

TIME SPENT ON RELIGIOUS ACTIVITIES OF PAKISTANI YOUTH: EVIDENCE
FROM TIME USE DATA

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Dedicated to my mother Ferdous Ara Begum (Shelly)

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Abstract

Pakistan being the 2nd largest Muslim country with a large youth base population. Given the importance of youth for development of the country, it is a vital subsection to study in terms of all aspects of their lives, including education, work, marriage, and how they spend their time.

The purpose of this research is to examine time spent on religious activities of youth of Pakistan. Data for this purpose is used from a nationally representative survey of young people, collected by Population Council in 2001-02. The analysis will explore background factors like gender, locality, educational level, etc. which impacts on participation in religious activities of youth in Pakistan.

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Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this research is to examine time spent on religious activities of youth of Pakistan. A national level study on religious behavior of Pakistani youth is first of its kind. The findings will shed light on the myriad factors that affect youth's choice in time allocation for religious activities.

1.1 Interest in Youth Research

Interest in studying adolescence and youth as a specific stage of life is not new as we can judge from Hall's seminal work spanning two volumes on this stage of human life (1904). Hall's work "continues to define the scope of the field nearly a century later." (Petersen, 1991 cited in Furstenberg 2000). Ever since then adolescence has been regarded more as a problematic stage of life that one goes through before reaching adulthood. The rise in age at marriage and prolonged stay in educational institutions—especially since the sixties-- brought a shift in thinking in this regard and "adolescence became a more distinctive and culturally marked life stage during the second third of this century" (Furstenberg 2000).

The world population reached six billion in 1999 and one out of every six inhabitant of this world was a young adult. There are about 2 billion young people (10-24 year olds) in the world in 2010 and majority of them live in developing countries.¹ Since

¹ United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, World Population

then, the youth population continued to grow, especially in the developing countries. It was a time to understand this group better, not only in terms what “they do”, like formal and informal education, training for work, work, sexual activity, risk taking etc. but also in terms of what their values, gender attitudes, aspirations, inspirations, motivations and constraints in life are. Lloyd, in the introduction to “growing up global” aptly describes the importance of studying the period of adolescence for policy and programmatic perspectives, while criticizing the lack of such research in the past,

“The transition to adulthood is a critical stage of human development during which young people leave childhood behind and take on new roles and responsibilities...To a large degree, the nature and quality of young people’s future lives depend on how successfully they negotiate through this critical period. Yet in many developing countries, it is a stage of life that has only recently begun to receive focused attention (Lloyd 2005).”

In order to get a better understanding of what goes in an “everyday life of a youth person” a good starting point would be to analyze their current time-use pattern, which has obvious links with their current education, work and marital status. While survey research has typically served well to provide information on lives of young people, time use research has grown as an important tool for policy analysis. Typically such an analysis is undertaken with survey of current “human development” activities the youth engage in, so that policy recommendations can be made for a comprehensive youth development program. Time-use studies, thus have gained significant importance not

only in estimation of market based and household based “productive” activities but also those which leads to future “productivity,” in other words human development or human capital development activities. The of these surveys are used to feed into a wide array of population policies and programs, including transportation, labor laws, leisure, pension plans, and various health care programs. (United Nations Statistics Division 2005)

With a population of 180 million, Pakistan is the sixth most populous country in the world. The country’s population is fairly young with around 68 percent of the inhabitants below the age of 30 years of age.^{2,3} Until the recent years, the government had largely ignored the needs of youth as a separate sub-group, despite acknowledging them as an asset of the country. Testimony to this is the Youth Ministry that keeps changing its structure and the never-finished Youth Policy.⁴ The Ministry and the youth policy saw as many upheavals and abrupt changes as the governments of the country itself in the six decades of its history.⁵ Most youth related programs and policies have been administered by the government through the ministries of education, social welfare, population and health. However, this has changed significantly since the nineties and government has taken several initiatives to understand the youth of the country better, in order to create

² Based on Labour Force Survey 2012-13 statistics, more than two thirds of the population of Pakistan is under the age of 30.

³ One third of the population falls in the category of adolescent and youth (15-24 years).

⁴ Government of Pakistan, Ministry of Youth Affairs. Accessed 8/31/2013 url: http://www.moya.gov.pk/national_youth_policy.html

⁵ Pakistan became an independent country in 1947.

and implement specific policies and programs. The biggest reason for such shift is to plan for the impending demographic bonus. Pakistan, with its youthful population and a decline (albeit slow) in fertility rates, is moving towards a population age structure which will produce a higher proportion of people in the working ages, known as the “youth bulge,” a phenomenon which is also called the "demographic dividend." Population projections shows that this demographic dividend window opened in 1990 (with the first signs of documented fertility decline) and is likely to start closing around 2045 (Sathar et al. 2007; Nayab 2008; British Council 2009) when the country would face the “aging bulge.”⁶ The demographic dividend is touted to have brought the rise of the Asian Tigers in the East Asian region, where fertility declined much earlier (than South Asia), with parallel investments in human capital and economic infrastructure. However, this opportunity lasts only for a limited number of years. Moreover, in order to make use of this opportunity the working age population has to be well educated and trained to be economically productive. While the “demographic gift” provides an window of opportunity for fast economic growth, the same can turn into a “burden” if the population is not prepared to be embrace the new opportunities and the economic infrastructure is not developed to deploy them (Nayab 2008).

Pakistan is predominantly a rural country and two thirds of Pakistani youth live in

⁶ The current proportion of people who are 60 years and over is around 5 percent. However, with the closing of the youth bulge, this segment will rapidly increase, assuming that fertility levels would either remain the same or decline, when the “bulge of the youth” will start to grow old.

rural areas. There are two education system Pakistan's education system, traditional which is religious schools (*Madrassas*)⁷ and modern formal education, both in private and public sectors.⁸ Overall education statistics in the country is quite dismal, only 58 percent of the population is literate. According to Barro and Lee's (2012) analysis a little less than a fifth of the population of Pakistan (over 25 years of age) finished secondary education, while only about five percent completed tertiary. In terms of labor force activities, half of the population of young people are not part of the labour force and those who are, find it hard to acquire work and have unemployment as high as 22 percent (Ahmad and Azim 2010, 185).

1.2 Current Research

The focus of this dissertation to analyze how young men and women in Pakistan use their time in religious activities. Personal, household, and societal level characteristics such as age, gender, marital status, secular attitude score, economic status of the household, parental education, urban vs. rural, province etc. will be included both in descriptive as well as inferential analysis. Finally, a multivariate model will be created to determine

⁷ Madrassa education is not the most popular choice among masses. In fact, only less than 1 percent of the enrolled students are part of the *Madrassas* system (Andrabi et al. 2006).

⁸ In Pakistan's the modern formal education system is multi-tiered. At the first level is five years primary education, then comes middle and secondary school which is from grade 6 to 8 and 9 and 10. Third level is colleges which provides higher secondary or intermediate certificate. Higher education is provided through colleges and universities and ranges from takes anywhere between four or more years. Usually the degrees granted are Bachelors, Master's, Doctorate, and professional level. For more information see Pakistan Education system, overview <http://education.stateuniversity.com/pages/1143/Pakistan-educational-system-overview.html>

the pathways to that lead to the use of discretionary time for religious activities. Selected background factors would be used in the model as predictors to determine total time spent in religious activities and non-reporting of religious activity.

The reason for choosing the topic itself assumes the a) that it is important to study adolescence or youth as a sub-group of population for Pakistan and b) that studying time use in religious activities is a fruitful exercise both as for academic as well as for drawing policy implications is critical in understanding how time-use is shaped by context, and finally c) that time-use research is an important methodological route to that goal.

1.3 Outline of Dissertation

The dissertation highlights the demographic, socio-economic and other background factors which affect young people's participation in religious activities on a daily basis. Chapter 2 provides theoretical approaches to the study of sociology. Chapter 3 comprises of a detailed discussion on religiosity in the Muslim world a section on religiosity in Pakistan.⁹ Chapter 4 focuses on methodological issues with details of time use research. The next chapter presents findings and discussion about them, from the research study starting with descriptive statistics and hypothesis testing, and results from multivariate analysis conducted with a model to determine factors which makes an impact in time spent on religious activities. The final chapter presents conclusions and implications for

⁹ The majority of Pakistanis adhere to Islam. Hence the description of religious life in Pakistan will focus on only on Islam and its adherents, and the analysis will be conducted for Muslim respondents only.

further studies.

While reading the chapters, it should be kept in mind that religion and religiosity in Pakistan has piqued interest of many due to the current US-Pakistan engagement in war on terror and acts of terrorism and sectarian violence in the country that are generally assumed to be linked with growth of religious fanaticism and radicalization. Though the dissertation does focus on youth and religion in Pakistan, however, the data used for this research is not sufficient to draw any conclusions indicating a correlation of religiosity and tendencies of Islamization or *Talibanization*¹⁰ of society. This is so for three reasons, first the complexity of defining what is religiosity and its relationship to radical mindset would require an entirely different study. Second, in a cross sectional study you can only conjecture about the direction of causality, that is, the reason for that particular outcome. Third, this study did not collect any information to show whether religiosity could be a pathway leading to fanaticism. In other words is it spending too much time in prayers that leads a person to become radical or if a person with an already radicalized mindset would dedicate more time to religious activities or perhaps being religious may not have any relationship with hyper-religiosity (demonstrated by time spent in such activities). Hence the dissertation does not address the issue of religious fundamentalism and fanaticism in Pakistan. Moreover, the author would like to point that “radicalization is not necessarily a

¹⁰ The term Talibanization --has roots in the Taliban rule in Afghanistan (from 1996 to 2001)--was used first by Roy in 1998 (see Roy 1998, 119 and Rashid 2002, 22). According to one definition “The term implies a number of conditions: the strict regulation of women; the *prohibition* of entertainment including music, movies, dance, and television; the enforcement of specific religious appearance involving *burqas* for women and beards for men.” (Al Sayyad and Massoumi 2011)

religious phenomenon” rather it is a “deviation from law” to bring a desired change in society, as noted by Dr. Tariq Rahman.¹¹ Along similar lines, Peracha et al. (2012) argue that “poverty, deprivation and political pressures as key factors in the youths’ vulnerability to becoming part of violent extremist groups” rather than religion or to be precise Islam.¹² Therefore, a study to create factors that lead to higher level of religious activity and thus radicalization is beyond the purview of this research. However, there is another school of thought refutes this theory and their analysis of empirical data shows that poverty does not necessarily lead to support of terrorism (Blair et al. 2013; Shapiro and Fair 2010).

1.4 Personal Reflection

The main area of my professional interest is research in youth development issues including within the realm of Pakistan in particular and in Muslim societies and in the South Asian region in general. The study group is based on my experience, expertise and interest lies in the adolescent and youth age group. The primary reason for selecting that demographic group is simply that Pakistan experienced fertility decline only in the recent past and due to that the current population is quite young.¹³ With a population of 180

¹¹Pakistan Institute for Peace. Accessed 7/12/2012, URL: <<http://san-pips.com/index.php?action=events&id=04>>

¹² United States Institute of Peace. 2012. The Challenges of Countering Radicalization in Pakistan. Accessed 7/12/2012, URL: <<http://www.usip.org/publications/the-challenges-countering-radicalization-in-pakistan>>

¹³ The median age of Pakistani population is 20 years.

million, the proportion of youth population is a quite significant, and hence, not surprisingly has alerted the policy makers to give special attention to this age group. Moreover, with such a shape and size of the population and a declining fertility rate,¹⁴ it is predicted that the country's population would still grow but the population age structure will shift, with higher proportion of people in the working ages (15-60 years). Thus, it will have a large proportion of population in the productive ages, than those considered dependent and require resources to survive, i.e. under 15 or over 65 years of age. This phenomenon is also known as the “demographic dividend” and is a phase of the demographic transition which allows a window of opportunity for immense potential for economic growth. However the same dividend could easily become a burden if not well prepared to engage gainfully in social, economic and political spheres of life. My interest in youth is precisely shaped because of the demographic importance for the country's future and also due to my exposure to various projects related to research on young people in Pakistan, starting from 1997, while working in Population Council. Later on, I gained further insights on youth attitudes, behaviors and aspirations while working with World Population Foundation on their Life Skills for Health project, targeted towards students in 8th grade, in 4 districts of Pakistan.

Another main area of my interest related to youth is measuring manifestations of modernity and reactions to modernity and the contextual sources for that. Secularization

¹⁴ The Total Fertility Rate (“the number of children that would be born to a woman if she were to live to the end of her childbearing years and bear children in accordance with current age-specific fertility rates”) for Pakistan is 3.3 and the population growth rate is 2.0. (Government of Pakistan 2013, 156)

or revived interest in religion, are both a function of modernization and globalization. Moreover, growing up in Pakistan during the Islamization era of General Zia ul Haque and observing the shifts in society with changes in later government's ideology, I find the political forces quite fascinating, in terms of their power in shaping society.

Another impetus for my choice of topic is recent geo-political affairs. The world order changed drastically after the catastrophic events of 9/11/2001 in the United States of America and the course of history changed forever. For some countries that were later attacked for that event or the countries that took part in war on terror, it has been a tumultuous time for the past decade. Given strategic location of Pakistan, it has been part of many wars and proxy wars and 9/11/2001 was no exception when the country had no choice but to support USA in its war against Afghanistan and also search for terrorists and terror hideouts in the Waziristan¹⁵ region, a large area governed by tribal laws, between Afghanistan and Pakistan. The past decade has been a difficult for Pakistan and many of its inhabitants. Keeping this scenario in mind, I decided to focus on religion and youth in Pakistan.

¹⁵ Waziristan is one of the seven administrative subdivisions of Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan. The FATA subdivisions are autonomous and regulated by Frontier Crimes regulation (FCR) and tribal laws (Hasnat 2011, 148-149).

Chapter 2

REVIEW OF SOCIOLOGICAL LITERATURE ON RELIGIOSITY

Religion performs multi-fold and complex roles for individuals as well as societies.

Religion not only provides spiritual fulfillment, but also acts as a source of identity and ethical framework for life. Religion's impact in the world has long intrigued academics, social and behavioral scientists, and public and mental health experts. Participation in organized religion is purported to help improve physical and mental health through social increasing bonding by bringing on people on a platform thus increasing cohesion in society. Moreover, research has shown that religious beliefs impact the economic and demographic behavior of individuals and families, “including the choice of marital partner, entry into cohabitation and marriage, divorce, fertility, women’s work at home and in the labor market, education, wages, and wealth” (Lehrer 2004, 707).

Religion, while providing the function of fulfilling spiritual needs, yearnings, answers to existential questions and the meaning and purpose of life to individuals, also integrates individuals following similar religious beliefs with each other, and hence is very critical in social cohesion and integration, as well as a means of social control (Durkheim 1915). Religion also provides a bridge for creating cultural and social capital for their followers which thus adds to its attraction because the benefits of religion are generally perceived to be reaped after death while these are tangible benefits that can be enjoy in this world (as discussed by Bourdieu 1993 and 1987; see also Verter 2003).

The role and function of religion changes over time for societies as well as individuals, hence the need of religion among youth might be very different than for a child or an older person. While for youth, religion may act as a protective factor and safety net against risks taking behavior but for people in advanced ages it could provide only spiritual satisfaction and confirmation and confidence in salvation after life. The stage in life also determines the amount of time one allocates to religious activities.

2.1 Sociology of Religion a Theoretical Approach

Religion is defined as a “unified system of beliefs and practices relative to sacred things, that is to say, things set apart and forbidden – beliefs and practices which unite into one single” (Durkheim 1915, 47). The sociology of religion entails use of various sociological methods to study how religion and society interact and impact each other. For sociologists religion is a phenomenon created by social construction and hence the field of sociology does not attempt to analyze religions on a normative level, rather their purpose is to understand how religion influences societies, social structure and/or social relations (Banu 1992; Borgatta and Rhonda 2000).

The foundation of the field of sociology of religion is rooted in the writings of Durkheim, Weber and Marx in the late nineteenth century. Durkheim’s extensive analysis of suicide in various societies, essays on elementary forms of religious lives, Weber’s groundbreaking analysis of Christianity and rise of capitalism and Marx’s theory of religion as a means for control of limited resources in society provided the theoretical underpinnings to understand the nexus of religion and society (Durkheim 1915 and 1951; Weber 1958).

“Marx, Durkheim and Weber represent the foundational sociological traditions examining the ‘institution’ of religion. They simply represent the attempt to explain the larger structures and patterns that are observable in every culture throughout history. Marx, Durkheim and Weber represent the objectivist, or modernist tradition within sociology (Townsend 2004).”

Among recent scholars, Carvalho (2009, 19), while extolling the function of religion in society writes that “...by directing attention from material to spiritual matters, religious activity (i) generates religious values, (ii) which place less importance on an agent’s economic status, and (iii) thereby serve as a coping mechanism for relative deprivation.” Moreover, “religious belief and practices can enhance self-esteem, life satisfaction and a person’s ability to withstand traumatic experiences” (see also Smith et al. 2003, cited in Carvalho 2009, 19).

Peter Berger (1967) -- known for postulating the functionalist perspective on religion-- argues that “religion is a kind of ‘canopy’ that shields individuals and, by implication, society from the ultimately destructive consequences of a seemingly chaotic, purposeless existence.” He also advanced the famous (and also famously discredited) “secularization thesis,” in which he predicted the demise of religions in the modern world based on the competition of various religious ideologies competing to take the central place in that sacred canopy, thus pushing religion from the public to the private sphere (Juergensmeyer 2004, 1).

According to the Encyclopedia of Religion and Society’s entry on sociology of religion there are three roles of studying the nexus of religion and society:

“first, to further the understanding of the role of religion in society; second, to

analyze its significance in and impact upon human history; and, third, to understand the social forces and influences that in turn shape religion”(Hamilton 1994 cited in Swato and Kivisto 1998).

As noted before religion came under fire after 9/11/2001 and all spheres of public life including journalists, policy makers, and academics have scrutinized how religion itself could be responsible for such an enormous tragedy. However Juergensmeyer (2004) postulates that no one agrees one way or the other, to the basic argument “whether religion is the cause of violence or its unwilling servant.”

2.2 Measuring Religiosity

The concept of religiosity has been studied from various perspectives within the field of social sciences. In the realm of sociology, religiosity is generally accepted as “a multidimensional phenomenon” (Mueller 1980, 41). It is considered to be a composite characteristic or trait of a person based on knowledge, feeling, practice, or commitment (Glock 1954; Lenski 1961; King 1967; Fichter 1969; Muller 1980; Hackney 2003; King and Hunt 1975; King 1967). However, of all the different facets of measuring religiosity, church attendance (or any other formal prayer in an institution) is considered to be one of the most robust measures.

“*religiousness* manifests itself in external rituals of devotion ... and centers upon the social/communal, the institutional and the discernible and is evidenced in the extrinsic use and practice of rituals, the most typical of which is church attendance” (Hill 2000).

2.3 Religious Participation and its Social Significance

Historically religious participation has been looked at as tool of oppression, and regressive and irrational practice (Stark and Finke 2000). However in the last few decades that view has changed significantly, and practice of religion is generally considered to be associated with positive outcomes in life --with the exception of those who still see it as a tool of oppression, regressive and irrational (see for example, Ellison and Levin 1998; Townsend et al. 2002; Rew and Wong 2006).

Another salient feature of recent studies related to role of religion is the focus on mental and physical health and wellbeing. Hence, religiosity in general and prayers in particular have been associated with health and healing, coping with trauma, psychological problems and other stresses in life (see for example, Koenig et al. 2001; Regnerus 2003; Ellison and Levin 1998; and George et al. 2000; Oman, and Thoresen 2005, among many others). Religion has been also been linked with bringing improvement in people's lives by creating pathways to enhanced well-being, increasing happiness and life satisfaction, adaptation to bereavement, and social support; lowering rates of alcohol and drug use and abuse, lessening delinquency and criminal activity (Koenig 2001). A meta-analysis done by McCullough et al. (2000) using 42 different studies based on 125,826 subjects, found that people who were more involved in public religious life were 20 percent less likely to have cardiovascular disease and [thus] higher life expectancy (cited in Al-kandari 2003, 470).

