How to do Things with Speeches:

A Critical Discourse Analysis of Military Coup Texts
in Nigeria

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Umar Bello

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ABSTRACT

Coup speeches that usher the military into political power in Nigeria are the central focus of this thesis. There are seven coup speeches that are notable in the changing of the political course in Nigeria and in enabling the military to rule Nigeria for 30 years, establishing another alternative political construct and party (Bangura 1991). The seven coup speeches along with two others, one a colonial proclamation of conquest and the other a counter coup speech (altogether making nine) constitute the data of this thesis. The analysis done here uses Critical Discourse Analysis, based on a combination of Fairclough (1989, 2001), Fairclough and Fairclough (2012), Thompson's (1984, 1988 and 1990) works with complementary insights by Chilton (2004), to analyze the speeches in order to understand the ideologies, perceptions and arguments of the coup makers enshrined in the texts. I also employ a concordance analytic system in corpus linguistics to sort uses of important terms and lexical items. The analysis is divided into three broad parts, namely: an analysis of representation of social actors and their action, an analysis of the processes of interpellation and then an analysis of the premises of the arguments contained in the speeches. In the concluding part, there is a discussion of the dialectical nature of the coup speeches especially in the areas of mutual influences which aids in the gradual sedimentation of the political ideology of the military. In particular, there is a longitudinal intertextual analysis across all the speeches, from the earliest to the latest, to see how a coup speech genre is created.

The contribution of this work to knowledge is in terms of combining discourse analysis and social theory to illuminate some aspects of Nigeria's socio- political crises in depth and multifariously. This work helps in understanding the nature of Nigerian autocratic democracy, subservient followership by the citizenry and the supremacy of the military elite. The work employs a novel combination of representation, argumentation, interpellation and constitutive intertextuality in understanding military discourse. It looks at speaker intention, the exploitation of interpretation or reception and the formation of subjects in general and each with its importance and social context. The work as a whole reveals that the military try to build legitimacy by way of establishing authority through rhetorical arguments in varying degrees. These arguments are laid bare, and what they discern is that charges are decidedly trumped up by the military against their opponents and constructed to suit the spin of their moments. The coup makers in some instances construct strawmen of opponents and then go ahead to attack their constructed assumptions or they charge without substance using nominalizations, metaphorical constructions and presuppositions. They apply stipulative definitions and emotionally loaded words in evaluating their actions favourably and also in the negative evaluation of the actions of the opponents.

At the level of interpellational analysis, the data reveals the use of language in gradually hailing the citizens as military subjects. The role of the audience changes here i.e. from those to be convinced in rhetorical evaluation of opponents to those to be firmly controlled. The

persistent hailing and positioning of the citizens as military subjects help in concretizing their subjecthood. The reaction of the people in affirmation of support to the rule of the military is crucial and it completes the interpellation process. As observed by Clark (2007, 141) "many African societies are so inured to military intervention as not to regard it as aberrant". This inuring of the societies has to do with hegemonic ideological practices in military discourses claiming legitimacy and the right to rule. At the reception level, this shows that most of the citizens have bought into the dominant ideology and are as such interpellated by it or have adopted what Hall (2015, 125) would call the 'dominant-hegemonic position'. Aspects of argumentation, speech acts, and deontic modals used by the coup makers help in gradually solidifying the subservient nature of the citizens to the military junta. The diachronic and intertextual nature of the analysis also reveals that the colonial proclamation of conquest in Nigeria by Lord Fredrick Lugard possibly influenced the first coup speech in 1966 in terms of structure and genre. There are traces of the colonial proclamations found in the 1966 coup speech. In substance, the military appear to copy their colonial progenitors. Historically, the military were formed as an army of colonial conquest. There is a dialectical interplay between colonial discourse and military coup speeches. The first coup speech, for its part, influences other coup speeches and they in general impact on civilian political language.

The work analyzes from the minute to the global and in this bid unties the layers of assumptions, constructions and points of views that underpin an otherwise objective presentation of reality. The study also engages social theory in illuminating aspects of discourse, social practice and political action. The works of post-structuralists like Foucault, Althusser, Bourdieu, Habermas, Laclau and Mouffe, Derrida etc. are employed in shedding light on the processes of social formation in the interpellation of subjects and in the construction of a new political authority by the military regimes.

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LIST OF NAMES SHORTENED IN THE THESIS

Major Chukwuma Kaduna Nzegwu----*Nzegwu*

Major Bukar Suka Dimka---------*Dimka*

Brigadier Joe Garba----*Garba*

Brigadier General Dogonyaro----*Dogonyaro*

General Ibrahim Badamasi Babangida--*Babangida*

General Olusegun Obasanjo---*Obasanjo*

Gen T.Y. Danjuma-----*Danjuma*

General Yakubu Gowon-----*Gowon*

General Muhammadu Buhari---*Buhari*

Major General Murtala Muhammad---*Murtala*

Ahaji Umaru Musa Yar'adua---*Yaradua*

Alhaji Shehu Shagari—*Shagari*

Dr. Goodluck Ebele Jonathan—*Jonathan*

General Sani Abacha—*Abacha*

Lord Frederick John Dealtry Lugard—*Lord Lugard*

CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

1.0 INTRODUCTION

In this chapter, I discuss the historical angle to the formation of the Nigerian military, right from the colonial era. I consider the history of coups in the Nigerian military and the intrigues and twists involved in the overall aspects of coup making. I also talk about two crucial issues that are important to the overall thrust of this thesis, i.e., the issue of class struggle and the issue of formation of legitimacy. I argue that far from the consideration of force arguably used as the reason for the success of military coups, hegemonic practices in the formation of authority are the most potent in the emergence, sustenance and survival of military regimes. The aspect of the possession of repressive apparatus has been overly cited over the issue of the operation of ideological apparatus that has created willing subjects among the citizenry and that has made them see a coup d'état not as an aberration but as an option to democracy. And it is here that discourse is a handy tool of hegemony. I also look at military regimes or the foray of the military into political leadership as part of a competition over the allocation of social goods and economic benefits. The military, in my assessment, is a sub-class of the *petit bourgeois* elements, what Mazrui (1977, 1) calls 'the lumpen militariat' that try to create an economic and political niche for themselves in competition with their civilian counterparts and create an option to democratic leadership. Attitudes of retired military all prove this fact as they turn out to be not only part of the new bourgeois class in terms of acquisition of wealth but democratically elected leaders of the polity. The formation of ideology is crucial for it legitimizes a takeover and removes any sense of aberration, and, it at the same time, enhances the class's symbolic capital which makes them electable democratically. On the other hand, it creates new subjects in the social and political fields with a particular attitude. I also discuss the outline of the thesis in the end so that the reader can appreciate how the various parts work together to create an overall coherent argument.

1.1 BACKGROUND TO THE RESEARCH

What influences this work is the gap that obtains in political discourse in Nigeria of a close Critical Discourse Analysis (hereafter, CDA) as is applied here on coup speeches.

Comprehensive searches in existing literature prove that this work is the first of its kind with an in-depth critical discourse analysis of coup speeches using a method that combines three important angles, i.e.,: analysis of representation, analysis of interpellation and that of argumentation. There is also a dialectical analysis of the impact of the coup speeches especially at the levels of intertextuality and interdiscursivity. This method triangulates results and has a holistic view in analyzing the data which has made the analysis very solid.

The term *coup d'état* is French, and it literally means a 'blow against the state'. According to Powell and Thyne (2011, 252) coups are "illegal and overt attempts by the military or other elites within the state apparatus to unseat the sitting executive". Coup speeches are the initial statements made at the hour of takeover of power and they capture all the anxieties and views of the coup makers at their freshest. These first statements are performative statements, that is, the military actually take over when they announce over the radio that they have assumed power by proclaiming their acts. And that is why "greater importance has to be attached to how the officers justify the coup in the ID rather than to how they justify it at another stage" (Wiking 1983, 13).This research will fill a gaping lacuna of a thorough critical analysis of power grab and the techniques involved in the formation of a political construct and aspects of ideological suppression which are almost non-existent in the academic literature of coup discourse in Nigeria. It will contribute to the debate about Africa's crisis of political leadership and how the military institution has possibly exerted a lot of (negative) influence.

The coup speeches to be examined are seven and they form the overall data. But, for comparative purposes, two texts will also be sampled and analyzed. The colonial text of the proclamation of conquest by Lord Lugard in 1903 and the 1966 coup speech will be compared in the conclusion in talking about the dialectical nature of discourse. This is with a view to seeing what expressions or world views the military, being fostered by colonial interests and colonialism, have adopted or incorporated intertextually and, or, interdiscursively into their own worldview. The other comparative speech is that of General Sani Abacha who has announced two coup speeches, yet counters another speech against their regime announced by Major Gideon Orkah. The latter speech shows a form of evaluation and argumentation that characteristically quashes the initial claims of the

mission of a military takeover espoused by Abacha in the other speeches he is involved in. His various faces and reactions replicate Bertrand Russell's emotive conjugation "I am firm. You are obstinate. He is a pig headed fool" (cited in Walton 2006, 220). General Abacha's counter coup speech shows that words can be 'floating signifiers' (Laclau and Mouffe 1985) that acquire form and meaning principally on the basis of their contexts of use and the ideological interests of the speaker. Invariably, meaning is ideological and contextual.

The time frame considered during which all the coups occurred is also crucial because it shows the overall coup speeches that are announced all in all. There is also the opportunity of flashback afforded to gauge, analyze and historicize their claims vis-à-vis their actions on the basis of factual, historical occurrences. Military rule in Nigeria ended in 1999. Interestingly, after 1999, the president that took over immediately is a former military president in the person of RTD Gen. Obasanjo. This is part of the spillover effect.

What I have done is to give a background to the study and to the choice of data and time frame. The choices made are crucial in making an objective analysis of the political and social realms of a militarized Nigeria.

1.2 STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS

Coups have occurred frequently in Nigeria from 1966 to 1993. They have had considerable influence on the political course of Nigeria and in the construction of military subjects and the nature of such subjects. This thesis attempts to see how such speeches are instrumental in the formation of both military ideology and hegemony. It is crucial in appreciating some of the reasons why military rule endured in Nigeria for the length of time it did. It will also contribute to understanding the nature of Nigerian 'subjects' and the reasons they are probably very subservient and passive. This study will also situate discourse as the central force in the construction of a particular rule and particular subjects, and, for that matter, our political and social realities. The contribution of this study to method is in terms of looking at how the combination of representation, interpellation and argumentation analyses can help in trying to understand the thought processes that give birth to Nigeria's political realities and the nature of the citizenry as determined by discursive positioning. In

a nutshell, this is a study concerned with the salience of the military of political leadership and the silence of the citizenry. The interpellative power of language in political contexts is particularly an area that has suffered neglect in the literature on political discourse in Nigeria. The following research questions have guided and helped this work in getting to the core of the issues involved in coup speeches:

1) What linguistic representations of social groups, identities and national issues are found in the coup speeches?

2) How are the representations used as premises in the military leaders' coup argumentations?

3) What ideologies, perceptions or points of view underlie military coup speeches in Nigeria?

4) What are the intertextual and interdiscursive realities of the coup speeches?

5) How are Nigerians enlisted as the 'subjects' of the military junta?

6) What are the effects of military coup discourse in the country?

7) How does the novel methodological synergy of representation, interpellation and argumentation employed in this study assist with the analysis of the coup speeches?

These questions all together look at the various layers of the analysis I have applied here with a view to investigating the issues thoroughly and triangulating results. Questions 1 and 3 relate to aspects of representation, questions 2 and 3 argumentation, questions 4 and 6 intertextual analysis, question 5 interpellation and question 7 concerns my method. As it is a thematic data analysis, some of the issues conflate. I discuss this more in 3.5 in the method chapter.

The essence of CDA here is that it can capture the vagaries and nuances of political constructions and representations from various angles. Texts, as argued by Fairclough (2003, 9), "are elements of social events that have causal effects — i.e. they bring about changes. Most immediately, texts can bring about changes in our knowledge (we can learn things from them), our beliefs, our attitudes, values and so forth". Values and cultures get handed down via generations through discourses and texts. They can bring about phenomenal changes in terms of the conditions of the people or make them subjects. A

simple performative like 'I declare you husband and wife' with all necessary felicity conditions brings instant changes to your marital status and you acquire a new sense of responsibility and subjecthood. So does a statement like 'I declare martial law…' change one from a particular kind of subject to another in a given context. Texts also have "longer-term causal effects — one might for instance argue that prolonged experience of advertising and other commercial texts contributes to shaping people's identities as 'consumers', or their gender identities" (Fairclough 2003, 9).

Likewise, a persistent exposure to texts that positions one as a subject of a kind to an authority shapes them as real and existential 'subjects'. Johnstone (2008) observes that each time a world is created in discourse it becomes easier to create that world again in subsequent or following discourses both in terms of citationality and familiarity. This is particularly important in showing the existence and workings of an intertextual chain through history, a diachronic build up and the gradual formulation of a kind of insidious hegemony. As "particular choices can come to stand for whole ways of seeing things, whole ways of being, and those ways of seeing things can come to seem natural, unchallengeable, and right"(Johnstone 2008, 46). In essence, each coup speech solidifies the previous one not only in contents but in shaping identities and constructing a political reality. Bourdieu (1999) corroborates this by arguing that linguistic representations give a specifically symbolic efficacy to the construction of social reality. He observes that "by structuring the perception which social agents have of the social world, the act of naming helps to establish the structure of this world, and does so all the more significantly the more widely it is recognized i.e. authorized" (105). There is no social agent, he further adds, who does not like, as far as their circumstances allow, to have the power to name and to recreate the world "through naming: gossip, slander, lies, insults, commendations, criticisms, arguments and praises are all daily and petty manifestations of the solemn and collective acts of naming, be they celebrations or condemnations, which are performed by generally recognized authorities" (105). It is instructive to understand that not only do words create worlds but they create subjects to the worlds as well.

A corollary to the strength of the text is the cognitive effect it has on people seen in terms of familiarity of a genre and the aspect of access. The tendency for people to be cognitive

misers makes them prone to being framed and thus interpellated. The cognitive miser, Stanovich (2009, 88) argues, "accepts whichever way the problem is presented and thinks from there, often never realizing that a different presentation format would have led to a different conclusion". In other words, people do not sometimes invest deeply in thoughts about issues affecting their political life that is why they are prone to manipulation through assumptions and presuppositions involving them. Frames according to Entman (1993), for example, give people a quick and easy system of processing information. Hence, people will use the previously mentioned mental filters to make sense of incoming messages. This can give the sender and framer of the information enormous power to use these processes to influence how the receivers will interpret the message. To relate this to the aspect of coup speeches, the first coup speech has not only created a ready template for others to use to enact a takeover of leadership, but it has created genre familiarity among the led. Language is one critical aspect of the material situation, "the aspect that most directly interprets developments by fitting them into a narrative account that provides a meaning for the past, the present, and the future compatible with an audience's ideology" (Edelman 1985, 11). Such accounts, he further maintains, succeed repeatedly in suspending disbelief, and in retaining political support.

The impressionability of the subjects complements the military's authoritative statutes and constructions related to their power and the positioning of roles and responsibilities as captured in their speeches. With cognitive resources like presuppositions "certain information is already taken for granted as shared knowledge—and if it's not, then the hearer should accommodate it post-haste into his set of background assumptions" (Sedivy 2011,2). An expression like 'the corrupt politicians' does not only say semantically that a certain class of people are corrupt but using the definite article 'the' there indicates that the audience already knows about this reality and it is existential. When cognitive miserliness in the aspect of social cognition within the citizenry (see Fiske and Taylor 1991, Stanovich 2009) matches with discourse access, hegemony and the saber-rattling by the military, the result is most probably the powerful naturalization of contentious political issues like military political leadership or the military's natural legitimacy to rule.

Ideologies are as such central in the formation of military leadership and they are expressed through various means which are chiefly linguistic. They can be conveyed through symbolic (mis)representation as in legitimation, dissimulation, reification, fragmentation, etc. (Thompson 1984). Ideology will fully be discussed in 2.2.4. As Bourdieu (1977, 164) aptly postulates "every established order produces a naturalization of its arbitrariness". The naturalization happens through efforts to make things appear inevitable, logical and commonsensical. Bayley (1999) succinctly sums up the fact that it is difficult to think about political action that is neither founded on language nor as a result of linguistic breakdown and at the same time a premise for further linguistic action. In essence, "the social is built into the grammatical tissue of language" (Chouliaraki and Fairclough 1999, 140).

This research is prompted by the need to examine the coup speeches of the military in light of these realities and to see the chains that have been recurring in them dialectically since colonial times and synchronically—in how they may have influenced contemporary circumstances---and how they seminally may influence, or have influenced, future realities.

Using Fairclough's (2001) three-dimensional analysis, I explore the descriptive aspect (textual analysis) along with the interpretative analysis (processing analysis) but in a mesh of my own, involving interpellation and argumentation. In short, I look at how the coup makers represent issues and how they pass on their assumptions cuing up Member's resources especially in presupposing and constructing the ideal audience and how also the speeches reinforce each other intertextually and in congealing the subjecthood of Nigerian citizens. As pointed out by Edelman (1985, 10) "language about politics is a clue to the speaker's view of reality at the time, just as an audience's interpretation of the same language is a clue to what may be a wholly different reality for them", but, as he further explains "it is not what can be seen that shapes political action and support, but what must be supposed, assumed, or constructed". At the explanation level, I look at the factors that give rise to coups and, ipso facto, coup speeches and the effects of these coups and their speeches on the generality of the people, i.e., the citizenry, the political class and the military as an institution itself. In short, this is a linguistic analysis of issues of political attitudes and historical factors in their interplay. As linguistics is related to the social and political realms, an interdisciplinary approach is adopted. It contributes to the debate about

the nature of African citizenry, post-colonial leadership and military interventions. In essence, the work investigates the interplay between colonialism, military political leadership and democracy.

1.3 SOCIO-HISTORICAL CONTEXT AND THE PHILOSOPHICAL THRUST OF THIS WORK

The historical context of military formation is very important in understanding the circumstances of their political actions and nature. The first part of this section will give its colonial history. The second part will look at the military's foray into political governance to be a class struggle and one with the tendency to establish a political and economic niche for the military institution itself. The third part is an argument in favor of legitimacy over the use of violence.

1.3.1 Military: The colonial angle

On the 21st of March 1903, Sir Fredrick Lord Lugard, standing under the famous Giginya tree in Sokoto, the capital of the Fulani Caliphate, proclaimed to the hearing of the conquered sultanate:

> the old treaties are dead, you have killed them. Now these are the words which I, the "High Commissioner", have to say for the future. The Fulani in old times under Dan Fodio conquered this country. They took the right to rule over it, to levy taxes, to depose kings and to create kings. They in turn have by defeat lost their rule which has come into the hands of the British. All these things which I have said the Fulani by conquest took the right to do now pass to the British…. (Kirk-Greene 1965, 44).

Sixty three years later, barely six years after Nigeria's independence from the British, Major Chukwuma Nzegwu of the Nigerian army, having just killed the premier of the northern Region, Sir Ahmadu Bello, who by chance was the grandson of the very rulers conquered by the British, equally proclaimed:

> In the name of the Supreme Council of the Revolution of the Nigerian Armed Forces, I declare martial law over the Northern Provinces of Nigeria. The Constitution is suspended and the regional government and elected

assemblies are hereby dissolved. All political, cultural, tribal and trade union activities, together with all demonstrations and unauthorized gatherings, excluding religious worship, are banned until further notice….

A few trained African soldiers brought down the overall northern emirate which was under British rule. Likewise, it was a fragment of the Nigerian army that did the same on the 15th of January, overthrowing yet another civilian regime strongly dominated by emirate structures (Luckham 1971). What both have in common was modern weaponry and a claim of authority which was purveyed discursively. These similarities are more than historical coincidences.

To many (Ajayi 2007, Wangome 1985, Cervenka 1987, Falola & Ihonvbere 1985) the African Military is an offspring of colonialism which gave birth to it. Barka and Ncube (2012, 5) state that since the years of independence, Africa has experienced more than 200 military coups, counting both successful and failed coup attempts, see Table 1 below (Barka and Ncube 2012, 5):

PARTS OF AFRICA	1960-1969 No of coups	1970-1989 No of coups	1990-2010 No of coups
WEST AFRICA	19	49	36
CENTRAL AFRICA	8	14	13
EASTERN AFRICA	10	26	12
SOUTHERN AFRICA	0	10	6
TOTAL	37	99	67

Table 1: Coups both successful and failed staged in Africa from 1960 to 2010

The table shows the number of coups that took place in Africa. Between 1960 and 1989, which was the period of decolonization in most African countries, the highest number of coups was witnessed (Wangome 1985). Batons, in essence, simply changed hands from colonial to military autocracies. In Nigeria, the first coup came six years after independence.

The Nigerian army, just as other colonially created armies in Africa, started as a tool of imperial conquests. At independence, African states inherited soldiers, equipment, and organizational structures from the colonialists. "Algeria apart, no former colonial territory gained statehood with indigenous, nationalist-oriented military institution" (Crocker 1974, 267). Back in the early days of colonialism in Nigeria, the West African Frontier Force, later renamed the Royal West African Frontier Force, was established as a colonial force in 1898 in Nigeria. The force was a merger of three colonial forces that assisted the British in the conquest of colonial Nigeria and in clamping down on any opposition to British imperialism. The work the military were made to do has relevance in the kind of orientation they came to adopt later in the political life of Africa. Violence and authoritarian control became means to political and economic ends. The colonial order or socio-political field involving its martial way of solving issues and gaining advantage has a tremendous influence on the way the military perceive the political and economic fields in post-independence. First (2012, 34), for instance, in talking about the infectious nature of militarist colonialism, maintains that Lord Lugard's system of governance as conqueror of Nigeria for the British:

> ….has been described as a classic example of militarism in government. It stemmed from his military training and mind, and the system of one man rule which he set up faithfully reflects military rather than civil considerations…Instead of embryo civil departments to provide commercial and social services, he created an autocratic command system, running from his headquarters to provincial outposts, and through them to the now-subordinate Fulani Emirates, themselves military in origin.

The sediment of colonialism, First (2012 {1970}) further argues, is deeply rooted in the African army more than any other segment. Like their colonial precursors, Kandeh (2004, 18) contends that the "postcolonial armies in Africa continue to betray a "mercenary" character that sets them apart from, and in opposition to, the rest of society". However even "mercenaries, realizing how important they are to the survival of political incumbents, can entertain delusions of grandeur that are sometimes acted upon". Of course this has been acted upon rather copiously (see Table 1 above).

In the Nigerian scene, the Nzegwu coup announcements came in 1966 as a bloody putsch and with pronouncements that shook the firmament of the nation (Siollun 2003). This set the tone for the military's foray into Nigeria's leadership. The coup contagion (Decalo 1976) Nzegwu creates leads to ten other coups and the military holding on to political power for about 37 years after independence. The little time the civilians have held leadership has also been seen as militaristic in their leadership given the fact they operate under the tutelage of the military as either part of military bureaucracy or coming under political transition programmes designed by the military or even in being retired military in democratic political governance like in the case of Generals Olusegun Obasanjo (1999-2007) and Buhari (2015- to date). Both leaders were military heads of state also. There is a dialectical interplay in terms of the three leadership styles that the Nigerians have witnessed. The colonial leadership determines or influences the conducts of its creation i.e. the military, and the military, for its part, in a way, determines the action of the political class it has given tutelage and, in some cases, transmuted into. All these issues have linguistic resonance as all social or political acts or rituals are done discursively (Edelman 1985, Chilton 2004, Fairclough 2001).

Essentially, the military, being a product of colonialism, have copied their masters in terms of proclamatory genre, their authoritative stance and distance, their awe-inspiring statutes and above all, for this research, in terms of the discourse used, and they in turn influence the political class. The Nigerian citizens as such have been subjected to a series of autocratic regimes right from colonial times to latter day civilian democracies which all converge in sculpting an acquiescent, servile nation. In other words, years of being subjectified and ordered, of being ideologically spoon-fed, have essentially numbed the

consciousness of resistance and challenge and have produced a citizenry that is passive and acquiescent. In short, these create interpellated subjects who see their reality as simply natural and commonsensical. Prolonged exposure to a particular discourse and performatives which construct the citizen as a particular kind of subject, virtually, concretizes the reality of that phenomenon. "The legitimacy of a state lasts as long as the 'political public' accepts the boundaries prescribed by the state" (Habermas 1989, 234), and the boundaries provided by the military have not been trespassed especially in terms of public rebellion to a coup. What happen are intra-military squabbles and competition over power which sometimes spill over to the public. The sundry effect of years of repression is not only in the creation of a subservient citizenry but in producing a political class that is also militaristic in its approach.

1.3.2 Charting of a political and economic paradigm (class struggle)

It is a basic notion of this study that military rule achieves its substance not only through the possession of what Althusser (1971) calls Repressive State Apparatus but Ideological State Apparatus as well. Far from the general notion of the use of force some may appear to espouse regarding the military in political leadership, I argue that ideological formation i.e. claim of authority, is central to the military's political success. Even the threat of force is carried via language. It is also another opening of a new political course for the country in which the military are the economic and political leaders. The twin functions of colonialism as part of global imperialism has impacts on the creation of local bourgeois not only among civilian political leaders but the military too. The aim is to advance the course of discourse analysis in the aspect of ideological formation.

The colonial army, after independence, became almost stranded as they had no clear cut function while their civilian counterparts were taking over everywhere as leaders. Their attempt at taking over power is to rearticulate a political process with a base, subjects and agenda of its kind that can create their own sphere of influence and challenge the status quo that is not favourable to them. The realization that economic power resides on the political enhances this resolve and results in intra-class schisms that "pit civilian and military elites against each other, with the result that tensions among civilian elites are

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often played out among senior military officers" (Kandeh 2004, 29). Successes in business are dependent "on favours granted by the state since it is the major source not only of money but also of vast opportunities (such as contracts, loans, subsidies, and import and export licenses)" (Othman 1984, 442). This is one of the major reasons why taking over power equates economic struggle and aggrandizement.

The military incursion into political governance and the creation of a niche for itself culminate in Babangida's practice of 'diarchy' later on in his political life, at least the practical not codified aspect of it. Diarchy is the act of power sharing between the military and the political class. This novel fusion of fields is a social construct in its own right. Babangida called himself the 'president' while the governors of states were civilians who were elected into office (Onwumechili 1998). The military are known to use the term 'head of state' on assumption of political power. 'President' is used for democratically elected leaders. Babangida also retired his deputy, Vice Admiral Augustus Aikhomu from the navy, but he (Aikhomu) "retained his position as deputy, albeit with a new job title 'vice president' '' (Siollun 2013, 132). The use of the terms 'president' and 'vice president' respectively indicates an attempt to enjoy all the appellations and nomenclature of democratic leadership, yet sidestepping the democratic process of election and the emergence of a leader through popular votes. Similarly, in this act of civilianization, Babangida even used to wear civilian clothes in many official functions. This is, in a way, the coupling of fields or the colonization of one field by another in order to create a new mesh. The fact that president Babangida wore civilian clothes and called himself president and the fact that all the military regimes worked with a civilian bureaucracy indicate the social and linguistic aspect of the coupling of fields. Medubi (2003) sees this as "an illustration of the blending of two different mental spaces, the military, undemocratic political regime, and the democratically elected majority government regime". And this fusion creates a conceptual integration that can make people easily associate the component *President* to the military so that the blend *Military President* will carry a somewhat democratic aura about it. In essence, there is a dialectical relationship between social order and orders of discourse as indicated in this example.

Fairclough (2001, 6) sees this in terms of the colonization of one social practice by another. He observes that "the restructuring of orders of discourse is a matter of shifting relations, changes in the networking, between the discourse elements of different (networks of) social practices". Bourdieu (1991,171-172) also perceives the social field in terms of struggle as "political life can be described in terms of the logic of supply and demand: the political field is the site in which, through the competition between the agents involved in it, political products, issues, programmes, analyses, commentaries, concepts and events are created". Both these commentaries indicate the fluidity with which hegemonists can chart a politically virginal course and in this process form a new political object or construct.

Fairclough (1995) observes this too in the Thatcherite discourse which has brought traditional conservative, neo-liberal and populist discourse elements into a new mix and constructs an ideological project for the constitution of a new political base, new political subjects, and a new agenda. This, in itself, is an area the political project of restructuring the hegemony of the bloc centers upon the bourgeoisie in new economic and political conditions. The military also have observed the essence of political power and control given the use of these in colonial conquests and suppressions in Africa.

Likewise, the formation and construction of the military in political governance cannot be detached from class struggle and competition over social goods. Military coups thus become a shortcut for taking over power and gaining prestige and wealth "without having to take on the drawn-out and often frustrating task of building a political constituency" (Clark (2007, 141). Kandeh (2004) argues that the class dimensions of military coups in Africa are shaped primarily by the identical class location of civilian elite and senior military officers, on the one hand, and subordinate strata and the military underclass, on the other. "Civilian and military sectors of the political class are united around a predatory mode of accumulation while armed subalterns share conditions of extreme social deprivation with workers, lumpens and peasants" (Kandeh 2004, 14).Similarly, writing on the 1983 coup at its freshest, Othman (1984, 442) maintains that Nigerian elite including the military and civilian seek political power as a means of aggrandizing their economic interest. "They have used state power to gain access to a share of profitable opportunities and the finance necessary to establish themselves as a bourgeoisie" (Op cit.).

In virtually every African army, a charismatic military figure may at some time ponder the prospect of seizing power through a coup d'état. To seize power, coup speeches are often formulated with a Hobbesian state of nature in mind. This is (purportedly) created by the misdeeds of opponents and a peculiar social contract is proffered as a solution that seemingly repairs all the wrongs. This state of nature shows a lawless natural condition of man with the absence of governance or social contract. Words that suit spin and serve ideology are created as means to a political and economic end. Amuwo (1995, 3) sees the military as a class of its own in an overall class struggle in a capitalist order. He stresses that:

> …the Nigerian military is a new class not necessarily in terms of ownership and production but rather to the extent that its monopoly of the paraphernalia of force and coercion permits it to define the context and content of the political game; maintain political homeostasis and a conducive environment for other factions of the ruling class to accumulate some surplus capital. The other major factions become little more than supportive edifices of the militarist state.

This accumulation of surplus capital, essentially, emerges as one of the reasons for most military coups though rather camouflaged in political purism and the need for accountability. At the end of the military leadership in Nigeria, the retired officers are mostly millionaires who have amassed fortunes from the economy of the country. Ihonvbere and Ekekwe (1988, 288) cited in Agbese (1990) observe that Nigerian Politics is commonly an investment. "The state", they argue, "is still the largest contractor, importer, exporter, employer and source of wealth. The struggle, therefore, is to use and/or manipulate all available resources - money, juju (magic - black or white), ethnicity, religion, etc. - to win access to the state and use it to deal with opponents while presiding over the allocation of its resources". This issue of the struggle for the resources of the country in a way shows that there is an economic struggle masked in a purist political intervention. Mazrui (1977, 11) observes that:

When African soldiers become businessmen, an important dual process is initiated. It is this particular form of the economicization of African soldiers, which constitutes the gradual embourgeoisement of the old lumpen militariat. The phenomenon is bound to have implications for the political system

The implications, Mazrui predicts, are essentially the tenacious grip onto political power by the military through which economic advantages may be amply gained. Akande (2005) believes that the military is central to this profile of African States in two major respects. Most African states have, at one time or the other, come under military rule with its attendant maladministration and consequent legacy of economic underdevelopment. He argues that the military has appropriated disproportional national resources, a phenomenon known as the 'Military Extractive Ratio' (Adekanye 1981). The military question, therefore, constitutes a major problematic for Africa's development. See Appendices 14, 15 and 16 for the involvement of the military political class in the business world and how they acquire or extract a great ratio from the economy in competing with their civilian counterparts.

In both appendices 14 &15, there are a number of military officers who have also held political positions in the country. Colonel Sani Bello (RTD) and AVM Usman Muazu (RTD) were both, for instance, military administrators in Kano and Kaduna states respectively. AVM Mukhtar, Maj Gen Jemibewon, and Z Lekwot were all administrators at different points in their careers. Maj. Gen. Hassan Katsina also held the top position of the governor of the overall Northern region. Maj. Gen. Shehu Musa Yar'adua (RTD.) was the second in command to Gen. Obasanjo during his first act as military head of state. Yar'adua happened to be the elder brother of the Nigerian Civilian president Alh Umaru Musa Yar'adua who died in office in the third republic.

The case of TY Danjuma, who was instrumental in both the coup against Gowon and the murder of General Ironsi, undoubtedly shows the excess of the military in the acquisition of economic fortunes. Danjuma's amassing of such huge wealth as seen in Appendix 16 is not uncharacteristic of the military top echelon. Fagbadebo (2007) particularly maintains that the regimes of Abacha and Babangida have reduced the whole country hitherto known as the 'giant of Africa' to a 'comatose midget' through acts of corruption. Abacha was

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reputed to have stolen US$1.13 billion and 413million (GBP) apart from wasting about US$386.2million through fictitious and inflated contracts while General Babangida, on his part, frittered away about US$12.2 billion Gulf War oil windfalls. Kalu (2008,150) maintains that after many years of presiding over the "looting and plundering of the Nigerian treasury, military personnel (both serving and retired) have become the largest repository of private capital accumulation, unrivaled in many countries of the world".

Babangida in fact developed a patronage system that is called 'settlement' which is a euphemistic reference to a form of 'bribery' that rewards cronies and silences opponents. During his regime, "corruption had become all-pervading and almost institutionalized" (Ajayi 2007, 60). The articulation of the charges of corruption by the military against their opponents should be viewed, as such, in terms of a "political artifice and performative" (Pierce 2016, 20). Peirce argues that the charge of corruption is made not as an attempt to genuinely uproot or tackle the phenomenon but as a performative with different illocutionary and perlocutionary forces. For the most, it aims to discredit opponents and to raise the moral pedestal of the 'crusader'. In Babangida's parlance 'settlement' may not be an act of corruption given the seeming positive value of a conciliatory deal that the term may signify. But shorn of its mask, 'settlement' refers to an attempt to bribe opposition and buy loyalty. The term 'corruption' is a floating signifier that serves various political interests and discourses and does not have any transcendental form or objectivity. Pierce (2016, 20) observes that:

> …corrupt acts occur and are labeled "corrupt." These acts of labeling are polyvalent, varying from time to time, place to place, and even situation to situation,….Changes in the entailments of "corruption" help to produce both the persistence of particular forms of political malfeasance and the perpetuation of a hierarchy of states and political forms.

In general, the sum total of the action of the military as seen here shows the creation of a nouveau riche in the armed forces and the control and possession of political power. The coups perpetuate this class control. Their political and economic grip on the structures of the country makes "several Nigerian scholars and politicians see the military as a brute fact of life – an alternative political party to the civilians" (Bangura 1991, 23).

Mazrui (1977, 2) sums this up in terms of two important significances to political sociology in Africa: "the first area concerns the consolidation of statehood and the second concerns the diversification of the class structure". These issues re-echo the twin motives of colonialism which the military class inherited, forming a metropole state and perpetuating global capitalist class structure.

1.3.3 Obligation under military regime: threat of violence or establishing authority?

The success of military coups is possible not only because of the institution's access to state's repressive apparatus. I see the issue of violence as simply complementary to the higher aspect of power, i.e., creation of legitimacy or authority. The guiding philosophy of this work is that the military are able to assert control and entrench themselves in political governance through claiming authority rather than the use of overt violence. This claim of authority, I argue, is discursive, i.e., through the ideological formation of the expediency and legitimacy of military authority. As held by Edelman (1985, 10), although coercion and intimidation help to check resistance in all political systems, "the key tactic must always be the evocation of meanings that legitimize favored courses of action and threaten or reassure people so as to encourage them to be supportive or to remain quiescent". The conflict over meaning and the struggle to entrench a particular form of perception is central to the formation of military authority.

The essence of the claim of authority and the formation of ideology has not been adequately examined in the assessment of the phenomenal influence of military leadership in Africa.

Military coup speeches try to use justifications in taking over power especially in their coup day manifestoes or speeches. These justifications are used to gain legitimacy and authority since the use of violence can be exhaustive and short-lived as argued by Rousseau (2003, 4) in his *Social Contract*:

> If force creates right, the effect changes with the cause.
> Every force that is greater than the first succeeds to its right.
> As soon as it is possible to disobey with impunity
> disobedience is legitimate; and the strongest being always in

the right, the only thing that matters is to act so as to become the strongest.

When force is the answer, it then becomes a challenge for a higher force to emerge and assert its authority, replicating the notion of 'might is right' and the jungle survival of the fittest. The atmosphere will then be that of war rather than governance. The establishment of authority and the claim to legitimacy by some kind of right (moral or otherwise), on the other hand, diminishes the use of force because people will respect the laws on their own volition without being forced. It is this search for legitimacy that makes the military deploy aspects of rhetoric in their coup speeches. The aim of spin here is simply to advance legitimate authority, create awe and thus submission. Therbon (1980, 97) believes that a common mistake people make is to assume that force can rule alone, whereas the truth is that force can never rule alone.

> This is so because, religious mythologies to the contrary, one can only rule over the living. And even when disobedience leads to certain death, one can always choose either resistance and death or obedience and life. Fear is the effect of ideological domination that brings about acceptance of the second solution.

In essence, if death is the ultimate threat of violence, there are people ever ready to die for their beliefs as martyrs of a sort. Therefore the naturalization of arbitrariness makes followership easy. Lukes (2005) cited in Wodak (2011, 36) ingeniously asks:

> Is it not the supreme and most insidious exercise of power to prevent people, to whatever degree, from having grievances by shaping their perceptions, cognitions and preferences in such a way that they accept their role in the existing order of things, either because they see it as natural and unchangeable, or because they value it as divinely ordained or beneficial?

Context is also very important in trying to exercise authority through coup justification as far as the coup makers are concerned. General Ibrahim Babangida, for example, argues that

the military always look at the context and national mood before staging a coup. The context must necessarily be one in which the status quo is abhorred and unwanted by the populace in order to ease the takeover of power and to make it appear justified and legitimate. In reference to the toppling of the Shagari democratic administration, Babangida (quoted in Maier 2000, 58-60) states:

> We in the military waited for an opportunity. There was the media frenzy about how bad the election was massively rigged, corruption, the economy gone completely bad, threat of secession by people who felt aggrieved. There was frustration within society and it was not unusual to hear statements like, the worst military dictatorship is better than this democratic government. Nigerians always welcome military intervention…

Maier, who was interviewing him, then asked: "you admit you were waiting for an opportunity?" to which the general answered:

> You see we are very smart people. We don't intervene when we know the climate is not good for it or the public will not welcome it. We wait until there is frustration in the society. In all the coups, you find there has always been one frustration or the other. Any time there is frustration, we step in. And then there is a demonstration welcoming the redeemers.

"At that, the evil genius broke into a deep self-mocking chuckle at the notion of the military as redeemers" (Maier 2000, 60). The term, the 'evil genius' is another name used for Babangida (Maier 2000, Siollun 2013).

The waiting for an 'opportunity' aspect indicates that coups can be predetermined and not spontaneous and can also be not motivated by the issues taking place in the country. There is a motive that is free from the claims. Nordlinger (1977, 64) concurs with Babangida

about the fact that coup makers strike at a point of deflation in governmental legitimacy of the incumbent government. He argues that "the officers can more easily rationalize and justify their coups when acting against incumbents whom they see as incompetent or corrupt". Following this, they assert the interventionist motives that resonate with the disenchantment of the polity. Deflation of governmental legitimacy of the incumbent can be historically or factually real but it can as well be exaggerated, contrived or assumed in a coup speech to serve the purpose of gaining acceptance or legitimacy. Utomi (1985,40), for example, maintains that the 1984 coup overthrowing the Shagari's government and Nigeria's Second Republic took place when President Shagari had put together a more technocratic and experienced cabinet for his second term that was better than the first four years which had a council of ministers "swollen with patronage appointments". The second republic was terminated a few months after it took office when apparently the political class was talking about setting in motion a cabinet that was all purposeful and ready to work. The work the cabinet could have done would have made any coup rather impossible that was why the coup took place before that opportunity could materialize. And that is also another reason that shows that coups are not, or may not be, driven by national interests. In fact, Decalo (1976, 3) maintains that the charge of corruption by the military against their opponents "is usually used ex post facto to justify intervention by military forces that are often neither truly aggravated by it nor untainted themselves".

To all intents and purposes, the military come up with coup claims and promises that appear to preempt and solve problems on the ground about which the people are complaining against the incumbent government. For example, Babangida in staging the anti-Buhari coup makes sure that areas where Buhari appears to be criticized, he promises and does the opposite. There are also intertextual re-echoes of military speeches in the media, translating the views of the military into ordinary language, thus sedimenting the interpellation process of Nigerians to a military state. Agbese (2012, 38) argues that the cynical environment under which Buhari rules provides Babangida "with a challenge he saw as a piece of cake to him….All he needed to do was to be what Buhari was not. Babangida took on the trademark of the constant, toothy smile". His constant smile is due to the fact that Buhari and Idiagbon have been termed 'the unsmiling duo'. Amuwo (1995, 3) captures the moment very well:

> In contradiction to the grim-faced, unsmiling General Buhari and his deputy General Idiagbon, Babangida brought smiles as well as a personal aura and warmth to the Nigerian political landscape. There was something seemingly arresting about him which was transmitted to the nation and the people by the media, in particular the press, namely, no matter how bad the Nigerian economic crisis, people could still afford a smile whilst tackling it.

He also abrogates most of the decrees implemented by his predecessor that appear draconian to the people. Siollun (2013, 70) corroborates this by maintaining that Babangida "was a master of spin and presentation, and always seemed to say the right thing. He continually massaged the public ego by telling them what they wanted to hear". Babangida appears to demonstrate the Weberian notion of charisma as a means of gaining authority. He is also described as 'Machiavellian', 'Maradonic' and the evil 'genius' (Siollun 2013).

The military chart many different courses in trying to legitimize power. In fact force happens to be the last resort. They can create a myth in which politically their position as heroes or the like will be discerned. Flowerdew (2012, 83), for instance, observes that "political leaders may invoke, project or create a myth as a means of motivation and direction of the masses for political support or action and as a way of deflecting criticism of their policies". And to do that they must bring it to a 'natural' state "through discourse by means of a range of discourse strategies, including constant reiteration" (ibid). Whitehouse (2012) in talking about Captain Ahmadu Sanogo's coup in Mali in 2012 maintains that the latter employs tactics of going back into the cultural repertoire of Mali to cut his image in historical and cultural heroes that the Malians revere and adore. His popular legitimacy is derived not from formal legal texts, but from widely acclaimed discourses pertaining to the role of leaders in the Malian society. Sanogo is also acclaimed to be a gifted speaker in his native Bamanan language and in French, the official language of Mali. Whitehouse (2012, 97) observes that "the Mande hero is always male… The hero is a complex figure because his heroism is dependent on his violating society's usual codes

of conduct. He must defy social norms—in particular he must defy existing power hierarchies—in order to acquire a name for himself….yet the hero is highly respected because his actions, destabilizing as they may be, succeed in freeing his people from inertia and complacency…." In short, the coup is legitimized through the exploitation of local folklores and the assumption of a hero image that rekindles the heroic values of the Malian people. The frames triggered like that of a force of destabilization are to make his power takeover be a form of mythic heroism as folk heroes are expected to be recalcitrant or stubborn. His jettisoning of the constitution is an act of cultural heroism which displaces the grave crimes of 'mutiny' and 'treason' against the state.

There are also issues of economic patronage and clientelist orientation among the military political elite in order to buy support as discussed in 1.3.2. Again Babangida's 'settlement' issue comes to the fore here as people were silenced through bribery and patronage. See appendices 14, 15 and 16 for the level of the economic 'settlement' military regimes have made to themselves and associates alike. The generosity is also handed down to the civilian population. Babangida was in the habit of silencing critics of his administration with political appointments into offices. Professor Wole Soyinka (a Nobel laureate), Tai Solarin, Kalu I Kalu, etc. were all involved in Babangida's politics of patronage. Amuwo (2002) bemoans the fact that the major political scientists and intellectuals in Nigeria were involved in Babangida's Political Transition Programme (PTP). The major function of these intellectuals was to rationalize and theorize a programme that will have an intellectual basis in order to make it more palatable to the public. "Appointed to serve as an instrument of legitimization for the regime, they contained, constricted and shrank the political and intellectual space rather than facilitating intellectual and democratic empowerment" (Amuwo 2002, 93). The intellectual class helps, in this case, in the ideological shaping of the regime and in manufacturing legitimacy in its quest for acceptability and legitimacy. Babangida went to all length in trying to entice and solicit for support of the country using every means possible but force. It seems that he may agree with Rousseau that "force is always insufficient, only the voluntary acceptance of rule by the subordinated can provide an adequate guarantee of stability" (Rousseau cited in Bertram 2004, 62).

When intervention to 'save' the country by using a coup is naturalized and when aspirations and grievances of the people are shaped to be in line with the coup makers' visions and mission, it gradually becomes another option beside democracy in political governance. Legitimacy is, thus, accorded, and any challenge to that legitimacy post hoc is perceived as mutinous or treasonable. The resort to mete out capital punishment on the army whose coup is unsuccessful is probably based on this premise.

1.3.3.1 Essence of claim of legitimacy over force

Though ideology and discourse will be discussed fully in the theoretical chapter, it is important at the introductory stage to give this footnote about why ideological state apparatus works better in the service of the military than the repressive state apparatus. This will also summarize all the basic points so far discussed on the aspect of ideology.

First, as argued by Finer (2017), rule by force alone, or the threat of such force, is not adequate; governments must be widely recognized not only as the government but as the lawful and the rightful government. A government that centers its rule on the fact that it is materially stronger than any other force or forces in society would prove both short-lived and ineffectual. The reason is simply that the claim to rule by virtue of superior force invites challenges to any contender who thinks they are strong enough to challenge authority by force. Another issue is the ratio of the armed forces to the populace which is highly disproportionate because as they say in Hausa "the most populous is stronger than one person who is the strongest". Multitudes will certainly trump monolithic strength.

Secondly, the threat of physical compulsion is also not an efficient and economical way of securing obedience. Jones and Peccei (1999) maintain that to secure power, it makes sense to persuade everyone else that what you want is also what they want. By encouraging people to embrace your views of their own concurrence, any cost-conscious ruler can save money on armed forces and police officers. To achieve this, one's ideology needs to be established or sustained to make the beliefs which you want people to hold appear to be 'common sense', or logical or simply inevitable thus making it difficult for them to question your assumptions. If acceptance is by ideological means then there is no need to expend any bullet in coming to power.

Thirdly, it is also enduring. Finer (2017) provides an interesting analogy regarding a village schoolmaster and his pupils to reemphasize the essence of authority over force. He says that suppose that a village headmaster's only means for getting his students to come to school, keeping them there, making them regular attenders is by physical force alone. Imagine him going to the houses of the children, bringing them to school and forcing them to learn. In these circumstances, estimate how much of the schoolmaster's time would be spent in rounding the pupils up and contrast this with the other more common option, that his authority as 'the schoolmaster' is recognized. In these circumstances, he can spend almost the whole of his time on his primary function -teaching. Physical coercion will emerge only as a sanction in negligible cases. This in fact is a cogent treatise on the essence of the ideological establishment of authority over force in a higher up political arrangement involving multitudes of citizens under a single political leader.

Fourthly, right to rule or the creation of political legitimacy vindicates the initial entry and accords positivity to the method of taking over power. It is a point of saying the ends justifies the means. Finer (2017, 75), quoting Victor Hugo's commentary on Napoleon's legitimization of himself after the plebiscite of 1852, observes that:

> Mr. Bonaparte's crime is not a crime, it is called a necessity;
> Mr. Bonaparte's ambuscade is not an ambuscade, it is called
> defence of order; Mr. Bonaparte's robberies are not
> robberies, they are called measures of state; Mr. Bonaparte's
> murders are not murders, they are called public safety; Mr.
> Bonaparte's accomplices are not called malefactors, they are
> called magistrates, senators, and councillors of state; Mr.
> Bonaparte's adversaries are not the soldiers of the law and
> right, they are Jack Cades, demagogues, communists.

Similarly, Hebditch and Connor (2009, 28), in their book: *How to Stage a Military Coup,* provide a humorous glossary to what certain military slogan might entail or mean:

'We did it to defend the Constitution!' A coup victory speech is incomplete without this one… no one will challenge it by asking which specific clause in the constitution legitimizes the overthrow of an elected government by a group of soldiers…

'Someone had to put an end to corruption!' This does not mean that the coup leader is against kick-backs and pay-offs. What it means is that he is against getting 10 per cent when he could be getting 20 per cent – not at all the same thing…

'Power had to be restored to the people!' What this actually means is 'Power had to be taken away from the present regime!'…

Or, a favourite of ours: 'There was no other way!' This is an excellent one-size-fits-all slogan…

The transformation of Mr. Bonaparte's undoing has to do with the claim of legitimacy and authority and the series of linguistic renaming of his acts show how the cognitive perception of the people has been transformed. The essential point here is the aspect of discourse and the use of euphemism for ideological dissimulation has lent itself to legitimization. Hebditch and Connor's (2009) peculiar glossary likewise shows the essence of discourse in promoting and disguising ideology.

By and large, the aim here is to reemphasize the essence of authority over violence in the military's claim to power and the reason why this is expedient. As Taiwo (1999, 171) puts it: "even the most coercive of military regimes seeks to cloak itself in some legitimacy or a moral right to govern". The claim to authority, the aspect of the justification and the representation of the incumbent leaders and the status quo all involve the construction of a perception. The aim of this work is to see this perception in terms of the formation of ideology in coup discourse. Bonaparte's euphemism is one classic example of the work of discursive construction. Finer's (2017) argument regarding the headmaster and force is also strong in terms of the viability of a discursive construction of hegemony that manufactures

consents and that easily regulates acts and makes people believe that the intervention itself is inevitable and commonsensical.

1.4 COUPS IN NIGERIA

In Nigeria, there are a lot of coups alleged to have either been nursed, or executed or intended. There are overall about seventeen allegations of coups in the country. Toyin (2015, 197) classifies Nigerian coups into:

- Coups d'état proper, that is successful takeover of government, whether or not the group that began the action actually assumed power;
- Coups by the state or government against the basic law or the civil society;
- Attempted coup d'état where there were overt actions, but the initiative failed in their bid to overthrow the government;
- Conspiracy to stage a coup d'état, where there were only allegations by the state that certain people were planning a coup d'état:
- Political allegation of conspiracy to stage a coup d'etat, where the allegation was made, not by the state, but by individuals whose allegations were however, not contradicted by the state.

What follows is a rough classification of the different coups d'état that have taken place in Nigeria.

i. The Coups proper or successful Coups are:

- January 1966 — General Aguiyi Ironsi
- July 1966 — General Yakubu Gowon
- July 1975 — General Muhammed Murtala
- December 1983 — General Muhammed Buhari
- August 1985 — General Ibrahim Babangida
- November 1993 — General Sani Abacha

ii. The attempted Coups d'état in Nigeria are as follows:

- January 1966—Major Nzeogwu
- February 1976 — Lt. Col. Dimka
- April 1990 — Major Orkah

iii. Conspiracies to stage a coup as alleged are:

- October 1962 — Chief Obafemi Awolowo

- September 1967 — Colonel Ifeajuna, Biafra
- December 1985 — General Mamman Vasta
- March 1995 — No clear leader
- December 1997 — General Diya Oladipo

iv. Political allegation of Coup plans include:

- January 1965 — no clear leader

- June 1998 — no clear leader

Date	Head Of State	Remarks
Jan 1966-July 1966	Maj Gen Aguiyi Ironsi	Came through the Nzegwu coup but was killed in the July 1966 coup
July 1966-1975	Lt Col Yakubu Gowon	Came after the July 1966 but was removed through a coup.
1975-1976	Brig Gen Murtala Muhammad	Came through a coup. Coup announcement was made by Garba, but Murtala was killed in the Dimka coup.
1976-1979	Brig Gen Olusegun Obasanjo	Came after the death of Murtala
1983-1985	Maj Gen Muhammadu Buhari	Came via coup against Shagari
1985-1993	Maj Gen Ibrahim Babangida[1]	Came via coup against Buhari
1993-1998	Gen Sani Abacha	Came through a palace coup against Shonekan
1998-1999	Maj Gen Abdulsalami Abubakar	Came after the natural death of Abacha

Table 2: Military leaders of Nigeria since independence

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[1] Preferred being called 'president' rather than 'head of state'

1960-1966	Abubakar Tafawa Balewa[2]	Killed in the Jan 1966 coup
1979-1983	Alhaji Shehu Shagari	Came through election organized by the military
June 1993-Nov 1993	Chief Earnest Shonekan	Came as the head of the interim government established by the Babangida military administration
1999-2007	Chief Olusegun Obasanjo	Former military head of state returned as civilian head through election
2007-2010	Alhaji Umaru Musa Yaradua	Came through an election heavily rigged in his favour and organized by Obasanjo.
2010-2015	Dr. Goodluck Ebele Jonathan	Came after the natural death of Yaradua
2015-Till Date	Alhaji Muhammadu Buhari	Former military head of state now returned as civilian president through election

Table 3: Civilian presidents of Nigeria

I am principally concerned with seven coup speeches that were announced successfully on the radio and captured by the media. This is for the fact that they are verifiable and their announcements can be gauged at the level of reactions which will shed light on my interpellation analysis. The military have ruled Nigeria for close to 30 years of its independence with eleven military coups including those alleged or aborted (Abaya 2008).

Barely six years after Nigeria's independence in 1960, the country experienced its first military takeover. Since then there has been a series of take-overs and counter take-overs which culminated in the military holding on to power for approximately three decades ending only in 1993.As you can see from Table 3, Nigeria has had seven civilian presidents, but two out of them are retired military who were also military heads of state. The first

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[2] He was the first and last Prime Minister Nigeria had under the British parliamentary system because Nigeria's democracy as designed by the military opted for the American presidential system with a bicameral legislature in the second republic and henceforth.

president, Sir Tafawa Balewa, was killed in a military coup. The second, Alh Shehu Shagari, who came through a political transition programme organized by the military under Obasanjo was ousted through a coup. The third was an interim president installed by the military, Chief Shonekan who was also removed by the military. The fourth president was a retired military head of state, Obasanjo and the fifth was Yar'adua who came through a transition programme organized by Obasanjo and he happens to be the younger brother of Obasanjo's chief of staff, General Shehu Musa Yar'adua, (see appendix 14for Yarádua's economic interest). Yar'adua died while in his tenure and was succeeded by Dr. Goodluck Ebele Jonathan. After the tenure of Jonathan, he was succeeded by Buhari RTD also one time military head of state. One can safely say that the Nigerian political scene has been militarized at nearly all levels. Transition programmes organized by the military go in line with their perception of democracy and what constitutes politics. At a time Gen Babangida is reputed to have turned Nigeria into his vast political laboratory, where, using turncoat intellectuals, he tried all manner of political systems (Amuwo 2002). The effect of this shall be discussed in the explanation stage (5.1.2) in the conclusion, especially the impacts of such action on the whole nation.

1.5 OUTLINE OF THE THESIS

This chapter has set the tone for a discussion of the military in politics and for the whole thesis. It gives a historical background to the colonial nature of the military and their formation. There is a correlation between colonial conquest and military coups. Both have an implicit appeal to force while claiming authority. Yet, I also argue that force is of marginal significance in the formation of military ideology. Discourse is crucial in this aspect in constructing, within the polity, the authority of the military in political leadership. I show cases where other phenomena are appealed to instead of force. There is Babangida's charismatic as well as legal/institutional appeal. But I also do not see them as separate as Weber (1978) has put them because all three sources of power are ideological and they are delineated as such by those who control and construct such realities. I then go ahead after that to give the history of military coups in Nigeria. This is the background to the coups and speeches that I analyze in Chapter Four. It shows whether the coups succeeded and what some of the acclaimed motives of the coups are.

In chapter two, I talk about discourse as a whole in a top down structure, beginning from the arguments involving the nature of discourse. I emphasize the aspect of interpretation using Members' Resources (henceforth, MR) and how this is crucial to the formation of ideology. What is assumed or presupposed can be honest and neutral but it can also be ideological. I then discuss key issues in the aspect of CDA, namely: ideology, access, hegemony, history and power. After a thorough discussion of these subjects and how they interact in the naturalization of contentious historical and ideological issues, I then talk about the interdisciplinarity of discourse, i.e., its dependence on social theory. CDA looks to social theory in helping to interpret aspects of social practice and vice versa. I sample theories of importance like Hallidayan Systemic Functional Linguistics which helps in showing the functional nature of textual choices. Its aspects of grammatical transformation like passivization and nominalizations are crucial to my analysis. I also discuss Foucault's theory of social formation that helps in throwing light on the aspects of construction and all these can be merged with discourse as related to Fairclough's Textually Oriented Discourse Analysis (TODA).Laclau and Mouffe's articulation theory is also discussed for its importance in classification, naming and subjectivity. From there, I move on to political discourse analysis and elaborate on the works of Wodak and Chilton, Van Dijk and Habermas and their significance in their relation to my own understanding of military coup discourse. The last part of this chapter is a discussion of literature on coup speeches. I talk about three approaches, i.e., Adegbija's (1995) discourse pragmatic analysis, Akanbi's (1998) textual properties of coup speeches approach and Abaya's (2008) pragma-sociolinguistic concept of discourse. The lapses I see in the works relate to the inability of the scholars to relate discourse to the social and ideological aspects. My work will enrich the discussion of such literature in terms of a deep consideration of the social and ideological context. These works, so far on military discourse, again toe the line of non-committal, apolitical disposition towards analysis as issues are only analyzed, and the analysis is an end in itself not a means to a deeper interpretation of society, especially the hegemony of the ruling class and how this endures.

In chapter 3, I discuss the method I use in this research. I, first, discuss the research objectives and methodology of CDA. I then talk about the criticisms made against CDA and tackle some of the criticisms of its method and theoretical orientations. I sample

opinions regarding the need for social sciences to move from merely descriptivist and uncommitted positions in social analysis to one with a political attitude and stance in support of the oppressed. I then talk about the methods of Fairclough (2001) and Fairclough and Fairclough (2012) at length. I use both these methods to triangulate results. The component of argumentation or practical reasoning is to see how representation features as a premise in argumentation. From there, I move to discuss my own method, i.e., how I have reworked Fairclough's method and combined it with interpellation and argumentation to suit my study. Also, at the level of argumentation, I retain Fairclough and Fairclough's (2012) practical reasoning aspect in terms of the premises, but I also use fallacies in informal logic to bring out the rationally flawed premises in the speeches that are of ideological significance. Afterwards, I talk about aspects of corpus linguistics that I use i.e. concordance lines in sifting data and coming up with helpful semantic and collocational groupings. I talk about the data and how they are acquired and vetted. My analysis focuses on seven coup speeches that are announced, and these are the total texts produced as coup speeches throughout the sojourn of the military and political leadership, i.e., from 1966 to 1993. Other coups are either without coup announcements or they are not announced publically or they are simply purported. There are two additional speeches that are used for comparative purposes. One is the colonial proclamation made by Lugard in 1903 which is compared to the first coup speech in Nigeria to see possible areas of intertextual influences. The second one is the Abacha counter coup speech used to show the dual face of the military and ideological shifts in relation to different contexts.

Chapter 4 is where I do the data analysis. The chapter is divided into three parts, namely: representation, argumentation and interpellation. In representation, I analyze how the military represent self and others in such a way as to contrast positive self from negative other. The ideological square is clearly shown here. This division throws light on how the military use rhetoric to advance their arguments and mis/represent society. The transition to argumentation is necessary for it shows how a particular form of mis/representation is used as a reason for action. When you nominalize action, for example, 'mismanagement', there is the aspect of the freezing of details. This may be used as reason for action, which is a power take over. In the aspect of argumentation, I restrict myself to discussing only the premises as expounded by Fairclough (2012) without considering the inferences and

conclusions for that would be superfluous. When premises are wrong it behooves a reformulation of the argument recursively because if taken as such the inferences and conclusions will most certainly be wrong. At the level of interpellation, I look at how the military go about setting up power and the creation of subjects. Here I focus on the interpersonal aspect of discourse and the distribution of roles. The military set up authority and claim it by using speech acts, especially performatives in annulling existing governments and creating their own. The response of people, being hailed as subjects, captured in their reactions completes the aspect of interpellation. The chain of occurrences of coup speeches intertextually reinforces each other and forms a peculiar genre of power take over with its peculiar orientation, subjects and objects. The Althusserian interpellation theory applies here in showing how the subjects are formed using discourse.

The final chapter takes up the aspect of Fairclough's explanation stage. Here the concern is the dialectics of discourse. I try to establish a chain running from colonialism to militarism then to civilian administration in terms of influences. The colonial proclamation or seizure of power, I hypothesize, seems to have relevance or influence on coup speeches especially the first coup speech. I compare them to see the similarities and areas of possible influence. The chapter also talks, though marginally, about the effects of military language, especially the disdain for constituted authority and its authoritative nature on the citizens and the political class. The political class appears to adopt the authoritarian nature of military language in their communication or campaigns. In sum, all aspects of ideology are discussed thoroughly using the comprehensive schema provided by Thompson (1984) in his symbolic construction of ideology theory. This synchronizes well with the conclusion as the data is revisited and summed up and placed into areas belonging to ideological construction. The last part is the overall conclusion of the thesis.

1.6 CONCLUSION

I have attempted to achieve three objectives in this chapter. I emphasize the colonial angle to the issue of coup making and that the army, being largely formed for reasons of colonial repression, seems to adopt this stance towards the country politically in gaining their interests. Secondly, I also attempt to argue about the crucial place in discourse of other

aspect of knowledge formation and the construction of a new political paradigm in terms of legitimacy. Thirdly, I also try to show that there is more to the military regime's formation than the claim to power through violence as indicated in the various examples I have given. All in all this sets the scene for the overall research and answers the reasons for the analytical stances I have taken.

CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW

2.0 INTRODUCTION

This literature review traces the development of critical discourse analysis both thematically and diachronically, right from the inception of discourse as textual cohesion to its forking into CDA then Political Discourse Analysis (PDA). It is a top-down pyramid structure. This aims to provide a clear picture of the theoretical and methodological arguments and issues involved especially in the interdisciplinarity of critical discourse analysis. I also discuss five aspects that are of crucial essence to understanding the standpoint of CDA as a critical theory, i.e., access, hegemony, power, history and ideology. Since language has a dialectical relationship with culture and society, CDA linguistically operationalizes, or provides the practical operation of, social theory and vice versa. For this reason, some concepts from social theory and how they exert influence on discourse are discussed. Foucault's views about discourse, for example, provide Fairclough's ideas about orders of discourse and interdiscursivity. This is crucial in establishing my theoretical underpinning of coups speeches as a kind of order of discourse with phenomenal influence. Habermas's (1981) validity claims provide Fairclough, Chilton and me with ideas about how the claims are overridden for ideological reasons and the mechanics of this subversion. Laclau and Mouffe's (1985) logic of difference and Derrida's binaries provide ideas about classification. In my case, I connect Althusser's ideological interpellation with Hallidayan interpersonal metafunction, and performatives in speech acts to see how a political subject is, or can be, created. In the discussion of social theory, I show how what aspects will be of essence to my method and analysis. As will be noticed, methodological issues are also discussed in the chapter as differences between theory and method may be blurred as far as CDA is concerned (Chouliaraki and Fairclough 1999).As will also be noticed in my discussion of CDA and various aspects of it, I discuss social theorists as passing commentary, but a fuller discussion of their theories and relevancies will follow in 2.3. The review also looks at extant literature on coup speeches in Nigeria and their flaws in terms of analyzes, and how critical discourse analysis and the method applied in this work can provide a more nuanced, insightful and richer analysis. Three influential works are discussed here, that is, Adegbija (1995), Abaya (2008) and Akanbi (1998).

2.1 WHAT IS DISCOURSE ANALYSIS?

There are controversies regarding the nature and purview of discourse analysis. Some scholars view discourse as a study of language above the sentence while others see it as a study of language in use. Stubbs (1983, 1) is among the early proponents of discourse as study of language above the sentence. He maintains that "it refers to attempts to study the organization of language above the sentence, or above the clause, and therefore to study larger linguistic units, such as conversational exchanges or written texts". This implies that the structural study of the techniques of cohesion in a text is the central focus of discourse analysis. This notion, in essence, delimits discourse to a study of structural cohesion. However, extra-textual factors like contexts and Members Resources are important in establishing meaning.

Members resources have variously been defined as 'common sense assumptions' which are in the interpreter of a message, as 'interpretative procedures' or 'background knowledge' which can all be used in the service of ideology (Fairclough 2001).

Citing an example of the essence of coherence and assumption, Fairclough (2001, 67) provides an example of a letter that appears in a question and answer section of a magazine:

> Embarrassed by boys
>
> Please help me. I'm 13 and whenever there's a boy on TV, and my mum's in the room I get really embarrassed. I've never been out with anyone even though mum says I'm quite pretty. How can I get over this problem?
>
> Worried BJ fan, Chester.

Though this letter appears to be cohesive, there are a lot of implicit assumptions that have to be brought to bear in the interpretation of the message. First, there is the issue of the genre which shows the notion of having an expert to advise you on a problem that you may have. In the use of this cohesive device this problem as a reference to get really embarrassed

is also based on the assumption that being embarrassed is a problem. There is also the notion of secrecy especially in the not mentioning of real name of the advice seeker which shows that problems like this should be treated secretly. The use of the word 'though' in 'I've never been out with anyone even though mum says I'm quite pretty' shows that there is an implicit notion that if you are pretty you need to have a date. Fairclough (2001, 69) argues that the thought-provoking issue about examples like this one here "is that it is the reader who is responsible for bringing all these contentious assumptions into the process of interpretation, not the text". Nothing in the text is asserted. "This suggests a powerful way in which to impose assumptions upon readers and interpreters generally; by so placing the interpreter through textual cues that she has to entertain these assumptions if she is to make sense of the text" (Op cit.).The essence of bringing this Fairclough's analysis is to demonstrate how a lot of interpretation is brought to bear by the audience and how common sense assumptions can be cued rather implicitly in texts.

