

Is India Fit for a Role in Global Governance? The Predicament of Fragile Domestic Structures and Institutions

Wulf, Herbert

Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version

Arbeitspapier / working paper

Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:

Wulf, H. (2014). *Is India Fit for a Role in Global Governance? The Predicament of Fragile Domestic Structures and Institutions*. (Global Cooperation Research Papers, 4). Duisburg: Käte Hamburger Kolleg / Centre for Global Cooperation Research (KHK/GCR21). <https://doi.org/10.14282/2198-0411-GCRP-4>

Nutzungsbedingungen:

Dieser Text wird unter einer CC BY-ND Lizenz (Namensnennung-Keine Bearbeitung) zur Verfügung gestellt. Nähere Auskünfte zu den CC-Lizenzen finden Sie hier: <https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/4.0/deed.de>

Terms of use:

This document is made available under a CC BY-ND Licence (Attribution-NoDerivatives). For more Information see: <https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/4.0>



Centre for
**Global
Cooperation
Research**

Herbert Wulf

Is India Fit for a Role in Global Governance?

The Predicament of Fragile Domestic Structures and Institutions

SPONSORED BY THE



**Federal Ministry
of Education
and Research**

Global Cooperation Research Papers 4

Editorial Board

Rainer Baumann
Frank Gadinger
Volker Heins
Silke Weinlich

Editorial Office

Martin Wolf
Tina Berntsen

Käte Hamburger Kolleg / Centre for Global Cooperation Research (KHK/GCR21)

Managing Board

Markus Böckenförde
Tobias Debiel
Claus Leggewie
Dirk Messner

Schifferstr. 196
47059 Duisburg
Germany
Tel: +49 (0)203 29861-100
Fax: +49 (0)203 29861-199
E-Mail: info@gcr21.uni-due.de
Internet: www.gcr21.org

*A Central Research Institute of the
University of Duisburg-Essen*

UNIVERSITÄT
DUISBURG
ESSEN

Open-Minded

**License: Creative Commons
Attribution CC BY-ND 4.0**

Attribution

Please cite the work as follows: Christian Wulf 2014. *Is India Fit for a Role in Global Governance? The Predicament of Fragile Domestic Structures and Institutions* (Global Cooperation Research Papers 4). Duisburg: Käte Hamburger Kolleg/ Centre for Global Cooperation Research (KHK/GCR21). doi: 10.14282/2198-0411-GCRP-4. License: Creative Commons Attribution CC BY-ND 4.0.

No Derivative Works

You may not alter, transform, or build upon this work.

Notice

For any reuse or distribution, you must make clear to others the license terms of this work. The best way to do this is with a link to this web page: www.gcr21.org/publications.

DuEPublico

Issues are permanently filed at the public online archive server of the University of Duisburg-Essen.



All Global Cooperation Research Papers are available online. To learn more about the Käte Hamburger Kolleg / Centre for Global Cooperation Research, please visit www.gcr21.org.

DuEPublico Issues are permanently filed at the public online archive server of the University of Duisburg-Essen, <http://duepublico.uni-duisburg-essen.de>.

© Duisburg 2014

Copyright is held by the contributing authors.

ISSN: 2198-1949 (Print)
ISSN: 2198-0411 (Online)
DOI: 10.14282/2198-0411-GCRP-4

Contents

Abbreviations

Glossary

Introduction	6
1 The Indian Paradox	8
1.1 Conflicting Situations	8
1.2 The Economy: Growth, Poverty, and Inequality	9
1.3 Security Challenges at Home	13
2 Socio-cultural Explanations: Disorderly but Resilient Structures	17
2.1 Hybridization: Merging Tradition and Modernity—Yoga and Wi-Fi	18
2.2 Amorphous Practices: Rhetoric and Improvisation	20
2.3 Functioning Political Institutions: Federalism and Centralism in Balance	23
2.3.1 Keeping the Union, Building a Nation State	23
2.3.2 Party Politics and Regional Self-assertion	24
2.3.3 The Expanding Role of the Federal States in Foreign Policy	26
Conclusion	27
References	30

Abstract

How do emerging powers cooperate at the global level? The government of India—one such power—has let it be known that it is seeking an enhanced role in global governance. Is Indian society ready for this new, global role? This paper analyses the impact of domestic factors on India's foreign-policy ambitions. It begins by examining the country's paradoxical social and economic development and the problems it faces in the realm of internal security. Section 2 looks at a number of socio-cultural and political factors that may help to explain India's new, globally oriented approach to foreign policy: 1. Indian society's capacity to merge tradition and modernity, resulting in the creation of resilient institutions; 2. the amorphous nature of Indian society and its distinctive capacity to exploit vagueness and improvisation in resolving problems; and 3. the competition and cooperation between political actors at national and federal level, which has resulted in the emergence of a functioning federal system but has also complicated centre–state relations. The paper concludes that, overall, the question of whether India's social structures and political institutions are robust enough to allow it to assume a global role is not one that can be answered unambivalently. The government has undertaken major reforms and the country's institutions are strong, resilient, adaptive, and keen on global cooperation. On the other hand, Indian society is still bedevilled by incoherent economic development in which phenomenal growth is found alongside appalling poverty and inequality.

Keywords

Conflict, development, domestic structures, economic growth, federalism, foreign policy, global governance, hybridity, India, internal security, poverty, socio-economic development, regionalism, resilient institutions, soft power, tradition and modernity

Author

Herbert Wulf was a Director at the SIPRI arms trade project and founding Director of the Bonn International Center for Conversion (BICC) in 1994. He is presently a Senior Fellow at BICC and an Adjunct Senior Researcher at the Institute for Development and Peace (INEP) at the University of Duisburg-Essen where he was a Senior Expert Fellow in 2012–2013 at the Käthe Hamburger Kolleg / Centre for Global Cooperation Research. For his lifetime achievement the Phillips University in Marburg awarded him the Peter Becker Prize for Peace and Conflict Research in 2007. ✉ wulf.herbert@web.de.

Abbreviations

BJP	Bharatiya Janata Party
BRICS	Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa
CPI	Communist Party of India
CPI (M)	Communist Party of India (Marxist)
DMK	Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
G20	Group of Twenty Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors (of 19 states and the European Union)
GDP	gross domestic product
HCR	head count ratio
HDI	Human Development Index
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IR	Indian rupee
NAM	Non-Aligned Movement
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NDA	National Democratic Alliance
NGO	Non-governmental organization
NPT	Non-Proliferation Treaty
NREGA	National Rural Employment Guarantee Act
OBC	Other Backward Castes
PPP	purchasing power parity
RSS	Rashtriya Swayam-sevak Sangh
SC	Scheduled Castes
ST	Scheduled Tribes
UN	United Nations
WTO	World Trade Organization

Glossary

<i>babus</i>	bureaucrats
<i>Bharat</i>	Sanskrit name for India
<i>dalits</i>	tribals and people traditionally considered 'untouchable'
<i>danda</i>	coercive authority
<i>dharma</i>	common good
<i>dharna</i>	sitting and fasting on an offender's doorstep
<i>garibi hatao</i>	eradicate poverty
<i>gherao</i>	encirclement of politicians
<i>hindutva</i>	Hindu nationalist ideology
<i>jugaad</i>	quick fix, a work around
<i>license raj</i>	bureaucratic licensing system
<i>Naxalite</i>	member of Maoist militant group formed in the wake of a peasant revolt in the village of Naxalbari
<i>netas</i>	politicians
<i>sangh parivar</i>	Hindu family
<i>satyagraha</i>	non-violent resistance
<i>swadeshi</i>	autarky

Is India Fit for a Role in Global Governance?

The Predicament of Fragile Domestic Structures and Institutions

Herbert Wulf

Introduction

The broker came here to procure the necessary certificates for these men, in exchange for the necessary sums of money. With a smile and a hundred-rupee note, he invented legitimate occupations and respectable business offices for his clients; conjured wives for unmarried men, and husbands and children for single women. The real-estate broker was a master of fiction.

Aravind Adiga, *Last Man in Tower*, 2011

No power on Earth can stop an idea whose time has come. I suggest to this august House that the emergence of India as a major economic power in the world happens to be one such idea.

Manmohan Singh¹

For several decades, India's foreign policy was founded on two unshakeable primary concepts: in the political sphere, non-alignment; and in the economic sphere, as great a degree of autarky (*swadeshi*) as possible.² These ideals were never fully realized, but Indian governments of various persuasions—particularly those in power in Nehru's time, until his death in 1964—continued to uphold them amidst the complexities occasioned by underdevelopment, national heterogeneity, and the split from Pakistan at the end of colonial rule in 1947. Political change came only gradually: the signing of the Peace and Friendship Treaty with the Soviet Union in 1971 was not so much a formal departure from non-alignment as a de facto step away from it; and the acceptance of foreign aid—particularly technical, financial, and food aid—from Western donors and the IMF during the 1960s and 1970s constituted an implicit rather than an explicit acknowledgement that economic self-reliance had not (yet) been achieved.

¹ From a 1991 budget speech by the then Finance Minister (later Prime Minister) Manmohan Singh. Quoted by Baru (2013: 37).

² Nehru, the architect of India's foreign policy, stressed the necessity of basing that policy on economic development. In the Constituent General Assembly he said: 'Ultimately, foreign policy is the outcome of economic policy, and until India has properly evolved her economic policy, her foreign policy will be rather vague, rather inchoate, and will be groping' (Nehru 1961: 24).

Over the last two decades, both these foreign-policy concepts—political non-alignment and economic autarky—have been abandoned and the Indian government has instituted fundamental changes in policy during this period. With the disappearance of the two opposing military blocs, non-alignment—through which India had sought to evade the influence of the major military powers—ceased to be a defining criterion of foreign policy and began to look somewhat outdated.³ In the economic sphere, meanwhile, the dramatic shift towards liberalization, initiated in the early 1990s, when India found itself in the throes of a deep economic and political crisis, brought about the gradual disappearance of the concepts of self-reliance and protectionism. The inward-looking approach to the economy was abandoned. Since then, all Indian governments, whether headed by the Congress Party or by the Hindu-nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), have sought to integrate the Indian economy into the world market rather than pursue self-reliance.

The loss of India's foreign-policy basis at the end of the Cold War, the demise of the Soviet Union, the new foreign-policy emphasis on economic issues (such as trade and foreign investment), and the rejection of anti-Americanism heralded a new era in Indian foreign policy. Alongside the extraordinary expansion of the economy over the last two decades has come a growth in India's aspiration to play a more active global role. This is making itself felt particularly strongly in multilateral forums, both economic (like the World Trade Organization and the International Monetary Fund) and political (the United Nations Security Council, the G20, and BRICS). However, economic success is not of itself a sufficiently solid basis for an enhanced global role. Domestic factors are also key when it comes to devising foreign-policy architecture. Such factors can both accelerate and hamper the implementation of a new foreign-policy concept. Stability at home and good relations in the region are the cornerstones on which any enhancement of global roles must be founded.

