aldborough, Knaresborough, and the escheated honor of Blyth (Tickhill) during Henry's later years, obtained the lordship of Malton.<sup>31</sup> Even these examples do not exhaust the list of Henry's changes in the tenurial structure of the shire for there are a number of other examples of the king diverting the descent of estates to his own candidates or inserting subtenants of his choice into established baronies, but the general dimensions of his introduction of his new men is sufficiently clear.<sup>32</sup> By 1135 the king had brought into being a group of nobles who owed their rise to him, rivaled in power the descendants of the Conqueror's barons, and controlled the government and most of the important castles of the shire.

Beyond Yorkshire, the impact of Henry's patronage was even more complete. Apparently the Northumbrian countryside was considered royal demesne. This was, of course, a legal fiction typical of Norman justice, but it was useful to Henry who filled the Far North with his supporters. In southern Durham he gave Hartness to Robert de Brus and probably Greatham to the Bertrams, and above the Tyne he created a line

of baronies running to the Tweed.<sup>33</sup> In the Tyne valley and the hills to the north, Walter de Bolbec, who probably benefited from a connection with the Giffards, received Styford, and in the same region Robert de Umfraville obtained Prudhoe which was probably augmented before 1135 by the grant of the serjeanty of Redesdale.<sup>34</sup> To the east and north, Henry apparently gave Mitford to William Bertram or his father, and he may have given the neighboring lordship of Bothal to a son of William.<sup>35</sup> Mitford, Bothal, and Morpeth, which may have been an older lordship, dominated the lowlands of Northumberland from the Tyne to the Coquet. Beyond them six new baronies were created. Morwick and Hadestone, which adjoined the royal demesne at Warkworth, went respectively to Hugh fitz Eudo, perhaps the son of Henry's dapifer Eudo, and to Aschantinus de Worcester, who had custody of the Durham episcopal manors after Ranulf Flambard's death.<sup>36</sup> North of these fees, Henry established Alnwick, the greatest of the Northumbrian baronies, for Eustace fitz John and Ellingham for Nicholas de Grenville.<sup>37</sup> Finally, the king brought Norman settlement to the Tweed. Robert de Muschamp, who may have been the steward of Walter de Gant, was given Wooler in the Till valley, and Walter Espec received Wark on the Tweed.<sup>38</sup>

West of the mountains the tenurial structure of the countryside was also established during Henry's reign, and here again the process itself represented the endowment of Henry's followers. Probably after 1106, the king gave the lordship of Carlisle, which encompassed the Vale of Eden with the Cumbrian lowlands north of the Derwent, to Ranulf Meschin. Ranulf was the son of the vicomte of the Bessin and had led the van of Henry's army at Tinchebrai.<sup>39</sup> He, in turn, established two baronies,

Burgh by Sands and Liddelstrength, on the Galwegian border; and he seems to have tried to install his brother William in Gilsland. This attempt did not succeed for Gille, the native lord of the area, held out against the Normans till ca. 1156, but William did not go without land.<sup>40</sup> Henry gave him Copeland (also called Egremont or Allerdale above Derwent) on the southwestern coast of Cumberland.<sup>41</sup> Copeland was the westernmost member of a string of lordships which ran around the southern side of the Cumbrian dome and the western side of the Pennines, and these too all went to Henry's supporters. Furness was part of the honor of Lancashire. Nigel d'Aubigny received Kendale and Burton in Lonsdale, the lordship created by Rufus for Ivo Taillebois.<sup>42</sup> Skipton passed to William, Ranulf Meschin's brother, when he married the daughter of Robert de Rumilly; and the forest of Bowland and Blackburnshire, members of the castlery of Pontefract, were held successively by Robert de Lacy, Hugh de la Val, and William Maltravers.<sup>43</sup> Finally Lancashire itself was given to Stephen of Blois, Henry's greatest political creation, ca. 1120, and it may have belonged to Ranulf Meschin prior to this date, although this is by no means certain.<sup>44</sup>

Throughout England's northernmost counties the creation of a Norman landholding class was primarily the work of Henry I after 1106, and in a fundamental sense this development is to be understood in terms of the king's patronage. Even in Yorkshire where a Norman aristocracy had been established during the 1070's, forfeitures and the abnormal extent of the royal demesne made it possible for him to install a large group of his own supporters who represented an intensification in the French presence in the shire. In the lands beyond, including those parts of

Durham not held by St. Cuthbert, Henry created the territorial aristocracy by granting fiefs to his supporters. Furthermore, Henry's patronage was not limited entirely to Normans. Natives played a secondary but important part in the process, and the first sign that this would be the case comes from a Northumbrian writ of ca. 1103 which reveals that Henry had replaced Robert Picot, Rufus's sheriff, with two Northumbrians, Ligulf and Aluric.<sup>45</sup> Subsequent writs and other documents show that Ligulf administered that part of Northumberland dependent upon Bamburgh, and Aluric, the part dependent upon Corbridge.<sup>46</sup> This rather curious return to native officials presumably indicates that Henry had decided that the best way of governing Northumberland in these early years was through local men, but the system was actually used even after his new men had come into the area. Around 1118, Aluric and Ligulf were replaced or followed by Ligulf's son Odard of Bamburgh, and he was succeeded ca. 1133 by his son Adam.<sup>47</sup> The reliance on a line of native sheriffs long after any obvious need for their collaboration is curious, and the usage had a parallel in Cumberland where another Odard, apparently the son of Hildred, the farmer (?) of Carlisle, was sheriff in 1130.<sup>48</sup>

The re-emergence of natives in the North was, in fact, a notable feature of the years between 1100 and 1135, and the king himself even exhibited a strange and somewhat contradictory taste for northern Anglo-Saxons. For a period of time during the 1120's he employed as his confessor Prior Athelwold of Nostell who had originally been lord of Pocklington in the East Riding.<sup>49</sup> Moreover, Henry took as one of his mistresses the daughter of Forne son of Sigulf, who was apparently a



Yorkshire man; and he both rewarded and employed these northerners.<sup>50</sup> In 1133 Athelwold became the first bishop of Carlisle.<sup>51</sup> Forne's daughter eventually was married to Robert d'Oilli, one of the king's constables, and Forne himself rose mightily.<sup>52</sup> He was a minister of the king in Yorkshire during the 1120's and later in Northumberland, and Henry rewarded him with a small estate in Yorkshire and, more importantly, the barony of Greystoke in Cumberland. In addition to these lands, Forne also apparently acquired Coquetdale in Northumberland, Coniscliffe in southern Durham, and probably large possessions in upper Teesdale from King Henry.<sup>53</sup> He was, in reality, a Northumbrian "new man," and there were other examples of the type. Adam son of Swane, for instance, who was descended from a family which had held land around Pontefract since before the Conquest, received an extensive lordship east of the Eden in Cumberland and land in Lancashire from Henry I, and his younger brother Henry acquired Edenhall and Langwathby in Cumberland.<sup>54</sup> The king's native sheriffs were also rewarded for their services with land. Henry gave Gamelsby and Glassanby with other lands in Cumberland to Odard and Hildred, and he created two baronies in Northumberland, Embleton and Dilston, for Odard son of Ligulf and Richard son of Aluric.<sup>55</sup> Furthermore, a number of Northumbrian villages, notably a group of nine near Bamburgh and the vills west of Rothbury which later became the barony of Hepple, were left in the hands of natives as thanages, and there seems to have been an analogous group of serjeanties in Cumberland.<sup>56</sup> Finally--and these were perhaps the most curious grants of all--Henry reestablished the sons of Cospatric in the North. Cospatric II, the youngest son of the old earl, received the great serjeanty of Beanly in

Northumberland; and Waltheof, Cospatric I's second son, obtained Allerdale below Derwent in Cumberland.<sup>57</sup> These grants to natives are numerous enough to show that being a native was not a bar in the North to entering the king's service under Henry I. Some might be tempted to go on from this to conclude that here was reconciliation between Saxon and Norman in practice, but such an idea would be highly doubtful. Henry may conceivably have had a personal weakness for natives. His Yorkshire mistress and his confessor suggest this, and such a predilection would fit in with a certain type of romanticism concerning the Anglo-Saxon past which the king's new men sometimes affected.<sup>58</sup> Yet it must be noted that Henry's native new men usually received definitely second-rate land. If this was reconciliation, the price was cheap. In fact, it seems more likely that they were simply useful on the local level and that by employing them Henry's patronage tapped another source of disaffected men whose gratitude could be relied upon. The result of Henry's land grants was, in any case, the creation of a hybrid aristocracy in the North, and the chief characteristic of these men was that they owed their fortunes to him. They were his men, whether Anglo-Saxon or Norman, and they were unrivaled from Cheshire and the honor of Tickhill north. Their establishment represented the territorialization of Henry's party.

The creation of a Norman landholding class in southern Scotland can be viewed as an extension of the same process. This was certainly true chronologically. Normans appeared on both sides of the Tweed during roughly the same years even though this is usually overlooked because of the ideological width of the Tweed or on the assumption that there were

Normans in Northumberland and Cumberland earlier than was actually the case. Furthermore, King David's reasons for bringing Normans into Scotland can only be explained in terms of his early education and his relationship with Henry I. David, or David "fitz Malcolm" as he should be called, was in reality one of Henry's new men, although his high descent and his eventual accession to the Scottish throne tend to blind Scottish historians to this. He was born around 1085 and spent only some eight years in his parents' household before the circle was broken in 1093 by the death of his parents and Donald Bane's purges. At this time, his elder brothers and sisters evidently took him to England where he was reared among the Norman boys of the court.<sup>59</sup> The seriousness and religious attitudes which he was later to exhibit may go back to his childhood with St. Margaret, but in most other respects it was his stay among the Normans which was of critical importance in the formation of his character. David spent his adolescence being educated by Normans to be a Norman, and according to both William of Malmesbury and Orderic Vitalis, he became one in his tastes and behavior.<sup>60</sup> This, of course, explains in cultural terms why he was later to surround himself with Normans, and it has been taken as the chief reason for the coming of the Normans into Scotland.<sup>61</sup> The Norman Conquest of this kingdom is explained as a matter of royal taste. Yet this approach, evidently because it seems a sufficient explanation, has obscured how David first became important in Scotland, and this was the work of Henry I. After his sister's marriage to Henry, David became a member of the royal household, and he witnessed several royal acts. He was, however, important because of his sister. He signed as "David the Queen's brother,"

and no one was likely to have thought that he would ever become king of Scots.<sup>62</sup> Indeed, it was not until he was grown that anyone could have predicted this. David was the seventh son of Malcolm Canmore, and even though four of his elder brothers had been killed or otherwise eliminated by 1100, probability suggested that one of his two remaining brothers, Edgar and Alexander, would have a son who would supersede him. To understand David's relationship with Henry, one must forget the knowledge that this did not happen. In the early 1100's David was a young man with no great prospects. This may have recommended him to Henry, who had spent his own youth in similar circumstances, and in 1107 the king became David's benefactor. In that year King Edgar died, and he apparently left David either the lordship of southern Scotland or the royal estates in this region. David, however, was only put in possession of this bequest when Henry threatened to send an army against King Alexander who was reluctant to honor Edgar's wishes.<sup>63</sup> This incident is hard to explain in terms of Henry's Scottish policy, but unless one assumes that Maud's demands for justice for her youngest brother were truly formidable, it means that Henry feared that Alexander could not be relied upon and had decided to weaken his power by establishing David in Lothian and Cumbria. David's first rise in the world probably came because of his usefulness in keeping the Scots weak.

