

**ETHICAL ISSUES IN THE BOKO HARAM'S RELIGIOUS TERRORISM IN
PLATEAU STATE, NIGERIA**

BY

FRANCIS AUGUSTINE OBASI

(BSU/REL/Ph.D/12/1763)

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CERTIFICATION

We certify that, this thesis entitled: “ETHICAL ISSUES IN THE BOKO HARAM’S RELIGIOUS TERRORISM IN PLATEAU STATE, NIGERIA” has been duly presented by FRANCIS AUGUSTINE OBASI (BSU/REL/Ph.D/12/1763) of the Department of Religion and Cultural Studies, Faculty of Arts, Benue State University, Makurdi and has been approved by the examiners.

1st Supervisor:

2nd Supervisor:

Signature:

Signature:

Name: Prof. Alloy Shaagee Ihuah

Name: Dr. Robert Iornenge Kastina

Date:

Date:

Head of Department

Signature:

Name: Prof. Emmanuel Ordue Usue

Date:

Having met the stipulated requirements, the thesis has been accepted by the Postgraduate School.

.....

Professor Toryina Ayati Varvar

Dean, Postgraduate School

Date:

DECLARATION

I, FRANCIS AUGUSTINE OBASI (BSU/REL/PhD/12/1763) do hereby declare that:

- (a) This thesis has been written by me and that it is an account of my research;
- (b) No part of this thesis, to the best of my knowledge has been presented or published anywhere and at any time for the award of any degree/high degree;
- (c) And that all quotations and references herein have been duly acknowledged.

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DATE:

DEDICATION

To my lovely wife, Princess Amaka, and my amiable children, Chinenye, Chinagorom, Uchechi, Ogbonnaya, and Obasi.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

1. ANPP: All Nigeria Peoples Party
2. AQIM: AL Qaeda in the Maghreb
3. BBIED: body-borne improvised explosive devices
4. CAPRO: Calvary Project
5. COCIN: Church of Christ in Nations
6. DICON: Defence Industry Corporation of Nigeria
7. DIY: do-it-yourself
8. ECWA: Evangelical Church Winning All
9. FCT: Federal Capital Territory
10. HRH: His Royal Highness
11. IDP: Internally Displaced Persons
12. IEDs: Improvised Explosive Devices
13. JIBWIS: Jam'at Izalat al Bid'a wa Iqamat is Sunna (Society for the Removal of Innovation and Re-establishment of the Sunna), also known as Izala.
14. MBIEDs: motorcycle-borne improvised explosive devices
15. MNJTF: Multi-National Task Force
16. PENTN: pentaerythritol tetranitrate
17. RPGs: rocket-propelled grenades
18. SALW: small and light weapons
19. STF: Special Task Force
20. TBIEDs: tricycle-borne explosive devices
21. TNT: trinitrotoluene ($C_7H_5N_3O_6$)
22. VBIEDs: vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices

ABSTRACT

Boko Haram is a religious terrorist organisation. It has identified itself as an Islamic organisation, but Muslims have argued against that identification. Boko Haram became publicly violent in 2003 in Kanama, Yunusari Local Government Area of Yobe state, Nigeria where they are believed to have originated in 2002. They see themselves as the only true representatives of Allah, while attacking Western civilisation. They carried out their initial public attacks between 21 December 2003 and January 2004 and caused much destruction in Yunusari, Borsari, Tarnuwa, Geidam, and Damaturu Local Government Areas of Yobe State. The problem of Boko Haram evidently entered Plateau state on 24 December 2010 with the bombing of Kabong and Angwan Rukuba areas of Jos. Following those two attacks, the activities of the Boko Haram religious terrorists had spread to other parts of Plateau state. They carry out their attacks through guerrilla warfare, suicide bombing, placing explosives in crowded places, shootings, assassinations and kidnapping. The study used phenomenological method which deals with what is seen, heard, felt and experienced, also the characteristics of Boko Haram. Unstructured interview method was used in collecting data from victims, parents, relatives, security agents, religious leaders, traditional leaders and government officials. Focus group discussions were held with selected groups of victims and security agents. While other methods were being used in the study, observation method was keenly used in collecting data from relevant areas in Plateau state. The study dwelt on consequentialist ethical theory, which states that the consequences of a person's action are the basis of judging the rightness or wrongness of that action. Boko Haram's religious terrorism has caused a widespread destruction of life and property in Plateau state. Many people were killed in different places, and property was destroyed on a larger scale, such as churches, mosques, police stations, military bases, markets and houses. As a result, the people of Plateau state have experienced emotional problems such as trauma, depression, frustration, stress, distress, worry, hopelessness and desperation in different degrees. In the context of this situation, there have been tension, threat and fear among the people of Plateau state. The study has then made some recommendations. Religious terrorism should be included in the educational curriculum in Nigeria. Sound theological education should be inculcated by Christians and Muslims. Adequate and sustainable welfare programmes should be provided for internally displaced persons (IDPs). Comprehensive reconciliation, rehabilitation and reconstruction should be carried out in Plateau state. Finally, for efficient, creative, innovative, effective, productive and prompt service delivery by the security agents, maximum funding and effective equipment should be provided promptly in order to maintain and sustain high morale among them.

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1 BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY

Terrorism has become a disturbing global phenomenon. Terrorists also have attained such astute prominence of gallantry to command the attention of the world powers, while their striking exploits daily constitute the headlines of both local and international media. The reckless confidence and destructive impact with which they carry out their onslaughts are so overwhelming. They kill, maim and dehumanize their targets with such a callous feat that leaves the ethicist wondering if terrorists are completely devoid of every sense of morality. Properties worth billions of naira have been destroyed and various societies are turned upside down, all in the attempt to send messages to the government and subjugate the people. What is more worrisome is that these militias claim they fight for, in the name of, and with God. That raises the question if God is, Himself a terrorist; or rather, if He has commanded terrorism as an aspect of religious devotion. Or does the God of the religious terrorists differ from the God of the average religious seekers? Every religion resonates on ethical principles. However, whenever any religion or sect starts operating on unethical and unacceptable standards, one cannot help but question the authenticity of their claims.

Terrorism is by no means a new concept, nor is its practice recent within human societies. This is because terrorism dates back to the period of antiquity (Fafowora 3). Historically, however, the most common early reference to terrorism in general and religious terrorism in particular was the activity of the Jewish Zealots. The first acts of what is now described as terrorism were carried out over 2,000 years ago by a radical religious sect, of Judaism, the then Jewish Zealots who were active in Judea in the 1st and 2nd century AD, in their rebellious attempts to militantly topple the Roman rule in Palestine. Hoffman details that they fought

viciously against the rule of the Roman Empire over the place called Israel today through various campaigns involving assassinations. The zealots used the *sica*, a primitive dagger, to launch attacks on their targets in broad daylight, usually in crowded places, markets or on feast days – mostly whenever a large number of people were to witness their violence. This is quite reminiscent of modern terrorists, and of course the Boko Haram. The zealots, like the Boko Haram, used their actions to communicate a larger target audience, in this case, the Roman authority and their Jewish sympathizers or collaborators (Hoffman 255).

The extremist zealots turned to terrorism and consequent multiple assassinations in such gravity that they came to be known as “*si carri*” (Greek *sikarioi*, “dagger men”). The dagger men went to public places with hidden daggers with which they struck down anybody who identified with Rome. The rebel zealots were quite revolting and suicidal similar to present day terrorists, most especially in their primary revolt against Rome (AD 66-70) and in their decision to commit suicide at their fortress, Masada (AD 73) instead of surrendering to Roman forces (Jenkins, 2012). Also, between the period 1090 and 1272 an Islamic sect called the Assassins used similar suicidal tactics against the Christian Crusaders who invaded parts of the present Syria. The Assassins used what they saw as self-sacrifice and suicidal martyrdom evidently present in today’s Islamic terrorist groups. They saw violence as a divine act which would catapult the perpetrators to glorious paradise should they perish in the act (175).

Similarly, terrorism was advocated openly by Maximilian de Robespierre (May 6, 1758 – July 28, 1794) during the French Revolution, a period known as “the reign of terror”. Also, the Spanish inquisition arbitrarily arrested, tortured, and executed many to punish what they viewed as religious heresy. The post-American civil war (1861-65), saw the rebellious southerners form the clandestine, nocturnal and violent Ku Klux Klan (KKK) who through underground violence and wizardry terrorized and intimidated the supporters of

Reconstruction (1865-77) and the newly freed former slaves in order to continue white supremacy. Terror was adopted in the latter half of the 19th century in Western Europe, Russia, and the United States by anarchism adherents who believed that the assassination of those in positions of power was the best way to bring about political and social revolution. Meanwhile, terror has always characterized human society and history for a very long time (Jenkins 318).

Terrorist organizations that possess a fundamentalist religious ideology, and which are quite destructive and extreme emerged since the late 20th and early 21st centuries. These, according to Jenkins, include, but not limited to Hamas, Al-Qaeda and Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelan (LTTE). ISIL and Boko Haram of present history also fall within this category. They adopt the tactic of suicide bombing, in which the terrorist would attempt destroying important military, political, economic, or symbolic target by detonating a bomb on his or her person. The September 11, 2001 attacks on United States of America by the al-Qaeda suicide terrorists have been rated the deadliest by many scholars. The fatality stood at over 3,000 people. Jenkins cautions that religious terrorism appears to be an enduring feature of political life (2012).

Yonah Alexander attributes the rising of religious terrorism in Africa to the Libyan state-sponsored terrorist bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland, on 21st December 1988, which resulted in the death of 270 passengers, majorly Americans (212). Alexander observes that though Muammar Gadhafi's 42 years of dictatorship and terror was changed in 2011, Libyan terrorism has continued to grow active and extended its ominous tentacles to other countries in Africa such as Nigeria. He traced the techniques of religious terrorists to a significant statement a Libyan Muslim cleric made during a Friday sermon days after the brutal killing of United States government personnel in Benghazi on September 11, 2012 calling on Muslim faithful to “detonate our wrath upon them “and” stab them in their

main artery” (Alexander 2012). Subsequent terrorist activities on the international scene had followed, and on 25th December 2009, Nigeria was dishonourably represented by her citizen, Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab (a Nigerian young man from a rich Kaduna family trained terrorist by Al-Qaida branch in Yemen). This happened in the foiled 2009 Christmas Day bombing of the Northwest flight 253, with 278 passengers and crew on board from Amsterdam to Detroit.

Nigeria has witnessed much religious terrorist violence since her return to democracy on May 29, 1999. The magnitude of the blood-letting is as terrifying as is reflected in the captions of various print media: “Politics of the Jos Bloodbath” (Newswatch March 22, 2010). More and more of such headlines abound in Nigeria dailies, as observed by Alubo, who equally reiterated that such situations compelled him to join Uwazurike to lament that “we are passing through an era when Nigerians could hardly make up their minds as to just what sort of country they really aspired to erect” (2). Alubo laments further that Nigerians have become inured to incessant blood flow from terrorist onslaughts and massacres, especially in Plateau state. Alubo fears more that “Nigeria is grappling with a rising wave of religious bloodshed”, in which her citizens have been killed in their thousands (2-3). Best and Hoomlong affirm this position, that Nigeria has been witnessing recurrent “religion-type” terrorist insurgencies mostly in Plateau state (10). More sarcastic is Ishaku’s assessment of the Nigerian terrorist dilemma, when he wrote that:

Nigeria appears to be at a cross-road; one road leads to Mogadishu, the road to a failed state where territories are shared between sectarian strongmen. Another is the road to Sarajevo, the road to the dissolution of the federation as we know it. And yet, there may be a third road, the road to Kigali, the road to ethno-religious bloodbath (19).

Plateau state, Nigeria experienced a terrible blood bath in 2001, which affected almost the entire state. The 2001 religious killings have been described in recent history as “the most grievous bloodletting ever witnessed” (77), which has given rise to more terrorist killings that have followed in the subsequent years. Since that Friday, September 7, 2001 till date killings in the name of religion in Plateau state have unabatedly become almost a daily exercise, with consequent notable episodes in 2004, 2008, 2010, and other intermittent skirmishes. Meanwhile, terrorism in Plateau state has taken a religious nature, and manifests both at the urban and rural areas alike. A steady rise in terror was maintained in the state from November 2008 till January 2010 which destabilized the peace of the society and disrupted religious, political, social and economic activities.

It was in 2010 that the Boko Haram terrorist group admittedly launched their initial public attacks on Plateau state. On the evening of December 24, 2010, usually described as Christmas Eve, actually one of the most celebrated Christian holidays, Boko Haram terrorists detonated multiple explosives in Kabong and Gada Biyu areas of Jos, predominantly occupied by Christians. Scores of people were killed and many injured. Boko Haram claimed they launched this attack in what they termed a retaliation of the atrocities done to Muslims in Plateau state and other parts of Nigeria. They also promised to carry out more attacks on the state, which they surely did (Punch 28th December 2010). The brutality, gravity and explosive nature of the 2010 and subsequent Boko Haram violence in the already religiously polarized and violence prone Plateau state are revealed in the rapid spread of reprisal attacks to towns, villages and other areas around Jos and the incessant secret and open killings in various parts of the state between Christians and Muslims till date. Wanton destruction of lives, properties and livelihood, huge damage to socio-economic development and polarization of Jos residential areas along religious fault-lines have been identified as some of the resultant effects of religious terrorism that pervade the now volatile Plateau State (Para-Mallam 1).

This research, therefore, investigated the Ethical Issues in the Boko Haram's Religious Terrorism in Plateau state, Nigeria.

1.2 STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

Boko Haram is a religious organisation which has identified and popularised itself as religious terrorism. Boko Haram made a self-proclamation that it is an Islamic organisation; however, Muslims have argued that it is not an Islamic organisation. The Boko Haram sect originated from Kanama, Yunusari Local Government Area of Yobe State, in north-eastern Nigeria in 2003. The members who formed the group of Boko Haram withdrew from their former religious groups and mainstream society and formed the religious organisation which is now called Boko Haram. They see themselves as the only true representatives of Allah. As a result, they have condemned Western civilisation in general and Western education in particular. This is the major cause of Boko Haram's religious terrorism in Nigeria.

They began their initial attacks on Police stations and government owned buildings between 21 December 2003 and January 2004 and caused a lot of destructions in Yunusari, Borsari, Tarmuwa, Geidam, and Damaturu Local Government Areas of Yobe State. This problem of Boko Haram came into Plateau state on 24 December 2010 when Boko Haram's terrorists bombed Kabong and Angwan Rukuba areas of Jos. From those bombings, Boko Haram's terrorist activities spread to other places in Plateau state.

Boko Haram's religious terrorism has been studied by scholars in Peace and Conflict Studies, Criminology and Security Studies, Political Science, Sociology, Anthropology, and Economics among others. However, much has not been done in religion, especially in the area of Christian Ethics. Therefore, the study has focused on the ethical issues that are involved in the nature, causes, effects and solutions of the problem of Boko Haram. It is in

the context of ethical issues involved in Boko Haram's religious terrorist activities that the study has made recommendations.

1.2 AIM AND OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY

The aim of this study is to investigate Boko Haram's religious terrorist organisation in terms of the following objectives.

1. The nature of their activities.
2. Causes of their activities.
3. Effects of their activities.
4. Making appropriate suggestions as to the ways of tackling Boko Haram terrorism.

1.4 SCOPE OF THE STUDY

The research studied Boko Haram's religious terrorist activities in Plateau State, Nigeria with special attention paid to Plateau North Senatorial District, comprising Jos North, Jos South, Jos East, Bassa, Riyom and Barkin Ladi Local government areas. The reason for carrying out this research in Plateau North Senatorial District is because this part of the state had recorded too many terrorist attacks. In order to gain a better understanding of the activities of Boko Haram in Plateau state, the scope in time of the research was from 2010 to 2015. The choice of this study period was based on the fact that Boko Haram activities in Plateau state were worse during this time frame.

1.5 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY

The study of Boko Haram's religious terrorism has great significance. The study has increased our understanding of the nature of Boko Haram's religious terrorist activities, such as suicide bombing, use of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) in crowded places, assassinations, kidnappings, burning down of buildings, attacking security forces, guerrilla

warfare, drive-by shootings, attacks at market places and parks as well as attacks at churches and mosques.

The study has identified the major cause of the activities of Boko Haram in Plateau state. The major cause is their rejection of Western civilisation, which includes Western education, science, technology, medicine, law, governance, and social relationships. The study has adequate potential of providing required information about the nature, causes and effects of Boko Haram as well as appropriate solutions to the problem arising from Boko Haram's religious terrorist activities in Plateau state. Finally, the study has added a scholarly source of information for further studies.

1.6 METHODOLOGY OF THE RESEARCH

The study of Boko Haram's religious terrorist activities in Plateau state made use of several methods in order to understand the nature, causes and effects of Boko Haram's activities in the state. The study made use of the phenomenological method which deals with what is seen, heard, felt and experienced. The phenomenological method helped the researcher to set aside his biases and preconceived ideas and beliefs about Boko Haram's religious terrorism. Therefore, the phenomenological method was used extensively in the study.

Interview method was also used in the study. The people who were interviewed were drawn from the victims, parents, relatives, teachers, students, rural dwellers, religious leaders, traditional rulers, security agents, humanitarian organisations, politicians and government officials. The total number of people interviewed was one hundred and twenty two (122). The identity of each of the people who were interviewed included the name, age, occupation and place of interview. Those sampled and interviewed were selected from relevant areas in Plateau state.

Focus group discussion was held at various times in the course of the study. The focus groups were drawn from security officers and the victims of Boko Haram attacks. In addition, the study keenly used observation method in order to understand the nature of Boko Haram's activities. Chat and informal conversation were also used to decipher information from people who were not comfortable with interview.

1.7 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

While considering the theoretical framework of terrorism, it is important to bear in mind that there are many kinds or forms of terrorist movements, and no particular single theory can cover all of them. This is because not only are the groups engaged in terrorism extremely diverse in members, beliefs, aims, and resources, but also varied are the religious and political contexts or milieus of their campaigns (Jenkins 318).

Various attempts have been made by different scholars and authors to explain the complex subject of terrorism. In so doing, many theories have been employed. One of such theories is anarchism. Anarchism has always been referred to as the nineteenth century root of terrorism. The word, Anarchism was derived from a Greek word *Anarkos*, which means 'without a chief'. This term was introduced in 1840 by Pierre-Joseph Proudhon. The idea was maintained by Europeans, Russians and Americans in the 19th century. The essence of the idea is abolishment of government system and its replacement with voluntary cooperation as a society's organized principle. This ideology was adopted by the industrial working classes as a political voice for their rights (Fowler 4).

At the end of nineteenth century and earlier decade of the twentieth century, the major political assassinations and casualties were instigated by anarchist ideas and labelled as anarchist terrorism. These killings created an assurance and sense of fear among governments about the existence of anarchist conspiracies on national and international level. Anarchism

may not properly explain out religious terrorism of Boko Haram's kind. This is because there are weak theoretical linkages between anarchism and terrorism, as anarchists do not support blind suicide bombing and target infrastructure, institutions like the terrorists (Stott 1).

Another theory that has been used to explain terrorism is the orthodox terrorism theory. Orthodox terrorism theory explains, understands and deals with the logic of terrorism as a doctrine and strategy for political action and change. While discussing political objectives of terrorism, this theory focuses on established authority and state as the main targets of terrorist act. The theory of Orthodox terrorism explains comprehensively that what, why and how terrorism aims at to achieve. The purpose of this theory is not to engage in the discussion of roots of or reasons for terrorism (Franks 14). Hence, the theory falls short in explaining Boko Haram that has its root in fanatical Islamic history.

Also, Fascism has been used in an attempt to explain terrorism. The word Fascism is a Latin word which means to use power to impress or scare people. In 1922, Benito Mussolini introduced this term and in the same year Fascists attacked socialist officers, killed many leading figures, set their homes at fire and occupied cities by using violent means (Blamires 8). Fascism supports the concentration of total power (economic, social and political) into a sole supreme authority that is super patriot and forbids all kinds of opposition (Griffin 24). Fascism is ideology of war, violence, domination and conflict. The theory of fascism falls short of this research in that the political ideology supports violence for human progress and advocates militarism for domination and oppressing adversaries. It also approves war as a means of change in society and considers conflict as a fundamental law of life to gain strength.

Fundamentalism/Fanaticism theory is another important theory that has been projected in terrorism discourse. Fundamentalism theory states that faith, belief or doctrine should be

literarily applied, implemented or enforced and not modified or altered. The term has a Christian root, with the conservative movement of the Protestant churches in the United States of America which started in the late 19th century (Redmond 216). Those Christians taught what they considered as the basic Christian beliefs, including the infallibility of the Bible, the virgin birth and divinity of Jesus Christ, the sacrificial death of Christ on the cross to atone for the sin of the world, and the bodily resurrection of Christ and all believers. Islamic fundamentalism is a term which has been used to describe the activities of various Islamic groups whose activities are considered to be rather fanatical.

Fundamentalism theory suggests that religious terrorism is the creation or activity of religious fanatics, fundamentalists and overzealous and misguided people who pursue extreme and confrontational forms and interpretations of religious teachings. They are usually non-tolerant of other beliefs and do not accommodate other religions in a pluralistic society (Best and Hoomlong 60). Religious leaders can easily incite or provoked religious fanaticism by what they say to or teach their followers. An instance is a statement credited to Sheikh Abubakar Gumi, a well-respected Muslim cleric of his time: “if Christians do not accept Muslims as their leader, we have to divide the country... once you are a Muslim, you cannot accept to choose a non-Muslim to be your leader” (60). Similarly, in 2010, Col. Moumar Gaddafi of Libya heated the Nigerian polity when he advocated that Nigeria should be divided along religious lines into two: Muslim North and Christian South. No wonder some Nigerians pointed accusing finger to him, his country (Libya) and his General, Youssef Dhiri, whose mother was a Nigerian from Nguru, Yobe state and a town very close to Kanama in Yunusari Local Government area where Boko Haram started operation in 2002 (Ishaku 19).

Tamuno argues that the radicalization of Islam and the provocative utterances of some of their preachers in no small measure incite and inflame the passion of Nigerians in the direction of religion (19). Fundamentalism, in this sense, gives birth to intolerance, which in

turn produces religious clashes when different religious followers refuse to tolerate themselves. Best and Hoomlong observe that fanaticism, overzealous teaching and intolerance, though threatening factors may not be said to be the main causes of religious terrorism in Nigeria; but on proper articulation, such factors have contributed variously to both trigger and escalate religious violence, as can be seen in the case of Boko Haram (61). Nigeria, however, being a pluralistic society, cannot thrive harmoniously without tolerance and mutual accommodation by adherents of the various religions.

Larab opines that Boko Haram is just like other Islamic fundamentalist movements that see “Islam as a comprehensive philosophy with a homogenous entity.” They maintain that attempting to reform part of Qur’an by introducing certain foreign elements could invariably mean destroying it. Larab states further, that the general ideology of Islamic fundamentalism, as seen in Boko Haram run concurrently with the following characteristics:

1. Total rejection of rationality. The fundamentalists instead popularize their own beliefs after fanning up the emotions of the people.
2. They rely on divine power, rejecting human reason to lead the people on the right path.
3. They sternly refuse to compromise their beliefs.
4. They see and regard themselves as the genuine, properly guided adherents of religion, while treating others as their enemies.
5. They are ready to sacrifice their lives for the sake of their beliefs, and are equally prepared to kill their religious opponents or those they consider as opposers.
6. They make fanatical attempts to force their religious opinions or views on other people through violent means (cited in Zakariya 44-45).

Similarly, Gwamna revealed that Islamic fundamentalism took a new turn in the 1970s following the upswing of the Wahhabi Movement in Saudi Arabia, the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, and the Shiite which was propagated by Ayatollah Khomeini of Iran, all of which has resulted to the formation of various terrorist movements in the world today, including the Boko Haram terrorists in Nigeria (69). Thus, Muhammed Yusuf maintained the fundamental stance of earlier fanatical preachers of Islam in his teachings against allowing any kind of innovation in Islam, attacking and destroying democratic system of governance and eradicating civil service in order to return Nigeria to a pure Islamic society run on the principles of sharia, as stipulated in the Qur'an. While fundamentalism could be used to explain Boko Haram, many scholars have argued that it does not qualify for a theory. Hence the researcher settled for and adopted the relative deprivation theory for this study. This is because most of the reasons the founder of the Boko Haram sect, Muhammed Yusuf and the fighters gave for their attack border on poverty, unemployment, marginalisation and poor governance.

Another theory of interest in terrorism discourse is the Relative Deprivation Theory. Ted Robert Gurr, an expert on violent behaviour and terrorist movements was the person who proposed the relative deprivation theory along with the attendant frustration-aggression theory in 1970. The theory was reformulated in 1973 by J. C. Davies to include the gap which exists between rising expectations and need satisfaction. This theory states that human beings have basic needs, which could be spiritual, physical, social or economic. The denial of these basic needs by individuals or groups could be a source of violent behaviour (Hudson 19). The term, deprivation is used to mean poverty; and also to imply the act of taking away something from somebody or presenting somebody from having something. This reflects the Nigerian parlance that "a hungry man is an angry man."

A number of scholars have attributed the rise of the Boko Haram terrorism in Nigeria to social and economic recess and the attendant deprivations, particularly the very harsh and austere socio-economic conditions in Northern Nigeria which has forced many idle youths to avail themselves of religious terrorism. A number of these youths are not educated, and most of the few who are educated have no jobs, whereas their politicians live in enviable affluence. The poor, then, easily becomes a ready tool in the hands of the rich. Obetaro points out that poverty is responsible for the religious terrorism being experienced in northern Nigeria, due to the problem of unemployment, absence of social infrastructure and inadequate housing (cited in Best and Hoomlong 62). Sanusi concurs that poverty and deprivation are the lot of both Christians and Muslims in Northern Nigeria; and that the associated frustration is a major cause of religious violence in that region. He reveals further that from 1986 onward, over 90 per cent Nigerians have had to live below the poverty line. He maintains that the general poor economic situation in the nation is a major factor which has contributed to religious terrorism in Northern Nigeria (183).

The deplorable socio-economic condition of northern Nigeria that gave rise to Boko Haram in the region has been equally attested to by some Nigerian leaders. During a media chat with the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), Olusegun Obasanjo, former Nigerian president outlines bad government, inadequate education and unemployment as the remote causes of Boko Haram terrorism in northern Nigeria (Mukhtar 5). Meanwhile, the inequality that exist between the political elite and the common populace, the marginalization, the wide gap between the rich and the poor contributed in creating the enabling environment for Boko Haram to spring up and thrive.

Some analysts are of the opinion that there has been a decomposition of the state, which resulted in its decay, loss of focus and inability to respond positively to the cry and yearnings of the people, as Jega notes:

In essence, therefore, the process of the decomposition of the state, characterised by the chaotic management of the economy, institutional decay, and the inability of the state to provide basic socio-economic and security needs of the people, was simultaneously accelerating the emergence of contending loci of power organized around identity politics (31).

Best and Hoomlong emphasize that though unemployment and poverty, on their own, may not be sufficient reason for terrorism, wherever they are given religious contextualization, as in the case of northern Nigeria, they are bound to assume heightened functionality (63).

Though suitable for a research focusing on northern Nigeria which has become a showground for religious terrorism, the economic deprivation theory also raises some questions that are begging for answers. Does poverty always have to provoke violence? Should that be the situation, why should it always be in certain northern Nigerian cities and not so in other highly populated city centres in Nigeria? Again, why does this violence almost, always tend to be sparked off by fanatical or fundamental Islamic sects in Nigeria? Finally, are these terrorists fighting just to address the deplorable economic and social conditions prevailing in northern Nigeria, or are there other salient issues that inform their struggle? The researcher observes that these questions are yet to be adequately handled in academic literature in Nigeria, and so are inviting more research.

It is true that mass poverty could complicate and deepen violent conflict. However, it is not every poor society that is characterised by terrorist violence (65). That must be the reason Egwu opined that the Boko Haram terrorism in Nigeria is not caused by only economic deprivation, but also by politicisation of religion (in Best and Hoomlong 64). Buttressing this point, Mu'azzam and Ibrahim reveal that more than any Nigerian city centres, fundamentalist religious groups are strongest in the north, where religion has been turned into the largest

industry where the economy has failed. These fundamental groups, they say, are usually led, sponsored or supported by the elites (81). This boils down to what Usman calls the manipulation of religion; a situation whereby the elites instigate religious violence in order to confuse and divert the attention of the people from their harsh and deplorable conditions so as to continue remaining in power (6). Meanwhile, relative deprivation theory may not adequately suite this research on the ethical issues in Boko Haram's religious terrorism in Plateau state, Nigeria. Hence the researcher adopts consequentialist ethical theory.

Consequentialist Ethical Theory

Consequentialist ethical theory is otherwise known as consequentialism. It was G. E. M. Anscombe who coined the term, "consequentialism" in an essay she wrote on "Modern Moral Philosophy" in 1958. She used this term to describe what she understood as the central error of certain moral theories, more particularly such as propounded by Mill and Sidgwick. Prior to this time, however, the hedonistic utilitarianism of Jeremy Bentham (1789), John Stuart Mill (1861), and Henry Sidgwick (1907) was seen as example of consequentialism (Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy online).

Consequentialism is a normative ethical theory which holds that the consequences of a person's action or conduct are the ultimate determinant or basis for judging the rightness or wrongness of that person's action. It suggests further that a good action is such that the result favours a greater number of those that the action affects (Ayantayo 14). The theory embodies the perception that what is right or best is that which can make the world better in the future. This is owing to the fact that no one can change the past; so efforts should be invested in making the future better.

Thus, this theory discourages evil actions, while encouraging good ones. Evil actions damage, degrade and destroy the society, and so must be discouraged at all cost. Good

activities, on the other hand build, develop and advance the society and should be encouraged and emphasised. Consequentialism holds further that what makes any act morally right or wrong depends on the consequences of such acts, or of something relating to that act, such as the motive or a general rule regarding that act (Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy online). The theory, therefore, judges both motives and actions, while protecting the rights of people.

Boko Haram's terrorist activities in Plateau state have been generally condemned by most Nigerian citizens. Their onslaughts are hugely destructive and grossly detrimental. They slaughter, shoot and bomb people and detonate themselves with such a callous feat that makes the ethicist wonder if they ever had any moral virtue in their character. The effects and aftermaths of their attacks leave many mourning their loved ones; the economy is broken down; while the environment is badly damaged and polluted, leaving potential dangers even for the yet unborn. The choice of the consequential ethical theory, therefore, is adequate for a research on Boko Haram terrorism. This is considering, among other things the condemnable activities of the sect and the destructive impacts they have on the people, society and environment.

1.8 ORGANISATION OF CHAPTERS

The thesis was organised into five chapters. Chapter one was introductory, giving the background to the study, statement of the problem, aim and objectives of the study, scope of the study, significance of the study, methodology of the study, and organisation of chapters, theoretical framework, and definition of terms. In chapter two, review of related literature to the subject of the study was carried out. Here relevant published books and articles or journals were examined. Reviewed were literature on religious terrorism and Boko Haram. Chapter three investigated Boko Haram's terrorist activities in Plateau state, giving background information about Plateau state and examining the nature of the Boko Haram's

religious terrorist activities in the state. Chapter four considered the effects of Boko Haram's activities and their ethical implications in Plateau state. Chapter five concludes the study. In this chapter, the researcher summarised the work, made recommendations, spelt out the contribution to knowledge and gave concluding remarks based on the findings of the study.

CHAPTER TWO

REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE

Efforts were made in this chapter to examine the relevant works of researchers and writers on the subject of the study. This review exposed the researcher to what other intellectuals had said about religious terrorism and Boko Haram. Reviewed are recent literature on religious terrorism and Boko Haram in Nigeria. Earlier Literature, which has relevant ideas to the research, was also reviewed.

The work of other academics provided the researcher the required background knowledge and also helped him to identify the gap left by scholars, which this thesis sought to fill as he made contribution to the field of study of Christian Ethics in particular and Religious Studies in general in the management of terrorism in Nigeria. The researcher discovered that many publications in Nigeria addressed the menace of Boko Haram. However, the writings did not handle the ethical issues in Boko Haram's religious terrorism, which this study has addressed.

The review of the literature was thematically carried out in two major sections. The first section examined literature on the conceptual development of religious terrorism in Nigeria. This also included literature on religious development of terrorism in Plateau State. The second section considered the conceptual and historical development of the Boko Haram terrorist organization in Plateau State, Nigeria. The researcher summarised the review, identifying the gap which may have to be filled as a contribution of the research to knowledge.

2.1 CONCEPTUAL DEVELOPMENT OF RELIGIOUS TERRORISM

Religious terrorism is a current biting issue all over the world. Many terrorist organizations are carrying out their onslaughts in different countries in the name of religion, such as Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), Al-Qaeda, Hamas, Muslim Brotherhood and others. Nigeria is also represented among nations with the presence and violence of religious terrorists. Books were selected and reviewed here due to their relevance to this study.

In his book, White, Jonathan R. *Terrorism and Homeland Security*. Wadsworth: Cengage Learning, White made a beautiful interplay between religion, politics, and terrorism. He revealed that religion is the garment with which terrorists usually cover their political motives. He noted that religious terrorism came on the rise during the Soviet-Afghan war (1979-1989). At this time the *mujahedeen* or “holy warriors” were drawn from different Muslim nations to fight the Soviets in guerrilla warfare (276). By the time that the Soviets retreated in 1989 from Afghanistan, about 31 mujahedeen groups were left, who spread terror to other places in the world, mostly to Israel and the western countries considered the enemies of God.

White’s book layed a good background for contemporary religious terrorism. Being a terrorism scholar, the author honestly admitted that defining terrorism is not an academic exercise; his reason being basically that terrorism changes over time (3). The book gave a lucid presentation of a vivid history of religious terrorism, organization and financing, gender roles, tactics, targets and suicide bombings in terrorism. All these are reminiscent of the Boko Haram terrorist group. The work, however, locates religious terrorism outside the shores of Nigeria in the Horn of Africa (Kenya, Ethiopia, Uganda, Sudan, Eritrea and Djibouti). White, who wrote with a western bias, failed to consider the ideology of the religious terrorists,

which is the major determinant of their actions. Equally, the book did not give any attention to the ethical issues in religious terrorism. This is a very important gap this study has filled.

In his authorship titled *Terrorism in North Africa and the Sahel in 2012: Global Reach and Implications*, Yonah Alexander, an expert in terrorism studies focused his study on the global reach of terrorism in North Africa and the Sahel. The countries that constituted his research include the Maghreb – Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, and Tunisia, and also part of the Sahel – Chad, Mali, and Niger. The two major terrorist groups he centred on are the Al-Qaida in the Maghreb (AQIM) and Al-Shabaab. He also reflected on the activities of some other terrorist groups, such as Ansar Al-Sharia, MUJAO, and Polisario (9).

Alexander demonstrated that the religious terrorism presently being suffered in some African countries could be traced to Libya where, though Maummar Gaddafi's 42 years of dictatorship was changed with a new Tripoli regime in 2011, Libyan terrorism has remained active and alive. The book further revealed that current religious terrorists operate with the same terrorist ideology of Osama bin Laden's Al-Qaida. Thus, the author established that Al-Qaida, a major terrorist organisation is instrumental in the development of modern religious terrorist movements that operate in some parts of Africa. However, the geography, approach and content of the book are foreign to the Nigerian terrorist situation, while the study did not provide any information on the ethical implications of terrorism. This left out a gap for the current research to fill.

Mark A. Gabriel, in his *Journey into the Mind of an Islamic Terrorist*, actually took an academic adventure into the mind of the terrorist and revealed how it works. A devout Islamic scholar for decades prior to his conversion to Christianity, Gabriel explained experientially that a very strong bond exist between Islam and terrorism. However, he cautioned that all Muslims are not fanatical. Most Muslims, he explained, could be best

described as secular, moderate, orthodox or traditional. This set he said disagree with the ideology of the radical ones and blame them for making things difficult for other Muslims (xi).

Gabriel identified five pillars of radical Islamic terrorist philosophy. First is what he called the Islamic law, which he said is “the line that divides the religious terrorist from the secular terrorist” (23). Others include: infidels are around (and should be seen as suspects); Islam must rule; jihad is the only way to win; and finally, faith is the major reason for violent attacks. Using the writings of Osama bin Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri and others, Gabriel explained how religious terrorists justify their actions through the Quran, life of Mohammed, and Islamic history. He described how early terrorist groups were overcome and recommended that the world should work together to end the terrorism of today.

Gabriel’s book clearly explained the factors that motivate religious terrorists to fight. However, he located his work solely on the American society, thereby creating a literary gap for a study on the African soil to fill. This study on ethical issues in Boko Haram’s religious terrorist activities in Nigeria has filled that gap.

The work of Akpenpuun Dzurgba: *The Psychology of Religion* examined the psychology of religion and the psychology of religious terrorism, among other issues. Dzurgba discussed exhaustively on the concept of religious terrorism, aims of religious terrorism, operational tactics of religious terrorism, combat weapons of religious terrorism, and solutions to religious terrorism.

The book really surveyed religious terrorism broadly. Dzurgba, however, did not handle Boko Haram terrorism, which has been a frontline security challenge and has dealt deadly blows on Plateau state. His book equally did not consider the ethical implications of Boko Haram’s terrorism. Therefore, this study on Boko Haram stepped in to fill the gap.

Sun Tzu presented excellent tactical operational strategies in fighting terrorism in his *Sun Tzu's The Art of War plus Strategy against Terror: Ancient Wisdom for Today's War*. Originally written in Chinese, the book was translated into English language by Gary Gagliardi. Sun Tzu developed and succinctly presented the basic principles of combating and winning the war against terrorism in *The Art of War*. The fight against terrorism in this book is described as “a religious war – not of Christianity against Islam, but of those who support God’s gift of freedom against those who want to compel religious belief to justify their own rise to power” (17). Sun Tzu’s winning tactics over terrorism resonate on five pivotal stands. These include articulate analysis of the philosophy, the ground, the climate, the leader, and the methods. These factors must be critically considered when planning any war against terrorism (20).

War on terrorism is seen in this work as a battle between opposing philosophies. It is a battle of the ideals of freedom against the ideals of religious and moral totalitarianism. Sun Tzu warns that anyone who would like to fight current religious terrorism successfully should learn from the history of fundamental and fanatical Islam, which he said is as old as the religion itself. He revealed that starting from the dogmatic Kharijites in 657 till date, successive dogmatic or fundamental Islamic sects have been fighting for political relevance and control through religion. He said that the primary mandate of today’s religious terrorists is to forcibly seize power on the deceptive notion of reforming those they consider less dogmatic Muslims, while their second objective is to conquer, convert or kill non-Muslims (10). The book equally provided key dates in modern Islamic terrorism, spanning from November 4, 1979 to March 11, 2004.

The book excellently furnished the readers with operational tactics in the fight against religious terrorism. It passes for a training manual for the military and other law enforcement

personnel engaged in counter terrorism battles. The work, however, failed to provide any recommendation on how to manage damages caused by religious terrorists, nor did it advice the government on any other way of tackling the menace of terrorism other than the military might; hence a necessity for a recherche of this nature.

Dingsan Charles Chagu's book, *International Terrorism, a Global Threat* is basically historical in nature. Chagu identified and explained the origin of terrorism, both in ancient and contemporary era. Chagu handled international terrorism, considering the causes, impact, and made recommendations on how the global terrorism could be managed. He called on African Union (AU), Common Wealth of Nations, Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), European Union, church organisations and Organisation of Islamic Countries to all rise up to the challenge of religious terrorism in the world (70-79).

The book presented international dimensions of terrorism. However, Chagu did not explain properly what terrorism or religious terrorism entails. He kept switching between world wars and terrorism, at the same time calling on Christians and Muslims to intervene (78). Also, he did not localise his work to any part of the world. His work lack proper structuring. Several gaps, therefore, exist in Chagu's work, which this study has filled.