In this paper I will take a closer look at key domestic factors of this kind and ask whether India's social and political institutions are fit for a more substantial role in global governance⁴ or whether, as some Indian foreign-policy observers claim, 'the fascination with India's growing economic clout and foreign-policy overtures has glossed over its institutional limits, the many quirks of its political culture, and the significant economic and social challenges it faces' (Ganguly 2012).

Cultural and social heritage are important factors to consider in this context. Most importantly, we need to determine whether India's social and political institutions are robust and adaptive enough to underpin the Indian elite's ambition to assume a more substantial global role or whether they are an obstacle in coping with new challenges.

³ Some foreign-policy thinkers regard non-alignment as antiquated (Thakur 1992, Mazumdar 2011). Ganguly and Pardesi (2009: 11) talk of 'a requiem for Nonalignment'. Others believe it can be revived and that it is still of value in Indian foreign policy (Khilnani et al. 2012). As former Prime Minister Inder Kumar Gujral put it: 'It is a mantra that we have to keep repeating, but who are you going to be nonaligned against?' (Quoted in Ganguly and Pardesi (2009: 11).

⁴ I deal with the conceptual basis of Indian foreign policy in a separate publication (Wulf 2013a). For India's role in BRICS, see Debiel and Wulf 2013.

The first of the two main sections that make up this paper analyses conflicting economic, social, and political developments in India; the second looks at socio-cultural and political factors that help explain how Indian institutions function. There then follows a brief concluding section.

1 The Indian Paradox

1.1 Conflicting Situations

Paradox, inconsistency, and contradiction are an intrinsic feature of India's role in the twenty-first century.⁵ To the foreign eye, the political process seems exotic and confusing—as chaotic as the traffic in the country's mega-cities. India is described as the largest functioning democracy in the world, yet its society is one of the most corrupt and is dominated by traditional caste-structures. It is one of the fastest-growing economies in the world but remains an underdeveloped, poverty-stricken country, where the vast majority of people live in acute need. It is viewed as an emerging power—possibly even a superpower in the making—but is still caught up in unresolved and sometimes violent conflicts with its immediate neighbours (Stuenkel 2012: 35).

In an extensive special report on India, the Economist concluded that the country seemed 'set on a promising path'. The national census, it said, revealed 'fast-rising literacy; more girls in schools; the relentless spread of mobile phones'. The country ranked as the world's tenth-biggest economy and was 'more stable than ever'.⁶ The mobility of its population might even 'give it an advantage over countries like China'.⁷

However, India's new world is not without its contradictions—indeed, the country's political, social, and economic development has been neither coherent nor smooth. Amartya Sen talks of two Indias: 'the first . . . lives a lot like California, the second (and more populous) . . . lives a lot like Sub-Saharan Africa' (quoted by Guha, 2012: 11).

Article 17 of the Indian constitution abolishes 'untouchability', but this is not reflected in real life (Mitra 2012: 139). The caste system continues to block upward mobility for millions in India, and those *dalits* who have become wealthy entrepreneurs on the back of the economic dynamic of the last two decades remain only a handful in number.⁸ The constitution affirms minority rights; various forms of

⁵ Stuenkel (2012: 34) writes: 'India's role in today's international context abounds with paradox.'

⁶ Adam Roberts (2012), 'Aim Higher', *Economist*, 29 Sep., <http://www.economist.com/node/21563414>.

⁷ 'Express or Stopping?' (2012), *Economist* 29 Sep., <http://www.economist.com/node/21563420>.

⁸ *Dalits* are underprivileged tribals and people traditionally considered 'untouchable'. The rise of a small number of *dalits* to millionaire status has led to a debate about the opportunities open to this group. However, the success of these few does not appear to be representative (Iyer, Khanna, and Varshney, 2013: 58; see also Guru 2012).

affirmative action are proposed as a means of supporting socially deprived sections of the population; and the Indian state is formally committed to ending various forms of inequality (Wankhede 2012: 40). Yet the social, political, and economic reality of Indian society is far from harmonious. India is polymorphous⁹—rich and poor, modern and traditional, secular and religious, industrialized and feudal, urban and rural, fragile and flexible, open and, at the same time, bureaucratic and hierarchically closed.

Each of these labels captures an important aspect of Indian society, but none can of itself do justice to India's new and complex role in the globalized world. Most explanations of the country's ambition to act (and be accepted) as a global player discuss these within a 'realist' international political framework, in which it is assumed that states are rational actors pursuing their own interests and putting considerations of security, power, and influence above all else.¹⁰ Economic growth has indeed meant that 'India had the resources for a significant modernization of its armed forces and the development of a range of instruments to convert its growing capabilities into influence' (Mohan 2012: 27); but Indian foreign policy, its history and underlying ideology, are much more diverse and multi-faceted than this suggests. To understand India's global aspirations—which contrast so starkly with the enormous difficulties it faces at home and beyond its borders—it is necessary to look deeper than the phenomenal economic growth of the last two decades and the ambitious military posture the country has adopted (Balachandran 2012).¹¹

1.2 The Economy: Growth, Poverty, and Inequality


The Indian economy has experienced a phenomenal growth since the start of economic liberalization in the early 1990s and India is now one of the fastest-growing economies in the world. Before this, growth rates had hovered at around 4 per cent, with periodic dips below population-growth, prompting the renowned Indian economist Raj Krishna to coin the term 'the Hindu rate of growth'.¹² Figure 1 shows how, in the years before the financial crisis, growth rates, measured in overall GDP, reached levels of almost 10 per cent. When the financial crisis broke in 2008–9 and growth rates slowed down, the Indian government responded with strong fiscal and monetary stimuli, which brought GDP growth rates back up to about 9 per cent in the period 2009–11. However, this policy also had an impact on inflation, and the Reserve Bank of India reacted by raising interest rates. Investment slowed and, as Figure 1 indicates, growth rates fell substantially over the following two years and were expected to drop to only 5 per cent by 2012–13.

⁹ Heinemann-Grüder (2011) uses this term in the title of his chapter on Indian federalism (pp. 71–150).

¹⁰ On this, see my analysis elsewhere (Wulf 2013a).

¹¹ For the last few years, India has been the world's largest importer of arms. Over the past decade, it imported roughly 10 per cent of all the major weapons traded (SIPRI data bank, http://armstrade.sipri.org/armstrade/html/export_toplist.php).

¹² By which he means the inability of the Indian economy to grow at more than a modest 3 per cent per annum.

Figure 1. Annual GDP growth rates (overall GDP real, % change)

Note Annual growth rates for Five Year Plans up to 1997–2002, thereafter annually. Five Year Plans were not in place in the periods 1966–1969, 1979–1980, or 1990–1992.

Source Government of India, *Economic Survey 2012–13*, Annex 4.

What were the effects of the economic boom on poverty and income-distribution in India? The slogan *garibi hatao*—‘Eradicate poverty’—was coined by former Prime Minister Indira Gandhi during the 1970s election campaign, long before the UN rallied to formulate the Millennium Development Goals (Wankhede 2012: 40). And yet, despite the faith in economic growth and modernity, large sections of the population remain poor. Neither the original economic concept of state-sponsored industrialization that prevailed during the first four decades after independence, nor the liberalization of the economy that has taken place over the last two, has come close to eliminating inequalities or eradicating poverty.

Economic growth has undoubtedly improved the lot of a number of poor people, but the reduction in poverty and income-inequality has fallen far short of declared political goals. According to a 2012 report of the Government Planning Commission, the all-India poverty ratio, despite declining by 7.3 per cent in the five years under review, still stood at 29.8 per cent of the population in 2009–10. The figure for rural poverty, though said to have dropped by 8 per cent, remained at a substantial 33.8 per cent (Government of India, Planning Commission, 2012a). ‘What is really startling’, conclude Drèze and Sen (2013: 190), ‘is not so much that the official poverty line is so low, but that *even with this low benchmark*, so many people are below it.’ Depending on the criteria applied, these ratios can work out much higher: in 2010–11, 68.7 per cent of the population fell within the World Bank’s ‘head count ratio’ (HCR) of \$2 a day (PPP).¹³ Taken together, the statistics from the World Bank and the Planning Commission indicate that a minimum of 350 million and possibly over 825 million of the total population of 1.2 billion Indians are still living below the poverty line. Gangopadhyay and Singh (2013) have

¹³ [http://search.worldbank.org/all?qterm=poverty+line+india&title=&filetype=.](http://search.worldbank.org/all?qterm=poverty+line+india&title=&filetype=)

analysed various methods of gathering poverty statistics and confirm that most studies indicate levels of poverty higher than those reported by the Planning Commission.

The number of people living in poverty in India continues to be the highest of any country in the world. This is reflected, in wider regional terms, in the 'Nonalignment 2.0' report, which sets out basic principles for Indian foreign and strategic policy over the next decade, and whose authors come to the sobering conclusion that: 'South Asia is home to the largest number of poor people in the world' (Khilnani et al. 2012: 6). Poverty figures for India are highly contested and there has been intense debate about what is actually being measured here. Some authors claim that, despite the abundance of statistics and studies, there is still no agreement on such basic issues as how many poor are out there and which way the trends are moving (Vakulabharanam and Motiram 2012: 44). Prompted by the continuing contention, the Planning Commission set up an expert group—the Tendulkar Committee, named after its chairman—which suggested a change of methodology (Government of India, Planning Commission, 2009). However, the Committee's suggestions were themselves criticized, with some commentators claiming that recorded reductions in poverty-rates were due in part to the changes in methodology—changes such as lowering the daily calorie-intake used as a measure. In a biting critique, Usha Patnaik (2010) writes: 'Anyone can do away with poverty on paper simply by lowering the consumption standard against which poverty is measured.'

The poverty statistics also reveal inter-state variation, with Bihar (53.5 per cent) having the poorest record on poverty levels, and urban centres like Delhi (14.2 per cent) and the better developed states like Punjab (15.9 per cent), Haryana (20.1 per cent), and Gujerat (23 per cent) exceeding the all-India average by some margin.¹⁴ Inequalities also exist within states (Khilnani et al. 2012: 47, Wankhede 2012: 42). Social indicators vary widely, not only between states and, within states, between districts, but also between religious and social groups, with women suffering systematic disadvantage (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2012: 15).