Overall, local coherence relations can contribute significantly to textual processes of ideological coherence and as well as interpellation "audience members are, so to speak, called upon to acknowledge the framework of ideological common sense ….within which they are positioned. Such texts can cumulatively shape the knowledge, beliefs and values of audience members" (Fairclough 1995b, 123). Van Dijk also, talking about the property of sequential sentences (or propositions) in text and talk, maintains that they 'hang together' or form a 'unity' and coherence relative to the models projected by the speaker. The model does not have any transcendental objective coherence outside of the unity of the text. This shall be further discussed in Laclau and Mouffe's (1985) logic of equivalence and difference in 2.3.4.

In this short discussion and various examples, I attempt to show that discourse is the study of language in use. This language is not about textual size but about content and contexts (both physically and cognitively). Brown and Yule (1983, 1) sum this up to say that "the analysis of discourse is, necessarily, the analysis of language in use. As such, it cannot be restricted to the description of linguistic forms independent of the purposes and functions which those forms are designed to serve in human affairs." This makes me then adopt Howarth's (2000, 284) definition of discourse analysis which he says refers:

to the process of analyzing signifying practices as discursive forms. This means that discourse analysts treat a wide range of linguistic and non-linguistic material - speeches, reports, manifestos, historical events, interviews, policies, ideas, even organizations and institutions - as 'texts' or 'writings' that enable subjects to experience the world of objects, words and practices.

Nonetheless, when subjects experience the world we talk about mental models, frames, presuppositions, etc. as elements in interpretation and place readers as having a certain level of background knowledge that we can exploit innocently in communication, but it is also possible that such assumptions may be deliberately manufactured for ideological reasons. An "ideal reader" (Fairclough 1989) can be constructed to assume that there is already a background understanding upon which they are in agreement with the speaker or writer. The claims in the text "may or may not be substantiated……assertions may for instance be manipulatively passed off as assumptions, statements may mistakenly or dishonestly be attributed to others" (Fairclough 2003, 41). This juncture sets the tone for a discussion of a particular kind of discourse analysis that seeks to investigate such assumptions latently purveyed and how ideology and asymmetric power relations feature in discourse and the consequences this may have.

2.2 CRITICAL DISCOURSE ANALYSIS: DEFINITIONS, CONCEPTS, AND OBJECTIVES

Critical Discourse Analysis emerges as an aspect of discourse analysis influenced by social theory. It is concerned with the workings of discourse in the service of power. It perceives discourse as the foundation of social relationships and asymmetric power relations. It is concerned with analyzing covert as well as overt structural relationships of dominance, discrimination, power and control as manifested in language. "In other words, CDA aims to investigate critically social inequality as it is expressed, signaled, constituted, legitimized and so on by language use (or in discourse)" (Wodak and Meyer 2001, 2).

CDA is thus a problem-oriented perspective, that is, concerned with particular problems brought about by socially-instituted dominations. It is a school of thought "with an attitude" (van Dijk 2001, 96). This attitude is maintained in support of the dominated and exploited

groups. By showing the interconnections between language and social practice and delineating linguistic and discursive facilities used in this, there could possibly be a reversal or mitigation of 'insidious' social practices.

In bourgeois scholarship, a researcher is meant to remain neutral or unbiased even when confronted with an identifiable social injustice. Habermas (1981), for instance, dismisses sociology as bourgeois scholarship. This tendency to be 'biased' against hegemonic practices or be in support of dominated entities has caused critical scholarship to be dismissed as "deficient methodology" (van Dijk 2001, 96). Such accusation, according to van Dijk (2001, 96), "is part of the complex mechanisms of domination, namely as an attempt to marginalize and problematize dissent". He further maintains that critical analysts should continue in the direction that rejects the possibility of a 'value-free science' as this may not be divorced from a social structure influenced and produced by a particular social interaction that, in itself, requires a critical study. In other words, value-free science, in itself, should be an area worthy of critical inquiry for it may not be unconnected with the objectification of purely a subjectivist notion of an epistemological enterprise. He further argues that

> theory formation, description and explanation also in discourse analysis are socio-politically 'situated', whether we like it or not. Reflection on the role of scholars in society and polity thus becomes an inherent part of the discourse analytical enterprise. This may mean, among other things, that discourse analysts conduct research in solidarity and cooperation with dominated groups" (2001, 354).

So, studies into the mechanics of power and domination are germane given that practices are gradually ingrained, naturalized and taken for granted. People's perceptions in, and of social intercourse are constrained by available discursive structures and conventions 'permitted' to them. More shall be discussed on this in the method chapter.

These structures and conventions with implicit "commonsense assumptions" (Fairclough 1985, 2) have dialectical relevance in sustaining hegemonic status quos. CDA's demystificatory stance helps in clearly pointing at the interplay between society and discourse in a way that may lead to revolutionary awareness and social emancipation. This is because "human matters, interconnections and chains of cause and effect may be

distorted out of vision. Hence 'critique' is, essentially, making visible the interconnectedness of things" (Fairclough 1985, 747). Available explanations only distort critical vision. Meyer (2001, 17) in this case regarding methodological controversies in social research further maintains that these controversies "concretize two irreconcilable positions, i.e., whether it is possible to perform any research free of a priori value judgments and whether it is possible to gain insight from purely empirical data without using any pre-framed categories of experience." He believes that CDA agrees with the first question even with "dogmatic positivistic methodology which permits value judgment" (Op cit.), but only in the context of discovery not in the context of justification. In the second question, he maintains that CDA's position aligns with the Kantian denial of the possibility of "pure cognition" in epistemology without a measure of valuation and experience.

Unlike other aspects of discourse analysis and text linguistics, CDA is not basically concerned with only texts (verbal or written) as objects of inquiry. A wholly critical account of discourse would necessitate "a theorization and description of both the social practices and structures which give rise to the production of a text, and of the social structures and processes within which individuals or groups as social historical subjects, create meanings in their interaction with texts" (Wodak 2001, 3).

This concern with contexts of use shows the fact that texts influence (and are influenced by) the social forces that produce them. An analysis of textual representation may not suffice in getting a comprehensive and objective understanding of the issues involved. Candlin in his preface to Fairclough (1989, VIII), sees this departure from basic textual analysis to other aspects as being of central importance for linguistics as it shows a movement away from the merely descriptive towards "the interpretative, to an inclusion of the participants in the linguistic process, to a reconciliation of the psychological and the social with the textual, which radically alters the map of conventional linguistics". This involvement of context as an integral object of inquiry makes "three concepts figure indispensably in all CDA: the concept of power, the concept of history, and the concept of ideology" (Wodak 2001, 3). For ease of explanation and due to their worth to this study, I add hegemony and access to the other three concepts that will be discussed below.

2.2.1 Discourse and power

The notion of power in CDA transcends the views of objectivists like Weber (1978) who see power as central or as having a form and being gained through various means i.e., charismatic, legal-rational etc. Power, in the Foucauldian sense which I also subscribe, is much more omnipresent and dispersed. It inheres in the view of those who decide how, and what we can think about, and even in those that objectify power as a possession or inheritance. Power "'excludes', it 'represses', it 'censors', it 'abstracts', it 'masks', it 'conceals'. In fact power produces; it produces reality; it produces domains of objects and rituals of truth" (Foucault 1991, 194). In my discussion of legitimacy over authority, I broach the fact that the gradual establishment of authority diminishes any sense of aberration and makes the military an option over democracy in the aspect of political leadership. This is achieved through the process of gradual ideological formation. Power here in the sense of the military masks and produces the domains and rituals of truth that mystify their aberrationist intervention and that also justify their mission.

Following Foucault, Fairclough (1989, 46) goes deeper to explain that power in discourse has to do with "...participants controlling and constraining the contributions of non-powerful participants". He distinguishes three types of constraints, namely: constraints on contents, constraints on relations and constraints on subjects. The first constraint pertains to the constraint derived from the conventions of the discourse type used. In a doctor-patient relationship, for example, there is a particularly powerful role accorded to the doctor who controls the direction and dimension of an exchange. The second one involves the social relations that people enter into in discourse like in a teacher-student role-position. The latter is accorded a professional educator position whose role is to give education while the student is identified as a learner who simply receives. Similarly, in the third, there is the ability of the powerful participants in a discourse to make subjects of their interlocutors. This is seen in the way, for example, the military make subjects of the citizens through coups and their speeches.

These particular examples are seen at the local, individual level not at the systemic levels involving issues of significance in political affairs. Generally, this power is able to control affairs and a fortiori, the people's minds. Powerful groups have access to discourse which

in turn helps them exert such control. Van Dijk (2008, 89) rightly observes that "the power of dominant groups may be integrated in laws, rules, norms, habits and even a quite general consensus, and thus take the form of 'hegemony'." He further explains that those groups who control most influential discourse also have the greatest chances to control the minds and actions of others. In Nigeria, we have seen how this access to discourse has led to the codification of purely elitist values in our national affairs. Today people are found talking more about features like 'rotational presidency', 'federal character', 'turn-by-turn presidency', 'north versus south' political arguments than about grave issues that pertain to the (dys)function of institutional and governmental affairs or about affairs that have direct bearing on their lives. Constitutional conferences in Nigeria, for example, talk about the devolution of power among ethnic nationalities, restructuring, and revenue allocation not the responsibility of power and the need for accountability. This is one of the essences of discourse to power i.e., its ability to determine the political trajectory of a given state. This power is exercised through access to discourse. This will be discussed in detail in the next section.

2.2.2 Discourse and access

For one to participate in a constitutional conference, as cited in the example above, one has to be part of the elite, so this access is limited. There are constraints that one can meet all the way from the constraints of literacy to that of genre, from that of form to that of discourse control or exchange or turn and even constraints based on sex, class and color. Free speech is a myth because all speech is influenced by power. Fairclough (2001, 52) argues that the idea "…that anyone is 'free' to say what they like, is an amazingly powerful one". It is powerful in the sense of its impracticability. The dominant group in every society is the one that has access to discourse and even the control over the access. Take for example the statement made by Field Marshall Idi Amin, one time head of the state in Uganda, on freedom of speech in his country. He said: "you have freedom of speech, but freedom after speech that I cannot guarantee" (cited in Orimolade 2014, XV). The Field Marshall here is not only controlling access to discourse but also indirectly controlling what is to be said as well as sounding a veiled warning regarding speaking against the government.

The power of the elitist groups to have their views dominate relates to discourse access. Van Dijk (2008, 67) argues that "one major element in the discursive reproduction of power and dominance is the very access to discourse and communicative events". In this respect discourse is similar to other valued social resources that form the basis of power and to which there is unequally distributed access. For instance, not everyone has equal access to the media or to medical, legal, political, bureaucratic or scholarly text and talk. Powerful elements with symbolic capital may have access to discourse and be heard more than commoners. That is, we need to explore the consequences of the complex question who may speak or write to whom, about what, when, and in what context, or who may partake in such communicative events in various recipient roles, for example as addressees, audience, bystanders and over hearers (Van Dijk2008). People here gain symbolic power, and this can be referred to as the resources available to an individual on the basis of honor, prestige or respect, and serves as value that one has within a culture (Bourdieu 1981).

It is believed in many African societies that women ought only to be seen not heard. Decisions are taken by the patriarchs. "Silence represents the historical muting of women under the formidable institution known as patriarchy, that form of social organization in which males assume power and create for females an inferior status….." (D'Almeida 1994, 12).Under such condition, a woman by her sexual/ biological nature is denied access to discourse especially at the cultural and political levels, and she is only a subject in decisions taken on her behalf.

Moreover, Goke-Pariola (1993) also contends that the way the English language has become bestowed with symbolic capital in such a way that access to this medium gives one leverage in the Nigerian society. He argues that one of the ways in which English serves this purpose is by the very position it occupies as the language of the colonizer. "The British had tremendous political power by virtue of dominating the life of the country. Consequently, their language, English, was automatically considered superior to all others in the country….In the process, the local person who understood the White man's language increased his own power dramatically: he became a man before whom others stood in awe" (Goke-Pariola (1993, 223). Similarly, Imam (1989,79) bemoans the fact that whenever he speaks Hausa and dresses in a traditional way in the midst of southern Nigerians and

attempt to sit on the same seat in a railway carriage there would be trouble especially pretending that he cannot speak. This ability to speak English accords one instant respect and other social goods. The first prime minister of Nigeria, Sir Abubakar Tafawa, is rated and prided highly due to his flawless British accent and he is called "the golden voice of Africa" for his ability "to speak English through the nose" (Goke-Pariola 1993, 225).

In a military regime, the officers, by virtue of their symbolic capital as colonial agents of suppression, of being educated military officers in the western tradition and also of having access to weapons, are put in a position capable of hegemonic practices. They have access to discourse which is reinforced when they are in power through the enactment of decrees that serve their economic and political interest. Such decrees are obeyed and not questioned. Aiyede (2003), for example, talks about a plethora of decrees that placed the Buhari government (1984-1985) above the law and essentially muzzled all form of dissent or censure. The first, (Decree 2), empowers the Chief of Staff, Supreme Headquarters, to detain any person for a period of three months without trial for any act 'prejudicial' to state security. The second, (Decree 4), enables the government to jail journalists for publishing 'false accusations' against public officials. The third, (Decree 13), places the government above the law by removing all actions of the government from the jurisdiction of the courts. These decrees reinforce each other and place the people in a vicious cycle of government action. By placing the government above the law, anyone can be accused of anything and can be dealt with as deemed appropriate by the military. What is 'prejudicial' to the state or what is 'false accusation' are terms that are defined by the state according to its ideological interests. The words are empty waiting to be filled with whatever meaning serves the military's interests. The people are thus silenced and their access to discourse with which to air their opinions is constrained. So the military have access to various forms of symbolic capital including discourse through which they formulate their ideologies and arguments and through enactment of legislation that favors them and at the same time enforces obedience.

Invariably, one of the greatest tools used by the military in realizing their goal of a power takeover is control over flow of information. As Bayley argues (1991,2) "the first act after a coup d'état is very often the occupation of broadcasting structures, and all established

totalitarian regimes maintain strict control over the press; in other words, they try to control the boundaries of discourse". This control over the boundaries of discourse impinges on access to be heard and be listened to thus making the available discourse the only one that people can read, hear or talk about and this is mostly in support of the regime.

So, this access to discourse makes it possible to determine the course of truth and construct social reality. People that have access to discourse of power make their views available. Available discourse, on the other hand, is easily captured cognitively because that is what is out there and available. It is because of this access to discourse that the truth and what constitutes it remains controversial. Foucault (1980, 131) captures the subjectivity of truth here:

> truth isn't outside power … Truth is a thing of this world; it is produced only by multiple forms of constraint. And it induces regular effects of power. Each society has its regime of truth, its 'general politics' of truth; that is the types of discourse it accepts and makes function as true, the mechanisms and instances which enable one to distinguish true and false statements, the means by which each is sanctioned … the status of those who are charged with saying what counts as true.

Those who determine what counts as true are those who have symbolic power and discourse access. One crucial aspect in the formation of a point of view is the ability to make your version of truth common and recurrent. Those who count as speaking the truth and as commanding the resources to do so are all controlled in turn by people with hegemonic power. They are the ones who control Fairclough's (2001) those constraints over language mentioned above.

2.2.3 Discourse and hegemony

As with Gramsci's notion of hegemony, power, for Foucault, is "secured not so much by the threat of punishment, but by the internalization of the norms and values implied by the prevailing discourses within the social order" (Mesthrie *et al* 2000, 324). People are formed as 'subjects', that is, free but disciplined individuals. Free and disciplined within a

particular form of construction that veils real freedom and discipline. Real freedom and discipline liberate subjects from hegemonic control.

According to Suarez (2002, 513), the Gramscian concept of hegemony through consent and persuasion is essentially comprised of three associated processes: "(1) leadership without force, (2) leadership through legitimation and (3) leadership through consensual rule." It is important to recognize these three basic processes of hegemony when applying the concept in an analysis and critique of interaction among social groups because together these processes produce a 'total system'. The establishment of hegemony thus makes leadership most potent and efficient, i.e., people are willing to obey laws even if such laws are against them. This willingness is as a result of seeing the laws or order of things as simply inevitable and rather commonsensical.

At a broader level, Fairclough (1995, 94) argues that there is a dual relationship of discourse to hegemony. "On the one hand, hegemonic practice and hegemonic struggle to a substantial extent take the form of discursive practice, in spoken and written interaction." The concept of hegemony, he further states, leads to the development in various domains of social practices which naturalize particular relations and ideologies, practices which are largely discursive. Many of these conventions that we take for granted as if they are drop-down-from-heaven privilege or favor certain roles over others. They enact power asymmetries. In the field of political discourse, a coup speech, for example, has come to be conventionalized with its particular genre, setting and audience. It is decidedly a monologue not a dialog and it also comes with a performative power. The fact that one takes up the position of a political leader and informs people about what is going on, and the laws being sanctioned in the land, there are interpersonal roles being enacted simultaneously with the message delivery. The fact that the audience listens to the message and abides by the commandments and instructions therein indicates that the apportioning of roles has been accomplished. In essence, the line has been drawn between who the leader is and who the followers are. This conventionalization and naturalization mask issues of arbitrary power grab and the issue of constitutional illegality. And essentially "naturalized discourse conventions are a most effective mechanism for sustaining and reproducing cultural and ideological dimensions of hegemony" (Fairclough 1995, 94).

The second aspect of the dual relationship of discourse to hegemony is that discourse is itself "a sphere of cultural hegemony, and the hegemony of a class or group over the whole society or over particular sections of it (or indeed, these days, hegemony on a transnational scale) is in part a matter of its capacity to shape discursive practices and orders of discourse" (Fairclough 1995, 95). This also relates to aspects of politics as there are people who by dint of their social position tend to lord it over the whole system. The elite in the society has hegemonic powers that their views, tastes and demands are made to be everyone's. Aspects of militarization of the polity in Nigeria, for instance, relates to the fact that military interests are seen as the most paramount in competing national interests. In national budgets, the military department or the defense ministry usually has the highest share (Siollun 2013). This decision has not been arrived at just value-free. It is arguably a product of hegemonic influences.

2.2.4 Discourse and ideology
The coinage of the term "ideology" predates Marx and Engels. It comes from Antoine Destutt de Tracy (1754–1836), a French philosopher and economist, in reference to the science of ideas. The term has evolved and generated various meanings and understandings. One of the greatest features of ideologies is in its appearances as simply natural and commonsensical. "The languages we speak hand down to us ready-made categories which we regard as commonsense" (Goatly 2007, 25). They thereby unconsciously carry with them an ontology or ideology of which we may not be aware. Halliday (2001, 180) maintains that "language has the power to shape our consciousness; and it does so for each human child, by providing the theory that he or she uses to interpret and to manipulate their environment". The theory about the world is constructed as such right from childhood and we grow up with such theories and ontologies in our encounter with the outside world. The opening sentence of Rousseau's *The Social Contract* is "man is born free and everywhere he is in chains" (Rouseeau 2003, 97). Althusser (1971) complements this view of ideological omnipresence by saying that as soon as a child is born and there is an exclamation about the sex of the child, then that begins the process of interpellation and subjecthood. A girl is most likely to be bundled in pink and a boy in blue with gendered clothes. One is then given a name, a religion, a family, a community etc. Each level of this new plane has conventionalized and naturalized world views. The world

views and ideas as such "do not drift through the social world like clouds in a summer sky, occasionally divulging their contents with a clap of thunder and a flash of light" (Thompson 1990, 2). This also corresponds to Althusser's (1971) observation that 'ideology' does not say "I am ideology". It comes through language organized around certain belief systems.

Fairclough (1989, 2) perceives ideology as the most important means of 'manufacturing consent'. He sees it as also closely related to language because the use of language is the "commonest social behavior and the form where we rely most on 'common sense' assumptions". The categories language provides may continue to be used unchallenged as they are seen as simply there and natural. Hunt (2011, 4), for instance, talks about how "Gender differences were regarded as innate and unchallengeable" and how choices on the kind of work to do are constrained for a woman. The choices that society offers are determined by hegemonic values that are serving certain ideological interests. Just as a feminist ideology may control attitudes about abortion or glass ceilings on the job or knowledge about gender inequality in society, van Dijk (2008) argues, a racist ideology may also control attitudes about immigration, and a social ideology may favor a more important role of the state machinery or elite groups in public affairs. Relating ideology to meaning access and control, Martin and Rose (2007, 16) see ideology and power as running "through the whole ensemble of language and culture, positioning people within each social context with more or less power, and opening or narrowing their access to resources for meaning". The 'naturalness' of ideology is a mask that appears superficially innocuous. Althusser's (1971) notion of 'lacunar discourse' is relevant here. Take for example Fairclough's (2001) conventional implicatures where certain kinds of expressions are passed off as reality, yet hold views that are contentious. In an expression like 'we take over power to rescue the nation from disaster'. There are so many contentious issues that this expression covers like who are the 'we', what elements or moments do the words like 'rescue' 'disaster' or 'take over' serve to protect or flourish. What do the words even mean, for meaning can be subjective?

Take also the view about 'freedom of expression' for all or notions of 'equality before the law'. In all these cases, there is a surface of rational and truthful presumptions but the realities they subsume show asymmetries of power. There are so many constraints that are

not demonstrated textually there. *Equality before the law* does not talk about the inequality that exists in terms of the ability of one class to get access to justice through being wealthy or the lack of freedom of expression of one class for not having symbolic capital. Such notions of equality all mask the reality.

Study of language in the traditional sense has narrowed the paradigm. Language is studied as a potential, a system, an abstract competence, rather than attempting to see it as actual practice.

> These assumptions and the neglect of language practice result in an idealized view of language, which isolates it from the social and historical matrix outside of which it cannot actually exist. Mainstream linguistics is an asocial way of studying language, which has nothing to say about relationships between language and power and ideology. (Fairclough 2001, 6).

In mainstream linguistics, for example, formalist grammar has taken the non-aligned stance of traditional scientific inquiry through Chomskyan Generative Grammar (henceforth, GG). GG has no concern for language use other than providing a systematic description of rules of generative grammar, a syntagmatic concern. This concern does not respond to the social impact of language and how language can help in the oppression of the weaker people in the society. Systemic Functional Grammar, on the other hand, has a concern with meaning and function that can help in a deeper understanding of a society (see a more detailed discussion of this model adopted by Fairclough in 3.3). Martin and Rose (2007, 1), for instance, have an understanding of a text as a knowledge engendering system. "Social discourse", they argue, "rarely consists of just single clauses; rather social contexts develop as sequences of meanings comprising texts." They further argue that each text is produced interactively between speakers, and between writers and (potential) readers, it can be used to interpret the interaction it manifests. And since each interaction is an instance of the speaker's culture, we can also use the text to interpret aspects of the culture it manifests.

Hart (2014, 20), for his part, provides these two sentences as having a similar syntactic structure [S[NP[VP[NP[PP] to show the concerns of Systemic Functional Linguistics as against that of Generative Grammar:

1. The police forced the rioters back.

2. The police moved the rioters back.

To GG, the sentences are structurally the same, and this structural concern is its basic raison d'être. In SFL, which has concern about functions, meanings and choices, there may be a question paradigmatically about the reason for such a choice of structure and even processes which may reveal certain things about language and ideological interest. Here it is not only about how sentences are structured as they are, but why they are structured as they are. The choice of the latter sentence or the former is about point of view or attitude towards the subjects or the context in the incidence. That is why in newspaper reportage, we have various kinds of headlines reporting the same event. Every newspaper reports an event on the basis of its ideology, not the reality. Those who use the first sentence above as a headline may be sympathising with the 'rioters' and those who use the second may be supporting the police action. Similarly, a sentence like 'all men are created equal' has 'all men' as NP in (GG), and in Hallidayan metafunction, as the theme or the point of departure of the message. Substitution with other NPS like 'animals' or 'dogs' i.e. 'all animals are created equal', for instance, would still make the structure intact as far as generative grammar is concerned since both are noun phrases. But again there should be a reason for a choice of that particular NP (all men) in that particular expression and context, and we have to look elsewhere outside the text into the society for answer.

If we look deeper semantically especially as the term 'men' is, or made to be, a neuter gender representing all people, the choice may reveal a more complex, ideologically ingrained sexist or patriarchal perspective. This perspective is made clearer through a paradigmatic concern with choices. Choices of structures are not innocent or value-free. This revelation about the use of 'man' as a neuter gender would lead one to go deeper into how a woman is displaced in an ideologically patriarchal or sexist society. The use of an expression like that and its instantiation, as Fairclough (1992) would argue, though at micro individual level, has been influenced by institutional and overall social values and attitudes at the macro level.

To sum up, Lemke (1995,17) rightly observes that "discourse functions ideologically in society to support and legitimate the exercise of power, and to naturalize unjust social relations, making them seem the inevitable consequence of common sense necessity". This without doubt sums up the overall kernel of my argument regarding the use of discourse in the service of power through coup speeches. Coups are presented simply as the commonsensical thing to do to rescue the country.   For the analysis of ideology in a comprehensive manner, I employ Thompson's (1984) symbolic representation which involves a discussion of the processes of legitimation, dissimulation, fragmentation, reification and unification which help in sustaining the dominant power relations. This part shall be discussed more in my chapter five.

2.2.5 Discourse and history

Ideas are generated ideologically, but they are also built up diachronically. They continue being in motion, changing and evolving other ideas. The concept of history concerns the position of the text within the socio-historical context it draws upon. Fairclough (1989, 152) considers discourse and texts which occur within them as having a genealogy "and the interpretation context is a matter of deciding which series a text belongs, and therefore what can be taken as common ground for participants, or presupposed". He believes that texts need to be historicized as they belong to an intertextual chain available to the producers at particular points in history. He believes that "intertextual analysis draws attention to the interdependence of texts upon society and history in the form of the resources made available within the order of discourse (genres, discourse etc.)" (Fairclough 1995, 149).

Texts are linked up to other texts in terms of the genre, context of use and constructions. The original proponent of this idea is Bakhtin, a Russian linguist. Bakhtin is among scholars who have constructed a social theory of discourse (Lemke 1995). According to Bakhtin, people make sense of every word, utterance or act against the backdrop of other words, utterances, acts of a similar kind. "This implies, of course, that it is very important to understand just which other texts a particular community considers relevant to the interpretation of any given text" (Lemke 1995,19). Corroborating Lemke's point, Holquist (2002, 58) argues that a primary way in which the constraints on choice make themselves

apparent is in the fact that an utterance is never in itself original or novel: "an utterance is always an answer. It is always an answer to another utterance that precedes it, and is therefore always conditioned by, and in turn qualifies, the prior utterance to a greater or lesser degree". The genres of discourse and exchange are also not spontaneous. They have been replicated in a society and can only be understood by the society. In this linguistic duplication of texts context and genre social reality is congealed and solidly constructed. A text copies from the past and anticipates the future as a form of dialog both in terms of response and in terms of preemption.

The interconnection between various texts and discourses leads directly to the notions of contextualization and recontextualization, processes in which elements typical of a particular context can be taken out of it and inserted into a new context with which it has not been conventionally associated. So, the discussion above regarding concepts of power, ideology and history are crucial to a political analysis as we have here in this thesis. Military inaugural and coup speeches relate to both use of coercive language and subtle language hinged on power and the ideological rationalization of actions and these are all done within a particular socio-historical context. Speeches of the military draw upon past speeches both at the level of genre or style and at the level of ideas recaptured, or recontextualized and, or, even decontextualized to acquire other values. A decision taken, for instance, about toppling a government as in a coup on the basis of its 'mismanagement' is a distillation of contexts and it goes back to a series of attitudes that has been defined, redefined and reevaluated to arrive at that notion. Such evaluations may not be ideologically value-free. Signifiers float and they have no fixed referents across time. Pierce (2016), for example, studies how the term 'corruption' has become polyvalent not only currently in Nigeria but throughout the history of northern Nigeria. It has evolved various referents that serve various interests.

To sum up, this discussion has shed light on the various dimensions of discourse and how all these interact in the aspect of social and political constructions. People with power and symbolic capital exercise control over discourse in terms of what is to be said and how it is to be said and even who to say it. They at the same have access to discourse i.e. the public sphere through the mass the bourgeois. The worldview and ideology of the people

with power, thus, becomes the natural dynamics of the society. It is on this backdrop that coup speeches emerge from one of the powerful elite society, i.e., the military in Nigeria.

In this discussion of the various ramifications of discourse, a reader may notice that the issues are not water-tight. They tend to spill into each other. They have certain simultaneity that makes it difficult to neatly compartmentalize. This is as a result of the ubiquitous nature of 'ideology'. Nevertheless, the division here has achieved some form of focus on the various dimensions that make up CDA and its understanding of discourse as crucial in the analysis of power. In rounding up, it is essential to bring Johnstone's (2008, 10) discourse heuristics as they may guide the overall thrust and attitude of this study:

- Discourse is shaped by the world, and discourse shapes the world.
- Discourse is shaped by language, and discourse shapes language
- Discourse is shaped by participants, and discourse shapes participants
- Discourse is shaped by prior discourse, and discourse shapes the possibilities for future discourse.
- Discourse is shaped by its medium. And discourse shapes the possibilities of its medium
- Discourse is shaped by purpose, and discourse shapes possible purposes.

In the next segment, there will be a discussion of social theory that will elaborate more on the connection between linguistics, discourse and the socio-political realms.

2.3 CDA AND ITS INTERDISPLINARITY

Language and society have a dialectical relationship which makes the need for interdisciplinary study necessary. The study of the field of politics as is intended here necessitates the need to engage aspects of social theory in a mutually beneficial association. The society influences language and vice versa. An awareness of a general social theory is important "in order to understand how the discourse of every moment shapes the changing resources and patterns characteristic of a community we need a general social theory" (Lemke 1995, 16). Chouliaraki and Fairclough (1999, 16) see the benefits of a transdisciplinary approach in terms of bringing forth different theories into dialogue, "especially social theories on the one hand and linguistic theories on the other, so that its theory is a shifting synthesis of other theories, though what it itself theorizes in particular

is the mediation between the social and the linguistic – the 'order of discourse'; the social structuring of semiotic hybridity (interdiscursivity)." The theoretical constructions of discourse which CDA tries to operationalize, they further argue, "can come from various disciplines, and the concept of 'operationalization' entails working in a transdisciplinary way where the logic of one discipline (for example, sociology) can be 'put to work' in the development of another (for example, linguistics)" (Chouliaraki and Fairclough 1999, 16).

Lemke (1995) further argues that the social theory we need must also be a critical theory; it must describe social processes in ways that show how power is exercised in the interests of the powerful, and how unjust social relations mask their injustice.

Transdisciplinarity also depends upon theories being 'exotropic', i.e., open to dialogue with other theories. "For instance, CDA is exotropic in that it defines its object of research (discursive aspects of contemporary social change) within a problematic shared with other theories, namely the (dialectic between social systems and social action in contemporary social change)" (Chouliaraki and Fairclough (1999, 113). They further argue that communicative interaction intends to show that the semiotic and linguistic features of interaction are systemically interrelated with what is going on socially, and what is going on socially is indeed going on, in part or wholly, semiotically or linguistically. "Different theories can be brought together to make complementary contributions to this problematic, and each theory can be specified in terms of its relations of "relevance" to others and to the overall analytical focuses of CDA" (Chouliaraki and Fairclough 1999,113).

2.3.1. Functional linguistics

Systemic functional linguistics (SFL) is a method of the study of linguistics that takes language to be a social semiotic system. This is developed by Michael Halliday. Where many approaches to linguistic description place structure and the syntagmatic axis in the foreground, Hallidayan systemic functional theory adopts the paradigmatic axis as its point of departure or focus. The concern with the paradigmatic access relates to question of choices of structure which may reveal certain aspects of the social. Lemke (1995, 22) maintains that Halliday recognizes the fact that that the language of a sports report, a sales transaction, and a newspaper editorial differ not simply in their vocabulary, and not because

these uses of language are more likely for people in some social positions than others, "but because the frequencies of occurrence of many grammatical and semantic features in these texts were skewed by the nature of the different activities in which language was being used". In the case of the coup speeches their being replete with directives and declaratives is because their role is about changing the political atmosphere to one that suits the purpose of the coup makers. *Declarations* are words that change the world while *directives* are those that make the world fits words (Yule 1996). The selection of language by the military, as such, is determined by what they want the language to do under the circumstance of a regime change.

Language is as it is "because of its function in the social structure, and the organization of behavioural meanings should give some insight into its social foundations" (Halliday 2007, 60). In essence the organization of behavioural meanings gives insight into ideologies and ontologies of a given society. Fairclough (1992, 2001) sees this in the aspect of coherence discussed earlier here and in the aspect of classification. Things are made to cohere through ideological common sense. The choices one makes in constructing a piece of writing are made using a point of view, and this point of view draws upon the reader's or audience's MR either innocently or ideologically. Cohesion, itself, may not be ideologically free especially considering the fact that linkages, like *however, but, although*, etc. can lead to subjective binaries or ontologies (Fairclough 2001).

Systemic functional linguistics is also "functional" because it considers language to have developed under the pressure of the particular functions that the language system has to serve. Halliday (2001, 179-180) believes that

> our 'reality' is not something readymade and waiting to be meant - it has to be actively construed; and that language evolved in the process of, and as the agency of, its construal. Language is not a superstructure on a base; it is a product of the conscious and the material impacting each on the other - of the contradiction between our material being and our conscious being, as antithetic realms of experience.

Functions are therefore taken to have left their mark on the structure and organization of language at all levels, which is said to be achieved via metafunctions. The term 'metafunction' is particular to systemic functional linguistics.

Downing and Locke (2006, XV) explain the metafunctions "one is to express our interpretation of the world as we experience it (sometimes called the 'ideational' or the 'representational' function); the other is to interact with others in order to bring about changes in the environment (the 'interpersonal' function)". The organization of the message in such a way as to enable representation and interaction to cohere represents a third (the 'textual' meta-function), and this, too, is given its place in a functional grammar because these functions are considered to come into being at the same time. As also put, in a nutshell, by Fairclough (1993, 134), "language use is always simultaneously constitutive of (i) social identities, (ii) social relations and (iii) systems of knowledge and belief - though with different degrees of salience in different cases".

One cannot mean about the world without having either a real or virtual audience. Language must also be able to bring these meanings together. This is the role of structural organization, be that grammatical, semantic or contextual. These three generalized functions are termed "metafunctions". As Chouliaraki and Fairclough (1999) argue that it is not by accident that critical linguistics and social semiotics develop out of SFL. They maintain that "SFL theorizes language in a way which harmonizes far more with the perspective of critical social science than other theories of language" (Chouliaraki and Fairclough 1999, 139). This particular section is relevant to my study because the three metafunctions of a text adopted here by Halliday influence my three-tier analysis. The experiential metafunction relates to my analysis of representation. The interpellation analysis relates to the interpersonal aspect while the textual to the argumentation and practical reasoning analysis. This novel combination is, however, routed through Fairclough's classification as well. Where mine is different from Fairclough's is in the inclusion of argumentation analysis to replace the textual. More on this will be discussed at length in the method chapter. Other discussions that follow are about areas of other influences from social theory as they relate to society and discourse.

2.3.2 Truth, Power and Knowledge

There are five theoretical insights from Foucault's works that need to be incorporated in discourse analysis (Fairclough 1992). The first two pertain to his 'archeological' work and the remaining three, to his genealogical work. Archeology, according to Foucault (1972, 131) relates to "the general theme of a description that questions the already said at the level of its existence, of the enunciative function that operates within it, of the discursive formation, and the general archive system to which it belongs". The elements that are of relevance to this study are, as summarized by Fairclough (1992, 55-56), the following:

1. The constitutive nature of discourse, i.e., it constitutes its objects and social subjects. This is important in shedding lights on the power of speech to form it worlds and meaning and create its subjects through role-designation. This is much more potent especially when backed by repressive ideological apparatus as in the case of the military in my study. Foucault sees discourse as "practices that systematically form the objects of which they speak" (1972, 249). In this sense discourse is seen as producing itself and not as a transcendental objective element. Foucault is particularly concerned about the mechanics through which one particular form of discourse becomes dominant over others.

2. The primacy of interdiscursivity and intertextuality which pertains to the interdependence of discourses. Discourses are not spontaneous as they copy or incorporate, build upon or polemicize other discourses (Bakhtin 1986).

In his genealogical works, three "substantive" points emerge:

1. The discursive nature of power—the practices and techniques of modern 'biopower', i.e., the technologies of power in relation to how people are objectified and made docile in submission to modern leadership schemes. Power is diffused and is always shifting and present not least in the details "what Foucault refers as the micro-physics of power" (Boreous and Bergstorm 2017, 2)and when studying power there is the need to analyze how it is exercised, "its technologies—is it exercised e.g. by weapons, by linguistic means or through different forms of

surveillance and control? The way power is institutionalized should also be investigated" (Op cit.). In this case the technologies of power are via speeches and these speeches are to be studied to understand how power is exercised and how subjects are created. Quantitative control over discourse especially during coup speeches is one example. Usually radio and TV stations are told to hook on to the national news which is under the control of the military. No station will be allowed to air any program without the permission of the military (Siollun 2003). This is done to avoid any counter propaganda against the coup and also to enunciate the new social through information repetition.

2. The political nature of discourse—power struggle occurs both in and over discourse. Power is gained or resisted discursively.

3. The discursive nature of social change—changing discursive practices are an important element in social change.

The incorporation of these viewpoints in my work will strengthen social analysis by ensuring attention to clear instances of practice and the textual forms and processes of interpretation associated with them (Fairclough 1992). It can also assist in relating general statements about social and cultural change to the precise mechanisms and modalities of the consequences of change in practice.

Truth, power and knowledge, for example, are crucial in any aspects of critical discourse. Truth and knowledge, for their parts, are elements that political actors claim to possess either overtly or covertly to possess in their dealings with the subjects. Power, for its part as discussed earlier, is also relevant to aspects of truth and knowledge. With access to discourse, whosoever claims the truth and knowledge over what constitutes the truth, has hegemonic influences.

2.3.3 Interpellation
The essence of Louis Althusser's interpellation theory is in its concern with subject creation or formation. This central argument of this thesis is how a military subject is created in Nigeria, and how this subject is consolidated through coup speeches. In "Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses", following Lacan's theory of the mirror image, Althusser

(1971) introduces the concepts of Ideological State Apparatuses (ISA), Repressive State Apparatuses (RSAs), ideology, and interpellation. Ideological State Apparatus relates to all those social institutions and values that shape the personality and outlook of a person into an ideological subject, while the Repressive State Apparatus talks about the forces of coercion like the military and police that all exist in a bourgeois state. Althusser (1971) argues that all ideology hails or interpellates concrete individuals as concrete subjects and emphasizes that ideology 'acts' or 'functions' in such a way as to 'transform' the individual into a subject. This is made possible through his notion of interpellation or hailing. For example, when a police officer shouts (or hails) "Hey, you there!" and an individual turns around and so-to-speak 'answers' the call, he becomes a subject. Althusser argues that this is because the individual has realized that the hailing is meant for him/her which makes him/her subjective to the ideology of democracy and law.

The moment a baby is born, he further illustrates, and the nurse exclaims the sex of the baby, like ''it is a baby boy/girl!'' At that very moment, that child has been interpellated into a particular pattern of life. To say that someone is fully interpellated is to say that he or she has been successfully brought into accepting a certain role, or that he or she has accepted values willingly. In my analysis, we will see how the Nigerian civilians have become interpellated as subjects of the military and the crucial aspect of this interpellation in the first military coup and the linguistic resources used to achieve this. While I concede to the fact that the military operate on the basis of having both the apparatuses, i.e., ideological and repressive, the line between the ISA and RSA is blurry and their relationship is that of interdependence. Police or army officers from the lower cadre who are used to enforce martial laws are themselves interpellated subjects of the political ideology of the top hierarchy of the military. Kandeh (2004, 14), for example, argues that civilian and military sectors of the political class are united around a predatory mode of accumulation "while armed subalterns share conditions of extreme social deprivation with workers, lumpens and peasants." In essence, the armed subalterns are made to work within purely an ideological framework that favours the military elite while being represented as a solution to the problems of the nation. The language of the coup speeches as such also affects the deployment and the utilization of the repressive apparatus represented by the lower cadre of the armed forces.

Basically those who come to lead after every coup are the military top elite, not those who hold the guns to take over power who are mainly from the lower ranks and are also interpellated subjects of the top military hierarchy. In a coup speech even the lower cadre of the armed forces are addressed and told what to do. They are called upon ideologically to act with their guns, and the guns are turned against the people. What keeps the guns turned against the masses is ideology for the holders of the weapons can as well turn them on the few top commanders of the army who are both largely outgunned and outnumbered, but they do not dare as they are beholden to some ideologically defined professional roles. Singh (2014), for instance, argues that Jerry Rawlings, in his 1981 coup in Ghana, was able to succeed in his coup with just a handful of officers but through his alliances with the civilian population especially radical student bodies who bought the idea that his coup was a 'holy' and 'revolutionary' war against an evil regime.

It is also instructive to understand that ideology is mediated through language, and that is why linguistic resources are central to the formation and conveyance of ideology. Fowler and Kress (1979, 185) believe that "ideology is linguistically mediated and habitual for an acquiescent, uncritical reader who has already been socialized into sensitivity to the significance of patterns of language". The very day Major Nzegwu, on the 15th of January 1966, announces the coup on the radio in the way he does and without any immediate rebellion that sets the motion for the interpellation of the Nigerian citizenry to military leadership, which altogether makes up a substantial part of Nigeria's post-independence existence.

As Burr (2003, 130) points out "when we recognize ourselves as the person hailed in the ideology, we have already become that person. The idea of positioning within discourse is rather similar. Discourses address us as particular kinds of person (as an old person, as a carer, as a worker, as a criminal and so on), and furthermore we cannot avoid these subject positions, the representations of ourselves and others that discourses invite". This point is important as it shows that whenever there is a coup and people comply with the directives in the speeches, they are invariably accepting their new subject positions.

According to Althusser (1971, 180-181) the duplicate mirror-structure of ideology ensues simultaneously:

> (1) the interpellation of 'individuals' as subjects; (2) their subjection to the Subject; (3) the mutual recognition of subjects and Subject, the subjects' recognition of each other, and finally the subject's recognition of himself; (4) the absolute guarantee that everything really is so, and that on the condition that the subjects recognize what they are and behave accordingly, everything will be all right" (Althusser 1971, 180-81).

This description brings into play three key concepts: language, "in the ordinary use of the term, subject in fact means: (1) a free subjectivity, a centre of initiatives, author of and responsible for its actions; (2) a subjected being, who submits to a higher authority, and is therefore stripped of all freedom except that of freely accepting his submission." In essence the process of interpellation is not enough to create a subject with a stable identity. The process gains traction through a repetition of rituals and the acts of affirmation to the call by the subjects.

In the case of my study, I see the correlation of interpellation with the Hallidayan interpersonal metafunction especially in terms of the creation of political roles and position. "…the speaker adopts for himself a particular speech role, and in so doing assigns to the listener a complementary role that he wishes him to adopt in his turn" (Halliday and Matthiessen 2014, 135). Through this and a repetition of the process a subject is interpellated and formed.

2.3.4 Articulation, moments and floating signifiers

Articulation theory is important in the thorough understanding of the formation of classification that aids ideological manipulation of difference. Laclau and Mouffe (1985, 105) develop this theory which they define here:

> We will call articulation any practice establishing a relation among elements such that their identity is modified as a result of the articulatory practice. The structured totality resulting from the articulatory practice, we will call

> discourse. The differential positions, insofar as they appear articulated within a discourse, we will call moments. By contrast, we will call element any difference that is not discursively articulated.

Central to the theory of articulation are what Laclau and Mouffe in the quote above call 'articulation' 'moments' and 'elements'. These are integral part of their discourse theory. Starting from the bottom, 'Elements', also called 'floating signifiers' (Laclau 1990, 28), are signs whose meanings are not yet fixed. Their meanings are defined by their differences to the other elements and are therefore ambiguous. In essence, 'elements' are signs that have multiple, potential meanings, i.e., they are polysemic and "using this concept, we can now reformulate the concept of discourse: a discourse attempts to transform elements into moments by reducing their polysemy to a fully fixed meaning" (Jorgensen and Phillips 2002, 28). This notion of element is crucial in the aspect of the subjectivity of meaning. Take for instance the word *terrorism*. *Terrorism* is a protean term that can mean different things to different people, but the moment the term is articulated in a particular discourse called 'nodal point' it acquires meaning and definition and then it becomes a 'moment' in that articulatory practice.

The 'nodal points' are the privileged discursive points which partially fix meaning within signifying chains (Laclau and Mouffe 1985).When coup makers talk about their coup as '*national protection*', the term is defined within the ambit of a coup speech and power take over, but there are many dimensions of 'national protection', outside the logic of the coup speech, one of which may be the defence of the constitution and the commander-in-chief of the federation. '*National protection*' is thus an element outside the realm of a coup speech. The ability to realize that a moment in this speech can be an element in another or outside of that speech is critical in understanding the workings of ideology. "Dictionaries", as rightly argued by Edelman (1985,10) "cannot tell us what language means; only the social situation and the concerns of human beings who think and act define meanings" and it is how it is used in the social that matters in giving life and form to texts.

Furthermore, '*Articulation*' is the linking of elements that gives them meaning, turning them to 'moments'. The power to fix meanings resides with hegemony and access. In essence, meaning in coup speeches form 'moments' that are relevant within that speech,

and that lose their imports outside the speech. Laclau (1990) uses the signifier "democracy," which acquires particular meanings when it is articulated with other signifiers. When democracy is articulated with antifascism it takes on a different meaning than it does when it is articulated with anti-communism.

In the aspect of the logic *of equivalence* and *logic of difference*, differences and similarities are built in relation to subjective classifications and ontologies that have resonance within a particular articulatory practice. According to Fairclough (2003,88), *logic of difference* and *equivalence* "are respectively tendencies towards creating and proliferating differences between objects, entities, groups of people, etc. and collapsing or `subverting' differences by representing objects, entities, groups of people, etc. as equivalent to each other". He shows how semantic and grammatical representations capture this in legitimation and hegemonic tendencies of social practice. This may seem to be a rather abstract theoretical point, but it is an aspect of the continuous social process of classification. Thus classification and categorization, according to Fairclough (2003, 88)

> shape how people think and act as social agents. Equivalence and difference are in part textual relations, and itis fruitful to 'operationalize' this rather abstract theoretical point in text analysis, looking at how entities of various sorts (people, objects, organizations, and so forth)are differentiated in texts, and how differences between them are collapsed by 'texturing' relations of equivalence between them.

The essence of Laclau and Mouffe's discourse theory is that it elucidates representation and meaning which are of relevance to the experiential metafunction. The knowledge about 'moments' and 'floating signifiers' exposes the polysemic nature of critical political definitions and the hegemonic power to fix subjective meanings and make them dominant or objective. Jurgensen and Phillips (2002) see objectivity as the historical outcome of political processes leading to the sedimentation of discourse. The boundary between "objectivity and the political, or between what seems natural and what is contested, is thus a fluid and historical boundary, and earlier sedimented discourses can, at any time, enter the play of politics and be problematized in new articulations" (Jurgensen and Phillips 2002, 36). The entry of the military in political affairs is so sedimented that areas of contentions have shifted from propriety of the military as a political force to the nature of

military leaders, just as their democratic counterparts. This is achieved through the naturalization of their position over time as they hold onto power.

 Certain crucial 'signifiers' or meaning potentials have been left outside the coup discourse. 'Indiscipline', as an important 'moment' in coup speeches, is imputed to the enemy or opponents, but it is a 'floating signifier' or an 'element' outside the coup discourse, itself, that can mean 'indiscipline' on the part of the coup makers for daring to flout the constitutional provision that rules against mutiny. The concept of *discipline* is so congealed regarding the military that it has achieved almost a permanent fixity in reference to the military rule as the only force that can provide 'discipline' in Nigeria, (see Smith 2007). It has essentially marginalized its other meaning potentials that may classify acts of treason and mutiny as grave indiscipline. "Every discourse", Laclau and Mouffe (1985, 113) maintain, "is constituted as an attempt to dominate the field of discursivity by expanding signifying chains which partially fix the meaning of the floating signifier". Moreover, the logic of equivalence and difference are about artificial binaries and ontologies that are built within a particular text that also do not have any substance outside of their articulatory practice. This particular aspect corroborates Derrida's (1981) binary opposition and logocentricism where binaries are created, and one part of the binaries is favored over the other. In ideological analysis, this particular portion lends credence to aspects of Thompson's (1984) unification and fragmentation as a strategy of ideological manipulation. In military versus the civilian in political leadership, a binary is created and, through a long period of hegemonic influence of the former, the military is the favored one of the pair.

2.3.5 Communicative rationality

Validity claims are very important in political discourse analysis for they are implicit notions every political speaker has in their minds as they address people. These claims form part of the rationality project of Jurgen Habermas. Habermas (1981) develops a theory of communicative action anchored in the supremacy of linguistic rationality. In this, he departs from viewing rationality from mainly an instrumentalist or objectivist position. He believes that rationality inheres in our communicative action as it does have a linguistic

structure. The discerning of this linkage aims toward a normative understanding of society that can engender emancipation from domination or oppression.

In constructing his communicative action theory, Habermas argues that communicative ability is universal and has basic structures and fundamental rules that all people acquire in learning how to speak a language. Communicative competence is thus not only about being able to produce grammatically correct language. We also relate to the world about us, our feelings, intentions and desires. In all these activities we make validity claims even if implicitly about truth, about rightness, about legitimacy etc. Chilton (2004, 43) neatly classifies these Habermasian validity claims into four:

a. The claim to understandability, i.e. that what the speaker utters is intelligible within the scope of the exchange.

b. The claim to truth: that is to uttering a propositional truth, or in other words to truthfully assert a representation of a state of affairs. This claim also connects with the Gricean maxim of quality.

c. The claim to be telling the truth: i.e. the claim to be speaking sincerely, i.e. performing utterances that the utterer believes corresponds to their intended meanings. This claim also connects to the Gricean maxim of quality.

d. The claim to rightness: i.e. the claim to be normatively right to utter what one is uttering.

These validity claims according to Chilton (2004) are tied in with a threefold model of 'worlds': the social world and the objective world, together constituting the public sphere, and the subjective world, constituting the private sphere. Habermas's key to his notion of reaching understanding is the possibility of using reasons to gain intersubjective recognition for criticizable validity claims. This possibility exists in each of the dimensions mentioned above. In each of these claims it is possible to reach agreement about disputes by way of argumentation. The rationality proper to the communicative practice of everyday life points to "the practice of argumentation as a court of appeal that makes it possible to continue action with other means when disagreement can no longer be headed off by

everyday routines and yet is not to be settled by the direct or strategic use of force" (Habermas 1981, 17-18). Chouliaraki and Fairclough (1999, 84) see them as the "gentle but obstinate presuppositions of communication which ground social theory".

The criticizability of validity claims creates a possibility of identifying and correcting mistakes. If this is carried at a reflective level, forms of argumentation may take shape which may be transmitted and developed within a cultural institution. Habermas believes that through this correction with cultural traditions and social institutions the concept of communicative action becomes serviceable to social theory.

Chouliaraki and Fairclough (1999) believe that the Habermasian theory balances between instrumental rationality and communicative rationality. While instrumental rationality is about achieving result, communicative rationality is about reaching or achieving understanding. They sum up the political project as "preventing instrumental rationality from spreading too far at the expense of communicative rationality with socially pathological consequence (positively) creating the social conditions in which the full emancipatory potential of communicative rationality can be realized", they also maintain that Habermas sees an unrealized emancipatory potential in language or communication.

In essence, Habermas' critique is rooted in the fact that societies need to open themselves to rationale debate and argumentation. He is critical of all social institutions that bar rationale debate, such as the capitalist system. A system like capitalism is not established through process of rationale consensus. It thus has objectified arbitrary values that force consensus and manufacture consent. It establishes only pseudo-communication. The foundations of societies and institutions need to be subject to rationale understanding and argumentation. The implicit notions of those claims should be challenged and made explicit.

2.3.6 Conclusion

Generally, this discussion of aspects of social theory in relation to discourse is necessary in terms of the analysis of the social and political world. Fairclough's works that I attempt to use linguistically operationalize the basic kernels of the social theorists' submissions. In

systemic linguistics, we see how the sign contributes in creating the social and the functions of language in that regard. Foucault's notion of bio-power shows how human beings can be 'thingified' and reduced to objects. These issues are also true in the aspect of politics where subjects are seen more as means to political goals than as people deserving of good governance and freedom. Secondly, the aspect of objectification which I find most important for discourse analysis of any kind is the fact that there is not any objective reality transcendental to consciousness or its creation in discourse. Laclau and Mauffe's view about articulation shows that any knowledge of phenomenon is just as it is discursively postulated or constructed. Structures are created then objectified. Many users of language in the political and advertising spheres use this discursive potential to psyche people up to believe in the givenness of an objectified entity.

Such objectifications go far beyond to complex issues pertaining to institutions that we have taken for granted. Foucault's work on prisons and madness all seem to challenge objectified institution that appears transcendental and even dogmatic. In the case of my work, this particular notion will help in challenging the 'received' notion about the military remaining unchallenged and an institution beyond reproach and that is associated with the sanitization of the society which are all made with the implicit notion of Habermasian validity claims that are untouched or unquestioned. It will also seek to challenge the permissiveness of the military to exercise violence in the discharge of their duties which people see as simply there, given and irreproachable.

Invariably, power gives access to discourse. Access to discourse makes the views of the dominant and powerful elements of the society the most available and obtainable views on offer. There is certain simultaneity and spontaneity in the work of ideology, access, power and the like. Dant (2011, 12) sees social knowledge as it is shared by people as existing as discourse. "Knowledge becomes available for sharing when it is uttered; either spoken or written down." And it is more so when there is a segment of society that has vital access to discourse and they do so with powerful constructions. Access to such privileges by implication makes one having the knowledge they believe in be distributed. Constraints on access, constraints on medium, and constraints in interpersonal discussion all are brought to bear in impeding the common man from getting heard. The powerful elements in the

society controls what is in the news and what constitutes news. Other institutions all conspire to complement the hegemonic view. Ideology thus speaks to the common man from all the pores of the society. Crimes and punishments are defined. Norms and values are defined. Right and wrong behavior is defined. All these aspects of definition may suit the dominant ideology and thus become the laws of the land and the naturally occurring view. And increasingly there is a wide lacuna between the lifeworlds and the systems. People become simply objects of the systems and follow the pronouncements of the systems. No constructive dialogue between them. In Christianity, for instance, in Matthew (5:5), there is a glorification of the meek. "Blessed are the meek: for they shall inherit the earth" (Matthew 5:5). When such is uttered to people oppressed, it may numb the aspect of critical consciousness and make the conditions under which they work be acceptable. 'The meek', knowing themselves, become subjects as defined by their terminology and systems that they follow. The people become thus interpellated as subjects.

2.4 MILITARY (POLITICAL) DISCOURSE ANALYSIS

Political discourse analysis is both about political discourse analysis and about the analysis being a critical enterprise (van Dijk, 1998). PDA or critical political discourse analysis deals especially with the reproduction of political power, power abuse or domination through political discourse, including the various forms of discursive dominance" (van Dijk 1998, 11). Fairclough and Fairclough (2012) further add that political discourse analysis should approximate to the concerns of political theory that is both descriptive and normative. This concern with normative standards would make discourse analysis not only be critical for its sake but critical for the sake of radical normative changes or standards, or what Wodak (2001, 64) would call "a prognostic critique".

According to Chilton (2004), the doing of politics is the doing of language. Language is an integral tool of politics. Political campaigns, parliamentary debates, media interviews, inaugural speeches are all done with language. There is a competition for advantage between opponents and language is an effective tool in this regard. In my case it relates to the power of a group taking over a government to be able to assert its authority while repealing it and establishing a new one. Van Dijk (1998) believes that once we have

analyzed the particular properties of political contexts, political discourse analysis in many respects will be like any other kind of discourse analysis. The specifics of political discourse analysis therefore, he maintains, should be aligned with the relations between discourse structures and political context structures. "Thus, whereas metaphors in classroom discourse may have an educational function, metaphors in politics will function in a political context, for instance in the attack on political opponents, the presentation of policies or the legitimation of political power" (Van Dijk 1998, 24). Let us now identify the broad features of coup speeches as aspects of political language.

Military coup speeches are aspects of political discourse. Their essence lies in their performative declarative powers i.e., both being used in ending a government and in starting another one. The speech is used also in establishing laws and repealing others. Bodies are formed and new subjects are also formed. Future projections and imaginaries are established. The language used here falls in the realm of what Chilton (2004) calls 'coercion' or coercive use of language. Chilton argues that this is one of the strategies through which Habermasian Validity Claims are overridden whether obviously or covertly. Coercion is partly linguistic and partly dependent on the utterer's resources and power. Some examples of this are speech acts backed by legal, extra-legal and physical sanctions and use of deontic and epistemic modals. Coercion is extremely important in my analysis as it relates to interpellation and the formation of subjects, governance and the removal of other regimes. The Habermasian claim of rightness, for example, has relational significance for it places the speaker or utterer with both deontic and epistemic powers and clearly hails the audience. Appearing out of the blue to 'declare a state of emergency', as an example, is made on the backdrop of the claim of the rightness to speak in the way and manner done. Acquiescence to any actions, pronouncements or declarations like this shows that the validity claim of rightness has not been challenged and it has ungrudgingly been accepted.

Secondly, for coup speeches to gain legitimacy through the ideological apparatus, they have to discredit the outgoing regime. This act of discrediting serves as the raison d'être of the coup itself. Their legitimacy as such is on the basis of the deflation of governmental legitimacy of the incumbent regime. This negation can be made by exaggeration or

hyperbole, contrivance and or assumption or presupposition to advance selfish political motives. This brings us to the second method of overriding validity claims, i.e., legitimization and deligitimization. Legitimization here talks about the ways a government portrays its positive face in other to be obeyed. All attempts are made to legitimize its actions for the purpose of being accepted. Deligitimization, on the other hand, refers to the ways others or perceived are presented negatively using speech acts of blaming, criticizing insulting etc. and the techniques in the use of difference and boundaries. The military employ these tactics in self-presentation and the presentation of the enemy. Coup speeches exist on the notion of presence of absence as we shall in the representation of the political class in data analysis. They are made on the twin backdrops of self-legitimation and other deligitimization. They are formed with binaries of 'us' and 'them'. This also relates to the van Dijk's (2005, 33) ideological square:

1. Emphasize our good properties/actions
2. Emphasize their bad properties/actions
3. Mitigate our bad properties/actions
4. Mitigate their good properties/actions.

Linguistic strategies are employed that play a role in this demarcation of interests. Good properties of the in-group are emphasized through iconic active processes "I/we did this or that", or through positive hyperboles "we can sacrifice our lives for the nation", etc. Negative or bad properties are mitigated through euphemisms, passivisations, nominalizations etc. The out-group can also be described in dysphemisms or hyperboles, and their good side can be understated through understatements or negative euphemisms or the like. George Orwell (2015, 1), in his 1946 article: 'Politics and the English Language', bemoans the 'badness' of the English language due to the fact that meaning is made vague and fuzzy. This is obviously so because in political language vagueness can be an end in itself especially where the in-group may be involved and see that as face saving tactics. Orwell argues that:

> ...political language has to consist largely of euphemism, question-begging and sheer cloudy vagueness. Defenceless villages are bombarded from the air, the inhabitants driven out into the countryside, the cattle machine-gunned, the huts set on fire with incendiary bullets: this is called pacification. Millions of peasants are robbed of their farms and sent trudging along the roads with no

> more than they can carry: this is called transfer of population or rectification of frontiers.

This Orwellian example is a classic case of mitigating an in-group's bad actions for ideological reasons. This is also demonstrated in the coup speeches.

Thirdly, there is the aspect of information control both qualitatively and quantitatively which is highly crucial with the military. In my discussion of discourse access, I have raised the issue of discourse control. There is a code of secrecy in the military in Nigeria which hamstrings information flow. In fact, this secrecy, as argued by Abaya (2008), makes research in the area quite scanty and difficult. Chilton (2004) maintains that secrecy and inadequate information flow are a way of quantitative misrepresentation. The first act of a coup plot, as we shall see, is to control the mass media especially the broadcasting or electronic media. Control over flow of information is crucial to the success of the coup for their will be no access to a counter narrative by people who may be opposed to the coup. And in the life of the regime many decrees are enacted to muzzle the press. A good example of this is the decree 4 of the Buhari administration (see 2.2.2 for more on this). Qualitative misrepresentation, on the other hand, includes various kinds of strategies like omission, verbal evasion and denial, euphemism, implicit meaning and the subjective representation of reality. Access to discourse and control over discourse together make both qualitative and quantitative (mis)representation easy for the military in power.

In conclusion, a military coup speech is a sub-class of political language that has performative powers and that uses strategies of both qualitative and quantitative mis/representations in promoting the ideological interests of the coup makers. All Habermasian validity claims are overridden here which proves that the speeches are ideologically saturated and need a thorough critical disambiguation of issues. Coercive language and misrepresentation impinge on the claims to uttering a propositional truth and to be speaking sincerely. Coercion also impinges on the claim to rightness: i.e. the claim to be normatively right to utter what one is uttering. A military coup is a political aberration, so any military officer that emerges and claims the rights to order people around and to take over government without constitutional sanction is impinging on the claim to rightness. Lastly, a speech that is obfuscating and that has a vague representation of issues

may be impinging on the claim to understandability, i.e. that what the speaker utters is intelligible within the scope of the exchange. Tropes used in a language may displace meaning as well within the scope of the exchange and deliberately promote ideological interests. All these issues make coup speeches political texts that deserve an analysis of a critical kind.

2.5 DISCOURSE LITERATURE ON COUP SPEECHES IN NIGERIA

On the whole, academic literature on the military institution in Nigeria is scarce due to what Abaya (2008, 156) sees as "the clandestine nature of the institution and the way research work on its activities is held with suspicion". This, without doubt, only justifies the need to look deeper into this 'mysterious institution' that has played a crucial role in state formation and that has interfered in governance all over Africa with a view to unraveling the assumptions and force that continue to make it relevant in our societies. This phenomenal 'enigma' associated with the military re-echoes Habermas's (1981) validity claims and his insistence on the need for institutions, practices and discourses associated with them to be laid bare in order to engender rationale debate and argumentation.

This study, as such, forms part of the drive towards understanding the military as a political institution in Nigeria. In this segment, I am going to examine the works of three scholars who have worked on various linguistic modes of analyses of military coup speeches in Nigeria and have exerted a measure of intellectual influence on the field of political discourse. While the scholars have done their bits in making us have a rich understanding of coup speeches through various areas of linguistics, more still needs to be done in terms of the analysis of context, deeper interdisciplinary inquiry and the employment of a comprehensive method that would triangulate results.

2.5.1 Discourse pragmatic analysis

Adegbija (1995, 254) using "a sociolinguistic, ethnographic and pragmatic" approach has done some of the most important work in relation to coup speeches (Abaya 2008). His paper reveals that coup speeches "are uniquely sensitive to the anomalous discourse context and capitalize on the discourse socio-cultural constraints and values in the Nigerian

society relating to indirectness, social rank and collective essence" (Adegbija 1995, 254). In general, Adegbija concludes that the tactics in the speeches are, in their coverage of all areas warranting the speech, heavily loaded in their potential to assess the addressees and listeners into making the intended inference. He identifies eight strategies that are important in making coup speeches achieve their aim, namely:

- Self-identifying and discourse initiating
- Atmosphere sanitizing
- Discrediting tactic
- Support garnering tact
- Authority assumption and exercising tact
- Confidence building measure
- Survival tactic
- Departure/closing tact

While Adegbija's analysis is seminal in its own rights and while it has also enriched the rather unexplored field of military discourse, it has certain setbacks that my own analysis may either remedy or further enrich in the understanding of military coup discourse. One of Adegbija's major claims is the fact that some of the strategies he mentions are African in nature

> In African countries, perhaps more than most other communities, greetings and the recognition of the addressee in one form or another constitute important strategies for identifying self and getting attention. In many traditional Nigerian communities, for instance, when the town crier has an important message, usually from the village head, he normally begins by recognising the Community as a group after beating the gong to initially attract attention. Martial music, characteristic of the background of coup speeches, functions as the gong and suggests that a coup is in the offing or has already occurred (Adegbija 1995, 257)

This statement has largely glossed over the fact that a coup genre has intertextual influences. Nzegwu's first coup speech creates a template that others copy from and this template may go back to history and the colonial experience of the military as a conquering

force, not our cultural repertoire. Lugard's speech in 1902 also has this element of self-identification and the use of martial music that Adegbija talks of is purely a colonial creation, see (Olatunji 2012, Adeogun 2005, Wangome 1985). As shall be seen in my intertextual analysis, Nzegwu's coup speech appears to copy a lot not from the traditional African setting which is nebulous here (given that Africa is a disparate entity with multifarious ethnic and cultural groups) but the colonialists themselves. An in-depth intertextual analysis will prove generic influences. The use of martial music started as early as 1892 and "became a full-fledged orchestrated military band in 1922 under a Mr. Lovell, an Englishmen, as its bandmaster" (Adetunji 2012, 429).

Another issue with Adegbija's paper is in terms of not recognizing the essence of grammatical transformation in the aspect of ideological analysis. He, for instance, relates the use of the passives like the following to the aspect of military humility:

- *Workers not on essential duties are advised to ...*
- *People are warned ...*
- *The accounts of FEDECO and ... are ...*
- *All airway flights are ...*
- *All ... are hereby dissolved.*
- *The Constitution is suspended.*
- *All radio stations are advised to ...*
- *All sea ports are ...*
- *The National Guard is hereby disbanded.*
- *Decrees ... are also hereby abrogated.*
- *Doubtful loyalty will be penalized.*
- *The former AFRC is now disbanded and replaced by ...*
- *A curfew is hereby imposed on ...*

Adegbija argues that if the active and personalised forms have been used instead of the passives, in the above examples given by him, "they would have created an impression of arrogance, pride and brute force" (Adegbija 1995, 265). I think the use of passives there is in respect of the thematization of messages and the emphasis on the point of departure of the message. Themes like *decrees, the constitution, curfews, all radio stations* etc. are all important topics in a military takeover of power, so foregrounding them is to emphasize their importance. The illocutionary force there and the message sent across have already shown the aspect of 'brute force' and the 'arrogance' of the military in this case. This is

typical of ideology i.e. not needing to spell itself out. What better show of arrogance can there be than suspending the constitution? Moreover, the finished or completed nature of the process or verb in constructions like these "becomes more like an adjective, a state….Causality is no longer the main concern, but instead attribution or classification is" (Hodge and Kress 1993, 27). For example, in *a curfew is imposed* the term *imposed* is like a finished state in a modifying role, a given decision which also aids in the formulation of ideology, i.e., an already finished uncontested state of affairs serves hegemonic interest. In addition, restricting movement of all people and vehicles in a *curfew* which is *imposed* and foregrounded in the message has already shown this 'arrogance' in the aspect of power as there is no regards to people's human rights. Passives also are used by the military if they want to emphasize or thematize the Affected party through the actions of the enemy.

