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LOYOLA UNIVERSITY CHICAGO

THE POETICS OF THUCYDIDES'

EXCURSUS ON STASIS: III. 82-84

A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO  
THE FACULTY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL  
IN CANDIDACY FOR THE DEGREE OF  
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY  
DEPARTMENT OF CLASSICAL STUDIES

BY

PHILIP S. PEEK

CHICAGO, ILLINOIS

JANUARY 1995

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## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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These acknowledgements cannot be complete without my remarking the inexpressible and unpayable debt I owe my parents for their role in all I have achieved. Finally I thank Elaine J. Bruckner for listening, consoling, supporting, and advising.

## PREFACE

The idea for this study was conceived in frustration and anger. Early in my graduate studies, I had a survey course in Greek literature; the selections focused on Greek society and its social organization. The texts were difficult; our progress was slow. Thus, when Dr. Keenan cut back the Thucydides' assignment from III. 70-84 to III. 82-84, I walked blithely home--with only three paragraphs to translate, I could rest easy.

For the first time in my struggle to learn Latin and Greek, I reached such a pitch of frustration that I nearly threw my book against the wall. The words became so entangled, my confusion so great that all I had previously learned about grammar and syntax was lost: I did not think to ask why Thucydides had written like that.

The answer to this question Dr. Keenan suggested at our next meeting. He proposed that Thucydides was reflecting the chaos of Kerkyra in the inconcinnity and convolution of his prose.

Anger and frustration slid from my mind and a keen interest in Thucydides' language and thought took root. Under Dr. Keenan's patient tutelage, respect and admiration grew, and continues to grow, for a writer whose language and thought ever enlighten and challenge always.

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## CHAPTER 1

### INTRODUCTION

The aim of this dissertation is to obtain meaningful insight into Thucydides and his *History*. Given such a rich and complex author, valid methods for achieving this end are surely as numerous as thoughtful creativity can contrive. But as past scholarship has shown, there are at least two methods, leading nowhere but the barren desert, that should be avoided.

The most arduous and fruitless path scholars still tread is the one that attempts to gain insight into the development of Thucydides' thought by identifying the *History's* early and late passages.<sup>1</sup> The idea is sound enough. The problem is that although late passages can be identified with some certainty, it is impossible to date with surety any passage as early. Conceptual or stylistic arguments are matters of opinion, and although they may win their adherents, in the end the detractors are the

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<sup>1</sup>For example, see D. Proctor, *The Experience of Thucydides* (Warminster, Wilts, England: Aris & Phillips LTD, 1980) and S. Hornblower, *Thucydides* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987).

The proposer of *Die thukydeischen Frage*, Ullrich argues for two different periods of composition: (1) Books I-IV written soon after 421 (2) Books V-VIII written after 404 and I-IV reworked. F. W. Ullrich, *Beiträge zur Erklärung des Thukydides* (Hamburg: 1846). E. Schwartz is the first who uses *Die thukydeischen Frage* to argue for a development in Thucydides' thought. Schwartz believes that Thucydides originally saw Korinth as the cause of the war and only later conceived of the *ἀληθεστάτη πρόφασις*: his theory that Spartan fear of Athens' growth was the true cause of the war. E. Schwartz, *Das Geschichtswerk des Thukydides* (Bönn: Georg Olms Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1960).

ones standing. Arguments which point to a passage whose validity becomes false at some later point before Thucydides' death are more successful. For example, at II. 23. 3, the Oropians are referred to as Athenian subjects; their subjugation ends in 411, and so it is possible that the passage was written before 411.<sup>2</sup> Dating by this method, however, is not absolutely conclusive and is seldom possible. What happens, therefore, is that as each successor overturns the conclusions of his predecessor, more and more of the *History* becomes conclusively dated as late and less and less of it as early.<sup>3</sup> Thus it becomes impossible to trace any development in Thucydides' thought.

The second method to be avoided is the one that considers Thucydides' own thoughts, opinions, and assumptions immaterial. Those who use this method emphasize everything and anything but what the historian himself thinks.<sup>4</sup> Even in poetry where equating the poet with a poem's persona can put the reader in the awkward position of Catullus' Aurelius and Furius, poetic intent, i.e., what the poet

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<sup>2</sup>De Romilly, *Thucydides and Athenian Imperialism*, trans. by P. Thody (Oxford: Alden Press, 1963), 25.

<sup>3</sup>J. Finley, "The Unity of Thucydides' History," in *Three Essays on Thucydides* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1967), 120.

<sup>4</sup>For Cochrane this results in Thucydides the *objective scientist*; for Woodhead it results in a neutral Thucydides who "in the fact of power and in the rightness of its exercise" is simply "reporting and no more." C. N. Cochrane, *Thucydides and the Science of History* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1929), Introduction and 165 and A. G. Woodhead, *Thucydides on the Nature of Power*, Martin Classical Lectures 24 (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University press published for Oberlin College, 1970), 9.



thinks, is of paramount importance.<sup>5</sup> Why then in history and especially in the study of Thucydides, where authorial comments are precious because of their rarity,<sup>6</sup> do some consider the author's thoughts immaterial?

The answer lies, I believe, in the notion that the historian is merely an objective recorder of events. If the historian is an objective recorder, then because they do not impinge upon the work, his opinions are immaterial. The existence of objectivity in history I attempt to disprove below. What concerns me here is not whether history is objective, but why history's objectivity has so many standard bearers.

At least part of the answer has its roots in 19th century inductivism. I think that the adherents of inductivism advised scholars to hold no theory at all but simply to observe because they realized that theory is by nature subjective and because they thought that what is subjective has a lesser claim on truth. Though he claimed to work solely by inductive observation, Darwin himself, in a letter to John Scott, a young zoologist, supports this contention and at the same time shows the folly of inductivism:

I would suggest to you the advantage at present of being very sparing in introducing theory in your papers (I formerly erred much in geology in that way): *let theory guide your observations* but till your reputation is well established be sparing in publishing theory. It makes persons doubt your

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<sup>5</sup>"qui me ex versiculis meis putastis . . . parum pudicum" (Catullus 16).

<sup>6</sup>Of course the reader must guard how he interprets the statements lest irony, sarcasm, understatement, or some other figure lead to the wrong conclusions.

observations.<sup>7</sup>

Just as theory can make persons doubt observation so do I think that historians who cling to the standard of objectivity do so because they think that admitting history's subjectivity renders history a pseudo-discipline. But since, as I argue below, subjectivity is the necessary component of meaningful history, and in fact of any meaningful scholarly endeavor, objectivists should be disabused of their objective illusion.

But before arguing against objectivity in history, I must pave the way for my own approach to Thucydides by returning to scholars' past approaches to him. Most fruitful, I believe, are those studies which focus attention on some aspect of the *History* in their search for insight into Thucydides' thought. Parry uses the *λόγος/ἔργον* (word/deed) antithesis that Thucydides employs throughout the *History* as a means to uncovering Thucydides' thought and the *History*'s theoretical underpinning.<sup>8</sup> Akin to Parry's work is Rawlings' book on the structure of Thucydides' *History*. There Rawlings uses the echoes and similarities between pairs

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<sup>7</sup>Francis Darwin, *More Letters of Charles Darwin*, vol. 2 (London: 1903), 323; quoted in Peter Novick, *That Noble Dream: The "Objectivity Question" and the American Historical Profession* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 36, n. 22.

<sup>8</sup>A. M. Parry, *Logos and Ergon in Thucydides* (Salem, New Hampshire: Arno Press, 1981). Compare L. Edmunds, *Chance and Intelligence in Thucydides* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1975).

See also: M. Ostwald, *ΑΝΑΓΚΗ in Thucydides* (Atlanta, Georgia: Scholars Press, 1988) and J. W. Allison, *Power and Preparedness in Thucydides* (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989).

of books to peer into the workings of Thucydides' mind.<sup>9</sup> Also after insight into the workings of Thucydides, Connor, focusing on the work's rhetorical strategy and literary technique, attempts "to determine Thucydides' expectations about his reader and the methods by which he shapes and guides his readers' responses."<sup>10</sup>

It is into this genre of Thucydidean studies that my work seeks admittance. Pursuing the same end as those above and, like them, focusing on one aspect of the *History*, I use Thucydides' stasis excursus, III. 82-84,<sup>11</sup> as my means to understanding. The thesis is that Thucydides views the Peloponnesian War as a type of stasis and that his reflections on stasis in III. 82-84 form part of the basis for his understanding of the war in general. For this reason, I contend, III. 82-84 can be used as a key for understanding the *History*.

Any study with such a sharp focus cannot hope to open all the doors in the mind of so complex an author and work. But if my study clarifies one of the levels on which Thucydides' *History* operates, its aim is fulfilled. Beyond this, a study that

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<sup>9</sup>H. R. Rawlings, *The Structure of Thucydides' History* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981).

<sup>10</sup>W. R. Connor, *Thucydides* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 18.

<sup>11</sup>In the past most scholars have considered III. 84 spurious. As of late the chapter has won more defenders: E. Wenzel, "Zur Echtheitsfrage von Thukydidēs 3, 84," *WS* 81 (1968): 18-27; H. R. Rawlings, *The Structure of*, 179 n. 7; M. R. Christ, "The Authenticity of Thucydides 3.84," *TAPA* 119 (1989): 137-46; and J. R. Ellis, "The Structure of Thucydides' Dissertation on Stasis and the Authenticity of 3.84," *Electronic Antiquity* 1 (July 1993): 1-7. Since the burden of proof rests upon those who wish to excise, and since they have yet to prove beyond doubt the chapter spurious, I accept its authenticity.

focuses on Thucydides' understanding of stasis and war presupposes the subjective nature of the work. For it is my belief not only that Thucydides' *History* is subjective but that any meaningful history must also be. If there were not serious debate concerning objectivity and subjectivity in history,<sup>12</sup> I would answer those who believe in history's objectivity with these two quotes:

There is no such thing as pure *objective* observation. Your observation, to be interesting, *i.e.*, to be significant, must be *subjective*. The sum of what the writer of whatever class has to report is simply some human experience, whether he be poet or philosopher or man of science. The man of most science is the man most alive, whose life is the greatest event. Senses that take cognizance of outward things merely are of no avail. It matters not where or how far you travel--the farther commonly the worse--but how much alive you are.<sup>13</sup>

and

History cannot be written impartially, as can botany, and the reason is quite clear. An author can approach the life of the cabbage quite objectively. He has no conception of the voluptuous thrill that a cabbage feels when it sinks its roots into well fertilized earth. He, therefore, can lay aside all prejudice and describe the life of a cabbage 'without love and without hatred.' If a common cabbage were to write botany, the account would be filled with prejudice of color, scorn for the inferior red cabbage, race prejudice against such foreign interlopers as the Chinese cabbage and scorn for debased cabbage substitutes like Brussels sprouts. A cabbage, however, could write an impartial history of human events, and the nearer a historian's mental processes approach those of a cabbage, the nearer he may approach impartiality in historical writing.<sup>14</sup>

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<sup>12</sup>See, for example, P. Novick, *That Noble Dream: The "Objectivity Question" and the American Historical Profession*.

<sup>13</sup>H. D. Thoreau, "Observation," in *The Norton Reader: An Anthology of Expository Prose*, general editor, Arthur M. Eastman, 7th ed. (New York and London: W. W. Norton & Company, 1965), 193.

<sup>14</sup>Louis E. Lord, *Thucydides and the World War*, Martin Classical Lectures, vol. 12 (New York: Russell & Russell, 1945), 27-28.

But since many take the debate seriously, I offer a more extensive argument for history's subjectivity. My column is selectivity, whose pieces are held together by the rods of subjectivity.

The argument of selectivity holds that because the historian cannot relate all the events of his chosen topic, that is, because he must select those events that he deems most significant and because selection requires taste and judgement, history must be subjective. For an example of what would happen without selectivity, consider the fable by Karl Popper. Suppose an ardent believer in objective science rigorously pursues the method of inductive science. He records everything he possibly can, filling notebook after notebook with all and sundry; he omits nothing. He dies, certain in the gratitude of Science for his life's work, blissfully unaware of his own inanity. For science like other disciplines requires more than fact. Facts alone are meaningless. Our ardent believer might as well have been counting pebbles in a pit.<sup>15</sup>

Macaulay also recognizes the necessity of selectivity in history. Of history

Macaulay writes:

Perfectly and absolutely true, it cannot be; for, to be perfectly and absolutely true, it ought to record *all* the slightest particulars of the slightest transactions--all the things done and all the words uttered during the time of which it treats. The omission of any circumstance, however insignificant, would be a defect. If history were written thus, the Bodleian library would not contain the

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<sup>15</sup>J. Bronowski, "The Nature of Scientific Reasoning," in *The Norton Reader: An Anthology of Expository Prose*, general editor, Arthur M. Eastman, 7th ed. (New York and London: W. W. Norton & Company, 1965), 929-30.

occurrences of a week.<sup>16</sup>

This is what prompts him, I believe, to assert that "facts are the mere dross of history."<sup>17</sup>

As a proponent of the 19th century belief that history consists of the maximum number of irrefutable objective facts, Lord Acton's teacher Döllinger is ironic proof of selectivity's necessity in history: Döllinger wrote no history of his own. Acton himself signals the inanity of 19th century inductivism when he writes in his introductory note to the first volume of the *Cambridge Modern History* that the requirements pressing on the historian "threaten to turn him from a man of letters into the compiler of an encyclopedia."<sup>18</sup> Acton does not mean to disparage the encyclopedist; his point is that the historian is in danger of merely listing facts like the devotee of Popper's fable.

Since the meaningful historian is not a mere compiler of facts but a careful selector of those he deems requisite, what is it that sets him apart from the compiler? In other words, it is certain that the historian must select, but if he merely selects events he thinks pertinent and compiles them, is he not a smaller version of Popper's devotee? If he writes such a history, then of course he is. But I write

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<sup>16</sup>Thomas Babington Macaulay, "History," in *The Varieties of History: From Voltaire to the Present*, ed. Fritz Stern (New York: The World Publishing Company, 1956; revised 1972), 76 (page references are to the revised edition).

<sup>17</sup>Ibid., 78.

<sup>18</sup>E. H. Carr, "The Historian and His Facts," in *The Norton Reader: An Anthology of Expository Prose*, general editor, Arthur M. Eastman, 7th ed. (New York and London: W. W. Norton & Company, 1965), 756.

above that the meaningful historian is not a mere compiler, and so I ask again: what is it that distinguishes the one from the other?

Simon Schama, a modern historian, relates precisely what this distinguishing factor is. In the Afterword to his book *Dead Certainties*, which contains two accounts that he calls historical novellas, Schama writes:

Though these stories may at times appear to observe the discursive conventions of history, they are in fact historical novellas, since some passages (the soldier with Wolfe's army, for example) are pure inventions, based, however, on what documents suggest. This is not to say, I should emphasize, that I scorn the boundary between fact and fiction. It is merely to imply that even in the most austere scholarly report from the archives, the inventive faculty--selecting, pruning, editing, commenting, interpreting, delivering judgements--is in full play. This is not a naïvely relativist position that insists that the lived past is *nothing* more than an artificially designed text. (Despite the criticism of dug-in positivists, I know of no thoughtful commentator who seriously advances this view.) But it does accept the rather banal axiom that claims for historical knowledge must always be fatally circumscribed by the character and prejudices of its narrator.<sup>19</sup>

The distinguishing factor is what Schama calls the inventive faculty, i.e., the author's own subjective creativity that is subject to his own assumptions, beliefs, values, and character and that makes meaningful his facts.<sup>20</sup>

Schama argues that to some degree all historians make use of their own inventive faculty. Since this is true, not only does Schama add his own blow to the

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<sup>19</sup>Simon Schama, *Dead Certainties* (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1991), 322.

<sup>20</sup>Hayden White thinks history as a discipline is in bad shape today because "it has lost sight of its origins in the literary imagination. In the interest of *appearing* scientific and objective, it has repressed and denied to itself its own greatest source of strength and renewal." H. White, "Historical Text as Literary Artifact," in *Tropics of Discourse: Essays in Cultural Criticism* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978), 99.

rather gory horse of objectivity in history, but also by the method chosen in *Dead Certainties*, he advances the argument a step further. The argument implicitly made by the book is since the inventive faculty imbues all history, while maintaining the sanctity of those details that we can say with some surety actually happened, if an historian uses his inventive faculty to recreate one or more versions of what might have happened, he will have a greater claim on truth than the historian who presents one version of what, in his view, actually happened.

Schama takes us a long way from Thucydides, whose stated purpose and method are wholly concerned with presenting what actually happened. Indeed when we can check Thucydides' account against inscriptional and archaeological evidence, the facts he uses are usually verified.<sup>21</sup> But since Thucydides' *History*, like any other meaningful history, is not a mere collection of facts that can be tested by external evidence, the creative faculties these two historians employ make their works more alike than different.

Clearly I am making a distinction between the factual and creative elements of meaningful history. I have no desire to lecture at length on the distinction between fact and invention. Suffice it to say that when Thucydides says that Alkibiades, Nikias, and Lamachos are the generals of the Sicilian Expedition, he is making a factual statement that can be tested against inscriptional and other evidence; but when he writes that war is a violent teacher, he has invented a metaphor in his effort

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<sup>21</sup>W. P. Wallace, "Thucydides," *Phoenix* 18 (1964): 254. This is not to say that Thucydides does not commit errors of detail, just that he rarely does.



to comprehend war. This metaphor is his own subjective creation, and although the majority may agree with it, it will never become a fact like the one above. Similarly when he says that given a constant human nature similar events will recur in similar ways (I. 22. 4 and III. 82. 2); that people are uncritical in their acceptance of the past (I. 20. 1); that there is an incalculable element (*παράλογον*) in events (VIII. 24. 5); and that the truest cause of the war is the Spartan fear of Athens' growth, he is also being subjective.<sup>22</sup>

By subjective I do not mean to imply that the inventive statements above are untrue, for any one or all may be as true as the sun's warming the earth. But even if they are all true, they will still be subjective: subjectivity and truth are not mutually exclusive.<sup>23</sup> What I wish to emphasize, however, is that there is a verifiable

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<sup>22</sup>τὴν μὲν γὰρ ἀληθεστάτην πρόφασιν, ἀφανεστάτην δὲ λόγῳ, τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἠγοῦμαι μεγάλους γιγνομένους καὶ φόβον παρέχοντας τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις ἀναγκάσαι ἐς τὸ πολεμεῖν (I. 23. 6).

A. D. Momigliano argues that "if there is something that Thucydides does not succeed in doing, it is to explain the remote origins of the conflict between Sparta and Athens." The reason for this failure Momigliano attributes to the nature of Greek political thought, which tended to concentrate on constitutional problems and to view causes of war as marginal because war was considered inevitable, whereas men had control over what type of constitution they adopted. It is only recently (the beginning of the 20th century) that historians have begun to explain more successfully the causes of wars, "Some Observations on Causes of War in Ancient Historiography," in *Studies in Historiography* (New York and Evanston: Harper & Row, 1966) 116-122.

<sup>23</sup>There is good reason to believe that the validity of fact can be just as uncertain as that of theory. In an interesting, compelling, and controversial discussion on how and why new scientific discoveries happen, T. S. Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, 2d ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962; 2d ed. enlarged, 1970), argues that adherence to a theory (paradigm) colors our observation of the facts, and when one theory replaces another, our facts change also (111-35).

difference between Thucydides' factual statement noting the generals of the Sicilian Expedition and his other inventive assertions: the one can be conclusively proven, the others cannot.

In addition to this verifiable difference, there is another important distinction that can be made between the above factual assertion and the subjective ones. The distinction is that Alkibiades, Nikias, and Lamachos are the generals of the Sicilian Expedition is, in itself, of little meaning; whereas the subjective assertions are not. Herein lies the difference between compiling a list of facts and writing a meaningful history: meaningful history *requires* subjectivity, or in Schama's words inventiveness, to make its facts meaningful.<sup>24</sup> By the following examples I will

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Kuhn also argues that we should relinquish the notion that theory (paradigm in his terminology) brings us closer and closer to the truth. He doubts whether there is one objective, true account of nature. We can speak of an evolution from primitive beginnings, but not of an evolution toward anything. We should learn to substitute evolution-from-what-we-know for evolution-toward-what-we-wish-to-know (170-73).

In writing that truth and subjectivity are not exclusive, my object is only to argue that to many the word subjective wrongly connotes falsity just as objective and factual wrongly connote truth. If we could rid these words of such connotations, I think many disciplines would benefit. The most *factual* and *objective* Popperian account of the Vietnam War will surely distort our view of what occurred, but the most subjective and theoretical account need not.

<sup>24</sup>Thucydidean scholars have embraced Thucydides' subjectivity with two contrary results: those who accept Thucydides' subjectivity without impugning his integrity, and those who believe that Thucydides purposely manipulated the facts to support his own personal viewpoints. The former believe in what Stahl aptly called *die subjective Redlichkeit* (subjective honesty) of Thucydides. H. P. Stahl, *Thukydides: Die Stellung des Menschen im geschichtlichen Prozeß* (Munich: Beck, 1966), 30. The latter believe Thucydides not an historian but a manipulator of evidence.

Examples of the former: H. D. Westlake writes "nor do I intend to try to convict him of gross distortion or gross partisanship . . . his picture of the war is a

attempt to uncover Thucydides' inventiveness, i.e., to show four ways by which Thucydides renders his facts meaningful. The examples show Thucydides' use of theory, *enargeia*, characterization, and style.

## THEORY

In 427 the Peloponnesians ask the Plataeans, besieged since the third year of the war, to surrender with the understanding that the guilty will be punished but not without trial. Because they expect the trial to be favorable, the Plataeans capitulate. Five judges from Sparta arrive and without bringing any charge against the Plataeans, simply ask them whether they have done the Peloponnesians any service

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highly subjective picture." H. D. Westlake, "The Subjectivity of Thucydides: His Treatment of the Four Hundred at Athens," *Bulletin of the John Ryland's Library* 56 (1973): 195. H. R. Rawlings emphasizes Thucydides' artistry and dramatic intensity over his precision, *The Structure of*, Preface. By accepting the objective fallacy, R. Connor feels free to "give passages their full emotional force and to recognize the role of suffering in the work," *Thucydides*, 8. R. H. Moyer says that "Thucydides' history is based fundamentally on fiction, both in the way the record, the narrative, is constructed and in the way the past itself is seen as possessing meaning and order. No doubt Thucydides thought that his History was a truly accurate rendering of the past, that he had discovered the true meaning of the past and had recorded it. No doubt Thucydides did not see his History as a fiction; nor did he think of the order that he saw in history as a fiction," "Thucydides' "Great War": The Fiction in Scientific History," *Clio* 19 (1990): 179-180.

Examples of the latter: W. P. Wallace asks rhetorically, "Is it omission or suppression when a historian fails to record pertinent facts which cast doubt on his interpretation?" ("Thucydides," 255). M. Lang writes, "So far we have attempted merely to explain why Thucydides and Aristotle present such different versions of the conspiracy and to show that the validity of Thucydides' account is affected by his efforts to disprove the parallelism of the situations in 514 and 415 B.C." M. Lang, "The Murder of Hipparchus," *Historia* 3 (1955): 395-407. For Lang see also: "A Note on Ithome," *GRBS* 8 (1967): 267-273; "Scapegoat Pausanias," *Classical Journal* 63 (1967): 79-85; "Kylonian Conspiracy," *Classical Philology* 62 (1967): 243-49; "Thucydides and the Epidamnian Affair," *Classical World* 61 (1968): 173-76. In *Thucydides the Artful Reporter* (Toronto: Hakkert, 1973), V. Hunter devotes an entire chapter to Thucydides' manipulative subjectivity.

in the war. Their eyes having been opened by this rhetorical question, the Plataeans remind the Spartans that they were the only Boeotians to defend Hellas when the Persians threatened the security of all; that they rendered Sparta assistance when the Helots seceded to Ithome; and that they allied themselves with the Athenians only after the Peloponnesians denied their request for an alliance and told them to go to the Athenians.

To such compelling reasons, the Thebans persuade the Spartans to allow them to make a rejoinder. The Thebans argue that the Plataeans did not medize (go over to the Persians) because the Athenians did not; that they themselves medized because their government at the time, neither an oligarchy or democracy but an iniquitous dynasty, forced them; and that the Plataeans willingly atticized and are, therefore, as guilty of enslaving Greeks as the Athenians are.

After reading these two persuasive speeches, the reader is eager to know the issue. When Thucydides says that the Spartans thought their question fair because they had always invited the Plataeans to be neutral in accord with the treaty Pausanias cut after the defeat of the Persians and because they had even extended their offer of neutrality just before the siege, the outcome is certain: the Spartans condemn and massacre the Plataeans (III. 52-68).

These are the bare facts of the event. The factual gives little understanding into the reasons behind occurred. What the facts do is pique our interest in Sparta's motivation behind destroying Plataea. For it is clear from the rhetorical question they pose to the Plataeans that the Spartans never intended the trial to be a fair one.

The reason that immediately pops to mind is that the Spartans destroy Plataea because she is of material importance to the waging of the war. This reason, however, is one that neither Thucydides nor the Spartans ever suggest. All the Spartans do is defend their decision.

Though in the *History* he notes that Sparta is always concerned with keeping up an appearance of propriety,<sup>25</sup> nonetheless Thucydides is not content with Sparta's defense.<sup>26</sup> He is after Sparta's motivation behind the massacre. He never indicates that the Spartans consider Plataea of material significance to the war.<sup>27</sup> But he does stress their desire to maintain control of Plataea in the event of peace. The answer he gives for their motivation is found near the end of Chapter 68:

σχεδὸν δέ τι καὶ τὸ ξύμπαν περὶ Πλαταιῶν οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι οὕτως ἀποτετραμμένοι ἐγένοντο Θηβαίων ἕνεκα, νομίζοντες ἐς τὸν πόλεμον αὐτοὺς ἄρτι τότε καθιστάμενον ὠφελίμους εἶναι.

The adverse attitude of the Lacedaemonians in the whole Plataean affair was mainly adopted to please the Thebans, who were thought to be useful in the war at the moment raging. (trans. Crawley III. 68. 4)

This reason places the episode into a meaningful whole. Throughout the affair, it is

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<sup>25</sup>He is careful to note that the Spartans thought they suffered misfortunes in the Arkidamian War because they infringed upon the truce by the Thebans' entering Plataea and by their refusing to listen to Athens' offer of arbitration (VII. 18).

<sup>26</sup>Arguing that the Spartan rationale that they are justified in punishing the Plataeans because the Plataeans are false friends who have broken the obligation of friendship, Lionel Pearson writes that "Thucydides withholds comment." L. Pearson, "Popular Ethics in the World of Thucydides," *Classical Philology* 52 (1957): 234. Thucydides, of course, shows no such restraint.

<sup>27</sup>Further proof of Plataea's lack of strategic importance is that in the aftermath, a temple of Hera is built on the ruins, not a fort (III. 68. 3).

expediency determining Sparta's actions. Plataea is not of material significance. The Spartans wish to maintain control of Plataea because Thebes, who has always detested Boeotian Plataea's independence from Boeotia, is useful to her. For this reason, the Spartan judges condemn and massacre the Plataeans.<sup>28</sup>

By this episode Thucydides emphasizes one of the main theories of the *History*: justice aside, men act in accordance with their own expediency, an aphorism that applies to the Athenians as well as to the Spartans, as Thucydides reminds us in the last sentence of this event: "*καὶ τὰ μὲν κατὰ Πλάταιαν ἔτει τρίτῳ καὶ ἐνενηκοστῷ ἐπειδὴ Ἀθηναίων ξύμμαχοι ἐγένοντο οὕτως ἐτελεύτησεν*" (such was the end of Plataea, in the ninety-third year after she became the ally of Athens) (III. 68. 5). After such a reminder, who can forget the promise of assistance made by the Athenians to the Plataeans (II. 73. 3)? After ninety-three years Athens allows an ally of proven bravery and integrity to be extirpated because she means nothing materially to the war being waged. To boot Plataea is destroyed by Sparta for no other reason than the enmity of a useful ally.

### ENARGEIA

The episode at Plataea shows how Thucydides' theory of expediency makes

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<sup>28</sup>One might argue that Sparta's offer of neutrality runs counter to Thucydides' interpretation of the event, but it does not. Even if the offer was sincere (and I think it was), Sparta would not have lost had Plataea accepted it. Acceptance without handing the city over to Sparta would have left the Plataeans vulnerable to attack, thereby pleasing the Thebans. Acceptance with handing the city over would have enabled Sparta to do as she pleased: restore the city to the Plataeans, hand it over to the Thebans, or use it as a bargaining chip in her negotiations with Athens in the event of peace.

meaningful an otherwise inexplicable event. Throughout the *History* theory and fact combine to help determine our understanding of events. But in addition to theory there is another aspect of Thucydides' inventiveness that impinges upon our understanding--his ability to make the reader a participant in the action.<sup>29</sup>

Thucydides places the reader on the boat sent to Mytilene to countermand the order of execution (III. 49. 2-4). He places him in the stench-filled quarries of Syrakuse (VII. 87. 1-4). He also places him in the mind of the actors. Connor provides an example of this technique from the third year of the war. It is the end of the campaigning season, and the Peloponnesians decide to make one last operation. They will surprise the Athenians with an attack on the Peiraeus, Athens' port. Connor notes the clarity and ease of the narrative until the reader encounters the following sentence of "contorted phraseology and nine negatives":<sup>30</sup>

*οὔτε γὰρ ναυτικὸν ἦν προφυλάσσειν ἐν αὐτῷ οὐδὲν οὔτε προσδοκία οὐδεμία μὴ ἂν ποτε οἱ πολέμιοι ἑξαπιναιῶς οὕτως ἐπιπλεύσειαν, ἐπεὶ οὐδ' ἀπὸ τοῦ προφανοῦς τολμῆσαι ἂν καθ' ἡσυχίαν, οὐδ' εἰ διεννοοῦντο, μὴ οὐκ ἂν προαισθέσθαι.*

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<sup>29</sup>Thucydides' *enargeia*, or ability to make the reader a participant in the action, has been noted since antiquity. Of this ability Plutarch writes, "ὁ γοῶν Θουκυδίδης ἀεὶ τῷ λόγῳ πρὸς ταύτην ἀμιλλᾶται τὴν ἐνάργειαν, οἷον θεατὴν ποιῆσαι τὸν ἀκροατὴν καὶ τὰ γινόμενα περὶ τοὺς ὀρώντας ἐκπληκτικὰ καὶ ταρακτικὰ πάθη τοῖς ἀναγινώσκουσιν ἐνεργάσασθαι λιχνεύμενος (ΠΟΤΕΡΟΝ ΑΘΗΝΑΙΟΙ ΚΑΤΑ ΠΟΛΕΜΟΝ Η ΚΑΤΑ ΣΟΦΙΑΝ ΕΝΔΟΞΟΤΕΡΟΙ, 347A).

For a recent exploration of *enargeia*, see Andrew D. Walker, "Enargeia in Greek Historiography," *TAPA* 123 (1993): 353-77.

<sup>30</sup>I think the phraseology is straightforward: no navy was on guard; there was no expectation that the enemy would attack so suddenly because not even openly and at their leisure would they dare [to attack] nor, if they did intend to, would they [the Athenians] not perceive them. It is the shift in perspective to the Athenians and the negatives that make the sentence difficult.

There was no fleet on the look out in the harbor [of the Piraeus] and no one had the least idea of the enemy attempting a surprise: while an open attack would, it was thought, never be deliberately ventured on, or if in contemplation would be speedily known at Athens. (II. 93. 3)

Connor writes that Crawley added the crucial "it was thought" (unexpressed but implicit in the Greek) to mark Thucydides' shift from the Peloponnesian point of view to the Athenian. The negatives indicate to the reader that precisely because the Athenians did not expect it, the attack might have worked. When Thucydides shifts back to the Peloponnesian point of view the reader learns that the riskiness of the operation kept the Peloponnesians from attacking the Peiraeus. The account continues alternating between the two viewpoints. Connor concludes,

The effect is consistently ironic: by the time we hear of the Peloponnesian decision to abandon their original plan we know that from the Athenian point of view it might have worked; by the time we hear of the panic in Athens, we know that from the Peloponnesian point of view the plan was too risky to carry through. The irony is characteristic of Thucydides and so are the rapid changes of viewpoint, a major component of his style and an important contributor to this second source of his authority [i.e., his style].<sup>31</sup>

In addition to the irony, the alternation of viewpoints causes the reader to experience the events as both the Athenians and Spartans did. Athenian overconfidence turns into panic when the city thinks the Peiraeus taken and the Peiraeus thinks Salamis overcome and the enemy about to attack. Spartan bravery becomes fear, which makes them lose what they might have gained. The reader experiences the one's good fortune and the other's hesitancy. He is not merely

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<sup>31</sup>Connor, "Narrative Discourse in Thucydides," in *The Greek Historians: Literature and History, Papers Presented to A. E. Raubitschek* (Saratoga, California: ANMA Libri & Co., 1985), 8-9.



reading an account; he is taken into the action, and from different perspectives is made to see things as they occurred. The result is that he knows what happened, why it happened, what could have happened, and why it did not.

He also comes to know better the tendencies of his characters. The Korinthian characterization of the Athenians and the Spartans is famous. Its essence is that the Athenian dares beyond his power, but the Spartan acts below his potency (I. 70). The overall effect of the aborted strike on the Peiraeus reinforces the Korinthian characterization and suggests to the reader the danger inherent in the characters of the two: overconfidence could be Athens' downfall, hesitancy, Sparta's.

### **CHARACTERIZATION**

From the two naval battles off Naupaktos in the third year of the war, Edmunds provides another example of Thucydides' inventiveness: the characterization of the Spartans and the Athenians as two groups with different qualities. In the first engagement Phormion with his twenty ships defeats the Peloponnesians with their forty-seven ships, of which Phormion captures twelve. Outnumbered, Phormion waits for the morning breeze, which always blows down the gulf. The wind throws the Spartan ships against one another; the Athenians attack and win. The Spartans attribute the Athenian victory to chance, but through his experience Phormion knew the breeze would come. Superior Athenian intellect and experience defeat the Spartans.

In the second battle, seventy-seven Peloponnesian ships lure the twenty Athenian ships into the gulf, drive them ashore, and disable all but eleven. These

escape and flee, pursued by twenty Peloponnesian ships. One Athenian ship falls far behind the rest. Outside Naupaktos' harbor a transport ship is anchored. The trailing Athenian ship maneuvers around it and sinks the lead Peloponnesian ship. As a result, the Peloponnesians are thrown into confusion; the Athenians counter-attack, win, and recover the ships that were initially disabled. Athenian intellect uses chance to win. Thus, in the former battle what was thought to be chance (the wind) is not, and in this battle, chance (the transport ship) is taken advantage of by skill.<sup>32</sup>

By these two engagements, Thucydides distinguishes Athenian reliance on experience and skill from Spartan reliance on bravery and superior numbers. He shows the danger of fighting in a narrow strait, where a sea fight is similar to a land battle, and numerical superiority does matter. Likewise, in open water, mere force and numbers cannot overcome experience and skill. Thucydides suggests that if the Athenians use the qualities at which they excel, they will succeed. But if the Peloponnesians can do the same by forcing the Athenians to fight a land battle on water--they will succeed.

Thus, in 413, when the Athenian Konon begs Demosthenes and Eurymedon for ships because his own eighteen are no match for the twenty-five Korinthian ships stationed opposite him, the reader knows the engagement is doomed (VII. 31). In a narrow crescent-shaped bay with its entrance blocked, thirty-three Athenian ships now under Diphilos' command fight to a draw twenty-five Peloponnesian ships with reinforced hulls. The Athenians meet force with force and because they do not win,

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<sup>32</sup>Lowell Edmunds, *Chance and Intelligence in Thucydides*, 97-99.

lose (VII. 34). By acting contrary to their character, the Athenians defeat themselves. Konon's request for ships conveys this contrariness most trenchantly. Doubt and reliance on numbers have replaced the confidence that results from reliance on skill. As we get closer and closer to Athens' demise we get farther and farther from the Athenians characterized by the Corinthians in I. 70.

## STYLE

In addition to his use of theory, his making the reader a participant in the action, and his characterization of the Spartans and Athenians, prose style is another inventive element Thucydides uses to create understanding. Thucydides' style runs the spectrum from clear to obscure. Hardly anyone has understood Thucydides' reason for switching from a simple and clear style to a complex and obscure one. I contend that part of the reason for employing his complex prose style is his desire to recreate in the reader's mind the event under scrutiny. In the Peloponnesian aborted strike on the Peiraeus, the nine negatives stress Athens' overconfident belief that such an attack would *never* happen; but by piling up the negatives, Thucydides emphasizes how never almost came to pass.<sup>33</sup>

At VII. 44. 7 Thucydides helps recreate the event at hand by his arrangement of words:

*ὥστε τέλος ξυμπεσόντες αὐτοῖς κατὰ πολλὰ τοῦ στρατοπέδου, ἐπεὶ ἅπαξ ἐταράχθησαν, φίλοι τε φίλοις καὶ πολῖται πολίταις, οὐ μόνον ἐς φόβον κατέστησαν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐς χεῖρας ἀλλήλοις ἐλθόντες μόλις ἀπελύοντο.*

Thus, after being once thrown into disorder, they ended by coming into

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<sup>33</sup>See above.

collision with each other in many parts of the field, friends with friends, and citizens with citizens, and not only terrified one another, but even came to blows and could be parted only with difficulty. (trans. Crawley VII. 44. 7)

In this description of the Athenians' disastrous night attack on the Epipolae, Thucydides places *φίλοι* next to *φίλοις* and *πολίται* beside *πολίταις* to stress the confusion of the attackers. Visually or aurally friend mistakenly strikes against friend and citizen against citizen as they did in the darkness of their attack.

In addition to striking *φίλοι* against *φίλοις* and *πολίται* against *πολίταις*, Thucydides recreates the event by mirroring with his prose the confusion the Athenians experienced in trying to distinguish friend from foe:

*οἱ τε Ἀθηναῖοι ἐζήτουν τε σφᾶς αὐτοὺς καὶ πᾶν τὸ ἐξ ἐναντίας, καὶ εἰ φίλιον εἶη τῶν ἤδη πάλιν φευγόντων, πολέμιον ἐνόμιζον, καὶ τοῖς ἐρωτήμασι τοῦ ξυνηθήματος πυκνοῖς χρώμενοι διὰ τὸ μὴ εἶναι ἄλλω τῷ γνωρίσαι σφίσι τε αὐτοῖς θόρυβον πολὺν παρείχον ἅμα πάντες ἐρωτῶντες καὶ τοῖς πολεμίοις σαφῆς αὐτὸ κατέστησαν· τὸ δ' ἐκείνων οὐχ ὁμοίως ἠπίσταντο διὰ τὸ κρατοῦντας αὐτοὺς καὶ μὴ διεσπασμένους ἦσσαν ἀγνοεῖσθαι*

and the Athenians were seeking for one another, taking all in front of them for enemies, even though they might be some of their now flying friends; and by constantly asking for the watchword, which was their only means of recognition, they not only caused great confusion among themselves by asking all at once, but also made it known to the enemy, whose own they did not so readily discover, as the Syracusans were victorious and not scattered, and thus less easily mistaken . . . (trans. Crawley VII. 44. 4-5)

Thus far the subjects of the sentence are clearly expressed. But as the sentence ends, the subjects of the verbs *ἐντύχοιεν* and *διέφευγον* become confused just as the Athenians confuse friend for foe and vice versa:

*ὥστ' εἰ μὲν ἐντύχοιέν τισι κρείσσους ὄντες τῶν πολεμίων, διέφευγον αὐτοὺς ἅτε ἐκείνων ἐπιστάμενοι τὸ ξυνηθημα, εἰ δ' αὐτοὶ μὴ ἀποκρίνοιντο, διεφθείροντο.*

so that if being stronger they happened upon some of the opponents, they escaped them because they knew their password, but if they did not answer,

they were killed. (VII. 44. 5)

Exactly who, being stronger, happens upon whom and who is fleeing from whom is not clear until the *ἄτε*-clause. It is only then that we realize that the Athenians are the subject of *ἐντύχοιεν* and the enemy the subject of *διέφευγον*. After the *ἄτε*-clause the subjects become clear not because Thucydides makes them explicit but because of the context: above we learn that the enemy knows the Athenians' password so he must be the subject of *ἐπιστάμενοι* and, therefore, also of *διέφευγον*. Once we have determined these subjects, the rest reads easily. But in the meantime we have had to tease apart the subjects of *ἐντύχοιεν* and *διέφευγον* just as the Athenians had to struggle to determine who was who.

In addition to his piling up negatives to suggest that *never* almost happened, these two examples show how Thucydides uses his style to recreate events in the reader's mind; there are many others, for style is a main component of Thucydides' inventiveness. By the examples of style, characterization, *enargeia*, and theory, I have attempted to relate the two main levels on which Thucydides' *History* operates: the factual and the inventive, i.e., subjective. I contend that it is through the inventive that one understands the factual, that it is through understanding Thucydides and his inventiveness that one understands his *History*.

To achieve this understanding one could scrutinize each sentence of each book of the *History* for insight into Thucydides and his inventiveness. It is not my intention to explicate all eight books of the *History*. Rather, as stated above, I will explore one of the main tributaries of it, and hope that I end up at the mouth and not

lost in a marsh.

My tributary, III.82-84, is crucial to the *History* because it contains, in the historian's own words, the lengthiest and most complex analysis of any event in the Peloponnesian War.<sup>34</sup> For this reason alone it gives us unique insight into its author. In most other sections of the history, Thucydides adopts an objective pose: he keeps himself and his views in the background.<sup>35</sup> His opinions are still felt, but the reader must glean them from the white of the page, thus making proper understanding more difficult. In this passage Thucydides' frankness diminishes the reader's opportunities for misunderstanding him. Thus the picture we draw from it should be an accurate depiction of his expressed views.

