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Pluralism and Ecological Values: The Case of the Siskiyou National Forest, 1983-1992

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LOYOLA UNIVERSITY CHICAGO

PLURALISM AND ECOLOGICAL VALUES:
THE CASE OF THE SISKIYOU NATIONAL FOREST 1983-1992

VOLUME I

A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO
THE GRADUATE SCHOOL
IN CANDIDACY FOR THE DEGREE OF
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

BY
STEVEN DAVIS

CHICAGO, ILLINOIS
JANUARY 1994

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PREFACE

It is important in the field of political science to bridge the gap between broad-scale political theory and more specific empirical policy analysis. To fail at this endeavor is to produce work that is imbalanced; either being too shallow and empirically unconvincing or failing to tie into those larger questions of political inquiry which really matter.

This work represents an attempt to bridge that gap and explore the juncture where normative theory and empirical analysis intersect. The broader theoretical question at hand regards the performance and appropriateness of pluralism as a form of democratic organization. Does pluralism function as the optimal form of democratic decisionmaking and governance or is it, as critics claim, deeply flawed, especially in its treatment of certain supposedly more vulnerable types of policy initiatives?

This study concentrates upon ecological issues as the specific policymaking context within which such theoretical questions will be addressed. By analyzing in a given case the way in which ecological values, initiatives, and policies are treated within a pluralist system, this study examines both how pluralist structures influence this specific area and what this case tells us about the claims of pluralism as democratic theory.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

In the two years it has taken to complete this fairly huge endeavor, I have received the help of many and I would like to express here some of the deep appreciation I feel. First, I would like to thank all those in Oregon, whether timber officials or forest activists, who patiently, honestly, and openly provided me with the information this project required. I would especially like to thank the staff of Headwaters in this regard for their extraordinary helpfulness. I would also like to express my gratitude to former Siskiyou Supervisor Ron McCormick and all of the other U.S. Forest Service personnel I dealt with in the course of this study. Without exception, they were accessible, helpful, and courteous.

Closer to home, I would like to thank the Graduate School of Loyola University for the generous support they have given me in the form of the Schmitt Dissertation Fellowship and a 1991 travel grant. I would also like to express gratitude to all members of the political science department at Loyola for their support, but especially my dissertation committee--Barbara Bardes, John Fren dreis, and Alan Gitelson. They have always believed in me and my project and their assessibility, dependability, and wise guidance was perhaps the most important aspect in this project's success.

I must also thank my good friends Cliff Berkman and Steve Bacon for all their patient computer help, including getting me out of more than one serious jam. They have turned an inept Luddite into a fairly proficient word processor. I should also thank the folks at the late, great *Steep N' Brew* coffeehouse in Evanston, IL where the bulk of this work was conceived and written. Never once did they complain about the freeloader sitting in the corner writing feverishly for five hours on a seventy-five cent cup of coffee--the truest cafe spirit!

I reserve my deepest gratitude and affection for my parents for their steadfast love, support, and generosity and Candace Pantoga, my future wife, for helping me see this project through with much love and encouragement.

My acknowledgements cannot end without honoring the forests of this land from the magnificent old growth of the Siskiyou to the oak woods of my home. Since I was a young boy, they have graced me with solace and inspiration. I shall also never forget that these forests have provided much of the resources that this project has depended upon and so voraciously consumed. I only hope I will be able somehow to give back to the forests a fraction of what they have given me.

Steven Davis
Chicago, IL
May, 1993

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AFPA	American Forest Products Association
AFRA	American Forest Resource Alliance
AFSEEE	Association of Forest Service Employees for Environmental Ethics
ASQ	Annual Sales Quantity
bbf	billion board feet
bf	board feet
BLM	Bureau of Land Management
CEQ	Council on Environmental Quality
DEIS	Draft Environmental Impact Statement
EA	Environmental Assessment
EIS	Environmental Impact Statement
ESA	Endangered Species Act of 1973
FEIS	Final Environmental Impact Statement
FLPMA	Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976
FWS	United States Fish and Wildlife Service
FY	Fiscal Year
GAO	Government Accounting Office
HCA	Habitat Conservation Area
ISC	Interagency Scientific Committee
K-V	Knutson-Vandenberg (Act)
mmbf	million board feet

NEPA National Environmental Protection Act of 1969
NFMA National Forest Management Act of 1976
O & C Oregon and California
ODEQ Oregon Department of Environmental Quality
ODFW Oregon Department of Fish and Wildlife
ONRC Oregon Natural Resources Defense Council
PAC Political Action Committee
ROD Record of Decision
RPA Forest and Rangeland Renewable Resources
Planning Act of 1974
SNF Siskiyou National Forest
SORA Southern Oregon Resource Alliance
SOTIA Southern Oregon Timber Industries Association
SY/MU Sustained Yield/Multiple Use Act of 1960
WAFC Western Ancient Forest Campaign
WWPA Western Wood Products Association

CHAPTER 1

PLURALISM AND ECOLOGY

Among conservationists, there is an unspoken conviction that something in the American political process is inherently inhospitable to environmental protection; that "politics" undermines sound environmental policies established in the public interest while nature's private exploiters profit.

Walter Rosenbaum

If in fact environmentalism is costing an elite group billions of dollars--which it is--perhaps discarded theories of pluralism should be re-viewed and rethought.

Joseph Petulla

Pluralist Theory And Its Critics

The Development of Pluralist Theory

Although its intensity and fashionability have waxed and waned over the years, the debate between pluralism and its critics still remains the central issue in American democratic theory. As articulated in the 1950s and 60s by political scientists such as David Truman, Robert Dahl, and Earl Latham, pluralism and its closely related predecessor, group theory, propose that American politics can be understood as a system of competition and bargaining between and

among political elites and organized interests.¹ This interplay between and ever-shifting equilibrium among competing interests is, to the pluralists, the essential dynamic of American politics.

While featuring some elements of centralized authority, the pluralist process is also seen to be marked by a considerable fragmentation and decentralization of power and theoretically provides, therefore, numerous opportunities for political inputs to enter the system. It is, according to William Kelso, a "mixed form" of governance that is "neither highly centralized nor highly decentralized."² In terms of public participation, pluralist theorists claim that the optimal avenue for an individual to affect policy is by engaging in or supporting group activity relevant to that individual's concerns.³ As such, participation in a pluralist system is open, but not in a direct or strictly majoritarian manner.

While group theories of politics were to become the centerpiece of the discipline in the post-World War Two era, they were by no means new theories, but instead refinements and reworkings of much older ones. "The language of the

¹David Truman, *The Governmental Process* (New York: Knopf 1951); Robert Dahl, *Who Governs?* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1961); Earl Latham, "The Group Basis of Politics: Notes for a Theory" *American Political Science Review* 52:2 (June, 1952), 376-397.

²William Kelso, *American Democratic Theory* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1978), 216.

³Ibid. 4.

group approach," G. David Garson points out, "is rooted deeply in American political thought,"⁴ and at least in the American context, those roots can be traced all the way back to the eighteenth century.

James Madison, for one, clearly recognized the pivotal and unavoidable role of groups, or factions as he called them, in American politics. In fact, the bulk of Madison's political philosophy focused upon how a republic could best avoid their potentially ill effects. In addition to recommending that government structures be divided both by location (federal and state) and branch, Madison felt that factions could be controlled by constituting a republic large enough to embrace a great diversity of factions.⁵ This, it was thought, would create enough competition and rivalry amongst the numerous factions to retard the formation of majority faction mischief.⁶

A half-century later, John Calhoun in his own conservative way, reiterated this notion of the centrality of groups in American politics. As part of his defense of slaveholding interests, Calhoun argued that only his "concurrent majority" which recognized and respected established interests was truly constitutional. Calhoun rejected simple

⁴G. David Garson, *Group Theories of Politics* (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1978), 25-26.

⁵James Madison, "Federalist #10" in Roy P. Fairfield (editor), *The Federalist Papers* 2nd ed. (Garden City, NY: Anchor, 1966), 16-23.

⁶H.R. Mahood, *Interest Group Politics in America* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1990), 4.

numerical majorities as being akin to Madison's feared tyrannical majority factions.⁷

Finally, to this pair of proto-group theorists one certainly must add Alexis de Tocqueville whose keen eye long ago recognized the prominence of organized groups in American politics as he observed that, "In no country in the world has the principle of association been more successfully used or applied to a greater multitude of objects, than in America."⁸ Echoing Madison and Calhoun, Tocqueville found groups or "associations," as he called them, to be the only reliable obstacle to tyranny. Associations provided, to Tocqueville, an antidote to America's severe individualism which, by atomizing society and leaving each individual weak and helpless, left the public vulnerable to hysterical mass appeal and the tyranny of the majority.⁹

Another early group theorist, turn of the century political scientist Arthur Bentley, is often singled out as an especially seminal figure in the development of modern pluralist thought. Though largely ignored in his day, Bentley was resurrected a half-century later and hailed by pluralists as a genius.¹⁰ In an attack upon the legalism and formalism so prevalent in the political science of his day,

⁷John Calhoun, "A Disquisition on Government" in Kenneth Dolbeare (editor), *American Political Thought* (Chatham, NJ: Chatham House, 1984), 269-285.

⁸Alexis de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*, Richard Heffner (editor) (New York: Mentor, 1956), 95.

⁹*Ibid.* 198-202.

¹⁰Garson, 25-26.

Bentley developed a stark group determinism which rejected the significance of formal institutions in and of themselves. Instead, Bentley found the origins of all political activity in the interplay of groups. "The balance of group pressures," he stressed, "is the state of society" and society, as he saw it was "nothing other than the complex of groups that compose it."¹¹ Not merely satisfied to elevate the status of groups in the field of political science, Bentley sought to define all of the field in those terms. "When the groups are adequately stated," Bentley observed of political inquiry, "everything is stated, when I say everything, I mean *everything*."¹²

By the 1950s, the various group theories which had been around in one form or another for a century and a half began to be organized into a singular body of thought which soon thereafter gained dominance in political science. The earliest modern group theorists Truman and Latham, each presented far more subtle and sophisticated versions of Bentley's hypothesis which, while still maintaining the primacy of groups in politics, offered a much more solid analytical framework. Truman stresses that:

The behaviors that constitute the process of government cannot be adequately understood apart from groups, especially organized interest groups which are operative at any given point in time. Whether we look at an individual citizen, the executive secre-

¹¹ Arthur Bentley, *The Process of Government* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1908), 222, 259.

¹² Bentley quoted in Mahood, 5.

tary of a trade association, at a political functionary, at a legislator, administrator, governor, or judge, we cannot describe his participation in the government institution, let alone account for it, except in terms of interests with which he affiliates and with which he is confronted.¹³

Not long after Truman's groundbreaking *The Governmental Process*, Robert Dahl's *Who Governs?* continued to add subtlety, complexity, and multi-dimensionality to group theory. Dahl's work went beyond a crude reliance on groups as the only explanatory factor to include the role of government as its own entity as well as the structural characteristics of government regarding, for example, the degree of centralization, bureaucratic behavior, and the political rules of the game. The result of Dahl's effort, which came to be known as *pluralism*, represented the most sophisticated manifestation of group theory and dominated American political science throughout much of the 1960s.

The Nature of Pluralist Theory

From the start, pluralist theory has had both a descriptive and a prescriptive dimension.¹⁴ Not only do plural-

¹³ Truman, 502.

¹⁴ While many who write on this subject use the terms *group theory*, *interest group theory*, *interest group liberalism*, and *pluralism* interchangeably, Garson distinguishes group theory as the broader umbrella term under which pluralism is merely one particular reformulation. While technically that may be so, this study, like most of the literature, will employ the term pluralism (as it has thusfar) in a slightly less restrictive manner than does Garson. It shall encompass the work of Garson's "true pluralists" such as Dahl and his successors as well as those immediate group theory relatives of pluralism (such as the work of Truman or Latham) which speak to the same issues and capture many of

ists attempt to show how and why American politics can be so successfully characterized by pluralism, but also why this system is preferable to any other form of democratic organization. Broadly stated, the main points of pluralist theory are as follows:

1. *Groups and group interaction with government are at the center of American politics.* Empirically and normatively, pluralists adhere to the idea that the most effective and appropriate route for public participation in the political process is through the joining or supporting of the organization or organizations which best represent one's political interests. According to the pluralists, a system of civic participation channelled through groups is the optimal form for the representation of one's interests as it avoids the limitations of strictly electoral representation as well as the undemocratic excesses of more direct majoritarian styles of representation (such as, for example, referenda).¹⁵

2. *The American public is fragmented by a extreme diversity of political, social, and economic interests.* Consequently, identifying a single monolithic public interest is problematic at best, impossible at worst. Instead of thinking in terms of the public and the public's interest, plur-

the same themes. Thus, for the purposes of clarity and consistency the term *pluralism* will be used exclusively in this study. Garson, 91.

¹⁵William Kornhauser, *The Politics of Mass Society* (Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1959), 60-70; Kelso, chaps. 3-4.

alists tend to conceive of specific interests and specific *issue publics*. Issue publics are that sector of society which finds a given issue relevant enough to their own particular concerns and interests to actually or potentially participate.¹⁶

3. *Due to its relatively decentralized nature, the American political system has an abundance of entry points through which groups can gain the access to policymakers necessary for effective participation.* As a result, a fairly diverse collection of groups and public officials tend to be involved in any given policy decision. This decentralization extends access points both vertically and horizontally; that is, between federal, state, and local levels of government, as well as between various branches and/or agencies within any of those levels. Normatively, this situation is generally seen by pluralists as a quite beneficial expansion of opportunities for group (and thus ultimately citizen) involvement in policymaking and the redress of grievances.¹⁷

4. *Politics is, above all, a process of bargaining, negotiation and compromise forced upon competing interests.* Because of the decentralized nature of pluralist politics, practically any concerned or affected group in a given pol-

¹⁶ For a discussion of issue publics see Gerald Pomper, *Elections in America* (New York: Dodd, Mead, and Co., 1974), 94-95.

¹⁷ While a number of pluralists make this point, it is, perhaps, most thoroughly laid out in Wallace Sayre and Herbert Kaufman, *Governing New York: Politics in the Metropolis* (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1960).

icy decision has, according to the pluralists, at least some say. This abundance of potential veto points forces all the political actors involved to partake in a process of give-and-take invariably involving some degree of dealing, bargaining, and compromise. Dahl notes this characteristic of pluralist politics:

When one looks at American political institutions in their entirety....what stands out as a salient feature is the extraordinary variety of opportunities these institutions provide for an organized minority to block, modify, or delay a policy which the minority opposes. Consequently, it is a rarity for any coalition to carry out its policies without having to bargain, negotiate, and compromise with its opponents.¹⁸

One benefit of what Kelso calls the "open, fluid" nature of pluralism,¹⁹ is that it allegedly encourages a free and constant flow of information as each rival group wanting to influence policy will naturally communicate a great deal of information to bolster their case. As a result, the process of give-and-take bargaining works against the suppression of information by any policymaking elite or single interest.²⁰ The process, therefore, guarantees a broadening of policymaking debates.

In addition, the involvement of rival groups and the necessity of bargaining, according to the pluralists, will in most cases assure that the final policy outcome does not completely ignore or violate the interests of a particular

¹⁸ Robert Dahl, *Pluralistic Democracy in the United States* (Chicago: Rand McNally & Co., 1956), 326

¹⁹ Kelso, 13.

²⁰ *Ibid.* 16-19.

group. Thus, even if the outcome was not what that group initially sought, they were likely to have had at least enough input so that they were not completely swept aside.²¹ This compromise product of extensive bargaining is, to the pluralists, the closest that a democracy can come to addressing the public interest, if such a thing could be said to exist.

5. *The political system is self-regulating and thus corrects pronounced imbalances before any one interest can gain an excess of power and thereby seriously bias the process.* In a pluralist system, prolonged biases in what needs to be a fair and open arena of political competition are supposedly avoided through what Dahl terms "political slack" or what Truman calls the phenomenon of "potential groups."²² What both concepts convey is the notion that the mere existence of untapped power and influence and group mobilizing potential is often enough to deter existing interests from abusing their power. Truman clearly articulates this point:

The power of unorganized interests lies in the possibility that, if these wide, weak interests are too flagrantly ignored, they may be stimulated to organize for aggressive counteraction. In a society permitting a wide freedom of association, access to power is not confined to the organized groups in the population.²³

Dahl confirms that this excess capacity or "slack" to check bias or excessive power exists and can be activated if necessary. Thus, the system exists in an equilibrium of sorts

²¹ *Ibid.* chap.5.

²² Dahl, *Who Governs?*, 310; Truman, 114.

²³ Truman, 114.

which, if disrupted, will quickly work to correct the imbalance.²⁴

Another major factor inhibiting the abuse of power in the pluralist system is the sheer diversity of groups and interests. Much like Madison, pluralists take comfort in the rivalry of more groups rather than less. When "one center of power is set against another," contends Dahl, "power itself will be tamed, civilized, controlled and limited to decent human purposes" while "coercionwill be reduced to a minimum."²⁵ The danger of excess power is further decreased, argue the pluralists, by the similarly divided and decentralized government which is bound to the principles of federalism and checks and balances.

6. *In most policy areas, the role of the state is and ought to be primarily mediative.* Pluralist theorists claim that because of the fragmentation of power in the political system, as well as the government's own internally divided nature, the power of all concerned parties, including government, is constrained. Government's chief and most appropriate role, therefore, is seen to be as facilitator of the give-and-take process, referee of group competition, and reconciler of disparate interests.²⁶ This is as it should be, argue the pluralists, for if the government were to unilaterally act in a way that ignored the group dynamic and var-

²⁴ *Ibid.* 26-33.

²⁵ Dahl, *Pluralistic Democracy*, 24.

²⁶ For a general discussion of this idea see Kelso, 15-16.

ious groups' concerns and demands, the entire equilibrium of interests might come unhinged. In the pluralist vision, the state's proper role, then, is as one participant, albeit a crucial and central one, among many in the process of group interaction.²⁷

The Critics of Pluralism

While pluralism at one time completely dominated political science, it has never gone unchallenged. From the start, pluralism has faced counterarguments; some gleaned from pre-existing theories, others developed as a direct response and rebuttal. The critiques of pluralism fall roughly into one of two categories. The first includes the work of elite and critical theorists, such as C.Wright Mills, G. William Domhoff, or Ralph Miliband who fundamentally reject pluralism's validity as descriptive model.²⁸ Elite theory contends that power in the United States is dominated by a small, identifiable elite, while critical theorists deny the central role not only of interest groups, but the entire decisionmaking process itself. Instead, they see a system of elite symbol manipulation charading behind an empty democratic facade.

²⁷ Latham, 382.

²⁸ C. Wright Mills, *The Power Elite* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1956); G. William Domhoff, *Who Rules America?* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1967); Ralph Miliband, *The State in Capitalist Society* (New York: Basic Books, 1969).

Other critics of pluralism such as Theodore Lowi, Grant McConnell, Peter Bachrach and Morton Baratz or Robert Wolff, on the other hand, do not offer such a vigorous rejection of pluralism's empirical reality.²⁹ While many of these critics do have very specific empirical doubts about aspects of the pluralist model, unlike elite or critical theorists, they do not reject wholesale the existence of pluralist structures and processes in American politics. Instead, these critics either raise doubts about pluralism's normative desirability as a form of democratic organization or else empirically question certain descriptive aspects and assumptions of pluralist theory. These empirical reservations, however, are never raised in a way which denies the overall pluralistic nature of American politics.

For the purposes of this study, it will be assumed that, in the broadest conception of the term, the American political system is pluralistic, at least insofar as power is fragmented, political authority is divided, there exist numerous theoretical access points, and interest groups are involved, in varying degrees, in the policymaking process. Presuming this broadly defined pluralist nature of American politics is not to say that political reality perfectly fits

²⁹ Theodore Lowi, *The End of Liberalism* 2nd ed. (New York: W.W. Norton, 1979); Grant McConnell, *Private Power and American Democracy* revised ed. (New York: Vintage, 1970); Peter Bachrach and Morton Baratz, *Power and Poverty* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970); Robert Wolff, *The Poverty of Liberalism* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1968).

the pluralist model. Nor does this study's general acceptance of a pluralist political reality imply anything as to pluralism's normative desirability. Instead, it simply means that a broad understanding of pluralism as the American political context will provide the framework for this study and its attempt to explore pluralism and the claims of its critics. As such, the arguments of the elite and critical theorists, although certainly noteworthy, shall be considered outside the scope of this study.

The criticisms directed at pluralism have usually been voiced by detractors who advocate alternative forms of democratic organization such as those distinguished by Kelso.³⁰ Much of the disagreement between these competing alternative perspectives and pluralism revolves around the question of where the locus of power should lie in a democratic system.

On one hand, critics such as Lowi, Joseph Schumpeter, Samuel Huntington, or Robert Crain call for a centralization of power into the hands of a more rational, capable, and less discretionary elite.³¹ For these critics, elites who are insulated from the demands of special interests are best able to design and implement sound, innovative, and rational

³⁰ Kelso, 3-20.

³¹ Lowi, *The End of Liberalism*; Joseph Schumpeter, *Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy* (New York: Harper, 1950); Samuel Huntington, *American Politics: The Politics of Disharmony* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1981); Robert Crain, Elihu Katz, and Donald Rosenthal, *The Politics of Community Conflict* (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1969).

policies, resist the mass threats to civil liberties as Herbert McClosky suggests, and, according to Giovanni Sartori, otherwise act as a corrective to the mediocrity of the masses.³² To these elite-centralists, or polyarchal democrats, as Kelso terms them,³³ the appropriate avenue for public participation in politics is through the maintenance of elite accountability through electoral means.

Meanwhile, other critics of pluralism, such as Wolff, Bachrach and Baratz, Alan Altschuler, Milton Kotler, Richard Hamilton, and more recently Kirkpatrick Sale, Frank Bryan and John McClaughtry, and Murray Bookchin have all advocated quite the opposite--increased decentralization (beyond even pluralism's level) and dispersal of power to the community level.³⁴ They seek, in other words, a system of grassroots

³² Herbert McClosky, "Consensus and Ideology in American Politics" *American Political Science Review* 58:2 (June, 1964), 361-382; Giovanni Sartori, *Democratic Theory* (New York: Praeger, 1958), 96-124.

³³ Kelso, xi. I have chosen the the term *elite-centralists* to designate those theorists typified by Lowi who advocate increased centralized rule guided by a rational elite. The terms *elitists* or *elitist democrats* might become confused with the elite theory of Mills or Domhoff, while the term *polyarchal* is clouded by Dahl's usage which more akin in certain ways to pluralism.

³⁴ Wolff, *The Poverty of Liberalism*; Bachrach and Baratz, *Power and Poverty*; Alan Altschuler, *Community Control* (New York: Pegasus, 1970); Milton Kolter, *Neighborhood Government* (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1967); Richard Hamilton, *Class and Politics in the United States* (New York: Wiley & Sons, 1972); Kirkpatrick Sale, *Human Scale* (New York: Coward, McCann, and Geoghegan, 1980); Frank Bryan and John McClaughtry, *The Vermont Papers: Recreating Democracy on a Human Scale* (Post Mills, VT: Chelsea Green Publishing Co., 1989); Murray Bookchin, *The Ecology of Freedom* (Palo Alto, CA: Chesire, 1982).

participatory democracy. At a minimum, such a system must feature local control, decentralized jurisdictions, and extensive and meaningful opportunities for individual citizen participation in the decisionmaking process. Besides arguing that grassroots democracy is a logistically superior form of democratic organization,³⁵ the participatory democrats see political participation, as did their mentor Rousseau, as an end in and of itself. The actual act of participating, these critics argue, builds morality, virtue, and civic obligation rather than serving merely as a means by which to scramble for advantage.³⁶

The specific complaints about pluralism voiced by these diverse critics generally fall into one of two broad categories or what Kelso terms "perennial" aspects of democratic theory: issues relating to the process of decision-making and the administration of those decisions and those regarding the nature of participation and the mobilization of the various interests involved.³⁷

It is the former aspect of pluralism, decisionmaking and administration, which tends to concern elite-centralist critics the most and leads them to question pluralism's ef-

³⁵ Sale, Chap. 8.

³⁶ For a discussion on the personal benefits which political participation is alleged to bring see Terrence Cook and Patrick Morgan, *Participatory Democracy* (San Francisco: Canfield Press, 1971); this theme is also echoed in Wolff, *The Poverty of Liberalism* and Carole Pateman, *Participation and Democratic Theory* (Cambridge, MA: At the University Press, 1970).

³⁷ Kelso, 7.

ficacy as a policymaking process. Critics such as Lowi see pluralism as a haphazardly ineffective and inefficient manner by which to make policy, especially in areas that are complex, multi-dimensional, or involve the long-term national interest.³⁸ Such critics charge that pluralism so fragments power and leaves government so reluctant or unable to act decisively, that the entire policymaking process becomes paralyzed. Too often, what all the players can agree on rather than what is most sound and beneficial to the public interest becomes the criterion for such fragmented decisionmaking.

At the root of this paralysis, argues Lowi, is the pluralist system's profound aversion to the formalized and authoritative exercise of governmental power. Instead, public officials are alleged to be far more comfortable as a mere participant in the give-and-take of group bargaining; the state is thus reduced to being nothing more just than another interest. The costs of government's allergy to formal power are high, according to Lowi, and lead to a very troubling "discontinuity between politics and government."³⁹ The signs of this discontinuity include the inability of government to plan or determine independent goals, the withering of popularly controlled political institutions, and a stifling inertia which thwarts innovation and pre-

³⁸ Lowi, chaps. 4-6.

³⁹ *Ibid.* 36

serves the status quo and all of the privilege bound up into it. Rather than taking the bull by the horns, so to speak, and pursuing sound, rational, long-term policies informed by notions of principle, morality, and justice, Lowi accuses pluralism's weakling government of "yielding" to conflict and merely being content to "redistribute power by the maxim of each according to his claim."⁴⁰ Says Lowi:

By rendering formalism impotent, [pluralism] impairs legitimacy by converting government from a moralistic to a mechanistic institution. It impairs the potential of positive law to correct itself by allowing the law to become anything that eventually bargains itself out as acceptable to the bargainers.⁴¹

Lowi and other critics, such as McConnell also warn that pluralism frequently leads to policymakers becoming unduly influenced by the private interests they must deal with and supposedly regulate. Because pluralism's fragmentation isolates and compartmentalizes policymaking agencies into disconnected little realms, they become increasingly vulnerable to interest group penetration and even *capture*. As a result, argues McConnell, pluralism allows private interests to seize large chunks of public authority and use it to their benefit:

A large number of groups have achieved substantial autonomy for themselves and the isolation of important segments of government and public policy. The result has been the establishment of varying degrees of control and exercise of public authority by the private

⁴⁰ *Ibid.* 297.

⁴¹ *Ibid.* 63.

groups within the public areas with which they are concerned.⁴²

In addition to indicting pluralism on the grounds that it is poor at policymaking, critics also focus upon the question of just how open and fair pluralism's battlefield of interests really is. Some critics, especially those of a populist or communitarian bent, charge that pluralism, despite its supposedly self-regulating nature, contains an inherent bias against certain types of interests, namely those that are underprivileged, marginal, diffuse, or otherwise less robust. Bachrach and Baratz, Hamilton, Wolff, and others all point to pluralism's subtle and not-so-subtle biases which allow some groups to be heard while others are marginalized, shut out, or never get the chance to organize. As such, the critics maintain, pluralism in practice, despite its theoretical equality of opportunity, acts to defend the status quo. "The flaw in the pluralist heaven," as E.E. Schattschneider states in his famous quote, "is that the heavenly chorus sings with a strong upper-class accent."⁴³ Wolff affirms this as well:

Pluralist theory functions ideologically by tending to deny new groups or interests access to the political plateau. It does this by ignoring their existence in practice, not by denying their claim in theory. The result is that pluralism has a braking effect on social change.⁴⁴

⁴² McConnell, 7.

⁴³ E.E. Schattschneider, *The Semi-Sovereign People* (New York: Holt, Rinehart, & Winston, 1960), 35.

⁴⁴ Wolff, 156.

Even if pluralism is willing to recognize all comers on the political battlefield, critics contend that many interests cannot even make it onto the battlefield in the first place. Some either lack the resources, education, or inclination to organize or, as Mancur Olson demonstrates, have a stake in too diffuse or non-exclusive an interest to mobilize effectively, if at all.⁴⁵ According to critics, then, large segments of the population (the vast majority, argues Schattschneider) cannot penetrate what Schattschneider calls the "pressure system" and so because they exist in this group-oriented pluralist system, essentially go unrepresented.⁴⁶

Is There a Public Interest?

In reviewing the criticisms of pluralism from both a policymaking and participatory angle, it soon becomes clear that a fundamental bone of contention between pluralists and their opponents regards the notion of the public interest. The pluralists, influenced as they are by Lockean political philosophy, see society ultimately as a fragmented and diverse collection of self-interested individuals or groups of the similarly-interested locked in competition for advantage. The notion of a *true majority* in the pluralist's universe is a myth; all that really exists are *issue or atten-*

⁴⁵ Mancur Olson, *The Logic of Collective Action* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1965).

⁴⁶ Schattschneider, 35.

tive publics, those groups and individuals for whom a given issue is relevant and involves their interests.⁴⁷ The benefit of issue publics, the pluralists maintain, is that they assure that a given policy area will be most heavily influenced by those citizens who are more knowledgeable and concerned about and impacted by that issue. Thus a pluralist system has the ability to discern what the pluralists call *intensity*.⁴⁸ Also, pluralists argue that such fragmentation of interests, as Madison pointed out two centuries ago, helps to preserve liberty by preventing tyrannical mass movements.

In such an atomized political environment, the notion of the public interest is, consequently, quite limited. Because there is no singular public to the pluralists, there is no real public interest if by that one means an overriding, obviously discernable mass interest. Rather than a singular interest, there are instead many diverse and equally valid interests locked in competition. If it can be said at all that there is anything approaching a pluralist public interest, then it is not based upon an obvious a priori political good, but rather is the end result of the bargaining and accomodation of the political process. Since nearly every issue features diverse competing claims, what could more resemble the public interest, ask the pluralists, than

⁴⁷ Kelso, 62-63.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.* 82-83.

the compromise between all these factions? Thus, the pluralist public interest is, as Garson puts it, "social rationality emerging from group accomodation."⁴⁹

In stark contrast to the pluralist conception of the public interest is that of pluralism's critics. To nearly all the critics, whether elite-centralists, majoritarians, or participatory democrats, the public interest is singular and readily identifiable, as Wolff or Lowi would argue, through the employment of either moral or legal principles and standards or else merely as a reflection of the public's collective will (as populists or some participatory democrats would suggest). Just as pluralism betrays its liberal and Lockean roots on this issue, the critics' conception of the public interest exposes their theoretical heritage as well. Whether that heritage stems from Plato, Aristotle, Rousseau, or Burke, most of pluralism's critics adhere to a vision of society that is far more unified and organic than that of the pluralists. Consequently, if one views the polity as a single and whole community, then common problems and needs and desires could readily be identified and addressed by an active government executing policy based upon a combination of public mandate and moral principle.

In such a scenario, the wishes of interest groups (or *special interests* as they are called by their detractors) should account for little since they would not be the pri-

⁴⁹ Garson, 94.

mary vehicle for the articulation of the public's needs and desires. Thus, critics argue, the public interest stands far above and apart from the lesser and more narrow conflict of self-interests which they claim is all the pluralists ever recognize. "The genius of American politics," notes Wolff disapprovingly, "is its ability to treat even matters of principles as if they were conflicts of interest."⁵⁰ To the pluralists, though, this sort of talk not only raises the question of whose principles Wolff finds so obviously and unquestioningly valid, but also the dreaded specter of Madison's tyrannical factions, each claiming the mantle of public interest while riding roughshod over individual and especially minority rights.

The academic struggle that has pitted pluralism against its critics peaked in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Though certainly not resolved, this debate has quieted down considerably since then. But it has not been completely quiet. Without as shrill a tone, the debate has reemerged in the late 1970s and throughout the 1980s as pluralist scholars have conducted numerous smaller scale, more specialized studies which have attempted to empirically test at least certain aspects of the pluralist argument. As part of what Andrew McFarland calls the "critical pluralism" of the 1980s, these studies and this revised perspective in general have been mindful of prior critiques and have,

⁵⁰ Wolff, 137.

therefore, kept within more modest bounds than earlier, more theoretical works.⁵¹ While acceding to their opponents on certain of pluralism's more indefensible claims (such as Latham's portrayal of the passive state acting as just another interest with little autonomy), this revised pluralism has attempted to confirm the role of groups in the policymaking process, while asserting that equal opportunity amongst groups has grown as well.⁵² These groups are found to be operating as part of a very complex and fairly well-functioning relationship with various government agencies.⁵³ Not only is this revised vision of pluralism found to be empirically valid, contends Kelso, but a strong case could still be made for its normative superiority as well.⁵⁴

⁵¹ Andrew McFarland, "Why Interest Groups Organize: A Pluralist Reponse to Olson" from a paper delivered at the Western Political Science Association annual meeting, Seattle, WA (April 1991). In general, such a perspective can be found in: James Q. Wilson, *The Politics of Regulation* (New York: Basic Books, 1980); Paul Culhane, *Public Lands Politics* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press for Resources for the Future, 1981); John Kingdon, *Agenda, Alternatives, and Public Policies* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1984); Hugh Heclo, "Issue Networks and the Executive Establishment" in Anthony King (editor), *The New American Political System* (Washington D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1978); William Brown, *Private Interests, Public Policy, and American Agriculture* (Lawrence KS: University Press of Kansas, 1988).

⁵² See, for example, Culhane, *Public Lands Politics*; Mahood, *Interest Group Politics in America*; Browne, *Private Interests, Public Policy, and American Agriculture*; Christopher Bosso, *Pesticides and Politics*, (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1987).

⁵³ See, for example, Heclo, "Issue Networks and the Executive Establishment."

⁵⁴ Kelso, 25-34.

Pluralism and Ecological Values⁵⁵

The Politics of Ecology

As mentioned before, the debate over pluralism, whether on the level of broad theorizing or more specialized case studies, has concentrated on the questions of how effectively and autonomously policymakers and their agencies function and whether the pluralist process discriminates against certain interests and their policy goals. There is a policy area from which to examine these questions and the arguments of the pluralists and their critics which, although quite well-suited for this task, has been largely overlooked. The politics of ecological concern as Dean Mann complains, "scarcely receives mention" in the debate over pluralism, being "clearly subsidiary to the dominant issues of economic policy and social relations."⁵⁶ And yet, ecological politics provide the scholar with a unique opportunity to probe pluralist theory for several reasons.

First of all, ecological matters, perhaps more so than just about any other policy area, feature incredibly complex, interrelated and long-term issues.⁵⁷ As any biologist

⁵⁵ For a far more in-depth discussion of the nature of ecological values than this section provides, see appendix A.

⁵⁶ Dean Mann, "Democratic Politics and Environmental Policy" in Sheldon Kamieniecki, Robert O'Brien, and Michael Clarke (editors), *Controversies in Environmental Politics* (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1986), 17.

⁵⁷ Ecological matters in this study will broadly be defined as issues involving the aesthetic, spiritual, and biological dimensions of objects in the natural world.

can attest to, they involve principles whose intricacy humankind is only scarcely beginning to unravel and comprehend as well as systems which often proceed at a glacial pace and in quite subtle ways. In this way, then, ecological policy provides the perfect archetype for the complex and long-range policies which Lowi accuses pluralist policymakers of so gravely mishandling.

In addition to, and perhaps even more important than their complex nature is the fact that ecological concerns can be so intangible. Ecological values, especially those immediately divorced from human health or safety concerns tend to be far less tangible, quantifiable, and material than those of many other interests in pluralist competition. According to Daniel Henning and William Mangun:

Many values and considerations found in environmental administration are of an intangible nature and consequently are difficult or impossible to define or quantify. It is extremely difficult if not impossible to assign economic values to living resources due to the complexities and ambiguities associated with their being given proper weight and consideration.⁵⁸

In other words, ecological values involve concepts that go well beyond the standard *who gets what, when, and how?* of the give-and-take politics of pluralism. Ecological concerns depend upon measures of value which are often not commonly recognized or understood within the political process. Rather than relying upon traditional and widely accep-

⁵⁸ Daniel Henning and William Mangun, *Managing the Environmental Crisis* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1989), 4-5.

ted economic measures of worth, ecological values are usually measured in terms of fairly intangible emotional, aesthetic, and biological justifications (see appendix A). To an ecologist, therefore, an immense ancient tree in an old growth forest is more than the board feet of timber which the policymaking realm has traditionally measured it by.

The advocates of ecology complain that such subtleties are easily lost in the more quantitatively-oriented pluralist process. The tendency of the pluralist process to perceive of political demands in terms of self-interest, especially materially quantifiable self-interest, might attest to the fact that it is the language of economics it is most comfortable speaking. If true, then ecological values might have an especially hard time competing as they risk occupying something of a pluralist no-man's-land where the language of ecology is not reliably spoken nor understood. The early Forest Service wilderness advocate Bob Marshall noted this gap when he characterized the arguments of preservation as being "subtle and difficult to express" as opposed to the "concrete and direct" language of development.⁵⁹ Naturalist Wallace Stegner puts this issue in more partisan terms:

Being an intangible and spiritual resource, [the wilderness idea] will seem mystical to the practical-

⁵⁹ Bob Marshall quoted in Roderick Nash, *Wilderness and the American Mind* revised ed. (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press 1973), 20.

minded--but then anything that cannot be moved by a bulldozer is likely to seem mystical to them.⁶⁰

Because they are often speaking in terms of such disparate measures of value, ecologists and their opponents very often find themselves politically in zero-sum situations, and with no type of politics is pluralism more uncomfortable. The problem for the pluralist process is that zero-sum situations tend to preclude, or at least make very difficult, much of the accomodation and bargaining that define pluralism. The essential question that arises then, is whether or not that discomfort translates into a bias against and marginalization of ecological interests and their initiatives just as critics charge pluralism does to other disadvantaged interests. Robert Paehlke suggests that this may be the case:

In this context [that is, pluralism], environmental groups often seem foreign to the political decision-making process. Environmental issues are treated as inconvenient, time-consuming add-ons.⁶¹

Understanding just whose interests are identified with ecological values can be as complex as appreciating the values themselves. Although they definitely constitute a distinct political interest, ecologists, like other "collective" interests which Olson identifies, are, in many ways, a special case. This is because their interest is so broad,

⁶⁰Wallace Stegner quoted in Walter Rosenbaum, *Environmental Politics and Policy* (Washington D.C.: CQ Press, 1985), 255.

⁶¹Robert Paehlke, *Environmentalism and the Future of Progressive Politics* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1989), 210.

diffuse, and immaterial. Any group which speaks to these sorts of large-scale, non-exclusive interests invariably terms themselves a public interest; that is, a supposedly aloof, selfless defender of what is in the whole public's best interest.

Such interests also commonly play to the fact that they themselves have no self-interest vested in the pursuit of their goals. In the case of ecological interests, aside from a few wilderness outfitters or kayak guides, this indeed may be true regarding *materially quantifiable* self-interest, but in terms of the more intangible dimensions of self-interest, such individuals may actually have much at stake. Any group ideologically and emotionally invested in a cause cannot help but have at least some degree of personal, psychological self-interest in that cause. Ecologists would be the first to admit to the spiritual and emotional benefits which the wilderness accrues for them. Still, they would argue that the protection of the planet's complex ecosystems is hardly on the same level of interest as the mill owner trying to protect the steady flow of timber into his mill. Whether ecologists are a special type of public interest or just another self-interested faction fighting it out on the pluralist battlefield amongst all the other equally valid factions is a question that strikes at the heart of the debate between the pluralists and their critics.

Ecological matters are by no means the only policy area within pluralist politics which transcend distributive and/or easily quantifiable concerns or involve self-proclaimed public interests. Political battles that have raged over school prayer, abortion, flag burning, and federal funding for the arts are just a few examples of issues which also involve less tangible, non-quantifiable interests and very emotional, symbolically potent issues. In fact, it might be said that, to some extent, even the most seemingly tangible issues have their intangible aspects. Thus, even fairly standard distributive issues involving, for instance, taxes or various benefit programs could be said to have a strong emotional and symbolic dimension which also cannot be easily quantified. Still, ecological values and issues stand out. Despite a potential intangible dimension to practically any interest, ecological interests, along with a few others, have goals and values which are, for the most part, exclusively non-economic.

Ecological Values and the Case of the Siskiyou National Forest

Because of this distinctness, ecological policymaking offers an especially good opportunity to determine how pluralism operates and its theoretical claims hold up when confronted with challenging, often zero-sum, policy dilemmas and demands. Does the political system's fragmentation and numerous points of access provide, as pluralists like Dean

Mann might suggest, the guarantee that marginalized or fragile (in our case ecological) values will gain a forum and a voice which otherwise, perhaps in another system of democratic organization, might be denied them?⁶² Or does the short-term economically-oriented policymaking patchwork of pluralism leave supposedly vulnerable ecological values skewered on what Rosenbaum calls the "pikes of the politicians"?⁶³ These are the chief questions that this study will concern itself with.

In order to address these questions, the broad-scale theoretical claims of the pluralist model and its critics must be empirically tested. One way to achieve this is to explore in-depth a specific case of political conflict involving explicit ecological values and issues as we earlier defined them.

The case which will be explored in this study involves the political battle over the Siskiyou National Forest in southwestern Oregon. Since the early 1980s, local groups have been trying to prevent the Siskiyou from being logged and having logging roads built into it. During the mid and late 1980s this issue heated up and merged with the larger regional, and later national effort to save the old growth forests of the Pacific Northwest and the threatened Northern spotted owl which inhabits the forests.

⁶² Mann, "Democratic Politics and Environmental Policy."

⁶³ Walter Rosenbaum, *The Politics of Ecological Concern* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1977), 93.

I have chosen the Siskiyou case for a number of reasons. First, it involves very basic and explicit ecological values which are, at least in the short-term, not directly related to human health or safety. In other words, the readily identifiable and tangible human welfare interests that are evident in the pursuit of some ecologically informed policy demands such as, say, preventing ozone depletion, the greenhouse effect, or toxic dumping are less obvious and more indirect in the case of the Siskiyou forest. Therefore, the values which foster a desire for the forest's protection can be less easily confused or diluted with matters of quantifiable self-interest or economic rewards. What is at stake here for the Siskiyou's defenders are the symbolic, spiritual, aesthetic, and ecological aspects of the forest.⁶⁴ The Siskiyou case is, in other words, a very straightforward example of fairly intangible values competing in a pluralist system against far more tangible, quantifiable, and (as far as pluralism goes) traditional interests and values. In the case of the Siskiyou, these opposing values have been largely, though not exclusively,

⁶⁴ Concerning that last, ecological, aspect, it must be said that environmentalists would make a very strong case that, in the long-run, human welfare is indeed very much tied up with the forest's fate. This is a central tenet of the ecologic perspective. In terming the ecological interests at stake as being not directly related to human health or safety, I do not intend to rule out this perspective. What I am trying to convey is that human health and safety interests in the forest's continued existence are usually long-term, indirect, and often subtle rather than obvious, direct, and immediate.

material and utilitarian in nature and involve the economic interests of those who make a livelihood from the logging of this national forest.

In addition to the explicitness of its ecological values, the politics of the Siskiyou case closely mirror the pluralist process in that they provide sets of actors at various levels of jurisdiction (both horizontally and vertically) and ultimately involve the pluralist system at many equally important points.

Broadly, this case study attempts to address two major issues. First is the issue of how ecological values and initiatives fare in a pluralist political process. Is this process inherently hostile towards and biased against ecological concerns or is it the best system that could be hoped for at least in regards to allowing peripheral values the chance to be heard? Secondly (though this is really part of the previous issue), this study attempts to determine how valid the critics' major complaints against pluralist theory, both empirical and normative, are, at least in the context of ecological issues. In addition to examining their critiques of pluralism, the question of how the critics' specific prescriptions would affect ecological values and initiatives is considered as well: would these reforms really improve the success of ecological interests as many critics claim?

To address these issues, both the participatory and decisionmaking aspects of the pluralist process in the Siskiyou National Forest must be considered. More specifically, such an analysis encompasses the following questions:

1. Were there inherent biases or serious imbalances in interest group resources, organization, and mobilization capacity which seriously harmed or limited ecological interests? If there was a discrepancy in raw resources was there enough "political slack" to offset these inequalities?

2. Were there biases amongst administrative or other decisionmakers which limited ecological interests' access to the policymaking process or prevented their demands and initiatives from being seriously considered?

3. Were there structural biases in the political system, especially in regards to levels of decentralization, which militate against the success of ecological values and initiatives?

Other research has touched upon this issue of pluralism and environmental values and pondered some questions similar to those addressed in this study. They regard whether the structure of American government and its policymaking process is well-disposed towards dealing with environmental concerns or whether it is inherently hostile and biased against them. A number of scholars argue in favor of the latter scenario. While representing a variety of perspectives, these critics of pluralism would all agree with

Rosenbaum's description of the perceived disadvantage of ecological values in a pluralist system:

Many [environmentalists]...recognize they are operating in a milieu where the opposition has historically enjoyed the greater advantage and success. Under the most favorable of conditions, environmentalists expect a hard, uncertain battle in an unfriendly arena.⁶⁵

Kraft, writing in 1974, is even more forthright and specific about this "unfriendly arena":

[T]he dominant political response to the ecological crisis has been characterized by marginal and superficial attention to, understanding of, and concern for ecological problems; a weak and uncertain commitment to new environmental priorities....; timidity and moderation at best in public policy developments....; the frequent use by politicians of rhetorical and symbolic gestures as a substitute for material, real accomplishments; dedication to palliative measures....In short, the political response has favored inertia and old priorities rather than rigorous and imaginative progress and new priorities.⁶⁶

Harold and Margaret Sprout offer a similar critique of the pluralist system's piecemeal approach to ecological issues,⁶⁷ while William Ophuls argues that the individual self-interest basis of pluralism is woefully inadequate for dealing with ecological matters.⁶⁸

There are also those who see pluralism in a much more favorable light. Far from being inherently hostile, plural-

⁶⁵ Rosenbaum, *The Politics of Ecological Concern*, 93.

⁶⁶ Michael Kraft, "Ecological Politics and American Government: A Review Essay" in Stuart Nagel (editor), *Environmental Politics* (New York: Prager Publishers, 1974), 148.

⁶⁷ Harold Sprout and Margaret Sprout, *The Context of Environmental Politics* (Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 1978).

⁶⁸ William Ophuls, *Ecology and the Politics of Scarcity* (San Francisco: W.H. Freeman, 1977).

ism is seen by some as ecology's best, if not only, chance to influence policy. While admitting that pluralism may offer some difficulties, these advocates of pluralism, including Mann, Petulla, Paehlke, Howard McCurdy, and Norman Vig and Michael Kraft claim there is no better alternative.⁶⁹

McCurdy defends pluralism as being more democratic and beneficial to the environment than more centralized alternatives, while Kraft undergoes at least a partial change of heart from his earlier works as he and Vig proclaim that:

Pluralism and flexibility in governance, as well as in economic activities, permit widespread experimentation and social change when challenges arise. Popular mobilization that results from voluntary cooperation tends to outlast coerced obedience, as we have learned.⁷⁰

The research into pluralism's treatment of ecological values is incomplete however. When attempts have been made to address broad theoretical questions about pluralism and environmental issues, such studies have often failed to accompany their claims with detailed empirical support. On the other hand, when such detailed empiricism is indeed applied to environmental policy issues, it usually takes the form of

⁶⁹ Mann, "Democratic Politics and Environmental Policy"; Joseph Petulla, *American Environmentalism* (College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 1980); Robert Paehlke, "Environmental Values and Democracy: The Challenge of the Next Century" in Norman Vig and Michael Kraft, *Environmental Policy in the 1990s* (Washington D.C.: CQ Press, 1990); Howard McCurdy, "Environmental Protection and the New Federalism: The Sagebrush Rebellion and Beyond" in Kamieniecki, et al.; Norman Vig and Michael Kraft, "Conclusion: Toward a New Environmental Agenda" in Vig and Kraft.

⁷⁰ Vig and Kraft, 385.

a narrowly focused examination of some small aspect of the policymaking process, thereby failing to explore any larger theoretical implications. Michael Kraft disapprovingly notes the proliferation of such microanalysis in environmental policy studies:

One of the major weaknesses of the social science literature on ecological matters, in fact, is a notable failure to come to grips with such questions [of whether or not pluralist institutions and structures are inherently incapable of addressing ecological problems]....while deficient in attending to these tough and subversive questions, we have by comparison absolutely lavished attention on trivial descriptions of routine issues in contemporary environmental politics and administration, on microanalysis of largely inconsequential environmental behavior, and on the development of methodological sophistication in policy analysis that seems greatly to exceed the marginal payoffs of the final product.⁷¹

Although the more specific research relevant to this study probably does not deserve so harsh a criticism, Kraft touches on an important point regarding political science's treatment of the "big questions" of environmental policy wherein it sometimes cannot see the theoretical forest for the empirical trees.

Plan of the Study

In order to comprehensively explore the effect a pluralist political system has upon ecological policymaking and what this says about pluralism itself, it will be necessary in this study to approach the issue from several angles. First, though, an overview of the issues at hand and the

⁷¹ Kraft, "Ecological Politics," 146.

relevant political events that have thusfar occurred must be presented. Chapters two and three provide such an overview as they lay down the basic facts and history of this case.

The next chapter focuses upon the manner in which the various interests involved in the Siskiyou case have articulated demands, mobilized supporters and resources, and participated in the process. Such an investigation will shed light upon those issues in the debate over pluralism which revolve around the nature of interest group activities and allegations of marginalization. How effectively, for example, did the ecological interests organize and mobilize? Was there a great disparity between the resources available to the ecological interests and their opponents and if so, did this affect their ability to effectively participate? What role did the way in which demands were articulated and symbols manipulated play in the competition between interests? Did this aspect of the interest group competition serve at all to compensate for any material inequality in group resources or was it simply another function of resource advantage?

Chapter five turns to the issue of bureaucratic administration in the Siskiyou National Forest, concentrating primarily upon whether pluralist or critical models of administration are most appropriate in this case. For instance, did ecological interests gain sufficient access to the decisionmaking process? Were their values and policy

objectives taken seriously by policymakers? Were they weighed in a manner commensurate with the level and skill of organization behind them or was there a consistent bias preventing this? If there was a bias, what was the nature of this bias; was it caused by internal agency norms and values or outside client pressures or, perhaps, various immutable principles of bureaucratic behavior?

Still within the realm of the decisionmaking process, the following chapter will address the critics', especially Lowi's, allegations that the very structure of pluralism, most particularly its decentralization, is ill-designed for and inept at producing sound, rational policy. Both the effects of policy fragmentation in the Siskiyou and the alternative of centralization are considered. Critics put forth other alternatives to pluralism besides elite centralization, specifically radical decentralization or majoritarianism, and in chapter seven, this study speculates upon the validity of these other alternatives. Finally, the last chapter moves on to draw some conclusions about pluralism and ecology in the Siskiyou battle.

CHAPTER 2

THE BATTLE FOR THE SISKIYOU NATIONAL FOREST

Americans....may be said not to perceive the mighty forests that surround them till they fall beneath the hatchet.

Alexis de Tocqueville

....the Forest Service has announced plans to begin clearcutting much of the remaining unprotected public forest in the Siskiyou. In the hamlets around the Rogue River, clusters of people say that they will die to prevent that from happening. Few people doubt them.

Timothy Egan

They just created Appalachia in the Northwest.

President, Medford Timber Company

Like a stranger who defies stereotype upon first acquaintance, the Siskiyou are hard to figure. A little incongruent, at times spooky.

Timothy Egan

This case study revolves around the political struggle over one particular national forest, the Siskiyou. Before any attempt is made to analyze how the politics of this forest relate to larger questions of ecological policymaking and pluralist democratic theory, though, the forest's story must be told. This chapter and the next, therefore, lay out

the political history of the Siskiyou National Forest and the larger old growth controversy that it was a part of for the period of 1983 to 1992.

The Siskiyou Forest: The Natural Context

In the northwest corner of this continent, from northern California to southern Alaska, ocean currents and buckled jet streams conspire to produce a gush of moisture and mild air which the region's mountains wring dry. With annual precipitation in excess of two hundred inches in some areas, the Pacific Northwest is a place which for millenia has produced immense trees and vast forests. In fact, these trees, which often reach astonishing height, girth, and age, and the forests they are a part of, are estimated to comprise the greatest density and mass of living organic matter on the entire planet.¹ The remnants of such forests are known today as *old growth*.

To describe old growth is to use a good deal of superlatives; tallest, heaviest, widest, oldest. The precise definition of old growth, however, is as politically significant and contentious as is the struggle over its future. Those who favor the continued logging of these forests use fairly liberal definitions that describe quite a bit more

¹At four hundred tons per acre, an average old growth forest in the Pacific Northwest far outweighs its tropical rainforest counterpart which measures only 185 tons per acre. Catherine Caufield, "The Ancient Forest" *New Yorker* (14 May 1990), 46.

acreage than the far more stringent interpretations of old growth adhered to by environmentalists.

Perhaps the closest thing to a standard definition has been established by Forest Service biologist and old growth expert Jerry Franklin who identifies specific criteria a forest must meet to be considered old growth. According to Franklin, old growth forests must contain trees of mixed age and species including a number of very large and very old trees. In addition, old growth forests must have a certain amount of standing and downed dead trees and organic matter.²

For decades, the conventional wisdom regarding old growth forests was that they were, as one Forest Service silviculturist termed them in 1952, a "biological desert,"³ too dense and dark and static to harbor much flora or fauna. Moreover, since the biggest trees in these mature forests are slow-growing, not growing at all, or even dying, they have traditionally been seen by foresters as a monumental

²Specifically, Franklin lays out five criteria: (1) there must occur two or more tree species with a wide range of ages and sizes amongst individual trees; (2) six to eight coniferous trees per acre must measure at least thirty inches in diameter and be at least two hundred years old; (3) the forest must have a non-uniform, multi-layered canopy; (4) there must exist two to four standing dead trees (snags) per acre, measuring at least twenty inches in diameter and fifteen feet tall; and (5) on the ground must lie at least ten tons per acre of fallen logs, including at least two sections twenty-four inches in diameter and fifty feet long. These criteria are summed up in Herbert McLean, "Paying the Price for Old Growth" *American Forests* (October 1991), 25.

³Caufield, 48.

waste. In the parlance of the logger they are "overripe" or "decadent"; that is, just sitting there taking up land upon which rapidly growing young trees could be established instead.

It was not until Franklin's seminal 1981 study of old growth that myths regarding its biological impoverishment were dispelled.⁴ Rather than being an "overmature desert," what Franklin found was that the ecologically mature or climax stage known as old growth is the biologically richest and most complex in a Northwest forest's life. Franklin describes intricate ecological interrelationships and an ecosystem of almost mind-boggling complexity and diversity. Like the tropical rainforests, old growth forests play host to thousands of specialized plant, animal, and microbiotic species which perform, as former BLM biologist Chris Maser has termed it, "a ballet of interaction."⁵

Towards the southern end of the historic range of the Pacific old growth forests, straddling the Oregon-California

⁴USDA Forest Service, Pacific Northwest Forest and Range Experiment Station, *Ecological Characteristics of Old Growth Douglas-fir Forests*, by Jerry Franklin et al., General Technical Report PNW-118 (1981).

⁵Chris Maser quoted in David Fishman, "America's Ancient Forests" *E Magazine* (October 1989). So precise and efficient are these interactions and processes that the old growth forest is a system in near-perfect balance, consuming precisely what it produces and therefore wasting practically no organic matter. Such a system, barring cataclysm, could theoretically remain stable indefinitely. Yet as stable as it is, old growth is also extremely fragile; if any part of the system is removed, from mammals to the lowliest nitrogen-fixing root fungi, the entire process could unravel. Caufield, 49.

border, lies a region of exceptional botanical and geological interest. Where the northern edge of the Siskiyou mountains meet and blend into the Coastal Range further to the west is found the Siskiyou National Forest. Within this national forest are perhaps the largest remaining unlogged and roadless blocks of old growth forest in the continental United States.⁶

Unlike more typical old growth regions in northern Oregon and Washington, the Siskiyou area, which has what is classified as a Mediterranean climate, features very hot, dry summers, frequent fires, and less rainfall.⁷ As a result, the old growth in the Siskiyou is, for the most part, not quite as immense or long-lived and the soils are thinner and more fragile than in the cool, dripping wet forests further up the coast. In relation to most Pacific Northwest ecosystems, therefore, the Siskiyou is an anomaly; dry enough to spark fearsome fires and support sparse desert-like habitats in some places and yet rainy enough to produce towering old growth forests including the northernmost stands of coast redwoods, the world's tallest tree.⁸

⁶Timothy Egan, *The Good Rain* (New York: Knopf, 1990), 164.

⁷The Siskiyou receive only 20-160 inches of rain compared to 100-200 inches further north. Robert Sterling, "In a Strikingly Different Ecological Overlap Zone" *Medford Mail Tribune* (25 June 1989).

⁸Egan, 161; Jonathan Nicholas, "The Once and Future Forest" (Portland) *Oregonian* (20 June 1988).

Because of its unique geological features,⁹ the very ancient Siskiyou mountains have for millions of years served as an evolutionary crossroads, nursery, and gene pool for much of the continent west of the Mississippi.¹⁰ Not surprisingly, such evolutionary continuity and centrality has led to the development of an unusual level of biological diversity and complexity in the Siskiyou's plant and animal communities as botanist Robert Whittaker points out:

This [the Siskiyou] is an area of biological interest as great as that of the Southern Appalachians....as dramatic an expression of relationships of natural communities to geological formation as is to be found anywhere in the world.¹¹

In terms of both flora and fauna, this purported birthplace of the modern coniferous forest is home to the biologically uncommon and significant. Over 1,400 plant species, of which more than one hundred have been classified as either endangered, rare, or sensitive occur here,¹² as does the Rogue River system, described by the Forest Service as "some of the most valuable salmon and steelhead habitat

⁹Unlike most all other mountain ranges on the continent, the Siskiyou and its parent Klamath mountains have an east-west rather than north-south orientation. This unique orientation is thought to have possibly been responsible for blocking the periodic advances of the glaciers which crushed the forests of the north-south ranges. As a result, scientists believe that the Siskiyou region has been temperate and continuously vegetated for 40 million years. Caufield, 72-73; Egan, 161.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*

¹¹ Robert Whittaker, *Vegetation of the Siskiyou Mountains, Oregon and California*, Ecological Monographs Series, vol. 30 (1960), 279-338.

¹² Egan, 161; Caufield, 73.

in the United States."¹³ In addition, rare or endangered fishers, wolverines, pileated woodpeckers, and the northern spotted owl are found in the Siskiyou. Rarest of all might be Bigfoot, Sasquatch, or the Hermit of the Siskiyou as he is locally called, whose elusive presence, real or imagined, has haunted this region for ages.¹⁴

The Siskiyou Forest: The Human Context

Covering 1,092,302 acres of land over parts of Curry, Josephine, and Coos Counties in southwestern Oregon and a very small portion of Del Norte County in extreme northern California, the Siskiyou National Forest is one of the 155 national forests administered by the United States Forest Service¹⁵ (see figure 1). The agency manages the forests under what is called a *multiple use* mandate which includes authorization to harvest timber on the forest.

The Forest Service, which is part of the Department of Agriculture, oversees from its Washington D.C. headquarters nine regional offices.¹⁶ One of these, Region Six (Oregon and Washington), includes the Siskiyou National Forest. Individual national forests are administered by a forest su-

¹³ USDA Forest Service, Pacific Northwest Region, Siskiyou National Forest, *Land and Resource Management Plan Final Environmental Impact Statement* (Region 10: GPO, 1989), sec. I, 15.

¹⁴ Egan, 161.

¹⁵ There are nineteen national grasslands under its jurisdiction as well.

¹⁶ Several million acres of additional public forestlands in central and southern Oregon are administered by the Department of Interior's Bureau of Land Management (BLM).


pervisor who reports to one of the nine regional foresters who in turn answers to the Chief of the Forest Service in Washington D.C. The Siskiyou National Forest, which is headquartered in the city of Grants Pass, OR, is further decentralized into five ranger districts.¹⁷ Each of these ranger districts, with headquarters in nearby towns, is administered by a district ranger.

The area surrounding the Siskiyou National Forest is a fairly rural region situated several hundred miles in any direction from a major metropolis.¹⁸ The largest city in the region is Medford with a population of approximately forty thousand people. Unlike the increasingly diversified economies of the Portland area and a good deal of Washington state, the economy of southwestern Oregon is still heavily dependent upon timber production. Providing a little over 17% of total employment in the four-county area, the lumber and wood products industry is the single largest employer in

¹⁷ These ranger districts are Powers in the far northern portion of the forest, Gold Beach in the north-central, Galice in the east-central, Chetco in the southwest, and Illinois Valley in the southeast.

¹⁸ The region around the Siskiyou, defined by the Forest Service as the "primary area of economic and social influence" consists of the three counties in which the forest lies as well as nearby Jackson County which includes the city of Medford. *Land and Resource Management Plan FEIS*, sec. III, 128.

FIGURE 1
THE SISKIYOU VICINITY



the region.¹⁹ Other major employers in the region include government, tourism, agriculture, and fisheries.²⁰

Communities within this four-county area having what the Forest Service calls, "close socioeconomic ties" to the forest include Medford, Grants Pass, Brookings, Gold Beach, Port Orford, Powers, and Cave Junction²¹ (see figure 1). Besides the direct and indirect employment which the wood products industry provides, communities in this area also depend upon the portion of timber receipts which the Forest Service pays to the counties. On most national forest land, counties earn a quarter of Forest Service receipts from timber sales and in the 17% of the Siskiyou's area that is specially classified as *Oregon and California* lands, counties are supplemented with an additional 25% of receipts.²²

¹⁹ *Ibid.* sec. III, 129.

²⁰ Amongst the agricultural activities in this region is a great deal of illicit marijuana production which has become, in fact, the area's number one cash crop. Egan, 165.

²¹ USDA Forest Service, Pacific Northwest Region, Siskiyou National Forest, *Land and Resource Management Plan* (Region 10: GPO, 1989), sec. I, 4.

²² *Land and Forest Management FEIS*, sec. II, 211. Counties are offered either seventy-five cents per federal acre or 25% of receipts. In the high-yield national forests of the Northwest, the latter has always been far more lucrative. As for the so-called Oregon and California (O&C) lands, they were confiscated by the federal government in 1916 from the Oregon and California Railroad which had engaged in massive fraud with land granted to them. The O&C lands operate under a different charter which mandates a higher rate of payment to local governments. While most O&C lands are now under BLM jurisdiction, some acreage does occur in the National Forest system, including the Siskiyou. Kathie Durbin, "BLM Mandate Collides With Owl" from special report: "Forests in Distress" *Oregonian* (15 October 1990), 10. For full statistics regarding county receipts, see *Land and Forest Management Plan FEIS*, sec. III, 132.

Within this region's communities, a diversity of lifestyles exist. In addition to the socially conservative loggers, farmers, ranchers, and fishermen who have traditionally populated this region, southwestern Oregon has for several decades served as a magnet for individuals who abide by alternative lifestyles. Drawn to the region's rural character and scenic beauty, a good number of such individuals have settled in this region, a few living in communes, or more commonly, small communities such as Takilma.²³ These less traditional residents of the area are most often employed or self-employed in small cottage industries or in the recreational sector.²⁴

That logging has traditionally been king in southwestern Oregon is written all over the land in the patchwork of second growth forests and clearcuts and logging roads that are evident throughout the countryside. When the first loggers arrived in this region a century and a half ago, many coming from the completely spent timberlands of the upper Great Lakes, they settled in the best timber growing regions in the lowlands and coastal areas.²⁵ When the Siskiyou National Forest was established around the turn of the cen-

²³ Egan, 169.

²⁴ This is not to imply that all individuals in the region with alternative values or lifestyles are migrants from elsewhere; there are also many native Oregonians amongst their ranks. Also, although many are environmental activists, I am in no way implying that such individuals are synonymous with the environmental community in this region.

²⁵ Caufield, 60.

tury, it was relegated to the steepest, most mountainous forestlands.

While logging commenced soon after settlement, it was not until the 1920s that large-scale operations began. From that time until the 1950s, private lands were heavily logged, to the point where today practically no significant acreage of old growth exists outside of the public domain.²⁶ In southwestern Oregon as well as the entire Pacific Northwest, the cutting reached its peak in 1952 when the annual cut for the whole region climbed to a record 9.8 billion board feet (bbf) of timber.²⁷

Such a rapid depletion of forestlands was made possible by the logging practices common to private lands where, according to Bernard Shanks's estimate, only one in ten acres of forest is managed properly.²⁸ Not bound by any legal mandates to maintain the forests' long-term sustainability, much timber on private lands is harvested instead when the financial needs of the owner or market considerations determine that a liquidation of assets is economically prudent.

²⁶ From Section V, "Findings of Fact" in the opinion of Judge William Dwyer, *Seattle Audubon Society v. Evans* 771 F. Supp. 1081 (9th U.S. District, 1991).

²⁷ Kathie Durbin and Paul Koberstein, introduction to special report: "Forests in Distress" *Oregonian* (15 October 1990), 24. A board foot is a unit of measurement which corresponds to a piece of wood one foot square by one inch thick.

²⁸ Bernard Shanks cited in Daniel Henning and William Mangun, *Managing the Environmental Crisis* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1989), 109.

All throughout the first half of this century, while private timberlands were being exhausted all around them, the Forest Service held onto its trees, assuming a largely caretaker role. Part of the reason that national forests in the Pacific Northwest were left unexploited was due to the pressure which private logging concerns put upon the Forest Service to keep its timber off the market, thus keeping prices high.²⁹ Obviously, though, the extremely high rates of timber production on private lands could not continue for long and indeed, after the peak 1952 harvest, a steep and steady decline in the productivity of such lands began. In Curry County alone, the 1952 harvest of approximately 620,000 board feet (bf) plummeted to the point where in 1988, volume stood at just 48,628 bf.³⁰

As the depletion of private timber stocks began to become apparent by the 1950s and the post-war building boom increased demand, the timber industry's pressure on the Forest Service reversed itself.³¹ Now what the industry sought was access to the vast stands of virgin old growth that lie on national forest lands. Not only did this land represent an immense untapped timber supply, but a good portion of it was in enormously profitable old growth. Just one giant old

²⁹ Caufield, 52.

³⁰ Paul Koberstein, "Private Forests Face Critical Log Shortages" *Oregonian* special report, 4.

³¹ Julie Norman, "Our Choices to Keep Overcutting" *Headwaters* (September 1990), 15.

growth Douglas Fir may contain enough timber to build an average single family house.³²

In short order, the Forest Service shifted course and geared itself for timber production. At the centerpiece of this new orientation was the goal of converting old growth to younger stands. Unlike private owners, the Forest Service is legally bound to the principles of *sustained yield*³³ which requires that the annual cut in a given forest not exceed annual growth, thereby maintaining the timber supply, at least in theory, indefinitely. Old growth presented a problem for the Forest Service in that because it was mature, it put on less annual growth than younger stands and thus, by its mere existence, kept down the harvest levels allowable under sustained yield.

Not surprisingly, old growth began to disappear on public land just as it had on private land. Since the 1960s, the Forest Service is estimated to have liquidated 65% of all old growth on its lands.³⁴ In fact, it has been this very liquidation of old growth stocks that has been the key to what little profitability the Forest Service has achieved in recent decades. Logging from the twelve very productive old growth forest units in Region Six provides, according to

³² Caufield, 56.

³³ The doctrine of sustained yield is laid out in the Multiple Use-Sustained Yield Act of 1960 and the National Forest Management Act of 1976.

³⁴ "Liquidation of the Public Forests Since 1960 Leads Citizens to Court and Now Congress" *Headwaters*, (Late Summer 1991), 2.

Catherine Caufield, 90% of the Forest Service's net receipts, while the other 143 units in the system provide the remaining 10% of receipts. These twelve forests also account for a full one-third of the total volume cut in the entire system.³⁵

This conversion of old growth in particular, and the harvest of timber in general, further accelerated during the 1980s under the influence of the Reagan administration and especially its Assistant Secretary of Agriculture (and former Vice President of Louisiana Pacific Corp.) John Crowell, Jr. Crowell, who referred to old growth as "decadent" aggressively sought to boost timber output in the national forests by, in his words, "liquidating the existing inventory and getting the forest into a fully managed condition."³⁶ Throughout the 1980s, old growth in the Pacific Northwest was removed at a rate of 2% or approximately 71,000 acres a year.³⁷ At that pace, it is estimated that the last unprotected old growth would be harvested by the year 2020.³⁸

Such estimates naturally bring up the question of exactly how much old growth is left from the twenty million acres or so that is believed to have existed in presettle-

³⁵ Caufield, 69.

³⁶ Crowell quoted in Kathie Durbin, "Politics Helped Delay Northwest Timber Management Plans" *Oregonian* special report, 8; Egan, 170.

³⁷ Durbin and Koberstein, introduction "Forests in Distress," 24.

³⁸ Fishman, "America's Ancient Forests."

ment Washington and Oregon. As mentioned before, the estimates and even definitions of old growth can depend on one's political persuasion. The most comprehensive and scientifically reliable old growth inventories (based upon Franklin's standard definition of old growth) have been conducted in 1990 by Peter Morrison for the Wilderness Society and in 1991 by the Forest Service.

Although both studies employ similar definitions of old growth and the same satellite computer mapping techniques, they come to somewhat differing conclusions. The Forest Service, which surveyed thirteen national forests found 4.3 million acres of old growth of which 966,000 acres were protected in Wilderness areas. Morrison, on the other hand, found only 2.3 million acres or 12% of what he considered to be true old growth left in the twelve national forests he surveyed. In what is termed *ancient forests* (which display many, but not all of the characteristics of true old growth), Morrison found another 1.5 million acres bringing total ancient/old growth acreage to 3.8 million, of which 934,600 acres were protected.³⁹

³⁹ For a summary of the findings of both studies, see Gerald Gray and Anita Eng, "How Much Old Growth is Left?" *American Forests* (October 1991), 46-48. Far less rigorously obtained estimates of remaining old growth acreage includes the claim of the Northwest Forest Resource Council that 8.2 million acres of old growth still exist, and that of the Evergreen Foundation which puts the figure closer to 6.2 million. Of this, timber interests claim that 4.2 million acres are already protected in national parks and Wilderness areas. McLean, 72.


Of the Siskiyou's million acres, Morrison identified 132,000 acres of true old growth of which sixty thousand acres were protected, while the Forest Service using the much broader category of *mature and old growth forests* lists 443,000 acres of which 99,000 are Wilderness⁴⁰ (see figure 2). Regardless of the estimate employed, 1989 Forest Service plans in the Siskiyou scheduled the eventual harvest of most of the currently unprotected acreage.

Bald Mountain: The Opening Shot

The decade-long struggle environmentalists have waged over the Siskiyou has involved, at different levels and at various times, a complex range of issues. Initially, however, it was the particular goal of preventing road construction on Bald Mountain in 1983, which furiously ignited the political and social conflict over the Siskiyou's future. The stage for the Bald Mountain Road protests was actually set several years earlier as local residents organized to protest the Forest Service's use of herbicides in the area. In order to control the weeds and brush that competed with tree seedlings on its newly replanted clearcuts, the Forest Service had long sprayed these areas with the herbicide 2,4-D. In the late 1970s certain residents near the Siskiyou forest claimed to have become ill from water poisoned by

⁴⁰ Morrison's findings are charted forest by forest in "Forests in Distress," 7; *Land and Forest Management Plan FEIS*, sec. I, 15.

FIGURE 2
MATURE AND OLD GROWTH FOREST, 1989



Source:
Siskiyou National Forest Land and Resource Management Plan, Sec. III, 4.

Egan, 1985.
Chant Thomas, "Return to Bald Mountain," *Earth First!* (20 March 1987), 1.
Currently, 232,495 acres of the Siskiyou are part of designated National Wilderness Preservation System, but are under federal jurisdiction but subject to very strict management regulations as outlined in the Wilderness Act of 1964. These guidelines are aimed at preserved the wild, roadless character of such areas.

herbicide runoff.⁴¹ In response, a grassroots campaign began to pressure the Forest Service to switch to mechanical means of brush control. Although this effort eventually triumphed with a Forest Service moratorium on 2,4-D usage, the local organizational framework which these environmentalists had built remained and grew.

In 1983, a number of these local anti-herbicide activists hooked up with some out-of-state members of Earth First, a new, fairly radical environmental group and initiated a campaign to prevent the road on Bald Mountain from being built.⁴² Bald Mountain lies roughly in the middle of the Siskiyou National Forest and straddles a ridge that forms the border between the Siskiyou's largest official Wilderness area, the 179,850 acre Kalmiopsis Wilderness and the similarly expansive, but unprotected, defacto wilderness to the north⁴³ (see figure 3). This latter area, called the North Kalmiopsis, contained some of the largest blocks of old growth in the forest and perhaps the entire continental U.S. While other areas of the Siskiyou, especially in the periphery, were already heavily roaded and clearcut from

⁴¹ Egan, 175.

⁴² Chant Thomas, "Return to Bald Mountain" *Earth First!* (20 March 1987), 1.

⁴³ Currently, 232,495 acres of the Siskiyou are part of the congressionally designated National Wilderness Preservation System, most of which is under Forest Service jurisdiction but subject to very strict management regulations as outlined in the Wilderness Act of 1964. These guidelines are aimed at preserved the wild, roadless character of such areas.

many decades of high volume harvests, this interior portion remained a huge, virtually intact chunk of high-quality wilderness. Saving the North Kalmiopsis would become the central goal and symbol of the environmentalists throughout this entire struggle.


In 1936, the early Forest Service wilderness advocate Bob Marshall, recognizing the Siskiyou's unusual biodiversity, proposed an immense one million acre wilderness area encompassing most of the National Forest. Ten years later, the Forest Service responded with the much smaller 76,000 acre Kalmiopsis Wild Area. In 1964, this area was granted formal legal protection with the passing of the Wilderness Act in Congress. In a subsequent Wilderness bill passed in 1978, the Kalmiopsis was enlarged to its present size of 179,850 acres, but in a compromise, the prime areas of old growth to the north of Bald Mountain were left out and released for development.⁴⁴

In 1979, the Forest Service began to plan a road along the ridge of Bald Mountain. While they claimed it was merely to facilitate future timber harvesting on lands released for such activities by Congress, environmentalists believed that the very costly road was being built specifically to destroy the roadless character of the North Kalmiopsis as quickly as possible. Severing it from the rest of the Kalmiopsis would

⁴⁴ "Fires, Controversy Scorch Forest's Past" *Eugene Register-Guard* (13 March 1988).

FIGURE 3

SISKIYOU NATIONAL FOREST WILDERNESS AREAS AND NORTH KALMIOPSIS ROADLESS AREA



Sources: Siskiyou National Forest Land and Resource Management Plan, Sec. A, 1; LRP FEIS, Sec. II, 34

prevent it from being considered in any future wilderness bills.

The Forest Service's push to build the Bald Mountain Road took on new urgency after President Reagan took office in 1981. As part of the Reagan Administration's overall drive to open public lands in the West to resource development, Crowell and Secretary of Interior James Watt attempted to shift the focus of the agencies under their charge towards increased commodity production.⁴⁵ For the Forest Service, this meant a requirement to boost the annual cut.

In 1982, actual construction of the Bald Mountain Road began. The Rogue River Sierra Club promptly brought suit charging that an adequate accounting of the environmental consequences of the road had not been conducted.⁴⁶ After gaining an initial injunction on the road, the court eventually ruled against the environmentalists, finding that the Forest Service's environmental assessment (EA) was in order.⁴⁷

By early 1983, the North Kalmiopsis exploded with protests in what marked the symbolic opening shot not only in

⁴⁵ See C. Brant Short, *Ronald Reagan and the Public Lands* (College Station, TX: Texas A & M University Press), 1989.

⁴⁶ Thomas, 1.

⁴⁷ Under the guidelines of the National Environmental Protection Act of 1969 (NEPA) and the National Forest Management Act of 1976 (NFMA), the Forest Service is required to complete an environmental assessment (EA) for potentially disruptive activities such as timber sales, roadbuilding, or mining. If that activity is expected to have an especially substantial impact, than a more extensive environmental impact statement (EIS) must be completed.

the battle for the Siskiyou, but for old growth in the entire Pacific Northwest. After the injunction on the road was lifted, local activists who had formed Earth First Siskiyou joined Earth Firsters from other states for a civil disobedience campaign centered around a series of road blockades. In a total of seven blockades featuring over forty-four arrests and some very tense confrontations,⁴⁸ the political fight entered a new stage.

Throughout the Siskiyou that summer, trees were found with spikes driven into them to discourage logging. When loggers began to use metal detectors on the trees, some spikers switched to ceramic spikes. Elsewhere there were scattered incidents of construction equipment being disabled at night as posters promising sabotage began to appear.⁴⁹ Although they never officially condoned such actions and since 1983 publically denounced tree spiking in the Siskiyou,⁵⁰ Earth First, nevertheless, came to be associated with such actions; an accusation they could never quite shake.

The direct actions and arrests on Bald Mountain served to generate publicity and offers of legal aid for the very much ad hoc and resource-poor Earth First movement. Before long, a new lawsuit brought by Earth First and the Oregon

⁴⁸ In fact, in the third blockade Earth First co-founder Dave Foreman was run over and injured by a logging truck. Thomas, 1.

⁴⁹ Egan, 160-171.

⁵⁰ Robert Brothers, "Sensational Stories Fuel Already Tense Situation" letter to the editor, *Medford Mail Tribune* (20 August 1988)

Natural Resources Defense Council (ONRC) succeeded in stopping the road after nine miles, or half its length, had already been built. With new evidence and testimony, the environmentalists convinced the court that the Forest Service had not sufficiently considered the environmental impact of the road which, because it penetrated wilderness, was substantial.⁵¹

On the summit of Bald Mountain, meanwhile, Lou Gold, a former University of Illinois political science professor-turned-activist set up a summer camp to keep vigil on the divided mountain. In what was to become a yearly ritual, Gold would host scores of reporters, sympathizers and even congressional aides who would make the arduous trek through the wilderness to pay homage to the "man on the mountain."⁵²

Bald Mountain Revisited

In 1984, another Oregon Wilderness bill was passed, but Oregon's Senator and strong timber ally Mark Hatfield (R) managed to keep all of the North Kalmiopsis and its abundant old growth out of the bill.⁵³ Instead, four much smaller areas totalling 52,645 acres were added (see figure

⁵¹ "Radical Activists Join Battle for Forests" *Oregonian* (20 November 1987). A district court ruling in 1989, established that any proposal to enter a roadless area was in and of itself significant and controversial enough to warrant an EIS rather than an EA. After 1989, therefore, all Siskiyou roadless entries required EISs.

⁵² Kathie Durbin, "Lou Gold" *Oregonian* special report, 19.

⁵³ Douglas Murphy, "Earth First! and the North Kalmiopsis!" *The Sneak Preview* (Ashland, OR: 11 June 1987).

3). Thus, the North Kalmiopsis was once again released for development and, at least according to the Forest Service, the injunction on the Bald Mountain Road was thereby dissolved.⁵⁴ Still, since the controversy over the adequacy of the initial EA was not yet resolved, the Forest Service promised not to complete the road until the master Forest Plan which required an extensive Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) was finalized sometime in the next several years.⁵⁵

While they did not extend the road, the Forest Service did begin to resume timber sales and harvesting in the North Kalmiopsis in 1985 and 1986 with twenty-four planned or active sales.⁵⁶ The environments reacted angrily to these sales claiming that they had an understanding with the Forest Service that the sales, like the road, would be delayed until the release of the Forest Plan.⁵⁷

This resumption of timber harvesting in the North Kalmiopsis could be attributed, in part, to the mounting poli-

⁵⁴ USDA Forest Service, Pacific Northwest Region, Siskiyou National Forest, *Land and Forest Management Plan Final Environmental Impact Statement Appendices Volume 1* (Region 10: GPO, 1989), sec. C, 113.

⁵⁵ Robert Brothers, "Wildfire Adds New Twist to the Politics of Logging v. Wilderness" *Forest Watch* (April 1988), 20.

⁵⁶ The *timber sale* is the basic unit by which the Forest Service sells timber to the highest bidder who then does the actual cutting and removing of logs. In the Siskiyou, as in most Region Six forests, such contracts usually cover areas between forty and three hundred acres and most often stipulate clearcutting methods.

⁵⁷ Thomas, 1; Murphy.

tical pressure from certain members of Congress and the administration upon the Region Six forests to keep timber output high. In 1986 and 1987, annual harvest levels in the Siskiyou neared a record two hundred million board feet (mmbf), a level which the supervisor of the forest warned could not be kept up for long without violating sustained yield requirements.⁵⁸

Converting the North Kalmiopsis's old growth to younger plantations would satisfy the administration's and Congress's demands for high output in two ways. Not only would immense old trees be cut, but also, once replanted, this would boost the annual growth figures for the entire forest. The counties were equally eager to open the North Kalmiopsis since by a quirk of fate this part of the Siskiyou National Forest has an especially high percentage of O&C lands in its acreage (it is roughly half O&C as compared to 17% for the forest as a whole) which by law nets twice as much county revenue as non-O&C lands (see footnote 22).⁵⁹

In the several years since the first Bald Mountain protests, the bulk of the environmentalists' efforts involved the appealing of individual timber sales.⁶⁰ It has been rare, however, for an administrative appeal to succeed

⁵⁸ Paul Fattig, "Supervisor Says Forest Service Must Slow Down" *Grants Pass Daily Courier* (9 June 1987), 1.

⁵⁹ Headwaters Press Release (29 April 1988).

⁶⁰ The law requires that, in most cases, before a group can bring suit against the Forest Service, it must first file an administrative appeal.

in turning back a sale. In fact, from 1986 to 1988, only three of the sixty-one sales appealed were withdrawn or modified.⁶¹ And if the paperwork was in order and the sale did not involve any controversial new roads, there was usually little legal recourse in the courts for these individual sales. It soon became clear to the environmentalists, therefore, that this case-by-case appeals process was getting them nowhere in terms of halting the stepped-up logging in the North Kalmiopsis.

By 1987, frustration over the continued logging north of Bald Mountain spurred a new wave of protests and direct actions. Throughout the summer of 1987 tensions in the already polarized region heightened further as blockades and civil disobedience led mostly by Earth First Siskiyou flared up again as logging commenced on the Hobson Horn, South Indigo, and Sapphire timber sales, all in prime old growth. On the Hobson Horn site, protesters buried themselves up to their necks on the logging road while at the Sapphire protest, a number of individuals sat high up in trees slated for cutting as others chained themselves to the loggers' yarding unit.⁶² Meanwhile, protests and disruptions at the

⁶¹ USDA Forest Service, Siskiyou National Forest, Appeal Number Record 1986-1990, internal document.

⁶² "Earth First Protests Hobson Horn Sale" *Grants Pass Daily Courier* (4 April 1987); David Barron, "CD Begins Anew in Kalmiopsis" *Earth First!* (1 May 1987), 1, 5; "Eighteen Arrested in 3 Actions in North Kalmiopsis" *Earth First!* (21 June 1987), 6; Jericho Clearwater, "Kalmiopsis Shutdown!" *Earth First!* (1 August 1987), 1.

Siskiyou Headquarters in Grants Pass were becoming an almost commonplace occurrence. In all, twenty-seven protesters were arrested that spring and summer and the "Sapphire Six," as they came to be called, were fined \$56,800 in damages.⁶³

Before long it became evident to the environmentalists that if they wanted to save the North Kalmiopsis and other unprotected roadless areas in the Siskiyou, then they would need a strategy beyond blocking roads or appealing individual timber sales after they have already been sold. Not trusting the Forest Service to refrain anytime soon from cutting and roadbuilding and having all but exhausted their chances at securing congressional wilderness designation for the North Kalmiopsis, the environmentalists (specifically the ONRC) came up with a rather bold proposal; the creation of a Siskiyou National Park.

Encompassing about 700,000 acres of the national forest, the proposed park would be off limits to logging and administered by the Department of Interior's more preservation oriented National Park Service. This change of jurisdiction, felt many environmentalists, offered the best hope for long-term protection for the Siskiyou. Several local environmental groups immediately endorsed this idea, while several new groups organized strictly to promote the plan.⁶⁴

⁶³ Thomas, 1; Kathy Hands, "Protesters Get Jail Terms" *Grants Pass Daily Courier* (30 June 1987); Earth First!, *In the Fight to Save the Earth... Will Our Constitutional Rights Become Sawdust Too?*, pamphlet, (1988).

