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# THE POWER OF IRRATIONAL BELIEFS

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This article is about irrational beliefs and their role in the construction of our knowledge. Since Ancient Greece philosophers decided to consider knowledge as a true belief. The first question that arose was "which sort of beliefs they were talking about? Belief as a faith or just a simple statement person is certain in?" So, first of all, the main terminology such as "knowledge" and "belief" was clarified. After the ascertainment of what a belief is, we reviewed how it forms the basis of knowledge. We showed two possibilities of this process. One is the JTB theory that states that the belief should be justified and true (in reality) to become the knowledge. The second one insists that the belief does not need any justification and don't need to be true in reality but in a person's mind. The last one refers to the irrational beliefs, such as magic or religious, but not only. The main question of this paper was to see why the people in the Est of Ukraine have such irrational thoughts as "it is better to live in Russia" or "the Soviet Union was a "golden time". Exploring these questions, we have seen that an important aspect is occupied by social features which contribute to the development or the preservation of irrational beliefs. We studied two different categories of societies, savage and civilized, to see the difference of prevalence of the irrational believes in both of them, and we showed the diversity of it's usage in our society compared to savage tribes. Particular attention was given to the examples. In the conclusion, the main questions were answered by showing the mythological roots of these irrational thoughts.

Key words: knowledge; irrational beliefs; truth; objective reality; social influence; myth.

# СИЛА ІРРАЦІОНАЛЬНИХ ВІРУВАННЬ

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Стаття присвячена ірраціональним віруванням і їх ролі в конструюванні нашого знання. Ще за часів Стародавньої Греції філософи вирішили розглядати знання як істинне вірування. Перше питання, яке виникло було "про який саме типі веровань йшла мова? Вірування, як віри, або просте твердження, в якому людина впевнена?» Так що, в першу чергу, була роз'яснена така основна термінологія, як, що є "знання", а що є "вірування". Після з'ясування того, що з себе представляє вірування, ми розглянули, як вона лежить в основі знань. Ми показали дві можливості цього процесу. Однією з них є ЈТВ теорія, яка говорить, що вірування повинна бути виправдане і істинне (насправді, в реальності), щоб стати знанням. Друга наполягає, що вірування не потребують будь-яких обґрунтувань і не обов'язково повинні бути істинними насправді, але в свідомості людини. Останній варіант якраз і відноситься до ірраціональним віруваннь, таким як магія або релігія, та не тільки. Головне завдання цієї статті було зрозуміти, чому люди на Сході України мають такі ірраціональні думки, як "краще жилося б в Росії" або "Радянський Союз був "золотим часом" для життя". Вивчаючи ці питання, ми побачили, що важливий аспект займає соціальний фактор, який вносить свій внесок у розвиток або збереження ірраціональних вірувань. Ми вивчили дві різні категорії соціумі: дикунів і "цивілізований", щоб побачити різницю поширеності ірраціонального вірувань в обох соціальних строях, показавши відмінність їх використання в нашому суспільстві в порівнянні з дикими племенами. Особливу увагу було приділено прикладам. У висновку ми відповіли на основні питання, показавши міфологічне коріння цих ірраціональних думок.

*Ключові слова*: знання; ірраціональні вірування; істина; об'єктивна реальність; соціальний вплив; міф.

### FORMULATION OF THE PROBLEM

Have you ever asked yourself "Why am I so afraid of black cats crossing the road before me?" or "Why am I so sure that atoms are really the basis of everything?" In this paper we are going to consider the irrational beliefs that we received from our "magic past" and their influence on us.