2.3.1 Religion and Youth

Studies pertaining to religiosity and youth also share a long history. In this area of sociological studies, religion has almost been looked at from the perspective of a “protective” mechanism for young adults who are perceived to be at risk for deviant behaviors. In these studies (which once again are dominated by studies conducted in Western societies and hence mostly involve followers of Christian faith) we find a positive influence of religion in the lives of youth (see for example, Hemming and Madge 2012; Pearce and Denton 2011; Bartkowski et al. 2009; Burdette and Hill 2009; McNamara et al. 2010; Uecker 2008).¹⁶ However it should be stressed that, youth participation in religious activities or other programs that are organized by their religious group relies strongly on the family’s religiosity. As observed by Denton (2006),

[for youth] "religious participation, ... is not a direct measure of religious commitment or salience. For teenagers in particular, it is necessary to distinguish between religious attendance and religious salience. Teenagers are not fully autonomous individuals and their religious practices may be the result of parental direction as much as voluntary choice" (Denton 2006, 16).

2.3.2 Religion’s Impact on Economics

Even though a causal pathway cannot be demonstrated, there have been many attempts to show how religion impacts economic and business behavior. Religion’s role in the institution of economics has been first pointed out by Adam Smith in his seminal work,

¹⁶ For example, the National Study on Youth and Religion produced a series of publications on religion’s role and influence in the lives of youth. <http://www.youthandreligion.org/publications>

“Wealth of Nations.” Smith analyzed the linkages of society with religion and noted that “competition among religious institutions leads to greater religiosity in society” (Smith 1776, cited in Carvalh 2009, 14). He also argued that lack of state religion allows competition among religions and sects and thus provides more choices for people to select a “particular” religion or a school that makes the most rational sense for them (McCleary 2011). Economic behavior and religion has shown to have so much affinity that a whole field, “Economics of Religion” has emerged (McCleary 2011). Since then, Max Weber’s research on religion and economic systems in which he argues that religious beliefs have a direct correlation to methods of business and hence success or failure, has received ample attention both in terms of adulation as well as criticism (1958).¹⁷

Barro and McCleary (2003) explain linkages of economics, religion and determinants of religiosity. In this multi country analysis, the authors discuss how religion is neither a product nor the main force of economic institutions in a particular society. The direction of causality of these two variables works in both directions.

2.3.2.1 Religion’s Impact on Economics of the Household

Following Weber’s seminal work on religion and Protestant work ethics, Lenski (1961)

¹⁷ The Economist published an interesting critique in this regard. "Holy relevance: Faith can influence economic behaviour—but not always directly." The Economist 29 Oct. 2011. Accessed 8/31/2012, URL: <<http://www.economist.com/node/21534762>>

empirically tested how religion intervened in economic outcomes. Lenski's findings show that household behavior has been shown to consciously incorporate religious activities in their daily routines for "gains" in life after death (Lenski 1961). Similarly, Carvalh (2009) identifies an inter-temporal household production model of religion and opportunity cost of religion model which has been developed by Azzi and Ehrenberg (1975). Azzi and Ehrenberg (1975) concluded that the household members "trade off present-life consumption with after-life rewards which are generated through religious participation" (Carvalh 2009, 14).

"since household members participation in religious activities requires the use of their time, it seems logical for economists to utilize a similar framework to analyze certain dimensions of religiosity" (Azzi and Ehrenberg 1975, 4).

2.3.3 Religion and Health and Wellbeing

A number of research studies studying religion's role in personal wellbeing have found positive correlations (for a detailed analyses see Ferraro and Albrecht-Jensen 1991; George et al. 2013). Tiliouine (2009) notes that even something as small as belief in God, increases the average score for life satisfaction and suicide tendencies go down.

Religion, taken in its broad sense, represents a protective factor against despair resulting from a lack of transcendence in the human condition (Ellison and Levin 1998, cited in Tiliouine 2009)

2.3.4 Religion as a Tool for Oppression

Varying degrees of strength of religiosity may have different results. For example, research shows that domestic violence decreases with moderate religious participation but

increases for those who are very active in church going (Lehrer 2004). Religion (especially orthodox beliefs) has also been strongly associated with patriarchy, negative cultural practices and the oppression and control of certain sections or members of population. In some instances, religiosity has shown to increase intolerant behavior. For example it has been found that followers of hardliner sects (i.e., Evangelical Protestants) are more likely to oppose immigrants who appear to be a “threat to American values” (McDaniel 2011, 223; cited in Ai et al. 2003, 92). Another criticism of essentialism of religion through the functionalist lens is that “it overlooks religion's dysfunctions. For instance, religion can be used to justify terrorism and violence” (Juergensmeyer 2000). On many occasions, unfair treatment of women, religious minorities and homosexuals, and restricting access to contraception or abortion services are also justified on the basis of religion--even when there is no such postulation in the scripture. In many of these cases the fine line between religion and culture is blurred to such extent that even pointing out such discrepancies could be tantamount to blasphemy (e.g., Pakistan’s Law’s related to rape, and blasphemy).¹⁸

In an analysis conducted by Seguino and Lovinsky (2009, 40) with World Values Survey data (including Chile, India, Iran, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, Poland, Serbia, United States, and Turkey) on religiosity and gender attitudes, it has been found that religiosity is positively correlated with patriarchal attitudes . However, before drawing

¹⁸ Pakistan Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860)
<http://www.pakistani.org/pakistan/legislation/1860/actXLVof1860.html>

conclusions, other background characteristics of respondents should also be taken into consideration. For example, in terms of support of inequality of wages (between men and women), the effect of being male was almost as great as religiosity. The study highlights that regardless of level of religiosity, individuals with higher levels of education and income are more likely to have better attitudes towards gender equality. The authors did not find any particular religion to be most antagonistic towards gender equity. The data shows that contrary to expectations and stereotypical image of Islam, most “dominant religions – and not exclusively Islam – have varying effects on gender attitudes and outcomes, some positive, some negative” (Seguino and Lovinsky 2009, 41).

Moreover, religion does not always act as a “factor” or cause in determining a certain pathway of behavior. Religiosity can also be an “outcome” of certain background and demographic characteristics, like women are found to be more religious or old age increases religiosity. Research on religious beliefs and behaviors to be a function have shown that they are shaped in the context of (a) family and denominational socialization, (b) gender, (c) social status, and (d) life course events and aging (Sherkat and Ellison 1999). Moreover, “parents influence their children's religious beliefs and commitments both directly through the socialization of beliefs and commitments” (Sherkat and Ellison 1999).

Research using religion as dependent as well as independent variable abounds about correlation of religion with higher level of volunteerism, protection from drug and alcohol consumption, better physical and mental health, stability in marriage, fertility decision making, acquiring social capital, etc. (Iannaccone 1998, 1475). However,

religious behavior may just be a co-occurring phenomenon rather than a cause or outcome to any of the listed social outcomes.

Another important aspect of scholarly research on religion and religiosity is that most of the studies have been conducted in more developed countries or Western societies where Christianity is the predominant religion. Hence religiosity research is mostly dominated by one religion albeit with diverse denominations.

2.3.5 Religion and Secularization

Finally, a discussion of theories of religiosity cannot be completed without referring to secularization of individuals and societies. Historically these two terms have been discussed in opposition to each other, namely that secularization of society reduces religiosity. Durkheimians, “to whom religion refers to a set of collective representations providing moral unity to a society” consider secularization as anathema for solidarity. However, Weberians consider secularization as a social change that is bound to happen as societies become more and more rational (Chaves 1994, 750). The perspective on secularization by sociologists about the purported decline of religion (due to heightened rationalization) in societies has not turned out as predicted by scholars of religion and society (for elaboration on this topic see Tschannen 1991; Stark 1999; Evans 2012).

As we know that though people’s participation in religion (i.e., frequency of prayer and church attendance may have decreased) but the proportion of people who believe in the supernatural forces defined as religion has not gone down. In fact, the last few decades have seen renewed interest in religion. In this context, Sherkat and Ellison

(1999) provide an extensive and interesting critique on how sociology of religion has emerged as an important field, in response to increasing value of religion in social life.

It appears that religion is not decreasing in importance in any society but religious participation is decreasing, especially in some parts of the world. For example, according to the latest general survey in the United States of America, more than 90 percent people believe in the existence of God but only around half belong to an organized religion and about one fourth go to the Church regularly. It is quite apparent in this background, that considering religiosity and secularization in opposition to each other does not make sense. To be fair, “secularization is best understood not as the decline of religion, but as the declining scope of religious authority” (Chaves 1994, 750).

“some theorists adhere to the modernization thesis, arguing that the intensity of religious beliefs is a response to economic insecurity and is thus inversely correlated with the stage of economic development. Adherents predict a diminished role of religion with greater and more stable material well-being” (Seguino and Lovinsky 2009, 4).

Religious attachment has increased, not decreased in several countries of the world. Moreover, Borgatta et al. (2000, 2946) also address the issue of seemingly a renewed interest in religion in various parts of the world “the United States, Australia and other European societies, as well as newly modernizing societies like India, the Philippines, Singapore, Brazil, Mexico and in Muslim societies.” Instead of disappearing in private quarters, religion seems to continue to thrive with greater number of followers and its influence in public life (Hassan 2006, 120). Along the same lines, religiosity of societies has not necessarily gone down with economic gains.

2.4 Research on Religiosity in Muslim Societies

Interest in Muslim societies among Westerners is not new, starting from the days of “Orientalism” in eighteenth century which ushered in an era of exploration of the mystical and mythical east, especially Middle East (Said 1979). Or in recent times, as Hassan (nd) postulates that since the nineteen-seventies the interest in the West to study Muslim societies, especially issues like women, Islamic fundamentalism etc. has grown. These studies however, unfortunately show the Muslim world as a monolith with Islam as the common denominator, rather than highlighting the tremendous diversities in religious practices and beliefs (Hassan 2004). Or as Bayat (2010, 3) explains how “Middle East” as a subject of study is not new, and has been “approached with a largely western Orientalist outlook.” He further expounds that the Western interest as a region for study, goes back to eighteenth century or before.

In the recent past, studies related to Muslim societies have garnered attention (Hughes 2007). There are various theories and hypothesis to explain the recent interest mostly stemming from perceived threat from Muslims. One of the most important recent changes is the demographic shift in the Muslim world and of the Muslims residing in the West. As we know, Islam is one of the fastest growing religions in the world-- the Muslim population is expected to grow up to 2.2 billion (from 1.3 billion) by 2030, which is mostly due to higher birth rates among Muslims and new conversions to the religion (Pew Research Forum 2011). Due to higher fertility the Muslim world is comparatively younger, and thus potentially a major boon or bane for the world in terms of having huge proportions of work age population when the rest of the (developed) world would be

grappling with aging issues. This demographic force also coincides with high level of Muslim immigration to various Western countries. These immigrants now form a significant minority, large enough for some of the countries to change their laws like in Switzerland, where, since 2009, it is illegal to build buildings with minarets, a visible marker for mosques (for example see Baumann 2009). Moreover, due to the higher fertility (plus immigration and some conversion) Islam “supposedly” poses a threat to the existing European culture and there is a fear of *Sharia* law taking over Western societies, and *Arabization* or Europe being converted to Eurabia¹⁹ (Marcinkowski 2009).

The end of first world war-- the Ottoman Empire had lost against the allied forces thus formally ending a long period of Islamic empire-- ushered in a wave of Islamic revivalism (Amghar 2007, 40; Roy 2006). Since the early seventies, when the Arabs lost the 1967 Arab-Israel war, it has been suggested that there has been a wake-up call to invoke and create a stronger Muslim identity and religious revival (for example see Dekmejian 1980; Lapidus 1997). Demant (2006) attribute this phase as the first wave of Islamism which took place from 1967-1981 and spread Sunni extremist ideology.²⁰ Moreover, around the same time period events in Saudi Arabia, Malaysia, and Indonesia also called for Islamic revival to deal with social and political problems. Since then, there

¹⁹Demography Matters Blog. Accessed 4/3/2012 url: <<http://demographymatters.blogspot.com/2011/02/on-pew-forums-disproof-of-eurabia.html>>.

²⁰ In continuing Roy's (1994) typology that the history of Islamism can be categorized in three distinct periods and places, the first (1967-81) as rise of Arab Sunni power, second in the assertion of *Shia* supremacy in the 1980s and the period of 1991-2001 as the third phase.

has been resurgence in *Islamization* movements across several Muslim countries. Moreover, in the nineties the challenge of globalization and modernization was perceived as another threat to Islamic ways of life and (perceived as an) attack of western culture through easy access to the cultural and economic goods of the West (Lapidus 1997). Commenting on the tussle between globalization and religion Sachedina notes that,

“Since the 1990s, a tension has arisen between globalization, which claims to be universal through its program of exchanges and the interdependence of economies that go beyond the state boundaries, and Islam, which, although particularistic, claims to be universal in its ethical application and to offer comprehensive directives covering all aspects of human existence” (Sachedina 2002, 23).

As noted earlier, ever since 9/11/2001, there has been a renewed interest in Muslims particularly the youth (Bayoumi 2009; Cainkar, 2009; Ghaffar-Kucher 2011; Larsson 2005). Werbner (2004, 897 cited in Ghaffar-Kucher 2011, 2) considers this problematic as “much of this research responds to the construction of Muslims as an ‘an alienated, problematic minority.’” Kuper (2012) writing for Financial Times (a British daily) laments the fact that, “Muslims” were discovered in the west only on September 11, 2001.... Since 9/11, “Islam” explains everything from the French riots to Saddam Hussein.” In addition to the conundrum of 9/11, the Arab Spring of late 2010 and early 2011 sparked further interest in the West to study Muslim societies, especially since these movements toppled decades-long dictatorships and called for democracy, in effect challenging Western notions about that Islam that it is incompatible with democracy (for example see Marzouki 2012).

Currently there are 1.6 billion Muslims living in this world residing in 49 Muslim

majority countries spread out in almost all other countries of the world (Pew Research Forum 2011). Contrary to the popular perceptions about Muslims that they are mostly Arabs from Middle East, about one half of the Muslims reside in only three South Asian countries: Pakistan, India and Bangladesh (Pew Research Forum 2011). According to the estimates of Pew Research Forum majority of the Muslims in the world belong to the Sunni sect of Islam, while Shia Islam is practiced by about 10-13 percent majority of whom (68-80%) reside in just four countries, Iran, Pakistan, India and Iraq.

As noted by Pargament (1997) that the typical quantitative method of gauging religiosity of Muslims may be too simplistic,

“... Islam might mean different things to different people, and some people might adhere to some of its elements but not to others. Therefore, using a few items (i.e., prayer, masjid attendance) to measure Islamic religiousness fails to capture the multifaceted nature of Islam and may render the results simplistic and uninformative (Pargament, 1997 cited in Raiya et al 2008, 313).

Roy (2006, 21), in an attempt to define what constitutes a “Muslim,” grapples with the problem of diversity and amalgamation of culture and religion. He postulates “whom do we call a Muslim? A mosque-goer, the child of Muslim parents, somebody with a specific ethnic background (an Arab, a Pakistani)? A set of beliefs based on a revealed book? A culture linked to a historical civilization?”

Moreover, despite a long history of interest in Muslim civilization, it appears that there is a gap in knowledge about what the Muslim world is and whether they are all very religious or equally “Muslim” in their attitude and behavior. In the absence of

detailed studies on religiosity in Muslim countries (and for other countries and religions too), usually a quantifiable term like time allocated to prayers or frequency of prayers etc. provides a strong proxy measure for religiosity in a society. Hence, several studies on religiosity in Muslim societies which are quoted in this chapter could be taken as indicative rather than representative of religiosity.

A survey on mapping the religiosity in seven Muslim majority countries comprising of Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, Iran, Egypt, Turkey and Kazakhstan (with 6,300 respondents) notes that there are “...no good studies, which explore the nature and contents of Muslim piety sociologically.” Two main reasons are cited for this shortfall, one is the lack of academic development related to the field of Sociology of Muslim societies and the other is the sectarianism among the Muslims (Hassan 2005).

It is been contended that since most of the seminal research on religiosity has been conducted in Christian majority countries, hence it is “...questionable whether these methodological approaches can adequately measure or explain non-Christian religious experience in general and manifestations of Islamic orientation in particular” (Kucukgan 2000, cited in Krauss et al. 2005, 133). Moreover, the research on religiosity among Muslims is often carried out amid a perceived threat of radicalism and preconceived ideas that rise in religiosity is somehow correlated with a rise in fundamental outlook (Abu Raiya et al. 2008, 292). As Ramji (2007, 1173) aptly describes the phenomenon, “a new sense of danger also accompanies contemporary perceptions of these Muslim men.” Hence several of such studies conducted among Muslims –especially immigrants-- residing in European countries do show a higher level of religiosity among the younger

generation. However, the interpretation of such results should be understood in the backdrop of a rise in identity politics. The generation born to immigrant families is less concerned about economic needs while resenting the need to assimilate in an alien culture and religion in the periphery of these societies (For example see Laurence and Vaïsse (2006, 89-90) for a discussion on generational change among French Muslims.

The largest source of data on attitudes towards religion is the “World Values Survey” which has been conducting surveys related to “values” since early eighties all over the world including several Muslims countries.²¹ Results from the report show that majority (80 % or more) of the citizens of almost all Muslim countries (with the exception of former Soviet nations and European countries) consider religion to be very important in their lives.²² Similarly other concepts of religion, such as considering themselves as a religious person and importance of God in their life, and the response to subjects “get comfort and strength from religion” also show that the general population in Muslim counties is highly religious, as least in the sense of beliefs. However, these statistics need to be interpreted with caution as they do not provide respondents’ knowledge, commitment and practice of Islam. In addition, being religious does not always correlate with support of religious parties or religious political ideologies” (Tessler 2003, p177). In the same study, countries like Nigeria, Iran, and Pakistan were

²¹ Algeria, Bangladesh, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kyrgyzstan, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Egypt.

²² Author’s calculations based on World Values Survey data.

found to have high degree of religiosity but it is not necessary that they want the personal religion to manifest in politics of their country. For example, “the Pakistanis are Islamic—but they do not want to be ruled by religious leaders,” which is shown by results of several elections (Tanwir 2002 and International Crisis Group 2011) in which none of the religious parties have ever received the majority votes.

A recent study conducted in Saudi Arabia and Egypt to measure youth attitudes towards gender roles show some interesting differences between the two countries. “...while most young people in both contexts observe *Salah* [prayers] and have orthodox beliefs, Saudi Arabians define themselves as more religious, observe *Salah* at higher rates, and are more likely to report orthodox beliefs than Egyptians on average.” However, mosques attendance rates are similar among the youth of both countries (Kucinskis 2010, 765).

Another study of Malaysian and Indonesian youth's attitudes and behavior towards religion exhibits the peculiar nature of piety in these two Muslim majority countries. For example, though most Muslim Malaysian youth (88 %) grow up religious households, slightly more than a quarter always pray five times a day (which is obligatory for Muslims), around a fifth read the *Quran* (the religious book of Muslims) often, whereas only one in ten of youth understand all the verses. Less than two thirds of the Muslim youths in Malaysia always fast during Ramadan (Muslim Youth in Southeast Asia, 16). In the same study, having faith in God was listed as very important for most of the youth. Other results show that almost two thirds (60 %) of the youth noted that they fasted during the Muslim holy month of Ramadan. About a third prayed five times a day


and only one in 10 always read the *Quran*. However in terms of their attitudes these youth display a much higher level of Islamic orthodoxy; for example, almost two thirds of them said that Muslim youths who drink alcohol should be whipped (Krauss et al. 2006).

