

What Makes Hume An External World Skeptic?

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150-word Abstract:

What would it take for Hume to be an external world skeptic? Is Hume's position on knowledge sufficient to force him to deny that we can acquire knowledge of (non-logical) propositions about the external world? After all, Hume is extremely restrictive about what can be known because he requires knowledge to be immune to error. In this paper, I will argue that if Hume were a skeptic, then he must also deny a particular kind of view about what is immediately present to the mind. I will argue that direct realisms—views that maintain that mind-independent (i.e. ontologically distinct) things are immediately present to the mind—combine with Hume's position on knowledge to entail the negation of skepticism. So, despite his position on knowledge, Hume could still consistently reject skepticism, if he were to endorse direct realism.

750-word Synopsis:

Can we *possibly* err in representing the external world? Since antiquity, many philosophers have been gripped by the concern that we can. The possibility of error seems ever-present. It would be natural, then, to believe that a philosopher who holds that a knower must have utmost certainty about what she knows would be saddled with external world skepticism. External world skepticism is the view that one could not know, even in principle, any (non-logical) propositions about the external world. Yet, in this paper, I argue that, although Hume holds that we must be absolutely certain about what we know, his position on knowledge is *insufficient* to force him to endorse skepticism. I argue that a further view is needed to impugn Hume with skepticism, namely the view that it is not possible that mind-independent (i.e. ontologically distinct) things are immediately present to the mind. That is, Hume must also deny direct realism if his position on knowledge is to entail skepticism.

The reason that there is this tight relationship between Hume's position on knowledge and direct realism becomes clear once the former is specified with care. I argue that Hume defends the following account of knowledge, which I call the *Constitutive Account*:

- (i) every instance of knowledge must be an immediately present perception (i.e., an impression or an idea);
- (ii) an object of this perception must be a token of a knowledge relation; and
- (iii) this token knowledge relation must have parts of the instance of knowledge as relata (i.e., the same perception that has it as an object).

I argue for this account of Humean knowledge by analyzing Hume's statements about the knowable things in section 1.3.1 of his *Treatise*. As indicated above, these things, which Hume calls the "objects of knowledge and certainty," are a proper subset of the relations that I refer to as the 'knowledge relations.' Hume states that the knowledge relations are all and only those relations that things bear to one another solely in virtue of their intrinsic properties. Hume

defends this feature as that which distinguishes the knowledge relations because he holds that there must be no room for error about whether a knowledge relation holds, and so whether the relation holds must not depend on the extrinsic properties of its relata. The rest of the world needn't cooperate for one to know. After all, knowledge, for Hume, is akin to his predecessors' *scientia*.

At this juncture in the argument, the problem is that it is unclear how we could have certainty about whether the properties of the relata of a given relation are, in fact, its intrinsic properties. Since Hume holds that one must be certain about whether a relation holds or not if one is to know it, and this certainty is attainable only if one is aware of the intrinsic properties of its relata, it follows that, for Hume, candidates for knowledge must provide certainty about what the intrinsic properties of the relata are, and they must do so at the time that one knows the relation.

It turns out, though, that this certainty can be achieved, on Hume's own view, because he argues that one's perceptions are immediately present to the mind and immediate presence is factive (that is, if *that p* is immediately present, then it is true *that p*). Since there must be no possibility that the knower misrepresents the known, and mediated representation introduces the possibility of this sort of error, the knower's access to the known must be immediate. Given that Hume holds that our perceptions are the only things immediately present to us, it follows that we have certainty about their intrinsic properties. Of course, there is a catch, and it is that our immediately present perceptions are momentary mere appearances or mere seemings, so our knowledge is limited to knowledge relations that hold between their parts at a given point in time.

With this setup in hand, the reason for the tight relationship between Hume's position on knowledge and direct realism is clear. Since direct realism is the view that it is possible that mind-independent things are immediately present to the mind, it follows from the conjunction of direct realism and the Constitutive Account that it is possible, in principle, to know propositions about the external world. So, despite his restrictive position on knowledge, Hume could still consistently reject skepticism, if he were to endorse direct realism.

