

Texas Integrated Child Support System: Final Evaluation Report

Daniel Schroeder
Ashweeta Patnaik

August 2016



3001 Lake Austin Blvd., Suite 3.200
Austin, TX 78703 (512) 471-7891

TABLE OF CONTENTS

List of Figures	iii
List of Tables	iv
Executive Summary.....	vi
Introduction	1
Integrated Child Support System (ICSS).....	1
Impact Evaluation Design	1
Key Questions	2
Implementation of ICSS	4
OAG IV-D and County Child Support Enforcement in Texas.....	4
Case Flow under ICSS.....	5
OCSE Waiver and Implementation of ICSS in Texas	7
Experimental Design	10
Random Assignment: El Paso County	10
Random Assignment Mechanism	10
Random Assignment, Implementation.....	11
Random Assignment, Exclusions	12
Results of Random Assignment	13
Quasi-Random Assignment: Harris County.....	16
Time Series Design: Other ICSS Counties.....	21
Subgroup Analysis Strategy	24
Program Impact Estimates.....	27
El Paso: Experimental Impacts.....	28
Collection of Child Support	29
Receipt of Public Assistance by Custodial Parents	31
Employment and Earnings of CPs and NCPs.....	32
Harris County: Quasi-Experimental Impacts.....	34
Collection of Child Support	34
Receipt of Public Assistance by Custodial Parents	35
Employment and Earnings of CPs and NCPs.....	36
Other ICSS Counties: Quasi-Experimental Impacts.....	37
Collection of Child Support	37
Receipt of Public Assistance by Custodial Parents	39
Employment and Earnings of CPs and NCPs.....	39
Impact Variation by Subgroups.....	40
Hispanics	40
Military Members	42
Alternative Arrears Analysis.....	44
Opt-out Analysis.....	49
Opt-out Reasons Cited	49

Opt-outs Identified through Administrative Data	51
Outcomes among Opt-Outs	53
Opt IN Analysis	58
Discussion.....	62
Appendix A: Data Processing	67
Appendix B: Detailed Statistics	82

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1. OAG Case Flow in non-ICSS and pre-ICSS Counties	5
Figure 2. OAG Case Flow in ICSS Counties	6
Figure 3. OAG Case Flow in El Paso County, Random Assignment by Cause Number	11
Figure 4. Harris County Random Assignment to ICSS over Time.....	16
Figure 5. OAG Case Flow in Harris County, Random Assignment by Court Number, Example from Sep 2004	17
Figure 6. Experimental Drift: Full-Service Case Share over Time	28
Figure 7. Prompt Case Opening in Harris County	45
Figure 8. Prompt Case Opening in Other ICSS Counties	47
Figure 9. Opt-out Reasons	50
Figure A-1. Processing of El Paso DRO Data to Build Study Population	70
Figure A-2. Processing of OAG Data to Build Study Population for Harris County.....	74
Figure A-3. Processing of OAG Data to Build Study Population for Other ICSS Counties.....	78

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1. ICSS Implementation by Site	7
Table 2. Harris County ICSS Entry Date by Court	9
Table 3. El Paso Case Eligibility for Random Assignment	12
Table 4. El Paso Final Treatment vs Control Group, Member Characteristics	14
Table 5. Harris County Treatment vs Comparison Group, all Identified Non-PA Case Members	19
Table 6. Other ICSS Counties Treatment vs Comparison Group, all Identified Non-PA Case Members	22
Table 7. Other ICSS Counties, Hispanic Categorization Scheme.....	25
Table 8. Other ICSS Counties plus El Paso, Military Categorization Scheme.....	26
Table 9. El Paso Child Support Collections.....	30
Table 10. El Paso Child Support Judgments and Arrears	31
Table 11. El Paso Public Assistance Receipt.....	32
Table 12. El Paso Employment and Earnings of CPs and NCPs.....	33
Table 13. Harris County Short Term Child Support Collections.....	34
Table 14. Harris County Short Term Judgments and Arrears	35
Table 15. Harris County Short Term Public Assistance Receipt.....	36
Table 16. Harris County Short Term Employment and Earnings of CPs and NCPs.....	36
Table 17. Other ICSS Counties Child Support Collections.....	38
Table 18. Other ICSS Counties Judgments and Arrears	38
Table 19. Other ICSS Counties Public Assistance Receipt.....	39
Table 20. Other ICSS Counties Employment and Earnings of CPs and NCPs.....	39
Table 21. Differential ICSS Impacts among Hispanics, Child Support Collections	40
Table 22. Differential ICSS Impacts among Hispanics, Judgments and Arrears	41
Table 23. Differential ICSS Impacts among Hispanics, Public Assistance Receipt	41
Table 24. Differential ICSS Impacts among Hispanics, Employment and Earnings of CPs and NCPs	42
Table 25. Differential ICSS Impacts among Military Members, Child Support Collections	43
Table 26. Differential ICSS Impacts among Military Members, Judgments and Arrears	43
Table 27. Differential ICSS Impacts among Military Members, Public Assistance Receipt	44
Table 28. Differential ICSS Impacts among Military Members, Employment and Earnings of CPs and NCPs	44
Table 29. Statewide Arrears Analysis.....	48
Table 30. Comparing Apparent Opt-Outs to Cases that Remained Full-Service	52
Table 31. Apparent Opt-Outs, Child Support Collections	54
Table 32. Apparent Opt-Outs, Child Support Judgments and Arrears	55
Table 33. Apparent Opt-Outs, Public Assistance Receipt.....	55
Table 34. Apparent Opt-Outs, Employment and Earnings of CPs and NCPs	57
Table 35. Comparing Apparent Opt-Ins to Mandatory Full-Service Cases	58
Table 36. Apparent Opt-Ins, Child Support Collections	60
Table 37. Apparent Opt-Ins, Child Support Judgments and Arrears	60
Table 38. Apparent Opt-Ins, Public Assistance Receipt.....	61

Table 39. Apparent Opt-Ins, Employment and Earnings of CPs and NCPs	61
Table A-1. Random Assignment by El Paso DRO	67
Table A-2. Matches with OAG Administrative Data	67
Table A-3. Cases Potentially Eligible for Random Assignment in El Paso Study Adult Population	68
Table A-4. Medicaid/TANF History for Any Child.....	69
Table A-5. Harris County Cases by Court Number	71
Table A-6. Treatment Assignment in the Harris Study Population.....	72
Table A-7. Medicaid/TANF History for Any Child.....	73
Table A-8. Other ICSS Counties Cases by County.....	75
Table A-9. Treatment Assignment in the Other ICSS Counties Study Population	76
Table A-10. Medicaid/TANF History for Any Child.....	77
Table A-11. County-level characteristics used for PSM	79
Table A-12. Comparison Counties identified for Other ICSS Counties	80
Table B-1. El Paso Treatment vs. Control Group, all Identified Non-PA Case Members, Detailed.....	82
Table B-2. Harris Treatment vs. Comparison Group, all Identified Non-PA Case Members, Detailed	84
Table B-3. Other ICSS Counties Treatment vs. Comparison Group, all Identified Non-PA Case Members, Detailed.....	86
Table B-4. El Paso Impact Estimates, Full Sample, Detailed	88
Table B-5. El Paso Impact Estimates, Late Assignments Only, Detailed	89
Table B-6. Harris Short Term Quasi-experimental Impact Estimates, Detailed	90
Table B-7. Other ICSS Counties, Quasi-experimental Impact Estimates, Detailed.....	91
Table B-8. Other ICSS Counties, Quasi-experimental Impact Estimates, Difference-in- Differences Model.....	92
Table B-9. Differential ICSS Impacts among Hispanics, Difference-in-Differences Model, Detailed	93
Table B-10. Differential ICSS Impacts among Military Members, Difference-in- Differences Model, Detailed	94
Table B-11. Opt-Outs vs. those Remaining in Full Service, All Sites, Detailed.....	95
Table B-12. Apparent Opt-Outs, El Paso, Outcomes Comparison, Detailed	97
Table B-13. Apparent Opt-Outs, Harris, Outcomes Comparison, Detailed	98
Table B-14. Apparent Opt-Outs, Other ICSS Counties, Outcomes Comparison, Detailed	99
Table B-15. Opt-Ins vs. Mandatory Full Service, Other ICSS Sites, Detailed.....	100
Table B-16. Apparent Opt-Ins, Other ICSS Counties, Outcomes Comparison, Detailed	102

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In 1995 the Texas Legislature authorized the Office of the Attorney General (OAG) to improve child support services statewide through the creation of an Integrated Child Support System (ICSS) wherein the OAG may provide IV-D child support enforcement services under contract with counties that elect to participate in the system. The OAG sought and was granted a waiver from the Federal Office of Child Support Enforcement (OCSE) of the requirement for a written application for IV-D services in participating ICSS counties. The waiver was renewed several times, but with the last approval the OAG was required to have the program independently evaluated. The OAG contracted with the Ray Marshall Center for the Study of Human Resources (RMC) to design and conduct an evaluation to measure the impacts of ICSS, the results of which are included in this final report.

The Ray Marshall Center conducted the ICSS waiver evaluation using a combination of random assignment and composite pre-post evaluation designs to measure the impacts of the waiver at the county level. The evaluation relied primarily on OAG administrative records data, Unemployment Insurance (UI) wage records, public assistance administrative records data, U.S. Bureau of the Census data, and other sources. These were used for estimating net impacts and for identifying relevant factors that may influence or be associated with the observed impacts. A process study provided a sufficient understanding of the structure and functioning of ICSS as implemented in order to accurately estimate the impacts of the waiver.

The key research question for the impact analysis was: ***What effect did the ICSS waiver have on the collection and enforcement of child support in areas in which it was implemented?***

This was answered by focusing on more specific questions:

1. What was the impact of introducing deemed, or “self-activating,” applications for IV-D services on child support monitoring, collections, and enforcement in Texas?
2. How did the child support experience vary for those who “opted-out” of enforcement services in ICSS areas?
3. How did the child support experience vary for those who “opted-in” to receive enforcement services prior to implementation of ICSS?
4. Did the ICSS program differentially impact sub-populations, including Hispanics, or members of the military?

5. To what extent did ICSS change the composition and case characteristics of the IV-D caseload in participating counties?

Random Assignment: El Paso County

El Paso County was the only forward-looking experimental site in the Texas ICSS evaluation. Case randomization was done based on the last digit of the cause number with an optimal design assigning half of cases to the ICSS treatment group and half to the control group. New cases in the ICSS experimental or treatment group were automatically registered to receive IV-D child support services, with an opportunity to opt-out. New cases assigned to the control group did not receive IV-D services by default, but had the opportunity to apply on their own as they did prior to ICSS implementation. Random assignment of new cases to the ICSS treatment and control groups began in El Paso in March of 2013 and was concluded on May 7th, 2014.

At the conclusion of random assignment, 1175 cases had been identified for potential inclusion in the ICSS experiment in El Paso. Of those who could be tracked within OAG administrative records data (95%), additional screens were applied for current receipt of public assistance, including TANF or Medicaid, and whether a child support case was already open. A total of 743 cases, or just over 66% of cases passed both screens and were included in the experiment. Of these cases, 376 were randomly assigned to the ICSS treatment group, and 367 to the control group. T-tests comparing the treatment and control groups showed only one significant difference among 36 tests. Thus it was concluded that ICSS random assignment in El Paso produced essentially equivalent treatment and control groups.

Quasi-Random Assignment: Harris County

In the Harris County family court system, there was for many years an ongoing “natural experiment” in which, depending on the court to which they were assigned, some individuals were automatically enrolled in ICSS, while others were required to actively apply if they wanted IV-D child support assistance. During the roll-out period for Harris County, those utilizing the family law courts were assigned to one of nine courts, where the judges had chosen to implement the ICSS program in their courtrooms at different points in time (Sep 2004 to May 2012). Assignment of cases to courts in Harris County satisfies the definition of random assignment because all cases in a given time frame have essentially equal odds of being assigned to an ICSS court.

In trying to determine whether ICSS had an impact on the composition of the caseload, an examination of characteristics of the treatment and comparison groups found a pattern of Harris County cases assigned under ICSS being slightly more affluent, with some mixed evidence as well. ICSS CPs and NCPs were more likely to be employed and showed greater historical employment and earnings, but were also more likely to rely on some benefits such as SNAP.

Comparison Group Time Series Design: Other ICSS Counties

ICSS was also implemented in seventeen other counties over 22 years, starting in 1997 with a demonstration in Bexar County (San Antonio). We include pre- and post-ICSS cases from most of these counties in the evaluation as part of a comparison group time-series design, which also includes cases from similar non-ICSS counties. The advantage of this final design is that impact estimates are longer-term and more representative of the state. Whereas El Paso and Harris County have higher internal validity, results from the Other ICSS Counties time series design are more generalizable.

Again, to determine whether ICSS impacted the composition of the caseload, we examined characteristics of ICSS treatment and comparison groups selected from 13 ICSS counties that converted within the time frame covered by the OAG data files. Once again the general pattern emerged: members of new cases opened in ICSS counties tend to be slightly more affluent, on average, than those on new cases opened in these counties prior to ICSS, but again with some mixed evidence.

Finally, non-ICSS comparison counties were selected using a quasi-experimental similarity estimation procedure. Inclusion of these comparison counties allowed better control of one important factor: the passage of time. This difference-in-differences design answers the question how much more things changed in the ICSS counties after ICSS implementation than they changed in the non-ICSS comparison counties.

Results and Discussion

The overall pattern of impacts among the El Paso, Harris, and Other ICSS counties sites is remarkably similar. Child support collections were increased in all sites, sometimes dramatically. Combining registry only and full-service data to measure collections improved but did not completely eliminate the problem that some payments made outside the state disbursement unit

(contrary to policy) may be missed. We can confidently conclude, at a minimum, that ICSS dramatically increased the documented payment of child support.

Observed impacts of ICSS on public assistance and other benefit receipt was also remarkably consistent and positive. Across sites, ICSS case members were less likely to receive SNAP, received less SNAP benefits, or both. Receipt of TANF was similarly reduced in all sites in which it was measured, and receipt of Medicaid was consistently reduced across sites. Moreover, these reductions cannot be solely attributed to shifts in the composition of the caseload, and they bolster confidence in the findings of consistent improvements in child support collections.

Estimated impacts of ICSS on employment and earnings measures were strong and positive in Harris and Other ICSS Counties, while El Paso showed more mixed employment and earnings findings. Most of the improvements in employment are likely due to the slight shift in the caseload toward those with more attachment to the labor market.

The impact of ICSS on child support arrears was difficult to ascertain in any direct way. With a biased measure that only detects arrears in the control group if they opt-in, findings on arrears balances are difficult to trust. A money judgment measure was meant to capture this concept longer-term in a more unbiased way, but such judgments were simply too infrequent for any trend to be detected. Finally, the alternative analysis of arrears made a convincing case that implementation of ICSS leads more cases to be opened nearer in time to the establishment of their child support orders, and in the long run on a statewide basis such cases have historically led to far lower arrears balances. This strongly suggests that ICSS would be found to lead directly to reduced arrears, should the cases be followed long enough.

The opt-in and opt-out analyses actually tell a similar story from opposite sides of the coin. The opt-in analysis looked at those who voluntarily sought full service enforcement of their child support cases prior to ICSS, whereas the opt-out analysis looked at those who voluntarily chose not to receive such services after ICSS. Cases opting-in are more likely to have female NCPs, more likely to be older, more likely to be employed but at lower average wages. In direct contrast, cases opting-out are more likely to have male NCPs, more likely to be younger, and less likely to be employed but at higher earnings. This analysis paints a clear picture of those who think formal child support enforcement is good and useful versus those who do not.

ICSS was found to have differential impacts for Hispanics and members of the military, but for the most part the program worked better for such groups. In areas whose child support

caseloads contain more members of the military, ICSS led to better collection of child support, lesser arrears and money judgments, lesser reliance on public assistance, and better employment and earnings outcomes. Areas with higher concentrations of Hispanics showed similar patterns on all of these, with the exception of child support, which was less likely to be collected but in higher amounts on average. Apparent arrears accumulation was far less likely in higher Hispanic areas, so on the whole it is clear that ICSS implementation is not hurting these subgroups, and in many ways it appears to be helping.

Considering all these results together, it is clear that members of the IV-D caseload under a system of deemed applications and default enrollment are slightly but not dramatically more affluent, but that the positive effects of ICSS also extend well beyond the impact of this shift. Making enrollment in IV-D services the default tends to bring in more cases, and in some ways these cases are slightly more affluent. Some of these new cases subsequently opt-out, taking their chances that they will receive the support they need without the OAG. What remains among the newly recruited cases is some fraction who weren't sure whether they would benefit from IV-D enforcement or weren't aware of its existence or value. These could be the groups that benefit most from a shift in policy toward 'deemed applications.' They may not be poor now, but the assistance they receive enforcing child support obligations from the start could be the very thing that keeps them from becoming poor when the next economic shock hits.

The effects of ICSS on the IV-D child support caseload are clear. Better child support outcomes, strong evidence of reduced arrears, and reduced public assistance all testify to the importance of enforcing child support cases early. The 'nudge' toward the IV-D system that ICSS represents appears to help these families in multiple ways, while the choice of opting-out preserves their freedom of choice.

INTRODUCTION

Integrated Child Support System (ICSS)

In 1995 the Texas Legislature authorized the Office of the Attorney General (OAG) to improve child support services statewide through the creation of an Integrated Child Support System (ICSS) wherein the OAG may provide IV-D child support enforcement services under contract with counties that elect to participate in the system. In support of the ICSS, the OAG requested that the Federal Office of Child Support Enforcement (OCSE) at the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) grant Texas a waiver of the requirement for a written application for IV-D services in participating ICSS counties. The rationale for the request was based on the earlier finding of the OAG Child Support Division that the application requirement was “a barrier to the collection of child support in participating counties.”¹ OCSE granted Texas such waiver in March 1996 for a period of five years. Due to the voluntary county-level choice to participate through the adoption of a local judicial rule, the counties participating in the ICSS system are sometimes also referred to as 'Local Rule' counties.

The waiver was subsequently granted by OCSE for three consecutive five-year periods, the latest of which spanned the period from April 11, 2011 through April 11, 2016. As a condition of the most recent waiver, the OAG was required to contract with an independent evaluator to conduct a rigorous impact analysis of the waiver. The OAG and its Child Support Division (CSD) contracted with the Ray Marshall Center for the Study of Human Resources (RMC), a policy research and evaluation unit at the Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs of The University of Texas at Austin, to design and conduct an evaluation to measure the impacts of the ICSS created under the waiver policy.

Impact Evaluation Design

The Ray Marshall Center conducted the ICSS waiver evaluation using a combination of random assignment and composite pre-post evaluation designs to measure the impacts of the waiver at county-level operational scales in Texas. The evaluation relied on multiple data sets, but primarily OAG administrative records data for determining child support case characteristics, child support obligations, collections, and enforcement actions. OAG administrative data were

¹ *Integrated Child Support System Annual Progress Report: September 2009-August 2010*, (nd), p.1.

supplemented with Unemployment Insurance (UI) quarterly wage and claim records, public assistance administrative records data, U.S. Bureau of the Census data, survey data from some customers² who “opt-out” of IV-D services, and other data sources as appropriate and available. These were used for estimating net impacts and for identifying relevant factors that may influence or be associated with the observed impacts in ways that strengthen the explanatory power of the evaluation.

