Evaluations of Witnesses' Responses to Bias: Universalism-Concern and the Costs of

Confrontation

(*pre-print version; in press at* Personality and Individual Differences)

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Abstract

The present research examined how situational and individual difference factors influence majority-group observers' evaluations of witnesses' responses to an incident of bias. In Study 1, participants learned of a situation in which a White person applying for a job that he did or did not need (high vs. low cost of confrontation) heard his interviewer make a racist comment, which the White person did or did not confront. Non-confrontation was evaluated as less appropriate than confrontation when the costs of confronting were low, but not when costs were high, revealing that in a high cost situation, the appropriate response to bias is more ambiguous. Study 2 focused on this high cost situation to show that evaluations of another person's responses to bias depend on individual differences in the observer's values. Observers who scored low on Universalism-Concern evaluated another person's non-confrontation as appropriate as confrontation, but participants who scored high on Universalism-Concern perceived non-confrontation as less appropriate. Considering how responses to bias are assessed helps illuminate normative processes that affect confrontations of bias against outgroups, contributing to the knowledge of the processes that may allow biases to persist.

Key-words: bias, confrontation, costs, universalism-concern, witnesses

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of Confrontation

1. Introduction

Recent research has aimed to understand when targets of bias confront unfair negative comments and actions directed toward them or their group (see, for example, a recent special issue on confrontation of sexism; Becker, Zawadzki, & Shields, 2014). That research also considers how individual differences, such as in beliefs about the malleability of prejudice (Rattan & Dweck, 2010) or optimism (Kaiser & Miller, 2004), among targets of bias can increase or decrease their willingness to confront this bias. However, confronting bias is not solely the responsibility of members of targeted, disadvantaged groups; how members of majority groups not only perceive injustice (Drury & Kaiser, 2014; Inman & Baron, 1996) but also evaluate the responses of others to injustice can affect the persistence and impact of social bias in society. In the present research, consisting of two studies, we investigated how majority-group members evaluate other ingroup members who do or do not confront racial bias against another group. Specifically, we tested the potential moderating roles of (a) the social conditions under which the person decided whether to confront the bias (Study 1), and (b) individual differences in the values held by observers of the other person's response to bias (Study 2).

With respect to social conditions under which bias is confronted, previous research in prosocial actions has highlighted that the inherent costs associated with a particular action can decrease the extent that action is perceived as appropriate. For instance, although helping behaviors are generally evaluated positively, when helping involves greater personal cost to the person who intervenes (e.g., greater personal risk), not intervening is perceived to be a more socially acceptable response (Holahan, 1977;

Piliavin, Dovidio, Gaertner, & Clark, 1981). Indeed, people often justify not intervening to help another person on the basis of the potential costs incurred for helping (Penner, Dovidio, Piliavin, & Schroeder, 2005). We expected a similar effect to occur in evaluations of confrontational behavior, based on the work conceptualizing confrontation of bias by a witness as a form of prosocial behavior in which people weigh the costs and benefits of various courses of action (Ashburn-Nardo, Blanchar, Petersson, Morris, & Goodwin, 2014; Good, Moss-Racusin, & Sanchez, 2012; Penner et al., 2005).

We hypothesized that confrontation of bias would be evaluated more positively than non-confrontation by majority-group observers, in line with previous work (Dickter, Kittel, & Gyurovski, 2012). Confrontations of bias address socially unfair treatment and preserve egalitarian norms and, therefore, may be generally seen by observers as positive social behaviors. Likewise, non-confrontations are likely perceived as less appropriate, because they allow a biased remark to remain unchallenged, and may even convey agreement with bias.

However, there are likely exceptions to this general negative assessment of non-confrontations of bias. Under some conditions, observers may recognize that the personal costs to a witness for confronting bias are high and may outweigh the cost to society of not confronting a socially unfair behavior. In these circumstances, non-confrontation may be perceived as excusable and not be seen as a less socially appropriate response than confrontation. Thus, in situations in which the personal costs of confronting are high, the appropriate response to bias may be ambiguous, and non-confrontation of bias may be viewed as a socially acceptable behavior. We tested this hypothesis in Study 1.

Whereas Study 1 aimed to investigate how observers assess the appropriateness of not confronting (vs. confronting) as a function of situational factors affecting personal costs for intervention, Study 2 focused on individual differences that influence observers' evaluations of different responses to bias in situations in which the cost to a witness for confronting bias is high.

Previous research demonstrates that in situations where behavioral appropriateness is ambiguous, individual differences among observers are particularly important guides of behavior. As Mischel (1973) explained, "Individual differences can determine behavior most strongly when the situation is ambiguously structured … so that subjects are uncertain about how to categorize it" (p. 276; see also Snyder & Ickes, 1985). Confrontations by individual targets are shaped by personal factors, such as commitment to fight bias or optimism, affecting perceptions of the costs and rewards of confronting or not an expression of bias (Kaiser & Miller, 2004; Shelton, Richeson, Salvatore, & Hill, 2006). Similarly, in situations where the personal costs of confronting are at odds with the social costs of *not* confronting bias, individual differences among observers would likely shape their perception of the appropriateness of reactions to bias.