⁶⁴ Most notably, the Siskiyou National Park Campaign.

To the environmentalists, the Siskiyou's fantastic biodiversity, especially its unusual plant life, made it a natural for park designation, being on a par with the Everglades or Yellowstone in its natural wonders. It was also argued that Oregon with only 183,000 acre Crater Lake, had far less national park acreage than most western states. Furthermore, advocates claimed that the park would be an economic boon to the region's tourist industry and help southwest Oregon make the inevitable transition away from dependence on a troubled timber industry. The argument here was that, tourist-wise, a national park geared towards recreation and preservation would far outdraw the national forest, which is the case, for example, with Yellowstone or Yosemite and their national forest neighbors.⁶⁵

With the park proposal's increasing publicity and momentum, those timber interests who did not already see what was coming finally began to perceive of the environmentalists as more than just a nuisance, but instead as an immediate and growing threat to their interests. With the park proposal, local timber interests began to mobilize in earnest, offering a furious counterattack. They labelled the park an economic disaster that would cost at least fifteen hundred jobs and lock-up resource-rich lands.⁶⁶ As for the

⁶⁵ For a summary of the supposed benefits of the park plan, see Fishman, "America's Ancient Forests."

⁶⁶ "Unknowns Make Park a Gamble" (editorial) *Grants Pass Daily Courier* (1 April 1989).

tourism jobs the park was to create, the timber interests scornfully dismissed them as minimum wage service-sector employment barely fit for teenagers. Some even questioned whether the park would create any additional tourism at all, pointing to the already existing abundance of recreational opportunities in the region. As evidence, they cited the experience of the costly Redwood National Park not far down the coast where a promised economic boom after its establishment in the late 1970s never materialized.⁶⁷

Not surprisingly, the Forest Service was just as forceful in its rejection of the park proposal, warning of lost jobs, lost county revenue, and less "balanced" management.⁶⁸ The Forest Service, as any bureaucracy would, dreaded the possibility of losing jurisdiction to its historic rival; a scenario not without precedent in the annals of Forest Service-Park Service history.⁶⁹ Painfully aware of this precedent, the Siskiyou National Forest wasted no time in denouncing the plan. In uncharacteristically forthright language, the normally diplomatic Forest Service accused the

⁶⁷ Jim Peterson, "In Search of Excellence: Lew Krauss" *Evergreen* (April 1987); "Perspective: Forest Service Opposes Park" *Evergreen* (April 1987).

⁶⁸ USDA Forest Service, Siskiyou National Forest, Press Release (24 March 1987).

⁶⁹ The Sequoia, Olympic, and North Cascades National Parks are but a few more famous examples of national parks being carved out of national forest jurisdictions. For a case study of the Olympic transfer, see Ben Twight, *Organizational Values and Political Power: The Forest Service Versus the Olympic National Park* (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1983).

ONRC and other environmentalists of having ulterior motives in proposing the park.⁷⁰ The National Park Service, meanwhile, officially remained neutral on the park proposal while most all of the region's newspapers opposed it. Other than the environmentalists themselves, only the Oregon Coast Association and the Salem Statesman-Journal came out in support of the park plan.

The Silver Fire

As the national park campaign was getting underway and the Bald Mountain protests were winding down in the late summer, a sudden and unforeseen event dramatically altered the issues and raised the stakes. On the night on August 30, 1987, lightning from a dry electrical storm struck the tinder dry forest in several places, igniting a monstrous blaze that would burn for ten weeks in what would become the largest forest fire in Oregon in the last half-century.⁷¹ Although the fires burned in several areas throughout the forest and in adjacent national forests across the border in California, the worst blaze was centered around Silver Creek in the North Kalmiopsis, not far from Bald Mountain.⁷² The Silver Complex Fires, as they came to be called, burned over

⁷⁰ USDA Forest Service, Siskiyou National Forest, Press Release (24 March 1987).

⁷¹ Egan, 179.

⁷² In fact, Lou Gold barely made it off the mountain, escaping on foot one step ahead of the flames in a two-day ordeal. T.A. Allen, "Lou Gold Escapes Bald Mt." *Earth First!* (1 November 1987), 11.

an area covering roughly 110,000 acres. Of this, 53,600 acres burned in the Kalmiopsis Wilderness, while another 42,900 affected acres were in the North Kalmiopsis.⁷³ In other words, the fire could not have picked a more controversial place to burn (see figure 4).


For the newly invigorated local timber interests, the fire provided a golden opportunity to settle the North Kalmiopsis controversy in their favor once and for all. It also served as a rhetorical club with which to beat the environmentalists. Not missing a single angle, the timber interests went on the attack, demanding immediate salvage of the burned timber while blaming the fire itself on the environmentalists' efforts to keep the area roadless. The lack of roads, they claimed, seriously hampered firefighting efforts and thereby allowed the destruction of precious resources.⁷⁴

While the burned area within the Kalmiopsis Wilderness was legally off-limits to salvage, the North Kalmiopsis was not. The Silver Fire, therefore represented a serious threat to the environmentalists' goals in that area; namely, keeping the North Kalmiopsis roadless and unlogged, and achieving park status for it and the larger forest. Any substantial salvage of burned timber would require roadbuilding

⁷³ USDA Forest Service, Pacific Northwest Region, Siskiyou National Forest, *Silver Fire Recovery Project Final Environmental Impact Statement Record of Decision*, (Region 10: GPO, 1988), 1.

⁷⁴ Jim Peterson, "In Search of Excellence: The Firefighters" *Evergreen* (October 1987).

FIGURE 4
SILVER FIRE RECOVERY AREA AND SHASTA COSTA PLANNING AREA



LEGEND

- Shasta Costa Planning Area
- Silver Fire Recovery Area
- National Forest Land
- Wilderness Areas
- Rivers
- Main Highways

Source: Shasta Costa Timber Sales and Integrated Resource Projects FEIS, Sec. I, 6.

which, combined with the logging itself, would strike at the heart of the proposed park area and might very well leave it too developed for consideration as a national park. Increasing the pressure on the North Kalmiopsis further was the time element, as fire-damaged timber has a useful life of only about two years before insects and rot leave it unusable.⁷⁵ Thus, any decisions made on the salvage would have to be sped through.

The stakes thus raised, both sides geared up for action and launched all-out efforts. Locally, each stepped up their organizing and attempted to reach out beyond southwestern Oregon with their message. Painting the environmentalists as irrational radicals beyond reasoning, and the North Kalmiopsis as a disaster area of "ash and ruin," the timber interests, led by the Southern Oregon Resource Alliance (SORA) pushed for a maximum salvage of the area and the full-scale roadbuilding necessary to carry this out.⁷⁶ If salvage and rehabilitation were not carried out, warned SORA, not only would valuable resources go to waste, but "priceless fish and wildlife habitat" would "be left to the ravages of wind, rain, erosion and time."⁷⁷ The salvage, therefore, would not only benefit a damaged land, but would provide an economic silver lining to an otherwise bad situa-

⁷⁵ "Forest Officials Expect Major Battles Over Salvage of Fire-Damaged Timber" *Oregonian* (2 October 1987).

⁷⁶ Southern Oregon Resource Alliance advertisement in *Medford Mail Tribune* (18 October 1987), sec A, 12.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*

tion. Drawn to such common-sense logic, the area's two major newspapers quickly joined the chorus for rapid salvage.⁷⁸ SORA, meanwhile, launched an all-out advertising campaign featuring pre-printed mail-in coupons to be sent to the Forest Service and members of Congress demanding immediate and extensive salvage.⁷⁹

The environmentalists found themselves facing an uphill battle as they tried to explain the subtleties of why leaving the North Kalmiopsis alone to heal itself in its own time was a good idea. They disputed the timber interests' campaign on several grounds. First, they rejected SORA's characterization of the Silver Fire burn area as a wasteland and the fire as a tragedy. On the contrary, they argued, fire was a natural and necessary ecological agent for maintaining the long-term health of the forest and a force which the Siskiyou evolved with over many millenia.⁸⁰ In their view, then, only those seeing the forest strictly as a commodity would see the fire as a tragedy. Moreover, forest fires, especially in old growth, the environmentalists claimed, burn in an irregular mosaic pattern, rarely bringing complete destruction. Pointing to maps of burn intensi-

⁷⁸ "Roadless Area is No Excuse to Waste Wood" (editorial) *Grants Pass Daily Courier* (12 October 1987).

⁷⁹ "Storm Brews Over Fate of Roadless Area" *Grants Pass Daily Courier* (25 September 1987).

⁸⁰ David Atkin, *Fire Salvage Issue Not So Simple*, Siskiyou National Park Campaign flier (Portland: 1987); "Kalmiopsis Fire: The Reality and the Politics" *Earth First!* (2 February 1988), 7.

ty, the environmentalists claimed that in only 9% of the Silver Fire area had over 90% of the trees been killed, while over 50% of the area had only a 10% mortality rate (see figure 5) and most of that did not include the biggest, most fire-resistant trees.⁸¹

The environmentalists also challenged the idea of salvage bringing rehabilitation to the seriously burned areas. They argued that, far from restoring the North Kalmiopsis, the logging and roadbuilding of the salvage effort would bring further damage to already stressed areas; a situation akin, in the environmentalists' favorite analogy, to "mugging a burn victim." Specifically, it was warned that salvage activities would increase soil compaction, erosion, and landslides in areas denuded from the fire and seriously increase sedimentation in salmon spawning areas.⁸²


To either side, the other's position was really a front for more insidious goals. To the timber interests, all the environmentalists really wanted was to keep the North Kalmiopsis roadless at all costs in hopes of achieving their goal of a national park to keep out the loggers and shut down the industry. To environmentalists, on the other hand, the timber interests and the Forest Service were less interested in salvaging burnt logs of questionable value as they

⁸¹ *Ibid.*; Brothers, 19.

⁸² Paul Fattig, "Environmentalists Seek To Halt Silver Salvage" *Grants Pass Daily Courier* (9 September 1988); Headwaters Press Release (6 May 1988); Atkin, SNPC Flyer.

FIGURE 5
SILVER FIRE BURN INTENSITY, 1987

INDIGO & SILVER WATERSHEDS



BURN INTENSITY MAP

10% or less dead trees - WHITE
90%-10% dead trees..... GREY
90%- or more dead trees - BLACK

KALMIOPSIS WILDERNESS

Source: Headwaters

were in opening up the North Kalmiopsis to roads and tree farms once and for all.

With both sides more polarized than ever, the ball was now in the Forest Service's court. While the agency was clearly inclined towards salvage from the start, it still had to conduct environment impact studies and determine the extent of the salvage before it could commence operations. With the burned timber's limited life span, the pressure to speed this process through was intense. Originally, the Forest Service intended to prepare a full EIS only for the most controversial parts of the salvage area, such as around Bald Mountain, while other parts would be covered by the less comprehensive EA process.⁸³ However, after an initial series of public meetings and thousands of letters made it clear just how controversial the entire project was, Supervisor Ron McCormick relented, and decided to prepare a single EIS for the entire Silver Fire area; a procedural victory for the environmentalists.⁸⁴ Regarding roads, however, the Forest Service announced that the fire had invalidated its moratorium on North Kalmiopsis roadbuilding. While the road issue was originally to be settled in the forthcoming Forest Plan, it would now be decided in the Silver Fire EIS.⁸⁵

⁸³ Regional Forester James Torrence to Supervisor Ron McCormick, Internal Forest Service document, (17 November 1987).

⁸⁴ "Feds Order Study on All Kalmiopsis" *Medford Mail Tribune* (22 February 1988); Brothers, 20.

⁸⁵ "Forest Officials Expect Major Battles...."

Now committed to the more comprehensive and time-consuming EIS process, the Siskiyou National Forest found itself under considerable pressure from timber interests and Washington headquarters to finish the process by early spring 1988.⁸⁶ After unsuccessfully appealing to the Environmental Protection Agency for permission to shorten the length of the comment period on the draft EIS (DEIS), the Forest Service had no choice but to move as fast as it possibly could.⁸⁷ By early in the new year, the Silver Fire Project EIS effort sped into full gear. Preparing a DEIS under such massive time constraints necessitated an unprecedented effort on the Forest Service's part, as the Siskiyou found that it had to put practically all other national forest business on hold and bring in hundreds of personnel from other national forests. To house such a massive mobilization, the Forest Service had to expand into a rented office building in Grants Pass, the new Silver Fire Recovery Center which quickly became one of the city's largest employers with its own \$2.5 million budget and an ad hoc staff of 120.⁸⁸

⁸⁶ Brothers, 20.

⁸⁷ Originally the Forest Service sought to reduce the DEIS review period from the usual forty-five days to fifteen, but under pressure from one of the Siskiyou area's representatives, Peter DeFazio (D-OR), it requested but was still denied a thirty-day review. "Forest Service to Decide on Silver Fire Study" *Medford Mail Tribune Extra* (28 January-3 February 1988).

⁸⁸ Barnes Ellis, "Back From the Dead" *Oregonian* (24 April 1988).

Although the Forest Service held a series of public workshops in an effort to build consensus, environmentalists and the timber interests were less interested in negotiating with each other than in mobilizing their followers both locally and nationally, especially through massive mail campaigns. According to the former supervisor, the Siskiyou elicited over twenty thousand mail responses (the highest inputs for any unit in the entire system) from all over the country on the Silver issue; with most of these urging the adoption in the DEIS of either the environmentalists' national park/no salvage or timber's maximum salvage alternatives. "We were like a lightning rod," recalled the former supervisor.

By late March 1988, after several months of frantic work, the Forest Service completed its draft and announced its tentative decision to harvest 146 mmbf of timber out of the 270 mmbf estimated to have been killed. Such an effort would necessitate the building of twenty-one miles of roads including the nine mile completion of the Bald Mountain Road, and would account for the bulk of that year's total harvest on the Siskiyou. Of the roughly twelve thousand acre harvest area, one-quarter was to be clearcut and accessed by roads, while the rest would be harvested by helicopter in an attempt to minimize damage to the land.⁸⁹

⁸⁹ USDA Forest Service, Pacific Northwest Region, Siskiyou National Forest, *Silver Fire Recovery Project Draft Environmental Impact Statement* (Region 10: GPO, 1988).

Predictably, the draft plan elicited negative reaction from both sides. As the DEIS underwent its public comment period, the timber interests complained that the salvage volume and new road mileage was too low and depended too heavily on less profitable helicopter logging. The environmentalists, on the other hand, dreaded the many miles of new roads and clearcutting on the North Kalmiopsis's extremely steep and unstable slopes.⁹⁰

At this point, though, the environmentalists shifted their focus away from the park proposal and the area's fragile ecosystem, and concentrated their strategy instead, upon the economics of the plan. Led by Headwaters, a well-established local forest issues group, the environmentalists developed fairly sophisticated analyses showing the Silver Recovery Plan not to be economically feasible. To the environmentalists, the Forest Service was "spending a dollar to save a penny."⁹¹ The costs of both roadbuilding and helicopter salvage in the exceptionally steep and rugged terrain of the Silver Fire area would, according to environmentalists, exceed the retrieved logs' value. In addition, they argued, the salvaged timber volume by law would have to come out of the overall sustained yield. Thus, not logging the burned area would not cost any jobs since the annual sales quantity

⁹⁰ Paul Fattig, "Silver Fire Plan Awaits Hatchet" *Grants Pass Daily Courier* (22 March 1988).

⁹¹ Paul Fattig, "Group Says Recovery Plan Uneconomical" *Grants Pass Daily Courier* (29 April 1988).

(ASQ) would be the same regardless of whether fire-killed timber or living "green" timber from elsewhere in the forest was cut. Finally, claimed the environmentalists, county government would receive less receipts from the costly and lower quality salvaged timber.⁹²

As the comment period wound down and the Forest Service went to work on the FEIS, the Silver Fire controversy began to catch the notice of Congress which, if it so chose, could render a decision on the matter that would take precedence over the Forest Service. In late May, Rep. Doug Bosco (D-CA) proposed legislation designed to assure prompt salvage without the expected court delay by barring judicial review of any of the salvage sales. One of the Siskiyou area's representatives, Peter DeFazio (D-OR), who opposed such a court ban, began working on alternative legislation in an attempt to forge a compromise between timber and environmentalists. DeFazio suggested that the salvage go on, but at reduced level of 136 mmbf with far less roadbuilding and more helicopter logging. Although the timber interests promptly rejected DeFazio's plan, the environmentalists, alarmed by the Forest Service's rapid preparation of the

⁹² Headwaters Press Release (29 April 1988); Cascades Holistic Economic Consultants to Supervisor Ron McCormick, CHEC photocopied transcripts, (28 April 1988); Fattig, "Recovery Plan Uneconomical."

salvage sales and on the defensive, grudgingly got behind it as a basis for negotiation.⁹³

On July 8, as local congressmen continued their negotiations, the Forest Service announced its final decision on the salvage as they released the Silver Fire FEIS. In a modification of the draft plan, the Forest Service boosted the salvage volume from 146 mmbf to 157 mmbf, but reduced the acres to be harvested to 9,500 in twenty separate timber sales.⁹⁴ To the environmentalists, this modification worsened an already bad deal. The same day the final decision was announced, Headwaters and the ONRC joined by three prominent national groups, filed a request for a federal court restraining order to halt the imminent sales on the grounds that the Forest Service did not adequately consider all of the EIS-mandated alternatives, especially the park proposal. They were granted a hearing in Portland scheduled for later in the month.⁹⁵

In Congress, meanwhile, DeFazio, Hatfield, Rep. Les AuCoin (D-OR), and the Siskiyou area's other representative, Bob Smith (R-OR) reached a compromise which they attached to the Interior Appropriations. For the environmentalists,

⁹³ "DeFazio Raps Timber Salvage Plan" *Eugene Register-Guard* (20 May 1988); Robert Sterling, "DeFazio Seeks Pact on Logging" *Medford Mail Tribune* (9 June 1988).

⁹⁴ *Silver Fire Recovery Project FEIS ROD*, 23.

⁹⁵ Fattig, "Environmentalists Seek To Halt Silver Salvage." The three national groups were the National Wildlife Federation, the National Audubon Society, and the Wilderness Society.

DeFazio managed to delete the nine mile extension of the Bald Mountain Road, allowing for only a three-tenths mile extension to a flat ridgetop where helicopters could land. The elimination of the Bald Mountain extension would sacrifice about twenty mmbf from the total salvage volume. All other roads, though, would still be built. The price DeFazio paid for this, however, was a ban on court appeals of any of the salvage sales.⁹⁶

Although relieved by the halting of road they so hated, environmentalists reacted with outrage to such tampering with their judicial access, deeming such restrictions, in words of a Headwaters activist, "the stuff of petty dictators, of banana republic politics."⁹⁷ The timber interests, meanwhile, though pleased with the ban on appeals, expressed dismay with the reduced harvest and the delay, once again, of the road they badly wanted built. One disappointed mill owner characterized the legislation as a compromise of a compromise, while the Southern Oregon Timber

⁹⁶ Alan Hayakawa, "Compromise Would Block Timber Salvage Appeals" *Oregonian* (24 June 1988). Rep. Smith, under pressure from timber interests in his district, eventually reversed himself and withdrew his support for the compromise, pushing instead his own unsuccessful proposal to built the Bald Mountain extension. Robert Sterling and Bill Manny, "Bob Smith Proposal Opposed" *Medford Mail Tribune* (21 September 1988).

⁹⁷ "Timber Salvage Plan is a Compromise No One Likes" *Grants Pass Daily Courier* (24 June 1988).

Industries Association (SOTIA), angrily argued that there was clear public mandate to salvage 200 mmbf.⁹⁸

In late July, a federal judge turned down the environmentalists' request for an immediate injunction on the salvage and several weeks later, an appellate court turned down an appeal of that ruling. Court relief was to become a moot point, however, as Congress soon thereafter passed the Hatfield salvage rider. Although their plans were now modified by Congress, the Forest Service finally had a green light on the salvage operation. In July the timber sale auctions closed and the rush to harvest was on. In celebration, timber interests in Grants Pass organized the Silver Fire Roundup, a massive parade and demonstration featuring over a thousand logging trucks.⁹⁹

Now that all the legal, administrative, and legislative avenues had been exhausted, Earth First stepped back into the spotlight announcing the start of a direct action campaign to stop the logging in their beloved North Kalmiopsis. Jittery about the prospect of anything delaying the salvage, the Forest Service braced itself for the protesters. As Supervisor McCormick issued orders closing the salvage area to the public, the Josephine County sheriff's po-

⁹⁸ Robert Sterling, "Both Sides Unhappy With Silver Salvage" *Medford Mail Tribune* (24 June 1988); Ellis, "Logging Compromise Kindles Anger."

⁹⁹ Evergreen (August 1988).

lice took special riot control courses and promised aggressive action.¹⁰⁰

In late July, after infiltrating the salvage zone near the Bald Mountain Road with climbing equipment, Earth First members in three different actions ascended onto platforms high up in the trees with supplies of food and water. In no mood for such protests, the Forest Service moved quickly to remove the treesitters who were gaining quite a bit of media attention. By early August, they were brought down by professional climbers while a police sniper stood by.¹⁰¹ As the long summer wound down so did the protests. The salvage, however, went on.

The Spotted Owl and the Nationalization of the Old Growth Controversy

As the controversy over the Silver Fire raged in the Siskiyou, similar issues and policy conflicts began to crop up all over the Pacific Northwest. The seed of dissent planted at the Bald Mountain Road protests back in 1983 had blossomed into a full-blown regional and, in many respects, national issue; quite possibly the most important environmental policy debate of the decade.

¹⁰⁰ Paul Fattig, "Closure to Block Protests" *Grants Pass Daily Courier* (8 July 1988); Gail Bullen, "Sheriff Maps Out Strategy to Handle Forest Protests" *Grants Pass Daily Courier* (12 July 1988).

¹⁰¹ Paul Fattig, "Protesters Take to the Trees" *Grants Pass Daily Courier* (21 July 1988); Robert Sterling, "Sniper Was Prepared to Shoot Sitter" *Medford Mail Tribune* (5 August 1988).

Perhaps more than anything else, what raised the stakes and catapulted the old growth issue beyond local protests and appeals was *Strix occidentalis caurina*, the northern spotted owl. Native only to the Pacific Northwest, this unobtrusive little bird of prey has highly specific habitat needs. To feed and nest, each mating pair requires a substantial block of undisturbed old growth. Because the spotted owl is so particular in its old growth habitat needs, it serves to scientists as what is called an *indicator species* for the larger old growth ecosystem. In other words, the owl is seen as a barometer which gives insight into the health of the larger ecosystem.¹⁰²

As the harvesting of old growth intensified in the 1960s and 70s, scientists began to see the first signs of spotted owl decline. As early as 1972, biologists were warning that the owl was in big trouble, but the Forest Service and the BLM at that point opted to take no action.¹⁰³ By 1986 and 1987, as the rate of old growth felled on public land reached an estimated 170 acres a day,¹⁰⁴ it became

¹⁰² For example, the spotted owl feeds largely upon forest rodents who, in turn, feed upon the truffles of the nitrogen-fixing root fungi so essential to the big trees of the ancient forest. A decline in owls, therefore, could be linked to a decline in mycorrhizal fungi due to logging, erosion, or other major forest disturbances. Caufield, 52.

¹⁰³ Carrie Casey, "The Bird of Contention" *American Forests* (October 1991), 30.

¹⁰⁴ Steve Young, "Tree Slaughter: Your Taxes at Work" *Washington Post* (13 August 1989).

clear to biologists and environmentalists that the spotted owl was reaching the point of no return.

In January, 1987, several national environmental groups filed a petition with the United States Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) to list the northern spotted owl as a nationally endangered species. Such a listing would, according to the Endangered Species Act of 1973 (ESA), require the federal government to design and implement a plan for the owl's recovery while taking no action in the interim to harm the owl or its essential habitat. Fish and Wildlife Service personnel, however, were under strict orders from the Reagan Administration, specifically Secretary of Interior Donald Hodel and their own chief Frank Dunkle, to not extend protection to the bird under any circumstances. Rolf Wallenstrom, the FWS director for the Pacific Northwest region, later admitted to having been absolutely forbidden to list the owl.¹⁰⁵ And so, by December, 1987, after drawing their inevitable decision out for almost a year's worth of heavy old growth harvesting, Fish and Wildlife denied the petition.

Almost immediately a coalition of twenty-five environmental groups brought suit against the agency out of concern for the owl itself, but perhaps more importantly, to broaden their arsenal in the fight to save the old growth forests.

¹⁰⁵ As told to Ted Williams, "The Spotted Fish Under the Spotted Owls" *Fly, Rod and Reel* (January/February 1990), 20.

In November, 1988, federal Judge Thomas Zilly of the Seattle district, a Reagan appointee, ruled with the environmentalists, finding that the Fish and Wildlife Service had acted in a manner that was "arbitrary, capricious, and contrary to the law" in not listing the owl as threatened despite "expert opinion to the contrary."¹⁰⁶ Consequently, Zilly ordered FWS to reconsider its decision and base it upon scientific criteria which, as all parties knew, meant near-certain listing. Still, due to the low capacity of this chronically underfunded and understaffed agency as well as administrative pressure to go as slow as possible, formal protection for the owl was still a long way off. What this meant for the Forest Service's timber program in owl habitat, aside from the agency's vague and voluntary promises of restraint, was a continued green light.

One thing which this uproar over the owl served to accomplish was to gain increasing national exposure for the old growth issue. This previously obscure term, once the sole domain of foresters and ecologists, began to filter into the vocabulary of policymaking circles. To the media,

¹⁰⁶ Northern Spotted Owl (*Strix occidentalis caurina*) v. Donald Hodel 716 F. Supp. 479 (9th U.S. District, 1988). This was a finding later corroborated by a highly critical 1989 GAO report of the Fish and Wildlife Service which questioned whether its "objectivity was maintained" and blasted the agency for having "substantially changed the body of scientific evidence" warning of the owl's demise. This damaging report was one factor in Dunkle's sudden retirement. Government Accounting Office, *Endangered Species: Spotted Owl Petition Evaluation Beset by Problems*, GAO/RCED-89-79 (Washington D.C.: GPO, 1989).

meanwhile, another dramatic snail darter-like endangered species case seemed to be shaping up. With the Region Six timber harvest at its all-time high of 5.5 bbf,¹⁰⁷ both the timber interests and environmentalists began competing to define the controversy for the growing national audience.

For the timber interests, the old growth issue boiled down to the prosperity and stability of timber dependent communities whose loggers and millworkers required a steady and reliable supply of timber. At the heart of the issue was, therefore, jobs. While the estimates of job loss resulting from old growth protection varied wildly depended upon both the source of the statistics and the degree of forest preservation foreseen, practically all painted a grim picture of hardship and dislocation. The Bush Administration pegged the figure at 28,000 jobs lost if the spotted owl was protected, while Hatfield predicted 25,000-50,000 unemployed. Lower estimates of 13,000 and 19,000 were cited, respectively, by Congress and Reuters.¹⁰⁸ The highest estimate was the American Forest Product Alliance's prediction of 102,757 jobs wiped out over a decade in addition to the 44,500 they claimed were already lost to the environmentalists' "lock-up" of federal lands in the Northwest.¹⁰⁹

¹⁰⁷ Philip Shabecoff, "The Battle for the National Forests" *New York Times* (13 August 1989), sec.4, 24.

¹⁰⁸ John Mitchell, "Sour Times in Sweet Home" *Audubon* (March 1991), 89.

¹⁰⁹ *Ibid.* 88.

In addition to lost jobs, less timber also meant reduced local government receipts which in many rural areas provided the bulk of funding for schools and services. To replace such funding in communities already smarting from high unemployment would be next to impossible claimed timber advocates. The result of such severe layoffs and reduced timber receipts, they argued, would be a gradual disintegration of once stable and prosperous communities along with all the accompanying social disruption.¹¹⁰ In the words of a joint Forest Service/BLM study, this expected unravelling of the social fabric of timber dependent communities would be marked by "increasing rates of domestic disputes, divorce, acts of violence, vandalism, suicide, alcoholism and other social problems."¹¹¹ Thus, to the timber interests, nothing less than the family and community life so deeply rooted in these small towns was at stake, as the owner of a small Oregon logging operation makes clear:

My son is twenty-eight. He will not leave this area. His great-grandfather was born here. Our roots are here. We don't want to go anywhere else. I was in Seattle a few weeks ago, and there was an editorial in the paper saying that the government should buy our homes from us, reeducate us, relocate us. But that's what they don't understand. We want to stay here. And what are they going to retrain us for? *What?*¹¹²

¹¹⁰ Michael Satchell, "The Endangered Logger" *U.S. News and World Report* (25 June 1990), 27-29.

¹¹¹ Report quoted in Ted Gup, "Owls vs. Man" *Time* (25 June 1990), 57.

¹¹² Quote in Mitchell, 94.

In addition to its economic necessity, timber interests also argued that the logging of old growth was smart forestry as well. Allowing conversion of old growth to vigorous stands of second growth would allow for optimal forest management and provide timber indefinitely, thereby averting future timber famines in a society whose seemingly insatiable demand for wood products has been constantly growing. In addition, timber interests claimed that clearcutting vastly improved wildlife habitat for game species who preferred open habitat to old, dark forests.¹¹³ As for those who saw old growth as a unique and irreplaceable habitat, they maintained that plenty was already off limits to logging in wilderness areas and national parks.¹¹⁴ Finally, the timber interests argued that the spotted owl, even if it was endangered (which they claimed was not yet clear), should never come before human beings. If the issue boiled down to man versus owl, then man had to and ought to prevail.

The environmentalists, on the other hand, saw the issue in starkly different terms. Far from being a case of owls versus people, it was instead a case of the timber industry's greed and inflexibility. Lost jobs, they main-

¹¹³ A good summary of all these points from a pro-timber perspective can be found in Leila Kysar, "A Logger's Lament" *Newsweek* (22 October 1990), 10.

¹¹⁴ The environmentalists respond to this point by claiming that most protected areas had the best old growth carefully left outside their boundaries when they were drawn especially in wilderness areas which consist of far greater acreage of high elevation rock, ice, and alpine meadow. For actual estimates of protected old growth, see pages 55-56.

tained, were due, for the most part, to the automation of the timber industry and the export of raw logs which denied local mills a massive supply of timber. They cited estimates that approximately 25% of all unfinished whole logs and 60% of all wholly or partially processed timber (chips, slabs, pulp, etc.) from the Pacific Northwest are exported annually.¹¹⁵ While timber from national forests (which accounts for around 25% of the total harvest) cannot be exported, environmentalists charged that it was used to satisfy domestic demand in order to free up private timber for profitable export.¹¹⁶ This arrangement, they argued, has increased pressure to keep public timber output high. As one of the world's only major timber producers to allow export, environmentalists charged that the United States had become a massive resource colony for Japan at the expense of local mills and workers.

To support these charges that timber industry practices were behind most of the job loss, environmentalists pointed to statistics showing an industry which produced roughly the same volume of wood products, consumed more public timber, and enjoyed far greater profits in 1988 as it did in 1972, but with only two-thirds or twenty thousand

¹¹⁵ These estimates, the former from the Forest Service, the latter from Rep. Peter DeFazio's office, are cited in "Log Exports Liquidating our Forests for Insatiable International Demand" *Forest Voice* 2:2 (1990), 4.

¹¹⁶ *Ibid.*

fewer workers and three-quarters of the mills.¹¹⁷ To the environmentalists then, cutting the last remnants of old growth would not reverse these long-term economic trends, but instead would only briefly forestall the inevitable continuation of job loss and mill closures. Only through economic diversification and a restructuring of the timber industry, they claimed, would things turn around.¹¹⁸

For the environmentalists, therefore, to blame impending hardships on the preservation of the spotted owl was a cruel hoax based upon the false premise that prosperity and employment based upon a finite and rapidly dwindling resource (old growth) could continue indefinitely. An editorial in a Siskiyou area newspaper sums up this view:

Communities....grew accustomed to a higher standard of public living than would have been possible had the resource [old growth] been properly stewarded to begin with....unconscionable overcutting of a limited old growth forest made our towns and counties feel richer than they ever really were.¹¹⁹

Sacrificing the last scraps of irreplaceable old growth in exchange for a very short-term postponement of unemployment that, if nothing else changed, would occur re-

¹¹⁷ Shelby Scates, "Running Out of Trees" *Seattle Post-Intelligencer* (19 November 1989); Egan, 173.

¹¹⁸ Such reforms would include banning or taxing exports, retooling mill machinery for second-growth timber and hardwoods, and stressing production of finished lumber products (such as furniture prehab housing, etc.). Brock Evans, *We Can Protect our Remaining Ancient Forests and Maintain a Strong Timber Economy in the Pacific Northwest*, memorandum (3 February 1989).

¹¹⁹ Robert Staal, "Do They Really Care About Diversification?" (editorial) *Ashland Daily Tidings* (23 May 1990).

ardless (when the old growth ran out ten or twenty years down the road) was, to the environmentalists, senseless.

"When you have a war between nations," suggested Lou Gold, "you don't refuse peace just because it might cause unemployment among soldiers."¹²⁰

The Forest Plan

Just as the old growth controversy in the Northwest was intensifying, the Siskiyou National Forest was working towards completion of its long-awaited Forest Plan. As mandated in the National Forest Management Act of 1976 (NMFA) and the Forest and Rangeland Renewable Resources Planning Act of 1974 (RPA), each national forest unit was to draw up a ten to fifteen year master plan. Such plans, which were to strive for both balanced usage and compliance with all major environmental laws, would serve as an overall blue-print for forest management for that period. Previously, most national forests were managed through a rather haphazard mix of decentralized area plans, regional plans, and the Forest Service manual. Because the preparation of each plan for a given forest required an elaborate data-gathering and coordination effort between all the ranger districts and the different areas of specialization, as well as a draft and final EIS, plans were often a decade or more in the making.

¹²⁰ Lou Gold quoted in Caufield, 83.

The Siskiyou's Forest Plan, the initial stages of which were begun in the late 1970s, proved no exception to this rule.

On August 28, 1987, two days before lightning ignited the Silver blaze, the DEIS for the Forest Plan was released and a lengthy 150-day public review period commenced. Reflecting Supervisor McCormick's determination to get the cut down from what he felt were unsustainable levels, the draft plan featured a modest drop in the ASQ from the previous range of 168-200 mmbf to 150 mmbf.¹²¹ Still, the plan kept the forest firmly on a commodity-producing path as it called for the eventual harvest of three-quarters of currently unprotected mature forest (including old growth) and the penetration of most roadless areas (including the North Kalmiopsis) outside of the congressionally designated wilderness with several hundred miles of new roads.¹²²

As with the Silver Fire DEIS, the immediate reaction to the draft plan was criticism from both sides. For the timber interests, the plan did not maintain timber harvests at sufficient levels or manage the Siskiyou as intensively as it could have. In response, SOTIA launched a massive letter and pre-printed coupon campaign pushing its "Evergreen

¹²¹ The DEIS preferred alternative is described in *Land and Resource Management Plan FEIS*, sec. II, 103-106.

¹²² *Land and Forest Management Plan FEIS*, sec. II, 154. Specifically regarding mature and old growth forest, the draft plan increased protected areas by eleven thousand acres over the Forest's current guidelines. Roughly 85,500 acres of mature forest outside of wilderness areas was to be pre-served while the remaining 258,500 acres were slated for eventual harvest. *FEIS*, sec. II, 104.

Alternative" for the final version of the Forest Plan.

SOTIA's plan would set the annual Siskiyou harvest at 188 mmbf, increase roadbuilding, and reduce the normal 100-120 year cutting rotations to eighty years.¹²³

The environmentalists, meanwhile, were even less pleased by the draft. Their main critique of the plan, which Headwaters was especially instrumental in developing, centered around allegations that the Forest Service models used to calculate the forest's sustained yield, and hence the ASQ, were seriously flawed. According to Julie Norman, president of Headwaters, the plan relied upon inaccurate computer model predictions of the growth rate of its second growth tree farms, thereby falsely boosting the whole forest's sustained yield and the current harvest levels set by that measure. These models' suspect long-term growth rate projections, claimed Norman, were based upon little more than sheer optimism and the liberal use of fertilizers and currently banned herbicides on the young stands.¹²⁴ According to one environmentalist, this amounted to "voodoo forestry":

Shorter rotations, better seeds--they conjure up all these intangibles that are supposed to enhance future growth. They don't care if it really works. The point is that it provides them with an excuse to cut more big old trees now.¹²⁵

¹²³ Roger Morton, "Santa's List Won't Make Some Jolly" (editorial) *Grants Pass Daily Courier* (17 December 1987).

¹²⁴ Norman, "Our Choices," 15.

¹²⁵ Quote in Caufield, 68.

As such, argued environmentalists, these models served less to realistically predict forest growth and more as a continued justification for the "business as usual" of clear-cutting, overcutting, and old growth harvesting.¹²⁶

The truth of the matter regarding reforestation in the Siskiyou, claimed Headwaters, was something quite different. On certain parts of the forest (especially on the high, dry, and rocky slopes of the Illinois Valley Ranger District), where the Forest Service projected vigorous growth rates for reforested stands, it was charged that that many of the replanted trees were not thriving or even surviving. In fact, a few Illinois Valley sites had been unsuccessfully reforested six times since 1961.¹²⁷ According to one environmentalist, the Forest Service had been growing "stealth trees."¹²⁸ Based upon their studies, Headwaters estimated that the Forest Service would realize only 66% of their expected harvest

¹²⁶ Headwater's charges would be largely upheld three years later in a very critical House Interior Committee Report on the adequacy and reliability of Forest Service timber yield models and reforestation practices. Specifically, the report found that Siskiyou National Forest's growth projections were totally unproven and purposefully blind to a number of limiting factors. In the national forests of the Northwest as a whole, the report found a pattern of over-optimistic growth projections and inaccurate inventories of actual standing timber. The report also found actual growth rate to be only 64% of the volume cut--a clear violation of sustained yield. U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, *Management of Federal Timber Resources: The Loss of Accountability* (Washington D.C.: 15 June 1992), 1-3.

¹²⁷ *Ibid.*

¹²⁸ Kathie Durbin, "Clearcut Logging Ravages Soil in Areas of Siskiyou's" *Oregonian* special report, 16.

on replanted sites,¹²⁹ some of which their own district silviculturist deemed in 1973 as "questionable" or "out of the question" for clearcutting in the first place.¹³⁰ Since NFMA prohibits cutting in areas not successfully reforested in five years, these were quite serious charges the environmentalists were levelling.¹³¹

Until the Silver Fire Project was wrapped up in the autumn of 1988, progress on the FEIS was slow. It was not until September that attention refocused on the Forest Plan as the state of Oregon jumped into the fray. Democratic Governor Neil Goldschmidt's National Forest Planning Team had for some time been drawing up the state's own preferred long-term management plan for the Siskiyou and on September 26 presented its "Oregon Alternative." The state plan called for an annual harvest of 160 mmbf (ten mmbf over the Forest Service's proposal), but kept the still substantial undis-

¹²⁹ Robert Sterling, "Headwaters Notes Flaw in Forest Plan" *Medford Mail Tribune* (22 January 1988).

¹³⁰ Illinois Valley District Silviculturist Alan Wolfson quoted in House Interior Committee Report, 10.

¹³¹ Again, these charges were backed up in the 1992 Interior Committee Report. The report charged that the Siskiyou misleadingly claimed a 99% reforestation success rate "by using a biased, incomplete sample that ignored high-elevation failures...." In the strongest terms the report goes on to find that "the parallel with the savings and loan crisis is clear. Managers substituted junk bonds and poorly-secured loans for reliable long-term home mortgages.... Likewise, the trustees for the public's forest trust, the Forest Service and BLM, have failed to adequately audit the consequences of their actions and their investments. Thousands of acres of original forests have been cashed in by clearcutting. The basic productivity of the land has been reinvested (loaned out) in a speculative system of clearcuts and monoculture tree farms." House Interior Report, 22.

turbed portion of the North Kalmiopsis either roadless or off-limits to logging.¹³²

Although it recommended a higher ASQ, the state plan was still quickly rejected by the timber interests who saw the North Kalmiopsis provision as needless pandering. Environmentalists, especially Headwaters, though, saw the state plan as an improvement upon the federal plan in that it was more amenable overall to the goals of ecological protection and biodiversity.¹³³ The environmentalists' tentative faith in the state plan soon crumbled, though, after the state, under heavy pressure from the timber interests, pulled back from its proposal to keep the North Kalmiopsis roadless.

Although it alone was responsible for the final decision, the Forest Service granted considerable weight to the state's view on this matter. According to the Supervisor, he considered it impossible to come up with a plan that the state did not sign-on to, primarily because Hatfield made the state's endorsement of the plan a condition for his own support. Consequently, the Forest Service went out of its way to coordinate with and accomodate the state, working closely with the governor's staff. Most local governments, taking a very hard line and endorsing SOTIA's Evergreen

¹³² Paul Fattig, "State Wants Siskiyou Harvest Increased" *Grants Pass Daily Courier* (26 September 1988).

¹³³ "Environmental Groups Like State Alternative" *Medford Mail Tribune* (2 November 1988).

Alternative, found themselves largely outside this policy loop.

The construction of the final plan featured some of the most pronounced and closely involved political intervention Siskiyou personnel had yet faced as Supervisor McCor-mick describes:

There was some pretty heavy political influence and some give and take in the last minutes before that plan was born that was....in some ways heavier than with the Silver Plan.

By April, 1989, under heavy pressure from all sides, the Forest Service released the FEIS and the long-awaited final decision for the Forest Plan. The final plan featured several changes from the draft including a ten mmbf boost in the ASQ which put it in line with the state's goal of 160 mmbf and a 13,407 acre increase in mature/old growth protection.¹³⁴ Although the Forest Service promised to switch a few high-altitude logging sites from clearcutting to selective logging,¹³⁵ environmentalists felt this did little to ameliorate their larger concerns about reforestation failure and inaccurate growth projections; how could it have, they asked, if the ASQ actually went up? The environmentalists promptly appealed the plan and the appeal was just as promptly rejected.

¹³⁴ *Land and Forest Management Plan FEIS* sec. II, 14, 104, 116.

¹³⁵ Unlike clearcutting which removes all the trees in a given area, selective cutting takes only certain individual trees of varying ages and leaves most of the rest.

CHAPTER 3

OLD GROWTH ON THE NATIONAL AGENDA

The preservationists....will soon have the blood of thousands of unemployed timber workers on their handsIf we compromise, we let them off the hook.

Yellow Ribbon Coalition

We already cut the heck out of our forests and every damn stick of old growth left is significant. I for one am sick and tired of being considered unreasonable and uncompromising because I don't want to split the last five percent of the ancient forest with the timber industry.

Tim Lillebo, ONRC

The Pressure Builds

As the Forest Plan was being hashed out in the Siskiyou, the larger old growth issue was expanding. In response to the court order of the previous year, the Fish and Wildlife Service officially proposed to list the spotted owl as a threatened species in March 1989. A torturous fifteen month path of bureaucratic delay still lay ahead before the actual listing would occur, however, as the Bush Administration sought to stall the inevitable for as long as possible.

As old growth habitat continued to fall, the environmentalists grew increasingly frustrated at the glacial pace at which the reluctant agencies were being forced by the courts to move to protect the owl. Subsequently, they brought separate suits against the Forest Service and BLM in early 1989 charging that both agencies failed to properly consider the impact of their old growth timber sales upon the owl. As a result, in March 1989, Seattle District Court Judge William Dwyer, another Reagan appointee, enjoined the Forest Service timber sales in question until the case could gain a full hearing. In all, approximately one billion board feet (bbf) of timber, or about one-quarter of Region Six sales were held up.¹

The injunction of a billion board feet of timber not only heightened already serious tensions, but lent the old growth issue increasingly high visibility. Both the timber interests and environmentalists were now involved in fully national efforts. Timber industry groups, enraged at the injunction, sponsored advertisements all over the country and lobbied heavily both regionally and in Washington D.C. Most all of the large public lands-oriented national environmental groups, meanwhile, had signed onto the old growth/spotted owl campaign. Even the Siskiyou's Lou Gold took to

¹This preliminary injunction order is described in the text of Judge Dwyer's 1991 opinion for Seattle Audubon Society v. Evans 771 F. Supp. 1081 (9th U.S. District), section II.

the road in 1988, coming down from his Bald Mountain vigil each winter to travel around the country delivering lectures and slide shows promoting the Siskiyou National Park idea and old growth protection in general. Forest Service officials claimed that they could track his movement across the country each year by following the postmarks of the indignant letters they received.²

Although the Forest Service was bearing much of the brunt of the environmentalists' ire, the high volume harvests of the late 1980s were as much or more the responsibility of Congress. Year after year, the Northwest's delegation managed to boost the timber sales appropriations even further than the Forest Service was requesting.³ In 1987, for example, the Siskiyou was ordered by Congress to sell 46.7% more timber than the forest had originally planned.⁴ Especially with so much timber being held up in court, the 1990 appropriations were to prove no exception regarding congressional intervention. Senator Hatfield managed to attach a rider to the 1990 Interior Appropriations bill that freed up most of the billion bf being enjoined, while mandating a 3.85 bbf Region Six harvest in 1990 and barring judi-

²Catherine Caufield, "The Ancient Forest" *New Yorker* (14 May 1990), 72.

³Congress increased the Region Six harvest by 700 mmbf in 1986, 1 billion bf in 1987, 300 mmbf in 1988, and 200 mmbf in 1989. Kathie Durbin, "Politics Helped Delay Northwest Timber Management Plans" from special report: "Forests in Distress" *Oregonian* (15 October 1990), 11.

⁴Caufield, 56.

cial review of any of 1990 sales.⁵ Interior Appropriations Subcommittee Chairman Sidney Yates (D-IL), long a staunch friend of environmentalists, tried to keep the rider off the House version, but was outmaneuvered by AuCoin. Previously, court-stripping amendments had been very case-specific such as the rider used in the Silver Fire salvage, but this rider, known as Section 318, was the broadest court ban ever attempted.⁶

In order to get such a controversial measure through Congress, however, Hatfield had to sweeten the deal with several compromise measures. First, Section 318 issued a somewhat vague directive for the Forest Service to do its best not to fragment significant blocks of owl habitat. Given the extremely high 1990 quota, however, this goal would be hard not to violate. Second, it mandated the creation of citizen advisory boards for each Region Six "owl forest" to review timber sales as to their impact on the spotted owl and advise the Forest Service accordingly.⁷ Finally, Section 318 directed the Forest Service to develop

⁵Philip Shabecoff, "Senate Votes to Allow Cutting of Northwest's Virgin Forests" *New York Times* (27 July 1989), sec. A, 17

⁶In all there have been nine court-stripping riders added to appropriation bills.

⁷These advisory boards were to be composed of two timber industry representatives, two environmentalists, and two or three supposedly neutral members.

a spotted owl plan by September, 1990,⁸ something the agency had already promised to do by the spring of 1989.⁹

As might be expected, Section 318 raised howls of protest from the environmentalists. Not only did it released 163 timber sales in owl habitat before the courts could rule on their legality, but it also took from them their most effective weapon. The need for a court ban was obvious, fumed the environmentalists, because Section 318 violated NEPA, NFMA, the Endangered Species Act, the Migratory Bird Act, and the Clean Water Act, not to mention the rights of citizens for redress.¹⁰

Around the same time Section 318 was passed, an inter-agency panel of scientists from the Forest Service, BLM, FWS, National Park Service, and northwest states, headed by Forest Service biologist Jack Ward Thomas, convened to devise a plan to save the spotted owl. Around six months later, in March 1990, this Interagency Scientific Committee (ISC) issued its findings and recommendations, commonly known as the Thomas Report.¹¹ The committee came to the fairly obvious conclusion that the spotted owl was headed towards extinction if current logging practices did not

⁸Public Law #101-122, Section 318, 103 Stat. 701 (1989), 745-750.

⁹Text of Dwyer opinion for Seattle Audubon Society v. Evans, section II.

¹⁰"Fundamental Rights Trampled" *Forest Voice* 2:1 (1990), 4.

¹¹Interagency Scientific Committee, *A Conservation Strategy for the Northern Spotted Owl* (GPO region 10: 1990).

change. At the very least, according to the Thomas Report, a 25-40% reduction in timber harvests and increased protection of significant stands of old growth were necessary to keep owl populations above the critical threshold. As a non-binding recommendation towards that end, the ISC drew up its own fairly modest three million acre system of Habitat Conservation Areas (HCA) which attempted to identify areas of especially critical habitat or high dispersal potential. Adoption of the HCAs, however, would have to be accompanied by logging reductions outside the HCAs, including a 50% reduction in corridors linking one HCA to the next.¹² Although they generally applauded it, environmentalists were never very comfortable with the ISC plan.¹³ Specifically, they feared that the committee's very measured, overly cautious response could not stand up to the owl's opponents. "They built in all the compromise already," claimed a spokesman

¹² It is important to note that the HCA system was designed as the bare minimum needed to protect the owl, not old growth. In fact, HCAs leave out many significant areas of prime old growth and encompass some fairly marginal areas. The ISC plan was drawn up with wide consideration for economic and social factors and as such did not seek the protection of every single spotted owl, but rather attempted to keep owl populations above the point of no return. Thus, it did allow for and expect a certain degree of population decline.

¹³ Nor, for that matter, were some scientists. In his lengthy 1991 court opinion on the spotted owl controversy, Judge Dwyer writes of the ISC report, "While it is endorsed by well-qualified scientists, it is criticized by others, equally well-qualified as over-optimistic and risky." *Seattle Audubon Society v. Evans*, section V, finding 31c.

for the Wilderness Society, "It's not a plan that could be further compromised and still protect the owl."¹⁴

Following on the heels of the Thomas Report on June 22 came the long awaited decision that Fish and Wildlife could delay no longer--the northern spotted owl was now officially listed as a threatened species. Although the Bush Administration knew it was coming, the owl's listing put it in an extremely difficult position. While it was firmly opposed to any harvest reductions and warned of lost jobs as loudly as the timber industry, the government's own scientists were calling for less logging to save an owl that now had legal protection. Faced with such a tough decision, the administration balked; only four days after the owl's listing, it delayed its decision on how to proceed until September. In the interim, announced the administration, it would ask Congress to modify the ESA to allow for easier exemptions.¹⁵ Angry environmentalists charged that this failure to promptly implement legally mandated protection was a "throw-back to the Reagan-era."¹⁶

The Forest Service and FWS similarly stalled implementation of owl protection measures. Even after the owl's June listing, Fish and Wildlife did not oppose a single 1990 Forest Service sale in owl habitat. In 1989 and 1990, in fact,

¹⁴Quote in Scott Somer, "Northwest's Old Growth Forests Shrink" *Medford Mail Tribune* (22 May 1990).

¹⁵Timothy Egan, "Softening Stand on Spotted Owl, Administration Delays Protection" *New York Times* (27 June 1990).

¹⁶Quote in "No Peace for Owl," *Time* (9 July 1990), 63.

FWS issued 1,062 "no jeopardy" rulings for Region Six timber sales, 63,425 acres of which were located in Thomas Committee HCAs.¹⁷ The Forest Service, meanwhile, continued their 1990 harvest with little movement towards developing their own plan as mandated by the Hatfield rider. Moreover, neither agency showed any inclination to accept the Thomas Report's HCA recommendations.

The Thomas Report and the owl's listing led to a surge of national press in the summer of 1990 with long features and regular coverage in the *New York Times*, *Chicago Tribune*, *Newsweek*, and the *Wall Street Journal*, as well as a June cover story in *Time*. The longer the issue dragged on, the more nationalized it was becoming. The *Wall Street Journal* began to warn of the dire economic consequences of environmental extremism,¹⁸ while a June *Washington Post* editorial countered with strong support for old growth protection:

The country isn't running out of jobs, but it is running out of ancient forest. This is an irreplaceable resource; these forests are special and majestic areas. The country doesn't need the lumber, and for the loggers and communities involved, cutting the forest down would be only a respite. Once it was done, there would be no forest (or owls) and still no jobs.¹⁹

¹⁷ These figures were taken from letters from Marvin Plenart, FWS regional director to John Butruille, Region Six Forester cited in "U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service Credibility Hits New Low...At Owl's Expense" *Headwaters* (September 1990), 9-11.

¹⁸ "Owls are People Too" (editorial) *Wall Street Journal* (9 April 1990), sec. A, 1.

¹⁹ "Forests, Jobs, and Owls" (editorial) *Washington Post* (29 June 1990).

Despite the fact that Section 318 was keeping harvest levels high and free of court interference, and despite the administration's unwillingness to act, timber interests where, nonetheless, quite jittery in the summer of 1990. In the past twenty-one months, thirty-five mills and 5,500 jobs in Oregon alone had been lost and the owl's listing only worsened the scenario.²⁰ Calling for special action to offset or weaken the owl's ESA protection, timber interests began to ominously warn of complete economic disaster in the region.

Not surprisingly, the Northwest turned, in the summer of 1990, into a powder keg of social tension. In this atmosphere, resentment, fear, and intimidation became increasingly prevalent. Multilated spotted owls began showing up hanging from trees or nailed to signs while bumperstickers reading "Save a logger, kill a spotted owl" or "I love spotted owls....well done" became commonplace.²¹ Also growing more frequent were pro-logging demonstrations including a 3,500 person rally in Kelso, WA and a huge noisy demonstration in western Oregon involving hundreds of logging trucks flying the movement's ubiquitous yellow ribbons from their anten-

²⁰ Kathie Durbin and Paul Koberstein, introduction to "Forests in Distress" *Oregonian* special report, 24.

²¹ Timothy Egan, *The Good Rain* (New York: Knopf, 1990), 172; Shawn Doherty, "Oregon's Not-So-Sweet Home" *Newsweek* (11 December 1989), 54.

nas.²² Earth First, meanwhile, began planning for what it called its version of Freedom Summer, urging people from all over the country to descend on northern California for "Redwood Summer." The May car-bombing of two Earth First activists organizing this event, both of whom were seriously injured, was evidence of the new level the desperation in the region.²³

The Battle Widens in Congress

By early September 1990, as its self-imposed deadline for coming up with an owl strategy had already passed, the administration found itself deeply divided and still without a plan.²⁴ On September 21, the administration, announcing

²² Herbert McLean, "Paying the Price for Old Growth" *American Forests* (October 1991), 73; "Loggers Protest Owl Decision" *New York Times* (25 June 1990), sec. A, 19.

²³ "2 in an 'Earth' Group Hurt as Car Explodes" *New York Times*, (25 May 1990), A19. This incident soon developed into a bizarre controversy as the police immediately charged the activists, one of whom had previously been getting death threats, with transporting the bomb that blew up their car, but then withdrew their charges, admitting that they had no evidence. Not long after, an anonymous caller took responsibility for the blast. The case remains unsolved. The old growth controversy began filtering down to other, very unlikely places. For example, the Forest Service stopped sending its Woodsy Owl mascot to grade schools in the communities around the Siuslaw National Forest in Oregon. Meanwhile parents in Laytonville, CA sparked a First Amendment battle when they demanded that their local school ban Dr. Seuss's tale of the Lorax, a creature endangered by the destruction of the Truffulla trees where it lived. "Woodsy Owl Still Gives a Hoot, But in Siuslaw He Gets a Boot" *Oregonian* (4 April 1990); Ron Arias and Liz McNeil "A Boy Sides With Dr. Seuss's Lorax and Puts a Town at Loggerheads" *People* (3 February 1990).

²⁴ Reportedly, Secretary of Interior Lujan, OMB chief Richard Darman, and Council of Economic Advisors chief Michael Boskin all favored keeping harvest levels high and

that "no perfect solution exists," proposed a 3.2 bbf harvest, a modest decrease. Both sides immediately lambasted the plan as saving neither jobs nor owls and a waste of three months' time to decide what everyone already knew. "Congress and the Pacific Northwest carefully awaited the recommendations of this Delphic-like task force," claimed one congressional staffer, "only to find out later....that these folks really have nothing to say."²⁵ In addition to the modest reduction in logging, the administration called on Congress to insulate Region Six timber sales from NFMA and NEPA as well as invoke the so-called *God Squad*--a special cabinet-level committee empowered to make exemptions to the Endangered Species Act.²⁶ The environmentalists claimed that this move only proved that the administration acknowledged the illegality of their timber sales program.²⁷

The Forest Service, meanwhile, had to confront its own owl plan deadline imposed upon it by Congress in Section 318. Having failed to meet that deadline, the Forest Service

changing the ESA should legal challenges arise. The Forest Service and EPA chief William Reilly, on the other hand, pushed for acceptance of the ISC plan. Timothy Egan, "Split on How to Save Spotted Owl is Reported in Bush's Study Group" *New York Times* (8 September 1990), sec. I, 8.

²⁵ Timothy Egan, "Administration Offers Plan to Limit Northwest Logging" *New York Times* (22 September 1990), sec. I, 7; quote in Alyson Pytte, "Bush's Modest Proposal" *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report* (29 September 1990), 3105.

²⁶ Egan, "Administration Offers Plan", sec. I, 8; Alyson Pytte, "Timber, Spotted Owl Interests Find Middle Ground Elusive" *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report* (29 September 1990), 3104.

²⁷ Egan, "Administration Offers Plan", sec. I, 8.

announced on September 28 its decision, made without hearings or an EIS, that it would conduct its timber sales in a manner "not inconsistent with" the Thomas Report.²⁸

The rush of events in late 1990 continued to unfold as the court-stripping provision of Section 318, two weeks before it was to expire, was ruled unconstitutional by a federal appellate court in San Francisco for violating the separation of powers doctrine.²⁹ As a result, the environmentalists' previously banned lawsuits were reinstated and twelve Oregon timber sales not yet executed were halted by Judge Dwyer.³⁰

In Congress, meanwhile, the 1991 Interior Appropriations and with it the annual timber quota was being hashed out. Hatfield, as he did every year, pushed hard for high timber quotas; seeking for 1991 a 3.45 bbf Region Six harvest; substantially higher than the Forest Service's 2.6 bbf request. More significantly, Hatfield sought language in the appropriations bill which would require the final congressionally designated ASQ to be a legal mandate rather than

²⁸ An overview of spotted owl management is provided in USDA Forest Service, Pacific Northwest Region, Siskiyou National Forest, *Canyon Integrated Resource Project Draft Environmental Statement* (Region 10: GPO, 1991), sec. B, 2.

²⁹ Pytte, "Timber, Spotted Owl....", 3104. This ruling, however was itself overturned by the Supreme Court in March of 1992 as it ruled that Congress did indeed have the authority to block judicial review in that instance, By this point, though, the ruling was largely academic. Linda Campbell, "Endangered Owl Loses in High Court" *Chicago Tribune* (26 March 1992), sec. 1, 5.

³⁰ The 18 December 1990 motion halting these sales is described by Dwyer in *Seattle Audubon v. Evans*, section II.

the target which NFMA defines it to be.³¹ What concerned Hatfield was that the various national forests, hemmed in by their own Forest Plans, sustained yield, and now, perhaps, the ISC guidelines, were finding it impossible in some cases to satisfy their full congressionally mandated ASQ without violating these other requirements.³²

While the demands of Hatfield and others in the Northwest delegation regarding timber quotas had traditionally held sway, now for the first time, intense environmental lobbying was beginning to pay off. Eastern congressmen were becoming increasingly involved in timber matters and more willing to take an oppositional stance. As a result, the 1991 appropriations package was rider-free for the first time in five years and cut levels, although still held by environmentalists as unsustainable and above ISC recommendations, were slowly beginning to come down.³³ Hatfield's ASQ-mandating language and Senator Robert Packwood's (R-OR) at-

³¹ Headwaters Press Release (22 October 1990).

³² Not fully meeting all the Section 318 quotas, in fact, was the same reason a coalition of timber industry groups brought an unsuccessful lawsuit against Region Six of the Forest Service. Interestingly, this suit saw Headwaters intervening on the Forest Service's behalf. Although certainly not unknown, timberinitiated lawsuits against the Forest Service were far less common than environmentalist suits. "Industry Sues USFS; Headwaters Intervenes" *Headwaters* (Late Winter 1991), 9.

³³ For entire Pacific Northwest harvest (Region Six and BLM) was sent at 3.2 mmbf, the same as the administration requested. Alyson Pytte, "The Timber Bureaucracy" *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report* (29 September 1990), 3106-3107. For all 155 national forest units, the ASQ was reduced to 9.3 bbf, down from 11.2 bbf in 1990. "Interior Appropriations Hits and Misses" *Wilderness* (Winter 1990), 6.

tempt to add language to weaken the ESA were both turned back. Environmentalists, sensing that they had ridden out the worst of the spotted owl storm and had, perhaps, turned the corner on this issue, confidently declared that it was "time for law and order" in the forests.³⁴

Both the timber interests and environmentalists were tiring of this annual spectacle of appropriations battles and court orders as each sought to settle the issue once and for all in their favor. The Congress, of course, was the only venue to achieve this, and thus, both sides began to focus upon a legislative strategy. The environmentalists had found a very sympathetic patron in the House: Rep. Jim Jontz (D-IN) who in April, 1990 introduced HR 4492, the Ancient Forest Protection Act (AFPA). The Jontz bill would create an Ancient Forest Reserve System designed to protect all "significant stands" of old growth as well as the corridors between them.³⁵ During the course of the year, the AFPA would pick up 125 co-sponsors.

The Jontz bill incensed members of the Northwest delegation who saw Jontz as a meddlesome outsider with no stake in the matter. At one point, in fact, the acrimony became bad enough to violate Congress's usual collegiality as an

³⁴ "Hatfield Riders Fade; Owl Suits Come Alive" *Headwaters* (Late Winter 1991), 9.

³⁵ This would be determined later by a special mapping and designation process

enraged Les AuCoin threw Jontz out of his office.³⁶ Jontz defended himself by claiming ancient forests to be national treasures no different than the Grand Canyon whose fate, he argued, no one suggests only Arizonans should determine.³⁷

In July, Rep. Bruce Vento (D-MN) made a far more modest bid for old growth protection, introducing the Ancient Forest Act (HR 5295), which would reduce Northwest harvests to three bbf and create a 6.3 million acre Ancient Forest Reserve.³⁸ Unlike the more preservationist Jontz bill, Vento's bill would only protect a little over half of unprotected old growth, although it would require such forest to be logged using non-clearcut methods.³⁹ On September 13, Vento's bill was approved nineteen to thirteen by the House Interior Subcommittee on National Parks and Public Lands, but could not get through the less friendly full Interior Committee.⁴⁰

³⁶ Timothy Egan, "Fighting for Control of America's Hinterlands" *New York Times* (11 November 1990), sec. IV, 18.

³⁷ Caufield, 83.

³⁸ This reserve would be comprised of both mature and old growth forests. Like *ancient forests*, mature forests contain some, but not all characteristics of true old growth as defined Franklin.

³⁹ Gerald Gray, "The Politics of Old Growth" *American Forests* (October 1991), 18. While the national environmental groups welcomed both the Jontz and Vento bills, many of the more uncompromising grassroot groups, while backing the Jontz bill, most preferred the Native Forest Council's unsponsored proposal, the Native Forest Protection Act. The NFPA would mandate sweeping changes in the entire National Forest system including the protection of all ancient forest, an end to all clearcutting, and a ban on all timber exports.

⁴⁰ Pytte, "The Timber Bureaucracy", 3106. Even if it passed Interior, it would also have to clear the even more

A number of legislative proposals were advanced by the timber interests' side as well. In spring, the Northwest Forest Resource Council (NFRC) proposed changes in Wilderness and Wild and Scenic River boundaries to release new land for logging to offset any future limitations caused by owl protection measures.⁴¹ At this point, the timber industry was not willing to propose any specific old growth plan as to do so would, timber feared, would lend credence to the notion of old growth protection as a legitimate concept in the first place as well as call into question current forestry methods.⁴²

Instead, timber interests threw their full weight behind S 2762 and HR 5092, the National Forest Plan Implementation Act, simultaneously introduced into both houses by Hatfield, AuCoin, Smith, and Rep. Sid Morrison (R-WA). This bill, dubbed by environmentalists the "Timber Tantrum Act," sought what it called "community stability" by mandating for all 155 national forest units minimum timber quotas that would absolutely have to be met. In addition, the bill would limit court challenges and, as the NFRC sought, return portions of Wilderness acreage to commercial use to offset any

hostile Agriculture Committee, as this is a policy area with overlapping committee jurisdiction.

⁴¹ Les Line, "Gambits and Skirmishes" *Audubon* (May 1990), 4. Like Wilderness, Wild and Scenic River is a special congressional designation which protects the natural and aesthetic character of river sections by prohibiting development activities on the river or the adjacent land along its banks.

⁴² Gray, "Politics of Old Growth", 17.

future owl or old growth protection. Despite this flurry of legislative activity, though, none of the various bills, whether pro-timber or environmental, had substantially moved forward in 1990.

Section 318 and Siskiyou Logging

Back on the Siskiyou, meanwhile, the dizzying national events of the old growth issue in 1989 and 1990 were threatening to turn the new Forest Plan on its head. Judge Dwyer's March 1989 injunction blocked 79.4 mmbf of the Siskiyou National Forest's 181 mmbf sales plan for 1989.⁴³ In October, though, that timber was released by the Hatfield rider which also set an extremely high quota on the Siskiyou for 1990. Together the freed-up 1989 sales and the 1990 quota required the Siskiyou to meet an unprecedented 310 mmbf harvest in a single year.⁴⁴ As previously mentioned, Section 318 also required the Forest to minimize fragmentation of large blocks of old growth and set up a citizen advisory board to review sales.

By December 1989, the Forest Service picked the Siskiyou advisory board which consisted of two local timber company officials, two moderate and uncontroversial local environmentalists, a county commissioner, a port director, and a

⁴³ Robert Sterling, "Owl Reports Impact Studied" *Medford Mail Tribune* (5 April 1990).

⁴⁴ Gordon Gregory, "Siskiyou Falls Short of its Timber Target" *Grants Pass Daily Courier* (20 July 1990).

community college president.⁴⁵ Noticeably absent from this board was anyone from Headwaters which, more so than any other local group, commanded technical expertise on Siskiyou issues and had clearly expressed an interest in participating. Despite its exclusion, Headwaters immediately set out mapping areas that the Forest Service could harvest without seriously fragmenting owl habitat and yet still try to meet Section 318's massive quota.⁴⁶

As the 1990 sales began to take shape, however, environmentalists found their recommendations largely ignored. They charged that the Forest Service was still engaging in "business as usual" proposing sales in roadless areas and large stands of old growth in direct violation of the Section 318's provision to minimize fragmentation. Two such sales, Homestead Butte and Snail Creek particularly rankled environmentalists as they were in large roadless blocks of prime old growth surrounded by numerous fragmented little patches of forest in nearby roaded areas, the very places Headwaters was urging to cut first.⁴⁷ On the northwest side of the Siskiyou, meanwhile, the Forest Service announced plans for sales in the Elk River drainage despite the riv-

⁴⁵ USDA Forest Service, *Report to Congress on Implementation of Section 318 of the Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations Act for FY1990*, 1st Report (1 December 1989).

⁴⁶ Headwaters Press Release (11 December 1989).

⁴⁷ "The Broken Promise of the Timber Compromise" *Headwaters* (March 1990), 4. After the Forest Service's adoption of the Thomas Report guidelines, however, these two sales were withdrawn.

er's Wild and Scenic designation and its inclusion in Vento's proposed Ancient Forest Reserve.

The lifting of the Hatfield rider's court ban in September gave back to environmentalists their most potent weapon as they promptly reinstated suits against four old growth sales in the Siskiyou: Garden, Sugarloaf, China Left, and Briggs Secret. In two separate rulings, Judge Dwyer stopped all four sales, the last three of which were part of his larger twelve sale injunction (see p.112). In their defense, the Forest Service had claimed such sales to necessary for meeting Section 318's huge timber quota. Furthermore they pointed to the thirteen sales they had modified thusfar in response to citizen advisory board recommendations as evidence of their flexibility.⁴⁸

The Siskiyou National Forest, therefore, found itself in a nearly impossible position, caught between directives to minimize fragmentation, ISC spotted owl regulations, the extremely high quotas of Section 318, and a very limited time frame to carry out almost two years of current and backlogged sales. Despite three-quarters of a million dollars in overtime, by late summer the Siskiyou announced that it was not quite going to be able to meet the quota in the time allotted. Said one Siskiyou official, "we understand the

⁴⁸ Forest Service, *Report to Congress on Implementation of Section 318*, 9th Report (1 August 1990); "Siskiyou Sale Bordering Wild Rogue Wilderness Blocked By Court" *Headwaters* (Late Winter 1991), 8.

consequences....we don't like it....But Congress gave us an impossible task."⁴⁹

New Perspectives and the Drive for Forest Reform

To most environmentalists, the root causes behind the destruction of old growth were located in the ill-advised practices and patterns of public land agencies. While timber sales appeals and court injunctions were seen as vital strategies, they were still just holding actions; no real, lasting change would ever be realized, argued the environmentalists, until the public land agencies, particularly the Forest Service, were reformed. This represented, of course, a further expansion of the scope of this issue; from grass-roots protests to save particular local forests to coordinated regional efforts on behalf of old growth in general to, now, a national drive for bureaucratic reform.

The environmentalists' critique of Forest Service forestry was grounded in both ecological and economic arguments. Prior to the 1950s, the Forest Service most commonly employed uneven-aged selective harvesting methods (see chapter 2, footnote 135). But such methods were not suitable for the type of highly mechanized, large volume harvesting which commenced in the post-war era. Consequently, clearcutting came to be adopted, in a radical departure of Forest Service

⁴⁹Quote in Gregory, "Siskiyou Falls Short."

practice, as the predominant management style.⁵⁰ While logistically and economically more efficient, clearcutting has long been challenged by environmentalists as an ecological disaster. Besides the erosion and biological disruption the act of clearcutting itself has long been documented to cause,⁵¹ its critics argue that the tree farms that are replanted in clearcuts are biologically impoverished croplands whose one or two species create a sterile, vastly simplified version of the complex ecosystem they have replaced.⁵²

Environmentalists have also charged that Forest Service practices are economically wrong-headed. While freely hurling labels such as "timber industry welfare" and "forest

⁵⁰ Michael Frome, *The Forest Service*, 2nd edit. (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1984), 108; Roy Keene, "'New Perspectives' to Limit Clearcutting" *High Country News* (19 November 1990). A typical clearcut involves the complete removal of trees from a area usually between forty to three hundred acres. Most often, the cut-over site is then burned to eliminate left-over debris (called site preparation) and then replanted with one or two species of rapid growing hybrid seedlings.

⁵¹ For a discussion of clearcutting and its ecological effects see Frome, 117.

⁵² Growing in straight, dense, even-aged rows, typical Forest Service tree plantations do not let enough sunlight reach the forest floor for understory plants to grow. Also, because of the lack of organic matter on the forest floor and the destruction of essential nitrogen-fixing root fungi during site preparation, tree plantations rely upon heavy applications of artificial fertilizers to maintain productivity. While many of today's tree farms outgrow natural forests by 30-40%, biologist Chris Maser warns that there is no record anywhere on earth of any intensively managed forest maintaining full productivity beyond three rotations. The exhausted, insect-plagued tree plantations of Germany and Scandinavia, suggests Maser, ought to serve as evidence of modern forestry's unsustainability. Kathie Durbin and Paul Koberstein, "New Forestry: Trying Logging with a Lighter Touch" *Oregonian* special report, 21; Caufield, 68-69.

socialism," environmentalists have long maintained that the three-quarters of the Forest Service budget that goes towards timber cutting-related activity⁵³ amounts to little more than a subsidy for timber companies. Such private concerns, they argue, could never profitably log the mountainous national forests without taxpayer-built roads, replantings, and other services. As a result, the Forest Service, system-wide, operates at a loss for most timber sales with the costs of preparing a sale outweighing the value of the timber itself.⁵⁴ Even in Region Six, by far the most profitable of all Forest Service regions, one study has concluded that 20% of all sales lose money.⁵⁵ The Siskiyou National Forest, meanwhile, was estimated by environmentalists to operate at a loss in 1989 of \$2.3 million, or ten cents on the dollar.⁵⁶

These sorts of charges were not only originating from environmental circles. Even from within the ranks of the

⁵³ This would include direct expenditures such as roads and sale preparation as well as indirect spending on things such as forestry research, firefighting, and local payments. For complete figures for the FY 1990 budget see, Timothy Egan, "Forest Service Abusing Role, Dissidents Say" *New York Times* (3 March 1990), sec. I, 26.

⁵⁴ Caufield, 69. This is assuming that the Forest gets fair price market value for the timber it sells, which is not always the case. On the Tongass National Forest in Alaska, for example, environmentalists claim that trees worth \$700 on the open market are auctioned off for \$1.48. "Your Taxes Pay for this Outrage" *Forest Voice* 2:2 (1990), 5.

⁵⁵ Cascades Holistic Economic Consultants, Newsletter (Eugene OR: 23 September 1988).

⁵⁶ Robert Sterling, "Wilderness Group Claims Siskiyou Forest Unprofitable" *Medford Mail Tribune* (4 October 1990).

Forest Service itself, dissent began to emerge. While the most severely dissatisfied formed an organization and a newspaper dedicated to reforming their agency,⁵⁷ a number of mainstream rangers and supervisors also began to voice their concerns that Forest Service practices could not continue unchanged for long. In the fall of 1989, supervisors from all over the system began to warn Forest Service Chief Dale Robertson that the agency was "out of control." At their annual conference in Las Vegas later that year, the supervisors continued to press their case, even presenting Robertson with a videotape documenting their concerns.⁵⁸

Under widespread criticism and facing growing turmoil within the ranks of his agency, Robertson in January 1990 announced that the Forest Service would begin experimenting with a new forest management program called *New Perspectives*. Employing concepts of *New Forestry* developed by Forest Service biologist Jerry Franklin, the *New Perspectives* scheme officially represented an attempt to harvest forests without quite so much ecological disruption. *New Forestry* attempts to mimic nature by leaving harvest sites in a more natural condition. This is achieved by retaining some snags

⁵⁷ The organization that was formed was called the Association of Forest Service Employees for Environmental Ethics (AFSEEE) and their paper, *Inner Voice*, has a circulation of several thousand.

⁵⁸ "Forest Managers Speak Out for the Forest" *Headwaters* (March 1990), 3; Timothy Egan, "Forest Supervisors Say Politicians are Asking Them to Cut Too Much" *New York Times* (19 September 1991).

and large living trees for wildlife habitat and reseedling and leaving a certain amount of downed logs and other debris on the ground. In addition, New Forestry emphasizes stream-side protection and encourages increased helicopter logging and the minimization of fragmentation where possible.⁵⁹ All of this, although largely untested, has been alleged to allow harvest sites to more readily regenerate into a healthy natural forest community.⁶⁰

For timber interests, New Forestry represented just one more threat to their timber supply to contend with. "It looks to us," claimed a lobbyist for the American Forest Resource Alliance, "like [New Forestry is] going to be an excuse to cut fewer trees."⁶¹ The timber interests, still not willing to recognize the value of old growth or the ecological problems associated with clearcutting, would not admit any need for these so-called "reforms." Claimed one industry executive:

There's no crisis in our woods and no reason to be rushing in and making changes when we don't have any problem replanting trees and regenerating forests.⁶²

⁵⁹ Durbin and Koberstein, "New Forestry", 21-22; Jon Luoma, "New Logging Approach Tries to Mimic Nature" *New York Times* (6 June 1990), sec. C, 13.

⁶⁰ Despite its increased ecological sensitivity, New Forestry is not to be confused with selective uneven-age cutting methods (see footnote 135, chapter two); more accurately, it is a modified, environmentally friendlier version of clearcutting. Also, because its methods result in a reduced harvest volume, New Forestry require logging over a larger area to achieve the same overall volume. *Ibid.*

⁶¹ Quote in Luoma, 13.

⁶² *Ibid.*

The environmentalists, on the other hand, were far less certain how to react towards New Perspectives. While, New Forestry methods clearly represented a genuine and welcomed improvement over traditional clearcutting practices, environmentalists worried that it might degenerate into a justification for the continuation of unsustainable harvest levels and old growth liquidation. A spokesman for ONRC sums up this ambivalence:

New Forestry would be great if combined with a reduced cut. We're concerned that it not become a placebo for the real problem, which is, we're just cutting too fast in the national forests.⁶³

Another activist had similar doubts:

New Forestry is dangerous because it tells politicians that they can have their owls and their timber too. That's a great message if it's true, a risky one if it isn't.⁶⁴

To the most uncompromising environmentalists, however, New Perspectives was a "kinder, gentler rape of the forest," a "bureaucratic response to a public relations problem," or simply, "New P.R."⁶⁵ The ONRC's Kerr charged that the Forest Service was manipulating the universally respected Jerry Franklin and using this "warmed over old forestry" to get at the last scraps of ancient forest.⁶⁶ Others sarcastically noted that:

⁶³ *Ibid.*

⁶⁴ Quote in Seth Zuckerman, "New Forestry, New Hype?" *Sierra* (March/April 1992), 41.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.* 67; Andrew Kerr, "New (Age) Perspectives" *Forest Watch* (October 1990), 22-23.

⁶⁶ Kerr also complained that without an accompanying reduction in the overall harvest volume, the practice of New

....New Forestry and the rest of the New Perspectives program, including New Technology and New Alliances will likely be carried out with New Chainsaws, allowing loggers to buy New Pickup Trucks.⁶⁷

The Forest Service was, therefore, stuck in the middle between two skeptical foes. "The industry" observed one agency official, "says 'That's not a clearcut,' and the environmentalists say 'That's not a forest'".⁶⁸

Shasta Costa: True Reform or Trojan Horse?


As was so often the case, the Siskiyou National Forest found itself once again at the front lines of the old growth controversy, as the Forest Service chose the Forest to debut its New Perspectives program. As a "test-run" of sorts, the Shasta Costa Integrated Resource Project had all eyes upon it as to whether New Perspectives was feasible or not. The Shasta Costa watershed in the north-central part of the Siskiyou, north of the North Kalmiopsis, encompasses 23,419 acres, a good deal of this roadless (see figure 6). Not only is the watershed prime spotted owl habitat, but it also provides an important wildlife corridor between the Kalmiopsis area and the Wild Rogue Wilderness to the north. In addition, it lies directly south of the only paved east-west

Forestry might in some ways actually be worse for the forests since the achievement of the normal ASQ using such lower yielding methods would require the cutting and roading of an even greater percentage of forest acreage. Kerr, "New (Age) Perspectives", 22, 25.

⁶⁷ Zuckerman, 42.

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*

FIGURE 6
SHASTA COSTA AND QUOSATANA PROJECT PLANNING AREAS



Source: Quosatana/Bradford Integrated Resource Projects
DEIS, Sec. I, 2.

route through the Siskiyou and thus, is an exceptionally scenic area of high visual sensitivity.⁶⁹

In 1987 the initial planning process for the timber sales in the Shasta Costa area began, but was soon interrupted by the Silver Fire. Although the Silver salvage was mostly seen as a defeat for environmentalists, it did, for the first time, force the Siskiyou National Forest to clearly admit to the significance of fisheries, biodiversity, organic debris, erosion, and streamside vegetation--all issues it had previously avoided but was forced to confront in the extensive and closely scrutinized Silver Fire EIS process. By the time Shasta Costa planning resumed in 1989, rapidly changing events made such concepts politically impossible to ignore.

To design the prototype New Perspectives project, the Siskiyou brought in some of the best talent from across the system and spent a half million dollars in preparation and marketing.⁷⁰ "So goes Shasta Costa, so goes the USFS" was a phrase heard within the Siskiyou which attested to the importance which was being placed on this project.⁷¹ Besides

⁶⁹ USDA Forest Service, Pacific Northwest Region, Siskiyou National Forest, *Shasta Costa Timber Sales and Integrated Resource Projects Final Environmental Impact Statement Volume 1* (Region 10: GPO, 1990), sec. I, 20.

⁷⁰ Kathie Durbin, "Innovative Forestry Arrives in Siskiyou" *Oregonian* special report, 23.

⁷¹ Quote cited in letter from Jim Neal, Helicopter Loggers Association to Bonnie Wood, Gold Beach District Ranger (20 September 1990) reproduced in *Shasta Costa FEIS Volume 2*, sec. F, 76.

incorporating New Forestry techniques, another feature of New Perspectives was to be increased public involvement and input in the planning process. All throughout the winter and spring of 1990, therefore, the Forest Service held an extensive series of public workshops.

Meanwhile, the Shasta Costa team closely studied the natural history of the Shasta Costa region, including its burn and regrowth patterns and tried to draw up a plan they claimed would imitate natural processes. The resulting DEIS, released on July 27, 1990, recommended a management plan for the three year life of the project which would harvest a total of 11.2 mmbf, as opposed to the 17.5 mmbf originally slated for that three year period under the 1989 Plan. More significantly, the draft's recommendation was for no traditional clearcutting to occur, requiring instead that New Forestry methods be used and very minimal old growth be harvested.⁷² To achieve this, only 2.5 miles of roads (as opposed to the Plan's 6.2 miles) would have to be built as the project intended to rely more heavily upon helicopter logging.⁷³

As the draft's comment period commenced, both sides struggled to comprehend the implications of this "new per-

⁷² The Shasta Costa DEIS called for a twenty tree per acre rate of live tree retention as well as no fragmentation of old growth stands. The Shasta Costa draft alternative is summarized in *Shasta Costa FEIS Volume 1*, sec. II, 14, 35-40.

⁷³ *Ibid.* sec. II, 14.

spective." Although they welcomed the access to this roadless region they had long coveted, most on the timber side were alarmed by the Shasta Costa plan's restraint. SOTIA protested Shasta Costa on the grounds that it deviated from the Forest Plan and they could not understand why it was suddenly so important to keep this area, previously slated for roads, roadless. Urging the Forest Service to stick to its Plan, SOTIA complained that it was unfair to local citizens that Shasta Costa be chosen to conduct untried experiments in forestry.⁷⁴ Boise Cascade, Douglas Timber Operators, and several county governments echoed these concerns in their responses to the draft.⁷⁵

Most timber interests were very careful not to directly attack the broader goals of New Perspectives but instead, its specific manifestation as laid out in the draft. Some, though, were not nearly so timid or politic as evident in the scathing letter sent to the Shasta Costa planning team from an executive of the Northwest Timber Association:

It is clear to me that the shift from alternative B [the 1989 Forest Plan guidelines] to C [the Shasta Costa draft plan] is no more than a political move to appease the preservationists and others in and outside of the agency who hope harvesting of timber will be ended on public lands in the near future. To those in the community who have trusted the agency and who depend upon this timber....this blatant disregard is a

⁷⁴ Gregory Miller, Executive Vice President, Southern Oregon Timber Industries Association to Kurt Wiedenmann, Shasta Costa Project Leader (9 October 1990), reproduced in *Shasta Costa FEIS Volume 2*, sec. F, 116-117.

⁷⁵ *Shasta Costa FEIS Volume 2*, sec. F, 74-75, 113-116, 121-122.

slap in the face....You are discrediting the promises of both the Forest Plan and the hype of new perspectives.⁷⁶

The environmentalists, meanwhile, faced their own dilemma regarding how to react to the Shasta Costa draft. The draft itself represented, to them, a far more enlightened approach to logging and public involvement which they certainly wanted to encourage now and in the future. Headwater's Norman expressed to Siskiyou officials the group's desire "to get in line with you" on Shasta Costa.⁷⁷ Still, there were many unanswered questions about the project which gave environmentalists some serious doubts. These doubts focused not so much upon the project itself, but where it fit into the larger scheme of things.

The Forest Service was extremely vague as to what the future held for Shasta Costa after the three year life of the project. Because of its reduced yield, Shasta Costa would fall short of the Forest Plan's three year target for that area. If it would not amend the Forest Plan to reflect this lower volume brought on by New Forestry, then what, asked the environmentalists, was the Forest Service really up to? Would Shasta Costa's reduced quota simply be made up elsewhere on the forest or after 1993 within Shasta Costa itself? The Forest Service refused to rule out either of

⁷⁶ R. Dennis Hayword, North West Timber Association to Abel Camarena, Acting Supervisor (26 September 1990), reproduced in *Shasta Costa FEIS Volume 2, sec. F, 126.*

⁷⁷ Julie Norman quoted in Gordon Gregory, "Future Forestry Taking Root in Shasta Costa" *Grants Pass Daily Courier* (12 July 1991).

these scenarios. The following exchange at a public workshop between Oregon State University biologist Chris Frissell, environmental activist Jim Brittell, and a Shasta Costa planner illustrates the Forest Service's ambiguity and evasiveness on this matter:

Frissell: Why don't you make a 10 year decision on this EIS?