Full paper:

1. Introduction

What would it take for Hume to be an external world skeptic?¹ Is Hume's position on knowledge sufficient to force him to deny that we can acquire knowledge of (non-logical) propositions about the external world?² After all, Hume is extremely restrictive about what can be known because he requires knowledge to be immune to error. In this paper, I will argue that if Hume were a skeptic, then he must also deny a particular kind of view about what is immediately present to the mind. I will argue that direct realisms—views that maintain that mind-independent (i.e. ontologically distinct) things are immediately present to the mind—combine with Hume's position on knowledge to entail the negation of skepticism. So, despite his position on knowledge, Hume could still consistently reject skepticism, if he were to endorse direct realism.

2. Hume's position on knowledge

Since skepticism is a view about knowledge (or the lack thereof), we must first evaluate Hume's position on knowledge before we can evaluate Hume's position on skepticism. An immediate issue is that the texts where Hume addresses knowledge in his strict sense are rather limited. They amount to a series of glimpses of an underlying picture that Hume never fully reveals. They consist of one small section of the *Treatise* dedicated to the topic (section 1.3.1; "*Of knowledge*"), the subsequent section, and a smattering of other passages throughout the rest of his corpus. In the *Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding*, for instance, Hume uses 'knowledge' in many different colloquial senses, and the few passages there related to 'knowledge' in his strict sense must be understood through those in the *Treatise*.³

However, I will argue that T 1.3.1-2 provide sufficient evidence for my interpretation of Hume's position on knowledge.⁴ In particular, I will argue in the rest of this section that Hume defends the following account of knowledge, which I call the *Constitutive Account*:

- (i) every instance of knowledge must be an immediately present perception (i.e., an impression or an idea⁵);
- (ii) an object of this perception must be a token of a knowledge relation⁶; and

¹ Henceforth, I will use 'skepticism' and 'a skeptic' to refer to external world skepticism and an external world skeptic, respectively.

² As this question implies, skepticism about the external world is the view that one could not know, even in principle, any (non-logical) propositions about the external world.

³ Hume does use 'knowledge' in a colloquial or loose sense throughout the first *Enquiry*, as in E 1.8, E 4.4, or E 5.22. This is not the sense that this paper concerns. For an explanation of this citation format, see the Primary Texts and Abbreviations sections.

⁴ For an explanation of this citation format, see the Primary Texts and Abbreviations sections.

⁵ Like Hume (T 1.1.1.1), when I use the word 'perception' in isolation, I use it as a generic term for ideas or impressions.

⁶ I will define and explain what I mean by 'knowledge relation' later in this section.

- (iii) this token knowledge relation must have parts of the instance of knowledge as relata (i.e., the same perception that has it as an object).

2.1 - *The objects of Humean knowledge*

In T 1.3.1, Hume's primary concern is with giving an account of "the objects of knowledge and certainty" (T 1.3.1.2). These objects are what instances of knowledge are about—they are the knowable things. We must start with Hume's position on the objects of knowledge because Hume is most explicit about the objects of knowledge and we can infer a lot about his position on knowledge from what he writes about them.

Hume maintains that the objects of knowledge are tokens of four kinds of the so-called "philosophical relations" that, for this reason, I will call the 'knowledge relations'.⁷ (To be clear, these relations are not relations *between* a knower and what she knows or could know. These relations are *what* she knows or could know.) Hume argues that when we compare any two things in any dimension, there is an immediately present "perception" (i.e., idea or impression) that has a philosophical relation as its object.⁸ For instance, when I think of my friend's resemblance to their parent, I am thinking of a philosophical relation that holds between my friend and their parent. The adjective 'philosophical' is Hume's nod to the fact that philosophers are prone to specify and consider a wide range of relations in philosophical discussions. Hume argues that, as philosophers, "even upon the arbitrary union" of two things in the mind, "we may think proper to compare them" and thereby relate them in a philosophical fashion (T 1.1.5.1). Hume also describes philosophical relations as "any particular subject of comparison, without a connecting principle." In discussing composition, a metaphysician might tell us to consider all those things 3281 meters from the tip of the Statue of Liberty's nose. In doing so, they are specifying a sort of relation that only a philosopher would ever consider.

This is *not* to claim that Hume holds that all philosophical relations are specified by fiat. As I have argued in other work, some are simply given to us in sense perception; they are part of what is immediately visible to us. Hume's point in using the term 'philosophical' is that the range of the philosophical relations that one can conceive is limited only by one's ability to compare and one can compare a whole lot.⁹ It is crucial to note that the sort of comparison evoked here is a minimally-demanding one that does not require us to have higher-order awareness of what we compare as we compare.¹⁰ For instance, I compare two blue patches in my visual field as resembling with respect to blueness simply in virtue of seeing them simultaneously.

