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

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THE POWER OF THE POWERLESS: STRATEGIC SELF-PRESENTATION CAN UNDERMINE EXPECTANCY CONFIRMATION

A Thesis Presented

by

DON OPERARIO

Submitted to the Graduate School of the
University of Massachusetts Amherst in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF SCIENCE

May 1996

Department of Psychology

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

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

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

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

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The Problem of Expectancies

> "If [observers] know, or know of, the individual by virtue of experience prior to the interaction, they can rely on assumptions as to the persistence and generality of psychological traits as a means of predicting his present and future behavior" (Goffman, 1959, p. 1).

A rich and growing body of literature in social psychology depicts a daunting challenge and dismal fate for individuals who are stereotyped, stigmatized, or marginalized. Independent lines of research in stereotyping, attributions, and expectancy confirmation (to name but a few research areas) suggest that biased perceivers employ simplistic, and often distorted, thinking styles to predict, explain, and even control the behavior of others. This premise leaves the stereotype target in a seemingly debilitated state of passivity and obedience. In the face of such disheartening evidence regarding the nature of biased thought, must we assume that targets necessarily conform to the situational constraints imposed by the beliefs and actions of others? This paper investigates existing research that suggests why this may or may not be so, and presents a series of studies to demonstrate the ability of targets to undermine negative expectancies.

Attempts to explain the nature of stereotyping have enthusiastically addressed the cognitive biases that serve to simplify people's perceptions of others (e.g., Brewer,

1988; Fiske & Neuberg, 1990). Such a cognitive approach suggests that prejudiced people overly rely on stereotypes as a spontaneous, default, and almost reflexive person-perception strategy. By getting "inside the head" of the social perceiver, social psychologists tend to place the primary locus of responsibility for prejudice reduction on the stereotype holder: the prejudiced person or group (see Devine, 1994; Stephan, 1985, for reviews). Such offerings preclude an understanding of the role of the stereotype target (e.g., minorities, stigmatized individuals, or out-group members) in interpersonal interactions. Often, targets are viewed as passive recipients of, or even active allies to, perceivers' evaluative biases (c.f., Snyder, 1992). While such previous findings underscore the necessity for biased perceivers to monitor their cognitive and interactional processes, they often depict targets in an overly-simplistic and situationally paralyzed manner.

What seems to be missing in our understanding of interpersonal and intergroup processes is a view of targets as agents of personal change, despite the negative expectancies held by others.[1] Undeniably, people who are stereotyped, stigmatized, and marginalized can and do disconfirm categorical biases in everyday situations (c.f., Jones et al., 1984). This often occurs without the direct intention of these individuals to overcome their stereotype, but rather by pursuing situational or self-concept related

goals that are inconsistent with their category's prototype (Schlenker, 1980). For example, a blind woman taking an art course, an openly gay man going out for the college soccer team, or a Latina professor delivering a lecture on organic chemistry may incidentally disconfirm categorical expectations held of them. More likely, however, these people are merely behaving in accordance with their personal motives (i.e., pursuing artistic interest, becoming an athlete, or delivering an important lesson). Thus, stereotyped people can disconfirm perceivers' categorical expectancies in the course of fulfilling other goals; targets are not chronic victims of social biases.

One should not be pacified into assuming that the actual consequences of stereotyping are mere figments of social psychology's collective imagination, however. Despite the implications of targets' stereotype-inconsistent behavior for perceivers' beliefs, there clearly are instances whereby targets are situationally (and even chronically) constrained by biased perceivers. Specifically, when power is configured into the relationship between perceiver and target, the nature and deployment of stereotypes may alter significantly.

Power Reinforces the Deployment of Stereotypes

Interactions that are marked by distinct power differentials may be particularly vulnerable to the effects of stereotyping and stigmatization (Clark, 1974; Jones et

al., 1984; Fiske 1993; Yoder & Kahn, 1992). For instance, the blind woman described previously may alter the biases of her fellow classmates, but may be limited by the instructor's preconceptions of her abilities; the gay athlete may disconfirm the association between homosexuality and effeminacy held by other players, but may be kept off the team by a prejudiced coach; and the Latina professor may alter the stereotypic views of her colleagues, but be denied tenure by a racist dean. Power, therefore, plays a pivotal role in the situational affordances of stereotype targets. When constrained by the judgments of those in power, stereotyped people may be unable to display expectancy-disconfirming behavior. But what exactly do we mean here by "power"? And what are its psychological (i.e., cognitive and behavioral) manifestations?

Quite simply, power can be defined as control over another's outcomes (Dépret & Fiske, 1993; Fiske, 1993). Interdependent relationships in which one individual has asymmetrical <u>outcome control</u> over another renders that person <u>powerful</u> over the other. Similarly, relationships in which one individual is asymmetrically <u>outcome dependent</u> on another renders that person relatively <u>powerless</u>. Prior research suggests that distinct cognitive processes are associated with different levels of power. For example, people who are symmetrically interdependent (i.e., hold equal control, or power, over one another) will actively

attend to others when valued outcomes are at stake (Erber & Fiske, 1984; Neuberg & Fiske, 1990; Ruscher & Fiske, 1990). This cognitive activity is heightened in the asymmetric case, in which one person is powerful and the other not. That is, powerless individuals tend to allocate high levels of attention to those in power, upon whom they depend (Dépret & Fiske, 1994; Stevens & Fiske, 1994). Since powerful people are typically independent of their subordinates for outcomes, they need not and do not pay as much individuating attention to the powerless (Goodwin & Fiske, 1993; Goodwin, Fiske, & Yzerbyt, 1994). Instead, powerful people are likely to use low-effort and cursory thinking strategies about their subordinates and, hence, are vulnerable to forming categorical impressions, often based on social stereotypes (Goodwin & Fiske, 1993). We can see, then, that disparate forms of cognitive activity are associated with power differentials such that the powerless think effortfully about their superiors, whereas the powerful only think superficially about their subordinates.

The implications of power for interpersonal and intergroup relations do not stop inside perceivers' heads, however. Strong evidence indicates that people's impression formation strategies may affect their behavioral interactions (Neuberg, 1989). Specifically, perceivers acting on their biases may actually lead outgroup targets to behave in ways that confirm categorical expectancies, a

process known as behavioral confirmation (Christensen & Rosenthal, 1982; Merton, 1948; Snyder, Tanke, & Berscheid, 1977; Word, Zanna, & Cooper, 1974; for reviews, see Darley & Fazio, 1980; Jussim, 1986; Snyder, 1992).[2] When constrained by the power of the situation, expectancy targets are likely to display behavior that is uncharacteristic of their true selves, yet congruent with perceivers' a priori beliefs.

In a well-cited expectancy confirmation study (Snyder, Tanke, & Berscheid, 1977), male perceivers anticipated interacting with either a physically attractive or unattractive woman (based on bogus photographs given prior to the interaction). This manipulation was designed to elicit social expectancies associated with either attractiveness or unattractiveness (e.g., warm or cold; sociable or unsociable; poised or awkward; humorous or serious). In a subsequent telephone conversation with female participants (i.e., expectancy targets), perceivers' initial expectancies were confirmed in the ongoing interaction; targets actually behaved in congruence with perceivers' expectancies. Independent judges (blind to condition) listening to audiotapes of the targets' conversation corroborated that the "attractive" participants seemed more warm, sociable, etc. than the "unattractive" participants.

This pattern of findings has been replicated in numerous forms of interpersonal interaction, including

school settings (Crano & Mellon, 1978; Rist, 1970; Rosenthal & Jacobsen, 1968); interview settings (Word, Zanna, & Cooper, 1974); gender-role socialization (Eccles, Jacobs, & Harold, 1990); and conflict negotiation (Rubin, Kim, & Peretz, 1990). Indeed, it is evident that cognitive biases do not only exert influence over the activity occurring in perceivers' minds. Instead, this literature suggests that erroneous beliefs can actually elicit confirmatory behavior, and thereby perpetuate false biases.

But does expectancy confirmation necessarily occur across all social interactions? Naturally, all social perceivers hold some expectancies about their interaction partners. Must we assume, then, that biased perceivers uniformly and consistently elicit confirmatory behavior from unsuspecting targets? Clearly, the answer would be no, and recent examinations of the expectancy confirmation literature suggest that this effect may be limited (see Jussim, 1986, 1990, for reviews).

Some Hope for Expectancy Targets

Expectancy confirmation may be most limited in situations lacking power asymmetry between perceiver and target. Recent findings suggest that in the presence of power asymmetry, whereby perceivers are high in power and targets low in power, confirmation is likely to occur (Copeland, 1994). However, confirmation does not occur in the converse relationship (in which perceivers are low in

power and targets are high). A review of the expectancy confirmation literature argues that power hierarchy plays a pivotal role in the confirmation process (Claire & Fiske, 1995). Past laboratory demonstrations of expectancy confirmation have often confounded power with the roles of perceiver and target (c.f., Copeland, 1994; Darley & Fazio, 1980; Snyder, 1992).[3] To date, no demonstrations of expectancy confirmation exist whereby the power between interactants is equal or nonexistent (Claire & Fiske, 1995). The role of power in expectancy confirmation closely mirrors its role in impression formation: The powerful are likely to use their biases to elicit stereotype-congruent behavior from powerless targets. The converse relationship, in which powerless perceivers elicit confirmatory behavior from powerful targets, does not appear to hold true in the existing literature.

