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LETTER FROM THE EDITOR OF

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Dr. Marilyn Fernandez, Professor of Sociology

The Sociology Department at Santa Clara University is proud to present, in this volume of Silicon Valley Notebook, six research papers written by students from the class of 2017. As in the past years, the substantive, theoretical, methodological, and applied content of the Sociology curriculum at SCU are reflected in these papers. Originally prepared as part of the Research Capstone course (Sociology 121), the student authors further refined their work during the following quarter for inclusion in this volume.

Taken together, the authors addressed a classic sociological issue, the tension between social structure and personal agency in understanding and addressing the effectiveness of contemporary social organizations, institutions, and the challenges that youth face. Each student used a sequential mixed methods research design. They conducted rigorous quantitative analyses of national secondary survey data to test predictions grounded in sociological theoretical traditions and reflected on their potential social applications; narrative interviews with sources knowledgeable about their respective topics and content analyses of documents were used to supplement their quantitative findings.

The authors in the first set titled, Effectiveness of Organizations and Institutions, examined the challenges and promise that international and local organizations as well as institutions face in actualizing their mission focus. **Jessica Frydenberg**, in her paper titled **"**Political Elites or Average Citizens? Perspectives on the Political Legitimacy of the European Union," used the 2009 Eurobarometer 72.4 survey and current political events in Europe to illustrate the crucial role of an informed citizenry in the future stability of the EU. While the power elites did have a voice in the Union's future, tighter systemic coupling between citizen interests and the EU organization is necessary to sustain EU's mission focus. The central question in **Nicole G Speciale**'s paper was how member identities and their social integration shaped assessments of LGBT Organization' Effectiveness. Members who had strong identities were more critical of LGBT organizations while those who were socially integrated were more appreciative. She used data from the 2010 Social Justice Sexuality Survey, along with commentaries from LGBT professionals to verify theoretical concepts of flexible self-concept, collective consciousness and solidarity and offer suggestions for improved mission driven operations. **Ana Raquel Gómez-Pérez**, in her analyses of "Structural Dynamics and Personal Agency in Housing Careers," demonstrated that housing moves driven by structural displacement lead to downward mobility in housing careers while personal agency (choice) in housing moves led to upward mobility. She used the 2009 American Housing Survey: National Microdata, updated with content analyses of journalistic writings about contemporary housing issues, to contrast the operations of structural inequalities against human capital paradigms in housing careers. In the face of gentrification, locating affordable quality housing in healthy neighborhoods was an important message to housing assistance advocacy organizations.

The authors in the second set, Youth and Young Adults, investigated the social ecologies of youth as they shaped the challenges and successes they faced in their educational careers and personal relationships. **Veronica Fay Ybarra,** in her paper "Youth Academic Success: It starts in the Home," found that academic support in the home was the primary force behind prosocial and academically successful youth. She analyzed data from the 2008-2013 "Social Capital and Children's Development" survey, supplemented with commentaries from eight education professionals, and found support for the theoretical predictions about the value of social and cultural capital in the home and communities in shaping the core academic self-concept of youth. However, young adults who had faced challenges early in their academic careers can recover and succeed academically as young adults, the thesis explored by **Oscar Quiroz-Medrano** in his paper, "The Past Is Not Prologue": Educational Achievements of Young Adults." Academic success in young adulthood was dependent on access to social and cultural capital resources that helped young adults reshape their compromised adolescent academic self-concept. Survey data from the NLSY, supplemented with qualitative commentaries from seven education professionals, were used to illustrate the flexible academic self-concepts of young adults and their need for permanent positive support. In the third paper, **Karen Robles** explored "Interpersonal Violence Victimization of Adolescents" and contrasted the violence risks posed by drug and alcohol culture against the protections offered by family and the community. In her analyses of survey data from the 1999-2006 Welfare, Children, and Families: A Three-City Study, supplemented with qualitative insights from five professionals, she found that involvement in adolescent alcohol-drug cultures increased the probability of victimization in their intimate relationships. Youth differentially associating with socially disorganized youth sub-cultures was a more powerful predictor of intimate partner violence than the protections offered by families and cultures, pointing to the need for prevention programs to include peer cultures of adolescents.

As a collection, student research presented in this volume, continue to exemplify the evidence based social science curriculum offered by the Department of Sociology at Santa Clara University. The social issues explored have important policy implications that resonate with the University's mission to not only prepare students of competence, conscience, and compassion but who will also help fashion a more just, humane, and sustainable word.

Perspectives on the Political Legitimacy and Future of the European Union

By
Jessica Frydenberg[1]

Abstract. The confidence that Informed Citizenry and their Economic Elites have in the European Union were assessed. Survey data, from the 2009 Eurobarometer 72.4 with a sample size of 8,499 citizens, from 27 European nations, were supplemented with interviews with two professionals knowledgeable about EU politics and content analyses of current events, such as the EU debt crisis, the rise in terrorist attacks, the British Referendum, and the immigration crisis. Although both citizens and elites were confident about the EU's future, voices of informed citizenry shaped the confidence in the EU more than economic elites. These findings substantiated the Systemic Coupling theoretical model more than the Power Elite model and contributed to the empirical literature on citizens' trust in the EU and transnational political systems. Additional cross-temporal examination of citizens' confidence in the EU and the roles of new media are warranted.

INTRODUCTION

The ongoing economic uncertainty in the European Union (EU), the unprecedented influx of immigrants and refugees, and the growing threat of terrorism, have raised questions about the long-term legitimacy, stability, and resilience of the EU. Little has been done by the EU administration to successfully address doubts in the hearts of its citizens. Can the EU administration turn things around for Europe? Does the EU administration have the power, the drive, and the resources to restore its citizens' faith in the institution's ability to address Europe's problems, and if so how would they go about doing that?

In 1958, following the Second World War, the European Economic Community (EEC) was formed in the hopes of peacefully bringing Western European countries together. Six nations, Belgium, Germany, France, Italy, Luxembourg, and The Netherlands, were

[1] **Acknowledgements**: I would like to thank Dr. Marilyn Fernandez for her constant support, guidance, patience, and motivation throughout this research process. Thank you for believing in me and for pushing me to do my best and be my best in everything. I extend my deepest appreciation to my professional interviewees for taking the time to provide some valuable insights to the topic. Finally, I'd like to thank my friends and family who have loved, supported, and motivated me throughout my time at Santa Clara University and in my many research endeavors.

the first to join in forming the EEC to foster economic cooperation, minimize conflict between different European nations, and encourage democracy in member states. The EEC quickly grew and evolved to be a unique and powerful economic and political union that addresses policy areas ranging from human rights, the environment, security, climate change, and external relations with non-EU nations (Europa, European Union 2016). With its core values based in the rule of law and respect for human rights and a fundamental purpose of fostering, promoting, and reinforcing social, political and economic harmony amongst European nations, the organization was officially renamed the European Union (EU) in 1993. As of 2015, the EU is comprised of 28 member states, covering over 4 million square kilometers (just over 1.5 million square miles) and protecting the rights of approximately 508 million inhabitants (Europa, EU 2016). To this day, these core values of human rights, democracy, and rule of law continue to be EU's driving force and the root of its success but also the challenges they still face.

It is in this historical context that my research on EU citizens' confidence in the European Union, particularly in its political legitimacy, is located. With the rise in terrorism and immigration and the lingering effects of the economic crises in Member States, understanding citizens' faith in the EU administration is important now more than ever to ensure the successful and stable future of the institution. It is also important to recognize that EU citizens' confidence is dependent on their location on the political, social, and economic hierarchy. The political and economic elites, arguably the ones who benefit the most from the work and policies of the EU, are likely to have a more positive view of the EU and its legitimacy than the average citizen who has fallen through the cracks and whose needs are not addressed by their political leaders. Part of why the British, for example, voted to leave the European Union was that they felt only the EU elitists who ran the EU benefitted (Robertson 2016; Frum 2016). So whose European Union is it? Does it belong to the political elites or to the average citizen?

To address these questions, confidence of citizens in the EU and its political legitimacy were examined through a dual lens, that of the political elites versus the average citizen. On the one hand, confidence could be all about how knowledgeable the average citizen is about the EU, its policies, and the organization's responsibilities to the citizens. On the other hand, one could argue that it is really about one's stake in how strong and stable the economic health of the EU, irrespective of knowledge. In other words, it would not matter how informed citizens are, but it would be the political and economically healthier citizens, the elites, that dominate the workings and future of the European Union.

Knowledgeable citizens are vital for democracy to function properly; they are the voices that can drive changes in their lives to protect their rights, and liberties. If citizens are not informed adequately about the purpose of an institution and its policies, they will be unable to be engaged in a way that is truly representative of their needs and expectations. Because the European Union deals with not only economics, but also issues of justice, migration, environment, and human rights, it is necessary that citizens know and understand these issues in order for the EU administration to enact changes that will benefit the wider population.

In addition to how much working knowledge citizens have of the EU and its policies, their quality of life and economic health can also shape their opinions of the Union's future. Even though the EU strives to improve the living standards, human dignity and freedom of all its citizens, it is quite likely that the economic and political elites benefit more from the system than the average citizen. If the elites are satisfied with their lives they may have more faith in the EU and the European leadership. In contrast, if the EU and its leaders cannot reduce disparities, the less privileged citizens are likely to lose confidence in the EU. It is reasonable to assume that those who have not benefitted as much from the system hold the EU responsible for their poor economic health and quality of life. The day-to-day experiences and standards of living of citizens are likely to define their confidence in the EU.

In short, both the informed EU citizen and the EU elites have the power to influence confidence in the EU. A comparative assessment of the voices of knowledgeable citizenry and elites will be useful to the EU administration as it shapes its future policies. Because the EU is so vast and diverse, in terms of the history of its member states and because citizen confidence in the system can be expected to vary by region, analyses need to be disaggregated by EU regions, as in Western, Eastern, and Mediterranean nations. Findings from this study will add to the scholarship of the EU's future as well as the sociology of transnational politics and government.

LITERATURE REVIEW

Scholars of the extant literature reviewed below have focused on the political legitimacy of the EU, particularly trust in the EU and how informed citizens were about EU policies. Because the European Union is by nature a multilevel governing body that is structurally deeply intertwined with national governments, it has been argued that EU citizens who trust their own national governments were more likely to extrapolate that trust to other supranational political levels. EU scholars also found that citizens' knowledge about the European Union, its history, governing bodies and their respective policies, can influence, both directly and indirectly, whether they trust and support the EU. Some researchers have also noted contradictions in the way citizens' quality of life and their economic health shaped faith in the future of the EU.

The Struggle for EU Legitimacy

The struggle for EU legitimacy, both political and economic, is waged in the minds of the average citizen as well as its elites. Scholars have found that the political legitimacy and authority of the EU as an organization has fluctuated over the years depending on the context and environment at the time. Moreover, the Union constantly reshapes itself to better fit the needs of the people it serves. The EU's legitimacy was also measured by whether EU citizens were satisfied with their lives and felt that they were benefitting from being in an EU Member State. Other scholars argued that citizens' confidence in the EU comes down to how well educated and knowledgeable citizens were about the EU, its history and its policies. The ways the EU administration communicated information regarding the EU and how much knowledge citizens had largely influenced what citizens demanded of the organization and if they believed in its legitimacy.

EU Political Legitimacy

At the heart of the European Union lays the ambiguous understanding and definition of the organization itself, McCormick (2014) argued. He posited that scholars, on the one hand, have defined the EU as a form of multi-level governance or consociationalism,[2] while other researchers have left the definition vague, calling it an international organization that oversees politics and economics across European nations. McCormick formally defined the EU as an international organization that is embedded in an intergovernmental system in which leaders from the governments of member states work together and create a singular set of policies, currency, market, and trade. The fluid and ambiguous nature of the EU create challenges for citizens as well as for the key players and leaders involved to understand and legitimate the organization.

The struggle for political legitimacy and political trust is a story as old as the European Union and European integration itself and only continues to reinforce the vague definitions and roles of the EU (Sternberg 2013). Sternberg, in her work on the legitimacy of the European Union, asserted that the organization, despite surviving some of the most severe crises to date, is encountering growing skepticism and concern about how trustworthy and legitimate the Union itself is.[3] In fact, the EU citizen's understanding of legitimacy is much more fluid and continuously changing depending on the context at the time. Initially, the EU was created and was legitimized by European nations' unspoken desire and agreement to create and maintain peace and prosperity across Europe, to serve the common good of the people. Over time, this view of legitimacy became much more about economic integration with goal of creating a common market objective. With the Maastricht Treaty[4], otherwise referred to as the Treaty on European Union, the integration discourse evolved to include classic democratic ideals and related reforms. Through her detailed study of the historical meaning of EU legitimacy, Sternberg argued that European Union leaders continue, to this day, to struggle with formally defining and creating legitimacy around the organization, particularly with regards to what the EU should and should not be doing and how well the Union is meeting citizen expectations.

[2] Consociationalism is "a form of democracy which seeks to regulate the sharing of power in a state that comprises diverse societies (distinct ethnic, religious, political, national or linguistic groups), by allocating these groups collective rights" (Reut Institute, 2008).
[3] Sternberg 2013: 1, 187-192.
[4] The Maastricht negotiations took place in 1992 wherein leaders from various European nations met with the goal and intention of creating the first single [European] currency, the Euro, across sovereign nations in the modern world.

Other scholars have devoted attention to the shifting understanding of the nature of the EU. Beetham and Lord (2013), for example, while acknowledging legitimacy as something affiliated to political authority, noted that the EU is constantly changing to fit the needs of the organization and the people it serves. They defined legitimacy as a framework used to analyze and explain the different types of EU member governments and how and why citizens abide by the legal and political laws of organizations like the European Union or a national government. Beetham and Lord argued that political legitimacy of the EU and the European political space essentially comes down to the interactions, and intrinsic connections, between the EU and its member states. To these authors, political authority is only deemed legitimate and recognized if it is (a) legal, “acquired and exercised according to established rules”, (b) normative “the rules are justifiable according to socially accepted beliefs, and (c) democratically legitimate “positions of authority are confirmed by the express consent or affirmation of appropriate subordinates, and by recognition from other legitimate authorities” (p.3).

EU political legitimacy has also been approached from the opposing end of the legitimacy-illegitimacy spectrum. Scholars, like Rousseau (2014), used a democratic deficit model and problems with legitimacy, to explain the failure of the EU to practice and operate in a democratic fashion. Rousseau, in his analysis EU’s democratic deficit, found that legitimacy, or more pointedly illegitimacies of the EU, came in two primary forms. Input-oriented legitimacy, based on the collective identity of the people, the average citizens, is “government by the people” (p.11) while out-put oriented legitimacy is dependent on common interests and goals, a “government for the people” (p.11). In both forms, new forms of decision-making, reliant on transparency and public participation, was deemed more popular and legitimate by the average citizen than the traditional, behind the scenes, methods of decision making and discussion between business and political leaders with minimal deliberation, benefitting primarily the elites.

Political legitimacy is also a matter of trust, with its breadth of meaning and importance to all individuals, their nations, and transnational institutions. In the EU political context, extrapolation of citizens’ trust in the health of their national institutions to the EU has swung both ways. Researchers have empirically documented a positive association between citizens’ trust in national institutions and their trust in larger EU organizations. Harteveld (2013) defined trust as fundamental to a social system because it diffuses support through all levels of society. Political trust is the glue that keeps the political system together and is the “prime expression of [political] legitimacy” (p.543). Using data from the June – July 2009 Eurobaromater survey 71.3, administered in 30 Member States with approximately 1000 respondents per State, Harteveld found the logic of extrapolation[5] to be the most influential in citizens’ confidence in the EU while the logics of identity[6] and rationality[7] to have little to no impact. Citizens’ confidence in the EU was

[5] The Logic of Extrapolation: If people were generally optimistic and trusting of things, it is highly predictable that they would be trusting of other institutions, people or situations. In short, if citizens trusted their national political institutions, they are likely to have faith in the European Union as well.
[6] The Logic of Identity: Trust arose when citizens were able to identify with the state and its institutions because it [trust] is diffused through the community.

almost entirely rested on citizens' trust in national institutions, regardless of their rational evaluation or emotional affiliation. The more they trusted their national governments, the more likely they were to trust the European Union too.

A more specific form of extrapolation is how trust in domestic local governments translated into trust in supranational political institutions**.** Arnold et al. (2012) in their study of trust in EU institutions using 2005 – 2010 Eurobarometer survey data, found citizens' trust in domestic institutions and local governments cultivated greater confidence in EU institutions. However, extrapolated trust was conditional to specific countries; domestic corruption levels explained away the positive association between trust in national institutions and the EU. Besides, when national corruption levels were low, citizens trusted their non-political and national institutions more than the EU.

On the other hand, researchers have also found a negative relationship between citizens' trust in national institutions and the European Union. In Munoz, Torcal, and Bonet's (2011) analyses of the 2nd, 3rd and 4th waves of the European Social Survey (completed in 2004, 2005 and 2008 in all the then twenty-seven EU member states), trust in the national and European parliaments were intrinsically interdependent but also negatively extrapolated. Trust in a national institution or the local government created an upper limit standard in the minds of citizens, a standard they used to evaluate the EU and its institutions. In other words, the more citizens trusted their local government and institutions, the less confidence they had in the EU. But, when citizens had little trust in their national institutions, they tended to have more confidence in EU institutions.

Economic Legitimacy of Institutions and Citizens

The collective and individual quality of life of EU citizens has been another influential dimension of the EU's legitimacy and citizen confidence in the EU. The Euro deficit, the rise in terror and crisis of legitimacy, and political ideologies, amongst other things, led the EU parliament and the EU to introduce a variety of economic reforms in the hopes of increasing citizen support and legitimacy of the European Union.

Kumlin (2009), using the 2002 wave of the European Social Survey in 24 countries in and around Europe, discovered that citizens' confidence in and support of the EU was significantly lower in larger member nations that adequately protected the health and wellbeing of its citizens. In other words, citizens' who judged their quality of life as fairly good or great were more distrustful of the EU. In Western European countries, trust in the EU as a political institution was also directly fueled by their satisfaction or dissatisfaction with national public services and organizations. Dissatisfied European citizens from nations that provided robust welfare benefits distrusted and blamed the EU for their misgivings. Kumlin concluded that citizens' trust in the EU was dependent on

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[7] The Logic of Rationality: Confidence is the rational result of citizens' evaluations of the benefits received from the EU or other political institutions, more specifically aspects that served their personal interest or that they personally benefitted from.

perceptions of whether the EU member nation protected and cared for its citizens, especially those with financial or social needs.

More specifically, citizens' quality of life, measured by their socio-economic resources, perceived benefits from EU membership and life satisfaction, positively shaped confidence in the EU (Arnold 2012). The more satisfied citizens were with their quality of life and economic health, the more confidence they had in the EU. On the other hand, the economic debt crisis, which negatively impacted much of Europe and resulted in rising unemployment rates and lower wages, left citizens questioning what the EU was doing to ensure their economic wellbeing. With a rise in terror and conflict, citizens, who had most at stake, questioned whether the EU was ensuring their safety and protecting their needs. In either case, when the EU citizens were unhappy, insecure, or felt that the EU was not performing its duties socially, politically or economically, they blamed the EU and trusted the Union less. In short, when citizens' quality of life was threatened, so was their confidence in the EU.

Intersections of Political and Economic Legitimacy

Quality of life and its relation to political trust, however, are not quite so clear-cut and often incorporate citizens' personal values and political views. Using the public opinion polls from the 2008 Eurobarometer 69, Primozic (2009), found that personal values had little to no effect on citizens' confidence in the EU with the exception of how citizens' viewed democracy and solidarity. In Member States where citizens valued democracy, there was more confidence in national institutions. Similarly, member country citizens who valued solidarity voiced more trust in the EU than in their national institutions.

When it comes to whether or not the European Union is deemed legitimate, one has to consider the individuals or groups in charge. Crespy (2014), in her critical account of the need for a reappraisal of conflict in the EU around the issue of democratic legitimacy and deliberative democracy[8], argued that EU governance is largely elitist and technocratic. The operations of the EU are entirely elite-based, reliant upon those who hold power, privilege or resources in society. Crespy found that dissenting voices of the average citizens were often excluded and undermined the democratic legitimacy of the EU polity. In other words, it was the power elite stakeholders that ultimately controlled and organized the European Union. She argued that the EU must create a deliberative, transparent, and equal democracy [for all to participate in]. By permitting all citizens, but especially the average citizen, to channel their views and voice their concerns to the EU, they are not only participating in the deliberative decision making process and policy output, but are as a consequence, helping create a better quality of life that does not benefit only the elite (pp. 82-83).

On balance, the definition of quality of life and economic health in the EU comes down to who is defining it: the political and economic elites or the average citizen. The

[8] Deliberative or discursive democracy is a form of democracy in which conflict-based discussion and deliberation are central to the decision-making process within the EU (Crespy 2014: 88).

average citizen, whose voice is typically dismissed, does not benefit as much from the EU economic and political system as the political and economic elites.

Citizens' Working Knowledge of Institutions

Political legitimacy of and citizens' trust in the EU also comes down to how informed and knowledgeable citizens are about the European Union. Karp (2003), in his study of cognitive mobilization (citizens' knowledge), institutional confidence and economic benefits of the EU, found that citizens' lack of knowledge about the EU was one of the largest impediments to their evidence based evaluation the EU's performance. Citizens, in the Oct – Nov 1999 Eurobarometer 52.0 survey (a face-to-face survey questionnaire of about 30,000 EU citizens), who had a solid understanding of the EU, positively evaluated the EU's success. However, perception of costs and fewer benefits from being a part of the EU led to more negative views about the European Union.

Transparency in communication between leading political actors in the governing body and EU citizens is essential for creating an informed citizenry. Meyer (1999), in his study of political communication in the EU, found that a technocratic mindset and associated language, and resultant lack of transparency and poor communication about policies and procedures eroded public trust in the legitimacy and success of the EU. For example, policy documents shared publicly to encourage transparency and political action were "riddled with technocratic jargon and little explanation" (p.629). As a result, key issues and policies that may have been of public interest were lost in the complex and distorted methods of communication. Consequently, he posited that the European Commission failed their duties to achieve democratic legitimacy and public support. Meyer concluded that, transparency, as in strong, clear, and direct public communication, is vital to the success and political legitimacy of any governing body.

A specific illustration of the legitimacy impediments of opaque communication was seen when Central and Eastern Europe were added into the EU beginning in 2004 (Stefanova 2016). The technocratic jargon language led to euro skepticism. The institutional and technical nature and language of the European Union's expansion into Central and Eastern Europe was inadequate to garner public support and confidence in the new EU member states. In fact, the political elite and the EU administration dismissed the average citizen's negative views of the EU's expansion. To the elites, this accession as "a major opportunity in political and economic terms" and communicated it as so with the public (p.278). But this story of the EU's expansion resulted in several negative consequences for the political legitimacy and citizen trust in the EU. By and large, it decreased public support because of negative perceptions of the benefits of EU membership and frustration with the lack of transparent communication (281-282). Stefanova concluded that the EU administration's failure to communicate with and address the concerns of the average citizen resulted in an unfortunate decline in not only the EU's political legitimacy but also in citizens' faith in the democratic image of EU and its future.

Informed knowledge about the EU also had the power to change citizens' demands of and expectations from the EU administration and related political institutions. Hobolt (2012), in her study of the intrinsic relationship between the national governments, EU institutions and citizens, concluded that the more knowledgeable citizens were, the more they demanded, and expected better quality change and action, from not only their national state but also from the EU. Her research found this to be true at all levels, personal, national, and EU, in the 2009 27 Members States European Elections Studies (EES); "over half [of the citizens] are fairly or very satisfied with how democracy works in the EU – slightly more than the proportion of citizens who are satisfied with democracy in their own country" (p.100). The more citizens understood how EU democracy worked procedurally, the more knowledge-based their opinions on the EU's effectiveness were. There was an immediate sense of public ownership in the institutions, regardless of one's level in society, and a desire to be a part of the decision-making process, a rather anti-elitist perspective. This perspective was reinforced by Sternberg (2013: 80) who argued that there was an inherent need to align integration with citizen desires in order for the EU to address the expectations of the citizens and achieve legitimacy in the eyes of the EU citizens. In short, citizens' satisfaction with and faith in the EU was not based on a single legitimating factor, but rather citizens' trust in national, state, and EU institutions and their knowledge of the EU itself.

Citizens' knowledge of major events and crises across Europe and in their home nations also shaped their confidence in political institutions such as the EU. The 2009 EU Debt Crisis for example, not only negatively impacted most European economies but has drastically changed public opinion on the economic future and viability of the European Union. Corbu (2013), who used interviews with eleven economic experts and a national survey of about 1002 citizens in Romania, concluded that citizens with little to no knowledge of the EU and current events across Europe were more likely to use utilitarian criteria, what is most practical and attractive to them personally, to evaluate the EU and its legitimacy post-Euro crisis. Most of Corbu's respondents felt more optimistic about the EU's future than the future of Romania or of their personal situations. On balance, Corbu asserted that major crisis, such as the Euro Crisis, did not drastically diminish European citizens' confidence in the EU; in fact, the majority believed that the EU would be able to turn things around, even if not immediately.

On balance, knowledgeable citizens have the power to drastically change public opinion about the viability of the European Union, at the member nation and the citizen levels. Trust in the European Union seemed to be centered on knowledgeable citizens, their informed demands and expectations of the EU, as well as their sense of public ownership in the performance and success of national and broader public institutions.

State of Scholarly Knowledge about EU Legitimacy

It is evident that at the heart of citizens' confidence in the European Union is how politically and economically legitimate their citizens saw the organization as well as how informed and educated they were about EU policies and EU history. While the research linking citizens' trust in the EU system to their knowledge of political institutions and quality of life was illuminating, their conclusions were conflicting. For example, Haartveld (2013) and Arnold (2012) found that citizens' trust in the national institutions were positively associated with their faith in EU's political legitimacy while Munoz, Torcal, and Bonet (2011) and Kumlin (2009) discovered a negative relationship between citizens' confidence in national and EU-wide institutions. Likewise, the logic of extrapolation from Harteveld (2013) were contradictory. Primovic (2009) and Arnold's (2012) work on quality of life and economic health also proved incongruous. Despite these mixed results, there is general agreement that everything boils down to trust, the backbone of society, which is vital to ensuring successful democracy. And that informed citizenry had more confidence in both their national institutions and the EU, compared to their less informed counterparts.

The research presented in this paper, attempted to reconcile some of these contradictions by comparatively assessing the impact of knowledge and economic health on citizen confidence in the EU. Moreover, it relied on the most recent data available from the Eurobarometer survey. These updated findings will be useful to the EU administration as they work on re-examining their policies and reforms to garner more public support and trust.

RESEARCH QUESTION

This study explored citizens' confidence in the future of the European Union to understand the roles that its stakeholders, the elites and average citizens, might play in shaping it future. More specifically, how might EU citizens' confidence in the EU and in the organization's future, be shaped by citizens' knowledge of the EU and/or their economic health? Answers to these questions can offer clues into whether the political legitimacy of the EU will be defined by the political elite, the average citizen, or both. Regional differences were also examined to assess how confidence in the EU and its political legitimacy might vary depending on the regional context. Content analyses of sample current events and regional news about the political elite and the average citizen were used to illustrate the regional differences in the Eurobarometer survey findings. The formal research question posed was, "How do informed EU citizenry and economic health impact their confidence in the European Union?"

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKS

Trust in social institutions is a vital component to the success or failure of major institutions and democracies. Organizations that enjoy a large degree of public support and trust tend to also have more political legitimacy thereby making them more effective and valuable to its members. But, how do organizations build trust in their effectiveness? And is trust in organizational effectiveness widely shared across the society? Or is trust the prerogative of the elite and not the masses? This study, which evaluated the relative roles of informed citizenry and their quality of life on citizens' confidence in the EU, tested these alternative perspectives on organizational efficiency.

Parsons' Structural Functionalism (Parsons 1975; Powers 2010) is theoretically useful in explaining organizational effectiveness and trust from the average EU citizens' perspective; organizations are most effective when the average citizen is involved. On the other hand, theories of political and power elites (Domhoff 2005; Gilens 2014) offer a counter perspective: effective organizations meet the needs of and are determined by the elites and not so much the average citizen. In other words, there will be a direct relationship between what the elites want and need, and what the organization accomplishes, leaving the average citizen out of the equation (Hage & Dewar 1973).

Irrespective of whether organizations serve the elites or the average citizen, how is organizational efficiency achieved? Applied to the EU, an argument can be made that in order for EU citizens' to have confidence, the Union needs to be efficient. According to the Principle of Organizational Efficiency (Powers 2010), long-term organizational efficiency and effectiveness is a positive function of (a) success in maintaining uniform mission awareness and accurate institutional history, (b) depth of commitment to minimizing repetition of past mistakes and taking other steps to improve performance, (c) organizational capacity for assessing challenges and instituting change without interrupting normal operations, and (d) adequacy of alignment of training, information, resources, and operational authority with the tasks people are called on to perform in their roles (Powers 2010: 173). Stated from an EU standpoint, its administration will find ways to maintain organizational effectiveness in order to garner citizens' support and confidence. But whose support and confidence is the EU trying to gain and keep? Is it the power elites or the average citizens?

Model of Systemic Coupling

The European Union's organizational efficiency, seen from a Systemic Coupling perspective within a Structural Functionalist worldview, would posit that, other things being equal, the ability of an organization to maintain its mission focus is a positive function of tight systemic coupling. In other words, an effective organization will maintain (a) a stable shared awareness of common ends, (b) open and honest lines of communication (c) effective allocation of resources with mission involvement, and (e) have people at different locations within the system with a sense of common fate (Powers 2010: 165). A weakly coupled system, in contrast, is a function of individuals or structures in society becoming autonomous and independent units from one another.

Applied to the research question at hand, the European Union will be evaluated by its citizens as doing its job poorly by citizens who have limited knowledge of EU goals and policies. To the extent that the EU does not maintain transparency and fails to build and promote stable awareness and knowledge of the Union's purpose or policies to its citizens, the whole system will be deemed to be not only weakly coupled but also not faithful to its values of peace, stability and prosperity for all EU citizens (Europa, 2016). In other words, the more knowledge and understanding provided by the EU to the average citizen, and the more transparent the organization's purpose, policies, and functioning, the more likely the average citizen is to have confidence in the EU as a legitimate political institution. If citizens do not think that the performance of the Union is efficient and effective, then the system will have to change to ensure the needs of the people are better met, their trust is kept, and their citizens feel like they are being well cared for. In other words, as captured by the Form Follows Function principle of Structural Functionalism (Powers 2010: 153), widespread patterns of structural change emerge as systemic responses to meet new needs or correct for poor performance in the face of old and emerging needs.

Following these theoretical lines of reasoning, it was predicted that Informed Citizenry will have a stronger positive influence, than citizens' Economic Health, on members' Confidence in the European Union, net of EU regions and demographics **(Hypothesis 1)**. The more working knowledge and understanding the average citizen has about the EU (Informed Citizenry) and its benefits to them, the more likely they will be to endorse the political legitimacy of the EU and view its future positively.

Theory of the Power Elite

On the contrary, it could be argued that it is not the average citizen but rather the power elite that control the EU's future. In a power elite organizational model, the elite not only control and protect the most important power sources of society, they also have the resources to interject their interests and will into the mainstream societal structures and institutions (Lopez 2013: pp. 1-3). To paraphrase George William Domhoff (2005), it is the power elites, with their resources and power to influence the makeup of the institutional structures and policies that benefit most from public institutions. They ensure that the system is set up in a way that prioritizes, privileges, and perpetuates their needs and interests over that of the average citizen.

In a political elite framework, it stands to reason that the power elites will be more likely to perceive the system as politically legitimate, trustworthy, and successful because their interests are protected and served (Gilens 2014). The average citizen who does not benefit as much, be it economically, politically, or socially, from the system will not be as confident about the future of the EU, likely blame the power elite for their misgivings, and question the EU's political legitimacy. Stated differently, the power elite who control and benefit from the system will be likely to accept the political legitimacy and have more confidence in the EU's future. In contrast, the average citizen might be more critical and negative of the EU. Following this power elite model, it was predicted (**Hypothesis 2**) that Economic Health of its citizens and nations will have stronger positive impact on citizens' confidence in the EU than Informed Citizenry, net of background characteristics of the citizens.

METHODOLOGY AND DATA SOURCE

A mixed methods approach was used to test the competing perspectives of the power elite and the average citizen models on the EU's future. Secondary data from the 2009 Eurobarometer survey questionnaire were central to testing the hypotheses. Results from the survey analyses were elaborated on with the perspectives of professionals knowledgeable about the European Union and content analyses of journalistic reports of the British Referendum, the EU debt crisis, the immigration crisis, and the rise in terrorism. The professionals who were interviewed provided on-the-ground illustrations of stakeholders who control the political legitimacy and the future of the EU. The sample case studies of current events and regional news addressed the perspectives of the political elite, of the average citizen, or sometimes both.

Secondary Survey Data

The "Eurobarometer 72.4: Globalization, Financial and Economic Crisis, Social Change and Values, EU Policies and Decision Making, and Global Challenges"[9], a cross-national and cross-temporal interview questionnaire conducted on behalf of the European Commission was the source of the quantitative data for this paper. These surveys, based on a multistage, national probability sample of citizens from EU member states monitor public opinion in European Union member states. Opinions about the performance of the EU, various EU policies, economic recovery, responses to global threats, and basic demographical data are ascertained. The questionnaire interviews were conducted in English and French between October 23, 2009 and November 18, 2009 with 30,238 citizens in the 27 countries of the European Union[10].

Because each EU nation and region has its own experiences and historical context, the analyses were disaggregated by major EU regions: Western (40.5%) and Eastern (41.0%) regions were represented more in the EU survey sample than the Mediterranean region (18.5%). The disproportionate regional representation was partly because both Western and Eastern regions are larger in terms of the number of countries it encompasses than the Mediterranean (Appendix A). As for citizen sample demographics, there was a fairly even split between male (46.5%) and female (53.5%) respondents. The sample was also evenly distributed across the six different age groups; the largest group was 55 – 64 years old (26.7%). These background characteristics and demographics amongst other quality of life factors (Corbu, 2013) have been shown to make a difference in how EU citizens thought about the future of the EU. Hence, they will be controlled for in the multivariate analyses.

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[9] Will be referred to as Eurobarometer 72.4 in the remainder of the paper.
[10] The original collector of the data, or ICPSR, or the relevant funding agencies bear no responsibility for use of the data or for the interpretations or inferences based on such uses.

Qualitative Methodology

In keeping with a mixed methods design, the statistical analyses of the Eurobarometer survey were supplemented with content analyses of current events and regional news as well as two qualitative interviews. The two interviewees were professionals, from European Union member nations. Both were female ambassadors and officers, respectively for NATO and the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade to the EU. They were asked a series of questions via email about their thoughts on how EU citizens' confidence in the future of the EU is impacted by informed citizenry and their economic health. Refer to Appendix B for the consent form and the interview protocol.

Current events analyzed for this research included journalistic reports of major current issues such as the widespread migrant crisis, the British Referendum, the EU Debt Crisis, and the rise in terrorist attacks in Western Europe. These reports not only supplemented the quantitative EU regional differences and interviewee comments, but also updated the 2009 Eurobarometer findings. These current events also had the potential to shape EU citizens' confidence in the EU and its future.

DATA ANALYSES

Three levels of statistical data analysis were used to examine and answer the research. The descriptive analyses, which drew a portrait of the EU sample, aided in setting the context for further explorations into the research question at hand. The preliminary glimpses into the roles of informed citizenry and their economic health in their confidence in the EU's legitimacy and future, offered in the bivariate analyses, were retested using multivariate regression analyses. It was in the multivariate analyses that the net comparative strengths of informed citizens versus their economic health in shaping citizen confidence in the EU were identified. A comparative regional analysis was also conducted and explicated with content analyses of regional current events.

Operationalization and Descriptive Analysis

On balance, most EU respondents trusted the EU, even if they disagreed with certain policies or projects the Union has undertaken. Citizens also had elementary knowledge about the EU but did not know how the organization functions or which nations are members. Lastly, the economic and personal wealth of the EU citizens was in the middle class range; their economic wellbeing was not polarized at either end of the economic spectrum.

Confidence in the EU

As the EU has been continuously hit with one crisis after another, confidence of their citizens continues to be a concern for the EU administration. Citizen views on both the strengths of the EU and its challenges were measured (Table 1.A.)[11].

From the citizens' perspectives, the strengths of the EU lay in its positive future directions, its membership status, and overall satisfaction with the EU. Citizen respondents were more likely (58.6%) than not, to trust the EU, its Council (the main EU decision-making body, at 61.0%), and to be optimistic about the future of the EU (71.4%). On balance, EU citizens felt that the EU was fairly strong and successful in its mission; the average score on the EU strength index was 28.64 on a scale of 7.0 to 43.0 (Appendix C, Table 1.A.A.).

However, there was some reticence hesitance in the full-throated endorsement of the EU; the hesitation became clearer when looking at the citizens' opinions on the system's weaknesses (Appendix C, Table 1.A.B.). Some of the prominent complaints were that the EU had grown too rapidly (67.5%) and were short of ideas and projects (at the time of the survey, at 54.5%). As summarized by the cumulative index mean of 5.45 (on an index range from 2.0 – 8.0), EU respondents tended to be somewhat neutral, even slightly negative, when talking about the weaknesses of the EU system.

Table 1.A. Confidence in the EU
2009 Eurobarometer 72.4

Concept	Dimensions	Values	Statistics			
			Total Sample (n = 13797)	**Western Europe (n=5819)**	**Eastern Europe (n=5090)**	**Mediterranean (n=2374)**
Confidence in the EU	EU Strengths	Mean (SD) Min–Max	28.64 (6.09) 7.0–43.0	27.91 (6.47) 7.0 – 43.0	29.0 (5.80) 9.0 – 43.0	29.41*** (5.82) 10.0 – 43.0
	EU Weaknesses	Mean (SD) Min – Max	5.45 (1.38) 2.0 – 8.0	5.58 (1.39) 2.0 – 8.0	5.21 (1.37) 2.0 – 8.0	5.70*** (1.33) 2.0 – 8.0
	Index of Confidence in the EU[1]	Mean (SD) Min – Max	34.1 (5.77) 12.0 – 49.0	33.45 (6.03) 12.0 – 48.0	34.21 (5.45) 15.0 – 48.0	35.12*** (5.77) 15.0 – 49.0

[1] Index of Confidence in the EU = Sub-Index of EU Strengths + Sub-Index of EU Weaknesses. Possible range: 12.0-49.0. Correlations among these indicators ranged from .06*** to .49*** at .000 significance level.

Overall, as of 2009, the average EU respondent lay somewhere in the middle, neither too confident nor too insecure in their faith and confidence in the European Union's

[11] A factor analysis of the confidence in the EU questions revealed two dimensions in the confidence index: one set highlighted the strengths of the EU while the second captured the EU's weaknesses. Therefore, the analyses were also split along these two dimensions when appropriate.

future; the overall confidence index mean was 34.1 on a range from 12.0 to 49.0. Interestingly, Mediterranean and Eastern European nation citizens were slightly more confident in the EU than their Western European counterparts.

It is not surprising that the moderate confidence recorded in the 2009 Eurobarometer survey has been further shaken by a number of tragic events that recently hit the EU member nations. Among these unfortunate events is the recent rise in the terrorist attacks, particularly in Western Europe. Britain, France, Turkey, Norway, Belgium, and Germany, have all faced terrorist attacks that have shattered the confidence and faith of citizens across the EU (Peek 2016). The physical damage caused by these horrific events was easy to see, the number of injured and dead was easy to count and to mourn, But, the fears and loss of confidence that many citizens experienced was even more poignant than the physical damages (Hope, Foster, Hughes 2016).

