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**Consociationalism and Corruption: An Exploration of the Consociational System's
Susceptibility to Corruption**

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By

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
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Abstract

Countries whose societies are fragmented, and which are in the process of transitioning to democracies, face the question of which political system best manages social conflict. Among those political systems that deal with conflict resolution in fragmented societies is consociationalism. This thesis argues that consociational political systems are prone to corruption, but, that specific factors in addition to the consociational arrangement itself activate the potential for corruption. An initial regression was conducted to establish the general relationship between consociationalism and corruption. A sample of 13 non-consociational countries was compared to 13 consociational ones. The regression test included consociationalism, political rights and civil liberties as independent variables. Corruption was the dependent variable. Results showed a significant relationship between consociational political systems and corruption. In addition, an increase in political rights was associated with a decrease in corruption. On the other hand, an increase in civil liberties was associated with an increase in corruption. These quantitative results were complemented by a qualitative case study of Lebanon's experience with consociationalism. The case study highlights how political corruption in Lebanon's consociational system has been aggravated by patterns of patron-client relationships that have long been present in Lebanese society.

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Chapter One: Introduction

Rationale

In a world of diverse countries run by different political systems, conflict among those countries is inevitable. It is relatively hard to reach an agreement without compromise in an international arena encompassing nations with diverse cultures and perspectives. In an effort to settle international conflict, “fifty-one countries committed to maintaining international peace and security,” founding the United Nations in 1945 (UN.org). In effect, this signified a multinational recognition of the detrimental consequences of international conflict. According to the Lacina/Gleditsch dataset, from 1946 to 2006, interstate battle deaths, internationalized interstate battle deaths, and colonial-conflict battle deaths dropped significantly (Dunne,2010).

While the above paragraph elaborates on the efforts that have been implemented to resolve conflicts internationally, the main domain of this thesis is worth mentioning—the exploration of domestic conflict resolution theories. The sub-discipline in political science that has a great deal of literature on domestic conflicts is comparative politics. Generally, societal conflicts arise in deeply divided societies (Dunne, 2010). Based on this premise, influxes of proposed theories have been put forth in an attempt to resolve such societal conflicts, and these theories have gained prominence because of the importance of analyzing the issues that confront a plural or heterogeneous society.

Stability, an integral part of virtually all countries, is an endeavor that different political systems strive to maintain. In order to prevent a state disorder in any given country, governments are primarily responsible for ensuring stability. Although political systems vary in their

relevancy and the consensus of the governed, in the end, stability is one of the main priorities of governments.

Theoretical Framework

Given that stability is an important issue, its significance increases in countries plagued with cross-cutting cleavages—countries that have diverse societies in terms of their religion or ethnicity. As one means of stabilizing fragmented societies, Arend Lijphart proposed consociationalism as a remedial political system for countries that are struggling with conflict among their fragmented societies.

Coping with the fact that conflict in deeply divided societies with cross-cutting cleavages is inevitable, Arend Lijphart (1969) introduced his well-known consociationalism theory. According to this theory, “consociational democracy means government by elite cartel designed to turn a democracy with fragmented political culture into a stable democracy” (p.216). For a country with a fragmented society, it is necessary to not only recognize the fragmented groups but to give every group’s elite an official position in the government.

To simplify Lijphart’s consociational theory, it merely advocates a democratic parliamentary government that employs proportional representation for all groups, giving group elites a veto right in order to prevent majoritarian rule and having group elites form a grand coalition. For the purpose of illustration, Lijphart’s description of how a grand coalition works is as follows: In a plural society, segments collectively govern their country (Lijphart, 1969). Accordingly, leaders of segments in the society derive their legitimacy and trust from the people who look up to them, like chieftains of tribes. Thus, we can derive the main pillars of consociationalism as follows: “(1) a grand coalition of elites from different groups, (2) a veto for

each group in important policy areas, (3) proportional representation in key institutions, and (4) group autonomy” (Lijphart, 1977, p. 25).

Statement of the Problem

Given the definition and characteristics of consociationalism mentioned above, this thesis’s main concern (research problem) is that consociationalism is, with some societal features, is prone to corruption, “the abuse of entrusted power for private gain” (Transparency International, 2012). With that definition, how can consociational practices, which are backed by constitutional laws, be prone to corruption? In other words, how can a potentially corrupt but legal act become an actual act of corruption? What are the consequences of consociationalism if it promotes corruption? These questions will be explored in this thesis.

Research Design

This research utilizes both quantitative and qualitative designs, making it a mixed-methods thesis. The quantitative research will statistically test the study’s hypothesis, and two quantitative measurements are incorporated. Moreover, the qualitative research will be an in-depth case study of Lebanon, given that its democratic system is consociational.

Hypothesis

This thesis argues that, while consociational arrangements are not by definition corrupt, consociational democracies are prone to corruption if other factors are present which allow their corrupt potential to be realized.

Importance of the Study

Many countries struggle with varying issues that pertain to maintaining stability. Among those issues is the ability to mitigate diverse societal tensions. Tellingly, theories that deal with peace making or conflict resolution are critical. But when consociationalism would most likely lead to corruption and further divide the already divided society, it is imperative that research focus on assessing the merits of that model. If it fails to do so, consociationalism will continue to be considered a strong system that maintains stability, and, thus, its susceptibility to corruption would not be known until countries adopt the system. Based on this premise, this study is relatively important because it could add more evidence in the literature as to the effectiveness of consociationalism as a model for a democratic polity. By suggesting more deficiencies in consociationalism, nations transitioning to new democracies will have enough evidence to see that they should not adopt a consociational system.

Key Terms

- Consociationalism
- Sectarianism
- Clientalism
- Cronyism
- Favoritism
- Corruption
- Wasta
- Zu'ama

Chapter Two: Review of the Literature

In a world of cultural diversity, views and perspectives on life vary significantly among its inhabitants. In the international sphere, theories pertaining to interaction among various cultures have led to prominent ones conducive to the maintenance of global cultural diversity. Among those prominent theories are “cosmopolitanism” and “communitarianism,” both of which have recognized the relativity in coping with global cultural diversity. For cosmopolitans, human beings, regardless of their culture and ethnicity, are global citizens (Dunne, 2010). Hence, human beings are entitled to universal rights and should have access to basic life necessities. Cosmopolitans argue that encroachment of these rights by any governmental authority, however, requires external intervention to safeguard and preserve the integrity and dignity of global citizens. In contrast, communitarians confine the notion of citizenry rights that should be secured solely to those who reside within the borders of a particular country, ignoring any issue pertaining to others residing outside those borders (Dunne, 2010). Thus, cosmopolitans emphasize that all of the entitlements and privileges have no borders in an effort to encompass all human beings; on the contrary, communitarians exclusively grant them to inhabitants of their own communities.

Domestically, as opposed to the previous international perspectives, people have sought to establish governments that can readily serve and secure not only the society but also the integrity and efficiency of its institutions. In deeply divided societies, governments have different approaches to dealing with societal diversity and conflict. Domestic conflict in deeply divided societies, the focus of this thesis, is an issue that has prompted researchers in scholarly empirical studies to render remedial applications. From among those scholarly contributions emerged

“consociationalism,” a theory that is set solely on maintaining stability in deeply divided societies (Lijphart, 1969, 1971, 1977, 1979, 1981, 1991, 1996, 2004). Conflict in the absence of stability has been a concern of many scholars: “From Hobbes through Dukheim, Dahrendorf, and Samuel Huntington, societies have been analyzed as agglomerations of individuals and/or groups whose interests and desires conflict” (Lustick, 1979, p. 326).

Hence, the purpose of this thesis is to explore the evidence in the literature that can justifiably support, or refute, the research thesis (consociational democracies are prone to corruption). In this chapter, an elaborate review of the literature of both, consociationalism and corruption, is presented. It is worth mentioning that, after extensive research of a fair amount of literature, only one article explicitly connects corruption with consociational democracy (Frognier, 1986). Thus, the following paragraphs are reviews of the most appealing scholarly articles that separately discuss consociationalism and corruption.

Arend Lijphart and the History of Consociational Theory

Stability, an ambitious endeavor for virtually any government, is important to maintain, especially in a country with a deeply fragmented society. Accordingly, the first question that comes to mind is, how can integration be possible in deeply divided societies? Arend Lijphart describes integration with theories that could be categorized under the broad title of theories of political integration, nationalism and national unification, regional (international) integration, regional (subnational) integration, political development and nation building, political stability, and federalism (Lijphart, 1971). Deutsch (1954) defines *integration* as the fulfillment “of a sense of community, accompanied by formal and informal institutions or practices, sufficiently strong and widespread to assure peaceful change among members of a group” (p.33). Therefore,

in a country plagued with cross-cutting cleavages, a consociational system can contribute to the integration of the society.

As a method for integrating a deeply divided society, Lijphart proposes his remedial theory of establishing a consociational democracy (Lijphart, 1969, 1971, 1977, 1979, 1981, 1991, 1996, 2004). Mitigating societal tensions and bringing about an integrated society requires, Lijphart emphasizes, one main element of his consociational theory: cooperation among elite cartels. Employing all efforts to integrate a fragmented society promises political stability; cooperation among elite cartels, however, is relatively critical because if elites of subcultures join to counterattack centrifugal tendencies of cultural fragmentation, political stability can be sustained in culturally fragmented (Lijphart, 1971).

While the previous paragraphs describe consociationalism from Lijphart's perspective, the evolution of consociationalism from the decade of its introduction to Lijphart's most recent writings on it is also worth mentioning. The literal term consociational democracy was changed—or, as Bormann says, rebaptized—to power-sharing democracy (Bormann, 2011; Lijphart, 1985). This change served not only to bring the term up to date but also to narrow it, giving it a more practical and acceptable meaning. Moreover, power-sharing is itself an expression that portrays consociationalism as a democratic concept. At first glance, however, power-sharing means “equality among citizens in a democratic government,” yet this type of power-sharing is not what it appears to be. Moreover, power-sharing in a democracy implies equality for all citizens, while Lijphart's power-sharing is specifically among elites.

Although power-sharing is a new term that serves the purpose of consociational democracy, Lijphart was not satisfied with relying on it. Consequently, he has changed the term

to a one of higher relevancy, which is consensus democracy (Lijphart, 1984, 1991, 1999). Lijphart argues that consensus democracy significantly differs from majoritarian democracy (Lijphart, 1991). The difference between them lies in the composition of their institutions. In a consensus democracy, the executive cabinet is oversized, which is a result of appointing people from different groups to each cabinet post. In a majoritarian democracy, however, there are a minimum number of winning cabinets. When it comes to executive-legislative relations, balanced power between the two branches is a main attribute of a consensus democracy, as opposed to executive dominance in a majoritarian democracy. As far as the electoral processes are concerned, an integral proportional representation is a common characteristic of a consensus democracy; on the other hand, plurality and majority electoral systems are commonplace for majoritarian democracies (Lijphart, 1991). Since all of the recently mentioned terms emanate from consociationalism and to mitigate any ambiguity in this paper, this thesis will use consociationalism as the main term instead of power-sharing or consensus democracies.

Proportional Representation

Lijphart contends that elite cooperation is facilitated by a constitutional right to form a grand coalition, so it is worthwhile to succinctly mention the relative application in a democracy that is conducive to the fulfillment of the grand coalition. Correspondingly, the application of proportional representation in the legislature surely is a prerequisite for the integrity and stability of the grand coalition since, as mentioned earlier, consociational democracies can function efficiently and serve their stabilizing purpose through a parliamentary government. Tellingly, the application of proportional representation (PR) can bring to the top the most trustworthy elites. Hence, PR not only prevents a majority group from resorting to tyranny, it accommodates the

fragmented groups' representatives and bestows them with the ultimate authority to compose the grand coalition (Bormann, 2011; Lijphart, 2004).

Grand Coalition

The establishment of a grand coalition in a consociational democracy serves the betterment of the apparatus, demonstrates ethnical inclusivity, and decreases the propensity for igniting a civil war (Bormann, 2011; Cederman, Wimmer, & Min, 2010). Since societal tension is inevitable in a deeply divided society, respected leaders of the groups can cooperate efficiently and democratically for the well-being of the land they all share.

