

Banking on Military Assistance

Czechoslovakia's Struggle for Influence and Profit in the Third World

1955-1968*

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Abstract: In the 1950s, Czechoslovakia launched an ambitious program of military assistance to countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America. Driven by the desire to obtain political influence and hard cash, the program involved the delivery of arms, military technology, and training to select clients. However, Czechoslovakia faced many challenges, as the country struggled to offer quality training to their Third World partners and to control foreign soldiers who often challenged military discipline and social order. Moreover, Czechoslovakia also struggled to make the program commercially viable, as arms sales and student numbers dropped in the early 1960s. This paper reconstructs the inception, structure, challenges, and debates surrounding the key objectives of the Czechoslovak military training program for the Third World in the 1950s and 1960s. In particular, it focuses on the 'tug of war' waged by key stakeholders running the assistance program, which set political and geopolitical interests against commercial gain. By interrogating the challenges of Czechoslovakia's military assistance programs to the Third World, this paper provides a rare insight into Prague's foreign policy at a crucial juncture, when it fashioned a new, activist role in the Third World. It challenges the assumption that this highly sensitive area of Czechoslovak foreign policy was defined either by politics or ideology, rather arguing it was shaped by a constant struggle between these two often competing priorities.

Key words: military assistance; arms trade; secrecy; Czechoslovakia; Third World

The pursuit of security is fundamental to modern nationhood. As colonial empires disintegrated after World War II, national security became crucial to newly independent and revolutionary states in the Third World.¹ However, militaries and security services across the Third World were often unprepared to fulfil these needs. Under colonial rule, they were often run by Europeans who frequently left or were pushed out after independence. Many newly independent states thus needed to fill this void by recruiting new security and military forces and training them according to the appropriate standards. Before independence, officers were largely trained by former colonial powers, such as Great Britain and France. As decolonisation accelerated in the 1950s, many newly independent states needed to construct 'national' military and security services that broke with the patterns and injustices of the colonial past. Hence, many leaders of newly independent states sought to acquire arms and build new training infrastructure to 'nationalise' their military and security services to overcome threats to sovereignty. As the 1960s progressed, a number of Third World leaders increasingly relied on armies and security services to stay in power and thus needed to train loyal

military personnel² As demand grew, the provision of military assistance also accelerated; arms, military equipment, and training became a key part of the Cold War battle for the Third World.

From 1955 to 1968, Czechoslovakia became one of the most active and ambitious providers of military assistance to clients across the Third World among the Non-Soviet Warsaw Pact (NSWP) countries.³ Closely watched by the West, Prague's military assistance programs gradually grew in scale and prestige as they provided arms, training and advice to armies led by Fidel Castro, Gamal Abdel Nasser, and Ahmed Sukarno. The Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (*Komunistická strana Československa*, KSČ) believed that the provision of military assistance, including arms, military equipment, and training, would allow a modicum of political influence over Third World governments. Simultaneously, Prague recognised that the provision of arms was potentially a profitable business.

This large-scale enterprise, however, suffered from myriad operational challenges from the start. Czechoslovakia was ill-prepared to provide quality training because of high demand and it struggled to deal with its clients' requirements, which were often unrealistic and usually *ad hoc*. Furthermore, foreign students – diverse in their backgrounds, education, military experience and aptitude – often challenged the social order in the host country. Third World demand for Czechoslovak training fluctuated too. If Prague at first struggled with an inflow of foreign students, numbers and thus profits suffered a sharp drop in the early 1960s. The decline in student numbers and arms sales triggered heated debates between the Ministry of Foreign Trade (hereinafter Ministry of Trade) and Ministry of National Defence (hereinafter Ministry of Defence) about the priorities of assistance programs. While the former focused solely on profits, the latter argued that politics were equally, if not more, important. During the short-lived period of reform known as the 'Prague Spring' in 1968, the Ministry of Trade proposed far-reaching reforms to put the provision of military assistance on solely commercial footing. Overall, we argue that this highly sensitive area of Czechoslovak foreign policy was tainted by a constant 'tug of war' between competing priorities and interests. These heated bureaucratic debates over priorities reflected the contested nature of Czechoslovakia's foreign policy in the Third World.

The literature on Cold War military and security assistance in the Third World is a dynamic field of academic research. Drawing on Arne Westad's 'Global Cold War', much recent scholarship has focused on Soviet and American military interventions in Cold War 'hotspots', such as the Congo, Vietnam, Angola, Ethiopia, and Afghanistan.⁴ Meanwhile, the former colonial powers such as Britain, France and Belgium used military assistance to retain influence, often for commercial reasons.⁵ Much new scholarship has focused on the agency of Third World actors, who exploited the Cold War to get better military assistance packages.⁶ In parallel, historians have investigated military assistance to explore intra-bloc dynamics. In the West, close allies, such as Britain, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, and the USA often competed as providers of military and security assistance in the Third World.⁷ Soviet Third World interventions and the provision of military assistance were also often shaped by rivalry with other socialist countries, notably China and Cuba.⁸ The emerging literature on military assistance has thus highlighted the agency of so-called 'peripheral actors' in the Cold War, the role of ideology and commercial considerations, as well as contradictions within the blocs.

The growing body of literature on the NSWP countries has generally the following trends. One trend has concerned the agency of NSWP countries, especially in their relations with the Soviet Union. Early literature assumed that the foreign policies of the NSWP followed the Moscow line, including in the Third World. As a result, Eastern European policy in the Third World was not a focus of this literature.⁹ The end of the Cold War spelled the opening up of archives, with scholars revising their earlier assumptions. Some have started to look at state socialist regimes in East-Central Europe as important actors in the Cold

War, who often shaped Soviet options.¹⁰ Another trend has seen scholars of Central and Eastern Europe pay significantly more attention to relations with the Third World.¹¹

However, only a fraction of emerging scholarship has focused on relations between military and security services of the NSWP countries and their counterparts in Asia, Africa and Latin America. A number of authors have looked at arms sales.¹² A few have looked at how the German Democratic Republic (GDR) attempted to export its models of state security to the Third World.¹³ Meanwhile, our understanding of the military training programs relies heavily on memoirs of former instructors and trainees who often portray their experiences in romantic terms, emphasising ‘socialist internationalism’ and solidarity.¹⁴ We still know very little about the organisation of the military training programs across the Soviet Bloc, the challenges these entailed, and the debates that surrounded and ultimately defined them. The lack of scholarship on military training programs contrasts sharply with a rich literature on civilian educational programs in the socialist countries.¹⁵

The same applies to Czechoslovak military assistance programs in the Third World. The first authors to write about Czechoslovak policy in the Third World in some detail were historians-turned-journalists Petr Zidek and Karel Sieber. Although they acknowledged commercial motivation behind Czechoslovak policy, they still argued Prague was controlled by the Soviets.¹⁶ In *Czechoslovakia in Africa*, Philip Muehlenbeck pursued a revisionist approach, arguing Prague pursued an activist policy in Africa for its own largely economic reasons.¹⁷ A few authors have touched upon certain aspects of weapons transfers to countries such as Egypt or Libya.¹⁸ Others have highlighted Czechoslovakia’s attitudes towards prominent Cold War terrorists and revolutionaries.¹⁹ However, the literature on Czechoslovak military training has been fragmented. We lack a comprehensive discussion of how Prague attempted to negotiate between the varied objectives it set out for its training programs. Moreover, we know equally little about the kinds of dilemmas and challenges that Czechoslovakia faced while providing military and security support to unfamiliar and diverse Third World partners. Drawing on new research, we argue that Czechoslovak military assistance programs were subject to considerable debate in the 1960s and plagued by competing objectives.

This study is important for four distinct reasons. First, by looking at the motivations behind the military training program, it contributes to debates about the nature of Czechoslovak policy in the Third World. Second, it shows that socialist Czechoslovakia was not the bureaucratic and political monolith it is often depicted as. When it came to foreign military assistance to the Third World, there existed substantial debates and disagreements about direction, viability, and effectiveness with regard to this secretive foreign policy tool. Hence, this paper provides an insight into bureaucratic politics and the tug of war between different parts of the state machinery. Third, by looking at the military programs of small states like Czechoslovakia, we can better understand the agency of the so-called ‘peripheral’ powers in the Cold War, the challenges they faced, and the opportunities they tried to seize for their own advantage. By investigating the setup, challenges, and internal debates around the provision of military training to Third World clients, this paper illuminates debates surrounding power, agency, and bureaucratic dynamics in socialist states during the Cold War.

Finally, understanding the goals and modus operandi of military assistance providers helps further illustrate how states employ this highly secretive and often controversial foreign policy tool. Throughout history, governments have utilised arms sales, military training, and specialist advice to further their foreign policy objectives and foster alliances. Yet, owing to their clandestine nature, our understanding of the politics and practice of military assistance programs is limited. Most importantly, we know little of the challenges and obstacles that assistance providers face when exporting their military knowhow to new,

often unfamiliar, clients. This is problematic as most key state players in the international domain are military assistance providers. By investigating Czechoslovakia's experience with providing military assistance to Third World clients, the paper also offers a rare insight into how small states cope with providing military aid while trying to balance multiple foreign policy and economic aims.

This paper is based on diplomatic, military, and security documents collected in two sections of the Czech military archive.²⁰ Most of these documents detail the correspondence between the Czechoslovak Ministry of Defence and different government branches: the Politburo of the Central Committee of the KSČ, the Ministry of Trade, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Ministry of the Interior. Although records of the Ministry of Trade remain closed, leaving certain gaps in the record, the files which are at the core of this paper provide unique insight into the policy and practice of military assistance programs. This enables us to observe debates between the various institutions responsible for providing assistance to the Third World. In contrast to the Soviet military archives for the period, liberal Czech archival laws allow us to explore formerly highly-classified documents not designed for public consumption. The timeline covers the period from 1955 to 1968: the first and most 'ambitious' phase in Czechoslovak policy in the Third World. Although military training programs of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic continued up until the fall of the Berlin Wall, a focus on this early period allows a close look at the inception and early challenges of the program, leading up to the watershed events of 1968.