Forest Service: We believe that this decision will be germane for three years.

Brittell: Is the Forest willing to concede that New Perspectives will reduce the ASQ?

Forest Service: No. For *this* drainage with *this* set of conditions and opportunities, volume harvested will probably be reduced. This *may or may not be true* in another planning area.

Brittell: You need to clearly state that we don't want to get 32 mmbf out of the [Shasta Costa] basin.

Forest Service: We can only make a decision for 1991 to 1993. Projecting a decision beyond 1993 is inappropriate.⁷⁸

If the Forest Service really believed in New Forestry and it was not just a trojan horse designed to briefly appease critics in order to enter roadless areas, asked Kerr, then why did it not amend the Forest Plan's ASQ to reflect lower volumes.⁷⁹ By the Forest Service's own estimates, a Forest-wide reduction of New Perspectives would lower the Plan's ASQ by 10-20%.⁸⁰ And yet touting its bold new "lighter touch on the land" on one hand, the Forest Service went

⁷⁸ USDA Forest Service, Siskiyou National Forest, Minutes from Shasta Costa Workshop, internal document, (June 1991).

⁷⁹ Kerr, 25.

⁸⁰ Shasta Costa, FEIS Volume 2, sec. F, 34.

on to announce that it could "not preclude the future harvest of timber on Shasta Costa."⁸¹ Until the Siskiyou National Forest admitted that Shasta Costa-style projects were incompatible with their own Plan and ended the ambiguity surrounding the area's long-term future, many environmentalists doubted that Shasta Costa could not be said to reflect any meaningful change in Forest Service values.⁸²

Timber on the Defensive

Although the spotted owl had been officially listed as threatened since June 1990, the administration and the Fish and Wildlife Service had yet to implement any protective measures for the owl, not even the fairly modest ISC recommendations. To force action, the environmentalists kept up a nearly continuous stream of lawsuits. One of these, against Fish and Wildlife, hit paydirt for them in early 1991. In a ruling on February 26, Judge Zilly chided Fish and Wildlife for having "abused its discretion when it declined to designate critical habitat for the northern spotted owl" and accused them of deliberately stalling in violation of their mandate.⁸³ On March 15, Zilly gave FWS forty-five days to come up with a habitat protection plan.

The court's order moved the agency to produce their own tentative proposal announced in late April. The FWS plan

⁸¹ *Ibid.*

⁸² Durbin, "Innovative Forestry", 23.

⁸³ Northern Spotted Owl (*Strix occidentalis caurina*) v. Manual Lujan, 758 F. Supp. 621, (9th U.S. District, 1991).

identified 11.6 million acres of public and private critical habitat; the largest habitat designation in the history of the ESA.⁸⁴ What Fish and Wildlife's announcement served to do was to further confuse an already confusing situation. Nobody it seemed, least of all public officials, quite knew what this designation really meant or how to react to it. Hatfield, assuming the worst, quickly condemned the ruling as "biology run amok" while an AFRA spokesman warned of a "land lockup equivalent to the size of Massachusetts, Vermont and Connecticut combined."⁸⁵ Fish and Wildlife was careful to point out, however, that this designation merely identified a broad zone of habitat which did not necessarily preclude timber harvesting and could, in the future be adjusted by the administration or Congress. With time, claimed Interior Secretary Lujan, the final version of the FWS plan "might be much, much different than it is now."⁸⁶

Another court decision issued on May 23 by Judge Dwyer further complicated the increasingly byzantine politics of old growth.⁸⁷ Dwyer, responding to one of the lawsuits revived after the Section 318 court ban was overturned, ruled

⁸⁴ "U.S. Proposes Giant Refuge in Northwest to Save Spotted Owl" *Chicago Tribune* (27 April 1991). This figure was later reduced to 6 million acres as the private portion was exempted.

⁸⁵ Margaret Kriz, "Owl 1, Timber 0" *National Journal* (4 May 1991), 1056; quotes in "U.S. Proposes Giant Refuge" *Chicago Tribune*.

⁸⁶ Lujan quoted in Mike Mills, "Spotted Owl Gains Ground in Timber Controversy" *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report* (4 May 1991), 1127.

⁸⁷ *Seattle Audubon Society v. Evans*.

that the Forest Service's actions regarding the spotted owl had violated NFMA. This violation, according to Dwyer stemmed from the agency's failure to commit itself to a conservation strategy to save the owl. The Forest Service's tentative and half-hearted adherence to the ISC guidelines, was not sufficient action for Dwyer who wrote in a strongly worded opinion:

The problem here has not been any shortcomings in the laws, but simply a refusal of administrative agencies to comply with them. This invokes a public interest of the highest order: the interest in having government officials act in accordance with the law.⁸⁸

Dwyer goes on to discuss the job losses which "will continue regardless of whether the spotted owl is protected":

To bypass the environmental laws either briefly or permanently, would not fend off the changes transforming the timber industry. The argument that the mightiest economy on earth cannot afford to preserve old growth forests for a short time, while it reaches an overdue decision on how to manage them, is not convincing today. It would be even less so a year or a century from now.⁸⁹

As a result, Dwyer announced a comprehensive injunction on all timber sales in owl habitat in seventeen "owl" forests in Region Six and northern California and gave the Forest Service until March 5, 1992 to design and implement a single plan to save the owl. This injunction virtually shut down the entire Region Six timber program in old growth for-

⁸⁸ *Ibid.* section VI.

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*

ests, freezing sales on 66,000 acres.⁹⁰ While the Forest Service argued that these sales accounted for less than one percent of owl habitat, Dwyer was convinced that the loss of those acres "would constitute irreparable harm and would risk pushing the species beyond a threshold from which it could not recover."⁹¹

Environmentalists were delighted by this ruling which could have been mistaken for something they themselves might have written. Timber interests, on the other hand, were furious and predictably began to rage against what one official termed "court lockups" of public lands whose fate was now being decided by unelected judges with no expertise in forestry. More than ever before, the Dwyer ruling convinced the timber interests that their only salvation was to be found in a legislative solution, and so it was in this direction that they began to pour an increasing portion of their energy. This need for a legislation was, perhaps, the only thing that all parties could agree upon, as environmentalists, despite their legal successes, ultimately saw this strategy as a dead-end road. Either way, the Dwyer ruling's new injunction and the administration's intransigence placed extreme pressure upon Congress to resolve the issue, especially amidst Forest Service warnings of a 1992 log shortage.⁹²

⁹⁰ This injunction was on future sales only; sales already "in the pipeline" were not included.

⁹¹ *Ibid.*

⁹² Gray, "Politics of Old Growth", 18.

In the summer of 1991, the environmentalists, both grassroots and national, launched a major lobbying campaign to preserve old growth and modify Forest Service logging practices. Early in the 1991 session, the Jontz and Vento bills (now numbered HR 842 and HR 1590 respectively) were reintroduced. Before long, Vento, reportedly impressed by committee testimony and Dwyer's ruling, began meeting with Jontz and the Interior Committee's new, pro-environmentalist chairman, George Miller (D-CA) to discuss possible changes in his bill that would bring it more in line with Jontz's.⁹³ Rep. John Bryant (D-TX), meanwhile, introduced HR 1969, the Forest Biodiversity and Clearcutting Prohibition Act which, while having little chance to pass, represented the environmentalists' broadest, most comprehensive goals.⁹⁴ The biggest news for the environmentalists, though, was in the Senate where Brock Adam's (D-WA) Pacific Northwest Community Recovery and Ecosystem Conservation Act (S 1536) was the first old growth-friendly bill to be introduced in that house. S 1536 would create a fairly extensive Forest Reserve System, tax log exports, and fund economic transition and

⁹³ Mitch Friedman, "Ancient Forests: The Perpetual Crisis" *Wild Earth* (Summer 1991), 32.

⁹⁴ HR 1969 would ban clearcutting on the national forests and would specifically require forest management to incorporate biodiversity goals. This bill was sweeping enough to cause some of the more moderate national environmental groups to withhold their support. Other bills relating to biodiversity (HR 2082 and HR 585) were also introduced by Reps. Gerry Studds (D-MA) and James Scheuer (D-NY). Friedman, 31; Phillip Davis, "From the Shade to the Spotlight" *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report* (1 June 1991), 1439.

diversification programs. More significantly, this bill represented a major break from the heretofore solidly pro-timber bipartisan ranks of the Northwest delegation.⁹⁵

The events of 1991 which allowed the environmentalists to ride what one Siskiyou ranger termed a "power wave," conversely put timber on the defensive. With unfavorable court rulings and injunctions, timber was forced to give some ground and, for the first time, conceded to the legitimacy of both the owl's threatened status and the concept of preserving some old growth.⁹⁶ Timber interests yielded on this point because, in the words of one congressional staffer, "it's not in the industry's interest to delay anymore."⁹⁷ Thus, the strategy of fighting tooth-and-nail any and all change had now given way to compromising for the best deal possible. To timber, the best hope for this rested with a bill proposed by a joint industry-labor coalition.⁹⁸

The bill, introduced in the House by Rep. Jerry Huckaby (D-LA) as the Forest and Families Protection Act (HR 2463) and in the Senate by Packwood as the Federal Lands and

⁹⁵ Other cracks in the delegation appeared as urban representatives such as Jim McDermott (D-WA) and newly elected ones such as Jolene Unsoeld (D-WA) began to stake out positions less friendly to timber. Phillip Davis, "Ruling Gives Lawmakers a Push To Resolve Spotted Owl Issue" *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report* (1 June 1990), 1439.

⁹⁶ Gerald Gray, "Seeing Eye-to-Eye on Old Growth" *American Forests*, (October 1991), 20.

⁹⁷ Quote in Kriz, 1056.

⁹⁸ This coalition included the AFRA, the National Forest Products Association, the Carpenter's Union, the Western Council of Industrial Workers, and the International Woodworkers of America

Families Protection Act (S 1156), were the first timber-supported bills to establish old growth reserves for the spotted owl, albeit far less than the Jontz bill. In return for allowing some old growth to stand, the bills would limit legal challenge to timber sales, amend NFMA to require guaranteed timber quotas, and ease ESA restrictions.⁹⁹ This bill, which essentially replaced Hatfield's 1990 bill (S 2767) as timber's main legislative vehicle, was immediately condemned by Chairman Miller who accused its sponsors of ignoring and complicating the old growth negotiations already occurring in the House.¹⁰⁰

In October the environmentalists' cause in the House was bolstered by very favorable testimony from a panel of old growth scientists including Franklin and Thomas who urged for reductions in logging and roadbuilding. Meanwhile the FY 1992 appropriation was passed again without any court-blocking riders or absolutely guaranteed quotas. Despite considerable activity, however, by the end of 1991

⁹⁹ HR 2463 and S 1156 are described in Kriz, 1056.

¹⁰⁰ Gray, "Politics of Old Growth", 19. It was hoped that using Vento's middle-of-the-road bill as a framework and starting point, both sides could negotiate a compromise from there. In addition to the Packwood/Huckaby bill, pro-timber legislators also proposed two other bills: Democrats in Oregon's delegation, uncomfortable with court restrictions proposed their own bill, HR 2807, which also created modest old growth reserves and maintained high timber outputs, but without the court-stripping provisions. Another pro-timber bill, HR 1309, was introduced by Rep. Smith. Davis, "Ruling Gives Lawmakers a Push", 1438.

there was still no movement of any bill out of committee, as the ongoing legislative stalemate could not be broken.

The administration firmly rejected both the Vento and Jontz proposals, but declined to endorse outright any of the pro-timber bills. Instead, the only initiative that the administration seemed interested in pursuing at this point was to try exempt old growth timber sales from ESA regulations through God Squad proceedings. It got its first chance to test-run this process when Fish and Wildlife rejected forty-four BLM timber sales in owl habitat (claiming they would cause twelve percent mortality of all owls on BLM land). BLM chief Cy Jamison promptly appealed to Secretary Lujan to invoke the controversial panel. In October Lujan obliged and the long and cumbersome process commenced.¹⁰¹ Thus, despite the changing political climate on this issue, the administration was, nevertheless, showing no signs of fundamentally changing its commodity-oriented approach to resource management.¹⁰²

¹⁰¹ Phillip Davis, "BLM Calls on God Squad to Let Timber Go" *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report* (14 September 1991), 2611-2612; Phillip Davis, "'God Squad' Called on to Weigh Timber Interests, Spotted Owl" *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report* (5 October 1991), 2854. While timber interests eagerly looked to this case as a welcome harbinger in their efforts to bypass spotted owl regulations, environmentalists argued that BLM had no legal grounds to seek an exemption since the God Squad clause requires that all "good faith" efforts to find alternatives to destroying habitat be exhausted before an exemption could be granted.


¹⁰² In fact, in Fall 1991, Jon Mumma, the head forester for Region One in the northern Rockies was forced to retire after he resisted pressure to meet a regional timber quota which he determined was unsustainable. Mumma and the former

In the Siskiyou, meanwhile, timber sales planning continued as if all were normal. As the Forest Service began work on the final version of the Shasta Costa plan, it came to be convinced that such an approach, employing mostly New Forestry techniques, rather than the standard individual clearcut sales, represented the wave of the future. Confident of its potential, the Siskiyou officials began to announce plans for more of such integrated resource projects in similarly controversial and largely roadless areas, including the West Indigo drainage, a 13,500 acre section of the North Kalmiopsis (see figure 7) and a 23,550 acre partially roadless area known as Canyon in the dry, steep southeast of the forest where Whittaker conducted his famous botanical study of the Siskiyou (see chapter 2, p.45 and figure 7). Because all such projects were slated for roadless or partially roadless areas, a full EIS process would have to be held for each.

In July 1991, the Shasta Costa FEIS was completed. By boosting the cut by 2.2 mmbf and adding 2.5 more miles of

regional director of the Park Service (who was demoted) testified at Civil Service Subcommittee hearings in September. Mumma revealed that he faced intense political pressure from the administration, especially Chief of Staff John Sununu, as well as certain western congressmen to keep timber output, as in Region Six, at levels which violated sustained yield. The Mumma controversy, which caught quite a bit of attention in Washington only served to provide more ammunition for a forest reform campaign that was now spreading to local national forests from coast to coast. "Park Service Aide Tells of Sununu Pressure" *Chicago Tribune* (25 September 1991).

FIGURE 7
CANYON AND WEST INDIGO PROJECT PLANNING AREAS



Sources: Canyon Integrated Resource Project DEIS, Sec. I, 2;
West Indigo Timber Sales DEIS, Sec. 1, 2.

roads, the final recommendations pulled back quite a bit from the surprising moderation of the draft . New supervisor Mike Lunn, however, held off signing the final record of decision until the Forest Service finalized its spotted owl plan as ordered by Dwyer. In fact, the Dwyer injunctions brought all new projects on the Siskiyou in the summer of 1991 to a screeching halt as the DEIS target dates for West Indigo, Canyon, and several other projects were all pushed back due to the confusion and uncertainty over old growth and the spotted owl. With so many parallel streams of planning, negotiation, and litigation occurring simultaneously, the situation on the Siskiyou by late 1991 became, according to former Supervisor McCormick, "very, very confusing" and "hard to track," even for the people directly involved in it. "How in the world," asked McCormick "is this going to come out?"

The Administration Counterattack

In January 1992, the so-called God Squad began deliberations to decide whether to exempt the BLM sales that FWS had deemed to be in critical owl habitat from the requirements of the Endangered Species Act.¹⁰³ Although the scope

¹⁰³ The Bush administration's God Squad was comprised of the Secretaries of Agriculture, Interior, and the Army, the chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors, the heads of the EPA and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, and a state representative from Oregon. Phillip Davis, "Logging Decision Set for May 14" *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Review* (2 May 1992), 1154.

of this exemption would be limited (in terms of all pending old growth sales), it had the potential to set an enormously significant precedent. It also dispelled all doubts as to the thrust of the administration's strategy regarding old growth--it was clearly to attack and weaken the ESA. Environmentalists, while clearly alarmed by this frontal assault on a key law, doubted, nonetheless, whether the God Squad's findings would stand in court (see footnote 101).¹⁰⁴

The Fish and Wildlife Service, meanwhile, continued to work on its long-overdue draft recovery plan for the spotted owl which was now scheduled to be released in spring. In January, however, the agency, under tremendous political pressure, announced that it was reducing the acreage of forest that would be considered critical habitat from the eleven million acres identified the previous April to 6.9 million acres. Still, the as yet unreleased plan was branded by timber interests as "a legal lynching of an entire region by an out-of-control federal agency."¹⁰⁵

¹⁰⁴ Keith Schneider, "U.S. to Push for Logging in Owl's Forests" *New York Times* (21 February 1992), sec. A, 12.

¹⁰⁵ "U.S. Sets Aside 6.9 Million Acres to Save Owl" *Chicago Tribune* (10 January 1992), sec.1, 4. On February 20, 1992, the timber interests' and the administration's woes further increased as Federal Judge Helen Frye, in response to an environmentalist lawsuit, issued an injunction on all old growth sales on BLM land on much the same grounds as Dwyer's injunction on the Forest Service--refusal to follow federal land management statutes. Although much of this forestland was currently listed by FWS as critical habitat, it was, in many cases, still being sold for logging. The injunction was to hold until until an adequate BLM owl plan was formulated. Schneider, "U.S. to Push Logging...."

With the official release of the draft plan (and its projection of a loss of 33,000 jobs) still several months away, Secretary Lujan made a highly unusual preemptive strike on February 21. Seeking to bypass the anticipated recommendations of his own department's wildlife agency, Lujan announced the formation of yet another committee, this one to draw up a plan to merely "preserve" the owl at current levels rather than restore the species. Since any such plan would violate the ESA which requires that strategies be developed for endangered species recovery, Lujan conceded that this alternative plan would need congressional approval. Timber interests promptly applauded this move which they saw as a backup to God Squad proceedings in the event that the exemptions did not work out.¹⁰⁶

Soon thereafter, the administration unveiled the last element of their three-pronged attack on behalf of timber interests. On March 19, 1992, Secretary of Agriculture Edward Madigan announced a proposal to repeal the eighty-five year old Forest Service rule allowing for the written appeal of timber sales by the public.¹⁰⁷ While the administration portrayed the appeal ban in terms of recession-fighting reg-

¹⁰⁶ Keith Schneider, "To Save Jobs, U.S. Seeks to waive Rule on Saving Owl" *New York Times* (21 February 1992); Schneider, "U.S. to Push Logging...."

¹⁰⁷ Keith Schneider, "Forest Service May Alter Rule Blocking Logging" *New York Times* (28 April 1992), sec. A, 12.

ulatory relief, environmentalists howled in protest at what they saw as another blatant assault upon their rights.¹⁰⁸

That same spring, while the administration pushed hard to weaken preservation laws, Congress attempted once more to craft a legislative solution to the old growth controversy. In the previous session, in 1991, as Congress was deadlocked over conflicting ancient forest bills, the House Agriculture Committee commissioned a four-member scientific panel in Portland (officially, the Scientific Panel on Late Successional Forest Ecosystems) to provide the debate with the sort of hard numbers and indisputable data they felt was lacking.

In the spring of 1992, while the Portland panel was still preparing their report, Interior Chairman George Miller introduced HR 4899, the Ancient Forest Act. This bill came to be the chief legislative vehicle for old growth preservation, since the Jontz bill (HR 842) had gotten nowhere in two years. Initially introduced without specifics, the bill's actual degree of protection was to be determined after the panel's report. When it was finally released, the Portland panel's report was developed into a fourteen-point rating system (with 14c representing the highest level of

¹⁰⁸ Environmentalists argued that filing lawsuits would become their only option, something which small groups with few resources cannot do. The administration, on the other hand, claimed that the appeal ban might actually induce citizens to become more involved in the planning process of sales. Schneider, Forest Service May Alter Rule...."

protection) to be used to assess the risks of various levels of logging.¹⁰⁹

By May, both of the subcommittees with jurisdiction (Interior's Public Lands and Agriculture's Forests), began an attempt to flesh out HR 4899. Interior Chairman Miller, fresh from an Easter recess flyover of the Siskiyou and adjacent BLM lands,¹¹⁰ expressed shock over the reforestation failure of many of the clearcuts he saw:

Putting the best light on it, these tree plantations just didn't work out folks. Putting the worst light on it, it's one of the great frauds perpetrated on the American public, because most people believe the commercials on TV about planting trees, and they're all coming back, and deer are running through it. That's not what's happening here.¹¹¹

Miller, in fact, was sufficiently impressed by the evidence that Headwaters presented him regarding reforestation failures, inaccurate yield projections, and NFMA violations that he ordered his committee staff to prepare a full report on the matter (issued in June). Among this report's findings were that "the lack of monitoring and outdated inventories in the Pacific Northwest have prevented accurate determination of timber cutting levels, to the detriment of America's forest heritage."¹¹²

¹⁰⁹ "Science and the Siskiyou" *Siskiyou Project* (December 1992), 1.

¹¹⁰ "Miller Gets Aerial Tour of Forest" *Medford Mail Tribune* (20 April 1992).

¹¹¹ Miller quoted in "Chairman Miller Tours Southwest Oregon" *Headwaters Journal* (Summer 1992), 16.

¹¹² U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, *Management of Federal Timber Resources: The Loss of Accountability* (Washington D.C.: 15 June 1992), 1.

Not surprisingly, the Public Lands subcommittee, under Miller's ally Bruce Vento, had soon drafted and easily passed a version of HR 4899 that had a fairly strong 12c level of protection which would protect roughly nine million acres of forest and two-thirds of remaining unprotected old growth. In the more pro-timber Forests subcommittee, however, several days of intense debate in early May yielded a version with only an 8a level of protection (6.8 million acres) which just barely passed seven to six (over the strenuous objections of the Siskiyou area's Bob Smith).¹¹³

As HR 4899 went to the full Interior Committee, it ran into increased trouble as Representative DeFazio stalled the bill for a month. In May, the committee voted to reject both De-Fazio's 6a proposal as well as Jontz's full-protection 14c amendment, finally settling upon, but not yet voting for a level of 12a, below which Miller refused to go.¹¹⁴ Meanwhile, in the Senate, the Adams/Leahy bill (S 2894), featuring 12c protection and vigorous working retraining provisions,¹¹⁵ was moving far more slowly, not yet having been considered in committee. Also stalled in the Senate were

¹¹³ Julie Norman, "Forest Protection Legislation is Moving" *Headwaters Journal* (Summer 1992), 3. In May, the Forests subcommittee also defeated three to six HR 3414 which would have prohibited below-cost timber sales. "Panel Fells Timber Sales Bill" *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Review* (16 May 1992), 1335.

¹¹⁴ "House Speaker Tom Foley Crushes Ancient Forest Protection Bill" *Save America's Forests D.C. Update* (August 1992), 6; "Ancient Forests Legislation Progress Report" *Save America's Forests News*, newsletter (no date).

¹¹⁵ *Save America's Forests D.C. Update* (August 1992), 11.

timber's bills. Packwood's S 1156 was the same bill as the previous year's (see pp. 138-139), while Senator Slade Gorton's (R-WA) S 2762, "The Northern Spotted Owl Preservation and Northwest Economic Stabilization Act" which would allow about half of the owl's habitat to be logged, was newly introduced.¹¹⁶ In the House, meanwhile, the Huckaby bill (HR 2463, see page 138) was also reintroduced.

On May 14, at the height of this congressional flurry of activity, the administration made three major announcements. First, the God Squad had concluded their deliberations and voted five to two to waive the ESA (for only the second time since the law's inception) on thirteen of the forty-four BLM sales covering 1,700 acres.¹¹⁷ Despite its precedent-setting nature, this decision was only a partial victory (if at all) for the administration as the committee directed the BLM, as part of its limited exemption deal, to follow FWS recovery plans henceforth.¹¹⁸ In addition, the thirteen sales were exempted only from FWS regulations; Judge Frye's BLM injunction still held.

The administration's second announcement was that Fish and Wildlife had formally completed its draft recovery plan for the owl. Under continuing pressure, the agency further

¹¹⁶ *Ibid.* 9.

¹¹⁷ Keith Schneider, "White House on Conflicting Paths as it Agrees to Protection for Owl" *New York Times* (15 May 1992), sec. A, 1. Only EPA's William Reilly and the Oregon state representative voted against the exemptions.

¹¹⁸ "Bush's God Squad Defeated Despite Face-Saving Ruling" *Headwaters Journal* (Summer 1992), 10.

reduced habitat protection from the 6.9 million acre level it had announced in January to 5.4 million acres.¹¹⁹ Whether by mere coincidence or with what environmentalists considered "Machiavellian" orchestration, Lujan had one more announcement to make that same day.¹²⁰ Calling his own agency's plan unacceptable, Lujan revealed that his hand-picked committee had designed its own alternative to the FWS plan. This alternative would protect only 2.8 million acres and supposedly cut the numbers of jobs lost in half. Admitting that this plan might cause the owl's extinction, the administration conceded that it would require a congressionally-approved amendment to the ESA.¹²¹ This amendment was to be introduced in their respective houses the following week by Senator Gorton and Representative Smith, the latter admitting, "I don't think it has a chance."¹²²

The reaction from environmentalists and their congressional allies to this rather brazen proposal was one of disbelief and outrage. Vento claimed that Lujan's plan "doesn't save owls or timber workers--it's just a full employment bill for lawyers."¹²³ Environmentalists, meanwhile, were even more blunt referring to the entire episode as "owl-

¹¹⁹ Schneider, *White House on Conflicting Paths....*"

¹²⁰ "Owl-Gate: Bush's Election Year Extinction Plan" *Headwaters Journal* (Summer 1992), 10.

¹²¹ Schneider, "White House on Conflicting Paths...."; Phillip Davis, "Critics Say Too Few Jobs, Owls Saved Under 'God Squad' Plan" *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Review* (16 May 1992), 1335.

¹²² Rep. Smith quoted in Davis, "Critics Say....", 1334.

¹²³ Rep. Vento quoted in *Ibid.* 1335.

gate."¹²⁴ Even some pro-timber congressmen were somewhat put off by the confusion and contradictoriness of the fairly bizarre three-ring spectacle of May 14.¹²⁵

The Forest Service on the Defensive

As the summer approached, the politics of old growth continued to grow even more splintered and confused. In June, as the Interior Committee's damning report on Forest Service abuses began to circulate, Miller believed he had the votes to get HR 4899 out of committee. However, on the eve of the vote, with success closer at hand than ever before, Speaker of the House Tom Foley (a Democrat who represents a timber-rich district in eastern Washington) made phone calls to key committee members and succeeded in pressuring six to change their votes.¹²⁶ When Miller found this out the following morning, he called off the vote rather than have it defeated.

In the meantime, the Forest Service had finally completed its long-awaited spotted owl EIS that Judge Dwyer had ordered the previous year. As would be expected, the agency was eager to get the injunctions lifted and resume logging. The only problem was that their plan was largely a rehash of the now two-year old (and increasingly obsolete) ISC (Thom-

¹²⁴ "Owl-Gate...." *Headwaters Journal*, 10.

¹²⁵ Davis, "Critics Say....", 1334.

¹²⁶ "House Panel Cancels Vote on Bill to Protect Forests" *New York Times* (18 June 1992), sec. B, 12; Julie Norman, "Legislative Stalemate in D.C." *Headwaters Journal* (Fall 1992), 3.

as) Report. According to one bemused timber official, "it is the Jack Ward Thomas Report. They might as well have just taken the cover off."

Immediately, environmentalists filed suit to maintain the injunction on old growth logging based on their allegation that the Forest Service EIS was grossly inadequate given what information was currently available. On July 21, 1992, Judge Dwyer ruled with the environmentalists in a decision perhaps more far-reaching than the first. Dwyer refused to lift the injunction on the grounds that the EIS did not incorporate the best and latest scientific information on the owl's decline (including the FWS's Anderson/Burnham Report which found a startling 7.5-10% rate of annual population decrease).¹²⁷ "Highly qualified experts," said Dwyer, "including some in the employ of the Forest Service, believe [the Anderson/Burnham report] means the ISC strategy must be revised."¹²⁸ This time, however, Dwyer ordered the agency to consider the impact of their plans upon thirty-two other old growth species for whom the owl is an indicator species, thereby complicating the agency's task considerably.¹²⁹

Noting their long history of non-compliance with wildlife laws, Dwyer gave the agency an additional year to pre-

¹²⁷ Seattle Audubon Society v. Moseley, 798 F. Supp. 1494 (9th U.S. District); Julie Norman, "Dwyer Shuts Down USFS Sales Again" *Headwaters Journal* (Summer 1992), 4.

¹²⁸ Judge Dwyer quoted in Norman, "Dwyer Shuts Down USFS...."

¹²⁹ Seattle Audubon Society v. Moseley.

pare a new plan. For the court not to require such action, the Judge wrote, "would invite lawlessness; an agency could escape its statutory duties simply by procrastinating."¹³⁰ The Forest Service promptly appealed this ruling, but was turned down by an appellate court in September.¹³¹ All the exasperated agency could muster in reponse was a dire warning (considered mere scare tactics by critics) that such a plan could take two more years to develop, thus destroying the timber industry through delay.¹³²

The public scoldings the Forest Service received at the hands of the Dwyer ruling, the Miller report, and various editorial pages,¹³³ only served to deepen the agency's ongoing public relations problem.¹³⁴ Whether it represented

¹³⁰ Seattle Audubon Society v. Moseley, sec. 5.

¹³¹ "Court Won't Lift Logging Ban in Northwest" *New York Times* (6 September 1992), sec. I, 29. Timber was also having scant legal success as a federal court ruled in June against their claims that FWS logging restrictions were illegal. "Timber Groups Lose Another Round to Owl" *Chicago Tribune* (2 June 1992).

¹³² "2-Year Logging Delay Forecast in Owl Habitat" *New York Times* (2 August 1992).

¹³³ See, for example, "Mr. Bush's Political Environment" (editorial) *New York Times* (19 May 1992), sec. A, 22.

¹³⁴ This was further exacerbated in June (during the height of the U.N. Earth Summit), as NASA scientists working on a satellite mapping project released widely publicized satellite photographs of the Northwest that show, according to Egan, "clearcutting...that is so extensive that the land looks perforated by buckshot." Most embarrassing were revelations that forest fragmentation in the Northwest was far worse than in the Amazon. Said project scientist Dr. Compton Tucker: "When you compare the situation in the Pacific Northwest to the Amazon of Brazil, the Northwest is much worse. The pictures show this amazing graphic situation--the severe fragmentation of the forest in the Northwest....It appears that much of the forest has been literally cut to pieces." Timothy Egan, "Forest Damage, North and South" *New*

a symbolic gesture or genuine change, the Forest Service responded to these pressures with an announcement in June that the agency's two-year old experiment with New Forestry (the New Perspectives program) was being adopted as standard procedure. This move to so-called "Ecosystem Management" was supposedly intended to implement ecological principles into forest planning and reduce traditional clearcutting by 70% from 1988 levels.¹³⁵ Sounding remarkably candid about past mistakes, Robertson admitted that the agency "must get away from practices that make our forests look like tree farms."¹³⁶ To environmentalists, however, the past two years of New Perspectives did not really seem to change much as yields continued to be set at unsustainable levels. Timber interests, meanwhile, were also still quite wary of what they derisively called "politically correct silviculture" by an agency seen as caving in to political pressure and faddism.¹³⁷

The Siskiyou on Hold

Back on the Siskiyou, the whirlwind of political and

York Times (14 June 1992), sec. IV, 6; Dr. Compton quoted in Timothy Egan, "Photos Show Forests in Pacific Northwest Are in Peril, Scientists Say" *New York Times* (11 June 1992).

¹³⁵ Keith Schneider, "U.S. Forest Service Increases Protection of Public Timber" *New York Times* (9 June 1992), sec. B, 10; Julie Norman, "Ecosystem Management Directive is Here" *Headwaters Journal* (Winter 1992), 25.

¹³⁶ Robertson quoted in Schneider, "U.S. Forest Service Increases Protection...."

¹³⁷ Jon Luoma, "New Government Plan for National Forest Generates a Debate" *New York Times* (30 June 1992), sec. C, 4.

legal activity on the national level brought old growth logging projects on the Forest to a standstill. By early in the year, as the Forest Service readied its owl plan and anticipated the lifting of the injunction, the Siskiyou was poised with about 150 mmbf ready to be sold in various backlogged projects.¹³⁸ But this was not to happen anytime in 1992. Instead, the local decisions and actions of the Siskiyou's administrators (once fairly sovereign) were becoming increasingly irrelevant in the light of the region-wide injunction, clashing legislative proposals, pending owl plans from a number of quarters, and the upcoming elections.

By 1992, then, the Siskiyou came to be suspended in a sort of policy limbo. The confusion of national events combined with increasingly severe budget constraints (occasioned by the continuing recession) to throw the agency's schedule way off from what was outlined in the Plan. Because the Forest relied so heavily upon old growth timber harvesting, most of its projects were frozen in their tracks. Yet this did not stop the Siskiyou from continuing (as in the previous year) to devise and prepare future sales in a business-as-usual manner, even as their current ones gathered dust. All told, they had plans in the pipeline for eighteen multi-sale projects in mostly roadless areas for 1992-1997 representing hundreds of millions of board feet of timber, much

¹³⁸ Barbara Ullian, "Agencies Continue Plans for Massive Timber Cutting" *Headwaters Journal* (Spring 1992), 17.

of that in old growth or mature forest. Just for 1992 and 1993, these timber projects included Shasta Costa (which was supposed to have begun in 1991), as well as West Indigo, Upper Silver, and Lawson in the North Kalmiopsis, Elk River and Sixes River in the northwest, Quosatana and Two Forks in the west, and Canyon and Kangaroo in the southeast.¹³⁹

While their premier effort, the Shasta Costa project, remained enjoined, the Siskiyou's administrators began to focus their attention upon the next project in line. The Canyon FEIS was released in July 1992 and called for four miles of new roads to be built and nine mmbf to be removed with New Forestry techniques from a fairly steep, dry, and lightly forested area adjacent to the designated Kalmiopsis Wilderness.¹⁴⁰ While Canyon was not prime owl habitat, the project particularly irked environmentalists since they felt that the area was both extremely sensitive and had very marginal timber productivity. Furthermore, the New Forestry techniques would impact three times the acreage of the original plan.¹⁴¹

Although increasingly distracted by national campaigns, local Siskiyou environmentalists did manage to organize rather vigorously against Canyon, encouraging another

¹³⁹ *Ibid.*; Barbara Ullian, "Roadless Area Timber Sales" *Headwaters Journal* (Fall 1992), 7.

¹⁴⁰ USDA Forest Service, Pacific Northwest Region, Siskiyou National Forest, *Canyon Integrated Resource Project Final Environmental Impact Statement* (Region 10: GPO, 1992).

¹⁴¹ Barbara Ullian, "Roads and Cuts Planned for the Heart of Canyon" *Headwaters Journal* (Fall 1992), 6.

very heavy mail load during the FEIS comment period. With West Indigo, Quosatana, Lawson and several other projects scheduled to be logged soon thereafter, environmentalists sought to publicize how the Siskiyou's plans were part of the same old discredited way of doing things. Projects such as Canyon were also seen to be a legacy of the agency's past failures as one environmentalist argues:

Had [the agency] maintained prudent harvest levels and encouraged the inevitable transition to smaller renewable timber, there would be less pressure to go into these steep fragile drainages to remove old growth.¹⁴²

For the time being, however, all of these sales, actual or proposed, were blocked by the injunctions. The most the Forest Service could do was to consider taking a few individual sales in Canyon that were not owl habitat and try moving on those.

While the agency's new "ecosystem management" was precisely the sort of more responsible logging the environmentalists had long sought, they felt it was now too late to use even the best forestry methods to enter the few remaining roadless areas. One activist stressed this point as he toured the site of the proposed Lawson project:

We wanted to applaud their significant movement towards a more sensitive, naturally-oriented approach and agreed that we could have heartily supported this direction twenty years ago. But given the tremendous impact on the watershed and the surrounded forest landscape, from the heavy logging of the past several decades, we questioned whether any further entry at

¹⁴² Roy Keene, "Forest Focus: The Siskiyou" *Public Forester* (Autumn 1991), 3.

this time would really enhance the desired recovery and health of the forest ecosystem, wildlife populations, rivers, and fish stocks.¹⁴³

Old Growth Forests and the Elections

After HR 4899's committee vote was called off in June, it did not move forward before the October recess that ended that session. Nor did any other ancient forest bills as the legislative stalemate was guaranteed to enter its fourth year. As usual, the only real congressional action came in the form of annual Interior appropriations. For FY 1993, the environmentalists came out better than usual as none of the guaranteed "hard" targets that timber once again pushed for were adopted, judicial review was maintained for another year, and no last minute pro-timber riders were added on. In fact, the only amendment that was added legislatively formalized the Forest Service appeal process that the administration was trying to repeal.¹⁴⁴

By late summer, the nation's attention turned to the presidential campaign. Any doubt that the old growth controversy had fully worked its way into the national political consciousness was dispelled as the spotted owl and the plight of loggers came up time and again on the campaign trail and the nightly news. The national press, in fact, kept up steady stream of coverage for the third consecutive

¹⁴³ John Stahmer "Gold Beach RD Planning Lawson Timber Sale" *Headwaters Journal* (Winter 1992), 23.

¹⁴⁴ Julie Norman "Fresh Breezes in D.C." *Headwaters Journal*, 21; "F.S. Appeals Made Law" *Headwaters Journal* (Winter 1992), 33.

year; quite surprising in a venue not noted for encouraging long attention spans.

In the midst of a grueling recession, President Bush (especially when addressing Western audiences) began to portray the spotted owl as an extremist's luxury that no job-loving society could afford. Speaking in September to a crowd in Washington state, Bush promised to veto any reauthorization of the ESA (due for renewal that year) unless it was subject to a sweeping rewrite that included cost-benefit analyses and provisions to guarantee annual timber harvests.¹⁴⁵ Calling the ESA a "broken" law that, reminiscent of his vow against Iraqi militarism, "will not stand," Bush claimed that it was "time to put people ahead of owls.... time to consider the human factor in the spotted owl equation." "There are a lot of trees around here," Bush told his supporters, "so don't listen to some of the critics."¹⁴⁶

Although he tried to downplay the issue during the campaign, Bill Clinton was on record as strongly supporting the ESA, favoring the principle of old growth preservation, and backing worker retraining for unemployed loggers, positions no doubt influenced by his pro-environmental running

¹⁴⁵ Michael Wines, "Bush, in Far West, Sides With Loggers" *New York Times* (15 September 1992), sec. A, 25; Timothy McNulty and Carol Jouzaitis, "Bush, Clinton Try to Balance Environment and Economy" *Chicago Tribune*, (15 September 1992), sec. 1, 4.

¹⁴⁶ The first two Bush quotes are in Wines, sec. A, 25, the last is in McNulty and Jouzaitis, sec. 1, 4.

mate, Sen. Al Gore (D-TN).¹⁴⁷ Clinton's one foray into the issue came during a Western campaign swing during the summer in which he promised to convene a "timber summit" between all concerned parties in order to work out a consensus.¹⁴⁸ Nonetheless, his candidacy (as well as his running mate) was not well-received by timber interests who strongly supported Bush.

While Bush took a jab at "the spotted owl crowd" during one of the nationally televised debates in October, it was not until a week before the election, running behind in the polls, that he really let go. Mocking Gore with the tag "ozone man" in a Michigan speech, Bush went on to warn that in a Clinton administration, "we'll be up to our necks in owls and out of work for every American (sic)."¹⁴⁹ According to one observer, *Strix occidentalis caurina* had thus become the Willie Horton of the 1992 campaign.¹⁵⁰

As would be expected, forest activists cheered Clinton's victory in November, eager to bid farewell to their various nemeses in the Bush administration (Quayle, Madigan,

¹⁴⁷ Gore outlined these views on old growth forests on a Sunday morning television talk show. "I think the real question," said Gore during the interview, "is whether [loggers] will get new jobs before the last 10% of the old growth forest is gone, or after the last old growth forest is gone." Al Gore quoted from *This Week With David Brinkley*, (12 July 1992), photocopied transcripts from Native Forest Council.

¹⁴⁸ McNulty and Jouzaitis, sec. 1, 4.

¹⁴⁹ Bush quotes in Stevenson Swanson, "When in Office, Gore May Find it isn't so Easy Being Green" *Chicago Tribune* (8 November 1992), sec. 1, 8.

¹⁵⁰ This was the observation of a caller to a talk show on public radio station WBEZ Chicago, (November 1992).

Lujan, and so on) and anticipating new, more environmentally inclined officials to replace them.¹⁵¹

Epilogue

As 1992 drew to a close, a new chapter in the old growth/spotted owl controversy, and possibly even forest management in general, was about to open. While the issue as of early 1993 was still largely unresolved, it is quite possible that a substantially different policy course will be followed regarding endangered species and forest management. Even short of aggressive reform, it is safe to say that the high-level administrative effort to avoid or amend federal environmental legislation and push for extremely high levels of resource production is less likely. While the new administration may treat environmental values differently, the situation in Congress is less clear. On one hand, non-

¹⁵¹ All did not go perfectly well for environmentalists in the November elections, however, as a number of the forests' most ardent congressional defenders were swept from office, including Sen. Wyche Fowler (D-GA), and Reps. Peter Kostmayer (D-PA), Gerry Sikorski (D-MN), as well as the patron saint of old growth, Jim Jontz, who was defeated by four thousand votes in a very tight race. Considering him their enemy number one, timber interests targeted Jontz and spent \$100,000 to help defeat him. A number of grassroots environmental activists from southwest Oregon went as far as to travel to Indiana to help man Jontz's campaign staff. The defeat of these legislators offered timber interests their only consolation in an otherwise disastrous election. Searching for a silver lining, an AFRA spokesman claimed that "their [Jontz, Fowler, Kostmayer, and Sikorski] absence, combined with what I think will be a greater emphasis on the economy, suggests to me the prospect of a more conservative Congress on resource issues." Margaret Kriz, "A New Ball Game?" *National Journal* (2 January 1993), 23; Norman, "Fresh Breezes in D.C.", 21.

Western members of Congress are growing increasingly assertive in matters of public land management, traditionally left to local, development-oriented legislators. On the other hand, with the loss of several key forest advocates and an acute reluctance to cause any further unemployment, the future of ancient forest legislation (likely to be introduced pending the results of the upcoming "forest summit"¹⁵²) is still up for grabs. If no legislation can make it through soon (a distinct possibility if one recalls that an acid rain bill was stymied for over ten years) and the Forest Service and BLM ever come up with legally defensible owl plans, then it is in the realm of possibility that old growth logging projects (albeit with increased restrictions) could feasibly commence in a year or two.¹⁵³

Still, the environmentalists, at the end of 1992, were in a fairly strong legal and political position and thereby had the potential to eventually resolve this issue on fairly favorable terms. The movement to save old growth has cer-

¹⁵² It was renamed such after environmentalist complaints over the word *timber*.

¹⁵³ The environmentalists, though, might soon have other legal avenues to pursue. In September 1992, another old growth-dependent bird, the marbled murrelet, was listed as threatened by the FWS (under court order, of course). This might action might have the potential to set off another round of recovery plans, injunctions, restrictions, etc. should any solution to the spotted owl controversy not be to the environmentalists' satisfaction. If anything, this listing shows that the complex interdependence of the old growth ecosystem cannot be successfully dealt with through piecemeal policies. "Another Bird May Curb Logging in the Northwest" *Chicago Tribune* (27 September 1992), sec. 1, 14.

tainly come a long way since the raggedy blockades and guerilla theatre on the Bald Mountain Road nearly a decade earlier.

What exactly will happen in the Siskiyou National Forest itself is far from clear. How increased national protection for the spotted owl and old growth ecosystems will relate to Forest Service plans to enter eighteen major roadless areas (and eventually all such unprotected areas within fifty years) depends upon how Siskiyou administrators interpret such restrictions and redesign their plans.¹⁵⁴ If roadless entries are still to be a priority in the next decade (rather than a fundamental shift to second growth harvesting, tree farm thinning operations, controlled burning to restore fire-dependent ecosystems, and, of course, reduced yields), political activism on the Siskiyou will continue for some time to come.

¹⁵⁴ One legal avenue local environmentalists might pursue would be to legally challenge the validity of the 1989 Forest Plan which they claim violates a host of environmental statutes. In 1989, they appealed the Plan administratively and were turned down. But due to the injunctions and pending spotted owl plans, they never took the Plan to court, something they might do if these roadless projects ever progress.

CHAPTER 4

THE DIMENSIONS OF INTEREST GROUP COMPETITION

We will do anything that's legal, anything.

Andrew Kerr, Oregon Natural Resources
Defense Council.

Tie your yellow ribbons, and keep 'em flying for as
long as it takes.

Yellow Ribbon Coalition

To know how interest groups are involved in environ-
mental policymaking is not to know all, or explain
all; but an analysis of environmental policy devoid of
attention to interest group activities would be art-
less and quite unsatisfactory.

Walter Rosenbaum

Interest Groups and Pluralist Theory

Given pluralist thought's emphasis upon group activ-
ity, it should be no surprise that the topic of interest
groups occupies center stage in the debate between pluralist
theorists and their detractors. "There is no point in the

policymaking process," Walter Rosenbaum reminds us, "at which group activity ceases to be significant."¹ Examining the role and nature of interest group activity is imperative, therefore, in order to gain a useful understanding how the pluralist process influences politics in the Siskiyou and whether the assumptions of the pluralists or their critics prove valid. It is the task of this chapter, then, to consider the organization and mobilization of interests in the Siskiyou conflict and explore the various dimensions of their competition.

Types of Interests

In the simplest terms, an interest is, according to Zeigler and Peak, a "desire for, or concern over, either an abstract or material political object"; what they term a "political good."² An interest group can be understood, then, as a social aggregate which forms to seek such goods which, because they are in the political realm, can only be secured by dealing at some level with the state. Interests and the goods they seek reflect the diversity of society at large. Some political goods, termed *selective*, are divisible and particular to given beneficiaries, while others, *collec-*

¹Walter Rosenbaum, *The Politics of Environmental Concern* (New York: Praeger, 1977), 21.

²L. Harmon Zeigler and G. Wayne Peak, *Interest Groups in American Society* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1972), 1.

tive goods, cannot be divided and thus benefit all equally, even those who did nothing to gain them.³

Mahood also makes the distinction between material, tangible goods and non-material, intangible ones such as status, symbolic reassurance, or ideological rewards.⁴ In a similar vein, Peter Clark and James Q. Wilson see political incentives as being *material*, *purposive*, or *solidary*. Material goods would have a clearly quantifiable value, while purposive goods, on the other hand, cannot be quantified or allocated in the same manner as they tend to reflect "supra-personal goals." Solidary goods, while similarly non-quantifiable, are goods intrinsic to the group itself, bestowing such rewards as the identification and personal fulfillment that come with group membership.⁵

Interest Groups and the Question of Bias

In the debate between pluralists and their critics the issue of interest groups invariably leads to the question of whether all the interests in a given issue could initially form and effectively organize and compete or whether some bias in the pluralist process prevents this.

Central to pluralist theorists' vision of the American political process is the notion that the field of competi-

³*Ibid.* 66.

⁴H.R. Mahood, *Interest Group Politics in America* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1990), 11.

⁵Peter Clark and James Q. Wilson, "Incentive Systems: A Theory of Organization" *Administrative Science Quarterly* VI (September 1961), 124-166.

tion among conflicting interests is, for the most part, open, fluid, and fairly well-representative of the disparate interests of society as a whole. To the pluralists, fluidity and openness do not necessarily imply perfect equality amongst interest groups at any one given time, but rather an overall balance of power whereby the fortunes of the many groups in competition wax and wane in a pattern which allows no one group to consistently dominate.

Even if an interest is not currently manifest, argue pluralists such as Truman, the mere potential of its coalescence can often exert an influence upon the policymaking process.⁶ Dahl, meanwhile, points to what he calls the "non-cumulative" nature of group resources whereby inequalities in one facet of group resources, such as money, can be offset by other factors such as expertise, intensity of commitment, or status. What this flexibility or "slack" in the system tends to do, according to Dahl, is level the playing field. What matters is not so much the amount of a group's resources, but instead the skill with which it uses them.⁷ Thus, a group's raw resources can only imply *potential* but not *actual* power.

The critics of pluralism remain unimpressed with such notions of flexibility and openness. The central theme run-

⁶David Truman, *The Governmental Process* (New York: Knopf, 1951), 114.

⁷Robert Dahl, *Who Governs?* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1961), 305-310.

ning through their work is that the pluralist process is inherently biased against the formation, maintenance, and effective operation of certain types of interests, namely those that represent the economically disadvantaged and politically disenfranchised or those that are very broad and diffuse, what some call "public interests." According to critics, pluralism responds far more favorably to groups representing narrow, well-endowed interests which can organize far more readily and effectively than cumbersome mass interests or the inherently weak and marginal interests of the disadvantaged. Without proper organization or resources, the critics argue, the interests of vast sectors of society go unrepresented.⁸ The proof of this, suggest the critics, are the vastly unequal outcomes the American system clearly produces.⁹

To Wolff, the problem lies not so much with pluralist theory, but with pluralist practice:

Thus pluralism is not explicitly a philosophy of privilege or injustice--it is a philosophy of equality and justice whose *concrete application* supports inequality by ignoring the existence of certain legitimate groups.¹⁰

As Wolff sees it, pluralism guarantees inequality and injustice by responding only to interests currently endowed with

⁸E.E. Schattschneider, *The Semi-Sovereign People* (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1960), 35.

⁹G. David Garson, *Group Theories of Politics* (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1978), 126.

¹⁰Robert Wolff, *The Poverty of Liberalism* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1968), 154.

resources and privileges necessary to organize and effectively operate. The gaping disparities in group resources, Wolff contends, allow no meaningful bargaining and compromise to take place and this essentially cripples fair competition.¹¹ As if gross inequities in group power were not bad enough, argues Wolff, the role of government works to reinforce, rather than ameliorate the situation:

It is as though an umpire were to come upon a baseball game in progress between big boys and little boys, in which the big boys cheated, broke the rules, claimed hits that were outs, and made the little boys accept the injustice by brute force. If the umpire undertakes to "regulate" the game by simply enforcing the "rules" actually being practiced he does not thereby make the game a fair one. Indeed, he may actually make matters worse because if the little boys get up their courage, band together, and decide to fight it out, the umpire will accuse them of breaking the rules and throw his weight against them! Precisely the same sort of thing happens in pluralist politics....The net effect of government action is thus to weaken, rather than strengthen the play of conflicting interests in the society.¹²

To Hamilton, meanwhile, the whole notion of a diverse set of specific interests corresponding to specific publics, all in competition--a notion at the heart of pluralist thought --is fallacious. The majority of people, claims Hamilton, do not belong to any group at all,¹³ and thus, they and their interests, the mass public interest, are shut out of the

¹¹ *Ibid.* 156-158.

¹² *Ibid.* 157.

¹³ Pluralists would dispute this. For example a 1972 study by Sidney Verba and Norman Nie finds that 62% of the public claims to belong to at least one association and 40% claim that their membership is active rather than nominal. Sidney Verba and Norman Nie, *Participation in America* (New York: Harper & Row, 1972), 41-42.

process. Even when public interests are organized, maintains Hamilton among others, such groups are still seriously handicapped since they attempt to secure diffuse, non-divisible public goods rather than private narrowly focused benefits.¹⁴

Zeigler and Peak make a similar observation regarding the easier time that groups oriented towards material or economic goods have in organizing as compared to purposively-oriented interests.¹⁵ Robert Paehlke concurs as he notes that "most political scientists would argue that without an economically interested attentive public, fewer political and organizational resources are available."¹⁶ Participation by economic interests, according to Zeigler and Peak has more readily quantifiable results and can be seen by potential supporters as an investment of sorts. On the other hand, support for purposive interests because it "result[s] in benefits whose values cannot be fiscally counted" tends to be more fickle and less dependable.¹⁷ Furthermore, claim Zeigler and Peak, members of material/economic interests tend to give greater per capita contributions to their

¹⁴ Richard Hamilton, *Class and Politics in the United States* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1972), 35-46; Among a number of theorists who also make this argument is Philip Foss, *Politics and Grass* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1960).

¹⁵ Zeigler and Peak, 76.

¹⁶ Robert Paehlke, "Environmental Values and Democracy: The Challenge of the Next Century" in Norman Vig and Michael Kraft (editors), *Environmental Policy in the 1990s* (Washington D.C.: CQ Press, 1990), 352.

¹⁷ Zeigler and Peak, 76.

groups than supporters of more intangible interests do, in part, they suggest, because of the higher socioeconomic strata and better-endowed resource base such groups tend to draw from.¹⁸

As a result, argues Rosenbaum, "no interest has exploited this right to take part in the governmental process more pervasively or successfully than has business." He goes on to claim that business interests' "privileged status":

....ensure[s] that its views are represented early and forcefully..., its interests are pursued and protected carefully at all policy stages, and its forces are mobilized effectively for long periods of time. These are formidable advantages, often enough to give a decisive edge in competitive struggles with environmental or other interests that have not the political endurance, skill, or resources to be as resolute in bringing pressure on government when it counts.¹⁹

Other critics of pluralism stress what they perceive as the built-in, systemic nature of the pluralist process's bias, the development of which Schattschneider calls the "mobilization of bias."²⁰ According to Bachrach and Baratz, these are the predominant values, beliefs, political rituals, and "rules of the game" which "operate systematically and consistently to the benefit of certain persons and groups at the expense of others."²¹ How this relates to interest groups is that those which are well-organized, well-

¹⁸ *Ibid.* 77.

¹⁹ Walter Rosenbaum, *Environmental Politics and Policy* (Washington D.C.: CQ Press, 1985), 38-39.

²⁰ Schattschneider, 71.

²¹ Peter Bachrach and Morton Baratz, *Power and Poverty* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970), 43.

placed, and status quo-oriented find themselves in a position to control the "context of political conflict" in such a way that public or reform interests are prevented from organizing effectively, if at all.²²

Bachrach and Baratz have taken Schattschneider's mobilization of bias a step further with their notion of *non-decisionmaking*. They define a non-decision as:

....a decision that results in the suppression or thwarting of a latent or manifest challenge to the values or interest of the decisionmaker. To be more nearly explicit, non-decisionmaking is a means by which demands for change in the existing allocation of benefits and privileges in the community can be suffocated before they are even voiced; or kept covert; or killed before they gain access to the relevant decision-making arena; or, failing all these things, maimed or destroyed in the decision-implementing stage of the policy process.²³

In other words, by "mobilizing bias" within the system through the use and manipulation of dominant values, myths, and procedural and institutional practices, Bachrach and Baratz argue that the status quo forces in the pluralist process limit the scope of debate and the range of policy options considered. The effect of this is to stunt and restrict interests seeking to alter the status quo:

Pluralism fails to consider the case where A devotes his energies to creating or reinforcing social and political values and institutional practices that limit the scope of the political process to public

²² Andrew McFarland, "Interest Groups and Theories of Power in America" *British Journal of Politics* 17 (April 1987), 132.

²³ Bachrach and Baratz (1970), 44.

consideration of only those issues which are comparatively innocuous to A.²⁴

The pluralist process's tendency to gravitate to "safe issues" claim Bachrach and Baratz underscores the presence of what they consider to be the hidden "second face of power." While the process may seem open and decentralized, it is actually tightly defined and its boundaries clearly delineated by this other face of power.²⁵

In pluralism's defense, Kelso claims that any status quo bias in the system may have more to do with American culture and society than pluralist theory. While he concedes that Bachrach and Baratz may be on target in their description of how biases in values and myths limit the scope of policy options, Kelso wonders if that would not occur in any political system.²⁶ Kelso and his pluralist brethren contend that, in the biggest picture, pluralism still offers the best chance and most feasible method for marginal groups with little or no power to gain a forum and influence policy. The critics' vision of a system responding only to whomever has the most money is too simplistic, maintain the pluralists. The point, they argue, is not to achieve an essentially unachievable equality of group resources, but in-

²⁴ Peter Bachrach and Morton Baratz, "Two Faces of Power" *American Political Science Review* 56 (1962), 948.

²⁵ *Ibid.* 952.

²⁶ William Kelso, *American Democratic Theory* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1978), 107.

stead to develop adequate countervailing power by effectively exploiting all manner of sources.²⁷

In addition, resource discrepancies can further be neutralized, argue the pluralists, if a group can reach the bargaining table and deal directly with policy elites rather than having to first win considerable mass support, since in this realm total raw resources matter less.²⁸ From what Dahl and Truman have argued it can be implied that pluralism's openness and flexibility stem from an overall balance of power rather than a constant equality of all groups at all times.²⁹ To look at group competition and resources at a given time in a given policy case is to look at a frozen snapshot which misses the overall long-term dynamic inherent in a balance of power in which groups' power is constantly in a state of flux.

Individual Motivation and the Logic of Collective Action

No work has so powerfully challenged pluralist thought (at least regarding interest groups) quite like Mancur Olson's seminal study, *The Logic of Collective Action*.³⁰ By suggesting that simple rational choice is the reason that so many latent interests do not form into active groups, Olson

²⁷ See, for example, Dahl, *Who Governs?*; Roger Cobb and Charles Elder, *Participation in American Politics* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1972).

²⁸ Kelso, 107-108.

²⁹ Dahl, 305-310; Truman, 26-33.

³⁰ Mancur Olson, *The Logic of Collective Action* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1965).

calls into question two basic pluralist tenets: that individuals will band together with other like-minded individuals to secure their interests and that a group's resources or effectiveness is a reflection of its degree of support in society.

Since participation in an interest group incurs a cost whether in time, money, or labor, Olson contends that no rational individual will assume these costs unless two conditions are met: (1) the likely benefits resulting from participation exceed benefits achieved without participation, and (2) benefits exceed the costs of membership and participation. The precise reason that these constraints prove insurmountable to many latent interests, Olson argues, is because of the so-called *free-rider* problem which occurs when a collective good is sought. Because such goods are non-divisible, they can be shared equally by all regardless of whether or not they participated. In addition, since collective goods appeal to such a potentially broad population, the perceived advantage added to a group by any one individual's membership will likely be calculated as insignificant and so the costs of membership would most often be seen as outweighing benefits.³¹

For interests seeking collective goods, therefore, neither of the aforementioned conditions for participation would likely be met. The only way in which a potential group

³¹ *Ibid.* 1-52.

could get around this dilemma and attract members, maintains Olson, is if: (1) selective benefits are offered in addition to the group's collective goals (these benefits, available only to members, might include such incentives as magazines, discounts, travel, or insurance), (2) membership is made compulsory, or (3) the group is small enough to allow an individual's impact upon achievement of the group's objectives seem sufficiently noticeable so that the benefits of participation would be seen to outweigh the costs.³²

These stringent criteria for successful organization would seem to put purposive or broad-scale (what some call "public") interests at a much greater disadvantage than those seeking more concentrated material benefits. First, as has been previously noted, the latter type of interest tends to have a much greater resource base with which to dispense selective incentives to lure members. Furthermore, since materially-oriented interests usually seek benefits which are more narrowly focused, they tend to better avoid the free-rider problem since they are appealing to a more restricted audience to begin with.

The pluralist response to Olson takes issue with several aspects of his model.³³ One problem, argues Kelso, is

³² *Ibid.*

³³ Ironically, argues McFarland, it was Olson's work, considered by so many to have been the most lethal blow to pluralist thought, that helped revive it by forcing pluralists to develop well-thought out and empirically grounded defenses. Andrew McFarland, "Why Interest Groups Organize: A Pluralist Response to Olson" from a paper delivered at the

Olson's suspect portrait of the individual as a fully rational actor with perfect knowledge. A number of influential studies have long challenged this assumption in fields ranging from voting behavior to bureaucratic behavior to public policy.³⁴ Rather than the fully rational minimizer of costs and maximizer of benefits, Kelso wonders if man the "social animal" of "limited rationality and limited knowledge" is a bit more prone to the influences of emotion, passion, ideology, altruism, or obligation than Olson allows.³⁵

Even Terry Moe, who mostly stands behind Olson's thesis, admits that Olson's assumption of perfect information among potential group members is quite dubious. Moe's modification of Olson's model allows for the possibility that individuals may misjudge and overestimate the actual impact that their membership might have and thereby join a group on that basis alone.³⁶ Beyond this calculation of one's own efficacy, a number of pluralists find that an individual's estimation of a group's overall chances for success provide

Western Political Science Association annual meeting, Seattle, WA (April 1991).

³⁴ See for example, Angus Campbell, et.al., *The American Voter* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1960); Herbert Simon and James March, *Organization* ((New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1958); Thomas Dye, *Understanding Public Policy*, 6th edition (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1987).

³⁵ Kelso, 100.

³⁶ Terry Moe, *The Organization of Interests* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980), 34.

another alternative incentive for membership which Olson ignores.³⁷

Moe attempts to bolster Olson's thesis that selective incentives are better than shared goals in explaining membership by broadening the notion of what constitutes a selective interest. In trying to overcome Olson's one-dimensional view of human values and drives, Moe allows for more "heterogenous value structures" which may include altruism, ideology, morals, status, or duty; items most commonly associated with purposive or solidary benefits.³⁸ The key to Moe's revised model is that the personal satisfaction of these values can be considered a type of selective interest as well. According to Moe, therefore, "collective goods can actually generate their own selective incentives" and thus become incorporated into the individual's rational calculus.³⁹

McFarland, nonetheless, finds any theory of selective incentives insufficient to explain the complexity of interest group organization as it exists today. Far from being the mere aggregations of coequal citizens that both Olson and early pluralists have considered them, interest groups are, according to McFarland, diverse, multi-dimensional organizations that often do not fit neatly into

³⁷ See, for example, Brian Barry, *Economists, Sociologists, and Democracy* (London: Collier-Macmillan, 1970).

³⁸ Moe, 113-118.

³⁹ *Ibid.* 118.

Olson's model.⁴⁰ For instance, he notes the growing importance of patrons (such as foundations, wealthy individuals, and even government agencies) which often allow interest groups to reduce reliance upon, or even bypass individual member dues. Likewise, the existence of coalition interest groups with smaller organizations or businesses rather than individuals as members violates the traditional patterns of organization that Olson's theory is built upon. Finally, McFarland calls attention to the role of professional lobbyists and lawyers, whom he terms "agents," in achieving influence or effective mobilization for the group. In many cases, McFarland argues, it is the skill of these agents rather than overall group numbers or resources which determines a group's success.⁴¹

Pluralists point to the massive proliferation of interest groups since the 1970s, what Mahood calls the "participation revolution," as the starkest empirical evidence of the deficiencies of Olson's model.⁴² Much of this growth, pluralists stress, has occurred amongst "public interest" and reform groups, precisely the type alleged to be at the greatest disadvantage in forming.⁴³ Some other set of motivations besides selective incentives must be at work, they suggest.

⁴⁰ McFarland (1991), 10-18.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*

⁴² Mahood, 1.

⁴³ McFarland, "Why Interest Groups Organize", 1; Mahood, vii.

The Role of Symbolism and Communications

It is argued that one of the reasons for the explosion in interest group activity in the past two decades has been the advances in technology and communication which make the activation of more latent interests possible.⁴⁴ If so, this might lend credence to Roger Cobb and Charles Elder's assertion that the logic of collective action could be better understood in symbolic rather than economic terms.⁴⁵

Symbols are described by Cobb and Elder as "any object used by human beings to index meanings that are not inherent in, nor discernable from, the object itself."⁴⁶ "Symbolism, then, can be understood as a patterned and "socially shared coding system" used to process, simplify, and give meaning to the deluge of incoming stimuli and information every individual constantly confronts.⁴⁷ A number of scholars have turned to communications theory, political symbolism, and so-called "socio-emotional" variables to explain group organization and mobilization.⁴⁸ Critical and neo-Marxist

⁴⁴ Mahood, 19.

⁴⁵ Charles Elder and Roger Cobb, *The Political Uses of Symbols* (New York: Longman, 1983), 1.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.* 28.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.* 55-56. Cobb and Elder distinguish between two categories of symbols: referential symbols which have a factual, rational base and condensational symbols which have an emotive base. Charles Elder and Roger Cobb, *Participation in American Politics*, 57.

⁴⁸ For an especially good example of a communicative analysis regarding public lands politics, see C. Brant Short, *Ronald Reagan and the Public Lands* (College Station, TX: Texas A & M University Press, 1989).

theorists, for example, have long stressed the role of technology and communication as the key to a subtle and sophisticated system of social control which elites use to legitimate the political and economic process and keep potentially dissenting groups latent.⁴⁹

The way that this is achieved, argues Murray Edelman, is by the manipulation of emotionally powerful symbols in order to encourage quiescence or provoke anxiety as the needs arise. To Edelman, the political realm is not unlike the religious one in that it is characterized by irrationality and marked by activity that is fundamentally symbolic and expressive in nature.⁵⁰ Given such elite tampering with symbolic meaning, Edelman finds little evidence that a truly open and competitive pluralist process could flourish. Instead, he finds a situation where highly organized elites capture scarce material benefits so that all that system can offer the vast remainder of the public are symbolic rewards.⁵¹

⁴⁹ See, for example, Ralph Miliband, *The State in Capitalist Society* (New York: Basic Books, 1969); Herbert Marcuse, *One-Dimensional Man* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1964); Jurgen Habermas, *Communication and the Evolution of Society* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1979).

⁵⁰ Murray Edelman, *The Symbolic Uses of Politics* (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1967). Cobb and Elder argue that politics is neither rational or irrational, but *arational*, arising "from a loosely structured process of interpreting fragmentary information and ambiguous cues in the light of prior expectation and changing, uncertain or conflicting political preferences. Cobb and Elder, *Political Uses of Symbols*, 1-2.

⁵¹ Edelman, chap. 2. This whole process of political symbolism could also be seen as a key factor in determining

Theorists like Cobb and Elder, however, see in political symbolism not only the risk of manipulation and domination, but also the opportunity for increased organization. The opiate, therefore, can sometimes also serve as a stimulant. Cobb and Elder have no quarrel with allegations of bias in the pluralist process, readily conceding that group influence and access is unequally distributed and that the scope of decisionmaking is truncated in a way that favors the status quo.⁵² Still, the notion that the strongest group will automatically determine the agenda is, they suggest, simplistic and empirically questionable.⁵³

What matters most, Cobb and Elder argue, are not groups' raw resources or even how these are put to use, but rather the way in which groups articulate and present their demands. If groups can do this in a way that increases support, wins over allies, discredits opponents, and ultimately expands the arena of political conflict into increasingly broader and more diverse publics (or conversely, prevents this) they will succeed.⁵⁴ Much of this process, according to Cobb and Elder, is largely a matter of the effective manipulation of symbols by the groups involved. More precise-

where the line is drawn between "acceptable" politics and off-limit non-decisions as Bachrach and Baratz describe them. Thus, their "second face of power" might be understood as one whose chief tool is the effective use of symbols.

⁵² Cobb and Elder, *Participation in American Politics*, 10-11.

⁵³ *Ibid.* 34.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.* 67-110.

ly, their theory focuses upon how groups attempt to wrap themselves and their policy objectives in the symbols of legitimacy,⁵⁵ a point made previously by Richard Merelman:

Indeed, most major political conflicts within any polity may be seen as the attempt by partisans to attach the available legitimacy symbols to the policies they advocate and to sever the relationship between these symbols and the policies of their opponents.⁵⁶

Success in claiming the mantle of legitimacy and monopolizing those symbols associated with it, therefore, should translate into an improved ability of a group to enlist allies, restrict the flexibility of its opponents, and assure its policy alternatives a place on the agenda.

To Cobb and Elder, therefore, a group's real power should be measured not by its financial superiority or inferiority but by its skill at defining and redefining an evolving issue to its advantage as circumstances warrant. The political system, they contend, is such that any group with communicative prowess and strategy-making skill can achieve at least some measure of success. They believe, therefore, that there is enough slack in the system to allow for more open, responsive, and flexible politics than most critics believe.⁵⁷

⁵⁵ *Ibid.* 60.

⁵⁶ Richard Merelman, "Learning and Legitimacy" *American Political Science Review* 60 (1966), 553.

⁵⁷ Cobb and Elder, *Participation in American Politics*, 164-165.

Interest Group Competition in the Siskiyou

At the center of all the political activity swirling around the Siskiyou National Forest has been, of course, the clash of competing interest groups. Consequently, this case provides an excellent opportunity by which to apply theoretical questions raised by pluralists and their critics regarding interest group organization, specifically whether interest group competition is essentially fair and open or inherently lopsided and biased.

Such assumptions are tested in this analysis by comparing quantifiable measures of group resources (such as membership, staff, budget) and reviewing how these relate to group tactics and effectiveness. Additionally, various harder-to-quantify aspects of group competition that are in some ways at least partially independent of material resources (such as strategy, communication, the articulation of goals and values, the nature of the issue itself) are considered in light of how they might alter a simple calculation of raw group resources.

Interest Groups and the Public Interest

According to Rosenbaum, ecological objectives are a classic example of the type of broad, immaterial political goods which provide "diffuse benefits" to a "large and amorphous public";⁵⁸ precisely the sort of benefits which cri-

⁵⁸ Rosenbaum, *Politics of Ecological Concern*, 61.

distributed among a relatively small set of groups or economic interests."⁵⁹ Environmentalism is, according to Paehlke "an ideology distinct....in its unwillingness to maximize economic advantages for its own adherents, or for any contemporary group....it may be the least economically self-interested of all ideologies."⁶⁰ Brock Evans of the Audubon Society is even more explicit:

....[there] is no economic gain for us in the policies and programs we advocate for the public lands. Creation of new parks, wilderness areas, wildlife refugesdoes not return any specific gain to our treasuries. We work on them, fight for them, care about these issues because we believe in them, and because we truly think it is best for the country that we love.⁶¹

Many other observers, however, see environmentalists as merely an interest seeking a subjective "good" like any other, and hence, not deserving of the halo of public interest.⁶² Petulla presents this line of reasoning as such: "You might like forests, but I prefer redwood panelling in my living room; let's not argue about tastes."⁶³ Such logic

⁵⁹ *Ibid.* 104.

⁶⁰ Robert Paehlke, *Environmentalism and the Future of Progressive Politics* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1989), 7.

⁶¹ Brock Evans quoted in Short, 127.

⁶² Zeigler and Peak anecdotally note that being identified as a public interest is something that most all groups seek: "A few years ago, a state university....invited several people registered as lobbyists at the state capital to explain their work. Without exception, each began his remarks by explaining that his organization was not a pressure group since its goals were in the public interest." Zeigler and Peak, 38.

⁶³ Joseph Petulla, *American Environmentalism* (College Station, TX: Texas A & M University Press, 1980), 12.

"You might like forests, but I prefer redwood panelling in my living room; let's not argue about tastes."⁶³ Such logic would, of course, topple ecological interests from the moral high ground which public interests seek to occupy. Ultimately, whether or not one views the environmental groups in the Siskiyou as public interests largely depends upon which conception of the public and its needs and desires one adheres to. While the pluralist would tend to see environmentalists wishing to preserve old growth as just one diverse interest among many, critics of pluralism might be more inclined to associate the goals of preservation with the general and long-term interests of society as a whole.

Despite the disagreement regarding their status as a public interest, environmentalists' goals in the Siskiyou clearly do stand out as an especially vivid example of fairly intangible, purposive political goods. Conversely, it can be said that environmentalists' timber interest opponents have sought benefits that could be defined as primarily economic and material, or what the former Siskiyou National Forest supervisor terms "commodity-oriented."⁶⁴

people registered as lobbyists at the state capital to explain their work. Without exception, each began his remarks by explaining that his organization was not a pressure group since its goals were in the public interest." Zeigler and Peak, 38.

⁶³ Joseph Petulla, *American Environmentalism* (College Station, TX: Texas A & M University Press, 1980), 12.

⁶⁴ This is not to say that timber's goals are exclusively economic; there certainly has existed a secondary tier of less material, purposive goals as well.

This distinction gives rise to a number of questions which tie into larger issues of pluralist theory: (1) Did ecological interests in the Siskiyou, because of the less quantifiable and material nature of the goods they sought, face a more difficult time forming politically active groups and attracting members to these groups than their timber interest opponents? (2) For these same reasons, were ecological interests, if they did organize, disadvantaged in terms of resources and capabilities in their competition with timber interests for support and influence? (3) Of the groups that did organize, could their existence be explained by Olson's theory in terms of his criteria for group formation (that is, compulsory membership, small group size, or selective incentives)? and (4) Does Olson's economic rational actor or the pluralist's socio-political model best explain the motivations behind group organization?

Levels of Organization⁶⁵

What is most striking about the political conflict over the Siskiyou National Forest is the sheer number and

⁶⁵ In comparing interest group organization and resources in the Siskiyou, this study has drawn upon a number of sources. Using in-depth participant interviews, telephone surveys of group participants, Forest Service documents (especially EISs), and the general case history as gleaned from a variety of journalistic and official sources, a roster of the major interest groups involved between 1983 and 1992 has been compiled. Specific information regarding various measures of group resources as well as measures of intensity was gained from telephone surveys and, to a lesser extent, written documentation. For a more detailed discussion of the criteria used for each variable, see appendix D.

diversity of the groups involved on both sides of the issue. If the question is merely *did ecological interests form or otherwise mobilize to protect the Siskiyou forest?*, then the answer has to be a definitive yes. At all levels of the issue--local, state, regional, and national--there was a good deal of interest group organization and activity. Including politically active local sawmills and logging operations, a survey of the groups directly involved in the politics of the Siskiyou as shown in tables 1 and 2 shows a rough equality the number of groups on each side. While a number of groups have faded or merged in the last decade,⁶⁶ there has been a steadily increasing presence of environmental groups involved in the Siskiyou as latent environmental interests seem to have been readily organized. Thus, within the realm of the Siskiyou, this study's data suggest vigorous local organization.

Nationally, the trend has been the same, as Robert Mitchell reports an average annual membership increase for several large national groups for 1980-1989 of between 20 to 100%⁶⁷ Concurring with this trend are Henning and Mangun who

⁶⁶ For example, in 1991 alone, the Kalmiopsis Alliance became defunct, while the Siskiyou Environmental Council merged with the Siskiyou Regional Education/Action Project (as the Siskiyou National Park Campaign had done previously). Similarly, on the timber side the North West Timber Association was absorbed into the Northwest Forestry Association in 1991, while a number of politically active mills have since ceased operations.

⁶⁷ Robert Cameron Mitchell, "Public Opinion and the Green Lobby: Poised for the 1990s?" in Vig and Kraft, 92. The

estimate that there are now somewhere near forty-thousand environmental groups in the United States.⁶⁸ A number of explanations have been offered as to the cause for this growth ranging from reaction to the anti-environmental hostility of the Reagan-Watt years,⁶⁹ to a power deflation of established interests in the 1970s,⁷⁰ to an overall increase in participation and organization due to changes in demographics and communication.⁷¹ Whatever the cause, Helen Ingram and Dean Mann contend that the decade's growth in environmental organization is best explained in pluralist terms.⁷²

The presence and persistence of ecological interests in the Siskiyou does not by any means imply that such groups or their timber interest opponents have been marked by uniformity. In actuality, interest group organization on either side has been characterized by a great diversity of groups of differing type, size, and scope. Regarding size and scope, three basic categories--local, regional, and national--are identifiable in the Siskiyou case. Smaller groups specific to southwest Oregon, the Siskiyou area, or even a sin-

groups Mitchell cites are the Sierra Club, the Wilderness Society, and Greenpeace.

⁶⁸ Daniel Henning and William Mangun, *Managing the Environmental Crisis* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1989), 30. Given the ad hoc and very local nature of many of these groups, this estimate might actually be a bit low.

⁶⁹ Short, *Ronald Reagan and the Public Lands*.

⁷⁰ Rosenbaum, *Politics of Ecological Concern*, 61.

⁷¹ Mahood, 18-20.

⁷² Helen Ingram and Dean Mann, "Interest Groups and Environmental Policy" in James Lester (editor), *Environmental Politics and Policy* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1989), 136.

gle watershed or portion of the Siskiyou have been fairly common and have played a large role in the politics of the case. On the environmentalist side, examples of such groups, which typically have had memberships numbering in the tens, hundreds, or low thousands, include Headwaters, the Siskiyou Regional Education Project/Siskiyou Action Project,⁷³ local Audubon chapters, or the watershed-focused Friends of Elk River. Amongst timber interests, grassroots political representation on the Siskiyou was primarily achieved by individual local mills such as Rough and Ready Lumber or Gregory Forest Products, although the Southern Oregon Timber Industries Association (SOTIA), the Southern Oregon Resource Alliance (SORA), and the Illinois Valley Resource Coalition all represent more "typical" interest groups at the local/sublocal level.

Groups of a state-wide or regional (Pacific Northwest) scope, with memberships usually in the thousands (if they were individual membership groups), also figured prominently in the Siskiyou case. Still, their efforts in the Siskiyou represented only a portion, often modest, of the group's overall efforts on behalf of old growth or logging issues. Examples of such state/regional groups would include the environmentalist Oregon Natural Resources Defense Council (ONRC) or the Public Forestry Foundation and the pro-timber

⁷³ These are twin organizations, the former being tax-exempt and the latter not.

Northwest Forestry Association or large regional corporations like Boise Cascade.⁷⁴

While such efforts usually represent only a small fraction of their overall activities, groups at the national level, such as the Wilderness Society or the National Wildlife Federation, with memberships often in the hundreds of thousands or even millions, have also played a direct, though usually less intense role in the Siskiyou. Finally there have been groups both grassroots (but from other localities) as well as national which, although not directly participating in any of the politics of the Siskiyou, nevertheless played an indirect role through their participation in the larger old growth issue (see appendix C).⁷⁵

⁷⁴ Although they were actors in the Siskiyou, big corporations have played a much larger role in the old growth battle further north, especially in Washington, according to one timber official. It is important to note, therefore, that the timber industry is really two industries in one. Large corporate entities, usually with huge private forest landholdings of their own, cut and mill mostly their own timber. Because the overseas market is so lucrative, they have in the past decade shut down many of their own mills and export much of their timber instead. These companies extract relatively little timber from national forests, but indirectly depend on public timber to supply the domestic market to keep political pressure off of their exports. Independent sawmill operators, on the other hand, rarely own their own forests and tend to be much smaller and more localized than corporate timber concerns. Lacking their own supply and denied much private timber due to exports, such mills are almost exclusively dependent on timber from their local national forest. Keith Ervin, "The Tree Fight" *Seattle Post-Intelligencer* (24 September 1989).

⁷⁵ As we have seen in the previous chapters, events that are part of this larger issue, such as Judge Dwyer's 1991 injunction, although out of the hands of Siskiyou administrators, still had a very profound impact upon events in the Siskiyou.

TABLE 1

INTEREST GROUP PARTICIPATION IN THE SISKIYOU 1983-1992

<u>Group/Scope</u>	<u>Level of Partic.¹</u>	<u>Group Type & Members²</u>	<u>Paid Staff³</u>	<u>Annual Budget⁴</u>	<u>Funding Source⁵</u>	<u>Activ-ities⁶</u>
Environmentalists-						
Headwaters local/SW OR	1	M/800 (90) CG/20	5 (90)	85,000 (90)	1,2,3	m,lt,e, lb,r
Siskiyou Regional Education Project local/Sisk.N.F. ⁸	1	M/2000 ⁹ (90)	4	100,000 (90)	2,3,1	m,e,lb
Siskiyou Audubon ¹⁰ local/Sisk.N.F.	1	M/360	0	5,000	1,4	m,lt,e
Kalmiopsis Audubon local/NW Sisk.	1	M/150 (90)	0	2,000 (90)	1,2,3	m,lt,e, lb,r

¹1=high level of participation; 2=moderate or infrequent level of participation.

²M=individual membership group; CG=coalition group or trade association. Either symbol is followed by the number of individual or group members. All figures are for 1991 unless otherwise noted in parentheses.

³Part-time staff members are given a value of 0.5. All figures are for 1991 unless otherwise noted in parentheses. Figures with (*) are approximations.

⁴All figures are in dollars and for 1991 unless otherwise noted in parentheses. Figures with (*) are approximations or the average of a range.

⁵1=member dues; 2=grants; 3=fundraising; 4=sales. Sources are put in order of prominence.

⁶m=monitoring/tracking; lt=litigation; e=public education; lb=lobbying; r=research; p=PAC.

⁷The SREP has a non-tax deductible spinoff, the Siskiyou Action Project.

⁸Although it is also involved in the regional old growth issue, SREP's primary focus is the Siskiyou.

⁹This is a mailing list network; contributions are voluntary.

¹⁰Local Audubon chapters are financially and politically autonomous from the National Audubon Society.

TABLE 1 (continued)

INTEREST GROUP PARTICIPATION IN THE SISKIYOU 1983-1992

<u>Group/Scope</u>	<u>Level of Partic.</u>	<u>Group Type & Members</u>	<u>Paid Staff</u>	<u>Annual Budget</u>	<u>Funding Source</u>	<u>Activities</u>
Friends of Elk River local/NW Sisk.	1	M/80 (90)	0	18,000 (90)	2,1	m,lt,e, lb,r
Earth First Siskiyou Local/Sisk.N.F.	1	M/125*	0	500*	1,3	m,lt,e, r
Siskiyou Environ. Council ¹¹ local/SE Sisk.	1	M/75*	2	1,200	2	m,e,lb
Klamath/Siskiyou Coalition ¹² local/SW OR, NW CA	2 ¹³	M/50	0	2,000	1,2	m,e,lb
Rogue Sierra Club ¹⁴ local/SW OR	2	M/1,100	0	3,000*	1,2	m,lt,e, lb
Oregon Natural Res. Defense Council state	1	M/6,000 CG/56	13.5	650,000	1,2	m,lt,e, lb
Audubon Society of state/reg.	1	M/7,000	8	1 mil.	1,2	m,e,lb

¹¹The SEC merged with the SREP in 1991.

¹²This group is a 1991 incarnation of the Siskiyou National Park Campaign which had previously merged into the SREP.

¹³This is more due to the group's relative newness than to a current lack of involvement.

¹⁴Unlike local Audubon groups, local Sierra Club chapters are closely affiliated with the national Sierra Club.

TABLE 1 (continued)

INTEREST GROUP PARTICIPATION IN THE SISKIYOU 1983-1992

<u>Group/ Scope</u>	<u>Level of Partic.</u>	<u>Group Type & Members</u>	<u>Paid Staff</u>	<u>Annual Budget</u>	<u>Funding Source</u>	<u>Activ- ities</u>
Public Forestry Foundation regional/NW	1	M/650*	6.5	100,000	1,2	m,e,lb, r
Sierra Club Oregon Chap. state	2	M/11,000	1	n.a.	n.a.	m,e,lb
Oregon Rivers Council state	2	M/3,000	7	389,000	1,2,3	m,lt,e, lb,r
National Wildlife Federation national	2	M/5,800,000 CG/n.a.	700 (90)	79 mil.	1,4,3, 2	m,lt,e, lb,r
Wilderness Society national	1	M/372,000 (90)	130 (90)	14 mil.	1,4,3 2	m,lt,e lb,r
Sierra Club Legal Defense Fund ¹⁵ national	2	M/n.a.	40	4.2 mil.	n.a.	lt,e
Natural Resources Defense Council national	2	M/160,000	151	16 mil.	n.a.	lt,e
National Audubon Society national	2	M/550,000 (90)	337 (90)	40 mil. (90)	1,4,2, 3	lt,e, lb

¹⁵SCLDF is a distinct entity, independent from the Sierra Club with separate budgets, members, and even ideology.

TABLE 1 (continued)

INTEREST GROUP PARTICIPATION IN THE SISKIYOU 1983-1992

<u>Group/Scope</u>	<u>Level of Partic.</u>	<u>Group Type & Members</u>	<u>Paid Staff</u>	<u>Annual Budget</u>	<u>Funding Source</u>	<u>Activ-ities</u>
Earth First ¹⁶ national	1	M/15,000*	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	m,lt,e
Timber Interests-						
Southern OR Timber Industries Association local/SW OR	1	CG/108	2	120,000	1	m,e,lt,lb,r
Southern Oregon Resource Alliance local/SW OR	1 ¹⁷	M/5,500*	0	n.a.	1,2	m,e,lb,r
North West Timber Assoc. ¹⁸ regional/NW	1	CG/25 (90)	5 (90)	300,000*	1	m,e,lt,lb,r
Northwest Forestry Association regional/NW	1	CG/80	12	736,000	1	m,e,lb
Northwest Forest Resource Council regional/NW	1	CG/13 ¹⁹	0 ²⁰	n.a.	n.a.	e,lt,lb r

¹⁶Earth First is not a typical interest group with official dues and membership. It does have, however, subscribers and a core of activists.