With respect to inter-elite relations in the grand coalition, a thorough description is vital to Lijphart's portrayal of its effectiveness. After getting accustomed to regular cooperation and democratic deliberation, group elites reach a point at which consociational practices become the norm (Lijphart, 1969). As Gerhard Lehmbuch asserts, "These norms may become an important part of the political socialization of elites and thus acquire a strong degree of persistence through time" (Lehmbuch, 1967; Lijphart, 1969). While every group elite possesses the authority to veto as part of the balance-of-power environment in which they all interact, Lijphart emphasizes that not only will the eventual cooperative atmosphere prevail among them, but they will also gradually transcend the relative differences among all cultures they represent.

Based on the previous articulation of the nature of group elite interaction, the virtuous principle of "nation comes first" can influence group elites to an extent that they come to a realization that patriotism should emanate from segments to the whole nation. Indeed, according to Lijphart's portrayal of elite cooperation, this cooperation may influence the segments they represent.

Group Autonomy

While two of consociationalism theory's pillars, grand coalition and PR, have been elaborated on, it is necessary to illustrate the other two pillars. For group autonomy, the authority of decision making is conceivably its main indicator. In contrast with majority rule, segmental or group autonomy "means that decision-making authority is delegated to the separate segments as much as possible" (Lijphart, 1979, p. 500). In majority-rule systems, the relative dominance of the majority is over the minority.

In contrast, in a consociational system, the principle behind group autonomy not only prevents the majority from dominating the minority, it also gives a minority authority over itself. Since the entire group elites in the grand coalition are minorities deliberating with other minorities, the sheer existence of this system prevents any majority from engaging in hegemonic abuse of the system.

According to Jan-Erik Lane, "any group in a democratic system will tend to respect the democratic rules of the game and hence contribute to democratic stability if it enjoys a satisfactory combination of influence on the central political system and autonomy with regard to its own affairs" (as cited in Lijphart, 1979, p. 500). Consociationalism's success can be achieved only if it functions within a democracy (Lijphart, 1969, 1971, 1977, 1979, 1981, 1991, 1996, 2004). Instead of, in a democracy, conceding their right to participate in governing their country to an autocrat, inhabitants in a segmented society can have their opinions resonate through the electoral democratic process of voting their representatives into office, which, in turn, reflects the significant contributions that consociationalism can make in conveying diverse constituency needs.

Group Veto

In an effort to protect their autonomy and manifest the consociational system's credibility, each group enjoys an authoritative veto (Lijphart, 1996). This way, no group or groups have veto authority when others do not. Some countries with solid majorities, like Belgium and Cyprus, have group veto entrenched in their constitutions, but Lijphart's preference is an informal group veto (Lijphart, 1996), in part because of the ever-changing population demographics in most countries. Therefore, a constitutional group veto prevents other potentially growing groups from having this right to themselves. Moreover, it can be inferred that an informal group veto establishes a balance of power among participating groups in the grand coalition.

Proponents of Consociational Theory

Having discussed the history and main themes of Lijphart's consociational theory, it is now crucial to address the theory's impact on other scholars. Hence, in this section, prominent articles by consociational theory proponents shall be reviewed. Emphasizing that consociational principles are valid and plausible in a deeply divided society, Ian Lustick assures that consociationalism is a significant system that provides stability in countries where it is direly needed (Lustick, 1979).

The purpose of Lustick's study was to explain how consociationalism can maintain stability in fragmented societies and contribute to the democratic process it employs. However, he hypothesizes that adding "control" to the consociationalism apparatus will enhance the system. In his secondary qualitative study, he analyzes an important element in a consociational system—the grand coalition. For Lustick, the grand coalition in a consociational democracy is

the main mechanism not only for uniting the fragmented society but also for constituting a democratic body that conveys peoples' demands (Lustick, 1979). Yet, this grand coalition needs to be modified because the authorities all groups enjoy may cause conflict in the coalition. Accordingly, Lustick introduces control as a means to stabilize the grand coalition's working environment. "Consociational models can be deployed effectively only if an alternative typological category of 'control' (or domination) is available" (Lustick, 1979, p. 326).

When consociational democracies, in principle, endeavor to maintain stability within their deeply divided societies, certain issues must be assessed. According to Lustick, the overarching commitment of elite cartels to their coalitions is a fact that cannot be denied (Lustick, 1979). However, what perpetuates this stable commitment? Lustick's concern is that, while consociational theory's approach is to resolve the relative problematic tensions that arise in fragmented societies by establishing a grand coalition consisting of elite cartels, these elite cartels—with all of their authority—may transfer the tensions that exist within the society to the elites themselves (Lustick, 1979).

Based on the latter, adding a category of control in consociational democracies will not only perpetuate societal stability, it will also permanently prevent any potential devastating conflict that might arise among the elite cartels. Hence, Lustick argues that there must be a dominant elite with authority over all the subcultural elites in order to prevent any conflict that might lead to a breakdown (Lustick, 1979).

Given that consociationalism focuses on maintaining cooperation among elite cartels, the control factor, if applied, would focus on the more practical method of maintaining cooperation among the elites. The relatively superior group that is over all groups in the grand coalition "is

mobilized to enforce stability by constraining the political actions and opportunities of another segment or segments” (Lustick, 1979, p. 328). For example, in a parliamentary system, the prime minister is responsible for implementing the laws, and, as head of the majority party, he or she represents the government and the parliament. This being said, the prime minister cannot work with a second prime minister or more. In other words, in efforts to implement laws passed by parliament, a problematic obstacle would prevent the prime minister from doing anything if another official with the same authority was in place. Although parliamentary representatives may cast a no-confidence vote to establish a new government, this particular authority does not conflict with the prime minister’s superiority in many political aspects.

If a superordinate group over all elites is not in place, an unproductive consequence of a consociational democracy is the likelihood of justifying the status-quo (Lustick, 1979). Given that consociationalism, without the control factor, renders equal authority to all leaders of the segments, there is a high susceptibility that they will justify and insist on sustaining the status quo simply to avoid compromising to an unlimited extent. Moreover, group elites may be well aware of the relative chaos a particular piece of legislation could create if they all agreed on it. This is the difficulty of governing among officials who have equal powers.

Lustick emphasized viewing the categorical control factor as a contribution to the consociational school, but another scholar who is considered a member of the consociational school has also made some interesting assertions. Taking consociationalism as an analytical point of departure to research the ever-growing conflicts in deeply divided societies, Alan Sairoff compares and contrasts centrifugal democracies with consociational democracies. Hence, the purpose of Sairoff’s (2000) study was to determine six consociational factors that can

presumably prevent centrifugal democracies from breaking down. In doing so, he focused on the causes that led to centrifugal democracies' breaking down in some cases but in others (Siaroff, 2000).

Centrifugal democracies, Sairoff states, are fragmented polities, but unlike in consociational democracies, inter-elite relations in centrifugal democracies are described as being engaged in competitive behavior, not cooperation (2000). While consociational democracies are described as fragmented but stable, centrifugal democracies are considered fragmented and unstable. Centrifugal democracies are plagued with the detrimental state of not only fragmentation, but also instability. In his study, Sairoff focused on bringing about a stable remedial solution for currently unstable centrifugal democracies.

While Siaroff's study was significantly grounded on Lijphart's consociational theory, he alluded to Giovanni Sartori's conceptualization of "polarized pluralism" (Siaroff, 2000; Sartori, 1976). Accordingly, Sartori (1966) defines polarized pluralism as encompassing eight features: "(1) relevant anti-system parties, (2) bilateral opposition, (3) one or more parties clearly in a center position, (4) polarization, (5) centrifugal drives, (6) ideological patterning, (7) irresponsible oppositions, and (8) the politics of outbidding" (as cited in Siaroff, 2000, p. 317). That being said, Siaroff mainly asserts that, based upon all of the above-mentioned features of polarized pluralism, the central and overarching feature stems from the "centrifugal drives" (Siaroff, 2000).

Quantitatively, Siaroff studied thirteen centrifugal democracies in an effort to determine why some centrifugal democracies had broken down while others had not. Consistently, Siaroff has studied "France from 1875 onwards; Portugal from 1910 onwards; Austria, Germany, and

Italy after the First World War; Spain from 1931 onwards; Finland, France, and Italy after the Second World War; Brazil from 1961 onwards; Chile as of 1964; Belgium since the early 1970s; and El Salvador from 1982 onwards” (Siaroff, 2000, p. 319). Regarding Siaroff’s analyses of all of the above-mentioned centrifugal democracies, his time series cross-national study was limited to national political regimes (Siaroff, 2000).

In an effort to incorporate testable variables in this study, Lijphart’s (1985) favorable factors that are conducive to consociational democracy were tested in all of the thirteen centrifugal democracies. The favorable factors are “1) cross-cutting economic cleavages, 2) external effects, 3) moderate countrywide nationalism, 4) external threats to the nation, 5) a moderate number of segments, 6) segments of equal size, 7) small population size, 8) overarching loyalties, 9) geographic concentration of segments, 10) traditions of compromise and accommodation, and 11) absence of a solid majority” (as cited in Siaroff, 2000, p. 320). Utilizing a t-test to determine the relevance of these factors, Siaroff gave a +1 for a factor that was present, –1 for the absence of a factor, and 0 for a mixed or vague factor (Siaroff, 2000).

While cross-cutting economic cleavages, external effects, and moderate countrywide nationalism were statistically significant, the absence of a solid majority factor was positive in all centrifugal democracies that broke down (Siaroff, 2000). In deriving the many factors conducive to consociational democracies in order to assess their validity in centrifugal democracies, Siaroff concludes that, in the absence of some relevant collective factors of consociational democracies, centrifugal democracies are highly susceptible to breaking down (Siaroff, 2000).

All in all, the primary effectiveness of consociational theory has interested many scholars concerned with domestic conflict resolution. Scholars like Siaroff utilize the many factors it has to offer in their endeavors to prescribe a remedy for unstable centrifugal democracies.

The proponents' consensus

Undoubtedly, Lijphart's initial introduction of his consociational theory in the academic sphere has attracted many concerned scholars to not only support his theory and align themselves with him but also utilize consociational factors in their own studies to measure, enhance, assess, and modify theories of conflict resolution in plural societies. Indeed, this shows that Lijphart has established a theoretical framework from which concerned scholars of conflict resolution in plural societies can derive many testable hypotheses that are conducive to the improvement of their studies in this field. Taking into account the devastating and immobilizing effect that instability has on countries, consociational theory offers a means to democratic stabilizing that can mitigate conflict to an extent that plural societies can reach a stable consensus (Lijphart, 1984). In addition to prescribing remedial theories aimed at alleviating the relative tensions in fragmented countries, consociationalism has contributed to the body of comparative politics literature.

Opponents of Consociational Theory

Since the previous paragraphs synthesized prominent arguments made by proponents of consociational theory, a necessary elaboration of the prominent opposing arguments is of high importance for the integrity and impartiality of this literature review. In a critical study about the validity of the claim that consociational theory can mitigate conflict in segmented societies, Joel Selway and Kharis Templeman, raise arguments in an effort to refute the integrity of this theory.

As a result of their skepticism, Selway and Templeman conducted a quantitative empirical study aimed solely at identifying the inefficiencies of consociationalism (Selway & Templeman, 2011). However, in an effort to evaluate the ultimate reason that consociationalism is said to stabilize deeply divided societies, this present study's purpose is to test whether political violence occurs more in consociational democracies than others.

The reason that Selway and Templeman focused on political institutions' effects on political violence is the sheer fact that a country with an increasingly high rate of political violence surely suffers from a political defect in its apparatus. In other words, political violence was a clear indicator of a problem with the political system. Hence, in their study, political violence is measured by the number of riots and political deaths per year in every country.

After searching for particular indicators that can help researchers accurately identify a consociational democracy, Selway and Templeman agreed that three prominent features, if present, indicate that a country is considered to have a consociational system. These features must be present at the federal level and involve a parliamentary government with proportional representation (Selway & Templeman, 2011; Lijphart, 2004).

With those features in mind, Selway and Templeman (2011) rendered four hypotheses for their study, which were as follows:

Hypothesis 1: The marginal effect of PR on political violence is negative when ethnic fractionalization is high, but PR has no effect when ethnic fractionalization is low.

Hypothesis 2: The marginal effect of parliamentarism on political violence is negative when ethnic fractionalization is high, but parliamentarism has no effect when ethnic fractionalization is low.

Hypothesis 3: The marginal effect of federalism on political violence is negative when ethnic fractionalization is high, but federalism has no effect when ethnic fractionalization is low.

Hypothesis 4: The marginal effect of consociationalism on political violence is negative when ethnic fractionalization is high, but consociationalism has no effect when ethnic fractionalization is low (p. 11).

