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# Río Bravo

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# Río Bravo

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## Table of Contents

<b>Usos del Suelo y Configuración de la Estructura Urbana en Ciudad Juárez, Chih., (1960-1990)</b> Cesar M. Fuentes	<b>3</b>
<b>César Chávez, the United Farm Workers and Mexican Immigration</b> Richard Griswold del Castillo	<b>32</b>
<b>Texas Higher Education and Border Funding Inequities: Implications for Border Universities and Transborder Cooperation</b> Ellwyn R. Stoddard	<b>54</b>
<b>Texas Discovers Its Mexican Neighbors: Border-State Governmental Relations, 1978-1991</b> E. V. Niemeyer, Jr.	<b>76</b>
<b>The Mexican Crisis and the Segmented Labor Market of the Lower Rio Grande Valley of Texas</b> Joseph Spielberg Benitez	<b>103</b>
<b>Medicalization of the U.S.-Mexico Border: Is it Really Needed</b> Paul Villas and Erin Frew	<b>120</b>
<b>Reviews/Reseña</b>	<b>133</b>





# Usos del Suelo y Configuración de la Estructura Urbana en Ciudad Juárez, Chih., (1960-1990)

César M. Fuentes\*

## Summary

This study analyzes land use patterns in Ciudad Juárez, Chihuahua, 1960-1990. Since its founding and into the twentieth century, the city has had a dynamic history. But under the period of study, massive migration to Cd. Juárez has fostered important changes in urban patterns. The maquila industry, for example, has directly and indirectly created a large number of jobs. This growth has revolutionized industrial, commercial, agricultural, and habitation patterns of the city. The impact of this recent development is the topic of this work.

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## Introducción.

Desde su fundación y a lo largo del siglo XX, Ciudad Juárez ha sido uno de los centros poblacionales con mayor dinámica demográfica del país, la cual se ha visto incrementada o disminuída por fenómenos sociales, políticos y económicos por los que ha atravesado el país.

Este gran crecimiento poblacional responde principalmente a su localización geográfica respecto a los Estados Unidos, que han convertido a Ciudad Juárez en puente de llegada y paso de una gran cantidad de migrantes en busca de mejores condiciones de vida.

De 1940 a 1950 la población de la ciudad tuvo el crecimiento relativo más alto de su historia. A partir de 1950 la tasa de crecimiento poblacional disminuyó, pero siempre se mantuvo por encima de la nacional.

#### 4-Ciudad Juárez

Durante las décadas de los cincuenta y sesenta el gran crecimiento por migración, aunado al crecimiento natural fueron configurando la estructura urbana de la ciudad.

Un acontecimiento que marcó un cambio importante en la estructura urbana de Ciudad Juárez fue la cancelación del Programa Braceros que condujo a la implementación del Programa de Industrialización Fronteriza, que se inició a mediados de la década de los sesenta el cual reorientó la principal actividad económica de la ciudad, ya que de tener una marcada presencia del subsector turismo y agrícola se transformó en una ciudad con una fuerte estructura industrial especializada en procesos intensivos en mano de obra.

La industria maquiladora creó un importante número de empleos directos e indirectos, incrementando la atracción de la población de otras partes del estado y del país para establecerse en la ciudad.

Durante las décadas de 1970 y 1980 la tasa de crecimiento poblacional continuó siendo alta, aunque en menor medida que en las décadas anteriores.

El crecimiento económico y poblacional que experimentó la ciudad durante la década de los setentas y ochentas transformó la estructura del uso del suelo en Ciudad Juárez.

De 1960 a 1980 la superficie ocupada por la mancha urbana casi se cuadruplicó y de 1980 a 1990 se incrementó en 715 hectáreas.

Historicamente el crecimiento urbano se dirigió del centro de la ciudad hacia el oeste de la misma. A partir de la década de los setenta y ochenta el crecimiento se orientó principalmente hacia el este y sureste de la ciudad.

El oriente de la ciudad con un marcado uso agrícola comenzó a ser ocupado por parques industriales y zonas habitacionales de mediano y alto ingreso. En la parte suroriente se localizó un importante porcentaje de las nuevas zonas habitacionales para población de bajos ingresos y la instalación de algunas industrias. Asimismo las áreas comerciales crecieron sobre las principales vías de acceso a estos nuevos asentamientos de población.

El objetivo del estudio es analizar los cambios en el uso del suelo en Ciudad Juárez, Chih. durante el período 1960–1990.

## Metodología

El estudio requirió de análisis espacial, así como longitudinal con cuatro puntos en el tiempo.

Las variables que se usaron son superficies ocupadas por cada uso del suelo (habitacional, comercial, industrial, agrícola y tiempo (1960, 1970, 1980 y 1990).

En base a lo antes expuesto el estudio requirió de la siguiente metodología.

Para la realización del análisis espacial, se utilizó el Sistema de Información Geográfica Computarizada (IDIRISI)<sup>1</sup> que tiene como objetivo el manejo y distribución de objetos y atributos en un contexto espacial y socioeconómico. Lo anterior con el objetivo de elaborar planos cartográficos en diferentes puntos en el tiempo y usos del suelo, a fin de determinar como se ha ido configurando la estructura urbana de Ciudad Juárez en los últimos 30 años.

Por lo que se requirió de la revisión de los siguientes documentos: El Plan Regulador Urbano de Ciudad Juárez de 1971, El Plan de Desarrollo Urbano de 1979, 1984 y 1989.

El primer paso fué buscar las principales fuentes de información, en este caso se visitó la Dirección de Desarrollo Urbano del Municipio, en busca de los planes reguladores del desarrollo urbano antes mencionados.

Asimismo, se adquirieron planos de la ciudad que tenían una escala de 1: 10,000 y también se recopilaron documentos e investigaciones relacionados con el tema.

Una vez hecho lo anterior, se procedió a marcar en planos de la ciudad las áreas ocupadas por cada uso del suelo (habitacional, industrial, comercial y agrícola) en cada una de las siguientes décadas 1960, 1970, 1980 y 1990.

A los planos que se les había marcado el área ocupada por cada uso del suelo, se procedió a cuadricular y cada cuadro midió 1 centímetro cuadrado. El número total de cuadros del plano fué de 4,067 que representan el total del área estudiada.

Posteriormente se procedió a darle un valor numérico a cada uso del suelo al momento de capturar la matriz de datos.

Al finalizar lo anterior se procedió a filtrar las imágenes resultando una estratificación de los usos del suelo.

Lo anterior se realizó para cada uno de los siguientes años; 1960, 1970, 1980 y 1990.

Cuando se obtuvieron las imágenes de los planos se procedió a calcular las áreas ocupadas por cada uso del suelo, ya que el programa de computación nos presenta un histograma en el cual nos indica el número de celdas que ocupa cada uso del suelo.

### **I.-Orígenes del Patrón de Urbanización en Ciudad Juárez.**

En 1659 una vez que se fundó la misión de Nuestra Señora de Guadalupe se dió la primer forma de urbanización en Ciudad Juárez, la cual se localizó en una planicie al sur del Río Grande.

Este surgió como un importante pueblo de paso para caravanas de comerciantes y migrantes que se dirigían hacia el oeste de los Estados Unidos.

Esta primer forma de urbanización se dió con las características de una misión, la cual consistió en la construcción de la plaza e iglesia cerca de la parte sur del Río Grande como ocurrió en la mayor parte de las ciudades latinoamericanas.

Su localización inicial ha persistido como la principal característica del desarrollo urbano de la ciudad. Su estratégica localización como punto de paso hacia el oeste y el florecimiento de actividades productivas como la agricultura, condujo a una concentración de población y actividades alrededor de la misión que fué uno de los asentamientos poblacionales más importantes en el siglo XVII.<sup>2</sup>

Durante el siglo XVIII la estructura geográfica del asentamiento incluyó la localización del centro alrededor de la misión, presidio, las extensas tierras irrigadas y la continúa orientación del asentamiento al corredor histórico de transportación norte-sur.<sup>3</sup>

Como ya se mencionó, el crecimiento poblacional con el paso del tiempo transformó su estructura urbana debido a la importancia adquirida por su localización geográfica y la riqueza de sus suelos, lo que determinó la instalación del cuartel militar cerca de la ya existente plaza e iglesia, aunado a la importancia que tenía la producción agrícola que cada vez incorporaba una mayor cantidad de tierras y población a esta actividad.

Habr  que recordar que El Paso del Norte fu  fundado en territorio de Nuevo M xico, posteriormente con la independencia de M xico de Espa a, El Paso del Norte pas  a formar parte del naciente estado de Chihuahua en 1824.

El patr n de urbanizaci n de El Paso del Norte fue dram ticamente alterado por el establecimiento del R o Grande como frontera internacional entre M xico y Estado Unidos, aunado al descubrimiento de oro en California durante 1840.<sup>4</sup> Lo anterior atrajo a grandes cantidades de poblaci n, los que encontraron en la poblaci n un punto de provisiones y descanso aunado a un nuevo intercambio comercial internacional.

Los impactos inmediatos se dieron de manera directa al dividir pol ticamente a El Paso del Norte en dos comunidades, una en el estado de Chihuahua en M xico y la otra en el estado de Texas en los Estados Unidos, las cuales manten an en ese momento las mismas caracter sticas culturales,  tnicas y sociales.

El centro hist rico del pueblo qued  en el lado sur del r o, y el lado estadounidense localiz  su centro en la orilla norte del R o Grande, debido a las necesidades de mantener intercambio comercial con la parte mexicana donde se localizaba la mayor parte de la poblaci n, ya que mientras que en el lado mexicano viv an varios miles de personas en la parte norteamericana s lo viv an 50 personas.<sup>5</sup>

Una vez dividido el asentamiento y el valle en dos pa ses, el r o influy  significativamente en el patr n espacial de urbanizaci n, ya que la regi n durante muchos a os se vi  afectada por inundaciones que con cierta regularidad en  pocas de lluvia se presentaban, lo que ocasion  que los asentamientos humanos se localizaran en las partes m s altas del valle, y no mantuviera un patr n de crecimiento regular.

En 1882 se inauguraron las l neas del ferrocarril entre El Paso del Norte y la Ciudad de M xico, lo anterior impact  de manera sobresaliente el patr n de urbanizaci n.

Al revisar los planos de la  poca observamos que la l nea del ferrocarril se vuelve el cord n umbilical de la poblaci n, ya que los nuevos asentamientos humanos se comenzaron a localizar a lo largo de esta v a de comunicaci n, adem s de poder aprovechar su localizaci n geogr fica para el traslado de mercanc as. El anterior



acontecimiento convirtió a El Paso del Norte en un importante centro de exportación e importación, así como un importante mercado de productos agrícolas y ganaderos.

En 1885 después de largas discusiones en el Congreso Mexicano se extendió a lo largo de toda la Frontera Norte la zona libre, que logró cierto auge económico en Ciudad Juárez. Lo que ocasionó que en esa época el movimiento de población en busca de trabajo e inversiones se dirigiera hacia el sur del Río Bravo.<sup>6</sup>

El impacto inicial de lo anterior fue el incremento de la población que alcanzó aproximadamente 12,000 habitantes en 1887.

En 1888, la población de El Paso del Norte fue clasificado como ciudad y su nombre fue cambiado a Ciudad Juárez en honor a Don Benito Juárez.

En 1895 Ciudad Juárez era una ciudad compacta de aproximadamente 6,900 personas ocupando un área aproximadamente de 65 hectáreas. La anterior disminución en el número de habitantes estuvo influido por una crisis económica que vivió la ciudad, lo que provocó una gran migración hacia los Estados Unidos.

Al revisar un mapa realizado por Salvador Arellano en 1894 y presentado por Valencia en 1969, se observó que la actual estructura geográfica de Ciudad Juárez surgió desde finales del siglo XIX.

Como resultado de su relativa incomunicación con el resto del país, Juárez inicialmente creció con un patrón irregular, ya que como mencionamos las principales vías de acceso de la población fueron establecidas para comunicar a los agricultores con la iglesia y la plaza, y las calles fueron trazadas en forma perpendicular al cauce del Río Bravo. Adicionalmente vinieron canales, drenes que después del ferrocarril se agregaron a este irregular patrón urbano.

La falta de un ordenamiento en el sistema de calles en las primeras etapas del crecimiento, sobre todo hacia la parte izquierda del centro de Ciudad Juárez, que creció con un inusual tipo de diseño geográfico con calles estrechas, lo cual condujo a la formación de cuellos de botella en la mayor parte del centro histórico de la ciudad.<sup>7</sup>

Durante la segunda década del siglo XX, acontecimientos como Guerras, Revolución y cambio social produjeron impactos directos e indirectos en la urbanización de Ciudad Juárez.<sup>8</sup>

La Revolución Mexicana incrementó la migración hacia la ciudad, debido a su localización geográfica con respecto a los campos de combate, lo que permitió que importantes cantidades de población buscaran ponerse a salvo del conflicto y algunas familias ricas del norte del país “salvaran sus fortunas” al cambiar su residencia a El Paso Texas. Además de que la ciudad fue el punto de paso para el contrabando de importantes cantidades de armas para la revolución.

La población de Ciudad Juárez se incrementó de 10,621 habitantes en 1910 a 19,457 en 1920. Esta fue probablemente la más grande tasa de crecimiento desde el siglo XVII.<sup>9</sup>

Otro evento que tuvo influencia en el crecimiento de la ciudad y en los nuevos usos del suelo fue la Primera Guerra Mundial, ya que se incrementó el número de tropas estadounidenses en el Fuerte de Fort Bliss en El Paso Texas, los cuales demandaban una serie de servicios entre los que se encontraban principalmente los turísticos. El área dedicada a actividades comerciales creció con el número de bares, clubes nocturnos y salones de juego. Estas actividades se localizaron en el primer cuadro de la ciudad junto al puente internacional, para facilitar el acceso del turismo.

En 1930 la población de la ciudad alcanzó cerca de 40,000 habitantes, un incremento de un 100% respecto a la década anterior y el área urbanizada en 1934 fue de 471 hectáreas.<sup>10</sup> Aunque virtualmente la población total de esta compacta ciudad, vivía dentro de un área de un kilómetro a partir de la plaza central, presentando un patrón concéntrico.

Un estrecho corredor del asentamiento empezó a crecer hacia el lado izquierdo del centro, a lo largo de la parte este de la montaña, extendiéndose hacia abajo de la Sierra de Juárez.

En esta misma década la actividad industrial era casi inexistente, pero debido al gran crecimiento poblacional la demanda de terrenos para uso urbano y agrícola se incrementó.

Durante la década de los cuarenta, la población de Ciudad Juárez experimentó un crecimiento inusitado. La migración interna

contribuyó con el 78.1% de la población y el crecimiento natural con el 21.9%.<sup>11</sup> Lo anterior estuvo fuertemente influido por la instauración en 1942 de El Programa Braceros acordado entre México y los Estados Unidos, así como por el éxodo de miles de trabajadores no documentados. Este acontecimiento atrajo una gran cantidad de familias que se establecieron en la ciudad, ante la imposibilidad legal de poder migrar toda la familia completa hacia los Estados Unidos, éstas encontraron en las ciudades fronterizas una relativa cercanía geográfica con sus seres queridos además del acceso a ciertos bienes y servicios.

Los efectos en el proceso de urbanización de Ciudad Juárez fueron inmediatos.

Asimismo, a principios de la década de los cuarenta estalla la Segunda Guerra Mundial, que como la Primera Guerra Mundial tendría influencia en la ciudad.

En el cuadro I observamos el incremento de la población económicamente activa y la relativa expansión de los diferentes sectores de la economía, sobre todo del sector terciario que se extiende con mayor rapidez, lo cual dió paso a la incorporación de mayores áreas de la ciudad dedicadas al comercio y los servicios.

La población de la ciudad alcanzó aproximadamente 85,000 habitantes para finales de la Segunda Guerra Mundial y más de 122,000 habitantes para 1950.<sup>12</sup>

Entre 1940 y 1950 Ciudad Juárez se convirtió en la principal ciudad de la Frontera Norte.<sup>13</sup>

Este gran crecimiento poblacional se reflejó en la alta densidad poblacional que alcanzaron más de 174 personas por hectárea en una área urbanizada de 732 ha.

Cuadro I.  
Población Económicamente Activa de Ciudad Juárez  
por Ramas de Actividad (1940-1960)

Sectores	1940	%	1950	%	1960	%
PEA.	13,572	100	38,665	100	73,665	100
Primario	2,214	16.3	3,652	9.4	5,091	6.9
Agropecuario	2,132	15.7	3,435	8.9	4,738	6.4
Extractivas	82	.6	217	.5	353	.5
Secundario	3,562	26.3	13,654	35.4	24,872	33.7
Transformación	2,611	19.3	8,433	21.8	16,385	22.2
Construcción	908	6.7	4,901	12.8	8,062	10.9
Electricidad	45	.3	320	.8	425	.6
Terciario	7,794	57.4	21,359	55.2	43,702	59.4
Comercio	3,107	22.9	7,265	18.8	15,346	20.8
Comunicaciones y Transportes	936	6.9	2,668	6.9	4,388	6.0
Servicios	3,751	27.6	11,426	29.5	23,968	32.68

Fuente: L. Unikel y F. Torres, "La población económicamente activa en México y sus principales ciudades, 1940-1960, Demografía y Economía, Vol. IV, Núm. I. (1970).

De 1950 a 1960 la tasa anual de crecimiento de la población fue tres veces más alta que la experimentada por el país y el doble de la del resto del estado de Chihuahua.

En 1961 se presentaron alteraciones urbanas espectaculares con las obras del Programa Nacional Fronterizo (PRONAF), las cuales tenían entre sus principales objetivos fomentar las actividades turísticas en la Frontera Norte.

En Ciudad Juárez se construyó la escuela Abraham González, el museo de Arte e Historia, el Centro de Convenciones, hoteles, tiendas de artesanías, supermercados y las principales avenidas que circundan esta área. Cerca de allí hay un hipódromo, una plaza de toros, un club campestre y otros atractivos que complementan los proyectos en la zona central del PRONAF.<sup>14</sup>

En 1963 después de años de negociaciones entre ambos gobiernos, es devuelto el territorio del Chamizal del cual México recibió 254 hectáreas al sur de El Paso, y los Estados Unidos 77 hectáreas del distrito noreste de Ciudad Juárez.<sup>15</sup>

Ambos acontecimientos marcaron un cambio importante en la estructura urbana de la ciudad.

Durante la primer mitad de la década de 1960, la ciudad continuó creciendo a altas tasas, caracterizada por la decadencia de las actividades turísticas y la cancelación en forma unilateral de El Programa Braceros por parte de los Estados Unidos, por lo que se pensó que serían deportados cerca de medio millón de trabajadores mexicanos que crearían un grave problema de desempleo principalmente en las ciudades de la frontera. Por lo que en 1965 se aplicó un programa emergente del empleo, el que se denominó Programa de Industrialización Fronteriza, el cual marcó profundamente la estructura urbana y trajo nuevos usos del suelo debido a la aparición de nuevas actividades económicas y el crecimiento de otras que ya existían.

## **II. Impacto de El Programa de Industrialización Fronteriza en la configuración de la Estructura Urbana y los nuevos Usos del Suelo en Ciudad Juárez.**

### **1) Crecimiento de la estructura urbana.**

Una vez que se canceló el Programa de Braceros el nivel de desempleo se incrementó dramáticamente. Aunado a la elevación de la tasa de crecimiento demográfico, ocasionada por la inmigración y la incapacidad de los distintos sectores productivos para absorber una gran masa de trabajadores que incrementaron la desocupación.<sup>16</sup>

Lo anterior tuvo como resultado un desempleo súbito de miles de trabajadores, y aunque todavía no se conocen con precisión las repercusiones de este suceso que afectó a varias ciudades fronterizas, diversos estudios han coincidido en señalar que el desempleo alcanzaba entre 40 y 50% de la población.<sup>17</sup>

Ante el anterior panorama y muchas otras razones se justificó el establecimiento de El Programa Industrial Fronterizo, el cual mostraba las ventajas que la región presentaba a el capital trasnacional.

Es así como a finales de 1966 se finalizaron las negociaciones entre un grupo de empresarios fronterizos y la Secretaría de Industria y Comercio, en donde se les permitió la importación de maquinaria y equipo, considerándose de hecho la instalación de las primeras plantas maquiladoras en la Frontera Norte.

Las primeras ciudades en donde se puso en marcha el programa fueron Matamoros, Nuevo Laredo y Ciudad Juárez.<sup>18</sup>

Cuadro II.

Número de plantas y trabajadores en la industria maquiladora de Ciudad Juárez. (1966–1990)

Año	Número de Empresas	Número de Trabajadores
1966	5	760
1967	9	925
1968	10	1,502
1969	17	2,093
1970	22	3,135
1971	52	5,617
1972	N.D	N.D
1973	74	12,058
1974	85	18,483
1975	84	19,775
1976	81	23,580
1977	80	26,792
1978	92	30,374
1979	103	36,206
1980	121	39,402
1981	128	43,994
1982	129	42,695
1983	135	54,073
1984	155	72,495
1985	168	77,592
1987	199	97,800
1988	246	107,315
1990	300	130,000

Fuente: Secretaría de Industria y Comercio, Datos estadísticos sobre la industria maquiladora 1966–1974. citado por Carrillo y Hernández, op. cit.

Estadísticas de la Industria Maquiladora de Exportación 1975–1985. INEGI.

Secretaría de Programación y Presupuesto, México, D.F. 1986

En 1966 se establecieron en Ciudad Juárez las primeras 6 plantas presentando un crecimiento sostenido hasta 1974.

Como se puede observar en el cuadro II, para 1969 ya existían 17 empresas maquiladoras las que generaron más de 2000 empleos.

En la década de los setenta continuó el crecimiento de las maquiladoras y para 1976 existían 81 plantas y se generaron 17,153



#### 14-Ciudad Juárez

empleos que correspondió al 31.7% del total de empleos generados por la industria maquiladora a nivel nacional.

A partir de principios de la década de 1980 el número de maquiladoras tuvo un crecimiento sostenido generando una gran cantidad de empleos.

Cuadro III.  
Población Económicamente Activa de Ciudad Juárez  
por Ramas de Actividad (1970-1990)

Sectores	1970	%	1980	%	1990	%
PEA	108,070	100	208,868	100	283,182	100
Primario	9,342	8.7	6,366	3.1	3,894	1.3
Agropecuario	9,342	8.7	6,366	3.1	3,894	1.3
Secundario	28,888	26.7	59,573	29.0	139,816	49.37
Extractivas	403	.3	276	.2	462	.16
Transformación	19,215	17.7	44,586	21.6	117,007	41.31
Construcción	8,851	8.2	14,218	6.8	20,967	7.9
Electricidad	419	.4	493	.2	1,380	.48
Terciario	57,305	53.0	71,477	34.6	127,272	44.9
Comercio	19,149	17.8	29,455	14.3	41,419	14.6
Comunicaciones y Transportes	4,532	4.2	10,786	5.2	10,365	3.66
Servicios	3,624	31.1	31,236	15	75,488	26.658

Fuente: X Censo de Población y Vivienda. Secretaría de Programación y Presupuesto.  
Citado por Carrillo y Hernández op. cit., p. 80 y XI Censo de Población y Vivienda.

En 1980 existían 121 empresas que emplearon a 39,402 trabajadores y para 1990 existían 300 empresas y 130,000 empleos.

Hay que resaltar que en la mayor parte de los años del período 1966-1990, Ciudad Juárez fue la localidad que tuvo el mayor número de empleos, producidos por la industria maquiladora a nivel nacional.

En el cuadro III observamos que a partir de 1970 las actividades de transformación, se perfilan como las actividades que emplean la mayor proporción de la PEA de la ciudad.

El anterior crecimiento del número de plantas, y empleos aunado a la crisis económica por la que atraviesa el país, generó una fuerte atracción para la población del resto del país y estado de

Chihuahua, que buscaron en Ciudad Juárez mejores condiciones de vida. Aunado a los empleos directos que produjo la industria maquiladora, también generó efectos multiplicadores en otras actividades económicas como el comercio y los servicios.

Asimismo hay que mencionar que a partir de 1982 con la agudización de la crisis económica en el país, que desempleó a grandes masas de la población, y aunado a la caída de los salarios reales indujo a una mayor migración además de la incorporación de una mayor proporción de mujeres y jóvenes para contribuir a mejorar el ingreso familiar.

El crecimiento migratorio neto hacia Ciudad Juárez durante la década 1960–1970 fue de 36,623 personas y durante la década 1970–1980 la misma fue aún mayor representando 47,034 personas.<sup>19</sup>

Alicia Castellanos menciona la existencia de una correlación entre los períodos de mayor emigración hacia Ciudad Juárez y los períodos de mayor demanda de mano de obra.

En 1979 se aplicó una encuesta de hogares en Ciudad Juárez, y se encontró que los migrantes con menos años de residencia en la ciudad habían viajado de poblaciones más cercanas a Juárez, que los migrantes con más años de residencia en la ciudad. Y los migrantes con menos años de residencia citaron la posibilidad de emplearse como principal motivo para migrar, en comparación con los migrantes con mayor tiempo de residencia.

El 48% de los entrevistados habían llegado durante los últimos cinco años anteriores a la fecha de aplicación de la encuesta y venían del interior del estado de Chihuahua y de ellos el 30% manifestó la búsqueda de empleo como principal motivo para migrar. Sólo el 16.5% de los individuos encuestados que tenían más de cinco años de residir en Juárez, y vinieron de alguna población del interior del estado de Chihuahua, manifestó haber migrado por motivos de empleo.<sup>20</sup>

Como se observa en el cuadro IV, durante la década de 1950 la población creció a una tasa de 9.1, lo que significó un alto crecimiento en relación a la década anterior. También podemos ver como de la década de 1950 a 1960 casi se triplicó el área urbanizada, de 1960–1970 se duplicó y de 1970–1980 se volvió a duplicar. Sin

## 16-Ciudad Juárez

embargo para la década de 1980–1990 la ciudad ya no creció en la misma proporción.

Algo que también llama la atención es la disminución de la densidad de población después de la década de 1960, lo anterior es resultado de la natural segregación de la población de medianos y altos ingresos de las zonas del centro, hacia las zonas más alejadas del centro de la misma.

Pero de 1980–1990 la densidad poblacional se incrementó, ya que la ciudad no creció en la mismas proporciones que en décadas anteriores como se observa en el cuadro IV. Lo anterior se debió a que se ocuparon gran parte de los terrenos baldíos y por lo tanto se incrementó la densidad poblacional.

Cuadro IV.  
Crecimiento de Ciudad Juárez (1910–1990)

Año	Población	Tasa de Crecimiento (%)	Area (ha)	Densidad de Pob.(habit/ha)
900	8,218	3.5	—	—
1910	10,621	2.5	—	—
1921	19,457	5.5	—	—
1930	39,669	7.9	—	—
1940	48,881	2.0	—	—
1950	131,308	9.1	732	179
1960	276,995	7.2	2,230	124
1970	424,135	5.2	4,580	92
1980	567,365	4.4	8,290	70
1990	970,181*	1.8	9,005	108

\* Población estimada por el COLEF para 1990

Fuente: La tasa de crecimiento de la población, el área y la densidad de población fueron calculadas por el autor. VII, VIII, IX y X Censos de Población y Vivienda de México y Encuesta Socioeconómica Anual de la Frontera (ESAF–87), EL COLEF, 1987

### a) Década de los sesenta.

En 1960 el área urbanizada fue de 2,230 hectáreas y la ciudad mostró un crecimiento lineal en una superficie irregular en dirección oriente y sur–oriente con un escalonamiento marcado hacia el poniente, hay que resaltar que durante esta década el crecimiento de las áreas habitacionales se dió de dos formas: 1) Por la venta de terrenos por parte del municipio y en algunos casos por invasión, esta última se realizó hacia el sureste de la ciudad.

2) Por la venta de terrenos por fraccionadores privados, ubicados al oriente de la ciudad en las áreas agrícolas principalmente.

En el cuadro V observamos que en 1960 las áreas con uso habitacional fueron de 2,040 hectáreas.