Dozens of journalists also hypothesized that each of these attacks were not about targeting a specific group of people or nation but rather the European Union as a whole (Pearce & Chad 2016), a perspective endorsed by EU leaders. As the European Commission President, Jean-Claude Juncker, following the devastating Brussels airport attack, stated, “these attacks have hit Brussels today, and Paris yesterday, but it is Europe as a whole that has been targeted” (Pearce & Chad 2016). Similar waves of attacks that occurred in France in the year prior to the Brussels bombing, and more recently the lorry truck attacks in Nice and Berlin, to name a few, have brought to the forefront questions about the open borders across Europe and consequent vulnerability of Member States (Peek 2016). Some Eurosceptic European leaders, such as George Eustice, capitalized on these fears of vulnerability to stoke citizens’ distrust in their national governments and the governance of the EU (Hope, et al. 2016). Hope and his colleagues endorsed the rationale offered by Minister Eustice, a pioneer for border controls within the EU, that having stronger borders within the EU would allow national governments to protect their citizens from terrorism. In other words, using the influx of refugees and terrorist attacks in Western Europe to incite panic and fear, the media and political-economic leaders alike stoked distrust in the EU and its legitimate ability to serve and protect its citizens.

No doubt, there is no population in the world that is completely exempt from any sort of major atrocities, no matter how prepared and safe a city or region is. This being said, if the leadership of a particular nation or larger governing body like the EU is not able to meet the needs of its citizens and protect them from these horrific, large-scale acts of violence, then the average citizen will not only dismiss the legitimacy and success of the EU but also have little to no trust in the system. Under these challenging circumstances, citizens are more likely, than not, to vote to change their leaders and the political regime in its entirety (Peek 2016). Although this has yet to occur on a grand scale across the European Union, similar movements and structural changes have been witnessed around the world. A most notable example is the Arab Spring, which occurred less than a decade ago. What began with the self-immolation of Mohamed Bouazizi, a lower-class Tunisian street vendor, quickly spread like wildfire across the Middle East and North Africa resulting in episodes of unrest, disruptive activism, and the eventual overthrowing of political leaders such as Mubarak [Egypt], Ben Ali [Tunisia], and Qadaffi [Libya] (Alimi & Meyer 2011). Because these authoritarian regimes dismissed and ignored the needs of average citizens and failed to protect all citizens, many decided to successfully fight back.

Added to the terrorist attacks and the ensuing political and economic turmoil, was the migrant or refugee crisis, which shook up the EU regions even more. The growing turmoil and civil unrest in the Middle East, which reached a peak in 2014, led to more than a million migrants, predominantly through Southeast Europe and the Mediterranean Sea, to come into the European Union, in search of a better life (BBC 2016). According to The Telegraph, a British newspaper, as of November 2015, more than 1 million refugees and migrants had illegally arrived in Europe; one in 22 of the migrants were deemed to be refugees by the UN refugee agency (Holehouse & Smith 2016). The count of refugees has been estimated to have grown even more and is believed to have reached record levels in 2017, as per the President of the European Union Council (Williams 2017).

The surge of refugees, along with other economic crises that the Union already faced, created a perfect storm of events that worsened the political turmoil in the continent. The refugee crisis occurred as the EU continent was attempting to recover from the debt and related economic disasters (The Economist 2016). The European Institute (European Affairs) noted that the EU debt crisis has "heightened anti-immigrant feelings" across the EU, amongst average citizens and political elites alike. This has resulted in a series of political crisis, not only about the internal and external EU border controls but also whether or not the EU administration is doing enough to protect its Member States and their EU citizens. Furthermore, political tensions in the EU have been steadily rising due to the disproportionate burden faced by the more economically sturdy member countries which must then care for the less economically stable nations in the Mediterranean and Eastern European regions. Making matters worse is the fact that EU Member States with weaker economies such as Greece, Italy, and Hungary, among other Eastern and Mediterranean EU nations have received the majority of migrants (BBC 2016; European Institute 2017).

Besides, many Western European and some Eastern European political leaders have argued that opening borders to migrants puts the lives of European citizens at risk and destabilizes the EU system in place (Hope et al. 2016). The polarized political sentiments around the migrant crisis created further rifts amongst EU Member States and with the EU because the discussions around the crisis have failed to incorporate all stakeholders involved. The typical complaints were that the EU was taking into consideration only the perspectives of the elites and the more powerful EU Member States, and did not acknowledge and incorporate the voices of the average citizens and nations being affected first hand. The average citizens' growing concerns and distrust were a consequence of the clashes in voiced perspectives, or a lack there of, between the political elite and the average citizen.

The upcoming decades certainly promise to be pivotal to the future of the European Union and its political legitimacy. With the French elections coming up this spring, Eurosceptic Marine Le Pen looks to take power, return the French franc and hold a French referendum on EU membership (Mcdonald-Gibson 2017). Meanwhile, the British Prime Minister has formally begun the process of leaving the EU. In the Netherlands, Geert Wilders, a radical populist who was also calling for a vote to leave the EU and the “de-Islamization” of the Netherlands failed to win the elections but still managed to gain some seats (Deacon 2016; Mcdonald-Gibson 2017). Germany gears up for election sin the fall and Italy in early 2018, both of whom have political parties calling for referendums on their respective country’s EU membership (The Economist 2017). As Mcdonald-Gibson (2017) stated in a recent Time article, “While populists [like Wilders and Le Pen] are creating new visions for the future, traditional European powers are scrambling to uphold the lofty ideals of the past. If they can’t find a way to fit in with the new world order [and re-instill confidence in its citizens], they might not have much of a future at all.”

Informed Citizenry

One mechanism to improve citizens’ confidence in the European Union and their views on EU political legitimacy is through improving their knowledge and understanding of the EU structures, its history, and its policies. The concept of Informed Citizenry (Table 1.B) and its component indicators offered a generalized view of how educated citizens were about the European Union. Citizens’ breadth of knowledge and understanding of the EU and the EU administration was represented by both general knowledge of and understanding about its purpose as well as EU policies[12].

On the face of it, citizens’ general knowledge of the EU remained fairly elementary; they knew little about the general purpose of EU organization, it history and functioning (Appendix D, Table 1.B.A.). More than half the EU respondents had difficulty answering a set of three true or false questions correctly (got question one wrong: 55.6%, got question two wrong: 18.1%, got question three wrong 56.1% respectively). With a cumulative mean of 3.71 on a knowledge index range of 0.0 – 6.0, it was evident that while citizens generally knew what the EU and its council was, they did not have general working knowledge of the EU processes and its history. This lack of clear understanding of the structure, history, and policies of the EU makes it difficult for citizens to offer evidence based judgements of whether the EU is fulfilling its role and to endorse the organization or not. Yet, EU citizens were quite positive about the effectiveness of EU policies enacted to combat the widespread economic crisis at the time of the survey (Appendix D, Table 1.B.B.). More than half the respondents viewed the EU policy efforts extremely positively and successful (range of 78% to 82.6%). That EU respondents were not very knowledgeable about EU policies but quite content with

[12] Factor analysis of the informed citizenry questions revealed two main dimensions in the informed citizenry index: one set highlighted general EU knowledge of history and purpose while the second emphasized citizens’ knowledge of EU policies. Therefore, these analyses were also split along these two dimensions when appropriate.

the success of EU policies was recapped in the cumulative index of policy knowledge mean of 12.12 on an index that ranged from 4.0 – 16.0.

Overall, the average EU citizen was fairly informed with reasonable knowledge of the EU and its purpose (cumulative index of Informed Citizenry mean was 15.83 on a scale from 5.0 to 22.0). Interestingly, EU citizens from the Mediterranean nations were more knowledgeable about the EU and its history and policies in contrast to Western European citizens who had the least amount of knowledge. The vast majority of average citizens felt that they knew the role of the EU but had little to no understanding of how it works and the types of policies and work the Union actually does. To quote an International Staff Executive Officer for NATO (Interviewee #1), "the average informed citizen still understands very little of what is going on due to the vastness and complexity of the various institutes. They may have some idea of purpose but not much on policies." In lacking even, the most basic knowledge of the EU and how it works, the average citizen is unable to recognize the ways in which the EU is succeeding or failing at addressing their specific needs and therefore will likely deem the EU to be slightly less legitimate and untrustworthy.

Table 1.B. Informed Citizenry
2009 Eurobarometer 72.4

Concept	Dimensions	Values	Statistics			
			Total Sample	Western Europe	Eastern Europe	Mediterranean
Informed Citizenry	Index of General EU Knowledge	Mean (SD) Min – Max (n)	3.70 (1.28) 0.0 – 6.0 (9176)	3.72 (1.30) 0.0 – 6.0 (4262)	3.72 (1.23) 0.0 – 6.0 (3251)	3.58*** (1.29) 0.0 – 6.0 (1319)
	Index of Policy Knowledge	Mean (SD) Min – Max (n)	12.12 (2.47) 4.0 – 16.0 (13015)	11.78 (2.51) 4.0 – 16.0 (5494)	12.15 (2.40) 4.0 – 16.0 (4769)	12.93*** (2.32) 4.0 – 16.0 (2271)
	Index of Informed Citizenry[1]	Mean (SD) Min – Max (n)	15.83 (2.96) 5.0 – 22.0 (8832)	15.57 (3.01) 5.0 – 22.0 (4088)	15.83 (2.90) 5.0 – 22.0 (3121)	16.63*** (2.82) 6.0 – 22.0 (1290)

[1] Index of Informed Citizenry = Sub-Index of General EU Knowledge + Sub-Index of Policy Knowledge. Possible range: 5.0–22.0. Correlations among these indicators ranged from .03*** to .65*** and significant at .000 level.

The British Referendum (Brexit) in June of 2013 was a perfect example of what can occur when citizens' had poor understanding of the European Union and what EU membership entails. The Brexit vote, which had a 71.8% turnout, recorded that 51.9% of citizens voted to leave the EU versus 48.1% voting to stay in the EU (Hunt & Wheeler 2017), left many elites in disbelief. Despite pro-EU urgings from the leaders of the largest British political parties, the then Prime Minister David Cameron, major business leaders, trade unions, esteemed scientists and economists, and more, about 17.4

million British citizens voted to leave the EU (Chu 2016; Hunt & Wheeler 2017). The question is why?

In the months following Brexit, much has been written in the journalistic and scholarly circles about not only the repercussions of this decision on the average citizen and the economic well-being of the United Kingdom, but more importantly that the voters were largely uninformed and voted blindly to leave the European Union. British voters were quite unaware of even the most elementary political facts and history. Such lack of awareness became especially clear when the Google Trends Twitter account reported that in the hours after the poll closed, there was a 250 percent increase in people searching “what happens if we leave the EU” and “what is Brexit” (Walton 2016). In a survey of 1,00 people completed by Ipsos MORI, a market research company in the UK and Ireland, it was also concluded that British citizens’ perceptions of the British government and of the EU was way off from the actual facts and figures (Peck 2016). In Peck’s analyses, approximately 15% of British citizens, one in seven, were reported to believe in at least one Euro-myth, an exaggerated or invented story about nonsensical EU legislation or EU bodies (also, Wikipedia 2016). These inaccuracies and misunderstandings of the political systems in place and lack of awareness of the potential policy changes resulted in a major change not only for the UK but also for the entire European Union (Friedman 2016).

Some journalists placed the onus for the high levels of public ignorance on the media and the British politicians. On the other hand, others have posited that the Brexit vote goes beyond a simple lack of knowledge and actually has to do with the cultural, economic, and political divides in the country. Ben Chu (2016), The Independent’s Economics Editor and its previous chief lead writer, argued that “the crude majoritarian politics of this referendum has seen half of the population, a generally poorer, less well-educated and elderly half, effectively strip major freedoms and even a cherished identity from the other half, a more prosperous and predominantly younger half.” In either event, the average citizens, who barely had a rudimentary sense of the pros and cons of Brexit, voted to leave the UK (Friedman 2016). Ironically, the average poorly informed Brexit voter voted against his or her own economic interests; they were also the economically marginalized in the country (Economic Health). Brexit is the ultimate proof of the political and economic turmoil that an uninformed voting citizenry can unleash and perhaps explain why (in Table 1B), Western European respondents were slightly less informed than their Eastern Europe and the Mediterranean counterparts.

<u>Economic Elites and Their Wellbeing</u>

While it has been argued that an average citizen has the ability to shape the perceived legitimacy and success of the EU, it is important to also recognize the power that the elites have in controlling the dominant view of the EU.

Economic Elites, and their economic standing, was examined by the economic success and wellbeing of EU citizens at two levels: (1) the individual level (Appendix E, Table

1.C.A.) and (2) the national level (Appendix E, Table 1.C.B.)[13]. Citizens from Western European nations were much better in personal and national economic health than their Eastern and Mediterranean counterparts. Western European citizens had a better quality of life and economic well-being, reflected in the economic index mean of 42.93 on a scale of 19.0 – 60.0. EU citizens from Eastern European and Mediterranean nations had about the same level of personal economic wealth but differed when it came to their nation's economic health; Eastern European citizens had a slightly higher national index mean (19.41) than their Mediterranean counterparts (18.76).

On a personal economic health level, the majority of the EU participants rated themselves as a part of the middle class of society, Boxes 4 – 7 on a scale of 1 to 10 (77.3%). From the citizens' perspective, their personal economic health lay in their economic standing within society as well as their satisfaction with their personal economic and financial situations. Citizen respondents were quite positive when asked about their lives; three quarters of citizens felt fairly, if not very satisfied with their lives (73.4%), and just over half judged their personal job (62.4%) and financial situations (60.9%) as good or very good. All things considered, while EU citizens' personal economic and financial health was neither good nor bad, they were comfortable with their economic status (personal health index mean was 21.5 on a scale of 7.0 – 34.0).

Table 1.C. Economic Elites and Their Health
2009 Eurobarometer 72.4

Concepts	Dimensions	Values	Statistics			
			Total Sample	**Western Europe**	**Eastern Europe**	**Mediterranean**
Economic Elites and Their Health	Personal Economic Health	Mean (SD) Min – Max (n)	21.5 (4.42) 7.0 – 34.0 (10756)	22.66 (4.25) 7.0 – 34.0 (4631)	20.54 (4.53) 7.0 – 34.0 (3851)	20.88*** (4.06) 7.0 – 33.0 (1856)
	National Economic Health	Mean (SD) Min – Max (n)	19.54 (3.58) 9.0 – 30.0 (10971)	20.05 (3.60) 9.0 – 30.0 (4715)	19.41 (3.43) 9.0 – 30.0 (4008)	18.76*** (3.57) 9.0 – 28.0 (1863)
	Index of Economic Health[1]	Mean (SD) Min – Max (n)	41.18 (6.39) 17.0 – 60.0 (8788)	42.93 (6.18) 19.0 – 60.0 (3866)	40.06 (6.35) 18.0 – 60.0 (3125)	39.42*** (6.0) 17.0 – 57.0 (1480)

[1] Index of Economic Health = Sub-Index of Personal Economic Health + Sub-Index of National Economic Health. Possible range: 17.0 – 60.0. Correlations among these indicators ranged from .05*** to .07*** and significant at .000 level.

Although the EU Debt Crisis was only just beginning at the time of the survey, it is evident that the economic state at the national level was also important to EU citizens.

[13] Factor analysis of the economic health questions revealed two main dimensions in index economic health: one set reflected the personal economic and financial well-being of EU citizens while the second highlighted the national economic well-being and health EU member states. Therefore, the analyses were also split along these two dimensions when appropriate.

There was concern and negative sentiments from EU citizens when discussing the current state of their national and EU economies (Appendix E, Table 1.C.B.). The dominant view was that the national economy was doing rather badly or very badly (75%), as was their assessment of the European economy in general (63.6%). This being said, approximately half or more than half of EU citizens felt that the European economy was performing better or much better than other leading world economies such as the Chinese, the American, the Russian, and the Indian. As summarized by the cumulative mean of 19.54 on the index of national health which ranged from of 9.0 to 30.0, EU citizens tended to deem the health of the national and European economies as decent enough to get by, neither good nor bad.

Much has been written in the journalistic circles that the economic problems facing the European Union today go back to the global financial meltdown and euro-zone crisis of 2009 (Featherstone 2012; Mason 2016; Mcdonald-Gibson 2017). The EU Debt Crisis largely began taking its toll on nations across Europe in the final months of 2009, exposing not only the economic rifts between the rich Northern and Western European nations and the poorer South but also the "stagnant growth, high unemployment and public anger in member states of, say, Italy, Greece, and Spain," nations of the Mediterranean EU region (Mcdonald-Gibson 2017). Despite the stabilization of the euro zone, the growth rates are still incredibly low for citizens in the Mediterranean and Eastern European regions (The Economist 2017). Moreover, unemployment rates continue to remain high and the European Central Bank (ECB) has become overwhelmed by the number of loans they have had to give out to nations across all of Europe (The Economist 2017).

Lord Howard, the former Tory leader, said: "The European Union, in its current form, is a flawed and failing project which is making many of its inhabitants poorer than they should or need be and is failing to keep its people safe. The first is a consequence of the euro, which has an exchange rate far too high for the crippled economies of southern Europe, though, because it is lower than the deutschmark would have been, helps to make Germany's exports competitive. The second is a consequence of the Schengen agreement which, according to the former Head of Interpol 'is like hanging a sign welcoming terrorists to Europe'" (Hope et al. 2016). Despite years of attempted austerity and severe economic reforms, many nations are still drowning in debts larger than that their economic output (Mason 2016; Kirk 2017). While the Western EU nations continued to flourish, many Mediterranean and Eastern EU nations floundered, causing even greater division between the elitist and the average nations (Mason 2016).

Summary

Several conclusions are worth noting in the descriptive portrayal of EU citizens outlined above. (1) Most EU citizens positively viewed and trusted the European Union and its political legitimacy. Eastern and Mediterranean citizens were slightly more confident in the EU than their Western counterparts. (2) Although respondents did not understand either how the EU functions or what nations make up the member states, many were able to identify some of the EU's policies and their effectiveness. In this regard too, EU citizens' from the Mediterranean had slightly more knowledgeable than their Western and Eastern counterparts. (3) As for their economic wellbeing, a majority of EU respondents were satisfied with their personal financial wellbeing, despite the stagnation in, or even worsening of their nation's economic situation. Yet, citizens felt that the national and European economies were doing well in comparison to other nations and regions of the world.

Bivariate Analyses

To test for preliminary empirical relationships of Informed Citizenry and Their Economic Health with citizens' confidence in the future of the European Union, bivariate analyses were conducted. The preliminary correlations (Table 2 in Appendix F) indicated multiple strands in the potential strengths of informed citizenry and their economic health in shaping the future of the EU.

As might be expected, the more informed the citizens were and the better their economic health, the more confidence they had in the EU. However, EU citizens were much more likely to trust the EU ($r = .53^{***}$) when they were informed than when they were satisfied with their economic wellbeing was healthy ($r = .34^{***}$).

While not as strong as the knowledgeable citizenry and their economic health correlations, demographic factors were also related to EU confidence. Females ($r = -.04^{*}$) and older EU citizens ($-.07^{**}$) were slightly less confident than their male and younger counterparts respectively. Citizens from Mediterranean EU nations ($r = .08^{**}$) had a bit more confidence in the EU and in its EU's future than their Western European counterparts ($r = -.09^{***}$). Mediterranean nation citizens were also faintly more informed and knowledgeable about the EU than citizens from Western European nations (Mediterranean: $r = .11^{***}$; Western: $r = -.08^{**}$). On the other hand, the economic health of Western EU nations and their citizens ($r = .24^{***}$) was twice as strong and healthy than their Eastern ($r = -.13^{***}$) and Mediterranean ($r = -.12^{***}$) counterparts. The robustness of the comparative net (of sex, age, and EU regions) influences of informed citizenry and their economic health on their confidence in the EU will be tested in the multivariate analyses presented in the subsequent section.

Multivariate Regression Analyses

In the final analytical step, multivariate regression analyses were used to test the hypotheses about the net effects of Informed Citizenry and Their Economic Health on Confidence in the EU; sex, age, and EU regions were controlled. The analyses were also disaggregated by the three EU regions: Western, Eastern, and Mediterranean.

Table 3. Regression Analyses of the Net Relative Impacts of Informed Citizenry and Economic Health on Confidence in the European Union; Beta (β) Coefficients, 2009 Eurobarometer 72.4

	Confidence in the EU[1] Beta (β)		Confidence in the EU[1]			
			EU Strengths[2]		EU Weaknesses[3]	
Informed Citizenry[4]	.45***		.45***		-.11***	
General EU Knowledge[5]		.24***		.26***		-.12**
Policy Knowledge[6]		.34***		.34***		-.05**
Economic Elites & Health[7]	.25***		.28***		-.19***	
Personal Economic Health[8]		.17***		.19***		-.11***
National Economic Health[9]		.14***		.16***		-.12***
Age[10]	-.03*		-.03*		.02*	.03*
Sex[11]	.00		.00		.00	-.00
Western Europe[12]	-.23***		-.22***	-.21***	-.03*	-.04*
Eastern Europe[12]	-.15***		-.11***	-.10***	-.15***	-.16***
Model Statistics:						
Constant	13.98	14.18	5.92	6.16	8.06	8.02
Adjusted R^2	.33***	.33***	.35***	.36***	.08***	.09***
DF 1 & 2	7 & 6275	9 & 6273	7 & 6275	9 & 6273	7 & 6275	9 & 6273

[1] Index of Confidence in the EU = Sub-Index of EU Strengths + Sub-Index of EU Weaknesses; range = 12.0 (low confidence) – 49.0 (high confidence).
[2] Sub-Index of EU Strengths: Range of 7.0 (fairly weak/not strong) – 43.0 (very strong/very confident). See Appendix C Table 1.A.A for index components.
[3] Sub-Index of EU Weaknesses: Range: 2.0 (not weak) – 8.0 (very weak/poor confidence). See Appendix C. Table 1.A.B for index components.
[4] Index of Informed Citizenry = Sub-Index of General EU Knowledge + Sub-Index of Policy Knowledge; range = 5.0 (no knowledge, uninformed) – 22.0 (knowledgeable, well informed).
[5] Sub-Index of General EU Knowledge: Range of 0.0 (no EU knowledge) – 6.0 (solid EU knowledge). See Appendix D. Table 1.B.A for index components.
[6] Sub-Index of Policy Knowledge: Range of 4.0 (little/poor policy knowledge)-16. (good/strong policy knowledge). See Appendix D. Table 1.B.B for index components.
[7] Index of Economic Elites, their Health: Sub-index of Personal Economic Health + Sub-Index of National Economic Health; Range of 17 (low/poor economic health)–60 (good/strong health).
[8] Sub-Index of Personal Economic Health: Range = 7 (poor personal economic health)–34 (strong personal economic health). See Appendix D. Table 1.C.A for index components.
[9] Sub-Index of National Economic Health: Range of 9.0 (poor national economic health)–30.0 (strong personal economic health). See Appendix D. Table 1.C.B for index components.
[10] Age: 1 = 15 – 24yrs, 2 = 25 – 34yrs, 3 = 35 – 44yrs, 4 = 45 – 54yrs, 5 = 55 – 64yrs, 6 = 65yrs and older
[11] Sex: 0 = Male, 1 = Female; [12] EU Regions: reference group is the other two regions.
***<=p .001; *p<=.05.

As was predicted from a Systemic Coupling framework, the more knowledgeable the average citizens were about the EU, its history and policies, the more confident and trusting they were of the EU (Beta = .45***). While economic health also improved citizens' confidence in the EU, its impact was substantially smaller than how informed citizens were, by approximately two times (Beta = .25***). Additionally, citizens from Western Europe were least confident in the European Union (Beta = -.23***), followed by Eastern Europe (-.15***); ergo, of the three regions, Mediterranean citizens were the most confident. Male and female EU citizens did not differ in their confidence. Even though older respondents (Beta = -.03**) trusted the EU and its institutions less than their younger counterparts, the difference was minor.

The robustness of how knowledgeable citizens and economic elites shaped confidence in the EU was also verified in that these patterns did not differ across the three EU regions. Besides, irrespective of whether citizens' knowledge or economic wellbeing were disaggregated by their constituent dimensions, informed citizens overall had a greater positive impact on shaping the future of the European Union and its political legitimacy, more than the economic elites and their health.

While all members of the uneven economic and political EU felt the impacts of the debt crisis, it was those who were hit the hardest that truly viewed the EU negatively because they were yet to reap any benefits from the institution (Interviewee #2). Because of this, the middle and lower classes of the EU, the average citizen, have less EU confidence than their elitist counterparts. The economic elites of society, although were also hit, did not experience as much hardship or lose as much of their property and lifestyles as the average citizen because they already began with a greater amount of resources and privilege, and were only slightly negatively impacted by the crisis.

In a press conference last year, the former president of Poland, Donald Tusk stated, "All too often today, the European elites seem to be detached from reality" (Deacon 2016). He felt that their lack of interest in the well-being of all citizens of the European Union, had the power to not only change the EU agenda and to overlook the needs of the average citizen but also was one of the root causes of major events such as the British Referendum (Deacon 2016).

CONCLUDING REFLECTIONS:
Empirical and Applied

Previous research had shown that both informed citizenry and citizens personal and national economic health had huge, but separate, impacts on citizens' confidence in the European Union and its legitimacy. There were however, no comparisons, to date, of the respective roles political elites and the average citizen played in shaping thinking about EU political legitimacy.

Important insights were gained about the strong role that informed citizens played in EU political legitimacy. While economic elites were important for politically legitimating the EU, their influence was not as important as that of the average citizen. The more knowledgeable and educated citizens were, the more likely they were to deem the EU as a legitimate political organization. Informed citizens are able to better understand whether or not their needs as average citizens are being met and well taken into account by their leaders; if they are not, they are able to more easily demand changes to be made. As for elites, the more economically healthy they were, the more they trusted the EU. Perhaps, unlike the average citizen who does not benefit as much from the system economically, politically, or socially, the elites control and benefit the most from the system and are more likely to be confident in the EU. The roles of informed citizenry versus elites were similar across the EU regions, even though Eastern European and the Mediterranean citizens both shared a slightly greater amount of trust in the EU than their Western EU counterparts.

These findings can inform the EU administration's attempts to develop new policies and reforms to garner more public support and trust. For example, providing more transparent and easily accessible information to the public, about their meetings, their policies and their reforms, allows citizens to be more informed about the EU and how it benefits them and their home nation. As Donald Tusk, the former president of Poland stated, "We must help people to restore faith in the fact that the EU should serve them, guarantee their protection and share their emotions" (Deacon 2016). By allowing the average citizen's voice to be heard and listening to and acknowledging their needs, the EU can better address the needs of all its citizens and its Member States as opposed to simply taking care of the political, economic, and social elites of the Union. Although the elites will be major players in the EU and political and economic reforms, it is evident that the average citizen yields much more power than the economic and political elites when it comes to the legitimacy and the future of the EU.

Theoretical Implications

While there was support for both theoretical predictions, the set of Systemic Coupling and Form Follows Function concepts had more support for understanding EU citizens' confidence in the EU than the theory of power elites. On the one hand, when citizens lacked knowledge and awareness of the EU's purpose, the system and its citizens became not only weakly coupled but the EU also failed to achieve its main purposes of peace, stability and prosperity for its citizens. On the other, when there was sustained shared awareness and knowledge between the EU and EU citizens, the system became moderately coupled with citizens. In short, when citizens were fairly informed, the EU was able to garner citizens' trust by maintaining a degree of mission focus and a moderately coupled system.

Figure 1
Empirical Model of the Comparative Effects of Informed Citizenry and Economic Elites on Confidence in the European Union [1, 2, 3]
2009 Eurobarometer 72.4



[1] Refer to Table 3 for index coding;
[2] In the interest of clarity, the difference in sex (β = .00) was not presented.
[3] The differences in the effects of sub-indices of Confidence in the EU were minimal. If interested, please contact the researcher.

Class-consciousness of power elites also shaped confidence in the EU but was not as influential as hypothesized by the Power Elite model. It is true that the more satisfied and economically healthy citizens were with their lives, the more confident they were in the EU and its institutions; yet the elites were not as impactful in influencing overall confidence in the EU as the average citizen. To quote the Maritime Affairs Attaché to the EU for the Republic of Ireland's Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (Interviewee #2), "following the economic downturn experienced across the EU in recent years, those who were hardest hit and those who have yet to feel any benefits from what was already a very uneven economic system, were more likely to view the EU negatively." In other words, the middle and lower classes of the EU, the average citizen, unsurprisingly had the least amount of confidence in the EU. The lack of confidence might be because of the economic and social support provided to them by the EU and/or their national institutions. The political and economic elite, while also hit, did not experience as much hardship as the average citizen. The elites, who had access to resources and privilege, felt that they were benefitting from the EU and therefore deemed the EU to be more trustworthy and legitimate.

Limitations and Suggestions for the Futures

Like most studies, this research was not free of limitations. While valuable insights into the dominant role of the average citizen in shaping confidence in the European Union were gained, many unresolved questions still remain. For example, the research only captured only 36 percent of variability in EU citizens' confidence in the EU (Adjusted $R^2 = .36^{***}$). This leaves much about citizens' EU confidence unexplained and opens up possibilities for future research.

From the multivariate analyses, it was clear that by and large, the more informed and knowledgeable citizens' were the more they tended to trust the European Union and the EU administration in a broad sense. But, as the NATO Executive Officer (Interviewee # 1) explained, the European Union is vast and complex in its structural make up of many smaller committees and institutions. Citizens and elite confidence will likely vary from institution to institution within the EU. For example, future research should focus on specific EU institutions such as the European Parliament, the European Commission and the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU). Targeted attention to specific issues, such as human rights, trade, IT security or external relations, is also warranted.

Another fruitful research investigation is exploring regional differences in citizens' confidence in the EU and its political legitimacy. In the words of the Maritime Affairs Attaché to the EU (Interviewee #2), "While there is a general sense that citizens of many EU Member States are increasingly skeptical of the benefits of EU membership, it is important to recognize that EU citizens are not a homogenized group." In other words, more granular country specific analyses are needed. Each EU Member State has a different culture, context, history, demographics, and experiences. In Greece for example, one of the hardest hit nations by economic and immigration crises, reforms will likely be received differently than say in Belgium, the headquarters of the European Union (located in downtown Brussels), who was recently faced with horrific acts of terrorism. Western European nations have also experienced a surprising rise in terrorism and issues of xenophobia and Islamophobia. By recognizing and acknowledging these contextual differences, one can more accurately evaluate citizen and elite opinions on the legitimacy and success of the Union.

Additional research that delves into how the media, social media in particular, shape citizens' knowledge would provide more elaboration on citizens' trust in the EU and EU's political legitimacy. The way the EU administration communicates their policies and reforms could highlight not only the ways in which the EU succeeds or fails at maintaining transparent and easy to understand communication with their citizens but also how it is perceived and influences the average citizen. Both interviewees spoke to the roles that the media played in many EU crises. The Maritime Affairs Attaché to the EU (Interviewee #2) noted the press highlighting the case of the British EU referendum as a product of the voices of the average citizen not being heard. Media also provided little information to help citizens understand the EU and the referendum in order to be more informed voters. The Maritime Affairs EU Attaché went on to further explain the nuanced role of the media and communication thusly:

> “EU institutions are failing to communicate with their citizenry. The EU has had and continues to have an important role in the designation of social and human rights – on working conditions, social protection, poverty – yet since the economic downturn, the language of its communications has been too economically focused and it is failing to engage the media and hence its citizenry on these issues. It is too easy then for it be portrayed as has been the case a heartless bureaucracy whose primary concern is serving the interests of the market-it urgently needs to find” (Interviewee #2).

Finally, a methodological suggestion would be to update the quantitative analyses of the kind presented here with more recent and cross-temporal examination. Much has occurred since the data for the 2009 Eurobarometer 72.4 were collected; there has been a rise in terror attacks, the debt crisis, various reform policies, and conflict, to name a few. The world is quite different from the one captured by the Eurobarometer seven years ago. A cross-temporal analysis could identify changes in the ways the average citizens and elites shape the political legitimacy of the EU.

APPENDICES

Appendix A
Table 1.D. Controls
2009 Eurobarometer 72.4

Concepts	Dimensions	Indicators		Values and Responses	Statistics
Socio-demographics	EU Regions	Q1A	What is your nationality? (n=27654)	1 = Western Europe	40.5%
				2 = Eastern Europe	41.0
				3 = Mediterranean	18.5
					53.5
	Demographics	D10	Sex/Gender (n=30238)	1 = Female[1]	
				1 = 15 – 24 years	12.6%
		D11	How old are you? (n=30238)	2 = 25 – 34 years	15.7
				3 = 35 – 44 years	16.8
				4 = 45 – 54 years	17.0
				5 = 55 – 64 years	26.7
				6 = 65 years and older	21.2

[1] QD10 (dummy interval): the omitted category Male is coded = 0.

Appendix B
Consent Form and Interview Protocol
Consent Form

Dear interviewee,

I am a Sociology Senior working on my Research Capstone Paper under the direction of Professor Marilyn Fernandez in the Department of Sociology at Santa Clara University. I am conducting my research European Union citizens' confidence in the European Union.

You were selected for this interview, because of your knowledge of and experience working in the area of European politics.

I am requesting your participation, which will involve responding to a series of open-ended questions about citizen's confidence in political institutions, more specifically the EU institutions, and what factors may impact this. Your participation in this study is voluntary. You can answer as many of the questions as you have time permits. The results of the research study may be presented at SCU's Annual Anthropology/Sociology Undergraduate Research Conference and published (in a Sociology department publication). Pseudonyms will be used in lieu of your name and most likely the name of your organization in the written paper. You will also not be asked (nor recorded) questions about your specific characteristics, such as age, race, sex, religion.

If you have any questions concerning the research study, please call/email me at +1 (408) 981-2572 or jfrydenberg@scu.edu or Dr. Fernandez at +1 (408) 554-4432 or mfernandez@scu.edu

Sincerely,
Jessy Frydenberg

By signing below you are giving consent to participate in the above study.

______________________ ____________________ ____________

Signature Printed Name Date

If you have any questions about your rights as a subject/participant in this research, or if you feel you have been placed at risk, you can contact the Chair of the Human Subjects Committee, through Office of Research Compliance and Integrity at (408) 554-5591.

Interview Schedule

Interview Date and Time: _______________________

1. What is the TYPE of Organization where you learned about (and/or worked) citizens' confidence in the EU and larger political institution?
2. What is your position in this organization (formal title)?
3. How long have you been in this position and in this organization?
4. In your professional judgment, how confident are EU citizens of the EU?
5. What are some factors that influence an individual's confidence and trust in the EU and in political institutions at large?
    a. How about an Informed Citizenry, ie how much knowledge and understanding a citizen has of the EU, its purpose and its policies?
    b. How about their Quality of Life, ie an individual's daily life on the ground, their lifestyle, job situation, financial situation, etc.?

6. Is there anything else about the confidence and trust of EU citizens in the EU that I should know more about?

Thank you very much for your time. If you wish to see a copy of my final paper, I would be glad to share it with you at the end of the winter quarter. If you have any further questions or comments for me, I can be contacted at jfrydenberg@scu.edu. Or if you wish to speak to my faculty advisor, Dr. Marilyn Fernandez, she can be reached at mfernandez@scu.edu.

Appendix C
Component Indices of Confidence in the EU
Table 1.A.A EU Strengths (n = 13797)
Eurobarometer 72.4, 2009

Concept		Indicators	Values and Responses	Statistics
Index of EU Strengths	QA7A	Generally speaking, do you think that (YOUR COUNTRY)'s membership of the EU is a good or bad thing?	3 = A good thing 2 = Neither nor 1 = A bad thing	55.2% 30.3 14.5
	QA9A	At the present time, would you say that, in general, things are going in the right or wrong direction in the EU?	3 = Right direction 2 = Neither nor 1 = Wrong direction	47.8% 23.4 28.8
	QA10	Do you tend to trust or not trust the European Union?	1 = Tend to trust[1]	58.6%
	QA11	In general, does the EU conjure up for you a positive or negative image?	5 = Very positive 4 = Fairly positive 3 = Neutral 2 = Fairly negative 1 = Very negative	8.1% 39.6 36.6 12.1 3.6
	QA12	What does the EU mean to you personally? *Positive Meanings:*		
		…Peace	1 = Mentioned[2]	28% (8456)
		…Economic prosperity	1 = Mentioned	21.2% (6411)
		…Democracy	1 = Mentioned	24.2% (7307)
		…Social protection	1 = Mentioned	13% (3929)
		…Freedom to travel, study and work anywhere in the EU	1 = Mentioned	49.8% (15057)
		…Cultural diversity	1 = Mentioned	20.4% (6159)
		…Stronger say in the world	1 = Mentioned	24.3% (7335)
		…Euro	1 = Mentioned	35.3% (10659)
	QA12	What does the EU mean to you personally? *Negative Meanings:*		
		…Unemployment	1 = Not Mentioned[3]	85.7% (25913)
		…Bureaucracy	1 = Not Mentioned	81.7% (24716)
		…Waste of money	1 = Not Mentioned	82.0% (24790)
		…Loss of our cultural identity	1 = Not Mentioned	88.5% (26753)
		…More crime	1 = Not Mentioned	83.9% (25377)
		…Not enough control at external borders	1 = Not Mentioned	85.8% (25954)

QA14	Do you tend to trust or not trust the Council of the EU?	1 = Tend to trust	61.0%
QA18B	On the whole, are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied or not at all satisfied with the way democracy works in the EU?	4 = Very satisfied 3 = Fairly satisfied 2 = Not very satisfied 1 = Not at all satisfied	7.7% 54.3 30.3 7.8
QA20	Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: What brings the citizens of the different countries together is more important than what separates them.	4 = Totally agree 3 = Tend to agree 2 = Tend to disagree 1 = Totally disagree	32.5% 51.6 13.2 2.7
QA20	Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: The EU is indispensable in meeting global challenges.	4 = Totally agree 3 = Tend to agree 2 = Tend to disagree 1 = Totally disagree	32.2% 46.0 16.3 5.5
QA25	Would you say that you are very optimistic, fairly optimistic, fairly pessimistic or very pessimistic about the future of the EU?	4 = Very optimistic 3 = Fairly optimistic 2 = Fairly pessimistic 1 = Very pessimistic	9.6% 61.8 23.7 5.0
Sub-Index of EU Strengths[4]		Mean (sd) Min – Max	28.64 (6.09) 7.0 – 43.0

[1] QA10 and QA14 (dummy interval): the omitted category Tend Not to Trust is coded = 0.
[2] QA12 (dummy interval): the omitted category Not mentioned is coded = 0.
[3] QA12 (dummy interval): the omitted category Mentioned is coded = 0.
[4] Sub-Index of EU Strengths = Nation Membership + EU Direction + EU Trust + Image of The EU + EU Personal Meaning+ Council of the EU Trust + Democracy Satisfaction + Citizens Brought Together + EU Indispensability + Future of the EU. Possible range: 7.0-43.0. Correlations among these indicators ranged from .06** to .49*** and significant at .000 level.

Table 1.A.B. EU Weaknesses (n = 13797)
Eurobarometer 72.4, 2009

Concept	Indicators		Values and Responses	Statistics
Index of EU Weaknesses	QA20	Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: The European Union has grown too rapidly.	4 = Totally agree 3 = Tend to agree 2 = Tend to disagree 1 = Totally disagree	25.3% 42.2 27.3 5.3
	QA20	Do you you agree or disagree with the following statement: At the current time, the EU is short of ideas and projects.	4 = Totally agree 3 = Tend to agree 2 = Tend to disagree 1 = Totally disagree	17.0% 37.5 35.5 9.9
	Sub-Index of EU Weaknesses[1]		Mean (sd) Min – Max	5.45 (1.38) 2.0 – 8.0

[1] Sub-Index of EU Weaknesses = EU Growth Too Rapid + EU Idea Shortage. Possible range: 2.0-8.0. Correlation between these indicators was .28*** and significant at .000 level.