The evaluation was supported by a process study designed to gain a sufficient understanding of the structure and functioning of the ICSS as implemented in order to accurately estimate the impacts of the waiver. Impact estimates were derived by observing four categories of cases:

1. “self-starting” cases in ICSS counties (and the El Paso treatment group);
2. cases in ICSS counties (and in the El Paso treatment group) in which customers "opt-out" of services;
3. application-based non-public assistance (NPA) cases in non-ICSS counties (and the El Paso control group); and
4. Registry-only (RO) cases in non-ICSS counties (and the El Paso control group).

The impact evaluation utilized multiple quantitative methods to arrive at estimates of the waiver's impact. While any given method may to some degree be susceptible to alternative explanations, results distilled across several methods are more robust.

Key Questions

The RMC, in consultation with the staff of OAG-CSD and OCSE, developed key research questions for the impact analysis and understanding its results. The impact analysis was primarily concerned with answering one over-arching research question: ***What effect did the ICSS waiver have on the collection and enforcement of child support in areas in which it was implemented?***

We answered this primary research question by focusing on more specific questions:

² The OAG refers to its clients as "customers" in order to emphasize a service-oriented approach. We follow that convention here.

1. What were the impacts of the introduction of a deemed, or “self-activating,” application for IV-D services under the OCSE waiver on child support monitoring, collections, and enforcement in Texas?
2. How did the child support experience vary between those individuals whose application for IV-D services had been waived in participating counties and individuals who “opted-out” in those same counties?
3. How did the child support experience vary between those individuals whose application for IV-D services had been waived in participating counties and non-recipients of public assistance who had applied for services in counties and courts not participating in the ICSS program or who had been assigned to a control group for evaluation purposes?
4. Did the OCSE waiver differentially impact sub-populations within the IV-D caseload in terms of collections, payment stability, and other outcomes? Did the impacts vary, particularly for cases involving Hispanics, or former and current military personnel, or other subgroups of interest?
5. To what extent did the composition and case characteristics of the IV-D caseload change with the introduction of the waiver in participating counties? Were the characteristics of the “self-activating” cases notably different from the regular application-based, non-public assistance IV-D caseload in the participating counties? As a population universe, was the waiver population notably different from the statewide application-based, non-public assistance IV-D caseload?

The five research questions above are listed verbatim as they were developed at the start of this project. Although the frame for these questions has evolved since then, the spirit of each question is addressed in this final impact report, albeit in a different order. For example, question 5 is addressed first, in recognition of the finding that the first impact of ICSS implementation is a change in the composition of the OAG caseload. Question 1, which is closely related to the overarching question, is answered for multiple sites throughout the Program Impact Estimates section. Question 2, regarding the experiences of those who opt-out of ICSS, was first answered in the interim impact report that was completed in July 2015, and is updated below in the Opt-out Analysis section with additional outcome measures and follow-up data. Similarly, those who opted-in, or voluntarily applied for services prior to ICSS implementation in their areas, are the subjects of question 3, and are addressed in the Opt-in analysis section. Finally, question 4, regarding varying

impacts among sub-populations, is addressed for Hispanics and members of the military in the Impact Variation by Subgroups section.

Implementation of ICSS

OAG IV-D and County Child Support Enforcement in Texas

In 1985, the OAG became the operational entity for child support enforcement under Title IV-D of the Social Security Act in Texas, assuming the responsibility for the federally regulated and funded child support program. District and county attorneys and the former Texas Department of Public Welfare had previously borne that responsibility since 1975 when federal legislation authorizing Title IV-D became effective. Texas is one of only three states in which the attorney general is currently responsible for the child support program and one of a few states with a statewide consolidated program. In most states, by comparison, child support programs are administered at the county governance level.


The Child Support Division of the Office of the Attorney General is responsible for IV-D services, including:

- Parent locator services
- Establishment of paternity
- Establishment of child support orders
- Establishment of medical support orders
- Review and adjustment of child support orders
- Enforcement of child support and medical support orders
- Collection and disbursement of child support payments

Figure 1 illustrates the flow of new child support cases in counties that have not implemented ICSS, and it also accurately describes the flow as it existed in current ICSS counties prior to the implementation of ICSS. Child support cases are automatically referred to the OAG if the custodial parent (CP) applies for or has received public assistance, including TANF or Medicaid. Approximately 45 percent of the current IV-D caseload are public assistance cases (known as IV-A cases), with only a small fraction of these being current public assistance, and the vast majority being former public assistance cases. Individuals who require child support assistance may also apply for low-fee IV-D services. These types of cases are also known as application-based or non-

public assistance (NPA) cases. As shown below, the ICSS waiver in relevant counties is primarily concerned with the treatment of these NPA cases.

Figure 1. OAG Case Flow in non-ICSS and pre-ICSS Counties



There is a major difference in the treatment of public assistance and non-public assistance child support cases. A person who has never received public assistance can voluntarily terminate IV-D services at any time. Current public assistance recipients cannot terminate services and must cooperate with the OAG or risk losing their benefits. Previous recipients of public assistance cannot terminate services until after any arrears assigned to the state have been recouped.


Case Flow under ICSS

The ICSS waiver in relevant counties allows all new child support orders—by “deeming” the application to have been made automatically—to be enforced by the OAG with status equal to other IV-D cases. Figure 2 illustrates the flow of cases with child support orders in ICSS counties. A close examination of this figure in comparison to Figure 1 reveals that the only major difference is in the

default action for non-public assistance cases. Prior to ICSS, such cases are initiated as registry-only³ (RO) cases by default, with the option of becoming full-service (FS) cases should they choose to apply. Under ICSS, non-public assistance cases become full service by default, with the option of becoming registry-only cases at any time in a process known as 'opting-out'.

The terms of the federal ICSS waiver require the OAG to inform custodial parents of their right to decline IV-D services. Every custodial parent in a child support case deemed as a “self-starting” IV-D case under the ICSS waiver is provided a letter that informs the custodial parent of his or her right and opportunity to decline IV-D services, in what is commonly referred to as the “opt-out letter.” Those who do not choose to opt-out become full service (FS) IV-D cases, but they retain the right to opt-out at a later date.

Figure 2. OAG Case Flow in ICSS Counties



³ Registry Only (RO) is for payment processing only in privately entered child support orders. OAG does not provide locate, enforcement, or collection services, nor do they track arrears (unpaid child support) for RO cases. An RO case can become a IV-D full service case if either party applies for OAG services.

OCSE Waiver and Implementation of ICSS in Texas

The OCSE waiver permits the OAG to automatically establish IV-D services and an ICSS office at the county level for those jurisdictions that choose to voluntarily participate in the ICSS program. Texas implemented ICSS on an incremental basis, expanding county by county as judges adopted a *local rule* deeming that new—and in some areas existing—child support orders rendered in their courts included an application for IV-D child support services. Participating counties may also be known as “local rule counties”; self-starting cases are handled in “local rule offices.” Such offices consist, in some areas, of county Domestic Relations Offices (DROs) providing services under contract with OAG, while in one area (Bexar County) they consist of OAG field offices. Table 1 presents ICSS or local rule adoption dates, case administration type, the respective Field Office numbers, and an indicator of whether new only or new and existing cases are subject to ICSS.

Table 1. ICSS Implementation by Site

County Name	ICSS Date	Type	Field Office Number	Caseload Description
Bexar	Mar 1997	OAG Field Office	214	New
Cameron	Aug 2005	OAG Field Office	313	New
Dallas	Oct 2005	Contract/DRO	418	New
Ector	May 2006	OAG Field Office	813	New
Gregg	Sep 2005	OAG Field Office	523	New
Harris	[varies] Sep 2004 to May 2012	Contract/DRO	614/622	New and Existing
Harrison	May 2005	OAG Field Office	523	New
Hidalgo	Feb 2006	OAG Field Office	314	New
Lubbock	May 2009	OAG Field Office	107	New
Midland	Mar 2002	OAG Field Office	814	New
Panola	Sep 2005	OAG Field Office	523	New
Smith	Sep 2005	OAG Field Office	516	New
Tarrant	Oct 2000	Contract/DRO	909	New
Taylor	Nov 2005	Contract/DRO	106	New
Travis	Jul 2009	Contract/DRO	708	New
Upshur	Sep 2005	OAG Field Office	523	New
Webb	Oct 2006	OAG Field Office	312	New
Wichita	Dec 2003	OAG Field Office	109	New and Existing

Source: Texas OAG, Child Support Division

Subsequent to Bexar County's early experimentation with ICSS, mentioned briefly above and detailed below, Tarrant County followed as an early implementation site. Tarrant County, consisting of the greater Fort Worth area, adopted a local rule and established an ICSS office in October 2000. Over time, sixteen additional counties established ICSS programs, culminating in the entry of Travis County (including the greater Austin area) in July 2009. El Paso County, consisting of the greater El Paso area, was the most recent entrant into the ICSS system. As part of this waiver evaluation, random assignment of new cases to either the ICSS treatment or control groups began in El Paso in March 2013 and ended in May 2014.

The establishment of ICSS programs in participating counties has not been uniform across currently participating counties, although each must adopt a local rule or administrative order to allow voluntary participation in the system. OAG and Bexar County, the first county to adopt a local rule in support of ICSS, initially executed a contract that allowed the Bexar County Child Support Enforcement Office to provide IV-D services on a pilot basis in its existing and new child support cases. As originally structured, new cases were divided between the Bexar County Child Support Enforcement Office and an existing OAG Office in San Antonio. After three years of pilot operation, in August 2000 the county office and its caseload were merged with the OAG Field Office, creating a unified Bexar County ICSS Office.⁴

Wichita County, the main city of which is Wichita Falls, entered into ICSS in December 2003. It is one of only two counties to introduce an ICSS office that incorporated previously existing cases, as well as all new cases. Child support enforcement for non IV-D cases had been handled by the county Friend of the Court (FOC) program, a part of the County's Domestic Relations Office. The County discontinued the Friend of the Court program due to budgetary constraints and all new and existing child support cases are administered under the waiver terms.

Harris County, which encompasses the City of Houston, chose a unique, hybridized path of participation in ICSS. Harris County approved a local rule that grants discretion to each of its nine family law courts to "opt-in" to the ICSS. The courts incrementally adopted local rule beginning with three courts in September 2004, and concluding with the final court converting in May 2012 (see Table 2). This phased adoption, court-by-court, combined with an essentially random method

⁴ Although Bexar County no longer contracts with OAG to provide full enforcement services in IV-D cases, the local rule enables the ICSS office to continue providing monitoring and enforcement services for all new child support orders in Bexar County.

of assigning cases to courts, made Harris County an ideal site for studying the impact of ICSS when implemented as a natural experiment.

The contract between OAG and Harris County authorized the creation of a County-operated ICSS office, jointly operated by the Harris County District Clerk and the Harris County Domestic Relations Office (DRO). The DRO had been operating a Friend of the Court program for non-IV-D child support cases for many years. As in Wichita County, the local rule deemed all existing Friend of the Court cases in participating courts as IV-D cases; all new Harris County child support orders in participating courts are monitored and enforced as IV-D cases from the rendition of the order.⁵

Table 2. Harris County ICSS Entry Date by Court

Court	Entry Date
308th	Sep-04
309th	Sep-04
311th	Sep-04
246th	Jul-05
312th	Aug-05
257th	Feb-06
310th	Mar-11
245th	Sep-11
247th	May-12

⁵ Two separate office identifiers are used to differentiate the existing Friend of the Court caseload from the new IV-D cases in those participating courts.

EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN

Random Assignment: El Paso County

El Paso County was the only forward-looking experimental site in the Texas ICSS evaluation, and the only site in which assignment of cases to conditions was intentionally and unambiguously random⁶. It was very important for researchers to monitor the random assignment process and outcomes to ensure that it resulted in two groups of cases and case members who were essentially equivalent at the point of random assignment. These criteria having been satisfied, any differences between the groups that emerged later could be safely attributed as an impact of the Integrated Child Support System.

Random Assignment Mechanism

Random assignment in El Paso County proceeded as designed. New cases in the ICSS experimental or treatment group were automatically registered to receive IV-D child support services, with an opportunity to opt-out. New cases assigned to the control group did not receive IV-D services by default, but had the opportunity to apply on their own as they did prior to ICSS implementation.

The intended case flow for experimental and control group cases in El Paso County during enrollment is illustrated in Figure 3.⁷ Cases randomly assigned to the control group (non-ICSS) were meant to follow the left path in this chart, while those assigned to the experimental group (ICSS) followed the right path. Control cases following the left path began in registry-only (RO) status by default, unless they chose to opt-in and apply for IV-D services. Experimental, or ICSS cases, followed the right path and became full service (FS) cases until and unless they chose to opt-out. Cases whose members were currently receiving public assistance (PA) at entry were ineligible for inclusion in the impact study, and are represented in Figure 3 by a red arrow bypassing random assignment and leading directly to FS case status.


Case randomization in El Paso County, as illustrated by the random wheel in the figure, was done using a fixed but arbitrary characteristic, the last digit of the cause number, to minimize the

⁶ Implementation of ICSS in Harris County was done in such a way that enrollment in ICSS for new cases was essentially random during the court-by-court rollout period.

⁷ This figure was adapted from Figure 3 in *Integrated Child Support System: Evaluation Analysis Plan*, Schroeder, O'Shea, & Gupta, 2012.

possibility of the system being gamed. This optimal design assigned half of the cases to the ICSS treatment group and half to the control group, based on whether the last digit of the cause number was odd or even.

Figure 3. OAG Case Flow in El Paso County, Random Assignment by Cause Number



Random Assignment, Implementation

Implementation of ICSS in El Paso, including random assignment of new cases to the ICSS treatment and control groups, began in March of 2013 and was concluded on May 7th, 2014. All new cases opened in El Paso subsequent to that date have been enrolled in ICSS, and are not included in the impact evaluation. A total of 1,175 cases were assigned by the EPDRO, however,

substantial shares of these identified cases were found to have characteristics that precluded their inclusion in the experiment. Reasons for the exclusion of cases are detailed below. Outcomes for the remaining cases are included in the impact analysis below.

Random Assignment, Exclusions

At the conclusion of the random assignment period, a cumulative total of 1,175 cases had been identified for potential inclusion in the ICSS experiment in El Paso County. Of these, researchers were able to locate 1,119 cases (or 95%) within OAG administrative records data. These 1,119 identified cases were subjected to additional screens using administrative records data to determine, as of the date of random assignment, 1) whether any members of the custodial parent (CP) family were receiving public assistance, including TANF or Medicaid, or 2) whether a child support case was already open.

Table 3. El Paso Case Eligibility for Random Assignment

Child support case status at random assignment	Public Assistance (PA) status at random assignment			
	No PA	Children Only	CP Only	Both
Case not yet open	743	26	9	113
	66.4%	2.3%	0.8%	10.1%
Case already Open	168	6	3	51
	15.0%	0.5%	0.3%	4.6%

Source: RMC analysis of Texas OAG and HHSC administrative records and El Paso County DRO data.

As shown in Table 3, a total of 743 cases, or just over 66% of cases passed both screens and were included in the experiment. Of the remainder, 168 cases, or 15% were excluded for already having a child support case open; 148 cases, or 13.2% were excluded for ongoing receipt of public assistance; and another 60 cases, or 5.3% were excluded for both reasons.

True experiments, which involve random assignment of cases to treatment and control groups, represent the gold standard for determining *causality*, or whether the treatment can be said to have *caused* any differences that emerge later. When properly done, true experiments are said to be high in *internal validity* to the extent that the only differences between the groups as of random assignment are due to chance alone. If one were to remove cases from one or the other group based on events occurring subsequent to random assignment, this would threaten the

internal validity and make it difficult to safely conclude that the experiment caused the effects observed.

On the other hand, removing cases based on objective criteria, uniformly applied, prior to random assignment, has no effect on internal validity. Instead, this practice affects the *external validity* of the findings, or in other words, it constrains the populations to which the effects can be expected to generalize. Among cases identified for potential inclusion in the El Paso ICSS experiment, those who are receiving public assistance cannot be randomly assigned because according to policy they should be referred to the OAG as full-service cases. Since they cannot receive the control group experience, they must be excluded from both groups in the experiment to preserve the pre-program comparability of the two groups. Similarly, cases identified for potential inclusion that are discovered to already have a child support case open also cannot receive the true control group experience, and thus must be excluded entirely from the study as well. The net effect of these exclusions is that external validity is narrowed somewhat, and the estimated impacts of ICSS can only be generalized to the population of new child support cases that are not receiving public assistance. On the other hand, with high internal validity preserved, one can draw strong conclusions that the ICSS program caused the observed impacts.

Results of Random Assignment

Of the 743 cases determined to be eligible for inclusion in the experiment, 376 were randomly assigned to the ICSS treatment group, and 367 to the control group. Random assignment was based on a pre-determined but essentially random characteristic: whether the last digit of the cause number was odd or even.⁸ As a final check on the fairness of the random assignment mechanism, it is useful to compare characteristics of members of the final ICSS treatment and control groups (see Table 4). Note, however, that it was not possible to determine whether the two groups had equal proportions of current military members due to inadequacy of this measure for members of the control group.

⁸ Cause numbers are assigned sequentially upon their creation. Thus the last digit is a random wheel, and thus whether it is odd or even is essentially a random process.

Table 4. El Paso Final Treatment vs Control Group, Member Characteristics

	ICSS Treatment group	Control group	
All cases, demographics	N=376	N=367	
NCP age (years)	37.0	36.9	
NCP is female	6.2%	6.5%	
NCP is Hispanic	19.9%	23.7%	
NCP is black	3.2%	2.5%	
NCP race/ethnicity unknown	69.9%	62.1%	*
NCP is current or former military	28.2%		
CP age (years)	35.1	35.1	
CP is Hispanic	21.8%	25.9%	
CP is black	1.6%	1.6%	
CP race/ethnicity unknown	68.6%	63.2%	
CP is current or former military	2.4%		
Number of children	1.6	1.6	
Age of youngest child, years	7.2	7.2	
Age of oldest child, years	9.1	9.0	
Non-custodial Parent, employment and benefit history			
NCP employed at case opening	40.4%	40.6%	
Percent of time NCP employed over prior 8 quarters	41.4%	38.4%	
NCP average quarterly earnings over prior 8 quarters	\$6,170	\$5,603	
NCP experienced earnings dip of at least 20% within prior 8 quarters	16.0%	12.0%	
Time since first observed NCP earnings (quarters)	22.2	20.5	
NCP earnings history sufficient to qualify for UI	41.2%	39.0%	
NCP filed for unemployment within prior year	4.3%	2.7%	
NCP receiving SNAP (Food Stamps) benefits at case opening	2.4%	2.7%	
Percent of time NCP received SNAP benefits in prior year	3.2%	3.0%	
NCP receiving TANF benefits at case opening	0.3%	0.3%	
Percent of time NCP received TANF benefits in prior year	0.1%	0.3%	
Percent of time NCP enrolled in Medicaid in prior year	1.2%	0.9%	
Custodial Parent, employment and benefit history			
CP employed at case opening	53.2%	52.3%	
Percent of time CP employed over prior 8 quarters	48.1%	48.3%	
CP average quarterly earnings over prior 8 quarters	\$4,952	\$5,381	
CP experienced earnings dip of at least 20% within prior 8 quarters	14.6%	12.5%	
Time since first observed CP earnings (quarters)	22.1	22.1	
CP earnings history sufficient to qualify for UI	48.4%	48.2%	

	ICSS Treatment group	Control group	
CP filed for unemployment within prior year	2.9%	2.5%	
CP receiving SNAP (Food Stamps) benefits at case opening	11.2%	10.1%	
Percent of time CP received SNAP benefits in prior year	8.7%	10.3%	
CP receiving TANF benefits at case opening	0.0%	0.0%	
Percent of time CP received TANF benefits in prior year	0.0%	0.0%	
Percent of time CP enrolled in Medicaid in prior year	0.9%	1.5%	

Source: RMC analysis of Texas OAG, TWC, and HHSC administrative records and El Paso County DRO data.