Estas siguen siendo las del centro tradicional, en donde la densidad de población es la más alta y son poblados por vivienda tipo medio.

Cuadro V

Usos del suelo en Cd. Juárez, Chih. (1960–1990).

Años	Habitacional (has)	Industrial (has)	Comercial (has)	Agrícola (has)
1960	2,040	120	70	5,475
1970	4,025	250	305	4,090
1980	7,535	380	375	3,400
1990	8,025	575	405	32,550

Fuente: Cálculos hecho por el autor en base a información proporcionada por El Plan Regulador de desarrollo Urbano de Ciudad Juárez 1971 y los Planes Directores de Desarrollo Urbano del Municipio de Juárez 1979, 1984 y 1989.

Adicionalmente, años más adelante el área habitacional de clase media se dirigió hacia el sur–oriente de la ciudad y en algunos casos hacia el oriente. La vivienda de tipo alto se ubicó en la zona oriente, sobre el Valle de Juárez.

Sin embargo hacia el sur–poniente de la ciudad se localizaron las áreas de vivienda baja, la cual creció por la venta de terrenos por parte del Municipio a bajos precios y también por la invasión de terrenos. Esta nuevas áreas habitacionales alcanzaron una distancia de más de 12 kilómetros del centro de la ciudad.<sup>21</sup>

Schmidt y Lloyd mencionaron que los límites del área urbanizada en 1960 alcanzó como 9 kilómeros del centro histórico.

En lo que toca al uso comercial, ésta ocupó 70 hectáreas, las que se localizaron en el centro y las principales arterias que las unen. A lo largo de esta década, como ya se mencionó se incorporó el área del PRONAF en el que se construyó principalmente una infraestructura para uso turístico.

En 1960 las superficies ocupadas por industria nacional fue de 120 hectáreas, las cuales se dirigieron en un primer momento hacia el sureste de la ciudad, tal es el caso de las Industrias Zaragoza que se ubicaron en esta parte de la ciudad.

Alicia Castellanos menciona que la actividad industrial entre 1960–1965, se concentraba en un reducido número de industrias de transformación de proyectos agropecuarios (productos de cerveza, fabricación de refrescos, industrias alimenticias, matanza de ganado y manufactura de productos de molino).

En 1967 se instaló el primer parque industrial en donde se instalaron las primeras empresas maquiladoras, el cual se ubicó al oriente de la ciudad en áreas con uso agrícola.

En 1960 del área total de estudio 5,475 hectáreas correspondieron a usos agrícolas, las cuales a lo largo de las siguientes décadas disminuyeron.

#### b) Década de los setentas.

En la década de los setenta el área urbana de Ciudad Juárez ocupó 4,580 hectáreas. El crecimiento siguió los principales ejes carreteros norte–sur–este sobre terrenos agrícolas.

El área con usos habitacionales fue de 2,040 hectáreas, como se observa en el cuadro V. Esta continuó creciendo, principalmente hacia el sureste con viviendas de tipo bajo y al oriente de la ciudad con viviendas de tipo medio y alto. El anterior crecimiento habitacional responde a la localización del primer parque industrial, que como se mencionó, se localizó en una área al oriente de la ciudad en terrenos para uso agrícola. Localidades como Satélite y Zaragoza<sup>22</sup> comenzaron a dedicar mayores áreas a la construcción de viviendas.

Como también se mencionó hasta antes de 1970 solo se había instalado un parque industrial, el cual ocupó 174.2 hectáreas, las que se agregaron a las 75 hectáreas ocupadas por industria nacional. En total para el año de 1970 existían 250 hectáreas con usos industriales como se observa en el cuadro V.

A lo largo de la década de los setenta se instalaron 2 nuevos parques industriales, que aunado al instalado, a finales de la década

pasada ocuparon casi 300 hectáreas, de las cuales 256 has. correspondían al área agrícola.

En 1970 el área ocupada con uso comercial fue de 305 hectáreas, las cuales continuaron el mismo patrón de las décadas anteriores, es decir el área más importante se localizó en el centro de la ciudad y las principales vías de comunicación norte-sur-este.

Lloyd en 1982 menciona que la estructura comercial de Ciudad Juárez, al igual que el patrón de localización de las industrias, también creció hacia el este de la ciudad.

Por lo que respecta a las áreas con uso agrícola para este año disminuyeron en 1,385 hectáreas representando 4,090 has como se observa en el cuadro V.

Como ya mencionamos antes, durante esta década el área agrícola adyacente a las orillas de el área urbanizada, comenzó a ser ocupada por industrias, viviendas y comercios, como se observa en el plano 2 (pag. 20).

### c) Década de los ochentas.

Durante la década de los ochentas el número de parques industriales se incrementó, por lo que este crecimiento tuvo gran influencia en la conformación de la actual estructura urbana.

Para 1980 la superficie total urbanizada ocupó 8,290 hectáreas como se observa en el cuadro IV.


El uso habitacional fue el que mayor espacio consumió en la ciudad, presentando una agrupación de vivienda media, alrededor del centro comercial tradicional cuyas densidades de construcción y habitación son las más altas de toda el área urbana.

Asimismo las áreas habitacionales de bajo nivel socioeconómico, que se localizaron al sureste de la ciudad se saturaron, tal es el caso de las siguientes colonias: La Azteca, La Cuesta 2, Constitución, División del Norte, Ampliación Aeropuerto etc. En lo que toca al poniente de la ciudad, éste conservó su tamaño de las décadas anteriores debido al impedimento físico para su crecimiento.<sup>23</sup>


Hacia el sur-oriente no se observan crecimientos notables, ni procesos de saturación claros.




Usos del suelo en Cd. Juárez, Chih.  
(1970)



Usos del suelo en Cd. Juárez, Chih.  
(1980)



Usos del suelo en Cd. Juárez, Chih.  
(1990)



Por su parte en el oriente de la ciudad con viviendas de tipo mediano y alto se observa una mayor saturación del área.

La ubicación de estos parques industriales, más allá de los límites del área urbanizada existente, fue influenciado por una variedad de razones, entre los que se incluyen la disponibilidad y posesión de los terrenos y la relativa proximidad con los cruces fronterizos de El Chamizal y el puente de Zaragoza.<sup>24</sup> Otro de los efectos fue el cambio de localización industrial dentro de la ciudad, ya que como se comentó las primeras industrias que se localizaron a inicios de la década de los sesenta se establecieron cerca de las vías de comunicación como el ferrocarril, debido a que su principal mercado era el regional, a partir de 1965 que se establecieron las primeras empresas maquiladoras, éstas se localizaron en áreas donde pudieran tener una fácil y rápida comunicación con el mercado externo.

#### d) Década de los noventa.

En 1990 el área total ocupada por la mancha urbana fue de 9,005 hectáreas como se observa en el cuadro IV.

En la década de los noventa el crecimiento de la ciudad continuó hacia el sur-este, el oriente y las áreas agrícolas de Salvarcar, Satélite, Zaragoza, etc.

Como ya se mencionó antes, durante la década de 1980-1990 el crecimiento que experimentó la estructura urbana fue menor que en las décadas anteriores. Sin embargo durante esta década la ciudad experimentó un importante crecimiento interno.

El área habitacional ocupó 8,025 hectáreas y continuó el mismo crecimiento que en décadas anteriores, sin embargo pequeñas poblaciones que se encontraban en las afueras del área urbana de Ciudad Juárez crecieron y de hecho se integraron al área urbana, tal es el caso de Salvarcar que a principios de esta década surgieron nuevos asentamientos poblacionales.

Por lo que respecta al área comercial, ésta ocupó 405 hectáreas, las cuales crecieron como en décadas anteriores sobre los ejes de comunicación.

Por su parte las áreas industriales crecieron, ya que desde mediados de los ochentas y principios de los noventa se abrieron

5 nuevos parques industriales, de los cuales la mayor parte de ellos se ubicaron al sur-este y oriente de la ciudad como se observa en el plano 4.

Para 1988 existían 7 parques industriales que en conjunto para este año ocupan 431.86 hectáreas y para 1990 existían 11 parques industriales.

Las áreas agrícolas se redujeron y ocuparon 3,255 hectáreas. La mayor parte de la reducción de la superficie agrícola, se debió al incremento de las áreas con uso habitacional e industrial.

## 2) Crecimiento interno de la mancha urbana de 1984–1989.

Como se observa en el cuadro VI el mayor crecimiento interno de 1984 a 1988 lo tuvo el uso habitacional que representó el 59.69% seguido muy de cerca por el uso industrial que fue de 28.14%

Por su parte la industria se distribuyó con un uso periférico, formando áreas concéntricas correspondientes a las diferentes etapas del crecimiento de la ciudad.

Esta ha continuado creciendo, pero sigue el patrón de distribución tradicional siguiendo las vías primarias de comunicación, lo que ha originado que los nuevos asentamientos industriales se localicen al oriente de la ciudad presionando sobre las áreas agrícolas para su cambio de uso.

La ocupación comercial del suelo urbano se dió en zonas específicas, sobre los ejes de comunicación, la zona central y los asentamientos de población del oriente y suroriente.

Por lo que respecta al área agrícola esta tuvo una importante reducción. Como se observa en el cuadro VII durante el lapso que va de 1984 a 1988 hubo modificaciones importantes en el uso del suelo, como fueron 304 hectáreas que con un uso ya establecido cambió a otro diferente.

Cuadro VI.  
Crecimiento interno del uso del suelo (1984-1988).

Usos y Destinos	Superficies (has)	Porcentaje de distribución %
Habitacional	337.49	59.69
Industrial	159.13	28.14
Equipamiento 1)	44.46	7.33
Comercio y oficinas	7.61	1.35
Alojamiento y turismo	1.33	0.23
Talleres y servicios	7.42	1.31
Destinos	4.60	0.8
Otros Usos	6.35	1.23
	568.39	100.00

1) Sólo incluye los elementos de los subsistemas de educación, salud, cultura, asistencia social, abastos, comunicaciones y transporte, administración pública, servicios públicos, parques, jardines y deporte.

Fuente: Plan Director de Desarrollo Urbano de Ciudad Juárez, Chihuahua. Documento Base, Vol. III.2 Uso del Suelo. Comportamiento del crecimiento físico registrado en el período 1984-1988. Ciudad Juárez, Chihuahua, Julio de 1989.

Las superficies para uso habitacional y agrícola fueron los que representaron un mayor decremento, el primero disminuyó en 187.99 hectáreas y el segundo 110.20 hectáreas.

Por su parte, el crecimiento registrado en las actividades de comercio, oficinas y equipamiento elemental fueron los nuevos usos que mayor incremento obtuvieron, en los cambios dados en la estructura urbana.

Las áreas industriales también se incrementaron al instalarse dos nuevos parques industriales al sur-este y oriente de la ciudad. La industria se distribuyó con un uso periférico formando áreas concéntricas correspondientes a las diferentes etapas de crecimiento de la ciudad. Esta localización correspondió a las vías de acceso y salida de la ciudad.

## 26-Ciudad Juárez

### Cuadro VII.

Cambios de uso del suelo en el área urbana (1984-1988)

Uso	Decremento has. (-)	Incremento has. (+)
Habitación	-187.99	
Industria		5.14
Equipamiento	-3.08	
Comercio y Oficinas		62.58
Alojamiento y turismo		13.65
Talleres y yonques		14.47
Destinos		14.37
Baldíos		76.86
Agrícola	-110.20	
Viveros	-2.73	
Desuso (lechería)H		32.84
	<u>-304.00</u>	<u>304.84</u>

Fuente: Plan Director de Desarrollo Urbano de Ciudad Juárez, Chih. III.2 Usos del Suelo. Dirección de Planeación del Municipio de Cd. Juárez, Ciudad Juárez, Chihuahua. Junio de 1989.

## Conclusiones

La configuración de la estructura urbana de Ciudad Juárez, estuvo influenciada por diversos acontecimientos dentro de los que destacan, su fundación como misión, el movimiento de la frontera norte de México con los Estados Unidos, la instauración de la zona libre etc, que le imprimieron características especiales a su proceso de urbanización.

Podemos decir que desde la fundación de Ciudad Juárez, hasta la década de los cincuenta el crecimiento de la ciudad se dió en forma concéntrica respecto al núcleo original, cuyas dimensiones respondieron a las actividades comerciales y de servicios.

La puesta en marcha de El Programa de Industrialización Fronteriza marcó profundamente el crecimiento y los usos del suelo en Ciudad Juárez, debido a la aparición de nuevas actividades económicas y el crecimiento de otras que ya existían.

Durante el proceso de investigación cartográfica, se detectaron importantes modificaciones en el uso del suelo en un lapso de 30 años.

En 1960 la ciudad mostró un crecimiento lineal en una superficie irregular en dirección sur-oriente y oriente.

Al oriente de la ciudad, se establecieron nuevos fraccionamientos de medianos y altos ingresos en áreas con uso agrícola del suelo, al sureste se localizaron viviendas de bajos ingresos.

A las áreas con uso comercial, además de las ya existentes en el centro de la ciudad, se incorporaron las obras del PRONAF las cuales dieron otra imagen a Ciudad Juárez.

Las áreas para uso industrial, desde los cincuenta y principios de los sesenta se localizaron en el sur-este de la ciudad junto a las vías del ferrocarril, pero a partir del PIF<sup>25</sup> los primeros parques industriales se localizaron hacia el oriente en terrenos agrícolas.

En resumen en 1960 la estructura urbana muestra una forma irregular compacta con protuberancias, hacia el oriente y sur con un escalonamiento marcado hacia el poniente.

En la década de los setenta, la ciudad siguió los principales ejes carreteros norte-sur-este sobre terrenos agrícolas.

Asimismo el crecimiento de áreas con uso habitacional continuo creciendo principalmente hacia el sureste, con viviendas de tipo bajo y al oriente con vivienda de tipo medio y alto.

Durante esta década se instalaron dos nuevos parques industriales, que aunados al instalado a finales de la década pasada, ocuparon casi 300 hectáreas, de las que 256 hectáreas fueron ocupadas por área agrícola.

En 1970 se producen alteraciones principalmente hacia el poniente (carbonera) y hacia el oriente, a lo largo de la carretera el Porvenir, con dispersiones hacia el sur en las cercanías del aeropuerto y hacia el oriente y la colonia Satélite. La base de contacto con el Río Bravo crece hasta su alcance actual. La zona de Zaragoza y Salvarcar cobran cierta importancia.

En 1980 el crecimiento de la ciudad continuó el mismo crecimiento hacia el suroriente y oriente.

Las áreas habitacionales crecieron en menor medida que en la década anterior, dándose en esta década una saturación de los lotes baldíos que existían en estas áreas de la ciudad.

Las áreas comerciales crecieron hacia las principales vías de acceso a estas áreas habitacionales, las que se agregaron a las ya existentes.



Por su parte las áreas industriales crecieron en forma importante, para 1988 ya existían 7 parques industriales que en conjunto ocupan 431.86 hectáreas. La industria se ha distribuido con un uso periférico formando áreas concéntricas correspondientes a las diferentes etapas de crecimiento de la ciudad. Esta localización correspondió a las vías de acceso y salida de la ciudad.

Para 1990 la ciudad ha incrementado su crecimiento en un 15% en relación a la década anterior. La ciudad continuó el crecimiento hacia el sur-este, el oriente y las áreas agrícolas de Salvarcar, Satélite y Zaragoza.

En esta década las áreas habitacionales, industriales, comerciales y agrícolas continuaron la misma tendencia que en décadas anteriores, sin embargo el crecimiento experimentado por la estructura urbana fue menor, ya que la mayor parte del crecimiento fue interno.

Estos cambios han respondido básicamente a la dinámica misma del crecimiento económico que la ciudad experimenta impulsado por agentes de desarrollo económico nacionales y extranjeros.

## Notas

<sup>1</sup> Estman Ronald J. IDRISI. A. Grind-Based Geographic Analysis System. Clark System. Clark University. Graduate School of Geography, Massachusetts, 1988.

<sup>2</sup> Wilbert H. Timmons, *The International Boundary and Water Commission: United States and Mexico* (Austin: University of Texas Publications No. 4134, 1974)15.

<sup>3</sup> Robert Schmidt and William Lloyd, "Patterns of Urban Growth in Ciudad Juárez", en Young Gay (Compilador) *The Social Ecology and Economic Development of Ciudad Juárez, Chih.* (United States, Westview Press, Inc., 1986) 28.

<sup>4</sup> Schmidt y Lloyd 29.

<sup>5</sup> Schmidt y Lloyd 30.

<sup>6</sup> Alicia Castellanos, *Ciudad Juárez la vida fronteriza* (México: Editorial Nuestro Tiempo, 1981) 94.

<sup>7</sup> Schmidt y Lloyd 34.

<sup>8</sup> Oscar Martínez, *Ciudad Juárez: El auge de una ciudad fronteriza a partir de 1848* (México: Fondo de Cultura Económica, Primera Edición en Español, 1982) 59.

<sup>9</sup> Schmidt y Lloyd 34.

<sup>10</sup> Schmidt y Lloyd 34.

<sup>11</sup> Castellaño 108.

<sup>12</sup> Castellaño 37.

<sup>13</sup> Castellaño 110.

<sup>14</sup> René Zenteno y Rodolfo Cruz, "El contexto geográfico de la frontera norte de México en la investigación demográfica", El Colegio de la Frontera Norte, Presentado en el Simposium Binacional sobre Población en la Frontera Norte de México, Tijuana, B.C., 1987, 3.

<sup>15</sup> Martínez 165.

<sup>16</sup> Martínez 159.

<sup>17</sup> Jorge Carrillo y Alberto Hernández, *Mujeres Fronterizas en la industria maquiladora* (México: SEP-CEFNOEMEX, 1985) 82.

<sup>18</sup> Hernández 83.

<sup>19</sup> Hernández 15.

<sup>20</sup> Plan Director de Desarrollo Urbano de Ciudad Jurez. Dirección de Planeación del Municipio de Ciudad Jurez, Ciudad Jurez, Chihuahua., 1984.

<sup>21</sup> Schmidt y Lloyd 39.

<sup>22</sup> Schmidt y Lloyd 40.

<sup>23</sup> Las localidades de Zaragoza y Salvarcar eran pequeñas poblaciones rurales, que hasta la década de los cincuentas se encontraban alejados de la mancha urbana de Ciudad Juárez.

<sup>24</sup> Plan Director de Desarrollo Urbano de Ciudad Juárez, Dirección de Planeación del Municipio de Ciudad Juárez, Chih., 1984.

<sup>25</sup> William Lloyd, "Land Use Structure and the Availability of Services in Ciudad Juarez" en Young Gay (Compilador), *The Social Ecology and Economic Development of Ciudad Jurez, Chih.* (Estados Unidos: Westview Pres Inc., 1986) 48.

<sup>26</sup> Programa de Industrialización Fronteriza.

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## César Chávez, the United Farm Workers and Mexican Immigration

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### Resumen

El sindicato de campesinos, United Farm Workers y su líder César Chávez, ha luchado por los derechos de los trabajadores mas pobres en los Estados Unidos. También tienen una historia acerca de la inmigración mexicana y las relaciones con las agencias del gobierno mexicano poco conocida. Esta dimensión internacional del sindicato de campesinos no ha sido investigada en relación con la historia del movimiento campesino del UFW. En los cincuentas, su líder, César Chávez, se oponía a los abusos del Bracero Program y defendía los derechos de los inmigrantes, pero, al mismo tiempo, ha tratado de prevenir el uso de mexicanos como rompe huelgas. Chávez trataba de defender los derechos humanos de los indocumentados y el respeto para las leyes de los Estados Unidos.

A través de las décadas Chávez estaba mas a favor de alianzas con el gobierno mexicano para proteger los derechos de los inmigrantes. También los mexicanos han tenido un papel mas y mas importante en el desarrollo del sindicato.

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For the past 40 years the United Farm Workers, led by César Chávez, has struggled to unionize farm workers of Mexican heritage and nationality in California and the American Southwest. Beginning with the grape boycott in 1965, a reoccurring problem has been the union's position on Mexican immigration. On one hand most of the union's membership has had family ties to Mexico. On the other hand, Mexican immigrants were the ones who were often recruited to break strikes.

This essay explores the recent history of the complex and changing relationship between the United Farm Workers Union (UFW) and the issue of Mexican immigration. The development of UFW strategies that dealt with the problem of government sanctioned strike breakers from Mexico sometimes led to nativist rhetoric on the part of the union as it fought the powerful alliance of business and government. At the same time, the evolution of closer relationships between the UFW Mexican *sindicatos* (unions) and the Mexican government, especially after 1975, shows how, during a period of decline in support for the farm worker's union, Chávez came to rely more on official Mexican support to sustain his union. Generally the historiography surrounding César Chávez has created an over-romantic and somewhat stereotypical evaluation of his leadership. With a few exceptions no one really has given much attention to his changing position on immigration, nor has there been a study of the union's relationship with official Mexican institutions. This essay appraises the partial historical evidence that exists in both of these areas and considers the international dimensions of Chávez's leadership during the 1950-1980 period.

The key to understanding the evolution of the United Farm Worker's policy towards Mexican immigration is the background of its leader, César Chávez. His experience as a migrant worker and organizer over the years has been the single most important influence in shaping the union's policy towards Mexican immigration and Mexico.

Born on March 31, 1927 in a rural barrio near Yuma, Arizona, Chávez's immigrant family suffered the loss of their farm in 1939 and moved to California. For the next 10 years Chávez and his family moved up and down California's San Joaquín Valley following the crops and living for periods of time in Delano and San José. It was during this period of his life that Chávez encountered the conditions that both Mexican immigrants and Mexican-Americans shared in the fields. He lived in wretched migrant camps, was cheated by corrupt labor contractors, survived on subsistence wages, and endured racism and discrimination. This first-hand experience as a migrant worker made Chávez different from many organizers before him. This hard life gave him a strength of character that enabled him to communicate convincingly with the humblest of field workers.

César Chávez was introduced to the politics of labor organizing and Mexican immigration in 1952. In that year he met Father Donald McDonnell, an activist Catholic priest and Fred Ross, an organizer with the Community Service Organization. Ross recruited Chávez to join the CSO, a community organization dedicated to political empowerment for Mexican-Americans. It was within the CSO that Chávez first fought against the abuse of immigration laws, specifically the Bracero Program.

Begun in 1942, the Bracero Program arranged for the importation of Mexican workers under contract to help in the war effort. Under heavy lobbying by Southwestern agricultural interests the United States and Mexican governments renewed the Bracero Program until 1965. During the agreement almost five million Mexican workers came to the United States. The law obligated growers to pay braceros a specified minimum wage, provide them with basic amenities, and employ them only in agricultural jobs. Braceros complained of wage agreement violations, substandard living quarters, exorbitant charges for food and clothing, and instances of racial discrimination. For economic reasons, growers liked the Bracero Program and lobbied for its continuance. Growers often preferred bracero labor. They could pay them less and not have to worry about unionization. Moreover, they often used braceros illegally to break agricultural strikes and to lower wages.<sup>1</sup>

In 1958, Chávez confronted the bracero issue when the CSO sent him to Oxnard to help the lemon workers organize a strike for higher wages. Local resident workers, mostly native born Mexican Americans, felt cheated when the growers brought in bracero labor. They felt that U.S. citizens should be given hiring preference. The Bracero Program's regulations stipulated that growers could not use them to replace local workers unless the Department of Labor certified a labor shortage. When Chávez began working with the local residents to resolve the problem, he found the growers in league with state and federal officials. Officials falsely certified the existence of labor shortages and helped growers exploit braceros by recruiting many more than could be employed. This resulted in the braceros working part time at lower pay while labor contractors charged them inflated prices for room and board.<sup>2</sup>

Chávez organized an attack on many fronts. First, he encouraged CSO and community members to apply for work every day with the Farm Placement Service and then he compiled records of their applications and rejections. Next he organized a boycott of local merchants to protest their support of the system and to pressure them to change. Chávez organized sit-down strikes in the fields to challenge the hiring of braceros. Farm workers picketed a meeting of the Secretary of Labor, James Mitchell when he visited Ventura for a talk. They marched with a banner depicting Nuestra Señora de Guadalupe (the patron saint of Mexico) to protest the lack of jobs for local residents and they pressured the Farm Placement Service Office with hundreds of complaints. They sent workers to lobby the state government offices. The outcome of this intensive campaign was a temporary victory. Under pressure, state officials fired the Farm Service Placement Director and some of his staff, and started hiring hundreds of people who lined up outside the CSO headquarters every day.<sup>3</sup> Unfortunately, after Chávez left Oxnard, the situation reverted to growers again working in collusion with the government to undercut Mexican-American farm workers. The failure to organize a farm worker's union and to secure a contract with agribusiness convinced Chávez that unionization was the only way to change things in the long run.

The Oxnard experience was pivotal. Chávez received first-hand training in the use of tactics such as the boycott, the march, the use of religious images, and political lobbying. These strategies later became key organizing techniques during the struggles of the United Farm Workers Union. He also gained experience in negotiating the troublesome waters created by the illegal recruitment of Mexican immigrant labor.<sup>4</sup> Tellingly, most of the workers protesting the use of bracero strikebreakers were themselves Mexican nationals legally resident in the U.S. Their language of organization was Spanish and their cultural values were Mexican. In opposing the exploitation of braceros, Chávez was not being anti-Mexican and this the rank and file understood.

A few years after the Oxnard strike, Chávez became the CSO's National Director. But in 1962 he resigned this position to devote his energies to organizing a union for farm workers. After years of sacrifice and hard work, Chávez and a small cadre of



volunteers established a fledgling union composed of both native born Mexican-Americans and Mexican born workers.<sup>5</sup>

### **The California Grape Strike**

On September 16, 1965 Chávez's Farm Workers Association voted to join a strike started by Filipino farm workers in Delano's grape fields. Within months the union became nationally known. For the next five years the California grape strike and boycott became international news. Chávez was dynamic and inspiring. His insistence on non-violent means to achieve social justice appealed a wide spectrum of American society: progressive elements of the Protestant and Catholic Church, middle class liberals, and Anglo and Mexican-American students. As a result, the UFW attracted hundreds of volunteers from urban universities, religious organizations, and labor unions. Chávez's alliance with organized labor and his use of mass mobilizing techniques, such as a dramatic farm workers march on Sacramento in 1966, made the grape strike and boycott part of a growing protest movement in the United States.<sup>6</sup>

The grape strike and boycott included Mexican immigrants from the beginning. In meetings and rallies a Mexican ambience pervaded the union with Spanish being a commonly used language and many workers joined by common bonds of nationality. Symbolically, the day chosen to join the grape strike was September 16, Mexican Independence day. Banners of Nuestra Señora de Guadalupe, the Mexican flag and other Mexican symbols became an integral part of La Causa or the farm worker's movement. Several of the original members of the Farm Workers Association were immigrants of long term residence. An example was Antonio Orendain, a young organizer born in Mexico, who had come to the United States as a farm worker when he was 18. Orendain became an important UFW leader organizing along the Texas border during the late 1960s.<sup>7</sup>

During the California grape strike, lasting from 1965 to 1970, Chávez and union supporters often spoke about the cynical manipulation and abuse of Mexican immigrant workers by growers and the government. From the start, however, Mexican immigrants were part of the problem as much as they were part of the solution.

As has been well documented in contemporary accounts, agribusiness regularly employed Mexican immigrants as strike breakers and Chávez and UFW leaders complained about the porous border with Mexico. At the same time many UFW supporters and members were Mexican nationals. The proportion of undocumented and documented immigrants who were active in the early UFW actions varied, ranging from more than 70 percent in the Imperial Valley, adjacent to Mexico, to less than 30 percent in the labor actions that took place in northern California and Florida. According to UFW staffers, Mexican immigrants formed an important element within the union's organization, especially during the strikes and demonstrations of the late 1960s and early 1970s. Mexican members and supporters were the ones who could most easily convince potential strike breakers to respect their picket lines.<sup>8</sup> Beginning with the grape boycott of 1965 Chávez walked a fine line between championing the rights of immigrants and advocating stronger police measures to enforce labor laws. The distinction between advocating the rights of Mexican immigrants to fair treatment while being in favor of immigration restrictions eventually led, in the 1970s to open criticism of Chávez's position by Chicano immigrant right activists.