Michael Weiss and Hassan Hassan, in their book, *ISIS: Inside the Army of Terror* explained how Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), also called Islamic State have shocked the world. The authors relayed how the religious terrorists have conquered large places in both Iraq and Syria with a burning desire to create Muslim caliphates ruled with sharia law. The authors further traced the history of ISIS from when the terrorist organisation was nearly destroyed in Iraq to how the group developed into a jihadi army of international volunteers.

The authors traced the historical development of ISIS, beginning with the early days of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, who founded ISIS with its initial name as "al-Qaeda in Iraq." The

key leaders were discussed, including Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, Saddam Baathists and others. Their local and international support, operational tactics, social media strategies and illegal financial sources were revealed. The book exposed the true nature of ISIS and demonstrated how the terrorist organisation has expanded religious terrorism to other neighbouring nations. The book, however, left a gap by focusing majorly on the Middle East, which this study has closed by looking at the activities of ISIS's ally, Boko Haram in Plateau state of Nigeria.

2.1.1 Concept of Religious Terrorism

Terrorism is a term that is difficult to define. This is owing to the fact that the tactics and modes of operation of terrorists keep changing, and also because scholars have no consensus definition of the concept. That is why, in the words of Anyacho, "the view of what constitute terrorism varies widely" (115). Some regard terrorist act as legitimate and normal, mainly the actors and their sympathizers, whereas others describe them as terrorist, usually the larger society against whom the impact of their activities are directed and felt. Alemika supports this view. He states that terrorism arouses both sympathy and fear among supporters and victims alike, such that a singular action may be applauded or condemned by the differing groups. He holds that terrorism is like beauty, which people say is in the eye of the beholder; and that "one man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter" (94). Corroborating this point, Hoffman opines that any decision to describe any organization as "terrorist" is nearly subjective, largely depending on whether you are a sympathizer or oppose of those concerned (32).

Schmid presents the Revised Academic Consensus definition of terrorism:

Terrorism refers, on the one hand, to a doctrine about the presumed effectiveness of a special form or tactic of fear-generating, coercive political violence and, on the other

hand, to a conspiratorial practice of calculated, demonstrative, direct violent action without legal or moral restraints, targeting mainly civilians and non-combatants, performed for its propagandistic and psychological effects on various audiences and conflict parties (cited in Alemika 94).

Nigerian Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) Act gives a rather lengthy definition of terrorism seeing it as a crime, which involves:

- i. Any act which is a violation of the Criminal Code or the Penal Code and which may endanger the life, physical integrity or freedom of, cause serious injury or death to, any person, any number or group of persons or causes or may cause damage to public property, natural resources, environmental or cultural heritage and is calculated to -
 1. Intimidate, put in fear, force, coerce, or induce any government, body, institution, the general public or any segment of thereof, to do or abstain from doing any act or to adopt a particular standpoint, or to act according to certain principles; or
 2. Disrupt any public service, the delivery of any essential service to the public or to create a public emergency; or
 3. Create general insurrection in a state;
- ii. Any promotion, sponsorship of, contribution to, command, aid, incitement, encouragement, attempt, threat, conspiracy, organization or procurement of any person, with the intent to commit any act referred to in paragraph (a) (i) (ii), (ii) [section 46 of the Act dealing with interpretations] (cited in Alemika, 95-96).

Alemika observes that The EFCC Act's definition of terrorism is a comprehensive one, which paradoxically could eventually become a "catch-22 provision" which covers everything and anything. He fears that this can lead to an abuse and give birth to a kind of "law enforcement terrorism" by the government inappropriately and indiscriminately in many unwarranting circumstances. It would also lead to undue arrest, trial and further judicial prosecution (96).

2.1.2 Types of Terrorism

Terrorism has been classified in different ways by various scholars. Laquer discussed terrorism under the far rightist, religious, state, exotic, and criminal terrorism (5). Hoffman classified terrorism as separatist/ethno-nationalist, religious, international, and state-sponsored terrorism (43). Barkan and Snowden described terrorism under vigilante, insurgent, transnational, and state terrorism. Martin categorises terrorism as state, dissident, religious and international terrorism. Martin's categorisation is worth a little explanation. By state terrorism, he refers to terrorism carried out from the top; usually by the government against those they consider enemies of the state. Dissident terrorism operates from below, and is carried out by non-state groups or actors against the government, religious groups, ethno-national groups, and others perceived as enemies. Religious terrorism is that motivated by a faith or an absolute belief that a religion permits violence or terrorism in the propagation and practice of a religion. Religious terrorism is usually carried out in defence of faith (12). For the purpose of this study, the types of terrorism have been discussed broadly under secular and religious terrorism.

2.1.2.1 Secular terrorism

Secular terrorism is also called traditional or political terrorism. This type of terrorism is sub-divided into three categories, including left wing, right wing and ethnic-separatist. Left

wing terrorism primarily refers to the Marxist, Anarchist and Socialist ideological orientation, which thrived in the 20th century in Europe, Latin America, and the Middle East (to a lesser extent). Anarchists, particularly in Russia, emerged to destroy the monarchy and the state. Examples include Argentinian Montoneros, Italian Red Brigades, German Red Army, and Palestinian Popular Force for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), etc. Religious terrorism has not been associated with the left-winged terrorists.

Right-wing terrorism talks about those groups with fascist, racist, or nationalistic goals or motives. They have been strong and reasserted through the World Wars till date, mostly in the West. Examples include Ku Klux Klan (KKK) in the United States, Rumanian Iron guard of 1930s, neo-Nazis in Europe and United States etc. Religious terrorism has been categorized often as a new breed or kind of right-winged terrorism, though some elements of religious terrorism fit not into this category.

Ethnic separatist terrorism speaks of the groups using terrorism to fight for autonomy or independence from a military force or nation. It has also been discovered that religious terrorism is associated with this branch of traditional terrorism, though difference exists between ethnic-separatist terrorists containing religious elements but whose primary goals are not religious and those whose goals are religious. Irish Republican Army (IRA) is an example of religious-ethnic group with non-religious goals. Though Catholic by constituency, they only strive to drive out the British in their region in order to reunite Northern Ireland with the Republic, not necessarily to form a religious state. Hamas is, in contrast, is an example of a religious-ethnic group with religious goals. Hamas are fighting in order to expel Israeli forces in order to create an Islamic state in Palestine. Table 1.1 gives Gregg's summary of traditional terrorism.

Table 1: Traditional Terrorism

Type	Defining Goals	Examples
Left	<p>Anarchist – destroy the Government</p> <p>Marxist – foment workers’ revolution</p> <p>Socialist – economic restructuring</p>	<p>Argentinian Montoneros/ERP</p> <p>Red Brigades, German/ Japanese Red Armies</p> <p>Palestinian PFLP, Colombian Elm</p>
Right	<p>Racist – racial Supremacy</p> <p>Fascist – State-sponsored, militant Racism/nationalism</p> <p>Nationalistic</p>	<p>Ku Klux Klan</p> <p>Rumanian Iron Guard</p> <p>1. Neo-Nazis</p>
Ethnic Separatist	<p>1. Dispel foreign occupying force</p> <p>2. Create ethnically independent state</p>	<p>1. Nirgun</p> <p>1. PLO, IRA, Basque ETA</p>

2.1.2.2 Religious Terrorism

Gregg believes that religious terrorism or religiously motivated terrorism, as he calls it, contains elements of the three branches of secular or traditional terrorism, though it differs in some respects. He also notes that there is a lack of consensus on the definition of religious terrorism from current literatures, and that authors also lack agreement on how traditional terrorism differs from religious terrorism, with some saying that there is no difference (4). David C. Rapoport, a scholar of religious terrorism argues that the precedents and justification of religious terrorism are different from traditional terrorism. Religious terrorists use historic examples and sacred texts or scriptures which are not obtainable in secular or traditional terrorism. Secular terrorism, on the other hand, advances or develops a kind of

culture of actions, activities and boundaries which restrains the scope of brutal acts (cited in Gregg, 5). Rapoport's argument centres on the internal features of religion – religious scriptures and traditions. He did not consider factors which are external to religion or how those factors could explain the alteration or variation of violence and peace within religions.

Mark Sedgwick is of the opinion that religious terrorism could be understood better in consideration of the immediate and ultimate objectives of the terrorists. He suggests that inasmuch as the ultimate objectives could be religiously articulated, the immediate aims, no doubt, are usually found to be almost entirely political (795). The observation of Sedgwick is quite helpful in understanding that the aims of religious terrorists are not solely religious. They have ulterior political motivation in their quest and clamour for religiosity. They carry political undercurrent within their religious garb. They could be best described as political gangsters in religious camouflage. This questions the ethical content of their hearts, thoughts, teachings and activities. When a man is given to obtaining or acquiring things, privileges, positions or wealth through pretence, falsehood, fraud, or deceit, such an individual is looked upon as lacking in moral rectitude. This also keeps in doubt the ethical content of the character of those religious terrorists and their credibility to provide the plausible leadership they crave.

In Gregg's view, it is not enough to distinguish between traditional terrorism and religious terrorism by looking just at the use of religious adherents, scriptures and symbols, but also by directing focus on the distinctive religious objectives which motivate them to fight. This is why he proposes the following as his own adopted definition of religious terrorism: "the threat or use of force with the purpose of influencing or coercing governments and/or populations towards saliently religious goals" (6).

Types of Religious Terrorism

Distinctive religious goals or objectives motivate religious terrorists to fight. Gregg identifies three main goals of religious terrorism which include to: foment the apocalypse, create a religious government, and religiously cleanse a society or state. These goals typifies religious terrorists (7-10).

1. Apocalyptic Terrorism

Apocalyptic terrorists are those religiously motivated terrorist groups with apocalyptic goals. Apocalypse here denotes a total destruction or devastation of something or someone or some people. It also refers to a revelation of future events. The primary aim of this group is to cataclysmically destroy property, people and the environment in order to foment the end time and usher in a religiously promised new world. This form of religious terrorism exists among traditional religions, cults or New Religious Movements (NRM). Rapoport opines that apocalyptic terrorists, which he also describes as the millennialist groups, are usually motivated by their yearning for a coming Messiah, which they believe climaxes the end of the world (cited in Gregg 6).

Mayer corroborates that apocalyptic imagination causes terrorism in NRM and cults, but does not, by itself always result in violence, groups that turn to terrorizing rather, are responding to real world threats, internal disputes and a mix of millennialism. Mayer further gives some examples of apocalyptic terrorism to include the Gush Emunim in Israel and Aum Shinrikyo cult in Japan. Members of Gush Emunim in 1984 plotted to blow up the Muslim Dome in Jerusalem in order to spark of a chemical and nuclear war between Israel and the Muslim world, with a catastrophic messianism – disaster that would hasten the coming of the Messiah. In 1995, Aum Shinrikyo released nerve gas in an attack that killed 13 persons and

injured 700 others with the aims of instigating World War III and to destroy the world ultimately in order to save it.

There are also some of the apocalyptic terrorist groups who turn their attacks inward so as to foment the apocalypse, as opposed to violence against those who are outside the groups. They include the apocalyptic cult of Heaven's Gate and the People's Temple. Heaven's Gate followers believed that suicide would liberate their souls. Jim Jones, leader of the People's Temple aided over 900 followers to commit suicide en masse by drinking a cyanide-laced soft drink in an apocalyptic standoff with the government of United States of America, including over 240 children, in Jonestown in 1978. Reflecting on the incidence, the American philosopher George Santayana warned that "those who do not remember the past are condemned to repeat it" (Redmond 219). Mayer states that while these examples may not strictly define terrorism as their aims did not go beyond their groups, they provide useful clues on the situations within which apocalyptic thoughts emerge and consequently result in mass violence (32). This made Gregg to point out that of the three goals of religious terrorism; the apocalyptic religious terrorism goal appears to be the most dangerous for two reasons:

- (1) The paradox of destroying the world to create a better order removes them from rational thinking and negotiation, and
- (2) The aim of destroying the world makes them prone to the use of weapon of mass destruction (WMD) as a quick way to achieve such ends (7).

2. Religious Government Terrorism

There are religious terrorism groups whose aim is to create religious government out of an already existing government, or to change and replace a secular government with an entirely religious government. Gregg argues that "This goal is most commonly associated with militant Islamic groups and their desire to establish a government run by Sharia Law"

(7). His examples include the Lebanese Shia organization, Hezbollah which fight to establish an Islamic government in Lebanon and the Sunni Palestinian Hamas which aim to sack Israel and establish Islamic state in Palestine. Christian movements include the Christian Identity Movement and the Covenant, the Sword and the Arm of the Lord (CSA). These movements aim to use terrorism to force change in the government of United States of America. Kessler revealed that Timothy McVeigh, Oklahoma City bomber was discovered to have strong link with both CSA and Christian Identity. The bombing of the Federal building in Oklahoma on April 19, 1995 happened to be one of the worst terrorist acts in United States history, with 168 persons killed and 850 others injured. McVeigh, a former U.S. soldier was found guilty of the bombing in June 1997 and sentenced to death. (Microsoft Encarta).

There are religious government terrorists groups who are confined or limited within a nation's borders, such as Christian Identity Movement in USA and such others who maintain transnational ties and objectives through support from similar counterparts in other countries. Greg reveals that the Lebanese Hezbollah, receives material and financial support from the government of Iran; Hamas allegedly gets enormous monetary support from Saudi Arabia, Iran and the Gulf States; while Kach is considerably supported by similar minded Jews in United States (7). Apart from creating a religious government within a nation state, some other religious sects are fighting to form religious region or supper-states - a pan-Islamic regional entity that will transcend national boundaries. Example of this includes the Al-Qaeda network and their subsidiaries: Al – Qaeda in Iraq, Al – Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. Jemiyah Islamia in Southeast Asia also shares this goal of creation of a regional Caliphate (8). Currently, the Islamic State (IS) is a very perfect example.

The creation of a religious state or government is betide with numerous problems, whether through a peaceful or violent means, forcing Gregg to warn that the government of

any nation where religious terrorist groups operate should not sleep on their oars, but should tackle such sets with maximum caution, as they have the propensity to inflict various degrees of havoc on the society. He sees the problems of a single-religion state or region to include maltreatment of religious minorities, suppression of secularity, refugee problems, national and regional instability. Iran is used here as a case-in-point. With the creation of the Islamic Republic of Iran in 1979, Iran's theocracy has been characterized with notorious intolerance towards religious minorities, mostly the Baha'i faith as well as towards opposition groups. Also, regionally, Iran has instigated enormous instability in their spread of religious fervor and violence across Shia populated countries, mostly, Iraq, Lebanon, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, with outright war with Iraq from 1980 – 1988 (8).

Internal problems also abound within such religious entities, as they always disagree among themselves on what should be the scope and nature of the involvement of religion in the state. For example, in 1959, the prime minister of Sri Lanka of the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) was assassinated by a Buddhist Monk when his government failed to deliver on the promise to give Buddhism a superior place in the country. Also, Yitzhak Rabin, Israeli Prime minister was assassinated in 1995 by the Israeli Yigal Amir because Rabin was seen as compromising true Jewish integrity in having negotiations with Palestinians. Thus, clamour for the creation of a religious state is usually full of disruptions, bringing to question the true nature of the state and who speaks for the religion (9).

3. Religious Cleansing Terrorism

These are religions terrorists whose objective is to wipe out “unbelievers” or “infidels”, who they regard to be unfaithful within their own tradition or in other religions, so as to enable the creation of a religiously pure state. Mayer expresses that religious cleansing could be explained specifically as eradicating another group, or broadly as the cleansing of

ideas, norms, culture which do not conform to the worldview of the group (47). They differ in goal from religious government terrorists in that their aim is to force everyone within the nation state or region to conform to their own interpretation of faith and religious practice. They therefore make efforts to fight, subject and subjugate other religions and those within their own kind of religion whose understanding and interpretation differ from theirs. Examples include the Judaism's Jewish Defence League (JDL) and Kach in the West Bank whose one of their objectives is to expel non-Jews, non-Jewish religions, and battle other Jews who do not conform to their own interpretation of faith together with the government of Israel, who they believe are not holding up the true tenets of faith. Rabbi Meir Kahane, who co-founded JDL and is the founder of Kach stated in 1980 that their mandate is the creation of a government based and run on the Torah. They assassinate targets and destroy religious sites in the attempt to achieve their goals (49).

Gregg observes that terrorism directed at religious cleansing is comparable to non-religious terrorism that aims at ethnic cleansing. Religious terrorism is a form of religious fratricide (brother killing brother), making violence intra-religious. These terrorists attack and kill members of their religion, who do not belong to their own sect; who they look upon as not upholding or corrupting the teaching of their faith. In each case, the salient point is faith, not different ethnicities (9). Gregg gives a succinct summary of religious terrorism below (10.)

Table 2: Religious Terrorism

Terrorism Goal	Defining Goals	Examples
Apocalyptic	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Cataclysmic destruction of people, property and environment 2. Hasten the arrival of a new world 	Aum Shinrikyo, Elements of ID'S/Kach, strains of Christian Identity, Lebanese Hezbollah, Christian identity, Hemas, Elements of ID'S/Kach, Element of
Create Religious Government	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Abolish secular state 2. Create a state governed by religious law and doctrine 3. Create trans state religious government 	IDL/Kach, Let,shir sena,RSS
Create Religiously Pure State	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Remove groups from other religions 2. Remove groups within same religion with different interpretation of faith 	

Among other things, Gregg's examples and summary reveal that a particular religious terrorist group could be characterized by more than one goal. Contemporary examples include the Islamic State (IS), a regional religious terrorist organization, and the Nigerian Boko Haram, currently owing their allegiance to IS.

Leadership and Targets of Religious Terrorism

A common feature of religious terrorist groups is that they are usually led by the clergy or religious leaders such as the rabbi, imam, swami, or alim. Mayer asserts that such leadership could be self-appointed, as with the founder and spiritual leader of Aum Shinrikyo, Shoko Asahara; derived by charismatic and influential personality, as in the case of Osama bin Laden who led Al-Qaeda - he was seen as a warrior in the Afghan-Soviet war and various terrorist operations; or conferred religious training as in the case of spiritual leader of the Lebanese Hezbollah, Sheikh Fadlallah, who trained as a Shai cleric in Iraq, Iran, Qun, Najaf, and Meir Kahene of IDL/Kach, who trained in the United States as a Rabbi (50-51). Whatever the source of religious authority, it is characteristic of religious terrorist sects to have a religious leader recognized and respected as the authentic person who is accorded the authority by his followers to represent them and speak on their behalf in matters of faith and action. Meanwhile, religious authority rests with the followers of the group (Gregg11).

Mayer reveals that religious terrorist groups have two types of targets, namely, tactical targets which serve specific earthly goals, and does not differ from other forms of terrorism, and symbolic targets (52). Tactical targets are meant for greater, earthly campaigns. It includes attacks on head of state, government functionaries and establishments, as in Egyptian Gammat's killing of Anwar Sadat in 1981. Yigal Amir's assassination of Yitzhak Rabin in 1994; and bombing of Alfred P. Murray's national building in Oklahoma in 1995 inspired partly by Christian Identity movement. Tactical targets also include religious terrorist attacks on the presence of foreign governments or embassies within their religion, such as the bombing of Egyptian embassies in Pakistan in 1995 and AL-Qaeda's bombing of United States embassies in Tanzania and Kenya in 1998. Equally inclusive are religious terrorist attacks on foreign targets located beyond their borders of residence, for example Islamic religious terrorist groups in Egypt and Pakistan names United States as a major target

for their support to Sadat’s and Mubarak’s regimes which they termed un-Islamic and their support to Pakistan government which they see as secular. Mayer states that religious terrorist tactical targets are not different from the secular, Marxist, ethnic-separatist or anarchist terrorists whose goal include political change, insurgency or revolution (56-58).

Symbolic targets of religious terrorists appear abstract in nature and are directed towards specific religious aims and objectives. Here, the religious terrorists attack cultures, norms, values and practices which do not conform to their own religious ideas or principles, which could manifest in attacks launched at bars, hotels, clubs, theatres and other social centers. Examples include Muslim terrorist burning down a hotel in Turkey in 1993; Algerian fundamentalists’ suppression of Rai music in the 1990 for having a mix of western styles, attacking and exiling the singer, Khalid; Christian Identity’s bombing of a lesbian bar and Hindu militants’ destruction of many paintings of a Muslim artist, Magbod Fida Husain which depicted Hindu deities (68-69).

Gregg presents his summary of the targets of religious terrorism in the table below.

Table 3: Religious Terrorism Targets

	Specific Targets	Abstract Targets
Domestic	<p>Workings on establishments of the state –assassinate leaders, attack infrastructure, undermined state authority</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • States that support regimes 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Attacks on peculiar art and other cultural institutions. 2. Attacks on secular intellectuals 3. Attacks on historic other religious sites or

International	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Foreign government presence/militaries • International tourists 	artifacts or “Secular” “western” culture Globalization
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In their own efforts, Crenshaw, Schmid and Luz identified eight goals and seven techniques of terrorists (cited on Alemike 97). The goals they aim to achieve include the following.

1. To draw attention to grievances.
2. To secure concessions.
3. Intimidating groups of people or the government in order to prevent a particular course of action.
4. To frustrate the implementation of programmes and policies of government.
5. To change the constitutional order or pattern of a nation - right wing/left wing, democratic/non-democratic, secular/theocratic.
6. Defending or achieving economic goal (demand for the control of resources, resisting exploitation and poverty).
7. Defending or achieving political goals (freedom from secession, repression, under-representation, etc.).
8. Defending or achieving ideological goals (religious and racial supremacy of freedom, left-wing, right-wing).

The techniques of terrorism here mentioned include bombing, kidnapping and hostage taking; assassination of important personalities; tampering with various means of transportation to cause accident and destroying equipment, electric and electronic facilities;

computers and telecommunication system; and weapons of mass destruction (nuclear and biological weapons).

2.2 CONCEPTUAL DEVELOPMENT OF BOKO HARAM

The terrorist activities of the Boko Haram sect in Nigeria have generated a lot of authorship. Jonathan Ishaku, in his book, *The Road to Mogadishu: How Jihadist Terrorism Tears Nigeria Apart* gave a narrative on the state of insecurity in Northern Nigeria brought about by Boko Haram against Christians, Southerners and opposing Muslims. Ishaku traced the history of Boko Haram to the emergence of religious extremism in Northern Nigeria in the 1980s and 1990s and the adoption of Sharia law by 12 Northern states in Nigeria, beginning with Zamfara state in year 2000.

Revealing that the Boko Haram group was formed in a village called Zagi-Biriri in Tarmuwa Local Government Area of Yobe state; Ishaku focused his study on the impact of Boko Haram on Jos and Maiduguri. The book disclosed the weapons of the terrorists; discussing their resorting to asymmetric warfare and the factors that had favoured such a tactic. By recommending ways to check the extant vulnerabilities, the book offers solution to the current terrorist onslaughts. Ishaku's work provided a background understanding of the activities of Boko Haram in Plateau state. However, the book did not consider the causes of Boko Haram in Plateau state. This gap has been closed by this study.

Marc-Antoine Perouse de Montclos's *Boko Haram: Islamism, Politics, Security and the State of Nigeria* is the result of the research of scholars who worked with the French Institute for Research in Africa (IFRA-Nigeria), drawn from Nigeria, France, Germany, the United Kingdom and United States of America. The assemblage of their papers presented a constructive debate on Boko Haram. Their work was a combination of theory, fieldwork,

qualitative and quantitative analysis. The book provided a good understanding of the Boko Haram sect.

The authors made evaluations of the causes and consequences of Boko Haram on Nigerian from religious, political, and social standpoints. Also, the book looked at the extent to which the sect could be seen as a product of economic deprivation and marginalization. It also exposed the role of security forces, political parties, and Islamic bodies in the radicalization of the Boko Haram movement. The book provided good background knowledge for a research which centres on Boko Haram. However, it did not describe the Plateau state experience of Boko Haram, which this work has done.

Another work on the activities of the Boko Haram sect that is relevant to this study is Abdulkareem Mohammed's *The Paradox of Boko Haram*. Mohammed described Boko Haram as a religious terrorist group of a special type. According to him, Boko Haram is different in the sense that previous religious crises in Nigeria were either intra or inter religious, whereas Boko Haram is basically against the government and governmental establishments. He states that what makes Boko Haram a paradox is the fact that their violence started during democratic governance which guarantees constitutional provisions for freedom of expression, religion and association; operating under the rule of law (64).

Commendable is the author's effort in tracing the historical development of the sect; looking at their ideology, and admitting that the sect poses a serious challenge to the Ulama (Muslim elites). The author believes strongly that Boko Haram came up as a result of economic deprivation. He, however, did not bother to define clearly some of the terms he used in his work, such as paradox, Ulama, etc. He wrote as if all his readers are familiar with Islamic terminologies and other related concepts. Also, he did not cite the sources of most of

his sources, nor did he make academic representation of his data. These gaps have been carefully filled in this study.

Chukwuemka Emmanuel Mbaezue carried out a research on “Early Warning Signals and Conflict Prevention: An Examination of the Rise of the Boko Haram insurgency in Northern Nigeria”. Mbaezue’s research focused on early warning signs of Boko Haram and how the terrorism could have been prevented. He discovered that the early warning signals came in two ways: structural and behavioural. The structural early warning signals, according to him were revealed in poverty, unemployment, illiteracy, bad governance and economic problems. Behavioural early warning signs, on the other hand, were reflected through prejudice, exclusion, intolerance, exploitation, discrimination and extremism.

The research revealed that the Boko Haram’s violence being suffered today was announced early enough by early warning signs, which were neglected by the Nigerian government and the general public. The prize of such neglect, he said, is the pain Nigeria is suffering today. Mbaezue’s study provided general information on why Nigerian government should be proactive in addressing serious issues that border on the security and general well being of her people. Mbaezue, however, did not bother about the ideology, operational tactics and targets of Boko Haram. The gap has been filled by this study.

Salisu Uba, in his contribution to the Boko Haram carried out a study on “Press Coverage of Boko Haram Insurgency (2012-2014): An Analysis of Some Selected Nigerian Newspapers.” Salisu’s research focused on media’s coverage of Boko Haram activities in some selected Nigerian Newspapers, such as the Punch, the Daily Trust, and the Guardian. He discovered that the newspapers he sampled portrayed Boko Haram terrorism as a religion-political instead of ethno-religious organisation. He further observed that the assessed

newspapers displayed social responsibility by avoiding sensationalism in reporting Boko Haram violence so as to minimize the psychological impact of such news on the people.

The research of Salisu demonstrated its strength in providing media perspective on Boko Haram. Professional media practitioners were advised to check political interference, ownership factor and religious sentiments if they must discharge their duties equitably. Also to be avoided is making inciting, abusive and insensitive statements while reporting terrorist activities. Salisu's research, however, did not border to explain the problem of Boko Haram or what they stand for. The gap has been closed by the present study.

Isma'ila Bashari Baba's research on "The Role of the Youths in Boko Haram Crises: A Case Study of Selected Attempts in Kano (2012 to 2014)" takes a look at the role the youths have played in perpetrating Boko Haram terrorism, focusing on Kano metropolis. Bashari hinges his research on the displaced-aggression theory of Neal Miller (1984), which states that when a provoked person cannot retaliate directly against the one who provoked him, he could transfer his retaliation on a seemingly innocent target. The researcher used this theory to explain that the Boko Haram menace came as a result of the numerous Nigerian youths who for a long time have suffered hunger, unemployment, marginalization and illiteracy while the ruling class looted all the resources meant for the people. Since the youths could not attack those rich politicians directly, they resorted to venting their anger on government establishments and innocent citizens.

The research provided the perspective of the youth on the question of Boko Haram. However, Baba failed to explain why children, women and older men also constitute the membership of Boko Haram. The existing gap has been closed by this study.

Mark Lipdo made startling revelations in his book titled *Killings in North and Central Nigeria: A Threat to Ethno-Religious Freedom and Democracy*. In this book, Stefanos

Foundation research group made a comprehensive compilation of all known incidences of terrorist violence in Central and Northern Nigeria from 2010 to 2014. The book revealed that Boko Haram terrorism is not just a happenstance. Rather, it is the continuation of the long struggle to Islamize Nigeria by both local and international forces; a struggle that started even before Nigerian independence. The book also recognized that the terrorism in Northern and Central Nigeria is caused largely by religious, political and cultural factors.

The book further looks at targets of Boko Haram's attack, patterns of the attack, and beneficiaries of the attack. Lipdo made a very strong argument, that Northern and Central Nigeria have a large number of Christians, and lamented that the people affected most by Boko Haram violence are the minority ethnic groups and Christians. He used charts, maps, photographs and tables to illustrate his points. Lipdo's work, however, appears somehow biased, seemingly pitching Islam against Christianity. This gap was closed in the book.

Another work that largely discussed Boko Haram is that of the National Institute for Policy and Strategic Studies (NIPSS), titled *Eminent Persons and Expert Group Meeting on Complex Insurgencies in Nigeria*. This book presents the articulation of academic papers from different scholars on terrorism in Nigeria. The authors diagnosed Boko Haram terrorism deeply from the religious, economic, sociological, cultural, legal, political and psychological dimensions, revealing the sources, causes and offering remedies in its management. Also studied in this book are such ethnic groups such as Odua Peoples Congress (OPC), Movement for the Actualisation of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB) and Niger Delta Militants.

The book approached the issue of terrorism and of course Boko Haram rather academically. However, it book did not specifically discuss the Plateau state experience of Boko Haram activities, thereby creating a gap that has been filled by this study.

Funsho Omotoso, in his book, *Terrorism in Nigeria: Stemming a Rising Menace* presents a vivid picture of terrorism in Nigeria, ranging from insurgency in the Niger Delta region to the religious terrorism in Plateau state. Drawing definitions of terrorism from organisations and countries such as the League of Nations, United Nations (UN), European Union, United States of America, United Kingdom, and terrorism scholars like Raffoul Saadeh, Tamar Meisels, Andrew Byrnes, Daniel D. Notovotny, Walter Laquer and others, the author, who admitted that defining terrorism is a difficult task took to Hoffman's submission that the decision to label a person or an organisation as "terrorist" could be a subjective one. This he argues, depends on whether the individual opposes the act or sympathises with it (29). Funsho made a brief survey of 33 organisations whose activities have been condemned as terrorism, and whose ideology and operational tactics are similar to that of Boko Haram, including the Anarchists, Abolitionists, Ku Klux Klan (KKK), Muslim Brotherhood, Hezbollah, Hamas, Al-Qaeda, among others.

The author observed further that religious terrorism in Plateau state is about the most prolonged form of violence in any part of Nigeria. He maintained that violence in the name of religion in the state operate in two major dimensions. The first is the religious clashes between Christians and Muslims, which has been worsened by the activities of Boko Haram in the state. The other is the ethnic violence between the Muslim herders and Christian farmers, which he saw as an indigene-settler contestation over the ownership of Jos (103).

He opines that the rise of Islamic fundamentalism, extremism or radicalism, among other factors served as a veritable dynamic for religious terrorism in Nigeria. While fundamentalism entrenched its position against common Islamic beliefs and practices, extremism took divergent and extreme stance on economic and political philosophies contrasting acceptable and defined moral, social and political views. Thus, Islamic fundamentalists and extremists see themselves as the genuine adherents of their religion. A

marriage of these two concepts, according to Funsho, had produced terrorism, and infact, Boko Haram in Nigeria. He adduces that while many Muslim scholars condemn Boko Haram and argue that Islam is a religion of peace, so many of them had supported the imposition of shari'a in 12 northern states of Nigeria, which posed a constitutional problem, going by the fact that Nigerian constitution guarantees a secular state, freedom of religion and a judicial system. The wide adoption of sharia'a, therefore, provided the Boko Haram elements a galvanised impetus to terrorise the government and the citizenry in an attempt to establish an Islamic state in place of the existing secular society (141-46).

Funsho stated further that Boko Haram, which started in North Eastern states of Nigeria, had invaded Plateau state with its mandate to conquer and topple the government and possibly turn it into an Islamic society (103). He recommended different ways by which Boko Haram could be tackled in Nigeria. The book, however, did not provide a chronicle of Boko Haram attacks in Plateau state, which this study has addressed.

Des Wilson edited a work, *The Media, Terrorism and Political Communication in Nigeria* which focused on the role of the media in the fight against terrorism in Nigeria. The book is an assemblage and synthesis of the works of many communication scholars across Nigerian institutions of higher learning. The book recognises the causes of Boko Haram and other forms of violence in Nigeria to include greed, lust for power, unequal access to resources, oppression of the people, suppression of the public will, hegemonic tendencies, usurpation of authority, etcetera. The book acknowledged that terrorism is understood differently among Nigerians, as in other countries. While some people see terrorism as a positive force which helps in making right perceived wrongs, others picture it as a negative agency that commits heinous crimes against humankind.

The book provided relevant media perspectives generally on terrorism and particularly on Boko Haram but lacked on Boko Haram experience in Plateau state, thereby creating a gap that has filled by this study.

Solomon E. Arase's *National Security: Intelligence and Community Partnership Approach* spells out the imperative of intelligence-led policing and community partnership in the fight against Boko Haram and general internal security. The book explains that if the war on Boko Haram will be a success, the Police, which have the constitutional responsibility of providing internal security, must be efficient in the discharge of their duties. The success of the Police, to a large extent, the book reveals depends on operational partnership between the citizens and the personnel of the Nigeria Police and responsive and accountable leadership form all levels of government.

The book sets out a functional operational synergy between the police and traditional rulers, religious leaders, civil society organisations, men, women, youths, and the mass media. The book revealed Community Policing strategies in the fight against Boko Haram. The author, however, did not discuss the ideology of Boko Haram, which this study has addressed.

2.2.1 Concept of Boko Haram

Before explaining what Boko Haram is, worthy of note is the fact that the Hausa language has been infused with or corrupt by the Arabic language. This, perhaps, is because of the long use of Arabic language or terms in religious/Islamic expressions and teachings in Hausa speaking places. Hausa language is the second lingua franca after English language in northern Nigerian states. Etymologically, the term, "Boko" is Hausa, while "Haram" is Arabic. The Bargery's Hausa-English Dictionary and English-Hausa Vocabulary define "Boko" as "any reading or education which is not connected to Islam or any government or native administrative school or establishment in Roman character (117). In Hausa language,

“Boko” means western education, westernization or western system of life. Haram is an Arabic term, meaning that which is unlawful or taboo. Boko Haram, therefore, means that westernization or western education is forbidden or unlawful (4). In a simpler understanding, “Boko” in Hausa is what the Igbo and Yoruba in Nigeria may refer to as *Bekee* or *oyinbo* respectively, meaning people of the west or white people. The West here refers to the countries in Europe and the Americas (North and South America), whose culture and society are influenced mostly by such traditions that are rooted in Greek and Roman culture and in Christianity.

Abba reports that the Boko Haram sect members do not address or call themselves by the name, “Boko Haram”. Rather, the residents of Maiduguri, where the sect was formed in 2002 nicknamed them Boko Haram due to their ideological underpinnings. Others called them the Nigerian Taliban, while some others addressed them as *Yusufiya*, after their late founder and former leader, Muhammed Yusuf. The group’s officially adopted name, however, is *Jama’atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’awati wal-Jihad* (People Committed to the Propagation of the Prophet’s Teachings and Jihad) (40). Kyari corroborates that the Yusufiya movement had no official name for itself until the July 2009 crushing by Nigerian security forces. Prior to that time, he said, the group referred to itself as “dawaah”; identifying its mission as a return to the *Ahlus Sunnah wal Jama’a* (Adherents to the Sunnah the Community of Muslims), also referring to its followers or members as “brothers”. He hints further that the initial reference to the present preferred name *Ahlus Sunnah Liddawa’ati wal Jihad* came up in the aftermath of the prison break in Bauchi in September 2010 (13-14).

Contributing to the etymological discourse on Boko Haram, Adamu concurs with Abba that “it is the persistent theme of condemning aspects of western schooling that earned the group the sobriquet of boko haram in the Nigeria media” (43). However, Adamu frowns that the expression “Boko Haram” has widely been translated wrongly to mean “western

education is sin”. This, he says is because writers wrongly assume that “boko”, a Hausa onomatopoeic of “book” means “western education based on western books”. He quips that scholars often make this mistake due to poor knowledge of the Hausa language, lack of content analysis of the statements of the group, and complete reliance on newspaper reports of the activities of the sect.

While citing Bargery (117), Adamu explains further that the term “boko” in Hausa lexicon has 11 meanings, 10 of which conveys the same idea, implying “doing anything to create impression that one is better off, or that it is of better quality or larger amount than is the case”. This, according to him entails deception. The eleventh meaning of “boko”, he says, refers to “English book”. He argues that the classical definition of “boko” has retained its original colonial meaning of deception. Technically speaking, Adamu remarks, Boko Haram implies the “deceptive knowledge which is sinful”, and not “western education is sin”.

Still harping on the meaning of *boko*, Adamu makes reference to the meaning of “book” in the New Dictionary of Hausa Language, which presents four meanings of the word: 1. Ilimin zamani (modern knowledge) 2. Rubutun Hausa da bakaken Romawa (Hausa written in Latin alphabet) 3. Giri (deception, lying) 4. Makirci (guile). Adamu then submits:

Thus Muhammad Yusuf’s lectures and writings were geared precisely towards convincing his followers that knowledge by western idea is false in some aspects, but neither he, nor his followers after his death, ever actually proclaimed that such knowledge is sinful. He thus used the word ‘boko’ in its original Hausa context to mean ‘false’. It is the process of demonizing the movement that created the projected medieval persona of the group as condemning Western education – a fact they found amusing, since they do not only use products of Western technology and knowledge (laptops, arms, explosives), but at one stage they even had a full blown website to

proclaim their ideals. In addition, their attack on Bauchi prison in August 2010 was facilitated by extensive use of Google Map which helped them to map out the prison location and its access roads, and subsequently take strategic locations that hampered counter attack by security agents, as documented in their video release, “Gazqatu Abi Ibrahim” [Abi Ibrahim’s War] (44).

The submissions of Adamu are worthy of pertinent observations. In the first place, Adamu appears at some points to be attacking persons instead of issues. For example, he describes some scholars as “charlatan and marabouts – basing their epistemology on faulty interpretation of Islamic injunctions to deceive their clients – [they] are also “yan boko” (dispensers of deceptive knowledge)” (44). The researcher sees such injurious affronts as not being truly reflective of objective reasoning for an academic. Secondly, Adamu’s arguments appear to be somewhat sympathetic of the Boko Haram sect. Thirdly, he seems rather contradictory in his representation of ideas. Having argued that the term, ‘boko haram’ was the invention of members of the public in describing the sect, he went on to contend that the sect’s original leader, Muhammed Yusuf invented the word ‘boko’ to express the falsity of western thought and practice. Finally, Adamu’s semantics dwells mainly of ‘boko’, leaving out ‘haram’. Moreover, he did not bother about explaining out the meaning of the sect’s chosen name: *Jama’atu Ahlissunnah Lid-da’awati wal Jihad*, implying a “People Committed to the Propagation of the Prophet’s Teachings and Jihad”.

Abba’s understanding of Boko Haram is reminiscent of politics. He sees them as the Islamic sect seeking to impose Sharia legal code in the entire northern Nigeria region. The followers of this sect, he says, are influenced by the Koranic passage that states: “Anyone who is not governed by what Allah has revealed is among the transgressors.” Thus, continues Abba, Boko Haram sect sees it as ‘haram’ or forbidden for any Muslim to partake in politics or social activities that are associated with the West, including receiving secular education,

wearing of shirts and trousers, voting during elections, taking up political appointments, etc. The sect condemns Nigerian president, though himself a Muslim, for the fact that he is partaking in democratic governance seen to reflect western thought (41).