In the main his expressed views comment upon stasis, society, war, and human nature--four main concerns of the *History* in general. Thucydides grants stasis such attention because it is one of the most important phenomena of the war. It afflicted almost all participants, contributed greatly to Athens' downfall, and helped destroy society's customary conventions. By making these chapters paradigmatic of all

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<sup>34</sup>Using Roman Jakobson's term, *shifters*, Roland Barthes indicates two ways that an historian speaks in his own words: (1) shifters of listening (a) statements like, I have heard, (b) the use of the non-historical present tense, and (c) reference to his personal experience and (2) shifters of organization such as, as I said earlier, or I will return to . . . , or enough about . . . Roland Barthes, "The Discourse of History," in *The Rustle of Language*, trans. Richard Howard (New York: Hill and Wang, 1986) 128-29. Because of the frequent use of gnomic aorists and the present tense, III. 82-84 is an example of a shifter of listening.

<sup>35</sup>Two exceptions are the Archaeologia (I. 1-23) and the account of the plague (II. 47-54). It is the content of the stasis excursus that distinguishes it from these two passages.

subsequent staseis, Thucydides demands that we recall them at specific points in the remaining account. In addition the analysis of stasis contains his philosophy of war and human nature. Thus not only does he express his views in his own voice, the views expressed concern four of the most important aspects of the *History*.

Finally, Thucydides composed III. 82-84 in a style which reflects the complex interrelations among his thoughts, philosophy, and the events themselves. I suggest that the complexity of the passage is deliberate.<sup>36</sup> By contorting the structure of the sentences, Thucydides attempts to reflect the chaos rampant in a city afflicted by stasis. The distorted structure confuses the reader so that he experiences the helplessness felt by stasis' victims.<sup>37</sup>

Because of its style, content, and candidness, this passage, more than any, should have important consequences for understanding Thucydides and his *History*.

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<sup>36</sup>I understand that Thomas Garrity uses this method in his dissertation, "The Experience of History: Reading Thucydides' Prose," (Ph.D. diss., University of California, 1994). Due to its recent completion, I have not had the opportunity to incorporate its findings. Tompkins takes a similar approach in his unpublished dissertation, "Stylistic Characterization in Thucydides" (Ph.D. diss., Yale University, 1968). Tompkins argues that in the speeches Thucydides adapts his prose to reflect the speaker's personality. Thus, the speeches are distinctive but their uniqueness is akin to that of the differences among actors' lines in a play written by one author. For Tompkins, see also "Archidamus and the Question of Characterization in Thucydides," *Nomodeiktēs: Greek Studies in Honor of Martin Ostwald* (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1993), 99-111; "Reciprocities between a Text and Two Translations: Thucydides, Venizelos and Kakrides," *Journal of the Hellenic Diaspora* 5 (1978): 69-79; and "Stylistic Characterization in Thucydides: Nicias and Alcibiades," *YCS* 22 (1972): 181-214.

<sup>37</sup>I also suggest that the desire that prompted him to reflect in his style the event being described may be an explanation for his dating the *History* by summers and winters: his concern for accuracy was so strong that he wished his readers to experience the events as they happened in time and space.

By explicating it and by showing its relation to the whole, I expect to arrive at a more complete understanding of the two. Because I argue in Chapter 3 that the style and content of the excursus combine to create understanding of it, this study insists upon the authenticity of III. 82-84. It demands that the passage's difficulties not be eliminated by emendations, the tack taken by most commentators. To this end, in Chapter 2, the text is reevaluated and presented with a grammatical commentary. Chapter 3 presents a literary critical exegesis of this section. The concern of this chapter is to elucidate the passage's meaning. Chapter 4 argues that Thucydides' interpretation and understanding of stasis and of the Peloponnesian War are similar and that for this reason, III. 82-84 can be used as a key for understanding the *History*. Finally Chapter 5 uses III. 82-84 as a key to understanding the Mytilenean Debate.



## CHAPTER 2

### TEXT, COMMENTARY, AND TRANSLATION

The complexity of Chapters 82-84 is notorious. Since Göller's commentary (1835) at least, and as recently as Romilly's (1981), there has been a tendency to eliminate the complexities with emendations. Because I argue that the difficulties of this passage are integral to its overall import, a text with all the complexities intact is required. To this end this chapter consists of a reevaluation of the text, a grammatical commentary, and a translation.

In 1821 Bekker produced his *Thucydidis de Bello Peloponnesiaco Libri Octo*, a critical edition which includes the *scholia graeca* and the essential variants of the best manuscripts, a commentary, and the notes of Duker and Wass. Thus his edition is the logical place to begin any reevaluation. To Bekker's *apparatus criticus* I have added the significant variants from the *apparatus critici* of Poppo, Herwerden, Arnold, Jones, and Romilly, any variants from Dionysius of Halicarnassos' *Περὶ Θουκυδίδου* and *Περὶ τῆς Δημοσθένους λέξεως*, and any of the Scholiast's variants. Where editors differ in what variant they chose to read, I have listed the choices of each. I have also included the significant emendations proposed or printed by Göller, Poppo, Krüger, Stahl, Herwerden, Poppo/Stahl, Böhme, Arnold, Classen/Steup, Jones, Gomme and Romilly. I have printed the source of the

emendation first, with those who later accepted the reading listed after. At times I have included readings of editions not personally examined, such as those from Dobree and Badham's editions.

The divergences of the manuscripts consist of either readily ascertainable scribal errors (e.g. *ἕκαστα αἰ μεταβολαί* for *ἕκασται αἰ μεταβολαί* (82.2)) or of variants of little or no consequence (e.g. *ἐπειδὴ* for *ἐπεὶ* (82.1)) or of differing omissions and inclusions of articles, particles, prepositions, and prefixes (differences which may be important but difficult to decide between or among, given Thucydides' penchant for poetical prose and for rhetorical figures).

The general agreement among the manuscripts is so strong that it strengthens my belief that Thucydides consciously contorted the language of these paragraphs and that what we have is very nearly what he wrote. Thus the readings of the manuscripts are preferred to the supposed ameliorative emendations proposed by most editors and commentators: of the editors and commentators considered, only Bekker and Jones resist simplifying and regularizing these chapters.

Consequently, with three exceptions,<sup>1</sup> the reevaluated text is the same as Bekker's (although the punctuation is quite different), and except for three punctuation differences,<sup>2</sup> the same as Jones'. For orthographical differences like

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<sup>1</sup>At III.82.4 *ἀσφαλεία* is read in place of *ἀσφάλεια* and at III.82.8 *φιλονικεῖν* is read, not *φιλονεικεῖν*, and *φιλονικίαν*, not *φιλονεικίαν*.

<sup>2</sup>At III.82.8 a comma is printed after *φιλοτιμίαν* instead of a ('); at III.82.8 no comma is printed after *διαπράξασθαι*, and at III. 84. 1 no comma is printed after *διὰ πάθους*.

*ἄφρακτος* and *ἄφαρκτος*; *προὔχοιεν* and *προύχοιεν*; *φιλονικεῖν* and *φιλονεικεῖν*, Jones' text has been followed.

The goals for the commentary are two: to provide comprehensive grammatical explanations when the syntax is unclear, and for the parts much debated, to provide the different solutions previously offered as well as my own. The commentaries consulted were those by Bekker, Göller, Krüger, Poppo/Stahl, Böhme, Arnold, Classen/Steup, and Gomme.<sup>3</sup> Where appropriate the remarks of the Scholiast are included.

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<sup>3</sup>Because Hornblower's *A Commentary on Thucydides* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991) is interpretive rather than grammatical, it was not used for this chapter.

## CONSPECTUS SIGLORUM

|                |                |   |   |   |   |            |
|----------------|----------------|---|---|---|---|------------|
| A              | Parisinus      |   |   |   |   | Saeculi XI |
| B              | Vaticanus      | Vatican Library                           |   |   |   | XI         |
| C              | Laurentianus   | Laurentian Library, Florence              |   |   |   | X          |
| D              | Marcianus      | Library of St. Mark, Venice               |   |   |   |            |
| E              | Palatinus      | Library at Heidelberg                     |   |   |   | XI         |
| F              | Augustanus     | Library at Munich                         |   |   |   |            |
| F <sub>1</sub> | Monacensis 430 |   |   |   |   |            |
| G              | Monacensis 228 | Library at Munich                         |   |   |   |            |
| H              | Cassellanus    | Cassel in Westphalia                      |   |   |   |            |
| I              | Vindobonensis  | Imperial Library Vienna                   |   |   |   |            |
| K              | Graevianus     | At Utrecht                                |   |   |   |            |
| L              | Arundelianus   | Arundel Library                           |   |   |   |            |
| M              | Baroccianus    | Bodleian Library                          |   |   |   |            |
| M <sub>1</sub> | Britannicus    |   |   |   |   |            |
| N              | Clarendonianus | Public Library at Cambridge               |   |   |   |            |
| O              |                | Library of Corpus Christi College, Oxford |   |   |   |            |
| P              | Danicus        | Copenhagen                                |   |   |   |            |
| Q              | Mosquensis     | Moscow                                    |   |   |   |            |
| T              |                | University Library, Cambridge             |   |   |   |            |
| V              | Venetus        | Library of St. Mark, Venice               |   |   |   |            |
| W              | "              | "   | " | " | " | "          |
| X              | "              | "   | " | " | " | "          |
| Y              | "              | "   | " | " | " | "          |
| Z              | "              | "   | " | " | " | "          |

## In the Library at Paris

|   |         |
|---|---------|
| a | 1868    |
| b | 1791-92 |
| c | 1636    |
| d | 1637    |
| e | 1733    |
| f | 1735    |
| g | 1736    |
| h | 1734    |
| i | 1638    |
| k | 317     |

οὕτως ὠμῆ <ῆ> στάσις προνώρησε, καὶ ἔδοξε μᾶλλον, διότι ἐν τοῖς  
 πρώτη ἐγένετο, ἐπεὶ ἕστερον γε καὶ πᾶν ὡς εἰπεῖν τὸ Ἑλληνικὸν ἐκινήθη,  
 διαφορῶν οὐσῶν ἑκασταχοῦ τοῖς τε τῶν δήμων προστάταις τοὺς Ἀθηναίους  
 5 ἐπάγεσθαι καὶ τοῖς ὀλίγοις τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους. καὶ ἐν μὲν εἰρήνῃ οὐκ ἂν  
 ἐχόντων πρόφασιν οὐδ' ἐτοίμων παρακαλεῖν αὐτούς, πολεμονύμενων δὲ καὶ  
 ξυμμαχίας ἅμα ἑκατέροις τῇ τῶν ἐναντίων κακώσει καὶ σφίσι αὐτοῖς ἐκ τοῦ  
 αὐτοῦ προσποιήσει ῥαδίως αἱ ἐπαγωγαὶ τοῖς νεωτερίζειν τι βουλομένοις  
 ἐπορίζοντο.

1 ἡ mavult Krüger et acceperunt Herwerden Poppo/Stahl Böhme Classen/Steup  
 Jones Romilly ὅτι g ἐν om. B 2 ἐπειδὴ g 3 διαφορῶν  
 A B τῶ δήμῳ c 5 ἐτόλμων mavult Steup et accepit Romilly τολμώντων  
 Herwerden οὐδετέρων Marshall LCM 15 (1990) 6 post ἑκατέροις] οὔσης,  
 ἐπὶ Herwerden 7 προσποιήσιν g αἱ om. A τι om. d

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1. οὕτως ὠμῆ] οὕτως ὠμῆ predicate to προνώρησε. <ῆ>] "Articulus abesse  
 nequit, quod de seditione antea narrata sermo est" (Poppo/Stahl p. 143). μᾶλλον]  
 μᾶλλον ὠμῆ ἔδοξεν ἥπερ ἐγένετο (Scholiast). ἐν τοῖς πρώτῃ] It is interesting that  
 not one of the commentators considered notes that Kerkyra is not the setting for the  
 first instance of stasis in the war, but Notion the port of Kolophon is (III. 34).  
 Rather most argue that ἐν τοῖς strengthens the superlative (Kühner/Gerth *Satzlehre I*,  
 i p.28 and Smyth 1089). Although he makes no mention of Notion, Arnold argues  
 that ἐν τοῖς πρώτῃ means *among the first* (p. 452). As support Arnold refers to his  
 note on III. 17. 1. 2 (ἐν τοῖς πλείστοις), where the context demands that the meaning  
 be *one of the largest* (p. 360-61). (For this reason Classen/Steup and Jones bracket  
 the entire paragraph.) Of all the other instances in Thucydides of ἐν τοῖς with the  
 superlative, not one conclusively supports Arnold's contention (I. 6. 3. 1, VII. 19.  
 4. 1, VII. 24. 3. 1, VII. 27. 3. 4, VII. 71. 3. 11, VIII. 89. 2. 5, VIII. 90. 1. 4).  
 VII. 71. 3. 11 and VIII. 90. 1. 4 argue strongly against him. If Arnold is wrong,

then perhaps Thucydides thought Kerkyra so different from Notion in kind and degree that he considered the stasis at Kerkyra the first true outbreak.<sup>4</sup> The

Scholiast's wish to supply *Κερκυραίοις* after *ἐν τοῖς* I find improbable. 3.

*διαφορῶν οὐσῶν . . . ἐπάγεσθαι*] *ἐπάγεσθαι* is dependent upon *διαφορῶν*. Both sides were contending against one another to invite in either the Lakedaemonians or the Athenians. *τοῖς προστάταις . . . καὶ τοῖς ὀλίγοις*] datives of possession with *διαφορῶν*. 4. *καὶ ἐν μὲν εἰρήνῃ . . . ἐπορίζοντο*] This sentence has caused much debate. At issue are the subjects of *ἐχόντων*, *ἐτοίμων*, and *πολεμουμένων*, the lack of a main verb in the *μὲν* clause, the syntax of *ξυμμαχίας* and *ἐκατέροις*, and the soundness of a bare adjective (*ἐτοίμων*) answering a participle (*ἐχόντων*).

As evidence of an adjective answering a participle, Poppo cites III. 69. 1: *αἱ δὲ τεσσαράκοντα νῆες τῶν Πελοποννησίων αἱ Λεσβίοις βοηθοὶ ἐλθοῦσαι, ὡς τότε φεύγουσαι διὰ τοῦ πελάγους ἔκ τε τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἐπισιωχθεῖσαι καὶ πρὸς τῇ Κρήτῃ χειμασθεῖσαι καὶ ἀπ' αὐτῆς σποράδες πρὸς τὴν Πελοπόννησον κατηνέχθησαν, καταλαμβάνουσιν ἐν τῇ Κυλλήνῃ . . .* (p. 137). Krüger quotes Julian, *Epistle* 56 p. 442, whose use of *ἐτοίμων* parallels Thucydides': *τοὺς νῦν ἀκρωμένους τοῦ μουσικοῦ Διοσκόρου ποιήσον ἀντιλαβέσθαι τῆς τέχνης προθυμότερον, ὡς ἡμῶν ἐτοίμων ἐπὶ ὅπερ ἂν ἐθέλωσιν αὐτοῖς συνάρασθαι* (p. 71). These examples, I think, prove the validity of *ἐτοίμων*.

*ξυμμαχίας* the Scholiast construes with *προσποιήσει* (*διὰ προσποίησιν*

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<sup>4</sup>For a recent examination of *ἐν τοῖς πρώτῃ*, see M. F. Williams, "Two Traditional Elements in Thucydides' Corcyrean Excursus," *Classical World* 79 (1985): 1-3.

συμμαχίας). Göller takes *ξημμαχίας* with *κακώσει* and *προσποιήσει*, i.e., "*propter imminutionem et propter acquisitionem*," and he construes *ἐκατέροις* with *ἐπορίζοντο*: "*ἐκατέρων τοῖς νεωτερίζειν τι βουλομένοις*" (p. 324-25). Quoting Portus, Poppo takes *ξημμαχίας* with *αἱ ἐπαγωγαί*; the lengthy separation of the two he explains by hyperbaton for emphasis. For *ἐκατέροις* he quotes Göller (p. 137). Gomme explains *ξημμαχίας* as another genitive absolute, lacking *ὑπαρχούσης* or *διδομένης*; *ἐκατέροις* is the indirect object of the participle (p. 372-73). Because word order and simplicity argue in Gomme's favor, I prefer his explanation. Instead of *ὑπαρχούσης* or *διδομένης*, I suggest *οὔσης*; *ἐκατέροις*, therefore, is a dative of possession with *ξημμαχίας*.

Stahl adduces VI. 69. 1 as evidence for the lack of a main verb in the *μέν* clause and writes, "Duo hic membra *μέν*--*δέ* particulis ita inter se iuncta sunt, ut alterum verbo finito, alterum huic subditum participio enuntietur" (p. 143). Steup thinks VI. 69. 1 quite different from III. 82. 1 and believes the lack of a main verb an intolerable anacoluthon (p. 164). Following one of Classen's recommendations, he emends *ἐτοίμων* to *ἐτόλμων*.

Steup's solution requires him to take Athens and Sparta as the subject of *ἐχόντων* and *πολεμουμένων* but the oligarchs and democrats of the various cities as the subject of the emended *ἐτοίμων* (p. 164). Conversely Gomme understands the oligarchs and democrats of the various cities as the subject of *ἐχόντων*, *ἐτοίμων*, and *πολεμουμένων* (p. 373). I think Gomme is correct and reject Steup's argument because the logic and perspective of the sentence demand that the oligarchs and

democrats have no pretext (*οὐκ ἂν ἐχόντων πρόφασιν*) not the Athenians and Spartans.

In agreement with Steup, Gomme thinks the lack of a main verb in the *μέν* clause intolerable (p. 372). I offer three suggestions: (1) Gomme and Steup are correct; there is a breakdown in syntax, but the breakdown is deliberate: Thucydides skews the grammar to emphasize the difference between war and peace; (2) *ἐχόντων* answers *ἐπορίζοντο* as Stahl asserts; (3) With a comma after *Λακεδαιμονίους*, the sentence runs from *ἐπεὶ* to *ἐπορίζοντο* as Marchant suggests. If Marchant is correct, then Thucydides is contrasting the primacy of *ἐν τοῖς πρώτῃ ἐγένετο* with the regularity of *ῥαδίως αἱ ἐπαγωγὰ τοῖς νεωτερίζειν τι βουλομένοις ἐπορίζοντο*. For this argument to hold, the *καὶ* of *καὶ ἐν μὲν εἰρήνῃ* must be explanatory and introduce a parenthetical phrase, running from *καὶ ἐν μὲν εἰρήνῃ* to *σφίσιν αὐτοῖς ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ προσποιήσει*. I prefer the first suggestion. 6. *τῇ κακώσει* and *προσποιήσει*] datives of purpose (Kühner/Gerth *Satzlehre I* #11 p.439 and Smyth 1473 a). 7. *τοῖς βουλομένοις*] construe with *ἐπορίζοντο*.



- καὶ ἐπέπεσε πολλὰ καὶ χαλεπὰ κατὰ στάσιν ταῖς πόλεσι, γιγνώμενα μὲν  
 10 καὶ αἰεὶ ἐσόμενα, ἕως ἂν ἡ αὐτὴ φύσις ἀνθρώπων ἦ, μᾶλλον δὲ καὶ  
 ἡσυχαιότερα καὶ τοῖς εἶδεσι διηλλαγμένα, ὡς ἂν ἕκασται αἱ μεταβολαὶ τῶν  
 ξυνηχιῶν ἐφιστῶνται. ἐν μὲν γὰρ εἰρήνῃ καὶ ἀγαθοῖς πράγμασιν αἱ τε  
 πόλεις καὶ οἱ ἰδιῶται ἀμείνουσ τὰς γνώμας ἔχουσι διὰ τὸ μὴ ἔς ἀκουσίους  
 15 βίαιος διδάσκαλος καὶ πρὸς τὰ παρόντα τὰς ὀργὰς τῶν πολλῶν ὁμοιοῖ.

9 ἔπεσε V πολλὰ χαλεπὰ c f 10 φύσις τῶν ἀνθρώπων B h Stahl  
 Herwerden Böhme Classen/Steup 11 ἡσυχώτερα K ἡσυχέστερα e  
 ἡσυχαιότερα καὶ] καὶ om. i ἦθεσι διηλλαγμένα ἕως A ἕκαστα A B E F g  
 ἕκασταις mavult Hude ἕκαστοις mavult Krüger τῶν ὤρων ξυνηχιῶν c 14  
 ἐσπίπτειν Herwerden βίου ante βίαιος forsā excidisse putat Krüger 15 τὸ  
 παρὸν L O ὀρμάς L O P d

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9. καὶ ἐπέπεσε] καὶ is intensive. ἐπέπεσε] gnomic aorist, otherwise γιγνώμενα is  
 incomprehensible. 10. ἡ αὐτὴ] predicative. μᾶλλον] worse, i.e.,  
 χαλεπώτερα, modifying the noun present in γιγνώμενα and ἐσόμενα. An adverb  
 similarly modifies a noun at IV. 68. 5: ἀσφάλεια δὲ αὐτοῖς μᾶλλον ἐγίγνετο τῆς  
 ἀνοίξεως (Göller p. 325). Adverb and adjective are similarly combined at III. 13. 2:  
 ἡ μέντοι ἀπόστασις ἡμῶν θάσσον γεγένηται καὶ ἀπαράσκευος (Porro note 4. 2 p.  
 7). 13. ἔχουσι διὰ τὸ μὴ ἔς ἀκουσίους ἀνάγκας πίπτειν] hypallage for ἔχουσι  
 διὰ τὸ μὴ ἔς ἀκούσιοι ἔς ἀνάγκας πίπτειν. 14. τοῦ καθ' ἡμέραν] Krüger's  
 suggestion that βίου has fallen out is unnecessary. τοῦ articulates καθ' ἡμέραν.

16 ἔστασίαζέ τε οἶν τὰ τῶν πόλεων, καὶ τὰ ἐφυστερίζοντά που πύσσει τῶν προγενομένων πολὺν ἐπέφερε τὴν ὑπερβολὴν τοῦ καινοῦσθαι τὰς διανοίας τῶν τ' ἐπιχειρήσεων περιτεχνήσει καὶ τῶν τιμωριῶν ἀτοπία. καὶ τὴν εἰωθυίαν ἀξίωσιν τῶν ὀνομάτων ἐς τὰ ἔργα ἀντήλλαξαν τῇ δικαιοῦσει.

16 ὑφυστερίζοντά g πίσσει Q ἐπιπύσσει Dionysius, *Περὶ Θεοκ.*, p. 886 (but που πύσσει, *Περὶ Δημοσθ.*, p. 953), Stahl Herwerden Böhme ἀποπύσσει F<sub>1</sub> M<sub>1</sub> 17 προγεγεννημένων c cum Dionysio<sup>5</sup> Stahl προσγενομένων e πολλήν Dionysius, *Περὶ Θεοκ.*, p. 886<sup>6</sup> Stahl τοῦ καινοῦσθαι] ἐς τό Dionysius<sup>7</sup> Stahl Böhme κενοῦσθαι A B E F h 18 τ' om. K

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16. τὰ τῶν πόλεων . . . τὰ ἐφυστερίζοντα] "i.e., αἱ πόλεις. Quaeritur, utrum τὰ ἐφυστερίζοντα sint αἱ ἐφυστερίζουσαι πόλεις, οἱ ἐφυστερίζοντες, an τὰ ὕστερον γιγνώμενα" (Poppo p. 138). Poppo prefers τὰ ὕστερον γιγνώμενα (p. 139). I prefer αἱ ἐφυστερίζουσαι πόλεις and οἱ ἐφυστερίζοντες because of the αἶ τε πόλεις καὶ οἱ ἰδιῶται of the prior sentence and because the plural ἀντήλλαξαν of the next sentence assumes the same subject as the preceding two. 17. πολὺ] adverbial. 18. περιτεχνήσει and ἀτοπία] datives of respect further defining καινοῦσθαι τὰς διανοίας. τὴν εἰωθυίαν ἀξίωσιν . . . ἐς τὰ ἔργα ἀντήλλαξαντα] It is not, as many understand, that the accustomed meanings of words were changed, but that the

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<sup>5</sup>Dionysius also has *προγενόμενον*. He quotes the passage twice in *Περὶ Θεοκωδίδου* at 886 and once in *Περὶ τῆς Δημοσθένους λέξεως* (953): (1) ἐπιπύσσει τῶν προγενομένων πολὺν ἐπέφερε τὴν ὑπερβολὴν τοῦ καινοῦσθαι τὰς διανοίας, (2) ἐπιπύσσει τῶν προγεγεννημένων πολὺν ἐπέφερε τὴν ὑπερβολὴν ἐς τὸ καινοῦσθαι τὰς διανοίας, (3) που πύσσει τῶν προγεγεννημένων πολὺν ἐπέφερε τὴν ὑπερβολὴν ἐς τὸ καινοῦσθαι τὰς διανοίας. He explains thus, "οἱ δὲ ὕστερίζοντες ἐπιπυθνανόμενοι τὰ γεγεννημένα παρ' ἑτέροις ἐλάμβανον ὑπερβολὴν ἐπὶ τὸ διανοεῖσθαί τι καινότερον" (p. 886).

<sup>6</sup>Reiske reads *πολλήν* but Usener/Radermacher read *πολύ*.

<sup>7</sup>See note 1 above.

values of words were exchanged<sup>8</sup> in order to suit the faction's interest. For example, in the next sentence *ἀνδρεία* maintains its positive meaning; its worth, however, is debased by using it to obscure an abhorrent action (in this case *τόλμα ἀλόγιστος*). *δειλία ἐμπρεπής* remains pejorative; it is misapplied to scorn an otherwise honorable trait, *μέλλησις προμηθής*. Thus virtues become vices and vices virtues by an exchange of words' usual values; meanings remain unchanged.<sup>9</sup> 19. *δικαιώσει] ἀντὶ τοῦ τῆ ἐαυτῶν δικαίᾳ κρίσει* (Scholiast). "Sed *δικαίᾳ* omittere poterat" (Göller p. 325).

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<sup>8</sup>Cf. Dennis Proctor, *The Experience of Thucydides* (Warminster, Wilts, England: Aris & Phillips LTD, 1980), 204; John T. Hogan, "The *ἀξίωσις* of Words at Thucydides 3.82.4," *Greek, Rome and Byzantine Studies* 21 (1980): 139-49; J. Wilson, "The Customary Meanings of Words Were Changed--Or Were They? A Note on Thucydides 3.82.4," *Classical Quarterly* 32 (1982): 18 ff; and I. Worthington, "A Note on Thucydides 3.82.4," *Liverpool Classical Monthly* 7 (1982): 124.

<sup>9</sup>Hogan argues convincingly, I think, that not only were vices called virtues and virtues vices, but that a vice, such as *τόλμα ἀλόγιστος*, might have been considered a good thing and a virtue, such as *τὸ σῶφρον*, might have lost its positive connotation and become a word of derision (Hogan, "The *ἀξίωσις*," 145). Note that in this instance, meanings remain, but connotations change. For a detailed discussion of this passage see Chapter 3.

- 20 τόλμα μὲν γὰρ ἀλόγιστος ἀνδρεία φιλέταιρος ἐνομίσθη, μέλλησις δὲ προμηθῆς δειλία εὐπρεπής, τὸ δὲ σῶφρον τοῦ ἀνάνδρου πρόσχημα, καὶ τὸ πρὸς ἅπαν ξυνητὸν ἐπὶ πᾶν ἄργόν· τὸ δ' ἐμπλήκτως ὄξυν ἀνδρὸς μοίρα προσετέθη, ἀσφαλεία δὲ τὸ ἐπιβουλεύσασθαι ἀποτροπῆς πρόφασις εὐλογος. καὶ ὁ μὲν χαλεπαίωνων πιστὸς αἰεὶ, ὁ δ' ἀντιλέγων αὐτῷ ὑποπτος.
- 25 ἐπιβουλεύσας δὲ τις τυχὼν ξυνητὸς καὶ ὑπονοήσας ἔτι δεινότερος·

20 τόλμαν K φιλαίτερος A G H P Q d e h i ὠνομάσθη Herwerden 22 πρὸς ἅπαν] παράπαν L O P ἐκπλήκτως b 23 ἀσφαλεία B f g M<sub>1</sub> Q Schol. Poppo Krüger Stahl Herwerden Böhme Arnold Classen/Steup Jones Romilly ἀσφάλεια cet. Dionysius, Περὶ Θουκ. et Περὶ Δημοσθ., p. 888 et p. 954, Bekker Göller ἀσφαλεία δὲ τὸ] τοῦ L O P ἐπιβουλεύσασθαι K ἔτι βουλεύσασθαι Herwerden 24 πάντ' ἐπαινῶν pro χαλεπαίωνων Rauchenstein 25 post τις τυχὼν] <τε> Dionysius, Περὶ Θουκ. et Περὶ Δημοσθ., p. 889<sup>10</sup> et p. 954, Stahl Böhme

20. μέλλησις δὲ προμηθῆς, τὸ δὲ σῶφρον, and τὸ πρὸς ἅπαν ξυνητὸν] all subjects of an ἐνομίσθη understood from the first colon. 21. καὶ τὸ πρὸς ἅπαν ξυνητὸν ἐπὶ πᾶν ἄργόν] καὶ τὸ πρὸς πάντα συνητὸν πρὸς πάντα ἄργόν ἔλεγον (Scholiast). 22. τὸ δ' ἐμπλήκτως ὄξυν] "ein wahnsinniges Drauflosgehen" (Classen/Steup p. 166). Gomme rightly contrasts τὸ δ' ἐμπλήκτως ὄξυν with τὸ ἐπιβουλεύσασθαι (p. 375). But because of τὸ ἐπιβουλεύσασθαι, he wrongly thinks τὸ δ' ἐμπλήκτως ὄξυν a more intellectual vice. τὸ δ' ἐμπλήκτως ὄξυν is the absence of intellect; it is unthinking, impulsive action. 23. ἀσφαλεία . . . ἀποτροπῆς πρόφασις εὐλογος] The meaning of this thought is much disputed. The scholiast translates, "τὸ ἐπιπολὸν βουλευσασθαι δι' ἀσφάλειαν πρόφασις ἀποτροπῆς ἐνομίζετο." Göller prints ἀσφάλεια and understands τὸ ἐπιβουλεύσασθαι as "quod attinet ad insidias." Thus the whole would be *safety with respect to snares was a nicely phrased pretext for*

<sup>10</sup>δέ τι f. Usener/Radermacher

*declining to attack the enemy* (p. 326). Poppo thinks the syntax of Göller's τὸ ἐπιβουλεύσασθαι impossible; rather, for Göller's translation to be possible, ἀσφαλεία δὲ τοῦ ἐπιβουλεύσασθαι must be read (p. 140). Arnold prints ἀσφαλεία and translates, "*But safely to concert measures against an enemy was accounted but a decent pretence for declining the contest with him altogether*" (p. 455). I prefer the Scholiast's τὸ ἐπιπολὺν βουλεύσασθαι δι' ἀσφάλειαν: *planning for the sake of safety*. Gomme argues that ἐπιβουλεύσασθαι cannot simply mean *to plan*; and so he thinks emendation necessary (p. 376). But for ἐπιβουλεύω in the sense of *to plan* or *to aim at so as to acquire* rather than *plot against* see III. 20. 1. 4, IV. 103. 4. 2, and VII. 51. 1. 5. 25. τυχόν] *to succeed*, as often in Thucydides, e.g. III. 42. 4. 1.

- 26 προβουλεύσας δὲ ὅπως μὴδὲν αὐτῶν δεήσει, τῆς τε ἑταιρίας διαλυτῆς καὶ τοὺς ἐναντίους ἐκπεπληγμένους. ἀπλῶς δὲ ὁ φθάσας τὸν μέλλοντα κακὸν τι δρᾶν ἐπηνείτο, καὶ ὁ ἐπικελεύσας τὸν μὴ διανοούμενον. καὶ μὴν καὶ τὸ ξυγγενὲς τοῦ ἑταιρικοῦ ἀλλοτριώτερον ἐγένετο διὰ τὸ ἐτοιμότερον εἶναι  
30 ἀπροφασίστως τολμᾶν

26 δεήσει A B C E F G H I P V c d e f g h i Bekker Haack Götter Poppo Krüger Stahl Herwerden Böhme Arnold Classen/Steup Jones Romilly vulgo δεήσοι τῆς τε] τε om. i ἑταιρίας A c f i διαλύτης E 27 ἀπλῶς δὲ] τε Haase et acceperunt Krüger Stahl Classen/Steup 28 ἐπικωλύσας Herwerden Badham ὃς μὴ ἐπικελεύσαντος διανοούμενον d ἐπικελεύσας τὸν] τοῦ B 29 τὸ ἀλλοτριώτερον K εἶναι διὰ τὸ ἀπροφασίστως i ἀνετοιμότερον Badham et accepit Herwerden

26. αὐτῶν] τοῦ ἐπιβουλεύειν καὶ ὑπονοεῖν. δεήσει] future indicative in an object clause of effort (Kühner/Gerth *Satzlehre II*, Anmerk 5 p. 376 and Smyth 2211).

27. ἀπλῶς δέ] τὸ ξύμπαν εἰπεῖν, i.e., *to sum up*. ὁ φθάσας τὸν μέλλοντα] one comrade anticipating another comrade just as ὁ ἐπικελεύσας τὸν μὴ διανοούμενον (Classen/Steup p. 167); enemy anticipating enemy whereas ὁ ἐπικελεύσας encouraged a man would have taken no part in the conspiracy (Gomme p. 377).

Because it paints a more trenchant picture, I prefer Gomme's interpretation.

28. ὁ ἐπικελεύσας] supply ἐπηνείτο. τὸν μὴ διανοούμενον] generic μὴ with an attributive participle. Understand κακὸν τι δρᾶν. τὸ ξυγγενὲς] *blood-tie*.

29. τοῦ ἑταιρικοῦ] *party-tie* not mere *friendship*. ἐτοιμότερον] Badham posits ἀνετοιμότερον (accepted by Herwerden), but τὸ ἑταιρικόν is the unexpressed subject of διὰ τὸ ἐτοιμότερον εἶναι.

31 οὐ γὰρ μετὰ τῶν κειμένων νόμων ὠφελίας αἱ τοιαῦται ξύνοδοι, ἀλλὰ παρὰ τοὺς καθεστῶτας πλεονεξία.

31 μετὰ τῆς τῶν κειμένων νόμων ὠφελίας e et μετὰ τῶν κειμένων νόμων ὠφελία mavult Poppo et acceperunt Poppo/Stahl Böhme Classen/Steup ὠφέλεια Herwerden 32 πλεονεξία Herwerden

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31. μετὰ τῶν κειμένων νόμων ὠφελίας] most commentators prefer ὠφελία: *in accordance with the established laws for the sake of profit*. Göller interprets the two genitives as ὠφέλεια νομίμη, *lawful gain*, and cites as a comparandum Euripides' *Bacchae*, l. 338, ὀ τῆς ἡσυχίας Βίωτος for βίος ἡσυχος (p. 327). Because a dependent genitive between the preposition and its object is common in Thucydides and because Thucydides' penchant for inconcinnity is especially apparent in this passage, I prefer Göller's interpretation.

καὶ τὰς ἐς σφᾶς αὐτοὺς πίστεις οὐ τῷ θείῳ νόμῳ μᾶλλον ἐκρατύνοντο ἢ τῷ κοινῇ τι παρανομῆσαι. τὰ τε ἀπὸ τῶν ἐναντίων καλῶς λεγόμενα ἐνεδέχοντο  
 35 ἔργων φυλακῇ, εἰ προύχοιεν, καὶ οὐ γενναιότητι. ἀντιτιμωρήσασθαι τέ τινα  
 περὶ πλείονος ἢν ἢ αὐτὸν μὴ προπαθεῖν. καὶ ὄρκοι εἴ ποιν ἄρα γένοιτο  
 ξυναλλαγῆς, ἐν τῷ αὐτίκα πρὸς τὸ ἄπορον ἑκατέρῳ διδόμενοι ἴσχυον οὐκ  
 ἐχόντων ἄλλοθεν δύναμιν

33 θείῳ καὶ νομίμῳ Dionysius, Περὶ Δεμοσθ., p. 955 οὐ τῷ ὀσίῳ καὶ νομίμῳ  
 Dobree et accepit Herwerden ἐκρατοῦντο I 34 ἀνεδέχοντο i 36 οὐ  
 ante περί inserit Badham ἐγίγνοντο Dionysius, Περὶ Θουκ., p. 891, sed  
 γένοιτο, Περὶ Δεμοσθ., p. 955 37 τὸν ἄπορον L O τὴν ἄπορον P τὰ  
 ἄπορα F 38 ἔχοντες d

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33. τῷ κοινῇ τι παρανομῆσαι] compare the initiation rites of gangs in the U.S.A. today. 35. ἔργων φυλακῇ] Gomme translates *with precautionary action* (p. 378). Better I think to take *λεγόμενα* and *ἔργων* as the words and deeds of the party suing for peace, i.e., *with a guard against the enemy's deeds*.<sup>11</sup> προύχοιεν] the subject is debated. Poppo, Stahl, Böhme, and Arnold argue for *οἱ ἐναντίοι*; Classen/Steup and Gomme for *οἱ ἐνδεχόμενοι*. Arnold argues that it is surely the weaker party that would be cautious and suspicious (p. 456). Although such a change in subject is not unlike Thucydides, it is precisely the stronger party who can act *γενναιότητι*, not the weaker. In addition it is usually the weaker party who sues for peace not the stronger. Finally, I think Thucydides' next sentence supports this interpretation: the stronger foe who accepted peace overtures had to be on guard against his opponent's actions because revenge was more important than suffering the first loss.  
 ἀντιτιμωρήσασθαι] subject of ἢν. τινα] object of ἀντιτιμωρήσασθαι. 36.

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<sup>11</sup>Cf. A. M. Parry, *Logos and Ergon in Thucydides* (Salem, New Hampshire: Arno Press, 1981).



*αὐτόν*] subject accusative of *προπαθεῖν*. 37. *ξυναλλαγῆς*] dependent upon *ὄρκοι*.  
*ἐν τῷ ἀντίκῃ*] *ἀντίκῃ* articulated. *ἐκατέρῳ*] dative of agent with *διδόμενοι* (*by each*, i.e., the oligarchs and democrats). For the dative of agent with the passive voice cf. III. 64. 4 (Classen/Steup p. 168). 38. *ἐχόντων*] temporal genitive absolute: *oaths lasted in the immediacy of the moment on account of an impasse while they did not have strength from elsewhere*. *ἐχόντων* is plural because of the dual nature of *ἐκατέρῳ*. The change of case, dative to genitive, is frequent in Thucydides and Greek literature.

40 ἐν δὲ τῷ παρατυχόντι ὁ φθάσας θαρσήσαι, εἰ ἴδοι ἄφαρκτον, ἥδιον διὰ τὴν πίστιν ἐτιμωρεῖτο ἢ ἀπὸ τοῦ προφανοῦς, καὶ τό τε ἀσφαλὲς ἐλογίζετο καὶ ὅτι ἀπάτη περιγεγόμενος ξυνέσεως ἀγώνισμα προσελάμβανεν. ῥῆζον δ' οἱ πολλοὶ κακοῦργοι ὄντες δεξιοὶ κέκληνται ἢ ἀμαθεῖς ἀγαθοί, καὶ τῷ μὲν αἰσχύνονται, ἐπὶ δὲ τῷ ἀγάλλονται.

39 Θαρσήσαι Herwerden εἰ] ἢ E d i ἴδη N V g ἥδει c f 40 ἀπό] διά M<sub>1</sub> τό τε] ὅτι d 41 ἀνάγκη K περιγεγόμενον d ῥῆζιον A F H g h pro ῥῆζον Badham mavult ἥδιον 42 πολλοί om. c ὄντες secl. Classen/Steup τὸ μὲν I

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39. ἄφαρκτον] understand ἐναντίον. ἥδιον] adverbial. 40. καὶ τό τε ἀσφαλὲς] explanatory καί (Kühner/Gerth *Satzlehre II*, #2 p.247 and Smyth 2869 a), parallel to ὅτι. Both explain ἥδιον ἐτιμωρεῖτο. ἐλογίζετο] subject is ὁ φθάσας, also the subject of προσελάμβανεν. 41. ὅτι] see above, καὶ τό τε ἀσφαλὲς οἱ πολλοὶ . . . ἀγαθοί] The meaning of this aphorism depends upon ὄντες. Nowhere does Thucydides predicate any form of εἶναι to the verb καλέω. Thus in Thucydides ὄντες κέκληνται does not mean *lassen sich nennen* as Krüger thinks (p. 75). As Classen/Steup argue, Krüger's translation, "*die meisten lassen sich aber lieber gewandte Schelme als ungebildete Biedermänner nennen*," which they accept, requires bracketing ὄντες (p. 169). If Classen/Steup are wrong and ὄντες is not a marginal gloss that has been incorporated into the text, then the statement must be understood as Arnold translates, "*Men in general, when dishonest, more easily gain credit for ability, than, when simple, they gain credit for honesty.*" He explains, "This is inserted as the reason why successful perfidy was rather emulated than detested; why men would rather deceive others than be themselves deceived" (p. 457). 42. καὶ τῷ μὲν αἰσχύνονται, ἐπὶ δὲ τῷ ἀγάλλονται] note the chiasm: (A)

ῥᾶον δ' οἱ πολλοὶ κακοῦργοι ὄντες δεξιοὶ κέκληνται ἢ (B) ἀμαθεῖς ἀγαθοί, (B) καὶ τῷ μὲν αἰσχύνονται, (A) ἐπὶ δὲ τῷ ἀγάλλονται.

πάντων δ' αὐτῶν αἴτιον ἀρχὴ ἢ διὰ πλεονεξίαν καὶ φιλοτιμίαν, ἐκ δ' αὐτῶν  
45 καὶ ἐς τὸ φιλονικεῖν καθισταμένων τὸ πρόθυμον.