Between 1107 and 1124 David was Henry's marcher lord in southern Scotland, and the second great improvement in his fortunes was probably connected with this fact. On the one hand, he needed sufficient material resources to function effectively; and, on the other hand, there was the necessity of insuring his loyalty. Both problems were solved in



1113 when Henry gave him Maud de Saint-Liz for his wife. She was the daughter of Earl Waltheof, Siward's son, and Judith, William the Conqueror's niece; and besides these genealogical attractions, she was the heiress of the earldom of Northampton and the honor of Huntingdon.<sup>64</sup> David's marriage with Maud made him one of the most important nobles in England. It also bound him even more closely to Henry and gave him the lordship of a number of the Normans who would later become important in Scotland. Henry had, in fact, revived the old pattern of a Northumbrian earl holding the earldom of Northampton except in this instance the earl in question ruled the lost province of Lothian. It is also probably no coincidence that it was during the reign of Henry I that the earliest stories of how Lothian had been lost to the Scots were inserted into the chronicles. These accounts, which are contradictory in their details, carried the inference either that Lothian was a fief of the English crown or that it had been improperly acquired by the Scots,<sup>65</sup> and they may have been intended as the basis for a revived English claim of the province. Alternatively, they may only reflect a feeling at Durham that Lothian should have been part of England; but, in any case, from 1107 until 1124, David was Henry's man both in a personal and a tenurial sense. The Normans who accompanied him around Lothian and Cumbria were predominantly drawn from the earldom of Northampton or from Henry's patronage network.<sup>66</sup> These were the men who staffed his government and received lands in Scotland; and after David became king in 1124, this pattern persisted until Henry's death in 1135. After that, few Normans entered Scotland.<sup>67</sup>

The value of the ties between David and Henry was not restricted, however, simply to the maintenance of peace between England and Scotland or to the provision of David with suitable companions. Henry I's greatest accomplishment in the North was the containment, division and reduction of the northern free-zone. It was this which made estates in the region valuable enough to be granted out as rewards for his supporters and ended the concentration of the Normans around a few military and administrative strong points such as Newcastle, Bamburgh, and Carlisle; and David's cooperation was an important factor in this process. At first sight, this is not particularly obvious, of course, for in Northumbria, the eastern margin of the free-zone appears to have been contained by methods which were similar to those employed further south and which owed little to Earl David. In Teesdale, Guy de Balliol built Barnard castle in the early twelfth century, and Brancepath above the Wear is probably of a comparable date.<sup>68</sup> To the north, Henry created two new baronies, Styford and Prudhoe, at the mouth of the Tyne gap, and Robert de Umfraville apparently built a castle at Prudhoe.<sup>69</sup> Furthermore, Norman control was pushed up the North Tyne to its junction with the Rede. The valley of the latter was given to Robert de Umfraville on the condition that he close it to robbers, and he accomplished this by the erection of Elsdon castle. Furthermore, the line of motte-and-bailey castles between Hexham and the junction of the Rede and the North Tyne, that is Gunnerton, Wark on Tyne, and Bellingham, presumably also date from this period.<sup>70</sup> Elsdon and the castles on the Tyne controlled all the important routes out of the northern free-zone south of Coquetdale. The latter was apparently protected by a royal castle at

Rothbury.<sup>71</sup> The upper reaches of the Aln and Beamish were dominated by Gospatric's serjeanty of Beanly which he held by the tenure of guaranteeing the good intentions of outsiders entering Northumberland through his estates. The valley of the Till was blocked by the barony of Wooler, which probably had a castle at Wooler, and by Walter Espec's lordship of Carham.<sup>72</sup> Walter's castle at Wark-on-Tweed defended an important ford over the Tweed, and to the east, Bishop Ranulf's new castle of Norham, which he had explicitly built to protect Northumberland from raiders, performed a similar function.<sup>73</sup>

These castles along the eastern edge of the free-zone from the Tees to the Tweed gave the east coast plain a measure of protection against raids; but in spite of the prominence of this attempt to contain the effects of the free-zone, it is likely that the most important work was done in the West. The key to creating peace in the Far North was the control of communications through the hills, and this was established by Ranulf Meschin, the lord of Carlisle, and by Earl David. Presumably Ranulf's work took precedence chronologically. When he received Cumberland, Carlisle was an exposed strong point, but probably by 1120, at which time he gave up his northern lordship to become earl of Cheshire, and almost certainly by 1135, Carlisle had been linked with Richmond by castles at Appleby, Brough, and Bowes, and its communications with Lancashire had been secured by the castle of Burton-in-Lonsdale.<sup>74</sup> The former castles in particular were very important because they controlled the Vale of Eden-Stainmore route and split the Pennines. Furthermore, Ranulf blocked the Galwegian border itself with two new baronies. Burgh by Sands controlled the fords across the Solway which were the most

practical route to the north, and Liddel covered the route around the edge of the hills.<sup>75</sup> These lordships and castles put the Normans in a much better position to control movements through the southern part of the old Cumbrian kingdom, but to be really effective, they needed to be extended beyond the border. This was earl David's contribution. According to local tradition at Glasgow, David had been sent by God to punish and restrain the Galwegians, and he accomplished this by creating around the western flanks of the Scottish part of the free-zone three large lordships modeled upon Carlisle.<sup>76</sup> He gave Liddesdale to Ranulf de Soules, Eskdale to Robert Avenel, and Annandale to Robert de Brus.<sup>77</sup> These military districts covered all the dales between Cumberland and Annandale. The latter contained the Galwegians of Nithsdale and provided the basis for keeping the Roman road to the Clyde open.<sup>78</sup> Eskdale and Liddesdale dominated the trails leading to Teviotdale and to the North Tyne. Together these fees split the northern free-zone and made east-west raids impossible. They were, moreover, matched by a series of military districts in the north which protected the Midland valley of Scotland just as the southern lordships shielded Tweeddale and Northumberland. David gave Cunningham to Hugh de Morville and North Kyle and Renfrew to Walter fitz Alan.<sup>79</sup>

The effect of the activities of Ranulf Meschin and Earl David was the fragmentation and containment of the northern free-zone. This was a necessary condition for the revival of northern society on both the English and Scottish parts of the east coast plain, and there is a curious parallel between David's career and the appearance of Normans above the Tyne. This pattern can only be stated tentatively, of course,



because of the extremely limited nature of the evidence, but it is suggestive nonetheless. There is practically no evidence that Norman landholders were established in Northumberland during the first decade of Henry I's reign. A shadowy "Graffard," who apparently held land around Tynemouth, is mentioned, and two writs refer to Guy de Balliol. But the second of these, a writ issued in 1105, strongly suggests that there were no other important Norman landholders along the Tyne, and beyond Graffard and Guy, no outside settlers are mentioned except for a mysterious colony (?) of Flemings who seem to have been established somewhere above the Tyne.<sup>80</sup> After King Edgar's death, however, this situation changed. David vanishes from Henry's charters between 1108 and 1112, which presumably means that he was spending most of his time in Scotland, and at the end of this period two significant pieces of evidence concerning Northumberland appear.<sup>81</sup> First, in 1111 Henry removed the Flemings from the shire; and second, in the same year Robert Muschamp, the lord of Wooler, is mentioned in a writ.<sup>82</sup> This is a rather suspicious coincidence, and it is repeated later in the 1110's. From ca. 1116 through 1121 David again fails to attest any of Henry's acts; and during roughly the same years, ca. 1114-1121 and ca. 1116-1120 respectively, neither Robert de Brus, the future (?) lord of Annandale, nor Ranulf Meschin witness a royal charter.<sup>83</sup> The simultaneous absence of these three men is not likely to have been the result of chance, and it probably means that during these years they were busy in the West bringing order to the Galwegian march. Furthermore, at the end of this period, Eustace fitz John, Walter Espec, and Forne son of Sigulf, the three principal agents of Henry's government in Northumberland, all

appear above the Tyne, and the same is true of Walter de Bolbec and Robert de Umfraville.<sup>84</sup> In 1121, moreover, Bishop Ranulf built Norham castle, and between 1119 and 1124 Berwick and Roxburgh, the first Scottish burghs, appear.<sup>85</sup> Finally, in 1122 King Henry himself came north and surveyed Cumberland and Northumbria.<sup>86</sup> If the pattern which this evidence discloses can be relied upon, the attack upon the northern free-zone was at least contemporaneous with the settlement of Normans in Northumbria and Tweeddale, and it probably preceded the latter. Furthermore, David's activities were clearly central to the whole process, even though their exact nature remains hidden.

The Norman settlement of the border counties and of southern Scotland cannot be explained except in terms of the political needs of Henry I and his relationship with Earl David. Henry brought the Normans north either directly or through David, and with the aid of David he created the conditions which made their settlement possible. The lands of the old kingdoms of Northumbria and Cumbria were settled as a unit. Yet this conclusion raises a fundamental question which cannot be answered satisfactorily within the framework of political history. If this chronology is correct, then one must ask why the Normans had not taken lands in the Far North before 1110. They had come to England to get estates, to become greater lords than they were; and their behavior in southern England and elsewhere in Christendom establishes that they had few scruples, and these largely restricted to the Church, which could stand for long between them and land in the hands of natives. Judged from the standpoint of what they did elsewhere, their neglect of Northumberland, Cumberland, and even Scotland till the early twelfth century is an

enigma. Indeed, this is probably why their late arrival above the Tyne has been largely overlooked. They should have been there; and despite the fact that Henry I's diplomatic and political needs provide a convincing explanation of why he gave Normans land in this area, his reasons were not really unusual. Both William the Conqueror and William Rufus had wanted a quiet North so that they could concentrate their strength in Normandy, and the need to reward followers with land was not new in 1100. There is no sign that the Conqueror or Rufus had more lands at their disposal than men willing to occupy them. The idea that estates in the region were not very valuable because of the insecure conditions which prevailed there is more helpful, but it only pushes the problem back geographically. Why had the Normans not moved into the hills and mountains of the free-zone before 1100? The cooperation which Henry received from David was, no doubt, convenient in this endeavor, but it was not essential. Ranulf Meschin could have pushed into Gallogway. No answer to this question is apparent, and this is because the explanation lies in an unexplored area.

In reconstructing the history of the Norman Conquest it is usual to concentrate one's attention on such subjects as the diplomatic, political, and administrative activities of the kings, the question of feudalism, and military history. Normally ecclesiastical history is also included so that the famous triad of castles, knights, and monks tends to dominate our conception of the Conquest. This is, of course, inevitable because to varying degrees these were the questions which interested chroniclers or were mentioned in charters. In the case of the North, this point of view dates back to the 1090's when a certain Boson,

a knight of Bishop William de St. Calais, is reported to have had a vision which could be favorably compared with the concluding paragraphs of many modern works on the Norman Conquest. Boson had the privilege of witnessing through a vision a supernatural slide-show which revealed that the significance of the Norman Conquest of the North lay in the replacement of Northumbrian spearmen on fat horses by armored knights riding chargers, the substitution of monks for married priests, and the building of the castle and cathedral at Durham.<sup>87</sup> One might add on the basis of this research that Boson should also have seen peasants laboring under a more intensive manorial regime to support all this, but his picture is still strikingly modern. Unfortunately, however, such a point of view cannot explain why the Normans failed to pass beyond Durham until late in the life of this perceptive knight because the reason lies in the mundane. Twelfth-century writers usually took this realm for granted, and modern accounts of the Normans either ignore the day to day reality of their lives and in particular the fact that they functioned in terms of an agricultural society or relegate this subject to generalized discussions of manners and morals or to abstract Domesday studies. This is unfortunate because the Norman settlement of the North was a colonizing process; and, as in most such ventures, mundane considerations played an important role in determining its course and scope.

This question has been deferred until now despite its relevance between 1070 and 1100 because the most important clue to its solution comes from an obscure corner of Scotland during the reign of King David. As observed earlier, he was responsible for bringing Normans into Scotland, but very little evidence on this subject has survived. To a



remarkable degree the history of this event is based upon deductions from a limited group of charters. In terms of twelfth-century Scottish history this small body of evidence is regrettable, but in a roundabout way it is favorable to the present investigation because in Scotland peripheral information concerning the Normans, which in England receives little emphasis, stands out clearly. Specifically, settlement patterns seem to have existed among the Normans who took land in Scotland, and this phenomenon is most striking in the Southwest. The men whom David planted around the Galwegian border formed a very interesting group. Their infiefment showed, in the first place, the importance of David's possession of Northampton and his connection with Henry I for they either held land in David's Midland honor or, as in the case of Robert de Brus, were Henry's new men. Moreover, these men all stemmed from the same region in France, Lower (western) Normandy or the borders of Brittany. Walter fitz Alan's father was from Dol, and Robert de Brus was from Brix south of Cherbourg. Morville is near Brix, and Soules (now Soulles) is in the vicinity of St. Lô. Robert Avenel apparently belonged to an important family of the Avranchin.<sup>88</sup>

That all these men came from the same area is curious, and it might be explained as the result of the fact that Henry I's patronage network had originally been based on western Normandy.<sup>89</sup> But while this consideration is obviously relevant, David's land grants in eastern Scotland show that it was not the only factor involved. The Normans to whom he gave land in Tweeddale, Lothian, and Fife were of diverse origins. A number of them, in fact, cannot be traced to northern France at all, even by conjecture; and of these, William of Lamberton is perhaps the

most remarkable for he took his name from the village of Lamberton near Berwick.<sup>90</sup> Others in this group can, at least, be traced to England although in some instances not by much. Walter de Ridale (Tweeddale), for instance, was from Northumberland, and William de Sommerville (Lanarkshire) and Walter of Lindsey (Lothian) cannot be followed south beyond the castlery of Pontefract and northern Lincolnshire respectively.<sup>91</sup> The other men in this group, Robert Corbet (Teviotdale), Berenger Engaine (Teviotdale), and David Olifart, were from Northampton, but the origins of their families beyond that point are unknown.<sup>92</sup> The remaining men came from different parts of northern France. Hugh de Morville and Robert Avenel, who both held land in western Scotland, also got land in the east, and Simon fitz Michael (Fife) was a Breton judging from his name.<sup>93</sup> Robert de Bourneville (Lothian) apparently came from near Caen, and Gervais Ridel (Lothian) is said to have stemmed from Blayne in Guienne prior to Northampton.<sup>94</sup> The rest came from the east. Richard Comin (Peebleshire) is said to have been from Comines near Lille, and Geoffrey Melville (Angus?), William Maule (Perths), and Robert de Umfraville (Stirlings), the lord of Prudhoe and Redesdale in Northumberland, all were eastern Normans.<sup>95</sup> Finally, three dependents of the Warrenes' from eastern Normandy, Alexander de Saint-Martin, Hugh Giffard, and Bernard de Balliol, received land in Lothian after the marriage of Ada de Warenne to David's son Henry.<sup>96</sup> David's Normans in eastern Scotland formed a heterogeneous group. As in the West, the importance of the king's connection with Northampton and with King Henry's friends is noticeable. Yet there was no exclusive concentration of western Normans in this part of Scotland as there was on the borders

of Galloway, and this discovery makes the latter arrangement more suspicious than it seemed in isolation.