However, we are not aware of any research investigating the influence of values in judgments about whether it is appropriate to confront bias. Values are general beliefs that guide not only people's selection of actions but also evaluations of their own and other people's behaviors (Feather, 1995; Rokeach, 1973; Schwartz, 1992, 1994; Schwartz & Bilsky, 1987), particularly members of their own group's (Marques & Paez, 1994; Tyler & Blader, 2003). Values would likely be important predictors of the weight given to different costs and rewards in confronting or not confronting bias, because values directly define the standards by which action (or inaction) is judged. Thus, in Study 2, we hypothesized that majority-group observers' evaluations of responses to

bias would be related to their endorsement of a value related to the degree to which equality is held as a central standard of behavior – Universalism. Universalism is one of the values proposed on Schwartz's (1992) theory of basic human values, which aims to capture a comprehensive and cross-culturally valid set of values and to describe the relations among those values.

Schwartz's (1992) original theory of basic human values identified 10 basic human values (Self-Direction, Stimulation, Hedonism, Achievement, Power, Security, Conformity, Tradition, Benevolence and Universalism) that can be organized into a circular continuum, according to compatibilities and conflicts among them. Cross-cultural research in more than 80 countries (e.g., Australia, Brazil, Portugal and the US) and with diverse samples supported the comprehensiveness of this set of values, their relationships, and their broad applicability (see Schwartz, 1992; 2012; Schwartz et al., 2012; Schwartz, Melech, Lehmann, Burgess, Harris, & Owens, 2001). The theory of basic human values has been used in research on diverse topics, such as political behavior (Schwartz, Caprara, & Vecchione, 2010), self-affirmation (e.g., Burson, Crocker, & Mischkowski, 2012) and altruism (e.g., Lönnqvist, Leikas, Paunonen, Nissinen, Verkasalo, 2006).

Universalism, the value of primary focus in Study 2, is defined as a motivation to understand, appreciate, tolerate, and protect all people and nature. Universalism is closely (and positively) related to Benevolence. However, Benevolence is defined as a motivation to care for the welfare of people with whom one is close and therefore has a relatively narrow focus of application. By contrast, Universalism is related to concerns about the welfare of others more generally. Both Universalism and Benevolence are in conflict with Power (a motivation to attain social status and prestige, and control or dominance over people and resources) and Achievement (a motivation to be personally

successful according to social standards), in the sense that an action that expresses the former values tends to be incompatible with an action that expresses the later values (Schwartz, 1992).

While Universalism, Benevolence, Achievement and Power are all related to traditional measures of social bias, Universalism is the value most strongly related to measures of prejudice and social dominance (e.g., Cohrs, Moschner, Maes, & Kielmann, 2005; Duriez & Van Hiel, 2002; Feather & McKee, 2008) – individuals who endorse the value of Universalism score lower on these measures. In addition, although both Benevolence and Universalism (but not other values in the model) are important predictors of prosocial behaviors (e.g., Caprara, Alessandri & Eisenberg, 2012; Caprara & Steca, 2007), Universalism is more related conceptually to prosocial actions toward other people in general, not just toward others with whom one is close (Schwartz, 2010). Because values affect behavior mainly when they are activated by a specific situation (Verplanken & Holland, 2002) and the value of Universalism captures whether equality is held as a central standard of behavior, we hypothesized that Universalism would be the primary value in guiding evaluations of confrontations (and non-confrontations) of bias.

In addition, Schwartz and colleagues (2012) recently refined the theory of basic human values and identified three subtypes of Universalism: Universalism-Nature, a motivation to preserve the natural environment; Universalism-tolerance, a motivation to accept and understand people who are different from oneself; and Universalism-Concern a "commitment to equality, justice and protection for all people" (Schwartz et al., 2012, p. 669).

To the extent that Universalism-Concern specifically reflects a motivation to strive for social justice and equality, even at personal expense, when appraising the

appropriateness of different responses to bias, people relatively high on this value would

likely give more weight to the social cost of not confronting, even when there are

potentially mitigating personal costs associated with confronting. In Study 2, we apply

the situation identified in Study 1, where the personal costs of confronting are at odds

with the social costs of not confronting, to test the unique effects of Universalism-

Concern, over and above other basic values in Schwartz et al.'s (2012) refined theory on

observers' assessments of the appropriateness of non-confrontation versus confrontation

of bias.

Theoretically, expanding the study of confrontation to how others evaluate those

who do or do not confront bias can broaden the perspective on the general social forces

that can either ameliorate or maintain social bias. Practically, understanding the

influences on non-targets who witness bias can have important social consequences, as

non-targets who confront are taken more seriously and are seen as more persuasive than

confronters who are the target of bias (Czopp & Monteith, 2003; Gulker, Mark, &

Monteith, 2013; Rasinski & Czopp, 2010). Investigating how observers evaluate

witnesses' decision to confront bias or not, and the conditions that may shape that

assessment, can provide insight into the process that socially inhibit unfair bias, as the

perceived appropriateness of different behaviors can influence people's decisions in

intergroup contexts (Blanz, Mummendey, & Otten, 1997).

2. Study 1

2.1 Overview

In Study 1, participants (all from a majority group) learned of a situation in

which a White applicant heard his interviewer make a biased comment about Black

applicants and then did or did not confront the interviewer about that comment. We also

varied the social circumstances of the applicant by indicating that he had a high versus

low need for the position for which he was interviewing. The dependent measure was how appropriate participants perceived the behavior of the applicant.