44 αἴτιον ἀρχή A B C E F G H K L N O P V c g h Bekker Göller Poppo  
Krüger Stahl Herwerden Böhme Arnold Classen/Steup Jones Romilly αἴτιον δ'  
ἀρχή d i et αἴτιον ἢ ἀρχή ceteri αἴτιον secl. Madvig ἢ secl. Hude 45  
φιλονικεῖν Q Stahl Herwerden Classen/Steup Jones Romilly φιλονικεῖν cet. et  
Bekker Göller Poppo Krüger Böhme Arnold

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44. αἴτιον] predicate of ἀρχὴ ἢ and τὸ πρόθυμον. Supply ἦν. ἀρχή ἢ] not  
beginning but rule. Usually accepted as the meaning of ἀρχή ἢ is the Scholiast's ἡ  
ἐπιθυμία τοῦ βούλεσθαι ἄρχειν. The article is necessary as Gomme asserts, "not all  
ἀρχή, obviously, brings such bad results, only ἡ διὰ πλεονεξίαν" (p. 379). ἐκ δ'  
αὐτῶν] i.e., τῆς πλεονεξίας καὶ φιλοτιμίας. 45. ἐς τὸ φιλονικεῖν] construe  
with καθισταμένων. καθισταμένων] genitive of possession with πρόθυμον. The  
subject of the participle is unexpressed. The Scholiast paraphrases well, πάντων δ'  
τῶν εἰρημένων κακῶν αἴτιον ἦν ἡ ἐπιθυμία τοῦ βούλεσθαι ἄρχειν τῆς γῆς διὰ  
πλεονεξίαν καὶ φιλοτιμίαν. ἐκ τούτων δὲ ἡ στάσις ἀρχὴν λαμβάνουσα (φημί δὴ τοῦ  
ἄρχειν καὶ τῆς πλεονεξίας καὶ φιλοτιμίας) ὕστερον λαμβάνει ἕτεραν τῶν κακῶν  
αἰτίαν, τὴν τῶν στασιαζόντων προθυμίαν, ὥσπερ εἰς ἕξιν ἐρχομένων αὐτῶν τοῦ  
περιγενέσθαι καὶ μὴ ἡττηθῆναι τῶν ἐναντίων.

οἱ γὰρ ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι προστάντες μετὰ ὀνόματος ἑκάτεροι εὐπρεποῦς, πλήθους τε ἰσονομίας πολιτικῆς καὶ ἀριστοκρατίας σώφρονος προτιμήσει, τὰ μὲν κοινὰ λόγῳ θεραπεύοντες ἄθλα ἐποιοῦντο, παντὶ δὲ τρόπῳ ἀγωνιζόμενοι ἀλλήλων περιγίγνεσθαι ἐτόλμησάν τε τὰ δεινότατα ἐπεξῆσάν τε τὰς τιμωρίας ἔτι μείζους, οὐ μέχρι τοῦ δικαίου καὶ τῆ πόλει ξυμφόρου προτιθέντες, ἐς δὲ τὸ ἑκατέροις πον ἀεὶ ἡδονὴν ἔχον ὀρίζοντες, καὶ ἢ μετὰ ψήφον ἀδίκον καταγνώσεως ἢ χειρὶ κτώμενοι τὸ κρατεῖν ἐτοῖμοι ἦσαν τὴν ἀντίκα φιλονικίαν ἐκπιμπλάναι.

47 πολιτικῶν L O P 49 περιγενέσθαι i 51 προτιθέντες secl. Arnold προστιθέντες K Dionysius, Περὶ Θουκ., p. 894 Krüger Stahl Böhme Romilly τιθέντες i ἡδονὴν ἀεὶ c f 52 καταγνώσεως secl. Herwerden 53 φιλονικίαν Stahl Herwerden Classen/Steup Jones Romilly φιλονικίαν cet. et Bekker Göller Poppo Krüger Böhme Arnold ἐκπιμπλάναι A B E F G H K d f Bekker Göller Poppo Krüger Stahl Herwerden Böhme Arnold Classen/Steup Jones Romilly ἐκπιμπλάναι e ἐμπιμπλάναι L O P g vulgo ἐμπιμπλάναι

46. μετ' ὀνόματος εὐπρεποῦς . . . προτιμήσει] ἰσονομία πολιτικῆ and ἀριστοκρατία σώφρων are the political slogans used by each party. That πλήθους ἰσονομία πολιτικῆ is in place of the offensive δημοκρατία and ἀριστοκρατία σώφρων in place of the offensive ὀλιγαρχία as Poppo and others assert is open to debate (p. 143). Thucydides is surely, however, making a distinction between the noble words and the nefarious deeds of the party leaders. 47. πλήθους] subjective genitive. πολιτικῆς] "implies the relation of citizen to citizen, that is, of equal with equal, as opposed to δεσποτικῆ or τυραννικῆ" (Arnold p. 458). προτιμήσει] governs ἰσονομίας and ἀριστοκρατίας. 48. τὰ κοινὰ] the commonwealth. 49. ἐπεξῆσάν τε] τὰς τιμωρίας ἐπιτεταμένους ἐποίουν (Scholiast). Poppo and Arnold place a comma after τε because they think ἐπεξῆσάν τὰς τιμωρίας not Greek. They are surely wrong, cf. I. 70. 7. 2 and V. 100. 1. 4. 50. μέχρι] correlative with

ἐς. 51. *προτιθέντες*] those who read *προστιθέντες* miss the point of the metaphor. From *ἐπεξήεσαν* to *ὀρίζοντες* runs the metaphor of setting up and surpassing physical boundaries. *προτίθημι* is commonly used to mean setting up a mark (L.S.J. 3b); *προστιθέντες*, therefore, spoils the metaphor and should be rejected. *μετὰ ψήφον ἀδίκου καταγνώσεως*] see above, *μετὰ τῶν κειμένων νόμων ὠφελίας*, line 39. 52. *χειρὶ*] *νι*, L.S.J. IV. *τὸ κρατεῖν*] direct object of *κτώμενοι*.

ὥστε εὐσεβεία μὲν οὐδέτεροι ἐνόμιζον, εὐπρεπεία δὲ λόγον οἷς ξυμβαίη  
 55 ἐπιφθόνως τι διαπράξασθαι ἄμεινον ἤκουον. τὰ δὲ μέσα τῶν πολιτῶν ὑπ'  
 ἀμφοτέρων ἢ ὅτι οὐ ξυνηγωνίζοντο ἢ φθόνῳ τοῦ περιεῖναι διεφθείροντο.  
 LXXXIII. οὕτω πᾶσα ἰδέα κατέστη κακοτροπίας διὰ τὰς στάσεις τῶ  
 Ἑλληνικῶ, καὶ τὸ εὐηθες, οὐ τὸ γενναῖον πλείστον μετέχει, καταγελασθὲν  
 ἠφανίσθη, τὸ δὲ ἀντιτετάχθαι ἀλλήλοις τῇ γνώμῃ ἀπίστως ἐπὶ πολὺν  
 60 διήνεγκεν·

54 εὐσεβείαν d λόγων N V 55 τῶν πολιτικῶν ἐπ' g 57 κακοπραγίας  
 c d f 59 ἀντετάχθαι F H

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54. εὐπρεπεία] "*quibus autem contigisset, ut speciosa oratione utentes aliquid invidiose (nefasti quid) perpetrarent, melius audiebant*" (Poppo p. 144). It is better to take εὐπρεπεία with ἄμεινον ἤκουον, I believe, as Krüger does, "Das [εὐπρεπεία with διαπράξασθαι] zerstört den Gegensatz, welcher erfordert: *der Religiosität bedurfte es nicht; bessern Ruf als sie schaffte eine beschönigende Darstellung gehässiger Thaten*" (Krüger p. 76). 55. ἐπιφθόνως] *invidiose*. ἄμεινον ἤκουον] past general condition: *whoever happened to accomplish anything detestable had a better reputation by specious rhetoric*. τὰ δὲ μέσα] the people allied with neither faction. 56. φθόνῳ τοῦ περιεῖναι] "*weil die Parteien ihnen nicht die ungefährdete Existenz und Ruhe gönnten*" (Classen/Steup p. 171). 58. τὸ εὐηθες] τὸ ἀπλοῦν and τὸ ἀπόνηρον. σημειῶσαι τὸ εὐηθες ἐπὶ καλοῦ (Scholiast). "Daher wird unsere Stelle von den spätern Grammatikern (Photius, Moeris, Thomas Mag.) als charakteristisches Beispiel der ursprünglichen Bedeutung hervorgehoben" (Classen/Steup p. 171). πλείστον] adverbial. 59. τὸ δὲ ἀντιτετάχθαι ἀλλήλοις τῇ γνώμῃ ἀπίστως] as opposed to τὸ δὲ ἀντιτετάχθαι ἀλλήλοις ἐν πεδίῳ. ἐπὶ πολὺν διήνεγκεν] *κρεῖττον ἐγένετο* (Scholiast).

οὐ γὰρ ἦν ὁ διαλύσων οὔτε λόγος ἐχυρὸς οὔτε ὄρκος φοβερὸς, κρείσσους δὲ ὄντες ἅπαντες λογιμῶ ἔς τὸ ἀνέλπιστον τοῦ βεβαίου μὴ παθεῖν μᾶλλον προνοκόπουν ἢ πιστεῦσαι ἐδύνατο.

61 διαλύττων d ισχυρός d f i 62 λογιμοί K ἄπιστον Rauchenstein  
63 ἐδύνατο C

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61. ὁ διαλύσων] "Gewöhnlich faßt man ὁ διαλύσων als Prädikat auf (vgl. Kr., Spr. 50, 4, 4). Aber dann würde angedeutet, daß zwar weder λόγος ἐχυρὸς noch ὄρκος φοβερὸς, aber etwas anderes ὁ διαλύσων gewesen wäre, was doch ganz und gar nicht die Meinung des Th. gewesen ist. Es ist daher notwendig, ein attributives Verhältnis von διαλύσων zu οὔτε λόγος ἐχυρὸς κτέ. anzunehmen und ὁ διαλύσων . . . φοβερὸς als Subjekt anzusehen" (Classen/Steup p. 172). κρείσσους δὲ ὄντες . . . τοῦ βεβαίου] variously interpreted. The Scholiast writes, "ρέποντες δὲ οἱ ἄνθρωποι τοῖς λογιμοῖς πρὸς τὸ μὴ ἐλπίζειν τινὰ πίστιν καὶ βεβαιότητα προενοοῦντο μᾶλλον, ἵνα μὴ πάθωσιν αὐτοὶ κακῶς· πιστεῦσαι δὲ οὐκ ἐδύνατο." Dobree says, "Sensus est, Argumentis et jurejurando minimè moti." Thus he understands, κρείσσους ὄντες τῶν λόγων καὶ τῶν ὄρκων (quoted in Arnold p. 459). Stahl interprets τοῦ βεβαίου as ἡ τῷ βεβαίῳ and cites Cassius Dio, fragment 49, "κρείττους ἔς τὸ ἀφανὲς τοῦ προδήλου (i.e., ἡ ἔς τὸ προδηλον) τῷ λογιμῶ γιγνώμενοι" (p. 152). Classen/Steup, with whom Gomme agrees, offer "vielmehr trafen alle, wenn sie stärker waren (als die Gegner), in ihrer Überlegung mehr für die (oder im Hinblick auf die) Aussichtslosigkeit des festen Bestandes von Wort und Eidschwur Vorsorge, nicht zu Schaden zu kommen, als daß sie . . ." (p. 172). Dobree's interpretation requires the reader to supply too much. Stahl and



Classen/Steup's interpretations may be right, but I incline more toward the Scholiast's. I take *κρείσσοις ὄντες λογισμῶ* together: *those stronger in respect to intelligence*. This interpretation requires that *ἐς* be translated independently and that it mean *in view of* or *on account of* or simply *in*. For the first two meanings, cf. II. 40. 4. 5 and VII. 63. 3. 8. 9. For the last, cf. I. 3. 4, I. 15. 3. 1, I. 32. 4. 3, II. 65. 7. 8, and VII. 21. 2. 4. What all commentators miss is that *κρείσσοις ὄντες λογισμῶ* is opposed to *οἱ φαυλότεροι γνώμην*. Thus there is an extended chiasm: (A) *κρείσσοις ὄντες λογισμῶ*; (B) *οἱ φαυλότεροι γνώμην*; (B) *τολμηρῶς πρὸς τὰ ἔργα ἐχώρου*; (A) *ἄφρακτοι μᾶλλον διεφθείροντο*. This interpretation makes *πιστεῦσαι ἐδύναντο* more trenchant and ironical since those who *μὴ παθεῖν μᾶλλον προεσκόπον ἢ πιστεῦσαι ἐδύναντο* actually did not foresee (*προαισθέσθαι*), but were destroyed. This interpretation also preserves the word/deed dichotomy, found throughout Thucydides, and at work here. The more intelligent relied on their ability of foresight to protect them from harm and were thus inactive. The less intelligent, because of their acknowledged inferiority, acted first and thus succeeded.

- καὶ οἱ φανυλότεροι γνώμην ὡς τὰ πλείω περιεγίγοντο· τῷ γὰρ δεδιέναι τό  
 65 τε αὐτῶν ἐνδεῆς καὶ τὸ τῶν ἐναντίων ξυνητόν, μὴ λόγοις τε ἡσσοῦς ὡσι καὶ  
 ἐκ τοῦ πολυτρόπου αὐτῶν τῆς γνώμης φθάσωσι προεπιβουλεύμενοι,  
 τολμηρῶς πρὸς τὰ ἔργα ἐχώρον. οἱ δὲ καταφρονούντες κἂν προαισθήσθαι  
 καὶ ἔργῳ οὐδὲν σφᾶς δεῖν λαμβάνειν ἂ γνώμη ἕξεστιν, ἄφαρκοι μᾶλλον  
 διεφθείροντο. LXXXIV. ἐν δ' οὖν τῇ Κερκύρα τὰ πολλὰ αὐτῶν  
 70 προντολήθη, καὶ ὅποσα ὕβρει μὲν ἀρχόμενοι τὸ πλεόν ἢ σωφροσύνη ὑπὸ  
 τῶν τὴν τιμωρίαν παρασχόντων οἱ ἀνταμυνόμενοι δράσειαν, πενίας δὲ τῆς  
 εἰωθίας ἀπαλλαξείοντες τινες, μάλιστα δ' ἂν διὰ πάθους ἐπιθυμοῦντες τὰ  
 τῶν πέλας ἔχειν, παρὰ δίκην γιγνώσκοιεν, οἱ τε μὴ ἐπὶ πλεονεξία, ἀπὸ ἴσου  
 75 ἀπαιτήτως ἐπέλθοιεν.

64 πλείω] πολλά Q 67 προαισθῶντ g προαίσθεσθαι B F 68 ἔργῳ  
 λογιζόμενοι ὡς οὐδὲν h δεῖν om. Q 69 Κερκύρα Herwerden 70  
 ὅπόσ' ἂν Hude 71 τὴν om. K d e 72 τινες f Schol. Bekker Göller  
 Poppo Krüger Stahl Herwerden Böhme Arnold Classen/Steup Jones Romilly  
 τινας A B C E F G H K L O P b e g μάλιστα ἂν B Q 73 δίκης P  
 ἀπὸ τοῦ ἴσου H L O P d

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64. τό τε αὐτῶν ἐνδεῆς] τὴν ἔλλειψιν τῆς γνώσεως (Scholiast). 66. αὐτῶν]  
 ἐναντίων. 69. τὰ πολλὰ αὐτῶν] *the majority of these things*. Most think αὐτῶν  
 refers to the ἔργα of the preceding paragraphs, but τὰ πολλὰ αὐτῶν anticipates its  
 protases ὅποσα . . . δράσειαν, γιγνώσκοιεν, and ἐπέλθοιεν. Notice that while ἐν δ'  
 οὖν τῇ Κερκύρα is specific, the optatives are generalizations. In fact the paragraph  
 becomes progressively more general from sentence to sentence: the next sentence  
 contains a gnomic aorist (ἐδήλωσεν); the next is a present contrafactual conditional  
 sentence; and the last has a future most vivid protasis and a present general  
 apodosis. ὅποσα] relative adjective used correlatively with πολλά (i.e., *as many*  
*as . . . of these things the majority . . .*). ὅποσα is the direct object of δράσειαν,  
 γιγνώσκοιεν, and ἐπέλθοιεν. 70. ἀρχόμενοι] passive, not ἀρχθέντες because

Thucydides is generalizing. τὸ πλεόν] μάλλον. 71. δράσειαν . . . ἐπέλθοιεν] Because of μάλιστα δ' ἂν διὰ πάθους ἐπιθυμοῦντες τὰ τῶν πέλας ἔχειν παρὰ δίκην γιγνώσκοιεν, Poppo wishes to understand ἂν with δράσειαν, γιγνώσκοιεν, and ἐπέλθοιεν. ὅποσα, however, introduces a relative future less vivid conditional clause; ἂν by rule, therefore, should not be present in the protasis (Kühner/Gerth *Satzlehre I*, #6A p. 255 and Smyth 2566). The condition, of course, is mixed (future less vivid protasis with an aorist indicative apodosis). At times Thucydides seems to use ἂν to strengthen μάλιστα cf. I. 76. 4. 2, VI. 22. 1. 15, VI. 49. 3. 1, and VI. 57. 3. 5. Thus I think it best to take ἂν with μάλιστα not γιγνώσκοιεν or ἐπιθυμοῦντες. 72. διὰ πάθους] not *passionately*, as most understand the phrase and, as a result, reject because it cannot have had this meaning before Aristotle, but *arising from*, or *as a consequence of, their suffering*. 73. παρὰ δίκην γιγνώσκοιεν] "*beschließen, sich vorsetzen*" (Classen/Steup p. 174). οἱ] the article, not the relative pronoun, modifying ἐπιόντες. μή] generic with attributive participle. ἀπὸ ἴσον δὲ μάλιστα ἐπιόντες] "are those who enter into revolutions on an equality with their adversaries--not as oppressed men thirsting for vengeance, nor as needy men desiring plunder--and whose cruelties are owing merely to the fury of party spirit which they acquire in the course of the contest" (Arnold p. 461). 74. ἀπαιδευσία] *incontinence*. πλείστον] adverbial.

ξυνταραχθέντος τε τοῦ βίου ἐς τὸν καιρὸν τοῦτον τῇ πόλει καὶ τῶν νόμων  
κρατήσασα ἢ ἀνθρωπεία φύσις, εἰωθυία καὶ παρὰ τοὺς νόμους ἀδικεῖν,  
ἀσμένῃ ἐδήλωσεν ἀκρατῆς μὲν ὀργῆς οὐσα, κρείσσων δὲ τοῦ δικαίου,  
πολεμία δὲ τοῦ προύχοντος· οὐ γὰρ ἂν τοῦ τε ὀσίου τὸ τιμωρεῖσθαι

80 προντίθεσαν τοῦ τε μὴ ἀδικεῖν τὸ κερδαίνειν, ἐν ᾧ μὴ βλάπτουσαν ἰσχὺν εἶχε  
τὸ φθονεῖν. ἀξιούσι τε τοὺς κοινούς περὶ τῶν τοιούτων οἱ ἄνθρωποι νόμους,  
ἀφ' ὧν ἅπασιν ἐλπὶς ὑπόκειται σφαλῆσι κἂν αὐτοὺς διασφῆσθαι, ἐν  
ἄλλων τιμωρίαις προκαταλύειν καὶ μὴ ὑπολείπεσθαι, εἴ ποτε ἄρα τις  
κινδυνεύσας τινὸς δεήσεται αὐτῶν.

76 τε om. L O P 77 κρατήσαντα C εἶωθε d i ἀδικεῖν καὶ ἀσμένῃ i  
82 καὶ C E e 83 ἄλλω P Q προκαταλύσειν Q

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78. ἐδήλωσεν] gnostic aorist. ἀκρατῆς, κρείσσων, and πολεμία] predicate  
adjectives with οὐσα, the verb in indirect discourse. 79. τοῦ τε ὀσίου] dependent  
upon the prefix of προντίθεσαν. τὸ τιμωρεῖσθαι] direct object of προντίθεσαν.  
80. προντίθεσαν] note the change in subject from ἡ ἀνθρωπεία φύσις to an  
unspecified third person plural. ἐν ᾧ μὴ] εἰ μὴ ἐν τούτῳ [χρόνῳ] (Poppo/Stahl p.  
156). The condition is present contrafactual. 81. νόμους] direct object of  
προκαταλύειν and μὴ ὑπολείπεσθαι. 83. προκαταλύειν and μὴ ὑπολείπεσθαι]  
complementary with ἀξιούσι.

The following translation renders the Greek as literally as possible, to facilitate understanding and to clear up any confusion the notes have failed to eradicate.

So rawly did the stasis advance, in fact it seemed worse since it was the first. When later all of Greece, so to speak, was convulsed, there were struggles on both sides: the leaders of the people striving to invite in the Athenians and the oligarchs, the Lakedaemonians. For in peace time having no reason, nor being prepared, to call them in . . . but being at war and there being an alliance to each side for the purpose of harming the enemy and likewise benefitting themselves, invitations were readily available to those desiring revolution. Many and difficult indeed are the things which assault cities during stasis, things which are happening now and always will as long as human nature remains the same though they be sometimes worse, sometimes milder, and different in form as each chance variation asserts its force. For in peace and prosperity, cities and individuals have better judgement on account of not falling into unwilling necessities; but war, taking away the facility of daily life, is a forceful teacher and assimilates the tempers of the majority to their present circumstances. Thus cities and men were in stasis, and those afflicted later, because of their knowledge of previous occurrences, carried further forth the excess of inventing both in the ingenuity of their assaults and in the uniqueness of their retributions. They interchanged the accustomed value of words in relation to deeds as they saw fit. For brash temerity was considered bravery engendered by love for the party; forethinking hesitancy, specious timidity; prudence, a veil for the coward;

intelligence toward everything, delay for everything; mad haste was added to the traits of manliness; planning for safety, a nice sounding excuse for turning tail. The violent man was always trusted, his gainsayer always suspect. The successful plotter, intelligent; the suspecter of one, fearsomer; if one planned ahead so that he might need none of them, he was a subverter of the party and struck with fear of the enemy. In short, the man anticipating one about to do evil was praised, as was the man who ordered one not intending. In fact even kinship was more alien than partisanship because of the latter's being readier to dare without excuse; for these relationships existed not with customary legal gain but contrary to the established laws for the sake of greed. They sealed their pledges to one another not by divine sanction but by shared transgression. The opposition's noble overtures were received by the stronger party with a guard against his actions not with nobility. It was worth more to avenge someone in turn than never to have suffered. If oaths of reconciliation ever came about, being given to each other in the immediacy of the moment on account of an impasse, they remained strong while neither side had power from elsewhere; when able to act, the one who dared first, if he saw the other unguarded, exacted revenge all the sweeter on account of the trust than if he had acted openly because he planned safely and because, having triumphed through deceit, he also won the contest of wits. For the majority when knaves are much more easily called clever than when ignorant they are called honorable; they are ashamed of the one but exult in the other. The cause of all this was rule through greed and ambition, and from these, the desire of those in love with triumph. For in

the cities, the leaders, each with his own fine slogan, *the people's political equality* or *the prudent aristocracy*, looking after the state in word, set up contests, and vying in every way to surpass one another, dared the most dreadful deeds, went after ever greater vengeance, not setting their endpoint at a place just and beneficial to the city but making their boundary that which always gives pleasure to each, and acquiring power either with an unjust vote's condemnation or by force, they were prepared to sate their immediate desire for victory. Neither side considered anything with reverence, but whoever happened to do anything liable to provoke jealousy, by a specious speech he obtained better repute. Neutral citizens were destroyed by both sides either because they did not join the contest or from envy of their survival.

Thus every form of wickedness was established on account of the staseis in Hellas, and simplicity, of which nobility has the greatest share, was laughed into oblivion, but an aligning against one another in mutual distrust thrived; for there was neither a secure word nor a fearful oath to create a reconciliation, but because of their despair of safety, the more intelligent were guarding against suffering more than they were able to trust. The weaker in intellect succeeded most often; for by fearing their own deficiency and their enemy's intelligence lest in planning they be defeated and on account of the cunning of his intellect be plotted against first, they boldly advanced to action. The former, contemptuously thinking that they would foresee any threat and that it was hardly necessary for them to take by action what they could by intellect, were rather often caught off guard and destroyed.

The majority of the following things were dared for the first time at Kerkyra,

as many things as men might do in retribution if ruled more with arrogance than with temperance by those providing punishment; as many things as men might resolve upon contrary to justice if they desire to be rid of their accustomed poverty, and especially if on account of their suffering they are eager to possess the things of their neighbors; and as many things as men not after profit, but advancing from a state of equality [with their neighbors], and being impelled mostly by uncontrollable passion, might go after rawly and inexorably. When life is in turmoil during this critical time in the city, human nature, reigning over laws, accustomed to do wrong contrary to them, happily shows that it is unable to control its passion, stronger than justice, and inimical to its superior. For they would not prefer vengeance to piety, profit to propriety unless at this time jealousy had harmful force. Men think it worthwhile in their attacks upon others to destroy utterly the shared laws concerning these sorts of things, by which every one in trouble has hope that he may be saved, and they do not leave them intact if ever someone in danger needs one of them.



## CHAPTER 3

### EXEGESIS OF III. 82-84

III. 82-84 is significant because it contains Thucydides' own views on war, stasis, human nature, and society. Thucydides is not giving a bald narrative of events, during which he assumes an objective pose that makes it difficult to discern his own opinion.<sup>1</sup> He is not writing from the perspective of one of the *History's* speakers.<sup>2</sup> His analysis is written on his own authority. The insights, thoughts, and opinions are his alone.

In this regard the excursus on stasis is not unique. For example, in the archaeologia and in the description of the plague, Thucydides also speaks directly to his reader.<sup>3</sup> But because of its content the stasis excursus differs from these two. The archaeologia is both a defense of the Peloponnesian War's preeminence and an explanation of Thucydides' thoughts on power. In the description of the plague, Thucydides' concern is to describe its symptoms and its effects on the Athenians.

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<sup>1</sup>See the introduction of R. Connor, *Thucydides* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984).

<sup>2</sup>Even if the speeches are Thucydides' own creations, one cannot assume that the insights and opinions they contain are Thucydides' own.

<sup>3</sup>Of course authorial statements are made throughout the *History*, and I think a worthwhile study would be to collect these statements and to analyze them with the aim of establishing a picture of Thucydides' views.

The stasis excursus is different because it examines human nature and society under the pressure of war and stasis; its content is the same as the focus of the *History* proper. It is for this reason that this analysis is so crucial: the conclusions drawn from it should have important consequences for understanding the *History* in general. But before leaping into the rest of the *History*, I must first explicate these three chapters. Thus in this chapter the focus is the style, structure, content, and purpose of III. 82-84.

### **STYLE**

Since antiquity Thucydides has had the reputation for being one of the most difficult of writers to comprehend.<sup>4</sup> His prose, often tortuous and at times nearly incomprehensible, can also be clear and straightforward. The disparity in ease of comprehension between pure narrative and detailed descriptions, speeches, and diagnostic evaluations is great. The pure narrative is as readable and comprehensible as Hemingway, the others can be as difficult as *Finnegan's Wake*. This difference in Thucydides' style is seldom recognized.<sup>5</sup> Rather than seek to answer why Thucydides' two prose styles differ so greatly, critics generally have been content with either condemning the style as a whole or with criticizing the more complex

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<sup>4</sup>See Cicero, *Orator*, 9. 30; Quintilian, *Institutio Oratoria*, X. 1. 73; and Hermogenes, *Περὶ ἰδεῶν λόγων*, 2. 12. 155.

<sup>5</sup>Exceptions include Dionysius of Halicarnassos, *Περὶ Θουκυδίδου*; H. J. Rose, *A Handbook of Greek Literature: From Homer to the Age of Lucian* (New York: E.P. Dutton & Co., INC., 1960), 304; and A. Lesky, *A History of Greek Literature*, trans. by James Willis and Cornelis de Heer (London: Methuen & CO LTD, 1966), 480.

passages. For example, Collingwood calls the style "harsh, artificial, repellent," and says that it is a result of a "bad conscience."<sup>6</sup> Dover writes that "[Thucydides was] not always sufficiently self-critical to read what he had written with the eyes of someone who could not know what train of thought had run through the writer's mind."<sup>7</sup>

Limiting his criticisms to certain passages, Dionysius of Halicarnassos, a Greek rhetor and historian of the first century B.C., criticizes in particular the style of Thucydides' analysis of civil strife, Book III. 82-84.<sup>8</sup> Dionysius writes,

ἃ δὲ τούτοις ἐπιφέρει, σκολιὰ καὶ δυσπαρακολούθητα καὶ τὰς τῶν  
σηματισμῶν πλοκάς σολοικοφανεῖς ἔχοντα καὶ οὔτε τοῖς κατ' ἐκείνον τὸν  
βίον γενομένοις ἐπιτηδευθέντα οὔτε τοῖς ὕστερον, ὅτε μάλιστα ἤκμασεν ἡ  
πολιτικὴ δύναμις.

The passages that follow these [the account of the stasis at Kerkyra] are contorted, hard to follow, and contain ungrammatical weavings of figures, [figures] that were not used by writers of that time nor by those of later times when political ability was at its peak. (*Περὶ Θουκυδίδου* 29)

Pointing out the faults of this section, Dionysius goes so far as to show how Thucydides could have improved some of his more complex sentences, had he written them differently. Struck also by the difficulty of III. 82, a modern scholar,

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<sup>6</sup>R. G. Collingwood, *The Idea of History* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1946), 29.

<sup>7</sup>K. J. Dover, *Thucydides, Greece and Rome New Surveys in the Classics*, No. 7 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973), 13.

<sup>8</sup>Also criticizing this passage, A. Andrewes writes that there is "some reckless paradox in the celebrated chapters on stasis." A. Andrewes, "The Mytilene Debate: Thucydides 3.36-49," *Phoenix* 16 (1962): 74 n. 25. Quoting Andrewes, S. Hornblower writes that the passage "has justly been said to contain some 'reckless paradox'." S. Hornblower, *Thucydides* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987), 75.

Williams, attributes it to the chapter's "almost certainly mutilated text."<sup>9</sup>

But critics like these are to be feared the least. Worst are those with pen in hand who, like the well-meaning editor who corrected the misspellings in Twain's *Huckleberry Finn*, think that Thucydides cannot possibly have written the words before them and think themselves obliged to put his sentences into proper Greek. One editor, Herwerden, makes no fewer than fourteen emendations over the course of the three pages that this passage runs.<sup>10</sup> But rather than emend like Herwerden or criticize like Dionysius, Dover, and, Collingwood, I think it preferable to ask what makes a given passage complex and to ask why Thucydides chose to make it so.

In reply to the first question I propose that one of the things that make this passage so complicated is its high rhetorical style. Thucydides polishes every sentence with figures, many used multiple times. Some of these figures simply serve to heighten the solemnity and grandeur of the passage, that is, they mark the passage as different from the ones written in Thucydides' plain prose style. But they do not add appreciably to the passage's complexity. Having made this qualification, I do think that the totality of the figures present in this passage adds something to the

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<sup>9</sup>M. F. Williams, "Two Traditional Elements in Thucydides' Corcyrean Excursus," *The Classical World* 79 (1985): note 1 p. 1. As support he cites Gomme, *A Historical Commentary on Thucydides* (Oxford: 1956), 372-73. It need hardly be said that Gomme makes no such assertion. What Gomme says is that the second sentence of Chapter 82 cannot stand in its present form as what Thucydides wrote. For a full discussion on this sentence see my comments in Chapter 2.

<sup>10</sup>Herwerden, ed., *Θουκυδίδου Ἐνγγραφή* (Utrecht, Holland: 1877-1882).

complexity of the whole. What follows is a list and explication of the figures present in III. 82-84. The figures that do not strain comprehension precede those that do.

## HENDIADYS

Thucydides breaks one phrase into two (hendiadys):

*πολλὰ καὶ χαλεπά*

many and difficult (III. 82. 2. 1)

not

*πολλὰ χαλεπά*

many difficult.<sup>11</sup>

## CLIMACTIC WORD ORDER

He arranges cola so that each successive phrase is longer than the next

(climactic word order):

(1) *μᾶλλον δὲ καὶ* (2) *ἡσυχαιότερα καὶ* (3) *τοῖς εἶδεσι διηλλαγμένα* (III. 82. 2. 3)

and

(1) *ἄθλα ἐποιούντο;* (2) *ἐτόλμησάν τε τὰ δεινότατα;* (3) *ἐπεξῆσάν τε τὰς τιμωρίας ἔτι μείζονες;* (4) *ἐτοῖμοι ἦσαν τὴν ἀντίκα φιλονικίαν ἐκπιμπλάναι.* (III. 82. 8. 6)

## ALLITERATION

At III. 82. 3. 1,

*ἔστασίαζέ τε οὖν τὰ τῶν πόλεων, καὶ τὰ ἐφυστερίζοντά που πύσσει τῶν προγενομένων πολὺν ἐπέφερε τὴν ὑπερβολὴν τοῦ καινοῦσθαι τὰς διανοίας τῶν τ' ἐπιχειρήσεων περιτεχνήσει καὶ τῶν τιμωριῶν ἀτοπία,*

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<sup>11</sup>The hendiadys, I think, sets a lofty tone similar to that set by Lincoln's writing "four score and seven years ago" instead of 87 years ago.

Thus cities and men were in stasis, and those afflicted later, because of their knowledge of previous occurrences, carried further forth the excess of inventing both in the ingenuity of their assaults and in the uniqueness of their retributions,

pi's and tau's<sup>12</sup> pile upon themselves just as ingenious impropriety proliferates.

## ASSONANCE

Thucydides uses assonance to emphasize an antithetical thought:

*ὄστε εὐσεβεία μὲν οὐδέτεροι ἐνόμιζον, εὐπρεπεία δὲ λόγον οἷς ξυμβαίη ἐπιφθόνως τι διαπράξασθαι ἄμεινον ἤκουον*

Neither side considered anything with reverence, but whoever happened to do anything liable to provoke jealousy, by a specious speech he obtained better repute. (III. 82. 8. 12)

## JUXTAPOSITION

To heighten contrast, he juxtaposes words:

*τὸ ξυγγενὲς τοῦ ἐταιρικοῦ ἀλλοτριώτερον*

kinship than partisanship was more alien. (III. 82. 6. 1)

## CHIASM

At other times he uses a chiasmic arrangement:

*(A) ῥᾶρον δ' οἱ πολλοὶ κακοῦργοι ὄντες δεξιοὶ κέκληνται ἢ (B) ἀμαθεῖς ἀγαθοί, καὶ (B) τῷ μὲν αἰσχύνονται, (A) ἐπὶ δὲ τῷ ἀγάλλονται.*

(A) For the majority when knaves are much more easily called clever than (B) when ignorant they are called honorable; (B) they are ashamed of the one but (A) exult in the other. (III. 82. 7. 10)

## HYPALLAGE

He changes the relation of words so that men fall into unwilling necessities

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<sup>12</sup>Though grammatical necessity accounts for a number of the tau's, I do not think it strong enough to dismiss the alliteration.

instead of falling unwillingly into necessities:

*διὰ τὸ μὴ ἐς ἀκουσίους ἀνάγκας πίπτειν. (III. 82. 2. 6)*

## ANTITHESIS

Or he makes esteemed vice antithetic to despised virtue:

*τόλμα μὲν γὰρ ἀλόγιστος ἀνδρεία φιλέταιρος ἐνομίσθη, μέλλησις δὲ προμηθῆς δειλία εὐπρεπής, τὸ δὲ σῶφρον τοῦ ἀνάνδρου πρόσχημα, καὶ τὸ πρὸς ἅπαν ξυνετὸν ἐπὶ πᾶν ἀργόν· τὸ δ' ἐμπλήκτως ὄξυ ἀνδρὸς μοίρα προσετέθη, ἀσφαλεία δὲ τὸ ἐπιβουλεύσασθαι ἀποτροπῆς πρόφασις εὐλογος. καὶ ὁ μὲν χαλεπαίνων πιστὸς αἰεὶ, ὁ δ' ἀντιλέγων αὐτῷ ὑποπτος. ἐπιβουλεύσας δὲ τις τυχῶν ξυνετὸς καὶ ὑπονοήσας ἔτι δεινότερος· προβουλεύσας δὲ ὅπως μηδὲν αὐτῶν δεήσει, τῆς τε ἑταιρίας διαλυτῆς καὶ τοὺς ἐναντίους ἐκπεπληγμένος. ἀπλῶς δὲ ὁ φθάσας τὸν μέλλοντα κακὸν τι δρᾶν ἐπηγείτο, καὶ ὁ ἐπικελεύσας τὸν μὴ διανοούμενον. καὶ μὴν καὶ τὸ ξυγγενὲς τοῦ ἑταιρικοῦ ἀλλοτριώτερον ἐγένετο διὰ τὸ ἐτοιμότερον εἶναι ἀπροφασίστως τολμᾶν· οὐ γὰρ μετὰ τῶν κειμένων νόμων ὠφελίας αἱ τοιαῦται ξύνοδοι, ἀλλὰ παρὰ τοὺς καθεστῶτας πλεονεξία.*

For brash temerity was considered bravery engendered by love for the party; forethinking hesitancy, specious timidity; prudence, a veil for the coward; intelligence toward everything, delay for everything; mad haste was added to the traits of manliness; planning for safety, a nice sounding excuse for turning tail. The violent man was always trusted, his gainsayer always suspect. The successful plotter, intelligent; the suspecter of one, fearsomer; if one planned ahead so that he might need none of them, he was a subverter of the party and struck with fear of the enemy. In short, the man anticipating one about to do evil was praised, and the man who ordered one not intending. Indeed even kinship was more alien than partisanship because of being readier to dare without excuse; for these relationships existed not with customary legal gain but contrary to the established laws for greed. (III. 82. 4. 2)

Notice that the structure is haphazard: that what, in an ethic of peacetime, would be despised--a vice--and what, in an ethic of peacetime, would be valued--a virtue--are not regularly opposed but rather a single vice (*τόλμα μὲν γὰρ ἀλόγιστος ἀνδρεία φιλέταιρος ἐνομίσθη*) opposes three virtues (*μέλλησις δὲ προμηθῆς δειλία εὐπρεπής, τὸ δὲ σῶφρον τοῦ ἀνάνδρου πρόσχημα, καὶ τὸ πρὸς ἅπαν ξυνετὸν ἐπὶ*

πᾶν ἀργόν); next comes a combination of vice (τὸ δ' ἐμπλήκτως ὀξὺ ἀνδρὸς μοίρα προσετέθη), virtue (ἀσφαλεία δὲ τὸ ἐπιβουλεύσασθαι ἀποτροπῆς πρόφασις εὐλογος), vice (καὶ ὁ μὲν χαλεπαίνων πιστὸς αἰεὶ), virtue (ὁ δ' ἀντιλέγων αὐτῷ ὑποπτος); then come two vices (ἐπιβουλεύσας δέ τις τυχῶν ξυνετὸς καὶ ὑπονοήσας ἔτι δεινότερος) followed by a virtue (προβουλεύσας δὲ ὅπως μηδὲν αὐτῶν δεήσει, τῆς τε ἑταιρίας διαλυτῆς καὶ τοὺς ἐναντίους ἐκπεπληγμένος); and finally two more vices (ἀπλῶς δὲ ὁ φθᾶσας τὸν μέλλοντα κακόν τι ὄρᾶν ἐπηνείτο, καὶ ὁ ἐπικελεύσας τὸν μὴ διανοούμενον) against a virtue (καὶ μὴν καὶ τὸ ξυγγενὲς τοῦ ἑταιρικοῦ ἄλλοτριώτερον ἐγένετο διὰ τὸ ἐτοιμότερον εἶναι ἀπροφασίστως τολμᾶν).

Throughout this passage, Thucydides shuns regularity and parallelism.

## INCONCINNITY

In fact the rhetorical device Thucydides uses most frequently in the analysis is inconcinnity, i.e., a deliberate skewing of sentence structure or a deliberate avoidance of parallelism and regularity.<sup>13</sup> At III. 82. 1. 5, for example, the prepositional phrase *ἐν μὲν εἰρήνῃ*: *in peace* is answered by the participle *πολεμουμένων*: *being at war* instead of by a parallel prepositional phrase *ἐν δὲ πολέμῳ*: *in war*. At III. 82. 8. 15 the conjunction *ὅτι*: *because* is answered by the dative case of the noun *φθόνῳ*: *from envy*,

μετὰ ψήφον ἀδίκου καταγνώσεως ἢ χειρὶ κτώμενοι, ὅτι οὐ ξυνηγωνίζοντο ἢ φθόνῳ τοῦ περιεῖναι

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<sup>13</sup>For a detailed examination of this figure, see J. G. A. Ros, *Die μεταβολή (Variatio) als Stilprinzip des Thukydides* (Paderborn: 1938; reprint, Amsterdam: 1968).



Neutral citizens were destroyed by both sides either because they did not join the contest or from envy of their survival.

What makes this next sentence so difficult is the coordinate use of *καί* and *ὅτι*:

ἐν δὲ τῷ παρατυχόντι ὁ φθάσας θαρσῆσαι, εἰ ἴδοι ἄφαρκτον, ἥδιον διὰ τὴν πίστιν ἐτιμωρεῖτο ἢ ἀπὸ τοῦ προφανοῦς, καὶ τό τε ἀσφαλὲς ἐλογίζετο καὶ ὅτι ἀπάτη περιγενόμενος ξυνέσεως ἀγώνισμα προσελάμβανεν.

When able to act, the one who dared first, if he saw the other unguarded, exacted revenge all the sweeter on account of the trust than openly for he planned safely and because, having triumphed through deceit, he also won the contest of wits.