¹⁷SORA is less active now than in the mid-to-late 80s.

¹⁸NWTA merged in 1991 with the Northwest Forestry Assoc.

¹⁹NFRC is made up of other trade associations rather than companies.

²⁰NFRC is closely affiliated with the Northwest Forestry Association and uses its staff and offices.

TABLE 1 (continued)

INTEREST GROUP PARTICIPATION IN THE SISKIYOU 1983-1992

<u>Group/Scope</u>	<u>Level of Partic.</u>	<u>Group Type & Members</u>	<u>Paid Staff</u>	<u>Annual Budget</u>	<u>Funding Source</u>	<u>Activities</u>
Douglas Timber Operators local/county	2	CG/130	5	250,000* (90)	1	m,e,lb, r
Associated Oregon Log- gers state	2	CG/780	12	250,000* (90)	1	m,lt,e, lb,r,p
Western Forest Industries Association regional/West	2	CG/125 (90)	10 (90)	750,000 (90)	n.a.	n.a.
Helicopter Loggers Association regional	1	CG/6	n.a.	60,000	n.a.	m,e,lb
Illinois Valley Re- source Coalition local/SE Sisk.	2	M/110	0	1,000* (90)	1,3	lb
Western Wood Pro- ducts Assoc. regional/West	2	CG/300	100 (90)	>5 mil. ²¹ (90)	n.a.	n.a.

²¹The only information available for WWPA's budget states that it is in the "above \$5 million" range.

TABLE 2

BUSINESSES INVOLVED IN THE SISKIYOU 1983-1992

<u>Company</u>	<u>Employees</u> ¹	<u>Annual Sales</u> ² (mm \$)	<u>Annual Lumber Production</u> ³ (mmbf) .	<u>Level of Particip.</u> ⁴	<u>Activities</u> ⁵
Rogge Forest Products ⁶	92	40	60 (88)	1	m,lt
Medford Corp.	700	135	144	2	lt,lb
Spalding & Bros.	200	26	51	1	n.a.
Gregory Forest Products ⁷	448	72	78	1	m,lb
Rough and Ready Lumber	235 (89)	n.a.	70	1	m,lb
South Coast Lumber	425	100	78	1	m,lb
Murphy Creek Lumber ⁸	150	19	96 (88)	1	m,lb
Croman Corp.	150	51	70	2	n.a.
Burrill Lumber	n.a.	n.a.	107	2	n.a.
Gold Beach Plywood ⁹	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	1	m,lb

¹All figures are for 1990 unless otherwise noted in parentheses.

²See above.

³All figures are for 1987 unless otherwise noted in parentheses.

⁴1=high level of participation; 2=moderate or infrequent participation.

⁵m=monitoring; lt=litigation; lb=lobbying; p=PAC

⁶Formerly Douglas Pacific (prior to 1988).

⁷Ceased operations in 1991.

⁸Ceased operations, date unknown.

⁹Ceased operations, date unknown.

TABLE 2 (continued)

BUSINESSES INVOLVED IN THE SISKIYOU 1983-1992

<u>Company</u>	<u>Employees</u>	<u>Annual Sales</u> <u>(mm \$)</u>	<u>Annual Lumber Production</u> <u>(mmbf)</u>	<u>Level of Partic.</u>	<u>Activities</u>
Boise Cascade Medford Div.	19,810 1,000	4,186 130	920 75	1 -	m,lb, p -
Stone Container Medford Forest Industries Div.	32,600 1,000	5,360 140	536 n.a.	2 -	m,lb -
Weyerhaeuser Corporation	40,621	9,024	3,140	2	lb,p

Perhaps the most notable distinction regarding the scope of the different groups involved concerns the intensity with which they participated in the politics of the Siskiyou. Looking at table 3, it becomes clear that the more localized a group's focus was, the more heavily that group tended to participate. Two-thirds of all the local groups measured versus 58% of the state/regional groups and less than a quarter of the national groups were in the heavy participation category.

In addition to differences in scope and size, groups in the Siskiyou were also distinguished on the basis of their organization. Some groups, such as the Wilderness Society, the Siskiyou Audubon, or SORA were individual membership organizations. Other groups, though, had not individual members, but smaller groups or companies as members. SOTIA and the Northwest Forestry Association were examples of this type of coalition organization. Other groups, such as Headwaters or the ONRC, were a mixture of individual membership and group coalition. These hybrids made for an interest group line-up that could be difficult to keep track of when groups operated both independently and as coalition members. For instance, in addition to eight hundred individual members, Headwaters included under its fold twenty watershed groups including the Friends of Elk River. Headwaters, in turn was a member group of the ONRC (although the two acted as very distinct entities). Both Headwaters and

TABLE 3

PERCENTAGE OF INTEREST GROUPS BY SCOPE ACCORDING TO
LEVELS OF PARTICIPATION

	Level of Participation ¹	
	1	2
<u>Group Scope</u>		
Local Groups and Businesses (n=24)	66.7 (16)	33.3 (8)
State/Regional Groups (n=12)	58.3 (7)	41.6 (5)
National Groups and Businesses (n=9)	22.2 (2)	77.8 (7)

¹For an explanation of this variable, see table 1
or appendix D

the ONRC, incidentally, were both part of the Western Ancient Forest Campaign. Boise Cascade, meanwhile, itself a player in the Siskiyou, also belonged to SOTIA.

This overlap suggests two things. First, while interest group organization in the Siskiyou has been undeniably widespread and diverse, these somewhat incestuous patterns of membership suggest that what may seem like completely different sets of actors, may sometimes be the same players operating under several banners. Secondly, the existence of coalition groups and their intermixture with membership groups would seem to bypass elements of Olson's theory. Since coalition groups have *other groups* and not *individuals* as members, Olson's theory of selective incentives for individuals would not seem to apply. Individuals participating in such groups pay no costs since their parent group picks up the tab for their participation. The umbrella group, meanwhile, enjoys increased organizational capabilities as well as the enhanced clout that often comes with being an alliance.

This overlap of group affiliations, as pluralists have long argued, also extends to individual members and group entrepreneurs.⁷⁶ For example, a key figure in the Friends of Elk River also featured prominently in the Kalmiopsis Audubon, while the conservation chair of the Siskiyou Audubon also simultaneously headed the Siskiyou Environmental Coun-

⁷⁶ Truman, 157-167.

cil (the former chair, incidentally, was also a past president of Headwaters). Such was the case with the timber interests as well as the president of SOTIA also served as the past head of SORA, while another key SOTIA official was formerly a leader in the North West Timber Association.

Besides coalition and membership interest groups, there have been a number of other types of organizations involved in the Siskiyou. As already mentioned, many active groups were private businesses, usually local mills or logging operations and as such had no membership per se (although many belonged to one or another interest group consortium). Other partisan interest groups not directly environmentalist or timber-related were, nevertheless active participants. Such groups included a number of local Chambers of Commerce⁷⁷ and, in the larger national issue, various labor unions representing woodworkers and carpenters.⁷⁸ Finally there was very heavy involvement in the Siskiyou from various county and city governments,⁷⁹ at least one government association (the Association of O & C Counties), and various federal and state agencies besides those agen-

⁷⁷ Specifically, these were the Bay Area, Brookings, Grants Pass/Josephine County, Illinois Valley, Medford/Jackson County, and Roseburg Chambers of Commerce.

⁷⁸ See previous chapter, note 98 for the unions involved.

⁷⁹ This would include the governments of Curry, Josephine, Coos, Jackson, and Del Norte counties as well as a number of school board districts and city governments such as Brookings, Cave Junction, Glendale, Gold Beach, Grants Pass, Port Orford, Powers, and Bandon.

cies with primary jurisdiction in the case.⁸⁰ Those latter primary agencies, according to pluralist theory ought to count as distinct interests as well (their influence and goals will be fully discussed in the next chapter).

The Motivation to Organize

It is clear from examining the roster of ecological interest groups involved in the Siskiyou that despite the purposive and less material nature of the goods they have sought, these interests have made the transition from latent to manifest groups with little or no more difficulty than their timber interest opponents. This information, however, is not enough to fully test Olson's thesis. What needs to be understood beyond the mere fact of their organization and mobilization is the motivation underlying this behavior.

If Olson's model was accurate in this case then we could expect to find that the ecologists' seemingly successful effort to organize into manifest groups was due to either: (1) the granting of selective benefits, (2) small group size, or (3) some form of compulsion. It is clear that the last condition was not a factor for environmental groups in the Siskiyou as they, unlike labor or professional groups, have no legal basis for mandatory group membership.

For a few very small grassroots environmental groups, group size may have been a relevant factor. Several groups

⁸⁰ Examples would include the U.S. EPA or the Oregon Department of Fish and Wildlife.

such as the Siskiyou Environmental Council or the Friends of Elk River had memberships of between seventy to eighty. It is in the realm of possibility, therefore, that individual members of these very small groups (usually focused upon a specific watershed near which many of the members live) have felt that their support has had a noticeable effect upon the achievement of their goals.⁸¹ Still, this possibility, even if it were true, would not account for the formation of the majority of environmental groups involved in the Siskiyou which had memberships ranging from the high hundreds to several million.

This leaves us then with selective incentives as the only remaining explanation for the majority of environmental group organization according to Olson's theory. Yet for most of the small and mid-size groups in this case, all that was offered to members in terms of traditional selective benefits was a newsletter and, perhaps, periodic "action alerts"; hardly the selective material enticements likely to make a twenty-five dollar contribution seem worthwhile. Only the larger national groups could offer greater, though still fairly modest, selective incentives; usually vivid, well-produced magazines, travel packages, certain discounts, and, perhaps, a free patch or keychain.

⁸¹ Although it could also be argued that such groups failed far more often than they succeeded in achieving these goals.

Although Culhane implies that this is precisely what maintains large environmental group memberships,⁸² other scholars, such as Ingram and Mann, strongly disagree, and find instead that offering selective benefits provides environmental groups with some spare income and little more. The real sources of formation, growth, and maintenance, they argue, are common perceptions of threats to one's personal or general environment as well as a shared ideological and emotional commitment to counteract these threats and thus achieve collective goods.⁸³ This, of course, corresponds more closely with the traditional pluralist notion that groups form on the basis of common interests, goals, and attitudes.

Kerry Smith's survey research supports this assertion by finding expressive values highly correlated to environmental group membership. He characterizes a public that is fully aware of the fact that the collective goods they seek will be shared by all and yet is still willing to shoulder the costs in time or money.⁸⁴ Ingram and Mann, meanwhile, cite a survey of Sierra Club members in which 64% identify perceived threats and 42% express a purposive goal as reasons for joining.⁸⁵ More importantly, they raise the point

⁸² Paul Culhane, *Public Lands Politics* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press for Resources for the Future, 1981), 25.

⁸³ Ingram and Mann, 138.

⁸⁴ Kerry Smith, "A Theoretical Analysis of the Green Lobby" *American Political Science Review* 79:1 (1984), 137-147, 150.

⁸⁵ Ingram and Mann, 139.

that membership for environmental groups has roughly paralleled changes in the popular perception of threats to the environment.⁸⁶ For example, Sierra Club membership growth was slow during the relatively friendly Carter Administration but skyrocketed after Reagan and his antagonistic appointee Watt took power. Finally, Smith reports a relatively high rate of environmental group members (ranging from 17 to 49%) who give voluntary contributions in excess of the minimum necessary to secure selective benefits.⁸⁷ All of this, then, would seem to imply that public policy concerns and ideological and emotional commitment were the operative factors here.

McFarland finds the theory of selective incentives to be an unconvincing explanation for other reasons; namely its failure to perceive of interest groups as anything other than spontaneous aggregations of equal members. As mentioned before, McFarland believes that the role of external patronage, the dominance and dedication of skillful entrepreneurs and/or agents, and the existence of non-individual membership groups all render the notion of selective incentives obsolete.⁸⁸ In the Siskiyou, this unconventionality of interest groups is made abundantly clear. Very few small and mid-sized groups did not receive at least some some form of patronage, either from foundations or larger national

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*

⁸⁷ Smith, 137-147.

⁸⁸ McFarland, "Why Interests Organize", 10-18.

groups.⁸⁹ In fact, some smaller groups, relying exclusively upon patronage or other sources of funding, did not even require membership dues. Furthermore, many environmental groups, as previously mentioned, were comprised either partly or wholly of other groups. Taken together, all these facts would seem to leave Olson's emphasis on individual motivations, cost-benefit calculations, and selective incentives largely irrelevant.

It would certainly be difficult to argue, therefore, that the chief impetus for group formation and maintenance in the case of the Siskiyou was selective incentives. Most of the environmental groups involved offered quite negligible material inducements, if any. Even the more substantial incentives offered by the large nationals, were not adequate to explain the patterns and depth of support evident in this case. Other groups did not even consist of the individual members central to Olson's model nor did they rely exclusively on the financial support which selective incentives are supposed to clinch.

Only by using Moe's expansive interpretation of selective benefits which includes the socio-emotional benefits of striving for a collective good, can one salvage any aspect of selective goods theory in regards to environmental

⁸⁹ In some groups, patronage rather than membership dues accounted for the bulk of funding in a given year. For example, in 1990 and 1991, respectively, seven-eighths of the Friends of Elk River's and all of the Siskiyou Environmental Council's funding came from patron's grants.

organization in the Siskiyou. At least in this case, the key to understanding the motivations behind environmental group organization is to recognize the role of a shared ideological and emotional commitment and a common perception of a specific threat or imminent loss (of, for instance, a particular roadless area or salmon stream or old growth in general); all backed up by a fairly effective cultivation of external patronage.

Why is Olson's celebrated model of such limited applicability in this particular case? First there are the obvious structural changes in interest group organization that Olson did not foresee such as agents, alliances, patronage, etc. Beyond that, though, it may be that the theory of selective incentives is far more useful in understanding only certain types of organization in certain situations, namely those which feature a clear free-rider problem such as union organizing on behalf of better wages (precisely the type of case from which Olson draws the bulk of his research). Organizing on behalf of ecological goals, on the other hand, has far less divisible, quantifiable benefits. These goals and benefits are also seen by their advocates as being crucially important. As a result, the free-rider problem may not be much of a problem after all. What environmentalist would resent or hesitate sharing the benefits of clean air or old growth forests with those who did not contribute towards that goal as well? Thus, the intangibility

and perceived overwhelming significance of such benefits are probably enough to convince concerned individuals that their small share on behalf of the cause is worth making.

Grassroots and Nationals

In the Siskiyou as well as in the larger old growth issue, the environmental movement has never been a single monolith that has spoken with one voice. In actuality, it has been a very diverse collection of groups with differing resources, goals, and tactics which has sometimes found itself deeply divided over various issues. Perhaps the most relevant distinction in this respect has been that of grassroots versus national groups. In the Siskiyou and elsewhere in the Northwest, grassroot groups have tended to be more confrontational, uncompromising, and resource-poor than their national counterparts. They also tend to have different bases of membership support. While both types of groups usually to attract members who are white, well-educated, and politically left-of-center,⁹⁰ grassroots membership has tended to be less affluent and more oriented towards political activism.⁹¹

⁹⁰ This characterization applies only to groups focused upon the old growth issue. Other grassroots environmental groups, especially ones active in pollution or toxic dump issues, tend to be more ethnically diverse, less educated and not necessarily left-of-center.

⁹¹ I observed this in my own research and it is also discussed in Margaret Kriz, "Shades of Green" *National Journal* (28 July 1990), 1826.

Such differences in membership profile has led to a certain amount of friction and mistrust between the two. While grassroots groups see themselves on the front-line, "where the rubber meets the road," as one activist puts it,⁹² the nationals' large size and professionalization are invariably seen by the grassroots as leaving them out of touch and far too eager to compromise and accomodate. "National lobbyists think in terms of political reality and quiet sacrifice," observes one activist, while "grassroots exclaim ecological imperatives to the grave."⁹³ Thus, in the Siskiyou and the larger old growth issue the grassroots, with their more militant and confrontational brand of politics, have come to harbor a certain amount of resentment towards the national groups who, they fear, will eventually "sell them out" as a grassroots activist expresses:

The model for conservation politics through the 1970s and 1980s was this: Grassroots mobilizes around an issue which nationals won't touch; grassroots gets beaten to hell by agencies and media; nationals come in to gain members off controversy; nationals cut a deal in D.C. without grassroots input.⁹⁴

In some ways, though, the old growth issue broke this pattern in that the grassroots groups have remained an active and potent force even after the national groups jumped aboard the issue in the mid-to-late 1980s. From Bald Mountain to 1988, claims the same activist, "everything was

⁹² Kriz, 1827.

⁹³ Mitchell Friedman, "Ancient Forests: The Perpetual Crisis" *Wild Earth* 1:2 (Summer 1991), 32.

⁹⁴ *Ibid.* 31.

going as usual....except the grassroots never let go."⁹⁵ For example, when the Sierra Club and the Wilderness Society tried to move the Vento bill out of committee, this so incensed grassroots groups that they formed the Western Ancient Forest Campaign (WAFC) to establish their own D.C. office; a move that the Wilderness Society is reported to have strongly pressured potentially supportive foundations to prevent.⁹⁶ As a result of WAFC, the grassroots managed to offset some of the nationals' Washington D.C. influence by establishing close ties to a number of congressmen including Jontz and Miller. Thus, the nationals have found themselves having to share power within the environmental movement.

The effects of this friction, though, are not all negative for mainstream national environmentalists. Grassroots expand the scope of the debate with their bolder policy demands, thereby making the positions of the nationals seem more reasonable to policymakers by comparison. This expanded realm of possibility may even safely allow nationals to adopt the tougher stances which they truly favor but previously felt were politically unrealistic. This indirect level of grassroots influence is pointed out by Ingram and Mann:

While such groups [militant grassroots] are small and outside the mainstream, their significance should not

⁹⁵ *Ibid.* 32.

⁹⁶ *Ibid.* Grassroots activists accuse the Sierra Club and the Wilderness Society as being the groups most willing to accommodate and compromise. The National Audubon Society and the National Wildlife Federation usually get higher marks from the grassroots, at least on old growth.

be discounted. Through their actions, difficult issues may get placed on the environmental agenda that would be otherwise ignored. Further, their vocal criticisms of compromise probably restrain the leaders of main-line groups from the appearance of excessive moderation.⁹⁷

To paint a picture of grassroots-national relations in the Siskiyou as being strictly antagonistic, however, would be seriously misleading. Along with intergroup rivalry and conflict has been as much or more close cooperation and coordination. In some instances, national groups, especially the National Audubon Society and the National Wildlife Federation, have outright sponsored grassroots efforts, providing technical assistance, airplane tickets (for grassroots activists to testify at D.C. hearings), and funding for local activities and projects.⁹⁸

Thus, despite their uncompromising battle cries, grassroots organizations, at least in the old growth issue, have inevitably found themselves drawn together with the nationals into a rough symbiosis of sorts with the nationals depending on the grassroots for local organizing and monitoring and the grassroots relying on the nationals for resources.

⁹⁷ Ingram and Mann, 154.

⁹⁸ One of the most successful of these was the National Audubon Society's Adopt-A-Forest program which provided funds for local groups to map their nearby national forest in detail and learn the ins and outs of the EIS process in order to allow the close tracking of sales and effective participation in the Forest Service's planning process.

Group Resources

Even if groups seeking diffuse, intangible goods do manage to organize, the critics of pluralism argue, they invariably find themselves seriously outspent and over-matched as their economically-focused opponent's resources will most often far exceed their own. Henning and Mangun argue that not only do economic interests tend to be well-funded, well-staffed, and politically and legally represented by professionals, but they are also heavily favored by tax laws.⁹⁹ Even the pluralist Culhane admits in his study of various local public lands resource battles that, "environmentalists....had organizational resources that were significantly inferior to those of the consumptive user groups."¹⁰⁰

To attempt such a comparison of group resources in the Siskiyou is more difficult than it may seem for two reasons. First, amongst many of the groups involved, there is a lack of directly comparable measures of resource strength. As mentioned before, many of the timber interest participants

⁹⁹ Henning and Mangun, 31-32. While businesses can deduct lobbying expenses from their taxes as a cost of doing business, environmental groups risk losing their tax-exempt status if they use their income for certain types of lobbying which the IRS deems "too political."

¹⁰⁰ Culhane, 168. Culhane suggests, however, that the more focused nature of the environmentalists' goals in his study may have offset some of this disadvantage. This argument, though, as we shall see, can work both ways. To measure group resources, or what he calls "power," Culhane employs four indicators: staff, budget, gross volume of business, and membership.

in the politics of the Siskiyou were individual mills or corporations rather than traditional interest groups with memberships and clearly focused operating budgets. While number of employees and total sales volume do provide some measure of each business's resources and capabilities, such figures are substantially different from and much less focused than the paid staff or annual budget of interest groups.

The other problem standing in the way of a clear comparison of group resources involves groups whose focus and scope extend well beyond the Siskiyou. Groups such as the Northwest Forest Resource Council or Boise Cascade or the Wilderness Society, while directly involved in the politics of the Siskiyou, were also heavily involved in many other conflicts and issues throughout the Northwest or even the country. Thus, while these groups may possess substantial organizational resources, only a small fraction of that is likely to have been expended directly on the Siskiyou issue. On the other hand, groups like SOTIA or Headwaters that focused only on southwest Oregon would likely spend a much larger portion of their resources on the Siskiyou. Still more narrowly focused would be Siskiyou-wide or watershed groups which could be expected to target the entirety of their resources upon the Siskiyou.

Despite these constraints it is still possible to gain some sense of the capacities of the groups involved. One way

around this methodological thicket, as Culhane demonstrates, is to restrict comparisons to like-sized groups.¹⁰¹ Tables 4 and 5 each compare mean resources based on staff, membership, and budget for local and state/regional groups. What such comparisons show is that at both the local and state and regional¹⁰² levels as well as a combination of the two (table 6), timber group staff size and budgets exceeded those of their environmental counterparts.¹⁰³

Left out of this comparison have been the national environmental groups directly involved in the Siskiyou. The problem is that they have no direct timber counterpart since no national timber interest groups, despite being heavily and influentially involved in the larger old growth controversy, met the criteria necessary to be considered direct participants in the Siskiyou conflict (see appendix D, p.1). With an average staff of 272, mean membership nearing two

¹⁰¹ Culhane, 372.

¹⁰² Regional in this respect refers to *interstate* such as the Pacific Northwest region rather than *intrastate* such the southwestern region of Oregon.

¹⁰³ The one exception to this would be for the mean budget of state/regional groups if the Western Wood Products Association's budget is not factored in. As what may be considered a *mega-regional* group whose focus is the entire western United States rather than just the Pacific Northwest, WWPA's scope and size are considerably larger than any other state/regional group in the study. If one excludes the group's considerable budget, the state/regional timber group budget mean drops from \$1,182,667 to \$419,200 as compared to the environmentalists' \$534,750. See table 5. It is also important to note that the individual membership mean for local and state/regional timber groups was calculated with an N of only two, while for the local timber group budget mean, the N was only three.

million, and an average budget of over thirty million dollars, these national groups, as shown in table 7, cannot be ignored. Still, it is necessary to keep these figures in perspective and note once again that only a fraction of these groups' resources went towards the old growth issue and an even smaller percentage of that went directly to the Siskiyou conflict.

Within just the Siskiyou, perhaps the most comparable timber interest participants to the national environmental groups (in terms of size and scope) would be the three large national wood products corporations involved locally. Table 8 shows their mean resources. Like the national environmentalists, these companies command substantial resources-- averaging 31,000 employees, annual production of 1.5 billion board feet of timber, and total sales of over six billion dollars (of which Weyerhaeuser and Boise Cascade drew profits of \$601.4 million and \$267.6 million, respectively, in 1989¹⁰⁴). Also like the national environmental groups, only a very small percentage of these figure could be said to have been applied to the Siskiyou controversy.

Smaller mills were also major players in the Siskiyou, perhaps even more so than local timber interest groups. Their mean resources are also shown in table 8. Although they have no formal membership, staff, or operating budgets,

¹⁰⁴ Figures from chart in "Forests in Distress" special report, *Oregonian* (16 September 1990).

their average workforce of 440 employees, \$79 million in annual sales, and 83 million board feet of lumber production¹⁰⁵ (most of which emanating from public land) has assured them a resource base and an overall capacity to participate quite effectively.

Regardless of which side they were on, local groups (excluding businesses) tended to be, not surprisingly, the most resource-poor, while the nationals were the most well-endowed. As table 9 shows, all of the poorest groups were local and nearly 60% of the local groups measured were in this lowest budget category (<\$10,000). On the other hand, five of the six groups in the highest category (>\$1,000,000) were national (all the nationals measured fell into this category). State/regional groups, meanwhile, mostly populated the middle categories. The figures also show that environmental groups accounted for the bulk of both the poorest and richest groups (the latter is partly attributable to the fact there were no national timber groups) while two-thirds of all timber groups fell in the mid-high range (\$100,001-\$1 million).

Regarding levels of participation, table 10 shows the groups more closely involved in the Siskiyou to be fairly evenly split between the low and mid-level budget categor-

¹⁰⁵ These figure include the local divisions of Boise Cascade and Stone Forest Industries. These mills are of roughly equal size and operate similarly to the independents in the area.

TABLE 4
MEAN LOCAL INTEREST GROUP RESOURCES

	<u>Environmentalists</u>	<u>Timber</u>
Paid Staff	1.2	3.5
Individual Membership ¹	355 ⁴	2,805
Group Membership ²	-	119
Budget (in dollars) ³	24,078	123,667
<u>Category N</u>	<u>9⁵</u>	<u>4⁶</u>

¹Rounded off to the nearest member.

²See above.

³Rounded off to nearest dollar.

⁴Because the Siskiyou Regional Education Project/Action Project considers a large mailing list network and not formal duespayers as its membership, they were not included in this calculation as it would skew the figures. If SREP/SAP is included, the mean individual membership would be 2,538.

⁵For individual membership, N=8.

⁶For individual membership, N=2; group membership, N=2; budget, N=3.

TABLE 5
MEAN STATE AND REGIONAL INTEREST GROUP RESOURCES

	Environmentalists	Timber	Timber without WWPA ¹
Paid Staff	7.2	27.8	9.8
Individual Membership	5530.0	-	-
Group Membership	-	219 ²	203
Budget (in dollars)	534,750	1,182,667 ³	419,200
Category N	5 ⁴	7 ⁵	6 ⁶

¹The Western Wood Products Association is a group that, while not national, is far larger in size and scope than any other state/regional group. Since it may be seen as skewing the statistics, this additional category is provided.

²This figure does not include the Northwest Forest Resource Council which has other trade associations as members.

³The only data available for WWPA is that their budget is in the "above \$5 million" range. The mean budget is calculated using a budget figure of \$5,000,000. In actuality, however, WWPA's budget might very likely be a good deal higher.

⁴For budget, N=4.

⁵For staff, N=5; groups membership and budget, N=6.

⁶For staff, N=4; group membership and budget, N=5.

TABLE 6

MEAN LOCAL, STATE/REGIONAL INTEREST GROUP RESOURCES

	Environmentalists	Timber	Timber without WWPA ¹
Paid Staff	3.4	16.2	5.8
Individual Membership	2,345 ²	2,805	2,805
Group Membership	38	194	179
Budget (in dollars)	181,208	829,667	302,125
Category N	14 ³	11 ⁴	10 ⁵

¹See note 1, table 5.

²This does not include the SREP/SAP (see note 4, table 4). If they are included, mean individual membership is 3,606.

³For grp membership, N=2; indiv membership and budget, N=3.

⁴For indiv membership, N=2; grp membership, N=8; staff and budget, N=9.

⁵For indiv. membership, N=2; grp. membership, N=7; staff and budget, N=8.

TABLE 7
MEAN NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL GROUP RESOURCES

Paid Staff	271.6
Individual Membership	1,720,500
Budget (in dollars)	30,640,000
N	5 ¹

¹The national Earth First movement was deleted from this calculation since its membership is quite ad hoc and informal and its budget and staff information is missing.

TABLE 8

MEAN EMPLOYEES, SALES, AND ANNUAL PRODUCTION OF FOREST
PRODUCTS COMPANIES

	<u>Local Businesses¹</u>	<u>National Corporations</u>
Employees	440	31,010
Annual Total Sales ² (in millions of \$)	79	6,190
Annual Lumber Production ³ (in mmbf)	83	1,532
<u>Category N</u>	<u>11⁴</u>	<u>3</u>

¹Includes two local mills which comprise divisions of large national corporations.

²Rounded off to the nearest dollar.

³Rounded off to the nearest dollar.

⁴For sales, N=9; employees and production, N=10.

TABLE 9

PERCENTAGE OF INTEREST GROUPS BY TYPE/SCOPE ACCORDING TO BUDGET.

Interest Group Type/Scope	Budget			
	under \$10,000	\$10,000- 100,000	\$100,001- 1,000,000	over \$1,000,000
Local Interest Groups n=12	58.3 (7)	25.0 (3)	16.7 (2)	0 0
State Interest Groups n=10	0 0	20.0 (2)	70.0 (7)	10.0 (1)
Natl. Interest Groups n=5	0 0	0 0	0 0	100.0 (5)
Total Enviro. Groups n=18	33.3 (6)	22.2 (4)	16.7 (3)	27.8 (5)
Total Timber Groups n=9	11.1 (1)	11.1 (1)	66.7 (6)	11.1 (1)

TABLE 10

PERCENTAGE OF INTEREST GROUPS BY LEVEL OF PARTICIPATION ACCORDING TO BUDGET

Level of Participation ¹	Budget			
	under \$10,000	\$10,000- 100,000	\$100,001- \$1,000,000	over \$1,000,000
1 n=15	26.7 (4)	33.3 (5)	33.3 (5)	6.7 (1)
2 n=12	25.0 (3)	0 0	33.3 (4)	41.7 (5)

¹For an explanation of this variable, see table 1 or appendix D.

ies, while the wealthier groups were far less likely to be heavy participants. These findings, though, probably have far more to do with the nature of this specific case with its high levels of grassroots organization than with any general tendency of well-endowed groups to participate less.

Taken as whole, a comparison of the resources of the groups involved in the Siskiyou case, however imperfect, does make two observations fairly clear. First, it can be said with some confidence that the timber interests could marshal superior resources, but not by an overwhelming margin. Both locally and state and regionally, timber groups maintained an edge and adding nearly a dozen local mills into the equation would probably only strengthen that edge. While not directly comparable, one has to wonder whether or not local companies averaging \$79 million in sales could bring more resources to bear than local groups with a mean budget of less than \$25,000.

Although outside the scope of this study's quantitative comparisons, one has to consider as well the influence of national timber groups and other large wood products corporations¹⁰⁶ upon the larger old growth issue. While the average annual budget of a national timber interest group is probably roughly similar to that of most national environ-

¹⁰⁶ Corporations would include International Paper, Georgia Pacific, Louisiana Pacific, and Plum Creek, to name a few. Some of the more noteworthy national timber interest groups are listed in appendix C.

mental groups, timber's cause nationally has been bolstered by the additional resources of large, politically active corporations. In addition, one must consider, once again, that most environmental groups' budgets are spread thin across a whole range of issues from air and water pollution to ozone depletion to public lands policy. Timber interests, on the other hand, can narrow in upon only one aspect of environmental policy--timber issues. One indicator of timber's advantage on a national level could be seen in PAC expenditures. Table 11 offers an overview of relevant PAC donations for the five election-year cycles from 1977 to 1988. In the 1987-1988 election cycle, for instance, Forest and paper product industry PACs outspent environmental PACs by a ratio of nearly three to one.¹⁰⁷

The second observation made evident from this study's examination of comparative resources is that environmental groups, although at some disadvantage, still have had access to resources adequate to make themselves an effective countervailing force in this policy conflict. At all levels of the old growth issue, environmental groups, even if strapped for cash, as local groups have certainly been, have usually had at least enough resources to make themselves a vocal and

¹⁰⁷ In 1987-1988 Forestry and paper products industry PACs dispensed with a total of \$1,308,318 as opposed to the three environmentalist PACs' combined \$459,951 expenditure. Larry Makinson, *Open Secrets: The Dollar Power of PACs in Congress* (Washington D.C.: CQ Press, 1990). It should also be noted that the environmental PACs have a broader focus--all environmental issues--than do the forest and paper PACs.

TABLE 11

FOREST AND PAPER PRODUCTS INDUSTRY AND ENVIRONMENTAL
PAC EXPENDITURES IN THOUSANDS OF DOLLARS BY ELECTION
YEAR 1977-1988.¹

	<u>87-88</u>	<u>85-86</u>	<u>83-84</u>	<u>81-82</u>	<u>79-80</u>	<u>77-78</u>
Boise Cascade	83.8	77.9	50.1	96.1	96.8	47.7
Georgia-Pacific	99.1	83.9	93.0	104.2	107.2	86.3
NFPA ²	81.4	74.6	64.8	91.4	81.1	60.3
Weyerhaeuser I	63.3	96.4	62.3	70.1	89.9	59.5
Weyerhaeuser II ³	36.2	24.5	29.4	31.0	32.1	18.2
Louisiana-Pacific	33.9	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Stone Container	80.8	14.4	16.1	9.5	6.6	-
Internatl. Paper	139.2	106.6	98.4	141.5	163.8	173.1
Westvaco	208.5	143.2	124.0	129.0	129.3	40.0
Mead	68.3	59.2	57.9	70.4	60.6	37.9
Potlatch	37.8	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Kimberly-Clark	36.1	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Scott	47.0	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Sierra Club	292.2	250.0	254.4	231.1	-	-
Environmental Action	38.1	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
LCV ⁴	89.4	93.8	185.9	137.0	3.4	.2

¹All figures rounded off to the nearest hundred. The sources for this table are: Edward Zuckerman, *Almanac of Federal PACs: 1990* (Washington D.C.: Amward Publications, Inc., 1990); Larry Makinson, *Open Secrets: The Dollar Power of PACs in Congress* (Washington D.C.: CQ Press, 1990).

²National Forest Products Association.

³Weyerhaeuser Corporation has two separate political action committees.

⁴League of Conservation Voters.

relatively effective presence. Thus, even if they were outspent, the worst-case scenario painted by the critics of pluralism whereby marginal or purposively-oriented groups stay latent or completely ineffective due their resource inferiority cannot be said to apply in the case of the Siskiyou.

Group Tactics

As important as how much money a group has is how they put it to use. In the Siskiyou, both the environmentalists and timber interests demonstrated quite a bit of flexibility regarding the tactics they employed which ran the gamut from dramatic direct action to careful behind-the-scenes research.

Direct action refers to an activity--usually highly symbolic, sometimes controversial, and occasionally illegal --which is outside the realm of standard participation (activities such as voting, attending meetings, negotiating, litigating, and so on) Designed to dramatize and draw attention to a particular policy demand, direct action is usually characterized as the alternative of last resort, used when a group has exhausted all options or has been shut out of the process. In the Siskiyou, environmentalists, mostly affiliated in some way with Earth First, relied quite heavily upon direct action and civil disobedience, especially in the North Kalmiopsis from 1983-1987 and during the Silver sal-

vage in 1988. Such confrontational strategies had mixed results. While direct actions alienated many people in the local community, they did gain considerable media attention which not only nudged certain issues towards the forefront, but also caught the attention (much of it sympathetic) of a wider urban audience across the region and even, to a lesser extent, the nation. With its guerrilla theatre and animal costumes and militant slogans,¹⁰⁸ Earth First was guaranteed controversy and as such became a media magnet. But the sensationalism could cut both ways and Earth First was just as frequently hurt by the media's innuendos and relentless hype as it was helped by the attention.

As might be expected, direct actions by environmentalists began to subside in the Siskiyou as their political hand strengthened by 1989 and 1990. With favorable court rulings standing behind them, they could now cite the rule of law rather than dire moral imperatives as their motivation. Not long after, it was, ironically, local timber interests, feeling increasingly desperate, who turned to direct actions including noisy logging truck protests and more frequent demonstrations.¹⁰⁹

¹⁰⁸ Earth First's official slogan "No Compromise in the Defense of Mother Earth" was frequently augmented with the popular battle cry, "No Deal Assholes." In Earth First's lexicon, logging executives are known as *timber beasts*, rangers as *freddies*, the Forest Service's philosophy of multiple use as *multiple abuse*, and the Forest Service itself as either the *Forest Circus* or the *Forest Disservice*.

¹⁰⁹ One incident in particular, as told by a district ranger, showed how the tables had turned regarding direct ac-

Ingram and Mann identify a basic distinction between environmental groups oriented towards confrontation and those dedicated to working within the system.¹¹⁰ What is interesting about the Siskiyou case is that seemingly radical groups and individuals manned blockades one day and participated in a Forest Service planning workshop or met with congressmen the next. At least at the local level, there was a curious integration of mainstream and radical tactics that blur Ingram and Mann's dichotomy.

One strategy which the entire spectrum of groups on either side were sure to rely heavily upon was to engage in campaigns to boost publicity, or what interest groups prefer to call "public education." In fact, for some of the smaller groups without legal staff or lobbyists this was the main focus of their efforts. Larger regional and national groups engaged in their own slicker, better-funded campaigns as well. Both timber and environmental interests produced a deluge of press releases, news conferences, fliers, pamphlets, newsletters, letters to the editor, press kits, newspaper advertisements, and, among more well-endowed groups, even television commercials.¹¹¹

tion. After the children's newsletter of the Target department store in Medford featured an interview with Lou Gold in which he exhorted them to save the forests, a number of pro-timber protestors filled up shopping carts at the store and then left them in the aisles.

¹¹⁰ Ingram and Mann, 143.

¹¹¹ Commercials up to this point have mostly been timber company ads trying to advance a positive image of their industry in general. Although, they have not yet aired their

One element of these public education strategies that has been especially widespread in the Siskiyou conflict has been letter-writing campaigns. Despite the fact that letter-writing, especially form letters, is of "doubtful impact,"¹¹² it figured very prominently in the overall strategies of a number of groups including SOTIA, SORA, and the Siskiyou Regional Education Project. According to Zeigler and Peak, adoption of letter-writing strategies is a good indication that a group is working with limited resources.¹¹³ Nevertheless, most of these groups clung to the notion that that letter-writing was crucial to the success of their objectives. A timber industry newsletter states, "The power of your voice [regarding phone calls] and your pen is a thousand times greater than the power of a logging truck."¹¹⁴ Headwaters, meanwhile, assured members that "your phones, letters, suggestions, and votes will make a difference!"¹¹⁵ As a result, the Siskiyou National Forest was deluged with an unprecedented tens of thousands of letters concerning major issues such as the Forest Plan and the Silver salvage. These proved, according to the former supervis-

own television commercials, environmentalists have gotten their anti-logging message across through episodes of various television series including *L.A. Law*, *the Simpsons*, and *Harry and the Hendersons*.

¹¹² See Zeigler and Peak, 153.

¹¹³ *Ibid.*

¹¹⁴ *Yellow Ribbon Express* (5 June 1989), 4.

¹¹⁵ *Headwaters* (Late Summer 1991), 8.

or, to be the highest rates of mail comments ever registered for a unit in the National Forest system.

A more low key strategy, employed mostly by local and a few state/regional environmental groups, involved closely tracking and monitoring Forest Service activities, especially timber sales and roadbuilding. Given Forest Service procedure as well as the sheer size of the Siskiyou and its timber program, this could prove to be an amazingly complex and tedious task. Although it is, for the most part, unglamorous drudgery, close and accurate tracking and monitoring have proven to be absolutely essential in providing groups their "eyes and ears" on the ground; without it participants, including legislators and sometimes even the bureaucrats themselves would essentially be blind as to what is actually transpiring in the forests. This, in turn, allows for far more effective participation, litigation, and lobbying efforts. For environmentalists, this has been, therefore, a very wise investment of resources.¹¹⁶

While lobbying has also been a widely employed tactic, the opportunity to effectively engage in it has been far from universal. Many groups in the Siskiyou have lobbied in some way or another, but only certain groups have been well-placed enough to be able to reach key decisionmakers, espe-

¹¹⁶ This is a fact not lost on the National Audubon Society whose old growth effort centers, in part, around its ambitious "Adopt-A-Forest" program of local tracking and mapping.

cially at higher administrative levels. Local groups have tended to lobby local bureaucratic officials and, perhaps, local congressmen or state officials. Local timber interests also lobbied county and municipal governments in search of support and alliances. Only through their affiliations with larger groups such as the Western Ancient Forest Campaign or the Western Forest Industries Association, did local groups get a chance to lobby in Washington D.C.. National environmental and timber groups, on the other hand, had much more well-developed and professional lobbying operations with established lines of access to various congressional and administrative sources. Timber interests have been especially successful in this respect, gaining the close and consistent support of a number of key congressmen, Bush Administration personnel, and Agriculture Department officials.

Another very crucial strategy in the Siskiyou has been the use of litigation. While this tactic in general has been, according to Ingram and Mann, of highly variable effectiveness for environmentalists, in the Siskiyou and the larger old growth issue, it has been the central pillar of their campaign. Although it has the potential to be a very costly course to pursue, in the old growth issue it has actually been used quite cost-effectively, at least given the results. Much of the legal work has been done by highly skilled, low paid staff attorneys who have managed to win major, pivotal victories. These legal victories and the

various policy crises they have provoked, according to one activist, are the only things that have forced policymakers to respond to the environmentalists. No amount of lobbying or educational efforts have come close to the results gained from litigation. Conversely, timber, while also attempting to use the legal weapon, has met with little success.

One of the reasons for the environmentalists' legal success has been a technical mastery of public lands and forestry issues gained by an effective research strategy. Ingram and Mann suggest that another basic distinction between environmental groups is based upon whether they engage in science or activism.¹¹⁷ Once again, many groups in the Siskiyou completely blurred this distinction. Groups like Headwaters, while in the thick of the political action, also conducted extensive research and developed enough technical expertise in forestry issues to prompt the House Agriculture Committee to request research of theirs. They and other groups such as the Public Forestry Foundation gained a great deal of respect for this technical mastery. National groups also conducted or underwrote much research as well. Even Earth First would send out press releases that were often filled with detailed facts, figures, and quantitative analyses.

For environmentalists, the payoffs from this research have been enormous. Active research has provided a great

¹¹⁷ Ingram and Mann, 143.

deal of information that otherwise would be unavailable whether due to purposeful neglect or bureaucratic budget constraints. For example, environmentalists in the Siskiyou and elsewhere have provided courts and congressmen with previously undisclosed or unknown information, much of it very damning to the Forest Service, regarding reforestation failures, the actual extent of old growth loss, and the breeding locations and condition of spotted owl populations. Effective research, therefore, has not only led to a certain legal and scientific edge, but also to increased credibility within policy circles.

Tables 12, 13, and 14 break down individual activities according to a number of variables. According to table 12, what is found is that amongst all groups, lobbying is the most common activity closely followed by monitoring and education/public relations. A little over half of the participants engaged in litigation, two-fifths conducted research, and only a few had PACs. Businesses were more likely than interest groups to have PACS, while interest groups engaged in far more education. Both types of groups monitored and lobbied in roughly similar proportions. In terms of political orientation, environmental groups had a slightly greater tendency than timber to do research, were twice as likely to litigate, and were equally disposed towards monitoring. On the other hand, nearly all timber groups (94.4%) lobbied as opposed to three-quarters of environmental

TABLE 12

PERCENTAGE OF INTEREST GROUPS BY TYPE/SCOPE ENGAGED IN
SELECTED ACTIVITIES

<u>Type/Scope</u>	Activities ¹					
	<u>m</u>	<u>lt</u>	<u>e</u>	<u>lb</u>	<u>r</u>	<u>p</u>
Total n=38	78.9 (30)	52.6 (20)	73.7 (28)	84.2 (32)	39.5 (15)	7.9 (3)
Local Interest Groups n=13	92.3 (12)	53.8 (7)	92.3 (12)	84.6 (11)	53.8 (7)	0 (0)
State Interest Groups n=10	90.0 (9)	60.0 (6)	100.0 (10)	100.0 (10)	60.0 (6)	10.0 (1)
Natl. Interest Groups n=6	33.3 (2)	83.3 (5)	100.0 (6)	50.0 (3)	33.3 (2)	0 (0)
Total Enviro. Groups n=20	80.0 (16)	70.0 (14)	100.0 (20)	75.0 (15)	45.0 (9)	0 (0)
Total Timber Groups ² n=18	77.8 (14)	33.3 (6)	44.4 (8)	94.4 (17)	33.3 (6)	16.7 (3)
Total Interest Groups n=29	79.3 (23)	62.1 (18)	96.6 (28)	82.8 (24)	51.7 (15)	3.4 (1)
Total Business Groups n=9	77.8 (7)	22.2 (2)	0 (0)	88.9 (8)	0 (0)	22.2 (2)

¹For an explanation of this variable, see table 1 or appendix D.

²Excludes businesses.

TABLE 13

PERCENTAGE OF INTEREST GROUPS BY LEVEL OF PARTICIPATION ENGAGED IN SELECTED ACTIVITIES

Level of Participation ²	Activities ¹					
	m	lt	e	lb	r	p
1 n=17	94.1 (16)	64.7 (11)	100.0 (17)	88.2 (15)	64.7 (11)	0 0
2 n=12	58.3 (7)	58.3 (7)	91.7 (11)	75.5 (9)	33.3 (4)	8.3 (1)

¹For an explanation of this variable, see table 1 or appendix D

²Excludes businesses. For an explanation of this variable, see table 1 or appendix D.

TABLE 14

PERCENTAGE OF INTEREST GROUPS BY BUDGET ENGAGED IN SELECTED ACTIVITIES

Budget ²	Activities ¹					
	m	lt	e	lb	r	p
<\$10,000 n=7	85.7 (6)	57.1 (4)	85.7 (6)	57.1 (4)	28.6 (2)	0 0
\$10,000-\$100,000 n=5	100.0 (5)	40.0 (2)	100.0 (5)	100.0 (5)	60.0 (3)	0 0
\$100,001-\$1,000,000 n=8	100.0 (5)	75.0 (6)	100.0 (8)	100.0 (8)	75.0 (6)	12.5 (1)
>\$1,000,000 n=5	40.0 (2)	100.0 (5)	100.0 (5)	60.0 (3)	40.0 (2)	0 0

¹For an explanation of this variable, see table 1 or appendix D.

²Annual budget, see table 1.

groups.¹¹⁸ Meanwhile, if one looks at activities in light of levels of participation, as is shown in table 13, what is found is that monitoring and research are the hallmarks of a heavily involved group, while both categories are equally likely to engage in lobbying, education, and litigation.

Looking at the differences according to groups' scope (excluding businesses) in table 12, one finds local and state/regional groups extremely likely to be engaged in the essentially localized activity of monitoring whereas only a third of national groups monitored in this case. Likewise, all state/regional and 85% of local groups lobbied on behalf of Siskiyou issues as compared to only half of the nationals. Nationals were also less likely to conduct research. What the national groups were more likely to be doing was to be involved in litigation (83.3%), although more than half of the local and state/regional groups did as well. All groups, meanwhile, were heavily involved in education/public relations efforts. Regarding national groups, it is important to note that some of these differences may be due less to the nature of national groups themselves than to the fact that in this particular case, they tended to be less heavily

¹¹⁸ Some of the differences between environmentalists and timber interests might be attributable to the fact that businesses, all of which were in the timber camp, are by nature less all-purpose than interest groups when it comes to political activity and thus the figures for timber's activities may be skewed a bit towards a narrower range.

involved and hence engaged in a narrower range of activities than they might otherwise have been.

Finally, the question of how resources affected activities must be considered. According to table 14, the poorest groups engaged in a good deal less litigation, lobbying, and research than other groups, concentrating more frequently upon education and monitoring, activities which, if necessary, can be conducted on a shoestring. Groups with annual budgets in the low-middle range (10,001-100,000), on the other hand, engaged in more costly activities nearly as frequently as wealthier groups, a fact which suggests that some sort of minimum threshold may exist for broad-scale participation.

The Less-Quantifiable Aspects of Group Competition

Truman bases his study of interest group influence on the assumption that the variables of group power are, in fact, identifiable and quantifiably measurable.¹¹⁹ Many years earlier, however, Bentley warned students of interest groups that group influence resulted from activities that could not always be precisely defined or measured.¹²⁰ This study works from the assumption that there is some value in Bentley's characterization. While a group's material resources and the personnel, publicity, research,

¹¹⁹ Culhane discusses this in *Public Lands Politics*, 311.

¹²⁰ Arthur Bentley, *The Process of Government* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1908), 214-215.

or litigation these resources can appropriate are certainly crucial factors and demanding of close attention, they nevertheless have their limitations. There are other, less tangible and more difficult to quantify, but no less important variables which Truman's or Culhane's measures cannot capture. Such factors as communication strategies, the dynamics of public opinion, the role of culture and values, group intensity, and the peculiar quality of the case itself all can influence the outcome just as surely.

One way to examine the impact that at least some of these variables have had upon the Siskiyou conflict and thereby achieve a fuller analysis of group organization and competition would be to employ Cobb and Elder's framework. Such an analysis would serve not as an alternative, but instead as a complement to the previous analysis in this chapter. Central to Cobb and Elder's model of agenda-building is the question of how effectively a group either expands or contains a policy conflict.¹²¹ When an issue expands, according to Cobb and Elder, it moves beyond the original disputants involved in the first manifestation of the conflict (such as Earth First, the ONRC, or SORA) to encompass other, broader sectors of the public.¹²² Specifically, an issue is

¹²¹ Cobb and Elder, *Participation in American Politics*, 105-111.

¹²² More specifically, Cobb and Elder identify five categories of the public arrayed like concentric circles. First are the original disputants. Their earliest support will tend to come from *identification groups* which are very sympathetic and fairly close natural allies (i.e. other envi-

expanded when people in one of these broader publics become aware of the issue and subsequently develop either a positive or negative disposition regarding it.¹²³ The opposite of expansion, containment, would occur when a group restricts an issue so that it cannot break outside of its original boundaries.

Whether an issue expands or is contained, according to Cobb and Elder, depends upon a number of factors which are related to the characteristics of that particular issue. The role of an interest group is to maximize or minimize the impact of these various factors by defining and redefining the policy conflict to their advantage. This is primarily achieved, they argue, through effective symbolic communication and skillful strategizing.

Issue Breadth

The first characteristic determining issue expansion that Cobb and Elder identify is issue breadth and concreteness. Issues that are broad and fairly ambiguous, rather than narrow and concrete, they argue, are more likely to

ronmental groups, timber workers, etc.) The next realm an issue expands into is that of the *issue public*, individuals or groups who tend to pay attention to the particular sphere of concern in question or have related concerns. The *attentive public* is that tenth or so of the public that keeps closely abreast of and is interested in public affairs. Finally, there is the *general public* which only the most generalized and symbolic issues can penetrate. Cobb and Elder, *Participation in American Politics*, 105-108.

¹²³ *Ibid.* 111. Awareness, in this case, does not necessarily imply detailed knowledge, something only the mostly closely involved participants will have.

expand.¹²⁴ This is because such issues have the slack and flexibility to be defined and redefined in a number of ways to a number of audiences as the need arises. Conversely, narrow, concrete issues are more easily typecast as being of no concern except to a small, specialized audience.

Naturally, it was the environmentalists' strategy to try to expand the issue at every turn since they were the group seeking to change the status quo and to do so required intervention by a broader public. The local timber interests, on the other hand, sought to maintain the status quo and continue having, as a Siskiyou district ranger put it, "what they've had in the past." They asked, in the words of the former supervisor, "why should it [Siskiyou forest policy] change? It's fine, it works good, it pays people, we're doing great. Who are these latecomers who want to make it something else?"

Accordingly, timber sought to assure the public that, despite the environmentalists' hysterics, everything was fine down in the woods. Using the scientific methods and technology of modern forestry, claimed timber, healthy forests were being managed into perpetuity.¹²⁵ Focusing on the fact that many seedlings are planted for each tree harvested, they tried to reassure the public that there was noth-

¹²⁴ *Ibid.* 112-116.

¹²⁵ One industry magazine used the phrase *Star Wars Forestry* to refer to this marriage of modern technology and forestry. "Star Wars Forestry" *Evergreen* (February 1989), 4.


ing to worry about. While this message aimed at defusing environmentalist charges has never wavered, the timber interests, nonetheless, found themselves increasingly unable to keep the issue from expanding. They had no choice, therefore, but to play the expansion game themselves, turning to wider audiences to plead their case and try to gain the edge in defining the issues.

The central goal of either side's efforts toward issue expansion has been to gain as many allies and sympathizers as possible. Not surprisingly, what initially began as an focused conflict over various roads and timber sales in limited area came to be continually redefined with ever-broader stakes: family and free enterprise or bureaucratic accountability and reform or the prevention of global environmental upheaval. Justifications based solely upon local mills' access to a commodity or the vulnerability of a particular salmon spawning stream or the beauty and biodiversity of the North Kalmiopsis, while of intense concern to closely involved groups, could not alone be expected to propel an issue outside its original limits. Figures 8 and 9 show just how each sides' initial demands mushroomed over time as the issues came to be redefined in a way which widened their boundaries.

The environmentalists' case proved broad and flexible enough to allow the expansion and merger of the battle over roadless areas in the Siskiyou into a wide range of auxil-

Figure 8
Expansion of Issues and Demands


Timber Interests -



1983-1987

1988-1992

Environmentalist -



iary issues including old growth, salmon streams, water quality, erosion, the spotted owl, the Siskiyou National Park proposal, rights to judicial review, Forest Service reform, forest resource economics, biodiversity, and global warming. As the issues diversified, they also began to reach larger audiences, whether through Lou Gold's coast-to-coast lecture circuit, coordination with national groups, or the increased media coverage that both resulted from and fed further issue expansion.¹²⁶

The timber interests likewise began to redefine what originally for them had been the protection of their access to a local timber supply. Again, through coordination with regional and national groups, increased media coverage, and aggressive public outreach, timber's approach to the issue enlarged to include campaigns to protect family and community and assure adequate funding for local governments. More broadly (and nationally), their efforts soon evolved into campaigns to avert a nationwide timber famine and turn back

¹²⁶ Evidence of this successful issue expansion could be seen by the fact that the state of Illinois, rather than neighboring Washington or California accounted for the second-highest number of comments to the Siskiyou Forest Plan. There was also the 1990 case of a Long Island, NY Audubon chapter appealing the Homestead timber sale in the northern Siskiyou. USDA Forest Service, Pacific Northwest Region, Siskiyou National Forest, *Land and Resource Management Plan Final Environmental Impact Statement Appendices Volume II* (Region 10: GPO, 1989), sec. KA, 3; Paul Fattig, "New Yorkers Hope to Stop Siskiyou Sale" *Grants Pass Daily Courier* (19 May 1990).

the anti-property rights, anti-progress threat of preservationism and the laws which bolster it.

Thus, timber's new strategy was to actively reach out to a wider audience with its expanded message rather than merely react to environmentalist charges. During the thick of the Silver Fire controversy, for instance, an activist with the North West Timber Association walked the 150 miles from Eugene to Grants Pass to call attention to what he saw as the role of preservationism in creating the homeless problem. The theme "Salvaging Timber to Salvage Lives" was used to argue that the timber salvaged from the fire could build 100,000 starter homes. Referring to the efforts of the environmentalists' congressional ally Sidney Yates (D-IL) to prevent Silver roadbuilding, the activist wondered "what homeless people in Chicago would say about this."¹²⁷

In their efforts to achieve issue expansion both sides also strived to enlist allies amongst groups representing other sectors of society. For instance, environmentalists in the Elk River watershed, warning of certain damage to extremely productive salmon fisheries, aligned themselves with groups representing commercial fishermen and processors.¹²⁸ The timber industry, meanwhile, not only sought alliances with fellow public lands commodity-users such as mining, ranching, and oil interests, but with labor as well.

¹²⁷ *Evergreen* (August 1988).

¹²⁸ Jeff Muiderman and Carolyn Moran, "Part of the Solution" *Talking Leaves* (Eugene, OR: September 1991), 12.

Consequently, it was a much-touted labor-industry coalition formed by several carpenter/woodworkers unions with the AFL-CIO's blessing, which sponsored the major pro-logging legislation in the 1991 session of Congress. Recognizing the significance of labor's pro-timber stance, environmentalists, mostly at the grassroots, have long attempted to counteract it by endorsing various retraining, worker compensation, and economic development programs as well as export bans to offset job losses.¹²⁹

Allies were also found in other, sometimes unlikely places. When the Section 318 rider banning judicial review was passed, the civil liberties group People For the American Way jumped into the fray issuing a press release denouncing what they saw as an obstruction of citizens' rights to judicial access. Meanwhile, when the drug Taxol, which at the time could only be extracted from the bark of the old growth-specific Pacific Yew, was found to have powerful cancer-fighting properties, the American Cancer Society promptly issued a statement decrying the destruction of old growth forests.

Issue Significance

In addition to being broad and ambiguous enough, issues in Cobb and Elder's model must also be perceived by

¹²⁹ Earth First activists in northern California (the same activists whose car was bombed) went as far in their attempt to gain labor allies as to jointly form an IWW chapter with a number of local loggers.

their target public as significant and salient if they are to expand.¹³⁰ Despite whatever objective importance they may have, issues such as water quality in the Shasta Costa basin or a steady timber supply for the mills in the Illinois Valley would simply not prompt much concern outside of a mostly local audience. Consequently, making the old growth conflict salient to a wider public required the groups involved to present their cases in the boldest, most dire, and most personal terms possible.

For the timber interests, this meant characterizing the environmentalist challenge as a threat to economic growth, free enterprise, and even human progress. This "lockup" of resources, it was argued, would eventually impact upon all Americans' lives through housing shortages, far more expensive wood and paper products, and a general decline in the standard of living. "We have to be a productive nation," implored one Grants Pass mill executive.

The environmentalists' campaign also attempted to make the issue more salient by linking the health of the forest to the well-being of all people. The strategy was to make the issue as personally threatening as possible, warning of a bleak future if the logging, which was repeatedly compared to (and described as progressing faster than) the devastating deforestation of the Amazon, continued. "Deforestation

¹³⁰ Cobb and Elder, *Participation in American Politics*, 116-117.

and global warming start here" warned a Headwaters advertisement with an accompanying photograph of a Siskiyou clearcut in progress.¹³¹ Other appeals described the importance of the forest's genetic biodiversity as a storehouse of potential medicines and other useful products, a point no doubt bolstered by the discovery of the old growth-derived drug Taxol. "Saving this ancestral forest," as one group put it "is a step towards saving ourselves."¹³²

Environmentalists also tried to frame the issue in politically and economically relevant terms as well. By focusing on the cost of taxpayer "subsidies" to the timber industry while the rest of the country suffered through deficit-induced fiscal sacrifice, environmentalists attempted to portray current public forest management policy as one which taxpayers could ill afford. Showing rare confidence in market forces, environmentalists delighted in urging timber interests to embrace the free market and go it alone by logging without government-built roads and other assistance.¹³³

The Time Factor

The factor which Cobb and Elder call *temporal relevance* simply means that issues seen as having more profound long-term implications will tend to expand more readily than

¹³¹ *Headwaters* (March 1990), 16.

¹³² "Saving an American Original" *Audubon Activist Special Report*, (no date, circa winter 1988), 1.

¹³³ An example of this sort of argument can be found in "The U.S. Government Subsidizes Logging on the National Forests" *Forest Voice* 4 (Spring 1991), 5.

those which do not. This commonly engenders the use by interest groups of words like "byproduct" or "fallout"; what Cobb and Elder refer to as *spill-over terms*.¹³⁴ Furthermore, this strategy of calling attention to long-term implications is usually accompanied by reminders that the time to avert such problems is rapidly running out.

According to timber, the chief fallout down the road, besides a hundred thousand unemployed workers and dozens of ghost towns, were tighter and more costly lumber supplies leading eventually to an all-out "famine."¹³⁵ Environmentalists, meanwhile, had their own warnings for the future including the greenhouse effect, imminent extinctions, and an Oregon with neither jobs nor forests. Environmentalists especially exploited the image of dwindling virgin forests falling faster and faster, day after day, month after month until the fateful day when none would be left. Not surprisingly, the image of leaving a legacy for future generations was a powerful theme in environmental rhetoric as evidenced by their frequent use of words such as "heritage," "treasure," and "inheritance." Headwaters proclaimed that "these forests belong to you, your children, and your great-grandchildren,"¹³⁶ while Lou Gold promised to "keep talking

¹³⁴ Cobb and Elder, *Participation in American Politics*, 119.

¹³⁵ Such warnings about the supply of lumber are discussed in Stanley Ziemba, "Owl Dispute Helped Lift Lumber Cost" *Chicago Tribune* (27 June 1991), sec. 1, 1, 18.

¹³⁶ *Headwaters* (Late Summer 1991), 8.

so that your kids never have to hear a story that begins, 'Once upon a time there used to be big trees....' "¹³⁷ "My vision of the good life," he wrote in a pamphlet, "is a peaceful forest full of happy children and big old trees."¹³⁸

Issue Complexity

While it is advantageous for an issue to be broadly defined, it still must be kept fairly simple if it is to expand. In the battle for the public's hearts and minds, overly complex and subtle messages tend to be forgotten or ignored far more readily.¹³⁹ Not surprisingly, in the old growth issue, groups struggled to turn what, in reality, was an extremely complex policy conflict into a simple bipolar case of owls versus man or trees versus jobs or greed versus virtue. If the environmentalists were "tree huggers," then the loggers had to be "tree-muggers."¹⁴⁰

An especially vivid example of the advantage of keeping issues stark and simple could be seen in the Silver Fire episode. The timber interests effectively simplified the issue as being one of burnt timber about to go to waste be-

¹³⁷ Lou Gold quoted in David Fishman, "America's Ancient Forests" *E Magazine* (October 1989).

¹³⁸ Lou Gold, untitled pamphlet, Native Forest Action Council (no date, circa winter 1990).

¹³⁹ Cobb and Elder, *Participation in American Politics*, 120-122.

¹⁴⁰ *Tree hugger* is a very common derisive term in the Northwest for an environmentalist trying to preserve forests. "Tree mugger" is attributable to Andrew Kerr, "ONRC's Legislative Vision" *Wild Oregon* (Summer 1990), 10.

cause of stubborn and selfish radicals with ulterior motives. The environmentalists, on the other hand, for all their effort, could not succeed in similarly simplifying their case which seemingly violated the average person's notion of thrift and common sense. After all, salvaging burnt logs and preventing waste do seem, at least on the surface, very prudent and reasonable things to do. Ecological arguments, whatever their ultimate virtue, were just too complex and subtle, requiring burn intensity charts and stream sedimentation estimates and detailed cost-benefit analyses. All timber had to do, on the other hand, was show photographs of blackened snags and scream "waste!" Similarly, on the national level, timber cut away all the messy layers of multiple factors leading to job-loss such as automation and log exports and proclaimed that the problem was due to nothing other than an owl-caused lockup of timber.

Environmentalists were not always prisoners of issue complexity, though, as they have shown that sometimes they could indeed cut through the intricacies of ecological principles and public lands policy and analyze the issue, as does one activist, in starkly simple terms: "When a four-hundred-year-old tree ends up on some baby's ass, it's an insult to all that's good and right with the world."¹⁴¹ Environmentalists were especially adept at portraying the Sis-

¹⁴¹ Quote in Catherine Caufield, "The Ancient Forest" *New Yorker* (14 May 1990), 79.

kiyou conflict as a David and Goliath struggle with impoverished grassroots citizen-activists defending the public interest against the monolithic timber industry; a special interest which, due to its financial might, could keep corrupt politicians in its vest pocket. Rarely acknowledged in such portrayals was the heterogenous nature of the timber industry or its grassroots support. The Forest Service and the Administration were similarly characterized in fairly black-and-white terms; beholden to timber and ever willing to pervert and break the law to accomodate them.

The Emotional Element

One route to very quick issue expansion is for that issue to be emotionalized in such a way as to elicit powerful affective responses from an audience previously unengaged. The environmentalists have had a number of ready-made symbols to serve in this capacity. Making widespread use of photography, they have taken great advantage of the gruesome visual ugliness inherent to clearcuts.¹⁴² By widely distributing pictures of the jagged, smoking, stump-filled wreckage of a clearcut, often juxataposed with a photo of a beau-

¹⁴² "There is an old political maxim," said Andy Kerr of the ONRC, "that one should witness neither laws nor sausages from being made, lest one loses their taste for them. The same could be said of wood products." In fact, one district ranger on a Northwest forest has compared the visual impact of clearcuts to an atomic blast: "It looks like Alamagordo, as if it's been nuked." Andrew Kerr, "New (Age) Perspectives" *Forest Watch* (October 1990), 23; second quote in Ted Gup "Owls vs. Man" *Time* (25 June 1990), 59.

tifully intact forest, the environmentalists exploited what had to be their most potent symbol for all it was worth.¹⁴³ Timber interests fully recognized their disadvantage in this respect:

In travelling through Oregon, you most likely will see forest land where the timber has been completely removed. This is clearcutting which, although unsightly, represents a scientifically sound technique of Douglas fir tree management....Many people are not exactly happy about the shaggy appearance of a cut over area for the first five to ten years. Even some Oregonians question the desirability of this practice until they become better informed as to the reasons why....¹⁴⁴

Ironically, the timber interests got to turn the tables on the environmentalists in the Silver Fire by exploiting emotionally arousing photographs of the fire's destruction to encourage the salvage operation. Their dramatic pictures of Silver, which showed a charred moonscape of "ash and ruin" were featured in newspaper advertisements and warned of the "radical preservationists'" plans to block any attempt to regenerate the dead and blackened forest.¹⁴⁵

The little spotted owl with its large eyes and almost comically big head also served effectively as a visual symbol capable of evoking widespread sympathy, a fact timber

¹⁴³ Another widely used variation was aerial and even satellite photographs of the perfectly geometric checkerboard fragmentation of vast acreages of forestland.

¹⁴⁴ Oregon State Forestry Department produced in cooperation with the Western Wood Products Association, et. al., *Oregon Trees and Forests*, pamphlet (no date).

¹⁴⁵ Southern Oregon Resource Alliance advertisement in *Medford Mail Tribune* (18 October 1987), sec. A, 12.

also recognized as it offered the following advice to loggers so as not to invite any public relations disasters:

Please don't take your frustrations out on the owl.... messages that degrade the owl.... "If it's hootin', I'm shootin'"....make us look like the rapers [sic] and pillagers the preservationists say we are. Remember, the general public has not made up its mind yet concerning the crisis we face. *Owl bashing lowers us to the same level as tree spikers.*¹⁴⁶

The old growth forest itself, visually the very embodiment of the word *majestic*, was another common visual image in the environmentalists' arsenal. Often shown with near-divine shafts of sunlight pouring down from above and a dwarfed, barely noticeable figure in the foreground for perspective amongst the giant ferns and immense trunks, the ancient forest provided an irresistably powerful and moving image. The language which accompanied such images was also quite emotionally evocative: "priceless," "irreplaceable," "treasured," "magnificent." Attention was also called to the ancient forest's incredible age through references to great historical figures such as Chaucer, King Richard II, or Columbus as having walked the earth as the seedlings of these giants took root.¹⁴⁷

To disrupt such a sacred place, the environmentalists seemed to imply, would simply be blasphemy. Logging the Siskiyou for a few hundred jobs, argued Lou Gold, "would be no

¹⁴⁶ *Yellow Ribbon Express* (5 June 1989), 2.

¹⁴⁷ David Kelly, "The Grove" (excerpt) *Wild Oregon* (Winter 1988-1989, 11; "Saving an American Original" *Audubon Activist Special Report*, (no date, circa winter 1988).

different than trashing a cathedral to get at the candle wax.¹⁴⁸ In order to maintain this image of sacredness, environmentalist language sought to invoke emotionally charged images of wholeness and purity counterposed by that of violence and even rape. The wilderness, in the environmentalists' vocabulary was "virgin," "untrammelled," and "pristine" while logging and roadbuilding would "violate" and "penetrate" the forest leaving it shattered and fragmented.

The timber interests just as readily exploited emotional symbols. Rallying behind their yellow ribbon of solidarity, timber forces focused heavily on the gravely threatened sanctity and continuity of family and community. Under the caption, "Who's endangered?," one pamphlet featured a photograph of a logger, his wife, and his five small daughters. Their heartbreaking vulnerability comes across quite clearly as the pamphlet goes on to warn of rural Oregon becoming another western Appalachia.¹⁴⁹ In terms of eliciting strong emotions, timber's strategy of reducing the conflict to one of people versus owls was another heavily relied-upon device. To prefer the well-being of a bird over human beings was, according to timber, a sure sign of moral decay. "I get real uptight," said one millowner, "when I think they gave

¹⁴⁸ Lou Gold quoted in Timothy Egan, *The Good Rain* (New York: Knopf, 1990), 171.

¹⁴⁹ Oregon Project, *Who's Endangered*, pamphlet (no date).

my ancestors 160 acres for homesteading and they're giving the owl 2,200 acres."¹⁵⁰

Group Legitimacy

Perhaps even more important than how a group presents an issue, argue Cobb and Elder, is whether that group can create an aura of legitimacy around itself while simultaneously discrediting its opponents.¹⁵¹ Success at achieving this, they suggest, can go a long way towards expanding or containing an issue. Helping the timber interests' efforts in this respect was the early prominence of Earth First in the Siskiyou conflict. While Earth First's direct actions did attract much-needed attention outside the Siskiyou, their confrontational behavior, countercultural lifestyles, and general irreverence left them, and by association all environmentalists, quite vulnerable to attack at the local level. While passing themselves off as a "cross-section of Americana," as one official put it, timber interests in the Siskiyou, with rhetoric that strongly resembled the Vietnam debate two decades prior, sought to portray their adversaries as jobless, ill-washed, marijuana-smoking hippies who lived on communes. Such characterizations, coupled with Earth First's own militant tendencies, were quite successful

¹⁵⁰ Quoted in Gup, 61. The quote refers to the minimum amount of territory which the ISC determined that each breeding pair of spotted owls requires.

¹⁵¹ Cobb and Elder, *Participation in American Politics*, 125-127.

in alienating a substantial sector of the local community from the environmentalists.

As the conflict in the Siskiyou intensified, so did the timber interests' assault on the environmentalists' character. "Radical preservationists" (the standard timber term) soon degenerated in pro-timber rhetoric from hippy throwbacks into people-hating fanatics and even terrorists. After a 1987 incident in which a logger in the North Kalmiopsis broke his chainsaw on a tree spike (not long after the serious spike-related injury of a California millworker), timber interests had just the ammunition they needed to brandish environmentalists as terrorists.¹⁵² If not guilty of outright terrorism, then environmentalists were in the least accused of practicing "a brand of mental terrorism"¹⁵³ in pursuit of their "hidden agenda."¹⁵⁴

Part of this hidden agenda, timber revealed, were plans to halt progress in America. This desire to impose a new primitivism upon the land was born, argued timber interests, out of a distinctly anti-humanistic streak in the en-

¹⁵² Phil Manzano, "Old Growth Timber Auctioned Off as Protesters Chant, Beat Drums" *Oregonian* (24 June 1987). Although Earth First had publically renounced tree-spiking, timber nevertheless blamed them for the North Kalmiopsis incident. In retaliation, someone cut a tree occupied by an Earth First tree-sitter at the Lazy Bluff sale one-third of the way through. Although environmentalists were more successfully cast as terroristic, acts of violence or intimidation perpetrated by environmental foes, although mostly scattered and unorganized, were not uncommon.

¹⁵³ Quote in Michael Lemonick, "Showdown in the Treetops" *Time* (28 August 1989).

¹⁵⁴ *Yellow Ribbon Express* (1 May 1989), 1.

vironmentalists. "I do not understand," pondered one Illinois Valley mill executive, "how people who say they care deeply about life and living things could display so little regard for their fellow man."¹⁵⁵ Others in the timber camp, meanwhile, tried to link preservationism and its supposedly collectivist ideology with socialism.¹⁵⁶

In tight-knit local communities, another very effective strategy was to unfailingly characterize environmentalists as meddling outsiders, usually from the dreaded East Coast. According to one logging business owner:

There is a deep resentment of the fact that we are controlled by people on the East Coast; ninety-nine-point-nine percent of them have never been out here, and they're sitting back there and telling us how to live.¹⁵⁷

In the Siskiyou, which saw a huge influx of newcomers since the 1960s, this notion of local matters being interfered with by latecomers or "lawyers from the city"¹⁵⁸ became

¹⁵⁵ Quote in Jim Petersen, "In Search of Excellence: Lew Krauss" *Evergreen* (April 1987).

¹⁵⁶ Baden cited in Short, 92. Perhaps the climax of the timber interests' campaign to discredit Siskiyou environmentalists occurred when SOTIA ran newspaper advertisements (*Grants Pass Daily Courier* 1 October 1987) featuring a reprint of an article by conservative writer Thomas Sowell entitled, "Green Bigots." This wide-ranging and quite vitriolic attack on environmentalism warned of federally protected predators killing small children, accused wetlands of causing disease, and characterized public television nature programs as a "steady diet of propaganda." The ad proved so controversial that the normally pro-timber *Grants Pass Daily Courier* roundly criticized SOTIA in a full-length editorial (6 October 1987). In subsequent ads, even SOTIA tried to distance itself from its own reprint of "Green Bigots."

¹⁵⁷ Quoted in John Mitchell, "Sour Times in Sweet Home" *Audubon* (March 1991), 94.

¹⁵⁸ Egan, 171.

quite a source of resentment for some. It ignored the fact, however, that many environmentalists had roots that went just as deep into the region:

In rural Oregon, preservationists are invariably perceived as urban, white-collared, ignorant of where toilet paper comes from, and eastern. There are no exceptions to the geographical slur, not even for preservationists born, bred, and housebroken in Portland Oregon.¹⁵⁹

A final method of discrediting environmentalists involved portraying them as a small, wealthy, and elite special interest. Such a strategy borrowed heavily from earlier critiques of environmentalism as being primarily an upper-middle class movement to preserve the status quo and prevent the formation of new wealth (that would supposedly benefit the poor).¹⁶⁰ Consequently, timber interests cast environmentalists as a very narrow, but highly organized group which gets their way by playing "tricks with the law."¹⁶¹ "There are a lot more of 'us' than there are of 'them'," claimed one timber official, "But they are well-organized and we are not."¹⁶² By warning of "enemies who want to destroy you"¹⁶³ timber goaded the "sleeping giant" to awak-

¹⁵⁹ Quoted in Mitchell, 91. For instance, the ONRC's Andy Kerr, a fairly militant environmentalist, was born and raised in a small Oregon timber town.

¹⁶⁰ See, for example, William Tucker, *Progress and Privilege: America in the Age of Environmentalism* (Garden City, NY: Anchor Press, 1982).

¹⁶¹ Letter to the Editor, *Grants Pass Daily Courier* (3 October 1987).

¹⁶² *Evergreen* (August 1988).

¹⁶³ Gup, 61.

en.¹⁶⁴ If it did not, timber warned, then the silent majority would continue to be overwhelmed by a noisy radical minority with no real stake in the matter. "It's a living to me"; protested one small mill owner, "it's a hobby to them."¹⁶⁵ This small-time grassroots image served timber interests well in maintaining their legitimacy. Not surprisingly, timber interests all the way up to the largest mega-corporations actively and quite vigorously cultivated such a "down-home" image.

If timber's strategy was to be seen as a broad grassroots front, the environmentalists' goal was to paint them as either greedy, big business interests or else grassroots dupes blinded by these giant corporate concerns into ignoring the real sources of their problems. The environmentalists' main efforts to bolster their own legitimacy, meanwhile, revolved around wrapping themselves in the cloak of good science and good government. In their effort to uphold "law and order"¹⁶⁶ and "stand up and patriotically defend the forest"¹⁶⁷ environmentalists tried to be seen as fighting an arbitrary and lawless abuse of public land management

¹⁶⁴ *Yellow Ribbon Express* (1 May 1989), 1.

¹⁶⁵ Quoted in Caufield, 76.

¹⁶⁶ "Hatfield Riders Fade; Owl Suits Come Alive" *Headwaters* (Late Winter 1991), 9.

¹⁶⁷ "The Crisis Mounts" *Save America's Forests D.C. Update* (March 1992), 2. Save America's Forests played up this patriotic "apple pie" theme quite vigorously adopting as their logo three trees superimposed upon a waving American flag.

guidelines as well as defending the public's right to redress:

Watch out folks! Before you know it, our only handles on Forest Service and other government abuses may be taken from us as ultra-conservatives push us toward authoritarian "democracy." We must insist that our rights as citizens be protected.¹⁶⁸

Far from being the radical and unreasonable militants, then, the environmentalists argued that they represented scientific reason, the rule of law, democratic accountability, and fiscal responsibility regarding taxpayers' money.

Containment Strategies

Cobb and Elder identify a number of ways to contain an issue besides simply working to reverse the expansionary factors previously mentioned. *Symbol co-optation* is an example of one such containment strategy. By co-opting an opponent's symbols, a group can effectively defuse those symbols' potency.¹⁶⁹ Timber interests, for instance, made such an attempt with their frequent terming of themselves as "environmentalists" as well as their association with the symbols of environmentalism such as abundant wildlife, healthy forests, and wise stewardship. It is noteworthy that they, almost without exception, referred to their opponents as preservationists rather than environmentalists.

¹⁶⁸ "Timber Congressmen and Bush Administration Attack Citizen Rights" *Save America's Forests D.C. Update* (March 1992), 4.

¹⁶⁹ Cobb and Elder, *Participation in American Politics*, 128.

While interest groups are often the source of such containment strategies, it is also something that government agencies with their own active interests (in this case the Forest Service) engage in. This is especially true regarding strategies such as tokenism (offering small insubstantial benefits), the offering of symbolic rather than substantive rewards, and the creation of delay and/or additional administrative processes¹⁷⁰ (Forest Service behavior in this respect will be discussed in far more depth in the next chapter).

The Role of Media

One last factor relating to issue expansion/containment is the role of the mass media. As the main vehicle for the dissemination of symbolic information, the media play a significant part in determining if or how readily an issue can enlarge its boundaries. By zeroing in on or sensationalizing some aspect of an issue, the media can create rapidly heightened interest and subsequently force groups to tailor their activities accordingly. In the Siskiyou, for example, the question of tree-spiking, because of its dramatic nature, dominated news accounts of forest issues for quite some time, often at the expense of more far substantive, though less splashy issues. While controversial groups such as Earth First were often penalized by such sensationaliza-

¹⁷⁰ *Ibid.* 127-129.

tion, it had the potential to allow them to profit as well. This same attraction of the media to flash and drama inevitably led to widespread coverage of bold direct actions. Such actions were, in turn, planned and coordinated with the media in mind as news coverage and political action became somewhat co-generating. What is better news from both a ratings-conscious editor's and a publicity-hungry activist's point of view: critiques of Forest Service timber yield models or tree-sitters and road blockades? Rather than merely being a neutral vehicle to pass along information, the media, especially television, by its very nature became a heavy influence upon and determinant of the manner by which groups chose to present their demands.¹⁷¹

The Limits of a Communications Approach

While Cobb and Elder's framework is quite useful in capturing some of the subtleties left out of traditional, more easily quantifiable indicators of group competition, it is not without limitations of its own. The important thing that Cobb and Elder fail to consider, or at least greatly downplay, is the likelihood that there is at least some relationship between a group's quantifiable material resources and its effectiveness at interest articulation and symbolic communication. They see mastery at formulating a winning

¹⁷¹ For a more detailed discussion of the media's role in this respect see, W. Lance Bennett, *News: The Politics of Illusion* (New York: Longman, 1988).

communicative strategy to be the "great equalizer," and this is true to the extent that it can prove invaluable at getting issues on the agenda. But Cobb and Elder would be naive to deny the high probability that more money will buy more and better media coverage, greater staff to formulate effective communication strategies, marketing experts, consultants, advertisements, a greater ability to secure allies, and so on. Who, for example, has access to superior tools to fine-tune and transmit the sort of sophisticated communication that will win support and expand or contain the issues, Friends of Elk River or Weyerhaeuser? Who is in a better position to research public opinion in order to ingeniously manipulate symbols or employ a wider and more effective variety of media, the National Wildlife Federation or the Illinois Valley Resource Coalition?

Cobb and Elder are right in that competition between groups cannot simply be seen as a crude match of resources. The more brilliant and crafty a group's strategy is and the more "bang" it gets out of each "buck" it has, the further a group can close the gap between itself and its more wealthy opponents. Still, it is dangerous to carry this notion too far and sever all connections between a group's material endowment and its capacity to effectively engage in the more subtle, communicative aspects of competition. If this shows anything, then, it is that quantitative and communicative

analyses are essentially complementary as neither alone can capture the full dynamic of interest group competition.

Conclusion

There exists a large body of literature, critical of pluralism, which predicts trouble for interests seeking broad, diffuse, or what critics term "public" goods. As part of this broad category, ecological interests, according to pluralism's critics, could be expected to face an organizational disadvantage.

What the evidence from the Siskiyou conflict shows is that contrary to what some might predict, ecological interests did organize into manifest groups or take on the issues of the Siskiyou (if the group was pre-existing) quite readily. Furthermore, the underlying motivation for this behavior is not well-explained by any of Olson's criteria for group formation. Rather, shared goals and values and a common perception of threat seem to better explain environmental organization in this case. In addition, the groups involved in the Siskiyou have consisted of more complex networks of individuals, patrons, agents, and groups than Olson's model allows.

Critics of pluralism also argue that purposively oriented and/or broad-scale interests, even when manifest as groups, face an inevitable disadvantage in resources as the pluralist process tends to favor economic and materially

oriented interests. In the Siskiyou, timber interests, as predicted, did seem to have a superiority in resources, but not by quite as large a margin as critics might expect. Although, outspent, the environmentalists were not necessarily out-matched as their resource base seemed at least adequate to provide the effective countervailing presence which pluralists claim is necessary to keep the balance of power intact.

Whatever the relative financial and organizational strength of the groups involved has been, the full dynamic of group competition cannot be completely captured by quantitative comparisons of group resources alone. By applying Cobb and Elder's agenda-setting framework to the Siskiyou case, it becomes clear how important a group's skill and cleverness in presenting its demands are. In the Siskiyou, both sides attempted, through a variety of strategies, to expand the issue on their terms while simultaneously trying to contain their opponent's efforts to do the same. It was partly in this way that environmentalists nationalized their issue and assured it a place on the agenda, while timber kept up a steady level of doubts and fears amongst the same public. Overall, the relationship between a group's resources and their capacities in this respect is probably less than the critics but more than Cobb and Elder and other pluralists might acknowledge.

Examining the history of this case from 1983 on is a very useful way to test some of the claims of the pluralists and their critics. This is a period when a number of significant issues came to light and major group organization coalesced. Still, it must be warned that the scope of this study offers only a snapshot or perhaps a series of snapshots. If this study was done for the decade proceeding 1972 or 1966, for example, the findings might have been very different. In fact, some of the critics' claims would probably have been brilliantly confirmed. We would have seen a Siskiyou forest being rapidly clearcut for the benefit of well-organized commodity-using interests with virtually no opposition, interference, or dissent. Ecological interests, if even conceived of, would have been almost entirely latent. Bachrach and Baratz's second face of power, backed forcefully by the attitudes towards logging and nature dominant at the time, would, therefore, have rigidly enforced the status quo through the process of nondecisionmaking. By truncating the scope of possibilities --forests as being only for forest products--status quo forces would have succeeded in preventing issues and organized interests from even arising; that is, until 1983.

The point here is that this study's examination of the organization of interests in the Siskiyou, and what this says about pluralism, is essentially timebound to one decade-long phase of land management in the forest's eight

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THE CASE OF THE SISKIYOU NATIONAL FOREST 1983-1992

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CHAPTER 5

BUREAUCRATIC ADMINISTRATION AND THE SISKIYOU NATIONAL FOREST

The Forest Service....has been notorious for its alignment with lumber companies.

Justice William O. Douglas

Given the demonstrable impact on public lands policies of the various opposing groups, the service....seem[s] to be striking a valid political balance, which would satisfy the pluralist notion....

Paul Culhane

What shall we say to that management that halts between two courses--does neither this nor that, but botches both?