Applying the head count ratio, the Planning Commission also points up variations in the degree to which certain groups are affected. In rural areas, it says, Scheduled Tribes have the highest HCR (47.4 per cent), followed by Scheduled Castes (42.3 per cent) and Other Backward Castes (31.9 per cent), as against 33.8 per cent for all classes. In urban areas, it is Scheduled Castes that have the highest HCR (34.1 per cent) followed by Scheduled Tribes (30.4 per cent) and Other Backward Castes (24.3 per cent), as against 20.9 per cent for all classes (Government of India, Planning Commission, 2012a). Again on the caste structure, Iyer, Khanna, and Varshney (2013: 53) conclude that: '[D]espite more than a decade of rapid nationwide economic growth, the share of [Scheduled Castes] and [Scheduled Tribes] in firm ownership and employment generation over the period 1990–2005 increased only very modestly.'

According to the Indian government's *Economic Survey* for 2012–13, annual per capita income (in real terms) increased from 14,330 Indian rupees (INR) in 1990–91,

¹⁴ Gangopadhyay and Singh (2013) confirm the Planning Commission data cited here and show how the reported poverty-levels fluctuate widely between states. Mundle et al. (2012: 49) argue that indices of good governance demonstrate 'a strong correlation between governance and development, as reflected in per capita income'.

at the start of economic liberalization, to 33,901 INR—or the equivalent of US \$1.70 per day at current exchange-rates—in 2009–10 (Government of India 2012: Statistical Appendix). This rising trend in average per capita income gives no indication of the way in which the income is distributed. Inequalities here seem to be on the increase. In the case of urban India, the Gini index (indicating the degree of deviation from equal income-distribution) shows an increase ‘from 34.4% in 1993–4 to 37.6% in 2004–5, and then to 39.3% in 2009–10. ... In fact, the urban elite, constituting about 10–15% of the total population in the country, has monopolised almost the entire relative gains after the economic reforms’ (Vakulabharanam and Motiram 2012: 46). This demonstrates clearly the urban–rural divide. In sum, economic reform has exacerbated income-inequality and has primarily benefited India’s urban elite, indicating growth that is skewed and unequal. Compared with the other BRICS states, however, India is the best-performing country when it comes to income-equality. All the rest have higher Gini coefficients: Russia comes in at 40 per cent, China at 48 per cent, Brazil at 51.9 per cent, and South Africa at 65 per cent (Central Intelligence Agency, figures for 2009).

Whereas the data on poverty-reduction is contested, the results of quantitative studies on income-distribution are much more cogent and differentiated, documenting inequalities at various levels—between urban and rural areas and, within urban areas themselves, between the elite and the workers (Vakulabharanam and Motiram 2012: 50). The government’s own statistics on poverty confirm these findings. The Planning Commission states that ‘[n]early 50% of agricultural labourers and 40% of other labourers are below the poverty line in rural areas, whereas in urban areas, the poverty ratio for casual labourers is 47.1%’. And referring to religious groups, it reports that ‘Sikhs have the lowest HCR in rural areas (11.9%) whereas in urban areas, Christians have the lowest proportion (12.9%) of poor [and in] urban areas [the] poverty ratio at [the] all India level is highest for Muslims (33.9%)’ (Government of India, Planning Commission 2012a).

India has clearly not been so adept at translating its high rates of economic growth into reduced rates of poverty and an improvement in the lives of the disadvantaged sections of society. In fact the gap between the poor and the better-off has widened. All these dry economic statistics find concrete expression in the state of human development in India. Although India’s ranking in the Human Development Index (HDI) has improved over the last two decades, it still languishes at the bottom of the ‘medium development’ group. The 2013 *Human Development Report* lists India 136th out of a total of 186 countries (United Nations Development Program 2013)—scarcely a cause for pride, given India’s global ambitions. Clearly, there is a glaring gap here between ambition and action.

In theory, the liberal market economy resolves disparities and opens up opportunities for economic gain. What happens in practice in India is that chronic poverty remains entrenched along caste and class lines—with the growing middle class often being described as a new caste.¹⁵ In terms of the structure and future of the caste system, economic growth and modernization constitute a double-edged sword. Some members of the urban middle classes give the impression that castes no longer exist. However, ‘those displaced from traditional occupations rarely find a new one and are reduced to being landless, daily-wage laborers, tilling the fields of the upper castes and constructing the buildings of the new India’ (Vij 2012: 2).

¹⁵ ‘Power Shifts’ (2012), *Economist*, 29 September, www.economist.com/node/21563423/print.

Given the traditional ties between the caste one is born into and the occupation one can follow, the caste system is clearly a potential obstacle on the economic path which Indian society has elected follow. At the same time, modernization and economic growth can help improve the lives of individuals from the poorer sections of society: urbanization, democratization, and increased levels of literacy, are slowly changing the rigid caste-system (Jürgenmeyer and Rösel 2009: 26) and economic liberalization has created at least some opportunities for upward mobility (Brosius 2009: 220).

India's economic rise has yet to be translated into concrete benefits for the poor on a mass scale: disparities in income, education, health-care, and general opportunities remain immense. The continuing incidence of starvation and malnutrition, high rates of illiteracy, and the growing number of suicides among highly indebted farmers, are expressions of a gross imbalance in economic growth. These disparities are not simply going to disappear and there is no adequate welfare-system to offset them. Although the level of food-security in India is much higher than in the early decades after independence, and the country is now able to feed itself, economic growth has not yet translated into 'inclusive growth' (Baru 2013: 39).

1.3 Security challenges at home

India faces a number of security concerns in its immediate neighbourhood: South Asia is a region that abounds in conflict and several of India's neighbours are regarded as failed states. Amongst the problems afflicting the country in this connection are: its long-standing dispute and stagnating political relations with Pakistan; delicate relations with a number of smaller neighbouring countries; and various disputes over Indian diasporas, the sharing of river water, and national borders. In addition, there are, of course, a number of unresolved issues with China—territorial claims, for example, and China's invasion of Tibet. Relations between the two countries are competitive.¹⁶ One major challenge for the Indian government in the immediate neighbourhood will be the political and security situation in Afghanistan following the withdrawal of the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (Pattanaik 2012). The potential for conflict in the area calls for significant economic and political investment on the part of India.


But India's security concerns do not lie solely abroad. There are pressing challenges at home, in the shape of Naxalite (Maoist-inspired) insurgency, Islamist extremism and terror—partly linked to Pakistan, and ethnically and religiously based political fundamentalism and militancy (Kumar and Kumar 2010: 17). The reasons for this internal unrest are manifold. They include: the failure of the state to provide basic services; state abuse of human rights and brutal suppression of unrest; and the nature of the counter-strategies employed by the state to address contentious issues (Khilnani et al. 2012: 43–9). Some of the threats to India's security stem from the conflicting political and economic developments within society, which have created the 'two Indias' of rich and poor, developed and underdeveloped. These act as de-stabilizers, producing enormous friction and

¹⁶ On these issues, see my comments elsewhere (Wulf 2013b).

triggering resistance and conflict (Sahni 2012: 2). The South Asia Conflict Map on the Institute for Conflict Management’s South Asia Terrorism Portal shows the extent of the various conflicts in 2011 and the large number of Indian states affected.

In the government’s view, the most serious internal threat facing the nation is Naxalite insurgency and the violence that accompanies it:¹⁷ Naxalites are active in as many as 150 districts across a vast tract of the country from Nagaland, Assam, and West Bengal in the north-east to Andhra Pradesh and Tamil Nadu in the south. The movement takes its name from the village of Naxalbari in West Bengal, the scene of a peasant revolt in 1967. Naxalites oppose the Indian constitution and seek to overthrow the government by force. Their followers agitate for greater economic and political rights for *dalits*. In response to the unrest, government at national and state level has proclaimed a twin strategy of ‘development and police action’ (Chadha 2012: 98). In reality, however, action on development has been slow whilst centrally led police efforts to roll back Naxalite influence have intensified, with substantial police and military resources being expended to keep the unrest in check.

Figure 2. Conflict in India



Source: <http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/database/conflictmapindia2011.htm>

¹⁷ Chadha 2012: 93, quoting a 2006 speech by the Prime Minister.

Terrorist attacks by Muslim-inspired groups are nothing new to India. Acts of this kind have been a frequent occurrence in Jammu/Kashmir, supported in many cases from within Pakistan but recently also from within India. In the past, most of these attacks were directed against the Indian authorities, particularly the security forces, but the focus has now shifted to areas beyond Jammu/Kashmir, and the actions have become part of the notion of global *jihad*. The attack on Mumbai in November 2008—when a variety of Islamist groups, some based in India, engineered a series of terror attacks—marked the culmination of two decades of Islamist terror in India. The government and security forces are still trying to establish the causes of Indian-based terrorism of this kind, and to develop strategies to counter it (Kalyanaraman 2012).

Although the number of fatalities due to terrorist violence has steadily decreased—from a peak of 4,507 in 2001 to 1,116 in 2006 and 117 in 2012¹⁸—the Mumbai attack in particular created ‘an atmosphere of insecurity in the country, particularly among its vocal urban middle classes, who abruptly saw themselves at great risk’ (Sahni 2012: 13).

On the right of the political spectrum, religious fundamentalists, working within the democratic process, seek the establishment of a Hindu theocracy in India. The BJP and a number of its sister organizations take a chauvinist Hindu stance and oppose the modern, secular, multicultural model of society. This policy has its roots in colonial times. The Indian National Congress, established in 1885, pursued a notion of India based on territory. The alternative was a model based on culture and religion, in which the Indian people were seen as defined by two opposing group-identities: Muslim and Hindu. It was this latter notion that lay behind the foundation of the radical Hindu Mahasabha and Rashtriya Swayam-sevak Sangh (RSS) groupings in the early twentieth century. Originally, neither Muslims nor Hindus viewed themselves as homogeneous groups. It was the British who introduced simplifications of this kind—for administrative purposes and as part of the notorious policy of ‘divide and rule’ (Wolf and Schultens 2009: 165–6).

The ascent of the BJP, created in 1980 out of the fragments of the former Bharatiya Jan Sangh party, has been one of the most significant political developments to have occurred in modern India. Between 1951 and 1999, the party increased the number of its seats in parliament from 3 to 182 and its share of the overall vote from 3.1 per cent to 23.8 per cent (Wolf and Schultens 2009: 167). Under the umbrella of *sangh parivar* (‘family’), Hindu nationalists and fundamentalists have pursued a two-fold strategy, creating a network of parliamentary and extra-parliamentary organizations committed to the *Hindutva* ideology (political or nationalist Hinduism), which envisages India as a great and militarily powerful nation (Kundu 2004: 8). At the heart of this extensive and diverse network is a ‘triumvirate’ comprising: 1. the RSS, a hierarchical right-wing paramilitary volunteer cadre organization that forms the ideological backbone of the movement; 2. the Vishwa Hindu Parishad, a religious organization; and 3. the BJP, providing the political/parliamentary representation (Wolf and Schultens

¹⁸ ‘Fatalities in Terrorist Violence 1988–2012’, Institute for Conflict Management South Asia Terrorism Portal, http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/states/jandk/data_sheets/annual_casualties.htm. Of a total of more than 43,300 fatalities between 1988 and early 2013, over 14,600 are listed as civilians, over 6,000 as security-forces personnel, and over 22,600 as terrorists.