<u>Our economy</u> has been hopelessly mismanaged

<u>Workers</u> are being owed salaries…..

Foregrounding the Affected there, i.e*., our economy* and *workers* in that prominent position is strategic for these two things are very important to the lives of Nigerians and would draw their attention. So, the lack of involvement of the experiential and interpersonal values of lexical and grammatical aspects here has, in a way, hampered a more focused analysis of the issues and the values involved. This study on the other hand involves this thorough analysis of representation in grammar and lexis.

Thirdly, in the aspect of the strategy of garnering support, Adegbija (1995) has also overlooked the use of MR in cuing for support. While there are obvious textual ways of seeking for support, especially as clearly shown in his examples, there are ways of garnering support or claim of solidarity through positioning the audience as witnesses, especially when they are constructed as 'ideal readers' (Fairclough 2001). Take Dimka's *'I bring you good tidings…'* in the anti-Murtala coup speech, as an example. This statement is made on the backdrop of an assumption cued in the audience's MR that they share a distaste against Murtala, so any change of the status quo would appear as a happy thing to the people. People may not share this perspective, but they are made, or recruited, to appear as if they do. Personal pronouns like 'we' can also be used involving the audience to show a form of constructed solidarity and support between the coup makers and the generality

of the people which also helps in ideological construction. Take, for example, Abacha's statement '*intolerable conditions under which we are now living* '. In this statement, not only does Abacha put himself in a similar situation to other Nigerians but places them also as sharing the view about 'intolerable conditions' in the country. As Wales (1996, 62) expresses it:

> The politician-speaker [frequently] uses 'we' with the double inference and presumption that he or she is not only speaking on behalf of the party or government, but also on behalf of the audience . . . the rhetorical implication is that the audience or readership must therefore share the government's views as being the only correct views.

Moreover, Adegbija also believes that there are contradictions in coup speeches. He argues that "the tactful spicing of speech acts that appeal to the addressee with those that threaten (in order to guarantee the survival of the speaker and his group) is the real index of the ambivalence of the military coup speech" (op. cit, 258). Adegbija identifies these ambivalent cases in the tactics used by the military a lot. I think this ambivalence could have been better shown in an argumentation analysis that has a comprehensive schema of analyzing arguments for action. The ambivalences, contradictions and simplifications for rhetorical and persuasive reasons could have all been better analyzed. Also, itemizing the analysis on the basis of representation, subject-formation/interpellation and argumentation could really have teased out all the elements and place them in their perspectives and their functional worth.

2.5.2 Graphological, syntactic and rhetorical analysis

The graphological, syntactic and rhetorical analysis is a model used by Akanbi (1998) to analyse coup speeches. His contributions are analyzed under three broad headings, namely: graphological features, syntactic features and rhetorical devices. I will highlight some of his major assumptions here and then give my opinions.

Under the graphological devices, he argues that the Nigerian coup speeches use little punctuation. The relative sparseness of punctuation to him can be attributed to the purpose of the speeches i.e., information and persuasion. The urgency of the messages and the

educational level of the coup planners may be responsible for the dearth of punctuation in their speeches. He also notes that paragraphs are uniquely short in order to make reading easier and more interesting. The military may also not care for aesthetics. Akanbi also identifies four main types of sentences used in the coup speeches: that is, simple, compound, complex and compound-complex. In his view, the sentences are relatively short except on rare occasions where fairly long sentences are used to show the mood of the writer and the seriousness of the theme. There is even a bit of contradiction there especially where sentences are said to be short or simple, yet there is a lack of punctuation. Does it mean that the sentences are run-on sentences? According to Akanbi simple sentences are most commonly used for "self-identification, issuance of threat, commands, giving information and for indicating departure" (Akanbi 1998, 47).

The compound sentence in his view is sparingly used because of the hurriedness in writing the speech. However, the complex sentence in his opinion is commonly used as the subject matter of coups is complex and involves life and death. Akanbi, also, further notes that complex sentences accommodate hidden intentions more than other sentence types. He argues that compound-complex sentences are few because they are long and make reading laborious. Akanbi further maintains that the indicative mood is the most commonly used in the speeches in order to assert, inform, declare etc. The imperative mood is used to ensure an effective grip of the situation on the ground. This is done through blunt use of orders and commands.

In the aspect of cohesion, he maintains that the ideas in the speeches stick and hold together through the use of connectives, pronouns, anaphoric and cataphoric references. He also identifies elements of foregrounding in the coup speeches which he says helps in focusing and emphasizing and that "it brings into prominence certain aspects of texture in a text" in order "to arrest readers attention and interest" (Akanbi 1998, 75). This textual cohesion or local coherence may be very significant indeed in the ways in which texts "position people as subjects and cumulatively shape identities…, and how texts work ideologically" (Fairclough 1995, 122). It is important to understand that such local coherence or how a text hangs together can be made to appear as universally given for its audience, and so positions such audience to draw it to arrive at a coherent interpretation that is ideologically

potent. The examples given at the beginning of this chapter on the aspect of cohesion and coherence are relevant here. Local coherence leaves wide issues to be assumed and brought to bear by the audience to make sense of the text. Analysis of presuppositions can help in showing how such ideological coherence is woven.

What is obvious, in other points raised by Akanbi, is that the use of transitivity analysis could have nuanced the study and provided deeper insight into the workings of language in the service of power and in a far reaching context. First, contrary to Akanbi's viewpoint regarding the length of a sentence as having to do with its ability to mystify reality, the fact remains that it all depends on the choices we make and the intended meanings we wish to convey. In these two sentences we can see how two realities may be represented and how such representation may realize different meanings:

1. Five security guards <u>died</u> in the presidential villa during the coup
2. We <u>killed</u> five security guards in the presidential villa during the coup

Both sentences are not complex in their structure and they are also not in the passive, but they realize different meanings and have different levels of iconicity on the basis of the choices of verbs and structures. The first one uses an intransitive verb where the agent is the victim and the cause of death is rather mystified. The decision to choose either the first sentence or the second may not necessarily be about a simple linguistic choice from options but a choice that may be ideologically determined as both can serve the same reality. Likewise in these two sentences:

1. I have become the head of state (a relational process)
2. I have seized power to become the head of state (a material process)

The first sentence does not indicate the process leading to the agent becoming the head of state, while the second one is explicit about the process leading to his/her becoming the head of state. Downing and Locke (2006, 145) state that "with dynamic verbs of transition such as *become, get, turn, grow, run*, the Attribute exists as the result of the process and can be called the resulting Attribute". In this case, the first sentence treats the process as simply an effectual attribute of the carrier with no further details. The second one, on the other hand, reveals the process with rather clear details.

Also regarding the use of derivatives as indicating a deft knowledge of language as opined by Akanbi, it can also be a way of freezing clausal processes to save one from an iconic detailing of events or of saying the reality that may not serve the speaker's interests as in nominalizations. Nominalizations, according to Downing and Locke (2006 162-163), "distances us from the event, raising the representation of a situation to a higher level of abstraction". And the moment the event is objectified and depersonalized in this way, it is conceptualized as if it "had temporal persistence, instead of the transience associated with a verb". "Civilian corruption", as an example, is a nominalization derived from the verb "corrupt" which has not detailed the nature, agents, circumstances etc. of the "corruption". This process may also involve redefinition, reassessment, reframing and recontextualization of a situation. As rightly put by Fairclough & Fairclough (2014, 93),"Redescribing or reframing reality in rhetorically convenient way is part of a strategy of action" A speech that is lexically dense with nominalizations may be opaque especially as clear details of who, how, where and what may be stinted. The examples I have shown above are to demonstrate, in a nutshell, the potentials of a CDA analysis in going deeper textually and in providing a critical dimension to the analysis.

2.5.3 Speech act analysis

Within the purview of pragmatics, Abaya (2008) works with speech act theory. He adopts the speech act theory as developed by Austin (1962) and revised by Adegbija (1982, 1999). The study reveals that despite their military background and format, coup announcements have some elements of political language ingrained in them for certain reasons. The result of the study shows that at the pragmatic context level, the speech acts in each coup event depend largely on the context that gives birth to them. The analysis at the social context level reveals that the social relationship between the interlocutors is both symmetric and asymmetric depending on the audience that is being addressed by the coupists. At the linguistic level, he notes that the diction is used to enforce or attenuate illocutionary force. He further maintains that most of the sentence constructions are in the passive as the coupists do not want to create the impression of arrogance or brute force. Abaya relates the use of the passive here to humility. The study concludes that despite the peculiarities of military coup speeches, they are essentially a subset of political language. While Abaya has done a worthy job in his speech act analysis which has helped in demonstrating their

deontic powers, there are issues that are lacking in the overall analysis, though to be fair to Abaya they do not fall within the delimitation of his work. The work lacks thorough assessment of the discursive practice, i.e., issues of production and consumption of discourse as it is purely a pragmatic analysis without critical rigour.

Abaya also does not talk about the social and political context and their dialectical impacts on Nigeria. In essence, the social must be engaged both in its contemporary and historical essence thoroughly to understand some linguistic choices and their trip through time. Acts of government inauguration is through the democratic process and the leader is sworn in to office in a solemn process involving the chief Judge of the federation, but in the case of the military, we may look at their acts in terms of forgery of a political process at the initial stage, then concretizing it to an object through repetition and iterability. Toyin (2015) maintains that there are about 14 coups both concrete and alleged in Nigeria. A point is reached where people are not asking about why should the military takeover power, having come past that stage, but asking about who the one taking over is. This shows that the military have been accepted as an alternative political construct. There is even nostalgia about certain regimes (Smith 2007). This also relates to Laclau and Mouffe's sedimentation of signifier into objectivity due to hegemony and ideology. As argued by Brookes (1995,464) about the transmutation of ideology when challenged "discourses that come to be recognized as racist will ultimately disguise and present their ideologies in new forms, generating old meanings in new disguises which conceal the exercise of power and thus make it more acceptable". People have become naturalized to a power take over by the military and newer areas like the diarchy once proposed by Babangida and also the nature of military leaders like Buhari are the topics that are thought of not the propriety of the military in political power.

Similarly, Abaya, in a discussion of social context, quotes Bach and Harnish's (1979) Mutual Contextual Beliefs (MCBs) as representing the context of the coup speeches. This is meaning that the coup is launched amid shared values and concerns between the citizenry and the military regarding the disillusionment and disenchantment of the citizenry with the status quo. This positivist analysis by Abaya has probably not considered the fact that the realities that the military draw upon can, as mentioned earlier, substantially, be

presupposed and in these presuppositions they may have constructed Nigerians as their ideal readers/subjects and put them in such a way as to assume they share similar values or experiences. In chapter 1, I discuss Babangida's waiting-for-an-opportunity-to-strike commentary which indicates that there is already an intention to take over power regardless of any shared values or concerns.

One other area also overlooked is the essence of intertextual chain which relates to presuppositions and that solidifies ideology through repetition. There are longitudinal mutual influences from the earliest to the latest coup speeches. There is also the aspect of synthetic personalization Fairclough (1995), in talking about synthetic personalization, maintains that in all phenomena in strategic discourse there may be a matter of constructing fabricated individual persons, for instance, the addressee and addresser or of manipulating the subject positions of, or the relationships between, actual individual persons. This manipulation can then lead to the exaggeration or misrepresentation of state of affairs using various linguistic mechanisms to arrive at a decision to take over power. A statement like: '*you are all aware of....*' attempts to appeal to an ideal reader not that there is a reality which the overall people are aware of. As argued by Janks (2010, 61) "texts work to position their readers; and the ideal reader, from the point of view of the writer (or speaker), is the reader who buys into the text and its meanings".

Abaya (2008) and Akanbi (1998) all seem to have an understanding of syntactic structures according to the views of traditional grammar not as is contained in transitivity in systemic grammar which has a regard for context. This lack of regard for context subtracts from the validity of the work. Abaya (2008, 10) also opines that:

> The study of coup announcements is neither historical nor political in the true sense of it. Rather, it is an application of the theory of linguistics to explain a political phenomenon. In other words, the study focuses on 'how' coup speeches are used to perform actions (speech acts). Studies on speech acts have focused on the 'how' and 'why' of verbal exchanges in the context of natural communication.

This delimitation in a way creates the need for a work that is politically committed and that asks not only a critical 'how' and 'why' but for 'whose' interest and against 'whose' interest. A historical analysis cannot be discounted both at the level of real history,

especially in terms of the social context of the study, and at the level of the text itself. Texts can be historicized due to having intertextual properties. Coup speeches have persistent resonance and they influence each other dialectically and diachronically across time. A clear avoidance of history may short-circuit results and make analysis be not all rounded.

To conclude therefore, the works, I have discussed here, have generally touched on different aspects of coup speeches that are of importance to my research and to the understanding of the aspect of the military in political power. My work, however, serves to fill a lacuna in understanding the social context and in the use of the tools of critical discourse analysis. I also employ a multi-faceted form of analysis in understanding the subject matter in a holistic manner that triangulates results. The debate about the military factor in African politics is continuous and gaps in this direction will continue to be enriched with various perspectives.

2.5.4 The contribution of this study to the analysis of coup speeches

The chief contribution of this study is a discussion of the ideological angle of the coup speeches. It will also augment the following aspects that have not adequately been covered in the existing literature.

1. It will cover aspects of the interpellation of the citizenry as military subjects. Subject formation is very important because through the coups, Nigerians become gradually molded into subjects of the military. This molding is done linguistically because even a threat with a weapon is carried out via a linguistic act. It also covers the effect of this interpellation in terms of the nation and the citizenry. It will discern aspects of hegemony and ideology too. These aspects have not been investigated in depth.

2. Most of the works cover aspects of the speaker's intention pragmatically the speech acts, but this work also covers more than that into aspects of interpretation and the way other linguistic elements like presupposition and intertextuality can be brought to bear in the service of power. The interpretation aspect is where most ideological

ideas are planted. Assumptions key in as reality or as shared information with affinity to reality.

3. My argument has a dialectical nature also. It looks at the influences of the military. Its historical formation and how this has come to shape its perspectives and its role in the political governance of the country. Elements of the features of Colonial notes of conquest are found in the military coup speeches. The overall military rule is also influential in the formation of a particular kind of citizenry and political class. Militarization in the country has influences on the general aspects of the country. The political class comes to adopt the some of the language and attitude of the military.

4. It analyzes also in detail some grammatical transformation aspects like nominalization and passivisation in the mystification of issues carried via ideology.

This work will be valuable in providing a deep analytical and critical analysis away from mainstream descriptivist paradigm that abounds in coup speech analyses in the Nigerian academic context. In the next chapter, I will discuss the method I will use in achieving the research objectives of this study.

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CHAPTER THREE: METHOD AND METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES

3.0 INTRODUCTION

This chapter talks about both the method I am going to use in this research and the data I will analyze. I elaborate on how the research will be carried out by first delineating CDA as a research methodology and the various arguments involved in substantiating the fact that one can remain uninhibitedly committed to a position in their research as against positivist objectivity in bourgeois scholarship. This concern does not detract from the fact that one will do worthwhile research. I also discuss the various criticisms made against CDA and the way such are tackled and rebutted. I then go further to discuss language and ideology as an indication of the way language serves power. After that I proceed further to discuss Fairclough (1991, 2001) and Fairclough & Fairclough (2012) as methods and analytical tools to be used on my data. The choice of Fairclough in this analysis is anchored in the fact that he has one of the most developed and comprehensive schemas of analysis (Richardson 2007, Jurgensen and Phillips 2010, Janks 1997, Simpson 1993) in CDA. His model appears to have various windows and dimensions of analysis that triangulate and strengthen analytical perceptions and results.

In sorting data, corpus linguistic resources like concordance is involved for accuracy and the building up of particular lexically notable groupings. Argumentation is also involved as a larger scale global analysis of texts in terms of practical reasoning. Textual descriptions enter as premises and arguments that need be attached with burdens of proof that require critical questioning. From the description level, I move on to the interpretation level which is a great site of ideological reproduction and transformation. Here I discuss the essence of MR (members' resources) and how this may be used or manipulated in purveying and planting ideological assumptions. It is more like the analysis of context and how this plays a role in ideological construction. I finish the discussion of method with the explanation level where I explain how the socio-cultural values dialectically influence discourse and how it is influenced by it, thereby maintaining and possibly transforming the ideological status quo. In all the various levels of analysis discussed in the methods, I have tried to

engage my data directly in showing examples of the efficacy of the analytical framework and how I would go about doing my data analysis.

I then elaborate on my data especially how they are acquired and vetted, the dates, and their significance as a choice for analysis. The seven coup speeches that constitute my data are objectively thecomplete set of successful coup speeches in the whole military history of political governance in Nigeria. This collective and holistic nature of the data addresses the criticism of cherry picking data to suit research expectations made against CDA by Widdowson (1995).

3.1 CDA AS A RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Critical discourse analysis does not possess a clear demarcation between theory and method as is obtained in other social science disciplines. Fairclough and Chouliaraki (1999, 16) succinctly see:

> CDA as both theory and method, as a method for analyzing social practices with particular regards to their discourse moments within the linking of the theoretical and practical concerns and public spheres alluded to, where the ways of analyzing 'operationalise'—make practical—theoretical constructions of discourse in (late modern) social life, and the analyses contribute to the development and elaboration of these theoretical constructions. We therefore agree with Wacquant (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, 26-35) that it is necessary to avoid both theoreticism—theory for its own sake—and methodologism—seeing method as a theory free means of achieving results

CDA, as such, is a collection of schools of thought that have connection to different grand theories, from micro-sociological perspectives, to theories on society and power in Michel Foucault's tradition (Fairclough and Wodak), theories of social cognition (Van Dijk) (Wodak and Meyer 2001). Because of these connections to grand social theories, there is no unified method of analysis that is used. Each scholar uses a method that will best address their particular research questions and address the basic thrust of their social theory, a means of mutual operationalization, yet there is a uniformity of purpose, that is, in

addressing social problems engendered through language and a belief in the capability of language being, or as, an instrument of power enactment and oppression.

I summarize and harmonize Wodak (1989), Fairclough (2003) and some aspects of van Dijk (2001) to provide below the main tenets and principles of CDA research methodology:

a. Research Interest: CDA addresses social problems to uncover inequality and injustice. In doing this and because it is often the case with marginal research traditions (van Dijk 2001), there is the need to try harder and prove your worth more than in the mainstream traditions in order to be accepted. This has made CDA scholars employ exhaustive analytical processes in efforts to triangulate and strengthen analysis. That is why I employ a multi-disciplinary approach and framework in my data analysis

b. Object under investigation: Language behaviour in natural speech situations of social relevance (institutions, media, minority problems, racism etc.) is to be investigated. All situations which are threatening or involve a power play between individuals are of interest. In essence power relations are partly discursive and should thus be analyzed from a discursive perspective

c. Interdisciplinary research: Social phenomena are too complex to be dealt with adequately in only one field and also because discourse constitutes society and culture and that the link in this constitution is mediated, interdisciplinarity is extremely important. In my literature review chapter, I have discussed various theoretical traditions and how such could help in my analysis and the understanding of social phenomena. For example, the use of speech acts and command language that produces social relations can give a clue to how 'subjects' are, or can be, hailed (interpellated).

d. Empirical research: Data from natural speech situations are to be analyzed. Theory and methodology, values and aims are to be discussed explicitly.

e. Inclusion of the historical perspective: Social processes are dynamic, not static. This has to be reflected in the theory and in the methodology. This is because discourse is also historical. Discourse analysis should not be synchronic alone. It should also be diachronic as well especially in the aspects of intertextuality i.e. how texts build upon other texts and incorporate them.

f. Researchers are forced to take sides: Especially in empirical research, the "subjects under investigation" cannot be treated as objects any longer. Research includes the "researched" and, eventually, how a researcher ought to help them (if possible). In this case, the analysis by itself can create critical language awareness by making clear what is (ideologically) made opaque and by emphasizing on the essence of discourse in the creation of social realities.

g. Social and political practice is aimed at: Results of research not only imply success in the academic field, but they should also include proposals for practical implementation. Necessity for new notions of extensions of traditional concepts of "language behavior" and "meaning": social phenomena are very complex, irrational and rational. Many different and ambivalent, conscious and subconscious motives are relevant. Thus multiple methods, manifest and latent meanings, cognitive and affective aspects are important.

The above tenets are important because this chapter is, in large part, a description of how I have implemented these tenets in my research.

The concept of interdisciplinarity mentioned above is crucial in CDA due to the fact that discourse is a social action. This inroad into the social clearly shows a connection between social phenomena and linguistic phenomena. In essence, there is an attempt to bring "social science and linguistics together within a single theoretical and analytical framework, setting up a dialogue between them" (Chouliaraki and Fairclough 1999, 6).The linguistic turn in social theory has clearly emphasized the importance of language in social intercourse and its symbiotic and dialectical nature. Any piece of language, with close examination, provides data about social perceptions and constructions that may

immediately be discernible. Though CDA is sometimes mistaken to represent a 'method' of discourse analysis, it is generally agreed upon by many CDA scholars (Wodak *et al*) that any explicit method in discourse studies, the humanities and social sciences may be used in CDA research, in so much as it is able to adequately produce insights into the way discourse reproduces or resists social and political inequality, power abuse or domination. Generally the aim is to argue that social practice is not just given, transcendental and objective but that issues are objectified and that such objectifications are carried out principally through linguistic constructions. It is based on the assumption that powerful groups try to naturalise and conventionalise discourse in a way that makes the dominant ideology appear 'given' or 'taken-for-granted' or 'the simple common sense'. CDA does not, as such, limit its analysis to specific structures of text or talk, but systematically relates these to structures of the socio-political context because the influence here is dialectical.

This 'dissident research' method may be seen as a reaction against the dominant formal (often "asocial or uncritical") paradigms of the 1960s and 1970s (van Dijk 2001, 352). Thus, CDA provides an alternative to traditional epistemology and research that best addresses social inequality and power asymmetries. Far from the non-aligned nature of traditional scholarship or objectivist social science, it believes that issues should not only be observed and explained as innocuous social systems but that such arrangement should be closely observed to manifest the power dynamics and the displacement of the weaker part of society with any clear method that can reveal this. This departure from traditional research has not begun with CDA, as far back as the 1960s Glaser and Strauss (1967) devised a theory that challenged the prevailing sociological method of analysis. Their Grounded Theory subscribes to the supremacy of data and that social science research should examine data, then, based on that, propound a theory that will suit the analysis of that data and context. They maintain that "previous books on methods of social research have focused mainly on how to verify theories. Our basic position is that generating grounded theory is a way of arriving at theory suited to its supposed uses" (Glaser and Strauss 1967, 1-2). This clearly shows that traditional research method is not unassailable and should not be dogmatic. Adorno and Horkheimer (2002) in the Frankfurt School offer a strong critique of positivism and its over-reliance on science, reason, and objectivity. They argue that instrumental rationality has penetrated all aspects of everyday life and that

science has become a tool of social domination and control that actually denies the critical faculty of reason in deference to the empirically provable fact which is an ideological notion in itself.

In their view, science has fallen prey to the scientific method and analysis has become separated from the questions of ethics and ends, being solely focused instead on description, classification and means. This focus is what creates a scientific method with no practical human face. Similarly Van Dijk (2008, 352-353) argues that science, and especially scholarly discourse, is inherently an integral part of, and influenced by, social structure, and produced in social interaction. Instead of denying or ignoring such a relation between scholarship and society, CDA insists that such relations be studied and accounted for in their own peculiar circumstance, and that scholarly practices be based on such insights. "Theory formation, description, and explanation, also in discourse analysis, are socio-politically 'situated,'. Reflection on the role of scholars in society and the polity thus becomes an inherent part of the discourse analytical enterprise" (van Dijk 2008, 353).

3.2 CRITICISM OF CDA'S THEORY AND METHOD

CDA's theoretical orientation and commitment has been attacked and criticized by various linguists and discourse practitioners of other orientations (Breeze 2011). They attack the premises of CDA, its methods and its political commitment. Hammersley (1997, 239), for instance, attacks CDA on its use of the term 'critical' which shows as if its foundation is unproblematic. He also argues that CDA is built on the foundation of Marxism which has been discredited in the academic world. He states that:

indeed, the argument of CDA is that research is defective, methodologically as well as politically, if it does not fulfil this function. This is a much more controversial claim. Yet Fairclough and other advocates of CDA treat the validity of a critical approach as obvious, and as providing an unproblematic basis from which to criticize more conventional kinds of work. One reason for the neglect of this issue may be that a 'critical' approach is seen as a logical development from the normal ideals of academic research.

The use of the term 'critical' overtly has been "the cardinal sin of CDA practitioners" (Fairclough 1996, 52). While it is seen as a misnomer, this declaration of commitment made explicitly is done by all other academics but in an implicitly covert manner. No one confronts a piece of analysis without a kind of bias or premeditation. Fairclough (1996,3) states that "CDA would argue that we are all - including Widdowson - writing from within particular discursive practices, entailing particular interests, commitments, inclusions, exclusions, and so forth". He further explains that CDA scholars are indeed generally characterized for their explicit political commitments. They are people who perceive things as wrong with their societies, see language as involved in what is wrong, and are committed to making changes through forms of intervention and education involving critical language awareness for various affected sectors. In my opinion, the fact that there is also what Hammersley calls 'normal ideals of research' simply justifies the raison d'être of critical discourse analysis which is to challenge those dominant views and the notion of binaries that put two contending forces up, one governing the other. The notion of 'normal research ideals' presupposes the existence, or has a 'trace', of an 'abnormal research'. To borrow Derrida's (1981) notion of meaning subversion, one may be tempted to ask: who for instance decides what a normal or abnormal science is and why is this so? And whose interest does this demarcation serve? This is in the same way as other binaries that call up associations with marked and unmarked forms: man-woman, white-black, conventional medicine-alternative medicine etc. These binaries make the former the dominant type while the latter the opposite or the less prominent.

Not showing an explicit political commitment is in fact one of the workings of ideology. Ideology does not declare itself because if it does its hegemony may not last. Foucault (1980, 86) reasons in this light as he sees power as "tolerable only on condition that it masks a substantial part of itself. Its success is proportional to an ability to hide its own mechanisms". In not making a political commitment, dominant research may be serving the interest of powerful groups. Lewontin (1995, 7), for instance, sees biology itself as ideological. Though biological theories do not declare any political or economic commitment and they pursue the aspect of traditional objectivity in their studies, he argues that:

> the ideology of modern science, including modern biology, makes the atom or individual the causal source of all the properties of larger collections. It prescribes a way of studying the world, which is to cut it up into the individual bits that cause it and to study the properties of these isolated bits

This cutting up of atom with all the academic arsenal of knowledge at the scientist's disposal is to maximize capitalist gain from the environment without being so much concerned about the overall implication to the ecosystem. Lewontin (1995, 9) further maintains that scientists do not begin life as scientists but as social beings immersed in a society, and they view nature through a lens that has been molded by their social experience and by the society that they already belong to as a human productive activity "that takes time and money, and so is guided by and directed by those forces in the world that have control over money and time" Lewontin (1995, 9)." He further argues that:

> Science uses commodities and is part of the process of commodity production. Science uses money. People earn their living by science, and as a consequence the dominant social and economic forces in society determine to a large extent what science does and how it does it. (Op cit.).

Masking the real motives of scientific inquiry here does not at all make the motives objective more than those who show a genuine humanist commitment to emancipation and declaring such commitment rather uninhibitedly. The argument by Lewontin further proves that current scientific research may be pursuing capitalist ideals camouflaged in ideologically-free objective scholarship. Similarly, Edelman (1985, 13) also reasons that:

> A reader of the American politics text books and journals finds in them a great deal of attention to elections, rational choice, leadership, participation, and regulation: i.e., to the reassuring procedures, and little attention to the inequalities, forms of social control, and social pathologies that are the outcomes of the procedures. The language that purges consciousness of the disturbing consequences of established institutions is defined and ordinarily accepted as objective and scientific, while language that calls attention to such consequences is defined and ordinarily accepted as ideological and polemical. Clearly, the terms "objective," "ideology," and "polemical" as used in academic writing and speech are themselves political.

Edelman's point of view restates the fact that history is written by those who control the discourse in society, and it is underpinned by their ideological interests. Part of Foucault's (1972) concern in the study of knowledge, which also resonates with Edelman's point of view, is its formation and how this formation has brought about certain objectified standards that appear irreproachable and that serve certain vested interests. It may possibly be that current values of research fall among the mechanism of knowledge production that Foucault (1972, 216) talks about here:

> ……in every society the production of discourse is at once controlled, selected, organised and redistributed according to a certain number of procedures, whose role is to avert its powers and its dangers, to cope with chance events, to evade its ponderous, awesome materiality.

Indeed, practitioners of Critical Discourse Analysis, as argued by Wodak *etal*. (2009, 8) in terms of the mainstream academic non-alignment of scholarship, "believe that such ostensible political indifference ultimately assists in maintaining an unjust status quo". This positivism ushers in a system that always stops short of critique, and is forever stuck in describing the world as it is seen, heard, and felt as an object or an end in itself. This problem is at the heart of much research today, where efforts to let the data speak for itself or the reader make sense of it by themselves leave questions of structural inequality and power largely unresolved (Adorno and Horkheimer 2002).

Habermas (1973) corroborates this line of reasoning by arguing that adherence to reason alone eliminates the ability to hope, to take a position, to desire, to strive for happiness, and to dignify all other aspects of human experience that does not fit into the scientifically observable fact. It creates or narrows the possibilities of human uncapped progression and subverts Nietzsche's Übermensch. Undoubtedly, behind observable facts there are always underlying facts that are systemically glossed over or unanalysed. In Habermas's view, science has separated reason from desire and suffering, and has increasingly centred itself on production, technological "progress," and efficiency alone. As a result, anything associated with transcending reality is deemed nonsensical and outside the scope of scientific study. In the end, he feels that science has abandoned its role in aiding the progress of humanity.

The pursuit of an objective social science has also not helped the course of humanity in its material advancement. Dahms (2008, 7-8), in what he calls, "the dilemma of social sciences" argues that during the last quarter century, social scientists continued to be committed to producing the kind of knowledge needed to support the efforts of decision makers in positions of political and economic power, to amplify the effectiveness of public policies.

> Yet, achievements in politics, economics, culture, society, and natural environment, in the so-called advanced societies, neither seem to have translated into a greater capacity for overcoming social problems once and for all, nor to correspond with continuous qualitative improvements at the global level.

He has seen the futility of a purely descriptivist pursuit of a science that fails to take a stance in terms of obvious displacement and imbues itself with description as an end in itself.

Moreover, Van Heertum (2005) summarizes the views of postmodern theorists like Michel Foucault, Jean-Francois Lyotard, Jacques Derrida, and Richard Rorty who go even further than their predecessors in rejecting the notion of one objective, universal truth implicitly. Lyotard, for example, argues that all knowledge exists within language games and that there is thus no means to gauge the validity of one kind of knowledge over another. In this context, he ultimately labels scientific knowledge as a particular discourse. In the process, he calls into question the whole course of Western science and theory by privileging difference and plurality over any form of universality or foundationalist theory. Earlier, Foucault (1972) has taken a huge step in this direction by challenging the "objective" basis of history and connecting knowledge, truth, and power in a manner that rejects the "normalization" and "subjectification" of modern science and philosophy. He argues, following Nietzsche, that history is written by those that control its outcomes and that what has been taken for universal truth is actually just a discourse underwritten by particular perspectives and power dynamics.

Given this notion of the unobtrusive yet powerful nature of ideology, Widdowson's (1995, 168) criticism of CDA on the basis of its premeditated notion of ideological presence in texts is like stating the obvious. He argues that:

> You cannot explain how people express their ideology by assuming in advance that ideology is already fixed in the language. To assume that is to adopt a transmission model of communication in which meanings are semantically packaged, in which signification is significance, and human beings have no say in the matter.

I think Widdowson may be stating the obvious here about the nature of language and ideology. His perception about language is that it is free and not ideological and that people speak from value-free perspective. Ideology is probably fixed in language on two levels. First, there is the level of the concept of standardization or the privileging of one language or dialect over others. In chapter two, I have talked about how the English language has become a badge of prestige in Nigeria. Speaking the language offers one some advantages, and a good speaker of English has the chances of having their views being taken seriously and being accorded some authority or respect. Discourse access as such is more gained by virtue of a good command of the English language than indigenous African languages. It has, in effect, hegemonic influences. Secondly, choices in language are also ideological. The choices we make in how we report reality tend to capture the realities we wish to relate to others. Realities are also made into commonsense by virtue of hegemonic influences. A case in point is sexism in language which helps in shaping perception of gender and also of the issue of the prominence of male domination and patriarchy. Gender issues are made to appear natural rather than nurtured and performative. Language enacts roles too. The way we speak to others or the way we are spoken to enact roles and social positioning. There are resources in language that can be deployed to serve such purposes. Fairclough (2003, 149) sees Widdowson's use of the term 'ideology' there as probably wrong:

> in the sense of political ideologies, explicit commitments to particular political positions; whereas the term is used in CDA - and widely in the literature on ideology - in the sense of assumptions which are built into practices (especially for CDA practices of discourse) which sustain relations of domination, usually in a covert way

In essence, such assumptions feed what constitutes 'knowledge', 'reality' or 'objects' and thus forms a construct invariably underpinned by the values of the dominant class. CDA employs this stance and understanding in the analysis of texts to examine the underlying assumptions that are presented as commonsensical and natural. However, Janicki (2010) believes that the arguments between Widdowson and Fairclough point to misinterpretations and confusion over many polemical issues and based on their respective perceptions and intellectual callings or specializations. Words such as 'interpretation', 'convergence', 'assumptions', 'practices', and 'ideology', have different meaning to different people based on different perceptions. This argument and conflict over meaning and sometimes the elevation of one meaning potential over another, rather ironically, restates the essence of a critical inquiry especially where certain meaning potential is of importance in the aspect of hegemony.

For further elaboration between language and ideology, I discuss the relationship between the two especially at the level of concerns by both Systemic Functional Grammar and Generative Grammar in 3.3, two dominant schools of grammar in linguistics. This is with a view to elucidating on aspects of the essence of choices, contexts and social practices in the construction of a point of view and how a neutral apolitical language is not possible. This makes a case for the focus of language in ideological analysis.

3.3 FAIRCLOUGH'S CDA AND METHOD

Fairclough's approach generally "represents, within the critical discourse analytical movement, the most developed theory and movement for research in communication, culture and society" (Jorgensen and Phillips 2010, 61). His approach is a departure from critical linguistics that attempts to draw considerable mileage from ideological analysis through close textual examination. Fairclough goes further to analyze reception of members' resources in interpretation and how this is all subsumed within the socio-cultural practice obtained in the society at a certain point in time. His concern also about intertextuality also shifts the scope of analysis from immediate texts to how texts are embedded, referred to, inferred in other texts and also the concept of interdiscursivity. This

concept is about the mapping of one order of discourse onto another, for example, using the discourse of marketing in university student admission.

According to Fairclough (1992), there are three aspects of the constitutive effects of discourse. First, discourse contributes to the construction of what are variously referred to as 'social identities' and 'social positions for 'subjects' and types of 'self'. Secondly, discourse helps in constructing social relationships between people. Thirdly, discourse contributes in the construction of systems of knowledge and beliefs. These three effects correspond respectively to the three functions of language and dimensions of meaning which coexist and interact in all discourse, 'identity', 'relational' and 'ideational' functions of language. The first two map onto Hallidayan interpersonal metafunction, while the latter to the ideational or representational metafunction. Fairclough also adds a third which is the textual function (also Hallidayan) which relates to bits of information foregrounded or backgrounded taken as given or presented as new or picked out as a theme. For the hearer or reader, a Theme "acts as a signal, creating expectations and laying the foundation for the hearer's mental representation of how the message will unfold" (Downing and Locke 2006, 224).

Generally, metafunctions, according to Bloor and Bloor (2004), are the ways in which human beings use language classified in SFL into three broad categories known as metafunctions, Language that is used to organize, understand and express our perceptions of the world and of our own consciousness is known as the ideational metafunction. The experiential is largely concerned with content or ideas while its logical aspect is concerned with the relationship between ideas. The language that is used to enable us participate in communicative acts with other people, to take on roles and to express and understand feelings, attitudes and judgements is known as the interpersonal metafunction. Lastly, the language used to relate what is said (or written) to the rest of the text and to other linguistic events which involves the use of language to organize the text itself into a cohesive and coherent document is known as the textual metafunction.

The interplay of these metafunctions constructs our realities and also transforms them. Discourse as a socio-political practice, as such constitutes, naturalizes, sustains and changes the significations of the world from diverse positions in power relations. This

brings us to Fairclough's (2001), three-dimensional conception of discourse i.e. discourse as text, as discursive practice and as social practice.


Figure 1: Fairclough's three-dimensional conception of discourse

Figure 1 clearly illustrates three layers of analysis. The text is embedded in the discursive practice which gives shape to the genre in use and how this is consumed. Social practice on the other hand determines how discursive practices are organized based on the belief system and ideology in the society. Discourse as a text corresponds to his description analysis; discourse practice corresponds to his interpretation analysis while social practice corresponds to the explanation level. The use of Fairclough's (2001) three-tier analytical framework is crucial because it takes cognizance of the overall discourse process. The windows it provides include queries that help in clearly analysing discursive phenomena in a comprehensive mode. According to Janks (1998), what is useful about this approach is that it enables one to focus on the 'signifiers' that make up the text, the specific linguistic selections, their juxtapositioning, their sequencing, and their layout and so on. This also requires you though to recognize the historical determination of these selections and to understand that these choices are tied to the conditions of possibility of utterances in a given context. This is another way of saying that texts "are instantiations of socially regulated discourses and that the processes of production and reception are socially constrained." (Janks 1998, 1). This shall be explained below using Fairclough (2001).

3.3.1 Discourse as text (Description)

It is important at this juncture to bring Fairclough's (2001, 92-93) ten questions regarding textual analysis or that should be asked of a text. These questions will underpin the kind of analysis espoused for this study though not all the questions are relevant to my analysis.

A. Vocabulary

1. What *experiential* values do words have?

    What classification schemes are drawn upon?
    Are there words which are ideologically contested?
    Is there *rewording* or *overwording?*
    What ideologically significant meaning relations *(synonymy,*
    hyponymy, antonymy) are there between words?

2. What *relational* values do words have?

    Are there euphemistic expressions?
    Are there markedly formal or informal words?

3. What *expressive* values do words have?

4. What metaphors are used?

B. Grammar

5. What experiential values do grammatical features have?

    What types of *process* and *participant* predominate?
    Is agency unclear?
    Are processes what they seem?
    Are *nominalizations* used?
    Are sentences active or passive?
    Are sentences positive or negative?

6. What relational values do grammatical features have?

    What *modes (declarative, grammatical question, imperative)* are used?
    Are there important features of *relational modality?*
    Are the pronouns *we* and *you* used, and if so, how?

7. What expressive values do grammatical features have?

Are there important features of *expressive modality?*

8. How are (simple) sentences linked together?

What logical connectors are used?
Are complex sentences characterized by *coordination* or/ *subordination?*
What means are used for referring inside and outside the text?

C. <u>Textual structures</u>

9. What interactional conventions are used?

Are there ways in which one participant controls the turns of others?

10. What larger-scale structures does the text have?

Text analysis is thus organized under four main headings, that is: vocabulary, grammar, cohesion and text structure. But for ease of analysis we shall look at them from the headings in Fairclough (2001) as experiential, relational and expressive values and the higher levels maintained in that analysis.

I will use the first two values in relation to grammar and words i.e. experiential and relational values as they will help in seeing how the military encode their experience and worldviews and at the same time the relationship that they enact in their coup discourse through choices of language. I perceive expressive values as part of the experiential, meaning that, the way we construe, classify and encode our experience also shows our way of making judgment. Fairclough (2001) states that expressive values are related to experiential values. In essence, "the experiential values represent the text producer's knowledge and ideas, while the expressive values represent the text producer's way of judging" (Fairclough 2001, 99).

I will also look at the metaphors used; then replace large scale structural analysis as in Fairclough (2001) with argumentation analysis as contained in Fairclough & Fairclough (2012).

3.3.1.1 Experiential values of words

By looking at experiential values, CDA attempts to show how "the text producer's experience of the natural or social world" (Fairclough 2001, 112) is shown in a text. A person's views of the world can be identified by assessing formal features with experiential value.

Fairclough (2001) maintains that the experiential value of a lexical item may have a trace of, and be a cue to, the way in which the text producers' world is represented. In Fairclough (1995), this aspect is seen as the primary aspect of linguistic analysis i.e., the structuring of propositions and how people and events are represented. He believes that the experiential value commonly deals with contents, knowledge and beliefs. These issues are first structured lexically. The use of a dictionary as repository of lexical items is of limited use as vocabulary in discourse overlaps and acquires different domains, institutions, practices, values and perspectives. Fairclough (1991) argues that terms like 'wording', 'lexicalization', and 'signification' capture this better than 'vocabulary' because they imply processes of wording, lexicalizing, signifying the world which happen differently in different times and places and for different people. People who control access to discourse may have the power to control meaning potential that favour and purvey their world view through a particular way of lexicalizing or signifying issues.

The choice of one ideological item over another with obviously similar meaning may give a cue or hint as to ideological preference. Van Dijk (1991, 53) considers lexicalization as never neutral: the choice of one word rather than another to express more or less the same meaning, or to denote the same referent may signal the opinions, emotions, or special position of a speaker. Three issues that are important here are the classification scheme words are put into, their rewording or overwording, the use of ideologically contested words and the meaning relations engendered in them. In this way, "the structure of a vocabulary, namely synonymy, hyponymy and antonymy, is ideologically based" (Fairclough 2001, 96-97).

Systems of classification are not fixed, as they can change gradually over a long period of time, especially with the change in the material, social, political or ideological environment. Culturally determined systems of classification are very important, as they

show how the world is represented in the minds of language users, and they form part of their ideologies (Hodge & Kress, 1993). Following Laclau and Mouffe, Fairclough (2003,88)argues that logic of difference and equivalence "are respectively tendencies towards creating and proliferating differences between objects, entities, groups of people, etc. and collapsing or `subverting' differences by representing objects, entities, groups of people, etc. as equivalent to each other". These logics of differences and equivalences are ways of the creation of our synonymies and antonymies especially structurally in our texts or speeches.According to Derrida (1981, 40), meaning in the West is defined in terms of binary oppositions. He argues that "in a classical philosophical opposition we are not dealing with the peaceful coexistence of a vis-à-vis, but rather with a violent hierarchy. One of the two terms governs the other (axiologically, logically, etc.), or has the upper hand within the white/ black binary opposition in the United States, the African American is defined as a devalued other". The idea of binaries as such creates two pairs, one superior and the other, marked.

3.3.1.2 Relational values of words

Relational values of words have to do with how a text's choice of wordings relies on and helps create social relationships between participants (Fairclough 2001). They give clue as to the speakers' attitude towards the readers or the audience they may have in mind. In coup speeches, there are so many commands passed to the citizenry. This ability to issue commands creates identities and subjects. The military perceive themselves as capable of issuing commands while the citizenry are presented as being in a position to abide by the commands. The use of this in high frequency may prime the audience to seeing the military's commandeering capability as a given.

One crucial aspect of relational values of words is the use of euphemism. Fairclough (2001) sees euphemism as a way of avoiding negative values. Euphemisms can be used also to hide ideological effects or intentions. Montgomery (1997, 231), for example, brings out this euphemistic obscurantist phraseology that "creates an illusory sense of precision" in the political realm:

- To mount a strike—to attack (and, if nuclear weapons are used, presumably to destroy)
- A surgical strike—destroying an individual target
- A pre-emptive strike—destroying the enemy first to prevent their destroying you Strategic nuclear weapon—'large' nuclear bomb of immense destructive power
- Demographic targeting—killing the civilian population
- Collateral damage—killing the civilian population

Beard (2011) talking about "surgical strike" contends that it sounds like a doctor healing the target rather than destroying it. And one is tempted to ask: if the attack is so surgical why should there be 'collateral damage'? Generally these euphemisms, apart from being representational, are also relational for they attempt to hide the consequences of actions in respect of sensibilities, and subtly also hide the ideological nature of such actions. In the aspect of my research the awareness of this relational values and their use help the coup makers in advancing their rhetoric and in underplaying effects of their action. While euphemisms are used that underplay the negative values of the in-group (here the coup makers in my study), hyperbolic representations are deployed to exaggerate and magnify the negative values of the opponents. Coups are tagged 'revolutions'. News of murder involving opponents is 'good tidings to the nation'. Imposing curfews is taking 'security measures', etcetera.

3.3.1.3 Experiential values of grammatical features (grammatical transformation)

According to Fairclough (2001), when one wishes to represent some real or imaginary action, event, state of affairs or relationship textually, there is often a choice between different grammatical process and participant types and such selection can be ideologically significant. This is because "linguistic codes do not reflect reality neutrally; they interpret, organize and classify the subjects of discourse. They embody theories of how the world is arranged; worldviews or ideologies" (Fowler 1986, 27). The choice of an iconic SVO sentence is significant in delineating agents, processes and patients. In an SV sentence, we have an event with a focus on the action rather than on the participants in the action. An SVC sentence has attributions. The choice of either one of these sentence types may show what a speaker really wants readers to know or not to know. In essence, there may be a

huge difference, for instance, in interpretation, meaning and even emotional reaction to these sentences:

- Major Nzegwu has killed Sardauna (SVO)

- Sardauna has died. (SV)

- Sardauna is dead. (SVC)

The first sentence clearly reveals, in iconic terms, the doer of the action, the action itself and the victim. The second sentence shows only the victim as subject while using an intransitive verb. The third sentence has a subject and treats the overall information as a given event. There are other choices like the passives and the use of ergative pairs that may also reveal choices that may not be neutral. Similarly, in the two sentences below, the first sentence has no agency but the patient is foregrounded. The second sentence has the same structure as the first but there is a 'circumstance' which is implicated. The circumstance further mystifies agency and make the whole issue be as if it were happening in a chaos.

- Sardauna was killed (a passive with undeclared agency)

- Sardauna was killed in a crossfire (a passive with an undeclared agency but with a circumstance)

There is also a difference (for instance) between 'Bombs explode in Gaza' and 'Israel Bombs Gaza'. In the former there is an ergative pair, 'bombs' are only a medium and they cannot act on their own without human agency. So using the medium here may help in hiding the actual agent. Simpson (1993, 107) gives a particular illustration of what he considers "an astonishing act of linguistic dissimulation" in this sentence:

The boy died when the policeman's gun went off.

There is a deliberate obfuscation of causality here, especially as agency is mystified. The boy is shown as dying by himself while the gun is shown as exploding by itself. The connection is most certainly not discernible here or is clearly remote. He sees such obfuscation as having underlying political motive that may be biased in favour of certain political institution. One other issue here is the handicap to challenge such issues on the basis of truth as this arguably is still a true representation of circumstances. This can only

be challenged on the basis of a conscious suppression of a reasonable version of reality (Simpson, 1993).

Generally, the resort to use a particular grammatical structure may depend largely upon the version of reality a speaker is projecting to their audience. Selection of particular sentences types builds up a model of reality that simply serves the ideological interests and perceptions of a speaker. The grammatical system has facility that allows a speaker to choose and that facility, ipso facto, creates subjectivity as well. This issue will be discussed further with the grammatical metaphor (in terms of nominalizations) where representation is much more complex and frozen.

According to Toolan (2001), a nominalization is a transformation of a clausal process into a noun phrase, thus treating the entire process as an established "thing", which can then serve as a participant in another more inspectable process. It essentially freezes a clausal process. Similarly, Downing and Locke (2006) see it as a grammatical metaphor that distances us from events, raising the representation of a situation from the iconic to a high level of abstraction. Nominalization analysis is handy in ideological analysis for it provides a process by which one can utter a statement without an iconic detailing of events and the responsibility to do so. As nominalization is a common grammatical feature in writing, it is only relevant in ideological analysis when it is used in the service of power or where essential clarification of details is important. The late Murtala Muhammad, in explaining why they took over power from Gowon, gave three reasons which are all forms of nominalization 'lack of consultation', 'indecision', 'indiscipline and neglect'. These issues are all put into such summative lexicon that affords one the room to charge against another without necessarily giving details. This can also be compared to when one gives accounts of a positive thing done by themselves which they prefer to give in clear iconic terms in order to take credit.

 Downing and Locke (2006, 163-164) outline that a nominalization can be realized in various forms, namely:

Process realised as entity just as in:

- His conception of the drama has a very modern ring. (nominalized)

- He conceives of the drama in a way that sounds very modern to us.

Attribute realised as entity:

- The usefulness of this machinery is dwindling. (nominalized)

- This machinery is becoming less useful.

Circumstance into entity as in 'last decade'

- The last decade has witnessed an unprecedented rise in technology. (nominalized)

- During the last decade agricultural technology has increased as never before.

Dependent situation realized as entity:

A whole state of affairs, which in its congruent form would be realised as a subordinate clause, can be visualised as an entity and expressed by a nominal:

- Fears of disruption to oil supplies from the Gulf helped push crude oil prices up dramatically. (nominalized)

- Because people feared that oil would not be supplied as usual from the Gulf, the prices of crude oil rose dramatically.

These changes into nominalized forms obfuscate issues and stint on details.   Fowler and Kress (1979) argue that apart from the disappearance of modality and tense in nominalization, the change also helps in objectifying a process. The change, moreover, also helps in the process of lexicalization as the nominalizations become objects of modification thus yielding (or generating) other lexicon like modifiers and becoming established. This lexical density created by nominalizations, according to Eggins (2004, 96), allows us to be able to "count, specify, classify and qualify" nominals. Take as an example "the soviet threat" cited by Fairclough (2001). This is a nominalization which has a modifier 'soviet' and an article 'the' (which also doubles as a presupposition). This phrase, due to its lexical density, has a capacity for believability and rootedness   Lexicalization, thus, fixes the object-as-process into a single habitualized entity. Eggins (2004,95) also argues that apart from lexical density, nominalizations also make us create logical relations in the abstract by organizing "our text not in terms of ourselves, but in terms of ideas, reasons, causes etc." This use reifies objects and makes them acquire certain responsibility and agency. We can therefore safely conclude that nominalization helps in objectification, mystification,

abstraction and reification. In my data analysis, we will see how such reification assists in the service of ideology and power.

3.3.1.4 Relational values of grammatical features (mood & modality)

At the relational level, there are three issues of significance, according to Fairclough (2001), namely: modes, modality and pronouns.

First, the major modes of a sentence are declarative, grammatical question and imperative. Declaratives usually come with an SV(O), say, *we declare martial law*. The implication of a declarative is that it has roles i.e., that of a giver of information and that of a receiver of information. Sometimes such positions may be determined by social structures in the society especially in a formal educational setting between a teacher and a learner. The imperatives, for their part, start right away with a Verb without a Subject, i.e., giving command. In this case, there are also socially enforced roles that position one subject as being (or assuming to be) able to issue commands while the other subject is the compliant actor. In fact, Hodge and Kress (1993), maintain that in an imperative, speaker and hearer, commander and commanded, addresser and addressee, are so clear that the question of authority and who is issuing it is least problematic compared to transactive modes. In the aspect of grammatical questions, there are also interpersonal roles especially between the asker of the question and the answerer. In this case, one is in a position to ask while the other is in a position to answer, for example in a police/witness or suspect situation. In all of these, Fairclough (2001, 105) argues that "systematic asymmetries in the distribution of modes between participants are important per se in terms of participant relations". What is of essence to my research in this regard is that this would clearly help in analysing the level of power dispensed by the military through the construction of such roles. If an individual suddenly emerges on the radio, issues commands, declares curfews and establishes immediate sanctions, and the audience all comply, then clearly power asymmetries are established. The process of interpellation has taken place and roles are delineated of who the commander/ the leader is and who the commanded/ the led are.

Secondly, there is the aspect of relational modality expressed by modal auxiliary verbs and other formal features including verbs and tense. Relational modality has to do with a

speaker's authority in relation to others. What is of importance here in the course of ideological analysis is the "implicit authority claims and implicit power relations" (Fairclough 2001, 106). In relational modality, there is both deontic and epistemic power. When a speaker makes a categorical assertion like "this change of government is the only answer", there is an implicit epistemic claim there i.e., the ability to say the reality as it is without any form of doubt. There is also the ability to speak with authority (as a sort of an expert analyst) for, or on behalf of, the audience involved. Cap (2010, 29) argues that if legitimization is defined as enactment of the political speaker's right to be obeyed and the linguistic justification of actions following this obedience "then the strongest pragmatic contribution to legitimization, manifested at the linguistic level, comes from the act of assertion". Similarly, when a speaker declares that "all the people of the country will observe a curfew today", there is an implicit deontic claim. A person that can restrict another person's movement by a simple declaration does that on the basis of the possession of certain powers. The military in their coup speeches are known for giving such orders and making categorical assertions regarding aspects of governance and the state.

With regard to pronouns, which are the third aspect, there are also relational values. According to Fairclough (2001), when 'we' is used by a leader inclusively as part of the led, it assimilates the leader to 'the people' and hides the social class disparities that may exist. It also forms solidarity or a 'gang up' on certain values and stands in the converse of an assumed binary. It lends itself to Thompson's (1989) ideological representation in terms of unification and fragmentation. 'We' 'us' and 'our' are favourably disposed, while 'they' 'them' and 'their' are the marked group in oppositional relationship. Fairclough (2001), in discussing Thatcherism, states her dilemma between balancing of authority and solidarity in the usage of inclusive 'we' or 'you' to address people. Using the former indicates solidarity and the latter, authority. It serves the ideological interests of political leaders to oscillate between various identities depending on the ideological goals they wish to achieve. It is in this context that I find the analysis of personal pronouns crucial, i.e., the ability of the analysis to possibly map out pronominal representations carried out in view of political exigencies to serve political goals that may otherwise, under other theoretical constructs, remain opaque.

3.3.1.5 Use of metaphors

A metaphor in the cognitive sense involves a relationship between a source domain, the source of the literal meaning of the metaphorical expression, and a target domain; the domain of the experience actually being described by the metaphor. For example, to waste time involves comparing TIME (the target domain) to MONEY (the source domain). In the metaphor represented by the Lakoffian formula, time is money (Lakoff and Johnson 1980). Time is construed as a valuable asset that is possessed by human beings and can be 'used' in the same way that money is.

According to Fairclough (1995), metaphors are socially motivated; different metaphors may correspond to different interests and perspectives and may have different ideological loadings. Guo (2013) argues that when individual metaphors from people in power begin to be accepted by more and more people, individual cognition will turn into social cognition. Through this transformation, hegemony then tends to be instituted. According to Chilton and Lakoff (1989), metaphors belie important aspects of reality. In discussing the state-as-a-person metaphor, for example, Chilton and Lakoff further maintain that individual citizens and multi-national corporations are absent. The well-being of the state is seen as the wellbeing of the citizens and vice versa too. Flowerdew (2012, 68) maintains that

> metaphor is probably the most memorable of the figures of speech of political language….Whether it is 'the iron curtain' of Churchill, 'the tryst with destiny' of Nehru, 'the winds of change' of Macmillan, 'the rivers of blood' of Powell or 'the mother of all battles' of Saddam Hussein, metaphor has the power to remain in the public consciousness long after its original utterance.

Koenigsberg (2007) sees the issue of metaphors in terms of role distribution in political language especially in Hitler's images. If the country is a living organism, with the people constituting the body of that organism, it would be reasonable to suggest that each individual human being constitutes a 'cell' in this organism. From this point of view the enhancement of the life instinct in a national body would consist of a process whereby the 'cells' of this body (the German people) were made to be more closely bound to one another, thus increasing the tendency of this body to hold together. That is, the forces of

disintegration (the death instinct) within the national body could be opposed by causing the elements which constitute this body to be so tightly knit together that it could not fall apart. Indeed, Hitler's programme for the German people embodies this concept precisely. One can then see how the adroit and deft use of metaphors by leaders can lead to phenomenal historical episodes as the ultra-nationalism created by Hitler among the Germans.

The analysis of metaphors will help in answering my research questions about the ideological perception of the military and the way they can garner support by the metaphorical configuration of their mission. The military, for example, employ metaphor of the body as an organism with parts that should work in harmony in reference to the ruling team. This justifies the need to excise or repair an organ of the body not in harmony with other parts. This can serve as an excuse to take over power from the stubborn organ especially if the person happens to be the leader. Metaphorical usage, as such, can be ideological as one tries to construct a vision of the world by way of constructing it in another with a much more convincing narrative which veils the real story. In an example given by Fairclough (2001, 100) of an article in a Scottish newspaper about the riots of 1981, the whole activity is seen as the spread of cancer which has a strong expressive value that is transferred onto the object. He maintains that the metaphorical representation of social problems as disease tend to take dominant interests to be the interests of society as a whole, and construe expressions of non-dominant interests like strikes, demonstrations etc. as undermining the health of society per se.

3.3.1.6 Metonymies

Another closely related aspect of the cognitive view is metonymy which makes different assumptions. Panther and Raddan (1999, 21) see metonymy as "a cognitive process in which one conceptual entity, the vehicle provides mental access to another conceptual entity, the target within the same idealized cognitive model".

Thus, like metaphors, metonymic concepts construct not just our language but our thoughts, attitudes, and actions. And, like metaphoric concepts, metonymic concepts are related to our experience of the world. In fact, the grounding of metonymic concepts is in

general more obvious than is the case with metaphoric concepts, since it usually involves direct physical or causal associations.

Kövecses (2002, p. 148) maintains that the main function of a metonymy is to provide "mental, cognitive access to a target entity that is less readily or easily available; typically, a more concrete or salient vehicle entity is used to give or gain access to a more abstract or less salient target entity within the same domain". Wodak *etal*. (2009, 43) maintain that metonymy can be realized in these forms:

- Product for cause; for example, 'The identity narrative channels political emotions'
- Object for the user of this object; for example, 'The buses are on strike'.
- Place for person; for example, 'The whole of Vienna celebrates'; or place/ building as seat of an institution for the (responsible) representatives of the institution; for example, 'Washington is concerned. The White House has no solutions'.
- Place/building for person; for example, 'The liberation of Mauthausen concentration camp'.
- Place for event/act (at this place); for example, 'Vienna must not become Chicago'.
- Country for persons; for example, 'All in all, Austria has never been so well off'; 'Austria is World Champion'.
- Persons for country; for example, 'We are much too small to allow disharmony in vital areas of our country'.
- Time for persons living during that time; for example, 'The twentieth century has shaken Austria several times'.
- Institution for (responsible) representatives of the institution; for example, 'Parliament rejected the motion'.
- Institution for events/actions; for example, 'The success story of the Second Republic'.

Beard (2000), in a good example of the political use of metonymy to hide ideological motives, maintains that the use of a metonymy in a BBC news broadcast concerning growing tension between the USA and Iraq: 'The White House today threatened Saddam Hussein with military action over the UN inspectors' affair' is ideological. The metonymy is where 'the White House' replaces 'the president and his advisers' and 'Saddam Hussein' replaces 'the country/people of Iraq'. This example gives a very favourable view of the

American stance. There is a distinct advantage for the president in not himself being mentioned. Attacking a foreign country is dangerous, not something an individual would want to be held responsible for - it is much better if the threat is reported as emerging from an impressive building which contains a suitably impressive collection of top people. On the other hand, by using Saddam Hussein to represent the country he ruled, it appears that he alone would suffer the results of the attack - innocent bystanders are not involved. In both cases actual agencies and consequences of actions are displaced.

In the Nigerian political context, for example, Ahmed (2017, 143-144) argues that former President Goodluck Jonathan uses 'Nigeria' in a metonymic fashion in order to screen the elitist participation in the nation's economy as in this example:

> Nigeria is now exporting cement. We are moving forward! We must produce what we consume and consume what we produce.

He argues that the use of "Nigeria" to stand for its people has the tendency of hiding the human agents behind various actions associated with Nigeria. This serves chiefly to render the dominant human forces who are responsible for such actions or who benefit from government's major policies anonymous. The statement "Nigeria is now exporting cement" makes the tag 'Nigeria' replace the billionaire, Aliko Dangote, the owner of Dangote Cement who is the sole cement exporter in the country. By using Nigeria as the responsible agent, Aliko Dangote remains backgrounded even though he is the primary beneficiary in the exportation of cement, and by backgrounding Dangote, President Goodluck Jonathan hopes to achieve a political credit in the drive towards bumper international trade. Similarly, in the cry of *marginalization* by the Nigerian elite, they argue in metonymic terms. If a few powerful individuals are not involved in a government, they complain of *marginalization* of their geographical location or religion or ethnic affiliation. Orkah employs this in his coup speech by talking about the *marginalization* of the southern part of Nigeria and the middle belt which transposes for their individual *marginalization* in the government of Babangida.

In conclusion, this discussion of the relational and experiential values of language along with the power of tropes in discussion has shown that language is not neutral and it can be

employed to serve various motives. As shown here, language can create political identities, relations and notions in a given situation. In short language can construct our realities. But it is not enough, for example, to know that words create attitudes or that certain nominalizations freeze important details without knowing how this plays out in a larger global discourse. This brings us to the aspect of practical reasoning and argumentation where such micro level aspects, discussed in this segment, serve as premises in an argument for action.

3.3.2 Argumentation and practical reasoning

According to van Eemeren et al. (1997, 208), argumentation employs language to justify or refute a standpoint, with the aim of securing agreement in views. "The study of argumentation typically centres on one or two objectives: either interactions in which two or more people conduct or have arguments such as discussions or debates; or texts such as speeches or editorials in which a person makes an argument". My study falls into the second category as the speeches are monologic.

Fairclough & Fairclough (2012) draw ideas from pragma-dialectical argumentation of Van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1997, 1992 ,2004), Walton (2006, 2007, 2008) and Audi (2001,2002,2009) in their works on practical reasoning (which is adopted here) that pertains to critical rationalism. Pragma-dialectics sees the use of argumentation analysis as a form of complex speech act with possibly the illocutionary force of making one believe in, and be acquiescent to, a given argument. According to Fairclough & Fairclough (2012) practical argumentation is the primary activity that is going on in political discourse and that argumentation and deliberation will strengthen the analytical power of CDA. They further maintain that "a considerable amount of research in CDA involves analysis of representations of social action, actors or various other aspects of the world (analysis of discourses) without however connecting these representations to agents' action via agents' practical reasoning"(Fairclough and Fairclough 2012, 86). This analysis of representation is what is shown in the micro level segment discussed earlier. If only representations are analysed, it is essentially not complete until an argumentation analysis is applied to see how these representations feed into action or the decision to take a particular line of action.

Labelling politicians as *corrupt* or *inept* by the military and the analysis of this labelling as a form of negative/ideological profiling of a kind of social actors may not be enough until this labelling leads to a particular argument to take over power. In essence, "It is not enough for (political) textual analysis to analyze action/genres and representation/discourses and identity/styles; dialectic and rhetoric. It should analyze the relations between them, for example, the way in which particular representations (discourses) can give agents reasons for action, and how this in turn can serve particular power interests" (Fairclough and Fairclough 2016, 190).

This large scale analysis would involve seeing how the argument is woven and see how, say, alternatives to particular action have been constructed and possibly jettisoned to suit the ideological interests of the agents. Fairclough and Fairclough (2012) argue that the use of such loaded or emotional connotations should all be subject to critical questioning with a burden of proof attached. If there is no any attempt to critically question and thus set the acceptability of these definitions by the participant, if such definitions are put forward or accepted as the one and only possible way of understanding the matters in question, as uncontroversial truth, "then the dialogue in question holds the potential for deception and manipulation" (Fairclough & Fairclough 2012, 93). Meaning potentials are subverted and the texts are then objectified. It is essentially not enough for one to charge without giving evidence and proof. When nominalizations are used in making a claim against the politicians, such constructions that freeze clausal process are ways of avoiding the burden of proof. Metaphors can also be used as Circumstance or as Claims for Action.

Fairclough & Fairclough (2012) in analysing Tony Blair's speech about the *Third Way* using argumentation, for instance, come to the conclusion that Blair is wrong or misleading in claiming a weighing of options. All the options he formulates are made in such a way as to favour his own conclusions. Essentially Blair is not addressing real options or alternatives but his own representations of these alleged alternatives and they are put in a rhetorically convenient way as to make his preferred option the only rational and logical alternative. Persuasive terms or definitions involve rhetorical re-descriptions of reality and are as such arguments that need to be questioned.

Fairclough & Fairclough (2012) propose a schema of analysis different from other theorists. They argue that practical arguments take 'goals' and 'circumstances' as premises and also 'values' that underlie goals. 'Circumstances of action' are not only empirical circumstances but also social, institutional facts, duties, commitments, socially recognized values. 'Goals' are not also to be equated with what agents want but as imagined, future states of affairs that are compatible with various sources of normativity like desires, moral values etcetera. Invariably, there are five issues involved in the schema, namely: 'Claim for action': Agents presumably ought to do A, 'Goal' (G): Agent's goal, i.e. a future state of affairs in which values are realized, 'Circumstances' (C): Agent's context of action: natural, social, institutional facts, 'Means-Goal' (M-G): if the agent does A, he will presumably achieve G, and finally 'Values' (V): The agent is actually concerned with or ought to be concerned with.

Figure 2: Argumentation schema with distribution of premises

With a schema like this, the whole argument in the coup speeches would be laid bare. Representation analysis enters as premises. But these representations themselves have been analyzed. The practical reasoning analysis will only complete the analysis and see how premises are constructed on the basis of a perception that is not unproblematic. As an example, a coup is made on the basis of universal goals and values that are cherished, but

the *circumstances* and *means to goals* may be constructed to suit the values. There are options that are more compelling and less costly than taking over power, but these options like strengthening the judiciary may be marginalized and coup d'état may be spun as the only viable option.