Henry David Thoreau

Political Theory and Bureaucratic Administration

An adequate discussion of pluralist theory requires an understanding not only of the role and nature of interest groups, but of issues of administration as well. The administrative half of the pluralist equation is crucial to con-

sider because it is where the authority to implement and enforce public policy is located. Although the earliest conceptions of administration (what is usually referred to as the *traditional* or *Weberian* model) envisioned a precise and automatic enactment of pre-determined legislative mandates, it is clear that administration involves quite a bit more. In actuality, bureaucratic agencies exercise a good deal of independent power and initiative.

Because administration represents, as Rosenbaum puts it, "the point where [policy] is interpreted and applied,"¹ it often equals, or in some cases, supercedes the legislature as the primary battleground of interest group competition:

....policy is not effective until it is administered; how it is administered will determine how effective it will be. This political maxim is lost least of all on the interests affected by public policy. The administrative apparatus....is the focus of an intense interplay of group pressures on agency officials leading to a complex pattern of political understandings and relations among administrators and pressure groups.²

This is especially true in this particular case study where an administrative unit of a larger bureau has provided the main forum for competing interests to participate in the decisionmaking process. While relevant decisionmakers certainly existed at many other administrative, executive, legislative, and judicial levels, the chief day-to-day respon-

¹Walter Rosenbaum, *The Politics of Environmental Concern* (New York: Praeger, 1977), 103.

²*Ibid.* 102.

sibility for the development and execution of policy on the Siskiyou National Forest lie with the specific administration of that forest.

The examination of the literature on administrative theory in general and Forest Service administration in particular provides a basis by which to analyze the case of the Siskiyou regarding questions of bureaucratic decisionmaking. Specifically, this chapter seeks to address the question of whether the administrative unit in charge, the Siskiyou National Forest, conformed with pluralist theory when confronting ecological issues.

This is attempted through a three-part test of: (1) the extent and influence of the participation process, (2) the nature of the agency's value system and (3) the agency's organizational flexibility. This will rely upon data from in-depth interviews of participants and agency personnel as well as a comparative analysis of Siskiyou policy outputs.

Pluralism and Bureaucratic Administration

Pluralist theory has never had a unanimous vision of bureaucratic administration. If the various strains of pluralist administrative theory share anything in common, it is the view that bureaucratic administration in a pluralist system has the overall effect of encouraging and adequately responding to the participatory input of a wide variety of

interests.³ As a result, the process leading to the formulation and execution of public policy ought to reflect a fair degree of openness and equity. Beyond this broad point, however, there exists quite a bit of difference between the two major pluralist orientations towards bureaucratic administration.

The first tradition, best represented by Dahl, Herbert Kaufman, Charles Davis and Sandra Davis, or Paul Culhane suggests that government agencies engage in the delicate task of mediating interest group competition within the framework of the agencies' professional goals and standards as well as their legislative mandate.⁴ The agency, in the

³Although pluralists may disagree about what precise balance of agency autonomy and responsiveness to interests is ideal, pluralists of all stripes place great emphasis upon participation since access to decisionmakers is the ultimate precondition for all pluralist policymaking. Accordingly, pluralistic conceptions of bureaucratic administration stress the role and legitimacy of the participation from which policy outputs must depend. Traditional or neo-traditional theories of administration, on the other hand, frown upon the intrusion of interests into the administrative realm finding that they ultimately interfere with rather than facilitate meaningful public participation. With bureaucrats properly isolated from the "politics" of interest group competition, traditionalists argue that it is the legislature and not the implementing branch of government that is the proper and more democratic forum for participation.

⁴Robert Dahl, *Pluralist Democracy in the United States* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1967); Herbert Kaufman, *The Forest Ranger* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press for Resources for the Future, 1960); Charles Davis and Sandra Davis, "Analyzing Change in Public Lands Policymaking: From Subsystems to Advocacy Coalitions" *Policy Studies Journal* 17:1 (Fall 1988); Paul Culhane, *Public Lands Politics* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press for Resources for the Future, 1981). Although it shares with traditional public administration theory an emphasis on professionalism, this

course of implementing legislation, must act, therefore, as a referee of sorts while simultaneously pursuing its own agenda as well.⁵ According to pluralists who abide by this view of bureaucracy, the challenge of mediating and balancing conflicting group demands while maintaining professional integrity is best met by agencies which possess a mixture of competence, flexibility, and responsiveness. While an agency can never be perfectly neutral (due to both its mandate and its own independent goals), this model of administration suggests that a pluralist agency can still be open enough to serve as an honest broker between squabbling interests and help, in Culhane's words, in "striking a valid political balance."⁶

Other pluralists, however, dispute this view of the balanced and competent agency and find the fairness and balance of pluralism to reside instead in the larger plur-

particular model of pluralist administration differs with the traditional view in one important respect. In the traditional model the only forum for interests to try to influence the system is in the legislature; after a law is passed all that is left is for the apolitical bureaucracy to strictly implement the law as Congress intended. The pluralist variant, however, sees political competition between interests as occurring both inside and outside the administrative process. Fighting for or against the passage of a particular piece of legislation is, to pluralists, only half the story; the administrative realm offers a whole new set of opportunities and potential strategies for influencing policy.

⁵This degree of autonomy is in contrast to characterizations of the state made by earlier pluralists such as Truman, Latham, or Bentley which conceived of policy outputs as strictly the sum of interest group pressure.

⁶Culhane, *Public Lands Politics*, 341.

alist process's decentralization. This view, held by such pluralists as Cobb and Elder or Kelso, firmly rejects all traces of traditional administrative theory which holds bureaucrats up to be apolitical and highly rational implementors of legislative mandates.⁷ Instead, bureaucratic behavior is primarily seen to be driven by internal agency norms rather than external directives. Far from being strictly neutral and professional, then, agencies are characterized as being self-interested, often irrational (even pathologically so), and highly political.⁸

Agencies are seen, therefore, as each having different and often conflicting styles, biases, interests, goals, and constituencies. Thus, any given agency cannot necessarily be relied upon to act as an impartial arbiter of conflicting group claims. The system's fairness, argue proponents of this model, lies not in the behavior of the agencies themselves, but in the multiple points of access with which the pluralist process offers interests. They argue that this messy and often inefficient jurisdictional overlap of agencies nevertheless affords interests a number of options and inevitably breeds a competition among bureaus that is as healthy to administration as it is to interest group inter-

⁷Roger Cobb and Charles Elder, *Participation in American Politics* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1972); William Kelso, *American Democratic Theory* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1978).

⁸For an example of this argument, see Kelso, 231-262.

action.⁹ Out of this "creative disorder" as Kelso terms it, comes a system that through its very fragmentation guarantees group access and participation which, in turn, provides a forum for all manner of demands to be heard.¹⁰

Agencies and Their Clientele

Traditional administrative theory, as has just been shown, has come under strong attack from a number of critics. This rejection of Weberian assumptions of rational and neutral administration guided by statutory law began with Herbert Simon's groundbreaking work. Simon identified the primary influences upon a bureaucratic organization to be its customers and suppliers. The former refers to those who use the agency's products,¹¹ while the latter are those whose support the agency needs in order to produce its products.¹²

The theory of clientelism which eventually evolved from Simon's work takes this idea a step further. Rather than customers and suppliers, though, it speaks of the agen-

⁹For a particularly illustrative case study of this administrative overlap in action, Kelso cites Arthur Schlesinger, *The Age of Roosevelt vol. II: The Coming of the New Deal* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1958).

¹⁰Kelso, 263.

¹¹Such "products" may be of a material, distributive nature (such as national forest timber) or of a regulatory nature. Bureaucratic rule-making process and the interpretation of legislation (for example, how the Forest Service chooses to deal with the spotted owl and thus, NFMA and the ESA) may allow or prevent an interest from obtaining what it desires.

¹²Herbert Simon, *Administrative Behavior* (New York: Macmillan, 1947), 16-17.

cy and its *clientele*, the latter defined as those groups whose interests are heavily dependent upon an agency's activities. As articulated by such students of bureaucracy as Norton Long or Phillip Selznick, the clientelist thesis states that agencies, if they are to survive in the highly competitive and fragmented political realm, must maintain a satisfied clientele in order to secure the support necessary for self-preservation. Accordingly, agencies and their clientele tend to develop a mutually supportive relationship which affords clients the products they need in exchange for the support an agency requires.¹³

Ideally, a successful agency will be able to coopt its clients in the course of their political exchanges. Unfortunately though, argue the critics of pluralism, it is often the agency that gets coopted by its clients. It is this charge of agency *capture* which is the main pillar of the critics' attack upon pluralist models of bureaucratic administration. First presented by Marver Bernstein in the 1950s, capture theory represents a degenerate form of clientelism in which the regulated comes to dominate the regulator. According to Bernstein, agencies go through various stages which inevitably transform them from aggressive

¹³ Norton Long, "Power and Administration" *Public Administration Review* 9 (Autumn 1949), 257-264; Phillip Selznick, *TVA and the Grassroots* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1949).

watchdog over the industries they were created to oversee into sympathetic allies:

Left largely to its own resources....a commission will probably be guided by dominant interests in the regulated industry in its formation of the public interest. Thus the public interest may become more private than public.¹⁴

He goes on to describe how an agency:

becomes a protector of the status quo and uses its public powers to maintain the interest of the regulated....Although an agency in this situation stresses its role of mediator and judge among conflicting interests, its actual role is that of advocate and partisan.¹⁵

A variation on the capture theory involves what is termed *iron triangles*.¹⁶ According to the critics, situations of undue client influence often lead to the development of rather durable and impenetrable little triumvirates or *subgovernments* in which an administrative agency, the interests they are to oversee, and the congressional subcommittee which funds and oversees the agency can all be found locked in a fairly cozy and sympathetic embrace.¹⁷

While capture or iron triangle theories have been employed by a number of theorists, it is the work of two of

¹⁴ Marver Bernstein, *Regulating Business by Independent Commission*, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1955), 154.

¹⁵ Bernstein, 270-271.

¹⁶ For a good summary of the iron triangle thesis, see Randall Ripley and Grace Franklin, *Congress, the Bureaucracy, and Public Policy* (Homewood, IL: Dorsey Press, 1984).

¹⁷ Whereas Kelso the pluralist would counsel an interest locked outside of the triangle to turn elsewhere in order to be heard, critics would likely argue that for most interests in most cases an iron triangle offers no where to turn at least for tangible results.

pluralism's most prominent critics, McConnell and Lowi, that has proven to be particularly noteworthy in this respect. According to McConnell, the chief fault of pluralism is that it allows private interests to exercise undue and quite undemocratic levels of influence; a situation that comes about when vulnerable agencies are captured by "those very interests they had been established to regulate."¹⁸ Consequently, the line between state authority and private demands becomes blurred and policy, therefore, becomes perverted to enhance private rather than the public's interests. By allowing this "conquest of segments of formal state power,"¹⁹ McConnell argues that the pluralist ideal of balance and compromise becomes impossible to achieve:

Often it is assumed that the role of government is that of arbiter or mediator among the many interests that exist within society. Neither role is possible where the distinction between public and private is lost.²⁰

McConnell places the blame for agencies' vulnerability to capture squarely upon decentralization, that same feature of pluralism that supposedly guarantees open access. To McConnell, political fragmentation leads less to open access than to the development of isolated and fairly autonomous fiefdoms of policymaking authority. At this local level where the "lonely judicial grandeur of agencies isolated

¹⁸ McConnell, *Private Power and American Democracy*, revised edition (New York: Vintage, 1970), 360.

¹⁹ *Ibid.* 162.

²⁰ *Ibid.* 362.

from the influence of 'politics'" can prevail, McConnell contends that it is all too easy for client groups, with the help of their congressional friends, to dominate at the public's expense.²¹

Like McConnell, Lowi bemoans the political fragmentation which allows clientele to exert control over bureaucratic behavior. To Lowi, the main problem with the insulated, almost self-governing entities of pluralist administration is their hostility to rational planning or legal standards. "Interest group liberalism," argues Lowi harkening back to traditionalist models of administration, "has little place for law because laws interfere with the political process."²² In other words, a clear, detailed legal mandate precludes the possibility to deal, bargain, or compromise; all of which are central to pluralist politics. According to Lowi, the pluralist system's aversion to law along with its fractured, special-interests dominated policymaking apparatus can only lead to decisionmaking paralysis and an arbitrary, ineffective, and democratically illegitimate system of privilege. The most that can be expected in the way of decisionmaking, therefore, would be poorly conceived, ad hoc policy responses.²³

²¹ *Ibid.* 360.

²² Theodore Lowi, *The End of Liberalism*, 2nd edition (New York, W.W. Norton, 1979), 92.

²³ *Ibid.*, 93, 297. Interestingly, Lowi employs elements of the capture and iron triangle theses which developed out of earlier critiques of the traditional model of administration (as competent and apolitical) and yet he is one of the tra-

Rather than offering clear and authoritative laws representing rationally derived social goals and priorities, argues Lowi, pluralism features broad delegations of legislative power to the bureaucratic fiefdoms and their clientele. By constructing purposefully broad and ambiguous mandates, legislators grant agencies the authority, wide discretion, and resources needed to maintain their semi-autonomous subgovernments.²⁴ In return, argues Morris Fiorina, legislators gain bureaucratic cooperation on matters of constituent benefits.²⁵ This political "pork," consequently, goes a long way towards bolstering legislators' reelection chances. The problem with this mutually beneficial scenario, maintains Lowi, is twofold. First, broad discretion "makes a politician out of a bureaucrat" by giving agency officials too much interpretive leeway, thereby increasing the oppor-

ditional model's staunchest modern advocates. His prescription for overcoming what he sees as the political disaster wrought by pluralism involves a return to traditional principles of administration such as clear, detailed mandates, rational planning, politically insulated bureaucracies, etc.

²⁴ Lowi, *The End of Liberalism*, 281-297. In another famous, earlier work Lowi draws a distinction between *distributive*, *redistributive*, and *regulatory* policies and argues that distributive policy areas are most likely to develop into iron triangles. In *The End of Liberalism*, Lowi argues that this distributive style of politics is the one that the pluralist system naturally gravitates towards and consequently, this form of politics has proliferated to the point where it often transforms or pushes out the other two. Theodore Lowi, "American Business, Public Policy, Case Studies, and Political Theory" *World Politics* 16:4 (July 1964), 677-715.

²⁵ Morris Fiorina, *Congress: Keystone of the Washington Establishment*, 2nd edition (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1989), 37-47.

tunity for client mischief.²⁶ Secondly, this voluntary surrender of legislative power to the executive branch is alleged by Lowi to be of questionable constitutionality.²⁷

The Pluralist Response

In the face of such serious charges of agency capture, collusion, and impotence, pluralists respond by arguing that capture theory grossly simplifies the often complex realities of administrative politics. While pluralists concede that isolated incidents of agency capture have occurred, they (and for that matter, most political scientists) contend that one would be hard-pressed to find a clear case of capture today as significant developments in American politics have now made capture in the classic sense practically impossible. Wilson, for example, points out that the massive proliferation of competing interests in the past several decades (many of them "public" or at least purposively-oriented) has tended to neutralize the potential for mischief by entrenched clientele.²⁸ In fact, argue both Wilson and McFarland, a diverse and competitive multiple clientele may actually have the effect of bolstering an agency's autonomy since the interests tend to cancel out each others' influence leaving bureaucrats with a freer hand.²⁹ And as

²⁶ Lowi, *The End of Liberalism*, 304.

²⁷ *Ibid.* chapter 5.

²⁸ James Q. Wilson, *The Politics of Regulation* (New York: Basic Books, 1980), chapter 10.

²⁹ *Ibid.*; Andrew McFarland, "Why Interest Groups Organize: A Pluralist Response to Olson" conference paper, Western

long as an agency can exercise any meaningful degree of autonomy, maintains McFarland, capture can be ruled out.³⁰

In today's political world of multiple clientele, pluralists argue, the traditional iron triangle or "dominant subgovernment" model of administration needs to be revised.³¹ One such revision involves Hugh Heclo's theory of *issue networks*. Rather than existing as a rigid and closed triangle, Heclo finds subgovernments operating within a larger network of communications revolving around a particular policy area. These networks involve a multitude of government and non-government actors including congressmen, a wide range of interest group representatives (including interests other than those being directly regulated), personnel from other government agencies, various other public officials, academic experts, journalists, lawyers, and assorted others.³² According to pluralists, the existence of such issue networks and their interest in and scrutiny of a particular policy area makes the insular business of iron triangles and agency capture all but impossible.

Political Science Association annual meeting, Seattle, WA (April 1991), 23.

³⁰ *Ibid.* 22.

³¹ See, for example, Thomas Gais, Mark Peterson, and Jack Walker, "Interest Groups, Iron Triangles, and Representative Institutions in American National Government" *British Journal of Political Science* 14 (1984), 185.

³² Hugh Heclo, "Issue Networks and the Executive Establishment" in Anthony King (editor), *The New American Political System* (Washington D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1978).

Similar to the idea of issue networks is Paul Sabatier's notion of *advocacy coalitions*. Such coalitions feature a mix of government and non-government actors broadly advocating a particular interest. Unlike the dominant sub-government (iron triangle) structure, subgovernments in this model operate within a much larger context which includes advocacy coalitions and thus features more varied and active participants, wider access, and greatly increased competition and conflict among interests.³³ In addition, the presence of advocacy coalitions, according to Sabatier, assures that policy change will not always originate strictly from the subgovernment.³⁴ In other words, external pressures such as particular events or crises, socioeconomic conditions, or interest group participation also exert influence; a situation which leads, therefore, to a more flexible and mediative role for those bureaucrats in charge. In this new policymaking context, such officials function as "policy brokers."³⁵ Finally, because of this "opening up" of the policymaking process, Sabatier contends that subgovernments are no longer solely focused upon the distribution of benefits as Lowi charges they are.³⁶

³³ Paul Sabatier, "Knowledge, Policy-Oriented Learning, and Policy Change" *Knowledge: Creation, Diffusion, Utilization* 8 (1987), 649-692.

³⁴ *Ibid.*

³⁵ Davis and Davis, 5.

³⁶ Sabatier, 649-692.

Biased or Balanced?: Models of Forest Service Administration

Broadly, this chapter examines how pluralist and critical theories of bureaucratic administration relate to the United States Forest Service and its role in the politics of the Siskiyou conflict. To achieve this, it is necessary to review the various models of Forest Service behavior and observe what these say about the role and nature of public participation, agency norms and values, agency responsiveness and flexibility (and from this determine the implications regarding the pluralist process in general). Such a review creates a framework upon which to specifically analyze the agency's behavior in the Siskiyou.

As the agency with the legal authority and responsibility to administer the national forest system, the Forest Service, and particularly its local administration in the Siskiyou, are clearly the primary source of policy outputs on the Siskiyou National Forest.³⁷ The United States Forest

³⁷ As has been shown in previous chapters, the Siskiyou conflict has involved at one level or another a multitude of governmental actors besides the Forest Service including the Fish and Wildlife Service, the Bureau of Land Management, the Environmental Protection Agency, the Departments of Interior and Agriculture, various state agencies, and an assortment of congressmen, judges, and administration officials. Each of these groups or individual actors has undoubtedly had an impact, sometimes quite substantial, upon the Forest Service and the politics of the Siskiyou. Because they do not have the day-to-day responsibility to administer the national forests, though, these other actors will essentially be considered external influences upon the Forest Service, which because of its direct jurisdiction, is this study's main focus regarding issues in administration. The other governmental actors will be considered in depth in the next chapter.

Service was officially created in 1905 to administer the Forest Reserve System (later to become the national forests). These public forests were established fourteen years earlier in reaction to the disastrous exploitation of the nation's woodlands by private loggers in the 19th century. Given its idealistic objectives, it is not surprising that the agency and its establishment figured prominently in the growing Progressive Movement.³⁸

The Forest Service, which oversees approximately 189 million acres of land on 155 far-flung units, is located in the Department of Agriculture. The agency operates under a host of statutes (a good portion of them enacted in the 1960s and 70s) that are supposed to define and authorize its activities. Most prominent among these are: (1) the Multiple Use-Sustained Yield Act of 1960 which directs the Forest Service to manage the national forests for a multitude of uses in a manner that perpetuates the outputs of forest resources; (2) the National Forest Management Act of 1976 which among other things mandates land management planning and public participation; and (3) the National Environmental Protection Act of 1969 which establishes the process mandating environmental impact statements. (For a more complete list of major laws, see appendix E).

³⁸ For a discussion of the link between the Forest Service and the larger Progressive Movement, see Samuel Hays, *Conservation and the Gospel of Efficiency* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1959).

In addition to its legislative mandate, the agency relies heavily upon the *Forest Service Manual*, a huge and continuously evolving guidebook of internally derived regulations, guidelines, and operating procedures. All together, the Forest Service mandate might be summarized as follows: *to manage the national forests for a multitude of values and purposes in a way that involves and best suits the public, does not impair the land, assures a perpetual flow of resources, and does not violate federal environmental laws.*

As one the more closely studied bureaucracies in the United States,³⁹ the Forest Service has been the object of quite a bit of administrative theorizing. From this long and varied history of research, one can identify four major models of Forest Service administration; each with a unique set of implications regarding democratic theory.

Clientelism and Capture

Beginning with important critiques by McConnell, Philip Foss, and Wesley Calef in the early 1960s, a persistent theme has developed in the literature of public lands politics alleging that administrative agencies have come under the sway of their resource-using clients to the point where they have become co-opted by those clients.⁴⁰

³⁹ Catherine McCarthy, Paul Sabatier, and John Loomis, "Attitudinal Change in the Forest Service: 1960-1990" conference paper, Western Political Science Association annual meeting, Seattle, WA (April 1991), 1.

⁴⁰ Grant McConnell, *Private Power and American Democracy*, Philip Foss, *Politics and Grass* (Seattle: University of

According to critics, public lands politics take the form of a classic iron triangle which features:

the distribution of tangible benefits to a relatively small number of individuals and groups (such as ranchers or mining firms) and the inability of agency administrators to exercise independent judgement in the face of political pressures generated by resource user groups and their allies in the Interior Committees of Congress.⁴¹

Specifically regarding the Forest Service, capture theorists suggest that as the agency's dominant client, the timber industry, has managed, with the help of its congressional allies, to keep the agency pliant and supportive. McConnell asserts that it is the agency's decentralization which makes it isolated and vulnerable to local resource-using interests. The Forest Service, he maintains, has always "wandered before the pressures of all the winds that blew."⁴²

In the 1970s, a number of very critical non-academic studies reiterated this notion of Forest Service capture. Ralph Nader associate Daniel Barney characterizes "hapless"

Washington Press, 1960), Wesley Calef, *Private Grazing and the Public Lands* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960). Foss and Calef focused their studies upon the BLM and its predecessor the Grazing Service while McConnell examined a number of agencies including the Forest Service, the BLM and its predecessors, and the Soil Conservation Service, the Army Corps of Engineers, and the Bureau of Reclamation. The fact that the bulk of case studies used by McConnell to illustrate localism and capture in *Private Power and American Democracy* come from the realm of public lands administration points to the central role that early public lands research has played in the development of broader theories of capture and clientelism.

⁴¹ Davis and Davis, 3.

⁴² McConnell, 360.

Forest Service personnel as being "easy prey for the timber lobbyist and his political friends" and finds that "the Forest Service has succumbed increasingly to industry schemes to convert much of the National Forests to timber factories."⁴³ Jack Shepherd, meanwhile, comes to largely the same conclusion in *The Forest Killers*, a book whose title clearly sums up his perspective.⁴⁴

In addition to these journalistic accounts, academic observers besides McConnell, such as Rosenbaum or Charles Reich have basically concurred, though in a far less strident way, with this notion of timber interest dominance over the Forest Service.⁴⁵ Reich in particular echoes Lowi's critique of pluralism by finding that the Forest Service can maintain its timber industry bias because of the vague and overly broad mandates which Congress grants it. This vast discretionary power, according to Reich, is used by the Forest Service to reinterpret legislation in ways which clearly favor the timber industry and shut out environmentalists.⁴⁶

Not surprisingly, the Forest Service capture thesis is most enthusiastically advanced by interest group partisans. One does not have to search far through environmentalist

⁴³ Daniel Barney, *The Last Stand* (New York: Grossman, 1974), 70, xiii.

⁴⁴ Jack Shepherd, *The Forest Killers* (New York: Weybright and Talley, 1975).

⁴⁵ Rosenbaum, *The Politics of Environmental Concern*, 107; Charles Reich, *Bureaucracy and the National Forests* (Santa Barbara, CA: Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions, 1962).

⁴⁶ Reich, *Bureaucracy and the National Forests*.

literature to find the capture thesis applied to a Forest Service that supposedly follows "marching orders planned by the timber lobby"⁴⁷ as shown by this passage in the Sierra Club's magazine:

....over the years the agencies have strayed from their missions. Two in particular, the Forest Service and the BLM....[have] developed cozy relationships with the very commercial interests they were designed to keep at bay....the general culture of these bureaucracies is prodevelopment....⁴⁸

In a letter to Forest Service Chief Robertson, former Willamette National Forest planner Jeff DeBonis notes how this perception of Forest Service capture has gained popular currency:

Our basic problem right now is that we are too much biased toward the resource-extraction industries, particularly the timber industry....we support their narrowly focused, shortsighted agenda to the point that we are perceived by much of the public as being dupes of the resource-extraction industries.⁴⁹

The Forest Service as a captured agency is a characterization that has, according to Culhane, "become accepted theory among journalists, political activists, and popular writers."⁵⁰

Budget Expansion

Not all observers who notice a pro-timber bias in the

⁴⁷ "America's Forests in Crisis" *Save America's Forests Citizen Action Guide* (January 1992), 7.

⁴⁸ Bruce Hamilton, "Unfinished Business" *Sierra* (September/October 1989), 50.

⁴⁹ Jeff DeBonis quoted in Timothy Egan, *The Good Rain* (New York: Knopf, 1990), 163-164.

⁵⁰ Culhane, *Public Lands Politics*, 338.

Forest Service attribute it to outright capture. Some critics, such as forest economist Randall O'Toole reflect the work of earlier public administration theorists like Long or Selznick by emphasizing that the main determinant of bureaucratic behavior is the desire of organizations to survive and expand. According to O'Toole, the Forest Service is simply a large bureaucracy seeking to maximize its budget and because of various political realities, it finds the best way to achieve this by cutting massive quantities of timber.⁵¹

The reasons for this are twofold. First, according to one critic, is the fact that timber sales represent a form of political "pork" for congressmen who find it a far more lucrative constituent benefit than any other forest use. As such, timber sale activity is rewarded by Congress with high budgets.⁵² Often, Congress even imposes yearly timber quotas (ASQs) higher than Forest Service plans call for, but the agency rarely complains since this translates into higher budgets. Given this politically valuable product it produces, it is little wonder, argue critics, that the Forest Service with its roughly \$2 billion appropriation is funded at substantially higher levels than just about any other pub-

⁵¹ Randall O'Toole, *Reforming the Forest Service* (Washington D.C.: Island Press, 1988).

⁵² Tom Ribe, "Pork Barrelling Our National Forests" *Inner Voice* 3:2 (Spring 1991), 1, 5.

lic lands agency.⁵³ Table 15 details this massive budget. The Forest Service roadbuilding budget alone has made it the world's largest roadbuilder, having constructed 340,000 miles, or eight times the entire U.S. interstate system in the last fifty years.⁵⁴

Another factor which provides incentives for the Forest Service to overcut, according to O'Toole, is the nature of the laws it operates under. The chief culprit in this respect is alleged to be the Knutson-Vandenburg Act of 1930 which allows local managers to keep a certain percentage of timber sale receipts (the rest of which go to the U.S. Treasury).⁵⁵ The effect of this and other similar legislation⁵⁶ (which together account for more than a fifth of the Forest Service budget), O'Toole argues, is to provide an irresis-

⁵³ The Forest Service with a 1991 appropriations of \$2.33 billion is nearly a billion dollars ahead of its closest rival, the National Park Service whose '91 appropriations totalled \$1.36 billion. Lagging far behind were the Bureau of Land Management (\$906 million) which administers nearly a third more land than the Forest Service and the Fish and Wildlife Service (\$698 million). *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report* (3 November 1990). Figures have been rounded off.

⁵⁴ Timothy Egan, "Forest Service Abusing Role, Dissidents Say" *New York Times* (4 March 1990), 1; Catherine Caufield, "The Ancient Forest" *New Yorker* (14 May 1990), 61.

⁵⁵ Randall O'Toole, "Incentives to Mismanage" *Inner Voice* 3:2 (Spring 1991), 6. Ostensibly, these funds are to be spent for improvement of the cut-over area, but in reality, according to O'Toole, their expenditure is left largely to the rangers' discretion.

⁵⁶ In addition to Knutson-Vandenburg (K-V), there is the Brush Disposal Act of 1916, the National Forest Roads and Trails Act of 1964, and provisions in NFMA which all allow district rangers to keep receipts from various timber-related Forest Service operations. Including K-V, these laws add about \$600 million a year to the Forest Service budget.

tible temptation for district rangers to make as many timber sales as possible, even if they are money-losing, below-cost sales (since the ranger is granted a budget to make those sales anyway and gets a reward in addition).⁵⁷ According to proponents of this theory of budget-driven administration, the timber industry, though it benefits mightily, is clearly not the chief motivator of Forest Service policy. Instead, it all boils down to a simple formula: *increased timber sales equal increased budgets, decreased sales equal decreased budgets.*

Naturally, claim critics, such a process of national forest administration becomes "almost entirely divorced from biological reality" and at odds with environmental laws passed by Congress.⁵⁸ Forest Service management becomes instead a desperate scramble to squeeze out every last budget-expanding timber sale possible in a style of incentives, penalties, and quotas which, according to O'Toole:

most clearly resemble the Soviet system of management where a central committee determines production targets and the local managers are required to meet those targets at any cost."⁵⁹

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*

⁵⁸ Ribe, 5.

⁵⁹ O'Toole quoted in Ribe, 5. Critics maintain that a large part of Forest Service personnel's annual performance rating depends upon how well they met their timber output target. Neither environmentally-based reluctance or legal tie-ups help to reach this target. According to O'Toole, rangers of-ten find themselves "walking on a tightrope. If they don't meet their target, they won't get promoted. If they get sued for breaking environmental laws, they won't get promoted either." O'Toole quoted in Kathie Durbin,

TABLE 15

FOREST SERVICE FY 1990 BUDGET¹
(in millions of dollars)

Timber Sales.....	\$921
Firefighting.....	551
Payments to Local Govt.....	363
Research.....	131
State and Private Forestry..	104
Roads.....	96
Other Construction.....	88
Fish and Wildlife.....	71
Land Acquisition.....	63
Soil, Air, and Water Mgmt...	41
Trails.....	24
Other.....	392
Timber-related Subtotal ²	2,166
Total ³	2,845

¹These figures represent official budgets. Unofficially, however, the Forest Service has been widely accused of spending non-timber related funds on timber-related activity. A GAO investigation, in fact, found that 60% of the funds earmarked by Congress for wilderness management were diverted to other activities, mostly timber-related. GAO report cited in "Forest Service Illegally Diverted Wilderness Funds" *Inner Voice* 3:2 (Spring 1991), 3.

²This figure is a subtotal of the timber sale budget and those accounts indirectly related to timber activity (firefighting, research, payments to local government, state and private forestry and roads) . This conservatively assumes that none of the *other construction* budget or the huge *other* account goes towards any timber-related activity. This timber-related category accounts for 76% of the total budget

³This figure represents total Forest expenditures, some of which comes from timber sales and related revenue rather than direct congressional appropriations which are roughly \$2 billion.

Organizational Values

Another school of thought critical of Forest Service management stresses internally-derived organizational values as the source of what it sees as the agency's stubborn timber production bias. Drawing from Simon's seminal work, a number of observers, including Ashley Schiff, Ben Twight, Twight and Fremont Lyden, and Connie Bullis and James Kennedy, all work from the assumption that administrators are heavily influenced by their own and their agency's values.⁶⁰ In the case of the Forest Service, these values are alleged to have an especially firm grip.

As the agency that many claim spearheaded the twentieth century Progressive Movement, the Forest Service was created, in the words of Samuel Hays, according to "the gospel of efficiency."⁶¹ Accordingly, this gospel accurately reflected the values of the larger Progressive crusade; elite technical expertise, rational planning, and apolitical administration all coupled with an almost religious moral

"Rangers Scramble to Meet Timber Quotas" special report: "Forests in Distress" *Oregonian* (15 October 1990).

⁶⁰ Ashley Schiff, *Fire and Water* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1962); Ben Twight, *Organizational Values and Political Power: The Forest Service Versus the Olympic National Park* (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1983); Ben Twight and Fremont Lyden, "Multiple Use vs. Organizational Commitment" *Forest Science* (June 1988); Connie Bullis and James Kennedy, "Value Conflicts and Policy Interpretation: Change in the Cases of Fisheries and Wildlife Managers" *Policy Studies Journal* 19:3-4 (1991).

⁶¹ Hays, *Conservation and the Gospel of Efficiency*.

certainty and confidence that what the agency was doing was "intrinsically right."⁶²

More specifically, Twight identifies the organizational values of the Forest Service as being based in a utilitarian theory which includes: (1) an emphasis upon timber and other resource production as the primary purpose of the national forests, (2) a faith in planned forestry to achieve social ends such as the stability of the nation's wood supply, local wood products industries, and the communities that depend on them, and (3) a faith in technical rationality as guidance in forest management. This technical orientation is closely tied to what Twight calls "scientific elitism"; the idea that professional foresters and not the public or politicians are best equipped to know what the proper course of forest management ought to be.⁶³

⁶² Hal Rothman, "A Regular Ding-Dong Fight: Agency Culture and Evolution in the NPS-USFS Dispute 1916-1934" *Western Historical Quarterly* xx:2 (May 1989), 146.

⁶³ Twight, 23-25. There is much debate over whether the multiple use doctrine is part of the Forest Service's basic value system. Culhane, for example, sees multiple use as a primary Forest Service value, adopted and enthusiastically followed since the 1930s. Twight, on the other hand, argues that the concept of multiple use violates the agency's utilitarian founding values which strongly emphasize a single dominant timber-oriented course of forest management. Multiple use, claims Twight, was a gradually developed strategic response to political pressure and especially Park Service competition over jurisdiction, the true meaning of which the Forest Service has never internalized. Henning and Mangun concur, finding multiple use to be merely a "convenient slogan covering a 'dominant use' decision that really fails to take into consideration other uses and values. In this case multiple use can be considered a devious ploy...." Daniel Henning and William Mangun, *Managing the Environmental Crisis* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1989), 109.

According to organizational values theorists, this value orientation automatically biases the Forest Service in favor of timber production and against all other non-consumptive uses⁶⁴ as the words of the agency's founder, Gifford Pinchot can be presumed to show:

the object of our forest policy is not to preserve the forests because they are beautiful....or because they are refuges for the wild creatures of the wildernessbut the making of prosperous homes....Every other consideration comes as secondary.⁶⁵

In another pronouncement, Pinchot confirms that "a forest is a crop, and forestry is uniformly classed as a branch of agriculture."⁶⁶ This confident utilitarian/technological tone has not changed much since Pinchot's turn-of-the-century proclamations: "We know what nature can do," states the contemporary Deputy Chief George Leonard, "and we're relatively certain that we can do better than nature."⁶⁷

The structural characteristics of the Forest Service which values theorists claim have so strongly bound personnel to such orthodoxy were first identified in Herbert Kaufman's groundbreaking 1960 study of the agency. Although Kaufman himself was a great admirer of the Forest Service,

⁶⁴ Twight and Lyden's 1981 data finds Forest Service personnel to hold values very closely in synch with members of commodity user groups. Ben Twight and Fremont Lyden, "Measuring Forest Service Bias" *Journal of Forestry* 87:5 (May 1989), 35-41.

⁶⁵ Pinchot quoted in Davis and Davis, 5-6.

⁶⁶ Pinchot quoted in Twight, 111.

⁶⁷ Leonard quoted in Caufield, 61.

his work has been extensively cited by outspoken critics such as Twilight. What Kaufman found in his examination of the Forest Service were various internal mechanisms at work building loyalty and commitment to the agency and its values and ideology, while simultaneously discouraging non-conformity. According to Kaufman, it is no small task to homogenize so highly decentralized an agency with such naturally strong centrifugal tendencies.⁶⁸

The specific mechanisms aimed at achieving this, Kaufman found, included selective recruitment and staffing (which not only heavily favored foresters, but those from certain schools of forestry), an elaborate system of incentives, promotions, transfers, inspections, ratings and sanctions (to discourage disobedience and reward conformity), rigorous training and socialization techniques, and the strategic use of agency symbols.⁶⁹ As a result, Kaufman contends that the agency has achieved a high degree of integration:

Much that happens to a professional forester in the Forest Service thus tends to tighten the links binding him to the organization. His experiences and his environment gradually infuse into him a view of the world and a hierarchy of preferences coinciding with those of his colleagues. They tie him to his fellows, to the agency....They practically merge the individual's identity with the identity of the organization.⁷⁰

⁶⁸ Kaufman, 66-87.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.* 126-197.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.* 197.

By internalizing and adhering to a definitive set of organizational values, then, geographically scattered agency personnel operate within what is actually a "mythology of decentralization"⁷¹ in which they can always be counted on to voluntarily conform. Kaufman states that the various techniques of integration:

....actually infuse into Forest officers the desired patterns of action in the management of the districts, so that the Rangers handle most situations precisely as their superiors would direct them to if their superiors stood looking over their shoulders, supervising every detail. To overstate the case, their decisions are predetermined.⁷²

Although it certainly prevents capture, such a cohesive value system in the Forest Service is argued by some to have quite negative consequences as well. Critics such as Schiff or Twight describe an agency so blinded by its own ideology that it becomes isolated, inflexible, and unresponsive to public demands or other external pressures or even, in some cases, principles of sound scientific management. According to Twight, the Forest Service is so strongly influenced by its ideology that it will stubbornly stick to decisions even if they cost the agency dearly as Twight's case study of the Forest Service's loss of jurisdiction over

⁷¹ Terence Tipple and J. Douglas Wellman, "Herbert Kaufman's Forest Ranger Thirty Years Later: From Simplicity and Homogeneity to Complexity and Diversity" *Public Administration Review* 51:5 (September/October 1991), 422.

⁷² Kaufman, 222.

a nearly one million acre chunk of the Olympic National Forest suggests.⁷³

Twight and Lyden argue, therefore, that the Forest Service tries to control change rather than accomodate it. If faced with political pressure that is counter to its values, Twight contends that rather than engage in the "politics" it abhors, the agency will usually try to explain to the public its values and why these are correct, often employing costly public relations campaigns. If that fails, the last resort, according to Twight, is to attempt to fit the new directive or program into its existing framework of values as well as possible.⁷⁴ In sum, the proponents of organizational values theory argue that the Forest Service represents a closed system of organization which makes decisions that are "pre-conceived," is resistant to change or innovation, and hostile to or at least uninterested in outside, especially public, input.

The Pluralist View: Balance and Professionalism

A final and quite influential school of thought regarding the Forest Service portrays the agency in a largely positive light; as professional, competent, and balanced.

⁷³ Twight, *Organizational Values and Political Power*.

⁷⁴ For example, the Forest Service approaches the management of wilderness areas (which they vigorously oppose, for the most part, but have been mandated to protect) not in terms of the intrinsic value of wilderness (which would violate its own values), but as one of many "multiple uses" to which the forest can be subjected.

Defenders of the Forest Service firmly reject the notion of the agency as captured. Some observers, beginning with Kaufman, emphasize the agency's professionalism and internal cohesion, alleging that not only do these qualities encourage operational efficiency, but also the autonomy necessary to thwart domination by clientele. Citing its widespread reputation as one of the most effective and well-managed agencies in the entire federal government,⁷⁵ the Forest Service is cast by its scholarly admirers as a "bureaucratic superstar"⁷⁶ with personnel "in charge of the national forests and in control of their destinies."⁷⁷

Other scholars who reject the capture thesis argue that Forest Service policymaking "meets the pluralist criterion" because the agency acts through decentralized authority to balance interests within a strongly pluralistic and competitive political environment.⁷⁸ In his 1981 study, *Public Lands Politics*, Culhane offers strong support for this pluralist view of the Forest Service. He argues that the Forest Service is a consensus-seeking, conflict-avoiding

⁷⁵ Culhane, *Public Lands Politics*, 29. In fact, a 1981 study by Penn State and the Office of Personnel Management rated the Forest Service as among the ten most successful organizations in the United States. Study cited in Michael Frome, *The Forest Service* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1984), 32.

⁷⁶ Jeanne Nienaber Clarke and Daniel McCool, *Staking Out the Terrain* (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1985), 33-47.

⁷⁷ This quote is used to describe Kaufman's position. Tipple and Wellman, 422.

⁷⁸ Culhane, *Public Lands Politics*, 341.

agency that is responsive to a broad range of competing interests.⁷⁹ Unlike what capture theory would imply, Culhane finds that local land management constituencies are not completely dominated by resource-using interests. To Culhane, this multiple clientele, which reflects the agency's multiple use mission assures that the Forest Service almost always occupies the middle ground and fulfills the broker's role.⁸⁰ Discontent on all sides, claims a former chief of the Forest Service, is a sign of the multiple use concept in action.⁸¹

This characterization of the Forest Service as an essentially pluralist organization is reinforced by a number of other studies. Charles Davis and Sandra Davis, for example, find in their Wyoming case study that a pluralist advocacy coalition model with its multiple actors and access points offers a much better explanation of local Forest Service and BLM administration than the traditional iron triangle model.⁸² Although their focus is a bit broader, William Klay and James McElveen come to a similar conclusion in their Florida case study of wildlife management. In this

⁷⁹ *Ibid.* 280. According to Rosenbaum, pleasing as many parties and making as few enemies as possible by bringing as many interests into the fold as it can, is the overriding desire of all agencies. In many ways it is simply a function of organizations' inherent desire to expand. Walter Rosenbaum, *Environmental Politics and Policies* (Washington D.C.: CQ Press, 1985), 35.

⁸⁰ Culhane, *Public Lands Politics*, 332-339.

⁸¹ Former Forest Service Chief Richard McArdle cited in Henning and Mangun, 194.

⁸² Davis and Davis, 18-19.

case, the authors find Heclo's issue network model more appropriate than the iron triangle due in part to the unco-optable zero-sum nature of the policy demands of the competing interests involved.⁸³

Although it certainly increases political conflict, a multiple clientele, pluralist theorists suggest, presents certain important advantages to the Forest Service as well. Besides preventing capture, a fragmented and competitive constituency, as mentioned previously, inevitably strengthens an agency's autonomy.⁸⁴ In the case of the Forest Service, Culhane reports that agency personnel routinely use interests as buffers to offset the pressures of other interests.⁸⁵ Such a situation, pluralists argue, actually has the fortuitous effect of integrating pluralistic administration with agency values and expertise. "Political bargaining" claim Simmons and Dennis, "is supposed to establish the parameters within which scientific management can be used by trained land managers."⁸⁶ According to Culhane, this integration is due to a rare coincidence of agency mandate and

⁸³ William Klay and James McElveen, "Planning as a Vehicle for Policy Formulation and Accomodation in an Evolving Sub-government" *Policy Studies Journal* 19:3-4 (1991), 527-533.

⁸⁴ McFarland, 23; Culhane, *Public Lands Politics*, 227.

⁸⁵ Culhane, *Public Lands Politics*, 228.

⁸⁶ William Dennis and Randy Simmons "From Illusion to Responsibility: Rethinking Regulation of Federal Public Lands" in Sheldon Kamieniecki, Robert O'Brien, and Michael Clarke (editors), *Controversies in Environmental Politics* (Albany NY: State University of New York Press, 1986), 68. It is important to note that the authors are actually critical of this model they describe.

the political environment. Both the Forest Service and the BLM:

....have so arranged matters that the political necessity of responding to their multiple clienteles reinforces the dictates of their professional experience and statutory mandates [i.e. multiple use laws]. Most agencies in the federal bureaucracy are not so fortunate.⁸⁷

This resulting hybrid of professional values and pluralist mediation differs somewhat from classic pluralism, according to Davis and Davis, in that the Forest Service's role as a broker:

....is less a process of bargaining between PLMs [professional land managers] and interest groups than a relatively open decisionmaking process guided by administrators who rely heavily upon professional values to justify their actions.⁸⁸

What this balance of professionalism and responsiveness brings, according to the Forest Service's defenders, are enhanced opportunities for the agency to be flexible, innovative, and open enough to encompass changing clients,

⁸⁷ Culhane, *Public Lands Politics*, 341. It is important to note that this pluralist model of Forest Service administration is at odds with Kelso's or Cobb and Elder's vision of non-rationalist pluralist agencies from which only responsiveness and not rational, impartial implementation can be hoped for. Proponents of Forest Service pluralism, on the other hand, tend to argue that the agency can "have its cake and eat it too" so to speak by being responsive and balanced while also maintaining its professional competence and integrity. It is equally important to note that the ideology of the Progressive reform movement from which the Forest Service sprang relied heavily upon the traditional model of professional, apolitical administration. This may, therefore, account for the agency's traditionally close association with elite, professional administration.

⁸⁸ Davis and Davis, 18-19.

demands, and policy challenges; precisely the opposite qualities attributed to the agency by its critics.

Participation and the Forest Service

One of the most important indicators of how open Forest Service administration is would be the role which participation plays in the agency's decisionmaking process.⁸⁹ The institutionalization of public participation in Forest Service policymaking has come about through both externally imposed mandates and internal agency directives. Legislatively, public participation has been established, expanded, and/or specified by a number of statutes including the Administrative Procedure Act of 1946, RPA, FLPMA, NFMA, and NEPA.⁹⁰ NEPA especially has been a cornerstone of the participation process. By requiring an environmental impact statement with mandatory public input for any federal action

⁸⁹ Public participation is defined by Henning and Mangun as "that part of the decisionmaking process which provides opportunity and encouragement for the public to express its views. It assures that proper attention will be given to public concerns and preferences when decisions are made. Such participation includes involvement or consultation in planning, decisionmaking, and management activities dealing with environmental affairs....Effective participation requires the availability of adequate non-technical information, public encouragement, and opportunities to use that information." Henning and Mangun, 61. With the Forest Service, participation usually takes a number of forms including written comment, public meetings, field trips, public workshops as well as informal interaction and negotiation.

⁹⁰ The Administrative Procedure Act established the initial basis for public participation in administrative policymaking; RPA, FLPMA, and NFMA all established specific guidelines and mechanisms for participation in the Forest Service policymaking process.

with potentially significant environmental effects, NEPA provides the framework for most of the formal participation that occurs in the Forest Service's policymaking process.

Besides these legally mandated participatory requirements, there have been a number of internal Forest Service directives and initiatives (New Perspectives being the most recent) which over the past several decades have supposedly established and reaffirmed the role of public participation and the agency's commitment to incorporating it. As a result, there are very few observers today who would deny the institutionalization of at least some degree of participation into the Forest Service policymaking process.⁹¹

It is not, therefore, the existence of opportunities to participate that is at the center of most academic debate. What the debate focuses on is whether this participation is substantive and truly influences and is incorporated into Forest Service policymaking or whether it is an elaborate and highly symbolic facade aimed at achieving a veneer of legitimacy for essentially pre-determined policy outputs.

⁹¹ One notable exception to this would be Nickolas Facaros, who takes a very strict legal view. He argues that the Forest Service does not live up to even the most basic requirements of NFMA and CEQ regulations. In his case study of the Willamette National Forest, he finds that the Forest Service "did little to affirmatively encourage and facilitate.... involvement in the planning process" and "next to nothing to bring....the general U.S. population into the planning process." Nickolas Facaros, "Public Involvement in National Forest Planning: What the Council on Environmental Quality Requires and the Forest Service Neglects" *Journal of Environmental Law and Litigation* 4 (1989), 34.

The pluralist position, of course, clearly supports the notion that participation is a major and meaningful component of Forest Service policymaking and that the agency is very much responsive to public and interest group input.

Culhane states that:

Public participation is not a passive public relations exercise. It is so thoroughly intertwined in the agencies' formal decisionmaking sequences that it is an integral part of public lands policymaking.⁹²

The main conclusion of Culhane's detailed analysis in *Public Lands Politics* is that a great deal of variance in local public lands policies can be explained by the makeup of local administrators' constituencies. In other words, interest groups were found to have a significant influence on Forest Service policymaking (though in a manner far different than a capture or iron triangle situation).⁹³ In a followup test of Culhane's findings which examined mail comments, Paul Mohai also found public input to be influential in the policymaking process, although he left open the possibility that this responsiveness may be shaded by some degree of agency subjectivity.⁹⁴ Later research by Culhane, meanwhile, finds the Forest Service as firmly committed as ever to participation but somewhat overwhelmed by the rising

⁹² Culhane, *Public Lands Politics*, 333.

⁹³ *Ibid.*

⁹⁴ Paul Mohai, "Public Participation and Natural Resource Decision-Making: The Case of the RARE II Decisions" *Natural Resources Journal* 27 (1987), 153-155.

volume of written comments it receives.⁹⁵ He claims that this has prevented meaningful responses to much written input and suggests that the agency reduce its reliance on coding and analyzing mail and emphasize instead workshops and public meetings.⁹⁶

Critics of the Forest Service, on the other hand, take a far dimmer view of the true role and nature of participation. Although most will concede that the opportunities to participate are fairly plentiful, they argue that participation as it occurs today is essentially an exercise in public relations; a formality to satisfy legal requirements and lend an air of legitimacy to internally (or worse, timber industry) derived policies. Twight, for example, finds the Forest Service, regardless of mandated requirements, to be hostile towards and suspicious of public input:

....despite massive public involvement efforts, feedback from clients and supportive groups is treated perfunctorily or has little apparent effect on organizational decisions....structural characteristics of the Forest Service appear to preclude adaptive negotiations or decisions made through citizen participation.⁹⁷

This "anti-political" attitude, contends Twight, has its roots in the agency's elitist rationalist origins which emphasize the agency's technical expertise and distrusts any

⁹⁵ Paul Culhane "Public Participation in National Forest Planning: Is it Different or Just More?" conference paper, Western Political Science Association, annual meeting, Seattle, WA (April 1991), 1-11.

⁹⁶ *Ibid.* 10-12.

⁹⁷ Twight, 27.

alternative source of policymaking.⁹⁸ If the increased requirements for participation (in NFMA or NEPA) have achieved anything, argue Twight and Lyden, it is that agency values have entrenched and hardened further as an adaptation to guarantee cohesion in the face of new demands and increased scrutiny.⁹⁹

Jim Britell, an environmental activist and veteran of numerous Forest Service meetings and workshops on the Siskiyou, strongly supports this view of Forest Service participation as being less than authentic.¹⁰⁰ Regarding public input in the formulation of ten-year forest plans, he claims that:

In theory, forest planning is a rational sifting and evaluation of facts and observations which produces possible courses of action that logically flow from the facts. In reality, *most government planning is the systematic collection of evidence to justify predetermined conclusions.* The important outcomes of most planning processes are decided before planning begins *Information is gathered so the agency can proceed with what it intended to do all along.* Agencies seek your input not to act on it, but to document for the file the fact that they made an honest attempt to obtain it. Thus, agencies collect data to file it and thus satisfy NEPA requirements. . . . From an agency's point of view it is perfectly logical to aggressively seek your input, then just as aggressively ignore it.¹⁰¹

In order to maintain its masquerade as an agency truly concerned with public input while still getting what it

⁹⁸ *Ibid.* 111.

⁹⁹ Twight and Lyden, "Multiple Use vs. Organizational Commitment," 481.

¹⁰⁰ Jim Britell, "When You Must Negotiate. . . . Negotiate to Win" *Forest Watch* (May 1991), 17-24.

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.* 18.

wants, Britell argues that the Forest Service has become extremely sophisticated in its orchestration of public meetings and negotiations. By employing principles of group psychology, conflict management, and other persuasive techniques, Britell finds that:

managers or facilitators choreograph meetings so that peer group pressure smothers substance. Even people who strongly disapprove of deforestation are often carried along into acquiescing to things they know are wrong.¹⁰²

According to Britell, their never-ending quest for the appearance of consensus leads the Forest Service to "classify public reaction in two categories: 'yes' and 'maybe'.... nonresponse is as good as a positive and enthusiastic 'yes'. Silence is endorsement."¹⁰³

Other critics point to the entire EIS process as being of questionable substantive value. While it has led to substantial changes in administrative procedure, argues Rosenbaum, NEPA has yet to translate into real changes in policy. This is because the courts have thus far interpreted the act to require an agency to merely list impacts, however damaging, rather than actually alter its policies.¹⁰⁴ According to critics, this reduces the EIS to nothing more than a pro-

¹⁰² *Ibid.* 21.

¹⁰³ *Ibid.* 19.

¹⁰⁴ Walter Rosenbaum, "The End of Illusion: NEPA and the Limits of Judicial Review" in Stuart Nagel (editor), *Environmental Politics* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1974), 261-268. The courts' interpretations notwithstanding, the truest original intentions of NEPA are, to this day, unclear to scholars.

cedural requirement. "Virtually nobody," claims Lynton Caldwell, "seems to read and make use of environmental impact statements, particularly the decisionmakers who must act on the projects for which the statements are prepared."¹⁰⁵

Can the Forest Service Change?

An issue that has long concerned students of bureaucracy involves whether agencies are flexible enough to change or whether principles of bureaucratic structure or behavior prevent this. Most critics of the Forest Service tend to discount the possibility for any meaningful change in the agency. While capture theorists would implicate single-client domination¹⁰⁶, organizational values theorists argue that rigid socialization breeds a stubborn adherence to agency norms and values which resists change at all costs. Budget driven models, meanwhile, would stress the constraints placed upon the agency's policy outputs by budgetary realities. In any of these scenarios, the most that can be expected are superficial and highly symbolic gestures which attempt to put a new face on business as usual.

There are other theorists, though, most notably Daniel Mazmanian and Jeanne Nienaber, who suggest quite the oppo-

¹⁰⁵ Caldwell quoted in Walter Rosenbaum, "The Bureaucracy and Environmental Policy" in James Lester (editor), *Environmental Politics and Policies* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press), 218.

¹⁰⁶ Capture theorists would have to admit, though, that a captured agency did change from its earlier "watchdog" phase into being captured. Still, they tend to stress the persistence of this situation once it develops.

site; any agency interested in maintaining itself as a viable organization can and will adapt to a changing political environment.¹⁰⁷ In fact, Clarke and McCool consider this adaptability to be one of the primary reasons for the Forest Service's "superstar" status.¹⁰⁸

The issue of whether the Forest Service can change has become especially important in the last several decades because of profound changes in the political context within which the agency must operate. There is near-universal consensus among scholars that the Forest Service began as a strongly utilitarian and elitist agency. For a good deal of its history, it operated with little outside interference, fulfilling its preferred role as technical expert. In the last several decades, however, the agency's mandate has been expanded to embrace what Culhane considers two fundamentally contradictory elements: rational, comprehensive planning as well as a high degree of responsiveness to public input.¹⁰⁹ The primary question, then, revolves around whether the Forest Service will successfully make the transition and adopt roles and attitudes traditionally anathemic to it or respond with hostility, reluctance and symbolic gestures?

¹⁰⁷ Daniel Mazmanian and Jeanne Nienaber, *Can Organizations Change?* (Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institute, 1979).

¹⁰⁸ Clarke and McCool, 38.

¹⁰⁹ Culhane, "Public Participation in Forest Service Planning," 1.

As we have seen, most agency critics dispute the possibility for real change in the Forest Service. As recently as 1988, Twight and Lyden found commodity production to still clearly be the primary value of the agency despite all of the changes that were supposed to have taken place.¹¹⁰ A growing body of evidence, however, comes to the opposite conclusion. Those who characterize the Forest Service as flexible see it as a dynamic agency with a diverse personnel from which to draw new ideas. Even a half-century ago Aldo Leopold recognized a diversity of values in his agency where one group was "quite content to grow trees like cabbages" with "no inhibition regarding violent manipulation of nature," while another group "worries on biotic as well as economic grounds."¹¹¹

According to a number of researchers, trends in the Forest Service indicate that the dominant "cabbage-growers" of Leopold's dichotomy are steadily losing influence to the latter group. Attitudinal studies by Catherine McCarthy, Paul Sabatier, and John Loomis, Connie Bullis and James Kennedy, and Kennedy and Thomas Quigley all show values among Forest Service personnel during the last decade to be shifting away from a strict commodity orientation and more favor-

¹¹⁰ Twight and Lyden, "Multiple Use vs. Organizational Commitment."

¹¹¹ Leopold quoted in Frome, 4.

ably inclined towards public input.¹¹² According to Bullis, the agency's role is thus shifting from *expert* to *servant* while its culture is transforming accordingly.¹¹³ No longer just aloof technicians, rangers are now alleged to see their proper role to be as facilitators and mediators. The Forest Service, then, has come to be seen by change model advocates as less strictly aligned with a single set of traditional agency values. One reason, according to Bullis and Kennedy and Culhane, is that it has internalized the multiple use values foisted upon it by Congress long ago.¹¹⁴

One reason put forth for this supposedly greater diversity of values is a growing trend in the agency towards the inclusion of specialists besides foresters within the ranks. It is argued that this new breed which includes wildlife biologists, landscape architects, hydrologists, and soil scientists (as well as more women and minorities) have brought new perspectives and values to the agency.¹¹⁵

¹¹² McCarthy, Sabatier, and Loomis, 12; Bullis and Kennedy, 550-551; Kennedy and Quigley study cited in McCarthy and Loomis, 8.

¹¹³ Bullis cited in Tipple and Wellman, 424.

¹¹⁴ Bullis and Kennedy, 542; Culhane, *Public Lands Politics*, 125-129.

¹¹⁵ Tipple and Wellman, 424. Christopher Leman claims that non-foresters now outnumber foresters among Forest Service personnel. Even Bullis, generally an advocate of the change model, admits, however, that many of these newer specialists are not well-integrated and cannot break into the "old-boy network" of foresters who still constitute the real power structure in the agency. Leman and Bullis cited in Tipple and Wellman, 425

Tipple and Wellman argue that along with increased agency heterogeneity has come more internal contention.¹¹⁶ A letter written by disgruntled Region One supervisors to Chief Robertson in early 1990 vividly illustrates the growing dissatisfaction within the ranks in the late 1980s and early 1990s:

Many people, internally as well externally, believe the current emphasis of national forest programs does not reflect the land stewardship values reflected in our forest plan....We have become a dysfunctional Forest Service family.¹¹⁷

The agency's legendary esprit de corps has been further undermined recently by highly controversial whistleblower allegations and forced resignations of a number of employees, most notably Region One Forester Mumma who refused to meet what he felt were unsustainably high timber quotas for his region.¹¹⁸ Perhaps the clearest indication of this growing dissent has been the formation of the Association of Forest Service Employees for Environmental Ethics (AFSEEE). The organization, to which several thousand Forest Service employees belong, advocates strong measures for environmental protection and represents a dramatic schism in agency values.¹¹⁹

¹¹⁶ Tipple and Wellman, 424.

¹¹⁷ Letter quoted in Egan, "Forest Service Abusing Role...", 26.

¹¹⁸ For a summary of recent whistleblower controversies, see Paul Schneider, "When a Whistle Blows in the Forest...." *Audubon* (January/February 1992), 42-49; "Forest Service Chops Whistleblowers" *Environment* 34 (April 1992), 23-24.

¹¹⁹ A University of Idaho survey found that 93% of AFSEEE members vs. 45% of line officers (rangers and supervisors)

Tipple and Wellman attribute recent changes in the Forest Service to a number of factors that did not exist in Kaufman's day when he portrayed the agency. First, there has been a slew of land management legislation in the 1960s and 70s which imposed a host of new regulatory requirements upon the agency. Kaufman's rangers, for example, would have never heard of forest plans, EISS, federally endangered species, or designated wilderness to name but a few. These same laws also mandated that the decisionmaking process be opened up to public input and in many cases specified how that was to be achieved.¹²⁰ A good argument could certainly be made that the Forest Service would never have embraced public participation on such a scale on its own. Finally, changes in the larger sociopolitical context, such as the growth of the environmental movement, changes in social values, or the increased incidence of litigation and citizen monitoring, are alleged to have generated monumental pressures upon the agency.¹²¹

and 58% of all employees favor increased preservation of old growth while 21% of AFSEEE employees vs. 84% of line officers and 62% of general staff believe the agency has maintained environmental laws to the letter and spirit. Survey cited in "Studies Probe Bias in Forest Service" *Inner Voice* (Spring 1991), 8.

¹²⁰ Tipple and Wellman, 423.

¹²¹ *Ibid.*

Bureaucratic Administration in the Siskiyou National Forest

As previously mentioned, it is the ultimate aim of this chapter to test whether or not bureaucratic administration in the Siskiyou has conformed to pluralist principles, at least for the period of 1983 to 1992. Specifically, this is achieved through an analysis of the Siskiyou case within the context of the models of Forest Service behavior we have just reviewed. For the most part, the capture, organizational values, and budget-driven models are critical of the Forest Service. For different reasons, each model finds the agency biased towards the interests of timber producers and thereby in violation of a number of criteria for pluralist administration. Only the pluralist/professional model, therefore, finds the Forest Service to be behaving in a balanced, responsive and flexible manner. Table 16 sums up the main points of these four models.

If the administrators of the Siskiyou National Forest are to be characterized as balanced, responsive, and open to ecological values, one would expect their behavior regarding the formulation and implementation of the major policy outputs in the Siskiyou from 1983 to 1992 to conform more closely to the pluralist/professional model. On the other hand, if the administrators' behavior more closely resembles any one critical model or combination thereof, it could be

TABLE 16

SUMMARY OF FOUR MODELS OF FOREST SERVICE
ADMINISTRATION¹

	Captured	Budget Driven	Organizational Values-Driven	Pluralist
Nature of Clientele	single/ dominant	irrelevant	irrelevant	multiple
Access to Agency	only for dominant client	low/ closed	low/ closed	high/open to all clients
Influence of Partic.	high only for domin- ant client	low	low	high
Chief Determinant of Policy	dominant client's demands	expansion of budget	utilitar- ian values	public input/ profession- al values
Overall Competence	low	low	low	high
Flexibility/ Innovation	low	low	low	high
Balance of Interests	poor	poor	poor	good

¹Kaufman's work falls somewhere between the organization-
al values and pluralist/professional categories. While he
stresses the role of internal norms and values and charac-
terized the agency as a closed system, he still found the
Forest Service to be extremely competent and fairly flex-
ible.

said that the Siskiyou National Forest did not operate as a pluralist agency.¹²²

In order to determine whether the Siskiyou National Forest has been as open, flexible, and responsive as pluralists might predict, the following questions must be considered:

1. Did Forest Service administrators recognize and interact in good faith with a multiple set of clients including ecological interests? While a pluralist agency would be expected to identify as clients and cultivate good working relations with any and all interested parties, administrators in a closed or captured agency would probably only recognize one interest--the timber industry--as its client or at least treat that client in a clearly preferential way.

2. Did the Siskiyou National Forest provide adequate opportunities for public participation and were these opportunities sufficiently advertised and carried out in a fair and balanced manner? A pluralist agency could be expected

¹²² Keep in mind, however, that this chapter's analysis tests only that variant of pluralist theory which characterizes agencies as balanced and administrators as policy brokers. None of the critical Forest Service models are necessarily incompatible with Kelso's or Cobb and Elder's less idealistic vision of bureaucracies in a pluralist system--that agencies may indeed be biased, but the system's overall fragmentation overcomes this. Also, it is important to note that technically, this chapter's analysis will not specifically test in any systematic way all aspects of all the critical models, but instead, whether the pluralist or critical models, broadly conceived, are more accurate. This does not rule out, however, speculation as to which critical model might be most appropriate in a given instance.

ted to hold numerous and varied forums as well as keep all potentially interested sectors of the public adequately informed as to both the issues facing the Forest and upcoming opportunities to participate. A non-pluralistic agency, on the other hand, might be expected to act in a purposefully lax, negligent, and/or biased manner regarding both opportunities to participate and the dissemination of information to the public. For example, key individuals or groups may be left out of participatory forums, certain types of forums might be avoided, or crucial information regarding Forest Service policies and intentions might be withheld.

3. Did the various participatory forums represent meaningful opportunities for public input as pluralists would suggest or were they merely pro forma exercises designed to appease critics and technically satisfy mandated participation requirements?

4. Did Siskiyou officials' values seem to be closer to utilitarianism and a strict timber production orientation as critics would charge or did they conform more to principles of multiple use and agency responsiveness? Was there evidence that any of these values were a primary determinant of agency decisions?

5. Did the Siskiyou National Forest display evidence of flexibility and an authentic willingness to change or did the agency resist accomodation and try to co-opt change through skillful public relations?

The Siskiyou National Forest and Its Clientele

A multiple set of clients is a prerequisite for any agency to act as a policy broker. The previous chapter has made it clear that the politics of the Siskiyou have involved two very well-organized interests locked in competition. To some pluralists, this fact alone rules out any potential for capture. This study, however, holds out the possibility that an agency may not recognize as clients or interact with all manifest interests, thus the mere existence of multiple interests is not enough to rule out capture. The real question, then, is whether ecological interests were fully recognized and dealt with by Siskiyou personnel.

Amongst most all the participants interviewed, whether agency, timber, or environmentalist, there seemed to be a consensus that, at least after 1983, the Forest Service has recognized and granted access to a multiple clientele. That environmentalists were recognized as a legitimate interest seems to be a fact pretty much taken for granted by all concerned parties. The articulate, well-organized ecological interests that have sprung up in the 1980s have become politically impossible to ignore.

It was not always this way on the Siskiyou, however. According to the former supervisor, environmentalists had "been shut out on this forest for some time. I opened my doors....unfortunately my predecessor hadn't." Thus, McCormick had made a point to consider environmentalists as well

as timber interests as clients of the agency. "I saw both of them," states McCormick, "as valid parts of the south Oregon community." Even members of Earth First Siskiyou, a source of unending grief for the Forest Service were considered by McCormick, at least, as legitimate constituents of his agency.¹²³

While Siskiyou environmentalists do not deny that the Forest Service has recognized them and granted them access, many have characterized their interaction with the agency as strained and, as one activist put it, "adversarial." One common complaint of the environmentalists has been a lack of informal access, something which all Siskiyou personnel interviewed claimed they granted to all clients. More than anything else, this discrepancy seems to be a case of differing interpretations of what constitutes *informality*. To the Forest Service, informal access is any contact outside of the formal participation process (meetings, workshops, field trips, etc.). Environmentalists, on the other hand, tend to perceive of informal access as their being closely confided in rather than merely heard or sounded out. While the door to the supervisor's office was, for the most part, literally and figuratively open to environmentalists, the

¹²³ To their credit, even the most radical environmental groups, such as Earth First, did their homework regarding forest policy; a fact that the Siskiyou National Forest could not help but respect. This knowledgability and articulateness, despite all their militance and drama, won certain members of radical groups a place at the table.

timber interests did seem privileged to more informal access, even using the Forest Service's broader definition of such access. The majority of impromptu phone calls, office visits, and social meetings (such as SOTIA's weekly breakfasts or dinners to which the supervisor was routinely invited) tended to be between Forest Service personnel and the timber interests.¹²⁴ "We get to see all fifty-two cards," claimed one timber official who reported a great deal of informal contact with the Siskiyou, especially at the lower ranger district level.

While their access to the policymaking process increased dramatically after McCormick's arrival in 1983, environmentalists feel that McCormick's replacement has been somewhat less open to them. Not surprisingly, timber officials report a much improved relationship with the supervisor's office since McCormick's departure in 1990. According to the former supervisor, timber interests were suspicious of him from the start due to his background in recreational management rather than forestry. McCormick claims that he arrived at the Siskiyou "with a cloud over me. I wasn't a traditional timber-oriented forest supervisor."

Timber's coolness towards McCormick did not necessarily translate into close relations between the supervisor and

¹²⁴ This seems to confirm Henning and Mangun's observation that environmentalists concerned with noneconomic land uses tend to have more fleeting contact with field personnel than do commodity interests. Henning and Mangun, 57.

environmentalists. Although his office was open and he professed to have a good working relationship with both national and local environmental groups, McCormick expressed his exasperation at what he perceived as environmentalist intransigence:

In some ways, environmental folks were getting more militant in spite of as much as I had invited them to the decisionmaking table....I was getting frustratedit could never be good enough....No matter what I did or we did together, it was never enough....it was always more they wanted.

Under the new supervisor, though, this relationship has strained further. The supervisor himself characterizes it as "frank and candid." While there is no turning back on the environmentalists' hard-won access, they have now come to look back on McCormick's tenure far more fondly. Whether the new supervisor's more distant style has been a function of personal style, deep-seated conviction, or orders from above remains to be seen.

Formal Participation: Opportunity and Conduct

As mentioned before, a pluralist agency would be expected to offer sufficient opportunities, conducted in a fair and balance manner, for all interests to participate. While it can be said that the Siskiyou National Forest recognized environmentalists as legitimate interests, the question remains as to precisely what opportunities for participation were extended to them and whether these satisfied the criteria for pluralist administration.

The opportunities for formal participation required on the Siskiyou, as with all national forests, are spelled out in a variety of statutes including NEPA, NFMA, RPA, and FLPMA as well as the Forest Service's own *Manual*. While there are opportunities for participation on the Siskiyou for a whole range of decisions down to the most local and mundane, the most widespread and important of this participation corresponds with NEPA's EIS process. NEPA provides for comment periods and public meetings to accompany various stages of the process (see appendix F for a detailed description of these stages). Since this study concentrates on a series of major policy decisions, most of which required an EIS, the participation that is focused on here has largely revolved around the EIS process.

The first step in any meaningful participation program is for the administrating agency to provide information on its plans and intentions as well as adequately announce in advance opportunities for participation to all potentially interested groups and individuals. Especially vigorous forms of participation may require even more detailed information on Forest Service activities.

For the most part, the Siskiyou National Forest has strictly followed NEPA regulations and has been fairly scrupulous in announcing upcoming opportunities to participate, notifying potential participants, and keeping the public informed of its general intentions. After issuing a *notice of*

intent (usually in major local newspapers) regarding a timber sale, or a group of sales, or other such projects, the Forest would rely on fairly extensive mailing and phone lists of potentially interested groups and individuals in order to solicit participants and identify key issues regarding the specific sale or project. Such issues are then developed into the various *alternatives* to be considered in the EIS. This initial process is known as *scoping*.

Specific public meetings and workshops were usually advertised (often with full-page spreads) in a number of daily newspapers and radio stations in the area. In addition, the Forest Service has sometimes even produced and distributed their own brochures describing a proposed action and (when the process has proceeded to that point) listing and explaining the various alternatives to be considered.

One major opportunity for public participation on the Siskiyou has been via the comment periods that follow the release of the draft and final EISs. Much of this input takes the form of comments sent through the mail to the Forest Service. As discussed in chapter two, the Siskiyou has seen some of the highest rates of mail response in the entire national forest system.¹²⁵ Mail comments, therefore,

¹²⁵ The Silver Fire Project elicited 28,000 post-draft responses, while the Forest Plan got 16,983 (compared to two to three thousand for an average plan). The Shasta Costa and Canyon Projects, for their size, also prompted extremely large amounts of mail; six hundred and eight hundred respectively. Much of this volume might be attributed to the high

have clearly been the most widespread form of participation in terms of total number of people involved. Letters have ranged in length from the very brief and to the near-epic, while their content has run the gamut from completely uninformed to extremely technical and/or articulate. Many other letters were of a mass-produced, interest group-sponsored "fill-in-the-blanks" variety (such as SORA's Silver Fire salvage campaign).

The Forest Service's official line regarding mail is that it is an integral part of its decisionmaking process and that each letter is thoroughly reviewed and fully considered.¹²⁶ A number of participants, though, have their doubts about the agency's sincerity as well as the ultimate usefulness of what Culhane derisively terms "mailbag-stuffing games."¹²⁷ The most generous assessment of mail comment would be that it helps the agency take the public's pulse and identify and define issues and areas of concern. Even Siskiyou personnel, however, agree that it is not much of a factor in shaping or changing actual decisions. Although the Forest did categorize and conduct content analyses of the mail it received, out-and-out "vote-counting," according to one official was never done. Participation,

levels of interest group organization in the Siskiyou as well as its high national profile.

¹²⁶ Culhane, "Public Participation....," 11.

¹²⁷ *Ibid.* 12.

claims the supervisor, is not a "contest."¹²⁸ As a result of this attitude, complains one timber interest participant, the Forest Service is always free to implement whatever course it chooses regardless of a clear trend in the public's response (which timber felt favored them): "If comments go their way, they claim support; if comments go against them they claim they're not substantive."

Siskiyou personnel seem to agree with Culhane's 1991 study which finds meetings and workshops to be a far superior forum for participation than mail comments.¹²⁹ Although they involve far fewer individuals, such face-to-face meetings tend to bring together key local actors and facilitate the sort of political interaction that is more influential than merely mailing in one's opinion. Face-to-face interaction on the Siskiyou has largely taken the following forms: (1) formal informational gatherings (public meetings, field trips, or small group briefings) in which Forest Service officials give a presentation on their tentative plans

¹²⁸ In terms of raw numbers, timber interests, with their well-organized campaign of mail-in forms outnumbered environmental responses in the Silver Fire and the Forest Plan. In Silver, for example, environmentalists sent only 38% of the responses of timber. In some of the smaller projects, however, environmental responses were in the majority. For instance, support for the environmentally preferable alternative in the Canyon DEIS outnumbered that for timber's alternative 69% to 18%. Siskiyou National Forest. Also, according to the Forest Service's content analysis, longer and more detailed letters tended to favor environmental positions. USDA Forest Service, Siskiyou National Forest, *Content Analysis Report for Silver Fire Recovery Project DEIS*, internal document, (May 1988).

¹²⁹ Culhane, "Public Participation....," 11-12.

and proposals and then answer questions or (2) workshops which have been designed as more open and informal "give-and-take" sessions between all parties. Such workshops have most commonly been held in the planning periods preceding the draft EIS.¹³⁰

Under McCormick, the Siskiyou began to rely upon workshops more heavily than formal public meetings, keeping the latter down to the minimum required by NEPA. Applying the philosophy that it is "better to have [interests] on the front end than the back end," McCormick contended that workshops were the best way to encourage issue resolution and creative solutions and break out of the old patterns of "business as usual." McCormick clearly expressed his faith in the unabashedly pluralist notion that "creative solutions can come out of mixed groups with different values....just sort of fightin' it out." He further reinforces this notion of administrator as mediator when he explains that:

I just didn't have the idea were the balance was. I wanted to put the responsibility there....with those

¹³⁰ Whereas the vast majority of mail comment is sent to the Forest in response to a DEIS or FEIS after it has been released, interactive participation on the Siskiyou has tended to occur before these decisions were made (in other words, before and after the DEIS). According to many participants, the most meaningful negotiations took place before the draft EIS. Post-DEIS participation, both mailed and interactive (usually formal meetings), has tended to focus more upon the draft's alternatives (especially the Forest Service's preferred alternative) and why a given alternative is opposed or supported. Post-FEIS participation, meanwhile, is usually by mail and most often is a last-ditch critique or appeal to the administrators to reconsider their decision before the Record of Decision is released.

folks [the various interests] and help them decide with us where the appropriate balance was as best we could on a local basis....The only way I knew how to do that was to bring folks to the table.

This new emphasis on less formal, more interactive workshops was first implemented in the Silver Fire Project. It reached its peak, however, during planning for Shasta Costa in which interests were intensely involved and kept closely informed. Whether workshops are truly the wave of the future on the Siskiyou is still not quite clear, though, as a number of district-level projects since Shasta Costa (including Canyon, Quosatana/Bradford, Two Forks, and West Indigo) have backed away from workshop-style participation.¹³¹ The reasons for the Forest Service's retreat are not certain. Time constraints, these projects' smaller-scale, changes in the supervisor's management style, external pressure from upper levels of the agency or the Department of Agriculture, and severe budget problems¹³² have all been offered as possible explanations.

Some environmentalists take this as evidence that the Siskiyou is still not truly committed to workshops or participatory decisionmaking in general. While they generally applaud the planning process for the Silver Fire and Shasta Costa, environmentalists worry that the dearth of workshops and emphasis on presentational public meetings in succeeding

¹³¹ The Canyon project did, however, permit a few environmentalists to sit in on a several project planning sessions as observers.

¹³² Workshops are expensive and labor-intensive; the planning process for Shasta Costa alone cost nearly \$1 million.

projects may be the shape of things to come. One activist complained that environmentalists even had to go to the extent of filing Freedom of Information Act requests for information on the recent Canyon decision. Environmentalists allege that the Siskiyou has not always been forthcoming with more detailed records and data that have been requested at other times (especially concerning sensitive issues such as reforestation failure rates or sustained yield models).

According to one environmentalist, the Siskiyou would like to have everyone believe that it is on the cutting edge regarding workshop participation. Perhaps in the late 1980s it was, but other forests have certainly surpassed it. The activist, who once considered the Siskiyou as the vanguard, has since been exposed to the participation processes on other national forests (some of which regularly hold negotiating workshops all the way up to the release of the FEIS) and now characterizes the Forest as "extremely behind the times."

While these complaints and doubts cannot be brushed aside, it is still probably fair to say that, overall, the trend in the Siskiyou, at least for most of the time frame of this study, has been towards the increased sharing of information and opportunities to participate. "Generally there's more [meetings] than you could keep up with," admitted one environmental activist. What is less clear is how meaningful these meetings and workshops, however plentiful,

have been. Timber industry participants, for example, tend to be skeptical about the value of sitting everyone down at the same table. One timber official acknowledged the necessity of speaking up and being counted, but doubted the probability of finding consensus in such a polarized environment:

They get you together and we're supposed to all hold hands and go home happy....it doesn't work that way. If we move off our polarized position and they move off theirs, then they've given up ground or we've given up ground. That's what it amounts to. So you can't--you have to go in there and say "we want max timber" and they go in and say "we want max environmental protection" and try to let the Forest Service sort it out....

The Forest Service, according to the timber official, is thus plagued with indecision; by trying to "make everyone happy" and not "raise a red flag" to anyone, it remains paralyzed. Another timber official, meanwhile, had a different complaint in that he found workshops to be just a big sales pitch: "It reminds me of going to an Amway meetingThey just try to sell you on how wonderful it is."

Not surprisingly, the former supervisor reports that, at least initially, he met quite a bit of resistance from timber interests, especially the head of SORA at the time, who "just didn't like to sit around a table and work things out with [Earth First members]." The workshops, says McCormick, "caused some people some heartburn."

Although McCormick reports that the environmentalists have generally been far more willing and eager to sit down

with the enemy and negotiate,¹³³ they too have had serious misgivings about the workshop process. Environmentalists in the Siskiyou have tended to have a fairly low sense of efficacy regarding their participation. They seem to perceive of workshops and even the whole EIS process as a combination of public relations and a minor regulatory obligation that the agency must attend to before doing what it plans to do anyway. As a result, they come to see themselves on a workshop panel as "sacrificial lambs."¹³⁴

Siskiyou environmentalists, therefore, tend to believe that the EIS process has forced the Forest Service to make only procedural rather than substantive changes in its policy. One activist argued that "planners must collect environmental information before they can legally offer timber sales, but if they acted on the information they collect they would often have to abandon the sales."¹³⁵ Similarly, another environmentalist complained that regarding NEPA, the Siskiyou was "following the letter of the law, but not necessarily the intent of the law."

A Siskiyou official, however, disputes this, arguing that NEPA requires policymakers merely to look at all angles. It does not, he offers candidly, legally require the

¹³³ One district ranger, however, has noticed that the environmentalist's interest in coming to the bargaining table has waned somewhat since their hand has been strengthened by successful lawsuits.

¹³⁴ Britell, 18.

¹³⁵ *Ibid.* 18-19.

agency to be more democratic or even make better decisions.¹³⁶ Not all Siskiyou officials see the purpose of participation to be the achievement of consensus as the former supervisor had. Instead, the current supervisor describes a successful program of participation as that which minimizes objections rather than maximizes support. The supervisor's rationale is that the high level of political conflict in the Siskiyou makes consensus impossible.

Ironically, the supervisor's perception of the goal of workshops and participation as the minimization of objection is not all that far removed from the environmentalists' claim that workshops are designed to manage dissent. According to a veteran participant of Siskiyou workshops, the main use of such public forums is for the Siskiyou's planners to promote the appearance of approval as they scramble to meet unsustainable quotas on a rapidly depleting forest base.¹³⁷ Because they are "planning timber sales that are worse and worse"¹³⁸ in roadless areas, steep inclines, owl habitat, and similarly controversial areas, it is argued that they desperately need environmentalist acquiescence to avoid lengthy appeals and lawsuits. Using the workshop process and

¹³⁶ A number of court rulings on NEPA suggest that at least in terms of judicial interpretation thus far, the Forest Service official is right. What Congress truly intended this somewhat ambiguous mandate to be is another question. It does seem to defeat the law's purpose to just identify harmful impacts and then carry them out anyway. See Rosenbaum, "The End of Illusion....," 261-268.

¹³⁷ Britell, 17-18.

¹³⁸ *Ibid.* 17.

highly skilled facilitators, the Siskiyou, more than ever before, has sought to tame the environmentalist threat by letting them in on the process, and, as any normal bureaucratic agency would be expected to do, co-opt the client. Says the activist:

Agencies are willing to give activists an endless supply of elk viewing areas, maps, rides in helicopters, new trails and schmoozing. Anything and everything except trees.¹³⁹

Unfortunately for the Forest Service, though, it is this last item that the environmentalists want most. As pointed out earlier, Klay and McElveen identify zero-sum interests as the hardest of all to co-opt, hence the conflict and sense of inefficacy and dissatisfaction on the part of the environmentalists.

How Influential Was Participation?

The ultimate question regarding participation, then, is: *did it really matter?* Was public input truly incorporated into the agency's decisionmaking process and did this input really have the power to influence or change the agency's decisions? As might be expected, the Siskiyou's administrators were confident that participation on their forest really did matter and accounted for "a lot of decisionmaking." They characterized it as "very important," and having a "major influence."

¹³⁹ *Ibid.* 20.

Interest group participants, however, have tended to be far less convinced of their influence and efficacy as we have previously seen. Both timber interests and environmentalists have generally felt that participation has been effective only when it concerns minor issues. "The big picture issues," complains one timber official, "don't change at all." Only in rare cases when the stakes are low enough, reports one environmentalist, has she seen workshop participation have a direct effect in swaying or altering a decision. Otherwise, she claims, the Siskiyou just goes through "lock-step NEPA." According to another activist, it is usually a matter of "justifying a decision already made."

Some of the interest group participants' characterizations, though, were a bit more charitable. One activist, for instance, conceded that the Siskiyou's administrators "do change some of their decisions if we put enough pressure on them," but, she was careful to add, "I don't feel that they significantly change them." Another interviewee admitted that participation was at least partially effective at encouraging New Forestry techniques. According to one environmentalist, the Siskiyou's administrators do occasionally "do some things in response to the public." To timber, meanwhile, the importance of just getting in there around the table to offset the demands of the environmentalists was justification enough to participate.

Still, real change, environmentalists argue, has come thus far only from lawsuits. Because of this fear of lawsuits, environmentalists maintain that the Siskiyou tends to use the participatory process "to write litigation-proof documents" by using environmentalist objections to point out to the agency their own legal weak spots. While the activist meant this as a criticism, others might construe some positive effects in such influence if, in fact, it leads to less violations of environmental laws.

Actually measuring the influence of participation upon policymaking in a systematic way is an incredibly difficult task. One problem is there is a certain amount of subjectivity inherent in any such analysis. While a well-designed analysis will eliminate some of this, in the end, the nature, motives, and intent of Forest Service actions as well as where these decisions fall on a political spectrum are still largely subjective matters. For example, Culhane, who sees the Sierra Club as "radical" and "extremist"¹⁴⁰ could be criticized by some as seeing even the slightest policy crumb thrown to environmentalists (an elk viewing area, perhaps?) as sufficient evidence of Forest Service balance and responsiveness to input. Another analyst with a different set of expectations as to what constitutes fair and balanced, on the other hand, might abide by far more rigorous criteria for evidence of responsiveness.

¹⁴⁰ Culhane, *Public Lands Politics*, 154, 167.

Is it, for instance, the sign of a balanced compromise or just "policy crumbs" to plan to log only 65% of old growth instead of 75% or enter roadless areas from the edges rather than through the center? How can one precisely identify so relative a concept as compromise when dealing with so non-quantifiable a concept as ecological values and demands? Likewise, what precisely distinguishes a meaningful response from a fraudulent or symbolic one? Which was Shasta Costa? A strong case could certainly be made for either characterization.