2009: 166) but also receiving support from its militant sister-organizations. Even before the BJP came to power, the rise of political Hinduism had become a major factor in Muslim–Hindu religious conflict (Malone 2011: 52). According to Upadhyay and Robinson (2012: 43), ‘the Sangh parivar and its political branch, the BJP, have been responsible for creating a fanatic political atmosphere since the 1980s’.

One of the many conflicts in this area occurred in 1992 and involved the destruction of a mosque by a violent mob of over 150,000 right-wing Hindu nationalists called to action by the Sangh parivar. The mosque, in the city of Ayodhya, had allegedly been built on the foundations of a Hindu temple which Hindus believed to be the birthplace of Lord Sri Rama. The riots that followed this event—not only in India but also in Pakistan and Bangladesh—claimed the lives of several thousand people (Wolf and Schultens 2009: 168).

In his major work *Defending India*, Jaswant Singh, one of the strategists of the BJP-led National Democratic Alliance government, formerly a captain in the Indian Army, one-time Deputy Chairman of the Planning Commission, and later Minister of Defence and Minister of Finance, complained that previous policies had resulted in the neglect of a number of important aspects of Indian security: ‘What, therefore,’ he asks, ‘has been the lasting legacy of the past 50 years? An absence of certainties in security-related issues; no established land boundaries; an absence of a secure geopolitical environment; a devaluation of India’s voice in global affairs and worrisomely, not even a beginning of any institutional framework for conceptualizing and managing the country’s defence’ (Singh 1999: 268, quoted by Kundu 2004: 8).

The BJP continues to be a major national party and remains an influential factor in national politics. As Ganguly (2014) points out, the Hindu Right ‘has yet to abandon its supremacist ideology’ and the religious dissension may flare up and turn violent. Galvanized by the chauvinist policies of the Hindus, says Ganguly, ‘small numbers of Muslims have also become increasingly radicalized.’

Separatism and insurgency, terrorist attack, fundamentalist ethnocentric Hindu anti-secularism—these diverse threats to India’s security have not led to the break-up of the country or to generalized violence. On the contrary, the social and political fabric has proved highly resilient. Nonetheless, these threats to the nation’s security and cohesion are real. Part of the problem has been the authorities’ lack of consistency in handling the problems. As Sahni (2012: 2) puts it: ‘The state’s responses to existing and emerging challenges of internal security have been marked by a high measure of incoherence, structural infirmities, and a growing crisis of capacities.’

2 Socio-cultural Explanations: Disorderly but Resilient Structures

It is widely accepted that a country's foreign policy is strongly influenced by domestic factors. Given the close intermeshing of the domestic and international environments, decision-makers formulating and implementing foreign policy must consider the pressures, challenges, and opportunities that exist at home.

Western observers long doubted India's ability to create a nation state and establish democracy. The country's sheer size, diversity, and heterogeneity, and its split from Pakistan, confronted its founders with enormous problems. Their goal was to create a just society free from structural obstacles such as castes, communalism, religious strife, feudalism, and capitalist exploitation. The constitution adopted by independent India—a document based largely on the British parliament's 1935 Government of India Act—is democratic, plural, federal, and republican. Still much treasured by the people of India, it emphasizes values such as freedom and liberty, social justice and equality. These are modern, universal norms.

Independent India's founding generation wanted the country's foreign policy to be based on moral principles. Peace and total nuclear disarmament, dissolution of the military blocs, solidarity amongst developing countries, and good neighbourly relations with other nations were key components of their foreign-policy vision. However, many of the admirable aspirations in this area—and also in the domestic social and economic sphere—were soon dashed, and successive Indian governments found themselves slipping down from the moral high ground into communal unrest, armed conflict with neighbours, deteriorating governance, and frustrated ambition on the global stage. There were periods when government policy was out of touch with the demands of the time and the interests of the people. Those times appear to be past and, bolstered by two decades of economic growth, India seems to have regained its self-assertiveness. Today, India is 'an example of successful nation-building in an extremely fractionalized society' (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2012: 5). Pragmatism rather than moral principle is now the watchword of Indian foreign policy, and in its dealings regionally and globally it now prioritizes national interest and what it terms 'strategic autonomy'.¹⁹

The roots of India's newly discovered self-esteem and confidence go deeper than its impressive economic growth-rates. To understand what motivates India's new, explicitly globally oriented foreign policy and its diplomatic efforts at transcultural cooperation and external engagement after decades of insularity, we need to be aware of the political, social, cultural, and economic background, and of the history of Indian society. In what follows here, I explore three facets of Indian society that contribute to, and help shape, the country's new-found buoyancy in foreign policy. The first is its capacity to integrate tradition and modernity and produce resilient institutions. The second is its amorphous nature, which endows it with a peculiar ability to improvise despite an inclination to vagueness. And the third is the competition and cooperation between political actors at national and federal level,

¹⁹ For a discussion of this term, and the foreign-policy ideas underlying it, see Debiel and Wulf (2013), where the topic is addressed from the point of view of cooperation within BRICS.

which has led to the emergence of a functioning federal system, complete with checks and balances, and which also generates the partly contradictory forces that shape relations between central and state governments.

2.1 Hybridization: Merging Tradition and Modernity—Yoga and Wi-Fi²⁰

Despite mass poverty, a poor outlook for democracy, and a frequently articulated expectation of failure, the Indian Union and the nation state have survived, and most near-to-medium-term scenarios see India as a rising power.

To the uninformed observer, Indian politics, though recognizably democratic in its processes and institutions, appears strange and sometimes archaic. The uniqueness of the country's approach to policy-making is something the country's elite are fond of pointing out. What initially appears familiar may turn out to be surprisingly other (Bilgin 2008). This state of affairs results from Indian society's capacity—exercised over centuries—to integrate foreign influences into existing structures. The rules and regulations underlying Indian politics interweave modern and traditional strands of what is a highly complex society. The political elite—and also the upper echelons of the cultural and business worlds—have blended well-established social traditions with modern institutions inherited from the British (Mitra 2012). Politicians play an important role as arbiters in resolving the tensions between traditionally oriented society and modern state institutions. The state is not just an agent of liberalism and an enforcer of norms; politicians and political parties are also 'partisan defender[s] of the traditional, marginal and patrimonial' (Mitra 2012: 136).

The political elite have shaped a system whose institutions, to the surprise of many Western observers, have proved extraordinarily resilient (Guha 2012: 6). Despite sometimes appearing dysfunctional to the Western eye, these institutions have withstood the pressures of widespread personal greed, bribery, nepotism, and corruption.²¹ Clientelism, patrimonial networks, and vote-rigging are expressions of a deeply ingrained pattern of group privileges in Indian society. Despite this endemic malpractice amongst politicians and civil servants, democracy is alive and well and enjoying continued popularity: most citizens turn out for democratic elections, and the image of India as a multicultural, secular society is one that is fostered and celebrated (Banerji 2012: 45).

Although British colonialism was extremely influential in shaping the Indian paradigm and Indian political institutions, the Indian approach has important roots elsewhere too—roots that continue to be of relevance today. One such is the treatise on statecraft entitled the *Arthashastra*, written by Kautilya nearly two and half millennia ago. Indians often compare it to Machiavelli's *The Prince*. It 'distilled all of traditional Indian thought on the question of good governance, maintained that it was essential for the king to have coercive authority (Danda), and elaborated

²⁰ The ideas in this section were inspired by Mitra (2012).

²¹ For examples of corruption, see 'Power Shifts' (2012), *Economist*, 29 September, www.economist.com/node/21563423/print. Indian newspapers report widely on the activities of corrupt politicians and bureaucrats—e.g. the 'Coalgate' scandal (Vaishnav 2012). In Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index, India ranks 94th out of a total of 177 countries (<http://cpi.transparency.org/cpi2013/results/>).

in great detail on how this was to be established with the help of the army, police, and secret service. But it also stated that the god king had to devote himself to the interests of the people, and that Danda had to be exercised not arbitrarily but in accordance with laws codified to ensure fairness, and promote governance for the common good (Dharma)' (Mundle et al. 2012: 42). Exploring the ideas of state influence and state interests, Kautilya sanctioned the use of force for the purposes of establishing political order and is therefore 'often evoked as an ancient precursor of contemporary realism' (Shahi 2013: 51). In the terminology of current, Western-dominated, International Relations, Kautilya's approach can be classified as 'rationalist', in the sense of states acting in their own interest.

Contrasting with this political outlook is Mahatma Gandhi's concept of *satyagraha* or non-violent resistance. Sometimes described as a conservative, Gandhi did indeed criticize certain strands of modernity but was by no means hostile to scientific progress and enlightenment. And there were some traditional aspects of Indian society with which he disagreed—the treatment of women, for example, or the caste system and untouchability. Gandhi 'sought to assimilate the best of tradition and modernity' (Prabhu 2012: 139). *Satyagraha* as taught by Gandhi drew on traditional practices to defeat modern British institutions such as the colonial administration and the colonial armed forces.

This mixing and merging of culturally specific strands in society, the conflation of tradition and modernity, is not a new phenomenon in India. Hybridization of this kind did not begin with recent economic modernization, nor with the introduction of (Soviet-style) socialist economic planning in the early years of Indian independence. Mitra (2012: 140) argues that the fusion of art, architecture, culture, and politics—between Islam, Hinduism, Jainism, and Buddhism—was a feature of life under the Great Mughals, from the 16th to the 18th centuries, following their advance into India from Persia. Indian society was able to integrate Mughal rule into its way of life without relinquishing its own identity. The British colonialists, masters in 'divide and rule', exploited traditional symbols and processes but also introduced new institutions.²² The combined action of British colonial rule and Indian resistance to it engendered hybrid institutions founded on 'traditional norms in modern garb' (Mitra 2012: 139). Thus we find distinctively Indian political instruments—hunger strikes, *gherao* (the encirclement of politicians), *dharna* (sitting and fasting on the doorstep of an offender until a demand is granted)—being used alongside modern methods such as election campaigns, parliamentary debates, lobbying, and judicial rulings.

Unlike the Western mind-set, the Hindu way of thinking tolerates difference, contrast, and contradiction. It does not demand 'the suppression of difference' (Tickner 2003: 304) and does not feel socialism's urge to pursue egalitarianism. This, in short, is the reason for the continued existence of Hinduism's inequitable hierarchical caste-system, with its stress on difference rather than on social equality and classlessness. On the other hand, the need to overcome inequality and discrimination has been a major concern since the time of independence. The Indian constitution—dubbed 'idealized rhetoric' by Wankhede (2012: 39)—is inclusive in its aspirations, and the Indian democratic process, though far from perfect, allows room for the expression of political discontent. The constitution

²² Dalrymple (2003) argues that in the early period of colonization, Indian society left more of a mark on the British colonists than they did on it.