Two recent studies suggest that disparate motivations underlie the behavior of powerful perceivers and powerless targets in the expectancy confirmation process. One study (Snyder & Haugen, 1994) indicates that confirmation will occur when <u>perceivers</u> are motivated by a <u>knowledge function</u> (i.e., motivated to form stable and predictable impressions of targets through social interaction), but not when they are motivated by an adjustive function (i.e., motivated to have a smooth and responsive interaction with targets). A second study (Snyder & Haugen, 1995) further suggests that

confirmation will occur when _targets_ are motivated by an _adjustive function_, but not when motivated by a knowledge function. These findings suggest that expectancy confirmation is not inevitable, and hence offer some hope to stereotyped people in overcoming their imposed rubric (particularly when they are not adjustive to perceivers' constraints).

Other research taking the targets' perspective specifies instances whereby expectancy confirmation does not occur. Specifically, targets with strong self-concepts are less likely to confirm perceivers' negative expectancies, whereas targets with weak self-concepts may be more likely to fulfill biases (Swann & Ely, 1984). Moreover, people who are aware of perceivers' negative expectancies are likely to overcome these biases in subsequent interactions, compared to naive perceivers who are unaware (Hilton & Darley, 1985). Together, these findings indicate instances of stereotyped people being "unadjustive": Individuals with strong self-concepts and knowledge about their negative group image may thwart perceivers' motivation to confirm their expectancies (c.f., Snyder & Haugen, 1995).

Both of the investigations just discussed may be limited, however, in that the perceivers do not hold explicit outcome control over their targets; that is, power is not operationalized. Indeed, some would argue that the stereotype-disconfirmation studies just mentioned neglect

the power differential that is often concomitant with perceiver-target roles (Claire & Fiske, 1995; Copeland, 1994; Snyder 1992). One is led to wonder, then, if expectancy confirmation can be undermined when perceivers are explicitly powerful, and targets explicitly powerless.

Powerless targets' motivated behavior in interpersonal interactions yet remains an important issue to be actively addressed. Ironically, the behavioral strategies that people use to control their images are not examined as enthusiastically as perceivers' inferential processes. The ability of people to behave strategically, in the service of their immediate motivations, may have far-reaching effects on expectancy confirmation. This ability may be particularly crucial for powerless people who are confined within the parameters of their social stereotype (Jones et al. 1984).

Strategically Motivated Images and Impressions

> "...when an individual appears in the presence of others, there will usually be some reason for him to mobilize his activity so that it will convey an impression to others which it is in his interests to convey" (Goffman, 1959, p.4).

A strong body of theory and research in impression management suggests that people often strive to create positive images of themselves through controlled, planned, and situationally appropriate behavior (Goffman, 1959; Schenkler, 1980). When motivated to impress others or control perceivers' inferences, individuals can engage in

finely-skilled performances to convey impressions that serve their self-interest (see Schlenker, 1980 for more details). Indeed, one is hard put to think of meaningful social interactions where controlling one's image is not an issue.

People's decision to manage their impressions is largely influenced by two factors: impression motivation and impression construction (Leary & Kowalski, 1990). Impression motivation (i.e., the motivation to engage in impression management) is affected by the goal-relevance of impressions, the value of the desired goals, and the discrepancy between the desired and current image. Impression construction (i.e., the tactics adopted to control one's images) is influenced by the individual's self-concept, desired and undesired identity images, role constraints, and the values of the individual. We can see, then, that people must be adequately motivated to manage their images, as well as have a repertoire of appropriate behaviors to present.

Powerless people may be particularly motivated to control their images and portray themselves positively, due to their dependence on powerful others (Baumeister, 1982; Leary & Kowalski, 1990; Jones et al., 1984). For example, a solo or "token" minority in an otherwise homogenous business setting may be motivated to appear credible, skilled, and professional in order to combat managers' speculations regarding qualifications and tokenism. This person,

therefore, would probably engage in appropriate and accessible behavior displays (e.g., job performance, dress, and speech) to achieve a desired image.

Powerless and stigmatized people often engage in this form of monitoring and behavioral management in order to contend with situational constraints (Jones et al., 1984). Indeed, powerless people who are asymmetrically dependent on others are motivated to accurately attend to the powerful, as noted earlier, and behave in situationally and interactionally appropriate ways (Frable, Blackstone, & Scherbaum, 1990; Leary & Kowalsky, 1990).

Various power differentials may require distinct impression management strategies in order for the actor to be effective (Tedeschi & Norman, 1981). As one can imagine, a job applicant interviewed by an executive might engage in strikingly different impression management practices from a young man asking a woman for a first date, who will differ from a politician running for public office. In the first example, the interviewee may wish to appear relaxed yet able, whereas the second individual may seek an image of attractiveness and sophistication. The third person running for office may wish to fuse both images into a unique blend of congeniality, ability, and morality.

Such a variegated array of impression management behaviors is addressed in a taxonomy of strategic forms of self-presentation (Jones & Pittman, 1982). Strategic self-

presentation is defined as "those features of behavior affected by <u>power augmentation motives</u> [italics added] designed to elicit or shape others' attributions of the actor's dispositions" (Jones & Pittman, 1982, p. 5). This concept differs from the broader concept of impression management, in that the actor is motivated by a desire to derive favorable outcomes, is dependent upon the audience to form a positive impression and respond favorably, and has specific attributes and goals that determine the self-presentation style (Schneider, 1981).

Jones and Pittman's (1982) taxonomy of strategic self-presentation differentiates among the specific attributes sought by the actor. These presentational classes include: (a) ingratiation, which seeks the attribution of likability; (b) intimidation, which seeks the attribution of threat or danger; (c) self-promotion, which seeks the attribution of competence or effectiveness; (d) exemplification, which seeks the attribution of integrity or moral worthiness; and (e) supplication, which seeks the attribution of helplessness or pity. Clearly, each form of self-presentation is specific to the actor's goal, situation, and audience (Greenwald & Breckler, 1985; Jones & Pittman, 1982).

Powerless people who are motivated to influence high-power perceivers, control their images, and augment their level of power are likely to present themselves in strategic

ways. Prior studies of stigma and self-presentation depict powerless people as skilled actors who, by choice and necessity, adapt their behavior to the standards of the powerful perceiver and the implicit situational norms (Goffman, 1959; Jones et al., 1984; Schlenker, 1980). The flexible and adaptable forms of self-presentation among people in different power roles can, therefore, be effective strategies for exerting influence over the situation (Gergen & Taylor, 1969; Hendricks & Brickman, 1974; Jones, Gergen, & Jones, 1963).

General Hypotheses

With these considerations, this research attempts to investigate the ability of powerless people to strategically present themselves according to their situational motivation. Deriving from the well-established behavioral confirmation paradigm, the undermining effect of strategic self-presentation on powerholders' expectancies is assessed.

The current studies offer the following hypotheses: (1) Given the characteristics and implicit norms of the situation, powerless people can be motivated to present themselves in an appropriate manner to achieve desired outcomes; and (2) when biased powerholders have expectations inconsistent with the powerless person's self-presentation style, their expectancies will be undermined.

Hence, the studies are hypothesized to depict powerless people as strong and effective contributors to the

interpersonal interaction. Rather than passive recipients of stereotypes and prejudice, powerless people can be viewed as motivated agents of change and personal empowerment.

CHAPTER 2

STUDY 1: SOME EVIDENCE FOR STRATEGIC SELF-PRESENTATION

Overview

The goal of the first study was to establish whether people in positions of relative powerlessness (i.e., outcome dependency) can identify appropriate self-presentational styles vis-a-vis the situational constraints. An experimenter informed participants that they had the opportunity to obtain Research Assistant (R.A.) positions with members of the Psychology Department. In addition to receiving the job, all participants read that the group of applicants receiving the highest scores on the application questionnaire would have the opportunity to win $50 prizes through a lottery drawing. Thus, students believed that they were outcome dependent on others' decisions for the R.A. position, thus providing our manipulation of powerlessness (c.f., Fiske, 1992). Participants read a short description of the research project and laboratory team seeking assistants. Four research descriptions were devised to motivate different self-presentation styles (c.f., Jones & Pittman, 1982): ingratiation, self-promotion, exemplification, and a no-goal baseline condition.[4] After reading one of the four sets of instructions, participants described their personalities and working styles in a questionnaire. In accordance with hypotheses, we expected outcome-dependent participants to

strategically present themselves along dimensions similar to those stated in their respective research descriptions.

