Practical Relativistic Zero-Knowledge for NP

Claude Crépeau
School of Computer Science, McGill University, Montréal, Québec, Canada
crepeau@cs.mcgill.ca

Arnaud Y. Massenet
École Normale Supérieure Paris-Saclay, Gif-sur-Yvette, France
arnaudyoh@gmail.com

Louis Salvail
Département d'Informatique et de R.O., Université de Montréal, Montréal, Québec, Canada
salvail@iro.umontreal.ca

Lucas Shigeru Stinchcombe
Bloomberg L.P., Tokyo, Japan
lucas.stinchcombe@mail.mcgill.ca

Nan Yang
Canadian Centre for Cyber Security, Ottawa, Ontario, Canada
Concordia University, Montréal, Québec, Canada
nan.yang@cyber.gc.ca

Abstract

In a Multi-Prover environment, how little spatial separation is sufficient to assert the validity of an **NP** statement in Perfect Zero-Knowledge ? We exhibit a set of two novel Zero-Knowledge protocols for the 3-COLorability problem that use two (*local*) provers or three (*entangled*) provers and only require exchanging one edge and two bits with two trits per prover. This greatly improves the ability to prove Zero-Knowledge statements on very short distances with very basic communication gear.

1 Introduction

The idea of using distance and special relativity (a theory of motion justifying that the speed of light is a sort of asymptote for displacement) to prevent communication between participants to multi-prover proof systems can be traced back to Kilian[16]. Probably, the original authors (Ben Or, Goldwasser, Kilian and Wigderson) of [1] had that in mind already, but it is not explicitly written anywhere. Kent was the first author to venture into *sustainable* relativistic commitments [15] and introduced the idea of arbitrarily prolonging their life span by playing

some ping-pong protocol between the provers (near the speed of light). This idea was made considerably more practical by Lunghi et al. in [19] who made commitment sustainability much more efficient. This culminated into an actual implementation by Verbanis et al. in [23] where commitments were sustained for more than a day!

As nice as this may sound, such *long-lasting* commitments have found so far very little practical use. Consider for instance the zero-knowledge proof for Hamiltonian Cycle as introduced by Chailloux and Leverrier[3]. Proving in Zero-Knowledge that a 500-vertex graph contains a Hamiltonian cycle would require transmitting 250 000 bit commitments (each of a couple hundreds of bits in length) and eventually sustaining them before the verifier can announce his choice of unveiling the whole adjacency matrix or just the Hamiltonian cycle. For a graph of $|V|$ vertices, this would require an estimated $200|V|^2$ bits of communication before the verifier can announce his choice *chall* (see Fig. 1). This makes the application prohibitively expensive. If you use a larger graph, you will need more time to commit, leading to more distance to implement the protocol of [3]. Either a huge separation is necessary between the provers (so that one of them can unveil according to the verifier's choice *chall* before he finds out the committal information B used by the other prover while the former must commit all the necessary information before he can find out the verifier's choice *chall*) or we must achieve extreme communication speeds between prover-verifier pairs. This would only be possible by vastly parallelizing communications between them at high cost. Modern (expensive) top-of-line communication equipment may reach throughputs of roughly 1Tbits/sec. A back of the envelope calculation estimates that the distance between the verifiers must be at least 100 km to transmit 250 000 commitments at such a rate.

In this work we consider the following problem: in a Multi-Prover environment, how little spatial separation is sufficient to assert the validity of an **NP** statement in Perfect Zero-Knowledge ? We exhibit a set of two novel Zero-Knowledge protocols for the 3-COLorability problem that use two (*local*) provers or three (*entangled*) provers and only require them to communicate two trits each after having each received an edge and two bits each from the verifier. This greatly improves the ability to prove Zero-Knowledge statements on very short distances with very minimal communication equipment. In comparison, the protocol of [3] would require transmitting millions of bits between a prover and his verifier before the latter may disclose what to unveil or not. This implies the provers would have to be very far from each other because all of these must reach the verifier *before* the formers can communicate.

Although certain algebraic zero-knowledge multi-prover interactive proofs for **NP** and **NEXP** using explicitly no commitments at all have been presented before in [18], [10] (sound against local provers) and [5],[12] (sound against entangled provers), in the local cases making these protocols entanglement sound is absolutely non-trivial, whereas in the entangled case the multi-round structure and the amount of communication in each round makes implementing the protocol completely impractical as well. (To their defense, the protocols were not designed to be *practical*).

The main technical tool we use in this work is a general Lemma of Kempe, Kobayashi, Matsumoto, Toner, and Vidick[13] to prove soundness of a three-prover protocol when the provers are *entangled* based on the fact that a two-prover protocol version is sound when the provers are only *local*. More precisely, they proved this when the three-prover version is the same as the two-prover version but augmented with an extra prover who is asked exactly the same questions as one of the other two at random and is expected to give the same exact answers.

Our protocols build on top of the earlier protocol due to Cleve, Høyer, Toner and Watrous[7] who presented an extremely simple and efficient solution to the 3-COL problem that uses only two provers, each of which is queried with either a vertex from a common edge,

Figure 1 Space-Time diagrams of [3]'s ZK-MIP⋆ for **NP**. (45° diagonals are the speed of light.) In the above two diagrams, V_1 at a first location sends a random matrix $\boxed{B}$ to P_1 who uses each entry to commit an entry of the adjacency matrix $\boxed{Y}$ of G. At another location, V_2 sends a random challenge $\boxed{chall}$ to P_2 who unveils all or some commitments as $\boxed{A}$. At all times, V_1 and V_2 must make sure that the answers they get from P_1 and P_2 come early enough that the direct communication line between V_1 and V_2 (even at the speed of light) is not crossed. The transition from left to right shows that increasing the number of vertices (and thus increasing the total commit time) pushes the verifiers further away from each other. In [3] the distance must increase quadratically with the number of vertices in the graph.

or twice the same vertex. In the former case, the verifier checks that the two ends of the selected edge are of distinct colours, while in the latter case, he check only that the provers answer the same colour given the same vertex. On the bright side, their protocol did not use commitments at all but unfortunately it did not provide Zero-Knowledge either. Moreover, it is a well established fact that this protocol cannot possibly be sound against entangled provers, because certain graph families have the property that they are not 3-colourable while having entangled-prover pairs capable of winning the game above with probability one. This was already known at the time when they introduced their protocol. The reason this protocol is not zero-knowledge follows from the undesirable fact that dishonest verifiers can discover the (random) colouring of non-edge pairs of vertices in the graph, revealing if they are of the same colour or not in the provers' colouring.

We are able to remedy to the zero-knowledge difficulty by allowing the provers to use commitments for the colour of their vertices. However they use these commitments in an innovative way that we call the *unveil-via-commit principle* (of independent interest) explained below. For this purpose we use commitments similar to those of Lunghi et al.[19] but in their simplest form possible, over the field $\mathbb{F}_3$ (or $\mathbb{F}_4$ if you insist working in binary), and thus with extremely weak binding property but also minimal in communication cost: a complete execution of the basic protocol transmits a question Q of exactly one edge number (using only $\log |E|$ bits) and two bits from verifiers to provers and an answer A of two trits back from the provers to verifiers (see Fig. 2). This implies that for a fixed communication

Figure 2 Space-Time diagram of our ZK-MIP* for **NP**. ($45°$ diagonals are the speed of light.)

speed, the minimal distance of the provers in our protocol increases logarithmically with the number of vertices whereas the same parameter grows quadratically in [3]. Nevertheless, this is good enough to obtain a zero-knowledge version of the protocol that remains sound against *local* pairs of provers. The main idea being that the provers will each commit to the colours of two requested vertices only if they form an edge of the graph. To unveil the colour of any vertex, the verifiers must request commitment of the *same* vertex by *both* provers but using different randomizations. This way the verifiers may compute the colour of a vertex from the *linear system* established by the two commitments and not by explicitly requesting anyone to unveil. This is the unveil-via-commit principle (very similar to the double-spending detection mechanism of the untraceable electronic cash of Chaum, Fiat and Naor[4]). We then use the Lemma of [13] to prove soundness of the three-prover version of this protocol even when the provers are *entangled*. A positive side of the protocol of [3], however, is the fact that only two provers are necessary while we use three. Zero-Knowledge follows from the fact that only two edge vertices can be unveiled by requesting the same edge to both provers. Otherwise only a single vertex may be unveiled. Finally, we show that even the three-prover version of this protocol retains the zero-knowledge property: requesting any three edges from the provers may allow the dishonest verifiers to unveil the colours of a triangle in the graph but never two end-points that do not form an edge (going to four provers would however defeat the zero-knowledge aspect).

