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The impression formation processes of asymmetrically dependent individuals.

Laura E. Stevens
University of Massachusetts Amherst

THE IMPRESSION FORMATION PROCESSES OF ASYMMETRICALLY DEPENDENT INDIVIDUALS

A Thesis Presented

by

LAURA ELAINE STEVENS

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LAURA ELAINE STEVENS

Approved as to style and content by:

Susan T. Fiske, Chair

Icek Aizen, Member

Paula R. Pietromonaco, Member

Charles Clifton, Department Head
Psychology

ABSTRACT

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LAURA E. STEVENS, B.A., ALLEGHENY COLLEGE

M.S., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS

Directed by: Professor Susan T. Fiske

Two studies were performed in order to address the impression formation processes dependent people in asymmetrical relationships use to form impressions of the powerful other. The first study investigated the relationship between non-dependent, asymmetrically dependent, and symmetrically dependent individuals. It was hypothesized that compared to non-dependent and symmetrically dependent subjects, task asymmetrically subjects would use accuracy-oriented processes and individuate the other person. The second study investigated non-dependent and evaluatively dependent individuals. It was hypothesized that evaluatively dependent subjects would inaccurately, selectively encode information about the other person in order to make the other seem more positive. The hypotheses were confirmed. Impression formation processes, prediction, control, and threats to self-esteem are discussed.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Interdependence theory was first proposed by Thibaut and Kelley in 1959. Since then, it has influenced a wide variety of research in social psychology. Research on topics ranging from bargaining and negotiation to threat and trust have all incorporated some aspects of interdependence theory (Chadwick-Jones, 1983). Given the explosion of social cognitive work in the last decade or more, it is odd that interdependence theory has not appeared in that context. One specific social cognitive theory that has drawn on interdependence theory is Fiske and Neuberg's (1990) continuum theory of impression formation. In its discussion of motives, this theory utilizes many ideas originally discussed in the context of interdependence theory (see Riley & Fiske, 1991 for a review). While interdependence theory has addressed both symmetrical and asymmetrical dependence (Thibaut & Kelley, 1959; see also Kelley, 1979; Kelley & Thibaut, 1978), the interdependence-related research on impression formation has dealt with only symmetrical dependence. Although some of the research on symmetrical dependence could be generalized to asymmetrical dependence, asymmetrical dependence is actually quite different and should be considered separately.

Asymmetrical Dependence

Dependence refers to the degree that an individual's outcomes depend on another person's actions. Thus, dependence reflects how much control one person has over another person's outcomes. Dependence is symmetrical when the control each person has over the other's outcomes is reciprocal. Each person can control the other's outcomes equally. On the other hand, dependence becomes asymmetrical as outcome control

becomes non-reciprocal. One individual can control the other's outcomes, but the other person is not capable of returning that control.

The discrepancy in the power to control outcomes that characterizes asymmetrically dependent dyads leads to two possible perspectives. Asymmetrical relationships could be examined through the eyes of the powerful person who has the ability to control. Or, the relationship could be approached from the perspective of the powerless person who does not have the ability to control. The perspective of the powerful person has been addressed elsewhere (Goodwin & Fiske, 1993). The perspective of the powerless member of the asymmetrically dependent dyad will be addressed here.

By the definition stated earlier, the powerless in asymmetrically dependent dyads do not have much ability to control the outcomes of the powerful on whom their outcomes depend. Thus, the powerless experience a tremendous loss of control over their own outcomes. According to Kelly's (1963) theory of personality, all individuals are motivated to predict and control their own outcomes. In addition, it has been argued that control over one's circumstances is integral to the self-concept (Dépret & Fiske, in press). Given this, the powerless would be motivated to find a way in which to cope with their lack of control.

If the asymmetrical dependence itself could not be directly challenged, the powerless would most likely try to gain indirect control over their outcomes. This would require the powerless to be able to predict and control the behavior of the powerful. In order to do this, the powerless would have to seek out information and form an impression of the powerful.

Impression Formation

Fiske and Neuberg's (1990) continuum model of impression formation posits that category-based processes of impression formation are the default, but people shift toward more individuating processes of impression formation when they are motivated to do so (see also Brewer, 1988). These individuating processes are characterized by an increased use of attribute information.

Research on impression formation has shown that this shift toward the individuating processes of impression formation does occur under conditions of symmetrical dependence (Berscheid, Graziano, Monson, & Dermer, 1976; Erber & Fiske, 1984; Neuberg & Fiske, 1987; Ruscher & Fiske, 1990; Ruscher, Fiske, Miki, & Van Manen, 1991). The impression formation processes of symmetrically dependent individuals are characterized by increases in attention to the other person's attributes. By attending to the other person, potentially individuating information is readily available. Symmetrically dependent individuals are then able to base their impressions on this individuating information rather than only on pre-existing stereotypes and expectancies (Fiske & Neuberg, 1990; Fiske & Pavelchak, 1986). On the other hand, when people are not dependent on one another, impressions are often based on pre-existing stereotypes and expectancies.

Because perceivers do subscribe to pre-existing stereotypes and expectancies, any attribute information they later encounter can be classified as consistent, inconsistent, or irrelevant with regard to these pre-existing beliefs. Consistent information is largely redundant with a pre-existing belief and offers little new information. On the other hand, inconsistent information provides novel information about

the target person's dispositions, intentions, or future behavior. Thus, accuracy-oriented perceivers may prefer inconsistent to consistent information because it is more informative about the target person. In fact, studies on cooperative and competitive symmetrical dependence found that interdependent and non-interdependent individuals paid equal attention to expectancy-consistent information, but interdependent individuals paid significantly more attention to expectancy-inconsistent information (Erber & Fiske, 1984; Ruscher & Fiske, 1990). Moreover, accuracy instructions have the same impact as symmetrical outcome dependence (Neuberg & Fiske, 1987).

In addition, many studies have shown that inconsistent information requires more time to encode than consistent information (e.g., Brewer, Dull, & Lui, 1981; Hemsley & Marmurek, 1982). This may be due to the fact that perceivers are trying to make sense of the inconsistent information. For example, they may be linking inconsistencies to attributes already in memory (Srull & Wyer, 1989). Moreover, some researchers argue that symmetrically dependent perceivers may be spending their time making dispositional inferences (Berscheid et al., 1976; Erber & Fiske, 1984; Ruscher & Fiske, 1990). The inconsistent information does not fit the perceivers' expectancy. Thus, the perceivers may attribute the inconsistent information to individual personality idiosyncracies (Jones & Davis, 1965). These idiosyncracies can later be used to help predict the target person's behavior.