⁷ This is a stipulative label, but others have used this term before, such as Miren Boehm (2013, 69).

⁸ I interpret perceptions as the objects of the mind, and they can have intentional objects of their own. See T 1.1.1.1, T 1.1.3.1, T 1.1.7.4, T 1.1.7.7, T 1.2.6.7-9, T 1.4.2.21, T 1.4.2.37, T 1.4.2.47, T 2.2.2.22, T 3.1.1.2, A 5, and E 2.1-3. I subscribe to what has been called the 'Object View', which I take to be the standard view. See Cottrell 2018 (esp. 2-3) for a recent discussion of the option space. I will discuss the metaphysics of the Object View in section 3.

⁹ See Millican 2017 (5-6) in this connection.

¹⁰ For places where Hume uses 'comparison' in this sense, see T 1.1.5.2-7, T 1.2.4.21-31, T 1.3.1.6, T 1.3.2.2, T 1.3.4.3, T 1.3.11.2, T 1.3.14.31, and T 1.1.7.7n5App. The reason why the relevant sort of comparison does not require higher-order awareness is that Hume holds that what prior philosophers identified as "judgment" and "reasoning" just is "conception." And to conceive something just is to have a perception of it. See T 1.1.1.7n5App. For discussion, see Echelbarger 1997, Owen 1999 (74n109, 75, 96-97, 103-104), and Millican 2017 (5-6).

Hume argues that the knowledge relations are all and only those philosophical relations that things bear to one another solely in virtue of their intrinsic properties. But why is this criterion the relevant one? In T 1.3.1, Hume emphatically argues that as long as our ideas of two things represent them as they are in themselves, we can "discover" whether a knowledge relation holds of them or not—no other information needed:

These relations may be divided into two classes; into such as depend entirely on the ideas, which we compare together, and such as may be chang'd without any change in the ideas. 'Tis from the idea of a triangle, that we discover the relation of equality, which its three angles bear to two right ones; and this relation is invariable, as long as our idea remains the same. On the contrary, the relations of *contiguity* and *distance* betwixt two objects may be chang'd merely by an alteration of their place, without any change on the objects themselves or on their ideas; and the place depends on a hundred different accidents, which cannot be foreseen by the mind. 'Tis the same case with *identity* and *causation*. Two objects, tho' perfectly resembling each other, and even appearing in the same place at different times, may be numerically different: And as the power, by which one object produces another, is never discoverable merely from their ideas, 'tis evident *cause and effect* are relations, of which we receive information from experience, and not from any abstract reasoning or reflection. There is no single phenomenon, even the most simple, which can be accounted for from the qualities of the objects, as they appear to us; or which we cou'd foresee without the help of our memory and experience. (T 1.3.1.1)

On Hume's view, there must be no room for error about whether the relation holds, and so whether the relation holds must not depend on the extrinsic properties of its relata. Thus, for a relation to qualify as a knowledge relation, it must be such that if one has the intrinsic properties of the relata in mind, then one is *certain* that they bear the relation to one another. After all, knowledge, for Hume, is akin to his predecessors' *scientia*.¹¹ Hume holds that the only relations that satisfy this condition are resemblances, proportions in quantity or number, degrees in quality, and contrarieties.¹²

2.2 - The nature of Humean knowledge

So far, the first two parts of the Constitutive Account have been established: per the preceding, all instances of knowledge are (i) immediately present perceptions that (ii) have token knowledge relations as objects. I will now turn to the evidence for (iii), which states that the token knowledge relation that an instance of knowledge has as an object must have parts of the instance of knowledge as relata.

¹¹ I take it that it is the certainty of *scientia* with which Hume seeks to associate when he uses the term 'science' in connection with knowledge. See, e.g., T 1.3.3.9, T 1.3.2.1, and E 12.26-28. For discussion of *scientia*, certainty, and Hume's antecedents, see Owen 1999 (17-23, 36-38, 83). See also Schmitt 2014 (50-81) and De Pierris 2015 (97-98). There are many aspects of traditional conceptions of *scientia* that are cleansed from Hume's notion of it. Hume does not understand it, like Aristotle in *Posterior Analytics*, as the product of Aristotelian demonstrations only. Likewise, Hume does not understand it as broad or systematic and thus contrasting with "intuitions of single truths", as Descartes might have if the *Meditations* are any indication (Sorell 2010, 72-73; for a competing interpretation, see Jolley 2010, 85).