An actual physical implementation of this protocol is currently being developed.

1.1 Implementations Issues

Traditionally in the setup of Multi-Prover Interactive Proofs, there is a single verifier interacting with the many provers. However, when implementing no-communication via spatial separation (the so called relativistic setting) it is standard to break the verifier in a number of verifiers equal to the number of provers, each of them interacting at very short distance from their own prover. The verifiers can use the timing of the replies of their respective provers to judge their relative distance. In practice, this means that we can implement MIPs under relativistic assumptions if the verifier are "split" into multiple verifiers, each locally interacting with its corresponding prover. The verifiers use the distance between *themselves* to enforce the impossibility of the provers to communicate: no message from a verifier can be used to reply to another verifier faster than the speed of light *wherever the provers are located.*

Moreover, multi-prover interactive proof systems may have several rounds in addition to several provers. In general, protocols with several rounds may cause a threat to the inherent assumption that the provers are not allowed to communicate during the protocol's execution. Nevertheless, most of the existing literature resolves this issue by providing an honest verifier that is *non-adaptive*. To simplify this task, most of the protocols are actually single-round. We stick to these guidelines in this work. Moreover, in order to prove soundness of our protocols against entangled provers, we use a theorem that is currently only proven for single-round protocols. The protocols we describe are indeed single-round and non-adaptive.

2   Preliminaries

2.1   Notations

Random variables $A, B \in \Gamma$ are said to be equivalent, denoted $A = B$, if for all $x \in \Gamma$, $\Pr\{(A = x)\} = \Pr\{(B = x)\}$. The class of probabilistic polynomial-time Turing machines will be denoted PPT in the following. A PPT Turing machine is one having access to a fresh infinite read-only tape of random values (uniform values from the set of input symbols) at the outset of the computation. In the following, adversaries will also be allowed (in some cases) to be quantum machines. The precise ways quantum and classical machines are defined is not important in the following.

For M a Turing machine, we denote by $M(x)$ it execution with x on its input tape (x being a string of the tape alphabet symbols). A Turing machine (quantum or classical) augmented with read-only auxiliary-input tapes and write-only auxiliary-output tapes is called an *interactive Turing machine* (ITM). Read-only input tapes provide incoming messages while the write-only output tapes allow to send messages. Interactive Turing machine M_1 and M_2 are said to *interact* when for each of them, one of its write-only auxiliary-output tape corresponds to one read-only auxiliary-input tape of the other Turing machine. An execution of interactive Turing machines $M_1, \ldots, M_k$ on common input x is denoted $[M_1 \ldots M_k](x)$. For $1 \leq i \leq k$, machine M_i *accepts* the interactive computation on input x if it stops in state accept after the execution $[M_1 \ldots M_k](x)$. When the ITM M_i that accepts a computation is clear from the context, we say that $[M_1 \ldots M_k](x)$ accepts when M_i's final state is accept. In this scenario, $\Pr\{([M_1 \ldots M_k](x) = \text{accept})\}$ denotes the probability that M_i terminates in state accept upon common input x. Quantum machines are also interacting through communication tapes the same way than for classical machines. When a quantum machine M_1 interacts with a classical machine M_2, we suppose that the write-only auxiliary tape and the reade-only auxiliary tape of M_1 used to communicate with M_2 are classical. This is the situation we will be addressing almost all the time in the following. A quantum machine M is also allowed to have a quantum auxiliary read-only input tape that may contain a part of a quantum state shared with other machines. This allows to model machines sharing entanglement at the outset of an interactive computation. Henceforth, we suppose that the (main) input tape of all machines (quantum or classical) is classical.

In the following, $G = (V, E)$ denotes an undirected graph with vertices V and edges E. If $n = |V|$ then we denote the set of vertices in G by $V = \{1, 2, \ldots, n\}$. We suppose that $(i, i) \notin E$ for all $1 \leq i \leq n$ (i.e. G has no loop). We denote uniquely each edge in E as (i, j) with $j > i$. For $i \in V$, let $\mathsf{Edges}(i) := \{(j, i) \in E\}_{j<i} \cup \{(i, j) \in E\}_{j>i}$ be the set of edges connecting vertex i in G. For $e, e' \in E$, we define $e \cap e' = i \in V$ if e and e' have only one vertex $i \in V$ in common. When e and e' have four distinct vertices in V, we set $e \cap e' = 0$. Finally, when $e = e'$, we set $e \cap e' := \infty$. For readability, we use the following special notations: $(a, b) \not\equiv (c, d)$ means $a \neq c$ **and** $b \neq d$, while as always, $(a, b) \neq (c, d)$ simply means $a \neq c$ **or** $b \neq d$.

2.2   Non-local Games, and Relativistic Multi-Prover Interactive Proofs

Multi-provers interactive protocols are protocols involving a set of *provers* modelled by interactive Turing machines, each of them interacting with an interactive PPT Turing machine called the verifier V. Although all provers may share an infinite read-only auxiliary input tape at the outset of their computation, they do not interact with each other. When the provers are quantum, an extra auxiliary read-only quantum input tape is given and can be entangled with other provers at the beginning.

▶ **Definition 1.** *Let* $P_1, \ldots, P_k$ *be computationally unbounded interactive Turing machines and let V be an interactive* PPT *Turing machine. The P_i's share a joint, infinitely long, read-only random tape (and an auxiliary reads-only quantum input tape if the provers are quantum). Each P_i interacts with V but cannot interact with P_j for any $1 \le j \ne i \le k$. We call $[P_1, \ldots, P_k, V]$ a k-prover interactive protocol (k–prover IP).*

A $[P_1, \ldots, P_k, V]$ k-prover interactive protocol is a *multi-prover interactive proof system for L* if it can be used to show V that a public input x is such that $x \in L$. At the end of its computation, V concludes $x \in L$ if and only if it ends up in state accept. We restrict our attention to interactive proof systems with perfect completeness since all our protocols have this property.

▶ **Definition 2.** *The k–prover interactive protocol $\Pi = (P_1, \ldots, P_k, V)$ is said to be a k-prover interactive proof system with perfect completeness for L if there exists $q(n) < 1 - \frac{1}{\mathsf{poly}(n)}$ such that following holds:*
perfect completeness: $(\forall x \in L) \left[\Pr\big\{ ([P_1, \ldots, P_k, V](x = \mathsf{accept}) \big\} = 1 \right]$,
soundness: $(\forall x \notin L)(\forall \widetilde{P}_1, \ldots, \widetilde{P}_k) \left[\Pr\big\{ ([\widetilde{P}_1, \ldots, \widetilde{P}_k, V](x = \mathsf{accept}) \big\} \le q(|x|) \right]$.
The parameter $q(|x|)$ is called the soundness error *of Π. Soundness can hold against classical provers or against quantum provers sharing entanglement. The former case is called* sound against classical provers *while to latter is called* sound against entangled provers.