Thus, in symmetrical dependence conditions, where each person's outcomes are partially controlled by the other person, individuals pay particular attention to expectancy-inconsistent attributes about the other person. This expectancy-inconsistent information is potentially

more informative than expectancy-consistent information. These individuating processes of impression formation would allow symmetrically dependent individuals to gain a greater sense of prediction and control over their outcomes.

Impression Formation and Asymmetrical Interdependence

Analogously to symmetrically dependent individuals, asymmetrically dependent individuals do not have complete control over their outcomes. Therefore, it seems natural to assume that asymmetrically dependent individuals would utilize individuating processes of impression formation in the same kind of attempt to gain some control over their outcomes. In fact, there is evidence to support this hypothesis.

Subjects in two recent studies by Dépret and Fiske (1993) believed they would be asymmetrically dependent on a group of three other people. This group of three was described as heterogenous or homogenous. The heterogeneous group was predicted to elicit the same processes as individual outcome dependence. Since this paper deals with individual outcome dependence, only the results for the heterogeneous group will be presented here. The groups were described as either low power, would have minimal control over the subject's outcomes, or high power, would have maximal control over the subject's outcomes. While subjects in both the low and high power heterogenous groups spent about equal time on expectancy-consistent information about a target group member, subjects in the high power heterogenous group spent more time on expectancy-inconsistent information than subjects in the low power heterogenous group. In addition, subjects in the high power condition made more dispositional inferences about the target than subjects in the low power condition. Overall, these results are very similar to the

individuating impression formation processes used by symmetrically dependent individuals.

Stevens and Fiske (1992) conducted a preliminary study which concentrated solely on individual asymmetrical outcome dependence. Subjects were either not dependent on the other or they were asymmetrically dependent on the other. While the asymmetrically dependent subjects tended to spend more time overall on the information about the other (M=76.55) than did non-dependent subjects (M=69.20), $F(1,50)=2.99$, $p=.09$, they did not distinguish between expectancy-consistent and expectancy-inconsistent information (although standard stimuli were used and freshly pretested). Asymmetrically dependent subjects did make more dispositional comments (M=4.00) than did non-dependent subjects (M=2.45), $F(1,50)=5.74$, $p<.05$, but, again, they did not distinguish between expectancy-consistent and expectancy-inconsistent information.

The three studies reviewed above suggest that, compared to non-dependent individuals, asymmetrically dependent individuals will engage in individuating processes of impression formation that are similar to those used by symmetrically dependent individuals. However, there do appear to be some differences in these processes.

Individuating processes of impression formation may allow symmetrically dependent individuals to gain a good deal of control over their outcomes, but would individuating processes also allow asymmetrically dependent individuals to regain all of their lost control? Asymmetrical dependence is not reciprocal. Unlike a member of a symmetrically dependent dyad, a powerless person cannot influence the powerful person's outcomes to any degree. Thus, it seems that the

powerless person in an asymmetrically dependent situation would have less control than a person in a symmetrically dependent situation. This additional loss of control should motivate the powerless to be extremely accurate about the person on whom they are asymmetrically dependent. Thus, asymmetrically dependent subjects may be more accurate than symmetrically interdependent subjects.

The critical issue is how this increase in accuracy motivation would differentiate symmetrically and asymmetrically dependent subjects. Findings from research on symmetrical dependence seem to shed some light on this issue (Ruscher & Fiske, 1990; Ruscher, et al., 1991). Both the think-aloud protocols of subjects and the variability of their responses suggest that some people discount the inconsistent information (which seems not to be a fully accuracy-oriented process because they are not using all the available information) while some people do incorporate all the information (which seems to be a more accuracy-oriented process because they are using all the available information). In an effort to be accurate, subjects may accept all of the information they receive about the powerful target as valid and use all of it. By disagreeing with or making an excuse for a piece of information, subjects are discounting the information. Thus, in an attempt to regain prediction and control, asymmetrically dependent subjects should process information accurately and should not discount the information they receive about the powerful other person. Asymmetrically dependent subjects should do this more than not dependent or symmetrically dependent subjects.

Impression Formation and Asymmetrical Dependence on an Evaluator

While people are often in asymmetrically dependent relationships like those described above, a more common type of asymmetrical dependence is asymmetrical dependence on someone who is evaluating your performance. Evaluative dependence is quite different from asymmetrical dependence related to concrete outcomes. Not only does an evaluator have control over the dependent person's tangible outcomes, but an evaluator also provides information regarding the dependent person's competence at a task. Thus, an evaluator evokes some threat to the dependent person's self-esteem. So, dependent people not only rely on an evaluator for their task outcomes, but they also rely on an evaluator for information relevant to self-esteem. Because these evaluatively dependent people have more at stake (self-esteem in addition to tangible outcomes) than purely outcome asymmetrically dependent people, they may have even less of a sense of prediction and control.

Interestingly, Swann (Swann, 1990; Swann, Stein-Seroussi, & Giesler, 1992) has shown that people have mixed motives when it comes to self-perception. They are motivated both to be accurate about their traits and to maintain their self-esteem. Although there is no evidence addressing this point yet, it is probably true that these same mixed motives would be evident in people's perception of others who have control over the them. Evaluatively dependent perceivers should seek information about the evaluator, yet they should also monitor the information in an attempt to maintain their self-esteem. The most effective way to protect one's self-esteem may be to picture the powerful other as competent; someone who is fair, predictable, and consistent.

Kunda and Sanitioso (1989; see also Kunda, 1987) have proposed and supported the idea that motivation may cause changes in people's temporary self-conceptions by guiding people's memory searches and leading only to the activation of self-conceptions that are consistent with the currently desired view of the self. Analogously, in an attempt to maintain their self-esteem, dependent people may engage in similar kinds of changes in their conceptions of a powerful other who has some impact on their feelings of self-worth. These changes may be accomplished via motivated biases in the search through information about the powerful other. In other words, evaluatively dependent perceivers would search for positive information about the evaluator. In fact, Pepitone (1950) found distortions in a positive direction in subjects who were evaluatively dependent on a group of others.

Klein and Kunda (1992) have proposed that people who are motivated to hold certain beliefs about others attempt to construct rational justifications for their desired beliefs. Thus, when confronted with negative information about their evaluator, evaluatively dependent people may attempt to discount that information in order to justify their positive beliefs about the evaluator.