### **Texas and Immigrant Workers**

In 1966, a year after the Delano strike began, Chávez expanded his organizational activities to Texas where the UFW confronted Mexican immigrants recruited as strike breakers. Along with Antonio Orendain, César sent Eugene Nelson, a young volunteer who was the son of a wealthy California grower, to lead the organizing effort. In the Spring of 1966 they decided to have a march to protest the abysmal wages and degraded living conditions endured by South Texas farm workers. They earned less than \$1.00 an hour. California workers earned almost twice as much. Patterned after the Sacramento march the year before, they went from the border town of Rio Grande City to Austin, Texas, the state capitol, a distance of 450 miles,

Mexican-American melon workers in the Rio Grande Valley were crucial to the UFW efforts. They had been on strike for several months but had failed in contract efforts. The ease with which growers could enlist Mexican workers from across the border

did not help their efforts. In an attempt to take more direct action, before the march began, UFW organizers and the Texas melon workers (The Independent Workers Association) decided to stop Mexican strike breakers from crossing the bridge between Roma, Texas and Miguel Aleman, Mexico. On October 24, 1966 a group of UFW supporters began stopping buses and cars carrying farm workers across the international bridge on their way to work in Texas. A local sheriff dragged an UFW organizer, over the line into Mexico and back into the United States and arrested him. After his detention, 10 to 15 UFW supporters lay down on the international bridge and stopped all traffic for about an hour until the police arrested them for obstructing traffic. Later a State District Judge issued temporary restraining orders to prevent future blockage of the bridge.<sup>9</sup> A few days later, Mexican officials arrested three UFW supporters for closing and locking the steel gate that was in the center of the international bridge.

This dramatic action got the attention of the press and helped advertise the strike. The UFW also worked with Mexican unions to gain support among border crossers. On May 13, 1967 the Confederación de Trabajadores Mexicanos (CTM) organized a picket on the Mexican side of the border opposite Rio Grande City. Their intention was to assist the UFW in discouraging Mexican green card holders from crossing to work as scabs. UFW organizers and members joined the Mexican strikers on the other side of the line. Later, five growers from the Rio Grande area sent a telegram to Senator John Tower accusing the UFW and CTM of engaging in an international conspiracy.<sup>10</sup> A Star County grand jury termed the strike "un-American." Meanwhile, the Texas Rangers escorted immigrant strike breakers to work in the fields. Later, the federal court found that the police and county authorities had engaged in illegal activities to suppress the strike.<sup>11</sup>

### **The INS and the UFW**

During the early years of the grape strike and boycott the UFW organized demonstrations against the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) to protest their failure to prevent growers from hiring Mexican immigrants during strikes. The UFW contended that the INS was working in cooperation with the larger

growers. The INS claimed that their funding was inadequate to allow them to monitor strike breakers.

During the Guimarra grape strike in 1967, Chávez met with the regional director of the INS. He charged that the INS was in violation of Justice Department regulations prohibiting the use of Green Card holders in areas where a labor dispute was in progress.<sup>12</sup> He told him that Guimarra, in violation of this regulation, was recruiting green card workers from the Calexico area and was busing them to Delano to break the strike. The director countered that the INS had no jurisdiction over the employment of green card workers once they had been admitted to the United States. He stated that the regulation only required that the INS monitor the place of employment at the time of application. He admitted, however, that there might be a technical violation of labor laws if growers had recruited the commuter workers specifically to break a strike. Not satisfied with this evasive response, Chávez subsequently led a picket in front of INS headquarters and organized a letter writing campaign to put pressure on officials in Washington.<sup>13</sup>

This particular controversy over green card abuses lasted well into the next year and the Justice Department eventually made a ruling that favored the growers. Chávez and the UFW continued to protest the government's pro-grower policies. When the Attorney General, Ramsey Clark arrived on May 29, 1968 to speak before a National Conference of Social Welfare in San Francisco, the UFW met him with more than 300 demonstrators who proceeded to disrupt his speech.<sup>14</sup>

The problem of government sanctioned strike breakers from Mexico was a serious one for the UFW. Chávez consistently argued that in order to raise wages and improve the working conditions for all farm workers the government needed to enforce existing laws and enact more stringent regulations. In his testimony before the Subcommittee on Labor of the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare in the late 1960s, Chávez called for employer sanctions, fines against growers who employed illegal Mexican immigrants and penalties against the green card workers who accepted employment on a struck ranch. He told the committee,

“What we ask is some way to keep the illegal and green carders from breaking our strikes; some civil remedy

against growers who employ behind our picket lines those who have entered the United States illegally, and likewise those green carders who have not permanently moved their residence and domicile to the United States.”<sup>15</sup>

If Chávez’s position sounded like that of a nativist it was because there was wide-spread evidence of growers violations of immigration laws. In June 1974, at the beginning of the grape harvest, Chávez told reporters that the union had “documented more than 2,200 illegal aliens working on ranches in the Fresno area.” Chávez publicly accused the Nixon administration of conspiring with agribusiness “to make sure this flood of desperately poor workers continued unchecked.”<sup>16</sup> He again accused the Border Patrol of working with the growers and demanded that the government increase its enforcement efforts.<sup>17</sup> Protests against the INS and their selective enforcement of the immigration laws went on throughout the summer of 1974. In August the UFW sponsored a demonstration in front of and inside the United States Federal Building in Sacramento where 350 supporters gathered to support Assembly Bill 3370 that would provide for state regulation of farm worker elections. They also protested the government-grower collusion to violate the immigration laws.

Chávez and the UFW’s support for hard line enforcement measures and tough new immigration proposals such as those proposed by Peter Rodino in 1973 soon led to conflict with immigration rights activists. In July 1974 the National Coalition for Fair Immigration Laws and Practices, an organization of Chicano and Mexican-American groups, openly criticized Chávez for his support of strict policing of the border.<sup>18</sup> Later that year when the Justice Department announced its intention to begin a massive deportation drive of illegal aliens with the apparent blessings of the UFW leadership, a broad spectrum of Mexican-American groups attacked the government and the UFW’s position. Within a few weeks Chávez sent an open letter to the *San Francisco Examiner*, expressing the union’s position on immigration.<sup>19</sup> He denied supporting the government’s plan to deport millions of immigrants and again blamed the INS for allowing growers to import undocumented immigrant strike breakers. He reiterated his concern for the

exploitation of undocumented workers and promised to support amnesty that would lead to their legalization and right to organize. This position was consistent with his views five years earlier—that the real criminals were growers who were violating immigration laws and that immigrants were pawns in their struggle with the union. The difference in this 1974 statement was a more public announcement of concern for the human rights of undocumented immigrants. By June of 1976 the UFW was on record in support of undocumented immigrant rights and had made special efforts to include them within the union.<sup>20</sup>

### **The UFW and Mexican Workers**

During the 1960s and 1970s, to combat pro-grower policies of the Border Patrol and Immigration Service, the UFW evolved several strategies. One was to work more closely with Mexican sindicatos (unions) to prevent strikebreaking by immigrants. When the UFW organized a striker in the Imperial Valley, they inevitably came into contact with large numbers of commuter workers who daily crossed the border at Mexicali to work in the United States. In 1968 Chávez asked Burt Corona, a long time activist and labor leader, to visit the Imperial Valley and work with Mexican commuter workers to convince them not to break the strike. On César's recommendation Corona met with the president of the Mexican local of the Confederación de Trabajadores Mexicanos in Mexicali. Corona recalled, "He [the Mexican labor leader] introduced me to other Mexican labor leaders with whom (sic) we had an opportunity to talk and ask for their support." Corona asked for and got permission to distribute leaflets on the Mexican side informing workers of the existence of the strike. He also obtained permission to place ads and stories in the Mexicali newspaper. Corona even made public service announcements on the Mexicali radio and television stations. Corona recalled, "we were interviewed periodically and we got the message about the strike through all the connections with the unions and in the communications industry. They brought pressure and they made it possible for us to carry out that work of informing and organizing."<sup>21</sup>

As opposed to this cooperative strategy, the union later tried more direct action. By 1974, frustrations over immigrant strike

breakers reached a high point and some members of the UFW decided to become more involved in enforcing the immigration laws along the border. In September, during an UFW strike of citrus pickers in Yuma, Arizona, Chávez sent his cousin Manuel Chávez to lead the organizational efforts. The growers, as usual, began recruiting undocumented Mexican workers from across the border. The UFW countered by protesting the inactivity of the INS and then began stopping undocumented Mexican workers at the border to convince them not to work as strike breakers. A predictable scenario followed. The local federal court issued orders restricting the number of strikers. Confrontations between union supporters and illegal immigrants took place. Complicating the issue, many of the UFW members on strike were Mexican immigrants, some of them undocumented. In the Yuma strike the struggle was between the UFW and the grower, police, judiciary alliance. It also was between the followers and members of the union, Mexican immigrants and immigrants of Mexico who were not UFW supporters.

By September the strike had become volatile. On September 16, 1974, the FBI arrested 25 UFW members in Yuma, identified as Mexican aliens. They were charged with trespassing and disturbing the peace during a rock throwing incident at a local labor camp. Soon after the FBI arrest, more than 200 UFW followers demonstrated in front of the Yuma County Jail. Speakers during the demonstration urged the group to proceed to the nearby United States Border Patrol offices in Yuma to protest the lack of action by INS agents.<sup>22</sup>

On September 20, 1974, the UFW met with the national park officers at the Organ Pipe National Park located on the Arizona-Sonora border. Convinced that many undocumented immigrants were crossing the national park, the UFW notified the officials that they were posting a roving patrol within the park to stop the undocumented crossings.<sup>23</sup> By October the UFW had organized a "Wet Line" watch along the border with the purpose of dealing directly with the problem of undocumented immigrants crossing to take jobs as strike breakers. Violent incidents took place. UFW patrols beat up several undocumented workers and detained others, turning them over to the Border Patrol. The newspapers reported that 300 UFW supporters patrolled a 125 mile border between San Luis and Lukeville, Arizona. The union even rented a plane to fly



reconnaissance for union pickets in their cars. Often they simply stopped border crossing Mexicans and talked to them about the strike, convincing many of them not to cross.<sup>24</sup> Technically, there was nothing illegal in these tactics. William Smitherman, a United States District Attorney visited the area to observe the "Wet Line". He later issued an advisory that this was not in violation of the federal statutes.<sup>25</sup>

Back in Yuma, the atmosphere of violence intensified. In early October 1974, unknown persons firebombed five cars owned by undocumented immigrants and a labor contractor's bus. On October 15, the police arrested a UFW member for carrying a concealed weapon during a picket in front of the Bow and Arrow Motel, a motel the union believed catered to undocumented strike breakers and labor contractors.<sup>26</sup> Because the violence involved Mexican nationals, the Yuma strike raised sensitive international issues. On October 21, 1974, President Gerald Ford was to meet with President Luis Echeverria to discuss other pressing international problems. The Arizona State Attorney General, N. Warner Lee, in a letter to President Ford requested that the president discuss labor problems in the Yuma area. He was hopeful that the Mexican president would agree to joint cooperation in stopping the labor violence involving Mexican immigrants.<sup>27</sup> There is no record that this topic surfaced during the meeting, or that any such agreement resulted.

The Yuma strike in 1974 did not signal a fundamental change in the UFW tactics of dealing with Mexican immigrants. Rather, it seemed that some UFW organizers and supporters had strayed from the non-violent philosophy advocated by Chávez. The strike itself generated unfavorable publicity for the union and embarrassed Chávez. It did not produce any UFW gains and probably hurt recruitment efforts among Mexican nationals. By the next year the UFW began to de-emphasize strikes as a tactic. The emphasis shifted to relying on California's new Agricultural Labor Relations Act and its promise to bring peace to the fields.

The Yuma episode was a hard strategy lesson. In contrast, the UFW in the 1970s expanded its mission of more assistance to Mexican workers. A new UFW Constitution, enacted in 1973, reflected the binational character of the union and provided the structure to give direct assistance to Mexican immigrant workers.



The Constitution did not distinguish between citizen and non-citizens, defining the union's purpose, "to unite under its banner all individuals employed as agricultural laborers, regardless of race, creed, sex or nationality."<sup>28</sup> The UFW Constitution provided for a Bill of Rights for all members, regardless of citizenship or legal status in the United States. All members had the right to participate equally in union affairs and to receive their legal entitlement. Accordingly the UFW made special efforts to provide union services to members residing in Mexico. In the 1980s the UFW opened several clinics and information offices across the border to serve its members who worked in Southern California but lived in Mexicali or Tijuana.<sup>29</sup> In addition, the union opened Campesino centers to provide a variety of services to farm workers. By 1990 there were 24 centers in California, two in Arizona and one in Mexico, located in Mexicali. The service centers provided assistance to workers who were eligible for federal-state benefits such as workmen's compensation, unemployment insurance, food stamps, aid to families with dependent children and the like. The Service Centers assisted Spanish-speaking workers in negotiating the complex federal and state bureaucracies, by providing free legal consul and help with translations and explanations.

Mexican immigrants within the union provided some of the first UFW martyrs-victims of strife in the fields. In 1973 a Teamster strike breaker shot and killed Juan de la Cruz, a 60 year old Mexican born UFW veteran. Years later in 1979 a grower killed Rufino Contreras, a UFW farm worker from Mexicali. To honor these Mexican workers, the union established two funds: the Juan de la Cruz Farm Worker's Pension Fund and the Rufino Contreras Political Action fund. Thus, by the end of the 1970s there was no doubt about Chávez's or the UFW's support for Mexican farm workers. But unlike many of the union's critics, Chávez had to live in the real world where actions counted for more than rhetoric and where the livelihood of thousands of farm workers and their families stood in the balance.

### **Immigration Reform and Internationalization**

During the 1980s Chávez and the UFW came to support immigration reform as well as strengthen the union's ties with the

Mexican sindicatos and the Mexican government. Along with other union officials, Chávez supported measures that ended with the U. S. Congress drafting a new immigration law, the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986. This law basically incorporated some of the proposals that he had been advocating for the past 20 years. It provided for employer sanctions, a strengthened border patrol, a guest worker program and, amnesty for undocumented workers who arrived before 1982.

This law, known as IRCA, was roundly criticized by Chicano activists as being discriminatory and creating a militarization of the border. Despite criticism from some Chicano activists, Chávez supported the immigration reforms arguing that they would ultimately benefit the undocumented immigrant's ability to unionize and improve working conditions. He believed that legalized farm workers would be more likely to join unions. Along with other union leaders he supported the enforcement provisions in the law because it committed the government to enforce the labor laws, something he had been advocating for years.<sup>30</sup>

Chávez's evaluation of IRCA in 1989 was that it benefited immigrant farm workers who met the amnesty provisions. He believed that the law would ultimately benefit the UFW as younger legal Mexican immigrant workers grew dissatisfied with pre-IRCA wages and working conditions. Over time, a revolution of rising expectations would result and the newly legalized farm workers would organize to solidify their position within American society. He said, "I think they'll always support, if not our union, the idea of a union. The better wages they have, the better support we have for the union. The worse the wages, the worse conditions, the harder it is to get them. When a work force is not afraid, it bargains for itself. They have a lot at stake in their families, because they are trying to get a house. They're fed up with the camp. They want their own home. Their needs are greater."<sup>31</sup>

Nevertheless, the new law had the potential of hurting the farm workers union. A section of the legislation, opposed by Chávez and the UFW, enabled agribusinesses to import contract laborers in the event of a certified labor shortage. In essence, this provision created a bracero-like program. While the full impact of the law has yet to be evaluated, by the end of 1989, it appeared that

IRCA made it easier for the UFW to recruit additional members. The amnesty provisions of the law, in particular those legalizing temporary agricultural workers (SAW 1 and SAW 2 workers), increased the mobility and self confidence of a whole segment of farm workers.

A consequence of IRCA was to make it even more important for the UFW to establish ties with Mexican organizations. The increased number of legal Mexican nationals within the UFW created a new dynamic that led to a more formal and public international policy on the part of Chávez. Recognizing the importance of Mexican nationals within the UFW, Chávez traveled to Mexico several times to meet with labor officials, including various Mexican presidents, to discuss government policies that would benefit Mexican UFW members. The union held press conferences to protest the mistreatment of Mexican nationals by the INS or the United States' police. News about the UFW struggle against the growers and the boycott during the 1980s was disseminated in Mexico through various Mexican publications. The most outspoken and pro-union of these was *Matices* published by Demetrio Almaguer Torres beginning in 1981 and lasting until 1988.<sup>32</sup> Torres regularly ran articles highlighting Chávez's speeches and analyzing farm worker issues advocated by the UFW. In the late 1980s Chávez publicly complained about the corruption in the Mexican postal system that resulted in the theft of remittances of UFW members. The UFW then lobbied the Mexican legislature to promote postal reform laws that would make the transmittal of remittances more secure.<sup>33</sup> In 1990 Chávez and UFW representatives successfully lobbied Mexican legislators to pass a bill that would allow UFW members resident in the United States to qualify their families for Mexican social security benefits. On April 23, 1990 Chávez met with President Salinas de Gortari in Los Angeles and signed an agreement with the Mexican Social Security Administration (IMSS).<sup>34</sup>

This historic pact between the Mexican government and a Mexican-American labor union appeared in most of the major newspapers and magazines in Mexico. The compact undoubtedly made the union more attractive to Mexican immigrants who wanted

to join the UFW. It showed the high regard that the Mexican government held for Chávez and the UFW. In 1991 the president of Mexico awarded Chávez the prestigious *Aguila de Oro*, a special award of merit given to only a few non-Mexican citizens. This honor recognized his contributions to the welfare of hundreds of thousands of Mexican workers in the United States. In February 1992 the National Autonomous University of Mexico awarded Chávez el *Premio Benito Juárez* to recognize his leadership in the struggles of millions of farm workers. This award has been given annually since 1988 to honor an individual of international importance who has advanced the cause of justice and peace.<sup>35</sup>

## Conclusion

How are we to evaluate the twists and turns in Chávez's and the UFW's attitudes towards Mexican immigration? For some Chávez has simply responded to political pressures. Chicano historian David Gutiérrez has found that during the mid 1970s Mexican-American organizations and leaders made a fundamental realignment on the issue of Mexican immigration.<sup>36</sup> They united for the first time against restrictionist immigration proposals and discovered a common interest between immigrants and native born Mexican-Americans. Gutiérrez argues that Chávez was essentially pressured by other activists into softening his position on immigration control. While it was true that the UFW and Chávez joined other traditionally anti-immigrant organizations such as the American G.I. Forum and the League of United Latin American Citizens to denounce deportation plans of undocumented immigrants, it is also true that Chávez has historically supported the rights of Mexican immigrants, whether documented or not. The nature of this support was mainly to demonstrate against the exploitation and manipulation of immigrant workers by growers. Along with other activists, Chávez became more outspoken about immigrant rights during debates over the Carter immigration proposals during the mid 1970s. But The UFW, in joining the debate on the side of the immigrants, was not changing its policy or orientation. Chávez emphasized his support for the legalization provisions of the proposed immigration bill but also supported strict enforcement mea-

tures. This is entirely consistent with his previous statements accusing the INS and growers of avoiding the laws.

Mexican immigration has shaped the development of the UFW as one of the few binational unions in the United States.<sup>37</sup> The hard realities of farm labor organizing compelled Chávez and the UFW to support immigration measures that were not popular with Chicano activists. At the same time, the increasingly Mexican UFW membership has made it important for the union to forge alliances and work cooperatively with Mexican unions and Mexican government officials. But Chávez himself has changed. During the thirty years of his organizing career, he moved from a nativism stance towards Mexican immigration to a more internationalist approach. In Mexico, writers and politicians have shown more interest in the Chicano political movement and as a result the farm workers union and César Chávez have become part of the folklore of the Mexican struggle against United States hegemony. President Carlos Salinas de Gortari's initiatives to forge links with Mexican-American leaders has heightened the importance of César Chávez and the UFW in the views of Mexican policy makers.

A constant through the years has been César Chávez' criticism of the United States' government agencies and their prejudicial interpretation of immigration and labor laws. The UFW has always had a sizable contingent of immigrants both documented and undocumented as part of its rank and file. With the amnesty provisions of the 1986 IRCA law, a larger number of UFW members have become legal residents. Indications are that the Mexican immigrant flow is not lessening despite new restrictions. The failure of the California Agricultural Relations Act to produce contracts for the UFW has led Chávez to lessen his reliance on agricultural strikes to pressure growers. No longer are Mexican immigrant workers a threat to union strikes. Instead, for 10 years now, Chávez has relied on an international grape boycott to force the growers to sign contracts and include anti-pesticide provisions. It may well be that the organizational dilemmas posed by the failure of the ALRB and continued Mexican immigration has given additional urgency to the grape boycott of the 1990s. The proposed Free Trade agreements, if enacted, may have a negative effect on the UFW since the importation of agricultural goods from Mexico

could create additional unemployment of farm workers in the U.S. even while not easing the pressure for additional rural migrants to come to the United States. This would be the latest in a long history of challenges faced by the farm worker's union and its leadership.

## Notes

<sup>1</sup> The classic analysis of the bracero program is Ernesto Galarza, *Merchants of Labor: the Mexican Bracero Story* (Santa Barbara and Charlotte: McNally & Loftin Publishers, 1964).

<sup>2</sup> For a first hand account of the Oxnard controversy see Jacques Levy, *César Chávez: Autobiography of La Causa* (New York: W.W. Norton and Co., Inc., 1975) 125–131.

<sup>3</sup> Levy 125–144, tells the detailed story of the Oxnard episode.

<sup>4</sup> As late as 1967 Chávez was writing about how the main issue was the displacement of native workers by braceros. See letter, Chávez to McLellan, January 21, 1967, UFW, Office of the President, Box 3 Folder 1, Archives of Labor History and Urban Affairs, Wayne State University.

<sup>5</sup> Levy 149–181.

<sup>6</sup> For a good account of the early months of the grape boycott see John Dunne, *Delano, Story of the California Grape Strike* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1967).

<sup>7</sup> Jorge Bustamante and Gilberto Cárdenas, *Antonio Orendain: a Bibliographic Note*, Press release, Centro de Estudios Chicanos, UFW Archives, Box 57, folder 14; Jorge Bustamante included a lengthy interview with a Mexican national who was an early organizer with Chávez. Bustamante gave him the pseudonym “Anbrosio Margain” but it might have been Orendain. In any case the interview gives a dramatic testimony to the importance of

Mexicanos within the early UFW. See Jorge Bustamante, "Chicanos: biografía de una toma de conciencia," *Cuadernos Políticos*, 6 (Oct.–Dec. 1975) 25–43.

<sup>8</sup> Author interview with Richard Ybarra, August 15, 1989.

<sup>9</sup> Memo, SAC, San Antonio to Director, FBI, 10/27/66, Bureau File, 100–444762.

<sup>10</sup> Memo, SAC, San Antonio to Director, FBI, 5/16/67, Bureau File 100–44444762–105.

<sup>11</sup> Rodolfo Acuña, *Occupied America: A History of Chicanos* 3rd. ed. (New York: Harper Row Publishers, 1988) 329.

<sup>12</sup> The regulation referred to by Chávez was Number BCFR211.1 to Public Law 414 of the Immigration and Naturalization Act of 1952. See AIRTEL, SAC, Los Angeles to Director, FBI, 8/10/67, Bureau File 100,444762–135.

<sup>13</sup> Memo, SAC, Chicago to Director, FBI, 8/11/67, Bureau File 100–444762. For a discussion of the evolution of the commuter worker policy see Larry Herzog, "Border Commuter Workers and Transfrontier Metropolitan Structure Along the United States–Mexico Border," *Journal of Border Studies* 5.2 (1990): 4–6.

<sup>14</sup> Teletype, SAC, San Francisco to Director, FBI, 5/23/68, Bureau File 100–4444762–150.

<sup>15</sup> "Statement of César E. Chávez, Director, United Farm Workers Organizing Committee, AFL–CIO, before the Subcommittee on Labor of the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare," Archives, Walter Reuther Library, UFW, Office of the President, Box 45, Folder 28, typescript.

<sup>16</sup> *Los Angeles Times* 19 June, 1974, II: 3 C1.

<sup>17</sup> *Los Angeles Times* 19 June, 1974, II: 3 C1

<sup>18</sup> David Gutiérrez, "Sin Fronteras?: Chicanos, Mexican Americans, and the Emergence of the Contemporary Mexican Immigration Debate, 1968–1978," *Journal of American Ethnic History* (forthcoming) 23.

<sup>19</sup> Gutiérrez 24, *San Francisco Examiner* 22 November, 1974.

<sup>20</sup> Jorge Carrillo and Alberto Hernandez, "La población de origen mexicano y el movimiento obrero norteamericano," *Cuadernos Seestrales: Estados Unidos: perspectiva latinoamericana—el movimiento obrero norteamericano*, no 11, primer semestre 1982 (Mexico: CIDE, 1982) 251.

<sup>21</sup> Author interview with Burt Corona, May 23, 1989.

<sup>22</sup> Teletype, SAC, Yuma to Director, FBI, 10/16/74, Bureau File 100–444762.

<sup>23</sup> Memo, SAC, Phoenix to Director, FBI, 11/7/74, Bureau File 100–444762.

<sup>24</sup> *Los Angeles Times* 8 October, 1974, I:3 C4.

<sup>25</sup> Teletype, SAC, Yuma to Director, FBI, 10/8/74, Bureau File 100–444762.

<sup>26</sup> Teletype, SAC, Yuma to Director, FBI, 10/15/74, Bureau File 100–444762

<sup>27</sup> Teletype, SAC, Yuma to Director, FBI, 10/16/74, Bureau File 100–444762.

<sup>28</sup> E. M. Colbert, *The United Farm Workers of America: The United States of America* (Geneva: International Labour Office, n.d.) 40.

<sup>29</sup> Colbert 21.



<sup>30</sup> David M. Reimers, *Still the Golden Door: The Third World comes to America* (New York: Colombia University Press, 1985) 228.

<sup>31</sup> César Chávez, personal interview at La Paz, 20 October, 1989. Chávez noted that since the passage of IRCA, the union staff had to redo many of their records to correct previously false information given by the members because of their undocumented status.

<sup>32</sup> *Matices* changed its name to *Dualidad* in 1987 and then to *Quinto Sol Azteca* in 1988. Its publisher, Demetrio Almaguer Torres had strong ties to the Union de Petroleros and traveled frequently to the U.S. to meet with Chávez and the UFW members. His publication was very pro-Chicano and expressly dedicated to forging Mexicano-Chicano alliances. Torres and his publication disappeared after 1988 after conflicts developed between the Petroleros and the government. Complete copies of this newspaper can be seen at the Seminario Permanente de Información y Estudios Mexicano-Chicanos y de Fronteras, located in the Museo del Carmen, San Angel, Mexico City.

<sup>33</sup> César Chávez, personal interview, 20 October, 1989.

<sup>34</sup> *Solidaridad*, 3 June, 1990, Suplemento Especial.

<sup>35</sup> *Réplica*, XXI (December 1990) 4–6; *Gaceta UNAM*, No. 2622, Enero 23, 1992, 5; *Excelsior*, 21 Enero, 1992, 4A.

<sup>36</sup> David Gutiérrez, “Sin Fronteras?: Chicanos, Mexican Americans, and the Emergence of the Contemporary Mexican Immigration Debate, 1968–1978,” *Journal of American Ethnic History* (forthcoming); see also his dissertation “Ethnicity, Ideology and Political Development: Mexican Immigration as a Political Issue in the Chicano Community, 1910–1977,” (Stanford University, 1988).

<sup>37</sup> This is not to de-emphasize the efforts of other Chicano unions to establish working relationships with their Mexican counterparts or to organize and champion the rights of undocumented

immigrants. See especially the discussion of Arturo Santamaría Gomez, *La izquierda norteamericana y los trabajadores indocumentados* (Culiacán, Sinaloa, Universidad Autónoma de Sinaloa, 1988) 191–197.

