

Family Values and Social Policy in member and applicant countries of the European Union*

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This paper explores the relation between family values and options for social policies of representative citizens from thirty European societies, constituting member and applicant countries of the European Union. It seeks to understand the values and value orientations supporting specific family structures and options for social policies of distinct groups of nations, corresponding to the various waves of accession or application for membership to the European Union. These include European Union (EU) members identified for an IPROSEC (Improving Policy Responses and Outcomes to Socio-Economic Challenges: changing family structures, policy and practice) project according to their welfare system and wave of EU accession as Continental (France, Germany, Italy [joined in 1951]), Universal (United Kingdom, Ireland [1973]), Latin Rim (Greece [1981], Spain [1986]) and Nordic (Sweden [1995]) countries; post-communist (Hungary [applied in 1994], Poland [1994], Estonia [1995]) and Mediterranean (Malta [1990]) applicant countries (Hantrais 2001); and the remaining countries taken together: members, applicant and non-applicant countries of the European Union.

Theory

Social policies are profoundly affected by the wider cultures that surround them and into which they are delivered. Nevertheless, very few comparative studies of welfare have taken social values seriously. In fact, over the past fifty years academic social policy has avoided the issue of culture - understood as the values and norms represented in social behaviour - and its effects on welfare development. Whenever culture was taken into consideration, it was seen as the context and the problem rather than the source of welfare values. The modernist view held that social policy should be used to change social values (Baldock 2000: 122-126). By contrast,

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contemporary sociologists are adopting new approaches and examine the impact of everyday life activities on social welfare (Cahill 1994). A few others analyse welfare ideologies (George and Wilding 1994), and elaborate theories emerging from modern and late modern thinkers on welfare (George and Page 1995). More recently, Esping-Anderson (1999: 5) has observed how public welfare is an expression of social values that are predominant when welfare services come to be institutionalised. Of course, the crucial question is which values, and whose values are institutionalised into welfare systems.

At the beginning of the twenty-first century, the observed economic and social changes of late modernity is leading to substantial cultural shifts often identified as post-materialism (Inglehart 1990, 1997) and its related post-traditional (Abela 1991, 2000; Harding, Phillips and Fogarty 1986), individualised (Ester, Halman and deMoor 1993) and masculine-feminine components (Abela 2000; van Deth and Scarbrough 1995). Distinct social groups are becoming increasingly differentiated in terms of the risks they face and the values they hold, and that these changes have profound implications for social policy. In this social context, sociologists are investigating the fit between culture and social policies. They have come to examine whether and if so how the values of people from distinct social groupings - as distinct from the values of elite leaders and their respective organisations of the post-war welfare state - have an impact on and shape social policy. The post-industrial context is marked by "Third way" or "eclectic social policy", where culture is believed "riven with particularistic, contradictory, shifting sometimes bigoted, often exclusive value positions" (Baldock 2000: 132-134).

The task ahead is to identify those value priorities and their related issues in social policy that command the support of significant majorities in the European countries under consideration. Accordingly, the current study seeks to identify differences and similarities between and within the European countries under consideration. It explores the factors contributing to socially differentiated value orientations and the corresponding policy options. What is the relation between traditional/materialist and post-traditional/post-materialist value orientations and social policy? Is the left-right political divide relevant to understand differences in policy options of distinct social groupings and of specific groups of countries with similar welfare systems in Europe? Alternatively is the left-right divide giving way to middle ground positions, variously identified as "Third Way" politics? Is there any discernible convergence between European member- and applicant-countries on core value orientations and the corresponding options for social policy?

Methods

A draft questionnaire for the third wave of the European Values Study (EVS) was first drawn up in English and then translated into all other languages where the study was to be carried out. It was then pre-tested in all participant countries, and the final version of the questionnaire was agreed upon at a methodology meeting for all principal investigators held at the end of January 1999 in Leuven. Fieldwork was carried out during 1999 and 2000 in over thirty participant countries. The first comprehensive EVS data file was available for analysis exclusively to EVS participants by January 2001. The English version of the EVS (1999/2000) questionnaire is reproduced in the source book of the third wave of the European Values Study (Halman. *ed.* 2001:299-334) and in a comparative study of values (Abela 2000: 294-327).

In all participant countries a random sample of over 1000 respondents was drawn from the total adult population, 18 years and older. For the eleven countries under consideration an overall sample of 15,120 was obtained. A total of 38,881 respondents were obtained from 30 European countries. Specially trained interviewers carried out interviews in the homes of respondents. To ascertain comparability between countries the data file was weighted by age and gender. [Table 1].

The following study reports results from questions on family values and social policies of representative citizens from thirty European societies, including member and applicant countries of the European Union. These are France, Germany and Italy; United Kingdom, Ireland and Northern Ireland; Greece and Spain; Sweden; Hungary, Poland, Estonia; Malta. Together they represent different types of welfare systems including the Continental, Universal, Latin Rim, Nordic, and post-communist group of countries. Results for the five types of welfare systems are compared with the average for all eleven countries as well as with the average for all thirty European countries taken together, and where appropriate by a breakdown for each separate country. As the resultant European average is not restricted to the values of the European Union, but includes those of Northern, Western, Eastern and Southern European countries, it is more representative than the one obtained in earlier studies (Abela 1991, 2000).