It might be suggested, of course, that this pattern is accidental, and it would be difficult to rule out this possibility on the basis of the Scottish evidence which is rather limited with respect to the West. But if the distribution of Normans in Scotland has some meaning and is not the result of chance, one might expect to find a similar distribution in the border counties of England; and, if this question is actually pursued, significant results do emerge. Of the baronies in Northumberland, three, Hepple, Langley, and Warkworth-Rothbury, were established too late to be considered here.<sup>97</sup> Four of the remainder, Beanly, Dilston, Embleton, and Gosforth, were held by natives when they first appeared, and the holders of five other early baronies, Bolam, Bothal, and Hadestone along with Mitford and Wooler, have not been traced to Normandy although they were apparently Normans.<sup>98</sup> This group includes men who took their names from places in England such as Aschantinus de Worcester and Gilbert of Newcastle, and men with ambiguous names such as the Bertrams or Robert de Muschamp. Eight men remain after these deductions, and they were nearly balanced between eastern and western Normans. Robert de Umfraville (Prudhoe and Redesdale), Walter de Bolbec (Styford), and probably Nicholas de Grenville (Ellingham) came from eastern Norman families, and Guy de Balliol (Bywell) should be grouped with these men although Bailleul-en-Vimeu was a few miles east of the Norman border.<sup>99</sup> Hugh fitz Eudo, on the other hand, stemmed from west central Normandy, if he really was the son of Eudo de Ria, and there were two men, Walter Espec (Wark) and Eustace fitz John (Alnwick) whose

families came from the West.<sup>100</sup> Finally, Herbert de la Val may have been from the West, although this is by no means certain.<sup>101</sup> From the standpoint of their origins, the Northumbrian barons establish that the group of men who received land from David in eastern Scotland were not unusual. The landholders between the Tyne and the Tweed were drawn from families of both Upper and Lower Normandy with the former in a slight majority, and they included in their number a substantial group of men who cannot be traced to Normandy.

If one turns to Cumberland, however, quite different results emerge which have a direct bearing on David's western Normans, and this information is of critical importance because it shows that the Northumbrian and eastern Scottish evidence cannot be taken as revealing the composition of a "normal" Norman landholding class in this part of Britain. The tenurial structure of Cumberland was the work of Ranulf Meschin and, after 1120, of Henry I; and they enfeoffed a very interesting group of men. Seven of the men who received land were natives, which, given the size of the area, was a rather sizable group; and four of the Frenchmen cannot be traced to northern France.<sup>102</sup> These men were rather different from their eastern peers such as Gilbert de Newcastle or David's Northamptonshire men because in three of the cases, Guy the Hunter, Richard Redere, and Walter the Chaplain, their obscurity stems from their own lack of status rather than from their possession of an English place-name. Furthermore, the fourth man, Thurstan de Reigny, was clearly French even though he has not been traced.<sup>103</sup> None of these men has been shown to have come into Cumberland as the result of secondary immigration, such as certainly took place on the east coast. This is



curious, but the really important point is that there were no Normans at all from Upper Normandy in Cumberland. Ranulf himself was the hereditary vicomte of the Bessin; and six of the seven men who received land from him and Henry I were from Lower Normandy and Brittany.<sup>104</sup> The only exception to this was a solitary Fleming, Turgis Brundis, the lord of Liddel.<sup>105</sup> Furthermore, this same pattern is discernible just south of Cumberland. Burton in Lonsdale and Kendale were apparently held successively by Ivo Taillebois from west-central Normandy and by Nigel d'Aubigny from western Normandy, and the tenurial history of Skipton in the Aire gap is similar.<sup>106</sup> Its first lord was Robert de Rumilly who came from Remilly in Lower Normandy, and its second holder was William Meschin, lord of Allerdale above Derwent and the brother of Ranulf Meschin.<sup>107</sup> In Lancashire above the Ribble where most of the countryside was taken up by honorial demesne manors, thanages, and serjeanties, the only important lordship was the fee of Lancaster whose first holder, a certain Gilbert, seems to have been a retainer of William Meschin, and the only identifiable landholder in Furness during the reign of Henry I was Michael le Fleming.<sup>108</sup> The concentration of western Normans in Scottish Cumbria was not an anomaly. English Cumbria and the region just to the south were also settled by men from Lower Normandy and Brittany; and the two Flemings, who might be taken as exceptions to this pattern, have their parallel in Scotland for either King David or his successor, Malcolm the Maiden, settled a Flemish colony along the headwaters of the Clyde above Lanark.<sup>109</sup>

The combination of evidence from the northern counties of England and from southern Scotland establishes that there was an east-west split

in the settlement of Normans within the region during the reign of Henry I and David. The lands of the old kingdom of Strathclyde or Cumbria (in its widest sense) were settled by men from Lower Normandy and Brittany with some Flemings. Along the east coast plain, on the other hand, a composite nobility was established which included men from all the former areas, men whose families can only be traced to southern England, and Normans from Upper Normandy who probably formed the predominant faction. Furthermore, the nobility which William the Conqueror installed in Yorkshire was similar in its composition to the later nobility of Northumbria and Lothian.<sup>110</sup> This settlement pattern, which appears to be without exception, is so clear-cut that it must reflect the operation of some selective factor, and since this distribution of Normans ignores national boundaries and is not explicable in terms of Henry I's patronage, this factor must have been exercised by the Normans themselves who settled in the region. Indeed, in this selective factor lies the link between the mundane and the coming of the Normans into the Far North.

At first sight the bizarre arrangement of Normans in the North may seem to correspond with nothing more significant than the boundaries of the old kingdom of Strathclyde in the days of its greatest power or, to the nonromantic, with a north-south line from the headwaters of the Ribble to the Scottish Highlands, but this distribution does have a meaning. It corresponds with a basic agricultural division of the North which was reflected in a number of differences between the agricultural systems of the east coast plain and the West. The characteristics of these regions were probably complex even in the early twelfth century. They certainly were later, but for the moment they will be discussed in terms of the

distinction which in the first instance was of most significance to the Normans. This was the question of northern cereal production. From this standpoint, the North was transected by the oat bread line. This term is entirely a matter of convenience and was chosen in memory of Samuel Johnson who was of the opinion that oats were only eaten by horses and Scots.<sup>111</sup> The line itself defined that part of the North in which spring crops (oats and barley) were predominant over winter cereals (wheat and rye), and it was not absolute in the sense that there were no exceptions to its sway. Nevertheless, it was a fundamental division of northern farming, and it can be seen most clearly in the mid eighteenth century just before the advent of modern transport and the industrial revolution severed diet from the confines of regional agriculture. In the 1760's Arthur Young, that great apostle of agricultural improvement, toured the North; and, as was his custom, he wrote an account of his journey from which it is possible to reconstruct a rough map of the bread types of the North during this period.<sup>112</sup> This information should not be understood as necessarily applying to the "better" people on the wrong side of the oat bread line for they belonged in terms of food to a wider world, nor does it correspond completely with what was being grown in that "superior" grains which did not appear in the bread were sometimes grown locally. But the bread types do reveal the cheap local grains, those grains which did best in the neighborhood. Such a map is highly instructive. It shows that the consumption of wheat bread was largely restricted to the southern part of the east coast plain. North of the Vale of York in Durham and southern Northumberland, rye became an important bread grain in the local diet although


wheat was also used; and from Morpeth on the Wansbeck north, wheat and rye were both replaced by bread made from a combination of barley and peas.<sup>113</sup> As might be expected so close to Scotland, oatmeal in the form of porridge also occupied an important place in the Northumbrian diet.<sup>114</sup> The really surprising point, however, is that reliance on spring crops was not confined to northern Northumberland. In the eastern flanks of the Pennines in Yorkshire oatmeal seems to have been the primary bread grain, and spring cereals were unrivaled in the West.<sup>115</sup> In lowland Cumberland the local bread was made from oats and barley with some rye, and in Westmorland and Lancashire oat bread or oatcakes (clap bread) was the common bread.<sup>116</sup> The same was true, of course, in southwestern Scotland, and the English oat bread area apparently ended in Cheshire, although there was another zone of barley bread running down towards Newcastle-under-Lyme west of the Pennines.<sup>117</sup> Arthur Young's journals show that the North was divided by a line which ran from the Wansbeck south through the hills into the West Riding, and to the north and west of this line the usual bread grains were oats and barley. This distribution of bread types is quite significant; and it can be confirmed by the Board of Agriculture reports of the early nineteenth century which show Northumberland divided between a northern area of barley-peas bread and a southern rye area and the West still in general confirmed in its taste for oat bread.<sup>118</sup>

The oat bread line had probably cut across the North since prehistoric times. This is not to say that the situation in the mid eighteenth century can be carried backwards without alteration, of course. The exact location of the line had undoubtedly shifted from time to time



with fluctuations in the climate, developments in agricultural practice, and changes in taste. Such minor alterations are shown by the fact that in 1698 Celia Fiennes, another journal-writing traveler, did not encounter clap bread until she had penetrated Amounderness as far as Garstang or by the probability that northern Lancashire was in an area of barley bread in the sixteenth century.<sup>119</sup> There were also favored areas beyond the line in the East where wheat could be grown in the Middle Ages, and from the late sixteenth century spring wheat was occasionally grown in the West.<sup>120</sup> Furthermore, it is clear that winter wheat was grown on a limited basis in Lancashire before this.<sup>121</sup> But these are the exceptions which are inevitable in agriculture. F. J. Singleton has collected evidence which illustrates the reliance of the agricultural system in Lancashire on spring crops, principally on oats, from the eighteenth back to the thirteenth century, and he has shown that the structure of the field system there was based on their growth.<sup>122</sup>

Singleton's research, in fact, supplies a surprisingly direct link between conditions in Arthur Young's time and those of the High Middle Ages; and to a certain extent, the same correspondence can be found in the East. A portion of the Lay Subsidy Roll for 25 Edward I dealing with the West Riding has survived; and it discloses in enough detail what crops were being grown in the countryside south of the Aire and to a lesser extent around Ripon to make possible the construction of a crop sequence map (see Map 9).<sup>123</sup> This map reveals that the cultivation of wheat was limited to the lower parts of the area, generally to land below 250 feet and to the valley floor of the Calder. On either side of the zone in which wheat was grown, there were belts of villages in which



Map 9. Crop Sequences in the West Riding in 1297

rye took the place of wheat; and finally, on the higher ground towards the west there were a number of vills where only oats were grown. This is remarkable proof of the age of the distribution of bread types as they were revealed in the eighteenth century, and it is probably a correct assumption that in the thirteenth century, the oat bread line continued on to the north through the edge of the Pennines just as it did later. To the east of the line there is, of course, little need to establish the importance of wheat and rye. The Lay Subsidy shows their cultivation in the late thirteenth century, and they are accounted for in the pipe rolls of Henry III and John.<sup>124</sup> In Durham where the growing of wheat cannot, perhaps, be assumed so lightly, it is known that the episcopal demesne manors yielded 2,065½ quarters of wheat and 5,236½ quarters of oats in 1211, and Boldon Book shows that wheat was produced on these manors in the 1180's.<sup>125</sup> Finally, the oldest fairly general evidence which throws any light on this question, Henry II's pipe roll for 1172, apparently reflects the oat bread line. In that year the king sent 200 skeps of wheat and 100 skeps of oats to Ireland from Yorkshire. From Northumberland, however, he could only dispatch 300 loads of oats and from Cumberland, 200 loads of oats.<sup>126</sup>

This does not necessarily mean that no wheat was grown in Northumberland and Cumberland in 1172, but it is good evidence that there was no surplus of this grain which could be sent out of these shires. And this should not be particularly surprising. Both areas were beyond the "economic" or large-scale limit of wheat cultivation as defined by H. Dudley Stamp. According to Stamp, these limits are the 60-degree isotherm for July in the north and the 30-inch rainfall line in the west.<sup>127</sup>