The Now shifting from the realm of representation and argumentation is speaker-focused i.e., what is in the speaker (production level). In the next section, we move to an audience-focused discussion i.e., what could be in the audience's MR (the reception level) audience and how this could be manipulated in serving ideology.The production of the text "puts the focus on producers, authors, speakers, writers; the reception of the text puts the focus on interpretation, interpreters, readers, listeners" (Fairclough 2003,10).

3.3.3 Interpretation

The interpretation level is crucial because this is where textual features become real, socially operative if they are embedded in social interaction where texts are produced (Fairclough 2001, 117). A discussion of interpretation is very important as this is where common-sense assumptions are implicitly purveyed to the realm of interpretations. Interpretation is a combination of cues from the text and the interpreter's 'MR' or 'background knowledge' or 'interpretative procedures' (Fairclough 2001, 118).

There are interpretative procedures in the MR that is social orders and interactional history in the MR that influence the situational and intertextual context respectively. Social orders in the society determine the institutional setting and the institutional setting determines the situational setting.

3.3.3.1 Intertextuality & presupposition

At the intertextual context, consumers of texts interpret texts on the basis of historicity and the experience of other texts in the past. It is also about the reflection and embedding of other texts in a particular text. People experiencing a coup speech may arrive at the conclusion that it is what it is by virtue of a similar event that has happened in the past which they have stored in their memories. Bakhtin (1986, 78-79) observes that "we learn to cast our speech in generic forms and, when hearing others' speech, we guess its genre

from the very first words; we predict a certain length (that is, the approximate length of the speech whole) and a certain compositional structure…." Fairclough (1992) defines intertextuality as the concept that points to the productivity of texts, to how texts can transform prior texts and restructure existing conventions like genres, discourses etcetera to generate new ones. It also entails elements of interdiscursivity when one form of discourse or genre is used in another. The use of intertextuality in analyzing my data includes two main parts. The first deals with the way other discourses are embedded in coup speeches, their contextualization, recontextualization or reconceptualization and so forth. Wodak (2009, 39) argues that by taking an argument out of context and restating it in a new context, "we first observe the process of decontextualization, and then, when the respective element is implemented in a new context, of recontextualization. The element then acquires a new meaning, because, as Wittgenstein (1967) demonstrated, meanings are formed in use". Aspects that are important in interpretation here are presupposition, speech acts and frames. "…..genres are subject to free creative reformulation (like artistic genres, and some, perhaps, to a greater degree)" Bakhtin 1986, 80).

One issue about intertextuality which is significant is when discourse producers cue in the text issues in such a way as to make the audience feel that they cognitively experience the issues inferred or insinuated. Presupposition is used to achieve this. According to Yule (1996, 25) "a presupposition is something the speaker assumes to be the case prior to making an utterance". However, Fairclough (2001) sees it as also belonging in the intertextual chain to create common grounds. He further states that presuppositions can also have ideological functions when the assumptions embedded in them have the character of common sense that serves power. Bloor and Bloor (2004) explain that an intertextual chain such as a presupposition has two main functions "(1) It plays an important role in revealing speakers' and writers' strategies in reinforcing or reformulating ideas and beliefs; and (2) It can reveal traces of the dominant ideology or evidence of ideological struggle and cultural change" Similarly, Chilton (2006, 64) argues that in a political perspective, presupposition can be linked to what political scientists call 'consensus'. They are at least one micro-mechanism in language use that contributes to the building of a consensual reality. He further adds:

> Speakers will therefore have the option of using presuppositions strategically to avoid challenge or rejection. Such avoidance has two advantages: it evades social threats and it may result in unconscious cognitive adjustments, to which the hearer adds propositions to representations of the world in memory—this being effectively what we mean by 'taking something for granted'

It is in this appeal to background knowledge shared by all while the case may actually not be truly so that I find the presupposition analysis handy in this thesis.

Essentially, Fairclough (2001) believes that presuppositions can be sincere or manipulative and can also be ideological especially if what they presuppose is in the service of power. He illustrates how the persistent use of the term "the Soviet threat" can cumulatively help to naturalize highly contentious propositions which are presupposed in the notion that the Soviet Union is a threat to the world. So on the whole, presuppositions are sometimes drawn from particular texts and in other cases they make a general appeal to background knowledge. Wodak (2007, 214) sees existential presuppositions as a very effective way of manufacturing consent. "Presupposed content is, under ordinary circumstances, and unless there is a cautious interpretive attitude on the part of the hearer, accepted without (much) critical attention (whereas the asserted content and evident implicatures are normally subject to some level of evaluation)". Wodak provides a good example of such use

> a mother, knowing that her child is not happy about the idea of going to visit Aunt Mary, may utter, in order to facilitate consent, *Which Teddy bear would you like to bring with you to Aunt Mary's place*, where the fact that they are definitely going to visit Aunt Mary is presupposed, instead of simply stating We are going to Aunt Mary....

Take for example also what in legal parlance are called 'leading questions'. Such questions are presuppositional traps. Sedivy and Carlson (2011, 07) provide examples of such leading questions here:

- Was it with this letter opener that you stabbed the victim? (May I remind you, a simple "yes" or "no," please.)
- When the mailman came to the door, did you stop stabbing the victim?
- Do you regret murdering this innocent girl?

Whatever 'yes' or 'no' answer a suspect gives they are trapped into an admission of certain facts that is why sometimes defence counsels stridently object to such lines of questioning. In the first question, whether you answer yes or no you have admitted the stabbing issue which has been backgrounded.

Presupposition is as such one important element in interpretation that positions the reader to agree with a certain view point. After all, their entire reason for living is to allow the speaker to signal that certain information is already taken for granted as shared knowledge—and if it's not, then the hearer should accommodate it post-haste into his set of background assumptions (Sedivy 2011).

Presupposition is related to the concept of an 'ideal reader'. Discourse producers produce with interpreters in mind; those who will interpret the text and message from the point of view of the text producers (Fairclough 1989). For this reason "the event is put together with signs that indicate how it should be understood— what it "means" " (Hatley 1982, 62). All linguistic and pragmatic choices are made to make the point of view of the text producer the preferred reading or the common sense.

So with presuppositions, it is a win-win situation. Either they are taken for granted as shared knowledge or they begin to be seen as such, henceforth. It is in this appeal to background knowledge shared by all while the case may actually not be truly so that I find the presupposition analysis important in this study especially where contentious political issues are presupposed in coup speeches.

3.3.3.2 Speech acts

Other issues that belong to the interpretative level include speech acts. In speech acts, what is of essence aside from the way illocutionary acts are interpreted is the conventions of the acts, which form part of a discourse type that embody ideological representations of subjects and their social relationships. In other words, one who can issue commands does that on the background assumption (s/he has and would like you to have) and that s/he is in a position to do that.

Speech acts are broadly divided into two, performatives and constatives by Austin (1962). Performatives are thought of as doing an action while constatives are thought of as saying something. Regarding performatives, he maintains that

> (A) They do not 'describe' or 'report' or constate anything at all, are not 'true or false,' and (B) The uttering of the sentence is, or is a part of, the doing of an action, which again would not normally be described as, or as 'just,' saying something (Austin (1962,5).

The essence of performatives in carrying out social actions and in changing states makes them relevant to this study. Performatives are divided into two, explicit and implicit. Explicit performatives are unambiguous at the level of the action, the person making the action and the recipient of the action. They are thus clear on agency, action etc. Saeed (2007) maintains that explicit performatives tend to begin with a first person verb in the simple present tense, belong to a special class describing verbal activities, for example *promise, warn, sentence, name, bet, pronounce* and generally their performative nature can be emphasized by inserting the adverb 'hereby'. . Thus *I hereby sentence you to. . .* is a classic performative doing the action of 'sentencing'.

Implicit performatives, on the other hand, are not transparent. They perform a similar function but more indirectly. For example, 'You are hereby sentenced to 10 years imprisonment', is a performative but with a passive voice that does not declare who is issuing the sentence. Similarly, 'You hereby cease to be the president', is also a performative but without the use of the so-called performative verb which is also transitive in nature. 'Cease' is an intransitive verb doing the action of making one *cease* to occupy a position.

In enriching speech act theory, Searle's (1976: 10–16) work delineates all acts into five, namely:

> REPRESENTATIVES, which commit the speaker to the truth of the expressed proposition (paradigm cases: asserting, concluding);

DIRECTIVES, which are attempts by the speaker to get the addressee to do something (paradigm cases: requesting, questioning);

COMMISSIVES, which commit the speaker to some future course of action (paradigm cases: promising, threatening, offering);

EXPRESSIVES, which express a psychological state (paradigm cases: thanking, apologizing, welcoming, congratulating);

DECLARATIONS, which effect immediate changes in the institutional state of affairs and which tend to rely on elaborate extra linguistic institutions (paradigm cases: excommunicating, declaring war, christening, marrying, firing from employment).

Of particular significance to this study are those speech act types called declarations and directives in Searle's taxonomy. These two are important because they deal with the positioning of roles and power asymmetries. Yule (1996) sees directives as words that change the world (i.e., the speaker causes a change in the situation) while Searle, from his taxonomy above, considers them as effecting immediate changes in the institutional state of affairs and this state of affairs tends to rely on elaborate extra linguistic institutions. These extra linguistic institutions which are glossed over deserve to be studied, and they are not thought of as extra-linguistic but as social contexts that are of ideological significance. Performatives of naming children in Hausa society, for example, are carried out by the fathers and male segment of the society, see Parris (1996). Such social contexts are sexist in the cultural marginalization of women in Africa.

Part of Bourdieu's (1999) argument against Austin's speech act theory, to which I also subscribe, depends on the inability of the latter to look into the institutional realms that give nuance to the acts carried out by performatives. Bourdieu (1999) argues that if there are utterances whose role is not only to 'describe a state of affairs or state some 'fact', but also to 'execute an action', it is because the power of words resides in the fact that they are not pronounced on behalf of the person who is only the 'carrier' of these words: "the authorized spokesperson is only able to use words to act on other agents and, through their action, on things themselves, because his speech concentrates within it the accumulated

symbolic capital of the group which has delegated him and of which he is the authorized representative" (Bourdieu 1999, 109-110). He further contends that the most important thing to put in mind is that the success of these operations "of social magic— comprised by acts of authority, or, what amounts to the same thing, authorized acts—is dependent on the combination of a systematic set of interdependent conditions which constitute social rituals" (Bourdieu 1999, 109-110). These interdependent variables need analysis to understand the core of the issues involved. Speech acts by the military in their coup broadcasts are made based on the assumption of power asymmetries and the ideological belief in the military as a corrective and supreme institution. They use considerable number of performatives (chiefly declaratives and directives) in such cases as suspending the constitution and banning many issues against the backdrop of assuming to satisfy, or be in possession of the 'felicity conditions' to do that. It is here that the aspect of Althusser's interpellation is achieved. A form of address is ideological by itself because it declares roles by its utterance, as if by magic, without having to spell out its source of power.

Felicity conditions should be seen as part of the institutional and extra linguistic factors that aid the successful working of performatives. In his general discussion of felicity conditions, Austin (1962, 5) maintains, among others, for an utterance to be felicitious

> A.1 There must exist an accepted conventional procedure having a certain conventional effect, that procedure to include the uttering of certain words by certain persons in certain circumstances, and further,
>
> A.2 the particular persons and circumstances in a given case must be appropriate for the invocation of the particular procedure invoked.
>
> B.1 The procedure must be executed by all participants both correctly andB.2 Completely.

Infelicities are committed which 'misfire' the acts. Infelicities in "A.1 may be called Misinvocations. The second sort-where the procedure does exist all right but can't be applied as purported-Misapplications" (Austin 1962, 17). If we look into the institutional realms, we realise that, as far as the first military coup is concerned, there are no conditions

or conventional procedures for a political power take-over by the military. What Major Nzegwu did is "what is in effect the double crimes of treason against the state, and mutiny against the military hierarchy" (Siollun 2013, 19). This indicates the nonexistence of any convention. There may be an ideological influence from colonialism but an elaborate convention did not exist pre-the Nzegwu military coup. So as I said earlier, Nzegwu has created a template from which subsequent coup makers can copy. When the subjects do not feel that the act is 'misinvoked' or 'misapplied' in spite of constitutional provisions that legislate against mutiny, and they jubilate in affirmation of their being made 'subjects' then the act has become normative. The subjects have thus played a part in the circuitry of interpellation. If a *curfew* is declared, for instance, and people do not come. That obedience then plays a part in the material existence of martial or military ideology. Obedience in interpellation is acceptance, and this obedience is the perlocutionary effect of that declaration. Martel (2017) argues that interpellation as a circuit is projected from one site, usually, in this case, the state represented by the military "and received by individuals who then become legal subjects. These subjects in turn, in obeying, and—at least to some extent—in absorbing this subjectivity, project that authority back out to the "origin" from which it was received" (Martel 2017, 243). As we shall also see in the data analysis so many of the characteristics of the Nzegwu coup (textually and contextually) are reproduced by other coup makers and complied with by the Nigerian people. Nzegwu creates the felicity conditions that make a coup a new concept with its own peculiar dimensions. What this proves is the efficacy of analysing the institutional frameworks as speech acts sometimes form part of, or initiate, the rituals of ideological interpellation. It also proves that socio-political conditions can be forged or charted afresh. The performative as such, according to Butler (1996, 160), "is not a singular act used by an already established subject, but one of the powerful and insidious ways in which subjects are called into social being from diffuse social quarters, inaugurated into sociality by a variety of diffuse and powerful interpellations. In essence, the use of the performatives can both be inaugurative and ritualized and they can aid in the formation and sustenance of someone in a subject position.

3.3.4 Discourse as social practice (explanation)

The stage of explanation deals with the reproduction that connects the stages of interpretation and explanation, "whereas the former is concerned with how MR are drawn upon in processing discourse. The latter is concerned with the social constitution and change of MR, including of course their reproduction in social practice" (Fairclough 2001, 135). In essence, as soon as MR is drawn upon using interpretative procedures in discourse then that element is reproduced or transformed and the trip continues. This reproduction has dialectical effect on social structures. Fairclough argues that the stage of explanation portrays a discourse as part of a social process or a social practice that shows how it is determined by social structures, sustaining them or changing them. He further argues that these social determinants and effects are mediated by MR. Invariably social structures shape MR, which in turn shape discourses; and discourses sustain or change MR, which in turn sustain or change structures. This dialectics is what sustains world view and makes issues objectified and commonsensical. When in a military coup speech, for example, interpretative procedures like presuppositions and frames about the military as a corrective regime and politicians as the corrupt elements are cued, this leads to their reproduction in the MR. The MR then forms an opinion about the two categories which then becomes social knowledge. The military has held onto power 29 years out of the 55 years of the Nigeria's independence. They have done this partly through the ideological construction of their mission in the psyches of Nigerians.

Similarly, Emenyeonu (1997), in a study asking journalists (respondents) about whether they agree with some of the reasons given by the military juntas for taking over power, finds that nearly half of them. In essence, even among journalists who are thought to have a measure of critical knowledge, there is a belief not only of the raison d'etre of the military in political governance being unquestioned but that the reasons they provide for taking over power are in justified. This provides an example of the strength of ideology in public realm.

Fairclough (1992) sees three issues as important in the aspect of ideology, namely: the claim that ideology has a material existence in the practices of institutions. Secondly, the claim that ideology interpellates subjects which leads to the view that one of the most

significant 'ideological effects' which linguists ignore in discourse is the constitution of the subjects. Thirdly, the claim that ideological state apparatuses, i.e. institutions such as education or the media are both sites of and stakes in class struggle which points to struggle in an over discourse as a focus for an ideologically-oriented discourse analysis. Hegemony, on the other hand, is about constructing alliances and integrating rather than simply dominating subordinate classes, through concessions or through ideological means to win their consents. On the whole, Fairclough (2001, 138) summarizes three questions that one can ask of a particular discourse under investigation in the realm of explanation:

1. Social determinants: what power relations at situational, institutional and societal levels help shape this discourse?

2. Ideologies: what elements of the MR which are drawn upon have an ideological character?

3. Effects: how is this discourse positioned in relation to struggles at the situational, institutional and societal levels? Are these struggles overt or covert? Is this discourse normative with respect to MR or creative? Does it contribute to sustaining existing power relations, or transforming them?

These questions are important in understanding the overall workings and dialectics of ideology and discourse. Chiefly, we would see how power relations in Nigeria have been contested and rechannelled in consolidating military political and economic interests using the speeches.

3.4 MODIFICATION OF THE WORKINGS OF FAIRCLOUGH'S METHOD

In this section, I intend to discuss my method and how I modify some of Fairclough's ideas to suit my study and answer my research questions. The analysis I apply here divides into three parts in chapter 4: analysis of representation, argumentation or practical reasoning, interpellation, and, in chapter 5, I have an intertextual analysis in manifesting the dialectics of discourse.

1. Representation: although I do the full, thorough, analysis, my findings here are organized thematically, so as to illuminate patterns and trends in the representation which are significant for the interpretation. In doing so, I lose the idea of working on a schema that brings out linguistic analysis per se. In essence, I do not analyze description and interpretation as separate entities. I analyze them simultaneously as they elicit themes that occur in the data. It is productive to do this as the whole argument is built in terms of ideological mystifications and such mystifications are done via ideas. For example, an analysis of a kind of euphemism is just not sufficient unless it serves a particular context where, say, a positive aspect of the ruling class is to be projected. Such 'euphemistic' analysis will serve the strategies of positive-self presentation. So, here, I analyze nominalizations, metaphorical construction, presuppositions, etc. to see how the military represent social actors and action in relation to themselves. . The representations are divided into four parts, namely:

- Representations of civilian opponents
- Representations of military opponents
- Representation of a friendly takeover of power
- Representation of selves

This division made here shows different forms of perceptions, attitudes and ideological interests. Dividing the analysis into four parts helps in achieving a comprehensive analysis that shows the manipulation of discourse in serving interests. Values along the four representations fluctuate from extreme negativity to middling to extreme positivity based on who is involved and in which context. Bearing in mind the multi-functionality of a text, I focus here on the values of the text that bring out attitudes, identities, perceptions and the like. Meaning potentials are either foregrounded or backgrounded depending on interests. Focus is either too intense or less or even non-existent on issues all depending on a point of view. Statement like the "the civilian corruption", for example, is a phrase that combines a presupposition, nominalization and pre-nominal modification. This strong statement does not only do the work of representation and concealment but it does that of intertextuality as well; that's by using 'the' it is assumed that this is a fact already known, given and established. So an analysis of a theme that tries to show the negative evaluation of the civilian class would involve this multi-faceted analysis. State of affairs is better captured through the use of this kind of method that combines all the values to shed light on a theme.

This representational analysis, shows how the past and present realities are not only captured for their own end alone, but as a means to a higher argument for power. The main reason why people are painted as bad or the text producer paints themselves good is in order to form a premise where such construction serves as a reason for action. This leads us to argumentation.

2. At the argumentation level, I look at the building up of premises and the problematization of circumstances from representation shown in the previous level. The aim of a representational analysis is to prove that the launch-pad of 'action' is not unproblematic, i.e., the reasons advanced for a course of action are not in themselves given and objective and are built upon subjectivities as shown in representational analysis. The task of the argumentation here is to look at their claims at different levels on the values they claim and other issues. Fairclough and Fairclough (2012) identify five elements for practical arguments 'a value premise', 'a Goal premise', 'a Circumstantial premise' and 'a means to a goal premise'. Existing state of affairs are represented in the circumstance premise, possible and desirable state of affairs are represented in the goal premise. The means to a goal premise is a conditional that means pursuing a particular action will take us "from the existing problematic state of affairs C to the desirable future one G in accordance with values V" (7) The clear delineating of these elements in a speech itself is critical for the arguments are not stated in like manner in the texts.

Coup speeches are special kind of political speeches that have different features from the speeches tackled in analysis by Fairclough and Fairclough (2012). To this end, I model the premises in such a way as too suit the peculiar nature of coup speeches. Coup speeches are not deliberative i.e., being argued for the purposes of getting approval for an action. What happens is that coup speeches announce a power take over and simply discuss reasons. Claim for action or what needs to be done is not a future projection but an existential one. Coup speeches happen amid action. So for this reason, there is a focus on the premises. In a rough schema this is how practical reasoning schema may affect the aspect of representation:

- Claims to action: coup d'état as a solution
- Agent's goal immediate: Change of government

- Agent's goal in the future: prosperity, freedom development, true democracy etc.
- Values (that underpin Agent's goals): fairness, prosperity, religious, moral ethical etc. most of these values are implicit except for Orkah who proclaims that his mission is a religious one
- Circumstances: State of affairs that lead to the action (all acts of legitimization of self and delegitimization of social actors and action are mostly done here).
- (Immediate) means-to-goals: Change of government and the legislations to control the people

Most representation is done in the circumstances schema. This is where the bulk of analysis will come. Agent's goals and means to goals will also be discussed at length.

An argument like this as in the above distribution, in the first instance, has an interpellative power because it shows the agent's relational powers of authority. The fact that one has the power to make such claims and to subject the nation likewise indicates interpellative powers. Change of government or an attempt to do that shows that other alternatives may have been jettisoned. And the overall text is presented with premises marginalizing all other possibilities that may not serve the spin. A 'nodal point' is created upon which all the assertions have internal relevance though appearing as having objective transcendental relevance. In the case of democratic government, shouldn't the military enforce the institutions or allow the democratic processes to take their courses? If as Abacha says that the aim of his coup against Shonekan's interim government is to ensure lasting democracy is there no contradiction there? Claim for action clashing with goal? The argument here remains that there are ethical issues that pertain to rationalization and of deliberate misleading and issues of rationalization as well. In the Circumstances, are agencies or facts clear? This is where representation enters as a premise to action. Fairclough and Fairclough (2012) maintain that sometimes appeals to the value that underpins a proposed action can help in its legitimization without a clear questioning of the circumstances, goals, and means to goals. The end justifies the means, sort of. A proposed line of action that targets 'fairness' as a goal may be rhetorically cogent. This is "because fairness is a publicly justifiable or publicly recognized legitimate value. In addition, its invocation suggests that the politician is one who honours the (institutional, objective) obligation attaching to his status function." (Fairclough and Fairclough 2012, 115). Sometimes too much delving a value may overshadow an unsavory means-to-goal, etc.

These elements discussed will then be analyzed on the basis of Walton's (2007) critical questions as developed by Fairclough (2015). Walton's questions pertain to three aspects: questions that challenge the validity of the argument, questions that challenge the truth of the premises, and questions that challenge the practical conclusion. In a deliberative form of argumentation, every question that gets a negative answer goes back to quash the overall action or proposal. In my case the use of the critical questions to the coup speeches which are just monologues would further lay bare the premises and the arguments used to take crucial decisions about a whole nation's destiny. I would restrict myself to discussing only the premises since that suffices. If the premises are wrong the inferences and conclusions cannot be right. Fairclough (2015) sees the testing of the premises of the argument as a first step to assessing the reasonableness or soundness of an argument that should be able to connect a set of current state-of-affairs to a future state-of-affairs. "This is needed because the proposal may be reasonable in principle, i.e. without unacceptable consequences, but may have little or no connection to the context it is supposed to address, and therefore not be a "solution" to the actual "problem". These questions test the premise (Fairclough 2015):

- CQ Is it rationally acceptable that, in principle, doing A leads to G
- CQ2 1s it rationally acceptable that the Agent is in circumstances C
- CQ3 Is it rationally acceptable that the agent actually has the stated goal (and that the stated goal is actually generated by the normative source)?

This is how I rephrase the critical questions to suit my own study:

- *CQ1 Is it rationally acceptable that, in principle, a coup leads to the various positive claims or targets of better future state of affairs they mention?*
- *CQ2 1s it rationally acceptable that the country is in the circumstances that the coup makers paint it in order to advance a coup solution?*
- *CQ3 Is it rationally acceptable that the coup makers actually have the stated goals in mind (and that the stated goals are actually generated by the stated normative source)?*

These three questions will form the bulk of the argumentation analysis applied in chapter 4. Essentially, they are going to be on the Goals, Circumstances, means-to-a goal elements and how these combine in the service of ideology.

3. At the interpellational level, the focus is on subject formation. Here as explained in the theory chapter, I relate Althusser's interpellation with the issue of subject formation. The emphasis here is on how the same people who are convinced about the past, the present and the future are interpellated. Here I focus on speech acts, particularly, performatives (declaratives and directives) and their deontic power of creating changes in social practice. Such acts are examined and the reaction of the people as well, especially as related by the media is also understood to be the perlocutionary effects which also essentially complete the picture of the circuitry of the interpellation process. Focus here is on:

- the strategies of dismissing existing government
- the setting up of power and political base
- the establishment of laws and sanctions
- the move towards taking care of the future

The language in this regard shifts from the constatives in representation to performatives in the aspect of subject formation and making changes. This segment is crucial in understanding the nature of subject hood in Nigeria.

4. Intertextual/ interdiscursive analysis. This is the explanation level where two issues are focused on i.e. the dialectics of discourse and the ideological effects. Other parts of the analysis relate to aspects of synchronic linguistics, but here I look at the diachronic aspect i.e., the way speeches build upon other speeches and mutually influence and reinforce each other. The impacts and inspirations of the coup speeches are looked at. I argue that the first coup by Nzegwu has been colonially influenced in terms of the genre and even the nature of the coup speech. Hence, the coup speech of Nzegwu is compared with the 1903 speech of Lord Lugard addressed to the conquered sultanate of Sokoto. This comparison is made at various levels to see areas of possible influence. The Nzegwu speech also determines other coup speeches as the first template that they copy from, at least as a ready genre tailored for power take over. The overall impacts of the coups speeches and other discourses are also looked upon on the basis of:

- Impacts on the military
- Impacts on the civilian political class
- Impacts on the citizenry.

The social context is thus talked about at length with its dialectical role especially as discourses constitute, and are constituted by, the society (Fairclough 2001).

I also discuss the ideological effects of the coups looking at the overall latent strategies used. This in a way rehashes all the overall ideological arguments under the rubrics provided by Thompson (1984, 1990).The schema provided by Thompson forms an important part of the overall ideological construction that both interpellates and constructs ideal readers. Ideology simply declares itself without spelling out its mission. The major latent assumptions are those that consolidate ideological formation and are those given vent by Thompson. According to Thompson (1990, 56).

> The analysis of ideology, according to the conception which I will propose, is primarily concerned with the ways in which symbolic forms intersect with relations of power. It is concerned with the ways in which meaning is mobilized in the social world and serves thereby to bolster up individuals or groups who occupy positions of power.

Janks (1998, 198) maintains that the strength of Thompson's theory of ideology "is that it provides CDA with powerful machinery for understanding the relationship between language, power and domination". This analytical schema also synchronizes well with the concluding part as all the ideological issues are recapped and synopsized. See Table 14 below for Thompson's schema:

Mode of operation	Linguistic strategy	Definition
Legitimation (i.e., presenting a claim as just and worthy of support)	Rationalization	Creating a logically valid chain of reasoning to justify a claim
	Universalization	Presenting an institutional arrangement that actually serves the interests of some individuals as serving the interests of all
	Narrativization	Presenting current events as the result of a fertile tradition. Stories from the past are mobilized
Dissimulation (i.e., concealing or downplaying relations of power and domination)	Displacement	Presenting object A through a term that is customarily used to refer to object B. The positive or negative connotations of the term are then transferred to object A
	Euphemization	Presenting an object in such a way as to emphasize a range of positive connotations while saying nothing about any of its negative connotations. For instance, a prison is described as a "rehabilitation" center
	Trope:	Relying on the figurative use of language to obscure or conceal power relations
	a) Synecdoche	Conflating part and whole by merging relations between particular groups and larger social forms. For instance, using "the Americans" in a way that implies that all US citizens are homogeneous
	b) Metonymy	Presenting object A by using a word that refers to an attribute of object B—although there is no necessary actual connections between object A and the attribute
	c) Metaphor	Using a concrete term in an abstract context by analogical substitution
Unification (i.e., constructing a form of unity independently of individual differences)	Standardization	Promoting the need for a standard framework to create sufficient consistency within a collectivity made up of diverse individuals
	Symbolization of unity	Promoting the adoption of a shared set of symbols to create a sense of collective identity within a group
Fragmentation (i.e., perpetuating established order by seeking to divide groups)	Differentiation	Emphasizing differences between individuals and groups to disunite and prevent them from constituting an effective challenge to the established order
	Expurgation of the other	Creating a common evil enemy, either internal or external, to unite everyone in opposition
Reification (i.e., presenting an intrinsically unstable object as permanent and natural)	Naturalization	Presenting situations as a natural or inevitable outcome of history
	Eternalization	Portraying situations without their socio-historical background to make one believe that they are permanent and unchanging
	Nominalization	Using a noun (e.g., that of a famous historical figure) to designate an object

Table 4: Thompson's symbolic representation of ideology schema adapted from Brasier (2002, 241)

In conclusion, the method I have applied here and the combination of the mode of analysis is novel. The analysis looks at the various ways of hegemonic influences carried out through language. Fairclough (2001) and Fairclough and Fairclough (2012) have not presented an analysis with the combination applied here. Their argumentation analysis appears to be self-contained with a passing reference to some representational issues. But, in this case, there is a thorough discussion of representation, interpellation, argumentation and intertextuality in trying to understand a military regime as a political construct. In a nutshell, the analysis done here looks at the speeches as both dynamic and current forces. I feel that this method will go a long way in evincing all aspects of hegemony and would

shed light on Foucault's (1980) locations of power. In the next section segment, I discuss the data.

3.4.1 *Data*

Table 7 below shows the overall data of this thesis. The first seven coup speeches will be used in the analysis of representation and interpellation while the other two will be used in argumentation and explanation. The one for argumentation is to show how one of the coups construct his perception of a coup against their government. It is interesting to see how the perception of a coup and taking over power is seen from the perspective of one who makes two coup speeches and make one counter coup speech. The counter coup speech will be analysed in argumentation. The other speech (Lugard's) will be analyzed intertextually with Nzegwu's.

Coup announcer	Year	No of words
Nzegwu	1966	872
Garba	1975	229
Dimka	1976	169
Abacha	1984	686
Dogonyaro	1985	754
Orkah	1990	1669
Abacha	1993	894
Abacha	1990, (counter coup speech)	280
Lugard	1903,(colonial proclamation speech)	761

Table 5*:* Coup speeches with years and number of words

In short, this research will be carried out on the coup speeches made in Nigeria between 1966 and 1993, a short counter coup speech and one by Lord Lugard in 1903. Essentially, there are seven speeches announced. The seven speeches successfully announced are within the public domain are those to constitute the basic data of this research plus the other two. All the speeches are in English as it is the official language of Nigeria and are obtainable in books, websites and blogs. The speeches here have all been acquired from this website http://maxsiollun.wordpress.com/great-speeches-in-nigerias-history.In particular six of the speeches are obtained from Obotetukudo (2011). The usage of this data, as I have said in the introduction, is important because it represents the overall coup speeches in Nigeria as far as military leadership is concerned. I have tried to vet the data through checking the contents against other websites and publications to ensure that they

are textually verbatim, even in punctuation and paragraphing with the originals announced and proclaimed by the military.

The choice of the speeches i.e., the coup announcements or what Wiking (1983) calls "initial declarations" are ideologically very important because they give the justifications and reasons for the coup amid the tension to succeed. Subsequent discussions may not capture the nuances and intricacies of the first announcements. Wiking sees these coup speeches in terms of performatives themselves as their announcements at the same time double as the take-over of power. In essence, the initial statements capture the struggle, the need to make points and the apprehension to succeed manifest in the speeches. Other statements that come after the success of power take-over may not be made with the urgency and anxiety of the first ones. Success is also very much important as failure translates to capital punishment of mutinous parties. Another speech that I consider is the Abacha counter speech against the coup attempt by Orkah. Abacha has announced two coup speeches, but his counter coup speech is of grave importance in the understanding of ideology and the use of language in the construction of realities. This other counter coup statement is put in the part of practical reasoning especially in emphasizing the aspect of floating signifiers, and emotive conjugation.

The other speech is that of Lord Lugard that is compared with that of Nzegwu. This speech was the first colonial coordinated speech made by Lord Lugard especially to the conquered people of the Sokoto Caliphate. It was made to introduce his indirect rule system. Though in between there is about sixty years gap between Lugard's and Nzegwu's speech, the orientation, perspective and world view of the military have not changed from their colonial progenitors.

3.4.2 Corpus linguistics

My data will be sorted for easy and more comprehensive lexical analysis using the tools of corpus linguistics. The use of corpus methods is necessary due to some criticisms against CDA. CDA has been accused of cherry picking data to suit a predetermined research expectation. Widdowson (1995) critiques CDA on the basis of its pre-textual partiality which constrains a holistic consideration of a given text. He holds that this interpretative

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partiality inevitably leaves a vast amount of text unanalyzed and unaccounted for. This 'deficiency' can be remedied by the adoption of corpus linguistic resources with their mechanisms for the sorting of whole scale data for analysis (Baker 2006). Also, KhsoraviNik (2008) maintains that by merging quantitative efficiency with qualitative theoretical underpinning, the accusation of arbitrariness and the usage of fragmentary data will be clearly solved. Mautner (2007) also contends that while CL sorts data quantitatively, CDA reaches out beyond to ideological context; that is CL will sort a large amount of data into analyzable patterns that will throw up interesting leads for ideological analysis.

The data will be subjected to 'concordance' analysis. The software to be used for this analysis is a freeware concordancer called AntConc 3.3.0 obtained from http://www.antlab.sci.waseda.ac.jp/software.html. Although the corpus is not very large, it includes all the Nigerian coup speeches, and thus the total number of speeches announced.

Concordance and wordlist generation will be very important in this research and will be majorly used here. Baker (2006,71) defines a concordance as "simply a list of all occurrences of a particular search term in a corpus presented within the context that they occur; usually a few words to the left and right of the search term". The concordance feature will particularly show collocational associations that will help in discerning a particular pattern of use (lexical and syntactic). The analysis of concordance lines can enhance the understanding and essence of certain salient features in a text. Pronouns, for example, which are very important in political discourse will be discerned along with their collocations or co-texts. Using, say, 'we' followed by 'are' one can see what relational processes come after 'are'. Though as advised by Baker (2006), an analyst should be careful not to involve anaphoric and cataphoric references. So, concordance can enhance the statistical validity of transitivity system. In the aspect of speech acts especially performatives, concordance will realize them easily, especially where 'hereby' is used. *Hereby* is a performative ushering adverb. I have shown this in my analysis.

1	driven by a belief in himself, his	**countrymen**, and love for his country, he accepted	abacha 1993.
2	in which disturbances Fellow	**countrymen and women and comrades at arms**, I	abacha 1983.
3	Fellow	**countrymen and women**, I, Brigadier Sani Abacha, of	abacha 1983.
4	Fellow	**countrymen and women**, I, Colonel Joseph	garba 1975.
5	wanted people escape. Fellow	**countrymen and women**, the change in government has	abacha 1983.
6	to see displayed in public. My dear	**countrymen,** no citizen should have anything to fear,	nzegwu 1966.
7	I appeal to you, fellow	**countrymen**, particularly my colleagues in arms to refrain	dogonyaro 1985.
8	closed till further notice. Fellow	**countrymen**, this has been a bloodless operation and	garba 1975
9	My dear	**countrymen**, this is the end of this speech.	nzegwu 1966
10	of the people. My dear	**countrymen**, you will hear, and probably see a	nzegwu 1966

Table 6: Lines with 'countrymen' in the speeches

In Table 6, for example, the use of *countrymen* and sometimes with *women* may reveal either a sexist attitude by some or sensitivity to sexist issues by others. Abacha, for instance, may be shown to be much more politically correct as far as gender issues are concerned than the others. And also, the same lines may also reveal certain aspects of intertextuality. As we are dealing with texts diachronically, there are cases of mutual reinforcement of terminology too. The first coup by Nzegwu uses the term *countrymen* and this serves as a template for others to use in terms of synthetic camaraderie with the citizens. Also if you look to the left of the search term *countrymen,* you will see this social levelling with the term *fellow* which may also be reinforced through use. More on aspects intertextuality shall be discussed in chapter 5.

Patterns of use like *fellow countrymen* or the variant *fellow countrymen and women* may lead to lexical priming. The persistent use of particular lexical items together has the

possible effect of priming this pair in human memory, and essentially objectifying them. Essentially, "priming leads to a speaker unintentionally reproducing some aspect of the language, and that aspect, thereby reproduced, in turn primes the hearer" (Hoey 2005,9). This pattern of use will indicate attitudes and may have the potential to create cognitive impact on the target audience.

Collocations in my data will greatly help in viewing lexical primings as well. So, while CL provides concrete linguistic realizations which may construct certain cognitions by examining a huge chunk of data, CDA can deconstruct and investigate how such social cognition is constructed through semantic alignments of propositions and topics. Such association would reveal further both semantic prosodies and semantic preferences of a given text. Wordlist, for its part, will help in showing the basic preoccupation and theme of a given discourse by its demonstrating usage of high-frequency words.

3.5 CONCLUSION

The method I have chosen involving various means of analysis is the best in addressing my research questions and in carrying out research of this nature. It offers a form of analysis with regard to detail, right from the lexical to the global. It also analyzes issues from the textual, to the cognitive and right to the logical. The combination I am using as method is novel in its approach, i.e., in terms of incorporating argumentation and corpus linguistics all with a clear concern for objectivity within the realm of analysis, and with a view to understanding issues broadly and systematically. This kind of method is chosen on the backdrop of criticism made against CDA, and the need for the marginal to be better than the mainstream (van Dijk 2001). Criticisms from Widdowson (1995, 2000, 2004) and Billig (2008) are criticisms made against CDA at its infancy as Critical Linguistics. CL's basic textual concern has now been superseded by higher levels of analysis. Though Fairclough (2001) sees this change as a form of theoretical development upon the achievements of CL, he cautions against jumping the gun to read off ideology from textual analysis. In fact ideology is better understood and analyzed at the interpretation level and the textual aspect here only gives clues as to what is, or assumed to be, in the MR and so forth.

So, the overall essence of this research for me is the following:

1. It will test the usage of this particular method in the aspect of political discourse analysis and build a framework for future analyses in the realm of politics and governance.

2. It will apply this method (that appears very cogent to me) to understand a particular institution that has exerted phenomenal control over major parts of Africa and see what ideology sustains, nourishes and supports it.

3. It will contribute to the current debate about Africa and its underdevelopment and possibly see how political institutions may have contributed in the deepening of crises in the continent in terms of ideological construction.

In Chapter 4, I present the data and my analysis.

CHAPTER FOUR: DATA ANALYSIS

4.0 INTRODUCTION

In this chapter, I present my analysis of the coup speeches and the evidence that answer my research questions. The chapter is divided into three broad parts, namely: representation of groups and their political activities, interpellation of the citizens and a testing of premises under argumentation. Representation entails the way the coup makers represent the past involving the leaders replaced, the people of the country and themselves and the effects of the governance of past leadership on the country. Interpellation of the subjects talks about the ways through which the military assume current political power and how they construct the nation and the citizens as their military subjects. Argumentation, for its part, analyzes the premises the military use in constructing their arguments. Aspects of Representation, itself, enter as premises in the rationalization of decisions for takeover. The transition from representation to argumentation is highly crucial in ideological analysis because representation enters as reasons for action. These analyses triangulate results and findings by looking at the data from various entry points. The chapter divides itself equally into the thematic analysis of the past, the present and the future. The coup speech narrative is constructed to make the audience see a particular narrative that justifies and legitimizes coups. Edelman (1985, 11) observes that language is one critical aspect of the material situation, i.e., "the aspect that most directly interprets developments by fitting them into a narrative account that provides a meaning for the past, the present, and the future compatible with an audience's ideology".In 4.1, there is the discussion of the 'bad' past with its effects vis-a-vis the positive nature of the coup makers. The essential linguistic elements in this segment include: nominalization, presupposition, intertextuality, categorical modality and metaphorical construction. In the second segment, issues of interpersonal relationships are enacted through the use of speech acts (like declaratives, directives and commisives) and modal auxiliaries. The segment analyzes the interpersonal roles of subject and object formation and the enforcement of regulations in order to control governance. The position of the audience or citizens shifts from those to be convinced about the deplorability of the past via toppled regimes in rhetorical representation to those

to be firmly controlled and commanded in the segment on interpellation. Hoffmann (2005) calls this ambivalent audience treatment the 'snarl and purr' method. The convincing aspect is chiefly done in representation and the controlling in interpellation. For argumentation, this is where I cumulatively discuss the premises of the arguments at a higher level.

4.1 REPRESENTATION OF POLITICAL ACTORS AND THEIR ACTIONS

This section is about the representation of actors and action involved in the coup speeches. The military use this both as an end in itself and as a means to an end. A 'deplorable' representation is an act by itself for it creates a distasteful perception of the opponents but, at a higher level, this serves as a reason for action. Here there will be a discussion of various opponents: civilian opponents, fellow military opponents, and opponents which are deemed to be in a context of a friendly takeover of power. Then there is the aspect of self-representation. This division is necessary to delineate the way foes, friends and selves are represented and the degree and dimension of this representation. Civilian opponents, for example, are not treated in the same way as military opponents for strategic reasons as we shall see in the analysis.

4.1.1 The civilian administration: retrogressive, corrupt, divisive and irresponsible

Two coups are staged against democratically elected governments, i.e., in 1966 and 1984. The 1966 coup staged by Major Chukwuma Nzegwu and company is the first military coup in Nigeria. The coup topples the civilian government of Tafawa Balewa. This coup is very crucial in setting a template for subsequent military coups in the country in terms of action. It sets the precedence and creates citationality for subsequent coup copycats. The other speech is by Abacha who announced the coup against Shagari. The analysis carried out in this section is largely in terms of the overarching themes of retrogression, corruption, irresponsibility of the politicians etc., but the analysis is done speech by speech due to the nature of disparate linguistic elements used by Nzegwu and Abacha. While Abacha's condemnation is dispersed, that of Nzegwu is aggregated in one chunk.

4.1.1.1 Nzegwu's coup speech against the Tafawa Balewa regime

Major Nzegwu starts his coup speech with legal exhortations and by declaring Martial Law over the whole of the northern region. Towards the middle of the speech, Nzegwu focuses on the politicians in one chunk of a sentence, a portion Siollun (2009, 55) refers to as "spine-chilling words which have acquired near legendary status in Nigeria":

> *Our enemies are the political profiteers, the swindlers, the men in high and low places that seek bribes and demand 10 per cent; those that seek to keep the country divided permanently so that they can remain in office as ministers or VIPs at least, the tribalists, the nepotists, those that make the country look big for nothing before international circles, those that have corrupted our society and put the Nigerian political calendar back by their words and deeds.*

This can easily be analyzed using the relational process because there is only one identifier, *our enemies* and a series of identifieds, see below:

*(*the identifier*) Our enemies*

*(*process*) are*

the identifieds:

- *the political profiteers,*

- *the swindlers,*

- *the men in high and low places that seek bribes and demand 10 per cent;*

- *those that seek to keep the country divided permanently so that they can remain in office as ministers or VIPs at least,*

- *the tribalists,*

- *the nepotists,*

- *those that make the country look big for nothing before international circles,*

- *those that have corrupted our society and put the Nigerian political calendar back by their words and deeds.*

There are various linguistic implications of this chunk of a statement. Now starting from the broader part, there is a high level of abstraction because objects are simply called and tagged. Though the details are quite sharp, the abstraction is achieved through the absence of 'actions' but the use of nominals in a long relational process that shows the speakers attempt at a classification or "the articulation of the logic of an existing system" (Hodge and Kress 1993, 103).The relational process is an identifying one, especially with the use of the definite article 'the' (Downing and Locke 2006). The test of a relational identifying process is its reversibility. For example,

Our enemies are the political profiteers….

The political profiteers are our enemies

This shows the equative judgment that goes into a construction like this, i.e., identifying one classification in the other and vice versa, thereby eclipsing any sense of difference. There is also an indication of ideological struggle, given the profuse usage of labels with negative expressive value against the politicians in a short space. Over wording, according to Fairclough (2001, 96), "shows preoccupation with some aspect of reality—which may indicate that it is a focus of ideological struggle".

There is also an apparent authenticity of claims because no epistemic modality concerning the claims is used. Absence of epistemic modality "supports a view of the world as transparent—as if it signals its own meaning to any observer" (Fairclough 2001, 107). Reality is reported as just given and transcendental; what Simpson (1993, 49) argues is "expressing a basic proposition in its 'raw' form". The absence of modality lends itself to making the present tense or the relational process here appear timeless and factual. It is just like making a categorical factual statement like: 'Salmon and tuna are fish' or 'the sun is bright'.

Beside this absence, what also brings out the cogency of the commentary is in terms of the claims with presuppositional triggers like *the*, dotted all over the commentary. The use of the definite article 'the' and prenominal modifications all helps in making the assumptions appear mutual and intertextual. In the subject *our enemies*, there is a presupposition there with the use of the possessive determiner 'our' which indicates a prior existence of an

intextual consensus. The *our* there has an ambiguity that adds to the abstraction and ambivalence of the general statement. The 'our' can refer to the coup makers and it can also refer to them in collaboration with the whole Nigerians. Here the deictic centre is both contracted and expanded. In reference to the latter, the coup makers attempt to show that there is a consensus between them and the nation about an enemy with such characteristics as listed, i.e.:*the political profiteers, the swindlers, the nepotists ,the tribalists*etc.

One other thing is the aspect of collectivization and genericization which "can serve to impersonalize social actors and perpetuate social stereotypes" (Hart 2014, 34). The use of the terms *the political profiteers, the swindlers, the nepotists, the tribalists* is incollectives in reference to the politicians which tends towards having them stereotyped and labelled, robbing them of any sense of individuality. The crimes of say, the prime minister, may not be the same with that of the minister of Finance or the like, but they are here all put under similar tags for the purpose of advancing ideological interests.

Instructively not only are the politicians presented in terms of what they do, but in terms of what they are. We see this in the use of nominalizations. 'Swindle' to '*swindlers*', 'profit' to '*profiteers'*, and 'tribal' to '*tribalists*'. In fact a representation like this shows the politicians not in terms of how they act but in terms of what they are as a nature. If being *swindlers*, *profiteers* is what they are naturally, then it is difficult to reform them. Burr (2003) argues that the shift from viewing 'homosexual' as an adjective into a noun as it is today has created another person and perception of focus. Similarly, in this case, moving from 'swindle' to *'swindler'* and the like, creates a person and a nature rather than an act. The Nzegwu coup is one of the bloodiest coups in the history of Nigeria (Siollun 2003). This shows that the strong terminology he uses in reference to the political class is meant to justify his violent action against them for they represent the attitudes he is eager to eliminate. Pocock (1973, 27), for example, makes an interesting observation of Brutus's statement that 'Caesar is a tyrant'. He argues that this is:

> an assertion, an act of definition…in defining Caesar as a tyrant, Brutus is not only justifying the act he intends, but is also qualifying it; he is saying that to kill Caesar is to kill a tyrant, so that what he intends when he says 'I intend' is to

'kill a tyrant'. The statement 'Caesar is a tyrant' and the implication 'it is right to kill tyrants are both present…

This is in a way similar to Nzegwu's case since we find that both the definition and qualification of the politicians serve to justify the action taken against them. When they are removed their human aspect and individuality is blotted out. What remains is the aspect for which they are removed or killed. When Nzegwu kills Sir Ahmadu Bello in his coup he equally verbalizes the fact the he is killing the wreckers of the nation. The definition makes Nzegwu see his action as a revolutionary act. By killing the premier of the northern region, Sir Ahmadu Bello, the Prime Minister, Alhaji Tafawa Balewa, and host of other high ranking political actors, he is virtually annihilating *'political profiteers', 'the swindlers', 'the tribalists'*. Blotting individual and personal features is strategic to show that the war is against attitudes, not lives. Just as by "using so potent a word as 'tyrant', Brutus invokes a whole world of reference structures, into which his other words, his intended, and his verbalized state of consciousness now enter in such a way that it qualifies them all" (Pocock 1973, 27). This action by Brutus is an indication of the use of language to justify action, a case of giving a dog a bad name in order to hang it just as demonstrated in Nzegwu's treatment of the politicians.

4.1.1.2 Abacha's coup speech against the Shagari regime
Abacha's coup of 1984 against the Alhaji Shehu Shagari civilian administration comes about eighteen years after Nzegwu's coup. This is also heavily against the civilian administration, just like Nzegwu's. He foregrounds his commentary on the depressing national issues brought about by civilian 'misrule'. The difference between Nzegwu's statement and that of Abacha is the fact that the latter heavily concentrates his analysis on the action of the political class rather than in identifying them. Abacha employs more attributive relational and material processes, the passives and complex clausal subordination than Nzegwu:

> *You are all living witnesses to the great economic predicament and uncertainty, which an inept and corrupt leadership has imposed on our beloved nation for the past four years.* (identifying relational process, subordinating clause)

I am referring to the harsh, intolerable conditions under which we are now living (material process)

Our economy has been hopelessly mismanaged. (passive actional Affected)

We have become a debtor and beggar nation.(Resulting attributive with dynamic powers)

There is inadequacy of food at reasonable prices for our people who are now fed up with endless announcements of importation of foodstuffs. (Existent, *inadequacy of food at reasonable prices for our….*)

Health services are in shambles(stands in an intensive relationship with the Carrier, circumstantial attribute with metaphorical meaning)

our hospitals are reduced to mere consulting clinics without drugs, water and equipment. (Passive actional)

Our educational system is deteriorating at an alarming rate. (Agent doing (intrans.))

Unemployment figures including the undergraduates have reached embarrassing and unacceptable proportions. (Material process: Agent + Affected doing (trans.))

In some states, workers are being owed salary arrears of eight to twelve months and in others there are threats of salary cuts.(Passive Affected)

Yet our leaders revel in squandermania, corruption and indiscipline, and continue to proliferate public appointments in complete disregard of our stark economic realities. (Material happening (intrans.))

In the above statements, there are evidentialities, presumed consensus and negative other presentation. Abacha starts by creating an ideal reader with whom he shares a perspective regarding the realities of the country, a sort of constructed intertextual experience. '*You are all living witnesses…*' indicates that the realities here are known and assumed to be the case. Adegbija (1995,261) maintains that this particular statement "presupposes the pragmatic context and states explicitly that the audience is witness to the fact that the incumbent regime has not lived up to expectations". In '*the great economic predicament and uncertainty*', there is a combination of a presupposition along with pre-nominal

modification and nominalization. This combination makes a powerful case about the existence of the realities mentioned. The statement embeds a relative clause, "which an inept and corrupt leadership has imposed on our beloved nation for the past four years". This embedding further shows the pressuppositional nature of the statement. There are so many assumptions that are meant to be taken as fact. Similarly in the use of the material process '*imposed*' there is certain level of deliberateness or intentionality imputed to the politicians. They are presented as consciously creating the problems in the country. We can also see the objectification of both '*economic predicament and uncertainty*' i.e., they are presented as if standing there, picked and forced on the nation by the politicians. In other words, the economic system is presented as a force that can be easily manipulated not a product of complex interactions. This simplification is in order to create a scapegoat. In essence, there is no clear delineation of facts, figures and subtleties of economic systems, and things are just seen as there and given then 'imposed'.

The '*I am referring to the harsh, intolerable conditions under which we are now living*' shows a deictic construction and a performative for emphatic reason to underscore or emphasize or clarify the reality of the conditions in which Nigerians are living. The term 'referring' is a performative that names the act. The act is pointed and named to create attention and focus.

> *the great economic predicament and uncertainty*

Is rearticulated as:

> *(I am referring to) the harsh, intolerable conditions under which we are now living.*

This attempt at pointing and repetition or reiteration further strengthens the assumptions which are embedded in strong presuppositions of contentious realities albeit garbed as objective. The use of the modifier 'intolerable' appears as strengthening an objective categorical modality. '*Intolerable*' appears to assume that this is a general opinion. '*Intolerable*' to whom? Fairclough (1992, 159) considers objective modality as not being clear on whose perspective is being represented "whether, for example, the speaker is projecting her own perspective as a universal one, or acting as a vehicle for the perspective

of some other individual or group. The use of objective modality often implies some form of power". This statement below also indicates another categorical objective modality:

> *There is inadequacy of food at reasonable prices for our people who are now fed up with endless announcements of importation of foodstuffs. There are threats of salary cuts*

For this has not shown that this is Abacha's personal opinion. 'Inadequacy of food' is a nominalization that simply codes without details and how does Abacha know that people *'are now fed up with endless announcements of importation of foodstuffs'*. The whole expression indicates another objective categorical modality where an 'objective' fact is imputed to the citizens of the country. *'Announcements'*, *'importations'*, and *'cuts'* have all not been detailed. When are these announcements made? Who made them? Regarding salary who will cut which salary and the like? All the details are implicit. And besides that, we see the use of Existential processes "there is" and "there are" followed by the Existents: '*inadequacy of food at reasonable prices for our people who are now fed up with endless announcements of importation of foodstuffs'* and *'threats of salary cuts'*. These processes show categorical propositions. Fahnestock (2011, 149) argues that sentences with linking verbs, like these ones, "express states of being rather than actions and so allow the defining, categorizing, and qualifying that are indispensable in claims of knowledge and principle ". Such categorical claims, she further maintains "are the preferred form for logical manipulations (in categorical propositions), and they have been marked in rhetorical stylistics for their uses in argument" (Fahnestock 2011, 149).

We also see how the text is stacked negatively with modifiers and intensifiers that are against the politicians: *'deteriorating', 'alarming rate' , 'endless' , 'announcements', 'unacceptable' , 'embarrassing' , 'hopelessly mismanaged'*.

Having decried and spelled out the deplorable and grim state of the nation in the above constructions through the use of linguistic resources like nominalization, presuppositions and implicatures, and making categorical assertions, Abacha zeroes in on the political class as actors. He moves from the state of the nation to the political actors in charge of the nation:

Yet our leaders revel in squandermania, corruption and indiscipline, and continue to proliferate public appointments in complete disregard of our stark economic realities.

Here also we see a collection of nominalizations, *'squandermania'* (from squander), *'corruption'* (from corrupt) and *'indiscipline'* (from discipline). In this representation, we see a nation in dire need of leadership but what the leaders do is to exacerbate the crisis on the ground. The use of nominalizations like *'squandermania', 'corruption', 'indiscipline', 'disregards'* etc. paints the political class as insensitive to the plight of the masses. The presentation of the political class and what it does is made in rhetorical antithesis to enhance the speech's rhetorical argument. See table 5 below:

Problems in the country	What the politicians do
a debtor and beggar nation *workers being owed salary arrears of eight to twelve months and ...* *threats of salary cuts,* *harsh, intolerable conditions under which we are now living*	*revel in squandermania*
Unemployment figures including the undergraduates have reached embarrassing and unacceptable proportions	*continue to proliferate public appointments in complete disregard of our stark economic realities*

Table 7: Problems and how the civilian administration exacerbates them

In essence, what the charge indicates is a disconnect between the leaders and the led. In sum, there is no connection between the political class and the followers in terms of positive leadership. The two exist in different worlds. The only connection is negative. The political class siphons resources of the country only for their progress and personal aggrandizement and '*imposes'* hardship on the nation. In effect, while the nation has become *a debtor* and *beggar*, the leaders are busy *squandering* its meagre resources. And while there is *unemployment*, the politicians are busy *proliferating political offices* for their cronies and friends. In fact, what the politicians do indirectly fuels the economic crisis on the ground.

After a grim presentation of the situation of the country and the insensitivity of the political class, Abacha then ushers in the role of the armed forces, justifying the takeover of power:

> *After due consultations, over these deplorable conditions, I*
> *and my colleagues in the armed forces have in the discharge*
> *of our national as promoters and protectors of our national*
> *interests decided to effect a change in the leadership…..*

While the nation is presented with a political class that is very insensitive to their plights and as wreckers of the nation and as selfish elements, the military are ushered in here as people ready to lay down their lives for the nation as protectors and promoters of the national interest. This sense of responsibility, juxtaposed with the expression '*irresponsible leadership of the civilian administration*', intensifies the military versus the political class binary. While one is highly patriotic and ready to die for the nation, the other is simply feeding on the fat of the nation and destroying it. Chilton (2004) argues that binary conceptualizations, as seen here, have the tendency in much political discourse using antonymous lexical and other choices, making hearers form mental models that are binary in character This binary conceptualization may involve positioning the military as positive while the politicians as negative. This shall be further discussed when I talk about the military as they represent themselves, and also in the aspect of premising this circumstance in argument for a takeover of power in argumentation analysis.

Two marked similarities between Nzegwu and Abacha's speeches, apart from the negative expressive values used against the politicians, are the absence of epistemic modality and the use of the present tense. The use of the present tense or what some may call the 'historical present' in talking about the regimes toppled has great ideological significance. Jespersen (1954, 19) sees the 'historical present' as used in a situation where "the speaker, as it were, forgets all about time and imagines, or recalls, what he is recounting, as vividly as if it were now present before his eyes". This is helpful in creating a preferred interpretation and impression in the minds of the audience. Fleischman (1990, 23) also considers the present tense as having a range of temporal references that are greater than that of any other tense category. "These include reference not just to the speaker's present but also to the future and the past, as well as reference to habitual, generic, gnomic, and timeless situations…." All the functions here mentioned regarding the present tense serve

the interests of the coup makers in their evaluation of the politicians. A reference to the past and future serves the discourse in terms of showing a behavioural continuum in terms of the actions of the politicians. A reference to habitual, generic and timeless situations serves them well too as the object that they attempt to form is shown here as incorrigible and probably timelessly unchanged. On the part of making categorical claims, two things are achieved. First, to show that the coup makers have the ability to analyze reality with precision and also the fact that the realities they mention are doubtlessly a rendition of true state of affairs. These altogether serve their ideological interests as well.

In summary, we see three issues presented: the negative characteristics of the political class, the problems of the country contingent upon the civilian administration's misrule and the role of the military as saviours. The problems of the country are associated with the corruption of the land by the political class while the military are shown as those on a mission to save the country. In general, the civilian administrations are thus presented as inept, corrupt, divisive, and lacking in the skills to govern the country. Invariably, as shown here, there is a sense of political regression with the political class rather than progression. Table 5 shows how the nation regresses while they materially benefit and Nzegwu refers to them as those who '*put the Nigerian political calendar back by their words and deeds'*. In essence their presence pulls the nation back. Their presence is absence for the nation and their existence is a threat. Taking the Nigerian political calendar back synchronizes well with the use of the *'tribalists'* for both indicate an anachronistic set of people rooted in the past. When someone is a minus or a retrogressive element, then their removal is clearly necessary or justified. In this representation, agency is not so much hidden. Problems are associated with the leadership and solutions are associated with the military class. As argued by Edelman (1985, 11) "language often evokes a belief that particular groups are evil or harmful even though the language of history, analysis, and science suggests that they are scapegoats rather than enemies". Scapegoating here is necessary for by doing that the overall intervention of the military can, in a way, be justified.

4.1.2 Military opponents: misdirected, corrupt and uncooperative

This section talks about coups carried out by the military against their professional colleagues. These are the coups by Garba in 1975, Dimka 1976, Dogonyaro 1985 and Orkah 1990. The first two coup speeches are short in length and they happen just six months apart. The Dimka coup speech comes six months after the Garba coup. Garba possibly influences Dimka in terms of the length of the speech. Between Dogonyaro and Orkah, there is a gap of 5 years and their coup speeches are far lengthier than the other two. Coup speeches generally tend to be more personality oriented unlike the ones against the civilian administration. Attitudes of the coup makers here are varied from the discrete to the politically vulgar depending on the contexts. On the whole, the points preponderate on their opponent's corruption, misdirection and uncooperative nature. The most important linguistic elements here used are nominalizations, presuppositions and metaphorical constructions.

4.1.2.1 Garba's coup speech against the Yakubu Gowon regime

The first military coup speech against another military government is that of Col Joe Garba against the government of General Yakubu Gowon. This is very terse and direct, 229 word tokens as against the first coup which is 872 words. Probably this is as a result of the fact that the military have established themselves as a political force since the first coup.

Due to the terseness of the coup speech, there is only an announcement of the toppling of government and there is not much in terms of constructing premises.

> *Fellow countrymen and women,*
>
> *I, Colonel Joseph Nanven Garba, in consultation with my colleagues, do hereby declare that <u>in view of what has been happening in our country in the past few months</u>, the Nigerian Armed Forces decided to effect a change of the leadership of the Federal Military Government.*

The coup is staged "in view of what has been happening in the past few months….".There is an obvious mystery here and an assumption about a fact going on and known by

everybody. There is a givenness in terms of the 'what' which shows a deliberate attempt at obfuscation. It alludes to a known fact which has not been disclosed and this fact is simply planted in the MR post hoc.

4.1.2.2 Dimka's coup speech against the Murtala regime

Similarly, Dimka's coup of 1976 barely six months after that of Joe Garba is even terser, i.e., 169 word tokens and only six words are dedicated to talking about the take-over of power.

> *Good morning fellow Nigerians. This is Lt. Col. B. Dimka of the Nigerian Army calling. I bring you good tidings. <u>Murtala Muhammed's deficiency has been detected</u>. His government is now overthrown by the young revolutionaries. All the 19 military governors have no powers over the states they now govern. The states affairs will be run by military brigade commanders until further notice.*

In Dimka's coup speech, the coup makers refer to themselves as *'the young revolutionaries'*. This indicates a positive self-glorification. In tagging themselves as revolutionaries, Agbese (2012) argues that they borrow a leaf from Nzegwu's coup. These *'revolutionaries'* have *'detected'* '*Murtala Muhammad's deficiency'*. This *'deficiency'*, which is a nominalization, simply freezes and denarrates the details of the assertion and it is what forms the overall justification of the coup. The word 'detected' there accords the mission a sort of intelligence or espionage role in finding fault of governance. Both Dimka and Joe Garba appear to be very discreet in their justifications yet making the case as if the whole nation is aware of *'what has been happening…'*, and the *'deficiency'* of the Murtala administration. Siollun (2009) sees Dimka as ill-prepared for the coup. There is even a mistake in the announcement regarding the duration of the curfew he announces, saying dawn-to-dusk (6 am to 6 pm) instead of dusk-to-dawn (6pm to 6am). Curfews are some codified military take-over traditions in Nigeria that restrict nocturnal movements for fear of troop deployment as reprisal or a counter coup (Balogun 2009). Similarly, Babangida (quoted in Agbese 2012) sees Dimka's coup as an "ego thing, a sort of we too can do it". Coup making has thus become a simple ego trip for the army.

4.1.2.3 Dogonyaro's coup speech against the Buhari regime

The Dogonyaro coup speech, for its part, being a coup against a fellow military government that is seen as popular and well-intentioned, is lengthy and with elaborate premises. There is so much explanation tendered. The justification becomes necessary because the government is barely a year old and those who have staged the coup are key players in the toppled government. The reason for the nuanced wording of Dogonyaro's broadcast, Siollun (2013) argues, is to ensure the pacification of Buhari loyalists, and consolidation of power and to give justification of the takeover rather than curt announcement of overthrow which could have provoked violent resistance from Buhari's supporters. The coup takes place barely a year after the Buhari government takes over from the democratic presidency of Alhaji Shehu Shagari.

Dogonyaro (the coup announcer) employs the use of an extended metaphor in talking about the Buhari regime. According to Dogonyaro the Buhari government has become a *'small group of individuals that misuse power*, and *positive action is hindered'*. The nation becomes *at the risk continues misdirection. 'Hindrance'* alludes to obstacle of a motion and misdirection about getting lost. They further maintain that '*if action can be taken to arrest further damage, it should and must be taken'*. The state and the nation are presented as one vessel that is misdirected and that needs to be salvaged. This misdirection is further confounded with '*the slow pace of action of the federal government headed by Major General Muhammadu Buhari'* and '*due to the enormity of the problems left by the last civilian administration'*. In this construction, there is an interesting scenario painted, that is, the nation is not only misdirected but that, like an overburdened vehicle, it appears to be overwhelmed by the problems in the country. It also becomes stagnated as in '*the present state of uncertainty and stagnation cannot be permitted to degenerate…'* Things are as such getting out of hand and '*the government has started to drift'*. Misdirection certainly leads to stagnation, then to drifting. This nation-as-a-vehicle and the leaders-as-pilots metaphorical construction helps in designing an image of the overall country as being jeopardized by the ousted administration as pilots of a misdirected vehicle. What is, however, not made clear is the role of the coup makers in overloading the vehicle itself or in distracting the driver. This shall be discussed in 4.3.2.2. Charteris-Black (2005)

maintains that in journey metaphors in political discourse, optional elements like mode of travel, guides, companions etc., are equally as important as the trip. Here in this analysis, we have seen this as true. Those coup plotters have not positioned themselves as part of the piloting team as is historically. Too many cooks, they say, spoil the broth. They present themselves as distant watchers of events and not part of the quarrelling that overburdens and distracts the vehicle of state. The ship of state is thus objectified and made distant. The coup makers that topple the administration are part and parcel of Buhari's Supreme Military Council, that is, the highest ruling council in the administration (Siollun 2013).