# **Texas Higher Education and Border Funding Inequities: Implications for Border Universities and Transborder Cooperation<sup>1</sup>**

Ellwyn R. Stoddard\*

## **Resumen**

Casos recientes en la corte del estado de Texas han concluído que: a) no se han apoyado equivalentemente los distritos escolares mas pobres; b) que a los residentes en las áreas fronterizas no se les ha dado igualdad de oportunidades para el desarrollo de estudios profesionales o de doctorado como en el resto del Estado. Este artículo describe la distribución asimétrica de los programas doctorales dentro del Estado. Las soluciones presupuestarias son formuladas considerando los rápidos cambios en la situación política y económica en el Estado. Finalmente, el presente trabajo refleja el impacto positivo que estos programas tendrán en los residentes de la frontera y en la infraestructura de las ciudades fronterizas. Así se puede promover un mayor intercambio con universidades del norte de México.

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## **Introduction**

Today, America is experiencing new political and economic realities. Rapidly changing power alignments caused by the fragmentation of the USSR are altering traditional relationships with our European allies. American-based multinational corporations are being forced to adopt new global strategies to meet Pacific Rim competition; American consumers continue to buy foreign as our negative balance-of-trade mounts. As the world's largest debtor

nation—a \$4 trillion overdraft (increasing \$1 billion per day), we struggle with a crippling recession and high unemployment.

Domestically, our federal fiscal crisis deepens, exacerbated by an expensive military buildup, a costly Gulf War and a multibillion dollar federal bailout for failing banks and S & L institutions. At the same time, presidential campaign rhetoric promises voters more federal spending in catchy new programs which we can ill afford. The federal government is not ready to furnish financial aid for the states' internal economic problems, so troubled state and local government must seek financial solutions closer to home.

Back in the good ol' days, Texas oil created wealth for state coffers, but no more. When the oil rigs became silent, the state money tree died. Rising costs of governmental services coupled with depleted state revenues currently plague the Lone Star State. The state budget for 1992-93 contains a \$5 billion shortfall just to maintain existing services at current levels. Further, recent court-ordered reforms in public school taxation and funding will require additional revenues to stay within the constitutionally-mandated balanced budget. State officials can no longer procrastinate their fiscal responsibilities. Appropriate economic support for these required expenditures must be found for the next biennium.

### **Education Funding in Texas**

Texas ranks in the bottom one-third of American states in per capita expenditures for public education. This low priority has led to major problems in poorer school districts. Its southern counties have further depleted their meager budgets with costly curricula for non-English speaking students. Recently, some of the state's poorest school districts initiated legal action to force a more equitable distribution of public monies. The resultant court case (*Edgewood v. Kirby*, 1986) declared that poorer school districts within the state have been deprived of equal educational opportunities and funding equity. Texas currently has a legal mandate to provide for equity in future taxation and distributing of public funds to school districts. However, with critical legal deadlines again approaching, state legislators have been unable to agree on a plan for restructuring the tax load and distributing public funds more equitably.

### **Funding Equity: A Legal Challenge**

In Texas, institutions of higher education face a pattern of funding inequity similar to that found in its public schools. Whereas the children from prosperous families in select communities enjoy a plethora of doctoral options similar to those afforded their parents, children from less affluent families located in less politically powerful regions (such as its southern borderlands) have none. These artificially-induced inequities have been legally challenged, asking the court to order an end to continued discriminate use of public monies.

In the fall of 1991, the Mexican-American Legal Defense Fund (MALDEF) brought a class action suit on behalf of six Hispanic students in the lower Rio Grande Valley. It targeted the State of Texas, officials and agencies controlling higher education and doctoral programs whose policies had led to decades of inequity funding. The case of LULAC v. RICHARDS et al., argued in the 107th District Court (Brownsville, Texas), concluded that inequities in funding for border graduate programs and institutions indeed existed. In January 1992, Judge Benjamin Euresti issued a court decree requiring Texas officials, legislators, coordinating board members, and system regents to provide equitable funding for higher education in Texas' border region by May 1993 or to cease funding of all state universities until they had complied. That verdict is being challenged on appeal before the Texas Supreme Court beginning October 13, 1992.

If this case unfolds like the six-year-old EDGEWOOD v. KIRBY litigation, further delays and public posturing can be expected. Politically, after expensive evasive tactics have been exhausted, state leaders may well blame the court mandate for having to raise additional revenues.

In a rare departure from legal precedent, the winners of the LULAC v. RICHARDS et al. litigation have already initiated a settlement proposal for consideration by state political agencies and leaders. By meeting with border leaders of business politics and education, MALDEF drew up an initial plan for expanded doctoral and professional programs (with an implementation cost of \$2 billion over a 10 year period). For example, the University of Texas at El Paso would receive an additional sum of \$26 million annually

to initiate a dozen doctoral programs, a broader spectrum of Master's degrees, and a Health Science Center as part of its future mission.


If this legal approach eventually leads to fair budgetary allocations of public monies and greater regional equity, it will curtail political favoritism in university-linked expenditures, a practice which has dominated the Texas landscape for decades. This will inevitably translate into painful cutbacks for institutions accustomed to operating with inflated budgets. For border communities it will offer accessible graduate programs for its aspiring youth from poverty backgrounds. But none of this will happen if legislators do not show the political courage to attack the state's economic problems and projected shortfalls by reallocating the tax burden for all to share.

### **Texas Border Region: A Place, a People**

It is difficult to agree on what constitutes a border region inasmuch as each discipline, scholar or researcher delineates it in a different manner.<sup>2</sup> The LULAC vs RICHARDS et al. suit uses a simple demographic-geographic criterion to include all Texas counties sharing a common border with Mexico plus contiguous counties with Hispanic concentrations of 40 percent or more. This borderlands region of 41 counties is clearly designated on the state map, Figure 1. Two-thirds of the residents of these border counties are Hispanic, accounting for 54 percent of all Hispanics in the state. Because 24 percent of all Texans are Hispanic, their political power is limited; moreover, their regional concentration creates an inextricable link between salient border education problems and Hispanic opportunities for upward mobility.

The border region of Texas is a sprawling sparsely populated expanse. In drawing district lines for political representation, such vast territories may encompass only a handful of people and with little in common. Recently, state senate district lines were redrawn which lumped together citizens of East El Paso with those from Laredo and all towns between. (This would be the equivalent of designating all coastal counties from northern Florida to Washington D.C. as part of a single state congressional district.) Due to the social cost of space,<sup>3</sup> social services in sparsely populated areas are extremely costly on a per capita basis. Unlike densely populated

Figure 1  
 Accessibility to Publicly-Financed Higher Education in Texas:  
 Comprehensive Doctorate and Limited Master's Programs (1990)



Institution Level/Type	Mission Scope of Program
I	"Flagship" Institution
II	Comprehensive Doctorates
III	Multi-Doctorial Programs
4a	Limited/Single Doctorates
4b	Master's Level
4c	Limited MA, branch campus

areas where economies of scale are operative, per capita costs of public safety, health, and education must be budgeted at a much higher per capita rate to assure any semblance of equity in services provided.

This southern Texas borderlands region contains the greatest poverty concentrations in America according to the U.S. Department of Commerce which monitors per capita income in 319 urban centers (SMSAs) throughout the nation. The poorest communities in the nation as ranked are: 1) Pharr–McAllen; 2) Laredo; and 3) Brownsville–Harlingen–San Benito. El Paso, a city of one-half million further upstream is ranked fourth poorest.<sup>4</sup>

Inasmuch as any formula for poverty alleviation must focus on educational opportunities, the issue of equitable financing of public schools and higher education is critical for the residents of this region. Not only do doctoral and professional programs of a university give career training, but their activities add to the overall quality-of-life of the community in which said training is located. Local academicians can clarify local problems and possible solutions through research projects; students and community leaders may become actively involved together in outreach services; professors are models for pupils who interact with them and become familiar with pre-requisite academic training for eventual graduate degrees.

### **Available Doctoral Training in Texas**

On the map of Texas (Figure 1), universities offering multidoctoral programs are geographically identified. They are almost exclusively concentrated in the central and northern part of the state as compared with the absence of doctoral-granting universities in major border communities. The institutions providing master and doctoral level programs are compared by border and non-border locations in Table 1.

The key on the Figure 1 map indicates three major types or levels of doctoral programs offered, according to the scope of offerings and the mission of the institution itself. First, there are two flagship institutions (type I) which are typically found within each American state. Its main university (i.e. University of Texas at Austin) houses schools of law, medicine and related professionals



60-Texas Higher Education

Table 1

BACHELOR'S, MASTER'S, AND DOCTORAL/PROFESSIONAL PROGRAMS IN TEXAS  
PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS OF HIGHER EDUCATION, by Levels

Non-Border Location				Border Location			
Institution	BA's	MA's	PhD <sup>1</sup>	Institution	BA's	MA's	PhD <sup>1</sup>
COMPREHENSIVE DOCTORAL/"FLAGSHIP" INSTITUTIONS							
U T Austin	145	148	123				
Texas A&M <sup>2</sup>	141	143	105				
COMPREHENSIVE DOCTORATE INSTITUTIONS							
Texas Tech <sup>3</sup>	144	112	76				
U of Houston <sup>4</sup>	164	157	50				
MULTIDOCTORAL INSTITUTIONS							
U of No Texas	140	262	115				
Texas Womens U	129	114	39				
U T Dallas <sup>5</sup>	53	68	54				
U T Arlington	106	82	26				
E Texas State	144	99	25				
U T HSC-Houston	4	49	30				
LIMITED DOCTORAL INSTITUTIONS							
Texas Southern	94	83	8				
Lamar Univ	82	35	6				
U T MB-Galveston	8	26	10	U T San Antonio <sup>6</sup>	53	83	11
S F Austin	102	47	1	U T El Paso	83	79	2
Sam Houston St	97	71	1	Texas A&I-Kngsvl	61	60	1
BACHELOR'S, MASTER'S DEGREE INSTITUTIONS							
SW Texas State	108	70	—				
West TX State	102	62	—				
Prairie View A&M	55	61	—	Sul Ross State	33	36	—
U T Tyler	43	33	—				
Angelo State	48	23	—	U T Pan AM-Edinbg		47	22
—							
Tarleton State	72	19	—				
Midwestern State	52	18	—				
U T Permian Basn	26	19	—				
E Texas St-TxArk	17	15	—	Corpus Christi St	29	14	—
Houston-Victoria	18	25	—	Laredo State	18	13	—
				U T Pan Am-Brmsv	15	9	—
				Sul Ross, Uvalde	8	9	—

Source: Coordinating Board Inventory, Academic Degree Programs(4/1990)

FOOTNOTES IN TABLE

1=Includes professional programs,  
(i.e. law, medicine etc.)

2=Includes Medicine/Vet Medicine

3=Includes Tech Health Sci Ctr.

4=Includes three Houston campuses.

5=Includes U T SW Med Ctr at Dallas

6=Includes UTSA Health Sci Ctr.

as well as other academic Ph.D.'s. Its land-grant institution (i.e. Texas A & M University), a legacy of the Civil War Morrill Act, typically concentrates on agricultural and engineering specialties. However, over time both of these Texas institutions have expanded significantly beyond the narrow mission statement initially given them.

The second level of public universities are those with comprehensive multidocloral programs (type II) but without the traditional flagship mandate found in type I institutions. Two universities in Texas are included in this category: Texas Tech University (Lubbock) and the University of Houston campuses.

The third level of doctoral granting institutions within the state are multidocloral universities (type III) usually lacking the comprehensiveness of type I and type II institutions. Significantly, in Texas, these are all geographically clustered around the city of Dallas. These five universities reflect a very broad spectrum of training—from medical professions at the University of Texas at Dallas to varied academic doctorates issued by the University of Texas at Arlington (west side of Dallas). Many academic doctoral programs are also offered at East Texas State University in the small town of Commerce some 50 miles northeast of Dallas. But 40 miles north of Dallas, in Denton, (population 66,000), two major universities offer a combined total of 154 doctoral degrees—30 more than the total available at the University of Texas at Austin!

In addition to local accessibility provided by this regional concentration of doctoral programs, potential graduate students of Dallas and Houston areas have programs at other nearby institutions (within a 70 mile radius) from which to select their graduate program (see Table 2). A comparison of the doctoral-rich Dallas region with the limited total of three doctoral programs for the entire 41 county border area clearly reflects a disparity in funding and program accessibility.

In sum, Texas college graduates eager to pursue a doctorate should either be born to a rich family or chose parents living near Dallas!

### **Borderlands Doctoral Programs**

Obviously, political considerations rather than criteria of population concentrations or planned statewide distribution have resulted in vast resource commitments to central and northern parts

## 62-Texas Higher Education

Table 2

ACCESSIBILITY TO PUBLICLY-FINANCED HIGHER EDUCATION IN TEXAS:  
LOCATION OF COMPREHENSIVE DOCTORATE & LIMITED MASTER'S PROGRAMS  
(1990)

City (*border)	Population (1990)	Institution(s) and Type <sup>1</sup>	Other Access Compreh	70 miles Limited
Houston(SMSA)	1,630,553	University of Houston (II ) Texas Southern Univ (4a)	I I, II	4a(3) 4a(2)
Dallas(SMSA)	1,006,877	U T Dallas/SW Med Ctr (III)	III(4)	—
*San Antonio	935,933	U T SA/Health Sci Ctr (4a)	—	—
*El Paso	515,342	U T El Paso (4a)	—	—
Austin	465,622	U T Austin (I )	—	—
Arlington	261,721	U T Arlington (III)	III(3)	4b
*Corpus Christi	257,453	Corpus Christi State (4b)	—	4a,4b
Lubbock	186,206	Texas Tech U (II )	—	4b
*Laredo	122,899	Laredo State (4b)	—	—
Beaumont	114,323	Lamar Univ (4a)	II	4a(2)
Bryan/Coll Sta	107,458	Texas A & M (I )	—	4a
*Brownsville	98,962	Texas Pan Am-Brownsvl (4c)	—	4b
Wichita Falls	96,259	Midwestern State (4b)	—	—
Midland	89,443	U T Permian Basin (4c)	—	—
San Angelo	84,474	San Angelo State (4b)	—	—
Tyler	75,450	U T Tyler (4b)	—	4a
Denton	66,270	U of North Texas (III) Texas Woman's Univ (III)	III(4) III(4)	— —
Galveston	59,070	U T Medical Branch (4a)	II	4a(2)
Victoria	55,076	U Houston-Victoria (4b)	—	4b
Texarkana	31,656	E TX State-Texarkana (4b)	—	—
Nacogdoches	30,872	Stephen F Austin (4a)	—	4b
*Edinburg	29,885	U T Pan American (4b)	—	4c
San Marcos	28,743	SW Texas State (4b)	I	4a
Huntsville	27,925	Sam Houston State (4a)	I, II	—
*Kingsville	25,276	Texas A & I (4a)	—	4b
*Uvalde	14,729	Sul Ross Study Ctr (4c)	—	4a
Stephenville	13,502	Tarleton State (4b)	III	—
Canyon	11,365	West Texas State (4b)	II	—
Commerce	6,825	East Texas State (III)	III(3)	—
*Alpine	5,637	Sul Ross (4b)	—	—
Prairie View	4,004	Prairie View A & M (4b)	II	4a

Pop Source: TEXAS: Census of Population and Housing, Summary (1990)

Footnote 1 – Key to Types of Institutions/Degree Programs

I – Comprehensive Doctoral Programs, Flagship Institutions

II – Comprehensive Doctoral Programs

III – Multidoctoral Programs in various fields

4a – Limited doctoral offerings, or specialty field

4b – Master's degree offerings, no doctorates.

4c – Limited Master's offerings/branch campus programs.

of the state. At the same time border cities such as Brownsville (population 100,000) are left without even a reputable four-year college. Currently, residents of Brownsville might not be aware that graduate training is offered in their community being that only a handful of commuting instructors from the University of Texas-Pan American, the University of Houston, or Texas A & M arrive at their school. Their building (not buildings) might be confused with a small trade school. The frustration of potential college students in this border region seems justified indeed.

For decades, state planning agencies have assigned non-doctoral missions to border institutions leaving them powerless to request programs which might upgrade their offerings. For example, the University of Texas at El Paso (UTEP) was the former Texas School of Mines. In the mid-1960s its undergraduate curriculum became more diversified. Even though it was academically the strongest border institution in the state it was never allowed to expand its mission statement until recently. Its former mining specialty provided justification for a single doctoral program in geology. A second doctorate (electrical engineering) was subsequently approved when no additional state monies were required to initiate the program. The low priority for subsequent academic doctorates has prevented psychology (i.e. initiating their doctoral training) from being so designated even though their rigorously-evaluated application had cleared all approval levels other than the final bureaucratic designation.

The only other doctorate training in this vast border region is located in Kingsville more than 1,000 miles east of El Paso. This lone doctorate in bilingual Education at Texas A & I University (only recently attached to Texas A & M system) will be expanded to include a second doctorate in Leadership (an expanded version of Education Administration) in the Fall of 1992. Neither of these institutions are within commuting distance of most border community residents. Other graduate programs need to be made accessible to residents of the region.

Not only is there a paucity of doctoral programs available in the border region but funding support for academic infrastructure has suffered as well (as revealed in Figures 2 thru 5). Figure 2 graphically reveals the lack of border-based doctoral programs on

Figure 2  
COMPARISON OF DOCTORAL PROGRAMS IN 41 BORDER COUNTIES  
AND OTHER NON-BORDER COUNTIES OF TEXAS, 1989-1990  
(Ratio per One Million residents)





Figure 3  
COMPARISON OF STATE APPROPRIATIONS TO 41 BORDER COUNTIES AND  
OTHER NON-BORDER COUNTIES OF TEXAS, 1989-1990 (\$ Per Capita)



Source: LULAC v. RICHARDS et al., trial evidence.  
Texas Coordinating Board for Higher Education

Figure 4  
 COMPARISON OF STUDENT/FACULTY RATIOS (INSTITUTIONS OF HIGHER LEARNING)  
 IN 41 BORDER COUNTIES AND OTHER NON-BORDER COUNTIES  
 OF TEXAS, 1989-1990 (Student Numbers)





Figure 5  
 COMPARISON OF LIBRARY EXPENDITURES FOR INSTITUTIONS OF HIGHER  
 LEARNING IN 41 BORDER COUNTIES AND OTHER NON-BORDER COUNTIES  
 OF TEXAS, 1989-1990 (\$ Per Capita)



Source: LULAC v. RICHARDS et al., trial evidence.  
 Texas Coordinating Board for Higher Education

a per capita basis. The funding inequities of border v. non-border appropriations in Figure 3 reveal that two and one-half times more money is designated for training of a non-border college student than is allocated for one attending a border institution. Figure 4 shows the faculty/student ratios of border and non-border institutions. Whereas the sheer number of faculty and staff required to offer 154 academic doctorates in the small city of Denton provides adequate manpower and opportunity for professor-student contact, border institutions must carry large teaching loads with little opportunity for research and other community-based activity. Coupled with this is a 25 percent lower faculty salary than colleagues with lower teaching loads in nonborder institutions. With one-half the library appropriations of their non-border institutions (see Figure 5), border area programs lack equity in resource development. While scholars at a border university agonize over which \$25-30 per year professional or scientific journal subscription to cancel in a mandated budget cut, more favored institutions are given supplementary library budgets to order esoteric and costly library resources. Indeed, the preservation of current funding inequity procedures condemns future generations of border youth to languish in poverty while other politically-preferred locations wallow in excess.

It is quite clear that to meet the objectives set forth in the court order of Judge Euresti, a few spare dollars from the lottery will not suffice. Clearly, these changes will require a complete restructuring of the newly defined area missions for select border institutions. Program acceleration to develop new programs at the Masters and Doctoral levels will require sizeable start-up funds. Initial start-up library appropriations must be sizeable; special line items for research materials, for equipping laboratories capable of meeting the training objectives of the new mission, and the lowering of student-teacher ratios will require initial budgetary support. Special expanded faculty budgets will be required for seeking out established and competent senior scholars while more equitable faculty salaries must be offered those in border locations whose professional qualifications are comparable to non-border colleagues.

Social scientists agree that education (including graduate education) is the single most important key to personal upward

mobility. With the upgrading of present and additional institutions of higher education in the border region, Texas will discover that it is cheaper in the long run to educate all of its people than to maintain a chronic underclass of unemployable, uneducated and uninformed border residents. The evidence is so compelling as to make the state blush for having ignored it for so long or even now avoiding obvious changes needed to rectify the problem.

### **Increasing Border Opportunity: A Call for Action**

Recent judicial decrees require the state of Texas to 1) provide tax equity in funding public education, and 2) provide increased doctoral programs in its border region. For state political officials, meeting the requirements of Judge Euresti (January 1992) to fund border doctoral programs will not be an easy or popular task. In such a politically-charged milieu, the tendency is for state functionaries to maintain the status quo and pass on the problem to subsequent office-holders. However, legislators currently face critical time constraints for this mandated improvement in both public and higher education of the state. Prolonged legalism and evasion tactics may create organized discontent. During a presidential election year campaign, the newly visible Hispanic voting bloc in Texas might be persuaded to rally behind candidates willing to give their support to this vital issue. Also, by seizing the initiative, state leaders might avoid having to acknowledge the existence of past purposeful neglect. But regardless of how this potentially explosive issue is handled, it sends an urgent message to state officials:

- 1) The data showing neglect are so clear that only immediate efforts to ameliorate the problem will assuage the resentment of border residents who will hold all office-holders accountable.
- 2) The timing of the legal decision will not permit buck passing as a successful avoidance strategy in Texas politics.
- 3) Organized resistance to funding inequities in Texas higher education is solidly entrenched; political aspirants and minority organizations are eager to



challenge present state leadership. It is a major issue waiting to happen.

4) The growing Hispanic minority is politically ready to support programs designed to help them escape from poverty.

5) The Free Trade Agreement and other external factors will force this issue into the public forum for resolution; a potential embarrassment and deterrent for potential investors wishing to select Texas as their base of operations.

### **Border Higher Education and Transborder Cooperation**

America's Monroe Doctrine declared the Western Hemisphere was to be free of European intrusion. Nevertheless, its own position of power allowed a somewhat paternalistic relationship to develop between itself and its neighbors. International agreements with Mexico, for instance, have often been unilateral declarations by the U.S. However, in this modern era of global markets and multi-national integration, this archaic mechanism is not viable. New political and economic coalitions are forming, reminiscent of post-World War II, when enemies were reclassified as allies and allies became unfriendly adversaries. The once friendly NATO political-military organization is now seen as an economic threat (European Community); the dismantled U.S.S.R. is in need of economic assistance and no longer provides a bipolar threat for military strategists; and the Far East coalition organized to contain Russian aggression (SEATO) is now being labeled as an unfair trading partner, resulting in Japan bashing and resentment of the Pacific Rim's Four Little Dragons.<sup>5</sup>

To counter this shift of political and economic power, President Bush has pressed for the formation of a North American Free Trade zone, a somewhat premature heuristic construct to be sure. It would attempt to vulcanize the economies of two G-7 nations<sup>6</sup> (Canada and the U.S.) with a rapidly developing but economically troubled Third World nation (Mexico) as a coalition against the European and Far East trade blocs. Mexico's President Salinas de Gotari has visibly suppressed traditional Mexican na-

tionalism to embrace this new policy of close ties with America as his best option for a troubled Mexican economy.<sup>7</sup>

This arrangement could increase U. S.–Mexico coordination in issues common to the border; border environment, health and education. But border residents must be realistic in light of their past history of neglect. A mere national proclamation may not translate into a positive transborder vehicle if political opposition continues to restrict funding for border infrastructure projects. Such as border environment, health and education. They must be optimistic but also aware of past realities. A mere national proclamation for a new age of transborder coordination may not translate into a positive border scenario if political opposition to current funding for required border infrastructure projects continues.

### **Incongruities in Regional and Local Policies**

The U.S.–Mexico borderlands serve as a buffer zone between two vastly different nation-states; the U.S., the most powerful economic and political entity in the world, and Mexico, a rapidly developing Third World nation. Within the United States, its border regions are not only peripheral to the rest of America, but are peripheral to the governments in each of its four border states. When any segment of borderlands society survives, it must do so by successfully dealing with a variety of political entities; the mandates and restrictions issued by its own federal bureaucracy, policies of its own state government, and relations with other local jurisdictions. Further, it must somehow be aware of policies of foreign jurisdictions lying across the binational border operating at the local, state and federal level.<sup>8</sup>

These channels of cooperation and coordination are most difficult when they involve transborder relations, inasmuch as any formalized alliance would be the diplomatic equivalent of an international treaty, a privilege the federal government reserves strictly for itself.

With the southern borderland becoming a more strategic area for future maquiladoras (offshore assembly plants) and the proposed Free Trade zone, border states may be forced to give greater priority to their border regions. Economic development in

northern Mexico generates new industries and jobs in the U.S. just as Mexico's frontier growth and economic success reflects its historical linkage with the U.S. economy.<sup>9</sup> However, proposed expansion of the current maquiladora industry in northern Mexico is an explosive issue for unemployed American workers suffering in a dismal domestic economy.

While national issues are usually broad sweeping ideological declarations, most realistic day-to-day issues affecting shared transborder problems require a hands-on functional interplay, a process prohibited by the nation-state monopoly on treaty-making. Walking the tightrope between federal mandates and local traditions has never been an easy task inasmuch as federal officials perceive the border as the divisive limits of territorial sovereignty whereas local officials see it as a point of integrating scarce border resources and services in a positive symbiotic relationship.<sup>10</sup> Caught in a milieu of border necessity vs proscriptive rules, border institutions often maintain a complex network of frontier transborder relationships which, if discovered, are labeled by centrists as illegal behavior. This fortress mentality of federal and state functionaries blinds them to the realistic problems faced by local officials who must focus on problem-solving.<sup>11</sup>

Along the entire border, popular support is increasing for transnational programs aimed at improving or stabilizing the quality-of-life. New environmental agreements have been initiated to minimize air and water pollution along the southern U.S. boundary. Thus, non-controversial aspects of issues important to the U.S. such as environmental pollution of shared air and water resources, health and disease problems, drug interdiction and education alliances are accorded transborder cooperation. Those dealing with issues involving economic development which may place Mexico at risk face more opposition. Thus, transborder coordination is not a universal reaction; it varies from issue to issue.

Critics are quick to point out infrastructure limitations in Mexico's border areas while they ignore these same deficiencies on the Texas side. Prior to launching any new political, economic, or higher education projects for the borderlands, the immense task of simultaneously upgrading interlocking border infrastructures must be planned and funded as a major cost. Similar to the preparation

of a dented car body for a paint job, this institutional preparation stage is far more costly, less visible and less glamorous than the latter stages of program building. Moreover, bolstering the infrastructure is a long-range project which needs to be commenced immediately or it will become a major obstacle toward intra-state and transnational development later.

An expanded role for Texas border universities will favorably alter transborder cooperation and training in both Texas and northern Mexico universities. The expansion of doctoral programs in borderlands institutions (with concomitant funding for border infrastructure) could quickly expand borderlands scholarship and expertise. The popular notion of a North American common market will require seasoned researchers to study and help ameliorate various side effects of Free Trade. When economic opportunities expand on the border, both sides benefit. But none will benefit if the border region continues to be either ignored or labeled a foreign country as it is now.

Mexico's frontier universities (see Appendix A) are eager to establish ties with doctoral level institutions for large joint projects. And although Mexican universities and scholars are not the responsibility of Texas taxpayers, mutual cooperation in caring for the border will benefit Texans enormously.

## Notes

<sup>1</sup> This is an expanded and modified version of a paper presented to the 4th Annual Texas–Mexico Conference on Higher Education, University of Texas–Pan American (March 19, 1992), Edinburg, Texas. Appreciation is extended to MALDEF for use of selected trial evidence and for Jaime Nuñez-Cruz (LACIT, UTEP) for construction of Figures 2-5.

<sup>2</sup> These descriptions vary from economic criteria to demographics; topography to culture area or arbitrary historical usage. See discussion in Ellwyn R. Stoddard. "Introduction" in *Borderlands Sourcebook* edited by Ellwyn R. Stoddard, Richard L. Nostrand, and Jonathan P. West (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1983) 3-5.