Currently Durham and Lancashire are on the edge of the area marked off by these criteria. The 60-degree isotherm runs in a southwest tending arc through northern Yorkshire, and the 30-inch rainfall line stretches north-south across the eastern slopes of the Pennines. Lowland Yorkshire is mostly within these limits, and eastern Durham is just on the other side of the line in terms of temperature but not from the standpoint of moisture. Much of the Pennines are excluded on either ground. In the West, Lancashire and Westmorland are mostly below the 60-degree isotherm for July but only barely, and all of the area, especially to the east and northeast, receives more than 30 inches of precipitation yearly.<sup>128</sup>

There is a remarkable correspondence between Stamp's criteria for wheat cultivation and the historical oat bread line, and this is quite understandable. Wheat can be grown, to be sure, north of Stamp's limits, but it becomes an undependable crop liable to an alternation of good yields and poor except in a few favored spots which lie mainly on the very eastern margins of Scotland.<sup>129</sup> It is this problem of dependability--or "economic" production--which is the basis for the similarity of the eighteenth-century bread types and the crop distributions in the Middle Ages. The common local breads of the 1760's were the cheap breads made from grain which grew well under local conditions. These were not necessarily the only crops which could be grown in the neighborhood if one were prepared to take risks; and, of course, it was exactly "risks" which the medieval peasant could not afford to take. For him, crop failures meant ruin and starvation. The northern peasant had to grow crops which could be expected to do well year after year,



and this necessity produced the crop sequences which have been encountered. Rye will endure the cold better than wheat. Barley can be grown further north than rye, and oats will withstand more moisture than either barley or rye.<sup>130</sup> Furthermore, there is some evidence that the northern peasant's criteria for growing wheat prior to 1066 were closer to Stamp's theoretical requirements than to either the eighteenth-century distribution of bread types or the situation which existed in the twelfth century. Despite the general similarity of shire custom throughout the North, there were some important differences between its demands in Yorkshire and Northumbria which seem to reflect the pre-Norman oat bread line. In Yorkshire, for example, the old grain renders of the shire--in so far as their composition can be reconstructed--apparently were made up of oats and corn, presumably either rye or wheat.<sup>131</sup> Above the Tees, on the other hand, these renders consisted of oats and barley either in their raw state or as malt and meal, and it is probably a fair inference from this that the Northumbrian peasants did not normally grow wheat for had they done so, these grains almost certainly would have been included in their dues.<sup>132</sup> The number of boon-plowings required of peasants each year points in the same direction. In Yorkshire peasants usually had to do two free days of plowing a year, one in the fall and another in the spring.<sup>133</sup> In Northumberland, however, they did one plowing a year at oat seed time, and in Durham the oldest tradition required plowing only once a year.<sup>134</sup> Both Northumbrian grain renders and boon-plowings indicate that the oat bread line had run somewhere through southern Durham or northern Yorkshire during Anglo-Saxon times, and there is evidence that it had at least one outlier in Yorkshire. In

the reign of William the Conqueror, Holderness is said to have yielded nothing but oats.<sup>135</sup>

The question of the oat bread line is important for understanding the Norman Conquest of the North for the simplest reason: The Normans came to England for land—but not just for any land. This is what we forget as members of an industrialized society which is separated from the countryside by supermarkets and a commercial system of food distribution which blurs regional differences. In the eleventh and twelfth centuries such differences determined what most men ate, and this was of direct concern to nobles because they had specific expectations with respect to food. Nobility was expressed and enjoyed in a standard of living, and despite the fact that this aspect of noble status is often lost sight of in favor of other questions such as lordship or judicial privileges, in the settlement of new lands it was a matter of the first importance.<sup>136</sup> A noble standard of living was both a question of taste and a matter of status; and, as it always is with status, there were requirements. For one thing, wine was important. R. Dion has shown that good wine was an important symbol of nobility and that the necessity of serving wine to one's guests and dependents led to the extension of viniculture in France.<sup>137</sup> The consumption of venison which had been killed by one's own hand was probably another such symbol, and the right kind of bread certainly was.

For the French nobility in general this meant bread made from wheat (frumentum), and the Normans were no exception to this rule.<sup>138</sup> It is, in fact, doubtful whether they ate any other type of bread or, at least, thought that they should. In the lists of provisions for royal castles

wheat and wine occupied the place of honor, and when Richard fitz Nigel wrote his account of how the old royal farm had come to be paid in money rather than in produce, he assumed that the only bread grain which it had yielded had been wheat.<sup>139</sup> The assumption is, of course, questionable, but it did reflect Norman feeling on what the farm should have provided. In the early Norman maintenance allotments bread made from wheat occupied a dominant position, and the meaning of such allotments in Norman society stands out clearly in the rules which governed the royal court under Henry I.<sup>140</sup> At court, all bread was made from wheat. In Henry's reign a bushel of wheat, or as the Normans called it, "a bushel of Rouen," yielded three grades of bread. In order of descending fineness one could obtain from each bushel 40 lord's simnel loaves, 140 salted simnel loaves, and 260 ordinary loaves, and the type of bread which members of the royal court received each day depended upon their rank.<sup>141</sup> The chancellor, for example, was given "1 lord's simnel loaf, and 2 salted simnel loaves, and 1 sextary of clear wine, and 1 sextary of ordinary wine."<sup>142</sup> The steward, however, obtained only "2 salted simnel loaves, and 1 sextary of ordinary wine," and the various service personnel of the court were given something called "customary food" which presumably consisted of ordinary loaves and ordinary wine.<sup>143</sup> With the companaticum (side dishes of meat, poultry, and fish), these allotments constituted the diet of the nobles at the court, and they illustrate two very important points concerning the Norman nobility. First, despite their wealth, bread was the primary item in their daily diet; and second, the quality of one's bread was a symbol of personal status.

There was a direct connection between this aspect of nobility and regional agriculture. Indeed, this was the basis for the settlement patterns which were discovered in the North. William the Conqueror's followers hoped to be rewarded with land, but land which did not grow wheat, and particularly land where wheat could not be grown was of little use to them. Such acres would not make them greater nobles. In southern and central England this was not, of course, a serious problem because within these areas the land and its produce met the expectations of the Normans, but in other parts of the British Isles this was not necessarily the case. To illustrate this point in general, one need only recall Gerald of Wales' description of Ireland:

The land is fruitful and rich in its fertile soil and plentiful harvests. Crops abound in the fields and flocks on the mountains. . . . The island is, however, richer in pastures than in crops, and in grass rather than grain. The crops give great promise in the blade, even more in the straw, but less in the ear. For here the grains of wheat are shrivelled and small, and can scarcely be separated from the chaff by any winnowing fan. The plains are well clothed with grass. . . . Only the granaries are without wealth. What is born and comes forth in the spring and is nourished in the summer . . . can scarcely be reaped in the harvest because of unceasing rain.<sup>144</sup>


In other words, Ireland was a pleasing land except for the fact that wheat did poorly there, and this single consideration clouded Gerald's view of the island.

It might be objected, of course, that Gerald was the spokesman for a later generation of Normans and that such considerations did not restrain the Conqueror's rude barons, but in the north there is evidence which shows that this was a matter of fundamental importance from the beginning. The Norman settlement of the North cannot be explained without reference to the question of what kind of land the Normans wanted.



In terms of literary evidence, this point is made explicitly in a story concerning Odo of Champagne, the third husband of William the Conqueror's sister Adelaide. William apparently gave him Holderness which had been forfeited by Drogo, its first holder, late in the Conqueror's reign. Shortly afterwards, however, Odo and Adelaide had a son, and Odo was soon petitioning the Conqueror for more land. According to the story, his reason was very simple. Odo disliked Holderness because it produced nothing but oats, and he wanted some wheat bearing land so that he could feed the child. William is said to have agreed to the request. This story is admittedly late, but it probably represents an authentic family tradition of the lords of Holderness who were descended from Odo.<sup>145</sup> And even if Odo's reputed aversion to feeding his son oatcakes is not historical, there is other evidence which shows that the attitude itself did exist among the Norman nobles who settled above the Humber and that it restricted their settlement.

The clearest proof of this comes from Ilbert de Lacy's castlery of Pontefract in the West Riding. It constituted a nearly solid block of territory which stretched from the fens west of the Ouse up into the Pennines; and due to unique circumstances, the actual distribution of Norman settlement within his fee stands out clearly. First of all, Domesday consistently names the Anglo-Saxon undertenants who held of Ilbert, information not usually available elsewhere, and second, Pontefract lay just to the north and at some points inside the area covered by the late thirteenth-century crop sequence.<sup>146</sup> This conjunction makes it possible to compare the latter with the populated estates belonging to Ilbert, and such a comparison reveals an important phenomenon. In 1086, Ilbert's




Map 10. The populated estates of Ilbert de Lacy

Norman undertenants only held manors in the central part of the castlery, almost exclusively on land below 250 feet, and their manors corresponded closely with the area within which wheat was grown at the time of the crop sequence. On either side of this central block of estates, the villages were either held by natives, or they were held directly by Ilbert and contained no demesne land. These peripheral strips corresponded generally with the areas in which rye and oats were later grown. What had happened is clear. Ilbert and his vassals had only taken direct possession of that part of the castlery in which wheat either was

being grown or could be grown, and they had left the less desirable land to Anglo-Saxons.

Within the castlery of Pontefract, Norman settlement did not cross the oat bread line during the reign of William the Conqueror because the land to the west was unattractive and valueless to Ilbert's men, and the same was true all along the eastern flanks of the Pennines in Yorkshire, although in most other areas it is impossible to tell whether there was a band of Anglo-Saxon lords to the west of the Normans as there was in Ilbert's fee.<sup>147</sup> Probably this was a common phenomenon, however, for some signs of a similar pattern can be found in William de Percy's estates south of Ripon and in Richmond, and an arrangement of almost exactly the same type is visible in the description of Henry de Ferrers' estates in Derbyshire (see Map 11).<sup>148</sup> Despite the clarity of this pattern, it does not represent the only reaction of Normans to the oat bread line. In a sense it is an exaggerated example of what happened for around the Pennines the Normans were faced with poor soil and rapidly increasing elevation which brought in its train an ever decreasing growing season and increasing rain.<sup>149</sup>

Elsewhere the oat bread line did not bring Norman settlement to an immediate stop. Roger of Poitou, for instance, is said to have disliked Lancashire, which is understandable since it was probably an oat bread area, but he managed to attract a few Normans into the region.<sup>150</sup> The details of his enfiefments, however, indicate that this was a difficult process in which he was none too successful. In 1086 Roger's Norman tenants formed only a small group which numbered fifteen men if no two of them had the same name.<sup>151</sup> With two exceptions, they were obscure



Map 11. Henry de Ferrers' Estates in Derbyshire



knights of no standing, and they all settled south of the Ribble. Furthermore, it is likely that most of them gave up their lands and left.<sup>152</sup> Lancashire was, in fact, so unattractive to Normans that Roger was forced to rely heavily on natives. Nineteen natives were holding land south of the Ribble in 1086, and there were probably others who are hidden by the incomplete nature of Domesday's description of Lancashire.<sup>153</sup> By 1094 a hybrid aristocracy unquestionably existed in this area, and the early thirteenth-century surveys reveal that a large number of thanages had survived the coming of the Normans into Lancashire. These thanes held, moreover, by fee farm, and this probably means, as Jolliffe has suggested, that Roger of Poitou simply terminated the old renders and works of the shire in favor of rents because the former were valueless to him.<sup>154</sup>

In Lancashire Norman settlement faded out, as it were, between the Ribble and the Mersey rather than coming to an abrupt stop as it did around the Pennines, and something rather similar happened in Northumbria. Durham was probably on the very southern edge of the oat bread area--or barley bread area--in the late eleventh century if the later grain renders of the bondage vills accurately represent agricultural production prior to the Conquest. Nevertheless, Normans were established in this area before 1100, and their settlement was apparently made feasible by changing the manorial structure of Durham. Bishop Walcher, it will be remembered, was responsible for radically expanding demesne farming in a number of St. Cuthbert's villages and for imposing week-work on the peasants of these villages; and although this can be explained as a straightforward act of economic exploitation, it is

likely that it also represented an attempt by the bishop to obtain direct control over what the peasants were growing.<sup>155</sup> This is suggested by the fact that at the time of Boldon Book, wheat production in Durham was almost entirely confined to the demesnes of those villages which had been manorialized by Walcher. Furthermore, even at this late date most of the unmanorialized vills were either administered by drengs or were farmed by their inhabitants.<sup>156</sup>

In general, the first wave of Norman settlement in the North went to the oat bread line--to the limit of dependable wheat cultivation as expressed in peasant breads. In southern Lancashire and Durham, the Normans may actually have crossed the line somewhat, but in both of these border areas wheat could be grown even though it had not played an important role in peasant agriculture prior to the Conquest. Moreover, in these areas the Normans altered the old manorial system of the North. In Lancashire the shire system was scrapped, as it were; and in Durham the element of demesne farming was intensified. These changes, although different in their specifics, both represented attempts to improve local traditions of peasant agriculture which were unacceptable to the Normans.