Method

Participants

Seventy-two students from introductory psychology courses at the University of Massachusetts volunteered in exchange for course credit. Students participated in groups of 3-5 and sat at separate tables so that they could not see each others' materials. Four cases were excluded from final analysis due to participants' desire to discontinue (two) and limited English skills (two), leaving 68 participants (evenly distributed across the four conditions).

Procedure

Participants volunteered for a study of "Selection Processes". The experimenter informed participants that the study was an attempt to develop new screening measures for hiring decisions. Participants learned that they would have the opportunity to apply for, and possibly receive, a Research Assistant position with a member of the psychology department in the process of completing the study.

The experimenter informed participants that several members of the psychology department were currently screening for suitable research assistants. Students learned that their participation could facilitate receiving one of these positions, and that selection decisions were contingent on participants' written responses. Moreover,

students learned that the top group of applicants (based on their compatibility with the researchers' agenda) would be eligible for $50 lottery prizes. After reading a short description of the wonderful opportunities afforded to undergraduate research assistants, participants read one of four memos ostensibly written by a professor searching for R.A.s.

Participants in the social goal condition read a memo containing the following paragraph:

> "Our research team consists of 2 friendly and agreeable faculty members and a graduate student studying creativity and game playing in groups. The type of undergraduate student we seek is someone who can fit in a relaxed, amicable setting and can work well with others in a team. Furthermore, we are looking for students who are socially-skilled and compatible with many types of people. In effect, we are primarily interested in the dynamics within our research team rather than merely the final outcome."

Participants in the competence goal condition read a similar memo, but containing the following paragraph:

> "Our research team consists of 2 extremely productive faculty members and a graduate student studying college students' work ethic. The type of undergraduate student we seek is someone who can fit in a businesslike setting with others and can perform efficiently. Furthermore, we are looking for students who are diligent and competent workers. In effect, we are primarily interested in the final outcome of our work efforts."

And finally, participants in the moral goal condition read a memo containing the following paragraph:

> "Our research team consists of 2 senior faculty members (one of whom chairs the American Psychological Association Committee on Ethics and Standards in Research) and a graduate student studying the psychology of morality in our society. The type of

> undergraduate we seek is someone who understands the values and importance of research and can work with the highest of personal standards. Furthermore, we are looking for students who exemplify strong moral principles. In effect, we are primarily interested in the ethics within our research team rather than merely the final outcome."

Participants in the control condition read memos identical to those in the other conditions, but without a paragraph providing a specific description of the research team.[5]

Although these memos did not explicitly direct applicants' self-presentational responses, we expected participants to portray themselves strategically in order to match the characteristics and goals of the research team (i.e., to use respectively ingratiation, self-promotion, or exemplification strategies). The fourth, no-instruction condition served to assess participants' baseline self-presentational style.

After reading the memos, participants rated themselves using a 15-point scale on a set of 31 items. Pretesting developed these items to reflect one of the three self-presentational styles. To avoid uniformly positive responses on all items (thereby minimizing variance in the data), participants read the following: "We caution you NOT to rate yourself highly on EACH statement, as we (the committee members) are interested in knowing your best personal characteristics rather than false or exaggerated ratings suggesting you are perfect on every dimension." In addition to self-description trait ratings, participants

rated how interested, compatible, and qualified they were in working as R.A.s.

The final design was a 4 (self-presentational goal condition: social, competence, moral, or control) x 3 (self-descriptive trait statement: ingratiating, self-promoting, or exemplifying) mixed design, with repeated measures for the latter variable.

Results

The 31 trait statements were entered into a principle components factor analysis with varimax rotation. A scree test indicated that little added variance was explained beyond a three-factor solution, which accounted for 44.6% of the total variance. All items loaded above .30 on their respective factors (see Table 1).

The first rotated factor (labelled "relational") contained all items pretested to reflect ingratiation, and was reasonably reliable (α = .85). The second rotated factor (labelled "conscientious") contained all but one of the items pretested to reflect exemplification; however it also contained several items pretested to measure self-promotion. This factor was also reasonably reliable (α = .85). The third rotated factor (labelled "effective") predominately contained items pretested to reflect self-promotion, and was highly reliable (α = .90). Thus, these obtained factors replaced the pre-tested, a priori factors for the repeated-measure trait variables.

A 4 (self-presentational goal condition) x 3 (trait statement) repeated-measures ANOVA indicated no main effect for condition, $F(3, 64) < 1$, ns. However, a significant main effect for trait responses was evident, $F(2, 128) = 17.9$, $p < .01$. Additionally, analysis revealed as significant the predicted condition by trait interaction, $F(6, 128) = 2.3$, $p < .05$ (see Table 2).

Separate repeated-measures ANOVAs investigated main effects for trait responses (i.e., relational, conscientious, and effective) within each condition (i.e., social, competence, moral, and control). Analyses yielded main effects for trait responses in the social condition, $F(2, 32) = 7.56$, $p < .01$; competence condition, $F(2, 36) = 10.63$, $p < .01$; moral condition, $F(2, 34) = 3.44$, $p < .05$; as well as the control condition, $F(2, 26) = 5.04$, $p < .05$.

Participants in both social and competence conditions rated themselves highest on trait items that appropriately matched the nature of the task for which they were applying. Specifically, participants in the social condition rated themselves highest on relational items, and participants in the competence condition rated themselves highest on effectiveness items. Unexpectedly, participants in the moral and control conditions also rated themselves highest on effectiveness statements.

Finally, one-way ANOVAs revealed (as predicted) no condition main effects for participants' interest in

obtaining an R.A. position $F(3, 64) < 1$, ns; compatibility with research team, $F(3, 64) < 1$, ns; or qualifications $F(3, 64) < 1$, ns.

Discussion

This initial study partially supports the hypothesis that powerless people can strategically and appropriately present themselves in accordance with implicit situational constraints. Specifically, these findings indicate that when aware of powerholders' standards and norms, outcome-dependent individuals may be likely to display ingratiating and self-promoting images in order to influence, and perhaps control, others' impressions.

Applicants who read a memo from "friendly and agreeable" researchers seeking "relaxed" and "amicable" assistants rated themselves highest on statements emphasizing interpersonal relations and social skills. Applicants who read a similar memo from "extremely productive" researchers seeking "businesslike" and "diligent" assistants were more likely to emphasize their responsibility and task effectiveness. Together, these effects suggest that, when motivated to elicit favorable responses from powerful perceivers, people will attune to situational details in order to establish self-presentational goals. These findings also imply that ingratiation and self-promotion are specific behavioral goals that are accessible for people attempting to present

their best selves in employment hiring decisions (Leary & Kowalski, 1990).

One unanticipated finding emerged from the moral condition. Participants exposed to this manipulation rated themselves highest on effectiveness traits, instead of on conscientiousness traits as expected. This departure from the hypothesis may be explained in a number of ways, and hence may be multiply determined. First, it is possible that people in general, or this population of participants in particular, do not have a solid and accessible repertoire of exemplifying behaviors to present (Leary & Kowalski, 1990). Indeed, it may be more difficult to present oneself as morally worthy than to display responsibility and effectiveness--especially on self-report scales. Thus, exemplification goals may simply be more difficult to activate. More specifically, however, the hiring scenario designed in the laboratory may have thwarted attempts to elicit the goal of presenting oneself as moral and worthy. Such an image may be inconsistent with people's naive theories of appropriate interview displays.[6] If this is the case, participants may have opted for the more conventional display of effectiveness in order to meet perceived situational constraints.

Findings from control participants resonate with the latter point. Applicants without any specific motivation (i.e., to ingratiate, self-promote, or exemplify) appear to

have used a default, self-promoting presentational style. Whereas most studies using experimental controls anticipate no effects for this condition, the obtained finding for control participants' self-promotion is not surprising. Although unaware of the powerholders' specific agenda, these outcome-dependent participants were likely to be familiar with appropriate behavior for typical employment or hiring settings. Resting on their assumption that self-promoting behavior is the most fitting (and usually effective) display in these settings, control-condition participants were likely to have formed behavioral goals seeking the attribution of responsibility and competence. Moreover, this spontaneous generation of a self-presentational goal (in the absence of specific motivational influences) may further evidence the ability for powerless people to present their best selves when necessary.

These findings should not be viewed as trivial or attributable to demand effects. Note that the motivational manipulations did not explicitly direct participants' self-presentational responses. Rather, participants' goals were embedded within general written descriptions. And the repeated-measures design allowed for any one of a number of displays. The obtained findings, therefore, reveal people's ability to spontaneously produce strategically targeted behavioral goals when adequately motivated.

In sum, this study suggests that ingratiation and self-promotion are available behavioral goals that powerless people use to impress powerful perceivers. More importantly, however, this study reveals that outcome dependent people are adept at determining appropriate standards of behavior and presenting themselves fittingly in order to elicit positive feedback.