Buttressing Abba's political stance on Boko Haram, Perouse de Montclos maintains that the sect is a political clique, despite its religious shade. He opines:

Despite its religious background, Boko Haram is political in nature because it contests Western values, challenges the secularity of the state, and reveals the corruption of a system that relies on a predatory ruling elite. Yet its leaders have never actually proposed a political programme to establish a caliphate and govern Nigeria according to Sharia law. In this regard, Boko Haram is first and foremost a challenge to a divided 'ummah' that never succeeded in setting up a party to play the democratic game and contest elections with a religious programme instead of resorting to violence as an alternative channel to reform (5).

Many scholars who have written on Boko Haram have bordered their semantics on the public imposed sobriquet, "Boko Haram" rather than the sect's preferred designation as *Jama'atu Ahlissunnah Lid-da'awati wal Jihad*, suggesting they are a "People Committed to the Propagation of the Prophet's Teachings and Jihad". Meanwhile, the members of the sect are not happy that they are being addressed as *boko haram*. This is revealed in a statement released by the Vanguard Newspaper in August 2009, quoting one of the sect's self-acclaimed interim leader, Mallam Sanni Umaru:

Boko Haram does not in any way mean "Western education is forbidden" as the infidel media continue to portray us. Boko Haram actually means "Western Civilization" is forbidden. The difference is that the first gives the impression that we are opposed to formal education coming from the West...which is not true, the second

affirms our belief in the supremacy of Islamic culture (not education), for culture is broader, it includes education but not determined by Western Education (De Montclos 160).

This explains clearly that the members of the sect prefer to be addressed and described by what they truly stand for “ People Committed to the Propagation of the Prophet’s Teachings and Jihad” – a people committed to the propagation of Islam and the teachings of the prophet of Islam through jihad (researcher’s emphasis). Note the following salient points discernable from the sect’s preferred name as stated above: 1. Boko Haram is unarguably an Islamic sect 2. Boko Haram is committed to propagating or spreading Islam widely. This suggests missions or evangelisation. 3. Boko Haram uses Jihad (warfare) as a veritable means of carrying out their missionary mandate. Thus, while there are arguments and counter-arguments on *boko haram* by observers and scholars alike, the sect members are busy championing their course as revealed in their preferred name of “*Jama’atu Ahlissunnah Lid-da’awati wal Jihad*, (People Committed to the Propagation of the Prophet’s Teachings and Jihad).

Over the years, the sect has metamorphosed under various names, such as the *Nigerian Taliban*, *Muhajirun*, *Yusufiyyah* movement, and Boko Haram or Boko Haram Terrorists (BH or BHT). The group, however, prefers to be known and addressed as *Jama’atu Ahlissunnah Lidda’awati wal Jihad*, which the sect adopted publicly as their official address (Onuoha www.e-ir.info). The official name of the group, *Jama’atu Ahlissunnah lidda’awati wal Jihad* (JASLWJ), was formally launched in August 2010, the same time its Islamic agenda was declared. The delay in making this declaration would have been because prior to this time, the group had been engaged in proving its ideological and epistemological stance on various aspects of knowledge with different scholars (Adamu 55).

2.2.2 Ideology of Boko Haram

The main rubric of Boko Haram discuss is their ideology. Ideology here entails philosophy, body of beliefs or principles, set of teaching or doctrine of an individual or group. It is the belief or set of beliefs that a religious, political, moral or philosophical group holds to be true (Redmond 512). Many people have argued that Boko Haram is an ideology. The ideology of Boko Haram requires equitable attention, as everything the group does is determined by their ideology.

Richardson argues that every insurgent or terrorist has at least one formidable or outstanding asset – the ideological power of a cause on which to base his actions. This ideology, he says extensively transforms frustrations and aggressions into a political programme for violence and terrorism, and plays a major role in the development of terrorism. Ideology greatly affects the way people interpret situations; the way they respond; and their choice of strategies for action (cited in Abba 36).

In most occasions, the belief system of religious fanatics is tied up to religious zealotry or terrorism. The religious terrorist usually sees himself as an instrument of justice. He goes on to commit terrorist violence as an act of conscience. He keeps turning to religion as he commits terrorist acts, believing that his activities amount to religious service. Hacker, in this regard notes that:

Some terrorists are quite reconciled, though by no means resigned to the role of martyrs who unlike heroes, do not succeed but failed honourably at least they knew they tried: the unshakable belief that they work, fight and die for purposes transcending their own narrow interest give them that fanatic self-righteousness which makes their often self-destructive acts so destructive, dangerous and contagious (Abba 36).

Larab opines that Boko Haram is just like any other Islamic fundamentalist movements that see “Islam as a comprehensive philosophy with a homogenous entity.” They maintain that attempting to reform part of Qur’an by introducing certain foreign elements could invariably mean destroying it. Larab states further, that the general ideology of Islamic fundamentalism, as seen in Boko Haram run concurrently with the following characteristics:

7. Total rejection of rationality. The fundamentalists instead popularize their own beliefs after fanning up the emotions of the people.
8. They rely on divine power, rejecting human reason to lead the people on the right path.
9. They sternly refuse to compromise their beliefs.
10. They see and regard themselves as the genuine, properly guided adherents of religion, while treating others as their enemies.
11. They are ready to sacrifice their lives for the sake of their beliefs, and are equally prepared to kill their religious opponents or those they consider as opposers.
12. They make fanatical attempts to force their religious opinions or views on other people through violent means (cited in Zakariya 44-45).

Gwamna notes that Islamic fundamentalism took a new turn in the 1970s following the upswing of the Wahhabi Movement in Saudi Arabia, the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, and the Shiite which was propagated by Ayatollah Khomeini of Iran, all of which has resulted to the formation of various terrorist movements in the world today, including the Boko Haram terrorists in Nigeria (69).

Onuoha spells out that the ideology of Boko Haram is deeply rooted in *Salafi Jihadism*, while their actions are compelled by *Takfirism*. Salafism is an aspect of Islam that seeks to purge the religion of every outside influence while striving to return the Muslims to

the kind of Islam which was practiced by those considered as the pious ancestors (Muhammad and the early Islamic community). This kind of Islam emphasises strict adherence to a rigorous interpretation of the Qur'an and the Hadith, aiming to reform the behaviour of every individual Muslim. It equally warns Muslims to change their ways with the strict requirements of the Qur'an. Onuoha observes further that it is only one particular interpretation of *Salafism* that encourages the use of violence in achieving radical change, which is known commonly as *Salafist Jihadism* (160).

Takfirism is another ideological term that goes with the salafist Boko Haram. *Takfir* is Arabic word which means to pronounce an individual or action un-Islamic. Shahzad notes that Takfirism categorises every non-Muslim as *kafir* (infidel), and calls on every true Muslim to vacate or abandon existing societies and settle himself in isolated places or communities, and take up arms and fight infidels (cited in Onuoha 160). This is exactly what Boko Haram followers did in their formative years. Sani reports it this way: “calling themselves Nigerian Taliban, Boko Haram adopted a ‘live-off-the-land’ lifestyle and established a camp in a remote area of northeast Nigeria, which the group dubbed ‘Afghanistan’” (cited in Madueke 45).

Abba affirms that Boko Haram is a local *Salafist* group that turned a *Salafist* Jihadist movement in Nigeria in 2009. The group, he continues, is an Islamic fundamentalist sect opposed to the constitution and every other man made law. They advocate for strict enforcement and application of Sharia law; try to propagate a form of Islam that sees it as forbidden all interactions with Western society; and also fight against traditional Islam and the democratic government of Nigeria. This school of thought interprets everything western as religious deviation and unislamic. They consider western influence on Islamic society as the reason for Islam's weakness in the society. Therefore, they declared western education,

and of course all western institutions as *haram* (forbidden), and as such, must be avoided by all Muslims (50).

Further, Abba explains that the ideology of the sect is clearly spelt out by the two words that make up their popular name – *boko* (western or foreign) and *haram* (forbidden) – which when pieced together forms Boko Haram, meaning to forbid anything western/western education. The motive behind this ideology, Abba reveals is to replace Nigerian secular state with traditional Islamic state, because they feel that western values are opposed to Islamic values. Evil prevalent in the society, they hold is due to the fact that western civilization has been embraced. In order to check the unpleasant situation, therefore, a model Islamic society has to be established by ensuring that secular institutions and systems are destroyed. This ideology accounts for the imposition of Sharia law on modern society, as well as the multiple attacks on state institutions (50-51).

Assenting to the foregoing, Mohammed avers that the pronouncement and emphasis of the sect that western education is prohibited is what translates simply as *Boko Haram* in Hausa language. He stresses that the word, *haram* is primarily an Arabic term which has been adapted into Hausa language to imply anything that is islamically unacceptable (44). In his words, Boko Haram views western secular education to be islamically prohibited. Also, they hold that Christian evangelism, which to them is camouflaged deceptively as western education is islamically rejected. This viewpoint, Mohammed observes is not new in northern Nigeria. This is because, according to him, this perception has always been held in the Muslim north that since western education was brought to the area by Christian missionaries, Muslim children attending such schools would easily convert to Christianity. This he said, has led to strong opposition against western education against western education in northern Nigeria since colonial times.

Boko Haram's ideology of opposing Western education or westernization has encountered several clashes with many Islamic scholars and religious experts. Islamic jurisprudence has categorised all issues and actions that require Islamic verdict (*fatwa*) into two. The first is *Ibadat* (worship and devotion to Allah) the Qur'an and Sunnah of Prophet Muhammad stipulate. The second is *Mu'amalat* which includes other issues not stipulated in *Ibadat*. Boko falls under *mu'amalat* and not *ibadat*. Mohammed argues strongly that advocates of boko haram have the difficult task of explaining their position to the Muslim *ummah*. This is so, according to him, because the responsibility of providing evidence for a ruling on issues of *mu'amalat* rests upon whoever claims a thing is permissible. He states that the best deduction from the viewpoint of Islamic jurisprudence is that *Boko* is *halal* (permissible) except that which may be *haram* (prohibited) within it (45). However, he did not spell out that which could qualify as haram in boko.

In addition, Islamic legal system does not classify knowledge or information on the basis of its cultural or geographical origin. It rather rejects such information or knowledge on the basis that it contradicts the two main sources of Islam; which are the Qur'an and the hadith (Sunnah). Both the Qur'an and the Sunnah unarguably enjoin the Muslims to seek useful knowledge in every field of endeavour. Based on this premise, Mohammed dismisses the impression that boko, education or knowledge can be considered haram, prescribed or prohibited for the singular reason that it is new, modern or western (46). This position is equally expressed by the Da'awah Coordination Council of Nigeria (DCCN). They state that if anything in the contents and method of Boko does not contradict the clear teachings of the Qur'an and the Sunnah or the objectives (*maqasid*) of Sharia, then it cannot be regarded as haram from an Islamic perspective (143).

Isa Ali Ibrahim (Pantami) was the chief Imam of the Abubakar Tafawa Balewa University Central Mosque as at the time he wrote to refute the ideological position of Boko

Haram and called on Muslims to defend Islam from extremists. He observed that the *fatwa* (verdict) issued by Boko Haram which prohibits worldly knowledge (western education), civil service and recognizing the authority of government is contrary to basic established Islamic injunctions, principles and system. His based his argument on the following reasons:

One, the verdict is certainly contrary to that of permanent committee of verdict in Saudi Arabia, volume 12. This is a standing Islamic Committee comprising about 290 members of eminent scholars whose credentials in the different spheres of Islamic Religious Knowledge are impeccable. They give out *fatwah* (judgement) on current issues to the benefit of Muslim ummah. Secondly, the verdict is again contrary to the book authored by Sheik Salman Al-Audah entitled: 'Islam and the Pursuit of Worldly Knowledge.' Thirdly, the Boko Haram verdict is contrary to the teachings of Prophet Muhammad (SWA) and all the pious predecessors. And finally, the methodologies of Ahlus-Sunnah wal Jama'ah popularly known as As-Salafiyya never support the verdict of boko haram (Mohammed 55).

Conversely, to Salim I. Hassan, the Boko Haram movement deserve a hearing from the general public. He argues that people ought to be fair in their understanding and attitude towards Boko Haram. This, he says, is because when the sect declares that boko is haram, they refer to the negative aspects or attributes of western education/westernization. He contends further that all genuine Muslims profess that western education, be it social or natural science is embedded with elements of *kufir* (infidelity) which should be discouraged and suppressed in Islamic schools; while the same treatment should be given to democracy and its constitutional limits. Hassan identifies what he calls basic anti-Islamic and heretical theories and ideas contained in the curriculum of western education and democracy. This includes Charles Darwin's evolution theory, which by his interpretation claims Allah does not exist nor is He an eternal Creator, by suggesting that every human being came through

natural selection. Hassan calls this “typical kufr knowledge.” He goes ahead to explain that “kufr can be best described as secularism, and democracy is a tool or agent through which secularism is being imposed upon nations by the West. By this, he asserts that for the Muslim, the conflict here is the secularism claims that Allah has sovereign power only over the heavens, whereas humankind has sovereign power over the earth. Moreso, he holds that democracy “asserts that man-made laws as embodied in democratic constitution are superior to that of Allah – in obvious discord with Shari’ah”. He calls on all Muslims to rise up, like Boko Haram to the challenge and attack of westernisation on Islam (Mohammed 56-57).

Mohammed observes that when the Boko Haram movement started gathering momentum, the government and Muslim community (ulama) initiated approaches aimed at checking their excesses. Islamic scholars engaged their founder, Mohammad Yusuf on debates and dialogues aimed at convincing him and his followers to withdraw their *fatawah* that boko is haram and discourage further influx of membership to the sect. Those debates, according to Mohammed were counterproductive due to the fact that they were directed at attacking the personality of the sect’s leader than addressing the issues raised. This, he said helped the sect to win more public sympathy and become more strengthened (58). Toing Hassan’s line of argument, therefore, Mohammed makes the following assertions:

In Islam, there is also the danger in branding or condemning the practice of any Muslim or even accusing him of “extremism” if he decides to adopt a hard-line opinion based on juristic judgement through which he seeks Allah’s blessings. In such a situation, he cannot be forced to abandon his choice or make him follow a line of behaviour which is contrary to his convictions. Yet the Qur’an says in this respect: “if you differ on anything among yourselves, refer it to Allah and His Messenger, if you do believe in Allah and the Last Day” Qur’an 4:59. The duty, therefore, remains to appeal to the person with wisdom, argue with him patiently and try to convince him

by citing evidence in the hope that he may change his mind and fall in line with majority view (59).

An analysis of the taped sermons of the founder of Boko Haram, Mohammed Yusuf reveals further the ideology of the sect. The sermons focus on the following issues. 1. Condemning Nigerian constitution and describing it as *dagut* (idolatory). 2. Condemning various aspects of western education. 3. Condemning the government and everything related to it, and regarding anyone who identify with it as an infidel. 4. Accusing Nigerian government of not allowing Islam to be properly practiced (Adamu 43). Adamu adds that the fundamental philosophy of Boko Haram is based on core Islamic values – and entails not accepting anything which does not conform or have a place within the knowledge framework of Islam. He notes that Yusuf’s epistemology is derived from the book authored by Ibn Taymiyyah, titled “The Decisive Criterion between the Allies of the Merciful and the Allies of the Devil”. This book’s content, he said, influenced Yusuf and his followers and “sets the stage for his non-compromising views on the role of secular epistemology in Islamicate social structure” (48). Adamu also reveals that Boko Haram ideology is further contained in a book authored by Mohammed Yusuf himself, titled “*Hazihi Akeedatum wa Minhaju Da’awatuna*” (This is Our Manifesto and Our Path), published in 2009 in Arabic. This book presents the outline of the important features of Yusufiya philosophy. Adamu observes that from a close look at the book, it appears Yusuf’s book drew great inspiration from two other books earlier written by Ibn Taymiyyah, including *Minhaj as-Sunnah an-Nabawiyyah* (The Pathway of as-Sunnah an-Nabawiyyah), and *al-Furqan baina Awliya al-Rahman wa-Awliya al-Shaitan* (The Decisive Criterion between the Allies of the Merciful and the Allies of the Devil). An aspect of Yusuf’s book addressing the “Dangers of Western Schooling” has the following:

According to Darwinism, human beings originated from a small animal which evolved millions of years before becoming human. Subhannallah! This is a big lie! Whereas Allah has detailed how He created human beings from dust and water. This is our belief and on which we base our Islam. The amazing aspects of creation are stated in the Qur'an in many places (Adamu 52).

In another passage of Yusuf's book dwelling on democracy, he wrote:

I am warning you about the troubles of our modern times, especially on democracy, infidel, modern idol to whom its followers worship. We will not accept, interact, or partake in this democracy because it is the path of the infidels; following it, interacting with it and using it is following the path of the infidel. It is prohibited for any Muslim to be in it, or to elect an infidel under the system of democracy (Adamu 53).

Many debates and dialogues took place between the founder of Boko Haram, Yusuf and prominent Islamic scholars both in Saudi Arabia and northern Nigeria (Mohammed 64). Notable among those debates are those led by Malam Isa Ibrahim Pantami (Pantami debate), Imam of Abubakar Tafawa Balewa University of Technology, Bauchi on Sunday, 25 June 2006. Another is the one led by Ustaz Idris Abdul'Aziz of Jama'at Izalatul al Bidiah Wa Ikamat and al-Sunnah, which took place in February 2008 (Adamu 45-46). The first debate lasted for two hours, forty eight minutes and fifty one seconds (02:48:51). The debate was to determine the acceptability or otherwise of western education and democracy within the ambit of Islamic culture. The debate ended in a stalemate, with each of the scholars maintaining his position. While Pantami argued that westernization could be allowed within Islamic precincts, Yusuf opposed that, stating that western education and anything that has to do with the government is haram (46-49). "Consequently, any form of organized modern

secular education is considered sinful in Islam because of its potentials in aiding immorality” (52).

In Yusuf’s debate with Ustaz Idris Abdul’Aziz, Idris asked him to give a categorical answer if boko is haram or halal? Yusuf’s answer was a straightforward one: “western education as taught in the kinds of schools we have in Nigeria is haram”. He continues:

There are aspects of western education as taught in our schools that make it haram. The mixing of opposite sexes makes it haram. The importance given to some non-Muslim days in the schools’ calendar (Saturday being Jewish holiday and Sunday being Christian holiday) also makes it haram. Allah in the Qur’an said He created man from clay but its disputation by evolutionary theory makes it haram, even bordering on shirk. And the claim in western education that there are nine planets also contradicts what Allah says, thereby making it haram (57).

It is a plain fact that the emergence of the ideology of Boko Haram has posed a very serious challenge to the peace, unity and corporate existence of Nigeria. It is therefore, not the best to ignore this ideology. This glaring challenge should be studied, analysed and properly understood from all angles of ramification. Then a wise and practical approach at addressing it should be articulated. Proffering modifications or alternatives on rational issues highlighted could make for better management and existence than the present use of force and suppression prevalent in the country.

2.2.3 Leadership, Organizational Structure and Membership of Boko Haram

Leadership

The group popularly known today as Boko Haram was primarily being headed by one Mallam Abubakar Lawal under the name, Shabab Muslim Youth Organization with its base

in Indimi mosque, along Damboa road, Maiduguri. Lawal led the group from 1995 till the time he departed Maiduguri to the University of Medina, Saudi Arabia for further studies (Baba 44). The group came under the supervision of other Muslim clerics until 1997 when Muhammed Yusuf was chosen to be their new leader because he was seen by older clergies to be a vibrant young man who possessed the necessary qualities that could help him cope with the rigours of handling the group. It was not long, however, before Yusuf had a fall out with the other clergies of the mosque, who he accused of corruption and improper interpretation of the Qur'an. He quickly started changing the teachings of the group to assume a hard-line Islamic position (Ibrahim 20).

Ustaz Abu Yusuf Muhammad Yusuf (29 January 1970-30 July 2009) was a native of Jakusko, Yusufari Local Government Area (LGA) of Yobe state, Nigeria (Mohammed 107). Yusuf was the spiritual leader of the Yusufiya Movement (Boko Haram) which his followers named after him. He was a product of Tsangaya (Qur'anic school). He became so involved in Islamic youth activities early in his preaching life. Sheik Mahmud Jafaar, a prominent Saudi-trained Islamic scholar in Maiduguri who strengthened an existing Ahl-Sunna group that preached against innovations in Islam had a very strong early influence on Yusuf and other teaming youths who got attracted to his group, Shababul Islam (Islamic Youth Vanguard), which Yusuf eventually emerged as the leader of its youth wing. Yusuf and his Maiduguri youths became engrossed in the anti-Western and anti-Jewish preaching of a United Kingdom based Islamic scholar, Sheik Abdullah al-Faisal (born Trevor William Forrest) to the disappointment of Sheik Jafaar and other superior clerics of Ahl-Sunna, leading to Yusuf parting ways with them and setting up his own mosque in Maiduguri city (43).

Abubakar reveals that Yusuf got his Qur'anic education in Niger Republic and Sudan (though some add Chad) where he allegedly got radicalised (6). Marchal corroborates that Yusuf's religious orientation came from a Kano based Islamic scholar, Sheik Jafar Mahmud,

and Sheik Abubakar Gumi of the Izala group who was a strict adherent of the Salafi group and a disciple of the renowned Ibn Tamiyya. The Izala movement, which stood against every form of innovation in Islam, was formed in Jos, Plateau state under Sheik Ismaila Idris (1937-2000).

Madueke informs that Mallam Muhammad Yusuf started the Boko Haram movement due to the general dissatisfaction and concerns being expressed by various Muslims in Nigeria against western thought, dressing and political system and the attendant negative impact on the Nigerian society. Thus, in an effort to reverse the perceived negative trends, Yusuf built his model mosque and school where he started the indoctrination of puritanical Islamic values (46). He founded and led the Boko Haram sect until 30th July 2009, the day he died in the hands of Nigerian security personnel in what has been described as questionable circumstances or extrajudicial killing.

On the demise of Yusuf, his deputy, the notorious imam Abubakar Shekau took up leadership of the group and directed their affairs until August 2016, when Abu Musab al-Barnawi took over from him. Meanwhile, under the leadership of Shekau, factions emerged within the sect. These include the Abubakar Shekau led faction, Abu Qaqa led faction, Abu Musab al-Barnawi's faction, Mamman Nur led faction, and the Ansaru splinter group. There may be some other groups that are not yet reported. The two main rival factions, however, are those led by Shekau and al-Barnawi (africanarguments.org/2016/09/20making-sense-of-boko-harams-differdnt-factions/). These factions emerged due to operational strategy, ideological difference and ethnic identity. Abu Qaqa controlled one of the factions before he was captured in 2013 by security operatives. During interrogation, he disclosed that Abubakar Shekau was too protective of the Kanuri, and would always select non-Kanuri for suicide attacks. Refusal to embark on such a mission, he said would warrant death penalty. This affected membership and alienated members from other tribes, leading to the formation

of Abu Qaqa's faction. Meanwhile, fundamental Islamic ideology, Kanuri ethnic identity and manipulation of the historical narrative of the Kanem-Borno Empire's heritage - three inseparable factors have played significant roles in the recruitment, establishment and expansion of Boko Haram in Nigeria. These factors have also led to the factions and affected leadership in the group today (www.religionandpolitics.org/boko-haram).


Organisational Structure of Boko Haram

Boko Haram has an effective organizational structure and a functional networking within its ranks. By their structure, the *Amir ul-Aam* is the overall spiritual leader and Commander in chief of the group. He works with two deputies (*Na'ib Amir ul-Aam I and II*). Every state where they operate has one *Amir (leader/commander)* who is in charge of the state. Each Local Government Area has an *Amir*. All other followers/fighters are organized and operate under the Local Government *Amirs*, according to their various roles as servants, police, soldiers, et cetera. Also, the *Amir ul-Aam* has under his leadership the *Shura* Council, which is the highest decision making cabinet that oversees the entire affairs of the group (Da'awah Cordination Council of Nigeria (DCCN) 14). Prior to his death in 2009, Muhammed Yusuf was the *Na'ib Amir ul-Aam*, a position that Abubakar Shekau, one of his deputies occupied on his demise.

The sect has *amirs*, cells and units in northern Nigerian states as well as in some neighbouring countries of Cameroon, Chad and Niger Republic. In its early stage, Boko Haram had about 22 zonal/state commanders in Nigeria, some of which included Babagana Mustapha (Yobe), Ibrahim Bazan (Borno), Musa Mohammed (Adamawa), Mohammed Awwal (Kano), Isa Kumbia (Gombe), Mohammed Sani Sambo (Kaduna), Abubakar Habib (Katsina), and Abubakar Mohammed (Bauchi) (Oloja 3). Muhammed Yusuf was the *Amir ul-Aam*, a position that Abubakar Shekau, one of his deputies occupied after the death of Yusuf

in 2009. Shekau inherited this structure, but perhaps modified it to maintain a loose command-and-control structure that allows autonomous operation. The group operates from interlinked cells; however, receive directives from a general commander (Onuoha 160).

Figure 1: Hypothetical Organizational Structure of Boko Haram



Source: <https://rampages.us/bokoharam/wp-content/uploads/sites/7589/2015/07/bokoH-1.png> accessed on 26 August 2017

Membership of Boko Haram

The membership of Boko Haram is drawn from diverse geographical enclaves and professional diversities, both within and outside Nigeria. There are those members from northern Nigeria of such backgrounds as dissatisfied and alienated young people,

unemployed graduates, students, *almajirai*, and also wealthy businessmen, politicians and civil servants. A good number of them were students in their secondary and tertiary institutions who had to abandon their academic pursuit to dedicate themselves fully to Yusuf's teachings and movement. Those who had graduated from different fields of study had to destroy their certificates as a proof of total allegiance to the group. Muhammad Yusuf was equally able to pull to his fold some important figures in the government of his day, such as Alhaji Buji Foi, a two-term Local Government Chairman, also an honourable commissioner who served under the administration of former governor Ali Modu Sheriff of Borno State, Dr Kida from University of Maiduguri Teaching Hospital and many business moguls from Borno state and beyond. One of the members unveiled that Mallam Yusuf, as they called him, would always serve tea, chewing stick, et cetera to those who visited him; and once such things were taken, the one who took it would mindlessly become his follower due to the fact that those items contained charms that could easily turn a person to his pawn (Ibrahim 21). The group also draws its members from the neighbouring African countries of Chad, Niger, Cameroun, and Sudan, which are nations where they have their presence (161).

Many people believe that a significant part of the foot soldiers of Boko Haram are made up of the *almajirai* (plural of *almajiri*). Though there is no empirical data to substantiate this claim, the *almajiri* have been usually "associated with Islamic radicalization, militancy, and the periodic riots that have blighted many northern Nigerian cities." The *almajirai* are pupils in traditional Qur'anic schools, mostly boys and young men who wander about begging of alms (Hoechner 63). In 2012, the *Newswatch* magazine published the comments of Wole Soyinka on the harmfulness of the *almajirai* in Boko Haram terrorism. Describing Boko Haram as the "butchers of Nigeria", Soyinka dirges that they have:

Been deliberately bred, nurtured, sheltered, rendered pliant, obedient to only one line of command, ready to be unleashed at the rest of society. They were bred in

madrassas and are generally known as the almajiris. From knives and machetes, bows and poisonous arrows they graduated to AK-47s, homemade bombs, and explosive packed vehicles (cited in Hoechner 64).

Some scholars, such as Hoechner question what they see as unfounded stigmatization of the *almajirai*, while some other scholars decry the vulnerability of the *almajiri* to radical activities. Awofeso, Ritchie and Degeling identified four characteristics of the almajirai which Boko Haram terrorists and other radical movements could easily take advantage of. 1. It involves children being separated or relocated from their family members and friends to the guardianship of Mallams in various towns. 2. The practice is almost exclusively restricted to boys. 3. The curriculum of those schools is primarily concerned with rote memorization of the sixty six chapters of the Qur'an. 4. Each of the schools keeps 25 to 500 pupils at a time, ranging from ages 6 to 25. Moreover, these schools are generally independent of government supervision and control (314). Onuoha affirms that the almajirai are extremely vulnerable to religious extremism and financial inducement, given their poor economic, social and religious status (163).

The Boko Haram sect has had in its membership, in addition to the almajirai, some influential, wealthy and well-educated Nigerian followers. This includes Bunu Wakil (a very wealthy contractor based in Borno), Kadiru Atiku (former University lecturer), and Alhaji Buji Foi (ex-commissioner in Borno state). The strength of Boko Haram's membership is not publically known, though Adele projected in 2011 about 1.5 million followers, which Onuoha describes as "outrageous" (163). The major recruitment strategy is through indoctrination. Adamu reports that within a period of seven years (1999-2006), Yusuf had successfully indoctrinated over 2000 youths who resigned their appointments, abandoned tertiary education or tore their certificates to embrace petty businesses while imbibing Yusuf's ideology (44). Recruitment has also been done through kidnapping, prison jail breaks

where escapees were co-opted into the sect, and by the use of the internet in propagating their ideologies.

2.2.4 Funding of Boko Haram

Onuoha has identified four sources of fund to the Boko Haram sect. These include dues, donations, external funding, and bank robberies (163). Prior to Muhammad Yusuf's death, each member of the Yusufiya movement paid to Yusuf, their leader a daily levy of one hundred naira. Most of the members then were petty traders, peasant farmers, road-side car washers, and cyclists. Some of the motorcycles were believed to belong to Yusuf himself, which yielded him regular returns. Since Yusuf's death, however, the sect's activities have become very secretive, thereby hampering investigation into the economic life of Boko Haram adherents, or whether or not members still pay dues.

In terms of donations to the support of Boko Haram activities, some notable Nigerian politicians, businessmen, individuals and organisations have been accused. The Nigeria Police Force, on 5 January 2011, celebrated the arrest of Bunu Wakil and 91 others. Wakil, a very wealthy contractor from Borno state was alleged to be a principal Boko Haram financier. Also, the state security operatives on 21 November 2011 arrested Senator Mohammed Ali Ndume, a senator representing Borno South Senatorial District who was arraigned subsequently before a High Court in Abuja for maintaining ties with and sponsoring Boko Haram (Onuoha 164). Little wonder the immediate past Nigerian president, Goodluck Ebele Jonathan allayed that Boko Haram had pervaded the entire strata of the society.

Boko Haram is also alleged to be receiving fund from foreign terrorist groups. Muhammed Yusuf and Mohammed Damagun were tried in 2007 for offences related to terrorism. Damagun, the proprietor of Daily Trust newspapers was arraigned before an Abuja High Court on a three count charge, including that he: 1. was a member the Nigerian Taliban;

2. received a total of 300,000USD from Al-Qaeda for recruiting and training Nigerians in Mauritania for terrorist activities; 3. was supporting terrorists in Nigeria. Similarly, Mohammed Yusuf was arraigned on a five count charges which border on receiving funds from Al-Qaeda terrorists operating in Pakistan for the purpose of recruiting local terrorists to train and attack foreigners in Nigeria, especially Americans. Also, Abul Qaqa, a self-proclaimed spokesperson of Boko Haram explicitly declared to the *Guardian* newspaper that the Boko Haram terrorists are spiritual disciples of Al-Qaeda and late Osama bin Laden, and that Mohammed Abubakar Shekau, their leader had in August 2011 met with leaders of Al-Qaeda in Saudi Arabia to receive all the technical and financial supports they required. Some people, however, doubt the authenticity of this claim and see it as a propaganda aimed at creating more tension. Likewise, during the prosecution of Kabiru Abubakar Dikko Umar, also known as Kabiru Sokoto, the mastermind of the Christmas Day Bombing of a church in Madalla, Niger state, before an Abuja Federal High Court, a prosecution witness stated that Sokoto revealed in his statement that the insurgents receive fund from an Islamic group based in Algeria, called *Musilimi Yaa'maa*, and that those funds had led to the disintegration of Boko Haram, due to quarrels over the sharing formula (Onuoha 164-5).

Furthermore, Boko Haram engages in criminality to raise fund for their operations. They operate on the principle of *Fai*, by which the terrorists argue to justify the robbery of banks, jewellery stores and other financial outlets to support their jihadist violence. Sheriff Shettima, a member of a notorious robbery gang made confessions after his arrest by the police in 2011 that his gang had carried out several robbery operations in Borno state in order to raise fund for Boko Haram activities. Such operations included the raiding of Damboa branch of First Bank Nigeria Plc., on October 2011, where they made away with 21 million naira and killed a policeman. In 2011 alone, out of about 100 bank robberies in Nigeria, over 30 attacks were attributed to Boko Haram. While confirming this, Kabiru Sokoto further

revealed that Boko Haram raises fund for their operations through robbery; and the proceeds of the robbery are shared into five for the following groups: 1. The leaders (used for the prosecution of the jihad) 2. The robbers who bring the money 3. *Zakat* 4. Widows of those who have died in the jihad 5. The less privileged (165).

This practice raises serious ethical questions. What is the moral basis of “robbing Peter to pay Paul”? Could the robbery be justified because they share the loot with the less privileged? Are the recipients of such “alms” not as guilty as the raiders? If the robbery should amount to piety, would Allah accept such as devotion? The researcher submits that the morality of the Boko Haram jihadists is seriously to question. Moreover, with heightened security around the banks today, it could be observed that the terrorists would have turned to other forms of criminality to raise fund for their escapades, such as kidnapping, illicit arms deal, pipeline vandalism, car theft, human trafficking, drugs trafficking, and even ransomware (internet hijacking).

2.2.5 Historical Development of Boko Haram

The incubation of the Boko Haram sect in northern Nigeria dates back to 1995. The transformation of the organisation to an armed, complex and violent movement, however, could be traced to various incidents that led up to the general election in Nigeria in 2003. When the original founder of the group, Abubakar Lawan, departed Nigeria to Saudi Arabia for further studies, Muhammad Yusuf was appointed as the new leader by a committee of clerics in 2002. Subsequently, Muhammed Yusuf overthrew the clerics, accusing them of corruption and poor interpretation of the Qur'an (Onuoha 165). Following the altercation that ensued, he withdrew with his followers and sympathisers from the others and built his mosque complex in Maiduguri called *Ibn Taimiyya Masjid* or *Markaz Ibn Taimmiya*. The mosque was named after Ibn Taymmyia, a fiery medieval Islamic scholar who maliciously

criticised and condemned various Islamic sects, such as the Sufis, Shia and the ruling Sunni elite in his days. By naming his mosque after a prominent *Salafist jihadist*, Yusuf also demonstrated his hatred to the ruling Muslim elite of his day, as well as his disapproval to the traditional Islam being practiced in Nigeria. He started preaching puritanical sermons supposedly aimed at calling Muslims back to Islam as spelt out in the Qur'an and Hadith/Sunnah. He took up an ideology which abhors western education and sciences; blaming the failure prevalent in the society on the corrupt ruling class, whom he called *yan boko*, meaning present day elites who were educated at secular schools. The sect maintain that the Nigerian system as being exemplified by the *yan boko* is secular, unjust, corrupt and lacks divine origin or authority, and is so totally unislamic.

Three overlapping and yet distinct phases are discernible in the historical development of the Boko Haram movement. The first is the Kanama phase (2003-05), when they fought the Nigerian state but were suppressed by the security forces. The second is the *dawah* phase, which started with the Kanama upheaval and ended with the suppression of the group in July 2009. The third phase, which could be termed the terrorist phase, started with the suppression of the group and killing of their leaders by Nigerian security forces in 2009, and has continued till date (Muhammed, Kyari 10).

2.2.5.1 The Kanama Phase (2003-05)

Islamic thought and identity in Nigeria is derived from the Sufi brotherhoods of Qadiriyya and Tijaniyya, basically due to the historical role played by Kanem-Borno and Sokoto caliphates in spreading Islam. The Sufi orders and the Izala (*Izalatul Bidi'a wa Ikamatis Sunnah* – People Committed to the Removal of innovations in Islam) are obviously the major dominant Muslim modes of identity (11). The disdain for western education has always characterised the Muslim north since the colonial era. The colonialists equally took

advantage of this to under educate the northern Nigerians. Due to the fact that the British did not have the intention of proper education in Nigeria, they produced a very low cadre of western educated elites among the northerners. The aim of colonial education, mostly in northern Nigeria was just to maintain existing status quo, whereby they imparted limited education to the children of the aristocratic class, while neglecting the commoners (Tukur 886). Thus, in the course of time, the children of the aristocratic class who had western education emerged above their counterparts who had Qur'anic education to assume leadership position and control economic resources. Mohammed reports that:

This was the origin of the animosity and distrust between the traditionally educated and Western-educated elite in Northern Nigeria. Though subordinate to the Europeans, these educated elites were perceived as collaborators by their Arabic educated fellows. Thus antagonism towards Western education continues in many northern Nigerian communities, which have defied government campaigns for enrolment to this day. Mohammed Yusuf simply resurrected and built on an existing historical narrative (11-12).

In its formative stage, the Boko Haram followers withdrew from the mainstream society they considered evil and corrupt. They started living far away from the urban landscape of Maiduguri, in the rural village of Kanama, Yunusari Local Government Area (LGA) of Yobe state, north-eastern Nigeria in 2003. This was in a bid to intellectualise, radicalise and attempt the revolutionary process that would eventually lead to the overthrow of the Nigerian government. The choice of the village, Kanama as a base camp was for security and military reasons. It was quite remote and easily defensible. The camp was thickly forested and located between two water bodies close to the border of Nigeria and Niger. The jihadists dug trenches and laid camouflages across the two major roads between Kanama and Niger Republic, using sandbags to reinforce their defences. Then began their

initial attacks between 21 December 2003 and January 2004 on police stations and government owned buildings, where they caused a lot of havoc in Yunusari, Borsari, Tarmuwa, Geidam, and Damaturu LGAs of Yobe state (12). Cook reports that between January and September 2004, the group resurfaced and attacked Damaturu, capital of Yobe state, and Damboa, Bama, and Gwoza in the neighbouring Borno state, attacking police stations and attempting to force prison breaks (10). They took twelve policemen captive in Kala Balge in October 2004 and nothing has been heard about those hostages. They eventually settled at the top of Mandara Mountains, from where they were fought and dislodged by Nigerian military with the aid of artillery shells.

These attacks were led by Muhammed Ali, a Nigerian believed to have been radicalised in Saudi Arabia, and alleged to have fought together with the *mujahideen* in Afghanistan. By this time, the group referred to themselves as the “Nigerian Taliban”. The role of Muhammad Yusuf, along with Abu Umar and Ibrahim Abdulganiyu was talent spotting, recruitment and indoctrination of members. Muhammed Yusuf, however, escaped to Saudi Arabia where he remained throughout the Kanama uprising. On his return from his self-imposed exile in Saudi Arabia in 2005, the sect members who survived the Kanama adventure re-joined him and boosted the *Yusufiyya* movement. Mohammed Ali is considered one of those who introduced Muhammad Yusuf into militant jihadi ideology, making Yusuf to drop his mainstream Islamic rhetoric for destructive violence in 2005 (Mohammed, Kyari 13).

2.2.5.2 The *Dawah* Phase

The *dawah* phase refers to the period between the Kanama debacle and the suppression of Boko Haram by Nigerian security forces in July 2009. During a pilgrimage in Saudi Arabia in 2005, there was a peaceful agreement between Muhammad Yusuf and the

Borno state government, which was brokered by the then deputy governor, Adamu Shettima Dibal and Sheik Ja'far Mahmud Adam. Sheik Adam reported that Yusuf denied being a party to the Kanama uprising and swore to discontinue preaching inciting messages. Based on this truce, Yusuf was permitted to return to Nigeria, where he continued his preaching within and outside Maiduguri, Borno state capital. From this time to July 2009, the *Yusufiya* movement referred to itself as *dawah*, identifying its mission as returning to the *Ahlus Sunnah wal Jama'a* (Adherents to the *Sunnah* and the Company of the Muslims); while referring to its members as "brothers". Their official address, Ahlus Sunnah liddawa'ati wal Jihad came in force after the prison break in Bauchi in September 2010 (Adamu 32).

The term, *dawah*, according to Sivan, is an important issue in radical Islam. He states that *dawah* is the:

Islamic term which denotes a combination of propaganda, education, medical and welfare action – and its practitioners. Yet the *da'wah* has an importance beyond that of being a possible cradle for violence. It is bringing about change in the many Muslim societies, and sometimes plays a role – albeit indirect – in politics (27).