Because confronting tends to be seen as a prosocial behavior that preserves egalitarian norms, we expected that a White witness confronting an expression of bias against a Black person would generally be seen as more appropriate social behavior than would non-confrontation. However, we further hypothesized that this effect would be diminished when the personal costs to the witness for confronting bias were relatively high (i.e., the applicant had a high vs. low need for the job). The costs of confronting would make non-confrontation more excusable and, thus, more appropriate.

Both studies in the present paper were conducted with Portuguese participants. Previous research has suggested that discrimination against Black immigrants in Portugal is generally condemned by social norms (e.g., Vala, Lopes, & Lima, 2008; Vala & Pereira, 2012). Concurrently, however, Black immigrants still report being the target of verbal harassment more often than other immigrant or ethnic groups (Santos, Oliveira, Kumar, Rosário, & Brigadeiro, 2009). Thus, we expected that participants would find the situation presented in these studies plausible and would consider the blatantly biased comment as unfair and inappropriate.

2.2. Method

2.2.1. Participants. Because the theoretical focus in the research was on responses of members of the majority racial group as a function of whether another member of their group confronted bias against a racial minority group, Portuguese undergraduate students ($n = 87$; 55 men, 31 women, 1 did not specify gender; mean age = 20.69 years, SD = 4.05) were included in the analyses. An additional 19 participants who completed the study but indicated a different nationality were not included in the final analyses.

Participants were recruited as volunteers through the university, and they completed the survey in class with no direct compensation.

2.2.3. Design and procedure. The study employed a 2 (Need for the Job: High vs. Low) x 2 (Behavior: Confrontation vs. Non-Confrontation) between-groups factorial design. Similar to the procedure of Shelton and Stewart (2004, Study 1), participants were presented with a scenario in which a candidate was being interviewed for a job. In this scenario, the interviewer indicated that he was favorably impressed by interviewee Paulo (a name selected because it is one of the most common names for White Portuguese men), but followed that with a racist comment about Black applicants for the same position. The potential cost to the interviewee for confronting biased remark was varied by information in the scenario suggesting that the interviewee had a high need for the job (high cost for confrontation) or a low need for the position (low cost of confrontation). Specifically, the participants read the following text (low need for the job condition in brackets):

> Paulo is in a room waiting to be called for a job interview. This interview is [not] very important to Paulo because this is his third job interview in months and no one has offered him a job yet [he already received some interesting job offers]. Paulo [doesn't want] wants to give his best shot at this interview because he [doesn't] really needs the job. Plus, this position [does not seem] seems really interesting and he [doesn't want the opportunity to work in the company that much] would love the opportunity to work in the company. Paulo is called in to the interview. He is greeted by the interviewer, a tall white man wearing a suit. They both sit down and he starts asking Paulo questions. Paulo has the impression that the interview is going well. In the end, the interviewer shakes his hand and says: I really

liked you and I think you and the company would be a good fit. We had a

lot of Black applicants, so it's good to have someone White for a change.

I'll contact you when we have a decision.

We then varied the description of the behavior after the interviewer's racist

comment. In the Confrontation condition, participants were told that the interviewee

(Paulo) answered, "I don't think skin color should have anything to do with this." In the

Non-confrontation condition, participants were told that the interviewee stated simply,

"I'll be waiting for your call."

After participants read the scenario, they completed items measuring their

perceptions of the appropriateness of the interviewee's behavior during the interview. In

particular, participants were asked to evaluate, from 1 = *not at all* to 7 = *very much*, the

degree to which the interviewee's behavior reflected four qualities: appropriate, wise,

and (reverse-coded) irrational and unreasonable. The responses were submitted to an

exploratory factor analysis (using the principal axis factoring method of extraction),

which revealed only one factor that explained 60.34% of the variance (eigenvalue =

2.41; factor loadings from .69 to .82). The responses to the four items were averaged to

form a behavior appropriateness scale, α = .79.

After assessing the perceived appropriateness of the interviewee's behavior in

the scenario, to evaluate the effectiveness of the manipulations, we asked participants to

rate, on separate 1 = *not at all* to 7 = *very much* scales, how important it was for him to

get the job and the likelihood that he would be offered the position. Finally, we asked

participants for their age, gender and nationality.

2.3. Results

The manipulation produced the intended effects on the perceptions of

participants. A 2 (Need for the Job: High vs. Low) x 2 (Behavior: Confrontation vs.

Non-Confrontation) analysis of variance (ANOVA) yielded, as expected, a main effect of need for the job on the importance to the interviewee of getting the job, $F(1,83) = 939.13$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2_p = .92$. Participants in the high need for the job condition perceived that it was more important for the interviewee to get the job ($M = 6.87$, $SD = .40$) than participants in the low need for the job condition ($M = 2.05$, $SD = .96$). There was no effect for Behavior ($p = .898$) and no interaction effect ($p = .283$). Also, as anticipated, participants perceived that the interviewee would incur personal costs for confronting the interviewer about the racist remark. A 2 x 2 ANOVA on the likelihood that the interviewee would receive the job offer revealed a main effect for Behavior, $F(1,83) = 14.11$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2_p = .15$. Participants in the confrontation condition perceived that he would be less likely to receive the job offer ($M = 4.80$, $SD = 1.38$) than those in the non-confrontation condition ($M = 5.74$, $SD = 1.02$). There was also a marginally significant main effect of cost, $F(1,83) = 3.56$, $p = .063$, $\eta^2_p = .04$. Participants in the high need condition perceived it was less likely for the interviewee to get the job ($M = 5.09$, $SD = 1.40$) than participants in the high cost condition ($M = 5.52$, $SD = 1.13$). We found no interaction effect ($p = .745$).