The Czechoslovak Model

Czechoslovakia's ambitious policy in the Third World was enabled by fundamental changes in the Soviet Bloc. Since his ascent to power, the first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CC CPSU), Nikita Khrushchev, had ambitious plans to expand Soviet influence in the Third World. He wanted to establish a more equitable relationship with China and state socialist regimes in East and Central Europe. If Joseph Stalin expected East and Central Europe to completely emulate the Soviet example, Khrushchev envisioned the socialist countries could follow 'national roads to socialism' and play more independent roles on the world stage.²¹ He therefore encouraged Eastern European allies to pursue an 'activist foreign policy' in the Third World to enhance the power of the Soviet Bloc.²² Czechoslovakia soon proved to be Moscow's most willing 'junior partner' on the global stage and became an important supplier of arms, training and military technology to clients in Africa, Asia and Latin America.

As one of the most industrialised countries of the Soviet Bloc, Czechoslovakia had a long history of arms sales and military production, going back to the interwar period. After the breakup of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, the newly-established Czechoslovakia inherited an advanced arms industry, including the famous Škoda Works in Plzeň, which became part of the French firm, Schneider-Creusot, in 1919. The Czechoslovak government wanted to become self-sufficient in armaments production and expand exports. Therefore, the post-war period saw a large expansion of the arms industry, with the foundation of new manufacturers, such as Československá Zbrojovka at Brno (CZB) in 1918 in collaboration with Škoda.²³ The arms industry served the Czechoslovak defence industry, with Škoda becoming the prime supplier to 'Little Entente' allies Romania and Yugoslavia. The arms industry was also a profitable business, with Czechoslovak manufacturers supplying arms to China despite the embargo.²⁴ By 1935, Czechoslovak manufacturers were responsible for producing 25.5 percent of the world's arms market, supplying a range of war materials across the world.²⁵ After the Czech lands were occupied by Nazi Germany in 1939, Czechoslovak manufacturers became crucial to the German war effort, producing aircraft, tanks, artillery pieces, and other armaments.

Czechoslovakia remained an important manufacturer after World War II. After the KSČ came to power in 1948, the Soviet Union first suggested that Prague abandon its weapons production and rely on Soviet arms. Czechoslovakia declined the offer and rebuilt its arms industry, becoming a key weapons producer for the entire Soviet Bloc.²⁶ In 1948-49, Prague was a key weapons supplier to Israel during the Arab-Israeli War.²⁷ In 1953, the Guatemalan president, Jacobo Arbenz, asked Prague to help rearm his army, in view of long-standing commercial links between the two countries and the reputation that Czechoslovak arms had in Latin America. The following year, Prague agreed to supply 2,000 tons of old arms to Guatemala.²⁸ Once Nikita Khrushchev turned to the Third World in 1955, Czechoslovakia could capitalise on its manufacturing potential and its long-standing diplomatic and commercial contacts with Africa, Asia and Latin America.

The post-1948 venture, however, significantly differed from the inter-war enterprise in important ways. While inter-war manufacturers focused on producing and exporting arms, after 1948, the KSČ gradually launched a multifaceted and complex operation, which involved providing arms, training and strategic advice to client governments. At the heart of the venture was the export of so-called ‘special material’ (*speciální materiál*): military technology, equipment, and arms. In most cases, selling weapons went hand-in-hand with sharing knowledge. Starting in the 1950s, Prague created specialised facilities to provide training to Third World clients in Czechoslovakia as well as abroad. Most notably, Prague helped design some of the Third World’s first military education programs at the Military Engineering Faculty of the University of Alexandria, the military technical colleges in Cairo and Baghdad, as well as the Military Technical Academy in Poll-i-Charkhi, Afghanistan. Prague also dispatched special advisers to select Third World governments and nationalist movements to advise on military strategy and organisation. Third World clients mixed and matched the varied services Prague offered, with most requesting a combination of arms supplies and training.

The bureaucratic structure supporting Czechoslovakia’s military assistance program to the Third World also differed significantly from that of the pre-war period. In the interwar period, Czechoslovak arms manufacturers were largely private companies, but, after 1948, they were nationalised, and manufacturing, marketing and the export of arms was centralised. By 1952, military assistance contracts were negotiated and run by the Czechoslovak Ministry of Trade and its state-owned military equipment company, Main Technical Administration (HTS; *Hlavní technická správa*).²⁹ Although the Ministry of Trade was given some level of autonomy to negotiate commercial deals, the export of modern military weapons required approval from the Politburo of the KSČ’s Central Committee. In 1953, the Politburo banned the sale of all weapons to capitalist countries. Although the restriction was relaxed two years later, further lists of countries to which the sale of modern weaponry was prohibited were introduced.³⁰ This suggests that, in the 1950s, politics and increasing Cold War rivalry had an important impact on the country’s military assistance enterprise.

Meanwhile, the Ministry of Defence was responsible for implementing agreements signed and negotiated by the Ministry of Trade. In particular, the Ministry of Defence was responsible for organising and running the training program, including at the Antonín Zápotocký Military Academy (VAAZ; *Vojenská Akademie Antonína Zápotockého*). Established in 1951 in Brno, VAAZ was the main training facility for the Czechoslovak army.³¹ In the 1950s, it would also become the main training ground for cadets from the Third World. The Ministry of Defence was also to make sure that arms deals were in line with Czechoslovak defence strategy and assess whether they threatened domestic supplies. In theory, the division of labour made sense. In reality, though, the two ministries often had contrasting priorities.

Overall, Prague developed two parallel military assistance tracks. The first was a large-scale commercial scheme designed to train regular armies and experts for state actors. By providing ‘special material’ and training foreign cadets, Prague wanted to achieve two goals at once: sell military technology for profit, and build long-lasting relationships with military and security services by providing high-quality instruction and exposing cadets to the benefits of the socialist system. The second was a small-scale covert scheme available to non-state actors. Czechoslovakia provided free-of-charge covert training and arms to liberation movements in Africa and later in the Middle East. Here, Prague was not seeking monetary profit: by providing arms and expertise to the African National Congress (ANC), the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), or the African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde (PAIGC), it sought to show solidarity with national liberation movements and hopefully build long-term relationships with revolutionaries who might become prime ministers or presidents of Third World countries.³² The covert scheme was a gamble, but one Prague thought could deliver long-term returns.

Czechoslovakia provided military assistance on either a commercial or *pro bono* basis. During the 1950s and 60s, most of Prague’s clients paid for military assistance. The Ministry of Trade preferred their clients pay in hard currencies and set up various payment schemes to allow its Third World clients to make sizable purchases without going bankrupt. Many deals were thus negotiated on the basis of long-term loans, which would prove problematic in the immediate term.³³ The *pro bono* assistance was mainly allocated to politically important clients. These were mainly non-state actors, some of which continued to benefit from free-of-charge support even after their ascent to power. For instance, in 1961, Prague started to provide arms and training directly to the Algerian National Liberation Front (*Front de libération nationale*, FLN). Czechoslovak military assistance to the FLN continued after Algeria became independent in 1962, as Prague considered Algeria a ‘purely political project’, with arms and training delivered largely free of charge.³⁴ Sometimes, Prague also considered smaller requests from new clients, which would not initially bring much profit, if these were deemed to be economically viable in the long run. In 1963, when Ghana first requested Czechoslovakia train six of its pilots and three aviation technicians for free, Prague was inclined to proceed as a form of investment, hoping it would create the basis for more extensive future purchases of military technology.³⁵ Prague thus pursued a calculated strategy designed to ‘hook’ Third World governments on Czechoslovak aid.

Prague’s military assistance to the Third World was ambitious in scale as well as in scope. Although Czechoslovakia supplied arms to a number of Third World countries after 1948, it was the 1955 Czechoslovak-Egyptian arms deal that put Prague on the global map of military assistance providers in the 1950s. The deal was announced in September 1955, when the president of Egypt, Gamal Abdel Naser, pledged to buy a massive number of weapons from Czechoslovakia for the price of \$45.7 million. Czechoslovakia was to receive eighty percent in goods and the rest in hard currency, which was underwritten by a Soviet loan to Cairo. Although contemporary critics and many historians believed Prague was acting as a Soviet proxy, Muehlenbeck has shown Prague negotiated the deal on its own accord, for commercial reasons.³⁶ In addition to providing arms, Prague also provided training to Egyptian and Syrian soldiers on operating the equipment. In 1956, from training alone, Czechoslovakia made a turnover of 7.78 million Kčs (Czechoslovak Crowns), and the Soviet Union received 5.5 million Kčs. By mid-1957, Prague’s earnings from this deal were expected to double.³⁷ Soon, Czechoslovakia was supplying substantial military equipment and arms to Indonesia, Cuba, Yemen, Guinea, Vietnam, and India. During this era, further smaller supplies were provided to Ethiopia, Jordan, Afghanistan, Morocco, Laos, and Ghana. From 1956 to 1961, Prague made 2.3 billion Kčs in profit from providing special assistance –

training, weapons and military equipment – to the Third World (of this, 140 million Kčs. was made from training alone).³⁸