Yusuf's *dawah* was centred on his followers, who believed totally in their leader and in the genuineness of their cause. He prepared their mind ahead with his sermons, stating that "in this *dawah* we agreed that we are going to suffer... anyone who dies in the process goes to paradise. This is our *dawah* (Mohammed, Kyari 15). In another sermon he preached on 30 June 2006, he declared the following to his followers:

In the process they will abuse you, call you names and some of you may even die. They will shoot some of you, and we will just pray "may Allah give you *aljana* [Paradise] and proceed without any qualms. Can we endure? We ought to endure.

May Allah give us the will to endure. This is how our *dawah* is ...even if we die in the process, this *dawah* will continue – even after a hundred years (15).

The *dawah* phase of Boko Haram metamorphosis was devoted to extensive recruitment, proselytism and radicalisation of the followers. Equally observed are destructive criticisms of the secular system; debates and counter debates on the propriety or otherwise of secularism, democracy, western education or westernisation with opposing *Ulama* (Muslim cleric); and constant criticism of the bad governance and corruption experienced under Governor Ali Modu Sheriff (2003-2011) of Borno state. Also condemned is the wealth and extravagant spending of Western-educated elites in the midst of the poor and helpless (10).

Kyari Mohammed identifies that the following major planks of Yusuf's narratives characterise the *dawah* phase, which are quite reminiscent of the jihad ideology of the puritan Salafi scholar, Ahmad Ibn Taymiyya (1268-1328 CE): 1. The concept of *taghut* (idolatry), considering as *taghut*, secularism, partisan politics, democracy – and any form of judicial, legislative and executive function that derives from a secular constitution instead of Shariah law. 2. Western education and westernisation. 3. Working for a unislamic government (civil service); and 4. Repudiating the charge of Kharijism as levelled against the sect by the *Ulama*, especially Yusuf's former Wahabbi group in Maiduguri. These positions resulted into the clashes between Boko Haram movement and Nigerian security forces, which culminated in the 2009 fracas (15).

2.2.5.3 The Terrorist Phase

The third phase of Boko Haram history started with the military suppression of the group in 2009, leading to the death of their founder, Muhammad Yusuf and other leaders and members of the sect by the hands of Nigerian security agents. Boko Haram withdrew from public domain, hibernated, regrouped, and surfaced again in 2010 with such a destructive

vengeance that has laid the nation bare till date. It was within this period that the sect was declared a terrorist organisation by the United States of America. While blaming the security forces for high-handedness, Onuoha opines that the way the 2009 revolt was repressed by the Nigerian state proved to be a critical factor in the deadly escalation of Boko Haram's violent attacks (169).

Continuing Onuoha's argument, Mohammed, Kyari adduced that "the metamorphosis of Boko Haram from a *dawah* to an arms-bearing sect was in part the making of security agents" (23). He regrets that there was no known attempt made by the government to understand, analyse and give attention to the issues raised by the group which border on political and socio-economic failures in the society. Mohammed's analysis of the factors that led to the Boko Haram sect becoming violent at this stage could be outlined in the following order.

1. Boko Haram's contest over the ownership of a mosque at Monguno, Borno state which started in 2008. Boko Haram followers were thrown out of the mosque because Izala could not dissuade Yusuf from his firm religious convictions. On their way to reclaim the mosque, about 67 boko haram followers, including Abubakar Shekau, were arrested and locked up at Maiduguri prison by state security agents, seemingly at Izala's instigation. Muhammad Yusuf, who vowed to revenge this affront, encouraged his followers to use the prison to convert and proselytise other inmates to their fold.
2. Operation Flush II, a Borno state based joint military outfit was established primarily to combat armed banditry in the state. Operation Flush had severally harassed Boko Haram members while going or returning from carrying out their *dawah* (preaching activities). Operation Flush had also

stopped the movement of motorcycles at night, which brought about a serious misunderstanding between the sect members and the security men, leading to the shooting and wounding of 17 boko Haram men while they were going to bury their members who died in automobile accident at Gwanje cemetery in June 2009. With the subsequent denial of medication to the sect members wounded in that clash, Yusuf and his men saw this as a declaration of war. This precipitated violence at Maiduguri.

3. The death of Yusuf while in the hands of security personnel coupled with a massive onslaught and killing of Boko Haram members and the video footage by local media and Aljazeera further helped in radicalising the group. Many who survived went for further military training; some melted into the society for intelligence, while others went underground to plan resurgence. This is added to the destruction of Boko Haram headquarters complex, *Markaz Ibn Taymiyyah*, which was razed to the ground (22-24).

With their resurgence, Boko Haram fighters have carried out countless targeted and indiscriminate attacks on perceived opponents, politicians, security operatives and civil population. They have even bombed high profile targets at Abuja, such as Nigeria Police Force headquarters and United Nations offices in June and August 2011 respectively. The more the military crackdown on them intensifies the more ruthless, desperate and terroristic they become.

2.3 ETHICAL ISSUES IN BOKO HARAM'S RELIGIOUS TERRORISM

Global Terrorism Index report of 2015 ranked Boko Haram, the Nigeria based religious terrorist organisation as the world's most dangerous and deadliest terrorist group in the year 2014. According to the report, the Boko Haram religious terrorist attacks were

responsible for the death of 6, 644 persons in 2014. The deaths came from 453 attacks of Boko Haram on people mainly in Nigeria, as well as in Cameroon and Chad. The number of people killed by Boko Haram in 2014 was higher than those killed by the dreaded Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), which stood at 6073, making ISIS to be rated the second deadliest terrorist organisation in the world for that year. The report further revealed that Nigeria recorded the highest increased number of deaths from terrorism ever recorded in one year period, in 2014 with 7512 deaths, against the recorded 1850 deaths in 2013. This stands for 300 per cent increase in deaths (Botha et al 1).

The 2016 report of United Nations Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF) equally stated that in year 2015, about 1.3 million children from Nigeria, Cameroon, Niger and Chad were displaced following Boko Haram activities. This is in addition to the over 270 kidnapped Chibok School girls and 44 cases where children were used for suicide bombing attacks in 2015 (UNICEF <http://files.unicef.org/>). Various sources have given different death figures caused by Boko Haram since they came into the public space in 2002. Some have recorded 20000 to 35000 deaths, while Kashim Shettima, Borno State governor estimated 100000 deaths (The Nigeria Security Tracker www.fas.org/sgp/crs/). While much of the deaths and destructions occurred in north-east states of Adamawa, Borno and Yobe, other states, such as Plateau State had equally experienced different levels, intensity and frequency of Boko Haram religious terrorist attacks.

Meanwhile, scholars have been forced to brainstorm on the morality or ethical issues in Boko Haram terrorism. Obi and Ezeogu assert that Boko Haram religious terrorism has raised lots of ethical questions, stating that a major moral challenge with Boko Haram terrorism is in the methods they choose to carry out their violent activities (185). To Kainz, when questions are asked on the morality of terrorism or suicide bombing, some tend to justify it, stating that these are acts of desperation by people who are oppressed and forced to

take up extreme defensive measures. The question, however is, if terrorist attack is the only available option to an oppressed people? Have they considered, tried and exhausted other reasonable options? It is quite unfortunate that some religious leaders interpret suicide terrorism as “martyrdom,” thus enticing their naïve followers with a supposed heavenly reward. One may then ask, if suicide bombing is as much rewarding in the afterlife as it is being portrayed, why is it that the religious leaders who propagate such teachings are not the first to blow themselves up in order to exhibit leadership by example? When questioned on the killing of innocent civilians, the defenders of suicide terrorism argue that there are no non-combatants in their struggle. Thus, Kainz asserts that morality is useless to the Boko Haram terrorist who does not see any difference between religion and ethics (29). The Boko Haram considers sharia as the final authority, and so believes he has the religious mandate to carry out terrorist act.

Seto opines that the question about the morality of Boko Haram religious terrorism is worth asking for three reasons. First, a clear answer to Boko Haram religious terrorism may convince many people to join in the fight against terrorism, and dissuade those who intend to join the terrorists. Secondly, could terrorist acts be justified by the context in which such acts occur? Thirdly, when a terrorist act is described as immoral, the question that arises is if terrorism is implicitly moral. This also includes a mirror question, if adjudging an act as terrorism is moral. Seto asserts that terrorists believe that they are pursuing a righteous cause, and that their actions are both justified and moral. The terrorists are just like other criminals who know that what they do to others is wrong, and they go ahead to do it. Seto further asks, if terrorists believe that they are right, while other people believe they are wrong, whose position is right? He argues that if terrorists are to lay any claim to morality, they must include a communicative component. This implies that the terrorists need to state the cause of the unfairness, distress, pain, grief, injustice, and suffering they cause the public before

carrying out such actions. Failure to do so weakens any claim to morality the terrorist may make. Going about to kill people and bomb places is totally unwarranted, unjustified, unnecessary and unreasonable (Seto digitacommons.imu.edu/).

Madson is of the opinion that suicide terrorism is the weapon of the weak against a superior and more powerful enemy. He quoted the General Secretary of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad:

“Our enemy possesses the most sophisticated weapons in the world and its army is trained to a very high standard...We have nothing with which to repel the killing and thuggery against us except the weapon of martyrdom. It is easy and costs us only our lives...human bombs cannot be defeated, not even by nuclear bombs (190).”

The argument above is that Boko Haram terrorists consider the Nigeria state to be too strong and more sophisticated. To be able to fight the government favourably, suicide bombing and sporadic attacks become reasonable or rational options to the terrorists in their struggle. It then becomes necessary to ask if morality is identical with rationality. Does an action become moral because it is the most rational thing to be done? Is reason the determinant of morality? The question of Boko Haram religious terrorism puts us in a very serious ethical dilemma.

Lending his contribution to the discussion on the ethical issues in Boko Haram terrorism, Asthappan stated that the natural survival instinct of the human person would stop an individual from endangering himself. However, it is an exception to this natural human drive that may explain why terrorists logically kill themselves in order to kill others. Asthappan argues further that death in itself cannot be accepted at an experimental level, as it must be rationalised as the religious transition from temporal earthly life to eternal life (15). Enders and Sandler added that suicide bombers could be considered rational when “the utility

obtained from living with the current state of affairs is less than that obtained by a life-ending action” (18).

The nature of Boko Haram religious terrorism has indeed, raised a lot of ethical concerns. The terrorists attacked their victims through guerrilla tactics, shooting, assassination, planting explosive in crowded places, suicide bombing, and use of women and children in suicide attacks. The terrorists kill people arbitrarily, including soldiers, police and innocent civilians. Their terrorist activities have also brought about the destruction of economic and social activities, internally displaced persons problems, environmental pollution, among other detrimental effects. The terrorist activities of Boko Haram have caused many people psychological trauma, stress, high blood pressure, hopelessness, frustration, and desperation. Many bread winners are no more able to provide for their families. People live in fear and anxiety. Many people have lost sight of their ancestral homes. Crime, such as theft, house breaking and robbery are on the increase because the sources of livelihood of many young people have been destroyed. Also, some women practice begging or prostitution in order to survive.

In ethical terms, therefore, the Boko Haram’s religious terrorism state of affairs could be best described in the words of Martin Luther King Jr., as a “midnight within the moral order”, where “moral principles have lost their distinctiveness” (Strength of Love 491). African ethics encourages love, peace, brotherliness, good neighbourliness, unity and harmony and discourages fighting, murder, enmity, discord, disunity, killing or bloodshed. Even when war becomes inevitable, the battle is between the warriors, as it is considered a sacrilege and against African war ethics to kill the children, women, and the elderly. Elechi Amadi buttresses that Nigerian social ethics abhors murder, theft, adultery, rape, kidnapping and similar vices, which characterise Boko Haram religious terrorism (32). The ethics of Christianity and Islam also uphold same injunctions. God, Himself, who the Boko Haram

terrorists claim to serve and fight for forbids murder. God's biblical injunctions clearly forbid and condemn the activities of the religious terrorists in the following order: "You shall not murder. You shall not commit adultery. You shall not steal. You shall not bear false witness against your neighbor. You shall not covet" (Exodus 20:13-17, New King James Version). All these vices, however, characterize the conducts of the Boko Haram religious terrorists, who have been killing innocent and helpless people in Plateau state.

A good example of Boko Haram's terrorist attacks on the people of Plateau state is what happened at Dogo Nahawa, a suburb of Jos where about 400 people were brutally killed, mostly women, little children and the elderly. Another instance is the massacre of over 140 persons at Maseh village in Riyom Local Government Area on Sunday, July 8, 2012 during the mass burial of 64 victims of terrorism who were killed the previous day. Two prominent Nigerian law makers who attended the mass burial died in the ensued stampede, including Gyang Dantong, a senator representing Plateau North senatorial district and Gyang Fulani, who represented Barkin Ladi constituency in Plateau state House of Assembly. Chris Ajero described the killers as religious terrorists who were heavily armed with assorted rifles and dressed in mobile police camouflage and bullet proof vests, who opened fire on the mourners at the mass burial site (17). It is pertinent to note that the nature of Boko Haram terrorism in Plateau state is quite destructive and obviously pathetic.

CHAPTER THREE

BOKO HARAM'S TERRORIST ACTIVITIES IN PLATEAU STATE

This chapter discussed the Boko Haram's terrorist activities in Plateau state, paying attention to background history of Plateau state, nature of Boko Haram's activities and causes of the activities in the state.

3.1 BACKGROUND HISTORY OF PLATEAU STATE

Plateau state is located in North-Central Nigeria. Created in 1976, the state is rated the twelfth largest state in Nigeria, with a population of about 3.5 million people, according to the 2006 census figures (Best 3).

3.1.1 Historical Heritage

The history of Plateau State dates back to the colonial era, when it was a part of the Bauchi province. Plateau state was carved out of Bauchi in 1926, with the following subdivisions: Jos, Keffi, Akwanga, Lafia, Langtang, Pankshin, Nasarawa, Shendam and Wase, under the leadership of the then British Divisional Officer (D.O). In 1967, under the regime of General Yakubu Gowon, Plateau and Benue were merged to form one state – the Benue-Plateau State. That was when Gowon's military administration created twelve states in Nigeria. In 1976, the military government of General Murtala Muhammed created nineteen states from the former twelve, and Plateau State then emerged out of the defunct Benue-Plateau, with fourteen Local Governemnt Areas, including Awe, Lafia, Akwanga, Bassa, Jos, Keffi, Barkin Ladi, Kanam, Nasarawa, Langtang, Mangu, Wase, Pankshin and Shendam. In 1996, Nasarawa State was carved out of Plateau State, thereby leaving Plateau State with her present seventeen Local Government Areas of Jos North, Jos South, Jos East, Barkin Ladi, Riyom, Mangu, Pankshin, Bokkos, Kanke, Kanam, Bassa, Wase, Langtang North, Langtang South, Mikang, Qu'an Pan and Shendam. The official language in Plateau State is English,

though Hausa is widely spoken across the state in daily communication and commerce. With the exception of Langtang North and South, other local government councils in Plateau State are multi-ethnic and multi-lingual (CAPRO 2).

3.1.2 Geographical Features

“The greatest asset and the greatest liability of the city of Jos are one and the same – its geography” (Ishaku 59). Plateau State derived her name from her rich geographical features, more specifically, the Jos Plateau. Jos Plateau is situated at almost the centre of Nigeria; Plateau State falling within the middle belt region of Nigeria. Jos Plateau covers an area that approximates 8600km², and is surrounded by mountainous ridges which range from 300 to 600 metres high. Jos Plateau towers averagely an altitude of 1280 metres above sea level; its highest point reaching 2010 metres. The area is characteristic of enjoyable temperate climate as well as the source of many tributaries. The cultural geography of Plateau State makes it a meeting point for the Christian South and the Muslim North. It also creates a mix of the state’s multiple ethnic groups; a blend of different ethnic nationalities from various parts of the country to form a microcosmic Nigeria and a haven for other nationals.

Plateau State has a land mass of 54,232 sq. km, and is located between latitude 11⁰ North and longitude 70⁰East. The state shares boundaries with Bauchi State to the North East, Kaduna State to the North West, Taraba State to the South East, Nasarawa State to the South West, while Kogi State and the Federal Capital Territory are to the West (CAPRO 1). It is usually very cold in the month of December, January and February, due to the harmattan winds. The chilly weather has for a long time served as an attraction to many nationals to visit Jos or settle there and has also encouraged many mission agencies and firms to establish their bases and maintain rest houses in the town.

Annual rainfall ranges from 131.75cm (51in) in the South to 146cm (57 in) in Plateau. Rain could be falling on one part while other parts are dry and sunny. Rainfall begins from April or May and lasts till October or November. The weather condition determines the vegetables to be expected. Savannah is the predominant vegetation, with tropical grass and trees scattered, such as shear, acacia and baobabs in the north and dense forest in the South. The average temperature ranges from 18⁰C to 22⁰C. The warmest temperatures are experienced in the months of March and April. The highest rainfall is recorded in the months of July and August. The average low temperatures in Plateau State has attributed to reduced incidences of some tropical diseases, like malaria. The picturesque Jos Plateau is a mountainous area with captivating rock formations. Bare rocks are found scattered over the grassland. Valleys, ponds and lakes are leftover effects of years of tin mining found at various parts of the state (<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/plateaustate>).

3. 1.3 Economic Activities

Farming is the predominant occupation of a majority of people in Plateau State. The farm produce include assorted vegetables farmed in commercial quantity, such as cabbage, carrot, cucumber, lettuce, spinach, okra, garden egg, tomatoes, etc. Also, they produce huge amount of Irish potatoes, sweet potatoes, maize, yam, cocoyam, guinea-corn, rice, *acha* (Hungary rice), etc. Many people farm manually with tools like hoes, machetes, sickles, etc. Mechanized farming is also practiced. Farming is done on the Plateau both at subsistence and commercial basis; and during both rainy and dry seasons. A good number of the people also rear livestock, while some are engaged in blacksmith, carving, weaving, carpentry, trading, stone breaking and mining. A large number of cattle supply milk to the Farm Fresh Dairy in Vom. Poultry is also a lucrative business in the state. The favourable weather encourages large production of chicken and eggs there, as the Jos egg is rated one of the best in the country. Lories come from different parts of the country to purchase and load off various

agricultural produces from different markets in Jos, Bukuru, Vom, Mangu, and Pankshin etc., all in Plateau state on daily basis. There are also industries such as Nasco, Coca-cola, Grand Cereals and Oil Nigeria Limited, Swan Waters, Quarries, etc. that contribute immensely to the economic well-being of Plateau state.

Plateau State is also known as the most important mining part of Nigeria, and a major exporter of tin and columbite. The metals are moved by rail to Port Harcourt for export. Other minerals exploited on the Plateau are tantalite, kaolin, tungsten (wolfram), zircon, and uranium and thorium compounds. Zinc, silver and lead are excavated on a small scale around Wase, Kigon and Zurak. The world's largest known deposits of columbite (ore of niobium associated with tin) have been exploited in Plateau State since 1940s. The mineral wealth of the Plateau attracted Europeans, Igbo, Hausa, Yoruba and some other migrants since the 20th century and the absence of tsetse fly at this elevated upland attracted many Fulani herdsmen into the state. All these continue to compete for the natural and economic resources that Plateau is endowed with. The discovery of oil in the Niger Delta area of Nigeria, however, caused a major economic set back on the Plateau, but the environmental impact of mining is still written all over the landscape of the state (Encyclopedia Britannica 38919).

Tourism is another sector that contributes majorly to the socio-economic wellbeing of the state. Nature has truly blessed Plateau State with so much to see and enjoy; little wonder the state is addressed as the home of peace and tourism. The following sites are tourists' havens in Plateau state.

1. Jos Wildlife Safari Park: It is located about 4km (2mi) from Jos, the state capital city. The park is within 8km² (3.095q. miles) of undamaged savannah bush, and keeps such animals as lions, buffalos, monkeys, pythons, jackals, crocodiles, hippopotamus, eagles, etc.

2. National Museum: This is located in Jos. Founded in 1952; it is reputed as one of the best museums in the country. It has some samples of Nok terracotta heads and other artifacts dating from 500 to 200 AD.
3. Museum of Traditional Architecture: Located in Jos, it has a variety of building, replicas and interesting articles relating to colonial times, old railway and tin mining.
4. Jos Zoo: Established in 1957, it is also called “old zoo” to differentiate it from the new Jos wildlife park. It is located beside the museum in Jos, and has animals, birds and reptiles.
5. Assop Falls: This is one of the most notable Nigerian waterfalls. It is located about 40 miles (64km) from Jos city, on Abuja road. It is popular for those shooting soap operas and useful for advertisement. It is also a tourist pick nick and swimming scenery.
6. Kurra Falls: Located 77 kilometres southeast of Jos, it is the state’s first hydroelectric power station, still used today by Nesco Electricity Company. It serves other purposes of boating, rock climbing and camping.
7. Wase Rock: Located about 216 kilometres southeast of Jos town near Wase, it serves as one of the five centres in Africa that breed white pelican. Hence the state government presently protects about 321 acres (1.30 km²) of the land which surround the rock for wildlife development.
8. Kerrang Highlands: Located about 88 kilometres from Jos, these volcanic hills provide natural springs, from which the popular Swan Spring Water is produced.
9. Shere Hills: Some of the highest Plateau peaks are found here. Mountain climbers and hill walkers have their day on these hills. Nigeria Police Force trains their officers also on these hills.

10. Riyom Rock: Located 25 kilometres southwest of Jos, near Riyom town, the rock formation is of a captivating sight.
11. Pandam Game Reserve: This is a protected area of natural habitat which harbours Crocodiles, various species of snakes and hippopotamus; furnished with tourist accommodation.
12. Kahwang Rock Formation: Situated in Bangai village, Bachi District of Riyom Local Government Area, this set of basalt rocks have drawn tourists from within Nigeria and abroad.
13. Miango Rest House: A conference and a retreat home established in 1914 by missionaries of Sudan Interior Mission (SIM), Nigeria. It has artificial dam, farm, hill and accommodation which provide tourist enjoyment.
14. Solomon Lar Amusement Park: Located in the city of Jos, it is a tourist relaxation centre. All these tourist centres are revenue earners for the Plateau State Government.

3.1.4 Political Organization

The administrative structure of Plateau State is made up of the State Cabinet, House of Assembly and Local Government Areas. The affairs of the state government is run by the Governor who is the chief executive, Deputy Governor, Secretary to the State Government (SSG), Commissioners (cabinet members), special advisers, permanent secretaries, board chairmen and general managers. The present Governor is Rt. Hon. Simon Bako Lalong, from Shendam Local Government Area (L.G.A) elected on the platform of All Progressives Congress (APC) and sworn in on May 29, 2015. The immediate past Governor, Jonah David Jang hails from Du, Jos South Local Government Area, of the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP). He serves currently as a senator. Plateau State House of Assembly is made up of 25 members and 11 special advisers. The current speaker is Rt. Hon. Peter Azi, from Jos East L.G.A. (APC). The Local Government is headed by a chairman (Chief executive) and his

cabinet includes councillors who make up the legislative arm. The local governments are subsequently divided into electoral wards, districts, and villages. Traditional administrative institutions (chiefdoms and emirates) operate at local government level. Paramount traditional rulers (such as Gbong Gwom Jos) and Emirates are followed by District Heads, and then the Village Heads.

Paramount rulers are elected or appointed from many contestants who may or may not be related to past leaders, whereas succession to the emir is hereditary. These leaders represent the cultural and ethnic groups, serve as the custodians for their traditions and culture, and are also required to protect the interest of residents within their domain (Best 4). Plateau Indigenous Development Association Network (PIDAN) recognizes and records 18 Royal Fathers within Plateau State, out of which two are emirs. Each is addressed as His Royal Highness (HRH), and listed in the following order of recognition.

1. HRH Gbong Gwom Jos, Chairman Council of Chiefs, Plateau State.
2. HRH the Long Gamai of Shendam, Shendam LGA.
3. HRH the Ngolon Ngas, Pankshin LGA.
4. HRH the Mishkaham Mwaghavul, Mangu LGA.
5. HRH the Saf Ron Kulere, Bokkos LGA.
6. HRH the Ponzhi Taroh, Langtang LGA.
7. HRH the Long Pan, Qua'an-Pan LGA.
8. HRH the Long Tehl, Mikang LGA.
9. HRH the Agwom Izere, Jos East LGA.
10. HRH the Utu Ugo Kiche, Bassa LGA.
11. HRH the Bra Ngwe Irigwe
12. HRH the Ogomo Pengana
13. HRH the Ujaj of Anaguta – Paramount Ruler of Anaguta, Jos North LGA.

14. HRH the Atta Atten
15. HRH the Agwom Izere of Jos – Paramount Ruler of Jos Izere.
16. HRH the Long Kwo Qua'an-Pan LGA
17. HRH the Emir of Wase, Wase Emirate
18. HRH the Emir of Kanam, Kanam LGA (xvi-xvii).

Plateau is the twelfth largest of Nigerian's 36 states. The state has seventeen local governments, which are shared among the three Senatorial Districts, namely, the Northern Senatorial District, Southern Senatorial District and Central Senatorial District. Plateau North Senatorial District comprises of Jos North, Jos South, Jos East, Bassa, Riyom and Barkin Ladi Local government areas. Local government Areas which make up Plateau Central Senatorial zone are Mangu, Pankshin, Bokokos, Kanke and Kanam. The Southern Senatorial Zone is made up of Wase, Langtang North, Langtang South, Mikang, Qu'an Pan and Shendam local government councils (Best 14).

The following are the executive governors who have governed Plateau State: Dan Suleiman, Joshua Anaja, Solomon Lar, Samuel Atukum, Chris Ali, Lawrence Onoja, Aliyu Kama, Joshua Madaki, Fidelis Tapgun, Mohammed Mana, Habibu Idris Shuaibu, Musa Shehu, Joshua Dariye, Michael Botmang, Joshua Dariye, Jonah David Jang and Simon Bako Lalong (incumbent). Politically, Jos Plateau is accorded regard as the pearl of the Northern Region; while some address it as the headquarters of the Middle Belt (Ishaku 60).

3. 1.5 Religious Institutions

Calvary Project Research Department reveals that there are basically three main religions practiced in Plateau State, namely, Traditional Religion, Islam and Christianity (7).

Plateau State is one of the most religiously plural states in Nigeria, and incidentally the strongest meeting point of Christianity and Islam in the nation (Best and Hoomlong 94). Best

and Hoomlong observe that both the Nigerian Christians and Muslims have intense sentimental attachments to the city of Jos and environs. They maintain that Christian's sentimental attachment to the city comes from the fact that many national Christian headquarters are located in Jos, such as Evangelical Church Winning All (ECWA), Church of Christ in Nations (COCIN), Fellowship of Christian Students, various Pentecostal churches among others. Also there are numerous Christian seminaries such as Theological College of Northern Nigeria (TCNN), Bukuru, Evangelical Theological Seminary (ETS), Jos, Jos ECWA Theological Seminary (JETS), Jos, Saint Augustine's Major Seminary, Jos, et cetera; and so many other Christian establishments.

The Muslims, on the other hand, who also express sentimental attachment to the city, argue that they are instrumental to the founding of Jos city and so, cannot be undermined in the affairs of Plateau State. The Muslims trace the origin of some of the Islamic organizations to Jos, such as Izala, Jamatu Nasir Islam (JNI), and other Islamic educational and health institutions. This makes it easy, therefore, to understand why religious identity has always been the basis for frequent urban and rural violent crisis in Plateau State. Best and Hoomlong stress that despite the frequent religious violence in Plateau State, Jos has remained the greatest centre of attraction in northern Nigeria after Abuja, though the potentials for bloodshed are not yet eliminated (95).

Buttressing this stand, Ishaku affirms that when talking in terms of religious orientation, many people regard Jos as the Jerusalem of the Christian North for the absolute fact that the number of Christian organizations having their headquarters in the city is quite enormous, and also the fact that a majority of the population are Christians. This, he says is the reason Christians spell Jos as an acronym to mean Jesus-our-Saviour. Ishaku also points out that Jos is equally a kind of Mecca to Muslims who have many Islamic movements there, such as Jam'at Izalat al Bid'a wa Iqamat is Sunna (Society for the Removal of Innovation and


Re-establishment of the Sunna), also known as Izala, which was founded by a Jos resident, Sheikh Ismaila Idris in 1978 (60). He quips further that the crises in Jos did not begin as a result of religious diversity, but because of the importation of religion into the public space, which he blamed the government to have neglected until it bred bad blood among the population (62-63).

Figure 2: Map of Nigeria Showing Plateau State



source: guardian.ng/news/plateau

Figure 3: Map of Plateau State Showing Local Government Areas.



Source: *dailytimes.com.ng*.

3.2 NATURE OF BOKO HARAM'S TERRORIST ACTIVITIES

The nature of Boko Haram's terrorist activities was revealed in the weapons they used in carrying out their attacks, tactics of the attacks and targets of those attacks.

3.2.1 Weapons Used by Boko Haram in Plateau State

Of a worrying concern are the calibre, magnitude and sophistication of the weapons used by the Boko Haram group in carrying out their terrorist onslaughts in Plateau state. Some of the dangerous weapons they use included small and light weapons (SALW), such as firearms (assorted rifles, pistols and ammunition), Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs), rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs), rocket launchers, anti-aircraft missiles, swords, machetes, swords, knives, daggers, charms, etcetera. Some of these weapons have been intercepted in Jos and other places.

The Special Task Force (STF), a joint security unit made up of the police, military and civil defence in Plateau state in March 2011 intercepted a truck load of explosives being conveyed to Jos from Kaduna in the heat of terrorist activity in Plateau state. The truck was loaded with 15,000 kilogrammes of ammonium nitrate (a very important chemical in bomb manufacturing), 5,000 pieces of electric detonators, 1,000 pieces of cord relays of 25 centimetres length, 775 kilogrammes of super powder and drilling rods. A police constable was escorting the truck. The same scenario played out at the Abuja City Gate in July 2011, when at a military check point loaded with 700 explosives was intercepted, being escorted by two police men. Again 51 rocket launchers were found in a house at Barunde, Gombe in April 2012. On 30 July 2012, 10 RPGs were captured at Daban Massara on the Chad-Nigeria border, while on the following day, another cache of 10 rocket chragers, 10 rocket bombs, and 8 rocket launchers were intercepted in Monguno (Ishaku 174-75).

The Nigerian forces near Nigeria in November 2011 lost 14 soldiers in clashes with a Libyan convoy, overpowering and seizing from the convoy two 14.5mm guns, four 12.7mm machine guns, two ML-49, three M-80 machine guns, assorted number of rocket-propelled grenades and large quantity of ammunition. In another raid, they intercepted a convoy 1, 420 tonnes of Semtex plastic explosives and 445 detonators. Semtex contains a chemical called pentaerythritol tetranitrate (PENTN) the major component used in the production of IEDs used by the Boko Haram terrorists (166). On 4 August 2013, men of the Multi-National Task Force (MNJTF) intercepted four Toyota Hilux vans, 10 AK-47 rifles and magazines, two G3 rifles and 10x4 40mm bombs, three RPG tubes, and 85 rounds of special ammunition. Episodes of similar interceptions abound in the fight against Boko Haram. The access of the sect to RPGs and several other high capacity arms is a matter of serious concern within security organisations. RPGs are projectile explosive weapons which the terrorists use on long distant targets; whereas they use launchers to propel missiles or explosives over long ranges. Some launchers travel for 900 metres. Possession of this high calibre weaponry by the Boko Haram group confers deadly firepower on them and invariably poses serious threat on security agencies and aviation industry (Onuoha studies.aljazeera.net).

This is just as the Nigeria Army Theatre Commander of Operation Lafiya Dole, Major General Leo Irabor in April 2016 disclosed the recovery of a large cache of arms worth over 20 million naira buried in a graveyard by Boko Haram terrorists in a village called Gursum, around Alagarno in Borno state. Irabor announced the recovery of 36 boxes of .50MM equivalent to 12.7mm buried concealed in a place that looks like a grave. Other weapons found there include 5/20 lethal brief case as well as a mixture of 7.6mm NATO and 7.62 special concealed in cellophane. Equally discovered is one generator, one Hilux vehicle and several motorcycles (Audu premiumtimesng.com).

3.2.2 Operational Tactics of Boko Haram

A tactic is a course of action followed or a method used to achieve immediate result or a short-term goal (Hornsby 370). Boko Haram gained so much fame such that the sect was declared the deadliest terror group in the world in 2014. One wonders how the sect, with a supposed crude membership and unprofessional fighters could overrun and capture many Local Government Areas, towns and villages; and ransack many military and police barracks, armouries and stations in northern Nigerian states in such rare displays of courage. How were the terrorists able to achieve such feats? Does it mean that the Nigeria military and other security agencies are incompetent? Or are the terrorists better trained? It suffices to say that the success story of the terrorists and the recent successes of the Nigeria security forces in countering them all boil down to operational tactics. Hence an analysis of the major operational tactics exercised by Boko Haram terrorists is an important aspect of this study.

Sequel to the death of Mohammed Yusuf and many of his followers, coupled with the mass arrest of many others, the Boko Haram group retreated, re-strategized and resurfaced in two major ways. The first was adopting Abubakar Shekau, Yusuf's ruthless and vicious deputy as the new spiritual and administrative head of the sect. The second was redefining the tactics. They improved on their traditional hit-and-run approach to more volatile, flexible and unpredictable terrorist tactics (Onuoha 169). The operational strategies that have been employed by Boko Haram include guerrilla attacks, armed assaults, targeted assassination, drive-by-shooting, use of IEDs, suicide bombing, use of women and girls in terrorist actions, kidnapping, disguising as mad (insane) people, raids on towns and villages, and capturing and taking control of towns and villages. The choice of a tactic to be used depends largely on the chosen target, context and goal to be achieved (170).

i. Guerrilla tactics

It is quite necessary that a significant attention be given to the guerrilla tactics of Boko Haram assaults. This is because most Boko Haram attacks resonate around guerrilla tactics. A guerrilla is an irregular soldier or fighter, usually politically motivated with a political objective such as overthrowing an existing government. Guerrillas operate usually in small groups to harass and carry out sabotage (Hornby 78). Guerrilla tactics involve constantly changing or shifting attack strategies, operations, positions and patterns. It also involves terrorism and deliberate destruction of human life and property in order to destabilise and weaken the government. Guerrillas use overall political-military strategies to combat conventional military forces. The term, guerrilla (diminutive of Spanish *guerra*, meaning “war”), was first used in describing the Spanish-Portuguese irregulars or *guerrilleros* (equally called partisans and insurgents), who assisted the Duke of Wellington to drive away the French from the Iberian Peninsula in the wars of 1809-13. Traditionally speaking, guerrilla warfare has usually been a weapon used to protest alleged wrongdoings of a bad and unfavourable government.

The fundamental strategy in guerrilla tactics is to keep harassing the enemy till military strength is sufficiently built up to defeat the enemy in battle, or at least, till adequate military and political pressure is mounted to force the enemy to seek redress. Guerrillas could operate independently, as is the case of Boko Haram; or complement orthodox military operations. Sun-tzu (c. 350 BC), a Chinese general developed the essential rules of guerrilla tactics in “The Art of War”, where he advised that the tactics should be based on surprise and deception. An aspect of the guerrilla tactics teaches that “guerrilla strategy must be based primarily on alertness, mobility, and attack”, and further advises guerrilla fighters to “select the tactic of seeming to come from the east and attacking from the west; avoid the solid,

attack the hollow; attack, withdraw; deliver a lightning blow, seek a lightning decision” (Asprey Encyclopaedia Brotannica).

The various strews of Boko Haram attack are carried out in guerrilla combatant tactics. This assault strategy has been unprofessionally described as a “hit-and-run” technique. The competence of the terrorists in guerrilla combat skills suggests that the sect members would have received proficient training in the technique, in addition to bomb production and weapon handling. They keep changing tactics and hitting targets abruptly such that they have become largely unpredictable and nearly invincible, making it difficult for security agents predict their attacks.

ii. Armed Assault

Open armed assault is a major operational tactic that Boko Haram terrorists have used since 2009. This tactic entails the deployment of numerous fighters to carry out surprise attacks on security formations and establishments, such as barracks, stations, and prisons; and equally on soft targets (civilians), as in churches, mosques and markets. This strategy is usually adopted if the group they have a very large number of fighters that can overpower security operatives (Onuoha171).

iii. Targeted Assassination

After the military crushed the strenght of Boko Haram and destroyed their headquarters in Maiduguri called *Markaz Ibn Taymiyya*, which was completely razed to the ground, the surviving leaders of the group went underground, while most of their members fled to safety and many melted into the local population. Some respondents reveal that at this stage, the traditional rulers and many people in the communities were unwilling to give out any information about the boko haram members living among them. The state, however,

compelled the traditional leaders and their people to reveal the identities of the sect members to the security agents. Lack of confidentiality within the security apparatus and the sect's intelligence details and network helped the Boko Haram to know those who led the cat out of the bag. The initial phase of the sect's resurgence began with the targeted assassination of village and ward heads and individuals who had collaborated with the security agents, prominent politicians of the then ruling All Nigeria Peoples Party (ANPP) in Borno state who the terrorists declared enemies, prison officials accused of poisoning and torturing sect members who were in custody, and identified security personnel (Mohammed Kyari 25).

Targeted assassination tactic is adopted when the Boko Haram sect perceives and underlists a person or group as enemy. The target is assigned particular assassins whose duty it is to trail the victim to where he could be easily and successfully killed. Such targets are shot on the abdomen, head or chest to ensure their chances to survive is quite slim. Boko Haram have targeted, trailed and murdered several religious leaders, politicians, civil servants, security agents, educationists, and community leaders who opposed their ideology and condemned their activities, including both Christians and Muslims. Examples abound. On 8 July 2012 in Plateau state, two serving legislators were killed in an attack that was claimed by the Boko Haram terrorists. Senator Gyang Dantong was a Nigerian senator, representing Plateau North Senatorial District, whereas Honourable Gyang Danfulani was the majority leader of the Plateau State House of Assembly. These lawmakers were among those who attended a mass burial service held for the victims of violent attacks the previous day, 7 July 2012 on Plateau villages of Ruk, Kuzen, Maseh, Pwabuduk, Karuruk, Kufang, Kai and Ningong in the Garshis district of the state (Lipdo 166).

iv. Drive-by-shooting

This tactic is similar to targeted assassination. It involves the terrorists riding on motorbikes to shoot at their targets and escaping at once. This became a common tactic following the July 2009 revolt and beyond when many people, including notable politicians and other important personalities were shot dead by suspected boko haram members riding on motorcycles. The reason for adopting drive-by-shooting, perhaps, is to get rid of targets that have evaded or survived other execution attempts. Also this method is flexible as it is used in killing targets that operate usually in city centres. The target is shot at a very close range, while the killers manoeuvre their ways easily and escape security agents (Onuoha 172). The prevalence of drive-by-shootings was what led to the banning of the operation of commercial cyclists popularly called *okada* or *going* most northern Nigeria states, including Plateau, Bauchi, Gombe, Adamawa, Yobe, Borno, Kaduna, Kano, and other such states which have experienced serial Boko Haram incursions. This brought about the approval of tricycles (*keke*) as alternative means of intra-city transportation in those places, in addition to the already existing cars and buses. A few cases of tricycle attacks have been reported, mostly when it involves IEDs. The tricycle's capacity to manoeuvre is quite limited when compared to the motorcycle.

v. Use of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs)

The use of IEDs is another tactic that has gained prominence for Boko Haram since July 2009. IED is a homemade bomb, manufactured from either military or non-military components, mostly used by guerrillas, insurgents or terrorists, and other non-state actors as a crude but quite effective weapon to attack the conventional military or civilian targets. Basically, all IEDs contain an initiating mechanism, an explosive charger, a detonator, and a casing or a collection of projectiles such as nails or ball bearings which produce lethal

fragments or chips upon detonation. Practically, IEDs can be produced with different kinds of material, such as certain kinds of fertilizers, trinitrotoluene or TNT ($C_7H_5N_3O_6$), artillery or mortar rounds, aerial bombs, and other explosives. IEDs can also consist of chemical, biological, or radiological fillers to increase their psychological and lethal impacts. Terrorists use varieties of initiating systems to set off detonations. These trigger systems are in two main categories, namely command-initiated system and autonomously initiated system. Command-initiated IEDs are blown up through human interaction with the triggering system or mechanism. Once an electronic impulse is sent via wireless signal or over a wire circuit, a receiver on the explosive triggers detonation. Familiar examples of command initiators include wireless doorbells, remote-controlled toys, cell phones, cordless telephones, pagers, car alarms, and automatic garage-door openers. Autonomously initiated IEDs, on the other hand, are detonated without human intervention. Common examples of autonomous initiators are trip wires, infrared systems that activate the triggering mechanism when a vehicle breaks a beam's contact with its receiver, pressure plates that activate the triggering mechanism when a certain amount of weight is placed on them, and magnetic detonators that are triggered by changes in a magnetic field (as when a vehicle passes by). The use of IEDs has proven to be extremely effective in the hands of terrorists (Mansoor 117).