Addressing our primary research question, we conducted a 2 (Need for the Job: High vs. Low) x 2 (Behavior: Confrontation vs. Non-Confrontation) ANOVA on behavior appropriateness. There was, as expected, a main effect of confrontation, $F(1,83) = 17.78$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2_p = .18$. Participants in the confrontation condition judged the behavior as more appropriate ($M = 5.83$, $SD = 1.14$) than participants in the non-confrontation condition ($M = 4.73$, $SD = 1.38$). Importantly, this effect was qualified by a significant interaction between Need and Behavior, $F(1,83) = 9.32$, $p = .016$, $\eta^2_p = .07$ (see Figure 1).

Figure 1. Evaluations of behavior appropriateness for each experimental condition of Study 1.

Planned comparisons revealed that when the costs were low, there was a significant difference between confronting and not confronting, $F(1,83) = 21.71$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2_p = .21$, such that confronting was evaluated as more appropriate ($M = 6.10$, $SD = .78$) than not confronting ($M = 4.32$, $SD = 1.50$). However, when the costs were high there was no significant difference between confronting ($M = 5.54$, $SD = 1.38$) and not confronting ($M = 5.07$, $SD = 1.20$), $F(1,83) = 1.58$, $p = .212$, $\eta^2_p = .02$. From an alternative perspective, when the interviewee confronted the interviewer about his racist comment, the interviewee's behavior was rated as equivalently socially appropriate whether his need for the job was high (and thus the costs for confrontation were high) or low, $Ms = 5.54$ vs. 6.10, $F(1,83) = 2.13$, $p = .148$, $\eta^2_p = .03$. However, not confronting the comment was viewed as more socially appropriate when the interviewee's need for the job was high than when it was low ($Ms = 5.07$ vs. 4.32, $F(1,83) = 4.16$, $p = .044$, $\eta^2_p = .05$).

2.4. Discussion

The current study complements previous research, which shows that people are less likely to confront a biased remark when the costs of confronting are higher (Ashburn-Nardo et al., 2014; Shelton & Stewart, 2004), by investigating how *others* perceive the behavior of individuals in such situations. Consistent with previous research (Dickter et al., 2012), the results of Study 1 demonstrated that when an individual blatantly exhibits bias, participants perceived confrontation as a more socially appropriate response than non-confrontation. While this finding may appear intuitive, future research might further investigate the processes contributing to this evaluation. For example, one reason why confrontation may be viewed so favorably is because such actions are positively distinctive: Majority-group members rarely respond to expressions of prejudice (Kawakami, Dunn, Karmali, & Dovidio, 2009). Another reason why the type of confrontation represented in Study 1 may be viewed positively is because the bias was directed toward a group for which there are strong norms against biased treatment (Blacks), and the interviewee had no immediate self-interest in confronting the interviewer (Eagly, Wood, & Chaiken, 1978). It is possible that confronting a biased statement about another group would be perceived as less socially appropriate if the norms regarding prejudice against that group are less strong (e.g., overweight people) or possibly even support negative treatment (e.g., criminals) (Crandall, Eshleman, & O'Brien, 2002).

Study 1, however, further demonstrates that how people evaluate non-confrontation of bias depends upon their understanding of the circumstances of the other person who does not intervene. Importantly, Study 1 extends previous research by offering direct evidence of the moderating role of perceived mitigating circumstances on how inappropriate non-confrontation of even blatant bias is perceived. Specifically,

although confrontation of bias was generally seen as more socially appropriate than non-confrontation of bias, majority-group observers tended to excuse non-confrontation, rating it as more socially appropriate (and as socially appropriate as confronting bias) when the costs to a witness of confronting bias are relatively high (i.e., not getting a job that was needed). Practically, the present results suggest that people who encounter an incident of bias may face different types of costs (or lack of rewards) for action or inaction, some emanating directly from the perpetrator (e.g., a boss) but others associated with the way observers evaluate their behavior.

Study 1 suggests that majority-group observers are responsive to at least two different types of social forces in judging the appropriateness of confronting or not confronting expressions of racial bias. On the one hand, observers seem sensitive to prevailing egalitarian norms against racial bias and, as a consequence, evaluate a White person's confrontation of racial bias by another White person as more socially appropriate than a non-confrontation of such behavior. On the other hand, observers are responsive to the circumstances that a witness of bias encounters in making a decision about whether to confront. Specifically, observers appear more willing to excuse a witness for non-confronting bias when such action may involve greater personal cost.

When these two factors – the cost to society for not intervening and the cost to an individual for confronting bias – are in conflict, the appropriate response to bias becomes more ambiguous. In this situation – our situation of interest in Study 2, we hypothesized that the cost that is weighted the most would depend on individual differences between observers. People who value social justice more would be more sensitive to the social costs of not confronting a behavior that violates egalitarian norms. Thus, they would perceive non-confrontation as less socially appropriated, even when the costs for confrontation are high. We tested this hypothesis in Study 2.