¹² See T 1.3.1.

Since Hume holds that one must be certain about whether a relation holds or not if one is to know it, and this certainty is attainable only if one is aware of the intrinsic properties of its relata, it follows that, for Hume, candidates for knowledge must provide certainty about what the intrinsic properties of the relata are, and they must do so at the time that one knows the relation. Just as the relation must belong to one of the kinds whose members hold or not in virtue of only the intrinsic properties of their relata, so too must the knower be certain that the properties of the relata that the knower takes to be intrinsic to them are, in fact, intrinsic to them. Since there must be no possibility that the knower misrepresents the known, and mediated representation introduces the possibility of this sort of error, the knower's access to the known must be immediate. The intrinsic properties of knowledge relations must be immediately present to the knower at the time that they are known.

Hume holds this view about the certainty that immediate presence provides, and he argues that *one's perceptions* are the only things that are immediately present. As a consequence, they are the only things that have intrinsic properties that are immediately present.¹³ Hume explicitly states this view when he argues that the "only existences, of which we are certain, are perceptions, which being immediately present to us by consciousness, command our strongest assent, and are the first foundation of all our conclusions" (T 1.4.2.47). Our immediately present perceptions simply *appear* to us; they are what *seems* to be the case; they are the *given*. As a consequence of our special access to our immediately present perceptions, "they must necessarily appear in every particular what they are, and be what they appear" (T 1.4.2.7).

Given the preceding, what this means is that the objects of knowledge—token knowledge relations—must themselves be immediately present perceptions. This is not yet (iii), however, as it seems that it could be the case that an instance of knowledge is a perception which is distinct from the perception that it has as an object.

Yet, this is not in fact a possibility, at least by Hume's lights. If one's immediately present perception of the object of one's knowledge were distinct from it, then it would be possible for one to have that perception without the object of knowledge being as one represents it to be—perhaps by not even existing at all. This possibility follows from Hume's dual endorsement of the Conceivability Principle, which is the claim that "whatever we conceive is possible" (T 1.4.5.10), and the Separability Principle, which is the view that "whatever objects are different are distinguishable, and that whatever objects are distinguishable are separable by the thought and imagination" (T 1.1.7.3). The Separability Principle entails that one can conceive of any two distinct things as separately existing. It is conceivable that one exists and the other does not.¹⁴ Given the Conceivability Principle, it follows that it is possible that one exists and the other does not. Therefore, Hume must maintain that one's immediately present perceptions of the objects of

¹³ 'Immediate' is Hume's own term and it is the favored term of David Owen (1999, 84-85). 'Direct' is the favored term of Helen Beebe (2011, 21). For extensive discussion of this feature of perceptions and related issues, see Qu 2017. Hsueh Qu argues that Hume holds that "We cannot fail to apprehend the qualitative characters of our current perceptions, and these apprehensions cannot fail to be veridical" (2017, 577). Since Qu holds that "the intrinsic qualities of a perception seem limited to its qualitative character" (2017, 582), it follows that this view, which Qu calls 'Qualitative Transparency', applies to intrinsic properties. For related discussion, see Passmore 1980 (90) and Cottrell 2015 (544).

¹⁴ This is the standard interpretation of the Separability Principle. See, for instance, Garrett 1997 (ch. 3), Baxter 2011 (161-162), and Okamura 2018 (2-3).

knowledge could not be distinct from them. One must be certain that one has the intrinsic properties of the relation of the token knowledge relation at issue in mind, and this is achievable only if those intrinsic properties are intrinsic properties of the same immediately present perception that represents this relation.

3. Locating the immediately present in Hume's bundle theory

Skepticism is the view that one could not know, even in principle, any (non-logical) propositions about the external world. If the external world is everything ontologically distinct from one's mind and if Hume maintains that instances of knowledge are immediately present perceptions that have token knowledge relations between some of their parts as objects, it follows that we need to examine the relation between Hume's position on the mind and his view on which things are immediately present perceptions.¹⁵ The looming question is whether Hume holds that it is possible that some mind-independent (i.e. ontologically distinct) things are or could be immediately present perceptions.