Another problem in trying to determine the true influence of participation is the unavoidable subtlety and multi-dimensionality of the relationship between participation and Forest Service behavior. While it would certainly be analytically more tidy if the former led directly to the latter, reality is a much messier situation as a multitude of other variables make the politics of the Siskiyou far more complex. What portion of a policy decision, for example, could be accounted for by agency goals and values, personal values, external political pressures, internal budgetary constraints, or legislative directives?

Proving the influence of participation becomes even more difficult when there are two interests of roughly equal power pulling in different directions. The thesis of Culhane's study is that a local manager's policy outputs will roughly reflect the makeup of his or her constituency; if

the environmentalists are better organized in one area, then policies could be expected to be more favorable to them than in an area where mining or timber interests hold an edge.¹⁴¹ As clearly shown in chapter four, competing interests in the Siskiyou were in a rough balance of power. Should we then expect a corresponding middle-of-the-road balance of Forest Service outputs or does this, as Culhane admits happens sometimes, lead to both interests cancelling each other out so that the agency "could effectively ignore public participation input" and act autonomously?¹⁴²

Despite all the difficulties, limitations, and imprecisions inherent in such an analysis, it is still clearly worth trying to systematically determine as well as possible to what extent participation on the Siskiyou has had a real influence. This shall be attempted by examining all of the post-1983 policy initiatives on the Siskiyou which required environmental impact statements and the formal participation process that accompanies it up until the end of 1992. Of these, four were final EISS¹⁴³, while three other projects had reached only the draft EIS stage by the end of this

¹⁴¹ *Ibid.* 333.

¹⁴² *Ibid.* 240.

¹⁴³ Technically, the FEIS merely states the final preferred alternative for policy action. The true final decision after which policy can actually be implemented is the Record of Decision (ROD). The ROD, though, almost always formally chooses and authorizes the FEIS-preferred alternative. As of the end of 1992, only the Silver Fire project and the Forest Plan had had formal RODs issued.

study's time frame.¹⁴⁴ In addition to these EIS decisions, one non-EIS policy output is considered here as well. This decision, involving roadbuilding and timber sales in the North Kalmiopsis was made prior to the point in late 1980s when roadless entry automatically required an EIS. In all, these eight policy initiatives account for the overwhelming portion of political conflict and interest group activity on the Siskiyou from 1983-1992.

As we have seen in this chapter and the last, interest group participation in the Siskiyou has involved in roughly equal proportions both timber interests and environmentalists. However, one also needs to consider the historic dominance of timber interests in the Siskiyou's participatory process all the way up until the point when environmentalists began to seriously organize and challenge the Forest Service in the early to mid-1980s. If one assumes that participation really matters, then it could be said that prior to 1983, the Siskiyou's administrators were being influenced by the participation, largely informal,¹⁴⁵ of predominantly one interest--the local timber industry. Presuming then that

¹⁴⁴ While the final decision is sometimes quite a bit different from the draft, the preferred alternative identified in the draft usually serves as a starting point from which Forest Service decisionmakers can then modify or fine-tune their final decision. As such, the draft stage policy decisions represented by these three cases, though they may eventually be altered, still provide a fairly useful indicator of the substance and direction of Siskiyou policymaking.

¹⁴⁵ It was not until the EIS process was established by NEPA that there was much of a formal participation process, besides the written appeals of timber sales.

timber voices were essentially the only ones being heard by the Forest Service before 1983, any increase after that point in bipartisan participation might be expected to lead to more ecologically sound outputs than had been generated before, even if that participation also included a fairly equal presence of timber interests.

The assumption that this study works from, then, is that timber's participation has in one form or another been there all along and thus it tends to merely reinforce pressure that is already there. Environmental participation, on the other hand, presents a whole new set of demands that have never before been confronted or addressed. Thus, if participation is truly influential on the Siskiyou, we could expect increased formal participation *in general* to lead to more environmental outputs. Less formal participation, on the other hand should lead to an increased reliance upon the agency's own timber production goals and the informal contacts and previous patterns of influence that have historically favored timber interests.

Among the eight Siskiyou policy decisions this study compares, distinctions can be made as to the degree of formal participation (high, medium, or low) which occurred prior to the decision as well as the decision's relative position on a timber-environmental continuum in which 0 = the timber position and 1.0 = the environmental position. A decision's overall value on the scale is determined by where

it fell relative to the timber industry's and the environmentalist's preferred alternatives in regards to four variables: timber harvest volume, road construction, roadless areas, and old growth.¹⁴⁶ If increased participation truly helped environmentalists' to better achieve their goals, then index values should be higher in those decisions featuring increased participation and lower in decisions made with lower levels of participation (for details regarding how categories were determined and what the participant's pre-draft positions and concerns were, see appendices G and H).

Table 17 shows that there seems to be at least some correlation between the level of formal participation and how strictly timber-oriented a decision was. For example, the two most clearly timber-oriented decisions, the Two Forks draft and the North Kalmiopsis timber sales of 1982-1987 both featured the least formal participation. The North Kalmiopsis sales, for which EISs were not prepared, featured no real formal participation at all, while the Two Forks project held no public meetings in the crucial period before the draft when issues are identified and alternatives drawn

¹⁴⁶ The position of the North Kalmiopsis decision, because no EIS was prepared for it, does not have an exact value on this scale, so its position is less quantitatively precise. I have placed it where I have on the low end towards timber due to its aggressive harvest targets (employing standard clearcut methods), high road mileage, including the extremely controversial Bald Mountain road, and entry into a fragile roadless area with the largest stands of old growth in the Forest.

up. The only meeting held for Two Forks was to announce and explain the DEIS after it was produced. As for outcomes, the preliminary Two Forks decision features a substantial timber harvest that consumes old growth and roadless areas to a degree higher than even the maximum harvest alternative. The agency's preferred alternative will have, in their own words, a "moderate to high impact" on interior forest-dependent species.¹⁴⁷ The North Kalmiopsis sales were also extremely timber production-oriented; they opened up parts of the largest roadless area outside the wilderness to clearcut sales and mandated the construction of the very controversial eighteen mile Bald Mountain Road to sever the North Kalmiopsis from the Kalmiopsis Wilderness.

Those decisions featuring moderate levels of formal participation (mail comment and pre-draft public meetings, but no workshops) scored higher on the timber-environmental scale. Though still quite timber production-oriented, they made some environmental modifications and concessions. Like the previous decisions, these too entered roadless and old growth areas, but most of these decisions were somewhat scaled down from the timber volume and road construction targets found in the Forest Plan or the projects' original

¹⁴⁷ USDA Forest Service, Pacific Northwest Region, Siskiyou National Forest, *Two Forks Timber Sales and Other Projects Draft Environmental Impact Statement* (Siskiyou National Forest, 1992), sec. II, 17.

proposed action.¹⁴⁸ They also tended, to one extent or another, to incorporate more environmentally sound logging practices regarding both silvicultural techniques, stream protection, and the minimization of fragmentation.

Those decisions in which there was heavy formal participation (mail comment, pre-draft public meetings, and workshops) tended to cluster around the same position on the scale as the moderate participation decisions. The Shasta Costa FEIS and Silver Fire decisions featured considerable logging but also at least some features for environmental protection. Only the Shasta Costa draft clearly conformed to the expectations of high participation/high environmental protection. The draft of this project, which featured perhaps the most intense participation of any decision on the Siskiyou went pretty far not only in instituting fairly far-reaching changes in forestry practices, but also in reducing timber harvests, roads, and intrusions into old growth and roadless areas from the levels suggested in the Plan and the proposed action.¹⁴⁹

¹⁴⁸ The proposed action (PA) is the original tentative proposal to commence activities in a given area according to the Forest Plan. It serves as a starting point from which the scoping process takes place and alternatives to this action are drawn up. On rare occasions, the draft EIS will stick to the PA as its preferred alternative.

¹⁴⁹ The reason the draft and final EISs are considered separately in this analysis is because FEISs are usually subject to more outside political pressures. For example the Forest Plan and Shasta Costa drafts were released after some fairly heavy public participation only to be altered in the final stage by external political pressures coming from Congress, the state, or the upper levels of the agency. Consi-

In sharp contrast to the Shasta Costa draft was the Forest Plan decision which, although it included some fairly heavy levels of participation, was strongly timber-oriented. The fact that only the Shasta Costa draft among the high participation decisions also had a high environmental score may suggest that some sort of threshold exists whereby participation beyond a certain level often hits the brick wall of other decisionmaking factors such as agency goals, external political pressures, and so on. Still, the Siskiyou's policy decisions do show at least some support for the notion of low participation leading to more pro-timber outcomes and vice versa. Overall, then, the layout of points in table 17 is configured in such a way as to suggest that participation is necessary to achieve greater balance in Forest Service decisionmaking, but not sufficient by itself to do so.

If participation on the Siskiyou truly mattered and the Forest Service did indeed meet the pluralist ideal of responsiveness, we could theoretically expect one of two things to occur in this polarized political realm: (1) the agency's decisions would consistently feature a blend of ecological and timber-oriented provisions or (2) looking back over time, some policy outputs would be primarily timber-oriented while others would be predominantly disposed

dering the draft separately can thus provide an additional, perhaps even more authentic measure of the impact of participation.

towards ecological principles. In either scenario a certain overall balance between commodity production and preservation could be expected.

Judging from the actual policy decisions issued in the Siskiyou from 1983 to 1992, it seems that the second scenario could safely be ruled out. All major policy outputs during that time involved substantial commodity production activities; no decision rejected in any significant way the opportunity for timber production in favor of wildlife or ecosystem preservation. Perhaps this should be no great surprise; after all, the agency's self-proclaimed business is to produce timber (more on values later) and most of these decisions revolved around mandatory EISs required to commence logging activities in environmentally sensitive areas.

If the agency did not occasionally support the ecologists' position wholeheartedly in the various major decisions, then the question must shift to whether ecological values were at least partially incorporated somehow into the agency's decisions. This is a much harder and more subjective judgement to make. To the fairly neutral observer, however, the answer would have to be yes, but not to a very great extent. And certainly not anywhere near to the extent that commodity production goals are currently stressed. Environmental participation has, nevertheless, had at least some impact. Most timber projects on the Forest today employ some sort of New Forestry techniques and the agency is far

less likely to engage in the full-blown, at-all-costs clear-cutting of the 1960s, 70s, and early to mid-'80s. The Forest Service has been forced to at least slow down and consider stream quality, wildlife, roadless areas, and old growth, all of which were of no real concern to the forester of thirty or forty years ago. To be sure, the agency is still as eager as ever to cut timber, but environmentalist participation has, in the very least, forced them to seriously confront these issues.

The effect of participation found in this study, then, is not unlike that found by Mohai in his study: participation can have some real influence even if that influence is realized in ways that are not always equitable, balanced, or what the participants really wanted. The mere fact that environmentalists still insist on participating despite that act's alleged uselessness shows that they are probably underestimating, to some extent, their effect. All things being equal, most interests, timber or environmental, tend to feel inefficacious anyway, and given the Forest Service's performance in the last forty years, environmentalists might especially be excused for this perception. Participation's effects, though, can be quite subtle. While Siskiyou officials are not about to recommend wilderness area additions or a significant long-term reduction in harvest rates, they do now behave differently than when did before environmentalists took up the cause.

While much of what the critics of participation say rings true to some degree, to say participation is completely useless and a total fraud is simply inaccurate. The effect of participation could be summed up, then, as limited, but real. There is no direct line between the articulation of interest group or public demands in the participation process and the Forest Service's response. In the Siskiyou, participation matters more as a way to construct very broad boundaries for actions to occur within, rather than as a direct and absolute influence. It is probably true, as critics claim, that much participation is used to formally satisfy EIS requirements and justify pre-determined decisions. But how those broad decisions which perhaps cannot be changed are actually designed and executed is where participatory input can be influential.

For environmentalists, then, the most useful part of participation is to try to offset timber's influence and constantly remind the agency of its obligations to protect non-commodity forest values, not to convince the Forest Service to actually implement their policy desires. While such a modest payoff does little to boost a group's sense of efficacy and faith in the process, it still minimally satisfies pluralist requirements. Thus, the administrators of the Siskiyou are not the ideally responsive servants that some pluralists might claim nor are they the cynical and closed-off manipulators of participation that some critics suggest.

The Role of Values in the Siskiyou

The role of values in the decisionmaking process must also be considered if one is to test the various models of Forest Service administration we have identified. A pluralistic Forest Service, it should be remembered, would be expected to maintain a fairly open, diverse and non-deterministic value-set rooted in multiple use principles. In trying to pinpoint the exact amount of influence that agency values command, however, one runs into the same difficulty that arises when trying to gauge the influence of participation--it is impossible to completely isolate and measure in any precise, quantifiable way. Still, the evidence from this case can tell us a lot about values; what they are and how important a part they play.

If the organizational values model of Twilight and others is to be found valid in this case, one would expect to find evidence that local officials strongly hold a certain set of values and that these have the potential to overrule alternative sources of influence such as public participation or interest group lobbying. As was discussed earlier in this chapter, these allegedly rigid organizational values of the Forest Service would include a strong utilitarianism which stresses commodity production above all other forest values, a strong faith in supposedly rational and highly technical methods of forest management, and an overall belief in planned forestry to achieve social ends.

Pluralist conceptions of the Forest Service, on the other hand, see managers as holding far more diverse and open-ended sets of values. If these sets of values share anything in common in the pluralist view, it is a strong commitment to the principles of multiple use (which is, in many ways, the forest management analogy to pluralist thought itself). Unlike Twight's strictly utilitarian timber production orientation, which would tend to pre-determine policy decisions, multiple use values can essentially be reconciled to just about any type of policy output. Another type of overarching value that one would expect to find in a pluralistic Forest Service is an understanding of and dedication to its role as public servant and facilitator of public participation as opposed to the scientific-elitist characterization advanced by organizational values theorists.

The data from the Siskiyou case¹⁵⁰ finds fairly widespread evidence that both types of value-sets occur amongst Siskiyou officials. As far as utilitarian values are concerned, these managers seemed very comfortable speaking in terms of "outputs and services" "commodity production," "ASQs," "MMBF"--all the language of timber production. In fact, the current supervisor was quite blunt as to what he saw the Forest Service's job to be: "...our objective,

¹⁵⁰ This data was gathered mostly from in-depth interviews with various Siskiyou National Forest administrators and, to a lesser extent, various written decisions and opinions of the Forest Service.

we're very clear, we're going to harvest timber from the national forest--that's what it's all about." He minced no words in expressing that the agency's primary objective is to "produce things and opportunities." Although he claims it has since changed, the former supervisor admits that the pre-1983 Siskiyou National Forest was "just a commodity production forest" which operated under a fairly narrow set of values and objectives; a characterization that closely corresponds to pre-1983 management priorities and policy outputs.

This commodity production orientation was often accompanied by a great deal of confidence in technical solutions. A Siskiyou National Forest press release eagerly reflects this technological faith as it optimistically assures that "with fertilization and other intensive timber management techniques, we can sell an average of 160 million board feet annually, forever."¹⁵¹ Another sign of this highly technical orientation was the scientific jargon such as "resource enhancement mitigation," "integrated resource analysis," "partial retention viewsheds," or "culmination of mean annual increments" that the agency commonly employed.

Siskiyou administrators also paid heed to the traditional concept of using forestry to promote other social and economic ends. The agency's obligation to both local econo-

¹⁵¹ Siskiyou National Forest press release (10 March 1989).

mies and the nation's timber supply were constant themes sounded by most agency interviewees. "While recognizing and protecting the special places on the Forest," claims a Siskiyou press release, "we need also recognize the Nation's timber needs and the role timber plays in community stability."¹⁵²

Although they mostly spoke glowingly of the role of public participation, Siskiyou personnel occasionally displayed the irritation with outside interference and siege mentality that Twilight claims is a result of their value bias and self-imposed isolation. One district ranger, for example, spoke testily of "a movement out there to try to have the Forest Service grind to a halt and any way is OK." Others echoed his beleaguered attitude complaining of activists who wanted to shut them down and did not know when to stop pushing. One official, meanwhile, supported the Forest Service's very controversial proposal to ban administrative timber sale appeals (several other interviewees, however, opposed this move) on the grounds that they were a "bureaucratic nightmare to deal with."

The interviews seemed to confirm the great tension and uneasiness between the Forest Service roles of expert and servant. An example of this ambivalence could be seen regarding the subject of judicial review. Some personnel welcomed it as a legitimate form of citizen participation,

¹⁵² *Ibid.*

while others saw litigation strictly as a burdensome nuisance. While many personnel spoke as if they truly valued and respected public input, sometimes a certain elitist condescension would surface as when a district ranger explained that part of their job was to "help" congressmen who sometimes "get confused over their role....with better understanding." Statements such as this might be interpreted as a reflection of Twight's allegation that when confronted with challenges, the agency will circle its wagons and reaffirm its values rather than adapt or negotiate.

Siskiyou officials often conformed to Twight's model, but at other times though, they seemed authentically committed to multiple use principles. While Twight argues that the Forest Service abides by multiple use only in a reluctant and disingenuous way (under legal duress, so to speak), pluralists claim that the agency, having operated so many decades under this mandate, has truly internalized its values. The former supervisor, for example, seemed to invest the concept with great importance, describing how he worked "hard to place additional values on the [forest's] other resources." These other values that a number of officials professed to be crucial included fish and wildlife, recreation, and biological diversity, the last of which McCormick argued was "so important that our decision....was to make sure it was fully recognized in any management decision we took." Fish habitat, meanwhile, was asserted to be "co-

equal" to timber. In a similar vein, the current supervisor spoke frequently of "balance" and described the Siskiyou as a multiple use agency whose goal is to implement the Forest Plan "in a sustainable way without affecting the diversity and values we have here on this national forest." A number of other personnel strongly reiterated this multiple use ideal with its diverse goals and emphasis on balance.

As we have seen, Twight draws a sharp distinction between utilitarianism and multiple use values and announces them to be incompatible.¹⁵³ In reality, however, the latter concept, as currently interpreted, is so vague and relative that it can mean just about anything and still be abided by in seemingly good faith. True multiple use to an environmentalist might mean setting aside 500,000 acres of a million acre forest for old growth, spotted owls, and recreation, while a Forest Service official might believe with equal sincerity that the creation of a 5,000 acre botanical reserve or a narrow visual impact corridor along a highway truly constitutes multiple use. With so diffuse and amorphous a concept, it may well be very possible, therefore, that a strong utilitarian bent and some sort of sincere commitment to multiple use principles can co-exist simultaneously within both the agency as a whole and its individual personnel. Unless multiple use is defined in a very specific or formulaic sense (which it usually is not), the

¹⁵³ Twight, 111.

two values may not, therefore, be as mutually exclusive as Twight presumes.

In their article detailing how the Forest Service has changed, McCarthy, Sabatier, and Loomis describe the agency circa 1960 as a "multiple use agency with a strong emphasis on timber production."¹⁵⁴ At least in terms of values, this study would argue that that basic description still holds; the agency's value set seems to be a fusion of Twight's utilitarianism and Culhane's pluralistic/ multiple use orientation. We can, therefore, characterize the value system of the Siskiyou National Forest as being one dedicated to multiple use principles within the larger context of a traditional commodity production-oriented utilitarianism and technical rationalism. This larger context, of course, defines and limits the scope of multiple use decisionmaking possibilities. A similar dedication to multiple use principles but within the larger context of an ecological rather than timber orientation, for instance, might entail an entirely different range of values, priorities, and policy preferences.

The identification of a particular value orientation on the Siskiyou still leaves unanswered one critical question: was the value bias, in this case towards timber production, strong enough to determine policy outputs? To have a set of values is one thing, to allow those values to be

¹⁵⁴ McCarthy, Sabatier, and Loomis, 1.

the chief determinant of one's decisionmaking is quite another. While the discussion of this question must remain largely speculative, it seems nearly inconceivable that Forest Service values did not play at least some role in determining policy outcomes. Given the long history and deep hold utilitarian values have been shown to have, and the psychology of organizational values in general,¹⁵⁵ the ideal of a Forest Service official as a neutral "empty vessel" (within the bounds of discretion) waiting to be filled with the public's desires seems rather dubious.¹⁵⁶

The most likely scenario in this case is that values played a very prominent, though not entirely absolute role in decisionmaking. The role values probably served was to set broad-scale priorities as well as limit, to some extent, the scope of policy consideration (in a way similar to what Bachrach and Baratz would suggest; see chapter four). Within that scope, however, a number of other factors, such as bureaucratic structure, participation, and external political forces, were probably also quite influential. This chapter, then, can offer only partial support for Twight; the agency does have a distinct and noticeable and probably very influential utilitarian values bias (though one tempered somewhat by a simultaneous commitment to multiple use). Whether this

¹⁵⁵ See Twight's discussion of values, 16-17, 137-139.

¹⁵⁶ To be fair, however, one should note that the pluralist model does not strip the land manager of his or her values. Indeed, what the pluralists call "professional values" play a large role in this model.

bias controls every aspect of the agency's decisionmaking as Twight implies, however, is far less likely. Even the partial, limited influence of participation this study has found would seem to dispute this notion of the complete omnipotence of organizational values. While values are crucial to understanding policymaking in the Siskiyou, it should be clear that Siskiyou personnel are not values-driven robots impervious to all forces save their own values.

Is the Siskiyou National Forest Changing?

Any discussion of Forest Service values is destined to raise the issue of whether or not those values can change. The centerpiece of the pluralist model is a characterization of the agency as dynamic, flexible, and responsive to changes in the political environment. Thus, the question to consider is whether the values, priorities, and actions of the Siskiyou National Forest have indeed shown signs of changing during the time frame of this study. While pluralists would assume that it has, Twight would probably predict that the agency has responded to opportunities for change with only symbolic, non-substantive words and measures, clinging all the time to its unshakeable core beliefs.

Regardless of their value orientation, Siskiyou officials seemed to share a consensus regarding change on three points: (1) things have been changing on the Forest in very substantial ways, (2) this particular period in time marked

a watershed of sorts in the entire agency's evolution, and (3) the Siskiyou was in the vanguard of this larger trend. Those agency personnel interviewed all claimed to welcome such changes and expressed confidence that the agency would be better for it. "This is a real good time to change the way the Forest Service does things" the supervisor told a newspaper upon entering his job in 1990. The former supervisor also heavily stressed the theme of change recalling his tenure as a sharp departure from business as usual. By opening doors to the previously shut-out environmental community, he told of how he incurred the wrath of formerly contented timber interests: "I had an industry person tell me that 'we used to have supervisors who were supporters of industry; we're not so sure you are.'"

McCormick, a recreation specialist who came from California's Inyo National Forest, in and of himself represented what many observers have noticed as a changing trend--the increased prominence of non-foresters in the agency:

The timber industry folks, I felt, were always a little suspicious of me, I attributed that to the fact that I had a strong recreational management background.

Another interviewee, a female district ranger who was a wildlife biologist and of Asian descent perfectly embodied the agency's move away from the traditional white male foresters' club. Given time, argue many students of the Forest Service, this trend in staffing alone would be enough to

shift priorities and infuse new values. Even one fairly uncompromising environmentalist admitted that within the ranks of the archfoe Forest Service were "some of the only allies we have." There was, for instance, one Siskiyou employee in particular, a soil scientist, who was quite sympathetic to the environmentalists' concerns and could be counted on to plead their case within the agency.¹⁵⁷

Perhaps the truest test of change is accomplished by examining manifestations of change that are more concrete than a policymaker's opinions on the subject. The changing agency demographics just discussed is one such measure, but perhaps the most concrete evidence might be gained by reviewing actual trends in policy outcomes. Was the Siskiyou National Forest churning out qualitatively different policies in 1992 than it did in 1983?

The evidence is certainly mixed, but the overall conclusion would have to be that there has been at least some change in the overall direction and tenor of Siskiyou policy. In those nine years, for example, traditional clear-cutting has gone from a much-heralded and ubiquitously practiced silvicultural method to a biologically disruptive con-

¹⁵⁷ While the existence of such individuals represents to many clear evidence of a new pluralism in the agency, others might argue that the Forest Service has long tolerated a few ecologically impassioned dissenters within their ranks--Aldo Leopold in the 1920s and Bob Marshall in the 1930s to name but two--but has never allowed any of them to assume positions of real power or influence, a realm still dominated by utilitarian foresters.

fessed error of the past. Nearly all proposed timber sales on the Siskiyou today employ some variation of New Forestry techniques.¹⁵⁸ In response to environmentalists' concerns, timber sales are frequently adjusted to move further from stream banks or to avoid certain crucial wildlife corridors. Terms such as biodiversity, stream temperature, sedimentation delivery rates, riparian zones, or large woody debris, if not truly taken to heart, have at least gone from being alien and ignored concepts to powerful buzzwords the agency cannot avoid confronting. Similarly, EISs and workshops now grapple with issues of roadlessness and fragmentation once rejected out of hand.

Perhaps the single biggest change on the Siskiyou, though, has involved the Forest's participation style. The decisions of the early 1980s and before were made pretty much in administrative isolation with relatively little outside input or consultation. This contrasts sharply with the aggressive scoping process, blizzards of brochures and newsletter updates, far more frequent public meetings, and most notably, workshop opportunities of the later half of the decade.

A major problem with discussing the issue of change, however, is that perceptions of change cannot help but be of

¹⁵⁸ Critics, however, are quick to point out that much of New Forestry is merely a modified form of clearcutting rather than a wholly different approach, such as selective cutting. To them, it represents "politically correct" clearcutting as it were.

a largely subjective nature. The line between a real change and a symbolic distraction can be very difficult to distinguish. For example, the Siskiyou may now address issues of biodiversity and roadlessness in its EISs, discuss it in its workshops, and even minimize fragmentation in its New Forestry timber sales (cutting from the edges rather than the center), but the current long-term plans still aim to eventually log and road all roadless areas outside designated wilderness. Critics understandably perceive this more as a clever campaign to placate foes and distract them from an essentially unchanged mission of full-scale logging.

In the previous chapter we saw how competing interests in the Siskiyou used various communicative strategies and symbolic manipulations in an attempt to achieve their policy aims. Others claim the government does this as well.¹⁵⁹ Edelman, in fact, goes as far as to suggest that this is the state's chief role.¹⁶⁰ It is, therefore, certainly reasonable to expect that the Forest Service, as an agency with its own set of goals and interests, employs its own brand of highly symbolic language and action as any interest would. And much of this symbolic communication could be expected to be employed to support positive perceptions of the agency and what it is doing (such as wisely stewarding America's

¹⁵⁹ See, for example Richard Merelman, "Learning and Legitimacy" *American Political Science Review* 60 (1966).

¹⁶⁰ Murray Edelman, *The Symbolic Uses of Politics* (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1964).

forests into the future or, perhaps, being in the process of revolutionary change).

One Siskiyou environmentalist who found the Forest to have a strong "public relations side,"¹⁶¹ noted the agency's proclivity to use such heavily coded messages. What she calls the "language of dissociation," attempts to detach the current debate from the unpleasant realities of logging.¹⁶² Hence, ancient trees are verbally converted to mmbf, fire salvage clearcutting becomes "restoration," groves of old growth are turned into numbered units, and landslides become as the Chief of the Forest Service once called them, "mass soil movements."¹⁶³ Such language should hardly come as a surprise; indeed it would be a bigger surprise if a larger government agency did not communicate strategically. What is important here is to determine if this predictable use of strategic communication and symbolic action is sometimes mistaken for authentically changing trends in agency attitudes and behavior.

No aspect of the Siskiyou's, or for that matter the entire agency's, recent history embodies this analytical dilemma better than the New Perspectives program. On one

¹⁶¹ This activist did, however, observe that lately the Siskiyou seemed to be turning away somewhat from its concern over public relations and seemed to be more forthright as to its intentions to harvest timber.

¹⁶² Barbara Ullian, *Siskiyou National Forest Roadless Areas: The Dissociation of Words and the Paper Forest*, Siskiyou Environmental Council press release (undated).

¹⁶³ Then-Supervisor (of the Suislaw National Forest) F. Dale Robertson quoted in Frome, 120.

hand, this ambitious program, best typified by the Shasta Costa project, is held up by the Forest Service as the centerpiece of the positive changes sweeping the agency. It is a program described by the Siskiyou's supervisor as giving "heartburn" to the forces of the status quo; a program that has moved away from clearcuts as we know them, incorporated a number of fundamental, heretofore alien, ecological principles into forest management, and instituted a far more open partnership of agency official and concerned interests.

It is, on the other hand, also a program that exists within a context of still unreduced long-term harvest targets for both the Shasta Costa basin and the forest in general as well as an unaltered commitment to eventually log all unprotected old growth and penetrate all roadless areas on the Forest. With such incompatible goals something eventually has to give, and as of now, these latter goals seem to be the dominant ones on the Siskiyou. Even the Shasta Costa project leader admits that the project ultimately does little but buy three more years' time for the basin's old growth: "As you go further out in time, you can't hang onto goals like avoiding fragmentation."¹⁶⁴

As we have seen, determining what accounts for real change is an extremely complex challenge in which the objective and subjective are difficult to separate. It is

¹⁶⁴ Shasta Costa Team Leader Rod Stewart quoted in Seth Zuckerman, "New Forestry, New Hype?" *Sierra* (March/April 1992), 67.

tempting to claim that cases such as Shasta Costa are merely public relations scams that give lie to the Siskiyou officials' claims that the winds of change are blowing. But one can choose to focus instead on a number of real, and in some cases undeniably significant changes that have occurred in the past half-decade (including, perhaps, at least some elements of New Perspectives) in order to substantiate the pluralist's vision of an agency in flux.

There is a third possibility which exists: both scenarios are, to some extent, accurate. The Siskiyou National Forest and probably the Forest Service at large are in the throes of authentic and maybe even far-reaching change brought on by a number of forces inside and outside the agency. The widespread internal dissatisfaction felt by line officers in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the Mumma affair, and the formation of AFSEEE (see this chapter and chapter three) all represent the beginnings of what very well might be a profound shift in the agency. But the values and imperatives that have previously defined and guided the agency are, as Kaufman shows, exceedingly deep-rooted, and as Twilight suggests, difficult to move.

The result may be a body of actions, decisions, and communications that in representing both realities, seems increasingly chaotic, contradictory, or hypocritical. What may seem like strictly a cynical ploy or distraction might sometimes be at least partly the product of the internal

clash of the forces of change and status quo (the latter of which, though, certainly seems to be holding its own, if not temporarily triumphing).¹⁶⁵ Thus, Shasta Costa may not simply be a cruel hoax, but also a sincere attempt by certain more ecologically-minded employees to introduce change into a largely hostile environment. The project's overall failures may represent their incomplete success.

Once again, both Twight and the pluralists are proven partially correct in the Siskiyou case; the agency can be flexible and adaptive to changing realities, but only to a point. While it is capable of change, this ability is, to some extent, constrained by other powerful forces such as traditional utilitarian values or, as O'Toole would argue, structural budgetary realities, both of which dictate the continued harvest of timber above all. The result seems to be a state of tension wherein the inevitable, socially-derived push towards reform is offset by tenacious attempts to maintain the status quo. These attempts may include overt and quite clear rejections of ecological initiatives or the more subtle use of symbolism to affect an air of change when little or none exists.

¹⁶⁵ Such internal schisms would be unthinkable in Kaufman's Forest Service of the 1950s. It was precisely its discipline and rigid adherence to a single set of norms and values which allowed the agency to be so decentralized, in both its geography and power structure. Evidence of widespread internal dissatisfaction, especially in the lower ranks, would imply the existence of new values and expectations in the agency.

Conclusion

When confronting the question of why the Forest's administrators act as they do, one realizes that the evidence from the Siskiyou case is by no means as clearcut as are the various models we have used as a framework. One can, nevertheless, draw important conclusions from this analysis.

First of all, the evidence from this case offers very little support for the assertion that during the period of 1983-1992, the Siskiyou National Forest was captured by timber interests. The capture of local land managers becomes a possibility when the agency answers to a single dominant client. In the Siskiyou, it is clear that this was not the case. While local capture might technically have been feasible in previous decades in the Siskiyou before environmentalists became organized (especially prior to the 1970s), the post-1983 political landscape was one which clearly saw the Forest dealing with a multiple clientele which prominently included environmentalists. As such it could be said that, in the course of making policy, the Siskiyou's administrators dealt with two advocacy coalitions of interests and their assorted governmental and non-governmental allies.

It is important to note, however, that like Culhane's *Public Lands Politics*, this study tests capture only at the local level of Forest Service administration. One must keep in mind the untested possibility of capture or a situation akin to it occurring at the higher regional or national

levels of the agency or even higher in the administration (such as the Department of Agriculture or the executive office). Indeed, one district ranger Culhane interviewed reported that the forest products industry's influence was most clearly felt higher on up the administrative ladder,¹⁶⁶ a notion echoed by several interviewees, both timber and environmentalist, in this study. It is within the realm of possibility, therefore, that an executive who is exceptionally hostile to environmental goals (Reagan perhaps?) could appoint top administrators (Crowell?) who would essentially provide high-level access to only one set of interests while excluding all others.

Rosenbaum calls this top-down influence of a dominant interest "backdoor capture"¹⁶⁷ and although it violates the traditional local subgovernment capture theory (ala McConnell), it might be the more appropriate model of undue client influence in the post-Reagan era.¹⁶⁸ Indeed, the history

¹⁶⁶ Culhane, *Public Land Politics*, 270.

¹⁶⁷ Rosenbaum, "The Bureaucracy and Environmental Policy," 226.

¹⁶⁸ There are two important points to note here: (1) Despite a number of similarities, it is very debatable whether *backdoor capture* technically represents agency capture in the literal sense. When such collusion takes place at the highest administrative levels, it might more appropriately be conceived of as an ideological/political decision which has an effect similar to true capture; (2) Backdoor capture does not require the actual jurisdictional agency (in our case the Forest Service) to be fully involved in such collusion. The favoritism towards a certain interest that works its way down might originate in the Oval Office, various external agencies or committees (such as OMB, the God Squad, the Council on Competitiveness) or at the Cabinet level. Although the Forest Service is clearly more favorable to tim-

of the Siskiyou case lends some credence to this notion of grossly unequal access and client recognition at higher administrative levels (more about this in chapter six).

To rule out capture theory at the local level is not the same thing as finding the Siskiyou National Forest completely balanced, pluralistic, and innocent of any bias. While the Forest is caught between two highly polarized interests, it does not sit squarely in the middle. Given its organizational values and judging from the policy outputs it has produced from 1983 to 1992, one can fairly characterize the Siskiyou as biased to some extent towards commodity production over any other uses and values of the forest. Because its interests coincide far more closely with the interests of the timber industry, the agency's own inclinations clearly lean towards the cutting of timber over ecological preservation, a point even a staunch defender of the agency like Culhane admits.¹⁶⁹ As Culhane notes, agency-client relations need not degenerate into capture when both groups values and interests are more similar from the outset.¹⁷⁰ Why go through the trouble of co-opting an organization that wants to harvest trees nearly as much as you do?

It is in this realm of organizational values that we can find one of the keys to understanding what motivates the

ber at its higher levels, given its history and value structure, one might hesitate before hurling the charge of capture at the agency.

¹⁶⁹ Culhane, *Public Lands Politics*, 229.

¹⁷⁰ *Ibid.* 324.

Forest Service. This chapter finds partial support for Twight's emphasis on rigid agency values; these pro-timber utilitarian values do exist and are probably quite influential, but they are not the absolute determinant in the formulation of policy. This study also finds utilitarian and multiple use values to be less incompatible than Twight assumes as the value-sets of nearly all of the Siskiyou policymakers interviewed consisted of both types of values held in seemingly good faith. We might be able to attribute this to the extremely ambiguous nature of the multiple use concept or perhaps the changing sociocultural context of public land management.

Another possible element in the Siskiyou's timber production bias could be structural budgetary factors as proposed by O'Toole. While this study has not systematically tested this possibility, it certainly cannot be ruled out as a potential source of this bias. While the Forest Service interviewees largely discount the idea, much of what we know about organizational behavior supports this notion of budget maximization by way of timber sales. Since much of this system has been in place since 1930 (nearly a quarter century before the agency fully got into the timber production business), there is really no way to tell if district rangers would be inclined to make less sales or at least more ecologically sound ones unless profound structural changes are made in the agency's budgetary process. There is, neverthe-

less, a powerful logic in the speculation that budget reform would go a long way towards altering Forest Service behavior.

Just as ruling out capture theory does not guarantee pluralism, neither does finding a timber production bias necessarily preclude pluralism. Culhane's findings, in fact, find just that--an agency with a timber-oriented professional ideology that, nonetheless, answers to a diverse, multiple clientele and comports itself as a responsive, pluralistic agency would. Perhaps the important measure of an agency's pluralism is how it deals with public participation. The evidence from the Siskiyou case suggests that while the Siskiyou National Forest's relationship with the participation process is far from the pluralist ideal, it is certainly not the mere public relations ploy that some critics claim it is.

Participation on the Siskiyou matters, but only to a point. It rarely steers decisions in any substantial way or changes the minds of policymakers, but rather exercises its limited influence in far more subtle ways. In identifying the participants' major concerns, the participation process might, for example, define some broad parameters within which the agency can feel free to act. One important factor here besides organizational goals and values, might be the individual values or personality of key administrators (including their personal relationship with the various inte-

rests). The history of the Siskiyou shows that while participation may help construct a range of options, the simple matter of who is in charge often determines how final decisions are reached.

Whatever influence participation has, then, exists firmly within the framework of other realities such as individual and agency goals and values, budgetary concerns, and external political pressures, all of which, in the environmentalists' case, are usually pushing in the opposite direction. That last factor, outside political pressure, can be the most confining aspect of such a larger political framework. Indeed, while Siskiyou officials do have authority and discretion over a wide range of important decisions, the fact remains that some larger, broader decisions--the annual timber quota, for instance--are simply out of their hands and sometimes even force their hands on other matters. Thus, it must be reiterated that this chapter's analysis is of local Siskiyou administration as it occurs within the confines of these external decisions (this will be discussed in greater detail in the next chapter).

Another factor limiting the effectiveness of participation in the Siskiyou has been the existence of two fairly equal and highly polarized local interests--a situation which tends to minimize the pressure of the participants' demands upon the Forest Service and give the agency a somewhat freer hand. Still, even the limited influence of parti-

cipation in the Siskiyou certainly seems sufficient enough to satisfy the minimal requirements of pluralist administration.

Another test of pluralism is how flexible and amenable to change an agency is and in this regard, the findings in the Siskiyou are once again somewhat ambiguous. While the Siskiyou National Forest does seem to have changed in several significant respects since the late 1970s, much more supposed change is less clearly authentic and may, in fact, be largely symbolic rather than substantive. Whatever changes have occurred, though, are most likely the result of a slowly evolving shift in values and more importantly, an attempt to adapt to and thrive in a changing political milieu that is increasingly aware of environmental concerns. As such, the Siskiyou once again seems to minimally satisfy the pluralist criterion regarding agency flexibility.

The motives underlying the behavior of the Siskiyou National Forest's administrators cannot be explained by any one model of the Forest Service or larger administrative theories. When Paul Mohai studied the Forest Service's wilderness recommendation process of the 1970s, he found the agency to be "acting between the two contrasting poles of the Twight-Culhane perspectives."¹⁷¹ Accordingly, he argued that there was a dual influence upon the agency wherein both client's participation and the agency's timber-biased values

¹⁷¹ Mohai, 155.

and ideology had a role.¹⁷² In many ways, this chapter can draw a similar conclusion. Forest Service behavior in the Siskiyou can be traced to a number of factors.

While the agency can be deemed pluralistic for the period of 1983 to 1992,¹⁷³ its pluralism is of a somewhat minimalistic variety that is far removed from the ideal of balance and responsiveness that mainstream pluralist theory advances. It is more akin to the pluralism described by Davis and Davis (see page 302). What limits such pluralism is the fact that it exists in a context of fairly strong organizational values that favor commodity production, a budgetary structure that rewards timber sales, and an external political environment which includes congressional, state, executive, and cabinet-level demands that are difficult to ignore.

This limited pluralism found to characterize the Siskiyou National Forest regards pluralism in the "administrator-as-honest broker" mold. What about Kelso's or Cobb and Elder's "big picture" pluralism which recognizes and even expects severe agency biases and looks instead to pluralism's decentralization to provide numerous points of access to an aggrieved interest? If the environmentalists cannot

¹⁷² *Ibid.* 153-155.

¹⁷³ One could certainly cast grave doubt upon the notion of a Siskiyou National Forest that was pluralistic even to the most humble extent prior to the 1970s. Its client set and patterns of behavior, especially regarding public participation, would most likely have precluded the possibility of satisfying even the most minimal pluralist criteria.

get a fair shake with a biased Forest Service, then how about other avenues for redress such as Congress, the courts, or other agencies? These questions are what we turn to in the next chapter.

CHAPTER 6

THE STRUCTURAL ASPECTS OF PLURALISM: CENTRALIZATION, DECENTRALIZATION, AND ECOLOGY

Planning and authority have been fragmented into a bewildering mosaic of different agencies and levels of government, producing frequent confusion, contradiction, and frustration in environmental management.

Walter Rosenbaum

Given its inability to demand a place on the policy agenda because of its transcendent importance to voters and politicians, the fragmented structure provides opportunities for environmentalists to undertake initiatives, put together their own ad hoc coalitions, and gain a significant measure of success they might not achieve in a more orderly, coherent process where a clear center of power exists.

Dean Mann

As we have seen, critics have argued that the pluralist system is biased against ecological and other such non-material or supposedly public interests. The last two chapters have examined the critics' charges regarding the alleged inability of such interests to adequately organize and compete as well as the lack of balance that supposedly char-

acterizes their dealings with administrators. There is one last area that these detractors focus upon in their critique of pluralism. The structural characteristics of pluralism, specifically the level of decentralization amongst policy-makers, are alleged by critics to serve as another serious impediment to interests attempting to challenge the status quo.

This chapter explores the debate between pluralist theorists who find pluralism's decentralization largely beneficial and desirable and their critics who see it as harmful to the political process and propose as a remedy increased centralization. After detailing the theoretical dimensions of this issue, this analysis turns specifically to the case of the Siskiyou conflict in an attempt to determine how decentralization has affected environmental policymaking and whether it or more centralized modes of decisionmaking are more amenable to the demands of ecological interests.

Centralization, Decentralization, and Political Theory

Pluralism's supporters and detractors alike see the ultimate reality of American politics today to be the fragmentation of authority. According to many observers, whatever remains of potentially unifying forces such as political

parties and congressional leadership continues to decline,¹ as the political landscape devolves into a fractured system of "political molecules"² each exercising, according to Rosenbaum, "its own tiny ration of authority."³ This fragmentation is so thorough, argues William Ophuls, that:

In reality, the "American political system" is almost a misnomer. What we really have is a congeries of un-integrated and competitive subsystems pursuing conflicting ends--a non-system.⁴

In the realm of environmental politics, this governmental fragmentation is especially notable. According to Mann, environmental policy is:

....a jerry-built structure in which innumerable individuals, private groups, bureaucrats, politicians, agencies, courts, political parties, and circumstances have laid down the planks, hammered the nails, plastered over the cracks, [and] made sometimes unsightly additions and deletions....⁵

Varieties of Decentralization

Within the context of American politics, decentralization can take a number of forms. It can refer to a vertical decentralization of power such as the constitutionally sanctioned principle of federalism wherein considerable segments

¹Dean Mann, "Democracy and Environmental Policy" in Sheldon Kamieniecki, Robert O'Brien, and Michael Clarke (editors), *Controversies in Environmental Policy* (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1986), 5-6.

²Joseph Califano quoted in H.R. Mahood, *Interest Group Politics in America* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1990), 1.

³Walter Rosenbaum, *The Politics of Environmental Concern* (New York: Praeger, 1977), 109.

⁴William Ophuls, *Ecology and the Politics of Scarcity* (San Francisco: W.H. Freeman & Co., 1977), 189.

⁵Mann, 4.

of decisionmaking and administration are reserved for state and local governments (but with federal statutes, where they exist, ultimately prevailing). In addition to federalism, the downward diffusion of authority can also be found in the decentralized structure of various federal agencies and other governmental bodies. For instance, the decentralization that Kaufman observes in the Forest Service occurs because the agency's central headquarters distributes significant decisionmaking authority to its lower regional, local forest unit, and even sublocal ranger district levels.⁶

While vertical decentralization occurs within a hierarchical context of sorts (federal-state-local or HQ-region-ranger district), pluralism is also marked by *horizontal decentralization* which refers to the fragmentation of political authority across a great diversity of jurisdictions, each having only limited authority. Like federalism, a good deal of this sort of decentralization is, of course, by constitutional design. The executive, legislative, and judicial branches all must share power in a divided system established to maximize the principle of "checks and balances." This horizontal decentralization can also be manifest within the branches as can clearly be seen in the fragmentation of the executive bureaucracy. There is hardly a single issue area, except perhaps something like mail delivery, where only one

⁶Herbert Kaufman, *The Forest Ranger* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press for Resources for the Future, 1960).

agency has complete and clear jurisdiction. It is far more typical for a host of agencies and sometimes even several cabinet departments to be involved in some capacity in a given policy issue.

There occurs a good deal of legislative fragmentation as well. While Congress as a national legislature could theoretically be perceived as a more centralized source of policy, in reality, it is as fragmented as the executive bureaucracy if not more so. It acts more as a loose collection of semi-sovereign local representatives, committees, and subcommittees than a single, unified policymaking body. And the trend in Congress in the last several decades has been towards even more decentralization as the subcommittee structure has expanded and specialized further, while the centralizing authority of congressional leadership has dispersed far and wide across the body.⁷

In addition to numerous agencies, cabinet departments, and congressional committees, horizontal decentralization can manifest itself in a given policymaking case through the involvement of a number of other governmental actors including the executive office, state agencies, governors' offices, various advisory commissions, and perhaps the state

⁷See, for example, Roger Davidson, "Subcommittee Government: New Channels for Policy Making" in Thomas Mann and Norman Ornstein (editors), *The New Congress* (Washington D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1981); Steven Smith, "New Patterns of Decision Making in Congress" in John Chubb and Paul Peterson (editors), *New Directions in American Politics* (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1985).

or federal judiciary.⁸ While each of these players may possess more or less authority in a particular case, such horizontal decentralization is less a downward diffusion of authority than it is a centrifugal atomization of it. In the midst of such fragmentation, diverse and often competing governmental entities scramble to most fully assert their limited share of authority.

Pluralism and Decentralization

The decentralization of political authority, both vertical and horizontal, is at the heart of pluralist theory. To pluralists, the existence of multiple points of access into the system is the key to assuring the balanced and democratic representation of interests which will, in turn, lead to more equitable policy outcomes. For one thing, decentralization and the numerous points of access it provides are alleged by pluralists to serve as an antidote against bureaucratic capture and other biases in administration. As we have seen in the last chapter, pluralists such as Kelso acknowledge that due to inherent patterns in organizational behavior, agencies will often be biased in favor of a particular, well-positioned client.⁹ The only way to overcome such inevitabilities, it is argued, is for the system to

⁸It should be noted that when state and federal officials have joint jurisdiction in a given policy area, federalism may actually more resemble horizontal than vertical decentralization.

⁹William Kelso, *American Democratic Theory* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1978), chap. 10.

provide alternative avenues for interests to find a sympathetic ear and attempt to influence the policymaking process.¹⁰ Such detours around captured or biased agencies, whether they be through other agencies, particular congressmen, the executive office, or the courts, supposedly assure that the fullest range of voices are heard during the complex business of making policy.

Just as competition among interests nourishes democracy by leading to bargaining, compromise, and accomodation, pluralists claim that competition amongst the scattered jurisdictions of a pluralist government is equally healthy.¹¹ Not only do competing agencies or even branches of government assure responsiveness to a diversity of interests, but they also act as watchdogs over one another. Because of pluralism's necessary sharing of authority, these counter-vailing forces serve to check the worst abuses of single client domination and other such undemocratic mischief.

By forcing policy to be formulated and implemented in this decentralized context, the entire process becomes, according to pluralists, one of inclusion. Conversely, notes Kelso, the smaller the policymaking realm is, the fewer the players, the more concentrated their power, and the greater the chance for a monopoly of influence.¹² This cannot happen, pluralists emphasize, when policy is constructed under

¹⁰ *Ibid.* 119-120, 263-265.

¹¹ *Ibid.* 264-266.

¹² *Ibid.* 21.

influence of pluralistic policy structures such as Heclo's broad and diverse issue networks or Sabatier's equally inclusive advocacy coalitions.¹³ Pluralists suggest that by guaranteeing the participation of the broadest possible spectrum of interests and necessitating coalition-building, a pluralist system thus bestows considerable legitimacy upon the policy outputs that it produces.¹⁴

Many pluralists admit that this fragmented landscape of political authority can be frustratingly contentious and inefficient.¹⁵ Still, they contend that this is a necessary and ultimately worthwhile price to pay for its indispensable democratic virtues. Other pluralists, however, do not concede that pluralism is so inept, characterizing it instead as actually quite flexible and innovative. Helen Ingram and Scott Ullery, for example, find that pluralism's decentralization actually encourages policy entrepreneurship by presenting increased opportunities and motivation for risk-taking in the policy realm. The fragmentation of pluralism's policymaking structure, according to Ingram and Ullery, low-

¹³ Hugh Heclo, "Issue Networks and the Executive Establishments" in Anthony King (editor), *The New American Political System* (Washington D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1978); Paul Sabatier, "Knowledge, Policy-Oriented Learning, and Policy Change" *Knowledge: Creation, Diffusion, Utilization* 8 (1987), 649-692.

¹⁴ Helen Ingram and Scott Ullery, "Policy Innovation and Institutional Fragmentation" *Policy Studies Journal* 8:5 (Spring 1980), 664-682.

¹⁵ See, for example, Mann, 4. or Peter Stillman, "Ecological Problems, Political Theory, and Public Policy" in Stuart Nagel (editor), *Environmental Politics* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1974).

ers the costs of innovation by offering numerous routes for influence as well as widely-dispersed resources. The pressure of competition between interests and agencies, they argue, also serves to push actors towards seemingly risky innovation and large-scale change.¹⁶ Not only might this innovation bloom from the horizontal competition of rival agencies and their constituent interests, but from the tinkering and experimentations of the myriad policymaking entities at the grassroots level (that is, among state and local bodies and sometimes even federal field offices).

Specifically regarding environmental policy, Dean Mann finds empirical support for Ingram and Ullery's thesis in the wave of environmental legislation enacted in the 1970s. Such bold action, Mann confirms, was largely the result of entrepreneurship on the part of various interests and congressmen, made possible due to political fragmentation.¹⁷ More broadly, pluralists such as Mann, Michael Kraft, and Howard McCurdy see the system's fragmentation as providing a crucial forum for ecological values and demands to be expressed and one that should not be taken for granted.¹⁸ This hard-won place at the policymaking table, it is argued, can-

¹⁶ Ingram and Ullery, 664-682.

¹⁷ Mann, 20.

¹⁸ Mann, 18-19, Michael Kraft, "Conclusion: Toward a New Environmental Agenda" in Norman Vig and Michael Kraft (editors) *Environmental Policy in the 1990s*, (Washington D.C.: CQ Press, 1990), 385; Howard McCurdy, *Environmental Protection and the New Federalism: The Sagebrush Rebellion and Beyond* in Kamieniecki, et.al., 103-106.

not be guaranteed in a more centralized system. Because of its decentralization, claims Mann, the system "has responded well to the challenge of environmental damage and scarcity"; so well, in fact, that it "makes reversal towards anti-environmentalism almost unthinkable."¹⁹ McCurdy, meanwhile, claims that in terms of fairer environmental representation, "pluralism...is an imperfect solution, but it probably stands a better chance of reaching its payoff than the other alternatives."²⁰ According to McCurdy, environmentalists' best representation comes about through the balance, competition, and cooperation between diverse agencies and the programs they administer as he shows in his case study of the multi-agency management of Louisiana's Atchafalaya Basin.²¹

The Costs of Fragmentation I: Subgovernments

Where the pluralists see opportunity and access in the system's significant levels of political fragmentation, their critics see chaos and bias. This view is not strictly limited to academic critics; in the 1970s the President's Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) identified pluralism

¹⁹ Mann, 28.

²⁰ McCurdy, 106.

²¹ *Ibid.* 103-106. Unlike Kelso, however, McCurdy does not see the inevitability of biased or single client-dominated agencies as he calls for increased agency neutrality and technical focus (ala Lowi) in addition to maintaining a decentralized administrative context.

in government as a major structural impediment to the development of environmentally sound policies.²²

As was discussed in the previous chapter, one of fragmentation's greatest flaws, according to critics, has been that it leaves lawmakers and administrators vulnerable to capture by parochial interests. While pluralists perceive of fragmentation in terms of open windows of opportunity and checks and balances, critics such as McConnell or Lowi see it more in terms of isolated and impenetrable knots of near-sovereign political power.²³ In these closed subgovernments, claim critics, the line between regulator and regulated disappears as the most well-established local interests form a stranglehold upon political influence in the extremely narrow and/or localized policy area that concerns them. To critics then, decentralized and thus localized administrators sit alone as isolated targets.

The other part of the decentralized subgovernment equation is, of course, the Congress. It is argued that the diffusion of power all the way down to the subcommittees along with the associated decline of parties and congressional leadership have spread legislative authority thin.²⁴

²² Rosenbaum, 282.

²³ Grant McConnell, *Private Power and American Democracy*, revised edition (New York: Vintage, 1970); Theodore Lowi, *The End of Liberalism*, 2nd edition (New York: W.W. Norton, 1979).

²⁴ Davidson, "Subcommittee Government." It should be noted, however, that not all scholars would agree that parties are in decline. See, for example, Cornelius Cotter, et

As in the case of their bureaucratic brethren, the numerous, atomized little clusters of committee and subcommittee power supposedly present easy pickings for interest groups in their attempt to gain influence. In some ways, congresspersons are even more vulnerable than bureaucrats since unlike the latter, their political survival depends directly upon reelection by locally-minded constituents. And this, in turn, requires a constant and substantial flow of funding which interest groups are all too able and willing to provide.²⁵

This committee fragmentation is reinforced by the inherently local nature of Congress's representative function which has traditionally manifested itself through the distribution of tangible, material benefits to one's district.²⁶ The immense value of such political "pork," in fact, is alleged by critics to be a crucial component in the maintenance of iron triangles as bureaucrats acquiesce to the dispensation of such benefits in exchange for high budgets for their agencies.²⁷ Rather than lawmakers or honest

al., *Party Organization in American Politics* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1989).

²⁵ For a good discussion of this, see Philip Stern, *Still the Best Congress Money Can Buy* (Washington D.C.: Regnery Gateway, 1992).

²⁶ John Ferejohn, *Pork Barrel Politics* (Palo Alto CA: Stanford University Press, 1974); David Mayhew, *Congress: The Electoral Connection* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1974).

²⁷ Morris Fiorina, *Congress: The Keystone of the Washington Establishment*, 2nd edition (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1989).

brokers, critics see the congresspeople who populate these political fiefdoms as, in the words of James Burns, "little more than elected lobbyists."²⁸

According to Lowi, the key ingredient that keeps these localized subgovernments viable is the broad discretion that Congress grants bureaucratic administrators.²⁹ If legislated rules are to bend to the demands of special interests and their congressional patrons, they must, after all, be flexible enough. Lowi argues that by passing these purposefully broad and ambiguous mandates, Congress effectively surrenders its traditional policymaking authority to bureaucrats who thereby gain the leeway necessary to pervert statutes in ways that benefit dominant clients, both bureaucratic and legislative.³⁰

The Costs of Fragmentation II: Incrementalism

According to critics of pluralism, fragmented policy-making structures possess another fatal flaw in that they inherently produce short-sighted, piecemeal, and status-quo-oriented policy. Best described by pluralist Charles Lindblom, *incrementalism* refers to the type of policymaking which tends to thrive in a highly fragmented system.³¹ Sim-

²⁸ James Burns quoted in L. Harmon Zeigler and G. Wayne Peak, *Interest Groups in American Society* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1972), 136.

²⁹ Lowi, 274-175.

³⁰ *Ibid.* 105-108.

³¹ Charles Lindblom, "The Science of 'Muddling Through'" *Public Administration Review* 19:4 (Spring 1959), 79-88.

ply put, incrementalism (or what Lindblom specifically calls "disjointed incrementalism"³²) occurs when policymakers, both legislative and administrative, rely upon previously established ideas, technical orientations, budgets, and policies as a starting point from which to modestly alter or "tinker" with existing policy rather than establish a substantially different course or plan.

One reason the pluralist system tends to adopt the incremental style is due to its reliance upon bargaining, competition, and consensus among numerous interests in a fragmented policy structure.³³ Each limited unit of authority in such a system can exercise some degree of veto power, thereby reducing the chance that bold, innovative, or controversial proposals could clear all potential hurdles.³⁴ Thus, the only proposals fit to emerge from such a fractured obstacle course of a system, argue critics, are heavily com-

³² *Ibid.*

³³ There are, one must note, a number of other explanations put forth for why incrementalism prevails including limits to policymaker rationality, the caution inherent to organizational behavior, other aspects of human nature, and the considerable "sunk costs," material and psychological, invested in a previously established policy program. For a general discussion, see Thomas Dye, *Understanding Public Policy*, 6th edition (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1987).

³⁴ For a discussion of the difficulties implementation faces see, Jeffrey Pressman and Aaron Wildavsky, *Implementation* 3rd edition (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1984); Daniel Mazmanian and Paul Sabatier, *Implementation and Public Policy* revised edition (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1989).

promised, relatively innocuous policy tinkering that closely represent the previous policy.

While critics argue that incrementalism, or "the politics of muddling through" as many call it, limits policy formulation in all areas, a great number of them find that it is especially deadly for environmental policy.³⁵ The "ecological vices of muddling through," as one critic puts it,³⁶ stem from the fact that environmental problems by nature tend to be exceedingly complex and long-term--precisely the sort of issues incrementalism allegedly is least suited to address. With its focus on minimizing conflict and relieving the most political pressure, critics charge that incremental decisionmaking takes the path of least resistance rather than the path that will most effectively address intricate and thorny environmental policy problems. Where bold and comprehensive solutions are called for, then, incrementalism is said by critics to offer only the "tyranny of small decisions"³⁷ --weak, piecemeal responses and tiny

³⁵ Amongst the critics who make this point are Ophuls, *Ecology and the Politics of Scarcity*; Rosenbaum, *The Politics of Environmental Concern*; Charles Hardin, "Observations on Environmental Politics" in Nagel; Lynton Caldwell, *Environment: A Challenge to Modern Society*, (Garden City, NJ: Doubleday, 1971); and Harold Sprout and Margaret Sprout, *The Context of Environmental Politics* (Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 1978).

³⁶ Ophuls, 191.

³⁷ Alfred Kahn quoted in Robert Bartlett, "Comprehensive Environmental Decision Making: Can It Work?" in Vig and Kraft, 244.

modifications of the existing patchwork of policy compromises.

Thus, through its cautious love of precedence and the tactical advantage it gives to the forces of the status quo, critics find that incrementalism thus renders bold ideas impotent as Peter Stillman shows:

....incremental decisionmaking--"muddling through"--is, as even its proponents realize, inherently stagnant in that it tends to be bound by the logic of past decisions and not to consider nor strike out in new directions....because it is narrow and backward-looking, "muddling through" tends not to be a good method for the formation of ecological policies,...³⁸

To this characterization, Ophuls would add that:

....incremental decision-making largely ignores long-term goals: it focuses on the problem immediately at hand and tries to find the solution that is most congruent with the status quo. It is thus characterized by....a remedial orientation in which policies are designed to cure obvious immediate ills rather than to bring about some desired future state.³⁹

Such an "adhocracy" as Ophuls terms it in his scathing critique of pluralism is utterly oblivious to the long-range consequences of the actions it takes⁴⁰; it can recognize no common interests besides the short-term incremental compromises it spits out. Thus, major decisions of life-and-death importance are made almost by default by what Ophuls calls a "brokerage house government."⁴¹ "Muddling through," contends Ophuls, "is almost tailor-made for producing policies that

³⁸ Stillman, 50.

³⁹ Ophuls, 191.

⁴⁰ Ophuls, 193.

⁴¹ *Ibid.* 190.

will generate the tragedy of the commons"⁴²; that is, individual interests and decisions adding up to collective disaster. Ophuls borrows a famous line to describe the system's maximization of current benefits at the future's expense: "After us, the deluge."⁴³ Harold Sprout and Margaret Sprout, meanwhile, find the skeptical question "what has posterity ever done for me?" to best sum up the spirit of pluralist politics.⁴⁴

To critics, therefore, incrementalism automatically rules out precisely the type of holistic, "big-picture" solutions that ecological problems require. To be effective, claim critics, such solutions would have to incorporate an understanding of systems, interrelationships, and long-term consequences. They would also have to comprehensively respond to the causes of ecological problems rather than react to their symptoms on a crisis-by-crisis basis in which environmentalists always suffer the burden of proof.⁴⁵

According to critics, then, an insidious reductionism afflicts policymakers who operate in an incremental system which, in words of Mann, has "generally defied 'holistic' or 'ecological' principles of policy design."⁴⁶ Ophuls, for ex-

⁴² *Ibid.* 192.

⁴³ *Ibid.* 169.

⁴⁴ Harold Sprout and Margaret Sprout, "Environmental Politics: What Role for Political Scientists?" in Nagel, 9.

⁴⁵ Sprout and Sprout, *The Context of Environmental Politics*, 71, Daniel Henning and William Mangun, *Managing the Environmental Crisis* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1989), 34.

⁴⁶ Mann, 4.

ample, notes how the bureaucratic division of labor bears little resemblance to ecological realities and environmental needs.⁴⁷ Bartlett makes this same point:

The whole emphasis of comprehensiveness runs counter to the modern nature of expertise....Expertise almost always means narrow, specialized, disciplinary expertise; few persons by training, experience, or predilection are prepared to engage in or promote comprehensive environmental decisionmaking. The idea of comprehensive environmental decisionmaking finds little institutional support in the ways universities, science, or the professions generally are structured, or in the ways persons in government or business are employed.⁴⁸

In such an inappropriately fragmented administrative and legislative realm, each policymaker operates, argue critics, according to his or her own rationalistic and reductionistic mindset.⁴⁹ As a result, they cannot help but perceive of ecological problems in ways severely restricted by the blinders of their organization's or committee's particular specialization or technical orientation. Like a pulmonary specialist who sees his patient as only a pair of lungs rather than a whole body, critics would suggest that environmental administrators look at a complex forest ecosystem and see only big game or merchantable timber or navigable waterways or recreational opportunities or whatever their particular specialization leads them to see. As a result, truly comprehensive, holistic solutions which attempt to address ecological problems at their most fundamental

⁴⁷ Ophuls, 194.

⁴⁸ Bartlett, 242.

⁴⁹ Ophuls, 195.

levels become all but impossible for the reductionistic politics of a fragmented system as Walter Truett Anderson points out:

....the whole style of American politics is non-ecological. Ecology is a comprehension of systems, interdependencies, webs of relationship, connections, extending over space and time--and the very essence of our politics is to zero in on single causes....Environmental positions are required, by the very rules of the political game, to fix on a single issue - save the whale, clean up the air--that allow the real issues to recede into the background.⁵⁰

Capitalist Values and the Status Quo

To many critics, pluralism and its incremental, reductionist style of policymaking most often serve to perpetuate a status quo that heavily favors business interests, economic growth, and the current distribution of wealth, all of which are seen by many as being in direct conflict with ecological goals.⁵¹ This argument, which assumes that pluralism is inseparable from capitalism, is a staple of many environmental critiques of the political process. To critics, this economic status quo, therefore, represents another sort of deep structural bias which environmental policy must con-

⁵⁰ Walter Truett Anderson quoted in Paehlke, *Environmentalism and the Future of Progressive Politics* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1989), 210-211. Pluralists, though, might claim that these failings are just as much the product of inadequate efforts on behalf of advocates to articulate the issue in such a way that it will be conceived by the public and policymakers in a more holistic and ecological way in the first place. The fact that Greenpeace adopts splashy whale and seal campaign does little to advance appreciation of the intricacies of marine ecology.

⁵¹ Sprout and Sprout, *The Context of Environmental Politics*, 53-54, 129-154.

front. Given that these economic values have such a tenacious hold upon and fundamental position in American society, this is no easy task.

Perpetual economic growth, for example, seems at times to be no less than the foundational myth upon which all economic, social, and political structures in this country, and more broadly, Western society, have been built. As Ophuls puts it:

Growth is the secular religion of American society, providing a social goal, a basis for political solidarity, and a source for individual motivation; the pursuit of happiness has come to be defined almost exclusively in material terms, and the entire society--individuals, enterprises, the government itself--has an enormous vested interest in the continuation of growth.⁵²

As such, growth has become, in the words of Daniel Bell, the quintessential "political solvent"⁵³; the engine which endlessly churns out the stuff of pluralist distributive politics, the raw material of compromise and political placation. So central is it to the political structure that any policy proposal (such as protecting owls instead of cutting forests) which limits growth and its ability to serve in this capacity will likely be looked upon by many policymakers with a great deal of skepticism. Like incrementalism in general, critics argue that the pressures of growth and the market have the effect, therefore, of seriously limiting options for comprehensive, long-term action

⁵² Ophuls, 185.

⁵³ Daniel Bell quoted in Ophuls, 186.

on behalf of less tangible goals. The market, both economic and political, favors instead, short-term, distributively oriented outputs as Henning and Mangun observe:

Often environmental administrators are pressured to elevate the short-term material standard of living rather than maintain or improve long-term quality of life and environment. Those agencies managed under multiple use and sustained yield principles are most heavily affected by such pressures.⁵⁴

Thus, the policy response to dire environmental problems is forced to bend to economic realities rather than the other way around.⁵⁵ Kraft, for instance, observes that in the course of environmental politics thusfar:

There has not yet been a serious challenge to the dominant or core values of American politics (for example, private private property, capitalism, individualism, and the unrestrained right to pursue one's self-interest, limited government, and, perhaps above all, material abundance and economic growth).⁵⁶

To many critics of pluralism, then, the market system to which it is so closely aligned is an "environmental villain"⁵⁷ that at best, is incapable of recognizing and responding to complex ecological concerns, and at worst, is, in

⁵⁴ Henning and Mangun, 10.

⁵⁵ Many others, though, argue that without a strong economy, there are less resources available to protect the environment or public welfare in general. Thus, the economy should justifiably be a society's main concern. Some environmentalists, on the other hand, like to argue that "there are no jobs on a dead planet," as they tend to see environmental problems as the paramount issue society faces. Thus, this most central (and perennial) of policy debates largely hinges upon how priorities are ranked and threats perceived.

⁵⁶ Michael Kraft, "Ecological Politics and American Government: A Review Essay" in Nagel, 146.

⁵⁷ Ophuls, 168.

ideology and practice, fundamentally opposed to ecological goals and demands.

The Costs of Fragmentation III: Jurisdictional Rivalry and Conflict

Whereas pluralism's proponents look at competition among fragmented agencies and legislative committees and see a healthy and positive situation of mutual checks and balances, critics adhere to a darker vision of stubborn rivalry, needless conflict, and gridlock. Citing the organizational behavior research of Simon and others, critics portray agencies as focused first and foremost upon their survival or even expansion in a zero-sum environment of limited budgetary resources.⁵⁸ As Henning and Mangun claim:

A comprehensive environmental approach is seldom attained in the administrative process because of...an agency's own security and expansion interests. As a bureaucratic institution, an agency is concerned with its own welfare first. Other interests are of secondary consideration.⁵⁹

Critics extend this argument to congressional committees as well, characterizing them as being beset by the same sort of jealous turf rivalry and ideology of self-perpetuation as agencies. To be sure, not all rivalry amongst committees and agencies stems from a Darwinian struggle for expansion. Much conflict also stems from simple

⁵⁸ Herbert Simon, *Administrative Behavior* (New York: Macmillan, 1947); Norton Long, "Power and Administration" *Public Administration Review* 9 (Autumn 1949), 257-264; Phillip Selznick, *TVA and the Grassroots* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1949).

⁵⁹ Henning and Mangun, 49.

differences in goals, values, or technical orientations to problem solving (not to mention legislative mandate, if an agency).

In such a competitive, fragmented setting, critics wonder how complex, invariably cross-jurisdictional environmental policy questions can be settled in a scientifically rational and comprehensive way.⁶⁰ Instead of coordination, argue critics, the usual result is bickering, finger-pointing, and deadlock as each policymaking entity clings to its own particular value-set and technical orientation while simultaneously defending its turf.⁶¹

The vertical fragmentation and rivalry of state and federal environmental managers, claim critics, can be just as destructive to sound environmental policymaking. The friction between federal bureaucracies and very conservative state game, forestry, or grazing agencies in the western United States is legendary and serves mostly to thwart comprehensive policies.⁶² The Reagan administration's New Federalism of the early 1980s which surrendered additional fed-

⁶⁰ How can, for example a commodity-oriented Forest Service and a preservation/recreation-oriented Park Service, and the committees which oversee each, all operating in a competitive, zero-sum context, rationally and cooperatively coordinate sound land management policy in the greater Yellowstone ecosystem or the Sierra Nevada (both of which contains millions of acres of both national forest and park land)?

⁶¹ Henning and Nangun, 79.

⁶² For a discussion of comparative state environmental policy, see James Lester, "A New Federalism?: Environmental Policy in the States" in Vig and Kraft, 73.

eral authority to the states confused and fragmented policy-making even further as state agencies, left without coordination, funding, or direction, according to William Mangun and Jean Mangun:

....found themselves in a complicated, unsupported position because the federal government seemed to be more interested in ridding itself of responsibilities than helping the states do a better job.⁶³

Critics then, reject what they see as an "arthritic octopus"⁶⁴ of a government with its adversarial system of vetoes, delays, and stalemate. At most, critics contend, such a system can produce only disjointed policy fragments or extraordinarily ambiguous mandates, neither of which can adequately the complexity of real problems.

The Centralized Solution

Many of the critics of pluralism and its incrementalism and fragmentation look to increased coordination and centralization of government authority as the key to a more effective policymaking apparatus and thus better policy outputs. While a number of critics including McConnell, Samuel Huntington, and Robert Crain call for a consolidation of government power into more centralized and/or nationalized structures, it is Lowi who offers the most cogent and de-

⁶³ William Mangun and Jean Mangun, "Implementing Wildlife Policy Across Political Jurisdictions" *Policy Studies Journal* 19:3-4 (1991), 522.

⁶⁴ Graeme Duncan quoted in Mann, 8.

tailed prescription in this respect.⁶⁵ Lowi argues that the only way to overcome the crippling ineffectiveness and special interest domination of pluralism is to move closer to the traditional model of administration and shift policymaking authority to the center. "A law made at the center of government," claims Lowi, "focuses politics there and reduces interests elsewhere."⁶⁶ According to Lowi and other critics then, increased centralization would eliminate rivalry, deal-making, and special interest influence and replace it with clear goals and priorities made in the public interest by a government unafraid to plan and in an authoritative position to do so.

To Lowi, the key to achieving such rational and effective policymaking, perhaps even more so than the actual streamlining and restructuring of government agencies, is to eliminate vague legislative mandates and broad discretion.⁶⁷ In their place, clear, detailed, authoritative laws, according to Lowi, should prevail. This *juridical democracy*, as he calls it, would necessitate a strong legislature which would represent the national interest and reclaim its constitu-

⁶⁵ Lowi, *The End of Liberalism*; McConnell, *Private Power and American Democracy*; Samuel Huntington, *American Politics: The Politics of Disharmony* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1981); Robert Crain, Elihu Katz, and David Rosenthal, *The Politics of Community Conflict* (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1969).

⁶⁶ Lowi, 93.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.* 305-309.

tional policymaking authority from the interest-ridden scattering of autonomous subgovernments.⁶⁸

Bureaucracies, for their part, would act as in traditional theory--as neutral, rational implementors of the legislative (and hence public's) will. When agencies do have to make rules (due perhaps to changing circumstances or the agency's technical expertise), Lowi calls for "administrative formality" whereby early rulemaking, formal rulemaking norms and procedures, and rigid criteria would replace the case-by-case bargaining approach that allegedly favors special interests and creates ad hoc policies.⁶⁹ Such clear centrally-derived regulations would supposedly be far more purposeful, efficient, and just than pluralism's "policies-without-law."⁷⁰

In the realm of environmental policymaking, the calls for centralization have been especially loud and numerous. A number of observers including Barry Commoner, Lynton Caldwell, Garrett Hardin, Charles Hardin, Rosenbaum, and Ophuls see less fragmented governmental authority and increased government planning and action as the solution to the environmental gridlock that they believe threatens our existence.⁷¹ As the only repository of legitimate power with the

⁶⁸ *Ibid.* 295-313.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.* 302.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.* 299.

⁷¹ Barry Commoner, *The Closing Circle* (New York: Knopf, 1971); Caldwell, *Environment: A Challenge to Modern Society*; Rosenbaum, *The Politics of Environmental Concern*; C. Hardin, "Observations on Environmental Politics"; Garrett Hardin,

ability to coerce diverse, self-interested political actors, centralist critics look to government. Only a committed proactive government, they argue, can control the zero-sum struggle over increasingly scarce resources and enforce possibly unpopular, but ecologically necessary policies in the long-term public interest.⁷²

Ophuls makes this argument in an especially vigorous way, finding the firm implementation of political authority to be the only way to tame self-interest and step back from the brink of ecological disaster. With Aristotle, Burke, and Rousseau as his guides, Ophuls maintains that the only way to prevent the tragedy of the commons is to bid "farewell to economic man" and embrace true politics once more.⁷³ Unlike the short-term, distributive orientation of pluralist bargaining, such truly political solutions would, according to Ophuls, involve some conception of the collective interest and would require the subordination of individual interests, policymaking by the most competent, and an acceptance of legitimate authority.⁷⁴ Only through this reinforcement of authority, argues Ophuls and others, can adequate attention be focused on the holistic, systemic nature of ecological problems and appropriate measures be pursued.

"The Tragedy of the Commons" *Science* 162 (13 December 1968), 1243-1248; Ophuls, *Ecology and the Politics of Scarcity*.

⁷² Ophuls, 142-155.

⁷³ *Ibid.* 180.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.* 222-226.

While Ophuls's prescriptions tend to limit democratic prerogatives, other environmental centralists argue that increased comprehensiveness and centralization would actually enhance democratic decisionmaking. For instance, Edwin Haefele, in the style of Lowi, calls for a return to truly representative, legislatively-focused decisionmaking to deal with environmental issues. He suggests that the executive branch cannot fairly or adequately weigh competing interests.⁷⁵ Charles Hardin, likewise points out the potential democratic benefits of a reinvigorated party system which would be another centralizing influence.⁷⁶ Mangun and Mangun, meanwhile, find in their study of state-federal relations that environmentalists achieve better representation in cases where the federal government administers federal laws than in cases with state administration.⁷⁷

Thus, centralized authority is seen by those critics in the McConnell mold as better able to uphold democracy and the public interest by rescuing policy from the clutches of obscure and isolated and possibly captured bureaucracies or local governments and placing it in more open and accountable forums. "Comprehensiveness," claims Paehlke, "...shifts decision making out of specialized agencies and into central

⁷⁵ Edwin Haefele, *Representative Government and Environmental Management* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press for Resources for the Future, 1976).

⁷⁶ C. Hardin, 191-192.

⁷⁷ Mangun and Mangun, 520.

agencies, the courts, and/or the democratic process itself."⁷⁸

Short of the actual structural centralization of policymaking authority (or perhaps alongside it), some critics emphasize increased interagency, state-federal, or legislative-executive coordination and cooperation as being essential if more effective and comprehensive environmental policy is to be achieved. Such a move towards coordinated environmental management would supposedly allow for more holistic policy consideration of such things as ecosystems, watersheds, or bioregions and would force at least a partial integration of highly fragmented and specialized decision-making entities.⁷⁹

This overall approach to improving environmental policymaking has been loosely termed "the centralized solution." It should be noted, however, that the individual proposals cited above run the gamut from deep structural alterations presumably requiring the amending of the Constitution to fairly modest centralizing adjustments or reforms of the current system. Depending on the theorist, they also target a number of different manifestations of decentralization, from vertical forms (such as federalism or the downward

⁷⁸ Robert Paehlke, "Environmental Values and Democracy: The Challenge of the Next Century" in Vig and Kraft, 362.

⁷⁹ Mangun and Mangun, 519-524; McCurdy, 103, Bartlett, 236. While Bartlett criticizes centralists who hold out what he considers unrealistic goals for achieving comprehensiveness, he still believes, nevertheless, that there is room for improved coordination.

diffusion of power within an agency) to horizontal forms (such as separation of powers or overlapping agencies and committees).

The Pluralist Critique of Centralization

Calls for increased centralization, environmental and otherwise, are met by fierce pluralist objections which reject centralized solutions on several grounds. First, pluralists cast serious doubt upon a centralized policymaking structure's ability to formulate truly superior policy. Centralists are naive, argue pluralists, to believe that the consolidation of government authority alone will somehow allow better policy to magically emerge.⁸⁰ On the contrary, claim pluralists, it is centralization that embeds the status quo by stifling innovation and reducing opportunities for the competition of ideas. By isolating themselves from public opinion and interest demands, argues Kelso, the policymaking elite would cut themselves off from huge quantities of useful information and insight.⁸¹

Pluralists contend that centralists vastly overrate policymakers' capacities to formulate rational policy. From what is known of the psychology and behavior of organizations, claim a number of pluralists, it is clear that there are serious limits upon the near-perfect rationality that policymakers are presumed by centralists to possess. Incom-

⁸⁰ Kelso, 259.

⁸¹ *Ibid.* 236.

plete knowledge, cognitive limitations, the tendency towards "groupthink," personal values, and human nature are all thought by pluralists to work against policymaker rationality.⁸² To pluralists, this alone would seem to justify the incremental method with its accumulated knowledge, well-tested experience, and multiple points of access.

Mann echoes these doubts about centralized policymaking, arguing that the heavy-handed, overbureaucratized command-and-control style of centralization requires unrealistic and unworkable levels of knowledge, enforcement, and coordination.⁸³ Charles Perrow reaches this same conclusion finding that Lowi-style centralized, rule-oriented bureaucracies are effective only at carrying out relatively simple, straightforward tasks such as issuing passports.⁸⁴

⁸² Bartlett, 243; Kelso, 236-239. For a fuller discussion see, Robert Merton, *Social Theory and Social Structure* (Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1957); Peter Blau, *The Dynamics of Bureaucracy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1955).

⁸³ Mann, 26.

⁸⁴ Charles Perrow, *Organizational Analysis* (Belmont, CA: Brooks/Cole, 1970). Lowi, however, would probably argue that it is pluralism's hyper-fragmented, grossly overlapping executive branch that is rigid and "overbureaucratized" rather than his neutral and streamlined bureaucratic implementors of statutes. Ophuls also counters these pluralist warnings of unwieldy, unworkable, top-heavy bureaucracies by proposing that policy design standards rather than direct hands-on planning (ala the Soviet communism) be employed. Unlike the absolutism of planning, policy design standards set general limitations and identify important criteria that must be met, but leaves considerable latitude for democratic structures to determine how these goals are specifically going to be achieved. Thus social goals could be met, according to Ophuls, without a huge governmental planning apparatus. Ophuls, 228-229. Similarly, Lowi maintains that when rule-making is done early in the life of a statute, central-

Pluralists also take on Lowi regarding his call for legalism, formalism, and less administrative discretion. Kelso argues that it is the *content* of the law and not the manner of its formulation that is often the real problem with policy.⁸⁵ What guarantee is there, he asks, that unambiguous, centrally-derived laws would address the public interest any better? Could it be, he asks, that the system's status quo biases are not necessarily inherent to pluralism but to American culture and society in general?⁸⁶

Pluralists also portray centralized decisionmaking and strict mandates as inflexible and rigid. Kelso turns the centralists' attack on incrementalism on its head as he claims that it is actually centralized policymakers with their expanded jurisdictions and responsibilities who must more depend more heavily upon established "rules of thumb" and rigid rulemaking procedures or else risk overload.⁸⁷ Consequently, this is alleged to leave bureaucrats ill-prepared to deal with unprecedented situations that their predetermined mandates do not address. Indeed, increased decentralization and wider discretion have evolved, argues Kelso, precisely because of the increased prevalence of com-

ization can be achieved without a heavy-handed "Prussian" hierarchy or overbureaucratization. Lowi, 304.

⁸⁵ Kelso, 233.

⁸⁶ *Ibid.* 106.

⁸⁷ *Ibid.* 238.

plex, multi-dimensional problems which require flexibility.⁸⁸

The broader jurisdictional responsibilities of centralized agencies, pluralists argue, also pose the risk that bureaus may be less than enthusiastic and committed to some aspects of their widened mission. Given the nature of bureaucracies, Kelso speculates that it may be better to have a diversity of agencies each committed to the narrow task it knows best than fewer agencies with a host of tasks, some of which they might be hostile to.⁸⁹

Finally, pluralists condemn what they see as centralization's undemocratic, authoritarian tendencies. Pluralists such as Bartlett, Mann, or Stillman all warn of the possibility that political authority, centralized to achieve noble environmental goals, might degenerate into rigid, heartless, overbureaucratized rule by a technocratic class with little patience for popular concerns or liberal values.⁹⁰ Critics of Ophuls or Garrett Hardin paint a bleak Hobbesian picture of government power running roughshod over individual rights and aspirations in the name of some ruling

⁸⁸ *Ibid.* 254.

⁸⁹ *Ibid.* 261-262. In fact, it can be argued that it is centralization rather than pluralist fragmentation that features a riskier capture scenario since the stakes are higher. To capture a centralized agency is to gain influence over a far greater amount of policymaking authority than capturing a fragmented agency.

⁹⁰ Bartlett, 243, Mann, 28; Stillman, 51-52.

elite's arbitrary conception of environmental necessity. At its worst, an environmental police state is envisioned.⁹¹

The centralists, argue Stillman, thus contradict themselves in calling for stronger and thus more remote, less accessible government while simultaneously seeking, and often presuming, wider public support.⁹² It is a large and rather dubious assumption, contends Stillman, that centralized policy decisions, even if made in what the policymakers truly believe is the public's best interest, will enjoy popular consent.⁹³ Kelso is even more skeptical of the potential of centralized policymakers to achieve popular support as he suggests that "when government officials are not subject to the pressures of the bargaining table, they are less likely to perceive the objectives and needs of people other than themselves."⁹⁴ Thus, only through bargaining and com-

⁹¹ Once again Ophuls would defend his proposals by claiming that his system's reliance on design criteria rather than planning would eliminate the need for heavy-handed government intervention in the everyday realm. He emphatically denies, therefore, that his proposals would lead to a tyrannical regime. Still his enforcement of even design criteria would require some sort of coercion and, as he admits, the subordination to some extent of individual rights to collective needs. Other centralists take a different line of defense. As was previously discussed in chapter one, some centralists argue that it is the governing elite in this country that is most sensitive and protective of liberal values and not the often extremely illiberal masses. See Giovanni Sartori, *Democratic Theory* (New York: Praeger, 1958); Herbert McCloskey, "Consensus and Ideology in American Politics" *American Political Science Review* 58:2 (June 1964).

⁹² Stillman, 56-57.

⁹³ *Ibid.* 53.

⁹⁴ Kelso, 238.

promise between various interests and the government, argue pluralists, can true consensus and public support be forged.

This alleged lack of representation of interests in a centralized system is stressed by McCurdy as well in his Louisiana case study of multijurisdictional land management. McCurdy speculates that if management of the Atachafalya basin were ever centralized under a single agency, the broad representation and participation granted by numerous agencies to their diverse constituencies would inevitably be diminished.⁹⁵ Paehlke, meanwhile, finds that the broad access and participatory opportunities that pluralism provides creates a sense of efficacy that highly centralized systems cannot. This efficacy, he argues, is essential for encouraging environmental mobilization.⁹⁶ The distance at which centralization promises to keep interests would, therefore, seem to discourage the public from formulating their own collective responses, thus leaving environmental policymaking strictly to the "experts."

Decentralization vs. Centralization in the Siskiyou

As we have already seen, the American political system in general is highly fragmented. It should come as no surprise, then, that the politics of the Siskiyou have proven to be no exception. Despite the fact that the primary scope of this study is a single jurisdiction--the Siskiyou Nation-

⁹⁵ McCurdy, 106.