Profile of sample

All over Europe, generally, there are more women than men respondents. Thus

in the eleven IROSEC European countries taken together women (53%) outnumber men (47%) respondents. Only in Nordic Sweden the two genders are equally represented. In most countries, older people (over 55 years old) are equally represented as their younger (18-34 years old) and middle-aged (35-54 years old) counterparts. The Universal and Latin Rim Mediterranean countries of the European Union report a higher percentage of younger adults relative to their Continental counterparts who have higher percentages of older people. Nordic Sweden, Latin Malta and post-communist EU applicant countries have higher percentages of middle-aged people. Such a situation reflects a greater longevity, that of women in particular, in increasing ageing European societies.

Quite a few IROSEC respondents, older citizens from Mediterranean and Universal welfare state countries in particular, do not have an adequate schooling. Many others (23%) have only a primary level of education. Quite a few (11%), however, in addition to a terminal primary education have completed basic vocation training. This is the case in continental countries (14%), but even more so in post-communist applicant countries of the European Union (25%). Many others have reached a secondary level of education (13%) or its equivalent in vocational training (7%). Others (17%) have completed a maturity qualification or an upper-secondary level of education. Quite a few (8%), especially those from Nordic Sweden (23%), have completed a university first degree. A few others (9%), respondents from Universal welfare states (20%) in particular, obtained a post-graduate qualification.

More than half of respondents in the eleven countries under consideration (52%), those from Universal (56%) and Nordic (62%) in contrast to Latin Rim (43%) welfare states, are chief wage earners in their household. In the same way, respondents from Nordic Sweden (53%, 10%, 35%) and post-communist applicant countries (42%, 3%, 29%) are more likely to be in full-time, part-time or on retirement pensions than their counterparts from Latin Rim (33%, 9%, 13%), Continental (36%, 9%, 22%) or Universal (36%, 11%, 18%) welfare states. In fact, relative to the IROSEC average (12%) greater percentages from Mediterranean Malta (31%), the Latin Rim (21%), Universal (15%) and Continental (13%) countries but not from post-communist applicant countries (4%) are housewives. The highest rates of unemployment are reported in the post-communist countries (8%), but also in Universal (7%) welfare states of the European Union. Of all unemployed men and women, the long-term (over two years) unemployed are more likely to be found in Mediterranean Malta (54%) as well as in Universal (47%) and Continental (38%)

welfare states than in post-communist applicant countries (27%) or Latin Rim (22%) welfare states of the European Union.

With respect to living arrangements, quite a few respondents, in the main younger adults from Latin Mediterranean, Malta and post-communist applicant countries but fewer from Continental and Universal welfare states live with their parents. By contrast, very few respondents from Nordic Sweden (6%) live with their parents. Generally in all European countries under consideration, the majority of respondents (69%), those from Mediterranean Malta (76%) and Latin Rim EU welfare states (71%) in particular, have a stable relationship with a partner of the opposite sex. Generally, the greatest majority of those in stable relationship are also legally married to their partner (82%). However lower percentages of respondents with a stable relationship from Nordic Sweden (70%) and Universal welfare states (68%) are actually married to their partner. Relative to their other European counterparts (28%), prior to their current relationship the latter (46%, 45%) are more likely to have had a stable relationship with another partner.

Similarly, fewer respondents from Nordic Sweden (47%) and the Universal welfare states (48%), in contrast to their counterparts from Malta (67%), Latin Rim (62%) and Continental Europe (60%) are currently legally married. Instead, respondents from Nordic Sweden and Universal welfare states are more likely to have been divorced (20% Sweden, 6% Universal), or are currently divorced (7%, 8%), separated (13%, 3%) or in other unconventional marital relationships (23%, 13%). By contrast, higher percentages from Malta (26%), Continental (26%) and Latin Rim countries (28%) have never been married, than their counterparts from Nordic Sweden (5%).

Respondents were asked to indicate the number of children they ever had. Relative to the IPROSEC average (1.72), respondents from universal welfare states (2.23), report the highest rate of children ever had, much higher than in Malta (1.84) and Latin Rim countries (1.64) or Continental (1.56) and Nordic (1.48) welfare states. In fact, considerable numbers never had any children in Latin Rim (34%) and Nordic (32%) welfare states, much higher than in post-communist countries (23%) or Universal (27%) welfare states.

Single-person and/or single parent households are more common in Latin Rim (35%) and Nordic (30%) countries, in contrast to Mediterranean Malta (7%), Continental (16%) and Universal (15%) welfare states, or post-communist countries

(14%). In fact, the mean household adult occupancy is lowest in Nordic Sweden (1.88) but highest in Mediterranean Malta (2.83). At the same time, however, Latin Rim countries report the highest number of teenagers (57%), children aged between 5 and 12 year olds (57%) as well as under five year old children (57%) living in their households. Similar findings suggest that whereas Nordic Sweden has higher rates of single-occupancy households, Latin Rim countries have higher rates of single-parent households with dependent children. [Tables 2,3,4].

Value priorities

In all European countries under consideration, without distinction, the family has top priority. Thus, the majority of respondents from Mediterranean Malta (96%), Universal (90%), Nordic (89%), Continental (86%), and Latin Rim (86%) welfare states but also post-communist applicant countries to the European Union (83%) find the family very important in their life. It seems that the value of the family, irrespective of an observed diversity in personal family arrangements, unites citizens of the European Union and its applicant members.

Most member states of the European Union assign second importance to work closely followed by friends and leisure. They assign much less importance, however, to religion and politics. Universal and Nordic welfare states, however, displace the importance of work by friends and leisure time. [Table 5].