Consider a k–prover interactive proof system $\Pi(x)$ (with or without perfect completeness) for L executed with public input $x \notin L$. In this situation, $\Pi(x)$ defines a so-called *quantum game*. The minimum $q(|x|)$ such that for all $P'_1, \ldots, P'_k$, $\Pr\big\{ ([P'_1, \ldots, P'_k, V](x) = \mathit{accept}) \big\} \le q(|x|)$ is called the *classical value of game $\Pi[x]$* and is denoted $\omega(\Pi(x))$ when the provers are restricted to be classical and unable to communicate with each other upon public input x. When the provers, still unable to communicate with each other, are allowed to carry their computation quantumly and share entanglement, we denote by $\omega^*(\Pi(x)) \ge \omega(\Pi(x))$ the minimum $q(|x|)$ such that for all such quantum provers $P'_1, \ldots, P'_k$, $\Pr\big\{ ([P'_1, \ldots, P'_k, V](x) = \mathit{accept}) \big\} \le q(|x|)$. In this case, $\omega^*(\Pi(x))$ is called the *quantum value of game $\Pi(x)$*. A k–prover interactive proof system for L is said to be *symmetric* if V can permute the questions to all provers without changing their distribution.

The following result of Kempe, Kobayashi, Matsumoto, Toner, and Vidick[13] shows that the classical value of a symmetric one-round classical game cannot be too far from the quantum value of a *modified* game. Given a symmetric one-round two-prover game Π, one can always add a third prover P_3 and V asks P_3 the same question than P_1 with probability $\frac{1}{2}$ or the same question than P_2 with probability $\frac{1}{2}$. Then, V accepts if P_1 and P_2 would be accepted in $\Pi(x)$ and if P_3 returns the same answer as the one issued by the prover it emulates. We call $\Pi'(x)$ the modified game obtained that way from $\Pi(x)$.

▶ **Lemma 3** ([13], Lemma 17). *Let $\Pi(x)$ be a two-prover one-round symmetric game and let $\Pi'(x)$ be its modified version with three provers. If $\omega^*(\Pi'(x)) > 1 - \varepsilon$ then we always get $\omega(\Pi(x)) > 1 - \varepsilon - 12|Q|\sqrt{\varepsilon}$ where Q is the set of V's possible questions to a prover in Π.*

Lemma 3 remains true for non-symmetric two-prover one-round protocol by first making them symmetric at the cost of increasing the size of Q. This is always possible without changing the classical value of the game and by using at most twice the number of questions $|Q|$ of the original game (Lemma 4 in [13]).

The Zero-knowledge [11] version of MIPs were also defined in [1]:

Let $[\mathsf{P}_1, \ldots, \mathsf{P}_k, \mathsf{V}]$ be a k–prover IP. We denote by $\mathbf{view}(\mathsf{P}_1, \ldots, \mathsf{P}_k, \mathsf{V}, x)$ the random variable of V's outgoing and incoming messages with all provers according V's coin tosses.

▶ **Definition 4.** *Let* $[\mathsf{P}_1, \ldots, \mathsf{P}_k, \mathsf{V}]$ *be a k-prover interactive proof system for L. We say that* $[\mathsf{P}_1, \ldots, \mathsf{P}_k, \mathsf{V}]$ *is* perfect zero-knowledge *if for all* PPT *interactive Turing machines* $\widetilde{\mathsf{V}}$ *there exists a* PPT *machine* Sim *(i.e. the* simulator*) having blackbox access to* $\widetilde{\mathsf{V}}$ *such that for all* $x \in L$,

$$\mathbf{view}(\mathsf{P}_1, \ldots, \mathsf{P}_k, \widetilde{\mathsf{V}}, x) = \mathsf{Sim}(x) \ ,$$

and both random variables are equivalent. In the following, we allow $\widetilde{\mathsf{V}}$ *to be a quantum machine but our simulators will always be classical machines with blackbox access to* $\widetilde{\mathsf{V}}$*. If the zero-knowledge condition holds against quantum* $\widetilde{\mathsf{V}}$*, we say that the proof system is* perfect zero-knowledge against quantum verifiers*.*

2.3 Multi-Prover Commitments with Implicit Unveiling

Our multi-prover proof systems for 3COL use a simple 2-committer commitment scheme with a property allowing to guarantee perfect zero-knowledge. In this section, we give the description of this simple commitment scheme with its important properties for our purposes.

Assume that provers P_1 and P_2 share ℓ values $c_1, c_2, \ldots, c_\ell \in \mathbb{F}$ where $\mathbb{F}$ is a finite field. V wants to check that these values satisfy some properties without revealing the specific values.

Bit commitment schemes have been used in the multi-prover model ever since it was introduced in [1]. The original scheme was basically $w_i := b_i \cdot r_i + c_i$, a commitment w_i to value $c_i \in \mathbb{F}$ using pre-agreed random mask $b_i \in_R \mathbb{F}$ and randomness $r_i \in \mathbb{F}^*$ provided by V. Kilian[17] had a binary version where each bit $c_i := c_i^1 \oplus c_i^2 \oplus c_i^3$ is shared among provers P_1 and P_2 (and therefore $\mathbb{F}$ needs only to be a group). To commit c_i, V samples c_i^h from P_1 and c_i^j from P_2 at random. If $j = h$ but $c_i^j \neq c_i^h$, V immediately rejects the commitment. Otherwise either P_1 or P_2 may unveil by disclosing c_i^1, c_i^2, c_i^3 at a later time. Somehow, Crépeau's bad recollection of the scheme in [1] lead [2] to a similar but different scheme defining $w_i := c_i \cdot r_i + b_i$, a commitment w_i to bit $c_i \in \{0, 1\}$ using pre-agreed bit mask $b_i \in_R \{0, 1\}$ and binary randomness r_i provided by their corresponding verifiers. Although this latter form of commitment is intimately connected to the CHSH game [6] and the Popescu-Rohrlich box[20], this proximity is not relevant for the soundness and the completeness of our protocols, even against entangled provers. While the binding property of the latter scheme has been established in [15, 8, 23, 9, 19, 3] against entangled provers, it is still not clear how to get sound and complete proof systems against such provers. We shall rather get completeness and soundness against entangled provers using a different technique from [13] that uses a third prover.

For an arbitrary field $\mathbb{F}$, the commitment scheme produces commitment $w_i := c_i \cdot r_i + b_i$ to field element $c_i \in \mathbb{F}$ using pre-agreed field element mask b_i (specific to value $1 \leq i \leq \ell$) and random field element $r_i \in \mathbb{F}^*$ provided by their corresponding verifiers. Many results were proven for this specific form of the commitments. Notice however that the two versions discussed above, $w_i := b_i \cdot r_i + c_i$ in the former case and $w_i := c_i \cdot r_i + b_i$ in the latter have equivalent binding property(left as a simple exercice). Considering, the former as being

the degree-one secret sharing [22] of c_i hidden in the degree zero term, while the latter being the degree-one secret sharing of c_i hidden in the degree one term, we decided to use the former (original BGKW form) because all the known results about secret sharing are generally presented in this form. In particular, this form is more adapted to higher degree generalizations such as $w_i := a_i \cdot r_i^2 + b_i \cdot r_i + c_i$ being the degree-two secret sharing of c_i hidden in the degree zero term, and so on.

Moreover, this choice turns out to simplify our (perfect) zero-knowledge simulator. For the rest of this paper, we use $w_i := b_i \cdot r_i + c_i$ where $w_i, b_i, c_i \in \mathbb{F}_3$ and $r_i \in \mathbb{F}_3^*$. Provers therefore commit to trits, one value for each vertex corresponding to its colour in a 3–colouring of graph $G = (V, E)$. The values shared between P_1 and P_2 are therefore, for each vertex $i \in V$, the colour c_i of that vertex and a vertex specific random mask b_i.