CHAPTER 3

STUDY 2: EVALUATIVE POWER AND EXPECTANCY CONFIRMATION

Overview

Findings from the first study indicate that powerless people may be skilled at constructing desirable images in order to impress powerful others. In particular, evidence suggests that ingratiation and self-promotion are both available, and seemingly appropriate, self-presentational tactics within power hierarchies. But one is left to wonder whether these behavioral goals can actually be enacted and maintained in ongoing interactions. One may further ask if these presentational styles can be obstructed by perceivers' incongruent expectancies, or if the powerless can instead undermine false expectancies.

As described previously, powerful perceivers are likely to elicit expectancy-confirming behavior from targets (Copeland, 1994). Some evidence suggests that perceivers in high levels of power are most vulnerable to expectancy-governed misperceptions (Goodwin & Fiske, 1993; Goodwin, Fiske, & Yzerbyt, 1994). What happens, then, when powerless people (i.e., targets) strategically present themselves to powerful people (i.e., perceivers) who hold inappropriate expectancies?

The second study sought to investigate this issue by employing the behavioral confirmation paradigm (Snyder, Tanke, & Berscheid, 1977). This study operationalized

outcome control using a well-established dyadic interaction scenario: the interviewer-interviewee conversation (e.g., Neuberg, 1989; Neuberg et al., 1992; Word, Zanna, & Cooper, 1974). Participant pairs were assigned to powerful-powerless dyads in which an interviewer (i.e., the outcome-controlling, or powerful, individual) questioned and formed impressions of someone ostensibly applying for a job (i.e., the outcome-dependent, or powerless, individual).

All interviewers read information from a bogus personality assessment indicating that the applicant rated low on measures of competence and responsibility. Half the interviewers read that their evaluation of the applicant would account for 10% of the final hiring decision (low power), and the other half learned that their evaluation would account for 60% of the final hiring decision (high power).

Independently, applicants received brief descriptions of the job (similar to the method employed in Study 1) to motivate presentational goals. Following the findings obtained in Study 1, written job descriptions motivated either ingratiating or self-promoting behavior (i.e., the most plausible behaviors for this scenario).

Upon completion of a 10-minute interview, interviewers and applicants reported their impressions of each other. Judges unaware of experimental condition listed to the audiotaped conversations and rated both dyad members.

As hypothesized earlier, we expected powerless people to (a) present themselves in accordance with situational norms and constraints (i.e., use either ingratiating or self-promoting behavioral tactics) and in doing so, (b) undermine perceivers' negative expectancies.

Method

Participants

Introductory psychology students from the University of Massachusetts at Amherst participated in a study of "Telephone Interviews" in exchange for experimental credit. All participants were scheduled in same-sex pairs in order to avoid any implicit power differentials or stereotypes associated with gender (c.f., Yoder & Kahn, 1992). A total of 39 dyads (N = 78) participated, with one member of each dyad randomly assigned to the role of interviewer or interviewee. Five pairs of participants (distributed roughly even across conditions) were excluded from final analysis due to equipment malfunction (2), suspicion (2), or prior acquaintanceship (1), leaving 68 final participants.

Design

The study used a 2 (interviewer's level of power: high or low) X 2 (applicants' goal: social or competence) factorial design. Interviewers were randomly assigned to one of the two power conditions, and applicants were randomly assigned to one of the two goal conditions.

Procedure

Participants arrived at the laboratory area at staggered times and in different rooms, thus ensuring that participants did not see their partner before, during, or after the interview.

Interviewer Preparation. An experimenter greeted the participant assigned to the role of interviewer and explained that the project was an effort to assess the effectiveness of telephone interviews. Participants learned that telephone interviews are often used for job searches and graduate school admissions, and that the present project was an attempt to study the effectiveness of such interview processes. In order to examine this process, participants learned that the experimenters modified the telephone interview format in order to select undergraduate research assistants for the upcoming semester. Hence, participants would assist in the investigation by interviewing and subsequently evaluating an undergraduate student applying for an R.A. position. The experimenter informed participants that parts of their interview would be audiotaped and later studied in order to examine the content and structure of the conversation.

The experimenter instructed participants that interviewers' judgments would not be the sole criterion for R.A. selection, but that other criteria were additionally considered. Interviewers in the low-power condition read that their interview and evaluation of the applicant would

account for "only 10% of the total hiring decision," whereas those in the high-power condition read that their contribution would account for "as much as 60% of the total hiring decision". Participants' power condition was determined randomly prior to their attendance.

Interviewers then read a description of the R.A. position. Interviewers read an advertising flier describing research assistantships as "great opportunities for UMass students to gain work experience and get to know faculty fairly well." The flier encouraged applicants with strong working and interpersonal skills (both generally defined) to apply.

The experimenter then presented the interviewer with a personality profile of the applicant based upon the results of a bogus "Harvard Personality Assessment" (HPA). This personality summary constituted the expectancy manipulation. Scores comparing the applicant to the pool of all other applicants indicated that people with higher percentile scores were stronger applicants. Interviewers read that their applicant-partner ranked at the 41st percentile for competence, the 43rd percentile for responsibility, and the 47th percentile for overall ability. The personality profile also contained background information unrelated to these expectancies (e.g., first name, birthplace, and age) in order to provide some conversational material.

After reading the applicant's personality profile, the interviewer read an "optional discussion guide" containing a list of possible interview questions to help in conducting the interview. Interviewers read that the suggested questions were completely optional, but might be useful in providing structure to the interview. The suggested topics and questions covered a broad array of subjects (e.g., career goals, outside interests, past employment history, friendships, etc.). All questions were open-ended, with half being positive and half negative, such that the positivity or negativity of the suggested questions chosen by the interview could serve as a measure of expectancy bias. The instructions informed participants that they could interview the applicant for up to 15 minutes, and that they had the flexibility to conduct the interview as they best saw fit. During the interview, their task was to "get to know the applicant fairly well, based on the information provided." However, the experimenter asked interviewers not to disclose any knowledge of the personality profile information to the applicant during the interview. After the interview, participants would evaluate the applicant based on their impressions and what they learned from the conversation.

Applicant Preparation. At a distant lab room, a separate experimenter greeted participants randomly assigned to the applicant role and informed them that the project was

an investigation of the effectiveness of the telephone interview process for graduate students. In order to assess the phone interview process, these participants learned that the graduate student interview format was modified for the selection of undergraduate research assistants. Hence, undergraduate students enrolled in psychology courses had the special opportunity to engage in the R.A. screening process, as well as gain extra credit by participating in an interview with a member of the research lab. Participants read that the R.A. position was an "excellent way to learn outside of the lecture format, become acquainted with faculty, get great experience for resumes, and receive letters of recommendatıons that are important for graduate school." The experimenter informed these participants that the top group of applicants, based on their performance, were eligible for $50 prizes through a lottery drawing. If successfully selected, however, these participants could receive the money without having to accept the R.A. position.

In order to create "a more informed interview setting", experimenters (blind to condition) provided applicant with a memo written by "Professor Robert Anderson"--i.e., the faculty member ostensibly looking for student assistants. Applicants read one of two memos, depending on their experimental condition (social or competence). Participants read memos identical to those used in Study 1's goal

manipulation. Experimenters then gave the applicants a few minutes to read over the memo to "imagine [their] conversation partner and devise a strategy that will help achieve [their] goals."

Interview. The interviewer and applicant then engaged in conversation via a closed-circuit telephone. The experimenter instructed the interviewer to initiate the conversation when ready; the interview was interrupted after 10 minutes. Participants were aware that "parts of the conversation might be audiotaped." Each member's dialogue was recorded on separate audiotape machines.

Post-interview Evaluations. Afterwards, both interviewer and applicant completed independent evaluations of the interview. Interviewer participants provided their impressions of the applicants, based on a series of 7-point trait adjectives (e.g., competent, motivated, friendly, able to meet deadlines, etc.; see Dependent Measures section below). Applicant participants reported their strategic interview tactics and their impressions of the interviewer on 7-point adjective scales. Finally, all participants completed individual difference measures: the CPI Dominance Scale (Gough, H. G., 1969), and the Self-Monitoring Scale (Snyder, 1979).[7]

Debriefing. After completing their respective questionnaires, participants independently learned about the actual nature of the study. Specifically, the experimenter

informed participants about the misleading nature of the interview setting (i.e., that interviewers' expectancies and applicants' motivational goals were created by experimenters). However, all participants learned that they would indeed have the opportunity to apply for an RA job, if interested, by completing a legitimate application.[8] Furthermore, all applicants' names were entered into an actual lottery, with two $50 prize winners.

Dependent Measures

Applicants' Self-presentational Strategy. Applicants rated their interview performance strategies on measures assessing ingratiation and self-promotion.

Interviewers' Impressions of Applicants. Following the telephone conversation, each interviewer participant completed a questionnaire assessing the applicant. "General evaluation" measures included the applicant's interview performance, qualifications, likelihood of being hired, recommendation to hire, and overall evaluation.