Muslim societies are typically branded as misogynist and patriarchal where women enjoy limited freedom living under the veil and four walls of the house. However, as we know that a huge variation exists within and across various Muslim societies. In this context Read's (2003, 8) analysis demonstrate that despite widespread belief that Muslims are more patriarchal than other religions groups, gender attitudes not shaped in isolation, rather they are result of interaction of culture and religion. For example, in her regression model predicting patriarchal attitudes, once ethnicity of the study subjects are included, the "effect of Islamic population becomes insignificant for measures of gender inequality in literacy, life expectancy, and economic activity rates." Her results show that Arab Muslims are more patriarchal than Muslims from other countries.

Between the years 1996 through 2003, Riaz Hassan, a scholar residing in Australia, conducted a survey of Muslims residing in Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, Iran, Egypt, Turkey and Kazakhstan, interviewing 6,300 Muslims. According to the researcher himself is this survey is "probably the first attempt to compare and 'map out' Muslim religiosity in Muslim countries... from a comparative study of Muslim piety of over 6000 respondents from Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, Iran, Egypt, Turkey and Kazakhstan" (Hassan 2005). Not surprisingly the findings show great diversity in responses by their country of residence. For example an overwhelming majority (more

than 90%) of the respondents from Egypt, Indonesia, Malaysia and Pakistan believe in life after death,²³ but the same is true for 84 percent Iranians, 71 percent Turkish and only 13 percent Kazakhs. In another study Hassan (2002a) modified the typology of Muslim Societies created by Gellner (1983) based on their political and religious orientation (figure 1). The analytical pattern shows the wide diversity in Muslim countries in political and ideological realms. While countries like Saudi Arabia and Oman score high on rigidity of doctrine and being politically conservative, countries like Kazakhstan and Turkey appear high on the moderate and secular religious level and more democratic on political level.

Figure 1: Typology of Muslim societies (Hassan 2002a, 139)



²³ To be completely true.

In their research on religion and life satisfaction, Elliott and Hayward (2009) found that “the harshest restrictions on religious freedom ...are found in countries where Islam is the official national religion” (Elliott and Hayward 2009, 289). The study found that “restrictions on freedom reduce and ultimately reverse the positive association between participation in organized religion and life satisfaction, and increase the positive association between personal religious identity and life satisfaction...” (Elliott and Hayward 2009, 286).

In the recent past there has been considerable discussion about revival of religiosity among Muslims all over the world. As Carvalho (2009) noted that “there has been a dramatic surge in Islamic participation and values since the 1970s.” Another very visible manifestation of such public display of piety is the increase in the practice of veiling of women in various Muslim countries (like Indonesia, Malaysia, and Egypt). For example, research in various Muslim countries show that there has been dramatic change from the seventies to date, in use of veiling in the urban areas. Bayat puts forth (2007, cited in Carvalho 2009, 6) that by the year 2000, veiled women in Cairo constituted “a staggering majority of over 80 percent.” This was a dramatic shift from the seventies when veiling was equated more with being unprogressive. Similarly, Leila Ahmed (2011) a well-known feminist scholar from Egypt who specializes in gender and Islam (1992, 47), observed that starting from early seventies the veil re-emerged in Egyptian society and within a couple of decades the *hijab* or the headscarf was worn by most women of Egypt, and an “entire era of Muslim women going bareheaded was being quietly erased from Muslim memory, and even Muslim history.”

Similarly, In Indonesia, “In accordance with the process of Islamization, it was not until the 1980s that women started to wear the tight veil (*jilbab*). Before that, the majority of urban women wore western-style clothes while sometimes wearing a loose veil (*kerudung*) that accompanied traditional dress on special occasions (*Van Wichelen 2007, 97*).”Scholars like Brenner (1996) and Hariyadi (2010) have also argued that wearing of ‘*jilbabisasi*’ (Indonesian veil) is a result of Islamization process in the 1980s and 1990s, during which the veil emerged as the icon of religious expression of the new generation. Warburton (2008) notes that,

“By choosing to wear the *jilbab*, Indonesian women broke away from accepted forms of religious expression and demonstrated a new awareness of, and commitment to, Islamic principles and obligations.” (Warburton 2008, 3)

Using similar methodology of research Rozario (2006, 368) has argued that a recent change in veiling practices by Bangladeshi women which made the *burqa* (a head to toe covering for women) a more ubiquitous sight in the city of Dhaka is because of spread of “‘Islamist’ movements, modernist forms of Islam which have grown up over the last century or so as part of the Muslim response to modernity.” These movement, not only contest modernity but they also call for a ‘purer’ forms of religious practice. Use of *burqa* is a symbolic response to such demands.

While some of these revivalist movements in Muslim countries may seem a backward step for women’s rights, contrary to expectation it paves the way for more gender equality. For example, traditionally Muslim women do not pray in the mosque and even if they do, their prayer areas are deliberately kept segregated, small, and unkempt,

assuming women may not need to take part in public or congregational prayer. However, these new movements provided an impetus for Muslim women to ask for their right in the mosque and leadership in religion. Mahmood (2005, 3) contends that “the women’s mosque movement is part of the large Islamic Revival or Islamic Awakening ... that has swept the Muslim world, including Egypt, since the 1970s.” Moreover, as history tells us that in the same decade, popular revolutions in Iran, Afghanistan and (since the 2010) Algeria, Egypt and Tunisia, have toppled secular and modern monarchies in favor of (often rigid) Islamic governments. However, Carvalho (2009) claims that this is not due to increased interest in religion but is rather strongly correlated with “raised aspirations, low social mobility, high income inequality and poverty” and the expectation of fulfillment of these with a *Sharia* based government.

Like any other religion, Islam is not a monolithic belief. Contrary to how Muslims are depicted or thought of, there is no homogenous Muslim world. Other than the basic five tenets of the religion, belief in heaven and hell, prohibition of alcohol and pork, the beliefs and practice of Muslims vary in myriad of ways (Manger 1999). Their religious lives can be portrayed on a continuum ranging from extreme orthodoxy to adaptation of religion with existing cultural and superstitious beliefs such as believing in the powers of holy shrines, or special protective Gods. Zwemer and Marinus has (1920) discussed the influence of animistic practices among Muslims in various parts of the world in detail. Scholars have explained such differences and transgressions as “lived religion” (for example see Ahmad and Reifield 2004). South Asian Muslims’ syncretic practices traditions incorporating Hindu and other pagan customs have been documented by

Ahmad and Reifield (2004) in their edited volume entitled “Lived Islam In South Asia.” Sufia Uddin’s (2011) research in Bangladesh shows people (both Muslims and non-Muslims) pay respect to the mythical saint known as Forest God (*Bonbibi*) for protection from fierce animals in the forest. For some other cases of religious syncretism practiced by South Asian Muslims, see Mukherjee 2008, Burman 1996 and Burman 2005.

2.4.1 Religiosity in Pakistan

With more than 180 million inhabitants, Pakistan is the second largest Muslim country in the world, home to 10 percent of the world Muslim population. A country created in the name of religion, it is no surprise that majority of the citizens (96%) are Muslims and Islam is the official religion of the country.²⁴ As indicated by official name of the country “Islamic Republic of Pakistan” the constitution does not allow any non-Muslim to hold the position of the head of the state.²⁵ Despite the context of being in a deeply religious state, it is not easy to collect information about the extent of religiosity of people in the country. Andrabi et al. (2005) in their national study on *Madrassa* attendance in Pakistan highlight the difficulties and complexity of defining the concept,

²⁴ Pakistan was created in 1947 after British decided to give freedom to their Indian colony. The Muslims of India demanded a separate homeland fearing that if they are part of a Hindu majority country, they would be treated as second class citizens. Hence, it was decided that the Muslims majority states would become what is now known as Pakistan. According to one estimate by Butalia (2000) at the time of partition, 10-12 million Muslims and Hindus migrated between the two countries, while around 500,000 to around a million were killed in communal violence.

²⁵ It should be noted here that of the 49 Muslims majority countries in the world, Pakistan is one of the 6 countries which has adopted Islam as the basis for their state law and constitution. Constitution of Pakistan: accessed 4/12/2012, URL: <<http://www.pakistani.org/pakistan/constitution/part1.html>>

“No data on religiosity was collected as part of the census and a more recent and detailed household survey that includes information on time-use elicits little variation—everyone reports high mosque attendance and regular prayers.” (Andrabi et al. 2005, 19 Footnote 24)

As discussed earlier, religiosity is a complex and composite phenomenon which includes different aspect of belief, outlook and behavior towards religion, and highly subjective opinions as to what is considered religious. As Hassan (2005) notes, “sociology and commonsense indicate that being ‘religious’ can mean different things to different people.” His research conducted between 1996 and 2003 in seven Muslim countries show the wide range of beliefs and practices in various Muslim countries. In Pakistan many of the respondents described themselves as “Muslah (prayer mat) Muslim” indicating that their religiosity is perhaps limited to following basic Islamic rituals only rather than following a larger set of doctrinal beliefs (Hassan 2008). In the same research, Pakistan emerges as a deeply religious country with very ranking on the scale of orthodoxy.

“The meaning of the religious labels used by people to describe themselves and others is often problematic. Religiosity, religious behavior and experience vary in the way they are reported and understood” (Hassan 2008 et al.).

As indicated before, studies on measurement of religiosity are complex and ridden on problems of operationalizing the term “religiosity” and Pakistan is no exception. Accepting the proxy measure of equating prayers to religiosity, people in Pakistan appear to be quite religious, as per various polls carried out by Gallup Pakistan, Gallup International, Pew Research Center and the World Values Survey. For example, 80

percent people in the country consider religion as very important in their life.²⁶ A Gallup Pakistan poll (January 2011) shows that 82 percent urban men offer Friday prayers but only about half of them offer regular prayers in a mosque.²⁷ Polls also show that two thirds of Muslims in the country repent for their sins every day.²⁸ In the same polls, most Pakistanis (64%) support visiting shrines of Sufis,²⁹ around a third had attended a *Urs*³⁰ in the preceding year, and 37 percent believe in taking oath from a *Pir* (a religious Guide).^{31, 32} On the question of Islam and democracy, the same polling group's research show that a little less than three quarters of Pakistan consider democracy to be consistent with Islamic system.^{33,34}

It is also useful to mention the 10 year multi country study by conducted by Professor Riaz Hassan to measure religiosity in selected Muslim majority countries including Pakistan. Some of the findings from his articles and books have been presented

²⁶ The World Values Survey 1997 and 2001.

²⁷ Gallup Pakistan Poll. <http://www.gallup.com.pk/pollsshow.php?id=2011-01-24>

²⁸ Gallup Pakistan Poll. <http://www.gallup.com.pk/pollsshow.php?id=2011-01-06>

²⁹ Gallup Pakistan Poll. <http://www.gallup.com.pk/Polls/Press%20release%20%201-8-1987.pdf>

³⁰ Gallup Pakistan Poll. <http://www.gallup.com.pk/Polls/29-01-10.pdf>

³¹ Gallup Pakistan Poll. <http://www.gallup.com.pk/GallupPollsByCat.php#Religion>

³² The next Chapter provides a detailed description of religion in Pakistan.

³³ Gallup Pakistan poll. <http://www.gallup.com.pk/pollsshow.php?id=2009-11-19>

³⁴ The Gallup Poll did not probe further to elaborate on the reasons for supporting one or the other point of view.

in the previous section, and the statistics for Pakistan show the country as highly orthodox, with very high religious commitment (Hassan 2008; Hassan 2002a).

The government of Pakistan conducted a comprehensive study on time use in Pakistan in 2007. They interviewed adults from 19,366 households about their daily time use collecting data for a 24 hour cycle. The sample was selected to make sure that the results are representative at the provincial level with both urban and rural participation. The main purpose of the study was to document economic and non-economic activities of Pakistanis. However, since the methodology allowed for documentation of any activity during the past 24 hour time period, it also highlighted some religious practices in the country (Federal Bureau of Statistics, Government of Pakistan 2009).

In that survey, around one half of the respondents report any individual level religious activity. Pakistani adults spend around a little more than an hour, on average, every day on individual religious practice and meditation. Not much variation has been found in terms of the distribution of mean time spent on religious activities across the provinces. However the difference in terms of the proportion of the population reporting such activity is dramatically different between regions. While the Punjab and Balochistan regions appear to have around half of the population reporting religious time use, in the Sindh region, only a quarter reported such activity while in the North West Frontier Province (NWFP), 85 percent mention religious activity in reporting of their previous day.

Another recent nationally representative study conducted by Fair et al. (2013,

505) sheds light on religiosity in Pakistan and its relationship with support to militancy and sectarian conflicts.³⁵ In their methodology they decided to include *Quran* reading sessions as a measure for religiosity rather than mosque visits or prayers because “Sufis...may not prioritize mosque attendance as they tend to frequent Sufi shrines (which are not considered to be mosques) and few Pakistani women regularly attend a mosque.” They found that 58 percent of Pakistani attend “*Dars-e-Quran*” (reading of *Quran* sessions), while the rest of the respondents reported in negative. And, among those who do attend these sessions, about a third attends every day. The reason for participation in such meetings is predominantly personal piety. Their research team interviewed 6,000 Pakistani adults in 2009 on “beliefs about political Islam, *Sharia*, the legitimacy and efficacy of *jihad*, and attitudes towards specific militant organizations” (Fair et al. 2013, 497). The study found that contrary to popular perceptions, there is no relationship between personal religiosity and highly sectarian sentiments. And, that while there is high level of support in general for *Sharia* Law, upon examination, this is found to be due to the belief (among the supports) that *Sharia* means good governance rather than their desire to support militant groups who happen to champion such slogans (Fair et al. 2013).

In addition to the above, there is a multitude of studies on Pakistan related to folk and popular Islam—a strand of the religion that is practiced by the large section of society. There is a wealth of research on the shrine culture in Pakistan, including *Sufi*

³⁵ This is the first nationally representative research on this topic.

music, *Sufi* dance, following *Pirs* (religious guides), and other kinds of folk and popular religion (For example see Abdul 2011; Ewing 1983; Werbner and Basu 1998; Werbner 2003; Frembgen 2004; Marsden 2005; Wolf 2006; Rozehnal 2007; Marsden 2010).

A recent phenomenon of the rise of orthodoxy of the well to do and educated urban women, led by Dr. Farhat Hashmi has alarmed women's rights activist and feminist scholars of the country. Dr. Hashmi holds a doctoral degree in Islamic Studies from Britain and runs a network of organization called Al-Huda.³⁶ For example, Dr. Riffat Hassan, a wellknown progressive Islamic feminist, while writing about Dr. Hashmi, shares her concerns,

“Farhat Hashmi's interpretation of Islam, in which taking care of the family is the primary purpose of a woman's life and wearing “hijab” is a religious mandate for Muslim women. To ignore the massive injustice and violence to which millions of women in Pakistan are subjected to is to abandon a commandment of Qur'an.” (Hassan 2002b)

Dr. Hashmi's evangelism of orthodox Islam coupled with her charismatic personality has attracted the wealthy scion of society. Her meteoric rise in popularity among the affluent and the social change that she introduced has not gone unnoticed. Academics, media and even rival religious groups have written about her,

“Al-Huda 's work has spread like wildfire over the last decade and a half, it has become the subject of intense scrutiny and suspicion among communities of

³⁶ Al-Huda is Arabic word which means (center of) guidance.

competing interests in Pakistan.” (Shaikh 2011, 64)

Her charismatic personality, school network and their popularity has provided inspiration for at least two doctoral dissertations and several publications. For specific examples see Ahmad 2006; Zia 2009; Afzal-Khan 2007; Mushtaq 2008; Babar 2008; and Bano 2010.

This change among the urban, more affluent and educated women of Pakistan is consistent with recent research on the topic of “resurgence of the veil” among Muslim women. It has been argued that this change can no longer be explained by through the framework of patriarchy, oppression and orthodox religious practice. For detailed discussion on the topic of veiling as a symbol of identity, see Ladbury and Khan 2008; Ahmed 2011; and Mernissi 1987.

Chapter 3

RELIGIOUS BEHAVIOR IN PAKISTAN

“In the April 2009 donors’ conference in Tokyo, [where] nearly thirty countries and international organizations pledged some \$5 billion in development aid explicitly intended to “enable Pakistan to fight off Islamic extremism.” (Shapiro and Fair 2010, 80)

3.1. Self-Reported Religious Affiliations in Pakistan

Pakistan is a country of more than 180 million inhabitants of which majority (96.3 %) adhere to the Muslim faith, is second largest Muslim country in the world.³⁷ The main source of statistics about religious affiliation in Pakistan is the national population census--last conducted in 1998).³⁸ Though the population census and other national surveys conducted in the country do capture religious affiliation, however sectarian membership and denomination are not included in the questions (also see Schmidt 2011).³⁹ Hence, “there are no contemporary and reliable accounts of how Pakistanis are divided across these sectarian traditions or interpretative schools” (Fair et al. 2010, 504).^{40,41} The actual numbers and percentages of various denominations of Muslims are

³⁷ Pakistan Census Organization (1998).


³⁸ There has been an attempt to carry out another census in 2011, but the government was only able to complete the housing enumeration part. Actual census of the population is still pending (Population Census Organization 2013, Government of Pakistan <http://www.census.gov.pk/census2011.php>)

³⁹ The religion category in census includes, Muslim, Christian, Hindu, Qadiani (Ahmedi), Scheduled castes and others. (Pakistan Census Organization 1998)

⁴⁰ Future research should analyze why and how the Hindu *Dalits* (the untouchable) castes are counted as a separate religion category.

based on best estimates (which are generally not contested) by scholars and international think-tanks. Another source to establish religious affiliation is perhaps the National Database & Registration Authority (NADRA), which issues the “National Identify Card” to Pakistani citizens. However their records also do not require religious denominational information.⁴²

Figure 2: Distribution of followers of various sects of Muslims and religious minorities, in Pakistan (the data points are calculated based on Census and various estimates)



⁴¹ The author’s best guess for avoiding such a question is perhaps due to the potential for sectarian conflicts, a question like this might be too sensitive.

⁴² The categories for religion are: Muslim, Christian, Qadiani/Ahmedi, Hindu, Parsi, Sikh, Buddhist, Others

Within Pakistan, for government programs and national discourse, there is awareness and acknowledgement that differences in behavior exist on the basis of sects and sub-sects (aside from other demographic characteristics) and that people may have different attitudes and outlook to life due to adherence to certain ideologies or dogma. Hence activities may need to be cognizant of this fact; for example, family planning programs, maternal health or other social programs may have to be aware of the staunch literalist religious views of followers of *Deobandis*,⁴³ *Ahl-e-Hadees* and *Jamaat-e-Islami*.⁴⁴ However, the *Barelvis*⁴⁵ and *Shia* are presumed to be more liberal and approachable in terms of supporting government programs related to health issues (Tahir Abbas, text message to author, September 28, 201. Also refer to Karim (2005) and Hakim 2005; and Hassan 2000, for a detailed description of differences between various groups--on topics of women's rights and health issues).

⁴³ The name *Deobandi* comes from the *Madrassa Darul Ulum Deoband* established in the United Provinces (now Uttar Pradesh), India, in 1867.

⁴⁴ *Jamaat-e-Islami* is a political group which runs on a supra-sectarian basis but its ideology runs parallel to *Deobandi* and *Ahl-e-Hadis* literalism and orthodoxy. Another important feature of this party is that they are part of the five boards which oversee *Madrassas* (religious schools for Islamic education) in Pakistan (Bano 2011).