Suppose that V asks P_1 to commit on the colour c_i of vertex $i \in V$ using randomness $r \in_R \mathbb{F}_3^*$. Let $w = b_i \cdot r + c_i$ be the commitment returned to V by P_1. Suppose V asks P_2 to commit on the colour c_j of vertex $j \in V$ using randomness $r' \in_R \mathbb{F}_3^*$. Let $w' = b_j \cdot r' + c_j$ be the commitment issued to V by P_2. The following 3 cases are possible depending on V's choices for i, j, r, and r':

1. *(forever hiding)* if $i \neq j$ then V learns nothing on neither c_i nor c_j since w and w' hide c_i and c_j with random and independent masks $b_i \cdot r$ and $b_j \cdot r'$ respectively. Even knowing $r, r' \in \mathbb{F}_3^*$, $b_i \cdot r$ and $b_j \cdot r'$ are uniformly distributed in $\mathbb{F}_3$.

2. *(consistency testing)* If $i = j$ and $r = r'$ then V can verify that $w = w'$. This corresponds to the immediate rejection of V in Kilian's two-prover commitment described above. It allows V to make sure that P_1 and P_2 are consistent when asked to commit on the same value.

3. *(implicit unveiling)* If $i = j$ and $r' \neq r$ then V can learn c_i (assuming $w = b_i \cdot r + c_i$ and $w' = b_i \cdot r' + c_i$) the following way. V simply computes $c_i := -(w + w')$ (Note that over an arbitrary field $c_i := (wr' - w'r)(r' - r)^{-1}$ whenever $r \neq r'$). Interpreting the meaning of this test can be done when considering a strategy for P_1 and P_2 that always passes the consistency test. In this case, $w - b_i \cdot r = c_i = w' - b_i \cdot r'$ are satisfied and V learns c_i.

As long as P_1 and P_2 are *local* (or *quantum non-local*) they cannot distinguish which option V has picked among the three. The consistency test makes sure that if P_1 and P_2 do not commit on identical values for some $i \in V$ then V will detect it when V picks the consistency test for commitment w and w' in position i.

3   Classical Two-Prover Protocol

First, consider a small variation over the protocol of Cleve et al. presented in [7]. In their protocol, when P_1 and P_2 both know and act upon the same valid 3-colouring of G, V asks each prover for the colour of a vertex in $G = (V, E)$. Consistency is verified when V asks the same vertex to each prover and compares that the same colour has been provided. The colorability is checked when the provers are asked for the colour of two connected vertices in G. This way of proceeding is however problematic for the zero-knowledge condition. V could be asking two vertices that do not form an edge for which their respective colour will be unveiled. This certainly allows V to learn something about P_1's and P_2's colouring. Indeed, repeating this many times will allow V to efficiently reconstruct a complete colouring. To remedy partially this problem, V is instead asking each prover the colouring of an entire edge of G. The colouring is (only) checked when both provers are asked the same edge, while consistency is checked when two intersecting edges are asked to the provers.

3.1 Distribution of questions

Let $G = (V, E)$ be a connected undirected graph. Let us define the probability distribution $\mathcal{D}_G = \{(p(e, e'), (e, e'))\}_{e,e' \in E}$ for the pair $(e, e') \in E \times E$ that V picks with probability $p(e, e')$ before announcing e to P_1 and e' to P_2. For $e, e' \in E$ such that $e \cap e' = 0$, we set $p(e, e') := 0$ so that V never asks two disconnected edges in G (this would be useless).

The first thing to do is to pick $e = (i, j) \in E$ uniformly at random. With probability ϵ (to be selected later), we set $e' = e$, which allows for an edge-verification test. With probability $1 - \epsilon$, we perform a well-definition test as follows. With probability $\frac{1}{2}$, $e' \in \mathsf{Edges}(i)$ uniformly at random and with probability $\frac{1}{2}$, $e' \in \mathsf{Edges}(j)$ uniformly at random. In other words, the well-definition test picks the second edge e' with probability $\frac{1}{2}$ among the edges connecting $i \in V$ and with probability $\frac{1}{2}$ among the edges connecting $j \in V$. It follows that for $e = (i, j) \in E$ and $e' \in (\mathsf{Edges}(i) \cup \mathsf{Edges}(j)) \setminus \{e\}$, we have

$$p(e, e') = \frac{1 - \epsilon}{2|E|} \left(\frac{|\{e'\} \cap \mathsf{Edges}(i)|}{|\mathsf{Edges}(i)|} + \frac{|\{e'\} \cap \mathsf{Edges}(j)|}{|\mathsf{Edges}(j)|} \right) \ . \tag{1}$$

We also get

$$p(e, e) = \frac{\epsilon}{|E|} + \frac{1 - \epsilon}{2|E|} \left(\frac{1}{|\mathsf{Edges}(i)|} + \frac{1}{|\mathsf{Edges}(j)|} \right) \geq \frac{\epsilon}{|E|} \ . \tag{2}$$

It is easy to verify that $\mathcal{D}_G$ is a properly defined probability distribution over pairs of edges.

3.2 A Variant Over the Two-Prover Protocol of Cleve et al.

Distribution $\mathcal{D}_G$ produces two edges where the first one is provided to P_1 while the second one is provided to P_2. Each prover then returns the colour of each vertex of the edge to V. We denote the resulting protocol $\Pi_{\mathsf{std}}^{(2)}$.

Protocol $\Pi_{\mathsf{std}}^{(2)}[G]$: Two-prover, 3-COL.
Provers $\mathsf{P}_1, \mathsf{P}_2$ pre-agree on a random 3-colouring of G:
$\{(i, c_i) | c_i \in \mathbb{F}_3\}_{i \in V}$ such that $(i, j) \in E \implies c_j \neq c_i$.
Interrogation phase:

- V picks $((i, j), (i', j')) \in_{\mathcal{D}_G} E \times E$, sends (i, j) to P_1 and (i', j') to P_2.
- If $(i, j) \in E$ then P_1 replies with c_i, c_j.
- If $(i', j') \in E$ then P_2 replies with $c_{i'}, c_{j'}$.

Check phase:

- **Edge-Verification Test:**
  if $(i, j) = (i', j')$ then V accepts iff $c_i = c_{i'} \neq c_{j'} = c_j$.
- **Well-Definition Test:**
  if $(i, j) \cap (i', j') = h \in V$ then V accepts iff $c_h = c'_h$.

The perfect soundness of this protocol is not difficult to establish along the same lines of the proof of soundness for the original protocol in [7]. On the other hand, zero-knowledge does not even hold against honest verifiers. V learns the colour of each vertex contained in any two edges of G. This is certainly information about the colouring that V learns after the interaction. To some extend, the modifications we applied to the 2-prover interactive proof system of [7] leaks even more to V. In the next section, we show that the 2-prover commitment scheme, that we introduced in Sect. 2.3, can be used in protocol $\Pi_{\mathrm{std}}^{(2)}$ to prevent this leakage completely.

4   Perfect Zero-Knowledge Two-Prover Protocol

We modify the protocol of section 3.2 to prevent V from learning the colours of more than two connected vertices in G. The idea is simple, P_1 and P_2 will return commitments for the colours of the vertices asked by V. The implicit unveiling of the commitment scheme described in section 2.3 will allow V to perform both the edge-verification and well-definition tests in a very similar way that in protocol $\Pi_{\mathrm{std}}^{(2)}$. The commitments require V to provide a random nonzero trit for each vertex of the edge requested to a prover.