<sup>3</sup> This valuable concept developed by the late Carl F. Kraenzel. *The Social Cost of Space for Sparsely Populated Places and Regions* (El Paso: University of Texas at El Paso, Department of Sociology, Unpublished book ms, 1970).

<sup>4</sup> Two additional cities (Lawton, OK and Orem, UT) fit into this ranking but are not considered for technical reasons. For a comprehensive treatment of border poverty see Ellwyn R. Stoddard and John Hedderson, *Patterns of Poverty Along the U.S. –Mexico Border* (Las Cruces: New Mexico State University Border Research Institute, 1987).

<sup>5</sup> Japan and China are the "Big Dragons" of the Pacific Rim; Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore are called the "Little Dragons."

<sup>6</sup> The G-7 (Group of 7 most industrialized/wealthiest nations) include Canada, France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Japan and the U.S.

<sup>7</sup> Luis Rubio, "Free Trade: A Mexican Voice" *Border Trax* (December, 1990) 19-20.

<sup>8</sup> Both Duchacek and House describe the difficulties faced in transborder coordination of regional and local entities. Ivo D. Duchacek. "Transborder Overlaps between Three Federal Systems: From Gulf of Mexico to the Arctic Ocean" Paper presented to Western Social Science Association (April), San Diego, California, 1985. John House, "The Frontier Zone: A Conceptual Problem for Policy Makers" *International Political Science Review* 1.4 (1980) 456-477.

<sup>9</sup> Ellwyn R. Stoddard, *Maquila: Assembly Plants in Northern Mexico* (El Paso: Texas Western Press, 1987).

<sup>10</sup> Ellwyn R. Stoddard, "Structural and Functional Approaches to Policymaking: Viewing the U.S. Mexico Border as Divisive Barrier or Integrative System" in *One Border. Two Nations: Policy Implications and Problem Resolutions* edited by Oscar J. Martinez, Albert E. Utton and Mario Miranda Pacheco (Mexico, D.F.: ANUIES, 1988) 159-194.

<sup>11</sup> Ellwyn R. Stoddard, "Local and Regional Incongruities in Bi-National Diplomacy: Policy for the U.S.-Mexico Border" *Policy Perspectives* 2.1 (1982) 222-236. Also, Stoddard, "Frontiers, Borders and Border Segmentation: Toward a Conceptual Clarification" *Journal of Borderlands Studies* 5 (Spring, 1991)1-22.

## APPENDIX A

## MEXICAN INSTITUTIONS OF HIGHER EDUCATION IN BORDER STATES (ANUIES)

Institution/Location	Rector	Public Univ-Tech Inst	Private Univ/Inst
<b>CHIHUAHUA</b>			
Colegio de la Frontera Norte(COLEF) CHIHUAHUA, Chih	Lic. Eduardo Barrera	X	
Escuela Superior de Agricultura "Hermanos Escobar" CHIHUAHUA, Chih.	Ing. Marcos Lopez Torres		X
Instituto Tecnológico de Chihuahua CHIHUAHUA, Chih.	Ing. Horacio Nuñez Martinez	X	
Instituto Tecnológico de Ciudad Juarez CD. JUAREZ, Chih.	Ing. Humberto Morales Moreno	X	
Instituto Tecnológico y de Estudios Superiores de Monterrey CHIHUAHUA, Chih. (Branch) CD. JUAREZ, Chih. (Branch)			X X
Universidad Autónoma de Chihuahua CHIHUAHUA, Chih.	Dr. Carlos Ochoa Ortega	X	
Universidad Autónoma de Ciudad Juarez CD. JUAREZ, Chih.	Lic. Wilfrido Campbell Saavedra	X	
<b>COAHUILA</b>			
Instituto Tecnológico de Saltillo SALTILLO, Coah.	Ing. Jose Claudio Tamez Saenz		X
Instituto Tecnológico de La Laguna TORREON, Coah.	Ing. Jose Luis Villarreal Cardenas		X
Instituto Tecnológico y de Estudios Superiores de Monterrey SALTILLO, Coah. (Branch) TORREON, Coah. (Branch)			X X
Universidad Autónoma Agraria "Antonio Narro" SALTILLO, Coah.	Ing. M.S. Reginaldo de Luna Villarreal	X	

## MEXICAN INSTITUTIONS OF HIGHER EDUCATION (ANUIES) Cont'd

Institution/Location	Rector	Public Univ-Tech Inst	Private Univ/Inst
<b>COAHUILA (Cont'd)</b>			
Universidad Autónoma de Coahila SALTILLO, Coah.	M.C. Remigio Valdes Gamez	X	
<b>NUEVO LEON</b>			
Instituto Tecnológico y de Estudios Superiores de Monterrey (TESM) MONTERREY, N.L. EUGENIO GRAZA SADA, N.L. (Branch)	Dr. Rafael Rangel Sostmann		X X
Universidad Autónoma de Nuevo Leon MONTERREY, N.L.	Ing. Gregorio Farías Longoria	X	
Universidad Regiomontana MONTERREY, N.L.	Pablo Longoria		X
Universidad de Monterrey SAN PEDRO GARZA GARCIA, N.L.	Ing. Jorge Santiesteban Pría		X
<b>TAMAULIPAS</b>			
Instituto Tecnológico de Matamoros MATAMOROS, Tamps.	Ing. Rafael Rosaldo Cortazar	X	
Instituto Tecnológico de Nuevo Laredo NUEVO LAREDO, Tamps.	Ing. Tomas Garza Wong	X	
Instituto Tecnológico de Ciudad Madero CD. MADERO, Tamps.	Ing. Nicolas Echevarria Diaz	X	
Instituto Tecnológico y de Estudios Superiores de Monterrey TAMPICO, Tamps. (Branch)			X
Universidad Autónoma de Tamaulipas CD. VICTORIA, Tamps.	Lic. Jose Adame Micr	X	

Source: Directory, Texas-Mexico Border Higher Education Conference, held April 26-28, 1989 in Cd. Juárez-El Paso; Chihuahua updates from CIBS, U. T. El Paso (February 1992)



## **Texas Discovers Its Mexican Neighbors: Border-State Governmental Relations, 1978-1991**

E.V. Niemeyer, Jr.\*

### **Resumen**

Una época nueva y más prometedora en las relaciones gubernamentales entre Texas y Tamaulipas, Nuevo León, Coahuila y Chihuahua ha emanado de las administraciones de los Gobernadores Clements, White y Richards a causa de sus iniciativas con los estados fronterizos.

\*E.V. Niemeyer, Jr., is retired from the Foreign Service of the U.S. Information Agency and from a staff position at the University of Texas at Austin.

Studies of the U.S.–Mexico relationship have generally focused on the interaction of the governments of both countries with little attention being paid to relations between states that face each other along a common border. In part this has been due to the paucity of these relations. On each side of the border officials were so concerned with matters in their own states that they gave scant attention to their neighbors and their problems. An air of mutual indifference, even to the point of extending social amenities, prevailed. But with growing industrialization, increased trade across the border, population pressures in Mexico, and environmental concerns, the situation has changed. Now the chief executives of Texas and the four states that border it—Chihuahua, Coahuila, Nuevo León, and Tamaulipas—talk to each other, meet to discuss problems, seek to promote border development, and work together for the welfare of the people of the border area. The change has been dramatic. Texas has at last discovered its Mexican neighbors and their response to this attention has been positive.

Prior to 1979 Texas governors had been most concerned with the border states in times of conflict and stress. During the

period of conflict of the Mexican Revolution (1910-1925) instability in Mexico and border raids of revolutionary and marauding bands along the Río Grande forced Texas governors and other state officials to concentrate on the protection of life and property.<sup>1</sup> During World War II and the years following, the Good Neighbor Commission of Texas sought to reduce discrimination against Mexican workers in Texas, visitors from Mexico, and Mexican Americans as the state struggled to show that it could be a good neighbor of Mexico.<sup>2</sup>

The first Texas governor to notice his peers, the governors of the four border states, was John Connally, who in 1964 took the unprecedented step of paying them a courtesy call in their own state capitals: Chihuahua, Saltillo, Monterrey, and Ciudad Victoria. He was warmly received by state officials in each of those cities, and many people turned out to see the Texas governor who had survived the Kennedy assassination and who bore visible evidence of that tragedy.

The next governor to show interest in Mexico was William P. Clements who during his first term in office (1979-1983) brought about a revolution in Texas border-state relations. How and why did this come about? In his campaign for the governorship, Clements had made good relations with Mexico a principal issue, had said more than once that Mexico was crucial to the future of the United States in energy matters. Since this implied increased exploration and drilling for oil in Mexico, many believed that he sought greater opportunity to drill in Mexico for SEDCO, the Dallas-based oil drilling firm he had founded in 1947 that had made him wealthy. He was not considered to be particularly knowledgeable about Mexico, and there were questions about his attitude towards Mexican Americans.<sup>3</sup> While his views of both may have followed stereotyped patterns, there is no evidence that Clements held ethnic prejudices toward either. The impression that he did arose from his autocratic, patriarchal, almost tutorial manner of dealing with others, regardless of their racial background or nationality. He was gruff and outspoken. A man of candor, he avoided rhetoric and had little patience for self-indulgence.<sup>4</sup>

In reality Clements was governor at a time in history when state executives were beginning to exercise more active roles in areas of foreign affairs of vital interest to their states.<sup>5</sup> However

serious U.S.–Mexican problems were perceived in Washington and Mexico City, they were felt more acutely on the border. Both Texas and Mexican state officials, beset with the daily frustrations and complexities of the relations between the two countries, were becoming more and more aware of the need to deal with each other if conditions were to be improved. Clements saw this clearly, and while Mexican governors have less freedom than U.S. governors in the field of foreign relations, the border governors were willing to work with him.

Unconcerned with the linguistic and cultural differences that separated him from his Mexican counterparts, Clements initiated a personal diplomacy that began a long overdue era of good neighborliness at the state-government level.<sup>6</sup> Counseled by Richard Roy Rubottom, a retired diplomat of the U.S. Foreign Service, he plunged into the unknown waters of foreign relations with a bold stroke: a flight to Mexico City right after his inauguration in January, 1979, to confer with Mexican President José López-Portillo. He then turned his attention to the border-state governors, visiting each of them in their capitols and inviting them to Austin. They came, flattered to be so honored. During his four years in office, he met his Mexican counterparts a total of 20 times as he sought to improve Texas' relations with Mexico and to better economic conditions along the Texas–Mexico border.

In regard to the problems of undocumented Mexican workers in Texas, Clements proposed a guest worker program that stressed consultation, cooperation, and coordination with Mexico.<sup>7</sup> He also established a task force to determine the number of undocumented workers in Texas.<sup>8</sup> His administration initiated cooperative wild life projects with Nuevo León and Tamaulipas,<sup>9</sup> carried out training programs for law enforcement officers<sup>10</sup> and implemented cultural, technical and student exchange programs with Mexico.<sup>11</sup> In the commercial field, Clements signed enabling legislation to establish foreign trade zones in San Antonio and five border cities for the purpose of promoting trade and creating jobs in the border area.<sup>12</sup>

To relieve congestion, speed up the flow of goods into and from Mexico, and reduce the crossing time for tourists, his administration obtained approval for an application to build a bridge across the Río Grande at Presidio, Texas and authorized feasibility

studies for other bridges at Del Río, El Paso, and Laredo. Through the Governor's efforts, the U.S. Small Business Administration allocated \$8 million in direct loans for border businesses hurt by the peso devaluation of 1982. Finally, under the Development Corporation Act of 1979, which was signed into law by Clements, \$396 million in industrial revenue bonds set in motion a program that created more than 8,600 new jobs in border communities.<sup>13</sup> By the end of his first term, Clements had made an auspicious start in turning the Texas ship of state toward its Mexican neighbors.

For his part, Governor Mark White (1983-1987) did not neglect Mexico, although his program was low profile in comparison with that of his predecessor.<sup>14</sup> It appears that he concentrated on establishing personal relationships with his peers in the Mexican bureaucracy. He met with the governors of the four border states, some on several occasions, and in early 1986 his Executive Assistant met in Houston with the Governor of Yucatán. At the Fourth Border Governors' Conference held in Tucson in 1984, Governor White played a role in the planning sessions. His administration assisted in organizing and carrying out the First Regional Conference of the Río Grande Border States on Parks and Wildlife held November 5-6, 1985, in Laredo. This conference sought to identify issues affecting the management of flora, fauna and recreation along the border as well as to develop contacts and establish an informal network among resource management agencies. Additionally, it sought to increase awareness and appreciation of the complex issues facing the border region in the protection of the environment.<sup>15</sup>

Governor White also encouraged the growing *maquiladora* program, a relatively new economic development concentrated on the Mexican side of the U.S.-Mexico border.<sup>16</sup> Despite the fact that *maquiladoras* employ about one tenth of the Mexican industrial work force and have become the second largest earner of foreign exchange, they are criticized by American labor leaders for taking jobs away from American workers and by many researchers as sweatshop exploitation, for causing pollution and health hazards, and for primarily employing young women at low wages who are not in the work force. Furthermore, cities along the border in or around which *maquiladoras* are concentrated have become even more crowded with the influx of workers; this has strained existing

water and sewage systems and exacerbated even further the shortage of housing, transportation, and medical and educational services in these areas. For Texas, however, there has been an increase in plants along the border that supply component parts for *maquiladora* production. Aware of the deficiency in child and maternal health care along both sides of the border and the need to improve this vital service, White also signed an agreement between the State of Texas and the Mexican federal government for the exchange of public health personnel.

A major event of White's term was the devastating earthquake that struck Mexico City in September 1985. White responded immediately, appointing a state-wide task force, the "Texas Response—Citizens for Mexican Relief," with Henry Cisneros, then Mayor of San Antonio, and Robert Krueger, former ambassador-at-large to Mexico, as co-chairmen. Response to the task force's appeal for help resulted in "an incredible outpouring of assistance."<sup>17</sup> Texans sent tons of supplies by plane, rail, and truck. These included high priority medicines, vaccines, food, clothing, water in paper cartons, rescue equipment, earth moving machines, and demolition equipment. Over \$8 million in cash was also raised to help the suffering and the reconstruction effort.

During his second term, which began in January 1987, Governor Clements demonstrated the same interest and enthusiasm for strengthening ties with the Mexican border states that he showed during his first term. Most of his effort focused on the promotion of economic development of the border area. In early 1988 he met in Austin with each of his counterparts (Governors Fernando Baeza Meléndez of Chihuahua, Eliseo Mendoza Berrueto of Coahuila, Jorge Treviño of Nuevo León, and Américo Villarreal of Tamaulipas) and signed with each an agreement to support the continued expansion of the *maquiladora* industry. The first, titled a "Cooperative Agreement" and signed jointly on February 11 by Clements; Treviño; Antonio Villarreal, President of the Nuevo León Agency for International Trade and Industrial Development; and Edward O. Vetter, Chairman of the Board, Texas Department of Commerce, committed the signatories to "promote and facilitate joint economic development opportunities" and directed the Agency and the Department to develop and execute working agreements between them that

would promote and facilitate joint business opportunities and linkages between the two states; encourage business associations and chambers of commerce to cooperate in establishing stronger private sector business linkages; and promote the awareness of *maquiladora* and other production-sharing ventures that would benefit business and economic development on both sides of the border. The concept of a State of Nuevo León office in Texas to foster joint investment and industrial and commercial projects was also endorsed, as was a "Vacation-in-Two-Nations" program that would promote tourism through jointly funded advertising and the sharing of mailing lists of names of potential tourists to either state.<sup>18</sup> At the signing ceremony in Austin, Clements enthusiastically exclaimed that "what this is all about is jobs, jobs, jobs, and more jobs for Mexico and Texas, and that's exactly what our improved relations can trigger."<sup>19</sup>

Under the terms of a separate "Document of Understanding in Transportation and Highway Technology" signed the same day, the two chief executives agreed that transportation research would be exchanged between the University of Texas at Austin Center for Transportation Research, the Texas Department of Highways and Public Transportation, the Secretariat of Public Works and Transportation of Nuevo León, the Autonomous University of Nuevo León and the Instituto Tecnológico; y de Estudios Superiores de Monterrey (Monterrey TEC). It was also agreed that annual conferences would be held in Monterrey for the purpose of exchanging technical information, that highway installations would be visited to observe current construction techniques, and that the parties would participate in an exchange of graduate students. The Directors of the Center for Transportation Research and The Director of Major Highways of Nuevo León were designated to coordinate the various activities.<sup>20</sup>

The two governors further agreed to promote the construction of a bridge over the Río Grande some 16 miles north of Laredo. The bridge would link Colombia, Nuevo León with the Texas side where no town exists but where the township Dolores had during World War II. This bridge had long been sought by Monterrey industrialists to avoid bottlenecks and other rapid transit impediments for border traffic at Nuevo Laredo, Tamaulipas. The City of Laredo initially opposed the bridge, but eventually gave its approval

after it was agreed that traffic on the Texas side would be routed through Laredo to Interstate Highway 35, thus effectively bypassing Nuevo Laredo. Construction of the bridge and port of entry began in 1990 at a cost of \$10 million to be shared by the City of Laredo and Mexican enterprises including a state owned bank, private industry, and PEMEX. Completed in the fall of 1991, this toll bridge is the twenty-first bridge linking Texas and Mexico and, according to Governor Clements, will be used primarily to serve the rapidly growing *maquiladora* industry.<sup>21</sup> President Salinas de Gortari and Governors Clements and Treviño each made brief remarks at the ground-breaking ceremony on the Mexican side on March 29, 1990. Ground breaking on the Texas side of the bridge, officially called "Puente de Solidaridad (Solidarity Bridge)" by the Mexicans but probably just "Columbia Bridge" by the less philosophical Texans, took place five months later on August 22.

Of potentially greater impact because of Tamaulipas' longer border with Texas (300 miles) and the number of twin cities along it was the cooperative agreement Clements signed in Austin on March 22, 1988, with Governor Américo Villarreal. The agreement promoted twin-plant development (a plant on the Texas side making component parts for a plant on the Mexican side) and expansion along the border; established drug prevention programs in the border area; provided for the sharing of computerized vehicle registration data to assist in the prosecution of auto thieves; authorized the Texas state office in Mexico City to include a branch in Ciudad Victoria, capital of Tamaulipas; created a Tamaulipas state office in Dallas; created a Tamaulipas/Texas Commission to seek opportunities for the development of industry, business, and tourism; and encouraged cooperation between business associations in the two states.

As in the case of the cooperative agreement with Nuevo León, job creation was the principal objective of Clements in an area of Texas where the economy had been severely depressed since 1982, where unemployment in the work force at the time of the signing was between 16 and 20 percent, and where per capita income was only 62 percent of the state level. At the time of the signing of this agreement, Clements stated that "Tamaulipas and Texas need each other, are cooperating with each other and are



moving forward on several initiatives to enhance the job climate in both states for all our people.”<sup>22</sup>

The governors also committed themselves to the building of a new bridge at Los Indios near San Benito, first proposed in 1968, linking the north end of Cameron County to Tamaulipas. Construction began in November 1990. In addition they announced their support for a new sewage treatment plant at Nuevo Laredo. The city at that time was pumping some 25 million gallons of raw sewage into the Río Grande daily. Joint financing of the cost of this plant was agreed to by the U.S. and Mexican governments in August 1989.<sup>23</sup> This agreement was the third signed by the two governors since they took office in early 1987. In June of that year they had signed a border economic development compact and in December an agreement for universities in the two states to exchange research on shrimp culture.

Governor Clements welcomed two of his counterparts to Austin in April 1988, and signed cooperative agreements with each. The first, signed with Governor Baeza Meléndez of Chihuahua on the 19th, singled out the Ciudad Juárez–El Paso area as “the most significant *maquiladora* center along the Texas–Mexico border” but acknowledged that development of this industry had been more rapid than the development of its infrastructure. The agreement established a Chihuahua–Texas Commission to prepare recommendations for joint economic development opportunities, stressed the need for greater awareness of *maquiladoras* and other production sharing venture benefits through conferences and seminars. The agreement also called for meetings between directors of the Mexican Secretariat of Communications and Transportation, Mexico’s telephone company, Southwestern Bell, and AT&T “to analyze and find solutions to telecommunication problems.”<sup>24</sup> In a supplementary document the two governors agreed to “strongly support the construction and effective operation of a new Zaragoza International Bridge” at El Paso to handle the thirty percent increase over the last three years in daily commercial vehicle traffic across the area bridges.<sup>25</sup>

Along with the Rector of the Autonomous University of Chihuahua and the President of the University of Texas at El Paso (UTEP), the two governors also signed a “Memorandum of Understanding in Higher Education.” This document requested that the



two university heads chair a conference and subsequent meetings of Texas/Chihuahua educational and technical institutions. These activities were to develop an action plan that would address the educational needs of the rapidly expanding industrial region of Texas and Chihuahua. They were also encouraged to investigate the feasibility of establishing satellite linkage between UTEP and institutions of higher education in Chihuahua "for the purpose of cultural and educational programming as well as economic development."<sup>26</sup>

On April 27 Clements signed three agreements with Governor Mendoza Berrueto of Coahuila. The first, which the Director of the Coahuila State Commission for Border Development, Prof. Gustavo Villarreal, and Edward O. Vetter, Texas Department of Commerce, also signed, stressed the need to promote a greater awareness of the value of *maquiladoras*. The agreement further endorsed the establishment of a Coahuila state office in Austin, urged closer ties between Texas and Coahuila state offices in Mexico City, encouraged greater cooperation between chambers of commerce as well as joint tourism promotion, and supported development of a similarly protected ecological area adjoining the Big Bend National Park and the Coahuila area known as Boquillas del Carmen so as to develop the touristic attraction of the area.<sup>27</sup>

A second agreement recognized the historical importance of the San Juan Bautista mission complex as an important stop on the road to Texas during the colonial period. The agreement also recognized that Monclova had been a capital of Texas at one time, and thus called for an action plan to "research, restore, and interpret" the mission complex for the visitor and to create a museum of Texas and Coahuila history at Monclova.<sup>28</sup> The third agreement called for greater scientific and technical support in criminal investigations affecting both states, greater coordination of activities to identify and recover stolen property, the sharing of information in the campaign against drug addiction, and support for drug prevention programs in both states.<sup>29</sup>

Governor Clements' most aggressive actions were in the area of economic development, particularly in identifying and pursuing further opportunities for the expanding *maquiladora* industry. In cooperation with the Mexican governors, he established four Texas/Mexico regional commissions (one for each border

state) to operate under the auspices of the Texas/Mexico Authority in the Texas Department of Commerce. The Authority, whose members were initially appointed by the Board of Directors of the Texas Department of Commerce and served at the pleasure of the Board, was created by the 70th Legislature in 1987. It was to be an advisory body charged with assisting the development of commercial and industrial opportunities along the Texas–Mexico border. Currently the board serves as a clearing house for the collection and dissemination of information on border economic development; develops ties between private and public sector representatives in Texas and Mexico; prepares policy recommendations for local, state, and federal officials on both sides of the border; and addresses specific challenges relating to border economic and industrial development.<sup>30</sup>

The Texas/Mexico Authority also serves as an umbrella organization for the four bi-state regional commissions (Tamaulipas–Texas Regional Commission, etc.). Each bi-state commission has 15 members from Texas and approximately the same number from the corresponding Mexican state. The Texans were originally appointed by the Board of Directors of the Texas Department of Commerce, while the Mexicans were appointed by the governor of their respective state. These commissions were established to focus on industrial development, trade, tourism, education, environment and social infrastructure, and agriculture. Decisions taken at their meetings serve to guide policy making and project implementation.<sup>31</sup>

While opportunities for economic growth exist along the Texas–Mexico border, there are also obstacles. Although they vary in different localities, they generally include an inadequate industrial infrastructure, especially the lack of wastewater treatment facilities, roads, bridges, and ports of entry; educational systems that have produced a poorly trained work force, especially in the areas of vocational and higher education; a shortage of housing and basic social services, particularly in maternal and child health care; a shortage of capital to finance business ventures and infrastructure development, and, perhaps the most important of all, lack of cooperation between private and public sector representatives at all governmental levels in Texas and the Mexican border states.<sup>32</sup>

Steps taken by Governor Clements and his administration undoubtedly added momentum to the dramatic increase of

*maquiladoras* along the Texas–Mexico border. First established in the mid 1960s, by 1983 there were some 720 in operation along the entire U.S.–Mexico border, but in just two years (1987-1989) the number along the Texas border alone rose from 490 to 712, a 45 percent increase. These 712 plants employ more than 65 percent of the total maquiladora workers along the U.S.–Mexico border.<sup>33</sup>

Over the past three years the Texas Department of Commerce, acting on the advice of the Texas/Mexico Authority, has worked intensively to focus interest on *maquiladoras* as a market for Texas products. In June 1988 the Department sponsored, with the Texas Association of Business and the state of Nuevo León, a “Governors’ Conference on *Maquiladoras*” in Dallas. This conference sought to inform the participants of the economic benefits and opportunities that existed for vendors to the *maquiladora* plants in the border region. This was followed by a second “Governors’ Conference on *Maquiladoras*” held in Houston in September and co-sponsored with the State of Tamaulipas. Its purpose was to “introduce Texas businesses to the multi-billion dollar potential market for Texas products and services that the *maquiladoras* represent.” Nearly a fifth of the possible vendors who attended this conference entered into sales agreements with *maquiladora* plants and by December 1989 some four hundred Texas companies had expressed interest in selling automotive manufacturing and electronic assembly items, toy manufacturing parts, textile and apparel goods, furniture assembly parts, and food processing items to *maquiladoras*.<sup>34</sup>

The Department also sponsored on November 3-4, 1988 an “Infrastructure Finance Summit” to enable U.S. and Mexican representatives to evaluate the current status of infrastructure needs and improvements that would benefit Texas–Mexico trade and industrial growth, identify potential development projects, and devise ways of making investment in Mexican infrastructure projects attractive to foreign investors. Participants in this conference included U.S. and Mexican government representatives, U.S. and Mexican developers, U.S. engineering and construction firms, banking and investment representatives from both countries, and even representatives from the states of California and New Mexico.

Keeping up the pace set in 1988, the Texas Department of Commerce sponsored a Second Annual Finance Summit in San

Diego, California, November 9-10, 1989. The meeting was attended by some 75 prominent bankers, developers and government officials from the United States and Mexico. Its purpose was to make recommendations to federal authorities of both countries for the improvement of the investment climate along the border and to further facilitate trade between the two nations. A third finance meeting was held in Tijuana, Baja California in 1990.<sup>35</sup> Finally, on November 12-13 the Department sponsored a meeting of the four bi-state regional commissions (Texas-Tamaulipas Commission, etc.) for the purpose of discussing issues and recommending policies for the border governors to consider at their 1990 meeting. Held in Austin and attended by some 100 persons from the public and private sectors in both Texas and Mexico, it produced status reports from each of the five border states on pending infrastructure projects and legislative policy initiatives. Panel discussions on tourism, agriculture, housing, education, environment, and industrial development followed the presentation of these reports.