Prague wanted to profit but was also keenly aware of rivalry with the West. In 1961, the UAR (United Arab Republic) requested Prague train some of its officers and military instructors. With its training facilities at full capacity, VAAZ wanted to decline. Yet, when Czechoslovak officials learned that the UAR had received competing offers from West Germany, Switzerland, and Britain, it revised its decision.³⁹ Soon after, Prague discovered that the UAR had already sent eighteen future military academy lecturers to the West. Prague suspected this was part of Bonn's long-term plan to gain a foothold in UAR's military education system.⁴⁰ Certainly, many Third World governments were keen to play both sides and often explicitly leveraged the possibility of turning elsewhere if aid was not forthcoming.⁴¹ Moreover, some Third World political and military elites were also keen to further exploit this competitiveness by demanding bribes from potential military assistance providers. In 1958, Prague sent an envoy to Latin America to investigate the possibility of striking arms deals. During a visit to Venezuela, he quickly learned that contracts were contingent on giving out bribes to leading politicians.⁴² Later on, Prague had a similar experience in Uganda, as officials learned that bribes were necessary to maintain Czechoslovak military assistance. If this was what was required, Prague was ready to pay.⁴³

Military training became an integral part of arms deals. Initial training programs were administered for key allies in the Middle and Far East: the Egyptians, Syrians, and Indonesians. As arms sales went up, Czechoslovakia expanded its training capacity. In 1960, the Ministry of Defence opened specialist facilities for Third World cadets. One was the Faculty of Foreign Studies at VAAZ in Brno. Another was the Aviation Training Centre in Zvolen. The Foreign Faculty could accept an average of 250 cadets in any given year, while Zvolen was designed to train sixty pilots and another sixty aviation technicians.⁴⁴ The courses were tailor-made according to capacity and in line with clients' special requirements. The majority requested training for pilots and military and aviation technicians and engineers. The Foreign Faculty also offered three-year doctorate degrees in aircraft engineering or rocket science, as well as specialised training for military commanders at the battalion level. In some cases, students were also placed for work assignments in local factories in their final year.⁴⁵ Between 1956 and 1965, Prague trained a total of 1,921 cadets from fourteen countries both at home and abroad. Over 600 of them were pilots or aviation technicians.⁴⁶

We know that so-called 'ideological' or 'political' education was an important component of Prague's conventional military training programs in the 1970s and 80s. Nevertheless, in the early stages of this enterprise, direct political education in Marxism-Leninism and socialism was not a mandatory part of the curriculum.⁴⁷ In fact, if at all, requests for political or ideological education came directly from Third World clients. The first to request a course was Raul Castro; in 1960, serving as Cuba's Defence Minister, Castro requested that Prague provide political training for Cuban pilots studying in Czechoslovakia – the same that they taught to Czechoslovak soldiers.⁴⁸ This lack of formal schooling in Marxism-Leninism, however, did not mean that the foreign cadets were not subject to what could be termed as 'indirect political education'. The Foreign Faculty at VAAZ regularly organised movie nights and visits to exhibitions, historical sites, and cultural sites. These were largely designed to showcase Czechoslovak resistance against Nazi occupation during the Second World War.⁴⁹ Moreover, foreigners were taken for tours of agricultural syndicates, hospitals, dams, shopping malls, hotels, youth 'pioneer' clubs, and factories in order to expose the cadets to the socialist technocratic modernity.⁵⁰ The ultimate goal was to turn them into 'friends of socialist Czechoslovakia'.⁵¹

Prague regularly consulted Moscow and sought its approval when negotiating contracts and granting assistance packages, especially with new clients.⁵² The relationship, however, was not solely

characterised by dictate, as it has been often described.⁵³ In the 1950s and 1960s, Prague and Moscow developed various communication channels that enabled them to coordinate the nature and extent of their assistance to Third World partners. In a number of instances, Prague was eager to know how its military assistance could compliment that of the Soviets. In the midst of a crisis in the Congo, Moscow and Prague closely coordinated their military supplies to the government of Patrice Lumumba and his followers at critical junctions.⁵⁴ The Soviets and Czechoslovak representatives also held consultation talks on the ground. When Prague considered its future training activities in Guinea in 1959, its experts met with Soviet representatives in Conakry to determine the conditions and extent of Moscow's assistance.⁵⁵ Prague did not only seek approval from Moscow, but also turned to its neighbours to coordinate responses to urgent requests for assistance.⁵⁶

There were also attempts to coordinate training initiatives for Third World clients on bilateral and multilateral bases. In one instance, Czechoslovak and Soviet instructors co-taught cadets from Egypt and Syria how to operate and repair Soviet technology.⁵⁷ Sharing training materials was essential to this joint project.⁵⁸ Another instance of such cooperation came after the botched US invasion of Cuba in April 1961, when a group of Cuban pilots were first trained in Czechoslovakia to fly fighter-jet aircraft MiG-15s before moving to the Soviet Union to practice on the upgraded version, the MiG-19.⁵⁹ There were also a number of attempts to coordinate training of foreign cadets within the Warsaw Pact. The Soviet military would issue guidelines for Warsaw Pact allies on organising the training and content. For instance, foreign cadets were to be taught civilian defence in case of a nuclear war, but never anything to do with operating weapons of mass destruction. However, we do not know about the level of detail in these guidelines and whether the Warsaw Pact countries had the same training manuals.⁶⁰ Overall, Prague's relationship with Moscow consisted of much more than dictate. It showed clear hallmarks of defence collaboration and liaison aimed at coordinating military assistance efforts and carrying out the training programs to an appropriate standard.

In the 1950s, Czechoslovakia launched an ambitious military assistance program for clients in the Third World. The program relied on a substantial manufacturing capacity that had developed during the inter-war period. However, after 1948, Prague's military assistance was fully centralised to fulfil goals, which now had to be reconciled with the goals of the 'Soviet bloc' in the context of the Cold War. The KSČ thus developed a two-tier scheme, which involved the provision of arms and training for cash and *pro bono* to state and, clandestinely, to non-state actors. Similar to the pre-war period, the Czechoslovak government was motivated by profits, but now political motivations were shaped by furthering the influence and prestige of socialist Czechoslovakia. While the inter-war arms market was shaped by European rivalry for markets and profits, Cold War considerations definitely factored into considerations as to who could obtain arms and training on attractive terms. In contrast to the pre-war period, the Czechoslovak government also launched an ambitious training program for Third World clients. Although the training program was to support the Czechoslovak arms sales, it was also to demonstrate the benefits of state socialism to foreign soldiers. As the training programs expanded, however, Prague struggled to keep up with demand and to provide high-quality education to a diverse set of trainees from across the globe.

Operational Challenges

The expansion of cultural, commercial, and military links with the Third World proved a challenge for the Soviets and their allies. Many Soviet Bloc countries lacked the appropriate expertise to accommodate requests for assistance. There were few experts and thus little knowledge on conditions in Asia, Africa, and Latin America.⁶¹ These problems were exacerbated by Third World clients, who often submitted urgent requests for assistance that could not be fitted into the 'five-year plans', a hallmark of

state socialist systems. In Africa, the legacy of colonialism left the newly independent governments with weak states and scarce bureaucracy.⁶² Third World clients hence often changed plans and orders at the last minute, resulting in late arrivals or *ad hoc* changes in trainee group sizes.⁶³ Czechoslovak military assistance programs suffered from similar problems, as Prague struggled to accommodate high Third World demand. Playing catch up undermined Prague's ability to provide adequate infrastructure for training foreign soldiers on its territory.

In the 1950s, the Czechoslovak training scheme was not centralised and lacked capacity. Cadets were either trained at the VAAZ academy in Brno together with Czechoslovak soldiers or were placed across various facilities, such as training centres, military apprentice schools, and specialised military and repair units.⁶⁴ This decentralisation had a negative impact on the quality of training. Czechoslovak military instructors were either inexperienced or overwhelmed by their daily duties. There were few qualified interpreters; these often lacked technical knowledge of English, French, or Arabic.⁶⁵ Textbooks and models of equipment were also usually unavailable.⁶⁶ For instance, in autumn 1959, 12 UAR cadets were trained to use Soviet ammunition at the Nováky Artillery Base (*Dělostřelecké závody Nováky*).⁶⁷ Their Czechoslovak instructors complained they did not have any models or cuts of the appropriate ammunition and were only teaching off of simple drawings/templates, which seemed amateurish. As the cadets had no textbooks, they found it hard to keep up and make useful notes from lectures. Cadets also suffered from frequent colds because they were accommodated in a hotel with infrequent access to hot water and driven to and from their training facility in a freezing van.⁶⁸ Prague tried to address these issues, and the establishment of the Foreign Faculty at VAAZ in 1960 was part of such an attempt.

Nonetheless, the Ministry of Defence continued to struggle with accommodating large numbers of trainees even after establishing the Foreign Faculty. In 1961, the Czechoslovak military lamented that certain countries, such as Cuba, wanted 'too much, too quickly'.⁶⁹ As a consequence, the authorities had to learn to say no. In 1961, when the Syrian government requested training for fifty-nine military engineers, Prague had to turn it down because VAAZ was full.⁷⁰ The Army's General Staff also repeatedly warned that absorbing more and more cadets could undermine Czechoslovakia's combat capabilities, as training large numbers of Third World cadets often slowed down or decreased the quality of instruction provided to its own men.⁷¹ Furthermore, problems with facilities, staff, and training equipment persisted. In 1961, Czechoslovak instructors working with the Cubans complained that the weapons and equipment did not work and needed repair. Such issues were particularly problematic for short-term courses as they caused severe delays.⁷² Frustrated, instructors at the Foreign Faculty complained about how badly this 'politically very important operation' was being run.⁷³ Overall, in the 1950s and early 1960s, Prague's military assistance to the Third World was often reactive and improvised.