Appendix D
Component Indices of Informed Citizenry

Table 1.B.A. General EU Knowledge (n = 11151 - 13731)
Eurobarometer 72.4, 2009

Concept	Indicators	Values and Responses	Statistics
Index of General EU Knowledge	QA13. Have you heard of the Council of the EU?	1 = Yes[1]	73.5%
	QA17. True or False: The EU currently consists of twenty-five member states.	1 = False (Correct)[2]	44.4%
	QA17.True or False: The Irish voted “yes” to the second referendum on the Lisbon Treaty held on October 2nd, 2009.	1 = True (Correct)	81.9%
	QA17. True or False: The Euro area currently consists of twelve member states.	1 = False (Correct)	43.9%
	QA19A. Do you tend to agree or tend to disagree with the statement: I understand how the European Union works.	1 = Tend to agree[3]	49.3%
	QA19B. Do you tend to agree or tend to disagree with the statement: The interests of (OUR COUNTRY) are well taken into account in the EU.	1 = Tend to agree	44.2%
	Index of General EU Knowledge[4]	Mean (sd) Min – Max	3.71 (1.28) 0.0 – 6.0

[1] QA13 (dummy interval): the omitted category No is coded = 0.
[2] QA17 (dummy interval): the omitted category True/False (dependent on which is the correct answer) is coded = 0.
[3] QA19A/B (dummy interval): the omitted category Tend to Disagree is coded = 0.
[4] Index of General EU Knowledge = Heard of Council of EU + Member States + Lisbon Treaty + Euro Member States + How EU Works + Interests of Own Country in EU. Possible range: 0.0–6.0. Correlations among these indicators range from .03** to .30*** and significant at .000 level.

Table 1.B.B. Knowledge of Policy (n = 13334 - 13409)
Eurobarometer 72.4, 2009

Concept	Indicators		Values and Responses	Statistics
Index of Knowledge of Policy	QC6	Certain measures aimed at combating the current economic and financial crisis are currently being discussed within European institutions. How effective would a more important role for the EU at an international level in regulating financial services be in combating the crisis?	4 = Very effective 3 = Fairly effective 2 = Not very effective 1 = Not at all effective	18.7% 59.3 18.9 3.0
	QC6	Certain measures aimed at combating the current economic and financial crisis are currently being discussed within European institutions. How effective would the surveillance and supervision by the EU of the activities of the most important international	4 = Very effective 3 = Fairly effective 2 = Not very effective 1 = Not at all effective	24.6% 53.4 18.6 3.4

	financial groups be in combating the crisis?		
	QC6 Certain measures aimed at combating the current economic and financial crisis are currently being discussed within European institutions. How effective would a stronger coordination of economic and financial policies between all the EU member states be in combating the crisis?	4 = Very effective 3 = Fairly effective 2 = Not very effective 1 = Not at all effective	26.6% 56.0 14.9 2.5
	QC6 Certain measures aimed at combating the current economic and financial crisis are currently being discussed within European institutions. How effective would a supervision by the EU whenever public money is used to rescue a financial institution be in combating the crisis?	4 = Very effective 3 = Fairly effective 2 = Not very effective 1 = Not at all effective	29.0 49.1 17.9 4.1
	Sub-Index of Effective Combatting Measures[1]	Mean (sd) Min – Max	12.12 (2.46) 4.0 – 16.0

[1] Index of Knowledge of Policy = EU Regulating Financial Services + EU Surveillance and Supervision + Member Coordination of EU Policies + Supervision by the EU. Possible range: 4.0–16.0. Correlations among these indicators ranged from .52*** to .65*** and significant at .000 level.

Appendix E
Component Indices of Economic Elites and Their Health
Table 1.C.A. Personal Economic Health (n = 12134 – 13797)
Eurobarometer 72.4, 2009

Concepts	Indicators	Values and Responses	Statistics
Index of Personal Economic Health	QA1 On the whole, how satisfied are you with the life you lead?	4 = Very satisfied 3 = Fairly satisfied 2 = Not very satisfied 1 = Not at all satisfied	20.2% 53.2 19.2 7.3
	QA2A How would you judge your current personal job situation?	4 = Very Good 3 = Rather good 2 = Rather bad 1 = Very bad	15.8% 46.6 23.4 14.3
	QA2A How would you judge the current financial situation of your household?	4 = Very Good 3 = Rather good 2 = Rather bad 1 = Very bad	8.3% 52.6 29.3 9.8
	QC5 Could you tell me whether you totally agree or disagree with the following statement: Overall the Euro has mitigated the negative effects of the current financial and economic crisis.	4 = Totally Agree 3 = Tend to Agree 2 = Tend to Disagree 1 = Totally Disagree	13.8% 38.2 31.5 16.5

QD4	Thinking about your purchasing power, that is to say the things that your household can afford, if you compare to your present situation 5 years ago, would you say it has improved or gotten worse?	3 = Improved 2 = Stayed the same 1 = Got worse	16.8% 36.1 47.0
D15A	What is your current occupation?	1 = Non-Active 2 = Unskilled Workers 3 = Merchants 4 = Skilled Workers 5 = Managers 6= Professionals	53.9% 3.4 4.5 25.5% 9.0 3.6
D61	On the following scale, step ‘1’ corresponds to “the lowest level in the society”; step ‘10’ corresponds to “the highest level in society.” Could you tell me on which step you would place yourself?	1 = Box 1 – lowest level 2 = Box 2 3 = Box 3 4 = Box 4 5 = Box 5 6 = Box 6 7 = Box 7 8 = Box 8 9 = Box 9 10 = Box 10–to highest	1.7% 3.2 8.9 13.7 28.7 19.3 15.6 6.9 1.3 0.8
Sub-Index of Personal Economic Health[1]		Mean (sd) Min – Max	21.5 (4.42) 7.0 – 34.0

[1] Sub-Index of Personal Economic Health = Life Satisfaction + Personal Job Satisfaction + Financial Situation Satisfaction + Mitigation of Negative Effects + Purchasing Power Change + Level in Society + Occupation. Possible range: 7.0 – 34.0. Correlations among these indicators range from .05** to .66*** and significant at .000 level.

Table 1.C.B. National Economic Health (n = 11906 - 13797)
Eurobarometer 72.4, 2009

Concepts		Indicators	Values and Responses	Statistics
Index of National Economic Health	QA2a	How would you judge the current situation of the (Nationality) economy?	4 = Very Good 3 = Rather Good 2 = Rather Bad 1 = Very bad	1.3% 22.6 49.3 26.7
	QA2a	How would you judge the current situation of the European economy?	4 = Very Good 3 = Rather Good 2 = Rather Bad 1 = Very bad	2.3% 34.1 51.8 11.8
	QA2a	How would you judge the current situation of the world economy?	4 = Very Good 3 = Rather Good 2 = Rather Bad 1 = Very bad	15.9% 59.2 23.4 1.5
	QB5	Would you say that the European economy is performing better, performing worse or performing as well as the American economy?	3 = Performing Better 2 = Performing As Well As 1 = Performing Worse	37.2% 28.8 33.9
	QB5	Would you say that the European economy is performing better, performing worse or performing as well as the Japanese economy?	3 = Performing Better 2 = Performing As Well As 1 = Performing Worse	28.9% 20.1 51.0

QB5	Would you say that the European economy is performing better, performing worse or performing as well as the Chinese economy?	3 = Performing Better 2 = Performing As Well As 1 = Performing Worse	36.7% 15.3 48.0
QB5	Would you say that the European economy is performing better, performing worse or performing as well as the Indian economy?	3 = Performing Better 2 = Performing As Well As 1 = Performing Worse	60.4% 13.7 25.9
QB5	Would you say that the European economy is performing better, performing worse or performing as well as the Russian economy?	3 = Performing Better 2 = Performing As Well As 1 = Performing Worse	61.9% 16.3 21.9
QB5	Would you say that the European economy is performing better, performing worse or performing as well as the Brazilian economy?	3 = Performing Better 2 = Performing As Well As 1 = Performing Worse	64.9% 14.8 20.2
Sub-Index of National Economic Health[1]		Mean (sd) Min – Max	19.54 (3.58) 9.0 – 30.0

[1] Sub-Index of National Economic Health = National Economy + European Economy + World Economy + EU vs. American + EU vs. Japanese + EU vs. Chinese + EU vs. Indian + EU vs. Russian + EU vs. Brazilian. Possible range: 9.0 – 30.0. Correlations among these indicators range from .05** to .65*** and significant at .000 level.

Appendix F

Table 2. Correlation Matrix: Indices of Confidence in the EU, Informed Citizenry, and Their Quality of Life, Eurobarometer 72.4, 2009 (n = 8832 – 13797)

	Index: Confidence in the EU	Index: Informed Citizenry	Index: Economic Elites Their Health	Western	Eastern	Mediterranean	Sex	Age
Index of Confidence in the EU[1]	1.0	.53***	.34***	-.09**	.02	.08***	-.04*	-.07**
Index of Informed Citizenry[2]		1.0	.24***	-.08**	-.00	.11***	-.06*	-.01
Index of Economic Elites & Their Health[3]			1.0	.24***	-.13***	-.12***	-.07**	-.06*
Western[4]				1.0	-.65***	-.39***	-.05*	.12***
Eastern[4]					1.0	-.35***	.05*	-.08**
Mediterranean[4]						1.0	.00	-.02*
Female (1)[5]							1.0	-.05*
Age[6]								1.0

* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed); *** Correlation is significant at the 0.001 level (2-tailed).
[1] Refer to Table 3 for index and variable coding.

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Identity and Social Integration: Understanding Perceptions of LGBT Organizational Effectiveness

By
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Abstract. Factors that shape member perceptions of LGBT organizational effectiveness was the focus in this paper. Much of the extant research on effectiveness of organizations has relied on the perspectives of the leadership or their employees. A mixed methods approach, that combined survey data from 1,376 respondents in The Social Justice Sexuality Survey (2010) with the perspectives of four professionals, was used to estimate the relative impacts of member identity and social integration on perceived organizational effectiveness. While members with strong identities were more critical, those who were more socially integrated (particularly involved in and felt connected to LGBT) were more appreciative of their organizations. There is not only support for the theories of The Chicago School identity/ Flexible Self-Concept (Identity Effect) and Durkheim's Collective Consciousness and Solidarity (Social Integration effect), the findings also offered valuable practical insights into ways organizations can better serve the needs of members. Future research should take a broader ecological approach to organizational effectiveness using more ground level member perspectives, given the national presence of LGBT organizations.

INTRODUCTION

Analyzing how effectively organizations serve their members is crucial for improving service delivery and meeting their mission and causes. This information will especially be useful to non-profit organizations (not only LGBT activist organizations) that are resolute about avoiding mission creep, maintaining mission focus, and making positive impacts in their communities of interest.

With a mission focus on gay rights, The Society for Human Rights was founded in Chicago in 1924. Throughout the 1950s, additional organizations were established that advocated for gay and lesbian rights. It was not until 1951 that the first national organization for gay rights was founded, and the mid-1950s that organizations were created to also address lesbian rights. LGBT Organizations can take on many forms

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and structures from well-known community-building and advocacy centers, to shelters for at-risk LGBT youth, to on-campus clubs and resource centers in schools. Depending on the extent to which the organization is involved with the broader LGBT community, some organizations may operate on a meso-level with focus on enhancing integration for LGBT individuals by providing counseling services, support groups, and community events. Organizations with a more macro-level focus often advocate for rights, policy reform, awareness and education of the broader community and society at large. LGBT members, even within the same organization, are rarely homogenous, especially in the local Bay Area context, and present a very diverse body of membership across age, sexual orientations, race, socioeconomic status, gender identity, and ableism. Some common links amongst even diverse membership bodies, however, is that they are most often marginalized members of society, and may experience compromised integration, restricted access to resources, mental health challenges, familial strain, discrimination, stereotyping, mistreatment, and exposure to circumstances that put them at risk. Ultimately, LGBT Organizations exist to enhance integration, improve life quality, provide advocacy for LGBT members, and promote awareness for broader society.

LITERATURE REVIEW

A review of existing scholarly research on organizational effectiveness provided a context in which this paper was located. The themes that scholars have addressed range from definitions of organizational effectiveness, theoretical suppositions of leadership, to controversies surrounding effectiveness paradoxes and radius of organizational impact.

Organizational Leader Perspectives

A large body of organizational effectiveness scholarship has been devoted to analyzing perspectives of leaders of organizations. Savage-Austin and Honeycutt (2011) took a philosophical approach to examining 15 servant leaders and related barriers in their approaches. The authors linked organizational efficacy with internal psychosocial conditions like the intra-organizational environment, willingness to change, and collective knowledge on relative organizational information. Mitchell's (2012) study of U.S. nonprofits also relied on the opinions of 152 organizational leaders who thought of themselves as "servant leaders." Through qualitative methodologies, Mitchell, found that most of his interviewees cited "outcome accountability" as the most accurate measurement of success. These studies revealed the subjectivity of defining organizational success and the resulting variabilities in conceptualization and assessment methods of organizational effectiveness.

Organizational studies assessing the roles of organization boards and leaders also tended to emphasize the power of few members with the most executive power in the organization, instead of the perspectives of the masses that benefit from the offered services. For example, Green and Griesinger (1996) collected questionnaire and interview data from leaders and board members of sixteen not-for-profit organizations about the establishments' activities and how they contributed to effective execution of goals. They concluded that board performance, specifically its ability to implement productive activities (policy reform, resource development, etc.), had a large impact on organizational effectiveness perceptions.

"Ground Level" Employee Perspectives

Other scholars shifted the focus of organizational studies from the leaders' views towards the root of organizations- the employees. Lecy, Schmitz, and Swedlund (2012) used a snowball sampling method to assess non-governmental and nonprofit organizational effectiveness. They concluded that the rarity of empirical studies compromised a consensus on organization efficacy, but that scholars tended to unanimously agree that organizational effectiveness cannot be assessed by a single dimension. They recommended an interdisciplinary approach for accurate, albeit generalized, representations of this concept.

Similarly, Arnetz, Arnetz, and Lucas' (2011) employee respondents (n=5316) provided feedback on how various organizational climate factors impacted their mental health. Specific factors conducive to good employee mental health included positive 'organizational climate,' social dynamics in the environment, degree of participation, clarity of organizational missions, and employee performance feedback. These studies, which examined the general health of organizations from employee perspectives, revealed that organizational operations tend to be effective only if employee well-being is prioritized. Evaluations of individuals on the 'ground level' of organizations exposed different interpretations of organizational success than those of its leaders.

Theoretically Guided Evaluations

Other scholars theoretically evaluated organizations to obtain an objective (rather than self-reported) assessment of organizational effectiveness. Competing Values Framework (CVF) and Team Cognition Theory (TCT) are two theories that have been used to evaluate effectiveness. Although very different, both Team Cognition Theory and Competing Values Framework seek to explain organizational effectiveness by looking at individual variations amongst collaborative groups aiming to maximize organizational efficacy.

The Competing Values Framework (CVF), developed in 1983 by Quinn and Rohrbaugh is constructed as an intersection of dialectical concepts: an axis of flexibility and adaptability countered by stability, and a second axis of predictability- internal focus (integration and collaboration) countered by external focus (rivalry and competition-focused) (Cameron, n.d.). This model has been used to evaluate different organizational approaches and success probability. However, findings from Hartnell, Ou, and Kinicki (2011), who drew on data from 84 empirical studies, did not fully support the CVF approach and instead indicated that certain structural CVF aspects, such as those along the Internal axis, are in need of further research and modifications for accurate organizational effectiveness evaluations. In sum, the CVF perhaps oversimplifies the complex nature of organizations, thereby compromising predictability of success. On the other hand, Grabowski, Neher, Crim and Mathiassen (2014) found the CVF to be a valuable tool for resource management and structural transformation in organizations; they collected qualitative data over 8 months (n= n/a) and noted some support for the CVF but recognized that different models apply to different structures of organizations. Despite the reported success of CVF, the authors concluded that a fourth factor, motivation, should be incorporated into studies of volunteer-run organizations.

As for proponents of Team Cognition Theory (TCT) and Social Constructionism, scholars, like Willems (2015), found that more social reciprocity and support (part of TCT) were associated with greater levels of organizational effectiveness. Following a similar theoretical tradition, Herman and Renz (2008) examined nine key aspects of nonprofit efficacy, including ethical practices through a multi-dimensional approach, and social constructionism. They concluded that successful, outcome-oriented practices are not “one size fits all,” and that non-profit organizations should be subject to some form of assessment regarding mission outcomes.

Paradoxes and Fluidity

To make sense of difficulties in evaluating organizational effectiveness, researchers have incorporated an additional consideration: the dynamic relations between organizational structure and the communities which they serve. Furthermore, it is argued that effectiveness criteria are inherently paradoxical, and cannot accurately and definitively assess the efficacy of organizations. For example, Cameron (1986) argued that loose coupling (conditions for innovation and autonomy) and tight coupling (dependent mode of operating, limiting) paradoxically operated both dependently and independently of organizations that are effective; however, a lack of this functional dialectic in organizations leads to dysfunction.

To account for conflicting and paradoxical assessments of organizational effectiveness due to variations and inconsistencies between comparisons of subjective social constructions, Herman and Renz (1999) used a comparative, multidimensional and social constructivist approach. “The basis for the comparison is a key, though sometimes hidden, element of the definition of effectiveness,” and furthermore, “effectiveness cannot be assessed with a single indicator” (1999:2). They went on to argue that social constructions are paramount because they incurred cumulative consequences and offered methods for integrating such practices.

Continuing in the Herman and Renz (1999) tradition, Sandfort, Selden, and Sowa (2004) concluded that organizational effectiveness models should reflect the complexity of various levels and dimensions of the organization, emphasizing structural integration. Inevitably, multidimensional analysis of complex interrelationships will reveal conflicting and perhaps paradoxical accounts of effectiveness. To mitigate this potential outcome, Steer (1975) suggested an operative goal approach. Organizational effectiveness measures and models cannot be universal concepts; therefore, goal assessment must be weighted (flexible) to take into account longitudinal changes in criteria that account for the current state of organizational affairs.

Ecological Approach to Organizational Impact

Other work in organizational effectiveness research has emphasized the importance of capturing the broader environment in which organizations function. Hall's (1980) empirical analysis of social service organizations additionally drew upon his personal experiences in education as a vice-president. He concluded that organizational effectiveness theories must focus on phenomena outside the radius of the organization's control. Given the impact of internal and external authorities on organizations, he believed that evaluative questions should answer how external resources are obtained to meet goals. However, there is widespread disagreement about the range of eligible and relevant external relationships surrounding the radius of influence around organizations that most accurately gauge effectiveness. In fact, Seashore and Yuchtman (1967) disputed this outside-in conceptual framework by proposing what they call a "System Resource Approach to Organizational Effectiveness." Their approach was constructed with the following components: "the organization itself as the focal frame of reference, rather than some external entity or some particular set of people; (2) explicitly treats the relations between the organization and its environment as a central ingredient in the definition of effectiveness" (1967:897).

Summary and Suggestions for Future Research

Scholars who have examined organizational effectiveness have used a wide range of measures. Major themes included how efficiency is perceived (including by whom), and application of theoretical models to predict success. Overall, improvements in work environment seemed to enhance member wellbeing and organizational efficiency. From a leader's perspective, organizational efficiency was based upon tangible and more concrete outcomes related to management and profits. Alternatively, researchers who adopted a more ground-level analysis of organizations were quick to mention the importance of employee wellbeing and psychosocial impacts of the work environment, including work ethics. Future research would greatly benefit from a more holistic approach that synthesized opinions on organizational effectiveness from a broader range of organizational standpoints. It seems logical to include more member perspectives when trying to gauge organizational effectiveness because those benefiting from the establishment and its services are ultimately the ones who can clearly speak to whether or not the organization is effectively servicing the targeted community. Additionally, organizational effectiveness measures are only as strong as the depth and frequency of feedback; identifying individuals who are more likely to report their satisfaction or dissatisfaction is crucial to the construction of this holistic picture. It is in this ‘member tradition’ that this research was located.

RESEARCH QUESTION

This research contributed to extant research on organizational effectiveness by specifically examining the management of LGBT community establishments from the perspective of their members. The impacts of identity strength and three prongs of social integration on effectiveness perceptions were assessed as part of a holistic analysis. Organizational effectiveness was defined by three categories of action: the organization’s ability to address the prioritized concerns of its members as a whole; action taken to address concerns of LGBT communities of color; and efforts to improve racial and gender equality. Identity was indicated using multiple factors including comfort with being “out” to interpersonal circles, and how they feel their race, sexual orientation, and spirituality/religion impacted their senses of identity. Social integration was assessed by the level of homophobia they experienced, and their sense of connectedness to their racial/ethnic and LGBT communities. Other alternate explanations for perceptions of organizational effectiveness were accounted for; they included emotional well-being of members, accessibility of LGBT organization (measured by travel distance), and demographics including age, gender identities, sexual orientation and ethnic identification. These controls were selected because of their potential impacts upon the studied community and to account for perceptions related to their specific group membership.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

There is general agreement in the organizational literature that a more comprehensive understanding of organizations, including ecological evaluations of internal and external environmental contexts, is still needed. Complexity theory (Mason 2007), rooted in capturing degrees of diversity within internal and external environments, “focuses on how parts at a micro-level in a complex system affect emergent behavior and overall outcome at the macro-level” (Amagoh 2008:6) Proponents of complexity theory also suggested that as systems become increasingly more complex, the ability to comprehend and utilize information for proactive and preventative measures becomes more difficult. Yet, this theory is especially suited to exploring the effectiveness of LGBT organizations, relative newcomers to the organizational field. The intersecting complexities of their multiple stakeholders, namely the marginalized populations, identities, backgrounds, religions, and unequitable resource distribution, add to the thickness of LGBT organizations.

The unique member populations that LGBT organizations serve require that an evaluation of their effectiveness take into account the voices of multiple stakeholders. Starting with LGBT Identities of its members (symbolic of internal environment) and moving to stakeholder integration into the LGBT communities and the broader society (external environments), this evaluation of effectiveness was guided by theories of how internal and external environments shaped perceptions of organizational effectiveness.

The theoretical idea of *flexible self-concept* from within the Chicago School lens of Symbolic Interactionism are based on the premise that identity and human behavior adapt to society and environment (Lutters and Ackerman, 1996). Meaning, that the identity we carry throughout life is not necessarily the one with which we are born, but rather evolves and adapts to environments, experiences, and contacts with social strain and structural forces. Pugh, in a 2017 publication on the flexible self, wrote that “one of the most popular concepts that positive psychologists use to define a flexible individual is that of ‘resiliency,’ defined as a psychological state-like capacity of adaptation and coping with adversity that the individual is able to cultivate”(p.42).

Under this scenario, individuals with more developed identities- a result of social and environmental adaptations from coming of age experiences- can be expected, all things being equal, to be more critical of their LGBT institutions. For LGBT members, coming of age is an important milestone; it involves an acceptance of identity that is perhaps not approved by the broader society and subsequent differential treatment as an LGBT individual which can severely compromise their mental health, wellbeing, safety, and social integration. The Chicago school’s lens of flexible Self-Concept is appropriate to capture the process of restructuring social experiences as they come of age with their ‘new’ identities. Their well-developed personal identity rubric will render them more aware, and consequently more critical, of the range of social issues that LGBT organizations must address (**Hypothesis #1**).

Alternatively, organizational effectiveness may be conceptualized as a product of the environments in which LGBT organizations are located. Member perceptions of LGBT organizational functioning can be shaped by their connectedness to their LGBT communities and the broader society. Durkheim’s social integration and collective consciousness theories (1893:39) are useful to theoretically rephrase these associations. Durkheim would contend that members who are socially integrated share in the groups’ collective consciousness and feel solidarity with the group. Consequently, integrated members can be expected to positively appreciate the work of LGBT organizations, net of identity and other factors (**Hypothesis #2**). On the contrary, LGBT members who do not feel as connected to their communities- whether LGBT, racial/ethnic, or other communities- may experience compromised levels of social integration and are likely to view organizational outcomes less favorably than those who are more integrated. For example, members of potentially marginalized LGBT and racial/ethnic communities who feel less connected to LGBT organizations could be expected to be more critical of their organizations’ effectiveness. They might also not have total awareness of valid information on the criteria utilized to offer evaluative judgements of organizations. An additional component of integration in this study, is civic literacy; those who are more literate in the issues surrounding the LGBT community are more likely to be critical of their institutions because with an expanded knowledge comes a longer list of issues that must be addressed, and a better understanding of how their organization fits into that picture.

METHODOLOGY AND DATA SOURCES

A mixed methods design, combining the advantages of both quantitative and qualitative methodologies, was used in this research. Quantitative methodology was used to statistically estimate the effects of micro-ecological factors and wider social integration on perceptions of organizational effectiveness. Qualitative interviews conducted with knowledgeable professionals offered elaborations upon the statistical findings.

Secondary Survey Data

The Social Justice Sexuality Project (2010) was designed to produce insightful responses to questions assessing the experiences of gay, bisexual, lesbian, and transgender individuals of color who were members of various LGBT Organizations. The project, conducted by Battle, Pastrana, and Daniels, J., covered more than five thousand respondents from all fifty states, including Puerto Rico and Washington DC. A wide range of ethnic/racial identities, ages, sexual orientations, and gender identities were represented in the sample. While a convenience sampling method was used, areas with higher concentration of LGBT and color communities were identified using demographics provided by census data. This cross-sectional survey was administered via mail, web and in-person and yielded a 99.06% response rate.

The analyses presented in this paper were based on 2661 member respondents. Given that the survey focused largely on non-white respondents, it was not surprising that about 69.1% of the sample was non-white (Appendix 1.A). An overwhelming majority (91.9%) of members identified with a sexual orientation that fell into the LGBT category; but only 3.9% who identified as Transgender. Further, about half (43.9%) the surveyed members identified as female and were 25 to 49 years old (58.1%). Finally, just over half of respondents had an LGBT establishment within twenty miles, and a little over a third estimated thirty minutes or less travel time to reach these establishments (Appendix 1.B). Organization accessibility, measured by time and distance required to travel to an LGBT establishment, was important to account for because it can determine, to an extent, who has less LGBT social capital, is geographically excluded from these local resources, the general frequency of involvement, and impact on who can speak to organizational efficiency. On average, LGBT organizations were moderately accessible (Mean accessibility score of 7.63 on a range of 2-12). These demographic and accessibility factors were controlled for as the net impact of identity strength and social integration were estimated[2].

[2] The original collector of the data, or ICPSR, or the relevant funding agencies bear no responsibility for use of the data or for the interpretations or inferences based on such uses.

Primary Qualitative Interviews

Interviews with active and former LGBT organization members and coordinators were used to supplement and elaborate on the statistical findings. Interviewers were identified through convenience and snowball sampling methods. Two females involved in local LGBT organizations offered insights from their experiences in LGBT organizations, reflecting both their personal ideas and observations of the community as a whole. Interviewee #1 is a female in an organizational coordinator position at the Diversity Center at a local university, an on-campus resource and safe space that promotes a comprehensive approach to diversity in its many forms. Having worked for the center for over a year, she defines this organization as a center that “seeks to educate the broader campus community and to empower students, faculty, staff and alumni who self-identify within the wide spectrum of sexual orientations and gender identities.” Additionally, she noted that the organization’s atmosphere is “cozy and home[ly] [and] maintains a safe, inclusive, and welcoming environment for people of all identities.” The second and third Interviewees had membership experiences with LGBT community programs and organizations in CA, while interviewee #4 is an LGBT activist on the East Coast. The interview protocol and consent form available in Appendix 2.

DATA ANALYSES: SURVEY AND QUALITATIVE INSIGHTS

Data Analyses for this research covered three levels. Univariate statistics offered a descriptive profile of the sample on identity strength and social integration. The preliminary connections of organizational effectiveness with how strong member identities and integrated members found in the bivariate analyses were re-tested using multivariate linear regression. Interviewee insights were then used to illustrate and expand on the regression findings.

Operationalization and Descriptive Statistics:

On balance, respondents rated LGBT organizations at below average in addressing matters of racial and gender inequalities. However, member respondents reported above average to fairly strong identities. They also reported being moderately integrated with their communities. It was also interesting that despite feeling very connected and reporting high levels of civic literacy, many were not very involved in the activities of the LGBT organizations.

LGBT Organizational Effectiveness

Perceptions of LGBT Organizational Effectiveness (the dependent concept) were measured using eight indicators: how well LGBT organizations were addressed top issues related to the respondent and LGBT communities of color. The organizations’ attention to equality, for the communities of race, economic status, gender, disability, age and government representation, were also included in the measurement of organizational effectiveness.

TABLE 1.A. LGBT Organizations' Effectiveness (n= 2661)
The Social Justice Sexuality Project (2010)

Concept	Dimension	Indicators	Values and Responses	Statistics
LGBT effectiveness (addressing needs of community members)	Opinions about the degree to which LGBT organizations addressed:	2b. Your top three most important issues facing you?	1 Not doing enough 2 3 doing just the right amount 4	25.3% 33.6 35.1 6.0
		3b. The three most important issues facing LGBT communities of color?	1 Not doing enough 2 3 doing just the right amount 4	29.8% 39.5 26.3 4.5
		7a. Racial justice/equality?	1 not doing enough 2 doing just the right amount	60.7% 39.3
		7b. Economic justice/equality	1 not doing enough 2 doing just the right amount	57.8% 42.2
		7c. Gender equality?	1 not doing enough 2 doing just the right amount	47.7% 52.3
		7d. Disability rights?	1 not doing enough 2 doing just the right amount	62.4% 37.6
		7e. Age discrimination?	1 not doing enough 2 doing just the right amount	61.7% 38.3
		7f. Electing LGBT political officials?	1 not doing enough 2 doing just the right amount	49.2% 50.8
		Index of LGBT Organization effectiveness[1]	Mean (sd) Min-Max	12.88 (3.2) 8-20

[1] Index of LGBT Organization Effectiveness = Q2b+Q3b+Q7a+Q7b+Q7c+Q7d+Q7e+Q7f; Correlations among these indicators ranged from .208-.675, significant at the .001 level.

As seen in Table 1.A., more than half the member respondents felt that LGBT organizations addressed their top three personal concerns, but only a quarter of respondents felt that LGBT organizations addressed the top three issues concerning communities of color. When asked about the effectiveness of mainstream LGBT organizations, less than half felt that racial justice/inequality was being sufficiently addressed, and a little over half reported that gender quality was receiving adequate attention. Majority of respondents also reported that economic inequality, age discrimination and disability rights were insufficiently addressed. Yet, slightly more than half of the members thought that organizations were doing a fair amount to address the need to elect LGBT political officials. On a possible range of 8-20 on the index of Organizational Effectiveness, the mean score was 12.88 (standard deviation of 3.20); member respondents evaluated LGBT organizations as performing below average concerning prioritized issues, and other major concerns facing the LGBT community.

Strength of Identity

Identity, as it is influenced by micro-ecological factors, was measured by several contributing aspects of identity construction and stability. Sexual orientation, ethnic/racial status, and faith were measured by asking respondents to select a range of responses (from not important at all to extremely important) and to rate their level of agreement with select statements. Combined, these indicators assisted in shaping understandings of the extent to which core identity aspects are in fact associated with strength of identity.

The average score on the index of Identity was 31.6, (standard deviation of 7.3) out of a possible score range of 8-44, meaning that respondents had a fair level of identity strength. Members generally felt that sexual orientation, and racial/ethnic statuses were important aspects of their identity. Even though these findings may not necessarily indicate levels of personal confidence in their identities, they can help organizations understand core aspects of identity likely used by members as reference points for evaluating needs, concerns, and organizational success.

TABLE 1.B. Strength of Identity (n= 1952)
The Social Justice Sexuality Project (2010)

Concept	Dimension	Indicators	Values and Responses	Statistics
Strength of Identity	Do you feel that:	13. Your sexual orientation is an important part of your identity?	1 not important at all	6.1%
			2	4.2
			3	9.0
			4	14.6
			5	20.0
			6 extremely important	46.1
		16b. Your racial or ethnic status is an important part of your identity?	1 not important at all	11.7%
			2	8.4
			3	13.2
			4	14.3
			5	17.1
			6 extremely important	35.3
		12c. Thinking about your sexual identity, how much has your religious tradition or spiritual practice been a negative or positive influence for you in coming to terms with your LGBT identity?	1 negative influence	18.8%
			2	9.1
			3	10.9
			4 neither	37.7
			5	6.4
			6	5.3
			7 positive influence	11.9

Concept	Dimension	Indicators	Values and Responses	Statistics
	How many people:	14a. Within your family are you "out" to?	1 none 2 some 3 about half 4 most 5 all	7.9% 17.8 6.7 18.8 48.8
		14b. Within your friend community are you "out" to?	1 none 2 some 3 about half 4 most 5 all	2.4% 9.8 5.6 18.5 63.7
		14d. Of your coworkers are you "out" to?	1 none 2 some 3 about half 4 most 5 all	12.6% 17.9 7.3 13.8 48.6
		14e. In your neighborhood community are you "out" to?	1 none 2 some 3 about half 4 most 5 all	20.8% 23.1 6.9 12.9 36.3
		14f. In your online communities are you "out" to?	1 none 2 some 3 about half 4 most 5 all	8.6% 13.2 7.7 17.3 53.2
		Index of Identity[1]	Mean (sd) Min-Max	31.6 (7.3) 8-44

[1] Index of Identity= Q13+Q16b+Q12c+Q14a+Q14b +Q14d+Q14e+Q14f.

Social Integration: Connectedness to, Involvement in LGBT Community, and Civic Literacy

Another explanatory factor for perceptions of organizational effectiveness, Social Integration, was measured by gauging levels of bonding and connectedness within: the LGBT community, their kinship relations, their racial/ethnic communities, and neighborhoods (structural integration). Social Integration was disaggregated into three components: connectedness to relevant communities, community involvement, and civic literacy.

Connectedness to LGBT Communities. As seen in Table 1.C., half the member respondents reported moderate to strong levels of connectedness in their LGBT community; another 70% indicated a bond with other LGBT people in general. However, quite a large portion of respondents reported homophobia as an issue within their neighborhoods or ethnic communities, and felt uncomfortable within their racial or ethnic communities because of their sexual orientation. On average, members experienced average levels of social integration within the LGBT and their racial and kinship circles; the mean score was 22.0 on the index of LGBT Community Integration on a possible range of 6-36 (standard deviation of 4.91).

Table 1.C. Social Integration: Connectedness with LGBT Community (n= 2398)
The Social Justice Sexuality Project (2010)

Concept	Dimension	Indicators	Values and Responses	Statistics
Social Integration	**LGBT Connectedness**: I feel/felt	6a. Connected to my local LGBT community	1 strongly disagree	11.7%
			2	14.7
			3	24.3
			4	17.8
			5	14.8
			6 strongly agree	16.8
		6c. A bond with other LGBT people	1 strongly disagree	5.7%
			2	6.5
			3	13.9
			4	16.0
			5	19.5
			6 strongly agree	38.3
		15a. As a LGBT person, how much do you now feel supported by your family?	1 not supported at all	8.8%
			2	9.4
			3	11.0
			4	16.4
			5	18.1
			6 completely supported	36.3
		15c. How often felt uncomfortable in your racial or ethnic community because of your sexual identity?	1 Always	7.3%
			2	15.9
			3	22.0
			4	18.3
			5	12.7
			6 Never	23.8
		5a. Level of agreement with statement[1]: Homophobia is an issue within my racial or ethnic community.	1 strongly agree	46.6%
			2	16.5
			3	13.3
			4	11.0
			5	6.0
			6 strongly disagree	6.6
		5b[1].Homophobia is a problem within my neighborhood.	1 strongly agree	21.6%
			2	10.9
			3	16.6
			4	21.0
			5	16.9
			6 strongly disagree	13.0
	Index of Connectedness[2]		Mean (sd) Min-Max	22.02(4.9) 6-36

[1] Please indicate your level of agreement or disagreement with the following statement:
[2] Index of Connectedness= Q6a+Q6c+Q15a+Q15c +Q5a+Q5b; Correlations among these indicators range from -.186 to .524 and were significant at the .001 level.

LGBT Community Involvement. Community Involvement, another dimension of social integration, was measured by two indicators that require in-person presence as opposed to online or virtual involvement. These indicators were important because they helped provide an understanding as to how physical interactions with the LGBT establishments impacted perceptions of effectiveness.

Table 1.D. Social Integration: LGBT Community Involvement (n= 2610)
The Social Justice Sexuality Project (2010)

Concept	Dimension	Indicators	Values and Responses	Statistics
Social Integration	**LGBT Community Involvement**	8a. Thinking about LGBT groups, organizations, and activities in general, during the past 12 months, how often have you participated in political events?	1 Never 2 Once or twice a year 3 About 6 times a year 4 About once a month 5 About once a week 6 More than once a week	27.8% 46.7 12.8 7.0 2.6 3.2
		8b. Thinking about LGBT groups, organizations, and activities in general, during the past 12 months, how often have you participated in social or cultural events?	1 Never 2 Once or twice a year 3 About 6 times a year 4 About once a month 5 About once a week 6 More than once a week	9.5% 26.0 22.6 20.1 12.7 9.2
	Index of Community Involvement[1]		Mean (sd) Min-Max	5.48(2.27) 2-12

[1]Index of Community Involvement=Q8a+Q8b; Correlation of these indicators was .482*** and significant at the .001 level.

The majority of members fell within a participation range of never- several times a year. Fewer than half of the members indicated involvement in their communities once a month or more. On a range of 2-12 on the index of involvement, the mean score was 5.48 (sd=2.27); most member participants did not engage in regular or frequent activities at their respective LGBT establishments.

LGBT Civic Literacy. Civic Literacy, a third dimension of social integration, was measured by how often respondents read print or online sources for LGBT groups, communities of color, and LGBT groups of color. This measure was important to consider because, in theory, more informed citizens could have more evidence based perspectives on issues that should be prioritized and addressed by LGBT organizations.

Table 1.E. Social Integration: Civic Literacy (n= 2424)
The Social Justice Sexuality Project (2010)

Concept	Dimension	Indicators	Values and Responses	Statistics
Social Integration	**Civic Literacy[1]**	8c. how often have you read newspapers or magazines?	1 never 2 once or twice a year 3 about six times a year 4 about once a month 5 about once a week 6 more than once a week	6.8% 12.7 14.1 18.5 17.0 30.9

	8d. how often have you used the internet?	1 never	7.4%
		2 once or twice a year	8.7
		3 about six times a year	7.3
		4 about once a month	9.5
		5 about once a week	12.1
		6 more than once a week	54.9
	9c. how often have you read newspapers or magazines?	1 never	16.4%
		2 once or twice a year	19.4
		3 about six times a year	14.6
		4 about once a month	15.6
		5 about once a week	12.4
		6 more than once a week	21.6
	Thinking about groups people of color… 9d. how often have you used the internet?	1 never	17.2%
		2 once or twice a year	13.8
		3 about six times a year	10.6
		4 about once a month	11.1
		5 about once a week	12.0
		6 more than once a week	35.2
	10c. how often have you read newspapers or magazines?	1 never	25.1%
		2 once or twice a year	19.7
		3 about six times a year	13.6
		4 about once a month	13.4
		5 about once a week	10.0
		6 more than once a week	18.2
	10d. how often have you used the internet?	1 never	23.2%
		2 once or twice a year	14.5
		3 about six times a year	10.8
		4 about once a month	9.2
		5 about once a week	11.0
		6 more than once a week	31.3
Index of Civic Literacy[2]		Mean (sd)	23.24 (8.6)
		Min-Max	6-36

[1] Thinking about LGBT groups...
[2] Index of Civic Literacy= Q8c+Q8d+Q9c+Q9d+Q10c+Q10d; Correlations among these indicators ranged from .332 to .760 and significant at the .001 level

On a range of 6-36 on the civic literacy index, the mean score was 23.24 (standard deviation of 8.56); respondents generally were reading up on these issues at least once a month, which contributed to an above-average level of civic literacy for this group.

Bivariate Correlational Analyses

Correlations presented in Table 2 (in Appendix 3), represent preliminary relationships between Organizational Effectiveness with Community Involvement, Social Integration, Identity, Civic Literacy, LGBT Organization Accessibility, Age, Race, Gender Identities, and Sexual Orientation. Members who reported higher levels on community involvement ($r=-.07^{***}$), stronger identities ($r=-.09^{***}$) and civic literacy ($r= -.06^{**}$) were more likely to find their LGBT organizations less effective, while respondents who are more integrated ($r= .19^{***}$) regarded the efforts of the organization more positively.