T-tests revealed only one significant difference ($p < .05$) between El Paso ICSS treatment and control groups among the characteristics listed in Table 2: NCP race/ethnicity unknown. When conducting statistical tests at this level of sensitivity ($\alpha = .05$), one can expect to find approximately one significant difference due to chance alone for every twenty tests conducted. Thus, with only one significant difference observed among 36 tests conducted, it is safe to conclude based on this evidence that ICSS random assignment in El Paso has produced essentially equivalent treatment and control groups.

Quasi-Random Assignment: Harris County

In the Harris County family court system, there was for many years an ongoing “natural experiment” in which, depending on the court to which they were assigned, some individuals were automatically enrolled in the ICSS program under the local rule, while others needed to actively apply if they wanted IV-D child support assistance. During the implementation period for Harris County (Sep 2004 to May 2012, see Table 2 above and Figure 4 below), customers utilizing the Harris County family law courts were randomly assigned to one of nine courts, where the judges had chosen to implement the ICSS program in their courtrooms at different points in time.


Figure 4 illustrates the approximate share of the caseload that was assigned to ICSS over time due to the phased entry of the nine Harris County courts into the ICSS system. Beginning in September 2004, three out of every nine cases were assigned to ICSS. By February 2006, six out of every nine cases were assigned to ICSS, and by May 2012 when the 247th District Court converted, all cases were assigned to ICSS.

Figure 4. Harris County Random Assignment to ICSS over Time



As an example, Figure 5 illustrates the case flow in Harris County as of September 2004, a period of time in which one third of all cases were assigned to ICSS. The flow is similar to that shown in Figure 3 for El Paso County, except that the randomization for Harris County cases is done through the court number to which one's case is assigned. The diagram would look the same at other points in time except that the share of cases assigned to ICSS would vary with the number of courts converted by that date.

Figure 5. OAG Case Flow in Harris County, Random Assignment by Court Number, Example from Sep 2004



Assignment of cases to courts in Harris County is based on a random wheel. That is, cases are queued, and the first is assigned to the first court, the second to the second, and so on until nine cases have been assigned, at which point the process repeats from the first court until the cases are

all assigned. As with odd and even case numbers in El Paso, this process satisfies the definition of random assignment because all cases in a given time frame have essentially equal odds of being assigned to an ICSS court.

Noting that implementation of ICSS should have produced a shift in the composition of the caseload⁹, we examined characteristics of the Harris County treatment and comparison groups, and the results are shown in Table 5. Note that in this table the screen to eliminate cases receiving Public Assistance at case opening have already been applied, and we have restricted the cases in the study to new cases opening during a one year period before and after implementation of ICSS. This strategy is discussed in greater detail in the next section as well as in Appendix A.

The numbers in Table 5 show a clear pattern of Harris County cases assigned under ICSS being slightly more affluent, relative to the pre-ICSS comparison group. Of course, the presence of statistically significant differences here is in large part due to the much larger sample sizes in Harris County. With such high levels of statistical ‘power,’ many of the smaller differences, although judged to be *statistically* significant, may be of little *practical* significance. However, the pattern of differences among employment and benefit indicators, for both NCPs and CPs, does suggest a trend of practical significance. Both CPs and NCPs in the ICSS group were more likely to be employed at case opening, for example, and showed greater historical employment and earnings, were less likely to have filed for unemployment compensation recently, and were less likely to rely on benefits such as Medicaid.

Importantly, the differences observed here not only suggest that ICSS had an impact on the composition of the caseload, but that this needs to be taken into account when conducting the analysis of program impacts. Whereas it is common to include indicators such as those in Table 5 as covariates in statistical models, for the purpose of improving the estimation of program impacts by controlling for personal characteristics, doing so in this case would cause the underestimation of the effects of the ICSS program. Going forward, all estimates of ICSS impacts are done with no covariates included in the statistical models.

⁹ Prior to recognition that ICSS could lead to compositional changes in the caseload, some effort was expended in earlier reports attempting to demonstrate the groups’ equivalence at the point of random assignment.

Table 5. Harris County Treatment vs Comparison Group, all Identified Non-PA Case Members

	ICSS Treatment group	Comparison group	
All cases, demographics	N=9,814	N=9,532	
NCP age (years)	34.6	34.5	
NCP is female	11.6%	11.2%	
NCP is Hispanic	26.1%	24.8%	*
NCP is black	29.0%	30.5%	*
NCP race/ethnicity unknown	23.0%	22.9%	
NCP is current or former military	3.1%		
CP age (years)	33.3	33.0	
CP is Hispanic	26.0%	24.3%	**
CP is black	25.2%	26.3%	
CP race/ethnicity unknown	27.4%	28.0%	
CP is current or former military	0.5%		
Number of children	1.43	1.39	**
Age of youngest child, years	6.1	6.3	**
Age of oldest child, years	7.3	7.6	**
Non-custodial Parent, employment and benefit history			
NCP employed at case opening	61.2%	58.4%	**
Percent of time NCP employed over prior 8 quarters	59.3%	57.9%	*
NCP average quarterly earnings over prior 8 quarters	\$7,687	\$6,857	**
NCP experienced earnings dip of at least 20% within prior 8 quarters	23.7%	27.2%	**
Time since first observed NCP earnings (quarters)	28.7	28.6	
NCP earnings history sufficient to qualify for UI	58.9%	56.5%	**
NCP filed for unemployment within prior year	6.7%	9.1%	**
NCP receiving SNAP (Food Stamps) benefits at case opening	4.3%	3.9%	
Percent of time NCP received SNAP benefits in prior year	5.0%	4.2%	**
NCP receiving TANF benefits at case opening	0.2%	0.1%	
Percent of time NCP received TANF benefits in prior year	0.2%	0.2%	
Percent of time NCP enrolled in Medicaid in prior year	3.0%	3.6%	*
Custodial Parent, employment and benefit history			
CP employed at case opening	64.9%	60.7%	**
Percent of time CP employed over prior 8 quarters	61.1%	58.1%	**
CP average quarterly earnings over prior 8 quarters	\$5,695	\$5,233	**

	ICSS Treatment group	Comparison group	
CP experienced earnings dip of at least 20% within prior 8 quarters	20.4%	21.4%	
Time since first observed CP earnings (quarters)	27.5	26.7	**
CP earnings history sufficient to qualify for UI	61.3%	57.5%	**
CP filed for unemployment within prior year	5.6%	6.7%	**
CP receiving SNAP (Food Stamps) benefits at case opening	14.2%	12.8%	**
Percent of time CP received SNAP benefits in prior year	14.3%	12.1%	**
CP receiving TANF benefits at case opening	0.0%	0.0%	
Percent of time CP received TANF benefits in prior year	0.8%	1.7%	**
Percent of time CP enrolled in Medicaid in prior year	8.7%	10.5%	**

Source: RMC analysis of Texas OAG, TWC, and HHSC administrative records and El Paso County DRO data.

*=p<.05; **=p<.01.

Time Series Design: Other ICSS Counties

Aside from Harris and El Paso Counties, ICSS was also implemented in seventeen other counties over 22 years (see Table 1, earlier), starting with a demonstration in Bexar County, which includes the city of San Antonio, in 1997-2001. Cases are included from most of these counties in the evaluation, subject to data availability, as part of a comparison group time-series design from time periods before and after they became ICSS counties; this design also includes cases from similar non-ICSS counties. The advantage of this final design is that by including residents of as many areas of the state as possible, the resulting impact estimates will be more representative of the state as a whole. This serves as a nice counterweight to the experimental and quasi-experimental designs used for El Paso and Harris County, respectively. While those designs have higher internal validity but relatively lower generalizability, this time series design should produce results that are more representative of the state, thus making the results more generalizable.

Table 6 shows characteristics of ICSS treatment and comparison groups selected from those other ICSS counties that converted within the window of time covered by our OAG administrative data files. As noted in Appendix A, some counties that converted earlier had to be excluded. Similar to the patterns seen in Harris County, again many statistically significant differences between the ICSS Treatment and Comparison groups are noted. This does not present a problem for the estimation of program impacts, since ICSS implementation is expected to change the composition of the caseload. Again, with high statistical power, many of the statistically 'significant' differences noted are small in practical terms. Once again the same general pattern emerges: members of new cases opened in ICSS counties tend to be slightly more affluent, on average, than those members of new cases opened in these counties prior to ICSS.

Table 6. Other ICSS Counties Treatment vs Comparison Group, all Identified Non-PA Case Members

	ICSS Treatment group	Comparison group	
All cases, demographics	N=16,964	N=19,020	
NCP age (years)	34.3	33.4	**
NCP is female	13.2%	12.4%	*
NCP is Hispanic	35.1%	34.3%	
NCP is black	22.1%	24.0%	**
NCP race/ethnicity unknown	15.9%	19.5%	**
NCP is current or former military	3.7%		
CP age (years)	33.4	32.2	**
CP is Hispanic	34.2%	33.8%	
CP is black	18.7%	20.7%	**
CP race/ethnicity unknown	20.0%	23.2%	**
CP is current or former military	0.7%		
Number of children	1.45	1.39	**
Age of youngest child, years	6.4	6.2	**
Age of oldest child, years	7.7	7.5	**
Non-custodial Parent, employment and benefit history			
NCP employed at case opening	59.4%	55.9%	**
Percent of time NCP employed over prior 8 quarters	57.9%	55.4%	**
NCP average quarterly earnings over prior 8 quarters	\$6,301	\$5,491	**
NCP experienced earnings dip of at least 20% within prior 8 quarters	26.2%	27.4%	*
Time since first observed NCP earnings (quarters)	28.9	28.4	**
NCP earnings history sufficient to qualify for UI	57.1%	53.9%	**
NCP filed for unemployment within prior year	6.2%	6.7%	
NCP receiving SNAP (Food Stamps) benefits at case opening	5.3%	7.3%	**
Percent of time NCP received SNAP benefits in prior year	7.0%	7.4%	
NCP receiving TANF benefits at case opening	0.1%	0.1%	
Percent of time NCP received TANF benefits in prior year	0.2%	0.3%	**
Percent of time NCP enrolled in Medicaid in prior year	4.9%	4.1%	**
Custodial Parent, employment and benefit history			
CP employed at case opening	62.9%	60.0%	**
Percent of time CP employed over prior 8 quarters	59.7%	57.6%	**

	ICSS Treatment group	Comparison group	
CP average quarterly earnings over prior 8 quarters	\$4,947	\$4,327	**
CP experienced earnings dip of at least 20% within prior 8 quarters	19.9%	21.8%	**
Time since first observed CP earnings (quarters)	27.2	26.6	**
CP earnings history sufficient to qualify for UI	59.9%	57.0%	**
CP filed for unemployment within prior year	4.9%	5.8%	**
CP receiving SNAP (Food Stamps) benefits at case opening	13.1%	19.8%	**
Percent of time CP received SNAP benefits in prior year	15.0%	18.3%	**
CP receiving TANF benefits at case opening	0.0%	0.1%	
Percent of time CP received TANF benefits in prior year	0.9%	1.4%	**
Percent of time CP enrolled in Medicaid in prior year	12.6%	8.9%	**

Source: RMC analysis of Texas OAG, TWC, and HHSC administrative records. *=p<.05; **=p<.01.

Finally, multiple non-ICSS comparison counties were selected for each of these Other ICSS counties using a quasi-experimental similarity estimation procedure, which is described more fully in Appendix A. The purpose of selecting these comparison counties was to allow better control of the one factor that the 'Other ICSS counties' design does not adequately control for: the passage of time, over which progress in the quality case enforcement is often seen. Among the Other ICSS counties, using a pre/post design to accumulate study cases, each county serves as its own comparison group, so this research design does a good job of controlling for potential differences associated with geography and local labor markets. Each county contributes a year's worth of new cases to the ICSS comparison group, and a year's worth of new cases to the ICSS treatment group, but starting two years later than the first new cases in the comparison group. This time differential could potentially lead us to attribute differences to ICSS that might in fact be due simply to the improvements associated with passage of time in these counties. However, with the inclusion of additional comparison counties that did not operate ICSS programs at the time, we can eliminate the possibility that time alone caused the differences observed by checking for such differences in these other counties. In effect, with this *difference-in-differences* design, the estimation of ICSS impacts in the Other ICSS counties becomes a question of how much more things changed in these ICSS counties after ICSS implementation than they changed in the non-ICSS comparison counties that saw time progress but did not get a chance to benefit from an ICSS program.

Subgroup Analysis Strategy

One goal of the ICSS evaluation was to determine whether ICSS differentially impacted subgroups of interest, including specifically those of Hispanic ethnicity or members of the military. This should have been a straightforward analysis, however, problems with the data quality of the military and Hispanic indicators necessitated developing alternative methods of answering these questions.

The military indicator measure was based not on a direct reporting of military status, but on whether the employer records of NCPs in the OAG data system indicated they were employed by a branch of the military. Since the OAG data system is far more likely to contain employer records for members of full service (FS) cases, as opposed to registry only (RO) cases, and since the bulk of control group cases are RO, at least initially, this measure was judged to be inadequate for unambiguously identifying current military members within the control group. Similarly, there are unacceptably high levels of race/ethnicity unknown within both groups, as well as some indication that the completion percentage varies with RO status, and this casts doubt on the adequacy of the Hispanic ethnicity indicator as well.

A solution to this problem was to conduct the subgroup analysis at the county level, rather than at the individual level. Within the group of seventeen “other ICSS counties,” that includes all ICSS sites except Harris and El Paso, there were thirteen counties in the pre-post time series comparison group design that was used to estimate impacts of ICSS. These thirteen counties showed substantial natural variation in the shares of their FS child support caseloads who were Hispanic, and decent but not great variation in the shares of their caseloads who were military members. Table 7 shows the scheme for dividing these counties into groups of those with low and high percentages of Hispanic CPs and NCPs.

By dividing the other ICSS counties into groups, it was possible to test whether the impacts of ICSS varied according to the concentration of Hispanic CPs and NCPs. This was not a very sensitive test, thus the differential impact of ICSS due to Hispanic ethnicity would likely need to be sizable for this test to detect it. This does seem to be the best method of detecting such differential impacts, given the constraints of the available data.

Table 7. Other ICSS Counties, Hispanic Categorization Scheme

County Name	Percent Hispanic, CS caseload	Category	Overall Percent Hispanic
Panola	4.0%	Low	24.8%
Upshur	4.5%		
Harrison	5.6%		
Gregg	8.8%		
Smith	12.4%		
Dallas	28.4%		
Taylor	28.7%		
Travis	45.4%	High	70.2%
Lubbock	49.0%		
Ector	55.3%		
Cameron	94.1%		
Hidalgo	95.0%		
Webb	96.8%		

Source: RMC analysis of Texas OAG administrative records.

Table 8 shows a similar scheme for categorizing the other ICSS counties into low and high shares of active military members in their FS caseloads. Note that, in contrast to the Hispanic scheme discussed above, this military categorization scheme included El Paso County among the other ICSS counties. Since El Paso had by far the largest concentration of active military members among ICSS child support caseloads, the decision was made to include it in this analysis.¹⁰ As noted before, the differential effects of ICSS on these subgroups would have to be large in order to be detected by this test. In this case it may be even more difficult to detect a military influence, given that even in the high military counties, military members make up less than 8% of the child support caseload. In the absence of a better method, this was judged to be the best approach for answering the question of whether ICSS impacts varied for these groups.

¹⁰ Although El Paso ICSS impacts are regarded as experimental and the other ICSS counties as non-experimental, combining results in this way should not affect the validity of this subgroup analysis.

Table 8. Other ICSS Counties plus El Paso, Military Categorization Scheme

County Name	Percent Active Military	Category	Overall Percent Active Military
Ector	1.9%	Low	2.33%
Dallas	2.3%		
Smith	2.4%		
Hidalgo	2.4%		
Webb	2.4%		
Gregg	2.6%		
Upshur	2.7%		
Panola	2.9%		
Lubbock	3.7%	High	7.62%
Travis	3.8%		
Cameron	3.8%		
Harrison	4.7%		
Taylor	7.7%		
El Paso*	12.3%		

Source: RMC analysis of Texas OAG administrative records.


PROGRAM IMPACT ESTIMATES

Throughout this paper reference has been made to an approach to impact analysis that follows all cases that are part of the study regardless of what happens with their case status. In estimating the impact of the ‘nudge’ toward participation in the IV-D program that ICSS represents, one must allow that impacts may include initial registry-only (RO) cases opting-in to full service (FS), and initial FS cases opting-out and becoming RO cases. Impacts could also include case members changing their minds about it later and reversing these decisions. While acknowledging these impacts allows one to describe this program as it is implemented in the real world, one can also examine the extent to which such opt-in or opt-out decisions are made over time. Estimating what fraction of the groups are receiving different treatments over the course of their case histories provides a frame for interpreting the impacts estimated for the different sites.

Figure 6 shows the share of cases in full service status by months since their cases opened, in effect showing the average case history, for the treatment (or experimental) and comparison (or control) groups at each site. El Paso, whose trends are illustrated by the short green-hued lines at the top and bottom of the chart, shows the expected pattern for a policy implemented as a tightly controlled experiment. Almost a quarter (24.2%) of control group cases open a full-service case within the first month, and this number drifts up by a couple more percentage points two years later, to 26.3% full service. Of those randomly assigned to ICSS, a healthy 93.1% had opened full service cases in the first month, while 89.4% of cases were full service two years later. Put differently, this means random assignment in El Paso led to a 283% increase in FS case status, which persisted as a 247% increase two years into their case histories.

By comparison, the natural implementation of ICSS in the Harris and Other County sites led to a much milder shift toward full-service status among non-public assistance cases. Far more comparison group (pre-ICSS) cases made it into FS status in these sites, and fewer cases were in FS status after the conversion to ICSS, as compared to the stronger shift in El Paso. The net effect was a 32% increase in FS status in Harris County, which persisted as a 26% increase two years later. Similarly, the Other ICSS counties in aggregate saw a 27% increase in FS status due to ICSS implementation, which persisted as a 25% increase two years later. These can be viewed as better estimates what an ICSS rollout looks like in the real world. They also suggest the possibility that larger impacts of ICSS, due to a larger impact on FS case status, might be expected in El Paso.

Figure 6. Experimental Drift: Full-Service Case Share over Time



Source: RMC analysis of Texas OAG administrative records and El Paso County DRO data.

El Paso: Experimental Impacts

The use of a random assignment or experimental design, with assignment to groups proceeding as planned, means that impact estimates for the El Paso site are considered to be causal in nature. Thus we can conclude that any impacts observed were *caused* by the ICSS program implementation in El Paso.

Below we estimate the impacts of ICSS implementation overall. We also conducted additional analysis to address the possibility that a learning curve among El Paso ICSS child support enforcement workers in using the many enforcement tools newly available to them might affect their performance early on. In order to test for this, we split the El Paso sample in half by assignment date. Should we find greater impacts among those randomly assigned toward the end of the assignment window, this could be taken as evidence that workers improved over time in their

use of the new collection tools. Such impacts would thus be regarded as representative of the impacts one could expect from a more mature, fully-functioning ICSS program.