This makes Dogonyaro also talk about 'a ruling body' in an extended conceptual metaphor. 'Body' is mentioned five times and it has an important metaphorical dimension:

> *The economy does not seem to be <u>getting any better</u> as we witness daily increased inflation…No nation can ever achieve meaningful <u>strides</u> in its development where there is an absence of <u>cohesion</u> in the hierarchy of government; where it has become clear that positive action by the policy makers is <u>hindered</u> because as <u>a body</u> it lacks a unity of purpose. Although it is true that a lot of problems were left behind by the last civilian government, the real reason, however, for the very <u>slow pace of action</u> is due to lack of unanimity of purpose among <u>the ruling body</u>; subsequently, the business of governance has gradually been subjected to ill-motivated power play considerations. <u>The ruling body</u>, the Supreme Military Council, has, therefore, progressively been made redundant by the actions of a select few members charged with the day-to-day implementation of the SMC's policies and decision.*
>
> *This is because a few people have arrogated to themselves the right to make the decisions for the larger part of <u>the ruling body.</u>*

Buhari's government being likened to a body here is crucial. The human body as the source domain can work properly only if organs work harmoniously with one another. Some organs of the body that cannot work need either to be repaired or removed. He talks about 'cohesion' which hints at the aspect of harmonious interwoven acts. The *'economy does not seem to be getting any better'* further personifies the system as sentient and capable of being sick. Osborne cited in Bolinger (1980, 149) maintains that the speaker who sees society as sick and diseased calls for a radical surgery: "the image is decidedly

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revolutionary. The implied image links the power of metaphor with the appeal of one of the most favoured symbols of our culture, that of the physician". Acting as implied physicians of the nation, the political target hence is the justification for the removal of the government since nothing can be achieved by its stubbornness and lack of cohesion with other members of the military council. Moreover, two words, i.e., *strides* and *hindered* also show the metaphors of movement/progress and that of obstacle, meaning that the strides or forward course of the nation is hamstrung by the lack of cohesion of the body. Sickness of the body in an actual sense may hinder movement (*strides*). Fairclough, talking about the use of cancer as metaphor, (2001, 100) believes that different metaphors imply different ways of dealing with things: "one does not arrive at a negotiated settlement with cancer, though one might with an opponent in argument". In this case there can also be no negotiated settlement with an organ of the body that fails to work harmoniously with the other parts of the body, other than its excision. The use of presupposition here in the expression below further recalls a negative state of affairs brought about by the previous regime: *'We feel duty bound to use the resources and means at our disposal to restore hope in the minds of Nigerians and renew aspirations for a better future'.*

When '*hope*' is said to be restored in the minds of the people, '*aspirations*' are to be renewed and when there is a thought for a better future then there is already a state of hopelessness, dying aspirations and of a bad present. The triggers of presupposition here try to show that the nation and the coup makers are in agreement about the realities on the ground. Presuppositions have the capacity to "anchor the new in the old, the unknown in the known, and the contentious in the commonsensical" (Fairclough 1995, 107). This anchoring is shown here as the past is painted as gloomy and the present is seen as better and thus the commonsensical. Also, *hope* and *aspirations* are nominalizations which clearly have not said much about who *hopes* or what is *aspired* yet trigger presuppositions and assumptions.   Similarly, Dogonyaro uses categorical and objective modality here:

> *that Nigerians were unified in accepting the intervention and looked forward hopefully to progressive changes for the better. Almost two years later, it has become clear that the fulfillment of expectations is not forthcoming*

There is also the construction of an ideal reader who already knows about the facts under discourse. In effect, one may ask to whom has it become clear that the fulfilment of expectations is not forthcoming? Here subjective evaluation, it appears, is treated as given and objective.

In general, Dogonyaro talks about efforts and a hopeful future which the Buhari administration has all dashed using strategies of obstruction, see below:

> *Looked forward hopefully to progressive changes for the better—the fulfilment of these expectations not forthcoming*
>
> *Any effort meant to advise the leadership—met with stubborn resistance and viewed as a challenge to authority or disloyalty.*
>
> *Yearning and aspirations of the people—have been ignored*
>
> *The initial objectives and programmes of action—have been betrayed and discarded.*

In a nutshell, Dogonyaro discredits Buhari on the basis of dashed hopes and these dashed hopes are as a result of the lack of cohesion of the ruling body. This lack of cohesion also creates misdirection of the government. The stubbornness and uncooperative nature of the Buhari inner cabinet has created the whole problems of the nation.One can characterize these representations in terms of the ebbs and flows of positive and negative expressive values i.e., negative for the out-group and positive for the in-group. .

4.1.2.4 Orkah's coup speech against the Babangida regime

The Orkah coup is also staged against a fellow military regime. This coup speech is the longest and has the highest text dedicated to speaking about the regime to be ousted. The coup speech appears to be highly emotional in decrying the Babangida regime. Many see the speech as highly personal against Babangida (Abaya 2007, Siollun 2013).

> *On behalf of the patriotic and well-meaning peoples of the Middle Belt and the southern parts of this country, I, Major Gideon Orkah, wish to happily inform you of the successful ousting of the dictatorial, corrupt, drug baronish, evil man, deceitful, homo-sexually-centered, prodigalistic, un-patriotic administration of General Ibrahim Badamosi*

> *Babangida. We have equally commenced their trials for unabated corruption, mismanagement of national economy, the murders of Dele Giwa, Major-General Mamman Vasta, with other officers as there was no attempted coup but mere intentions that were yet to materialise and other human rights violations.*

There is a clear attempt at moral evaluation in the opening paragraph. The use of several pre-modifying negatives to talk about Babangida shows a lot in terms of ideological struggle and the need to delegitimize president Babangida by all textual means.

For the first time in all of the coup speeches, a speech is made appealing to regional and religious sentiments. The coup is made on behalf of the middle belts and the southern part of Nigeria. When social actors are represented by means of reference to a place or thing closely associated with them that is 'spatialization' which is an aspect of 'objectivation' (Van Leeuwen 2008). Orkah demarcates the country in terms of regions: middle belt and the southern part of Nigeria are classified as one as against the northern part of the country (implicitly inferred) where Babangida (whose administration the coup is directed at) comes from. One can see there is an attempt here to evoke sentiments in the southern part of Nigeria. One cannot also miss the resort to the use of a metonymy in projecting selfish political interests in terms of overall interests: '*On behalf of the patriotic and well-meaning peoples of the Middle Belt and the southern parts of this country, I, Major Gideon Orkah'*. Higher values are used to obfuscate selfish political values. As Kövecses (2002, 148) maintains , a metonymy can provide mental, cognitive access to a target entity that is less readily or easily available; "typically, a more concrete or salient vehicle entity is used to give or gain access to a more abstract or less salient target entity within the same domain". In this case, we see the interests of the coup makers masked in the interest of southern Nigeria and the middle belts.

The speech is generally infused with revolutionary Marxist ideals involving class struggle. Babangida and his regime are *'exploitative', 'dominatory', 'oppressive' 'subjugating'* and the people of Nigeria especially those in the Middle Belt and the South are *'enslaved', 'marginalized', 'voiceless'* and *'oppressed'*. The coup makers attempt *'to lay an egalitarian foundation',* against *'intrigues'* (mentioned five times), *domination* (mentioned four times), *'colonization'* (2 times), *'oppression'* and *'marginalization'* of the Babangida

administration. These particular expressive values imbue the Babangida regime with negative class struggles and place the coup makers as revolutionaries of a sort.

Orkah, by elaborating on Babangida's evils, is triggering a binary conceptualization that would place him as a saint of a sort. The classification or taxonomy he draws also shows his mind or psyche regarding the objects he constructs and his meaning making process. *Evil* appears to be different from '*corruption'* or '*drug baronship'*. In talking about homosexuality, Orkah attempts to problematize this sexuality and exploit the African and religious aversion to it as a form of emphasis of his sexual straightness. When he calls Babangida's administration '*dictatorial'*, the assumption (or unstated implicature) is that there is a military regime that can be democratic. All military regimes are enacted through diktats and fiat. I think the use of the word '*dictatorial'* is to serve his rhetoric, and possibly recontextualize the term dictatorial. Just as Dogonyaro who complains about the unilateralist nature of Buhari's rule, sometimes the military appears to be caught carried away by their rhetoric. Consultative and representative rule are the very values they fight against when they topple democratic governments and impose their leadership. In his discussion of the Babangida regime's *neutralization*' of groups, one can see how he constructs charges against the regime in a rather given and opaque manner that shows 'objects' as being existential instead of iconic processes. I discuss the items one by one due to their essence for this analysis:

> (1)   The Sokoto caliphate by installing an unwanted Sultan to
>   cause division within the hitherto strong Sokoto caliphate.

Here it is presupposed that there is a Sokoto caliphate which was strong before and its weakness is implicitly related to the installation of an 'unwanted' sultan by the ousted government. The question of such strength is also taken for granted as an uncontentious truth.

> (2)   The destruction of the peoples of Plateau State, especially
>   the Lantang people, as a balancing force in the body politics
>   of this country.

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The use of *'the'* and the nominalization *'destruction'* assume that this is a known reality. The combination of a presupposition and nominalization is powerful. That this issue takes place is contentious. That this issue is actually *'destruction'* in its dictionary sense is contentious. That this is done to the overall Langtang people is equally contentious.

(3)   *The intent to cow the students by the promulgation of the draconian decree Number 47.*

Here there is also another presupposition talking about the existence of an intention to cow students by a decree. The word 'cow' there shows the use of an emotionally charged naming of a process. To others, the action might just be to 'help' or to 'control' the students. And already he has negatively appraised the 'decree' by using a negative expressive modifier, i.e., *'draconian'*. Govier (2010, 58) points out that "through the use of emotionally charged language, a mood and attitude can be set without providing arguments, reasons, or any consideration of alternate possibilities".

(4)   *The cowing of the university teaching and non-teaching staff by an intended massive purge, using the 150 million dollar loan as the necessitating factor.*

As ditto, there is a 'cowing' process which everyone is aware of:

(5)   *Deliberately withholding funds to the armed forces to make them ineffective and also crowning his diabolical scheme through the intended retrenchment of more than half of the members of the armed forces.*

There is also another presupposition here that pertains to intention which everyone is also supposedly aware of. One wonders about the psychic power of Orkah in knowing the mental activities going on in people's minds.

Orkah also uses *Day of Judgment* damnation, and that of the nation as a vehicle with wheel metaphors to underscore his role and mission and paint Babangida as the villain. Religious

metaphors tend to exploit the moral angle and to present the speaker as Godly and trustworthy (Charteris-Black 2005). The coup makers here appear to be on a Godlike religious mission. Orkah in the coup speech maintains that '*it is our unflinching belief that this quest for domination, oppression, and marginalization is against the wish of God and therefore, must be resisted with vehemence'*. In reference to the Day of Judgment, Orkah talks about '*anything that has a beginning must have an end* and *the time of reckoning has come'*. What he perceives as the overwhelming iniquities of the *'Satanic Babangida administration'* has come to their end and would be tried by him akin to the Day of Judgment. Orkah sees himself and other coup members as the vicegerents of God as he keeps invoking the powers of God in his proclamations. One particular expression which is important is *'we are fully in control of the situation as directed by God'*. Geis (1987) in analysing President Kennedy's speech also makes reference to the latter's use of God and biblical language. He observes that "if a society's people believe in one or more gods, then a president who associates himself with the work of that gods will benefit through association" (Geis 1987, 42). Elsewhere in the speech he talks about Babangida's government as being homosexual. This probably further exploits the biblical distaste of such behaviour and rekindles the story of Lot and the Godly intervention in the destruction of Sodom and Gomorrah. In the nation as a rolling wheel metaphor, we see expressions like '*progress of the Nigerian state*' and the cancerous dominance of the Babangida regime as *'a major and unpardonable clog in the wheel of progress of the Nigerian state'*. He mentions '*clog in the wheel of progress'* two times. When you have a clog or an impediment that hamstrings your movement, the best thing to do is to remove it.

Even though the coup has not succeeded, the charges made by Orkah against General Babangida resonate with the southern part of Nigeria and seem to give their aspirations shape and better perspectives. Siollun (2013, 160) reasons that

> *…the grievances raised by the plotters emboldened opposition voices to raise taboo talking points that had hitherto only been discussed in hushed tones. The charge of northern domination of Nigeria raised by the plotters resonated with educated southerners who increasingly viewed northern control of Nigeria's military and political apparatus in conspiratorial terms.*

One can say that this particular perlocutionary effect of the speech on the southern intellectuals may not be unconnected with the strong charges made using linguistic elements (like grammatical metaphors and presuppositions) that exploit the audience's MR to assume truth value while essentially saying nothing in terms of details. It also restates the power of discourse in constructing social reality.

4.1.3 Difference between military and non-military opponents' representation (Systemic condemnation vs. personalized)

One clear feature which makes the distinction of chapters on the basis of military and non-military opponents essential is the personalization of military opponents. The opponents here are named and problems are squarely put on their doorsteps. Compared to military opponents, civilian opponents are treated more stereotypically and condemnation is usually systemic.

Dimka talks about the head of state by mentioning him here: *Murtala Muhammed's deficiency has been detected.* Dogonyaro bemoans General Muhammadu Buhari's intransigence, slow pace of action and betrayal i.e. by mentioning him, see underlined text:

> *The Nigerian public has been made to believe that the slow pace of action of the Federal Government headed by Major-General Muhammadu Buhari,…. the initial objectives and programmemes of action which were meant to have been implemented since the ascension to power of the Buhari Administration in January 1984 have been betrayed and discarded.*

Orkah on his part mentions General Babangida eight times in his speech. In this overt personalization, Babangida is called satanic, dictatorial with a cunning desire to install himself as life president. The modifiers that precede Babangida's name are: *'….the dictatorial, corrupt, drug baronish, evil man, deceitful, homo-sexually-centered, prodigalistic, unpatriotic'.* In the coups against the civilian administrations, the military leaders condemn them as a class. Orkah similarly, personalizes the coup in making

Babangida an object of his attack. He externalizes Babangida with a possessive pronoun 'his' in the table below. His use of 'his' is 67% of the overall use of this pronoun in the whole coup data.

1	against the wishes of the people are: (1)	**His appointment of himself as a minister** of	orkah 1990
2	putting under his direct control the SSS,	**his deliberate manipulation of the transition**	orkah 1990.
3	forces. Other pointers that give credence to	**his desire to become a life president** against	orkah 1990
4	he perceived as being able to question	**his desires**. Examples of groups already	orkah 1990
6	to make them ineffective and also crowning	**his diabolical scheme** through the intended	orkah 1990
7	a minister of defense, his putting under	**his direct control the SSS**,	orkah 1990
8	installed themselves as life presidents and	**his dogged determination** to create a secret	orkah 1990
9	able to achieve this **undesirable goals of**	**his**, he has evidently started destroying those	orkah 1990
10	manipulation of the transition programme,	**his introduction of inconceivable**, unrealistic	orkah 1990
11	of himself as a minister of defense,	**his putting under his direct control the SSS**,	orkah 1990
12	and impossible political options,	**his recent fraternisation** with other African	orkah 1990

Table 8 :Lines with 'his' in reference to 'Babangida'

Back reference to Babangida using *his* in Table 8 are all in a negative context. They are also presuppositions with the determiner 'his' and nominalizations:

- *his appointment of himself,*(presupposition & nominalization)

- *his deliberate manipulation,* (presupposition, prenominal modification & nominalization

- *his desire to become a life president*(presupposition & nominalization)

- *his desires* (presupposition & nominalization)

- *his diabolical scheme*(presupposition, prenominal modification & nominalization)

- *his direct control of the SSS*(presupposition & nominalization)

- *his dogged determination to create a secret force*(presupposition, prenominal modification & nominalization)

- *his introduction of inconceivable*….(presupposition & nominalization)

- *his putting under the direct control of the SSS*….(presupposition & nominalization)

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- *his recent fraternization with……*(presupposition, prenominal modification & nominalization)

The combination of presuppositions, chiefly 'his', and nominalizations and sometimes prenominal modification here presents facts strongly and as already known, yet those facts are not clear on details. In fact Yule (1996, 27) maintains that   "the existential presupposition is not only assumed to be present in possessive constructions (for example, 'your car' >>'you have a car'), but more generally in any definite noun phrase". So, those expressions above like the noun phrases with 'the' double as both nominalizations and presuppositions. For example, *the direct control of the SSS* is both a nominalization and presupposition. All these charges with pragmatically truth value are also all negatively loaded against Babangida. Tunji Lardner (cited in Ihonvbere 1991, 615) notes that the Orkah coup "was as much a violent and personal display of anger against the man President Ibrahim Babangidaas it was a brazen attempt at overthrowing his administration". The personalization of Orkah's case is the most vehement of all others in the speeches.

In the case of the two coups against the civilian administrations, issues are much more general and systemic, e.g.:

- *Political profiteers*
- *The irresponsible leadership of the past civilian administration*
- *the men in high and low places that seek bribes and demand 10 per cent*
- *the nepotists*

This lack of personalization shows that the aim of rhetoric is to show a systemic and institutional grouse or fault. But, the personalisation of military opponents tries to prove that a condemnation of the military institution may mean self-condemnation because they also belong to the same group. If the military as an institution is bad then those who are taking over, being military themselves, are equally bad. With the political class, the military must be absolute in condemnation to pave way for their own rule and to justify a systemic purge.

To show this systemic purge, Nzegwu, for example, bans institutional bodies here: *'all political, cultural, tribal and trade union activities, together with all demonstrations and unauthorized gatherings, excluding religious worship, are banned until further notice'*. The

idea here is that all the institutions under the civilian administration are bad and need reform.

While the general armed forces are treated as a collective and as an institution that is committed to national martyrdom, i.e., ready to lay their lives for the country against, on the one hand, the civilian political class is seen as an 'inept and corrupt leadership' systemically, on the other.

One thing this issue of difference in condemnation does is to mystify aspect of ideological interest and also to show that attitudes towards objects always guide the use of texts.

By and large, from the discrete submissions of Dimka and Joe Garba to the tactical logic of Dogonyaro and the emotionally charged speech of Orkah, military opponents are shown mostly as corrupt morally and financially, uncooperative and misdirected. Now, we shift to a takeover of power that is a bit friendlier than the rest.

4.1.4 Friendly and Convenient Take-over of Power: Passing the Buck to an Imaginary Enemy

The takeover of power here is carried out by Abacha against the transitional leadership of Chief Earnest Shonekan, a civilian brought by the Babangida administration after he (Babangida) stepped down. Shonekan is said to have resigned voluntarily of his own volition (Siollun 2013). Because of this, there is not much decrial of the regime except for the indictments of social, economic and political problems in the country. It is quite an interesting scenario that shows the use of language and manipulation in the service of power. The problems talked about here are reified and thought to be independent of human agency. He says:

> *Sequel to the resignation of the former Head of the Interim National Government and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, Chief Ernest Shonekan and my subsequent appointment as Head of State and Commander-in-Chief, I have had extensive consultations within the armed forces hierarchy and other well-meaning Nigerians in a bid to find solutions to the various political, economic and social problems which have engulfed our beloved country, and which have made life most difficult to the ordinary citizen of this nation.*

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First, using *'sequel'* there shows a relationship of causality and that of temporality. It is like the coup comes as a result, or after the resignation, of the interim president and implicitly inferring that the takeover is to avoid a power vacuum. The quote above is interesting as there is not any clear indictment of people/agents but states. Two interesting nominalizations there are *'subsequent appointment'* and *'extensive consultations'*. The *'appointment'* has rather mystified the processes involved i.e., who appoints who, where, when and how. Likewise *'extensive consultation'* has not shown the extent of the consultation and the processes, people and programmes involved. They are both meant to be treated as things not as processes. Political, economic and social problems of the nation, he talks about, do not just drop from heaven. They are caused by human agents. The lack of disclosure of the agents behind this may be deliberate and strategic as they (the coup makers) are part of the existing leadership in the country and also the previous ones that all culminate into the said problems, so it is clear that assigning agents here may be suicidal. Abacha, for example, was the chief of army staff to both Chief Shonekan and the previous government. He has also been part and parcel of the Nigerian Military leadership since 1981. In fact he was the one who announced the coup against Shagari's democratic government. In another breath Abacha also talks about other important issues:

> *On the current strike throughout the nation following the*
> *increase in the price of fuel, I appeal to all the trade unions*
> *to return to work immediately. We cannot afford further*
> *dislocation and destruction of our economy….*

In this extract, there is another attempt at mystification for ideological reasons. A lot of nominalizations without agency are used. Abacha continues trying to deflect agency through the use of another nominalization in terms of *'increase', 'dislocation'* and *'destruction'* of the economy. The use of nominalization again hides agency. The economy does not dislocate or destroy itself. There is reification here:.

> *Fellow Nigerians, the events of the past months, starting*
> *from the annulment of the June 12 presidential election,*
> *culminating in the appointment of the former Head of State,*
> *Chief Ernest Shonekan, who unfortunately resigned*
> *yesterday, are well known to you. The economic downturn*

> *has undoubtedly been aggravated by the ongoing political crisis….*

These are also interesting facts without 'agency' by Abacha about the Shonekan regime, like *'the annulment of the June 12 presidential election',* and *'appointment of the former Head of State'* which are nominalizations. There is also a reification when *'economic downturn'* in the country is attributed to *'a political crisis'*. The creators of the political crisis are at best unmentioned. The ideological reason why Abacha resorts to agentless construction is to absolve himself and the outgoing Babangida administration of complicity in the economic and political problems of the country. Siollun (2013), a historian himself, for instance, maintains that Babangida refers to *'irregularities'* as reasons for annulling the 12th, 1993 presidential election alluded to by Abacha. Siollun (2003, 88) rightly observes that "he did not provide convincing itemization of, or evidence of, such irregularities". In essence, Siollun asks a CDA question because Babangida has failed to give in clear iconic transitivity terms the details of the nominalized term *'irregularities'*. He resorts to the use of a grammatical metaphor to probably save face. In fact, Siollun (2013, 244) maintains that Abacha is one of the people who pressurised Babangida to annul the June 12th election. He states that Babangida has told Prof Omoruyi that Sani Abacha is opposed to a return to civilian rule.

The problems of the nation, in this case, are not made to be the making of the outgoing interim government given the seeming amicable transfer of power achieved, but they are shown to be existential, i.e., as if they crop up on their own.

> *the various political, economic and social problems*
> *which have engulfed our beloved country*

In this construction, we both see prenominal modification (i.e. various, political, economic and social) and presupposition (the) which help in showing and reifying the issues (i.e,. problems) and portraying them as given. The *'problems'*, besides being accorded agents roles, are further turned into metaphors of flood. Turning the problems, implicitly, into a *'flood'* (using a material process 'engulfed') presents the *'problems'* as natural. When a nation is *'engulfed'* as if drowning in a sea of problems, it only justifies the need for a rescue and in this case, a coup or power take over. In other words, the construction or the contextualization of the problems in the country in terms of a flood metaphor here clearly

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makes a rescue solution rather convincing and it technically marginalizes other possibilities. Basically the presentation of facts in certain ways indirectly implicates some solutions as the only efficient and viable means of survival. Fairclough (2015) addresses a similar situation involving the manipulation of public opinion by means of a tsunami metaphor to refer to the global financial crisis. She maintains that public opinion is manipulated to see the crisis as something that "'just happened', it was outside anybody's control, no human agency was involved" and how such entailments, she continues "can figure in subsequent arguments for action" (Fairclough 2015,5).

Recounting the time Chief Earnest Shonekan was invited to be the interim president; Abacha attempts to paint a complex picture of the moment:

> *Chief Ernest Shonekan took over as Head of State and Commander-in-Chief of the Nigerian Armed Forces at a most trying time in the history of the country. Politically, economically, and socially, <u>there were lots of uncertainties. Things appeared bleak and the atmosphere was heavy with uncertainties.</u>*

Again, there are apparently some mystifications there in the underlined sentences. There is the use of an existential process showing the Existent which is '*uncertainties*' and the '*politically, economically and socially*' as adverbials that only attempt to define or modify the Existent which is not a verb or action. The Existent here also happens to be a nominalization (from uncertain). Going further, Abacha uses a categorical objective modality '*Things appeared bleak and the atmosphere was heavy with uncertainties'* To whom do the things appear bleak…? There are also reifications in the use of '*thing*' and '*atmosphere*'. What are these things in the atmosphere and who created them? This should be seen in terms of an attempt to save face.

The nation is also constructed as a building in dereliction or needing repair. The metaphors imply that the past should be forgotten and a solid foundation should be built. Abacha says '*we must lay a very solid foundation for the growth of democracy'….'the problems must be addressed firmly*' and that '*we should show more restraint and build a united and peaceful Nigeria'*. He continues '*for the international community, we ask that you suspend judgment while we grapple with the onerous task of nation building, reconciliation, and repairs'*. In

essence, *'laying a foundation, building, repairs'* and doing so *'firmly'* all relate to the image of a new building being erected on perhaps a rickety and derelict building that needs reconstruction. How has the former building become derelict? How have successive military governments helped in demolishing the national edifice? The speech concludes *'this government is a child of necessity with a strong determination to restore peace and stability to our country and on these foundations, enthrone a lasting and true democracy'*. One thing these metaphors help to mystify is the fact that the sources of the problems are transcendental, i.e. as if they exist there without any human agency. The flood of problems and the destruction of the national edifice are shown as simply there. A discussion of the real agencies may have been avoided for Abacha would certainly feature in any real discussion of past political intrigues that land the nation into the quagmire or the decay it finds itself in. In addition, Abacha also refers to his government as a *'child of necessity'* which gives its raison d'etre. This shows that a baby of this nature simply comes by accident and that it has no responsibility in its making and formation. This innocent-child metaphor simply tries to justify and legitimize his power take-over as rather inevitable and fated. It may also mean the birth of a new nation with completely a new programme. And this will probably evoke all frames that show the features of children or babies, i.e., innocence, purity, novelty etc. Both of these interpretations may serve the spin.

It is interesting to note that in the coups staged against hostile civilian governments and military juntas, there is an unmistakeable apportioning of blame and the aligning of problems at the door steps of regimes toppled. The same Abacha, for instance, states that the civilian government under Shagari is *'inept and corrupt'* that operates an *'irresponsible leadership'*, and with leaders who *'revel in squandermania, corruption, and indiscipline'*. Similarly, Nzegwu sees the Tafawa Balewa government as *'political profiteers, swindlers, those who seek bribe etc'*. Orkah decries *'the dictatorial, corrupt, drug baronish, evil man, deceitful, homo-sexually-centered, prodigalistic, un-patriotic administration of General Ibrahim Badamosi Babangida'*. In all these cases, there is an unmistakable attribution of the source of the problems in the country, but here we see a complete departure from that norm given ideological and face-saving interests. Though there is a discussion of the problems in the country, but through an ideological manipulation of language, these things are shown to be existential problems and there is a lot of underplaying of human agency.

Human agency may not serve the rhetorical spin of Abacha and may be suicidal. See Table 6 below for a clear itemization of the problems and their sources as constructed by General Abacha.

Problems	Effects
Ongoing political crisis	*aggravates economic downturn*
The annulment of the June 12th election	*culminates in the appointment of Chief Earnest Shonekan as the interim president*
the increase in the price of fuel	*Current strike action throughout the nation the increase in the price of fuel*
Things appeared bleak	*(state of bleakness)*
The atmosphere was heavy with uncertainties	*(state of uncertainties)*

Table 9: Reified objects with material effects

Table 9 indicates a discussion of things and their effects. In the last two parts of the table, we have a sense of 'beingness' associated with the relational process. The process itself is encoded by linking verbs (here, 'appear' and 'was') relating "the Carrier to its Attribute, the Identified to its Identifier and the Possessor to the Possessed" (Downing and Locke 206, 144). The carriers here are inanimate, i.e. *'things'* and *'atmosphere'*. The human actors behind the *'ongoing political crisis', 'the annulment of the June 12th election', 'the increase in the price of fue'l, the* bleakness of things and making the *'atmosphere heavy with uncertainties'* are obviously backgrounded. Compare this with Table 8 describing the politicians and their attitudes. In that table, the politicians are described in clear terms and are shown as the causative agents of the negative state the country finds itself while here there is a face-saving hedging due to ideological interests. .

4.1.5 Self-representation: resolute, responsible, patriotic and messianic

In general, while the political opponents are decried through various means, there are tactics too of self-glorification employed in the portrayal of self by the military.

4.1.5.1 Mitigation of negatively valued deeds to appear innocent

In the representation of opponents, we see decrials and condemnations by way of hyperboles and dysphemisms. Generally, in terms of self-representation the military adopt euphemisms and the like especially to attenuate their undoing. As a tactic of legitimization, we see self-praise, self-apology, self-justification, self-explanation, etc. (Chilton1996).

The term 'coup' itself is a euphemism. According to Siollun (2013, 19) it "is a benign term for what is in effect the double crimes of treason against the state, and mutiny against the military hierarchy". The term is further rearticulated as revolution. Both Nzegwu and Orkah refer to their coups as "revolutions". This euphemism further accords an air of positivity to coups.

Nzegwu also describes his coup as *slight changes going on*. This is a euphemism because the coup of 1966 is one of the bloodiest coups in the history of Nigeria. Twenty one senior military and government officials including the Prime Minister, the premier of the northern region and their wives were killed. This led to a counter coup that saw the killing of 45 military officers, and that begins the drift towards the Nigeria's civil war (Siollun 2009). Elsewhere he also talks about his men on assignment:

> *you will hear, and probably see a lot being done by certain bodies charged by the Supreme Council with the duties of national integration, supreme justice, general security and property recovery…..*

This is an understatement regarding the atrocities going on during the coup by Nzegwu because those who go about on assassination assignments, creating havoc, restricting movement and violating human rights are said to have duties of '*national integration*', '*supreme justice*', '*general security*' and '*property recovery*'. Ademoyega (1981,126), as part of the 1966 coup makers, writes, in his book 'Why We Struck', that the coup was a "painless surgical operation designed to heal a sick Nigeria". This expression using both metaphors and euphemisms also attempt to understate or hide messy details and to recontextualize the circumstances of action. The statement has virtually overlooked the

ugly aspect of human casualty and the catastrophic consequences of the first coup in Nigeria.

Similarly, Dimka, having killed General Murtala (the military head of state) and a host of other officers, comes to announce what he calls '*good tidings*'. There is a paradox here when deaths are announced as *'good tidings',* a term which should be strictly used for good news, like birth. Invariably, Dimka may have attempted to see Murtala's death as a birth of a new Nigeria since his life is possibly paradoxically the death of the nation and vice versa. The coup happens barely six months after the presidency of late General Murtala Ramat Muhammad. He similarly uses the term "overthrown" which is another understatement rather than saying the death of the president. The aim here is to give the impression that that is what they are after. In Orkah's coup, which also has many casualties, he declares that '*I major Gideon Orkah, wish to happily inform you of the successful outing...'.*The murders and destruction committed are seen as part of a successful outing that makes the action sound more like hunting exhibition returning with game. Abacha and Garba praise their coups on the basis of them not being bloody. He states: *'fellow countrymen, this has been a bloodless operation and we do not want anyone to lose his or her life*' and Abacha: '*the change of government has been a bloodless and painstaking operation*'. They see their coups as bloodless and finding this in itself as praiseworthy and remarkable. One can perhaps notice the subtle marginalization of the crime of a take-over per se and how newer fields of chivalry or conformity are built. The contention has shifted from the crime of taking over power by force itself to whether it is bloody or bloodless.

In all these understatements, there is an effort to hide messy and hideous details of murder, violence and terrorism. They are made with assumptions that are ideologically meant to show that the people share their enthusiasm or their point of view. In other words, the coup texts are constructed in such a way that privileges a particular preferred reading. Dimka's 'good tiding' to the nation is based on a constructed assumption that the country may welcome this news. Orkah's '*successful outing*' also makes it as if the coup is an event that yields big prey instead of a bloody fierce encounter involving casualties. They load their actions with positive expressive values while their opponents are loaded otherwise. Following Thompson's (1990) strategies of symbolic construction, one can see the attempt

at dissimulation here in terms of playing down upon effects of an action for ideological reasons. According to Thompson (1990) relations of domination may be established and sustained by being concealed, denied or obscured, or by being represented in a way which deflects attention from or glosses over existing relations or processes.

4.1.5.2 Frames of positive responsibility

At the ideological level, framing is a device used by discourse makers to establish and naturalize hidden ideological assumptions by drawing upon pre-established institutional and societal order of discourse (Fairclough 1989). In essence, frames are the mental structures that allow human beings to understand reality – and sometimes to create what we take to be reality. In the speeches, the military attempt to construct a saviour frame and a sense of responsibility that are objective and that should be taken for granted. Stanovich (2009, 88) sees the majority of people as cognitive misers that allow "their attention to be focused by others", and this is chiefly done through framing. The traditional role of the military is defence and the protection of the territorial integrity of the nation. The aspect of toppling of government and the association of the military to political power especially in the Nigerian context relates, inter alia, to a strong formation of a frame of being watchdogs and being capable of effecting a positive change, correction or rescue. This frame is reinforced by every coup speech announced. There are specific textual cues of this role. Abacha's 1984 coup speech, after condemning the ousted Shagari government, states that:

> *After due consultations over these deplorable conditions, I*
> *and my colleagues in the armed forces have in the*
> *discharge of <u>our national role as promoters and protectors</u>*
> *<u>of our national interest</u> decided to effect a change in the*
> *leadership of the government of the Federal Republic of*
> *Nigeria and form a Federal Military Government. This task*
> *has just been completed.*

In the above statement, Abacha attempts to construct a role for the armed forces which is that they have the obligation and responsibility to effect a change in leadership. *Our national role* is a strong phrase which combines a presupposition (our) and a prenominal modification (national); likewise, the term '*our national interest*'. Both terms remain powerful as given issues but are, however, vague without a clear definition of what

constitutes those roles or without a clearly defined signified. Laclau and Mouffe (1985) consider such constructions as floating signifiers since their articulation as elements makes them particularly open to different ascriptions of meaning. There is also the aspect of redefinition of 'role' here or the formation of an arbitrary link between coup making, national role, national interest etc. A nodal point or a meaning hub is created that networks all this into a coherence that is ideological and that can appeal to an ideal reader or subject.

Protection and *promotion* of national interests are here implicitly associated with a power take over. In essence, while the coup makers are *promoters* and *protectors* of national interest, the politicians, according to Nzegwu, are *swindlers* and *profiteers* from our national wealth as a nature. The resort to the use of coup as a form of 'national protection and promotion', as said earlier, tries to extend the meaning of the words to include coup making rather than defence against external aggression. In this, there is a subversion of meaning in the logic of equivalence. There is a meaning associated with the act of a coup and such association builds up the positive image of the act and subvert meanings that may threaten this act. It is a deliberate marginalization of the actual role of the military which is the defence of the constitution, on one part, and an act of mutiny, on the other. Using 'constitution', there may not suit their political interests as the constitution forbids mutiny and treason. In fact, as contained in article 1 of the Nigerian 1979 Constitution:

> *the Federal Republic of Nigeria shall not be governed, nor*
> *shall any persons or group of persons take control of the*
> *Government of Nigeria or any part thereof, except in*
> *accordance with the provisions of this Constitution.*

Coup making or the taking over of power by military fiat is perhaps an affront to the laws of the land. The responsibility of the military is the defence of the constitution not jettisoning the constitution.

Another frame that is used by Abacha who sees his coup against Shonekan in terms of the survival of the nation:

> *Many have expressed fears about the apparent return of the*
> *military. Many have talked about the concern of the*
> *international community. However, <u>under the present</u>*

First, a kind of dialog or intertextual chain is brought up about people expressing concerns and the like about the return of the military, but these concerns, in the coup makers' response, are shown to be overshadowed by the survival of the nation. Indirectly, a frame of maintenance of the life of the nation is associated with the incoming government or power takeover. It is a convenient metonymic dialogue that exaggerates the take-over mission and assumes that it represents the larger interest of the nation. In the use of the word 'survival' there is also the metaphorical notion of the nation being alive and capable of distress, and it is only a military intervention that can bring succour or rescue or resuscitation back to healthy life. Daramola (2008) argues that hardly can one think really that the circumstance of this seizure of power is as chaotic and problematic as the time that Ibrahim Babangida annulled the presidential election in June. Hence his placing the '*survival of Nigeria above other considerations*' in this context shows a certain level of alarmist anxiety to convince a supportive ideal audience.

This role of the military in a saviour frame is also invoked by Dogonyaro when he states in his speech against the General Muhammadu Buhari government that '*we feel duty bound to use the resources and means at our disposal to restore hope in the minds of Nigerians and renew aspirations for a better future'.*

Here there is the invocation of a *'duty'* associated with the military in restoring hope and renewing aspirations and this role is associated with a change of leadership. He continues '*the present state of uncertainty and stagnation cannot be permitted to degenerate into suppression and retrogression'.* The use of *'cannot be'* attempts to evoke the existence of a responsibility by the military concerned with the protection of the country from allowing things to become worse. The expression is also made as if it is a general objective commentary. When things degenerate into retrogression, there is the need to stem the tide and the solution is a change of government, as it appears, not a consideration of other alternatives.

An interventionist frame is also shown where Dogonyaro maintains that:

> *Because this generation of Nigerians and indeed future generations have no other country but Nigeria, we could not stay passive and watch a small group of individuals misuse power to the detriment of our national aspirations and interest*

In this case the military is empowered as an interventionist force. It shows a duty to change government on the basis of avoidance of detriments. Similarly, Nzegwu also after the condemnation of the first republic politicians states that '*like good soldiers we are not promising anything miraculous or spectacular'*. This statement also attempts to show a frame of responsibility which is also meant to be seen as different from the political class. The politicians are stereotypically known for their lies and promises especially in the Nigerian contexts i.e., promising heaven and earth to get on to power only to renege on the promises. Here soldiers are known for being practical, sincere and straightforward.

As against the constructed bad aspect of the toppled regimes, the coup makers emphasize their positive aspects while mitigating and trivializing their bad parts. They exaggerate their mission by employing positive self-praising hyperboles. Orkah, for example, talks about a mission backed by God. They understate or underestimate their bad actions and legitimize them by framing them as good actionsand deeds while magnifying the bad deeds of the opponents for ideological reasons.

4.1.5.3 Sense of cooperation

Coup makers attempt to show that they are cooperative and united in their actions. They extend this form of cooperation and solidarity with the citizens. They open their speeches with humble salutations to the citizens:

- *'fellow country men and women' (twice) abacha (1984)*
- *'good morning fellow Nigerians' (Dimka)*
- *'fellow countrymen' Dogonyaro*
- *'fellow Nigerians' 2 times Abacha (1990)*
- *'fellow Nigerian Citizens' Orkah*

In all these statements, there is an attempt to show humility, cooperation, solidarity and respect and to give the impression that they are fellow citizens meaning well. Chilton(2004, 139), describing a similar phrase used by Clinton "my fellow Americans" in a speech, argues that the phrase establishes an extra-textual relationship between speaker and hearers "such that the hearers are postulated as present in the same (political) space and as proximate to the speaker. The space builders here that might prompt a hearer in this direction are: 'my', 'fellow' and 'Americans' ". These expressions establish affinity and kinship between the coup makers and Nigerians. The use of 'fellow' there is a social levelling tactic aimed at establishing a commonality with all Nigerians and also putting all in the same space.

Appeal to collective essence and solidarity, moreover, is important in giving the impression that coups are backed by others and one is not acting alone. The speaker usually announces that he is speaking on behalf of a group:

- *In the name of the Supreme Council of the Revolution of the Nigerian Armed Forces ... (Nzegwu)*

- *...this is Lt. Col. B. Dimka of the Nigerian Army calling...(Dimka)*

- *...I, Brigadier Sani Abacha, on behalf of the Nigerian Armed Forces ... (Abacha)*

- *....I and my colleagues in the Armed Forces ..(Dogonyaro)*

- *On behalf of all patriotic and well-meaning people of the Middle Belt and Southern parts of the country I Major Gideon Gwazo Orkar ... (Orkar)*

- *...I have had an extensive consultation within the armed forces hierarchy, and other well-meaning Nigerians.... (Abacha)*

Adegbija (1995) believes that in the socio-cultural settings of most Nigerians, collective achievement and authority have supremacy over individual achievement and authority and,

therefore, the individual performer has to learn to submit their overall goals to the societal or communal whims and caprices. The above affirmations serve a lot of different speech acts. To the people in the country, it probably serves as a veiled piece of information that the military is in control and that the coup has an overwhelming support and backing and that it is cooperative. To others in the armed forces who may be on the fence, it is a veiled warning that the coup plotters can defend themselves in the case of any rebellion.

'We' is also used to show such cooperation. It has various dimensions and referents that serve the interests of the coup makers (see appendix 17). Whether it refers to the actual coup makers themselves or to the coup makers together with Nigerians, it is used in a positive context or in a context of collective sharing of negative consequences brought along by the toppled government. From lines 2 to eleven, there is a relational process that links the carrier 'we' to its 'token'. This tries to serve two functions: first, to show solidarity and equality in suffering similar circumstances with the citizens. Secondly, to enlist Nigerians as ideal audience who already understand the realities talked about especially regarding the bad governance of the previous administration. As Wales (1996, 62) expresses it:

> The politician-speaker [frequently] uses 'we' with the double inference and presumption that he or she is not only speaking on behalf of the party or government, but also on behalf of the audience . . . the rhetorical implication is that the audience or readership must therefore share the government's views as being the only correct views.

The advantage of using the pronoun 'we' including other people in political speeches also is that it helps share responsibility (Beard 2000). It also tends to show might in number. This use of 'we' can help dissuade possible opponents of the coup as well as reassure the nation of the strength of the coup makers. Usually, 'we' is loaded with positive expressive value. Since the 'we' necessarily involves the speaker then it has to be positive. Morality and lawfulness can have a conceptual representation in spatial terms i.e., what is close to self is also morally good and vice versa. In this context, 'my dear countrymen', or 'my fellow Nigerians' can also be within perimeter of moral uprightness "What is inside is close to the self, and what is outside is also outside the law" Chilton (2004, 172). In essence what Chilton is saying is that what is close to the speaker is also close to rightness and what is

outside may be the opposite. Similarly, Wodak *et al.* (2009, 46-47) maintain that"….there are metonymic realisations of 'we'; for example, if 'we' pretends to include the speaker and perhaps also the addressee as well as third persons who are not present…..the form of 'person for country' is also a metonymic form of 'we'".

When the military talk in a collective term not only do they involve the citizenry as ideal speakers, they equally use their number (the coup makers) to represent all. Abacha, for example, tries to elicit support through the use of 'we' here with an implicit notion of the morality of his position or mission. The *survival of our beloved country* is associated with what the 'we'—possibly citizens and the coup makers alike—can do::

> *Many have expressed fears about the apparent return of the military. Many have talked about the concern of the international community. However, under the present circumstances the survival of our beloved country is far above any other consideration. Nigeria is the only country* <u>*we*</u> *have.* <u>*We*</u> *must, therefore, solve our problems ourselves.* <u>*We*</u> *must lay a very solid foundation for the growth of democracy.* <u>*We*</u> *should avoid any adhoc or temporary solutions. The problems must be addressed firmly, objectively, decisively and with all sincerity of purpose.*

There is also the notion of the collective or government as partnership using 'we' (Bello 2013). After "*Nigeria is the only country that we have*", subsequent use of *'we* 'does not indicate whether the nation is involved in the rest of the 'we' or it is referring to the coup makers alone. If we must follow from the antecedent, i.e., the first use of 'we' talking about the country, then we can safely conclude that the referents are the whole country as a tactic of cooperation. The pronoun, however, veils the ideological notion that the citizens are 'conscripted' into being part of the agreement and decisions taken. In essence the use of the inclusive 'we' places the citizens as acting together rather naturally with the coup makers. One can see here an attempt to obfuscate consent and to take it for granted or what Fairclough (1989) would call the 'manufacture of consent'. Ideology is most potent when its workings are not visible and are just taken for granted. Through naturalization, discourse types appear to lose their ideological character (Fairclough 1989).

We see this cooperation also extended rather intertextually with the citizens in terms of the construction of ideal readers and audience that agree with their postulations. This is used mostly with pronouns.

> *Fellow Nigerians, the events of the past months…………are well known to you.*
>
> *You are all living witnesses to the great economic predicament and uncertainty, which an inept…..*

In the coup speeches, there are many of such possessive constructions which are important in making sure things are taken for granted. In the appendix 18, there are concordance lines of the possessive construction 'our' with 39 hits.

There are 27 cases that refer to the country as "our" involving the citizens and also presuppose a reality of cooperation in appendix 18. Between lines 2 to ten, there is an intense preoccupation with the concept of nation/country being ours. Lines 15 and 16 show other contentious presuppositions. In line 15, Nzegwu presupposes the existence of collective enemies, while in line 16 Orkah talks about 'our history' being replete with numerous incidences of domination etc. Orkah's statement presupposes the awareness of such history and the fact that we also share the notion of that history through the use of the possessive. Similarly, in line 12 and 19 Abacha presupposes that a collective economy has been hopelessly mismanaged and the existence of our leaders that revel in squander. Lines 21 and 22 below also talk about the existence of a common national aspiration and interests. 31 and 36 are particularly interesting. They talk about the existence of economic realities that are stark and the existence of a common unflinching belief. Generally, the use of *'our'* and the presuppositions it modifies serves two interests: the notion of a collective opinion and the existence of a reality mentioned therewith. Abacha appears to have the most in the use of inclusive 'our'.

It is assumed that the people share experience and loyalty with the coup makers in terms of the reality of the nation. In line 9 there is even a reference to *'our people who are now fed up…'.* The use of "now" triggers a presupposition and shows an opinion as if it is a general consensus.

The "our", furthermore, is either about a rhapsody of a nation loved or about a common decrial of a national tragedy caused by the enemy. "Certain apparently simple terms such as "our society," "we," and "the market" carry taken-for-granted and interconnected meanings. This concept allows us to define the imaginary…" Steger and James (2013, 31). The "our" thus used is about national solidarity with the people and positive national interests.

4.1.5.4 Resoluteness/decisiveness

The coup makers try to indicate that their opponents are not resolute in what they do, but they themselves are resolute. Laws are enacted pronto and with immediate effects. This is to drive home the fact that the business of governance has changed. There are so many dissolutions and dissolving of institutions.

This decisiveness is also indicated in the way laws are immediately promulgated and the course of governance changed. The coup speeches usually come with a lot of changes like the suspension of the constitution, the enactment of new laws, etc. The aim here is to show to the citizenry how resolute the new regime is. Nzegwu, trying to drive home the resolute nature of his administration, says that:

> *This is not a time for long speech-making and so let me acquaint you with ten proclamations in the Extraordinary Orders of the Day which the Supreme Council has promulgated….*

Long speech making is not the business of the military. Rather, their business is action. Abacha also shows this brisk decision when in his speech taking over from Shonekan takes far reaching decisions at once:

> *We require well thought-out and permanent solutions to these problems if we are to emerge stronger for them. Consequently, a constitutional conference with full constituent powers will be established soon to determine the future constitutional structure of Nigeria. The constitutional conference will also recommend the method of forming parties, which will lead to the ultimate recognition of political parties formed by the people. While the conference is on, the reorganisation and reform of the following major institutions will be carried out: (a) The Military (b) The*

Police (c) The Customs (d) The Judiciary (e) NITEL (f) NNPC (g) NEPA (h) The Banking Industry (i) Higher Educational Institutions….

This show of resoluteness is meant to be seen in terms of the ability to take decisions and solve the problems of the country, and the solutions are *'well-thought out and permanent'*. The fact that well thought out and permanent decisions are taken given the limited time within which the coup and the speech is made, then the coup makers are meant to be seen as efficient and proactive problem solvers. It similarly shows that decisions of grave importance will be dealt with simultaneously especially where he says *'while the conference is on, the reorganization and reform of the following major institutions will be carried out…'* Items to be reorganized are also made in order of importance, using letters to show to the people how organized they are. Words like *'summarily'*, *'decisively'*, *'with immediate effect'* etcetera are also used to drive home this sense of urgency in dealing with issues. In brief, the aim of the resoluteness is also to create an immediate impact in creating changes to make the people have further confidence in the coup makers' problem solving abilities.

4.1.5.5 Revolutionary acts

All the military coup speeches attempt to show that the coup makers are either messiahs or revolutionaries or both. In fact Nzegwu refers to their governments as revolutionary likewise Dimka. Orkah also sees his own clearly as a religious mission with him performing the role of a vicegerent or a sent rescuer. They announced their coups amid lamentation of grave misgovernance. They construct their comings as *'good tidings'*, and the like. Dimka's good tidings intertextually is from the biblical *'good news or tidings'*[3].Generally, the military perceive their intervention as revolutionary in the way they construct their points of view even without making explicit claims to being either messiahs or revolutionaries. The use of revolutionaries attempts to show that their coups enjoy popular mass support or attempt to be seen like that post-hoc.

Nzegwu calls his team of coup makers the *'Supreme Council of the Revolution of the Nigerian Armed Forces'*. He mentions revolution six times, invoking it to drive home the

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[3] *(Matthew 11:5; Luke 4:18; 7:22; 9:6; 20:1)*

fact that his intervention is for the better. The use of the definite article 'the' and capital letters shows that the movement is meant to be seen as there(as an entity, and one that is official enough to get capital letters), existing and known not as a process in the formation of political leadership. Dimka also calls his group '*the young Revolutionaries'*. Orkah, for his part, sees his coup *'as a well-conceived and planned revolution'*. Their missions are also couched in religious rhetoric. Nzegwu's ten Extra-ordinary Orders of the day replicates the biblical Ten Commandments. Nzegwu is said to be a strict catholic (Siollun 2009). And here there is possibly an interdiscursive representation i.e., bringing religious discourse into a coup speech to make it appear Godlike. Orkah does the same by clearly cutting his image in the shape of a messianic redeemer:

> *It is our unflinching belief that this quest for domination, oppression and marginalisation is against the wish of God and therefore, must be resisted with the vehemence…. Anything that has a beginning must have an end….those with skeleton in their cupboards have all reasons to fear, because the time of reckoning has come.*

Anything that has a beginning and an end and the concept of a day of reckoning indicate aspects of religious accountability and aspects of day of judgement. If Messiahs appear, then there is the notion of a satanic or devilish regime to be fought.

4.1.5.6 Love for country and patriotism

The action of the coup makers in the speech is all constructed in the shadow of patriotism and love for country. They labour to show that they have a concern about the dereliction of the opponent. Nzegwu is concerned with the corruption and divisive nature of the political class. Abacha and his team are concerned with the corruption and retrogression of the nation and they are ready to lay their lives for the nation. Dimka detects *Murtala's deficiency*. Orkah is trying to '*lay a strong egalitarian foundation for the real democratic take off of the Nigerian state…'* In all these cases, there is a 'patriotic' concern with issues affecting the nation. Their sense of patriotism also extends to praying and wishing the country and other patriots well:

- *Long live the federal republic of Nigeria (Garba)*
- *Good bless Nigeria (Dogonyaro)*

- *Long live the federal republic of Nigeria (Abacha)*
- *Long live all true patriots of this great country of ours (Orkah)*

In Table 10 below there is an intense preoccupation with the concept of nation/country being ours and being loved:

2	social problems which have engulfed	**our** *beloved country*, and which have made life	Abacha 1993
3	present circumstances the survival of	**our** *beloved country* is far above any other	Abacha 1993
4	We are no prophets of doom for	**our** *beloved country*, Nigeria. We, therefore,	Dogonyaro 1985
5	corrupt leadership has imposed on	**our** *beloved nation* for the past four years.	Abacha 1983
6	to restore peace and stability to	**our** country and on these foundations, enthrone	Abacha 1993
7	view of what has been happening in	**our** country in the past few months, the	Garba 1975
8	we hope that such nations will respect	**our** country's territorial integrity and will avoid	Nzegwu 1966
9	the present composition of	**our** country\s leadership cannot, therefore,	Dogonyaro 1985
10	is ready to lay its life for	**our** *dear nation* but not for the present	Abacha 1983

Table 10: Lines with 'our' collocating with 'country' and 'nation'

There is a deliberate rhythm and repetition built into the frequent use of nation/country and the possessive construction *'our'*. The use of this construction here, apart from presupposing the existence of a country loved by its people especially the coup makers, is also a tactic of showing shared cooperation between the potential leaders and the people. This show of patriotism and love helps in making the citizens believes in the genuineness of the intervention by the military.

4.1.6 Conclusion

In this section, there is an attempt to look at the way the military represent the actions of the toppled government, the actors and also how they see their missions. It is here that most rhetoric is deployed. The out-group members are the toppled governments and their impacts are painted with negative expressive values, while the governments taking over see themselves as behaving and acting appropriately. Hoffer (1980) sees the rousing of

anger and hatred towards a particular thing or person as a tactic of not only territoriality but that of synthetic kinship. He opines that "to share a common hatred, with an enemy even, is to infect him with a feeling of kinship, and thus sap his powers of resistance" (Hoffer 1980, 67). Sharing a common enemy and the construction of the masses to believe in this fact establish a kinship which is not there at all given the multi-cultural nature of Nigeria. Using 'our' or 'we' including the nation is one strategy of creating this synthetic kinship. Positioning the in-group with positive values and the out-group with negative is a binarist conceptualization that necessarily puts political opponents in direct opposition to the values that the in-group espouse and claim.

The opponents also are divided into two. Opponents under a democracy are condemned more stereotypically using collectives, and with charges against the system as a whole, but with military opponents there is more of personalization and the singling out of a leader or a team and chastising them. The avoidance of a systemic condemnation is strategic for that will be an overall condemnation of the military institution involving the speakers. There is the deployment of nominalization, presupposition, metaphorical constructions, categorical modality and the present tense to make issues appear as factual as possible while at the same time forming meaning associations that build up ideology for both selves and opponents. Nominalizations, for example, are used, especially where there is the need to charge against opponents while stinting on details or to try to show a state of affairs while not needing to make explicit clear representation of facts and figures.

Moreover, it is clear that the rationales given by the coup leaders overlap considerably with those listed by Emenyeonu (1997) from respondents in a study carried out regarding justifications for military intervention. The respondents identified issues mostly in nominalizations that simply re-echo the coup justifications given by the coup makers, a case of intertextual rehashing of coup claims. Emenyeonu (1997, 267) itemizes these issues as: "political disorder", "unbridled corruption", "inept leadership", "neglect of masses' welfare" and "inability to contain ailing economy" "oppressive rule" and "ethnic domination". This indicates that the listeners or viewers have adopted the dominant-hegemonic position of the military or they operate inside the dominant code. This position, as explained by Hall (2015, 125-126), occurs "when the viewer takes the connoted meaning

….full and straight, and decodes the message in terms of the reference code in which it has been encoded". In other words, the listeners have adopted the preferred interpretation of the message by the speaker.

When issues are constructed like this, it is possibly "an effective way of constraining the contents of discourse and, in the long term, knowledge and beliefs" (Fairclough 2001, 87). Chilton (2004) call this "qualitative misrepresentation". And this largely overrides Habermasian (1981) validity claims of both claims of truth and saying the truth. In addition, due to the hegemonic power of access to discourse that the military have, the realities they construct are likely to be the knowledge we may have in the long run of our history, society and political systems. It is as Foucault (1980) rightly puts it that history is written by those who control its outcomes. Realities like these are those that end up forming our truth or our history.

The position or role of the audience is varied too. The citizenry are enlisted as sharers of similar opinion using aspects of presuppositions especially on issues bordering on ideology. This enlistment makes mutual subjectivation. When issues are constructed the aim is not only to construct ideal subjects who agree with the text producer but to reproduce the speaker as a subject in terms of such examples. Take as an example Orkah's charge of homosexuality against Babangida. He attempts there not only to discredit Babangida but to show himself as averse to that form of sexuality that is abhorred by Nigerians. The military create themselves as subjects whenever they charge other subjects negatively. The audience are also witnesses to the realities or facts the military want to foreground or concretize. They are also objects of rhetoric i.e., those to be convinced in terms of the facts represented. When facts are presented with selected premises that easily make an ideological point of view easy to agree with, for example, if there is hunger in the land and yet the civilian government is said to proliferate offices and engage in squander of the nation's wealth, then an audience is positioned as an arbiter in terms of an easy to judge representation. In the next segment on interpellation we will see how the audience position shifts radically from people to be convinced and cajoled to interpellated subjects needing firm control. Also, the representation aspects here talk about the past and its impact while the next segment addresses how the present is dealt with and projections for the future.

4.2 THE INTERPELLATION OF THE CITIZENRY

The previous discussion deals with how the past is represented and also aspects of what the present realities courtesy of the past entails, but, in this, the concern is the present and the projection for the future. The present here pertains to the realities of the takeover of power. The position of the audience here differs. It shifts to their construction into obedient subjects. This aspect of military regimes is the gradual interpellation of the citizenry as military subjects and what the iterability of the genre of coup speeches achieves on the citizens or subjects. The audience in the first analysis are constructed as arbiters of a past (judged by the military), but here they are constructed as military subjects in whom adherence to statutes and laws is expected. Language here is a social and political practice. The interpellation aspect is partly achieved linguistically through the use of speech acts and modal auxiliaries. Interpellation is very important here because it is through this process that the citizenry are made to acquiesce to being subjects of the military junta. "It is not facts or observations that are critical, but rather language that constructs observers in various social situations as particular kinds of subjects" (Edelman 1985, 16). The duplicate mirror structure of ideology, according to Althusser (1971), ensues in the following way in the formation of subjects:

- The interpellation of 'individuals' as subjects;
- Their subjection to the Subject;
- The mutual recognition of the subjects and Subject, the subjects' recognition of each other, and finally the subject's recognition of himself;
- The absolute guarantee that everything really is so, and that on condition that the subjects recognize what they are and behave accordingly, everything will be all right

I argue that military leadership gains substance and authority through ideological instruments, chiefly psychological operations and the subjection of the citizens. It is here that language plays a crucial role.

4.2.1 Awe inspiring self-appellation

One very important aspect that helps in hailing the citizens and in projecting an awe-inspiring image of the military in political governance is the lofty names the military give

to their ruling councils or coup teams. These names tend to show a superior image capable of providing the right atmosphere for leadership. Nzegwu calls his group: '*The Supreme Council of The Revolution of the Nigerian Armed Forces'*. The name is written with initial capital letters to enhance its graphic prominence and, ipso facto, its cognitive imprint. There are three definite articles right there that help in presupposing the givenness or certainty of the objects mentioned i.e.,*' the supreme council',' the revolution*' and *'the Nigerian armed forces*' all in the self-tag given by Nzegwu. The words '*supreme', 'revolution'* and all their positive, awe-inspiring semantic values are associated with the military here. Successive military governments trim the name to '*the Supreme Military Council*'. Later During the time of Babangida the name is changed to '*The Armed Forces Ruling Council'*. When Orkah launches his coup he changes the name again to the '*National Ruling Council*'. Abacha changes his to the *'Provisional Ruling Council'*. The changes are simply meant to prime the citizens to the novelty of the regimes through tinkering with the nomenclature of the ruling council without losing the awe such naming bestows. The subsequent removal of the tag '*military*' in the names may be an effort at downplaying that aspect and at the same time naturalizing the '*military*' as a political force and as ruling councils. If they are so entrenched in governance, then there is no point in using the '*military*' as a grammatical modifier there.

Essentially, this persistent association of the military with a *'supreme' nature*, in a way, helps in priming the minds of the citizens to this reality and in naturalizing the aberrationist nature of military coups. Also, the use of the word 'supreme', which shows height of greatness and enormity in size, is a metaphorical projection, showing height and size in terms of importance. Goatly (2007, 36) argues that anything " 'upper' or 'big' in size means 'of important status' and big seen in terms of size i.e., makes something appear successful and significant. The use of '*supreme*' as such is to evoke and inspire awe. The general illocutionary force of such tags is to create respect, regard, deference and to make the citizens assume a sense of subservience under the leadership of the military ruling class in supreme position.

Moreover in the tag '*The Federal Military Government'*, the '*federal*' there appears to be a euphemism of a sort. Siollun (2013, 124) argues that the tag is only in name as most

military regimes, especially the Babangida regime, operate governments that are "the most centralized, unitary and autocratic government in Nigeria's history". Agbese (2012, 180) holds similar opinion and maintains that in 1984, the Buhari government enacted the Federal Military Government (supremacy and enforcement of powers) decree i.e., decree 13 "in case anyone had any lingering doubts about the superiority of its laws to all other laws in the land".

In a similar vein, Ungpakorn (2007, 8), talking about Thailand's military junta, shows the essence of priming:

> The language of the military junta should remind us of George Orwell's 1984. "Democracy" means military dictatorship and "Reform" means tearing up the 1997 constitution, abolishing parliament, independent bodies and declaring martial law. After the coup the media was tightly controlled by the military officers placed in all offices and the critical Midnight University website was shut down for a while; all in the name of "Democracy". The junta were so paranoid that they insisted that its full title (above) be read out each time the media made any reference to it in Thai. This was to reinforce the "fact" that it was a "Royal and Democratic Coup". Yet when the junta's name was mentioned in English by the foreign media, they were asked to cut out the words concerning the monarchy, to avoid any foreign "misunderstanding" that it might be a Royal coup.

The Thais are primed to understand that the coup is a 'royal and democratic coup', yet the English translators are asked to clip the 'royal' part to avoid the international media from seeing the mix-up. The local Thais, just as Nigerians, are thus primed to have a particular image in mind which would help in earning the juntas' legitimacy and authority.

4.2.2. Dismissing existing governments

Coups are chiefly made to change government. So the coup makers dissolve existing government through strategies that tend to show the power they have in doing this. The Nzegwu coup was the first coup in Nigeria. In a series of performatives foregrounding the coup and taking a sizeable part of the speech he suspends the government. He declares:

> *In the name of the Supreme Council of the Revolution of the Nigerian Armed Forces, <u>I declare martial law</u> over the Northern Provinces of Nigeria. The Constitution is suspended and the regional government and elected assemblies are hereby dissolved. All political, cultural, tribal and trade union activities, together with all demonstrations and unauthorized gatherings, excluding religious worship, are banned until further notice.*

The statement 'I declare martial law over the Northern provinces of Nigeria' is an explicit performative because of the first person singular (I) and the simple present active form (Saeed 2007). This demonstrates the enormous power of the speaker. The other performatives that do the acts of suspension of the constitution, elected assemblies etc. are all in implicit forms. In essence, Nzegwu, by those declarations, has demystified the aura of invincibility of the constitution and democracy and has set the ball rolling in terms of the military's foray into political governance. Agbese (2012, 72) calls Nzegwu's action the opening of the "Pandora's Box". In essence, he has provided a template for others to use and copy. Cervenka (1987, 5) observes that "It was the military coup in Nigeria in January 1966 which changed Africa's attitude to military seizures of power. It began to be recognized that a coup d'état was a means of changing an unpopular government". Those declarations i.e., the suspension of the constitution, dissolution of the elected assemblies as declaratives are meant to use words to change the world or the political structure and set up, fitting the political world of Nigeria to fit words (Yule 1996). What are of essence are not only the wordings that come with them but the interpersonal attitude that this manifests in terms of the positioning of people as subjects in the enactment of roles.

Traditional performative declarations require felicity conditions. As discussed in 3.3.3.2, Austin (1962, 14ff) stresses that

> A.1 There must exist an accepted conventional procedure having a certain conventional effect, that procedure to include the uttering of certain words by certain persons in certain circumstances, and further,

A.2 the particular persons and circumstances in a given case must be appropriate for the invocation of the particular procedure invoked…..

In the case of Nzegwu both A.1 and A.2 above are immediately non-existent. There is neither any conventional procedure on hand that makes it possible for such an act to be carried out nor is he in anyway appropriate to invoke the particular procedure he has invoked. His statement and act are thus initiatory of a socio-political process. First, a military coup is unconstitutional and ultra vires and secondly, in the first military coup, for instance, there is even no precedent to copy or continue from. It is as such clear that the power resides as much in the possession of weapons at their disposal to muzzle control as in the verbal authority to substantiate this control especially in the type of discourse deployed. In Hausa, there is a popular saying "if a blind man says let's play a game of throwing pebbles, he must have trodden on some little stones". What this proverb implies in local discourse is that an authoritative speech must have been backed by something substantial even if not immediately visible to the people. This also may indicate why people are amenable to being convinced through threats, even implicit ones. Making declarations means that you are claiming as a coup leader that you are the correct person, having the correct roles and rights, to be able to "do" this declaration. The overall essence of Nzegwu's coup speech is the fact that the way it is done, including the nature of the speech, the dimensions of new regulations, the perception of subjects, the methods of communicating the message, provides or forges a felicity condition which other coup makers come to adopt. The felicity condition is therefore socially constructed by the Nzegwu coup.

Under an ideal circumstance the constitution can only be suspended by elected assemblies or duly constituted legal bodies like the judiciary, but this declaration has not only dissolved the constitution but the assemblies that have powers of adjudication over such matters. Though the action of the military is rather illegal, in the overall it has set a new-fangled options or alternatives beside constitutional governance and has articulated and created a new political object. Ajayi (2007, 48) maintains that

> Without doubt the dramatic termination of the life of the corrupt and inept civilian administration and the coup day 'manifesto' enlivened hope in the future greatness of the country. The euphoria that welcomed the coup

> announcement attests to this…..the image of corrective military regime had been etched in the minds of the people

Althusser's hailing process has begun and the reaction turns out to be in the affirmative rather than the negative because of the joyous celebration among Nigerians due to the change of government (Siollun 2013, Ogbeidi 2012, Ajayi 2007, Taiwo 1996). The perlocutionary effect of the overall coup acts has been achieved as there is compliance and welcome. *The Daily Times* made an editorial in support of the new government (cited in Ogbeidi 2012, 9):

> With the transfer of authority of the Federal Government to the Armed Forces, we reached a turning point in our national life. The old order has changed, yielding place to a new one.... For a long time, instead of settling down to minister to people's needs, the politicians were busy performing series of seven day wonders as if the act of government was some circus show... still we groped along as citizens watched politicians scorn the base by which they did ascend.... (Daily Times 1966).

The media support here enhances the acceptability of the coup and in general consolidates the military's entry into political governance and confirms the military's declaration as a recognised form of taking control of power. The constitutionality and the violent takeover of the country by military fiat are not even points to ponder about as far as the editorial of *The Daily Times* is concerned. What is important is the fact that a new order (which appears welcomed) is taking over from an old one. This has shown that not even the citizens but the societal watchdog represented by the press has probably been interpellated and enlisted as subjects of the new military junta. The essence of the press's approval is crucial because it is instrumental in setting the agenda and in the objectification of political processes (Geis 1987). In fact this "act of recognition becomes an act of constitution" (Butler 1996, 25). The recognition that the military hailing is meant for the country and even going ahead to endorse is a case of vintage constitution as a subject.