'envisages a society based on the ethical values of individual freedom, socio-economic liberties and communal harmony' (ibid.). At the same time, diversity is one of the assets of Indian society: '[I]nstead of deploring our lack of homogeneity', writes historian Dharma Kumar, 'we should glory in it. Instead of regarding India as a failed or deformed nation-state, we should see it as a new political form, perhaps even as a forerunner of the future' (quoted by Guha, 2012: 15). Considerations such as these are becoming increasingly important in present-day political processes: 'Parties that exploit narrow caste mobilization find it necessary to progressively widen their caste base' (Sahni 2012: 23). It seems minority consciousness is a new phenomenon (Upadhyay and Robinson 2012: 44).

The product of these complex socio-political processes is a series of enduring and resilient institutions—long-established but open to change. It is this 'indigenous evolution and resilience of the political and social system', the 'cutting edge of the process of self-assertion of Indian society' (Mitra 2012: 141), that affords the country scope for action in foreign affairs. A set of vital hybrid institutions and a series of political rules and regulations that do their job (though not always effectively) is what has ultimately emerged from the interplay of complex and sometimes contradictory elements such as anti-colonialism, independence, nation-building, economic experimentation (from Soviet-style planning to neo-liberal deregulation), democratic processes and governance (alongside rampant corruption), economic upturn (in which high-tech industry flourishes alongside feudal agricultural structures), and social difference and divergence (contrasting with constitutional norms and largely rhetorical policies). India is a partly third-world society with partly first-world institutions (Mitra 2012: 137).

Indian society and its structures and institutions are both fragmented and integrative. They may appear dysfunctional from a global perspective, but they are robust and resilient. The 'yoga and wi-fi' image is meant as an expression, not of contradiction but of a capacity to integrate apparent opposites into a workable, if not always very effective, social, political, and economic process.

2.2 Amorphous Practices: Rhetoric and Improvisation

Not only does India have a polymorphous and diverse society (Heinemann-Grüder 2011); its mode of operation, political and practical, is often nebulous, unstructured, and amorphous. Indians themselves often remark how skilled they are at planning and how ineffective at implementation. Writing about 'The India Model' and the reasons for many of its failings, the author and political commentator Gucharan Das remarks that 'a mundane inability to implement policy—reflecting a bias for thought and against action—may have been even more damaging [than the underlying ideology]'. Improvisation is more highly developed than implementation—indeed, it has become something of an art, and muddling through is the preferred conceptual approach. Nevertheless, Indian institutions do somehow manage to work.²³ In the words of Khilnani and company: '[A]s much as formal guarantees embodied in the constitution and in legislation, it is informal

²³ In his study *Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance*, Douglas North asks: 'Why do institutions work in South Asia, sometimes?' (quoted in Mitra 2012: 154).

mechanisms of working together' that render the political system functional (2012: 45).

The fluid and amorphous character of Indian society is also reflected in the way the state and economy are run. Land reform is a typical example. It has been on the agenda since independence and its stated purpose is to do away with the feudal structures that continue to dominate agriculture. Up to now, however, what it has delivered is mostly rhetoric and it has '[made] little headway in terms of actual implementation [concentrating instead] on direct poverty reduction measures (food programs) to do something about poverty and not to antagonize the land lords' (Mitra 2012: 142). One such programme is the National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (NREGA).²⁴ This scheme, and others like it, are intended to help safeguard the livelihoods of the rural population, but the reality is that the majority of India's rural inhabitants have benefited very little from economic liberalization.

Indian politicians and economic planners incline towards the 'third' or 'middle' way, as reflected in the policy of non-alignment, which allowed them to avoid commitment to either of the opposing blocs. Economically, the founding fathers of the Indian Union felt that the country should steer a course between socialism and capitalism, and the now long-established 'Five Year Plan' and its overseer, the Planning Commission, originally combined features of Soviet-style planning with capitalist, private-sector methods. Although the model of industrialization in operation in India has undergone a complete transformation—away from planning and import substitution towards neo-liberal deregulation—the concept of the Five Year Plan has survived and continues to guide Indian economic policy: the Twelfth Five Year Plan, covering the period 2012 to 2017, is now under way. In 1994, when the government was beginning to engage with economic liberalization and was seeking to attract foreign capital to India, it took part for the first time in the World Economic Forum in Davos. Asked about the government's new strategy, Prime Minister Rao 'answered in generalities [a]nd rather than focusing on India's new welcoming attitude to private capital, [he] and Commerce Minister Pranab Mukherjee highlighted India's vague "middle way"' (Kale 2009: 58).

Vagueness and inertia also characterize India's bureaucracy. As the *Economist* put it in its 2012 special report on India: 'The core of the internal problems is often summed up as "governance". That means, first, politicians (*netas*) who do not rule [and second] *babus*, bureaucrats working in an ossified system bequeathed by Britain. Their dead hand explains much of what does not happen day-to-day. The "licence raj" of old may have gone, but much too much of the commanding heights of the economy are still run—or rather, held back—by officials. . . . *Babus* have been a problem since Mughal days, but things have got worse . . . "No civil servant is remotely interested in pushing something along. There are three years' worth of pipeline projects stuck," lamented a senior planning official earlier this year.'²⁵ Such a bureaucracy is clearly a hindrance to economic development. Sibal (2012: 17) concludes that increased liberalization 'will simply perpetuate corruption and further inequality' if the government does nothing to enhance its regulatory capacities. The signs of economic progress are evident in general growth, but the omnipresent bureaucracy, at odds with the neo-liberal economic model, and the

²⁴ <http://nrega.nic.in/netnrega/home.aspx>.

²⁵ Adam Roberts (2012), 'Aim Higher', *Economist*, 29 September, <http://www.economist.com/node/21563414>.

elite's inertia in regard to empowerment of the poor hinder the implementation of effective poverty-reduction policies.

The administration is over-bureaucratized and politics is increasingly dominated by nepotism, corruption (Banerjee 2012: 46), and criminal practices. According to Sanchez (2012: 51): 'In the current Indian parliament, of the 543 elected representatives of the lower house, 158 (29 per cent) are currently charged with a criminal offence.' The distinguished constitutional lawyer Nani Palkhival (1998) gave it as his 'firm conviction' that 'it is not the Constitution which has failed the people but it is our chosen representatives who have failed the Constitution'. Sagar (2009: 812) makes an interesting socio-cultural comment here. Although India's political elite express admiration for systems of regulation, he says, they 'lazily circumvent the norms advocated by the very same systems [and in this] their behaviour is akin to that of ordinary Indians who bemoan the chaos of India's streets, even as they ignore traffic signals themselves'.

This gap between planning and implementation is not a new phenomenon. It is a recurrent feature of Indian politics. 'The socialist dream of the Nehruvian era was high on optimism but failed to fulfil and satisfy the hopes and expectations of ordinary people. State institutions do advocate people-centric development but the control and interest of the dominant classes and castes hardly allowed it to happen' (Wankhede 2012: 40). The BJP-led government of the Hindu nationalists has engaged in the same kind of bluster: its fulsome rhetoric about illegal immigration from Bangladesh was followed by the erection of a highly symbolic but ineffective security-fence along the border (Sagar 2009: 810).

The Indian state system abounds with obstacles to decision-making and incentives to deferment. This is all part of a long tradition of passivity and reactivity. As Sagar (2009: 812) observes: '[T]here is an undeniable sense in which the operative mentality in general has been that of *jugaad*, a colloquial Indian term that roughly translates as "quick fix" or "work-around". This mentality can be traced to India's uneven encounter with modernity: the forms and institutions have been imported or grafted on, but the spirit of modernity, an innate appreciation of rational thinking, has not taken root.' As pointed out previously, new institutions have been conflated with existing, traditional structures. This is one of the elements that gives Indian society its strength, but it is also an impediment to an economy seeking to compete on the global market. Performance differentials become evident and the 'licence Raj' mentality suppresses creative energy (Guha 2012: 10).

Addressing the adverse consequences of its failings in governance represents a major challenge for India, not only in terms of its future economic development but also from the point of view of foreign policy. High rates of economic growth cannot of themselves guarantee an enhanced global role. The conclusion which Dahiya and Behuria (2012: 220) draw in regard to India's role in the region has wider application. They attribute India's failure to deliver on high-level promises to a 'sorry state of coordination within the country'. To establish its credibility, they say, India will need to 'improve its project management skills, coordination mechanisms, and delivery capabilities'. Having said all this, it should be emphasized that, however inconsistent these practices may appear from the outside, they are not necessarily perceived as such within India itself.

2.3 Functioning Political Institutions: Federalism and Centralism in Balance

2.3.1 *Keeping the Union, Building a Nation State*

Separatism and national break-up are threats which India has faced since pre-independence times. Even with the departure of Pakistan, there was no let-up in the quest for autonomy and separation: aspirations to cultural and linguistic homogeneity and economic autonomy have caused a series of old states to disappear and new ones to be created within the Indian Union. All this, however, has not led to the 'balkanization' of India. Beck et al. (2010) identify three waves of state-formation, during which the overall number of states has increased from fourteen in the early period (1956 to 1966) to the 2013 tally of twenty-eight plus seven Union Territories.²⁶ Ronald Watts, an expert on federalism, regards the 'territorial social diversity and fragmentation' in India and elsewhere as a desirable characteristic but considers central powers important in resisting 'possible tendencies to balkanization'. Despite the serious threats of separation it has faced from regionally based parties and from both the Left and the Hindu nationalist Right, the country has remained one nation and is not likely either to break up or to become a Hindu state.

Even before independence, the Constituent Assembly had reached a general consensus that India should be built as a nation. On the moot point of centralism versus federalism, a 'healthy compromise' was ultimately arrived at, with the constitution describing India as a 'Union of States', 'implying that its unity is indestructible' (Singh and Misra 2012: 2).²⁷ A vigorous system of checks and balances was established, with countervailing forces operating between the centre and the regions (Mitra 2012: 138, Sahni 2012: 23).

The constitution prescribes various institutional arrangements for ensuring a balance of power between the centre and the federal states. One example is the post of state governor, authorized by central government and vested with extraordinary powers in times of crisis. Another is the Supreme Court, which 'enjoys considerable esteem and broad-based competence in the examination of constitutional correctness' (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2012: 8). In his analysis of federal conflict-management in India, Heinemann-Grüder (2012: 12) concludes that: 'In general, [India's] federal system proved to be adaptive, pragmatic and innovative; trust in the federal institutions is high.' 'Cooperative federalism' is the term used by Singh and Misra to describe the centre-state balance in India, and Mitra (2012: 49) sums up Indian federalism as 'very much a hybrid Indian creation, combining imported concepts of power-sharing with indigenous methods of consensus and accommodation'.