After all the times, although we are the people of technology progress, we still have not learned how to always think rationally and logically correct. Our thinking is structured the same way as the thinking of people from 15th or 9th century. The idea is that our reflection is built on the same in ancient times founded basis. To start, we need to understand what "knowledge" is, and what "belief" is, and how they are one in the same. The primary goal of my article is to show how the irrational beliefs influence our perception and knowledge of the world. For Ukraine, this topic is particularly relevant. As the country is currently experiencing difficulty, cultural division and military action, we can ask ourselves why some people in the eastern part of the country maintain the belief that "it is better to live in Russia" or why the older people, who have experienced all the fears and horrors of the Soviet Union, now call it a "golden time"? Is this an influence driven by propaganda or a burning sense of "patriotic love" instilled in them since childhood? Ultimately, as main task of this paper, we will seek to reveal and comprehend how irrational beliefs survive and act in times of rational scientific approach.

### JTB Theory

Since Plato philosophers decided to consider knowledge as a true belief. To start I must note that the word "belief" should not be interpreted in the religious sense of faith, but as a certainty of knowledge that an individual adopts as his own. For example, mathematicians believe in the infallibility of the axioms underlying the foundation of all mathematics. Belief is a state of mind in which a person is convinced of something with or without any empirical evidence. In other words, belief is a material that can be converted into either knowledge or faith. For example, a person who is superstitious might interpret a broken mirror as a sign of bad luck. On the other hand, for someone who thinks rationally, it could be recognized positively, as a physical manifestation that provides information and constructive direction to decrease music or to perhaps, exercise heightened care when polishing stuff. Hence, in the first case, the person only relies on a superstitious belief, not a knowledge. In the second case, however, a belief that the mirror was broken due to excessively loud music, for instance, adopts the knowledge that the mirror can be broken as a result of not simply strong but overpowering resonance. We can assume that "transformation from belief into a knowledge" depends on the truth or falsity of our beliefs. The belief of our superstitious friend hinges on the false premise that he was cursed. It is for this reason that his conclusions did not give him a strict knowledge. However, is this hypothesis correct? Do these conclusions, that were made by our superstitious friend have the same forceful importance for him as the "knowledge-conclusion" we have thus far subscribed to?

Maybe, it will be better to say that belief is "the simple fact of holding something to be true" [8, 23], like it was noted by Julien Dutant. In the moment when we truly believe in something we have a total confidence in what we believe even if we discover in future that our beliefs were false because of the false basis or our incorrect interpretation. Thus, a shaman is 100% sure than a dance around a fire may cause the rain. So, our beliefs could be wrong, when we are not aware of this fact. Like people from XV century were imagining the Earth in the center of the Universe, until the Ptolemy's concept was changed by the Copernicus's system. That means, our beliefs stay true for us as long as we do not change them. Thereby the knowledge "received" from an untested source or supported only by our feelings, imagination or desire, could mislead us. So the question is, does the truth of a supposition depend on the guarantees given by experiment

May I propose you to think right now, what represents the "truth" itself. Aristotle wrote in his Metaphysics that the truth is "to say that what is is not, or that what is not is, is false. And say that what is is, or that what is not is not, is true" [1, 201]. To explain more easily, the truth is when a certain "p" which we believe corresponds to "p" which is in reality and vice versa "~ p" we believe corresponds to "~ p" in reality. Nevertheless, we cannot check all the knowledge in the world! So some of it we take on trust. For example, the science teacher tells his class about The Black Hole. The class must believe that the story their teacher reports them is true because they cannot empirically verify what they hear. That means, there are some beliefs that do not need an extra-support. Another example, a little child does not want to sleep alone in his room, because an elder brother of one of his classmates said that every night, when it is dark and everybody sleeps, the blind monsters go out from the closet and look for children's feet to eat their toes. Of course, the poor child does not need proof to believe in this tale. Surely, he does not want the monster to eat his toes. Thus, those beliefs, that are considered unconsciously to be true as they are, do not require the proof. Ultimately, we find ourselves in a situation when we need to choose the formula

"belief" = "the simple fact of holding something to be true" or add something more as an additional evidence or support to reach the knowledge.