All of the above hypotheses are about the impact of “institutions conditioned on the level of ethnic fractionalization” (Selway & Templeman, 2011). The authors use the term ethnic fractionalization as a synonym for deeply divided society.

In their quantitative study, Selway and Templeman (2011) conducted a time series cross-national analysis of 106 country-regimes between 1972 and 2003. Although most of their data was drawn from Pippa Norris’s Democracy Time-Series Cross-National Dataset, the most appropriate data, in that it coincides with their attempt to measure political violence (total number of political deaths and violent riots) came from both the Arthur Banks Cross-National Time-Series Database and the Major Episodes of Political Violence (POLDEATH) (Selway & Templeman, 2011). If the relationships are found to be statistically significant, then their findings suggest that the more political violence a consociational democracy has, the more fragile the consociational theory is, in practical terms.

After testing these hypotheses and taking into account other factors that might cause political violence, Selway and Templeman stated some important results. First, however, it is highly important to mention a crucial aspect of their study. As stated earlier, the study takes into account the main features of consociational countries and compares them with their opposites (e.g., PR over majoritarian rules, federal over unitary systems, and parliamentary over presidential and semipresidential systems). The results revealed that larger countries have more riots and political deaths. Second, democratic countries are not likely to have a significant number of political deaths and riots when compared with nondemocratic countries. Third, while federalist governments appear to have fewer political deaths and more riots, parliamentary regimes experience fewer political deaths and more riots (Selway and Templeman, 2011).

Based on these results, some important findings have been laid out by the authors. PR systems are associated with substantial levels of political violence, while presidential systems have relatively low levels of political violence (Selway & Templeman, 2011). Also, “the combination of consociationalist institutions is associated with higher levels of political violence” (Selway & Templeman, 2011, p. 23).

All in all, this study separately tests all three of the main features of consociationalism (PR, federalism, and parliamentarism), and then it tests the features in combination. By associating the features as independent variables with political violence, as the main dependent variable, Selway and Templeman have suggested that consociationalism is, in reality, not serving its main purpose of maintaining stability given the levels of political violence that consociational countries have. Hence, the authors found that “presidentialism was beneficial in divided societies but only when paired with a majoritarian electoral system, and the consociational package of PR,

parliamentarism, and federalism together did not reduce political violence” (Selway & Templeman, 2011, p. 25).

While the previous article was a time-series cross-national quantitative study, another scholarly article on the subject was conducted with a different research design. In his qualitative in-depth case study, Imad Salamey explains the failure of consociationalism in Lebanon. Salamey (2009) examined the consequences of political sectarianism in the consociational context. Moreover, the purpose of his study was to challenge the notion that the sectarian ideal of “corporate” consociationalism is sufficient for transitional plural democracies.

Whereas corporatism is described as “the incorporation of interest groups into the process of policy formation and implementation” (Lijphart, 1991), corporate consociationalism prearranges official positions “among ethnic and sectarian national groups” (Salamey, 2009). In this context, Salamey equates interest groups with sectarian and ethnic groups in the political processes but with the major difference of fixed official appointments. In other words, interest groups do play a role in politics, but each can be replaced by another interest group due to the competitiveness among them and the fact that they do not have permanent official positions reserved for them. Sectarian and ethnic groups, however, enjoy all of the interest groups’ entitlements and, in addition, their fixed, permanent official positions. In turn, Salamey argues, this predetermined positioning that sectarian and ethnic groups enjoy is what leads to a more polarized and divided society (Salamey, 2009).

Given their predetermined official positions, sectarian groups fortify their offices by adding more officials from their own sects, creating separate governmental entities within the sects. By doing so, and thereby allowing powerful sectarian groups to dominate key ministries,

consociationalism is effectively establishing foreign alliances with each sectarian elite and influencing the country, given that the sects do not need one another to cooperate (Salamey, 2009). In addition, corporate consociationalism neglects a decisive issue of spatial formation and new emerging groups (Salamey, 2009). Indeed, based on the predetermined positions that are stated in the Lebanese constitution, for example, a constitutional amendment is required every time a new group emerges; this means there is a high potential for constant conflict among groups. As a result, corporate consociational arrangements in Lebanon have contributed to a more divided society and an unstable country (Salamey, 2009).

Given the skepticism that Salamey has about consociationalism and the negative consequences it has on the Lebanese state, he suggests “integrative consociationalism” as a theory of enhancement to the sectarian entrenchment that consociationalism has brought about in Lebanon. According to Salamey, the “Lebanese geopolitical interconnectivity” and the variability of rapidly growing groups impede the “corporate sectarian-based consociational state,” which eventually prompts the groups to backslide to the point that they are exclusively confined to sectarian domination or foreign attachments (Salamey, 2009). Salamey argues that consociationalism has not only worsened the Lebanese integrative endeavor but also has made the societal situation so centrifugal that the average Lebanese has to affiliate with a major sectarian group in order to survive.

Moreover, Salamey’s proposition regarding the remedial theory of “integrative consociationalism” means it is an “institutional formulation that injects political stimulation and incentives for inter-sectarian accommodation and cross-cutting cleavages formation” (Salamey, 2009). This is implemented through a strategy that “synthesizes national and sectarian-based

power-sharing arrangements through combining democratic proportional rule with that of sectarian consociationalism” (Salamey, 2009, p. 95).

In practical terms, integrative consociationalism, according to Salamey, can be formulated through institutional arrangements that follow integrative consociationalism ideals, and they are “bicameralism, duality of administrative local and national governance, mixed electoral system and cross-cutting electoral districting” (Salamey, 2009, p. 95). By adopting integrative consociational principles, Lebanon can preserve sectarian interests while at the same time efficiently accommodating new, growing groups into the representative system of governance in an effort to mitigate potential conflicts and sectarian-based strife (Salamey, 2009).

Although Salamey derives the principles of his integrative consociational theory from Lijphart’s consociationalism theory, this does not mean that Salamey supports consociationalism, per se. The reader might be puzzled regarding Salamey’s argument being included with those from the group of scholars from the consociational school of thought, believing that integrative consociationalism is a mere advancement of Lijphart’s consociationalism. However, this is not the case. Salamey’s argument is, de facto, a practical and realist one that deals with Lebanon’s current situation as it is. Hence, Salamey’s integrative consociational theory is not necessarily an endorsement of Lijphart’s consociationalism, but it is a temporary strategy to help abolish the centrifugal impetuses in Lebanon’s consociational system. If integrative consociationalism had been adopted, the Lebanese people would be ready for a new system that functions without any consociational features.

Why It All Matters

In conclusion, consociationalism is a theory that aims to accommodate deeply divided societies plagued with cross-cutting cleavages. While patriotic nationalism is a hard to attain in such societies, consociationalism deals with the status quo in order to prevent any sort of potential strife or civil war. This is the key argument that proponents of consociationalism invoke as their platform. As mentioned in the literature, deeply divided societies undermine governmental leaders by expressing some skepticism about those leaders' favoring people from their sects. Accordingly, this is why consociational theory emphasizes the role that elite cartels play in the betterment of their societies. Considering the trust that elites have from their people, the establishment of an authoritative grand coalition can satisfy the segments; of course, this is contingent upon cooperation among the elite cartels.

While proponents of consociationalism argue that the application of consociational features in deeply divided countries will decrease the propensity of domestic conflict, opponents do not consider this a valid argument. From the literature mentioned earlier, opponents of consociationalism believe that it increases domestic conflict more than other political systems and divides the society even more. The discussion now turns to the literature on corruption.

Understanding Corruption

Aristotle once wrote that “there are three kinds of constitution, or an equal number of deviations, or, as it were, corruption of these three kinds.... The deviation or corruption of kingship is tyranny. Both kingship and tyranny are forms of government by a single person, but ... the tyrant studies his own advantage.... The king looks to that of his subjects” (as cited in Heidenheimer & Johnston, 2002, p. 3). Of course, during Aristotle’s era, kings were portrayed as democratically elected leaders, unlike previous hereditary kings or monarchs.

While Aristotle’s conceptualization of corruption as a deviation that leads to negative consequences, other influential philosophers have also expressed their insights on the subject. According to Rousseau, corruption should be looked at from a moral standpoint. Asserting that human nature was pure but that humans became corrupt once they formed societies, Rousseau states that the fact that humans in society search for power is an evident attribute of corruption (as cited in Heidenheimer & Johnston, 2002). Acquiescing to the inevitable notion of humans’ adopting a corrupt nature, equality combined with good laws, Rousseau argues, should prevent “power-hungry individuals” from corrupting the society (as cited in Heidenheimer & Johnston, 2002). Hence, it is individuals’ unlimited pursuit of power that makes society corrupt. Accordingly, it is *not* the mere entrance of humans into society that makes them corrupt, per se; it is the corrupting influences of power-hungry individuals that prompt humans to engage in deviant pursuits.

Rousseau saw corruption vested primarily in power-hungry individuals; Montesquieu, however, saw that corruption lies in the political system. He deemed corruption “the dysfunctional par excellence by which a good political order or system is perverted into an evil

one, a monarchy into a despotism” (as cited in Heidenheimer & Johnston, 2002, p. 19). Given that Montesquieu is the theorizer of “the separation of powers,” there is no wondering why he attributes corruption to the state of the political system. Hence, a system that does not adopt the separation of powers is prone to corruption because it provides a disarray of power in which any branch of government can dominate the rest. In that situation, the executive branch will have the lion’s share of domination because it encompasses the means of coercion.

Another prominent philosopher, Machiavelli, offered some significant perspectives on corruption. According to Machiavelli, “corruption was the process by which the virtue of the citizen was undermined and the virtue of the good destroyed” (as cited in Heidenheimer & Johnston, 2002, p. 18). Given that humans are weak and that their weaknesses may affect their good virtue, unless a great leader compensates for their weaknesses, corruption will prevail (Friedrich, 1972). Tellingly, Machiavelli believed that the notion of virtue has to be embodied in a leader, with an influential character, who can lead the masses to their greater good. In contrast, a corrupt leader will only degrade virtue to an extent that he becomes a despot—a despot ruling a corrupt country that, due to his despotic nature, will be hard to maintain.

In addition to citing these great philosophers, it is worthwhile to refer to what Karl Marx has to say about corruption. Although Marxism, in theory, described capitalism as the ultimate corrupt system, it did not explicitly address corruption itself. Given the bold, corrupt acts of the Soviet Union, practices of corruption were utterly manifested in their bureaucracies (Friedrich, 1972). The lesson that can be drawn from the Soviet Union’s domestic corruption is that the more a country is bureaucratized, the more likely it will be susceptible to corruption.

Having cited prominent philosophers' perspectives on the notion of corruption, in which they are shown to have a tendency to look at abstract moral aspects, we now turn to the conceptualizations produced by contemporary scholars. Broadly, there are definitions of corruption in legal terms, and there are other definitions of corruption in public interest and opinion terms.

Legally, Yale Professor James C. Scott has defined corruption, saying that when "an official's act is prohibited by laws established by the government, it is corrupt; if it is not prohibited, it is not corrupt even if it is abusive or unethical" (as cited in Heidenheimer & Johnston, 2002, p. 29). Consequently, a strict and literal interpretation of the law is legally permissible even if the concerned law is unjust. For example, when voting rights in the United States were bestowed only to white male property owners, a voting-booth worker's refusal to extend the right to vote to white men who did not own property, women, or African Americans was not a corrupt act. By virtue of amendments, these rights can be inclusive, but they are contingent upon an amendment, meaning that the law has to be purposefully changed since revolting against it will not make a difference.

In contrast, according to the public interest definition of corruption, if a law is unjust and detrimental to the people and conflicts with the public's interest, even if it is legal, it is corrupt (Gardiner, 1993). Tellingly, representatives should anticipate the consequences of proposed legislation on areas of the public's interest. Moreover, for a legal but unjust law to be uncorrupt, it needs to align with the public's interest. Thus, in California, the legalization of marijuana for medicinal use, which mirrors the public's interest, is uncorrupt, even if other states deem it corrupt.

When it comes to public opinion's definition of corruption, Arnold Heidenheimer offered an interesting description. According to Heidenheimer (1989), public opinion views of corruption are subject to three categorical implications: white, gray, or black corruption. Black corruption is explicitly deemed corrupt not only by the public but also by elites. Gray corruption is revealed in an act that elites consider corrupt and punishable but that the public views somewhat ambivalently. While black and gray corruption have either a majority of consensus or a one-side consensus, a white act of corruption is one that is tolerated by the majority of both the elites and the general public, who do not see a need for a punishment to be imposed (Heidenheimer, 1989).