The parallel use of these two different words is so difficult because *καί*'s most common meaning is *and* not *for* and because *καί* is not usually coordinated with *ὅτι*.

In the sentence,

τόλμα μὲν γὰρ ἀλόγιστος ἀνδρεία φιλέταιρος ἐνομίσθη, μέλλησις δὲ προμηθῆς δειλία εὐπρεπής, τὸ δὲ σῶφρον τοῦ ἀνάνδρου πρόσχημα, καὶ τὸ πρὸς ἅπαν ξυνετὸν ἐπὶ πᾶν ἀργόν

For brash temerity was considered bravery engendered by love for the party; forethinking hesitancy [was considered] specious timidity; prudence [was considered] a veil for the coward; intelligence toward everything [was considered] delay for everything, (III. 82. 4. 2),

*ἐνομίσθη* from the first colon must be supplied to the subsequent three cola. In the next sentence,

τὸ δ' ἐμπλήκτως ὄξυ ἀνδρὸς μοίρα προσετέθη, ἀσφαλεία δὲ τὸ ἐπιβουλεύσασθαι ἀποτροπῆς πρόφασις εὐλογος

mad haste was added to the traits of manliness; planning for safety [was] a nice sounding excuse for turning tail,

Thucydides introduces a new verb, *προσετέθη*: *was added to*. As in the previous sentence, he omits the verb in the next colon. As before the reader expects to supply the verb expressed in the first colon, *προσετέθη*, to the subsequent colon; but the

reader is thrown off balance: not *προσετέθη* but the verb *εἶναι*, *to be*, must be supplied. Greek permits the omission of the verb, *εἶναι*; in doing this there is nothing remarkable. What is remarkable is the deliberate skewing of sentence structure: the reader's expectations are not met.

At III. 82. 6. 1, Thucydides similarly confounds the reader's expectations,

*καὶ μὴν καὶ τὸ ξυγγενὲς τοῦ ἐταιρικοῦ ἀλλοτριώτερον ἐγένετο διὰ τὸ ἐτοιμότερον εἶναι ἀπροφασίστως τολμᾶν*

In fact even kinship was more alien than partisanship because of being readier to dare without excuse,

What is readier to dare without excuse? The grammar of the sentence says kinship, but the sense demands partisanship. One finds this disruption, this inconcinnity, confounding the structure of many sentences of the passage.

## ANACOLOUTHON

A rhetorical device similar to inconcinnity is anacolouthon, which is not an avoidance of parallel sentence structure but an actual breakdown in the grammatical structure of the sentence. The first colon, (III. 82. 1. 5),

*καὶ ἐν μὲν εἰρήνῃ οὐκ ἂν ἔχόντων πρόφασιν οὐδ' ἐτοιμῶν παρακαλεῖν αὐτούς .*  
 . .

For in peace time having no reason, nor being prepared, to call them in . . .

lacks a main verb. When you read the whole,

*καὶ ἐν μὲν εἰρήνῃ οὐκ ἂν ἔχόντων πρόφασιν οὐδ' ἐτοιμῶν παρακαλεῖν αὐτούς, πολεμουμένων δὲ καὶ ξυμμαχίας ἅμα ἑκατέροις τῇ τῶν ἐναντίων κακώσει καὶ σφίσιν αὐτοῖς ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ προσποιήσῃ ῥαδίως αἱ ἐπαγωγὰι τοῖς νεωτερίζουσιν τι βουλομένοις ἐπορίζοντο*

For in peace time having no reason, nor being prepared, to call them in . . . but being at war and there being an alliance to each side for the purpose of

harming the enemy and likewise benefitting themselves, invitations were readily available to those desiring revolution,

the lack of a main verb in the first part of the compound sentence makes the transition between the two abrupt.

## ELLIPSIS

Although there are surely more rhetorical devices Thucydides employs in this passage, the last I wish to discuss is ellipsis, which Smyth defines as "the suppression of a word or of several words of minor importance to the logical expression of the thought, but necessary to the construction."<sup>14</sup> For example,

*ἀπλῶς δὲ ὁ φθάσας τὸν μέλλοντα κακὸν τι δοῦν ἐπηνείτο, καὶ ὁ ἐπικελεύσας τὸν μὴ διανοούμενον*

In short, the man anticipating one about to do evil was praised, and the man who ordered one not intending (III. 82. 5. 5),

*and the man*

What is the main verb?

*one not intending*

What is he not intending?

With the suppressed parts added, the sentence becomes comprehensible, *and the man who ordered one not intending to do evil was praised.*

The ellipsis of the next example is even harsher:

*ἐν δὲ τῷ παρατυχόντι ὁ φθάσας θαρσῆσαι, εἰ ἴδοι ἄφαρκτον, ἥδιον διὰ τὴν πίστιν ἐτιμωρεῖτο ἢ ἀπὸ τοῦ προφανοῦς, καὶ τό τε ἀσφαλὲς ἐλογίζετο καὶ ὅτι ἀπάτη περιγενόμενος ξυνέσεως ἀγώνισμα προσελάμβανεν.*

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<sup>14</sup>H. W. Smyth, *Greek Grammar* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1920), 677-78.

when able to act, the one who dared first, if he saw the other unguarded, exacted revenge all the sweeter on account of the trust than openly, because he planned safely and because, having triumphed through deceit, he also won the contest of wits (III. 82. 7. 6).

The ellipsis, ἢ ἀπὸ τοῦ προφανοῦς, is short for: *than he would have if he had attacked openly*. Far from suppressing words of minor importance, Thucydides almost crosses the boundary of comprehensibility.

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III. 82-84 is an example of Thucydides' high prose style. When contrasted with the straightforward syntax of the following three examples of Thucydides' plain prose style, the deliberate distortion of III. 82-84's syntax becomes more apparent. The three selections are chosen from Books I, IV, and VII. Their selection is based upon my own subjective opinion of what represents Thucydides' plain prose style. The first is from I. 89, the beginning of the Pentekontaetia:

Οἱ γὰρ Ἀθηναῖοι τρόπῳ τοιῶδε ἦλθον ἐπὶ τὰ πράγματα ἐν οἷς ἠξήθησαν. ἐπειδὴ Μῆδοι ἀνεχώρησαν ἐκ τῆς Εὐρώπης νικηθέντες καὶ ναυσὶ καὶ πεζῶ ὑπὸ Ἑλλήνων καὶ οἱ καταφυγόντες αὐτῶν ταῖς ναυσὶν ἐς Μυκάλην διεφθάρησαν, Λεωτυχίδης μὲν ὁ βασιλεὺς τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων, ὅσπερ ἠγείτο τῶν ἐν Μυκάλῃ Ἑλλήνων, ἀπεχώρησεν ἐπ' οἴκου ἔχων τοὺς ἀπὸ Πελοποννήσου ξυμμάχους, οἱ δὲ Ἀθηναῖοι καὶ οἱ ἀπὸ Ἰωνίας καὶ Ἑλλησπόντου ξύμμαχοι ἤδη ἀφεστηκότες ἀπὸ βασιλέως ὑπομείναντες Σησιτὸν ἐπολιόρκουν Μήδων ἐχόντων, καὶ ἐπιχειμάσαντες εἶλον αὐτὴν ἐκλιπόντων τῶν βαρβάρων, καὶ μετὰ τοῦτο ἀπέπλευσαν ἐξ Ἑλλησπόντου ὡς ἕκαστοι κατὰ πόλεις. Ἀθηναίων δὲ τὸ κοινόν, ἐπειδὴ αὐτοῖς οἱ βάρβαροι ἐκ τῆς χώρας ἀπῆλθον, διεκομίζοντο εὐθὺς ὅθεν ὑπεξέθεντο παῖδας καὶ γυναῖκας καὶ τὴν περιούσαν κατασκευὴν, καὶ τὴν πόλιν ἀνοικοδομεῖν παρεσκευάζοντο καὶ τὰ τείχη· τοῦ τε γὰρ περιβόλου βραχέα εἰσθήκει καὶ οἰκίαι αἱ μὲν πολλαὶ ἐπεπτώκεσαν, ὀλίγα δὲ περιήσαν, ἐν αἷς αὐτοὶ ἐσκήνωσαν οἱ δυνατοὶ τῶν Περσῶν.

For the Athenians in this manner came into the circumstances by which they grew. When the Medes, bested by the Greeks on land and sea, left Europe and when those of them who fled by ship to Mykale were destroyed, Leotyichides the Spartan King, who was the Greeks' general at Mykale, departed for home

with the allies from the Peloponnese. The Athenians and the allies from Ionia and the Hellespont who had already revolted from the King remained and besieged Sestos, held by the Medes. Having wintered there they took it, the barbarian departing, and afterwards sailed from the Hellespont, each going to his own city. The Athenian state, since the barbarians had departed their land, immediately brought back whence they were placed their children and women and belongings, and prepared to rebuild the city and its walls; only a bit of the perimeter wall still stood and the majority of houses were trammelled, but a few survived in which lived the Persian commanders.

Though the style is compact, few words can be said about this passage's rhetoric. There is climactic word order: *παῖδας καὶ γυναῖκας καὶ τὴν περιούσαν κατασκευήν*. And there is an ellipsis: *ὡς ἕκαστοι κατὰ πόλεις*. But the ubiquity of this phrase in the *History* argues more for calling it an idiom like *ἄλλος ἄλλο γράφει* (one man writes one thing, another writes another) than a figure. Finally it is of some interest that Thucydides considers the singular *τὸ κοινόν* plural. Although my eyes may have missed something, these are the only figures I find present in this passage.

For the next two passages I present the text of both first with my comments on each following:

*Ἐν δὲ τῷ ἐπιόντι χειμῶνι τὰ μὲν Ἀθηναίων καὶ Λακεδαιμονίων ἡσύχαζε διὰ τὴν ἐκεχειρίαν, Μαντινῆς δὲ καὶ Τεγεᾶται καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι ἐκατέρων ξυνέβαλον ἐν Λαοδοκίῳ τῆς Ὀρεσθίδος, καὶ νίκη ἀμφιδήριτος ἐγένετο· κέρας γὰρ ἑκάτεροι τρέψαντες τὸ καθ' αὐτοὺς τροπαῖά τε ἀμφοτέρω ἕστησαν καὶ σκόλα ἐς Δελφοὺς ἀπέπεμψαν. διαφθαρέντων μέντοι πολλῶν ἐκατέροις καὶ ἀγχωμαίων τῆς μάχης γενομένης καὶ ἀφελομένης νυκτὸς τὸ ἔργον οἱ Τεγεᾶται μὲν ἐπηλίσσαντό τε καὶ εὐθὺς ἕστησαν τροπαίων, Μαντινῆς δὲ ἀπεχώρησάν τε ἐς Βουκολιῶνα καὶ ὕστερον ἀντέστησαν.*

During the ensuing winter the Athenians and Spartans remained quiet on account of the armistice, but the Mantineans and Tegeans and allies of each clashed at Laodokion in the Oresthid. And victory was uncertain; for each routed the wing before him and both set up trophies and sent spoils to Delphi. Many on each side having perished and the battle undecided and night having

cut short the action, the Tegeans encamped and set up a trophy forthwith. But the Mantineans departed for Boukolion and set up their trophy later. (IV. 133)

Καὶ ταύτη μὲν τῇ ἡμέρᾳ προελθόντες σταδίους ὡς τεσσαράκοντα ἠῆλίσαντο πρὸς λόφῳ τινὶ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι τῇ δ' ὑστεραία πρῶ ἐπορεύοντο καὶ προῆλθον ὡς εἴκοσι σταδίους, καὶ κατέβησαν ἐς χωρίον ἄπεδόν τι καὶ αὐτοῦ ἐστρατοπεδεύσαντο, βουλόμενοι ἔκ τε τῶν οἰκιῶν λαβεῖν τι ἐδώδιμον (ὠκεῖτο γὰρ ὁ χώρος) καὶ ὕδωρ μετὰ σφῶν αὐτῶν φέρεσθαι αὐτόθεν· ἐν γὰρ τῷ πρόσθεν ἐπὶ πολλὰ στάδια, ἣ ἔμελλον ἵεναι, οὐκ ἄφθονον ἦν. οἱ δὲ Συρακόσιοι ἐν τούτῳ προελθόντες τὴν δίοδον τὴν ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν ἀπετείχιζον· ἦν δὲ λόφος καρτερός καὶ ἐκατέρωθεν αὐτοῦ χαράδρα κρημνώδης, ἐκαλεῖτο δὲ Ἀκραῖον λέπας.

Τῇ δ' ὑστεραία οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι προῆσαν, καὶ οἱ τῶν Συρακοσίων καὶ ξυμμάχων αὐτοὺς ἱππῆς καὶ ἀκοντισταὶ ὄντες πολλοὶ ἐκατέρωθεν ἐκόλυνον καὶ ἐσηκόντιζόν τε καὶ παρίππενον. καὶ χρόνον μὲν πολλὸν ἐμάχοντο οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι, ἔπειτα ἀνεχώρησαν πάλιν ἐς τὸ αὐτὸ στρατόπεδον. καὶ τὰ ἐπιτήδεια οὐκέτι ὁμοίως εἶχον· οὐ γὰρ ἔτι ἀποχωρεῖν οἶόν τ' ἦν ὑπὸ τῶν ἱππέων.

And on this day having advanced about forty stades, the Athenians encamped on a certain hill; on the next day at dawn they began their march and advanced about twenty stades, and descended into a plain and there made camp, wishing to take some edibles from the homes (for the place was inhabited) and to bring along with them some water from there; because for many stades ahead, where they were to go, it was scarce. During this time the Syrakusans advanced and walled off the road ahead for there was a steep hill and a rocky ravine on both sides of it, called the Akraeon cliff.

On the next day the Athenians advanced, and the Syrakusan and allied horse and spearmen, being many on both sides, hindered them and hurled their spears and charged their horses. And for a long time the Athenians fought, then returned back to the same camp. But the situation was no longer the same; for it was no longer possible to depart on account of the horse. (VII. 78. 4-6)

In the first passage climactic word order occurs again: *Μαντινῆς δὲ καὶ*

*Τεγεᾶται καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι ἐκατέρων*, as does an ellipsis: *οἱ Τεγεᾶται μὲν*

*ἐπηλίσαντό τε καὶ εὐθὺς ἔστησαν τροπαῖον, Μαντινῆς δὲ ἀπεχώρησάν τε ἐς*

*Βουκολιῶνα καὶ ὕστερον ἀντέστησαν*, neither of which is remarkable or difficult.

The second passage is more interesting.

The ellipsis of *ἡμέρα* at 4. 3 and 6. 1 is common. Of more interest are the

hyperbaton and paronomasia Thucydides employs. Reflecting the enemy's surrounding of the Athenians, Thucydides places *αὐτούς* in the midst of the Syrakusan and allied horse and spearmen: *Τη δ' ὑστεραία οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι προῆσαν, καὶ οἱ τῶν Συρακοσίων καὶ ξυμμάχων αὐτούς ἰππῆς καὶ ἀκοντισταὶ ὄντες πολλοὶ ἐκατέρωθεν ἐκόλων καὶ ἐσηκόντιζόν τε καὶ παρίππευον.* And contrasting the sameness of the landscape with the difference of their situation, Thucydides plays with the similarity in meaning between *ἐς τὸ αὐτὸ* and *ὁμοίως*: *καὶ χρόνον μὲν πολλὸν ἐμάχοντο οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι, ἔπειτα ἀνεχώρησαν πάλιν ἐς τὸ αὐτὸ στρατόπεδον. καὶ τὰ ἐπιτήδεια οὐκέτι ὁμοίως εἶχον· οὐ γὰρ ἔτι ἀποχωρεῖν οἶόν τ' ἦν ὑπὸ τῶν ἰππέων.* Though this last passage is more rhetorical than the other two, its figures facilitate, rather than hinder, comprehension.

These examples of Thucydides' plain prose style, I think, make it more apparent that high rhetorical style is one of the things that make III. 82-84 so complex. But I return to my second question, still unanswered. Why did Thucydides choose to write the passage in this way? Why the predominance of inconcinnity and why employ such harsh ellipses if both cause the reader much pain, trouble, and confusion? Is it because Thucydides had a "bad conscience" as Collingwood suggests? Is it as Dover argues that he was not always sufficiently self-critical? Or is it, as Herwerden, our well-meaning editor, thinks, that Thucydides cannot have written such ungrammatical Greek? I think none. I hold that what we have is what Thucydides wrote, that the rhetoric of this passage is in good conscience, and that it is indeed quite critically polished. I suggest that by employing a contorted style

Thucydides is attempting to reflect the chaos rampant in a city afflicted by stasis. For him the horrific subject matter prohibits the use of simple, straightforward language. If he is to communicate the atrocities of stasis at all, it is through complexity not simplicity. Thus the rhetorical figures, especially inconcinnity and ellipses, so jar and confuse the reader that he experiences the helplessness felt by stasis' victims. This feeling of helplessness can excite criticisms like those above. But once a deliberate purpose makes the chaos meaningful, the complexities invite the reader to reflect rather than to reject.

### **STRUCTURE**

In the broadest sense, Thucydides organizes III. 82-84 in a ring. He begins by saying that the stasis at Kerkyra was worse than the others because it was the first (*πρώτη*) and ends with the statement that the Kerkyraeans used these sorts of passions first (*πρώταις*) against one another (III. 82. 1 and III. 85. 1). Another general structural feature of the passage is that Thucydides tends to make a statement, either general or specific, and then either to state his reason(s) for making the assertion or to provide support for it.

At III. 82. 7, for example, he writes that partisans received their opponents' peace overtures with a guard against his deeds not out of nobility. The reason why follows, *ἀντιτιμωρήσασθαί τέ τινα περὶ πλείονος ἦν ἢ αὐτὸν μὴ προπαθεῖν* (*it was worth more to avenge someone in turn than never to have suffered*). At III. 82. 8 he writes,

*πάντων δ' αὐτῶν αἴτιον ἀρχὴ ἢ διὰ πλεονεξίαν καὶ φιλοτιμίαν, ἐκ δ' αὐτῶν καὶ ἐς τὸ φιλονικεῖν καθισταμένων τὸ πρόθυμον*



The cause of all this was rule through greed and ambition, and from these, the desire of those in love with triumph,

and proceeds to give evidence for this assertion,

*οἱ γὰρ ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι προστάντες μετὰ ὀνόματος ἑκάτεροι εὐπρεποῦς . . .*

For in the cities, the leaders, each with his own fine slogan . . .

Though not invariable, reason or support following statement is the basic building block of the passage.

Of structural interest also is Chapter 84's echoing of the first four sentences of Chapter 82. Both begin with generalities concerning stasis and end in two gnomic sentences that attempt to explain the phenomenon. Combining this observation with the loose ring structure of the whole, one could argue for the schematic: A B . . . B A. But under the microscope such a reduction would prove just tenable.<sup>15</sup>

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<sup>15</sup>Contrary to these assertions, J. R. Ellis argues for the authenticity of III. 84 by proposing that ring composition structures the entire passage. J. R. Ellis "The Structure of Thucydides' Dissertation on Stasis and the Authenticity of 3.84." J. R. Ellis, *Electronic Antiquity* 1 (July 1993): 1-7. He breaks the analysis into three circular structures, primary, secondary, and tertiary, with ring being placed within ring like the pattern of a pin-wheel. His primary structure reduces the paragraphs into the following schema:

- A 82. 1-3, Human nature was responsible for this first dreadful stasis.
- B 82. 4-7, The civilized virtues were replaced by their opposites.
- C 82. 8, Greed and ambition subordinated all public good to the lust for power.
- B' 83, The civilized properties were scorned and abandoned.
- A' 84-85. 1 Human nature overcompensated for misfortune in this first stasis. (p. 1)

Ellis' schematic teems with oversimplification and inaccuracy. Thucydides does not say that "human nature [is] responsible for this first dreadful stasis." Rather he condemns human nature and war. Even if you wish to call hesitancy (*μῆλλησις*), prudence (*τὸ σῶφρον*), intelligence (*τὸ ξυνητόν*), planning for safety (*ἀσφαλεία δὲ*

In addition to these structural observations, the content of III. 82-84 argues for dividing the passage into four sections. The first runs from *οὕτως ὠμή* to *τῶν τιμωριῶν ἀτοπία* and forms a ring. Its first sentence,

*οὕτως ὠμή <ή> στάσις προухώρησε, καὶ ἔδοξε μᾶλλον, διότι ἐν τοῖς πρώτῃ ἐγένετο, ἐπεὶ ὕστερόν γε καὶ πᾶν ὡς εἰπεῖν τὸ Ἑλληνικὸν ἐκινήθη, διαφορῶν οὐσῶν ἑκασταχοῦ τοῖς τε τῶν δῆμων προστάταις τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἐπάγεσθαι καὶ τοῖς ὀλίγοις τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους*

So rawly did the stasis advance, in fact it seemed worse since it was the first. When later all of Greece, so to speak, was convulsed, there were struggles on both sides: the leaders of the people striving to invite in the Athenians and the oligarchs, the Lakedaemonians,

provides a transition from Thucydides' narrative of the events of stasis on Kerkyra to his analysis of the phenomenon in general. The second,

*καὶ ἐν μὲν εἰρήνῃ οὐκ ἂν ἔχόντων πρόφασιν οὐδ' ἐτοίμων παρακαλεῖν αὐτούς, πολεμουμένων δὲ καὶ ξυμμαχίας ἅμα ἑκατέροις τῇ τῶν ἐναντίων κακῶσει καὶ σφίσι αὐτοῖς ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ προσποιήσει ῥαδίως αἱ ἐπαγωγὰι τοῖς νεωτερίζειν τι βουλομένοις ἐπορίζοντο*

For in peace time having no reason, nor being prepared, to call them in . . . but being at war and there being an alliance to each side for the purpose of harming the enemy and likewise benefitting themselves, invitations were readily available to those desiring revolution,

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*τὸ ἐπιβουλεύσασθαι*), vocal opposition (*ὁ ἀντιλέγων*), neutrality (*προβουλεύσας δὲ ὅπως μηδὲν αὐτῶν δεήσει*), and kinship (*τὸ ξυγγενές*) civilized virtues, it is not that they were replaced but rather that they were despised, as I discuss below. The civilized properties that were analogously scorned and abandoned in Ellis' B' is only *τὸ εὐθες*; the main focus of Chapter 83 centers on explaining why distrust predominated; B', therefore, is not parallel to B. Thus although chapter 84 does echo the beginning of Chapter 82, what intervenes cannot be molded into Ellis' circle.

Ellis' secondary and tertiary circles are more forced than this one. For example, by trying to knock into roundness Thucydides' disquisition on words, he fails to see that the structure present is antithetical and haphazard as I discuss above.

attempts to explain why stasis became so prevalent. The third,

*καὶ ἐπέπεσε πολλὰ καὶ χαλεπὰ κατὰ στάσιν ταῖς πόλεσι, γιγνόμενα μὲν καὶ αἰεὶ ἐσόμενα, ἕως ἄν ἡ αὐτὴ φύσις ἀνθρώπων ἦ, μᾶλλον δὲ καὶ ἡσυχαιότερα καὶ τοῖς εἶδεσι διηλλαγμένα, ὡς ἄν ἕκασται αἰ μεταβολαὶ τῶν ξυντυχιῶν ἐφιστῶνται*

Many and difficult indeed are the things which assault cities during stasis, things which are happening now and always will as long as human nature remains the same though they be sometimes worse, sometimes milder, and different in form as each chance variation asserts its force,

prophesies stasis' continual recurrence, and the fourth offers a reason why:

*ἐν μὲν γὰρ εἰρήνῃ καὶ ἀγαθοῖς πράγμασιν αἱ τε πόλεις καὶ οἱ ἰδιῶται ἀμείνους τὰς γνώμας ἔχουσι διὰ τὸ μὴ ἐς ἀκουσίους ἀνάγκας πίπτειν· ὁ δὲ πόλεμος ὑφελὼν τὴν εὐπορίαν τοῦ καθ' ἡμέραν βίαιος διδάσκαλος καὶ πρὸς τὰ παρόντα τὰς ὀργὰς τῶν πολλῶν ὁμοιοῖ*

For in peace and prosperity, cities and individuals have better judgement on account of not falling into unwilling necessities; but war, taking away the facility of daily life, is a forceful teacher and assimilates the tempers of the majority to their present circumstances.

Finally returning to stasis in Hellas, the fifth sentence,

*ἐστασίαζέ τε οὖν τὰ τῶν πόλεων, καὶ τὰ ἐφυστερίζοντά που πύσσει τῶν προγενομένων πολὺ ἐπέφερε τὴν ὑπερβολὴν τοῦ καινοῦσθαι τὰς διανοίας τῶν τ' ἐπιχειρήσεων περιτεχνήσει καὶ τῶν τιμωριῶν ἀτοπίαι*

Thus cities and men were in stasis, and those afflicted later, because of their knowledge of previous occurrences, carried further forth the excess of inventing both in the ingenuity of their assaults and in the uniqueness of their retributions,

completes the ring.<sup>16</sup> The schema is:

- A Stasis in Hellas
- B Why
- C Stasis' recurrence

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<sup>16</sup>This is the only of Ellis' rings that I am in total agreement with. See prior note.

B Why  
A Stasis in Hellas

Notice also that for the first four statements reason follows statement.

The rest of Chapter 82 makes up the second section. Its focus is the perversion of the value of words. The third section, Chapter 83, mourns the loss of *τὸ εὐηθές* (simplicity) and the predominance of *τὸ ἄπιστον* (distrust). Finally evils that the oppressed, the indigent, and those impelled mostly by uncontrollable passion perpetrate; human nature; and the destruction of *νόμοι* are the subjects of the fourth section, Chapter 84. What unites the whole is the thread of a change from an ethic of peacetime to one of war and stasis.

It seems that as we read the three latter sections the situation moves from bad to worse. In the first of these three sections, laws though transgressed are still in existence (III. 82. 6. 2). Likewise, though perverted, *πίστεις* (pledges) and *ῥοκοί* (oaths) offer some remembrance of stable society (III. 82. 6. 5-82. 7) as does the pretense of holding a vote (III. 82. 8. 10). Finally, in this section an appearance of rectitude remains important. In fact the leaders are at pains to justify their actions (III. 82. 8. 12). Though at the end of III. 82 stasis has reduced the city to a place where *ἡ εὐσέβεια* (piety) is absent and *ἡ εὐπρέπεια λόγον* (the fair-seeming word) reigns, a semblance of stable society can still be seen.

In the next section, *τὸ εὐηθές* is laughed into oblivion and the city becomes a battlefield of distrust upon which the less intelligent more often kill the more intelligent. One has the sense that all pretense to propriety is gone. This sense is confirmed when we move on to the last section.

In this section we see what the oppressed, the poor, and those of an uncontrollable temper can do. Revenge, gain, and malevolence take over and men destroy their only savior, νόμοι. Gone are all societal constraints and along with them the need to justify actions. The analysis culminates in chaos and anarchy.

In step with the breakdown of societal constraints is the movement from the actions of the leaders to those of the individual. Chapter 82 is largely concerned with cities, that is, with the striving of factions and their leaders to gain ascendancy. Chapter 83 divides the populace into two groups, the more and the less intelligent. Private individuals are the concern of Chapter 84. As we move from the factions and leaders to private individuals, stasis and men destroy values, trust, and finally laws. Though these three stages overlap and though their occurrence may be more synchronic than diachronic, Thucydides does seem to portray them as a parade of horrors, each worse than the last.

## CONTENT

Thucydides has two main concerns in the analysis. He takes pains to show how society changes from an ethic of peacetime to an ethic of war and stasis and to offer some explanation for why this change occurs. In his explanation, he reflects upon human nature and the effect the pressure of war has upon it. He also considers other contributing factors.

Implicit to his reasoning is a belief in the constancy of human nature,<sup>17</sup>

*καὶ ἐπέπεσε πολλὰ καὶ χαλεπὰ κατὰ στάσιν ταῖς πόλεσι, γιγνόμενα μὲν καὶ*

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<sup>17</sup>See I. 22. 4.

*αἰεὶ ἐσόμενα, ἕως ἂν ἡ αὐτὴ φύσις ἀνθρώπων ᾗ, μᾶλλον δὲ καὶ ἡσυχαιτέρα καὶ τοῖς εἶδεσι διηλλαγμένα, ὡς ἂν ἕκασται αἰ μεταβολαὶ τῶν ξυντυχιῶν ἐφιστῶνται.*

Many and difficult indeed are the things which assault cities during stasis, things which are happening now and always will as long as human nature remains the same though they be sometimes worse, sometimes milder, and different in form as each chance variation asserts its force.

Not only is human nature a constant, but impropriety is inherent in it. Thucydides gnominically states that the majority is ashamed of being honorable dolts but delights in being clever rogues (III. 82. 7. 10). He also says that conquering laws, human nature is accustomed to transgress them (III. 84. 2. 1).

It is in this context that the effect of war upon the psyche must be understood.

War presents the opportunity for upheaval,

*καὶ ἐν μὲν εἰρήνῃ οὐκ ἂν ἐχόντων πρόφασιν οὐδ' ἐτοιμῶν παρακαλεῖν αὐτούς, πολεμουμένων δὲ καὶ ξυμμαχίας ἅμα ἐκατέροις τῇ τῶν ἐναντίων κακώσει καὶ σφίσι αὐτοῖς ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ προσποιήσει ῥαδίως αἰ ἐπαγωγὰ τοῖς νεωτερίζειν τι βουλομένοις ἐπορίζοντο.*

For in peace time having no reason, nor being prepared, to call them in . . . but being at war and there being an alliance to each side for the purpose of harming the enemy and likewise benefitting themselves, invitations were readily available to those desiring revolution.

(III. 82. 1. 5)

But war does not change human nature; rather it assimilates it to present circumstance. Like a chameleon human nature darkens in the presence of war,

*ἐν μὲν γὰρ εἰρήνῃ καὶ ἀγαθοῖς πράγμασιν αἱ τε πόλεις καὶ οἱ ἰδιῶται ἀμείνους τὰς γνώμας ἔχουσι διὰ τὸ μὴ ἐς ἀκουσίους ἀνάγκας πίπτειν· ὁ δὲ πόλεμος ὑφελὼν τὴν εὐπορίαν τοῦ καθ' ἡμέραν βίαιος διδάσκαλος καὶ πρὸς τὰ παρόντα τὰς ὀργὰς τῶν πολλῶν ὁμοιοῖ.*

For in peace and prosperity, cities and individuals have better judgement on account of not falling into unwilling necessities; but war, taking away the facility of daily life, is a forceful teacher and assimilates the tempers of the

majority to their present circumstances.

(III. 82. 2. 5)

This dark side of human nature is constantly present. Placed in a crisis like stasis, it happily shows that it is unable to control its passion, stronger than justice, and inimical to its superior (III. 84. 2. 1).

Of course the cause of stasis is not so easily explained. In addition to human nature's propensity to err and the pressure of war, there are other factors that contribute to stasis' outbreak. Greed, love of honor, and desire all play their part (III. 82. 8. 1). Jealousy, which destroys those who wish no part in the fracas and which lies at the root of vengeance and cupidity, is another factor (III. 82. 8. 16 and III. 84. 2. 5). Finally oppression, poverty, and an inability to control passion must also be accounted for (III. 84. 1).

Thucydides' consideration of all these factors gives one the sense that he is not attempting an exhaustive definition of stasis and its origin. Rather by recognizing circumstance and human nature, his explanation shows the difficulty of trying to explain human behavior. By offering many general causes, his explanation embraces the multifarious factors that impinge upon behavior.

When we turn our attention from human nature to the change from an ethic of peacetime to one of war and stasis, we see that the technique Thucydides uses to communicate the change is to contrast the new ethic with the old. In stasis men value daring, unthinking, reckless, quarrelsome, intimidating action, but despise prudent, forethinking, intelligent thought (III. 82. 4-82. 6). This section, III. 82. 4-6, is the one most often referred to by those who comment on the whole excursus

and also the one least understood.

It is least understood because in the sentence,

*καὶ τὴν εἰωθίαν ἀξίωσιν τῶν ὀνομάτων ἐς τὰ ἔργα ἀντήλλαξαν τῇ δικαιοῦσει*

They interchanged the accustomed value of words in relation to deeds as they saw fit (III. 82. 4),

*ἀξίωσις* is usually mistranslated. *ἀξίωσις* is commonly understood as *meaning*.

Proctor, Wilson, and Worthington all argue correctly that it is not the meaning of words that was changed but their values.<sup>18</sup> It is precisely because words kept their meanings that such a perversion of language was possible. Although Wilson rejects his interpretation of the passage, Hogan makes the same argument. Hogan writes,<sup>19</sup>

Of course, those who employed *ἀνδρεία φιλέταιρος* to name what was actually *τόλμα ἀλόγιστος* relied (whether consciously or unconsciously) on the high estimation of *ἀνδρεία φιλέταιρος* in order to carry their points. In this sense they did not change the estimation of words, but in fact depended on its remaining the same.

Hogan also suggests that in stasis men considered *τόλμα ἀλόγιστος* a good thing and consequently called it by its correct name, a suggestion not at all unreasonable. For Thucydides' main concern in this passage is the change in ethics, not the phenomenon of newspeak, that is, of reprehensible behavior made seemly by calling it something positive or vice versa. Although newspeak is part of the change, it is

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<sup>18</sup>D. Proctor, *The Experience of Thucydides* (Warminster, Wilts, England: Aris & Phillips LTD, 1980), 204. J. Wilson, "The Customary Meanings of Words Were Changed'--Or Were They? A Note on Thucydides 3.82.4," *Classical Quarterly* 32 (1982): 18-20. I. Worthington, "A Note on Thucydides 3.82.4," *Liverpool Classical Monthly* (Oct. 1982): 124.

<sup>19</sup>J. T. Hogan, "The *ἀξίωσις* of Words at Thucydides 3.82.4," *Greek, Rome and Byzantine Studies* 21 (1980): 146.



not all.

For example, of the seven esteemed vices, only *τόλμα ἀλόγιστος* could have been called by a different positive name (*ἀνδρεία φιλέταιρος*). Though *τόλμα ἀλόγιστος* may have been called *ἀνδρεία φιλέταιρος*, the most important point is that *τόλμα ἀλόγιστος* was seen in a positive light. What concerns Thucydides is the way behavior was perceived, not what it was called. Similarly when the Kerkyraeans lobby the Athenians for an alliance, they consider their previous isolationist policy in a new light,

*καὶ περιέστηκεν ἡ δοκοῦσα ἡμῶν πρότερον σωφροσύνη, τὸ μὴ ἐν ἀλλοτρίᾳ ξυμμαχίᾳ τῇ τοῦ πέλας γνώμῃ ξυγκινδυνεύειν, νῦν ἀβουλία καὶ ἀσθένεια φαινομένη.*

What once seemed the wise precaution of refusing to involve ourselves in alliances with other powers, lest we should also involve ourselves in risks of their choosing, has now proved to be folly and weakness.

(I. 32. 4. 4, trans. Crawley)

Just as the Kerkyraeans conveniently change their view of the proper foreign policy, so Thucydides notes the change in values that occurs in stasis.

This change is seen most clearly in the other vices. *τὸ δ' ἐμπλήκτως δέξυ* is not referred to otherwise, but rather it is added to the criteria that determine manliness. The troublemaker, *ὁ χαλεπαίνων*, is called nothing; he is simply trusted. Likewise the plotter, *ἐπιβουλεύσας*, is intelligent and the suspecter, *ὑπονοήσας*, more fearsome. The preemptor, *ὁ φθάσας*, and suborner, *ὁ ἐπικελεύσας*, are praised (*ἐπηνεῖτο*). For six of the seven esteemed vices, the point is not that they were made to look good by using a positive description, but that the partisans valued them.

In the case of the despised virtues, the phenomenon of newspeak is more prevalent. Party members could have easily disparaged *μέλλησις προμηθῆς* by calling it *δειλία εὐπρεπῆς*. The same can be said for *τὸ σῶφρον (τοῦ ἀνάνδρου πρόσχημα)*, *τὸ πρὸς ἅπαν ξυνετὸν (ἐπὶ πᾶν ἀργόν)*, *ἀσφαλεία δὲ τὸ ἐπιβουλεύσασθαι (ἀποτροπῆς πρόφασις εὐλογος)*, and *προβουλεύσας δὲ ὅπως μηδὲν αὐτῶν δεήσει (τῆς τε ἑταιρίας διαλυτῆς καὶ τοῦς ἐναντίους ἐκπεπληγμένος)* but not for *ὁ ἀντιλέγων* (the gainsayer). He is merely suspected. Thus, Thucydides does concern himself with the phenomenon of newspeak, but newspeak is only one aspect of the change from an ethic of peacetime to one of stasis. As the passage proceeds Thucydides explores this change in more detail.

*τὸ ξυγγενές* (kinship) loses its consequence (III. 82. 6. 1). *πίστεις* (pledges) are no longer consecrated (III. 82. 6. 5). Peace proposals, *τὰ καλῶς λεγόμενα*, are suspect (III. 82. 7. 1). *ῥοκοί* (oaths) are sealed out of necessity, and it is considered commendable if by transgressing them one subdues his foe (III. 82. 7. 4). The veneer of *the people's political equality (πλήθους τε ἰσονομίας πολιτικῆς)* or *the prudent aristocracy (ἀριστοκρατίας σῶφρονος)* puts a nice shine on all of this so that by a specious word (*εὐπρεπεία δὲ λόγον*) the leaders obtain better repute (*ἄμεινον ἤκονον*) (III. 82. 8. 3). *εὐσεβεία* (piety), *τὸ εὐηθές* (simplicity), and *τὸ γενναῖον* (nobility) disappear and as a result the city becomes a battlefield of distrust (III. 82. 8. 12 and III. 83. 1). Finally men destroy their one salvation, *νόμοι* (III. 84. 3. 1). In the change from an ethic of peacetime to an ethic of stasis, men destroy the very values that ensure their existence.

In addition to contrasting the new ethics with the old, Thucydides uses metaphor and personification in his effort to communicate the phenomenon of stasis. At III. 82. 2. 5 Thucydides personifies the city but also recognizes that it consists of individuals. Thus he writes,

ἐν μὲν γὰρ εἰρήνῃ καὶ ἀγαθοῖς πράγμασιν αἱ τε πόλεις καὶ οἱ ἰδιῶται  
ἀμείνους τὰς γνώμας ἔχουσι διὰ τὸ μὴ ἐς ἀκονσίους ἀνάγκας πίπτειν.

For in peace and prosperity, cities and individuals have better judgement on account of not falling into unwilling necessities.

The argument is sometimes made that at the beginning of his *History*, Thucydides thinks individuals' impact in the political arena negligible, but by the end of the *History*, mainly because of Alcibiades, he comes to acknowledge and even to stress the individual's importance.<sup>20</sup> I think Thucydides recognition of the individual here and the emphasis he places on the power of Perikles (to say nothing of Themistokles) provide sufficient evidence for rejecting this view. But at the same time I do think correct the observation that individuals play a greater role as the *History* proceeds. I attribute their greater role to the effect of stasis, not to any

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<sup>20</sup>H. D. Westlake writes, "In the second half of the *History*, while Thucydides continues to attach importance to the reactions of the masses, he seems to have come to believe that the personality of leading individuals was a much more influential factor than he had been prepared to acknowledge; that their aspirations and rivalries, their general qualities of leadership, their success or failure in imposing their will on other leaders might, and often did, determine the course of history. It may be that the principal reason for this shift of attitude should be sought in the impression made upon him by the career of one man--Alcibiades." H. D. Westlake, *Individuals in Thucydides* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1968), 319. Dennis Proctor writes that "as Thucydides grew older, he moved further away from the sophistic generalities of his early years of authorship, and became more interested in the particular things that happened and the individual human beings who brought them about," (*The Experience of Thucydides*, 60).

revolution in Thucydides' thought. As stasis runs its course, the city-state can no longer function as an individual. Rather individuals' personal pleasures direct it down their own paths.

Thucydides also personifies human nature. In Chapter 84 human nature, *reigning over laws, accustomed to do wrong contrary to them, happily shows that it is unable to control its passion, stronger than justice, and inimical to its superior.*<sup>21</sup>

In his personification of human nature, Thucydides implies that the propensity for evil is within us all. He notices the different forms this propensity takes, and far from saying that it will be realized in all of us, he simply remarks its presence. In her book *The War*, Marguerite Duras, a novelist and memoirist, gives a more prosaic and explicit voice to this same notion,<sup>22</sup>

This new face of death that has been discovered in Germany--organized, rationalized--produces bewilderment before it arouses indignation. You're amazed. How can anyone still be German? . . . One of the greatest civilized nations in the world, the age-long capital of music, has just systematically murdered 11 million human beings with the utter efficiency of a state industry. The whole world looks at the mountain, the mass of death dealt by God's creature to his fellows. Someone quotes the name of some German man of letters who's been very upset and become very depressed and to whom these things have given much food for thought. If Nazi crime is not seen in world terms, if it isn't understood collectively, then that man in the concentration

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<sup>21</sup>Human nature shows its wicked propensities in an extended chiasm. In the previous sentence, Thucydides presented the evils that were likely to be perpetrated by three types of private citizens: *οἱ ὄβρει ἀρχόμενοι τὸ πλεόν ἢ σωφροσύνη, οἱ πενίας τῆς εἰθυίας ἀπαλλαξείοντες, οἱ μὴ ἐπὶ πλεονεξία*, and *ἀπὸ ἴσον δὲ μάλιστα ἐπιόντες ἀπαιδευσία ὀργῆς πλείστον ἐκφερόμενοι*. The oppressed (A) corresponds to inimical to its superior (A); the indigent (B), to stronger than justice (B); and those of uncontrollable passion (C), to unable to control its passion (C).