Plato proposed that the belief should be justified to become the knowledge. Accepting this proposition, European philosophers from all the later times have been tring to explain their positions and ideas and not only name them. Thus, when we use a demonstration to prove our position, it means that we have some doubts or we leave ta tiny possibility of incorrectness of our thoughts. Everything was fine until Edmund Gettier in his article Is Justified True Belief Knowledge? showed that truth and justification are not sufficient for knowledge. The philosopher has initiated a cycle of discussions which are continuing till now. I think it is unnecessary to repeat Gettier's examples, because every interested in epistemology should at least once hear about "ten coins". Many philosophers had been trying to solve the Gettier problem. The simplest tactic is to assume that the problem concerns the justification. So, to take something as the justification, this thing, fact or image must be infallible. However, there are few facts in this world that we can believe infallibly. Therefore, the knowledge in this sense would be limited to simple selfconsciousness, "cogito ergo sum" of Descartes and, perhaps, to some mathematical or logical propositions. Does it mean that we make our knowledge subjective? Does it mean that there is only private knowledge, such as the private language of Wittgenstein, that the only common knowledge we share is mathematical or logical propositions? I mean, how can we be sure in what we think? For example, Sophie is sick and has a fever of which she is unaware. Because of this fever, she has some hallucinations. She sees clearly that cockroaches, so horrible and disgusting, run on the floor of her room. Like most of the women, Sophie is afraid of cockroaches and so she did not dare to get out of her bed. In truth, there are no cockroaches in her bedroom, yet Sophie is 100% sure in what she sees and therefore she believes that these cockroaches are real.

## Which reality we live in?

Plato formed a metaphysical objectivism, arguing that ideas exist objectively and independently. Plato's opposition between objective knowledge and doxa (opinions) became later the basis for subsequent philosophers who decided to solve the problem of reality. For example, Descartes distinguished formal and objective reality. He stated: "By the objective reality of an idea, I mean the entity or being of the thing represented by the idea, as this entity is the idea <...> For everything we conceive as being in ideas of objects, all that is objectively, or by representation, in the ideas themselves" [5, 178]. It is the existence of things as they are, without our invention. By "formal reality" of the idea Descartes considered the reality of things involved in the process of thinking. So the idea of the sun, from the standpoint of the formal reality = "I thought the sun". We can say that the sun is formally "in me", but objectively "in itself". Almost like the idea of "things-inthemselves" of Kant. English philosopher - John Lock thought that all the ideas derive consequently from sensible experience. In other words, the ideas are copies of sensible impressions, wrote the philosopher in his work Essay on Human Understanding. Objects we feel are external to mind, but objects we think are the internal operations of the mind. The last one are built on the basis of the first. Thus, we always have the multiplication of realities. The easiest way to show the difference between the subjective judgment and the objective reality is well illustrated in the following example of Locke: imagine yourself holding one hand in icy water and the other in hot water for couple of moments. Then, put the both hands in a bucket of warm water, one hand feels cold and the other feels warm when in truth you have both subjective experiences of a single objective reality.

Peter Winch, a British philosopher known for his contributions to the philosophy of social science, thinks that position that "every science agrees with reality" [28, 12] "discriminate" and "disqualify" the magic which has the same relationship with reality as science. In The idea of a social science his position is described this way: "the scientific tradition, on the one hand, the magical and religious traditions, on the other, have contributed to the development of concepts of what a different objective reality" [28, 12]. So it is quite impossible to talk about superiority and supremacy of science, because it is not the one to have the direct links with objective reality. I think the objective reality is single and we all touch it by building our ideas, yet the views, the different positions that we get after our thoughts belong to different subjunctive realities. The idea that Winch tried to represent is that our reality depends on society in which we are raised. For Winch society plays an important role. All and any societies have their rules as the particular views and it imposes them on us. Many of them we do not even understand. They are natural for us, so we do