In contrast to Nordic Sweden (11%) or the average European country (21%), Mediterranean Malta (67%) and to a lower extent Latin Rim countries of the European Union (31%) find religion very important in life. Respondents in Malta (49%), however, are closer to Nordic Sweden (54%) and Universal welfare states (45%) in the importance they assign to leisure-time than either their neighbouring Latin Rim (33%) or Continental (32%) European countries. It seems that Malta's greater interaction through overseas travel and tourism from Universal and Nordic states leads to a greater appreciation of leisure time, but not of friends and acquaintances. Similarly, Maltese respondents (13%) are closer to Nordic Sweden in the importance they assign to politics than their Continental (8%) or Latin Rim (6%) counterparts. Such an occurrence, however, does not seem to undermine their high regard of religion. A strategic distance from friends and acquaintances, which together with their close family ties, family-oriented work and leisure, remain distinctive characteristics of the Maltese national identity. In the same way, it is to be expected that closer ties and interaction between citizens of European Union

member states and applicant countries, favour the sharing and shaping of common values but also a greater appreciation of national identities in an ever-widening European milieu in the making.

Closely related to the value of the family is the legitimacy of marriage as a social institution. Just as with the overriding importance of the family, the majority of respondents in the European countries under consideration, with some variations between and within countries, find marriage as a valid institution. Thus, the greatest support for the institution of marriage is reported in Mediterranean Malta, closely followed by post-communist EU applicant countries, the Latin Rim and Nordic Sweden. A slightly lower majority support is obtained in the Continental and Universal welfare states of the European Union. With the exception of Nordic Sweden most respondents from the other European countries think that a long-term relationship is important for a happy life, and that children need both parents to grow up happily.

Overall in all the European welfare states under consideration, the majority (70%) are also of the opinion that parents are to do their utmost for their children. Similar percentages (72%), except in Nordic Sweden (44%), respondents think that children are always to love their parents.

Moreover, all over Europe, irrespective of living arrangements, the majority (88%) are concerned about the well being of their immediate family, and a greater majority (94%) are willing to help members of their family. In this way, the values of marriage and the family or their alternative long-lasting stable family-type relationships serve as a foundation for the conviviality of people with different lifestyles. [Table 6].

Partners' issues

Respondents from post-communist applicant countries, Mediterranean Malta, Latin Rim and Continental welfare states of the European Union are more likely to hold traditional views about family relationships than their counterparts from Nordic or Universal welfare states. Thus, most of the former unlike respondents from Nordic or Universal welfare states, agree that women and to a lesser extent men need to have children for fulfilment, that children need both parents to grow up happily, and that a long-term relationship is necessary for happiness.

Gender Issues

Similarly, greater majorities from Nordic Sweden relative to other member and applicant countries of the European Union, support feminist positions on gender relations. Thus, respondents from Nordic Sweden are more supportive of working mothers with children (84%, compared to an overall 68% in IPROSEC countries), women's independence through work (80%; 72% IPROSEC), for both partners to contribute to household income (88%; 76% IPROSEC), and that fathers are equally suited to look after children (91%, 71% IPROSEC). By contrast, they are significantly less in agreement that pre-school children suffer when their mother works outside the home (36%; 57% IPROSEC; Malta [88%], Continental [66%] and Latin Rim [62%] welfare states in particular), that women prefer homemaking and child-caring (37%; 52% IPROSEC: Malta [69%], post-communist [65%] and Latin Rim [59%] welfare states in particular), or that being a housewife is equally fulfilling as having a job (46%, 51% IPROSEC: Malta [86%], post-communist [55%] and Latin Rim [54%] welfare states in particular). Contrary to expectations, however, in contrast to their European counterparts (50%), respondents from Nordic Sweden are more of the opinion that men are less able to handle emotions than women (63%). Such a situation suggests the cultural construction of country-specific feminist views on gender. [Table 7].

The meaning of marriage

Similar to results from earlier studies (van den Akker, Halman and De Moor 1993: 102; Abela 2000: 61), the analysis of marriage values in the eleven IPROSEC European countries has identified three basic orientations for a successful marriage. These consist of an interpersonal bond between partners, cultural homogeneity and situational conditions. The interpersonal bond in marriage is characterised by spending time together, discussing mutual problems, showing respect and appreciation, understanding and tolerance, talking about mutual interests, faithfulness, and to a lesser extent sharing household chores, enjoying happy sexual relationships and having children. Cultural homogeneity refers to partners' common social background, sharing religious beliefs and agreement on politics. Finally, situational conditions include living apart from in-laws, having happy sexual relations, an adequate income, good housing and sharing household chores. [Table 8].

In most European countries under consideration, interpersonal relationships between partners have primary importance whereas common cultural background

and situational conditions are of secondary importance. Thus Nordic Sweden just like Mediterranean Malta, the Latin Rim, Continental and Universal welfare states of the European Union attach great importance to interpersonal affective qualities including respect and appreciation, faithfulness, understanding and tolerance. But whereas Latin Rim and Continental welfare states give greater importance to companionship qualities like talking about mutual interests and spending time together, Nordic Sweden and Universal welfare states have a higher preference for partnership qualities like the discussion of mutual problems, respect and appreciation, and the sharing of household chores. Similarly, Mediterranean Malta and Latin Rim countries attach greater importance to situational conditions and cultural homogeneity between partners than their Nordic counterparts. All this suggests that citizens of Nordic Sweden and Universal welfare states are more likely to hold post-traditional and post-materialist values than their Mediterranean and Latin Rim counterparts. [Table 9].

The culture shift towards postmaterialism observable in the public spheres of the advanced industrial societies (Inglehart 1990, 1997) has its counterpart in the private and intimate sphere of marriage and the family. In most European countries, it seems that postmaterialism and its post-traditional component are most evident in the changing values of marriage and the family. The silent revolution is embedded in the transformation of the meaning of marriage where intimate interpersonal relationships have come to have pride of place.