The military also blamed the Ministry of Trade for its failure to provide high-quality assistance. In particular, the military complained that the Ministry of Trade had side-lined them during the crucial phase of negotiations with foreign clients, which at times resulted in assistance packages which were either unfeasible or outright impossible to deliver. For instance, the Ministry of Trade apparently refused to supply night flight lessons to Indonesian pilots as part of an assistance package to Jakarta. As such, their Indonesian clients were forced to seek additional training from Poland and West Germany. Moreover, the Ministry of Defence complained they were frequently informed of incoming cadets only at the last minute, making it much harder to prepare tailor-made courses. As a result, the quality of training for Third World cadets was much lower than that provided for Czechoslovak soldiers. This concerned the Ministry of Defence as it feared that the failure to deliver high-quality training could be used by the USA and West Germany to discredit Prague's efforts in the Third World.⁷⁴

Czechoslovak training programs were also plagued by what the Ministry of Defence described as behavioural problems. As courses for Third World cadets were run at military installations, strict discipline was at the epicentre of trainees' daily lives. Cadets were allowed to venture outside the training camp, but there was an evening curfew. However, cadets often challenged rules, especially when their expectations of life in Czechoslovakia contrasted with the harsh reality of strict military routine. In particular, cadets often resented restrictions on physical movement, and many defied them. The Ministry of Defence also struggled with what they deemed to be 'risky' and even criminal behaviour outside the training-camp grounds, which involved a variety of interactions with the local population. A number of cadets found girlfriends in the nearby villages and towns and even fathered children. Others favoured so-called 'frivolous' interactions with underage girls and prostitutes. In one case, a local woman was alleged to have had romantic affairs resulting in pregnancies with two different cadets, an Afghan and a Cuban.⁷⁵ To the Czechoslovak authorities, such behaviour not only undermined the military philosophy of strict discipline, but also conflicted with mid-twentieth-century social norms.

Cadets also tried to use their time outside the camps to make some money before they went back home. For example, a number of cadets engaged in 'machinations' with vouchers that enabled purchases in the state-run shop, Tuzex, which was stocked with short-supply or foreign goods. Others tried to circumvent strict rules for car purchases with the help of locals. Overall, VAAZ wanted to prevent any such 'problematic' interactions between the local population and their cadets, so much so that, in 1966, the leadership of the Foreign Faculty liaised with local authorities in an effort to reinforce cadet discipline.⁷⁶ This had to be done to minimise reputational damage to individual cadets, their home countries, and the foreign assistance training programs.

Some cadets went to extremes in their efforts to escape harsh military discipline. One such case involved an Afghan cadet known as Mohammad Yakub, enrolled in a three-year course at VAAZ. In January 1962, Yakub left the military training facility for an outing in the nearby town but failed to return by the 11:00 pm curfew. This was not the first time a foreign cadet forgot or decided to defy the rules. However, when Yakub turned up at 12:00 pm the next day, he appeared shirtless and claimed he had been mugged, kidnapped, and driven out of town by three men. The trainee also appeared drunk and in a 'a physically dire state'. The VAAZ leadership had a hard time believing the story, since such criminal acts were very rare in communist Czechoslovakia. When VAAZ began to investigate, they discovered that Yakub in fact got drunk with his fellow trainees in town before spending the night in his girlfriend's flat. When he woke up and realised he might be in trouble, with a little help from his friend, Yakub got rid of his shirt, wallet, documents, money, and watch, to concoct the abduction story. Within two weeks, the Afghan student and his accomplice were both sent back to Kabul. Ultimately, VAAZ concluded that this was not an isolated problem and that there were other Afghan trainees who detested having to live a 'military way of life'.⁷⁷

To help prevent such problematic behaviour, Prague urged cadets' superiors to step in. For instance, in the early 1960s, rivalries were apparent among some of the dozens of Cuban officers and soldiers who were undergoing artillery and infantry training at VAAZ. Allegedly, the officers 'kept to themselves', with more concerned with securing a good position back home than with studies at VAAZ or exhibiting leadership to the younger and less experienced soldiers. When the Cuban general Guillermo Garcia, still in power today, visited VAAZ in April 1961, trainee rivalries and lack of discipline were at the top of his agenda. General Garcia explained that discipline was a key feature of a true revolutionary. In a fiery speech to the cadets, he chastised those who were revolutionaries only in words, asserting that it was not enough to declare 'yo soy fidelista' [literally: I am a Fidelist, a supporter of Fidel Castro]. 'Batista also talked about

democracy', General Garcia told the cadets, 'but you cannot be revolutionaries only with your mouth. Those who are not studying, lack discipline, get drunk, and run after girls, are not revolutionaries.'⁷⁸ The issue of maintaining and enforcing discipline was thus not only a matter for the Czechoslovak authorities, but was also managed in conversation with foreign clients.

Lack of discipline was also problematic because of the highly secretive nature of Czechoslovak military installations. Prague did not want foreigners to know more about Czechoslovak military technology and equipment than was absolutely necessary for their training. Details on the Czechoslovak armed forces – number of troops, order of battle, and operational capacity – were all to stay off limits. As a result, the Foreign Faculty sought to restrict trainees' access to top-secret locations and classified documents. However, keeping cadets away from finding out the 'secrets' was a problem. In the 1950s especially, it was difficult to restrict movement and ensure cadets were not 'nosing around' because training took place at multiple locations. However, even after the foundation of the Foreign Faculty at VAAZ in 1960, Prague continued to struggle with keeping strict checks on physical movement. In 1960, a week-long visit of instructors from Cairo's military college to VAAZ made Prague uneasy. Allegedly, the Egyptian visitors were eager to see all rooms and review all teaching materials, making notes in what Prague referred to as 'unauthorised notepads'. To conceal the location of restricted areas, in the afternoon, the authorities tasked Czechoslovak soldiers with removing doors tags marked 'secret/restricted access', hoping to disorient their guests by making all doors look the same.⁷⁹

Prague faced many challenges when training military cadets from across the Third World. Like elsewhere in the Soviet Bloc, the influx of foreigners posed serious questions about the 'destabilising' effect of foreigners, as cadets interacted with the local population in ways that were considered either morally wrong or illegal by the authorities.⁸⁰ In general, Czechoslovak authorities seemed fairly lenient when it came to disciplining foreign cadets, acting decisively only in the most severe cases. Lack of centralisation and the *ad hoc* nature of the programs in the 1950s in the face of rapidly expanding demand meant that the Ministry of Defence often struggled to ensure a high quality of training. The lack of expertise, materials, and at times unsuitable living arrangements threatened to undermine the prestige of Czechoslovakia as a military assistance provider – a central feature of Cold War rivalry. As we have seen, the Ministry of Defence often pinned the blame on the Ministry of Trade, charging their colleagues with a lack of coordination and a failure to understand the training programs. These were early indications of rivalry between the two bodies, which were supposed to act in concert over a common goal. As student numbers and profits dipped significantly in the early 1960s, this bureaucratic rivalry increased and saw the two ministries locked in a 'tug of war' over competing priorities.

Tug of War

By the mid-1960s, the number of Czech military assistance contracts – for arms and training alike – had significantly dropped. The only growth area in Czechoslovakia's commercial venture included supplies and training provided to Third World countries who were building their own military service facilities like those in Afghanistan.⁸¹ In 1966, the Foreign Faculty at VAAZ was only used to forty-eight percent of its capacity. The aviation centre at Zvolen, designed to train pilots and aviation technicians, was running only approximately at fifty-three percent of its capacity.⁸² If both of VAAZ's main training facilities had been employed to their full potential, Prague would have been earning 35,5 million Kčs/annually.⁸³ However, with both centres running at half-capacity, these predictions for commercial profits did not materialise. The drop in student numbers ran in parallel with the decline in arms exports to the Third World.⁸⁴ From working at overcapacity, the Ministry of Defence was by the mid-1960s operating half-empty training facilities.

The Ministry of Defence blamed the drop in student numbers on the institutional setup of the Czechoslovak assistance programs. In the Soviet Union, the Ministry of Defence was directly responsible for negotiating contracts with Third World clients. In Czechoslovakia meanwhile, the Ministry of Trade and its arms company, HTS, were in charge of negotiating contracts. The Ministry of Defence believed that having a profit-making department at the helm did not send a favourable message to clients. In 1966, the Syrian government explicitly told Prague that a major disadvantage of doing business with them, as opposed to the Soviet Union, was having to negotiate with bureaucrats. Without direct military-to-military contacts, the acquisition of contracts resembled trade negotiations.⁸⁵ Moreover, it accused the Ministry of Trade of prioritising economic profit at the expense of political benefit and failing to pursue new clients. For instance, the Ministry of Defence argued it was wrong for their colleagues to show little interest in expanding assistance to Cuba only because of its low purchasing power. It had similar views of Prague's cooperation with Afghanistan and the United Arab Republic. A purely profit-based approach was wrong, argued the military, as it ignored wider socio-political interests of Czechoslovak foreign policy.⁸⁶

In addition, the Ministry of Defence pointed out that Czechoslovak prices for arms and training were too high. Czechoslovakia first lowered its prices in 1963, when it observed that its rivals in the West were willing to sell equipment, arms, and training for 'unacceptably' low prices. Eager to remain a key player in what the Ministry of Defence termed a 'very profitable' business, Prague adjusted its prices for 'special material' as well as training to be able to compete with other nations. For instance, it started charging lower prices for trainee pilots flying older models of jets or charged nothing for the time of its army instructors. Despite these efforts, prices remained high in comparison to its closest rivals in the market.⁸⁷ This discouraged some Third World clients. In 1966, when Czechoslovakia offered to sell Uganda thirty-six anti-aircraft guns and train fifty of its cadets, Kampala declined Prague's offer. The Defence Ministry blamed the fiasco on the Ministry of Trade, which asked for a high price even though Czechoslovak technology was old and redundant.⁸⁸ To avoid such disappointments in the future, the Ministry of Defence suggested that Prague should charge only for direct training costs and essential materials and give up any profit such deals might generate when negotiating with politically important clients. However, the Ministry of Trade stalled, as it was clearly not in favour of making further concessions.⁸⁹