With reference to consociational arrangements, a key feature of it is favoritism. According to the Oxford Dictionary (2012), the word favoritism means "the practice of giving unfair preferential treatment to one person or group at the expense of another." Indeed, preferential treatment of one group is a big concern given that the law established by consociationalism favors elite cartels' authoritative positions in the grand coalition.

If it is legal to bestow favored positions on elite cartels in the grand coalition, how can that act be corrupt? Aren't the elite cartels following the law? The legitimization of favoritism reflected in elite cartels' positions in the grand coalition and the deeming of this act as corrupt is the crux of this thesis. Indeed, using the legal definition of corruption provided by Scott, which considers an official's act corrupt only if the act is against the law, an act that does not break the law is legal even if it is overtly corrupt (Scott, 1972). Before illustrating the relevant literature that connects consociationalism with corruption, it is worthwhile to elucidate some of the prominent articles that consider corruption a positive factor.

Positive Corruption

While there is universal condemnation on corruption per se, some scholars argue that the mere existence of corruption in underdeveloped countries can contribute to the efficiency of the bureaucracy. Accordingly, Pierre-Guillaume Meon and Laurent Weill have conducted an empirical study devoted to illuminating some positive aspects of corruption. In their study, Meon and Weill (2009) test whether “corruption may be an efficient grease in the wheels” of an incompetent and inefficient bureaucracy. They tested two contrasting hypotheses: “greasing the wheel” and “sanding the wheel.” The “greasing the wheel” hypothesis states that in countries where governments are defective, corruption is relatively beneficial in that it speeds up bureaucratic efficiency, but it is detrimental elsewhere. In contrast, the “sanding the wheel” hypothesis posits that in countries where governments are defective, and even those where they are effective, corruption is detrimental to investment and growth in all respects (Meon & Laurent, 2009). The difference between the two hypotheses is that the former asserts that corruption may increase efficiency, while the latter emphasizes that the more corrupt a country is, the more likely it is that corruption will reduce efficiency, even in deficient institutions (Meon & Laurent, 2009).

Hence, the purpose of their study was to test the validity of the above-mentioned hypotheses. They focused on measuring productivity in a panel of sixty-nine developed and developing countries with respect to aggregate efficiency, corruption and other dimensions of governance. In an effort to quantitatively test the hypotheses, Meon and Laurent’s study sought to compare each country’s level of productivity, manifested in the data on a given country’s development, with the level of corruption in that country.

The results of this study were interesting because they provided evidence of weakness in the “grease the wheel” hypothesis as well as other evidence of robustness. With respect to the weakness of the hypothesis, the analysis resulted in a statistically positive relationship between corruption and aggregate inefficiency, but only in well-developed governments. As far as the robustness of the hypothesis is concerned, the results indicated an inverse relationship between corruption and aggregate efficiency, but solely in deficient governments (Meon & Laurent, 2009). Although this hypothesis is plausible in developed countries, it is not applicable to developing countries. Thus, corruption in developing countries can contribute to their betterment and efficiency so long as these countries strive to progressively move forward to becoming developed ones.

In conclusion, Meon and Laurent are not promoting corruption, per se; they are taking a practical look at more-efficient means of helping developing countries move forward. Instead of putting substantial efforts into and allocating large funds to counter-corruption agencies, developing countries can utilize corruption in a practical way, although only temporarily. In doing so, developing countries can allocate funds to other developmental programs that can help the economy flourish. This is not legitimizing acts of corruption; rather, it is only temporarily turning a blind eye to them. Adding more grease to the wheel can not only help make the government more efficient but also change the status quo of the country to an extent that it is given a short-cut to becoming a developed country.

While Meon’s and Laurent’s study focused on facilitating corruption in developing countries to make their governments more efficient, another study emphasized that bureaucratic corruption can contribute to economic development. Nathaniel Leff studied the relevant literature

in an effort to show that corruption can help develop countries. According to Leff, in autocratic regimes, where bureaucracies monopolize the economic environment, entrepreneurs will compete against each other for access to government (Leff, 1964). Indeed, bureaucracies, under autocratic direction, have the authority of implementation, meaning they can sign contracts with any company they prefer. Hence, Leff suggests that, in this noncompetitive environment, entrepreneurs can establish a good relationship with the concerned bureaucracy and, in turn, have their projects embraced by the bureaucracy. In addition, their entrepreneurial projects will be implemented, benefiting the economy and the citizens (Leff, 1964).

“Although lip-service may be paid to the importance of economic development, the government and bureaucracy are oriented primarily to maintaining the status quo” (as cited in Heidenheimer & Johnston, 2002, p. 312). Therefore, the status quo can be disrupted when entrepreneurs find their strategic paths to persuade the bureaucracy. Among the many means of persuasion, graft can have beneficial effects and “can provide the direct incentive necessary to mobilize the bureaucracy for more energetic action on behalf of the entrepreneurs” (as cited in Heidenheimer & Johnston, 2002, p. 313). According to Leff, the significant role that the bureaucracy plays in the economy can be directed along a progressive path that can help the economy flourish. Again, while bureaucracies have an authoritative monopoly over the economy, entrepreneurs have to take advantage of ways to potentially become closer to them, even if they have to do that with corrupt acts.

Another beneficial effect of corruption is that it reduces uncertainty and increases investment (Leff, 1964). Having a close connection with bureaucrats, entrepreneurs can, in cases of political uncertainty and crisis, exercise control over the consequences such situations might

have on their investments (Leff, 1964). Indeed, the autocratic environment in which they all function in can allow entrepreneurs, if they have political leverage, to share the monopolizing authority that bureaucracies acquire. In other words, in times of political uncertainty and crisis, entrepreneurs can play a dominant role in tailoring any new policies to their benefit.

Again, Leff is describing how corruption can help improve the economy only in underdeveloped, autocratic countries and how this endeavor can be furthered by entrepreneurs. Based on Leff's arguments, he is proposing realistic solutions for people who live in autocratic countries. The expression "the ends justify the means" does not sound very negative in this context. Indeed, Leff looks at providing some practical means, even through corruption, to help improve underdeveloped countries' economic situations.

Searching for the necessary loopholes is a vital endeavor when dealing with an autocratic regime that does not abide by a certain law. Thus, entrepreneurs can take advantage of corruption to make their innovative ideas emerge. With a more global consciousness, people come to realize the beneficial outcomes of democratizing their countries, but until they can attain this ideal, they must deal with the status quo and not wait. If they are practical and want to improve their countries' economies, entrepreneurs have to realize that corruption can be temporarily legitimized if it will eventually serve a good purpose. Therefore, until their countries become democratized, entrepreneurs must take necessary steps to improve the economy, even if it requires graft.

Corruption and Consociationalism

Lijphart's statement acknowledging consociationalism's susceptibility to corruption provided support for this thesis. In other words, Lijphart's acknowledgment adds more rigor to this thesis in that it conveys a genuine connection between corruption and consociationalism from the very person who argued for consociationalism's practicality in the first place. Lijphart says, "It may be hypothesized that the greater clarity of responsibility in majoritarian democracies inhibits corruption and that the consensus systems' tendency to compromise and 'deal-making' fosters corrupt practices" (Lijphart, 1999, p. 289). Based on this acknowledgement, this thesis takes this statement as a point of departure to describe what type of corruption that consociationalism produces, which is favoritism.

Upon delving into the literature on consociationalism, finding a study that argued solely that consociationalism is susceptible to corruption was extremely difficult. After extensive research, an interesting article surfaced; it was written in French by a Belgian scholar named A.-P. Frogner, and translated to English by Doig, in 1986. Frogner explicitly associates consociationalism with corruption, even in the title (*Corruption and Consociational Democracy: First Thoughts on the Belgian Case*). The main purpose of the article was to describe how consociationalism has facilitated corrupt practices in Belgium. In the 1980s, measures of corruption accurate enough to determine countries' ranks were not available; Frogner acknowledges that fact but offers some interesting insights into how corruption manifests in Belgium.

To begin with, Frogner describes Belgian politics as encompassing "all the hallmarks of a consociational democracy" (Frogner, 1986). Correspondingly, he describes the relevant

sectors of the Belgian government as parts of the elite cartels, though in Belgium they are called “political families,” “ideological families,” or even “sociological worlds” (Frognier, 1986).

Having a crucial question in mind—whether consociationalism can accentuate corruption or prevent it—Frognier rendered two hypotheses. The first one says, “The more dealings between elites, the greater the chances for corruption” (Frognier, 1986, p. 144). His hypothesis is based on the notion that corruption is an unavoidable result of the exercise of power. Hence, Frognier (1986) speculated that consociationalism can increase the practice of corruption if it provides the potentiality of corrupt practices. His second hypothesis—actually a counterhypothesis—says, “Opening up the decision making processes to several sectors in a society would lessen the need to use corruption as a functional alternative to direct participation in power” (Frognier, 1986, p. 144). According to this hypothesis, the institutionalization of negotiations between social and political actors contributes to lessened conflict between them and can prevent the tyranny of the majority.

Moreover, Frognier found some interesting results. Some evidence supports his second hypothesis, for which the institutionalization of negotiations is relatively effective; nevertheless, in his case study, negotiations among elites were not positive (Frognier, 1986). Given that consociationalism strives to establish a cooperative environment among elite cartels in the grand coalition, this empowerment makes elites work together corruptly; it produces a “loud silence” (Frognier, 1986). Given the absence of opposition parties, a result of all parties’ having a group leader in the grand coalition, the mass media and other dissenters cannot voice their criticisms, because they will undermine their elite’s reputation. In addition, thanks to consociationalism’s

permanent position assignments for elite cartels, those cartels seek to maintain good reputations through “self-protection” (Frogner, 1986).

Threatening that a change in the status quo may lead to disastrous outcomes, elite cartels try to cover up any scandals. Although, as in many democracies, Belgium’s campaign processes involve some wealthy contributors seeking political influence, this is not important in how consociationalism prompts corrupt practices in Belgium. Frogner is critical of the public prosecutor, of whom it is well known that he “is particularly cautious about inquiring into cases of political corruption at the highest level.... This caution itself is a factor which helps inter-family political trade-offs and internal policing and which reinforces the general preference for self-protection” (Frogner, 1986, p. 146). Therefore, the notion of self-protection is made valid through the ways in which the public prosecutor cannot inquire about any cases of political corruption pertaining to the political class only because of his cautiousness.

Hence, elite cartels are immune from official scrutiny because the consociational put them over the law. Tellingly, it can be inferred from Frogner’s article that Belgium’s elites’ behavior to seek self-protection and to avoid any public scrutiny for political corruption is based on the relative fear that the system will collapse. Therefore, Belgium’s case of political corruption portrays that consociationalism not only can justify practices of corruption but that the whole theory is “hanging by a thread.” (Frogner, 1986).

Why It All Matters

Corruption has been condemned in every society, from the ancient Greeks to modern times. Looking at it from a legal, moral, or practical perspective, corruption has disastrous implications for the behavior or the efficacy of institutions. While some scholars argue that

corruption can be utilized and even render positive results, they still prescribe the usage of corruption as a temporary resort. Thus, proponents of corruption still condemn it, but they suggest using it only in underdeveloped countries that seek to improve their economies. Once they have developed their economies to the point that they are similar to those of developed countries, the underdeveloped countries can then forego the use of corruption. This does not mean that corruption can be easily used and then stopped.

With regard to consociationalism and corruption, Frogner's article gives a better understanding of how consociationalism can produce corrupt practices. Indeed, elite cartels not only enjoy immunity and power, but the principles related to their enjoyment of these authoritative positions are fundamentally corrupt. The idea that a fragmented country should be ruled by elites makes some consociational countries susceptible to corruption. Frogner shows how Belgium's political class has reinforced its power through the consociational system, which has given them political leverage to be above the law.

All in all, this literature review's endeavor is to shed light on the many arguments pertaining to consociationalism and corruption. Scholars of conflict resolution have put substantial effort into rendering theories that identify the problems and remedial theories that help enhance the situation; Lijphart's consociationalism is one of them. By introducing consociationalism, Lijphart has significantly contributed to the body of knowledge and should be credited for that. But, thoroughly analyzing of what consociationalism has to offer raises important concerns, one of which is its propensity for corruption. A careful analysis of consociationalism shows how some factors in some countries makes its consociational system aggravate corruption.