Value orientations

As in earlier European studies values are organised into traditional-post-traditional, materialist-post-materialist value orientations. For this purpose respondents were requested to choose five priorities from a list of eleven qualities they think important for children to be encouraged to learn at home. Indirectly such an exercise reveals the value priorities of respondents in a given society or country. This is because respondents' options for the transmission of values to future generations are an expression of the deepest convictions. As in our previous studies, the main value orientations are identified through the application of factor analysis. This allows for comparisons between distinct social groups, societies and countries.

The application of factor analysis to the eleven values under consideration extracts two factors for the eleven IPROSEC European countries taken together. Overall in the IRROSEC member and applicant countries of the EU the first factor

runs from a set of newly aspired qualities obtaining a negative polarity including independence, determination and perseverance, and responsibility to conventional attributes with a positive polarity for obedience, religious faith and good manners. The second factor extends from conventional society-oriented and materialist qualities obtaining a negative polarity for thrift, saving money and things and hard work to positive polarities for the newly aspired values of unselfishness, imagination, tolerance and respect. The first factor has a social conformity-autonomy orientation with contrasting traditional and post-traditional polarities, extending from conformity to external authority towards self-direction and a sense of responsibility. Then, the second factor represents the materialist-post-materialist orientation obtaining negative polarities for traditional hard work and materialist thrift, saving money and things and contrasting positive polarities for post-traditional and post-materialist qualities. [Table 10].

As in earlier studies of European (Harding *et al.* 1986) and Maltese values (Abela 1991, 1994, 1997), with some improvement to account for middle-ground positions, respondents choosing at least three out of five traditional values are identified as traditional whereas those choosing at least four out of six post-traditional qualities are identified as post-traditional. To ascertain a greater accuracy, similar to the classification of 'materialists', 'post-materialists' and 'mixed' materialists-post-materialists on Inglehart's battery of questions, respondents opting for a mix of two traditional and three post-traditional qualities are identified as 'mixed' traditional-post-traditional. On this basis respondents are identified as traditional, 'mixed' traditional-post-traditional or post-traditional depending on their value options. The measurement of traditionalism and post-traditionalism makes possible the comparison of groups of individuals constituting social groups, societies and countries. In this way respondents with diverse social characteristics are situated on the traditional-post-traditional continuum.

Traditionalism and marriage values

The analysis of marriage values by traditional and post-traditional value orientations reveals how post-traditionalists are more likely to understand marriage as a partnership where respect and appreciation, understanding and tolerance, discussing problems and happy sexual relations have pride of place. On the other hand, traditionalists give more importance to companionship, adequate socio-economic conditions and the sharing of a common culture for success in marriage. Thus, traditionalists relative to post-traditionalists give more importance to

faithfulness, children, talking about mutual interests, spending time together, sharing household chores, adequate income, good housing, agreement on religion, politics and common social background. [Table 11].

Traditionalism and gender relations

The analysis of marriage values by traditional and post-traditional value orientations reveals how traditionalists, in contrast to post-traditionalists favour close family ties. Thus traditionalists are more likely to think that people, women in particular, need to have children for fulfilment and that children need both parents to grow up happily. They are also more likely to require a long-term and stable relationship for a happy life. On the other hand, postmaterialists are more likely to think that marriage is an outdated institution, approve for a single mother to raise a child without a stable relationship with a male partner, and do not see any necessary connection between happiness and having children.

Similarly, post-traditionalists are more supportive of feminist issues including women's reconciliation of motherhood with a working career, women's independence through participation in the labour market, the contribution by both partners to household income, and for fathers' sharing in childcare responsibilities. By contrast, traditionalists differ significantly from their post-traditional counterparts in their strong views on how pre-school children suffer when their mother works outside the home, that women prefer to have a home and children, that housework is equally satisfying as working for pay, and that men are less able to handle their emotions. [Table 12].

Traditionalism in EU welfare states

On the traditional-post traditional continuum, Nordic Sweden stands at the extreme post-traditional end whereas the post-communist EU applicant countries and Mediterranean Malta in particular, are situated at the extreme traditional end. Thus, in descending order of traditionalism we find Mediterranean Malta and post-communist applicant countries closely followed by Universal, Latin Rim, Continental and least of all Nordic welfare states of the European Union. [Table 13].

Issues in Social Policy

The Values Study enquired about respondents' political orientations and their

priorities on a number of issues on politics and social policy. The series of questions under investigation are concerned with respondents' preferences between (1) left and right political ideologies; (2) their choice of either freedom or equality; their views on (3) competition as either good or harmful; (4) whether the state should give more freedom to firms or to control them more effectively; (5) whether individuals should take more responsibility for providing for themselves or for the state to ensure that everyone is provided for; (6) whether unemployed people should have to take any job available or lose their unemployment benefits or alternatively that they should have the right to refuse a job they do not want; (7) the importance or otherwise to guarantee basic needs for all in terms of food, housing, clothes, education and health; (8) to recognize people on their own merits; and (9) to eliminate big inequalities in income between citizens. For a number of political and social policy issues respondents were requested to indicate their position on a 10-point or a 5-point scale, which for our purposes have been collapsed into three values (two opposite extremes and a middle value).

A final question (10), designed by Inglehart (1990, 1997) for the construction of a materialism-postmaterialism index asked respondents to identify what they consider to be the first and second aims for the coming ten years in their country from a list of four items. On this basis respondents choosing two materialist qualities ('maintaining order in the nation' and 'fighting rising prices') are identified as materialists, those choosing two post-materialist values ('giving people more say in important government decisions' and 'protecting freedom of speech') are post-materialists, whereas those choosing a mix of one materialist and one post-materialist value are termed 'mixed' materialists/post-materialists.