not pay attention. In his work Understanding a primitive society, he showed it by citing Evans-Pritchard "the fact that we attribute rain to meteorological causes alone while savages believe that Gods or ghosts or magic can influence the rainfall is no evidence that our brains functions differently from their brains" [17, 307] So, Europeans are confident that meteorologists "can predict" the weather we will have tomorrow, the next week or even the next month. Sometimes they are wrong, as well as the magical rites do not always produce the desirable results. And as the "savages" who are not used to the weather forecasts with their explanations, we do not take seriously the predictions of shamans. Yet, if we think, the meteorologist in our society plays the same role as the tribe's shaman. Using the resources, they both have, they make their predictions. Who is responsible that the shamans of Africa or Australia, for example, do not have the powerful computers and new technologies we have? They use what they have in their disposal: stones, bones, birds. That's a simple difference.

Winch points out that science affects the construction of our reality the same manner as the magic or religion does. Both give us basic beliefs that form the basis of our proper knowledge. The problem with the science-minded people is that the science always request the evidence of things that come out of our understanding. We cannot accept magic with its manifestations because we do not understand them and, what is more important, we are accustomed to the idea that our society does not accept them. We shall clarify it in another example. I am sure that there are a lot of people who do not understand physics. Nevertheless, if a physicist says that the electricity is composed of atoms, we will accept it without verification. Winch wrote "It would be easy, at this point, to say simply that the difficulty arises from the use of the unwieldy and misleadingly comprehensive expression "agreement with reality"; and in this sense this is true. Nevertheless, we should not lose sight of the fact that the idea that men's ideas and beliefs must be checkable by reference to something independent some reality is an important one" [17, 308]. However, science cannot "get so far" to see an independently real verification on the necessary distance. In other words, we are so engaged that we cannot rethink in objectively critical manner our culture as well as the others. Considering knowledge that we get from the science the only one that is logically correct, we exclude the possibility of the religion or magic to give us a different kind of knowledge.

As a Wittgenstein's student, Winch thinks that reality does not give sense, but obtains it from language used by people. He noted that our idea of what belongs to the realm of reality is given us by the language that we use. That means "the borders of our language are the borders of our world" [29, 5.6], as said Wittgenstein. Well, imagine next situation. You are traveling somewhere in savage Africaand one day you find a tribe with hospitable savage. You start to communicate with them, trying to find out the most useful and simple words, and suddenly you realize that they do not have a word "apple". Is a lack of this word changes the nature of the fruit? No, it is not. So their personal world does not have a word relevant to this fruit because they do not have it in the area they live in. However, it does not mean that there is no apple in a world at all. Thus, we should speak about plurality of subjective reflections and personal worlds instead of one objective reality unique for everybody. Thus, the science and the religion or magic can have their own different conceptions of reality. As an example Winch notes that existence of God does not depend on human thoughts, but thanks to those thoughts religion is present in our world.

### RESULTS OF THE THEORETICAL ANALYSIS OF THE PROBLEM

# <u>Irrationality of beliefs</u>

What is an irrational belief? This is not the faith that is completely contrary to the mind and opposed to logic. This is the faith for which we do not have any reasonable grounds, although it is still present in us. The first thing that comes to our mind when we are thinking of irrational beliefs are religious beliefs. However, is it true that the religious thoughts are always irrational? We shall check it now. All mythological or religious beliefs consist of three components:

- 1. The idea of one unique principal in the nature of everything, i. e. an absolute being, like God, Zeus or Allah:
  - 2. The idea of an individual principal as a center of human nature and personality;
- 3. All the mythological and religious cultures have an aim to regulate a human life, i. e. they give the laws people should respect and follow.

However, we can see that philosophy deal with the same points. So should we say that

philosophy is irrational too? Recall in your mind Plato's works (Philebus, Timaeus, Republic). Ancient philosopher was not a religious person, if we use the contemporary terminology, nevertheless, his philosophy has a concept of Good as the highest object of knowledge (it could be opposed to God, for example), personal soul and public laws. It is not my aim now to describe Plato's philosophy here and compare it with world religions, but to show that these three principles do not belong only to religions.