⁴⁵ "The name *Barelvi* (or *Berelwi*) originates from the group's place of origin in Bareilly, Uttar Pradesh, India" (Osman 2009). The *Barelvis* are the followers of Imam Ahmed Raza Khan, who initiated the movement in nineteenth century.

Despite lack of an official source, however, there are multiple estimates about the various sects, sub sects of and followers or other religious movements in the country. Estimates by Gregory and Valentine (2009)⁴⁶ propose that the majority (80%) of the Muslims in the nation belong to the *Sunni*⁴⁷ sect that follows *Hanafi*⁴⁸ school of jurisprudence. Around 15-20 percent of the Muslims follow *Shia* Islam.^{49,50,51,52,53} A little less than two percent of total population of the country follows the Christian faith (Malik 2002 reports they are equally divided between Protestants and Catholics) and the rest of the one percent is divided into other minorities groups including Hindu, *Ahmedi/Qadiyani*, *Zikri*,^{54,55} Sikh, Jain, Parsi (Zoroastrians) and others. The Sunnis are

⁴⁶ They prepared these statistics for UNHCR.

⁴⁷The Sunnis have four schools of jurisprudence named after the religious scholars, *Hanafi*, *Maliki*, *Shafi* and *Hanbali*. The *Hanafis* are further divided into *Berehwi*, *Deobandi* and *Mahdis* (Baloch 2010, p. 261).

⁴⁸ Hanafi school is one of the oldest and the largest school of Islamic jurisprudence.

⁴⁹BBC News. 2004. "Pakistan's Shia-Sunni divide" http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/3045122.stm

⁵⁰PBS Hawaii. 2007. "Pilgrimage to Karbala Sunni and Shia: The Worlds of Islam" <http://www.pbs.org/wnet/wideangle/episodes/pilgrimage-to-karbala/sunni-and-shia-the-worlds-of-islam/1737/>

⁵¹ Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life. 2009. "Mapping the Global Muslim Population" <http://pewforum.org/Muslim/Mapping-the-Global-Muslim-Population%286%29.aspx>

⁵² Amir Mir. 2010. Just who is not a Kafir? Outlook India July 19, 2010, <http://www.outlookindia.com/article.aspx?266157>

⁵³ Also see Laird 2007.

⁵⁴ Zikris are sometimes considered non-Muslims by orthodox believers of the faith.

⁵⁵ See Baloch (2010) for a detailed description of *Zkiris* the minority *Sunni* Muslim sect who mostly reside in Balochistan province.

divided into two main sub-sects: Barelvi and *Dobandis*. A small proportion (about 5%) of the Sunnis are estimated to follow *Ahl-e-Hadees*⁵⁶ doctrine.

According to a think tank, Global Security, Pakistan's religious landscape is comprised of 50 percent *Barelvis*, 20 percent *Deobandis*, 18 percent *Shias* (including 2% *Ismailis*), and 4 percent *Ahl-e-Hadees*.⁵⁷ *Ahmediyas* (also spelled as *Ahmedis* and called *Qadiyani*), who consider themselves as Muslims but are counted as non-Muslims, account for another 2 percent. Other minorities make up the remaining 4 percent. Husain Haqqani,⁵⁸ who was the Pakistani Ambassador to the United States from 2008 to 2011, a well-established writer, scholar, educator, intellectual and journalist, proposes that the 75 to 85 percent of the country's Muslim population are *Sunnis* and the *Shias* to be between 15 and 25 percent. (For detailed description of these groups see Chapter 3).

Like the Sunnis, the *Shias* of the country are also divided along the lines of various religious schools. Majority of them belong to the *Ithna Asharite* (also known as Twelver) sect. They are followers of *Fiqh-e-Jafria*,⁵⁹ the *Shia* school of Islamic jurisprudence, hence sometimes also addressed in this context. Other *Shia* sects, like

⁵⁶ Also written as Ahle-Hadith.

⁵⁷ Global Security. Accessed on 4/30/2012 URL: <<http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/intro/islam-barelvi.htm>>

⁵⁸ Husain Haqqani. Personal site. Accessed on 4/30/2012, URL: <http://www.husainhaqqani.com/>

⁵⁹ The title originated from the name of the sixth Shia Imam, Jafar-al-Sadiq, who developed the jurisprudence for the Twelver sect.

Ismailis (also called Seveners) exist in the northern areas of Pakistan, but they are fewer in number and politically less organized (Osman 2009).

A number of the Muslims in Pakistan are considered to be followers of *Sufi* doctrine. *Sufism* is “the generally accepted term for Islamic mystical tradition, is not clearly defined religious movement, but an interrelated network of ideas and practices, all aimed at a deeper understanding and faithful pursuit of the *Quranic* message” (Thomas Michel 2005, 341).⁶⁰ However, it is difficult to estimate the actual numbers of Sufis in Pakistan. This is partly because of the same reason which does not allow enumeration of other sects and sub-sects and partly because of their doctrinal overlap with the *Barelvis*. (For example, see Fair 2008; Geaves et al. 2009; Rubin 2010).

There is no official statistics for religiously unaffiliated, atheists and ex–Muslims, in Pakistan due to the fear of being “guilty of apostasy.”⁶¹ According to Association of Religious Data Archives (ARDA), a very small proportion (0.08) of the population is agnostic.^{62,63} This figure is comparable to some Muslim countries like Bangladesh (0.1%) and Indonesia (1.4%), but in some Muslim countries Uzbekistan the number of agnostics

⁶⁰ Also see Heck 2006 for a discussion on the definition.

⁶¹ "Atheists and Islam No God, not even Allah". 2012. *Economist -London- Economist Newspaper Limited*. (8812): 73. <http://www.economist.com/news/international/21567059-ex-muslim-atheists-are-becoming-more-outspoken-tolerance-still-rare-no-god-not>

⁶² ARDA. http://www.thearda.com/internationalData/countries/Country_172_1.asp

⁶³ The proportion of world population that is non-religious is 16%, including agnostics, atheists and the non-religious. Adherents. Accessed 8/16/2013, URL: <http://www.adherents.com/Religions_By_Adherents.html>

and atheists are 15.5 percent, which is similar to worldwide statistics for this category.⁶⁴

The "other" category (used in census and various national surveys of Pakistan) for religion, includes people who mention indigenous practices, and those with no specific religion or want to remain silent. Social pressure to adhere to a religion is so strong that very few would be brave enough to declare themselves unaffiliated with any religion.⁶⁵ A small number of people consider themselves secular and engage and interact through the social media, for example "Institute of Pakistani Atheists, Agnostics and Secular Humanists (IPAASH)" or the group "Pakistani Atheists."^{66,67} According to International Religious Freedom Report for 2011 "Less than 0.5 percent of the population, as recorded in the 1998 census, was silent on religious affiliation or claimed not to adhere to a particular religious group."⁶⁸

⁶⁴ Adherents Database. Accessed 8/16/2013, URL:
<http://www.adherents.com/Religions_By_Adherents.html>

⁶⁵ United States Department of State. 2003. International Religious Freedom Report 2003. Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor <http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/irf/2003/24473.htm>

⁶⁶ Institute of Pakistani Atheists Agnostics and Secular Humanists (IPAASH) Facebook Page. URL:
<https://www.facebook.com/pages/Institute-of-Pakistani-Atheists-Agnostics-and-Secular-Humanists-IPAASH/169850439712805>

⁶⁷ Pakistan Atheists. Twitter account. <https://twitter.com/PakistaniAA>

⁶⁸ United States Department of State. Accessed on 4/30/2012 URL:
<<http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/irf/religiousfreedom/index.htm#wrapper>>

3.2 The Variation in Religious Practice of Muslims

Despite the fact that majority (96%) of the population is Muslim, it would be erroneous to assume that Pakistan is religiously homogeneous because the practice and beliefs differ even among the practitioners of the same denomination (Behuria, 2008). These practices are intertwined with interpretation of faith mixed with unique historical, cultural, economic, political and social conditions. The majority of Pakistanis (as noted before) belong the Sunni school of thought *Barelvis*. They are known to “follow many Sufi practices, including use of music (*Qawwali*)⁶⁹ and intercession by their teacher.”⁷⁰ They believe in the occult powers of saints, miracles, amulets and charms and their practices are infused with religious syncretism (Alavi 1986, 30). In contrast, the other two sub-sects of the Sunnis, *Deobandis* and *Ahl-e-Hadees* are considered to be hardliners and followers of a more rigid version of Islam-- similar to the beliefs and practices of *Wahabis* (also referred to as *Salafis*) of Saudi Arabia and do not indulge in the aforementioned “folk” religion practices.^{71,72}

⁶⁹ See Henry 2002 and Qureshi 1995, for more details on Qawwali.

⁷⁰ Global Security. Accessed 1/8/2013, URL: <<http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/intro/islam-barelvi.htm>>

⁷¹ For an extensive discussion on Salafi/Ahl-e-Hadis group in Pakistan see Kamran 2011.

⁷² “The *Ahl-i Hadith* come from the same Delhi world and the same background of revival and reform as the *Deobandis*. They were, however, more extreme in their religious ideas, more intense in their commitment to them, more elitist in their social background, more consciously sectarian in their behavior, and less influential”(Robinson 1988).

Other than the Sunnis, Pakistan also has a large following of *Shia* tradition.⁷³ The followers of *Shia*⁷⁴ sect diverge from the mainstream *Sunnis* on the conception and legitimacy of religious authority and question of continuation of leadership of the Muslims, after the Prophet's death (see Schubel 1993; Nasr 2006; Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life 2009; Mirbagheri 2012; Hughes 2013). They are known for exaltation of prophet's cousin and son in law Ali ibn Abī Tālib and his sons Hassan and Hussain. The *Shias* believe that Ali (cousin and son-in-law of Prophet Mohammed) was deprived from his right to lead the Muslims after the death of the Prophet (for example see Hyder 2006 and Nasr 2006). They have various religio-cultural rituals and religious festivals which are celebrated with fervor and grandeur to mark and lament the death anniversary of Prophet's grandson (Hussain) and his extended family during the battle of Karbala in 680 AD. There are numerous scholarly publications on rituals of *Shias*, especially those residing in South Asia; for some examples, see D'Souza ; Abou Zahab 2008; Nasr 2006; Jones 2012. Despite important doctrinal differences between the *Shias* and *Sunnis* as the former follow different schools of *Fiqh* (Islamic jurisprudence), their devotion to and veneration of saints and their tombs are similar to those of *Barelvis* and differences between are two are "quite blurred in rural Barelvi society" (Abou Zahab

⁷³ After Iran and Iraq, Pakistan has the largest number of *Shias* (with more than 30 million adherents).

⁷⁴The word *Shia* originates in Arabic and means group or followers as the sect originally was called Shiite of Ali (the followers of Ali). There are various transcribed as Shi'i and Shiites. They are also called *Ahl-e-Tashi* in Pakistan.

2004, 143).

The basic religious activities --which are common to all denominations of Islam— include *Shahada*⁷⁵, prayers (five times in a day) known as *Namaz* in Urdu or *Salah* in Arabic, *Roza* (fasting), *Zakat*⁷⁶ (annual charity), and *Hajj* (pilgrimage to Mecca, Saudi Arabia during the Muslim month of Zil-Hajj).⁷⁷ Muslims also engage in other activities which are considered religious like reading the holy book (*Quran*), listening to lectures about Islam, attending and/or organizing *Sufi* festivals, *Milad*, listening to *Qawwali* (devotional music), *Dars* (religious lectures). Taking part in such activities serves not only as spiritual fulfillment but also as leisure, a break from the drudgery of life and socialization with like-minded people.

Muslims are required to pray five times a day and congregational prayers in the mosque, are highly recommended, however, for most people it is practically not possible follow the decree “religiously.” Hence, the largest group prayer which is held on Friday afternoons --could be called the Muslim Sabbath (Goitein 1959)-- known in Pakistan as just *Jumma* (Friday). Friday prayers are mandatory for adult Muslim males and should

⁷⁵ The translation of the basic statement of the first tenet of Islam: "I testify that there is none worthy of worship except God and I testify that Muhammad is the Messenger of God." (Annalakshmi and Abeer 2011, 720)

⁷⁶ The amount of Zakat is 2.5 percent of total savings for Sunnis and 20 percent for Shia Muslims.

⁷⁷ Muslims follow a lunar calendar is consisted of 355 days and 12 months. The Muslim calendar began in 622, twelve years after the revelation of Islamic religion to Prophet Muhammad in Macca, Saudia Arabia. The year marks emigration of the Prophet and his followers to the city of Medina from his native city of Mecca, due to persecution and opposition.

be performed in a mosque in a congregation. However, the same decree does not hold true for females (see Hammer 2010, 94 and Mosher 2006, 78).

The main place of worship of Muslims is the mosque, known as *masjid*⁷⁸ in Urdu. In Pakistan, the primary function and reason for existence of mosque is to provide a place for prayer congregation.⁷⁹ These spaces are community property but (generally) registered by the Government of Pakistan and the provincial governments.⁸⁰ The mosques are run by a religious leader known as *Imams* (the Muslim prayer leader) who receive a monthly salary from the government (Ahmed 1982, 278). Other costs of the upkeep of the mosques are defrayed by donation of patrons. The mosques serve as the most important central place for Muslims societies. In Pakistan they “constitute the center of community life in Pakistan” (Ahmed, 1982). There is at least one mosque in every village, town and city community (Ahmed, 1982). Children can go to the mosque by themselves to pray, to learn the *Quran*, listen to the Friday *Khutba* (sermons) and to take part in other activities like special prayers and recitation and devotional songs known as *Hamd* and *Naat* (devotional songs praising God and Prophet).

A particular place of prayer is not mandatory in Islam, according to a tradition of the prophet, the whole world is mosque for Muslims (Kahera et al. 2009, 8). However,

⁷⁸ Masjid is a Arabic word which literally means place of prostration in worship.

⁷⁹ The function, purpose and roles of mosque differ from place to place.

⁸⁰ Mosques may or may not be registered with the government.

mosques are ubiquitous in Muslim communities all over the world. Other than the function of congregational prayers, mosques are a place of community engagement where people's educational, social, cultural, political, judicial and economic needs can be met. However, all those functions have undergone changes over time and according to various demands of communities. For example, the larger mosques in non-Muslim countries serve as oasis for the followers of faith providing them with the necessary social capital while fulfilling spiritual needs. But in some Muslim countries mosques may just be a place of worship (for men). However despite diversity in the wide range of functions mosques may perform, all mosques provide a place of regular prayers, funerals, *Nikah* (the religious part of Muslim marriage ceremony) and teaching of the *Quran* to children, and socio-political lectures known as *Khutba* (see for example, Fathi 1981; Mohamad 1998).

Though most people pray in their neighborhood mosque, raying in a certain mosque does not equate to "membership" to that particular mosque. There is no record keeping of people who participate in the prayers. Mosque attendance is more of a matter convenience of proximity. However, most people tend to go to the mosques of their particular sect, i.e., *Sunni*, *Shia*.⁸¹

⁸¹ Mosques are registered by the sect or sub-sect. For example the Islamabad Police website provides the total number of mosques registered in the city, <http://www.islamabadpolice.gov.pk/Pages/CustomPages/IslamabadAtGlance.aspx>

3.2.1 Inter and Intra Sectarians Relations

As mentioned before, Pakistan is a predominantly Muslims country with the majority of whom adhere to the Sunni school of jurisprudence. However, large differences exist even within the Sunnis. Continuing with description of Muslims in Pakistan Haqqani (2006) warns the reader to be wary of the sectarian labels because even within each sect there are wide divergences of practices and beliefs.

“One must remember, however, that like the term ‘Muslim’, the terms ‘Sunni’ and ‘Shi’a,’ ‘Shi’i’ or ‘Shiite’ encompass groups with widely differing views. There are many Shi’a sects, such as the Ismailis, the Bohras and the Ithna Asharis (twelvers). Sunnis in South Asia include such groups as the Sufi-inspired Barelvis, the puritanical Deobandis, and the Wahhabi-like Ahl-e Hadith [sic].” , (Haqqani 2006)

It would be an understatement to say that these various sects especially Sunnis and *Shias* do not enjoy cordial relationship. The sectarian divide in Pakistan has been the source of multiple instances of bloody attacks on civilians (Kamran 2009; Tahir 2011). The *Shia-Sunni* schism is especially prone to violence as member of the dominant Sunni sect consider some practices of *Shias* as heretic. The religious rifts are liberally exploited by political groups for their party agenda, for example the violence in Karachi, Quetta, Jhang, Gilgit. Though sectarian in nature, however, the undercurrents are usually over control of resources, rather than having anything to do with religious differences.

The Sunnis follow two widely different strands of religious thoughts known as *Barelvis* and *Debobandi* --both of which originated in Northern India in later nineteenth century (there is a myriad of publications on the history of these groups in South Asia, for

example see Talbot 1998; Abbas 2005; Heath and Mathur 2011). The International Crisis Group, an international ‘think tank’ --headquartered in Brussels--points out the rift between the various sects and sub-sects, “The Shia minority -- and, in some cases, even the majority Sunni Barelvi sect -- is deeply resentful of this orthodox Hanafi Sunni bias in state policies.”⁸² As noted before that the *Barelvis* who believe in the intercession of *Pirs* and power of prayers at Shrines are sometimes declared non-Muslims by the hardliners (usually other Sunni groups like *Deobandi* or Ahl-e-Hadees) which creates basis for bloody confrontations. For example, in the past few years, while Pakistan is going through its own share of the global war on terror, several Sufi Shrines have had suicide attacks killing scores of devotees, which was historically unprecedented since shrines in Pakistan are considered religious sanctuaries even by people who do not believe in them.⁸³

Historically the Shia-Sunni conflicts were not so violent and the two main Islamic sects lived in relative harmony, until the Pakistani government implemented *Hanafi*⁸⁴ laws in Pakistan during the military rule of Zia ul Haque, during 1977-1988 (Abou Zahab

⁸² International Crisis Group. 2005. “The State of Sectarianism in Pakistan” accessed 3/1/2012 <http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/asia/south-asia/pakistan/095-the-state-of-sectarianism-in-pakistan.aspx>

⁸³ BBC News. 2011, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-12951923>; Christian Science Monitor. 2010 <http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Asia-South-Central/2010/1105/In-Pakistan-militant-attacks-on-Sufi-shrines-on-the-rise>; Huma Imtiaz And Charlotte Buchen. The Islam That Hard-Liners Hate. published in New York Times on January 6, 2011, URL accessed 3/31/2012 <http://atwar.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/01/06/the-islam-that-hard-liners-hate/>

⁸⁴ *Hanafi* is one of four schools of Islamic jurisprudence within Sunni Islam.

2004).

3.2.2 Practices of *Barelvis* and Sufis

National polls conducted by Gallup Pakistan points that two thirds of Pakistanis believe in visiting shrines of Sufis. This is not surprising given that the majority of the population practices *Barelvi* Islam which has practices similar to Sufi Islam.^{85,86,87}

“Sufi Islam is a powerful force. In Pakistan’s society and politics, Sufi Islam represented by the shrines and pirs has always played a critical role. In fact, successive governments including that of Ayub Khan, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and Ziaul Haq representing different political traditions wooed the pirs or sajjada nasheens... the fact that Ziaul Haq subscribed to Salafi Islam, he could not demolish the influence of the pirs.” (Siddiqi 2009)

As noted earlier, apart from mosques majority of the population also consider Shrines of as sacred spaces.⁸⁸ They are “central but controversial part of the religious organization of Pakistan, as they are in many countries of the Muslim world” (Trimingham 1971 cited in Ewing 1983, 251). The act of visiting a shrine itself has a term

⁸⁵ Gallup Poll. <http://www.gallup.com.pk/GallupPollsByCat.php#Religion>

⁸⁶ Paracha, Nadeem F. “Smokers’ Corner: Why attack the shrines?” Dawn, October 17, 2010 accessed January 1, 2011, <http://dawn.com/2010/10/17/smokers-corner-why-attack-the-shrines/> (around however does not provide the source of his statistics quoted in the article)

⁸⁷ Rana, Muhammad Amir. 2008. Counter-Ideology: Unanswered Questions and the Case of Pakistan *Perspectives on Terrorism*, Vol. 2 No. 3 accessed on 3/1/2012 <http://terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/29/html>

⁸⁸ In the absence of official statistics of these abodes, it is hard to provide exact numbers, but according to (Ahmed 1982, 281), Pakistan is believed to have over 10,000 shrines called *Mazaars* or *Dargah* in local language.

and often included in the lexicon of acts of piety. As Rehman describes such visits,

“Ziyarat (visitation) to shrines may be considered in itself a religious norm according to particular practices among Muslims of South Asia. Although non-obligatory in essence, ziyarat to shrines is considered a practice that complements and reinforces faith in a systematic religious and social order” (Rehman 2009, 141).