Social policy in European welfare states

Overall in the European countries under consideration, very few respondents support extreme left or extreme right political ideologies. Instead, the majority favour middle ground positions standing between left and right political orientations. A higher percentage of respondents from Latin Rim, Nordic and Continental European welfare states support a left political ideology. Middle-ground positions or 'third way' politics have the greatest support by respondents in Malta, post-communist applicant countries and Universal welfare states of the European Union.

Similar political middle-ground positions are accompanied by a greater

preference for the principle of freedom over and above equality, and a support of the free market where the state has only a limited control over firms. Thus, many respondents from the countries under consideration, Nordic Sweden and Continental European welfare states in particular, agree that the unemployed should have to take any job available or lose their unemployment benefits. Very few agree that they should have the right to refuse a job they do not want. In fact, most respondents from Malta, the Latin Rim, Universal and Continental welfare states of the European Union, prefer middle-ground positions between a total imposition of duties by society and the protection of absolute individual rights.

Middle-ground political ideologies are also supportive of joint welfare responsibilities to be shared by the individual and the state. Respondents from Nordic Sweden, Universal and Continental welfare states are more likely to agree that individuals should take more responsibility to provide for themselves. By contrast, respondents from post-communist applicant countries and Latin Rim welfare states of the European Union are more likely to agree that the state is to ensure that everyone is provided for. In most welfare states and applicant countries of the European Union there is a general consensus for the state to guarantee the basic needs for all in terms of food, housing, clothes, education and health (92%); and to recognize people on their own merits (80%). Fewer respondents, however, find important for the state to eliminate big inequalities in income between citizens. State intervention to ensure an egalitarian society is more supported by respondents from the Latin Rim and post-communist applicant countries than by their counterparts from Continental, Universal welfare states of the European Union; Malta and Nordic Sweden in particular.

On Inglehart's index of materialism-postmaterialism, respondents from post-communist EU applicant countries, closely followed by those from Mediterranean Malta are in the main materialists, whereas their counterparts from Nordic Sweden are more post-materialists. The majority of respondents from Continental, Universal, Latin Rim and Nordic welfare states, however, are 'mixed' materialists-postmaterialists. [Table 14].

Post-traditionalism and social policy

Finally, this section explores the relation between traditionalism/post-traditionalism and respondents' options on issues of social policy in the welfare states under consideration. The social policy issues under consideration are cross-

tabulated by post-traditionalism and in turn examined by the chi-square test of significance for relations between variables.

Results show that there is a significant relation between post-traditionalism, political ideologies and most issues in social policy. Thus, on the one hand, traditionalists are more likely to support a right political orientation, give greater importance to equality over freedom, think of competition as harmful, expect the state to control firms more effectively, favour state responsibility for social welfare, give importance for state intervention to eliminate big income inequalities in society, and possess a materialist value orientation. By contrast, post-traditionalists and mixed traditionalists/post-traditionalists in particular, are more likely to support a left-wing or 'third way' political orientation, give greater importance to freedom over equality, favour competition and a measure of free enterprise, require individuals and intermediate social groupings to be responsible for the provision of their needs, give less importance for state intervention to eliminate big inequalities in society, and possess a post-materialist or mixed-materialist-postmaterialist value orientation.

The greatest majority of traditionalists (92%), mixed traditionalist/post-traditionalists (91%) and post-traditionalists (92%), however, without distinction, give great importance for the state to guarantee basic needs for all in terms of food, housing, clothes, education and health. This suggests that in the European countries under consideration there is a widespread consensus for state intervention to guarantee a modicum of social welfare. After the elimination of material scarcity, however, the majority of respondents in the European welfare states under consideration tend to favour middle-ground positions requiring the joint efforts of the state, the individual and intermediate social groups for the provision of post-materialist social needs. [Table 15].

The observed relationship between the present right-wing politics and egalitarian policies generally associated with political 'old left' ideologies is counterintuitive. It seems that in the European welfare states under consideration, the 'new left' is shifting towards a third way politics, reconciling traditionally liberal right-wing positions with new left-wing ideologies.

Conclusion

The foregoing analyses have identified the family values, value orientations and the corresponding options for social policy of representative citizens from

Continental, Universal, Latin Rim and Nordic welfare states as well as post-communist and Mediterranean applicant countries of the European Union. The study has acknowledged differences but also similarities on specific values and social policies between and within the European countries under consideration. Irrespective of the observed differences over specific values, constituting distinct cultures and welfare state traditions, the study identified common orientations that cut across and serve as a potential source of unity between European countries. Accordingly, the traditional/post-traditional value orientation and its materialist/post-materialist component, common to a diversity of European welfare states, has a direct bearing on people's options for social policy.

Results from the study give evidence on how the 'old' left-right political divide and the corresponding options in social welfare are giving way to middle-ground positions, variously identified as 'third way' politics. At a time when material scarcity has been eliminated, the majority of citizens in the European welfare states under consideration tend to favour third way policies requiring the joint effort of the state, individuals and intermediate social groupings to meet post-materialist social needs in a free-market society. Similar findings suggest that a culture shift is taking place from traditional materialism towards individualised postmaterialism displacing the various types of welfare states by increasingly complex multicultural and post-traditional European welfare societies.