The question is what makes religious beliefs so special? There is a variety of religions. One are cruel, like Maya and Aztec religions were, which had brought blood sacrifices, the other ones, like Jainism or Dharma Jain, propagandizes total non-violence. However, there is one thing commune: the difficulty and almost impossibility to find the basis proofs for religious affirmations. The argument the most popular in a Middle Age was: world is arranged by certain laws and, as everything should have the cause, this world should have it too, so this cause should be the most intelligent transcendental being. This kind of ideas we can find in the philosophy of Descartes, Spinoza, Abelard, etc. Sure, it is difficult to prove the most of religious and mythological beliefs because we do not have materials (except some theoretical experiments). However, there are a lot of inventions in science that have no "touchable" proves too. As an example I propose you the theory of "time crystals". It is a theory of American physicist Frank Wilczek. Time crystals are the physical structures which move in the same schema as moments in hours without energetic expend. Wilczek made some theoretical proofs for his theory, but we have no practical experiments for the moment. So, we can consider that his thoughts are as much irrational as an invention of God.

Winch persists that "science, for example, tries to make the world intelligible; but the same are the historian, the religious prophet and the artist; as well as the philosopher. And although we can describe the activities of all these types of thinker in terms of concepts of understanding and intelligibility, it is clear that in many important points, the goals of each are different from those of all others" [28, 19] Each of them has their understanding of reality. In addition, each of us has his own "reality". "The philosophy of science will study the ways in which scientists try to make sense of the world, while the philosophy of religion explores the way in which religiously faithful seek a very different understanding of reality" [6, 9], Berel Dov Lerner noted in his study of Peter Winch's philosophy. Thereby, the thing that I want to show in this section is that an individual can believe in whatever he wants with no regard on the validity of his beliefs.

## The influence of irrational beliefs

As an example we can take magic practices. First of all, we should distinguish two types of magic:

- 1. the system of magical beliefs and practices that is the foundation of the tribe's social life;
- 2. the magical beliefs and practices that still exist in our society.

Summing up, finally, we can try to answer the question that we have posed in the introduction. As we have seen, the society and culture play a rather significant and important role in people's lives – they define the backgrounds for further searching, reasons and dreams of people. Elderly people who grew up and lived most of their life in the Soviet Ukraine, which brought them up as a "Pioneer," "Komsomol" and an "admirer of Lenin's and Marx's ideology", who have been living in fear of the Party for many years and become accustomed to its laws, they feel confused in a current situation. They were given a freedom of choice, which they never expected and to which they were not prepared. Moreover, the freedom of choice is the responsibility which frightens them. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, their own world completely collapsed too. And they did not succeed to adapt to a new one. It's like an immigrant who was forced to leave his homeland in search of a better future. He needs to adapt again and in

I would dare to give an example of witchcraft. In the first case I want to narrate you about an Azande tribe. It is an ethnic group of North Central Africa. People from this tribe cannot imagine their lives without magic and witchcraft. The witchcraft is believed always to be present, that is why there are several rituals connected to protection from it and canceling of its power that are performed almost daily. So when a member of this tribute thinks he was cursed, he goes quiet to the shaman which explains who and why has cursed him, and only afterward what he must do to be free of incantations. Very often the "cleaning procedure" is the same, so for savage is much more important to know who is the sorcerer to avoid a contact with him inn future. An example to the second point: in post-Soviet countries, it is popular to visit "clairvoyants" to clean your aura. It's

so widespread that there is even a TV show on extrasensory fight for the title of the most powerful magician of the country. There are some people who go to the "magicians" once a half a year to get rid of all the negative energy that has accumulated in their souls. However, not also the post-Soviet countries suffer from this "scum". For example, Sicilians are highly superstitious people. Even today they believe in a power of Jettatura - "an evil eye". That is why, they rarely watch you straight in the eyes and always wear red bracelets often with horns which play the role of amulet. They ancient legend tells that evil is scared of color of blood, so when Jettatura sees a red bracelet he won't be able to hurt you, and horns, like a lighting-conductor, repel the hit.