Collection of Child Support

The most important impact that ICSS might have is the timely collection of child support. Although we have had questions about the adequacy of administrative data for measuring child support collection equally well for members of cases in the control group, we have acquired registry-only (RO) payments data and incorporated it into our dependent measures, so our ability to measure child support collected is vastly improved. Still, some payments may be missed while cases are in RO status. Although RO cases are required to make payments through the state disbursement unit (SDU), there is no enforcement of these cases by the Title IV-D agency as long as they remain in RO status. While they are not being enforced, some share of these cases may involve payments made directly to the CP, and these payments will not be recorded in the SDU¹¹. In any case, though we may not have completely solved the problem of equal measurement of child support paid while in RO status, we have improved it to the point that we can compute outcomes with the caveat that this measure is still imperfect.

Several measures presented here address child support collection, with one approach gauging the frequency of any child support collections and another examining the average dollar amount of collections. The frequency of any collections being made is reported separately for full service (FS) and registry-only (RO) collections so their independent contributions to program impacts can be seen. All child support collections measures are computed on a monthly basis, aggregating payments made within a calendar month. As shown in the third row of Table 9, child support was collected in 64% of case months among ICSS cases, an impressive rate, as compared to a 51% collection rate in the control group. The bulk of these payments was made through the expected channels, FS for ICSS cases, and RO (or collections through the SDU) for the control group. Note however that payments made through the other, non-expected route can occur due to cases changing status, from FS to RO, and vice versa, over time. In a true experimental design these changes are part of the impact; people can opt freely from one group to the other, but we continue to track their outcomes in terms of their original group assignment to assess true ICSS impacts.

¹¹ There is no known direct quantitative evidence that payments are made outside the SDU by RO cases, but there is anecdotal support for this idea.

Table 9. El Paso Child Support Collections

Outcome	ICSS adjusted mean	Control adjusted mean	ICSS Impact
Any FS child support collections made	62.7%	11.9%	50.8% **
Any RO child support collections made	1.2%	39.6%	-38.4% **
Any child support collections made, either type	63.8%	51.4%	12.4% **
Total monthly child support collections, either type, among those paying	\$927	\$949	-\$22

Source: RMC analysis of Texas OAG administrative records and El Paso County DRO data. *= $p < .05$; **= $p < .01$.

The total dollar amount of child support collections per case in El Paso, when looking only at cases that made a payment in a given month, averaged \$927, and was not statistically different from the control group.¹² Similar results were found on these measures when we looked at ICSS impacts among those assigned in the second half of the study (see detailed statistical tests for late assignments in Appendix B, Table B-5). The impact on any child support collections, at 17.9%, was indeed stronger in the second half of the study, suggesting limited confirmation of the learning curve theory, but this bigger impact was paired with a \$91 lesser monthly payment, on average, among those making payments on these late cases.

A severe missing-data problem plagues the analysis of child support arrears, presented in Table 10. Since we can only detect arrears balances accumulated for full-service cases, there is a built-in bias in this measure against ICSS cases, who are overrepresented among FS cases due to successful implementation of ICSS, as shown earlier in Figure 6. Thus it is not surprising that there appear to be large impacts on the share of cases with arrears due. While we can't know what the real impact on arrears due is, because we can't know whether RO cases are behind on payments, it is useful to report this statistic in case the true ICSS effect ever grows large enough to overcome this built-in bias. It is worth noting that the average follow-up duration of the arrears measures reported for El Paso is a mere 11 months after case opening, so these are short duration impacts.¹³

¹² More detailed statistics supporting impact estimates listed here are included in Appendix B.

¹³ In contrast, the average follow-up duration for child support impacts in the full El Paso sample was 28 months.

Table 10. El Paso Child Support Judgments and Arrears

Outcome	ICSS adjusted mean	Control adjusted mean	ICSS Impact
Money judgment made in child support case	0.2%	0.2%	0.0%
Any arrears owed	43.6%	9.8%	33.8% **
Total arrears, among those who owe any	\$3533	\$5025	-\$1492

Source: RMC analysis of Texas OAG administrative records and El Paso County DRO data. *= $p < .05$; **= $p < .01$.

In one final indicator related to child support collections, we measured cumulative money judgments, case actions typically filed in court in instances of extended non-payment. A cumulative money judgment is an estimate of what is currently owed by the NCP, considering the most recent prior cumulative money judgment (if any), plus new current support and interest accrued, minus amounts paid by the NCP. Because they are filed through the courts, we can measure money judgments about equally well for both ICSS and control group cases¹⁴, so it is possible to estimate program impacts on this measure. Results for this measure indicate no impact of ICSS, however, as noted above, the average follow-up duration in El Paso is short.

Receipt of Public Assistance by Custodial Parents

The next set of analyses addresses the question whether ICSS led to changes in Public Assistance participation for the associated custodial parents (CPs) and their children. Public assistance receipt is summarized in Table 11. We intended to ask whether ICSS led to changes in utilization of Temporary Assistance to Needy Families benefits, or the TANF program. Unfortunately, we observed too few instances of TANF receipt in El Paso to model it statistically.

We asked whether ICSS led to reduced participation in SNAP, or Supplemental Nutritional Assistance Program, formerly known as Food Stamps. This measure counts the percent of post-entry months in which the custodial parent received SNAP benefits, with receipt of benefits for any part of the month considered as receipt for the entire month. ICSS in El Paso was found to lead to

¹⁴ Cumulative money judgments filed on full service (FS) cases are more likely to include interest calculations than those filed on registry only (RO) cases. However, by comparing the number of instances of money judgments, rather than the amounts of money involved, we avoid artificial bias in this measure.

reduced participation in SNAP. ICSS participants had less than a percentage point decrease in SNAP participation, representing about a 10% decrease, compared to cases in the control group.

Table 11. El Paso Public Assistance Receipt

Outcome	ICSS adjusted mean	Control adjusted mean	ICSS Impact
CP receiving SNAP (Food Stamp) benefits	7.6%	8.4%	-0.8% *
Average monthly SNAP (Food Stamp) benefits, CP	\$257	\$300	-\$43 **
CP enrolled in Medicaid	3.4%	4.8%	-1.4% **

Source: RMC analysis of Texas OAG and HHSC administrative records and El Paso County DRO data. *= $p < .05$; **= $p < .01$.

A related SNAP measure looks at the average monthly dollar amount of benefits received under SNAP, and considering only case-months in which the benefit was received (that is, no zeroes were included in the average). The average monthly SNAP benefit was \$257 for those in the ICSS, or \$43 lower than control group members who received SNAP. Finally, we measured the percentage of time that the CP was enrolled in Medicaid. Again, as with SNAP receipt, we found a significant effect of ICSS, with receipt among ICSS case members being 1.4 percentage points lower than members of the control group.

Taken together, the findings in this section suggest that families who were automatically enrolled in child support enforcement via the ICSS program experienced slightly lesser economic distress in comparison to control group members. Furthermore, all the benefit receipt effects seen in El Paso were stronger when we looked only at those assigned in the second half of the study (see Appendix B, Table B-5).

Employment and Earnings of CPs and NCPs

The next set of analyses examines the question whether ICSS child support enforcement leads to increased employment rates and earnings levels among custodial and noncustodial parents. Unlike with the public assistance programs discussed above, it would be difficult to make a strong argument that better and timelier child support enforcement should lead to better employment and earnings outcomes. In any case, looking for program impacts on these measures allows us to place the other observed impacts in the overall context of the families’ economic situations. Two measures are included here, one that gauges the percent of time CPs and NCPs were employed, and

another that measures the quarterly earnings levels of those who were employed in any given calendar quarter.

As shown in Table 12, the ICSS program effects on earnings and employment of NCPs and CPs was a mixed bag. We observed significantly lesser earnings among CPs in ICSS, but significantly greater employment rates among NCPs, as well as greater earnings of those who are employed, among NCPs in ICSS. While this pattern is difficult to explain, if we look again at impacts among those assigned late in the period (Appendix B, Table B-5), we see that none of the ICSS employment or earnings findings hold, as all are statistically non-significant.

Table 12. El Paso Employment and Earnings of CPs and NCPs

Outcome	ICSS adjusted mean	Control adjusted mean	ICSS Impact
CP employed	51.9%	49.8%	2.1%
CP average quarterly earnings, among employed	\$9393	\$10874	-\$1481 **
NCP employed	41.6%	39.1%	2.5% *
NCP average quarterly earnings, among employed	\$16606	\$13654	\$2952 **

Source: RMC analysis of Texas OAG, and TWC administrative records and El Paso County DRO data. *= $p < .05$;

**= $p < .01$.

Harris County: Quasi-Experimental Impacts

As noted earlier in the discussion of experimental designs, we no longer attempt to control for any of the mostly small differences between the ICSS and comparison groups in Harris County. We neither attempt to match cases to produce a comparison group, nor do we include covariates in the impact analysis that would control for these initial differences. Instead, we treat these differences as occurring due to the implementation of ICSS and report them along with any other outcome differences observed.

We have, however, substantially improved the Harris County data model over the course of this evaluation. For example, because Harris County is one of the sites that converts existing cases when ICSS is rolled out (most sites only create new cases under ICSS), we now restrict our use of follow-up data to one year after case opening so that outcomes only reflect the period prior to when comparison cases became eligible to convert to ICSS. Because of these improvements, we can be more confident that the effects reported for Harris County were due to ICSS implementation. On the other hand, any findings from the Harris County site are now essentially short-term impacts.

Collection of Child Support

For members of the ICSS group in Harris County, as shown in Table 13, child support was collected over 14 percentage points more often, relative to comparison group cases. Furthermore, the total dollar amount of child support collections in Harris County, averaging across only those cases that received a payment in a given month, was \$661, representing an increase of \$62 per month more than that received by comparison group cases.

Table 13. Harris County Short Term Child Support Collections

Outcome	ICSS adjusted mean	Comparison adjusted mean	Difference associated with ICSS
Any FS child support collections made	45.9%	29.1%	16.8% **
Any RO child support collections made	4.7%	7.0%	-2.3% **
Any child support collections made, either type	50.4%	35.9%	14.5% **
Total monthly child support collections, either type, among those paying	\$661	\$599	\$62 **

Source: RMC analysis of Texas OAG administrative records. *= $p < .05$; **= $p < .01$.

Finally, we examine several measures designed to indicate the extent to which cases may be delinquent in making child support payments. As discussed earlier, we should be able to measure

money judgments equally well for both ICSS and control group cases. Interestingly, as shown in Table 14, ICSS was found to have no impact on money judgments, perhaps reflecting the short duration of the follow-up for Harris County cases. Arrears balances, as discussed with respect to the El Paso findings above, cannot be measured equally well for comparison group cases, who are more likely to be in RO status than treatment or ICSS cases, and hence their arrears balances would be unknown. Thus it is not surprising that ICSS cases were more likely to have arrears balances when using this flawed measure. Interestingly, among cases who have known arrears balances, NCPs on ICSS cases owed \$996 less than their comparison group counterparts. For context, it should be noted that these arrears balances were measured on average 7 months after cases opened, so again they should be considered short-term impacts.¹⁵

Table 14. Harris County Short Term Judgments and Arrears

Outcome	ICSS adjusted mean	Comparison adjusted mean	Difference associated with ICSS
Money judgment made in child support case	0.3%	0.3%	0.0%
Any arrears owed	42.0%	38.8%	3.2% *
Total arrears, among those who owe any	\$4339	\$5335	-\$996 *

Source: RMC analysis of Texas OAG administrative records. *=p<.05; **=p<.01.

Receipt of Public Assistance by Custodial Parents

The next set of outcomes addresses the question whether ICSS in Harris County led to decreased Public Assistance participation for the associated custodial parents (CPs) and their children. ICSS impacts on public assistance receipt in Harris County is summarized in Table 15. ICSS cases were no less likely to receive SNAP than were comparison group cases. However, among cases that received SNAP, benefit levels averaged \$18 less per month among ICSS cases than their comparison group counterparts. Members of ICSS cases were also slightly less likely to be enrolled in Medicaid, and slightly less likely to receive TANF, than comparison group cases. The public assistance effects listed here consist of mostly small impacts, but significant in relation to generally low rates of participation in these programs. And importantly, the pattern of effects points to generally reduced reliance on public assistance among ICSS cases.

¹⁵ By way of comparison, the average follow-up duration for child support impacts in the Harris County sample was 9 months.

Table 15. Harris County Short Term Public Assistance Receipt

Outcome	ICSS adjusted mean	Comparison adjusted mean	Difference associated with ICSS
CP receiving SNAP (Food Stamp) benefits	15.2%	15.5%	-0.3%
Average monthly SNAP (Food Stamp) benefits, CP	\$352	\$370	-\$18 **
CP receiving TANF benefits	1.0%	1.5%	-0.5% **
CP enrolled in Medicaid	8.9%	9.7%	-.8% **

Source: RMC analysis of Texas OAG and HHSC administrative records. *= $p < .05$; **= $p < .01$.

Employment and Earnings of CPs and NCPs

Next we address the question whether ICSS child support enforcement is associated with increased employment rates and earnings levels among custodial and noncustodial parents. As discussed previously, it would be difficult to make a strong argument that better and timelier child support enforcement should lead to better employment and earnings outcomes. In fact, however, as shown in Table 16, we observe consistently positive impacts of ICSS on employment rates and earnings of both CPs and NCPs. CPs in ICSS cases were 4.7 percentage points more likely to be employed, and they earned on average \$533 per quarter more than those on comparison group cases. Similarly, NCPs on cases participating in ICSS were 3.8 percentage points more likely to be employed, and employed NCPs earned on average \$1328 more per quarter, as compared to those in the comparison group. Since these differences are similar in magnitude to the historical differences in earnings noted previously for Harris County ICSS and comparison group cases (Table 5), they likely partly reflect a continuation of that trend, rather than exclusively an impact of ICSS.

Table 16. Harris County Short Term Employment and Earnings of CPs and NCPs

Outcome	ICSS adjusted mean	Comparison adjusted mean	Difference associated with ICSS
CP employed	65.3%	60.6%	4.7% **
CP average quarterly earnings, among employed	\$9348	\$8815	\$533 **
NCP employed	60.3%	56.5%	3.8% **
NCP average quarterly earnings, among employed	\$12649	\$11321	\$1328 **

Source: RMC analysis of Texas OAG, and TWC administrative records. *= $p < .05$; **= $p < .01$.

Other ICSS Counties: Quasi-Experimental Impacts

As noted, ICSS was also implemented in seventeen other counties aside from El Paso and Harris (see Table 1, earlier), and for thirteen of these counties the implementation occurred during a period that allowed us to form pre- and post-implementation groups of cases using administrative records data. We include cases from these counties in the evaluation as part of a comparison group time-series design, which also includes cases from similarly situated non-ICSS counties, the matching and selection of which is described more fully in Appendix A.

Results reported here for Other ICSS Counties could be analyzed using a treatment-control difference model, in essentially the same manner as done for the El Paso and Harris County results. However, since the non-ICSS county selection process has been improved significantly, and the more powerful difference-in-differences design allows better control for the passage of time, this approach will be relied upon here. Using this difference-in-difference model, ICSS impacts in Other ICSS Counties are estimated by calculating how much more things changed in the ICSS counties after ICSS implementation than they changed in the non-ICSS comparison counties over the same period. Since many more numbers are involved in this estimation, and it is more complicated, most details are relegated to tables in the Appendix, while only the ICSS impact estimates and the statistical significance thereof are shown in the tables in this section.

Collection of Child Support

As shown in Table 17, ICSS cases in Other ICSS Counties were 3 percentage points more likely to receive child support through either FS or RO channels, as compared to comparison group cases. Furthermore, the total dollar amount of child support collections in Other ICSS Counties, when looking only at cases that made a payment in a given month, was \$75 per month higher than the same figure for comparison cases. That is, the increased dollar amount of child support collections associated with ICSS was significantly greater than the increased amount of child support collections observed in non-ICSS counties in the same time period.

Table 17. Other ICSS Counties Child Support Collections

Outcome	ICSS Impact (diff. in diff.)
Any FS child support collections made	7.3% **
Any RO child support collections made	-4.4% **
Any child support collections made, either type	3.0% **
Total monthly child support collections, either type, among those paying	\$75 **

Source: RMC analysis of Texas OAG administrative records. *=p<.05; **=p<.01.

Finally, when looking at measures intended to capture delinquency of child support payments, the difference-in-difference model reveals no impact of ICSS on the rate of money judgments, nor on any of the arrears measures. This is interesting because the arrears measures are biased against ICSS due to inability to know arrears balances among RO cases that are more common in the comparison group throughout their case histories. Furthermore, the average follow-up duration for arrears measured here for Other ICSS Counties is about 55 months, or almost five years, so these are longer-term outcomes closer to the time scale on which arrears impacts might be expected.¹⁶ Thus, it is possible that the true arrears balances in comparison group cases have gotten to the point where many of them are converting to FS cases in order to help with collections, and their arrears become documented in the process. If this happens enough, it could overcome the short-term positive arrears impacts seen in other sites, and yield a zero-impact estimate as seen here. It is an interesting possibility, but impossible to prove without additional data.

Table 18. Other ICSS Counties Judgments and Arrears

Outcome	ICSS Impact (diff. in diff.)
Money judgment made in child support case	-0.1%
Any arrears owed	-0.5%
Total arrears, among those who owe any	-\$410

Source: RMC analysis of Texas OAG administrative records. *=p<.05; **=p<.01.

¹⁶ In comparison, the average follow-up duration for child support impacts in the Other ICSS Counties sample was 87 months.

Receipt of Public Assistance by Custodial Parents

The next set of outcomes addresses the question whether ICSS led to decreased Public Assistance participation for the associated custodial parents (CPs) and their children. Public Assistance receipt in Other ICSS Counties is summarized in Table 19. Very much like the patterns seen in El Paso and Harris Counties, the estimated ICSS impact in Other ICSS Counties was in the direction of lesser receipt of SNAP, TANF, or Medicaid among ICSS cases. Average SNAP benefit receipt levels were unaffected by ICSS.

Table 19. Other ICSS Counties Public Assistance Receipt

Outcome	ICSS Impact (diff. in diff.)
CP receiving SNAP (Food Stamp) benefits	-5.2% **
Average monthly SNAP (Food Stamp) benefits, CP	-\$3
CP receiving TANF benefits	-0.5% **
CP enrolled in Medicaid	-3.9% **

Source: RMC analysis of Texas OAG and HHSC administrative records. *=p<.05; **=p<.01.

Employment and Earnings of CPs and NCPs

Finally we examine the question whether ICSS child support enforcement is associated with increased employment rates and earnings levels among custodial and noncustodial parents (see Table 20). Similar to Harris County, we found both increased employment rates and earnings levels among the employed for CPs. And similar to both Harris and El Paso Counties, we found both increased employment and earnings among NCPs attributable to ICSS.

Table 20. Other ICSS Counties Employment and Earnings of CPs and NCPs

Outcome	ICSS Impact (diff. in diff.)
CP employed	1.9% **
CP average quarterly earnings, among employed	\$1,189 **
NCP employed	2.3% **
NCP average quarterly earnings, among employed	\$2,884 **

Source: RMC analysis of Texas OAG, and TWC administrative records. *=p<.05; **=p<.01.