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Table 1. Respondents in IPROSEC and all other countries

	IPROSEC countries:	Frequency	Percent	Sum Percent
Wave/Welfare system				
1. <i>Continental</i>				
	France	1615	4.2	4.2
	Germany	2036	5.2	9.4
	Italy	2000	5.1	14.5
2. <i>Universal</i>				
	United Kingdom	1000	2.6	17.1
	Northern Ireland	1000	2.6	19.7
	Ireland	1012	2.6	22.3
3. <i>Latin Rim</i>				
	Greece	1142	2.9	25.2
	Spain	1200	3.1	28.3
4. <i>Nordic</i>				
	Sweden	1015	2.6	30.9
5. <i>Post-communist</i>				
	Estonia	1005	2.6	33.5
	Hungary	1000	2.6	36.1
	Poland	1095	2.8	38.9
	All IPROSEC	15120	38.9	
6. <i>Mediterranean/Latin Rim</i>				
	Malta	1002	2.6	41.5
	All other countries*	22759	58.5	100
	Total	38881	100	

* Austria, Belarus, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czechia, Denmark, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Ukraine.

Table 2. Socio-demographic characteristics of respondents in EU welfare systems*

	Contin- ental	Universal	Latin Rim	Nordic	Post- communist	Malta	IPOSEC 11 EC	other Europe	Total 30 EC
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
<i>Gender:</i>									
Male	47	48	43	50	46	48	47	47	47
Female	53	52	57	50	54	52	53	53	53
<i>age groups</i>									
18-34 years	31	33	33	32	32	29	32	32	32
35-54 years	36	36	35	39	37	40	36	37	37
55+ years	32	31	32	29	31	31	32	30	31
<i>highest level of education</i>									
inadequate education	8	20	21	0	9	4	12	5	8
compl compulsory educ.	26	12	27	17	26	26	23	16	19
compl elem ed+basic voc qual	14		1	6	25		11	12	12
2nd, interm vocational qualification	4	14	5	19	2	9	7	18	13
2nd, interm general qualification	15	14	15	16	3	42	13	12	13
full 2nd maturity certificate	17	13	17	12	24	9	17	20	19
higher educ- lower-level 3d cert	7	6	5	29	5	7	8	6	7
higher educ- upper-level 3d cert	8	20	8	0	6	3	9	10	10

Table 3. Employment in EU welfare systems

	Conti- nental	Universal	Latin Rim	Nordic	Post- communist	Malta	IPOSEC 11 EC	other Europe	Total 30 EC
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Chief wage earner	52	56	43	62	53	47	52	55	54
<i>Employed</i>									
30h a week or more	36	36	33	53	42	40	38	44	42
Less than 30h a week	9	11	9	10	5	3	8	6	7
Self employed	6	8	7	2	4	4	6	4	5
Retired/pensioned	22	18	13	35	29	15	22	24	23
Housewife	13	15	21		4	31	12	7	9
Student	7	4	6		5	3	5	6	5
Unemployed	5	7	5		8	4	6	8	7
Other	2	1	4		2		2	2	2
<i>How long unemployed</i>									
Less than half a year	25	25	30		27	5	26	23	24
Half/one year	16	9	18		23	15	17	13	15
One year	6	7	22		8	7	10	8	8
One -two years	11	8	6		8	10	9	11	10
Two years	5	4	2		6	10	5	8	7
+ Two years	38	47	22		27	54	34	37	36

Notes: EC = European countries

Table 4. Living arrangements in EU welfare systems

	Conti- nental	Universal	Latin Rim	Nordic	Post- communist	Malta	IPOSEC 11 EC	other Europe	Total 30 EC
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
<i>Living arrangements</i>									
Living with parents	17	18	22	6	21	21	18	19	19
Stable relationship	67	61	71	68	69	76	68	69	68
<i>of which:</i>									
Legally married to partner	87	68	86	70	85	85	82	85	84
stable relationship before	28	45	28	46	18	22	28	23	25
<i>Current legal marital status</i>									
Married	60	48	62	47	59	67	57	60	59
Widowed	7	8	7	3	11	5	8	10	9
Divorced	5	8	1	7	7	0	5	7	6
Separated	2	3	1	15	1	2	3	1	2
Never married	26	21	28	5	22	26	23	22	22
Other		13		23			4		1
Been divorced	5	6	3	20	9	1	7	9	8
<i>Number of children ever had</i>									
0	29	27	34	32	23	31	28	24	26
Mean	1.56	2.23	1.64	1.48	1.65	1.84	1.72	1.66	1.68
<i>Adults in household over 18 years:</i>									
1	16	15	35	30	14	7	19	16	17
2	50	49	31	56	47	43	47	49	48
3+	34	36	33	15	38	50	34	35	35
Mean	2.37	2.50	2.22	1.88	2.46	2.83	2.36	2.40	2.38
<i>One or more children in household</i>									
13-17 years old	17	25	57	15	22	25	26	21	23
5-12 years old	20	27	57	19	23	23	28	22	24
Under 5 years	12	17	53	10	15	13	20	14	17

Notes: * weighted cases by age, EC = European countries

Table 5. Value priorities in EU welfare systems

	Conti- nental	Universal	Latin Rim	Nordic	Post- communist	Malta	IPOSEC 11 EC	other Europe	Total 30 EC
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
<i>Very important in life:</i>									
Work	58	43	60	54	62	75	56	58	57
Family	86	90	86	89	83	96	86	83	84
Friends acquaintances	44	61	36	71	29	32	45	36	40
Leisure time	32	45	33	54	25	49	35	29	32
Politics	8	6	6	11	5	13	7	7	7
Religion	18	24	31	11	24	67	22	20	21