Ishaku maintains that the use of Improvised Explosive Devices has been the tactic of first choice for Boko Haram and other terrorist groups all around the world. He explains further that the term, "improvised" entails that explosives are made in a do-it-yourself (DIY) situation. On his list of popular DIY explosives are Perosol can bombs, DVD shit bombs, AA battery bombs, Molotov cocktail and Napalm. He observes that IEDs should be differentiated from standard factory manufactured bombs. However, he asserts that the fact that some IEDs are nearly equal to standard factory manufactured bombs, such as nitrate-based explosives has made IEDs so dear to Boko Haram terrorists (169).

Boko Haram terrorists configure IED in such a way that it can detonate easily when thrown off, or with the use of a remote control and a timer. They usually select strategic points where they place or plant the explosive such that it should produce maximum impact upon explosion. Bombs have been placed on the overhead bridge at Gada Biu in Jos; at a bridge at Rim in Riyom Local Government Area, and other strategic locations in Plateau state. Bombs have also been planted at cinema houses, forcing cinema centres to close down in Jos and other cities in northern Nigeria. Other places that received IED attacks include churches, mosques, car parks, bus stops, restaurants or hotels, rail lines, and schools. The United States Joint IED Defeat Organisation reveals that Nigeria experienced about a fourfold increase in IED attacks in 2011. Nigeria witnessed 196 bomb attacks in 2011, against 52 incidents in 2010 (Straziuso cited in Onuoha 172). Also, not less than 20 bomb incidents have been recorded in Plateau state between 2010 and 2015. The level of sophistication Boko Haram has attained in the construction of IEDs has forced security experts to conclude that the sect has been receiving support in the areas of acquisition of explosive materials, arms and training from foreign terrorist organisations, such as AL Qaeda in the Maghreb (AQIM). Boko Haram IEDs are mostly made with very strong explosive materials, such as pentaerythritol (PETN), trinitrotoluene (TNT), and ammonia fertiliser. Boko Haram's IED expertise is a major cause of worry to the Nigeria security forces.

Table 4: Bomb Incidences in Plateau State

S/N	DATE	INCIDENCE
1.	08/10/2010	Bomb blast between COCIN and 1 st Baptist Church in Bukuru, Jos South LGA
2.	20/03/2011	Bomb exploded in Nasarawa Gwom, Jos North LGA
3.	23/03/2011	Men of State Joint Force (STF) arrested some persons with bomb making equipments at Millionaire Quarters, Jos North LGA
4.	08/04/2011	Suspected terrorists arrested with bombs in Dengi, Kanam LGA
5.	04/09/2011	Some bomb that failed to explode was discovered in Riyom market, Riyom LGA
6.	11/09/2011	Bomb exploded and injured 4 persons in West of Mines, Jos North LGA
7.	10/12/2011	Three bombs exploded in a football viewing centre in Jos, Jos North LGA, killing at least three persons
8.	22/02/2012	Bomb blasts recorded at COCIN headquarters church during Sunday morning service in Jos, Jos North LGA, killing at least 2 persons
9.	11/03/2012	Two suicide bombers attacked St. Finbarr's Church, Jos, Jos North LGA, killing at least 5 and injuring 3 persons.
10.	10/06/2012	Suicide bomber detonated in a Volkswagen gulf car at Christ Chosen Church, Jos, Jos North LGA. The military van that the suicide bomber escaped, while 2 motorcycle

S/N	DATE	INCIDENCE
11.	06/07/2012	Locally made IEDs were defused at Congo Russia, Chwalnyap, Jos, Jos North LGA.
12.	17/07/2012	A blast was recorded opposite the new Jos South LGA secretariat by Bukuru expressway, Bukuru. A man reportedly parked his car and shot a Rocket-Propelled Grenade (RPG) into Kerana area.
13.	17/08/2012	A bomb blast incidence was recorded at night in Rikkos, Jos North LGA. No casualty was reported.
14.	20/05/20114	There were two major bomb blasts in Jos this day, along Murtala Muhammed way. Both explosions came from Vehicle Borne Explosives (VBE). The first explosion came from a VBE laden in a J5 bus with Plateau state number at about 1500hours. The second explosion came about 1525 hours in a Sienna bus with Gombe state number plate. The second explosive was kept about 50 metres away from the first. At least 46 persons died, while unascertained number of people sustained various degrees of injury.
15.	24/05/2014	A bomb explosion was recorded at Bauchi Road, Jos. The explosion was caused by VBE in a Honda Odyssey bus with Bauchi number plate, parked inside a mechanic workshop behind a football viewing centre. About 3 persons died following the incidence.
16.	22/07/2014	Gunmen, dressed in military fatigue used explosives and

S/N	DATE	INCIDENCE
17.	11/12/2014	Twin bomb explosion at Terminus Area of Jos at about 1630 hours. About 16 persons died, with numerous people injured.
18.	25/02/2015	Twin blasts were recorded. The first occurred at a bus stop opposite University of Jos, while the second was around Bauchi Road motor park, all in Jos North LGA. Over 12 casualties were reported.
19.	05/07/2015	A female suicide bomber attacked Shagalinku Restaurant along Bauchi Road, Jos at 2115 hours, killing about 19 persons and injuring 11 others. Same day, at about 2120 hours, gunmen in military uniform shot sporadically at worshippers in a mosque at Yan-tyre, along Bauchi Road, Jos before a male suicide bomber blew himself up during the attack. About 18 persons were killed, while 12 others sustained injuries. Twin bomb blasts occurred at Yantaya mosque, Jos, Jos North LGA. In reaction, Muslim mob set ablaze the Cherubim and Seraphim church at nearby Dilimi, while damaging an Apostolic church close-by.
20.	12/07/2015	Two bombs were detonated at ECWA Gospel church 1, Tudun Wada, Jos. No casualty was recorded.
21.	18/10/2015	STF/Operation Safe Haven (OPSH) detonated land mines at Gembos, along Kadunung road, in Mangu LGA, killing about 20 and displacing over 500 villagers.

S/N	DATE	INCIDENCE
22.	11/03/2012	Two suicide bombers attacked Saint Finbarr's church, Jos, Jos North LGA, killing at least 5 and injuring 3 persons
23.	04/12/2014	Failed IEDs were discovered at Obasanjo Model Primary School at Wholshe, Jos South LGA. The explosives contained two large canisters/gas cylinders attached to an electronic detonator.

Source: Field Survey

vi. Suicide terrorism

So worrisome is the adoption of suicide terrorism tactic by the Boko Haram group. Suicide terrorism denotes a pattern of extreme violence, usually committed by a person who intends or has been deceived or coerced to take his or her own life along that of a chosen target, in order to further a religious, ideological, or political objective. The suicide terrorist knows that the death of the perpetrator is the precondition for the mission's success; so he or she chooses to die in order to carry out the planned attack. The pattern of suicide terrorism mostly used by the Boko Haram is suicide bombing. This entails ideologically or politically inspired violent attack usually carried out purposely and actively by a person who is aware that the attack will cause his or her death and that of the chosen target (173). Boko Haram terrorists have used IEDs in various ways to carry out suicide attacks in Plateau and other states of northern Nigeria. These include body-borne improvised explosive devices (BBIEDs), vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs), motorcycle-borne improvised explosive devices (MBIEDs), and tricycle-borne explosive devices (TBIEDs). While most of the suicide attacks of Boko Haram have been successful, considering the quantity of damage done to life and property and the notoriety gained by the sect, some of the attacks were partially successful or totally failed. Basically, the following four factors account for the adoption of suicide terrorism by the Boko Haram. 1. Emergence of a more hard-line and radical leadership of the group following the aftereffect of the July 2009 insurrection. 2. Increased counter-insurgency measures brought up by the Nigerian security agents to suppress the sect's usual tactics of armed assault and IEDs placement. 3. Increased funding of the sect from local and international supporters. 4. Nexus between the sect and other foreign terrorist organisations, which serves as a psychological booster and intensifies martyrdom ideology (Onuoha 173).

The Nigerian underpants suicide bomber, Farouk Umar Muttalab strapped IED made of PETN and TATP in his underpants in the abortive 2009 Christmas Eve suicide bombing. He was preceded by Richard Reid the “shoe bomber” who concealed a PETN IED in his shoe in an attempt to blow up a Northwestern Flight 253 from Paris to Miami in 2001. Likewise, Abdullahi Hassan al-Asiri, a younger brother to an acclaimed Yemeni IED expert, Ibrahim Hassan al-Asiri attempted assassinating one of the members of the Saudi royal house and deputy Minister of interior by hiding a PETN IED on his body. Many Boko Haram bomb manufacturers and suicide bombers have been killed in many towns in northern Nigeria, including Jos, Kaduna, Suleija, and Maiduguri. In 2010, two terrorists riding on a motorbike were blown up in pieces while taking a TATP IED to ECWA Angwan Rukuba in Jos, Plateau state (Isaku 170-72).

vii. Use of Women and children in terrorist actions

Another tactic of Boko Haram is the use of women and girls in terrorist actions. This has become like a trademark of the sect. Women and children have been used as shields and for other onerous tasks by the terrorists. Within the organisation, women have actively played various imposed supporting roles, ranging from simple to complex functions. These include washing of clothes and dishes, cooking, fetching firewood, sexual roles, arms smuggling, armed assaults, and suicide bombing. The reason for using women and girls in terrorist activities by Boko Haram is not farfetched. 1. Women are less suspicious than men. 2. Women are not searched like men. 3. In northern Nigeria, men are required to keep their distance from girls and women not related closely to them. 4. Their loose dresses and veils (*yijab*) enable them to easily hide bombs and other weapons. The terrorists have taken advantage of these lacunae to engage women and children in various successful terrorist attacks.

Many people maintain that most of the women and girls that engage in terrorist actions are forced to do so by the Boko Haram terrorists. The use of women and girls in terrorist actions was a carefully thought-out and planned tactic, which was boosted with the Boko Haram's kidnapping of about 300 school girls in Chibok in April 2014. Since then, other hundreds of women and girls have been abducted, forcefully trained and used in various terrorist attacks. Since the 2014 kidnapping, over 100 women and girls have been used by Boko Haram in suicide bombings in public places like schools, markets, and refugee camps for internally displaced persons in Nigeria. In an attack carried out in a Nigerian camp in 2016, where two female bombers aged 17 and 20 blew themselves up killing about 60 and injuring over 80 persons, the third female bomber refused to detonate her explosive on realising that members of her family were staying in that camp. Similarly, according to Aljazeera news, 80 percent of the suicide bombings carried out in the neighbouring Cameroon in 2016 was perpetrated by women and girls aged 14 to 24 years (Pricopi 47-48).

viii. Disguising as insane (mad) people

Suicide bombing became so rampant such that security forces and people in the society became quite privy of the tactic and always raised suspicion on potential attackers. Security agents became more alert and developed strategies to counter suicide bombers, while people started canvassing against the use of long veils (*hijab*). The terrorists started changing their tactics again, this time disguising themselves as mad or insane people. This they do in a bid to gain unsuspecting access to public places. They would wear explosives to such places, which they would detonate to kill themselves and their targets. As Premium Times reported on 30 January 2016, two male suicide bombers who disguised as insane women gained access into a public market and detonated the explosives they wore, killing and injuring many people. In response to this shift in tactics, Nigeria security forces raised

security alerts among the citizenry, warning them to be quite wary of insane persons seen around crowded areas, markets and other public places.

ix. Taking control of towns and villages

The main mandate of Boko Haram in Nigeria is to overthrow the secular government and impose sharia on the people, turning Nigeria to an Islamic nation. Thus, theirs is a religious war – a form of jihad aimed at exterminating every person and creed that differ from their salafist ideology. Ishaku reveals that “in all the police interrogations of the arrested sect members, they confessed that they were on a jihad mission to turn Nigeria to an Islamic state” (55). Lipdo laments that “all terrorist attacks in North and Central Nigeria is indeed a campaign to impose Shari’a against the ethnic and religious people of the region” (167). Several bomb and arm attacks have been unleashed on the cities of Jos, Bukuru and numerous villages in the Local Government Councils of Riyom, Barkin Ladi, Bassa and some other rural places in Plateau state. Many people in Plateau state have lamented that Boko Haram terrorists are attacking the state in order to subjugate the people and impose sharia on them. These attacks in Plateau state are in continuum with the terrorist attacks on the north-eastern states of Borno, Adamawa and Yobe states, where the Boko Haram terrorists had seized and declared some towns, villages and Local Government Areas as their caliphate. Comparing the suppressive and destructive impacts of Boko Haram terrorism on the two northern cities of Jos, Plateau state and Maiduguri, Borno state, Ishaku further opines that “if Maiduguri is the road to Mogadishu, a precursor to a state of anomie, a failed state; then Jos is the road to Sarajevo, a harbinger to the dissolution of the Nigerian federation” (57).

Amnesty International in 2015 outlined the sequences leading to the capture of towns or villages by Boko Haram. First, a large number of the terrorists will attack the targeted community, initially attacking military and police formations and units. After neutralising governmental forces and forcing them to abandon their posts, the terrorists would seize the

abandoned arms and ammunition. Then they will attack the civilians, either gunning them down as they try to escape, or killing them in their houses, at times setting fire on the building with the occupants inside. The terrorists would be simultaneously looting shops, private valuables, setting houses on fire and abducting residents. The terrorists declared the town of Goza in Adamawa state their first caliphate in northern Nigeria, after killing the emir of Goza, ransacking the Mobile Police Training School and sacking many of the residents. The Nigerian military claims to the public that there is no area currently under the control of Boko Haram in northern Nigeria, though some people doubt the authenticity of such a statement. Security forces have gained commendable successes in the fight against the terrorists; however, Boko Haram still carries out sporadic raids on various communities in northern Nigeria.

x. Kidnapping

On the night of 14-15 April 2014, 276 female students were kidnapped from a Government Secondary School, Chibok in Borno state, north-eastern Nigeria. Boko Haram claimed responsibility for the kidnapping. The students were between 16 to 18 years of age. After some months, some 57 of the kidnapped girls reportedly managed to escape from their abductors. 21 girls were further freed in October 2016; with one more rescued the following month. In January 2017 another one was found, while 82 of the girls were exchanged for some of the Boko Haram terrorists by the Nigerian government in May 2017. Many of the kidnapped girls have died, some of them in suicide action; whereas the whereabouts of others is not known. Chibok is a Christian community in Borno state. Jonathan N.C. Hill of King's College, London asserts that Boko Haram took to kidnapping due to the influence al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb exercised over the group. He said the kidnapping of the Chibok girls is similar to the kidnapping episodes of girls in Algeria in 1990s and 2000s

(<https://en.m.wikipedia.org>). The tactic of kidnapping, therefore, like other terrorist tactics proves the existing links between Boko Haram and other foreign terrorist organisations.

Meanwhile, as situations and challenges changed for Boko Haram, the terrorists adopted kidnapping, a strategy they rejected in the past. This they did to weaken and intimidate the civilian population and discredit the Nigerian government as being unable to protect her citizens and visitors. There have been various incidents of kidnapping and killing of foreigners in northern Nigeria since 2012. Korean doctors and road construction workers were killed in Yobe and Borno states, with the subsequent killing of members of staff of Setraco, a construction firm in Jama'are town of Bauchi state. Another is the kidnapping of a French family, including Tanguy Moulin-Fournier, his wife, four children and brother at the Waza National Park in Cameroon. The French family, however, were released unhurt and returned to Paris on 19 April 2013 (Mohammed Kyari 28). Ansaru, a splinter group of Boko Haram claimed responsibility for the kidnapping of Franco Lamolinara and Chris MacManus in May 2011. The targeting of foreign interests and foreigners was the driving concern of Ansaru, who warned France that it would target her citizens for banning Islamic veil and her planned intervention in northern Mali. Ansaru further claimed responsibility for the kidnapping and killing of the seven construction workers in Jama'are in Bauchi state as a retaliation for alleged un-Islamic activities in Afghanistan and Mali carried out by European nations (30).

3.2.3 Targets of Boko Haram's Attacks

The targets of Boko Haram's attacks are quite diverse. These objects of attack include local and international establishments, police, prison and military personnel and formations, civil servants, business men and farmers, children, youths and adults, farms, markets, hospitals, parks, hotels, cinemas, recreation centres, restaurants, drinking joints, schools, and churches, mosques, in both city centres and rural areas. When it comes to hitting a target,

Boko Haram can go to any length. They have killed people for giving information on their activities, harming of their sect members, selling bush meat, playing cards, which they interpret as gambling, and drinking in beer joints. Boko Haram terrorists have killed many Christians and fellow Muslims. The leadership of the sect justify such deaths of anyone that does not follow sharia. Abul Qaqa, a spokesperson of the sect once issued the following statement: “there are no exceptions. Even if you are a Muslim and you do not abide by sharia, we will kill you. Even if you are my own father, we will kill you” (Harnischfeger 54).

In the early phases of their attacks after the death of their leader, Yusuf, Boko Haram selected their targets carefully. While targeting a Muslim area, they were careful not to hurt the ordinary people. School buildings were razed at night to avoid killing innocent children. Harnischfeger notes that “when attacking Christians, however, they killed indiscriminately. Churches were bombed during Sunday services in order to produce as many casualties as possible: men, women, and children” (56).

In the first week of January 2012, spokesman of Boko Haram, during an interview with *Daily Trust*, issued a two weeks ultimatum to Southern Nigerians who are basically Christians to vacate northern Nigeria or risk being killed. On the expiration of the two weeks, this threat was made real by the sect by viciously attacking the Southern Nigerians in Kano, killing about 400 people (Ishaku 2). In another statement issued the same year, Boko Haram demanded that the President, Goodluck Ebele Jonathan and all other Christians in Nigeria should convert to Islam if they should escape carnage (Walker 11). In yet a third and rather conflicting announcement, Abul Qaqa assured that Christians could be protected in an Islamic state. In his explanations, Qaqa asserted that Islamic orthodoxy provides for the protection of Christians and Jews under Islamic government. However, he insisted that Nigerian Christians were not entitled to enjoying this privilege, since the Christians have not requested to be placed under Islamic protection. He expressed his embitterment that

Christians are not ready to submit to Islam as they have resisted sharia implementation. In addition to this, Christians are seen as representatives of western civilization, who have brought along various vices of the West that corrupt Islamic societies. Thus, clever ways of dealing with them is to suppress, attack and exterminate them. This made Christians and churches major targets of Boko Haram (Harnischfeger 57-58).

Perouse de Montclos adduces that the early attack of Boko Haram on Christians was a tactical way of becoming a part of the global jihad. When the sect pretends to be defending Muslims against alleged Christian aggressions in Plateau states, it is covertly trying to gain external financial and moral support from radical Islamic organisations based in Arab nations. Such attacks would also attract to them the sympathy and endearment of Nigerian Muslims and make them to take sides (138). No wonder the Boko Haram sect in their early years were able to raise such a teeming membership, intimidating arsenal and financial support. Hence targeting Christian communities makes sense, as it easily creates terror or panic, challenging the secularity of the Nigerian state as it affects freedom of religion. This is even as so many Nigerians view Boko Haram's attacks on Christian as a very serious problem (Lugo *et al* 43).

Boko Haram terrorists also target Muslim clerics who are opposed to their ideology. Armed assaults and bomb attacks are taken to mosques and other Islamic gatherings where the terrorists perceive Muslims gather to criticise or discuss against them. The radical ideology of Mohammed Yusuf generated serious friction between Yusuf and some prominent northern Islamic scholars such as Yahaya Jingir, Sheik Abba Aji, and the late Ja'afar Mahmud Adams. The meetings of Adam and Yusuf between 2004 and 2007 (the year Adam was killed) was characterised by bitter theological arguments. Adam, a seasoned Islamic theologian described Yusuf's theological perception as "stupid", "ignorant", and very dangerous for the political aspirations of Nigerian Muslims. Against Yusuf's position, Adam encouraged secular and Western education for Muslims, noting that "only the conscious

adoption of Western and secular boko education would eventually enable Muslims to effectively fight the Western enemy” (Loimeier, cited in Onuoha 168). This, no doubt, earned Sheik Ja’far Mahmud Adam a bullet on the forehead as he bent down to pray in a mosque.

On 5 July 2015, bomb blasts occurred in a mosque during prayer time at Yan Taya in Jos, Plateau state. In outrage, Muslim mobs set on fire the adjoining Cherubim and Seraphim church (Stefanos Foundation). Perouse de Montclos opines that:

Since the first recorded act of violence committed by the so-called ‘Taliban’ in November 2003, Boko Haram has actually struck against political targets: police stations which were sometimes the only effective presence of the state in remote villages; prisons which were attacked to release militants; schools which symbolised Western education and the colonisation of the mind; mosques and Muslim scholars who contested the moral authority of the deviant sect; politicians and godfathers who were fraudulently elected and who were accused of failing to implement properly Islamic Law, etc. After the assault of the army and the extrajudicial killing of Mohammed Yusuf in July 2009, then the group started to operate outside of Borno and Yobe, hitting churches in Jos in December 2010 and United Nations offices in Abuja in August 2011... Boko Haram aimed to further destabilise Nigeria by going to the South to attack strategic targets such as bridges, power plants, the radar facilities of international airports, and radio and television transmitters (137).

It is quite clear that the Boko Haram sect targets and attacks everyone and everything that does not belong to their fold. Their pattern of attack suggests that the sect members are on a mission to destroy the secular Nigerian state and replace it with a religiously pure Islamic society where only the religious ideas of sect can thrive. This confirms that Boko Haram is a religious terrorist group; while their war of terror is a total jihad.

3.3 CAUSES OF BOKO HARAM’S TERRORIST ACTIVITIES

The causes of terrorism, such as Boko Haram are usually difficult to assess, ascertain or explain. This is due to the fact that terrorism, terrorists and terrorist tactics are quite dynamic and not static. They keep changing according to time, social milieu and diverse motivating factors. In the same vein, scholars who tend to understudy terrorism differ, owing to changing trends in terrorism and varying scholarly approaches. Hence, those searching for the causes of terrorism, and in this case, Boko Haram, approach the study diversely, including the religious, social, economic, political, cultural and historical dynamics. Some view it as both internal and external developments.

While psychologists have postulated psychiatric and behavioural defects, sociologists consider Boko Haram to be the resultant effect of years of poor governance, which has resulted to a failed state. Whichever side of the prism an analyst views from, the fact remains that Boko Haram terrorism constitutes serious ethical vices suggestive of an unhealthy society. Crenshaw warns that whatever the method one adopts to study the causes, Boko Haram terrorism should not be taken out of specific historical context or treated as a generic phenomenon. This she says is because terrorism is not a monolithic phenomenon, but is rather diverse in inception, ideology and organisation; and is usually rooted in political discontent and always attempts to sustain or legitimise violence (405).

Scholars, analysts and respondents have identified different factors responsible for the emergence and protraction of Boko Haram terrorism in Nigeria. Lipdo looks at the causes of Boko Haram terrorism in Plateau state and other Central and Northern Nigerian states to include religious, cultural and political factors, which he says have their root in injustice. He states further that these three factors act together in northern Nigeria due to the fact that the North comprises three basic social classes that have never been one at any time, including 1. The core northern Muslims; 2. The ethnic Middle Belt Muslims; and 3. Christians and natives. He reveals that “the problem is that the dominant and the powerful of old wish to continue to

oppress the minorities, but the oppressed minorities want their freedom” (41). Supporting Lipdo’s argument, Mbaezue maintains that the causes of Boko Haram in Plateau state as well as other northern states could be understood from political, religious, structural dimensions and foreign effects (vii).

To Sani, anyone discussing the causes of Boko Haram must consider manipulation of religion, disconnect between the government and the governed, social and economic injustice, global terrorism, collapse of public education, massive unemployment, unguarded borders and proliferation of fire arms, underdevelopment of the north by previous administration, human rights abuse and extra-judicial killing, economic collapse of the north, capitalism, disunity in the north, and distortion of religious realities (Ikenna vanguardngr.com). It suffices to say that Boko Haram resulted from a combination of many problems. For the purpose of this study, the researcher, from his surveys has deciphered and analysed critically the following factors.

- i. Colonial Legacy

A legacy is a situation existing now due to actions and events that took place in the past. It is something handed down or the remains from a previous time or generation (Hornby 843). The type of legacy which the British handed over to Nigeria on independence has been largely blamed for the emergence of political instability and various forms of insurgency in the nation, with Boko Haram currently ravaging northern Nigeria. Boko Haram terrorism in the north symptomizes a deeply rooted malaise spanning back to colonial days when colonial educational policies that forbade western education in northern Nigeria helped to make the region to fall behind the southern region in every aspect of endeavour. This has made the spate of civilisation, development and modernisation to be rather slower in the north than in the south.

This accounts for the frustration of the teeming northern youths, who find it difficult or rather impossible to compete with their southern colleagues. This failure and not only religious difference explains the deep-rooted grievances of Boko Haram in northern Nigeria. Thus, Boko Haram lies at the root of the fragile political institutions inherited from the British by Nigeria at independence in 1960. For Nigeria, colonialism was both a factor of cohesion and a source of discord, friction and hostility (Fafowora 8). Mohammed Kyari affirms that “the disdain for western education is as old as the imposition of colonial rule, but the resort to violence to overturn it is entirely new” (22).

ii. Fundamentalist Islamic Ideology

Adamu acquiesces that in northern Nigeria, since 1980, the rise of what might be “eventually placed within the rubric of militant Islam has shifted the focus from a band of albeit fundamentalists in the 1980s to a committed hard-core Islamists with a clear political-and-violent-ideology in the 2000s” (26). Dating from the time of Ali, the fourth Caliph (after Abubakar, Umar and Usman) events in Islam have been full of various groups who have preferred toing a different path other than that of the main Sunni orthodoxy. The first group to undermine, resist and rebel against Ali’s authority earned for themselves the sobriquet, *Kharijites* (defectors or rebels, from Arabic *khawarij*; singular: *khariji*, literally those who went out) (Kenny 22). The culmination of their resistance to authority came with the assassination of Ali, the Caliph in AD 661 by one of the *Khairjites*. Known for their fundamental slogan, *la hukum illa li-llah* (there is no judgement but that of Allah), they adopted a strict and puritanical interpretation of the Quran, rejecting every other knowledge – an ideology that the Boko Haram sect came up later to imbibe.

Mohammed Kyari reports that the charge of Kharijism was levelled against Yusuf and his Boko Haram group by the local Izala *ulama*, even in various debates led by Mallam Bashir

Mustafa (Kashar'ra), going by the fact that Boko Haram labelled other Muslims as unbelievers, could not clearly distinguish between sin and unbelief, killed people indiscriminately for no just cause, including Muslims, and rebelled against constituted authority. All these traits featured prominently among the Kharijites. However, in an attempt to defend their position and exonerate his sect from alleged kharijism, Muhammad Yusuf authored a book which he titled *Hazihi Aqeedatun wa Minhaju Da'awatuna* (This is Our Manifesto and Our Path), a 300 paged book published in Arabic in 2009. His self-defence efforts failed, as other Muslim bodies equally dubbed Boko Haram Kharijites, with their continued violent and rebellious strides (19).

The birth of the Wahhabi motivated Izala in Jos in 1978 under the guardianship of Sheik Mahmud Abubakar Gumi (1922-92) is another stimulus in radical or fundamental Muslim ideology in northern Nigeria. The Izala criticised traditional rulers, condemned the government and rejected the moral standard of the society, calling for strict Islam. Following this was the booster of the 1979 Iranian Revolution that overthrew the Pahlavi dynasty, establishing in its place an Islamic state despite the resistance of United States of America (USA). This event greatly inspired the Islamic Movement of Ibrahim El-Zakzaky of Zaria and his likes in different parts of northern Nigeria (22). This is one of the factors that inspired the Maitatsine uprising.

The Maitatsine Islamic sect, led by its founder, a Cameroon born Alhaji Muhammad Marwa who was resident in the city of Kano, staged a religious riot in Kano in their attempt to overthrow the secular government and enforce full-scale sharia law in the society. Though Marwa was killed in that uprising by the soldiers under the military regime of President Olusegun Obasanjo, the Maitatsine followers viciously attacked five northern states with heavy destructive impact in five battle-drawn years of bloodshed. This includes Kano (18

February 1980), Borno (28 October 1982), Kaduna (29 October 1982), Kano again (30 October 1982), former Gongola (27 February 1984), and Bauchi (26 April 1985).

The effect of this fundamentally based violence is that the entire northern region became a battlefield of sort, with outbreaks of ethno-religious violence instigated by Islamic extremists. Shiites demanded sharia law over Nigerian constitution; Muslim students attacked and disrupted Christian meeting at College of Education in Kafanchan in 1987. In Tafawa Balewa, Bauchi state Hausa-Fulani Muslims clashed with the Christian Sayawa in 1991 over the usage of the market. Muslim fanatics rioted over the visit of the Archbishop of Canterbury in Kano in 1982. There were serious crises in Kano, Katsina, Sokoto, and Funtua following the alleged FUNTIMES magazine's "blasphemous publication". There were also the 1992 Zango Kataf riots; 1994 attacks on Christians and churches, and 1996 riots in Maiduguri against the teaching of Christian Religious Knowledge (Ishaku 62). Major violence hit Plateau state in 2001 with terrible destructive impacts, and has remained protracted and unabated.

The introduction of Sharia and its supposed preference to Nigerian constitution in Zamfara state, and its subsequent adoption in twelve other states in northern Nigeria was another mega expression of fundamentalist Islamic ideology. The imposition of sharia sparked off violent crises in northern Nigerian states, leading to the death of over 2000 victims, burning of churches and mosques, and loss of considerable amount of properties. The campaign for sharia was not started by Boko Haram, as many Muslims have made such moves in the past. Boko Haram only continued the age long struggle. T. H. Gwarzo, in a research on the sharia campaign in Kano state discovered that all the Muslim organisations, from the conservatives to the radical Shiites, supported sharia with the call for the establishment of an Islamic state (cited in Harnischfeger 42). The failure of the sharia states to implement a full-scale sharia was a disappointment to many fundamentalist Muslims in

Nigeria; a situation that Boko Haram came up to challenge. The sect rejects the Zamfara modelled sharia, and has always insisted on total sharia imposition in Nigeria. This is an attempt many fear could lead to the Islamisation of Nigeria or its disintegration (Muhammed, Kyari 22). Harnischfeger affirms that Boko Haram is unarguably fighting for the Islamisation of the Nigerian state and society through the sharia legal code (34).

iii. Politics

Harnischfeger observes that the Islamisation of the Nigerian state, which is what Boko Haram is fighting for, is a battle which was began by Hausa-Fulani politicians many years ago (34). He opines that:

The campaign to transform state and society on the basis of shariah was begun by Muslim politicians in 1999, when military rule ended and power shifted to the Christian South. Although pious campaign was mainly a matter of political intrigues, it established a paradigm that still frames debates. Few Muslims in the far north of Nigeria would openly question what the imams are preaching: that the will of God takes precedence of man-made laws and constitutions. Like most other Islamic organisations, Boko Haram refers to this principle. With its call for a consequent islamisation, it seeks to achieve what Muslim politicians in the North have promised, but failed to deliver. This makes it difficult to denounce the aims of the rebels, and the Islamic establishment appears unable to formulate a coherent counter-paradigm (33).

Mazrui, while supporting Harnischfeger's argument stated in his "shariacracy", that following the shift of power to the South, northern political elites used the sharia advocacy as a "bargaining chip" to pressurise and destabilise the Christian president and his government (cited in Harnischfeger 35). During the sharia conflicts between February and May 2000, President Olusegun Obasanjo entreated the northern elders to retract their position on the new

sharia legislation, so as to halt further bloodshed and restore peace, but they remained resolute, insisting that Allah's law must be held second to none. Some of the prominent politicians took the issue rather personal and went to the extent of declaring self-sacrifice and total commitment to the course of sharia. Olowolabi reports that the current president of Nigeria, Muhammadu Buhari had to assure his followers that "I can die for the cause of Islam" (36). Another strong man in northern politics, Bukar Abba Ibrahim, who served as the governor of Yobe state corroborated that "if necessary, we are ready to fight another civil war. We cannot be blackmailed into killing sharia (Harnischfeger 34).

As Harnischfeger asserts, Buhari, Balarabe Musa, Shagari and other northern elders who supported sharia project knew well that the "apostle of sharia", Ahmed Sani, former governor of Zamfara state had canvassed for sharia to achieve his political ambition. Campaigning on sharia ticket in 1999, Sani was able to oust a formidable contestant, Aliyu Gusau. Seeing governor Sani's success, other northern politicians equally jumped on the sharia bandwagon as a means of advancing their political objective. They promised to transform the entire public life on sharia orientation. This, however, was not to be realised. As soon as the politicians achieved their political goals and stabilised their grip on power, sharia gradually started dying a natural death. Poverty has continued to be on the increase, while the ruling class, in a pretentious piety under the garb of religion, keep on amassing and exhibiting wealth to the disappointment of the people (Suleiman 26).

Again, there is this established practice in Nigerian politics, whereby the politicians arm the youths, mostly the unemployed ones and use them as thugs to secure election victory, dumping them after the election. This situation is true in the south as it is in the north. Commenting on thugs and northern politics, Ojo reports that:

Northern politicians use various groups such as Yan Sara-Suka in Bauchi, *Yan Kalare* in Gombe, *Yan Daba* and *Yan daukan amarya* in Kano and *ECOMOG* in Borno and Yobe states. In Adamawa state, the Political thugs are known as *Damagun Boys* and *Shinko Boys*. In Taraba state, they are called *Bani Israila* (cited in Onuoha 67).

It is reported that Ali Modu Sheriff used the services of two groups to snatch power from the former governor and his predecessor, then Governor Mala Kachalla, including Boko Haram (called Yusufiyya then) and Ecomog. Sheriff is said to have promised the Boko Haram movement full implementation of sharia in the state, a cash reward of 50 million naira, 50 units of motorcycle, and the office of the Commissioner for Religious Affairs, which the sect's national secretary, Alhaji Buji Foi occupied (166).

Trouble started when among other issues, governor Sheriff reneged on full implementation of sharia. At the height of the dispute, Muhammad Yusuf pressured Foi and other members of the sect serving in Sheriff's government to resign. As their relationship further broke down, Sheriff used the rival group to attack Yusuf's movement, while Yusuf continued to preach against and discredit Sheriff's government as corrupt and full of other immoral activities, describing them as *yan boko* (deceivers). Other youths who were equally discarded by their sponsors, frustrated and having no other means of livelihood joined Yusuf to champion his radical cause. The altercation between Governor Sheriff and Ustaz Yusuf culminated in the death of the later in 2009 in the hands of security agents, thereby escalating Boko Haram terrorism in northern Nigeria.

iv. Poverty

Poverty and deprivation have been used interchangeably to explain Boko Haram terrorism, as both terms mean the same thing. Poverty is the state of being poor or not being able to take care of one's needs. Deprivation is the state of being denied or without something

which is necessary for survival, such as adequate food, shelter, and other basic necessities. It is the suffering caused by one not having the essential requirements to take care of basic needs (Hornby 393). Many people, including politicians, humanitarian organisations, scholars and respondents argue that the root cause of Boko Haram terrorism in northern Nigeria is the deprivation of social and economic amenities which has played out largely in the region in poverty, unemployment, underdevelopment, marginalisation, poor education or illiteracy, frustration, misery and beggary. Socio-economic deprivation suggests that these antecedents expose people to terrorist inclinations and tendencies, and could as well drive them to outright terrorist acts (Sanusi 183). Academic inquiry requires plain objectivity. Thus, the researcher endeavours to present objective analysis of the various arguments for and against this position.

Ali Modu Sheriff, former governor of Borno state, in 2006 told journalists that about 95 per cent of Borno people were illiterates, whereas less than 2 percent of the residents had access to newspapers (Abba 47). Subscribing to Sheriff's position, Adesoji deduces that Boko Haram has been able to develop and spread in northern Nigeria due to poor standard of living, grievances and frustrations against the leaders, poor service delivery and insensitive leadership. According to him, Boko Haram came up to fight and humiliate the politicians who have exploited them for long in the name of Islam (cited in Abba 47). Mohammed Kyari infers that the decline in economic fortunes following the harsh economic realities has increased the poverty and suffering of Nigerians. This condition becomes more precarious with the ruling class displaying so much wealth amidst widespread poverty in the north, leading to anger, disappointment and frustration among the people. Mohammed states further that in matters of infuriation, disaffection and uncertainty, "Muslim societies naturally react in religious terms" (23), making Boko Haram a religious struggle for credible solution in Nigerian leadership.

Kwanashie equally concurs that poverty and marginalization provide fertile soil for terrorism, as it is easy to brainwash the poor, vulnerable and helpless to join violent or terrorist groups. He expresses sadness that poverty in Nigeria has been on a steady increase (82). The steady rise of poverty incidence in Nigeria is vividly displayed on the tables below.

Table 5: Poverty Profile of Nigeria from 1980-2010

Year	Poverty Incidence (%)	Estimated Population (million)	Population in poverty (million)
1980	27.2	65	17.1
1985	46.3	75	34.7
1992	42.7	91.6	39.2
1996	65.6	102.3	67.1
2004	54.4	126.3	68.7
2010	69.0	163	112.47

Source: National Bureau for Statistics, 2010

Table 6: Zonal Incidences of Poverty in Nigeria

Zone	Food Poor	Absolute Poor	Relative Poor	Dollar Per Day
North Central	38.6	59.5	67.5	59.7
North East	51.5	69.0	76.3	69.1
North West	51.8	70.0	77.7	70.4
South East	41.0	58.7	67.0	59.2
South-South	35.5	55.9	63.8	56.1
South-West	25.4	49.8	59.1	50.1

Source: NBS National Poverty Profile January 2012

The region with the highest poverty profile is the North East and North Western Nigeria, as is subsequently demonstrated in the table below.

Sanusi Lamido Sanusi, former governor of Central Bank of Nigeria and current Emir of Kano argues vehemently that the woe of the north is as a result of marginalisation and unequal revenue allocation (5). Reasoning along, Lengmang posits that issues of marginalisation and unemployment result to frustration and social unrest, which forces individuals and groups to become violent. He adds that Boko Haram terrorists use violence to express the frustration of the people due to years of corruption, poor governance, extreme inequality between the poor and the rich, unemployment, illiteracy and economic degradation (cited in Mbaezue 72).

Blaming the rise of Boko Haram on the socio-economic misfortune of the north, however, has forced the researcher to raise some pertinent questions. Who is marginalising who? Who has actually made the north poor? Are northern elites fair to accuse the south of marginalisation? Are poor people everywhere always violent? Is violence an answer or solution to poverty? Does killing one make another better? Can anyone be justified for taking up arms just because he feels alienated? Are there no other better options in expressing one's grievances than terrorist violence? Has the Boko Haram movement revealed any socio-economic plan that could make the northern region or Nigeria better in their years of terrorist onslaughts? A few records may serve well in this regard.