Impact Variation by Subgroups

One of the goals of the ICSS evaluation was to determine to what extent the implementation of ICSS differentially impacted subgroups of interest, including those of Hispanic ethnicity or who are members of the military. As described earlier, problems with the data quality of the military and Hispanic indicators necessitated the development of an alternative method of addressing these questions. The solution was to conduct the subgroup analysis at the county level, by dividing the Other ICSS Counties into groups of those with low (25%) and high (70%) percentages of Hispanic CPs and NCPs. A similar grouping was done for the military measure, including El Paso along with the Other ICSS Counties, yielding groups of counties with low (2.3%) and moderate (7.6%) percentages of military members among CPs and NCPs. The next two sections include testing for ICSS impact variation due to members of these two subgroups.

Hispanics

In this section a difference-in-difference estimator is used to determine the extent to which impacts of ICSS varied according to the concentration of Hispanic CPs and NCPs. It does this by answering the question how much bigger the impact of ICSS is among high Hispanic counties than it is in low Hispanic counties. As with the difference-in-difference estimates cited earlier, in the Other ICSS Counties impacts section, we include only the difference-in-difference estimate here, and leave the detailed table for the Appendix (Table B-9).

Table 21. Differential ICSS Impacts among Hispanics, Child Support Collections

Outcome	Hispanic Differential Impact (diff. in diff.)
Any FS child support collections made	-5.3% **
Any RO child support collections made	1.7% **
Any child support collections made, either type	-3.7% **
Total monthly child support collections, either type, among those paying	\$54 **

Source: RMC analysis of Texas OAG administrative records. *= $p < .05$; **= $p < .01$.

According to Table 21, the Hispanic differential impact of ICSS on any collection of child support was negative (-3.7%), meaning that ICSS tended to increase the frequency of collections more in low-Hispanic counties than it did in high-Hispanic counties. This is somewhat smaller than

the impact of ICSS measured for these other counties (4.9%)¹⁷, so the total impact of ICSS on collections in high Hispanic counties was still positive, just less positive than in low Hispanic counties. Table 21 also indicates that, among those making payments in any given month, the Hispanic differential impact of ICSS on the amount of child support paid was positive. This means that ICSS increased the dollar amount of child support paid more in high Hispanic counties than in low Hispanic counties.

Table 22. Differential ICSS Impacts among Hispanics, Judgments and Arrears

Outcome	Hispanic Differential Impact (diff. in diff.)
Money judgment made in child support case	0.0%
Any arrears owed	-7.2% **
Total arrears, among those who owe any	\$492 *

Source: RMC analysis of Texas OAG administrative records. *= $p < .05$; **= $p < .01$.

Next, Table 22 shows the Hispanic differential impact of ICSS on money judgments and child support arrears. The findings here indicate that ICSS was seven percentage points less likely to lead to arrears in high Hispanic counties, as compared to its impact in low Hispanic counties. But among cases with arrears, ICSS lead to higher arrears balances (\$492 higher) among high Hispanic counties than among low Hispanic counties.

Table 23. Differential ICSS Impacts among Hispanics, Public Assistance Receipt

Outcome	Hispanic Differential Impact (diff. in diff.)
CP receiving SNAP (Food Stamp) benefits	-9.8% **
Average monthly SNAP (Food Stamp) benefits, CP	-\$59 **
CP receiving TANF benefits	-0.4% **
CP enrolled in Medicaid	-6.2% **

Source: RMC analysis of Texas OAG and HHSC administrative records. *= $p < .05$; **= $p < .01$.

¹⁷ This 4.9% value is from the comparable simple outcomes model for Other ICSS Counties (see Appendix B, Table B-7), which was not reported due to reliance on difference-in-difference for the Other Counties analysis models instead.

Recall that the impact of ICSS on public assistance receipt in Other ICSS Counties was found to be uniformly negative. The Hispanic differential impact of ICSS on public assistance receipt, as shown in Table 23, was also found to be uniformly negative. This means that, whereas ICSS led to less public assistance receipt overall, the effect was even greater among high Hispanic counties.

Table 24. Differential ICSS Impacts among Hispanics, Employment and Earnings of CPs and NCPs

Outcome	Hispanic Differential Impact (diff. in diff.)
CP employed	.5% **
CP average quarterly earnings, among employed	\$1,015 **
NCP employed	0.1%
NCP average quarterly earnings, among employed	\$1,244 **

Source: RMC analysis of Texas OAG, and TWC administrative records. *= $p < .05$; **= $p < .01$.

Similarly, recall from the Other ICSS Counties impact section that the impact of ICSS on employment and earnings of CPs and NCPs was found to be uniformly positive. The Hispanic differential impact of ICSS on employment and earnings, shown in Table 24, was also positive for every indicator except NCP employment. This means that, for the most part, the impact of ICSS on employment and earnings was even more positive among high Hispanic counties than among low Hispanic counties.

Military Members

As with the Hispanic analysis, a difference-in-difference estimator is also used to determine the extent to which impacts of ICSS varied according to the concentration of members of the military among CPs and NCPs in each county. This estimator answers the question how much bigger the impact of ICSS is in counties serving moderate shares of military members than it is in counties serving low shares of members of the military. Henceforth these will be referred to as moderate military and low military counties. As with the previous treatment of difference-in-difference analysis, we include only the difference-in-difference estimate in tables here, while a table with detailed results is in the Appendix (Table B-10).

Recall that the effects of ICSS on child support collections in Other ICSS Counties and El Paso were positive, indicating greater likelihood of collections being made, and higher dollar amounts of collections due to ICSS. According to Table 25, ICSS impacts on frequency and amount of child

support collections was even greater among moderate military counties, as compared to low military counties. Thus, ICSS leads to even more frequent child support collections, of greater amounts, in areas with more members of the military on the caseload.

Table 25. Differential ICSS Impacts among Military Members, Child Support Collections

Outcome	Military Differential Impact (diff. in diff.)
Any FS child support collections made	1.0% **
Any RO child support collections made	-0.4% **
Any child support collections made, either type	0.7% **
Total monthly child support collections, either type, among those paying	\$61 **

Source: RMC analysis of Texas OAG administrative records. *=p<.05; **=p<.01.

Similarly, recall that there was no significant impact of ICSS on money judgments and arrears in Other ICSS Counties. As shown in Table 26, the military differential impact of ICSS was negative on both judgments (-0.1%) and whether any arrears are owed (-7.5%). Thus, even with an arrears measure that is known to be biased against ICSS, the program leads to clearly reduced arrears and money judgments in areas with moderate concentrations of military members among child support caseloads.

Table 26. Differential ICSS Impacts among Military Members, Judgments and Arrears

Outcome	Military Differential Impact (diff. in diff.)
Money judgment made in child support case	-0.1% **
Any arrears owed	-7.5% **
Total arrears, among those who owe any	-\$218

Source: RMC analysis of Texas OAG administrative records. *=p<.05; **=p<.01.

Likewise, recall that for all measures ICSS was found to negatively impact public assistance receipt on Other ICSS Counties. The military differential impact of ICSS on public assistance, as shown in Table 27, was also uniformly negative. That is, while ICSS was found to lead to less public

assistance receipt overall, the effect was magnified in areas serving greater shares of military members, and the reduction in public assistance was even greater.

Table 27. Differential ICSS Impacts among Military Members, Public Assistance Receipt

Outcome	Military Differential Impact (diff. in diff.)
CP receiving SNAP (Food Stamp) benefits	-12.2% **
Average monthly SNAP (Food Stamp) benefits, CP	-\$71 **
CP receiving TANF benefits	-0.4% **
CP enrolled in Medicaid	-7.7% **

Source: RMC analysis of Texas OAG and HHSC administrative records. *= $p < .05$; **= $p < .01$.

Finally, recall that the impacts of ICSS on employment and earnings of CPs and NCPs in Other ICSS Counties was uniformly positive. Once again, Table 28 shows that the military differential impact of ICSS was also uniformly positive across all four indicators. Thus ICSS can be said to lead to even greater levels of employment and earnings of the employed CPs and NCPs in areas with higher shares of military members.

Table 28. Differential ICSS Impacts among Military Members, Employment and Earnings of CPs and NCPs

Outcome	Military Differential Impact (diff. in diff.)
CP employed	2.6% **
CP average quarterly earnings, among employed	\$1,073 **
NCP employed	4.0% **
NCP average quarterly earnings, among employed	\$1,472 **

Source: RMC analysis of Texas OAG, and TWC administrative records. *= $p < .05$; **= $p < .01$.


Alternative Arrears Analysis

One of the more important expected outcomes from ICSS was that enforcing child support cases early would help to prevent the buildup of arrears. Unfortunately, the arrears measure, with

its inherent bias against the ICSS treatment group, was never up to the task of measuring the impact of ICSS on arrears in an impartial way. Instead of revealing the expected impact on arrears, this measure that can only detect arrears balances on full-service cases showed essentially the opposite. In the two sites reporting short-term (1-2 year) findings, El Paso and Harris, impacts on arrears were reported to be positive, meaning ICSS appears to have led to *increased* arrears. But arrears avoidance was always a longer-term prospect, and in fact the findings in Other ICSS Counties confirmed that at around five years the impacts on arrears were essentially zero despite the bias in the measure. It is tempting to conclude that the measured impact of ICSS on arrears grows more positive with longer-term follow-up, on the assumption that it takes a while for arrears to grow to the point where custodial parents are convinced to open a full-service case to collect them. But the flawed arrears measure may not be capable of confirming this interpretation within the time frames available.

Another approach to discerning the impact of ICSS on arrears was attempted based on a comment in Sorensen’s (2007) definitive paper on the topic of child support arrears. The key observation was that “obligors who had their IV-D cases opened around the same time as their order was established tended to owe considerably less arrears than other obligors” (p. 6). Opening cases early is in fact the primary tool of ICSS. So if it can be shown that 1) cases in ICSS sites do tend to be opened closer to their order establishment dates, and 2) cases in Texas that were opened within a year of the order establishment date have lower arrears balances many years later, then it may be possible to show the expected arrears effect without waiting for five more years of follow-up data to accumulate.

Figure 7. Prompt Case Opening in Harris County



Source: RMC analysis of Texas OAG administrative records.


Figure 7 illustrates an analysis of cases in Harris County before and after the courts through which they were processed converted to ICSS (this figure collapses the analysis across courts). The important component is the green band in the middle, which indicates what share of cases were opened within a year of their orders being established. In a confirmation of the expected pattern, prior to ICSS implementation, 40% of cases were opened within a year of their orders being established, but after ICSS was introduced, 53% of cases were opened within a year.

Similar analysis was done for the Other ICSS Counties, and the results are shown in Figure 8. Once again confirming the expected pattern, in 12 out of 13 counties the percent of cases opened within a year of their orders being established increased after implementation of ICSS (in Upshur County the percent was unchanged). The average increase was over eleven percentage points. So this confirms the first point: cases under ICSS are more likely to be opened within a year of their order establishment.

To address the second point, we casted a wide net and analyzed arrears balances for all active child support cases statewide, regardless of whether they had a connection to ICSS. Table 29 shows the results of this analysis. First, to roughly control for how long cases have been open, we divided them into three broad date ranges to include cases opening between 2001 and 2005, 2006 to 2010, and 2011 to 2015. Within each date range, we divided cases into the same three groups based on when their cases opened relative to when their orders were established. We then calculated the median arrears balances among these cases as of the latest available arrears data (February 2016).

As expected, in all three date ranges the lowest median arrears balance was found among group 2, those whose child support cases were opened on the same day or within a year after their order being established. The largest arrears balances, about three times larger, were consistently seen among those whose cases were opened much later than the order establishment date or never. And the next largest arrears balances, about twice as large as group 2, were seen among those whose case was opened first without an order established yet. This conclusively demonstrates the second point, that cases in Texas that were opened within a year of the order establishment date have lower arrears balances many years later.

Figure 8. Prompt Case Opening in Other ICSS Counties



Source: RMC analysis of Texas OAG administrative records.

Taken together, these two pieces of evidence strongly suggest that implementation of ICSS will lead to lower arrears balances in the long run. ICSS does cause child support cases to be opened closer to their order establishment dates, and if historical patterns hold, they will have lower arrears because of it.

Table 29. Statewide Arrears Analysis

Date range	Case opening type	N	Median Arrears
2001-2005	1 = Case opened first, order entered never or after a year	32,156	\$7,699
	2 = Case & Order entered same day or within a year	73,804	\$3,339
	3 = Order entered first, Case opened never or after a year	54,081	\$9,115
2006-2010	1 = Case opened first, order entered never or after a year	87,774	\$5,545
	2 = Case & Order entered same day or within a year	269,056	\$2,672
	3 = Order entered first, Case opened never or after a year	57,320	\$9,455
2011-2015	1 = Case opened first, order entered never or after a year	32,957	\$2,786
	2 = Case & Order entered same day or within a year	241,590	\$1,530
	3 = Order entered first, Case opened never or after a year	23,137	\$6,128

Source: RMC analysis of Texas OAG administrative records.

OPT-OUT ANALYSIS


This section aims to provide a sense of the experiences of those who choose to opt-out of IV-D child support collection services. The work presented below was originally included in an earlier report, but has been updated to include more outcome measures and to extend the follow-up interval by almost a year. We take two strategies in answering the question of how the child support experience varies for those who opt-out. First, we examine a sample of reasons that customers gave when completing forms signifying their intention to opt-out. There are limitations to this approach, of course. The ‘reason’ question was listed as optional on the form, and the sample was more of a convenience sample than random, so it would be difficult to draw inferences from this analysis to the statewide population of those opting-out. Nevertheless, the kinds of reasons people give can be informative. Second, through analysis of administrative data we examine the experiences of those apparently opting-out from IV-D services in any of the ICSS implementation sites we have been focusing on thus far: El Paso, Harris, or Other ICSS Counties.

Opt-out Reasons Cited

The opt-out form data we received from the OAG covered a period of four years, from 2010 to 2014, and included cases from fourteen counties: Bexar, Cameron, Dallas, Ector, El Paso, Harris, Hidalgo, Lubbock, Midland, Smith, Tarrant, Taylor, Travis, Webb, and Wichita. The dataset included information on the case ID, county, office code, the opt-out date and the opt-out reason. As in previous reporting periods, most of the custodial parents who declined IV-D services (55%, or 717 of the total 1,371 responses) did not provide a reason for doing so on these “Opt-out” forms. Another sixteen percent of those served were already receiving child support through direct payments from the NCP or through other official systems such as military allotments or social security. The reasons provided by the remaining respondents (29%) for their decision to opt-out of IV-D services are summarized in Figure 9.

The most common reason reported for opting-out of services (31%) identified some type of informal “agreement” between NCP and CP that may include the NCP making cash contributions to the CP household through the payment of rent, clothing and child care or noncash payments in the form of providing child care. The majority of these responses did not provide specifics regarding the nature of the “agreement” held between the CP and NCP (132 out of 140 responses). Nineteen percent of CPs responding indicated that they did not want nor need the support.

Figure 9. Opt-out Reasons



Source: RMC analysis of Texas OAG records. Number of respondents listing a reason: 440.

Eighteen percent of the opt-out respondents listed the behavior or status of the NCP as the reason for opting-out of services. The majority of these responses discussed the NCPs inability to pay due to:

- unemployment,
- incarceration,
- disability,
- drug and alcohol addiction, and
- health and mental health issues.

Only one respondent in this category listed family violence as the reason for their decision to opt-out. For the remainder who opt-out citing the NCP's inability to pay, there seems to be little recognition that for many NCPs these are likely to be temporary factors.

Mistrust or concerns with the OAG was identified by only three percent of the respondents as their primary reason for opting-out of services. Within this category 6 out of 16 individual

responses identified the delay in payments from the OAG as their reason for opting-out while the remainder of the responses in this category expressed mistrust in the system, unwillingness to attend a court date, or unhappiness in general with OAG services. A few, one percent, identified the status of the CP as deployed or out of the state or country, as their reason for opting-out of services. For some the family structure had changed (eleven percent), parents reconciled or remarried, children moved to reside with the NCP or had been emancipated. Finally, eight percent of the responses did not align with the clustered categories of responses and were labeled as “other.”

As mentioned previously, the opt-out forms we analyzed should be regarded as a convenience sample. The date range covered by the forms is only about five years, as compared to over twelve years of administrative data, and it has been reported that not all local offices send their opt-out forms to the state office, from where we collect them. Furthermore, the ‘reason’ question was listed as optional on the form, and only a fraction of respondents completed it. Thus, although these data do give a very good sense of the range of reasons people might offer for having opted out, it is difficult to make strong inferences from this analysis to draw conclusions about the statewide population of those opting-out. Instead, we can draw limited inferences from an analysis of administrative data focusing on those apparently opting-out from IV-D services in any of the ICSS implementation sites included in this study, to which we turn our attention next.

Opt-outs Identified through Administrative Data

In order to identify through administrative records data the cases of CPs who were likely to have opted out, we examined a file of case type histories over time. We focused exclusively on ICSS treatment group cases, or those cases that opened in one of the ICSS sites, El Paso, Harris, or one of the Other ICSS Counties, in the post-ICSS implementation year. Since the default action in these ICSS areas was for new cases to be full-service (FS), we determined that any cases that opened in registry-only (RO) status or became RO within the first calendar month were opt-outs. We tracked the outcomes for these cases as long as they remained RO cases. Second, we identified additional opt-out cases based on those whose status was initially FS but changed to RO at a later date. For this group, we tracked their outcomes starting in the month of their initial RO status and continuing as long as they remained RO cases.

Table 30. Comparing Apparent Opt-Outs to Cases that Remained Full-Service

	Opted Out	Remained Full Service	
All cases, demographics	N=2,343	N=27,574	
NCP age (years)	36.9	34.3	**
NCP is female	27.1%	10.4%	**
NCP is Hispanic	13.1%	31.2%	**
NCP is black	5.3%	27.3%	**
NCP race/ethnicity unknown	64.8%	14.4%	**
NCP is current or former military	1.0%	3.6%	**
CP age (years)	37.9	32.9	**
CP is Hispanic	9.6%	31.0%	**
CP is black	3.6%	24.5%	**
CP race/ethnicity unknown	74.1%	16.2%	**
CP is current or former military	0.6%	0.5%	
Number of children	1.0	1.2	**
Age of youngest child, years	8.2	6.1	**
Age of oldest child, years	9.5	7.3	**
Non-custodial Parent, employment and benefit history			
NCP employed at case opening	52.3%	59.7%	**
Percent of time NCP employed over prior 8 quarters	51.7%	58.3%	**
NCP average quarterly earnings over prior 8 quarters	\$8,053	\$6,554	**
NCP experienced earnings dip of at least 20% within prior 8 quarters	20.4%	26.3%	**
Time since first observed NCP earnings (quarters)	25.7	28.3	**
NCP earnings history sufficient to qualify for UI	50.4%	57.4%	**
NCP filed for unemployment within prior year	3.5%	6.6%	**
NCP receiving SNAP (Food Stamps) benefits at case opening	3.6%	4.6%	*
Percent of time NCP received SNAP benefits in prior year	5.4%	5.8%	
NCP receiving TANF benefits at case opening	0.3%	0.1%	
Percent of time NCP received TANF benefits in prior year	0.2%	0.2%	
Percent of time NCP enrolled in Medicaid in prior year	5.1%	5.0%	
Custodial Parent, employment and benefit history			
CP employed at case opening	54.5%	64.0%	**
Percent of time CP employed over prior 8 quarters	51.9%	61.0%	**
CP average quarterly earnings over prior 8 quarters	\$5,978	\$5,039	**
CP experienced earnings dip of at least 20% within prior 8 quarters	15.2%	24.2%	**
Time since first observed CP earnings (quarters)	24.7	27.3	**

	Opted Out	Remained Full Service	
CP earnings history sufficient to qualify for UI	52.1%	60.7%	**
CP filed for unemployment within prior year	2.6%	5.8%	**
CP receiving SNAP (Food Stamps) benefits at case opening	4.7%	18.4%	**
Percent of time CP received SNAP benefits in prior year	4.1%	18.8%	**
CP receiving TANF benefits at case opening	0.0%	1.1%	**
Percent of time CP received TANF benefits in prior year	0.1%	1.4%	**
Percent of time CP enrolled in Medicaid in prior year	5.7%	23.3%	**

Source: RMC analysis of Texas OAG, TWC, and HHSC administrative records and El Paso County DRO data.