Chapter Three: Methods & Results

Corruption is and has always been a plague that corrodes societies and their governmental institutions. Given that consociational democracies are the focus of this study, the thesis is attempting to test the following hypothesis: consociational democracies are prone to corruption. According to Arend Lijphart, “it may be hypothesized that the greater clarity of responsibility in majoritarian democracies inhibits corruption and that the consensus systems’ tendency to compromise and ‘deal-making’ fosters corrupt practices” (Lijphart, 1999, p. 289). This statement not only alludes to consociationalism’s inherent susceptibility to corruption, it justifies the hypothesis of general interest in this research. This being said, this chapter shall illustrate the methods that were implemented in the research to test the hypothesis quantitatively and qualitatively.

It is highly important to list both the quantitative and the qualitative research questions of this study:

1. What are the effects of corruption on consociational democracies?
2. Are non-consociational democracies less corrupt?
3. To what types of corruption are consociational democracies prone?
4. Is there a relevant country that has a clear connection between consociationalism and corruption— specifically, the favoritism type of corruption?

Setting

This is a secondary mixed-methods thesis. This means that both quantitative and qualitative data were collected from scholarly surveys and research, both of which were primary research. Moreover, peer-reviewed research and internationally recognized surveys constitute the foundation of data in this thesis.

Sample

Given that the independent variables were consociational democracies, civil liberties and political rights, and the dependent variable was corruption, measuring these variables required internationally recognized measurement surveys. But consociational democracies were primarily identified from the studies mentioned in the chapter describing the review of the literature. In other words, in reviewing the literature, this thesis determined certain democracies to be consociational based on their presence in case studies conducted by scholars. Correspondingly, a nonrandom purposive sample was selected from a measurement list that rates countries' degree of freedom based on their levels of political rights and civil liberties.

For the purpose of comparison, thirteen non-consociational countries (that share some characteristics of consociational countries) were selected to be compared with thirteen consociational democracies. Each country had a numerical ranking of its level of corruption next to it; this measurement will be illustrated later. In addition, each country's degree of political rights and civil liberties are measured on a scale from 1 to 7, 1 being the highest and 7 being the lowest.

Measurement Instruments

The quantitative data measuring corruption collected from 2003 to 2012 was from “Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index”

The index is an aggregate indicator that brings together data from a number of different sources. Each data source must fulfill the following criteria to qualify as a source for the Corruption Perceptions Index:

- Quantifies perceptions of corruption in the public sector
- Be based on a reliable and valid methodology, which scores and ranks multiple countries on the same scale
- Performed by a credible institution and expected to be repeated regularly
- Allow for sufficient variation of scores to distinguish between countries

(Short Methodology Note, 2012, p. 1).

That source is invaluable because it uses a corruption ranking scale from 0 to 100, with 0 being “fully corrupt” and 100 being “corruption-free.” The significance of the corruption index lies in its ranking measurements of corruption in countries, thus enabling comparisons.

The second source was the Freedom House Organization website from 2003 to 2012. Among the data provided on the site, the survey of interest to this thesis is Freedom in the World:

The Freedom in the World survey provides an annual evaluation of the progress and decline of freedom in 195 countries and 14 related and disputed territories. The survey, which includes both analytical reports and numerical ratings, measures freedom

according to two broad categories: political rights and civil liberties. Political rights ratings are based on an evaluation of three subcategories: electoral process, political pluralism and participation, and functioning of government. Civil liberties ratings are based on an evaluation of four subcategories: freedom of expression and belief, associational and organizational rights, rule of law, and personal autonomy and individual rights. (Methodology Summary, p.32)

Thus, the previously mentioned survey's data were used to determine the degree of freedom in the sample of countries used in this research. The logic behind determining the degree of freedom in countries is adding more supporting variables. It is worth noting that the Freedom in the World Survey uses two interval scales that define levels of political rights and civil liberties. The incorporation of the degree of countries' freedom will enable comparisons of political rights and civil liberties to the level of corruption in a given country.

Given that consociational democracies are the most important in the comparison, non-consociational countries were selected primarily because of their shared characteristics with consociational democracies. In doing so, consociational democracies could be fairly compared to countries that are similar to them. This thesis could have incorporated all countries, but this would not constitute a good example given that there are only thirteen consociational democracies.

Quantitative Results

The literature review surveys existing work on the connections between consociationalism and corruption. While case studies do focus on the presence of corruption in specific countries, no systematic study of consociationalism and corruption has yet been undertaken. Following the literature review is a preliminary statistical exploration of the propensity of consociational political systems to succumb to corruption. Twenty-six countries were selected and divided into two groups. The first group, non-consociational countries, included the following countries: Costa Rica, Croatia, Germany, Denmark, Poland, South Africa, Singapore, Switzerland, Turkey, Iran, Australia, United Arab Emirates and Qatar. The second sample consisted of consociational countries: Belgium, Iraq, Nigeria, Malaysia, Macedonia, Austria, Indonesia, Colombia, Cyprus, India, Netherlands, Lebanon, and Bosnia.

Using measurements of freedom established by the non-governmental organization Freedom House and indices of corruption reported by Transparency International, a simple regression confirmed a statistically-significant association over a ten-year period between the two variables. Consociational countries were more corrupt than non-consociational ones. Moreover, increases in political rights in a given country are associated with a decrease in corruption. Surprisingly, increases in civil rights are associated with an increase in corruption.

The regression produced an R^2 (.46) that indicates a moderate relationship between the independent and dependent variable. The fact that a country has a consociational governing arrangement is associated a 14 point worsening in its corruption ranking compared to a non-consociational country (since, on the Transparency International scale, the more corrupt a country is perceived to be, the lower its score, the coefficient takes a negative sign). Moreover, a

one-point improvement (i.e. a lower number) in the political rights component of the Freedom House index is associated with a 10 point improvement (i.e. a higher number) in the Transparency International corruption index for both consociational and non-consociational countries. Interestingly, a one point improvement in the civil liberties component of the Freedom House index is associated with an even larger (nearly 19 point) worsening in the corruption scores of the twenty-six countries. (See appendix for the regression results)

Chapter Four: Case Study

How does consociationalism in Lebanon lead to corrupt favoritism?

As pressing as the issue of consociationalism and corruption is, it is necessary to embark upon a case study that is relevant to the research's interest. This being said, this thesis used Lebanon to be the case study for many reasons. First, Lebanon has been ranked eighteenth on the Transparency International Corruption Index 2012, which means it has high levels of corruption. Second, Lebanon is clearly consociational based not only on Lijphart's study of it as part of his consociational cross-national research but also on the National Covenant in 1943 and the Taif Accord in 1989, which will be discussed in detail later on. This case study will focus on the main crux of this thesis, which is how consociational entities are prone to corruption, specifically favoritism.

For the purpose of clarification, the following terms that are related to consociationalism require some definitions. First, clientalism, which "is a set of interpersonal relations of a hierarchical nature based on unequal exchange between patrons and clients" (Makhoul and Harrison, 2004, p. 28), is one of the societal features that lead to corrupt favoritism in a consociational arrangement. Second, the term sectarianism, in the case of Lebanon, refers to the legitimate political engagement and parliamentary representation of religious groups. Tellingly, the consociational nature of Lebanese politics provides legitimate access for religious sects to actively participate in the political arena. Last, confessionalism in Lebanon reflects its government composition which along confessional lines.

The Republic of Lebanon

The Republic of Lebanon, which declared its dependence in 1943, is an Arab parliamentary democratic country and a member of the Arab League with its political capital in Beirut. With over 10,452 square kilometers of land area, Lebanon is located on the east coastline of the Mediterranean Sea. Lebanon is headed by a president who is a representation of the national unity and the commander-in-chief of the armed forces. Ideally, the political system is grounded on the values “of separation, balance, and cooperation amongst the powers” (The Lebanese Political System).

With respect to the branches of government, the legislative institution, called the Chamber of Deputies (Parliament), has 128 members who have four-year terms. In addition, given that Lebanon’s legislature is a parliamentary system, members or deputies of the legislative body elect a prime minister who serves as the head of the executive body. The prime minister composes his cabinet with the approval of the president of the republic. Judges, although independent in their exercise, are under the purview of the Ministry of Justice.

Lebanese Society

Lebanese society is highly diverse and fragmented. Although diverse societies in countries that uphold civil society and have no consociational arrangements employ this diversity to their countries’ interest, Lebanon’s diverse society in their consociational arrangement has led to entrenched religious sectarianism (Makhoul and Harrison, 2004; Hudson, 1999). With the cleavage between Muslims and Christians that exacerbated sectarianism, seventeen sectarian groups were formally recognized (Hudson, 1999).

Because of the mere existence of these seventeen sectarian groups and manipulations of patron-client relations of the consociational system have made them politically active, Shields (2008) argues that two civil wars ignited in Lebanon—the first in 1958 and the second from 1975 to 1990. Confessional groups in Lebanon emanate from Christianity or Islam (Shields, 2008). The breakdowns of these confessional groups are as follows:

Christians—Maronites, Greek Orthodox, Greek Catholic, Armenian Orthodox, Armenian Catholic, and Protestant (Salamey and Payne, 2008); and Muslims—Sunni, Shiite, Druze, Alawite, and Ismaelite (Salamey and Payne, 2008).

The Consequences of the 1975–1990 Civil War

While Lebanon's pre-1975 consociational system empowered some sects over others, some observers argue that consequence of that was the devastating 1975 civil war that lasted for fifteen years. While Lebanon was an embodiment of success for a consociational democracy, according to Arend Lijphart, after the civil war erupted, consociational theory was considered otherwise (Lijphart, 1987; Devre, 2011). In an attempt to stop the civil war, the Lebanese government requested Syrian assistance (Shields, 2008). As a result, in June 1976, the Syrian government deployed 30,000 troops to Lebanon in an effort to end the fighting (Shields, 2008).

Although the Syrian troops made significant efforts to stop the war, unfortunately, the bloodshed did not stop until the Taif Accord was reached in 1989, which was sponsored by Saudi Arabia (Shields, 2008). The main objectives of the Taif Accord were not only to end the civil war but also to organize a fairer power-sharing representation among the sectarian groups. "The Taif Accord modified the National Pact by increasing the number of parliamentary seats from 99 deputies (54 Christian, 45 Muslim) to 108 deputies (54 Christian, 54 Muslim). The

number of seats was changed again through 1992 electoral law to 128 seats (64 Christian, 64 Muslim)” (Shields, 2008). In addition, the agreement stipulated that the president of the republic had to be a Maronite, the prime minister a Sunni, and the speaker of the house a Shiite. “The Taif Accord also extended the term of the Shia Speaker from one year to four years, reduced the power of the Maronite Christian president, and increased the power of the Sunni prime minister” (Shields, 2008).

In general, the Taif Accord temporarily mitigated the tensions among sectarian groups. Because the agreement expanded parliamentary seats to 128, each sectarian group was given a number of seats based on the group’s population (Salamey and Payne, 2008). Therefore, in each electoral district, seats are recognized as belonging to sectarian groups, with each individual chosen by votes (Salamey and Payne, 2008).

It did not take much time for the Taif Accord’s drawbacks to surface. Although the agreement did end the civil war, it did not make significant changes in the patronage-driven, sectarian-based system that was adopted in 1943 (Salamey and Payne, 2008). Indeed, instead of taking the initiative to put the civil war as an example of the shocking consequences of imbalances in the system, group leaders have agreed to merely update the current system. The Lebanese people could have taken the opportunity to call for a form of democracy that establishes civil societal institutions and identifies citizens and officials solely by their Lebanese citizenships, not by their sectarian affiliation. Lebanon’s sectarian elites rarely reach a consensus on policies, and the Taif Accord exacerbated this problem by adding more sectarian elites (Denoeux, 2005; Salamey and Payne, 2008).

Lebanon's Legislature

When conducting a study on Lebanon's political system, the legislative body is central to the research because Lebanon is a consociational parliamentary democracy, and as such, the executive extends from the legislature. Moreover, "it is the legislative body that summons the collective will of society and institutionally channels the political struggle for power" (Salamey and Payne, 2008, p. 452). Tellingly, lacking a close observation of the nature of Lebanon's legislature, the features that infiltrated its consociational system will more likely be intractable and, thus, the anticipated susceptibility consociationalism with corruption will be almost impossible to detect.