The term *'a new order'* helps in renaming and recontextualizing the process of what may constitutionally be seen as 'mutiny' or 'treason', and it shows also a binary of political struggle, or subversion of the 'other' meaning, between probably a 'conservative order' represented by the political class and a progressive order represented by the military in

terms of its novelty or newness. *The Daily Times's* new tag seems to click as Dogonyaro in his speech states that *'in order to enable <u>a new order</u> to be introduced the following bodies are dissolved….".* Likewise Orkah warns that they "*are prepared at all costs to defend <u>the new order</u>*". Here we see the mutual and intertextual re-enforcement of a term and how political actions like 'mutiny' are reconstructed euphemistically as positive. This mutual reinforcement of a label or terminology may help in building a particular perception and knowledge. Similarly, even the ousted parties and politicians support the new regime. The Northern People's Congress which was the ruling party in the first republic issued a statement stating that:

> The party gives its unqualified support to the military regime and to the Major General in particular. We call on all our party members and supporters to cooperate with the military regime and to give the new administration unflinching support in its <u>great task of bringing peace and stability to Nigeria</u>. . . . We pray that the Almighty God may help Major-General J.T.U. Aguiyi-Ironsi, in the execution of the difficult national duties thrust upon him by the present circumstances. (Siollun 2009, 70)

The ousted parties also evaluate the new regime positively by seeing its mission as a "great task of bringing peace and stability to Nigeria". The wordings of Nzegwu and how he describes the situation and decries the civilian class have all been accepted by the ousted political class. Essentially, the Nigerian subjects are further hailed by other organs of ideological apparatus including the media (as in the Daily Times Report) and the statement of the ruling party that was deposed. Probably if the initial hailing has not been welcomed subsequent coups could not have taken place. Smith (2007, 232) states that although Nigerians often lament the violence of the state, many people also participate "in discourses that construct certain kinds of violence as ethical and necessary for the maintenance of an otherwise unruly society". He further states that this is evident "in the way many Nigerians have welcomed new military regimes and constructed nostalgic memories of previous ones". Invariably, Nigerians' perception of the military and the belief that certain violence is legitimate show the degree to which they are ideologically convinced or probably brainwashed about the political mission of the military political institution. The process of interpellation achieves most prominence with the response that acquiesces to the identity imposed by the hailer as Butler (1996, 33) observes here:

> imagine the quite plausible scene one is called by a name and one turns around only to protest the name: "That is not me, you must be mistaken!" And then imagine that the name continues to force itself upon you, to delineate the space you occupy, to construct a social positionality. Indifferent to your protests, the force of interpellation continues to work. One is still constituted by discourse, but at a distance from oneself.

If Butler's analogy here can be applied then the subject's protest against the call to them may at least create a certain level of distance and may possibly undermine the level to which they may be interpellated. It also indicates that the hailer needs much more effort in their calls before positionality and subjectivity could adequately be achieved. Butler (1996, 33) further avers that the mark interpellation creates is not descriptive but inaugurative as seen in the Nzegwu's coup and

> It seeks to introduce a reality rather than report on an existing one; it accomplishes this introduction through a citation of existing convention. Interpellation is an act of speech whose "content" is neither true nor false: it does not have description as its primary task. Its purpose is to indicate and establish a subject in subjection, to produce its social contours in space and time. Its reiterative operation has the effect of sedimenting its "positionality" over time.

After the initial coup by Major Nzegwu which is inaugurative of a social and political process, other coups follow suit and through this reiteration or what Derrida (1988) calls "iterability", the Nigerian subject is fully interpellated especially as there is not any protest but compliance to the orders of the military. Major Hassan Katsina quoted in Abgbese (2012, 72) points out (in reference to Nzegwu's coup) that "I know coups succeed coups. This will not be the end of it. This country will continue to witness coup d'états".

Katsina's statement is right and prophetic. Following suit after Nzegwu is a series of declarations by other coup makers spanning the overall national atmosphere for thirty five good years.

> *Garba:*
>
> *As from now on, General Yakubu Gowon <u>ceases</u> to be the head of the Federal Military Government and Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces of Nigeria*

Dimka:

Murtala Muhammad's deficiency has been detected. His government is now <u>overthrown</u> by the young revolutionaries

Abacha:

Accordingly, Alhaji Shehu Usman Shagari <u>ceases</u> forthwith to be the President and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Nigeria.

Dogonyaro:

In order to enable a new order to be introduced, the following bodies are <u>dissolved</u> forthwith pending further announcements: (a) The Supreme Military Council (b) The Federal Executive Council (c) The National Council of States.

Orkah:

The former Armed Forces Ruling Council is now <u>disbanded</u>……

Abacha:

The Interim National Government is hereby <u>dissolved</u>. (b) The National and State Assemblies are also <u>dissolved</u>.

Each one of this series of declarations abruptly terminates or affects existing governments with various degrees of success. Though Nzegwu uses an explicit performative *I declare martial law* all of the others resort to the use of implicit performatives which in a way may help in not giving the impression that power is unilaterally exercised. There are two uses implicit performatives with an intransitive active verb, 'cease', i.e.:

General Yakubu Gowon ceases to be the head of the Federal Military Government and Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces of Nigeria (Garba)

Alhaji Shehu Usman Shagari ceases forthwith to be the President and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Nigeria. (Abacha)

The word 'cease' seems to be re-enacted in the Abacha coup. The others all used implicit performatives but with the passive voice.

Murtala Muhammad's deficiency has been detected. His government is now overthrown by the young revolutionaries

In order to enable a new order to be introduced, the following bodies <u>are dissolved</u> forthwith pending further announcements: (a) The Supreme Military Council (b) The Federal Executive Council (c) The National Council of State

The former Armed Forces Ruling Council <u>is now disbanded……</u>

The Interim National Government is hereby <u>dissolved</u>. (b) The National and State Assemblies <u>are also dissolved</u>

The sum of all these is the gradual sculpting of the citizens into military subjects. As Fairclough (1995, 48) argues "… discourse contributes to the creation and constant recreation of the relations, subjects (as recognized in the Althusserian concept of interpellation) and objects which populate the social world". Nzegwu's speech provides a template from which other coup makers launch their samples with various degrees of modifications. The modifications continue to show the congealing of a social process and its gradual perfection. The evidence on the length and rhetoric of coup speeches indicates an increasing intertextual sophistication. In the above acts the coup makers assert their authority through explicit performatives and declaratives to change the governments in power to pave way for their own. As said earlier, it is important also to consider the initial hailing which forms the latitude of acceptance among the citizenry. Cap (2010, 29) explains that "if a novel message is generally accepted after it has been communicated for the first time, its credibility (and hence the credibility of the speaker) tends to increase over time. Once it has been fully internalized, the subsequent novel messages are interpreted relative to it". The first message eases the acceptance and the familiarity of the subsequent messages. Furthermore, some of the most important democratic institutions like the elected assemblies and state governments are all banned and dissolved with ease by each coming military government under a democratic regime. Constitutional governance has made way for military diktat and dictatorship and this has further ingrained and sedimented this new system of government as an alternative political construct.

4.2.3 Setting up power and political base

Having dismissed previous governments, the coup makers attempt to form their own in the political space they have created. In dissolving the governments found in power they are indirectly instituting themselves as the new leaders. Only two in the speeches come out obviously to show a power transition from the government overthrown to the new one i.e., Abacha and Orkah. Others use the pragmatic context to make the audience know that they have taken over.

> *Nzegwu:*
>
> *In the name of the Supreme Council of the Revolution of the Nigerian Armed Forces, I declare martial law over the Northern Provinces of Nigeria.*
>
> *Garba:*
>
> *Decides to form a Federal Military government*
>
> *Abacha:*
>
> *A Provisional Ruling Council (PRC), is hereby established. It will comprise….*
>
> *Orkah:*
>
> *The former Armed Forces Ruling Council is now disbanded and replaced with National Ruling Council to be chaired by the head of state*
>
> *Dogonyaro:*
>
> *In order to enable a new order to be introduced, the following bodies are dissolved forthwith pending further announcements:*

The expressions there all carry with them an apparent sense of political entitlement and force.

- *Declaring martial law*

- *Deciding to form a government*

- *Establishing a provisional ruling council*

- *Disbanding the Armed Forces Ruling Council and replacing it with National Ruling Council*

- *Enabling a new order to be introduced….*

All these acts spell power and its exercise by simple declarations, and decidedly treat the audience as subjects being informed and guided and not in any way involved in deciding the processes upon which they are going to be governed. They are in short dictated upon regarding the changes. All these acts of declarations that change existing state of affairs indirectly replicate Althusser's classic example of hailing: "hey you there!", but in this case it is like saying "Hey you there, I am your new master and you are my new subject!" The first announcement forms the beginning of this ritual of subjugation which is re-enacted or rehashed by others. The jubilation or silence or even lack of resistance reproduces a ritual of acquiescence and affirmation. So, announcing the takeover of governments simply becomes the reality of the takeover itself. It forms another way of political formation with its new felicity conditions in terms of instituting a new political order and in proscribing an old one. With time, Nigerians come to associate martial music with power takeover. In essence, what come to be Yule's (1996) IFID's i.e., Illocutionary Force Indicating Devices in the coup speeches are not only the coup texts. Abaya (2008) maintains that most of the coup announcements are made and televised on TV. Martial music and the national anthem are played before the announcements. Coup officers appear in military fatigues sitting in between two national flags. They appear stern and unsmiling while reading the coup notes. They read from the notes and give a stare at the camera. Morris (1995, 57) talking about the semantics of body language sees eyes stare as meaning threat and action:

> The direct stare with a fixed, stony expression is always threatening…… For this reason, professional boxers often 'eyeball' one another just before a fight, in a mutual attempt

to intimidate one another. The reason the stare is so worrying
is because it hints at an imminent attack.

The stare complements the textual threats, orders and commands. See Appendix 13 for Abacha's stare. Abaya (2008, 156) maintains that the coup speeches phonologically are read with strong, sonorous voices with high stresses on new legislations and sanctions in order to exhibit "a macho image in stamping authority". Radio stations are also asked to hook on to the national news and, through this, the announcement is made over and over again, drumming it in the minds of the overall country. Wiking (1983, 23), talking about the role of radio stations in power takeover, maintains that:

> In staging a military coup, the new rulers assert their right to power by taking control of certain strategic places, such as the parliament building, the main post-office, the international airport and the radio station. But the symbols of power no longer have the same authority that they once had and perhaps nowadays the control of information, brought about by the seizure of the radio station, is the most important part of true power.

If in the past, governments are formed through the process of the ballot and the new government is sworn in by a formal process involving the Chief Justice of the federation, now a new one can be instituted using the power of the military and the announcement of the coup itself. Madame De Stael (cited in Luttwak 2016, 149) captures moments of Napoleonic coup victory in France rather succinctly "as soon as the moral power of the national representation was destroyed, a legislative body, whatever it might be, meant no more to the military than a crowd of five hundred men, less vigorous and disciplined than a battalion of the same number". In essence, since the institution that forms the parliament has been removed then whatever attached prominence they may have has gone away. Indeed one may add that the parliament is not the people themselves but the discourse that forms them i.e., the constitutional arrangement that makes them relevant and the constitution gets abrogated by every coup act.

Moreover, in the two analyses, talking about the dissolution of old government and the ushering of a new one especially other organs of the government, there is the use of 'hereby', see Table 11 below:

1	Decree 61 of 1993 is	**hereby** *abrogat*ed.	Abacha 1993
2	Decrees Number 2 and 46 are	**hereby** *abrogated*. We wish to emphasise that	Orkah 1990
3	All radio stations are	**hereby** *advised* to hook on permanently to the	Orkah 1990
4	in any part of the country are	**hereby** *bann*ed.	Abacha 1993
5	armed forces and the police forces are	**hereby** *confined* to their respective barracks.	Orkah 1990
6	consultation with my colleagues, do	**hereby** *declare* that in view of what has	Garba 1975
7	The Federal Military Government	**hereby** *decrees* the suspension of the provisions	Abacha 1983
8	government and elected assemblies are	**hereby** *dissolved*.	Nzegwu 1966
9	The Interim National Government is	**hereby** *dissolv*ed.	Abacha 1993
10	The two political parties are	**hereby** *dissolved*.	Abacha 1993
11	Provisional Ruling Council (PRC), is	**hereby** *established*.	Abacha 1993
12	A curfew is	**hereby** *imposed* from 8 p.m. to 6 a.m.	Orkah 1990
13	Finally, a dusk to dawn curfew is	**hereby** *imposed* in Lagos and all state capitals	Dogonyaro 1985
14	A dusk to dawn curfew is	**hereby** *imposed* until further notice.	Garba 1975
15	media houses, government is	**hereby** *lifting* the order of proscription with	Abacha 1993
16	Dogonyaro, of the Nigerian Army,	**hereby** *make* the following declaration on behalf	Dogonyaro 1985
17	committee by whatever name called is	**hereby** *proscribed*.	Abacha 1993
18	You are	**hereby** *warned* that looting, arson,	Nzegwu 1966

Table 11: Lines with 'hereby', heralding performatives

The use of 'hereby' here indicates an ushering of a performative with declarative powers. It is a formal adverb used mostly in legal language.According to Austin (1962, 57) the word 'hereby'

> is often and perhaps can always be inserted; this serves to indicate that the utterance (in writing) of the sentence is, as it is said, the instrument effecting the act of warning, authorising, etc. 'Hereby' is a useful criterion that the utterance is performative.

Here it is used likewise in giving an air of legality and seriousness to the declarations made by the military. Words like '*imposed*', *'abrogated', 'banned', 'confine', 'declare', 'dissolve', 'establish*' etc. '*Hereby'* mostly collocates with '*dissolved* 'and '*imposed*' here. The powers to *'dissolve', 'form*' and *'impose*' are associated with the military. In this psychological

operation, the strong notion is that the military have legal and extra-legal wherewithal to do what they have done. Searle (1976, 13) maintains that declarations, as done here by the military in Table 11, bring about "the correspondence between the propositional content and reality, successful performance guarantees that the propositional content corresponds to the world: if I successfully perform the act of appointing you chairman, then you are chairman…." In such enactments, there are also the creations of subjects through the positioning of one commanding and the other being the commanded. Such acts "embody ideological representations of subjects and their social relationships" (Fairclough 2002, 131). In the immediate all previous legislations are suspended or repealed. In 1, for example, what is abrogated is the decree that forms the interim national government. In totality we have such performatives like: *'abrogate', 'ban', 'confine', 'declare', 'decree', 'dissolve', 'establish', 'impose', 'lift', 'make', 'proscribe', 'warn'* etc. These acts are all, invariably, doing the acts that they name. In essence, they have Bourdieu's (1980, 110) magical power of the performatives. The magical efficacy of the performative, he argues, which makes what it states, magically instituting what it says "does not lie, as some people think, in the language itself, but in the group that authorizes and recognizes it and, with it, authorizes and recognizes itself". There is a double role here. The people that announce the coup recognise it and exercise power over it and the people of the country follow suit through their jubilations, compliance with regulations and through the support shown by the media.

In essence, by that initial declaration by Nzegwu, the process of the authorisation has begun and the reaction of the populace welcoming it (Ajayi 2007, Abaya 2003, and Siollun 2009) fulfils the role of recognizing it. The authorisation and recognition done in the first coup breathe power into the subsequent coup speeches and the self-prominence of the performatives themselves as a form of recognized language manufactured with its peculiar felicity condition. The words '*I suspend the constitution*' or '*I declare martial law'* etc., henceforth become a process for the institutionalization of military governance by the context that the military have defined, consolidated, and internalized by, and in, the polity. That begins the actual political formation of an alternative object of governance and its subjects beside democracy.

4.2.4 Laws and sanctions

After the dissolution of governments and the establishment of new ones, the first law usually constituted that affects everybody is the imposition of a curfew. Curfew restricts movements at certain specified timings by the coup makers. The laws here (especially immediate ones) are mostly concerned with the strategic survival of the coup itself. The use of 'all' here (see examples below) indicates the absolutist nature of the rules enacted. It gives an air of absolute and unlimited control of the entire life of the country. When one is in a position to determine the closure of 'all' seaports and airports and to control all movements, then the psychological message remains that they have the power to do that. It also shows the military as authoritarian and dictatorial people that may not need to have any recourse to legal provisions or adjudications on crucial and sensitive matters like the human rights of the people:

All the incumbents of the above named offices shall, if they have not already done so, vacate their formal official residences, surrender all government property in their possession and report to the nearest police station in their constituencies.....

All the political parties are banned; the bank account of FEDECO and all the political parties are frozen with immediate effect.

All foreigners living in any part of the country are assured of their safety and will be adequately protected.

All categories of workers on essential duties will, however, report at their places of work immediately.

All airways flights have been suspended forthwith and all airports, seaports, and border posts closed.

All seaports and airports are closed, all borders remain closed.

By the same token, all citizens of the five states already mentioned are temporarily suspended from all public and private offices in Middle Belt and southern parts of this country until the mentioned conditions above are met.

All members of the armed forces and the police forces are hereby confined to their respective barracks.

All unlawful and criminal acts by those attempting to cause chaos will be ruthlessly crushed.

Be warned as we are prepared at <u>all</u> costs to defend the new order.

<u>All</u> workers and all Tanker Drivers will observe today, 29th of July, 1975, as a work free day.

<u>All</u> political, cultural, tribal and trade union activities, together with <u>all</u> demonstrations and unauthorized gatherings, excluding religious worship, are banned until further notice.

In the overall, airports and seaports occur more with *'all'* and are either closed or suspended as shown above. The closure of airports and seaports restrict movement in other to forestall any counter attack or reprisal. Such closures also attempt to prevent any escape of wanted political enemies. Bank accounts are frozen to possibly stop any last minute looting or withdrawal of funds. Radio stations are asked to hook on to the national network to avoid hijacks and counter coup or propaganda. Union activities and demonstrations are all banned to avoid protests against the coup.

Overall, the ability to infringe on human rights like freedom of movement, of assembly etc. (and absolutely) clearly indicates that nothing is beyond the purview of a martial legislation or rule. The militariat is thus the legislature, the executive and the judiciary all lumped into one. And that martial declaration puts all aspects of adjudication into one as well, unlike the democratic process that involves three bodies for checks and balances. The military define the law, interpret it and execute it. In the explanation aspect we shall see the effects of these extra-judicial and extra ordinary aspects of governance on both the citizenry and the political class in solving problems within the political leaders and the citizenry. Some of the legislations made are for the immediate strategic survival of the regimes. All these strategies are taken in the immediate for the survival of the coup and in sending signals that the new regime means business.

Also, if we look at the taxonomy of crimes and punishment drawn by the military we would see that many of the illegal acts spelt out are frozen on details because they are nominalizations. Nzegwu for example state that:

> *You are hereby warned that looting, arson, homosexuality, rape, embezzlement, bribery or corruption, obstruction of the revolution, sabotage, subversion, false alarms and assistance to foreign invaders, are all offences punishable by death sentence.*

In this statement '*sabotage', 'subversion'* and *'obstruction of the revolution'* have not been clearly defined, meaning that there is the need to still revert to established statutes to define these terms or the military would, by themselves, decide how one's act is to be defined and sanctioned. In essence, there is clearly a room for the military to deal with anyone as they see fit as aspects of law here are hazy and subject to their own interpretation. *'Embezzlement'* and *'bribery'* are placed ambiguously either as synonyms or different objects per se as in *'embezzlement', 'bribery' or 'corruption'* instead of having them subsumed in a hyponym like *'corruption'.* Generally, this lack of clear details on the law may contribute to a sense of awe and fear in the country as anyone can be charged and punished as the coup makers have given themselves a wide leeway within which to rope opponents or regime critics. This leeway is greatly widened by the choices in the language, especially in the use of nominalizations.

4.2.5 Taking care of the future

The military, having painted the past as bleak, attempt to reassure the citizenry of a good future only if the right changes (as argued by them) are made. In other words any future that is good is contingent upon their leadership or the changes that are about to be made. These changes though comprise both the use of forceful and reassuring language. Using commissive acts which comprise threats, reassurances and promises, the coup makers further impress it on the citizenry of being in control and are thus more interpellated as subjects. The use of 'will' does not only show commissive acts but deontic authority and with various functions. There are 28 occurrences of 'will' with 'be' with thematised subjects, see concordance output in Table 12:

1	country are assured of their safety and	**will be adequately protected.**	abacha 19
2	the armed forces and the police which	**will be answerable to himself alone,**	orkah 1990
3	reform of the following major institutions	**will be carried out:**	abacha 1993
4	Any acts of looting or raids	**will be death**. Everyone should be calm.	dimka 1976
5	Any attempt to test our	**will be decisively dealt with**.	abacha 1993
6	Our security system	**will be enhanced** to ensure that lives of	abacha 1993
7	Constitutional conference with full constituent powers	**will be established** soon to determine the future	abacha 1993
8	This regime	**will be firm, humane, and decisive**.	abacha 1993
9	a dusk to dawn curfew	**will be imposed between 7pm and 6am**	abacha 1983
10	Further announcements	**will be made** in due course. God bless	dogonyaro 1985
11	Further announcements	**will be made** in due course. Long live	garba 1975
12	to foil these plans from any quarters	**will be met with death**. You are warned,	dimka 1976
13	These	**will be modified** as the situation improves.	nzegwu 1966
14	Doubtful loyalty	**will be penalized** by imprisonment	nzegwu 1966
15	day or proclamation or other authorized notices	**will be penalized** by death	nzegwu 1966
16	military commanders in support of the change	**will be punishable** by a sentence imposed	nzegwu 1966
17	broadcasts of troop movements or actions,	**will be punished** by any suitable sentence	nzegwu 1966
18	revealing vital to the running of any establishment	**will be punished** by death sentence.	nzegwu 1966
19	Also, a Federal Executive Council	**will be put in place**.	abacha 1993
20	Shouting of slogans, loitering and rowdy behavior	**will be rectified** by any sentence of	nzegwu 1966
22	the armed forces and police commissioners who	**will be redeployed**. officers	dimka 1976
23	failure to declare open loyalty with the revolution	**will be regarded** as an act of hostility	nzegwu 1966
24	Any previously entered into with any foreign nation	**will be respected** and we hope that such	nzegwu 1966
25	The states affairs	**will be run** by military brigade commanders	dimka 1976
26	acts by those attempting to cause chaos	**will be ruthlessly crushed**.	orkah 1990
27	Anyone caught disturbing public order	**will be summarily dealt with**.	abacha 1983
28	Anyone caught disturbing the public order	**will be summarily dealt with**.	garba 1975

Table 12: Lines indicating the occurrences of 'will' with passives and thematizations

There is an intense preoccupation with the law and the establishment of order and control. The strong commitment there is projected in the future through passives that foreground the themes they are most interested in. This intense activity can be seen in material processes that denote militant action and authority. There are phrases like *'be adequately protected'*, *'be carried out'*, *'be answerable to'*, *'be decisively dealt with'*, *'be established'*, *'be firm'*, *'be made'*, *'be imposed'*, *'be met with death'*, *'be penalized'* (2), *'be punishable by'*, *'be punished'* (2 times), '*be ruthlessly crushed*', *'be summarily dealt with'* (2 times). Relative to other occurrences we find the words dealing with punishment standing as the predominant. Numbers 4, 5, 12, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 26, 27 and 28 are explicit threats and warnings. The militancy of these words can help in creating an image of phenomenal power and in inspiring awe. 1 and 24 are reassurances to the international community and their local interests. Line 25 is both a commitment and declaration concerning local commanders taking over leadership of states.

The use of the modal '*will*' indicates power because the speaker commits the state apparatus into certain restructurings geared towards the future and with definitive resolutions. This ability to determine the course of events spells the possession of power and the implicit notion of unbounded strength. There is also the Habermasian claim to rightness, i.e., the claim to be normatively right to utter what one is uttering. It is here that the one of the most interpellative powers of the military is most shown, i.e., the power to be able to control fates of the citizenry and their acquiescence to this control. Machin and Mayr (2012), in discussing the level of authority in these two sentences "you will come with me" and "you must come with me", maintain that the former indicates the power of the speaker to determine what will happen while the latter is an appeal to an unmentioned power using 'must' thus making 'will' much more powerful. So in this case "will", as part of relational modality, clearly indicates who has the power and the 'will' to control the life of another or the conditions of the nation. The penalties and proclamations they make are all made as such because of the belief that they have the power to determine events and what 'will' or 'will not' happen in the life of the nation. There is also a lack of hedging and mitigation in the statements made.

The arbitrariness of the rules made by the military indicates the aspect of power to construct, interpret and execute the laws. Sometimes these are even passed to subordinates like local commanders. Nzegwu for example proclaims that:

> *Demonstrations and unauthorised assembly, non-cooperation with revolutionary troops are punishable in grave manner up to death.*
>
> *Refusal or neglect to perform normal duties or any task that may of necessity be ordered by local military commanders in support of the change will be punishable by a sentence imposed <u>by the local military commander</u>.*
>
> *Spying, harmful or injurious publications, and broadcasts of troop movements or actions, will be punished by any suitable sentence* deemed fit <u>by the local military commander.</u>
>
> *Shouting of slogans, loitering and rowdy behaviour will be rectified by any sentence of incarceration, or any more severe punishment <u>deemed fit by the local military commander.</u>*

In these cases, the passive has an agent i.e., the local commander. The acts are clearly thematised and those to issue punishment are named. In other cases, i.e., Garba, Dimka, Abacha and Orkah there are no agents (see below). Only the acts are spelt out and prominently placed as the themes and the action to be meted out against the law breakers. Probably in the mastering of the technologies of power (Foucault 1988), the other coup makers have come to realize that agent mentioning may reduce the awe in the mystery of those to execute the laws.

> *Garba:*
>
> *Anyone caught disturbing the public order will be summarily dealt with.*
>
> *Dimka:*
>
> *Any attempt to foil these plans from any quarters will be met with   death...*
> *Any acts of looting or raids will be death.*
>
> *Abacha:*

Anyone caught disturbing public order will be summarily dealt with.

Orkah:

All unlawful and criminal acts by those attempting to cause chaos will be ruthlessly crushed.

Laws here can be made at the discretion of the military to be interpreted and executed by them as well. Nzegwu even explicitly declares that sentences that *'are deemed fit*' by the local commanders should be passed. In essence, it is at the discretion of the local commanders to decide how one is to be punished without recourse to any laid down regulations or written statutes or laws. '*Summarily dealt with'* means that the sentence will be passed pronto or instantly. In the angle of interpretation, as we can see, there are so many nominalizations in the laws i.e., *'spying', 'demonstrations', 'shouting of slogans', 'disturbing public order', 'raids', 'looting'* etc. All these acts are frozen on details and their signifieds may be subjective and also at the discretion of the military to interpret. For example, how can one disturb public peace, is it by making physical noise or by speaking against the new order, etc.? The point made here is that the military try to present themselves as capable of determining the fates of the citizenry and taking care of the future of the nation and in making declarations that can serve their political contexts and circumstances.

4.2.6 Conclusion

To sum up, the interpellation aspect has shown how the military set about running the affairs of the nation. Althusser (1971, 181) argues thatwhen the individuals are exposed to ideology and act according to its rules, they are altered to the subjects of that ideology. Interpellation occurs the time the subjects are hailed directly or dramatically by ideology "ideology 'acts' or 'functions' in such a way that it 'recruits' subjects transforms them all by that very precise operation which I have called interpellation or hailing."

The first aspect is the interpellation carried out by the coup makers through their speeches. The second one is the subjection to the Subject (which is the coup itself as an ideology). In essence, the subjects here become targets of the coup as a Subject or political ideology. The third is the mutual recognition from subject to subject and vice versa as carried out by

people in jubilation to the return of the military to political power and the press's approval and agreement (like the one by *The Daily Times*). All subjects here recognise and identify themselves as such and implicitly and explicitly accept their roles. The laws of the land promulgated afterwards appear to be the last part towards the subjectivation of the citizenry to the new status quo. Taiwo (1996, 182) succinctly observes that the polity appears to assent to their obligations through performances that indicate their obedience:

> By dancing in the streets, and in some cases garlanding soldiers who have shot their way into power, people indicate to the new regime that they accept it, or as a minimum, that they are not inclined to oppose it in the short term. Simultaneously, the demonstration of support kindles or reinforces in the regime a belief that it has done right or has at least not done wrong….

Those 'bad subjects' (Althusser 1971) or what Martel (2017) would call 'misinterpellated subjects' who appear not to be fully interpellated and who challenge the authority of the military in government are extremely few. Most of the critics do not question the appropriateness of the military as a political force and leadership to which they are interpellated but only sometimes challenge the incumbent leaders on certain charges. Following Hegelian dialectics, one can argue that the military regime has reached a point of synthesis and what remains is building upon it another thesis then antithesis. Its social formation has reached a point of acceptance and argument has shifted away from suitability of the system to the suitability of who takes over. Fairclough (2001, 32|) maintains that by making people occupy particular subject positions, such positions are thus reproduced. "It is only through being occupied that these positions continue to be a part of social structure". The formation and occupation of the subject position by the Nigerian citizens help in reproducing the military hegemonic structure.

To show the essence of interpellation, for example, the Ghanaian government strongly formulates an anti-coup clause in their constitution that empowers the citizenry with the right to resist any unconstitutional political interference or intervention. Ginsberg *et al*. (2013, 1429) capture this clause here:

> Article 1(3): All citizens of Ghana shall have the right and duty at all times— (a) to defend this Constitution, and in

particular, to resist any person or group of persons seeking to commit any of the acts referred to in clause (3) of this article; and (b) to do all in their power to restore this Constitution after it has been suspended, overthrown, or abrogated as referred to in clause (3) …Where a person referred to in clause (5) of this article is punished for any act done under that clause, the punishment shall, on the restoration of this Constitution, be taken to be void from the time itwasimposed and he shall, from that time, be taken to be absolved from all liabilities arising out of the punishment……

In fact the constitution goes further to state that people who suffer as a result of exercising a right to resist an unconstitutional takeover of power, like in a coup, are not only absolved of any crime but liable to be compensated:

Article 3(7): The Supreme Court shall, on application by or on behalf of a person who has suffered any punishment or loss to which clause (6) of this article relates, award him adequate compensation, which shall be charged on the Consolidated Fund, in respect of any suffering or loss incurred as a result of the punishment (Ginsberg *et al*. 2013, 1429).

This decision taken by the Ghanaian government is to make a counter narrative and to arrest the efficiency of using a particular naturalized interactional routine of power grab to interpellate the citizenry. Fairclough (2001) corroborates this by maintaining that "the naturalization of interactional routine is an effective way of constraining the social relations which are enacted in discourse, and of constraining in the longer term a society's system of social relationship" The interactional routine we can identify here are the coup genres and power take over which over time have naturalized that facet of taking over government. He adds: "finally, the naturalization of subject positions self-evidently constrains subjects, and in the longer term both contributes to the socialization of persons and to the delimitation of the 'stock' of social identities in a given institution or society" (Fairclough 2001, 87) . This also appears to be the case as the naturalization of the subject self-evidently constrains subjects and makes them remain so and help in their reorientation and

recognition of their roles. In essence, the naturalization of situation types helps to consolidate particular images of the social order and its gradual adoption or acceptance as the simple obtainable common sense of doing things.

Power is, thus, taken over on the basis of force and through performatives that prove so. Stringent rules are made that have to be followed. These rules achieve various objectives. First, they give the impression that the new government is in control. Secondly, they send signals to others in the armed forces (possibly on the fence) of the decisiveness and strength of the new government. Thirdly, they help in the immediate survival of the government especially the imposition of curfews to avoid opponent troop's movement etc. The aftermath of this subjection shall be discussed in the explanation stage of Fairclough's (1989) three dimensional analysis.

Overall, in the last two segments, i.e., representation and interpellation, the past and its effects have been rhetorically described by the military and the present and future have been taken care of by way of stiff legislations. In the final segment, we would look at how representations feature as premises in argumentation.

4.3 ARGUMENTATION

The analyses I have done so far in other parts of this chapter are one form of representation and interpretation or the other which all, in practical circumstances, are aimed at serving as raisons d'être of action. The attempt here to transit to argumentation and practical reasoning is to gauge the speakers' or writers' points of view at a higher and global level. Presuppositions, nominalizations, metaphorisation all enter as premises here because they attempt to serve as description of aspects of the arguments or reasons for taking a particular action. They are seen from the point of view of the fallacies that they hold in them as premises. Practical reasoning and arguments as maintained earlier relate to action and what is to be done as against theoretical argumentation that simply describes what is in the argument. The relevance of this to CDA is in the fact that it further strengthens the outlook of discourse at a higher level, especially where ideological interests are negotiated via premises (Fairclough and Fairclough, 2012). Assuming someone describes his political opponents as 'thieves' in a given discourse, it is not enough that this   negative expressive

value is simply identified as such without seeing or explaining how it serves to be woven into a 'circumstance' for certain action, like in changing political leadership.   It is instructive to understand that coup speeches are made mostly after, or in the midst of, action. The speeches come as a form of seeking for support via justification. The premises in table 8 below would be looked at on the basis of Fairclough's (2014, 3) critical questions but rephrased to suit this study.

Critical Questions	
CQ1 Is it rationally acceptable that, in principle, a coup leads to the various positive claims or targets of better future or state of affairs the coup makers claim?	*testing the premises*
CQ2 1s it rationally acceptable that the country is in the circumstances that the coup makers paint?	
CQ3 Is it rationally acceptable that the coup makers actually have the stated goals in mind (and that the stated goals are actually generated by the stated normative source)?	

Table 13: Critical questions' schema, testing the premises

4.3.1 Coup claims and goals: Misleading

The first critical question in Table 13 pertains to aspects of claims and goals. The analysis done here as such involves weighing the reasoning and rationality of the coup makers in terms of the connection between coup making and the goals they proclaim to be achieved. Table14 is a summary of the goals of the coup makers that are textually declared.

coups	goals
Nzegwu	*to establish a strong united and prosperous nation, free from corruption and internal strife….what we do promise every law abiding citizen is freedom from fear and all forms of oppression*
Abacha	*Promotion and protection of national interests*
Dogonyaro	*restore hope and renew aspirations, to stop stubborn and ill-advised unilateral actions*
Orkah	*To stop intrigues, domination and internal colonisation of the Nigerian state by the so-called chosen few. To stop Babangida's dictatorial desires*
Abacha	*Restore peace and stability, enthrone a lasting true democracy*

Table 14 : Declared goals of the coup makers

The claims made by the coup makers may not lead to goals, at least the goals avowed in the speeches. From empirical historical evidences, the coup claims, goals and values turn out to be rhetorical rather than factual. As shall be seen in the discussion of other questions, the goals claimed are mostly rationalizations that sometimes involve clear manipulations of facts to achieve implicit ideological goals. In the following discussion, I look at the various aspects of the CQ1 and the fallacies and logical contradictions that may void the goals and claims of the coup makers.

4.3.1.1 Argumentum ad baculum

First, looking at Table 14 above, there are clear positive goals that the coup makers attempt to achieve through coups which are, on the face of it, the products of reasoning. On the other hand, there is a tough language used where the overall concept of reasoning is

jettisoned and the use of force is adopted. The oscillation between forceful and rhetorical language indicates an ideological struggle and the anxiety about the need for the coup to succeed by all means, fair or foul. The interpellation segment shows this aspect of the creation of a subject by means of force. Use of force attempts to instil fear, awe and acceptance where reasoning may be perceived to be inadequate. This involves the operation of a fallacy i.e. the fallacy of the argumentum ad baculum. According to Pirie (2006) this fallacy leaves the argument behind and moves on to force as a means of persuasion. It introduces irrelevant material into the argument, and its use "represents the breakdown and subversion of reason" (Pirie 2006, 18).The danger of this fallacy is in using force in conjunction with "reason" i.e., claiming to use force in the interest of the people, convincing them that something quite false is true. For example, in the quotes below there are explicit threats against not abiding by the regulations of the new regimes:

- *Any attempt to test our will be decisively dealt with (Abacha)*
- *Any attempt to foil these plans from any quarters will be met with death.(Dimka)*
- *Wavering or siting on the fence and failing to declare open loyalty with the revolution will be regarded as an act of hostility punishable by any sentence deemed suitable by the local military commander.(Nzegwu)*
- *Be warned as we are prepared at all costs to defend the new order.(Orkah)*

People comply with these orders or do not resist them even where their fundamental human rights are abused. In fact, Hill (2012) argues that Nigerians have a nostalgia of regimes that have this forceful nature and that are capable of instilling discipline in them like the Buhari/Idiagbon regime. Thus interpellation has done much to create a paternalistic role for the military and the position of wards to the citizens who feel that they have to be reprimanded or watched over to be able to behave appropriately. Take for example the editorial of *The Daily Times* welcoming the Nzegwu coup and calling it 'a new order' or the press release by the toppled party, NPC, praising the coup makers for a 'great task' (Siollun 2006). These incidences indicate in a way the acceptance of the violent status quo and the right of the exerciser to mete out this and to argue and see things from the dominant military code by the interpellated citizens. Invariably the justification of the use of force for the advantage of the victim helps in legitimizing violence and in promoting the fallacy

that violence can sometimes trump reasoning in dealing with people. This use of violence and stringent regulations in actual sense is exercised for the survival and success of the regime not for the general good. If a curfew is imposed, for example, movement is restricted to avoid a counter coup.

4.3.1.2 Clash of premises

There are also clashes of premises which are either as a result of a struggle over meaning or ambivalences attendant in wanting to establish authority and seek for solidarity at the same time. Nzegwu, for example, claims to *fight for freedom from fear, freedom from general inefficiency and freedom to live and strive in every field of human* Yet, he promulgates, in what he calls Extra-Ordinary Orders of the day, such stringent regulations as '*Spying, harmful or injurious publications, and broadcasts of troop movements or actions* to be *punished by any suitable sentence deemed fit by the local military commander. Shouting of slogans, loitering and rowdy behaviour*' to be' *rectified by any sentence of incarceration, or any more severe punishment deemed fit by the local military commander*'. '*Doubtful loyalty*' to be also *'penalized by imprisonment or any more severe sentence'.* In this inversion of value hierarchies by Nzegwu, the punishment of issues like 'doubtful loyalty' among others is a means to providing freedom from fear! We find here means-to-goals rationally clashing with goals. In essence, there is fear and general lack of freedom, in contradiction to the very values he comes to establish. There is probably a redefinition of the term *'freedom', 'fear' or 'loyalty'* or in essence their nodal points are diminished or their meanings are not established. The strict legal or quasi- legal penalties put in place do not appear to take human rights into cognisance. One other area of contradiction is when Nzegwu declares that:

> *…. no citizen should have anything to fear, so long as that citizen is <u>law abiding</u> and if that citizen has religiously <u>obeyed the native laws of the country and those set down in</u> <u>every heart and conscience since 1st October, 1960.</u>*

But in the same speech, Nzegwu declares martial law over the Northern Provinces of Nigeria and suspend the 1963 Constitution. Declaring martial law has inadvertently and instantly repealed any other law and has created a constitutional vacuum. This act also has

voided the goal of enthroning the rule of law in the country. The coup itself commits acts of mutiny and treason. According to the 1963 constitution section 218, subsection (1), "the powers of the President as the Commissioner-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Federation shall include power to determine the operational use of the armed forces of the Federation" (cited in Akpeninor 2013, 30). In this case, Nzegwu has committed mutiny by usurping the powers of the commander-in-chief, and hence there is a flouting of the rule of law, the law that he threatens the citizens to follow.

Similarly, Dogonyaro accuses the Buhari government, also a fellow military, of arrogating to '*themselves the right to make the decisions for the larger part of ruling body'*. Orkah also accuses Babangida of a *dictatorial* attitude. But can there be a democratic military regime? Is it not what the military do at a higher level to the country while grabbing power or in their regime, i.e., to dictate to the whole country as a team while the citizens follow? These two accusations in a way show their love for democratic values and an ironical attack on the oligarchy that the military government in spirit and action is. In general, all coups and military regimes are dictatorial and oligarchic in nature. Edelman (1985) argues that through the use of adverbial or adjectival qualifiers that purport at one level of meaning to intensify an affirmation or claim while they negate it at another level, politicians or the political class manipulate meaning. The speaker who calls for a "true" freedom is invariably arguing for restraints on some other people's freedom, just as the insertion of the word "true" before "equality" is a sign that some inequality is being rationalized or justified elsewhere. By using 'dictatorial' there Orkah has not only glossed over the overall military incursion into political as vintage dictatorship, but he has placed his own power grab as probably a sort of revolutionary action. As Edelman (1985, 18) further maintains"…language offers a logic to defend any position regardless of contradictions, and it does so subtly. In the domain of political language there are many mansions, and they often defy the laws of physics by occupying the same semantic space. When signifiers like *'freedom' 'dictatorship', 'rights'* etc. float, they are held and made into 'moments' by a nodal point or a crystallizing point and their value remains temporarily fixed and inherent to that meaning hub. In essence, *'freedom'*, for example, has a peculiar meaning potential only within the coup discourse of, say, Nzegwu, and may lose this import outside of that text or context.

4.3.1.3 Appeal to universal values

Similarly, the coup makers also use universal values in order to gain acceptance of what may be their subjective interests. People easily yield to universal values. Fairclough and Fairclough (2012) argue about how an appeal to underlying institutional values may be targeted in order to legitimize a political process or objective. An appeal to fairness, for example, "can legitimize political action because fairness is a publicly justifiable or publicly recognized legitimate value. In addition, its invocation suggests that the politician is one who honours the (institutional, objective) obligation attaching to his status function." (Fairclough and Fairclough 2012, 115). No one may be against a political intervention meant to restore values like freedom, fairness etc. but the questions remain: how are these values defined, what are the routes to follow to gain them, or are the values used as means to an end or an end in themselves? Take for instance the claim of *'revolution'* made by the coup makers, i.e., Nzegwu, Dimka and Orkah. The term 'revolution' is more of a euphemism than a fact describing what the coup makers do.James (1983), for example, challenges the use of the term *'revolution'* in the Nzegwu coup. If we accept the definition of a '*revolution*' as an attempt to free people and their institutions through radical political, economic and social change through extra-constitutional means, James (1983) argues, then the officer's objectives fall short of this goal. He further explains that:

> This view is substantiated by a careful examination of Ademoyega's analysis of the political and military prelude to army intervention, both of which suggest that the revolutionary officers' aims were not the universal humanitarian objectives of freeing all Nigerians and their institutions through radical political, economic and social change, but the narrow parochial objectives of tilting the political pendulum in favour of their respective regions. (James 1983, 325)

Coups have not proven to fight corruption (Ajayi 2007, Siollun 2013, Mazrui 1977) which is one of the cardinal objectives of staging a takeover of power. So, in this case the values of probity, accountability, integrity etc. that they claim to fight for are simply at rhetorical levels to achieve their immediate goals of power snatch. The soldiers perfect the art of patron client relations that spans the social, economic and political realms in the country which exacerbates corruption (Ajayi 2007). They displace the civilian counterpart and try

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to create a class of their own. Adekanye (1993) argues also that by the time the military rule ends in Nigeria in the 1990s, the social, political, and economic structures of the country have been taken over by the retired military professionals. See appendices 15, 16, 17 for tables that show the amount of economic interests the military have gained due to their stranglehold on power. In their book "how to stage a coup", Hebditch and Connor (2009) argue that the truth of the matter is that there are two twin motives for any one political action, and that may be true as far as the Nigerian military is concerned. The first set contains the justifications one is going to mention to potential sponsors and supporters. The second set includes the real reasons one is leading troops into the political arena, and these, they argue, an officer will not share with anybody outside their most intimate clique.

To sum up, the analysis done here is in terms of examining a fallacy in the use of force and the contradictions that abound in the premises used by the military and how all these serve their interest. The goals they avow to achieve, i.e., the reasons why they change governments are put in rhetorical constructions that sometimes clash with other premises. On the one hand, a coup maker may argue for the enthronement of a rule of law, on the other hand, overlooks the means to this objective i.e. a coup which flouts the constitution of the state. This is better explained in terms of the anxiety and ambivalence of a coup. A coup maker may be lost as to how much leniency is balanced with force and the need to succeed at all cost.

4.3.2 Coup circumstances: rhetorical & contrived

The analysis here in CQ2 is in terms of the circumstances constructed as premises for a power take over. I argue that the circumstances are built through the use of loaded language, hasty generalization, argumentum ad hominem and the use of self-serving signifiers. In essence, the circumstances are constructed to suit the ideological interests of the coup makers and they do not actually represent the true state of affairs in the country.

4.3.2.1 Fallacy of emotive conjugation or freeloading terms

This fallacy is based on the emotive conjugation popularized by Bertrand Russell in his example "I am firm. You are obstinate. He is a pig-headed fool" (cited in Johnson and Blair 1994, 160). This fallacy occurs with a schema like this:

X truly does A
Y truly does A
But for X, Y does not do A but Z

While opponents are described in loaded and generalized terms using negative expressive values, the in group see themselves differently (with positive expressive values) even when doing the same action. A Coup, by the doers, for example, is seen as a *'revolutionary'* or messianic act while if a similar thing is done against the incumbents and who come through a similar coup process, the doers are treated as treasonable felons or mutineers that deserve to be killed at the stake by a firing squad (Adegbija 1995, Cervenka 1987).

Crime as such has no inherent essence more than the doer of the action. Orkah accuses General Babangida of "the murders of Dele Giwa, Major-General Mamman Vasta, with other officers as there was no attempted coup but mere intentions that were yet to materialise and other human rights violations", yet in what he calls "the successful ousting of the dictatorial…. of General Ibrahim Badamosi Babangida" there are murders committed by his coup team in the exchange of fire during the coup (Siollun 2013). But these murders are not mentioned, and in their stead a reference to "successful ousting" is made. Essentially the murders he commits are not murders but most probably collateral damage to a move towards change.

Moreover, in the coup speeches announced by Abacha, there is an utmost emphasis on the necessity of his mission and the decrial of the politicians in the 2nd republic. His mission is couched as a duty:

> *I and my colleagues in the armed forces have in the discharge of our national role as promoters and protectors of our national interest decided to effect a change in the leadership of the government of the Federal Republic of Nigeria and form a Federal Military Government.*

Yet, when a similar thing is done by Orkah against their government i.e. a coup, Abacha comes out and issues a stern rebuke in a counter coup speech:

I, Lieutenant-General Sani Abacha, Chief of Army Staff, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, have found it necessary to address you…. In view of the <u>unfortunate, development early this morning</u>…

"Early this morning there was sporadic firing by <u>a few disloyal and misguided soldiers</u> in some isolated parts of Lagos, followed by <u>an embarrassing radio broadcast</u>.

"Fellow Nigerians, you will all agree with me that the reasons given for <u>this grave misconduct</u> are <u>significantly motivated by greed and self-interest</u>. The soldiers involved decided to <u>constitute themselves into national security nuisance for no other cause than base avarice.'</u>

Most of these <u>disloyal elements</u> have been….The <u>remaining dissidents</u> are advised in their own interest to report to the nearest military location and hand over the arms and ammunition in their possession…. No amount of <u>threat or blackmail</u> will detract the federal military government's attention in this regard.

In the underlined words, we can see how the coup makers are negatively appraised. The act of coup is an *'unfortunate development','* grave misconduct', 'threat or blackmail'. While the officers who attempt the power take over are *'dissidents', 'disloyal and misguided soldiers'*, who are significantly motivated by *'greed and self-interest'* and *'constitute themselves into a national security nuisance for no other cause than base avarice'*. Abacha who in his life has made two coup announcements on radio taking over power is now viewing such broadcast as an embarrassment. This can be represented below in this argument structure:

- Abacha takes over power through a coup and sees it as the promotion and protection of national interests
- Orkah attempts to take over power through a coup
- According to Abacha taking over power through a coup by Orkah is an act of disloyalty, grave misconduct by misguided soldiers not that of the promotion and protection of national interests.

The fallacy of emotive conjugation applies here because acts are named differently by social actors according to their involvement or lack of or according to their selfish interests.

Similarly, Abacha in a speech on July 19th, 1993 (during Shonekan's interim administration), gave an address to senior military officers at the National War College in Lagos, in which he made the following statement (cited in Kalu 2008, 101):

> The success of the military profession depends on the <u>disciplined subordination of the officers and men of the armed forces to the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria that we have all sworn to uphold</u>. Thus you must resist all attempts to be used by unpatriotic people <u>to subvert the Constitution</u>. It is your <u>cardinal duty to defend the Constitution</u>. The nation, and indeed the whole world expect no less of you.

Yet, on November 17, 1993 (barely four months after his speech), General Sani Abacha, overthrows the Interim National Government and takes over the reins of political power. This is making it the second time Abacha has announced a takeover of power and established military regimes.

This argument particularly shows that the construction of circumstances are done on the basis of self-interest not an objective assessment of the reality on the ground

Similarly, Gowon, who became the head of state as a result of a coup plot says, in response to the 1966 coup:

> *the country <u>was plunged into a national disaster</u> by the <u>grave and unfortunate action taken by a section of the army against the public</u>. By this I mean that a group of officers, in conjunction with certain civilians, decided to <u>overthrow the legal government of the day</u>. But their efforts were thwarted by the <u>inscrutable discipline and loyalty of the great majority of the army</u> and the other members of the armed forces and the police. The army was called upon to take up the reins of government until such time that law and order had been restored. The attempt to overthrow the government of the day was done by eliminating political leaders and high-ranking army officers, a majority of whom came from a particular section of the country.*

Gowon here sees a coup as against the public interest not against an incompetent government. He also sees the act as an overthrow of '*the legal government'* in the country. This clearly shows that a term like '*legality'* or the *'public'* do not have any inherent logic or objective meaning other than the circumstances for which they are brought to label. Gowon is a beneficiary of a coup himself and is one of the longest serving military heads of state in the country. Can his government then be seen as perpetuating illegality?

In essence, the fluidity with which words are used to represent various self-serving signifieds indicates the essence of language in serving and masking ideological interests and in perpetuating military autocracy in this context. In short, actions are not bad based on their inherent nature but based on the context and the doer of the action.

4.3.2.2 Analogical fallacy (metaphor)

According to Lightbody and Breman (2010, 191), the metaphorical fallacy to a deductive inference is committed when the following two conditionsare fulfilled "(i) a faulty comparison is made between two things (false analogy); and (ii) this faulty comparison is then used as a premise in a sub-argument that is supposed to prove some conclusion which is believed to follow deductively". In the case of this study such analogies are used with deductive premises that rationalize military action or a coup plot. Lightbody and Breman (2010, 186) provide a schema to view a metaphorical analogy:

> Proposition 1: A is to B
> as
> Proposition 2: C is to D

Some of the metaphors used can be seen in the following analysis and reconstructed in a table:

> *The nation is at the <u>risk</u> of continues <u>misdirection</u>.*
> *the <u>slow pace</u> of action of the federal government headed by Major General Muhammadu Buhari…..the government has started to <u>drift</u>….*
> *(Dogonyaro)*

A clog[4] in the wheel of progress…..major and unpardonable clog in the wheel of progress of the Nigerian state (Orkah)

We should show more restraint and <u>build a united and peaceful Nigeria</u>.. for the international community, we ask that you suspend judgment while <u>we grapple with the onerous task of nation building</u>, reconciliation, and <u>repairs</u>…. to <u>restore</u> peace and stability to our country and on these <u>foundations</u>, enthrone a lasting and true democracy (Abacha)

Coups	Proposition 1: A is to B	As (Proposition 2:) C is to D
Dogonyaro	A reckless or inexperienced driver is to a vehicle	As Buhari is to the government
Orkah	A cog is to the wheel of a vehicle	As Babangida is to the nation
Abacha	An expert builder is to a derelict building	As the coup team is to the country

Table 15: Analysis of the metaphorical propositions in the speeches

Table 15 manifests the latent notions of the metaphorical projections made. In Dogonyaro's analogy, we have the imagery of a vehicle which is at risk and which is misdirected, slow, drifting and this vehicle is controlled by president Buhari. This creates a case about the effects of having a driver who is inexperienced or who doesn't understand the road, like *misdirection*, *slow movement* and *drifting*. All this conjure up the image of one driving the nation in a state of confusion. It at the same time justifies a case of having adroit and deft

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[4] Kpeerogi explains that: "A cog in the wheel of progress," also sometimes rendered as "a clog in the wheel of progress." This is undoubtedly derived from the distortion of the Standard English idiom "a cog in the wheel," also rendered as a "cog in the machine." It means an insignificant but nonetheless essential person in a large organization, as in: "The lowly civil servant is a cog in the ministry's machine." But Nigerians use the idiom to mean a stumbling-block, a hindrance, as in: "he is a cog [or clog] in the wheel of progress." https://www.dailytrust.com.ng/news/others/top-cutest-and-strangest-nigerian-english-idioms-ii/89933.html

drivers that can 'transport' the nation to its right 'destination'. The implicit metaphorical notion they wish to cue here in the MR is:

> An excellent road savvy driver is to a vehicle
> As
> Our coup team is to the nation

Since they (the coup makers) have identified areas of Buhari's weakness then a conclusion should be arrived at about their driving expertise and road savvy. These associations projected metaphorically have much more rhetorical nuance than a literal usage. However, what Dogonyaro, above, sees in terms of a stranded or misdirected vehicle and probably the driver as either reckless or not adept in driving is his own ideological construction of the situation which singles out the person of Buhari for blame. What he may have omitted is the position of the coup makers in terms of the vehicle. Are they in it as part and parcel of the government or outside as uninvolved onlookers? How far has the quarrelling in the inner caucus and top hierarchy of the administration contributed in distracting the 'driver' or the 'pilot'? Associations like these are mystified and hidden. The coup team that topples Buhari is all part of his top supreme council (Siollun 2009) that collectively rules the country.

Similarly, Orkah sees Babangida as an impediment by constructing him in terms of *'a cog* in *the wheel of the nation's progress'*. A wheel that is hamstrung by an object cannot move properly and progressively unless the object is removed. Abacha's construction of the nation as a building needing a firm foundation, also, has not discussed his role and the other coup agents in the destruction of the national 'edifice', especially as they have been part of the previous and existing governments.

All these analogical efforts are perhaps made to manipulate public opinion, divert attention on faults of the in group, focus attention on the faults of the out-group and seek support for the coup claims. The use of metaphors here serves their immediate rhetorical and ideological interests which further help in proving that the Circumstances of the coup are constructed in a subjective manner. The roles of the coup makers as helpers are implicitly made along with the explicit condemnation of their opponents: Abacha as a builder; Orkah

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as a clog remover; Dogonyaro team as good drivers. Creating premises like these, Lightbody and Barman (2010, 188) argue,

> deeply problematizes analogical reasoning. Metaphors, novel ones and dead versions, ascribe new and unique properties to one component of these propositions. The relations employed in these propositions are simple predications. Hence when metaphorical propositions are used in an analogy the kind of relation that such arguments can rely on for inferences to a fourth component is quite circumspect.

In clear linguistic terms metaphors are categorical in their assertions as they do not come with any epistemic modality and that reality is represented or predicated in a convenient imagery that serves to communicate ideological interests through an efficient system of comparison. As observed by Bolinger (1980, 146) "a single decision, guided by a metaphor that has become a rallying cry, can affect the lives of a million". The constructions of such metaphors by the coup makers only frames a particular version of reality which they want the Nigerian public to see and identify with while mystifying a version of reality whose knowledge may jeopardise their ideological interests. Their constructions are simply made on the basis of arbitrary predications that present facts as givens and without a thorough justification.

4.3.2.3 Loaded words

Loaded words are words calculated "to conjure up an attitude more favourable or more hostile than the unadorned facts would elicit…" (Pirie 2006, 106). Such loaded words are replete in the coup speeches and they are used against the political enemies of the coup makers and positively used for selves too.

There are many linguistic facilities that can be used to aid the use of loaded words in political statements. For example, presuppositions and nominalizations can be used to charge an opponent negatively without facts or figures. The actions of political enemies or the nature of state of affairs in the country are constructed in such nominalizations that simply freeze processes and assume the givenness of information. Take as an example the case of Murtala where Dimka talks about the detection of the former's "deficiency". This

vague term has not said anything about this deficiency, and that what may count as "deficiency" to Dimka may not be the same to another person. Definitions like this hold "rhetorically induced social knowledge" (Schiappa 2003, 3). Orkah itemizes a long list of charges against the Babangida administration using a combination of nominalizations and existential presuppositions:

1. The _destruction_ of the peoples of Plateau State,
   especially the Lantang people
2. _The buying of the press by generous monetary favours_
3. The _usage of State Security Service, SSS,_ as a tool of
   terror.

4. The _intent_ to cow the students by the promulgation of the
   draconian decree Number 47.

5. The _cowing of the university teaching and non-teaching_
   staff
6. The shabby and dishonourable _treatment_ meted
7. The wholesale _hijacking_ of Babangida's administration
   by the all-powerful clique.
8. The disgraceful and inexplicable _removal_ of
   Commodore Ebitu Ukiwe,
9. The now-pervasive and on-going _retrenchment_ of
   Middle Belt and southerners from public offices

10. The deliberate _disruption_ of the educational culture
11. The deliberate _impoverishment_ of the peoples from the
    Middle Belt and the
12. Their instant _replacement_ by the favoured class and
    their stooges
13. His _appointment_ of himself as a minister of defense,
14. his _putting_ under his direct control the SSS,
15. his deliberate _manipulation_ of the transition program,
16. his _introduction_ of inconceivable, unrealistic and
    impossible political options,
17. his recent _fraternisation_ with other African leaders that
    have installed themselves as life presidents
18. his dogged _determination_ to create a secret force called
    the national guard

The charges are all in nominalizations with negative expressive value. The use of 'the', 'his', and 'their' indicates the use of existential presuppositions. Yule (1996, 27) maintains that existential presuppositions are not only found in possessive constructions, "but more

generally in definite noun phrase….the speaker is assumed to be committed to the existence of the entities involved|". Definite noun phrases abound in Orkah's speech as seen above. From 1-11, there are fixed nouns phrases preceded by 'the'. Then from 12 to 18, there are other existential presuppositions with possessive constructions. The combination of factual commitment associated with existential presuppositions in noun phrases with 'nominalizations' (as head nouns) shows reality which is virtually stinted on details yet loaded with prominent negativity. Downing and Locke (2006 162-163) argue that a nominalized expression, "distances us from the event, raising the representation of a situation to a higher level of abstraction". This also makes the expressions acquire "temporal persistence, instead of the transience associated with a verb" (Op cit.). The tenseless nature of nominalizations adds to their strength in the assumption of factual reality. The ideas there are just shown to be givens and that they are the simply the reality. But there are no facts that are clearly itemized. A burden of proof should be attached to these charges which are empty of detail. Johnson and Blair (1983, 128) represent a loaded term argument in this schema:

> 19. *M* labels something, *X* (a person, act, event, situation, etc), in a way that is ether debatable or false.
> 20. *M* uses that classification of *X* without defense as support for some conclusion, *Q*.

Orkah's action is thus based on argumentum ad hominem and the fallacy of emotionally and negatively loaded terminologies to discredit Babangida's government and using that as raison d'être for his coup.

Just as Orkah, Abacha also does the same but with a clear premise of action, i.e., verbally connecting the premise of reason and the premise of action. Using the above Johnson and Blair's (1983) schema, this is how Abacha present his argument against the Shagari administration:

1. He labels the living conditions of the country as *harsh, intolerable, the economy hopelessly mismanaged, health services in shambles, educational system deteriorating, unemployment figures embarrassing etc.* He labels *leaders as reveling in squandermania, corruption and indiscipline*

2. He uses these loaded classifications of the civilian political class and their actions without solid factual evidence as a premise in his decision to take over power which he spells out here*:*

> *After due consultations over these deplorable conditions, I and my colleagues in the armed forces have in the discharge of our national role as <u>promoters and protectors of our national interest</u> decided to effect a change in the leadership of the government of the Federal Republic of Nigeria and form a Federal Military Government. This task has just been completed*

The phrase 'these deplorable conditions' is an anaphoric reference to the itemization done in the preceding text. The statement in the quote above is, thus, drawn upon as a logical contingent of his own ascription of the guilt of the politicians. The use of '*due consultation'* further accords his mission certain positivity. Having built up this rhetorically convenient circumstance with a rationally faulty premise about the civilian political class and the condition of the country, the solution to the problem is presented as a change of power by the 'promoters of national interests' represented by Abacha.

As argued by Johnson and Blair (1994, 160) as long as the arguer earns the right to depend on associations like these by providing the requisite evidence for their applicability, "there is no problem. However, such terms are easily abused, often thrown into an argument without any justification being given."

This emotionally charged language can only provide a biased slant on problems of substance, distorting issues and replacing cogent argument (Govier 2010). The presence of loaded language in an argument, Govier (2010) further maintains, often takes the place of evidence; it works to convey assumptions and attitudes without supporting reasons. The absence of argument can be a fault when claims are controversial and statements need support, and when an arguer builds up a case like 'a strawman' then moves ahead to attack their suppositions since that is much more surmountable.

4.3.2.4 Fallacy of hasty generalization

The fallacy of hasty generalizations occurs when people are treated in group with a particular tag which makes them lose their individual and personal features. In repeated cases, this can lead to stereotyping. This is represented this way:

X is true for A.

X is true for B.

Therefore, X is true for C, D, E, etc.

Walton (2006) argues that such generalizations are universal and that a universal generalization is absolute in nature because it says something about each and every individual of the given kind, and no exceptions are shown unless the generalization is appropriately qualified. Abacha and Nzegwu treat the civilian political class enmasse in talking about the crimes of a few. In fact no name is particularly mentioned but the overall group is condemned. Nzegwu calls the politicians in the 1st republic:

> *The nepotists*
> *The profiteers*
> *The tribalists*
> *The swindlers,*
> *the men in high and low places that seek bribes and demand 10*
> *percent*
> *enemies of the revolution and enemies of the people.*

Abacha, for his part, sees the government of the 2nd republic as:

> *An inept and corrupt leadership*
>
> *Irresponsible leadership of the past….*

It serves the political and ideological interest of the military to employ this fallacy for it is only then that their systemic purge will be justified. If they single out certain politicians as the criminals, the citizens may argue about the removal of those few bad elements than saving and sustaining the system. Walton (2006) points out that a grave problem with argumentation based on generalizations is that some people that are highly committed to a viewpoint tend to overlook qualifications that are needed in a specific case. Such a lack of

flexibility in argumentation "is at the root of the rigid stereotyping that is characteristic of fanatical and dogmatic arguers ….Such arguers want to see everything in a black-and-white, polarized kind of way that rigidifies defeasible generalizations into universal generalizations" (Walton 2006, 20). With a rigid classification between bad and good governments, making a systemic change is easy.

And to show that the charges of the military against the politicians are sometimes trumped up or simply used as excuses to stage a coup, most of the politicians so riled against are not tried for corruption, and the charges they proclaim against them are in most cases dropped. President Shehu Shagari who was toppled by Abacha was put under house arrest. The other politicians were arrested and later on mostly released by Babangida in yet another attempt at garnering support for his coup. Decalo (1976, 27) argues that "all too often the political elite, whose venality had been cited as a principal reason for the intervention, is treated with a magnanimity inconsistent with the impassioned accusations previously levelled against it". Coup makers also wait too for a perfect contextual opportunity (Maier 2000) before they strike. The need for opportunity to strike is thus predetermined and is contingent not upon the mishaps or wrong doings of the incumbent regime as passionately captured in their speeches but on the suitability of an ideologically convenient context of action.

4.3.3 Stated goals: not from normative sources

CQ3 in this segment is about whether it is rationally acceptable that the coup makers actually have the stated goals in mind (and that the stated goals are actually generated by the stated normative source). The major facts have already been analysed in CQ1 & CQ2 and here the basic analytical interest is both at the level of history and rationalization.

The implicit or stated goals of the coups are mostly a form of rationalization which borders both on epistemic and ethical issues. The goals may be talked about essentially in terms of a lack of comprehension of the overall situation or an honest misrepresentation of issues or in terms of a clear manipulation of facts to achieve goals as in the coup speech in the first republic. The former is thus an epistemic problem while the latter is ethical because it borders on the manipulation of the truth. Even at the level of the manipulation of truths,

there are a lot of controversies on the basic objectives of the coup, generating debates and a body of literature in history. Major Adewale Ademoyega, one of the coup makers, wrote a book in 1981 entitled *Why We Struck*, trying to justify their action in the 1966 coup. Ademoyega (1981) describes the 1966 coup as a nationalist one motivated by idealism and a desire to tackle corruption and end the anarchy and mindless violence that was raging then. Barely a year after the publication of the book, two ripostes were written in forms of books, namely: *The Five Majors: Why they Struck* by A.M. Mainasara and *Let Truth Be Told: The Coup D'état of 1966* by D.J.M Muffet. The arguments of the latter books indirectly see the reasons and objectives proffered by the coup plotters as a form of rationalization to cover the actual reasons, which are regional competition, professional jealousies and ethnic intolerance. The latter reasons manifest themselves much more with other coup regimes throughout history until the departure of the military in 1999.

4.3.4 Conclusion

To sum up, this argumentation analysis has attempted to do a higher level analysis above representation. Issues represented by the coup makers are seen from the perspective of practical reasoning and as part of the premises for action. Here we see how facts are redefined or recontextualized and that meaning chiefly remains context-dependent. We see how Abacha who considers their coup against Shagari as *promotion* and *protection of national interest*, ironically perceiving others who have attempted a coup against their regime as *misguided soldiers* prompted by *base avarice.* As argued by Chilton (2004), in political discourse authorial position is 'here' and 'now' which equates what is right and good as demonstrated by Abacha's position. Where ever a coup maker happens to be temporally, ideologically or otherwise is the right place, and those outside that realm are not doing the right thing, a moral deixis per se. In other words, what is normative is within the space that a speaker talks from, and opponents speak in the converse of that position. This typifies the fallacy of emotive conjugation. I also argue that nominalizations are loaded to charge opponents, and set up a straw man for easy attack. A burden of proof needs to be attached, and following Habermasian validity claims, there is the flouting of truth validity on the part of the speakers. The coup makers fail in uttering propositional truths, or in truthfully asserting a representation of a state of affairs. Iconicity as provided

in transitivity is essential in saying a propositional truth rather than using grammatical metaphors. Cognitive metaphors, for their parts, do the same but also reframe reality in the interest of the coup makers. Higher values are also appealed to in order to make people focus and look at the bigger picture, yet these values may serve as means to ends not ends in themselves. All in all what we have in these arguments are rationalizations that are constructed into arguments to make them rhetorically acceptable and to legitimatize their actions. The analysis done here disambiguate and deconstruct these rationalizations as a whole.