A preliminary study on evaluatively dependent individuals conducted by Stevens and Fiske (1991) provides evidence on this point. An expectancy (positive, negative) by information consistency (consistent, inconsistent) interaction indicated that evaluatively dependent subjects in the positive expectancy condition spent more time on expectancy-inconsistent information (the negative information) than on expectancy-consistent information. Subjects in the negative expectancy condition spent more time on expectancy-consistent

information (also the negative information) than on expectancy-inconsistent information. Overall, subjects spent more time on negative information (M=78.72) than positive information (M=69.88), $F(1,79)=22.18$, $p<.0001$. While initially this may seem to contradict the prediction that evaluatively dependent people would search for positive information about the evaluator, further inspection indicates it does not. A similar interaction revealed that subjects were discounting the negative information (M=1.97) much more than the positive information (M=0.19), $F(1,79)=48.72$, $p<.0001$. So, the increased time spent on negative information was used to construct justification for the subjects' otherwise positive view of the evaluator. Unfortunately, this study did not have a non-dependent control condition with which to compare.

Summary

In summary, symmetrically and asymmetrically dependent individuals should form impressions in different ways. To begin, symmetrically dependent people have lost some control over their own outcomes, but they have also retained some control over the other person (i.e., the symmetrical nature of the dependence allows the dependent person to influence the other person's outcomes as much as the other person influences the dependent person's). Therefore, it would be useful for symmetrically dependent people to accurately process information about the other person in an attempt to predict the other person's behavior. Of course, symmetrically dependent people do not need to be extremely accurate, although they can be, because they also have the means with which to directly influence the other person's behavior.

On the other hand, asymmetrically dependent individuals have lost some control over their own outcomes, but they have not retained any control over the other person (i.e., the asymmetrical nature of the dependence dictates that the dependent person cannot affect the powerful person's outcomes in any major way). Thus, asymmetrically dependent people should be motivated to process information about the powerful person extremely accurately in an attempt to successfully predict the powerful person's behavior. They do not have any other guaranteed means of control.

Finally, like asymmetrically dependent people, evaluatively dependent individuals also have lost some control over their outcomes without retaining control over the other person. In addition, they have lost some control over their self-esteem because they are subjected to the evaluation of their performance, and competence is a central aspect of self-esteem. While evaluatively dependent people could be motivated to be accurate in order to predict the other's evaluative behavior, the personal threat is greater than for the other two types of dependence. Therefore, evaluatively dependent people may interpret information about the other person in a self-protective manner and conclude that a seemingly incompetent other person is in fact competent because an incompetent evaluator is threatening; an incompetent evaluator could be unfair, inconsistent, wrong, and therefore unpredictable.

Two studies were performed in order to address the above hypotheses regarding how the dependent person in an asymmetrical relationship forms an impression of the powerful other. The first study investigated the relationship between non-dependent, asymmetrically

dependent, and symmetrically dependent individuals. The second study concentrated on non-dependent and evaluatively dependent individuals.

CHAPTER 2

EXPERIMENT 1

Method

Overview

An experimenter led subjects to believe that they would be working with a fictitious other subject on a task. In addition, the experimenter told the subjects they would be eligible for a prize based on (a) their individual performance (no dependence), (b) their joint performance with the fictitious subject who had already been paid a set fee for participating (asymmetrical dependence), or (c) their joint performance with the fictitious subject who also would be eligible for a prize based on their joint performance (symmetrical dependence). The fictitious subject was initially portrayed as competent (positive expectation) or incompetent (negative expectation). Subjects then received both expectancy-consistent and expectancy-inconsistent information about the fictitious subject and voiced their reactions to that information into a tape recorder. This created a three-way design with two between-subjects variables (dependence and expectation) and one within-subject variable (information consistency). We expected asymmetrically dependent subjects to use accuracy-oriented processes and to individuate the other person. In other words, compared to non-dependent subjects, asymmetrically dependent subjects should spend more time attending to the inconsistent information, just as do symmetrically dependent subjects. In addition, because asymmetrically dependent subjects are so strongly motivated to be accurate, they will discount the information less often than the other subjects.

Subjects

Ninety-two (65 females and 27 males) introductory psychology students from the University of Massachusetts at Amherst received extra credit for their participation. Subjects were randomly assigned to one of the six conditions created by the between-subjects variables. One subject's data were deleted due to experimenter error. In addition, the data of two subjects who volunteered suspicion about the alleged other subject, two subjects who understood English poorly, and 10 subjects who were more than two and a half standard deviations above the median on the critical variable of attention time were deleted from the analyses.[1] This left 77 subjects, 25-27 in each cell of the critical two-way interaction between dependence (a between-subjects variable) and information consistency (the within-subject variable). Positivity of expectancy was included as a counterbalancing variable to unconfound consistency and positivity.

Procedure

When subjects arrived, the experimenter explained that the person with whom they would be working was a non-student volunteer who had an opportunity to earn some money by participating in the study. This alleged person, always the same sex as the subject, was working on the preliminary stages of the experiment in another room with another experimenter. There were seven wind-up toys, paper, pen, and pencil on the table that would presumably be used for the task.

The experimenter briefly explained that the researchers were looking at how people work together on a creative task. So, later in the study, the experimenter would ask them to think up educational games for 8 year-olds using the wind-up toys. For example, subtraction could

be shown by winding up a toy and letting it hop away from the remaining toys. While explaining the task, the experimenter tried to convey that skill and creativity would be helpful. The subject and the volunteer were to think of ideas alone at first. In the second step, they would work together. Supposedly, the experimenter would be comparing people's performance alone versus their performance together.

Subjects then performed a bogus creativity task. They had two minutes in which to generate as many words as they could using the letters from larger words. The task supposedly warmed up the subjects for the later task. However, the true purpose of this activity was to give subjects positive feedback and to boost their feeling of competence. This was done because previous research (Ruscher & Fiske, 1990) has shown that subjects low in self-perceived competence respond differently than do subjects high in self-perceived competence.

Dependency Manipulation

The experimenter then informed subjects that, as extra incentive and in an effort to make things similar for them and the volunteers, they would also have an opportunity to earn some money. In the no-dependence condition, the volunteer received $10 merely for participating, and the subjects were eligible for one of three $50 prizes for the most creative ideas based on their performance alone, in the first phase of the study. In the asymmetrical-dependence condition, the volunteer received $10 merely for participating, and the subjects were eligible for one of three $50 prizes based on their performance with their partner in the second phase of the study. In the symmetrical-dependence condition, the volunteer and the subjects were jointly eligible for one of six $50 prizes (three for volunteers and

three for students) for the most creative ideas based on their performance with their partner in the second phase of the study. Subjects signed a form indicating that they understood how the prizes would be awarded.