4.1   Distribution of questions

We now define the probability distribution $\mathcal{D}_G'$ for V's questions in protocol $\Pi_{\mathrm{lhv}}^{(2)}[G]$ defined in the following section. It consists in one edge and two nonzero trits for each prover:

$$\mathcal{D}_G' = \{(p'(e, r, s, e', r', s'), ((e, r, s), (e', r', s')))\}_{e,e' \in E, r,s,r',s' \in \mathbb{F}_3^*}$$

upon graph $G = (V, E)$ and where (e, r, s) is the question to P_1 and (e', r', s') is the question to P_2. $\mathcal{D}_G'$ is easily derived from the distribution $\mathcal{D}_G$ for the questions in $\Pi_{\mathrm{std}}^{(2)}[G]$, as defined in section 3.1. First, an edge $e \in_R E$ is picked uniformly at random. Together with e, two nonzero trits $r, s \in_R \mathbb{F}_3^*$ are picked at random. Then, as in $\mathcal{D}_G$, with probability ϵ (to be selected later) the second edge $e' = e$, in which case we always set $r' = -r$ and $s' = -s$. This case allows for an edge-verification test. Finally, with probability $1 - \epsilon$, we pick e' with probability $p(e, e')|E|$ so that the couple $((e, r, s), (e', r, t))$ is produced with probability $\frac{1}{8}p(e, e')$ for all $e, e' \in E$, and $r, s, t \in \mathbb{F}_3^*$. This will allow for a well-definition test. A consequence of (1) is that for $e = (i, j) \in E$, $e' \in \mathsf{Edges}(i) \cup \mathsf{Edges}(j)$

$$p'(e, r, s, e', r, t) \geq \frac{1 - \epsilon}{16|E|} \left(\frac{|\{e'\} \cap \mathsf{Edges}(i)|}{|\mathsf{Edges}(i)|} + \frac{|\{e'\} \cap \mathsf{Edges}(j)|}{|\mathsf{Edges}(j)|} \right) \ , \tag{3}$$

where the inequality results from $e = e'$ being possible. According to (2), we also get

$$p'(e, r, s, e, -r, -s) = \frac{p(e, e)}{4} \geq \frac{\epsilon}{4|E|} \ . \tag{4}$$

4.2   The Protocol

The protocol is similar to $\Pi_{\mathrm{std}}^{(2)}$ except that instead of returning to V the colour for each vertex of an edge in G, each prover returns commitments with implicit unveiling of these colours. If V asks two disjoint edges then V learns nothing about the values committed by the *forever-hiding* property of the commitment scheme. The resulting 2–prover one-round interactive proof system is denoted $\Pi_{\mathrm{lhv}}^{(2)}$.

Protocol $\Pi_{\text{lhv}}^{(2)}[G]$: Two-prover, 3-COL

P_1 and P_2 pre-agree on random masks $b_i \in_R \mathbb{F}_3$ for each $i \in V$ and a random
3-colouring of G: $\{(i, c_i)|c_i \in \mathbb{F}_3\}_{i \in V}$ such that $(i, j) \in E \implies c_j \neq c_i$.

Commit phase:
- V picks $(((i, j), r, s), ((i', j'), r', s')) \in_{\mathcal{D}'_G} \left(E \times (\mathbb{F}_3^*)^2\right)^2$.
- V sends $((i, j), r, s)$ to P_1 and $((i', j'), r', s')$ to P_2.
- If $(i, j) \in E$ then P_1 replies $w_i = b_i \cdot r + c_i$ and $w_j = b_j \cdot s + c_j$.
- If $(i', j') \in E$ then P_2 replies $w'_{i'} = b_{i'} \cdot r' + c_{i'}$ and $w'_{j'} = b_{j'} \cdot s' + c_{j'}$.

Check phase:

   Edge-Verification Test:
- if $(i, j) = (i', j')$ and $(r', s') \not\equiv (r, s)$ then V accept iff $w_i + w'_i \neq w_j + w'_j$.

   Well-Definition Test:
- If $(i, j) = (i', j')$ and $(r', s') = (r, s)$ then V accepts iff $(w_i = w'_i) \wedge (w_j = w'_j)$.
- if $(i, j) \cap (i', j') = i$ and $r' = r$ then V accepts iff $w_i = w'_i$.
- If $(i, j) \cap (i', j') = j$ and $s' = s$ then V accepts iff $w_j = w'_j$.

Clearly, $\Pi_{\text{lhv}}^{(2)}$ satisfies perfect completeness. The following theorem establishes that in addition to perfect completeness, $\Pi_{\text{lhv}}^{(2)}$ is sound against classical provers.

▶ **Theorem 5.** *The two-prover interactive proof system* $\Pi_{\text{lhv}}^{(2)}$ *is perfectly complete with classical value* $\omega(\Pi_{\text{lhv}}^{(2)}[G]) \leq 1 - \frac{1}{9|E|}$ *upon any graph* $G = (V, E) \notin$ 3COL.

Proof. Assume $G \notin$ 3COL and let us consider the probability δ that V detects an error in the check phase when interacting with two local dishonest provers $\widetilde{P}_1$ and $\widetilde{P}_2$. $\Pi_{\text{lhv}}^{(2)}$ is a one-round protocol where the provers cannot communicate directly with each other nor through V's questions since they are independent of the provers' answers. It follows that the strategy of $\widetilde{P}_1$ and $\widetilde{P}_2$ can be made deterministic without damaging the soundness error by letting each prover choosing the answer that maximizes her/his probability of success given her/his question. Therefore, consider a deterministic strategy as a pair of arrays $W^\ell[i, r, j, s] \in \mathbb{F}_3^2$ to be used by prover $\widetilde{P}_\ell$ for $\ell \in \{1, 2\}$ (note: we only care about the entries where $(i, j) \in E$ upon question $((i, j), r, s)$ with $i < j$. V can always present edges in the same order)). For $z \in \{1, 2\}$, $W^\ell_z[\cdot, \cdot, \cdot, \cdot]$ is the z-th component of the output pair $W^\ell[\cdot, \cdot, \cdot, \cdot]$. We say that $W[i, r]$ for $[i, r] \in E \times \mathbb{F}_3^*$ is *well defined* if for all j, k such that $(i, j), (i, k) \in E$ and $\forall s, t \in \mathbb{F}_3^*$, one of the following 4 equalities is true depending on which of $j > i$ or $j < i$, $k > i$ or $k < i$ is correct

$$W_1^1[i, r, j, s] = W_1^2[i, r, k, t] = W_2^1[j, s, i, r], \text{ or } W_1^1[i, r, j, s] = W_2^2[k, t, i, r] = W_2^2[k, t, i, r] \quad (5)$$

When $W[i, r]$ is well defined for all $i \in V, r \in \mathbb{F}_3^*$, we say that W is well defined.

We now lower bound the probability $\delta_{\text{wdt}} > 0$ that, when $W[i, r]$ is not well-defined for some $i \in V$ and $r \in \mathbb{F}_3^*$, the well-definition test will detect it. When (5) is not satisfied , w.l.o.g. we have $W_1^1[i, r, j, s] \neq W_1^2[i, r, k, t]$ for some $(i, j), (i, k) \in E$. The other three cases are treated similarly. Let $e = (i, j)$ and $e' = (i, k)$ be these two edges. According to (3) (and (1) when $e = e'$), the well-definition test will then detect an error with probability

$$\Pr\{(\mathsf{V} \text{ picks } e \text{ and } e' \text{ with randmoness } r, s, t)\} = p'(e, r, s, e', r, t) \geq \frac{1 - \epsilon}{16|E||\mathsf{Edges}(i)|} \quad (6)$$

However, we can do much better: we observe that if $W[i, r]$ is not well defined, we can detect it in at least $2|\mathsf{Edges}(i)|$ places. Consider any $\ell > i$ such that $(i, \ell) \in E$ and $u \in \mathbb{F}_3^*$ (The case

where $\ell < i$ is treated similarly). It is obvious that one of the following three statements must be true:

$$W_1^1[i,r,j,s] \neq W_1^2[i,r,\ell,u], \ W_1^1[i,r,\ell,u] \neq W_1^2[i,r,\ell,u], \ \text{or} \ W_1^1[i,r,\ell,u] \neq W_1^2[i,r,k,t].$$

It follows that if $W[i,r]$ is not well defined then there are $2|\mathsf{Edges}(i)|$ ways for V to catch the provers and each of these has probability at least $\frac{1-\epsilon}{16|E|\cdot|\mathsf{Edges}(i)|}$ to be picked. It follows that,

$$\delta_{\text{wdt}} \geq \frac{(1-\epsilon)\cdot 2|\mathsf{Edges}(i)|}{16|E|\cdot|\mathsf{Edges}(i)|} = \frac{1-\epsilon}{8|E|} \ .$$