Winch wrote: "The difference is not merely one of degree of familiarity, however, although, perhaps, even this has more importance than might at first appear. Concepts of witchcraft and magic in our culture, at least since the advent of Christianity, have been parasitic on, and a perversion of other orthodox concepts, both religious and, increasingly, scientific. To take an obvious example, you could not understand what was involved in conducting a Black Mass, unless you were familiar with the conduct of a proper Mass and, therefore, with the whole complex of religious ideas from which the Mass draws its sense. Neither would you understand the relation between these without taking account of the fact that the Black practices are rejected as irrational (in the sense proper to religion) in the system of beliefs on which these practices are thus parasitic. Perhaps a similar relation holds between the contemporary practice of astrology and astronomy and technology. It is impossible to keep a discussion of the rationality of Black Magic or of astrology within the bounds of concepts peculiar to them; they have an essential reference to something outside themselves <...> Therefore, when we speak of "superstitious" practices, "illusory", "irrational", we have the weight of our culture behind us; and it is not just a matter of being on the side of the large battalions, because these beliefs and practices belong to, and derive meaning as they seem to have, from the same culture. This allows us to show that meaning is apparent, in terms that are culturally appropriate" [28, 310-311].

The French writer Théophile Gautier wrote: "the human mind, even the most enlightened, keeps a dark corner where crouch the hideous chimeras of credulity, or cling the bats of superstition" [14, 96] A man cannot always follow the reason because in general he is more passionate than rational, and as he is constantly affected by desires and fears, he becomes superstitious. "The real cause of superstition, which retains and cherishes it, is fear" [23, 58] said Spinoza. Reminding of Jettatura, it seems ridiculous that we, people from the twenty-first century, still suffering from an idea of the magical properties of the eye, as our ancestors did. Whence comes this idea? I think that our ancestors made it, watching snakes hypnotizing its victims. So the real image was transferred to the myths (Basilisk, Gorgon Medusa) and then into a fairy tales. In the Middle Ages, which was actively engaged in the "planting" of Christianity and which had on purpose to remove that connection with the mythological past, this charming property "was offered" to women (because it is a woman who extends the life of traditions by narrating the fairytales to children). For me, it is a reason why women were massively burnt as witches. Over time, this "gift" was caught by anyone and everyone of us today is "a descendant of the Medusa".

As stated Lerner, Winch's goal is to understand "the conceptual basis of some group's relative to reality especially as it is expressed in their language, and to clarify the importance of these concepts for the lives of the people involved" [6, 10], because every culture has its wisdom, even if it is built on the mystical or religious basis. Every culture is unique and we must try to understand it from the inside to be sure we are on the right path. For a believer, there is no doubt that God exists. He believes in God, he knows that Lord is somewhere there watching him, he is certain in his knowledge, so he try not to disappoint Him. The last example of this article - yoga. I think that it is the best example of how beliefs can influence on our knowledge. Yoga is a religious doctrine, and a philosophical study, and a set of different practices: spiritual, mental and physical. Their aim is to manage the physiological functions of the body to achieve the mental and sublime spiritual state. Yoga is one of the six orthodox schools of Indian philosophy Astika whose goal is moksha or liberation from samsara (cycle of rebirth), generated by the individual karma. To achieve its goal this field practice the meditation, moral asceticism and bodily exercises. There is a variety of courses. I want to discuss Yoga Sutra Patanjali. Moksha path consists of eight steps which are described in Yogasutra. These eight steps are the rules that a yogi must follow. These settlements regulate his life and the lives of other followers of this religious and mystical direction. Their knowledge of life, dead to the afterlife depend directly on different practices the yogis follow or not. Their knowing of life, of the world, of beings depend on their belief. As said Wittgenstein in his

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Remarks on Frazer's Golden Bough "it will never be plausible to say that mankind does all this by sheer stupidity" [29, 119] All rites have their sense that is prescribed by a long history.