Additionally, individuals who reported higher degrees of connectedness (r= .14***), identity (r= .26***) and civic literacy (r=.38***) were more frequently involved within their LGBT organizations. The positive correlation between Identity and Connectedness (r=.28***) indicated that people with stronger identities were more likely to feel connected to their communities, and educate themselves about current social issues impacting the LGBT community and people of color (r=.17***).

Correlations among the alternative (control) concepts and LGBT Organizational Effectiveness revealed the following: negative organizational perceptions were more common amongst individuals with more access to their LGBT establishments (r=-.13 ***), older age (r= -.15***), those with LGBT sexual orientations (r= -.11***), and white ethnic identification (r= -.10***). Older members were more involved in their communities (r= .07***), were more integrated (r= .14***), had stronger identities (r= .26***), and more civic literacy (r= .38***). Whites were more likely to report feeling integrated into their communities (r= .07***), but were less likely to educate themselves about current issues in LGBT communities and communities of color (r= -.10***). Finally members who identified with sexual orientations that fall into the LGBTQ+ category reported stronger identities (r= .12***) and civic literacy (r= .13***).

Multivariate Regression Analysis and Qualitative Insights

Predictions about the net impacts of identity strength and social integration on organizational effectiveness were tested using multivariate regression analysis (Table 3). Members with greater degrees of integration were more likely to feel positively about their organizations (Beta=.27***), but other findings represented critical perceptions. In order, those who were critical of their organizations' effectiveness were those who had strong senses of identity (Beta= -.16***), followed by those who were more involved (Beta=-.07*), had more access to these LGBT establishments (Beta= -.12***), and were older in age (Beta= -.12***).

Table 3.
Multivariate Regression Effects (net) of Strength of Identity and Social Integration on Organizational Effectiveness
The Social Justice Sexuality Project (2010)

	Perceptions of Organizational Effectiveness: Beta
1. Strength of Identity	-.16***
2. Social Integration:	
A. Connectedness	.27***
B. Community Involvement	-.07*
C. Civic Literacy	-.03
3. Controls:	
A. Accessibility	-.12***
B. Sexual Orientation	-.04
C. Female	-.03
D. Transgender	-.03
E. White	-.07
F. Age	-.12***
Model Statistics:	
Constant	15.26
Adjusted r squared	.12***
DF 1&2	10 & 1441

*** p<= .001; **p<= .01; *p<= .05
[1] Index of Organizational Effectiveness= Q2b+Q3b+Q7a+Q7b+Q7c+Q7d+Q7e+Q7f; range= 8-20;
Index of Community Involvement= Q8a+Q8b; range=2-12;
Index of Connectedness= Q6a+Q6c+Q15a+Q15c +Q5a+Q5b; range=3-36;
Index of Identity= Q13+Q16b+Q12c+Q14a+Q14b +Q14d+Q14e+Q14f+Q24a+Q24b+Q24d+Q25; range= 8-44;
Index of Civic Literacy= Q8c+Q8d+Q9c+Q9d+Q10c+Q10d; range= 3-36;
Index of LGBT organizational accessibility= Q1b+Q1c; range= 2-12; Age: 1= 18-24; 2=25-49; 3=50+;
Transgender: 0=non-transgender; 1= transgender; Sexual orientation= 0=heterosexual; 1=LGBTQ;
Female: 0=non-female, 1=female; White vs nonwhite: 0=nonwhite, 1=white.

CONCLUDING REFLECTIONS

In the concluding sections, the study findings, their theoretical implications, and real-world applications were synthesized. Some suggestions for future research on LGBT organizational effectiveness that flowed out of the study findings were also outlined.

Empirical, Theoretical, and Applied Implications

Analyzing factors that contributed to LGBT organizational effectiveness and their relevance for organizational theory were essential to identify areas for organizational reform. The results of this study were also an attempt to fill a dearth of input, specifically from a member-level, into effectiveness of organizations.

In terms of understanding how members perceived the effectiveness of LGBT organizations, critical perceptions were offered by those with more developed sense of identity (Hypothesis #1). A wide range of reasons can be attributed to why members with stronger identities were more critical of LGBT organizations (Figure 1). The Chicago School lens of Symbolic Interactionism suggested that individuals craft and redefine their self-concept as they encounter new environmental and social stimuli. Additionally, individuals might re-evaluate their perceptions of social structures and their effects as they accumulate and enhance their awareness of their social identities. Interviewee #2 concurred with this theoretical argument; she believed that more enhanced senses of self that evolve over time, do not develop without an increased awareness of personal needs in the wider context of society. Thus, as LGBT members become more aware of their needs, they expect more from, and become critical of, the organizations that are missioned to assist them.

Conversely, when member respondents felt better integrated into their communities, they viewed their LGBT organizations more positively (Hypothesis #2). Favorable opinions offered by more integrated members could be explained through Durkheim's theory of collective consciousness. The emotional solidarity gained through a sense of connectedness to their community and being part of the collective consciousness of shared beliefs, morals, and practices, translated into positive perceptions, perhaps simply because of the positive feelings produced by integration and solidarity. There is also a structural-functionalist aspect underpinning the relationship between overall levels of integration and organizational effectiveness: those who were more involved in organizational activities did so because they received some benefits from engaging in their communities and experiencing emotional and experiential solidarity. In other words, their positive perceptions of the organizations might be reflective of the benefits gained from engaging in such communities.

These findings will be most beneficial to organizations if they are willing to acknowledge the complexity of LGBT experiences and collectively work to improve organizational effectiveness. Organizations can improve the ways in which they meet member needs, and maintain a healthy and satisfied membership base by actively seeking member input about the investment of resources in their mission work. LGBT Organizations may want to solicit input from members who are more involved- and consequently more aware of organizational structure and functioning- even if they are more likely to be critical of their organizations. The measure of LGBT organizational effectiveness is deeply rooted in perceptions that member and member community's unique concerns are given, or not given as the case might be, adequate space and resource investment in the missions of LGBT establishments.

The Chicago Symbolic Interactionist School's idea of Flexible Self-concept can offer useful guidelines to LGBT organizations that address a large volume of youth, with shifting and developing self-concepts. These theoretical understandings urge organizations to acknowledge that identity is not stagnant but possess varying degrees of fluidity depending on social and environmental factors. Durkheim's theories of collective consciousness and solidarity encourage LGBT organizations to take steps towards increasing members' integration, whether within the organization itself or providing resources to assist with integration into the broader society. In short, LGBT organizations could greatly benefit from understanding the relationship between integration and emotional solidarity on a range of levels which could, in turn, generate more favorable views of and member satisfaction with the organization.

Figure 1. Theoretically Grounded Empirical Model[1]



[1] Refer to Table 3 for index and variable coding.

Limitations and Suggestions for Future Research

While this analysis offered valuable findings from both theoretical and applied vantage points, there is still much to be known about organizations' effectiveness. For one, the empirical model accounted for only 12% (Adjusted R^2= .12) of organizational effectiveness. Measurement of social integration and identity strength may require more in-depth survey methods to tap into the complexity of these factors. For example, Interviewee #3 offered clues in this regard when she elaborated on the importance of identity: “The way in which we view ourselves and how strongly we believe that image is a major factor in how we perceive the world. This picture is the result of the complex interactions of genetics and life experience, but how we handle life’s challenges is the greatest influencer of that image. How we define that image defines our place in the world, view of others, and thus our interactions with others. As social creatures, we all seek some positive connection with those around us.” Interviewee #4 pointed to additional challenges organizations may face, especially concerning how their efforts are perceived and received by their members: “Some LGBT groups might alienate individuals by focusing on narrow goals (e.g., gay marriage) without addressing other issues in the community (youth homelessness, trans issues, etc.)” Perhaps, member respondents who critiqued LGBT organizations wished to see efforts invested into these areas of need, although limited resources may present an obstacle in doing so.

In the final analyses, evaluations of LGBT organizations may be assessments of LGBT progress and integration at large. As alluded to by Interviewee #1, it is possible that organizational evaluations are particularly challenging to quantify because, as social microcosms, these establishments are assessed on a broader social rubric.

Given the complexity of LGBT organizations and structures, future research would also greatly benefit from examining LGBT Organizational Effectiveness in other countries, and regions within those countries. Additionally, LGBT Organizations may consider offering counseling support or resources for members with compromised emotional wellbeing, especially for transgender individuals; transgender members tended to have lower levels of emotional wellbeing. Ultimately, because member input is so valuable, LGBT organizations should strongly consider implementing on-going evaluations and seeking input from members so that they can fine-tune their operations, minimize mission creep, and maximize effectiveness in meeting their mission.

APPENDICES

Appendix 1. A. Race and Gender Identification (Controls)

Concept	Dimensions	Indicators	Values or Responses	Statistics
Demogra-phics	Identities	19. Which of the following racial groups comes closest to identifying you?	0) non-white 1) white (n)	69.1% 30.9 (2661)
		18a. What is your current gender identity?	0) non-transgender 1) Transgender (n)	96.1% 3.9 (2661)
		18a. What is your current gender identity?	0) non-female 1) Female (n)	56.1% 43.9 (2661)
	Age	Age sorted in 3 categories	1) 18-24 2) 25-49 3) 50+ (n)	23.5% 58.1 18.4 (2582)
	Sexual orientation	18c. Which one label comes closest to how you describe your sexual identity?	0) heterosexual 1) LGBTQ+ (n)	8.1% 91.9 2394

Appendix 1.B. LGBT Organization Accessibility (Control, n= 2495)

Concept	Dimension	Indicators	Values and Responses	Statistics
LGBT Organization Accessibility	Distance/ Travel	1b. Thinking about distance, how far do you typically travel to socialize or hang out at a LGBT establishment?	1 Over 40 miles 2 31-40 miles 3 21-30 miles 4 11-20 miles 5 6-10 miles 6 0-5 miles	19.7% 6.5 11.4 17.2 22.9 22.2
		1c. Thinking about time, how long do you typically travel to socialize or hang out at an LGBT establishment?	1 Over 90 mins 2 61-90 mins 3 46-60 mins 4 31-45 mins 5 16-30 mins 6 0-15 mins	16.9% 8.3 12.9 19.5 26.1 16.3
		Index of LGBT Organization Accessibility[1]	Mean (SD) Min-Max	7.63 (3.11) 2-12

[1]Index of LGBT Organization Accessibility= Q1b+Q1c; Correlation between the two indicators is .586*** and is significant at the .01 level.

Appendix 2
Interview Protocol and Consent Form

LETTER OF CONSENT

Dear _______________:

I am a Sociology Senior working on my Honors Thesis under the direction of Professor Marilyn Fernandez in the Department of Sociology at Santa Clara University. I am conducting my research on how an individual's community ties, sense of self, and community involvement contribute to how they perceive the success of LGBT Organizations.

You were selected for this interview because of your knowledge of and/or experience working in the area of non-profit LGBT organizations.

I am requesting your participation, which will involve responding to questions about what organizational effectiveness means to you, how you define and measure this, and the sociological elements you contribute to organizational outcome. It will last about 20 minutes. Your participation in this study is voluntary. You have the right to choose to not participate or to withdraw from the interview at any time. The results of the research study may be presented at SCU's Annual Anthropology/Sociology Undergraduate Research Conference and published (in a Sociology department publication). Pseudonyms will be used in lieu of your name and the name of your organization in the written paper. You will also not be asked (nor recorded) questions about your specific characteristics, such as age, race, sex, religion.

If you have any questions concerning the research study, please call/email me at (408) 823- 8491; nspeciale@scu.edu or Dr. Fernandez at (408-554-4432 mfernandez@scu.edu

Sincerely,

Nicole Speciale

Alternatively, if interview is to be conducted via email, a short note stating your consent to participate can be sent to nspeciale@scu.edu

If you have any questions about your rights as a subject/participant in this research, or if you feel you have been placed at risk, you can contact the Chair of the Human Subjects Committee, through Office of Research Compliance and Integrity at (408) 554-5591.

Interview Schedule for Supplemental Qualitative Interviews for Research Capstone Paper

Interview Date and Time: ____________

Respondent ID#: ______________

1. Have you ever utilized services or attended activities offered by an LGBT organization?
2. If so, how long were you involved with the organization, and did you have a specific role in the organization?

3a. What does LGBT Organizational Effectiveness mean to you, and how do you personally determine if these organizations are operating effectively?

3b. What makes Organizational Effectiveness for LGBT Organizations different than that of other types of organizations?

3c. What responsibilities do you believe LGBT organizations have in their local communities?

4. Based on what you know of Organization Effectiveness from a community member standpoint, how common is it that LGBT members feel their needs are not addressed sufficiently?
5. In your opinion, what are some reasons that contribute to why a member may feel that their LGBT Organization isn't effectively addressing the needs of its community?
6. How have the following factors influenced your perception of LGBT organizational effectiveness:
   a. **Social Integration**, or the degree to which you've had a support network/relations with friends, family, LGBT community members, and /or ethnic communities?
   b. Confidence in **sense of self**, in terms of what makes you who you are and what contributes to your self-concept?
   c. **Community Involvement**. How has attending meetings, support groups, activities, rallies, clubs, etc. shaped how you feel these organizations are operating?
   d. General **knowledge on current LGBT issues**. For example, does staying 'up to date' on current happenings in the LGBT community (via newspapers, online articles, etc.) contribute to how effectively you feel LGBT Organizations are operating?
   e. **Life course** stage. Over the years, has your perception of the effectiveness of LGBT organizations shifted? Why or why not?
   f. What does "identity" or "sense of self" mean to you? What factors contribute to how strongly you view your sense of self?
7. Is there anything else about LGBT Organizational Effectiveness that I should know more about?

Thank you very much for your time. If you wish to see a copy of my final paper, I would be happy to share it with you at the end of the quarter. If you have any further questions or comments for me, I can be contacted at nspeciale@scu.edu. Or if you wish to speak to my faculty advisor, Dr. Marilyn Fernandez, she can be reached at mfernandez@scu.edu.

Appendix 3

Table 2. Correlation Matrix: Indices of LGBT Organization Effectiveness, Social Integration (Community Involvement, Connectedness, Civic Literacy), Identity, LGBT Organization Accessibility, Age, Gender Identities, Race, and Sexual Orientation[1] (n= 2398- 2661)

Index of:	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K
A.Organizational Effectiveness	$-.07^{***}$	$.19^{***}$	$-.09^{***}$	$-.06^{**}$	$-.13^{***}$	$-.15^{***}$	$-.04^{*}$	-.03	$.04^{*}$	$-.11^{***}$
B. Community Involvement	1	$.14^{***}$	$.26^{***}$	$.38^{***}$	-.04	$.07^{***}$	.04	$.07^{***}$	$-.05^{**}$	$.13^{***}$
C.Connectednes s		1	$.28^{***}$	.02	.01	$.06^{**}$	$.09^{***}$	.02	$.07^{***}$	-.03
D. Identity (n=1765-1952)			1	$.17^{***}$	.02	$.08^{***}$	.03	-.02	.03	$.12^{***}$
E. Civic Literacy				1	$-.11^{***}$	$.07^{***}$	$-.16^{***}$	.02	$-.10^{***}$	$.13^{***}$
F. LGBT Organization Accessibility					1	$.12^{***}$	$.10^{***}$	0	$-.06^{**}$	-.01
G. Age (ascending)						1	$.05^{*}$	-.01	$-.05^{*}$	$.08^{***}$
H. Transgender (Gender Identity)							1	0	$.05^{**}$	.03
I. Female								1	$-.15^{***}$	$-.16^{***}$
J. Race: white and non-white									1	$-.10^{***}$
K. Sexual Orientation										1

*** p <=.001; *p <= .05

[1] Index of Organizational Effectiveness= Q2b+Q3b+Q7a+Q7b+Q7c+Q7d+Q7e+Q7f
Index of Community Involvement= Q8a+Q8b
Index of Connectedness= Q6a+Q6c+Q15a+Q15c +Q5a+Q5b
Index of Identity= Q13+Q16b+Q12c+Q14a+Q14b +Q14d+Q14e+Q14f+Q24a+Q24b+Q24d+Q25
Index of Civic Literacy= Q8c+Q8d+Q9c+Q9d+Q10c+Q10d
Index of LGBT organizational accessibility= Q1b+Q1c.
Age: 1= 18-24; 2=25-49; 3=50+; Transgender Dummy: 0=non-transgender; 1= transgender
Female Dummy= 0=non-female; 1=female; White vs nonwhite= 0=nonwhite; 1=white
Sexual orientation= 0=heterosexual; 1=LGBTQ+

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Structural Dynamics and Personal Agency in Housing Careers

By
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Abstract. The relative impacts of structural dynamics and personal agency on housing careers were assessed using a mixed methods approach. Secondary survey from the 2009 "American Housing Survey: National Microdata" (US Bureau of the Census) were supplemented with qualitative observations collected for this research from three professionals knowledgeable about housing issues as well as content analysis of journalistic writings about housing issues. Respondents' housing moves were driven more by personal choice than by structural displacement. However, both structural displacement (as predicted by the Structural Inequalities paradigm) and personal choice, a dimension of agency (predicted with Becker and Tumin's Human Capital theory), equally shaped, albeit in opposite ways, downward or upward housing mobility, respectively. Socio-economic resources that could facilitate personal agency had no impact. The professional interviewees agreed with some of these statistical findings but disagreed with others. Content analysis captured contemporary housing and gentrification issues in communities. This research extended the existing scholarship on housing quality by simultaneously accounting for structural dynamics and personal agency.

INTRODUCTION

In the past decades, there has been growing dissatisfaction with housing quality in many communities, particularly with residents' downward trajectories in their housing careers. As someone who grew up in the Bay Area for the past twenty years, I have seen the quality of housing deteriorate dramatically before my eyes. A once small suburban diverse town is now a metropolitan area that has pushed out many former residents and more urban development is still under construction. The effects are

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noticed in the waves of former residents fleeing due to their inability to continue living in what was for so long their home. And this process has only started.

The housing market has become a selling-and-buying game between investors and individual residents. Housing is no longer a basic human need but has become a commodity, with attendant profit considerations. The redevelopment or gentrification of residential areas has led to sharp increases in housing cost, forcing many former residents to turn to subsidized housing and other forms of housing assistance. Of course, in this gentrified housing market, those with fewer financial constraints have better chances of upward housing mobility.

To unpack the social forces that undergird and shape people's housing careers, the roles of structural dynamics and personal agency were examined. Structural dynamics are institutional considerations, measured in the current research as housing displacement and government-subsidized housing assistance. Structural displacement can happen because of urban development and/or other outside forces that push residents out of their homes and neighborhoods. Housing assistance, part of a structural poverty alleviation program, refers to government-programs that assist the lower income community with their housing needs. Personal agency or personal choice in housing moves, account for individual decision and preferences, often facilitated by human capital, socio-economic resources, and accumulated wealth.

LITERATURE REVIEW

Extant scholarship on housing has predominantly focused on housing mobility and housing careers. Structural forces, such as displacement and housing assistance or personal agency for upward or downward mobility in housing careers have also been a part of the conversations about housing. But, none have situated housing careers in the context of both structural and person phenomenon simultaneously.

Housing Careers

Housing Careers have been studied primarily using longitudinal studies of home ownerships and changes in ratings of home quality. Residential mobility, a movement from one dwelling to another, has been a dimension of housing that has received some academic attention. Scholars of housing have also examined shifts in quality of homes as part of housing careers.

For example, Pickles and Davies (1985) tracked 954 participants, who kept records of their dwelling history, through a nine-year period. As the study's participants progressed in age and in their life cycles, they moved less. Yet, older Americans were more mobile when compared to the British population. In a comparative study conducted in the United States and Britain by Banks et al. (2012), older aged Americans were found to be more mobile than their older British counterparts (each with 5,500 households).

While informative, both studies defined housing mobility as the movement from one place of dwelling to another and did not account for the progression, or lack thereof, in the quality of dwellings.

Focusing more on shifts in home quality was a twenty-six-year nation-wide longitudinal study in the United States in which 18,869 respondents tracked not only their housing moves but also changes in the quality of their homes (Clark, Deurloo, & Dieleman 2003). Overall, the respondents experienced upward progression in their housing careers; that is, they moved to better quality homes. Those with higher incomes made the most upward progress in their housing careers. Even those who started with higher quality homes at the start of the study reported upward housing mobility. Studies of changes in homeownership of Canadians came to similar conclusions (Haan 2005). But, while Canadian home ownership rates of immigrant-families were initially higher than their Canadian-born counterparts, the reverse was true after 20 years by the end of the study, net of age, income, education, and family type.

Structural Forces in Housing Mobility

Studies that have attempted to offer explanations for housing mobility have focused on the structural dynamics of the housing industry as well as housing displacements. The housing industry or market is a structural institution with the goal, on the face of it, of providing housing through building, selling and buying of houses. The U.S. housing market is mostly a private industry predicated on the personal choice and buyer resources. However, often homeowners are displaced or pushed out of their residences in the interest of housing industry developments. In this context, the government enters the housing market by building or subsidizing low-cost housing as well as by providing housing assistance to those who cannot afford the moves.

That the workings of the housing market and government housing subsidies have contradictory consequences for homeowners has been documented by scholars. On the one hand, when housing prices went down, respondents had more opportunities to move to better quality homes, as Li, et al. (2016) found in their longitudinal study of a sample of 1,069 respondents from a national housing survey. On the other hand, government assisted housing programs reinforced the structured inequalities faced by poorer homeowners. For example, Owen (2015), in his analysis of 600,000 households in subsidized housing located in the most populated areas in the United States, documented said housing units to be located in areas that offered limited economic opportunities to residents. Similar findings were reported by Seicshnaydre (2016) in a review of the New Orleans population displaced by Hurricane Katrina; the fair housing programs in New Orleans were flawed in terms of isolating low-income renters into specific residential areas and continuing racial discrimination.

Home displacement, another structural dynamic, refers to homeowner evictions due to urban development, foreclosures, building condemnation, and government use of eminent domain. Desmond and Shollenberger (2015) focused specifically on forms of structural displacement experienced by 1086 tenants in Milwaukee, Wisconsin; study participants kept a two-year residential history and their reasons for housing moves. Tenants with lower levels of income moved more, occasioned by evictions, landlord foreclosure, and building condemnation, amongst others. Such forced movements also resulted in respondents settling in more dangerous and lower quality housing. In the Chicago area, Holloway's (2015) analyses of four communities, with 20,000 units of public housing, came to similar conclusions; redevelopment of residential areas resulted in hyper segregation for low-income communities and communities of color, specifically African-American communities. Being displaced also led to tenants moving to residential areas of lower quality than their initial areas.

Displacement often is more than geographic; it can also be social and personal. Interviews conducted by Valli (2015) in Buschwick, New York, with residents who were displaced from their neighborhoods because of gentrification, found social and emotional displacements. Irrespective of demographics, the displaced faced social separation, in addition to the economic and physical displacement. These compounding displacements extended to and had ramifications for their community identities.

The mixed consequences of housing displacement for residents in communities outside the U.S. are noteworthy. Similar to U.S. studies debunking the myth of "positive gentrification", community development through gentrification did not result in better opportunities for the existing members of a community in Melbourne, Australia (Shaw & Hagemans 2015). In their qualitative interview study of twenty-two low-income residents of two Australian neighborhoods, the full benefits of gentrification became unobtainable to those who resisted gentrification; that is, even though the resisters remained in their communities, they were socially and economically displaced. However, a Netherlands study that tracked the housing careers of a community that was forced to relocate after receiving notice that their residential building was going to be redeveloped (Kleinhans 2003) found the opposite. A vast majority of Dutch homeowners were able to find better housing after relocation because of access to rent subsidized units in the same neighborhood as their previous redeveloped areas. In other words, structured options, as in government-subsidized housing, offered buffers to the downside of gentrification.

On balance, the structural dynamics of the housing market and housing displacement did shape housing mobility and housing careers. When home prices go down, individuals can buy with ease and be more mobile, in geography and in quality. On the other hand, displacement because of eviction, urban development and economic displacement resulted in physical or social disconnections. However, depending on the national context, structured relocation assistance was linked to both upward or downward housing careers.

Personal Agency in Housing Moves

Apart from external structured forces, housing mobility and quality are also shaped by personal agency. Previous literature has connected housing mobility to homeowner choice and constraints. This is to say, individual preference is an important element in housing career progression. Yet, the constraints that individual human capital, or lack thereof, place on homeowners, cannot be understated.

Choice and Constraints. When looking solely at instances of personal choice in housing moves, it has been evident that personal economic advancement leads to upward housing careers. Kendig (1984), who conducted a questionnaire survey with 697 participants in Adelaide, Australia about their recent housing moves, concluded that those who had gone from being renters to homeowners did so for personal economic advancement. Similarly, in a Beijing study of a series of condominium complexes (total of 1,092 complex units), those in advanced life cycle stages and with income resources were more willing to buy, and did so, certain dwellings based on personal preference (Jiang & Chen 2016). Personal preference for quality and aspects of the dwelling motivated older Chinese respondents with higher annual incomes in their housing purchase. In contrast, first-time buyers were more prone to buy dwelling spaces with less desirable traits.

Other demographic constraints in income accumulation, such as race, have also been noted to restrict housing mobility. For example, a study conducted using 108 randomly selected residents to create agency-based simulation models, looked to understand the role of race-income constraints in residential choices (Kim, Campbell, & Eckerd 2014). Race-based constraints as well as income levels limited the personal choices respondents had in selecting residential areas.

Summary and Future Research

Housing researchers have focused on residential mobility and housing careers as they are shaped by structural forces (displacement and housing assistance programs) or personal agency (choice and circumstantial limitations). However, a comparative evaluation of old and new dwellings in housing career has been largely missing in the housing research. Besides, irrespective of whether such comparisons are evaluated or not, the explanatory models for housing careers have relied on either structural or personal agency factors, but not both.

In the analyses presented in this paper, a comparative evaluation of structural forces vis-a-vis personal agency as they affected housing careers of Americans was conducted. Structural factors included urban development, eviction, disaster loss, public assistance. Personal agency was marked by personal reasons behind housing moves, such as home and neighborhood aesthetics, nearby neighborhood services, and job-related accommodations. Besides, unlike extant studies that limited their analyses to particular cities, be they in the U.S. or abroad, a national U.S. scope was adopted in this paper.

RESEARCH QUESTION

The primary goal of this research was to assess homeowners' satisfaction with their housing moves as it was shaped by structural displacement and personal agency. More specifically, through the formal research question, "What relative impacts did structural factors and personal agency have on housing careers?" attempts were made to assess whether housing moves were a consequence of homeowners being displaced or of their own choice. Such comparisons highlighted the various push and pull factors in considerations in residential moves.

Housing Career, in this analysis, was defined by the homeowner's assessment of the quality of their current homes. In order to further ground this appraisal in relation to their previous home, a comparative judgement of their old and new homes was also used. Family structure, race, and age were controlled. Family structure, measured by family type and household size, was expected to positively affect housing quality; all things being equal, those with larger families will seek better housing to accommodate their family needs, per Jian & Chen (2016). On the other hand, being a member of marginalized racial groups may have a negative effect on progress of housing career; housing segregation often pushes racial and ethnic minorities to lower quality housing and neighborhoods (Li et al. 2016 and Holloway 2015). Age was also controlled as younger individuals are more likely to be just commencing their housing careers unlike their more established counterparts (Jiang & Chen 2016).

THEORY AND HYPOTHESIS

The current research was theoretically framed within both a structural inequalities and human capital paradigms. The structural inequalities perspective provided insights into the role of structural factors in shaping housing careers while personal agency expectations were grounded in human capital theories located within a structural functional framework.

Structural Inequalities

The Marxian Structural Inequalities perspective conceptualized the survival of social orders to be functions of the powerful benefitting at the cost of the less powerful (Marx & Engels 1848). Societal structures are established to benefit the economic and political elite in society, at the cost of the less powerful community members. Applied to the housing context, urban developments, evictions, and other commercial developments benefit those who are in powerful positions at the expense of the average citizen. Even governmental programs designed to assist those in financial need and alleviate poverty, will keep those receiving such benefits at the bottom of the social hierarchy, if they are not appropriately designed. Following these theoretical premises, it was expected that the deeper the structural barriers faced by respondents, the less progression they would experience in their housing careers, net of personal agency, family type, household size, race, and age (**Hypothesis #1**).

Human Capital: Becker and Tumin

The personal agency hypothesis was based on Becker's theory of Human Capital as related to Melvin Tumin's functional perspective on inequality. In the human capital thinking, the primary focus is on rational personal decision making by individual actors to maximize their income resources and mobility opportunities (Becker 1993:402). Resources afford personal agency in actualizing their choices in housing and other products. In the final analyses, social stratification is all but a function of the distribution of human capital resources; those with more resources, accumulated through personal agency, have the social power to advance their position in the social hierarchy (Tumin 1953: 393-394). Applied to housing careers, it was expected that those with more agency and human capital will be able to make more progress in their housing careers, net of structural factors, family type, household size, race, and age (**Hypothesis #2**).

MIXED METHODOLOGY

A mixed-method approach was used to assess the relative consequences of structural displacement versus individual agency for upward mobility in housing. The theoretically grounded hypotheses were tested using a national secondary survey data on housing and supplemented with experiential information provided by three housing professionals (phone interviews) as well as content analysis of journalistic writings about housing displacement and housing assistance issues in cities located in California's Bay Area.

Secondary Survey Data

The "American Housing Survey, National Microdata" survey conducted by the United States Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census in 2009 was the quantitative data source used[2]. Though the Department of Commerce conducted two surveys simultaneously, namely the National Microdata (NMS) and Metropolitan survey, only the NMS was used in this analysis. The NMS included computer-assisted personal interviews, throughout a six-month period in 2009, with approximately 62,000 housing units originally selected for the interviews. The study's participants were selected in efforts to represent the national housing stock. The overall response rate was 89%; roughly 6,450 were deemed as no-interviews because of the inability to interview.

A subset of 9,850 respondents was selected for this research based on those who provided complete answers to the questions about "Quality of Housing." The majority (79.9%) of the subset were members of solely small primary family units; the average

[2] The original collector of the data, or ICPSR, or the relevant funding agencies bear no responsibility for use of the data or for the interpretations or inferences based on such uses. (check the spacing between this)

household size was small (mean=2.51). The majority of the sample was White (79.4%) and the average respondent was 36.95 years old (Appendix A). For reasons discussed earlier, these demographics will be controlled for in the multivariate analysis.

DATA ANALYSES

Following a sequential mixed methods analytical approach, the secondary survey data were first analyzed at three levels: descriptive, bivariate, and multivariate analyses. Content analyses of current news articles on housing displacement and the effectiveness of affordable housing in Bay Area cities were included in the univariate analysis to ground the concepts in ground-level community realities. The perspectives of three professional housing experts were used to elaborate on the results of the multivariate analyses.

Operationalization and Descriptive Analyses

The makeup of the sample, on Housing Career and other relevant factors described below, laid the foundation for the comparative assessment of structural and personal agency in housing mobility. Assessment of housing careers was measured by both the status of their current residence as well as reported comparisons to their previous living situation. Two aspects of “structural dynamics”, as they were predicted to shape housing careers, were considered: experiences of structural displacement as well as structural poverty alleviation resources received by respondents. Structural displacement pushes individuals out of their area of residence while poverty alleviation subsidies might assist them in their choice of new residential areas. The second explanation for housing careers, “personal agency” was measured along two dimensions: homeowner’s choice in their housing moves as well as their human capital resources that might have facilitated such moves.

<u>Housing Careers</u>

As noted above, two sets of evaluations were used to indicate housing careers. First, quality of current housing represented a detailed self-assessment (opinions and evaluations) of the quality of the participant’s current living situation (both home and neighborhood). A combination of quality of home, quality of services and institutions in their designated neighborhoods were used. The second was a comparative general rating by the homeowner of their current residence vis-à-vis their previous residence (housing mobility).

<u>Current Home Quality</u>. Homeowners rated their current home quality as quite high; the average rating was 9.77 on a range from 1 to 13 (Table 1.A.1). The same was true of their neighborhoods (mean=14.6 on a range from 1 to 18). Specifically, most were satisfied with the services and other aspects of the neighborhood, such as lack of street

noise (75.2%), of odor (95.1%), of serious crimes (80.5%), absence of trash accumulation (87.8%), and lack of repair work needed for streets (58.9%).

Table 1.A.1 Evaluation of Current Housing
2009 American Housing Survey, National Survey (n=9682)

Dimension	Indicators	Values and Responses	Statistics
Quality of Current Home	HOWH: Rate your home as a place to live (scale from 1 to 10)	Mean (sd)	7.94 (1.7)
	EAGE1: Current home older, newer, or about the same age as the nearby homes?	0 Older 1 Very Mixed 2 Same age 3 Newer	11.5% 5.0 72.6 10.9
	Index of Current Home Quality[1]	Mean (sd) Min-Max	9.77 (2.02) 1-13
Current Neighborhood Quality	NPROBS: Anything about neighborhood that bothers you?	1 No	83.7%
	HOWN: Rate your neighborhood (scale 1 to 10)	Mean (sd)	7.82 (1.91)
	Does your neighborhood have:		
	STRN: Bothersome street noise/heavy traffic?	1 No	75.2%
	ODOR: Bothersome smoke, gas, or bad smells?	1 No	95.1%
	CRIME: Serious crimes[2] occur in the past 12 months?	1 No	80.5%
	EJUNK1: Trash, litter, or junk in the streets, roads, empty lots (accumulation)?	0 Major 1 Minor 2 None	2.9% 9.3 87.8
	EROAD: Streets that need repair?	0 Major repair work 1 Minor repair work 2 No repair work	6.5% 34.6 58.9
	Index of Current Neighborhood Quality[3]	Mean (sd) Min-Max	14.56 (2.83) 1-18
Index of Current Housing Evaluation[4]		Mean (sd) Min-Max	24.34 (4.25) 2-31

[1] Index of Current Home Quality = HOWH + EAGE1;
[2] Ex. Burglary, robbery, theft, rape, or murder?
[3] Index of Current Neighborhood Quality = NPROBS + HOWN + STRN + ODOR + CRIME + EJUNK1 + EROAD;
[4] Index of Current Housing Evaluation: HOWH + EAGE1 + NPROBS + HOWN + STRN + ODOR + CRIME + EJUNK1 + EROAD; correlation among these indicators ranged from 0.362*** to 0.524*** and significant at the 0.001 level.

Housing Mobility. That homeowners in the study sample had moved up in their housing careers was evident when they compared their previous residences with their current ones (Table 1.A.2). For example, when asked to rate their new home vis-à-vis their old home, more than half (56.2%) said their new home was better; only a small portion (16.8%) thought it was worse. As for their neighborhoods, the new neighborhoods were either better (42.7%) or the same as the previous ones (44.8%). On balance, the average homeowner had experienced upward mobility in their housing career (Index mean of 2.7 on a range from 0 to 4).

Table 1.A.2 Housing Mobility
2009 American Housing Survey, National Survey (n=9421)

Dimension	Indicators	Values and Responses	Statistics
Evaluation of Old vs. New: Home and Neighborhood	XHRATE: Current home better, worse, or about the same as pervious home?	1 Worse 2 About the same 3 Better	16.8% 27.0 56.2
	XHRATE: Current neighborhood better, worse, or about the same as pervious neighborhood?	1 Worse 2 About the same 3 Better	12.5% 44.8 42.7
Index of Housing Mobility[1]		Mean (sd) Min-Max	4.71 (1.26) 2-6

[1] Index of Housing Mobility = XHRATE + XNRATE; correlation among these indicators was 0.524*** and significant at the 0.001 level.

Structural Forces

Structural forces that were conceptualized as affecting housing career were broken down into displacement and poverty alleviation. Structural Displacement pushed residents or forced them out of their area of residence. On the other hand, structural poverty alleviation was conceptualized as resources that could attract or pull residents into better residential areas.

Structural Displacement. Structural displacement that pushed respondents out of their residences included urban development, disasters, eviction, amongst others. As seen in Table 1.B., about a third (31.6%) stated their move was due to forced displacement. The main forms of structural displacement were due to urban redevelopment; construction of condominiums and cooperatives (87.5%) were followed by owners taking over rental units (32.5%). These national patterns echoed modern realities in local communities of rich corporations and investors buying up underdeveloped areas for their development projects (Hudson 2015). Other structural causes, albeit to a lesser extent, were unit repairs (12.2%), condemned units (7.4%), government use of land (5.3%), and expensive rent (7.0%). According to Hudson (2015), areas in Richmond, CA facing urban redevelopment have seen a 20% jump in rents from one month to the next. To Grey Ellis (2017), the collateral damage of redevelopment is disproportionately experienced by long-time community residents. Redevelopment does not impact newcomers to these neighborhoods who are typically tech company employees; their employment benefits in food and other services leave them more discretionary income for the high rents. Though only a small portion of the respondents in the study sample reported displacement via evictions (1.5%), it is crucial to realize that even longtime tenants are displaced (Pogash 2015).

Table 1.B. Structural Displacement
2009 American Housing Survey, National Survey(n=9850)

Concept	Dimensions	Indicators	Values and Responses	Statistics
Structural Displacement	Reason for Move	HUHIS: What happened to the old unit?	0 Other 1 Moved, demolished, lost to disaster	41.2% 58.8
	Reason for new unit selection	WHYTOH: Main reason this unit was chosen	0 Personal choice 1 Displacement	68.4% 31.6
	Displacement[1] (n=3113)	WMCHEP: Less expensive rent/maintenance	1 Yes	7.0%
		WMCNDO1: Going to become a condominium/cooperative?	1 Yes	87.5%
		WMDISL: Disaster loss?	1 Yes	0.9%
		WMEVIC: Eviction	1 Yes	1.5%
		WMGOVP: Government required use of land/building?	1 Yes	5.3%
		WMGOVT: Force to move by government?	1 Yes	1.0%
		WMNFIT: Unit was condemned?	1 Yes	7.4%
		WMOWNR: Owner took over unit	1 Yes	32.5%
		WMPRIV2: Private company/person wanted to use land/building?	1 Yes	2.7%
		WMREPR: Unit closed for repairs?	1 Yes	12.2%
	Index of Structural Displacement[2]		Mean (sd) Min-Max	0.44 (.64) 0-4

[1] Percentages for indicators of Displacement were calculated as percentage from those who reported being displaced under WHYTOH;
[2] Index of Structural Displacement = HUHIS + WHYTOH + WMCHEP + WMCNDO1 + WMDISL + WMEVIC + WMGOVP + WMGOVT + WMNFIT + WMOWNR + WMPRIV2 + WMREPR; Correlation among these indicators ranged from -0.284*** to 0.440*** and significant at the 0.001 level.

Structural Poverty Alleviation. Structural poverty alleviation support was measured by whether sample respondents had received services, such as government aid and additional help, meant to assist residents in moving into certain areas of living. As seen in Table 1.C., the majority of homeowners did not receive public assistance or public welfare; only 3.4% received public assistance from the state or local welfare office. The low proportions receiving housing assistance comports with discrepancy between the numbers of individuals who qualify for such units and the limited units actually available

(Jordan & Blumenthal 2016). A third in the study sample had received other forms of help or assistance (29.8% said yes).

Table 1.C. Structural Poverty Alleviation
2009 American Housing Survey, National Survey(n=3718)

Concept	Dimension	Indicators	Values and Responses	Statistics
Structural Poverty Alleviation	Government Assistance	QWELF: Did you receive any public assistance or public welfare payment from the state or local welfare office? Do not include food stamps.	1 Yes	3.4%
		QFS1: Did you receive any other help or assistance in making ends meet?	1 Yes	29.8%
	Index of Structural Poverty Alleviation[1]		Mean (sd) Min-Max	0.37 (0.6) 0-2

[1] Index of Structural Poverty Alleviation = QWELF + QFS1; Correlation among these indicators was 0.343*** and significant at the 0.001 level.

<u>Personal Agency in Housing Careers</u>

Personal Agency, the second explanation for housing careers considered in this research, indicated individual choice as well as the resources that allowed for personal choice to be materialized in terms of altering housing careers. Personal Agency was measured using two evaluation sets. In the first set, personal reasons for moving into certain housing areas were assessed. In the second, resources accumulated that allowed for such personal agency to be actualized were measured.