<sup>22</sup>Duras, *The War*, in *The Norton Book of Modern War*, ed. Paul Fussell (New York and London: W.W. Norton & Company, 1991), 516-17.

camp at Belsen who died alone but with the same collective soul and class awareness that made him undo a bolt on the railroad one night somewhere in Europe, without a leader, without a uniform, without a witness, has been betrayed. If you give a German and not a collective interpretation to the Nazi horror, you reduce the man in Belsen to regional dimensions. The only possible answer to this crime is to turn it into a crime committed by everyone. To share it. Just like the idea of equality and fraternity. In order to bear it, to tolerate the idea of it, we must share the crime.

Neither Duras nor Thucydides believes in a pure and innocent human nature.

Just as Thucydides and Duras share similar views on human nature, so it is interesting that the metaphors Thucydides uses in III. 82-84 are the same ones we use today when discussing war. For Thucydides, war is a teacher of violence,

*ὁ δὲ πόλεμος ὑφελὼν τὴν εὐπορίαν τοῦ καθ' ἡμέραν βίαιος διδάσκαλος καὶ πρὸς τὰ παρόντα τὰς ὀργὰς τῶν πολλῶν ὁμοιοῖ.*

But war, taking away the facility of daily life, is a forceful teacher and assimilates the tempers of the majority to their present circumstances. (III. 82. 2. 7)

It is perhaps his most famous metaphor and indicates clearly that human nature is subject to the vicissitudes of life. E. B. Sledge, World War II Marine veteran, offers an example of war's brutal effect upon human nature. Having described an incident in which a marine extracts gold fillings from the mouth of a wounded Japanese by slashing his cheeks open to each ear and by prying them out with the point of his kabar, Sledge writes,

Such was the incredible cruelty that decent men could commit when reduced to a brutish existence in their fight for survival amid the violent death, terror, tension, fatigue, and filth that was the infantryman's war . . . The fierce struggle for survival in the abyss of Peleliu eroded the veneer of civilization and made savages of us all. We existed in an environment totally

incomprehensible to men behind the lines--service troops and civilians.<sup>23</sup>

This incredible savagery of human nature Thucydides emphasizes when in the next sentence, he continues the metaphor,

ἑστασίαζέ τε ὄν τὰ τῶν πόλεων, καὶ τὰ ἐφυστερίζοντά που πύσσει τῶν προγενομένων πολὺν ἐπέφερε τὴν ὑπερβολὴν τοῦ καινοῦσθαι τὰς διανοίας τῶν τ' ἐπιχειρήσεων περιτεχνήσει καὶ τῶν τιμωριῶν ἀτοπία.

Thus cities and men were in stasis, and those afflicted later, because of their knowledge of previous occurrences, carried further forth the excess of inventing both in the ingenuity of their assaults and in the uniqueness of their retributions. (III. 82. 3. 1)

In the Funeral Oration Perikles claims that Athens is the school of Hellas. Here Thucydides asserts that war is her schoolmaster from whom unique and ingenious violence is learned.

The school metaphor is very much alive in today's war rhetoric and literature.<sup>24</sup> Battles are "tests of courage" which must be "passed" and from which one "learns" the appropriate "lessons." Henry Reed, teacher, journalist, author of popular radio plays, and WWII veteran, recalls the lessons he endured while an army cadet,

Lessons of the War  
to Alan Michell

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<sup>23</sup>E. B. Sledge, *With the Old Breed: At Peleliu and Okinawa* (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981), 120-21. Sledge gives another example of the brutalizing-effect of war when he describes the innocent act of his buddy splashing chunks of coral into a jap's skull, like a child throwing pebbles into a puddle (ibid., 123).

<sup>24</sup>Note also license plates and bumper stickers that declare war their owner's university.

*Vixi duellis nuper idoneus  
Et militavi non sine gloria*

## I. NAMING OF PARTS

To-day we have naming of parts. Yesterday,  
We had daily cleaning. And to-morrow morning,  
We shall have what to do after firing. But to-day,  
To-day we have naming of parts. Japonica  
Glistens like coral in all of the neighbouring gardens,  
And to-day we have naming of parts.

This is the lower sling swivel. and this  
Is the upper sling swivel, whose use you will see,  
When you are given your slings. And this is the piling  
swivel,  
Which in your case you have not got. The branches  
Hold in the gardens their silent, eloquent gestures,  
Which in our case we have not got.

This is the safety-catch, which is always released  
With an easy flick of the thumb. And please do not let me  
See anyone using his finger. You can do it quite easy  
If you have any strength in your thumb. The blossoms  
are fragile and motionless, never letting anyone see  
Any of them using their finger.

And this you can see is the bolt. The purpose of this  
Is to open the breech, as you see. We can slide it  
Rapidly backwards and forwards: we call this  
Easing the spring. And rapidly backwards and forwards  
The early bees are assaulting and fumbling the flowers:  
They call it easing the Spring.  
If you have any strength in your thumb: like the bolt,  
And the breech, and the cocking piece, and the point of  
balance,  
Which in our case we have not got; and the almond-blossom  
Silent in all of the gardens and the bees going backwards  
and forwards,  
For to-day we have naming of parts.

## II. JUDGING DISTANCES

Not only how far away, but the way that you say it

Is very important. Perhaps you may never get  
 The knack of judging a distance, but at least you know  
 How to report on a landscape: the central sector,  
 The right of arc and that, which we had last Tuesday,  
 And at least you know

That maps are of time, not place, so far as the army  
 Happens to be concerned--the reason being,  
 Is one which need not delay us. Again, you know  
 There are three kinds of tree, three only, the fir and  
   the poplar,  
 And those which have bushy tops to; and lastly  
 That things only seem to be things.

A barn is not called a barn, to put it more plainly,  
 Or a field in the distance, where sheep may be safely  
   grazing.

You must never be over-sure. You must say, when reporting:  
 At five o'clock in the central sector is a dozen  
 Of what appear to be animals; whatever you do,  
 Don't call the bleeders *sheep*.

I am sure that's quite clear; and suppose, for the sake of example,  
 The one at the end, asleep, endeavours to tell us  
 What he sees over there to the west, and how far away,  
 After first having come to attention. There to the west,  
 On the fields of summer the sun and the shadows bestow  
 Vestments of purple and gold.

The still white dwellings are like a mirage in the heat,  
 And under the swaying elms a man and a woman  
 Lie gently together. Which is, perhaps, only to say  
 That there is a row of houses to the left of arc,  
 And that under some poplars a pair of what appear to be humans  
 Appear to be loving.

Well that, for an answer, is what we might rightly call  
 Moderately satisfactory only, the reason being,  
 Is that two things have been omitted, and those are important.  
 The human beings, now: in what direction are they,  
 And how far away, would you say? And do not forget  
 There may be dead ground in between.

There may be dead ground in between; and I may not have got  
 The knack of judging a distance; I will only venture



A guess that perhaps between me and the apparent lovers,  
 (Who, incidentally, appear by now to have finished,)  
 At seven o'clock from the houses, is roughly a distance  
 Of about one year and a half.<sup>25</sup>

The last section of Reed's poem parodies the lectures given on unarmed combat. The school metaphor also surfaces in song,

High above the Chattahoochee  
 And the Upatoi,  
 Stands our noble Alma Mater,  
 Benning School for Boys.

Salt in Tablets, scorching sun,  
 Touch your toes on count of one,  
 Expert, bolo, school solutions,  
 Phenix City institutions.

Hail to Benning, Hail to Benning,  
 Follow Me's the cry.  
 You must use the school solution.  
 Follow me, or die.<sup>26</sup>

(sung to the melody of "Far  
 Above Cayuga's Waters")

For these writers as for Thucydides, the classroom of war or war as schoolmaster is ironic and contemptuous. It is ironic because war represents the absence of intellect. In it men reach the extreme of irrational acts that beggar credulity. Survival and brutality are the only learning. Because of these ironies, the metaphor cannot help but paint a contemptuous picture.

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<sup>25</sup>H. Reed, "Lessons of the War," in *The Norton Book of Modern War*, ed. Paul Fussell (New York and London: W.W. Norton & Company, 1991), 318-22.

<sup>26</sup>Graduation Program, The Infantry School, Ft. Benning, Ga., April 18, 1944 quoted in P. Fussell, *Wartime: Understanding and Behavior in the Second World War* (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), 60.

Thucydides employs two more metaphors in his struggle to communicate human behavior under the pressure of war. In the first, stasis is a contest in which the one who acts first and deceptively wins the contest of wits (*ὁ φθάσας θαρσῆσαι, εἰ ἴδοι ἄφαρκτον, ἥδιον διὰ τὴν πίστιν ἐτιμωρεῖτο ἢ ἀπὸ τοῦ προφανοῦς, καὶ τό τε ἀσφαλὲς ἐλογίζετο καὶ ὅτι ἀπάτη περιγενόμενος ξυνέσεως ἀγώνισμα προσελάμβανεν*). He continues the metaphor by having the factional leaders actually make contests (*ἄθλα ἐποιοῦντο*). *ἀγώνισμα* and *ἄθλα* bring to mind both theater and sport.

In *The Great War and Modern Memory*, Fussell devotes an entire chapter to "The Theater of War." He writes that war "is too grossly farcical, perverse, cruel, and absurd to be credited as a form of 'real life.' . . . A temporary army consisting of strangers forcibly accumulated will offer constant opportunities for theatrical artifice--that is, fraud, illusion, and misrepresentation--in its members' relations with each other.<sup>27</sup> Adapting Fussell's insight a bit, I would argue that it is war itself that offers the opportunities for fraud, illusion, and misrepresentation. I think that Thucydides chooses the metaphor precisely because it conveys this notion of artifice. The metaphor captures the factions' deceptive and unreal striving and desire for power.

The metaphor of war as theater surfaces again when before the annihilation of the Athenian troops and while the Athenians and Syrakusans are engaging one

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<sup>27</sup>P. Fussell, *The Great War and Modern Memory* (London, Oxford, and New York: Oxford University Press, 1975), 192 and 195.

another in the Great Harbor, Thucydides portrays the supporting ground troops as an audience watching a play. As the combatant audience, lined along the shore, focuses its attention on the action, Thucydides details each one's joy, uncertainty, and horror. The whole episode takes on the appearance of the surreal, especially when defeated, the survivors are forced to abandon their injured comrades, screaming and hanging upon their necks (VII. 71 and 75).

In addition to its artificial sense, I think Thucydides chooses the metaphor because of the contentiousness it suggests. Greek theater was entertainment but it was also a contest with a victor. Thus, it is both contentiousness and artificiality that make theater a particularly suitable metaphor.

Sport is also contentious and artificial. For this reason war as sport and sport as war will always be a persistent metaphor. The National Football League provides parallels particularly suitable to modern warfare. Players/soldiers are drafted and must attend training/boot camp. Coaches and generals harangue their troops before they enter the fray. Plays and orders are sent in from the safety of far off observation posts. Opponents stare at one another across No Man's Land. Inches of land are violently fought after, medals of valor proffered. Teammates help the injured to the safety of the sideline (or behind the lines). Casualties are borne off on stretchers. Linemen hold the trenches. There are bombs, spearing, traps, blitzes, and flanking maneuvers.

The outlook of the player and soldier is quite similar. Though neither is superstitious, both cling to their talismans. Just as the imminence of death forces the

grunt to live in the immediate present, the player's cliché is that he takes each game as it comes, never looking beyond. Each also is a firm believer in the unknown, that incalculable element that plays a role in every game and battle. Because of their artificiality and contentiousness, the metaphors of theater and sport are particularly appropriate for attempting to communicate incomprehensible war.

Another metaphor Thucydides uses is the crossing of boundaries,

*οὐ μέχρι τοῦ δικαίου καὶ τῇ πόλει ξυμφόρου προτιθέντες, ἐς δὲ τὸ ἐκατέρους πού ἀεὶ ἡδονὴν ἔχον ὀρίζοντες . . .*

not setting their endpoint at a place just and beneficial to the city but making their boundary that which always gives pleasure to each . . . (III. 82. 8. 3)

Breaking boundaries is a theme familiar to mythology. Dionysus breaks the boundaries between the city and the wilds, between man and beast, between nature and culture. He reminds humanity of its dual nature. Factional leaders, with their monomaniacal pursuit of personal gain and honor, oxymoronically limit their striving with the boundary of personal gratification. By doing so they cross the boundary of civility and limit themselves to savagery.

In his address to Amherst College, Robert Frost suggests that all thinking, except perhaps mathematical, is metaphor or analogy.<sup>28</sup> If this is so, then by the metaphors of school, theater, sport, and boundaries and by stating the new ethics in terms of the old, Thucydides dives deep in his effort to fathom war and stasis.

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<sup>28</sup>Robert Frost, "Education by Poetry: A Meditative Monologue," an address given at Amherst College in 1930, in *The Norton Reader: An Anthology of Expository Prose*, general editor, Arthur M. Eastman, 7th ed. (New York and London: W.W. Norton & Company, 1965), 1026-34.

## PURPOSE

As we have seen Thucydides, in his analysis, focuses upon why stasis occurs and upon the change from an ethic of peacetime to one of stasis. He takes pains to explain the perversion of values and the loss of force of institutions like pledges, oaths, and *vôμοι*. As we turn our attention from Thucydides' explanation and description of stasis to his purpose for writing the analysis, the picture becomes muddled. One reason is the use and abuse the passage has suffered at the hands of some scholars.

For a considerable time before John Finley's important works on Thucydides, many positivists believed in an amoral Thucydides. For them the morality sensed in III. 82-84 proved a stumbling block that had to be removed. For example, the amoral positivists Shorey, Cochrane, Adcock, and Woodhead all explain away the morality they sense in III. 82-84.

Shorey writes,

'Most men,' says Thucydides (III.83), 'more easily submit to be called clever knaves than honest simpletons; they glory in the one epithet and blush at the other.' There is a seeming injustice in attributing to Thucydides this feeling of 'the many.' But his protest is couched in language half contemptuous: 'Simple-mindedness, a chief element of nobility, was quite laughed down.'<sup>29</sup>

Shorey believes that Thucydides' "half contemptuous" language undercuts the moral tone of the passage.

Because he bases his entire work upon an amoral, deterministic, and scientific Thucydides, Cochrane also rationalizes the morality he senses in III. 82-84. At the

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<sup>29</sup>P. Shorey, "On the Implicit Ethics and Psychology of Thucydides," *Transactions of the American Philological Association* 24 (1893): 75.

end of his chapter on War and Revolution and right after his comments on III. 82-84, Cochrane writes,

To him [Thucydides], as a man of science, the conventional represents successful adjustment to the more or less permanent physical conditions of life, and to that extent the normal is the right. The war, by disrupting those conditions, swept away the norms or standards of conduct painfully erected by men to meet the conditions of peace, and so gave rise to a problem of suffering which science can merely note, but which it is the task of philosophy to justify and explain.<sup>30</sup>

Cochrane's scientific Thucydides views the conventional merely as necessary:

morality is purely expedient.

Saying that Thucydides' ethical standards are those of his class, Adcock takes a similar tack.<sup>31</sup> The class, of course, is the aristocracy; Thucydides' ethical stance he sums up as,

The city comes first: the interests of the city come first, and whatever does not serve these interests is a bad thing and not a good. The practice of private virtue, inhibited by private scruples, if it limits the city's power or disregards its interests, is dismissed with an ironical, contemptuous phrase. When private virtues--courage, self-abnegation, honesty, *a simple-mindedness that has a large ingredient of nobility*, serve the community, they are highly praised: but only then.<sup>32</sup>

Adcock permits Thucydides' stance some morality, but only the simplest sort, based on expediency to the city.

Woodhead, however, denies Thucydides' stance any morality. Discussing the

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<sup>30</sup>C. N. Cochrane, *Thucydides and the Science of History* (London: Oxford University Press, 1929), 136-37.

<sup>31</sup>F. E. Adcock, *Thucydides and his History* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1963), 50.

<sup>32</sup>*Ibid.*, 51-52.

*ὀνόματα καλά*, which the Athenians forbade the Melians to use, Woodhead assures us that Thucydides' stasis excursus does not criticize stasis' causing of moral debasement,

Thucydides knew that in essence they [*ὀνόματα καλά*] have nothing to do with the character of power, and that in the exercise of power there are motivating factors which have no connexion with them. But the good man looks to a moral code outside and beyond these; and the bad man, knowing that the phraseology of the code conveys a 'good' connotation with which he wishes to associate himself, misuses it for his own ends. It is this misuse which Thucydides criticises in the Corcyrean stasis; not the conflict itself, which is a natural process.<sup>33</sup>

According to Woodhead the analysis is simply a critique devoid of moral content. Thus for these positivists, III. 82-84 is merely a stumbling block obscuring their scientific, objective, rationalistic, amoral view of Thucydides.

Of course such a stance is required of them for their objective Thucydides to remain standing on the bema of science; for a moral Thucydides is an engaged and impassioned Thucydides, not a dispassionate recorder of events. Mainly as a result of the early and controversial work done by Cornford,<sup>34</sup> and the works of de

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<sup>33</sup>A. G. Woodhead, *Thucydides on the Nature of Power*, Martin Classical Lectures 24 (Cambridge Massachusetts: Harvard University press published for Oberlin College, 1970), 21-22.

<sup>34</sup>F. M. Cornford, *Thucydides Mythistoricus* (first publ. by Edward Arnold, Ltd., 1907; reprint, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1971). In his book Cornford calls the positivist view of Thucydides the 'Modernist Fallacy' (p. xi). For him Thucydides is a dramatist rather than an historian. Thucydides, in his view, has an Aeschylean philosophy of human nature in which *Τύχη* (fortune or luck) replaces Zeus, but the tragic passions of *Τόλμα* (Daring), *Πλεονεξία* (Greed), and *Υβρις* (Arrogance) still result in *ἄτη* (Blindness and Destruction) (Chapter XIII esp. p. 242).

Romilly,<sup>35</sup> Finley,<sup>36</sup> Parry,<sup>37</sup> and Stahl,<sup>38</sup> scholars' perception of Thucydides changes. Although some still believe in the objective scientist, others regard his work as subjective.<sup>39</sup>

For the latter group the result of this change in perception is that they are now freed from the fetters of objectivity and able to appreciate the literary, emotional, and dramatic elements of Thucydides' work. In addition to this freedom, predictably many now use III. 82-84 to define the nature of Thucydides' morality. Edmunds and Proctor are prime examples.

Edmunds uses the excursus to determine "what principles should, according to

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<sup>35</sup>De Romilly, *Histoire et raison chez Thucydide* (Paris: Les Belles lettres, 1956). In showing the relation between narrative and speeches, de Romilly provides grist for those who wish to grind away Thucydides' honesty because the close relation between the two can be seen as Thucydides' manipulation of facts.

<sup>36</sup>One of Finley's greatest contributions to Thucydidean studies is the work he did on the *History's* unity, "The Unity of Thucydides' History," in *Three Essays on Thucydides* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967). By identifying in the rest of the work the ideas expressed in Books VI and VII, Finley established a conceptual unity for the *History*. Once attention became focused on the interconnections and relationships among the Books of the *History*, it was no big step for those who wished to call foul. They could view these connections as Thucydides' manipulating the facts to make them conform to his philosophy or to his prejudices.

<sup>37</sup>See A. M. Parry, "The Language of Thucydides' Description of the Plague," *BICS* (1969): 106-18. Parry argues against a scientific Thucydides but for a precise and dramatic Thucydides. See also, "Thucydides' Use of Abstract Language," *Yale French Studies* 45 (1970): 3-20; "Thucydides' Historical Perspective," *Yale Classical Studies* 22 (1972): 47-61; and *Logos and Ergon in Thucydides* (Salem, New Hampshire: Arno Press, 1981).

<sup>38</sup>H. P. Stahl, *Thukydidies: Die Stellung des Menschen im geschichtlichen Prozeß* (Munich: Beck, 1966).

<sup>39</sup>See Chapter 1.



Thucydides, govern political life within the city."<sup>40</sup> Since in the excursus Thucydides' position is one of censure, Edmunds thinks that Thucydides' ethical sympathies should appear.<sup>41</sup> According to Edmunds, the ethical sympathies that appear reflect traditional ethical thought and show Thucydides' identification with an ethics that is conservative and Spartan.<sup>42</sup>

Proctor also thinks the passage indicative of a man of deep moral conviction.<sup>43</sup> But for Proctor Thucydides' morality is democratic not oligarchic. Proctor writes that Thucydides "viewed the scene unmistakably from the standpoint of a democrat; and revolution, in his eyes, was generally an oligarchical, not a left-wing, activity."<sup>44</sup> The passage, however, encompasses wrongs committed by both oligarchs and democrats. Thus, using this passage to label Thucydides' morality as democratic or oligarchic must be wrongheaded.

A similar but methodologically sounder interpretation is the one that views this passage as evidence for Thucydides' belief in the moral degeneration that occurs in wartime. Finley views the episodes of Mytilene, Plataea, and Kerkyra as examples

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<sup>40</sup>L. Edmunds, "Thucydides' Ethics as Reflected in the Description of Stasis (3.82-83)," *Harvard Studies in Classical Philology* 79 (1975): 73. Edmunds seems to accept de Ste. Croix's distinction that Thucydides believes that different ethical concerns govern relations between cities and those of citizens within a city. For de Ste. Croix's views see, *The Origins of the Peloponnesian War* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1972), 16-28.

<sup>41</sup>Ibid., 74.

<sup>42</sup>Ibid., 91.

<sup>43</sup>D. Proctor, *The Experience of Thucydides*, 205.

<sup>44</sup>Ibid., 53.

of the theme that "war produces violence and violence political chaos."<sup>45</sup> Connor is of similar mind.

Connor sees III. 82-84's purpose as unifying and defensive. III. 82-84 adds the disruption of values and the perversion of language to the deaths, exiles, migrations, earthquakes, and plagues, and it looks forward to Athens' internal struggles and eventual demise. Thus it justifies Thucydides' claim of preeminence for this war (I. 1. 2) and unites the beginning with the end.<sup>46</sup> Connor emphasizes language's inability to impede violence, the disappearance of traditional Greek restraints and conventions under the pressures of the war, and the complete destruction of human morality. The reigning principle is self-interest. The importance of III. 82-84 lies in what it tells about the nature of the war and the mind of its participants not in its strategic or material significance.<sup>47</sup> The cause of it all is found within human nature.<sup>48</sup>

Macleod also emphasizes the degenerative interpretation.<sup>49</sup> For him Thucydides sees in stasis and war circumstances uncovering human nature.<sup>50</sup> By

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<sup>45</sup>J. Finley, *Thucydides* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1942; reprint, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1963), 180.

<sup>46</sup>R. Connor, *Thucydides*, 103-4.

<sup>47</sup>*Ibid.*, 88-89.

<sup>48</sup>*Ibid.*, 102-3.

<sup>49</sup>C. Macleod, "Thucydides on Faction (3.82-83)," *Proceedings of the Cambridge Philological Society* 25 (1979): 52-68.

<sup>50</sup>*Ibid.*, 52-53.

inversion war and stasis undo human progress by the very means of that progress.<sup>51</sup> Thus, necessity, which brings men together and enhances life's standard, in war and stasis, subverts civilization. Laws are ignored. Human ingenuity troubles itself to destroy rather than to create. Intelligence plots or suspects; language is perverted.

Conversely, Cogan rejects the moral interpretation of the passage. Cogan rightly recognizes that the events of Mytilene, Plataea, and Kerkyra have no material effect on the war. What then, he asks, is their purpose? His answer is that they indicate a change in the progress of the war. This change is what he calls the ideologizing of the war. Henceforth Athens supports democracies, Sparta, oligarchies. Henceforth alliances are made with factions not governments. Henceforth factions in the smaller city states can take the initiative in the war by calling in the appropriate superpower. Mytilene, Plataea, and Kerkyra establish this new basis as the rule.<sup>52</sup>

Cogan's thesis hinges upon his observation that before the events of 428/27, Athens had no policy that required her to deal solely with democracies. His basis for this argument is that before 428/27 the Athenians sided with the Kerkyraeans and the oligarchs of Epidamnos against the democrats of Epidamnos, but did not support

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<sup>51</sup>Ibid., 54.

<sup>52</sup>M. Cogan, *The Human Thing: the Speeches and Principles of Thucydides' History* (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1981), 59-60 and 150. For a different view cf. I. A. F. Bruce, "The Corcyraean Civil War of 427 B.C.," *Phoenix* 25 (1971): 108-117 and C. Orwin, "Stasis and Plague: Thucydides on the Dissolution of Society," *Journal of Politics* 50 (1988): 831-47.

any oligarchies after the crucial events of 428/27. Though the argument is clever, it completely obscures the picture.

Athens sides with the pro-democratic party of the Kerkyraeans against the Corinthians, not against the democrats of Epidamnos. Though the conflict at Epidamnos is the cause of the conflict between Kerkyra and Corinth, the defensive alliance Athens concludes with Kerkyra has nothing to do with Epidamnos or with her own policy toward democracies. Athens makes an alliance with Kerkyra because it is expedient to do so. Likewise in the war it is expedient for her to support democracies. If, however, it were advantageous for her to support an oligarchy, I think it certain that she would have done so. Athens' as well as Sparta's shameless currying of Persia both at the beginning of the war and at the end should be sufficient to indicate that both sides were willing to deal with any type of regime that would help them win the war.

Barnard also rejects the moral interpretation of the passage. Barnard writes that "Thucydides' aim was to explain what happened to mind and intellect during stasis, not what happened to ethical values and norms." Barnard's Thucydides is amoral.<sup>53</sup> Ultimately Barnard thinks that in the stasis excursus, Thucydides "greatly exaggerates" the importance of stasis but fails to appreciate factors, such as economic and political equality or class hatred, that a modern historian would emphasize. This failure gives "all his observations about 'the contest for cleverness'

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<sup>53</sup>M. A. Barnard, "Stasis in Thucydides: Narrative and Analysis of Factionalism in the Polis," (Ph.D. diss., UNC at Chapel Hill, 1980), Abstract.

an air of unreality."<sup>54</sup>

Contrary to Cogan and Barnard's denial of the moral content of the passage, when Thucydides writes that neither side strengthened pledges to themselves in accordance with divine custom (*τῷ θείῳ νόμῳ*), when he writes that no one thought with piety (*εὐσεβείᾳ*) or with nobility (*γενναϊότητι*), when he laments the disappearance of simplicity (*τὸ εὔηθεος*), I find it impossible to deny the passage's moral--but not moralizing--tone. But if we accept its moral tone, are we also to accept the thesis of moral degeneration?

Cogan persuasively argues that the Spartans and Athenians are as brutal at the beginning of the war as they are at its end. Cogan draws attention to evidence for Spartan and Athenian brutality from the beginning of the war. He notes that since the war's start, the Spartans had the policy of killing any allied or neutral traders they captured at sea. And in retaliation for this policy, in the second year of the war, the Athenians executed envoys from Corinth, Sparta, and Argos.<sup>55</sup>

Although Cogan's argument is persuasive, again I find it difficult to reject totally the argument that the events of Mytilene, Plataea, and Kerkyra mark a

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<sup>54</sup>Ibid p. 160. Barnard examines Thucydides' view of stasis' causes and effects. He defines the Archaic understanding of stasis, derives a Thucydidean definition of stasis, examines the causes and symptoms of stasis as understood by Thucydides, and finally presents a Thucydidean theory of stasis. To Barnard, III.82-84 gives human nature ("which for Thucydides means ambition, greed and fear") as the principal cause of stasis; the contributing causes are war and stasis itself. III.82-84 seeks to explain what happens to the intellect during stasis; it is not concerned with ethical values and norms. Stasis distorts intelligence in two ways: rash and unthinking action force its disappearance or it becomes perverted to cleverness.

<sup>55</sup>Cogan, *The Human Thing*, 60.

heightening in the prosecution of the war, especially in light of Athens' policy in the Pentekontaetia. During this period Athens does enslave inhabitants, take hostages, tear down walls, and exact tribute. Athens may not be kind to her subjects, but she does not kill all the male and enslave all the female inhabitants of a revolted city-state as she nearly does to Mytilene in 427 and does do to Skione in 421 as well as to Melos in 416/15 (III. 49, V. 32. 1, and V. 116. 4). Thus, though the participants may be as brutal at the beginning of the war as at the end, the war, as Thucydides himself asserts, does seem to have a particularly pernicious effect on them.

Besides showing the degeneration that happens to human nature and society under the pressure of war, III. 82-84 establishes stasis as a major phenomenon of the war. Because stasis afflicted nearly all of Hellas and was a major reason for Athens' defeat,<sup>56</sup> Thucydides treats the phenomenon with special regard.

Furthermore it is my belief that Thucydides pays stasis such regard because he viewed the war itself as a kind of stasis fought by Greeks against Greeks. Thus in Chapter 4, by relating III. 82-84 to the rest of the *History*, I will attempt to show that Thucydides' understanding and interpretation of stasis are similar to his understanding and interpretation of the war in general. For this reason the ideas expressed in III. 82-84 can be used as a key for interpreting the *History*.

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<sup>56</sup>See II. 65.

## CHAPTER 4

### III. 82-84: A KEY FOR UNDERSTANDING THE *HISTORY*

In the previous chapter I explicated the style, structure, meaning, and purpose of III. 82-84. The task now at hand is to relate III. 82-84 to the rest of the *History*. At least one scholar, Proctor, thinks that the reflections in III. 82-84 bear little relation to the rest of the work. Proctor argues that Thucydides wrote his excursus on stasis as a result of the revolution of the Thirty. Thucydides was so moved by the bitter strife of 404-3 that he felt impelled to relate its horrors. Kerkyra's civil strife provided the perfect opportunity for him to relate his feelings. Thus he "duly translated his own reactions to the revolution of the Thirty into reflections on revolution as a general phenomenon of the war, to which, truth to tell, his own record bore very little witness."<sup>1</sup>

Against Proctor, I hold that Thucydides views the war itself as a type of stasis

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<sup>1</sup>D. Proctor, *The Experience of Thucydides* (Warminster, Wilts, England: Aris & Phillips LTD, 1980), 208. Proctor is not alone in thinking that Thucydides wrote the excursus because he was influenced by the reign of the Thirty; G. B. Grundy writes that the chapters were "evidently written under the influence of very strong feeling,--feeling so strong that it can only have been caused by events which appealed to the author in a very intimate and special way. The cruelties of the period of the tyranny of the Thirty, which inflicted a shock upon the Greek world from which it never wholly recovered, may have evoked from the historian this striking description of the effects of *στάσις*." G. B. Grundy, *Thucydides and the History of his Age*, 2d ed. (Oxford: Henderson and Spalding, 1948), 475.

and that his reflections on stasis form part of the basis for his understanding of the war in general. For this reason, I contend that III. 82-84 can be used as a key for understanding the *History*. By tracing stasis' presence and effects in the *History*, I aim to show that Thucydides' reflections on it form part of the basis for his understanding and interpretation of the war, and that Thucydides views the war itself as a type of stasis.

That Thucydides' understanding and interpretation of stasis and of the entire war are similar can be seen most clearly by noting that the ethics that he says take over during stasis are similar to the ethics that he says predominate in the Peloponnesian War. The sum of these ethics is that men value daring, unthinking, reckless, quarrelsome, intimidating action; that they despise prudent, forethinking, intelligent thought; that they lose their regard for laws (*νόμοι*), justice (*δίκη*), kinship (*τὸ ξυγγενές*), pledges (*πίστεις*), peace proposals (*τὰ καλῶς λεγόμενα*), and oaths (*ὄρκοι*); that *εὐσεβεία* (piety), *τὸ εὔηθεος* (simplicity), and *τὸ γενναῖον* (nobility) disappear; that distrust and a desire for personal gain predominate; and that specious words attempt to hide hideous deeds.

At the outset it is important to note that in the *History*, Thucydides makes it clear that stasis need not only be the outbreak of violence that occurs when citizens of an individual city-state struggle for control of its government. As we will see in greater detail later on, just as Hermokrates, in his speech at the congress at Gela in 424, argues that any warring *amongst* city-states in Sicily is stasis (IV. 59-64), so does Thucydides portray the Sicilian War itself as a type of stasis; stasis need not be



confined by the walls of an individual city-state.

Before noting the similarities between the ethics of stasis and those of the war, to show how great a role stasis plays in the war, I will briefly detail the ubiquity of the phenomenon in the *History*.

From the *Archaeologia* through Book VIII, stasis is one of Thucydides' prime concerns. In the *Archaeologia*,<sup>2</sup> Thucydides argues that the Peloponnesian War is the greatest war in Hellas' history. One of the reasons he offers is that in the past Hellas was not stable. In early times, migrations were frequent as were outbreaks of stasis:

διὰ γὰρ ἀρετὴν γῆς αἱ τε δυνάμεις τισὶ μείζους ἐγγιγνόμεναι στάσεις ἐνεποίουν ἐξ ὧν ἐφθείροντο, καὶ ἅμα ὑπὸ ἀλλοφύλων μᾶλλον ἐπεβουλεύοντο.

The goodness of the land favoured the aggrandizement of particular individuals, and thus created faction which proved a fertile source of ruin. It also invited invasion. (trans. Crawley I. 2. 4. 1)

Even after the Trojan War, stasis plagues Hellas:

ἢ τε γὰρ ἀναχώρησις τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἐξ Ἰλίου χρονία γενομένη πολλὰ ἐνεόχμωσε, καὶ στάσεις ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν ὡς ἐπὶ πολὺ ἐγίγνοντο, ἀφ' ὧν ἐκπίπτοντες τὰς πόλεις ἔκτιζον.

The late return of the Hellenes from Ilium caused many revolutions, and factions ensued almost everywhere; and it was the citizens thus driven into exile who founded the cities. (trans. Crawley I. 12. 2. 1)

In Thucydides' argument for the Peloponnesian War's preeminence, stasis is one of the primary obstacles to Hellas' achieving anything of note in her early history.

With the tyrants of Sicily excepted, Thucydides also argues that tyranny was a

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<sup>2</sup>For a thorough treatment of the purpose and meaning of the *Archaeologia*, see R. Connor, *Thucydides* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 20-32.

main reason for Hellas' subsequent failure to achieve any deed worthy of recording (I. 17). It is in this context that Thucydides offers *ἐννομία*<sup>3</sup> (good government) as the prime reason for Sparta's defeat of Athens:

*ἡ γὰρ Λακεδαιμίων μετὰ τὴν κτίσιν τῶν νῦν ἐνοικοῦντων αὐτὴν Δωριῶν ἐπὶ πλείστον ὧν ἴσμεν χρόνον στασιάσασα ὁμῶς ἐκ παλαιτάτου καὶ ἡννομήθη καὶ αἰεὶ ἀτυράννευτος ἦν· ἔτη γὰρ ἐστὶ μάλιστα τετρακόσια καὶ ὀλίγω πλείω ἐς τὴν τελευτὴν τοῦδε τοῦ πολέμου ἀφ' οὗ Λακεδαιμόνιοι τῇ αὐτῇ πολιτείᾳ χρῶνται, καὶ δι' αὐτὸ δυνάμενοι καὶ τὰ ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις πόλεσι καθίστασαν.*

For this city, though after the settlement of the Dorians, its present inhabitants, it suffered from factions for an unparalleled length of time, still at a very early period obtained good laws, and enjoyed a freedom from tyrants which was unbroken; it has possessed the same form of government for more than four hundred years, reckoning to the end of the late war, and has thus been in a position to arrange the affairs of the other states. (trans. Crawley I. 18. 1. 4)

Just as in Hellas' infancy stasis blocked her growth, so does stasis' absence account for Sparta's victory in the Peloponnesian War.

The obvious obverse of this coin is that stasis' presence is the primary cause for Athens' defeat. At II. 65 Thucydides himself makes this contention:

*ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἡσυχάζοντάς τε καὶ τὸ ναυτικὸν θεραπεύοντας καὶ ἀρχὴν μὴ ἐπικτωμένους ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ μηδὲ τῇ πόλει κινδυνεύοντας ἔφη περιέσεσθαι<sup>4</sup> οἱ*

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<sup>3</sup>Gomme writes that *ἐννομία* implies two things: "a constitutional government (the rule of law, as opposed to the tyrannies, however benevolent) and internal peace, absence of *στάσις*. This is what the Greeks in general, so much given to *στάσις*, admired in Sparta; it does not necessarily mean that they admired the Spartan constitution as such, nor the military mode of life; only that internal peace and the rule of law are things to be desired for their own sake, almost above all else," *A Historical Commentary on Thucydides*, vol. 1 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1945), 128.

<sup>4</sup>Thucydides is of course arguing that had Perikles' policy been followed, Athens would have won the war. Because Thucydides commends Perikles' policy and praises Perikles himself, scholars commonly assume that Perikles' views and Thucydides' are the same. (For this tendency in Thucydidean studies, see Connor,

δὲ ταῦτά τε πάντα ἐς τὸναντίον ἔπραξαν καὶ ἄλλα ἔξω τοῦ πολέμου δοκοῦντα εἶναι κατὰ τὰς ἰδίας φιλοτιμίας καὶ ἴδια κέρδη κακῶς ἐς τε σφᾶς αὐτοὺς καὶ τοὺς ξυμμάχους ἐπολίτευσαν, ἃ κατορθούμενα μὲν τοῖς ἰδιώταις τιμὴ καὶ ὠφελία μᾶλλον ἦν, σφαλέντα δὲ τῇ πόλει ἐς τὸν πόλεμον βλάβη καθίστατο . . . οἱ δὲ ὕστερον ἴσοι μᾶλλον αὐτοὶ πρὸς ἀλλήλους ὄντες καὶ ὀρεγόμενοι τοῦ πρώτου ἕκαστος γίγνεσθαι ἐτρέποντο καθ' ἡδονὰς τῷ δήμῳ καὶ τὰ πράγματα ἐνδιδόναι. ἐξ ὧν ἄλλα τε πολλά, ὡς ἐν μεγάλῃ πόλει καὶ ἀρχὴν ἐχούσῃ, ἡμαρτήθη καὶ ὁ ἐς Σικελίαν πλοῦς, ὃς οὐ τοσοῦτον γνώμης ἀμάρτημα ἦν πρὸς οὗς ἐπήσαν, ὅσον οἱ ἐκπέμψαντες οὐ τὰ πρόσφορα τοῖς οἰχομένοις ἐπιγινώσκοντες, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὰς ἰδίας διαβολὰς περὶ τῆς τοῦ δήμου προστασίας τὰ τε ἐν τῷ στρατοπέδῳ ἀμβλύτερα ἐποίουν καὶ τὰ περὶ τὴν πόλιν πρῶτον ἐν ἀλλήλοις ἐταράχθησαν.<sup>6</sup> σφαλέντες δὲ ἐν Σικελίᾳ ἄλλη

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"A Post Modernist Thucydides?," *The Classical Journal* 72 (1977): 295.) But Thucydides' praising Perikles does not make their views the same. Thucydides praises a number of people in the *History*: Archidamos (I. 79. 2); Themistokles (I. 138. 3), Brasidas (IV. 81. 2-3); Alkibiades (VI. 15. 3-4); Peisistratids (VI. 54. 5); Hermokrates (VI. 72. 2); Phrynichos (VIII. 27. 5); Antiphon (VIII. 68. 1-2); and Theramenes (VIII. 68. 4). If scholars were to equate the viewpoints of all these personages with Thucydides' own, they would err just as much as they do when they equate the views of Perikles and Thucydides. It also does not necessarily follow from Thucydides' declaration that adherence to Perikles' policy would have resulted in victory for Athens that Thucydides himself agrees with the policy. Thucydides may have agreed with Perikles that Athens had to fight Sparta to remain autonomous (I. 140-141. 1), but he certainly makes it clear that he thinks Athens oversteps her bounds when during and after the episode at Pylos she refuses Sparta's peace overtures (IV. 21. 2; 41. 3). Similarly when he states that the executions Athens makes in the affairs of the mutilation of the herms and of the profanation of the mysteries had a salubrious effect on the city, it does not follow that he agrees with such a means (VI. 60. 5). On the contrary the narrative makes it clear that the executions appalled him as I discuss later.

<sup>5</sup>Note that *οἱ δέ* is non-specific and all-encompassing. With this phrase Thucydides condemns Nikias and Alkibiades as well as Kleon. Cf. R. Connor, *Thucydides*, 61 n. 27.

<sup>6</sup>Thucydides' statement that the Sicilian Expedition failed more because of personal machinations at home does not mean he approved of the expedition as J. Finley seems to believe: "he [Thucydides] later says that even the Sicilian expedition was not in itself a mistake." J. Finley, *Thucydides* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1942 repr. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1963), 152. Thucydides clearly thinks the expedition a mistake (*ἡμαρτήθη καὶ ὁ ἐς Σικελίαν πλοῦς*) and another example of Athens' grasping for more (cf. note 4); *οὐ τοσοῦτον . . . ὅσον* does not exclude one reason while emphasizing another, rather it allows for both,

τε παρασκευῆ καὶ τοῦ ναυτικοῦ τῷ πλείονι μορίῳ καὶ κατὰ τὴν πόλιν ἤδη ἐν στάσει ὄντες ὅμως +τρία+ μὲν ἔτη ἀντείχον τοῖς τε πρότερον ὑπάρχουσι πολεμίῳις καὶ τοῖς ἀπὸ Σικελίας μετ' αὐτῶν, καὶ τῶν ξυμμάχων ἔτι τοῖς πλείοσιν ἀφεστηκόσι, Κύρω τε ὕστερον βασιλέως παιδὶ προσγενομένῳ, ὃς παρέιχε χρήματα Πελοποννησίοις ἐς τὸ ναυτικόν, καὶ οὐ πρότερον ἐνέδοσαν ἢ αὐτοῖ ἐν σφίσι κατὰ τὰς ἰδίας διαφορὰς περιπεσόντες ἐσφάλησαν.