*=p<.05; **=p<.01.

Table 30 compares the characteristics of cases identified using this method as having opted out against those that remained in full service (FS) status. Cases that opted out of enforcement services were more likely to be headed by older parents with older children, and were less likely to be black or Hispanic. Cases that opted-out were far more likely to have a female NCP. On the other hand, when the NCP was in the military they were substantially more likely to remain FS cases.

Members of cases that opted out of IV-D services were less likely to be employed in UI-covered jobs, but also less likely to have experienced an earnings dip, and when employed they tended to earn more than members of cases remaining in full service status. Members of opt-out cases were less likely to receive benefits of any kind, whether unemployment or SNAP, Medicaid, or TANF.

Outcomes among Opt-Outs

One must carefully interpret any outcomes seen among those who opt-out of ICSS child support enforcement, for this is purely a correlational design, and we have little idea whether opting-out led to these outcomes or the outcomes caused the opt-outs. It is likely that at least a bit of both occurred. With this caveat in mind, the patterns revealed are quite interesting. Note that the following tables track cases over time differently than anywhere else in this report. In the impact tables in previous sections, cases are tracked only according to their initial status, regardless of subsequent opt-outs or opt-ins that might happen. In this section, when examining opt-outs, those who opt-out are tabulated in the left column during case-months in which they remain in RO status, but are tabulated in the right column in all FS periods, including any time before opting-out and after returning to FS status, if applicable. We also cluster the results differently, to aid in the examination of related outcomes across sites. Table 31 shows child support outcomes comparing

those who opt-out against those who remain FS cases in three panels, one each for El Paso, Harris, and Other ICSS Counties.

Table 31. Apparent Opt-Outs, Child Support Collections

Site / Outcome	Opted out	Remained Full Service	Difference associated with Opting-out
El Paso			
Any FS child support collections made	10.2%	66.3%	-56.1% **
Any RO child support collections made	14.7%	0.4%	14.3% **
Any child support collections made, either type	24.7%	66.6%	-41.9% **
Total monthly child support collections, either type, among those paying	\$1210	\$921	\$289 **
Harris County			
Any FS child support collections made	1.0%	50.7%	-49.7% **
Any RO child support collections made	30.5%	2.1%	28.4% **
Any child support collections made, either type	31.0%	52.6%	-21.6% **
Total monthly child support collections, either type, among those paying	\$860	\$662	\$198 **
Other ICSS Counties			
Any FS child support collections made	0.4%	45.5%	-45.1% **
Any RO child support collections made	18.8%	1.3%	17.5% **
Any child support collections made, either type	19.1%	46.6%	-27.5% **
Total monthly child support collections, either type, among those paying	\$703	\$606	\$97 **

Source: RMC analysis of Texas OAG administrative records. *= $p < .05$; **= $p < .01$.

From this table it is apparent that opting-out of IV-D enforcement is associated with large reductions in the frequency of child support collections observed, regardless of site. The evidence on the amount of child support collected is more mixed, with those opt-outs who do make payments in El Paso and Harris paying more on average, but the opposite pattern is seen in the Other ICSS Counties. The evidence is also mixed on money judgments, with higher rates among opt-outs in El Paso, but drastically reduced chances of having a money judgment in Harris or Other ICSS Counties.

Similarly, child support arrears and money judgment outcomes are shown in Table 32, comparing those who opt-out against those who remain FS cases in three panels, one each for El Paso, Harris, and Other ICSS Counties. In Harris and the Other ICSS Counties, those who opt-out

were less likely to have a money judgment against them. And in all sites, those who opt-out were far less likely to have any documented arrears balances, a finding which may not be informative as it is completely expected based on the bias in the arrears measure.

Table 32. Apparent Opt-Outs, Child Support Judgments and Arrears

Site / Outcome	Opted out	Remained Full Service	Difference associated with Opting-out
El Paso			
Money judgment made in child support case	0.0%	0.2%	-0.2%
Any arrears owed	7.3%	45.0%	-37.7% **
Total arrears, among those who owe any	\$7686	\$3467	\$4219
Harris County			
Money judgment made in child support case	0.0%	0.3%	-0.3% **
Any arrears owed	4.5%	46.4%	-41.9% **
Total arrears, among those who owe any	\$1416	\$3832	-\$2416
Other ICSS Counties			
Money judgment made in child support case	0.0%	0.4%	-0.4% **
Any arrears owed	0.7%	46.3%	-45.6% **
Total arrears, among those who owe any	\$7866	\$8212	-\$346

Source: RMC analysis of Texas OAG administrative records. *=p<.05; **=p<.01.

Table 33 compares the public assistance outcomes by site for those who opted out of ICSS versus those who remained FS cases. Uniformly across sites, those who opted out were far less likely to receive public assistance, whether SNAP or TANF, or Medicaid.

Table 33. Apparent Opt-Outs, Public Assistance Receipt

Site / Outcome	Opted out	Remained Full Service	Difference associated with Opting-out
El Paso			
CP receiving SNAP (Food Stamp) benefits	2.7%	15.8%	-13.1% **
Average monthly SNAP (Food Stamp) benefits, CP	\$335	\$350	-\$15
CP receiving TANF benefits			
Percent of time CP receiving TANF benefits	0.1%	1.1%	-1.0% **
Harris County			

Site / Outcome	Opted out	Remained Full Service	Difference associated with Opting-out
CP receiving SNAP (Food Stamp) benefits	2.7%	15.8%	-13.1% **
Average monthly SNAP (Food Stamp) benefits, CP	\$335	\$350	-\$15
CP receiving TANF benefits	0.1%	1.1%	-1.0% **
CP enrolled in Medicaid	1.7%	9.2%	-7.5% **
Other ICSS Counties			
CP receiving SNAP (Food Stamp) benefits	5.3%	18.3%	-13.0% **
Average monthly SNAP (Food Stamp) benefits, CP	\$336	\$395	-\$59 **
CP receiving TANF benefits	0.1%	0.7%	-0.6% **
CP enrolled in Medicaid	3.7%	14.6%	-10.9% **

Source: RMC analysis of Texas OAG and HHSC administrative records. *=p<.05; **=p<.01.

Employment and earnings outcomes among those who opted out or those who chose to remain IV-D customers are tabulated by site in Table 34. The general pattern among the three sites on these measures is remarkably consistent, and it echoes the pattern seen in the initial characteristics at case opening of those who later opted out (Table 30). That is, we see a reduced likelihood of being employed in UI covered work among those who opt-out, but those who are employed tend to have higher earnings. The implication at this point seems to be that at least a portion of the opt-outs occur among cases in which either the CP earns enough not to need strict enforcement, or the NCP earns enough that payments are made without strict enforcement, or both.

Table 34. Apparent Opt-Outs, Employment and Earnings of CPs and NCPs

Site / Outcome	Opted out	Remained Full Service	Difference associated with Opting-out
El Paso			
CP employed	46.5%	51.0%	-4.5%
CP average quarterly earnings, among employed	\$9403	\$9387	\$16
NCP employed	20.8%	43.1%	-22.3% **
NCP average quarterly earnings, among employed	\$18652	\$16808	\$1844
Harris County			
CP employed	60.3%	65.8%	-5.5% **
CP average quarterly earnings, among employed	\$13834	\$9150	\$4684 **
NCP employed	49.8%	62.0%	-12.2% **
NCP average quarterly earnings, among employed	\$19340	\$12399	\$6941 **
Other ICSS Counties			
CP employed	50.7%	60.8%	-10.1% **
CP average quarterly earnings, among employed	\$12102	\$9161	\$2941 **
NCP employed	44.5%	55.0%	-10.5% **
NCP average quarterly earnings, among employed	\$16355	\$11674	\$4681 **

Source: RMC analysis of Texas OAG, and TWC administrative records. *=p<.05; **=p<.01.

OPT IN ANALYSIS

This section attempts to describe the experiences of those who opt into IV-D child support collection services. We analyze the administrative data and examine the experiences of those apparently opting into IV-D services in any of the Other ICSS Counties. In order to identify the cases of CPs who likely opted in, we examined a file of case type histories over time. We focused exclusively on pre-ICSS comparison group cases, or those cases that opened in one of the Other ICSS Counties, in the pre-ICSS implementation year. Since the default action in this pre-ICSS time period was for new cases to be registry-only (RO), we determined that any non-public assistance cases that opened in full-service (FS) status or became FS at any point in the future were opt-ins.

Using this criteria, we identified over ten thousand cases that opted in within the Other ICSS Counties comparison group, and we compare them against over four thousand cases that opened as mandatory full service cases in the same counties over the same interval. On average, about 95% of identified opt-in cases either opened in full-service status or opted-in during the first month, and only 5% chose to opt-in later.

Table 35 compares the characteristics of those who apparently opted-in against those who were mandatory full-service cases. Opt-ins are younger and more likely to be male¹⁸, and more likely to be employed but at lower wages. Opt-ins are also more likely to have experienced recent economic distress in the form of a dip in earnings, and are more likely to receive public assistance of any kind.

Table 35. Comparing Apparent Opt-Ins to Mandatory Full-Service Cases

	Opted In to Full Service	Mandatory Full Service	
All cases, demographics	N=10,958	N=4,126	
NCP age (years)	32.1	36.4	**
NCP is female	12.0%	19.9%	**
NCP is Hispanic	39.6%	12.7%	**
NCP is black	25.7%	6.9%	**
NCP race/ethnicity unknown	7.4%	68.7%	**
NCP is current or former military	3.9%	1.2%	**
CP age (years)	31.1	35.7	**

¹⁸ Race and ethnicity are too frequently unknown in this comparison to interpret the patterns of differences on these indicators.

	Opted In to Full Service	Mandatory Full Service	
CP is Hispanic	40.8%	9.7%	**
CP is black	22.7%	5.0%	**
CP race/ethnicity unknown	7.8%	76.4%	**
CP is current or former military	0.9%	0.3%	**
Number of children	1.4	1.2	**
Age of youngest child, years	5.0	7.7	**
Age of oldest child, years	6.2	9.2	**
Non-custodial Parent, employment and benefit history			
NCP employed at case opening	57.9%	53.3%	**
Percent of time NCP employed over prior 8 quarters	57.6%	53.5%	**
NCP average quarterly earnings over prior 8 quarters	\$4,836	\$8,658	**
NCP experienced earnings dip of at least 20% within prior 8 quarters	29.0%	20.1%	**
Time since first observed NCP earnings (quarters)	28.2	26.2	**
NCP earnings history sufficient to qualify for UI	56.1%	52.9%	**
NCP filed for unemployment within prior year	7.3%	4.8%	**
NCP receiving SNAP (Food Stamps) benefits at case opening	8.2%	3.0%	**
Percent of time NCP received SNAP benefits in prior year	8.5%	3.1%	**
NCP receiving TANF benefits at case opening	0.1%	0.1%	
Percent of time NCP received TANF benefits in prior year	0.3%	0.3%	
Percent of time NCP enrolled in Medicaid in prior year	4.5%	2.5%	**
Custodial Parent, employment and benefit history			
CP employed at case opening	61.7%	56.3%	**
Percent of time CP employed over prior 8 quarters	58.9%	54.1%	**
CP average quarterly earnings over prior 8 quarters	\$4,067	\$5,667	**
CP experienced earnings dip of at least 20% within prior 8 quarters	24.4%	14.3%	**
Time since first observed CP earnings (quarters)	26.4	24.6	**
CP earnings history sufficient to qualify for UI	57.9%	54.4%	**
CP filed for unemployment within prior year	6.0%	3.5%	**
CP receiving SNAP (Food Stamps) benefits at case opening	23.0%	4.3%	**
Percent of time CP received SNAP benefits in prior year	20.3%	3.9%	**
CP receiving TANF benefits at case opening	0.1%	0.0%	**
Percent of time CP received TANF benefits in prior year	1.2%	0.2%	**
Percent of time CP enrolled in Medicaid in prior year	9.8%	2.9%	**

Source: RMC analysis of Texas OAG, TWC, and HHSC administrative records and El Paso County DRO data.

*=p<.05; **=p<.01.

Looking next at outcomes among those who opted-in, the same caution used with opt-outs is necessary. One must carefully interpret outcomes among those who opt-in to child support enforcement. As before, this is a correlational design, so we will not be able to determine to what extent opting-in led to these outcomes or to what extent the outcomes led case members to opt-in.

Table 36 shows child support outcomes comparing those who opted-in against those who were mandatory full service cases in Other ICSS Counties. Those who opted-in to full service were more likely to have child support collections, but the average collection amounts among cases paying at all were lower for opt-ins.

Table 36. Apparent Opt-Ins, Child Support Collections

Outcome	Opted In to Full Service	Mandatory Full Service	Difference Associated with Opting In
Any FS child support collections made	36.5%	1.1%	35.4% **
Any RO child support collections made	3.6%	25.1%	-21.5% **
Any child support collections made, either type	40.0%	26.2%	13.8% **
Total monthly child support collections, either type, among those paying	\$527	\$783	-\$256 **

Source: RMC analysis of Texas OAG administrative records. *=p<.05; **=p<.01.

Next, Table 37 shows money judgments and child support arrears balances comparing apparent opt-ins against mandatory FS cases. Not surprisingly, cases that opted-in were both more likely to have a money judgment and more likely to have child support arrears due.

Table 37. Apparent Opt-Ins, Child Support Judgments and Arrears

Outcome	Opted In to Full Service	Mandatory Full Service	Difference Associated with Opting In
Money judgment made in child support case	0.4%	0.0%	0.4% **
Any arrears owed	44.5%	2.9%	41.6% **
Total arrears, among those who owe any	\$8643	\$9775	-\$1132

Source: RMC analysis of Texas OAG administrative records. *=p<.05; **=p<.01.

Table 38 compares public assistance benefit outcomes for those opting-in against those who were mandatory full service. Similar to the differences in historical characteristics of these two

groups noted above in Table 35, opt-ins continue to show greater utilization of public assistance programs, including SNAP, TANF, or Medicaid.

Table 38. Apparent Opt-Ins, Public Assistance Receipt

Outcome	Opted In to Full Service	Mandatory Full Service	Difference Associated with Opting In
CP receiving SNAP (Food Stamp) benefits	23.4%	5.0%	18.4% **
Average monthly SNAP (Food Stamp) benefits, CP	\$409	\$358	\$51 **
CP receiving TANF benefits	1.1%	0.3%	0.8% **
CP enrolled in Medicaid	17.5%	3.8%	13.7% **

Source: RMC analysis of Texas OAG and HHSC administrative records. *=p<.05; **=p<.01.

Finally, Table 39 shows similar trends as seen prior to their case opening when comparing the outcomes of those who opt-in against mandatory FS cases. Once again, members of opt-in cases were more likely to be employed but earning lower wages, relative to mandatory cases.

Table 39. Apparent Opt-Ins, Employment and Earnings of CPs and NCPs

Outcome	Opted In to Full Service	Mandatory Full Service	Difference Associated with Opting In
CP employed	58.7%	52.4%	6.3% **
CP average quarterly earnings, among employed	\$8076	\$12131	-\$4055 **
NCP employed	52.0%	47.3%	4.7% **
NCP average quarterly earnings, among employed	\$9444	\$17662	-\$8218 **

Source: RMC analysis of Texas OAG, and TWC administrative records. *=p<.05; **=p<.01.

DISCUSSION

The implementation of ICSS has clearly led to small but significant changes in the composition of the full service caseload. As noted, our approach has evolved to the point of recognizing that changes in the caseload composition are an impact of ICSS. It is by now clear that a system of deemed applications and default enrollment yields a IV-D caseload that is slightly but not dramatically more affluent. For example, both CPs and NCPs had greater employment and earnings histories as of their case opening dates, as evidenced on multiple measures, relative to members of the comparison group. On other aspects the evidence of a shift in the caseload was more mixed. Changes in prior experience with SNAP and Medicaid were inconsistent across sites, though there was agreement across sites on reduced CP use of TANF. Thus, the conclusion that the caseload shifted in the direction of more affluence is warranted, but the shift was not dramatic.

From a purely academic standpoint, the changing composition of the caseload complicates the task of sorting out the impacts. It is certainly an interesting problem to attempt to distinguish how much of the positive differences one sees are due to caseload changes induced by ICSS implementation, and how much are due to the enhanced enforcement tools and more proactive approach to child support collection. Practically speaking, however, the question is moot. If an administrator wants to implement a program like this, it matters little why the individual impacts happen. What matters more is knowing how the program will operate under new rules and a slightly different caseload, and what its results look like.

From more of a statistical perspective, acknowledging the fact that ICSS changes the caseload composition, and being OK with it, are critical to computing fair estimates of the program's impact. In earlier reports we made attempts, somewhat misguided in retrospect, to statistically control for characteristics of individuals and cases in order to clarify experimental impact estimates. But in doing so, we unintentionally eliminated some of the effects we were looking for. This, together with other changes and improvements implemented over the course of this multi-year evaluation have inevitably led to changes in the results with each successive report. We are now confident that the results presented here are the best we can accomplish within the constraints of the data available, including an unusual missing / unknown data structure caused by blindness of the data system to various aspects of registry-only cases. Whereas some of our prior efforts may have reduced any observed positive changes induced by ICSS, the estimates herein represent the best guess at what an administrator implementing a program like this can expect to see.

Several changes made for the final report represent significant improvements over prior impact estimates. For example, the difference-in-differences model used to estimate impacts for Other ICSS Counties has been improved by the addition of better county-level measures to the matching model, resulting in greater similarity of matched counties on dimensions important to child support (e.g., fertility rate). This is important because using cases from other non-ICSS counties helps to control for the passage of time, which is perhaps the biggest threat to internal validity in a simple pre-post comparison design. Without controlling for time, it is difficult to be sure that the changes in Other ICSS Counties were due solely to ICSS implementation. With these improvements in place, we now rely on the difference-in-difference estimator for all estimates of ICSS impacts in these counties. For comparison, the pre-post estimates are also included here (Appendix B, Table B-7); the difference between the two sets of results is more a matter of degree than quality.

Similarly, refinement of the analysis of ICSS in Harris County was necessary due to the conversion of existing cases into ICSS cases upon ICSS implementation. Previously, when we examined long-term (5 year plus) impacts, existing cases in Harris County may have been serving as comparison cases when they were converted to ICSS. To the extent that this happened, it would have depressed the impacts, as it would have blurred the distinction between ICSS and comparison cases. By limiting our analysis in this final report to impacts occurring in the first year after case opening, we avoid such problems. This had the unfortunate effect of losing one source of longer-term impact estimates, but the improvements in the Other ICSS Counties model allow it to help fill this gap.