Table 6. Marriage and family relations in EU welfare systems

	Conti- nental	Universal	Latin Rim	Nordic	Post- communist	Malta	IPOSEC 11 EC	other Europe	Total 30 EC
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Marriage valid institution	77	76	85	80	86	93	80	81	81
Long-term relationship to be happy	63	35	70	41	77	64	60	64	62
Children need both parents	88	64	89	56	95	92	82	84	84
<i>Immediate family</i>									
Concerned about	89	75	94	97	93	96	88	82	84
Willing to help	95	93	96	98	93	99	94	91	92
<i>Parents-children relationships</i>									
Do utmost best for children	68	78	75	67	65	92	70	68	69
No sacrifice of well-being	21	13	15	22	21	5	18	22	21
Neither	11	9	10	10	14	3	11	10	10
<i>Children-parents relationships</i>									
Always love parents	69	71	78	44	81	92	72	72	72
Parents have to earn respect	31	29	22	56	19	8	28	28	28

Table 7. Partners' and gender issues in EU welfare systems

	Conti- nental	Universal	Latin Rim	Nordic	Post- communist	Malta	IPROSEC 11 EC	other Europe	Total 30 EC
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
<i>Partners' issues</i>									
Women need children	55	16	58	23	74	44	49	54	52
Men need children	44	14	43		63	34	39	49	45
Children need both parents	88	64	89	56	95	92	82	84	84
Woman single parent	34	31	46	30	35	15	35	46	42
Marriage outdated	21	22	14	19	13	6	19	18	18
Long-term relationship to be happy	63	35	70	41	77	64	60	64	62
<i>Gender issues</i>									
Working mother and children	67	69	70	84	65	59	68	72	71
Job independence women	77	57	76	80	71	44	72	64	67
Household income contribution	75	66	78	88	83	71	76	73	74
Fathers looking after children	71	66	66	91	72	62	71	68	69
Children suffer with working mother	66	36	62	36	65	88	57	53	55
Women want home and children	53	35	59	37	65	69	52	57	55
Being a housewife	48	52	54	46	55	86	51	53	52
Men handling emotions	49	49	47	63	49	50	50	48	48

Table 8. Factor Analysis of Marriage values in 11 IPROSEC European countries

	F1	F2	F3
Discuss problems	0.68	-0.06	0.25
Respect & appreciation	0.63	-0.01	0.00
Understand & tolerance	0.62	-0.02	0.06
Talk mutual interests	0.62	0.17	0.23
Spend time together	0.59	0.16	0.26
Faithfulness	0.54	0.14	-0.16
Children	0.36	0.23	0.21
Happy sexual relations	0.29	-0.08	0.63
Same social background	0.02	0.73	0.09
Same religious beliefs	0.21	0.72	-0.15
Agree on politics	0.07	0.68	0.01
Apart from in-laws	0.00	0.00	0.62
Adequate income	-0.07	0.48	0.51
Good housing	0.05	0.52	0.50
Share household chores	0.34	0.05	0.50
Variance explained %	17.73	14.32	12.15

Varimax Rotation

Table 9. Marriage values in EU welfare system

	Conti- nental	Universal	Latin Rim	Nordic	Post- communist	Malta	IPOSEC 11 EC	other Europe	Total 30 EC
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
<i>very important in marriage:</i>									
Respect & appreciation	86	83	85	94	81	97	85	81	82
Faithfulness	83	92	84	88	77	97	84	79	81
Understand & tolerance	80	82	83	87	72	94	80	75	77
Discuss problems	72	85	77	81	67	95	75	66	69
Happy sexual relations	61	66	69	59	61	81	63	56	59
Children	55	52	72	58	72	69	61	63	62
Talk mutual interests	54	50	59	43	42	82	50	42	45
Spend time together	47	55	57	37	48	87	50	42	45
Apart from in-laws	47	45	41	41	48	56	45	42	43
Household chores	29	49	41	52	38	54	38	34	36
Adequate income	30	38	51	19	43	40	37	38	38
Good housing	27	40	48	29	46	38	37	37	37
Same religious beliefs	17	24	33	13	22	57	21	19	20
Same social background	14	22	24	7	13	51	17	15	16
Agree on politics	8	8	16	6	8	24	9	7	8

Table 10. Factor Analysis of traditional/post-traditional values in 11 IPROSEC countries

	F1	F2
Obedience	0.63	-0.02
Independence	-0.51	0.28
Religious faith	0.49	0.01
Determination & perseverance	-0.45	0.04
Feeling of responsibility	-0.44	0.05
Good manners	0.36	0.04
Hard work	0.07	-0.63
Thrift	0.16	-0.54
Unselfishness	0.28	0.51
Imagination	-0.12	0.46
Tolerance and respect	0.02	0.40
Variance explained %	14.12	12.81

Varimax rotation

Table 11. Traditionalism and marriage values in IPROSEC countries

	Post-traditional	Mixed	Traditional	Total
	%	%	%	%
<i>Very important:</i>				
Respect & appreciation	87	84	83	85
Understand & tolerance	84	79	77	80
Discuss problems	77	74	74	75
Happy sexual relations	63	64	62	63
Faithfulness	79	85	88	84
Children	51	63	68	61
Talk mutual interests	48	51	53	50
Spend time together	42	51	56	50
Apart from in-laws	45	46	45	45
Household chores	35	38	41	38
Adequate income	26	38	45	37
Good housing	25	38	46	37
Same religious beliefs	9	20	34	21
Same social background	10	16	23	17
Agree on politics	6	9	12	9