Interviewer participants also rated applicants on a series of 22 trait adjectives. A confirmatory factor analysis (using varimax rotation) established that two factors accounted for 52% of the variance, with each item loading above .30. The first factor, labelled "relational" (α = .92), included the traits "sociability", "likability", "outgoingness", "ability to become close to others", "warmth", "ability to work well with others",

"approachability", "ability to get along with many types of people", "easy-going", "sincerity," and "fun". The second factor, labelled "effectiveness" (α = .91), included the traits "assertiveness", "intelligence", "self-confidence", "competence", "motivation", "ability to assume responsibility", "ambition", "tendency to work hard", "problem solving skills", "ability to manage others", and "determination".

Finally, interviewers rated "how interested [they] would be in working or associating with the applicant" and "the degree to which [they] would recommend a person with similar ratings on the Harvard Personality Assessment (HPA) Scale."

Judges' Assessment of Applicants. Audiotaped interviews were rated by two independent judges blind to experimental conditions. Judges rated the applicants using the "relational" and "effectiveness" measures, as established by factor analysis of interviewers' data (see Appendix D). Judges' ratings indicated adequate interrater reliability for both the relational measure (α = .82) and the effectiveness measure (α = .84). These ratings were thus averaged to form a single score per subject for each measure.

Applicants' Impressions of Interviewers. Following the telephone interview, applicants completed a questionnaire assessing the interviewer on a series of adjective traits.

A confirmatory factor analysis (using varimax rotation) identified 2 factors accounting for 60% of the variance (with each item loading over .30). The first factor, labelled "positive evaluation" (α = .95), included the traits "friendliness", "openness", "warmth", "confidence", "comfortability". The second factor, labelled "negative evaluation" (α = .91), included "aloofness", "assertiveness", "aggressiveness", "stubbornness", and "difficult to relate with".[9]

Judges' Assessment of Interviewers. Judges (blind to experimental condition) reviewed the interviewers' conversation to assess information gathering behavior (c.f., Neuberg, 1989; Neuberg et al., 1992). Specifically, interviews were coded for warmth of interview opening, frequency of interviewers' use of applicants' name, number of prompts or encouragements (e.g., "uh huh" and "go on"), number of positive responses (e.g., "that's interesting"), total number of questions, number of positive versus negative questions, and number of topics covered.

Results

Applicants' Self-presentational Strategies

As hypothesized, applicants reported using strategic self-presentational displays in accordance with the perceived situational norms and constraints. A 2 (applicants' self-presentational goal) x 2 (interviewers' power) ANOVA revealed the anticipated effect of applicant's

goal (competence versus social) on their reported self-promoting behavior, $F(1, 33) = 5.96$, $p < .05$. Specifically, competence-goal participants (M = 6.07) rated themselves significantly higher on the effectiveness measure than social-goal participants (M = 5.41).

Analysis of variance also revealed the expected effect of applicants' goal on reported ingratiation behavior, $F(1, 33) = 17.67$, $p < .01$. Social-goal participants (M = 6.39) rated themselves significantly higher on the relational measure than competence-goal participants (M = 5.71).

Interviewers' level of power did not have an effect on the effectiveness measure $F(1, 33) < 1$, ns; nor did power affect the relational measure $F(1, 33) < 1$, ns. Applicants' level of dominance (high versus low) did not affect either effectiveness or relational measures, $F(1, 33) < 1$, ns for both. Nor did interviewers' dominance affect these measures, $F(1, 33) < 1$, ns for both.

Applicants' Behavior

Independent judges listened only to the applicants' conversation and confirmed that applicants' self-presentational goals were in fact fulfilled during the interview. Specifically, judges rated social-goal (i.e., ingratiation) applicants (M = 4.99) as more relational compared to competence-goal (i.e., self-promotion) applicants (M = 4.77). This effect was statistically significant, $F(1, 33) = 10.45$, $p < .01$. In addition, judges

rated competence-goal (i.e., self-promotion) applicants (M = 4.96) as more effective than social-goal (i.e., ingratiation) applicants (M = 4.70). This effect was also significant, $F(1, 33) = 11.96$, $p < .01$. No effect for applicants' dominance emerged on judges' ratings for either the relational or effectiveness measures, $F(1, 33) < 1$, ns for both.

Interviewers' Perceptions of Applicants

ANOVAs assessed the impact of interviewer's level of power (low versus high), applicants' goal (competence versus social), and interviewers' level of dominance (low versus high) on their post-interview impressions of targets. Similar to some previous research (e.g., Copeland, 1994), interviewers' level of power consistently influenced their judgments.

Two main effects emerged for interviewers' perceptions of applicants' task effectiveness. First, power level had a significant impact on judgments of task effectiveness, $F(1, 32) = 9.55$, $p < .05$. When making effectiveness judgments, high-power interviewers (M = 5.11) were significantly less positive than low-power interviewers (M = 5.76). Second, competence-goal (i.e., self-promoting) applicants (M = 5.85) received higher effectiveness ratings than social-goal (i.e., ingratiating) applicants (M = 4.98), $F(1, 32) = 14.78$, $p < .01$. These effects were qualified by two interactions with dominance. Specifically, interviewers'

power level interacted with their dominance level, $F(1, 32) = 3.50$, $p < .07$, such that high-dominant interviewers were less positive in high levels of power (M = 4.78), but more positive in low levels of power (M = 5.86); high-dominant interviewers were more affected by the power manipulation (see Figure 1). Post-hoc mean comparisons indicated that only this latter difference was significant, $p < .05$.

Moreover, applicants' goals interacted with interviewers' dominance level, $F(1, 32) = 14.78$, $p < .01$, such that low-dominant interviewers rated self-promoting applicants (M = 6.22) as more effective than ingratiating applicants (M = 4.60); thus, low-dominant interviewers were more sensitive to the targets' strategies on the task-effectiveness measures (see Figure 2). Post-hoc mean comparisons indicated that only this latter difference was significant, $p < .05$.

Two comparable main effects emerged for interviewers' relational ratings of applicants. High-power interviewers (M = 5.59) made significantly less positive ratings of targets than did low-power interviewers (M = 6.08), $F(1, 32) = 5.23$, $p = .03$. Furthermore, ingratiating applicants (M = 6.00) received higher relational ratings than self-promoting applicants (M = 5.62). The latter effect was qualified by a significant interaction with interviewers' dominance level, $F(1, 32) = 4.16$, $p = .05$. Post-hoc mean comparisons indicated that high-dominant interviewers rated ingratiating

applicants (M = 6.17) as more relational than self-promoting applicants (M = 5.39), whereas low-dominant interviewers showed no difference (see Figure 3); high-dominant interviewers thus were more sensitive to targets' strategies on the relational measures.

High-power interviewers (M = 4.90) were also significantly less positive than low-power perceivers (M = 5.92) on targets' general evaluation, $F(1, 32) = 5.26$, $p < .05$. This was qualified by a significant interaction with dominance level, $F(1, 32) = 6.24$, $p < .05$. Post-hoc mean comparisons indicated that low-dominant perceivers gave self-promoting applicants (M = 5.92) higher general evaluations than ingratiating applicants (M = 4.83), whereas high-dominant interviewers did not differentiate (see Figure 4). This interaction pattern parallels the pattern obtained for the effectiveness measure (see Figure 2).

In addition, high-power interviewers (M = 4.06) were significantly less positive than low-power interviewers (M = 5.13) in their interest in associating with the applicants. A marginal interaction between interviewers' dominance level and applicants' goal, $F(1, 32) = 2.92$, $p < .10$ (see Figure 5) indicated that low-dominant interviewers would prefer associating with self-promoting applicants (M = 4.83) than with ingratiating applicants (M = 4.00). Again, low-dominant interviewers seem more attuned to task dimensions. Conversely, high-dominant interviewers would prefer

associating with ingratiating applicants (M = 4.73) than with self-promoting applicants (M = 4.36). Again, high-dominant interviewers seem more interested in relational-oriented applicants.

Finally, in results that parallel the association measure, high-power interviewers (M = 4.43) displayed a marginal relative- negativity bias against other applicants with similar HPA scores, relative to low-power interviewers (M = 5.09), $F(1, 32) = 3.19$, $p = .09$. A marginal interaction (see Figure 6) between applicants' goal and interviewers' dominance level also emerged, $F(1, 32) = 3.25$, $p = .08$. Post-hoc mean comparisons indicated that low-dominant interviewers would rate self-promoting applicants with similar HPA scores (M = 5.15) higher than they would rate ingratiating applicants (M = 4.22) with similar HPA scores (M = 4.22). Conversely, high-dominant interviewers would rate ingratiating applicants with similar HPA scores (M = 4.85) more positively than they would rate self-promoting applicants with similar HPA scores (M = 4.43).