Now, assume that W is well-defined, which means that the commitment values produced by the provers satisfy the consistency test. As discussed in section 2.3, when the commitments are consistent, the unique colours committed upon are defined by $c_i := -(W[i,r] + W[i,-r])$ for both values of r. Since $G \notin \mathsf{3COL}$, two of the vertices must be of the same colour at the end-points of at least one edge $(i^*, j^*) \in E$. In this case the edge-verification test will detect it when (i^*, j^*) is the edge announced to both provers and if randomness $(r,s) \in \mathbb{F}_3^* \times \mathbb{F}_3^*$ is announced to P_1 then $(-r,-s)$ is the randomness announced to $\widetilde{\mathsf{P}}_2$. Using (4), the probability δ_{evt} to detect such an edge when W is well defined satisfies

$$\delta_{\text{evt}} \geq \sum_{r,s} \min_{e \in E}(p'(e,r,s,e,-r,-s)) \geq \frac{\epsilon}{|E|} \ .$$

Therefore, the detection probability δ of any deterministic strategy for $G \notin \mathsf{3COL}$ satisfies

$$\delta \geq \min(\delta_{\text{wdt}}, \delta_{\text{evt}}) \geq \frac{1}{9|E|} \quad (\text{maximized at } \epsilon = 1/9) \ .$$

The result follows as the classical value of the game $\omega\left(\Pi_{\text{lhv}}^{(2)}[G]\right) \leq 1 - \delta.$ ◀

To prove (perfect) zero-knowledge, it suffices to show that if $((i,j),r,s)$ and $((i',j'),r',s')$ are selected arbitrarily, V can determine at most the colours of two vertices (that form an edge). The commitments prevent a dishonest prover $\widetilde{\mathsf{V}}$ to learn the colours of two vertices that are not connected by an edge in G. Proving this is not very hard and will be done in Section 5.3 for the three-prover case (although with three provers, $\widetilde{\mathsf{V}}$ may also learn the colour of three vertices that form a triangle). The addition of a third prover will allow, using lemma 3, to get soundness against entangled provers without compromising zero-knowledge. As shown in [7], their protocol is not necessarily sound against two entangled provers. We also do not know whether $\Pi_{\text{std}}^{(2)}$ is sound against two entangled provers.

5   Three-Prover Protocol Sound Against Entangled Provers

The three-prover protocol $\Pi_{\text{qnl}}^{(3)}$, defined below, is identical to $\Pi_{\text{lhv}}^{(2)}$ except that P_3 is asked to repeat exactly what P_1 or P_2 has replied. The prover that P_3 is asked to emulate is picked at random by V. An application of lemma 3 allows to conclude the soundness of $\Pi_{\text{qnl}}^{(3)}$ against entangled provers. Zero-knowledge remains since the only way to provide V with the colours of more than two connected vertices is if they form a complete triangle of G. This reveals nothing beyond the fact that $G \in \mathsf{3COL}$ to V, since all vertices will then show different colours.

5.1   Distribution of questions

The probability distribution $\widehat{\mathcal{D}}_G$ for V's questions to the three provers is easily obtained from the distribution $\mathcal{D}'_G$ for the questions in protocol $\Pi_{\text{lhv}}^{(2)}[G]$. V picks $((e, r, s), (e', r', s')) \in_{\mathcal{D}'_G} \left(E \times (\mathbb{F}_3^*)^2\right)^2$ and sets $\hat{e} = e$, $\hat{r} = r$, and $\hat{s} = s$ with probability $\frac{1}{2}$ or sets $\hat{e} = e'$, $\hat{r} = r'$, and $\hat{s} = s'$ also with probability $\frac{1}{2}$. Defined that way, $\widehat{\mathcal{D}}_G$ is a properly defined probability distribution for V's three questions, each one in $E \times (\mathbb{F}_3^*)^2$.

5.2   The Protocol

In protocol $\Pi_{\text{qnl}}^{(3)}$, after the three questions picked according $\widehat{\mathcal{D}}_G$ by V have been answered by the the provers, V accepts if and only if the replies of P_1 and P_2 are accepted in $\Pi_{\text{lhv}}^{(2)}$ and in addition, P_3 gave the same reply than the prover it emulates.

Protocol $\Pi_{\text{qnl}}^{(3)}[G]$: Three-prover, 3-COL.

Provers $\mathsf{P}_1, \mathsf{P}_2$, and P_3 pre-agree on random values $b_i \in_R \mathbb{F}_3$ for all $i \in V$ and a random 3-colouring of G: $\{(i, c_i) | c_i \in \{0, 1, 2\}\}_{i \in V}$ such that $(i, j) \in E \implies c_j \neq c_i$.

Commit phase:

- V picks $(((i, j), r, s), ((i', j'), r', s'), ((\hat{\imath}, \hat{\jmath}), \hat{r}, \hat{s})) \in_{\widehat{\mathcal{D}}_G} \left(E \times (\mathbb{F}_3^*)^2\right)^3$.
- V sends $((i, j), r, s)$ to P_1, $((i', j'), r', s')$ to P_2, and $((\hat{\imath}, \hat{\jmath}), \hat{r}, \hat{s})$ to P_3.
- If $(i, j) \in E$ then P_1 replies $w_i = b_i \cdot r + c_i$ and $w_j = b_j \cdot s + c_j$.
- If $(i', j') \in E$ then P_2 replies $w'_{i'} = b_{i'} \cdot r' + c_{i'}$ and $w'_{j'} = b_{j'} \cdot s' + c_{j'}$.
- If $(\hat{\imath}, \hat{\jmath}) \in E$ then P_3 replies $\hat{w}_{\hat{\imath}} = b_{\hat{\imath}} \cdot \hat{r} + c_{\hat{\imath}}$ and $\hat{w}_{\hat{\jmath}} = b_{\hat{\jmath}} \cdot \hat{s} + c_{\hat{\jmath}}$.

Check phase:

   Consistency Test:
- If $((\hat{\imath}, \hat{\jmath}), \hat{r}, \hat{s}) = ((i, j), r, s)$ then V rejects if $(w_i, w_j) \neq (\hat{w}_{\hat{\imath}}, \hat{w}_{\hat{\jmath}})$.
- If $((\hat{\imath}, \hat{\jmath}), \hat{r}, \hat{s}) = ((i', j'), r', s')$ then V rejects if $(w'_{i'}, w'_{j'}) \neq (\hat{w}_{\hat{\imath}}, \hat{w}_{\hat{\jmath}})$.
   Edge-Verification Test:
- if $(i, j) = (i', j')$ and $(r', s') \not\equiv (r, s)$ then V accept iff $w_i + w'_i \neq w_j + w'_j$.
   Well-Definition Test:
- If $(i, j) = (i', j')$ and $(r', s') = (r, s)$ then V accepts iff $(w_i = w'_i) \wedge (w_j = w'_j)$.
- if $(i, j) \cap (i', j') = i$ and $r = r'$ then V accepts iff $w_i = w'_i$.
- If $(i, j) \cap (i', j') = j$ and $s = s'$ then V accepts iff $w_j = w'_j$.

The soundness of protocol $\Pi_{\text{qnl}}^{(3)}$ against entangled provers can easily be shown a direct consequence of the soundness of protocol $\Pi_{\text{lhv}}^{(2)}$ against classical provers, by an application of Lemma 3. Indeed, the soundness error corresponds to the quantum value of the game when $G = (V, E) \notin$ 3COL provided $\Pi_{\text{lhv}}^{(2)}$ is symmetric. As defined in Sect. 4.1 however, the distribution of questions $\mathcal{D}'_G$ is not necessarily symmetric since the first edge e is picked uniformly at random in E while the second edge $e' \in E$ is picked from e in a way that the marginal may not be uniform. However, $\Pi_{\text{lhv}}^{(2)}$ can easily be turned into a symmetric protocol by picking $(e, r, s), (e', r', s')$ according $\mathcal{D}'_G$ and announcing (e, r, s) to P_1 and (e', r', s') to P_2 with probability $\frac{1}{2}$ while announcing (e, r, s) to P_2 and (e', r', s') to P_1 with probability $\frac{1}{2}$. The resulting symmetric protocol is equivalent to $\Pi_{\text{lhv}}^{(2)}$ and therefore shares its classical value upper bounded in Theorem 5 and the set of questions Q to each player remains the same as for $\Pi_{\text{lhv}}^{(2)}$. In the symmetric version, Q is thus the same for every prover and $|Q| = 4|E|$.