Shrines are graves of pious men who are believed to possess special power in helping a believer fulfill their wishes which many devotees attach to vows known as *Mannat* (Raj and Harman 2006). Moreover, “the popular Islam characterized by devotional practices found in Sufi shrines is more pluralistic and embedded in locally bound folk cultures” (Rehman 2006, 26). While mosques fail to provide a platform for social interaction for the whole family, the *Dargah* and *Mazaar* act as an oasis and retreat for people from all classes, castes, clans, genders, and sexual orientation bringing together people who are bound by a sense of devotion and veneration. *Mazaars* and shrines have more than just a devotional and religious function.

“Shrines encourage social participation; they provide entertainment in the form of devotional music and song (*qawwali*); they are educational; they allow for a redistribution of money, food, goods and services among living saints, followers, pilgrims, *faqirs*, vendors and beggars.” (Kurin 1983, 312)

The *mazars* have free food distributed through an elaborate system of *langar*, free abode, devotional singing (*qawwali*) and transcendental acts of a ritual dance known as *dhammal* (or *dhamal*).⁸⁹

⁸⁹ Should be noted that such acts of public expression of religious ecstasy are usually limited to males and

Given the image of Pakistan as intertwined with “peril and turmoil”⁹⁰ and a “hard country”⁹¹ where songs and dances would be considered far removed from religious rites, it would be interesting to explain the religious dance *dhamal* often performed in shrines. As described by Brockman (1997, 440) it is “ecstatic twisting of body and head” and by Frembgen (2012), a German with extensive ethnographic research experience on Pakistani shrine culture, as a “full-bodied, active experience of mystical devotion which belongs to the ‘social habitus’ of the dancers and can be considered a pattern of appropriate ritual action embedded in the local cultures of both Sindhis and Punjabis... Guided by the hypnotic repetitive sound of drums, ...DHamāl [sic] belongs to the multiple worlds of Pakistani Sufi shrines” (Frembgen 2012). Uzma Rehman (2009) another scholar on South Asian religions argues that such a dance acts as spiritual experience and notes the practice as a ritual that is, “performed at several *mazars* in Punjab and Sindh which can be seen as an expression of panthic religious experience” (Rehman 2009, 140). Another scene of *Urs* and performance of *dhamal* in a Pakistani shrine (thus mixing of the sacred with the secular) by Rehman may paint a totally different of Pakistan which is usually known in the West for intolerance and as a hub of terrorism, or as noted by journalist Sabrina Tavernise (2010), that during a *Urs* “Muslim worshipers paid tribute to the patron saint of Lahore, Pakistan, this month by dancing,

transgender only. However, sometimes older women also join in.

⁹⁰ Declan Walsh. 2007. “The greatest party on earth?” Guardian October 3 2007, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2007/oct/04/pakistan.travel>

⁹¹ Title of a recent book on Pakistan by Anatol Lieven (2011).

drumming and smoking marijuana. It is not an image one ordinarily associates with Pakistan.” As Rehman (2009) illustrates that *Dhammal* is generally performed by men but sometimes joined by women too. Rehman describes the scene during the annual *Urs* of Shah Latif,⁹² that one could hear the sounds of *dhol* with ankle bells from several directions.

“For those disciples who attend the 'Urs regularly every year, the occasion creates the possibility of social networking across divisions of class and ethnicity. In a predominantly rural society that until recently was neither computer nor email literate, nor massively connected through mobile phones.” (Werbner 2010)

The shrines are known to have special celebrations to mark the death –according to Islamic calendar-- of the saint who is buried in the premises, known in South Asia as “*Urs*.”⁹³ According Gallup Pakistan poll conducted in 2005, almost a quarter of Pakistanis reported that they had attended a celebration of *Urs* in the previous year. A website dedicated to folk practices of the province of Punjab in Pakistan very aptly describes the function of such abodes and practices: “Sufi *Urs* are a platform for the people to hold and enjoy all kinds of festivities music, sports, expo, food, circus, etc. at one place.”⁹⁴

⁹² Eighteenth century Sufi saint of Sindh, Pakistan is buried in Bhit Shah a small town near Hyderabad city in the South of Pakistan.

⁹³ *Urs* which literally means wedding day marks the day of death of a saint because it is the day when the Saint became “one” with the divine (Raj and Harman 2006, 91)

⁹⁴ Sohail Abid. 2012. Folk Punjab,

Even though women's mobility is restricted to many public places, shrines are one location that treat all genders (almost) equally (Rozeenal, 2007, 2). Men, women, transgender and children, all can visit these places without discrimination. These holy places have all that it takes to create an atmosphere for salvation with celebration.⁹⁵ There is food donated by patrons and others who had wish fulfillment pledges (*langar*)⁹⁶ or want to do charity, religious and devotional music and songs and a safe space (albeit subtly segregated by sex and social status) to pray, meditate or to just simply relax and talk.

“The ambience of a Mosque is entirely different from that of a Shrine. A Mosque is opened only five times a day, for the five daily prayers. Whereas a Shrine and its premises remains[s] open for visitors round the clock. Shrines, in our society have both social and religious aspects” (Abdul 2011, 5)

The term *langar* (also called *tabarruk* or *niyāz*) is used for all food distributed at the mazārs or saints' khanqahs. The practice of food distribution in the Sufi mazārs is similar to the distribution of prasād (blessed food) given out in Hindu temples. In her

https://www.facebook.com/media/set/?set=a.10150670177138051.401431.124780653050&type=1&comment_id=22296002

⁹⁵ Declan Walsh the daily Guardian Correspondent for Pakistan and Afghanistan (2004-2011) described the 2007 Urs in *Sehwan Sharif* in Pakistan as the “Greatest Party on Earth”.
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2007/oct/04/pakistan.travel>

⁹⁶ The idea behind *langar* is providing free food to the needy. The use of the word "Langar" is generally associated with a Sikh and Hindu religions and is also common among *Sufis* and *Berelvis* of South Asia.

analysis of the *langar* at the Sufi cult of "Zindāpir," Werbner (2003: 121) uses the term 'good-faith economy' to describe the practice (Rehman 2009 note 14, 246). A blog post of a Policy Advisor, journalist and writer Raza Rumi describes *langar* in the shrine of *Data Ganj Bukhs* in Lahore, the largest of its kinds in Pakistan,

"Langar, the distribution of food, at the Sufi Khanqah (abode) is a centuries-old tradition. It allows devotees to eat together, feed the hungry and attend to an exhausted traveller and is a means of redistributing wealth. Data Darbar is also an important location, for it feeds thousands of people every day through the complex networks of langar, its financiers, distributors and organisers."⁹⁷

These *Mazaars* (graves of pious saints) are often connected (or part of) with lodging facilities known as *Khanqa*⁹⁸ or (Sufi lodges) which "offers room for visiting faqirs and followers" (Van Der Veer 1992). Werbner in her research on Sufi culture and gender in Pakistan explains,

"Sufi lodges draw together devotees and pilgrims across vast distances within Pakistan who share, at the very least, a sense of devotion to the saint, dead or alive. Lodges welcome all pilgrims, irrespective of age, gender, rank and ethnic origin" (Werbner 2010, 381).

These Sufi lodges are visible expressions of a shared tradition with other

⁹⁷Raza Rumi. "Data Ganj Baksh: Lahore's oldest guide" Friday Times, 15 February 2009
<http://razarumi.com/2009/02/15/data-ganj-baksh-lahore%E2%80%99s-oldest-guide/>

⁹⁸ For a detailed discussion on history and evolution of these lodges see Hassan 1987. He notes that, "Historically the word *Khanqah* has been used to refer to a house where mystics live and pray, according to the rules of their order. I have accepted this meaning but have also expanded it to include their shrines as well." (Hassan 1987, 554)

religions, and are often powerful centers for politics while providing meaning and orientation to the followers (Werth 1988, 78-88). Aside from that, they have important function for women in conservative societies like Pakistan. These are one of the few places where,

“women can worship and mingle with women strangers, devotees or supplicants from different backgrounds.” (Werbner 2010, 376)

Often these shrines are associated with *Pir* (religious leader).^{99,100} In Pakistan the religious institution of *Pirs* and shrines are inextricably linked with landholding and political power (Hassan 1987). For example, the current Prime Minister, Yusuf Raza Gilani, and ex Foreign Minister, Shah Mahmud Qureshi, are both hereditary *Pirs*. The current President of the country Asif Ali Zardari also has a personal *Pir* (The Economist 2008).¹⁰¹ These *Pirs* provide a range of socio-religious functions depending on the traditions of the particular (religious) order ranging from spiritual guidance to help in achieving life goals and desires or solving problems (such as fertility issues, love, jobs, health etc.) through *Taweez* (amulets), *Amal* (intercessory litany), *Dua* (supplications),

⁹⁹ Also known as *Sajada Nasheen* (literally means "he who sits on the prayer rug" as noted in Ewing 1983, 255) is occupier of a post or in other words are the successor of the saint act as the guardian of the place (Albinia 2010).

¹⁰⁰ These *Pirs* are almost always male and usually inherit the position from an ancestor.

¹⁰¹ Zardari, in his recent (April 2012) trip to India to pay respect at the Shrine of Khawaja Moinuddin Chishti –a 13th century Sufi saint-- donated 1 million dollars (Newsweek Pakistan 2012). URL <http://newsweekpakistan.com/scope/1033>

and mystical formulas (Ahmed 1982, 280).

It is important to distinguish between an *Imam* who leads the prayer and gives sermons in mosques and *Pirs*. The loyalty towards *Pirs* stems more from practical and functional needs rather than religious. People “seek specific remedies . . . not eternal salvation” from *Pirs* (Alavi 1986, p. 31). In Pakistan 37 percent of the population believes taking an oath (*bayet*) is necessary from a *Pir* to gain proximity to God and better religious guidance.¹⁰²

Aside from *Pirs* there are other men, known for their nontraditional life style and nonattachment to material and worldly life, who are also part of the shrine milieu. In Pakistan they are known as *malang*, or *qalandar*, or *faqir*. These men defy traditional norms and usually do not have families and live in the shrines surviving off of charities (Frembgen 2004; Berland and Rao 2004). They engage in many practices which may seem totally un-Islamic to even the not so orthodox followers. For example they are known to live nomadic life style, drink ritualistic *bhang* (concoction of marijuana leaves, almond and milk), consume hashish, and consider songs and dance as a path leading to God (Choudhary 2010, 18).

The Islam practiced by religious zealots and Taliban is hugely different from the

¹⁰² Gallup Pakistan Poll. <http://www.gallup.com.pk/Polls/06-04-11.pdf>

mainstream religion followed by most Muslims of South Asia.¹⁰³ The orthodox denounce the Sufi followers as Kafirs (non-Muslims) while the latter resent the former's literal following of the religion, and the conflict goes on, making one wonder about the future of Sufi Islam in Pakistan (see for example, Abou Zahab 2009, 128). On the question of the future of the rift between the Islamist and Sufi followers in Pakistan, Carl Ernst¹⁰⁴ appears quite hopeful for the latter and argues that "Sufism has been a part of the fabric of life in the Pakistan region for centuries, while the Taliban are a very recent phenomenon without much depth."¹⁰⁵ Hassan (1987, 565) also contends that "Given the immense cultural and social resources available to ...the *pirs* of popular Islam will be in a position to launch populist movements which may present a formidable challenge to purist Islam and an obstacle to efforts of the *ulema* to win the heart and minds of the masses."

It is instructive to add here that the Sufi infused folk and popular religion in Pakistan often tend to get romanticized and is perceived to be antidote to *Salafi* or puritanical Islam. However academics and intellectuals have pointed out on numerous occasions the shadowy aspects of blind following of *Sufis*. There is opportunity of

¹⁰³ The Economist. 2008 "Of saints and sinners: The Islam of the Taliban is far removed from the popular Sufism practised by most South Asian Muslims"
http://www.economist.com/node/12792544?story_id=12792544

¹⁰⁴ Scholar of Sufi Islam.

¹⁰⁵ Schmidle, Nicholas 2008. "Pakistan's Sufis Preach Faith and Ecstasy" Smithsonian Magazine
<http://www.smithsonianmag.com/people-places/Faith-and-Ecstasy.html>

exploitation of the “innocent” and “naïve” masses in the hands of unfeeling, rich, power-loving *Pirs* who have been co-opted in politics from the time of the British government (Javid 2012). Ayesha Siddiqi a military analyst from Pakistan, considers romanticizing the notion of *Pirs* and shrines as deadly,

“One of the major problems with this formula is that it reinforces exploitation rather than allowing for spiritual reassessment.”¹⁰⁶

3.2.3 Practices of Other Sunni Sects

As noted before, the *Deobandis*, the other sub-group of the Sunni sect of Islam, who vehemently oppose the aforementioned practices of *Barelvis*, *Shias* and other minority Muslim sects in Pakistan. The *Deobandis* who are influenced by the *Wahabis* and *Salafis* of Saudi Arabia “emphasize a puritanical interpretation of Islam that rejects the strong proclivities to syncretism characteristics of local, pre-Islamic, and Sufi influences, which mark much of South Asian Islam” (Rubin 2010, 348). It is believed that they consider rituals and rites including, invoking any prophet, saint or angel in prayer, visiting graves (of Prophets, saints, ancestors), celebrating annual feasts etc., tantamount to polytheism (Imran 2005, 84-85 footnote 28).¹⁰⁷

¹⁰⁶ Ayesha Siddiqi. 2012. “The road from Ajmer leads nowhere” The Hindu, <http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/op-ed/article3321349.ece>

¹⁰⁷ Polytheism (*Shirk*) in Islam means to believe in any power other than Allah (God) and to place such power equivalent to Allah, and is considered the biggest and unpardonable sin (Mawdudi et al. 1986).

The other main sub-sect in the Sunni tradition is *Ahl-e-Hadees*, which literally means the followers of *Hadees* (saying and practice of the Prophet). Like the other two Sunni sects, this sub-sect also started in India as a reform movement in India, in the twentieth century. Although not exactly the same as *Deobandis*, the followers of this sect are similar to them in their literalist and exclusivist outlook towards religion. (See Kamran 2011 and Robinson 1988, for detailed descriptions of *Ahl-e-Hadees*).

3.3 Women and Religious Practice

Though not prohibited by religion, women in Pakistan generally do not pray in mosques (Werbner 2010; Bano and Kalmbach 2011; Engineer 2008; Zakar 2012, 215).^{108,109}

Moreover, it should be noted that unlike other religions (i.e., Christianity), congregational prayers are not necessarily family activities for Muslims. Women stay home while often the male children accompany the father and other males in the household to go to the mosque.

Gallup Pakistan's poll with 2,677 men and women from rural and urban of Pakistan found that most Pakistani mosques (85%) do not have arrangements for female congregational prayers. However one in 10 respondents did claim to have mosques in

¹⁰⁸ See Sayeed 2001 and Sadeghi 2013 for detailed discussion on the religious discourse on women's prayer at mosques.

¹⁰⁹ Prayer at home is not necessarily performed in group. Men and or women who do not take part in the congregational prayer are allowed to fulfill the requirement even if they pray by themselves.

their neighborhood with such facility.¹¹⁰ In some cases the mosque may have a separate prayer space for females and hence in theory the whole family can attend prayers, albeit in two different sections of the same structure (Abbas 2002, xvii). (For an extensive discussion on Muslim women's leadership vis-a-vis mosque, see Bano and Kalmbach 2011).

However, women do have other religious activities like social gatherings to read *Quran* (*Quran Khawani*), *Dars*, visiting shrines or visiting holy men or women (Ahmed 2009; Abbas 2002). *Dars* which literally means lesson in Arabic, is a gathering to discuss theological matters. It is often organized in a semi-formal gathering where text from *Quran* and or *Hadees* (Prophet's traditions) is read and discussed and is followed by social mingling and sharing of food.

In the shrines, while women and children may not engage in the singing, dancing and drinking, however they can enjoy the food, pray and certainly partake of the spectacle. A family outing cannot be better than this especially if you cannot afford to go on vacations and trips. As illustrated by Purewal and Kalra,

“...the practices of women at shrines in West Punjab provide a living example of the vibrancy of popular practices despite institutional and state mechanisms to streamline religious practices. Though, once again the pressures on informal practices at shrines from reformist and formalist religious orthodoxy and the Pakistani state work through control of women's bodies.” (Purewal and Kalra 2010, 387)

¹¹⁰ Gallup Pakistan. 2009. <http://www.gallup.com.pk/pollsshow.php?id=2009-07-02>

Women's participation in religious shrine dance has been noted by ethnographers, researchers and journalists, however it is interesting to note that according to law it is forbidden to sing and dance in shrines, especially for women.¹¹¹

3.4 Religion and Social Change in Pakistan

How one defines modernity and traditionalism very much lies with the person who is defining it. Sociologically speaking, modernity is as defined by Giddens is,

“a shorthand term for modern society, or industrial civilization. Portrayed in more detail, it is associated with (1) a certain set of attitudes towards the world, the idea of the world as open to transformation, by human intervention; (2) a complex of economic institutions, especially industrial production and a market economy; (3) a certain range of political institutions, including the nation-state and mass democracy.” (Giddens and Pierson 1998, 94)

To some the dichotomy of modernity and traditionalism is a parallel to the duality of oriental and occidental. To lay people in Pakistan, just the notion of use of new technology, especially those related to means of communications are considered very modern, very Western to those who obtain them as imported, foreign technological goods. As another example, to a father in a village in Pakistan watching an advertisement on sanitary napkins while his young daughter is around is a ‘modern’ and ‘foreign’ idea

¹¹¹ Punjab Punjab Act VII of 1942. Music in Muslim Shrines Act. Accessed 12/1/2012, URL: <http://punjablaws.gov.pk/laws/56.html#_ftn1>

and in this context modernity is viewed very positively.¹¹² A scholar might reflect differently on this and consider the acceptance of a female as a prayer leader as modern for Muslims. The idea of modernity is also very temporal though there are many who remain fixated with the idea of maintaining the 'purity' of a practice or concept by following the 'words' of the law rather than the 'spirit.' However, with the passage of time there is an acceptance of certain technologies or social norms as traditional which originally started out as radical and modern. For example, although Muslims do not eat non *halal* meat (non -Kosher), those residing in Western countries it is hard to get, many Muslim scholars have allowed eating non *halal* meat of those animals permitted by Islam. Such injunctions are justified on the fact that eating and other social interaction with the “people of the book” are permitted, and in fact encouraged in Islam.¹¹³

Similarly, there is a considerable amount of debate going on regarding what constitutes the idea of female seclusion known as *purdah*. Some call the observance of *purdah* a privilege but for others it is a sign of oppression. Riaz in her dissertation (2012) observes that *purdah* “remains a symbol—of oppression on one hand, and of liberation and rebellion on the other—one that is debated about and contested consistently.” How and to what degree *purdah* is observed is a matter of preference and depends on personal

¹¹² Interviews conducted by author for World Population Foundation for a Life Skills Based Education project in Pakistan in 2004 (unpublished).