There are three kinds of interpretations of Hume's view on which things are immediately present perceptions. Since Hume is a bundle theorist, defenders of all three kinds of interpretations agree that Hume holds that (a) x is a mental state or mental object if, and only if, x is constituent or metaphysical part of the mind.¹⁶ A philosopher who maintains, by contrast, that the mind is a substance in the Cartesian sense must deny (a) since they hold that the mind has a metaphysical part which is not a mental state or mental object.¹⁷ Many interpreters also agree that Hume holds that (b) x is a mental state or mental object if, and only if, x is immediately present to the mind. Since, on all interpretations, Hume holds that if x is immediately present to the mind, then x is a perception, it follows from (b) that if x is a mental state or mental object, then x is a perception. The bulk of interpreters also claim that Hume endorses the converse of this last conditional, so, for them, 'perception' just is Hume's most general term for mental states or objects.¹⁸

¹⁵ Defining mind-independence (and thus the mind-independent world) in terms of ontological distinctness is necessary because it does not beg the question against one of the bundle theories under discussion in this section. A causal criterion would rule out the direct realist bundle theory discussed below.

¹⁶ Note that, throughout, I use 'x is a mental state or mental object' as a shorthand for 'x is a mental state or mental object, x is a part of a mental state or mental object, or x is a collection of mental state or mental objects'.

¹⁷ I borrow the term 'metaphysical part' from Robert Pasnau (2011, 6-11). Metaphysical parts are parts of things that are not constituents or "integral parts", including substantial forms, real accidents, and the like.

¹⁸ See, e.g., Passmore 1980 (85, 91), Seeman 1986 (392), Traiger 1988 (44), Garrett 1997 (11), Bennett 2002 (97), Strawson 2002 (234), Landy 2006 (119), Inukai 2011 (204-205), Cottrell 2015 (541), Garrett 2015 (2, 36), Cottrell 2018 (1-2), and Morris & Brown (2019). Note that, for these interpreters, it does not follow that those perceptions that are *not* mental states or mental objects could be perceptions when they are *not* immediately present to the mind—that would be a contradiction, given that, according to them, Hume holds that x is a perception if, and only if, x is immediately present to the mind. This issue must be addressed in light of confusions that may arise from Hume's temporary identification of 'perception' with 'object' from T 1.4.2.31 (when he says of the vulgar that he will temporarily "entirely conform myself to their manner of thinking and of expressing themselves") until T 1.4.2.46 (when he says he will once again "distinguish [...] betwixt perceptions and objects"). These are the main passages where Hume discusses the direct realist view. Those interpreters who maintain that x is a mental state or mental object if, and only if, x is a perception argue that the context of these passages shows that Hume's position is that any mind-independent thing that is a perception could *not* be numerically identical to any mind-independent thing that is *not* a perception, regardless of any qualitative identities or similarities they might enjoy. The vulgar are led to *believe* that there is some sort of identity (though crucially it is *not* a numerical identity) between such things because of the qualitative identities and similarities they enjoy (i.e. the "coherence" and "constancy" of their

Nevertheless, as we will see, if Hume endorses a direct realist account of perception, the converse of this last conditional must be denied. If Hume is a direct realist, then some perceptions are *not* always immediately present to the mind.

Defenders of two kinds of interpretations of Hume's view on which things are immediately present perceptions agree about (a) and (b). Since Hume maintains that instances of knowledge are immediately present perceptions that have token knowledge relations between some of their parts as objects, (a) and (b) force Hume to endorse external world skepticism as a consequence. After all, it follows from (a), (b), and this claim that the only possible objects of knowledge are token knowledge relations between the parts of one's own mental states or mental objects, which are themselves constituents or metaphysical parts of one's own mind. Even in principle, it is not possible to know about anything distinct from one's own mind.

Where these two kinds of interpreters disagree is about whether Hume endorses another claim: (c) x is represented by the mind if, and only if, x is immediately present to the mind. Under one kind of interpretation, Hume endorses (c), while on the other Hume endorses only its right-to-left direction. The latter view is a form of indirect realism (à la Locke) which maintains that we can represent things which are not immediately present to the mind only via our immediately present perceptions. Given the strictures of Hume's infallibilism, the indirect realist's denial of the left-to-right direction of (c) is no help to avoid external world skepticism. We cannot bootstrap our way to knowledge of mind-independent things by knowing a relation that would guarantee that those things are as we represent them to be, if it were to hold. Since the relata of the relevant token relations would have to be the mind-independent things themselves, it could not be known. After all, if Hume endorses (b), then mind-independent things are not identical to any mental state or mental object, and our knowledge extends only to our mental states or mental objects. There is nothing even God could do to give us knowledge of mind-independent things if this variety of indirect realism is true.