He [Perikles] told them to wait quietly, to pay attention to their marine, to attempt no new conquests, and to expose the city to no hazards during the war, and doing this, promised them a favourable result. What they did was the very contrary, allowing private ambitions and private interests, in matters apparently quite foreign to the war, to lead them into projects unjust both to themselves and to their allies--projects whose success would only conduce to the honour and advantage of private persons, and whose failure entailed certain disaster on the country in the war . . . With his successors it was different. More on a level with one another, and each grasping at supremacy, they ended by committing even the conduct of state affairs to the whims of the multitude. This, as might have been expected in a great and sovereign state, produced a host of blunders, and amongst them the Sicilian expedition, though this failed not so much through a miscalculation of the power of those against whom it was sent, as through a fault in the senders in not taking the best measures afterwards to assist those who had gone out, but choosing rather to occupy themselves with private cabals for the leadership of the commons, by which they not only paralysed operations in the field, but also first introduced civil discord at home. Yet after losing most of their fleet besides other forces in Sicily, and with faction already dominant in the city, they could still for three years make head against their original adversaries, joined not only by the Sicilians, but also by their own allies nearly all in revolt, and at last by the king's son, Cyrus, who furnished the funds for the Peloponnesian navy. Nor did they finally succumb till they fell the victims of their own intestine disorders. (trans. Crawley II. 65. 7. 1 and 65. 10-12)

Stasis snatches empire away from Athens as before the Peloponnesian War it did from the Epidamnians (I. 24. 4. 1).

In the beginning of the *History*, Thucydides gives another reason for stasis' importance. At I. 23 Thucydides lists the calamities that make the Peloponnesian War the greatest event in Hellas' history. Among them are exile and murder, caused

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while emphasizing one.

by both war and stasis (I. 23. 2. 5). Because stasis is the primary cause of Athens' defeat, because its absence accounts for Sparta's victory, and because it caused so much destruction throughout Hellas, at the outset of his *History*, Thucydides highlights its importance.

In addition to stasis' prominence in the *Archaeologia*, occurrences of stasis pervade the rest of the *History*. At III. 82. 1 Thucydides says that stasis was so rife in the cities because Hellas was at war:

ἐπεὶ ὕστερόν γε καὶ πᾶν ὡς εἶπείν τὸ Ἑλληνικὸν [ἐν στάσει] ἐκινήθη, διαφορῶν οὐσῶν ἑασταχοῦ τοῖς τε τῶν δῆμων προστάταις τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἐπάγεσθαι καὶ τοῖς ὀλίγοις τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους. καὶ ἐν μὲν εἰρήνῃ οὐκ ἂν ἐχόντων πρόφασιν οὐδ' ἐτοίμων παρακαλεῖν αὐτούς, πολεμουμένων δὲ καὶ ξυμμαχίας ἅμα ἑκατέροις τῇ τῶν ἐναντίων κακώσει καὶ σφίσιν αὐτοῖς ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ προσποιήσει ῥαδίως αἱ ἐπαγωγαὶ τοῖς νεωτερίζειν τι βουλομένοις ἐπορίζοντο.

When later all of Greece, so to speak, was convulsed [in stasis], there were struggles on both sides: the leaders of the people striving to invite in the Athenians and the oligarchs, the Lakedaemonians. For in peace time having no reason, nor being prepared, to call them in . . . but being at war and there being an alliance to each side for the purpose of harming the enemy and likewise benefitting themselves, invitations were readily available to those desiring revolution.

Thucydides' narrative is filled with cities that call upon either the Athenians or the Lakedaemonians to help them expel their political foes. In 429/28 the Athenians expect a pro-Athenian faction within Spartolos in Bottiaea to hand the city over to them, but the opposition party prevents the betrayal (II. 79). The Tenedians, the Methymnians, and a pro-Athenian faction within Mytilene betray to Athens the revolt of the island of Lesbos, except for Methymna. Later, reduced to starvation, the commons of Mytilene threaten to hand over the city to the Athenians unless the

few divvy up the remaining provisions. As a result the leaders come to terms with the Athenians (428/27; III. 27-28). A faction of Kolophonians at Notion calls upon the Athenian Paches' assistance (428/27; III. 34). Stasis at Kerkyra ends in the destruction of the oligarchic faction (427-25; III. 70-84; IV. 46-48). Treachery hands Eion and Anaktorion over to Athens (425; IV. 7; IV. 49). Fearing the return of exiled oligarchs, the Megarian democrats plan to betray their town to the Athenians. The Athenians and the conspirators succeed in capturing Nisaea and the long walls. But Brasidas, commanding the Peloponnesian forces, prevents their taking the city. Consequently Megara's newly formed oligarchic regime executes about 100 of those thought to be most guilty of conspiring with Athens (424; IV. 66-74). Pro-Athenian democrats plot with Demosthenes to betray their Boeotian cities to Athens (424/23; IV. 76-77; 89; 101. 3). At Akanthos stasis erupts over admitting Brasidas into the city (424; IV. 84-88). By offering moderate terms to the faction hostile to him, Brasidas peacefully obtains the surrender of Amphipolis (424/23; IV. 103-106). A pro-Spartan faction betrays Torone to Brasidas (424/23; IV. 110-114). Negotiations take place between Brasidas and Potidaea and Mende for the betrayal of the cities (423; IV. 121). Mende revolts from the Athenians, and Brasidas receives her even though the revolt occurred after the armistice between Athens and Sparta. Later with the help of the democratic faction, Athens regains Mende (423; IV. 123; 130). Brasidas makes an attempt on Potidaea but fails (423; IV. 135). A pro-Spartan faction of the Parrhasians of Arkadia calls upon the Spartans to free them from Mantinean control (421; V. 33). With the help of Sparta, Chios revolts

from Athens but later the demos helps return the city to Athens (413/12-411; VIII. 5. 4-15; 24. 4-6; 31.1; 38). Chalkideus and Alkibiades effect the revolt of Klazomenae from Athens. The Athenians later return the democrats to power. Astyochos orders the pro-Athenian party to depart Klazomenae. They refuse, but Astyochos fails to subdue the town (412/11; VIII. 14. 2-3; 23. 6; 31. 2). Athens supports a democratic uprising at Samos. The Samian demos and Athenian navy successfully defeat a later oligarchic coup (412/11-411/10; VIII. 21; 63. 3; 73; 75. 2-3). Rhodian aristocrats call in the Peloponnesians who persuade the island to revolt from Athens (411; VIII. 44. 1-2). Thasian exiles conspire with the Peloponnesians to cause a revolt from Athens (411; VIII. 64. 3). Originally invited by the Euboeans, the Peloponnesians cause the entire island of Euboea (except for Oreos) to revolt (411; VIII. 5; 95).

Stasis is not confined to cities calling in the Spartans or the Athenians. The war begins with the oligarchic faction at Plataea opening the gates for the Thebans (431; II. 2-6). The Mytilenians unsuccessfully attempt to gain Methymna by treachery (428/27; III. 18). Mytilenian exiles take Antandros by treachery (425/24; IV. 52. 2). By treachery the Boeotians capture Panakton, a fortress on the Athenian border (422; V. 3. 5). As a consequence of an Athenian siege and of treachery, Melos surrenders to Athens (416/15; V. 116. 3). The Thespian demos rises unsuccessfully against those in power (415/14; VI. 95. 2). By treachery the Boeotians take Oropos

(411; VIII. 60. 1).<sup>7</sup>

It is important to note that a fine line separates revolt, *ἀπόστασις*, from stasis, *στάσις*, for in any revolt there is present in the city some faction that disagrees with the dominant party's resolution. When revolt is decided upon, stasis either breaks out or is latent; therefore, *ἀπόστασις* necessarily implies *στάσις*.<sup>8</sup>

For example, stasis breaks out at Mytilene as a result of her desire to revolt from Athens:

Μετὰ δὲ τὴν ἐσβολὴν τῶν Πελοποννησίων εὐθὺς Λέσβος πλὴν Μηθύμνης ἀπέστη ἀπ' Ἀθηναίων, βουλευθέντες μὲν καὶ πρὸ τοῦ πολέμου, ἀλλ' οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι οὐ προσεδέξαντο, ἀναγκασθέντες δὲ καὶ ταύτην τὴν ἀπόστασιν πρότερον ἢ διεννοῦντο ποιήσασθαι. τῶν τε γὰρ λιμένων τὴν χῶσιν καὶ τειχῶν οἰκοδόμησιν καὶ νεῶν ποίησιν ἐπέμενον τελεσθῆναι, καὶ ὅσα ἐκ τοῦ Πόντου ἔδει ἀφικέσθαι, τοξότας τε καὶ σίτον, καὶ ἅ μεταπεμπόμενοι ἦσαν. Τενέδιοι γὰρ

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<sup>7</sup>The brief treatment Thucydides allots the above incidents of stasis exemplifies a characteristic of his methodology. As Rawlings writes:

Thucydides took the trouble to describe in detail the developments at Corcyra and to make at this point in his narrative general remarks on the course of stasis in the cities of Greece because Corcyra was the first of the revolutions that occurred during the war (3.82.1). It could thus be used as an exemplum of stasis generally . . . [III. 82-83] were designed to serve as a description of stasis in the abstract, stasis per se; they serve as an analysis that can safely be applied to the other staseis which occurred during the war as well.

Thus the stasis excursus enables Thucydides to treat in brief other staseis of the war. H. R. Rawlings, *The Structure of Thucydides' History* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981), 212.

<sup>8</sup>This observation may seem to run counter to Thucydides' statement at II. 8. 5: οὕτως <ἐν> ὀργῇ εἶχον οἱ πλείους τοὺς Ἀθηναίους, οἱ μὲν τῆς ἀρχῆς ἀπολυθῆναι βουλόμενοι, οἱ δὲ μὴ ἀρχθῶσι φοβούμενοι (thus the majority held Athens in anger, some desiring to be free from her empire, others fearing lest they be conquered). But it must be stressed that Thucydides is painting with broad brushstrokes and that this stroke does not deny the existence of pro-Athenian sentiment in Hellas as Thucydides narrative makes clear.



ὄντες αὐτοῖς διάφοροι καὶ Μηθυμναῖοι καὶ αὐτῶν Μυτιληναίων ἰδίᾳ ἄνδρες κατὰ στάσιν, πρόξενοι Ἴ�θηναίων, μηνυταὶ γίνονται τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις ὅτι ξυνοικίζουσι τε τὴν Λέσβον ἐς τὴν Μυτιλήνην βία καὶ τὴν παρασκευὴν ἅπασαν μετὰ Λακεδαιμονίων καὶ Βοιωτῶν ξυγγενῶν ὄντων ἐπὶ ἀποστάσει ἐπείγονται· καὶ εἰ μὴ τις προκαταλήφεται ἤδη, στερήσεσθαι αὐτοὺς Λέσβον.

Immediately after the invasion of the Peloponnesians all Lesbos, except Methymna, revolted from the Athenians. The Lesbians had wished to revolt even before the war, but the Lacedaemonians would not receive them; and yet now when they did revolt, they were compelled to do so sooner than they had intended. While they were waiting until the moles for their harbours and the ships and walls that they had in building should be finished, and for the arrival of archers and corn and other things that they were engaged in fetching from the Pontus, the Tenedians, with whom they were at enmity, and the Methymnians, and some factious persons in Mytilene itself, who were *proxeni* of Athens, informed the Athenians that the Mytilenians were forcibly uniting the island under their sovereignty, and that the preparations about which they were so active were all concerted with the Boeotinas their kindred and the Lacedaemonians with a view to a revolt, and that unless they were immediately prevented, Athens would lose Lesbos. (III. 2; trans. Crawley)

At Kerkyra, stasis breaks out because one faction wants to revolt from Athens and join Corinth:

Οἱ γὰρ Κερκυραῖοι ἐστασίαζον, ἐπειδὴ οἱ αἰχμάλωτοι ἦλθον αὐτοῖς οἱ ἐκ τῶν περὶ Ἐπίδαμον νουμαχιῶν ὑπὸ Κορινθίων ἀφεθέντες, τῷ μὲν λόγῳ ὀκτακοσίων ταλάντων τοῖς προξένοις διηγγνημένοι, ἔργῳ δὲ πεπεισμένοι Κορινθίοις Κέρκυραν προσποιῆσαι. καὶ ἔπρασσον οὗτοι, ἕκαστον τῶν πολιτῶν μετιόντες, ὅπως ἀποστήσωσιν Ἀθηναίων τὴν πόλιν.

The Corcyraean revolution began with the return of the prisoners taken in the sea-fights off Epidamnus. These the Corinthians had released, nominally upon the security of eight hundred talents given by their *proxeni*, but in reality upon their engagement to bring over Corcyra to Corinth. These men proceeded to canvass each of the citizens, and to intrigue with the view of detaching the city from Athens. (III. 70. 1; trans. Crawley)

Fearing the return of exiled oligarchs, the Megarian democrats plan to betray their town to the Athenians:

γνόντες δὲ οἱ τοῦ δήμου προστάται οὐ δυνατὸν τὸν δῆμον ἐσόμενον ὑπὸ τῶν κακῶν μετὰ σφῶν καρτερεῖν, ποιοῦνται λόγους δείσαντες πρὸς τοὺς τῶν

*Ἀθηναίων στρατηγούς, Ἴπποκράτη τε τὸν Ἀρίφρωνος καὶ Δημοσθένη τὸν Ἀλκισθένου, βουλόμενοι ἐνδοῦναι τὴν πόλιν καὶ νομίζοντες ἐλάσσω σφίσι τὸν κίνδυνον ἢ τοὺς ἐκπεσόντας ὑπὸ σφῶν κατελθεῖν.*

The leaders of the commons, seeing that the sufferings of the times had tired out the constancy of their supporters, entered in their alarm into correspondence with the Athenian generals, Hippocrates, son of Ariphron, and Demosthenes, son of Alcisthenes, and resolved to betray the town, thinking this less dangerous to themselves than the return of the party which they had banished. (IV. 3; trans. Crawley)

The Athenians and the conspirators succeed in capturing Nisaea and the long walls.

But Brasidas, commanding the Peloponnesian forces, prevents their taking the city.

Consequently Megara's newly formed oligarchic regime executes about 100 of those thought to be most guilty of conspiring with Athens (IV. 66-74).<sup>9</sup>

In addition Thucydides' words at III. 82. 1 also imply revolt:

*ἐπεὶ ὕστερόν γε καὶ πᾶν ὡς εἰπεῖν τὸ Ἑλληνικὸν [ἐν στάσει] ἐκινήθη, διαφορῶν οὐσῶν ἐκασταχοῦ τοῖς τε τῶν δήμων προστάταις τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἐπάγεσθαι καὶ τοῖς ὀλίγοις τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους. καὶ ἐν μὲν εἰρήνῃ οὐκ ἂν ἐχόντων πρόφασιν οὐδ' ἐτοίμων παρακαλεῖν αὐτούς, πολεμουμένων δὲ καὶ ξυμμαχίας ἅμα ἐκατέροις τῇ τῶν ἐναντίων κακώσει καὶ σφίσι αὐτοῖς ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ προσποιήσει ῥαδίως αἱ ἐπαγωγαὶ τοῖς νεωτερίζειν τι βουλομένοις ἐπορίζοντο.*

When later all of Greece, so to speak, was convulsed [in stasis], there were struggles on both sides: the leaders of the people striving to invite in the Athenians and the oligarchs, the Lakedaemonians. For in peace time having no reason, nor being prepared, to call them in . . . but being at war and there being an alliance to each side for the purpose of harming the enemy and likewise benefitting themselves, invitations were readily available to those desiring revolution.

The above shows the fine distinction there is between *ἀπόστασις* and *στάσις*,

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<sup>9</sup>See also: Samos (I. 115-17); Akanthos (IV. 84-88); Amphipolis (IV. 103-106); (Mende (IV. 123; .130); Argos (V. 76-84; 116; VI. 7. 1; VI. 61. 3); Messene (VI. 74. 1); Chios (VIII. 5; .24; .31; .38); and Samos (VIII. 21; .63 .3; .73; .75).

the important place stasis occupied in Thucydides' mind, and the many occurrences of stasis during the war. If, however, Thucydides confined himself only to noting the occurrences of stasis and only to stressing stasis' prominence in Hellas' early history, Proctor would be justified in his assertion that Thucydides' record bears little witness to his reflections on stasis, but Thucydides does not. Thucydides is careful to note the presence of stasis and its ethics at Sparta and at Athens, and he details the course stasis runs during the oligarchic coup of 411 at Athens. In addition the near dissolution of the Peloponnesian League during the Peace of Nikias; the dissension among the members of the League in Book VIII; and the Sicilian account are events portrayed by Thucydides as indicative of stasis and its ethics.

### SICILY

Before Athens' fateful expedition to Sicily, war plagues the island. The Syrakusans and, excepting Kamarina, the other Dorian cities are waging war against the Leontines, the Chalkidian (i.e., Ionian) cities, and Dorian Kamarina. In 427 the Leontines send an embassy to ask Athens for her assistance. The Athenians send 20 ships under the command of Laches (III. 86). In 426 the Athenians decide to send 40 more ships to Sicily and to replace Laches with Pythodoros. Taking a few ships, Pythodoros embarks for Sicily with Sophokles and Eurymedon to follow with the rest of the armament (III. 115).

The events of Pylos intervene and it is not until after the end of the stasis at Kerkyra that Sophokles and Eurymedon sail for Sicily (IV. 48. 6). In the meantime Athenian forces continue to support the Leontines and their allies against Syrakuse

and hers (IV. 24-25). In 424 Kamarina and Gela make peace. Subsequently the rest of the warring Sicilian states meet at Gela to discuss ending hostilities. It is at this congress that Hermokrates, a Syrakusan, makes a pan-Sikeliot plea for peace. He considers the war a kind of national stasis that threatens to destroy the island's autonomy.

Exhorting the cities of Sicily to make peace, Hermokrates argues that unless Sicily unites against Athens, Athens will subjugate a divided island (IV. 60. 1). He argues that civil strife will be her death:

*[χρῆ] νομίσει τε στάσιν μάλιστα φθείρειν τὰς πόλεις καὶ τὴν Σικελίαν, ἧς γε οἱ ἔνοικοι ξόμπαντες μὲν ἐπιβουλεύομεθα, κατὰ πόλεις δὲ διέσταμεν.*

and we should understand that the intestine discords which are so fatal to communities generally, will be equally so to Sicily, if we, its inhabitants, absorbed in our local quarrels, neglect the common enemy. (trans. Crawley IV. 61. 1)

Later in his speech he appeals to the various cities to unite together given that they are neighbors, they inhabit one land, are surrounded by one sea, and share the common name, Sikeliotics (IV. 64. 3). For the most part Hermokrates' pan-Sikeliot plea succeeds. Barring the exceptions that follow, Sicily does unite against Athens.

Ironically, after the peace of Gela, stasis, supported by Syrakuse, destroys the city of the Leontines. Leontine oligarchs call in the Syrakusans and expel the demos for wishing to redistribute the land. The Leontine oligarchs destroy the city and go to live at Syrakuse (V. 4). When Athens hears what has happened, she sends Phaeax to stir up support for the Leontine democrats against Syrakuse. The embassy fails (V. 4-5).

Also, for a time, civil strife places Messene in the hands of the Lokrians (422; V. 5). Later, in 415/14, after the Athenian expedition arrives at Sicily, a pro-Athenian faction is to betray Messene to Athens. But the recalled Alkibiades forestalls the plot by communicating it to Messene's pro-Syrakusan faction (VI. 74. 1).

In addition, at the outset of the Sicilian expedition, Katane refuses admittance to the Athenians because of the presence of a pro-Syrakusan faction. They do allow the generals to come in and speak, and while Alkibiades is speaking, the army forcibly enters the town. The Syrakusan faction flees, and the rest vote for an alliance with Athens (VI. 50. 3-51. 2). Finally, the pro-Athenian faction at Akragas drives out the party friendly to the Syrakusans (VII. 46 and 50. 1).

But as I indicate above, these incidents of stasis are exceptions. Except for the important cities of Leontini, Akragas, Naxos, and Katane, all Greek Sicily unites with Syrakuse for the defense of the island. Of course the barbarian Egestans support Athens, for their embassy of 416, asking for help in their dispute with Selinos and Syrakuse, provides Athens with her pretext for intervening. And some of the barbarian Sikels also support Athens.

In this cursory summation of the actual and near outbreaks of stasis that Sicily suffered, it has perhaps come clear that against Hermokrates' plea for unity, Athens' strategy is to stir up revolution. In his speech of 415, Alkibiades argues that Sicily is stasis-torn. He says that:

(1) the cities of Sicily easily change their constitutions (*αἱ πόλεις καὶ ῥαδίας ἔχουσι τῶν πολιτῶν τὰς μεταβολὰς καὶ ἐπιδοχάς*)

(2) no one fights for his fatherland or obeys its laws, but because each one, taking from the state by persuasive words or stasis, thinks that if he is unsuccessful he can live elsewhere, persuasion and stasis are his shield and spear (*καὶ οὐδεὶς δι' αὐτὸ ὡς περὶ οἰκείας πατρίδος οὔτε τὰ περὶ τὸ σῶμα ὄπλοις ἐξήρτυται οὔτε τὰ ἐν τῇ χώρᾳ νομίμοις κατασκευαῖς· ὅτι δὲ ἕκαστος ἢ ἐκ τοῦ λέγων πείθειν οἴεται ἢ στασιάζων ἀπὸ τοῦ κοινοῦ λαβὼν ἄλλην γῆν, μὴ κατορθώσας, οἰκήσειν, ταῦτα ἐτοιμάζεται*)

and

(3) the Sikeliots are not likely to follow one plan or to act in concert, but will probably yield to an agreeable offer especially if they are in stasis as is said (*καὶ οὐκ εἰκὸς τὸν τοιοῦτον ὁμιλον οὔτε λόγον μιᾶ γνώμῃ ἀκροᾶσθαι οὔτε ἐς τὰ ἔργα κοινῶς τρέπεσθαι· ταχὺ δ' ἂν ὡς ἕκαστοι, εἴ τι καθ' ἡδονὴν λέγοιτο, προσχωροῖεν, ἄλλως τε καὶ εἰ στασιάζουσιν, ὥσπερ πυνθανόμεθα*). (VI. 2-4)

As Thucydides does in his stasis excursus (III. 82. 2. 5), Alkibiades switches from the collective action of cities to the individual maneuverings of its citizens, and as Thucydides does, Alkibiades stresses lawlessness (III. 84. 2-3), the reign of persuasive rhetoric (III. 82. 8. 13), the struggle for personal glory at the expense of the state (III. 82. 8), and the readiness to accept whatever is pleasurable (*ἡδονή*) (III. 82. 8. 10). Besides the irony of Alkibiades' speaking these words, this speech's echoing of Thucydides' reflections in III. 82-84 gives the reader the basis by which he is to understand the conflict.

Alkibiades' speech also serves other thematic purposes. It shows what could have happened had Sicily not had so prudent and effective a statesman as Hermokrates, and what still might have happened, Hermokrates notwithstanding, had Alkibiades not been recalled. (Would Alkibiades' personality and persuasive rhetoric have been strong enough to overcome those of Hermokrates?) And it looks forward to Alkibiades' own machinations for power (hence the irony) and to the part

they play in Athens' downfall.

Finally the speech foreshadows what direction Alkibiades' plan for subduing Sicily will take. Having arrived at Sicily, Nikias, Alkibiades, and Lamachos give their opinions concerning what plan they are to follow. Nikias suggests settling matters between the Egestaeans and Selinuntines, making a display of Athens' power to the other cities, and then sailing home (VI. 47). Alkibiades suggests sending heralds to gain support, fomenting revolution between the Sikels and Syrakuse, gaining the friendship of others, and taking control of the Messinese, whose position in the passage and entrance to Sicily would provide an excellent harbor and base for their army.

Alkibiades' plan is the opposite of Hermokrates'. Alkibiades wishes to divide Sicily first and then to attack Syrakuse and Selinos. In short his policy is one of stasis (VI. 48). Though he suggests that they attack Syrakuse immediately while the city is unprepared and while fear of the armament is at its height, Lamachos votes for Alkibiades' plan (VI. 49). Although Alkibiades is recalled, Nikias adopts the policy of stasis. Later, after the disastrous attack on Epipolae in 413 when Demosthenes is urging complete withdrawal, partially because of a fifth column in Syrakuse, Nikias argues for remaining and pressing the siege (VII. 48). In addition, at VII. 55. 2. 4, Thucydides ascribes part of the despondency of the troops to their failure to win allies by causing civil strife (*οὐ δυνάμενοι ἐπενεγκεῖν οὔτ' ἐκ πολιτείας τι μεταβολῆς τὸ διάφορον αὐτοῖς, ᾧ προσήγοντο ἄν*). Thus, in strategy, the war in Sicily can be seen as a type of stasis with the Sicilians struggling to

maintain unity and the Athenians trying to foment discord.

Thucydides' catalogue of allies before the battle in the Great Harbor further supports the idea that the Sicilian war is a type of stasis. Thucydides' opening words make clear the system by which he orders the catalogue:

*οὐ κατὰ δίκην τι μᾶλλον οὐδὲ κατὰ ξυγγένειαν μετ' ἀλλήλων στάντες, ἀλλ' ὡς ἐκάστοις τῆς ξυντυχίας ἢ κατὰ το ξυμφέρον ἢ ἀνάγκη ἔσχευ.*

right or community of blood was not the bond of union between them, so much as interest or compulsion as the case might be. (trans. Crawley VII. 1. 3).

Expedience or force not justice or kinship rules.

Because the Ionian Athenians willingly go against Dorian Syracuse ('*Ἀθηναῖοι μὲν αὐτοῖ Ἴωνες ἐπὶ Δωριᾶς Συρακοσίους ἐκόντες ἦλθον*), they do so out of expediency not compulsion. Speaking the same tongue and using the same *νόμοι*, the Lemnians, Imbrians, and Aeginetans, all Athenian colonists, come along. The Ionian subjects are the Eretrians, Chalkidians, Styrians, and Karystians from Euboea; from the islands are the Keians, Andrians, and Tenians; and from Ionia are the Milesians, Samians, and Chians. All except the Chians, who are autonomous, come under compulsion.

Other subjects coming under compulsion are the Aeolians: Methymnians, Tenedians, and Aenians. Out of hatred come the Plataeans. Notice how by his word order Thucydides stresses that blood fought against blood:

*οὗτοι δὲ Αἰολῆς Αἰολεῦσιν τοῖς κτίσασι Βοιωτοῖς <τοῖς> μετὰ Συρακοσίων κατ' ἀνάγκην ἐμάχοντο, Πλαταιῆς δὲ καταντικρὸν Βοιωτοῖ Βοιωτοῖς μόνου εἰκότως κατὰ τὸ ἔχθος.*

These Aeolians fought against their Aeolian founders, the Boeotians in the Syracusan army, because they were obliged, while the Plataeans, the only



native Boeotians opposed to Boeotians, did so upon a just quarrel. (trans. Crawley VII. 5. 2)

*Αιολῆς* strikes against *Αιολεῦσιν* and *Βοιωτοὶ* against *Βοιωτοῖς*. The catalogue continues in this vein with Thucydides emphasizing kinship and compulsion. Dorian Rhodians are forced to fight against Dorian Syrakusans and the Geloans, colonists from their city. Dorian Kytherians, colonists from Sparta, fight against Sparta (VII. 57. 6). Athens' control of the sea forces the participation of the Kephallenians and Zakynthians, though they are autonomous (VII. 57. 7. 1). Nominally forced, but more out of hatred for Korinth, the Kerkyraeans fight against their metropolis Korinth and their relatives, the Syrakusans (VII. 57. 7. 4). The Messenians come under force (VII. 57. 8). Megarian exiles fight against the Megarian Selinuntines (VII. 8. 3).

The rest come along more of their own accord. Hatred of Sparta and desire for personal gain lead Dorian Argos to fight alongside Ionian Athens against her Dorian brethren (VII. 57. 9). Profit (*κέρδος*) makes the Mantineans and other mercenaries from Arkadia believe the enemy is their fellow Arkadians, who are fighting along with the Korinthians (VII. 9. 5). For pay the Kretans willingly fight against, not alongside of, their colonists who founded Gela along with the Rhodians (VII. 57. 9. 9). The Akarnanians come for pay but also out of friendship for Demosthenes and out of goodwill to the Athenians (VII. 57. 10).

Of the Italians, civil strife forces the Thourians and Metapontians to join Athens. The Sicilian Naxians and the Katanians fight with Athens as well as most of the barbarian Sikels and the barbarian Egestaeans, who invited Athens to Sicily (VII.

57. 11). Finally Athens has on her side some Tyrrhenian enemies of Syrakuse and Iapygian mercenaries.

Dorian, autonomous, and Greek are the Syrakusans, the Kamarinaeans, the Geloans, the Selinuntines, and the Himeraeans (VII. 58. 1). Syrakuse has on her side those of the Sikels who did not go over to Athens (VII. 58. 3. 3). The Spartans provide a general, some Neodamodes (freedmen), and Helots (VII. 58. 3. 4). Korinth, with ships and infantry, the Leukadians, and the Ambrakiotes come on account of kinship (VII. 58. 3. 7). Arkadian mercenaries, paid by Korinth, come, and under compulsion come the Sikyonians. Finally the Boeotians also join in (VII. 58. 3. 10).

Many insights can be gleaned from this catalogue. Expediency, compulsion, and kinship order the arrangement. Kinship of course suggests that the battle and war are a type of stasis, with kinsmen killing kinsmen. The reason for this murder (*φόνος*) is either profit (*κέρδος*, i.e., expediency) or compulsion (*ἀνάγκη*). Of the Athenian allies only the Plataeans and Akarnanians act for reasons other than these.

Expediency, compulsion, and kinship are also three of the main aspects of Thucydides' stasis excursus. Men work for private gain regardless of the public cost (III. 82. 8). War assimilates to present circumstances the tempers of the majority (III. 82. 2. 8). And kinship is more alien than partisanship (III. 82. 6. 1).

It is also significant that of the Syrakusans and their allies the vast majority fights not for gain or under compulsion but for autonomy and of its own free will. Thus the catalogue suggests that the Athenian loss is in part attributable to the

effects of stasis and that the Syrakusans win because they are, for the most part, free of these effects. Finally, I think it no mistake that in his summary of this event, Thucydides writes,

*ξυνέβη τε ἔργον τοῦτο [Ἑλληνικὸν]<sup>10</sup> τῶν κατὰ τὸν πόλεμον τόνδε μέγιστον γενέσθαι, δοκεῖν δ' ἔμοιγε καὶ ὧν ἀκοῇ Ἑλληνικῶν ἴσμεν, καὶ τοῖς τε κρατήσασι λαμπρότατον καὶ τοῖς διαφθαρείσι δυστυχέστατον*

This was the greatest Hellenic achievement of any in this war, or, in my opinion, in Hellenic history; it was at once most glorious to the victors, and most calamitous to the conquered. (trans. Crawley VII. 87. 5)

I think it safe, then, to conclude that stasis plays a prominent role in the Sicilian Expedition and that Thucydides views this war as a type of stasis. But stasis' time on stage is not limited to the Sicilian act. Thucydides shows that stasis and its ethics are present even in Sparta. In addition, it is my belief that Thucydides portrays the near breakup of the Peloponnesian League during the Peace of Nikias--and to a lesser degree the dissension present in the League in Book VIII--in terms of stasis and its ethics. Thus stasis nearly destroys the Peloponnesian League and with it Sparta's preeminence in Hellas. Finally, as a result of the coup of 411, stasis almost destroys Athens' empire.

## **SPARTA**

At the first congress of Sparta, in 432, after the Corinthians and Athenians have spoken, Archidamos, king of the Spartans, steps forward and urges the Spartans not to declare war hastily but to consider the magnitude of the war and to take two to three years to prepare for the coming struggle (I. 80-85). Though he has

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<sup>10</sup>Secl. Krüger.

had experience of many wars and of the suffering that walks hand and hand with them, it is no surprise that the Spartans reject Archidamos' advice for Sthenelaedas' simple, straightforward, and thoughtless exhortation for war.<sup>11</sup> In the excursus section on virtues and vices, Thucydides deplores this very replacement of prudent thought by unthinking, daring action.

Later when the Peloponnesians first invade Attika (431), Archidamos suffers public censure because his tarrying on the Isthmus, his slow marching into Attika, and his delaying at Oenoe are thought to be evidence of Athenian sympathies. His motivation is said to be his thinking that the Athenians would submit rather than allow their land to be ravaged (II. 18). But his failure to act quickly, or rather his desire to act prudently, nearly convict him of treason. Though Sparta's *ἐννομία* wins the war, it does so at great cost, and not even Sparta is free from the ethics that take over in wartime.

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<sup>11</sup>The Spartans' choice brings to mind the words of Chief Seattle to Governor Isaac Stevens:

Youth is impulsive. When our young men grow angry at some real or imaginary wrong, and disfigure their faces with black paint, it denotes that their hearts are black, and then they are often cruel and relentless, and our old men and old women are unable to restrain them. Thus it has ever been. Thus it was when the white men first began to push our forefathers further westward. But let us hope that the hostilities between us may never return. We would have everything to lose and nothing to gain. Revenge by young men is considered gain, even at the cost of their own lives, but old men who stay at home in times of war, and mothers who have sons to lose, know better.

Chief Seattle, "Address," in *The Norton Reader: An Anthology of Expository Prose*, general editor, Arthur M. Eastman, 7th ed. (New York and London: W. W. Norton & Company, 1988), 693-4.

At the end of ten years' fighting, Sparta's reputation is at an all time low. In fact since the disaster of Pylos (425/24), Sparta has feared civil strife:

*φοβούμενοι μὴ σφίσι νεώτερόν τι γένηται τῶν περὶ τὴν κατάστασιν.*

they lived in constant fear of internal revolution. (trans. Crawley IV. 55. 1)

Far from being formidable, Sparta's reputation is at its nadir and to boot she is despised (*ὑπερώφθη*):

*κατὰ γὰρ τὸν χρόνον τοῦτον ἢ τε Λακεδαίμων μάλιστα δὴ κακῶς ἤκουσε καὶ ὑπερώφθη διὰ τὰς ξυμφοράς, οἳ τε Ἄργεῖοι ἄριστα ἔσχον τοῖς πάσιν, οὐ ξυναράμενοι τοῦ Ἀττικοῦ πολέμου, ἀμφοτέροις δὲ μᾶλλον ἔνοσπονδοι ὄντες ἐκκαρπώσάμενοι.*

For at this time Lacedaemon had sunk very low in public estimation because of her disasters, while the Argives were in a most flourishing condition, having taken no part in the Attic war, but having on the contrary profited largely by their neutrality. (trans. Crawley V. 28. 2. 5)

In addition to her fear of internal strife, Sparta is faced with dissension amongst the members of the Peloponnesians League.

### **PELOPONNESIAN LEAGUE**

As a result of Sparta's humbling and miffed at her treaty and subsequent alliance with Athens, the Corinthians propose to the Argives that they pass a decree inviting any independent Hellenic state to make a defensive alliance with them (V. 27). Needing little coaxing because they wish to challenge Sparta for the supremacy of the Peloponnese, the Argives accept the proposal:

*ἔδέξαντό τε ταῦτα οἳ Ἄργεῖοι μᾶλλον ὁρῶντες τὸν τε Λακεδαιμονίων σφίσι πόλεμον ἐσόμενον (ἐπ' ἐξόδῳ γὰρ πρὸς αὐτοὺς αἱ σπονδαὶ ἦσαν) καὶ ἅμα ἐλπίσαντες τῆς Πελοποννήσου ἠγήσεσθαι·*

Argos came into the plan the more readily because she saw that war with Lacedaemon was inevitable, her truce with her being on the point of expiring,

and also because she hoped to gain the supremacy of Peloponnese. (trans. Crawley V. 28. 2)

After the Corinthian offer to Argos (V. 27), the Mantineans and their allies join the Argive alliance (V. 29). Having made a separate alliance with Korinth, the Eleians join the Argives (V. 31). Next the Korinthians and Chalkidians of Thrace join (V. 31). The Boeotians and Megarians remain undecided (V. 31). Tegea refuses to join (V. 32). The Boeotians and the Megarians refuse to join Argos' alliance (V. 38). This breaking up of the Peloponnesian League and Korinth's invitation to Argos to take over control are directly analogous to Thucydides' description of stasis as pro-Spartan or pro-Athenian factions inviting Sparta or Athens to help them gain control of the polis.

An uprising by any one of the factional city-states, Korinth, Boeotia, Elis, or Megara, is particularly imminent. Each is a threat to Sparta's supremacy of the Peloponnese. In addition, Korinth's soliciting Argos to challenge Sparta further threatens this supremacy. The entire narrative, (V. 16-83), exemplifies the political maneuvering for power and the disregard for treaties that are present during stasis. And it is for these two reasons that I think Thucydides intended this section to be understood in terms of stasis and its ethics.

In addition, it is not until Sparta quashes the rebellion with force that the rapid changing of alliances ceases.<sup>12</sup> Having defeated the Argives and their League (V. 57) in 418/17 at the battle of Mantinea, the Spartans regain their former esteem (V.

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<sup>12</sup>Cf. III. 82. 7.

75). Consequently, the Argives and Mantineans come to terms with Sparta (V. 76; V. 81). Nonetheless, during the seeming Peace of Nikias, stasis is a battle away from dissolving the Peloponnesian League and destroying Sparta's preeminence. Sparta's victory at Mantinea saves the League from dissolution and her from ignominy. By winning the battle, Sparta avoids stasis, and throughout the war, she continues to do so. But Book V shows how insidious a force stasis is.<sup>13</sup> Even Sparta nearly breaks under her pressure.

In Book VIII stasis again threatens the Peloponnesian League. In part the dissension among the Peloponnesians is the result of Alkibiades' advising Tissaphernes to let the Athenians and Peloponnesians wear one another out so that neither would be strong enough to threaten his empire (VIII. 45-46).

Two means of achieving this end that Tissaphernes seems to have followed are his dropping the pay to the Peloponnesian soldiers from a drachma to three obols and dispensing it irregularly and his failure to bring his Phoenician fleet to aid them. As a result the soldiers of the Peloponnesian League become irritated and clamor for engaging the enemy in a decisive battle (VIII. 78). Their dissatisfaction with Tissaphernes they direct against the Spartan admiral Astyochos whom they believe to be in cahoots with Tissaphernes for private gain (VIII. 83. 3).

Anger reaches the point that Astyochos, responding brashly to Dorieus' demand for his soldiers' pay and threatening him with his baton, barely avoids the soldiers' rush by taking refuge at an altar (VIII. 84). Sparta replaces Astyochos with

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<sup>13</sup>As does Book VIII, treated in detail below.

Mindaros and, by so doing, avoids stasis once again (VIII. 85. 1).

### ATHENS

Though Sparta avoids stasis, Athens does not. In 458/57 the Spartans assist Doris, their original homeland, in her struggle against the Phokians. Having compelled the Phokians to come to terms, the Spartans consider what route to take home. Sailing across the Gulf of Krisa seems unsafe as does the route across Gerancia, since the Athenians hold Megara and Pegae. The Spartans decide to remain in Boeotia and deliberate further, especially because a fifth column in Athens has been secretly conspiring with them to demolish the democracy and to end the construction of the long walls (I. 107).

Although nothing comes of the plot, the seeds of stasis have been sown in the reader's mind, and upon them the rays of Thucydides' comments at II. 65 shine strongly. The next instance of stasis' existence in Athens occurs in 431 when King Archidamos first invades Attika. Archidamos encamps upon and specifically ravages Acharnae.<sup>14</sup> His hope is that Athens will engage in battle. But if she does not, he hopes that having lost their land and, therefore, being less willing to risk themselves for their neighbors' land, the Acharnians will engender civil strife in Athens (II. 20. 4). Were it not for Perikles' supreme control, Archidamos' plan might have succeeded (II. 21).

For clearer instances of stasis at Athens we turn to Books VI-VIII. Before

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<sup>14</sup>Acharnae was the largest of Athens' demes and provided a significant number of hoplites to the Athenian infantry (II. 19. 2 and II. 20. 4).



urging the Athenians to embark on the Sicilian Expedition of 415, Alkibiades<sup>15</sup> is introduced as being at odds with Nicias and being desirous of private gain and glory:

*βουλόμενος τῷ τε Νικίᾳ ἐναντιοῦσθαι, ὧν καὶ ἐς τὰλλα διάφορος τὰ πολιτικὰ καὶ ὅτι αὐτοῦ διαβόλως ἐμνήσθη, καὶ μάλιστα στρατηγήσθαι τε ἐπιθυμῶν καὶ ἐλπίζων Σικελίαν τε δι' αὐτοῦ καὶ Καρχηδόνα λήψεσθαι καὶ τὰ ἴδια ἅμα εὐτυχήσας χρήμασί τε καὶ δόξῃ ὠφελήσειν.*

wishing to thwart Nicias both as his political opponent and also because of the attack he had made upon him in his speech, and who was, besides, exceedingly ambitious of a command by which he hoped to reduce Sicily and Carthage, and personally to gain in wealth and reputation by means of his successes. (trans. Crawley VI. 15. 2. 2)

Thucydides' emphasis on Alkibiades' personal dispute with Nicias and on his desire for personal gain and glory convict him of behavior that helps cause stasis.<sup>16</sup>

Thucydides explicitly condemns him when he writes that his desires being greater than his means most of all destroyed Athens:

*ὧν γὰρ ἐν ἀξιώματι ὑπὸ τῶν ἀστῶν, ταῖς ἐπιθυμίαις μείζουσιν ἢ κατὰ τὴν ὑπάρχουσαν οὐσίαν ἐχρήτο ἔς τε τὰς ἵπποτροφίας καὶ τὰς ἄλλας δαπάνας ὅπερ καὶ καθείλεν ὕστερον τὴν τῶν Ἀθηναίων πόλιν οὐχ ἥκιστα.*

For the position he held among the citizens led him to indulge his tastes beyond what his real means would bear, both in keeping horses and in the rest of his expenditure; and this later on had not a little to do with the ruin of the

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<sup>15</sup>As is the rule in Thucydidean studies, scholars are directly opposed in their estimation of Alkibiades' character in the *History*. J. Finley takes a negative stance on Alkibiades' character, (*Thucydides*, 218-20); conversely R. Connor thinks that Alkibiades' "extravagances and ambition are not the problem," but the city's "inappropriate response to him," (*Thucydides*, 164). As I argue in the text the important distinction is between Alkibiades' dangerous personal actions and desires but excellent statesmanship and his rivals' just as dangerous personal actions and desires but inferior statesmanship.