As prime minister and minister of foreign affairs, Nehru formulated Indian foreign policy virtually single-handedly. Those times are long gone, but foreign policy remains essentially a centrally directed affair. Despite minor encroachments by state governments on the power of central government, the conduct of foreign policy is still very much the preserve of the centre—or more precisely the privilege

²⁶ Approval was recently given for the division of Andhra Pradesh into two states.

²⁷ On the nation state and democracy, see Banerjee 2012.

of the executive, given that parliament plays only a marginal role in this area. As a complex, continent-wide democracy, India is often absorbed in its own internal politics and in the various disputes between its many political parties. With the exception of relations with China and Pakistan, foreign affairs rarely play a role in domestic politics or at the hustings (Ghosh 1994: 816). The outcomes of elections in the twenty-eight federal states and the autonomous regions are generally determined by domestic, provincial, or indeed local factors—but local factors, by contrast, can sometimes affect foreign-policy decisions.

Globalization is presenting India's finely tuned centre–state relations with additional challenges, including in regard to foreign policy. All over the world, social movements are contesting the legitimacy of the nation-state system of governance; non-state actors (from industry, trade, and finance) are pursuing their own business-interests abroad, usually with the consent and support of the governments in question; NGOs are acting as guardians of civil and minority rights; and ecological campaigners are forcing governments to take heed of their demands. India has been dubbed 'NGO capital of the world [hosting as it does] up to 100,000 different organizations and self-help associations' (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2012: 22). Over the past two decades, Indian foreign investments abroad have increased substantially, with flag often following trade.²⁸

Two further factors are currently calling the well-established centre–state balance into question. The first is the strong domestic tendency to emphasize local, regional, and cultural particularities, leading to federal-state engagement in international-relations issues. The second is the transformation of the centre–state power-equation that has resulted from globalization and the economic liberalization of the 1990s (Mazumdar 2011: 175). Both trends involve centrifugal as well as centripetal forces.

Economic issues are not the only motor here: linguistic and ethnic diversity as well as cultural and historical differences have given rise to questions on the role of central government.

2.3.2 Party Politics and Regional Self-assertion

The decade that followed the defeat of the Congress Party in the national elections of 1989 was a period of great political instability. It saw five national elections and six governments, some of them extremely short-lived. Instead of the single-party domination that had prevailed with the Congress Party under Nehru, there was a series of coalition governments, and regionally based or state-level parties emerged, often with regionally or caste-based programmes. The gains in popularity made by these groups usually came at the expense of support for nationally oriented parties (Mazumdar 2011: 172). The number of political parties

²⁸ The subject of NGO influence on foreign policy, and of the influence of Indian foreign trading and investment activity on government action, is not dealt with in detail here. In brief: though many of the Indian NGOs are poorly institutionalized and fragmented, there are a number who do manage to bend the government's ear. And on the matter of foreign trading and its influence, the endeavours of Indian private enterprise have resulted in an increase in diplomatic activity on the part of the government—e.g. in Africa and Latin America (Destradi and Küssner 2013).

has multiplied and their diversity and fragmentation reflect the heterogeneity of Indian society (Béteille 2013: 37).

The combination of multi-party fragmentation and the constant tension between centralizing forces and the push towards greater regional autonomy puts central government authority under strain. Regionally based parties are demanding greater independence from national government. Although certain groupings that operate largely at state level call themselves 'national', there are in fact only two parties with nation-wide reach: the Indian National Congress and the Bharatiya Janata Party.²⁹ In 2012, regional parties were in power in nine of the twenty-eight federal states. In the remaining nineteen states, it was the two national parties that formed the government, usually in coalition with smaller parties (Singh and Misra 2012: 5). 'States are the solution to India's policy dilemmas, but also the problem. When India's central government is unwilling or unable to take action on policy reform, its states are often heralded as the solution to gridlock or "policy paralysis" because Indian federalism gives the states considerable space for policy innovation' (Vaishnav 2012).

Many parties, including the Indian National Congress and the Communist Party, have spawned competing splinter-groups—a tendency that has become endemic in Indian politics and has led to frequent transfers of power at central and state level. Parliamentary 'floor-crossing' from government to opposition, often motivated by the promise of personal gain, has resulted in the de-stabilization of government. In situations such as this, party leaders become preoccupied with maintaining themselves in office and their capacity for decision-making on foreign affairs is severely hampered. Weak minority governments at national level have not usually shown themselves to be very proactive in foreign affairs (Mazumdar 2011: 172).

The internal dynamics of coalition governments have had a significant impact on a number of major foreign-policy matters. In line with their general anti-American stance and their belief in the need for continued non-alignment, India's various communist parties opposed the 2005/2008 nuclear deal between the United States and India. These parties formed part of the support for the Congress-led coalition headed by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh. Refusing to give in to the communist pressure, Singh was forced to marshal support from other parties in order to escape a vote of no confidence and be able to conclude the deal with the US government. 'The government's narrow escape', concludes Mazumdar (2011: 173), 'highlighted the risks associated with reorientation of foreign policy [against a background] of ideological differences.'

Overall, however, despite these ups and downs, coalition government has worked successfully at both national and federal level, and India's institutions, though marred by a number of serious flaws, have helped make the world's largest democracy a functional and vibrant one. In spite of these positive developments, and in contrast to the approach taken by certain Western democracies, the political elite has so far refrained from promoting India as a model for other countries. In its foreign relations, the Indian government has often sought to shift the spotlight

²⁹ The Communist Party of India (CPI) is recognized by the Election Commission (the body that oversees all electoral affairs in India) as a national party but actually underwent a split during the 1960s as a result of ideological differences, resulting in the establishment of the Communist Party of India (Marxist) or CPI(M). Communist influence varies widely from state to state.

away from issues relating to human rights and civil liberties and has avoided lecturing other governments on these matters. Instead, it has sought to cooperate even with governments (e.g. in Myanmar and Iran) that have at times been treated as outcasts by large sections of the international community (Sagar 2009: 804, Majumdar 2011).

2.3.3 The Expanding Role of the Federal States in Foreign Policy

State governments are becoming increasingly active in areas that are considered to come within the purview of central government. At the same time, the centre involves itself in activities that are actually part of the remit of the federal states. Clearly then, centre–state relations are changing. But the change is not unidirectional, to the sole advantage of either the centre or the state. Domestic political and economic forces seem to be pulling in opposite directions and it is not yet clear whether the end-result will be more decentralization or less. What does seem clear, however, is that if the present trends continue, central government will have to take greater account of the interests of the states when conducting foreign policy.

This is not an entirely new development. The state governments of Punjab and Jammu/Kashmir have always exerted influence on India's relations with Pakistan. And regional factors and state interests have played an important part in conflictual events such as the expulsion of the Portuguese from Goa in 1961, the separation of Bangladesh from Pakistan in 1971, and the struggle of the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka over the last twenty-five years.

The Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK), a regional party based in Tamil Nadu, has been an important ally in Congress-led national governments over many years. It has strongly influenced politics in Tamil Nadu itself and formerly campaigned for an independent Tamil homeland—a free 'Tamil Eelam'—of the kind fought for by the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka. In India, the Tamil Tigers were regarded as terrorists and the position of the central government, which sought a non-violent solution to the civil war in Sri Lanka, was complicated by coalition politics. In effect, the DMK, although loyal to the government, limited the latter's options in regard to policy on Sri Lanka (Mazumdar 2011: 173).

One area in particular in which states have become more proactive is that of cross-border affairs. The government of West Bengal, for example, negotiates with Bangladesh over water issues; Tamil Nadu is seeking to impose economic sanctions on Sri Lanka; and Jammu/Kashmir and Punjab have made it clear they wish to be involved in central government negotiations with Pakistan over water (Singh and Misra 2012: 1).

During the present legislative period, there have been a number of examples of regional parties influencing or reversing important foreign-policy decisions taken by the coalition government in Delhi (Maihack and Plagemann 2013). Because neither of the two national parties was able to form a government without support from regional parties, foreign policy is now increasingly having to take local, state, and regional demands into consideration in order to keep coalition partners happy.

Economic issues also exert push and pull influences on centre–state relations and it is not clear whether the end-result will be greater centralization or greater

federalization. Even at a time of economic liberalization and extraordinary economic growth, dichotomous relationships persist—not just between rich and poor but also between more developed states (such as Punjab, Maharashtra, Karnataka, and Kerala) and their less well developed counterparts (Orissa, Bihar, and Uttar Pradesh, for example). This has fuelled the desire of some states for greater fiscal autonomy.

State governments have initiated negotiations with foreign investors—and indeed with international financial institutions such as the World Bank (Kirk 2011). With the consent of central government, the World Bank now concentrates its efforts on less developed states like Bihar and Uttar Pradesh rather than on the centre—though it has on occasion also interacted directly with better-developed states such as Karnataka and Tamil Nadu (Biswas 2012: 135). At the same time, in a bid to protect their domestic industries, state governments actively oppose foreign direct investment (Singh and Misra 2012: 1, Ganguly 2012).

Contrary economic tensions are also evident in other areas. Whilst state governments insist on the principle of subsidiarity and call for greater fiscal powers, authority continues to rest first and foremost with the federal state. At the same time, central government involves itself in social programmes which it is the federal states' privilege and duty to carry out. Although responsibility for the social sector (education, health, welfare, etc.) lies with the federal authorities, central government's share of total spending in this area is greater than that of the states (Rath 2013: 70). In some sectors, state governments are gaining greater powers; in others, central government is encroaching on their competencies.

Conclusion

Indian society is a mixture of traditionalism and modernism, of old Bharat³⁰ and new republic. As a result, the question of whether India's social structures and political institutions are robust enough to allow it to assume a global role is not one that can be answered unambivalently.

Despite major economic reforms and the elimination of outdated and debilitating practices, India still faces numerous problems at home, particularly in regard to social and economic inequality. Its greatest challenge is to improve the lives of the many millions of its people currently living in appalling poverty. The persistent divisions along caste lines will continue to constitute a major obstacle to development. Thanks to regionally and socially oriented party politics, *dalits* have increasingly been integrated into the political elite, and the lower castes in general have become more politically empowered (Teltumbde 2013: 11). However, these same party politics have left the nationally oriented parties weaker and have made the formation of stable governments and the pursuit of a consistent foreign policy more difficult.

Poverty, a feudal system of land ownership, and gender-based violence are amongst the major social constraints hampering the country. India remains a male-dominated society and the much-publicized rape of a student in Delhi in December 2012 turned the international spotlight on traditional attitudes of 'male

³⁰ 'Bharat' is the Sanskrit name for India, derived from Hindu mythology.

superiority'. As the rising number of rapes demonstrates, what happened in Delhi was not an isolated, if unfortunate, occurrence, and the spontaneous protests that erupted in the wake of the crime have certainly not changed the general attitude to women, towards whom there continues to be a deep-rooted disregard. 'The organising principles of the family in India', says Roy (2013: 25) 'are structured to service men.' These realities are not easy to overcome. Aware of the importance of inclusive policies, the Prime Minister stated in 2005 that 'India must show that democracy can deliver development and empower the marginalised' (Manmohan Singh, quoted in Baru 2013: 41).