¹¹³ Islam considers Jews and Christians to be “people of the book”. “The term ‘People of the Book’ or *Ahl-alkitab* is mentioned in the Qur’an twenty-four times, referring to Christians and Jews in particular.” (Saritoprak, and Griffith 2005, 329)

interpretation of Islam. While modernity by itself is a complex, dense and multi-layered concept, the researcher considers the current transition of Muslims towards adoption of more moderate values as a sign of modernization.

The geographic location of this research project is in Pakistan which is a predominantly Muslim country and is currently undergoing enormous changes in values and practice of religion in everyday life (A map of the country is provided in Appendix A).¹¹⁴ The process of modernization (in all sense of different definitions) in Pakistan invariably qualifies as a case of Muslim modernity. In the recent past, especially last few years the country has been shaken with political and social turmoil, like the assassination of former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto in 2007, the occupation *Lal Masjid* (Red Mosque)¹¹⁵ in the capital city by religious radicals, and numerous suicide blasts throughout the country which have claimed around 50,000 lives.¹¹⁶ Both incidences point to deeply rooted ambivalence of a section of society which considers modernization of the country as problematic and who want to bring the Taliban or Wahabi version of Islamic government to the country. Though such ideologies are not the 'norm' in the country, as can be observed from the mass media, no such study has been conducted to

¹¹⁴ Pakistan is located in South Asia.

¹¹⁵ Since the bombing of *Lal Masjid* in 2007 by Government of Pakistan, the incidence has been the topic or part of several publications related to religio-political issues of Pakistan. See for example, Lieven 2011; Schmidt 2011; Friend 2012.

¹¹⁶ South Asia Terrorism Portal. Accessed 12/5/2012, url:
<<http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/database/casualties.htm>>

understand the psyche of the youth in terms of their perspective of the transition of their country, or the culture and religious values towards acceptance of more modern, rational, tolerant ideologies.

Chapter 4

METHODOLOGY AND SAMPLE

“Time represents a fundamental asset for both the individual and society. Because of its finite nature, time must be allocated to social roles, interpersonal relationships, and organizational involvements. In turn, these allocations reflect the social expectations, economic activities, and cultural identity of the individual and the age-graded phases of life. Time allocated to school, work, family, and leisure differs through the life course, and this variability says much about the individual's identity and the roles that age groups play in society” (Shanahan and Brian R Flaherty 2001, 385).

4.1. Time Use Research

“Time” is ubiquitous and each culture has its own notion of representation and value of time. In modern western societies there is emphasis on the linear structure of time with schedules tied to the rhythms of the day divided into hours and minutes, while in some traditional cultures the idea of time is associated with the movement of the sun and the moon, with light and darkness, with physical needs like hunger and sleep and so on and so forth. To define simply what we mean by a time use study is that these studies “show how people use their time” (Pentland 1999). Research on time deals with quantifying how people divide their time in a day or week to different tasks (United Nations Statistical Division 2005). Time use deals with “who does what (and what else simultaneously) during the day, for how long, how often, at what time, in what order, where, and with whom” (Szalai 1973). Many interesting patterns of social life are associated with the temporal distribution of human activities, with regularities in their timing, duration, frequency. In addition to just measuring the amount of time spent on different activities, time use research may also measure dimensions of temporal order, sequence of activities, spatial or location (‘timescapes’) aspects, who else was involved

and what other secondary and tertiary activity was involved (Szalai 1973).

Social scientists tend to divide “time” into few broad segments which may explain its usage. One such schema is the idea that a person has to deal with fulfilling three realms of “necessity” in time use on a daily basis, basically because those activities are required for continuation of life. First is economically productive, social (commitment with others, household work), and biological (sleeping, eating). Any time you are left with after dealing with these three necessary functions would be considered spare or discretionary time (Goodin 2008).

Time use research is used in a wide and diverse range of disciplines including sociology, urban planning and architecture (traffic, parking travel time), family management (i.e. household work, childcare), leisure (discreet, free time), productive and unproductive work, self-development, labor management (un/under employment), economics, nursing, transportation planning etc. Moreover, the time use data helps improve government policies and program. For example, the American Time Use Survey (ATUS) shows how low income families have time poverty for childcare, or how the old or the youth in America spend their time (Ver Ploeg and National Research Council (U.S.); Committee on National Statistics, 2000). Leisure, or the lack of it is the center of an incredible number of time budget surveys (Szalai 1973). Moreover, time use statistics show societal trends over time and across nationals (Belli et al. 2009).

Theoretically speaking, the need and motivation for our time utilization can be categorized into three sub groups of theories (Bhat and Koppelman 1999, 2-3). The first,

motivational theory (derived from anthropology and psychology) deals with the primary motivation of a person for doing an activity. Human motivation has always intrigued thinkers and philosophers and they have expounded various reasons. These theories differ on “motivational basis of behavior but agree on the notion that behavior is dictated by felt needs -- whether innate or nurtured” (Bhat and Koppelman 1999, 3). The second (sociological and planning theories) started in the fields of sociology and urban planning. They are based on acquisition and allocation of resources like income, job etc. and who should do what role in order to do this function in dealing with resources (Bhat and Koppelman 1999, 4). According to the theory individuals divide their time for subsistence activities, leisure and self-maintenance. The last theory deals with economic needs and has roots in micro-economics. The theory postulates that individuals

“allocate time as well as money income to various activities - receiving income from time expended in the market place and receiving utility from spending this income on the consumption of goods and services” (Bhat and Koppelman 1999, 5).

A list of the history of time use research around the world (85 countries) provided by the Center for Time Use Research website showcases the wealth of data available from these countries on use of time. Two of the most quoted earliest examples of time use research are a) Bevens (cited in (Sorokin and Berger 1939, 9) study which shows how workers use their free time (in New York City) and Pember-Reeves’s study of women with children living with small budgets (Bevens 1913; Pember-Reeves 1913, cited in Pentland 1999), and Michelson 2005. A brief examination of the chart on the website shows that most of the time use or time-budget studies have been conducted in more

developed societies to emphasize either quality of life or improve economic productivity. The main reason for dearth of interest in less developed countries on this topic is due to lack of resources.

Like many other developing nations including India and Bangladesh, Pakistan (the country of focus for this question) does not have a long history of detailed data collection on time use. Of the two studies noted the first one is longitudinal and conducted from 1986-1989 to “to assist with collecting data to shape food-related policies in rural areas as a part of the Food Security Management Project.” The second study carried out by FAO in 1990-91 was a methodological study to measure gendered dimension of agriculture work using multiple methods of data collection in rural areas of four countries. This study used eight different methods of collecting time use information including “rapid appraisal by checklist; diary methods; interview questionnaires; participant observation; non-participant observation; 24 hour recall; group discussion using checklists; and group feedback analysis.”¹¹⁷ The third study on time-use available from Pakistan was part of the national survey on young people in Pakistan (2001-02) which was based on an interview method with a pre-coded sheet covering 20 different activities distributed from 6 am to 12 am. The purpose was to get an idea of how young

¹¹⁷ Center for Time Use Research -- Information Gateway. Accessed 8/12/2012, URL: <<http://www-2009.timeuse.org/information/studies/data/india-1990-91.php>>

people spend their time in an ordinary day.¹¹⁸

In terms of data collection for time-use there are number of methodological approaches that are used. Data can be gathered using both quantitative and qualitative methods including observation, calendar or diary, stylized interviews on recall basis (Belli et al. 2009).

The time diary method, which is quite common in time use research, usually requires the respondent's time use information for two days based on a pre-coded format in temporal order. Studies show a high validity of time diary data (Verma and Larson 2003); (Kan and Pudney 2008). Keeping a diary reduces the likelihood of error due to retention problem, or their bias towards overestimation or underestimation of activities. The time diary is a robust method because of because of the 'closed' recording system used of 24 hours (Gershuny and Sullivan 1998). This method is best for capturing of "timing of activities and the distribution of activities over the day and the week" (Gershuny and Sullivan 1998).

Another method used in time use data collection is Experience Sampling Method (ESM) which avoids dependence on recall through usage of tools that records activities in

¹¹⁸ Data from this study is used for this dissertation. Details about the methodology are provided in later sections.

real time.¹¹⁹

The interview method (using stylized questionnaire) based on recalling previous day/week (or a standard day/week) is prone to errors and subjectivity issues (Verma and Larson 2003).

In terms of what is the best way to collect time data, Kan and Pudney concludes their critique of methods by suggesting that “future research should devote more efforts to developing data sources collecting weeklong diaries and stylized time-use estimates” (Kan and Pudney 2008).

All social science research studies have to deal with the issue of how to minimize “respondent bias” or to reduce errors due to answers which the “researcher may want to hear.” Studies have shown that when confronted with direct questioning, people tend to give socially acceptable and desirable responses.¹²⁰ For example Hofferth and Sandberg (2001) noted in their study of “parental reading to young kids” that since this is a socially desirable activity, that parents tend to over-report reading to their kids, because it is a ‘good’ activity and under-report television watching which is considered to be a ‘bad’ activity . In another study on religiosity, the researchers found that people over report

¹¹⁹ This research methodology asks participants to stop at certain times and make notes of their experience as they happen, rather than writing them after they had happened.

¹²⁰ “Social desirability (SD) generally is viewed as a tendency for an individual to present him or herself, in test-taking situations, in a way that makes the person look positive with regard to culturally derived norms and standards” Ganster et al. 1983.

their religiosity in conventional surveys (Presser and Stinson 1998). And to understand this kind of bias the researcher has to understand the ethos dominant in the cultural setting of the study.

4.2 Methodological Issues for Pakistani Setting

In the following paragraphs I would discuss problems which may be unique to Pakistan or other places which has similar social, cultural and economic environments.

The Pakistani society is governed by conservative moral codes where everyday behavior is stipulated in the mores and norms of the country. For example a strong social code in the country is separation of the two sexes in public sphere. Friendship of any kind between the sexes is generally not approved. Hence you cannot expect to hear anything about boyfriend or girlfriend in a general interview setting. Even if it is a socially condoned partnership such as people who are engaged, they are not supposed to overtly involve in a courtship and hence a study on youth partnership formation would not capture any “time spent” with the partner either by phone, in person or in any other social gathering etc.

For self-reporting (i.e., using time diary) of time-use the researcher has to rely on basic literacy of the respondents; while that may be possible, it would only capture a limited set of people because around half¹²¹ of the country is non-literate. And of those

¹²¹ The latest literacy rate is 58 percent (Government of Pakistan 2013).

who are 'literate,' only a smaller proportion (even if that is in a local language) would be able to take part in a survey which assumes complete understanding of the instrument and the ability to fill it accurately. Hence, any time use survey for the population has to be either based on stylized questionnaire using face to face interview method or be based on observation techniques.

Another problem with data collection in Pakistan is that it is almost quite difficult to get a respondent, (especially young and unmarried females) to talk to an interviewer or researcher alone. And, hence in many cases the interview setting in Pakistan would have more than the respondent which may contaminate the responses. For example a girl, who has restrictions on her movement, may not report meeting friends when she is not supposed to leave the house alone (Minhaj ul Haque, personal communication, January 9, 2010).

Similarly, the sex and age of the interviewer has to be taken into consideration. And, in some cases the marital status, occupation, and education of the interviewer also matters. For example, it would be virtually impossible to interview young girls if the interviewer is a male and would be hard for a young girl to interview a man. But in the case of medical practitioners, in the role of researcher, they might be able to cross some of these social barriers.

Gender norms and societal expectation ascribes special roles related to people's life stage and status. And some level of gender norms exist in all societies. Time use is considered one area of research where the gender differences comes out most

pronounced, as noted by this quotation,

“perhaps nowhere is the asymmetry in the respective rights and obligations of men and women more apparent than in the patterns of time use differentiated by gender, and the inefficiency and inequity they represent.” (Blackden and Wodon 2006)

For example, in Pakistan a woman (especially if they are married) is considered to be responsible for taking care of all household chores like cooking, washing clothes and dishes. While men are deemed the breadwinner and supposed to take care of all outside the house needs, like earning money, shopping etc. Hence, asking them about their time use with a stylized questionnaire may over estimate time spent in housework or employment activities respectively.

4.3 Description of This Time Use Survey

In Pakistan, the first national level study to capture multiple dimensions of young peoples' lives, was conducted by Population Council in 2001-02, entitled “Adolescent and Youth Survey of Pakistan 2001-02.” To date the study remains the only source of reliable data for study different aspects of young peoples' lives (Sathar et al. 2003).

For the current research the principal investigator chose to use this particular dataset but focused specifically on describing the religious time use patterns of young boys and girls of Pakistan. The dataset includes information collected from 8,074 boys and girls between the ages of 15-24 years from all over the country. Other than a comprehensive set of education, work, marriage, mobility and gender, and major events in life the survey included a time-use profile detailing the activities during the previous day from 6:00 am to 12:00 midnight (totaling up to 16 hours). The profile recorded day to

day activities including personal time (like eating, grooming etc.), school related, household and paid work, leisure, religious, and travel etc. in a matrix of 20 possible options. (See Appendix B for the Matrix of Time-Use).

Based on preliminary analysis of the dataset and existing statistics, the author expects significant and dramatic differences in religious time use by social class, gender and location.

4.4 Questions on Religious Time Use

To determine what constitute a religious activity, the interviewers noted down time spent main ritualistic religious activities such as prayers. For the Muslim respondents, the category included the daily prayers (*Namaz*),¹²² reading the *Quran* (the religious text of Muslims), attending religious sermons, particularly in mosques (called *Khutbah* or *Wa'az*) and/or gatherings to read the *Quran* and lectures (*Quran Khawani* or *Dars*) for the Muslim respondents. The averages for the study are tabulated on the basis of time spent in religious activities in the reference day for which time use data was collected. However since data was not collected about the particular sect (or denomination) of the respondents, it is not clear if some practices which are only adhered to by a specific sect is also captured by the interviewers. In this context, the reader should also note that the

¹²² Five daily prayers are mandatory for all adult (sane and healthy) Muslims. Praying in the mosque, however, is not necessary but is recommended, especially for males (Saeed 2006, 90-91). In Pakistan it is not customary for women to go to the mosque for regular prayers, though in many other Muslim societies it is a norm (For example, see Abbas 2002).

intensity of religious activities can be different according to the changes Muslim calendar. People tend to be more religious during the month of Ramzan/Ramadhan (9th month in the Islamic calendar) in which Muslims are required to fast from sunrise to sunset. Eating, drinking (of any liquid) and smoking are forbidden during the time of the fast. Religious practices are heightened during this month. In fact during the field work many adolescent boys were interviewed after *Tarawi* prayers (the long night prayers offered after the glow of sunset has disappeared --called *Isha*), outside the mosque. Some of the boys had just finished the solitary spiritual practice of *I'tikaaf* when they were interviewed (Munawar Sultana, text message to author, October 10, 2010).¹²³ To show the popularity of such practice, it might be useful to highlight that a research conducted by polling agency Gallup Pakistan notes that about a fourth of Pakistanis observed the practice in 2009.¹²⁴ In these cases the time spent on religion would seem strangely long because they are supposed to be praying, reciting the *Quran* and learning about religion during the whole time. Hence, they could report the whole day spent in religious activity.¹²⁵

¹²³ Though contested by some religious scholars, the ritual of *I'tikaaf* (الإعتكاف) or confinement to the Mosque, is widely practiced is considered to be a *Sunnah* or practice of the Prophet. It involves confining oneself to the mosque for at least three days to spend the time in prayers, reading the Quran while fasting. It is common to engage in this ritual during the last ten days of Ramadan - or part of the ten days (Sell 1880, 249, See also, Holy Quran 2:187).

¹²⁴ Gallup Pakistan Survey. <http://www.gallup.com.pk/pollsshow.php?id=2009-10-09>

¹²⁵ Even though the instruction for data collection team was to gather information only about a “typical” day which will preclude a day of fasting.

4.5 Critique of the Methodology

Time-use data provides rich and detailed information about how people live on a day to day basis. However, it is an expensive and time consuming enterprise. The current research is the first of its kind to focus on “time-use of youth in Pakistan” which covers four major dimensions of life. However, the data analysis would be essentially descriptive. Though important co-variables which determine the quality and quantity of how time is budgeted will be identified, the researcher does not aim to establish “causality.” The data is collected at one point in time, (as opposed to a panel) it is not sufficient to create “outcome” models, for example how allocation of time really impact these young peoples’ lives and thus show what would constitute “efficient” usage of time for “success in life.” Although time-use surveys are regularly conducted in developed countries like USA, UK, Japan etc. which provides a rich source of information to show trend over time in changing behavior of population in how they budget their time resources (and hence can gauge social change), it is not possible to do so in Pakistan where collection of time use data have been rare and the past studies on this topic were only limited to agricultural work (Sultana et al. 1994).

A second challenge, which is true for many large surveys, is ascertaining the quality of the activities. While the data may tell us how much a youth spends in leisurely reading or doing homework, but it does not shed light on the quality of that particular reading. Similarly, in terms of employment, even though all employment is assumed to be a positive human development activity, working in the field, stitching footballs at home or working in a factory entails a different set of trajectories of life and career chances.

The data also does not take into account multiple activities done at the same time; for example a mother taking care of the child and watching television may report just one of the activities or report one activity after the other. Moreover, someone who reported 3 activities in one hour would be assigned 20 minutes for each of the activity. Therefore, the analysis cannot designate the difference if overlapping activities occurred or not.

With regards to the physical space of religious activity we know from evidence elsewhere that Muslim females do most of their religious activities at home like prayers and reading the *Quran* while boys have option to do the same at home or in a mosque.

The data also does not explain the emotions or the mood of the person while they engaged in the activity, which is another dimension of interest for time-use researchers. Moreover, the recall interview method also does not capture recurrence of the activity. We also do not know if the activity takes place regularly, occasionally or it is rare.

4.6 Time Use as a Measure of Religiosity

The concept of religiosity, as discussed before is complex and in order measure such a phenomenon it is hard to operationalize as what would constitute religiosity. Generally, the adherence to an organized religion and participation in prayer is considered a pragmatic indicator of religiosity. To gauge religiosity time-use studies could be useful because at least it would offer a somewhat objective measure of religious behavior on something that can be measured for example, amount and frequency of formal prayers or other formal religious activity. However, if such a study is based on “recall method” which records activities as per the reporting of the respondent about a previous reference

day, the results may not be straight forward to interpret. Studies based on recall of a standard day of the previous week can down play or over emphasize religious activity, or even totally eliminate it, if it was for a very short duration. Moreover, even if time spent on religious activity is sincerely captured, it can only be considered indicative but cannot be predict religiosity the level of a particular population. For example young adults who live with their parents, may go to the place of worship just because their parents want them to.¹²⁶ Or, for a young wife, praying might be the best way to take a break from burden of household work. And, on the contrary, some deeply religious people may not find time out of their busy work hours for religious activities like praying, visiting the place of worship (in the case of Pakistan, it would be mosque or *masjid* because majority the people are Muslims), listening to religious lectures or reading religious book(s) (ie *Quran*).

Another issue arises because of a survey being at one point in time. Unless the same survey asks about something general, as “how often do you go to mosque or church in a week,” time use data cannot provide complete picture of religiosity. Along the same lines, some implicit religious activities, like remembering God when you are busy taking care of household chores would not count as religious activity. For example, ethnographic research in South India found that women generally sing religious songs,

¹²⁶ It might be interesting to note that 90 percent of the young people in Pakistan live either with their parents or parents-in-law (Sathar et al. 2003).

hymns or lullabies like *chakki-nama*¹²⁷ while engaging in mundane household work like grinding grains (Eaton 2000, 191, cited in Purewal and Kalra 2010, 387).