⁹⁶ Paehlke, "Environmental Values and Democracy," 363.


al Forest--old growth, and thus Siskiyou policymaking has involved, according to the former supervisor of the Siskiyou, "a lot of players with a lot of different authorities."

First of all, even the principal administrative entity, the Siskiyou National Forest, is itself divided into five ranger districts. Beyond the Siskiyou, as previous chapters and figure 10 show, the Forest Service's Region Six office in Portland, its Washington D.C. headquarters, the Department of Agriculture, the Department of Interior, the executive office, various individual congresspersons, a number of committees and subcommittees, other federal agencies (such as the Fish and Wildlife Service), an interagency committee, the state of Oregon, and the federal courts all played some role, direct or indirect, in shaping policy on the Siskiyou. This involvement of so many governmental actors, some of them regional and national, not to mention private citizens and interest groups, would seem, therefore, to strongly confirm a model of broad and fragmented policymaking such as, perhaps, Sabatier's advocacy coalition model.

The evidence from the Siskiyou case can tell us a great deal about the effects of political fragmentation on environmental policymaking as well as allow us to ponder the implications of further centralization.⁹⁷ Since the reality

⁹⁷ A centralized system, as it shall be defined here, would involve decisions that were made in a more unitary fashion by fewer, more consolidated jurisdictions and at

Figure 10 **Governmental Entities Involved in the SISKIYOU**



of Siskiyou/old growth policymaking is a high degree of fragmentation, the question of how different a centralized system would be requires a good deal of speculation. Still, the evidence from this case could go a long way in providing at least some empirical basis to such speculation.

While pluralism features an overall fragmentation of authority, this scattered authority can occur in the form of more centralized or higher-level sources such as the executive office, Forest Service headquarters, or the Department of Agriculture, or as more decentralized or localized sources such as a ranger district, the Siskiyou Forest itself, or a county surrounding the Forest. Let us assume then that a future scheme of increased centralization would feature the enhanced prominence and power of the higher-level, more centralized policymaking entities which currently exist. Based on this assumption, one can gain at least some sense of how a more centralized system might behave by examining how these higher-level entities act today as compared to the more decentralized actors.

This is, of course, an imperfect measure because centralization's actual implementation would involve far more than merely boosting the autonomy of the higher levels of

higher levels within those jurisdictions. Furthermore, legislative and executive directives would be more explicitly carried out with less room for administrative discretion. Finally, increased decisionmaking would probably occur at the federal level, at the expense of the state and local autonomy.

current policymaking bodies. True centralization, its advocates might argue, would feature a fundamental internal restructuring and consolidation of these current agencies. It would also require major changes in the way in which they operate, especially with respect to their relationship with Congress and its legislative mandates. These limitations notwithstanding, however, an examination of contemporary examples of high-level decisionmaking in the Siskiyou/old growth case provides perhaps the only opportunity there is to concretely measure anything even akin to true centralization. Though imperfect, such an approach provides at least a glimpse into possibilities that would otherwise be pure speculation.

The aim of this chapter, therefore, is to examine the following questions: (1) Amongst the fragmented policymaking entities, how did decisionmakers at higher levels of a given jurisdiction or branch of government treat ecological goals and demands? Were they or more local or lower-level policymakers more likely to advocate policies supported by environmentalists? (2) Were decisionmakers at the local or state level more or less amenable to comprehensive ecological goals than those at the federal level? (3) What were the overall effects of the fragmentation of Siskiyou/old growth policymaking upon the formulation of comprehensive, ecologically-oriented policy?

In order to address the first two questions, it is necessary to examine the various governmental bodies involved in this case in search of discrepancies in attitudes and behavior between those institutions as well as between different levels within them. In doing so, one might be able to discern patterns wherein levels of policymaker centralization would be linked to levels of ecological concern. In addition, such an examination might tell us something about the claims of centralists and pluralists regarding the effects of fragmentation (specifically capture, incrementalism, rivalry, and reductionism) on environmental policy.

The Forest Service

The most directly involved agency in the Siskiyou has been, of course, the United States Forest Service. With its many far-flung units, the Forest Service is widely recognized as one of the most thoroughly decentralized agencies in the entire bureaucracy (for a brief description of its structure see chapter two). In fact, it is at its most local and decentralized administrative level, the ranger district, where many observers claim that the agency's most important decisionmaking occurs.⁹⁸

Forest Service interviewees unanimously agreed with this characterization of ranger district autonomy. In the

⁹⁸ Herbert Kaufman, *The Forest Ranger*; Paul Culhane, *Public Lands Politics* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press for Resources for the Future, 1981).

Siskiyou, the district rangers, who, with their staff⁹⁹, do almost all of the planning and detail work on timber projects, reported very few constraints on their actions from the supervisor's office. The supervisor's role has been described by both interviewees and outside observers as being one of coordination, review, and guidance.¹⁰⁰ At least on the Siskiyou, rangers and the supervisor have tended to see eye-to-eye on most all issues. No major disputes of any substance were mentioned in the interviews, thus indicating a similarity in goals and values. Such congeniality and shared purpose, as Kaufman points out, allows the delegation of authority to assume far fewer risks.¹⁰¹

At the regional level, the relationship between the regional forester and the supervisors under his command is quite similar to the supervisor-ranger relationship. Regarding the day-to-day administration of their forests and even the details of their forest plans, supervisors, and rangers for that matter, are reported by interviewees to have considerable latitude. One Siskiyou ranger, for instance, claimed to "see hardly any influence from the regional office at all" and ventured to guess that it was the same for the supervisor. In Region Six, according to the ranger, most indi-

⁹⁹ Staff specialists such as wildlife biologists or hydrologists have no decisionmaking authority; their role is only advisory. Only line officers (rangers and supervisors) have such authority.

¹⁰⁰ Michael Frome, *The Forest Service* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1984), 43.

¹⁰¹ Kaufman, 222.

vidual forests plans lowered the ASQs and the regional office did not try to prevent it.

Other interviewees, however, argue that at the regional level certain constraints and pressures begin to be brought to bear upon local administrators. Although the Siskiyou did manage a relatively miniscule eight mmbf drop in the ASQ in its forest plan, the former supervisor implies that he was prevented from reducing the harvest as much as he wanted. He states, "...if anything [the forest plan] hadn't gone near far enough, but politically I went as far as I could in reducing the cut and emphasizing other values."

So despite their near-total autonomy regarding day-to-day administration, supervisors lose support and power, warns the current supervisor, when they prove "unable to perform." In this case, *perform* might be considered a euphemism for maintaining high levels of timber output.

Using the goals and values of local Siskiyou administrators which were discussed in chapter five as a basis for comparison, the regional office might seem even more timber-oriented than the Siskiyou. One Siskiyou environmentalist who finds Region Six "obstructionist," argues that even when local Siskiyou officials agree with environmentalists and make promises to alter policy, they are forced by regional timber goals to squeeze out so much timber that they ultimately have no choice but to go back on these promises. "No

matter what they agree to locally," she claims, "they don't have control over it" as the cut level "comes down on them like a big ole hammer."¹⁰² The former supervisor also recognized the timber production slant of the regional office:

Traditionally, the Forest Service, at least in Region Six...has been much more commodity oriented and much more tied to the production of timber and lumber products and tied into that whole economic picture and the political support base for it.

Even less inclined towards ecological protection has been the top, Washington D.C. level of the Forest Service. Although the agency's characteristic decentralization and delegation applies to D.C.-regional interaction as well, the top echelons of the Forest Service do impose mandatory levels of resource production (both internally and legislatively-derived) upon regional (and thus local) administrators which can be avoided only at the risk of termination or demotion. The controversy surrounding former Region One Forester John Mumma clearly attests to that fact. "I am expected to produce timber," explained Mumma who was forced out in 1991 for failing to meet his regional quota, "[t]here is no doubt about it. My longevity as Regional Forester is related to meeting the targets."¹⁰³ Regional foresters, warns one D.C. level official, have no choice but to accomplish what they were funded to do. Thus, regional foresters

¹⁰² As we shall discuss latter on, there are actually a number of parties responsible for such high quotas.

¹⁰³ John Mumma quoted in Jeff DeBonis, "Timber Industry Wins Again, Congress Sets Dangerously High Timber Cut for '91" *Inner Voice* (Winter 1991), 11.

and supervisors have been faced with the impossible task of simultaneously meeting timber targets and protecting forest resources. There is little doubt that such intense pressures to get out the cut at all costs led supervisors to appeal as a group to Chief Robertson for change at their 1989 convention.¹⁰⁴

Consequently, both critics and agency personnel describe the D.C. office as being the level of the Forest Service most aligned with timber production goals and as the former supervisor suggests, "pretty much stuck in a commodity orientation." This is vividly shown by McCormick's account of his 1989 visit to Washington to explain to Chief Robertson and his deputies his proposal to reduce the Siskiyou's ASQ to 155 mmbf:

I did not get any questions about biological diversity, about anadromous fish, about spotted owls, about wildlife; all the questions I got, all the inquiries were having to do with how I was reducing the cut, what was causing that to happen....It was close to being an inquisition....I thought the Chief's office was missing the big picture of what was going on out here and where the public wanted to take management of the forest.

Although he claims that it has profoundly changed for the better since 1989, McCormick still finds that by nature the Chief's office "is always a little behind the power

¹⁰⁴ "Forest Managers Speak Out for the Forest" *Headwaters* (March 1990), 3. This was not the first time supervisors pressured for a reduction in the cut as a similar appeal and warning of impending crises were made to Chief Peterson as early as 1983. Kathie Durbin and Paul Koberstein, introduction to special report, "Forests in Distress" *Oregonian* (15 October 1990), 26.

curve on what's really happening out here on the ground as regards folks changing, shifting values on how the forest is managed." Likewise, even the D.C. official, speaking of changes in agency direction such as the implementation of New Forestry techniques, conceded that "the field was....out ahead of Washington on this."

The Siskiyou's experiment with intense public participation from 1988-1990 also met with a certain degree of top-level suspicion as the former supervisor reports that his program of workshop-style participation "made some Forest Service folks nervous....The vibrations I would get would be that I might be going too far sometimes."¹⁰⁵

Not surprisingly, the D.C. office is characterized by a number of observers as being the arena within the agency where the timber interests' influence is most directly felt.¹⁰⁶ Interviewees tended to confirm this; environmentalists reported no direct contact whatsoever with the regional or D.C. office, while a timber official, on the other hand, saw his own group's influence and effectiveness slowly move from the ranger district level to the regional and national level (as environmentalists grew stronger on the local front). Whereas his predecessor never went to Washington, this official reported travelling there twelve to thirteen times a year. Thus, while they have lost their local advan-

¹⁰⁵ Although again, McCormick expressed confidence that D.C. was slowly moving in this direction as well.

¹⁰⁶ See, for example, Culhane, 270.

tage, according to one environmental activist, timber has enjoyed far superior higher-level access in the executive branch.¹⁰⁷ The former supervisor confirms this point admitting that at the D.C. level, interest groups tied to commodity production tend "to have the Chief's ear." Frome claims that the chief may have no choice:

The chief is cautious to avoid defying leaders of industry, for they can get his scalp one way or another. He acknowledges the role of citizen groups, but is careful not to go overboard or become overly intimate with them since such behavior is likely to stir up the industry.¹⁰⁸

The Administration and the Cabinet

Compared with its executive branch superiors, even the fairly pro-timber top echelon of the Forest Service has seemed positively moderate in the period from 1983 to 1992. Almost without exception, the environmental attitudes of top advisors, cabinet heads, and other top-level administrative officials who dealt with the old growth issue in both the Reagan and Bush administrations, have ranged from hostile to extremely hostile. Although these top-level administrative officials only very occasionally intervene in the day-to-day management of or detailed planning for public lands, the broad priorities they set can still exert tremendous indirect pressure upon land managers. Such priorities set the tone and the boundaries for policymaking and cannot help but

¹⁰⁷ During this time, environmentalists did, however, maintain their national access in the legislative realm.

¹⁰⁸ Frome, 39.

weigh heavily upon even seemingly autonomous lower-level bureaucrats. In the Reagan and Bush administrations there can be no mistaking these priorities: the maximization of commodity production on public lands and the minimization of ecosystem, wildlife, and other resource protection.

The cabinet official most directly responsible for overseeing the Forest Service is the Assistant Secretary of Agriculture for Natural Resources and the Environment. During the early and mid-1980s, this position was occupied by John Crowell Jr., a former top executive of Louisiana Pacific.¹⁰⁹ While most assistant secretaries have tread cautiously when dealing with the proud and independent Forest Service, Crowell was a man with an agenda and set about his task of overseeing the agency with a missionary zeal. During Crowell's tenure, timber and road budget requests skyrocketed while wildlife, recreation, and soil budgets atrophied.¹¹⁰ In fact, Crowell, who favored the complete liquidation and conversion of all unprotected old growth, sought a full doubling of the already high total annual national forest timber output to ten billion board feet.¹¹¹ Consequently, Crowell, reviled by environmentalists, was also viewed with suspicion by the Forest Service. Even the fairly

¹⁰⁹ Kathie Durbin, "Politics Helped Delay Northwest Timber Management Plans" *Oregonian* special report, 8. Crowell had as his deputy Douglas MacCleery, previously an official with the National Forest Products Association. Frome, 8.

¹¹⁰ Durbin, 8.

¹¹¹ *Ibid.*

timber-friendly Region Six forester was moved to comment that "John has no idea what's out there on the ground. He's not in touch with reality....He's living out there in fantasy land."¹¹²

Despite Crowell's unusually active stance as an assistant secretary, the Forest Service, for the most part, resisted his more outlandish plans for the national forests. Still Crowell played a big role in implementing the Reagan administration's maximum development policies and setting the agency down the path of unsustainably high timber production. Crowell, who left in 1985, was succeeded by assistant secretaries (George Dunlop and James Moseley) who, while still firmly production-oriented, stayed much further out of the spotlight and did not attempted to directly manage Forest Service policy.

The various secretaries of Agriculture during the period of 1983 to 1992 (John Block, Richard Lyng, Clayton Yeutter, and Edward Madigan) have all held largely the same unabashedly pro-development points of view.¹¹³ Though Agriculture is very careful not to step on the toes of its largest and most prestigious bureau, what is usually subtle, behind-

¹¹² Former Region Six Forester James Torrence quoted in *Ibid.*

¹¹³ This might be due, in large part, to the very nature of the department which is, of course, dedicated to the production of crops. It is small wonder then that a perennial demand of many environmentalists and others interested in Forest Service reform is that the agency to be transferred to Interior.

the-scenes pressure infrequently makes its way to the surface. An especially prominent example of this would be the department directive that forced a reluctant Forest Service to go along with the very controversial proposal to ban administrative timber sale appeals (the Forest Service sought only some revisions in the process). As the stakes and tensions in the old growth struggle began to rise after 1990, the usually silent secretary (by now, Madigan) started to become more vocal and strident. After publicly calling for the Forest Service to be "freed from the interference of the federal courts,"¹¹⁴ In a 1992 speech to an agricultural group, Madigan later defiantly proclaimed that "[t]his owl is ultimately going to go the way of the ice truck...."¹¹⁵

The other cabinet level department involved in the old growth issue has been Interior. While the ideologically ferocious anti-environmentalism of Reagan's forest secretary, James Watt, is legendary, his successors in the Reagan administration (William Clark and Donald Hodel) largely continued his policies, albeit with a less antagonistic style. It has been during the tenure of Bush's appointee Manuel

¹¹⁴ Edward Madigan quoted in "Legal Update" *Headwaters* (Late Summer 1991), 10.

¹¹⁵ Even more stridently, Madigan suggested, at that same speech that the 1992 Republican platform should call for "more money, higher income, more markets. String all the environmentalists up." Madigan quoted in "U.S. Can't Save Endangered Owl, Agriculture Secretary Warns" *Chicago Tribune* (16 July 1992), sec.1, 13.

Lujan, however, that Interior has had to deal most directly with the old growth/spotted owl controversy.

Like his predecessors, Lujan brought to his job what Vig terms a "dismal environmental record"¹¹⁶ and his stance regarding old growth has done little to change that reputation. Lujan's policies, according to one observer, "distinctly tilt towards industry"¹¹⁷ and he has intervened in his agencies' affairs far more vigorously than any of his counterparts in Agriculture have. Lujan did just about all in his power, for example, to prevent or delay the listing of the spotted owl as threatened by his department's Fish and Wildlife Service and when finally forced by the courts to do so, he strongly lobbied for the activation of the ESA-exempting God Squad committee of which he is chair.¹¹⁸

At the very top of the executive branch during the time frame of this study have been Presidents Reagan and

¹¹⁶ Norman Vig, "Presidential Leadership: From the Reagan to the Bush Administration" in Vig and Kraft, 49.

¹¹⁷ Ted Gup, "The Stealth Secretary" *Time* (25 May 1992), 57.

¹¹⁸ Like his predecessor Watt, Lujan has left a vivid trail of notable quotes, calling the BLM's three hundred-plus million acres of public land, for example, "a place with a lot of grass for cows." Referring to the questionable value of the ESA, Lujan said, "I believe that man is at the top of the pecking order. I think that God gave us dominion over these creatures....I just look at an armadillo or a skunk or a squirrel or an owl or a chicken, whatever it is, and I consider the human being on a higher scale. Maybe that's because a chicken doesn't talk." Lujan goes on to testify to the hardiness of species: "All species adjust to change. I can't give you any specific examples, but I'm sure biologists could give you examples of fish that all of a sudden here comes saltwater intrusion and slowly they adapt to a saltwater environment." Lujan quoted in Gup, 58.

Bush and their circle of advisors. For the most part, the old growth issue did not reach the point where it received direct presidential attention until the Bush years. While Bush is generally recognized as being less ideologically hostile to environmental objectives than Reagan,¹¹⁹ with the old growth issue his administration left little doubt that it stood with timber interests, perhaps more so than any other element of government, save congressmen from timber districts. During the 1992 presidential campaign, Bush cast aside any remaining pretensions of being the "environmental president," adopting harsh anti-environmental rhetoric regarding old growth and the "spotted owl crowd."¹²⁰ Well before this point, however, the administration sought to keep up a steady rate of old growth harvest and prevent or limit protection of the owl.¹²¹ Concerning the violation of environmental laws, Judge Dwyer writes:

¹¹⁹ Vig, 53.

¹²⁰ Bush repeatedly used the phrase "spotted owl crowd" in a dirisive way in 1992 campaign speeches and in the presidential debates.

¹²¹ Strongly pushing these positions has been a circle of advisors with a commodity production-orientation more pronounced than that of Bush himself. These executive office advisors (many of whom sat on the God Squad committee) have included Dan Quayle in his capacity as both Vice President and chairman of the anti-regulatory Council On Competitiveness, Chief of Staff John Sununu, Council of Economic Advisors chairman Michael Boskin, and Office of Management and Budget director Richard Darman. Darman especially, is known as a unrepentent arch-enemy of environmentalism. Darman emphasized in a 1990 lecture that "Americans did not fight and win the wars of the twentieth century to make the world safe for green vegetables." Darman quoted in John Newhouse, "The Diplomatic Round: Earth Summit" *New Yorker* (1 June 1992), 70.

This is not the doing of scientists, foresters, rangers, and others at working levels of these agencies. It reflects decisions made by higher authority in the executive branch of government.¹²²

What is most interesting about top-level administration in the case of the Siskiyou is the level of access public lands user groups seemed to have been granted. As mentioned in the previous chapter, this is actually the reverse of the localized capture McConnell and others warn of. Mahood, in fact, speaks of a recent trend in direct lobbying of the formerly more aloof president and his advisors.¹²³ Lowi, too, notes and bemoans this phenomenon of the "personal president" directly involved in the pettiness of special interest politics.¹²⁴ This trend of high-level timber influence probably extends back prior to this case, as Barney, speaking of the Nixon administration, finds that "[n]o agribusiness interest group has found the doors to the White House more open than the timber industry."¹²⁵ Even a local timber official conceded that, as a whole, his industry was most effective at the highest levels of national government.

Congress

Not all of the eagerness of the Forest Service to "get

¹²² From the opinion of Judge William Dwyer, *Seattle Audubon Society v. Evans* 771 F. Supp. 1081 (9th U.S. District, 1991), Finding of Fact # 15, Section V.

¹²³ Mahood, 133.

¹²⁴ Theodore Lowi, *The Personal President* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1985).

¹²⁵ Daniel Barney, *The Last Stand* (New York: Grossman, 1974), xvi.

out the cut" was internally generated or due to pressure from Agriculture or the executive office. To some extent this push for high levels of commodity production was also a product of congressional pressure on an agency understandably keen on maintaining its high budgets. In the Siskiyou and larger old growth conflict, Congress has played a very complex and often contradictory role, proving to be, in one capacity or another, both the environmentalists' best hope and worst foe. At the root of Congress's ambivalent stance towards old growth is its dual nature. Determining how ecologically oriented Congress has been has largely depended upon which segment of the institution is considered. Likewise, the literature on Congress's environmental performance tends to reflect the body's dualism with some observers stressing its notable achievements and others citing its paralysis and "lack of coherence" on environmental matters.¹²⁶

In the inherent institutional conflict between the goals of representation and distribution of benefits on one hand and rational and comprehensive lawmaking on the other, the former has clearly prevailed in the politics of old growth. As Lowi and other critics would predict, such dis-

¹²⁶ Michael Kraft, "Congress and Environmental Policy" in James Lester (editor), *Environmental Politics and Policy* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press); Mary Cook and Roger Davidson, "Deferral Politics: Congressional Decision Making on Environmental Issues in the 1980s" in Helen Ingram and R. Kenneth Godwin (editors), *Public Policy and the Natural Environment* (Greenwich, CT: JAI Press, 1985); Richard Cooley and Geoffrey Wandesforde-Smith, *Congress and the Environment* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1970).

tributive politics has been dominated by local representatives positioned on key committees. The Siskiyou's congressmen along with the rest of the Pacific Northwest's delegation as well as the delegations from other timber-rich Western states have heavily populated the various committees which oversee the Forest Service and public lands management.

Six committees and six subcommittees have been involved in the politics of old growth. The House and Senate Appropriations Committees and both of their Interior Appropriations Subcommittees are responsible for setting timber budgets, and thus ASQs, for the Forest Service. The task of crafting ancient forest and forest management legislation falls upon the Senate Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry Committee and its Conservation and Forestry Subcommittee, the Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee and its Public Lands, National Parks, and Forests Subcommittee, the House Agriculture Committee and its Forests, Family Farms, and Energy Subcommittee, and the House Interior and Insular Affairs Committee and its National Parks and Public Lands Subcommittee.

In 1990, Oregon's Senator Hatfield (R) sat on the Senate Appropriations Committee as well as the Public Lands Subcommittee. Both of the Siskiyou's representatives, Peter DeFazio (D) and Robert Smith (R), were on the National Parks and Public Lands Subcommittee, while Smith also sat on the

the Forests, Family Farms, and Energy Subcommittee. Nearby representative Les AuCoin (D) and Washington's Norm Dicks (D) were on the House Interior Appropriations Subcommittee, while Senator Slade Gorton (R-WA) and Rep. Sid Morrison (R-WA) among other Western and Northwestern congressmen also figured prominently on these committees and subcommittees.¹²⁷

While there have been too many other outside players to constitute a classic iron triangle, the relationship between some of these committees (especially Interior Appropriations), the Forest Service, and timber constituents have, at times, contained many elements of this situation. When it comes to pleasing constituents in home districts and guaranteeing their votes, timber is a tangible, distributable, and thus politically lucrative item, while standing trees and owls are not. As such, various members of Congress have consistently imposed upon a fairly compliant and understandably budget-conscious Forest Service timber quotas higher than even the timber-oriented agency has requested--700 mmbf more in 1986, 1 bbf in 1987, 300 mmbf in 1988, and 200 mmbf in 1989.¹²⁸ In the Siskiyou alone, the congressionally mandated target for 1987 was 46.7% more than the Forest Service had

¹²⁷ Committee membership information is from: Michael Barone and Grant Ujifusa, *Almanac of American Politics 1992* (Washington D.C.: National Journal, 1991).

¹²⁸ Durbin, 11.

planned.¹²⁹ According to an aide to Chief Robertson, these congressional imposed ASQs of the 1980s were "earmarked" and "untouchable,"¹³⁰ Thus, much of the rangers' mad scramble in that decade to squeeze sales from every available corner of their districts was attributable to these unsustainable quotas. Not surprisingly, Siskiyou officials reported in the interviews that Congress did place some constraints upon their decisionmaking.¹³¹

As one might expect, the loyalties of most of the Northwest delegation have been beyond doubt.¹³² "In my six years on the House Interior Appropriations Subcommittee," Representative AuCoin wrote in a 1986 letter to a constituent, "I have made the well-being of the Northwest's forest products industry my number one priority."¹³³ In keeping with these priorities, Northwestern and often Rocky Mountain

¹²⁹ Catherine Caufield, "The Ancient Forest" *New Yorker* (14 May 1990), 56.

¹³⁰ Quoted in Durbin, 11.

¹³¹ Still, Siskiyou officials reported a very cordial working relationship with the Oregon delegation and seemed to understand congressional intervention as a legitimate part of doing business.

¹³² The few notable exceptions would include former Washington Sen. Brock Adams, his replacement Sen. Patty Murray (D) and Reps. Jolene Unsoeld (D-WA) and Jim McDermott (D-WA).

¹³³ AuCoin letter quoted in Cary Groner, "The Congressional Connection" *What's Happening* (Eugene OR: 12 May 1988), 7. AuCoin represented an adjacent district to the Siskiyou area before his defeat to Senator Packwood in the 1992 Oregon Senate race. In that race, Packwood made a point of blaming the spotted owl and the ESA for Oregon's economic woes, while the equally pro-timber AuCoin moved to a more environmental position. Oregon's other senator, of course, was Mark Hatfield, "the politician most feared and detested by ancient forest activists," according to Caufield, 82.

legislators have not hesitated to use their congressional clout to bully bureaucrats on behalf of timber interests. AuCoin, for example, publicly threatened Chief Max Peterson's job during hearings when the Chief reported trouble meeting the 1986 quota's 20% increase.¹³⁴ Peterson resigned soon thereafter.¹³⁵

While the power of the Northwest delegation on the various forestry committees (and independently as well) has been substantial, various observers have noticed a slow but profound shift occurring as committee makeup over over the 1980s has moved slightly away from Westerners. Midwestern and Eastern representatives are becoming less shy, according to both Egan and Davis, when it comes to intervening in public lands issues--traditionally an area where strict deference to Western legislators had been the norm.¹³⁶ While a number of committees (especially Agricultural ones) still

¹³⁴ Durbin, 7.

¹³⁵ There is a long history congressional intimidation of Forest Service personnel when certain congressmen believe that the agency is not keeping up with commodity production. Most recent examples besides the AuCoin-Peterson flap include the resignation of Regional Forester Mumma in which Senator James McClure (R-ID) was perhaps the driving force and Senator John McCain's (R-AZ) confrontation with Coronado National Forest Supervisor Jim Abbott over an endangered squirrel. Timothy Egan, "Forest Supervisors Say Politicians Are Asking Them to Cut Too Much" *New York Times* (16 September 1991); John Pickens, "Arizona Senator Threatens Forest Service Chief and Forest Supervisor" *Inner Voice* (Winter 1991), 15.

¹³⁶ Timothy Egan, "Fighting for Control of America's Hinterlands" *New York Times* (11 November 1990), 4:18; Phillip Davis, "Cry for Preservation, Recreation Changing Public Lands Policy" *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Review* (3 August 1991), 2145-2151.

have, to varying degrees, a pro-development tilt, the House National Parks subcommittee could now be said to be firmly environmentalist.

In the House Appropriations Subcommittee, meanwhile, the staunch pro-timber stance of the early and mid-1980s has eased somewhat as non-timber legislators such as Subcommittee Chairman Sidney Yates (D-IL) have increasingly asserted themselves to offset pro-timber influence. Yates, representing Chicago, typifies this Eastern environmental counterbalance to Western timber interests. "These are the classic giants we read so much about," said Yates speaking of old growth at a 1988 hearing, "Coming from the city, I'm prejudiced about those forests. We want them to stand."¹³⁷ While environmentalists naturally welcome public lands issues being treated as matters of national policy rather than the domain of local congressmen seeking pork, this trend has enraged Western pro-timber legislators who resent such "interference." Rep. Don Young (R-AK) went as far as to deride his colleague Jim Jontz and other pro-environmental representatives as "pimps for Eastern environmentalists."¹³⁸

What the growing prominence of non-Western or non-timber congresspeople in public lands issues represents is a movement away from the strictly distributional, "iron-

¹³⁷ Rep. Sidney Yates quoted in Alan Hayakawa "Fight Erupts at Forest Service Hearings" *Oregonian* (15 April 1988).

¹³⁸ Rep. Don Young quoted in Egan, "Fighting for Control...."

triangle" brand of legislative politics that Lowi and McConnell decry. Instead, such politics is more akin to the national-interest policymaking that both critics advocate for Congress. In such a scenario, broader concern over national-scale policy would replace some of the traditional deference to local representatives' policy preferences and the vote-trading that often accompanies it. Increased nationalization of old growth politics also assumes that the relevant agency--the Forest Service--will answer to all of Congress and not just the local representatives in their subgovernments as Senator Patrick Leahy (D-VT) explains:

At the national level, the Forest Service must work with a broader segment of Congress than it has in the past. Many of us care deeply about forests located far beyond our state's borders. Timber target levels are set by the *whole* Congress--not just the two senators in whose state a particular forest is located.¹³⁹

In the same vein, Interior Chairman George Miller perceives the old growth issue as:

....sort of like the national debt. You're just screwing generations down the line out of their inheritanceIt's going to be a *national decision*. This is a *national resource*.¹⁴⁰

Although it is changing, Congress is still, however, quite far from this Lowiesque ideal regarding forest issues. Rather, this move away from strict distributional politics

¹³⁹ Senator Patrick Leahy quoted in Terence Tipple and J. Douglas Wellman, "Herbert Kaufman's Forest Ranger Thirty Years Later: From Simplicity and Homogeneity to Complexity and Diversity" *Public Administration Review* 51:5 (September/October 1991), 424.

¹⁴⁰ Miller quoted in "Chairman Miller Tours Southwest Oregon" *Headwaters Journal* (Summer 1992), 16. Author's italics.

has resulted in a nearly complete stalemate as far as ancient forest legislation is concerned. The pro-timber and pro-environmental factions in Congress are each strong enough to thwart the other, but not enough so to see their policy preference triumph. So on one hand, the worst abuses of the 1980's congressional super-quotas have ceased as timber targets, though still unsustainably high, have leveled off somewhat and threats to judicial review and citizen appeals have been soundly beaten back since 1990. And for all the grief congressional timber quotas have caused environmentalists, most would still claim that they are taken most seriously and find their closest allies at the congressional level. Yet in keeping within its overall environmental ambivalence, Congress is no closer, as of 1992, to producing any sort of long-term comprehensive solution than it was a half decade earlier.¹⁴¹

Perhaps where Congress has most closely conformed to Lowi's critique is regarding the flexibility of the legislative mandates it has given the Forest Service. In the case of old growth, Lowi's thesis that broad discretion is vulnerable to being perverted to suit powerful interests has been irrefutably realized. Not only has the Forest Service taken extreme liberties with the acts under which it must operate (most prominently, the Multiple Use/Sustained Yield

¹⁴¹ This may finally change in 1993 if the ascendance of the more environmentally inclined Clinton administration provides any impetus to resolve the issue.

Act, NFMA, NEPA, the ESA, and the Clean Water Act), but in many cases Congress *itself* has directly ordered the agency to take action that would violate such laws and in some cases has then shielded the agency from citizen or judicial review.¹⁴² Regulations regarding reforestation, water quality, sustained yield levels, wildlife habitat, endangered species, and environmental impact documentation, to name but a few, have been routinely violated whether through the Forest Service's own volition or under the congressional gun.¹⁴³

Thus, there exists a profound irony in congressional behavior regarding forest issues: Congress passes seemingly tough laws to protect forest resources, but when the actual implementation of those laws threatens to reduce the flow of distributive benefits, various congresspersons become indignant and threaten bureaucratic jobs if unsustainable

¹⁴² The Interior Appropriations Subcommittee's quotas in the 1980s, for example, could not be fulfilled without wholesale violations of Congress's own mandates. The Silver Fire court ban rider and the infamous Section 318 are clear examples of congressional protection of agencies who neglect to enforce mandates and would otherwise be subject to legal action.

¹⁴³ The laws listed above are each characterized by varying degrees of vagueness or clarity. On one hand, ESA, the Sustained Yield half of the MU/SY Act and parts of NFMA are relatively straightforward, while the Multiple Use half of MU/SY, much of NEPA, and the more general, non-procedural goals of NFMA are notoriously ambiguous. Regardless of their level of precision, however, Congress has generally allowed implementing agencies wide latitude in reinterpreting or selectively enforcing these laws.

congressionally-mandated quotas are not met.¹⁴⁴ More than anything else, this points to Congress's dualistic nature regarding ecological issues. There is great tension between national-interest lawmaking which tends to favor ecological goals and local, distributively-oriented representation which tends to favor commodity production.

Because they mostly live far away from old growth forests and do not represent timber workers, the former contingent in Congress has the luxury to consider very important long-term costs and benefits which logically seem to favor environmental protection. The latter contingent, however, is afforded no such luxury to be far-sighted since the short-term costs of preservation would be borne almost entirely upon their constituents (just as they previously almost entirely reaped the short-term benefits). Thus we have Sidney Yates simultaneously hailed as an issue-oriented statesman defending the national interest and our natural heritage and denounced as a sanctimonious meddler with nothing at stake.

¹⁴⁴ Appearing with President Bush at a 1991 speech in Portland in which Bush complained of "extreme environmental positions," Sen. Packwood candidly and perhaps inadvertantly confirmed this congressional double-standard regarding the laws it passes. When asked by reporters if any of the extremism to which the President referred was to be found in his own agencies or the courts, Packwood replied, "I think he was pointing out those who file petitions....Under the law, those bills [environmental protection measures] are not self-enforcing." Packwood quoted in David Sarasohn, "Packwood Connects Bush to a Tree" *Oregonian* (20 September 1991).

The Courts

Perhaps the clearest evidence of Congress's environmental dualism and the failure of broad discretion has been the pivotal role played by the federal judiciary in the Siskiyou/old growth case. Just as centralists would predict, in the absence of clear and authoritative goals whose implementation is beyond question, unresolved policy conflicts end up by default in an overloaded court system.¹⁴⁵ As a forum of last resort for gridlocked committees, interests, and agencies wrangling over vague or unimplemented statutes, the prominence of the judicial branch in old growth politics is clear testament to pluralism's weakness in this regard.

Despite a number of judicial setbacks (and the fact that the burden of proof usually rests with environmental litigants in such a way as to favor the status quo¹⁴⁶), successful lawsuits have, nevertheless, been the environmentalists' most effective weapon and the cornerstone of their efforts to save old growth. In fact, according to one activist, the *only* real tangible success environmentalists have ever achieved with old growth has been through litigation. They have scored key victories in which the courts have ruled that land management agencies have flagrantly violated statutes such as NFMA, NEPA, and the Endangered Species Act. Judge Dwyer writes in his 1991 opinion of "a systematic re-

¹⁴⁵ C. Hardin, 188.

¹⁴⁶ Henning and Mangun, 34.

fusal by the Forest Service to comply with laws protecting wildlife."¹⁴⁷

Because the law and irrefutable scientific evidence has mostly been on their side, environmentalists have been able, therefore, to achieve legally what they could not achieve politically, forcing their demands to be heard by a largely resistant legislature and bureaucracy. According to one environmentalist, it has been the rude crisis caused by tens of thousands of acres of enjoined timber sales and the subsequent disruption in the smooth flow of constituent benefits, rather than her group's lobbying and organizing that has caught Congress's attention and granted the group's demands legitimacy. At least in this case, Petulla is correct when he claims that "the citizens' 'agency' remains the courts" in matters environmental.¹⁴⁸

Naturally, timber interests, their congressional allies, and the Forest Service do not hold judicial intervention in nearly as high esteem. A number of interviewees spoke of the "total frustration" the Forest Service feels with the constant litigation and the courts' undoing of all

¹⁴⁷ Dwyer opinion, *Seattle Audubon Society v. Evans*, sec. VI. Actually, a representative of Headwaters claimed that although the Forest Service was in gross violation of the ESA, the group "had enough goods on 'em already" using only NFMA and NEPA. Dwyer's decision on the spotted owl, therefore, found the Forest Service to be in violation of NFMA procedures. Zilly's ruling against the Fish and Wildlife Service, on the other hand, did rely on the ESA.

¹⁴⁸ Joseph Petulla, *Environmental Protection in the United States* (San Francisco: San Francisco Study Center, 1987), 103.

their work. Timber interests, meanwhile, have been simply apoplectic. One timber company official complained bitterly about judges who know nothing about forestry making "academic" decisions which prevent Forest Service professionals from doing their job. According to that official, court-directed forest policy was akin to having a "dentist running a spaceship" or an "astronaut drilling on your teeth." Instead, timber interests generally preferred broad mandates within which Forest Service professionals could practice forestry as they felt most appropriate. Furthermore, most of their forest legislation proposals have also included some sort of limit on judicial review of timber sales.

The courts owe their prominence in the politics of old growth not only to their accessibility (court-banning riders notwithstanding), but to a highly fragmented and conflictual policymaking apparatus as well. Although the federal judiciary, as an antidote to vague or unimplemented statutes and decentralized confusion, does represent a type of centralized authority, the courts cannot simply be regarded as a typical manifestation of political centralization as called for by centralist theorists. A centralized system, at least as Lowi calls for it, would actually feature a less active judiciary that would be called on to referee policy disputes far less often. Still, by serving as a partial corrective to mischievously interpreted statutes, judicial rulings do allow us to gain at least some idea of how ecological policy

might be treated in a more centralized system. Thus, in an indirect way, court decisions such as Dwyer's or Zilly's allow us to sneak a glimpse into a world in which legislative mandates are interpreted as being clear and authoritative and bureaucracies are expected to implement those laws with some degree of fidelity to the law's intent.

State and Local Government

Although neither the state of Oregon nor the various counties or municipalities surrounding the Siskiyou had any direct jurisdiction over policymaking in the federal Forest, these local governments did, to varying degrees, wield influence. For example, although there was no legal or regulatory requirement for the Siskiyou's administrators to clear the Forest Plan with the state, the former supervisor reported that the Governor's forestry advisor worked closely with him on the Plan and that the state's influence was "significant." In fact, one district ranger claimed that state pressure on the Plan was much more intense than that from the regional office or D.C. McCormick confirmed that it was politically impossible to ignore the state (which went as far as drafting its own version of the Plan), especially since Senator Hatfield made it known that he would not agree to any Plan that Governor Neil Goldschmidt (a Democrat, no less) did not sign on to. The result was a plan with a

slightly higher ASQ than the Siskiyou's administrators would have preferred.

Not all elements of state government, however, were as timber-oriented as Governor Goldschmidt's office. While many Western states have fairly anti-environmental wildlife and public lands agencies, Oregon, traditionally one of the West's most liberal states,¹⁴⁹ has two fairly vigilant agencies, the Department of Fish and Wildlife (ODFW) and Department of Environmental Quality (ODEQ). Throughout the planning process for the Siskiyou's many timber projects, these two departments (especially the latter) would often raise doubts and clearly register their misgivings concerning the negative wildlife and water quality implications of Forest Service proposals. These agencies, however, enjoyed far less clout than the Governor's office.¹⁵⁰ The strongly pro-timber state Department of Forestry and the governor's office (although it was far less anti-environmental than many of its

¹⁴⁹ In his evaluation of state environmental policies, James Lester lists Oregon in the top "progressive" category with high commitment and high institutional capability. James Lester, "A New Federalism?", 73.

¹⁵⁰ More environmentally inclined state wildlife agencies such as Oregon's or Washington's have long clashed with the Forest Service. They argue that national forest wildlife, although on federal land, are still partly their jurisdiction. When dealing with the hunting and game management goals and responsibilities of traditional wildlife agencies, the Forest Service usually is happy to defer to the state. When confronted with state demands for increased habitat protection for non-game species, though, the agency is far less willing to share turf. "State Game Agency Appeals Forest Service Timber Sales" *Inner Voice* 3:2 (Spring 1991), 4.

Western counterparts) were much more likely than the ODFW or the ODEQ to support federal plans.

This gubernatorial support, however, became far less assured after Democrat Barbara Roberts' victory in 1990 state elections. Roberts, who leans towards environmental protection, quickly shifted the weight of the governor's office away from strict commodity production. For instance, the Governor submitted an official brief in early 1992 urging the God Squad to reject the BLM and Interior's request to partially lift the old growth logging injunction. Calling the God Squad process "disgraceful," Roberts claimed that the federal government was "playing on the fears of our workers and offering them false hope."¹⁵¹ Not surprisingly, this position earned her the enmity of the timber interests who promptly initiated a recall petition drive to oust her from office.¹⁵² Needless to say, then, the overall environmental stance of the state has been largely dependent upon who has occupied the governor's office. If the Siskiyou had to work with a Roberts administration when developing their Plan, the final outcome may have been somewhat different.

While the state has wavered from a moderate pro-timber position to a fairly environmentalist one, county and municipal governments around the Siskiyou have had only one unchanging stance--maximum timber harvest. Although the for-

¹⁵¹ "Governor Blasts Lujan....And Gets Blasted in Return" *Headwaters Journal* (Spring 1992), 16.

¹⁵² *Ibid.*

mer supervisor claims that local officials were a "strong factor" in policymaking, their positions were so invariably uncompromising (essentially the same as the timber interests¹⁵³), that this probably kept them a further distance from Siskiyou officials than the state government. For instance, while the state and the supervisor's office haggled over a relatively small ten or twelve mmbf difference for the Plan's ASQ, local governments, almost without exception, signed on to the timber industry's Evergreen Alternative which called for a huge 188 mmbf ASQ and short eighty-year rotations. Such an unbending stance probably led to them being treated more as another timber interest than as governmental representatives and potential policy brokers.

The Effects of Fragmentation in the Siskiyou

Whether policy in a given instance has been influenced at the top administrative levels or in the field, or by local, constituent-focused or national policy-focused legislators, or at the federal or state/local levels, the overall picture in the politics of old growth has, as mentioned before, been one of considerable fragmentation. The most crucial question, therefore, is whether the policymaking flaws of fragmentation as alleged by critics (namely, capture, incrementalism, rivalry, and reductionism) have been readily apparent in the Siskiyou case.

¹⁵³ In fact, many mill owners and other timber officials sat on these local government boards.

Chapter five has already addressed the issue of localized capture and it was determined that while timber-biased to some extent, the local administrators of the Siskiyou were certainly not captured. Thus, the isolation of administrative decentralization that critics warn leads to capture, was simply not enough for local commodity-using clients to control the Siskiyou, at least after 1983.¹⁵⁴ In fact, as mentioned in the previous chapter, the history of the Siskiyou case shows far more one-sided access (akin to a capture situation) at the higher, rather than lower levels of the agency, the Agriculture Department, and the executive office.

The effects of incrementalism, however, cannot be as easily dismissed. Throughout the course of Siskiyou and old growth politics, the grip of previously established policy patterns has been tenacious; precedence has been king. As we have seen, the main battlegrounds have been in the business-as-usual forums of timber budgets, ASQs, or EIS processes for timber projects. The battles that have raged have been whether to raise or lower targets by a few mmbf or budgets by a few percentage points. Proposals which have seriously deviated from the status quo in either direction, whether eliminating the Endangered Species Act, completely banning judicial review, establishing large-scale ecosystem-based

¹⁵⁴ While not captured, some aspects of the agency's relationship with local congressmen did, however, resemble aspects of the traditional subgovernment setup.

old growth protection, or restricting exports, have been routinely beaten back.¹⁵⁵ In fact, the only serious jolt to the status quo--the Dwyer injunctions--were imposed from outside the administrative/legislative realm. Otherwise, all the process could produce, at least through 1992, were advisory commission studies and incremental adjustments in the ASQ. And, of course, a fairly steady flow of timber, injunctions notwithstanding.

Policymaking structures in the old growth case have thus been incapable of producing radical or comprehensively conceived realignments of policy such as, perhaps, ecosystem reserves or true biodiversity protection or a program of economic restructuring and retraining for timber-dependent areas or, for that matter, eliminating sustained yield requirements. While perhaps they were never designed to be capable of such things, this inability, regardless of intent, is precisely what prompts critics to call for reform or fundamental restructuring.

¹⁵⁵ It could feasibly be argued that the incorporation of New Forestry techniques in Forest Service timber projects represent a radical deviation from previous policy. As we discussed in chapter five, however, there are good reasons to doubt whether the New Perspectives program is truly revolutionary. While New Forestry techniques are authentically preferable to clearcutting, until they are unmistakably part of an integrated attempt to achieve ecological sustainability on the national forests and not just designed to keep logging high volumes in more acceptable ways, then it cannot really be considered much of a deviation from an incrementalist status quo.

The critics' arguments regarding the rivalry and reductionism of decentralized policymaking units can also be confirmed by evidence from this case. As should be expected, there was some friction between various policymaking entities, whether state-federal, congressional-Forest Service, or even within various levels or disciplines within the Forest Service. While there were no spectacular clashes (such the epic Forest Service-Park Service struggle over the Olympic forest which Twight chronicled), this friction has, on occasion, caused problems. The rivalry between the timber-oriented Agriculture committees and more environmentally-oriented Interior committees over the domain of ancient forest legislation, for instance, has certainly played a role in creating the half-decade-long legislative stalemate.

Far more destructive to environmental goals, however, has been the reductionism that has characterized the policymaking realm. Within the world of public lands policy, the goals, values, and technical orientations of the various policymaking entities involved have served to constrict their abilities to formulate long-term, comprehensive solutions to the old growth question. Policies have largely been drawn up instead, by disparate parties in something of a vacuum, without regard to related problems, facts, or events. The Forest Service, for example, routinely planned timber sales with little consultation with Fish and Wildlife personnel as to spotted owl or marbled murrelet habitat or

salmon runs, while Fish and Wildlife drew up habitat conservation areas strictly as it concerned their charge, the spotted owl, rather than the larger old growth community.¹⁵⁶

The result of this sort of policymaking-with-blinders-on and lack of coordination has been, at times, chaos and confusion on the Siskiyou; even the policymakers most intimately involved have not always known what exactly is going on. The Forest Service sold old growth timber while drawing up their own spotted owl plan, while Fish and Wildlife formulated a completely unrelated recovery strategy which included protection of some of the timber the Forest Service was busy cutting. The ISC, meanwhile, issued their own spotted owl recommendations as rival congressional committees with the help of opposing interest groups each drew up their own tentative ancient forest reserve systems. And throughout all of this, upper-level executive appointees worked to undermine any potential protective measures, while the federal court rulings kept up a steady stream of pressure upon agencies in the opposite direction.

It is no wonder then, that with numerous authorized parties working with so little coordination and pushing in

¹⁵⁶ One reason, besides differing specializations, for the fairly poor coordination between the Forest Service and the Fish and Wildlife Service, according to several Siskiyou personnel, has been that the latter's chronic understaffing and underfunding limit its ability to communicate and coordinate. Clarke and McCool goes as far as to term the nearly friendless agency an "organizational gnat." Jeanne Nienaber Clarke and Daniel McCool, *Staking Out the Terrain* (Albany, NY: State University Press of New York, 1985), 145.

such disparate directions, each has tended, in their isolation and specialization, to be, as one observer put it, somewhat "out of the loop." One activist claims of the Forest Service, "We know more than they do. We can tell them what's going on." This reductionism goes beyond interagency relations as even the various specializations within the Forest Service have often tended to act with a minimum of internal coordination, mirroring the larger external picture. "The right hand," says a timber official, "doesn't know what the left hand is doing." Thus, with one of those hands, agency biologists work to formulate a spotted owl recovery plan, while with the other, foresters and line officers draw up unrelated forest plans with ASQs and roadless entries which might very well violate the owl plan.

This lack of a truly comprehensive vision of land management in favor of disjointed, piecemeal, timber sale-driven management might be partly attributable to the fact that the agency is so highly compartmentalized into the realms of specialists--foresters, engineers, wildlife biologists, hydrologists, soil scientists, archeologists, recreationists, and so on. Perhaps more importantly, some of these specializations are powerful while others are marginalized. As such, comprehensive solutions integrating old growth ecology, wildlife, and economic concerns into a long-term, big-picture strategy have faced enormously difficult,

nearly insurmountable obstacles in such a fragmented and biased structure.

The closest thing to true coordination and interagency cooperation in the old growth case has been the work of the Interagency Scientific Committee, made up of experts from a number of state and federal agencies. Theoretically, at least, such a commission should be able to transcend the conflictual fragmentation of jurisdictions deadlocked on a particular policy problem and in doing so, provide some coordination and basis for cooperation to these same jurisdictions. The degree of legitimacy that the committee's recommendations eventually garnered, as well as the centrality of the ISC as a player in the old growth politics of 1989-1991, points to their surprising success. They did indeed coordinate scientific efforts to understand and manage the spotted owl. Their exclusive focus on the owl and nothing else, however, has limited their effectiveness at offering the truly comprehensive sorts of solutions to the larger root problem (that of vanishing old growth ecosystems) that many observers would expect from an organization of this nature. At least in this case, therefore, good coordination did not guarantee comprehensiveness. A newer interagency commission, the Northern Spotted Owl Recovery Team, similarly made of various state and federal agencies and individuals, has since supplanted the ISC as the main vehicle for policy coordination.


Conclusion

When considering whether political fragmentation in the Siskiyou has been harmful to ecological goals or when comparing the policy preferences of higher levels versus lower levels of political authority, the only thing that becomes perfectly clear is that not much is clear. Is political centralization necessary if ecological values are to be taken seriously and comprehensively considered or does decentralization offer these values their best chance? The conclusions that can be drawn from the Siskiyou are decidedly mixed.

As table 18 shows, there has been no clear trend correlating higher-level, more centralized decisionmakers with more ecologically enlightened attitudes or vice versa. Rather, all policymaking levels advocated all sorts of old growth policy. Specifically, the federal courts and the ISC conformed most closely to the thesis that centralized structures are the most environmentally friendly. Internally, Congress also seemed to follow this pattern to some extent. For the most part, local and regional legislators, responding to timber's important role as a constituent benefit, were among the actors most closely aligned with timber interests and most consistently against old growth protection. On the other hand, representatives from non-timber districts, adhering to a more national policy (rather than local representation) orientation, were amongst the environ-

TABLE 18

LEVELS OF POLICYMAKER CENTRALIZATION AND ENVIRONMENTALISM



mentalists' closest allies. Because of this dualism, the Congress as a whole must be considered as neither wholly pro-timber or pro-environmental.

While the examples of Congress, the courts, and the ISC reinforce the centralization thesis, the evidence from the administrative sector seems to point to the reverse. Relatively speaking, in the Siskiyou it was the most decentralized units of administration, the National Forest and the ranger districts, who were a fair degree more environmentally sensitive than regional or headquarter offices. In fact, as one climbs the administrative ladder from the Siskiyou to Region Six to Forest Service headquarters to Cabinet-level departments to top administrative officials, the anti-environmentalism and commodity-user bias intensifies further and further.

This top-level anti-environmentalism is probably very case and time specific, however. As such, it points to the obvious importance of presidential politics and a given administration's ideology. One could easily envision an alternative scenario where top administrators were more ecologically inclined than their decentralized counterparts. For example, it is probably safe to say that the Assistant Secretary of Agriculture under Carter, Rupert Cutler (who went on to head the Defenders of Wildlife) was environmentally way ahead of most of the "on-the-ground" personnel he oversaw in the Forest Service. Similarly, the Clinton adminis-

tration may very well prove to have stronger environmental leanings than most rank-and-file Agriculture or Forest Service personnel. If this case study began after 1992, its findings in terms of administrative centralization might, therefore, be quite different. Thus, the hostility this study found in the Reagan and Bush administrations is far less about inherent patterns in centralized authority regarding environmental protection than it is about the changeability of such patterns.

Finally, in terms of differences between federal, state, and local positions, the evidence from the Siskiyou case has again been mixed. Prior to 1990, the governor's office and federal administrators stressed timber production to roughly the same extent, while several state agencies, on the other hand, were far more ecologically inclined than either. Since Governor Roberts came to power in 1991, though, the state government as a whole could be considered far more in favor of environmental protection than the federal government, a rare achievement in the West where the federal government is usually considerably more preservation-oriented than the states. Locally, however, things were far more traditional as the county and city governments surrounding the Forest were, without exception, vigorously opposed to old growth protection.

Regarding decentralization's alleged flaws, only localized capture has been shown in the Siskiyou case to have

very little basis. A cautious, status quo-oriented incrementalism and a divisive reductionism, on the other hand, proved to be serious, even crippling problems for comprehensive environmental goals. Incremental policy formulation has heavily favored a strongly unecological status quo of high timber budgets and a steady flow of constituent benefits. The fragmentation and narrow reductionistic perceptions of policymakers, meanwhile, have turned old growth politics, at times, into a chaotic and incoherent jumble, inherently incapable of producing, let alone conceiving of holistic or systematic approaches to ecological problems. Instead, a series of fractured proposals responding only to isolated aspects of this issue (the spotted owl, particular patches of big trees, jobs, or the steady flow of timber) have been the most this fragmented and highly specialized system could produce.

Does it follow, then, that centralization would correct these shortcomings? While this study can offer no truly conclusive evidence of this, one can surely speculate that a more centralized and integrated policymaking structure might indeed be able to churn out more comprehensive policy.¹⁵⁷ If the case of the Siskiyou shows anything, though, it is that centralization can be a double-edged sword that offers no

¹⁵⁷ Though it has the potential, centralization cannot absolutely guarantee comprehensiveness. While comprehensiveness probably needs some degree of centralization, the reverse is not necessarily true.

guarantee of environmental correctness. For environmentalists, therefore, the centralization and integration of government power is a risky and highly volatile affair.

If the centralized administration is sympathetic to ecological objectives, then such a system might have the potential to work brilliantly. If not, however, centralized structures could be used towards a very different end--perhaps *comprehensive* anti-environmentalism and *comprehensive* resource exploitation. As long as this country has free elections, then administrations will change and, as was the case in Oregon in 1990 or the United States in 1980 or 1992, fairly significant differences in environmental attitudes may result. Thus, only an environmental dictatorship could absolutely assure that a centralized and comprehensive policymaking structure would maintain fidelity to ecological values. What centralization does, therefore, is to raise the stakes and turn policymaking into a gamble in which interests could win big or lose big. Conversely, decentralization offers opportunities for neither a sweeping ecological overhaul of policy or an equally sweeping revocation or total backlash.¹⁵⁸

Despite all of its considerable flaws, fragmentation has the one advantage of providing a sturdy guarantee of ac-

¹⁵⁸ The only possible scenario for far-reaching policy change might be if either environmental interests or their resource-using opponents lost so much power as to become irrelevant and completely marginalized; in either case (but especially the latter), an unlikely scenario.

cess for environmentalists that a more fickle centralized system cannot. In a decentralized system opportunities to influence policy are simply more numerous. Environmentalists who found themselves shut out of top-level decisionmaking and kept at arms-length by the Forest Service still had cards to play as they turned, in this case, to Congress where they cultivated close non-timber district allies, and even more importantly, to the federal courts. By contrast, if an interest in a highly centralized system is shut out at the top, they are shut out *period*. Thus, fragmentation does indeed increase opportunities for participation, help groups maintain flexible strategies for achieving influence, and allow multiple policymaking entities to keep each other in check.

While these are undoubtedly attractive qualities to environmental interests who sometimes find themselves on the margins of politics, fragmentation inflicts a heavy price for its virtues. The costs of easy access and checks and balances are precisely the sorts of incrementalism and narrow vision that strangle holistic ecological policymaking. Mann recognizes this as he argues that fragmentation "imposes its own controls"¹⁵⁹ on the very reform movements it so generously gives an initial forum to:

[T]he same fragmented system that provided opportunities for fractional groups when public pressures where

¹⁵⁹ Mann, 23.

significantly intense, made further progress very difficult after the initial wave passed.¹⁶⁰

Fragmentation, therefore, offers environmentalists half a loaf: guaranteed access to the system and a wide array of tools and strategies to work with, but practically no chance to achieve the truly comprehensive, systemic ecological policy they feel is ultimately the only solution. Centralization, on the other hand, does hold out that potential, but it holds the chance for total disaster (James Watt or John Crowell with no restraints) as well. While the guarantee of heavy compromise and the knowledge that truly sound ecological policy will always be defeated are bitter pills to swallow, many environmentalists prefer the devil they know to one they do not, as Bartlett suggests:

The consequences of abstract and often untried comprehensive decisionmaking proposals are necessarily uncertain; what is certain is that political advantage would shift in poorly understood (and thus politically risky) ways.¹⁶¹

In sum, then, pluralist decentralization and its politics of "muddling through" are clearly antithetical to ecological policy goals, as its critics suggest. While they provide widespread access to the political system and often serve to prevent some of the more grievous and overt environmental abuses in the short term, they cannot prevent the slow, long-term deterioration and unraveling of ecosystems, something only a more comprehensive approach can address. It

¹⁶⁰ *Ibid.* 21.

¹⁶¹ Bartlett, 242.

cannot be concluded with much confidence, however, that the centralized alternative would be any better, and in some scenarios, might even be worse.

Centralization will be foolproof only after ecological values have been firmly associated with the public interest and universally and authentically accepted and internalized. Otherwise, the best strategy might be what McCurdy suggests: maintain the system's decentralization and access, but work to improve coordination, install procedures for integrated policymaking, and encourage the neutral professionalism of agencies. More interagency commissions (perhaps with binding authority), more unambiguous language in legislation which guarantees citizen and judicial review and allows less overtly subversive administrative discretion, and a less parochial public lands policy orientation in Congress would all go a long way towards improving coordination, and possibly the even the chance for comprehensiveness without assuming centralization's greatest risks.

CHAPTER 7

RADICAL DECENTRALIST AND MAJORITARIAN ALTERNATIVES

....there are limits to the environmentalist slogan
"think globally, act locally."

Robert Paehlke

Centralization is but one structural adjustment that the critics of pluralism advance as a preferable alternative to this process they oppose. This chapter examines two other forms of democratic organization commonly put forth by various critics--radical decentralization and majoritarianism--within the framework of ecological politics and the politics of the Siskiyou specifically.

While the centralist critique of the pluralist process prescribes increased governmental centralization, integration, and rationality as the solution to pluralism's alleged shortcomings, these other critics look to increased public participation and even final authority in matters of policy-

making. What these various advocates of public involvement all share in common is a firm belief that pluralism's special interest-dominated governmental apparatus or the centralist's rigid "expert"-dominated bureaucracy can only serve to thwart the public's interests and desires. Thus, the most legitimate and appropriate source of policymaking authority is seen to be the public.

Radical Decentralist Alternatives

Participatory Democracy

As the last chapter has shown, the centralist critique of pluralism emphasizes excessive decentralization as the root of pluralism's flaws. Another group of critics, however, come to quite the opposite conclusion, arguing that pluralism's alleged inequality and bias can be overcome only through even *more* decentralization all the way down to the most localized level. To participatory democrats such as Robert Wolff, Alan Altschuler, Milton Kotler, Carole Pateman, or Frank Bryan and John McClaughtry, it is only at this very local *community* level that direct and meaningful public participation in governance can take place.¹

¹Robert Wolff, *The Poverty of Liberalism* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1968); Alan Altschuler, *Community Control* (New York: Pegasus, 1970); Milton Kotler, *Neighborhood Government* (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1967); Carole Pateman, *Participation and Democratic Theory* (Cambridge, MA: At the University Press, 1970); Frank Byran and John McClaughtry, *The Vermont Papers: Recreating Democracy on a Human Scale* (Post Mills, VT: Chelsea Green Publishing Co., 1989).

According to these participatory democrats, or communitarians as some call them,² the virtues of such intense public involvement are twofold. Not only will it lead to authentically democratic decisionmaking with increased access to and responsiveness of government, but will also accrue benefits for the participants themselves. Direct participation, it is argued, bestows upon citizens a priceless sense of efficacy, belongingness, and civic responsibility.³ Thus, participation becomes, to participatory democrats, not only a means for more egalitarian policy, but a virtuous political and social end as well.

Pluralism's process of participation, on the other hand, is alleged to be a sham, offering only lopsided access and government-sanctioned inequity and bias, especially against marginal and/or more diffuse interests.⁴ Thus, only through community control by a fully mobilized citizenry can all the voices of a community be heard and the power of the

²While it used by some to denote the movement for decentralized community control, the term *communitarian* is used by other political theorists to refer more broadly to a belief in individual responsibility and obligation to the greater society. As such, it is the political opposite of libertarianism. To avoid confusion, the term *participatory democrats* will be used to refer to proponents of decentralized community control.

³This is a theme that runs through Wolff, *The Poverty of Liberalism*, Pateman, *Participation and Democratic Theory*, and Peter Bachrach, *The Theory of Democratic Elitism* (Boston: Little, Brown, and Co., 1967).

⁴Richard Hamilton, *Class and Politics in the United States* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1972), 35-46.

elite be reined in. One decentralist sums up participatory democracy's advantages:

Thus the virtue of the community of *direct democracy* is that it does not easily succumb to governing elites and is able to offer systemic resistance to autocratic leaders. It provides the forum where new ideas may at least be considered and, through free debate, the means of making their virtues known. It produces in time an openness and tolerance in political matters and processes that can extend into the social sphere. It encourages participation, not simply because it is in everyone's self-interest to show up at the meeting and keep from being elected dog-catcher, but because the whole range of community problems tends to become as real as--in effect to be--personal problems. If it is in addition *consensual*, its workings will militate against the unjust treatment of any individual--individuals presumably having a say in their own fate.... Consensus, too, if a regular process, works to round off the edges of minority opinions after a while so that in time they fit in more smoothly with--or at least accepted between--the opinions of the majority.⁵

While many ecological thinkers call for centralization (see chapter six), so-called *deep ecologists* such as Kirkpatrick Sale or William Devall and George Sessions and *social ecologists* like Murray Bookchin or Andre Gorz place blame for the ecological crisis firmly upon what they see as the large, remote, and thoroughly undemocratic social, economic, and political structures which pervade our society.⁶ According to Sale, these impersonal and hierarchical insti-

⁵Kirkpatrick Sale, *Human Scale* (New York: Coward, McCann, and Geoghegan, 1980), 509-510

⁶Kirkpatrick Sale, *Human Scale and Dwellers in the Land: The Bioregional Vision* (San Francisco, Sierra Club Books, 1985); William Devall and George Sessions, *Deep Ecology* (Salt Lake City: Peregrine Smith, 1985); Murray Bookchin, *The Ecology of Freedom* (Palo Alto, CA: Chesire, 1982); Andre Gorz, *Ecology as Politics* (Boston: South End Press, 1980)

tutions are struck by the disease of *giantism* and are controlled by the elite few to the detriment of the many.⁷

The indifferent destruction huge, centralized industrial structures bring, say decentralist ecologists, can only be reversed by the philosophy of *small is beautiful* wherein power is devolved to the local community, bioregion, or even watershed. It is only at this most decentralized level, they argue, that truly ecological policy can flourish, made possible by a direct democracy involving those who actually live in and love their local environs (rather than distant and unsympathetic interests or power brokers) as Sales shows:

If, further, the community is guided by the tenets of *ecological harmony* and *steady-state* equilibria, it is hardly the type to despoil its environment or readily admit the toxic or polluting industry (which, being in control of its economy, is free to reject). Conscious of the way it relates to the ecosystem, it would likely establish, and value, its connections to other communities within the bioregion....Conservative it would certainly be, in the best sense of that word, for that is precisely what recycling and resource recovery, precisely what self-sufficiency is all about,....⁸

Because the future configurations of politics and society they envision rely upon a somewhat optimistic view of human nature, participatory democrats and radical ecological decentralists are accused by pluralists and others of idealistic utopianism. As attractive as it seems in theory, say

⁷This is the main theme running throughout Sale, *Human Scale*.

⁸Sale, *Human Scale*, 510.

critics, participatory democracy will inevitably break down in practice due to a number of factors.

First, pluralists point out that while diffusing power to the community level might seem to enhance individual control, in the bigger scheme of things, it diminishes one's actual problem-solving efficacy. Not only does radical decentralization leave each local jurisdiction with less resources to cope with problems, but also less authority to deal with transjurisdictional issues outside their control which are often the real source of their problems.⁹ Thus, even the most ecologically committed community's prerogatives are limited when dealing with the sovereign town upstream which is dumping sewage into the river both share as Kelso suggests:

In their quest for meaningful participation, communitarian democrats thus seem to confront an unresolvable paradox. By reducing the size of the polity, they increase the opportunities for individuals to participate; but by increasing the opportunities for citizen involvement, they run the risk of trivializing its importance. The smaller the unit of government, the less significant become the issues that the individuals within the political community can effectively influence.¹⁰

Paehlke, too, notes this dilemma regarding environmental protection:

The contradictions between the "anarchist" and "localist" utopias of Bookchin and other environmentalists and the burgeoning bureaucracies cannot be ignored. But one cannot simply dismiss the growth of national

⁹William Kelso, *American Democratic Theory* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1978), 201.

¹⁰*Ibid.*

environmental bureaucracies as a betrayal of the cause. Were regulatory powers not established on a national basis, pollution "havens" would abound--some jurisdictions would choose a massive industrial tax base over a clean environment, and surrounding areas, if not whole nations, would soon bear the costs. National, even international environmental standards and regulations make a great deal of sense....there are limits to the environmentalist slogan "think globally, act locally."¹¹

To its advocates, then, pluralism's seemingly chaotic mix of centralized and decentralized structures provides just the right blend of meaningful authority and access to make participation, though less direct, really count.

Pluralists and other detractors also call into doubt participatory democracy's workability. Contrary to the decentralists' claims, pluralists such as Edward Banfield and James Q. Wilson argue that the smaller the jurisdiction, the more intense conflict will become.¹² Pluralists thus predict that communitarian systems will collapse under the weight of the inevitable conflict pure democracy brings. Robert Hine, in his study of California communes, in fact, finds that the most democratic ones had the least longevity.¹³

Other critics go as far as to suggest that a participatory democracy can ironically degenerate into something less than democratic. Kelso, for instance, borrowing an argument from centralist critics of pluralism, suggests that

¹¹ Robert Paehlke, *Environmentalism and the Future of Progressive Politics* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1989), 156.

¹² Edward Banfield and James Q. Wilson, *City Politics* (New York: Random House, 1963).

¹³ Robert Hine cited in Kelso, 200.

radical decentralization might actually increase rather than break the power of dominant groups in such a limited and isolated political realm.¹⁴ He also finds that communal patterns of social organization often serve to stifle and repress rather than celebrate diversity as is claimed.¹⁵ As such, minority groups, far from being empowered, may actually be oppressed within a community with none of the multiple avenues for redress which pluralism offers.

Finally, critics find participatory democracy unviable due to the sheer weight of public indifference. In addition to being over-confident about the logistics of mass involvement, argue critics, participatory democrats overestimate the public's willingness to overcome their indifference and narrow self-interest. Kelso, for example, points to a number of studies of direct democratic structures such as Kibbutzim, communes, and autonomous workers' councils which find not only widespread conflict, but also debilitating apathy in the face of the awesome obligations demanded by participatory systems.¹⁶ Recreating pre-modern political associations in an intensely modern world filled with individualistic, consumeristic, and technological pressures may very well be, therefore, an impossible task. The indirect parti-

¹⁴ Kelso, 227.

¹⁵ *Ibid.* 198-199, 203.

¹⁶ *Ibid.* 181-195. Participatory democrats, however, might respond by pointing to fairly successful examples of direct democracy in the industrialized world such as the Swiss confederation or New England town meetings.

icipation of interest groups in a pluralist system, on the other hand, is alleged to be a far more realistic and less burdensome manifestation of democracy and civic involvement.¹⁷

Participatory democrats respond to such charges by claiming that pluralists create a straw man when they base their criticisms of participatory democracy's potential upon observations and assumptions originating from a pluralist context. If people do not seem ready to take on the responsibility of self-rule, they argue, it is because the current undemocratic system leaves them cynical, apathetic, and unprepared.¹⁸ It is only through the act of direct participation and the actual witnessing of its many benefits, that a culture of civic duty and political efficacy can develop and eventually flourish.¹⁹ Few participatory democrats promise that this will be a quick or easy shift and some even seem to suggest that some sort of transition will be necessary.²⁰

Privatization

There exists another form of radical decentralization based upon assumptions very different from those of participatory democracy. The political ideology of privatization is

¹⁷ *Ibid.* 179.

¹⁸ Pateman, 79-101.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*

²⁰ There is disagreement among participatory democrats as to whether the public is ready to assume the substantial burdens of self-rule. Theorists such as Wolff feel that the public is currently ready, while others such as Pateman concede that they must first gain the skills to participate.

founded largely upon the beliefs of libertarianism and free-market capitalism. Its advocates claim that the decentralization of authority to its most basic unit--the individual (especially in his or her capacity as a potential property owner and economic free-agent)--provides the best alternative to what is seen as pluralism's scandalous inefficiency and illiberal (as in anti-private property) tendencies. Privatization as both coherent theory and political movement is perhaps most developed in the area of public lands politics where calls are made for public land to be divested to private owners, thereby decentralizing management even beyond local community control.

Theorists such as John Baden and Richard Stroup, Baden and Dean Lueck, and William Dennis and Randy Simmons all argue that distributively-oriented pluralist administration creates bureaucratic inefficiency in management, clientelism, and worst of all, government subsidization of environmental destruction.²¹ Speaking of pluralism, Simmons and Dennis maintain that "authority is separated from responsibility;" in this case, the responsibility conferred by pri-

²¹ John Baden and Richard Stroup, *Bureaucracy vs. Environment* (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1981); John Baden and Dean Lueck, "Bringing Private Management to the Public Lands: Environmental and Economic Advantages" in Sheldon Kamieniecki, Robert O'Brien, and Michael Clarke (editors), *Controversies in Environmental Policy* (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1986); William Dennis and Randy Simmons, "From Illusion to Responsibility: Rethinking Regulation of Federal Public Lands" in Kamieniecki, et al.

vate ownership.²² According to its advocates, privatization, by forcing a reliance upon the free market, would actually benefit ecological goals as in many cases, commodity production and associated environmental despoilation would become too costly without government subsidies.²³ Most privatizers would agree, then, with ideological bedfellow James Watt who as Secretary of the Interior claimed that, "there is no greater wisdom than the marketplace."²⁴

Most all environmental theorists, whether centralist, pluralist, or communitarian, vehemently oppose the ideology and practice of privatization. To suggest widespread privatization would benefit the environment, critics would argue, requires an appreciation of the fantastic far greater than that of even the most utopian communitarian. As wrong-headed and client-dominated as they often find it, government administration of public lands is far preferable to most environmentalists than private ownership; a point made by the pluralist McCurdy:

Privatizers conclude that government agencies are inefficient mechanisms for reflecting public choice. Pluralists, on the other hand, view the *absence* of government interference as inefficient given the public's desire for participation in resource decisions.²⁵

²² Dennis and Simmons, 71-75.

²³ Baden and Lueck, 51-54; Dennis and Simmons, 71.

²⁴ James Watt quoted in Walter Rosenbaum, *Environmental Politics and Policy* (Washington D.C.: CQ Press, 1985), 29.

²⁵ Howard McCurdy, "Environmental Protection and the New Federalism: The Sagebrush Rebellion and Beyond" in Kamieniecki, et al, 101.

Thus, government management, as poor as it may be, at least holds out the potential for public involvement and influence and maybe even policy change. On the other hand, private ownership, according to McCurdy, offers no representation, no appeal, and no redress, all standard in a pluralist system.²⁶ The only thing standing between healthy private land and a stripmine, therefore, is some ambiguous notion of owner "responsibility". And when the free market is the operative factor, the owner's responsibility is clear: to be efficient with his or her assets as the market determines. The problem here, claim Thomas Ingersoll and Bradley Brockbank is that the market has no real way to measure ecological value; those elements considered essential to the functioning of an ecosystem are usually considered "free goods" with little or no market value.²⁷

The Potential of Radical Decentralization: The Evidence from the Siskiyou

As has been discussed, decentralist ecologists would argue that, ultimately, land use decisions that are relevant to and respectful of bioregional ecosystems can come only from small autonomous communities exercising democratic participatory policymaking. They would probably suggest that if authority rested at the local level, whether as part of a

²⁶ *Ibid.* 100.

²⁷ Thomas Ingersoll and Bradley Brockbank, "The Role of Economic Incentives in Environmental Policy" in Kamieniecki, et al, 207.

loose confederation within the *Cascadia* bioregion of the Northwest or as a cluster of settlements within the Rogue or Illinois watersheds, the old growth would stand.

What then, would land management policy in what is now the Siskiyou *National Forest* really look like if authority was vested in the local community? Evidence from the Siskiyou case is based, of course, upon only what has been in the past and is presently; the rest is speculation. With that in mind, one should consider that what is observable from the southwest corner of Oregon does not seem to bode well for either old growth or the spotted owl. True community control, as things stand today, would most likely translate into a level of resource exploitation aggressive enough for environmentalists to yearn for the "good old days" of Forest Service management.

Simply put, on the most local level, pro-timber sentiment would overpower ecological concern. This is not to say that environmentalists are not a powerful presence in southwest Oregon; to the contrary, they are a dynamic, aggressive, and numerically respectable contingent of the area's population. But they also are a minority.²⁸ In a truly participatory context (that is, assuming fairly universal par-

²⁸ Polls show that while Oregonians are split fairly evenly over the old growth and spotted owl controversies, most environmentalist support comes from urban areas, while rural areas strongly favor logging. Southwest Oregon, it should be remembered, is one of the more rural parts of the state. Kathie Durbin, "Polls Show Oregonians Deeply Split Over Owl" *Oregonian* (6 May 1990).

ticipation) environmental voices would be drowned out and timber production would rule the day in local community governing structures. The resolutely pro-timber attitudes and behavior of municipal and county boards in the Siskiyou area in the past decade provide some idea as to what true local control might look like if implemented today.

Perhaps the only alternative scenario to outright timber domination might be the sort of extreme polarization and conflictual stand-off that pluralists warn about. Sales's claim that intense participation brings opponents closer together, seems somewhat wishful knowing the bitter political divisions that have so deeply split the Siskiyou community in the past decade.

It seems very doubtful, therefore, that mere decentralization would bring about ecologically sound policy unless such a structural change was *preceded* by a major value shift. In theory, at least, deep ecologists make sense when they suggest that local folks know and can thus care for their local ecosystems far better than remote centralized bureaucracies bent upon industrialization and economic growth. The problem is that there are two questionable assumptions implicit in this: (1) local people are unified in their commitment to ecological principles, and (2) they are self-sufficient enough to be free of the competition inherent to the global-scale economy that is the reality of the day. In actuality, however, local residents are sometimes

even hungrier and more desperate for economic growth and development than centralized bureaucrats are.

Some participatory democrats, as noted before, are cognizant of this dilemma and might concede that some sort of economic restructuring and value shift or socialization process is necessary before radical decentralization can be put into practice. The more that new ways of perceiving the forests, the planet, economics, and citizen responsibility gain currency, they would argue, the more appropriate and desirable becomes community control.

Just as troublesome would be transjurisdictional problems which, by their very nature, would abound in the Siskiyou case. Even assuming a particular county or watershed shared an unshakeable commitment to ecologically sustainable land use, how would it deal with the community upstream, perhaps less committed, whose logging chokes streams with debris and destroys interconnected salmon runs or fragments the larger forest ecosystem and owl habitat that the first community shares with it? Hardin's "tragedy of the commons" would likely be realized. Thus not only must communities be internally united in their values for community control to work smoothly, but *all* communities must be similarly united or else one community's policies, no matter how noble and well-intentioned, will become isolated and trivialized. As the example of the Siskiyou shows, environmentalists were most successful in addressing issues of larger

scope--forest management laws, endangered species--than fighting their battles on a local timber sale-by-timber sale or even forest-by-forest basis.

What about the other decentralist option--that of privatization? Here, there is more concrete evidence to judge by in that forest tracts adjacent to the Siskiyou are privately held and subject more directly to market forces. If this private land in southwest Oregon (or, for that matter, most anywhere else in the country), is any indication, then privatization would be an unmitigated environmental disaster for the Siskiyou forest. While Forest Service and BLM management has indeed often been extremely destructive, it pales in comparison to the land management history of adjacent private forest land, especially in areas of high commercial value.

Far from being "responsible" as advocates claim, private ownership in southwestern Oregon has mostly led to the wholesale liquidation of "assets" in ways that very often violate completely the principles of sustained yield, multiple use, ecological sustainability, public participation, or the right of appeal. Only on the steepest ridges or inaccessible slopes would privatization offer any advantage; the lack of government subsidization of prohibitively costly roads or helicopter logging would probably grant these areas a temporary reprieve until the price of timber rose high enough to justify such investments. Otherwise, any reasonab-

ly accessible acreage, especially low-lying areas along streams, would be sure to be harvested for its valuable old growth timber and probably with cost-effective clearcutting techniques. The private lands surrounding the Siskiyou National Forest, much of it either denuded pasture or monoculture tree farms, provide a fairly clear glimpse into any future scenario of privatization.

Majoritarianism

Majoritarian Theory and Ecological Politics

Advocates of majoritarian democracy comprise yet another school of thought critical of pluralism. Like participatory democrats, they object to pluralism on the grounds that it violates the public interest in favor of private interests. Also, they too argue that the public should be far more directly involved in their own governance. Unlike participatory democracy, though, advocates of majoritarianism, or populist democracy as Kelso calls it,²⁹ do not see radical decentralization as a prerequisite for achieving direct democracy. Nor do they share participatory democrats' suspicion of large-scale governmental institutions. On the contrary, an active and aggressive government endowed with the necessary resources is seen by majoritarians such as Michael Harrington as essential to the protection of the public

²⁹ Kelso, *American Democratic Theory*.

interest and the implementation of the public's sovereign will.³⁰

Thus, majoritarians basically favor a consolidation of government authority in order to render it unresponsive to any interest save the public's.³¹ How majoritarians differ from the centralist thinkers discussed in the last chapter involves where they believe government ought to get its mandate. To centralists, a rational and expert elite develops policy according to their conception of the long-term public interest. A majoritarian government, on the other hand, would exist merely to implement the popular will as expressed to them by the public (even at the state or national level) as directly as possible, especially by means of referenda and initiatives.³² Such a system, in all its directness and simplicity, argue majoritarians, maximizes democracy and assures that majority rule does not degenerate, as they feel it does in pluralism, into minority rule.³³

When it comes to environmental issues, for instance, majoritarians such as Mark Kann see a clearcut case of such minority rule, claiming that overwhelming public desires are

³⁰ Michael Harrington, *Towards A Democratic Left* (New York: Macmillan, 1968), chap. 5.

³¹ Here the majoritarians resemble the elite-centralists. In fact, scholars who call for such a consolidation from a somewhat left-of-center perspective such as McConnell or Schattschneider are quite difficult to definitively categorize as either purely centralist or majoritarian.

³² Harrington, chap.5.

³³ Austin Ranney and Willmore Kendall, *Democracy and the American Party System* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and Co., 1956), 24.

constantly being thwarted by an unholy alliance of private and governmental elites.³⁴ If "the people" only had their say and saw it enforced, majoritarians argue, environmentalism would triumph. To bolster their point, majoritarians might point to a number of public opinion studies which suggest that the American people overwhelmingly support environmentalism.³⁵

According to Robert Mitchell, such public support at the beginning of the 1990s, stands stronger than ever.³⁶ According to Mitchell, protection of the environment is now a bona-fide "motherhood issue", a fact made clear by the overall failure of Reagan's anti-environmental crusade.³⁷ In fact, a 1989 Roper poll found only 15% of the public supporting cutbacks in environmental protection, while another poll found 53% in 1988 agreeing that the government regulates and is involved in environmental issues "too little."³⁸ Thus, as Riley Dunlap says, environmentalism has

³⁴ Mark Kann, "Environmental Democracy in the United States" in Kamieniecki et al, 253-261.

³⁵ For overviews of such studies see, Robert Mitchell, "Public Opinion and the Green Lobby: Poised for the 1990s?" in Norman Vig and Michael Kraft (editor), *Environmental Policy in the 1990s* (Washington D.C.: CQ Press, 1990); Riley Dunlap, "Public Opinion and Environmental Policy" in James Lester (editor), *Environmental Politics and Policy* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1989); and a somewhat dated, though still informative article by J. Fred Springer and Edmond Constanti, "Public Opinion and the Environment: An Issue in Search of a Home" in Stuart Nagel (editor), *Environmental Politics* (New York, Praeger Publishers, 1974).

³⁶ Mitchell, 81.

³⁷ *Ibid.* 82-83.

³⁸ Roper and Cambridge Reports polls cited in *Ibid.* 85.

become not only an "enduring concern" but has achieved "the status of an important value."³⁹ If left up to the public rather than bureaucrats or private interests, a majoritarian would probably be quite confident that environmental objectives would almost always prevail.

Critics of majoritarianism, however, find the question of the popular will--both how to express it and how much authority to vest in it--to be far more complex than majoritarians would admit. First of all, critics argue that the referenda process which majoritarians rely so heavily upon, is deeply flawed or at least highly limited in its usefulness.⁴⁰ How can referenda, ask critics, address the technical intricacies of the extremely complex, multi-faceted issues which account for so many current policy problems? An undifferentiated public, argue critics, simply does not possess the knowledge to render a well-informed vote on many policy options.⁴¹ Such an uninformed mass, it would seem, could easily be fall prey to media campaigns of manipulation and deceit run by the most savvy and/or well-financed interests affected by a particular policy question.

Other critics, meanwhile, even question whether the public's will is synonymous with the public interest. Ophuls, for example, maintains that the problem with ecological policy is not that the public's voice has been silen-

³⁹ Dunlap, 133.

⁴⁰ Kelso, 67-82.

⁴¹ *Ibid.* 67, 87.

ced, but that the clamor for economic growth or political pork--the destructive sum of individual desires--is heard all too well.⁴² To Ophuls, therefore, only a rational elite could save us from ourselves and act on behalf of a true public interest that cannot simply be tallied through votes.

Another problem with such a majoritarian arrangement, according to critics, is that referenda can realistically produce only vague, large-scale directives, rather than technically detailed, workable policy. Consequently, "the linkage between the public's original wishes and the operations of the state will become more tenuous." as the power and discretion of the state become magnified to the detriment, rather than enhancement of the public interest.⁴³ Thus, Kelso argues that "the very quality of popular participation may become more symbolic than substantive in nature."⁴⁴ Ironically, according to pluralists, the public is more involved in the actual nitty-gritty of the policymaking process in a pluralist rather than majoritarian system.⁴⁵

Critics call attention to what they see as another serious flaw in the majoritarian process--it has no way to gauge the intensity by which different people support or oppose various policy outcomes. How democratic is it, critics would ask, for the votes of those who passionately desire

⁴² William Ophuls, *Ecology and the Politics of Scarcity* (San Francisco, W.H. Freeman, 1977), 189-190.

⁴³ Kelso, 88.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*

⁴⁵ *Ibid.* 65.

some outcome or are deeply affected by it to be swamped by the votes of those who know or care little but still cast their obligatory vote?⁴⁶ According to Kelso, "it may be more fair for the political system to decide in favor of those government policies which are most preferred rather than those programs which are preferred by most."⁴⁷ Otherwise, one risks confronting the so-called "Arrow Problem"--the paradox of a collective policy choice which does not faithfully correspond to most individuals' preferences.⁴⁸ Again, only pluralism is said to be appropriate--in this case, able to weigh intensity through its bargaining process.

At the root of this problem of intensity is what pluralist emphatically insist is a diverse and fragmented polity. In such a setting, they argue, majoritarian referenda are simply too unsubtle and inflexible a tool to truly capture the public will and decide complex issues. Kelso makes this point:

While populists often talk as if there were a popular or majoritarian sentiment on most issues, we can see that in many cases, such sentiment simply does not exist....Thus efforts to force a majority stand out of a diverse and heterogeneous set of publics are likely to lead to....problems....While the referendum will mechanically generate a majority opinion of an issue,

⁴⁶ This might especially be a problem in public lands politics, alleged by Rosenbaum to be an "arcane business to most Americans." Rosenbaum, *Environmental Politics and Policy*, 283.