<u>Personal Choice</u>. Agency for housing careers, as measured in this research, included homeowners' personal reasons for their choice of a new home and neighborhood. As seen in Table 1.D., about two-thirds moved because it was their personal choice (68.4%). The main reasons homeowners chose their new home included liking: the layout and design of the house (28.8%), the size of the house (21.9%), and yard, trees, and view (12.1%). Others moved to establish their own household (12.4%), or because they needed larger units (11.9%), or to be closer to work or school (11.1%). Their new neighborhoods were selected taking into consideration the following: work (30.4%), proximity to friends and family (24.5%), as well as neighborhood design and look (20.5%). On average, respondents cited at least three (mean=2.7 on a range of 0-17) personal choice reasons for their move into their new homes.

Table 1.D. Personal Choice
2009 American Housing Survey, National Microdata (n=9850)

Concept	Dimension	Indicators	Values and Responses	Statistics
Agency for Housing Career	Reasons for move to new home	Moved:		
		WMCLOS: Closer to work/school/other	1 Yes	11.1%
		WMFAML: Family/personal reasons	1 Yes	9.7%
		WMFEMP: Financial/employment reasons	1 Yes	4.8%
		WMHOUS: Housing related reasons	1 Yes	6.4%
		WMJOBS: New job/job transfer	1 Yes	10.3%
		WMLARG: Needed larger unit	1 Yes	11.9%
		WMMARR: Marital status change	1 Yes	6.9%
		WMONHH: Establish own household	1 Yes	12.4%
		WMQUAL: Obtain higher quality unit	1 Yes	10.7%
		WHDSN: Liked unit room layout/design	1 Yes	28.8%
		WHEXT: Liked unit exterior appearance	1 Yes	9.9%
		WHYKIT: Liked unit kitchen	1 Yes	4.5%
		WHQUL: Liked unit construction quality	1 Yes	8.2%
		WHSIZ: Liked unit size	1 Yes	21.9%
		WHYRD: Liked unit yard/trees/view	1 Yes	12.1%
	Reasons for choice to move to new Neighborhood	WNFUN: Close leisure activity	1 Yes	8.3%
		WNJOB: Close to work	1 Yes	30.4%
		WNLOOK: Looks/design	1 Yes	20.5%
		WNPEPL: Close to friends/family	1 Yes	24.5%
		WNSCH: Good schools	1 Yes	11.9%
		WNSRV: Public services	1 Yes	4.3%
	Index of Agency for Housing Career[1]		Mean (sd) Min-Max	2.7 (1.9) 0-17

[1] Index of Personal Choice = WMCLOS + WMFAML + WMFEMP + WMHOUS + WMJOBS + WMLARG + WMMARR + WMONHH + WMQUAL + WHDSN + WHEXT + WHKIT + WHQUL + WHSIZ + WHYRD + WHYTON + WNFUN + WNJOB + WHLOOK + WNPEPL + WNSCH + WNSRV; Correlation among these indicators ranged from -0.112*** and 0.287*** and significant at 0.001 level.

Human Capital Resources. As shown in Table 1.E., the average respondent was from the lower middle class (Mean of $168,107.00 on a range of $0 to $3,379,640.00). The average annual income of the respondents was $25,100.21 (on a range from 0 to 337,964). They typically had completed some college but did not complete a degree (mean education=5.34 on a range from 1 to 10).

Table 1.E. Human Capital Resources
2009 American Housing Survey, National Survey (n=7708)

Concepts	Dimension	**Indicators**	**Values and Responses**	**Statistics**
Human Capital Resources	Income	SAL: Wage and salary income of person (within 12 months prior to interview)	Mean (sd) Min-Max	$25,100.21 ($40,191.59) $0-$337,964
	Education	GRAD: Education	Mean (sd) Min-Max	5.34 (2.23) 1-10
	Index of Human Capital Resources[1]		Mean (sd) Min-Max	$168,107.00 ($317,184.45) $0-3,379,640.00

[1] Index of Human Capital Resources = SAL * GRAD; Correlation among these indicators was 0.356** and significant at the 0.001 level.

Summary Profile: Housing Careers, Displacement, and Agency

The average respondent reported that they had made progress in their housing careers. While only a third experienced some form of structural displacement, an even smaller proportion received structural poverty alleviation assistance. They were of lower middle class background and most moved out of personal choice; they cited at least four personal reasons for moving or relocating due to personal agency.

Bivariate Analyses

In order to get preliminary estimates of the effects of structural and agency factors on housing careers, bivariate correlational analyses were run (Table 2 in Appendix B). Not surprisingly, upward progression in housing career also meant homeowners were satisfied with their new residence ($r=.42^{***}$).

As for potential connections between structural forces and quality of their current homes, the following were noted: structural displacement ($r=-.20^{***}$) and structural poverty alleviation ($r=-.15^{***}$) were more likely, than not, to be associated with homeowners being dissatisfied with their new homes. However, those with higher levels of personal agency in terms of housing careers reported better quality in their current residence ($r=.20^{***}$). However, human capital variations did not make a difference in housing quality (r not significant). But, respondents who identified as White were slightly less likely to be satisfied with their housing quality ($r=-.04^{***}$) than those who identified as non-White. Family type, household size, and age did not relate to the quality of current residence (r not significant for all three correlations).

Similar patterns were also observed in housing mobility ratings (evaluations of current residence vis-à-vis previous residential area). Those who were structurally displaced

($r=-.16^{***}$) were less likely to have progressed in their housing career. But, personal agency resulted in upward mobility ($r=.18^{***}$). Bigger households meant better chances at upward mobility in housing career ($r=.11^{***}$). However, neither structural poverty alleviation nor human capital, family type, race, age appeared to play a role in housing mobility (r not significant for any of these associations).

Multivariate Analyses

In order to estimate the net comparative effects of structural conditions and personal agency on progression in housing careers, two sets of multiple regression analyses were conducted. First, quality of current residence was regressed on housing mobility ratings, structural displacement, personal agency, and other demographic characteristics. In the second set, similar predictive analyses were done for housing mobility. Together, the two sets empirically modeled the effects of structural and personal agency factors on housing careers.

As seen in Model 1 in Table 3, those who were structurally displaced ($\beta=-.09^{***}$) and were recipients of poverty alleviation resources ($\beta=-.13^{***}$) thought their current homes were of lesser quality than those who were not as structurally displaced. The poor quality of affordable housing units was expected based on the fact that poor housing conditions are a risk factor often associated with affordable housing units (Jordan & Poethig 2015). Furthermore, affordable housing units can also be expensive, and beyond the reach of low-income residents, despite the reduction in rent (Pogash 2015).

On the other hand, when the housing moves were a matter of personal choice, the homeowners were more satisfied, than not, with their current housing quality ($\beta=.08^{***}$). That those with larger households were less satisfied with their new homes spoke to additional structural barriers ($\beta=-.08^{***}$) that homeowners faced. However, neither human capital resources nor family types, race, and age, explained differences in evaluation of quality of housing (β were not significant).

The explanations for housing mobility ratings (Model 2 in Table 3) were similar and yet different from that of current home quality described above. Just as with appraisals of current home quality, structural displacement resulted in lower levels of housing mobility ($\beta=-.04^{**}$) whereas personal choice led to upward housing mobility ($\beta=.09^{***}$). As narrated by Interviewee #2, it is important to recognize that personal agency can also be seen as intertwined with housing assistance received in this sense: these affordable housing units are of lower quality and although these residents are “less likely to complain about mold and damage of living conditions… [they] decide at what point renting fees are [or are not] worth it.”

Table 3
Relative Regression Effects of Structural and Agency on Housing Quality and Mobility[1]
2009 American Housing Survey, National Survey

	Model 1 Current Housing Evaluation Beta (β)	Model 2 Housing Mobility Beta (β)
Current Housing Evaluation	--	.44***
Housing Mobility	.42***	--
Structural Forces:		
Structural Displacement	-.09***	-.04**
Structural Poverty Alleviation	-.13***	.09***
Personal Agency:		
Personal Choice	.08***	.09***
Human Capital Resources	-.02	.01
Demographics:		
Family Type	.003	-.002
Household Size	-.08***	.08***
White vs. Non-White	-.03	.004
Age	-.02	.09
Model Statistics:		
Constant (a)	17.64***	1.41***
Adjusted R^2	.24***	.22***
DF 1 & 2	9 & 2733	9 & 2733

*** p <= .001; ** p <= .01.

1. Index of Current Housing Evaluation: HOWH + EAGE1 + NPROBS + HOWN + STRN + ODOR + CRIME + EJUNK1 + EROAD (Range: 2-31)
Index of Housing Mobility: XHRATE + XNRATE (Range: 2-6)
Index of Structural Displacement: HUHIS + WHYTOH + WMCHEP + WMCNDO1 + WMDISL + WMEVIC + WMGOVP + WMGOVT + WMNFIT + WMOWNR + WMPRIV2 + WMREPR (Range: 0-4)
Index of Structural Poverty Alleviation: QWELF + QFS1 (Range: 0-2)
Index of Personal Choice: WMCLOS + WMFAML + WMFEMP + WMHOUS + WMJOBS + WMLARG + WMMARR + WMONHH + WMQUAL + WHDSN + WHEXT + WHKIT + WHQUL + WHSIZ + WHYRD + WHYTON + WNFUN + WNJOB + WHLOOK + WNPEPL + WNSCH + WNSRV (Range: 0-18)
Index of Human Capital: SAL * GRAD (Range: 0-3,379,640.00)
Family Type: Individual/Sub Family (0) or Primary Family (1)
Household Size: Range from 1-14
Race of respondents: (0) Non-White or (1) White
Age of respondents: Range from 18-93.

Human capital resources, family type, race, and age had no direct effect on housing mobility (βs not significant). However, all three interviewees, speaking from their experiences in the housing field, reported that income was influential in housing quality and stability (Interviewee #1, #2, & #3). One, in particular, highlighted the fact that levels of displacement, housing quality, mobility as well as stability, were predicted and determined by income (Interviewee #3). Another added that “we have some of the highest rent in the country according to the ‘Out of Reach Report’” (Interviewee #1), referring to an annual report that compiles a list of nationwide housing cost and living standard statistics.

On the other hand, the structural and agency dynamics in mobility ratings were different from that found with home quality. Even though structural poverty alleviation resulted in lower housing quality, it led to an upward progression in housing mobility (β=.09***). Additionally, bigger households were more likely to move upward in their housing careers (β=.08***).

CONCLUDING REMARKS:
Empirical and Theoretical Reflection

The theoretical and empirical implications of the current research are presented in Figure 1. The first hypothesis about the restricting role of structural forces in housing careers, framed under a Structural Inequalities paradigm, was sustained. Those who faced deeper structural displacement experienced more downward progression in housing careers (both home quality and housing mobility). However, receiving poverty alleviation assistance had mixed consequences for their housing careers. Although structural assistance allowed for upward progression in housing careers, the quality of the new homes was still not the best, raising questions about the potential of this form of housing assistance to bring about structural change.

Partially sustained was the second hypothesis guided by the functional human capital theory. Ironically, only personal choice to move was relevant in upward housing mobility, but not human capital resources available to residents. Housing moves guided by personal choice, not only resulted in better quality new homes but also upward mobility. Education and income did not seem to matter with satisfaction of their new housing; rather the main dynamics was whether the move was out of choice or necessity. Although it could be argued that resources give you more agency, they did not for this sample. Taking into consideration the multiple methods of loans and mortgages needed when seeking to move to new homes, education and income resources might not result in the predicted agency, leaving personal choice to be the main factor in terms of voluntary housing moves.

Figure 1. Theoretical Model of the net
Impacts of Structural Factors and Personal Agency on Housing Career[1, 2]
2009 American Housing Survey, National Microdata



1 Refer to Table 3 for index and variable coding.
2 Family Type, Race, and Age not included in Figure as they did not have a significant impact on dependent concept

Applied Reflections

A few lessons can be gleaned about the housing market, both for housing developers as well as community advocates and regulators. Forms of urban development can cause a sense of physical displacement among community members in which the redevelopment occurs. Not only does this displacement result in downward housing mobility for residents but their housing quality also suffers.

It was also clear in the evidence presented in this research that governmental housing assistance for residents in reality reinforces poverty hierarchies. A critical aspect of affordable housing is their neighborhood location; when subsidized housing is located in quality neighborhoods those benefitting from housing assistance can also benefit from the services provided within the neighborhood, such as schools, jobs, etc., which can allow for improved opportunities for upward mobility (Jordan & Poethig 2015). These findings are reminders to housing assistance organizations and sectors about providing quality housing units that would not perpetuate the poverty cycle. Housing should not been driven solely by a profit motive. Providing appropriate humane living conditions is also a basic human right.

Looking Ahead

Despite these important lessons, there is much more to be learnt about housing careers in the U.S. For one, the research model tested here captured only 22.1%-24.4% (adjusted R^2) of the variability in housing careers. There is a need to have homeowners directly compare and contrast their new homes with previous ones. Furthermore, mortgages and loans accumulated due to housing moves should also be considered when accounting for human capital and personal agency. Income measures can also be expanded to include more life style measures in order to obtain a more accurate measure of wealth. Questions including vacation frequency and destinations, grocery store preferences, health care provider, leisure time activities, and such will offer more realistic portrayals of socioeconomic class, without running the risk of inaccurate income reports. Future researchers should also strive to incorporate, as Interviewee # 1 mentioned, the idea of social capital, namely resources through family members and friends, as a means of progressing in housing careers.

APPENDICES

Appendix A

Table 1.F. Demographics
2009 American Housing Survey, National Survey

Concept	Dimension	Indicators	Values and Responses	Statistics
Demographics	Family Type	FAMTYP: Family type?	0 Individual and Subfamily 1 Primary Family	20.1% 79.9
	Household Size	PER: Number of people in household?	Mean (sd)	2.51 (1.47)
	Race	RACE: Race/ethnicity?	0 Non White 1 White	20.6% 79.4
	Age	AGE: Age of respondent?	Mean (sd)	36.95 (22.708)

Appendix B

Interview Protocol and Consent

Letter of Consent

Dear _______________:
I am a Sociology Senior working on my Research Capstone Paper under the direction of Professor Marilyn Fernández in the Department of Sociology at Santa Clara University. I am conducting my research on the impacts of structural dynamics and personal agency on housing and neighborhood quality, specifically the residents' current area of residence as related to their previous area of residence.

You were selected for this interview, because of your knowledge of and experience working in the area of housing.

I am requesting your participation, which will involve responding to questions about housing and neighborhood quality which will last about 20 minutes. Your participation in this study is voluntary. You have the right to choose to not participate or to withdraw from the interview at any time. The results of the research study may be presented at SCU's Annual Anthropology/Sociology Undergraduate Research Conference and published (in a Sociology department publication). Pseudonyms will be used in lieu of your name and the name of your organization in the written paper. You will also not be asked (nor recorded) questions about your specific characteristics, such as age, race, sex, religion.

If you have any questions concerning the research study, please call/email me at (650) 793-3603 or Dr. Fernandez at (408) 554-4432 mfernandez@scu.edu
Sincerely,
Ana Raquel Gómez
Since you were contacted by email, I will request an electronic message denoting consent to participating in this interview.

______________________ ____________________ ____________
Signature Printed Name Date

If you have any questions about your rights as a subject/participant in this research, or if you feel you have been placed at risk, you can contact the Chair of the Human Subjects Committee, through Office of Research Compliance and Integrity at (408) 554-5591.

Interview Schedule for Supplemental Qualitative Interviews

Interview Date and Time: ____________
Respondent ID#:

1. What is the TYPE Organization (**NO NAME**, please) where you learned about (and/or worked) with the issue of housing:
2. What is your position in this organization?
3. How long have you been in this position and in this organization?
4. Based on what you know about housing and neighborhood conditions, how common is it for people to move from their homes/neighborhoods to new homes?
5. Do people typically move to better homes and neighborhoods or are their new environments not as good as their previous homes?
6. In your opinion, what are some reasons why people move to better homes?
7. How about reasons why people have to move to homes that are not as good as their previous homes? Please expand.
8. [If the respondent does not bring up your independent concepts as potential causes), PROBE:
    a. How about those who are displaced from previous area of residence? Are their new homes better or worse than their previous residence? Expand, please.
        i. How about those who faced eviction, urban development, disaster, etc.? How does that affect the quality of their new homes?
        ii. How about those who receive government assistance such as public assistance, food stamps, etc.? How does that affect the quality of their new homes?
    b. How about the resources (income, education) they have? How does that affect the quality of their new homes?
        i. How about their willingness to move, voluntary choice, etc.? How does that affect the quality of their homes?
        ii. How about how many resources (income, education) they have? How does that affect the quality of their homes?
9. Is there anything else about transitions in housing and neighborhood I should know more about?

Thank you very much for your time. If you wish to see a copy of my final paper, I would be glad to share it with you at the end of the winter quarter. If you have any further questions or comments for me, I can be contacted at agomez@scu.edu. Or if you wish to speak to my faculty advisor, Dr. Marilyn Fernandez, she can be reached at mfernandez@scu.edu.

Appendix C

Table 2. Correlation (r) Matrix

Current Housing Quality Evaluation, Housing Mobility, Structural Dynamics, Personal Agency, Family Type, Household Size, Race, and Age[1]

2009 American Housing Survey, National Survey

	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J
A. Current Housing Evaluation	1									
B. Housing Mobility	.42***	1								
C. Structural Displacement	-.20***	-.16***	1							
D. Structural Poverty Alleviation	-.15***	.03	.09***	1						
E. Personal Choice	.20***	.18***	-.28***	-.07***	1					
F. Human Capital	-.004	.02	-.02	.01	-.01	1				
G. Family Type	-.007	-.02	-.02	-.03	-.007	.02**	1			
H. Household Size	-.001	.11***	-.04***	.30***	.03***	-.003	-.006	1		
I. Race	-.04***	-.01	.02	.02	-.02	.04***	.01	.002	1	
J. Age	.002	-.007	.01	-.02	.02	-.03**	-.16***	-.004	.08***	1

[1] Refer to Table 3 for index and variable descriptions

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Youth Academic Success: It Starts in the Home

By
Veronica Fay Ybarra[1]

Abstract. Academic Success of youth is critical for their future success as well as for the economic and social health of their communities. Using a mixed methods approach (the 2008-2013 "Social Capital and Children's Development" survey and commentaries of eight education professionals), academic support in the home was found to be the most influential in promoting sociable and non-disruptive behaviors in the classroom and contributing to academic success of 1800 youth. The importance of a supportive home ecological environment (relative to the school and community ecologies of youth) lent support to the predictions of social and cultural capital theories in shaping the core academic self-concept of youth. Education professionals lent support for the importance of a supportive home environment in youth academics. These findings, while contributing to the scholarship in the field of early education, also pointed to new research directions on how schools and communities can support parents.

INTRODUCTION

Academic success of youth is important because it lays the groundwork of our society's future. Youth who are academically successful are more likely to make positive contributions to society in their adulthood. Family Facts noted that a child's likeliness to attend college is dependent on their parent's relationship, as in whether it is a two-parent or single parent household (familyfacts.org. 2017). Youth with a supportive family life are more likely to succeed in their future by gaining an education that can lead to better paying jobs.

Youth engage in two broad forms of behavior that may affect their overall academic success. They form relationships with one another and engage in sociable behaviors. On the other hand, youth can also be disruptive, in the classroom, in the home, or in other environments. Whether youth are sociable or disruptive, these actions do impact how well they do academically. But, youth do not live in a vacuum. They are surrounded by several different communities that support their academic success and social interactions. Teachers and the school environment play a major role. Teachers socialize

[1] Acknowledgements: Thank you to Professor Fernandez for being so willing to help us. Thank you also to every loved one who made this possible.

youth in the classroom and guide them toward academic success. Schools are expected to create a nurturing learning environment for their students. However, learning first begins in the home. Parents start the learning process by setting expectations for the youth, as well as creating conducive learning environments. If we agree that youth are the future of our society and their early academic success prepare them to be leaders in adulthood, research on ways to help them succeed is critical.

LITERATURE REVIEW

The extant scholarship on academic success of youth starts with the premise that it sets a foundation for later success (Rivkin, 2003). Academic success is part of the holistic development of youth. As youth grow up, they learn not only the basics of academics but also to behave in socially acceptable ways while at the same time refraining from disruptive behaviors. There is general agreement that the family, school, and the community of youth are three of the most important contexts in which a child's overall development happens (Eccles et al., 1993). Community adults support children in their academics and overall development. But, they could also pose risks for youth.

Classroom Learning: Academic and Non Academic

Academic success within a school context is influenced by both a child's disruptive behaviors in a classroom and how sociable a child is in a classroom with peers (Xia et al. 2016: 442). Students who were less disruptive and were more persistent with their schooling tended to succeed more (Rivkin, 2003). Rivkin, who studied the way that basic student achievement occurs, in grades 4 and 5, concluded that it is a combination of positive experiences that lead to student achievement. It was hard to narrow down one specific reason why students succeed; for example, Rivkin found no direct correlation between specific teacher actions and their students' academic success. Both academic and nonacademic forces contributed to a child's overall classroom experience and their success. Holistically, the child who experiences positive school and family support would do better in the classroom.

Pro-social Behaviors: Sociable and Disruptive

Youth run into many social settings during their adolescence. These social situations and how they deal with them are a big determinant of their psychological development (Salakhova 2016). Starting early, youth social attitudes are conditioned by understanding to value sociability and the ways they can use it to their benefit (Asmolov 1977). Learning to behave sociably is important because it allows youth to grow in their ability to converse, understand social behaviors, and excel in social settings. And as they learn to value themselves, youth will be less prone to engage in behavior that may be aggressive or upsetting to another. It is important for youth to understand, at an early age, the meaning of why they should engage in social behaviors. Research on the adaptive ability that comes from early socialization has shown that self-socialization is important to develop an appropriate self-consciousness (Efimova, Oschepkov & Salahova, 2015); these scholars, in their study of technology in a classroom, found that when youth were able to successfully adapt in social situations, they were able to adapt more easily in classroom environments and do better academically.

At the same time, youth are also known to be disruptive. According to "Yellow Dyno" almost one out of every two grade schoolers has physically harmed another person (2016). Many times students act out in the classroom because they believe that they cannot relate with their teachers, sometimes because the teachers might be of a different race than the student (Buchanan, 2016:142). Buchanan's grade school students, in North Carolina, felt as if the teachers were not teaching them information they find meaningful to their education. Many expressed their feelings of disconnectedness from their teachers in physical misbehaviors within the classroom.

Sometimes students act disruptively because of the academic environment in which they are learning (Trussel, 2016:264). In Trussel's study of high school youth in the classroom, when children were spoken to, they were heavily instructed and given directions for the majority of the time. This form of directive teaching gave students fewer opportunities to misbehave. Teacher curriculums can also heavily shape the way youth interact in academic settings. Some teachers, in the 2015 Fitzsimmons study of elementary youth, tried to ensure that they adapted their teaching strategies so that their students became comfortable in their environments (p.40). When teachers prepared their curriculum with the students in mind, students felt safe enough to be pro-social, had the opportunity to flourish and performed better academically. They had higher test scores and reacted better in a classroom. In short, students behaved and performed better in the classroom when teachers were more supportive and showed the students that they cared.

Scholars, such as Tobin and Sprague (200), in their analyses of children in Oregon, have also identified research-based alternatives that would aid in reducing youth disruptive behaviors. Some of these initiatives included keeping a low ratio of students to teachers, having highly structured classrooms, and adult mentors at school. Elliott and Turco (1986) believed that misbehaving youth (in their sample of 5th, 7th, and 9th graders) would continue to misbehave unless someone else intervened in a positive way; they also found that students who misbehaved tended to not want to be reprimanded in the classroom.

Support in the Home

Even before a child gets to school, it is well known that parents can holistically support a child's overall social and academic growth. Many parents integrate social lessons into the way that they raise a child which overall allows for the child to succeed in the classroom. These students are able to learn from their parents and understand what their experiences in the educational system.

Students who had a parent who went through the educational system had an upper hand because they can learn from their parent's journey. However, some parents are not able to help their children with their academics because of their own limited education (Coleman, 2006). Coleman studied how parents of children in three different grade cohorts in Tennessee, can negatively impact their child because they lack the experience necessary to provide needed support to their child. It was important for parents to understand what the child was experiencing in school. Parents then are able to support the holistic development of their children, in their academics and in their social relationships.

School Protection and Risks

It is not just the classroom environment that can potentially improve youth academic success; the school environment is also critical. Some schools are more privileged than others. More privileged schools can offer their students opportunities to flourish as students. For example, a school whose students come from wealthy families would not have to worry about having to pay for school materials, as much as a lower socioeconomic-based school would. Privilege means that youth that attend the school excel in the classroom because they are able to mainly focus on school (Curtin, 2016:3). Many underprivileged students, rather than focusing on their school, are often worried about how hungry they are and their next meal. The schools across the United States that Curtin was referring to were very low income. Their teachers had to invest more time with their students because of multiple risk factors that came with poverty. On the other hand, Chiu and Khoo (2005:1) studied a wealthier school in Hong Kong. The parents at this school who had more socioeconomic power were able to easily gain more monetary support for their child's school over another poorer school.

It is important to note that often a school's privilege is dependent on the majority of parents' financial standing. Alba, Sloan, and Sperling (2001) argued that when children of low-income families attended wealthy schools, these students might be able to lessen their wage gap in the future. Many schools try to welcome those of low incomes in order to show that all are welcome. Yet, in reality, children of low income backgrounds tended to lag behind in 2011, from those who were from higher income families (Alba et al, 2011:395). But with school support and privilege, students are more likely to academically succeed; they have the needed foundation taught in the school and support throughout their academic lives.

Community Protection and Risks

Like the home and the school environments, the broader community in which the child grows up can be both protective and risky. It has been shown that when families home school all of their children, the children suffer from not having a wider community of peers (Comer, 1984). Home-schooled children are not exposed to other parents and families who have diverse norms and cultures. Instead, the children are only shown the way that their family acts as a community. Homeschooled adolescents were unsure of the positive and negative ways that this community can affect their academic success. Often times it is perceived that the stronger the local community, the better a student will be in school. Yet this false sense of community can actually detract their attention from the truths that are instilled in the wider world.

Summary and Suggestions for Future Research

Previous research reviewed above has documented the following: (1). Parents and the home play a positive role in encouraging youth academic success, wholesome sociable behaviors, and reducing disruptive behaviors; (2). Students excel in their academic pursuits when teachers and schools provide a healthy environment in which students can learn; (3). A supportive community also contributes to a more wholesome academic success.

My research will evaluate the comparative roles that the family, schools, and communities played in the holistic development of youth. Unlike previous research that focused on the environments of youth separately, I will simultaneously consider how the different communities shaped youth holistic development. Identifying the critical systems in a youth's life will offer educators and parents some guidance on the best way to approach their children's academic success.

RESEARCH QUESTION

Academic success of youth is the central question explored in this research. More specifically, how do resources in the home, schools, and in the community in which youth live help them develop pro-social behaviors (reduce disruptive behaviors, encourage sociable behaviors), and ultimately improve their academic success. Parents and the support they provide their children in the home is arguably the starting point of how well youth do both in and outside the home. Once in school, teachers and the school resources can boost or discourage youth in their academics. Resources available in their communities are yet another source of support for youth.

Youth academic success is closely linked to their social behaviors in school. Hence, a secondary set of questions that were addressed revolved around youth sociable and disruptive behaviors that might impact their academic success. Specific attention was paid to sociable and disruptive youth behaviors and how these behaviors, that have academic consequences, were shaped by the environments in which youth lived.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND HYPOTHESES

Following Bronfenbrenner's ecological approach (Bronfenbrenner, 1994: 37) several ecologies relevant to youth were identified for consideration in understanding the academic success of youth. The systems ranged from the communities (exo-system), the school (meso-system), and home (micro-system) in which the youth are located. The social and cultural capital that these systems offered theoretically illustrated the processes involved in how they shaped youth. In the final analyses, these ecological systems were conceptualized as shaping the academic self-concept of youth.

Social and Cultural Capital Theories

The Social and Cultural Capital theories gave special importance to the family system since this is where youth, through the close and personal relationships within the family, first learn the social obligations and mutual understandings necessary to succeed in life (Bourdieu, 1986: 242). For example, when parents take more interest in their child's lives, they performed better in the academic setting (Coleman 1990b: 36). Cultural capital, specific cultural beliefs, traditions, and norms that youth learn in the home and in environments outside the home, also lay an important foundation for youth development (Bourdieu, 1986: 248). Children typically relied on reciprocity as a norm, as well as social networks and relationships. Positive social relationships are important not only in childhood but also in adulthood (Schaefer and McDaniel, 2004). In addition to lessons learnt in the home, privileged school and community environments often reinforce these social and capital resources; together they shape the self-concept of youth and their future trajectories.

Core and Flexible Self Concepts

Succeeding academically was theorized as a critical element of youth self-concept. A strong academic self-concept is often formed early (Iowa School's Core self-concept; Blumer, 1969) in the home that offers supportive academic and other socio-cultural capital resources. But, youth academic self-concept might shift and become more flexible (Chicago School of Self-Concept; Blumer, 1969) as it is reshaped by their experiences and resources outside the home, as in their schools and in the broader communities. The flexible self-concept is rooted in the Chicago School of Self-Concept. According to this school of self-concept, individuals are more likely to change their beliefs and their actions throughout their life rather than staying complacent with their core self-concepts from early childhood (Pugh, 2017).

Drawing on these theoretical traditions, two predictions were tested. Per the Iowa core self-concept perspective, the academic success of youth was expected to be the most influenced by the academic support and related resources available in the home than in the school or in the community (**Hypothesis #1**). On the other hand, if youth self-concept is flexible, the resources available in the school and in the community were predicted to foster academic success more than the home (**Hypothesis #2**).

METHODOLOGY

A mixed methods approach was used to estimate the relative effects of different ecological systems on the academic success of youth. The secondary survey source used was “Social Capital and Children's Development: 2008-2013” (Gamoran, 2015). Qualitative interviews conducted for this research with education professionals were used to elaborate on the survey findings.

Secondary Survey Data

The “Social Capital and Children’s Development” survey was conducted with 3,084 students, their families, and over 200 teachers in 52 schools in Phoenix and San Antonio during 2008-2013[2]. Children who were from low-income Latino families were a special focus of the study. These children were in elementary school, aged 5-12.

Approximately, 3,084 students were included in this analysis. Female and Male students were equally represented in this sample. But, only 13.7% of the student body identified as White. The rest of the sample was made up of ethnic minorities (Appendix A). Gender and race will be controlled for to identify the unique effects of ecologies on youth development. Scholars have documented that students who identify with different genders and races learn differently and have different speeds due to a variety of reasons including bias, privilege, among others (Dee, 2004).

Qualitative Interviews

In order to gain ground-level perspectives on how the different ecological systems influenced youth, qualitative interviews were conducted with eight education professionals. They included: a school counselor, three school administrators, and four school teachers from eight public schools. These educators were selected for their impartial and well-rounded views of youth behavior in different settings. The Interview Protocol and Consent Forms are available in Appendix B.

[2] The original collector of the data, or ICPSR, or the relevant funding agencies bear no responsibility for use of the data or for the interpretations of inferences based on such uses.

DATA ANALYSES

Three different types of analyses were conducted for this research. First, the univariate analyses were used to build a profile of the youth sample based on their academic success, pro-social behaviors, and environments. The preliminary associations between academic success and the way it was impacted by the communities were explored using bivariate analysis. These associations were re-tested using multiple regression analyses, which offered evidence for the theoretically grounded hypotheses. Insights from the qualitative interviews were useful to illustrate the multivariate analysis findings as well as to offer suggestions for future research.

Operationalization and Descriptive Analyses

Academic Success

Academic success of youth was measured using four different indicators which centered on the performance and skills that students demonstrated in the classroom. These assessments were based on regular testing and assessments that teachers conducted of the students in the classroom (Table 1.A).

TABLE 1.A. Academic Success (Teacher Perspectives)
Social Capital and Children's Development, 2008-2013 (n= 3071)

Concept	Dimensions	Indicators	Values/Responses	Statistics
Academic Success	Performance	A5A Overall Academic Performance	1 = Lowest 10%	9.9%
			2 = Next lowest 20%	11.1
			3 = Middle 40%	30.4
			4 = Next highest 20%	23.0
			5 = Highest 10%	25.5
	Skills	A5B Reading Skills	1= Lowest 10%	11.2%
			2= Next lowest 20%	13.5
			3= Middle 40%	26.4
			4= Next highest 20%	22.4
			5= Highest 10%	26.5
		A5C Mathematics Skill	1= Lowest 10%	7.5%
			2= Next lowest 20%	10.2
			3= Middle 40%	32.6
			4= Next highest 20%	25.6
			5= Highest 10%	24.1
	Motivation	A5D Overall Motivation	1= Lowest 10%	5.6%
			2= Next lowest 20%	11.6
			3= Middle 40%	28.9
			4= Next highest 20%	23.8
			5= Highest 10%	30.1
	Index of Academic Success[1]		Mean (sd)	13.9 (4.55)
			Min-Max	4-20

[1]Index of Academic Success= a5a+a5b+a5c+a5d; correlations among the variables ranged from .715*** to .928***; $^{***}p \leq .001$.

As seen in Table 1.A, the children in the Social Capital and Children's Development Survey were successful in their academics. Teachers rated close to half the students as being in the top 30% of the class (48.5%) in their overall academic performance. Another third (30.4) fell in the middle 40% of the class. As for their reading skills, again half was deemed to be the highest 30% (48.9), while the middle 40% had another third (26.4). Similar patterns were found in Mathematics Skill ratings: almost 50% was in the top 30% (49.7), while more than a third was in the middle 40% (32.6). In overall motivation, more than 50% were rated to be in the highest 30% (53.9), the middle 40% had less than a third (28.9) of the students. That the sample was moderately successful in their academics was represented in their Academic Success index scores; the mean was 13.9 on a range of 4-20.

Pro-social Behaviors

Pro-social Behaviors were operationalized to include both positive and negative behaviors. A student was considered to be pro-social if they exhibited more sociable behavior and fewer disruptive behaviors in the classroom.

Youth Sociable Behaviors. Sociable behavior, an indicator of their holistic development, was measured using four different assessments offered by the teachers. Together they indicated how sociable children were in their interactions with other children in the school setting (Table 1.B).

TABLE 1.B. Sociable Behavior (Teacher Perspective)
Social Capital and Children's Development, 2008-2013 (n= 3071)

Concept	Dimension	Indicators	Values/Responses	Statistics
Sociable Behaviors	Teacher Assessment	A4i Student's behavior: Helpful if someone is hurt	1= Not true 2= Somewhat true 3= Certainly true	7.9% 35.2 56.9
		A4n Student's behavior: Liked by other children	1= Not true 2= Somewhat true 3= Certainly true	4.2% 27.6 68.2
		A4q Student's behavior: Kind to younger children	1= Not true 2= Somewhat true 3= Certainly true	4.5% 33.7 61.8
		A4a Student's behavior: Considerate of other people's feeling	1= Not true 2= Somewhat true 3= Certainly true	6.8% 33.4 59.8
	Index of Sociable Behavior[1]		Mean (sd) Min-Max	10.2 (1.9) 4-12

[1] Index of Sociable Peer Relation= a4i+a4n+a4q+a4a; correlations among the variables ranged from .459*** to .570**; ***p<u><</u>.001.

As per the teachers' assessments (Table 1.B), Children in the Social Capital and Children's Development Survey typically were well-behaved in their interactions with their school peers. According to their teachers, if someone was hurt it was certainly true that about 56.9% of the children would help. The teachers also reported that the children were liked by others (68.2%), were kind to younger children (61.8%), and considerate of other people's feelings (59.8%). That the children were generally sociable was evident in the high mean score of 10.2 on the summative index which ranged from 4-12. A majority of the students fell in the higher ranks on the sociable index range; that is, according to their teachers, the youth exhibited positive sociable behaviors.

Disruptive Behaviors. Disruptive behavior, another dimension of holistic development, was indicated by four questions (similar to the measurement of sociable behaviors). But, unlike sociable behaviors, both parents and teachers offered assessments of disruptive behaviors in the home and in the classroom, respectively.

TABLE 1.C. Disruptive Behavior

Social Capital and Children's Development, 2008-2013 (n= 3084)

Concept	Dimensions	Indicators	Values/Responses	Statistics
Disruptive Behaviors By Youth	Teacher Assessment	Q3a Child's behavior: Considerate of other people's feeling (reversed)	1= Certainly True 2= Somewhat True 3= Not True	69.0% 29.3 1.7
		Q3e Child's Behavior: Often loses temper	1= Not true 2= Somewhat true 3= Certainly true	60.9% 31.8 7.3
	Parent Assessment	Q3v Child's behavior: Steals from home, school, or elsewhere	1= Not true 2= Somewhat true 3= Certainly true	61.3% 2.8 1.0
		Q3x Child's Behavior: Has many fears or easily scared	1= Not true 2= Somewhat true 3= Certainly true	58.8% 32.3 8.9
	Index of Disruptive Behaviors[1]		Mean (sd) Min-Max	5.33 (1.3) 4-11

[1] Index of Disruptive Behavior by Youth = Q3a +q3e+ q3v +q3x; correlations among the variables ranged from .070** to .173***; $^{***}p \leq .001$

Children in the Social Capital and Children's Development Survey were generally not disruptive (Table 1.C). According to their parents, the majority of children did not steal (61%), nor did they have many fears (59%). And for the most part the children interacted and behaved well with one another in the classrooms as well, reported their teachers. For example, teachers said that the children very considerate of their classmates' feelings (69%) and did not lose their temper (60.9%). In short, a majority of youth avoided disruptive misconduct; the mean summative score on the index score of disruptive behaviors was 5.33 on a range of 4-11. There was very little disruptive behavior that occurred among students in this sample.

Academic Support in the Home

Success in education often starts at home. Educational support in the home, as measured in this study, tapped into whether children were supported at home, as per their teachers, in their pursuits of educational success.

TABLE 1.D. Home Support Social Capital and Children's Development,
Social Capital and Children's Development, **2008-2013 (n= 3071)**

Concept	Dimension	Indicators	Values/Responses	Statistics
Home Support for Education	Teacher Assessment	A3i Educational environment at home is high risk	1= Strongly agree 2= Somewhat agree 3= Neither agree nor disagree 4= Somewhat disagree 5= Strongly disagree	5.9% 13.0 19.2 12.9 49.0
		A3g Child has shared home experiences that negatively impact schooling	1= Strongly agree 2= Somewhat agree 3= Neither agree nor disagree 4= Somewhat disagree 5= Strongly disagree	6.2% 12.5 17.9 11.9 51.4
		A3e Child has reading experiences at home	1= Strongly disagree 2= Somewhat disagree 3= Neither agree nor disagree 4= Somewhat agree 5= Strongly agree	3.7% 8.8 12.0 28.2 47.3
		A3d Parent has not been involved in child's education	1= Strongly agree 2= Somewhat agree 3= Neither agree nor disagree 4= Somewhat disagree 5= Strongly disagree	8.7% 11.5 9.5 15.8 54.7
	Index of Home Support for Education[1]		Mean (sd) Min-Max	15.7 (3.9) 4-20

[1] Index of Home Support for Education= A3I+A3G+A3E+A3D; * correlations among the variables ranged from .312*** to .580***; ***$p \leq .001$.

According to the teachers, the relationships between the parents and the students in the home were highly supportive of the youth's education (Table 1.D). Almost half the students did not have risky educational environments (49%) at home or home experiences that negatively impacted their schooling (51.4%). Their reading experiences at home were also positive; about half had enough reading experiences in the home (47.3%). Also, a majority of students had parents who were involved in their education (54.7%). In short, there was a strong bond around academics between the parents and students at home. The majority of teachers believed that the children were supported in their education in a home setting. The mean home support index was 15.7 on a range of 4-20.

Teacher Support

Once children leave for school, teachers are often their first line of support. The indicators used to measure teacher support reflected whether parents and children felt comfortable around the teachers and trusted the relationships that teachers were forming with the students and their parents.