Ya' Usman is of the opinion that anyone who desires to investigate the socio-economic deterioration of northern Nigeria should focus his search lenses on the north. He blames the marginalisation and poverty experienced in the "core Muslim North" on the northern political elites and traditional rulers. He states that the blame for the emergence of Boko Haram lies at the door steps of the politicians and traditional institutions who turn blind eyes on the

suffering of their people whom they are pretending to lead on God's behalf under the cover of political Islam. He admits that the present condition of the north is an embarrassment, which should not be. This, he says is because northern Nigeria has produced more presidents than any other region in the country, who had the capacity to transform the living condition of the people in the north. He observes that this negligence betrays the legacy of Sardauna, who in his time used only groundnut to transform the economy of the north (www.compassnewspaper).

Furthermore, Abba observes that it is an aberration of thought for anyone to blame the south for the troubles of the north. This is, according to him, because northern Nigeria has 19 out of Nigeria's 36 states, in addition to the Federal Capital Territory (FCT) located in the north, leaving the South-East, South-South and South-West regions with 17 states. The north also has 409 Local Government Areas (LGA) against 387 for the entire south (50). Each of the states and LGAs receive federal allocation for both human and capital project development, coming from majorly the oil wealth in the South.

Despite the stream of allocations that have poured into the North, the North has remained the poorest region in Nigeria, as revealed by recent studies. The United Nations carried out an extensive research on the occurrence of poverty in the 36 Nigerian states and the FCT. Their research report is based on data collected on years between 2004 and 2014. The United Nations Global Multi Dimension Poverty Index has three dimensions and 10 indicators in estimating Overall Poverty. Each dimension is equally weighed, while each indicator within a dimension is also weighed, and added. 10 indicators are used to measure poverty in three dimensions, namely education, health and living standards. This report was published in 2015. The researcher has created a table, chart and graph with the data, as represented below.

Table 7: Poverty Rates of Nigerian States

S/N	STATE	POVERTY RATE (%)
1.	Lagos	8.5
2.	Osun	10.9
3.	Anambra	11.2
4.	Ekiti	12.9
5.	Edo	19.2
6.	Imo	19.8
7.	Abia	21.0
8.	Rivers	21.1
**	FCT Abuja	23.5
9.	Kwara	23.7
10.	Akwa Ibom	23.8
11.	Delta	25.1
12.	Ogun	26.1
13.	Kogi	26.4
14.	Ondo	27.9
15.	Enugu	28.8
16.	Bayelsa	29.0
17.	Oyo	29.4
18.	Cross River	33.1
**	National Average	46.0
29.	Plateau	51.6

20.	Nasarawa	52.4
21.	Ebonyi	56.0
22.	Kaduna	56.5
23.	Adamawa	59.0
24.	Benue	59.2
25.	Niger	61.2
26.	Borno	70.1
27.	Kano	76.4
28.	Gombe	76.9
29.	Taraba	77.7
30.	Katsina	82.2
31.	Sokoto	85.3
32.	Kebbi	86.0
33.	Bauchi	86.6
34.	Jigawa	88.4
35.	Yobe	90.2
36.	Zamfara	91.9

Sources: The Global Multidimensional Poverty Index by the U.N

<http://www.dataforall.org/dashboard/ophi/index.php/>

REGIONAL AVERAGES

1. South West - 19.3% Poverty (+ Average)
2. South-South - 25.2% Poverty (+ Average)
3. South East - 27.36% Poverty (+ Average)

** National Average: 46.0% Poverty

4. North Central - 45.7% Poverty (+Average)

5. North East - 76.8% Poverty (- Average)

6. North West- 80.9% Poverty (- Average)

From the data presented above, it could be observed that northern Nigeria is poorer than southern Nigeria. The entire northern region falls below the national poverty average of 46.0%. The north east and north west are the poorest geopolitical zones, with negative (-ve) poverty status that is far below the national average, with 76.8% and 80.9% respectively. These are the zones that adopted sharia, following Zamfara state in 2000, and the epicentre of Boko Haram terrorism. Zamfara state is at the bottom of the poverty line, with 91.9%. This further explains that the sharia campaign of governor Yerima, which preceded Boko Haram, is nothing more than mere political jingoism used in blindfolding the electorate, as the lives of the people are not improved by their leaders in any significant way.

Records equally prove that the impoverishment of the north is not caused by poor funding from the federal allocation. This is revealed in the breakdown of 1.4 trillion naira federal allocation shared from the federation account in the first quarter of 2017. The breakdown is contained in the monthly Federation Account Committee (FAAC) report, released to News Agency of Nigeria in Abuja on 22 May 2017. The main agencies that remit fund into the federation account are Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC), Federal Inland Revenue Service (FIRS), and Nigeria Customs Service (NCS). The allocation was made using the revenue sharing formula: Federal Government, 52.68 per cent; states,

26.72 per cent and local governments 20.60 per cent. This same sharing formula has always been used, even in the previous years that saw larger allocations. The report showed that before distribution, state liabilities were deducted. The researcher used the data to prepare the table below.

Table 8: Federal Allocation of Nigeria for First Quarter 2017

S/NO	STATE	ALLOCATION (BN)
1.	Abia	N8.42
2.	Adamawa	N7.8
3.	A-Ibom	N34.88
4.	Anambra	N8.7
5.	Bauchi	N7.9
6.	Bayelsa	N22.9
7.	Benue	N8.16
8.	Borno	N9.74
9.	C-River	N4.28
10.	Delta	N21.54
11.	Ebonyi	N7.56
12.	Edo	N6.5
13.	Ekiti	N4.97
14.	Enugu	N7.86
15.	Gombe	N6.35
16.	Imo	N7.92
17.	Jigawa	N9.66
18.	Kaduna	N10.56

19.	Kano	N14.02
20.	Katsina	N10.05
21.	Kebbi	N8.37
22.	Kogi	N8.28
23.	Kwara	N6.9
24.	Lagos	N19.03
25.	Nasarawa	N7.41
26.	Niger	N9 billion
27.	Ogun	N4.98
28.	Ondo	N10.22
29.	Osun	N1.76
30.	Oyo	N8.9
31.	Plateau	N5.7
32.	Rivers	N26.8
33.	Sokoto	N9.07
34.	Taraba	N6.9
35.	Yobe	N8.33
36.	Zamfara	N5.91

Source: Vanguard Media Limited, Nigeria www.vanguardngr.com Accessed 15 August 2017

From the above record, it could be seen that the northern states of Adamawa (N7.8 billion), Borno (N9.7 billion), and Yobe (N8.33 billion) where Boko Haram started and blossomed earn white higher than some southern states, like Osun (1.76 billion), Ogun (4.98 billion), Ekiti (4.97 billion), and Edo (6.5 billion). However, the human and capital

developments in these southern states far outweigh those of their northern counterparts. This suggests that the poverty in the region is not necessarily caused by the absence of cash inflow into the states. The area could have been impoverished by their corrupt leaders who amass stupendous wealth for themselves at the detriment of the people. So corruption, rather than marginalization is a major factor in northern destitution. Buttressing this point, Yemi Osinbajo, Nigeria's Vice President laments that corruption among public servants fuelled terrorism in North-Eastern Nigeria, which has brought adverse effects in the areas of healthcare, education, social services, poor infrastructure and low quality of life (Dailypost.ng). Further affirming this position, former Nigerian President, Olusegun Obasanjo reveals that abject poverty arising from the corruption of Nigeria leaders was what led to Boko Haram. He opines that:

One of the reasons that members of the extremist group – Boko Haram, gave for their insurrection is that they became disillusioned when they saw how corrupt that Western educated leaders were. According to them, if those who occupied government offices by virtue of their Western education would corruptly enrich themselves and deprive others of the basic things of life, then that education is 'haram' which means forbidden. I am told that when Mohammed Yusuf, the original leader of Boko Haram and his early followers first started, they all gathered and tore their certificates because they said a certificate, which could not fetch them a source of livelihood, is useless to them. Similarly, they saw Western education as corrupting the individual. We may not agree with their position, but the disappointment and disillusionment of citizens over the inadequacy or poor performance of their leaders is real (Nwachukwu dailypost.ng).

The above facts also prove that Boko Haram is an organised crime, based on terrorist ideological underpinnings. This could be so; going by the fact that many leaders of terrorist

organisations are hardly poor. It is on record that most of such leaders are from influential and wealthy backgrounds, such as Osama bin Laden and al Zawahiri. Muhammad Yusuf, founder of Boko Haram sect has never been presented as a pauper either. Some members of his movement were equally wealthy and quite influential, including Buji Foi, Kadiru Atiku, Bunu Wakil, and others. Farouk Abdulmutalab, the USA convicted Nigerian failed plane bomber hails from a very rich Nigerian family and was a student in United Kingdom. One may also ask: are the suicide bombers attacking their targets due to poverty or in order to get money from them?

Equally, one may not rule out socio-economic deprivation and the attendant effects as causation of Boko Haram terrorism, going by the number of unemployed youths and adults coupled with the high quantity of vulnerable *almajirai* that loiter the streets of northern Nigeria states. A research carried out by the Ministerial Committee on Almajiri Education in 2010 under President Goodluck Ebele Jonathan shows that Nigeria had 9.5 million *almajirai*, and over 70 percent of them cluster in northern Nigeria, living under very sympathetic conditions (Onuoha 162). This number should have increased exponentially after seven more years of negligence. Many of these *almajirai* constitute a sizeable number of Boko Haram foot soldiers and suicide bombers. They are easy preys with little bait. They are easily recruited, brainwashed along the line of religious fanaticism and deployed for an all-out violence, as has been witnessed in several conflicts in Plateau state and parts of northern Nigeria. A respondent revealed that the voices of the *almajirai* followers usually announce the presence of Boko Haram fighters with chants of *Allahu Akbar* (Allah is great) while they advance for destructive operations. The *almajiri* boys loot conquered places and burn what is left with fire, while some of them are trained on shooting and slaughtering of enemies. They also serve Boko Haram in intelligence gathering, as they easily mix up with people in the society.

In a nut shell, if Boko Haram could be excused due to the socio-economic failures brought upon the north by past leaders, it goes without saying that the terrorists should be held responsible for the total socio-economic crumbling of northern society, particularly the north-western Nigeria which they have destroyed. They are the ones who attack the markets, schools, hospitals and health workers. They kill the innocent and fight anyone they see as an opposition to their mandate. They burn churches at will and attack Muslim clerics and mosques that do not support them. They have scared off migrants and investors who could have helped to develop the north. If the past leaders made the people destitute, Boko Haram movement have reduced them to slaves, orphans, widows and widowers. Thus, in the few years of their operation, the Boko Haram sect has done worse to the people, society and economy than the northern political elites they condemn.

v. Human Rights Abuse and Extra-Judicial Killing

Nigerian security forces have been variously accused of human rights abuse and extra-judicial killing. In its 2015 annual report, Amnesty International accused the Nigerian military of violating human rights and committing war crimes, especially in their war against Boko Haram and suppression of Biafra. They faulted the military for torture, excessive use of force, extra-legal killings, non-abolition of death penalty, gagging of freedom of expression, violation of court orders; while the government has not done anything to protect the right of her citizens. The country director of amnesty international, Mohammed Kaura Ibrahim stated in Abuja that the clashes between Boko Haram and the military resulted in the death of thousands of civilians and over 2 million Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) at the end of 2015. He reiterated that

Torture and ill-treatment by the police and security forces were widespread.

Demolitions of informal settlements led to the forced eviction of thousands of people.

Death sentences continue to be imposed; no executions were reported. The military continue war crimes against humanity in response to Boko Haram between 2011 and 2015 (www.nij.com/74295-amnesty-internation2).

Many scholars, analysts, observers and respondents hold the opinion that the death of Muhammad Yusuf and some other key members of Boko Haram in the hands of security agents is the most important factor that radicalised the sect members and turned them against the institutions of government. Pe`rouse de Montclos reports that “Nigerian ranks highest in terms of the ratio of militant to security force deaths compared with other counter-insurgency operations, in Northern Ireland, Columbia and Chechnya.” The situation, he said is so horrible that “the ratio between arrests and killings has increasingly shifted towards killings with a corresponding rise in abuses and collateral damage amongst civilians” (5).

Boko Haram would always provoke the military by killing their men and melting into the local population, conscious of the fact that the military would vent their anger on the people in retaliation. That is why a Boko Haram fighter ridiculed the military in the following language: “when we killed the big unbelievers, they kill the lesser unbelievers”. The big unbelievers here refer to the military men, while the lesser unbeliever are the local population, whether Christian or Muslim (Mohammed Kyari 26). That was the pattern of military response demonstrated at Baga, Kukawa LGA, Borno state on April 2013 in the killing of about 185 civilians and burning of over 2000 houses by the military following an attack on their patrol vehicle that led to the death of their men. Other similar incidences have been reported by both local and foreign media, though the military always deny such claims (www.vanguardngr.com/2013/04/bloodbath-in-maiduguri).

Nigerian security forces have been badly criticised for not obeying international best practices and deviating from approved rules of engagement in the fight against the Boko

Haram sect. While this is capable of dampening the morale of the soldiers on one side, it should be appreciated that a positive reputation of the military among the people will benefit them a lot as they engage the terrorists, mostly in the areas of people's trust, information gathering or intelligence.

vi. Perennial Violent Conflicts in Northern Nigeria

Since the 1980s, Nigeria has witnessed a great upsurge in the occurrence of violent conflicts. Most of these conflicts have taken place in northern part of the country (Best 3). These conflicts have always followed either religious or ethnic paths, or both. The crises have been so frequent that northern Nigeria has become synonymous with ethno-religious violence. The media has usually portrayed it either religiously as clashes between Muslims and Christians; or ethnic and religious as involving Southern Christians and Northern Muslims. This made the former Libyan President, Muammar Gadhafi to suggest that Nigeria should be divided into two – north and south, following religious boundaries after the model of India and Pakistan. When told that adherents of both religions live in the two regions, he further recommended a disintegration of the country along ethnic lines. Though Gadhafi was severely criticised, the perennial conflict in northern Nigeria has remained a global puzzle (Abdu xii).

Following the burst of the Shiites and the Maitatsine violence in early 1980s respectively in Zaria and Kano cities, various breeds of fanatical ideology developed in northern Nigeria. This led to most of the ethno-religious crises experienced in the north in the 1980s and 1990s. The declaration of Sharia law in Zamfara state in year 2000 and its subsequent adoption in eleven other states of northern Nigeria eventually led to bitter clashes between Christians and Muslims in those states and other neighbouring states. Though calls were made to the leaders of those states by the presidency and other well-meaning Nigerians

to rescind their decision, they insisted on the prevalence of sharia. With the stage set for Islamic emancipation, the Boko Haram sect came up to enforce their puritanical Islamic ideology aimed at Islamising the northern, and thereafter the southern Nigeria. Their terrorist violence has done heavy human and material damages on the nation, mostly in Plateau state (Ishaku 1).

Plateau state has suffered different degrees of violence in the history of conflict in northern Nigeria. The state recorded her first conflict in Jos in 1932 at the height of the Great Depression. The 1945 Jos conflict registered the first blood shedding in the state. It took about fifty more years for bloody violence to return to the state, with the 12 April 1994 bloody clashes that followed President Ibrahim Babangida's creation of Jos North LGA, and the subsequent appointment of a Hausa-Fulani Muslim as Chairman. Gero Road conflict followed in 1998. The September 2001 conflict in Jos and other parts of the state has been described by analysts as "the most grievous bloodletting ever witnessed" (85). Since 2001, Plateau state has been immersed in protracted violence till date, with other major incidences in 2002-2004, 2008, and 2010. The warfare in Plateau state has always been fought on both ethnic and religious fronts – either between the Hausa-Fulani and the indigenes or between the Christians and Muslims. Records on conflicts in northern Nigeria show that "Plateau State is the most volatile with 53% instances of attacks that befell northern Nigeria from 1980 till date" (Stefanos Foundation 89).

Conflict in Plateau state became outright terrorism in 2010. Though the Terminus Market in Jos was bombed and destroyed earlier with multiple explosives following the 2001 bloody violence, people could not accuse the Boko Haram then, because nothing much was known about them in Plateau state at that time, and no group claimed responsibility for the attack. With recent developments, however, many people now suspect that Boko Haram might have been the perpetrators of the bomb attack on the market structures in their

formative years. Boko Haram and their counterpart Fulani herdsmen have grievously terrorised Plateau state with such a destructive feat that the state now lay bare, vulnerable and injured. People find it difficult to distinguish between Boko Haram attacks from Fulani terrorist attacks, with many holding that most of those who disguise as Fulani herdsmen are actually Boko Haram terrorists. Both the city centres and villages are generally attacked. With the 7 March 2010 attack on Dogo Nahawa village that took the lives of about 400 people, mostly woman and children, and the 24 December 2010 (Christmas Eve) multiple bombing of two Christian settlements of Kabong and Gada Biu in Jos claimed by the Boko Haram, it became clear that Plateau state was in for terrorist onslaughts. Boko Haram claimed that their attack was in revenge of perceived maltreatment of Muslims in Plateau state; referring to the previous incessant conflicts in the state that had assumed a religious nature – between Christians and Muslims. They promised more attacks, which they surely fulfilled with the subsequent bombings, killings and destructions carried out in churches, mosques, market places, city centres and rural communities. Considering the magnitude of Boko Haram destructions in the state, Fafowora laments that “Plateau state has suffered more casualties from Boko Haram attacks than any other state in northern Nigeria” (9). Meanwhile, the perennial crises in Plateau state and other northern Nigerian states have metamorphosed into full blown religious terrorism, as is being exhibited by Boko Haram.

vii. Failed Status of Nigerian State

While reacting to the question, “is Nigeria a failed state?”; Ladi Olorunyomi brought in the most current edition of Fragile States Index (FSI), released on 15 May 2017, that scored Nigeria 101.6 out of 120 failed status points. FSI score shows the magnitude of pressure coming from economic, political and social indicators on conditions within each country on the index. The higher the total score and ranking of a country, the more fragile and failure prone it is. The FSI is an early warning measuring system for determining internal

threats that could potentially lead to escalation of main national conflicts with international consequences. Early warning systems became popular following 11 September 2001 attack on USA. The concept has been known as Failed State Index until 2014, when it was changed to Fragile State Index (FSI). Though the index was renamed in 2014, the defining criteria or indicators of state fragility remain same as used in 2005.

Fund for Peace (FFP), a Washington, DC, USA based research organisation, released the first edition of Failed State Index (FSI) twelve years ago, precisely in 2005 when they studied weak and failing states in the world. Then, Nigeria was ranked 54 in the index, the best position the nation has ever attained. Nigeria's ranking has been on a steady decline since 2005. Nigeria poorly ranked 17th in 2007; 18th in 2008; and 15th in 2009. From 2010 to 2012, Nigeria maintained a negative high ranking of 14th most fragile or failed country in the world. Nigeria's current position for 2016 and 2017 is still worse, at 13th position. Perhaps this could get more severe at the end of the year, considering the socio-economic dilemma being suffered in the country this physical year. Then, Olorunyomi opines rhetorically:

So, is Nigeria a failing state? For those who always choose to look at the glass as a half full, it is painful to admit that, at this point in time, however hard we look, the answer cannot be in the negative. Nigeria is a weak state. Yes, Boko Haram is on the run but famine is gaining ground in its retreat. Yes, there are ongoing works around militancy in the Niger Delta, but the Niger Delta Action Plan is in the cooler. And the rest of the country is still wound up in infrastructure decay, public sector larceny, stunted healthcare delivery and so on (www.premiumtimesng.com/news).

The FFP report groups Nigeria with eight other nations in the High Alert category. These are countries with high scores of 110 and 100. They include Afghanistan, Iraq, and Democratic Republic of Congo. This group is described as a danger zone. To equate Nigeria

with countries that have been torn apart by war and terror spells out potential danger for the nation. Meanwhile, Boko Haram could have developed as a result of the weak and failed status of the Nigerian state. Their continuous terrorist onslaughts, coupled with weak economy are fast driving the already fragile nation to the brink of total collapse. This is just as Olorunyomi notes that “nothing says a country is going down the path of a Failed State as loudly as being placed in the same category as war torn countries” (www.premiumtimesng.com/news).

Ibrahim Mohammed asks another pertinent question: “do we have any reason not to see Nigeria as a failed state?” He retorts that no nation has the guarantee of continuous existence when her citizens continue wallowing in untold hardship and abject poverty in the midst of abundant natural resources. He states that once any nation cannot meet up with its primary responsibility of providing security and development, it becomes a failed state. When a government is so weak and ineffective that it cannot protect its territories and borders, rather it resorts to fighting and killing its own citizens, it becomes a failed state. When a nation cannot provide public services, such as good hospitals, sustainable education, good roads, steady power supply and clean water for her citizens, it becomes a failed state. Corruption, high crime rate such as kidnapping, robbery and cultism, migration/brain drain, poor policies, and economic bankruptcy all characterise Nigeria as a weak, failed state. The list is inexhaustive, he said. Mohammed is saddened that Nigerian leaders have been looking the opposite direction while things were going wrong with religion, security, economy and society. He maintains that all those things they ignored are now hunting the nation and her leadership (gamji.com).

Kwanashie corroborates Mohammed’s argument, insisting that Nigeria has no strength as a nation. He states that the religious, ethnic and regional activities of each successive government continue to stir up emotions that threaten the nation and widen the

gap that already exists in the society (69). This he blames on the poor political, economic and administrative foundations laid and handed over to Nigeria by the British colonialists, whose major interest was the continuous exploitation of Nigerian resources. Persistence of the capacity gap, he says, proves the failure of the Nigeria state in meeting the essential needs of most of her citizens. He refers to Mo Ibrahim's African Government Index report for 2011 in which Nigeria ranks 41 out of 53 African countries in the governance index report. The report lowly scores Nigeria on four basic governance indicators, including safety and rule of law, participation and human rights, sustainable economic opportunity, and human development. The report shows that Nigeria is still far below minimum globally accepted standard of governance. The report challenges Nigeria in the areas of weak and poor governance. With this, Kwanashie avers that if a nation is not capable of giving protection to her citizens, groups will naturally spring up to that. When the people perceive their leaders as being unjust, groups will rise up to challenge the injustices. Nigerian leaders, he said, have failed to direct the economy and society on the path of progress, justice and equality, leading to the failure of the state and that of the economy. This is why Boko Haram and other insurgent groups have emerged to challenge the strength of the nation (80).

viii. Foreign Stimulations

Foreign stimulations of Boko Haram terrorism in Nigeria occur in two ways. The first comes from perceived western incursion on Islam, while the second comes from foreign terrorist organisations. United States of America and other Western superpowers have been variously blamed for the upsurge of religious terrorism and Islamic great awakening being experienced in the world today. This is due to different United Nation's (UN) policies in the Middle East, America's unrelenting support to Israel, triumph of democracy and emancipation of Western culture. Various Muslim nations and groups perceive this as a threatening challenge to the survival of their faith; so they rise up to fight for the soul of

Islam. This has given rise to the various terrorist groups, and in some cases, state sponsorship of Islamic terrorism. Boko Haram is a reaction to this foreboding by a Nigerian Islamic sect (Muhammed, Kyari 23).

Syed Abul A'ala Mawdudi (1903-1979), an Islamic scholar from Pakistan was one of the first few Muslim intellectuals to take initiative in this fight. In 1941, he started a movement called *Jamaat-e-Islami* (Islamic Revivalist Party). They developed and operated on the mantra that Islam is not only a religion; but is also a political system and must be seen as a total way of life. They held that Muslims should fight and uphold the purity of Islam by enforcing sharia to replace the secular order. Adamu observes that this mantra has remained the central and controlling ideology of radical Islamic movements wherever they are found (28). Patel buttresses this fact when he argues that:

Islamic political radicalism in the last half-century has followed a tight pattern as a direct response to mainly US foreign policies, stretching from the installation and the support of the Shah of Iran in 1953, which led to the Islamic Iranian revolution, to the US backing of the brutal Sudanese regime of Jaafar Nimeiry leading to a coup by a radical Islamic military in 1989. The US involvement in Lebanon, with the aid of Israel as a proxy, led to the demise of a fragile coalition in the country and ushered in radical elements, which until today remain unsettled. The US in the former Soviet Republics like Tajikistan has even allied with communists in order to counter the growth of Islamic movements (42).

Demant adds that radical Islam spread out rapidly following the 1991 Gulf War, becoming a global threat with the Algerian civil war; Hamas in Palestinian regions; the Bosnia and Chechnya wars; the Taliban in Afghanistan; international terrorism of al-Qaeda;

rise of Islamist parties and movements in Indonesia, Pakistan, Central Asian Republics (of former Soviet Union), and other places around the world (28).

Adamu asserts that contrary to popular opinions, the 1979 Iranian revolution and 11 September 2001 events in USA did not initiate international terrorism, but only accelerated it, because it already existed. He observes that two main types of Islamic militancy have existed, majorly at the Middle East, both sharing the same radical political philosophy. The first group restrict their operations within their countries or territories, while the second group are transnational in operation. First is the *Fateh*, literarily meaning “opening”, and referring to the Palestinian National Liberation Movement (PLO). This was founded in 1954 by the members of the Palestinians in diaspora, who were mostly refugees from Palestine Working as professionals in the Gulf States. Yasir Arafat was among the founders. Also in 1987 in Gaza, another group was founded, called the *Hamas* (*Harakat al-Muqawamah al-Islamiyyah*), meaning Islamic Movement. Hamas was primarily formed by the Sunni Muslims to resist Israeli occupation of Gaza. The *Hezbollah*, (literarily the “party of God”, derived from the Qur’an *Al-Mujadala*, 58:22) was set up in 1982 as a Shi’a resistance force against Israeli invasion of Lebanon. *Al Shahab* (The Youth) was formed in Somalia as an armed Islamic group. They fight to establish a sharia sate governed by Islam, declaring jihad against non-Muslims, and urging attack on foreign forces, especially the African Union, United Nations, Ethiopia and Uganda. *Al Jama’ah* was established in South Africa and registered on 20 April 2007 as the first religious political party in the country, with the aim of introducing sharia in South Africa and Islamising the nation. In Algeria, in 1990-91, a newly formed Islamic party, the *Front Islamiqye du Salut* (FIS – Islamic Salvation Front) surprisingly won local and parliamentary elections. The army’s support for a constitutional coup and official banning of the FIS prevented the Islamic fundamentalists from forming a new government. This led to

protracted terrorist insurrections, reminiscent of Boko Haram experience in Nigeria, as recorded by Volpi:

Political violence began with the arbitrary arrests and torture of pro-Islamic demonstrators by the army and police, and with the revenge killings of civil servants by Islamic guerrillas. Later, these violent tactics were used against people who were not directly involved in the struggle for political power. At first the Islamic guerrillas waged a spectacular campaign of assassination and bombing directed at foreign nationals and assets in a desperate attempt to force foreign governments to drop their support for the Algerian junta. By the mid-1990s the use of terror had spread even to the most apolitical segments of the rural population, as blood feuds, struggles over land ownership and organised crime grew out of the confrontation the pro-government militias and Islamic guerrilla groups (vii).

The escalation of the Algeria terror violence in 1993 led to the coalition of various terrorist and guerrilla movements to form a single militia group known as the *Groupements Islamiques Arme`s* (GIA) or Armed Islamic Group that became notorious in their organised attacks on the government personnel, institutions and establishments through assassinations, bombings, car bombings and other tactics (Adamu 30). These national and transnational terrorist organisations, such as al-Qaeda, ISIS and others have greatly influenced and supported the operations of Boko Haram in Nigeria. Balogun observes that while Al-Shaba gives technical support, al-Qaeda provides the background ideological orientation that radicalises Boko Haram along terrorist onslaughts. Al-Qaeda, which has spread terrorism all over the world, ISIS, and other terror groups have great influence on Boko Haram.

To Lengmang, the ambition of America to expand her western values beyond the shores of the West has been viewed by Muslims, particularly those in the Middle East as an

unfavourable incursion on the Islamic values. This, added to the negative effects of secularisation has led to the rising of terrorist groups in different countries, including Boko Haram in Nigeria. General F. Ham, US commander of African Command (AFRICOM) reported in September 2011 that three African terrorist groups, namely Al-Shaba of Somalia, al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb across the Sahel, and Nigerian Boko Haram publicly and explicitly declared their intention to target westerners, and the US more specifically. The US leadership were seriously concerned about this threat, and more worried about the synergy that existed between these groups. It is a known fact that Boko Haram pledged allegiance to and has operational links with both al-Qaeda and Islamic State (IS) (86).

Also, members of the Boko Haram group have been trained diversely in weapon handling by terrorist groups in Mauritania, Somalia, Algeria, Chad, and etcetera. Abubakar Shekau, the dissident leader of Boko Haram once boasted in 2012 about having 300 suicide bombers trained in Mauritania, Algeria and Somalia who were set to attack the cities of Jos, Abuja, and Kaduna. It has also been reported that the membership of Boko Haram is drawn from northern Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. Some of the arrested members were reportedly having foreign identity cards and passports. In many of the killings in Plateau state, foreigners, including nationals of Chad and Niger have been identified as perpetrators. From all evidences, therefore, foreign incitement is a factor in Boko Haram terrorism (86-104).

ix. Proliferation of Arms and Unguarded Borders

Arms and ammunition move easily across Nigerian porous borders, making it easy for terrorists to access weapons without much difficulty. Trafficking in Small and Light Weapons (SALW) is an area that Nigeria has a very serious challenge. Nigeria endorsed some international agreements committed to eradicating SALW. One of such is the protocol for arms control in West African region, called the Economic Community of West African

States (ECOWAS) Mechanism for Conflict Prevention and Moratorium, signed on 31 October 1998. Another is the ECOWAS Convention on Small and Light Weapons, signed on 14 July 2006. Notwithstanding these treaties, the Defence Industry Corporation of Nigeria (DICON) which was established in 1964 became revived under President Olusegun Obasanjo to produce small and light weapons. Though the industry was pronounced bankrupt in 1972 and the German manager deported, a Russian firm was contracted that revamped DICON. The Kaduna factory manufacture small arms and ammunition, while Bauchi workshop assembles light armoured vehicles (Ishaku 160).

Some of the weapons produced by DICON include Nigeria Rifle 1 Model 7.62mm (code named NG1-7.62) which is manufactured under and Anglo-Belgian licence; Sub Machine Gun (PM 12S Calibre 9mm) under the licence of an Italian firm, Beratta; Nigerian Pistol 1 Model 9mm (NP1-9mm); DICON M36 Hand Grenade; DICON SG1-86 single barrel shotgun. Others are 9 by 19mm Parabellum Cartridge; 7.62mm by 51 blank bullet; 9mm Blank Star; 12 Bore Shotgun Cartridge; and OBJ006, which is a Nigerian model of the Russian AK-47 rifle named after the former President Olusegun Obasanjo. Also, some other African countries are known for manufacturing arms, including Egypt, South Africa, Morocco, and Zimbabwe (160). One wonders where Nigeria places the ECOWAS pacts she signed with other nations on the prohibition of arms manufacturing. This is not even the problem.

The major issue is that about 30 million arms in sub-Sahara Africa (under which West Africa and of course Nigeria falls) are not produced in African countries. This figure (30 million arms) represents 5 percent of the total arms produced in the world. Shocking is the fact that 80 percent out of these firearms lie in the hands of civilians, terrorists, militants and rebels. One may then ask, what is responsible for small arms and light weapons proliferation in Nigeria and surrounding nations? Ishaku indicts the leaders of Nigeria and other African

countries for filling the region with weapons. He reveals that Libya, Morocco, Algeria, Niger and Burkina Faso supply various rebel and extremist groups in West Africa with weapons to fight and bring down governments they disagree with. Kenya, Sudan, Ethiopia, and Eritrea have at different times armed rebels in Darfur, Somalia, Ogden, northern Kenya, and etcetera. Congo's insurrection is fought with arms supplied from South Africa, Zimbabwe and Rwanda. Through Burkina Faso, Libya supplied arms to Charles Taylor and Foday Sankioh's Revolutionary United Front (RUF) in Sierra Leon in the 1990s (161).

Furthermore, separate from state actors, individual and group smugglers traffic SALW across the borders. Florquin and Burman reveal in their research that Nigerian borders are open to arms smugglers by land, sea and air (80). Serious arms trafficking persists around Nigerian boundary with Cameroon and Equatorial Guinea, at the Bight of Bonny and through northern Cameroon into north-eastern Nigeria, carried out mostly through boats around the coastal areas. In October 2010, Nigeria Customs impounded 13 containers at Apapa port, Lagos. On opening the containers, it was discovered that they were filled with Norinco rockets, the type used by the Taliban in Afghanistan, grenades and other destructive arsenal. The weapons were shipped from Bandar Abbas, a port city located in southern Iran. The person behind the consignment was Sheik Ali Abbas Othman Hassan (popularly known as the radical Sheik Abbas Jega), a Nigeria Islamic scholar based in Tehran. Mohammed Tukur, a clearing agent who worked for Alhaji Aliyu Oroje Wamakko's clearing firm was the person to clear the failed deal (162).

Considering the spate of Boko Haram violence during this period, one could be forced to raise some questions. Is Iran a state sponsor of terrorism in Nigeria? What is their interest in the sovereign state of Nigeria? Could there have been other successful shipments of this nature before this discovery? Could there be Boko Haram representatives at various Nigerian borders and ports? Could the assertion of President Goodluck Ebele Jonathan be real that

Boko Haram pervades the entire strata of Nigerian society? Are there publicly known steps that Nigerian government has taken as it affects their relationship with Iran? Whatever the answers to these questions may be, the fact remains that Nigerian border security has been seriously compromised.

Even the Nigeria airspace is not left out of arms smuggling. In June 2009, a Ukrainian plane carrying 18 crates of explosives and various ammunitions was seized at Aminu Kano International Airport, Kano. At the same airport, on 11 November 2011, a heavy consignment of military uniform was intercepted from a Nigerian civilian pilgrim returning from Saudi Arabia. Again, in January 2012, Gary Hyde was arraigned in a London court for smuggling into Nigeria, through China a frightening 80,000 guns and 32 million ammunition. It is even more surprising that the same man, in 2007, reportedly smuggled into Nigeria 40,000 AK-47 rifles and 10,000 units of 9 mm pistol. To this, Ishaku regrets that “one finds the display of lethargy by Nigerian authorities in the face of collapse...completely inexplicable” (164).

The quantities of arms that enter into northern Nigeria by land come in through the porous borders with Cameroon, Chad and Niger. The insurrection in Chad, violent activities of Nigerein Tuaregs and Malian rebels have created illicit arms deals controlled by al-Qaeda around the Sahel and Maghreb regions. Al-Qaeda in the Maghreb had boasted of taking possession of a large reserve of Gaddafi’s weapon store that was hidden in various dumps of the desert around Cyrenaica. Mahamadou Issoufou, Nigerein president, while spelling out the potential dangers such arms have on the sub-region, told president Jacob Zuma of South Africa that “arms are stolen in Libya and are being disseminated all over the region. Sahara countries are facing terrorist threats, arms and criminal activities.” He asserted that the Libyan crisis has amplified violence in the region (166). With the links Boko Haram has with other terrorist organisations in Africa and beyond, it is not a surprise the kind of weapons they brandish.

x. Media Propaganda

The importance of the media in a contemporary era cannot be overemphasised. The media addresses social actions as it defines social realities. The media has actually reduced the world to a global village and universal happening to an on-the-spot assessment. Whatever the media calls an issue, that becomes its address; and because the media says so, many would not border if that is the reality. Yes, the media is an instrument of modernization and development; but as Abdu puts it, the media is a veritable tool for ethno-religious mobilisation, violence and division (177). The mass media, like other identities, is an ideological tool in the hands of the people who control the cost of production. The media says what they want it to say. The media has always projected Nigeria as a battle field, albeit so. Abdu doubts, however, if the media can ever be objective in their reportage. This is because, according to him, while they cover events and make their reports, there are strong forces behind the scene that decide or determine what should be said to the public. Thus, the media has contributed largely to inflaming the embers of hatred and violence in Nigeria, mostly in Plateau state (179). Nigerian mass media has grown phenomenally since they started publishing the first newspaper in 1857. One area that has given them growth is the news on violent conflict. News on conflict, no doubt, raises sales, with increased profit; whereas profit decreases when conflicts drop (180). Abdu asserts that the manner of media reportage on violence in Nigeria further incites more violence. That is why he addresses the mass media as the “media of conflict” (190).

There are two basic ways the Boko Haram and other terrorists use the media to their advantage, whether print, audio-visual or social. The first is that they use the media to create so much fear among the people from their terrorist acts such that the people feel so frightened, threatened and intimidated. The second way is that they use the media psychologically to weaken public support for the government and to demoralise security forces (Ishaku 187).

Boko Haram terrorists score cheap victories far away from real battle fields through the media who blow their impact out of proportion. Through the newspapers, radio, television, phone, internet, and other ways the Nigerian public has been terrified, terrorised and traumatised on account of the Boko Haram.

The terrorists have advantage over the government in the use of the media for the following reasons. 1. The government is required to tell the truth, but the terrorist is not. 2. Governmental forces are careful to avoid collateral damage but the terrorists are not. 3. The terrorists take the initiative in the battle, deciding who and where to attack, while security forces react only after the attack. 4. The government forces should be transparent and fight according to rules of engagement, while the terrorist can choose to be the anonymous fighter, and can easily deny any attack that may not give him a favourable reportage. 5. Government's vulnerability is worsened by the sophistication of modern social media such that any terrorist act or reaction to it, however minute, is picked by satellite and aired around the world instantly. This has been tagged "CNN effect" or "Aljazeera effect". 6. The cost of accessing the media is little for the terrorist, while it is heavy for the government. While the government spends much on press conferences, the terrorist requires just a single dial on his phone to hit the headlines (188-90).

The fact that people from different walks of life depend so much on the media to source information places the media in a very strategic position in human society. They influence situations with much ease, whether positively or negatively. Their reports quell or fuel passions, calm or raise sentiments, and leave a community in peace or set it on the fire of violence. Both the local and international communities rely on the media for information. The Boko Haram terrorists understand this very well; so they are always very quick to release propaganda, especially after launching an attack. Since the people are not there to ascertain the reality, coupled with the gullibility of the general public, the terrorists have their way

easily. Lipdo accuses some international media firms of biased reportage of various crises in Plateau state, leading to further escalation of conflicts and consequently Boko Haram terrorism in the state. Such media outfits include basically the Hausa services of BBC (Hausa service), VOA (*Muryan America*), Radio France International (Hausa service), and Deutsche Welle (Hausa service). He laments that the Hausa services of these channels are used to raise propaganda with inflamed and distorted information, leading to multiple killings and destruction of property (91).

While equally blaming the same foreign media as mentioned by Lipdo, Abdu adds that local media equally contribute immensely in inflaming the embers of hate and violence. In his study, Abdu selected four national newspapers, two from the north (New Nigeria, Weekly/Daily Trust), and two from the south (The Punch, The Guardian). After carrying out a critical content analysis based on the character and the pattern of their reporting during the crises in Kaduna from February 2000 to June 2002, Abdu placed the four newspaper industries on the same failed pane of inciting reportage and inflaming speeches. He concluded that media establishments all contribute to prevailing crisis and equally help in triggering new ones (179-90).