Other activities that Governor Clements undertook during his second term may be briefly summarized as follows: 1) repeating his initiatives of ten years earlier, Clements traveled to Mexico City in February, 1989 to meet with recently inaugurated President Carlos Salinas de Gortari, the first U.S. governor in office to do so; 2) on April 26, 1989 he signed an agreement with Governor Baeza of Chihuahua that encouraged U.S.-Mexico educational institutions to enhance the industrial and social development of the Texas-Chihuahua border region; 3) in November 1988 and in the same month of 1989 he brought together key participants from both sides of the border in seminars aimed at improving trans-border telecommunications, the latter meeting being held in San Diego, California; 4) he initiated a meeting on border infrastructure needs and financing mechanisms that brought together the Texas Department of Commerce, U.S. banks and investment companies, contractors, and U.S. and Mexican state and federal government officials; 5) during the separate border state governors' meetings held during the first half of 1988, Clements agreed to cooperate with the governors in research and technical assistance beneficial to agricultural production on both sides of the border, the result of which has been to exchange information on subjects ranging from pest management to

arid farming practices; and 6) he sponsored collaborative efforts between Texas and the governors of the bordering Mexican states to strengthen law enforcement training and to share data that can make law enforcement along the border more effective.<sup>36</sup>

Finally, it should be noted that Governor Clements actively sought to strengthen ties with Mexico in the field of education. He supported legislation that would permit Mexican students to enroll in Texas public colleges and universities in counties along the border without paying out-of-state tuition. The measure became law in 1987. By the end of 1990, more than 15 percent of all Mexican students attending institutions of higher learning in the United States were enrolled in Texas schools.<sup>37</sup>

The Border Governors' Conferences, a fresh and long overdue development in U.S.-Mexico border state relations, have changed forever the official reticence that has characterized these relations through the years. Although the Good Neighbor Commission of Texas had invited the Mexican border state governors to a three-day meeting in Fort Worth in 1949, where they met with Texas' Governor Allan Shivers, and Governor Connally had made his historic visit to the capitals of each of the Mexican border states in 1964, it was not until June, 1980 that the Border Governors' Conference (BGC) was held in Ciudad Juarez, Chihuahua, the first meeting ever of the governors of the states along both sides of the U.S.-Mexico border. The conference was an outgrowth of the 1979 meeting of the Southwest Border Regional Commission (SWBRC), a regional planning commission chartered in 1977 for the purpose of promoting economic growth in economically depressed border counties in Texas, New Mexico, Arizona, and California. That such a meeting should also include the Mexican border state governors had first been proposed by Governor Bruce Babbitt of Arizona, then SWBRC State Co-chairman. It was enthusiastically endorsed by Governor Clements who is generally considered to have been the prime mover in promoting and organizing the Ciudad Juarez conference.<sup>38</sup>

Over the next 10 years, the chief executives of the 10 U.S.-Mexico border states met seven more times. At each meeting the Texas governor played a leading role (Clements attended six, Mark White only one) in discussions with his peers of issues and problems of mutual concern: trade and investment, industrial development,

tourism, agriculture and livestock, health and environment, ports of entry and infrastructure, and education.<sup>39</sup> Eventually these conferences were criticized for lack of substantive achievements, a weak follow-up on resolutions approved, a failure to provide staff for continuing contact and on-going coordination, and the limitations imposed by the federal systems of both the United States and Mexico (especially Mexico, which is more centralistic in practice than the United States). In spite of these flaws, the conferences have established communication between U.S. and Mexican border governors that did not previously exist. They have created an atmosphere of good will and cooperation in the resolution of border issues which replaced customary unilateral action or none at all. Also by virtue of publicity surrounding them, the conferences have increased public awareness of problems common to both sides of the border.<sup>40</sup>

The Eighth Conference, co-chaired by Governors Clements and Villarreal (Tamaulipas) and held in Austin, March 29-31, 1990, was productive and perhaps the most gala of all. Since it was Clements' final appearance in these meetings, he was determined to put on a good show, and he did. Although no money had been appropriated by the Texas Legislature, and funds in the general appropriation for the Office of Governor were insufficient to meet the anticipated cost, a Border Governors' Conference Steering Committee, staffed by the Texas Association of Business (TAB), was created to solicit private donations. TAB raised over \$170,000 from 50 business firms and individuals.<sup>41</sup>

During their two days in Austin the 10 governors and their entourages kept up a dizzy schedule of activities that included keynote speeches by U.S. Secretary of Commerce Robert Mossbacher and Mexican Secretary of Commerce and Industrial Development, Jaime Sierra Puche; speeches on U.S.-Mexico border cooperative ventures by U.S. Ambassador to Mexico, John Negroponte, and Mexican Ambassador to the United States, Gustavo Petricioli, followed by the governors' discussion of these talks; round table meetings of Mexican and U.S. business leaders cosponsored by the Texas Department of Commerce and the Texas/Mexico Authority; a press conference; and a report presented by Don Michie, University of Texas at El Paso, on the Border Trade Alliance.

Nor were social activities lacking. These included a private reception for the governors and their spouses at the Governor's Mansion; a seated state dinner with entertainment and dancing; separate breakfasts for U.S. and Mexican governors; a luncheon for all the governors; a luncheon for the governors' wives at the Governor's Mansion hosted by Rita Clements; a tour for the wives of the University of Texas and the Texas State Capitol; and last but not least, a Texas-style barbecue at a local ranch with country-and-western music. This latest conference was both a tribute and a goodbye to the vigorous Clements who during both his terms had been such an enthusiastic supporter of these conferences. At the state dinner held on March 29, Clements stated in his prepared remarks:

"Like family members who share their thoughts over the dinner table, we have dealt with shared concerns and opportunities at our conferences. Which is how it should be. After all, we are linked not only by common land, but by common goals and by people whose roots in both our nations bind and strengthen us. We are united by history and by a vision of hope for our families. Truly, we are more than neighbors; we are not only friends; we are family, thriving in a vast region that many years ago bore no boundary at all. In that spirit, let us renew our commitment to the mission that unites us. As we prepare to enter a new century, let us remain determined to pursue new avenues of economic growth, to enhance job creation, and to strive for better lives for all...our partnership must build on that foundation of progress for both sides of our border. As President Salinas said in Washington last October, 'one's own well-being is more lasting when it is accompanied by the well-being of others.'"<sup>42</sup>

Without doubt all the governors shared these sentiments. And Clements could look back on his achievements during eight years in office with satisfaction knowing that he had begun a new era in Texas' relations with its Mexican neighbors.

While Texas governors were busy building new bridges to Mexico, the Texas Department of Agriculture under Commissioner Jim Hightower was developing programs in agricultural cooperation with the Mexicans. On July 29, 1985 Hightower signed a historic and unprecedented memorandum of understanding in Mexico



City with Mexican Secretary of Agriculture Eduardo Pesqueira that provided for the improvement and expansion of commercial programs regarding beef cattle for breeding, fattening, and final processing; dairy cattle, sheep and goat stock; stock for rodeos; and grain for animal consumption. The memorandum also provided for the exchange of commercial information on animals and agricultural products; the development of joint technical projects through courses, seminars, and the exchange of personnel on scholarships; and the participation by both parties in fairs and expositions.<sup>43</sup>

In accordance with the agreement, a Mexico–Texas Exchange Commission (M-TEC) was created, co-chaired by the Undersecretary for Livestock of the Mexican Secretariat of Agriculture and Hydraulic Resources, and the Commissioner of Agriculture of Texas. The commission consists of 19 members from Texas producer organizations and schools of agriculture as well as 19 members from similar organizations and schools in Mexico. This agreement is the first bilateral accord ever reached between the Mexican government and a U.S. state. By March 1990, three meetings of M-TEC had been held and it had generated more than \$130 million in livestock and \$40 million in grain sorghum sales to Mexico.<sup>44</sup> This successful commercial venture has been stimulated by the move toward a market orientation of the Mexican economy that has accelerated since President Salinas de Gortari took office. Previously Mexican governmental protocol and import limitations had made it difficult for Texas producers to deal directly with Mexican buyers. “In 1983 you couldn’t make a grain sale to a tortilla manufacturer because the Mexican government bought all grain and distributed it to manufacturers, but now you can make those direct sales,” Hightower is reported to have said in early 1990.<sup>45</sup>

Another Hightower project was the Texas–Mexico Livestock Export Finance Program drafted by M-TEC and approved by agricultural leaders in Texas and Mexico at a special ceremony held in Austin on July 30, 1987. The three-year program enabled individual Texas ranchers to sell registered breeding stock to individual Mexican ranchers, receiving one-third of the sales price upon delivery of the stock, the balance to be paid in annual installments over a three-year period at ten percent annual interest. The note was to be guaranteed by the statewide livestock association



of the home state of the buyer, i.e., Chihuahua, Coahuila, Nuevo León, or Tamaulipas. These associations have a combined total membership of approximately 33,000 ranchers.<sup>46</sup>

This program did not prosper because of the reluctance of Mexican ranchers to contract debts in dollars. As the decade ended, however, exports of cattle to Mexico for both breeding and slaughter increased dramatically. Whereas only 300,000 head of Texas cattle were exported to Mexico in 1989, this figure had doubled by the end of 1990, and as of September, 1991 over a million head had been shipped.<sup>47</sup> It remains to be seen if the present Commissioner of Agriculture, Rick Perry, will continue the work of his predecessor, although Department officials recognize its merits and the need to include Mexico in departmental programs.

Although Governor Ann Richards has been in office for a year and a half, it appears that Mexico is high on her agenda. Her first visit to Mexico as Texas' top official was for the Ninth Mexico-United States Border Governors' Conference held in Hermosillo, Sonora on February 21 and 22, 1991. There she endorsed a number of her predecessor's programs, including support of *maquiladoras*, the "two-nation vacation" concept, educational exchange, the "historic corridor with Coahuila," infrastructure development and the construction of more bridges across the Río Grande, and a common effort against crime on both sides of the border as well as the pervasive problem of auto theft. She shows great interest in the pending free trade agreement between Canada, the United States and Mexico but wishes to protect Texas' interests and reduce the danger of damage to the environment. She would also like to develop additional water and waste water projects along the Texas-Mexico border.<sup>48</sup>

In late October, 1991, Richards met with President Salinas de Gortari and members of his Cabinet and business leaders in Mexico City, then flew to Guadalajara to meet with the Governor of Jalisco and finally to Monterrey where she met with the Governor of Nuevo León. With each official visited she sought to strengthen commercial ties between Texas and Mexico and expressed her concern that greater industrialization in northern Mexico resulting from the free-trade agreement will cause more air, water and other pollution along the border.<sup>49</sup> In contrast to the blunt Clements,

Richards' charisma and her "next door neighbor" personality go over well with the Mexicans.

The unprecedented wave of governmental activity involving Texas and its Mexican neighbors that began following the inauguration of William Clements as Governor of Texas in 1979 has marked a turning point in the history of the border area. Long standing disinterest and lack of communication across the Río Grande have given way to visits, cooperation and displays of sincere friendship between state officials. The effect upon the border region and its people has been profound. As the governors of Texas, Chihuahua, Coahuila, Nuevo León and Tamaulipas have shown that they can overcome political and cultural differences, they have forged their own regional good neighbor policy. The challenge now is for effective leadership on their part and that of their successors to maintain the momentum, to obtain the cooperation of the public and private sectors on both sides of the border in working for the general welfare of the people of the border region. The Río Grande (Río Bravo) should no longer be considered the dividing line between Texas and Mexico but a 1200-mile monument to what good will and joint effort can achieve when Texans and Mexicans work together.

## Notes

<sup>1</sup> Linda B. Hall and Don M. Coerver, *Revolution on the Border: the U.S. and Mexico, 1910-1920* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1988).

<sup>2</sup> Governor Coke Stevenson signed "State of Texas House Concurrent Resolution" No. 105 (May 6, 1943) that declared the right of "all persons of the Caucasian Race" in Texas to full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities, and privileges of all public places of business or amusements. On June 25, 1943 Stevenson signed "Proclamation by the Governor of the State of Texas" No. 7039 that affirmed the "good neighbor policy" as the public policy of Texas in carrying out Resolution No. 105. In the fall of 1943 he implemented the proclamation with the formation of the Good Neighbor Commission of Texas which became a permanent state agency in 1947 and lasted until 1987. For a history of the Commission's activities and achievements, see Nellie Ward Kingrea, *History of the First Ten Years of the Texas Good Neighbor Commission and Discussion of its Major Problems* (Fort Worth: Texas Christian University Press, 1954); Texas Good Neighbor Commission, *Texas: Friend and Neighbor* (Austin: Von Boeckmann-Jones Press, 1961); and annual reports of the Good Neighbor Commission of Texas, Texas State Archives. See also Robert Chatten, "The Conduct of Foreign Relations by State Government Along the Mexican Border," Executive Seminar in National and International Affairs, 25th Session (1982-83), Foreign Service Institute (Washington: U.S. Department of State, 1983).

<sup>3</sup> Clements seemed to have difficulty in distinguishing between "Mexican" and "Mexican American." In 1977 he had spoken of the "Mexican American problem." Queried by a reporter on what this meant, he had replied that what he really meant to say was "the problem of the illegal aliens represented primarily by Mexican Americans," whereupon the reporter pointed out that an illegal alien would be a Mexican national, not a Mexican American. *Houston Chronicle* 20 Nov. 1977. On another occasion when he had been subjected to a barrage of reporters' questions on Mexico's

economic and social problems, and was then asked whether his platform was addressing the needs of Mexican Americans, Clements had retorted "I'm not running for governor of Mexico" *The Daily Texan* 4 September 1979.

<sup>4</sup> *Dallas Morning News* 16 January 1991; "He avoided political games and called shots the way he saw them. The Mexicans respected him." Interview with Jorge Garcés, Director, Office of Texas–Mexico Relations, Texas Department of Commerce, October 1, 1991. Clements claimed that when he served in the Department of Defense, his record on promotion of minorities was "the best in Washington." *Austin American Statesman*, 12 Nov. 1978.

<sup>5</sup> John Kincaid, "The American Governors in International Affairs," *Publius: The Journal of Federalism*, Vol. 14, No. 4 (Fall, 1984), 96. Clements' special assistant for relations with Mexico and Latin America is reported to have exuberantly exclaimed in June, 1980 that "we don't have to ask permission of Washington in order to talk to the Mexican government. We are a sovereign state." Kincaid. See also Dan Pilcher, "The States and Mexico: An Experiment in Cooperation," *State Legislatures*, Vol. 7 (March, 1981), 18-22.

<sup>6</sup> Clements and those who would work with him in forging the new Texas–Mexico relationship would have a formidable task in overcoming the gap in mutual understanding that separates Mexican from American. The following is a resumé of the problem involved: "Too little has been done to encourage Americans and Mexicans to come to grips with the fact that in a number of critical ways their views of the world differ radically and that these differences raise important barriers to effective communication and mutually satisfactory working relationships. Each assumes that what he knows about the other is enough. But it isn't. More is needed." John C. Condon. *Good Neighbors: Communicating with the Mexicans* (Yarmouth, Maine: Intercultural Press, 1985), xvii.

<sup>7</sup> The plan was criticized as being little more than a revised Bracero Program, although there were differences between the two.

Unlike the bracero program, which bound a worker to a certain job, the Clements plan would have allowed Mexican workers to enter the United States with special work visas to work at any job for a period of nine months. Clements was unable to persuade other U.S. border governors to endorse the plan and nothing came of it.

<sup>8</sup> The task force determined that the number of illegal migrants in Texas in 1980 ranged from about 600,000 to about 900,000, the average being about 750,000. For data on the report and the method of arriving at these figures, see Frank D. Bean, Allan G. Kind, Robert D. Benford, and Laura B. Perkinson, "Estimates of the Number of Illegal Migrants in the State of Texas," *Texas Population Research Center Paper No. 4.001*, a report prepared for the Governor's Task Force on Illegal Aliens, Governor's Office of Budget and Planning, State of Texas, Austin, Texas, March 15, 1982.

<sup>9</sup> In accordance with this and other wildlife agreements, 27 "Texas white tails" were trapped in over-populated deer areas of Texas and sent to Tamaulipas in 1979, 181 to the State of Mexico and 205 to Nuevo León in 1980, and 20 more deer to Tamaulipas in 1981. Texas had previously (1977) received ten big-horn sheep from Mexico. Each shipment of animals was made at no cost to the receiving state. Interview with Charles Winkler, Program Director, Wildlife Facilities, Texas Department of Parks and Wildlife, Austin, October 18, 1991.

<sup>10</sup> Training programs for not only Tamaulipas state and municipal law enforcement officers but those of Nuevo León and Coahuila as well as for regional federal judicial police were carried out by ten instructors from the Texas Department of Public Safety in Reynosa (1983), Brownsville (1988), and Nuevo Laredo (1981). Basic instruction was given in the use of firearms, the practice of martial arts, conduct of building searches, investigation of motor vehicle deaths, and search for stolen vehicles. Interview with training program coordinator Lt. Albert Rodríguez, Officer in Charge of In-service Schools, Texas Department of Public Safety, October 18, 1991.

<sup>11</sup>As of September 23, 1991, some 135 programs and activities have been undertaken, or with agreements pending, between the components of the University of Texas System and Mexican universities, technical schools, and governmental agencies. Seventy of these programs and activities are with border-state institutions. The University of Texas at El Paso alone has agreements with 42 border institutions and 22 in non-border states. Fields of study or activities covered include faculty and student exchange, cross cultural research, evaluation of border natural resources, social work, economics, technology transfer, industrial psychology, cultural identity, geological sciences, the problem of alcoholism, border health priorities, pre-natal care, dentistry, medical and biomedical sciences, continuing medical education, psychiatry, and business administration. Source: Summary of U.T. System/Mexican University Programs and Activities, copy of unpublished table in author's possession.

<sup>12</sup>Trade zones allow companies to avoid or reduce customs duties and local property taxes. By 1990 Texas had 21 such zones. See Texas Comptroller of Public Accounts, "Foreign Trade Zones Opening Doors for World Commerce," *Fiscal Notes* Sept., 1990: 9.

<sup>13</sup> William P. Clements, Jr., "Mexico Initiatives," *The Governor's Report, 1979-1983* (Austin, 1983) 17-19.

<sup>14</sup> Interview with Tom Walker, Executive Assistant to Governor Mark White, February 10, 1986.

<sup>15</sup> The agenda of this conference may be found in *La Reunión Regional de Estados Fronterizos del Río Bravo Sobre Parques Y Vida Silvestre—1st Regional Conference of the Río Grande Border States on Parks and Wildlife* (Austin, Office of the Governor, 1985). Annual meetings between Texas and border state and Mexican federal officials concerned with parks and wildlife management have resulted from this conference. Although parks management has been the main thrust of these meetings, the preservation of flora and fauna, especially endangered species, has also received considerable attention. Texas and Mexican game

wardens have discussed common problems, the Mexicans showing special interest in Texas' habitat preservation policies. Recent cooperation has included the visit of a Parks and Wildlife Department biologist to Tamaulipas to confer with state and federal officials on white wing dove management. The 1985 conference also resulted in the orientation of Tamaulipas officials on the technique used in Texas to count deer by helicopter. Interview with Charles Winkler, Program Director, Wild Life Facilities, Texas Department of Parks and Wildlife, October 18, 1991.

<sup>16</sup> *Maquiladoras* are assembly plants in Mexico that, in accordance with Mexican Laws and U.S. tariff preferences, import component parts from the United States and ship finished products back into this country with duty paid only on the added value of the labor used in the assembly process. For the advantages and disadvantages of *maquiladoras* and their place in the Mexican economy, see Joseph Grunwald, "Opportunity Missed: Mexico and *Maquiladoras*," *The Brookings Review* (Winter 1990/1991) 44-48 and Arturo García Espinosa, ed., *Maquiladoras: Primera Reunión Nacional Sobre Asuntos Fronterizos* (Monterrey, 1988) 294. The latter is a collection of essays and comments from the meeting held at the Autonomous University of Nuevo León, May 21-22, 1987.

<sup>17</sup> For a partial listing of the assistance rendered, see "Mexican Relief Status Report: January 16, 1986," Office of the Governor of Texas. See also "Texas Relief Efforts Reflect Close Relationship with Mexico," *Austin American-Statesman* 24 Sept. 1985.

<sup>18</sup> "Cooperative Agreement to Enhance Industrial and Commercial Relations between the States of Nuevo León, México, and Texas, United States of America," February 11, 1988 (RG 301), Archives Division-Texas State Library, hereafter cited TSL-A.

<sup>19</sup> *Austin American-Statesman* 12 Feb. 1988.

<sup>20</sup> "Document of Understanding in Transportation and Highway Technology, Texas-Nuevo León," February 11, 1988 (RG 301) TSL-A.

<sup>21</sup> *Austin American Statesman* 17 March 1990.

<sup>22</sup> *Austin American Statesman* 23 Mar. 1988. As of late 1991 neither the Texas state office in Ciudad Victoria nor the Tamaulipas state office in Dallas had been set up, due mainly to budgetary constraints on both governments. A Texas state office in Monterrey has been closed for the same reason.

<sup>23</sup> *Austin American-Statesman* 10 August 1989. The estimated cost of this project was reported to be \$42 million. At Governor's Clements' suggestion, Texas agreed to pay ten percent, or \$2.5 million of the U.S. share, of the construction costs. William P. Clements, *Report to the Seventy-second Legislature* (Austin: January, 1991) 41.

<sup>24</sup> "Cooperative Agreement to Enhance Industrial and Commercial Relations Between the States of Chihuahua, Mexico, and Texas, United States of America," April 19, 1988 (RG 301), TSL-A.

<sup>25</sup> "Cooperative Agreement to Strongly Support the Construction and Effective Operation of the New Zaragoza International Bridge," April 19, 1988 (RG301) TSL-A. Construction of the bridge and port of entry was completed in November, 1990.

<sup>26</sup> "Memorandum of Understanding in Higher Education Between Texas and Chihuahua," April 19, 1988 (RG301) TSL-A.

<sup>27</sup> "Cooperative Agreement to Enhance Industrial and Commercial Relations Between the States of Coahuila, Mexico, and Texas, United States of America," April 27, 1988 (RG301) TSL-A.

<sup>28</sup> "Cooperative Agreement of Texas and Coahuila Historical Preservation," April 27, 1988 (RG301) TSL-A.

<sup>29</sup> "Criminal Justice Cooperative Agreement Between the State of Coahuila, Mexico, and the State of Texas, United States of America," April 27, 1988 (RG301) TSL-A.



<sup>30</sup> *Texas/Mexico Authority* (pamphlet issued by the Texas Department of Commerce), May, 1989. In late 1991 the Department became a cabinet agency in the executive branch of the state government and was placed under an executive director appointed by the governor. The Board of Directors, which had set policy under Governor Clements, then became an advisory body.

<sup>31</sup> *Texas/Mexico Authority*, May, 1989.

<sup>32</sup> *Texas/Mexico Authority*, May, 1989.

<sup>33</sup> "Texas-Mexico Border Industrialization," *Texas Economic Rebound, '87-88-89* (Austin: Office of the Governor, State Development Division, n.d.).

<sup>34</sup> *Outlook '90*, 3.

<sup>35</sup> Clements, *Report to the Seventy-second Legislature*, 13

<sup>36</sup> Clements, 12; "Overview of Texas-Mexico Cooperation to Foster Economic Development," summary of activities prepared by the Office of the Governor, n.d. Copy in author's possession.

<sup>37</sup> Clements, 33.

<sup>38</sup> William Schmitt, "Border Governors Conference—A State Level Foreign Policy Mechanism: A Case Study," Executive Seminar in National and International Affairs, Twenty-fifth Session, 1982-83, United States Department of State Foreign Service Institute, 3. Although the conference held in 1990 was titled the 8th, only seven conferences had been held by the end of March, 1990, the reason being that the 5th conference was never held and the one following the 4th was titled the 6th, not the 5th.

<sup>39</sup> Dr. Robert Bernstein, former Commissioner, Texas Department of Health, believes the governors have not yet faced up to the gravity of the public health problems along the border. Remarks made before the Austin Chapter, International Good Neighbor Council, November 16, 1990.

<sup>40</sup> Schmitt, 10; The 6th conference held at Las Cruces, New Mexico, December, 1987, "didn't create much more than talk, but even small talk is better than no talk at all." *El Paso Times* 13 Dec. 1987.

<sup>41</sup> Border Governors' Conference, VIII, Austin, Texas, March 29-30, 1990. File in Office of Economic Development and International Relations, State Affairs, Office of the Governor of Texas.

<sup>42</sup> Press release, Office of the Governor, "Remarks of Governor Bill Clements, VIII United States–Mexico Border Governors' Conference, State Dinner, Austin Stouffer Hotel, Austin, Texas, March 29, 1990." By the end of his term, Clements could state that from 1986 to 1990, Texas' exports had soared 52.3 percent with exports to Mexico alone showing a 72 percent increase. *Maquiladoras* along the Texas–Mexico border had registered a 47 percent increase to 803. Bill Clements, "Strides Over the Past 4 Years a Source of Pride," *Austin American-Statesman* 2 Jan. 1991. See also Clements, *Report to the Seventy-second Legislature*, 13.

<sup>43</sup> "Memorandum of Understanding Between the Texas Department of Agriculture of the United States of America and the Secretary of Agriculture and Hydraulic Resources of the United Mexican States in Matters of Agricultural Cooperation." Copy of the Memorandum can be found in the Office of the Director, International Marketing, Texas Department of Agriculture, Austin, Texas.

<sup>44</sup> *San Antonio Express-News* 24 Feb. 1990.

<sup>45</sup> *El Paso Times* 24 Feb. 1990.

<sup>46</sup> *Fort Worth Star Telegram* 31 July 1987; Texas Department of Agriculture News Release 38-7-87 of July 30, 1987.

<sup>47</sup> Interview with Saul Mercado, Director for Latin America, Texas Department of Agriculture, Austin, Texas, October 22, 1991.

<sup>48</sup> "Texas: Ann Richards," in *IX Conferencia de Gobernadores Fronterizos Mexico Estados Unidos–IX Mexico–United States Border Governors' Conference, 95-97*. Copy in author's possession; *San Antonio Express-News* 22 Feb. 1991.

<sup>49</sup> *Austin-American Statesman* 22 Oct. 1991. During her meeting with President Salinas de Gortari, Richards also endorsed educational exchanges. Unfortunately, the 72nd Legislature failed to fund the Texas-Mexico-Initiative (an educational exchange program with Mexico) that pays the tuition of Mexican students at Texas universities. Budget cuts at the University of Texas at Austin have also ended the University's Mexican Fellows Program which brings Mexican Researchers to Texas and the American Scholars Program which enables university faculty and graduate students to research or study in Mexico. Support from private sources will only partially continue these programs. *Austin-American Statesman* 3 Nov. 1991.

# The Mexican Crisis and the Segmented Labor Market of the Lower Rio Grande Valley of Texas

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## Resumen

Este ensayo se ubica dentro de la problemática de la segmentación de la fuerza laboral y el rol de trabajadores transnacionales mexicanos en la división social del trabajo en "el Valle." Se propone que la segmentación de la fuerza laboral sea basada en una división social del trabajo, entre trabajadores domésticos residentes y trabajadores transnacionales con residencia permanente en México. Después de trazar los cambios económicos y el desarrollo de la fuerza de trabajo, el ensayo sigue con un análisis empírico, el cual sugiere que dentro del mercado de trabajadores manuales, los mexicanos transnacionales son los trabajadores preferidos en empresas locales de tipo agrícola, semi-industrial y servicios al consumidor. Finalmente, se sostiene que una gran parte del costo de la reproducción de la fuerza del trabajo sea externalizada hacia la economía mexicana, mientras tanto se desarrolla la proletarización de la clase trabajadora mexicano-americana de esta región.

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## Introduction

While the general contours of the Mexican crisis, its origins and its impact on the livelihood of the Mexican working class are generally known, especially for the urban working class, the effects of the crisis within the regional economies of the nation or among different types of producers are not particularly well known. Furthermore, it is safe to assume that the relative impact of the crisis—both regionally and intra-regionally—will vary with the characteris-

tics of the particular economies and the roles played by different classes of producers within them. Cook (1988), for example, found some significant variations with respect to the impact and the perception of Mexico's crisis among the different classes of rural producers in the Valley of Oaxaca. Continuing research on this question in other parts of Mexico will, no doubt, reveal similar variations.