India has a good knowledge-base. Every year, its colleges, universities, and elite institutions turn out around 500,000 graduate engineers of various calibres.³¹ However, overall expenditure on education is not very high, the average number of years of schooling is comparatively low at 4.4, and the adult literacy rate is no more than 62.8 per cent (UNDP 2011). Nevertheless, India boasts 'a full range of high-class colleges, universities and elite institutions which produce sufficient numbers of graduates for skill-intensive sectors' (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2012: 16).

The enthusiasm generated by India's economic growth has obscured some of structural deficits of Indian society. The growth has been extraordinary, and investment in the military, for example, is staggering in its proportions. However, economic expansion has primarily benefited capital- and skill-intensive production and has therefore not eliminated structural unemployment or brought much benefit to the agricultural sector.

The public sector, of considerable size, remains bureaucratic and intensely regulated, and, despite a lot of 'fat-trimming', still seems unable to do its job satisfactorily. Entrepreneurs are confronted with 'antiquated legal regimes and idiosyncratic rule-making' (Ganguly 2012). Corruption is a serious problem at various levels and India ranks high on the list of countries afflicted by this malady. Corrupt practices have become 'an accepted fact of life' in Indian administration and daily life (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2012: 21). Such practices are criticized but no sustained effort is made to combat them. Widespread corruption is also partly responsible for the inefficiency of the Indian police and judicial system: law enforcement is undoubtedly beset by practical difficulties, and the judiciary is clearly overburdened by its massive case-load, but both entities also suffer from a well-known want of impartiality. Meanwhile, civil rights are guaranteed, the press is free, and there is an almost total absence of anti-democratic forces—a positive picture but one which, according to the Prime Minister, will be further improved '[when] India's plural and secular democracy [is] bolstered by her social and economic development and growth'. The impact of the domestic situation on India's foreign policy has also been noted by the Prime Minister. 'There cannot', he has said, 'be a disconnect between domestic capabilities, national aspirations, and external policies' (quoted by Baru, 2013: 37 and 41).

India's involvement in global affairs has a long history and its contribution to multilateralism is well known. Once an acknowledged leader of the Non-Aligned Movement, with the decline in importance of the latter, India has seen its reputation as a spokesperson for 'the South' undergo a change. During the premierships of Indira and Rajiv Gandhi, the country lost its political 'clout' and

³¹ 'A Billion Brains' (2012), *Economist*, 29 September, <http://www.economist.com/node/21563418>.

became a marginal player at the edges of the South Asia region. Today, by contrast, it 'is . . . widely believed to be a potential economic superpower, a political counterweight to China, and a probable member of the UN Security Council' (Tripathi 2011: 63–4).

As India's international role increases in size and prominence, there will be certain global-governance issues (such as nuclear non-proliferation and the international financial crisis) on which the country will be willing to cooperate and others which it will find more contentious. The Indian government continues to make known its displeasure at actions (such as NATO's 2012 intervention in Libya) which impinge on national sovereignty. And as long as the industrialized countries refuse to assume responsibility for their share of environmentally damaging emissions, we cannot expect to see the debate on climate change driven forward by any strong show of commitment on the part of India.

On the whole, India can be viewed as a constructive partner at the global-governance level. With its pragmatic approach, and its acknowledged status as an emerging power, it is a respected participant in many multilateral forums. At the same time, its emphasis on strategic autonomy and its occasional insistence on its own uniqueness have earned it the reputation of a country that finds it difficult to compromise on global issues (as illustrated at the Doha trade talks and the negotiations on climate-change). The present Indian government engages in a variety of forms of interchange. These include classic multilateralism (at the UN and in other global forums), bilateral arrangements within its own neighbourhood and with strategic partners (such as the United States), and groupings such as the G20 and BRICS. This approach allows India to select the option that best accords with its interests (Debiel and Wulf 2013). When assessing India's potential role in global cooperation, one must take care to work from the basic premise that (despite some domestic perceptions to this effect) Indian politics is not concerned to mimic the West or catch up with other countries, but is, rather, a genuinely endogenous process that seeks to blend the home-grown with the foreign. This diversity can be seen as an asset.

In terms of global status, the Swiss Economics Institute's 2013 KOF Index of Globalization ranks India 107th out of a total of 208 countries—not an especially good ranking for an emerging superpower or potential global player. In Kappel and Pohl's listing (2013: 5), India occupies 65th place out of 100, far behind the other BRICS countries (China 16, South Africa 17, Brazil 23, and Russia 24). It fares a little better in the Bertelsmann Transformation Index, which places it 39th out of 128 on economic transformation and 21st out of 128 on political transformation (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2012: 1).

In conclusion: it seems that Indian society is in the process of reforming itself, but economically and socially there are still many problems to be addressed. Substantial structural reforms are required—not merely to banish the image of India as an underdeveloped country but also to bring about a genuine reduction in poverty and a significant lessening of social inequalities. Whatever deficiencies may persist, there is no doubt that India's socio-cultural structures have proved resilient and adaptive across many centuries and that its social and political institutions provide a sound basis for an enhanced global role. The Indian government has built up an excellent reputation in the international political arena and its civilizational message has generally been positively received.

References

- Balachandran, G. (2012). 'Trends in Indian Defence Expenditure and Hardware Acquisition', in Uma Purushothaman (ed.), *India-US Defence Trade Relations: Trends and Challenges*, ORF Seminar Series 1 (7) April, Observer Research Foundation, 31–43.
- Banerjee, Mukulika (2012). 'Democracy', in Nicolas Kitchen (ed.), *India: The Next Superpower?*, London School of Economics, 45–9, <http://www2.lse.ac.uk/IDEAS/publications/reports/SR010.aspx>.
- Baru, Sanjaya (2013). 'India and the World. A Geoeconomics Perspective', *Economic and Political Weekly* XLVIII (6) February 9: 37–41.
- Beck, Gertraud, Destradi, Sandra, and Neff, Daniel (2010). *Neue Bundesstaaten in Indien – eine Gefahr für die nationale Einheit?*, GIGA Focus Asien No. 9, Hamburg.
- Bertelsmann Stiftung (2012). *Bertelsmann Transformationsindex. India Country Report*, http://www.bti-project.de/uploads/tx_jpdwnloads/BTI_2012_India.pdf.
- Béteille, André (2013). 'The Varieties of Democracy', *Economic and Political Weekly* XLVIII (8) February 23: 33–40.
- Bilgin, Pinar (2008). 'Thinking past "Western" IR?', *Third World Quarterly* 29 (1): 5–23.
- Biswas, Bidisha (2012). 'New Directions in India's Foreign Policy', *India Review* 11 (2): 134–8.
- Brosius, Christiane (2009). 'Die Vorstellung vom "Neuen Indien". Anmerkungen zur unfassbaren Mittelklasse', *Der Bürger im Staat* 3/4: 220–6.
- Central Intelligence Agency. *The World Factbook*, Washington, D.C: Central Intelligence Agency. <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2172.html>.
- Chadha, Vivek (2012). 'Left-Wing Extremism-Challenges and Approach', in Krishnappa Venkatshamy and Princy George (eds.), *Grand Strategy for India 2020 and Beyond*, New Delhi: Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, 93–106.
- Dahiya, Rumel and Behuria, Ashok (eds.) (2012). *India's Neighborhood. Challenges in the Next Two Decades*, New Delhi: Pentagon Security International.
- Dalrymple, William (2003). *White Mughals*, London: Harper Collins.
- Das, Gurcharan (2005). 'The India Model', *Foreign Affairs* 85 (4): 2–16.
- Debiel, Tobias and Wulf, Herbert (2013). 'Indiens BRICS-Politik. Unentschlossen im Club', *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte* 50–51: 30–5.
- Destradi, Sandra and Küssner, Eva (2013). *Go South! Indien „entdeckt“ Afrika und Lateinamerika*, GIGA Focus Asien No. 2, Hamburg.
- Drèze, Jean and Sen, Amartya (2013). *An Uncertain Glory. India and Its Contradictions*, London: Allen Lane.
- Gangopadhyay, Kausik and Singh, Kamal (2013). 'Extent of Poverty in India', *Economic and Political Weekly* XLVIII (60): 75–83.
- Ganguly, Sumit (2012). 'Think Again: India's Rise. Is the World's Largest Democracy Ready for Prime Time, or Forever a B-list Player on the Global Stage?', *Foreign Policy*, July 5, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/07/05/think_again_india_s_rise.
- and Pardesi, Manjeet S. (2009). 'Explaining Sixty Years of India's Foreign Policy', *India Review* 8 (1): 4–19.
- Ghosh, Partha S. (1994). 'Foreign Policy and Electoral Politics in India: Inconsequential Connection', *Asian Survey* 34 (9): 807–17.