Interviewers' Behavior

Judges found only three of the interviewers' behaviors to be significantly different between experimental conditions.[10] First, two main effects for power emerged. High-power interviewers (M = 17.00) asked fewer overall questions than low-power interviewers (M = 19.25), $F(1, 32) = 8.72$, $p < .06$. High-power interviewers (M = 7.00) also

asked fewer novel and expansive questions than low-power interviewers (M = 9.20), $F(1, 32) = 5.76$, $p < .05$. Finally, high-dominant interviewers (6.20) asked more closed-ended questions than low-dominant interviewers (4.50), $F(1, 32) = 5.56$, $p < .05$.

Applicants' Perceptions of Interviewers

Two related main effects emerged in applicants' perceptions of interviewers. First, applicants rated low-power interviewers (M = 5.55) higher on the positive evaluation measure than high-power perceivers (M = 5.07), $F(1, 34) = 4.54$, $p < .05$; applicants appeared to like low-power interviewers more. This finding makes sense considering low-power interviewers asked more overall questions and more novel, expansive questions than the high-power interviewers. Similarly, applicants rated high-power interviewers (M = 3.13) higher on the negative evaluation measure than low-power perceivers (M = 2.54), $F(1, 34) = 6.51$, $p < .05$; applicants appeared to dislike high-power interviewers more. Again, this finding corroborates with the attenuation in high-power interviewers' information-gathering behavior.

Discussion

These findings support the hypothesis that powerless people can strategically present themselves according to situational norms and constraints, even in ongoing interactions. While previous research suggests that people

can generate effective self-presentational goals (e.g., Gergen, 1965; Gergen & Taylor, 1969; Hendricks & Brickman, 1974), very few studies address ongoing strategic behavior (see Leary et al., 1994, for a notable exception). Specifically, this study replicates findings obtained in Study 1 that suggest that powerless people will generate either ingratiation or self-promotion goals, depending on the nature of their anticipated interaction. By employing the behavioral confirmation paradigm, this second study suggests that these behavioral goals actually translate into meaningful behavior (as assessed by outside judges).

Such findings resonate with prior theory suggesting that people are adept impression managers--that they actively construct images in order to achieve positive situational reinforcement (Goffman, 1959; Jones & Pittman, 1982; Tedeschi & Norman, 1985). However, whereas most prior research focuses on one particular self-presentational style (e.g., only ingratiation, or only self-presentation), the current study demonstrates that powerless people may be motivated to do <u>either</u> in an identical setting, given sufficient information. This argument, then, advances the idea that people's situational self-concepts, or phenomenal selves (Jones & Pittman, 1982), are highly malleable (c.f., Markus & Kunda, 1986). This does not imply that the powerless have weak or impressionable self-concepts, however. Note that no differences in applicants' behavior

emerged between high versus low self-monitors or high versus low dominance, suggesting that the situational constraints created here overrode individual differences.

The implications for powerless people's self-presentational behavior may be contingent, however, on powerholders' dominance orientation. These findings consistently suggest differences in high-dominant versus low-dominant perceivers' impressions of ingratiating versus self-promoting behavior. Specifically, low-dominant perceivers displayed a sensitivity to self-promoting behavior, such that applicants appearing to be effective and responsible were evaluated more positively. However, the converse relationship emerged for high-power perceivers. These individuals seemed to be more in tune with applicants' ingratiating behavior. However, ingratiating behavior did not seem to have an impact on powerholders' overall judgments. That is, self-promoting applicants were judged overall more positively than ingratiating applicants. This difference in judgment seems to hinge on low-dominant perceivers (who were more impressed with self-promoters than with ingratiators); high-dominant perceivers did not differentiate between the two types of applicants in their overall judgments.

The final strong trend that emerged from the data indicates that high-power perceivers (but not low-power perceivers) may have a reduced positivity bias, despite

applicants' self-presentational attempts.[11] Future research may strengthen this argument (that high-power engenders less positivity) by including a comparison group consisting of targets without self-presentational motivation.[12] Despite this limitation, the obtained findings resonate with other data (i.e., Copeland, 1994) that suggest that high-power perceivers are more likely than low-power perceivers to elicit confirmatory behavior from targets. Powerless people's strategic displays of behavior may therefore be less effective when perceivers are in high levels of power.

Does this finding imply that targets are impotent under conditions in which perceivers hold high power? Previous theoretical offerings would argue against this assertion. Specifically, the <u>form</u> of power may have as much, or even more, influence on people's judgments than does the <u>amount</u> of power (French & Raven, 1959). Indeed, the type of power awarded to perceivers in this study (as in all expectancy confirmation studies) is the power to <u>evaluate</u> (c.f., Snyder, 1992). Some evidence suggests that this form of power may confer onto people certain entitlements, specifically the entitlement to judge others. This argument holds that in the absence of such an entitlement perceivers will refrain from making judgments (Yzerbyt, Schadron, Leyens, & Rocher, 1994).

In most expectancy confirmation studies, participants acting as interviewers are typically given a false

description of their interaction partner and instructed to evaluate (e.g., the person's extroversion) upon completion of the interview.[13] The current study employed a similar manipulation of power. Prior to the interaction, experimenters instructed perceivers to "get to know the applicant based on the information provided" and to "help...in [the] selection of research assistants by interviewing, and subsequently evaluating, the applicant." High-power perceivers learned that their "evaluations [italics added] will greatly influence the applicants' outcome a great deal," and low-power perceivers learned that their "evaluations [italics added] will not really influence the applicants' outcome at all." Such a direct emphasize on evaluative power may have unduly conferred onto perceivers an entitlement to make judgments. A feeling of entitlement may have contributed to high-power interviewers' reduced information-gathering behavior (i.e., total number of questions asked, and number of novel or expansive questions asked). Possibly in response to this behavior, applicants reported liking high-power perceivers less than low-power perceivers. Hence, high-power evaluative perceivers may have been much more judgmental (i.e., less positive) than low-power perceivers. Indeed, research indicates that people who feel entitled to judge are more likely to stereotype than people who do not feel entitled (Yzerbyt, Schadron, Leyens, & Rocher, 1994). In the current study,

therefore, high-power perceivers may have been more likely to employ the manipulated expectancy (i.e., applicants' low HPA score) than low-power perceivers, thereby influencing their information-gathering behavior as well as their final judgments.

This argument implies that a different form of power, i.e., one less explicitly evaluative, may yield findings different from those obtained in Study 2. One divergent form of power is allocative power: the ability to assign tasks or duties to outcome-dependent people (Goodwin, Fiske, & Yzerbyt, 1994). Compare this with the evaluative form of power--rather than being diffuse and emphasizing judgment, allocative power is more specific in nature and emphasizes responsibility. Could this type of outcome-control impede powerholders' judgmental biases? A second expectancy confirmation study investigated this issue.

CHAPTER 4

STUDY 3: ALLOCATIVE POWER AND EXPECTANCY CONFIRMATION

Overview

This study again employed the expectancy confirmation paradigm to assess the impact of targets' self-presentation on perceivers' expectancies. Study 3 employed the same exact procedure used in Study 2, with one exception. Rather than bestowing evaluative power on participants, interviewers learned that their role was to allocate a task to the applicant upon completion of the interview. The choice of task would be contingent on information gathered during the interview.

Method

Participants

Participants were 98 introductory psychology students from the University of Massachusetts at Amherst. All participants received experimental credit in exchange for their service. Seven dyads were excluded from analysis due to equipment malfunction (4), experimenter error (2), and acquaintanceship while coming to the study (1). This left a total of 42 same-sex dyads (N = 84), with one member randomly assigned to the role of interviewer or applicant.

Procedure and Design

The procedure followed that used in Study 2 almost verbatim. Participants in the applicant condition learned that they would have the opportunity to receive a research assistantship with a university researcher. After reading about the great opportunities afforded by this job (as well as the chance at receiving $50), applicants read either the social goal manipulation or the competence goal manipulation (see Study 1).

Participants in the interview condition learned that they would be interviewing a student applying for an R.A. position. Contrary to Study 2's procedure, the experimenter here instructed interviewers that after "learning about the applicant in a short interview, [they would] help decide what type of diagnostic task the applicant [would] complete. Some of these tasks are more fun than others, some are more challenging than others, and some are more likely to result in successful hiring than others." Participants learned that they would receive a list of these tasks after the interview was complete. The experimenter informed them that the applicants' task performance, based on interviewers' allocation, would account for "only 10% of the total hiring decision" (i.e., low power) or "as much as 60% of the total hiring decision" (i.e., high power).

The resulted in a 2 (interviewer's level of power: high or low) X 2 (applicants' goal: social or competence)

between-subjects factorial design. Note, however, that this form of power (i.e., allocative) is qualitatively different from that used in Study 2 (i.e., evaluative). In fact, the terms "evaluate" and "evaluation" (as used in Study 2's script) were completely deleted in this script, replaced instead by "allocate" and "allocation".

After completing the 10-minute interview, participants completed dependent measures identical to those in Study 2. For purposes of measure constancy, Study 3 used the same factor-analyzed measures (i.e., "relational" and "effective" trait ratings) obtained previously in Study 2.