Ishaku argues strongly that nothing has helped more in fuelling violence and reprisal attacks in Plateau state more than the “news”. This news at times circulates as rumours; but in most occasions, it comes as orchestrated propaganda from media houses (183). He views the terrorism in Plateau state as a “premeditated mayhem orchestrated to plunge the state into a state of anarchy for political ends using ethno-religious sentiments” advanced by the media (181). Ishaku holds that Boko Haram propaganda in Nigeria is modelled after the Palestinian Hamas asymmetric manipulation of the media in the world; maintaining that “the public is being fooled by the asymmetric manipulation of the media” (193). He states that the worst form of propaganda that has occurred in Plateau state is the film that supposedly recorded

those killed following the 28-29 November 2008 electoral violence in Jos North LGA, which was circulated via Global System for Mobile Communication (GSM) phones and YouTube. This in turn, provoked vicious Boko Haram attacks in the state. Questioning the veracity and reliability of that video clip, Ishaku frowns that the perpetrators premeditatedly cooked up the video to whip up religious sentiments that resulted to religious terrorism in Plateau state (194).

xi. Psychological Causes

Psychologists study the mind and behaviour of the human person. Major areas in psychological research include biopsychology, clinical, cognitive, developmental, and sociopsychology. Sociopsychologist studies how people feel, think, and behave in social settings or situations. The researchers here try to address such questions as, how do people form impression about others? How do people get persuaded to change their beliefs and attitudes? What makes people to join certain groups? Under what conditions do people obey or resist orders? (198).

Many psychologists have joined the discussion on the causes of terrorism. Some blame terrorism on major clinical illnesses, such as schizophrenia or major depression, while others attach it to antisocial personality disorder (APD). Of all their theories, psychopathology (sociopathy) stands out as it relates to Boko Haram terrorism. This antisocial disorder was called psychopathology until mid-1950s, and thereafter the term came to be known as sociopathy. A sociopath has been differentiated from a psychopath. Psychopathology suggests Psychosis or insanity. A psychopath or insane person is mentally deranged such that he does not know right from wrong. “Psychosis” is the psychological term, while “insanity” is the legal term. On the other hand, a sociopath knows wrong from right but chooses to do wrong due to his selfish reasons, and does not show any remorse or pang of conscience for doing wrong. Boko Haram terrorists can be classified as sociopaths, not

psychopaths (Victoroff 12). Discarding the notion that terrorists are insane persons, Victoroff opines that “while terrorist groups are sometimes led by insane individuals, and while a few terrorist acts might be attributed to unequivocally insane reasons, terrorists rarely meet psychological criteria for insanity” (12).

David Lyken, an expert psychiatrist states that psychopathology results from psychological brain defect, while sociopathy is a result of social neglect and abuse of the child. He adds that at the long run, both cases share the following common features: 1. Disregard for the right of people 2. Failure to feel guilt or remorse 3. Disregard for social mores and laws 4. Tendency to display emotional outbursts and violent behaviours (Ishaku 31). In addition to anti-social personality disorder (ASPD), Martha Crenshaw adds that shared ideological commitment and group solidarity are significant determinants of terrorist behaviours (409). While acceding to sociopathological causation, Knutson asserts that the violent acts of terrorists stem from the feelings of hopelessness and rage. Hudson, in his own efforts, advises that that psychological explanation of terrorism should not ignore other potent drivers such as religious, political, social, economic and possibly biological factors which have contributed in motivating terrorist activities (23).

Raymond H. Hamden, a Clinical Forensic Psychologist reveals that deceit and manipulation are the controlling features of people with antisocial personality disorder. He stated that this problem could begin in childhood and last through adulthood. Such people could be performing repeatedly antisocial or criminal acts such as destruction of property, stealing, harassing and harming others. They have no value for the rights, feelings and wishes of other people. They manipulate and deceive to gain for themselves pleasure, profit or fame. They can be extreme or fanatical. They blame and mock their victims for being helpless, foolish, or deserving their fate and punishment. They show complete indifference of those

they harm. Hamden opines further that this personality disorder could be caused by child neglect and abuse, unsteady parenting, and poor parental discipline (5-6).

Though psychological research may not have all the answer to the causes of terrorism, it suffices to say that the various features outlined above of a sociopath are quite characteristic of the Boko Haram terrorists. The picture presented above describes both the leadership and membership of the sect, considering the magnitude of the harm they have done to innumerable persons and unquantifiable properties. This is equally demonstrated in the callousness and cruelty with which they kill and maim their victims. Also revealed in the psychological causation of Boko Haram terrorism is the *almajiri* syndrome. Years of non-parentage, negligence, abuse, destitution and beggary have turned millions of children in northern Nigeria to rascals, mischievous miscreants and churned them out as potential dangers to the society. They become tools for violence with little bait in the hands of the terrorists, willing to destroy the same society that has been so unfair to them. This is largely due to the fact, in the words of Alade that “they have their own axes to grind against their parents, authorities and the society at large” (cited in Ishaku 31). Thus, ironically, an army of sociopaths, which have been bred over the years, with a ready leadership in the Boko Haram movement has finally returned home to settle.

CHAPTER FOUR

THE EFFECTS OF BOKO HARAM'S RELIGIOUS TERRORIST ACTIVITIES AND THEIR ETHICAL IMPLICATIONS

The activities of the Boko Haram religious terrorists registered a lot of devastating effects on Plateau State. The terrorists made a mockery of peace and stability in the state that had been known as the “Home of Peace and Tourism.” This chapter investigated the detrimental effects of the terrorist activities and their ethical implications on Plateau state, Nigeria.

4. 1 BACKGROUND OF RELIGIOUS TERRORISM IN PLATEAU STATE

At this juncture the researcher makes a brief historical overview of some of the major violent religious uprisings, which preceded Boko Haram, and of course formed the background of religious terrorism in Plateau State.

4.1.1 The Jos 1932 Religious Uprising

The first recorded history of uprising in the history of Plateau state was interpreted as having religious terrorist undertone. It bothered on the majorly Christian Berom, Anaguta and Afizere who are regarded as the indigenous people or owners of Jos, the capital city of the state and the Muslim Hausa/Fulani, who the indigenes regard as settlers (Ishaku 69). This unrest took place at the height of the Great Depression. The Great Depression refers to a period of drastic fall or decline in global economy that began in United States of America and resulted in widespread poverty and unemployment, lasting from 1929 till 1939 (Pells 332). Due to the collapse or decline of international demands for columbite and tin, many lucrative mines in Jos started folding up, while the European miners were leaving en mass.

This development gave rise to contradictory rumours among the local people in Jos about the British colonialists. One of the rumours held that the Muslim Hausa/Fulani were planning a jihad in order to take over what would be left behind by the Europeans, drive out all the non-Muslims from Jos and impose Islam on the area. Another rumour had it that should all the Europeans eventually leave, the natives had a plan to sack all the Hausa/Fulani Muslims from the town as they had attempted before the coming of the colonial masters (Ishaku 69-70). Both rumours raised serious tension and apprehension in the town such that the markets were emptied of machetes, daggers and other weapons in preparation for the impending war. At the end, the Europeans did not eventually vacate Jos completely, and the tension fizzled out with time.

4.1.2 The Jos October 1945 Religious Uprising

The population of migrants in Jos had grown significantly in 1940. This population increase is attributed to commerce. This resulted to a serious competition among the people, especially the Igbo and Hausa. The Igbo of South Eastern Nigeria, regarded as major adherents and missionaries of the Christian faith were evangelised by the early European missionaries. Like the Hebrews, the Igbo take his Christian faith to wherever he goes. The Hausa of Northern Nigeria were conquered and subjected to Islam in the Othman Dan Fodio's jihad. The Hausa Muslims equally move around with their religion. The Igbo grew greatly and occupied a section of the town called "Igbo Quarter" (Present Sarki Arab ward), and the Hausa were reportedly not happy about the influx of the Igbo. Nnoli observed that "before, this residential area, as well as the rest of the Native Town, had been occupied by the Hausa migrants who had cultivated a possessive attitude toward it" (234). Thus, a clash of religious identity ensued.

Furthermore, Ishaku details that the hardship that followed the end of World War II in 1945, coupled with the difficulties suffered due to the national strike led by Nnamdi Azikwe, a Christian Igbo, for independence made the British colonialists to fuel an already breeding anti-Igbo sentiment. Thus, in October 1945, Jos town broke down in two-day violence, before soldiers drafted from Kaduna came to restore normalcy. Two persons were reportedly killed and many others were wounded, with property belonging to both the Hausa and Igbo destroyed. This was, perhaps, the first time blood was shed in Plateau State as a result of seeming religious violence. The Igbo moved out of the Native Town segment to Township, following this incidence (Ishaku 71).

4.1.3 The Jos 12th April 1994 Religious Uprising

Religious uprisings in other parts of Northern Nigeria, such as Kaduna, Kano, Bauchi, Yola, etcetera since the 1980s had been eluding Jos, with people from such affected places coming to settle in the peaceful Plateau State. This peace, however, was shattered when the military president, Ibrahim Babangida decided to create Jos North Local Government Area. This was loudly celebrated by the Jasawa (the Hausa/Fulani residents in Jos), and strongly opposed by the indigenous people of Berom, Anaguta and Afizere, who saw this a religious jihad, and opposed the appointment of Aminu Mato, an Hausa/Fulani Muslim, as the chairman of Jos North LGA (Alubo 79). This position was portrayed by the Fiberesima Commission of inquiry into the 1994 conflict.

From the evidence placed at the disposal of the commission it is obvious that the immediate cause of the crisis in Jos stemmed from the appointment of Alhaji Aminu Mato as the chairman of the caretaker management committee of Jos North LGA. Evidence showed that Alhaji Aminu Mato was a Hausa-Fulani man. While his kinsmen nodded approval to his appointment, the Afizere, Anaguta and Berom tribes

gave it an outright rejection. A battle line was drawn between the tribes (Plateau State Government, White Paper 6)

The indigenes interpreted this as a religious Jihad, whereby the government of the day, headed by a Muslim President was trying to empower the Hausa-Fulani Muslims to rule over their land and impose Islam on their people (Gofwen 13). Venting his anger on this, Nenfort Gomwalk, an academic Professor from Plateau state lamented that there was no justifiable basis for creating Jos North Local Government at all, except carving out a safe haven for the Muslim Hausa Fulani settlers (Ishaku 63). In the ensuing violence, four persons were reportedly killed, with several properties destroyed, including a part of Gada Biu and Jos main markets, Mosques and Churches, NITEL and individual properties and vehicles. The crisis was quickly contained. However, the 1994 uprising became the fore runner of similar religious violence in Plateau State (Alubo 80).

4.1.4 The Gyero Road 1998 Religious Uprising

Gyero is a small rural community settled about 4 kilometers east of Bukuru, headquarters of Jos South Local Government Area. The people are predominantly Christian Berom with a sizeable Muslim Hausa/Fulani settlers along Gyero Road. The major occupation of the people is farming, done during the rainy and dry seasons.

Violence broke out in the community in 1998, following the death of a Berom man killed by a Hausa farmer for taking garden egg (yalo) from his farm without permission. Infuriated by this act, Berom relations of the deceased from Bukuru-Gyel fought the Hausa/Fulani viciously, leading to the death of many of them. Though the conflict did not go beyond Bukuru, it added to the deteriorating relationship between the Christian Berom and the Hausa Fulani Muslims in Plateau state (Gofwen 16).

4.1.5 The Jos 7 September 2001 Religious Uprising

This uprising was adjudged religious following two major incidences that triggered it off. The first was the appointment of a Muslim Hausa/Fulani, Alhaji Muktar Mohammed, as the Jos North coordinator of the Federal Government Poverty Alleviation Programme (NAPEP). The indigenous people of Berom, Anaguta and Afizere contested that such an important position ought to have been given to an “indigene” rather than a “settler”. They interpreted this as a form of jihad, reminiscent of the 1994 episode (Alubo 80).

The second and most important incident which triggered the violence was clearly religion. A Christian Berom lady, Miss Rhoda Haruna Nyam insisted on crossing the only road to her office while returning from a lunch break, at Congo Russia area of Jos. By this time the Muslims who were gathered to observe their Juma’at (Friday) prayer at a Mosque in this area had blocked the road. In the ensuing argument, Miss Nyam was thoroughly beaten up by the *Yan Agaji* (Aid group) who usually performed police duties during Muslim gatherings. As she ran to her house, the worshippers turned riotous, chased after her, beat up her father, smashed her mother’s car and set the entire house on fire (Ishaku 84).

Attracted by the pandemonium, the Christian youths who dominated the area reacted equally violently against the Muslims, and within minutes, the clash had spread around the entire Jos city and environs, including other parts of the state. The police alone could not contain the riot, so the military were drafted to help calm the situation. Over a thousand lives were reportedly lost and properties worth over N4 billion were destroyed. This religious violence was assessed as the first most grievous bloodbath ever witnessed in Plateau State (85).

Various religious versions were given on the terrifying violence by both Christian and Muslim bodies. Christians alleged that the 2001 carnage was not a mere happenstance, but

was pre-planned and orchestrated by the Muslims who had piled up caches of arms in various locations, such as houses of prominent people around Eto Baba, Dadin Kowa, Angwan Rogo, Jos Central Mosque, Bukuru Mosque among other places. It was also alleged that mercenaries were brought in from other states and climes for a full Islamic Jihad in order to conquer, take over and subjugate the Christian dominated Plateau State. The Police Commissioner, Alhaji M. D. Abubakar was accused of providing security for mosques and Muslims' properties, whereas leaving churches and Christian establishments to be vandalized and burnt down by Muslim marauders. This is why many Christians in Plateau state angrily opposed the appointment of M. D. Abubakar as an Inspector General of Police in Nigeria (Alubo 80).

Muslims, on the other hand, accused the Plateau state Christians of showing no genuine regard for the Hausa/Fulani and Islam. They revealed their anger about the oppositions previously put up by the indigenes against the appointments made to the Muslim Hausa/Fulani as chairman of Jos North in 1994 and also as coordinator of NAPEP in 2001. They upheld that the mosque incident was a demonstration of the contempt for the Muslim community. Killings and destruction of property in the name of religion lasted steadily and devastatingly from 7th-12th September, 2001, totally destroying peace and order in Plateau State in a magnitude never seen before (Alubo 81). The spill over bloodshed continued in other places within the state, even after the violence was contained in Jos metropolis. It suffices, therefore, to state that the 7th September 2001 Jos religious violence, just like the 11th September 2001 (9/11) attack on United States of America, presaged religious terrorism in Plateau state, Nigeria, which got worsened with Boko Haram activities.

4.1.6 The Eto Baba Uprising of 2002

Following the 2001 religious violence in Plateau state, subsequent clashes in the state have always been fought along the line of religion, whether the causative factors were religious or not. Eto Baba is a community on the fringe of Jos metropolis, located along Bauchi Ring Road, and dominated by the Anaguta tribe and people of the Christian faith. It is also the headquarters of Naraguta ward “B” (Gofwen 22). The ward congress of People’s Democratic Party (PDP) was scheduled to take place in Eto-Baba in May 2012. It was moved from Angwan Rogo after the 2001 mayhem (Alubo 82). Best reports that the Hausa/Fulani, in their determination to win positions in the congress, brought in so many supporters in Lorries and open trucks estimated crudely at about sixty thousand persons (60,000). This large number of people or supporters raised a lot of suspicion, panic and tension, with the indigenes pointing out that those supporters were imported from outside the ward and other places to intimidate and subdue them (76).

Within a short time, confusion and rowdy fighting broke out between the Christians and the Muslims. Before the matter could be brought under control, many were killed and others injured, with many of the vehicles belonging to the Hausa/Fulani and their supporters smashed or burnt. Soon the crisis escalated to the city centres, with the youths from both sides of religion mounting road blocks and harming people of “other faith”. The intervention of the Joint Security Teams was able to arrest the situation. Consequently, the animosity between the indigenes and Hausa/Fulani, and generally the Christians and Muslims got deepened. Muslims residing at Christian dominated areas relocated to Muslim dominated settlements, while Christians living in Muslim populated areas left for safe Christian comfort zones. This form of residence has become a pattern since the 2001 bloody violence in Plateau State (Best 77).

4.1.7 The Southern Plateau 2002-2004 Religious Uprising

The 2001 Jos bloodbath, which was fought along the line of religion in different parts of Plateau state, basically between the Christians and Muslims, had presaged subsequent violence in Plateau state. The pattern is such that once violence broke out, various groups would form a common religious front, depending on which religion one chooses to identify with. In 2002, terrorist violence erupted in the Southern Senatorial Zone of Plateau State made up of Langtang North, Langtang South, Wase, Mikang, Shendam and Qua'nan Local Government Areas (LGAs). The most affected areas in the violence were Wase LGA, Lantang North LGA, Langtang South LGA and Yelwa in Shendam LGA. While the violence had some local dynamics, the killings and arson in Jos metropolis and their escalations appear to have provided the impetus in the Southern area (Gofwen 24).

4.1.8 The Yelwa-Shendam 2002-2004 Religious Uprising

Administratively, Yelwa is under Shendam LGA, with headquarters in Shendam town, about 20 kilometres away. Yelwa has the predominance of Jarawa and Hausa/Fulani Muslims who historically originated from Dass (Bauchi State) and migrated to their present location since late 19th century. Also, Shendam residents and surrounding areas are predominantly Muslims (Higazi 108). Violence broke out in June 2002 between the Muslim Hausa/Fulani and Jarawa, and the Goemai who are majorly Christians with a good number of traditionalists, leading to the destruction of churches and mosques, loss of lives, property and homes. Best describes the terrorising violence in the following way:

The conflict at Yelwa-Shendam became the straw that broke the camel's back. The violence at this location came in different waves, and had given the town a reputation of a notoriously violent settlement with passion for large scale violence and killings. First was the killings of June 2002, then later the killing of some 47 persons at a

church on 24 February 2004 by armed Muslim militants, and then the reprisal attack launched by ethnic non-Muslim militias on May 2 and 3 2004 against what was essentially the remaining Muslim population of Yelwa-Shendam. After the February 2004 attacks, sporadic attacks continued throughout the southern zone of the state (112).

Gofwen gave two positions as to the immediate cause of the conflict. A part is that Christians had prohibited relationship between their daughters and Muslim men, which led to a fight in Angwan Pandam on the night of 26th June 2002, resulting to the death of a Christian man. Muslims recounted that the violence started as a result of masquerades coming out with weapons from their shrine during a Taroh traditional festival same night at Angwan Pandam. Added to these factors were the prior soured relationship between Muslims and Christians, competition for traditional and political power, and ownership of the town (25).

After May 3, 2004 violent killings, President Olusegun Obasanjo declared a state of emergency in Plateau state, which, though adjudged controversial, lasted from May 18 to November 18, 2004. Democratic administration was completely put on hold for the period, while an interim government headed by a retired Army General was constituted (Best 113). Terrorist violence in Plateau State, however, did not abate during the emergency rule period.

4.1.9 The Wase 2002-2004 Religious Uprising

In terms of land mass, Wase is the largest Local Government Area in Plateau State. Wase is an emirate founded as a vassal of Bauchi by the Jihadists in about 1820 when they conquered Basharawa. The two dominant tribes in Wase are, perhaps, the Fulani and Taroh. Jukun constitute a minority among other ethnic minorities in Wase, though the Jukun were the earliest inhabitants. Farming and animal rearing are the predominant economic activities. The religious uprising of 2002 to 2004 also had Wase as a major theatre (Higazi 109).

The uprising in Wase could have been propelled by the spill-over of the bloody violence in Yelwa-Shendam with reprisal killings and sacking of Muslims and Fulani herdsmen from Langtang South LGA into Wase, just as Christians were expelled from Yelwa into Langtang. Another key event that fuelled the conflict in Wase was the killing of four prominent elders of Taroh supposedly by the Hausa- Fulani. On July 3, 2002, after a peace meeting on the invitation of the emir at his palace in Wase, the Taroh elders were assassinated on their way back outside Wase town. The Taroh saw the killing as a set up at the instigation of the Emir, though the emirate tried to deny the accusation (Best 153).

Consequently, five Muslims were killed on their farms in Southern Wase on July 4, 2002, while many Christians were attacked the same day in Wase town, the seat of the emirate which is predominantly Muslim in population. People were killed, churches burnt and properties were destroyed, forcing all the Christians to flee the town and surrounding villages. 25 Taroh people were killed on July 5 at Saluwe, whereas 32 Boghom and Fulani were killed between July 5 to 6. The greatest loss happened on Saturday, April 19, when no fewer than 37 residents of Wase and two soldiers were murdered during a Taroh retaliation raid. Taroh and other Christians fled Muslim dominated settlements, while Muslims departed Kadarko and various parts of Maro districts majorly occupied by Christians (Higazi 16). In a continuous vigilante stride, the Taroh blocked the road between Wase and Langtang for about two years. This was the situation in the Southern Zone when President Olusegun Obasanjo declared a state of emergency in Plateau State in May 2004 (Gofwen 30).

4.1.10 The Jos November 2008 Religious Uprising

Council elections were held peacefully in all the 17 Local Government Areas in Plateau State on Thursday, November 27th, 2008 (Ishaku 90). In the early morning hours the next day, 28th November 2008, killings, looting and burning of houses had started at some

parts of Jos Township. At that time, the Plateau State Independent Electoral Commission (PLASIEC) had not even declared anybody winner of the Jos North Local Government Area polls, as results were still being collated. However, rumours went out that the election of Jos North Local Government Area was being won by the candidate of People's Democratic Party (PDP), Barrister Timothy Gyang Buba, a Christian who was defeating the candidate of All Nigeria People Party (ANPP), Alhaji Aminu Baba. This violence was adjudged highly religious. Places of worship were burnt down instead of party offices; while people and their property were attacked according to the faith they professed.

Hon. Justice Ajibola Judicial Commission of Inquiry into the November 2008 unrest presented a vivid picture of the violence, stating that:

As early as between 0230-0330 hours of 28th November 2008, information filtered to the police that some Muslim youths were holding nocturnal meetings in Muslim dominated areas and soon thereafter there were reports of people shouting "Allahu-Akbar" along Ali Kazaure street and other Muslim dominated areas in Jos North... More worrisome is the pattern of the attack. Places of worship rather than party offices were the targets of attack. Individuals were attacked based on their religious leanings rather than political leanings. The whole crisis took a religious dimension (24-30).

Areas affected mostly by the violence include Katako, Congo Russia, Ali Kazaure, Rikkos, Tudun Wada, Angwan Rogo, Farin Gada, Sarkin Mangu, Angwan Rimi, Dilimi, Bauchi Road, Nasarawa Gwom, Apata, Jenta, Kwararafa, Zaria Road, Bukuru etc. Over 1000 persons were killed, with many missing. Numerous churches and mosques were burnt, and properties worth billions were looted and destroyed. Over 30,000 persons were displaced, with Police Headquarters, Police Staff College, Air Force Base, Maxwell Khobe Cantonment, NDLEA Base and other places turned into temporary refugee camps (Gofwen 38).

The 2008 violence, however, raised a new dimension to religious terrorism in Plateau state. At the peak of the mayhem, during curfew hours, 26 men were arrested in a bus at a military check point at UTC junction, Jos. The soldiers searched out from the suspects, military uniforms and identify cards, and a cache of guns and ammunitions. The mission of the suspected mercenaries with such quantity of incriminating exhibits in Jos during curfew hours could not be explained. They claimed to be vigilantes from Bauchi hired by Okene Local Government Area, Kogi State. The next morning the men were moved to police headquarters, Abuja and nothing more was heard about them (Ishaku 91).

4.1.11 The Jos January 17, 2010 Religious Uprising

As stated earlier, since the 2001, violence in Plateau State always assumes a religious nature. This is because since then, Plateau State has been religiously polarized into two broad lines, namely, Christianity and Islam. The situation is such that even traditionalists always identify with either of the religions to vent their anger on their perceived enemies. On January 17, 2010 a Muslim man went to rebuild his house which was destroyed in 2008 violence located in Duste Uku in Nasarawa Gwom area of Jos, a predominant Christian area, with over 200 “workforce”. According to Christian account, the “workers” started attacking passers-by and worshippers in a nearby ECWA church. The Muslims said that the Christians opposed the reconstruction (Alubo 92).

Stephanos Foundation, a non-governmental organization in Jos that researched into the conflict reported that:

various accounts reveal that one Kabiru NEPA (as he is called in the area), a staff of Power Holding Company of Nigeria (PHCN), brought in some over 200 Muslim men to rebuild his house on Sunday, 17th January, 2010. Kabiru’s house is one of those burnt during the 28th November 2008 crisis ... Kabiru is the first to attempt rebuilding

in this area ... Kabiru did not bring this project to the notice of the village head 200 Muslim men on Sunday morning is not a common sight in this area since the last crisis, this certainly raised the tension in the area. The builders kept chanting intimidating noise, referring to non-Muslims as “Arna” (meaning infidels). Tension mounted in the area and got out of control when the driver of the lorry hauling sand to the site got into a quarrel with one of the non-Muslims in the area. This attracted the Muslim workers and later resulted into attack on any non-Muslim sighted around. The loud chants of “Allahu a’kabar” had attracted other Muslims to the area and worshippers in ECWA Church about 500m away were attacked (1-3).

The violence that started at Nasarawa Gwom area, soon spread to Angwan Rukuba, Congo Russia, Tina Junction, Bauchi Road, Kwararafa, Massalaci Juma’a, Channel 7, Dogon Karfe in Jos North LGA. Also Affected were Bukuru town and Angwan Doki in Jos South LGA. Over 300 persons died, and thousands were injured and displaced. Newswatch reported that soldiers intercepted a truck carrying about 15 mercenaries covered with tarpaulin, in Dadin Kowa area going to fight at the city centre. Also arrested were suspects in military uniform at Rikkos. Other over 100 suspects were equally arrested with various dangerous weapons like AK-47 rifles, locally made guns, axes, daggers, cutlasses, etc., in Dutse Uku, Rikkos, Angwan Nasamu and Congo Russia (23). Casualties overwhelmed the capacity of all the hospital spaces and medical personnel.

4.1.12 The Dogo-Nahawa Terrorist Massacre of 7th March, 2010

When relative peace returned to Jos city centres, the attacks and killings shifted to rural areas, and have continued so till date (Alubo 93). Dogo Nahawa, Rasat and Zot are rural communities within a distance of 5 kilometres from each other. Dogo Nahawa is less than 3

kilometres from Du village, location of the personal residence of Senator Jonah David Jang, former governor of Plateau State, all in Jos South LGA (Gofwen 45-46).

According to Ishaku, Jos violence took an outright terrorist dimension on March 7, 2010 when about 400 residents, mostly children, women and the aged were massacred at Dogo Nahawa, Zot and Rasat in a night attack by militias identified as terrorists. While many people accuse Boko Haram for this attack, others blame it on Fulani marauders. Some others argue that there is no difference between Boko Haram and Fulani marauders; thus describing this as a terrorist violence against the people of Plateau state (94). This incident drew both local and international attention. Newswatch reports that:

The motive behind the killings, even though it is done along ethnic and religious lines, is still shrouded in mystery as some of the suspects arrested claimed they were paid to avenge the death of some Fulani in the January 2010 sectarian violence at Tim-Tim and Kuru-Jenta villages. The arrested suspects, numbering about 200, were caught in possession of 44 guns, live ammunition, 35 live cartridges as well as bows and arrows. Some confessed they were paid to foment trouble in the state, others said they volunteered to join in the killings (24).

The gorilla pattern of terrorist attacks that characterised the Dogo Nahawa massacre has continued unabated in various parts of Riyom, Barkin Ladi, Bassa, Jos North and Jos South Local Government Areas.

4.1.13 The 24 December 2010 Terrorist Bombing of Gada Biyu and Kabong Areas of Jos

The first incidence of heavy ballistic sounds suspected to be of bomb blasts in Plateau state, Nigeria occurred on Monday, 11 February 2002 (Ozohu-Suleiman allafrica.com). This took place in a night attack on the Jos Main Market, popularly called “the Terminus”, and located in Jos city. This market had been described as one of the largest markets in West

Africa. Those who heard the sound attested that it was as if powerful bombs exploded at different parts of the market. The fire that followed engulfed the entire market, destroying it completely, and leaving many people in severe misery. This incidence had been preceded by the eruption of bloody violence in Jos that started five months earlier, precisely on 7 September 2001 which affected different parts of the state. The fighting was basically between Christians and Muslims. Having started around a mosque in Jos, it quickly spread to different parts of the state. The fight remained protracted and was eventually what brought about the Boko Haram terrorism to the public space in Plateau state. Though the responsibility for the blasts that destroyed the Terminus Main Market in Jos was not claimed by any known group, many residents of Jos are currently point accusing fingers on Boko Haram, following recent similar developments.

It was, however, in 2010 that Boko Haram admittedly made their first open violent appearance in Plateau state. This happened on 24 December 2010, usually referred to as Christmas Eve, while Christians were busying themselves about and anticipating Christmas celebration the next day. The terrorists detonated several explosive devices in Gada Biyu and Kabong settlements in Jos North – areas predominantly occupied by Christians. Boko Haram announced that they carried out the attacks to retaliate what they called atrocities done to Muslims in Plateau state and in other parts of Nigeria. They promised to launch more attacks on the state, which threat they made real by the numerous subsequent bomb blasts and guerrilla attacks that have been recorded in the state since 2010. The pattern of attack of Boko Haram in Plateau state, however, is quite deceptive. Their attacks and statements would seem to attract the sympathy of Muslims, while aggravating Christians to believe that the Muslims are the ones behind the attacks. Thus, Christians would attempt reprisal attack on Muslims, while Muslims would also fight back. Hence Boko Haram terrorism had heightened the cycle of bloody violence in Plateau state.

4.2 EFFECTS OF BOKO HARAM'S TERRORIST ACTIVITIES ON PLATEAU STATE

The activities of Boko Haram's religious terrorists produced harmful effects on the people and environment in Plateau state, as discussed below.

4.2.1 Destruction of Life

Boko Haram's terrorist activities in Plateau state had brought about the death of so many people in Plateau state. Considering the colossal loss of life, Ihuah lamented that so many people had been killed and thousands displaced from their ancestral homes, having lost their homesteads and farmlands to these religious terrorists (iii). Numerous are the devastating fatalities that resulted from Boko Haram's terrorist activities in Plateau state. On 7 March 2010, about 400 inhabitants, mostly children and old women were killed in terrorist onslaughts in a night raid attributed to Boko Haram at Dogon Nahawa, Zot and Ratsat in the suburb of Jos. This massacre attracted local and international condemnation in the like of past major horrors such as My Lai of 16 March 1968, Sabra and Shatila of 16-18 September 1982, Rwanda of 6 April 1994, and Srebrenica of 11-22 July 1995. The Dogo Nahawa carnage just turned out to be an early sample or the start of unrelenting terror campaign on the inhabitants of Plateau state. The state kept experiencing similar mass killings and destruction of property in targeted settlements of Riyom, Barkin Ladi, Jos South and Bassa Local Government Areas, coupled with the overt bombing experiences in Jos and Bukuru metropolis (Ishaku 94).

The year, 2010 culminated with the bombing of Kabong and Gada Biyu, two major Christian settlements in Jos on 24 December, usually called the Christmas Eve which left over 80 people dead (95). Boko Haram claimed responsibility for the bomb incidence. They announced that they launched the attacks on Christians in retaliation of what they termed the atrocities done to Muslims in Plateau state and other parts of Nigeria. They also promised to carry out more attacks on the state, which they surely did (Punch 28th December 2010). Thus, violence in Plateau state changed methodologically to religious terrorism campaigns of

bombing and targeted killings, as more people in the city and villages came under subsequent attacks.

On 7 July 2012, nine villages in the Garshish district of Barkin Ladi Local Government Area and three other villages in Riyom Local Government were attacked and burnt down with over 86 fatalities. The next day, while the Christian funeral service was being concluded for the mass burial, the terrorists dressed in military fatigue invaded the area, attacking and killing the helpless mourners. Some of the very important persons (VIPs) killed during the burial service include Senator Gyang Dalyop Dantong, who was representing Plateau North senatorial district, and Honourable Gyang Fulani that represented Barkin Ladi in Plateau state House of Assembly. Honourable Simon Mwadkon, member of the House of Representative who was representing Barkin Ladi and Riyom Constituency was one of the mourners who survived the attack. The Boko Haram terrorists equally claimed responsibility for this attack (Adamu 95).

In a statement allegedly issued by the spokesperson of the sect, Abu Qaqa, he boasted that “*Jama’atu Ahlussunnah Lidda’awati Wal-Jihad* wants to inform the world of its delight over the attacks we launched on Barkin Ladi and Riyom in Plateau State on Christians and security operatives, including members of the National Assembly”. He added that, “We will continue to hunt government officials wherever they are; they will have no peace again” (Logbaby.com).

There have been so much terrorist killings happening almost on daily basis in Plateau state, forcing Bagudu to decry that human life has lost value in Nigeria, thus, debasing humanity (28). Apart from the massive terrorist killings and destruction of property at the rural areas in Plateau state, multiple explosives have been detonated at strategic places within Jos, Bukuru and other locations leaving behind huge damages. Plateau state had recorded over 20 bomb incidences between 2010 – 2015, which were target at churches, mosque,

markets, restaurant, and residential buildings. One of the major destructive attacks occurred on 20 May 2014. On this day, two explosives were detonated in the city centre of Jos, Plateau state capital, killing over 118 persons; injuring over 56 others, and burning several shops and vehicles. Some sources put the death toll to over 150. Car bombs were mainly used to carry out the attack. The first explosive went off in a market place, while the second exploded near a bus station. The twin blasts occurred 30 minutes apart; the first at 3:00 PM, and the second at 3:30 PM (Lipdo 215).

4.2.2 Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs): Refugee Problems

Displaced Persons, under international law are defined as:

persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obligated to flee or to have cause to leave their homes or place of habitual residence in particular, as a result of or in order to avoid the effect of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and they must have either remain within their own national borders (as internally displaced persons) or they must have crossed an internationally recognized state border (as refugees), (Ladan 9).

Displaced persons, therefore, are of two groupings, namely Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs). While refugees have crossed their national boundaries to take refuge in other countries, internally displaced persons (IDPs) are taking shelter within their nation of origin, though outside their original places of abode (Ocha 250). This description brings up two elements of internal displacement, namely the involuntary or coercive nature of the movement, and the fact that the movements occur within national borders (Tajudeen 2). Plateau state, Nigeria suffers a double plight of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) (Onijala 1).

The National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA), in September 2015, had reported the presence of about 325,000 Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in Plateau state, who were victims of Boko Haram terrorist activities in northern Nigeria taking refuge in various camps in the state. Mallam Abdulsalam Mohammed, then NEMA's North-Central Coordinator revealed that the figure was expected to drop significantly, following successes recorded by the Nigerian army in the fight against Boko Haram (www.plateaustate.gov). Alhassan Barde, executive secretary, Plateau State Emergency Management Agency later disclosed that the current statistics of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) presently taking refuge in Plateau state stands at a total of 63,000 persons. Barde expounded that the IDPs come from Plateau, Borno, Yobe, Adamawa, Taraba, and Nasarawa states (www.premiumtimes.ng).

The IDPs in various IDPs camps in Plateau state face untold hardships and challenges, which include harsh/cold weather, lack of food and accommodation, poor infrastructure and inadequate support from the government. While commenting on the challenges the IDPs are grappling with, Idegu acquiesces that the people are faced with "bad weather, terrible accommodation, insufficient food, even diseases". He lamented further that "fate hurts. But the deepest cut may be that government has essentially turned its back on those who were violently pushed out of their comfort zones" (Idegu 1). Meanwhile, the upkeep of the IDPs has been largely left in the hands of some willing Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs). Visits to the camps were so revealing. Leader of Stefanos Foundation, which takes care of the IDPs camp at Zang Commercial Secondary School, Bukuru, Jos South LGA, Mark Lipdo complained that the camp is supposed to be a temporary one; however, the relevant agents of government, such as NEMA, have not lived up to their responsibilities.

The predicament of the IDPs is worsened by the fact that the government has abandoned them to fate. This is so revealed by the prevailing conditions in the camps. If you

expect to be welcomed at all when you visit, you must go along with some items, particularly the edible ones. Their care has been abandoned to the benevolence and philanthropy of the few NGOs and individuals. Since the parents in the camp have no means to trade or farm in order to cater for their families, they resort to giving their wards out to interested individuals and families where the children work as nannies and general house helps, while some of the parents and children engage in begging or scavenging just to eke out a living. This is one of the factors that have led to the reduction of the IDPs at the various camps in Plateau state. The practice, however, is not without its challenges, considering the spate of child molestation and sexual harassment prevalent in the society. The situation of the IDPs in Plateau state is quite pathetic.

4.2.3 Destruction of Infrastructure

Public structures and services, such as telecommunications, power supplies, health centres, school buildings, transportation, water supplies, and road and rail networks, broadcasting services of radio and television houses have been diversely attacked, damaged and hampered by the Boko Haram terrorists. Damage to infrastructure in areas of Boko Haram attacks is so colossal that the federal government of Nigeria earmarked the large sum of N792.7 billion in the 2017 budget for the purpose of rebuilding infrastructure that have been destroyed by the Boko Haram terrorists (Ahmed 3).

The cost of rebuilding destroyed infrastructure in Plateau state reveals a lot about the damage the terrorists have caused the government. Many police and military formations, bases and barracks have been destroyed. School buildings, hospitals, market structures and office complexes have been equally damaged. One of the social infrastructures the terrorists attacked viciously is the telecommunication industry. The model of Boko Haram's attack on telecom facilities in Nigeria follows the pattern of the Taliban's attacks on telecom masts and services in Afghanistan, further indicating a synergy between Boko Haram and other foreign

terrorist groups. Boko Haram's attacks on infrastructure have generated enormous casualty, service and financial costs on the government, private organisations and individuals (Onuoha 57). Thus, Plateau state has received an unfair share of the destruction of infrastructure from the Boko Haram terrorists.

4.2.4 Disruption of Economic Activities

The destructive effects of Boko Haram on Plateau state are felt in both foreign and local investments. Terrorist activities have drastically reduced foreign investments in Plateau state. Equally, the asymmetric gun attacks and devastating bombings have completely destabilised the economic activities of individuals and organisations in Plateau state (Best 57). Boko Haram violence have forced many business people to flee Plateau state to the southern parts of the country, thereby crumbling certain businesses in the state, while shifting the attendant economic gains to the southern region. Equally, the growing terror and insecurity in the state has made many traders in the south to feel unsafe to travel to the state in order to make purchases of their commodities. The Plateau farmers who depend largely on the south to consume their farm produces suffer great losses following the unsold products that are left to spoil, mostly the perishable ones, like vegetables (Ovaga 30).

Boko Haram terrorism has seriously disrupted economic activities in Plateau state. The Jos ultramodern Terminus market was bombed and razed down following the 2001 protracted violence. Bala J. Takaya, lamenting this incidence opines that: "the Jos ultramodern market, the only one of its kind in West Africa, which had brimmed to capacity...was bombed and destroyed. It was such a colossal loss to the Government and the traders" (20). Following this incidence, traders moved to the satellite market adjoining the Terminus market, with many other business people clustering around the market areas. However, with incessant terrorist bomb attacks on the terminus area, many people have been killed, and several shops and abundant wares have been destroyed, forcing the state

government to close down the Terminus satellite market with the attendant frustration on the surviving traders. Many of the traders are now clustering around the road, making the flow of traffic very difficult; while some others have left Jos city to other places in search of livelihood.

Tourism, which had been a major income earner for the state is another aspect of the economy that has suffered a lot of setbacks, as people are afraid of visiting the numerous tourist sites in the state. Many foreign nationals from the Western countries that made Jos a haven due to the favourable weather condition and business opportunities have abandoned the town and relocated their businesses due to insecurity. Many drinking joints, cinema houses, football viewing points and recreation centres have folded up. The livelihoods of lots of people have been destroyed by the terrorist violence. Many bread winners have been killed in violent attacks, leaving their family members in pitiful conditions. A lot of wealthy people have become impoverished. The disruption of economic activities in Plateau state can be blamed for the rise in antisocial activities, such as armed robbery, shop lifting and house breaking. This condition forced Ishaku to dirge that the economic life in Plateau state has crumbled, with many of the residents just struggling to survive, due to incessant terror attacks (46).