<sup>16</sup>See III. 82. 8.

Athenian state. (trans Crawley VI. 15. 3)

This last statement requires more comment, for Thucydides' next statement seems to shift the blame from Alkibiades to the *hoi polloi*:

*φοβηθέντες γὰρ αὐτοῦ οἱ πολλοὶ τὸ μέγεθος τῆς τε κατὰ τὸ ἑαυτοῦ σῶμα παρανομίας ἐς τὴν δίαιταν καὶ τῆς διανοίας ὧν καθ' ἕνα ἕκαστον ἐν ᾧ γίγνεται ἔπρασσαν, ὡς τυραννίδος ἐπιθυμοῦντι πολέμιοι καθέστασαν, καὶ δημοσίᾳ κράτιστα διαθέντι τὰ τοῦ πολέμου ἰδίᾳ ἕκαστοι τοῖς ἐπιτηδεύμασιν αὐτοῦ ἀχθεσθέντες, καὶ ἄλλοις ἐπιτρέψαντες, οὐ διὰ μακροῦ ἔσφηλαν τὴν πόλιν.<sup>17</sup>*

Alarmed at the greatness both of his license in his own life and habits and of the ambition which he showed in all things soever that he undertook, the mass of the people set him down as a pretender to the tyranny, and became his enemies; and although publicly his conduct of the war was as good as could be desired, individually, his habits gave offence to everyone, and caused them to commit affairs to other hands, and thus before long to ruin the city. (trans. Crawley VI. 15. 4)

I have quoted these passages because they are essential to any interpretation of *History*. Besides stasis in general, whom does Thucydides hold responsible for Athens' demise, Alkibiades, the Athenian demos, or both?

I do not think there is a clearcut answer. On the one hand, Thucydides shows throughout the *History* that the personal motives that impel Alkibiades are the ones that lead to stasis, but he also recognizes Alkibiades' strong and effective leadership. On the other hand, he condemns the just as personal motives of Alkibiades' enemies

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<sup>17</sup>Scholars disagree as to whether *ὅπερ καὶ καθείλεν* from the quote above and *οὐ διὰ μακροῦ ἔσφηλαν τὴν πόλιν* refer to Athens' defeat at the hands of the Syrakusans in 413 or to her defeat at the hands of Sparta in 404 or the first to her defeat in 404; the second to her defeat in 413. Because of *οὐ διὰ μακροῦ*, I incline toward the last understanding. For a different view, see Gomme, Andrewes, and Dover, *A Historical Commentary on Thucydides*, vol. 4 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1970), 242-45.

and their inferior statesmanship. If there is any answer to Thucydides' thoughts on the enigmatic Alkibiades, I think it must be the one put into Aeschylus' mouth by Aristophanes at the end of the *Frogs*:

[Οὐ χρὴ λέοντος σκύμνον ἐν πόλει τρέφειν.]  
 Μάλιστα μὲν λέοντα μὴ 'ν πόλει τρέφειν  
 ἦν δ' ἔκτραφῆ τις, τοῖς τρόποις ὑπηρετεῖν.

[A lion's cub must not be reared in the city.]  
 A lion must not be reared in the city  
 but if one is, submit to his ways. (1431 a & b-1432)

That Thucydides thinks the political maneuverings of Alkibiades' enemies stasis-causing comes clear in his narrative on the mutilation of the herms<sup>18</sup> (VI. 27-28; 53; 60-61) and in his Harmodios and Aristogeiton excursus (VI. 53-59).

On the eve of the Sicilian Expedition the herms are mutilated.<sup>19</sup> This mutilation is taken as ominous for the expedition and as part of a plot to destroy the demos:

τοῦ τε γὰρ ἔκπλου οἰωνὸς ἐδόκει εἶναι καὶ ἐπὶ ξηνωμοσίᾳ ἅμα νεωτέρων  
 πραγμάτων καὶ δῆμον καταλύσεως γεγενῆσθαι.

as it was thought to be ominous for the expedition, and part of a conspiracy to bring about a revolution and to upset the democracy. (trans. Crawley VI. 27. 3)

Some metics and slaves give testimony not concerning the mutilation of the herms

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<sup>18</sup>The herms were marble or bronze pillars with human head and phallus and sacred to the god Hermes, *The Oxford Classical Dictionary*, ed. N.G.L. Hammond and H.H. Scullard, 2d ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1970), 505.

<sup>19</sup>For a thorough discussion on the mutilation of the herms and profanation of the mysteries, see Gomme, Andrewes, and Dover, *A Historical Commentary on Thucydides*, 264-88.

but concerning the profanation of the mysteries,<sup>20</sup> and Alkibiades is implicated in this charge (VI. 28). Concerning these events Thucydides is clear on two things: one, it was never found out for certain who the guilty parties were and, two, Alkibiades' enemies took hold of the charge to discredit him and thereby to obtain their own unhindered control of the people (VI. 60. 5 and VI. 28. 2):

*κάν τούτω οἱ μὲν παθόντες ἄδηλον ἦν εἰ ἀδίκως ἐτετιμώρητο, ἢ μέντοι ἄλλη πόλις ἐν τῷ παρόντι<sup>21</sup> περιφανῶς ὠφέλητο*

In this it was, after all, not clear whether the sufferers had been punished unjustly, while in any case the rest of the city received immediate and manifest relief. (trans Crawley)

and

*ὧν καὶ τὸν Ἄλκιβιάδην ἐπητιῶντο. καὶ ἀντὰ ὑπολαμβάνοντες οἱ μάλιστα τῷ Ἄλκιβιάδῃ ἀχθόμενοι ἐμποδῶν ὄντι σφίσι μὴ αὐτοῖς τοῦ δήμου βεβαίως προεστάναι, καὶ νομίσαντες, εἰ αὐτὸν ἐξελάσειαν, πρῶτοι ἂν εἶναι*

Alcibiades being implicated in this charge, it was taken hold of by those who could least endure him because he stood in the way of their obtaining the undisturbed direction of the people, and who thought that if he were once removed the first place would be theirs. (trans Crawley)

Their conniving brings to mind Thucydides' words of III. 82. 8. 10:

*καὶ ἢ μετὰ ψήφον ἀδίκου καταγνώσεως ἢ χειρὶ κτώμενοι τὸ κρατεῖν*

acquiring power either with the condemnation of an unjust vote or by force.

Alkibiades offers to stand trial before embarking on the expedition, but afraid that with the army's support Alkibiades would be acquitted, his enemies have the

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<sup>20</sup>For another ancient account of the profanation of the mysteries, see Andokides, *Περὶ τῶν μυστηρίων*.

<sup>21</sup>*ἐν τῷ παρόντι*: the importance of this phrase cannot be overemphasized.

trial put off. Their plan is to have him brought home from Sicily upon some graver charge (VI. 29).

Hence it happens that the *Salaminia*, Athens' official ship, arrives at Sicily and charges Alkibiades and others with the profanation of the mysteries and the mutilation of the herms (VI. 53. 1). Of this recall Thucydides writes:

*οἱ γὰρ Ἀθηναῖοι, ἐπειδὴ ἡ στρατιὰ ἀπέπλευσεν, οὐδὲν ἦσσαν ζήτησιν ἐποιοῦντο τῶν περὶ τὰ μυστήρια καὶ τῶν περὶ τοὺς Ἑρμᾶς δρασθέντων, καὶ οὐ δοκιμάζοντες τοὺς μνηστᾶς, ἀλλὰ πάντα ὑπόπτως ἀποδεχόμενοι, διὰ πονηρῶν ἀνθρώπων πίστιν πάνυ χρηστοὺς τῶν πολιτῶν ξυλλαμβάνοντες κατέδουν, χρησιμώτερον ἡγούμενοι εἶναι βασανίσαι τὸ πρᾶγμα καὶ εὐρεῖν ἢ διὰ μνηστοῦ πονηρίαν τινὰ καὶ χρηστοῦν δοκοῦντα εἶναι αἰτιαθέντα ἀνέλεγκτον διαφυγεῖν.*

For the Athenians, after the departure of the expedition, had continued as active as ever in investigating the facts of the mysteries and of the Hermae, and, instead of testing the informers, in their suspicious temper welcomed all indifferently, arresting and imprisoning the best citizens upon the evidence of rascals, and preferring to sift the matter to the bottom sooner than to let an accused person of good character pass unquestioned, owing to the rascality of the informer. (trans. Crawley VI. 53. 2)

It is worthwhile, I believe, to compare these words of Thucydides with those he writes about Sparta's investigation into Pausanias' despotic conduct, some 50 years earlier.<sup>22</sup>

Sparta recalls Pausanias twice. On his first recall the charge was that he was acting more as a tyrant than a general (478; I. 95. 3).<sup>23</sup> Having been acquitted,

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<sup>22</sup>In 479 Pausanias was instrumental in defeating the Persians at the Battle of Plataea (I. 130. 1). Recalled twice by Sparta for acting like a tyrant, he is starved to death by the Spartans for having plotted a helot revolt (I. 131-134).

<sup>23</sup>Pausanias was the head of the allied Greek forces, who were attacking various cities of the Persian Empire (I. 94-95).

Pausanias leaves Sparta without orders, again behaves as if clad in royal purple, and again Sparta recalls him (c. 470; I. 131. 1). Thucydides says that Sparta's suspicion of Pausanias is based on four things: Pausanias' contempt of the laws; his imitation of the barbarians; his attributing the defeat of the Medes to himself on the tripod that was dedicated to Delphian Apollo; and his intrigue with the Helots (I. 132. 2-4).

These suspicions notwithstanding, the Spartans distrust even the information concerning the last which they received from the Helots, their reason being that they did not have indisputable proof. Although admitting her great suspicion, Thucydides emphasizes Sparta's lack of tangible evidence against Pausanias:

*ἀλλ' οὐδ' ὡς οὐδὲ τῶν Εἰλώτων μηνυταῖς τισὶ πιστεύσαντες ἠξίωσαν νεώτερόν τι ποιεῖν ἐς αὐτόν, χρώμενοι τῷ τρόπῳ ἧπερ εἰώθασιν ἐς σφᾶς αὐτούς, μὴ ταχεῖς εἶναι περὶ ἀνδρὸς Σπαρτιάτου ἀνευ ἀναμφισβητήτων τεκμηρίων βουλευσαί τι ἀνήκεστον,*

Even now, mistrusting the evidence even of the Helots themselves, the ephors would not consent to take any decided step against him, in accordance with their regular custom towards themselves, namely, to be slow in taking any irrevocable resolve in the matter of a Spartan citizen, without indisputable proof. (trans Crawley I. 132. 5).

When one compares these reflections of Thucydides with what he says concerning the Athenian investigation, his disgust becomes all the more apparent.

It is in the suspicious context of the mutilation of the herms that Thucydides relates the events of Harmodios and Aristogeiton.<sup>24</sup> At least part of his reason for this excursus is to show how uncritically most Athenians accept past events. His

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<sup>24</sup>For a thorough explication of some of the other strands interwoven in this excursus, see H. P. Stahl, *Thukydides: Die Stellung des Menschen im geschichtlichen Prozeß* (Munich: Beck, 1966), 1-11.

point, of course, is that just as they are lax concerning the truth of the past so they are lax in determining the truth of present events. Just how critical Thucydides is of their indolence becomes apparent when the Spartan investigation of Pausanias is compared with the Athenian condemnation of Alkibiades.

As well as showing how uncritically the Athenians accept the past, the Harmodios and Aristogeiton excursus is intended, I think, to show how great is the Athenian demos' (irrational?) fear and suspicion of tyranny and oligarchy (VI. 53. 3). Since the Athenians considered the profanation of the mysteries and the mutilation of the herms part of an oligarchical and tyrannical conspiracy (*[ὁ δῆμος] ὑπόπτῆς ἐς τοὺς περὶ τῶν μυστικῶν τὴν αἰτίαν λαβόντας, καὶ πάντα αὐτοῖς ἐδόκει ἐπὶ ξυνωμοσίᾳ ὀλιγαρχικῇ καὶ τυραννικῇ πεπραῆχθαι*, VI. 60. 1), the excursus helps explain how the execution of many prominent Athenians could have occurred without any tangible proof.

If, however, the only conclusion to be drawn from all this is that the Athenians are uncritical about the past and are suspicious of tyranny and oligarchy, Thucydides' efforts are but sound and fury. But when one sees that the motives behind the Athenian investigation are driven in part by Alkibiades' enemies' wish to get rid of him and to gain control of the demos for themselves, then the whole clarifies into a picture of the seeds of stasis and its ethics firmly taking root in the city of Athens, and a fuller understanding of Thucydides' words at II. 65 is obtained.

When we turn our attention to the Athenians' motives for undertaking the

Sicilian Expedition, the picture is further clarified. Thucydides' words introducing this section are ominous:

*τοῦ δ' αὐτοῦ χειμῶνος Ἀθηναῖοι ἐβούλοντο αὐθις μείζονι παρασκευῇ τῆς μετὰ Λάχητος καὶ Εὐρυμέδοντος ἐπὶ Σικελίαν πλεύσαντες καταστρέψασθαι, εἰ δύναιτο, ἅπειροι οἱ πολλοὶ ὄντες τοῦ μεγέθους τῆς νήσου καὶ τῶν ἐνοικούντων τοῦ πλήθους καὶ Ἑλλήνων καὶ Βαρβάρων, καὶ ὅτι οὐ πολλῶ τινὶ ὑποδέεστερον πόλεμον ἀνηροῦντο ἢ τον πρὸς Πελοποννησίους.*

The same winter the Athenians resolved to sail again to Sicily, with a greater armament than that under Laches and Eurymedon, and, if possible, to conquer the island, most of them being ignorant of its size and of the number of its inhabitants, Hellenic and barbarian, and of the fact that they were undertaking a war not much inferior to that against the Peloponnesians. (trans. Crawley VI. 1)

The general mindset of the Athenians is one of ignorant daring. This daring, I believe, indicates that the ethics that are becoming prevalent in Athens are the ethics of stasis that Thucydides details at III. 82. 4-6, where mad daring replaces prudent thought. All points of the compass are pointing toward doom, doom for the expedition and doom for the city. Stasis' ethics, of course, provide the ship. To emphasize the magnitude of Sicily and Athens' ignorance of it, Thucydides spends four chapters listing Sicily's Greek and Barbarian inhabitants (VI. 2-5).<sup>25</sup>

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<sup>25</sup>On Thucydides' excursus on the inhabitants of Sicily, Andrewes and Dover write that as elsewhere "Thucydides digresses in order to correct inaccuracies in published works (cf. i. 97. 2 on the Pentekontaetia) and tradition (cf. vi. 54. 1) or in order to give his readers interesting material which they are unlikely to find elsewhere (e.g. ii. 97, on Thrace; 96 is in substance, though not in form, a part of this digression)" (*A Historical Commentary*, vol. 4, 198). On the contrary Thucydides does not include material merely to correct inaccuracies or merely to give his readers "interesting material." While correcting inaccuracies, the Pentekontaetia shows the growing power of Athens and thus lends support to Thucydides' ἀληθεστάτη πρόφασις; correcting inaccuracies as well, the excursus on Harmodios and Aristogeiton evidences Athens' indolence concerning the truth of both past and present events, helps explain why the murder of so many prominent



In addition to her ignorance, Athens' reasons for wishing to conquer Sicily are purely ones of personal greed, also indicative of stasis. I explained above the personal motives Alkibiades has for wishing to undertake the expedition, and those of Athens are kith and kin. Thucydides writes that the desire for sailing fell upon everyone:

*καὶ ἔρωσ ἐνέπεσε τοῖς πᾶσιν ὁμοίως ἐκπλεῦσαι· τοῖς μὲν γὰρ πρεσβυτέροις ὡς ἢ καταστρεφόμενοις ἐφ' ἃ ἔπλεον ἢ οὐδὲν ἂν σφαλεῖσαν μεγάλην δύναμιν, τοῖς δ' ἐν τῇ ἡλικίᾳ τῆς τε ἀπούσης πόθῳ ὄψεως καὶ θεωρίας, καὶ εὐέλπιδες ὄντες σωθήσεσθαι· ὁ δὲ πολὺς ὄμιλος καὶ στρατιώτης ἔν τε τῷ παρόντι ἀργύριον οἴσειν καὶ προσκτήσεσθαι δύναμιν ὅθεν αἰδίον μισθοφορὰν ὑπάρξειν.*

All alike fell in love with the enterprise. The older men thought that they would either subdue the places against which they were to sail, or at all events, with so large a force, meet with no disaster; those in the prime of life felt a longing for foreign sights and spectacles, and had no doubt that they would come safe home again; and the idea of the common people and the soldiery was to earn wages at the moment, and make conquests that would supply a never-ending fund of pay for the future. (trans. Crawley VI. 24. 3).

That this is not a blissful and innocent *ἔρωσ* (desire), the next sentence, striking like a squall, makes clear:

*ὥστε διὰ τὴν ἄγαν τῶν πλεόνων ἐπιθυμίαν, εἴ τῳ ἄρα καὶ μὴ ἤρεσκε, δεδιῶς μὴ ἀντιχειροτονῶν κακόνους δόξειεν εἶναι τῇ πόλει ἡσυχίαν ἦγεν.*

With this enthusiasm of the majority, the few that liked it not, feared to appear unpatriotic by holding up their hands against it, and so kept quiet. (trans. Crawley VI. 24. 4).

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Athenian citizens could have happened, and most importantly shows that an ethic of stasis predominates in Athens; the paragraphs on Thrace are necessary because Thucydides thinks it of utmost importance to know the nature and the resources of the players in the *History*. His emphasis on the great resources of Sitalkes' empire, second only to the Skythians, implies that had the Athenians joined him with their fleet, as they had planned, they could have strengthened their interests in Thrace (II. 96-101).

Echoing Thucydides' observation that the troublemaker is always trusted, his ginsayer suspect (καὶ ὁ μὲν χαλεπαίνων πιστὸς αἰεὶ, ὁ δ' ἀντιλέγων ἀντὶ ὑποπτος III. 82. 5), this sentence clearly indicates that an ethic of stasis has taken hold in Athens and of course presages the disaster at Syrakuse and those of 411 and 404. In addition, if Cornford is correct in *Thucydides Mythistoricus*, Thucydides is alluding to the words Aeschylus has Klytaemestra speak on the return of the conquering army from Troy:<sup>26</sup>

\*Ἔρωσ δὲ μὴ τις πρότερον ἐπίπτῃ στρατῶ  
πορθεῖν ἅ μὴ χρῆ κέρδεσιν νικωμένους  
δεῖ γὰρ πρὸς οἶκον νοστήμον σωτηρίας  
κάμψαι διαύλον Θάτερον κῶλον πάλιν.

May no passion fall before upon the host  
To sack what is forbidden bested by greed;  
For a safe return home  
they have half their race yet to run. (341-44)

One final comment on the Sicilian Expedition is required. At II. 65. 11

Thucydides attributes the disaster at Sicily mainly to stasis at Athens:

ἐξ ὧν ἄλλα τε πολλά, ὡς ἐν μεγάλῃ πόλει καὶ ἀρχὴν ἐχούσῃ, ἡμαρτήθη καὶ ὁ  
ἐς Σικελίαν πλοῦς, ὃς οὐ τοσοῦτον γνώμης ἀμάρτημα ἦν πρὸς οὓς ἐπῆσαν,  
ὅσον οἱ ἐκπέμψαντες οὐ τὰ πρόσφορα τοῖς οἰχομένοις ἐπιγιγνώσκοντες,<sup>27</sup>

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<sup>26</sup>F. M. Cornford, *Thucydides Mythistoricus* (first publ. by Edward Arnold, Ltd., 1907; reprint, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1971), 214.

<sup>27</sup>This statement may perplex the reader of Books VI and VII because in relating the Sicilian expedition, nowhere does Thucydides say or show that the leaders at home failed to send the army the necessary supplies. In fact the Athenians prepare and send off an armament even greater than the conservative estimates of Nikias, (compare VI. 25 with VI. 43), and in response to Nikias' fateful letter of 414/13 requesting reinforcements, they send an armament nearly equal in size to the first (VII. 42. 1-2). What then does Thucydides mean by the words, ὅσον οἱ ἐκπέμψαντες οὐ τὰ πρόσφορα τοῖς οἰχομένοις ἐπιγιγνώσκοντες? It seems τὰ

ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὰς ἰδίας διαβολὰς περὶ τῆς τοῦ δήμου προστασίας τὰ τε ἐν τῷ στρατοπέδῳ ἀμβλύτερα ἐποίουν καὶ τὰ περὶ τὴν πόλιν πρῶτον ἐν ἀλλήλοις ἐταράχθησαν. σφαλέντες δὲ ἐν Σικελίᾳ ἄλλη τε παρασκευὴ καὶ τοῦ ναυτικοῦ τῷ πλέονι μορίῳ καὶ κατὰ τὴν πόλιν ἤδη ἐν στάσει ὄντες ὁμως +τρία+<sup>28</sup> μὲν ἔτη ἀντείχον τοῖς τε πρότερον ὑπάρχουσι πολεμίοις καὶ τοῖς ἀπὸ Σικελίας μετ' αὐτῶν, καὶ τῶν ξυμμάχων ἔτι τοῖς πλέοσιν ἀφεστηκόσι, Κύρῳ τε ὕστερον βασιλέως παιδὶ προσγενομένῳ, ὃς παρέιχε χρήματα Πελοποννησίοις ἐς τὸ ναυτικόν, καὶ οὐ πρότερον ἐνέδοσαν ἢ αὐτοὶ ἐν σφίσι κατὰ τὰς ἰδίας διαφορὰς περιπεσόντες ἐσφάλησαν.

This [committing the conduct of state affairs to the whims of the multitude], as might have been expected in a great and sovereign state, produced a host of blunders, and amongst them the Sicilian expedition, though this failed not so

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*πρόσφορα* cannot refer to supplies as Arnold argues, "the words οὐ τὰ πρόσφορα τοῖς οἰχομένοις ἐπιγιγνώσκοντες signify not voting afterwards the needful supplies to their absent armament," but must mean *suitable* or *fitting*. Arnold,

ΘΟΥΚΥΔΙΔΗΣ: *The History of The Peloponnesian War by Thucydides* (London: Whittaker and Co., 1882), 276. In fact the next part of the sentence supports this contention:

ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὰς ἰδίας διαβολὰς περὶ τῆς τοῦ δήμου προστασίας τὰ τε ἐν τῷ στρατοπέδῳ ἀμβλύτερα ἐποίουν καὶ τὰ περὶ τὴν πόλιν πρῶτον ἐν ἀλλήλοις ἐταράχθησαν.

For a similar use of *πρόσφορα* meaning *suitable* or *fitting*, compare VII. 62. 2: καὶ γὰρ τοξόται πολλοὶ καὶ ἀκοντισταὶ ἐπιβήσονται καὶ ὄχλος, ᾧ ναυμαχίαν μὲν ποιούμενοι ἐν πελάγει οὐκ ἂν ἐχρώμεθα διὰ τὸ βλάπτειν ἂν τὸ τῆς ἐπιστήμης τῆ βαρύτητι τῶν νεῶν, ἐν δὲ τῇ ἐνθάδε ἠναγκασμένη ἀπὸ τῶν νεῶν πεζομαχίᾳ πρόσφορα ἔσται (compare also, I. 125. 2. 3 and II. 46. 1. 2). For a similar interpretation of *πρόσφορα*, see: Poppo/Stahl, *Thucydides de Bello Peloponnesiaco Libri Octo* (Leipzig: 1889; reprint, New York and London: Garland Publishing, INC., 1987), 147.

I cannot resist noticing that Nikias' reliance on numbers, instead of on skill, by which Athens' navy surpasses all others, dooms the upcoming naumachia.

<sup>28</sup>Whether Thucydides is referring to the events of Sicily or those of 411 depends upon the phrase ἤδη ἐν στάσει ὄντες ὁμως +τρία+. Classen/Steup and Gomme think the former and posit an ὀκτώ. J. Classen and J. Steup, *Thucydides* (Berlin: Wiedmann, 1892-1922), 177-78. A. W. Gomme, *A Historical Commentary on Thucydides*, 5 vols. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1945-1981), 196-97. Thucydides' description of the politics at Athens in terms of stasis and its ethics lends support to this view.

much through a miscalculation of the power of those against whom it was sent, as through a fault in the senders in not taking the best measures afterwards to assist those who had gone out, but choosing rather to occupy themselves with private cabals for the leadership of the commons, by which they not only paralysed operations in the field, but also first introduced civil discord at home. Yet after losing most of their fleet besides other forces in Sicily and with faction already dominant in the city, they could still for three years make head against their original adversaries, joined not only by the Sicilians, but also by their own allies nearly all in revolt, and at last by the king's son, Cyrus, who furnished the funds for the Peloponnesian navy. Nor did they finally succumb till they fell the victims of their own intestine disorders. (trans. Crawley II. 65. 7. 1 and 65. 10-12)

It is a striving for control of the demos (i.e., stasis) that Thucydides holds responsible for the disaster in Sicily. This striving can refer to at least two events: the recall of Alcibiades by his political enemies (VI. 28-29) and Athens' failure to accept the request to be relieved of command made by Nicias, the reluctant and physically ill leader of the expedition (414/13; VII. 10-17).<sup>29</sup>

Although we do not have Thucydides' account of the last seven years of the war, which include the disaster of Aegospotami and Athens' subsequent capitulation

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<sup>29</sup>L. Pearson thinks that the narrative of the Sicilian Expedition "is not written in such a way as to bear out his [Thucydides'] remark in 2.65 that the Athenians failed to support the expedition adequately after starting it on its course. When the Athenians recall Alcibiades they are not represented as withdrawing support from the expedition and the failure of Nicias to act decisively is not blamed on the political atmosphere in Athens." L. Pearson, "Thucydides as Reporter and Critic," *Transactions of the American Philological Association* 78 (1947): 50-51. Pearson fails to appreciate the significance of these two events, both of which indicate that stasis has taken hold in Athens and show Athens' poor decision-making and both of which are a result of the political atmosphere in Athens. For more extreme corroboration of my view, see W. E. Thompson, "Thucydides 2.65.11," *Historia* 20 (1971): 141-54. For a middle-of-the-road interpretation, see H. D. Westlake, "Thucydides 2. 65. 11," *Classical Quarterly* 52 (1958): 102-10.

to Sparta, we do have his account of the events surrounding the stasis of 411,<sup>30</sup> which strongly marks the predominance of an ethic of stasis at Athens.

The events leading up to the stasis of 411 begin in this same year when Alkibiades, with the aim of being recalled by the Athenians, begins to advise Tissaphernes that the Athenians would be better allies than the Spartans (VIII. 46 and 47). Alkibiades sends word to the Athenians at Samos that if there were an oligarchy at Athens, he would be able to procure for them the help of Tissaphernes, Darios' satrap.

All those in power at Samos except Phrynichos accept Alkibiades' proposals and prepare to send an embassy led by Peisandros to persuade Athens (VIII. 48-49). By representing Tissaphernes as Athens' only hope of safety, Peisandros obtains the acquiescence of the Athenian demos, and the democracy is abolished (VIII. 54 and 63).

The public cry of the oligarchs is that only persons serving in the war are to receive pay and that only five thousand able in person and in purse are to serve in the government. In reality only the heads of the revolution actually serve (VIII. 66. 1). Because of its language and its depiction of Athens' condition at this critical moment, it is worth quoting Chapter 66 in full:

*ἦν δὲ τοῦτο εὐπρεπὲς πρὸς τοὺς πλείους, ἐπεὶ ἔξειν γε τὴν πόλιν οἵπερ καὶ μεθίστασαν ἔμελλον. δῆμος μέντοι ὁμῶς ἔτι καὶ βουλὴ ἢ ἀπὸ τοῦ κνάμου ξυνελέγετο· ἐβούλεον δὲ οὐδὲν ὅτι μὴ τοῖς ξυνεστῶσι δοκοίη, ἀλλὰ καὶ οἱ*

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<sup>30</sup>For a discussion of other possible accounts concerning these events, see Gomme, Andrewes, and Dover, *A Historical Commentary on Thucydides*, vol. 5, 184-256.

λέγοντες ἐκ τούτων ἦσαν καὶ τὰ ῥηθησόμενα πρότερον αὐτοῖς προύσκεπτο. ἀντέλεγέ τε οὐδείς ἔτι τῶν ἄλλων, δεδιὼς καὶ ὀρῶν πολὺ τὸ ξυνεστηκός· εἰ δέ τις καὶ ἀντίποι, εὐθὺς ἐκ τρόπον τινὸς ἐπιτηδείον ἐτεθνήκει, καὶ τῶν δρασάντων οὔτε ζήτησις οὔτ' εἰ ὑποπεύοιντο δικαίωσις ἐγίγνετο, ἀλλ' ἡσυχίαν εἶχεν ὁ δῆμος καὶ κατάπληξιν τοιαύτην ὥστε κέρδος ὁ μὴ πάσχων τι βίαιον, εἰ καὶ σιγῶν, ἐνόμιζεν. καὶ τὸ ξυνεστηκὸς πολὺ πλεόν ἡγούμενοι εἶναι ἢ ὅσον ἐτύγχανεν ὃν ἡσῶντο ταῖς γνώμαις, καὶ ἐξευρεῖν αὐτὸ ἀδύνατοι ὄντες διὰ τὸ μέγεθος τῆς πόλεως καὶ διὰ τὴν ἀλλήλων ἀγνωσίαν οὐκ εἶχον [αὐτοὶ ἐξευρεῖν]. κατὰ δὲ ταῦτο τοῦτο καὶ προσολοφύρασθαί τιμι ἀγανακτήσαντα, ὥστε ἀμύνασθαι ἐπιβουλεύσαντα, ἀδύνατον ἦν· ἢ γὰρ ἀγνώτα ἂν ἦνεν ὧ ἐρεῖ ἢ γνώριμον ἄπιστον. ἀλλήλοις γὰρ ἅπαντες ὑπόπτως προσῆσαν οἱ τοῦ δήμου, ὡς μετέχοντά τινα τῶν γιγνομένων. ἐνήσαν γὰρ καὶ οὐδ' ἂν ποτέ τις ᾤετο ἐς ὀλιγαρχίαν τραπέσθαι· καὶ τὸ ἄπιστον οὗτοι μέγιστον πρὸς τοὺς πολλοὺς ἐποίησαν καὶ πλείστα ἐς τὴν τῶν ὀλίγων ἀσφάλειαν ὠφέλησαν, βέβαιον τὴν ἀπιστίαν τῷ δήμῳ πρὸς ἑαυτὸν καταστήσαντες.

But this was a mere catchword for the multitude, as the authors of the revolution were really to govern. However, the assembly and the council of the bean still met notwithstanding, although they discussed nothing that was not approved of by the conspirators, who both supplied the speakers and reviewed in advance what they were to say. Fear, and the sight of the numbers of the conspirators, closed the mouths of the rest; and if anyone ventured to rise in opposition, he was presently put to death in some convenient way, and there was neither search for the murderers nor justice to be had against them if suspected; but the people remained motionless, being so thoroughly cowed that men thought themselves lucky to escape violence, even when they held their tongues. An exaggerated belief in the numbers of the conspirators also demoralized the people, rendered helpless by the magnitude of the city, and by their want of intelligence with each other, and being without means of finding out what those numbers really were. For the same reason it was impossible for anyone to open his grief to a neighbour and to concert measures to defend himself, as he would have had to speak either to one whom he did not know, or whom he knew but did not trust. Indeed all the popular party approached each other with suspicion, each thinking his neighbour concerned in what was going on, the conspirators having in their ranks persons whom no one could ever have believed capable of joining an oligarchy; and these it was who made the many so suspicious, and so helped to procure impunity for the few, by confirming the commons in their mistrust of one another. (trans. Crawley)

In this paragraph echoes of III. 82-84 abound. At III. 82. 8. 12 piety

disappears and fair-seeming words prevail: ὥστε εὐσεβεία μὲν οὐδέτεροι ἐνόμιζον,

*εὐπρεπεία δὲ λόγον οἷς ξυμβαίη ἐπιφθόνως τι διαπράξασθαι ἄμεινον ἤκουον.* Here the oligarchs make oligarchy *εὐπρεπής* by asserting that the Five Thousand will share in the government. Surpassing the suspicion of III. 82. 5 (*καὶ ὁ μὲν χαλεπαίνων πιστὸς αἰεὶ, ὁ δ' ἀντιλέγων αὐτῷ ὑποπτος*), here murder and fear of death do away with any opposition. The disappearance of justice that Thucydides notes at III. 82. 8. 9 and III. 84. 3 manifests itself here in the wanton impunity of murderers. Because not suffering prevails over trust (*κρείσσους δὲ ὄντες ἅπαντες λογισμῷ ἐς τὸ ἀνέλπιστον τοῦ βεβαίου μὴ παθεῖν μᾶλλον προσκόπονν ἢ πιστεῦσαι ἐδύναντο*), Thucydides says that the stasis-plagued city becomes a battlefield of distrust: *τὸ δὲ ἀντιτετάχθαι ἀλλήλοις τῇ γνώμῃ ἀπίστως ἐπὶ πολὺ διήνεγκεν* (III. 83. 1-2). Here also not suffering is gain; distrust, survival. Chapter 66 clearly marks the blossoming of civil strife and its ethics at Athens.

Ironically Samos, the birthplace of the oligarchy, becomes the base for the democrats violently opposed to the government at home. When some three hundred Samians, whom Peisandros won over to oligarchy, decide to put down the democracy at Samos, Leon and Diomedon, Phrynichos' replacements and unwilling supporters of the oligarchy, along with Thrasyboulos, Thrasyllus, and the Athenian soldiery, come to the people's aid, put down the coup, and establish Samos as their democratic base (VIII. 73). Echoing III. 82 . 8 (*πάντων δ' αὐτῶν αἴτιον ἀρχὴ ἢ διὰ πλεονεξίαν καὶ φιλοτιμίαν, ἐκ δ' αὐτῶν καὶ ἐς τὸ φιλονικεῖν καθισταμένων τὸ πρόθυμον*), Thucydides writes:

*ἐς φιλονικίαν τε καθέστασαν τὸν χρόνον τοῦτον οἱ μὲν τὴν πόλιν ἀναγκάζοντες δημοκρατεῖσθαι, οἱ δὲ τὸ στρατόπεδον ὀλιγαρχεῖσθαι.*

The struggle now was between the army trying to force a democracy upon the city, and the Four Hundred an oligarchy upon the camp. (trans. Crawley VIII. 76. 1)

Stasis' stormy sea separates the two factions of Athens.

The Athenians at Samos recall Alkibiades and elect him general (VIII. 81-82).

Subsequently Alkibiades with difficulty overcomes the prevailing sentiment of the camp and prevents its sailing against the Peiraeus. To the envoys from Athens who had come to Samos to explain the situation at Athens and to allay concerns, Alkibiades proposes that the Four Hundred be deposed and that the Five Thousand rule along with Kleisthenes' Council of Five Hundred (VIII. 86).

At Athens moderate oligarchs like Theramenes and Aristokrates welcome Alkibiades' proposals, their real reasons, as Thucydides writes, being their distrust of the stability of the oligarchy and their desire to be the sole leaders of the commons:

*ἦν δὲ τοῦτο μὲν σχῆμα πολιτικὸν τοῦ λόγου αὐτοῖς, κατ' ἰδίας δὲ φιλοτιμίας οἱ πολλοὶ αὐτῶν τῷ τοιοῦτῳ προσέκειντο, ἐν ᾧ καὶ μάλιστα ὀλιγαρχία ἐκ δημοκρατίας γενομένη ἀπόλλυται· πάντες γὰρ ἀθημερὸν ἀξιοῦσιν οὐχ ὅπως ἴσοι, ἀλλὰ καὶ πολὺν πρῶτος αὐτὸς ἕκαστος εἶναι· ἐκ δὲ δημοκρατίας αἰρέσεως γιγνομένης ῥᾶν τὰ ἀποβαίνοντα ὡς οὐκ ἀπὸ τῶν ὁμοίων ἐλασσόμενός τις φέρει.*

But this was merely their political cry, most of them being driven by private ambition into the line of conduct so surely fatal to oligarchies that arise out of democracies. For all at once pretend to be not only equals but each the chief and master of his fellows; however under a democracy a disappointed candidate accepts his defeat more easily, because he has not the humiliation of being beaten by his equals. (trans. Crawley VIII. 89. 3)

In addition to these fair-seeming words that reign in stasis, the metaphor of the contest that Thucydides uses in III. 82 surfaces again here:



*ἠγωνίζετο οὖν εἰς ἕκαστος αὐτὸς πρῶτος προστάτης τοῦ δήμου γενέσθαι.*

and it was now a race between them as to which should first become the leader of the commons. (trans. Crawley VIII. 89. 4. 4)

As a result of this contention, the oligarchs split into two camps: moderates like Theramenes and Aristokrates who wish the Five Thousand to rule, and extremists like Phrynichos, Aristarchos, Peisandros, and Antiphon, who are most opposed to democracy.

The extremists work posthaste on building a wall in Eetionia, a mole of Peiraeus. Theramenes rightly avers that the purpose of the wall is not to prevent the democrats at Samos from storming the Peiraeus but to welcome the fleet and army of the enemy (VIII. 90-91). The mindset of the extremists is that they want oligarchy and empire above all. Their second preference is independence with ships and walls, and finally rather than see democracy restored and their lives forfeited, they would invite in the enemy, make peace, and give up the walls and ships (VIII. 91. 3).

As the building of the wall continues, 42 Peloponnesian ships sailing for Euboea anchor at Epidaurus and overrun Aegina (VIII. 91 and 92). Theramenes and Aristokrates realize that unless they act the extremists will invite the enemy in. And so after many seditious words and suspicions (*πολλῶν καὶ στασιωτικῶν λόγων καὶ ὑποψιῶν προσγενομένων*), Aristokrates, a taxiarch, along with the hoplites who were building the wall in Eetionia, arrests the general Alexikles, an extreme oligarch. Moving inside the mind of the two parties, Thucydides paints a picture of confusion:

*ἦν δὲ θόρυβος πολὺς καὶ ἐκπληκτικός· οἱ τε γὰρ ἐν τῷ ἄστει ἤδη ᾤοντο τὸν τε*

Πειραιᾶ κατειλήφθαι καὶ τὸν ξυνειλημμένον τεθνάναι, οἳ τε ἐν τῷ Πειραιεῖ τοὺς ἐκ τοῦ ἄστεως ὅσον οὐπω ἐπὶ σφᾶς παρῆναι.

All was now panic and confusion. Those in the city imagined that Piraeus was already taken and the prisoner put to death, while those in Piraeus expected every moment to be attacked by the party in the city. (trans. Crawley VIII. 92. 7)

Only by the intervention of the older men and by Thucydides, a Pharsalian *proxenos*, throwing himself between the two and reminding them of the enemy's presence, are the rival factions kept from engaging one another (VIII. 92. 8).

The city quiets and readies itself for protecting Euboea from the Peloponnesians. But the Peloponnesians easily defeat the hastily embarked and poorly prepared Athenians ships and effect Euboea's revolt (VIII. 95). Thucydides writes that if the Spartans had followed up this victory by sailing against the Peiraeus, they could easily have increased dissension in Athens and taken control of the whole of Athens' empire. True to their slow and undaring character, however, the Spartans prove themselves the most convenient of foes (VIII. 96. 4-5). This first instance of clear stasis at Athens nearly undoes her, and indeed should have, had the Spartan character been less conservative.

Athens' sobering defeat gives the advantage to the moderate oligarchs. The Athenians depose the 400 and hand over control of the city to the Five Thousand, the government that Thucydides praises as the best of his time for its moderate combination of the concerns of the few and the many.<sup>31</sup> The Athenians also vote to

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<sup>31</sup>καὶ οὐχ ἥκιστα δὴ τὸν πρῶτον χρόνον ἐπὶ γε ἐμοῦ Ἴθηναῖοι φαίνονται εὖ πολιτεύσαντες (for the first time in my lifetime the Athenians were especially well governed (VIII. 97. 2). This statement of Thucydides has been the focus of much

recall Alkibiades (VIII. 97). Of the extremists, Peisandros and Alexikles withdraw to Dekeleia. Aristarchos makes good his escape by going to Oenoe, an Athenian fort besieged by the Boeotians, and by tricking the Athenians into surrendering the fort to the Boeotians (VIII. 98). So ends stasis at Athens.

Stasis' prominence in the Archaeologia, its affliction of individual cities, its prominence in the Sicilian Expedition, its presence in Sparta, its near destruction of the Peloponnesian League and with it Sparta's preeminence in Hellas, and its affliction of Athens show how much a part of the war stasis and its ethics are. In fact, I believe, stasis and its ethics are so much a part of the war that Thucydides himself saw the fighting between the Peloponnesians and the Athenians as a type of

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debate, primarily because scholars think it at odds with Thucydides' admiration of democratic Athens under the tutelage of Perikles. Attempts to reconcile Thucydides' favorable treatment of Perikles and of Perikleian Athens with his statement here usually result in taking a very narrow interpretation of the latter. The narrow interpretation makes a distinction between the form of government and the quality of rule: *ἐν πολιτεύσαντες* refers not to Athens' constitution but to the manner by which they governed. It translates *τὸν πρῶτον χρόνον* as "the initial period [of this rule]," and it lessens the force of *οὐχ ἥκιστα* by translating it "at least." For an example of this interpretation, see Gomme, Andrewes, and Dover, *A Historical Commentary on Thucydides*, vol. 5, 331-39). Against this view Connor argues that the statement here is part of a major development of attitude in the work: Thucydides' estimation of democracy changed as he wrote the *History* (*Thucydides*, 228 n. 34).