Czechoslovakia still struggled to offer a competitive price, especially for modern weapons. Until 1962, most of the special material Czechoslovakia exported to the Third World was from the World War II era. For some time, the technology worked well. However, as demand from the Third World increased, the military struggled to repair this old technology quickly enough. Moreover, clients increasingly started to request modern weapons and technology. This presented a problem because a large proportion of modern military technology requested by Third World clients was not of Czechoslovak origin. Prague either imported it from elsewhere or produced it on a licence. Most of the weapons produced in Czechoslovakia under license actually came from the Soviet Union, which charged a 'licensing fee', which increased production costs. As most arms deals were conducted on a bilateral basis, the Soviet Union could usually charge much less than their Eastern European allies.⁹⁰ Meanwhile, re-exporting non-Czechoslovak 'special material' to the Third World was not an easy task as this required prolonged negotiations.⁹¹ The Defence Ministry lamented that it did not have sufficient economic or production capacity to export this kind of material. As a result, the export of 'special material' went down.⁹²

The reform was indeed urgently required because of the decline in the Czechoslovak economy. The economy was experiencing positive growth rates after World War II. By the early 1960s the economy was in decline, reaching a negative growth rate of three percent. As the disastrous situation in the economy

became apparent, the commercial viability of the assistance packages came under the spotlight. The export of 'special material' represented an important share of the country's foreign trade.⁹³ However, many Third World governments were not paying back their loans. By August 1962, African governments owed Czechoslovakia 531 million Kčs in outstanding payments.⁹⁴

The Ministry of Defence took a number of measures to rectify the situation. In June 1966, it set up the Department for Foreign Relations, which was to closely cooperate with other Czechoslovak institutions responsible for military aid to the Third World. Moreover, it became increasingly vocal about the fact that unless political aims gained priority over commercial considerations, Czechoslovakia's military assistance programs would not recover from the decline.⁹⁵ To resolve these issues, the Ministry of Defence made a number of proposals to remodel military assistance programs. One suggestion included the Ministry of Defence fully taking over military assistance programs, including the negotiation of contracts. Another less radical reform involved the Ministry of Defence and Ministry of Trade jointly negotiating the contracts. From what we know, the Trade Ministry agreed to closer cooperation but showed no sign of willingness to relay responsibilities to the military. This closer cooperation entailed the Ministry of Defence engaging in assistance deals from the outset. The Ministry of Defence would negotiate content, while the Ministry of Trade would handle the money.⁹⁶ By providing solutions that favoured 'politics' over money and 'centralisation' of military assistance, the Ministry of Defence wanted to elevate its own power and prestige. By 1968, though, the tides turned and the Czechoslovak military assistance enterprise again became profitable. Between 1964 and 1968, Prague's export of military material and weapons more than doubled.⁹⁷

In a lengthy document written in June 1968, the peak of the 'Prague Spring', the Ministry of Trade argued that the turnaround was possible because of its own and rather different approach. As the Ministry of Trade argued, the revival of profits was possible because of them acquiring more autonomy over making deals on a commercial basis. Their strategy included focusing on clients who could pay in cash up front. Most of these were 'non-socialist' countries. In fact, some belonged to the 'Western camp' in the Cold War. To illustrate these achievements, the Ministry of Trade focused on three deals, all signed in 1967. One included a deal for the provision of 'special material' to Pakistan, worth 950 million Kčs, where Islamabad would pay eighty percent of the price in cash. Another deal was with Iraq, worth approximately 1,100 million Kčs, which was apparently paid entirely in cash. The third was a deal with Morocco worth 500 million Kčs. In addition, asserted the Ministry of Trade, they managed to improve the system of payments and prevent losses by insisting that their clients pay for most of the material upfront. The Ministry of Trade also argued they tried to improve the repayment of loans by negotiating shorter times for repayment.⁹⁸ It seems that the Ministry of Trade wanted to mainly sell old materiel, arguing that this would also be beneficial to the Ministry of Defence as the army would then be re-supplied with new weapons. For instance, after selling the T-54 A tanks to India and Morocco from reserves, the Czechoslovak military was provided with a modern T-55 replacement.⁹⁹

In a remarkable admission, the Ministry of Trade argued that the Prague Spring was good for business. The Ministry of Trade observed that in the latter half of the 1960s, a number of Third World states wanted to become more independent from superpowers regarding supplies and training for its militaries. As a consequence of its small-size status, Czechoslovakia was considered a very suitable supplier of 'special material' products. Seeing Prague as a more equitable partner, these Third World clients were less concerned about being pushed into a quid-pro-quo relationship. The Prague Spring, the ministry argued, would further increase the appeal of Czechoslovakia as a supplier of arms because it would no longer be seen as closely linked to one of the superpowers: 'With respect to some developing nations, the ongoing process of democratisation in the CSSR [Czechoslovakia] will increase the appeal of purchasing from

CSSR...'.¹⁰⁰ The rationale was that the process of reform in Czechoslovakia would help silence those Third World leaders who were critical of their government's doing business with communist states.

To reinforce its success, the Ministry of Trade proposed a series of measures. First of all, it contended that it alone should maintain overall authority over negotiating and signing deals. Second, it proposed that Prague abandon previous limits on exporting goods to non-socialist countries, asserting that this would give the country more flexibility to pursue trade outside the Socialist Bloc. Third, the Ministry of Trade argued that only they should be responsible for negotiating terms for the export of Czechoslovak-made material to socialist countries. Such a centralisation of decision-making, it contended, would speed up the export of non-Czechoslovak material to new clients or those where such export was previously not permitted. Moreover, likely in an effort to appease its domestic rivals, it suggested setting up an intergovernmental advisory board made up of deputies of all relevant ministers, including the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of National Defence, and the Ministry of Interior, which would assess key issues linked to special material business. This was a clear stop sign to the earlier attempts by the Ministry of Defence to garner a share of this authority. Trade understood that it could not stage a total takeover of this enterprise and had to leave certain decisions to its rivals in the Ministry of Defence. Therefore, the Ministry of Trade proposed that the Ministry of Defence and Ministry of Interior would not only sit on the advisory board, but would also be in charge of designing a list of 'special material' that could not be sold to non-socialist countries.¹⁰¹ Overall, political interests had to give way to economic profit.

We do not know whether these proposals were implemented. The 1968 Warsaw Pact occupation of Czechoslovakia led to a period of political turmoil, where many of those who resisted the invasion were purged or imprisoned. The development of Czechoslovak military assistance programs after 1968 is beyond the purview of this paper. However, from fragments of available information, we know that conflicts between the Ministry of Trade and Ministry of Defence continued after 1968.¹⁰² Once again, the arguments centred on which priorities, commercial or political, should take precedence in Prague's relations with the Third World. The Prague Spring served as a fascinating, albeit short, opening for the Ministry of Trade to openly put forth that economic concerns should be prioritised over political considerations, predating similar open debates in the 1980s. After the collapse of state socialism in Central-Eastern Europe in 1989, the Czechoslovak arms industry was privatised. Some arms manufacturing was converted to civilian use. Much remained, however, with Česká zbrojovka at Uherský Brod in south-east Czechia remaining one of the top ten producers of small arms in the world.¹⁰³ After forty years of communist rule, the Czechoslovak arms industry was finally free of ideological constraints, free to pursue profits on an open market.

Conclusion

Czechoslovak debates over military assistance show that Cold War foreign policy towards the Third World was highly contested and driven by competing priorities. From the outset, Czechoslovakia wanted to fulfil both political and economic goals. By selling arms, training soldiers and providing advice to armies, Prague wanted to gain new Third World allies while earning hard cash for its economy. The whole enterprise rested on Czechoslovakia's pre-war manufacturing capability but, following the 1948 communist coup, went through substantial reform characterised by nationalisation, centralisation, expansion and politicisation of Prague's military assistance programs. In theory, the 'Czechoslovak model' was to serve both political and economic ends, providing clients with arms and training to obtain hard currency while gaining prestige and influence in the Third World – in competition with the West.

In practice, however, Prague struggled to reconcile the economic and political priorities of its military assistance programs. The 'Czechoslovak model' contained inherent tensions. One was the

distinction between ‘commercial’ and *pro bono* assistance. While both were supposed to fulfil economic and political goals in the long run, in reality, giving military assistance to Third World clients for free was costly. In fact, even ‘cash-based’ military assistance was often problematic as it relied on loans, many of which were left unpaid. Another was the administrative distinction between the Ministry of Trade, responsible for negotiating contracts, and the Ministry of Defence, responsible for implementing the programs.

While the Ministry of Trade prioritised commercial profits, the Ministry of Defence argued that political influence was equally, if not a more important goal of the military assistance programs. These debates over priorities sparked a ‘tug of war’ between the two ministries, especially as student numbers declined in the early 1960s. In the short period of openness in 1968, the Ministry of Trade offered an approach that would put Czechoslovakia’s assistance programs on a solely commercial footing. These proposals were clearly an outcome of long-term debates over priorities, with the Ministry of Trade arguing that liberalisation was ‘good for business’. These proposals signified a shift away from ideological constraints and towards a focus on commercial priorities. The Prague Spring was crushed, but these debates did not go away. Although the post-1968 period is beyond the purview of this paper, Czechoslovakia continued to offer arms and training to state and non-state actors up until the collapse of state socialism roughly on the basis of the original model. Debates over assistance programs to Third World clients would once again become a matter of heated debate across the Socialist Bloc in the era of ‘perestroika’ in the 1980s, with the general public questioning the reasons behind assistance programs, especially as the level of debt became apparent.¹⁰⁴ Future research needs to investigate how these debates and practices of military assistance developed in the last two decades of the Cold War, to help understand the evolution and collapse of state socialism in East and Central Europe.