Table 12. Traditionalism, partnerships and gender issues in IPROSEC countries

	Post-traditional	Mixed	Traditional	All
	%	%	%	%
<i>Partners' issues</i>				
Women need children	39	51	58	49
Men need children	27	41	48	39
Children need both parents	75	84	88	82
Long-term relationship to be happy	50	61	67	60
Marriage outdated	23	19	14	19
Woman single parent	40	36	30	35
<i>Gender issues</i>				
Working mother and children	76	69	62	68
Job independence women	77	72	67	72
Household income contribution	77	76	75	76
Fathers looking after children	78	71	65	71
Children suffer with working mother	49	57	64	57
Women want home and children	37	53	64	52
Being a housewife	39	52	60	51
Men handling emotions	46	50	53	50

Table 13. Traditionalism in EU welfare states

	Conti- nental	Universal	Latin Rim	Nordic	Post- communist	Malta	IPROSEC 11 EC	Other Europe	Total 30 EC
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Post-traditional	40	22	25	65	17	9	31	25	27
Mixed	33	36	40	28	34	30	35	35	35
Traditional	27	42	34	7	49	61	35	40	38

Table 14. Social Policy in EU welfare states

	Conti- nental %	Universal %	Latin Rim %	Nordic %	Post- communist %	Malta %	IPOSEC 11 EC %	other Europe %	Total 30 EC %
<i>1. political ideology</i>									
a) left	20	11	25	22	13	8	18	16	17
b) middle way	66	77	59	62	70	78	68	67	67
c) right	14	12	16	16	16	15	14	17	16
<i>2. freedom or equality</i>									
freedom above equality	50	52	48	62	51	57	51	54	53
neither	9	7	6	4	8	4	8	6	6
equality above freedom	40	41	46	35	41	38	41	40	41
<i>3. competition good or harmful</i>									
a) competition good	44	47	40	55	48	63	45	54	51
b) middle way	44	46	48	41	41	32	44	36	39
c) competition harmful	12	7	12	4	11	5	10	10	10
<i>4. firms and freedom</i>									
a) state to give freedom to firms	37	31	22	46	18	34	30	30	30
b) middle way	43	55	49	48	39	45	46	39	41
c) state to control firms	20	14	29	6	43	21	24	32	29
<i>5. individual versus state</i>									
a) individual responsibility	38	37	20	41	18	33	31	31	31
b) middle way	44	49	51	51	51	45	48	43	45
c) state responsibility	17	14	29	8	31	23	21	25	23
<i>6. unemployed take any job</i>									
a) take any job	51	28	35	50	36	28	41	37	38
b) middle way	35	48	48	40	39	48	41	38	39
c) right to refuse a job	14	24	17	10	25	24	18	25	23
<i>7. basic needs for all</i>									
d) important	91	94	94	88	92	96	92	91	92
e) middle way	6	5	4	8	6	3	6	6	6
f) not important	2	1	2	4	2	1	2	2	2

<i>8. recognizing merits</i>									
d) important	77	82	80	75	86	88	80	85	83
e) middle way	16	13	14	18	9	9	14	10	12
f) not important	7	5	6	7	4	3	6	5	5
<i>9. eliminating inequalities</i>									
d) important	63	62	83	45	74	36	67	64	65
e) middle way	25	26	13	32	19	32	22	21	21
f) not important	12	12	4	24	7	32	11	16	14
<i>10. postmaterialism</i>									
materialists	23	21	23	6	43	35	26	31	29
Mixed	56	62	60	71	53	57	58	58	58
post-materialists	21	16	17	22	4	7	16	12	13

Notes: respondents scoring (a) 1-3, (b) 4-7, (c) 8-10, on 10 point scale; (d) 1-2, (e) 3; (f) 4-5, on 5 point scale.

Table 15. Traditionalism and social policies in IPROSEC countries, and chi-square tests

	post-traditional %	Mixed %	traditional %	all %	Pearson Chi-Square Tests		
					Value	df	Sig.
1. <i>political ideology</i>							
a) left	24	17	13	18			
b) middle way	66	69	68	68			
c) right	10	14	19	14	242.1	4	0.000
2. <i>freedom or equality</i>							
freedom above equality	56	49	49	51			
Neither	8	8	7	8			
equality above freedom	36	43	44	41	67.4	4	0.000
3. <i>competition good or harmful</i>							
a) competition good	44	47	44	45			
b) middle way	46	43	44	44			
c) competition harmful	10	10	12	10	21.4	4	0.000
4. <i>firms and freedom</i>							
a) state gives freedom to firms	33	31	26	30			
b) middle way	49	45	43	46			
c) state control firms	19	23	30	24	188.0	4	0.000
5. <i>individual versus state</i>							
a) individual responsibility	35	31	28	31			
b) middle way	50	48	46	48			
c) state responsibility	16	21	25	21	145.2	4	0.000
6. <i>unemployed take any job</i>							
a) take any job	37	41	45	41			
b) middle way	44	41	38	41			
c) right to refuse a job	19	19	17	18	57.9	4	0.000
7. <i>basic needs for all</i>							
d) important	92	91	92	92			
e) middle way	6	6	6	6			
f) not important	2	2	2	2	4.6	4	0.335

8. <i>recognizing merits</i>							
d) important	78	81	83	80			
e) middle way	16	14	12	14			
f) not important	7	5	5	6	45.9	4	0.000
9. <i>eliminating inequalities</i>							
d) important	62	67	72	67			
e) middle way	26	22	20	22			
f) not important	13	11	8	11	117.7	4	0.000
10. <i>postmaterialism</i>							
Materialists	15	24	37	26			
Mixed	57	61	55	58			
post-materialists	27	14	8	16	915.7	4	0.000

Notes: respondents scoring (a) 1-3, (b) 4-7, (c) 8-10, on 10 point scale; (d) 1-2, (e) 3, (f) 4-5, on 5-point scale.