TABLE 1.E. Teacher Support (Student/Parent Perspective)
Social Capital and Children's Development, 2008-2013 (n= 3071)

Concept	Dimensions	Indicators	Values/Responses	Statistics
Teacher Support	Student Perspective	P1a Trust School Staff	1= None	.6%
			2= A little	3.8
			3= Some	22.7
			4= A lot	73.0
		P2 Number of staff you feel comfortable approaching	0= None	1.0
			1=One	10.3
			2=Two	18.4
			3=Three	18.9
			4=Four	12.5
			5=Five	7.0
			6=Six or more	31.8
	Parent Perspective	P1d Staff shares your expectations	1= None	.9
			2= A little	5.2
			3= Some	27.3
			4= A lot	66.5
		P1c Staff builds trusting relationship with parent	1= None	1.0
			2= A little	6.6
			3= Some	28.3
			4= A lot	63.4
	Index of Teacher Support[1]		Mean (sd)	14.61(2.8)
			Min-Max	3-18

[1] Index of Teacher Support= p1a + p1d+p1c+p2; correlations among the variables ranged from .242*** to .630***; $^{***}p \leq .001$

The relationships formed between the teachers, parents, and the students in the sample were highly supportive (Table 1.E). As for the relationships teachers have with the parents, 63.4% of parents trusted the teachers and 66.5% believed that a lot of teachers shared their expectations. Similarly, three quarters of students (73%) reported that they trusted the school staff a lot. On balance, the school environment seemed to be quite supportive of students; the mean on the index was 14.61 on a range of 3-18 indicating the strong support parents and youth felt they received from the teachers.

School Privilege

The privileged status of the school attended by the students was measured by their financial, racial, and academic composition. School Privilege focused specifically on the teachers' perspective of their school's system. A school can have either a positive or negative impact on a child's academic success and their behavior in the classroom.

The schools that the sample youth attended were comprised primarily of Hispanic students (64.7%). More than half (58.5%) of the student body were also on free or reduced lunch and two-thirds (60.1%) were able to meet AYP in Reading. In other words, students in these schools were able to excel despite being on a lunch aid program. The school privilege index, with a mean of 3.57 on a range of 1-5, revealed that overall there was a strong sense of school privilege.

TABLE 1.F. School Privilege
Social Capital and Children's Development, 2008-2013 (n= 3084)

Concept	Dimensions	Indicators	Values/Responses	Statistics
School Privilege	Academic	P_Read Percent student body who met AYP in Reading	0= Less than 50% 1= Between 50 and <75% 2= 75% or more	7.1% 32.8 60.1
	Financial Composition	P_FRPL Percent student body eligible for free or reduced-price lunch	0= Less than 50% 1= Between 50 and <75% 2= 75% or more	9.3% 32.2 58.5
	Racial Composition	P_RE_HISP Percent student body 'Hispanic' race/ethnicity	0=75% or more 1=Between - <75% more 2= Less than 50%	64.7% 24.0 11.3
	Index of School Privilege[1]		Mean (sd) Min-Max	3.57(1.0) 1-5

[1] Index of School Privilege= p_read+P_FRPL_+P_RE_HISP; correlations among the variables ranged from -.042* to .593***; ***p<.001 *p<=.05

Community Support

Being surrounded by communities that are supportive of the youth's academic and other aspects of their holistic development are helpful to child while growing up. However, the parents in this sample did not feel supported by one another as evidenced in the mean of 7.7 of the index on a range of 4-16 (Table 1.G). Many parents did not feel they could rely on other parents for help with babysitting/shopping (68.9%), to listen to problems (49.2%), to invite them to activities (45%), and to share expectations (30.8%).

TABLE 1.G. Community Support (Parent Perspective)
Social Capital and Children's Development, 2008-2013 (n= 3071)

Concept	Dimension	Indicator	Values/Responses	Statistics
Community Support	Parents	Q8a Other parents: help with babysitting, shopping	1= None 2= A little 3= Some 4= A lot	68.9% 15.2 11.2 4.7

	Q8b Other parents: listen to your problems	1= None	49.2%
		2= A little	23.9
		3= Some	16.5
		4= A lot	10.4
	Q9c Invite other parents to school activities	1= None	45.0%
		2= A little	26.1
		3= Some	20.2
		4= A lot	8.7
	Q10 Other parents share your expectations	1= None	30.8%
		2= A little	20.4
		3= Some	27.9
		4= A lot	20.9
Index of Community Support[1]		Mean (sd)	7.7(3.23)
		Min-Max	4-16

[1] Index of Community Support= q8a+q8b+q9c+q10; correlations among the variables ranged from .353*** to .633***; ***$p \leq .001$

Summary Sample Profile

The youth in this study were moderately successful academically and were quite pro-social (sociable and non-disruptive) in their interactions with others. They came from homes that provided much academic support. They also had teachers who were supportive. And even though they attended privileged schools, there was not much support for academics in their communities.

Bivariate Analysis

Glimpses into the ecological systems relevant to the academic success of youth in this study were available in the correlational analyses presented in Appendix C. Hinting at holistic youth development, youth who were academically successful were also more pro-social or more sociable (r=.311***) and less disruptive (r=-.174***). In addition, youth who had more academic support in the home (r=.497***), in the community (r=.125***), and to a lesser extent in the classroom (r=.062***) did better academically. Female youth were more successful academically than their male counterparts (r=.105***).
The social dynamics around youth social behavior was also evident in Appendix C. Youth with more support in the home setting (.318***) were more sociable in their behaviors and less disruptive in the classroom (-.169***). Female students were more likely, than males, to display behaviors that are sociable (.188***), be less disruptive (-.097***) in the classroom, and to receive more support in the home (.074***). However, there were no appreciable differences on any of the support systems or behaviors among students from different race/ethnic backgrounds.

Multivariate Analysis

The preliminary associations noted above between the measures of holistic development (academic success, sociable and disruptive behaviors), support systems and controls were re-estimated using multiple regression so that the unique system could be identified (Table 3). Three models were estimated. First, disruptive behaviors were regressed on sociable behaviors and their system supports. In the second model sociable behavior was used as the predicted variable. Finally, the net impacts of pro-social behaviors and support systems on youth academic success were estimated.

As seen in Table 3, the strong direct effect of academic support in the home ($\beta = 0.42^{***}$ in Model 2) confirmed the expectation that youth academic success uniquely began in the home. Prosocial youth, be they sociable ($\beta = 0.17^{***}$) or less disruptive ($\beta = -0.07^{**}$) youth, were also more successful academically. Supportive home environments also indirectly supported youth academic success by encouraging sociable behaviors ($\beta = 0.27^{***}$ in Model 1.B) and curtailing disruptive behaviors ($\beta = -0.12^{***}$ in Model 1.A).

Table 3
Academic Success: Regression Analyses of the Relative Net Effects of Pro-Social Behaviors, Teacher, Home and Community Support, and School Privilege, net of Gender, and Ethnicity[1]
Social Capital and Children's Development, 2008-2013)

	Pro-Social Behaviors		
	Model 1.A Disruptive Behaviors Beta (β)	**Model 1.B Sociable Behaviors Beta (β)**	**Model 2 Academic Success Beta (β)**
Pro-Social Behaviors:			
Disruptive Behavior		-.10***	-.07**
Sociable Behavior	-.11***		.17***
Support Systems:			
Home Support	-.12***	.27***	.42***
Community Support	-.09***	.08***	.04*
Teacher Support	-.04	-.02	.05*
School Privilege	.06*	-.001	-.01
Gender (1=Female)	-.08**	.16***	.03
Ethnicity (1= White)	.09	-.021	-.003
Model Statistics:			
Constant (a)	7.22	8.4	1.22
Adjusted R	.06***	.14***	.28***
DF 1 & 2	7&1793	7&1793	8 & 1766

[1] Index of Academic Success= a5a+a5b+a5c+a5d;
Index of Home Support for Education= A3I+A3G+A3E+A3D;
Index of Disruptive Behavior by Youth = Q3a +q3e+ q3v +q3x;
Index of Sociable Peer Relation= a4i+a4n+a4q+a4a;
Index of Community Support= q8a+q8b+q9c+q10;
Index of School Privilege= p_read+P_FRPL_+P_RE_HISP;
Index of Teacher Support= p1a + p1d+p1c+p2

These statistical findings were echoed in the experiences of the education professionals who were interviewed for this research. In the words of a public school administrator (Interview #3) “Home support is the key”. This administrator believed that when a child has a good home life they will most likely succeed. Other interviewees expanded on the home-academics connection. For one, negative home lives can be detrimental to a child’s ability to learn in a classroom. A public school counselor (Interviewee #1), who spoke from her experiences with youth, noted that students who had a poor home life were more likely to be disruptive in the classroom; “Troubled youth typically need additional support and guidance because of their home lives”. Another public school administrator (Interviewee #2) shared that when a child believes that they can behave in any way that they want, then it is often difficult to have them focus in a classroom where there are strict rules. A teacher (Interviewee #7) confirmed; there is a sense of accountability that is held at home that shapes the child’s behavior in the classroom.

Prioritizing the roles of the different youth ecologies was this public school administrator (Interviewee #8): “one factor of academic success is home support, and while other communities play a role they do not affect the child to the same extent.” In fact, as seen above, communities that were supportive, even if to a lesser extent than support received in the home, encouraged sociable behavior ($\beta = 0.08^{***}$ in Model 1.B), limited disruptive behaviors ($\beta = -0.09^{***}$ in Model 1.A) and promoted academic success ($\beta = 0.04^{*}$ in Model 2).

The school environment was mixed in how it shaped holistic development of youth. For example, compared to the home environment, the role that teachers played in youth academic success was quite small ($\beta = 0.05^{*}$ in Model 2). Besides, attending a privileged school encouraged (rather discouraging) disruptive behaviors ($\beta = .06^{*}$ in Model 1.A). Yet, a private school teacher (Interviewee #4) felt that sociable behavior and teacher support were the two most important factors in a child’s academic success. To her, the classroom is where a child can really focus on academics and change their behavior to be conducive towards learning.

CONCLUDING REMARKS:
Empirical and Applied Implications

Overall, the home ecological system was the most important for the youth to be academically successful. When parents and caregivers encouraged their children in their academic endeavors, it also had the added benefits of curbing youth disruptive behaviors and encouraging sociable behavior in the classroom. Such pro-social behaviors had added academic benefits: sociable and less disruptive youth did better academically.

Being part of a supportive community was also somewhat beneficial for the overall development of youth. For one, when students were supported by adults who reside in their community, they were likely to perform better in the classroom, even if the influence was marginal. Supportive community adults also lent a hand in decreasing disruptive behaviors while encouraging sociable behaviors in the classroom. In short, the support youth received in the home, and to some extent from their community adults, were the most important to their academic success. Youth can be academically successful, even in challenging school environments, if they were supported in their home and by their communities.

Theoretical Implications

Theoretically speaking, both Social Capital and Cultural Capital perspectives on developing youth academic self-concept were supported (Figure 1). Devoting social and cultural capital early on in a youth’s life creates strong core self-concept that they can translate into their academics. Strong relationships that youth develop in the family and in their communities together help them become more pro-social (more sociable and less disruptive) as they move on to becoming successful in their academics.

Figure 1
Empirical Model of the Relative Effects of Pro-social Behaviors, Home and Community Support, and School Ecologies on Youth Academic Success, net of Gender, and Ethnicity (Beta Coefficients)
Social Capital and Children's Development, 2008-2013 (n= 1929)



1 See Table 3 for index and variable coding

Limitations and Suggestions for Future Research

As with any research, while many valuable lessons were learnt about youth academic success, there is much more to be explored; the adjusted R^2 in the Academic Success model was only 0.28^{***}. Other sources of support, as well as those that might distract youth, as they pursue their academics might include their peers and sibling relationships, rivalry, and home economic resources. It is worth exploring whether peers and siblings have a positive or negative impact on a child's individual growth academically. If there is a sense of peer or sibling rivalry, some youth may be more likely to respond positively and embrace the sense of competition and drive.

A public school teacher (Interviewee #5) hinted at additional sources of pro-social behaviors that should be explored further. She said, "I learned how mental illnesses are typically seen as misbehaviors; they are forms of behavior that teachers try to adapt to and learn about." A child's "self-motivation and drive through their own judgements and instincts" (Interview #6) to excel was another topic for future researchers. Some children do not necessarily feel as if they have other driving forces besides themselves. Finally, even though the statistical analyses showed that teachers made no net (after accounting for the support in the home) contribution to youth academic success, the Interviewee #8 disagreed. They believed that teachers are necessary for the classroom and to ensure that students are on the right track. Yet, other education professionals that I interviewed believed that while the teacher plays an important role for the youth, it is not the most important. Rather they felt that the home was the most important (Interviewee #1 & #2). After all, maximizing the ways adults can support youth prepare for success throughout lives is in the interest of families and the broader society.

APPENDICES

Appendix A

Social Capital and Children's Development, 2008-2013 (n= 1929)

Concepts	Dimensions	Indicators	Values/Responses	Statistics
Control Variables	Gender	GENDER of Student	0= Male 1= Female	49.3% 50.7
	Ethnicity	RACE_ETHNICITY District record of race/ethnicity of case	0= Ethnic Minorities 1=White	86.3% 13.7

Appendix B

Letter of Consent and Interview Protocol

Dear ____________:

I am a Sociology Senior working on my Research Capstone Paper under the direction of Professor Marilyn Fernandez in the Department of Sociology at Santa Clara University. I am conducting my research on Disruptive Behavior on Youth.

You were selected for this interview, because of your knowledge of and experience working in the area of Youth in Education.

I am requesting your participation, which will involve responding to questions about student's behavior in the classroom, as well as background knowledge of the school. This interview will last about 20 minutes. Your participation in this study is voluntary. You have the right to choose to not participate or to withdraw from the interview at any time. The results of the research study may be presented at SCU's Annual Anthropology/Sociology Undergraduate Research Conference and published (in a Sociology department publication). Pseudonyms will be used in lieu of your name and the name of your organization in the written paper. You will also not be asked (nor recorded) questions about your specific characteristics, such as age, race, sex, religion.

If you have any questions concerning the research study, please call/text me at 209-777-7706 or Dr. Fernandez at (408-554-4432 mfernandez@scu.edu
Sincerely,
Veronica Ybarra

By signing below you are giving consent to participate in the above study. You can also give me your written permission by sending a message to me via email stating that you give consent to participate in this study.

______________________ ____________________ ____________
Signature Printed Name Date

If you have any questions about your rights as a subject/participant in this research, or if you feel you have been placed at risk, you can contact the Chair of the Human Subjects Committee, through Office of Research Compliance and Integrity at (408) 554-5591.

Interview Schedule for Supplemental Qualitative Interviews

Interview Date and Time: ____________
Respondent ID#: __

1. What is the TYPE of Institution (**NO NAME**, please) where you worked with Troubled Youth in an academic setting?
2. What is your position in this school?
3. What is the most important factor to Academic Success?
4. How long have you been in this position? How long have you been at this school?
5. How common is the problem of youth who do misbehave in the classroom?
6. Do you believe the youth who do misbehave tend to have more academic success?
7. What explains children's misbehavior in a classroom setting and what can be done to fix this problem?
8. More specifically,
    a. What factor do you believe largely contributes to Academic Success and why? Teacher support, school privilege, sociable behavior, home support, or community support?

Thank you very much for your time. If you wish to see a copy of my final paper, I would be glad to share it with you at the end of the winter quarter. If you have any further questions or comments for me, I can be contacted at vybarra@scu.edu. Or if you wish to speak to my faculty advisor, Dr. Marilyn Fernandez, she can be reached at mfernandez@scu.edu.

Appendix C (n=3,084)

Table 2

Correlation Matrix: Indices of Disruptive Behavior on Youth, Teacher Support, School Privilege, Numbers of years lived in US, Gender

	Index: Academic Success	Index: Home Support	Index: Disruptive Behavior	Index of Sociable Behavior	Index: Community Support	Index: School Privilege	Index Teacher Support	White vs. Non-White	Female (1) vs. Male (0)
Index of Academic Success[1]	1.00								
Index of Home Support[2]	.497***	1.00							
Index of Disruptive Behavior[3]	-.17**	-.17***	1.00						
Index of Sociable Behavior[4]	.31***	.32***	.16***	1.00					
Index of Community Support[5]	.13***	.097***	-.12***	.12***	1.00				
Index of School Privilege[6]	-.06*	-.05*	.06**	-.02	.05*	1.00			
Index of Teacher Support[7]	.06*	.07*	-.06*	.02	.14**	-.01	1.00		
Gender 1=Female	.11***	.07***	-.097***	.19***	.03	-.02	-.03	1.00	
Race (1=White)	.029	.040*	-.023	-.025	.013	-.410***	.008	.006	1.00

$^{***}p \leq .001$; $^{**}p \leq .01$; $^{*}p \leq .05$

[1] Index of Academic Success= a5a+a5b+a5c+a5d

[2] Index of Home Support for Education= A3I+A3G+A3E+A3D

[3] Index of Disruptive Behavior by Youth = Q3a +q3e+ q3v +q3x

[4] Index of Sociable Peer Relation= a4i+a4n+a4q+a4a

[5] Index of Community Support= q8a+q8b+q9c+q10

[6] Index of School Privilege= p_read+P_FRPL_+P_RE_HISP

[7] Index of Teacher Support= p1a + p1d+p1c+p2

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Interviewee #2. November 10, 2016. Public School Administrator.

Interviewee #3. February 8, 2017. Public School Administrator.

Interviewee #4. February 28, 2017. Public School Teacher.

Interviewee #5. February 22, 2017. Public School Teacher.

Interviewee #6. February 17, 2017. Public School Teacher.

Interviewee #7. March 6, 2017. Public School Teacher.

Interviewee #8. March 6, 2017. Public School Administrator.

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"The Past Is Not Prologue"
Educational Achievements of Young Adults

By
Oscar Quiroz-Medrano[1]

Abstract. As global competition intensifies; college education has become a necessary tool for young adults to succeed. In this study, a mixed method approach was used (the NLSY survey, supplemented with qualitative interviews of seven education professionals) to identify the supportive resources needed by young adults to overcome the risks they faced as they aspired to complete high school and actualized their college aspirations. High school experiences and aspirations did not hinder youth from their later educational achievements. Rather, it was the social and cultural resources available in their post high school lives that mattered in actualizing their college aspirations. That the support available later in their lives as young adults were the most influential in their educational accomplishments supported the predictions of social-capital theories in shaping flexible (Chicago School) academic self-concepts of youth and contributed to the sociology of higher education. While contributing to the scholarship on higher education, the research also underscored the need for the continued support needed by young adults as they pursue their educational goals.

INTRODUCTION

As global competition continues to intensify, education becomes the fundamental mechanisms which can help individuals succeed. But, for many students across the United States, education is an obstacle that has to be overcome because they have limited access to resources in their communities which often translates into an inadequate preparedness for a four-year university. A youth's educational achievement is the end result of a host of social and cultural factors that shape aspirations and ultimate achievements. How much do early aspirations affect their later achievements? If aspirations do matter, what are the factors that shape early aspirations? And how important are social and cultural capital resources in actualizing educational aspirations. By furthering our knowledge of forces that shape our students, their parents, educators,

[1] **Acknowledgements**: I would like to begin by thanking Dr. Marilyn Fernandez for her continuous support, encouragement, and the endless hours spent contributing towards my education. I would also like thank family, friends, love, and my classmates for their support and encouragement throughout my research. And to the interviewees who have contributed to my research; I deeply appreciate their help. I would like to specially acknowledge and thank my parents for making this possible and their endless love and support.

and educational institutions can better manage and combat detrimental influences and augment support structures. Insuring that all needed resources are properly allocated and distributed is necessary for the positive success of future leaders.

LITERATURE REVIEW

The central themes examined in the scholarly articles reviewed below about educational achievements and aspirations centered on assets and risks in the lives of young adults. The principal contribution of this research will be to uncover an interdependent set of important signs in student's experiences that facilitate or stand in the way of their future academic trajectories.

Resources and Educational Achievements

It is a well-known fact, in the popular and academic circles, that young adults need a variety of resources to thrive. Researchers have located these needed resources in institutions, communities, and families. These systems are fundamental agents in the education of young adults.

Institutional Resources

School institutional resources are significant in achievement gaps in the U.S. Fram, Miller-Cribbs, and Van Horn (2007), in their longitudinal study of 3,501 children in 1,208 classrooms from 264 schools in the south, found links between student performance and disadvantaged schools. Using a hierarchical linear model (HLM) these researchers found that variability in a child's first-grade learning was connected to resource structures of schools. For example, public schools with high minority population, higher subscriptions to free lunch plans had under-equipped classrooms, that is, teachers with significantly lower work experience and certification than comparison schools. In turn, their students showed lower reading skills.

While education is important for the future of young adults, it is particularly so if they are at high risk of juvenile delinquency and potential incarceration. Scholars have studied ways in which government and voluntary community programs can improve services to better help high-risk youth. Frankford (2007), in her review of research on the state of prevention and intervention services for high risk youth, argued that government and voluntary programs are not meeting the actual needs of these youth because of their limited view of “fixing” certain issues. She offered a “systems of care” approach (p. 596) for identified high-risk youths with behavioral disorders who had deficits in family, neighborhood, and community assets. Looking into micro level of changes will allow governments and organizations to better combat the negative environmental factors that reshape the lives of high-risks youths and end the rotating door of delinquency among youth of color.

Educational opportunities in juvenile justice institutions have been shown to have positive effects in reducing recidivism. Blomberg, Bales, and Piquero (2011) conducted a 1-year study of recently released juvenile delinquents from Florida juvenile justice institutions. Young juveniles with above average (compared to below average) academic achievement while incarcerated were significantly more likely to return to school post-release, particularly for males and Blacks. While males and Blacks had higher re-arrest probabilities, school attendance assisted them in the re-entry process. Educational achievement provided them positive life outcomes because of being disassociated from previous criminal trajectories.

Community Assets

Community assets are yet another influential set of resources in a young adult's development. McCammon (2012) promoted the implementation and effectiveness of system of care (SOC) for young adults, their family, and communities. SOCs create a holistic positive atmosphere for young adults and their families to realize their full potential. SOC clearly encourages proper training and supervision to strengthen the assets of struggling families so that there could be positive development within the nuclear family. SOC will also cultivate support at the school and community level to help strengthen young adults.

Building assets in a community translates into personal well-being, economic security, civic behavior, and well-being of women and children in the communities. Page-Adams and Sherraden (1997) reviewed community revitalization strategies in high poverty stricken communities. The underlying question that drove this research was whether asset holdings had positive effects, and if so for whom and under what circumstances? Their longitudinal study mapped out the community asset-building programs which positively addressed larger anti-poverty issues.

Family Assets and Risks

Families are a fundamental agent in the education of a child's knowledge of societal norms, values and expectations. Families with assets have been found to help their young smoothly transition into adulthood. Using data from 14,823 youth in the 1994 National longitudinal study of adolescent Health (Add Health), these researchers found that those whose families had more expendable resources to offer to the young adult during this important time in their life were had higher probabilities of attending Four-year universities. Those who had a natural mentor at any given time at the age of 14 years old were more likely to stay on a positive trajectory rather than participating in risky behaviors.

Children in families with more assets were also more likely to have positive outcomes compared to children will low family assets. Grinstein-Weiss, Williams Shanks, and

Beverly (2014) reviewed the positive effects of asset building and their long term positive impact. Two central questions were raised: Do family assets improve child wellbeing? And can asset-building programs increase saving and assets, leading to improvements in the wellbeing of children from low-income families? They found that program increased family assets but most importantly positive outcomes for the child. These outcomes are seen in the long term effects such as college enrollments, and a decrease in risky behavior, all resulting from increase in the nuclear family assets. They also made a case for federal and state incentives to increase the family assets to those who otherwise would not have them, thus increasing positive academic outcomes for low income children.

The importance of parent, teacher, and sibling involvement in the child's basic psychological development has also been documented by researchers. A 2017 study conducted by Kaap-Deeder, Vansteenkiste, Soenens, and Mabbe followed 2 children each from 154 families over a consecutive 5-day time span, revealed that parents, teacher, and siblings played a significant role, by offering mentoring and support, in more positive outcomes in the child's psychological development. Creating a positive atmosphere with the support of the parents and siblings encouraged the young adult to continue their education.

Family ties have also been shown to be important to broader education of youth, as in developing their civic values and wealth accumulation. Using data on second generation immigrants in 29 countries, Ljunge (2015) youth with strong family ties had higher civic virtues when compared to their counterparts with weaker family ties. Cultivating strong family ties and kinship takes on added significance in modern times where the family structures and functioning has changed. Guizzardi (2006) argued that changes in the way modern families function have shifted the focus of new generations away from kinship relationships to their own professional career development and wealth accumulation.

College Aspirations

Another strand in the literature on youth education is college aspirations, factors that cultivate said aspirations, and its educational consequences. University aspirations, early on, are important predictors of attending college and completing a degree. Ching-Ling Wu and Haiyan Bai (2016), in their two wave-longitudinal study in Taiwan, found that parents and teachers expectations promoted positive outlook toward higher education among students and in turn their achievement. Family socio-economic resources were only an indirect force in dictating student aspirations. After factoring economic status and parents' educational experiences, early university aspirations of youth continued to be positively related to their university attainment. No doubt, parents played an influential role in shaping their children's life outlook by molding early academic aspirations.

But, once youth get to colleges, their university campus climate is another important factor in their success. To Shwu-Yong and Liou Huang (2012)'s sample of 12,423 juniors at 42 universities across Taiwan, relationships with faculty were instrumental in their sustained academic aspirations and success. The students positively responded to student cohesion on campus, library resources, and administrative support, even if they were less positive about student services and language enhancement, and supportive services for emotional development.

Research has also been conducted on the inhibiting and supportive aspects of youth social environments that might dim their college aspirations. Negative Experiences in high school, lack of support in the family support or in their neighborhoods, have been shown to promote juvenile delinquency and in turn dim college aspirations of youth. Peer victimization, such as verbal, physical, or relational bullying, is a growing problem in high schools. When such negative experiences were internalized or externalized by students in a sample of 6443 high school students, they were translated into problem behaviors (juvenile delinquency) and poor academic performance (Suldo 2016). On the other hand, high school students who were emotionally healthier and had lower psychopathology did better academically.

The health of neighborhoods in which youth grow up is another critical predictor of problem behaviors like juvenile delinquency, with consequences for college aspirations. Barrett, Katsiyannis, Zhang, and Zuhang (2016) compared students with non-criminal records to those with criminal records in the southern Carolina region of the United States. The constant negative social-environmental influences contributed to delinquency among adolescent youth. Those with criminal records had higher signs of aggression and anger, compared with those with non-criminal records. Unhealthy neighborhoods also triggered delinquent behavior among children (Burt, McGue, Krueger & Iacono 2016). Children from harmful environments exhibited conduct and oppositional defiant disorders, and arguably less clinically-significant outcomes.

Summary and Suggestions for Future Research

In the research reviewed above, the developmental circumstances of youth aspirations for higher education and achievements began to unfold. In addition to families and their critical place in shaping youth educational aspirations and achievements, resources are also needed in institutions, like schools, in government, and in communities. Educational opportunities in institutions of youth incarcerations have also been found to revitalize a yearning for success by improving their academic achievements advance positive life outcomes.

While these scholars offered valuable insights into the negative and positive forces in the academic trajectories of youth, they were treated in isolation. This study adopted a holistic focus on the macro and the micro environments of youth development, with a particular focus on their educational achievements.

RESEARCH QUESTION

In this research an attempt was made to unravel the mystery of young adults actualizing their aspirations for higher education. How much did early college aspirations affect their later educational achievements? If aspirations did matter, what were the factors that shaped early aspirations? And how important were social and cultural capital resources in actualizing educational aspiration.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND HYPOTHESES

Young adults' educational aspirations and their success were conceptualized as representing their academic identity and self-concept. As they go about actualizing their educational aspirations, many in their social environment play critical roles, some supporting them and others obstructing their progress. Using Bronfenbrenner's ecological model (Bronfernbrenner 1974), the following systems were identified as important socializing agents in the lives of youth. Starting early in the youth's lives, their family (micro-systems) and their communities (exo-system) offer essential resources, be they social network, cultural, and economic capital, that youth can tap into as they work towards realizing their educational aspirations. Social capital resources refer to the social connections, networks, and relationships which result in learning how to interact, maintain, and utilize relationships (Schaefer-McDaniel 2004). The knowledge and information that youth can gather about specific cultural beliefs, traditions and standards are some of the cultural capital resources (Bourdieu 1977). Available resources can also come in the form of financial (parental assets and net income), human capital (parent education and their economic skills), and social capital (social networks and connections/relationships (Coleman 1988, 1990).

As youth grow up, their friends (another micro-system) begin to play an increasingly influential role. While friends and peers often reinforce the socializing lessons taught by parents, they could also present alternatives that could detract youth from their goals. As theorized by Sutherland (Sutherland, Lee and Trapp-Dukes 1989), the more youth associate with delinquent sub-cultures, be they juvenile delinquents, drug and alcohol users, or criminals, the new peer norms and goals, that run counter to those learnt in the family home, are bound to present risks that divert them from their educational aspirations. Schools (a meso-system environment) could curb the negative influences of deviant sub-cultures and reinforce the educational aspirations of youth.

Which of these systems are most influential in guiding youth on their road to their educational accomplishments and shaping their academic self-concept? Stated differently, is the academic self-concept shaped early in high school or could it be reshaped by later life experiences? According to the Iowa School of Core Self-Concept (Kuhn 1964) the social systems that shaped the aspirations of youth in high school will be the driving forces behind their later educational success. On the other hand, it could be argued that (as per the Chicago School's Flexible Self-Concept (Meltzer 1975), irrespective of their high school experiences and aspirations, if youth have supportive social capital resources available to them in their young adult lives, they can be successful in realizing their educational goals.

Following these theoretical lines of reasoning, two hypotheses were tested:

1. Net of early (during high school) college aspirations and associated supportive and risky environments, the supportive social capital resources (family and community) available in their young adulthood will be the most relevant for how successful they are in their later educational accomplishments (Chicago School of Self-Concept).
2. On the other hand, irrespective of later social capital resources, it will be the early college aspirations and the associated influential systems that will be the most predictive of later educational success (Iowa School of Core Self-Concept).

METHODOLOGY AND DATA SOURCES

A mix-methods approach was used in this research to maximize the benefits of quantitative and qualitative methodologies. The survey data were drawn from the 1994-2008 National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent to Adult Health (Harris and Udry 2009.) Using a combination of self-reported surveys and interviews, the researchers gathered data on the experiences of 90,000 adolescents in four waves. Only information relevant to this research from Waves I and IV was used. Wave I (in 1994-2008) surveyed 90,000 adolescents who were in grades 7^{th}-12^{th}, with a focus on the social and demographic characteristics of adolescent respondents, their expectations for the future, self-esteem, health status, risk behaviors, friendships, and school-year extracurricular activities as well parents' education and occupation and household structure. In Wave IV (in 2008-2009), the former adolescents, now 24-32 years old, were followed up. Among other issues, data on their educational accomplishments, social and economic resources, and their psychological health status were gathered.

A subset of 6443 young adults who had complete information (from Waves I and IV) on the research concepts used in this study were selected for analyses. Both males (47.4%) and females (52.6%) were equally represented in the study sample; this demographic was controlled for in the multivariate analyses.

Supplementary information to elaborate on the survey statistical findings was collected through interviews with 7 highly knowledgeable education professionals. They had deep teaching backgrounds in the California High School Education System, were psychologists and therapists working with adolescents and young adults, and retirees from the California Division of Juvenile Justice system. The Interviews were identified through references and snowball sampling with the generosity and the support of the interviewees. Refer to Appendix A for Consent Form and Interview Protocol.

DATA ANALYSES

Three levels of data analyses were conducted to answer the research questions posed in this research. Descriptive analyses of relevant concepts were followed up with bivariate correlations to identify preliminary associations of educational achievements with resources and risks. In the final step, multivariate linear regression analysis was used to test the theoretically grounded hypotheses.

Descriptive Analyses

<u>Educational Achievements</u>

A child's future weighs heavily on their access to education. Their early experiences and access to resources influence their long term academic accomplishments. The lack of needed resources during adolescence could have detrimental effects later in their lives and continue the cycle of poverty.

Educational achievements of young adults were measured by evaluating the young adults' education and education progress in Wave IV. As seen in Table 1.A, the young adults had moderate academic success; their mean educational achievement (on the index with a range of 3-17) was 7.1. An overwhelming majority (85%) had finished high school. A third (33.3%) had completed some college education with another fifth (19.8%) had completed a bachelor's degree.

Table 1.A Educational Achievements (Wave IV, n=6443)

Concept	Indicators	Values and Responses	Statistics
Educational Achievements	H4ED1: What is your high school graduation status?	1=did not receive a high school diploma, equivalency degree (GED), or other certificate	6.4%
		2=earned a certificate of attendance or a certificate of completion	0.3
		3=earned a high school equivalency degree (GED)	8.2
		4=finished high school with diploma	85.1
	H4ED2: What is the highest level of education that you have achieved to date?	1=8th grade or less	0.3%
		2=some high school high	7.5
		3=school graduate	16.3
		4=some vocational/technical training (after high school)	3.6
		5=completed vocational/technical training (after high school)	6.4
		6=some college	33.3
		7=completed college (bachelor's degree)	19.8
		8=some graduate school	3.9
		9=completed a master's degree	5.0
		10=some graduate training beyond a master's degree	1.2
		11=completed a doctoral degree	0.6
		12=some post baccalaureate professional education (e.g., law school, med school, nurse)	0.8
		13=completed post baccalaureate professional education (e.g., law school, med school, nurse)	1.4
	H4ED6: Are you currently furthering your education[1]	0=no	84.0%
		1=yes	16.0
	Index of Educational Achievements[2]	Mean (sd)	7.14 (2.1)
		Min-Max	3-17

[1] Attending a college, university, or vocational/technical school where you take courses for academic credit? If enrolled but on school break or vacation, count this as attending;

[2] Index of Educational Achievements=H4ED1 + H4ED2 + H4ED6, correlation among these indicators ranged from .06** and .47***; ***p<=.001

Community Assets

Community Assets that were available to young adults are mapped out in Table 1.B. Indicators were selected based on their relative connections to educational achievements. On balance, the young adults lived in strong and stable communities with rich resources (Mean of 13.2 on a range of 7-16). The unemployment rates in the community were reasonably low (53.0%), had very low renter occupied units (6.3%). The interviewers who visited the neighborhoods highlighted the following community assets. The building structures appeared safe (91.2%), the yards were well maintained (9.7%), and safe (67.9%). And over three-quarters were lived either in suburbs (43.8%) or in urban areas (33.4%).

Table 1.B Community Assets (Wave1 HS and Wave IV, n-6443)

Concept	Dimensions	Indicators	Values and Responses	Statistics
Community Assets	Neighborhood Census Data	BST90P23. Unemployment rate	1=High 2=Medium 3=Low	22.5% 24.5 53.0
		BST90P26. Tenure of occupied housing units.	1=Heavily renter occupied 2=Mixed tenure 3=Heavily owner occupied	6.3% 44.7 49.1
	Interviewer Rating	H4EO3. The building structure or entrance is unsafe..[1]	0=Yes 1=No	8.8% 91.2
		H4EO4. The yard is unkempt ..[2]	0=Yes 1=No	9.7% 90.3
		H4EO6: Which of the following best describes the immediate area -- where the sample member/respondent lives[3]?	1=rural farm 2=rural own 3=suburban 4=urban, residential only	7.7% 15.1 43.8 33.4
		H4EO7: How safe did you feel when you were in the sample member's/respondent's neighborhood?	1=very unsafe 2=moderately unsafe 3=moderately safe 4=very safe	1.1% 4.5 26.5 67.9
	Index of Community Assets[4]		Mean (sd) Min-Max	13.2 (1.7) 7-16

[1]… or contains cracks or holes, broken siding or glass, or peeling paint;
[2] … with overgrown shrubs or grass, or contains clutter, trash or other debris;
[3] … or street (one block, both sides);
[4] Index of Community Assets=BST90P23Recode+BST90P26+H4EO3Recode+ H4EO4Recode + H4EO6 + H4EO7. Possible range: 7-16.

Family Assets: Wealth

Family assets, represented by wealth, that were available to young adults are shown in Table 1.C. Indicators were selected based on their relative connections to the resources available for the student. On balance, the youth lived in moderately low income households (Mean of 4.4 on a range of 1-11). Their family income was typically under $100k (11.2 %). While most families did not receive financial assistance from other relatives, about 40.9% owned their residence.

Table 1.C Family Assets: Wealth (Wave IV, 6443)

Concept	Dimensions	Indicators	Values and Responses	Statistics
Family Resources: Wealth	Family Income	H4EC7: What is your best estimate of the total value of your assets and the assets of everyone who lives in your household and contributes to the household budget?[1]	1=less than $5,000 2=$5,000 to $9,999 3=$10,000 to $24,999 4=$25,000 to $49,999 5=$50,000 to $99,999 6=$100,000 to $249,999 7=$250,000 to $499,999 8=$500,000 to $999,999 9=$1,000,000 or more	18.4% 12.2 18.3 17.2 15.1 11.2 4.5 2.0 1.1
	Other family assistance	H4ED7: In the past 12 months, have any relatives, including your parents or in-laws, helped you out by paying some of your educational expenses, such as tuition and books?	0=No 1=Yes	93.6% 6.4
		H4EC6: Have {YOU/YOUR SPOUSE/PARTNER} ever received any financial gifts from family[2]?	0=No 1=Yes	80.5% 19.5
		H4EC4: Is your house, apartment, or residence owned or being bought by {YOU AND/OR YOUR SPOUSE/PARTNER)?	0=No 1=Yes	59.1 40.9
	Index of Family Resources: Wealth[3]		Mean (sd) Min-Max	4.4 (2.2) 1-11

[1] Included all assets, such as bank accounts, retirement plans and stocks. Do not include equity in your home. (Income data are important in analyzing the health information we collect. For example, the information helps us to learn whether persons in one income group use certain types of medical care services or have conditions more or less often than those in another group;

[2] loans from your parents, in-laws, or relatives to help you buy, remodel, build or furnish a home or condominium?

[3] Index of Family Resources: Wealth=H4EC7+ H4ED7+ H4EC6+ H4EC4. Correlation among these indicators ranged from .057** to .217*** and significant at ***p<=.001.

Family Assets: Ties

Family social ties available to young adults are shown in Table 1.D. Indicators were selected to tap into kinship ties between parents and the young adult. On balance, youth had a low relationship with their parents (Mean of 7.82 on a range of 2-14. Father Tie rates was significantly low (24.2%), mothers had slightly higher ties (21.4%).

1.D Table Family Assets: Ties (Wave IV; 6443)

Concept	Dimension	Indicators	Values and Responses	Statistics
Family Ties	Availably of Parents	H4WP20Recode: How far do you and your (mother figure) live from one another?	1= More than 200 miles	21.4%
			2=101 to 200 miles	6.2
			3= 51 to 100 miles	5.7
			4=11 to 50 miles	19.6
			5=1 to 10 miles	21.5
			6= Within 1 mile	9.2
			7=Live Together	16.5
		H4WP34: How far do you and your (father figure) live from one another?	1= More than 200 miles	24.2%
			2=101 to 200 miles	6.7
			3= 51 to 100 miles	6.7
			4=11 to 50 miles	21.2
			5=1 to 10 miles	21.2
			6= Within 1 mile	8.3
			7=Live Together	11.7
		Index of Family Ties[1]	Mean (sd)	7.82 (3.9)
			Min-Max	2-14

[1] Index of Family Ties= H4WP20Recode + H4WP34. Correlation between the two indicators was .81***, p<=.001.

<u>Aspirations for Higher Education</u>

To understand fully the importance of early experiences (Wave I) in a young adult's life and their ability to overcome obstacles, one must understand the influences of positive and negative experiences they faced in high school. Negative high school experiences and juvenile delinquency are important factors in the development of a young adult's educational aspirations and achievement.