▶ **Theorem 6.** *The three-prover interactive proof system* $\Pi_{\mathrm{qnl}}^{(3)}$ *is perfectly complete and has quantum value*

$$\omega^*\left(\Pi_{\mathrm{qnl}}^{(3)}[G]\right) \leq 1 - \left(\frac{1}{9|E| + 432|E|^2}\right)^2 \leq 1 - \left(\frac{1}{21|E|}\right)^4 \tag{7}$$

upon any graph $G = (V, E) \notin$ 3COL.

Proof. Assume $G = (V, E) \notin$ 3COL. The contrapositive of Lemma 3 indicates any one-round symmetric game $\Pi_{\mathrm{lhv}}^{(2)}[G]$ with classical value $\omega\left(\Pi_{\mathrm{lhv}}^{(2)}[G]\right) \leq 1 - \delta - 12|Q|\sqrt{\delta}$ is such that the modified game $\Pi_{\mathrm{qnl}}^{(3)}[G]$ has quantum value $\omega^*\left(\Pi_{\mathrm{qnl}}^{(3)}[G]\right) \leq 1 - \delta$. The set Q of questions to each player satisfies $|Q| = 4|E|$. Theorem 5 establishes that $\delta + 12|Q|\sqrt{\delta} \geq \frac{1}{9|E|}$, which implies $\sqrt{\delta} \geq \frac{1}{(\sqrt{\delta}+12|Q|)\cdot 9|E|} \geq \frac{1}{(1+12|Q|)\cdot 9|E|} = \frac{1}{9|E|+432|E|^2} \geq \frac{1}{441|E|^2}$, and the result follows.   ◀

As an immediate consequence of Theorem 6, $\Omega(|E|^4)$ sequential repetitions of $\Pi_{\mathrm{qnl}}^{(3)}$ produces an interactive proof system for 3COL with negligible soundness error. Although the resulting proof system can be implemented on short distances, these many sequential rounds need to be performed at high rate for a given proof to be concluded in reasonable time. A few executions of $\Pi_{\mathrm{qnl}}^{(3)}$ could be ran in parallel without having to greatly increase the distances while reducing the number of sequential rounds. However, we don't know how the soundness error decreases when $\Pi_{\mathrm{qnl}}^{(3)}$ is ran only a few times in parallel, even though the results of Kempe and Vidick, a quantum version of Raz's parallel repetition theorem[21], indicate that $\Omega(|E|^4)$ runs in parallel produces a proof system with negligible soundness error[14].

5.3   Proof of Perfect Zero-Knowledge

In this section, we prove that protocol $\Pi_{\mathrm{qnl}}^{(3)}$ is perfect zero-knowledge. As a consequence, $\Pi_{\mathrm{lhv}}^{(2)}$ is also zero-knowledge since everything $\widetilde{\mathsf{V}}$ sees in $\Pi_{\mathrm{lhv}}^{(2)}$ can also be observed in $\Pi_{\mathrm{qnl}}^{(3)}$. The proof of zero-knowledge proceeds using the fact that a vertex must appear at least twice to have its colour unveiled. This is the *forever hiding property* of the commitment scheme described in Section 2.3. Notice that this would be enough for $\widetilde{\mathsf{V}}$ to learn something about the colouring if no extra condition on these three vertices is observed. In fact, we can easily show that only a few cases of colour disclosure are possible and in each of these cases, $\widetilde{\mathsf{V}}$ learns nothing about the colouring that it could not have computed on its own. $\widetilde{\mathsf{V}}$ can only learn the colour of two connected vertices in G and nothing else or the colours of three vertices forming a triangle in G. In each of these cases, $\widetilde{\mathsf{V}}$ learns random distinct colours for these vertices, which is to be expected by a valid 3-colouring of G. Let us show why this is enforced by the properties (see Section 2.3) of the commitment scheme. Remember that in order to learn the colour assigned to a vertex $i \in V$, $\widetilde{\mathsf{V}}$ must ask that vertex to at least 2 distinct provers. Otherwise, $\widetilde{\mathsf{V}}$ sees only random values returned by the provers. There are 8 cases of figure depending on how $\widetilde{\mathsf{V}}$ selects the 3 edges asked. Figure 3 shows all cases. The 3 edges indicated for each case are the one picked by $\widetilde{\mathsf{V}}$. The colours associated to white vertices remain hidden by the forever hiding property of the commitment scheme. For these vertices, the committed values received from the provers are just random and independent elements in $\mathbb{F}_3$. In each of the 8 cases, the unveiled colours of the vertices are displayed in shape and colour. We see that the only way to unveil the colour of two vertices (cases 4, 5, 6, and 7) is when they are connected by an edge, which means that the colours of both vertices

are random but distinct. The only way for $\widetilde{\mathsf{V}}$ to learn the colour of 3 distinct vertices is when they form a triangle (case 8). In this case, $\widetilde{\mathsf{V}}$ learns three random and distinct colours. Clearly, this is nothing more than something necessarily true when $G \in 3\mathsf{COL}$.

These properties of the commitment scheme allow, for any quantum polynomial-time dishonest verifier $\widetilde{\mathsf{V}}$, an easy simulator for $\mathbf{view}(\mathsf{P}_1, \mathsf{P}_2, \mathsf{P}_3, \widetilde{\mathsf{V}}, G)$ when $G \in 3\mathsf{COL}$, thus establishing that $\Pi_{\mathrm{qnl}}^{(3)}$ is perfect zero-knowledge.

▶ **Theorem 7.** *The three-prover interactive proof system* $\Pi_{\mathrm{qnl}}^{(3)}$ *is perfect zero-knowledge against quantum verifiers.*

Proof. The simulator Sim is classical given blackbox access to $\widetilde{\mathsf{V}}$ (and $\widetilde{\mathsf{V}}$ can be quantum).

Consider an execution $\mathsf{Sim}(G)$ upon graph $G = (V, E)$. It first picks a random permutation $\mathrm{COL}[\cdot] : \mathbb{F}_3 \mapsto \mathbb{F}_3$ over three colours, each corresponding to a distinct element in $\mathbb{F}_3$. Table $\mathrm{MARK}[i, r] \in \{\mathsf{true}, \mathsf{false}\}$, for $i \in V$ and $r \in \mathbb{F}_3^*$, is initialized to false and will indicate if the output of a prover has already been simulated for vertex i with randomness r. Table $\mathrm{COUNT}[i]$, for $i \in V$, counts the number of times vertex i has been asked so far during the simulation. Variable $c \in \mathbb{F}_3$, initialized to 0, indicates the next colour index the simulator should use when a new colour must be unveiled during the simulation.