Where wheat could not be grown, the Normans did not take lands, and this was one of the basic reasons for their weakness in the North between 1070 and 1100. This factor kept Normans out of the free-zone which occupied the most intractable part of the oat bread area, and it shielded northern Lancashire, the Vale of Eden, and the Cumbrian lowlands from their settlement. Estates in these regions held little value for Normans, and their reluctance to establish themselves on the other side of the oat bread line was the chief reason why they had difficulty

controlling the free-zone. During the reigns of William the Conqueror and William Rufus, the southern free-zone was contained by castleries, but it was not occupied. In Yorkshire where the east coast plain could support a numerous baronage, this policy had some success, and in Durham which was fairly well protected against raids from the West by the mass of the northern Pennines, it also worked. Yet beyond these limits, Norman power remained tenuous until after 1100. Rufus was unable to consolidate his hold of Carlisle by the establishment of a local baronage, and this failure combined with the inability of the Normans to penetrate the free-zone restricted Norman settlement in Northumberland.

There was land above the Tyne which was worth having from the point of view of the Normans. Wheat can be grown as an aristocratic crop north of Durham, especially in the Merse, Lothian, and the coastal fringe of southeastern Scotland proper.<sup>157</sup> The only difficulty with its cultivation in the dry parts of this region is the danger of occasional failures, a threat which kept peasants from growing it but which did not restrain nobles if they were sufficiently determined. This the Normans were; and there was, therefore, no insurmountable barrier in terms of wheat to Norman settlement above the Tyne. One simply had to be prepared to pay a very high price for it in certain years.<sup>158</sup> Of course, in realistic terms this consideration may not have been too important. As it existed, peasant agriculture undoubtedly produced unappealing crops; and, given the preponderance of renders in kind over labor dues in Northumbria, the introduction of the cultivation of wheat would have been difficult unless one were prepared to follow Walcher's example. This consideration notwithstanding, the real bar to Norman settlement in

Northumbria was the insecurity of the east coast plain vis-a-vis the free-zone. Above the Tyne this plain becomes progressively narrower and more exposed. It is backed by the hills of the northern free-zone all the way to Tweeddale, and beyond this break, the coastal plain of Lothian is similarly confined by the eastern extension of the southern highlands. In agricultural terms--and these were the terms which interested the Normans--the Far North consisted of this restricted plain, and as long as the northern free-zone and the West were unsubdued, the agricultural communities of the coastal plain were of little value. Indeed, if one is to believe some of the miracles attributed to St. Oswin of Tynemouth, the countryside of southern Northumberland was so poor in the late eleventh century that Norman armies could not feed themselves there, and this was apparently true not only of southern Northumberland but of Lothian and Tweeddale as well.<sup>159</sup> King Edgar is known to have given away two deserted villages in the latter area and to have extended material aid to the recipients for their redevelopment, terms which strongly suggest a small and impoverished population in the general area. In addition to this, several of the Anglo-Saxon and Norman expeditions against Scotland in the eleventh century were accompanied by fleets whose purpose was presumably to carry supplies.<sup>160</sup> This was certainly the case in 1091. When Rufus lost his grain fleet in that year, a number of his knights and horses died of hunger in Lothian or Northumberland.<sup>161</sup>

During the reign of Henry I this problem was solved--or at least greatly reduced. He and King David installed a Norman aristocracy in Cumberland and eastern Galloway who began the work of establishing law



and order on the local level and sealing in the Galwegians. In terms of the previous discussion of the Norman preference for wheat producing land, this extension of Norman settlement may seem mysterious, if not contradictory; but in fact there was a simple explanation for why Henry and David could achieve what had escaped William the Conqueror and Rufus. On a practical level the nobility of northern France was not entirely homogeneous in its criteria for land. There are signs that this was the case among the men who took land along the northern fringe of the kingdom during the reign of the Conqueror, and it was within this context that Henry I and his new men had special significance for the North. There had been a political split in the Norman nobility in the reign of William the Conqueror, at least in the sense that the nobility of Lower Normandy had not benefited from the distribution of English lands to the same extent as the nobles of Upper Normandy; and presumably it was this which led Henry to cultivate men from the former area in the days before he became king.<sup>162</sup> In Lower Normandy there was disaffection which he could turn to his own advantage. Once he was king, the fact that his political debts and his patronage network were based on this area had important consequences for the North because western Normans and their neighbors in Brittany had wider standards with respect to land than did the great men of the east. It was not a matter of their not sharing the same concepts of nobility. They too valued wheat highly as an article of food and as a symbol of their status. Their numerous grants of yearly gifts of wheat to the monasteries of the area prove this conclusively, but they also illustrate another point. These gifts, examples of wheat being used as money, and tenures based on the yearly payment of

a stated quantity of wheat show that while this grain was highly prized, it was also rare.<sup>163</sup> Indeed, there is literary evidence to this effect. Prior to the Conquest, the bishopric of Coutances was so poor that Bishop Geoffrey's household had to subsist on black bread, and this was not due simply to an absence of estates.<sup>164</sup> In terms of cereal production, much of Lower Normandy and the adjacent section of Brittany was poor land, and the common bread grains were rye and oats.<sup>165</sup> Because of their poverty, nobles from this region were more flexible than nobles from Upper Normandy. They would take land which would not grow wheat.

Furthermore, it is likely that many nobles from the region were anxious to obtain estates elsewhere and that they knew the value of land in the oat bread area. In a general sense, the Breton massif and its eastern extension, the lands which later bore the Norman bocage, were poor lands. They are wet, and the soil is generally acid, leached, and infertile.<sup>166</sup> It would seem, in fact, that they were so poor in places that their agricultural system would not support all the local nobles. During this period many Bretons became mercenary soldiers because of the poverty of western Brittany; and according to Orderic Vitalis, Robert Guiscard and his followers left the Cotentin for the same reason.<sup>167</sup> In many instances, then, it is likely that western Normans and Bretons had compelling reason to leave home, and they were probably peculiarly fitted, moreover, to deal with the oat bread area. In his account of William the Conqueror's early invasion of Brittany, William de Poitiers says that the Bretons normally ate little bread and that they relied principally for their livelihood on their herds and flocks rather than upon agriculture. Furthermore, William had to withdraw from Brittany on

this occasion because he could not find enough wheat to feed his army.<sup>168</sup> These were, of course, conditions reminiscent of the North, and to a lesser degree they applied to western Normandy. Both the higher parts of Brittany and the Norman bocage were areas of infield-outfield farming. Peasant labor dues were light, and livestock raising was very important.<sup>169</sup> These were conditions which were very similar to those found in northwestern England and western Scotland, and the fact that Henry's new men were familiar with such an agricultural system, at least in principle, meant that they could utilize land worthless to an eastern Norman.<sup>170</sup>

The relevance of this is obvious. Henry's new men would take land which the first generation of Norman nobles had despised. This is the meaning of the fact that no eastern Normans settled in Cumberland and western Scotland. What the Lower Normans and Bretons would not take could be given to Flemings who were accustomed to rye and oat bread and who were concerned, in any case, with raising sheep.<sup>171</sup> The residue, in northern England at least, went to Henry's Anglo-Saxons. Thus one returns in the end to the original point, although with more precision. Peace with Scotland and the establishment of a French aristocracy above Durham and Lancashire were a direct result of Henry's politics. For his own reasons, he brought to England a group of men who were able to breach the oat bread line. Norman settlement of the east coast plain from the Tyne to the Forth followed.

## Chapter VII

<sup>1</sup>Holt, The Northerners, p. 202.

<sup>2</sup>Anglo-Saxon Chronicle, s.a. 1097 E, p. 175; Florence of Worcester, II, 41; Tigernach Annals, Continuation, s.a. 1099, p. 119.

<sup>3</sup>Annals of Winchester, in Scottish Annals, s.a. 1099, p. 119.

<sup>4</sup>See the witnesses to Edgar's charters, ESC, Nos. XV, XX. Ritchie bases his interpretation of the reigns of Edgar, Alexander, and David upon this assumption, but he has no proof for it, Normans in Scotland, p. 106. See infra, n. 19.

<sup>5</sup>RRA-N, I, Nos. 367, 463, 478.

<sup>6</sup>Liber Feodorum. I, 197-203. The baronies in question are Bolam, Callerton (DeLaval), Dilston, Mitford, Morpeth, and Morwick. The holders of Bothal and Redesdale said that their families had held de antiquo feffamento, ibid., pp. 201-202. This phrase has been taken to imply an origin during the reign of William the Conqueror, but it surely indicates merely an origin prior to 1135, see J. H. Round, Feudal England: Historical Studies on the XIth and XIIth Centuries (London, 1909), pp. 236-46.

<sup>7</sup>Between 1107 and 1116 Henry I confirmed to Tynemouth the tithes of several villages which had been given to the priory by Earl Robert and his men. Numbered among these were the tithes of two villages, Black Callerton and Dissington, which later were included in the barony of Callerton, RRA-N, II, No. 1170; Craster, The Parish of Tynemouth, p. 49, n. 2. By itself this proves nothing, but in a notification of a similar date, Henry specifically confirmed the tithes which had been given by Hubert de la Val. This confirmation included the tithes of Black Callerton and Dissington, and this creates the presumption that Hubert had been a follower of Earl Robert and had held these villages prior to 1095, RRA-N, II, No. 1172.

<sup>8</sup>Ibid., Nos. 363-68.

<sup>9</sup>Gaimar, ll. 6129-75. It is hard to reconcile Gaimar's account of this revolt with the earlier descriptions. He seems to say that Rufus came north, built an unidentified new castle, and besieged Morpeth before moving up to Bamburgh, ibid., ll. 6149-57. Both the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle, s.a. 1095 E, p. 172, and Florence of Worcester, II, 38, record that Rufus initially besieged Tynemouth and that while this siege was in progress, he captured an unnamed small castle. This might have been Morpeth, but Gaimar's failure to mention the siege of Tynemouth makes his assertions suspect. William de Morley is also mentioned in De Injusta Vexatione Willelmi Episcopi I, in Symeon of Durham, Opera Omnia, I, 190-91.



<sup>10</sup>Liber Feodorum, I, 201. Guy might be mentioned in RRA-N, I, No. 412, although the erasure of all but the first letter of the name makes it impossible to be certain.

<sup>11</sup>In 1080, one hundred of Walcher's men were killed, Anglo-Saxon Chronicle, s.a. 1080 E, p. 160; De Injusta Vexatione, p. 186.

<sup>12</sup>RRA-N, II, Nos. 541, 589-90, 642, 643.

<sup>13</sup>Duncan, "Earliest Charters," pp. 104-105, 118.

<sup>14</sup>Nicholl, Thurstan, p. 16.

<sup>15</sup>Ritchie was of the opinion that Normans had been in Scotland as early as the reign of Malcolm Canmore, Normans in Scotland, pp. 68-83. But see G. W. S. Barrow, "The Beginnings of Feudalism in Scotland," Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research, XXIX (1956), 1-2.

<sup>16</sup>Anglo-Saxon Chronicle, s.a. 1101 E, p. 177; Ritchie, Normans in Scotland, p. 141.

<sup>17</sup>Ibid., pp. 101-106; Freeman, William Rufus, II, 383, 390-91; Poole, Domesday to Magna Carta, pp. 1-2; Barlow, Feudal Kingdom of England, p. 174. Duncan interprets the marriage as illustrating the reality of Scottish vassalage, "Earliest Charters," p. 134.

<sup>18</sup>Ordericus Vitalis, III, 267, 291-92, 384-85; IV, 118-20, 149, 256-58.

<sup>19</sup>Ritchie says that Edgar and Alexander needed Henry's support because they were "usurpers," Normans in Scotland, p. 106. This is, however, only an assertion. There is no evidence of anti-dynastic feeling in Scotland till 1130. Neither Edgar nor Alexander faced any revolts. The one which is usually placed in Alexander's reign, 1107-1124, is first recorded in Wyntoun and deserves no serious respect, Andrew of Wyntoun, Orygynale Chronykil of Scotland, ed. D. Laing, II (The Historians of Scotland, Vol. III; Edinburgh, 1872), p. 174. Bower, Fordun's continuator, also notes the story, but this is no better evidence. See Skene, Celtic Scotland, I, 452.

<sup>20</sup>Anglo-Saxon Chronicle, s.a. 1107 E, p. 181.

<sup>21</sup>William of Malmesbury, Gesta Regum, II, 476; The Brut y Tywysogion, in ESSH, II, s.a. 1111(=1114), 144.

<sup>22</sup>Ordericus Vitalis, IV, 164-67. See R. W. Southern, "The Place of Henry I in English History," Proceedings of the British Academy, XLVIII (1962), 132-55.

<sup>23</sup>Ibid., pp. 133-34; Barlow, Feudal Kingdom of England, p. 182; Round, Feudal England, p. 472.