The young adults in this research had quite high aspirations for college education (Table 1.F). Seventy percent registered a high level of desire (5=70.3%) while half (55%) thought it highly likely that they will go to college. The average young adult had a high mean score of 8.6 on the aspirations index that ranged from 2 to 10.

Table 1.F Aspiration Higher Education, Wave 1 (n= 6443)

Concept	Indicators	Values and Responses	Statistics
Aspiration Higher Education	H1EE1: On a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 is low and 5 is high, how much do you want to go to college?	1. Low	3.6%
		2. Not That Low	2.7
		3. May Be	10.3
		4. Not That High	13.1
		5. High	70.3
	H1EE2: On a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 is low and 5 is high, how likely is it that you will go to college?	1. Low	5.4%
		2. Not That Low	4.6
		3. May Be	13.9
		4. Not That High	20.8
		5. High	55.2
	Index of Higher Education Aspirations[1]	Mean (sd)	8.6 (2.0)
		Min-Max	2-10

[1] Index of Aspiration Higher Education H1EE1+ H1EE2. Possible range: 2 to 10. Correlation among these indicators ranged from 0.244*** to 0.699** and significant at .001 level.

Negative High School Experiences

Negative high school experiences coupled with its indicators are shown in Table 1.G. Indicators were selected based on their connection with student's daily experiences in a high school atmosphere and give important insights into their academic future.

One is able to see in Table 1.G that while the young adults had endured negative high school experiences, their positive experiences outnumbered negative ones. More than half felt close to people at their high school, that they were part of school, were happy to be at school, felt safe at school, and that their teachers treated them fairly. The only exception was the quarter (25%) who thought other students were prejudice. Their overall positive experiences in high school were captured in the summative index that had a mean of 14.56 on a range of 6 through 30.

Table 1.G Negative High School Experience (Wave 1, n= 6463)

Concept	Indicators	Values and Responses	Statistics
Negative High School Experiences	H1ED19: You feel close to people at your school?	1.Strongly agree	20.0%
		2. Agree	47.5
		3. Neither agree nor disagree	19.1
		4. Disagree	9.8
		5. Strongly disagree	3.6
	H1ED20: You feel like you are part of your school?	1.Strongly agree	26.3%
		2. Agree	47.7
		3. Neither agree nor disagree	13.8
		4. Disagree	8.9
		5. Strongly disagree	3.2
	H1ED21: Students at your school are prejudiced?	1.Strongly disagree	13.8%
		2. Disagree	27.0
		3. Neither agree nor disagree	24.0
		4. Agree	25.0
		5. Strongly agree	10.1
	H1ED22: You are happy to be at your school	1.Strongly agree	24.7%
		2. Agree	41.3
		3. Neither agree nor disagree	17.0
		4. Disagree	11.1
		5. Strongly disagree	5.9
	H1ED23: Do you feel safe in your school?	1.Strongly agree	25.5%
		2. Agree	45.7
		3. Neither agree nor disagree	16.4
		4. Disagree	9.1
		5. Strongly disagree	3.4
	H1ED24: The teachers at your school treat students fairly?	1.Strongly agree	15.9%
		2. Agree	41.8
		3. Neither agree nor disagree	21.9
		4. Disagree	15.3
		5. Strongly disagree	5.1
	Index of Negative High School Experiences	Mean (sd) Min-Max	14.38 (3.74) 6-30

[1]Index of Negative High School Experience = H1ED19+H1ED20+H1ED21+H1ED22+H1ED23+H1ED24. Correlation among these indicators ranged from .263*** to .595*** and significant at ***p<=.001.

Juvenile Delinquency

To capture student social interactions in academic settings, measures of campus juvenile delinquency was included (Table 1.H). The young adults typically did not engage in much delinquent actions (mean of 2.9 on an index range of 4.2 to 20.) They were not very likely to have trouble with their teachers, to get into trouble at school, to finish their homework done, and getting along with other students.

Table 1.H Juvenile Delinquency (Wave I, n= 6443)

Concept	Dimension	Indicators	Values and esponses	Statistics
Juvenile Delinquency	Academic	H1ED15: How often have you had trouble getting along with teachers?	1. Never 2. About once a week 3. Just a few times 4. Almost every day 5. Every day	39.4% 43.0 9.2 5.5 3.0
		H1ED16: How often have you had trouble paying attention in school?	1. Never 2. About once a week 3. Just a few times 4. Almost every day 5. Every day	24.4% 45.6 16.6 10.1 3.4
		H1ED17: How often have you had trouble getting your homework done	1. Never 2. About once a week 3. Just a few times 4. Almost every day 5. Every day	29.7% 41.4 15.8 9.1 4.1
		H1ED18: How often have you had trouble getting along with other students?	1. Never 2. About once a week 3. Just a few times 4. Almost every day 5. Every day	39.2% 44.8 8.1 4.6 3.3
	Index of Juvenile Delinquency[1]		Mean (sd) Min-Max	4.16 (2.9) 0-16

[1] Index of Juvenile Delinquency= H1ED15+ H1ED16+ H1ED17+ H1ED18. Possible range: 4.2 to 20. Correlation among these indicators ranged from .306*** to .383*** and significant at ***p<=.001

Family Risks

Risks that young adults faced in their families as teenagers are shown in Table 1.E. On balance, youth had a low level of family risk factor (mean of 17.71 on a range of 4-20 on the cumulative index). The risks of hurt feelings, physical and sexual violence was very low (53% to 96%). Besides, overwhelming majority did not either their biological mothers (96.5%) or fathers (84.9%) had ever been incarcerated.

Table 1.E Family Risks (Wave IV, 6443)

Concept	Dimension	Indicators	Values and Responses	Statistics
Family Risks	Availably of Parents: Before your 18th birthday,	H4MA1: how often did a parent or other adult caregiver say things that really hurt your feelings or made you feel like you were not wanted or loved?	1=More than ten times 2=Six to ten times 3=Three to five times 4=Two times 5=One time 6=This has never happened	10.3% 9.4 10.7 4.5 12.3 53.0
		H4MA3: how often did a parent or adult caregiver hit you with a fist, kick you, or throw you down on the floor, into a wall, or down stairs?	1=More than ten times 2=Six to ten times 3=Three to five times 4=Two times 5=One time 6=This has never happened	4.7% 3.3 3.4 1.6 4.4 82.6
		H4MA5: How often did a parent or other adult caregiver touch you in a sexual way, force you to touch him or her in a sexual way, or force you to have sexual relations?	1=One time 2=Two times 3=Three to five times 4=Six to ten times 5=More than ten times 6=This has never happened	1.7 0.8 1.0 0.5 1.0 94.9
	Ever in life time	H4WP3Recode: (Has/did) your biological mother ever (spent/spend) time in jail or prison?	0=Yes 1=No	3.5% 96.5
		H4WP9Recode: Has/did) your biological Father ever (spent/spend) time in jail or prison?	0=Yes 1=No	15.1% 84.9
	Index of Family Risks[1]		Mean (sd) Min-Max	17.7 (2.76) 4-20

[1] Index of Family Risk H4MA1+ H4MA3 + H4MA5 + H4WP3Recode + H4WP9Recode; Correlation among these indicators ranged from .28*** to .21*** and significant at ***p<=.001

Bivariate Analyses

In the next analytical step, bivariate correlations were used to identify preliminary associations of young adults' educational achievements with their assets (community and family assets) family risks, their college aspirations, problematic youth behaviors, and gender (Table 2 in Appendix B). Of the resources available to the young adults in their post-high school lives, community (r=.18***) and family (r=-.17***) assets seem to be the most useful in their educational progress. Interestingly, those with closer family ties were more likely to have progressed in their educational careers (r=-.26***) than those who lived away from their families. Females achieved more in their education than males (-.06**). However, none of the experiences in their adolescent years were associated with later educational achievements (r not significant). The stability of these relationships was re-tested using multivariate regression analyses.

Multivariate Analyses

In the final analytical step, multivariate regression was used to test the hypotheses about the relative effects of social and economic resources available to young adults in the adolescent years and later on their educational achievements. Several important insights about what it takes for young adults to succeed in higher education were available in the results presented in Table 3 below. One, it was the resources available in their young adulthood that were the most useful for their educational progress later in life. For example, young adults who had community (Beta =.14***) and family economic (Beta =.17***) resources made the most progress in their higher educational trajectories, irrespective of their adolescent college aspirations and negative experiences during their high school years. Second, except for their negative high school experiences, their college aspirations and risky behaviors were not relevant for their later educational success (Betas were not significant). Third, given access to resources, even those who had negative high school experiences were educationally successful (Beta=.06**).

Table 3
Regression Analyses of Youth Educational Achievements on Community and Family Assets, Risks, College Aspirations, Problem Youth Behaviors and Gender[1]

	Model Beta (β)
Community Assets	.14***
Family Assets: Wealth	.17***
Family Ties	-.21***
Family Risk	.03
Aspiration Higher Education	-.01
Negative High School Experience	.06**
Juvenile Delinquency	-.04
Male (vs. Female)	-.05*
Constant (a)	4.37***
Adjusted R^2	.11***
DF 1&2	8 & 2408

***p<=.001; **p<=.01; *p<=.05

[1] Index of Educational Achievements=H4ED1 + H4ED2 + H4ED6 (Range: 3-17);
Index of Community Assets=BST90P23Recode+BST90P26+H4EO3Recode+ H4EO4Recode+H4EO6+H4EO7. (Range: 7-16);
Index of Family Resources: Wealth=H4EC7+ H4ED7+ H4EC6+ H4EC4 (Range: 1-11);
Index of Family Risk H4MA1+ H4MA3 + H4MA5 + H4WP3Recode + H4WP9Recode (Range: 4-20);
Index of Family Assets: Ties = H4WP20Recode + H4WP34 (Range: 2-14);
Index of Aspiration Higher Education H1EE1+ H1EE2 (Range: 2 to 10);
Index of Negative High School Experience H1ED19+H1ED20+H1ED21+H1ED22+H1ED23+H1ED24 (Range:6 to 30);
Index of Juvenile Delinquency= H1ED15+ H1ED16+ H1ED17+ H1ED18 (Range: 4.2 to 20)
Gender: 0=Female 1=Male.

Ironically, living geographically closer to their families reduced the likelihood of being successful in higher education (family ties Beta= -.21***). Males too (compared to women) were disadvantaged in higher education (Beta= -.05*), irrespective of support from family and community. On balance, the trajectory of a young adult's future is delicately balanced between what happens in their adolescent lives, but even more during their young adult years. If they do not have the needed safety nets in place, the young adult might lean towards the negative path, resulting in a future of difficulties.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

Ensuring young adults have the best opportunities for success is an unalienable right. However, political and economic systems have placed current and future generations in jeopardy of not actualizing their full potential due to the budget cuts in our education system and in programs which help struggling parents ensure their children's success. It was evident in this research that given support and access to resources in young adulthood, youth will positively modify their educational trajectories irrespective of their high school experiences. These findings also lent support to the Chicago school's flexible self-concept theoretical idea (Figure 1). With adequate resources and support, youth can overcome early disadvantages and become academically successful as they grow up.

Figure 1. Empirical Model of Educational Achievements: Impacts of Community and Family Assets and Risks, College Aspirations, Problem Youth Behaviors and Gender[1,2]



[1] Refer to Table 3 for Index and variable Coding
[2] Non-significant effects not shown: Aspiration Higher Education, Juvenile Delinquency, and Family risks.

Empirical and Theoretical Implications

The results of this research fell into five separate types of supportive resources and risks that young adults faced in realizing their education goals. They were: community assets, family assets, family ties and risks, negative high school experiences, and problem behaviors in adolescence.

Community Assets

Supportive services located and accessible to young adults in their community cultivated more positive outcomes for them. These resources expand an adolescent's perspective of the world; they are exposed to different possibilities and can use these resources to realize their future goals. A youth corrections professional who was interviewed for this research underscored the important connection with having accessible resources in the community: "These kids have never experienced success in anything, because there is nothing out in their communities, ultimately limiting their views of what they can do" (Interviewee #4). This professional worked in the California Youth Authority (CYA) for 30 years before retiring. Resources embedded within the community allow youth to be exposed to something more than just their neighborhoods. Programs such as the Boys and Girls Club of America and National Compare Network are organizations embedded within disadvantaged communities cultivating and guiding youth towards realizing their full capabilities and opening their minds to the opportunities outside of their neighborhoods. These programs also offer a support system to young adults that may not be available in their households, filling a niche with positive influences and taking them away from misguiding entities. Another professional interviewee (Interviewee #3) expanded: the mentors offered by these and other programs allow a support system to be established and ensure that the youth has access to a safe space where they can receive positive encouragement and support to continue on a healthy path.

Community assets are especially important as youth transition into young adults. A young adult having to balance earning an education, earning an income, and other competing responsibilities faces stressful and tedious times, ultimately causing the young adult to choose between sliding by economically and competing their higher education. However, if they are supported through their transition from adolescence to young adulthood they can work through the difficulties they might face. These support systems are not solely limited to the nuclear family. They can be supported by various individuals in their young adult lives; mentors, teachers, siblings, and other permanent figures can also have great influence in the developmental process. The notion of permanence was a recurring theme during the interviews conducted. Interviewee #7 expanded on this concept by stating, "Permanent relationships such as long-term mentor has a significant influence in the adolescent development and transition into young adulthood because going off of kids in the system, they have inconstant family relationships (Interviewee #7)."

Family Assets: Wealth

Access to family resources was a significant asset in the educational achievements of the young adult. Family assets offer an easier transition from adolescence to young adulthood and a new set of adult responsibilities, a transition that is quite difficult without adequate help. Having families as a safety net allows young adults to focus on their education and expand their minds to a wider set of possibilities without having to juggle their education, family responsibilities, and working. Interviewee #7, who, for 27 years, has worked in various positions in the California Youth Authority, commented on the assets offered by parents. She stated; "The primary job of a child is to be exposed to the world and focus in school but we are speaking of parents will higher assets. Parents may want their children to get an education but due to limited resources is this not an opinion." Parents, she said, should be cultivating and encouraging this development; however, many parents do not have access to these resources for a variety of reasons such as low education, limited income, and language barriers. Parents who have limited assets might not be able to support their children in achieving academic success.

Family Ties and Risks

Family kinship ties also play a significant role in the young adult's educational outcomes. During adolescence, youth begin to develop their knowledge of the needed components of a healthy relationship; family interactions and relationships shape their identities. Besides, a strong family support system can disrupt other negative influences surrounding the young adult. But, left unmonitored, exposure to negative influences runs the risks of affecting the young adult's life outcomes. It should also be noted that close family ties do not necessarily mean geographic proximity. In fact, young adults in this research who were successful in their education lived away from their families. Perhaps, higher education opportunities lie away from the natal homes and moving away is the only way to make use of these opportunities.

While the importance of a healthy family support system was a reoccurring theme in the interviews with professionals, they were quick to add that for many children, the structure of their homes is far from healthy. Consequently, their support systems do not necessarily have to include the parents. Adult individuals that honestly care for the success and future of the child can make up for the lack of family support. But, adults who fulfil this support niche have to be permanent and positive channels of encouragement and support (interviewee #7). Unfortunately, in households where the parents are often away from the home due to work, adolescents try to fulfill this empty void by finding others who they can relate to or offer them what they are missing. If these others are themselves have problematic backgrounds, the youth end up joining gangs, or participating in other risky behaviors. In short, positive community support systems allow youth a smoother transition from adolescence to young adulthood. These support systems can include teachers, mentors, coaches, and other adults who are willing work to build long-term connections with these youths. It is when these support systems are non-existent that youth become defiant and engage in behaviors with negative outcomes (Interviewee #3).

Negative High School Experiences

Adolescents' developmental experiences during secondary education are also significant in their future trajectories. During adolescence, youth are continually soaking up information from their kin and their surroundings and slowly molding their identity. Fortunately, negative high school experiences did not have enduring negative effects in young adulthood in this research. Support during the secondary education period is a huge factor in helping them successfully dealing with negative experiences and ensuring their future successes. As Interviewee #2 stated, "I feel that we lack a good prevention education model in our district. This is where students go when they are in trouble and it should be more for students who are about to get in trouble. Stopping the risky behavior before it becomes late is key because I'm not sure we will be able to stop in the future."

Overcoming Problem Youth Behaviors

Misconceptions about youth range from their risky behaviors, lack of motivation, and delinquency. However, it was clear in this research that adolescents who have made mistakes or bad decisions still have the ability to change their life around provided they have stable, permanent, and continued support. These findings countered the Iowa School's idea of Core Self-Concept, that youth who have made mistakes in the beginning stages of their life have set the negative trajectories of their future. The quantitative and qualitative analyses presented in this paper suggested that youth, with adequate support, are fully capable of changing their trajectory to create more positive outcomes. As Interviewee #1, who has worked in California Youth Authority (CYA), commented, motivation is key to youth, even those who are in the juvenile hall system who want to change their current situation. However change becomes difficult when no one has ever encouraged them or has given then positive reinforcement (Interviewee #1). But, early disadvantages might not negatively affect a young adult's later success in their life, if these experiences can fuel their motivation for success in their future. With adequate support youth can create positive outcomes from difficult starts.

Limitations and Suggestions for Future Research

Despite the valuable lessons offered in this research, much more needs to be known about educational successes of young adults. The support and risk factors in the lives of young adults measured in this research explained only 11% (R^2=0.11) of their educational achievements. Additional explanations need to be studied to create a more holistic view of the factors influencing young adult's life trajectory. One such factor is the roles of federal, state and local organizations in helping young adults succeed, particularly when they have gotten off track in their early years.

APPENDICES

Appendix A

Research Consent Form

Dear Interviewee:
I am a Sociology Senior working on my Research Capstone Paper under the direction of Professor Marilyn Fernandez in the Department of Sociology at Santa Clara University. I am conducting research on how much do early aspirations affect students later achievements. If aspirations do matter, what are the factors that shape early aspirations? Moreover, how important are social and cultural capital resources in actualizing educational aspirations?

You were selected for this interview because of your knowledge of and experience working with high school students.

I am requesting your participation, which will involve responding to questions about your professional experiences working with youth and will last about 20 minutes. Your participation in this study is voluntary. You have the right to choose to not participate or to withdraw from the interview at any time. The results of the research study may be presented at SCU's Annual Anthropology/Sociology Undergraduate Research Conference and published (in a Sociology department publication). Pseudonyms will be used in lieu of your name and the name of your organization in the written paper. You will also not be asked (nor recorded) questions about your specific characteristics, such as age, race, sex, religion.

If you have any questions concerning the research study, please call/email me at (669) 300-1687 or Dr. Fernandez at 408-554-4432 mfernandez@scu.edu

Sincerely,
Oscar Quiroz-Medrano

By signing below, you are giving consent to participate in the above study.

____________________ ______________________________ ______
Signature Printed Name Date

If you have any questions about your rights as a subject/participant in this research, or if you feel you have been placed at risk, you can contact the Chair of the Human Subjects Committee, through Office of Research Compliance and Integrity at (408) 554-559)

Interview Questions

Interview Date and Time: ______
Respondent ID#:__________

1. What is the types of Agency or school (**NO NAME**, please) where you learned about (and/or worked) with this issue?
2. What is your position in this organization?
3. How long have you been in this position and in this organization?
4. Based on your experiences working with youth, what do you think helps young adults succeed

academically?

5. Can youth who get into trouble early in their lives (as when they are in high school) and recover later in the their lives and become academically successful?
6. What kind of supports will they need to overcome the early disadvantages?
   a. How can parents help young adults go to and complete their college education?
   b. What types of community resources would be useful to youth to go to college and complete their degrees?
   c. Any other kinds of supports?
7. Based on your vast experience in the field, what other resources do we need to provide young adults to become successful in life.
8. Is there anything else I should know about?

Appendix B
Table 2. Correlations[1]

	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H
A. Index of Educational Achievements:	1.0							
B. Index of Community Assets:	.18**							
C. Index of Family Resources: Wealth	.17***	.08***						
D. Index of Family Ties:	-.26***	-.11***	-.02					
E. Index of Family Risk:	.04	0.31	0.71***	.007				
F. Index of Aspiration Higher Education:	.000	0.47**	-.01	-.002	.01			
G. Index of Negative High School Experiences:	.02	-.05*	-.01	.02	.01	-.20**		
H. Index of Juvenile Delinquency:	.01	.03	-.01	.02	.00	-.20**	.36***	
I. Male vs. Female:	-.06**	-.00	-.01	.02	.01	-.00	.02	-.004

***p<=.001; *p=.05
1 Refer to Table 3 for index and variable coding.

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Interpersonal Violence Victimization of Adolescents: Drug and Alcohol Culture vs. Family and Community Protections

By
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Abstract. Environments that place adolescents at risk of, and those that protect them from, interpersonal violence were examined. Following a mixed methods design, survey data from the 1999-2006 Welfare, Children, and Families: A Three-City Study, were supplemented with qualitative insights from five professionals who work with victims of violence. Of the ecological environments considered, being part of peer drug and alcohol culture, and to a lesser extent adolescent alcohol/drug use, posed the strongest IPV risk, as predicted by theories of social disorganization and differential association. Presence of fathers in the home and Latino background, while offering some protective buffer against IPV, as per social integration theories, were not as strong as the risks. These findings contributed to the field of violence in intimate relationships and offered important lessons to practitioners about paying attention to adolescent peer cultures. Future researchers should pay attention to adolescent peers, in their schools and in their neighborhoods, as well how cultures shape violence experiences, particularly underreporting of the same.

INTRODUCTION

In the U.S, 1 in 3 adolescents will experience IPV before he or she is an adult (NDVH 2016). According to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (2016), intimate partner violence (IPV) refers to physical, sexual, or physiological damage caused by a former or current partner. IPV victimization refers to being the violent target of an intimate partner and IPV perpetration is the violence targeted at an intimate partner (Arriaga and Foshee 2004). According to a national survey conducted by the University of Chicago, 84% of adolescent victims of IPV also reported perpetrating IPV, a finding consistent with other research on adolescent dating violence. Researchers have also noted that IPV, increases during adolescence, peaks in the early 20s and declines in mid and late 20s (Johnson et al. 2015; Smith et al. 2015).

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Adolescence is a critical developmental stage in which rapid changes are occurring; they are surrounded by new circumstances and are learning new ways to interact (Smith et al. 2015). Parents and caregivers are usually the first teachers that guide adolescents through these developmental changes. They not only learn basic activities of daily living from their parents and caregivers but they also learn values, how to interact with others, and what is expected of them. However, adolescence is also a time when teens try to become autonomous and learn about the world around them from others in their environment. Peers become a significant group that teens look up to. They are influenced by actions they see of their peers outside the home, in addition to their parents at home. The neighborhoods in which teens live also play a role in shaping their values, attitudes, and actions. Depending on access to, or lack thereof, resources within the immediate community and neighborhoods can either protect adolescents from or exacerbate IPV experiences.

Experiences during this growing life stage have lasting effects. Unsafe relationships that teens develop can negatively impact their development during adolescence and later. For example, unsafe teen relationships can lead them to have poor judgements in future relationships. Also, teens might normalize violence if they are being constantly surrounded by it. These tendencies can follow them into adulthood and continue to negatively impact them. It is important for families, communities, and service agencies to understand why youth act in violent and harmful ways so that prevention programs that effectively provide youth with opportunities to live healthy lives can be created.

LITERATURE REVIEW

The literature pertaining to intimate partner violence (IPV) among older adolescents has shown that parenting and peer culture can function as a risk of as well as a protection against IPV. For instance, having delinquent peers and engaging in antisocial behaviors, such as consuming alcohol, were associated with IPV (Smith et al. 2015). Parenting practices, as seen in poor discipline and supervision, were also significantly related to IPV; these parents did not monitor their child's actions or teach them that violence in a relationship was not okay (Smith et al. 2015).

Gender Differences in Perpetration

In a longitudinal study of 526 adolescents between the ages of 12 to 17 from a rural county in North Carolina, Arriaga and Foshee (2004) found that an adolescent was more likely to be a perpetrator if they were surrounded by high levels of peer dating violence. However, the literature has been inconsistent about gender differences in IPV perpetration. A potential reason for this inconsistency could be because it is conventionally unacceptable in society for males to be violent towards females. Males are known to under report perpetration of IPV (Peitzmeier et al. 2016). Another explanation has been “masculine gender orientation” (Franklin 2010); males do not report IPV victimization because they believe they will be considered less of a man if they report that a female used violence towards them.

Gender variations have also been documented in IPV risk factors. Knight et al. (2016) examined intergenerational transmission of IPV by conducting a longitudinal investigation among 1,401 parents and their adult children. They concluded that intergenerational transmission of IPV had a stronger effect on females' perpetration as opposed to males. Similarly, Smith and his colleagues' (2015) longitudinal study among 1,000 youth found a direct connection between severe adolescent IPV and severe IPV in adulthood for females. Both sets of researchers recommended further research to better understand the factors that shape gender differences of IPV experiences. For instance, females could experience certain early life events that males do not, which might exacerbate the effect of IPV when they reach adolescence.

Even the transmission of violence has been seen to be gender-specific. In their cross-sectional study of 303 male arrestees, Eriksson and Mazerolle (2014) found IPV perpetration to be correlated to a mother's IPV perpetration only when the father was also violent. Subjects who witnessed mother-only IPV were no more likely to perpetrate IPV than subjects who did not experience IPV. Additionally, observing bidirectional, mother and father perpetrated IPV was correlated with a greater likelihood of IPV perpetration in adulthood compared to witnessing father-only IPV.

Gender Differences in Victimization

In addition to these inconsistencies in gender associations with IPV perpetration, researchers have also found differences in IPV victimization based on gender. For instance, Porcerelli et al. (2003) noted, through their cross-sectional study among a 1,024 sample of clinic patients, that women (7.4%) were violently victimized more by an intimate partner as compared to men (4.7%). There were also differences in how men and women respond to violence. Exner-Cortens, Eckenrode, and Rothman (2013), from a secondary analysis of the National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent Health, demonstrated the following gender differences in problem outcomes: males who were victims of physiological violence, in contrast to non-victimized males, used marijuana at higher rates and were victims of IPV in adulthood; female victims of psychological violence consumed alcohol more than non-victimized females. These female victims of violence were also more prone to IPV in adulthood like male victims. These gender variations underscore the environmental and personal factors that influence IPV.

However, Cui et al. (2010) found no gender difference in the effect of intergenerational transmission of IPV when they longitudinally followed a sample of 213 adolescents in north central Iowa; females and males were both prone to being perpetrators and victims of IPV, if they witnessed parental IPV as children. These contrasting results could be the result of research conducted among different populations in different regions and underreporting of victimization by males due to societal norms of masculinity.

Parental Influences

It is clear that the family environment is critical to understand adolescent experiences of IPV. As already noted, Arriaga and Foshee (2004) found that adolescents were more likely to perpetrate IPV, and become an IPV victim, if they witnessed their parents be violent with one another. Scholars have argued that adolescents who witness IPV are likely to implicitly accept dating violence since they have been socialized by their caregivers to normalize IPV (Lee, Begun, DePrince, and Chu 2016). On the other hand, providing adolescents with a stable, safe, and nurturing family environment can interrupt the intergenerational cycle of IPV (Latzman et al. 2015).

Parental influences in adolescent IPV experiences are not limited by geography. Miller and her colleagues' (2009) 2,824 urban families and their youth were similar to Arriaga and Foshee's rural adolescents; urban girls whose parents did not support aggressive resolution tactics reported experiencing less IPV. On the other hand, in a cross-sectional study (Leadbeater, Banister, Ellis, and Yeung 2008), of 2,824 sixth graders in four urban cities in Canada, the researchers concluded that parents who supported aggressive resolution tactics had children who perpetrated IPV. Weak parental monitoring measured by parent's psychological control or parental manipulation was also connected to dating victimization. Parents who did not monitor their children did not set limits on their teens' relationships; in these lax monitoring family environments, adolescents tended to use aggression in their own relationships. The Canadian findings were consistent with the findings of Latzman et al. (2015) who studied 417 adolescents in 4 high-risk U.S urban areas; these adolescents were more likely to report physical and verbal IPV when their parents had little knowledge of their dating partners.

Peer Culture

In addition to parental influences, it is well known that peers play a key role in adolescent IPV experiences. Besides parents, Arriaga and Foshee (2004) noted a connection between friends with IPV experiences and IPV perpetration. In fact, when adolescents' peers and parental impact on IPV were compared, peers' IPV experiences were more influential on adolescents own dating habits than that of parent's. Peer influence on IPV was also explored by Miller et al. (2009) in their cross-sectional study with 2,824 6th grade students; IPV was positively and significantly correlated with deviant peers. In short, peers are very influential on adolescents. Adolescents tend to befriend individuals who have similar behaviors and beliefs as them. Hence, adolescents who perpetrate IPV will tend to be friends with deviant individuals; IPV is an example of a deviant behavior. However, since Miller et al.'s study was cross-sectional they could not determine the direction of effect, whether deviant peers influence IPV perpetration or vice versa.

Neighborhood Influences

Moving outward in the adolescents' ecological surroundings, is the neighborhood environment which also plays a role in shaping an adolescent's actions. Like that of their families, adolescent neighborhoods can vary in their stability and organization. Schnurr and Lohman (2013) examined IPV and the impact of neighborhood collective efficacy and unity created among neighbors when they join to prevent negative acts from occurring in the neighborhood to maintain a common good. Ironically, in a sample of 765 adolescents and their caregivers, males were more likely to perpetrate IPV if their mothers reported high levels of neighborhood collective efficacy and low IPV levels. On the contrary, males perpetrated less when their mothers reported low neighborhood collective efficacy and high levels of IPV. Similarly, Miles-Doan (1998) investigated whether IPV was affected by neighborhood context using data from a Florida county census. Neighborhoods with high rates of resource-deprivation and concentrated poverty had high rates of IPV than affluent neighborhoods. Miles-Doan's findings can help better explain the contradictions in the Schnurr and Lohman findings. Schnurr and Lohman conducted their research among underserved cities and neighborhood collective efficacy was measured by mother's perceptions. Schnurr and Lohman (2013) explained how the mothers could have believed that simply because their teens were surrounded by a close-knit community their teens were safe. However, since the communities were underserved they tended to have concentrated poverty which lead to the teens being surrounded by bad role models. Consequently, the relationships adolescents had in the neighborhood were negative and did not buffer them from IPV. Browning (2002) came up with similar findings; through a cross-sectional analysis with 199 women in the city of Chicago neighborhoods, neighborhoods with concentrated poverty and disorganized tend to provide victims of IPV with less resources and discouraged them from disclosing violence.

Summary and Suggestions for Further Research

The extant research reviewed above has documented that adolescents are more likely to perpetrate, and become victims of, IPV when they experience their parents to be violent with one another. Furthermore, parental support for aggressive behavior is significantly correlated with adolescents' perpetration of IPV. Low parental monitoring was also associated with adolescents' victimization of IPV. It is also important to note that peers and their experiences, particularly deviant friends perpetrating IPV, were more influential to adolescents than their parents' experiences with IPV. Additionally, deviant friendships were related with higher chances of adolescents perpetrating IPV. The neighborhood the adolescent lived in also impacted their IPV experiences. There were also interesting gender differences in adolescent IPV experiences. For instance, girls perpetrated IPV more than boys did. But, boys' IPV perpetration was more severe than girls.

The IPV scholars reviewed above have recommended more research that compares the impact of school peers with neighborhood peers. Understanding social influences and the cognitive processing of adolescents is important to identify how society can develop IPV preventive programs and promote healthy relationships among adolescents and emerging adults.

RESEARCH QUESTION

This research will add to the research regarding the impacts parents, peers, and neighborhood have on IPV among adolescents. Unlike most of the research reviewed above, which used small, localized samples, this study used data from a three-city survey in the U.S. The present study was modeled after Schnurr and Lohman's (2013) study of IPV perpetration which also used the "Welfare, Children, and Families: A Three-City Study" (Ronald et al. 2009). However, this research, while analyzing similar ecologies, extended the Schnurr and Lohman study by looking at their impacts on IPV victimization instead of perpetration. Survey analyses will also be supplemented with commentaries from IPV professionals. The formal research question posed was: What are the impacts of alcohol and drug cultures and family-school-neighborhood environments on intimate partner violence victimization of older adolescents? Older adolescents between the ages of 15 to 21 were the primary focus.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND HYPOTHESES

Bronfenbrenner's ecological systems theory was used to model adolescents' ecological systems. Furthermore, Durkheim's social integration (1893) and Merton's social disorganization (1968) theories offered tools to capture the ways the ecologies, respectively, buffered against IPV or increased IPV risk. Additionally, Sutherland's differential association (1937) idea was used to explain how IPV is a deviant behavior that is learned through interaction with deviant peers.

Bronfenbrenner's (1979) ecological systems theory allows one to identify the various systems important in teen's lives. Bronfenbrenner's model includes 5 systems; the individual or adolescent at the center, the micro system, the mesosystem, the exosystem, and the macrosystem. The adolescent individual's experiences, including IPV, other risk and protective behaviors, as well as their demographics of sex and age, are the primary focus. The microsystem of the adolescent consists of close and direct relationships they have with their parents, friends, and partners. The meso-system, involves secondary, distant interactions with people outside the micro-system. For example, relationships teens have at school represent the mesosystem. The exo-system encompasses systems, like their neighborhoods, which indirectly influences him or her. The parent's work environment is another exosystem that can indirectly impact the teen. Lastly, the macrosystem is composed of the broader cultural systems, their race/ethnic backgrounds and cultural traditions, which shape the lives of adolescents.

These ecologies, and the extent to which they are integrated or disorganized, can buffer adolescents but also place adolescents at risk of IPV.

Social Organization-Disorganization Theories and Hypothesis

Ecologies that are organized and demonstrate social cohesion are expected to protect adolescents from IPV. For example, the social integration theory can be used to explain how ecologies that are integrated and structured can protect adolescent against negative experiences such as IPV. Durkheim (1893), in his collective conscious theoretical idea, stated that shared beliefs, attitudes, and morals unify communities. Applied to the adolescent's ecologies, stable families, supportive schools, and neighborhoods with strong collective efficacy will not permit adolescents to engage in illegal actions or be involved in drugs, or be victimized by partners. A socially integrated adolescent will have friends that are positively involved in school and refrain from drugs and alcohol and other illegal activities.

Conversely, these very ecologies can pose risks to adolescents, making them more prone to IPV. Merton's social disorganization theory (1968) captured how disorganized environments, such as neighborhood and family, can also negatively impact their adolescents. For instance, teens living in families marked by violent relationships learn to normalize violence. Similarly, teens, who are weakly monitored by their parents, are usually more autonomous, making it easier for them to get involved in deviant behavior and befriend deviant peers. Sutherland's differential association theory (1937) explained how IPV, a deviant behavior, is learned through interactions and communication with deviant peers. If adolescents' peers follow social norms relevant for their developmental stage and endorse the norms learned in the family, they can buffer adolescents against antisocial behaviors. On the other hand, if the peers of adolescents spend most of their time doing antisocial actions, adolescents might model their antisocial behaviors.

Of course, to the extent that neighbors are invested in the wellbeing of all their children and neighborhoods have resources to positively engage children, they will protect adolescents and their peers from anti-social actions. On the other hand, neighborhoods with high crime rates and low collective efficacy are dysfunctional ecologies; they not only do not protect adolescents from IPV but also make them more vulnerable.

Drawing from the social integration, disorganization, and differential association theories, the following hypothesis was formulated: To the extent that adolescents were not involved in drug/alcohol cultures, had stable family lives, were positively engaged in school, and lived in supportive neighborhoods their risk of being victims of IPV will be reduced. Both adolescents and their peers might or might not engage in drug and alcohol cultures. Their stable family life was marked by strong parental monitoring and healthy relationships between parents. How well adolescents were involved in extracurricular activities and in their school work defined as school engagement. And supportive neighborhoods were those that were efficacious collectively.

METHODOLOGY AND DATA SOURCES

A mixed methodology design used in this research entailed analyzing survey data and supplementing the statistical findings with narrative comments from professionals who work with organizations that provide services for individuals who have experienced violence. The quantitative survey data came from the 1999-2006 “Welfare, Children, and Families: A Three-City Study” (Ronald et al. 2009) in which researchers looked at the well-being of low-income families after the welfare reform. Qualitative interviews comments from five professionals were used to further elaborate on the findings from the quantitative survey data.

Secondary Survey Data

The “Welfare, Children, and Families: A Three-City Study” was an interview survey done via computers, telephones, and face to face interviews with youth aged 5-10 and 15-20. Survey youth were randomly chosen from a sample of 2,400 households in underserved neighborhoods in Boston, Chicago and San Antonio. Interviews were collected in three waves: Wave 1 in March 1999 to December 1999; Wave 2 September 2001 and June 2001; and Wave 3 February 2005 and January 2006.

For this analysis, adolescents who were aged 15 to 21 at the time of wave 3 were used; older adolescents, who are more likely to be involved in intimate relationships, were the focus. To protect the time ordering of risk-protective experiences and IPV experiences, the former were drawn from waves 1 and 2. Almost half (48.1 %) of the adolescents considered themselves Spanish, Hispanic, or Latino and 45.3 % were female (Appendix A). These demographics were controlled for the multivariate analyses[2].

To expand on the quantitative survey analyses, five narrative interviews were conducted with professionals who work with victims and perpetrators of IPV. The interviews added qualitative insights into IPV among older adolescents. Of the five interviewees, 2 were family and children service workers. The first interviewee (#1) worked in an organization in Northern California; the interview was done via telephone. Email interviews were conducted with the second and third interviewees. The second interviewee (# 2), a marriage and family therapist, worked in an organization in Northern California that aided perpetrators of IPV. The third interviewee (# 3) is a social worker in the Bay area. The fourth interview (# 4), done through the phone, is an executive director of an organization that provides various services for domestic violence victims. The last telephone interview (Interviewee # 5) was with a program director for an organization in New York that provided services for victims, perpetrators, and children exposed to IPV. The consent and protocol form that was sent to the interviewees can be found in Appendix B.

[2] The original collector of the data, or ICPSR, or the relevant funding agencies bear no responsibility for use of the data or for the interpretations or inferences based on such uses.

DATA ANALYSES

Three levels of data analyses were used to answer the research question. The dependent variable was intimate partner violence victimization. To examine the risks and protection that the families offered to adolescent IPV victimization, parental IPV, parental monitoring, and father presence were used. Since peers can impact adolescents' IPV, peer drug and alcohol usage, illegal actions, and positive school involvement was looked at. Lastly, neighborhood crime and neighborhood collective efficacy were investigated to see the risks and supports that neighborhoods offered adolescents.

Adolescent Intimate Partner Violence

As seen in the Table 1, most older adolescents in the Welfare, Children, and Families survey reported that they experienced at least one act deemed violent towards them by their dating partner; the mean value on the Index of IPV (which ranged from 0-8) was 1.1. The most common IPV experiences (Appendix C. Table 1.A) were being pushed, grabbed, or shoved by their partners (27.4%), followed by being threatened (20.5%) and have had something thrown at them (20.3%). The least common victimization experience was being forced into any sexual activity against one's will (4.5%).

Table 1
Intimate Partner Violence, Risks, and Protections[1]
Welfare, Children, and Families: A Three-City Study, 1999-2006

	Mean	Standard Deviation	Range
Intimate Partner Dating Violence Victimization, W3	1.1	1.9	00-8.00
Early Adolescent Risks and Protection W1			
Drug and Alcohol Usage	4.3	.89	4-12
Illegal Actions	4.5	.95	4-10
Adolescent Positive School Involvement	1.7	1.1	0-4
Family Risks and Protection, W1			
Parental Intimate Partner Violence	2.2	2	0-5
Parental Monitoring	13	2	5-15
Peer Culture, W2			
Peer Drug and Alcohol Usage	6.2	2.2	5-20
Peer Illegal Actions	3.5	.91	3-12
Peer Positive School Involvement (W1)	.61	.5	0-1
Neighborhood Risk and Support, W2			
Neighborhood Crime	7.4	2.7	4-12
Neighborhood Collective Efficacy	25	8.7	9-41

[1] Index coding available in Tables in Appendix C

Early Adolescent Risks and Protection: Adolescent

Adolescents can pose risks to themselves as well be their own protectors from IPV. Alcohol and drug usage and illegal actions reported by the adolescent represented risk cultures while their positive school involvement was expected to reduce IPV potential. As seen in Table 1, the average adolescent in this sample had committed at least one risky action ($\overline{x}$= 4.5 on a range of 4-10). But, they were also involved in at least one positive school activity; mean value of 1.7 on the Index of Positive School Involvement which ranged from 0-4.