Lebanon's political apparatus is based on two main two initiatives, the 1926 Constitution and the unwritten National Pact of 1943 (Salamey and Payne, 2008). With respect to the Taif Accord, however, it amended the Constitution and modified the National Pact (Salamey and Payne, 2008). Although the Constitution established the branches of government, it also established a weak legislature that gave the executive branch far more leverage and dominance than the others (Salamey and Payne, 2008). As a result, the bulk of the legislature's work has involved dealing with the confessional disputes among sectarian representatives regarding the Christian Maronite and Muslim Sunni executive policies.

Due to the consociational nature of Lebanese politics, the legislature has not become an institution that represents the people and a place for deliberation; it has become an arena of conflict with constant gridlock. This being said, it is worth describing how Lebanon manifests many features of consociationalism.

Positive Impacts of Consociationalism in Lebanon

In societies plagued with cross-cutting cleavages among different ethnic or religious groups, power-sharing solutions have been able to prevent outbreaks of civil wars (Jeog, 2005; Devre, 2011). As one of the power-sharing theories, consociationalism is considered a liberal democratic peace theory (Doyle, 1986; Devre, 2011). According to Shils (1966), “Lebanon is a country which must be kept completely still politically in order to prevent communal self-centeredness and mutual distrust from turning into active and angry contention” (as cited in Salamey & Payne, 2008, p. 455). In Lebanon, the consociational system has moderated “inter-denominational tensions,” which has enabled sectarian groups with different religions coexist (Salamey & Payne, 2008). Indeed, in some periods of Lebanon’s history, consociational arrangements mitigated sectarian tensions. As a matter of fact, consociationalism institutionalized sectarianism that was unorganized.

Consociationalism in Lebanon

Consociationalism in Lebanon built upon the society’s long experience with ethnic or religious leaders that engage in Lebanese politics. Historically, Mount Lebanon’s political and socioeconomic organization has been relatively feudal (Hamzeh, 2001; Harik, 1966). Hence, the grand coalition of religious or ethnic leaders that consociationalism had to offer and the subordination of groups to those leaders were easily embraced due to the feudal nature of Lebanon’s political and economic environment.

In Arabic, the feudal system is called “Al Eqtaia,” and the feudal leader was referred to as “Muqataji.” However, this feudal leader was subservient to an emir, who had this superior position due to the prominence of his family (Hamzeh, 2001). The prominent feudal families in

Lebanon were the Shihabs, who ranked first, “followed by the Abi Al-Lama and the Arslans, all of whom were given the princely title of emir. Next in line came the families with the title of shaykh, including the Druze Junblats and Talhuqs and the Maronite Khazins. Almost equally important were the Shiite Hamadeh shaykhs, not to mention the Khuri and Karam shatkhs, both of whom were Maronites” (Hamzeh, 2001, p. 168).

The major feature of Lebanon’s late-eighteenth- and early-nineteenth-century feudal system was that personal loyalty and obedience were rendered to the feudal emirs (Hamzeh, 2001). With respect to consociationalism, the Lebanese political system has shifted from feudal to consociational without significant behavioral changes in the society. In fact, the obedience that Lebanese people used to render to the feudal lords was simply transferred to the consociational arrangement. But success was not the system’s eventual fate.

“Lebanon’s power-sharing democracy takes a consociational or group-building block approach and relies on accommodation by political leaders, decision-making by consensus, and active participation by minority groups” (Shields, 2008, p. 475). According to Salamey and Payne (2008), the Constitution and the Taif Accord were the main impetus for instituting consociationalism in Lebanon. This system has allocated the highest public offices to sectarian groups (Salamey & Payne, 2008). Hence, consociationalism institutionalizes feudal lords’ positions as forms of government positions. This shows how feudal lords were given the opportunity to continue their dominance in a legal, institutional manner.

By establishing this consociational system, confessional groups have been given access to governmental patronage (Hamzeh, 2001). This is evident in the families from which representatives come. In fact, studies have reported that out of 359 representatives, 300 may be

considered to have inherited their parliamentary seats from family members (Hamzeh, 2001). Although governmental patronage and favoritism are not endorsed by the consociational theory, it has led to them in Lebanon's case in which pretexting patron-client relations have increased by means of Lebanon's consociational system. Tellingly, the favoritism example directs this research toward an essential issue in Lebanon, which is corruption.

Corruption in Lebanon

Distributional rights and communal identity are interrelated in Lebanon because of confessional groups' patron-client relationships (Shields, 2008). In other words, in order to have access to government services in general, a Lebanese individual has to have good connections. Government services that are rendered by patrons, for example, are driver's licenses, government projects, college admissions, etc. (Hamzeh, 2001). Correspondingly, the majority of government services will be rendered to people who have connections, and ultimately, corruption will occur. In these connections, the person who will provide the service will either need money in exchange or provide the service because the person who requested it is from the same sectarian group.

“Although corruption has existed long before the civil war in Lebanon, the implementation of the new power sharing system seems to have bolstered state corruption to new levels” (Devre, 2011, p. 222). The consociational system has put in place sectarian elites who have contributed to a citizen-government relationship based on favoritism and cronyism. Due to the new, updated system of power-sharing, each sectarian elite is distributing benefits to whomever it pleases, and this has led to state corruption (Young, 1998; Devre, 2011). Corruption in the form of favoritism and cronyism has not only eroded the legislature, it has also affected the executive branch and the whole bureaucracy (Hudson, 1976; Devre, 2011). For example, the

Sunni prime minister controls the finance ministry and, consequently, he controls Lebanon's political economy and its decision-making process (Devre, 2011).

As mentioned in this thesis, the pillars of consociationalism are “(1) a grand coalition of elites from different groups, (2) a veto for each group in important policy areas, (3) proportional representation in key institutions, and (4) group autonomy” (Lijphart, 1977, p. 25), and there is evidence of corruption in the majority of these pillars in Lebanon. With respect to proportionality, Lebanon's sectarian elites have employed cronyism and favoritism for their groups in order to maintain their seats (Devre, 2011). Although consociationalism's proportionality is not limited to parliamentary seats, sectarian elites in Lebanon used this advantage in a negative way to dominate certain bureaucracies. This has made Lebanon's bureaucracies as separate entities that reflect each sectarian group. Instead of using proportionality within bureaucracies, Lebanon's sectarian elites have applied it among bureaucracies (Devre, 2011). Moreover, given that each sectarian group used its veto rights for their own interests while undermining the nation's interest, these veto rights have caused parliamentary stalemates that have prevented many bills from passing (Devre, 2011). Again, this does not mean that consociationalism is corrupt, but the patron-client relationship in Lebanon has infiltrated the pillars of consociationalism and, hence, exacerbating corruption.

Regarding group autonomy in Lebanon, it has been utilized for group benefits, but it also has separated the nation, making groups, theoretically, in separate worlds. Finally, “grand coalitions made it possible that political blocs were formed along sectarian lines, which again bolstered favoritism and cronyism” (Devre, 2011, p. 236). By having this autonomy, the notion of a strong Lebanese state is least likely to exist (Salamey & Payne, 2008).

Lebanon's consociationalism has applied proportionality in public sector appointments as consociationalism prescribes. But the patron-client relations have exacerbated favoritism (Devre, 2011). Due to the abundance of benefits their positions offer, sectarian elites have managed to convince their group members that access to government services and rights cannot be done individually. Instead, sectarian group members have to ask their sectarian elites for services. Due to the patron-client relations in Lebanon, elites have made the political climate more sectarian than it was. The power-sharing principle was applied to preclude conflict among confessional groups and to make government more efficient, but it seems that sectarian elites want to reinforce sectarianism and not compromise. While in many democracies candidates running for office promise prosperity to all citizens, the practice of consociationalism in Lebanon made sectarian candidates promise benefits only for their own groups. Indeed, people running for office in Lebanon make their group members feel that they are going to a battlefield to fight for them. Although it is normal in a consociational system that elites strive to benefit their groups, but the Lebanese elites have unfairly distributed wealth to their groups (Devre, 2011). "Political elites were able to draw upon the fears of domination by other confessional groups to protect their own status as defenders of their groups versus leaders from other religious factions" (Salamey & Payne, 2008, p. 464). Consociationalism was not put in place for elites to compete, it is intended to make elites cooperate.

The quota system in parliament, as mentioned before, was put in place to accommodate the seventeen recognized sects. But, unfortunately, this system has influenced electoral behavior. Citizens cast their votes for candidates of their own religious sects, not on the basis of merit or the candidate's political agenda (Devre, 2011). In turn, there is no real competition among candidates, and this will eventually inhibit innovation and development. Which means that with

lack of competition, campaigning will least likely include promises for reform; instead, campaign promises will be based on more sectarian representation in government.

Sectarian influence has not been confined to men only; women have been influenced by it as well. Many Lebanese female critics claim that the six women in parliament do not represent Lebanese women. In addition, these representatives have been handpicked by sectarian elites and, thus, cannot engage in parliamentary activities that will harm those elites (Salamey & Payne, 2008). This means that female representatives cannot support policies pertaining to all Lebanese women, should these policies conflict with elite interests.

Consociationalism in Lebanon has created a political environment of brokers. Each individual seeks to make deals with representatives, bureaucrats, judges, and so on in order to finish any government work. In this corrupt environment, sectarian elites will prevent any initiative to change the system because they enjoy the lion's share of benefits that the system has to offer. The major problem is that consociationalism perpetuates sectarian elites' existence by giving them permanent positions in the grand coalition. Any attempt to amend the system will be fought on the basis of fear of another civil war. In other words, if any concerned Lebanese demands change that will affect elites' political positions, the elites will convince the Lebanese people that this change will make them go into conflict among each other and will eventually lead to another civil war.

With Lebanon's being a weak state, which has led to Syrian troop presence to maintain security, Syrian pressure on Lebanon's electoral system has resulted in corruption in the form of gerrymandering of some districts for presidential elections (U. N., 2006; Shields, 2008). Gerrymandering was based on expanding districts that favor a potential president that supports

Syria. In this light, sectarian elites who are benefiting from any foreign country will not stop at preventing any attempt to reform the electoral system. Lebanon's weak state has contributed to forcing factions to look for support beyond Lebanon's borders (Hudson, 1968; Salamey & Payne, 2008).

Foreign intervention is not confined to the electoral system, however. Given the geostrategic position of Lebanon, confessional elites have established foreign alliances (Salamey and Payne, 2008). This is a result of the vulnerability of the Lebanese state in efforts to maintain its sovereignty. Sectarian elites utilize their foreign support to fortify their domestic positions (Salamey & Payne, 2008). "Shiite Hezbollah and the Amal Movement aligned themselves with Syria and Iran; Sunni, Druze, and some Maronite groups sought the support of both France and the U.S." (Salamey & Payne, 2008, p. 458). Patron-client relations have contributed to these foreign alliances for which the system divides citizens along sectarian lines. Undoubtedly, the Lebanese society will not unite and will continue to consider its government weak in light of the role of sectarian elites.

It seems that in the absence of robust institutions, the phenomena of favoritism and cronyism practiced by sectarian elites will not end (Devre, 2011). It looks as though Lebanese elites want the status quo to persist. As they did during the civil war and continue to, Spears argues that elite favoritism will continue (Spears, 2000; Devre, 2011). Tellingly, the prevalence of favoritism and cronyism in Lebanon is being extended to and supported by elites who consider themselves to be saving the country from a new civil war.

Passing laws to end state corruption seems impossible given the veto rights that each group of sectarian elites possesses (Devre, 2011). In fact, these sectarian elites have blocked

many previous attempts to counter corruption (Devre, 2011). While Lebanon is considered one of the few democratic countries in the Arab world, the authority and immunities that sectarian elites enjoy undermine Lebanon's democracy. Indeed, while autocratic regimes are criticized for the one-man rule and dominance of their countries, in Lebanon's case, each a sectarian elite, with all the authority at its disposal, is relatively functioning as an autocrat—but in a more complex manner because of the many sectarian elites who have the authority of an autocrat in one country.