4.2.5 Destruction of Social Activities

The Boko Haram sect has unleashed untold pain, sorrow, terror and retrogression on the educational progress in Nigeria. Many school buildings have been razed down; a considerable number of students have been killed and numerous others kidnapped, including school teachers and university lecturers. Boko Haram constitutes both open insult and assault on conventional or Western system of education. After all, the sobriquet, *boko haram*, suggests that Western education is totally forbidden and unacceptable, and as such, must be fought and replaced with Islamic education. A major case in point is the abduction of the

close to 300 Chibok school girls. Though many of the girls have not been found, a lot of them are still missing. There are equally several other abductions of children of school age. These assaults on schools have made various schools to close down, and forced many school children out of school. By the time some of the schools reopen, their counterparts would be ahead of them in many aspects of academic schedules.

Over 1 million children have been forced out of school following Boko Haram terrorist attacks in northern Nigeria and her neighbouring countries of Niger, Chad and Cameroon. Manuel Fontaine, the West and Central African Regional Director of the United Nations Children Fund (UNICEF) reveals that this staggering number of children whose education is being hampered is an addition to about 11 million children who were previously out of school in Nigeria, Niger, Chad and Cameroon prior to the onset of Boko Haram violence. Manuel discloses that most of the schools closed down due to Boko Haram attacks in northern Nigeria last for over a year before they are reopened, with some of the schools remaining closed for many years. This is because many of the school buildings are attacked, looted or burnt down. Over 600 teachers have been killed in Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria, making many teachers and children afraid of returning to school. When they return, the classes are overcrowded due to poor infrastructure. UNICEF and other NGOs help in providing education to children at IDPs camps. The schools at the IDPs camps in Plateau state are mere shanties and many of the teachers are volunteers (www.unicef.org). Corroborating this stance, Mark Lipdo reports that the menace of Boko Haram terrorism has had a wide range effects on the educational sector, with the killing of over 611 teachers, displacement of 19,000 other teachers, closing down of 1500 schools, and 950,000 children being denied the opportunity of being in school (Okakwu www.premiumtimesng.com).

Another area that Boko Haram terrorism has affected academics and the attendant social services is the survival of the National Youth Service Corps (NYSC) scheme. The

NYSC programme is considered as a unifying plan in Nigeria. The primary purpose of the scheme is “to inculcate in Nigerian Youths the spirit of selfless service to the community, and to emphasise the spirit of oneness and brotherhood of all Nigerians, irrespective of cultural or social background” (NYSC Handbook 8). The programme is patterned in such a way that on graduation, Nigerian students are posted to serve mandatorily in a region different from their birth and school places for a period of one year. This unity plan of the nation has been endangered by Boko Haram activities in northern Nigerian states. In 2011, of the 4,171 NYSC members posted for service in Adamawa state, who were later trained as ad hoc staff by Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) for 2011 elections, not less than 1041 fled the state before the elections on account of Boko Haram terrorism.

Following the killing of many of the corps members in some northern states in the same 2011, many of them crowded the NYSC national secretariat in Abuja with the demand to be reposted out of northern states. Till date, corps members still protest against being posted to crisis-ridden states such as Plateau, Bauchi, Adamawa, Borno, Yobe, and etcetera. Some of them have vowed to quit the scheme should they be forced to serve in such places they consider as death zones. Many parents have called for the scrapping of NYSC programme, following fatal terrorist attacks on the corps members. Governor Kashim Shettima reacted swiftly to the decision of the Federal government not to post NYSC members to some states in northern Nigeria. While appealing to the Federal government to reconsider the decision, the governor regretted the negative effects the decision will have on the education and health sectors of his state. This is due to the fact that corps members provide over 65 per cent of the total education and healthcare services at the rural areas where about 75 per cent of the citizens are living (Ovaga 30).

Furthermore, So many places of worship have been destroyed by the Boko Haram terrorists in Plateau state. Churches and mosques have suffered various degrees of attacks from the terrorists, including the killing of clergymen and worshippers, looting of worship places, destruction of church and mosque buildings, and displacement of worshippers (Okakwu 2). Attack on places of worship has been quite frequent in Plateau state.

Police respondents revealed various attacks on places of worship in Plateau state. On 20 March 2010, there was a bomb blast between Church of Christ in Nations (COCIN) and First Baptist church in Bukuru, Jos South LGA by suspected terrorists. Another heavy bomb blast was recorded at COCIN headquarters in Jos, Jos North LGA on 26 February 2012 that killed not less than two persons. Two suicide bombers further attacked Saint Finbarr's church in Jos around 10:40 AM on 11 March 2012, killing 5 and injuring 3 persons. Again, a suicide bomber detonated explosives in a gulf car at Christ Chosen church, Jos, Jos North LGA on 10 June 2012; though the number of casualties could not be ascertained. Another attack occurred on 5 July 2015, when a mosque was bombed at Yan Taya, at the city centre of Jos by suspected Boko Haram terrorists. The explosions and killings that took place at the mosque are widely held by respondents to be a vengeance assault on Sheik Sani Yahaya, one of the victims, who was encouraging the Muslims to live peacefully with their neighbours.

Following the mosque bomb blast, a large number of Muslims gathered and attacked two church buildings located close to the mosque. Saint Michael's Parish of the First African Church Mission near the mosque was completely burnt down, while Evangelical Church Winning All (ECWA) at the Terminus area suffered different degrees of damage (www.bpnews.net). Thus, one of the antics of Boko Haram terrorists in Plateau state has been to incite the Muslims against the Christians, and vice versa. This incitement has led to several reprisal attacks between Christians and Muslims, resulting in killings, looting, damage to property and destruction of places of worship.

4.2.6 Hampering of Agricultural Activities

Nigeria's National Emergency Management Agency announced that over 17,000 farmers have fled northern Nigeria to the southern part of the country since 2012, following Boko Haram terrorism (Takaya 15). Most of these escapees are youths who constitute the working force in agriculture in Plateau state. Plateau state is one of the states in northern Nigeria whose farmers are worst hit by Boko Haram terrorists. Agriculture is a major means of livelihood in the state. This is proven by the quantity of agricultural products that leave the state in Lorries daily to the southern parts of the country. There are crops that appear to be produced in the state more than other parts of Nigeria, such as Irish potatoes, tomatoes, varieties of pepper, cabbage, carrot, peas, green beans, *acha* (Hungary rice) and other assorted grains, vegetables and tubers.

The production of these crops has become a very serious challenge due to the fact that farmers are always attacked and killed on their way to the farm, on the farmland, and in their communities by suspected the terrorists. One of the important recent terrorist attacks involved a first class traditional ruler in the state, Lazarus Agai, who was ambushed and killed together with his driver and two of his aids on their way from a farm located in Sha community within his jurisdiction. The murdered monarch was holding the title of Saf Ron Kulere, which is a first class traditional status in Plateau state. The state government confirmed that the paramount ruler and his entourage were killed by the terrorists, who did not spare a survival among the victims (Abba 13). This is just one among countless incidences of attacks on farmers in Plateau state.

The terrorist attacks on the farming population of Plateau state have been blamed on Boko Haram. Many agricultural communities in the state have been sacked through multiple terrorist onslaughts, mostly on the villages of Barkin Ladi, Riyom, Bassa, and Jos South Local Government Areas. Writing on this menace, Nankin Bagudu retorts that Plateau state is

under the siege of terrorism, as the scourge of killings, destruction of property and displacement of agricultural rural communities continue unabated. Bagudu is saddened that most of these farming communities under attack in Plateau state have been failed by the government, as they lack the presence of government, security of life and property and basic infrastructure; noting that this is why “entire farming communities have been wiped out by these marauding murderers” (25-29). There are instances when crops growing on the farms are completely destroyed by the attackers. These incessant attacks have made the farmers to abandon many of their farmlands. The attendant effect is that farm produces are not as much as before, contributing to hunger and hike in the price of agricultural commodities.

4.2.7 Widespread Insecurity

Terror connotes fear, horror, dread, shock, panic, fright, trepidation, and intimidation (Ishaku 101). All these terms are synonymous with the general insecurity that characterise the daily life of people in Plateau state. The spate of bombings, destructions, serial attacks and assassinations, rape and kidnapping constantly being carried out by the jihadists have created an atmosphere of fear, intimidation and general insecurity in Jos and various parts of Plateau state. Cars are parked hundreds of metres away from worship places; bags are not allowed into mosques or church buildings; scanners are used to search interested worshippers and road blocks are mounted during worship hours. Many roads close to places of worship are blocked until praying time is over. Many parents fear to send their children to school in Plateau state. Many are so apprehensive that there might be an unannounced attack at any given time. This insecurity has led many men to move their family members to stay with their relatives in other safer places. People hardly sleep soundly. Thus, Boko Haram terrorism has brought untold disquiet, fear, and general insecurity on the inhabitants of Plateau state (Peter 12).

4.2.8 Environmental Pollution

Pollution entails “the addition to the environment of substances that cannot be rendered harmless by normal biological processes” (Isaacs 974). The harmful activities of Boko Haram result to the pollution of the air, water and land. The various chemicals the terrorists used to produce explosives and smokes from explosions have a lot of harmful effects on the people, animals and their habitats. Many people have died of the chemical effects of the pollutants, while some others are suffering from various diseases as a result of the pollution (Owoseye 3).

Similarly, according to a UNICEF report released on 30 August 2017, the Boko Haram terrorists have destroyed 75 per cent of water and sanitation infrastructure in Plateau and some other northern states in Nigeria. The water and sanitation systems are attacked, damaged by the Boko Haram terrorists and abandoned in disrepair to the point of total collapse. This has the potential danger of the outbreak of cholera, diarrhoea and other water borne diseases (Polycarp 5).

Boko Haram has been variously accused of poisoning water bodies and destroying water facilities in Plateau state. The explosive weapons they use in bombing attacks produce toxic materials that pollute the air, water and land. As a consequence, the fertility of the land is also destroyed by the toxins. Water is polluted and the aquatic animals die because they could neither drink nor breathe in the water in which they lived. The water became so useless for drinking, cooking, bathing and washing. Air pollution has equally caused various diseases related to the vital organs of the body, such as the heart, lungs and liver. The pollutants resulting from Boko Haram activities, therefore, have devastating effects on human beings, animals and their habitats (Peter 18).

4.2.9 Destruction of Peace and Stability in Plateau State

While describing the peace, beauty and serenity of Plateau state, and Jos, its capital, Ishaku wrote the following interesting piece:

The greatest asset and the greatest liability of the city of Jos are one and the same – its geography...the geology of the plateau makes for a rich endowment of natural resources especially solid mineral deposits. The boom in the tin industry of the Jos Plateau in the first half of the twentieth century also encouraged the influx of ethnics and nationals, making Jos the first cosmopolitan city in the West African region...its physical geographical attributes – centrality, balmy weather, undulating hills, solid mineral deposits – and its cultural features – cosmopolitanism, religious pluralism, and peaceful disposition of its inhabitants – combine to give the town the appellation of “*Home of Peace and Tourism.*” It is regarded as the pearl of the Northern Region for people who believe that all the land lying north of the River Niger constitute the political north of Nigeria. Others regard it as the natural headquarters of the Middle Belt, the central belt stretching from Zuruland in the west to the sprawling Jos and Bauchi plateaux, at the middle, to the Tivland and Kwararafaland, at the lower Benue valley, onto Buraland, Bwatiyeland and Kilbaland on the western slope on the Mandara mountainous range in the east (59-60).

The beautiful description of Plateau state as given by Ishaku could pass for a nice poem or a sweet song. However, all these have become a thing of the past, as the same writer regrets to admit that the “home of peace and tourism” has lost its innocence and has now become the “home of peace in full throes of war” (79). Hence, the incessant terrorist attacks and consequent reprisal attacks in Plateau state have led to the destruction of peace and stability in the state. A good number of those interviewed revealed that they lived in constant

fear and uneasiness. They stated that they were so afraid of going out at night, because they would not know if they might return alive.

4.3 ETHICAL IMPLICATIONS OF BOKO HARAM'S TERRORIST ACTIVITIES IN PLATEAU STATE

The harmful activities and negative effects of Boko Haram's terrorism in Plateau state had raised various ethical issues, problems and implications.

i. Ethical Implication of the Destruction of Life

Boko Haram has made the destruction of life a common activity in such a way that life has lost its humanity, sacredness, sanctity, holiness, purity and value. Life is an important thing. Life, however, has lost its unique, distinctive quality in the destructive experiences of the Boko Haram's religious terrorist activities. God alone is the creator and giver of life. In the holy bible, God's command clearly forbids murder or the deliberate killing of any human being (Exodus 20:13). Consequently, it is unlawful for anyone to intentionally take the life of another person for whatever reason, be it provocation, anger, or injury.

Thus, the Boko Haram terrorists are guilty of blood. They move about with their hands stained with the blood of innocent people; yet claiming to be devout believers. The slashing of throats of people, shootings, assassinations, bombings, suicide bombings of human targets that had been carried out by Boko Haram terrorists reveal them to be callous, heartless, unsympathetic, cruel, pitiless, merciless, cold-hearted, hard-hearted, sadistic and insensitive to the suffering of other people.

ii. Ethical Implication of the Destruction of Infrastructure

Boko Haram terrorists had destroyed houses, blown up bridges, burnt down school buildings, damaged telecommunication, roads, parks, markets and other facilities. When Boko Haram destroy infrastructure, they have denied the people the freedom of movement. Even if someone had the money, there is little on nothing he could do, since he could not

move around or access the required services. People's responsibility of going to the market to feed the family would be hampered. Heads of families could lose their responsibility of catering for the family.

This could lead to emotional problems such as depression, frustration, stress, anxiety, hopelessness, worry, distress, and desperation. Someone could become quite tensed. These conditions could lead to physical and mental illnesses. Some might commit suicide. It could become difficult for an individual to take on an intelligent discussion. It takes only a few people who have very strong moral character to resist such situations. In so many people, it takes time for them to come down to a normal state of mind. People will lose moral courage. People will not be in a state of fortitude. They will become completely disorganised.

iii. Ethical Implication of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) Problem

Having been displaced, the internally displaced persons become seriously emotionally disturbed, disorganised, unstable, depressed, frustrated, stressed, worrisome, feeling despondent, and looking at life from a hopeless point of view. Because of desperation, they can take any decision or action, not minding the cost. Women can start committing adultery to survive. There will be the problem of rape, prostitution, stealing, and other moral vices. People will become morally wicked. They may admit that some decisions they take and wrong actions they engage in are bad, but they will say that they have no other option. Some men may become sexually enraged; perhaps their wives were equally displaced or separated from them, or killed. Even if the privacy is not complete, they may not mind to engage in sexual activities.

People's moral strength would have become fragile. There is hardly what they may do to safeguard personal integrity. Water is not enough. Food, cosmetics, upkeep are not enough. People should be sympathetic of such internally displaced persons, giving understanding to their predicament and fragile situations. Their conditions have made them weak and

undefensible. The Internally Displaced Persons camp has provided a very weak moral environment because of the consistent sufferings, agonies, pains, anguish, and sadness people are going through. Even if the people are religious, the conditions they are subjected to make them ignore upright living. Many descent men and women may do shameful, embarrassing things. Some may be telling lies to help to save their situations. The internally displaced persons are in constant hunger and lack basic things needed for day to day activities.

iv. Ethical Implications of the Destruction of Social Activities

Boko Haram's religious terrorist activities caused the destruction of social activities in Plateau state, such as religious worship centres, police stations and military bases, recreation centres, weddings, birthdays, cultural festivals, sports, recreational activities, tourism, and hospitality management.

Because churches and mosques were destroyed simultaneously, the cordial relationship that existed between Christians and Muslims were tarnished, obscure, distorted, and spoiled. This was so because there was a mutual prejudice, suspicion, distrust, lack of confidence between Christians and Muslims. Christians thought that the Muslims were the ones who constituted Boko Haram and destroyed their churches, while the Muslims thought that the Christians were the ones who were destroying their mosques on revenge missions. Therefore, Boko Haram's religious terrorist activities intensified suspicion, prejudice, distrust and lack of confidence between Christians and Muslims in Plateau state. This affects inter-personal, inter-group, and inter-religious relationships. There is no trust between the two groups. Everything is negatively interpreted suspiciously.

Boko Haram religious terrorists frequently attacked Police stations and military bases. They destroyed these security facilities and created great fears among civilians. As a result, the terrorist violence affects the morale of the security forces and the widespread moral

support of Nigeria civilians or members of the public. It requires a reasonable effort to re-encourage the security forces and members of the public.

Due to Boko Haram's terrorist activities, the enthusiasm and happiness with which the people of Plateau state engage in recreational activities, weddings, cultural festivals, birthday parties and sports were badly discouraged, because of the tremendous attacks Boko Haram terrorists have been unleashing on the people of Plateau state. Consequently, the great joy and celebration people derive from these activities have been cut down due to Boko Haram's terrorism.

v. Ethical Implication of the Destruction of Agricultural Activities

Farmers in Plateau state had been chased away by Boko Haram religious terrorists. Farms and farmers were violently attacked, and while farmers were killed, their crops were destroyed. The terrorist activities immediately brought about widespread hunger in the state, because of the scarcity of food. This situation had compared the people of Plateau state to look for food from other states of the federation. As a result, the morale of the farmers in Plateau state was badly damaged. Many farmers cannot go back to their farms for the fear of their lives. In this context, the people need moral encouragement and material provision from the government of the federation and international community in order to start farming again.

Consequently, food security became a major challenge to farmers, government and international community. Apart from the food insecurity in the state, there was a general insecurity in Plateau state. As a result, the people had tremendous fear of traveling to places, going to the farm or engaging in various forms of public activities in Plateau state. As a result, industrial entrepreneurs could not come to Plateau state for business.

vi. Ethical Implication of Environmental Pollution

Boko Haram's religious terrorists had engaged in various forms of violent attacks and destructive activities which involved the use of toxic chemicals, poisons and burning which produced heavy smoke in the areas affected. Consequently, a number of areas in Plateau state had suffered from environmental pollution comprising land pollution, water pollution and air pollution. The places affected became dangerous for human life, as the toxic chemicals, poisons and heavy smoke could cause various forms of illnesses. Diseases associated with pollution are quite dangerous to human survival, including lung cancer, stroke, ischaemic heart disease, acute lower respiratory infection in children among others.

vii. Ethical Implication of Disruption of Peace and Stability in Plateau state

Boko Haram's religious terrorists in Plateau state had occasionally disrupted peace and stability in certain places at various times. The disruption of peace and stability was brought about by suicide bombing, burning of buildings, shooting of persons, killings, and kidnapping. The news of these violent activities usually disrupted peace and stability in Plateau state. The disruption of peace and stability was viewed by the people as a failure on the part of the government which has the responsibility to provide adequate security for her citizens. Because of this instability, government had to work hard to restore people's confidence in security forces and government's competence to deal with such situations effectively, in order to restore peace and stability.

CHAPTER FIVE

SUMMARY, CONTRIBUTION TO KNOWLEDGE, RECOMMENDATIONS, AND CONCLUSION

The preceding chapters of this study have presented a comprehensive and detailed understanding of Boko Haram, and have also described the character of the various effects of their terrorist acts in Plateau state. In this chapter, the researcher has summarised the work, made recommendations, spelt out the contribution to knowledge and given concluding remarks based on the findings of the study.

5.1 SUMMARY

This thesis has studied the ethical issues in Boko Haram's religious terrorism in Plateau state, Nigeria. The study critically examined the ideology of Boko Haram, which, it was discovered, to be deeply rooted in Salafi jihadism (Salafism). Salafism is an aspect of Islam that seeks to purge the religion of every outside influence while striving to return the Muslims to the kind of Islam which was practiced by those considered as the pious ancestors (Muhammad and the early Islamic community). This school of Islamic thought interprets everything western as religious deviation and consequently unislamic. They consider western influence on Islamic society as the reason for Islam's weakness in the society. Therefore, they declared western education, and of course all western institutions as *haram* (forbidden), and as such, should be avoided and fought against by all Muslims. Various issues were discovered to be responsible for Boko Haram activities in Plateau state. Some of the factors include poverty, manipulation of religion, politics, and perennial conflict in northern Nigeria, and fundamentalist Islamic ideology.

The study equally revealed that the effects of Boko Haram on Plateau state are rather destructive and harmful. This is seen in the large number of lives and property that have been

destroyed in the state following Boko Haram's religious terrorist attacks. Many people have been killed through various assault tactics that have been employed by the terrorists, including guerrilla attacks, armed assaults, targeted assassinations, drive-by-shootings, use of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) and suicide bombing. Churches were bombed during Sunday services in order to produce as many casualties as possible. Mosques were attacked where the imams condemned the activities of the sect. Also targeted and attacked were police, prison and military personnel and formations, civil servants, business men and farmers, children, youths and adults, markets, hospitals, parks, hotels, cinemas, recreation centres, restaurants, drinking joints and schools. Boko Haram attacks have been carried out in both city centres and rural areas in Plateau state. Other effects of the religious terrorists include internally displaced persons (IDPs) problems, destruction of infrastructure, disruption of economic activities, hampering of agricultural activities, widespread insecurity, environmental pollution, destruction of educational progress, and disruption of peace and stability. As a result, the people of Plateau state have experienced emotional problems such as trauma, depression, frustration, stress, distress, worry, hopelessness and desperation in different degrees. In the context of this situation, there have been tension, threat and fear among the people of Plateau state.

The study has then made some recommendations. Religious terrorism should be included in the educational curriculum in Nigeria. Sound theological education should be inculcated by Christians and Muslims. Adequate and sustainable welfare programmes should be provided for internally displaced persons (IDPs). Comprehensive reconciliation, rehabilitation and reconstruction should be carried out in Plateau state. Finally, for efficient, creative, innovative, effective, productive and prompt service delivery by the security agents, maximum funding and effective equipment should be provided promptly in order to maintain and sustain high morale among them.

The study, therefore, has achieved its desired aim of investigating the Boko Haram's religious terrorist organisation in Plateau state in terms of the nature of their activities, causes of their activities, effects of their activities and making appropriate suggestions as to the ways of tackling Boko Haram terrorism in Nigeria. The study has contributed to the understanding of the problem of Boko Haram. It has exposed the way the terrorists reason, behave, plan, and carry out their activities. It has equally shown how the minds of the religious terrorists are morally devoid of emotions – how they are totally hardened to human feelings. The study recognises the fact that human beings are created by God who demands worship and forbids murder. As rational and moral beings, every human person is liable to the consequences of his or her right or wrong actions. This principle of divine judgment is being upheld by Christianity as well as Islam. This is stated clearly in the consequentialist ethical theory which states that the rightness or wrongness of a person's action is judged by the consequences of those actions. Thus, the terrorists cannot escape judgment. The thesis upholds the virtues of peace, love, unity, mercy, kindness, tolerance, mutual co-existence and interdependence, and discourages fighting, killing, assassinations, shootings, bombings, rebellion, war, hatred, and intolerance.

5.2 CONTRIBUTION TO KNOWLEDGE

The study has made both academic and social contributions to knowledge. The research has revealed that religious terrorism is present and active in Plateau state. The Boko Haram terrorists have functional cells in Plateau state. They use various disguising tactics to carry out their attacks on the people both at the towns and villages. Thus, the antics of the terrorists have been uncovered by the study.

Boko Haram's religious terrorism has caused a major division among Plateau state residents along religious lines. The religious divide affects a lot of issues in the day to day

activities in the state. There is mutual suspicion and distrust between the Christians and the Muslims. The situation is so bad such that people now reside at places where the adherents of their own faith are the majority. That is, Christians live only among Christians, while Muslims live among Muslims. Purchase of land, house or other property is also viewed from religious angle.

The study further contributed to knowledge by revealing that Boko Haram's attacks in Plateau state were patterned in such a way as to intensify confusion and enmity between the Christians and the Muslims. The terrorists started their first attacks in Plateau state on Christians and their property, while making public statements that their mission was to avenge the killings of Muslims in Plateau state. By this, the terrorists seemed to attract the sympathy of unsuspecting Muslims. The attacks enraged the Christians, and they carried out counter attacks on the Muslims because they thought the Muslims were the Boko Haram terrorists that attacked the Christians. The Muslims equally carried out retaliatory attacks on the Christians.

In the course of time, however, the Boko Haram terrorists equally attacked mosques and killed Muslims in Jos. Infuriated by this, the Muslims who suspected the Christians for the attack fought Christians and burnt down church buildings. This cycle of reprisals has continued in Plateau state. Thus, the Boko Haram terrorists are using both the Christians and Muslims to further their terrorist agenda. This has affected inter-personal, inter-group, and inter-religious relationships. There is no trust between the two groups. Everything is negatively interpreted suspiciously. Boko Haram's religious terrorist activities have intensified suspicion, prejudice, distrust and lack of confidence between Christians and Muslims in Plateau state. It is pertinent, therefore, for both the Christians and the Muslims in Plateau state to know that the real enemy is the terrorist, Boko Haram, who can go under any possible guise to incite, terrorise and destroy the people.

Further contribution of this study in the academic field is that it has provided a broad understanding of Boko Haram's religious terrorism. The study has increased our understanding of the nature of Boko Haram's religious terrorist activities, such as suicide bombing, use of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) in crowded places, assassinations, kidnappings, burning down of buildings, attacking security forces, guerrilla warfare, drive-by shootings, attacks at market places and parks as well as attacks at churches and mosques.

The study has identified the major cause of the activities of Boko Haram in Plateau state. The major cause is their rejection of Western civilisation, which includes Western education, science, technology, medicine, law, governance, and social relationships. In this context, the study has adequately provided required information about the nature, and effects of Boko Haram as well as appropriate solutions to the problem arising from Boko Haram's religious terrorist activities in Plateau state. Therefore, the study has added a scholarly source of information for further studies.

5.3 RECOMMENDATIONS

The religious terrorist activities of Boko Haram in Plateau state reflects their onslaughts in other northern Nigerian states where they had carried out their attacks and, of course, reveals the state of insecurity prevalent in the nation. This has warranted a generalisation of the recommendations to a national context. Thus, the recommendations set forth in this section will benefit both Plateau state and the entire country. These recommendations will be helpful to the categories of the government, security agencies and entire citizenry.

The following recommendations have been made in tackling Boko Haram's religious terrorist activities.

- i. For understanding the nature, causes and effects of Boko Haram's terrorist activities in Plateau state, Federal government of Nigeria should create a widespread public awareness of all Nigerians through national policy on education. Religious terrorism should be introduced in the educational curriculum from Primary Schools to Universities across Nigeria.
- ii. Christians, Muslims and other religious believers should include religious terrorism in their sermons, preachings, teachings, conferences, seminars, retreats, fellowships, publications and constitutions. The implementation of this recommendation should be vigorously pursued and enforced by the highest authorities concerned, such as bishops' conference, synod, Muslim *ulama* or Islamic leaders among others.
- iii. Religious terrorism should be made a subject of public dialogue in which individuals, groups, human rights activists, professional bodies, labour unions, Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) and the Mass Media should be actively involved in creating public awareness on religious terrorism in Nigeria.
- iv. Religious terrorism should be made a topic for public lectures, addresses, talks, speeches and discourses in educational institutions, civil service fora, parastatals, private sectors and security agencies in order to create public awareness on religious terrorism in Nigeria.
- v. Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), as the products of Boko Haram's terrorist violence should be given adequate attention for the purpose of their welfare, security, reconciliation, rehabilitation and reconstruction by the Federal government of Nigeria, state governments, local government areas, humanitarian organisations, philanthropists and religious organisations.
- vi. For efficient, creative, effective, successful and prompt management of Boko Haram's religious terrorism by security agencies, maximum funding and provision of

equipment should be promptly made available within a specific time in which they are needed. In addition, the welfare of the security agencies should be made the highest priority of government in order to maintain and sustain a high morale among them.

5.4 CONCLUSION

The study has examined the ethical issues in Boko Haram's religious terrorism in Plateau state. The study discovered that the Boko Haram religious terrorists have carried out destructive activities in Plateau state. They have used various tactics to carry out their attacks on the people both at the urban and rural areas, including guerrilla warfare, bombing, shooting, assassination and burning down of buildings. Boko Haram's religious terrorism has caused a widespread destruction of life and property in Plateau state. Many people were killed in different places, and property was destroyed on a larger scale, such as churches, mosques, police stations, military bases, markets and houses. As a result, the people of Plateau state have experienced emotional problems such as trauma, depression, frustration, stress, distress, worry, hopelessness and desperation in different degrees. In the context of this situation, there have been tension, threat and fear among the people of Plateau state. The study has then made some recommendations. Religious terrorism should be included in the educational curriculum in Nigeria. Sound theological education should be inculcated by Christians and Muslims. Adequate and sustainable welfare programmes should be provided for internally displaced persons (IDPs). Comprehensive reconciliation, rehabilitation and reconstruction should be carried out in Plateau state. Finally, for efficient, creative, innovative, effective, productive and prompt service delivery by the security agents, maximum funding and effective equipment should be provided promptly in order to maintain and sustain high morale among them. It behoves on the people of Plateau state to see the Boko Haram as a common enemy, form a common front despite their religious differences, and join hands with the government in order to defeat the Boko Haram terrorists.

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APPENDIX I

LIST OF RESPONDENTS

S/NO	NAME	AGE	OCCUPATION	PLACE OF INTERVIEW	DATE
1.	Victor Micheal	13	Student	Vom	04/05/2015
2.	Favour Dagwi	12	Student	Vom	04/05/2015
3.	Samuel Silas	13	Student	Vom	04/05/2015
44.	Irimiya Markus	11	Pupil	Vom	04/05/2015
5.	Jerry Dung	11	Pupil	Vom	04/05/2015
6.	Jeremiah Gyang	13	Student	Vom	05/05/2015
7.	Esther Gyang	12	Student	Vom	05/05/2015
8.	Francis Bulus	13	Student	Vom	05/05/2015
9.	Isaac Gyang	12	Student	Vom	05/05/2015
10.	Pam Dung	10	Pupil	Vom	07/05/2015
11.	Sandra Davou	10	Pupil	Vom	07/05/2015
12.	Cynthia Davou	11	Pupil	Vom	07/05/2015
13.	Gloria Markus	12	Student	Vom	07/05/2015
14.	Benjamin Dalyop	09	Pupil	Vom	07/05/2015
15.	Wilfred Iliya	10	Pupil	Vom	07/05/2015
16.	Gyang Sunday	12	Student	Vom	07/05/2015
17.	Chungdung Dalyop	12	Student	Vom	07/05/2015
18.	Daniel Davou	13	Student	Vom	07/05/2015
19.	Suzanna Samuel	12	Student	Vom	07/05/2015
20.	Kefas Bulus	12	Student	Vom	08/05/2015
21.	Emmanuel Dazi	12	Student	Vom	08/05/2015
22.	Silas Sailus	10	Pupil	Vom	08/05/2015
23.	Joshua Daniel	10	Pupil	Vom	08/05/2015
24.	Evelyn Markus	11	Pupil	Vom	08/05/2015
25.	Won Ibrahim	12	Student	Vom- Chugwui	08/05/2015
26.	Goodluck Emmanuel	08	Pupil	Vom	08/05/2015
27.	Daniel Joshua	09	Pupil	Vom	08/05/2015
28.	Patience Dalyop	12	Student	Vom	08/05/2015
29.	Lilian Samuel	12	Student	Kassa	16/07/2015
30.	Godfrey Gyang	14	Student	Kassa	16/07/2015
31.	Grace Ilisha	11	Pupil	Kassa	16/07/2015
32.	Saratu Andrew	12	Student	Pankshin	07/02/2016
33.	Fwenji Kefas	11	Pupil	Pankshin	07/02/2016
34.	Nangar Moses	12	Student	Pankshin	07/02/2016
35.	Sunday Danjuma	12	Student	Langtang	03/05/2016
36.	Nanma Vongnar	11	Pupil	Langtang	03/05/2016
37.	Ponfwan Vwannar	13	Student	Langtang	03/05/2016
38.	Godfrey Joseph	11	Pupil	Bacit	17/01/2017
39.	Reuben Gyang	11	Pupil	Bacit	17/01/2017
40.	Godwin Ayuba	13	Student	Bokkos	23/02/2017
41.	Gideon Monday	12	Student	Dangyel	04/03/2017
42.	Wilfred Choji	11	Pupil	Gyel	06/03/2017

S/NO	NAME	AGE	OCCUPATION	PLACE OF INTERVIEW	DATE
44.	Abraham Solomon	09	Pupil	Gyel	06/03/2017
45.	Emmanuel Bitrus	12	Student	Barkin Ladi	06/06/2017
46.	Rebecca Chollom	13	Student	Barkin Ladi	06/06/2017
47.	Patience Peter	12	Student	Barkin Ladi	06/06/2017
48.	Sarah Chung Dung	11	Pupil	Barkin Ladi	06/06/2017
49.	Saleh Zakka	10	Pupil	Barkin Ladi	06/06/2017
50.	Micheal Emmanuel	11	pupil	Rokon, Barkin Ladi	06/06/2017
51.	Moses Lepshak	13	Student	Shendam	14/07/2017
52.	Nandom David	14	Student	Shendam	14/07/2017
53.	Gungshang Nicolas	13	Student	Shendam	14/07/2017
54.	Victor Elisha	10	Pupil	Shendam	14/07/2017
55.	Shangsuar Emmanuel	12	Student	Shendam	14/07/2017
56.	Golfoji Gad	09	Pupil	Shendam	14/07/2017
57.	Nendrimwa Sunday	12	Student	Shendam	14/07/2017
58.	Shedrack Yohanna	12	Student	Shendam	14/07/2017
59.	Ngem Davou	14	Student	Chugui	02/08/2017
60.	Miracle Markus	10	Pupil	Chugui	02/08/2017
61.	Shemai Daniel	12	Student	Mikang	07/09/2017
62.	Alpha Apollos	10	Pupil	Mikang	07/09/2017
63.	Emdong Daniel	12	Student	Mikang	07/09/2017
64.	Meshak Dachung	12	Student	Haita	17/09/2017
65.	Pam Gyang	12	Student	Turu	23/09/2017
66.	Joel gyang	12	Student	Turu	05/10/2017
67.	Victoria Moses	11	Student	Turu	05/10/2017
68.	Pam Dung	13	Student	Jol	16/10/2017
69.	Vairat Joshua	11	Pupil	Dagwiluwal	21/10/2017
70.	Luka Sunday	12	Student	Kogom	25/10/2017
71.	Jere Dagwi	10	Pupil	Dagupyam	03/11/2017
72.	Abel Mala	47	Civil servant	Bukuru	21/02/18
73.	Paulina Stephen	33	Civil servant	Bukuru	23/05/18
74.	Putbak Christy Ezekiel	34	Civil servant	Bukuru	23/05/18
75.	Salome Augustine	30	Civil servant	Tal, Pankshin	21/02/18
76.	Dashe Dennis	32	Teacher	Bukuru/Pankshin	21/02/18
77.	Lyop Monday	53	Civil servant	Vwang	21/02/18
78.	Monday Chung Gyang	57	Teacher	Vwang	21/02/18
79.	Ishaya Hassan	43	teacher	Bukuru/Mangu	21/02/18
80.	Manji Habakkuk Yafet	33	Civil servant	Bukuru/Mangu	21/02/18
81.	Godiya Manji	28	Cook	Mbar, Bokkos	21/02/18
82.	Sgt Nanfa Bande	34	Police Counter terrorist	Jos Base, Bukuru	23/05/18
83.	SP Ali Obed Masoyi	49	Police Counter terrorist	Counter Terrorism Unit, Base 14,	13/06/18

S/NO	NAME	AGE	OCCUPATION	PLACE OF INTERVIEW	DATE
85.	ASP Nuhu Teng	48	Bomb Squad	Police Hqtrs, Jos	21/05/18
86.	Sgt Gadong Kumkur	41	Bomb Squad	Police Hqtrs, Jos	21/05/18
87.	Sgt Emmanuel Danjuma	38	Bomb Squad	Police Hqtrs, Jos	21/05/18
88.	DSP Cyprain Dariya	48	EOD(Bomb Squad) Commander	Police Headquarters, Jos	21/05/18
89.	Ngovo Gyang	60	Farmer	Hwak	17/3/2015
90.	Sunday Gyang	34	Farmer	Hwak	17/3/2015
91.	Dagyang Davou	42	Driver	Kuru	06/08/2015
92.	Ezra Pam	45	Bricklayer	Kuru	09/09/2015
93.	Ezekiel Dung	50	Teacher	Vom	19/10/2016
94.	Moses Jang	48	Shoe Cobbler	Nafok	26/10/2016
95.	Gwom Pam	52	Farmer	Nafok	26/10/2016
96.	Gwom Tsok	67	Farmer	Nafok	26/10/2016
97.	Gwom Ali	70	Businessman	Igip	28/10/2016
98.	Rev Dung Choji	56	Clergy	Bukuru	03/11/2016
99.	Abu Mohammed	63	Imam	Bukuru	03/11/2016
100.	Rev Onye Declan	46	Clergy	Jos	04/11/2016
101.	Kahlid Wada	43	Imam	Jos	04/11/2016
102.	ASP Ajik Azih	59	Police	Jos	18/12/2016
103.	Sgt Miri Y.	32	Police	Jos	18/12/2016
104.	Vonkur Moses	67	Police (rtd)	Dorowa	20/12/2016
105.	Sgt Hassan Abdu	28	Soldier	Rayfield	03/01/2017
106.	Cpl Jude Ossai	21	Soldier	Rayfeild	03/01/2017
107.	Margret Gwom	38	Banker	Bukuru	26/03/2017
108.	Pam Dung	50	Mason	Riyom	26/03/2017
109.	Damaris Mohammed	65	Teacher(rtd)	Riyom	26/03/2017
110.	John Pam	40	Farmer	Riyom	26/03/2017
111.	Amarachi Igwe	31	Trader	Lahol Chom	07/04/2017
112.	Chinelo Onu	50	Trader	Lahol Chom	07/04/2017
113.	Fatai Moshood	52	Tailer	Bukuru	17/05/2017
114.	Odabe Francis	72	Trader	Bukuru	17/05/2017
115.	Godwin Onuh	38	Trader	Gyero Road	17/05/2017
116.	Dung Davou	53	Mason	Gyel	05/08/2017
117.	Joshua Onoja	41	Barber	Gyel	05/08/2017
118.	Amed Suleiman	48	Imam	Jos	17/08/2016
119.	Tijjani Ahmed	43	Imam	Jos	17/08/2016
120.	Mohammed Alkafawi	40	Imam	Jos	17/08/2016
121.	Rev Yakubu Pam	53	CAN Chairman	Jos	22/05/18
122.	Dr. Khalid	60	JNI Secretary	Kaduna	12/10/14

APPENDIX II

LETTER OF INTRODUCTION

Dear Respondent,

The researcher, Francis Augustine Obasi is a Ph.D student of the Department of Religion and Cultural Studies, Faculty of Arts, Benue State University, Makurdi (BSU/REL/Ph.D/12/1763). He is carrying out a research on the Ethical Issues in the Boko Haram's Religious Terrorism in Plateau State, Nigeria.

He solicits your responses to his interview questions. Be assured that the information you may provide will be used only for research purposes, and must be treated with utmost confidentiality. Therefore, feel free to give your opinion.

Thanks for your cooperation.

Francis Augustine Obasi

Researcher

APPENDIX III

INTERVIEW QUESTIONS

1. What do you understand by religious terrorism?
2. How can you explain Boko Haram?
3. Do you think we have Boko Haram terrorists in Plateau state?
4. What are some of the causes of Boko Haram terrorism in Plateau state?
5. Can you mention some of the attacks that have been carried out by Boko Haram in Plateau state?
6. Have you or anyone close to you been a victim of Boko Haram attack?
7. What are the effects of Boko Haram activities on Plateau state?
8. In your own opinion, what should the government do in order to conquer or end Boko Haram terrorism?
9. Are there things you think the Police and Military officers who are engaged in fighting Boko Haram should do or not do in order to have success?
10. In which ways do you think that religious leaders, traditional rulers, media, Non-Governmental Organisations and the general public should come in and help in the fight against Boko Haram?
11. Can you give any other piece of advice that can help in ending Boko Haram terrorism?