⁴⁷ Kelso, 83. Kelso claims that it is, perhaps, only in a fairly small community with roughly similar values that referenda can weigh all votes in a truly equitable way.

⁴⁸ Kenneth Arrow, *Social Choice and Individual Values* (New York, John Wiley & Sons, 1951).

that opinion may not correspond to any well-defined set of beliefs in the larger population.⁴⁹

Without universal goals and values amongst the polity, it would run the risk, therefore, of alienating significant portions of the electorate and in its worst manifestation, imposing a tyranny of the majority.

Majoritarianism and the Siskiyou

The question at hand, then, is whether a process which offers less distilled, more direct public choice (through, perhaps, state or national referenda) would treat ecological goals and values more kindly. Would the Siskiyou case have been settled in the environmentalists' favor long ago if the influence of interest groups was lifted and the public spoke its mind through the ballot? While evidence exists as to the broad public support environmentalism enjoys, how reliably would this translate in a majoritarian system into Siskiyou National Forest policy?

Like similar questions regarding decentralized participatory democracy, much of what can be offered here as analysis involves, by necessity, a good deal of conjecture. Still, various polls and two very telling California referenda in 1990 offer at least some empirical basis with which to ponder the potential of majoritarianism in the politics of old growth.

⁴⁹ Kelso, 70.

It has already been speculated that if left strictly up to local, timber-dependent communities, there would be a good chance that policy on the Siskiyou would shift towards even more commodity production. A majoritarian system, however, would rely upon a much broader scope of public opinion to set policy in what majoritarians would stress is a *national* forest established for the benefit of all Americans.

In this broader context, the nature of public opinion, according to most of the public opinion literature on the environment, shifts rather dramatically to favor environmentalism.⁵⁰ While it cannot be said for certain, national, and to a lesser extent state (Washington and Oregon) opinion on old growth today is probably quite a bit more environmentally inclined than local community opinion.

Whether mass opinion would treat old growth more kindly than current policy does is less clear. A 1990 Media General/Associated Press poll, however, suggests it would. The poll shows 61% of the public favoring a "ban on woodcutting in old forests."⁵¹ Another 1990 poll conducted by the Seattle Times finds similar support for old growth amongst Washington residents with 52% backing "a logging ban to pro-

⁵⁰ Once again, see the summaries of this issue offered by Dunlap, Mitchell and Springer and Constantini (see footnote 32)

⁵¹ Media General/AP poll cited in *Wild Oregon* (Summer 1990), 9. The same poll also found 75% favoring prompt government action "to deal with global deforestation."

tect spotted owl habitat" versus 38% opposed.⁵² In a 1990 Elway Research poll, meanwhile, 64% of Washington residents found wildlife habitat and the number of trees left to be the primary considerations in logging issues as opposed to 30% who felt the economy and jobs were.⁵³ In less urban and more timber-dependent Oregon, on the other hand, a 1990 Oregonian poll shows public opinion over old growth to be far more polarized and evenly split.⁵⁴

Even if one could construe from these polls the implication that state or national referenda would put an end to the cycle of over-cutting in the national forests, environmentalists would be wise to look deeper into the nature of public opinion on the environment before declaring majoritarian decisionmaking a panacea (as some of their more fanciful literature seems to suggest).

While almost every commentator looking at this issue has found overall public support for the environment, nearly

⁵² Seattle Times poll cited in "Old Growth Wins in Poll" *Oregonian* (25 April 1990). While the AP poll has somewhat simplistic wording, the Seattle Times poll is fairly explicit. For instance, the question cited above included a warning that opponents of such a ban "say it will cost thousands of jobs in the timber-dependent communities in western Washington."

⁵³ Elway Research poll cited in "Old Growth Wins in Poll."

⁵⁴ Kathie Durbin, "Polls shows Oregonians Deeply Split Over Owl" *Oregonian* (6 May 1990). This poll should serve as a reminder that reliability of polling data is never indisputable. When a key statement in the poll was worded, "Forest jobs must be protected even if it means the loss of spotted owl habitat," 46% agreed and 48% disagreed. But when it was worded, "To protect the spotted owl, we should stop logging on large tracts of federal timberland," only 34% agreed and 60% disagreed.

all have also remarked upon the relative shallowness and fragility of much of this support. Dunlap, for instance, questions how salient environmental issues really are to the public, their professed support notwithstanding.⁵⁵ Anthony Downs agrees as he claims that ecological issues are on an "attention cycle" in which issues have their "moment in the sun" and then fade from view as media hype decreases and public boredom and doubts about costs increase.⁵⁶

Culhane, meanwhile, finds a similar lack of public interest regarding the Forest Service's participation process. After describing why the Forest Service could never, despite their efforts, get a grasp on the views of the non-existent "silent majority", he suggests that:

....the Service face reality, understand that the undifferentiated public is never going to prefer attending public meetings over watching "Dallas" and thus concentrate upon groups which actively profess an interest [*that is, groups with a high level of intensity--ed.*]⁵⁷

Despite the old growth controversy's relatively high profile (at least as environmental issues go) and its successful expansion beyond the Northwest into a national issue, Culhane is likely right in that forest issues are probably never going to capture the full public's imagination

⁵⁵ Dunlap, 132-134.

⁵⁶ Anthony Downs, "Up and Down with Ecology: The Issue-Attention Cycle" *Public Interest* 28 (1972), 38-50.

⁵⁷ Paul Culhane, "Public Participation in National Forest Planning: Is it Different or Just More?" conference paper, Western Political Science Association, annual meeting, Seattle WA (April 1991), 11-12.

or attention. Especially in areas in the East or Midwest with few public lands, forest issues will never be very salient to more than a select group of citizens and activists interested in environmental affairs.

While Dunlap or Downs find the public's broad support somewhat shallow, other observers such as Charles Hardin, also find it contradictory as demands for environmental protection and sacrifice-free material abundance are simultaneously made.⁵⁸ Dunlap, meanwhile, finds that the public, despite their self-professed environmentalism, holds politicians far more accountable for economic rather than environmental problems.⁵⁹ Americans, he goes on to argue, tend to have a profound lack of understanding of ecological issues and what is often their incompatibility with other deeply-held values such as economic growth or private property.⁶⁰

Thus, the public may not yet appreciate that the environmentalist, as Rosenbaum suggests, "may well be a revolutionist disguised as a reformer" asking "for some form of cultural suicide."⁶¹ This is a point Ophuls strongly echoes:

The irony is, of course, that the ideas of human ecology, despite their resemblance to older conservative ideas, will not be interpreted as conservative at all by most Americans, but as revolutionary in the most profound and radical way. Compared to them, Marxism,

⁵⁸ Charles Hardin, "Observations on Environmental Politics" in Nagel, 183-184.

⁵⁹ Dunlap, 134.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.* 122. Dunlap does find, however, that there is an emerging knowledgability that may someday change this.

⁶¹ Walter Rosenbaum, *The Politics of Environmental Concern* (New York: Prager, 1977), 57, 280.

which merely asks that "progress" be given central direction in the interest of social justice, seems like an old friend.⁶²

This supposed failure of the public to recognize the deeper costs and implications of ecology would seem, therefore, to set the stage for a potential backlash or some such eventual erosion of superficially held support at the first signs of oncoming hardships or sacrifice. Said one observer several years ago at the height of the so-called "green" craze:

Today, its anything green. Tomorrow, it'll be anything jobs. Try to cut thousands of jobs in the middle of a recession and see what happens. You'll have recipe books for spotted owl coming out of Congress.⁶³

The continuing recession and budgetary problems of the early 1990s may be just the event to fray this fragile support. Already, donations to environmental groups have declined in the past few years, prompting layoffs and scaled-back operations among formerly booming groups.⁶⁴ Thus, public opinion that once seemed solid may, if challenged, actually turn out to be quite unstable.

How, then, does all this relate to the Siskiyou case? While public support for old growth might seem fairly clear, environmentalists should want to think hard before unreservedly embracing the power of majoritarianism on forest is-

⁶² William Ophuls, "Reversal is the Law of Tao: The Imminent Resurrection of Political Philosophy" in Nagel, 44.

⁶³ Quoted in Margaret Kriz, "Shades of Green" *National Journal* (28 July 1990), 1831.

⁶⁴ Eliza Carney and W. John Moore, "From the K Street Corridor" *National Journal* (4 January 1992), 30.

sues; the ecological impact of *vox populi* is not quite clear. While national and regional public support of environmental goals has certainly been crucial to the success of Siskiyou environmentalists (Lou Gold, after all, knew exactly why he had to give hundreds of lectures coast-to-coast), public opinion is, at best a volatile ally of ecology. Before they surrender the current legal and scientific advantage they enjoy in an otherwise hostile pluralist arena, environmentalists ought to be sure their public support is unwavering, something they cannot now do.

A good example of this volatility of public opinion might be California's Propositions 128 and 130, perhaps the best pieces of evidence that exist today regarding old growth and majoritarianism in action. These two measures, informally known as "Big Green" and "Forests Forever" were put on the 1990 state ballot after the requisite 600,000 signatures were collected. Big Green was a sweeping, comprehensive proposal which would place limits upon greenhouse gases, ozone-depleting chemicals, and pesticide usage, in addition to prohibiting the clearcutting of redwood forests and raising a \$300 million bond for reforestation and private forestland acquisition.⁶⁵ The Forests Forever initiative, which dealt exclusively with forests, proposed to raise \$742 million for the purchase of highly endangered

⁶⁵ Robert Guskind, "Big Green Light" *National Journal* (6 October 1990), 2401-2402.

private old growth redwood forest, end clearcutting on all forests in the state, tax whole log exports, and assist displaced mill workers.⁶⁶

After early polls showed environmentalists with a substantial lead in both initiatives, opponents, including the timber industry, went all out, spending tens of millions of dollars to defeat the proposal.⁶⁷ In the state hardest-hit by an increasingly severe national recession, timber interests successfully managed to portray Big Green and Forests Forever not only as billion dollar taxpayer boondoggles, but a potential death-blow to the state's wood products industry.⁶⁸ In the end, Big Green was trounced by a two-to-one margin while Forests Forever was more narrowly defeated 52% to 48%.⁶⁹

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*; *Bald Mountain Bulletin* (Winter 1990/1991), 1.

⁶⁷ Big Green's opponents, which included an array of business and agriculture groups were reported to have spent \$16.5 million to defeat the proposal. The timber industry, meanwhile, reportedly spent \$10 million to defeat both Big Green and Forests Forever. Jorge Casuso, "Black Tuesday for Big Green Backers" *Chicago Tribune* (11 November 1990) sec.1, 6; *Bald Mountain Bulletin*, 1.

⁶⁸ Robert Reinhold, "Once Considered a Sure Thing, California's Environmental Package Falters" *New York Times* (16 September 1990), 30.

⁶⁹ Casuso, 6; *Bald Mountain Bulletin*, 1. It should be noted, however, that the timber industry's counterinitiative, paradoxically titled, "The Global Warming and Clearcutting Reduction, Wildlife Protection, and Reforestation Act", nicknamed by the media "Big Stump" was defeated 70% to 30%. In all, however, the 1990 elections were fairly bleak for environmentalists and their various referenda and initiatives. Environmental propositions in six states--mining regulations in South Dakota, a bond for wild land purchase in New York, a recycling measure in Oregon, stream protection measures in Missouri, land use measures in Washington and California's two initiatives all went down in defeat as

At least from the environmentalists' perspective, one lesson of this initiative and its defeat might be that even a generally supportive public is quite vulnerable to the fear and doubt-provoking media campaigns of a well-financed opposition, thereby making referenda a risky proposition.⁷⁰ Such riskiness and unpredictability largely sum up the difficulty environmental initiatives have not only with majoritarian-style referenda, but decentralized community control as well. Perhaps even more so than schemes of centralization, community and/or popular sovereignty on issues of environmental policy, given the social, cultural, and economic context which exists today, are subject to extremely volatile and unpredictable forces. Ecological crises, severe unemployment, corporate media campaigns, or popular culture trends can all sway public opinion quite suddenly and forcefully for or against environmental protection. Local community opinion, meanwhile, is influenced by the added dimension of local culture, history, and socio-

prospects for a worsening recession loomed. Robert Pear, "Voters Spurn Array of Plans for Protecting Environment" *New York Times* (8 November 1990), sec.B, 1.

⁷⁰Majoritarians, however, might argue that Big Green, although a majoritarian-style referendum, occurred within a larger context of pluralism. In this case then, administrative or legislative pluralism was simply replaced by "referenda pluralism" in which powerful interests still compete for influence and dominate the policymaking process. In a truly majoritarian system, its advocates would argue, the power of special interests to fragment, confuse, or manipulate the public would have previously been diminished.

economic circumstance which can all militate against comprehensive, holistic national environmental policies.

The mostly positive but fairly shallow and unstable body of public opinions towards the environment that exist today must be harnessed into a stable and deeply-held value-set if ecological advocates can more fully trust referenda or local control. Working towards this end should, therefore, be an imperative of the environmental movement.

CHAPTER 8

PLURALISM AND ECOLOGY: SOME CONCLUSIONS

Thus emerges the classic environmental dilemma: what *must* be done *cannot* be done.

Robert Bartlett

This study's long journey through the thickets of democratic theory, ecological politics, and the history of the Siskiyou National Forest, by its very design, is not capable of definitively proving broad theories or constructing grand models of ecological politics. But by concentrating in great detail upon a specific and very fascinating case of such politics, it has, nevertheless, provided quite a bit of insight, in a way that studies of broader scope could not, into the relationship of democracy (particularly of the pluralist variant) and ecology.

Critics have raised doubts about the pluralist process regarding both how well it actually functions and how norma-

tively desirable it is as a form of democratic organization. As a fairly diffuse, non-material public interest, environmentalism would seem to strongly qualify as one such political movement likely to be disadvantaged by the pluralist process.

The doubts of the critics center around three issues: (1) the inherent inequality of interest group organization and competition, (2) the bias of bureaucratic administration towards more powerful economically-oriented interests, and (3) structural characteristics in the system, particularly the fragmentation of political authority, which are also alleged to favor the status quo. As alternatives to pluralism, critics prescribe a diversity of arrangements depending upon their perspective. These include increased centralization and formalized administration and lawmaking, increased decentralization and community control, and broad-scale majoritarian control through referenda and other direct participatory mechanisms.

The question that has remained consistent throughout this study has been: what does the political history of the Siskiyou National Forest from 1983 to 1992 tell us about how interests and policy demands rooted in ecological values fare in a pluralist political process? As such, this work has tried to determine whether the arguments of pluralism's detractors or advocates seem more valid concerning the three main issues of interest group competition, bureaucratic ad-

ministration, and the potential biases of pluralist structures? Would the various forms of democratic organization offered as alternatives more reliably advance ecological initiatives?

Principal Findings

The history of the Siskiyou National Forest from 1983-1992 reveals that environmentalists have had mixed success in the pluralist system as it now stands. While losing (to various degrees) practically every battle they fought over local timber projects and plans on the Siskiyou, they still managed to move the Forest's administration away from a strictly one-dimensional preoccupation with timber production and forced the agency to at least acknowledge and confront issues important to them.

Local environmentalists have also had mixed success when working in conjunction with regional and national groups on broader old growth and spotted owl issues. They have very effectively built public support and expanded their issue into a matter of national concern attended to even by Presidents. In Congress, environmentalists have mostly taken a battering in the politics of timber appropriations and riders, but have recently had a few triumphs here as well. As for the high-stakes game of ancient forest legislation, stalemate has prevailed with both sides thwarting the other.

Only in the judicial realm have environmentalists clearly dominated. Court victories have been their ace-in-the-hole, a weapon so strong that it could hold off an actively belligerent presidential administration. Without such judicial support, the story of old growth politics would have been a very different one, with thousands more acres of ancient forest sure to have been cut in the last decade and the spotted owl, probably left unlisted as an endangered species, rapidly approaching extinction.

In the case of the Siskiyou, pluralist theory was most strongly supported as it concerned interest group organization. While ecological interests did face some obstacles and were at a distinct, but not overwhelming, disadvantage in terms of material resources, they seemed to suffer few of the problems of formation and mobilization that many of the critics would have predicted. Contrary to Olson's thesis, environmentalists vigorously organized and did so (at least locally) without offering selective incentives of any real value nor threatening sanctions. Instead, common values, ideology, and the shared perception of a serious threat seemed to be the chief motivating factors.

Despite some inequities, environmentalists in the Siskiyou proved to be more than worthy opponents of timber interests. They clearly served as the countervailing force that pluralists foresee, effectively voicing their concerns and pursuing their objectives. Part of this may have been

due to their successful use of strategic communication and symbolic language and imagery--facets of interest group competition which rely less upon the sheer weight of group resources. Timber, however, held their own in this regard, employing many of the same techniques.

Although the environmentalists made their presence keenly felt and effectively projected themselves into the policy struggle, the realm of bureaucratic administration (especially important in a national forest) offered less support for pluralist theory. The main bureaucratic actor in the Siskiyou case, the Forest Service, just barely met the criteria regarding how a pluralist agency is supposed to act (namely, as a fairly open, balanced, and flexible policy broker). While participation has been institutionalized and access opened, the real impact of this has been, at best, limited. Instead, other factors mentioned by critics, including deeply-held agency values, budgetary imperatives, and perhaps some vestiges of old-fashioned clientelism, all serve to produce a distinct bias in Forest Service administration in the Siskiyou. While the notion of agency capture by dominant clients (the centerpiece of many critiques of pluralist administration) could not at all be supported in the Siskiyou, the agency's bias often ends up serving the same ends. Regarding agency flexibility, the Forest Service could once more be found to inhabit a fairly hazy area that is not quite as pluralistic as advocates claim nor as in-

flexible as critics suggest. In the end, the Siskiyou National Forest could be considered an agency that simultaneously manages to act pluralistically to some extent while also maintaining a fairly strong timber production orientation. This orientation is most likely due to a combination of professional norms and values, the agency's budgetary structure, and perhaps some degree of obligation to a resource-using client group whose demands strongly reinforce the agency's own internally-derived mission.

Perhaps the most severe criticism of pluralism's effect on ecological policymaking centers around how the system's decentralized, fragmented authority renders policymakers impotent to tackle complex, multi-faceted ecological problems. The pluralist policymaking process is accused of being inertia-bound and heavily favoring the status-quo of environmental destruction. As a remedy, a number of critics call for centralized political authority capable of breaking the incrementalist logjam and producing rational, comprehensive policies.

In the Siskiyou, political fragmentation did indeed seem to have the deleterious effects upon ecological policymaking that critics argue it does (with the exception of agency capture). Narrow turf-bound reductionism, cautious piecemeal incrementalism, and a fractious tendency towards stalemate all cursed policymaking in the Siskiyou and the entire old growth region, and all clearly thwarted the crea-

tion of any sort of comprehensive and scientifically and socially defensible approach to old growth policy. For all their successes, environmentalists never really got the chance to move beyond reactive "preserve what you can" types of responses and address the root causes of ecological disruption.

What centralist critics do not give pluralist fragmentation enough credit for, however, has been the undeniably open access and broad strategic opportunities it has provided ecological advocates with. By contrast, centralization, while holding out the (not yet proven) potential for more comprehensive policy, also presents the risk of much more restricted decisionmaking access and fewer strategic weapons in the environmentalists' arsenal. To consolidate authority in such a way will work for environmentalists only if such authority is resolutely committed to ecology. At least in the Siskiyou/old growth case, however, there is no evidence that more centralized levels of policymaking are, by nature, any more or less ecologically sensitive than decentralized policymakers.

Prescriptions for Change

One must consider next, then, the question of which democratic arrangement would be most beneficial to ecological goals if the Siskiyou case is to serve as any indication. Many of pluralism's alleged flaws and biases were

abundantly clear and well-documented in this study. Centralized and formalized administration, though, is an extremely risky solution as a dependence upon the questionable ecological enlightenment of elites puts any environmental initiative on very shaky ground. Furthermore, if centralized administration ever does turn hostile, environmentalists could depend on far fewer avenues for redress or appeal, especially regarding the lawsuits that have been their salvation.

Majoritarianism, meanwhile, depends upon a similarly fickle source of authority. While currently supportive, public opinion, especially if not reinforced with high levels of knowledge and salience, could easily turn on environmentalism, regardless of its stature as a long-term public interest. This would especially be true if economically hard times prevail and/or significant sacrifices are asked to be made.

Highly decentralized participatory democracy and community control offers substantial risks and limitations of their own. There is simply no guarantee that without a deep and broad-based value shift, local populations will act as more vigilant defenders of the environment than more centralized authorities. In fact, in the case of the Siskiyou, some fairly good evidence exists suggesting they would act less so. And even if vigilant, the scope of authority in such small autonomous jurisdictions might prevent communities from dealing with more complex, transjurisdictional

aspects of ecological problems thus threatening to trivialize even the most well-intentioned policy decisions.

Although decentralization has, in the last decade, probably eclipsed centralization as the solution most in vogue among ecological theorists, it should be remembered that the bulk of environmentalist's political achievements thus far have been realized through fairly centralized policies. Paehlke echoes this point:

....there is an important caveat with regard to the relationship between decentralization and environmentalism. However strongly environmentalists prefer a decentralized, self-managing future, environmentalism's effect in advanced industrial economies has often been to broaden and strengthen the powers of the central government.¹

Where does this leave ecology as a political movement then? From the above summary, it would seem that no democratic formulation offers a rock-solid guarantee to treat ecological values and objectives sympathetically. While this is a sobering conclusion for ecologists, it is an important one if it reminds them that no prescription is a panacea, an unfortunate notion that frequently shows up in much ecological theory. Those who value things such as old growth or healthy streams would do well to beware of simple theoretical solutions to what in reality is so complex and multifaceted an issue.

¹Robert Paehlke, *Environmentalism and the Future of Progressive Politics* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1989), 155-156.

It is clear that the pluralist process places significant, sometimes seemingly fatal obstacles and biases in the path of ecologically enlightened policy. Yet environmentalists must never forget that pluralism also grants them one precious gift that no other form of political organization can guarantee in quite the same way--multiple channels of diverse and open access to the political process. Observes the head of the Sierra Club:

"Of all the countries in the world, the U.S. has, by far, the most easily influenced government....there is often pretty good recourse if you're systematic and organized in how you go about it."²

Thus, the "baby" of access, redress, and appeal must not be thrown out with the "bathwater" of status quo biases, delay, and incoherent policy. This naturally provides all thoughtful environmentalists, and political scientists for that matter, with a thorny dilemma that Robert Fluno sums up well:

....so long as pluralism is so frustrating and so embarrassingly selfish, men will be angered by it. As a process of collective policy-making, it is too intellectually unattractive, too incredibly clumsy, for those of us who prize order in a world so depressingly chaotic....But the gamble that concentration [or devolution--ed.] is better than pluralism is simply that: a gamble, perhaps the most ancient and risky of political gambles.³

²Quoted in Trip Gabriel, "If a Tree Falls in the Forest, They Hear It" *New York Times Magazine*, (4 November 1990), 59.

³Robert Fluno quoted in G. David Garson, *Group Theories of Politics* (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1978), 155-156.

Yet to be content with the status quo of pluralism as it stands today is and should be unacceptable to most environmentalists. Their significant legal successes notwithstanding, environmentalists, in dealing with the Forest Service, Congress, and the Administration, have had a grueling uphill fight every step of the way. For all the access it grants, this pluralist status quo mostly has brought shortsightedness, paralysis, and a profound bias towards the dispensation of those material, distributable political goods that cause old growth to fall and the web of biodiversity to further unravel. This is the paradox of pluralism and the case of the Siskiyou can serve as a metaphor for this ambivalence as it occurs across the political spectrum.

Here one must return to a question raised in the first chapter: are ecological values, because of their immaterial, firmly zero-sum nature, hopelessly out of place in a pluralist process that stresses bargaining and compromise and is far more comfortable distributing material benefits? To a pluralist, the environmentalists might be considered to have enjoyed great success and influence in the old growth campaign. They did, after all, gain much access and clearly push policymaking, however grudgingly, their way. By pluralist standards, this is about the most any reasonable player could ask for. To an environmentalist with zero-sum beliefs, however, ecological disruption is an either/or thing which no amount of access or even success in nudging arguments

around can make up for; only the halting of such disruption will do. A cartoon printed in a Northwestern newspaper during the height of controversy captures the environmentalists' dissatisfaction with pluralist-style solutions. It shows a politician, presumably seized by the spirit of compromise, pointing to a giant Douglas fir and offering a logger the top half and an environmentalist the bottom half.⁴ When analyzing the outcome of this case, it is quite important, then, to keep in mind these differing standards of what constitutes policy-influencing success.

Ultimately, it is quite difficult to determine whether the pluralist system holds out the potential to adequately confront ecological problems in the long-term; that is, without mistaking interest group access or even influence for the resolution of real problems. Perhaps pluralism's worst flaws in this regard cannot be rectified; maybe they are rooted too deeply in its structural core and very nature and the best the process can be expected to produce is a continuation of muddling through with haphazard, piecemeal reactions. If one feels that such a critique overemphasizes structural factors, on the other hand, this might be a bit too pessimistic an assessment in that it does not adequately recognize the importance of situational, historical, and sociocultural factors in shaping the outcomes a pluralist

⁴ This cartoon appeared with Keith Ervin, "The Tree Fight" *Seattle Post-Intelligencer* (24 September 1989).

process can produce. Perhaps profound changes in these external policymaking factors (deep values shifts, worsening ecological deterioration, etc.) can, in some cases, exert enough pressure to overcome or offset the effects of pluralism's fragmented structure and piecemeal orientation.

Even if it is assumed that this latter scenario is true, the need for radical reform in the process as it regards environmental policymaking should be vividly clear. Undertaking such reform will not be as easy as wishing it so, however, as the more admirable aspects of pluralism are clearly the flipside of its more troublesome ones. To banish reductionist fragmentation, for instance, is to possibly banish checks and balances or multiple access as well. To preserve pluralism's beneficial qualities while addressing its many problems, therefore, is a very precarious task which, if at all possible, must be attempted with immense precision.

With that warning in mind, it must also be said that if ecological problems are ever to be adequately confronted, this process of reform must carry on even to the point where pluralism actually incorporates significant aspects of the critics' remedial alternatives. From the centralists, for example, pluralism must far more vigorously adopt mechanisms for formulating more comprehensive policy and coordination and cooperation across jurisdictions. Policymaking procedures must also be allowed to assign adequate value to those

less material, less tangible ecological values that so often fail to be incorporated or given full weight in distributive pluralist bargaining. A reformed pluralist system must also allow less administrative reinterpretation and outright disrespect for the law and better attempt to ensure the scientific and legal integrity of bureaucratic administrators.

From participatory democrats and majoritarians, the pluralist process should adopt a thorough institutionalization of meaningful citizen participation and review in every stage of the policymaking process as well as uphold standing to sue in the courts. For environmentalists, such rights and opportunities, to the extent they have been extended, have proven simply indispensable. At least in this regard, the validity of Paehlke's thesis that democracy goes hand-in-hand with environmentalism should be abundantly clear.

And perhaps most importantly, from all critical theories, however divergent, should be borrowed and incorporated into a pluralist democracy the heretofore alien concept that there sometimes does exist a clear and identifiable *public* interest that unites all citizens (whether they recognize it or not) and transcends all notions of "issue publics" or "attentive publics" or any other use of *public* in the plural form. There must come a time when our collective needs as a polity to protect the ecosystems that sustain us, conserve the future's resources, and safeguard the biodiversity upon which we depend and are an integral part of are recognized

as more than "just another interest" in the pluralist battleground of so many interests.⁵ This reluctance to rank problems and values and collective needs beyond simply assuaging whichever interest cries out the loudest is one of the most insidious aspects of pluralism. Perhaps more than anything else, then, the pluralist process needs to be allowed the courage and resolve to identify the long-term public interest better. If it does, then it just may be able to adequately address the ecological problems that we all must confront.

⁵Even Kelso, pluralism's ardent defender, argues for reform in this respect, calling for a *public pluralism* in which the government actively sponsors and encourages those groups it deems to be working on the public's behalf. While preserving pluralism's basic competition of interests, government would, in effect, act to level the playing field so to speak. William Kelso, *American Democratic Theory* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1978).

APPENDIX A

THE NATURE OF ECOLOGICAL VALUES

To fully appreciate how pluralism and ecology interact, one must delve more deeply into the nature of ecological values than merely recognizing that they are complex and often intangible. It must be understood just how fundamentally such values and priorities differ from economically quantifiable ones.

The dominant attitudes towards nature prevalent throughout America's early history has been characterized by most observers as being utilitarian and fairly antagonistic.¹ These attitudes stemmed largely from two sources. First is what historians Lynn White and Roderick Nash each suggest is the influence of European culture and religion.² The first settlers brought these cultural and religious values with them to the New World and were, consequently, guided by them in their endeavors to subdue what they felt was a savage, desolate and godless wilderness.

The influence of the Enlightenment, which figured so prominently in shaping American political thought, also had a role in shaping early attitudes towards the natural world. Besides basing political legitimacy upon the foundations of property rights and economic self-interest, Enlightenment thought, in a more general sense, offered a vision of continual material progress based upon the rational scientific unraveling and manipulation of nature. The achievement of this goal of optimal rationality and material progress, of course, required a substantial alienation from any affective attachment to the natural world which, by necessity, had to be seen as nothing more than raw material and potential economic opportunity.³ "In the vocabulary of material progress", claims Nash, "wilderness had meaning only as an obstacle."⁴ By overcoming this obstacle and making the land accessible and productive, its full economic and thus rational value could then be realized.

¹There are seemingly countless treatments of this subject; perhaps the best is Roderick Nash, *Wilderness and the American Mind* revised ed. (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1973).

²Nash, *Wilderness and the American Mind*; Lynn White, "The Historical Roots of our Ecologic Crisis" *Science* 155 10 March 1967), 1203-1207.

³Perhaps the best summation of Enlightenment Thought's views on nature is in William Leiss, *The Domination of Nature* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1974).

⁴Nash, 41.

Originating with the Romantic and Transcendentalist movements of the early to mid-19th century and continuing ever since, dissent towards this dominant view of nature has steadily grown in both scope and complexity, developing eventually into what today we can broadly call the ecological position. In its original and most precise sense, the term *ecology*, according to Henning and Mangun, is the "study of the relationships between all living things and the physical environment."⁵ As shall be shown, however, ecology has come to be used far more broadly than merely referring to a field of study. Ecological values can be considered to encompass at least three dimensions, which although distinct, are usually characterized by so much overlap and interconnection of concepts, that they now rarely, if ever, occur in isolation.

The first dimension of the ecological value system includes biocentric or what Henning and Mangun call, "appreciative and non-utilitarian" attitudes;⁶ that is, the belief that all natural things have inherent value and thus do not require having utility for human beings in order to have worth. Such thinking necessitates, of course, a rejection not only of utilitarianism, but humankind's privileged position in the grand natural scheme of things. The naturalist and writer John Muir who was deeply influenced by Transcendentalists Emerson and Thoreau makes this point:

The world, as we are told was made especially for man --a presumption not supported by the facts. A numerous class of men are painfully astonished whenever they find anything, living or dead, in all God's universe which they cannot eat or render in some way that which they call useful to themselves....Now it never seems to occur to these....that Nature's object in making animals and plants might possibly be first of all the happiness of each one of them, not the creation of all for the happiness of one. Why should man value himself as more than a small part of one great unit of creation?⁷

Similarly, the forester and naturalist Aldo Leopold admonishes us to develop the respect for nature necessary to change from "conquerer" of the land community to "plain mem-

⁵Daniel Henning and William Mangun, *Managing the Environmental Crisis* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1989), 2.

⁶*Ibid.* 8.

⁷John Muir quoted in Joseph Petulla, *American Environmentalism* (College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 1980), 29.

ber and citizen of it",⁸ while the author Edward Abbey invokes an existentialist plea for us "to let Being be."⁹

Although biocentric ideas have been a common thread throughout the writings of the ecologically-minded from the Transcendentalists on down, it has not been until the last decade that they have been fully articulated as a coherent and well-developed body of social, ethical, and philosophical thought. Works by William Devall and George Sessions, Fritjof Capra, Arne Naess, and Gary Synder have heartily rejected anthropocentrism while attempting to clearly and formally stake out the alternative biocentric or *deep ecology* position and its implications for society.¹⁰

Another subtly different component of the ecological value system, what Joseph Petulla calls the "ecologic" perspective, emphasizes the interdependence and interrelatedness of all elements in nature.¹¹ This perspective borrows many of its ideas from the science of ecology which was formally established around the turn of the century as a means to measure the flow of energy and balance of life throughout natural communities. Scientific ecologists such as Rachel Carson, Barry Commoner, or Garrett Hardin, have all attempted to document the self-regulating balances of natural systems and humankind's disruptive effects upon those balances.¹²

Not surprisingly, this focus upon interdependencies and equilibriums makes ecology the most holistic and inclusive of all the sciences. Perhaps Commoner offers the starkest rejection of reductionism in his field when he declares simply that, "everything is related to everything else."¹³ To ignore this basic fact of ecology and foolishly attempt to do "just one thing", ominously warns William

⁸Aldo Leopold, *A Sand County Almanac* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1949), 204.

⁹Edward Abbey, *Down the River* (New York: E.P. Dutton, 1982), 119.

¹⁰William Devall and George Sessions, *Deep Ecology* (Salt Lake City: Peregrine Smith, 1985); Fritjof Capra, "Deep Ecology: A New Paradigm" *Earth Island Journal* 2:4 (1987), 27-30; Arne Naess, "The Shallow and Deep, Long-Range Ecology Movement" *Inquiry* 16 (1973), 95-100; Gary Synder, *The Practice of the Wild* (San Francisco: North Point Press, 1990).

¹¹Petulla, 30.

¹²Amongst their many works, perhaps the most representative are: Rachel Carson, *Silent Spring* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1962); Barry Commoner, *The Closing Circle* (New York: Knopf, 1971); Garrett Hardin, "The Tragedy of the Commons" *Science* 162 (13 December 1968), 1243-1248.

¹³Commoner, 33.

Ophuls, is to be assured of facing "unintended consequences."¹⁴ Because of this holistic and systemic orientation, those operating from the ecologic perspective value, above all, the integrity, stability, and proper functioning of complex and biologically diverse natural systems both for the entire planet's and our own species' sake.

To the ecologists, therefore, the gravest sin possible is to disrupt this delicate balance. Such priorities, however, naturally find themselves on a collision course with values and priorities associated with the economic growth demanded by modern industrial society. Leopold recognizes this value gap as he argues that a policy towards the land that is:

...based solely on economic self-interest is hopelessly lopsided. It tends to ignore, and thus eventually eliminate, many elements in the land community that lack commercial value, but are (as far as we know) essential to its healthy functioning. It assumes, falsely, I think, that the economic parts of the biotic clock will function without the uneconomic parts.¹⁵

Similarly, Commoner likens life on earth to a complex web in which humankind, through its destructive activities, is continually breaking strands. Eventually, he warns, when enough of the threads have been eliminated, the entire web will disintegrate.¹⁶ Thus, ecologists' chief role is to serve, in Petulla's words, as the "enemies of disruption."¹⁷

The final element of the ecological value system involves that which can be considered primarily spiritual or aesthetic. It is rare that ecological values are articulated without at least some reference made to the awesome beauty and sublimity of nature as well as the serenity, wisdom, and spiritual power to be either gained by the observer or found within the observed. In fact, aesthetic and spiritual arguments formed the original basis for the preservationist position as ecologic and biocentric rationale were added only later.

Aesthetics provided the grounds upon which the Romantic movement, which gave birth to some of the earliest preservationist sentiments, justified the value of nature. The wilderness provided to the Romantics and their modern off-

¹⁴ William Ophuls, *Ecology and the Politics of Scarcity* (San Francisco: W.H. Freeman, 1977), 22-23.

¹⁵ Leopold, 214.

¹⁶ Commoner, 38.

¹⁷ Petulla, chap.4.

spring the most perfect standard of beauty and, according to Bob Marshall, "perhaps the best opportunity for...pure esthetic rapture."¹⁸ Thus, to the Romantics and their kin, on the basis of its sheer, overpowering beauty alone, nature clearly justifies its own value and thereby deserves protection.

The spiritual aspect of ecological values is a bit more complex as it can take one of two forms: the upholding of nature as spiritually sacred in its own right or else the belief that nature offers spiritual benefits to those who become intimate with it. In American thought, the former sentiment goes all the way back to Transcendentalist thought which, in seeing nature as synonymous with or at least symbolic of the Universal Spirit and hence, goodness, morality, and truth, provided the starkest of counterpoints to the hostile Puritan or frontier vision of the wilderness.

Perhaps no one linked nature to the divine with as much enthusiasm and quasi-religious fervor as did Muir who spoke of nature as a "window opening into heaven" and a "mirror reflecting the Creator."¹⁹ Muir's writings are filled with all sorts of religious imagery as he refers to natural objects as "sparks of the divine Soul", to forests as "God's First Temples" and the business interests who would commercially exploit them as "temple destroyers."²⁰ Thus, to Muir and those who follow in his footsteps, nature and especially wondrous natural places are the sacred dwellings of whatever their conception of the divine is (be it God or gods or animistic spirits). As such, defiling these places would not merely be wrong or ill-advised, but profanity and blasphemy of the worst sort.

There is another angle to this notion of nature and spirituality that is less concerned with the divine nature of nature itself than it is with the spiritual and psychological benefits nature offers humankind. According to such thinking, nature has value and deserves protection as the antidote for the nerve-shattering alienation, dehumanization, and brutality of modern civilization. To Justice William O. Douglas, for example, wilderness provides a respite from society's "mass compulsions" and a place where "man need not become an automaton",²¹ while Nash quotes neurologist William Gibson as deeming wilderness areas "the greatest mental health guardians we have."²² Historian Theodore Roszak, meanwhile, argues that nature's magical,

¹⁸ Bob Marshall quoted in Nash, 204.

¹⁹ Muir quoted in Nash, 125.

²⁰ *Ibid.* 125, 130, 161.

²¹ William O. Douglas quoted in Nash, 248.

²² William Gibson quoted in Nash, 249.

mystical, and wondrous qualities are one of the only things left that can stand up to the modern era's crushing cynicism.²³

In addition to wilderness's tonic effect on humankind, preservationists also suggest that it serves the essential function of providing a real, present contrast to civilization; in other words, wilderness plays the vital role of the *Other* through which civilization gains definition and even value. Wilderness, then, is thought to be crucial as the wellspring of civilization, the raw material out of which civilization was forged. Without wilderness, its proponents warn, civilization loses its source and hence, its identity.²⁴

In a similar vein is wilderness's alleged role as a storehouse of raw freedom. To William O. Douglas, for example, a society which maintains roadless areas makes a "pledge to Freedom."²⁵ To eliminate wilderness, then, would be to strike a direct blow at freedom as Abbey clearly believes as he confesses his fear "that if we allow the freedom of the hills to be taken from us, then the very idea of freedom may die with it."²⁶ To Abbey, then, the destruction of the wilderness in all its dark, mysterious, and dangerous glory and its replacement with the mind-numbing bland safety of modern conveniences is synonymous with the destruction of freedom by an ever more obstrusive and totalitarian technological state:

I see the preservation of wilderness as one sector of the front in the war against the encroaching industrial state. Every square mile of range and desert saved from the strip miners, every river saved from the dam builders, every forest saved from the loggers, every swamp saved from the land speculators means another square mile saved for the play of human freedom.²⁷

The summation of the ecological value system is best left to Thoreau who ties together all the strands of ecol-

²³ Theodore Roszak, *The Making of a Counter Culture* (Garden City, NY: Anchor, 1969), chap. 8.

²⁴ Such arguments are particularly well put by such writers as Aldo Leopold, Howard Zahniser, and Joseph Wood Krutch among others who contribute to the text of Francois Leydet (editor), *Time and the River Flowing: Grand Canyon* (San Francisco: Sierra Club Books, 1964), as well as in Edward Abbey, *Down the River*.

²⁵ Douglas quoted in Nash, 248.

²⁶ Abbey, *Down the River*, 120-121.

²⁷ Edward Abbey, *The Journey Home* (New York: E.P. Dutton, 1977), 235-236

ogy, biocentrism, romanticism, Transcendentalism, aestheticism, and spirituality when he boldly proclaims in no morally uncertain terms that, "In wildness is the preservation of the world."²⁸

²⁸ Thoreau quoted in Paul Brooks, "Wilderness in Western Culture" in William Schwartz (editor), *Voices for the Wilderness* (New York: Ballantine, 1968), 39.

APPENDIX B
THE INTERVIEWS

Much of the data used in this study were gathered through in-depth interviews. Although conducting such detailed and time-consuming interviews inevitably limits the number of individuals contacted (as compared to say, telephone surveys or questionnaires), it was the goal of this study to collect information from a well-balanced and highly relevant group of participants. Those I interviewed met one of three criteria: (1) they were known to me through my research as a significant participant, (2) they were recommended by other participants as someone to talk to, or (3) they were representative of a larger group of actors whose perspective I sought (such as Siskiyou district rangers or D.C. level Forest Service officials). I certainly did not get to interview every last person my research told me was important or whom was recommended to me due to a number of practical constraints inherent to the research design (for one, I would probably be interviewing until 1994!). Nevertheless, I feel that my final roster of interviewees was relevant, diverse, and well-balanced enough to offer a very full and richly multi-dimensional view of Siskiyou politics.

Specifically, I interviewed fifteen individuals. These included eight fairly active local interest group participants and seven Forest Service officials. The interest group interviewees were evenly split between four timber industry officials from several different trade associations or companies and four environmentalists, similarly from a variety of groups. Of the Forest Service personnel interviewed, five were from the Siskiyou National Forest, one was a regional official from Portland and one was an official from the agency's Washington D.C. headquarters. The five Siskiyou personnel included the Forest Supervisor, the now-retired former Supervisor (who served from 1983-1990), two district rangers, and a staffer involved in timber planning and appeals. All interviewees were asked a similar set of open-ended questions which varied slightly depending upon whether the individual represented timber, environmentalists, or the agency.

Since most of the interviewees are still actively involved in the politics of the Siskiyou and must deal with one another, maintaining their confidentiality was of utmost importance. Thus, information, opinions, and quotes taken from these interviews, with the exception of the former and

current Forest Supervisors, are attributed only in a generic manner and none are cited in the footnotes. All interviews were conducted by the author between April 1991 and November 1992 in either southwest Oregon or Chicago and were tape recorded. Approximately half were conducted in person and half by telephone.

APPENDIX C

LIST OF OTHER NOTABLE NATIONAL, AND STATE/REGIONAL INTEREST GROUPS INVOLVED IN OLD GROWTH AND RELATED ISSUES.¹Environmental

Save America's Forests,
Washington D.C.

Western Ancient
Forest Campaign,
Washington D.C.

Ancient Forest Alliance,
Washington D.C.

Association of Forest Service
Employees For Environmental
Ethics, Eugene, OR

Cascade Holistic Economic
Consultants, Portland

Forest Conservation Council
Eugene, OR

Greater Ecosystem Alliance,
Bellingham, WA

Washington Environmental
Council, Seattle.

Central Oregon Audubon
Society, Bend, OR

Greenpeace U.S.A.,
Washington D.C.

Native Forest Council,
Eugene, OR

Sierra Club, San Francisco

Forest Reform Network, Dallas

Lighthawk, Sante Fe, NM

Seattle Audubon Society
Mazamas, Portland

Timber

American Forest Resource
Alliance, Washington D.C.

Western Washington
Commercial Logging Action
Committee, Seattle

American Forest Products
Alliance, Washington D.C.

Oregon Project/Oregon
Public Lands Coalition
Salem, OR

National Forest Products
Alliance, Washington D.C.

Public Timber Council,
Washington, D.C.

Oregon Forest Industries
Council, Salem, OR

Washington Contract Loggers
Association Olympia, WA

Gifford Pinchot
Alliance²

Western Public Lands
Coalition, Salt Lake City

¹This listing includes some of the more notable interest groups involved in the old growth issue and related issues (such as national forest management policy, Forest Service reform, or wilderness) which did not directly take part in the conflict over the Siskiyou National Forest. Still, these groups had an indirect impact upon the Siskiyou through their more general activities regarding old growth and other forest issues. Measuring indirect impact is, of course, an extremely difficult proposition in that the Siskiyou conflict took place on so many levels and involved so many factors. As such, it is very difficult to draw the line as to which indirectly involved groups to include and which to leave out. A truly comprehensive listing would have to include literally hundreds of local environmental groups or sawmills focused on a particular county, national forest, or watershed all across the nation. As the forest reform issue has heated up in the past decade such groups, at least on the environmentalist side, have been established in every part of the country where there are National Forest units (including Illinois, Indiana, Ohio, New England, and the Appalachian states). Because such local groups' influence on events in the Siskiyou is so much more indirect and diluted than the more broadly focused national and state/regional groups, they will not be included here. Groups that are included are: (1) of a national or Pacific Northwest focus; (2) mentioned by a Siskiyou participant in an interview; (3) mentioned in a journalistic account of old growth/forest policy issues; or (4) a litigant in federal case regarding old growth or the northern spotted owl 1988-1991.

²I was unable to track down the headquarters location of this organization.

APPENDIX D

DESCRIPTION OF VARIABLES AND SOURCES OF DATA FOR
TABLES 1 and 2.**Table 1 -**

Group--This list of groups includes those determined to have directly participated at some level in the politics of the Siskiyou National Forest. A group included in this list must have satisfied one of the following criteria: (1) identified as a Siskiyou National Forest workshop attendee; (2) litigant in a lawsuit involving solely the Siskiyou National Forest; (3) filed an administrative appeal to the Siskiyou National Forest 1986-1991; (4) mentioned by participants interviewed as a group actor (not including participant's own affiliation; (5) mentioned as a participant in at least two separate non-interest group journalistic accounts of the Siskiyou conflict.

Scope--*Local* refers to an area of concern that corresponds to southwest Oregon, the Siskiyou National Forest, or a watershed or section of the Siskiyou. *State* refers to the state of Oregon. *Regional* refers to the Pacific Northwest or the western United States.

Level of Participation-- 1 = very active and/or sustained participation; 2 = moderate and/or infrequent participation. Category 1's high level of participation would include any group that was identified as being a regular and active participant in the Siskiyou conflict and its many subissues. Such a group would consistently and energetically engage in the various activities listed in table 1. While such groups did not necessarily have to engage in all of these activities, it had to have at least pursued its speciality consistently and vigorously. Category 2 is essentially a catchall category for any group that did not qualify as having a high level of participation. It may, therefore, include a range of levels of participatory intensity. Note also that this variable does not necessarily measure effectiveness, but instead intensity of involvement. The measure in this variable was determined by the identification of a group participant by interviewees (from a group other than the one being measured) as a group with a high or less than high level of involvement in the Siskiyou. In addition, any group determined to have been a regular workshop attendee was automatically considered to have a high level of participation.

Group Type and Membership-- M = individual membership group; CG = coalition group or trade association with other groups or companies as members. The actual membership figure

is the number of dues-paying individual or group members, or if the group does not collect dues, members which satisfy that group's minimum requirements for membership.

Paid Staff--Number of paid, non-volunteer staff. Paid part-time staff are measured as .5 staff each. Thus, the staff of a group with 2 full and 2 part-time workers would be calculated as 3.

Annual Budget--Total annual operating budget. A (*) next to the figure indicates an approximation and/or the average of a range. Sometimes interviewees could only give an approximate, non-official figure for their group's annual budget. Other interviewees gave a range such as "somewhere between x and y dollars." In the latter case, the average of these figures was presented in the table.

Source of Funding--Listed in order of the amount of the group's budget for which each accounts: 1 = membership dues; 2 = grants (donations beyond annual or life membership requirements, foundation grants, or grants from any other source); 3 = fundraising (special projects, speaker's fees, auctions, benefits, etc.); 4 = sales (proceeds from the sale of group-sponsored products or services).

Activities--This variable shows how groups participated in the political conflict in the Siskiyou. M = monitoring, tracking, mapping, or appealing timber sales, the Forest Plan, or similar projects and/or attendance at Forest Service workshops, advisory boards, or hearings; LT = litigant or intervener in any lawsuit regarding activities in the Siskiyou; E = public education and publicity including newsletters, press releases, speaking engagements, guided field trips, letter-writing campaigns, advertising, and related organizing; LB = lobbying public officials in order to impart information and influence policy; R = technical, economic, or scientific research; P = group maintains state or federally registered political action committee to dispense campaign contributions. Activities have been determined by interviews with participants and a multitude of data from the case, including Forest Service documents and journalistic accounts

Table 2 -

Company--This is a list of politically active local woods products companies. Several large corporations have local operations which are listed as well. The criteria for listing these companies is the same as for the interest groups in table 1 (see this appendix).

Employees - Number of total employees.

Annual Sales - Amount of total sales in millions of dollars.

Annual Lumber Production - Number of millions of board feet of timber the company produces annually. Note that most of the timber produced by smaller companies comes from public land, much of that from the Siskiyou. The large corporations, on the other hand, get their timber from a number of sources, most prominently their own private timberlands.

Level of Participation - See same heading for table 1 in this appendix.

Activities - See same heading for table 1 in this appendix. Note, however, that there are less possible activities in table 2.

Sources of data:

Personal interviews (see main text for specific citations) and telephone survey of various group participants by author (April 1991 to February 1992).

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Million Dollar Directory (Parsippany NJ: Dun's Marketing Services, 1991).

1990 Directory of the Forest Products Industry (San Francisco: Miller Freeman, 1990).

USDA Forest Service, Pacific Northwest Region, Siskiyou National Forest, Appeal Number Record 1986-1990.

USDA Forest Service, Pacific Northwest Region, Siskiyou National Forest, minutes from Shasta Costa workshop, (June 1991).

State and Regional Associations of the U.S., 3rd ed. (Washington D.C.: Columbia Books, Inc., 1991).

USDA Forest Service, *Report to Congress on Implementation of Section 318 of the Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations Act for FY1990*, 1st Report (1 December 1989).

Ward's Business Directory (Detroit: Gale Research, Inc., 1991).

Western Ancient Forest Campaign, *Oregon Grassroots Inventory*, unpublished document (22 April 1991).

Western Ancient Forest Campaign, *Oregon Grassroots Survey*, unpublished document (April 1991).

Edward Zuckerman, *Almanac of Federal PACs: 1990* (Washington D.C.: Amward Publications, Inc., 1990).

APPENDIX E

MAJOR LEGISLATIVE MANDATES OF THE UNITED STATES FOREST SERVICE

1. **The 1897 Organic Act**--broadly sets forth the principles of the Forest Reserve System and how it is to be administered.¹

2. **The Multiple Use-Sustained Yield Act of 1960**--recognizes a diversity of values inherent in the national forests² and mandates that they be administered for a multiplicity of uses that best suits the public interest and is "not necessarily the combination of uses that will give the greatest dollar return or the greatest unit output." The act also requires that the annual output of renewable resources from a given forest not exceed that forest's ability to perpetually sustain those resources.

3. **The Forest and Rangeland Renewable Resources Planning Act of 1974 (RPA)**--directs the Forest Service and the BLM to engage in periodic long-range review and planning on its various units.

4. **The Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976 (FLPMA)**--besides serving as the BLM's charter, also provides additional guidelines for systematic Forest Service and BLM planning, reiterates multiple use/sustained yield principles, and provides mechanisms for public participation.

5. **The National Forest Management Act of 1976 (NFMA)**--amends previous legislation to add further requirements for comprehensive planning (such as ten year plans for each unit) and public participation. In addition it reaffirms and specifies additional multiple use/sustained yield principles (regarding such issues as annual timber quotas, watershed protection, and reforestation), as well as establishes regulated clearcutting as an allowable harvesting method.

¹One key provision of the Organic Act specifically prohibits the cutting of any timber other than dead or mature trees, a prohibition which essentially precludes clearcutting. The Forest Service was successfully sued in 1973 for this violation of their own organic act and consequently, legislation was passed in 1976 (NFMA) which amended the Organic Act to allow clearcutting.

²Specifically these are identified as recreation, range, timber, watershed, and fish and wildlife.

Other major environmental legislation not exclusively directed at the Forest Service but with which it is required to comply include:

6. **The National Environmental Protection Act of 1969** (NEPA)--a sweeping and somewhat vague law which among other things requires federal agencies to prepare detailed environmental impact statements for any federal actions "significantly affecting the quality of the natural environment."

7. **The Wilderness Act of 1964**--sets strict guidelines for the management of congressionally designated wilderness areas, many of which are on national forest land.

8. **The Endangered Species Act of 1973** (ESA)--mandates that the federal government document, protect, and attempt to revive species determined to be officially threatened or endangered.

9. **The Clean Water Act**--establishes water quality standards for the nation's waterways and contains provisions regulating activities that affect wetlands.

10. **The Wild and Scenic Rivers Act of 1966**--establishes restrictive management guidelines for congressionally designated Wild and Scenic Rivers and the land immediately along the banks.

APPENDIX F

STAGES OF TYPICAL FOREST SERVICE EIS PARTICIPATION
PROCESS

PRE-DRAFT EIS STAGE

1. Notice of intent regarding a proposed action is issued through various local media outlets.
2. Participants are notified and recruited through Forest Service mailings, calls, and media appeals.
3. Public meetings and small group presentations are held to explain the proposed action and identify issues and participant concerns to be incorporated into the various EIS alternatives that the Forest Service must construct.
4. Mail comment solicited and analyzed to identify issues and participant concerns.
5. In some cases, workshop sessions are held for participants and the Forest Service to discuss issues and concerns and jointly design EIS alternatives.

PRE-FINAL EIS STAGE

6. Draft EIS is formulated and released; it compares the various alternatives in terms of key issues and indicators measuring those issues and identifies the Forest Service's draft preferred alternative(s).
7. The DEIS comment period commences; mail comments regarding the various alternatives, including the preferred alternative are solicited and analyzed.
8. Public meetings and small group presentations are held to explain and describe the alternatives including the preferred alternative and identify participant concerns.

POST-FINAL EIS STAGE

9. Final EIS is formulated and released; it compares the various alternatives, including any new or modified ones, and identifies the Forest Service's final preferred alternative.

10. Final EIS comment period commences; mail comments regarding the various alternatives, including the final preferred alternative are solicited and analyzed.
11. The Record of Decision is formulated and released.

APPENDIX G

PRE-DRAFT EIS ISSUES, PARTICIPANT CONCERNS, AND
POLICY POSITIONS

The period preceding the development of a draft environmental impact statement is a crucial period for policy formulation and one in which the most meaningful participation supposedly takes place. This is the stage when alternatives to be considered in the EIS are constructed and the crucial issues to be measured and compared between alternatives are identified.

It is important for this study, therefore, to establish the primary issues, concerns, objections, and demands raised by the various participants during this stage for each of the seven EISs considered in this study. Participation at this stage differs from that in post-draft stage. Post-draft participation focuses, in large part, on supporting or opposing the various alternatives, including the Forest Service's preferred one. All of these alternatives can be expressed in quantifiably measurable ways; board feet of timber, acres harvested, miles of roads built and so on. Pre-draft participation, on the other hand, very often revolves around essentially non-quantified demands. At this stage, participatory input most often does not take the form of explicit numerically-expressed policy preferences, but rather broader types of demands; cut more timber, don't enter such-and-such roadless area, protect old growth, etc.

The pre-draft positions identified here are taken from the EIS documents themselves. NEPA regulations require that such issues and concerns expressed during public meetings, workshops, and mail comments be identified, summarized, and documented in the EIS (both draft and final). The issue headings are as presented in each EIS. The specific sources for this data are:

USDA Forest Service, Pacific Northwest Region, Siskiyou National Forest, *Silver Fire Recovery Project Record of Decision*, (Region 10: GPO, 1988), 9-15.

Land and Resources Management Plan Final Environmental Impact Statement Appendices, Volume 1 (Region 10: GPO, 1989), sec. A, 2-7.

Shasta Costa Timber Sales and Integrated Resource Projects Final Environmental Impact Statement, Volume 1 (Region 10: GPO, 1990), sec. I, 14-29.

Canyon Integrated Resource Project Final Environmental Impact Statement (Region 10: GPO, 1992), sec. 1, 8-14.

Quosatana/Bradford Timber Sales and Integrated Resource Projects Draft Environmental Impact Statement (Region 10: GPO, 1992), sec. I, 12-21.

Two Forks Timber Sales and Other Projects Draft Environmental Impact Statement (Siskiyou National Forest: 1992), sec. I, 1-3.

West Indigo Timber Sales and Other Projects Draft Environmental Impact Statement (Region 10: GPO 1992), sec. 1, 9-11.

Silver Fire Recovery Project Issues and Concerns

RAPID TIMBER RECOVERY -

Timber--Rot and insect damage will reduce quality of burned timber and drop volume 35-90% unless salvage is conducted promptly.

WATER QUALITY/FISHERIES -

Environmentalists--Salvage logging and road construction will compound fire-caused to fish habitat through increased sedimentation and loss of stream-side shading causing stream temperatures to rise.

PRODUCTIVITY -

Environmentalists--Salvage logging and road construction will cause increased soil erosion and will remove organic matter/woody material essential for the recovery and future productivity of the burned areas.

WILDLIFE -

Environmentalists--Salvage activities will compound adverse effects of the fire upon wildlife populations (including the northern spotted owl) and their habitats.

Timber--Salvage activities will enhance big-game habitat and restore badly damaged habitat.

REFORESTATION -

Timber--Only full-scale salvage can return burned area to optimum stocking levels; natural regeneration would lower sustained yield harvest levels.

ROADLESS AREAS -

Environmentalists--Entering roadless areas will increase erosion and fragmentation and preclude future wilderness or national park designations in North Kalmiopsis.

Timber--New roads are necessary for salvage/recovery activities, future fire protection, and recreation, hunting, and sightseeing.

RECREATION AND VISUAL RESOURCES -

Environmentalists--Salvage activities would destroy remoteness, solitude, and scenic value of Bald Mountain area and would thus preclude highly-valued recreational and aesthetic opportunities.

Timber--Burn area is an unsightly wasteland and only full salvage/recovery program will make area fit once again for recreational usage.

ECONOMICS -

Environmentalists--Costs of expensive salvage operation will far outweigh revenue that salvaged wood products will generate, thus costing the Federal government and taxpayers.

Timber--Only full-scale, rather than limited salvage harvests enough timber to be cost-effective.

-Alternative logging methods such as helicopter logging are too expensive to be cost-effective.

-Maximum salvage operations are necessary to maintain jobs, community stability, and local revenue.

ISSUES CONSIDERED OUTSIDE SCOPE OF THE EIS -

Environmentalists--The burn area should not be developed so that the portions of the Siskiyou National Forest, including the North Kalmiopsis, can be designated the Siskiyou National Park.

Forest Plan Issues and Concerns¹

TIMBER MANAGEMENT -

Environmentalists--Current harvest levels are unsustainable and damaging to forest ecosystem health and biodiversity; harvest levels need to be reduced.

-Unproductive, unsuitable land needs to be removed from forest land base when calculating the Siskiyou's sustained yield level; much land currently in the forest land base has soil that is too fragile to allow for harvesting and successful reforestation.

-Economic criteria, such as whether a sale is below-cost, should be incorporated in management decisions regarding timber harvesting.

Timber--Annual harvest levels need to be increased, or in the very least maintained, in order to assure a steady flow timber necessary for local and regional jobs, county revenue for schools and services, and overall community stability.

-The forest land base cannot be reduced any further if there is to be an adequate flow of timber into local economies; further withdrawals will make the ASQ impossible to meet and will thus reduce the overall annual output and lock up high-quality marketable timber.

-Certain methods of logging mandated by the Forest Service in given sales (such as helicopter logging, for example) are not cost-efficient.

OLD GROWTH -

Environmentalists--Old growth forests are a vital component of the forest ecosystem and their protection is necessary to maintain biodiversity, especially as habitat for old growth-dependent species as well as aesthetic values and certain recreational opportunities.

Timber--Old growth is overmature, wasteful, and keeps the sustained yield rate down; converting old growth into younger, managed stands would boost forest yields.

¹Some issues mentioned in the EIS that are not relevant to the forest management issues this study is concerned with were excluded.

RESIDUE MANAGEMENT -

Environmentalists--Disposing of timber harvest wastes, especially through burning, damages soil productivity by sterilizing the soil and removing decomposing organic material; it can threaten other resources such as air and water as well.

Timber--Disposal of wastes is necessary to prevent catastrophic forest fires and improve yields.

DEPARTURE FROM NON-DECLINING FLOW -

Environmentalists--Accelerating harvest schedules and/or shortening rotations would lead to even more unsustainable harvest levels and would seriously damage forest resources.

Timber--Accelerating harvest schedules and/or shortening rotations is a means by which to fill a projected void in private timber supplies as well as make up for recent losses in the forest land base.

WILDLIFE HABITAT -

Environmentalists--Unsustainable levels of timber harvest will damage wildlife habitat, especially that of interior forest-dependent species.

Timber--Logging will open up closed forest environments and create habitat beneficial to a number of big-game species.

SOILS -

Environmentalists--Logging activities damage soil through compaction, erosion, increased landslides, and the reduction of organic matter; this will, in turn, decrease soil productivity to the detriment of the entire ecosystem.

SENSITIVE PLANTS -

Environmentalists--A number of rare, unusual, and locally occurring plants exist only in the Siskiyou National Forest and many occupy fragile ecosystems that are not restorable if disrupted by logging activities.

FISHERIES -

Environmentalists--Logging and road construction will damage fish habitat and cause declines in fish production in

one of the most economically valuable fisheries in the United States.

VISUAL RESOURCES -

Environmentalists--Logging activities destroy scenic values which, in turn, precludes recreational opportunities and hurts the local tourist industry.

Timber--A large number of scenic areas are already protected; to prevent timber management to protect additional scenic values would require too high a cost in terms of lost timber volume.

RECREATION -

Environmentalists--Logging activities irreversibly alter wild, scenic, and remote areas and thus preclude valuable and increasingly rare recreational opportunities centered around solitude and primitive, unspoiled settings.

Timber--A major portion of the forest is already reserved for primitive recreational opportunities.

WATER -

Environmentalists--Logging activities can degrade water quality through increased siltation, water temperature, and possibly other pollutants; changes in vegetative cover and ground water recharge can also adversely affect the Forest's delicate hydrology, leading to the increased potential for both drought and flooding.

WILDERNESS AND UNROADED AREAS -

Environmentalists--Additions to the existing wilderness system should be made or recommended; in the least, timber harvesting should not occur in unprotected roadless areas so to not preclude the potential for future congressional wilderness designation.

Timber--Any additions to the already large areas of protected wilderness on the Siskiyou would further reduce the forest land base, lock up economically valuable resources, and force reductions in harvest levels.

HARDWOOD CONVERSION -

Environmentalists--Loss of hardwood forest acreage through timber harvesting and subsequent conifer reforestation adversely affects wildlife habitat, biodiversity, and

aesthetic variety; soils and water are also damaged when the unmarketable hardwoods are disposed through burning.

Timber--Economic benefits gained from converting commercially valueless hardwoods to valuable conifers would outweigh the wastage of the logged hardwoods.

ISSUES CONSIDERED OUTSIDE OF THE SCOPE OF THE EIS -

Environmentalists--Herbicide usage for brush control.

-National Park proposals.

Timber--Lifting of protected status of congressionally designated wilderness areas.

Shasta Costa Project Issues and Concerns

AESTHETIC/ROADLESS VALUES -

Environmentalists--Logging in the highly scenic Shasta Costa basin would destroy the aesthetic attributes of this area, especially along the heavily travelled Bear Camp Road, the main east-west route through the Forest.

-Logging and road construction would impact upon the area's wild, unroaded character and thereby preclude opportunities for solitude and various recreational activities.

BIODIVERSITY/ECOSYSTEM RESILIENCE -

Environmentalists--Logging and road construction would adversely affect the forest ecosystem and its ability to sustain itself as well as reduce the diversity of plant and animal species.

-Fragmentation of old growth stands is especially injurious to ecosystem sustainability and makes it very difficult to maintain viable populations of old growth-dependent species.

-Local issues of forest health are tied into global environmental concerns such as the issue of global warming.

COMMODITY OUTPUTS/FOREST PLAN -

Timber--Sufficient timber output from the Shasta Costa basin is necessary to maintain local jobs, county revenue for roads, schools, and services, and overall community stability.

-Projects employing New Forestry methods in the basin would feature significantly reduced timber yields and would thus violate the harvest targets laid out in the Forest Plan and would lead to an eventual reduction in the Plan's overall ASQ for the entire Forest.

-New Forestry projects would be economically inefficient; timber sales in the basin should stress cost-effectiveness and long-term positive cash flow.

WATER QUALITY/FISH HABITAT -

Environmentalists--Previous logging activities in the area as well as naturally occurring landslides have already adversely affected water quality and fish habitat through sedimentation in portions of Shasta Costa Creek; additional logging activities would further damage already degraded parts of the creek and offset the benefits of any stream restoration efforts.

-Further degradation of Shasta Costa Creek would damage water quality, appearance, and turbidity on the National Wild and Scenic Rogue River into which it flows. The Rogue is a very heavily used recreational river and damage to it might adversely impact the local tourist/recreational industries.

Canyon Project Issues and Concerns

WATER QUALITY/FISHERIES -

Environmentalists--Logging, mining, and road construction in the Canyon area would reduce water quality, especially in the Wild and Scenic Illinois River, by increasing stream sedimentation and temperature, thereby damaging fish habitat including that of the Fall Chinook and Coho Salmon currently listed by the state as sensitive species.

ECONOMICS/FLOW OF WOOD PRODUCTS -

Environmentalists--The costs of preparing timber sales in this difficult, marginal area would exceed revenue.

Timber--Initial preparation costs (i.e. roads) would be offset by futures sales.

-Overall benefits of maintaining steady flow of wood products from the area is worth the costs; a steady supply of timber is necessary to generate county revenue and maintain jobs and community stability.

-Certain harvest methods designed for maximum resource protection are too costly and remove too low a volume of timber.

-The timber base on the Forest is shrinking and all areas destined for harvest in the Forest Plan ought to be intensively managed for maximum timber production.

NORTHERN SPOTTED OWL -

Environmentalists--Logging in the Canyon area may adversely affect northern spotted owl habitat and/or individual spotted owls located in the area.

Timber--Canyon is very marginal spotted owl habitat with an extremely sparse owl population and the area is not currently listed by the USFWS as critical habitat.

FOREST HEALTH/BIODIVERSITY -

Environmentalists--Logging and road construction may adversely affect the very fragile and unique ecosystem of the Canyon area by reducing soil productivity, fragmenting and removing biologically valuable stands of mature interior forest habitat, and reducing the diversity of plant and animal species.

-The rate of projected harvest for the Canyon area is unsustainable and will lead to the breakdown of the forest ecosystem.

Timber--Timber harvesting would increase biological diversity by creating new types of habitat.

ROADLESS CHARACTER -

Environmentalists--Logging and road construction in roadless portions of the Canyon area would alter its natur-

al, wild character and jeopardize backcountry recreational opportunities.

-Entering roadless areas would rule out possibility for future wilderness designation, national park status, or U.N. World Heritage Site status for the area.

Timber--Roads are necessary for more productive timber management and more cost-efficient logging.

ISSUES CONSIDERED OUTSIDE THE SCOPE OF THE EIS -

Environmentalists--Limits on mining activity.

-Nomination of the Canyon area as a U.N. World Heritage Site.

-Scenic and aesthetic values in the Canyon area.

-Preventing the spread through roads and logging of the Port Orford cedar root rot disease.

Quosatana/Bradford Projects Issues and Concerns

SCENERY -

Environmentalists--Logging would destroy the area's high scenic quality and adversely impact the local Rogue River-based tourist industry.

WILDLIFE HABITAT -

Environmentalists--Fragmentation of interior forest habitat would adversely affect various wildlife species, especially those dependent upon old growth such as the northern spotted owl and the marbled murrelet.

-Logging and road construction might cause the loss of connective wildlife habitat between the planning area and the adjacent Kalmiopsis Wilderness.

FISH HABITAT AND WATER QUALITY -

Environmentalists--Logging and road construction would adversely impact water quality and consequently fish habitat through increased siltation, sediment deposition, and changes in water temperature.

-Diminished water quality might reduce the Rogue River's aesthetic quality as well as adversely impact upon economic sectors (fishing, recreation, and tourism) dependent upon the Rogue.

BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY -

Environmentalists--Conversion of natural forests to plantations reduces the diversity of plant and animal species.

-Soil compaction, erosion, and loss of woody debris may adversely impact upon soil productivity and consequently forest health.

-Logging would reduce the amount of especially diverse old growth forest.

PORT ORFORD-CEDAR ROOT ROT DISEASE -

Environmentalists--Road construction and logging activities would pose a serious risk of introducing Port Orford-Cedar root rot disease into currently uninfected areas.

GEOLOGICAL STABILITY -

Environmentalists--Logging increases the potential for landslides, especially near sensitive riparian areas.

ROADLESS CHARACTER -

Environmentalists--Logging and road construction would alter the area's roadless character, preclude future wilderness designation, and adversely affect primitive recreational opportunities.

ECONOMICS -

Environmentalists--Logging in areas of marginal productivity will lead to expensive reforestation efforts.

-Certain timber sales in the planning area will be below-cost, money-losing sales.

Timber--Proposed helicopter logging in certain areas would adversely affect local logging companies which do not have such capabilities.

- Adequate levels of timber harvesting will provide important county revenues.

HARDWOOD CONVERSION -

Timber--Conversion of hardwood stands to coniferous plantations is necessary to increase commercial forest base in order to maintain adequate timber yields.

ISSUES CONSIDERED OUTSIDE THE SCOPE OF THE EIS -

Environmentalists--Additional wilderness designation for parts of the planning area.

-Global environmental concerns such as global warming.

-Northern spotted owl and marbled murrelet protection.

Two Forks Project Issues and Concerns

INTERIOR HABITAT -

Environmentalists--Proposed logging activities would reduce habitat for interior forest-dependent wildlife species including old growth species such as the northern spotted owl and the marbled murrelet.

ROADLESS CHARACTER -

Environmentalists--Proposed logging and road construction would adversely impact upon the roadless character of the area and thereby preclude future wilderness designations in the Windy Valley Roadless Area as well as various recreational and aesthetic opportunities.

LONG-TERM TIMBER YIELD -

Timber--The proposed action does not truly abide by the Forest Plan in that it does not harvest and intensively manage as many acres as the original Plan calls for thereby reducing future timber yields.

FISH HABITAT -

Environmentalists--Proposed logging activities would lead to increased sedimentation thereby damaging high-quality spawning areas for steelhead and trout in sensitive areas.

ISSUES CONSIDERED OUTSIDE THE SCOPE OF THE EIS -

Environmentalists--Logging would reduce the number of critical wildlife corridors between larger blocks of forest.

-Logging and road construction would risk spreading Port Orford-Cedar root rot disease into currently uninfected areas.

West Indigo Project Issues and Concerns

WATER QUALITY/FISHERIES -

Environmentalists--Logging and road construction would degrade fish habitat in West Indigo Creek by increasing erosion and stream sedimentation.

ECONOMICS -

Environmentalists--Some timber sales in the planning area might be below-cost, money-losing sales.

Timber--A steady flow of timber into the local area is essential to maintain jobs, county revenue, and community stability.

INTERIOR HABITAT -

Environmentalists--Logging and road construction would fragment mature/old growth forest and adversely impact old growth and interior forest-dependent species such as the northern spotted owl and the marbled murrelet.

FOREST HEALTH/BIODIVERSITY -

Environmentalists--Logging and road construction might adversely affect forest ecosystems by disrupting soils, hydrology, nutrient cycles, natural fire activity, and forest productivity and leading to a reduction in the diversity of plant and animal species.

APPENDIX H

DESCRIPTION OF VARIABLES AND CATEGORIES AND INDICATOR
VALUES FOR TABLE 17

Table 17 attempts to compare seven Siskiyou National Forest final and/or draft EIS decisions (as well as one non-EIS decision) in terms of both level of formal participation and the timber-environmental index, a quantifiable measure of where a decision stood relative to the timber interests' and the environmentalists' favored positions.

Level of Formal Participation--This variable measures the degree to which a given EIS process offered opportunities for formal participation (as opposed to informal calls, visits, etc.) in the crucial period preceding the release of the draft EIS. It consists of three categories: *low*, *moderate*, and *high*. Decisions in the low category offered no pre-draft workshops or public meetings; at most they included only mail comments. Decisions featuring moderate levels of participation included pre-draft public meetings and mail comments, but no workshops. High participation decisions incorporated all three forms of participation in the pre-draft stage.

Timber-Environmental Index--This index measures where the Forest Service's preferred alternative for a given EIS stands in relation to the timber interests' and the environmentalists' preferred alternatives. The index values fall between the scores of 0 which represents the timber interest position and 1.0 which represents the environmentalist position. The index is calculated as follows with x = timber EIS alternative, y = environmentalist EIS alternative and z = Forest Service preferred alternative:

$$\frac{|x-z|}{|x-y|}$$

The specific indicators which are measured by the index (i.e. total harvest volume) vary in some cases from EIS to EIS. This lack of direct comparability is a serious problem and a major reason this index was designed; it allows for a more comparable cross-EIS measure. The index is not foolproof, however, as indicators measuring things that are just too different might still allow a certain skewing of the index value to occur.¹ It is, therefore, still important

¹This was the case with the indicators chosen to measure water quality and silviculture. They were so completely disparate from EIS to EIS that even the index value was of

to choose indicators that are as similar as possible. While specific indicators may vary, they can all be organized into four broad categories: timber production, road construction, roadless areas, and old growth (for the specific indicators themselves, see the following tables).

The summary index value given to each to each EIS decision in table 17 is calculated as the mean of only the first four categories listed above. This is because these categories tended to employ indicators that were consistently the most similar from decision to decision. This hopefully would avoid skewed index numbers. When a category consisted of two or more relevant individual indicators, the mean index value of these indicators was used to obtain the broader category's index value.²

There is one last note about the index that is important to consider. While the index measures Forest Service decisions between a scale of 0 to 1.0, a score of .50 does not necessarily imply perfect Forest Service balance; only that its preferred alternative fell exactly halfway between the range defined by the timber and environmental alternatives. For example, the fact that the agency enters a major roadless area or stand of old growth but plans to log only half of what the timber industry wants may not necessarily represent a balanced decision or a true mid-point compromise. Thus, the index is by no means a perfect measure of how the Forest Service balances interests and their demands. It is rather a measure limited by the bounds of the EIS alternatives and the indicators by which the Forest Service chose to analyze those alternatives. Still, the index can provide, in the very least, a means by which to compare various EIS decisions against one another in terms of their relative leanings.

The Alternatives--The various alternatives upon which calculation of the index depends are listed, described, and compared in each EIS. Identifying the DEIS and FEIS preferred alternatives is a straightforward task--each EIS announces such a preference and as such it constitutes Forest Service policy. Identifying the timber and environmental alternatives, however, is not nearly so simple. The most direct and certainly most desirable manner by which to determine which EIS alternative comes closest to each interest's posi-

questionable validity. For this reason, they were left out of the analysis.

²For example, if the old growth category has two indicators, *acres of old growth remaining* and *acres of mature interior habitat remaining* and their values are .60 and .40 respectively, the overall old growth index value would be considered .50 when it was figured into the overall EIS index.

tion is to find a clear trend in participant support and endorsement for a given alternative in the post-DEIS mail comment that is excerpted, summarized, and in some cases, reproduced in the appendices of all final EISs. Thus, if a clear majority of comments urge adoption of Alternative A, then an assumption will be made that that alternative comes closest to capturing the essence of that interest's positions and demands.

Occasionally, though, interests voiced clear preferences for alternatives outside the range of those described in the EIS. In such cases, the EIS alternative or combination of alternatives that come closest to approximating the major points of the outside alternative were considered as that group's alternative. Fortunately, in the few cases where this happened, there were fairly similar EIS stand-in alternatives (see the preceding tables). When more than one alternative was commonly supported or several were needed to capture the full essence of an outside alternative, the timber-environmental index value was figured by taking the mean of those several alternatives that collectively correspond to a given interest.

Perhaps a more serious problem occurs when attempting to determine which alternatives match interest positions in the decisions for which there is only a DEIS document currently available. The problem is that draft EISs do not, of course, contain information on post-draft comments supporting or opposing the various alternatives. In these cases, a best guess as to the interest-favored alternative had to be made based upon the pre-draft issues, concerns, and positions documented in Appendix G as well as previous patterns and tendencies made evident in other decisions.

Trying to capture the full nature of an interest's policy desires by matching the interest to an EIS alternative is, admittedly, an imperfect and rather constrained measure that at best can only offer a partial approximation of an interest's overall policy orientation (appendix G's pre-draft issues and concerns perhaps come closer to achieving this). Still, these alternatives are supposedly drawn up in accordance with the information gained through pre-draft public comment and participation and so, at least indirectly, they reflect the interests' positions to some extent. Thus, however limited this preferred alternative approach may be, these alternatives are by no means arbitrary.

Silver Fire Recovery Project¹

	Timber Alt.D	Envir. Alt.J	DEIS pref. Alt.I	T-E index ²	FEIS pref. Alt.I-mod.	T-E index
TIMBER PRODUCTION						
salvage volume (mmbf)	241	0	146	.39	157	.35
ROAD CONSTRUCTION (miles)						
	38.0	0	20.5	.46	20.0	.47
SUMMARY INDEX						
VALUE				.43		.41

¹Source: USDA Forest Service, Pacific Northwest Region, Siskiyou National Forest, *Silver Fire Recovery Project Final Environmental Impact Statement*, (Region 10: GPO, 1988).

²Timber-Environmental index; 0 = timber position, 1.0 = environmentalist position.

Forest Plan¹

	Timber Alts. ² C,D,D1	Envir. Alt.M ³	DEIS pref. Alt.K	T-E index	FEIS pref. Alt.S	T-E index
TIMBER PRODUC- TION- annual ASQ (mmbf)	177/170/185 177.3 mean	34	155	.16	162	.11
ROAD CON- STRUCTION (miles)	308/271/271 289.5 mean ⁴	0	206	.29	228	.21
ROADLESS AREAS-acres retained by 5th decade (1000s)	69/69/69 69 mean	284	92	.11	126	.27
OLD GROWTH acres mature/OG retained ⁵ (1000s)	67/72/72 69.2 mean	190.6	85.7	.14	99.1	.25
% of forest as OG by 5th decade (1000s)	17/17.5/16 16.7 mean	32.6	18.3	<u>.10</u> (.12 mean)	19.1	<u>.14</u> (.20 mean)
SUMMARY INDEX VALUE				.17		.20

¹Source: USDA Forest Service, Pacific Northwest Region, Siskiyou National Forest, *Land and Resources Management Plan Final Environmental Impact Statement Appendices*, Volume 1 (Region 10: GPO, 1989)

²The majority of timber interest participants supported their own "Evergreen Alternative" which the Siskiyou N.F. did not specifically develop as an EIS alternative. However the main features of the "Evergreen Alternative" are featured in Alternatives C,D, and D1.

³Many environmentalists also wanted a national park alternative, but that was ruled out on the basis that it was beyond Forest Service jurisdiction.

⁴On those indicators where Alt. D and its quicker rotation variation D1 are the same the mean is calculated counting them as only a single value.

⁵Outside already protected wilderness areas.

Shasta Costa Project¹

	Timber Alts. ² B, H	Envir. Alt.A	DEIS pref. Alt.C	T-E index	FEIS pref. Alt.SC	T-E index
TIMBER PRODUCTION						
3 yr. harvest volume (mmbf)	17.5/22.5 20.0 mean	0	11.2	.44	13.4	.33
ROAD CONSTRUCTION (miles)						
	6.23/11.54 8.89 mean	0	2.47	.72	5.09	.43
ROADLESS AREAS						
% roadless acres maintained	85/84 84.5 mean	100.0	93.0	.55	92.0	.48
OLD GROWTH						
% interior old growth retained	83/84 83.5 mean	100.0	96.0	.76	90.0	.39
SUMMARY INDEX						
VALUE				.62		.41

¹Source: USDA Forest Service, Pacific Northwest Region, Siskiyou National Forest, *Shasta Costa Timber Sales and Integrated Resource Projects Final Environmental Impact Statement*, Volume 1 (Region 10: GPO, 1990).

²Some in the timber community merely wanted the Forest Service to implement the Forest Plan objectives for the basin (Alt. B), while others wanted maximum harvest.

Canyon Project¹

	Timber Envir. Alt.C	DEIS pref. Alt.A	T-E Alts.E,PA ²	FEIS pref. index	T-E Alt.S	index
TIMBER PRODUCTION						
2 yr. harvest volume (mmbf)	16.5	0	6.2/10.7 8.5 mean	.49	9.0	.45
ROAD CONSTRUC- TION (miles)	7.9	0	0.4/7.3 3.9 mean	.51	4.0	.49
ROADLESS AREAS acres harvested in roadless areas	323	0	34/247 140.5 mean	.57	240	.26
OLD GROWTH acres OG retained	66	141	141/66 103.5 mean	.50	141	1.00
acres owl habitat retained	1610	2187	1982/1748 1865 mean	.44	1859	.43
acres interior mature forest retained	1908	3137	2119/2299 2209 mean	<u>.24</u> .39 mean	1928	<u>.02</u> .48 mean
SUMMARY INDEX						
VALUE				.49		.42

¹Source: USDA Forest Service, Pacific Northwest Region, Siskiyou National Forest, Canyon Integrated Resource Project Final Environmental Impact Statement (Region 10: GPO, 1992).

²In the Canyon DEIS, the Forest Service identified two different preferred alternatives.

Quosatana/Bradford Projects¹

	Timber Alts.D,E	Envir. Alt.A	DEIS pref. Alt.F	T-E index
TIMBER PRODUCTION				
3 yr. harvest volume (mmbf)	19.4/28.2 23.8 mean	0	18.55	.22
ROAD CONSTRUCTION				
(miles)	5.23/10.61 7.92 mean	0	3.97	.50
ROADLESS AREAS				
acres harvested in roadless areas	471/587 529 mean	0	294	.44
road construction in roadless areas (miles)	1.69/5.93 3.81 mean	0	0.20	<u>.95</u> .70 mean
OLD GROWTH-acres				
interior mature/OG forest retained	1676/1605 1640.5 mean	2396	2212	.76
% area in mature/ old growth forest	35/33 34 mean	39	35	<u>.20</u> .48 mean
<hr/>				
SUMMARY INDEX VALUE				.48

¹Source: USDA Forest Service, Pacific Northwest Region, Siskiyou National Forest, Quosatana/Bradford Timber Sales and Integrated Resource Projects Draft Environmental Impact Statement (Region 10: GPO, 1992).

Two Forks Project¹

	Timber Alt.B	Envir. Alt.A	DEIS pref. Alt.F	T-E index
TIMBER PRODUCTION 2 yr. harvest volume (mmbf)	20.0	0	13.8	.31
ROAD CONSTRUCTION (miles)	5.4	0	5.2	.04
ROADLESS AREAS-acres roadless area retained	10566	11484	9558	<0.00
road construction in roadless areas (miles)	3.04	0	3.04	0.00
OLD GROWTH-acres interior mature/OG habitat retained	12220	13374	12085	<0.00
SUMMARY INDEX VALUE				.08 ²

¹Source: USDA Forest Service, Pacific Northwest Region, Siskiyou National Forest, *Two Forks Timber Sales and Other Projects Draft Environmental Impact Statement* (Siskiyou National Forest: 1992).

²Index values less than 0.00 are counted as 0.00 when calculating the summary index.

West Indigo Project¹

	Timber Alt.E	Envir. Alt.A	DEIS pref. Alts.D,G ²	T-E index
TIMBER PRODUCTION harvest volume (mmbf)	28.65	0	16.0/10.65 13.3 mean	.53
ROAD CONSTRUCTION (miles)	13.6	0	9.7/4.5 7.1 mean	.47
OLD GROWTH-acres interior mature/old growth retained	2428	3435	2726/3087 2906.5 mean	.48
acres total old growth retained	3367	3883	3588/3682 3635 mean	<u>.52</u> .50 mean
SUMMARY INDEX VALUE				.50

¹Source: USDA Forest Service, Pacific Northwest Region, Siskiyou National Forest, *West Indigo Timber Sales and Other Projects Draft Environmental Impact Statement* (Region 10: GPO, 1992).

²In the West Indigo DEIS, the Forest Service identified two preferred alternatives.

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