Instead of positively using quotas to the country's benefit, "confessional groups have focused on grasping onto the patronage spoils from the division of public sector offices and resources, trading alliances and allegiances in efforts to maintain or increase their proportion of influence" (Salamey & Payne, 2008, p. 456). In this patronage environment, networks, rather than bureaucratic institutions, are handling distributional issues (Leenders, 2003; Devre, 2011). In order to reinforce their patronage networks, sectarian elites compete with one another for access to public goods, which makes it a zero-sum game (Salamey & Payne, 2008). Sectarian elites have segmented the political order into patriarchal units that they dominate, and, hence, they negotiate among themselves for control of and access to public resources and goods (Salamey & Payne, 2008). Lacking any sort of legitimate competition, however, confessional elites will continue to build larger networks of patronage (Salamey & Payne, 2008). Evidently, when any given official knows that he will not face competition and the position in which he resides is permanent, corrupt practices of patronage, favoritism, and cronyism will prevail. This goes back to the historical patron-client relationships in the Lebanese society that has distorted its current consociational system.

As much as patron-client relationships have contributed to corruption in Lebanon's consociational system, it has also affected the society. Postwar Lebanese society is still held captive by the prewar patron-client interactions (Makhoul & Harrison, 2004). Warlords are providing jobs and connections for business owners and merchants (Makhoul & Harrison, 2004), a practice that has made the Lebanese people clients for warlords, who are now the confessional elites. Lebanese society is basically doing the same deal making that happens in parliament, though in a different setting. "This situation has made the cliental system more socioeconomically entrenched and effective, facilitated by tight labor market conditions, which has tied the clients more tightly in their livelihood to the destiny and whims of their patrons" (Ofeish, 1999, p. 112).

In many postcolonial countries, the political arrangement is clientalist, in which citizen rights are weak with regard to regulations and procedures, and, thus, informal groups play a major role in regulations (Khan, 1996, 1998; Neal & Tansey, 2010). According to Walzer, in circumstances in which clientalism prevails, corruption shall manifest in some form of political life and business (Walzer, 1973; Neal & Tansey, 2010). In this clientalist environment, government institutions will inevitably become weak and may succumb to corruption.

While confessional elites are in governmental positions, patrons can be members of labor unions or militias (Makhoul & Harrison, 2004). Basically, these organizations are hierarchically structured, with sectarian elites at the top and patrons working at the bottom, close to the public. For example, when a Lebanese citizen needs service, he simply requests it from the patron in his district. In this way, patrons and clients benefit mutually because the client gets his service and the patron earns the client's support (Gunes-Ayata, 1994; Scott, 1977; Makhoul & Harrison,

2004). With such support, the patron can be assured that when he runs for a municipal position, for example, he will be able to get his clients' votes.

In Arabic, patrons in Lebanon are called *zu'ama* (plural) and *zaim* (singular). The practice that is built on patron-client interactions is called *wasta* in Arabic. *Wasta* is "the ability to attract a client group and attain access to a power broker" (Hamzeh, 2001, p. 170). Criticism of the role of *wasta* is common in almost every Arab country to the extent that even illiterate Arabs usually know what it means. The term is so common that it is used colloquially. A person who has *wasta* can obtain a variety of favors, like a job or even a college admission (Makhoul & Harrison, 2004).

Obviously, in order to have access to *wasta*, an individual must establish good relations with patrons. Patrons are from wealthy families, and their societal positions are hereditary (Makhoul & Harrison, 2004). While democracies that have real civil society institutions and clear, open channels for citizen participation have no patrons, in Lebanon it is relatively hard for an individual to obtain services from the government without the help of a patron. This arrangement is common in many Arab countries; in Lebanon, the patrons are divided along sectarian lines. "The inability among some of Lebanon's political elite to embrace normative, democratic standards of behavior to guide negotiations, encourage compromise and promote cooperation, particularly since the Syrian withdrawal, has made it impossible to institutionalize these values in a way which would promote democratic reform" (Shields, 2008, p. 485).

As mentioned earlier, unlike sectarian elites, patrons interact closely with the Lebanese people and consider them clients. This close relationship gives patrons a better understanding of what their clients need from government. Although this behavior is considered corrupt in

Lebanon and in other countries, for some people, it is their only alternation. Since the confessional elites in higher positions in government are in favor of corruption, any grassroots effort to end the corruption will be blocked. The more this patron-client behavior continues, the more likely the Lebanese society will continue to depend on getting services through favors (Gubser, 1974; Knight, 1992; Salem, 1973; Makhoul & Harrison, 2004). In fact, if this patron-client arrangement permeates Lebanese society, it will likely be extremely hard to change (Roniger, 1994; Hamzeh, 2001; Eisenstadt & Roniger, 1984; Makhoul & Harrison, 2004).

Given that sectarian elites have foreign support, which solely benefits members of their groups, the Lebanese state cannot offer public goods and services like elites do (Makhoul & Harrison, 2004). This means that an individual who does not ask patrons for services and instead goes directly to the state will not receive the services that he or she needs. In turn, this individual will not have any option other than seeking *wasta* from a *zaim* for the needed service.

The patron-client influence goes beyond simple services. In fact, even the judicial system is susceptible to it. For example, if a *zaim* facilitates the process of appointing a judge, that judge would probably be lenient toward a criminal who is affiliated with that *zaim* (Makhoul & Harrison, 2004). This shows the extent of the patrons' enormous leverage. Had it not been for consociationalism in Lebanon, which instituted the patron-client relationships, citizens could have pursued other means to get services from the government. Indeed, the extent of patron-client relations in Lebanon has divided the society and made it almost impossible for citizens to consider themselves equal in their own country. Hence, the structure of the Lebanese political system has become like a council of separate entities. The sense of belonging to one nation is

impossible to achieve in a political system plagued with client-patron relationships (Anderson, 2000; Makhoul & Harrison, 2004).

The ideal of a greater Lebanon that treats all citizens equally is relatively hard to achieve. This is quite obvious given that elites in the political system and patrons in the society are benefiting from the status quo. Confessional traditions have benefited political leaders to the extent that they impede any bureaucratic development due to concerns of losing their interests (Salibi, 1988; Salem, 1973; Makhoul & Harrison, 2004). In the leaders' attempt to perpetuate patron-client relationships, "it is useful to blame the government for neglect and to cast themselves as the protectors of the people" (Makhoul & Harrison, 2004, p. 30). Hence, development is prevented by these patron-client relationships (Makhoul & Harrison, 2004).

Another example of the power of patron-client relations is government projects in villages. In a case study conducted by Jihad Makhoul and Lindsey Harrison, the influence of *wasta* in two Lebanese villages, Dar el Lawz and Ain Zeitoun, was observed (Makhoul & Harrison, 2004). In Dar el Lawz, for example, villagers would not have had a mosque built in their village had it not been for their access to *wasta* (Makhoul & Harrison, 2004). Although these villagers benefited from their *wasta*, a schoolteacher in Ain Zeitoun was not satisfied with the role of *wasta* (Makhoul & Harrison, 2004). According to an interview conducted by Makhoul and Harrison (2004), a male teacher said about the school principal "he is corrupt and has been accused of stealing the school money and spending it. They could not fire him. The problem is not with the man, but the currents that steer him" (p. 32). This frustrated schoolteacher displays the extent to which *wasta* plays a negative role in his village and also shows how it gives immunity to those who practice corruption. Definitely, the power of *wasta* is known in many

Arab countries in which certain government employees can either arrive to work late or use their positions for personal gain with no accountability, even if complaints are raised against them.

Lebanon's consociational system stipulates that the highest positions in government are determined along sectarian lines; the president is a Maronite Christian, the prime minister a Sunni Muslim, and the speaker of the house a Shiite Muslim. In this consociational power-sharing arrangement, competition among sectarian candidates is minimal because the positions are fixed. Unless there is another strong candidate from the same sect who decides to run against an incumbent, the incumbent's position is almost permanent. Hence, enjoying minimal competition and healthy support from his sectarian group, the incumbent could easily engage in corrupt practices. For example, Rafik Hariri had minimal competition and thus his engagement in corruption to reconstruct Lebanon was not faced with harsh criticism from his Sunni group (Neal & Tansey, 2010).

Lebanon is supposedly democratic (Issawi, 1966; Neal & Tansey, 2010). "The surface appearance of democracy, however, conceals a subculture of political corruption, embedded in a traditional political clientelist system, headed at the top by national (zaims) leaders" (Neal & Tansey, 2010, p. 39). In this context, it is imperative to mention Lebanon's former prime minister Rafik Hariri. A well-known billionaire, Hariri served as Lebanon's prime minister from 1992 to 1998 and from 2000 to 2004 (Abu Rizk, 2004; Neal & Tansey, 2010). Formerly, Hariri was a diplomatic representative in Saudi Arabia, where he played a major role in the negotiations that brought about the Taif Accord (Miller, 2005; Sbaiti, 1994; Neal & Tansey, 2010).

Although Hariri helped manifest the Taif Accord and reconstruct Lebanon after the civil war, the reconstruction was financed through corruption to the extent that, in 1992, Lebanon's

public debt was \$5 billion and had increased to \$35 billion by October 2004 (Becherer, 2005; Neal & Tansey, 2010). Hariri's corruption is considered by some Lebanese to be effective corruption (Neal & Tansey, 2010). But others criticize him for benefiting his own sectarian group and bringing businesses to their district. Hariri's corruption is only one example of many that patron-client relations have contributed to corrupting the political system.

Eventually, the end result of Lebanon's confessional system is a self-perpetuating capture of the state by confessional elites who are immune to accountability and undermine the role of government as the main regulator (Salamey & Payne, 2008). Thus, corruption will be curbed only if it harms those elites. This is counterproductive to the development of a modern democracy.

Conclusion

In societies plagued with cross-cutting cleavages, a conflict management system is necessary in order for ethnic or religious groups to coexist and not to resort to war to resolve their issues. Indeed, as a liberal peace theory, consociationalism was conceptualized by Arend Lijphart to help stabilize countries that struggle with fragmented societies. And consociationalism did play a major role in stabilizing Lebanon's society, but the 1975 civil war proved to be its undoing. The problem that consociationalism brought about in Lebanon is that it has put warlords in the highest positions of government.

Instead of being a temporary arrangement, consociationalism not only became the norm in Lebanon but also came to be seen as the only successful system for the country. Undoubtedly, sectarian elites have taken advantage of the many benefits that consociationalism has rendered to them. When they were informally interacting in the Lebanese society as warlords,

consociationalism gave sectarian elites legitimate authority for them to use at their disposal. And this authority was given to them on the basis of preventing any potential civil war. Hence, out of fear, consociationalism has rendered supreme authority to sectarian elites, and, in turn, any engagement in corruption by those elites cannot be countered due to fear of another civil war.

As this case study argues, Lebanon's patron-clients relationships have infiltrated the consociational system and, thus, contributed to the proliferation of corrupt favoritism. Since the system has put confessional elites in the grand coalition along sectarian lines, each sectarian elite will likely favor members of its own group. This is quite evident in the quota-based legislature, where affiliation, not merit, is the primary requirement for gaining a parliamentary seat.

The basic requirements for becoming president, prime minister, or speaker of the house perpetuate sectarianism, and, hence, the system is prone to corruption. A bold example of this, as mentioned earlier, is the former prime minister, Rafik Hariri, who engaged in corruption in both of the terms he served. Due to the consociational stipulations that require that a prime minister position to be given to a Sunni Muslim, Hariri's corruption was not supported by many citizens in Lebanon, except Sunnis. Obviously, any sectarian sect will not oppose actions that benefit them.

While consociationalism has been abused in Lebanon by producing corrupt favoritism in government, its influence has trickled down to the society. Patron-client relationships are a good example of how consociationalism has made favoritism an important facilitator in the citizenry's getting its demands met. Like sectarian elites, patrons, or *zu'ama*, attract members from their sects in exchange for favors. This means that it is least likely for a Muslim Sunni to seek favors from a Christian Maronite, and vice versa. The more sectarian elites who are entrenched in

dividing the society in government, the more likely it is that patrons, at the societal level, will continue engaging in this type of behavior.

While the notion of *wasta* is prevalent in many Arab countries, Lebanon's consociational system institutionalized it. In other words, *wasta*, as a form of corruption, is considered legitimate when used among sectarian members based on the authority that consociationalism gives them. For example, if two Lebanese citizens—a Sunni and a Maronite—apply for a job, and the only vacant position is reserved for Sunnis, the Sunni citizen will get the job. The problem here is that the Sunni will get the job even if the Maronite citizen is more qualified. In addition, if two Sunnis apply for that job, the one who has *wasta* will be hired, and, of course, due to the consociational system, any complaint about that will not get far.