The Czechoslovak experience of running military training programs also highlights the nature of socialist states. The rapid expansion of the training program from the 1950s onwards posed many operational challenges, as Prague had to set up infrastructure and control hundreds of young men from diverse backgrounds. As the story shows, the Ministry of Defence often struggled with both providing quality services and maintaining strict discipline. If a lack of appropriate housing, materials, and instructors posed a threat to Czechoslovak prestige in the context of the Cold War, disciplinary issues were potentially disruptive for the social order. Soldiers interacted with the local population in ways that could not always be controlled, with often unpredictable consequences. Further research is required to understand the consequences of these interactions as well as how the cadets themselves viewed and ‘lived’ these experiences. Only thanks to such holistic understanding can we draw a balanced picture of the nature of military training in Czechoslovakia and the long-term impact this has had on the country’s Third World clients.

Overall, Czechoslovakia developed an ambitious program of military assistance for its own reasons. It was not solely a product of Soviet diktat and was subject of substantial discussion and debate between different branches of government. Although the Politburo of the KSČ’s Central Committee remained the ultimate decision-maker, the nature of Prague’s foreign military assistance programs was significantly shaped by substantial bureaucratic in-fighting, with different branches of government pulling in different directions. Czechoslovakia’s small-power status was a double-edged sword. On one hand, its small-power status made it an attractive provider to those fearing dependence on the superpowers. On the other hand, the size of its economy put it into competition with more powerful players on the world market, including the Soviet Union. Similar to the West, the socialist countries did not always ‘pull together’ in competition with the West, but often competed over Third World markets. From 1955-68, Czechoslovakia became an important player in the struggle for the Third World, largely due to its ambitious military assistance program. However, economic and operational problems put limits on the scope and quality of

military assistance that Prague was able to offer its clients. The moral of this story is somewhat paradoxical: it shows that so-called ‘peripheral’ actors like Czechoslovakia had substantial agency in the context of the Cold War but, at the same time, struggled with numerous obstacles and limitations.

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¹ We subscribe to Arne Westad’s definition of the Third World to mean ‘the former colonial or semi-colonial countries in Africa, Asia, and Latin America that were subject to European (or rather pan-European, including American and Russian) economic or political domination’, in Arne Westad, *Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 3.

² On the dilemmas of security assistance, see: Simon Baynham, “Quis Custodiet Ipsos Custodes? The Case of Nkrumah’s National Security Service”, *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 23 (1985), 87-103; Marco Wyss, “The Challenge of Western Neutralism during the Cold War: Britain and the Buildup of a Nigerian Air Force”, *Journal of Cold War Studies*, 20:2 (2018); Poppy Cullen, “Playing Cold War politics”: the cold war in Anglo-Kenyan relations in the 1960s, *Cold War History*, 18:1 (2018), 37-54.

³ The NSWP countries included the German Democratic Republic, Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Albania and Czechoslovakia.

⁴ Arne Westad, *Global Cold War*.

⁵ For an overview, see: Frederick Cooper, *Africa Since 1940: The Past of the Present* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014).

⁶ Jeffrey A. Lefebvre, “The United States, Ethiopia and the 1963 Somali-Soviet arms deal: containment and the balance of power dilemma in the Horn of Africa”, *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 36, 4 (1998), 611-43; Poppy Cullen, “Playing Cold War politics”. On the agency of so-called peripheral actors, see: Tony Smith, “New Bottles for New Wine: A Pericentric Framework for the Study of the Cold War.” *Diplomatic History* 24, no. 4 (2000).

⁷ On US-British contradictions in the Third World, see: Nigel J. Ashton, *Kennedy, Macmillan and the Cold War: the Irony of Interdependence* (Basingstoke, 2002), 109-26; Marco Wyss, “The Challenge of Western Neutralism during the Cold War: Britain and the Buildup of a Nigerian Air Force”, *Journal of Cold War Studies*, 20:2 (2018).

⁸ On China, see Jeremy Friedman, *Shadow Cold War: The Sino-Soviet Competition for the Third World* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2015). On Cuba, see: Piero Gleijeses, *Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959-1976* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2002).

⁹ Andrzej Korbonski, “Eastern Europe and the Third World”; or, “Limited Regret Strategy” Revisited’ in *The Soviet Union and the Third World: The Last Three Decades*, Andrzej Korbonski and Francis Fukuyama, eds. (Ithaca, 1987); Alvin Z. Rubinstein, *Moscow’s Third World Strategy* (Princeton, 1988); Michael Radu, ed. *Eastern Europe and the Third World: East vs. South* (New York, 1981).

¹⁰ For a clear indication of the trend, see: Hope M. Harrison, *Driving the Soviets up the Wall: Soviet-East German Relations, 1953-1961* (Princeton, NJ, 2003). For a recent revision of the Warsaw Pact in general, see: Laurien Crump, *The Warsaw Pact Reconsidered: International Relations in Eastern Europe, 1955-1969* (New York, 2015).

¹¹ On Eastern European engagement with the Third World, see: James Mark, Artemy Kalinovsky and Stefii Marung (eds), *Alternative Globalizations: Eastern Europe and the Postcolonial World* (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 2020); Philip Muehlenbeck and Natalia Telepneva (eds), *Warsaw Pact Intervention in the ‘Third World’: Aid and Influence in the Cold War* (London: IB Tauris, 2018); Patryk Babiracki and Austin Jersild, (ed), *Socialist Internationalism in the Cold War. Exploring the Second World* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2017). For a slightly outdated, yet useful overview, see: David C. Engerman, “The Second World’s Third World”, *Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History*, 12:1 (2011): 183-211.

¹² Csaba Békés and Dániel Vékony, "Unfulfilled Promised Lands: Missed Potentials in Relations between Hungary and the Countries of the Middle East", 1955-75", in Muehlenbeck and Telepneva (eds), *Warsaw Pact Intervention in the ‘Third World’*, 271-97; Przemysław Gasztold’s article in this special issue.

¹³ Massimiliano Trentin, “Modernization as State-Building: The Two Germanies in Syria, 1962–1972,” *Diplomatic History*, 33, 3 (2009), 487-505; Klaus Storkmann, *Geheime Solidarität: Militärbeziehungen Und Militärhilfen Der DDR in Die 'Dritte Welt'* (Berlin: Ch. Links, 2012). Also see Martin Grossheim’s article in this special issue.

¹⁴ On the Soviet Military and their support for national liberation movements, see: Vladimir Shubin, “Unsung heroes: The Soviet military and the liberation of Southern Africa” in S. Onslow (ed.), *Cold War in Southern Africa: White Power, Black Liberation* (London: Routledge, 2009); Yuriy Gorbunov, *Partizany dlya Afriki* (Partisans for Africa), 16 December 2013, Voennoye Obozreniya, available at <http://Topwar.Ru/37349-Krym-Partizany-Dlya-Afriki-Chast-1.Htmlmilitari>, accessed 12/07/2016 at 17:55. For trainee experiences in the USSR, see: Jocelyn Alexander and JoAnn McGregor, “African Soldiers in the USSR: Oral Histories of ZAPU Intelligence Cadres’ Soviet Training, 1964–1979”, *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 43:1, (2017): 49-66; Barry Gilder, *Songs and Secrets: South Africa from Liberation to Governance* (London, Hurst and Co., 2012).

¹⁵ Sean Guillory, “Culture Clash in the Socialist Paradise: Soviet Patronage and African Students’ Urbanity in the Soviet Union, 1960-1965”, *Diplomatic History*, 38 (2014), 271-81; Julia Hessler, “Death of an African Student in Moscow: Race, Politics and the Cold War”, *Cahiers du monde russe*, 47 (2006), 33-63; Abigail Judge Kret, “‘We Unite with Knowledge’: The People’s Friendship University and Soviet Education for the Third World”, *Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East*, 33 (2013), 239-56; Maxim Matusevich, “Probing the Limits of Internationalism: African Students Confront Soviet Ritual”, *Anthropology of East Europe Review*, 27 (2009), 19-39; Sara Pugach, African Students and the Politics of Race and Gender in the German Democratic Republic’, in Quinn Slobodian (ed), *Comrades of Colour East Germany in the Cold War World* (Oxford, 2015), 131-56.

¹⁶ Petr Zidek and Karel Sieber, *Československo a subsaharská Afrika v letech 1948-1989* (Praha: Ústav mezinárodních vztahů, 2007); Petr Zidek and Karel Sieber, *Československo a Blízký východ v letech 1948-1989* (Praha: Ústav mezinárodních vztahů, 2009).

¹⁷ Philip Muehlenbeck, *Czechoslovakia in Africa, 1945-1968* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016).

¹⁸ Motti Golani, “The Historical Place of the Czech-Egyptian Arms Deal, Fall 1955”, *Middle Eastern Studies*, 31:4 (1995), 803-27; Guy Laron, “Logic dictates that they may attack when they feel they can win: The 1955 Czech-Egyptian Arms Deal, the Egyptian Army, and Israeli Intelligence”, *The Middle East Journal*, 63:1 (Winter 2009), 69-84; Pavel Žáček, “Vojenské zpravodajství z Libye a terorismus”, *Paměť a dějiny. Revue pro studium totalitních režimů* 5:3 (2012), 74-86; Igor Baka, “Československá vojenská pomoc Libyi v prvej polovici osemdesiatych rokov dvadsiateho storočia”, *Vojenská história* 3:16 (2012), 55-81.