Finally, the effort to sub-divide El Paso impacts to focus on those randomly assigned later in the process was well-intentioned but made little difference in the end. The theory was that case workers needed some time to get familiar with the new tools available to them under ICSS, and thus outcomes for later cases might be better. This 'learning curve' theory received some support in the area of child support collections, which were indeed better among cases randomly assigned in the second half of the enrollment period, but overall the differences between the two sets of results were not dramatic. As a result, we have focused our discussion of El Paso on the overall impacts among all cases.

In light of these improvements, the overall pattern of impacts among the El Paso, Harris, and Other ICSS Counties sites is remarkably similar. Child support collections were increased in all sites, sometimes dramatically. Combining two data sources, registry only and full-service, to measure

collections has improved the estimation but has not completely eliminated the problem that some payments made outside the state disbursement unit (which is contrary to policy) may be missed. We have no direct evidence that such payments are made, nor how frequently if they are. We can confidently conclude, at a minimum, that ICSS has dramatically increased the evidence of documented payment of child support. If such improvements were illusory, then we might not expect to see improvements in public assistance.

Observed impacts of ICSS on public assistance and other benefit receipt was also remarkably consistent and positive. Unlike child support collections, public assistance can be equally measured for both groups regardless of their full-service status within the OAG caseload, so there is no bias in these measures. Across sites, ICSS case members were less likely to receive SNAP, received less SNAP benefits, or both. Receipt of TANF was similarly reduced in all sites that had enough TANF receipt to measure the impact of ICSS on this outcome. Even receipt of Medicaid was consistently reduced across all sites. Moreover, these reductions cannot be solely attributed to shifts in the composition of the caseload, since as noted the changes among caseload members in prior experience with SNAP and Medicaid were inconsistent across sites. The fact that all public assistance outcomes were improved under ICSS also bolsters confidence in the findings of consistent improvements in child support collections, since non-receipt of child support is a big factor in need for public assistance.

Estimated impacts of ICSS implementation on employment and earnings measures were strong and positive in Harris and Other ICSS Counties. Both increased employment rates and earnings levels among the employed were seen for both CPs and NCPs in these sites. El Paso, on the other hand, showed more mixed employment and earnings findings. The difference here is difficult to explain, however, it is not uncommon to see increased employment among some populations paired with a finding that those newly employed are earning less, due perhaps to low entry-level wages. Most of the improvements in employment are likely due to the shift in the caseload toward those with more attachment to the labor market.

Finally, the impact of ICSS on child support arrears was difficult to ascertain. Since arrears balances at any given moment are only known with certainty for full-service cases, it is difficult to trust the findings seen on the arrears measure. With child support collections improving, it makes no sense that arrears would also increase unless this were due to the bias in the measure. Longer-term, the findings of increased arrears had disappeared, suggesting perhaps that the artifact due to the bias had finally been overcome by increasing real-world (but unseen) arrears in the comparison

group. The inclusion of money judgments was meant to measure this phenomenon longer-term in a more unbiased way, but such judgments were simply too infrequent for any trend to be detected. Finally, the alternative analysis of arrears made a convincing case that implementation of ICSS leads more cases to be opened nearer in time to the establishment of child support orders, and that in the long run such cases have historically led to far lower arrears balances. This strongly suggests that ICSS would be found to lead directly to reduced arrears, should the cases be followed long enough.

The opt-in and opt-out analyses actually tell a similar story from opposite sides of the coin. The opt-in analysis looked at counties prior to implementation in order to characterize those who voluntarily sought full service enforcement of their child support cases. And the opt-out analysis gave a picture of those who voluntarily chose not to receive such services. Generally speaking, those cases opting-in are more likely to have female NCPs, more likely to be older, more likely to be employed but at lower average wages. In contrast, those cases opting-out are more likely to have male NCPs, more likely to be younger, less likely to be employed but at higher earnings. Thus, those opting-in are in many aspects the opposite of those opting-out, and they paint a clear picture of those who think formal child support enforcement is good and useful versus those who do not.

To the extent that ICSS impacts were reported to be different for subgroups such as Hispanics or members of the military, the tendency is toward the program working better for such groups, for the most part. In areas whose child support caseloads contain more members of the military, the impacts on ICSS were toward better collection of child support, lesser arrears and money judgments, lesser reliance on public assistance, and better employment and earnings outcomes. Areas with higher concentrations of Hispanics showed similar patterns on all of these, with the exception of child support, which was less likely to be collected but in higher amounts on average. Since apparent arrears accumulation was less likely in higher Hispanic areas, it is difficult to interpret the child support finding. However, on the whole it is clear that ICSS implementation is not hurting these subgroups, and in many ways it appears to be helping.

Considering all these results together, it is clear that members of the IV-D caseload under a system of deemed applications and default enrollment will be slightly but not dramatically more affluent, but that the positive effects of ICSS also extend beyond the impact of this shift. Making enrollment in IV-D services the default tends to bring in more cases, and in some ways these cases are slightly more affluent. Some of these new cases could be regarded as “on the bubble” in terms of the likelihood that they will benefit from enhanced, pro-active child support enforcement. Some of the most affluent among these cases then subsequently opt-out, with the belief that they don’t

need the assistance in collecting child support, or that they need the assistance less than others might. What remains among the newly recruited cases, then, is some fraction who weren't sure whether they would benefit from IV-D enforcement or weren't aware of its existence or value. And these could be exactly the groups that benefit most from a shift in the policy toward 'deemed applications.' They may not be poor now, but the assistance they receive enforcing child support obligations could be the very thing that keeps them from becoming poor when the next economic shock hits.

The effects of ICSS on the caseload are clear. Better child support outcomes, strong evidence of reduced arrears, and reduced public assistance all testify to the importance of enforcing child support cases early. The 'nudge' toward the IV-D system that ICSS represents appears to help these families in multiple ways, while the choice of opting-out preserves their freedom of choice.

APPENDIX A: DATA PROCESSING

El Paso County

Random Assignment

Implementation of ICSS in El Paso, including random assignment of cases to the ICSS and control groups, began in March of 2013 and ended in May 2014. A total of 1,175 unique records with random assignment designations were received from the El Paso DRO (see Table A-1).

Table A-1. Random Assignment by El Paso DRO

Case Type	N	(%)
Cases identified for potential inclusion in the Control Group	565	(48%)
Cases identified for potential inclusion in the Treatment Group	610	(52%)
<i>Total</i>	<i>1,175</i>	

Study Population

The El Paso DRO data included both cause-numbers and case-ids. Using both variables to match to the OAG administrative data ensures a one-to-one match. Case-ids were available for 97% of the randomly assigned cases, and these 1135 cases were matched to the OAG datasets using both cause number and case-id. The remaining 40 cases without case-id were matched to the OAG datasets using only cause-number. The two sets of matches were then combined. A total of 1,122 matches (95%) were obtained. These 1,122 cases form our study population. A close examination indicates similar match rates for the treatment group and the control group. Also, the match rate is fairly steady across the time period within which cases were assigned (March 2013 – May 2014).

Table A-2. Matches with OAG Administrative Data

Record Type	Not Matched	Matched	Total
El Paso DRO records with case-id	17 (2%)	1,118 (99%)	1,135 97%
El Paso DRO records without case-id	36 (90%)	4 (10%)	40 3%
<i>Total</i>	<i>53 (5%)</i>	<i>1,122 (95%)</i>	<i>1,175</i>

The study cases were matched to other OAG administrative datasets (court order data, case data, member-to-case cross-reference, and individual demographic data) to obtain additional information about the cases. Only 58% of the study cases could be matched to the OAG court order dataset. Nearly all (91%) of the study cases were matched to the OAG case dataset. Using the case-id to member-id cross-reference, custodial parents (CPs), non-custodial parents (NCPs) and dependent children were identified for each case, and their demographic information was obtained. Figure A-1 provides an overview of the matching process described above. Our final study population thus consisted of 1,119 cases. Table A-3 summarizes cases potentially eligible for random assignment and inclusion in the final study adult population. Note, however, that these cases were subjected to additional screens prior to inclusion in the study, as described in the Experimental Design section of the main body of the report.

Table A-3. Cases Potentially Eligible for Random Assignment in El Paso Study Adult Population

Study Adults	CPs	NCPs	Total
Cases identified for potential inclusion in the Control Group	538 (48%)	538 (48%)	1,076 (48%)
Cases identified for potential inclusion in the Treatment Group	581 (52%)	581 (52%)	1,162 (52%)
<i>Total</i>	<i>1,119</i>	<i>1,119</i>	<i>2,238</i>

Employment and Benefit History

Using social security numbers to match against other datasets, employment and benefit (SNAP and TANF) history were obtained for 97% of study adults (n=2168). Social security numbers were not available for 3% of study adults (n=70), and thus for these individuals, employment, earnings and benefit history were treated as missing data (they are omitted from such analyses).

Employment history was derived from quarterly Unemployment Insurance (UI) earnings records. Derived measures included whether the adult was employed in the quarter during which the case was opened, the percent of time that the adult was employed in the prior 8 quarters, the adult’s average quarterly earnings in the prior 8 quarters, and whether or not the earnings history would have been sufficient for the adult to qualify for unemployment insurance if they had lost their job and met other criteria. Benefit history indicators included whether the adult was receiving benefits during the month in which the case was opened, as well as the percent of time the adult received benefits in the prior 12 months.


Medicaid/TANF History

Dependents were identified for the study cases and then matched to the available Medicaid and TANF data to determine if they had been enrolled in Medicaid or receiving TANF benefits prior to the date on which the case was opened (see Table A-4). Enrollment in these programs would have made their cases ineligible for study because they should have been referred for enforcement as full-service (FS) IV-D cases.

Table A-4. Medicaid/TANF History for Any Child

	No	Yes	Total
Cases with any child on Medicaid at case opening	923 (82%)	196 (18%)	1119
Cases with any child on TANF at case opening	1115 (100%)	4 (0%)	1119

Figure A-1. Processing of El Paso DRO Data to Build Study Population



Harris County

Study Population

The OAG administrative cause data has 562,566 cases that were opened in Harris County (see Table A-5). We restricted the data to the nine courts for the study (524,320 cases). These cases were then matched to other OAG administrative datasets (court order data, case data, member-to-case cross-reference, and individual demographic data) to obtain additional information about the cases. Nearly half of the records (40%) could not be matched to the OAG court order dataset. Nearly half of the records (43%) could also not be matched to the OAG case dataset.

Table A-5. Harris County Cases by Court Number

Court Number	N	%
0	22701	4%
22	1	0%
55	846	0%
133	1	0%
151	1	0%
176	1	0%
215	1	0%
245	58931	10%
246	58350	10%
247	58448	10%
256	1	0%

257	58410	10%
308	58533	10%
309	58643	10%
310	57646	10%
311	57463	10%
312	57896	10%
313	4847	1%
314	4858	1%
315	4690	1%
351	1	0%
398	1	0%
507	296	0%
<i>Total</i>	<i>562,566</i>	

The order-effective date was used as the entry date for study cases. Records that were missing the order-effective date were substituted with the cause-start-date from the OAG cause dataset. Records that were missing both the order-entered-date and the cause-start-date were substituted with the case-open-date from the OAG case dataset. After making these substitutions, we found that 76,310 cases (15%) did not have an entry date and were thus excluded from analysis.

Treatment Assignment

The cases in the study population were designated as “treatment” or “comparison” based on the entry date and the ICSS adoption date of the court to which they were assigned. Cases with an entry date (a) in the month that the assigned court flipped, or (b) in the two months prior to the

month that the assigned court flipped, or (c) in the nine months after the month that the assigned court flipped, were excluded from analysis. We eliminated cases from around the time of ICSS implementation to allow a period for case workers to get used to the new policies, procedures, and enforcement tools associated with ICSS. New cases starting from a full year prior to this interval were kept for analysis and designated as the comparison group while new cases from a full year after this interval were kept for analysis and designated as the treatment group (see Table A-6).

Table A-6. Treatment Assignment in the Harris Study Population

Court Number	ICSS Start date	Comparison	Excluded	Treatment
308th	2004 Sep	2003 Jul - 2004 Jun	2004 Jul - 2005 Jun	2005 Jul - 2006 Jun
309th	2004 Sep	2003 Jul - 2004 Jun	2004 Jul - 2005 Jun	2005 Jul - 2006 Jun
311th	2004 Sep	2003 Jul - 2004 Jun	2004 Jul - 2005 Jun	2005 Jul - 2006 Jun
246th	2005 Jul	2004 May - 2005 Apr	2005 May -2006 Apr	2006 May - 2007 Apr
312th	2005 Aug	2004 Jun - 2005 May	2005 Jun - 2006 May	2006 Jun - 2007 May
257th	2006 Feb	2004 Dec - 2005 Nov	2005 Dec -2006 Nov	2006 Dec - 2007 Nov
310th	2011 Mar	2010 Jan - 2010 Dec	2011 Jan - 2011 Dec	2012 Jan - 2012 Dec
245th	2011 Sep	2010 Jul - 2011 Jun	2011 Jul - 2012 Jun	2012 Jul - 2013 Jun
247th	2012 May	2011 Mar - 2012 Feb	2012 Mar - 2013 Feb	2013 Mar - 2014 Feb

The Harris County study population was then comprised of a total of 43,657 cases. Using the case-id to member-id cross-reference, custodial parents (CPs), non-custodial parents (NCPs) and dependent children were identified for each case, and their demographic information was obtained. Figure A-2 provides an overview of the process used to create the Harris County study population. Our final study population thus consisted of 41,112 cases.

Employment and Benefit History

Using social security numbers to match against other databases, employment and benefit (SNAP and TANF) history were obtained for 94% of the study adults (n=77,205). Social security numbers could not be found for 6% of the study adults (n=5,019), and thus for these individuals, employment, earnings and benefit history were treated as missing data. Employment history, derived from UI records, included measures of whether the adult had been employed during the quarter in which the case was opened, the percent of time that the adult was employed in the prior 8 quarters, the adult’s average quarterly earnings in the prior 8 quarters, and whether the earnings history would have been sufficient for the adult to qualify for unemployment insurance if they had

lost their job and met other criteria. Benefit history included whether the adult was receiving benefits during the month in which the case was opened, as well as the percent of time the adult was eligible or received benefits during the prior 12 months.

Medicaid / TANF History


Dependents were identified for the study cases and then matched to the available Medicaid and TANF data to determine if they had been enrolled in Medicaid or receiving TANF benefits during the month in which the case was opened (see Table A-7). These characteristics would have made their cases ineligible for study because they should have been referred for enforcement as full-service (FS) IV-D cases.

Table A-7. Medicaid/TANF History for Any Child

	No	Yes	Total
Cases with any child on Medicaid at case opening	27,677	13,435	41,112
	67%	33%	
Cases with any child on TANF at case opening	39,151	1,961	41,112
	95%	5%	

Note that due to limitations in the historical coverage of OAG administrative data, which was available and complete starting in January 2004, it was necessary at the time of analysis to exclude 6 months’ worth of new cases from the ICSS group for the three courts that converted in September 2004, in order to match the 6-month interval for accumulating new cases in the comparison group for these 3 courts.

Figure A-2. Processing of OAG Data to Build Study Population for Harris County



Other ICSS Counties

Study Population

The OAG administrative cause data has 801,655 cases that were opened in the thirteen counties that we examine in our “Other ICSS Counties” analysis (see Table A-8). These 776,057 cases were then matched to other OAG administrative datasets (court order data, case data, member-to-case cross-reference, and individual demographic data) to obtain additional information about the cases. About a third of the records (33%) could not be matched to the OAG court order dataset. Nearly half of the records (46%) could also not be matched to the OAG case dataset.

Table A-8. Other ICSS Counties Cases by County

County Name	N	%
Cameron	66622	8%
Dallas	313314	39%
Ector	31134	4%
Gregg	24542	3%
Harrison	10400	1%
Hidalgo	90128	11%
Lubbock	51351	6%
Panola	3622	0%
Smith	35216	4%
Taylor	25576	3%
Travis	111284	14%
Upshur	5584	1%
Webb	32882	4%
<i>Total</i>	<i>801,655</i>	

The order-effective date was used as the entry date for study cases. Records that were missing the order-effective date were substituted with the cause-start-date from the OAG cause dataset. Records that were missing both the order-entered-date and the cause-start-date were substituted with the case-open-date from the OAG case dataset. After making these substitutions, we found that 83,943 cases (10%) did not have an order-entered-date and were thus excluded from analysis.

Treatment Assignment

The cases in the study population were designated as “treatment” or “comparison” based on the date they were opened and the date that the county in which they were opened adopted ICSS, similar to what was done with Harris County cases. For each county, cases with an entry date (a) in the month that the county flipped, or (b) in the two months prior to the months that the county flipped, or (c) in the nine months after the month that the county flipped, were excluded from analysis. New cases opened from a full year prior to this interval were kept for analysis as the comparison group and cases from a full year after this interval were kept for analysis as the treatment group (see Table A-9).

Table A-9. Treatment Assignment in the Other ICSS Counties Study Population

ICSS County	Start date	Comparison	Excluded	Treatment
Harrison	2005 May	2004 Mar - 2005 Feb	2005 Mar - 2006 Feb	2006 Mar - 2007 Feb
Cameron	2005 Aug	2004 Jun - 2005 May	2005 Jun - 2006 May	2006 Jun - 2007 May
Gregg	2005 Sep	2004 Jul - 2005 Jun	2005 Jul - 2006 Jun	2006 Jul - 2007 Jun
Panola	2005 Sep	2004 Jul - 2005 Jun	2005 Jul - 2006 Jun	2006 Jul - 2007 Jun
Smith	2005 Sep	2004 Jul - 2005 Jun	2005 Jul - 2006 Jun	2006 Jul - 2007 Jun
Upshur	2005 Sep	2004 Jul - 2005 Jun	2005 Jul - 2006 Jun	2006 Jul - 2007 Jun
Dallas	2005 Oct	2004 Aug - 2005 Jul	2005 Aug - 2006 Jul	2006 Aug - 2007 Jul
Taylor	2005 Nov	2004 Sep - 2005 Aug	2005 Sep - 2006 Aug	2006 Sep - 2007 Aug
Hidalgo	2006 Feb	2004 Dec - 2005 Nov	2005 Dec -2006 Nov	2006 Dec - 2007 Nov
Ector	2006 May	2005 Mar - 2006 Feb	2006 Mar - 2007 Feb	2007 Mar - 2008 Feb
Webb	2006 Oct	2005 Aug - 2008 Jul	2006 Aug - 2007 Jul	2007 Aug - 2008 Jul
Lubbock	2009 May	2008 Mar - 2009 Feb	2009 Mar - 2010 Feb	2010 Mar - 2011 Feb
Travis	2009 July	2008 May - 2009 Apr	2009 May -2010 Apr	2010 May - 2011 Apr

The study population was then comprised of a total of 70,674 cases. Using the case-id to member-id cross-reference, custodial parents (CPs), non-custodial parents (NCPs) and dependent children were identified for each case, and their demographic information was obtained. Figure A-3

provides an overview of the process used to create the Other ICSS Counties study population. Our final study population thus consisted of 66,650 cases.

Employment and Benefit History

Using social security numbers to match against other databases, employment and benefit (SNAP and TANF) history were obtained for 93% of study adults (n=123,381). Social security numbers could not be found for 7% of study adults (n=9,915), and thus for these individuals, employment, earnings and benefit history were treated as missing data. Employment history, derived from UI records, included measures of whether the adult had been employed during the quarter in which the case was opened, the percent of time that the adult was employed in the prior 8 quarters, the adult’s average quarterly earnings in the prior 8 quarters, and whether the earnings history would have been sufficient for the adult to qualify for unemployment insurance if they had lost their job and met other criteria. Benefit history included whether the adult was receiving benefits during the month in which the case was opened, as well as the percent of time the adult was eligible or received benefits during the prior 12 months.