While consociationalism endeavors to resolve conflict in fragmented societies, in Lebanon's case, it has deepened the existing divisions in these societies. As a result, as in the case of Lebanon, corrupt favoritism prevails, and any attempt to stop it will be blocked by the ultimate beneficiaries of the consociational system, the confessional elites.

All in all, consociationalism had maintained stability in Lebanon prior to the 1975 civil war, but the pre-existing patron-client relations made consociationalism a mean to institutionalize corrupt favoritism. This favoritism is embodied in sectarian elites who have practiced it in government, and, eventually, society followed suit. Lebanon is considered one of the few Arab democratic countries, but in order to be considered a full democracy, it has to adhere to a civil system that treats citizens equally, not according to sectarian lines. In doing so, any corrupt official would not appeal to a sectarian elite for help. In addition, if this civil

democratic system is applied in Lebanon, sectarian elites will no longer advocate remaining in the status quo by using threats of a potential civil war.

Chapter Five: Discussion

Given that this chapter focuses on interpreting the results of this mixed-methods research, it is worth reiterating that this research was designed to test the validity of the correlation between consociationalism and corruption. While consociationalism has maintained temporary stability in some fragmented societies, depending on it has rendered negative consequences. Based on this premise, the following paragraphs shall illustrate the results of the study along with a detailed interpretation of all quantitative and qualitative measurements.

Prior to embarking upon interpreting the results of the thesis, it is crucial to explain why this thesis has utilized mixed methods. Quantitative results that established a correlation between consociational countries and corruption have prompted the case study to investigate corruption in Lebanon. In addition, given the importance of assessing the performance of systems that were put in place for the purpose of conflict resolution, a mere utilization of quantitative data, with a presumably large number of cases, will require case study examples. Thus, the qualitative case study on Lebanon has served as an example of how consociational systems are prone to corruption.

As mentioned in the methods chapter, two quantitative measurements were used in this study. The first measure was from the Freedom House Freedom in the World Survey. This was used to measure the degree of freedom in countries from 2003 to 2012 and was utilized to determine the degree of civil liberties and political rights in the two samples. The non-consociational sample was purposely selected because this would be a fair sample of non-consociational countries compared to the other sample of consociational countries.

Moreover, in the sample of consociational countries, only four out of the thirteen countries were labeled as completely free countries. This suggests an important point pertaining to the role of elites in the grand coalition. Since elites in consociational countries are the supreme representatives who deliberate and render policies, it seems that in free consociational countries, elites have restraints on their authority. As in the case of Lebanon, which was labeled as partly free, confessional elites do not have strong oversight and, thus, restraint on their power is most likely minimal. This is due to the corrupt favoritism that sectarian elites benefit from. Given that the Freedom House Freedom in the World Survey measures the degree of freedom according to political rights and civil liberties, the four consociational countries categorized as completely free must have good restraints on elites' authority. And, elites in the other nine consociational countries that have been categorized as partly free or not free must have authority that is not subject to oversight.

The second measurement was from Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index from 2003 to 2012. Since corruption rates among countries varied in both samples, data were statistically tested. A simple regression confirmed a statistically-significant association over a ten-year period between the two variables. Consociational countries were more corrupt than non-consociational ones. Moreover, increases in political rights in a given country are associated with a decrease in corruption. Surprisingly, increases in civil rights are associated with an increase in corruption. Hence, this result enabled the thesis to reject the null hypothesis.

By rejecting the null hypothesis, this statistical test has suggested that consociational democracies are prone to corruption. Indeed, the quota-based parliamentary seats, grand coalition, group autonomy, and group veto that consociationalism put in place in Lebanon has

been infiltrated by patron-client relationships that have facilitated corrupt favoritism. Offering these arrangements to deeply divided societies would be welcomed by the elites, not the people. Ultimately, the elites will most likely favor their own groups and neglect national unity based on equal treatment of citizens. Again, the mere statistically based rejection of the null hypothesis puts more emphasis on the issue of how consociational democracies are prone to corruption.

Although the qualitative case study of Lebanon focused on corruption, many counterproductive features have surfaced. Client-patron relations, *wasta*, and the role of the *zu'ama* are examples of how these features specific to Lebanon have contributed to corruption. As mentioned in the case study chapter, *wasta* means “the ability to attract a client group and attain access to a power broker” (Hamzeh, 2001, p. 170). And, *zu'ama* means “patrons.”

The individuals responsible for the proliferation of *wasta* are to a great extent the sectarian elites and to a lesser extent the Lebanese society. Although the Lebanese society engages in *wasta*, this behavior would not have continued had it not been for the sectarian elites' prior engagement in it. In other words, if sectarian elites had not engaged in *wasta*, the Lebanese society would have followed suit. Of course, in the case of *wasta*, sectarian elites are the ones considered as the sources of power. Hence, the consociational system in Lebanon institutionalized the role of *wasta*, making it a common and legal pathway for favors. In turn, corrupt favoritism legitimately prevails, and, consequently, an anticipated civil and fully democratic Lebanon shall be difficult to achieve.

Again, as the case study reveals, the application of patron-client relationships in Lebanon have rendered various defects that have created many forms of corruption, especially ones pertaining to favoritism. These relationships have created a political, economic, and societal

culture drowned in corrupt favoritism. In order for citizens to survive in this environment, they have to engage in favoritism. The consociational system has been manipulated by these relationships which institutionalized favoritism and made the Lebanese society dependent on it.

While consociationalism has promoted corrupt favoritism in government, its influence has trickled down to the society. Patron-client relations are a good example of how consociationalism has made favoritism an important facilitator in the citizenry's efforts to get their demands met. Like sectarian elites, patrons, or zu'ama, attract members from their sects seeking favors. This means that it is least likely for a Muslim Sunni to seek favors from a Christian Maronite and vice versa. The more entrenchment of sectarian elites in dividing the society, the more likely patrons, at the societal level, will continue engaging in this type of behavior.

While consociationalism endeavors to resolve conflict in fragmented societies, in reality, it has deepened the division in societies that are already divided. As a result, like in the case of Lebanon, corrupt favoritism prevails, and any attempt to stop it will be blocked by the ultimate beneficiaries of the consociational system, the confessional elites.

Limitations

Since this thesis's literature and data were secondary, meaning that this thesis derived them from other primary sources, there are many limitations to this thesis. Although the corruption index accurately measures corruption in countries, the problem with it is that it measures perceptions of corruption and not actual practices. This does not mean that Transparency International's Corruption Index would not reflect corrupt favoritism, but a survey that specifically measures it will add more rigor to this thesis.

Moreover, some consociational countries with somewhat high GDPs per capita are ranked quite highly on the corruption index. This variable was not controlled for in this thesis. Although this thesis rejects the null hypothesis, investigating the relationship between per capita GDP and corruption for consociational democracies would shed light on a new aspect of this thesis.

Lebanon represents only one case study and, hence, adding more case studies would allow for greater exploration of corruption in consociational countries with different cultures and characteristics. Since consociationalism has been adopted by various countries, not only Arab countries, case studies on European or Asian countries would make this research more comprehensive.

Recommendations for Future Research

As found in the literature review, many negative consequences of the application of the consociational system have been identified by scholars. Future research on those negative consequences is highly recommended. For example, in consociationalism literature, the prevalence of religious sectarianism, which made some governments confessional, has been clearly argued to negatively affect the consociational system. Research focusing on the role religious sectarianism in consociational countries will inevitably be beneficial to the body of consociationalism literature.

Moreover, developed societies function in democratic systems that uphold equality among all citizens regardless of their ethnic or religious backgrounds. Based on this premise, consociationalism inherently favors citizens of certain ethnicities or religions and, hence,

systematically impedes the pathway to equality among citizens. Thus, research focusing on the reasons that consociationalism does this and possible solutions will be highly beneficial.

Consociationalism is a liberal democratic theory propounded for the purposes of conflict resolution, as in Lebanon's situation, and it proved to maintain temporary stability before the civil war of 1975 broke out. Correspondingly, it is recommended that future research should provide evidence suggesting that consociationalism could be used as only a temporary system in fragmented societies until a better democratic system could be adopted.

A primary survey that specifically measures corrupt favoritism in consociational systems is recommended as a measurement tool in future research. By using such a tool, the research will be solely focusing on corrupt favoritism, and if the results are quantitatively significant, the hypothesis could be generalizable. If this significant measurement were utilized, it would add more evidence in the literature for opponents of consociationalism.

Consociational political arrangements are not per se corrupt. However, their vulnerability to rent-seeking behavior by organized groups makes them prone to corruption in a way that political systems with a more civic, rather than sectarian, basis are not. Further research focusing on the range of variables encouraging corruption in consociational systems will specify the relationship between consociationalism and corruption in a more comprehensive manner. As was evident in the case of Lebanon, social practices that solidify clientelistic relationships have the potential for infiltrating consociational governance, turning a political arrangement meant to manage conflict into one that maximizes the competitive extraction of resources by sectarian groups. Yet another research topic worth exploring in more detail is the relationship, captured in the thesis' regression analysis, between civil liberties and corruption, and its implication for

democratic governance more generally. This interesting finding invites an in-depth exploration of how increased civil liberties result in an increase in corruption.

All in all, the more research identifying specific features that distort consociationalism is published, the more likely nations sharing these same features and transitioning from authoritarian systems to democracies will alternate these features before adopting a consociational system. Merely providing a range of solutions to the negative social features infiltrate consociationalism helps prevent transitioning nations from falling into more societal strife.

Conclusion

Many political scholars have published important research that has benefited many nations. These studies vary in their scopes and approaches, but ultimately they strive to construct new theories or shed light on deficiencies of existing theories. Eventually, the audience reading this research will benefit in some way. Since political science is a discipline in the social sciences, however, no theory or research is considered holistically correct. Hence, it is imperative that scholars review their colleagues' research. Clearly, among the opponent scholars who have reviewed consociationalism, this thesis contributes to the opponents' arguments.

Assessing the validity of political systems is relatively important given that political systems play a major role in people's lives. This being said, because of the many negative consequences some social characteristics in some consociational have produced, it is of high importance that this thesis's arguments be heard. Neglecting them will exacerbate social tensions in some consociational countries.

Given that this thesis has established a correlation between consociationalism and corruption, the consociational system should be evaluated. Indeed, Lebanon's case study showed much evidence of corrupt favoritism in the system. Again, when a political system institutionalizes corrupt favoritism, making it a legal pathway for government services, it is no wonder why sectarian tensions are exacerbated.

Although consociationalism in Lebanon had maintained stability in the country prior to the 1975 civil war, that war not only proved the deficiencies of Lebanon's consociationalism, it also systemically institutionalized corrupt favoritism. This favoritism is embodied in sectarian elites who have practiced it in government, and, eventually, the society followed suit. Lebanon is considered one of the few Arab democratic countries, but in order to be considered a full democracy, it has to reassess its patron-client relationships that are undermining its consociational democracy. By doing so, no corrupt official will appeal to a sectarian elite to help him in an illegal favor. In addition, if Lebanon mitigated corrupt favoritism, sectarian elites will no longer take advantage of remaining in the status quo under the threat of a potential civil war.

All in all, consociationalism is still a system that has been adopted by many nations for the purpose of conflict resolution, and the system has proven that it does maintain stability in fragmented societies, though it has done that temporarily in Lebanon. However, this thesis suggests that consociational democracies are prone to corruption and, hence, nations continuing to embrace this system should think of reforming the system if they want to mitigate their corruption rates. The prevalence of corruption, especially favoritism, should be taken seriously due to its undesirable consequences.

Appendix

Model Summary

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
1	.678 ^a	.460	.454	18.219

a. Predictors: (Constant), Civil_Libs, Consociational, Pol_Rights

ANOVA^b

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	72455.729	3	24151.910	72.759	.000 ^a
	Residual	84977.082	256	331.942		
	Total	157432.812	259			

a. Predictors: (Constant), Civil_Libs, Consociational, Pol_Rights

b. Dependent Variable: Corruption

Coefficients^a

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	83.330	2.389		34.875	.000
	Consociational	-14.324	2.282	-.291	-6.278	.000
	Pol_Rights	10.276	1.890	.791	5.437	.000
	Civil_Libs	-18.618	2.138	-1.271	-8.707	.000

a. Dependent Variable: Corruption

Coefficients^a

Model		Collinearity Statistics	
		Tolerance	VIF
1	(Constant)		
	Consociational	.981	1.019
	Pol_Rights	.100	10.045
	Civil_Libs	.099	10.098

a. Dependent Variable: Corruption

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