3. Study 2

3.1. Overview

Study 2 examined whether the endorsement of Universalism-Concern predicts how majority-group observers evaluate a confrontation of bias versus a non-confrontation in a situation where the appropriate response to bias is ambiguous (i.e., the high need/high cost situation, identified in Study 1). We tested the unique effects of Universalism-Concern over and above the effects of other values, which complement or are in conflict with Universalism-Concern (Universalism-Tolerance, Universalism-Nature, Benevolence-Dependability, Benevolence-Caring, Achievement, Power-Dominance, and Power-Resources) in Schwartz et al.'s (2012) refined values theory. As noted earlier, the value of Universalism-Concern distinctively emphasizes the importance of the value of equality in the treatment of others generally, and this value is likely to be activated when people are exposed to an incident of injustice, such as bias (Verplanken & Holland, 2002).

We hypothesized that when a witness's personal interests are in conflict with the general social interest in limiting expressions of bias, individual differences in observers' commitment to strive for equality would be important predictors of their evaluations of responses to bias. Specifically, we predicted that whereas participants who scored lower in Universalism-Concern would perceive a non-confrontation as appropriate as a confrontation (the result for the high-cost situation in Study 1), those higher in Universalism-Concern would perceive non-confrontation as less appropriate than confrontation (the results we observed in the low-cost situation of Study 1), giving more weight to the social cost of not addressing an unfair treatment in their judgments.

3.2. Method

3.2.1. Participants. One hundred and twenty Portuguese undergraduate students completed the study (60 men, 60 women; mean age = 21.84 years, SD = 3.61). They received no compensation for their participation.

3.2.2. Design and Procedure. Participants were recruited in a university library. All students present at the library at the recruitment time were approached and asked to complete the survey. They task was described as an evaluation task were they had to give their opinion about another person's behavior in a social situation. The experimenters were unaware of the condition presented in the survey they asked participants to complete.

Participants were first asked to respond on a 6-point scale *(1 = not like me at all, 2 = not like me, 3 = a little like me, 4 = somewhat like me, 5 = like me, 6 = very much like me)* to the three Universalism-Concern items of the Schwartz et al. (2012) revised Portrait Values Questionnaire (PVQ-5X): "Here we briefly describe some people. Please read each description and think about how much each person is or is not like you:" "Protecting society's weak and vulnerable members is important to him[her]"; "He [she] thinks it is important that every person in the world have equal opportunities in life"; "He [she] wants everyone to be treated justly, even people he/she doesn't know." The scale showed good reliability in the current sample (α = .72). The items were embedded among items from Schwartz and colleagues' (2012) PVQ-5X measuring seven other related values: Universalism-Tolerance (motivation for accepting and understanding people who are different from oneself), Universalism-Nature (motivation for preserving nature), Benevolence-Dependability (motivation for being a dependable ingroup member), Benevolence-Caring (motivation for caring for other ingroup members), Achievement (motivation to succeed according to social standards), Power-Dominance (motivation for having power through control of other people), and

Power-Resources (motivation for having power through control of material and social resources) (Schwartz et al., 2012). Because we believed that the scenario would be the mainly related to concerns about social justice, we did not have specific predictions for individual differences in these additional values. However, we included this items in order to investigate the unique predictive ability of Universalism-Concern, not only relative to other Universalism values but also, more broadly, to other self-transcendence and self-enhancement values.

Then, participants read in the survey the scenario representing the high cost context of Study 1. Participants were randomly assigned to one of two confrontation conditions varied in Study 1. In one condition the interviewee confronted the interviewer who made a racist comment; in the other condition the interviewee did not confront the interviewer. After reading the scenario, participants answered the same Behavior Appropriateness items (appropriate, wise, irrational and unreasonable) of Study 1 ($\alpha = .77$). Then, participants were asked to indicate (from 1 = *not at all* to 7 = *very much*) their perceptions of the interviewer's behavior as (a) prejudiced, (b) appropriate, and (c) fair. Responses (reverse-coded for fair and appropriate) were averaged to produce a measure of perceived bias ($\alpha = .82$). At the end of the survey we asked participants to recall whether the interviewee's had confronted or not confronted the prejudiced comment (as an attention check) and to provide information about their age, gender, and nationality[1]. All participants indicated they were Portuguese. We excluded from the final sample 11 participants who failed to correctly answer the attention check[2]. Thus, the final sample was composed by 109 participants.

3.3. Results

To test how participants perceived the interviewer's behavior, we regressed perceptions of bias on Behavior (confrontation vs. non-confrontation, dummy-coded),

Universalism-Concern (centered) and the Behavior x Universalism-Concern interaction

term. As expected, the way participants rated the interviewer's behavior was not

predicted by their endorsement of Universalism-Concern or by the behavior of the

interviewee. The overall model was not significant (p = .161), and there were no main

or interaction effects (p's > .130).   Overall, participants viewed the interviewer's

behavior as generally biased, M = 6.33, SD = .97, on the 1-7 scale).

In order to test our main hypotheses, we regressed behavior appropriateness on

Behavior (confrontation vs. non-confrontation, dummy-coded), Universalism-Concern

(centered; M = 4.52, SD = .89) and the Behavior x Universalism-Concern interaction

term. The model explained a significant amount of variance in behavior

appropriateness, adjusted R^2 = .07, $F(3, 105)$ = 3.67, p = .015. There was a significant

effect of Behavior on behavior appropriateness, B = .53, SE = .27, p = .050, η^2_p = .03.