This paper describes the major changes in the regional economy of the border region of South Texas, with particular emphasis on the role of Mexican labor in the social organization of production. It is my contention that to understand the economic, social and political impact of the Mexican crisis in this border region of Mexico, as well as local level perceptions of the crisis, its causes and solutions, it is necessary that the linkages across this porous boundary be examined—especially the labor connection. A regional perspective is further justified in that the manner in which the national economies of Mexico and the United States are joined or integrated is not necessarily the same from region to region or with respect to the flow of capital, goods and labor. Recently, various scholars have pointed to the particular conditions that prevail in the border regions (frontiers) or at the point where the two economies interface physically (Fernandez 1977; House 1982; and Cockcroft 1986). In addition, the manner in which these two economies articulate within these regions has varied over time—especially in the disposition and use of labor—due not only to changing conditions in Mexico, but also to changes within the regional U.S. economy. These temporal changes also have an impact on the perceptions and strategies of Mexican workers with respect to their economic prospects and their manipulation of U.S. labor markets as they attempt to cope with the crisis in their own country. In my view, the key aspect in this regionally specific articulation of the border economies is the pattern of labor market segmentation on the American side and its changes over time. With this in mind, I offer here some tentative observations and thoughts concerning the use of Mexican immigrant labor (especially the pool of Mexican commuter workers) in the regional economy of the Lower Rio Grande Valley of South Texas—a region commonly referred to as “El Valle.” This three-county region (i.e., Willacy, Cameron and Hidalgo counties) borders the northeastern tip of the state of Tamaulipas that

contains three international crossings from Mexico—at Matamoros, N. Progreso/Rio Bravo and Reynosa.

A brief history of the economic development of the Valley, with special reference to the ethnic division of labor it created, and a description of the post-World War II changes in the economy of the region and how they have affected the relationship between Mexican immigrant labor and locally resident Chicano workers provide the background. This is followed by a brief examination of the ideological matrix associated with the current pattern of labor market segmentation. Finally, I attempt to draw out some of the implications of this pattern for the impact of the Mexican crisis on Mexican immigrant workers, especially with respect to immigration patterns and domestic division of labor.

The observations offered here are based primarily on field research conducted in the Valley in early 1980s. The focus of this field work, sponsored by the U.S. Department of Labor, was the relative impact of health versus other human capital characteristics on the labor market performance of farm and non-farm, blue collar workers (Spielberg B. 1983). I collected basic demographic and health data, including detailed work histories, by interviews with approximately 100 migrant farmworker households and 100 non-farmworker households. The sample of non-farm, blue collar workers was selected from 10 firms located throughout the Valley, including producers of durable goods, food and beverage processors and bottlers, a clothing manufacturer, a hospital, and a local school district. In addition, extensive interviews were conducted with the personnel managers of at least 15 firms to obtain information on their labor recruitment practices, wages, worker characteristics and labor deployment practices. Interviews with several farm labor contractors, truckers and Texas Employment Commission administrators contributed additional data.

### **Pre-War Mexican Immigration and Labor in the Valley**

To understand the relationship between Mexican immigrant labor and the domestic, resident labor force in the Valley, it is important to understand Valley history and its economic changes. For clarity, the history can be divided into a pre-WWII and a post-WW II phase.

Prior to WW II, the predominant economic base of the Valley was agriculture. Agricultural development began with the coming of the railroad in 1904 and the platting of farming communities for anticipated Anglo colonization. During the first decade or so after 1904 however, the development of commercial agriculture was slow. Problems arose such as the lack of marketable product and difficulties in clearing the monte and creating a suitable irrigation system. The principal demands for cheap labor during this early period were for clearing land, construction of rail lines and irrigation canals (Foscue 1932; 1934:3). By some accounts, this limited demand for labor was easily met by the local, Spanish-speaking *ranchero* population in the immediate area on both sides of the river (Allhands 1960: *passim*). At any rate, it was not until the introduction of partially mechanized cotton production, beginning around WW I, and, later, the establishment of winter citrus and vegetable crops, that agricultural development of the Lower Rio Grande Valley took off, bringing with it a significant increase in the demand for cheap, seasonal labor, principally for cotton harvesting (Coalson 1977:5-7). This requisite reservoir of cheap labor was provided by Mexican nationals whose displacement and movement northward began at the height of the Porfirian era and was greatly accelerated by the nearly two decades of political turmoil beginning with the Mexican Revolution of 1910 (Cardoso 1980:1-54).

It is important to note that this Mexican immigration to the United States was not a seasonal or transitory move in search of work but one characterized by permanent resettlement in the United States. Official estimates are that between 1900 and 1930, the number of United States residents of Mexican origin rose from 71,062 to 226,046, an increase of approximately 266%. The actual increase was probably significantly higher (Coalson 1977:13). The overwhelming majority of these immigrants resettled permanently in populated border regions such as the Valley. These resettled Mexican immigrants and their labor became the principal source of profit for agriculture during this relatively capital-poor period of development.

Furthermore, actions that threatened to diminish this source of profit to South Texas agriculture were resisted at the national, state and local levels (Montejano 1979). In the Valley itself, the principal mechanisms for maintaining this reservoir of labor were

labor market discrimination, anti-labor union activity and more importantly, institutionalized deprivation of economic opportunities for these resettled Mexican workers and their offspring. All three of these mechanisms operated in a colonial-like social division of labor and differentiation between the Anglos and Mexican Americans. In the ethnically dichotomized communities of the Valley, this system of colonial relations and practices was rationalized by an Anglo myth that the Spanish speaking residents across the tracks were an undifferentiated mass of *peones* whose physical abilities (but not their particular talents) were necessary for the agricultural and economic development of the Valley. Many of these Anglos thought of the Mexican side of town as being nothing more than an urban farm labor camp.

In this pre-war period, the Valley very neatly conformed to the dual labor market model. Aside from a small merchant class and some skilled workers employed by Anglo firms, the vast majority of the Spanish-speaking workers were employed in seasonal agricultural tasks, in hourly wage work in the processing and canning plants, and in low paid domestic services. Anglos, on the other hand, were employed in professional and managerial occupations and higher paid skilled craftsmen. As stated earlier, partially mechanized cotton production was the crown jewel in the Valley's agricultural economy, as it was in the upper coastal regions of Texas, in western Arkansas, and in west Texas and eastern New Mexico. The "existence of this reservoir of poorly paid, underemployed Mexican resident labor in the border regions, then, was the important factor in the development of the migratory farm labor system of Texas" (Coalson 1977:13) dedicated primarily to cotton harvesting. Prior to the war, this migratory circuit was restricted to the regions just named, beginning from the Valley in late June or early July and returning around November.

Finally, and more to the point, seasonal temporary labor migration from Mexico itself did not play a significant role in the organization and deployment of labor during this period, especially from the late twenties to the start of WW II and the Bracero program. In large part, this was due to: 1) restrictions placed on Mexican immigration to the U.S. in the late twenties; and, 2) the relatively progressive agrarian policies of the Lázaro Cárdenas presidency in



Mexico. Thus, in the period prior to WW II, temporary labor migrants from Mexico did not represent significant competition for resident Mexican-American workers. More importantly, during this period, the degree to which the Valley economy externalized or transferred the costs of labor reproduction to Mexico was minimal. That is, both the maintenance and labor renewal costs of this labor were borne principally by the local Valley and the Texas economies.

### **The Post-WW II Period**

The immediate post-war period signaled the beginning of some fundamental changes in the Valley's economy that would affect the social structure of the Valley, the organization and deployment of its resident Mexican-American labor force and more importantly, the role played by seasonal, temporary Mexican labor migration. This is especially true beginning in the 1960's after the end of the Bracero program and the surge of undocumented workers it engendered. Prior to the war, the Valley economy rested on highly competitive agricultural and agriculture-related firms and on small locally owned and managed non-agricultural firms manufacturing light, non-durable goods and services. Around WW II however, the Valley economy began to lose its earlier competitive quality and began to take on the characteristics of a more heavily capitalized, monopolistic economy; the change began in the agriculture sector and later extended into the manufacturing and services industries.

The first major step in this transformation was the total mechanization of cotton production, in large measure a response to the competition from midwestern and western states for the cheap, Mexican-American labor of border regions like the Valley. This competition increased with the intensification of fruit and vegetable production in the Midwest and the labor shortages occasioned by WW II. An immediate resolution to this competition, especially during the war and shortly thereafter was, of course, the Bracero program and the increase in illegal immigration it brought about. The ultimate resolution, however, was the nearly total mechanization of cotton production made possible by the invention of hybrids amenable to mechanized harvesting. From then on, the peak labor demand periods in the southwestern and midwestern agricultural

labor markets became complementary, rather than competitive, despite the relatively higher wages paid in the Midwest. At this point, the old cotton circuit of seasonal migratory agricultural labor disappeared and was replaced by the now more familiar midwestern stream. Similar trends in other areas of agricultural production ultimately resulted in significant changes in land ownership and tenure patterns, as well as in the organization of production itself. For example, today a significant portion of productive Valley land is under the effective control of large scale, transnational corporations or their subsidiaries producing hybrid grain and other seed products.

These developments ultimately resulted in an increase in the capital/labor ratio in agricultural production and a concomitant decrease in the demand for agricultural workers. The decrease in the demand for agricultural labor resulted in an even larger reservoir of surplus farm and non-farm labor. Furthermore, this surplus labor pool was greatly augmented by post-war Mexican agricultural development policies and the effects of the Bracero program, which spurred the movement of displaced and underemployed *campesinos* and *pequeños propietarios* to the border region in search of seasonal, temporary work in the United States. It was from this pool of Mexican workers, resettled in the border communities of Reynosa and Matamoros, for example, that the core of commuter workers would ultimately be derived.

Coincident with this increase in the surplus labor pool, if not actually a direct result of it, began a particular process of industrialization in non-agricultural production and services in the border regions and in the Valley in particular. The essential feature of this process is encompassed in W. R. Thompson's filtering down theory of industrial location:

"In national perspective, industries filter down through the system of cities, from places of greater to lesser industrial sophistication...as the industry slides down the learning curve, the high wage rates of the more industrially sophisticated innovating areas become superfluous [thus seeking] out industrial backwaters where the cheaper labor is now up to the lesser [skill] demands of the simplified process [of production]." (1969:80)

In the Valley, this filtering down process is manifested in the form of branch plants producing light, durable and non-durable goods, as well as a similar proliferation of branches and franchises representing national service firms, especially in retail food, hotel and domestic services. Two additional characteristics of the Valley's non-agricultural development through this filtering down process must be mentioned here. First, as indicated by Thompson, the production processes and assembly operations in most of these new, relocated firms have been so simplified and routinized that relatively unskilled, low-wage labor can be profitably exploited with a minimum of investment in on-the-job training and other human capital assets. Today, in most of these firms not even a modicum of English is required for employment in the hourly wage, production sectors.

Secondly, even though a greater number or percentages of poor, underemployed and unemployed unskilled workers are being hired by these firms than would otherwise be the case, a relatively small proportion of these workers apparently rise above poverty level earnings, despite the area's relatively greater increase in non-agricultural employment (Brook and Peach, 1981). This paradox is due to extremely high labor turnover rates and the low wage structure.

### **Mexican Immigrant Labor and Labor Market Segmentation Today**

As a result of the post-war changes in the economy of the Valley, the dual labor market segmentation based on ethnicity has all but disappeared. Since the war, Valley Chicanos have been increasing their proportion of employment in the white collar occupations, especially the professional, managerial and clerical groups, such that today they have at least achieved parity with Anglos, if not dominating these occupations. The occupations in which there have been relative declines in Chicano employment are laborers and farm labor. This change can be attributed to a number of factors resulting from the post-war pattern of economic development, not the least of which has been the dramatic exodus of young Anglos from the region.

Some scholars attribute this distributional shift largely to a movement of Chicanos from the laborer and farm labor group into the white collar group (Briggs 1977:75). At best, this is only a

partial answer. At worst, it fails to account for the continued high rates of unemployment and underemployment among Chicanos, as well as increases in the proportion of workers earning poverty level or lower wages. Other interrelated factors that must be taken into account in explaining not only the shifts in the occupational structure but also the persistence of unemployment and underemployment and the working poor, are: 1) the incorporation of lower skilled laborers and farm workers into the labor force of non-agricultural, industrial firms; 2) the resettlement of migratory farm workers in the Midwest; 3) movement out of the labor force by ex-laborers and ex-farmworkers; and 4) the role played by Mexican commuter workers in the Valley's labor force.

The latter is my central interest here. The blue collar labor force of the Lower Rio Grande Valley today is composed primarily of resident, Chicano workers and Mexican commuter workers who reside with their families in the adjacent Mexican border towns and their environs. It appears, furthermore, that a significant proportion, if not the majority, of the latter are legal, resident aliens (i.e. green carders) or persons with daily visitor permits. (The proportion of temporary, undocumented workers in the Valley's labor force, incidentally, is hard to document. Nevertheless, there are indications that it is not significantly large. Most seem to pass over the Valley in search of work in the more urban centers in the interior of the state and elsewhere.) While this, in and of itself, is not new or surprising, what is interesting are the patterns in the distribution of both types of workers in the work force of the Valley.

First, both types of workers (residents and commuters) are found in all the types of firms and occupations in the Valley. Thus, in the Valley there is no labor market segmentation between types of industries based on national residence in blue collar occupations. On the other hand, the data indicates a strong tendency for the higher wage firms to have a greater proportion of commuter workers than the lower wage, more seasonal ones. In addition, and in part the result of this last tendency, my data also demonstrated a noticeably higher labor turnover rate among the resident workers than the Mexican commuters within the firms surveyed. Both of these tendencies were corroborated by the personnel managers and some workers in these firms.

For example, based on information provided by the personnel managers, the average hourly wage rate in the firms surveyed ranged from \$4.15 an hour in the service firms to approximately \$7.15 an hour in the manufacturing firms, for an overall average of \$5.70 an hour. In the two firms with the highest hourly wage rates, both of which manufactured durable goods, the percentage of workers with permanent residence in Mexico (almost all "green carders") was approximately 70%. In the two lowest paying service firms, the percentage of workers resident in Mexico ranged from 20 to 25%. Similarly, the average, annual labor turnover rates in the two relatively high wage firms noted above were 20 and 25%, respectively. In the lower wage, service and processing firms, the average annual labor turnover rates ranged from around 50% to as high as 103%. The pattern in agricultural employment is similar to that in non-agricultural work. The agricultural labor force of the Valley is characterized by two types of employment, with different patterns of organization. The largest segment consists of migrant farmworkers. From April through October, this segment of the labor force is organized in domestic units that migrate to cultivate and harvest the fruit and vegetable crops principally in the Midwest. During the winter months, these domestic units return to the Valley region, where the heads of household and other able-bodied adults seek employment in agriculture and odd jobs. In Valley agricultural work, they find employment not as domestic units but as individuals, usually on a daily basis, two or three days cultivating or harvesting winter vegetables, followed by periods of two or three weeks with little or no employment. What is most important here is that the vast majority (by my survey estimates, nearly 90%) of these migrant workers are permanent residents of one or another of the many towns that make up the Rio Grande Valley.

The second segment of the agriculture labor force consists of permanent, year-round workers, usually, but not always, working directly for the firm or its management. These are workers who are employed year-round by the same firm (or patron) or, alternately, can put together year around work through various patrones or labor contractors within the Valley itself without having to resort to seasonal migration to the Midwest in search of work. More importantly, the consensus among my informants (i.e., migrant

farmworkers, labor contractors and employment agency officials) is that the majority of this year-round agricultural labor force are permanent residents of Mexico, mostly residents of Mexican border towns who commute daily to work on the U.S. side. This labor force is organized in one of two ways. Some workers have direct contracts with agribusiness enterprises. These tend to be workers with some technical skills in specialized tasks such as irrigation, mechanized planting or cultivation, and pesticide application. Other workers are recruited daily or weekly at one of the three international border crossings by labor contractors who transport them to the workplace and supervise their work. These workers tend to toil in the more labor intensive phases of cultivation or harvesting. Unlike the migrant workers, these workers are not organized in domestic units, but rather work as individual laborers, or, in some cases, as experienced teams of male workers. At most, one might find a married couple or a man with one or two grown sons working together.

### **The Ideological Matrix of Labor Market Segmentation**

Statements made by informants make it clear that they are acutely aware of this labor market segmentation based on residence; they can also provide some justifications for its existence. Personnel managers and farm labor contractors, for example, almost to a person expressed a preference for the non-resident, commuter worker. According to them, these Mexican workers worked harder and more efficiently than resident workers. In addition, they were said to be more adaptable or flexible (i.e., willing to do anything asked of them to get the work done) and less complaining. Conversely, resident workers were viewed by management as being less willing to work, sloppier in their work, unable to take criticism or direction, and in general less dependable workers. When asked why these differences between resident and Mexican commuter workers might occur, the consensus among these managers and contractors was that native, resident workers really do not have to work, or work as often and as hard, since they can always resort to such things as food stamps, ADC, and other welfare and worker compensation programs.

Resident worker informants were also well aware of this preference among employers for workers from Mexico and were often able to parrot the opinions held by management. Furthermore,

they themselves often acknowledged that the Mexican commuter worker was a productive worker. They did not, however, agree that the Mexican workers were more productive because they worked harder or were more efficient workers. Their view was that Mexican commuter workers were given more opportunities to be more productive by management and labor contractors. Farmworkers, for example, frequently pointed out that the best fields were more often assigned to the Mexican workers so that at the end of the day they would wind up with more pay than the U.S. workers, even if both were being paid at the same piece-rate. They also said that Mexican commuter farmworkers were more often assigned to crews using more productive harvesting techniques; or to higher paying farm operations and tasks. Resident workers in the service and manufacturing firms cited similar management practices in their places of work. Interestingly, resident workers rarely expressed animosity toward Mexican commuter workers or characterized them as competitors for jobs. On the contrary, they often cited the desperate situation or conditions in Mexico as leaving these non-resident workers with no alternative but to seek work in the United States. The U.S. residents said that, were they in the place of the Mexico resident, they would do the same thing; and, indeed, many of them had done so in the past before taking up permanent residence in the United States.

Finally, resident workers acknowledged their dependence on welfare benefits and the advantages that these gave them over the Mexican workers. They did not, however, see these benefits as alternatives to work, but rather as supplements to the low wages earned and the sporadic employment opportunities or slack periods that characterize the Valley economy.

Perceptions of commuter Mexican workers as to their role in the labor market of the Valley are harder to gauge from the range of ideological statements made by informants. Many made statements that indicate a perception of a labor shortage in the Valley (i.e., "necesitan gente pa' los trabajos") which in turn would explain the demand for their labor. Still others made statements that indicated qualitative differences between themselves and workers that reside in Texas as the reason for the demand for their labor. As one such worker put it, "Nosotros somos más menso, no sabemos



otra cosa más que el trabajo, por eso los patrones nos tienen mas confianza”. [“We are more stupid. We don’t know how to do anything else but work. That is why the bosses trust us more.”] Another Mexican commuter worker expressed the difference this way: “El Tejano es más libre, tiene mas oportunidades...no se deja del patron”. [“The Texas Mexican is freer. He has more opportunities. He doesn’t let the boss take advantage of him.”]

Among the *oportunidades* these Mexican workers attributed to the resident Texas worker were welfare benefits. Interestingly enough, they did not begrudge Texas resident workers these benefits, nor did they see the situation as unfair to themselves. On the contrary, as one informant put it, “Ellos tienen derecho a esos beneficios porque son Americanos. Nosotros no.” [“They have a right to those benefits because they are Americans. We are not.”] Or, as another said, “Y por que no? Al fin de cuentas, es su país..que no?” [“And why not. After all, it is their country, is it not?”] On the other hand, these commuter Mexican workers acknowledged that they had advantages over the resident workers by virtue of residing in Mexico but working in the United States. These perceived advantages revolved around the notion that the cost of living in Mexico was cheaper than in the United States. Statements such as “En Mexico se vive mas cómodo” [“In Mexico one can live more comfortably.”] or “En Mexico el Dolar rinde mas” [“In Mexico the dollar goes farther.”] were commonplace.

## Conclusions and Implications

I have tried to show that since WW II the blue collar labor force of the Lower Rio Grande Valley has increasingly been composed of permanent residents of the area and daily or seasonal commuter workers whose permanent residence is on the Mexican side of the border. Furthermore, I have tried to show that both types of workers are to be found in all of the major labor markets of the area—from agriculture to manufacturing. This is not particularly new or surprising, but the particular way in which the types of workers are combined in the various industries, and its consequences, in this region is somewhat unexpected and significant. In short, commuter Mexican immigrant workers seem to be disproportionately represented in the higher wage firms, are the more stable



workers in these firms, and are relatively more capable of finding year-round employment in agriculture than are the resident, Mexican-American workers. In other words, the blue-collar labor force of the Valley is divisible into two segments based on residence, with the resident segment being relatively less productive or more marginal than the non-resident, commuter segment.

This pattern of labor market segmentation has, of course, been beneficial to Valley employers. In addition to keeping wages low and maintaining the pliability of the most productive sector of the respective work force, this internal segmentation pattern also serves to tie these commuter workers to the firm and, perhaps, heighten their loyalty to the "patron." More importantly, as Buroway (1976) has pointed out, it has enabled the local economy to externalize a good portion of the costs of renewal of this labor force to the Mexican economy. In addition, living in Mexico on wages earned in the U.S. serves to minimize the family maintenance costs and other non-public labor renewal services, at least in perception of these Mexican commuter workers.

Assuming all this to be true, what can we anticipate as some of the major consequences of the current Mexican crisis on the Mexican border commuter workers and their families? One very possible consequence could be the acceleration of permanent, household migration to the United States. As various studies have indicated (Reichert and Massey 1980; Flores 1984), since the late 1970's, household immigration to the United States has been increasing significantly. Elizabeth Briody's (1987) study of households in the Valley that had immigrated permanently from Mexico, mostly from the Mexican border towns adjacent to the Valley, indicates that a considerable portion of these households, if not the majority, had been households with commuter workers (usually the heads of household) prior to the permanent move of the household to the Valley. My own data on Valley workers confirms this transitional pattern of household migration as well. In her interpretation, this increase in household immigration has been due principally to agricultural labor demands and growing employment opportunities in the non-agricultural sector in the Valley. If her interpretation is correct, the rampant inflation, decreased supplementary employment opportunities, and the deterioration of ser-

vices and government support programs in Mexico as a result of the crisis can only increase the motivation of commuter worker households to immigrate their families permanently to the United States. In other words, as the economic advantages of living in Mexico and working regularly in the Valley diminish, more commuters will become Valley residents.

Another related and potential scenario involves changes in the domestic division of labor among these commuter worker families. As Briody's and my data indicate, commuter worker families tend to be relatively young and in the process of raising a family in Mexico. As a result, they tend to be single worker units dependent on the earnings of the head of household working in the United States, and very often they have no savings at all. The economic effects of the crisis on their purchasing power can only put pressure on these families to increase the worker/dependent ratio in their households, which essentially means finding employment for the female head of household. This would put added pressure on households to migrate permanently to the United States, where the employment opportunities are better or, at the least, to find commuter type employment in the Valley for the adult women. In either case, a significant portion of household earnings would have to be spent in securing legal documentation for the spouse and, in the case of those seeking permanent immigration, for other family members. Given that savings or savings accounts are rare among commuter workers, such expenditures would decrease the amount of money available for the maintenance costs of the family in Mexico. In addition, the need for more employment among women (as commuters or within Mexico) would increase the demand for child care and other labor renewal services on the Mexican economy.

On a broader level, the particular pattern of industrial development of the Valley, especially since the 1960's, along with the pattern of internal labor market segmentation based on residence described here, has permitted a creaming of the labor supply of Mexican border towns thereby gaining a somewhat higher quality of agricultural and non-agricultural worker than would otherwise be the case. Coupled with the increasing tendency for experienced commuter worker household immigration to the United States, as a result of the crisis, the implications for Mexico's economy and for

its recovery, at least in this part of Mexico, are clear. To quote Cockcroft, "...it may be inferred that [this] migration out of Mexico represents a transfer to the United States of a significant investment by Mexico in the form of human capital" (1987:91). Whatever other investments may be required by Mexico for its recovery from the crisis, this investment in human capital and labor renewal is one it can ill-afford to lose or transfer to the United States.

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# Medicalization of the U.S.–Mexico Border: Is it Really Needed?

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## Resumen

Cuando hay que hacer decisiones importantes acerca de la salud, siempre deben ser acondicionadas por el estado funcional del paciente. Esa decisión muchas veces se determina por lo que los profesionales perciben como la condición del paciente y no necesariamente en lo que el paciente necesita. Cuando el paciente vive en la frontera entre EEUU y Mexico, los que desean hacer decisiones en su nombre tienen que reconocer que los pacientes en ambos lados de la frontera tienen problemas de salud que son similares. También se debe reconocer que esfuerzos biomédicos no deben ser el centro de atención. Si tenemos interés en resolver problemas de salud en la frontera debemos tener enfoque sobre variables sociales tal como la falta de nutrición adecuada, alojamiento inadecuado, falta de agua potable, la pobreza, falta de drenaje y falta de educación. No hay medicina que pueda corregir estos problemas. La solución queda en hacer un ataque multidisciplinario usando el cuidado de salud primaria como modelo.

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## Introduction

The recent attention the U.S.–Mexico border has attracted because of the Free Trade Agreement and a changing political

climate in Mexico has had different groups discussing the coming demographic changes along the border. Of particular interest has been the issue of health care and how the health needs of a growing population will be met. To some, health care is the treatment of disease or illness by a second or third party. Many times the prescribed treatment is medication by and attention from a physician. Although the prescription may be correct for the symptoms, medicine often fails to identify the reason behind the problem. In addition, when health needs have been identified, there has been too much temptation to create a physician-centered, medicine only solution which makes the recipient of medical care the centerpiece of attention (Conrad and Kern, 1990). This control and dominance by medicine on society is referred to as medicalization.

Health care has also been described by the World Health Assembly's (WHA) definition reached at the Alma-Ata conference in 1978 which set global goals of achieving "Health for All by the Year 2000." The WHA proposed the concept of primary health care in order to improve health around the world. Although public health care is defined differently between locations, there is some agreement regarding which types of health problems should be addressed when using this model. As stated in the recommendations of the Alma-Ata conference, primary health care is defined and should include at least:

1. Health education
2. Environmental sanitation of food and water
3. The employment of community health workers
4. Maternal and child health programs, including immunization and family planning
5. Prevention of local endemic diseases
6. Appropriate treatment of common diseases and injuries
7. Provision of essential drugs
8. Promotion of nutrition
9. Traditional medicine (Basch, 1990)

## **Disease and Illness**

It is understood that disease is not evenly distributed throughout any population. Certain groups of people get sick more often and die at higher rates than others. Epidemiologists study the

distribution and determinants of states of health in human populations in order to determine which groups of people get sick and with which diseases. Answers are determined by using the traditional biomedical model which focuses on organic pathology in individual patients, rarely considering societal factors (Zola, 1990). Needed are ways to identify characteristics of groups and individuals and the social conditions that make them more or less vulnerable to disease.

It is paramount for the successful provision of improved health along the border shared with Mexico to consider the social conditions of the people who inhabit the area (Conrad et al, 1990; Dubos, 1959). (For the purposes of this paper, the U.S.–Mexico border is defined as including all the U.S. counties that share their boundaries with Mexico.) Some of the most noteworthy health problems are social and environmental in nature. They include high fertility rates, a disparity in infant mortality rates and the lack of potable water (Warner, 1991). Much can be learned from the shortcomings of well intentioned programs such as India's Universal Immunization Program which failed to recognize that effective intervention requires working within the culture of the people (Franke & Chasin, 1992). Success hinges on the involvement of the targeted population. This 2,000 mile zone is geographically and ethnically diverse; any attempts to improve the health of border citizens in this area must consider the contrasting cultures and their respective needs for care. Individual and community health will not improve by a biomedically driven initiative along the U.S.–Mexico border alone, but by the inclusion of changing, understanding and improvement of social and environmental conditions.

According to Rene Dubos, "To ward off disease or recover health, men as a rule find it easier to depend on the healers than to attempt the more difficult task of living wisely." (Dubos, 1959). Dependency on healers for better health has happened in the larger U.S. society, and this mentality wants to encroach upon the U.S.–Mexico border. Living wisely to recover or to keep health requires education and the means to change the social conditions that entrap the more susceptible. To improve the health of those living on the border will necessitate that medicine become one of the many players and not the whole team. It also necessitates an understanding of the inner workings of cultures such as the fact that all societies

have some systematized manner in which to deal with illness (Chesney, Chavira, Hall, and Gary, 1982). Along the border it could well be the utilization of curanderos or folk medicine practitioners.