Although it is most likely that Hume endorses (a) and (b), he does consider an alternative and, relative to my overall thesis, it is an extremely illuminating one. This third option is the account of the mind that Hume maintains non-philosophers presume, including philosophers most of the time (those whom Hume calls the "vulgar"; this term is derived from a Latin word for 'common').¹⁹ On these views, (a) is retained but the right-to-left direction of (b) is denied. (c) can be retained in either form discussed above.

Under this direct realist view, the mind is a proper subset of those things which are immediately present. Given (a) and given that, under all interpretations, Hume holds that if x is immediately

qualities at different points in time). This is why the vulgar speak as if perceptions just are objects, which is an identification that Hume mirrors with his temporary identification of the terms. Now, were Hume himself to endorse the direct realist view, he would likely abandon his position that x is a perception if, and only if, x is immediately present to the mind. A more natural use of the terms 'perception' and 'object' under that picture would be for 'perception' to stand for any mind-dependent thing (e.g. a memory or a passion) and 'object' to stand for any mind-independent thing (including those that are immediately present to the mind). Hence why many interpreters take the fact that Hume does not abandon his position to be strong evidence that he does not endorse the direct realist view. For discussion, see Yolton 1980 (153-157), Traiger 1988 (esp. 43-44), and Garrett 1997 (209-213).

¹⁹ Places where Hume uses 'vulgar' in this context T 1.4.2.12, T 1.4.2.14, T 1.4.2.17, T 1.4.2.31, T 1.4.2.38, T 1.4.2.43, T 1.4.2.46, T 1.4.2.49, T 1.4.2.53, and T 1.4.2.56.

present to the mind, then x is a perception, it follows that some perceptions are *not* mental states or mental objects. Hume is fascinated with direct realism and spends significant effort trying to explain its psychological origins. However, the prevailing interpretation is that Hume does not explore it as a viable philosophical theory because he presumes that it is simply a seductive illusion—easily dismissed by reason but worth diagnosing as a test of some features of his own account of belief.²⁰

Since immediate presence is the crucial property that explains our special access to our immediately present perceptions, the direct realist's denial of the right-to-left direction of (b) opens up a new avenue: namely, knowledge of immediately present perceptions that are mind-independent. Hume was so convinced of (b) that he did not take this route seriously, but, supposing that some thing could be *both* immediately present to the mind *and* mind-independent, one could be aware of its intrinsic properties immediately and thereby know that a knowledge relation holds between its parts. Some of one's perceptions could be mind-independent things and instances of knowledge. Given that skepticism about the external world is the view that one could not know, even in principle, any (non-logical) propositions about the external world, and the external world is everything other than one's mind, the negation of external world skepticism follows from this direct realism and Hume's position on knowledge.

4. Conclusion

Canvassing the option space facing Hume reveals the manner with which restrictive views on knowledge like his own interface with skepticism more generally. Although Hume is probably not a direct realist, what my analysis shows is that his extreme position on knowledge is not singularly responsible for skepticism. Some strains of direct realism provide ample space for Hume to reject skepticism. In short, the more about the external world that Hume can establish to be immediately present to the mind, the farther Hume gets from skepticism.

²⁰ For discussion, see Norton 2002 (373-376), Inukai 2011 (198-203), and Garrett 2015 (97-105).

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Abbreviations

- 'T' book, part, section, paragraph from Hume's *Treatise* (Oxford, 2007), unless citation is from the Appendix main text, then the convention is 'T App' = paragraph, or unless citation is from the Appendix notes, then the convention is book, part, section, paragraph from Hume's *Treatise* with 'n' for note on the corresponding paragraph in the Appendix main text
- 'A' paragraph from the *Abstract* to Hume's *Treatise* (Oxford, 2007).
- 'E' when followed by Arabic numeral: section, paragraph from Hume's first *Enquiry* (Oxford, 2007).

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