Expectancy Manipulation

The experimenter then told subjects that the researchers were also interested in whether subjects knowing something about the person with whom they worked would affect performance. Due to time constraints, the subjects would receive information about their volunteer partners, but volunteer subjects would not receive information about the student subjects. The experimenter allegedly had some background information about the volunteer partners available from a pre-testing session and would not have to take additional time gathering the information. Supposedly, complex statistical analyses made it possible to look at how information affected only one person in a two-person pair.

After this explanation, subjects received a summary report on the volunteer. The summary report listed the volunteer's high school grade point average and scores on a number of creativity and skill tests. One version of the summary report portrayed a competent person (positive expectation) and the other portrayed an incompetent person (negative expectation). Subjects looked over this summary sheet while the experimenter went down the hall allegedly to pick up some additional information from the volunteer.

Consistency of Information Manipulation

After the experimenter returned, the subjects were asked to go through the information that the volunteer had supposedly given the experimenter to supplement the test scores. The experimenter told the

subjects that their initial reactions to this information was of interest to the researchers. Thus, they would like to record their reactions on an audiotape. After reassuring subjects of the anonymity of their responses, especially with respect to the fictitious other person, the experiment asked subjects to read each piece of information aloud and to comment about it.

This information consisted of ten sentences the volunteer had supposedly written. Five of the sentences were consistent with competence and inconsistent with incompetence. The other five sentences were consistent with incompetence and inconsistent with competence. These statements, which were based on statements used in previous research (Ruscher, 1991), were pretested (see Appendix A) and are available in Appendix B. The sentences appeared in a different random order for each subject, with the stipulation that no more than two competency or two incompetency statements appeared consecutively.

When subjects finished commenting on the information about the volunteer, they completed a short questionnaire (see Appendix C). On 11-point bipolar scales, subjects rated how competent, likable, and good at the task the fictitious volunteer was. In addition, subjects rated their own competency at the task, their perceived control, and how happy they were with their partner. Subjects also rated how much their individual and their joint performance would affect the distribution of the prizes. Finally, subjects rated the consistency, clarity, and positivity of their impression of the fictitious other person. A second part of the questionnaire asked subjects to recall the purpose of the experiment and comment on the study so far. Once this questionnaire was completed, the experimenter probed subjects for suspicion and debriefed

them. A random drawing for the three $50 prizes was held when the study was completed.

Data from protocols. From the audiotapes, the experimenter recorded the number of seconds subjects considered each piece of information. The experimenter was blind to condition. Timing always commenced when subjects began to read each statement. Subjects' tape-recorded comments were then coded into discrete categories (see Table 1). In addition, because of the specific hypotheses here, the comments were also coded for discounting. To assess reliability of the coding scheme, another individual, who was also blind to condition, coded a random third of the protocols; 809 comments were used to assess reliability of the coding scheme. Cohen's kappa coefficients were computed for each code type are as follows: dispositions, k=.84; elaborations, k=.81; evaluations, k=.94; hedging, k=.98; attribute matching, k=.72; repetitions, k=.79; self-reference, k=.88; no comment, k=1.00; and discounting, k=.80 (median k=.84).

Results

Manipulation Checks

An aggregate measure of subjects' perceptions of the fictitious other's positivity was computed from five items on the questionnaire: competence of the other, likability of the other, how well the other would do on the task, positivity of subjects' impressions of the other, and how happy the subjects were having the other as their partner. As expected, subjects in the competent expectancy condition rated the other person more positively (M=8.61) than did subjects in the incompetent expectancy condition (M=6.84), $F(1,71)=34.15$, $p<.0001$.

Further, as expected, there was a main effect for dependence on the questionnaire measure of how much the joint performance of the subject and the fictitious other would affect the distribution of the prizes, $F(2,71)=5.03$, $p<.01$. An a priori contrast indicated that subjects in the non-dependence condition rated the influence of their joint performance significantly lower ($M=5.82$) than subjects in the asymmetrical and symmetrical dependence conditions ($Ms=8.04$ and 7.92, respectively), $F(1,75)=10.02$, $p<.01$. This accurately reflects the instructions these subjects were given. It also indicates that subjects perceived the reward contingencies for the asymmetrical and symmetrical dependence situations as similar.

Timed Attention

The total number of seconds subjects attended to attribute information was entered into a 2X2X2 mixed-model analysis of variance (ANOVA): Dependence (none, asymmetrical, symmetrical) X Expectation (positive, negative) X Information Consistency (expectancy-consistent, expectancy-inconsistent). This analysis yielded the predicted dependence by information consistency interaction, $F(2,71)=3.99$, $p<.05$, indicating that attention to inconsistent information increased from no ($M=74.19$) to asymmetrical ($M=77.01$) to symmetrical ($M=77.78$) dependence and that attention to consistent information decreased from no ($M=78.96$) to asymmetrical ($M=76.51$) to symmetrical ($M=74.93$) dependence (see Figure 1). An a priori contrast indicated that, compared to subjects in the no-dependence condition, subjects in the symmetrical-dependence condition spent more time on inconsistent than consistent information, $F(1,75)=3.99$, $p<.05$. A test of the residual was not significant, $F<1$, indicating that the interaction was linear. Subjects in the

asymmetrical-dependence condition spent about equal time on inconsistent and consistent information.

Think-aloud Protocols

For each comment type described in Table 1 that accounted for more than 10% of the total comments made, the number of such comments served as the dependent variable entered into a 2X2X2 mixed-model ANOVA, using the independent variables noted above.

Discounting. As originally predicted, the ANOVA yielded a main effect for dependence. Asymmetrically dependent subjects discounted the information the least (M=1.13), while symmetrically dependent subjects and non-dependent subjects discounted the information more often (Ms=2.06 and 2.36, respectively), $F(2,71)=3.45$, $p<.05$. An a priori contrast provided further support that asymmetrically dependent subjects discounted the information less often than the other subjects, $F(1,75)=6.43$, $p<.05$.