Results

Applicants' Self-presentational Strategies

Applicants reported using appropriate self-presentational behavior befitting the implicit situational constraints. Competence-goal participants (M = 6.17) reported using more effectiveness behavior than did social-goal participants (M = 5.23). An analysis of variance indicated this difference to be significantly different, $F(1, 41) = 15.14$, $p < .01$.

Likewise, social-goal participants (M = 6.39) reported behaving more relationally than did competence-goal participants (M = 5.39). This difference was statistically significant, $F(1, 41) = 27.32$, $p < .01$.

Applicants' Behavior

Two judges unaware of condition listened to each tape and rated participants independently. Ratings were sufficiently reliable with one another (relational α = .81; effectiveness α = .85) and were averaged to yield a composite score.

Upon listening to applicants' dialogue, raters found social-goal participants (M = 5.02) as more relational than competence-goal participants (M = 4.96). An ANOVA found this different to be significant, $F(1, 83) = 11.72$, $p < .05$. Judges also rated competence-goal applicants (M = 4.84) as more effective than social-goal applicants (M = 4.63). Again, this difference was significant, $F(1, 83) = 10.23$, $p < .05$.

Interviewers' Perceptions of Applicants

Unlike the findings obtained in Study 2, interviewers' level of power did not have any impact any of the dependent measures--namely the effectiveness ratings, $F(1, 41) = 2.14$, ns; relational ratings $F(1, 41) < 1$, ns; general evaluation, $F(1, 41) < 1$, ns; interest in working or associating with the applicant, $F(1, 41) < 1$, ns; or assessment of a different applicant with similar test results, $F(1, 41) < 1$, ns.

As in Study 2, interviewers rated self-promoting applicants (M = 5.95) as more effective than ingratiating applicants (M = 5.00), $F(1, 41) = 14.12$, $p < .01$. Likewise,

interviewers rated ingratiating applicants (M = 5.91) as more relational than self-promoting applicants (M = 5.34), $F(1, 41) = 4.14$, $p = .05$.

Interviewers' dominance level continued to have a significant impact on their ratings. Dominance interacted significantly with applicants' goals on interviewers' effectiveness ratings, $F(1, 41) = 13.16$; $p < .01$. Paralleling Study 2's results, low-dominant interviewers rated self-promoting applicants (M = 6.30) as more effective than ingratiating applicants (M = 4.52), whereas high-dominant interviewers did not exhibit this effect (see Figure 7). Post-hoc mean comparisons indicated that only low-dominant interviewers' difference was significant.

A goal by dominance interaction (see Figure 8) also emerged on interviewers' relational ratings, $F(1, 41) = 4.78$, $p < .05$. In this case, again paralleling Study 2, high-dominant interviewers rated ingratiating applicants (M = 6.06) as more relational than self-promoting applicants (M = 4.90), whereas low-dominant interviewers did not display this tendency. Post-hoc mean comparisons again found only this difference significant, $p < .05$.

A significant crossover interaction of applicants' goal by interviewers' dominance (see Figure 9) emerged on interviewers' general evaluation ratings, $F(1, 41) = 5.11$, $p < .05$. Paralleling Study 2, low-dominant interviewers rated self-promoting applicants (M = 6.05) as higher overall than

ingratiating applicants (M = 5.00). Conversely, high-dominant interviewers rated ingratiating applicants (M = 5.40) as higher overall than self-promoting applicants (M = 5.02). Again, it is clear that high-dominant interviewers are sensitive to applicants' ingratiation, and low-dominant interviewers are sensitive to applicants' self-promotion.

Finally, a similar crossover pattern (see Figure 10) emerged on interviewers' rating of applicants with similar HPA scores, $F(1, 41) = 4.25$, $p = .05$. As in Study 2, low-dominant interviewers would rate self-promoting applicants with similar HPA scores (M = 5.14) higher than ingratiating applicants with similar scores HPA scores (M = 4.37). Conversely, high-dominant interviewers would rate ingratiating applicants with similar HPA scores (M = 4.89) as higher than self-promoting applicants with similar HPA scores (M = 4.00). Post-hoc mean comparisons found both differences significant, $p < .05$.

Interviewers' Behavior

Only two of the interviewers' behaviors indicated significant differences between conditions, as assessed by blind judges. Specifically, high-power interviewers (M = 3.60) asked a marginally higher number of negative questions than did low-power interviewers (M = 2.61), $F(1, 41) = 3.36$, $p < .08$. Furthermore, high-dominant interviewers (M = 13.13) covered marginally more topics than low-dominant interviewers (M = 10.94), $F(1, 41) = 3.19$, $p < .09$.

Applicants' Perceptions of Interviewers

Unlike the findings in Study 2, applicants did not report a difference in their liking for low versus high-power interviewers, $F(1, 41) = 1.58$, ns. But similarly to Study 2, applicants reported disliking high-power interviewers more than low-power interviewers. That is, applicants rated high-power interviewers ($M = 3.18$) higher on the negative evaluation measure than they did low-power interviewers ($M = 2.66$), $F(1, 41) = 6.13$, $p < .05$.

Discussion

This study replicates all of the major findings obtained in Study 2, with one important exception. In this case, whereby outcome control was allocative rather than evaluative, as expected, no differences in power level emerged; high-power applicants were not any less positive than low-power applicants. A comparison of the data between Studies 2 and 3 resonates with the argument proposed by social judgeability theorists: People who feel entitled to judge may be less positive or more stereotypical than people who do not feel entitled to judge (Goodwin, Fiske, Yzerbyt, 1994; Yzerbyt, Schadron, Leyens, & Rocher, 1994). As this study employed a more restricted form of control, i.e., assigning a task rather than making an evaluation, high-power perceivers may have felt less entitled to form expectancy-based judgments. This was not the case in Study 2, whereby high-power perceivers consistently formed less

positive judgments of applicants. As mentioned in the previous discussion, future research should include a comparison group (i.e., targets without any self-presentational motivation) to test whether high power elicits an relative negativity bias.

A comparison of the data obtained in Study 3 with those obtained in Study 2 implies that allocative, rather than evaluative, power may attenuate perceivers' tendency to form negative judgments in general, and make expectancy-based judgments in particular. A more direct study of this hypothesis, however, is necessary. Future research should compare evaluative versus allocative power within one design.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUDING REMARKS

> "In noting the tendency for a participant to accept the definitional claims made by the others present, we can appreciate the crucial importance of the information that the individual initially possesses or acquires concerning his fellow participants, for it is on the basis of this initial information that the individual starts to define the situation and starts to build up lines of responsive action" (Goffman, 1959, p. 10).

Until recently, only a handful of studies indicate powerless people's ability to exert control over their situation via strategic, planned behavior (e.g., Gergen & Taylor, 1969; Hendricks & Brickman, 1974; Jones, Gergen & Jones, 1963; Kipnis & Vandeveer, 1971). Even fewer studies indicate the ability of targets to undermine perceivers' expectancies (e.g., Hilton & Darley, 1985; Swann & Ely, 1984). These studies, therefore, help fill an empirical lacuna by extending the area of impression management to suggest people's skill at presenting themselves appropriately, given informative cues about the situation. In particular, it is evident that powerless people can effectively present themselves to a powerful other for the purpose of gaining desired outcomes. In so doing, powerless people can undermine perceivers' negative expectancies.

These findings resonate with some of the original discussions of impression management and strategic self-presentation. Specifically, prior theory argues for people's power-induced self-presentational motives (Jones &

Pittman, 1982). Powerless people (motivated to augment their actual or perceived situational power) may be particularly likely to engage in strategic behavior to project favorable impressions and fulfill their goals. In so doing, powerless people must often act contrary to their category's stereotype (c.f., Jones et al., 1984).

But could there be long-term implications for people's stereotype-incongruent behavior? Indeed, one of the goals of this research is uncovering the mediating impact, if any, that powerless peoples' (or targets') behavior can have on powerholders' (or perceivers') expectancies. While previous studies point to the moderating effect of perceivers' self-presentation strategy on behavioral confirmation (Neuberg et al., 1993), the impact of targets' behavior on the interactions characterized by power asymmetry has been largely ignored. To test the mediating effects of strategic self-presentation, power, and dominance, a structural equation model will be tested in the future.

In addition, the present study hopes to break the long-lasting empirical tradition of viewing stereotype targets as passive recipients of perceivers' categorical biases (c.f., Amir, 1969). Most existing frameworks of stereotyping and prejudice reduction place fundamental control over the situation in the hands of the powerholder, who is typically a majority group member (Cook, 1978; Devine, 1989; Dovidio & Gaertner, 1993; Tajfel & Turner, 1979; see Eberhardt &

Fiske, in press). Seemingly, extant perspectives view the target as situationally ineffective in the face of the perceiver's biases, thereby perpetuating images of stereotyped people as debilitated and simplistic. Ironically, these perspectives serve to maintain the status quo, or the differentiation between the powerful (i.e., active) agent and powerless (i.e., passive) recipient. The findings obtained in the current research, in addition to future path analysis, depict the powerless target as an agent of actual change.