The interviewee's behavior was perceived as more appropriate when he confronted (M

= 5.02, SD = 1.22) than when he did not confront (M = 4.49, SD = 1.57). Importantly,

this effect was qualified by a two-way interaction between Behavior and Universalism-

Concern, B = .81, SE = .31, p = .010, η^2_p = .06 (see Figure 2).

Figure 2. Predicted behavior appropriateness scores as a function of experimental condition and participants' endorsement of the Universalism-Concern value.

Simple slopes analysis (Aiken & West, 1991) revealed, as predicted, that among participants who scored higher in Universalism-Concern (i.e., one standard deviation above the mean), there was a significant effect of Behavior, $B = 1.25$, $SE = .38$, $p = .002$, $\eta^2_p = .09$: participants who scored higher in Universalism-Concern perceived confronting bias as more appropriate (*estimated mean* = 5.45) than not confronting bias (*estimated mean* = 4.21). Among participants who scored lower in Universalism-Concern (i.e., one standard deviation below the mean), however, we found no significant effect of Behavior, $B = -.18$, $SE = .38$, $p = .637$, $\eta^2_p < .01$. As expected, participants lower in Universalism-Concern evaluated non- confrontation (*estimated mean* = 4.90) as appropriate as confrontation (*estimated mean* = 4.73) in these circumstances.[3]

Supplementary analyses revealed that the Behavior x Universalism-Concern interaction remained significant after controlling for the seven other values in the Schwartz scale, $B = .81$, $SE = .32$, $p = .013$, $\eta^2_p = .06$. No other scale showed an interaction with Behavior in comparable analyses.

3.4. Discussion

Study 2 results support our hypothesis that individual differences in Universalism-Concern moderate how majority-group observers evaluate responses to bias when the appropriate response to bias is ambiguous. Under circumstances in which the personal costs to a witness for confronting bias are high – in this case, jeopardizing being hired for a job that is needed – participants lower in Universalism-Concern judged non-confrontation as equivalently appropriate as confrontation. By contrast, participants higher in Universalism-Concern, who are highly committed to the value of equality, perceived non-confrontation as less appropriate than confrontation. This effect occurs because participants higher in Universalism-Concern tended to view both confrontation as more socially appropriate and non-confrontation as less appropriate.

Previous work has demonstrated that greater endorsement of the higher-order value of Universalism (Schwartz, 1992) predicts a range of behaviors reflecting concern for the welfare of others (Feather & Mckee, 2012; Kuntz, Davidov, Schwartz, & Schmidt, 2015; see also Schwartz, 2010). Although less research specifically tested the more differentiated values of the Schwartz and colleagues' (2012) revised theory, the evidence that does exist indicates that greater endorsement of Universalism-Concern specifically predicts responses supporting social justice better than other forms of Universalism. In particular, Universalism-Concern (which represents a commitment to social justice) is a better predictor of attitudes favoring equal rights for immigrants and homosexuals than Universalism-Nature (which reflects a concern for preserving the

natural environment), and a better predictor of opposition to economic inequality than Universalism-Tolerance (which measures a motivation for accepting and understanding people different from the self) (Schwartz et al., 2012; see also Schwartz & Butenko, 2014).

The results of Study 2 further support the distinctive effects of Universalism-Concern for affirming general principles of social justice. Perception of how biased the interviewer was did not vary as a function of the participant's endorsement of Universalism-Concern, but differences in this value did affect the way the witness's behavior was evaluated. In particular, in Study 2 we found that participants who scored higher in Universalism-Concern perceived a non-confrontation as a less socially appropriate behavior, even when the witness could incur in substantial personal cost for confronting bias. This effect remains even when controlling for their endorsement of other values (including Universalism-Nature and Universalism-Tolerance). Participants who scored low in Universalism-Concern apparently viewed high personal cost for intervention as a mitigating factor for not confronting; they judged non-confrontation as socially appropriate as confrontation under these circumstances. Thus, in addition to extending work on confrontation of bias by identifying a particularly relevant individual difference variable that may moderate evaluations of a decision to confront bias, our findings offer further evidence of the discriminant validity of Universalism-Concern, as distinguished from other forms of Universalism (Nature and Tolerance) and other types of individual values.

Both Benevolence-Caring and Benevolence-Dependability are positively related to Universalism values (together, they form the higher-order value of self-transcendence). However, Benevolence-Caring and Benevolence-Dependability scales were designed by Schwartz et al. (2012) to reflect motivations to care about the welfare

of ingroup members and to be a dependable member of the ingroup, respectively. ,

Perhaps because the scenario made social justice concerns more salient than concerns

about other ingroup members, we did not find a relation between either of the

Benevolence values and the extent a confrontation was perceived to be appropriate.

4. General Discussion

The present studies revealed that the perceived appropriateness of a witness's

response to bias depends both on situational and personal factors. In Study 1, majority-

group observers evaluated non-confrontation of bias as less appropriate than

confrontation when the personal costs of confronting were low. However, the same did

not happen but not when the personal costs of confronting were high. These results

suggest that when the personal costs of confronting are at odds with the social costs of

not confronting, the appropriate response to bias is ambiguous.