Two higher order effects were also present. A two-way interaction between expectancy and consistency indicated that negative expectancy subjects discounted consistent information more than inconsistent and that positive expectancy subjects discounted inconsistent information more than consistent $F(1,71)=81.27$, $p<.0001$. In other words, negative information was discounted more often (M=2.92) than positive information (M=0.83). Thus, it seems subjects attempted to make their partner appear positive. People would prefer to work with people they find competent than people they find incompetent. In addition, a three-way interaction among dependence, expectancy, and consistency reflected the combined influence of the two other significant effects, $F(2,71)=4.61$, $p<.05$. While all subjects discounted negative information more than

positive, the asymmetrically dependent subjects discounted both the negative (M=1.69) and positive information (M=0.56) less than the not dependent (negative M=3.74 and positive M=0.09) or symmetrically dependent subjects (negative M=3.21 and positive M=0.91).

Other Comments. A two-way interaction between expectancy and consistency indicated that negative expectancy subjects were more likely to make dispositional comments about inconsistent information and positive expectancy subjects were more likely to make dispositional comments about consistent information, $F(1,71)=36.42$, $p<.0001$. So, more dispositional comments were made about positive information (M=5.35) than negative information (M=3.78). Once again, subjects were more likely to attribute positive than negative attributes to their partner's disposition.

All subjects made more elaborations about negative information (M=4.39) than positive information (M=2.94), as indicated by another two-way interaction between expectancy and consistency, $F(1,71)=18.93$, $p<.0001$. Many of these elaborations about negative information were elaborations that discounted the negative information. Again, subjects tried to make their partner appear a competent other.

In addition, a two-way interaction between expectancy and information indicated that subjects hedged more often on negative information (M=4.83) than positive information (M=4.08), $F(1,71)=9.77$, $p<.01$. Once again, the subjects seemed uncomfortable with the negative information.[2]

Consistency

Finally, a contrast indicated that asymmetrically dependent subjects (M=5.36) tended to rate the information as less consistent than

the other subjects (not dependent M=6.78 and symmetrically dependent M=6.52), $F(1,75)=3.46$, p=.07. This seems to demonstrate that asymmetrical subjects recognized the actual variability of the comments more accurately than other subjects.

Summary and Conclusions

As anticipated, relative to non-dependent subjects, asymmetrically dependent subjects increased their attention to expectancy-inconsistent information, just as do symmetrically dependent subjects. In addition, attention to expectancy-consistent information decreased from no to asymmetrical to symmetrical dependence conditions. In addition, asymmetrically dependent subjects discounted the information less often than the other subjects. Thus, the behavior of the subjects substantiates the hypothesis that asymmetrically dependent subjects would be motivated to use accuracy-oriented processes and to individuate the other person in an attempt to regain lost prediction and control.

Furthermore, it seemed as though all subjects wanted to view the other person in a positive light. They discounted, elaborated, and hedged about the negative information, while they made dispositional attributions about the positive information. This natural tendency to want to view a partner as competent rather than incompetent may have been motivated by the subjects' drive to maintain their self-esteem. An incompetent partner may be somewhat threatening to self-esteem.

Both the motivation to seek information about and to be positive about the other may grow stronger with additional losses to peoples' prediction and control. Evaluatively dependent individuals lose prediction and control over their outcomes and, to a greater degree than asymmetrically dependent individuals, over their sense of self-esteem.

Thus, evaluatively dependent individuals would probably be strongly motivated to interpret information about the powerful other on whom they depend in a positive manner. The next study addresses this point.

Table 1. Content Categories for Subjects' Comments about Target Information

Category	Explanation
Disposition	Inference about target's traits, tendencies, likes.
Elaboration	Interpretation of what the information means or implies.
Evaluation	Evaluation without interpretation.
Hedging	Comment not directed at anything in particular. A pause filled with "well....uh."
Attribute	Attempt to match information to prior knowledge of target.
Repetition	Verbatim or paraphrased restatement.
Self-reference	Self-comparison, reference to self, opinions.
No comment	No comment made or subject says "no comment."
Discounting	Changing the valence of the information or making an excuse for it.



Figure 1. Attention to Inconsistent and Consistent Information

CHAPTER 3

EXPERIMENT 2

Method

Overview

An experimenter led subjects to believe that their performance would (asymmetrical evaluative dependence) or would not (no dependence) be evaluated by a fictitious other, whom they expected to meet. In addition, the experimenter told the subjects they would be eligible for a prize based on the evaluation of their performance. The fictitious subject was initially portrayed as competent (positive expectation) or incompetent (negative expectation)[3]. Subjects then received both positive and negative (expectancy-consistent and expectancy-inconsistent) information about the fictitious subject and voiced their reactions to that information into a tape recorder. This created a three-way design with two between-subjects variables (dependence and expectation) and one within-subject variable (consistency of information). We expected evaluatively dependent subjects to inaccurately, selectively encode information about the other person in order to make the other person seem more positive. In other words, evaluatively dependent subjects should discount the negative information more than non-dependent subjects.

Subjects

Fifty-three (35 females and 18 males) introductory psychology students from the University of Massachusetts at Amherst received extra credit for their participation. Subjects were randomly assigned to one of the four conditions created by the between-subjects variables. The data of two subjects who volunteered suspicion about the alleged other

subject, three subjects who understood English poorly, and three subjects who were more than two and a half standard deviations above the median on the critical variable of attention time were deleted from the analyses.[4] This left 45 subjects, 22-23 in each cell of the critical two-way interaction between dependence (a between-subjects variable) and consistency of information (the within-subject variable). Positivity of expectancy was included as a counterbalancing variable to unconfound consistency and positivity.

Procedure

When subjects arrived, the experimenter explained that a work-study undergraduate was also participating in the study.[5] This alleged person, always the same sex as the subject, was waiting in another room. There were seven wind-up toys, paper, pen, and pencil on the table that would presumably be needed for the task.

The experimenter briefly explained that the researchers were looking at how discussion affects performance on a creative task. So, later in the study, the experimenter would ask them to think up ways to communicate concepts using the wind-up toys. For instance, subtraction could be shown by winding up a toy and letting it hop away from the remaining toys. Supposedly, the experimenter would be comparing the performance of two groups of subjects--one group of people who discuss their ideas and another group of people who do not discuss their ideas. Thus, some people in the study would be having a discussion with the fictitious other person and other subjects would not.

Subjects then performed the bogus creativity task used earlier, supposedly to get warmed up for the later task. However, as in the

first study, the true purpose of this activity was to give subjects positive feedback and to boost their feeling of competence.