<sup>24</sup>RRA-N, II, No. 631; EYC, III, Nos. 1418-21; Wightman, The Lacy Family, pp. 36-37.

<sup>25</sup>EYC, II, 432; Holt, The Northerners, p. 214. Cf. Wightman, The Lacy Family, p. 20.

<sup>26</sup>EYC, II, v, 11-12.

<sup>27</sup>Charters of Mowbray, pp. xvii-xix, xxiii-iv.

<sup>28</sup>Sanders, English Baronies, pp. 56, 150.

<sup>29</sup>EYC, III, 143, 148; Wightman, The Lacy Family, pp. 66, 68, 72.

<sup>30</sup>EYC, III, 2-3, n.

<sup>31</sup>Ibid., I, 385-86; II, 326. Holt, The Northerners, p. 215; Ritchie, Normans in Scotland, pp. 145-47.

<sup>32</sup>EYC, I, 466; II, 133-37, 176, 432, 462; III, 457.

<sup>33</sup>G. V. Scammell, Hugh Du Puiset, Bishop of Durham (Cambridge, 1956), p. 187; Holt, The Northerners, p. 214. The statement concerning Greatham is conjectural.

<sup>34</sup>For Styford see Liber Feodorum, I, 201; Sanders, English Baronies, pp. 84-85; Ritchie, Normans in Scotland, pp. 142-43. On Prudhoe, see ibid., p. 73; Liber Feodorum, I, 201. Redesdale represents a problem. In the Liber Feodorum, I, 201, it is said that the Umfravilles had held it de antiquo feffamento. Northumbrian antiquarians have taken this to mean that William the Conqueror gave Redesdale to Robert de Umfraville, see M. H. Dodds, The Parishes of Ovingham, Stamfordham, and Ponteland, Vol. XII of A History of Northumberland (Newcastle-upon-Tyne, 1926), pp. 80-81. To sustain this view, they have had to invent a mythical Robert de Umfraville "I" to help fill up the time gap until Robert de Umfraville "II" appears in charters ca. 1120, ibid., p. 81. In fact, of course, this "second" Robert de Umfraville was the founder of the Northumbrian Umfravilles. In 1207 Richard de Umfraville, the descendant of Robert, was of the opinion that there had been but one Robert, ibid., and the phrase which is used as the foundation for an origin before 1087 actually means that the barony was created before 1135. Finally, it is unlikely that Robert de Umfraville would have accepted Redesdale, which was probably valueless, unless it was combined with the grant of Prudhoe, which he is known to have received from Henry I.

<sup>35</sup>The lords of Mitford claimed that their ancestors had held since the Conquest, Liber Feodorum, I, 201. But the first known holder of this barony was William who appears during the reign of Henry I, C. H. Hunter Blair, "Mitford Castle," Archaeologia Aeliana, 4th Ser., XIV (1937), 74. The Bertrams of Bothal claimed an origin before 1135, Liber Feodorum, I, 202; Sanders, English Baronies, p. 107.

<sup>36</sup>A. M. Oliver, "Early History of the Family of Morwick," Archaeologia Aeliana, 4th Ser., XII (1935), 264-65; Liber Feodorum, I, 203; Sanders, English Baronies, p. 119; Pipe Roll of 31 Henry I, pp. 132-33.

<sup>37</sup>Liber Feodorum, I, 200, 203; Sanders, English Baronies, p. 41. It is often said that Eustace received Alnwick from Ivo de Vesci who had himself obtained it from William Tyson, its lord in 1066, ibid., p. 103. But this is groundless. See Freeman, William Rufus, II, 596.

<sup>38</sup>Liber Feodorum I, 200; Sanders, English Baronies, pp. 100, 149; Ritchie, Normans in Scotland, pp. 146-47; RRA-N, II, Nos. 993, 1001. Use the conclusions of A. M. Oliver on the origins of Wooler with caution, "The Family of Muschamp, Barons of Wooler," Archaeologia Aeliana, 4th Ser., XIV (1937), 243-44.

<sup>39</sup>Wilson, "Introduction to the Cumberland Domesday," pp. 303-304; Ritchie, Normans in Scotland, p. 150; Holt, The Northerners, p. 214.

<sup>40</sup>Wilson, "Introduction to the Cumberland Domesday," p. 310; Sanders, English Baronies, p. 124.

<sup>41</sup>Ibid., p. 115.

<sup>42</sup>Farrer, Kendale, p. x; Charters of Mowbray, pp. xxii, xxiv n.

<sup>43</sup>Sanders, English Baronies, p. 142.

<sup>44</sup>The date when Lancashire came into the possession of Stephen has not been definitely established, R. H. C. Davis, King Stephen, 1135-1154 (London, 1967), p. 6. W. Farrer seems to have thought that he received it ca. 1118, "Feudal Baronage," in The Victoria History of Lancaster, I, 292-93. The possibility that Ranulf Meschin held Lancashire before Stephen depends upon a charter of Ranulf's son, Ranulf Gernons. In this charter Ranulf confirms the tenure of some land near Penwortham held by Evesham. The monks were to hold it as they had tempore comitis Rogeri Pictavensis et tempore Rannulfi comitis patris mei, The Lancashire Pipe Rolls, ed. W. Farrer (Liverpool, 1902), p. 319. If this can be believed, Ranulf Meschin had held Lancashire, but Farrer was reluctant to accept this idea, "Feudal Baronage," p. 292. J. Tait was of a similar opinion, Mediaeval Manchester and the Beginnings of Lancashire (Manchester, 1904), pp. 164-65.

<sup>45</sup>RRA-N, II, No. 640.

<sup>46</sup>C. H. Hunter Blair, "The Sheriffs of Northumberland, Part I, 1076-1602," Archaeologia Aeliana, 4th Ser., XX (1942), 25-26.

<sup>47</sup>Ibid.

<sup>48</sup>Pipe Roll of 31 Henry I, pp. 140-42; Wilson, "Introduction to the Cumberland Domesday," p. 313, n. 2.



<sup>49</sup>The Register and Records of Holm Cultram, ed. F. Grainger and W. G. Collingwood (Cumberland and Westmorland Antiquarian and Archaeological Society, Record Series, Vol. VII; Kendal, 1929), p. 119; Nicholl, Thurstan, pp. 134, 148

<sup>50</sup>EYC, II, 505 n.

<sup>51</sup>Register of Holm Cultram, p. 119.

<sup>52</sup>RRA-N, II, xvi; EYC, II, 505 n.

<sup>53</sup>Ibid.; RRA-N, II, Nos. 1279, 1639.

<sup>54</sup>EYC, III, 317 n.; ESC, p. 375 n.

<sup>55</sup>Wilson, "Introduction to the Cumberland Domesday," p. 313, n. 2; RRA-N, II, Nos. 1203, 1560, 1563; Sanders, English Baronies, p. 42; H. H. E. Craster, The Parish of Corbridge, Vol. X of A History of Northumberland (Newcastle-upon-Tyne, 1914), p. 41.

<sup>56</sup>Liber Feodorum, I, 198-99, 203, 205; Sanders, English Baronies, p. 122.

<sup>57</sup>Hodgson, The Parish of Edlingham, pp. 28-30. Hodgson's remarks on Allerdale below Derwent are somewhat confused because he assumed that the Dolfin expelled by Rufus in 1092 was Cospatric's son, ibid., pp. 24-27. If this were true, there would be a possibility that Cospatric's family had held Allerdale before 1100, but this is doubtful. The descendants of Waltheof claimed that Henry I had given Waltheof this barony, Liber Feodorum, I, 198.

<sup>58</sup>See Ritchie, Normans in Scotland, pp. 118-20, 297-300.

<sup>59</sup>Barrow, The Kingdom of Scots, p. 321.

<sup>60</sup>Ibid., pp. 165-87; William of Malmesbury, Gesta Regum, II, 476-77; Ordericus Vitalis, III, 401-402; IV, 274.

<sup>61</sup>Barrow, The Kingdom of Scots, p. 321; Ritchie, Normans in Scotland, pp. 142ff.; Skene, Celtic Scotland, I, 454-60.

<sup>62</sup>Barrow, The Kingdom of Scots, p. 173.

<sup>63</sup>Ibid.; Ritchie, Normans in Scotland, pp. 407-10; Aelred of Rievaulx, "The Relatio De Standardo," in Vol. III of Chronicles of the Reigns of Stephen, Henry II, and Richard I, ed. R. Howlett (Rolls Series, Vol. LXXXII; London, 1886), p. 193.

<sup>64</sup>Ritchie, Normans in Scotland, p. 137.



<sup>65</sup> There are three clear accounts of the "loss" of Lothian. Ordericus Vitalis asserts that Edward the Confessor gave it to Malcolm Canmore when the latter married Margaret, III, 394-95; IV, 268-70. In De Obsessione Dunelmi, pp. 218-19, it is said that Eadulf Cudel gave it to the Scots ca. 1116 rather than fight them, and in De Primo Saxonum Adventu, p. 382, King Edgar is said to have given it to King Kenneth after the latter had performed homage. The veracity of these accounts is not at issue here, but it should be noted that any one of these versions of how the Scottish kings had obtained Lothian could be used as a basis for the revival of an English claim to the province. This is highly suspicious because all three of these stories were written down between ca. 1100 and ca. 1140, Anderson, "Lothian," pp. 104, 111.

<sup>66</sup> Barrow, The Kingdom of Scots, p. 321; Ritchie, Normans in Scotland, pp. 142ff.

<sup>67</sup> Ibid., p. 287. Barrow says that the first phase of Norman immigration into Scotland ended in the 1140's, The Kingdom of Scots, pp. 320-21.

<sup>68</sup> D. F. Renn, Norman Castles in Britain (London, 1968), p. 100; Reginaldi Monachi Dunelmensis Libellus De Admirandis Beati Guthberti Virtutibus, ed. James Raine (Surtees Society, Vol. I; Durham, 1835), p. 92.

<sup>69</sup> Hunter Blair, "Castles of Northumberland," pp. 153-54.

<sup>70</sup> Ibid., pp. 132-33, 135, 142, 162, 164. Hunter Blair dates Elsdon too early upon the assumption that William the Conqueror gave Redesdale to Robert de Umfraville.

<sup>71</sup> Ibid., pp. 165-66.

<sup>72</sup> Ibid., p. 161; Hodgson, The Parish of Edlingham, p. 31.

<sup>73</sup> Hunter Blair, "Castles of Northumberland," pp. 138-39, 156; Symeon of Durham, HDE, p. 140.

<sup>74</sup> Renn, Norman Castles, pp. 54-55, 90-92, 113, 118, 124.

<sup>75</sup> G. W. S. Barrow, Robert Bruce and the Community of the Realm of Scotland (Berkeley, 1965), p. 28.

<sup>76</sup> ESC, No. L.

<sup>77</sup> Barrow, Robert Bruce, pp. 28-29.

<sup>78</sup> Wigtownshire Charters, ed. R. C. Reid (Publications of the Scottish History Society, 3rd Ser., Vol. LI; Edinburgh, 1960), pp. xiv-xv.

<sup>79</sup> Barrow, Robert Bruce, pp. 28-29.

<sup>80</sup> Tynemouth received the land and service of Graffard ca. 1110, RRA-N, II, No. 995. Guy is mentioned in ibid., Nos. 575, 709. The second of these forbids the laity of Northumbria to hunt in St. Cuthbert's forests, but Guy de Balliol is the only Norman mentioned. Ibid., No. 918 (A.D. 1109), is the record of a settlement between the bishop of Durham and the Northumbrians concerning forest rights. It mentions no Normans at all. Florence of Worcester, II, 64.

<sup>81</sup> RRA-N, II, Nos. 832-33, 1015a.

<sup>82</sup> Ibid., Nos. 993, 1001; Florence of Worcester, II, 64.

<sup>83</sup> RRA-N, II, Nos. 1180 and 1241; 1062 and 1241; 1154 or 1166 and 1233.

<sup>84</sup> In 1119, Eustace witnesses his first act concerning Northumberland, ibid., No. 1217, and by 1121 he had land above the Tyne, ibid., No. 1279. Walter Espec and Forne are first addressed in writs referring to Northumberland in 1121, ibid., No. 1264. This is the first mention of either. Dodds, The Parish of Ovingham, pp. 80-81; Ritchie, Normans in Scotland, p. 142.

<sup>85</sup> Symeon of Durham, HDE, p. 140; Scottish Annals, p. 129, n. 1; G. S. Pryde, The Burghs of Scotland: a Critical List (London, 1965), p. 3.

<sup>86</sup> RRA-N, II, xxx; Ordericus Vitalis, IV, 435.

<sup>87</sup> Symeon of Durham, HDE, pp. 130-32. For a discussion and paraphrase of this passage, see Ritchie, Normans in Scotland, pp. 88-91.