4.4 OVERALL DATA ANALYSIS CONCLUSION

In the above three segments (i.e. 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3), I have been able to analyze the speeches at different levels that triangulate and then strengthen the essence of the results. In 4.1, I have shown how the coup makers talk about themselves in relation mostly to their opponents, painting themselves as saints while their opponents as the villains of the nation. Here the aim of the coup makers is to inspire confidence among the citizenry and thus to create acceptability. The coup makers in the next segment attempt to show their possession of the power or authority to lead or rule through interpersonal constructions that hierarchize roles and responsibilities and that evince submission. The data divides into the analysis of: representation of actors and action, subject interpellation and the control of the future. There is a high level of rhetoric and the attempt to discredit the past and raise the positive image of the intervening governments. In the aspect of interpellation, the coup makers attempt to take over the reins of leadership and set up laws. The audience's role shifts from those to be convinced about the necessity of the takeover via the delegitimization of past regimes and legitimization of selves to those to be held with firm grip as military subjects. The analysis of the interpellation process is important because it demonstrates the linguistic tools that could possibly help in the building up of the military in political governance. Here there is the use of performatives, deontic modalities and the like. Generally, this indicates the level of distance in interpersonal connection between the audience and the coup makers. As observed by Scollon & Scollon (1995, 53) "when the weight of imposition increases, there will be an increased use of independence strategies. When the weight of imposition decreases, there will be an increased use of involvement strategies".

Involvement strategies are more with the representational analysis through the construction of ideal readers, the use of inclusive 'we' and space builders that mitigate social hierarchy like 'fellow countrymen' etc. Independence strategies, on the other hand, are more invested in the interpellation analysis where roles are delineated between the makers of law and the followers of law.

The argumentation analysis revisits representation again to see how elements are used as premises in arguments. Nominalizations, presuppositions and metaphorical constructions put a spin on a speech, yet without substance in terms of concrete details and facts. All previous points in terms of justifications are seen as premises on the backdrop of practical reasoning and argumentation. They are seen also not within the realm of valid arguments only, but substantially also within the realm of the use of naturalized viewpoints as premises. The argumentation analysis is also not done on the basis of normative standards and valid argumentation only, but with the advantage of using historical hindsight afforded by the time frame of the coups (1966 to 1993) to gauge claims of the coup speeches against their practical/historical actions. All this lays bare all the issues involved.

By and large, the analyses have revealed aspects of description, interpretation and argumentation as espoused by (Fairclough 2001 and Fairclough and Fairclough 2012) in embedded social actions and interactions of phenomenal political incidences as in coup speeches in Nigeria. The next chapter will complete the procedures of demystification as in shedding light on the socio-political and historical contexts that give rise to coups and the power they assume to have, and in turn also the effects of the coups in existing power relations in Nigeria. This will be the explanation of the social context stage in Fairclough's (2001) three-dimensional analysis.

CHAPTER FIVE: EXPLANATION AND CONCLUSION

5.0 INTRODUCTION

In this chapter, I complete the analysis of Fairclough's (2001) three-tier analytical framework which is the explanation stage. The explanation synchronizes well with the conclusion as issues are seen in terms of higher level of analysis including their social impacts. The analysis done in Chapter 4 relates to both textual analysis (description) and processing analysis (interpretation). The first part of this chapter deals with social analysis (that is the explanation level). I try to see how discourses in these texts are influenced by prior discourses and how they may influence subsequent ones. The speech of Nzegwu is the reference point for both prior and later texts. In particular, I compare the first coup with Lord Lugard's proclamation to see how the orders of discourse of one can influence another, i.e. how colonialism influences African military leadership. Then I compare the former's speech again with series of other coup speeches to see areas of possible influences. After that, using Thompson's (1984) schema of ideological analysis, I analyze the overall texts to lay bare the common sense assumptions built in the texts. I also discuss my research questions, methodological issues, the title of the thesis and directions for future research. Then I make an overall conclusion of the chapter.

5.1 DIALECTICS OF DISCOURSE

According to Fairclough (2001, 1) CDA is the analysis of "the dialectical relationships between discourse (including language but also other forms of semiosis, e.g. body language or visual images) and other elements of social practices". Its concern particularly is with the radical changes that are going on in contemporary social life, with how discourse appears within processes of change, and with shifts in the relationship between semiosis and other social elements within networks of practices.

To this end, Fairclough (2001, 138) maintains that there are three questions that can be asked of a particular discourse under investigation at the level of social determinants, ideologies and effects:

1. Social determinants: what power relations at situational, institutional and societal levels help shape the discourse?

2. Ideologies: what elements of members' resources drawn upon have ideological character?

3. Effects: how is this discourse positioned in relation to struggles at the situational, institutional and societal levels? Are these struggles covert or overt? Is the discourse normative or creative? Does it contribute to the sustenance of existing power relations or in their transformation?

I attempt to look at the questions and to answer them as units of the chapter.

5.1.1 Historical role of the military since colonialism as a determinant of its power relations

The historical role played by the army as an army of conquest determines its political role in Nigeria's history, for immediately after the departure of the colonialists the army strikes and takes over power. It holds onto power intermittently for 36 years of the nation's fifty years of independence. The army adopts the policies and attitudes of their mentors. When an actor adopts a particular social practice, they are also most likely to copy its orders of discourse. According to Chouliaraki and Fairclough (1999), an order of discourse is a socially structured construction of discursive practices involving both genres and discourses which constitute the discursive field of the social order. The social order in our case is militarism which copies from colonialism.

This historical position of the military as a colonial army is perhaps what gives the coup makers the strength and audacity to challenge civilian administration and exert their own political interests barely after the exit of their colonial progenitors. In a report by the Crisis Group Africa, the Nigerian army has been noted for its human rights abuse. The report says "abuse is deep-seated and longstanding, dating to the army's pre-independence origins, when soldiers (and police) saw themselves as the enforcement agents of the colonial government, thus superior to other citizens. This feeling was reinforced by military rule" (2016, 17). Similarly, Falola and Ihonvbere (1985) equally maintain that the antecedent of the military as a repressive tool of the imperialist in conquering nation states and in sustaining colonialism position its subsequent role in deploying similar apparatus in gaining power and making it reckon as an important sub class. As also rightly maintained

by Ukpabi (1976, 74) "during the colonial period the army was not above politics, and there was no reason to expect that the contrary would be the case after independence". After the exit of the colonial lords, there is suddenly an avalanche of coups all over Africa. The decade that mostly sees to the independence of most nations i.e. 1960-70 is even called the 'decade of coups' for there are about 21 coups in the continent (Wangome 1985) and by 1987, out of the 52 independent African States only 12 have been spared "the turmoil of military coups and conspiracies to overthrow civilian governments" (Cervenka I987, 1).

It is in light of this vast influence of one political order onto another that I compare Nzegwu's coup speech, being the first in Nigeria, with Lord Fredrick Dealty Lugard's address to the conquered people of the Sokoto caliphate in 1903. One interesting fact about the two gentlemen is that not only were they military men but both attended the Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst, England, (Siollun 2009, Faught 2011). Talking about the academy in an article in The Telegraph entitled: *Sandhurst Where Warriors Are Made*, Dewar (2013) observes that "the Academy's motto is 'Serve to Lead'…It teaches, above all else, that an officer must lead by the force of his unselfish example; it explicitly emphasises the centrality of leadership rather than man-management". Whether this fact influenced the political actions of both Nzegwu and Lugard in political decisions later in their years remains controversial. Feit (2011) indicates that this military background in a way influences their political attitudes.

I study their speeches to see possible areas of influences and formation of ideas. Chain analysis of this kind, according to Chouliaraki and Fairclough (1999), creates channels between discursive practices and across orders of discourse which systematically connect discursive practice with others. This also relates to aspects of intertextuality which "points to the productivity of texts, to how texts can transform prior texts and restructure existing conventions (genres, discourses) to generate new ones" (Fairclough 1992, 270). The findings indicate areas of influence at the generic level and at the specific levels in audience, authority, law and order, delegation of responsibility.

5.1.1.1 Genre

At the global level, both speeches have a structure that revolves around three important themes: declaration of a change from past system to the new one, promulgation of laws

and the reassurances to the people. Declaration of a change involves formation of new subjects and new authority. Promulgation of laws solidifies and consolidates authority. It also brings about aspects of delegation of responsibility. Reassurances on the other hand are germane on the basis of ideological pacification.

5.1.1.2 Audience as conquered subject

Both Lugard and Nzegwu appear to address similar audience and circumstances. The nature of the address is a performative of a kind which engenders telling people or the audience that they are now subjects under a new dispensation or order. Lord Lugard assembles all the people under a '*giginya*' tree and makes his pronouncements. Equally Major Nzegwu uses more modern instruments of the mass media, i.e., the radio, to address and reach out to the whole people conquered through a coup. The announcement or the proclamation performs the act of the establishment of a new political authority. The audience is simply confronted with a state of affairs and they are meant to fully interpret it as such. This sense of interpellation with the existence of certain realities is ideological by bringing issues into play but leaving a vast lacuna of assumptions in the MR of the audience.

> *The old treaties are dead, you have killed them. Now these are the words which I, the "High Commissioner", have to say for the future. (Lugard)*
>
> *In the name of the Supreme Council of the Revolution of the Nigerian Armed Forces, I declare martial law over the Northern Provinces of Nigeria. (Nzegwu)*

The audience will have to work out what the *Supreme Council of the Revolution of the Nigerian Armed Forces* is or means, or what the *High Commissioner* or the *old treaties* talk about. In case they cannot find any in their MR, then they store it post hoc as new knowledge. In short, people are simply confronted with a state of affairs 'voila!'! And a new state springs up, as if by magic. Ideology simply confronts them as simply how things are not as it should be or not as a moot topic involving their contributions. They are also addressed using 'you' by both to show that they are in proximity ideally to the new people at the helms of affairs i.e. in close proximity to be able to listen to the new proclamations and work with them pronto. The audience is thus treated as a conquered subject.

5.1.1.3 Authority

Lord Lugard acts as a harbinger with the powerful use of 'I' which indexicalizes the influence and the power of the speaker (Bramley 2001):

> *Now these are the words which I, the "High Commissioner", have to say for the future. (Lugard)*
>
> *I declare martial law over the Northern Provinces of Nigeria. (Nzegwu)*

This harbinger role is also re-enacted by Nzegwu. Both Lugard and Nzegwu come acting on behalf of higher powerful authorities. For Lugard, he acts on behalf of the King and the British Empire, but for Nzegwu, it is on behalf of his revolutionary council. See below:

> *I have little fear but that we shall agree, for you have always heard that <u>British rule is just and fair, and people under our king are satisfied</u>. (Lugard)*
>
> *<u>In the name of the Supreme Council of the Revolution of the Nigerian Armed Forces</u>, (Nzegwu)*

The two also appear to hinge their authority on the right of conquest and the possession of superior implements of violence. Greene (cited in Ejiougu (2006)) maintains that Lugard derives the legitimacy for his authority to levy taxes, to depose kings and create order on the right of conquests. Coup speeches and the directives therein also are made on the implicit notion of conquest and that the conquered people have no option but to obey the conquerors.

> As governor-general of the 'Nigerian' supra-national state, Frederick Lugard and his successors invoked the same 'right of conquest' as the only 'basis of legitimacy' for their extensive authority. In the post-colonial period subsequent military actors who have exercised authority in the 'Nigerian' supra-national state have all invoked the same 'right' as the sole basis of legitimacy for their own rule (Ejiogu 2006, 254).

5.1.1.4 Delegation of responsibility

In basic terms, they subordinate powers especially through the use of bureaucratic and traditional institutions. Lugard orders that:

> *The Emirs and Chiefs who are appointed will rule over the people as of old time and take such taxes as are approved by the "High Commissioner", but they will obey the laws of the Governor and will act in accordance with the advice of the Resident.*

The colonialists here use traditional authority found on the ground in perpetuating their rule. Both the colonialists and the military have no administrative wherewithal in terms of laid down working policies and men on ground to work so they resort to the use of personnel found and already ingrained bureaucratic structures with a bit of tweaking. Apart from the use of already established bureaucratic and political structures, they also involve the use of traditional rulers and chiefs for grassroot control and support. Balogun (2009, 38) observes that:

> Succeeding civilian regimes have continued this tradition of "indirect rule"—started by the colonial administration and adapted by the military—on the assumption that pampering the traditional rulers is the most effective way of securing the support of their "subjects.

Traditional chiefs and rulers have access to the masses and the masses listen to them, so routing leadership through them may help in getting the support and obedience of the grassroots. Equally, similar refrains are passed especially on areas of potential threats to the regime. Major Nzegwu gives a command almost in the same nature:

> *<u>As an interim measure all permanent secretaries, corporation chairmen and senior heads of departments are allowed to make decisions</u> until the new organs are functioning, so long as such decisions are not contrary to the aims and wishes of the Supreme Council.*

There is also another delegation of responsibility that involves professional colleagues. While Lugard uses Residents:

> *The Emirs and Chiefs who are appointed will rule over the people ..but they will obey the laws of the Governor and will act in accordance <u>with the advice of the Resident</u>...<u>The Resident may give permits</u> to trustworthy men to bear arms....<u>Sentences of death will not be carried out without the consent of the Resident</u>...Every person, including slaves, has <u>the right to appeal to the Resident</u>,...and there are other minor matters which the Resident will explain.*

As can be seen from the quote above, very important responsibilities are reposed in the Residents by the High Commissioner. Crucial Issues that relate to life and death and the bearing of arms are put in the hand of the Resident who would give permission. The residents were all British. Nzegwu possibly borrows the structure and uses local commanders. These local commanders appear to have equally crucial roles and autonomy, and they can adjudicate on matters of their locality

> *Spying, ...will be punished by any suitable sentence deemed fit by the <u>local military commander</u>.....Shouting of slogans by any sentence of incarceration, or any more severe punishment deemed fit by <u>the local military commander</u>....Wavering or siting on the ...will be regarded as an act of hostility punishable by any sentence deemed suitable by the local military commander. ...Refusal or neglect to perform normal duties will <u>be punishable by a sentence imposed by the local military commander</u>.*

Both Lugard and Nzegwu confront a similar circumstance of absence of manpower. They use traditional leaders and the bureaucrats for purely administrative functions, but they leave aspects of life and death and serious adjudications to people that are like them and that they trust. Nzegwu uses local military commanders, while Lugard uses Colonial Residents.

5.1.1.5 Law and order (the snarling process)

Law and order are taken very seriously by both governments. They both have a very serious and uncompromising tone. They use deontic modalities (will) in passing their resolutions

and in taking care of the future (see appendices 19 and 20). Both have a concern about how the new administrations will be conducted and the laws to be implemented.

Far reaching changes are made to bring about a new social order. For Lugard, there is a concern with issues like the legal tender, slavery, laws of succession, law courts, etc., These are all exigencies of a newly conquered state in that era. Nzegwu, for his part, is likewise concerned with laws, punishment, and how to fully discipline and interpellate the new subjects in a modern state. While both exist in different climes and under different political circumstances, what they have in common is the deontic power to force their wills on the conquered people and on the new states.

One interesting case of intertextuality and copying (which though is not in the coup speeches proper) is in decree 4 promulgated by the Buhari military administration of 1984 which is from the 1909 Seditious Offences Ordinance. Published in September 1909 in the official Gazette and reprinted in an extraordinary issue of the government Gazette dated October 1, 1909, the Seditious Offences Ordinance under Sections 3 and 5, is re-echoed and similar in content to the Public Officers (Protection Against False Accusation) Decree No. 4, 1984 (75 years later after its colonial clone!). According to Ogbondah and Onyedike (1991, 61), the colonial one provides that:

> Whoever by words, either spoken or written . . . brings or attempts to bring into hatred or contempt... the government established by law in Southern Nigeria, shall be punished with imprisonment which may extend to two years or with a fine or with both imprisonment and fine. Whoever makes, publishes or circulates any statement, rumour or report, with intent to cause, or which is likely to cause any officer of the Government of Southern Nigeria or any person otherwise in the service of His Majesty to disregard or fail in his duty as such officer or servant of His Majesty. ... shall be punished (Gazette, 1909).

While the decree 4 of 1984 by the Buhari administration states that:

> Any person who publishes in any form, whether written or otherwise, any message, rumour, report or statement, being a message, rumour, statement or report which is false in any material particular or which brings or is calculated to bring the Federal Military Government or the Government of a state or public officer to ridicule or disrepute, shall be guilty of an offence under this Decree.

(Gazette, 1984).

In both the laws, there is an attempt at defining what issues like seditious offences or false accusations are. Ogbondah and Onyedike (1991, 64) further observe that:

> The language and provisions of Section 8, sub-section (i) of Decree No. 4 of 1984 are similar to those of Section 3 of the 1909 colonial newspaper law. That section of the 1984 newspaper law provided for a prison term of up to two years for convicted offenders of the law - the same provisions found in the colonial law. The 1984 press law merely differed slightly from its colonial primogenitor in the sense that (it decree no 4) provided no option of a fine for convicted persons.

In essence, the legal and linguistic dimensions of both laws are nearly the same because they both confront similar apprehensions of wanting total subjugation of the people as governments that are illegal and that are anxious to prevent any form of opposition. The *Colonial Seditious Ordinance* provides the military with a blueprint for the *Protection Against False Accusation Decree No. 4* of 1984. Definitions of what constitute aspects of concern for both the military and the colonialists like *a false message* or *a rumour* are at their discretion for the terms do not carry any inherent meaning or a clear cut objective signification. An ordinary criticism of the government, for example, can be construed as spreading *a false message* or *a rumour*.

5.1.1.6 Reassurances (the purring process)

Both speeches also give a lot of reassurances to the people conquered or about to be ruled. They try to show the benevolence of their administrations. They are concerned with the 'prosperity' of the people and the country as a whole:

It is the earnest desire of the king of England that <u>this country shall prosper and grow rich in peace</u> and in continent; that <u>the population shall increase, and <u>the ruined towns which abound everywhere shall be built up</u>; and that war and trouble cease...In conclusion, I hope that <u>you will find our rule sympathetic</u>, and that <u>the country will prosper and be contented</u>. <u>You need have no fear regarding British rule;</u> it is our wish to learn your customs and fashion, just you must learn ours. I have little fear but that we shall agree, for <u>you have always heard that British rule is just and fair,</u> and <u>people under our king are satisfied</u>. You must not fear to tell the resident everything, and he will help and advice you.

And Nzegwu too gives such reassurances:

...My dear countrymen, this is the end of this speech. I wish you all goodluck and I hope <u>you will cooperate to the fullest in this job which we have set for ourselves of establishing a prosperous nation and achieving solidarity</u>....My dear countrymen, <u>no citizen should have anything to fear</u>....<u>what we do promise every law abiding citizen is freedom from fear and all forms of oppression, freedom from general inefficiency and freedom to live and strive in every field of human endeavour, both nationally and internationally. We promise that you will no more be ashamed to say that you are a Nigerian.</u>

<u>I leave you with </u>a message of good wishes<u> and ask for your support at all times,</u>

They both seem to have a concern about the prosperity of the land, and they reassure the people about needing not to fear the new administrations. The gap or distance between the conquerors and the conquered state is here abridged. The tone also changes from the fiery one dealing with the implementation of laws to a soothing one calming the people. Put in a nutshell, both Nzegwu and Lugard implicitly rest their claim to authority on the basis of conquest, yet need the support of the people to make this enduring. That is why we see 'snarl' and 'purr' words (Hoffmann 2005), trying to balance authority with solidarity with the 'conquered' people. There is also the demonstration of deontic powers in making the state and people change to suit the new governments. Both systems also appear to be handicapped for not having political structures on the ground and would have to use already ingrained structures, forming an expedient structure for administrative convenience. Areas

of influences between colonialism and militarism are in terms of the former begetting the latter and in terms of the conquest speech genre, otherwise called 'coup speech'. The idea of addressing a conquered people goes back to colonialism. The way the colonialists form authority and grapple with the aspect of establishing a metropole colonial state is not lost on the military (the foot soldiers of colonialism) who copy that in grabbing power and forming a praetorian state. In essence, when social orders are copied, the orders of discourse are also copied.

5.1.2 The speech (es) as determinative/constitutive of social practice

Coup speeches and other aspects of military discourse have a dialectical impact at three levels in Nigeria's political life, i.e., impact on the military itself, on civilian leaders and on the citizenry. Agozino and Edem (2008, 69), having looked at and studied the country's social fabric, i.e., the institution of the family, the educational system, the economy, the military, the judiciary, and traditional communities conclude "that the more than thirty years of rapacious military dictatorship, which the Nigerian people have been forced to go through, have left an indelible mark on the collective psyche". This impact can be constitutive of acts and social practices and would be looked at from these levels. At the immediate, the speeches are determinative of practices at the level of instant political changes that occur by their utterance. They politically change the administration and usher in a new one or change the political composition of the country.

5.1.2.1 Impact on the military (socio-political and linguistic)

The first military coup speech by Nzegwu, which I talk about earlier as having a colonial speech genre, has a determinative influence on subsequent coup speeches. It is determinative because it is primarily the first military coup speech in Nigeria. This without doubt creates a template for subsequent coup makers in the country in terms of genre, contents, context and audacity and in strengthening and solidifying the military factor in Nigeria's political governance. Johnstone (2008) argues that each time particular choices are made, the possibility of making those choice are highlighted and given prominence.

So Nzegwu's speech is the pace-setter in all aspects of coup making, including the nature of the speech and the pronouncements made and the way opponents should be addressed

and the laws to be promulgated. Basically, it provides the initial or classical genre of a coup speech. It also sets pace for the creation of identities in terms of the military and the subjects. It aids in the initial interpellation of the citizenry to a praetorian state. Following Derrida (1988), iterability or repeatability of a performative congeals it and makes it non-saturable, i.e., capable of being modified and in this way much more ingrained as a practice. The non-saturability is in the different contents, creativity and increasing sophistication of the other speeches that copy from the initial template as we shall see in the example of the linguistic intertexts below. The coup speech of Nzegwu cannot be compared in terms of rhetoric, for instance, with Abacha's. According to Balogun (2009), military speeches begin to be lengthier and lengthier as time goes on as they are getting much more rhetorical especially when a takeover is made against a fellow military regime that has initially avowed to similar ideals in order not to be caught in ideological contradictions.

The Nzegwu coup invariably demystifies the political strength of a republic and the political class and makes the political institution vulnerable to subsequent military takeovers. Othman (1984), for example, states that there were about ten coup attempts the government had known about in the Shehu Shagari 2nd republic. Babangida also talks about the Dimka coup as a sort of 'we too can do it' action since others have done the same (Agbese 2012). That is to show the infectious nature of coup attempts. It opens the door for all those that have the hearts to plan one. Planning coups invariably becomes a second function of the senior cadre of the Nigerian army having been politicised and having understood the gains involved.

One important area of influence is in the aspect of the formation of a clause in the constitution following the Nzegwu coup of 1966. A constitutional conundrum is created which necessitates the formulation of a decree which empowers the military to suspend and modify the constitution. As such "The legal basis for military rule in Nigeria can be found in two sources: (i) the Constitution (Suspension and Modification) Decree, and (ii) the Federal Military Government (Supremacy and Enforcement of Powers) Decree". (Siollun 200, 75). "Subsequently every single military government in Nigeria's history has re-enacted the Constitution (Suspension and Modification) Decree and the Federal Military Government (Supremacy and Enforcement of Powers) Decree and used them as the legal

basis of its rule" (Ibid). The decree has had "the military revolution which took place on 15 January 1966 effectively abrogated the whole pre-existing legal order in Nigeria" (Ibid) as its preamble. In essence the first military coup has created a constitutional niche or space that a future coup can always be based upon.

 The power of the military junta has not led to the right of resistance formation as in Ghana, Benin, Uganda and other African countries. Far from that, what is obtained in the constitution is the reverse. This is akin to the case of Fidel Castro who used a clause in the Cuban constitution in 1953 to organize an armed attack on a military enclave. "In the court proceedings that followed his arrest, Castro predicated his defense on the constitutionally protected right to rebel, which had itself been enshrined into Batista's new constitution as a justification for overthrowing the previous government" (Ginsberg *et al.* 2013, 1237). Ginsberg *et al.* further argue that even when the right to rebel is not adopted to constrain the future but to legitimate the past, the right to resist may motivate regime opponents later on to latch in on that and bring a change. This is what happens with the Nzegwu coup, other coups follow because there is a right to suspend and modify the constitution.

One other problem created by the military is in the formation of the various Nigerian constitutions i.e., 1979, 1993 and 1995. All the constitutions are arbitrarily formulated with barely any input from the citizenry. They are mostly formed by select people from the elite and the purview of these constitutions is provided by the military. "The military arrogated to itself the right to determine what is right for the people" (Ihonvbere2000, 351). Ihonvbere faults the constitutions at the level of obvious lack of control of the political ambitions of the army, human rights issues, citizenship, lack of constitutional civic education, federalism, gender etc. One of the highlights of the constitution is the belief in the devolution of powers among the six geopolitical zones. Devolution of power is a problematization of elitist interests as regional interests. Power devolution is a metonymic reduction which perceives or construes the elite as a clear representation of all in their region or tribe and this is seen as an end in itself. The constitution "concentrates most of its provisions on dealing with power and much less on civil society. Reflecting the obsession of the Nigerian elite with power" (Ihonvbere 2000, 352).

Coup making also reveals that there is a connection between political power and class interests. See appendices 14, 15&16, for the level of military involvement in commercial ventures in the country through their political clout. In chapter one, I have discussed, at length, the gross economic advantages that the military have gained from political power. This is also reminiscent of the colonial state that uses political power to extract vast economic advantages from the colonies. The materialist motives may be masked in values of redemption and civilization, just as the military may transpose subjective interests in values of freedom, integrity and prosperity.

One other impact is in terms of initiating the possibility of a more formal diarchy. Military regimes are all, in essence, diarchies since they have to work with civilian bureaucracies and cabinets, but as they progress and sophisticate in political power, newer more complex political arrangements are thought about. Babangida, for instance, tries this when he calls himself *president* instead of *head of state* and uses civilian clothes sometimes. He retires his deputy from the army and calls him *vice president* (Siollun 2013). During his regime, there are elections at state levels, but he retains the executive presidential power. In sum, Bangura (1991) sees the militarization of the political atmosphere in terms of acts of indiscretion started by Babangida's diarchy which include the arbitrary dissolution of all the local government councils before their full tenure and the appointment of sole administrators to run the councils.

This power sharing unites the elite (civilian and the military) under one umbrella. The merger of two social and political practices is an attempt to forge a particular hybrid or construct. We have seen this happening though at a more democratic level when retired heads of state become political leaders in Nigeria through the ballot. Though such leaders have come through the electoral processes, their nature as retired military leaders has not been pliant to a democratic liberal atmosphere (Udogu 2005).

So, we can thus say that the effect of the Nzegwu speech in terms of transforming existing power relations is phenomenal since it precedes all others in setting the tone for the military as a political institution and as an alternative to democracy. At the cumulative level, other speeches that come later continue to entrench and solidify these incursions into political

administration, mutually reinforcing themselves and becoming more sophisticated and more naturalized.

There are also linguistic influences that will be discussed at the generic and lexical levels.

At the global level, the coup speech of Nzegwu has given a blueprint to other coup makers in terms of contents and structure. All the coup speeches have a form that includes these points:

- Self-introduction
- Acting on behalf of a group
- Dissolving former government
- Ushering in their own
- Discrediting past regimes
- Justifying the new leadership

First, in looking at the aspect of collective essence, i.e., acting as a group and speaking on behalf of the group, the Nzegwu speech has set a precedence which other coup speeches have followed. See examples below:

In the name of the Supreme Council of the Revolution of the Nigerian Armed Forces ... I (Nzegwu)

I, Colonel Joseph Nanven Garba, in consultation with my colleagues

...this is Lt. Col. B. Dimka of the Nigerian Army calling...(Dimka)

...I, Brigadier Sani Abacha, on behalf of the Nigerian Armed Forces ... (Abacha)

....I and my colleagues in the Armed Forces..(Dogonyaro)

On behalf of all patriotic and well-meaning people of the Middle Belt and Southern parts of the country I Major Gideon Gwazo Orkar ... (Orkar)

...I have had an extensive consultation within the armed forces hierarchy, and other well-meaning Nigerians.... (Abacha)

As can be seen above, all the officers use the 'I' indexical to indicate the entity speaking and their roles, and some with introduction of names. This is to send a message of acting as a group but with a self-identified heralder.

Starting from Nzegwu, utterances are also used to change government and change the overall political atmosphere. They create spaces which are to be filled by the military junta and their teams. They also, at the same, institute their leadership through, see below:

> *Nzegwu*
>
> *The Constitution is suspended and the regional*
> *government and elected assemblies are hereby*
> *dissolved.*
>
> *Garba:*
>
> *As from now on, General Yakubu Gowon ceases to be the head of*
> *the Federal Military Government and Commander in Chief of the*
> *Armed Forces of Nigeria*
>
> *Dimka:*
>
> *Murtala Muhammad's deficiency has been detected. His*
> *government is now overthrown by the young revolutionaries*
>
> *Abacha:*
>
> *Accordingly, Alhaji Shehu Usman Shagari ceases forthwith to be*
> *the President and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of*
> *Nigeria.*
>
> *Dogonyaro:*
>
> *In order to enable a new order to be introduced, the following*
> *bodies are dissolved forthwith pending further announcements:*
> *(a) The Supreme Military Council (b) The Federal Executive*
> *Council (c) The National Council of States.*
>
> *Orkah:*
>
> *The former Armed Forces Ruling Council is now disbanded……*
>
> *Abacha:*
>
> *The Interim National Government is hereby dissolved. The*
> *National and State Assemblies are also dissolved.*

In all these statements, there is an attempt to usher in a new leadership through various means. Though Nzegwu uses performatives to indicate his power and command, others are a bit more subtle as they learn the tricks of power.

Coup speeches also, starting from Nzegwu, are never short of excuses and condemnation of opponents either covertly or overtly. As can be seen in representation and argumentation analyses, opponents are negatively appraised while selves positively. This condemnation serves as raison d'êtrefor the coups themselves. A tradition is thus established in a coup genre regarding the use of condemnation to create justification.

Now moving to the lexical level, Nzegwu also provides some lexicon to the other coup speeches. Look at his use of 'revolution' to describe his coup attempt as an example. He mentions revolutions and issues related to revolution five times in his speech:

> …*Supreme council of the <u>revolution</u>……The <u>revolutionary</u> council…….Enemies of the <u>revolution</u>…….Obstruction of the <u>revolution</u>….Open loyalty to the <u>revolution</u>….*

The term is used together with a presupposition 'the' which shows the existentiality and givenness of the term. This aspect of perception of a coup speech as a *revolution* is reenacted by Dimka and Orkah. Dimka calls his coup team *the young revolutionaries* turning the word 'revolution' from an abstract noun into a name. Orkah considers his coup as *a well-conceived, planned and executed revolution* adding lexical density to the term 'revolution' with prenominal modifiers. This has a way of altering the perception of an object. The construction of a meaning potential that sees coup as a 'revolution' is thus enacted.

Similarly, in Table 16 below, looking at the dates, it is clear that Nzegwu started the use of *'countrymen'* in his address. He used the term three times. This form of address is further reinforced by other coup makers but with increasing sophistication and political correctness. Abacha (lines 7 and 8) and Garba (line 5) use *'countrymen and women'*.

1	of international endeavor. My dear	**countrymen,** this is the end of this speech	Nzegwu 1966
2	of the people. My dear	**countrymen**, you will hear, and probably	Nzegwu 1966
3	displayed in public. My dear	**countrymen**, no citizen should have	Nzegwu 1966
4	till further notice. Fellow	**Countrymen**, this has been a bloodless	Garba 1975
5	Fellow	**country men and women**, I, Colonel Joseph	Garba 1975
6	which disturbances occur. Fellow	**Countrymen and women and comrades at arms,**	Abacha 1983
7	Fellow	**countrymen and women**, I, Brigadier Sani	Abacha 1983
8	wanted people escape. fellow	**countrymen and women**, the change in	Abacha 1983
9	I appeal to you, fellow	**countrymen**, particularly my colleagues in	Dogonyaro 1985
10	driven by a behalf himself, his	**countrymen**, and love for this country, he	Abacha 1993

Table 16: Lines with 'countrymen' arranged with date sequence

The most sophisticated appears to be Abacha who draws a tripartite classification involving men women and comrades at arms. The use of this term as a form of address becomes gradually solidified. "its informational value in providing a framework for interpreting what is changed or "new" by repeating what has already been said"(Fairclough 1991, 20). This repetition continues the process. In Table 17 below, another addition to the form of address in terms of a pre-modifier *'fellow'* is introduced by Garba in line 5 and this is repeated henceforth by other coup makers with various forms of modifications and associations. What started as *'fellow countrymen and women'* by Garba reached its apex with Abacha's *fellow Nigerians*, shedding all its sexist and other classificatory baggage.

1		**Fellow countrymen and women,** I, Colonel	Garba 1975
2		**Fellow countrymen,** this has been a	Garba 1975
3	Good morning	**fellow Nigerians,** this is Lt. Col. B. Dimka	Dimka 1976
4	disturbances occur.	**Fellow countrymen and women and comrades**	Abacha 1983
5		**Fellow countrymen and women** , I,	Abacha 1983
6	wanted people escape.	**Fellow countrymen and women,** the change	Abacha 1983
7	I appeal to you,	**fellow countrymen**, particularly my	Dogonyaro 1985
8	Nigerian Armed Forces.	**Fellow countrymen,** the intervention of the	Dogonyaro 1985
9		**Fellow Nigerian Citizens ,** On behalf of the	Orkah 1990
10	and peaceful Nigeria.	**Fellow Nigerians,** the events of the past	Abacha 1993
11		**Fellow Nigerians,** sequel to the resignation	Abacha 1993

Table 17: Lines with 'fellow' arranged with date sequence

The changes show various attitudes while keeping the context and position intact. Nearly all of them foreground their message with the expression except for Dogonyaro's introduction and Dimka's *'good morning'*. The positionality of these salutation texts, i.e., coming at the beginning of the text, is important in alerting the people to the message and in trying to assuage them to a feeling of a common destiny. Then now we go to the use of 'hereby' in the table 18:

1	elected assemblies are	*hereby dissolved*	Nzegwu 1966
2	You are	*hereby warned* that looting, arson	Nzegwu 1966
3	with my colleagues, do	*hereby declare* that in view of what has	Garba 1975
4	A dusk to dawn curfew is	*hereby imposed* until further notice	Garba 1975
5	The Federal Military Government	*hereby decrees* the suspension of the	Abacha 1983
6	Finally, a dusk to dawn curfew is	*hereby imposed* in Lagos and all states	Dogonyaro 1985
7	Dogonyaro, of the Nigerian army,	*hereby make* the following declaration	Dogonyaro 1985
8	Decrees Number 2 and 46 are	*hereby abrogated*. We wish to emphasize	Orkah 1990
9	All radio stations are	*Hereby advised* to hook on permanently	Orkah 1990
10	forces and police forces are	*hereby confined* **to** their respective	Orkah 1990
11	A curfew is	*hereby imposed* until further notice	Orkah 1990
12	Decree 61 of 1993 is	*hereby abrogated*	Abacha 1993
13	National Government is	*hereby dissolved*	Abacha 1993
14	The two political parties are	*hereby dissolved*	Abacha 1993
15	Ruling Council (PRC) is	*hereby established*	Abacha 1993
16	in any part of the country is	*hereby banned*	Abacha 1993
17	whatever name is called is	*hereby proscribed*	Abacha 1993
18	government is	*hereby lifting* the order of proscription	Abacha 1993

Table 18: Lines with 'hereby' arranged with date sequence

In this table, looking at the dates from the earliest to the latest, Nzegwu starts the use of 'hereby' in ushering performatives in the context of a coup speech, and then this is reenacted in the same context throughout, by all the other coup speeches. They use its legal air to make far reaching declarations that change states of affairs. As can be seen from the dates vertically down, the word gains more usability as time goes on. Nzegwu who is the progenitor uses it two times, but it reaches its peak with Abacha who uses it seven times.

This ample usage may not be unconnected with the increasing anxiety over the need for a coup to succeed and the need to enunciate new regulations.

As is obvious from the foregoing linguistic analysis, there is a continuous buildup of a coup speech genre into a 'proper' one with an increasing sense of sophistication by the coup makers. Additions, subtractions and refinements are all applied in the evolutionary process of a coup speech genre. What started from Nzegwu's *dear countrymen* as a space builder takes an evolutionary trajectory that culminates into Abacha's *fellow Nigerians*, making it politically correct. This reiteration of both the term and the context of use creates part of the major features of a coup speech. People learn to cast "speech in generic forms and, when hearing others' speech, we guess its genre from the very first words; we predict a certain length (that is, the approximate length of the speech whole) and a certain compositional structure…." (Bakhtin 1986, 78-79). This compositional structure has across time been refined and the audience perceives the genre through its salient features consolidated over time.

Another important influence from the Nzegwu coup is in the formation of a practice that can be said to be part of the felicity condition of coup performatives. Nzegwu's introduction of martial music to precede a coup speech and the use of the radio to make a coup broadcast are both sustained and used by other coup makers.The radio is an important instrument of mass media for its wide and instant reach to Nigerians especially the common people. The day Nzegwu made his broadcast, during the coup, Nkwocha (2010, 68) narrates that "rather than hearing the usual English and Igbo news of what was happening in Lagos……the first thing that alerted my ears that all was not well was the continuous sound of military music". Since then other coup makers continue with this tradition. Thus the public comes to associate martial music heard on radio with military coups (Siollun 2003). The control over radio stations is as important as the control over the armoury. The radio as an instrument of massive communication helps in interpellating the citizens. Coup speeches are aired and repeated throughout the day to drum into the people the new social and political order.

Chilton (2006) perceives this as quantitative discourse control. When the mass media is controlled, then access to information is also controlled. This control also leads to

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qualitative control for through this medium the coup makers convey their ideological interests through couching their speeches to represent their worldview. It is due to the prominence of this control that the Orkah coup was routed and defeated because there was a counter coup speech announced on the radio by Abacha. There was a competition over the control of the broadcasting air space in the country during the Orkah coup. In the course of the Dimka coup, the civilian staff at the radio house, who helped him with the martial music, i.e., Mr Abdulkarim Zakari, was seen as an accomplice and was executed along with Dimka by the Obasanjo administration. Later on, with increasing technological sophistication, Abacha used the TV and the radio as well. The visual image came along with a particular physical context i.e. the speaker, sitting in between two national flags with a direct stare as he addresses the nation in a strong confident voice (Abaya 2007). See appendix 13 for Abacha's image. All these issues help in building up the felicity conditions and rituals that consolidate a coup speech genre.

The overall aim of this intertextual analysis is to show the formation of a coup genre. As we can see in the above linguistic analysis, the initial speech gives rise to future speeches which also continue to cement this order of discourse in military coups. Extra linguistic symbols like martial music also contribute. The repetitions of the genre "….give rise to relatively fixed ways of proceeding with the activities, and these ways of proceeding often include relatively fixed, routinized ways of talking and types of texts…" (Johnstone 2008, 16), and these ways of talking and text types continue the formation and consolidation of a coup speech genre. On the part of the audience, they come also to associate such wordings with the activity of a coup, and this becomes part of its features. Invariably, a reality is constructed and gradually naturalized.

5.1.2.2 Impact on the political class (civilian)

The leadership of previous military regimes and that of subsequent civilian democratic governments essentially complement or mirror each other. When authoritarian regimes take over political power, their first attempt is to impose a regimented dictatorial order (Kalu 2008, 146). This regimented dictatorial order and the like make Ekeh (1998, 3) bemoan the fact that "the military has installed structures and processes that are inimical to civil and democratic politics".

The overall coup speeches and other command discourse of the military have, as such, effects on the political civilian class. Many scholars (Ajayi 2007, Frank and Ukpere 2012, Toyin 2015, Udogu 2005) have converged on the fact that the political class has imbibed the command structure and language of the military while in governance. Frank and Ukpere (2012) maintain that the politicians have adapted the command system of the military, which they have been subjected to considerably. Similarly, Kalu (2008, 146) believes that the "civilian political leaders more often than not embrace the same governing style and worldview as their military predecessors. They become agents in the facilitation of a nondemocratic political culture".

One other issue of note is the fact that the little time the government has transited to democracy is either with a retired military leader as the democratic president (like Obasanjo and the current Muhammadu Buhari) or political transition programmes designed and implemented by the military as in Gen. Obasanjo in 1979 handing over to Shagari and in 1993 Gen. Abdualsami Abubakar handing over to Chief Obasanjo (a retired general). In essence, the political leadership of the country is not only being populated by the military but retired military as civilian leaders as well. Moreover, political transition programmes, right from the second republic are designed by the military. Agbese (2012) sees the designs of these transition programmes in terms of the military arrogating to themselves not only the power of determining the political future of Nigeria but also the terms and circumstances of such governance.

In a BBC article entitled: 'How first coup still haunts Nigeria 50 years on', Siollun (2016) maintains that the influence of retired military officers is so pervasive that Mr Jonathan is the only president in Nigeria's history who has no personal or family involvement in the 1966 crisis and the ensuing civil war. "Military rule not only facilitated military supremacy over state and society in Nigeria, It also allowed the military to usurp and designate an ever widening array of roles and responsibilities to itself-often with disastrous consequences" (Siollun 2016). Udogu (2005, 30) also particularly observes that the paradox in Nigerian politics, even within its current democratic rule is that

military rule for better or worse transferred the balance of power in favor of the military brass simply because they have been socialized to believe in their supremacy. They have mainly moved their operations from the military barracks to the seat of political power (in Aso Rock Villa) as soldiers in *agbada* or civilian clothes. For instance the manifestation of military habits could be felt in the political language and actions of the current leadership that tend to be militaristic and apolitical.

Similarly, Toyin (2015) points out that, the long years of military rule make the boundaries between the barracks and the civil society porous that the ethos of the military affects the entire society.

Thus, the rule of operation became that of order, combat rather than dialogue, disregard to court orders and violation of human rights became the tenets of militarized civic culture under a democratic dispensation. These values and norms are unknown to democracy. They are decidedly tough and uncompromising and do not brook opposition, just like in actual military regimes. Militarization also takes the form of popular discourse, values, attitudes, and life styles as public language or discourse in the public space adopts the authoritarian, insensitive and commandist lexicon of the military. Frank and Ukpere (2012, 290) talk about how the term "with immediate effect" used by the military become so entrenched in the lexicon of the civilian political class. There are four occurrences of this phrase in the coup speeches:

> ..*Consequently, the following decisions come into*
> *immediate effect.. (Abacha 1993)*
>
> *On the closed media houses, government is hereby lifting*
> *the order of proscription with immediate effect (Abacha*
> *1993)*
>
> *The bank account of FEDECO and all the parties are*
> *frozen with immediate effect (Abacha 1984)*
>
> *The National Guard already in its formative stage*
> *is disbanded with immediate effect (Orkah 1990)*

'*With immediate effect*' is an adverbial phrase that talks about the need for alacrity and immediacy in carrying out assignments or in complying with directives. This sense of

immediacy is not concerned with due legal processes. This also has a relational angle that indicates the power of the user to make one behave in this manner or to want things to be done in this manner. The use of this lexicon by the political class as maintained by Frank and Ukpere (2012) indicates the colonization of the political space with military lexicon which in turn imbues the civilians with a military attitude and action.

There is also a popular phrase during the third republic elections, viz.: 'do or die' popularized by Obasanjo which frames elections in terms of battle fields. Obasanjo being a military man happens to be a civilian president as well, and his actions have helped in saturating the political atmosphere with uncompromising military attitudes. Another term that is popularized is one by Gen Buhari "*kare jini biri jini*" in Hausa which depicts election as a fierce battlefield where both "the dog and the monkey are sullied in blood".Omilusi (2015, 9) talking about the militarization of politics in Nigeria observes that *"*violence is often a tool to wage political struggles—to exert power, rally supporters, destabilize opponents, or derail the prospect of elections altogether in an effort to gain total control of the machinery of government". Catch phrases that the retired military in political leadership use in electoral issues with symbolic violence like this have a way of sanctioning real violence in the political processes of the country.

Moreover, all the coup speeches usually jettison and abrogate the constitution in the immediate and while in leadership they continue with this trend. The impact of this on the overall country, especially on the civilian democratic class, is the general treatment of constitutional provisions with levity and lack of regard. Performatives like *I suspend the constitution*, *I declare martial law*, etc. have demystified and belittled the strong aura and irreproachability of the law and the constitution. Leaders, whether military or civilian, do as they like while in government.Coker and Obo (2012) and Frank and Ukpere (2012 itemize a lot of breaches of the constitution by the Obasanjo and Buhari civilian administrations. They maintain that Obasanjo, particularly, ordered military actions on Odi and Zaki Biam communities without resort to constitutional provisions.In a nutshell, command structure of the military gives no room for dialogue, negotiation, arbitration and conciliation. Kunle (2014), reporting for the International Centre For Investigative Reporting, maintains that far from the claim Buhari made at the Chatham House address

in London of being 'a converted democrat who is ready to operate under democratic norms', there are many abuses by his regime. He itemizes a lot of the breaches of the constitution by Buhari among which are flouting court orders and the extra judicial killings of the Shiites and the incarceration of their leaders. There are also extra-budgetary allocations and provisions made that are not transmitted through the national assembly or parliament. Radio and TV stations, as done in military juntas, are easily closed or reprimanded for being anti-government. These extra-judicial actions indicate that the constitution is still on suspension even if not declared explicitly.

The military also change the nature of the democratic system from the parliamentary system following the British model of the First Republic to the American presidential model. Bjørnskov (2017), having studied 111 democratization episodes since 1950 championed by the military, reveals that a number of features that is broadly consistent in the study is the military's preference for the American presidential model of leadership. This is because:

> military interests are better able to organize a 'constitutional lobby'. Military dictatorships are therefore more likely to both change constitutional rules prior to democratization and to choose a set-up in which a powerful president can act as a potential status quo-preserving veto player" (Bjørnskov 2017,3).

In Nigeria, the case is not different especially perhaps as the military find the presidential system more in synchrony with their dictatorial nature should they want to shed their uniform and contest under a democratic process. This is manifested in both Obasanjo and Buhari's presidential leaderships under a democratic set-up.

In conclusion, the command structure in the military hierarchy, which is top-down vertically, persists in the civilian regimes and weakens the democratic system which operates a horizontal level of power separation and sharing involving three tiers of government, i.e., the executive, the judiciary, the legislature. The judiciary and the legislature simply become very weak appendages of the executive class as such. Court rulings against the government of the day are hardly abided by. Legislative bills are heavily influenced, or dictated upon by the executive. All these issues may not be unconnected

with the kind of constructions and orientations the military have, over the years, built discursively using their ideological state apparatus. Aspects of social practices like legislation, judicial responsibility, executive duties etcetera are given breath by the orders of discourse consolidated by the military in their speeches and vice versa. A persistent suspension and dissolution of the constitution as demonstrated in the coup texts in my data, for example, may weaken judicial responsibility and make the laws of the land be treated with levity. Militarism enmeshing with democracy (which indicates a colonisation of social practices), as such, has created a dictatorial democratic state.

5.1.2.3 Impact on the citizenry

The impact of colonialism, military rule and the rule of a militarized political class all take their toll on the citizenry. They become acquiescent and totally interpellated as passive subjects, yet, seeing abundantly the mechanisms of power and control exerted upon them use similar procedures in their interpersonal dealings (Agozino and Edem (2008). From colonial governments all through to the military juntas what people have understood is the display of force as a form of strength. Foucault (1995, 56), in talking about 'atrocity', shows how the spectacle of violence has been objectified and how the state appropriates this as a form of power:

> Atrocity is that part of the crime that the punishment turns back as torture in order to display it in the full light of day: it is a figure inherent in the mechanism that produces the visible truth of the crime at the very heart of the punishment itself. The public execution formed part of the procedure that established the reality of what one punished.

When the leaders demonstrate violence as a means of solving problems as justified to the spectacle of the people that they lead and when grave abuse of judicial processes and human rights become a means of mastering and demonstrating power, then the state has given the people a model of solving problems through mastering violence. Just as between a parent and their wards, the government has a symbolic essence in mirroring the nature of the followership.

The emergence of an authoritarian culture, invariably, influences people to believe in a particular manner of governance (Toyin 2015). Frank and Ukpere (2012, 288) argue that

"the militarization of governance engenders a militarized civic culture the outcome of which is a militarized psyche". Violence used by the state to settle scores, becomes a strategy or a social practice by itself. There are communal strife and misunderstandings that always end in inter-ethnic fights. In interpersonal relationships among the citizenry people use violence to settle misunderstandings just as they have been schooled in the art of violence by the state. There is the rise of ethnic and religious militias who use violence as a form of reaching objectives. There are groups like the Boko Haram, the OPC, the Niger Delta militants etc. Also, there is the ascendancy of intra-class agitation which increases conflicts and instability.

The military in Nigeria has neither provided effective and exemplary leadership nor mass mobilization of the people. The flow of information and directives is (from top to bottom) without censure, complaints or opposition. The enactment of social roles as entailed in speech acts which helps in enshrining roles and the positioning of subjects continue to be used by the civilian class in their interactions with the citizens. The role of the citizen as a quiet recipient of legislations continues to aggravate even with the claims of popular participation engendered by democracy. El-Rufai (2017)[5] maintains that:

> A new generation of citizens grew up knowing only the command-and-control system of the soldiers. A psychological distortion made political deformation even worse. More powers had been concentrated at the center, the federal bureaucracy had ballooned and there were now many states (from 12 to 36)

Cervenka (1987, 14) similarly argues that one of the most alarming consequences of militarization in Africa has been the change in attitudes towards traditional values, where respect for human life formerly occupied a central place. Today, life has become very cheap and in some countries the summary execution of political opponents has become a common practice which in turn fuels violence in the society.

In conclusion, the coups which are the new social orders have contested the political atmosphere and changed the status quo. First, they have introduced a new system of

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[5] El Rufai is the current governor of Kaduna State (2015-). He made this remark at the Chatham House, London, and it was published by the Daily Post newspaper.

governance as an alternative to democracy. Secondly, they have raised the power of the executive arm of government over other tiers i.e., the legislature and the judiciary. The political class imbibes the authoritarian culture of the military and thus the leaders at the executive arm parody the 'supreme military councils' in a way. This is because transition programs to democratic leaderships are designed by the military. Pure civilians who became leaders like Shagari have worked under the rigid bureaucracy operated by the military and past military leaders also transform into democratic leaders. All these help in militarizing the political space. This scenario helps in tilting the power balance in favor of the military and militarism in democracy. Thirdly, beside political power, the military also possess economic power via their control of the former. Being a military officer comes with a symbolic capital in the Nigerian society. Two retired generals have been civilian presidents in Nigeria. Nostalgia of past leadership by the citizenry still favours past military leaders even in democratic elections (Hill 2012). This issue is due to the fact that the citizenry having been fed with, and interpellated to, the use of force as a form of political correction still feel that strong people (like Buhari) deserve leadership more than civilians. This leads us to the fourth point. Military regimes have helped in creating a new subject with a subservient nature which also continues even in the civilian era.

5.1.3 Ideological effects

Generally, what I have done so far in Chapter 4 and part of this chapter are all forms of ideological analyses. But to make it more systematic and to show how members' resources are drawn upon for ideological reasons, I will use Thompson's (1984, 1990) theory of ideology. Thompson (1984, 130-131) sees the study of ideology as the study of the ways in which "meaning (signification) serves to sustain relations of domination". This signification is covert and works on the basis of assumptions hinted. "The formal properties of a text", according to Fairclough (1989, 24), "can ... be regarded as on the one hand traces of the productive process and, on the other hand as cues in the process of interpretation". It is at the covert level (cues in the MR) that ideology is planted and most potently established. When issues are cued up in the MR as common sense or the natural reality, people tend to swallow that. I argue that beside the issue of discourse access what aids this mechanism is the fact that people are cognitive misers who do not invest much in political

interrogations and take reality as it is posed to them. In the case of the military, as mentioned in the process of interpellation in chapter 4, they possess both the repressive and ideological apparatuses. In the following, I will discuss five aspects of Thompson's ideological theory which explains the workings of ideology, namely: legitimation, dissimulation, reification, unification and fragmentation.

1. Legitimation

According to Thompson (1984), legitimation involves a chain of reasoning that is constructed to advance an argument by presenting a state of affairs "as legitimate, that is just and worthy of support" (Thompson 1990, 61). Language is without doubt the most important vehicle in social construction. Berger and Luckman (1991, 112) have even argued that, effectively, all of language is legitimation:

> Incipient legitimation is present as soon as a system of linguistic objectification of human experience is transmitted. For example, the transmission of a kinship vocabulary ipso facto legitimates the kinship structure. The fundamental legitimating "explanations" are, so to speak, built into the vocabulary.

Here we can safely say that the transmission of a military vocabulary, point of view and perception legitimates the political structure proposed without spelling out any ideological interest nakedly or manifestly. In this vein, the premises drawn, as indicated in the argumentation analysis, involve a lot of rhetorical constructions and rationalizations that make the coup arguments appear, on the surface, as the only logical options available.

When opponents are painted as incompetent and leading the nation to destruction, rescue is the only helpful option. Yet, again under the microscopic analysis of the issues under CDA involving argumentation analysis many of the constructions appear to contradict themselves or to be frozen on details or to be subjective. In legitimation there is also the aspect of universalization. This pertains to metonymic constructions. Most of the values the coup plotters claim to fight for are positive universal values that pertain to justice, fighting corruption, arresting rot, etc., but apart from the fact that there is a high level of rationalization, there is the issue of veiling of the true values that cloak coups in the garb of acceptable universal values. Individual values are magnified as universal values. In other

words, subjective values are hidden in lofty values or lofty values are made to stand for small values metonymically. Fairclough and Fairclough (2012, 115), for instance, maintain that an "appeal to fairness can legitimize political action because fairness is a publicly justifiable or publicly recognized, legitimate value. In addition, its invocation suggests that the politician is one who honours the (institutional, objective) obligation attaching to his status function". Such appeals to universal values may mystify the process and route taken to achieve the goal. In coups, there is what Decalo (1976) calls the implicit goals of the coups. Universal values may hide the implicit selfish values of the military. It is as summed up by Hill (2012, 100):

> ....tensions between word and deed, between what those in charge say and do, are a central feature of political life all over the world. More crucial, and where Nigeria does differ from other places, is the size of the gap between the stated aims of these soldier–politicians and the consequences of their actions in pursuit of them.

Coups will never scale through if the implicit values are mentioned, so the resort to higher universal values is a rhetorical and ideological tactic to create acceptance and legitimacy.

2. Dissimulation

A second way in which ideology operates is by means of dissimulation. According to Thompson (1984, 131) "relations of domination which serve the interests of some at the expense of others may be concealed, denied or 'blocked' in various ways". Dissimulation involves two aspects, euphemization and displacement. In the aspect of euphemization, we have seen this in the construction of positive frames where the military coup makers appear to understate or mitigate their bad deeds and magnify those of the opponents. Nzegwu's coup that costs a lot of lives is called '*slight changes'*; likewise, Dimka sees his assassination of Murtala in terms of '*good tidings'*---more to do with birth than death. A coup is also seen as a '*revolution'* instead of a mutiny or rebellion. Soldiers are considered as '*saviours'* and 'redeemers'. All these are attempts not only to avoid negative values and the like, but to present the issues or the atrocities committed as just amounting to nothing in a bid to establish 'permanent correction'. At the metaphorical level, I have also explained

how Abacha presents the nation as a derelict building and positions himself as a good builder

> *For the International Community, we ask that you suspend judgement while we <u>grapple</u> with the <u>onerous task</u> of <u>nation building</u>, reconciliation and <u>repairs</u>. This government is a child of necessity with a strong determination to restore peace and stability to our country and on <u>these foundations</u>, enthrone a lasting and true democracy. Give us the chance to solve our problems in our own ways.*

The government is strongly determined to grapple with the task of *nation building* and *repairs*. Building needs strength and a derelict building needs strong bulwark of support which the new government will provide. Similarly Dogonyaro also presents the Buhari government as misdirected and also lacking cohesion in the body of the nation. When an organ of the body appears to be stubborn or not working in harmony with other parts of the body, then the best solution built metaphorically will be a surgical removal or excision of the organ They, on the on the other hand, are cohesive and attempting to work as a team for the country. Such metaphors advance the arguments of coup speeches by subtly discrediting the opponents. This wholly attempts to advance the ideological interests of the military and to make its mission acceptable.

The other aspect of dissimulation is 'displacement'. I see the aspect of displacement in terms of transference, i.e., when issues with positive connotations are used for self and those with negative for the opponents. Shagari's regime is seen as *inept and irresponsible* while Abacha sees their coup as the *promotion and protection of national interests* but the resort to the use of these terms is all subjective. *Irresponsibility* or *promotion of national interests* is only relevant on the basis of the discourse that they serve. They are, as such, floating signifiers that can have various nodal points. The same Abacha calls a coup attempt against him by Orkah act of *base avarice*, to topple the legal government by *disloyal officers*. The concept of 'loyalty', in particular, is essentially floating signifier as argued by Ekeh (1998, 3) against the Nigerian military: "loyalty is no longer defined on the basis of institutional principles, but on the grounds of obedience to those who control the implements of most violence".

3. Reification

In Reification, "relations of domination and subordination may be established and sustained by representing a transitory, historical state of affairs as if it were permanent, natural, outside of time" (Thompson 1990. 65). In the coup speeches, there are mystificatory devices used to convey ideological interests. There are nominalizations that freeze clausal processes and can be used to pass judgments or appraise people or situations either negatively or positively. There are presuppositions and categorical modality and prenominal modification whose combination creates a lot of assumptions that pass as the reality. There are metaphorical constructions that also present people and events in such a way as to suit the ideological interests of the coup speech. These are also used as arguments to take over power. Take for instance, the coup by Dimka that is predicated on what he calls "Murtala's deficiency". This nominalization simply charges without details yet serves as a premise for a power takeover.

In reification, there are issues like naturalization, no attempt is ever shown to indicate that coups are illegal or are illegitimate. All the coups are shown to be naturally inevitable and they simply hail a citizen as a subject. Positive expressive values are used in the discussion of intentions and manifestations of actions. Positive frames are also used to show that the resort to coup is the simple common sense under the circumstances and contexts of the coups. Euphemisms are part of the scheme to avoid negative expressive values. The use of frames also shows this.

Coups are presented as uncomplex decisions to change government and as inevitable decisions by the wise men in the armed forces. In the aspect of nominalization as shown earlier, nearly all the coup claims and premises are constructed using nominalizations that reify issues and displace agents. I see the use of reifications first in terms of charging against the opponents without the need for details and the taken-for-grantedness of contentious issues etc. Issues are treated as givens without the need for details and iconic detailing of events. Abacha, for example, sees his coup against Shonekan as an '*appointment*' after '*consultation*'. In the nominalization '*appointment*', nobody has clearly shown who appoints who and no tense to indicate time. The tenseless and agentless

nature of nominalization makes it amenable to political manipulation. A clear iconic transitivity process and circumstance like:

X and Y appointed Z as president yesterday in Abuja

could have served better in detailing facts empirically. With passivisation, we also see aspects of thematization. The military thematizes aspects that are of grave importance in the advancement of their arguments and in the creation of their laws and sanctions. Fairclough (2001, 105-106) argues that the "naturalization of subject positions self-evidently constrains subjects, and in the longer term both contributes to the socialization of persons and to the delimitation of the 'stock' of social identities". Naturalization, then, as he argues further, is "the most formidable weapon in the armoury of power, and therefore a significant focus of struggle".

In chapter 4, I indicated how the military attempt to rationalize their actions. They construct positive frames of responsibility to intervene politically when there is a 'problem'. They delegitimize their opponents and make their intervention appear to be the only available option for the redemption of the country. The arguments they construct are made in such a way that their opponents cannot be seen in good lights. There are also obvious aspects of universalisations when the intervention is presented as related to general human values of honesty, peace, discipline and the enthronement of good leadership.

4. Unification and fragmentation

In cases of both unification and fragmentation, we see an attempt at divide and rule. Through many techniques, the military attempt to alienate the toppled government and to unify themselves with the people. Through use of inclusive pronouns like 'we', 'us' and 'our' the citizens are made to be in unison with the coup makers. The use of the inclusive 'we', also constructs the nation in terms of having a similar voice. The coup makers draw experiences in such a way as to make it the general experience of the nation through the construction of 'ideal readers' with similar intertextual experience. Expressions like: *you are all aware, Nigerians are tired*, etc. attempt to show that there is a similar understanding

between the coup makers and the people. The opponents, on the other hand, are shown as outsiders or the out group and as the villains of the nation. They are '*the political profiteers', 'the swindlers', those who have taken the nation back by their words and deeds, the irresponsible civilian leadership, the prodigalistic Babangida regime etc*. With Gideon Orkah, there is the creation of a sub-national consciousness with the unification of the southern Christian part of Nigeria against the northern part. In all the coup speeches, there are attempts at group unification for the in-group which at the same time intensifies a fragmentation from the opponents. It was such an attempt in the 1966 coup that led to the Biafran secession and the Nigerian civil war with over a million casualties. The out group in this case are treated as outside the situation and as an external enemy. In political discourse, as Chilton (2004, 203) argues, "the perception and conception of space is of major significance. On the anthropological level this claim involves the suggestion that territoriality is an intrinsic part of the socio-political instinct".

The use of the pronoun 'they' or 'their' creates fragmentation and externalization of groups that do not belong to the in-group. In the use of 'we' or 'our', as put by Chilton (2004, 204-205305)

> ….the speaker may claim identity with the hearer and third parties, role-players in the discourse world are 'positioned' more or less close to 'me' or 'us', the self is positioned at the intersection that is conceptualised not only as 'here' and 'now' but also as 'right' and 'good'.

What is claimed by Chilton here is that solidarity can all be spatial, temporal and moral. The in-group has a tendency to see their position as the one that is the best under the circumstances of where they are, who they are and what they believe in. See appendix 21 for the occurrences of 'their' with political opponents that are distant and morally bankrupt. In line 1, Orkah talks about the existence of a '*birth right*' to dominate by the political opponents. In lines 3 and 4, he also talks about the idiom about people with '*skeletons in their cupboards'* in a veiled reference to his political opponents. Line 7 refers to '*ill-gotten wealth*'. This is also presupposed since there is even an aspect of recovery. In lines 18 and 19 he also talks about the existence of *stooges of a favoured aristocratic* class. He also mentions the existence of a trial in line 20 about the enemies for their unabated corruption.

Nzegwu, on his part, decries those enemies for their words and deeds that put Nigeria's political calendar back. It is clear that 'our' which includes the coup plotters has an aura of moral uprightness, goodness, love of the country and patriotism while 'their' refers to political opponents as corrupt, divisive and retrogressive.So the 'unities' which identities proclaim, argued by Hall (1996,5), "are, in fact, constructed within the play of power and exclusion, and are the result, not of a natural and inevitable or primordial totality but of the naturalized, over determined process of 'closure'".

While the 'enemies' are distanced and externalized due to their corruption (skeletons in the cupboard), power hunger and cronyism for having stooges, and as retrogressive elements who will face trial, the coup makers in appendix 18 are united with the people at the level of love and patriotism for the country, a concern with issues that are important to the development of the country, i.e., education, economy, society etc. They also unite with the citizenry as a humbling tactic and in sharing a common destiny.

5.2 METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES

The combination of representation, interpellation, argumentation and intertextual analyses has proven here to be a worthy analytical model. It has added another critical perspective to the study of authoritarian leaderships including the kind of dictatorial democracies we have in Africa. A close textual analysis of representation has shown a worldview or ideology and how this ideology is sustained. Argumentation, for its part, has identified the fallacies that are otherwise hidden in rhetoric or in otherwise objective speeches. Both representational and argumentational analysis help in showing how what becomes our 'truths' or 'reality' or 'history' are formed or spun. Citizens argue about historical or contemporary affairs on the basis of what they learn from the elite who have access to discourse through their quantitative control of discourse. This control also makes it possible to have a qualitative control over what can be thought of or about or what can be said. Aspects of interpellation have demonstrated how performatives are important in the formation of subjects and a new political construct. The intertextual, for its part, has shown how objects are created longitudinally and how they reinforce each other in the formation of a model coup speech genre.

By this study, people can be awakened to the necessity of critical language awareness and the understanding of the techniques of the use of language to obfuscate or (mis)represent reality based on ideological motives. In the interpellation of the subjects, the citizenry in a way participate in their subjection or subjugation by 'turning to answer' to their hailing i.e. in this sense by sometimes coming out in jubilation over the imposition of military dictatorship or by accepting the new order ungrudgingly. Right from the first coup, had the Nigerian people come out to protest persistently that element of political domination might not have been possible and might not have had the long tenure it has, holding on to political leadership.

At this juncture, I will address my research questions here and see how they have fared in terms of the analysis.

What linguistic representations of social groups, identities and national issues are found in the coup speeches?

In my analysis, there are different representations of the political class, the military and the citizenry. The research has shown the coup makers' positioning of people and events in line with van Dijk's (1988) ideological square. They represent themselves and their actions in positive light while their opponents in negative. Their civilian opponents are condemned in absolute systemic terms. Military opponents, on the other hand, are condemned in a more personalized form for the fear of appearing to attack the constituency or institution of their leadership. The citizens, for their parts, are the ones to be convinced and courted, yet they are also the ones to be coerced. They are the targets of rhetoric, yet they are also targets of the harsh changes going on. They are constructed as ideal readers/audience who share a common destiny with the coup makers and are united on confronting the problems of the country and against a common enemy. The coup makers also place themselves and the citizens as victims of the negative consequences of the leadership of political opponents, but this unity disappears when deontic powers are spelt out and roles are delineated between the leaders and the subjects.

How are the representations used as premises in the military leaders' coup argumentations?

Representations are woven into arguments to justify actions. Some of the representations are negatively loaded and saying nothing substantial in terms of facts. Using such shaky premise, coup makers argue for certain actions like power take over. When you accuse your opponents of 'mismanagement', for example, you nominalize a process without clear details. A burden of proof should be attached to such a charge as it can be used as part of the 'circumstance' for action. Argumentation analysis reveals that the launch-pad or the premise of action (i.e., representation) is mostly a convenient rationalization of issues. There are also cases where the coup speeches fall short in aspects of logical presentation, at the normative levels, especially when goals clash with means to a goal. These issues have been thoroughly discussed in 4.3

What ideologies, perceptions or points of view underlie military coup speeches in Nigeria?