¹⁹ Daniela Richterova, “The Anxious Host: Czechoslovakia and Carlos the Jackal”, *The International History Review*, 40:1 (January 2018), 108-32; Daniela Richterova, “Terrorists and Revolutionaries: the Achilles Heel of Communist Surveillance”, *Surveillance and Society*, 16:3 (September 2018).

²⁰ Vojenský ústřední archiv: Vojenský historický archiv (VHA) and Správní archiv (SA).

²¹ Westad, *Global Cold War*, 39–67; Austin Jersild, “The Soviet State as Imperial Scavenger: ‘Catch Up and Surpass’ in the Transnational Socialist Bloc, 1950–1960”, *American Historical Review*, 116:1 (2011), 109-32.

²² Csaba Békés, “The Warsaw Pact and the Helsinki Process, 1965–1970”, in *The Making of Détente: Eastern and Western Europe in the Cold War, 1965–75* (eds), Wilfried Loth and Georges-Henri Soutou (London: Routledge, 2010).

²³ In 1936, the Czechoslovak government opened a subsidiary company, Československá Zbrojovka, at Uherský Brod in south-east Moravia to remove production from its Western border.

²⁴ On the Czechoslovak arms business during the inter-war period, see: Jonathan A. Grant, *Between Depression and Disarmament: The International Armaments Business, 1919-1939* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018); Aleš Skřivan JR, “On the Nature and Role of Arms Production in Interwar Czechoslovakia”, *The Journal of Slavic Military Studies*, 23:4 (2010): 630-40.

²⁵ Otakar Franěk, *Zbraně pro celý svět. Zahraniční obchod se zbraněmi a municí koncernu brněnské Zbrojovky mezi dvěma válkami* (Brno: Blok, 1970), 10-11.

²⁶ Muehlenbeck, *Czechoslovakia in Africa*, 88-9.

²⁷ On Czechoslovak relations with Israel, see: Eva Taterová, *Československá diplomacie a Izrael v letech 1948-1967* (Brno: Mendelova Univerzita v Brně, 2017).

²⁸ Lukáš Perutka, “Arms for Arbenz. Czechoslovakia’s Involvement in the Cold War in Latin America”, *Central European Journal of International and Security Studies*, 3:7 (2013), 59-76.

²⁹ See more on HTS and its relationship with Omnipol in Petr Zidek, “Vývoz zbraní z Československa do zemí třetího světa v letech 1948-1962”, 528.

³⁰ Muehlenbeck, *Czechoslovakia in Africa*, 89.

- ³¹ Since its establishment, the Academy was renamed several times. In 1958 it merged with Vojenská akademie Klementa Gottwalda in Prague and became officially known as VAAZ.
- ³² As a part of this scheme, at VAAZ Prague trained approximately fifty to sixty non-state actors. This covert action scheme struggled with separate challenges, which are beyond the purview of this article.
- ³³ Petr Zidek and Karel Sieber, *Československo a subsaharská Afrika v letech 1948-1989*, 75-8.
- ³⁴ On Czechoslovak support for the FLN, see Muehlenbeck, *Czechoslovakia in Africa*, 99-100.
- ³⁵ Otakar Rytíř (Náčelník generálního štábu Čs. lidové armády), 22.12.1962, 'Žádost vlády republiky Ghana o vývik pilotů pro ghanskou armádu', VHA, f. MNO 1963, Ka 358.
- ³⁶ Muehlenbeck, *Czechoslovakia in Africa*, 91-7.
- ³⁷ 'Zpráva o plnění usnesení politického byra ÚV KSČ ze dne 28.8.1955, 2.1.1956, 9.2.1956 a 9.7.1956 o poskytování technické pomoci Egyptu, Syrii a Jemenu', [bez data], VHA, f. MNO 1960, Ka 464.
- ³⁸ 'Zpráva o současném stavu poskytování technické pomoci rozvojovým zemím v oblasti vojenské techniky', [bez data], VHA, f. MNO 1967, Ka 160.
- ³⁹ Otakar Rytíř (Náčelník Generálního štábu Čs. lidové armády), 11.5.1961, 'Postgraduální školení a praxe příslušníků SAR v zařízeních ČSSR', VHA, f. MNO 1961, Ka 453.
- ⁴⁰ 'Informace o stavu ve školení zahraničních příslušníků na školách čs. lidové armády a o situaci v naší pomoci při výstavbě vojenské technické akademie v SAR', [bez data, 1961], VHA, f. MNO 1961, Ka 457.
- ⁴¹ František Mareš (ředitel MZO-HTS) – Bohumil Špaček (Generální štáb ČSLA), 25.8.1960, VHA, f. MNO 1960, Ka 464.
- ⁴² Por. Pohan, [bez data, 1958/59], 'Opis agenturní zprávy od spolupracovníka KŘIŽÍKA', VHA, f. MNO 1959, Ka 351.
- ⁴³ 'Zpráva ze služební cesty do Ugandy ve dnech 11.1.-26.1.1970', [bez data, 1970], VHA, MNO 1970, Ka 142.
- ⁴⁴ Originally established as a military engineering academy, in 1958 VAAZ became Czechoslovakia's principal military academy, <https://www.unob.cz/en/fmt/faculty/Pages/History-of-Faculty.aspx> [cit. 20 December 2019]; Otakar Rytíř (Náčelník generálního štábu Čs. lidové armády), 16.3.1966, 'Zpráva pro ÚV KSČ o rozvojových zemích', VHA, f. MNO 1966, Ka 245, 101443; 'Rozbor plnění plánu technické pomoci za období od 1. ledna 1966 do 30. června 1966', [bez data], VHA, f. MNO 1966, Ka 245.
- ⁴⁵ See, for example, 'Tajné rozkazy velitele zahraniční fakulty VAAZ–ukončení kurzů', různá data, SA, f. Vojenská akademie Antonína Zápotockého [VAAZ], ka 389; Václav Vondrášek, Sylvestr Chrástil and Martin Markel, *Dějiny vojenské akademie v Brně* (Praha: MO ČR–AVIS, 2001), 96.
- ⁴⁶ Otakar Rytíř (Náčelník generálního štábu Čs. lidové armády), 16.3.1966, 'Zpráva pro ÚV KSČ o rozvojových zemích', VHA, f. MNO 1966, Ka 245.
- ⁴⁷ In contrast, from the onset ideology was an important component of training for national liberation movements, which included the Angolan MPLA and the South Africa's ANC.
- ⁴⁸ Hřivna (Ministerstvo národní obrany), 15.7.1960, 'Politické školení kubánských letců', VHA, f. MNO 1960, Ka 465.
- ⁴⁹ Jaroslav Tykal – Náčelník GŠ ČSLA, 3.3.1959, 'Program kurzu 537', VÚA-VHA, f. MNO 1959, ka 355. The supply of journals included *Czechoslovak Life*, *Czechoslovak Youth*, *World Student News*. R. Horký – MNO GŠ Správa materiálního plánování, 2.4.1959, 'Hlášení o průběhu kursu 124 – předložení', VÚA-VHA, f. MNO 1959, ka 355.
- ⁵⁰ For more on 'socialist modernity' (terms and historiography), see Matěj Spurný, *Making the Most of Tomorrow. A Laboratory of Socialist Modernity in Czechoslovakia* (Praha: Karolinum Press, 2016), 93-99.
- ⁵¹ For instance, see this in reference to Algerian cadets, Náčelník generálního štábu – Bohumír Lomský (Ministr národní obrany), 4.2.1964, 'Souhrnná zpráva o poskytování technické pomoci HMVZ za rok 1963', VHA, f. MNO 1964, Ka 326.
- ⁵² František Krajčír (Ministr zahraničního obchodu) – Bohumír Lomský (Ministr národní obrany), 17.11.1960, VHA, f. MNO 1960, Ka 460.
- ⁵³ Petr Zidek and Karel Sieber, *Československo a subsaharská Afrika v letech 1948-1989*, 7-9.
- ⁵⁴ Václav David (Ministr zahraničních věcí), 1.9.1960, 'Zpráva pro vládní komisi pro pomoc Republice Kongo'. VHA, f. MNO 1960, Ka 461; Pplk. Trpík (Náčelník generálního štábu), 28.1.1964, 'Pomoc vládě Konžské lidové republiky ve Stanleyville', VHA, f. MNO 1964, Ka 326. On Czechoslovak-Soviet cooperation in the Congo, see: Natalia Telepneva, "Cold War on the Cheap: Soviet and Czechoslovak Intelligence in the Congo, 1960–1963", in Muehlenbeck and Telepneva (eds), *Warsaw Pact Intervention in the 'Third World'*: 81-85; Petr Zidek and Karel Sieber, *Československo a subsaharská Afrika v letech 1948-1989*, 127-37.
- ⁵⁵ 'Zápis z porady o stavu v poskytování pomoci Guinejské republice', 25.11.1960, VHA, f. MNO 1960, Ka 460.