Dependency Manipulation

The experimenter then told the subjects that they happened to be in the condition of the study where they would have the discussion with the fictitious other person. In fact, all of the subjects were in this "condition."

The experimenter proceeded to inform subjects that, supposedly as a way to thank subjects for their time and effort, a number of $20 prizes[6] would be distributed for the most creative ideas. In the no-dependence condition, the research supervisor would be awarding the prizes. In the evaluative-dependence condition, the fictitious other person with whom the subjects would be discussing their ideas would be awarding the prizes. Subjects signed a form indicating that they understood how the prizes would be awarded.

Expectancy Manipulation

The experimenter then told subjects that, in an effort to make the study more like a real-life work situation, they would be receiving some information about the person with whom they would be discussing their ideas. The first piece of information would be a brief statement written by the other person explaining how well this person expected to do in the discussion. This statement served to manipulate subjects' expectancy for the other person. The competent expectancy statement read: "To be honest, I think I might be pretty good at this. I've been a teaching assistant for several semesters now and I've done pretty well, especially with things like this." The incompetent expectancy statement read: "To be honest, I'm not sure if I'll be any good at

this. I was a teaching assistant last semester, but I didn't to so great, especially with things like this."

Consistency of Information Manipulation

After the subjects read this statement, the experimenter explained that the next bit of information would be ten comments taken from an informal evaluation of the person when that person was a teaching assistant. The experimenter also explained that this was the first time information from a teaching evaluation had been used in a study. Thus, the researchers were interested in subjects' reactions to the information and would like to record their initial responses to it on an audiotape. After reassuring subjects of the anonymity of their responses, especially with respect to the fictitious other person, the experiment asked subjects to read each piece of information aloud and to comment about it.

This information was mixed. Five of the sentences were consistent with the positive expectancy (competence) and the other five sentences were consistent with the negative expectancy (incompetence). These statements, which were based on statements used in previous research (Erber & Fiske, 1984; Ruscher & Fiske, 1990), were pretested (see Appendix D) and are available in Appendix E. The sentences appeared in a different random order for each subject, with the stipulation that no more than two positive or two negative statements appeared consecutively.

When subjects finished commenting on the information about the volunteer, they completed a short questionnaire (see Appendix F). On nine-point bipolar scales, subjects rated how competent, likable, and good at the discussion the fictitious other was. In addition, subjects

rated their own competency at the task and their perceived control. A second part of the questionnaire asked subjects to recall the purpose of the experiment and comment on the study so far. Once this questionnaire was completed, the experimenter probed subjects for suspicion and debriefed them. A random drawing for the three $20 prizes was held when the study was completed.

Data from protocols. Attention and comments were assessed as before. To assess reliability, a second individual coded a random third of the protocols; 597 comments were used to assess reliability of the coding scheme. Cohen's kappa coefficients were computed for each code type are as follows: dispositions, k=.81; elaborations, k=.84; evaluations, k=.82; hedging, k=.98; attribute matching, k=.78; repetitions, k=.66; self-reference, k=1.00; no comment, k=1.00; and discounting, k=.85 (median k=.84).

Results

Manipulation Checks

A measure of subjects' perception of how well the fictitious other expected to do in the discussion indicated that the expectancy manipulation worked. Subjects in the positive expectancy condition expected the other person to do better in the discussion (M=7.64) than subjects in the negative expectancy condition (M=4.78), $F(1,41)=57.22$, $p<.0001$.

Further, there was a main effect for dependence on the questionnaire measure of how much control the other person had over whether the subject won the prize, $F(2,41)=75.40$, $p<.0001$. Subjects who were not dependent indicated that the other person had less control

(M=2.64) than subjects who were evaluatively dependent (M=7.18). This accurately reflects the instructions these subjects were given.

Timed Attention

The total number of seconds subjects attended to attribute information was entered into a 2X2X2 mixed-model analysis of variance (ANOVA): Dependence (none, evaluative) X Expectation (positive, negative) X Information Consistency (positive, negative). This analysis yielded only one significant effect: an interaction between expectancy and consistency of information, $F(1,41)=19.58$, $p<.001$, indicating that subjects in the positive expectancy condition spent more time on inconsistent information than consistent information and that subjects in the negative expectancy condition spent more time on consistent information than inconsistent information. Overall, all subjects spent more time on negative (M=79.75) than positive information (M=70.45). This is not unusual. A great deal of person perception research has indicated that, in general, negative information is considered more informative than positive information (see Skowronski & Carlston, 1989).

Think-aloud Protocols

For each comment type described in Table 1 that accounted for more than 10% of the total comments made, the number of such comments served as the dependent variable entered into a 2X2X2 mixed-model ANOVA, using the independent variables noted above.

Discounting. As predicted, the ANOVA yielded a two-way interaction between expectancy and consistency similar to the interaction on timed attention, $F(1,41)=19.81$, $p<.001$. It indicated that subjects discounted negative information (M=2.56) more often than positive information (M=0.067). In addition, a three-way interaction

among expectancy, dependence, and consistency, $F(1,41)=4.05$, $p=.05$, indicated that, while both non-dependent and evaluatively dependent subjects discounted more negative ($M=1.41$ and $M=3.70$, respectively) than positive ($M=0.045$ and $M=0.087$, respectively) information, this difference was much larger for evaluatively dependent subjects (see Figure 2).[7] There was also a main effect for dependence, $F(1,41)=4.41$, $p<.05$. Overall, evaluatively dependent subjects discounted the information more ($M=1.89$) than non-dependent subjects ($M=0.73$). As hypothesized, this may have been in an effort to interpret the information about the evaluator in a positive manner.

Other Comments. The only other significant effects for the comments were interactions between expectancy and consistency. These interactions were similar to the two presented above for timed attention and discounting. As above, here they are presented in terms of information valence rather than consistency. More dispositional comments were made about the positive information ($M=4.62$) than the negative information ($M=2.47$), $F(1,41)=34.16$, $p<.0001$. More elaborations were made about negative information ($M=5.22$) than positive information ($M=4.24$), $F(1,41)=4.88$, $p<.05$. More evaluative comments were made about positive information ($M=1.47$) than negative information ($M=1.11$), $F(1,41)=5.05$, $p<.05$. Finally, more hedges were made about negative information ($M=5.78$) than positive information ($M=4.38$), $F(1,41)=22.03$, $p<.0001$. As in Experiment 1, these findings seem to indicate that subjects preferred to view the other person in a positive rather than a negative manner. While they discounted, elaborated, and hedged about the negative information, they preferred to make dispositional inferences and comment on the valence of the positive

comments. The subjects seemed more comfortable with the positive aspects of the other.