Another area of potential problem is blending religiosity with actual practice of religion. Research has shown that people tend to be more religious in attitude than they are in practice.¹²⁸ Hence the practice of religion without the data on religious outlook cannot adequately capture levels of religiosity.

Defining what constitutes a “religious practice” can also affect data collection and interpretation. For example lamentation during the month of *Moharram* (the first month in Islamic calendar based on lunar system) is considered to be a religious activity by the believers of that sect whereas a more literalistic believer of Islam would consider that blasphemous. Or, any other sectarian differences in practice of religion may not even appear as a religious activity, especially when data is captured through interview method and the interviewer has the authority to put various activities into pre-decided categories.

To gauge religiosity time-use studies could be very useful especially when the study design uses the diary method which requires the subject to note any activity they undertake with the time and place. However if the study is based on “recall method”

¹²⁷ Folk poetry which sung during grinding using *Chakki* (grindstone) (Purewal and Kalra 2010).

¹²⁸In order to capture “regular” day activities, data was collected for a “regular” day for the respondent. For example, it made sure that data collection does not take place during long schools holidays and if the previous day was a holiday or weekend for a student the “reference” day was considered the last day the respondent went to school.

which records activities based on memory of the respondent, results may not be straight forward to interpret. Studies based on recall of a standard day of the previous week can down play or over emphasize religious activity, or even totally eliminate it, especially if the act was for a very short duration. Secondly, even if time spent on religious activity is sincerely captured, it can only be considered indicative but cannot be explain the religiosity level of a particular population. Because the time use research usually just captures the quantitative aspect of the act. For example how much time a person spends in religious activity in a day or in a week. However, concept of religiosity can only be comprehensively captured if the information on behavior is coupled with attitude is also captured. For example, as noted in another section in this dissertation that for some religious activity is a way to take a break from household work, or a teenage whose parents are religious can influence him or her to spend more time on prayers. Secondly, in societies where religion is considered very important part of time, public prayer also establishes piety which can bring in valuable social capital. Thus, the quantity of time spent on activities that are deemed religious does give a good measure of a person's religiosity but it may not tell everything about their religious outlook. Nevertheless, due to constraints in capturing attitudes towards religion and other nuances of religious behavior the simple variable which captures the amount of time spent on religious activity does provide a strong proxy to measure religiosity in society.

In addition to that responses based on recall are also subject to another survey bias known as "Recall Decay" which means "the decline in the ability to retrieve information from memory as the event to be remembered recedes in time." The respondents can also

over or underreport due to “Forward Telescoping” bias which happens due to “the misperception that an event occurred more recently than it really did.” (Johnson et al. 1997 p. 964)

However there are some advantages to the study of religiosity through time-use surveys. Though on one hand there are potential problems of over-reporting due to social desirability of certain actions such as going to church or mosque, and or forgetting some other actions which are trivial or not socially acceptable. At the same time, the chances of over-reporting is less with time-use studies, when the respondent is simply asked to recount the activities they did in the previous day without giving any cue of the kind of activities. Hence, when response is not structured and respondent has to recall the day from morning till night, they are more likely to provide more accurate picture rather than if they are prompted about certain activities like if they did attend church in the previous day or if they watched television or not.

4.7 Variables Used in the Analysis

The analysis in this dissertation employs all the important contextual and demographic variables to determine religious life. This includes age, sex, marital status, schooling, work, household wealth, province, location. It should be noted that in April 2010, the name of one of the provinces was changed officially changed from NWFP to Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (abbreviated as KP or KPK).¹²⁹ However, this dissertation would continue

¹²⁹Government of Pakistan. 2010. Constitution of Pakistan: 18th Amendment. 2010. URL

to use the previous name.

In terms of religious “space” the daily prayers among Muslims can be performed at home, in a mosque, at a street-side or road-side, shrine, or while travelling. The prayers can be completed with a congregation or in solitude. Moreover, the Muslims pray five times a day (every day) and hence the time and day of religious practice is about the same for the whole day and every day of the week.¹³⁰

4.7.1 Description of the Exploratory and Dependent Variables

The independent variables used in the regression model include selected personal, household, regional and time-use variables (descriptive statistics of these variable are provided in Appendix C). Personal level variables include sex, age, schooling, work and marital status of respondents. Time used on other activities, such as paid and household work-- are also hypnotized to be important predictors of time used in religious activities-- are also included. Household socio economic status (SES), province and locality of respondents are also part of the analysis. Finally, since part of the data collection was done during the month of fasting (Ramzan), which is added to the model to remove any confounding effects of the higher levels of religiosity. Short descriptions of the variables are provided as below.

<http://www.pakistani.org/pakistan/constitution/amendments/18amendment.html>

¹³⁰With the exception of Friday which could be considered the Muslim day of Sabbath. Participation in the afternoon prayers increases manifold on this day.

Sex of the respondents is divided into the categories of male and female. Males are coded as the reference category.

Age of the respondents was collected as a continuous variable (completed years) and used for analysis as is. However for the descriptive analysis age has been grouped into two categories, 15-19 years and 20-24 years. The reason for choosing these is to show the differences between younger youth (in their teens) and relatively more mature youth most of who would have moved from adolescence to adult life.

Schooling Status is determined by the current schooling activity, i.e., if the respondent is in school or not. It is coded as dichotomous variable. Those who were in school in the past or never went to school are grouped in one category while the rest are coded as the other. The latter category is used as reference.

Work Status is determined by the current (paid) work status of respondent. It is a dichotomous variable. The respondents currently involved in work for remuneration are coded in group while those who are not in the workforce or are unemployed are coded in the other group. The former group is the reference category.

Marital status is coded as dichotomous variable. Respondents are divided into two groups by their current marital status. Those who are currently married are in one group while the rest (those who are never married or were married in past i.e., widowed, divorced etc. are in the other group. Married participants are coded in reference category.

The youth who are currently not in school, workforce or married have been

pooled in a “do nothing” category. This is the group which has the highest amount of discretionary time at hand. The youth who are married and/or are part of the workforce or in school are coded as the reference.

Total time spent doing work in the household or for paid work is also included as a predictor for religious time use. Both are continuous variables.

The economic status of the household is divided into four groups, low, low-mid, mid and high.¹³¹ Three dummy variables were created keeping low SES as the reference category.

There are four provinces in Pakistan, Punjab, Sindh, NWFP and Balochistan. Three dummies were created with Sindh as the reference category. The urban and rural location of respondents is a dichotomous variable. Rural locality is coded as the reference category.

Almost half of the survey was conducted during Ramzan the month of fasting and hence religious time use is presumed to be different during this period. This is also a binary variable and non Ramzan period is coded in reference category.

¹³¹ The Adolescent and Youth Survey of Pakistan used 29 questions to develop socio-economic status of the households of the young people interviewed. These variables collected through the household survey, comprised of household possessions and amenities like condition of the house, ownership of television, cycle, animals etc. To develop the proxy indicator, these variable were added to a principal components analysis. The selected component was then scored and the weighted households were divided into quartiles. The SES was then matched to the adolescent survey (Sathar et al. 2003, Appendix II, 214)

OLS linear regression will be used to examine the dependent variable, time spent in religious activities. This variable is continuous and is measured in hours. A set of predictors, listed above will be included in the model to show relationship between religious time use and selected variables.

Chapter 5

FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION

5.1 Introduction

This first part of this chapter presents descriptive statistics from the analysis. The later part includes regression model for time-use with the various independent variables described in the previous chapter. The data for the analysis includes only Muslim respondents and those who have provided complete time-use profiles.¹³²

Various background characteristics such as sex, age, location and province of residence, schooling, work and marital status all in some ways or other affect how much time is spent on prayers and other kind of religious activities. Table 1 presents an overview of mean hours spent on such activities by selected characteristics.

Around half of Pakistani youth in this national survey reported time spent on religious activities in the reference day and on average they spend about an hour in a day, on these activities. On a typical day the religious activities range from 0 to 13 hours. Of course, like many other non-essential activities of life the amount of time of religion varies by their socioeconomic and demographic characteristics, such as sex, age, location and province of residence, schooling, work and marital status. All of these factors, in some ways or other affect how much time is spent on prayers and other kind of religious activities.

¹³² All statistics are calculated for Muslim respondents except for the means by Religion in Table 1.

Although a causal relationship cannot be established, it seems though that religious activity has emerged as a small luxury that only those who have higher level of discretionary time can enjoy. Hence, youth from low SES families spend less time on religious activity than those from the higher SES. The youth from province of NWFP report the highest level of religious activity as they spend more than two hours on average on such pursuits. Young people who are in school and those who are not working (thus younger), on average report more than an hour per day on these activity.

In terms of overall religious activity, younger males (15-19 year olds) in Pakistan are more likely to be religious than young females of any age and males in the older cohort (20-24 year olds). However, the differences by gender and age should be treated with caution because we cannot determine the direction of causality. That is, whether the younger males are more religious and hence they spend more time on these, or they are more religious because they do not have responsibilities of supporting the family and doing household work and hence have more free time at hand. One could also hypothesize that younger youth may be influenced by family to spend more time on religious activity.

Table 1: Mean hours spent on religious activities by background characteristic of respondents (Muslim Respondents only).

Background Characteristics		Mean hrs	In Minutes	SD	Count
Age	15-19 yrs	0.93	55.8	1.45	4503
	20-24 yrs	0.9	54	1.4	3075
Sex	Male	0.91	54.6	1.54	3045
	Female	0.92	55.2	1.35	4533
Schooling Status	Currently in School	1.08	64.8	1.35	1139
	Not in school	0.89	53.4	1.44	6439
Marital Status	Never married	1.02	61.2	1.52	5356
	Currently married	0.68	40.8	1.13	2153
Work Status	Currently working	0.63	37.8	1.15	2944
	Not working	1.11	66.6	1.55	4629
Work status by hours	No work or not working	1.07	64.2	1.54	4644
	Work upto 4 hours	0.91	54.6	1.42	921
	Work more than 4 hours	0.59	35.4	1.06	2013
Economic Status	Low SES	0.71	42.6	1.23	1567
	Low-mid SES	0.91	54.6	1.42	1766
	High-mid SES	0.97	58.2	1.47	1905
	High SES	1.04	62.4	1.51	2019
Province	Punjab	0.81	48.6	1.35	4256
	Sindh	0.43	25.8	0.99	1975
	NWFP	2.36	141.6	1.63	946
	Balochistan	1.16	69.6	1.35	402
Locality	Rural	0.9	54	1.41	5464
	Urban	0.97	58.2	1.47	2115
Religion of Respondent	Islam	0.92	55.2	1.43	7578
	Christianity	0.56	33.9	1.40	160
	Hinduism	0.01	0.6	0.10	126
Timing of Survey	Survey was conducted in Ramzan	1.52	91.41	1.76	2250
	Not in Ramzan	0.66	39.85	1.17	5306
All Respondents		0.92	55.2	1.43	7578

Although a causal relationship cannot be established, it seems though that religious activity has emerged as a small luxury, and only those who have higher level of discretionary time can enjoy. Hence, youth from low SES families spend less time on religious activity than those from the higher SES. It seems that youth from low SES families do not have the luxury of indulging in religious activities for too long. Looking at their overall time, it appears that they are too busy with either household chores or employment

The previous table shows age as a negative factor on religion, however when the sex of respondent is taken into consideration, it seems that girls' such activities increase with age whereas boys experience the opposite effect. The NWFP province youth report the highest level of religious activity as they spend more than two hours on average on such pursuits. Young people who are in school and those who are not working (thus younger), on average report more than an hour per day on these activity.

Seasonal variation other time bound factors such as religious festivals during the survey also played an important role in determining time allocation of various activities. About a third of the survey was conducted during *Ramzan* (also known as *Ramadhan*), the Muslim month of fasting. Religious activities are usually heightened during this period, and hence it is no surprise to see the time spent on religious activity during Ramzan is twice as much as non-Ramzan period.


Religion of respondent seems to have significant amount of bearing on mean time spent on religious activities. Muslim respondents, who are the majority of the

respondents, tend to spend 55 minutes per day on religion, while Christians spend about half an hour, whereas Hindus spend only about 6 minutes on average.

5.2 Overall Religious Practice

It is interesting to note that while we have about one hour average in a day dedicated to religion, as much as half of the young people reported no religious activity (Figure 3). A little less than a fifth of the respondents spend up to one hour, on average, in a day on such actions. About a third of the youth reports spending more than 1 hour on religious activities. A small proportion (3%) spends four or more hours in prayers etc. (not shown in the figure).

Figure 3: Distribution of religious activity by time, for all respondents in analysis




Total N=7578

5.3 Gender and Age

The combination of age and sex of respondent yields some interesting results in relation to religious behavior. While boys seem to spend less and less time with increase in age, the change for mean time for girls is minimal (figure 4).

Figure 4: Religious activities by gender of all respondents in analysis



Age has negative impact on being religious and being female slightly increases the chances of spending more time on such activities (table 2). In terms of overall religious activity, younger males (15-19 year olds) in Pakistan are more likely to be religious than young females of any age and males in the older cohort (20-24 year olds). However, the differences by gender and age should be treated with caution. Whether the younger males are more religious and hence they spend more time on these, or they are more religious because they do not have responsibilities of supporting the family and

doing household work and hence have more free time at hand. One could also hypothesize that younger youth may be influenced by family to spend more time on religious activity.

Table 2: Religious activities by gender and age of all respondents

	15-19 yrs		20-24 yrs	
	%	N	%	N
Male				
No religious activity	52%	993	56%	636
Up to 1 hour of religious activity	18%	350	16%	178
More than 1 hour of religious activity	30%	575	28%	313
Total %	100%	1918	100%	1127
Female				
No religious activity	52%	1333	52%	1006
Up to 1 hour of religious activity	15%	395	17%	321
More than 1 hour of religious activity	33%	857	32%	622
Total %	100%	2585	100%	1949

5.4 Socio-Economic Status

Although a causal relationship cannot be established, it seems though that religious activity has emerged is a small luxury that only those who have higher level of discretionary time can enjoy. Hence, youth from low SES families spend less time on religious activity than those from the higher SES. It seems that youth from low SES families do not have the luxury of indulging in religious activities for too long. It is perhaps considered free time activity. Looking at their overall time, it appears that they are too busy with either household chores or employment (table 3).

Table 3: Religious activity by socio economic status (SES)

	Low SES	Low-mid SES	High-mid SES	High SES
No religious activity	63.6%	53.4%	49.2%	45.7%
Up to 1 hour of religious activity	10.5%	16.4%	18.5%	19.3%
More than 1 hour of religious activity	26.0%	30.2%	32.3%	35.1%
Total %	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Total N	1567	1766	1905	2019

5.5 Religion and Province and Locality

The most dramatic differences in religious activity are found in the provincial distribution. Upon distribution of religious activities by province we see huge variation among them, thus presenting very interesting insights to the data as well as allowing us to conjecture about some socio cultural dimensions of the provinces (Table 4).

Table 4: Religious activity by province.

	Punjab	Sindh	NWFP	Balochistan	Total
No religious activity	52.0%	74.7%	9.5%	46.9%	52.3%
Up to 1 hour of religious activity	21.6%	9.4%	12.5%	5.7%	16.4%
More than 1 hour of religious activity	26.4%	15.9%	78.0%	47.4%	31.2%
Total %	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Total N	4255	1975	945	401	7576

While the provinces of Punjab and Balochistan follow the national trend, Sindh seems to be the least religious of all provinces, as three fourth of the youth there did not report any religious activity for the reference day. In contrast, young people from NWFP province seem more deeply religious as only one in 10 do not report any religious activity and more than a third spend two to four hours on such activities. One in 10 spends four or more hours in the service of God.

Given the huge differences in life style and opportunity structure between cities and rural areas, it is important to look at the results by location (Table 5). One many think that urban dwellers would have more secular tendencies, but contrary to general expectations, it was noticed that rural respondents reported lower level of religious activity than their urban counterparts. For example, two thirds of the young girls in rural areas who are from the lowest socio economic stratum, do not report any religious activity (data not presented).

Table 5: Religious activity by region.

	Rural	Urban	Total
No religious activity	53.9%	48.2%	52.3%
Up to 1 hour of religious activity	15.6%	18.6%	16.4%
More than 1 hour of religious activity	30.5%	33.1%	31.2%
Total %	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Total N	5463	2115	7578

5.6 Religious Activity by Life Status (Marriage, Education and Work)

Marriage is an important marker for adulthood and gives certain level of empowerment. However it can also add burden of finances on the males and managing the household on females. Table 6 shows that marriage has negative effect on religious activity. The table shows a 13 percent points decrease in spending any time for religious activities for married youth.

Table 6: Religious activity by marital status of all respondents.

	Never married	Currently married	Total
No religious activity	48.5%	61.5%	52.3%
Up to 1 hour of religious activity	17.6%	13.6%	16.4%
More than 1 hour of religious activity	33.9%	25.0%	31.2%
Total %	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Total N	5356	2154	7578

The presence of children in the household actually decreases religious participation. This is in sharp contrast to developed western societies where introducing the child to religion is the motivation behind spending more time on religion. In Pakistani society the responsibility of religious education is shared by family and community (data not shown).

Table 7: Religious activity by paid work status of all respondents.

	Currently Working	Not Working	Total
No religious activity	62.0%	46.2%	52.4%
Up to 1 hour of religious activity	15.9%	16.7%	16.4%
More than 1 hour of religious activity	22.0%	37.1%	31.2%
Total %	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Total N	2944	4628	7572

The burden of economic activity takes time away from other discretionary time activity like “religious activity.” Table 7 shows how the young people who are currently working are less likely to have time for religious activity. Those who do not work, one fifth spend two or more hours in a day on religious activities while those who are working.

Table 8: Religious activity by schooling status of all respondents.

	Currently in School	Not in School	Total
No religious activity	38.3%	54.8%	52.3%
Up to 1 hour of religious activity	23.8%	15.1%	16.4%
More than 1 hour of religious activity	37.9%	30.0%	31.2%
Total %	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Total N	1139	6439	7578

Respondents who are in school tend to spend more time on religious activity (table 8). That might be due to the age affect. As we know that religiosity generally

decreases with age, presumably due to lessening of parental and social control of behavior and also due to increase in household and/or economic responsibilities. Those respondents who have never been in school are mostly from rural areas, and as we have seen in the previous tables.

Youth who are not in school, or employed or not married appears to spend more time on religious activities (table 9). Forty percent of these youth report spending on average more than 1 hour on religious activity in a day compared to just 28 percent of their counterparts who are involved in any kind of productive or are married.

Table 9: Religious activity by “doing nothing” status

	Doing Nothing	Others	Total %	Total N
No religious activity	45%	56%	52%	3967
Up to 1 hour of religious activity	15%	17%	16%	1245
More than 1 hour of religious activity	40%	28%	31%	2366
Total %	100%	100%	100%	7578
Total N	2248	5330	7578	

5.7 Affect of Ramzan¹³³

The Muslim month of fasting could have pushed the amount of time spent on prayers considerably up. Hence it might be interesting to see the break-down of religious activity

¹³³The time of sunrise and sunset during Ramzan of 2001 was calculated from World Clock. URL: <http://www.timeanddate.com/worldclock/astronomy.html?n=106&month=11&year=2001&obj=sun&af=-11&day=1>

time by the timing of Ramzan. As demonstrated in Table 10, Ramzan did have a huge impact on religious activity of young people. Generally the Muslims become more religious during this month, they pray more and spend more time reading the *Quran* and attend more religious gatherings and lectures. And, hence the high level of religious activity may be due to data collection during Ramzan. Almost two thirds of the youth do not note any religious activity when the survey was conducted before or after Ramzan, but only a third of respondents do so during Ramzan.