- ⁵⁶ Václav David (Ministr zahraničních věcí) – Antonín Novotný (Prezident republiky), 14.3.1966, VHA, f. MNO 1966, Ka 245.
- ⁵⁷ ‘Zpráva o poskytování pomoci ministerstva národní obrany zemím hospodářsky málo vyvinutým’, [bez data], VHA, f. MNO 1960, Ka 462; ‘Zpráva o plnění usnesení politického byra ÚV KSČ ze dne 28.8.1955, 2.1.1956, 9.2.1956 a 9.7.1956 o poskytování technické pomoci Egyptu, Syrii a Jemenu’, [bez data], VHA, f. MNO 1960, Ka 464.
- ⁵⁸ Otakar Rytíř (Náčelník generálního štábu Čs. lidové armády), únor 1964, ‘Souhrnná zpráva o poskytování technické pomoci HMVZ za rok 1963’, VHA, f. MNO 1964, Ka 326.
- ⁵⁹ Otakar Rytíř (Náčelník generálního štábu) – Bohumír Lomský (Ministr národní obrany), 1.10.1961, ‘Výcvik kubánských pilotů’, VHA, f. MNO 1961, Ka 453; Josef Jurášek and Milan Pohlodek, ‘Zpráva o pobytu skupiny “Jurášek” na Kubě’, 5.6.1961, VHA, f. MNO 1961, Ka 456.
- ⁶⁰ Generální štáb Čs. Lidové armády - A. N. Gusjev (Zástupce náčelníka štábu spojeného velení armád států Varšavské smlouvy), [bez data], ‘Poskytování technické pomoci zemím hospodářsky málo vyvinutým’, VHA, f. MNO 1961, Ka 457.
- ⁶¹ Jeremy Friedman, "Soviet Policy in the Developing World and the Chinese Challenge in the 1960s", *Cold War History*, 10: 2 (Spring 2010), 247–72.
- ⁶² Frederick Cooper, *Africa Since 1940: The Past of the Present* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).
- ⁶³ Josef Zuska (Náčelník ZF VAAZ), 2.12.1960, ‘Memorandum’, VHA, f. MNO 1960, Ka 463.
- ⁶⁴ Until 1960, flying exercises were carried out in Prešov, Hradec Králové, Trenčín, and explosives were taught in Nováky. Stanislav Homola (Velitel letectva a PVOS) – Otakar Rytíř (Náčelník generálního štábu), 18.3.1960, ‘Zabezpečení výcviku kubánských osádek na letounech MIG-15’, VHA, f. MNO 1960, Ka 465.
- ⁶⁵ ‘Zpráva o plnění usnesení politického byra ÚV KSČ ze dne 28.8.1955, 2.1.1956, 9.2.1956 a 9.7.1956 o poskytování technické pomoci Egyptu, Syrii a Jemenu’, [bez data], VHA, f. MNO 1960, Ka 464.
- ⁶⁶ ‘Podklady MNO ke zpracování zprávy o zajištění školení egyptských a syrských specialistů’, [bez data], VHA, f. MNO 1960, Ka 464.
- ⁶⁷ In 2007, the base (later known as Vojenský opravárenský závod Nováky) suffered an explosion which leveled the facility and resulted in eight deaths. ‘V Novákoch opět nastal výbuch’, <https://www.aktuality.sk/clanok/202716/v-novakoch-opat-nastal-vybuch>, [cit. 20 December 2019].
- ⁶⁸ Václav Vlk, (Náčelník kursu), [bez data, 1960], ‘Hlášení o průběhu kursu cizích odborníků v době od 16. 11. 1959 do 31. 12. 1959’, VHA, f. MNO 1960, Ka 462.
- ⁶⁹ ‘Zabezpečení výcviku kubánských pilotů’, 14.3.1960, VHA, f. MNO 1960, Ka 465.
- ⁷⁰ Otakar Rytíř (Náčelník Generálního štábu) – Ludvík Úbl (ředitel HTS MZO), 4.1.1962, VHA, f. MNO 1961, Ka 457.
- ⁷¹ ‘Zpráva o plnění usnesení politického byra ÚV KSČ ze dne 28.8. 1955, 2.1.1956, 9.2.1956 a 9.7.1956 o poskytování technické pomoci Egyptu, Syrii a Jemenu’, VHA, f. MNO 1960, Ka 464.
- ⁷² Josef Zuska (Náčelník ZF VAAZ), 12.6.1961 ‘Zpráva o průběhu výuky za období od 10. 5. Do 10. 6. 1961’, VHA, f. MNO 1961, Ka 455.
- ⁷³ ‘Informace o stavu ve školení zahraničních příslušníků na školách čs. lidové armády a o situaci v naší pomoci při výstavbě vojenské technické akademie v SAR’, [bez data, 1961], VHA, f. MNO 1961, Ka 457.
- ⁷⁴ Ibid.
- ⁷⁵ Ladislav Kolovratník, 11.1.1962, ‘Akce 101 – posluchači 32. Zmaraj Kassi a 62. Mohamad Jakub - nepřítomnosti’, VHA, f. MNO 1962, Ka 373.
- ⁷⁶ Ministerstvo národní obrany – HTS MZO, říjen 1966, ‘Krádeže na VAAZ – sdělení’, VHA, f. MNO 1966, Ka 246.
- ⁷⁷ Ladislav Kolovratník, 11.1.1962, ‘Akce 101 – posluchači 32. Zmaraj Kassi a 62. Mohamad Jakub - nepřítomnosti’, VHA, f. MNO 1962, Ka 373; Otakar Rytíř (Náčelník Generálního štábu), 26.1.1962, ‘Vyloučení dvou afgánských posluchačů akce 101 ze studia na zahraniční fakultě VAAZ’, VHA, f. MNO 1962, Ka 373.
- ⁷⁸ ‘Proslov commandante Guillermo Garcia k posluchačům Akce 122 v Brně dne 12. dubna 1961’, 12.4.1961, VHA, f. MNO 1961, Ka 453.
- ⁷⁹ ‘Opis. Stranická informace o průběhu studia cizích státních příslušníků na Vojenské akademii Antonína Zápotockého a o práce vojenské delegace na “Military College of Engineering” v Cairu’, 8.3.1960; Václav Šoral, [bez data], ‘O nedostatech zabezpečení a provádění akce 105’, VHA, f. MNO 1960, Ka 465.
- ⁸⁰ On the dilemmas facing Soviet authorities after the influx of foreign students, see: Sean Guillory, “Culture Clash in the Socialist Paradise: Soviet Patronage and African Students' Urbanity in the Soviet Union, 1960-1965”, 271-81; Julia Hessler, “Death of an African Student in Moscow: Race, Politics and the Cold War”, 33-63; Kristin Roth-Ey, “‘Loose Girls’ on the Loose?: Sex, Propaganda and the 1957 Youth Festival,” in *Women in the Khrushchev Era* ed. by Ilić, Reid, Attwood (London: Palgrave, 2004): 75-95.

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- ⁸² 'Rozbor plnění plánu technické pomoci za období od 1. ledna 1966 do 30. června 1966', [bez data], VHA, f. MNO 1966, Ka 245.
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- ⁸⁴ Vratislav Pechota, "Czechoslovakia and the Third World," in Michael Radu, ed, *Eastern Europe and the Third World: East vs. South* (New York, 1981), 85.
- ⁸⁵ 'Technická pomoc poskytovaná ČSSR ozbrojeným silám rozvojových zemí', [bez data], VHA, f. MNO 1966, Ka 245.
- ⁸⁶ 'Rozbor plnění plánu technické pomoci za období od 1. ledna 1966 do 30. června 1966', [bez data], VHA, f. MNO 1966, Ka 245.
- ⁸⁷ Josef Širočka (zástupce náčelníka správy pro zahraniční stžk GŠ) – Karel Vítka (děkan Zahraniční fakulty VAAZ) 'Podklady pro perspektivní činnost zahraniční fakulty VAAZ', leden 1969, VHA, f. MNO 1969, Ka 211.
- ⁸⁸ 'Rozbor plnění plánu technické pomoci za období od 1. ledna 1966 do 30. června 1966', [bez data], VHA, f. MNO 1966, Ka 245.
- ⁸⁹ The Ministry of Defence suggested the following ratio be used for training: 50% should be trained for full price (125 cadets); 40% for reduced prize (100); 10% on stipends (25). If all capacity would be filled according to this key, it would bring approximately 27 million Kčs annually. Náčelník Oddělení technické pomoci GŠ – ÚV KSČ, 15.4.1966, 'Zpráva o poskytování speciální technické pomoci rozvojovým zemím', VHA, f. MNO 1966, Ka 245.
- ⁹⁰ Csaba Békés and Daniel Vékony, "Unfulfilled Promised Lands: Missed Potentials in Relations between Hungary and the Countries of the Middle East, 1955-75" in Philip Muehlenbeck and Natalia Telepneva (eds) *Warsaw Pact Intervention in the 'Third World': Aid and Influence in the Cold War* (London: IB Tauris, 2018), 271-98.
- ⁹¹ V. Valeš (Ministr zahraničního obchodu) – vláda ČSSR, 18.6.1968, 'Zpráva k návrhu Zásad pro uskutečňování zahraničního obchodu se speciálním materiálem a pro pojednávání a schvalování obchodních jednání o jeho dodávkách', VHA, f. MNO 1970, Ka 254.
- ⁹² 'Zpráva o současném stavu poskytování technické pomoci rozvojovým zemím v oblasti vojenské techniky', [bez data], VHA f. MNO 1967, Ka 160.
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- ⁹⁴ Philip Muehlenbeck, *Czechoslovakia in Africa, 1945-1968* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), 173-175.
- ⁹⁵ 'Rozbor plnění plánu technické pomoci za období od 1. ledna 1966 do 30. června 1966', [bez data], VHA, f. MNO 1966, Ka 245.
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- ⁹⁸ Ibid.
- ⁹⁹ Ibid.
- ¹⁰⁰ Ibid.
- ¹⁰¹ Ibid.
- ¹⁰² In 1969, Pakistan continued to be a matter of contention. František Langer (Generální ředitel HTS) – Oldřich Černík (Předseda vlády), 17.1.1969, VHA, f. MNO 1969, Ka 211.
- ¹⁰³ For more information on the company see, see: <https://www.czub.cz/en/>.
- ¹⁰⁴ On these debates in the USSR, see: Arne Westad, *The Global Cold War*, 364-96.