### **Medicine, Physicians, and Health**

Life, whether in Mexico, the United States, or on the U.S.–Mexico border, would be so simple if we could rely on physicians to keep us healthy, but the fact is that we can't. In spite of potent drugs, high-tech procedures, and sophisticated treatments, the accomplishments of medicine in the last century are often exaggerated in people's minds. The dependence on medicine as cure-all is frequently misplaced. It is true that in the United States, health has improved tremendously in the last 100 years when measured by how long we live. Since 1900, life expectancy has increased from an average of 47 to the current 75 years. The statistically short life expectancy in 1900 was due mainly to the large number of infant deaths caused by pneumonia, diarrhea, premature birth, and to a lesser degree, infectious diseases such as whooping cough, measles, and tuberculosis (Vickery, 1978). However, the truth was that people who survived childhood had nearly the same life expectancy that we have now—about 70 years (Sagan, 1987). For decades, the medical community has assumed responsibility for the implied improvement in health status and in increased life expectancy of the population when, in fact, the largest gains in reducing mortality and morbidity have been the result of public health efforts. Figure 1 illustrates how infant mortality rates from communicable disease had already declined dramatically even before antibiotics became widely available.

From the late 1800s through the 1940s, the survival rates from infectious diseases and infant deaths steadily improved as beneficial changes took place in hygiene, sanitation, crowded housing conditions, water quality, nutrition, and other public health initiatives. Our increased life expectancy is often attributed to advances in medicine, but Figure 2 illustrates that antibiotics, the wonder drugs, only appeared on the scene in the 1940s and 1950s after rates of infectious disease had been steadily decreasing for nearly 100 years (Sagan, 1987)



### Infant Death Rates, New York City Per 1000 Live Births




Figure 1<sup>9</sup>




Figure 2<sup>11</sup>

By 1950, with major environmental improvements accomplished and infectious diseases largely controlled, the formerly decreasing death rates came to a standstill—even though at the same time many medical advances were introduced: hospital intensive-care units, coronary-care units, open-heart surgery, organ transplants, and other high-technology modes of treatment. Life expectancy and death rates, however, improved very little for the next 25 years in spite of the availability of the new medical treatments (Vickery, 1990).

After the 1950s, lifestyle became the next crucial factor in preventing disease. With more people surviving into adulthood, rates of the chronic, degenerative diseases increased—heart disease, cancer, diabetes, and stroke. These are the diseases medicine has had little success in treating and are most likely to develop when lifestyle habits are unhealthy. These are also border diseases whose rates can decrease with proper health education and health promotion which result in behavioral changes. Figure 3 illustrates how death rates in the United States declined as a result of environmental improvements before medical intervention and how positive lifestyle changes will continue to improve health.

The Decline in Death Rate, United States 1875-1989




Figure 3<sup>11</sup>

If the biomedical philosophy of health care is allowed to embrace the U.S.–Mexico border, a scenario similar to last year's Persian Gulf War is possible. Much of the great technologically advanced equipment the United States possessed was ineffective because the desert terrain was inhospitable. It was a case of having the right equipment at the right time in the wrong place. If improving health along the U.S.–Mexico border is a worthy goal, then it will not be a medically driven agenda that will accomplish the task but a primary health care philosophy that is right for the area.

Health promotion experts report it is difficult for people to accept the reality that environment, nutritional conditions, and lifestyle have had a greater effect on disease rates than medical treatment. Although treatment and management were available for many infirmities, a medical cure existed for relatively few. The last 50 years of medical research have produced an enormous number of drugs that aid many disorders, but few inroads have been made in curing the most common ailments and diseases such as heart disease, stroke, cancer, diabetes, and the common cold (Harley, Schlaadt, 1992).

For example, in spite of new surgical treatments and drugs, death rates for breast cancer have remained unchanged for the last 75 years. In the case of minorities, poverty and low education are better predictors of high cancer rates and cancer deaths (Rover, 1991). Nevertheless, according to a study conducted by the University of Chicago, most adults believe that modern medicine has cures for nearly all diseases or will within their lifetimes. It seems evident too much is expected from medicine—a relationship that medicine enjoys and society encourages. Considering the prevalence in our society of alcohol, cigarette, and drug use; unbalanced, high-fat diets; and lack of exercise—all habits that contribute to disease risk—it does not seem reasonable nor possible that medicine can do for people what they can do for themselves (McKinlay, McKinlay, and Beaglehole, 1989). It is unconscionable that any group or organization would want to make health dependents of anyone and ignore the emphasis on teaching self-responsibility. For decades the medical community has assumed responsibility for the implied improvement in health status and in increased life expectancy of the population, when in fact, the largest gains in reducing mortality and morbidity have been the result of public health efforts.

## **Border Health Profile**

The U.S.–Mexico border region has a higher birth rate and a lower death rate than the United States in general. Hispanics account for about 75 percent of the population, although those who claim that there are errors in the census believe it to be higher. The leading causes of death in both the border area and the United States are heart disease, cancer, stroke, accidents, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, pneumonia, and influenza. Communicable diseases that occur at higher rates on the border than in the rest of the United States include hepatitis, tuberculosis, gastrointestinal diseases, and syphilis. Other health conditions common to the border area are diabetes mellitus, gallbladder disease, and obesity. The population, considered to present a challenge to researchers, is difficult to reach for identification purposes, to retain in programs, and to study if migratory and binational variables are not considered along with cultural or ethnic issues (Ortega and Ramos, 1991)

## **Discussion and Recommendations**

It has been considered that good health was the consequence of medical care. In many circles, and by many who practice medicine, that idea is still maintained. This notion is believed by certain state medical associations who have identified the U.S.–Mexico border area in need of health care. Others have suggested the U.S. and Mexico border to be an ideal region to establish new guidelines for improving the health of interdependent nations (Falck, 1989). Although the betterment of health along the border is needed, it will be accomplished by an already recognized primary health care philosophy and community empowerment.

Health is a social idea with psychological, cultural, economic, political, and biological aspects. When a community (the U.S.–Mexico border area qualifies) perceives health in holistic terms and seeks to enhance its role using community resources which are nonpaternalistic, the results are a respect for the lay experience and an empowerment that takes place at a very pragmatic level. There is evidence the public wants to gain control of their health destinies (Carlson and Newman, 1987). The task before all of us who wish the very best for those living on the U.S.–Mexico border is to insure equity in access to the necessary knowledge, tools

of control and accurate information. This is particularly true for those who are highly vulnerable to professional dependency for their health—the poor, minorities, elderly, uneducated, and women (McKinlay, McKinlay, and Beaglehole, 1989). A first step in expressing the needed concern to improve health and the quality of life along the border is a healthy respect for the population and the elimination of the we-they dichotomy. Adhering to the ideology of using primary health care to positively impact the health status of the people living along the U.S.–Mexico border, the following recommendations are offered.

1. Considering the poverty level and the high fertility rates, it is recommended that midwives be employed. Midwives tend to relate to their patients in a nonauthoritarian manner and emphasize education, support and patient satisfaction (Rooks, 1990). Midwives can provide services for large numbers of the poor border population in an effective manner.

2. Teaching and encouraging self responsibility are important steps in improving health. The barrier to the assumptions of individual responsibility for one's own health is lack of knowledge (implicating the inadequacies of formal education's lack of sufficient interest in, and knowledge about, what is health prevention) (Rover, 1991). Strategies for improving health along the U.S.–Mexico border must include the incorporation of preventive measures into personal health services and the environment as well as individual and mass educational efforts. A direct relationship between a mother's educational level and immunization compliance in border communities has already been established (Perez, Fernandez, and Apodaca, 1990). Individuals along the border must be educated to know they have the power and moral responsibility to maintain their own health by the observance of simple, prudent styles of behavior. Social policy to improve education, employment, civil rights and economic levels must join forces with efforts to develop accessible health services.

3. Social sponsorship of a self-care development movement can contribute to a healthier community life along the border. The self-care (individuals ministering to their own needs) concept could be introduced to the neighborhoods or colonias as a community-wide proposition. Establishing a model of self-care education that

truly empowers the community and its values, its style of problem solving and its economic diversity provided by lay people to themselves will contribute to community life.

4. It is through decentralization of services and through grass-roots leadership that primary health care functions to reduce inequities in access to care. The great accomplishment of providing much health care with few resources was exemplified by China. China's fundamental strategy was the decentralization of governmental policies and the initiation of mass health education campaigns (Villas, Lile, and Perez-Coronado, 1991). A decentralization policy that encourages local active responsibility and evaluation is encouraged.

5. Since the lack of education is directly linked to many problems, one of them being poor health, it is recommended that efforts be made to encourage students to stay in school. High levels of school dropouts should never be accepted as normal. There should be a constant campaign for parental involvement with the schools.

6. Work already begun in this area should be recognized and supported. Private funders such as the Kellogg, Ford, and Robert Wood Johnson foundations and the Pew Charitable Trusts are backing projects in public interest law, water management, and economic empowerment. The Pan-American Health Organization has begun promoting cross-border cooperation among health care agencies with activities such as immunization campaigns, mosquito and rabies control, and AIDS prevention, along with environmental, educational, and emergency services. Also currently developed by the World Health Organization (WHO) is a project to test whether academic research institutions can assist communities in analyzing and planning how to develop health care by the Primary Health Care Review (PHCR) model. The PHCR is, among other things, a technique for empowering local communities to participate in solving their health problems in a constructive manner (Ortega, 1991).

7. At a recent Texas Medical Association (TMA) conference, it was recommended that there be created a U.S.–Mexico border health commission. The TMA was considering asking the larger American Medical Association to draft legislation for Congress to create a two-nation panel in order to solve environmental and health problems along the U.S. border with Mexico (*El Paso*

*Times*, 1991). It is strongly recommended that no more legislation, panels, or organizations be formed in order to improve the health problems along the border. Instead, those concerned about the health issues should adhere to the recommendations already made during the Alma-Ata conference of 1978 (Basch, 1990). Regions such as those found along the U.S.–Mexico border would best benefit by employing the Primary Health Care strategies already proven all over the world.

## Conclusion

As the multidisciplinary examination of the Free Trade Agreement and its impact on the U.S.–Mexico border continues, we must keep in mind the past attempts to control disease and improve health by medical efforts alone have met with limited success. Instead, the influence of environmental control has been far more effective. In fact, only 3.5 percent of the decline in infectious diseases in the twentieth century can be attributed to medical intervention (Dubos, 1959; Rover, 1991). Unfortunately, as misconceptions regarding the role of the biomedical model persist, the rationalization for and validation of increased spending on curative care instead of health education and health promotion also endures. This shortcoming in investment in public health measures becomes exacerbated in a period marked by rising health care costs. In 1985, it was conservatively estimated that efficacious preventive measures could produce an annual saving of 750,000 lives and \$6 billion in medical expenses (McKinlay, McKinlay, and Beaglehole). The chronically poor economic conditions that exist along the border demand comprehensive implementation of public health measures that consider the indigenous social milieu.

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## 132-Medicalization

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***The Unionization of the Maquiladora Industry: The Tamaulipan Case in National Context.*** By Edward J. Williams and John T. Passé-Smith. San Diego: Institute for Regional Studies of the Californias, San Diego State University, CA 92182-0435, 1992. xv +134 pp.

Shortly after Williams and Passé-Smith finished their book, Mexican federal agents arrested Agapito González Cavazos, the seventy-seven year old head of the Matamoros Union of Journeymen and Industrial Workers, and whisked him off to Mexico City (see James Pinkerton, "Labor Don Under Siege." *Houston Chronicle* 3.29.92, p. 21A). Williams and Passé-Smith explain some of the stakes in the spectacular investigation of the main Matamoros labor union launched in January 1992. The action continues President Salinas de Gortari's clamp down on major unions, a famous episode of which was the arrest of "La Quina," the oil workers' union leader, and is widely seen as an effort to demonstrate to potential investors that the Mexican government is prepared to break with its long-time political allies in order to insure a climate favorable to business in the border industrialization zone.

The question that arises is why the Mexican government was led to take action against the Matamoros union in particular, rather than against any of the other border town unions. The official reason, that a long-standing charge of fiscal fraud finally had to be investigated, is not sufficient: there are obviously many other cases of alleged tax evasion and the federal bureaucracy is not known for the rapidity of its procedures. Passé-Smith and Williams offer some statistics that suggest the Matamoros union was different from its sister unions in other Tamaulipan border cities.

Starting from overall figures of unionization along the Mexican side of the border, the two sociologists are led to distinguish apparently similar union situations by finer criteria describing the varying relations between the unions, their membership, industry and the government. They establish these distinctions through interviews with maquiladora workers and a review of the recent history of city politics.

The state of Tamaulipas first attracted their attention because its three major maquiladora concentrations (Nuevo Laredo,

Reynosa and Matamoros) all displayed very high rates of union membership (close to 100% organized), compared to states further west (Coahuila to Baja California Norte). Although their initial hypothesis was that the three Tamaulipan unions shared the features of a strong labor movement, their investigation led them to separate the Matamoros union from the other two. In Matamoros, the union appeared closer to its membership and more militant in the face of new demands by the employers. By contrast, the Nuevo Laredo union was "slavish" and the Reynosa union caving in to the employers.

The authors frame their case study of Tamaulipas with an extensive overview of recent trends in the Mexican government's policy towards labor in general and maquiladora unions in particular. The many types of relations between unions and management are described and the conclusion examines the somewhat gloomy prospects for labor in the border area.

The authors surveyed two hundred and twenty-one workers. The statistics they construct from this sample are successful in bringing out the general feelings of the workers and establishing the distinction between Matamoros and the other two Tamaulipan towns. Some of the questions asked, however, may have been very sensitive and additional material describing the exact context in which they were asked could shed more light on their significance: were the interviewees chosen through firm employee lists, through the union or through neighborhood networks; how effectively were they protected from retaliation by union leaders and employers; at what stage of contract negotiations were they questioned? Moreover, the reader thirsts for a more complete history of the local labor and neighborhood movements that shaped the social climate in which the survey was conducted. The situation in Matamoros has already changed in many ways since this book was finished. For instance, one wonders, in light of the above-mentioned arrest of "Agapito," whether the Matamoros interviewees would answer in the same fashion today the questions asked them last year about their confidence in the Mexican government.

The book is valuable as an update on industrial relations in the northern border area. The existence of trade unions with the avowed mission of defending the wages and working conditions of maquiladora workers is too often forgotten in discussions of Mexico's

industrialization program and the North American Free Trade Agreement. Williams and Passé-Smith remind us that these unions encompass a wide range of situations and are subject to significant change over time. Their work confirms once again that the real state of labor relations cannot be deducted from overall unionization statistics but requires, to be truly understood, both sociological surveys and a careful study of the historical past and social context. As a detailed picture of the recent situation in Tamaulipas, it is therefore a welcome contribution to a broader study of labor along the border.

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**Entre Yerba, Polvo y Plomo: Lo Fronterizo Visto Por El Cine Mexicano, Volumen I & Volumen II.** By Norma Iglesias. Tijuana, Baja California: El Colegio de la Frontera Norte, 1991. 156 pp. (vol. 1), 224 pp. (vol. 2).

As interest in the border increases in both the United States and Mexico, so does the realization that the region encompasses a distinct reality that is as much cultural as geographical. Norma Iglesias' two-volume cinematic history focuses on how the border has been perceived and interpreted in the history of the Mexican cinema. Ms. Iglesias, whose previous books have focused on a range of border issues, shows how the *frontera* or border has played a part in Mexican cinema practically since the latter's inception.

The title of both volumes is taken from a movie with the same name (albeit slightly different spelling) and highlights a popular theme in current border films—drug trafficking, with its attendant emphasis on marijuana (*yerba*), heroin and/or cocaine (*polvo*) and melodrama riddled with bullets (*plomo*). This is just one of several cinematic scenarios of the border, and the author's first volume documents the different eras that have attempted to portray—although at times stereotype seems more accurate—the border experience on celluloid.

In addition to a historical introduction to the topic, the first volume aims for a more complex appreciation of the circumstances

that surround any cinematic enterprise. Indeed, an overall perspective on *frontera* films requires interdisciplinary investigation, and this first volume assumes the task quite well. One chapter examines the psychology of the Mexicans and Chicanos who comprise its audience, with special attention to how border films fulfill identity needs. Although the open-ended interviews with moviegoers could have been edited more stringently, the material is rewarding in both anecdote and insight.

Along with the consumer end of the border “dream industry”, the author examines the other end of its spectrum, explaining how production considerations, including strategies for targeting the audience market, determine the final product. Similarly, she reveals how the monopoly on distribution and theater exhibition has as its ultimate consequence inferior filmmaking.

These chapters are not without their minor faults. For instance, the analysis of the production process includes tables—a typical example cites the number of tickets sold in given years throughout selected theaters in Tijuana—that only the most meticulous (or masochistic) cineast would care to ponder. On the whole, however, Ms. Iglesias’ observations on matters of production provide necessary insights for understanding the finished product. The static stereotypes and the sameness that plague most of the genre, she argues, can be explained by the fact that production lies in the hands of a very small number of families whose narrowness of vision makes that of American studios seem limitless by comparison. Moreover their familiarity with the border experience, particularly on the U.S. side, is negligible. Thus, when one respondent holds up *La Bamba* as the artistic yardstick by which to measure his industry’s own output, one almost wishes that the statement were motivated more by sarcasm than sincerity. One could well argue that Chicanos, after being subjected to years of distorted portrayals at the hands of Anglo directors now have to turn the other cheek and endure stereotypes perpetuated by Mexican directors in films such as *Johnny Chicano*, *El chicano justiciero*, and *El chicano karateca*.

The author rightfully criticizes these misrepresentations which at times reach surreal proportions, for while one hardly expects a *Buñuel* in the bunch, the directors’ lack of integrity or artistry is dismal by almost any standards. In all fairness Ms. Iglesias

acknowledges the cooperation of these same producers and directors with her project; as one producer pointed out, he did not expect her to shower his work with flowers and accolades.

If one strength of the first volume lies in its informative value, an equally valid element can be found in its engaging readability. Its blend of academic insight and genuine enthusiasm for its topic resembles the style of one of its primary sources—García Riera's exhaustive filmography of the Mexican cinema. García Riera analyzes his material with an intellectual humor that makes its reading at once pleasurable and enlightening, and Ms. Iglesias provides her own variation with great effect. As with any serious critic of popular film, she understands the dilemma of interpreting lowbrow cultural artifacts—movies for a mass audience—within academic parameters, for nothing ruins an intellectual analysis of banal art like holding the work to the same standards that one applies to more profound works of creativity. One does a disservice both to inferior art and superior efforts. Ms. Iglesias understands that academic interest in borderline art may exist for reasons other than esthetic ones, and what make this book on border films so readable is her ability to maintain that distinction: that popular art which has little to tell us artistically can still say much to social scientists; conversely, one can discuss the social or cultural context of such art without necessarily taking its esthetic content seriously.

Although the author has introduced an innovative and valuable area of study, there exists a major problem with one of the criteria used to designate a given film as *fronteriza*: that the film “refer to the Mexican-origin population living in the United States”. In essence, any film that touches on Chicanos could be included, and while Chicanos constitute a major segment of U.S. border culture, we must also recognize that the vast majority of the Mexican-origin population in the U.S. does not reside along the border. Indeed some of the film settings are in places such as Los Angeles or Chicago, areas which may have a sizeable Mexican-origin population but which would not fall within border boundaries by any stretch of the imagination. It is true that some of the concerns faced by Mexicans and Chicanos throughout the U.S. may be similar; moreover, the collective cognitive map of Mexicans may make little distinction between the border region of the U.S. and the rest of its territory.

Still, the construct of the border as a cultural and political phenomenon must be defined with greater restraint and rigor for it to have meaningful utility. For instance, if we take her same Mexican-origin population criterion but now apply it to populations south of the Rio Bravo (i.e., all of Mexico) the term is so all-inclusive as to be impractical.

Similarly, making the border population synonymous with Mexican-origin population perpetuates yet another stereotype on an ethnic group which has already endured more than its share. Because of generational, geographical and historical realities, the variety of cultural experiences within Chicano communities is considerable. Although border films may gloss over these differences due to ignorance or to a profit motive that imposes an artificial common denominator on its audience, it is up to the academic community to point out these misperceptions rather than perpetuate them. The fact that this book is a pioneering work makes the task doubly important, since all too often the thesis of original sources—along with their shortcomings—are subsequently cited without criticism.

Aside from her sympathetic albeit sporadic treatment of Chicanos, the author alludes to a number of other subthemes throughout her work, including the role of women in border films. Her observations on the portrayal of Chicanos and women, though, are interspersed throughout the work, whereas a distinct chapter on each might have proved more satisfactory. Better still, one would suggest a separate book for each theme; certainly her present insights on the issues impacting both groups would support a more formal development of those ideas.

Regardless of how one views the artistic merit of these works, there is little doubt but that they help contribute to the cognitive world of many U.S. Hispanics and Mexicans. To the extent that such films attempt to reflect border reality they serve as ready-made cognitive maps of the region, and it would appear that technological transformations in the medium will help underscore their impact. One example: in years past, undocumented Mexicans living in the U.S. might think twice about attending theaters catering to such interests. That fear has been erased by the proliferation of video stores which allow home viewing of such material. Similarly, those who live in communities where theater screenings of Mexican films are not

feasible now have access. In short, populations which were heretofore culturally isolated have now been incorporated into the audience.

Ms. Iglesias argues that while these films tend to be produced at least partially in Mexico, their cultural impact is especially significant in the U.S., where their major audience is found. For this group the popularity of such films, aside from the entertainment element, may serve a dual function in identity: an attempt to reaffirm cultural ties to a mother country—ties that may in fact be more mythical than actual—as well as an attempt to redefine their new surroundings into a distinct synthesis.

As with any work that critically examines a portion of popular culture, the book is capable of satisfying a strata of audiences. A reader who simply wants academic affirmation of border culture's existence will be pleased, for Ms. Iglesias' authentic and intimate interest in the field should serve to legitimize it. Yet the author carries her comments farther still, to the arena of social criticism, for she points out the responsibility that directors must assume for the impact of their films, which are both shapers of culture and esthetic products of the same. She observes that films on *la frontera* typically exploit timely social issues such as undocumented immigration yet ultimately defuse and dismiss their relevance by turning them into fodder for comedy or melodrama. Urging for a greater artistic commitment among the directors and producers of such films, she ends her first volume with a quote from Fellini, who although sometimes accused of an extremely personal surrealism, nonetheless expresses the ultimate challenge for filmmakers: the creation of fantasies which confront that ineludible reality that sustains the imagination.

The second volume of *Entre yerba, polvo y plomo*, a directory of Mexican border films, consists of a more detailed annotation of the movies mentioned directly or indirectly in the first volume. Limiting herself to a selection and compilation of these works, the author also limits the breadth of her own remarks and observations to the film at hand rather than to the overall genre. A significant part of the volume consists of earlier texts either compiled or composed by Garcia Riera or Ayala Blanco in their respective histories of the Mexican cinema. For those films which the author herself summarizes and comments on, one must often be



satisfied with a cursory synopsis and a publicity blurb from the studio; the latter, instead of clarifying the plot, usually adds to its surrealism. Occasionally, though, the information transcends that of trivial pursuit. For instance, anyone who has viewed as bizarre the cinematic tastes of the French for American cinema will be further mystified to learn that *Mojado power* received an award from a film festival in France.

For the cineast or anyone else interested in a more detailed description of a particular picture, the filmography by Ms. Iglesias certainly saves the time of poring through Garcia Riera's tomes to sort out border cinema from other Mexican productions. In the sense that the volume delineates the genre, her excerpts are useful, yet the lack of even a basic index severely limits its utility. The films are catalogued chronologically, but even films within a given year are not listed alphabetically by title, so tracking down a given movie can prove exasperating. Moreover, this volume lacks the theoretical and thematic interest—to say nothing of the sense of future research potential—that the first volume generates. Comparing it to the first volume, it can only serve to complement or accompany the former but cannot properly stand on its own.

Genaro Gonzalez

The University of Texas-Pan American

**Entre la Magia y la Historia: Tradiciones, Mitos y Leyendas de la Frontera.** Compilado por José Manuel Valenzuela Arce. México, D.F: Gráfica, Creatividad y Diseño. 1992. 259 páginas; cinco capítulos.

Estos ensayos abarcan las ponencias presentadas en el Foro De Análisis del VII Festival Internacional de la Raza de 1990, reunido por el Colegio de la Frontera Norte y publicadas en 1992 por el Programa Cultural de Las Fronteras del Consejo Nacional para La Cultura y Las Artes.

La colección de ensayos representa un estudio que enlaza varias disciplinas. Al mismo tiempo, es de interés para todo lector. La gran sensibilidad con la cual se relatan estos ensayos denotan el

respeto de cada autor, así como al pueblo sobre el cual se escribe—el pueblo fronterizo Mexicano y Chicano. Esta cultura fronteriza, poco entendida por las dos naciones que les da su dinamismo, sigue arraigada en la tradición, con su propia identidad y su propia historia.

*Entre la Magia y la Historia* forma una estructura basándose en el mito, la historia, la literatura y las leyendas. El mensaje o tema sobresaliente de este libro es la dinámica de las culturas en la región geográfica de la frontera, donde se entrecruzan tradiciones, leyendas e historia. Aquí, en este ambiente “mágico” se reúnen las corrientes del mito y la leyenda y se organiza una historia propia del pueblo. Esta historia no es una historia despegada de la otra, sino que va mano a mano con la ya reconocida oficialmente y aceptada. Olga Vicenta Díaz Castro (Sor Abeja) lo dice bien en “La Tía Juana” del capítulo titulado “Los Mitos Fundadores”: “no siempre lo que se escribe es cierto, y a veces la verdad nunca se escribe”. Esta es la clave de *Entre la Magia y la Historia*.

La riqueza cultural de esta región, bastante bien ilustrada en esta colección, es tan abundante que solo suele presentarse para comprenderla. Y así lo hacen los autores de este libro. Los símbolos, mitos y leyendas aquí presentados son las realidades de un pueblo poco comprendido. Esta colección, representa una crónica de las tradiciones, valores y sueños—la historia—de un pueblo no reconocido u apreciado.

Por su mayor parte, los personajes presentados en estas páginas reflejan un pueblo aislado y marginal, en peligro de desaparición. Pero, al mismo tiempo, revelan un espíritu indomable, valiente, luchando ante la dominación y la injusticia, manteniendo su identidad, sus tradiciones y su cultura. Surgen también valores de principios humanitarios, una ideología propia y una visión del mundo.

Esta colección abre paso para tener un mejor entendimiento de la frontera y su dinámica; enlaza argumentos persuasivos para un entendimiento más sofisticado de la historia según las perspectivas étnicas; y propone un contexto internacional para estudios más profundos en esta región.

Juanita Elizondo-Garza,  
The University of Texas—Pan American

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
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**CONTENTS:**

**USOS DEL SUELO Y CONFIGURACION DE LA  
ESTRUCTURA URBANA EN CIUDA D JUAREZ, CHIH.,  
(1960-1990)**

**Cesar M. Fuentes**

**CESAR CHAVEZ, THE UNITED FARM WORKERS AND  
MEXICAN IMMIGRATION**

**Richard Griswold del Castillo**

**TEXAS HIGHER EDUCATION AND BORDER FUNDING  
INEQUITIES: IMPLICATIONS FOR BORDER UNIVER-  
SITIES AND TRANSBORDER COOPERATION**

**Ellwyn R. Stoddard**

**TEXAS DISCOVERS ITS MEXICAN NEIGHBORS:  
BORDER-STATE GOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS,  
1978-1991**

**E. V. Niemeyer, Jr.**

**THE MEXICAN CRISIS AND THE SEGMENTED LABOR  
MARKET OF THE LOWER RIO GRANDE VALLEY OF  
TEXAS**

**Joseph Spielberg Benitez**

**MEDICALIZATION OF THE U.S.-MEXICO BORDER: IS  
IT REALLY NEEDED?**

**Paul Villas and Erin Frew**

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