Analysis of effect of Ramzan with province produced some interesting results (table not presented).¹³⁴ During Ramzan, in NWFP only one in ten did not record any religious activity, which is significantly lower than the national average (54%). In Punjab province, around 40 percent youth did not mention any religious activity when survey was conducted during Ramzan, but this figured increased by more than 20 percent points for the same question when asked before or after the sacred month.

Table 10: Religious activity by timing of the data collection

	Before or After Ramzan	During Ramzan	Total
No religious activity	60.7%	32.7%	52.3%
Up to 1 hour of religious activity	15.2%	19.4%	16.4%
More than 1 hour of religious activity	24.1%	48.0%	31.2%
Total %	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Total N	5307	2250	7579

¹³⁴ Fieldwork during Ramzan was carried out only in Punjab and NWFP.

5.8 Day of the Week

Friday is considered to be the most auspicious day in Muslim tradition and hence religious activity should peak on this day. However from the analysis it appears that religious activity is only mildly affected by the day being Friday (table not included).¹³⁵

5.9 Multivariate Analysis

A model to predict the number of hours in religious activity has been created with the background variables of sex, age, marriage, work and schooling status, SES, province, location and effect of Ramzan. The model predicts time use (in hours) in various religious activities as defined before (Table 1).

The multivariate analysis shows how the background variables play out in terms of time allocated to religion. The complete model explains 24 percent of the variation in the differences in allocation of time towards religious practices. Age, sex, marital, schooling and work status, economic class, residence, effect of Ramazan, all explain time spent religious activities.

¹³⁵ The concept of “weekend” in Pakistan is similar to other countries, but mostly for urban areas and the government activities. However, the idea of weekend or day or rest from work does necessarily correspond in the rural areas where Friday is the day when people take time to rest.

Table 11: Regression coefficients for time spent in religious activities

Variables	Coefficients	Sig.
Male		
Female	-0.025	**
Age	0.014	**
Married		
Not married	0.288	***
Working		
Currently not working	0.269	***
Not in school, work or married		
In school and/or working and/or married	-0.145	**
Time spent in schooling	-0.005	
Low SES		
Low-mid SES	0.145	***
High-mid SES	0.223	***
High SES	0.266	***
Sindh		
Punjab	-0.003	
NWFP	1.475	***
Balochistan	0.741	***
Rural		
Urban	0.029	
Survey was not conducted during Ramzan		
Survey was conducted during Ramzan	0.798	***
(Constant)	-0.617	
R²	.242	
N	7231	

Notes: * $p < .10$. ** $p < .05$. *** $p < .01$.

The biggest difference in religious time use is seen in the province of NWFP, where controlling from all factors, we see youth spending 1.5 hours more than what youth of Sindh spend on religious practices. The second most important factor to explain higher time-use in religion is effect of Ramzan. After controlling for other background factors, the month of fasting adds almost an hour to overall time spent in religion.

Certain aspects of “modern” life style, such as schooling and work has a negative association with time on religion. This could be because paid work have its own time commitments and the since benefits of this world outweighs the benefit of the other, work responsibility would takes preference over piety. Youth from higher socio-economic class are likely to report more religious activity, which could be due to the availability of more time.

Factors such as age; marital, work and schooling status; the provinces of NWFP and Balochistan; SES; and effect of Ramzan, are all statistically significant in the complete model. Not being part of the work-force, not being in school or being married, being male or being part of a High SES household increases the likelihood of spending more time in religious activities.

5.10 Discussion

The results of the present study support the hypothesis that religious time use is associated with individual level background characteristics, household SES, province and time use in household and paid work.

The regression coefficients show huge variations among the provinces in religious activities. In Sindh, for example, the majority of young people report no religious activity in the “reference day” while the youth of NWFP present an opposite scenario. The degree of participation in the annual religious congregation in Shrines is much higher in the

Punjab and Sindh compared to Frontier and Balochistan.¹³⁶ Another explanation for such difference is the unequal set of opportunity structure in these provinces,

“The four provinces of Pakistan (Punjab, Sindh, North West Frontier Province (N.W.F.P.) and Baluchistan [sic] differ demographically and in terms of socioeconomic development. Punjab is considered the most developed and Baluchistan [sic] the least developed region in Pakistan. Also, inhabitants of these provinces differ significantly in terms of cultural and traditional practices and have different norms and values regarding children” (Muhammad 2009).

From the Gallup Pakistan polls, it is also been observed that shrine visits are significantly higher in Sindh than the other three provinces. Perhaps, the “implicit” religious practices such as shrine visitations, taking part in religious festivals, meeting *Pir*, fill the gap for pure religious rituals. In relation to provinces, this should be noted that the provinces of Sindh and Punjab and predominantly *Barelvi* while the other two provinces, NWFP and Balochistan comprise mostly of *Deobandi* adherents. A big difference between the two sects is that the latter sub-sect’s emphasis on strict following of religion. The other reason that could explain higher level of religious activity in NWFP is their ethnic composition. *Pashtoons*, who live in NWFP are known for strict religious practice and piety. Even the most rogue among them would stop everything when the time comes for prayer and fast (Munwar Sultana, text message to author, January 2, 2013).

¹³⁶ Gallup Pakistan. <http://www.gallup.com.pk/Polls/29-01-10.pdf>

.Generally religious activity is found to be higher among the lower socio-economic group, and level of religiosity goes down with higher level of income (Seguino and Lovinsky 2009, 4). As explained by Carvalho (2009), the theory does not explain behavior in Muslim societies.

“When production of the religious commodity is time-intensive relative to secular production, agents with lower wages devote more time to religious activity... However, neither the household production model of religion or any other model in the economics of religion literature explain a surge in religiosity amongst the educated middle class in Muslim societies.” (Carvalho 2009, 14)

The data from Pakistan also shows that among Pakistan youth the correlation is of these two variables is similar to Carvalho’s analysis. The youth in Pakistan who are better off appear to be more religious than the youth who belong to households with fewer resources. That is perhaps due to the phenomenon of time poverty. The youth from lower economic class tend to spend more time on work, either at home or outside and hence end up with less time in hand to spend on religious or any other activity that is not necessary for survival. Hence, the youth who report no time in the category of religion, might be doing so because religion is perhaps no more vital than work or maybe there is no time left.

During the month of fasting religious rituals, especially prayers, reading the *Quran*, visiting the mosque etc., are intensified (Bialkowski et al. 2010) and results in the model are consistent with religious practice in Pakistan. Youth who were surveyed during the holy month are found to be significantly more religious than those who were contacted before or after.

In contrast to expectations that women are more religious (Loewenthal et al. 2002), the evidence from this analysis shows males to be more religious. The counterintuitive finding is similar to that of socio-economic status and religious time use. It appears that in both cases time poverty takes a toll on the available time (for females and for youth from lowest SES) to spend on religious activities. Such difference could also be due to the fact that most religiosity and religion related studies are conducted with Christian population. However, Loewenthal et al. (2002) in their research individual religiosity with women from various faiths found that Muslim women were less religious than Muslim men. They argue that this difference is due to the fact that “traditional Judaism and Islam place less strenuous religious obligations upon women than upon men in some respects.” This shows that the idea that “women are more religious than men is culture-specific, and contingent on the measurement method used” (Loewenthal et al. 2002).

Chapter 6

CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTION

6.1 Conclusions

More than half of the youth in Pakistan in this assessment, report no religious activity in the reference day. Youth who are not in school, not working nor are married are more likely to spend more hours on religious activities. On average youth spend a little less than an hour on religious activities. However it should be noted that religious activities do not mean high level of religiosity--it seems that adolescents and youth who are not doing anything are more likely to spend time in religious activities. However, lack of religious activity does not necessarily mean lack of religiosity. As explained by Shepard,

“It is important to stress that moderate secularism is not necessarily ‘irreligious.’ A secularist may perform faithfully all of the Islamic rituals and follow an Islamic code of ethics in his or her personal life...Secularists may also, quite consistently, view religion as a desirable or even necessary support for personal ethics and...wellbeing.” (Shepard 1987, 310-311)

Data shows that religious activity slows down with age and other important markers of adulthood like entering job market and getting married, having children etc. Poverty of resources also creates poverty and scarcity of time since youth from the higher socio economic households report more time spent on religious activities. Generally women are found to be more religious but in terms of time spent on religion in Pakistan, the female youth do not appear to spend as much time as the males. This is perhaps due to time bind of household responsibilities.

Youth from low SES families spend much less time than those from the highest strata. These youth clearly do not have the luxury of indulging in religious activities as much as their counterparts from the highest strata of society. Perhaps religion is considered discretionary activity. Looking at their overall time, it appears that they are busy with either household chores or paid work. It seems that people who are time-poor, i.e., have less discretionary time spend less time in religious activities, and this includes women with small children and men with who are working for remuneration.

In terms of the provincial distribution, two of the provinces stand out because of the sheer difference in the time spent on religion activities. It appears that youth in Sindh spend half as much time than their counterparts in NWFP, in religious activities. Or, at least that is what they report. Future research could explore what could explain such a huge gap. Is it because youth in Sindh are less religious or that youth in the other province over-reported their time in these activities.

Half of the survey was conducted during the Muslim holy month of Ramzan which brings on aura of religiosity in Muslim countries and people usually spend more time in prayers, reading the *Quran* and other activities deemed sacred. The analysis shows that Ramzan did increase the total time spent on religious activities. This phenomenon can be further studied to explore if there are Ramzan specific religious activities that people take part in.

The high amount of time spent on religious activity may indicate a high level of interest in religion but may not be a proof of being very religious. Sometimes youth may

spend more time praying because there are no other avenues to explore and praying or other faith related activities would be considered better alternative. In places like NWFP the very high level of religious activity may also be indicative of prevailing social norms adding a positive bias.

This kind of study did not measure attitudes. Can we ascertain devotion or through time spent in religious activities? Moreover, religious fanaticism cannot be ascertained by just looking at the quantity of prayers and other services to God (reading the *Quran* or other sacred text, visiting shrines, listening to religious lectures). A single dimension study of time use also does not take into consideration the problem of dual activity and multi-tasking, for example like visiting a shrine or going to the mosque for prayer might be a religious activity but at the same time social networking, outing and recreation.

Religion on hand has a protective factor for youth in terms of indulging in risky deviant activities like taking drugs, alcohol consumption etc., but on the other hand can spending a substantial amount of time on religious activities like long hours spent in praying etc. could be a drain on youth's time with little gain in human development. Moreover, overindulgence in religion per se or in a certain dogma can promote any other risky behavior i.e., intolerance, fanaticism or just indolence.

The results raise several questions and hypotheses about various socio-demographic factors such as location, gender, age, class, stage of life and their association with religious activity. It appears that lack of time and resources takes time

away from religious activity perhaps because that time is invested in other economically viable activities. Moreover, religious activity defined as just prayers and reading the holy book may not be sufficient to study religious life of Pakistanis, majority of who engage in various syncretic practices infusing cultural rituals with those of religious nature.

6.2 Future Research Direction

In future time use studies with a focus on everyday life including religion, various aspects of religious activities could be explored rather than just adding up the total amount of time in such activity. What are the different activities that are deemed “religious” in nature can be explored with reference to frequency of activity and the site of activity. Also, in such a research religious activity cannot be analyzed without information about sect, sub-sect and caste or clan of the respondent.

From various socio-cultural studies in the country and exploration of mosque facilities, it is clear that most religious activities are segregated by gender but there are some religious practices which are gender-specific. Women in Pakistan tend to participate in some religious activities like more than men. There is a wide array of literature on shrine visits and *Dars* arrangements and attendance, however there are other activities which are of religious nature such as *Milad*, *Quran Khawani* etc., which are considered common religious activities of women. Women’s participation in mosques either for prayer or mosque-schools, is also not documented in large surveys. There is no reliable count on number of mosques and the number of mosques that has a separate section of female devotees.

Some religious activities are annual or occasional, for example visiting a shrine just for prayers or to attend a *Urs* should be explored separately. A scale of religious activities can be prepared on the basis of activities reported ranging from purely religious to cultural practices which are considered as religious (i.e., celebration of *Urs* etc.). Such a scale may also include attitudinal and behavioral questions.

Research shows that youth spend considerable amount of time on internet and use of other technologies. There is also evidence regarding the use of new technology for religious purposes i.e., online Church congregation, Muslim sermon on cable TV, using texting to share religious messages. However the current data does not shed any light on time spent online. As a follow up to a study on religion in Pakistan, religiosity and new technology i.e., cable and internet, the rise of televangelism and the possible impact on society can be documented.

Pakistani society is not immune to social change. While the sixties was a decade of liberation and breaking away from social and religious norms, at least in urban areas, the seventies ushered in the era of Islamization coupled with the USA's proxy war with Russia in Afghanistan and success of Islamic revolution in Iran.¹³⁷ The military dictator of Pakistan adopted Islamization as the official doctrine in 1979, mostly to justify continuation of his rule and also to support the Taliban in Afghanistan in their so called

¹³⁷ Nadeem Farooq Paracha. 2012. Also Pakistan. Blog published in the daily Dawn, URL: <http://dawn.com/2012/02/09/also-pakistan-2/>

jihad. Such Islamization efforts did leave its marks in the society, as the generation growing up in that era is called the “lost generation” (Rizvi 2011). However, the same era also witnessed the fast growth of globalization and spread of modern technology which can bring rapid socio-cultural change. Hence, at least the youth in urban areas who have more access to such technologies are purported to espouse more liberal and secular values. However, there is no research documenting such social change. Future research could delve into the polarization of the society into the contrasting forces of secularization and Islamization. Such study could explore if there is any link of celebrities in Pakistan (singers and cricketers) becoming more religious (like in Egypt in the 90’s) with the trend in Islamization of youth. The questions to explore are the social forces leading to that. Also, if there is really a change in expression of public piety in terms of heightening the phenomenon. Perhaps this could be best measured by observation studies on use of various ways *purdah* is observed among Pakistani (especially urban women). Such study may benefit from those conducted by Bayat (2007) in Egypt or Rozario (2006) in Bangladesh.

A huge corpus of literature exists, linking religiosity with social, health and psychological outcomes for all age groups including youth (refer to Chapter 2 for details listed in current research). Hence, using religious time-use could act as a strong predicting variable for the existing dataset. In the absence of any cultural indicators, religious time-use could be used as a proxy. For example, future researchers could use this variable in analysis of gender attitudes.

Appendix A: Map of Pakistan



Source: CIA World Fact book.

Appendix B: Time-Use Matrix

TIME USE PROFILE																			
ACTIVITIES	6:00	7:00	8:00	9:00	10:00	11:00	12:00	1:00	2:00	3:00	4:00	5:00	6:00	7:00	8:00	9:00	10:00	11:00	12:00
	AM	AM	AM	AM	AM	AM	PM	PM	PM	PM	PM	PM	PM	PM	PM	PM	PM	PM	AM
F4. Personal activities																			
a) Sleeping																			
b) Bathing, dressing, personal care																			
c) Eating																			
F5. School Related Activities																			
a) In School																			
b) Home Work/ Tuition/ Studies at home																			
F6. Domestic Duties																			
a) Household chores inside house (cloth/ dish washing, cleaning, cooking, mending etc)																			
b) Household chores outside house (washing cloths, bringing goods, fetching water etc)																			
c) Care of children, sick & elderly																			
F7. Work																			
a) Paid Work																			
b) Unpaid work (Other than HH chores)																			
c) Learning work/ skill																			
F8. Leisure/ Spare time Activities																			
a) Taking rest/ nap/ relaxing																			
b) Visiting friends/ relatives																			
c) Watching TV/ movies																			
d) Reading magazines/ listening to music																			
e) Games/ Sports																			
f) Other Recreational activities																			
F9. Religious activities																			
F10. In Transit to and from																			
F11. Other activities																			

Appendix C: Descriptive Statistics of the Sample

Background Characteristics of Sample. (Muslim respondents only from AYP data).

Background characteristics	Percent	N	
Sex	Male	40.1	3061
	Female	59.9	4578
	Total	100.0	7639
Age	15-19 yrs	59.4	4534
	20-24 yrs	40.6	3105
	Total	100.0	7639
Schooling Status	Currently in School	15.0	1143
	Not in school	85.0	6495
	Total	100.0	7639
Work Status	Currently working	38.8	2965
	Not working	61.2	4668
	Total	100.0	7633
Marital Status	Currently married	28.5	2175
	Not married	71.5	5461
	Total	100.0	7636
Overall Status	Not in school, not working, nor married	29.7	2266
	Doing something	70.3	5372
	Total	100.0	7639
Location	Rural	72.2	5512
	Urban	27.8	2127
	Total	100.0	7639
Province	Punjab	56.1	4283
	Sindh	26.1	1994
	NWFP	12.5	958
	Balochistan	5.3	403
	Total	100.0	7639
Socio-economic status	Low SES	21.7	1591
	Low-mid SES	24.3	1777
	High-mid SES	26.2	1917
	High SES	27.8	2032
	Total	100.0	7317
Timing of Survey	Not during Ramzan	70.0	5307
	During Ramzan	29.7	2250
	Total	100.0	7579

GLOSSARY

The following local and/or Islamic terminologies are used in the text. It should be noted that many Arabic words are pronounced differently in South Asia, for example *Hadeeth* is pronounced as *Hadees*. In this dissertation, wherever there were such words, I have chosen the term that is more commonly used in South Asia.

Azan: Muslim call for prayers. It is pronounced as Adhaan in Arabic.

Burqa: A dress for purdah which covers the whole body as well as the head and face.

Dargah: Shrine

Dars: Islamic lecture

Dhamal: Dance typically performed at shrines on the beats of drums.

Faqir: Muslim Sufi ascetics. They are also known as Malang or Qalandar.

Fiqh: Islamic jurisprudence

Hadees: The authenticated sayings of the Prophet Mohammad. Pronounced as Hadeeth in Arabic

Hajj: Islamic pilgrimage to the holy sites in Mecca, Saudi Arabia.

Halal: Food and other behavior that are allowed in Islam

Hamd: Devotional song in praise of God

Hijab: Headscarf used by women to cover all of the hair.

Imam: Prayer leader of Muslims

I'tikaaf: Solitary spiritual practice practiced during Ramzan.

Jihad: Struggle (inner or external). Also translated as Islamic holy war.

Jilbab: Indonesian dress for purdah

Jumma: Friday or Friday prayer

Khanqah: Building used for gatherings of Sufi groups.

Khutba: Sermon in the mosque.

Langar: Distribution of food in shrines. The food is considered sacred and is also called Tabarruk or niyāz.

Madrassa: Islamic religious schools

Masjid: The Muslim house of prayer, called mosque in English

Mazar: Shrine

Milad: Prophet Mohammad's birthday celebration

Muslah: Prayer mat of Muslims

Naat: Devotional song in praise of the Prophet Mohammad

Namaz: Muslim Prayer. Called Salah in Arabic.

Nikah: Covenant between husband and wife which is based on verbal acceptance and signing of a document. It is the religious part of Muslim marriage ceremony.

Pashtoon: Ethnic group from the North-West part of Pakistan.

Pir/Peer: Religious guide

Purdah: The practice of using veil and/or any other dress to cover up body (and sometimes face) among Muslim women.

Qawwali: Music genre based on mixture of Hindustani classical and Middle Eastern music and Sufi poetry. This genre was developed in India in the thirteenth century.

Quran Khawani: The reading of Quran in a social gathering

Quran: The holy book of Muslims

Ramzan (Ramadhan): Month of fasting

Roza: The act of fasting

Sajjada Nashin: Guardian of a shrine

Shahada: Verbal utterance of the acknowledgement of oneness of God and Prophet Mohammad as the last messenger.

Sharia: Classical Muslim Law

Ulema: Islamic religious scholars.

Urs: The death anniversary of a saint celebrated by their followers.

Wa'az: Friday Sermon

Zakat: Annual charity.

Ziyarat: Pilgrimage sites (especially of Prophet, his family members and famous saints).
The same word also means visitation to such holy sites.

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