Simulator $\mathsf{Sim}(G)$: Simulator for $\widetilde{\mathsf{V}}$'s view upon graph G in $\Pi_{\mathrm{qnl}}^{(3)}$.
*All arithmetic below is performed in* $\mathbb{F}_3$.
1. Let $\mathrm{COL}[\cdot]$ be a uniform permutation of $\mathbb{F}_3$ and let $c := 0$.
2. $\forall i \in V, \forall r \in \mathbb{F}_3^*$, let $\mathrm{MARK}[i, r] := \mathsf{false}$ and $\mathrm{COUNT}[i] := 0$.
3. Run $\widetilde{\mathsf{V}}$ until it returns $((i_1, j_1), r_1, s_1), ((i_2, j_2), r_2, s_2), ((i_3, j_3), r_3, s_3)$.
4. For each $\ell \in \{1, 2, 3\}$ do:
   - Whenever $(i_\ell, j_\ell) \in E$ is provided by $\widetilde{\mathsf{V}}$, output $(w_{i_\ell}^\ell, w_{j_\ell}^\ell) \in \mathbb{F}_3 \times \mathbb{F}_3$ to $\widetilde{\mathsf{V}}$, both computed as follows:
   a. If $\neg\mathrm{MARK}[i_\ell, r_\ell]$ then
      - If $\mathrm{COUNT}[i_\ell] = 0$ then pick $W[i_\ell, r_\ell] \in_R \mathbb{F}_3$.
      - If $\mathrm{COUNT}[i_\ell] = 1$ then set $W[i_\ell, r_\ell] := -\mathrm{COL}[c] - W[i_\ell, -r_\ell]$, $c := c + 1$.
      - $\mathrm{COUNT}[i_\ell] := \mathrm{COUNT}[i_\ell] + 1$.
   b. If $\neg\mathrm{MARK}[j_\ell, s_\ell]$ then
      - If $\mathrm{COUNT}[j_\ell] = 0$ then pick $W[j_\ell, s_\ell] \in_R \mathbb{F}_3$.
      - If $\mathrm{COUNT}[j_\ell] = 1$ then set $W[j_\ell, s_\ell] := -\mathrm{COL}[c] - W[j_\ell, -s_\ell]$, $c := c + 1$.
      - $\mathrm{COUNT}[j_\ell] := \mathrm{COUNT}[j_\ell] + 1$.
   c. $\mathrm{MARK}[i_\ell, r_\ell] := \mathsf{true}$, $\mathrm{MARK}[j_\ell, s_\ell] := \mathsf{true}$.
   d. $w_{i_\ell}^\ell := W[i_\ell, r_\ell]$, $w_{j_\ell}^\ell := W[j_\ell, s_\ell]$.

$\widetilde{\mathsf{V}}$ is then invoked to produce questions $((i_\ell, j_\ell), r_\ell, s_\ell)$ for all provers $\mathsf{P}_\ell, \ell \in \{1, 2, 3\}$. Sim now aims at setting the values $(w_{i_\ell}^\ell, w_{j_\ell}^\ell)$ for P_ℓ's commitments. If $(i_\ell, j_\ell) \notin E$, Sim produces no value for $(w_{i_\ell}^\ell, w_{j_\ell}^\ell)$, exactly as P_ℓ in $\Pi_{\mathrm{qnl}}^{(3)}$.

When $(i_\ell, j_\ell) \in E$, Sim first produces P_ℓ's commitment $w_{i_\ell}^\ell$ for $i_\ell \in V$ and then produces P_ℓ's commitment $w_{j_\ell}^\ell$ for $j_\ell \in V$. We show how $w_{i_\ell}^\ell$, $w_{j_\ell}^\ell$ is computed similarly mutatis mutandis:

- if $\mathrm{MARK}[i_\ell, r_\ell]$ then Sim returns the value of $w_{i_\ell}^\ell$ already determined for the simulation of the commitment of an *earlier* prover P_h, $h < \ell$. This ensures that both the commitment's *consistency test* performed and the well-definition test are always successful, as in $\Pi_{\mathrm{qnl}}^{(3)}$ with honest provers.

Figure 3 The 8 ways to unveil the colours of at most 3 vertices in $\Pi_{\mathrm{qnl}}^{(3)}$.

- if $\neg\mathrm{MARK}[i_\ell, r_\ell]$ then Sim has never simulated a commitment of the colour for vertex i_ℓ with randomness r_ℓ. The value $\mathrm{COUNT}[i_\ell]$ indicates the number of times prior to this value for ℓ, vertex i_ℓ has been asked:

  - If $\mathrm{COUNT}[i_\ell] = 0$ then $w_{i_\ell}^\ell \in_R \mathbb{F}_3$ is picked uniformly at random, as it should be when the commitment value for the colour of vertex i_ℓ is observed in isolation.
  - If $\mathrm{COUNT}[i_\ell] = 1$ then the colour associated to vertex i_ℓ has been committed to value $w_{i_\ell}^h$ by an *earlier* simulated prover P_h, $h < \ell$ upon randomness $-r_\ell$ (otherwise, $\mathrm{MARK}[i_\ell, r_\ell] = \mathsf{true}$). Sim sets $w_{i_\ell}^\ell = -\mathrm{COL}[c] - w_{i_\ell}^h$, which satisfies the *implicit unveiling* of random colour $\mathrm{COL}[c] = -w_{i_\ell}^\ell - w_{i_\ell}^h$. The current colour c is incremented.

  The value of $\mathrm{COUNT}[i_\ell]$ is increased by one and $\mathrm{MARK}[i_\ell, r_\ell] = \mathsf{true}$, as the colour of vertex i_ℓ with randomness r_ℓ has been committed upon by the simulated prover P_ℓ.

Let $(w_{i_1}^1, w_{j_1}^1)$, $(w_{i_2}^2, w_{j_2}^2)$, and $(w_{i_3}^3, w_{j_3}^3)$ be all commitment values simulated by Sim. As discussed above and shown in Fig. 3, the colours of no more than 3 vertices are unveiled in the process. Sim always unveils as many different colours as there are colours unveiled to $\widetilde{\mathsf{V}}$. If Sim's simulated committed values unveils only the colour of one vertex then that colour is random, as it should in this case in $\Pi_{\mathrm{qnl}}^{(3)}$.

If Sim's committed values unveils the colours of exactly 2 vertices then these 2 vertices form an edge in G and the colours are two different random colours, as it should be in $\Pi_{\mathrm{qnl}}^{(3)}$. Finally, when Sim's committed values unveil the colours of exactly 3 vertices then these vertices form a triangle in G. The 3 colours unveiled by Sim to $\widetilde{\mathsf{V}}$ are different and assigned randomly to each of the 3 vertices, as it is in $\Pi_{\mathrm{qnl}}^{(3)}$. Otherwise, if w_i^ℓ for $i \in V$ has been generated with only one random value then w_i^ℓ is random and uniform in $\mathbb{F}_3$, exactly as it is in $\Pi_{\mathrm{qnl}}^{(3)}$ in the same situation. It is now clear that,

$$\mathbf{view}(\mathsf{P}_1, \mathsf{P}_2, \mathsf{P}_3, \widetilde{\mathsf{V}}, G) = \mathsf{Sim}(G) \ ,$$

and $\Pi_{\mathrm{qnl}}^{(3)}$ is perfect zero-knowledge.   ◀

Note: Since no *rewinding* is used by our simulator, it is absolutely unnecessary to explicitly handle *auxiliary-inputs* or the fact that V is quantum. No special care is required to handle these considerations that become highly non-trivial in the case where rewinding is required.

6 Conclusion and Open Problems

We have provided a three-prover perfect zero-knowledge proof system for **NP** sound against entangled provers that is implementable in some well controlled environment. In order to make it fully practical, it would be better to find a protocol with smaller soundness error and requiring only two provers.

Our protocols are *proofs of membership* whereas in practice we would like to use them for identification purpose in which scenario *proofs of knowledge* is what we really need.

Moreover, we would like to extend our techniques to prove any language in **QMA** or **QCMA**, the natural quantum extensions of **NP**.

We would also want to prove whether $\Pi_{\text{std}}^{(2)}$ is sound against entangled provers. Finally, we seek a variant of $\Pi_{\text{std}}^{(2)}$ that would be sound against No-Signalling provers and variants of $\Pi_{\text{lhv}}^{(2)}$ and $\Pi_{\text{qnl}}^{(3)}$ that are both sound against No-Signalling provers and Zero-Knowledge.

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