Adolescent Drug and Alcohol Usage. More specifically, the most common substance used by adolescents was smoking cigarettes or chewing tobacco at least once (4.8%) in their lifetime, followed by getting drunk at least once (4.8%). But, almost all the adolescents (99%) reported that they had never used hard drugs such as heroin, cocaine, or LSD (Appendix C. Table 1.B).

Adolescent Illegal Actions. As for illegal actions, stealing from someone or a store at least once in their lifetime was the most common action (14% in Appendix C. Table 1.C). Stealing was followed by getting in trouble with the police (11%). Most of the adolescents reported that they had never used a phony ID (98%).

Adolescent Positive School Involvement. In contrast to these sources of risk, positive school involvement was investigated as a potential barrier against IPV (Appendix C. Table 1.D). More than half (64%) of the adolescents reported receiving an award or recognition because of their grades or school performance. Also, almost half (48%) participated in sports and 41% received an award for sports, music, or art. However, only 14% had been elected an officer for their class or of a school club.

Family Risks and Protection

Moving outward in the adolescent's ecological system, their families can be the first source of protection for adolescents. However, prior research has shown that family dysfunctions can place their adolescents at risk. It was evident in Table 1 that most of the adolescents witnessed their mothers experience violence ($\overline{x}$= 2.2 on a range of 0-5 on the Index of Parental Intimate Partner Violence). But, adolescents' parents were reasonably aware of their whereabouts ($\overline{x}$ =13 on a range of 5-15) and had their father present in the home.

Parental Intimate Partner Violence. The literature reviewed earlier demonstrated how adolescents who witnessed their parents be involved in violent relationships were more vulnerable to experience IPV. Thus, mother's experiences with IPV were examined (Appendix C. Table 1.E). Half of the mothers reported a partner threatening to hit them (54.5%) followed by being pushed, grabbed, or shoved by a partner (41.1%). A lesser form of violence by a partner was the mother being beaten (33%).

Parental Monitoring. Research has also demonstrated that adolescents, whose parents were unaware of their dating practices, experienced higher rates of IPV than otherwise. A majority (82.4% in Appendix C. Table 1.F)) of the adolescents' caregivers reported that they knew a lot about where the adolescent was at night and about where the adolescent was after school (76.3%). However, only half (53.1%) of the caregivers knew much about who the adolescent's friends were; such lack of awareness can be problematic if adolescents have peers that engage in negative activities, since research showed that adolescents look up to their peers during adolescents.

A third dimension of the adolescents' family ecology was whether the father was present or not in the respondent's life. Only a fifth (20%) of older adolescents in this study reported their father not present in their life (Appendix C. Table 1.F). It is logical to expect that when a father is absent there is one less parent to help protect the adolescent from negative influences. Furthermore, research has shown that negative life experiences that come with parents separating are risk factors for IPV perpetration (Smith et. al 2015).

Peer Culture

During the adolescent stage of development, their peers become an important reference point. In the literature reviewed earlier, it was found that peers have a significant impact, either positive or negative, on adolescents' experiences of IPV. Hence, to capture peer influences, peer drug and illegal cultures (risks) as well their positive school involvements were measured. From Table 1, it was apparent that peers and adolescents were quite similar. Adolescent peers had used at least one type of drug ($\overline{x}$= 6.2 on a range from 5 to 20 on the Index of Peer Drug Culture) and were positively engaged in school in at least one measured way ($\overline{x}$ =.61 on a range of 0-1).

Peer Drug Culture. As seen in Appendix C. Table1.G, adolescents reported that 21% of their peers used alcohol and 20.5% of them used tobacco. However, a majority (90%) of the adolescents reported that their peers did not use other drugs nor did they sell drugs (88%).

Peer Illegal Culture. Furthermore, to better understand the negative impacts of peers, peers' illegal actions were analyzed (Appendix C. Table1.H). Most adolescents reported their peers being involved in at least one illegal action; mean value of 3.5 with a range of 3 to 12 on the Index of Peer Illegal Culture. It was reported that almost none (93.4%) of the adolescents' peers broke into buildings nor did they rob from people (90.5%) The most committed illegal action by the peers was stealing form stores (29%).

Positive Peer School Involvement. Considering that researchers have found that peers can also have a positive impact on adolescents, variables regarding peer involvement in schools was measured (Appendix C. Table 1.I). Many of the adolescents' peers (89%) attended classes regularly or had peers who planned to go to college (73%). Additionally, more than half of the adolescent had peers who got good grades (67%), were interested in school (61.5%), or looked up to kids who studied hard and got good grades (61%).

Neighborhood Risks and Support

In addition to ecologies close to adolescents, neighborhoods in which *adolescents* live have been shown to shape their IPV experiences. Crime levels in the neighborhood as well neighborhood collective efficacy were investigated. As evident in Table 1, most adolescent neighborhoods had some sort of crime ($\bar{x} = 7.4$ on a range of 4-12) and had low collective efficacy ($\bar{x}$=25 on a range of 9-41).

Neighborhood Crime. The most common crime in the adolescent's neighborhoods was drug dealing (44%) followed by gangs (37% in Appendix C. Table 1.J). But, assaults and muggings (55%) were not a problem in the neighborhoods. Burglaries and thefts were also not a big problem (45%).

Neighborhood Collective Efficacy. Neighborhood collective efficacy, reported by the adolescents' mothers, was relatively low. Only 35% of the mothers reported that neighbors would take some action to prevent fights that broke out in front of their house (35%) or taking some action if an adolescent was showing disrespect (28%). Most of the mothers reported that their neighbors would not do anything if they saw an adolescent skip school and hang out in the street corner (34.4%). Also, it was very unlikely (24.4%) that a neighbor would do something if they saw an adolescent spray-paint graffiti on a local building (Appendix C. Table 1.K).

Summary

The descriptive analyses indicted that many adolescents had experienced some sort of IPV. Furthermore, adolescents and their peers both consumed alcohol but were not involved with other harder drugs and were involved in at least one positive school activity. While half the mothers were victims of IPV, most of them monitored their adolescents well; yet, they were not very aware of who their child's friends were. Finally, the adolescents were exposed to some crime in their neighborhoods and neighborhood collective efficacy was not very strong.

Bivariate Analyses

Bivariate analyses were used to examine the preliminary empirical relationships between adolescents IPV (dependent concept) and risks and protections presented by the different ecologies (Table 2 in Appendix D). Adolescent drugs and alcohol culture were strongly associated with IPV experiences. For example, the more an adolescent engaged in drug and alcohol the more likely they were to experience IPV. ($r=.27^{***}$). This was also the case when adolescents' peers engaged in drug sand alcohol ($r=.23^{***}$).

Similarly, adolescents themselves ($r=.16^{***}$) or having peers involved in illegal actions also made adolescents more susceptible to IPV ($r=.13^{***}$). On the other hand, having peers involved positively in school somewhat protected adolescents from IPV victimization ($r=-.11^{**}$). As for their families, more parental monitoring also made adolescents less susceptible to IPV ($r=-.19^{***}$). Being Spanish, Hispanic, or Latino also protected adolescents from victimization ($r = -.11^{**}$)[3].

Multivariate Analyses

In the final step of the analyses, a one-step regression analysis was used to test the theoretically guided research hypothesis. As presented in Table 3, adolescents being immersed in alcohol and drug cultures made them most vulnerable to IPV victimization. The worst risk for victimization was being in an environment where peers were involved with drugs and alcohol (Beta=$.25^{***}$). Their own drug/alcohol use, albeit to a lesser extent, was also similarly risky (Beta=$.11^{*}$).

On the other hand, adolescents were protected by some of their environments, even though the protection they received was not strong enough to offset the risks of peer alcohol/drug cultures. For example, being of Latino descent (Beta=-0.10^{*}) and having a father present in the household ($-.12^{*}$) somewhat reduced the probability of IPV victimization. However, positive school involvement by the adolescent or by peers, or parent monitoring, or neighborhood collective efficacy did not function as protectors against adolescent IPV (Betas not significant).

[3] Unfortunately, adolescents' positive school involvement did not protect or make then more vulnerable to IPV victimization (r not significant). The same was the case with parental IPV, whether or not the father lived in the household, neighborhood crime and neighborhood collective efficacy (r not significant).

Table 3
Regression Analyses of Intimate Partner Violence:
Impacts of Peer Culture, Family and Neighborhood Support, on Older Adolescents[1]
Welfare, Children, and Families: A Three-City Study, 1999-2006

	Model Beta **(β)**
Adolescent Risk and Protection:	
Adolescent Drug and Alcohol Usage	.11*
Adolescent Illegal Action	.06
Adolescent Positive School Involvement	.02
Gender: Female = 1	.01
Parental Risk and Protection:	
Parental Intimate Partner Violence	-.001
Parental Monitoring	-.01
Father's Presence: Yes = 1	-.11*
Peer Culture:	
Peer Drug Culture	.25***
Peer Illegal Culture	-.07
Peer Positive School Involvement	-.02
Community and Neighborhood:	
Race/Ethnicity = Yes Latino	-.10*
Neighborhood Crime	-.02
Neighborhood Collective Efficacy	.001
Model Statistics:	
Constant	.28
Adjusted R^2	.10***
DF 1 & 2	13 & 411

[1] Index of Intimate Partner Violence= AYR12AA + AYR12BA + AYR12CA + AYR12DA + AYR12EA + AYR12FA + AYR12GA + AYR12HA + AYR12IA;
Index of Adolescent Drug and Alcohol Usage= YDS5A + YDS11A + YDS17A + YDS18A;
Index of Adolescent Illegal Actions = YDS7A + YDS8A + YDS9A + YDS10A;
Index of Adolescent Positive School Involvement= ZSC7A + ZSC8A + ZSC9A;
Gender = 1 = Female; 0 = Male;
Index of Parental Intimate Partner Violence = PDV1A + PDV2A + PDV3A + PDV4A + PDV5A;
Index of Parental Monitoring = YMO3A + YMO4A + YMO5A + YMO6A + YMO7A;
Father's Presence= 1 = Yes; 0 = No'
Index of Peer Drug Culture = ZPR20A + ZPR21A + ZPR22A + ZPR23A + ZPR24A;
Index of Peer Illegal Culture = ZPR17A+ ZPR18A + ZPR19A;
Index of Peer Positive School Involvement = ZPR1A + ZPR2A + ZPR3A + ZPR4A + ZPR7A;
Race/Ethnicity: 1= Hispanic; 0 = Non-Latino, Spanish, or Hispanic;
Index of Neighborhood Crime= PNG33A + PNG34A + PNG35A + PNG36;
Index of Collective Efficacy= QNG18A + QNG19A + QNG20A + QNG21A + QNG22A + QNG23A + QNG24A + QNG25A + QNG26A.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

Empirical, Theoretical, and Applied Implications

On balance, negative peer culture carried more weight in adolescent IPV experiences than the protection they could receive from their peers, families and neighborhoods. Having their fathers present in the household and being of Latino descent did reduce

IPV victimization; however, it was not enough to protect against influences from negative peer culture such as engaging in drug and alcohol usage and illegal actions.

Figure 1. Theoretical and Empirical Model[1]



[1] Refer to Table 3 for index and variable coding.

These findings were theoretically supported by social disorganization, and to a lesser extent, by social integration theories (Figure 1). Adolescents surrounded by deviant peers who used drugs and engaged in antisocial behaviors experienced most IPV. But, interviewees #3 and #4 categorically denied the connection between drug/alcohol usage and IPV victimization. In their professional judgements, one cannot assume that drugs and alcohol led to IPV because one is not sure which action came first. To interviewee #4, victims of IPV might use drugs and alcohol to cope with the violence they have experienced. However, since this research examined peer and adolescent drug and alcohol usage prior to (data from Waves 1 and 2) IPV victimization (from Wave 3), it can be concluded that being part of a drug and alcohol culture elevated the risk of adolescents being victimized in their intimate relationships.

Adolescents whose fathers were present experienced less IPV victimization than their counterparts whose fathers did not live with them. But, peers overshadowed parents in their influences on adolescents. Interviewee #4 agreed that adolescents tend to look up to their peers more than their parents; there is a disconnection between them and their parents. She also confirmed that many parents are unaware of how social interactions have changed over time. Speaking to a particular kind of change in the lives of adolescents, interviewee #1 speculated: IPV has become even more prevalent due to social media which makes it easier for perpetrators to hurt victims and the hurt is constant since social media is easily accessible.

These statistical findings and interviewee comments can inform practitioners of IPV prevention programs. Based on these findings, a major component of IPV programs should be drug and alcohol prevention for adolescents and their peers. Prevention programs that focus on reducing drug and alcohol usage by adolescents and their peer can, in turn, reduce IPV victimization among adolescents.

Interviewee #5 advocated educating adolescents about healthy relationships and how to proactively deal with problems such as IPV. Hence, part of IPV prevention and intervention work should also be to help adolescents find ways to cultivate healthy communication between parents, particularly their fathers, and adolescents so that teens do not see parents as rigid authority figures that restrict teens for no reason. Additionally, parents should be made more informed of how teens communicate these days. All the professional interviewees mentioned that family support from, say parents, and their constant monitoring of their children was important for reducing adolescent's victimization. While the multivariate analysis (Table 3) was not in accord with the interviewees' suggestions, a case can still be made as follows: when adolescents are supported by their families (parental monitoring), they not only were less likely to use alcohol or drugs ($r=-.31^{***}$ in Appendix D. Table 2) but also not associate as much with other adolescents who did alcohol and drugs ($r=-.17^{***}$ in Appendix D. Table 2). It was quite clear from the multivariate analysis that reducing alcohol/drug use by adolescents as well as the peers does also reduce IPV.

One final note is about how culture might shape adolescent IPV. Adolescents whose fathers were present in their lives or were of Latino descent, experienced less IPV victimization, net of their drug/alcohol cultures, than their counterparts. These findings contradicted what the literature regarding IPV has noted. Interviewee #1 explained the discrepancy thusly: there could have been underreporting of IPV occasioned by legal and social pressures such as fears of deportation or language barriers. Economic barrier and related lack of access to services and awareness could be another possible reason.

Limitations and Suggestions for Future Research

Although this study provided important information regarding the impacts of peer culture and family support on adolescent IPV, it had several limitations. For one, only 10.2 percent of variability in IPV was explained by the environments considered here. One major imitation was the limited measures available to examine the different ecologies in which adolescents are located. One illustration was the reported lower IPV levels of Latinos than non-Latinos. Interviewees #1 and #2 were certain that high IPV among

Latinos is underreported. To reconcile these contradictions future research should examine the underreported Latino adolescent IPV. Similarly, positive school involvement by adolescents and peers can be more fully captured by adding other aspects of adolescent academic life, such as volunteering, sports, and other social activities. Such broad measurements are needed to obtain a fuller picture of adolescent lives. Additionally, since it was apparent that peers made adolescents most susceptible to IPV victimization, future research should compare school peers and neighborhood peers to see which group is associated with leading adolescents to be more exposed to IPV victimization. Lastly, some scholars explained how it is important to note how neighborhood collective efficacy is measured because it is a subjective concept. Thus, an individual might believe his or her neighborhood has high levels of collective efficacy but the case might be that the close-knit relationships might in fact be detrimental. In the future, researchers should take into account neighborhood rates of violence and concentrated poverty when analyzing neighborhood collective efficacy to see if neighborhood relationships are positive or negative for adolescents.

Appendix A

Table: Demographics
Welfare, Children, and Families: A Three-City Study, 1999-2006

Concepts	Dimensions	Indicators	Values and Responses	Statistics
Controls	Race/Ethnicity[1]	PDE31A What about [CHILD]? Is [he/she] Spanish, Hispanic or Latino?	1 = Yes	48.1 %
	Gender[2]	PHHEX_2 Is [NAME] male or female?	1 = Yes	45.3 %

[1] Race/Ethnicity: 1= Hispanic; 0 = Non-Latino, Spanish, or Hispanic
[2] Gender = 1 = Female; 0 = Male

Appendix B

Consent Form and Interview Protocol
Letter of Consent

Dear _______________:
I am a Sociology Senior working on a research paper that will be published in the Silicon Valley Notebook under the direction of Professor Marilyn Fernandez in the Department of Sociology at Santa Clara University. I am conducting my research on the impacts of adolescent risks, peer culture, family dynamics, and neighborhood have on intimate partner violence among adolescents.

You were selected for this interview, because of your knowledge of and experience working in the area of intimate partner violence.

I am requesting your participation, which will involve responding to questions about intimate partner violence and the impact peers, family, and neighborhood have and will last about 20 minutes. Your participation in this study is voluntary. You have the right to choose to not participate or to withdraw from the interview at any time. The results of the research study will be presented at SCU's Annual Anthropology/Sociology Undergraduate Research Conference and published (in a Sociology department publication). Pseudonyms will be used in lieu of your name and the name of your organization in the written paper. You will also not be asked (nor recorded) questions about your specific characteristics, such as age, race, sex, religion.

If you have any questions concerning the research study, please call/email me at 323- 809-0932 or Dr. Fernandez at 408-554-4432 mfernandez@scu.edu.
Since I reached out to you via email your email confirmation for participating in the interview will function as your signed consent.
If you accept to participate in the interview Please provide me with dates as to when we can meet or when it is a good time to have a phone interview.
Sincerely,
Karen Robles

If you have any questions about your rights as a subject/participant in this research, or if you feel you have been placed at risk, you can contact the Chair of the Human Subjects Committee, through Office of Research Compliance and Integrity at (408) 554-5591.

Interview Schedule for Supplemental Qualitative Interviews

Interview Date and Time: ____________
Respondent ID#: ______

1. What is the TYPE of Organization (**NO NAME**, please) where you learned about (and/or worked) with adolescent who experienced intimate partner violence?
2. What is your position in this organization?
3. How long have you been in this position and in this organization?
4. Based on what you know of intimate partner violence how common is this problem (issue or concern)?
5. In your opinion, what are some reasons that contribute to this problem (issue or concern)? (PROBE with: Could you expand a bit more?).
6. [If the respondent does not bring up your independent concepts as potential causes), PROBE:
    a. How about positive school influences from peers, such as getting good grades, attending school, planning to attend college?
    b. What role does family play (mother experiencing intimate partner violence, parental monitoring)?
    c. How about peers who engage in illegal actions or involvement with drugs?
    d. How important is neighborhood collective efficacy (unity that is created among neighbors when they join to prevent negative acts to occur in the neighborhood to maintain a common good) in protecting against intimate partner violence?
7. From my data, I found that individuals who consider themselves Hispanic, Latino, or Spanish experience intimate partner violence at lower rates than their White counterparts. My findings differ from most of the literature which shows the opposite. Do you have any ideas as to why individuals who consider themselves Hispanic, Latino, or Spanish experience intimate partner violence at lower rates than their White counterparts?
8. Is there anything else about adolescent intimate partner violence I should know more about?

Thank you very much for your time. If you wish to see a copy of my final paper, I would be glad to share it with you at the end of the winter quarter. If you have any further questions or comments for me, I can be contacted at krobles@scu.edu Or if you wish to speak to my faculty advisor, Dr. Marilyn Fernandez, she can be reached at mfernandez@scu.edu.

APPENDIX C

Table 1.A. Adolescent's Intimate Partner Violence Victimization (n=774)
Welfare, Children, and Families: A Three-City Study, 1999-2006

Concept	Indicators	Values and Responses	Statistics
Intimate Partner Violence[1]	AYR12AA threaten to hit you?	1= Yes[2]	20.5 %
	AYR12BA ever thrown something at you?	1= Yes	20.3
	AYR12CA ever pushed, grabbed, or shoved you?	1= Yes	27.4
	AYR12DA ever slapped, kicked, bit or punched you?	1= Yes	20
	AYR12EA ever beaten you?	1= Yes	6.2
	AYR12FA ever choked or burned you?	1= Yes	6.3
	AYR12GA ever used a weapon or threaten to use a weapon against you?	1= Yes	6
	AYR12HA ever forced you into any sexual activity against your will?	1= Yes	4.5
	Index of Intimate Partner Violence[3]	Mean ($\bar{x}$)	1.1 (1.9)
		Min-Max	00-8.00

[1] In any romantic relationship you've had, has your partner ever done any of the following to you . . .
[2] Recoded into dummy interval = 1 = Yes; 0 = No
[3] Index of Intimate Partner Violence= AYR12AA + AYR12BA + AYR12CA + AYR12DA + AYR12EA + AYR12FA + AYR12GA + AYR12HA + AYR12IA; correlations among these indicators ranged from .25*** to .68***); ***p<=.001.

Table 1.B. Early Adolescent Risks and Protection: Drug and Alcohol Usage (n=745)
Welfare, Children, and Families: A Three-City Study, 1999-2006

Concept	Indicators	Values and Responses	Statistics
Drug and Alcohol Usage[1]	YDS5A smoked cigarettes or used chewing tobacco?	1 = Never	93%
		2 = Once or twice	4.8
		3 = Several times	1.6
		4 = Often	.9
	YDS11A gotten drunk?	1 = Never	94%
		2 = Once or twice	4.8
		3 = Several times	1.1
		4 = Often	.1
	YDS17A have you smoked marijuana or hashish (pot, grass, hash)?	1 = Never	95%
		2 = Once or twice	3.1
		3 = Several times	1.1
		4 = Often	.7
	YDS18A used hard drugs such as heroin, cocaine, or LSD?	1 = Never	99%
		2 = Once or twice	.3
		3 = Several times	.1
		4 = Often	0.0
	Index of Drug and Alcohol Use[2]	Mean ($\bar{x}$)	4.3 (.89)
		Min-Max	4-12

[1] In the past 12 months have how often have you . . .
[2] Index of Drug and Alcohol Usage= YDS5A + YDS11A + YDS17A + YDS18A; (r = -.003 to .53***); ***p <=.001.

Table 1.C. Early Adolescent Risks and Protection: Illegal Actions (n=744)
Welfare, Children, and Families: A Three-City Study, 1999-2006

Concept	Indicators	Values and Responses	Statistics
Illegal Actions[1]	YDS7A stolen something from a store or another person?	1 = Never	83%
		2 = Once or twice	14.0
		3 = Several times	2.5
		4 = Often	0.5
	YDS8A gotten in trouble with the police?	1 = Never	87.0%
		2 = Once or twice	11.0
		3 = Several times	2.0
		4 = Often	0.4
	YDS9A carried a weapon?	1 = Never	93.0%
		2 = Once or twice	5.0
		3 = Several times	1.5
		4 = Often	0.8
	YDS10A used a phony ID?	1 = Never	99%
		2 = Once or twice	1.1
		3 = Several times	0.1
		4 = Often	0.1
	Index of Illegal Actions[4]	Mean ($\bar{x}$)	4.5 (.95)
		Min-Max	4-10

[1] In the past 12 months have how often have you . . .
[2] Index of Illegal Actions = YDS7A + YDS8A + YDS9A + YDS10A; (r = .09** to .24***); ***p <=.001; **p <=.01.

Table 1.D. Early Adolescent Risk and Protection: Adolescent Positive School Involvement (n=756)
Welfare, Children, and Families: A Three-City Study, 1999-2006

Concept	Indicators	Values and Responses	Statistics
Adolescent Positive School Involvement Culture[1]	**YSC7A** been elected officer of a school class or of a school club?	1 = Yes[2]	14%
	YSC8A received an award/recognition for your school grades or performance?	1 = Yes	64%
	YSC9A received an award or letter for sports, music or art?	1 = Yes	41%
	YSC10A participate on sports teams	1 = Yes	48%
	Index of Adolescent Positive School Involvement[3]	Mean ($\bar{x}$)	1.7 (1.1)
		Min-Max	0-4

[1] In the past 12 months, have you . . .
[2] Recoded into dummy interval = 1 = Yes; 0 = No
[3] Index of Adolescent Positive School Involvement= ZSC7A + ZSC8A + ZSC9A (*r* = .15*** to .29***); ***p <=.001.

Table 1.E. Family Risks and Protection: Parental Intimate Partner Violence (n=752)
Welfare, Children, and Families: A Three-City Study, 1999-2006

Concept	Indicators	Values and Responses	Statistics
Parental intimate Partner Violence[1]	**PDV1A** threatened to hit you?	1 = Yes[2]	54.5%
	PDV2A thrown something at you?	1 = Yes	41.1%
	PDV3A pushed, grabbed or shoved you?	1 = Yes	52.0%
	PDV4A slapped, kicked, bit, or punched you?	1 = Yes	43.0%
	PDV5A beaten you?	1 = Yes	33.0%
	Index of Parental Intimate Partner Violence[3]	Mean ($\bar{x}$) Min-Max	2.2 (2) 0-5

[1] Now, think about all of the romantic relationships you have had in your life. Has anyone you have been in a romantic relationship with ever . . .
[2] Recoded into dummy interval = 1 = Yes; 0 = No
[3] Index of Parental Intimate Partner Violence=PDV1A+PDV2A+PDV3A+PDV4A+PDV5A (*r* =.49*** to .68***); ***p<=.001.

Table 1.F. Family Risks and Protection: Parental Monitoring and Father Presence (n=728)
Welfare, Children, and Families: A Three-City Study, 1999-2006

Concept	Indicators	Values and Responses	Statistics
Parental Monitoring[1]	**YMO3A** who your friends are?	3 = Knows a lot	53.1%
		2 = Knows a little	41.0
		1 = Doesn't know	6.0
	YMO4A where you are most afternoons after school?	3 = Knows a lot	76.3%
		2 = Knows a little	19.0
		1 = Doesn't know	5.1
	YMO5A where you go at night?	3 = Knows a lot	82.4%
		2 = Knows a little	13.0
		1 = Doesn't know	5.0
	YMO6A what you do with your free time?	3 = Knows a lot	60.0%
		2 = Knows a little	32.0
		1 = Doesn't know	8.4
	YMO7A how you spend your money?	3 = Knows a lot	65%
		2 = Knows a little	28.0
		1 = Doesn't know	8.0
	Index of Parental Monitoring[2]	Mean ($\bar{x}$) Min-Max	13 (2) 5-15
Father's Presence[3]	YFA2AA Does your biological father live in your household with you?	1 = Yes	20.0%

[1] How much does your [RELATIVE] know about . . .
[2] Index of Parental Monitoring = YMO3A+ MO4A+YMO5 +YMO6A+YMO7 – all variables reverse coded (*r* = .20*** to .47***); ***p <=.001;
[3] Father present in household: 1 = Yes; 0 = No.

Table 1.G. Peer Involvement: Peer Drug Culture (n=683)
Welfare, Children, and Families: A Three-City Study, 1999-2006

Concept	Indicators	Values and Responses	Statistics
Peer Drug Culture[1]	ZPR20A sell drugs?	1 = None of them	88.0%
		2 = A few of them	11.0
		3 = Many of them	0.7
		4 = All of them	0.7
	ZPR21A use tobacco?	1 = None of them	74.1%
		2 = A few of them	20.5
		3 = Many of them	4.0
		4 = All of them	2.0
	ZPR22A use alcohol?	1 = None of them	74.0%
		2 = A few of them	21.0
		3 = Many of them	3.4
		4 = All of them	2.0
	ZPR23A use marijuana?	1 = None of them	75.0%
		2 = A few of them	18.3
		3 = Many of them	4.4
		4 = All of them	3.0
	ZPR24A use other drugs	1 = None of them	90.0%
		2 = A few of them	8.5
		3 = Many of them	1.0
		4 = All of them	1.0
	Index of Peer Drug Culture[2]	Mean ($\bar{x}$)	6.2 (2.2)
		Min-Max	5-20

[1]How many of your friends . . .
[2]Index of Peer Drug Culture = ZPR20A+ ZPR21A+ZPR22A+ZPR23A+ZPR24A (*r* = .43*** to .67***); ***p <=.001.

Table 1. H. Peer Involvement: Peer Illegal Culture (n=681)
Welfare, Children, and Families: A Three-City Study, 1999-2006

Concept	Indicators	Values and Responses	Statistics
Peer Illegal Culture[1]	ZPR17A steal from stores?	1 = None of them	69.0%
		2 = A few of them	29.0
		3 = Many of them	2.0
		4 = All of them	1.0
	ZPR18A rob from people?	1 = None of them	90.5%
		2 = A few of them	9.0
		3 = Many of them	0.3
		4 = All of them	0.3
	ZPR19A break into buildings or houses?	1 = None of them	93.4%
		2 = A few of them	6.3
		3 = Many of them	0.1
		4 = All of them	0.1
	Index of Peer Illegal Culture[2]	Mean ($\bar{x}$)	3.5 (.91)
		Min-Max	3-12

[1]How many of your friends . . .
[2] Index of Peer Illegal Culture = ZPR17A+ ZPR18A + ZPR19A (*r* = .31*** to .49***); ***p <=.001

Table 1.I. Peer Involvement: Positive Peer School Involvement (n=620)
Welfare, Children, and Families: A Three-City Study, 1999-2006

Concepts	Indicators	Values and Responses	Statistics
Positive School Involvement[1]	ZPR1A get good grades in school?	1 = Yes[2]	67.0%
	ZPR2Aare interested in school?	1 = Yes	61.5%
	ZPR3A Attend classes regularly?	1 = Yes	89.0%
	ZPR4APlan to go to college?	1 = Yes	73.1%
	ZPR7A Look up to kids who study hard to get good grades?	1 = Yes	61.1%
	Index of Peer Positive School Involvement[3]	Mean ($\bar{x}$) Min-Max	0.61 (.5) 0-1

[1] Thinking about your friends in school, as far as you know, would you say that most of them . . .
[2] Recoded into dummy interval = 1 = Yes; 0 = No
[3] Index of Peer Positive School Involvement = ZPR1A+ZPR2A+ZPR3A+ZPR4A+ZPR7A (r = .08* to .34***); ***p <=.001.

Table 1.J. Neighborhood Crime (n=714)
Welfare, Children, and Families: A Three-City Study, 1999-2006

Concepts	Indicators	Values and Responses	Statistics
Neighborhood Crime[1]	PNG33A burglaries and thefts in your neighborhood? Would you say...	1 = No problem	45.0%
		2 = Somewhat of a problem	33.0
		3 = A big problem	22.1
	PNG34A assaults and muggings in your neighborhood? Would you say...	1 = No problem	55.0%
		2 = Somewhat of a problem	29.3
		3 = A big problem	16.1
	PNG35A gangs in your neighborhood? Would you say...	1 = No problem	36.0%
		2 = Somewhat of a problem	27.0
		3 = A big problem	37.1
	PNG36A drug dealing in the open? Would you say...	1 = No problem	37.0%
		2 = Somewhat of a problem	19.0
		3 = A big problem	44.0
	Index of Neighborhood Crime[2]	Mean ($\bar{x}$) Min-Max	7.4 (2.7) 4-12

[1] How much of a problem are. . .
[2] Index of Neighborhood Crime= PNG33A + PNG34A + PNG35A + PNG36A (correlations among these indicators ranged from .43*** to .69***); ***p <=.001.

Table 1.K. Neighborhood Protective Collective Efficacy (n=642)
Welfare, Children, and Families: A Three-City Study, 1999-2006

Concept	Indicators	Values and Responses	Statistics
Neighborhood Protective Collective Efficacy[1]	QNG18A skipping school and hanging out on a street corner? Would you say...	1 = Very unlikely	34.4%
		2 = Somewhat unlikely	11.0
		3= A 50-50 chance	17.3
		4 = Somewhat unlikely	14.4
		5 = Very likely	23.0
		6 = Already happened	0.0
	QNG19A spray-painting graffiti on a local building? (Would you say...)	1 = Very unlikely	24.4%
		2 = Somewhat unlikely	11.0
		3= A 50-50 chance	15.4
		4 = Somewhat unlikely	13.2
		5 = Very likely	36.0
		6 = Already happened	0.0
	QNG20A Showing disrespect to an adult? (Would you say...)	1 = Very unlikely	26%
		2 = Somewhat unlikely	12.4
		3= A 50-50 chance	17.5
		4 = Somewhat unlikely	16.1
		5 = Very likely	28.0
		6 = Already happened	0.0
	QNG21A a fight that broke out in front of their house? (Would you say...)	1 = Very unlikely	22%
		2 = Somewhat unlikely	9.2
		3= A 50-50 chance	17.4
		4 = Somewhat unlikely	17.0
		5 = Very likely	35.0
		6 = Already happened	0.0
	QNG22A if the fire station closest to their home was threatened with budget cuts? (Would you say...)	1 = Very unlikely	19.1%
		2 = Somewhat unlikely	9.0
		3= A 50-50 chance	20.0
		4 = Somewhat unlikely	19.2
		5 = Very likely	33.0
		6 = Already happened	0.0
	QNG23A This neighborhood is a good place to raise kids. Do you...	1 = Strongly disagree	26.0%
		2 = Disagree	22.0
		3 = Agree	36.0
		4 = Strongly agree	17.0
	QNG24A People around here are willing to help neighbors? Do you...	1 = Strongly disagree	20.2%
		2 = Disagree	23.1
		3 = Agree	39.2
		4 = Strongly agree	17.4
	QNG25A This is a close-knit neighborhood. Do you...	1 = Strongly disagree	22%
		2 = Disagree	29.0
		3 = Agree	32.3
		4 = Strongly agree	17.0
	QNG26A People in this neighborhood can be trusted. Do you...	1 = Strongly disagree	30%
		2 = Disagree	31.0
		3 = Agree	30.0
		4 = Strongly agree	10.0
	Index of Neighborhood Protective Collective Efficacy[2]	Mean (sd)	25.0 (8.7)
		Min-Max	9-41

[1] How likely is it that your neighbors would do something about children who were. . .
[2] Index of Neighborhood Protective Collective Efficacy = QNG18A + QNG19A + QNG20A + QNG21A + QNG22A + QNG23A + QNG24A + QNG25A + QNG26A (r = .274*** to .696***); ***p <=.001.

Appendix D

Table 2
Correlation Matrix: Indices of Adolescent's Intimate Partner Violence, Neighborhood Crime, Parental Intimate Partner Violence, Parental Monitoring, Early Adolescent Risks, Academic Difficulty, Adolescent Positive School Involvement, Peer Positive School Involvement, Antisocial Peer Involvement, Protective Collective Efficacy, and Race/Ethnicity, Father's Presence, Gender Welfare, Children, and Families: A Three-City Study, 1999-2006

	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N
A. Index of Adolescent's Intimate Partner Violence	1.0													
B. Index of Adolescent Drug and Alcohol Usage	.27*** (745)	1.0												
C. Index of Adolescent Illegal Actions	.16*** (744)	.46*** (738)	1.0											
D. Index of Positive School Involvement	-.06 (756)	-.10** (743)	-.05 (742)	1.0										
E. Female (1) vs. Male (0)	-.02 (759)	-.08* (745)	.09** (744)	.04 (756)	1.0									
F. Race/ Ethnicity	-.11** (759)	.03 (745)	-.04 (744)	-.10* (756)	.008 (759)	1.0								
G. Index of Parental Intimate Partner Violence	.002 (752)	.02 (739)	.06 (738)	.08* (750)	.01 (752)	-.11** (752)	1.0							
H. Index of Parental Monitoring	-.19*** (728)	-.31*** (718)	-.34*** (717)	.12*** (727)	-.07 (728)	-.03 (728)	.006 (723)	1.0						
I. Father's Presence	-.05 (679)	-.02 (670)	-.02 (669)	-.02 (678)	.04 (679)	.10** (679)	-.23*** (674)	-.03 (656)	1.0					
J. Index of Peer Drug Culture	.23*** (683)	.30*** (658)	.20*** (656)	-.02 (667)	-.06 (669)	.05 (669)	.03 (662)	-.17*** (642)	.01 (600)	1.0				
K. Index of Peer Illegal Culture	.13*** (681)	.14*** (656)	.19*** (654)	-.01 (665)	.05 (667)	.03 (667)	.03 (660)	-20*** (641)	-.001 (598)	.48*** (666)	1.0			
L. Index of Peer Positive School Involvement	-.11** (620)	-19*** (598)	-.16*** (596)	.07 (604)	-.06 (607)	-.06 (607)	.03 (600)	.21*** (585)	-.08 (543)	-.31*** (602)	-.30*** (602)	1.0		
M. Index of Neighborhood Crime	.02 (714)	.06 (702)	.01 (700)	-.01 (711)	.006 (714)	-.005 (714)	.08* (707)	-.02 (687)	-.03 (641)	.06 (633)	.06 (632)	-.03 (579)	1.0	
N. Index of Neighborhood Collective Efficacy	.008 (642)	-.06 (620)	-.02 (617)	.03 (628)	-.02 (630)	-.03 (630)	-.06 (623)	.03 (606)	.03 (566)	-.07 (602)	-.11* (605)	.03 (555)	-.25*** (603)	1.0

***p <=.001; **p <= .01; *p<= .05.
[1] Refer to Table 3 for index and variable coding.

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Interviewee #2. March 1, 2017. Marriage and family therapist.

Interviewee #3. March 20, 2017. Social worker.

Interviewee #4. March 22, 2017. Executive director.

Interviewee #5. March 23, 2017. Program director.

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SCU SOCIOLOGY MAJOR REQUIREMENTS

(Cohort 2010 to 2016)

Foundation: (2 lower division courses) ***REQUIRED***

Sociology 1 — Principles of Sociology
Anthropology 3 — Introduction to Social and Cultural Anthropology

Lower division elective (*recommended but not required*):

Sociology 33 — Social Problems in the United States

Inquiry Sequence: (3 Theory/ Methods courses)

Sociology 119 — **Sociological Theory** (***winter quarter of junior year***)
Sociology 120 — **Survey Research and Statistical Analysis** (***winter quarter Junior Yr***)
Sociology 118 — **Qualitative Methods** (***spring quarter of Junior year***)

Capstone Courses: (***Majors must take EITHER***)

Sociology 121 — **Research Capstone** (***fall quarter of senior year***)

OR

Sociology 122 — **Applied Capstone** (***in the senior year***)

FIVE Upper Division Sociology Electives: Including at least *TWO each from 2 OF 4 CLUSTERS*

Criminology/Criminal Justice Cluster

Sociology 158 — Sociology of Deviance
Sociology 159 — Sociology of Crime
Sociology 160 — Sociology of Law
Sociology 161 — Sociology of the Criminal Justice System
Sociology 162 — Gender & Justice

Immigrant Communities Cluster

Sociology 137 — Social Change
Sociology 138 — Populations of India, China and the United States (was Demography)
Sociology 150 — Immigrant Businesses in the United States (was Ethnic Enterprises)
Sociology 180 — Immigrant Communities

Inequalities Cluster

Sociology 132 — Social Stratification
Sociology 134 — Globalization and Inequality
Sociology 135 — Gender and Social Change in Latin America
Sociology 140 — Urban Society and Social Conflict
Sociology 153 — Race, Class, and Gender in the United States
Sociology 165 — Human Services
Sociology 175 — Race and Inequality

Organizations/Institutions Cluster

Sociology 127 — Group Dynamics
Sociology 148 — Stakeholder Diversity in Contemporary American Organizations
Sociology 149 — Business, Technology, and Society
Sociology 152 — Women and Men in the Workplace
Sociology 157 — Sociology of Family
Sociology 163 — Sociology of Work and Occupation
Sociology 164 — Collective Behavior
Sociology 172 — Management of Health Care Organizations

***Other Recommended (but not required) Outward Bound Courses* (after 118, 119, 120 & 121)**

Sociology 125 — Honors Thesis
Sociology 198 — Internship (Preferably in the Senior year)
Sociology 199 — Directed Reading/Directed Research

Up-dated 5/20/13. If you have any questions regarding the above listed requirements, please feel free to give us a call in the Sociology Department and we will be happy to answer your questions. The department phone number is 408/554/279.

Credits: Cover design credits go to Mr. Chris Zamarripa, class '13 and student of graphic design and art at Santa Clara University.