Inaccuracy

While subjects accurately indicated that the fictitious other person in the positive expectancy condition would do better in the discussion than the fictitious other person in the negative expectancy condition as described in the manipulation check section above, there were other inaccuracies on this measure. Overall, evaluatively dependent subjects thought the other person would do better in the discussion (M=7.00) than did non-dependent subjects (M=5.64), $F(1,41)=11.14$, $p<.01$. A two-way interaction between dependence and expectancy, $F(1,41)=7.13$, $p<.05$ (see Figure 3), indicated that both non-dependent and evaluatively dependent subjects in the positive expectancy condition accurately perceived the other's competence and rated it high (M=7.73 and M=8.0, respectively). However, in the negative expectancy condition, only the non-dependent subjects recognized the other person's incompetence (M=3.55). The evaluatively dependent subjects rated the incompetent other as fairly competent (M=6.0). Thus, the evaluatively dependent subjects inaccurate perception of the other person's competence in the negative expectancy condition drove the main effect for dependence.



Figure 2. Discounting Positive and Negative Information



Figure 3. Inaccuracy in Subjects' Perceptions of Other's Competency

CHAPTER 4

DISCUSSION

The results of these two experiments suggest that task dependent and evaluatively dependent individuals process information about powerful others in two different ways. Task dependent individuals are motivated to attend to information both inconsistent and consistent with initial expectations about the powerful other. The decrease in attention to consistent information relative to non-dependent individuals is interesting because it indicates that less expectancy confirming processing is occurring. The increase in attention to inconsistent information relative to non-dependent individuals is of particular interest because it is a necessary condition for more individuating processes. Moreover, these individuating processes of impression formation are particularly accuracy-oriented, and all the information is considered equally. Task dependent individuals discount the information less often than either non-dependent or symmetrically dependent individuals. These results largely confirm the original predictions.

On the other hand, evaluatively dependent individuals work with information about the powerful other quite differently. They are not particularly concerned with information consistent or inconsistent with prior expectancies. Instead, they spend most of their effort on any negative information that is available. Evaluatively dependent individuals discount this negative information and are motivated to form a positive impression of the powerful other. Again, the original predictions were largely confirmed.

Issues of Prediction and Control

The different processes of impression formation used by task and evaluatively dependent individuals seem to be a consequence of different levels of prediction and control. Neither is exactly like those processes found under conditions of symmetrical dependence. Asymmetrical dependence is characterized by less control than symmetrical dependence. Asymmetrically dependent individuals, by definition, have no control over the other's outcomes. Yet, conditions of task dependence do give the dependent person an opportunity to work with the powerful other. Thus, the powerless person could gain some control over outcomes by influencing the powerful other. However, there is no guarantee that the powerful other would be receptive to this influence. Therefore, it is in the powerless person's best interest to have accurate information about the powerful person in order to predict behavior. This accurate information provides the powerless person with some sense of control or at least prediction over outcomes.

In the evaluatively dependent case, the powerless person not only loses prediction and control over outcomes, but also over self-esteem maintenance. The evaluator has the ability to give negative feedback. This threat to self-esteem, not just to tangible outcomes, motivates the powerless to view the evaluator in positive manner. A competent evaluator would be less likely to threaten the powerless person's feelings of self-worth than a incompetent evaluator. Thus, in an attempt to regain prediction and control over self-esteem, the powerless are motivated to use inaccurate processes of impression formation and to engage in wishful thinking.

Impression Formation

According to Fiske and Neuberg's (1990) continuum model of impression formation, people shift toward more individuating processes only when they are motivated to do so. Research has shown that this shift toward the individuating processes of impression formation does occur under conditions of symmetrical dependence (Berscheid et al., 1976; Erber & Fiske, 1984; Neuberg & Fiske, 1987; Ruscher & Fiske, 1990; Ruscher et al., 1991). Experiment 1 provides evidence that task asymmetrically dependent individuals are also motivated to shift toward the individuating processes of impression formation. In fact, they seem to use even more accuracy-oriented processes than symmetrically dependent individuals. Alternatively, the absence of an increase in timed attention in Experiment 2 indicates that evaluatively dependent individuals do not use quite as many individuating processes. Yet, they do think about the information differently than non-dependent subjects. They are motivated to think wishfully about the powerful other.

Interestingly, unlike the findings in previous research on symmetrical dependency (Fiske & Pavelchak, 1986; Ruscher & Fiske, 1990; Ruscher et al., 1991), these studies did not show an increase in dispositional inferences about inconsistent information. However, both studies did show an increase in dispositional inferences about positive information, which may indicate that asymmetrical dependence has strong implications for subjects' self-esteem. Therefore, they attempted to view the powerful other in a positive manner by making dispositional inferences about the positive information.

It would be interesting to be able to make more powerful comparisons between the cases of task and evaluative dependence.

Unfortunately, these two conditions were not included in the same study. This semester a study including both cases will be conducted.

Impression formation in conditions of asymmetrical dependence are currently being studied. This research on the powerless person in asymmetrical dyads, Goodwin and Fiske's research on the powerful person in asymmetrical dyads, and Dépret and Fiske's research on the powerless in asymmetrical groups has worked to fill the gap. As a result, we are better able to understand how people cope in unequal power relationships.

APPENDIX A

PRETEST CONSISTENCY RATINGS OF STIMULI FOR EXPERIMENT 1

Sentence	Negative Expectation	Positive Expectation	F(1,27)	p<
Intelligent	2.9	9.2	52.37	.0001
Thorough	3.7	8.7	33.27	.0001
Disciplined	4.1	8.8	33.56	.0001
Conscientious	3.7	8.1	27.01	.0001
Motivated	3.3	8.9	61.53	.0001
Irresponsible	8.8	4.1	39.27	.0001
Vague	7.9	4.0	25.43	.0001
Inefficient	7.5	3.8	19.18	.0005
Nitpicking	7.5	5.1	8.02	.01
Sloppy	7.9	4.2	30.29	.0001

Measured on an 11-point scale (1=completely inconsistent, 11=completely consistent).

APPENDIX B

STIMULI FOR EXPERIMENT 1

Information consistent with positive expectancy

E.C. thinks that I am intelligent because I got good grades in high school.