Study 1 results laid the ground for Study 2, which investigated how individual

differences predict evaluations of responses to bias. Study 2 results showed that

observers' personal values related to equality and social justice predicted their

evaluations of confrontations when the appropriate response to bias was ambiguous. In

this situation, participants who scored lower on Universalism-Concern evaluate non-

confrontation as appropriate as confrontation, while participants who scored higher on

Universalism-Concern perceived non-confrontation to be less appropriate.

Taken together, these two studies suggest that majority-group observers attend to

two different types of costs, and potentially benefits, associated with witnesses'

responses to racially biased comments. On the one hand, confronting the biased remark

appears to represent a socially valued behavior, particularly by majority-group

observers who endorse Universalism-Concern more strongly. Allowing bias to remain

unchallenged would permit the violation of basic social principles of fairness and

justice, fundamental pillars of society (e.g., Oishi, Kesebir, & Diener, 2011; Tyler & Blader, 2003), which would be especially aversive for people highly committed to equality. On the other hand, majority-group observers also appeared to attend to the personal cost that a witness to bias could potentially incur for confronting bias. Participants, especially those lower in Universalism-Concern, judged non-confrontation as socially appropriate as confrontation when the costs for this action (potentially not being hired for a job that was needed) were high. That is, for majority-group members less committed to equality and social justice, the costs of confronting seem to constitute valid excuses for not confronting.

To our knowledge, the present research is the first to explore how individual differences shape majority-group observers' perceptions of the appropriateness of different responses to bias, highlighting the important role of endorsing Universalism-Concern. In addition, the current results contribute to the validation of the Schwartz's refined Theory of Basic Individual Values by showing that Universalism-Concern, but not other universalism values, predicts evaluations of behaviors related to social justice. Although that was not the main goal of the present research, our studies underscore the distinctiveness of each of the three factors (Universalism-Concern, Universalism-Tolerance, and Universalism-Nature) that are usually collapsed into a single higher-order value.

Because people tend to be sensitive to social perceptions of what is an appropriate conduct in intergroup behaviors (Blanz, et al., 1997; Franco & Maas, 1999; Gaertner & Insko, 2001; Paluck, 2009; Pereira, Vala, & Leyens, 2009), evaluations of reactions to bias may constitute an important influence that may help or hinder witnesses' confrontation. Our research suggests that people face different types of costs for deciding to confront or not bias. While confronting may entail some costs arising

from the person being confronted, not confronting may also be penalized by others who observe their behavior. Thus, our work broadens the consideration of costs and benefits associated with majority-group member's decisions on how to respond to bias (Ashburn-Nardo et al., 2014; Czopp, Monteith, & Mark, 2006; Good et al., 2012; Kaiser & Miller, 2004). This is particularly relevant considering that witnesses who confront may be particularly effective in reducing further bias (Czopp & Monteith, 2003; Gulker, et al., 2013; Rasinski & Czopp, 2010).

It should be noted that, in the present research, we investigated how observers from a majority group evaluated responses to bias when both the confronter and the confronted person are members of a majority group. There are reasons to believe that group membership affects observers' evaluations of responses to bias. Majority group members tend to be less sensitive to prejudice (Blodorn, O'Brien, & Kordys, 2011; Drury & Kaiser, 2014; Inman & Baron, 1996), and observers who are not targets of prejudice tend to be less supportive of confrontations of bias than observers who belong to the target group (Becker & Barreto, 2014; Dodd, Giuliano, Boutell, & Moran, 2001). It is expectable that evaluations of the appropriateness of confronting are influenced by whether the observer is a member of a minority group and/or a member of the target group. Future research might further investigate whether the observers' group memberships influence their evaluations of responses to bias.

Methodologically, although we manipulated the perceived cost to witnesses for confronting bias in Study 1, we did not directly assess participants' perceptions of the costs or benefit to the witness or to society for the alternative behaviors. We did not include such measures before asking how socially appropriate participants perceived the witness behavior because we did not want to sensitize participants to the specific predictions of the work. Measuring perceived costs and benefits after assessing

perceptions of social appropriateness may reflect *post hoc* justifications for ratings of social appropriateness rather than true mediating mechanisms. Moreover, conceptually, observers may not be consciously aware of their processes of weighing different costs and benefits in shaping their assessments (Piliavin et al., 1981; Nisbett & Wilson, 1977). Nevertheless, future research might consider indirect measures of the attention people devote to either the personal or social costs in their consideration of the situation, for example by measuring the relative cognitive accessibility in a lexical decision task (Kay & Jost, 2003) of words associated with social justice (e.g., equality) and words associated with the consequences for the witness (e.g., employment). These indirect measures would mediate how people judge the social appropriateness of confronting or not confronting bias.

Future work may also investigate how individual differences in Universalism-Concern or other factors (such as individual differences in the extent participants share the interviewer's bias against the target of the remark; see Dovidio & Gaertner, 2004) may moderate the weight majority-group observers give to alternative costs for confrontation or non-confrontation by a witness. Although the present research constitutes a first step in that direction, understanding more fully and directly how individual differences influence the way people attend to and weigh different types of costs (and benefits) may provide more conceptual insight in how people respond to instances of social injustice.