- Government of India (2013). *Economic Survey 2012-13*, New Delhi, <http://indiabudget.nic.in/survey.asp>.
- Government of India, Planning Commission (2009). *Report of the Expert Group to Review the Methodology for Estimation of Poverty*, November, New Delhi, http://planningcommission.nic.in/reports/genrep/rep_pov.pdf.
- (2012a). *Press Note on Poverty Estimates 2009-10*, March, http://planningcommission.nic.in/news/press_pov1903.pdf.
- (2012b). *Twelfth Five Year Plan*, http://12thplan.gov.in/displayforum_list.php.
- Guha, Ramachandra (2012). 'Will India Become a Superpower?', in Nicolas Kitchen (ed.), *India: The Next Superpower?*, London School of Economics, 6–16, <http://www2.lse.ac.uk/IDEAS/publications/reports/SR010.aspx>.
- Guru, Gopal (2012). 'Rise of the "Dalit Millionaire"', *Economic and Political Weekly XLVII* (50) December 15: 41–9.
- Heinemann-Grüder, Andreas (2011). *Föderalismus als Konfliktregelung. Indien, Russland, Spanien und Nigeria im Vergleich*, Opladen: Verlag Barbara Budrich.
- Iyer, Lakshmi, Khanna, Tarun, and Varshney, Ashutosh (2013). 'Caste and Entrepreneurship in India', *Economic and Political Weekly XLVIII* (6), February 9: 52–60.
- Jürgenmeyer, Clemens and Rösel, Jakob (2009). 'Hierarchie und Differenz – Die indische Kastengesellschaft', *Der Bürger im Staat* 3/4: 206–14.
- Kale, Sunila S. (2009). 'Inside Out: India's Global Reorientation', *India Review* 8 (1): 43–62.
- Kalyanaraman, S. (2012). 'Thinking about Counter Terrorism in India's National Security Strategy', in Krishnappa Venkatshamy and Princy George (eds.), *Grand Strategy for India 2020 and Beyond*, New Delhi: Institute For Defence Studies and Analyses, 107–15.
- Kappel, Robert and Pohl, Birte (2013). *Der wirtschaftliche Aufstieg der BRICS-Staaten*, GIGA Focus Global No. 1, Hamburg.
- Khilnani, Sunil et al. (2012). *Nonalignment 2.0. A Foreign and Strategic Policy for India in the Twenty First Century*, Centre for Policy Research India, http://www.cprindia.org/sites/default/files/NonAlignment%202.0_1.pdf.
- Kirk, Jason A. (2011). *India and the World Bank: The Politics of Aid and Influence*, New York: Anthem Press.
- KOF Swiss Economics Institute (2013). *KOF Index of Globalization 2013*, <http://globalization.kof.ethz.ch/>.
- Kumar, Rajiv and Kumar, Santosh (2010). *In the National Interest. A Strategic Foreign Policy for India*, New Delhi: BS Books.
- Kundu, Apurba (2004). *India's National Security under the BJP/NDA: "Strong at Home, Engaged Abroad"*, European Institute for Asian Studies, BP 04/02 (June).
- Maihack, Henrik and Plagemann, Johannes (2013). *Souveränität im Wandel: die Rolle der Bundesstaaten in der indischen Außenpolitik*, GIGA Focus Asien No. 1, Hamburg
- Majumdar, Munmun (2011). 'Engaging Myanmar through India's Look East Policy: How far have we gone?', in Mahendra Gaur (ed.), *Focus: India's Look East Policy*, Foreign Policy Research Centre Journal 8, 154–66.
- Malone, David M. (2011). *Does the Elephant Dance? Contemporary Indian Foreign Policy*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Mazumdar, Arijit (2011). 'India's Search for a Post-Cold War Foreign Policy. Domestic Constraints and Obstacles', *India Quarterly* 67 (2): 165–82.

- Mitra, Subrata (2012). 'The Dialectic of Politics and Law and the Resilience of India's Post-colonial Governance: Ultima ratio regum?', *Verfassung und Recht in Übersee* 45 (2): 131–56.
- Mohan, C. Raja (2012). 'Managing Multipolarity: India's Security Strategy in a Changing World', in C. Raja Mohan and Ajai Sahni (eds.), *India's Security Challenges at Home and Abroad*, The National Bureau of Asian Research, Special Report No. 39 (May), 25–49.
- Mundle, Sudipto, et al. (2012). 'The Quality of Governance. How Have Indian States Performed?', *Economic and Political Weekly* XLVII (49) December 8: 41– 52.
- Nehru, Jawaharlal (1961). *India's Foreign Policy: Selected Speeches*, September 1946–April 1961, New Delhi: Government of India.
- Palkhivala, Nani (1998). '*We are Third Rate, Unfit to be a Democracy*', The Rediff Special, Rediff on the net, <http://www.rediff.com/news/1998/jul/14nani.htm>.
- Patnaik, Usha (2010). *The Tendulkar Committee Report on Poverty Estimation*, <http://idathupaksham.wordpress.com/2010/01/05/the-tendulkar-committee-report-on-poverty-estimation/>.
- Pattanaik, Smruti S. (2012). 'India's Afghan Policy: Beyond Bilateralism', *Strategic Analysis* 36 (4): 569–83.
- Prabhu, Joseph (2012). 'Peace and Violence in Hinduism: Gandhi – Beacon of Peace', in: Czada, Roland, Thomas Held and Markus Weingardt (eds.), *Religions and World Peace*, Baden-Baden: Nomos, 134–41.
- Rath, Anita (2013). 'Growing Centralisation of Social Sector Policies in India', *Economic and Political Weekly* XLVIII (4) January 26: 62–70.
- Roy, Rahul (2013). 'Men and Their Lakshman Rekha', *Economic and Political Weekly* XLVIII (8) February 23: 24–6.
- Sagar, Rahul (2009). 'State of Mind: What Kind of Power will India Become?', *International Affairs* 85 (4): 801–16.
- Sahni, Ajai (2012). 'India's Internal Security Challenges', in C. Raja Mohan and Ajai Sahni (eds.), *India's Security Challenges at Home and Abroad*, The National Bureau of Asian Research, Special Report No. 39 (May), 1–24.
- Shahi, Deepshikha (2013). 'Indian Scholarship on International Relations and Multilateralism', *Economic and Political Weekly* XLVIII (5) February 2: 50–8.
- Sibal, Rajeev D. (2012). 'The Untold Story of India's Economy', in Nicolas Kitchen (ed.), *India: The Next Superpower?*, London School of Economics, 17–22, <http://www2.lse.ac.uk/IDEAS/publications/reports/SR010.aspx>.
- Singh, Jaswant (1999). *Defending India*, New Delhi: Macmillan India Ltd.
- Singh, Zorawar Daulet (2010). 'Thinking about an Indian Grand Strategy', *Strategic Analysis* 35 (1): 52–70.
- Singh, Surendra and Misra, Satish (2012). *Federalism in India: Time for a Relook?*, ORF Issue Brief No. 40 (July).
- Stuenkel, Oliver (2012). 'India's National Interests and Diplomatic Activism: Towards Global Leadership', in Nicolas Kitchen (ed.), *India: The Next Superpower?*, London School of Economics, 34–8, <http://www2.lse.ac.uk/IDEAS/publications/reports/SR010.aspx>.
- Teltumbde, Anand (2013). 'Caste in the Play of Corruption', *Economic and Political Weekly* XLVII (47 & 48) December 1: 10–11.
- Thakur, Ramesh (1992). 'India after Nonalignment', *Foreign Affairs* 71 (2): 165–82.
- Tickner, Arlene B. (2003). 'Seeing IR Differently: Notes from the Third World', *Millenium* 32 (2): 295–324.

- Tripathi, Amitava (2011). 'Prospects of India becoming a Global Power', *Indian Foreign Affairs Journal* 6 (1) January–March: 58–69.
- United Nations Development Program (2011). *Human Development Report 2013*, New York, http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/HDR_2013_EN_complete.pdf.
- Upadhyay and Robinson (2012). 'Revisiting Communalisms and Fundamentalisms in India', *Economic and Political Weekly* XLVII (36): 35–57.
- Vaishnav, Milan (2012). *Five Truths about India*, Carnegie Endowment, <http://carnegieendowment.org/2012/11/02/five-truths-about-india/ebjq>.
- Vakulabharanam, Vamsi and Motiram, Sripad (2012). 'Understanding Poverty and Inequality in Urban India since Reforms. Bringing Quantitative and Qualitative Approaches Together', *Economic and Political Weekly* XLVII (47&48) December 1: 44–52.
- Vij, Shivam (2012). 'A Journey to a Casteless Society', *The New York Times International Weekly*, 15 October: 2.
- Wankhede, Harish (2012). 'Globalisation, Society and Inequalities', in Nicolas Kitchen (ed.), *India: The Next Superpower?*, London School of Economics, 39–44, <http://www2.lse.ac.uk/IDEAS/publications/reports/SR010.aspx>.
- Watts, Ronald. L. (2012). *Comparative Conclusions*, Forum of Federations, <http://www.thomasfleiner.ch/files/categories/Intensivkurs%20III/comparativeg2.pdf>.
- Wolf, Siegfried O. and Schultens, René (2009). 'Hindu-Nationalismus – (k)ein Ende in Sicht', *Der Bürger im Staat* 3/4: 164–73.
- Wulf, Herbert (2013a). *India's Aspirations in Global Politics, Competing Ideas and Amorphous Practices*, INEF Report 107, <http://inef.uni-due.de/cms/files/report107.pdf>.
- (2013b). 'Konflikt, Kooperation und Konkurrenz. Indiens China-Perspektiven', *Wissenschaft und Frieden* 4 (Der pazifische Raum): 18–20.



OTHER TITLES

Global Dialogues

ISSN 2198-1957 (Print)
ISSN 2198-0403 (Online)

Claus Leggewie, Marcel Siepmann (Hrsg.),
**Provokation über Kreuz –
Positionen zur Blasphemiedebatte**
Global Dialogues 1, Duisburg 2013

Wren Chadwick, Tobias Debiel, Frank
Gadinger (eds.)
**Relational Sensibility and the ‚Turn to the
Local‘. Prospects for the Future of
Peacebuilding**
Global Dialogues 2, Duisburg 2013

Markus Böckenförde (ed.)
**International Security and Global
Cooperation**
Global Dialogues 3. Duisburg 2014

Special Edition
**MANIFESTE CONVIVALISTE. Déclaration
d’interdépendance.** English Language
Edition. Global Dialogues 4. Duisburg 2014

Current Annual Report

**Global Cooperation Re:search 2013
(Annual Report 2)**
Duisburg: Käte Hamburger Kolleg/Centre for
Global Cooperation Research (KHK/GCR21)
2014

KHK/GCR21 *is the youngest of
the ten Käte Hamburger Kolleg suppor-
ted by the German Federal Ministry of
Education and Research. The Centre
recognises global cooperation as the key
to solutions for urgent transnational
problems. It provides a framework for
internationally renowned scholars from
different disciplines to pursue research
on the challenges and opportunities of
global cooperation in a culturally diverse
world society.*

Global Cooperation Research Papers

ISSN 2198-1949 (Print)
ISSN 2198-0411 (Online)

The Research Papers series is intended
to reflect the latest state of research at
the Centre. Individual issues are based on
ideas that have emerged from in-depth
exploration at the Centre’s research col-
loquiums. Papers may be submitted either
by permanent Centre staff or by visiting
academics and their research partners.

Dirk Messner, Alejandro Guarín, Daniel
Haun, **The Behavioural Dimensions of
International Cooperation**
Global Cooperation Research Papers 1,
Duisburg 2013

Dirk Peters, **Rethinking the Legitimacy
of Global Governance. On the Need for
Sociological Research and Philosophical
Foundations**
Global Cooperation Research Papers 2,
Duisburg 2013

Christian Meyer, **New Alterities and
Emerging Cultures of Social Interaction**
Global Cooperation Research Papers 3,
Duisburg 2013

Herbert Wulf, **Is India Fit for a Role in
Global Governance? The Predicament of
Fragile Domestic Structures and
Institutions**
Global Cooperation Research Papers 4,
Duisburg 2014

Volker M. Heins, **Global Cooperation and
Economies of Recognition: The Case of
NGOs**
Global Cooperation Research Papers 5.
Duisburg 2014

Morgan Brigg, **Culture, ‚Relationality‘, and
Global Cooperation**
Global Cooperation Research Papers 6.
Duisburg 2014



Participating Institutes



www.gcr21.org