<sup>88</sup> Barrow, Robert Bruce, pp. 28-29; idem, The Kingdom of Scots, pp. 323-25; Ritchie, Normans in Scotland, pp. 154, 277-78, 280.

<sup>89</sup> Barrow, The Kingdom of Scots, p. 321.

<sup>90</sup> Ritchie, Normans in Scotland, p. 276.

<sup>91</sup> Ibid., pp. 157-58, 188, 222; Barrow, The Kingdom of Scots, p. 324.

<sup>92</sup> Ritchie, Normans in Scotland, pp. 155-56, 188, 279.

<sup>93</sup> Ibid., pp. 188, 277-78, 289.

<sup>94</sup> Ibid., pp. 154-55, 188; Barrow, The Kingdom of Scots, p. 324. Barrow does not accept the idea that the Ridels originally came from Guienne.

<sup>95</sup> Ritchie, Normans in Scotland, pp. 144, 274, 277, 281-82; G. F. Black, The Surnames of Scotland: Their Origin, Meaning, and History (New York, 1962), pp. 191, 588.

<sup>96</sup>Ritchie, Normans in Scotland, pp. 148, 214, 276. There is disagreement concerning the origin of the early Scottish Balliol's. Ritchie identifies them with the Balliol's established in Northumberland, ibid., p. 148. This family came from Bailleul-en-Vimeu in Picardy, L. C. Loyd, The Origins of Some Anglo-Norman Families (Harleian Society, Vol. CIII; Leeds, 1951), p. 11. Barrow, however, says the Scottish Balliol's came from Bailleul-Neuville in Normandy, The Kingdom of Scots, p. 328.

<sup>97</sup>Liber Feodorum, I, 200, 202-203; Sanders, English Baronies, pp. 68, 127, 150.

<sup>98</sup>Liber Feodorum, I, 203; Sanders, English Baronies, pp. 17, 42, 65, 100, 106-107, 119, 131.

<sup>99</sup>Ibid., pp. 41 n. 3; 68, 73. Loyd, Anglo-Norman Families, pp. 17, 47, 108.

<sup>100</sup>Oliver, "The Family of Morwick," pp. 264-65; RRA-N, II, xi; Sanders, English Baronies, p. 53; The Complete Peerage of England, Scotland, and Ireland, ed. G. E. Cokayne (13 vols.; London, 1910-59), XIII, 268-74. Walter Espec cannot be definitely traced to Lower Normandy. But Especs held land there, and Walter's three sisters all married men from this part of Normandy, Ritchie, Normans in Scotland, pp. 146-47. Walter's father held land in Bedfordshire, ibid.

<sup>101</sup>Loyd, Anglo-Norman Families, p. 53.

<sup>102</sup>Liber Feodorum, I, 197-99.

<sup>103</sup>Ibid.

<sup>104</sup>On Ranulf Meschin, his brother William, and Hugh de Morville, see Ritchie, Normans in Scotland, pp. 150, 154; Sanders, English Baronies, p. 115; Barrow, The Kingdom of Scots, pp. 323-24. Adam son of Alan (Ravenwic) was apparently a Breton. Robert de Trevers (Trivers), who held Burgh by Sands before Hugh de Morville, was probably from Trevieres, northwest of Bayeux. He married Ranulf's sister, Sanders, English Baronies, p. 23. Richard de Boivill (Kirkclinton) was apparently from Biville west of Cherbourg, Calendar of Documents Preserved in France, ed. J. H. Round, I (Public Record Office; London, 1899), 556; Sanders, English Baronies, p. 58. Philip de Valonies (Thorpennou) was presumably from Valoignes in Manche, Calendar of Documents, France, p. 663.

<sup>105</sup>Barrow, "The Border," p. 27.

<sup>106</sup>Farrer, Kendale, p. x; Loyd, Anglo-Norman Families, p. 100. The Taillebois's came from around Cristot, west of Caen. Aubigny is in Manche. It is sometimes said that Robert de Stuteville held Kendale between Ivo and Nigel, but the only evidence for this is a claim made by William de Stuteville in 1200-1201, Charters of Mowbray, p. xxii. If



this were true, which is doubtful, it would represent an exception to the general pattern for Stuteville is Etoutteville-sur-mer in Upper Normandy, Loyd, Anglo-Norman Families, p. 40.

107 Ibid., p. 87; Sanders, English Baronies, p. 142.

108 Farrer, "Feudal Baronage," map between pp. 290 and 291. On Gilbert, see ibid., pp. 358-59. There was also another small fee, Butler of Amounderness, above the Ribble. Its first lord was Hervey Walter who was a Breton according to Farrer, ibid., p. 350. The Montebegon lands in northern Lancashire (Hornby) were acquired by marriage with a descendant of Adam son of Swane, Tait, Mediaeval Manchester, p. 190. For Michael le Fleming, see ibid.; Lancashire Pipe Rolls, pp. 301-302. This charter also refers to two other men, Roger Bristwald (Bristoldum) and Warin the Little who had held land in Furness before the foundation of the monastery.

109 Ritchie, Normans in Scotland, pp. 374-75; Barrow, The Kingdom of Scots, pp. 289-91.

110 Le Patourel, "The Conquest of Yorkshire," p. 11.

111 Johnson's Dictionary, A Modern Selection, ed. E. L. McAdam and G. Milne (New York, 1963), p. 268.

112 A. Young, A Six Months Tour through the North of England (4 vols.; London, 1770).

113 Ibid., I, passim; II, passim; III, 16-103.

114 Ibid., p. 110.

115 Ibid., I, 136-37, 153.

116 Ibid., III, 117-220.

117 Ibid., pp. 221-312; The Journeys of Celia Fiennes, ed. C. Morris (London, 1947), pp. 204-205.

118 J. Bailey and G. Culley, General View of the Agriculture of the County of Northumberland (3rd ed.; London, 1805), pp. 79-82, 85; A. Pringle, General View of the Agriculture of the Counties of Cumberland and Westmoreland, in ibid., pp. 220, 310-13, 337-38; J. Holt, General View of the Agriculture of the County of Lancaster (London, 1795), pp. 56-57; J. Nicolson and R. Burn, The History and Antiquities of the Counties of Westmorland and Cumberland, I (London, 1777), 11.

119 Journeys of Celia Fiennes, pp. 188, 190-91. See ibid., pp. 193-94, on the making of clapbread. J. Thirsk, "The Farming Regions of England," in The Agrarian History of England and Wales, Vol. IV, 1500-1640, ed. idem (Cambridge, 1967), p. 19.



- 120 Ibid.
- 121 F. J. Singleton, "The Influence of Geographical Factors on the Development of the Common Fields of Lancashire and Cheshire," Transactions of the Historic Society of Lancashire and Cheshire, CXV (1963), 33-34.
- 122 Ibid.
- 123 Yorkshire Lay Subsidy: Being a Ninth Collected in 25 Edward I (1297), ed. W. Brown (The Yorkshire Archaeological Society, Record Series, Vol. XVI; London, 1894), pp. 16-113; A. H. Inman, Domesday and Feudal Statistics (London, 1900), pp. 149-50.
- 124 Pipe Roll of 26 Henry III, p. 118; Pipe Roll of 12 John, p. 149; Pipe Roll of 13 John, p. 44.
- 125 Ibid., p. 40; Boldon Book, p. 328, et passim.
- 126 Pipe Roll of 18 Henry II, pp. 55, 66, 69.
- 127 L. D. Stamp and S. H. Beaver, The British Isles: A Geographic and Economic Survey (5th ed.; London, 1963), pp. 187-88.
- 128 Ibid., fig. 55, p. 71; fig. 61, p. 78.
- 129 Ibid., pp. 187-88; see especially fig. 98, p. 186, which shows the distribution of wheat cultivation in 1931, the year with the lowest acreage ever recorded.
- 130 Ibid., pp. 189-93; C. Parain, "The Evolution of Agricultural Technique," in The Agrarian Life of the Middle Ages, ed. M. M. Postan, Vol. I of The Cambridge Economic History of Europe (2nd ed.; Cambridge, 1966), pp. 161-63.
- 131 EYC, I, 95-96 n., no. 166. See supra, pp. 107-108.
- 132 Lapsley, "Introduction to Boldon Book," p. 302; Boldon Book, pp. 331, 339-41, et passim; Craster, The Parish of Tynemouth, pp. 223, 225; Hodgson, The Parish of Warkworth, pp. 197, 363.
- 133 Records of the Templars, pp. 117-18, 123-24; YI, I, Nos. XLVIII, LIV.
- 134 In the records of the late twelfth and thirteenth centuries, two distinct traditions of boon-plowing are visible in Northumbria. On the one hand, peasants in unmanorialized bondage vills usually plowed once a year. Jolliffe apparently thought that this tradition was dominant, "Northumbrian Institutions," p. 8 (but cf. p. 7); and examples of this type of requirement are common. For example, peasants plowed once a year at Fishwick in the Merse, at Thornton in Northamptonshire, and at Elwick,

Shorston, and Sunderland near Bamburgh, The Priory of Coldingham, p. lxxxvii; Boldon Book, p. 332; E. Bateson, The Parish of Bamburgh, Vol. I of A History of Northumberland (Newcastle-upon-Tyne, 1893), p. 408; Calendar of Inquisitions Miscellaneous (Chancery), I (Public Record Office; London, 1916), 9. One "boon-ere" was also required in several of Tynemouth's villages (West Chirton, Flatworth, Whitley, and Monkseaton), and apparently the inhabitants of St. Cuthbert's bondage vills plowed once a year, although in a number of instances this obligation must have consisted of two days' work, Craster, The Parish of Tynemouth, pp. 337-38, 389-90; Boldon Book, pp. 329, 331, 335-37. These examples represent the original demands of Northumbrian custom, but there was a second tradition. In those villages which had been manorialized by the Normans, that is the Boldon villages in Durham and several of Tynemouth's villages, peasants plowed twice a year, ibid., pp. 331, 336-37; Craster, The Parish of Tynemouth, p. 223.

135 Freeman, The Norman Conquest, IV, 542.

136 G. Duby, Rural Economy and Country Life in the Medieval West, trans. C. Postan ([London], 1968), p. 9.

137 See ibid.

138 Ibid., p. 90.

139 EHD, II, 515-16; Lancashire Pipe Rolls, pp. 254-55; Pipe Roll of 19 Henry II, p. 113.

140 EHD, II, 422-27.

141 Ibid., p. 424.

142 Ibid., p. 422.

143 Ibid., p. 423.

144 Giraldus Cambrensis, The First Version of the Topography of Ireland, trans. J. J. O'Meara (Dundalk, 1951), pp. 14-15.

145 Freeman, The Norman Conquest, IV, 542-43; Sanders, English Baronies, p. 24.

146 Domesday, fols. 315-18.

147 Darby, Domesday Geography, fig. 17, p. 66; fig. 35, p. 146; fig. 36, p. 149.

148 Domesday, fols. 274-76, 309-12, 321b-22.

149 Stamp, The British Isles, fig. 61, p. 78.

150 Farrer makes this statement in his introduction to Lancashire Pipe Rolls, p. xiv.

151 Domesday, fols. 269b-70. Farrer sets the number around twenty, Lancashire Pipe Rolls, p. xiv.

152 This hypothesis would explain why it is impossible except in a few cases to establish a convincing connection between the tenurial structure of Lancashire at the time of Domesday and the tenurial structure of this area in the twelfth century. See Farrer, "Introduction to the Lancashire Domesday," pp. 279-81.

153 Domesday, fols. 269b-70.

154 See the witness list of Roger's charter to Seez, Lancashire Pipe Rolls, pp. 289-90; Liber Feodorum, I, 208-21; Jolliffe, "Northumbrian Institutions," p. 25.

155 Supra, pp. 301-304.

156 Boldon Book, pp. 329, 331, 335-37.

157 Stamp, The British Isles, pp. 187-88.

158 From the twelfth century onwards, the supply of wheat in Scotland was occasionally inadequate, and supplies had to be imported from abroad. See I. F. Grant, The Social and Economic Development of Scotland before 1603 (Edinburgh, 1930), p. 113. This was accompanied by wide fluctuations in the price of wheat. At Berwick on Tweed, for example, a quarter of wheat cost 2s. in 1248, 16s. in 1253, 1s. 6d. in 1287, and 30s. in 1301, T. B. Franklin, A New History of Scottish Farming (Edinburgh, 1952), p. 103.

159 Vita Oswini, pp. 20-22.

160 ESC, Nos. XX, XXIV. Anglo-Saxon Chronicle, s.a. 1054 D, p. 129; s.a. 1072 DE, p. 154.

161 Ibid., s.a. 1091 E, p. 169; Vita Oswini, pp. 22-23; Florence of Worcester, II, 28.

162 J. H. Round, Studies in Peerage and Family History (Westminster, 1901), pp. 124-25; Barrow, The Kingdom of Scots, p. 321.