G.M. thinks that I am thorough because I do a lot of research on my projects.

J.L. thinks that I am disciplined because I focus on what needs to be done and am not easily distracted.

B.H. thinks that I am conscientious because I always worry about getting my work done on time.

S.V. thinks that I am motivated because I often start work early or work through my lunch hour.

Information consistent with negative expectancy

E.D. thinks that I am irresponsible because I don't always follow through on all my projects.

L.G. thinks that I am vague because he says I never explain my ideas clearly.

S.P. thinks that I am inefficient because I don't work as fast as she does.

B.M. thinks that I am nitpicking because I usually don't let people forget when they make a mistake.

L.R. thinks that I am sloppy because I don't keep my files in order.

APPENDIX C

QUESTIONNAIRE FOR EXPERIMENT 1

Part I

Your responses are completely confidential. Please be honest.

1. Please list some personality traits you think characterize this person.

_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____

2. You have received some information about the person with whom you will be working in a few minutes. Do you think this information will be useful for your interaction with this person?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11
very useless										very useful

3. In general, how competent do you think the person with whom you'll be working is?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11
very incom-petent										very com-petent

4. In general, how likable do you think the person with whom you'll be working is?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11
very unlik-able										very lik-able

5. How well do you think you will do in this study?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11
very poorly										very well

6. How well do you think the person with whom you'll be working will do in this study?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11
very poorly										very well

7. How much impact will your individual performance (i.e., your performance alone) have on whether or not you win one of the prizes?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11
very little										very much

8. How much impact will your joint performance (i.e., your performance with the other person) have on whether or not you win one of the prizes?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11
very little										very much

9. How much control do you think you have over how you will do in this study?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11
very little										very much

10. How much control do you think your partner has over how you will do in this study?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11
very little										very much

11. How consistent or inconsistent was the information you received about you partner?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11
very incon-sistent										very con-sis-tent

12. How clear or unclear is your impression of your partner?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11
very unclear										very clear

13. How positive or negative is your impression of your partner?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11
very negative										very positive

14. How happy or unhappy do you feel about having this person as your partner?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11
very unhappy										very happy

Part II

1. Based on what you remember, please briefly describe the study.

2. We are always interested in any comments, ideas, or predictions people have about our studies. If you have any, please describe them below.

APPENDIX D

PRETEST CONSISTENCY RATINGS OF STIMULI FOR EXPERIMENT 2

Sentence	Negative Expectation	Positive Expectation	F(1,30)	p≤
Clever	3.50	5.44	7.91	.01
Persistence	3.38	6.56	22.64	.0001
Quickly	3.63	5.63	6.69	.05
Efficient	3.81	6.56	12.57	.005
Relaxed	3.81	6.19	12.21	.005
Irresponsible	6.44	3.06	15.63	.0005
Vague	5.69	3.69	6.91	.05
Superficial	6.00	4.13	4.75	.05
Nitpicking	5.63	4.06	4.70	.05
Sloppy	5.38	3.13	8.84	.01

Measured on a nine-point scale (1=completely inconsistent, 9=completely consistent).

APPENDIX E

STIMULI FOR EXPERIMENT 2

Information consistent with positive expectancy

I thought the TA sometimes had very clever answers to questions.

I thought the TA had just the right amount of persistence when trying to relate an idea to the class.

I liked how quickly the TA went through the material without omitting any important points.

The TA was efficient and usually got the homework graded way ahead of time.

The TA appeared to be relaxed during teaching.

Information consistent with negative expectancy

From the amount of preparation and the level of organization, I would say that the TA was an irresponsible instructor.

I thought the TA was sort of vague when explaining things.

The TA took a superficial approach to teaching, not showing a lot of interest in the subject.

In the discussion section, the TA spent a lot of time nitpicking at minor details.

The TA was sloppy and had illegible handwriting.

APPENDIX F

QUESTIONNAIRE FOR EXPERIMENT 2

Part I

Your responses are completely confidential. Please be honest.

1. You have received some information about Chris, the person with whom you will discuss your ideas. Do you think this information will be useful for interaction later?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
not at all useful								extremely useful

2. How likable is Chris?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
extremely unlikable								extremely likable

3. How competent is Chris?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
very incompetent								very competent

4. Please list some personality traits you think characterize Chris.

_____ _____

_____ _____

_____ _____

_____

5. How well do you think you will do on the upcoming task?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
very poorly								very well

6. How much control do you think you have over whether you win a prize?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
no control at all								complete control

7. How much control do you think Chris has over whether you win a prize?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
no control at all								complete control

8. How well does Chris expect to do in your discussion?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
not very well								very well

9. How good a TA was Chris?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
not very good								very good

Part II

1. Based on what you remember from the explanation of the study, please briefly describe the study.

2. We are always interested in any comments, ideas, or prediction people have about our studies. If you have any, please describe them below.

ENDNOTES

1. Of the deleted subjects, one was in the no dependence-positive expectancy condition, two were in the no dependence-negative expectancy condition, four were in the asymmetrical dependence-positive expectancy condition, two were in the asymmetrical dependence-negative expectancy condition, four were in the symmetrical dependence-positive expectancy condition, and two were in the symmetrical dependence-negative expectancy condition.

2. Two other significant interaction, theoretically uninteresting, are not discussed here. Subjects expecting an incompetent other made more elaborations than subjects expecting a competent other, $F(1,71)=9.32$, $p<.01$. No and asymmetrically interdependent subjects hedged more often that symmetrically interdependent subjects, $F(1,71)=3.06$, $p=.05$.

3. Of course, competence has a different meaning in an evaluator than in a partner. One would appreciate an extremely competent partner, but may shy away from an evaluator who was too competent. Thus, our competency manipulation was made a little weaker in Experiment 2.

4. Of the deleted subjects, one was in the no dependence-positive expectancy condition, three were in the no dependence-negative expectancy condition, two were in the evaluative dependence-positive expectancy condition, and two were in the evaluative dependence-negative expectancy condition.

5. We opted against using a non-student because we wanted the subjects to believe that the same person would be evaluating all the subjects. It was easier to convince them that a work-study student would be available every time a subject was run than a non-student volunteer.

6. The amount of the prize was reduced in this study because a preliminary study indicated that it took less monetary incentive to get subjects invested in an evaluative dependence task than in an asymmetrical dependence task.

7. For simplicity of presentation this interaction is collapsed over consistency and expectancy. The data is presented in terms of information valence.

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