In sum, any culture with its vision of reality and its conception itself are built around such rules that influence on perception and understanding of life and world. The society (whatever it is) in which we were raised leaves a mark on us. That is why when we change the culture or the religious preference, we change all our life. And that's why it is so hard to get used at first to foreign morals. All our life, perceptions and understanding of this world turn with the whip of rules. However, knowledge should give the opportunity to be incorrect and false, that is, to say, the question of fallibility. Lerner gives an example of two men: one is comatose and the other is the monk. Both remain silent and therefore we can describe them as those that say nothing. Yet only the monk followed the rule. Thus, "determine the correctness and the incorrectness is what rules are all about" [6, 14] That's mean that the individual, following the rules of his social group, understands what he is doing and why. Thus, a person can reflect on the correctness of his actions. So when a girl to please a boy begin to prepare a magic potion, that is not the common situation in our society, she can ask herself is this really what she should do. However, in the wild tribes this process is current and accepted by everyone, so, an African girl will not demand accuracy of her acts.

### CONCLUSION AND PROSPECTS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH

As we have seen, if a belief is considered to be irrational, it is not from a sense of absurdity, but because it is not based on strong arguments that underpinned rationally. Thus, the scientific theories that have no experimental support are also taken for granted until an experimental discovery confirms or denies them. So, the cosmology of Aristotle (which can be considered today as a product of philosopher's imagination), who considered the World spherical and closed, was replaced by an idea of infinite space with many of stars and other worlds that are not orderly united, but rather hold a system of interacting parts mechanically connected through a variety of mechanical forces. But this last turn was replaced by the theory of relativity with its scientific view of the world where the universe is no longer a static object of study. I'm not saying that these theories are irrational, but they could well be on the basis of irrational guess that was confirmed after a practical study.

Summing up, finally, we can try to answer the question that we have posed in the introduction. As we have seen, the society and culture play a rather significant and important role in people's lives – they define the backgrounds for further searching, reasons and dreams of people. Elderly people who grew up and lived most of their life in the Soviet Ukraine, which brought them up as a "Pioneer," "Komsomol" and an "admirer of Lenin's and Marx's ideology", who have been living in fear of the Party for many years and become accustomed to its laws, they feel confused in a current situation. They were given a freedom of choice, which they never expected and to which they were not prepared. Moreover, the freedom of choice is the responsibility which frightens them. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, their own world completely collapsed too. And they did not succeed to adapt to a new one. It's like an immigrant who was forced to leave his homeland in search of a better future. He needs to adapt again and in rapid order to the rules and traditions, which children learn gradually, to the customs and cultural features, which people of the country know from birth and which are familiar to them. We can say that the Ukrainian pensioners sense a nostalgia that creates this image of the "golden past" which is nothing but a mythological notion of "lost paradise".

As for those to whom "it would be better to live in Russia" (paying no attention to the fact that the parents and grandparents of these people grew up in the Soviet culture, as instilled her with his children in childhood (because it is the one they know)), it is also a mythological idea as "grass is greener somewhere there", and like the one noticed above, it stems from the myth of the "lost paradise" - the ideal place where everybody would be happy. Of course, we must not forget that the important role is also played by propaganda the main task of which is to create the new myths and introduce them to the masses. So, our mythological past, preserved in our collective unconscious, still affects us with proper manipulation. As the Latin proverb says - "Nihil novum sub sole". Everything changes: eras, rules of etiquette, fashion tastes, languages, technologies... People think that they become smarter and smarter, but actually, we're the same scared and weak creatures that are looking for the ways to protect themselves and creating the myths, the religion,

some physical theories in physics or mathematical hypotheses and so on, to find answers that will explain the unknown that frightens us.

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