Although this research does not directly assess the impact of targets' behavior on powerholders' global outgroup stereotype, these findings reveal an empowering potential for the individual. Addressing this, Tajfel (1981) states that "the choice is between initiating some form of action on a limited scale or waiting until--miraculously--prejudice and discrimination disappear from our social scene" (p. 186). The current research posits a first, albeit limited, step toward prejudice reduction: Goal-motivated, strategic behavior can incidentally disconfirm immediate negative expectancies, and perhaps attenuate larger stereotypes. Research in the area of cognitive subtyping (e.g., Weber & Crocker, 1983) advances that expectancy-disconfirming interactions may definitely produce long-term impact, if perceivers' biases are consistently challenged.

People's attempts to disconfirm others' biases may be more difficult, however, to the extent that perceivers hold evaluative power (as in Study 2) or are interpersonally dominant (as in Studies 2 and 3). These findings suggest that targets of stereotypes may be able to attenuate the impact that their rubric imposes on them, but the effectiveness of their strategies are limited by the overarching power structure. Such an awareness of evaluative and dominant perceivers' vulnerability to form negative judgments, as well as use social stereotypes (Goodwin & Fiske, 1993; Goodwin, Fiske, & Yzerbyt, 1994), is crucial for social psychology's understanding of intergroup relations.

Limitations of this research provide a set of considerations for future studies. The current project investigates the social interaction on a purely verbal level (via conversation), neglecting the role of nonverbal behavior (e.g., eye contact, physical proximity, touching, etc.) in impression management and behavioral confirmation (Goffman, 1959; Leary et al., 1994; Schlenker, 1982). The current research intentionally leaves out the visual component of strategic self-presentation and impression management in order to avoid extraneous variables such as physical attractiveness and race. Future studies may attempt to investigate nonverbal self-presentation tactics

(c.f., Word, Zanna & Cooper, 1974), and their implications for stereotype disconfirmation.

Additionally, future studies can explore the possible moderators of strategic self-presentation, including self-esteem, and need for approval (Schlenker, 1982; Tedeschi & Norman, 1985). Future investigations should also address other forms of strategic self-presentation besides ingratiation and self-promotion. There are evidently times when people want to appear threatening or helpless (Jones & Pittman, 1982; Leary et al., 1994). Potential studies may look at people's ability to discriminate among the most appropriate forms of presentation tactics, as well as compare the relative effectiveness of each.

With these considerations and limitations in mind, this research hopes to provide evidence that people are motivated self-presenters in addition to being motivated social perceivers. Specifically, people in powerless roles evidently are active and intelligent social interactants. Strategic self-presentation choices can strongly impact potentially adverse interactions, thereby advancing change for the individual and for the collective.

Table 1

Study 1 - Factor loadings of trait statements

	Factor Loading
Factor 1: Relationality	
It is important for me to get to know my co-workers well.	.73
I am a well-mannered person.	.69
I always try to follow rules and guidelines.	.69
I get along well with most people I meet.	.59
It is important for me to be fair to my co-workers and colleagues.	.55
I try to be humorous and fun around my co-workers.	.55
I consider myself to be a very approachable person.	.52
I try not to act pushy or overly aggressive.	.49
I pay compliments to others whenever it is appropriate.	.45
I support the honor code and ethics system of the university.	.42
I try to keep a smile on my face at work or school.	.38
Factor 2: Conscientiousness	
I often take a leadership role in various situations.	.78
Whenever possible, I try to speak on behalf of those less fortunate than me.	.74
When possible, I stand up for and support my issues and beliefs.	.68
When I state an idea or opinion, I am ready to support it with strong arguments.	.60
I speak in a clear and intelligent manner.	.55
I bring my personal convictions into any situation that is suitable.	.53
I am usually alert and enthusiastic.	.51
I listen well to the needs and problems of others	.50
I support affirmative action.	.46
I consider myself to be socially conscious.	.46
Whenever possible, I will go out of my way to perform favors to help others out.	.45
I often engage in intelligent and intellectual conversations with my co-workers.	.44
I have certain opinions and values which I believe in very strongly.	.36
I am always honest about my mistakes or shortcomings.	.33

Continued, next page

Table 1, continued

Factor 3: Effectiveness	Factor Loading
I have strong confidence in myself and the things I do.	.75
I always state my true opinions and beliefs honestly.	.70
I am punctual and usually get to work/school on time, if not earlier.	.67
I consider myself to be an assertive person.	.56
I am good at meeting deadlines without outside pressure.	.48
I try to always dress appropriately and appear professional at work.	.39

Table 2

Study 1 - Analysis of variance of self-presentational goal by self-presentational style.

	CONDITION				
GOAL	ingratiation	exemplification	self-promotion	control	MEAN
relational	12.45	12.31	12.19	11.54	12.39
conscientious	11.10	11.53	11.20	11.05	11.37
effective	11.42	12.36	12.46	12.36	11.47
MEAN	11.65	12.01	11.95	11.66	



Figure 1. Study 2 - Ratings of applicants' effectiveness by interviewers' power and dominance.



Figure 2. Study 2 - Ratings of applicants' effectiveness by applicants' goal and interviewers' dominance.



Figure 3. Study 2 - Ratings of applicants' relationality by applicants' goal and interviewers' dominance.



Figure 4. Study 2 - Ratings of applicants' general qualifications by applicants' goal and interviewers' dominance.



Figure 5. Study 2 - Willingness to interact with applicant by applicants' goal and interviewers' dominance.



Figure 6. Study 2 - Ratings of similar HPA applicants by applicants' goal and interviewers' dominance.



Figure 7. Study 3 - Ratings of applicants' effectiveness by applicants' goal and interviewers' dominance.



Figure 8. Study 3 - Ratings of applicants' relationality by applicants' goal and interviewers' dominance.



Figure 9. Study 3 - Ratings of applicants' general qualification by applicants' goal and interviewers' dominance.



Figure 10. Study 3 - Ratings of similar HPA applicants by applicants' goal and interviewers' dominance.

ENDNOTES

[1]Current socio-political terminology refers to this form of personal change as empowerment.

[2]Whereas a distinction between behavioral and perceptual confirmation is often maintained in the literature (e.g., Jussim, 1986), the current argument employs the inclusive term "expectancy confirmation" which subsumes both.

[3]Interestingly, some expectancy confirmation theorists would argue that the roles of "perceiver" and "target" closely parallel the roles of "powerful" and "powerless", respectively (e.g., Snyder, 1992). However, insofar as equating these roles might perpetuate the view of stereotype targets as situationally debilitated (against which the current perspective argues), this comparison provides a useful heuristic for expectancy confirmation processes.

[4]We selected these specific self-presentational styles due to their association with the nature of the scenario (i.e., academic research).

[5]Pretesting of these manipulation paragraphs indicated that the scenarios adequately represent situations in which ingratiating, self-promoting, or exemplifying behavior is appropriate.

[6]On the other hand, numerous other studies have repeatedly demonstrated people's ability to perform ingratiating and self-promoting behavior in order to

influence others' decisions (e.g., Baumeister & Jones, 1978; Gergen, 1965; Gergen & Taylor, 1969; Hendricks & Brickman, 1971).

[7]Based on median scores, participants were split into groups for high versus low dominance, and high versus low self-monitoring categories. No significant effects for participants' self-monitoring emerged in the data analysis, so this individual difference measure will not be reported in the results.

[8]Two research assistants were actually selected through this process.

[9]Conventional practice might pool these items into a single measure, reversing the items on Factor 2. However, since factor analysis indicated that the two were indeed orthogonal, they were analyzed separately.

[10]Due to time limitations, tapes were not coded for proportion of interviewer listening time (as proposed). This measure will be assessed in the future in accordance with Neuberg's (1989) methodology. When all interviewer-behavior measures are completed, each measure demonstrating significance will be combined to yield a composite score for interviewers' information gathering behavior (see Neuberg, 1989; Neuberg et al., 1993).

[11]This reduced positivity bias should not be underestimated. Considering the standard positivity bias in people's general judgments about others, as well as

respondents' ratings about targets (c.f., Matlin & Stang, 1978), the relative negativity bias obtained here might have far-reaching implications.

[12]Caution must be taken in framing the control-condition. As in Study 1, no-goal participants spontaneously reported self-promoting behavior (most likely due to the perceived nature of the task). Future studies must take this default job-presentation behavior into account.

[13]In a recent study manipulating perceivers' knowledge motivation, participants were instructed to "find out what [the target] is like, what her personality traits are, and find out what someone with her personality can be expected to say and do. Afterward, we will be asking you to tell us about your impressions of your partner and how she behaved in the conversation" (Snyder & Haugen, 1993, p. 228). Indeed, such instructions closely resemble and <u>evaluative</u> function as well as a <u>knowledge</u> function.

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