I suggest that there need not be any tension to resolve or to explain. Nowhere does Thucydides praise democratic Athens. The closest he comes to praising democracy at all is when he says that in a democracy a candidate accepts defeat more easily because he is not beaten by his equals (VIII. 89. 3). In most other instances he criticizes the fickleness of the demos. I do not mean to argue that Thucydides is an oligarch; he is equally critical of oligarchy (VIII. 89). What I wish to argue is that praise of Perikles is praise of the man's ability and no more (see note 4). Thucydides' praise of Perikles is not at all incompatible with his praise of the moderation that resulted from The Five Thousand's successful fusion of the needs of the few and the many. As I argue below, it is moderation or *εἰσνομία* that Thucydides admires most, not any specific form of government.

stasis, with Greek killing Greek. Certainly Thucydides does not equate the two for in his litany of disasters at I. 23. 2. 4, he distinguishes between those caused by war and those caused by stasis:

*οὔτε φυγαὶ τοσαύτῃ ἀνθρώπων καὶ φόνοσ, ὃ μὲν κατ' αὐτὸν τὸν πόλεμον, ὃ δὲ διὰ τὸ στασιάζειν.*

never was there so much banishing and blood-shedding, now on the field of battle, now in the strife of action. (trans. Crawley)

But just as his interpretation and understanding of the phenomenon of stasis are similar to his interpretation and understanding of the events considered above so does stasis and his reflections on it form part of the basis for his interpretation and understanding of the war fought by the Peloponnesians and Athenians.

### **THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR**

It has already been argued that Thucydides conceives of the Sicilian War as a type of stasis. Sicily is depicted as a polis and any alliance with Athens is viewed as stasis within this polis. Thucydides makes this point most strongly in his catalogue of allies before the Battle in the Great Harbor (VII. 57-58). It has also been contended that Thucydides portrays the near dissolution of the Peloponnesian League in terms of stasis and its ethics, with various members struggling for ascendancy. Finally, Thucydides devotes much of Book VIII to the stasis that embroils Athens in 411.

Turning our attention to the fighting between the Peloponnesians and the Athenians, I likewise contend that like the strategy of the Athenians in the Sicilian War, the strategy of the Spartans and of the Athenians in the Peloponnesian War is

one of stasis. This strategy works on two levels: on the level of the individual city-state and on the level of the League or Empire.

For example, at Akanthos stasis erupts over admitting Brasidas into the city:

*οἱ δὲ περὶ τοῦ δέχεσθαι αὐτὸν κατ' ἀλλήλους ἐστασίαζον, οἳ τε μετὰ τῶν Χαλκιδέων ξυνεπάγοντες καὶ ὁ δῆμος.*

The inhabitants were divided into two parties on the question of receiving him, those who had joined the Chalcidians in inviting him, and the popular party. (trans. Crawley IV. 84. 2)

and

*οἱ δὲ Ἀκάνθιοι, πολλῶν λεχθέντων πρότερον ἐπ' ἀμφοτέρα, κρύφα διαψηφισάμενοι, διὰ τε τὸ ἐπαγωγὰ εἰπεῖν τὸν Βρασίδαν καὶ περὶ τοῦ καρποῦ φόβῳ ἔγνωσαν οἱ πλείους ἀφίστασθαι Ἀθηναίων*

The Acanthians, after much had been said on both sides of the question, gave their votes in secret, and the majority, influenced by the seductive arguments of Brasidas and by fear for their fruit, decided to revolt from Athens. (trans. Crawley IV. 88. 1)

Likewise stasis erupts at Mende. Brasidas effects the revolt of Mende and receives her even though the revolt occurred after the armistice between Athens and Sparta. Later with the help of the democratic faction, Athens regains Mende:

*Ἐν τούτῳ δὲ Μένδη ἀφίσταται αὐτῶν, πόλις ἐν τῇ Παλλήνῃ, Ἐρετριῶν ἀποικία. καὶ αὐτοὺς ἐδέξατο ὁ Βρασίδης*

Meanwhile Mende revolted, a town in Pallene and a colony of the Eretrians, and Brasidas received them. (IV. 123. 1)

and

*καὶ τινος αὐτῷ τῶν ἀπὸ τοῦ δήμου ἀντειπόντος κατὰ τὸ στασιωτικὸν ὅτι οὐκ ἐπέξεισιν οὐδὲ δέοιτο πολεμεῖν, καὶ ὡς ἀντίπεν ἐπισπασθέντος τε τῇ χειρὶ ὑπ' αὐτοῦ καὶ θορυβηθέντος, ὁ δῆμος εὐθὺς ἀναλαβὼν τὰ ὄπλα περιοργῆς ἐχώρει ἐπὶ τε Πελοποννησίους καὶ τοὺς τὰ ἐναντία σφίσι μετ' αὐτῶν πράξαντες*

At this moment one of the popular party answered him factiously that they

would not go out and did not want a war, and for thus answering was dragged by the arm and knocked about by Polydamidas. Hereupon the infuriated commons at once seized their arms and rushed at the Peloponnesians and at their allies of the opposite faction. (trans. Crawley IV. 130. 4)

In the above instances, *στάσις* and *ἀπόστασις* are inextricably entwined. In fact, *στάσις* is the direct result of *ἀπόστασις*. Furthermore, as I state at the beginning of this chapter, in any revolt there is some pro-Spartan or pro-Athenian faction that disagrees with the dominant party's resolution. Thus when revolt is decided upon, stasis either breaks out or is latent, that is, the one necessarily implies the other.<sup>32</sup>

On the level of the city-state, therefore, the Spartans and the Athenians carry on a factional war in conjunction with those within the city who are favorable to them. As the *History* proceeds, the war is reduced to the Athenians struggling to maintain the unity of her Empire and the Spartans inciting revolt--a struggle fought by Athens and the factions favorable to her against Sparta and those favorable to her.

The Corinthians verbalize this strategy of stasis when they list their reasons for expecting success in the war:

*ὑπάρχουσι δὲ καὶ ἄλλαι ὁδοὶ τοῦ πολέμου ἡμῖν, ξυμμάχων τε ἀπόστασις,*

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<sup>32</sup>This observation may seem to run counter to Thucydides' statement at II. 8. 5: *οὕτως <ἐν> ὀργῇ εἶχον οἱ πλείους τοὺς Ἀθηναίους, οἱ μὲν τῆς ἀρχῆς ἀπολυθῆναι βουλόμενοι, οἱ δὲ μὴ ἀρχθῶσι φοβούμενοι* (thus the majority held Athens in anger, some desiring to be free from her empire, others fearing lest they be conquered). But it must be stressed that Thucydides is painting with broad brushstrokes and that this stroke does not deny the existence of pro-Athenian sentiment in Hellas as Thucydides narrative makes clear and as do his words at III. 82. 1. 5.

*μάλιστα παραίρεσις οὔσα τῶν προσόδων αἷς ἰσχύουσι . . .*

We have also other ways of carrying on the war, such as revolt of their allies, the surest method of depriving them of their revenues, which are the source of their strength . . . (trans Crawley I. 122. 1)

To effect the revolt of Athens' allies, the Spartans make ample use of the reputation won in the Persian War for being the liberators of Greece.<sup>33</sup>

Brasidas is the Spartan most effective in persuading Athens' allies to revolt. Many of the cities of Thrace accept Brasidas' clever argument that they revolt from Athens and join the Spartans in liberating Hellas, or since he understands their refusal as benefitting the enemy, be compelled to by force.

Throughout the war, Sparta pursues this strategy of inducing revolt. Athens pursues the same strategy but is not as successful--in part because she is hampered by continually having to retake her own seceding subjects. Of course for Athens this strategy is overtly one of subjugating new cities,<sup>34</sup> whereas for Sparta the subjugation is hidden by the profession that she is liberating Hellas.

For Athens this strategy runs counter to Perikles' advice. In his first speech, Perikles advises that the Athenians protect their empire and make no new conquests (I. 144. 1). In the same speech, although he does not expressly use the word *stasis*, by saying that the individual members of the Peloponnesian League will each seek their own and personal ends, Perikles prophesies *stasis* for the League,

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<sup>33</sup>cf. I. 69. 1; II. 8. 4; III. 32. 2; and IV. 85. 1.

<sup>34</sup>Witness for example Demosthenes conspiring with Boeotian democrats to betray their cities to Athens (IV. 76-77; 89-101).

πολεμείν δὲ μὴ πρὸς ὁμοίαν ἀντιπαρασκευὴν ἀδύνατοι, ὅταν μήτε  
βουλευτηρίῳ ἐνὶ χρώμενοι παραχρῆμα τι ὀξέως ἐπιτελώσι πάντες τε ἰσόψηφοι  
ὄντες καὶ οὐχ ὁμόφυλοι τὸ ἐφ' ἑαυτὸν ἕκαστος σπεύδῃ· ἐξ ὧν φιλεῖ μηδὲν  
ἐπιτελεῖς γίγνεσθαι

but they are incapacitated from carrying on a war against a power different in character from their own, by the want of the single council-chamber requisite to prompt and vigorous action, and the substitution of a diet composed of various races, in which every state possesses an equal vote, and each presses for its own ends, a condition of things which generally results in no action at all (trans Crawley I. 141. 6),

and as we saw above it does almost divide them. Although Perikles predicts stasis, as part of his war strategy he does not advise inciting revolt. Not until after his death in 429, do the Athenians adopt the strategy that the Peloponnesians have had since the war's inception. Inciting revolt then becomes one of the main strategies of both combatants.

Both also share an altered system of values. A major component of stasis is striving for individual gain and glory instead of working for the good of the city. In stasis personal striving destroys the state:

οἱ γὰρ ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι προστάντες μετὰ ὀνόματος ἑκάτεροι εὐπρεποῦς,  
πλήθους τε ἰσονομίας πολιτικῆς καὶ ἀριστοκρατίας σώφρονος προτιμήσει, τὰ  
μὲν κοινὰ λόγῳ θεραπεύοντες ἄλλα ἐποιούντο, παντὶ δὲ τρόπῳ ἀγωνιζόμενοι  
ἀλλήλων περιγίγνεσθαι ἐτόλμησάν τε τὰ δεινότατα ἐπεξῆσάν τε τὰς  
τιμωρίας ἔτι μείζους, οὐ μὲχρι τοῦ δικαίου καὶ τῇ πόλει ξυμφόρον προτιθέντες,  
ἐς δὲ τὸ ἑκατέρους πον ἀεὶ ἡδονὴν ἔχον ὀρίζοντες, καὶ ἢ μετὰ ψήφον ἀδίκον  
καταγνώσεως ἢ χειρὶ κτώμενοι τὸ κρατεῖν ἐτοίμοι ἦσαν τὴν ἀντίκα φιλονικίαν  
ἐκπιμπλάναι.

For in the cities, the leaders, each with his own fine slogan, *the people's political equality* or *the prudent aristocracy*, looking after the state in word, set up contests, and vying in every way to surpass one another, dared the most dreadful deeds, went after ever greater vengeance, not setting their endpoint at a place just and beneficial to the city but making their boundary that which always gives pleasure to each, and acquiring power either with an unjust vote's condemnation or by force, they were prepared to sate their immediate desire



for victory. (III. 82. 8)

In his speech after the second invasion of the Peloponnesians, Perikles himself stresses the importance of the state over the individual:

*καλῶς μὲν γὰρ φερόμενος ἀνὴρ τὸ καθ' ἑαυτὸν διαφθειρομένης τῆς πατρίδος οὐδὲν ἦσσαν ξυναπόλλυται, κακοτυχῶν δὲ ἐν εὐτυχούσῃ πολλῶ μᾶλλον διασφύζεται.*

A man may be personally ever so well off, and yet if his country be ruined he must be ruined with it; whereas a flourishing commonwealth always affords chances of salvation to unfortunate individuals. (trans. Crawley II. 60. 3)

In the stasis excursus, Thucydides' point, however, is that personal greed can destroy the state.

Although Athens' purpose for fighting the war, at least as verbalized by Perikles and tacitly agreed to by the Athenians (I. 140), is initially to avoid subjugation to Sparta, after Perikles' death, in addition to fighting the war with the Peloponnesians, Athens seeks to expand her empire. This purely personal (*ιδίᾳ*) aim is indicative of the ethics that take over in a time of stasis.

Sparta also seems to begin the war for a public and noble reason: the liberation of Hellas from Athens' yoke. Brasidas' actions in Thrace, however, give the lie to this noble cry and show that Sparta's aim is the same and as personal as Athens', that is, the domination of Hellas. And Thucydides writes as much at VIII. 2. 4:

*πανταχόθεν τε εὐέλπιδες ὄντες ἀπροφασίστως ἄπτεσθαι διανοοῦντο τοῦ πολέμου, λογιζόμενοι καλῶς τελευτήσαντος αὐτοῦ κινδύνων τε τοιούτων ἀπηλλάχθαι ἂν τὸ λοιπὸν οἶος καὶ ὁ ἀπὸ τῶν Ἀθηναίων περίεστη ἂν αὐτούς, εἰ τὸ Σικελικὸν προσέλαβον, καὶ καθελόντες ἐκείνους αὐτοὶ τῆς πάσης Ἑλλάδος ἤδη ἀσφαλῶς ἠγγήσεσθαι.*

With these reasons for confidence in every quarter, the Lacedaemonians now resolved to throw themselves without reserve into the war, considering that,

once it was happily terminated, they would be finally delivered from such dangers as that which would have threatened them from Athens, if she had become mistress of Sicily, and that the overthrow of the Athenians would leave them in quiet enjoyment of the supremacy over all Hellas. (trans. Crawley)

This dichotomy (*ιδίος* v. *δημόσιος*) is a major theme of the *History*, and, as in the *stasis excursus*, serves to differentiate actions which are beneficial from those that are destructive to the state.<sup>35</sup>

As does *stasis* so does war remove justice from the opponents' actions and interactions. For example, Athens allies with Kerkyra out of expediency. She kills ambassadors for revenge. She nearly kills all the male population of Mytilene and does do so at Skione and Melos. On her side, Sparta executes all sailors captured at sea, whether they be neutral or not. Out of expediency she levels Plataea and executes the remaining besieged.

In addition to the disappearance of justice is the disappearance of piety and nobility (*εὐσεβεία* and *γενναιότης*). In all cases but one peace overtures are rejected by the party with the upper hand. Thucydides attributes to her greed Athens' refusal to make peace after Pylos: [*Ἀθηναῖοι*] *τοῦ δὲ πλέονος ὠρέγοντο* and *οἱ δὲ* [*Ἀθηναῖοι*] *μειζόνων τε ὠρέγοντο* (IV. 21. 2; IV. 41. 4). When Athens and Sparta do make peace (i.e., the Peace of Nikias), it is because the war has so weakened

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<sup>35</sup>An implication suggested by this dichotomy, but nowhere manifestly made by Thucydides, is that the personal strivings of Athens and Sparta are publicly harmful to the state of Hellas. That such a pan-Hellenic view would have come clear had Thucydides finished his *History* is uncertain. It is certain, however, that such a view would not have sounded strange in the ears of the Greeks of this period, for in 408 at Olympia Gorgias fulminates against the Greeks currying Persia's favor and bids them rather to unite against her. J. B. Bury and R. Meiggs, *A History of Greece*, 4th ed. (New York: St Martin's Press, 1975), 314.

them that they require time to recover (V. 14). But even this armistice Thucydides considers only seeming (V. 26. 2).

Thucydides' assertion at III. 82. 7 best describes the interval of nearly seven years:

*τά τε ἀπὸ τῶν ἐναντίων καλῶς λεγόμενα ἐνεδέχοντο ἔργων φυλακῇ, εἰ προύχοιεν, καὶ οὐ γενναιότητι. ἀντιτιμωρήσασθαι τέ τινα περὶ πλείονος ἦν ἢ αὐτὸν μὴ προπαθεῖν. καὶ ὄρκοι εἴ ποιν ἄρα γένοιτο ξυναλλαγῆς, ἐν τῷ αὐτίκα πρὸς τὸ ἄπορον ἑκατέρω διδόμενοι ἴσχυρον οὐκ ἐχόντων ἄλλοθεν δύναμιν*

The opposition's noble overtures were received by the stronger party with a guard against his actions not with nobility. It was worth more to avenge someone in turn than never to have suffered. If oaths of reconciliation ever came about, being given to each other in the immediacy of the moment on account of an impasse, they remained strong while neither side had power from elsewhere.

Neither side gives back what they agreed. Both carry on the war abroad and violate the treaty in the Epidaurian and Mantinean wars as well as in other instances (V. 26. 2). In addition I think the sentiment in the quote above is the motivation behind Thucydides' quoting verbatim the three sets of treaties and alliances made during the Peace of Nikias.

That the treaty and alliance of Athens and Sparta is made out of necessity and that the terms are never totally honored have already been made clear. The treaty and alliance of 420 made by the Athenians, Argives, Mantineans, and Eleans is even more short-lived. In 419/18, hemmed in by the Peloponnesians, in violation of the treaty and alliance of 420 with the Athenians, the Mantineans, and the Eleans, the Argives make a treaty with Sparta (V. 59-60). Later Alkibiades persuades the Argives, in violation of their treaty with Sparta, to join in an expedition against

Orchomenos (V. 61. 2).

Having successfully besieged Orchomenos, the allies are divided again when the Eleans depart, angered because the Athenians and Argives supported the Mantineans' wish to attack Tegea instead of their desire to march against Lepreon (V. 62). After their defeat at the battle of Mantinea, the Argives violate their treaty and alliance with the Athenians, the Mantineans, and the Eleans and make a treaty and alliance with Sparta (V. 76-79). Not much later the Mantineans follow Argos' lead (V. 81). The next summer the people of Argos rise up against the oligarchs and again court an alliance with Athens (V. 82). The ensuing summer Alkibiades sails to Argos and rids her of 300 suspected Spartan sympathizers (V. 84).

Rather than reverence for one's word the majority of Book V shows deception and intrigue ruling the actors' actions. In war as in stasis the sanctity of the word enjoys no worshipers. Individual states struggle for personal gain and glory to the detriment of any common action.<sup>36</sup> In this respect Book VIII is similar to Book V.

In Markellinos' collection of three introductions to Thucydides,<sup>37</sup> Book VIII is

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<sup>36</sup>Because of the inclusion of the treaties and the compressed narrative, some scholars have argued that Book V is unfinished. See, for example, V. Hunter, "The Composition of Thucydides' History: A New Answer to the Problem," *Historia* 26 (1977): 270. But as I argue below the makeup of Book V, as well as Book VIII, is, I think, in part attributable to the nature of the war during both periods.

<sup>37</sup>Markellinos is a Thucydidean biographer probably of the 5th century A.D. who combined three introductions to Thucydides. The first is probably from Proclus' *Chrestomathia*, the second may be the work of Caecilius, Dionysius of Halikarnassos' contemporary, and the third is part of Zosimus' introduction to the scholia on Isokrates, Demosthenes, and Thucydides. *The Oxford Classical Dictionary*, ed. N.G.L. Hammond and H.H. Scullard, 2d ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1970), 646.

criticized for being unadorned and incomplete:

Λέγουσι δὲ τινες νοθεύεσθαι τὴν ὀγδόην ἱστορίαν· οὐ γὰρ εἶναι Θουκυδίδου, ἀλλ' οἱ μὲν φασὶ τῆς θυγατρὸς αὐτοῦ εἶναι, οἱ δὲ Χενοφῶντος. πρὸς οὗς λέγομεν ὅτι τῆς μὲν θυγατρὸς ὡς οὐκ ἔστι δῆλον· οὐ γὰρ γυναικείας ἦν φύσεως τοιαύτην ἀρετὴν τε καὶ τέχνην μιμήσασθαι· ἔπειτα, εἰ τοιαύτη τις ἦν, οὐκ ἂν ἐσπούδασε λαθεῖν, οὐδ' ἂν τὴν ὀγδόην ἔγραψε μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄλλα πολλὰ κατέλιπεν ἂν, τὴν οἰκείαν ἐκφαίνουσα φύσιν. ὅτι δὲ οὐδὲ Χενοφῶντός ἐστιν, ὁ χαρακτήρ μόνον οὐχὶ βοᾷ· πολὺ γὰρ τὸ μέσον ἰσχυροῦ χαρακτήρος καὶ ὑψηλοῦ. οὐ μὴν οὐδὲ Θεοπόμπου, καθά τινες ἠξίωσαν. τισὶ δέ, καὶ μᾶλλον τοῖς χαριστέροις, Θουκυδίδου μὲν εἶναι δοκεῖ, ἄλλως δ' ἀκαλλώπιστος, δι' ἐκτύπων γεγραμμένη, καὶ πολλῶν πλήρης ἐν κεφαλαίῳ πραγμάτων καλλωπισθῆναι καὶ λαβεῖν ἔκτασιν δυναμένων. ἔνθεν καὶ λέγομεν ὡς ἀσθενέστερον πέφρασται ὀλίγον, καθότι ἀρρωστῶν αὐτὴν φαίνεται συντεθεικῶς. ἀσθενοῦντος δὲ σώματος βραχὺ τι καὶ ὁ λογισμὸς ἀτονώτερος εἶναι φιλεῖ· μικροῦ γὰρ συμπάσχονσιν ἀλλήλοις ὃ τε λογισμὸς καὶ τὸ σῶμα.

Some say that the eighth book is spurious because it was not written by Thucydides: some hold that it is his daughter's work; others that it is Xenophon's. To them we reply that it is clearly not his daughter's, for it is not in a woman's nature to mimic such virtue and skill. Second, if there were a woman of such a nature, she would not wish to remain unknown, and she would not have written only the eighth book, but also would have left behind many other works, thereby making clear that such a nature is her own. That it is not Xenophon's, the style alone shouts, for the middle style combines the plain and the lofty. Nor is it Theopompos' as some claim. The more acceptable critics are those who think the book Thucydides' but unadorned and unrevised, full of events able to be adorned and expatiated. Hence I say that it has been composed less forcefully because while sick he composed it. The mind of an invalid tends to be sluggish and less forceful; for mind and body are of little concern to those suffering.

Most modern critics share this author's viewpoint.<sup>38</sup> The similarity between Book VIII and Book V, with strict narratives, lacking speeches but containing verbatim documents and accounting for the majority of V and all of VIII, I think is in part attributable to the nature of the war during both periods. Since the stasis filled action

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<sup>38</sup>"Almost all the scholars who have approached Book VIII of Thucydides have agreed that it is unfinished." H. R. Rawlings, *The Structure of Thucydides' History*, 176.

of Book V has already been discussed, I focus my attention on Book VIII.

The action of Book VIII includes an area stretching from mainland Greece to the Hellespont, to Ionia, to Rhodes, and to Aspendos. Stasis and revolt account for most of the action. The cities of Chios (.14), Klazomenae (.14), Miletos (.17), Lebedos (.19), Erae (.19), Samos (.21; 63. 3; 73; 75. 2-3), Methymna (.22), Mytilene (.22), Eresos (.23), Rhodes (.44), Oropos (.60), Abydos (.62), Pharnabazos (.62), Lampsakos (.62), and Thasos (.64) all revolt as does the island of Euboea (.95). The war that is being fought in Book VIII is a fragmented and factional one in which the Peloponnesians induce revolt by conspiring with that faction favorable to them and the Athenians attempt to prevent revolt and to win back revolted cities by conspiring with the faction favorable to them.<sup>39</sup>

Narrative not taken up by stasis and revolt at these cities is consumed by stasis at Athens and by dissension among the Peloponnesian League. Thus it seems that the nature of the war during this period requires an episodic narrative. As stasis determines the fighting between the Peloponnesians and Athenians, as it tears apart Athens, and as it threatens the unity of the Peloponnesian League, so the narrative shifts from one arena to the next. Also the lack of speeches in this book may suggest the lack of a single policy or individual dominating on either side.<sup>40</sup>

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<sup>39</sup>Of course, during the coup of 411, Athens facilitates revolt by forcing oligarchies upon the members of her Empire (VIII. 64).

<sup>40</sup>Of Book VIII, Finley writes, "it is generally assumed that the main part of the fifth book (25-84) and all the eighth book, both of which lack speeches, are particularly incomplete, and the view may be correct, especially for the eighth book, although it seems not impossible that Thucydides may have intended to treat certain

## SUMMARY

Given all the above examples of stasis, I find it impossible to deny stasis' prominent role in the Peloponnesian War. Stasis plays a central role in one of the most important sections of Book I, it is one of the most important parts of Book III, it concerns about one-third of Book IV, and it is involved in most of the action in Book V, in Book VI, in Book VII, and in Book VIII. In addition, I think it has been shown that the way Thucydides thinks about stasis is similar to the way he does about the war, that is, his understanding and interpretation of the two are similar.

This similarity is seen most prominently in the way Thucydides emphasizes the predominant ethics of the time. Even the Spartan Archidamos is subject to public rebuke for hesitant and prudent delay. Daring ignorance and greed drive the Athenians to undertake the disastrous Sicilian Expedition. Thoughtful dissent is nowhere thoughtfully received. At Sicily and elsewhere kin sheds the blood of kin. Whether the speaker is Athenian or Spartan, specious words hide ignoble intents. The Peace of Nikias fails because of a lack of trust in, and of a failure to respect,

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years in this unemphatic way." Later Finley expresses this view more strongly, "It is sometimes said that the narratives of both these periods--namely, the middle of the fifth book and the eighth book--are unfinished because they lack speeches, but the fact is more easily explained by the nature of the periods themselves" (*Thucydides*, 77 and 246).

Connor elaborates on Finley's suggestion that the seeming incompleteness of Book VIII is attributable to the nature of the war during this period. He writes that, "in *stasis*, however, narrative units, as well as political coherence, disintegrate." Analogous to the "loss of individual and civic control is a disintegration of the units and techniques upon which so much of the earlier portions of the work is built." For example, Thucydides does not focus upon one theater or certain individuals; he breaks narrative boundaries of summer and winter; and he admits doubt as to what actually occurred (*Thucydides*, 214-18).

the sanctity of oaths. Both sides fight not for public good but for private gain. For Athens the result of this ethic is stasis and defeat at the hands of the Spartans. For Sparta this ethic nearly results in the breakup of the Peloponnesian League and in defeat in the war.

Sparta, however, manages to avoid stasis and to win the war. For her avoidance of stasis, for her *ἐννομία*,<sup>41</sup> Sparta receives Thucydides' admiration:

*Χίοι γὰρ μόνοι μετὰ Λακεδαιμονίους ὧν ἐγὼ ἠσθόμην ἠὲ δαιμόνησάν τε ἅμα καὶ ἐσωφρόνησαν, καὶ ὄσω ἐπεδίδον ἢ πόλις αὐτοῖς ἐπὶ τὸ μείζον, τόσω δὲ καὶ ἐκοσμοῦντο ἐχυρώτερον.*

Indeed, after the Lacedaemonians, the Chians are the only people that I have known who knew how to be wise in prosperity, and who ordered their city the more securely the greater it grew. (trans. Crawley VIII. 24. 4)

After all, in the most simplified analysis, Sparta's avoidance of stasis, her *ἐννομία*, wins the war, but not without suffering, for indeed true to Melesippos' prophecy,<sup>42</sup> Sparta and the rest of the Hellenes endure much misfortune during the course of the war.

In addition to noting stasis' ubiquity in the *History*, my argument for Thucydides' viewing the Peloponnesian War as a type of stasis is based on the following: that he is careful to note the presence of stasis in Hellas' early history; that he holds stasis responsible for Athens' loss and Sparta's victory; that he names

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<sup>41</sup>If we are to pigeonhole Thucydides at all, we must assert that it is this moderation, this *ἐννομία*, that he values rather than argue that he prefers oligarchy to democracy or vice versa.

<sup>42</sup>*ἦδε ἡ ἡμέρα τοῖς Ἑλλήσι μεγάλων κακῶν ἀρξεί* (this day will be the beginning of great evils for the Hellenes) (II. 12. 3).



stasis and war as the two causes of much destruction in the war; that he details the presence of stasis and its ethics at Athens and Sparta; that he echoes III. 82-84 throughout the work; that he conceives of the Sicilian War as stasis; that he portrays the near breakup of the Peloponnesian League in terms of stasis and its ethics; that he portrays the period during The Peace of Nikias in terms of stasis and its ethics; and that he portrays the action in the Peloponnesian War in terms of stasis and its ethics.

Furthermore it is my belief that Thucydides was working towards a climax, as he does in the Sicilian section, in which he would have made it obvious by a catalogue or by a battle that the Peloponnesian War is stasis and that the inviting in of the Persians, just as the Sicilians inviting in Athens and just as Korinth inviting in Argos, is akin to the invitations factions made to the Athenians and Spartans in their effort to gain political control of the polis. I also think he would have made it clear that such an invitation to the Persians was a breaking of the Hellenic bond (like kinship) that connected all Greeks.

## CHAPTER 5

### CONCLUSIONS

In the previous chapter I focused on elucidating stasis' role in the war and on showing that Thucydides' understanding and interpretation of stasis in the stasis excursus are similar to his understanding of the war in general and that the war is a kind of stasis. This being so, I think it possible to use the stasis excursus as a key for interpreting some of the ambiguous and hotly debated sections of the *History*. Thus, as an example, I propose to show what light the excursus can shed on the Mytilenian Debate, often cited as evidence for Thucydides' extreme rationalism and realism.

The Mytilenian debate of 427 deliberates the best course for Athens to take when confronted with a revolted ally. When she first deliberates how to proceed against the revolted and subdued Mytilene, Athens decides to execute Mytilene's entire male population and to enslave her female, the punishment later meted out in 421 to the Skioneans and in 416/15 to the Melians (V. 32. 1 and V. 116. 4).

The next day, however, thinking their previous decision to execute an entire population rather than just the guilty savage, the people reconsider:

*καὶ τῇ ὑστεραίᾳ μετάνοιά τις εὐθὺς ἦν αὐτοῖς καὶ ἀναλογισμὸς ὡμὸν τὸ βούλευμα καὶ μέγα ἐγνώσθαι, πόλιν ὅλην διαφθεῖραι μᾶλλον ἢ οὐ τοὺς αἰτίους.*

The morrow brought repentance with it and reflection on the horrid cruelty of a decree which condemned a whole city to the fate merited only by the guilty.  
(trans. Crawley III. 36. 4)

Next Thucydides presents us with Athens' reconsideration. Kleon argues for upholding the first decision; Diodotos argues for punishing only the guilty. Kleon bases his argument upon justice and expediency:

*ἐν τε ξυνηλῶν λέγω· πειθόμενοι μὲν ἐμοὶ τὰ τε δίκαια ἐς Μυτιληναίους καὶ τὰ ξύμφορα ἅμα ποιήσετε, ἄλλως δὲ γνόντες τοῖς μὲν οὐ χαριείσθε, ὑμᾶς δὲ αὐτοὺς μᾶλλον δικαιοῦσεσθε.*

To sum up shortly, I say that if you follow my advice you will do what is just towards the Mytilenians, and at the same time expedient; but by a different decision you will not oblige them so much as pass sentence upon yourselves.  
(trans. Crawley III. 40. 4)

The punishment is just because by their own volition the Mytilenians, though in possession of walls and a fleet and though autonomous, rose up against Athens (III. 39. 1-2). It is expedient because unless Athens inflicts harsh punishment upon those who choose revolt freely, revolt will become rife throughout the empire (III. 39. 7-8).

Although considerations of justice do subtly enter into his argument (see III. 47. 3), Diodotos bases it mainly upon expediency and not on justice:

*Ἐγὼ δὲ παρηλθὼν οὔτε ἀντερῶν περὶ Μυτιληναίων οὔτε κατηγορήσω. οὐ γὰρ περὶ τῆς ἐκείνων ἀδικίας ἡμῖν ὁ ἀγών, εἰ σωφρονοῦμεν, ἀλλὰ περὶ τῆς ἡμετέρας εὐβουλίας. ἦν τε γὰρ ἀποφῆνω πάνν ἀδικοῦντας αὐτούς, οὐ διὰ τοῦτο καὶ ἀποκτεῖναι κελεύσω, εἰ μὴ ξυμφέρον, ἦν τε καὶ ἔχοντάς τι ξυγγνώμης + εἶεν+, εἰ τῇ πόλει μὴ ἀγαθὸν φαίνοιτο.*

However, I have not come forward either to oppose or to accuse in the matter of Mytilene; indeed, the question before us as sensible men is not their guilt, but our interest. Though I prove them ever so guilty, I shall not, therefore, advise punishment by death, unless it be expedient; nor though they should have claim to indulgence, shall I recommend it, unless it be clearly for the

good of the country. (trans. Crawley III. 44. 1-2)

Diodotos' argument from expediency first holds that the death penalty that Kleon advocates is no deterrent to crime, but rather, if inflicted, will prove more costly to the Athenians by taking away from rebels the hope of repentance and of atonement (III. 46). And second it holds that Kleon's policy will alienate the demos which, throughout the empire, is favorable to Athens.

Diodotos' argument from expediency, based as it is on rationalism and realism, has provoked some scholars to comment. For example, bothered by Thucydides' omission of any argument based on mercy and pity, de Ste. Croix writes:

Are the arguments reported by Thucydides limited within such a curiously narrow scope because Thucydides believed that this was in principle the *best way to argue* such a case, or because he thought this type of argument was *successful in practice* in convincing the Athenians and inducing them to change their minds? . . . I am now inclined to accept both; but the first of the two explanations is the basic one and the second follows from it. I believe Thucydides thought that public and political argument should always be conducted on purely rational lines, and that emotion should be excluded altogether, on the ground that although emotions such as pity may be useful, or at least harmless, yet once emotion is allowed in at all it is the more violent ones, such as hatred and the desire for revenge, which are likely to swamp the rest and lead to dangerous behaviour.<sup>1</sup>

De Ste. Croix's Thucydides is calculating and rational and reasonable. He is one who banishes morality from interstate relations but retains it for dealings between individuals within the state.<sup>2</sup>

Invoking the gods of science and logic, Cochrane also argues that expediency is

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<sup>1</sup>De Ste. Croix, *The Origins of the Peloponnesian War* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1972), 13.

<sup>2</sup>*Ibid.*, 18-27.

the only basis for the argument:

It has been observed as a remarkable fact that both speakers--Cleon, into whose mouth is put the argument for severity, and Diodotus, who voices the argument for leniency in the treatment of the rebels--discuss the issue simply on grounds of expediency. This fact ceases to be remarkable if it be remembered that from the democratic (and scientific) standpoint, this is the only ground on which the discussion could logically take place . . . Thus, in at least one instance, the cool and dispassionate consideration of what was expedient prevented a horrible crime.<sup>3</sup>

Cochrane's Thucydides is the *objective scientist*.

Both de Ste. Croix and Cochrane have failed in their analysis of the passage because neither employs the appropriate touchstone. Both use one that equates the realism and rationality that permeates the *History* with the author Thucydides. I grant that Thucydides does admire intellect, but I reject the view that denies Thucydides everything but intellect.

The appropriate touchstone, I believe, is the authorial comments that contain Thucydides' own thoughts and feelings on the war. The key to interpreting the Mytilenian Debate and the *History* itself lies in Thucydides' own opinions. The case has already been made for using III. 82-84 as this key, and with III. 82-84 in hand I proceed.

The beginnings of both speeches define for us the characters of the two speakers. Kleon argues vehemently against cleverness and intellect. According to him the best helmsmen of the state are the less intelligent:

*οἱ τε φαυλότεροι τῶν ἀνθρώπων πρὸς τοὺς ξυνετωτέρους ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πλεόν*

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<sup>3</sup>C. N. Cochrane, *Thucydides and the Science of History* (London: Oxford University Press, 1929), 103-4.

*ἄμεινον οἰκοῦσι τὰς πόλεις*

The less intelligent of men in comparison to the more intelligent usually manage cities better. (III. 37. 3)

Diodotos, on the other hand, is the advocate of reason and good counsel and the enemy of hasty passion:

*οὔτε τοὺς προθέντας τὴν διαγνώμην ἀθίς περὶ Μυτιληναίων αἰτιῶμαι, οὔτε τοὺς μεμφομένους μὴ πολλάκις περὶ τῶν μεγίστων βουλευέσθαι ἐπαινῶ, νομίζω δὲ δύο τὰ ἐναντιώτατα εὐβουλίᾳ εἶναι, τάχος τε καὶ ὀργήν, ὧν τὸ μὲν μετὰ ἀνοίας φιλεῖ γίγνεσθαι, τὸ δὲ μετὰ ἀπαιδευσίας καὶ βραχύτητος γνώμης.*

I do not blame the persons who have reopened the case of the Mytilenians, nor do I approve the protests which we have heard against important questions being frequently debated. I think the two things most opposed to good counsel are haste and passion; haste usually goes hand in hand with folly, passion with coarseness and narrowness of mind. (trans. Crawley III. 42. 1)

By their own words, both define themselves. Kleon identifies himself with the less intelligent whom Thucydides decries when he bemoans the less intelligent's destruction of the more at III. 83.<sup>4</sup> Thucydides also characterizes Kleon as an enemy of *ἐννομία* and a causer of stasis when he introduces him as the most forceful (*βιαιότατος*) of demagogues (III. 36. 6).<sup>5</sup> Conversely, Diodotos defines himself as an advocate of the prudent and hesitant thought that is suspect during stasis (III. 82. 4-5). Thus, the stasis excursus provides us with a means for evaluating Thucydides'

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<sup>4</sup>For an opposite interpretation of the character of Kleon in the *History*, see A. G. Woodhead, *Thucydides on the Nature of Power*, Martin Classical Lectures (published for Oberlin College by Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970), 26, 36-37, 45, 107, and 160.

<sup>5</sup>Remember Thucydides' dictum: *ὁ δὲ πόλεμος βίαιος διδάσκαλος* (III. 82. 2. 7).

opinion of the speakers.<sup>6</sup>

By understanding Diodotos' seemingly enigmatic words at III. 43. 2 in terms of the stasis excursus, they and the passage itself obtain their proper understanding:

*καθέστηκε δὲ τὰγαθὰ ἀπὸ τοῦ εὐθέως λεγόμενα μηδὲν ἀνυποπτότερα εἶναι τῶν κακῶν, ὥστε δεῖν ὁμοίως τὸν τε τὰ δεινότατα βουλόμενον πείσαι ἀπάτην πρῶτα γέσθαι τὸ πλήθος καὶ τὸν τὰ ἀμείνω λέγοντα ψευδόμενον πιστὸν γενέσθαι.*

Plain good advice has thus come to be no less suspected than bad; and the advocate of the most monstrous measures is not more obliged to use deceit to gain the people, than the best counsellor is to lie in order to be believed. (trans. Crawley)

Diodotos' lament is a prime example of those by now familiar

words: *καὶ ὁ μὲν χαλεπαίνων πιστὸς αἰεί, ὁ δ' ἀντιλέγων αὐτῷ ὑποπτος* (III. 82.

5).

Andrewes thinks these words of Diodotos nearly cross the border of absurdity:

The fact is that by [43.2] Diodotos has brought paradox dangerously close to the border of nonsense . . . What should the honest man do? Convey just a flavour of spurious dishonesty, enough to gratify suspicion but not enough to wreck his proposal?<sup>7</sup>

Surely Andrewes' interpretation cannot be the one Thucydides intended. Echoing Thucydides' statement of the distrust that the advocate of sense creates, Diodotos rather seems to be stating a truism, oftentimes found in cities in the midst, or on the brink, of war or stasis.

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<sup>6</sup>I do not see how Andrewes' comment, "He [Thucydides] does not identify himself with Diodotos' view," can be more wrong. A. Andrewes, "The Mytilene Debate: Thucydides 3.36-49," *Phoenix* 16 (1962): 78.

<sup>7</sup>A. Andrewes, "The Mytilene Debate: Thucydides 3.36-49," *Phoenix* 16 (1962): 74.

Noting the great and exalting excitement of people beating drums, of toy pistols popping, of firecrackers hissing, of flags blazing, and of breasts burning with patriotism, Samuel Clemens attests the words of Thucydides and Diodotos,

It was indeed a glad and gracious time, and the half-dozen rash spirits that ventured to disapprove of the war and cast a doubt upon its righteousness straightway got such a stern and angry warning that for their personal safety's sake they quickly shrank out of sight and offended no more in that way.<sup>8</sup>

Diodotos' words are not nonsense. Rather they are a signpost indicating the nature of the times.

What is significant is not that Diodotos uses expediency as the basis of his argument but that given the hostile and suspicious nature of the city, an argument from expediency is the only one that can succeed. One based upon a justice that accounts for the lives of the opponent as well, or one based upon humanity, is doomed to failure if only because such an argument is most easily defeated by calling its propounder unpatriotic or financially interested. Thus in order to succeed Diodotos must lie. He must construct an argument based mainly on the benefit of Athens.

This said, it is true that pity and justice do play a part in the debate. Because of pity, that is because they think their first decision harsh, the Athenians are moved to reconsider Mytilene's fate. Also in his argument, Diodotos does invoke justice when he argues that the Athenians will be committing a crime if they kill the Mytilenian

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<sup>8</sup>Samuel Clemens, "The War Prayer" in *The Norton Reader: An Anthology of Expository Prose*, general editor, Arthur M. Eastman, 7th ed. (New York and London: W. W. Norton & Company, 1965), 1115.



demos which had nothing to do with the revolt. But it must be remembered that even given this pity and sense of justice, Diodotos' argument from expediency barely prevails over Kleon's.

In conclusion, Thucydides' stasis excursus unlocks the door leading to a proper understanding of the Mytilenian Debate. Diodotos' argument of expediency is not indicative either of a calculating, rational, and reasonable Thucydides or of a Thucydides who is an *objective scientist*. Nor are Diodotos' words on the impossibility of being frank absurd. Both are a sign of the times, current and to come, for as Skione and Melos indicate once an ethics of wartime and of stasis takes a firm hold on Athens, Diodotos' narrow victory will not be repeated.

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