The military create a world view that enhances military supremacy through the projection of their image and role as a corrective force. Their intervention is presented as inevitable amid (assumed) problems. The military is framed as having a responsibility to take over power and correct the ills of the incumbent government. In short, the coups and speeches have helped in portraying the image of the military class and in the militarization of both the citizenry and the political class in the overall country. The projection of this ideology has helped in making the military to be an awesome force even when outside power.

What are the intertextual and interdiscursive realities of the coup speeches?

The intertextual analysis reveals that the initial coup by Nzegwu may have been influenced by colonial discourse which in turn influences subsequent coup speeches. The coup speeches have dialectical impacts. Nzegwu first creates the genre or template, and this is copied, further improved and mended by other coup makers in succession and based on increasing political sophistication. This part of the analysis also shows the intertextual impact on the language of the political class and the civilians as well, leading to the militarization of the political space.

How are Nigerians enlisted as the 'subjects' of the military junta?

Nigerians are hailed as military subjects in two ways. First, they are interpellated through the use of forceful language, chiefly performatives that make political declarations and issue new rules and regulations. The lack of resistance by the people and the acquiescence to these declarations completes the interpellation process. What complements the acquiescence is also the military's possession of, or access to, the state's repressive apparatus.

What are the effects of military coup discourse in the country?

There are sundry effects of this discourse on different sections of the society. For the coup makers, the speeches usher them into power, give other military officers the script and strength to copy and carry out their own. The speeches help also in contesting the power dynamics of the country, tilting it in favour of the military. The civilian political class also copies some of the lexicon of the military in their affairs and adopts their authoritative stand on issues. As for the citizens, military pronouncements and rule help in making them subservient and passive on issues affecting them. A long period of being dished out laws to be obeyed unquestioned has helped in making them a non-confrontational, acquiescent citizenry.

How does the novel methodological synergy of representation, interpellation and argumentation employed in this study assist with the analysis of the coup speeches?

This has been discussed at the beginning of this section, i.e., 5.3. It is a worthy method that combines how people are represented and controlled with the arguments deployed to do this. The rich analysis done in this study has thrown up interesting details that go a long way in providing a critical perspective and in making this method a practical one.

5.3 HOW TO DO THINGS WITH SPEECHES

The term, *how to do things with speeches*, emulates Austin's (1961) 'how to do things with words', and it forms the title of my thesis. Things can really be done with speeches as variously demonstrated in my analyses. In any case, speeches are formed by words, and they in themselves (the speeches) are complex, global speech acts that perform certain functions. A speech is also dialectical i.e. it is influenced and can influence as well.

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The first essence of the coup texts is that they have created a new social order. The declaration of coups by the coup makers using performatives instantly creates a new social and political order, what Bourdieu would call the "magical power of the performative". Right from Nzegwu to other coup makers, this social order has been formed, sustained then concretized.

Closely related to this is the aspect of the formation of a new coup genre. Over the years of military intervention an ideal coup speech genre has been formed. In essence, it has formulated how one can go about constructing a coup speech and, ipso facto, making a coup itself. Military leaders that come after Nzegwu copy from him(and each other) and refine the genre as they deem fit or in consonance with increasing social expectations.

Thirdly, the formation of this social order comes along with a particular kind of subject role. The coup speeches form roles both for the military and the civilians. By accepting coup declarations and working with the directives and exhortations therein, Nigerians change to military subjects. Such subjects are confronted with an order where might is right.

Fourthly, the speeches made on the spirit of the possession of repressive apparatus undermine constitutional arrangement in such a way that the country has not yet recovered even with democratic dispensations. Years of suspension of the constitution and the centralization of power with the executives weaken other facets of government like the judiciary and the legislature even under democracies.

Fifthly, coup speeches create narratives that end up forming what constitute our historical facts and realities. Siollun (2003), for instance, talks about the way the Orkah coup speech goes about emboldening southern Nigerians to raise their voices on topics that are 'politically taboo', meaning that they see the reality from the perspective of Orkah. Other similar issues have also supplanted the reality for what the elite feel is the actual reality.

So one can safely say that speeches can do a lot in the political realm, and that is why I find the title 'How To Do Things With Speeches', a worthy one for my thesis.

5.4. FUTURE RESEARCH AND APPLICATION

There are so many areas of further research. This particular method introduced in this thesis can be used to also gauge the civilian political class in their speeches and to see how they construct their objects and how they are able to continue perpetuating their exploitative tendencies or misrule as can be seen happening in Africa today. Of particular note is the way Nigerians happen to be more preoccupied arguing over political issues that are elitist, yet allowing grave issues of mis/governance affecting them personally to continue undiscussed and unabated. This condition shows the operation of an efficient ideology that renders the people dumb on issues that matter though this cannot be detached from the historical trajectory of the militarist leadership the country has been under since the colonial period to date. In particular, the Nigerian masses bicker and fight themselves over issues of ethnic and religious dimensions, while the political elite, at the high level, come together, close ranks, and share political and economic interests. Religious and ethnic issues are seen as ends in themselves for the masses, but these are only objectified for them. Nigerian masses hardly confront the government partly because they have suffered throughout history as passive receivers of orders from above and partly because of the hegemonic powers of the ruling class which make its views to be the most common and available discourse or truth out there or to be the most discuss-worthy issues. Either way, they are entrapped by ideological influences. A careful discursive analysis of the civilian political leadership as applied here can go a long way in demystifying issues and in complementing this study.

5.5 GENERAL CONCLUSION

This research has been able to discuss some important issues that have to do with the aspect of politics in Nigeria using CDA with its concern for a multi-layered form of analysis. It has shown that texts have underlying meanings that can be subjective and serve the interests of the producers. There are issues of assumptions, simplifications, positioning, contextualization, etc., that can be brought to bear in the service of ideology. These interact with other linguistic factors to further substantiate this from textual construction to common sense and this happens dialectically. The people that create such ideologies also

control, or monopolize, access to discourse. Due to people's cognitive miserliness and inadequate access to discourse, those issues heard, cued and seen are the real issues to them. What is authoritative and strongly presupposed equates to what is real. CDA is thus not only demystificatory but emancipatory as well in the sense that critical language awareness is a necessary first step towards redemption. There is a need as such to incorporate CDA into social and political research to further look at other areas of our national life to unravel the discourses that hold them together and that make people be subjugated to them. This research contributes in a way to understanding the influences of colonial, military influence on the militarized political class and in a way sheds light on the linguistic as well as historical factors that have created an acquiescent passive citizenry. It is a diachronic study that relates past texts intertextually with present realities and also a synchronic one that studies present circumstances in their essence as well.

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APPENDICES TABLE OF CONTENTS

APPENDIX 1: MAJOR CHUKWUMA KADUNA NZEGWU 1966 COUP SPEECH

In the name of the Supreme Council of the Revolution of the Nigerian Armed Forces, I declare martial law over the Northern Provinces of Nigeria.

The Constitution is suspended and the
regional government and elected
assemblies are hereby dissolved. All
political, cultural, tribal and trade union
activities, together with all demonstrations and unauthorized gatherings, excluding religious worship, are banned until further notice.

The aim of the Revolutionary Council is to establish a strong united and prosperous nation, free from corruption and internal strife. Our method of achieving this is strictly military but we have no doubt that every Nigerian will give us maximum cooperation by assisting the regime and not disturbing the peace during the slight changes that are taking place.

I am to assure all foreigners living and working in this part of Nigeria that their rights will continue to be respected. All treaty obligations previously entered into with any foreign nation will be respected and we hope that such nations will respect our country's territorial integrity and will avoid taking sides with enemies of the revolution and enemies of the people.

My dear countrymen, you will hear, and probably see a lot being done by certain bodies charged by the Supreme Council with the duties of national integration, supreme justice, general security and property recovery. As an interim measure all permanent secretaries, corporation chairmen and senior heads of departments are allowed to make decisions until the new organs are functioning, so long as such decisions are not contrary to the aims and wishes of the Supreme Council. No Minister or Parliamentary Secretary possesses administrative or other forms of control over any Ministry, even if they are not considered too dangerous to be arrested.

This is not a time for long speech-making and so let me acquaint you with ten proclamations in the Extraordinary Orders of the Day which the Supreme Council has promulgated. These will be modified as the situation improves.

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You are hereby warned that looting, arson, homosexuality, rape, embezzlement, bribery or corruption, obstruction of the revolution, sabotage, subversion, false alarms and assistance to foreign invaders, are all offences punishable by death sentence.

Demonstrations and unauthorized assembly, non-cooperation with revolutionary troops are punishable in grave manner up to death.

Refusal or neglect to perform normal duties or any task that may of necessity be ordered by local military commanders in support of the change will be punishable by a sentence imposed by the local military commander.

Spying, harmful or injurious publications, and broadcasts of troop movements or actions, will be punished by any suitable sentence deemed fit by the local military commander.

Shouting of slogans, loitering and rowdy behavior will be rectified by any sentence of incarceration, or any more severe punishment deemed fit by the local military commander.

Doubtful loyalty will be penalized by imprisonment or any more severe sentence.

Illegal possession or carrying of firearms, smuggling or trying to escape with documents, valuables, including money or other assets vital to the running of any establishment will be punished by death sentence.

Wavering or siting on the fence and failing to declare open loyalty with the revolution will be regarded as an act of hostility punishable by any sentence deemed suitable by the local military commander.

Tearing down an order of the day or proclamation or other authorized notices will be penalized by death.

This is the end of the Extraordinary Order of the Day which you will soon begin to see displayed in public.

My dear countrymen, no citizen should have anything to fear, so long as that citizen is law abiding and if that citizen has religiously obeyed the native laws of the country and those set down in every heart and conscience since 1st October, 1960. Our enemies are the political profiteers, the swindlers, the men in high and low places that seek bribes and demand 10 per cent; those that seek to keep the country divided permanently so that they can remain in office as ministers or VIPs at least, the tribalists, the nepotists, those that

make the country look big for nothing before international circles, those that have corrupted our society and put the Nigerian political calendar back by their words and deeds. Like good soldiers we are not promising anything miraculous or spectacular. But what we do promise every law abiding citizen is freedom from fear and all forms of oppression, freedom from general inefficiency and freedom to live and strive in every field of human endeavour, both nationally and internationally. We promise that you will know more be ashamed to say that you are a Nigerian.

I leave you with a message of good wishes and ask for your support at all times, so that our land, watered by the Niger and Benue, between the sandy wastes and gulf of guinea, washed in salt by the mighty Atlantic, shall not detract Nigeria from gaining sway in any great aspect of international endeavour.

My dear countrymen, this is the end of this speech. I wish you all goodluck and I hope you will cooperate to the fullest in this job which we have set for ourselves of establishing a prosperous nation and achieving solidarity.

Thank you very much and goodbye for now.

APPENDIX 2: COLONEL JOSEPH GARBA JULY 29, 1975 COUP SPEECH

Fellow countrymen and women,

Garba

I, Colonel Joseph Nanven Garba, in consultation with my colleagues, do hereby declare that in view of what has been happening in our country in the past few months, the Nigerian Armed Forces decided to effect a change of the leadership of the Federal Military Government.

As from now, General Yakubu Gowon ceases to be head of the Federal Military Government and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Nigeria. The general public is advised to be calm and to go about their lawful duties.

However, in view of the traffic situation in Lagos area, all workers other than those on essential services like NEPA, Medical Services, Water Works, NPA, the P & T, all workers and all Tanker Drivers will observe today, 29th of July, 1975, as a work free day.

A dusk to dawn curfew is hereby imposed until further notice. Nigeria Airways operations are suspended and all Airports and Borders are closed till further notice.

Fellow countrymen, this has been a bloodless operation and we do not want anyone to lose his or her life. You are therefore warned in your own interest to be law abiding. Anyone caught disturbing the public order will be summarily dealt with.

We appeal to everyone to co-operate in the task ahead. Further announcements will be made in due course. Long live the Federal Republic of Nigeria.

APPENDIX 3: LT COL B. DIMKA COUP1976 SPEECH

Good morning fellow Nigerians,

This is Lt. Col. B. Dimka of the Nigerian Army calling.

I bring you good tidings. Murtala Muhammed's deficiency has been detected. His government is now overthrown by the young revolutionaries. All the 19 military governors have no powers over the states they now govern. The states affairs will be run by military brigade commanders until further notice.

All commissioners are sacked, except for the armed forces and police commissioners who will be redeployed.

All senior military officers should remain calm in their respective spots. No divisional commanders will issue orders or instructions until further notice.

Any attempt to foil these plans from any quarters will be met with death.

You are warned, it is all over the 19 states.

Any acts of looting or raids will be death.Everyone should be calm.

Please stay by your radio for further announcements.

All borders, air and sea ports are closed until further notice.

Thank you. We are all together."

APPENDIX 4: BRIGADIER DOGONYARO AUGUST 27, 1985 COUP SPEECH

I, Brigadier Joshua Nimyel Dogonyaro, of the Nigerian Army, hereby make the following declaration on behalf of my colleagues and members of the Nigerian Armed Forces.

Fellow country men, the intervention of the military at the end of 1983 was welcomed by the nation with unprecedented enthusiasm. Nigerians were unified in accepting the intervention and looked forward hopefully to progressive changes for the better. Almost two years later, it has become clear that the fulfillment of expectations is not forthcoming.

Because this generation of Nigerians and indeed future generations have no other country but Nigeria, we could not stay passive and watch a small group of individuals misuse power to the detriment of our national aspirations and interest.

No nation can ever achieve meaningful strides in its development where there is an absence of cohesion in the hierarchy of government; where it has become clear that positive action by the policy makers is hindered because as a body it lacks a unity of purpose.

It is evident that the nation would be endangered with the risk of continuous misdirection. We are presently confronted with that danger. In such a situation, if action can be taken to arrest further damage, it should and must be taken. This is precisely what we have done.

The Nigerian public has been made to believe that the slow pace of action of the Federal Government headed by Major-General Muhammadu Buhari was due to the enormity of the problems left by the last civilian administration.

Although it is true that a lot of problems were left behind by the last civilian government, the real reason, however, for the very slow pace of action is due to lack of unanimity of purpose among the ruling body; subsequently, the business of governance has gradually been subjected to ill-motivated power play considerations. The ruling body, the Supreme Military Council, has, therefore, progressively been made redundant by the actions of a select few members charged with the day-to-day implementation of the SMC's policies and decision.

The concept of collective leadership has been substituted by stubborn and illadvised unilateral actions, thereby destroying the principles upon which the government came to power. Any effort made to advise the leadership, met with stubborn resistance and was viewed as a challenge to authority or disloyalty.

Thus, the scene was being set for systematic elimination of what, was termed oppositions. All the energies of the rulership were directed at this imaginary opposition rather than to effective leadership.

The result of this misdirected effort is now very evident in the country as a whole. The government has started to drift. The economy does not seem to be getting any better as we witness daily increased inflation.

The nation's meager resources are once again being wasted on unproductive ventures. Government has distanced itself from the people and the yearnings and aspirations of the people as constantly reflected in the media have been ignored.

This is because a few people have arrogated to themselves the right to make the decisions for the larger part of the ruling body. All these events have shown that the present composition of our country's leadership cannot, therefore, justify its continued occupation of that position.

Furthermore, the initial objectives and programmemes of action which were meant to have been implemented since the ascension to power of the Buhari Administration in January 1984 have been betrayed and discarded. The present state of uncertainty and stagnation cannot be permitted to degenerate into suppression and retrogression.

We feel duty bound to use the resources and means at our disposal to restore hope in the minds of Nigerians and renew aspirations for a better future. We are no prophets of doom for our beloved country, Nigeria. We, therefore, count on everyone's cooperation and assistance.

I appeal to you, fellow countrymen, particularly my colleagues in arms to refrain from any act that will lead to unnecessary violence and bloodshed among us. Rest assured that our action is in the interest of the nation and the armed forces.

In order to enable a new order to be introduced, the following bodies are dissolved forthwith pending further announcements: (a) The Supreme Military Council (b) The Federal Executive Council (c) The National Council of States. All seaports and airports are closed, all borders remain closed.

Finally, a dusk to dawn curfew is hereby imposed in Lagos and all state capitals until further notice. All military commanders will ensure effective maintenance of law and order. Further announcements will be made in due course. God bless Nigeria.

APPENDIX 5: MAJOR GIDEON ORKAR COUPAUGUST 22, 1990 SPEECH

Fellow Nigerian Citizens,

On behalf of the patriotic and well-meaning peoples of the Middle Belt and the southern parts of this country, I , Major Gideon Orkar, wish to happily inform you of the successful ousting of the dictatorial, corrupt, drug baronish, evil man, deceitful, homo-sexually-centered, prodigalistic, un-patriotic administration of General Ibrahim Badamosi Babangida. We have equally commenced their trials for unabated corruption, mismanagement of national economy, the murders of Dele Giwa, Major-General Mamman Vasta, with other officers as there was no attempted coup but mere intentions that were yet to materialise and other human rights violations.

The National Guard already in its formative stage is disbanded with immediate effect. Decrees Number 2 and 46 are hereby abrogated. We wish to emphasise that this is not just another coup but a well conceived, planned and executed revolution for the marginalised, oppressed and enslaved peoples of the Middle Belt and the south with a view to freeing ourselves and children yet unborn from eternal slavery and colonisation by a clique of this country.
Our history is replete with numerous and uncontrollable instances of callous and insensitive dominatory repressive intrigues by those who think it is their birthright to dominate till eternity the political and economic privileges of this great country to the exclusion of the people of the Middle Belt and the south.
They have almost succeeded in subjugating the Middle Belt and making them voiceless and now extending same to the south.
It is our unflinching belief that this quest for domination, oppression and marginalisation is against the wish of God and therefore, must be resisted with the vehemence.
Anything that has a beginning must have an end. It will also suffice here to state that all Nigerians without skeleton in their cupboards need not to be afraid of this change. However, those with skeleton in their cupboards have all reasons to fear, because the time of reckoning has come.
For the avoidance of doubt, we wish to state the three primary reasons why we have decided to oust the satanic Babangida administration. The reasons are as follows:

(a) To stop Babangida's desire to cunningly, install himself as Nigeria's life president at all costs and by so doing, retard the progress of this country for life. In order to be able to achieve this undesirable goals of his, he has evidently started destroying those groups and sections he perceived as being able to question his desires.
Examples of groups already neutralised, pitched against one another or completely destroyed are:
(1) The Sokoto caliphate by installing an unwanted Sultan to cause division within the hitherto strong Sokoto caliphate.
(2) The destruction of the peoples of Plateau State, especially the Lantang people, as a

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balancing force in the body politics of this country.

(3) The buying of the press by generous monetary favours and the usage of State Security Service, SSS, as a tool of terror.

(4) The intent to cow the students by the promulgation of the draconian decree Number 47.

(5) The cowing of the university teaching and non-teaching staff by an intended massive purge, using the 150 million dollar loan as the necessitating factor.

(6) Deliberately withholding funds to the armed forces to make them ineffective and also crowning his diabolical scheme through the intended retrenchment of more than half of the members of the armed forces.

Other pointers that give credence to his desire to become a life president against the wishes of the people are:

(1) His appointment of himself as a minister of defense, his putting under his direct control the SSS, his deliberate manipulation of the transition program, his introduction of inconceivable, unrealistic and impossible political options, his recent fraternisation with other African leaders that have installed themselves as life presidents and his dogged determination to create a secret force called the national guard, independent of the armed forces and the police which will be answerable to himself alone, both operationally and administratively.

It is our strong view that this kind of dictatorial desire of Babangida is unacceptable to Nigerians of the 1990's, and, therefore, must be resisted by all.

Another major reason for the change is the need to stop intrigues, domination and internal colonisation of the Nigerian state by the so-called chosen few. This, in our view, has been and is still responsible for 90 percent of the problems of Nigerians.

This indeed has been the major clog in our wheel of progress.

This clique has an unabated penchant for domination and unrivalled fostering of mediocrity and outright detest for accountability, all put together have been our undoing as a nation.

This will ever remain our threat if not checked immediately. It is strongly believed that without the intrigues perpetrated by this clique and misrule, Nigeria will have in all ways achieved developmental virtues comparable to those in Korea, Taiwan, Brazil, India, and even Japan.

Evidence, therefore, this cancerous dominance has as a factor constituted by a major and unpardonable clog in the wheel of progress of the Nigerian state. (Sic) It is suffice to mention a few distasteful intrigues engineered by this group of Nigerians in recent past. These are:

(1) The shabby and dishonourable treatment meted on the longest serving Nigerian general in the person of General Domkat Bali, who in actual fact had given credibility to the Babangida administration.

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(2) The wholesale hijacking of Babangida's administration by the all powerful clique.

(3) The disgraceful and inexplicable removal of Commodore Ebitu Ukiwe, Professor Tam David-West, Mr. Aret Adams and so on from office.

(4) The now-pervasive and on-going retrenchment of Middle Belt and southerners from public offices and their instant replacement by the favoured class and their stooges.

(5) The deliberate disruption of the educational culture and retarding its place to suit the favoured class to the detriment of other educational minded parts of this country.

(6) The deliberate impoverishment of the peoples from the Middle Belt and the south, making them working ghosts and feeding on the formulae of 0-1-1- or 0-0-0 while the aristocratic class and their stooges are living in absolute affluence on a daily basis without working for it.

(7) Other countless examples of the exploitative, oppressive, dirty games of intrigues of its class, where people and stooges that can best be described by the fact that even though they contribute very little economically to the well-being of Nigeria, they have over the years served and presided over the supposedly national wealth derived in the main from the Middle Belt and the southern part of this country, while the people from these parts of the country have been completely deprived from benefiting from the resources given to them by God.

(8) The third reason for the change is the need to lay a strong egalitarian foundation for the real democratic take off of the Nigerian state or states as they circumstances may dictate.

In the light of all the above and in recognition of the negativeness of the aforementioned aristocratic factor, the overall progress of the Nigerian state a temporary decision to excise the following states namely, Sokoto, Borno, Katsina, Kano and Bauchi states from the Federal Republic of Nigeria comes into effect immediately until the following conditions are met.

The conditions to be met to necessitate the re-absorption of the aforementioned states are as following:

(a) To install the rightful heir to the Sultanate, Alhaji Maccido, who is the people's choice.

(b) To send a delegation led by the real and recognised Sultan Alhaji Maccido to the federal government to vouch that the feudalistic and aristocratic quest for domination and operation will be a thing of the past and will never be practised in any part of the Nigeria state.

By the same token, all citizens of the five states already mentioned are temporarily suspended from all public and private offices in Middle Belt and southern parts of this country until the mentioned conditions above are met.

They are also required to move back to their various states within one week from today. They will, however, be allowed to return and joint the Federal Republic of Nigeria

when the stipulated conditions are met.

In the same vein, all citizens of the Middle Belt and the south are required to come back to their various states pending when the so-called all-in-all Nigerians meet the conditions that will ensure a united Nigeria. A word is enough for the wise.

This exercise will not be complete without purging corrupt public officials and recovering their ill-gotten wealth, since the days of the oil boom till date. Even in these hard times, when Nigerians are dying from hunger, trekking many miles to work for lack of transportation, a few other Nigerians with complete impunity are living in unbelievable affluence both inside and outside the country.

We are extremely determined to recover all ill-gotten wealth back to the public treasury for the use of the masses of our people. You are all advised to remain calm as there is no cause for alarm. We are fully in control of the situation as directed by God. All airports, seaports and borders are closed forthwith.

The former Armed Forces Ruling Council is now disbanded and replaced with National Ruling Council to be chaired by the head of state with other members being a civilian vice-head of state, service chiefs, inspector general of police, one representative each from NLC, NUJ, NBA, and NANS.

A curfew is hereby imposed from 8 p.m. to 6 a.m. until further notice. All members of the armed forces and the police forces are hereby confined to their respective barracks.

All unlawful and criminal acts by those attempting to cause chaos will be ruthlessly crushed. Be warned as we are prepared at all costs to defend the new order.

All radio stations are hereby advised to hook on permanently to the national network programmeme until further notice.

Long live all true patriots of this great country of ours. May God and Allah through his bountiful mercies bless us all.

APPENDIX 6: LT-GEN. SANI ABACHA AUGUST 1990 COUNTER COUP SPEECH AGAINST MAJ. ORKAH

I, Lieutenant-General Sani Abacha, Chief of Army Staff, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, have found it necessary to address you once again in the course of our nation's history. In view of the unfortunate, development early this morning, I'm in touch with the CGS, Service Chiefs, GOCs, FOCs, AOCs, of the armed forces and they have all pledged their unflinching support and loyalty to the federal military government of General Ibrahim Badamasi Babangida who is perfectly safe and with whom I am in contact.

"Early this morning there was sporadic firing by a few disloyal and misguided soldiers in some isolated parts of Lagos, followed by an embarrassing radio broadcast.

"Fellow Nigerians, you will all agree with me that the reasons given for this grave misconduct are significantly motivated by greed and self-interest. The soldiers involved decided to constitute themselves into national security nuisance for no other cause than base avarice.'

Most of these disloyal elements have been arrested and are already undergoing interrogation. The remaining dissidents are advised in their own interest to report to the nearest military location and hand over the arms and ammunition in their possession. All formation and unit commanders are hereby directed to exercise effective command and control. "At this stage, let me reiterate our commitment to pursue vigorously the transition programmeme. No amount of threat or blackmail will detract the federal military government's attention in this regard. We are set to hand over power to a democratically elected government in 1992. I wish to assure all law-abiding citizens that the situation is now under control and people should go about pursuing their lawful interest.

"Long live the Federal Republic of Nigeria.

"Thank you.

APPENDIX 7: GENERAL SANI ABACHANOVEMBER 17, 1993 COUP SPEECH

Fellow Nigerians,

Sequel to the resignation of the former Head of the Interim National Government and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, Chief Ernest Shonekan and my subsequent appointment as Head of State and Commander-in-Chief, I have had extensive consultations within the armed forces hierarchy and other well meaning Nigerians in a bid to find solutions to the various political, economic and social problems which have engulfed our beloved country, and which have made life most difficult to the ordinary citizen of this nation.

Chief Ernest Shonekan took over as Head of State and Commander-in-Chief of the Nigerian Armed Forces at a most trying time in the history of the country. Politically, economically, and socially, there were lots of uncertainties. Things appeared bleak and the atmosphere was heavy with uncertainties. However, driven by a belief in himself, his countrymen, and love for his country, he accepted to face the challenges of our time. I will, therefore, like to take this opportunity to pay tribute to him for his selfless service to the nation. He showed great courage at taking on the daunting task of heading the Interim National Government and even greater courage to know when to leave.

Many have expressed fears about the apparent return of the military. Many have talked about the concern of the international community. However, under the present circumstances the survival of our beloved country is far above any other consideration. Nigeria is the only country we have. We must, therefore, solve our problems ourselves. We must lay a very solid foundation for the growth of democracy. We should avoid any adhoc or temporary solutions. The problems must be addressed firmly, objectively, decisively and with all sincerity of purpose.

Consequently, the following decisions come into immediate effect:

(a) The Interim National Government is hereby dissolved.

(b) The National and State Assemblies are also dissolved.

(c) The State Executive Councils are dissolved. The Brigade Commanders are to take over from the Governors in their States until Administrators are appointed. Where there are no Brigade Commanders, the Commissioners of Police in the State are to take over.

(d) All Local Governments stand dissolved. The Directors of Personnel are to take over the administration of the Local Governments until Administrators are appointed.

(e) All former Secretaries to Federal Ministries are to hand over to their Directors-General until Ministers are appointed.

(f) The two political parties are hereby dissolved.

(g) All processions, political meetings and associations of any type in any part of the country are hereby banned.

(h) Any consultative committee by whatever name called is hereby proscribed.

(i) Decree 61 of 1993 is hereby abrogated.

A Provisional Ruling Council (PRC), is hereby established. It will comprise:

(a) The Head of State, Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the federal Republic of Nigeria as Chairman.

(b) The Chief of General Staff as Vice-Chairman

(c) The Honourable Minister of Defence

(d) The Chief of Defence Staff

(e) The Service Chiefs

(f) The Inspector General of Police

(g) The Attorney General and Minister of Justice

(h) The Internal Affairs Minister

(i) The Foreign Affairs Minister

Also, a Federal Executive Council will be put in place.

Our security system will be enhanced to ensure that lives of citizens, property of individuals are protected and preserved. Drug trafficking and other economic crimes such as 419 must be tackled and eliminated.

On the current strike throughout the nation following the increase in the price of fuel, I appeal to all the trade unions to return to work immediately. We cannot afford further dislocation and destruction of our economy.

On the closed media houses, government is hereby lifting the order of proscription with immediate effect. We, however, appeal to the media houses that in this spirit of national reconciliation, we should show more restraint and build a united and peaceful Nigeria.

Fellow Nigerians, the events of the past months, starting from the annulment of the June 12 presidential election, culminating in the appointment of the former Head of State, Chief Ernest Shonekan, who unfortunately resigned yesterday, are well known to you. The economic downturn has undoubtedly been aggravated by the ongoing political crisis.

We require well thought-out and permanent solutions to these problems if we are to emerge stronger for them. Consequently, a constitutional conference with full constituent powers will be established soon to determine the future constitutional structure of Nigeria. The constitutional conference will also recommend the method of forming parties, which will lead to the ultimate recognition of political parties formed by the people. While the conference is on, the reorganisation and reform of the following major institutions will be carried out:

(a) The Military

(b) The Police

(c) The Customs

(d) The Judiciary

(e) NITEL

(f) NNPC

(g) NEPA

(h) The Banking Industry

(i) Higher Educational Institutions

This regime will be firm, humane, and decisive. We will not condone nor tolerate any act of indiscipline. Any attempt to test our will be decisively dealt with. For the International Community, we ask that you suspend judgement while we grapple with the onerous task of nation building, reconciliation and repairs.

This government is a child of necessity with a strong determination to restore peace and stability to our country and on these foundations, enthrone a lasting and true democracy. Give us the chance to solve our problems in our own ways.

Long Live the Federal Republic of Nigeria."

APPENDIX 8: LT-COL. Y. GOWON AUGUST 1966'S SPEECH OF ACCEPTANCE OF POWER

This is Lt-Col. Y. Gowon, Army Chief of Staff, speaking to you. My fellow countrymen, the year 1966 has certainly been a fateful year for our beloved country, Nigeria. I have been brought to the position today of having to shoulder the great responsibilities of this country and the armed forces with the consent of the majority of the members of the Supreme Military Council as a result of the unfortunate incident that occurred on the early morning of 29th July 1966.

However, before I dwell on the sad issue of 29th July 1966, I would like to recall to you the sad and unfortunate incidents of 15th January 1966 which bear relevance. According to the certain well-known facts, which have so far not been disclosed to the nation and the world, the country was plunged into a national disaster by the grave and unfortunate action taken by a section of the Army against the public. By this I mean that a group of officers, in conjunction with certain civilians, decided to overthrow the legal government of the day; but their efforts were thwarted by the inscrutable discipline and loyalty of the great majority of the Army and the other members of the armed forces and the police. The Army was called upon to take up the reins of government until such time that law and order had been restored. The attempt to overthrow the government of the day was done by eliminating political leaders and high-ranking Army officers, a majority of whom came from a particular section of the country. The Prime Minister lost his life during this uprising. But for the outstanding discipline and loyalty of the members of the Army who are most affected, and the other members of the armed forces and the police, the situation probably could have degenerated into a civil war.

There followed a period of determined effort of reconstruction ably shouldered by Maj-Gen. J. T. U. Aguiyi-Ironsi but, unfortunately, certain parties caused suspicion and grave doubts of the Government's sincerity in several quarters. Thus, coupled with the already unpleasant experience of the 15th January still fresh in the minds of the majority of the people, certain parts of the country decided to agitate against the military regime which ad

hitherto enjoyed country-wide support. It was, unfortunately, followed by serious rioting and bloodshed in many cities and towns in the north.

There followed a period of uneasy calm until the early hours of 29th July 1966, when the country was once again plunged into another very serious and grave situation, the second in seven months. The position on the early morning of 29th July was a report from Abeokuta garrison, that there was a mutiny and that two senior and one junior officers from a particular section of the country were killed. This soon spread to Ibadan and Ikeja. More casualties were reported in these places. The Supreme Commander was by this time at Ibadan attending the natural rulers' conference and was due to return on the afternoon of 29th July. The Government Lodge was reported attacked and the last report was that he and the West Military Governor were both kidnapped by some soldiers. Up till now, there is no confirmation of their whereabouts. The situation was soon brought under control in these places. Very shortly afterward, at about the same time, there was a report that there were similar disturbances among the troops in the North, and that a section of the troops had taken control of all military stations in the North as well. The units of Enugu and the garrison at Benin were not involved. All is now quiet and I can assure the public that I shall do all in my power to stop any further bloodshed and to restore law, order and confidence in all parts of the country with your co-operation and goodwill.

I have now come to the most difficult part, or the most important part, of this statement. I am doing it, conscious of the great disappointment and heartbreak it will cause all true and sincere lovers of Nigeria and of Nigerian unity both at home and abroad, especially our brothers in the Commonwealth.

As a result of the recent events and the other previous similar ones, I have come to strongly believe that we cannot honestly and sincerely continue in this wise, as the basis of trust and confidence in our unitary system of government has not been able to stand the test of time. I have already remarked on the issues in question. Suffice to say that, putting all considerations to test-political, economic, as well as social-the base for unity is not there or is so badly rocked, not only once but several times. I therefore feel that we should review the issue of our national standing and see if we can help stop the country form drifting away into utter destruction. With the general consensus of opinion of all the Military Governors and other members of the Supreme and Executive Council, a decree will soon be issued to lay a firm foundation of this objective. Fellow countrymen, I sincerely hope we shall be able to resolve most of the problems that have disunited us in the past and

really come to respect and trust one another in accordance with an all-round code of good conduct and etiquette.

All foreigners are assured of their personal safety and should have no fear of being molested.

I intend to continue the policy laid down in the statement by the Supreme Commander on 16th January 1966 published on 26th January 1966.

We shall also honour all international treaty obligations and commitments and all financial agreements and obligations entered into by the previous government. We are desirous of maintaining good diplomatic relationships with all countries. We therefore consider any foreign interference in any form will be regarded as an act of aggression.

All members of the armed forces are requested to keep within their barracks except on essential duties and when ordered from SHQ. Troops must not terrorise the public, as such action will discredit the new National Military Government. Any act of looting or sabotage will be dealt with severely. You are to remember that your task is to help restore law and order and confidence in the public in time of crisis.

I am convinced that with your co-operation and understanding, we shall be able to pull the country out of its present predicament. I promise you that I shall do all I can to return to civil rule as soon as it can be arranged. I also intend to pursue most vigorously the question of the release of political prisoners. Fellow countrymen, give me your support and I shall endeavour to live up to expectations. Thank you.

APPENDIX 9: SIR FREDRICK LORD LUGARD 1903 PROCLAMATION OF CONQUEST SPEECH

The old treaties are dead, you have killed them. Now these are the words which I, the "High Commissioner", have to say for the future. The Fulani in old times under Dan Fodio conquered this country. They took the right to rule over it, to levy taxes, to depose kings and to create kings. They in turn have by defeat lost their rule which has come into the hands of the British. All these things which I have said the Fulani by conquest took the right to do now pass to the British. Every Sultan and Emir and the principal officers of state will be appointed by the "High Commissioner" throughout all this country. The "High Commissioner" will be guided by the usual laws of succession and the wishes of the

people and chiefs, but will set them aside if he desires for good cause to do so. The Emirs and Chiefs who are appointed will rule over the people as of old time and take such taxes as are approved by the "High Commissioner", but they will obey the laws of the Governor and will act in accordance with the advice of the Resident…. It is forbidden to import firearms (except flint-locks), and there are other minor matters which the Resident will explain. The Alkalis and Emirs will hold the law courts as of old but bribes are forbidden, and mutilation and confinement of men in inhuman prisons are not lawful. The powers for each Court will be contained in a warrant appointing it. Sentences of death will not be carried out without the consent of the Resident. The Government will, in future, hold the rights in land which the Fulani took by conquest from the people, and if Government requires land it will take it for any purpose. The Government holds the right of taxation, and will tell the Emirs and Chiefs what taxes they may levy, and what part of them must be paid to Government. The Government will have the right to all minerals, but the people may dig for iron and work in it subject to the approval of the "High Commissioner", and may take salt and other minerals subject to any excise imposed by law. Traders will not be taxed by Chiefs but only Government. The coinage of the British will be accepted as legal tender, and a rate of exchange for cowries fixed, in consultation with Chiefs, and they will enforce it. When an Emirate, or an office of state, becomes vacant, it will only be filled with the consent of the "High Commissioner", and the person chosen by the council of Chiefs and approved by the "High Commissioner" will hold his place only on condition that he obeys the laws of the Protectorate and the conditions of his appointment. Government will in no way interfere with the Mohammedan religion. All men are free to worship God as they please. Mosques and prayer places will be treated with respect by us. Every person, including slaves, has the right to appeal to the Resident, who will, however, endeavour to uphold the power of the native courts to deal with native cases according to the law and custom of the country. If slaves are ill-treated they will be set free as your Koran orders, otherwise Government does not desire to interfere with existing domestic relations. But slaves set free must be willing to work and not remain idle or become thieves. The Resident may give permits to trustworthy men to bear arms. It is the earnest desire of the king of England that this country shall prosper and grow rich in peace and in continent; that the population shall increase, and the ruined towns which abound everywhere shall be built up; and that war and trouble cease. Henceforth no emir or chief shall levy war or fight; but his case will be settled by law, and if force is necessary, Government will reply it. I earnestly hope to give effect in these matters to the wishes of my king.

In conclusion, I hope that you Will find our rule sympathetic, and that the country will prosper and be contented. You need have no fear regarding British rule; it is our wish to learn your customs and fashion, just you must learn ours. I have little fear but that we shall

agree, for you have always heard that British rule is just and fair, and people under our king are satisfied. You must not fear to tell the resident everything, and he will help and advice you. … (Shaw 1905 cited in (Kirk-Green 1965, 43-4)).

APPENDIX 10 BRIG. ABACHA, DECEMBER 31, 1983 COUP SPEECH

Fellow countrymen and women, I, Brigadier Sani Abacha, of theNigerian army address you this morning on behalf of the
Nigerian armed forces.
You are all living witnesses to the great economic predicament
and uncertainty, which an inept and corrupt leadership has
imposed on our beloved nation for the past four years. I am
referring to the harsh, intolerable conditions under which we
are now living. Our economy has been hopelessly mismanaged.
We have become a debtor and beggar nation. There is
inadequacy of food at reasonable prices for our people who are
now fed up with endless announcements of importation of
foodstuffs. Health services are in shambles as our hospitals are
reduced to mere consulting clinics without drugs, water and
equipment. Our educational system is deteriorating at an
alarming rate. Unemployment figures including the
undergraduates have reached embarrassing and unacceptable
proportions. In some states, workers are being owed salary
arrears of eight to twelve months and in others there are
threats of salary cuts.
Yet our leaders revel in squandermania, corruption and
indiscipline, and continue to proliferate public appointments in
complete disregard of our stark economic realities. After due
consultations over these deplorable conditions, I and my
colleagues in the armed forces have in the discharge of our
national role as promoters and protectors of our national
interest decided to effect a change in the leadership of the
government of the Federal Republic of Nigeria and form a
Federal Military Government. This task has just been
completed.
The Federal Military Government hereby decrees the
suspension of the provisions of the Constitution of the Federal
Republic of Nigeria 1979 relating to all elective and appointive
offices and representative institutions including the office of
the President, state governors, federal and state executive
councils, special advisers, special assistants, the establishment

of the National Assembly and the Houses of Assembly including the formation of political parties. Accordingly, Alhaji Shehu Usman Shagari ceases forthwith to be the President and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Nigeria . All the incumbents of the above named offices shall, if they have not already done so, vacate their formal official residences, surrender all government property in their possession and report to the nearest police station in their constituencies within seven days. The clerk of the National Assembly, the President of the Senate and Speaker of the House of Representatives shall, within two weeks, render account of all the properties of the National Assembly. All the political parties are banned; the bank account of FEDECO and all the political parties are frozen with immediate effect.

All foreigners living in any part of the country are assured of their safety and will be adequately protected. Henceforth, workers not on essential duties are advised to keep off the streets. All categories of workers on essential duties will, however, report at their places of work immediately. With effect from today, a dusk to dawn curfew will be imposed between 7pm and 6am each day until further notice. All airways flights have been suspended forthwith and all airports, seaports, and border posts closed. External communications have been cut. The Customs and Excise, Immigration and the Police will maintain vigilance and ensure watertight security at the borders. The area administrators or commanders will have themselves to blame if any of the wanted people escape.

Fellow countrymen and women, the change in government has been a bloodless and painstaking operation and we do not want anyone to lose his or her life. People are warned in their own interest to be law abiding and to give the Federal Military Government maximum cooperation. Anyone caught disturbing public order will be summarily dealt with. For avoidance of doubt, you are forewarned that we shall not hesitate to declare martial law in any area or state of the federation in which disturbances occur. Fellow countrymen and women and comrades at arms, I will like to assure you that the Armed Forces of Nigeria is ready to lay its life for our dear nation but not for the present irresponsible leadership of the past

civilian administration. You are to await further
announcements, 1 NIGERIA!

APPENDIX 11: COUPS IN AFRICA BETWEEN 1960-1970

Congo-Kinshasa, 1960. General Mobutu seizes power temporarily.

• Togo, January 1963. Coup deposes President Olympio, who gets killed in the process.

• Congo-Brazzaville, August 1963. Government of Abbe' Youlou overthrown.

• Dahomey, December 1963. Colonel Sogho overthrows President Maga.

• Gabon, February 1964. Coup d'etat occurs but is reverted by French forces.

• Algeria, June 1965. Colonel Boumedienne overthrows President Ben Bella.

• Dahomey; December 1965. A second coup is staged.

• Burundi, October 1965. The monarchy is overthrown

• by Army officers.

• Central Africa Republic, January 1966. President David Dacko is ousted by Colonel Jean Bokassa.

• Upper Volta, January 1966. Colonel Lamizana deposes President Yamego.

• 11. Nigeria, January 1966.General Ironsi is installed   after a coup led by young officers (Major Nzegwu and co).

• Ghana, February 1966. President Kwame Nkruma is over-

• thrown by the military led by General Ankrah.

• Nigeria, July 1966. General Gowon overthrows General Ironsi.

• Burundi, November 1966. Captain Micombero takes over in another coup.

• Sierra Leone, March 1967. President Margai deposed by Lieutenant Colonel Juxon-Smith.

• Algeria, December 1967. A second coup attempt is made.

•   Sierra Leone, April 1968. A coup from the ranks over- throws Lieutenant Colonel Juxon-Smith. Civilian government re-installed under President SiakaStevens.

•   Mali, November 1968. Young officers led by Lieutenant Moussa Traore depose the government of President Keita.

•   Sudan, May 1969. Free Officers' Movement seizes power.

•   Libya, September 1969. The monarchy is deposed.

•   Somalia, October 1969. A revolutionary Council led by the military overthrows the government.

APPENDIX 12: CONCORDANCE LINES SHOWING THE OCCURENCES OF 'ALL'
IN THE COUP SPEECHES

Concordance Hits 63

Hit	KWIC	File
1	through his bountiful mercies bless us all.	gideon orkah.txt 4 2
2	of the masses of our people. You are all advised to remain calm as there is no caus	gideon orkah.txt 4 1
3	irways operations are suspended and all Airports and Borders are closed till further	joseph garba.txt 5 4
4	ts have been suspended forthwith and all airports, seaports, and border posts close	abacha 1984.txt 1 1
5	rol of the situation as directed by God. All airports, seaports and borders are closed	gideon orkah.txt 4 1
6	and 6am each day until further notice. All airways flights have been suspended forth	abacha 1984.txt 1 1
7	?s, and, therefore, must be resisted by all. Another major reason for the change is th	gideon orkah.txt 4 4
8	your radio for further announcements. All borders, air and sea ports are closed until	dimka.txt 2 5
9	s. All seaports and airports are closed, all borders remain closed. Finally, a dusk to d	dogonyaro.txt 3 4
10	ies are advised to keep off the streets. All categories of workers on essential duties	abacha 1984.txt 1 9
11	f the Nigeria state. By the same token, all citizens of the five states already mentione	gideon orkah.txt 4 9
12	l conditions are met. In the same vein, all citizens of the Middle Belt and the south ar	gideon orkah.txt 4 1
13	ade commanders until further notice. All commissioners are sacked, except for the	dimka.txt 2 2
14	imself as Nigeria\x92s life president at all costs and by so doing, retard the progress	gideon orkah.txt 4 3
15	ied. Be warned as we are prepared at all costs to defend the new order. All radio st	gideon orkah.txt 4 1
16	nd trade union activities, together with all demonstrations and unauthorized gatherin	nzegwu 1966.txt 6 2
17	ral Republic of Nigeria 1979 relating to all elective and appointive offices and represe	abacha 1984.txt 1 2
18	s that are taking place. I am to assure all foreigners living and working in this part of	nzegwu 1966.txt 6 3
19	rties are frozen with immediate effect. All foreigners living in any part of the country	abacha 1984.txt 1 8
20	ntil Administrators are appointed. (e) All former Secretaries to Federal Ministries a	abacha palace cou
21	biding citizen is freedom from fear and all forms of oppression, freedom from genera	nzegwu 1966.txt 6 7
22	is is the end of this speech. I wish you all goodluck and I hope you will cooperate to t	nzegwu 1966.txt 6 9
23	r formal official residences, surrender all government property in their possession a	abacha 1984.txt 1 4
24	e are extremely determined to recover all ill-gotten wealth back to the public treasury	gideon orkah.txt 4 1
25	bus states pending when the so-called all-in-all Nigerians meet the conditions that w	gideon orkah.txt 4 1
26	of the Nigerian armed forces. You are all living witnesses to the great economic pre	abacha 1984.txt 1 1
27	olice in the State are to take over. (d) All Local Governments stand dissolved. The L	abacha palace cou
28	om 8 p.m. to 6 a.m. until further notice. All members of the armed forces and the poli	gideon orkah.txt 4 1
29	d all state capitals until further notice. All military commanders will ensure effective	dogonyaro.txt 3 6
30	tates pending when the so-called all-in- all Nigerians meet the conditions that will ens	gideon orkah.txt 4 1
31	d. It will also suffice here to state that all Nigerians without skeleton in their cupboal	gideon orkah.txt 4 1
32	nd assistance to foreign invaders, are all offences punishable by death sentence. D	nzegwu 1966.txt 6 6
33	e met with death. You are warned, it is all over the 19 states. Any acts of looting or ra	dimka.txt 2 4
34	perty recovery. As a interim measure all permanent secretaries, corporation chairn	nzegwu 1966.txt 6 5

25

APPENDIX 13: THE PICTURE OF LT GEN SANI ABACHA SHOWING A FIXED STARE IN A COUP SPEECH.

APPENDIX 14: THE POSITIONS AND INTERESTS OF THE MILITARY IN COMMERCIAL BANKS

Commercial Banks	Names of Military Officers	Positions Occupied
Broad Bank of Nigeria limited	Col. Sani Bello (RTD.) Maj. Gen. Innih (RTD.) AVM. Usman Muazu (RTD.)	Chairman Director Director
Chartered Bank Ltd.	Lt. Gen. MI.I Wushishi	Chairman
Equatorial Trust Bank	Col. C.O. Ekundayo (RTD.)	Director
Gamji Bank of Nigeria Limited	Major M.H. Jokolo (RTD.)	Director
Habib Bank of Nigeria Limited	Maj. Gen Shehu M. Yar'adua (RTD.)	Chairman
Highland Bank of Nigeria	AVM. Ibrahim M. Alfa (RTD.)	Chairman
Intercity Bank Ltd.	AVM. John N. Yisa Doko (RTD.)	Chairman
North south bank ltd	Air Com. Dan Suleiman (RTD.) Gen. M.I. Wushishi (RTD.)	Chairman Director
Trade Bank PLC	Maj Gen. A Moh'd (RTD.)	Chairman
United bank for Africa	Air Com. Samson Omeruah (RTD.)	Chairman
Universal trust bank of Nigeria ltd	Maj Gen. T.Y. Danjuma (RTD.) Maj. Gen. Paul Tarfa (RTD.)	Chairman Director

APPENDIX 15: THEIR POSITIONS AND INTERESTS IN MERCHANT BANKS[6]

Merchant Banks	Names Of Military Officers	Position Occupied
Continental Merchant Bank Nig. Ltd.	Col. Sani Bello (RTD.)	Chairman
Great Merchant Bank Ltd.	Lt. Col. P.O. Ogbebor (RTD.)	Chairman
Group Merchant Bank	AVM. Mouktar Moh'd (RTD.)	Chairman
Int'l Merchant Bank Nig. Ltd.	Maj Gen Moh'd Shuwa (RTD.)	Chairman
ICON Merchant Bank	Maj. Gen. D. Jemibewon (RTD.) AVM. A.D. Bello (RTD.)	Vice Chairman Director
Manufacturers Merchant Bank	Maj Gen. G.O. Ejiga (RTD.)	Director
Nationwide Merchant Bank Ltd.	Lt. Col. Tunde Oyedele (RTD.)	Director
Prime Merchant Bank	MAJ. GEN. Hassan Katsina (RTD.)	Director
Prudent Merchant Bank	Maj Gen Z. Lekwot (RTD.)	Director
Rims Merchant Bank	Lt. Col. P.Z. Wyon (RTD.)	Director
Royal Merchant Bank Ltd.	Maj Gen Dr A Rimi (RTD.)	Director
Societe Bancaire Nig. Ltd.	Gen J.S. Jalo (RTD.) Comm. O. Ebitu Ukiwe (RTD.)	Chairman Director

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[6]*Source of tables 2&3: adapted from 1992 Annual Reports of the Nigerian Deposit Insurance Corporation (NDIC) cited in Ajayi (2007,110-111)*

APPENDIX 16: THE VAST ECONOMIC EMPIRE ACQUIRED BY GENERAL T.Y.DANJUMA (RTD)[7]

Company	Sector	Position Occupied
Nigeria-America Line	Shipping	Chairman
Comet Shipping Agencies	Shipping	Chairman
Universal Trust Bank	Banking	Chairman
Union Dicon Salt	Industrial	Chairman
Acres Farms, Takum	Agriculture	Chairman
Oil Tec (Nig.) Ltd. Port Harcourt	Energy	Chairman
White Oil Company Kaduna	Energy	Chairman
West Africa Milk Company	Dairy	Chairman
Guinness (Nig.) PLC	Brewing	Chairman
Tarabaro Fisheries	Fishing	Chairman
T.Y. Chemical	Industrial	Chairman
World Trade African Forum	Service	Chairman
Meridian Publishing Coy.	Publishing	Chairman
Ideal Flour Mills	Industrial	Chairman
Eagle Flour Mills	Industrial	Chairman
Nigerian Eagle Flour Mills	Industrial	Director
SCOA (Nig.) Plc	Conglomerate	Ex-Director
Agip (Nig.) Plc	Energy	Ex-Director
Nigeria Tobacco Company	Industrial	Ex-Director

[7]*Source: Tempo, 26th December 1996 (cover story) p.3 cited in Ajayi (2007,111)*

APPENDIX 17: CONCORDANCE LINES WITH 'WE' IN THE SPEECHES

Concordance Hits   39

Hit	KWIC	File
1	order will be summarily dealt with. We appeal to everyone to co-operat	all the data in text (1).txt 0 33
2	osed from 6am to 6pm. Thank you. We are all together." I, Brigadier	all the data in text (1).txt 0 17
3	th inside and outside the country. We are extremely determined to rec	all the data in text (1).txt 0 29
4	as there is no cause for alarm. We are fully in control of the situat	all the data in text (1).txt 0 30
5	new aspirations for a better future. We are no prophets of doom for ou	all the data in text (1).txt 0 23
6	ords and deeds. Like good soldiers we are not promising anything mira	all the data in text (1).txt 0 36
7	intolerable conditions under which we are now living. Our economy ha	all the data in text (1).txt 0 1
8	e ruthlessly crushed. Be warned as we are prepared at all costs to defe	all the data in text (1).txt 0 31
9	he risk of continuous misdirection. We are presently confronted with tl	all the data in text (1).txt 0 19
10	nent solutions to these problems if we are to emerge stronger for them	all the data in text (1).txt 0 13
11	1. For the International Community, we ask that you suspend judgemen	all the data in text (1).txt 0 15
12	ions to return to work immediately. We cannot afford further dislocatio	all the data in text (1).txt 0 9
13	have no other country but Nigeria, we could not stay passive and watcl	all the data in text (1).txt 0 18
14	ess and painstaking operation and we do not want anyone to lose his	all the data in text (1).txt 0 3
15	has been a bloodless operation and we do not want anyone to lose his	all the data in text (1).txt 0 32
16	niraculous or spectacular. But what we do promise every law abiding cit	all the data in text (1).txt 0 37
17	nto suppression and retrogression. We feel duty bound to use the reso	all the data in text (1).txt 0 22
18	that you suspend judgement while we grapple with the onerous task o	all the data in text (1).txt 0 16
19	y has been hopelessly mismanaged. We have become a debtor and begg	all the data in text (1).txt 0 2
20	state the three primary reasons why we have decided to oust the satanid	all the data in text (1).txt 0 28
21	iust be taken. This is precisely what we have done. The Nigerian public l	all the data in text (1).txt 0 20
22	ieral Ibrahim Badamosi Babangida. We have equally commenced their ti	all the data in text (1).txt 0 25
23	achieving this is strictly military but we have no doubt that every Nigeri;	all the data in text (1).txt 0 34
24	to the fullest in this job which we have set for ourselves of establi:	all the data in text (1).txt 0 39
25	eration. Nigeria is the only country we have. We must, therefore, solve	all the data in text (1).txt 0 5
26	oreign nation will be respected and we hope that such nations will resp	all the data in text (1).txt 0 35
27	proscription with immediate effect. We, however, appeal to the media h	all the data in text (1).txt 0 10
28	fore, solve our problems ourselves. We must lay a very solid foundation	all the data in text (1).txt 0 7
29	Nigeria is the only country we have. We must, therefore, solve our probl	all the data in text (1).txt 0 6
30	ooth nationally and internationally. We promise that you will know mor	all the data in text (1).txt 0 38
31	ed by the ongoing political crisis. We require well thought-out and pe	all the data in text (1).txt 0 12
32	of doubt, you are forewarned that we shall not hesitate to declare mar	all the data in text (1).txt 0 4
33	ation for the growth of democracy. We should avoid any adhoc or temp	all the data in text (1).txt 0 8
34	nis spirit of national reconciliation, we should show more restraint and	all the data in text (1).txt 0 11
35	m for our beloved country, Nigeria. We, therefore, count on everyone\x	all the data in text (1).txt 0 24
36	will be firm, humane, and decisive. We will not condone nor tolerate ar	all the data in text (1).txt 0 14
37	oer 2 and 46 are hereby abrogated. We wish to emphasise that this is n	all the data in text (1).txt 0 26
38	come. For the avoidance of doubt, we wish to state the three primary r	all the data in text (1).txt 0 27
39	seem to be getting any better as we witness daily increased inflation	all the data in text (1).txt 0 21

APPENDIX 18: CONCORDANCE LINES WITH 'OUR' IN THE SPEECHES

Concordance Hits   39

Hit	KWIC	File
1	bloodshed among us. Rest assured that our action is in the interest of the nation and the armed forces.	dogonyaro1985.txt
2	d social problems which have engulfed our beloved country, and which have made life most difficult to	abacha1993.txt 1 1
3	e present circumstances the survival of our beloved country is far above any other consideration. Niger	abacha1993.txt 1 3
4	uture. We are no prophets of doom for our beloved country, Nigeria. We, therefore, count on everyon	dogonyaro1985.txt
5	and corrupt leadership has imposed on our beloved nation for the past four years. I am referring to the	abacha1984.txt 0 1
6	ination to restore peace and stability to our country and on these foundations, enthrone a lasting and tr	abacha1993.txt 1 8
7	in view of what has been happening in our country in the past few months, the Nigerian Armed Forces	garba1975.txt 4 1
8	we hope that such nations will respect our country's territorial integrity and will avoid taking sides wit	nzegwu1966.txt 5 2
9	shown that the present composition of our country\x92s leadership cannot, therefore, justify its contin	dogonyaro1985.txt
10	rces of Nigeria is ready to lay its life for our dear nation but not for the present irresponsible leadership	abacha1984.txt 0 10
11	und to use the resources and means at our disposal to restore hope in the minds of Nigerians and renev	dogonyaro1985.txt
12	ditions under which we are now living. Our economy has been hopelessly mismanaged. We have becor	abacha1984.txt 0 2
13	d further dislocation and destruction of our economy. On the closed media houses, government is her	abacha1993.txt 1 6
14	s without drugs, water and equipment. Our educational system is deteriorating at an alarming rate. Un	abacha1984.txt 0 5
15	nd conscience since 1st October, 1960. Our enemies are the political profiteers, the swindlers, the men	nzegwu1966.txt 5 3
16	colonisation by a clique of this country. Our history is replete with numerous and uncontrollable instanc	orkah1990.txt 6 1
17	uffs. Health services are in shambles as our hospitals are reduced to mere consulting clinics without dru	abacha1984.txt 0 4
18	sk for your support at all times, so that our land, watered by the Niger and Benue, between the sandy v	nzegwu1966.txt 5 5
19	ers there are threats of salary cuts. Yet our leaders revel in squandermania, corruption and indiscipline,	abacha1984.txt 0 6
20	ree from corruption and internal strife. Our method of achieving this is strictly military but we have no	nzegwu1966.txt 5 1
21	luals misuse power to the detriment of our national aspirations and interest. No nation can ever achieve	dogonyaro1985.txt
22	nal role as promoters and protectors of our national interest decided to effect a change in the leadersh	abacha1984.txt 0 9
23	e armed forces have in the discharge of our national role as promoters and protectors of our national in	abacha1984.txt 0 8
24	us the chance to solve our problems in our own ways. Long Live the Federal Republic of Nigeria.\x94	abacha1993.txt 1 10
25	equacy of food at reasonable prices for our people who are now fed up with endless announcements of	abacha1984.txt 0 3
26	ic treasury for the use of the masses of our people. You are all advised to remain calm as there is no car	orkah1990.txt 6 8
27	lemocracy. Give us the chance to solve our problems in our own ways. Long Live the Federal Republic	abacha1993.txt 1 9
28	try we have. We must, therefore, solve our problems ourselves. We must lay a very solid foundation for	abacha1993.txt 1 4
29	Executive Council will be put in place. Our security system will be enhanced to ensure that lives of citi	abacha1993.txt 1 5
30	ional circles, those that have corrupted our society and put the Nigerian political calendar back by their	nzegwu1966.txt 5 4
31	appointments in complete disregard of our stark economic realities. After due consultations over these	abacha1984.txt 0 7
32	operationally and administratively. It is our strong view that this kind of dictatorial desire of Babangida	orkah1990.txt 6 3
33	doing as a nation. This will ever remain our threat if not checked immediately. It is strongly believed th	orkah1990.txt 6 7
34	, he accepted to face the challenges of our time. I will, therefore, like to take this opportunity to pay tr	abacha1993.txt 1 2
35	countability, all put together have been our undoing as a nation. This will ever remain our threat if not	orkah1990.txt 6 6
36	now extending same to the south. It is our unflinching belief that this quest for domination, oppressior	orkah1990.txt 6 2
37	te by the so-called chosen few. This, in our view, has been and is still responsible for 90 percent of the	orkah1990.txt 6 4
38	This indeed has been the major clog in our wheel of progress. This clique has an unabated penchant fo	orkah1990.txt 6 5
39	act of indiscipline. Any attempt to test our will be decisively dealt with. For the International Communi	abacha1993.txt 1 7

APPENDIX 19: CONCORDANCE LINES SHOWING 'WILL' IN LORD LUGARD'S
SPEECH

Concordance Results 3:		
Concordance Hits 28		
Hit	KWIC	File
1	ll obey the laws of the Governor and will act in accordance with the advice of the	lugards speech.txt 0 6
2	overnment. The coinage of the British will be accepted as legal tender, and a rate	lugards speech.txt 0 16
3	mir and the principal officers of state will be appointed by the \x93High Commission	lugards speech.txt 0 1
4	ot lawful. The powers for each Court will be contained in a warrant appointing it. Se	lugards speech.txt 0 9
5	try. The \x93High Commissioner\x94 will be guided by the usual laws of succession	lugards speech.txt 0 2
6	e country. If slaves are ill-treated they will be set free as your Koran orders, otherwis	lugards speech.txt 0 23
7	shall levy war or fight ;but his case will be settled by law, and if force is	lugards speech.txt 0 24
8	please. Mosques and prayer places will be treated with respect by us. Every perso	lugards speech.txt 0 21
9	, in consultation with Chiefs, and they will enforce it. When an Emirate, or an office	lugards speech.txt 0 17
10	er minor matters which the Resident will explain. The Alkalis and Emirs will hold the	lugards speech.txt 0 7
11	y king. In conclusion, I hope that you Will find our rule sympathetic, and that the cou	lugards speech.txt 0 26
12	aid to Government. The Government will have the right to all minerals, but the	lugards speech.txt 0 14
13	o tell the resident everything, and he will help and advice you.	lugards speech.txt 0 28
14	approved by the High Commissioner will hold his place only on condition that he	lugards speech.txt 0 19
15	ent will explain. The Alkalis and Emirs will hold the law courts as of old but	lugards speech.txt 0 8
16	right to appeal to the Resident, who will, however, endeavour to uphold the power	lugards speech.txt 0 22
17	ent of the Resident. The Government will, in future, hold the rights in land which	lugards speech.txt 0 11
18	ions of his appointment. Government will in no way interfere with the Mohammedan	lugards speech.txt 0 20
19	ant appointing it. Sentences of death will not be carried out without the consent of	lugards speech.txt 0 10
20	any excise imposed by law. Traders will not be taxed by Chiefs but only Governmer	lugards speech.txt 0 15
21	x93High Commissioner\x94, but they will obey the laws of the Governor and will	lugards speech.txt 0 5
22	an office of state, becomes vacant, it will only be filled with the consent of the	lugards speech.txt 0 18
23	ule sympathetic, and that the country will prosper and be contented. You need have	lugards speech.txt 0 27
24	nd if force is necessary, Government will reply it. I earnestly hope to give effect	lugards speech.txt 0 25
25	Emirs and Chiefs who are appointed will rule over the people as of old time	lugards speech.txt 0 4
26	wishes of the people and chiefs, but will set them aside if he desires for good	lugards speech.txt 0 3
27	e, and if Government requires land it will take it for any purpose. The Government h	lugards speech.txt 0 12
28	ment holds the right of taxation, and will tell the Emirs and Chiefs what taxes they	lugards speech.txt 0 13

APPENDIX 20: CONCORDANCE LINES SHOWING 'WILL' IN MAJOR
CHUKWUMA NZEGWU'S SPEECH

Concordance Results 1:

Concordance Hits 17

Hit	KWIC	File
1	ountry's territorial integrity and will avoid taking sides with enemies of the	nzegwu 1966.txt 0 5
2	Council has promulgated. These will be modified as the situation improves. You	nzegwu 1966.txt 0 7
3	y commander. Doubtful loyalty will be penalized by imprisonment or any more	nzegwu 1966.txt 0 11
4	tion or other authorized notices will be penalized by death. This is the	nzegwu 1966.txt 0 14
5	nders in support of the change will be punishable by a sentence imposed by	nzegwu 1966.txt 0 8
6	of troop movements or actions, will be punished by any suitable sentence deemed	nzegwu 1966.txt 0 9
7	e running of any establishment will be punished by death sentence. Wavering or	nzegwu 1966.txt 0 12
8	s, loitering and rowdy behavior will be rectified by any sentence of incarceration	nzegwu 1966.txt 0 10
9	open loyalty with the revolution will be regarded as an act of hostility	nzegwu 1966.txt 0 13
10	ed into with any foreign nation will be respected and we hope that such	nzegwu 1966.txt 0 3
11	part of Nigeria that their rights will continue to be respected. All treaty obligati	nzegwu 1966.txt 0 2
12	ou all goodluck and I hope you will cooperate to the fullest in this job	nzegwu 1966.txt 0 17
13	re no doubt that every Nigerian will give us maximum cooperation by assisting the	nzegwu 1966.txt 0 1
14	ple. My dear countrymen, you will hear, and probably see a lot being	nzegwu 1966.txt 0 6
15	nationally. We promise that you will know more be ashamed to say that	nzegwu 1966.txt 0 16
16	and we hope that such nations will respect our country's territorial integrity a	nzegwu 1966.txt 0 4
17	ary Order of the Day which you will soon begin to see displayed in public.	nzegwu 1966.txt 0 15

APPENDIX 21: CONCORDANCE LINES WITH 'THEIR'

		File
23		
s by those who think it is	their birthright to dominate till eternity t	orkah1S
e nearest police station in	their constituencies within seven days. T	abacha1
er, those with skeleton in	their cupboards have all reasons to fear	orkah1S
erians without skeleton in	their cupboards need not to be afraid of	orkah1S
stries are to hand over to	their Directors-General until Ministers a	abacha1
ot already done so, vacate	their formal official residences, surrende	abacha1
c officials and recovering	their ill-gotten wealth, since the days of	orkah1S
rs from public offices and	their instant replacement by the favoure	orkah1S
be calm and to go about	their lawful duties. However, in view of	garba1S
life. People are warned in	their own interest to be law abiding and	abacha1
es will, however, report at	their places of work immediately. With e	abacha1
l government property in	their possession and report to the neare	abacha1
es are hereby confined to	their respective barracks. All unlawful a	orkah1S
rs should remain calm in	their respective spots. No divisional con	dimka1
n this part of Nigeria that	their rights will continue to be respected	nzegwu
he country are assured of	their safety and will be adequately prote	abacha1
er from the Governors in	their States until Administrators are app	abacha1
the aristocratic class and	their stooges are living in absolute afflu	orkah1S
by the favoured class and	their stooges. (5) The deliberate disrup	orkah1S
nave equally commenced	their trials for unabated corruption, misi	orkah1S
required to come back to	their various states pending when the s(	orkah1S
required to move back to	their various states within one week fror	orkah1S
political calendar back by	their words and deeds. Like good soldie	nzegwu