163 Calendar of Documents, France, I, Nos. 724, 727, 776, 780-81, 797, 836, 838, 912, 926-27, 980; "Extracts from the Cartulary of Mont-Saint-Michel," in Vol. IV of Chronicles of the Reigns of Stephen, Henry II, and Richard, ed. R. Howlett (Rolls Series, Vol. LXXXII; London, 1889), Nos. 7, 14, 19, 31-32, 36, 38, 48.

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167 Ordericus Vitalis, III, 184; IV, 32. William of Malmesbury, Gesta Regum, II, 478.

168 Guillaume de Poitiers, pp. 108, 110, 112.

169 H. Touchard, "Le moyen age breton (XIIe-XVIe siècles)," in Histoire de la Bretagne, ed. J. Delumeau (Toulouse, 1969), pp. 166-67; F. L. Ganshof and A. Verhulst, "Medieval Agrarian Society in its Prime," in The Agrarian Life of the Middle Ages, ed. Postan, pp. 304-306; Douglas, William the Conqueror, p. 18; Smith, An Historical Geography, pp. 216, 218-19.

170 See H. Uhlig, "Old Hamlets with Infield and Outfield Systems in Western and Central Europe," Geografiska Annaler, XLIII (1961), pp. 288-95, et passim.

171 Pounds, An Historical Geography, p. 286.



## CONCLUSION

By 1135, the year of Henry I's death, the great theme which has united this study, that is, the destruction of northern society and its rebuilding, was complete in its essentials. There were, of course, unfinished tasks, but in most respects the North of the High Middle Ages had come into existence by this date. The region's old problems had been largely solved, and the northern barons faced new difficulties such as the Galwegians' reaction to the intensification of Lowland culture which the Norman settlement represented or the question of the political relationship between Norman Scotland and Norman England. We have, in fact, reached a familiar world, a world whose birth has been dated too early, misunderstood, or simply taken blithely for granted because of the way in which eleventh and twelfth-century English history has been written.

Court-centered history is not an adequate medium for recovering the past, even in England. When written from a regional point of view, the history of the North between 1000 and 1135 assumes a different shape than that found in accounts which inexorably advance reign by reign with the deeds and worries of a southern king as their focus. The findings of this study show that the latter approach has obscured the nature and continuity of the North's problems, distorted the accomplishments of several kings, and even failed to notice a number of important developments in northern history. In particular, the prominence normally accorded the Norman Conquest, that great child of court history following its inherent trend towards biography, needs to be modified and the

concept itself expanded as it concerns the North. The idea that the Conquest was a primary causative factor which had completed its work by 1070 has artificially severed the post 1066 history of the North from what went before and beclouded the history of the Norman settlement of the North. To reduce the matter to basics, the idea that the northern thanes resisted the Conquest because it was a conquest being carried out by Normans, and the assumption that once the former were crushed in the reprehensible but effective harrying Norman settlement immediately followed, are false. Before 1066 the North had, in fact, been changing in the direction it later followed. After that date it was a number of years before the old northern world passed away entirely, William the Conqueror notwithstanding, and many more before Norman power was firmly established throughout the North.

During the first eighty years covered by this study, northern political history was dominated by a clash between the regional nobility and the kings. In the most general terms, this conflict was the result of the kings' attempts to govern the North and the northerners' progressively more desperate efforts to resist the king or his agents. There was little real correspondence between the self-interest of the two parties. The North was poor, politically and fiscally privileged, and in need of defense. It was also, however, remote from the Anglo-Saxon kings' center of power and interest, and they were concerned with it only as a source of danger to their authority or as a means of maintaining the equilibrium of the kingdom's political system. Between 1000 and 1066 the North was ruled by setting the northerners against each other

and by unpopular earls whose power was bolstered by the earldom of Northampton.

By the fall of 1066, the opposition which such measures had aroused above the Humber had become so powerful that the bond between the northern nobility and the king had nearly dissolved, and this is of great importance in understanding the course of the Conquest. The northerners had no way of knowing that William the Bastard and his mercenaries represented the wave of the future, and they reacted to him not as a new phenomenon that had radically altered the political order but rather in accordance with the lessons of their past. Every king since 1000 had oppressed either Northumbria or York. Ethelred had controlled the Danes of York with the Northumbrians. Cnut had reversed the relationship, and Edward the Confessor had governed the North through Siward who had been unpopular in Northumbria and through Tostig whose rule had provoked the great northern revolt of 1065. With these precedents, the northern thanes had every reason to expect the worst from William simply because he was king; and he, unfortunately, lived up to their fears. His appointments, gelds, and confiscations were reminiscent of Tostig's rule and clear evidence that he would ignore the traditional ruling families of the North and trample on the area's privileges. When combined with his castles, these measures provoked the revolts of 1067, 1068, and 1069. In these insurrections, the northerners employed the tactics which had worked for them in the past: surprise attacks aimed at destroying the agents of southern government. Northern resistance to the Conquest was an extension of the regional nobility's pre-Conquest resistance to the king, and its object was to reject William's authority,

not to undo the Conquest. William, however, did not understand this; and when the northern revolt merged with the Danish invasion in the fall of 1069, he destroyed the immediate threat to his power which the latter represented and solved the old problem of resentment in Yorkshire to West Saxon rule by the harrying. Despite the prominence of this event in most accounts of the Conquest, however, it did not give the Normans control of the North. Rather, it activated the free-zone which made the redevelopment of Yorkshire a slow process, and this in turn was a serious barrier to the extension of Norman power beyond York. For ten years the Conqueror was forced to govern Northumbria through a succession of natives, and this policy had little success because the nobles above the Tees had not been cowed by the harrying. True to their past, they answered new Norman outrages by revolts in 1074-75 and 1080, and the last of these led William to destroy the Northumbrian nobility.

In a political sense, this was the end of the Norman Conquest of the North. It was also the last episode in a conflict which stretched back to the early eleventh century and perhaps into earlier times, but a conception of the Conquest which turns on the elimination of the old nobility between the Humber and the Tweed is incomplete. Until after 1100, Norman power in the North was weak because the Normans did not immediately spread to the old limits of the Anglo-Saxon kingdom or into the Northwest. The establishment of the new territorial aristocracy was not the substitution of one group of nobles for another. It was in reality a colonization with two stages; and during the first of these, the expectations of William's followers determined the scope and nature of the Conquest quite as much as their king's victories. The Norman



nobles wished to transplant their culture to England, and in an important respect they were unable to do this in parts of the North. In their culture bread made from wheat was a primary sign of nobility, and the corollary of this was that land which would not grow wheat was little esteemed. Of course, in the North wheat either would not grow or did poorly in several areas, and this directly limited the extent of Norman settlement. William's men took estates in Yorkshire, Durham, and southern Lancashire. Moreover, in the first two of these shires, they exploited the desperate conditions produced by the harrying to impose on the peasants a more rigorous manorial regime than the one in force before 1066, and at least in part their objective was to establish a system which would give them control over what the peasants planted. Where wheat could not be grown, the Normans did not settle. This explains why William I and William II had to contain the free-zone rather than conquer it, and why Cumberland and Northumberland remained without territorial aristocracies after 1092 and 1080 respectively. The first was on the wrong side of the oat bread line, and the second was too vulnerable to depredations from the West to be worth settling. Finally, the fact that the border counties were unoccupied was one of the principal factors which forced the Conqueror and Rufus to deal with the Scots by means of diplomacy and intervention in their internal affairs.

Between 1070 and 1100, the Norman Conquest of the North was impeded by the culture of the barons of Upper Normandy, who were the most trusted and rewarded of the Conqueror's followers, and this barrier was not removed until a shift in Norman politics occurred. When settlement

pushed forward after ca. 1106, it encompassed the border counties and southern Scotland as well because these areas could best be occupied together. That this was accomplished was the Normans' most important contribution to the North. For political reasons King Henry brought to England a group of western Normans and Bretons who were willing to take lands on the other side of the oat bread line, and he established these men in northwestern England and through Earl David in Galloway. Their settlement shielded the East from the Galwegians and closed the routes through the hills; and once this was done, Norman nobles pushed up the east coast plain from the Tyne to the Forth and even into Fife.

As a concept the Norman Conquest usually consists of two parts, the establishment of effective Norman power and a radical break with the past or a turning point; and in terms of these criteria, the movement which brought Normans to the Tweed and beyond marked the true end of the Conquest of the North. This colonization fundamentally altered the region. In a negative sense, the problems which would complicate the future stemmed directly from the nature of the second stage of settlement. In the West this was not a spontaneous migration. It was the establishment of a specific group of men, King Henry's supporters, and they were only numerous enough to contain the Galwegians, not to conquer all Galloway. This was a serious shortcoming because the Galwegians reacted to foreign penetration of their land in a violent fashion. Before 1135 southwestern Scotland became the seat of an anti-dynastic and--given the nature of David's rule--anti-foreign revolt which was the harbinger of several later revolts, and during the invasions of Stephen's reign, the Galwegians came out of the hills to torture and kill the

Lowlanders of the North whose increasing strength threatened their world.<sup>1</sup> Furthermore, the willingness of Henry's followers to take land in the West was largely a function of their poverty, and there is one piece of evidence which shows that they did not automatically pass on their taste for the West to their wealthier descendants.<sup>2</sup> Throughout the rest of the century, in fact, the marcher lords of Galloway had to be continuously replenished by newcomers. Finally, for the next two centuries Anglo-Scottish relations would be bedeviled by the fact that the border divided a single nobility.<sup>3</sup>

These problems notwithstanding, however, it is difficult to exaggerate the positive results of the second stage of colonization. Had isolated Norman barons pioneered in Northumberland and Lothian, they probably could only have recreated the depressed conditions which had existed there before 1066, but by subjugating the West, the Normans revived a set of circumstances not seen since the years when Northumbrian power was at its peak. The security thus gained was the basis for the redevelopment of the old Northumbrian lands on both sides of the border. Even before 1135, Henry's new men began to fill the North with burghs and monasteries, and King David was engaged in the same task in Lothian and Tweeddale. Moreover, the taming of the free-zone made it possible for the monks and nobles to send their sheep into the hills, a most fortuitous circumstance given the industrial complex which was emerging in Flanders in this period. These developments need to be investigated both in the light of the reduction of the free-zone and from the standpoint of their function in Norman colonization of the North, but in general terms they clearly amounted to nothing less than

the successful transplanting of Norman culture to the lands between the Humber and the Forth.

It was in creating the peaceful conditions which made this possible that the Normans surpassed their immediate predecessors and even the Romans who had not been able to master the Northwest for long, but the triumphs of the second period of Norman colonization also have an ironic element. The Normans did not, in fact, surpass the pre-Viking Northumbrians. For a time they, too, had mastered both the East and part of the West, and their culture had flowered until their kingdom was laid in ruins by the Danes in Yorkshire and the Norwegians in the West. The North did not recover from the effects of these depredations until Henry's supporters breached the oat bread line, and it is here that one encounters a curious phenomenon. Norman colonization of the North was to some extent a reverse migration, or perhaps one should say that it followed an old pattern. Recent research has found that Danes from eastern England played a major role in the Scandinavian colonization of Upper Normandy and that Norwegians from the Irish Sea littoral were dominant in the settlement of Lower Normandy.<sup>4</sup> It was the descendants of the latter who supported Henry I against the Upper Norman establishment and tamed the West, and the significance of this is not limited solely to its irony. The repetition of this pattern suggests that the importance of the oat bread line (or at least the cultural divisions with which it corresponded) was not limited to the episode of medieval colonization studied in this paper and that this factor must be considered in any attempt to explain the distribution of Scandinavian settlement in Britain and in Ireland too, for that matter.



## CONCLUSION

<sup>1</sup>After the initial failure of the revolt of Angus, the earl of Moray, and Malcolm Macheth in 1130, the latter apparently fled to the Southwest and continued his revolt. Usually it is assumed, of course, that this second part of the revolt took place in Moray or Ross, Ritchie, Normans in Scotland, pp. 230-32; but this is apparently incorrect. King David was unable to put down the revolt until 1134, and he was only successful in that year because he obtained Norman aid. Walter Espec summoned the northern barons to Carlisle and gathered a fleet, and these preparations induced the rebels to surrender, Aelred of Rievaulx "De Standardo," p. 193. How a Norman expeditionary force in Carlisle could so intimidate rebels in Moray or Ross that they would capitulate without a battle defies the imagination, but the difficulty vanishes if one assumes that the rebels were in the Southwest. On the Galwegians, see ibid., pp. 187-88.

<sup>2</sup>After the Battle of the Standard, Robert de Brus the elder "imprisoned" his son Robert in Annandale for siding with the Scots, and the latter is known to have complained over the fact that wheat could not be grown in the area, see Ritchie, Normans in Scotland, p. 278.

<sup>3</sup>See Holt, The Northerners, pp. 208-10.

<sup>4</sup>Musset, Les invasions, pp. 257-60.

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