We note a seemingly inconsistent finding between Study 1 and Study 2. Across the situations involving potentially high personal costs for confronting bias, we found that participants low in Universalism-Concern in Study 2 viewed non-confrontation slightly but not significantly more appropriate than confrontation, participants in Study 1 (in which Universalism was not assessed) on averaged perceived non-confrontation as

somewhat less appropriate than confrontation, and participants high in Universalism-Concern in Study 2 evaluated non-confrontation as significantly less appropriate than confrontation. However, this apparent inconsistency may be accounted for by statistical considerations. In particular, while the size of the effect of Behavior (confrontation vs. non-confrontation) on judgments of appropriateness were comparable in Study 2 (η^2_p = .03) and in Study 1 (η^2_p = .02), there were over twice as many participants in Study 2 (n = 109) than in the high cost condition of Study 1 (n = 45). Statistical power is a function of sample size. Indeed, estimates of statistical power using G*Power (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007) revealed that the power to detect a small-sized effect was .52 in Study 2, but only .25 in Study 1. Thus the non-significant effect for Behavior in the high-cost condition of Study 1 but significant effect in Study 2 is likely a function primarily of the statistical sensitivity of the test not a difference in the size of the effect.

We assessed Universalism-Concern, along with other six scales in Schwartz and colleagues' (2012) value inventory at the very beginning of Study 2, before the manipulation and the assessment of the dependent variables, because it was hypothesized to represent a moderator of the effect of the manipulation of confrontation versus non-confrontation. It is possible that including the value items first in the procedure might operate as a kind of prosocial prime. However, inconsistent with a general prosocial prime interpretation of our findings, Universalism-Concern systematically moderated responses to the manipulation even when controlling for the other values in Schwartz et al.'s instrument. Nevertheless, methodologically, future work might present the value scales at the very beginning and very end of the study (counterbalanced) to assess any order, and potential priming, effects.

Another limitation of the present research is that we relied on a scenario methodology to assess participants' evaluations of a witness' behavior. Indeed, a

number of studies of responses to an incident of bias have used scenarios (Ashburn-Nardo et al., 2014; Shelton & Stewart, 2004; Swim & Hyers, 1999; Woodzicka & LaFrance, 2001) or retrospective reports of responses (Good et al., 2012; Kaiser & Miller, 2004), in addition to immediate and spontaneous reactions to an incident. We used the scenario methodology for the experimental control it provides for manipulating specific elements of the situation and our interest in a particular outcome – judgments of social appropriateness. Perceptions of what behaviors are socially appropriate or inappropriate are particularly important, because perceptions of normative appropriateness can guide behavior, including intergroup behavior, in ways independent of personal attitudes (e.g., Paluck, 2009). Nevertheless, because people's descriptions of what they would do in situations portrayed in scenarios, particularly in the context of confrontations of bias (Kawakami et al., 2009; Woodzicka & LaFrance, 2001), do not always match their behavior when presented with the actual incident, future research might productively investigate how people respond to others who do or do not confront bias in more immediately unfolding and compelling situations. In an actual situation that directly involves them, observers may spontaneously weigh the social costs of not confronting and the personal costs of confronting differently, in line with the finding that targets of prejudice imagine they would be less influenced by the confrontation costs than they actual are (Shelton & Stewart, 2004). This kind of finding suggests that future work on how observers evaluate whether someone confronts bias or not should compare the responses of observers detached from the situation, as in the present research, to those more immediate involved in the situation that unfolds.

Individuals may be less likely to confront bias than they expect because of cognitive and affective processes. In particular, concerns about how confrontation may undermine social harmony represent a cost for confrontation that may be more salient,

and thus weighed more heavily, when people who are more detached from the situation predict how they will respond to bias. In addition, affectively, majority-group members report that they will be more emotionally upset by witnessing an act of bias than they experience in the actual situation (Kawakami et al., 2009). If majority-group observers closer to the immediate situation experience less upset in response to a racist comment, they would also likely evaluate non-confrontation by a witness as more appropriate. Thus, future research on how observers judge the appropriateness of a witness's decision to confront or not confront bias might productively consider proximity to the actual incident and the associated salience of various costs and benefits as important moderators of perceptions of the social appropriateness for the witness's behavior.

In conclusion, the present research offers a complementary perspective to previous research on whether people confront bias in understanding the dynamics involved in confronting bias. Our work focused on how *majority-group observers* perceive another person's response after witnessing bias, in terms of social appropriateness. Both situational factors (costs to the witness for confronting bias) and individual differences (in the degree to which observers endorse Universalism-Concern) systematically shape these evaluations. Considering how observers assess the appropriateness of alternative behaviors helps illuminate the normative processes that may ultimately affect whether people confront bias against members of another group, painting a more complete and complex picture of the processes that may allow traditional biases to persist socially or to combat it through social and interpersonal interventions.

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Footnotes

1. We conducted regression analyses using gender and age as control variables. We found no significant effects of either age or gender, and including these variables as controls did not change the pattern of results.

2. Participants who failed to correctly answer the attention check were evenly distributed across conditions, $X^2(1, N = 120) = .10$, $p = .752$.

3. From an alternative perspective, simple slopes analyses demonstrate that participants higher in Universalism-Concern tended to perceive the behavior of the interviewee as more appropriate when he confronted bias, $B = .42$, $SE = .23$, $p = .068$, $\eta^2_p = .03$, and as less appropriate when the interviewee did not confront bias, $B = -.40$, $SE = .21$, $p = .063$, $\eta^2_p = .03$.