Medicaid / TANF History


Dependents were identified for the study cases and then matched to the available Medicaid and TANF data to determine if they had been enrolled in Medicaid or receiving TANF benefits during the month in which the case was opened (see Table A-10). These characteristics would have made their cases ineligible for study because they should have been referred for enforcement as full-service (FS) IV-D cases.

Table A-10. Medicaid/TANF History for Any Child

	No	Yes	Total
Cases with any child on Medicaid at case opening	44,480 67%	22,170 33%	66,650
Cases with any child on TANF at case opening	62,696 94%	3,954 6%	66,650

Note that due to limitations in the historical coverage of OAG administrative data, we had to exclude Bexar, Wichita, Tarrant, and Midland Counties because their conversion to ICSS preceded the data coverage window, or because there was insufficient coverage of the pre-ICSS window to form pre-conversion comparison groups.

Figure A-3. Processing of OAG Data to Build Study Population for Other ICSS Counties



Comparison Counties

In order to study the impact of ICSS on the Other ICSS Counties, it was desirable to first identify suitable comparison counties that were as similar as possible to the ICSS counties, but that were not implementing ICSS at the time. Note that this definition allows cases from some counties that would later convert to ICSS, like Travis or El Paso, for example, to serve as comparisons for counties that switched earlier, provided there was enough of a time differential. A number of diverse county-year level characteristics (see Table A-11) were compiled for all counties in the state of Texas for each year of our study period using data from the OAG administrative datasets, the 2010 U.S. Census and the Bureau of Labor Statistics' Local Area Unemployment Statistics.

Table A-11. County-level characteristics used for PSM

Total population (2010)	Counties sharing a physical border with Mexico
% population living in urban areas (2010)	Counties with a military base
% population living in rural areas (2010)	% population in active military (2009)
% high school graduate or higher (2014)	OAG case openings
% bachelor's degree or higher (2014)	% OAG case openings with a female CP
Per capita income in the past 12 months (2014)	% OAG case openings with a Hispanic CP
Median household income in the past 12 months (2014)	% OAG case openings with a black CP
% population who are veterans (2014)	% OAG case openings with a race unknown CP
% children in single parent households (2014)	% OAG case openings with a female NCP
% single parent households (2010)	% OAG case openings with a Hispanic NCP
% population who are never married (2014)	% OAG case openings with a black NCP
Fertility Rate (2014)	% OAG case openings with a race unknown NCP
% population who are citizens (2014)	% OAG case openings with a military NCP
Unemployment Rate	Mean age of CP in OAG case openings
Metro designation	Mean age of NCP in OAG case openings
NCHS urban-rural designation (2006)	Median age of CP in OAG case openings
Border counties	Median age of NCP in OAG case openings

Propensity score matching methods were then used to match on these characteristics and identify the three most similar comparison counties for each county in the "Other ICSS" analysis (see Table A-12). Once the comparison counties were chosen, a weighting scheme was devised so that 1) the county most similar to the target county in the Other ICSS analysis carried the greatest weight, and the

third most similar carried the least weight, and 2) the cases from the three comparison counties combined would carry the same weight as the target county.

Table A-12. Comparison Counties identified for Other ICSS Counties

Other ICSS County	County flip date	Comparison County
Cameron	Aug-2005	El Paso Hudspeth Zapata
Dallas	Oct-2005	El Paso Lubbock Travis
Ector	May-2006	Lubbock Matagorda Potter
Gregg	Sep-2005	Lubbock Matagorda Potter
Harrison	May-2005	Jefferson Matagorda Washington
Hidalgo	Feb-2006	El Paso Fort Bend Montgomery

Other ICSS County	County flip date	Comparison County
Lubbock	May-2009	El Paso Jefferson Matagorda
Panola	Sep-2005	Chambers San Jacinto Wheeler
Smith	Sep-2005	Brazos Jefferson Matagorda
Taylor	Nov-2005	Bowie Kleberg Tom Green
Travis	Jul-2009	Collin Denton El Paso
Upshur	Sep-2005	Callahan Jones Liberty
Webb	Oct-2006	El Paso Hudspeth Zapata

For each selected comparison county, cases with an entry date (a) in the month that the reference “other ICSS” county flipped, or (b) in the two months prior to the month that the reference county flipped, or (c) in the nine months after the month that the reference county flipped, were excluded from analysis. Cases from a full year prior to this interval and cases from a full year after this interval were kept for analysis. We refer to these simply as Pre and Post, as there was no concurrent ICSS implementation at these sites.

OAG administrative data as well as employment and benefits data were extracted for these comparison county cases in a manner identical to that described earlier for Harris county and the Other ICSS Counties.

APPENDIX B: DETAILED STATISTICS

This Appendix includes more detailed versions of several tables that appear in the main body of this report, including results of statistical tests. In some tables, too few cases received TANF to allow TANF outcomes to be computed. In addition, unconditional means were computed for some measures but no statistical tests were done.

Table B-1. El Paso Treatment vs. Control Group, all Identified Non-PA Case Members, Detailed

All cases, demographics	ICSS Treatment group		Control group		t-value	df	prob
	N=376		N=367				
	Mean	Std	Mean	Std			
NCP age (years)	37.0	8.383	36.9	9.097		733	0.987
NCP is female	6.2%	0.241	6.5%	0.248		739	0.828
NCP is Hispanic	19.9%	0.400	23.7%	0.426		741	0.215
NCP is black	3.2%	0.176	2.5%	0.155		733	0.543
NCP race/ethnicity unknown	69.9%	0.5	62.1%	0.5	*	741	0.024
NCP is current or former military	28.2%	0.451					
CP age (years)	35.1	8.03	35.1	8.48		734	0.990
CP is Hispanic	21.8%	0.414	25.9%	0.439		741	0.193
CP is black	1.6%	0.125	1.6%	0.127		741	0.966
CP race/ethnicity unknown	68.6%	0.465	63.2%	0.483		741	0.121
CP is current or former military	2.4%	0.153					
Number of children	1.6	0.775	1.6	0.791		741	0.981
Age of youngest child, years	7.2	5.043	7.2	4.846		741	0.959
Age of oldest child, years	9.1	5.530	9.0	5.578		741	0.918
Non-custodial Parent, employment and benefit history							
NCP employed at case opening	40.4%	0.491	40.6%	0.492		741	0.962
Percent of time NCP employed over prior 8 quarters	41.4%	0.450	38.4%	0.453		741	0.359
NCP average quarterly earnings over prior 8 quarters	\$6,170	10863.3	\$5,603	9230.3		727	0.443
NCP experienced earnings dip of at least 20% within prior 8 quarters	16.0%	0.367	12.0%	0.325		734	0.119

	ICSS Treatment group		Control group		t-value	df	prob
	Mean	Std	Mean	Std			
All cases, demographics	N=376		N=367				
Time since first observed NCP earnings (quarters)	22.2	17.85	20.5	18.06	-1.26	741	0.206
NCP earnings history sufficient to qualify for UI	41.2%	0.493	39.0%	0.488	-0.63	741	0.531
NCP filed for unemployment within prior year	4.3%	0.2	2.7%	0.2	-1.14	716	0.256
NCP receiving SNAP (Food Stamps) benefits at case opening	2.4%	0.153	2.7%	0.163	0.29	741	0.775
Percent of time NCP received SNAP benefits in prior year	3.2%	0.14	3.0%	0.14	-0.24	741	0.814
NCP receiving TANF benefits at case opening	0.3%	0.052	0.3%	0.052	0.02	741	0.986
Percent of time NCP received TANF benefits in prior year	0.1%	0.017	0.3%	0.052	0.64	443	0.522
Percent of time NCP enrolled in Medicaid in prior year	1.2%	0.102	0.9%	0.089	-0.41	731	0.681
Custodial Parent, employment and benefit history							
CP employed at case opening	53.2%	0.500	52.3%	0.500	-0.24	741	0.811
Percent of time CP employed over prior 8 quarters	48.1%	0.449	48.3%	0.454	0.06	741	0.954
CP average quarterly earnings over prior 8 quarters	\$4,952	6044.4	\$5,381	8966.5	0.76	640	0.446
CP experienced earnings dip of at least 20% within prior 8 quarters	14.6%	0.354	12.5%	0.332	-0.83	741	0.406
Time since first observed CP earnings (quarters)	22.1	17.29	22.1	17.10	0.03	741	0.975
CP earnings history sufficient to qualify for UI	48.4%	0.500	48.2%	0.500	-0.05	741	0.962
CP filed for unemployment within prior year	2.9%	0.2	2.5%	0.2	-0.40	741	0.691
CP receiving SNAP (Food Stamps) benefits at case opening	11.2%	0.315	10.1%	0.302	-0.48	741	0.631
Percent of time CP received SNAP benefits in prior year	8.7%	0.22	10.3%	0.24	0.96	741	0.338
CP receiving TANF benefits at case opening	0.0%	0.000	0.0%	0.000			
Percent of time CP received TANF benefits in prior year	0.0%	0.000	0.0%	0.000			
Percent of time CP enrolled in Medicaid in prior year	0.9%	0.082	1.5%	0.101	0.87	702	0.383

Table B-2. Harris Treatment vs. Comparison Group, all Identified Non-PA Case Members, Detailed

All cases, demographics	ICSS Treatment group		Comparison group			t-value	df	prob
	N=9,814		N=9,532					
	Mean	Std	Mean	Std				
NCP age (years)	34.6	8.859	34.5	8.734		-0.85	18705	0.397
NCP is female	11.6%	0.320	11.2%	0.315		-0.82	19238	0.411
NCP is Hispanic	26.1%	0.439	24.8%	0.432	*	-2.12	19338	0.034
NCP is black	29.0%	0.454	30.5%	0.460	*	2.26	19338	0.024
NCP race/ethnicity unknown	23.0%	0.4	22.9%	0.4		-0.19	19338	0.851
NCP is current or former military	3.1%	0.172						
CP age (years)	33.3	9.06	33.0	8.80		-1.90	18583	0.058
CP is Hispanic	26.0%	0.439	24.3%	0.429	**	-2.67	19334	0.008
CP is black	25.2%	0.434	26.3%	0.440		1.73	19335	0.083
CP race/ethnicity unknown	27.4%	0.446	28.0%	0.449		0.96	19335	0.338
CP is current or former military	0.5%	0.070						
Number of children	1.4	0.711	1.4	0.766	**	-3.77	19131	0.000
Age of youngest child, years	6.1	4.976	6.3	5.038	**	3.63	18964	0.000
Age of oldest child, years	7.3	5.499	7.6	5.492	**	2.92	18964	0.004
Non-custodial Parent, employment and benefit history								
NCP employed at case opening	61.2%	0.487	58.4%	0.493	**	-4.05	19338	<.0001
Percent of time NCP employed over prior 8 quarters	59.3%	0.425	57.9%	0.424	*	-2.34	19338	0.019
NCP average quarterly earnings over prior 8 quarters	\$7,687	16425.4	\$6,857	18928.1	**	-3.25	18793	0.001
NCP experienced earnings dip of at least 20% within prior 8 quarters	23.7%	0.425	27.2%	0.445	**	5.50	19231	<.0001
Time since first observed NCP earnings (quarters)	28.7	14.66	28.6	14.69		-0.13	19338	0.893
NCP earnings history sufficient to qualify for UI	58.9%	0.492	56.5%	0.496	**	-3.38	19338	0.001
NCP filed for unemployment within prior year	6.7%	0.3	9.1%	0.3	**	6.22	18800	<.0001
NCP receiving SNAP (Food Stamps) benefits at case opening	4.3%	0.202	3.9%	0.194		-1.20	19336	0.228
Percent of time NCP received SNAP benefits in prior year	5.0%	0.17	4.2%	0.16	**	-3.30	19273	0.001
NCP receiving TANF benefits at case opening	0.2%	0.039	0.1%	0.027		-1.65	17518	0.100
Percent of time NCP received TANF benefits in prior year	0.2%	0.032	0.2%	0.032		0.87	19337	0.382

All cases, demographics	ICSS Treatment group		Comparison group		t-value	df	prob	
	N=9,814		N=9,532					
	Mean	Std	Mean	Std				
Percent of time NCP enrolled in Medicaid in prior year	3.0%	0.143	3.6%	0.149	*	2.57	19240	0.010
Custodial Parent, employment and benefit history								
CP employed at case opening	64.9%	0.477	60.7%	0.488	**	-5.99	19285	<.0001
Percent of time CP employed over prior 8 quarters	61.1%	0.423	58.1%	0.433	**	-4.85	19286	<.0001
CP average quarterly earnings over prior 8 quarters	\$5,695	7554.1	\$5,233	7831.6	**	-4.17	19255	<.0001
CP experienced earnings dip of at least 20% within prior 8 quarters	20.4%	0.403	21.4%	0.410		1.79	19335	0.074
Time since first observed CP earnings (quarters)	27.5	15.18	26.7	15.69	**	-3.71	19263	0.000
CP earnings history sufficient to qualify for UI	61.3%	0.487	57.5%	0.494	**	-5.45	19335	<.0001
CP filed for unemployment within prior year	5.6%	0.2	6.7%	0.2	**	3.08	19107	0.002
CP receiving SNAP (Food Stamps) benefits at case opening	14.2%	0.349	12.8%	0.334	**	-2.87	19330	0.004
Percent of time CP received SNAP benefits in prior year	14.3%	0.29	12.1%	0.27	**	-5.58	19306	<.0001
CP receiving TANF benefits at case opening	0.0%	0.017	0.0%	0.000		-1.73	9804	0.083
Percent of time CP received TANF benefits in prior year	0.8%	0.060	1.7%	0.093	**	7.88	16284	<.0001
Percent of time CP enrolled in Medicaid in prior year	8.7%	0.228	10.5%	0.243	**	5.36	19175	<.0001

Table B-3. Other ICSS Counties Treatment vs. Comparison Group, all Identified Non-PA Case Members, Detailed

All cases, demographics	ICSS Treatment group		Comparison group			t-value	df	prob
	N=16,964		N=19,020					
	Mean	Std	Mean	Std				
NCP age (years)	34.3	8.903	33.4	8.688	**	-9.70	33546	<.0001
NCP is female	13.2%	0.338	12.4%	0.329	*	-2.26	35151	0.024
NCP is Hispanic	35.1%	0.477	34.3%	0.475		-1.41	35976	0.159
NCP is black	22.1%	0.415	24.0%	0.427	**	4.31	35714	<.0001
NCP race/ethnicity unknown	15.9%	0.4	19.5%	0.4	**	9.01	35935	<.0001
NCP is current or former military	3.7%	0.188						
CP age (years)	33.4	9.34	32.2	9.05	**	-12.30	32826	<.0001
CP is Hispanic	34.2%	0.474	33.8%	0.473		-0.75	35977	0.452
CP is black	18.7%	0.390	20.7%	0.405	**	4.70	35768	<.0001
CP race/ethnicity unknown	20.0%	0.400	23.2%	0.422	**	7.42	35848	<.0001
CP is current or former military	0.7%	0.083						
Number of children	1.4	0.739	1.4	0.795	**	-6.33	35915	<.0001
Age of youngest child, years	6.4	5.239	6.2	5.235	**	-3.27	34879	0.001
Age of oldest child, years	7.7	5.641	7.5	5.740	**	-3.13	34767	0.002
Non-custodial Parent, employment and benefit history								
NCP employed at case opening	59.4%	0.491	55.9%	0.497	**	-6.77	35976	<.0001
Percent of time NCP employed over prior 8 quarters	57.9%	0.423	55.4%	0.424	**	-5.78	35976	<.0001
NCP average quarterly earnings over prior 8 quarters	\$6,301	11822.1	\$5,491	12029.4	**	-6.44	35638	<.0001
NCP experienced earnings dip of at least 20% within prior 8 quarters	26.2%	0.440	27.4%	0.446	*	2.51	35976	0.012
Time since first observed NCP earnings (quarters)	28.9	14.78	28.4	14.99	**	-2.82	35976	0.005
NCP earnings history sufficient to qualify for UI	57.1%	0.495	53.9%	0.498	**	-6.12	35976	<.0001
NCP filed for unemployment within prior year	6.2%	0.2	6.7%	0.2		1.71	35731	0.087
NCP receiving SNAP (Food Stamps) benefits at case opening	5.3%	0.223	7.3%	0.260	**	7.96	35926	<.0001
Percent of time NCP received SNAP benefits in prior year	7.0%	0.21	7.4%	0.21		1.41	35727	0.158
NCP receiving TANF benefits at case opening	0.1%	0.038	0.1%	0.036		-0.40	34945	0.692
Percent of time NCP received TANF benefits in prior year	0.2%	0.029	0.3%	0.037	**	3.52	35539	0.000

All cases, demographics	ICSS Treatment group		Comparison group			t-value	df	prob
	Mean	Std	Mean	Std				
	N=16,964		N=19,020					
Percent of time NCP enrolled in Medicaid in prior year	4.9%	0.174	4.1%	0.158	**	-4.74	34436	<.0001
Custodial Parent, employment and benefit history								
CP employed at case opening	62.9%	0.483	60.0%	0.490	**	-5.71	35977	<.0001
Percent of time CP employed over prior 8 quarters	59.7%	0.431	57.6%	0.430	**	-4.67	35977	<.0001
CP average quarterly earnings over prior 8 quarters	\$4,947	6280.1	\$4,327	5792.1	**	-9.70	34667	<.0001
CP experienced earnings dip of at least 20% within prior 8 quarters	19.9%	0.399	21.8%	0.413	**	4.60	35752	<.0001
Time since first observed CP earnings (quarters)	27.2	15.76	26.6	15.82	**	-3.18	35977	0.002
CP earnings history sufficient to qualify for UI	59.9%	0.490	57.0%	0.495	**	-5.60	35977	<.0001
CP filed for unemployment within prior year	4.9%	0.2	5.8%	0.2	**	3.75	35932	0.000
CP receiving SNAP (Food Stamps) benefits at case opening	13.1%	0.338	19.8%	0.399	**	17.21	35883	<.0001
Percent of time CP received SNAP benefits in prior year	15.0%	0.30	18.3%	0.32	**	10.06	35940	<.0001
CP receiving TANF benefits at case opening	0.0%	0.022	0.1%	0.024		0.44	35972	0.658
Percent of time CP received TANF benefits in prior year	0.9%	0.067	1.4%	0.086	**	6.42	35393	<.0001
Percent of time CP enrolled in Medicaid in prior year	12.6%	0.268	8.9%	0.229	**	-13.88	33556	<.0001

Table B-4. El Paso Impact Estimates, Full Sample, Detailed

Outcome	ICSS group		Control group		ICSS Impact	F-value	prob
	Adjusted mean	sample size	Adjusted mean	sample size			
Any FS child support collections made	62.7%	10632	11.9%	10207	50.8% **	7893.32	<.0001
Any RO child support collections made	1.2%	10632	39.6%	10207	-38.4% **	6272.39	<.0001
Any child support collections made, either type	63.8%	10632	51.4%	10207	12.4% **	336.15	<.0001
Total monthly child support collections, either type, among those paying	\$927	6785	\$949	5243	-\$22	1.96	0.1612
Total monthly child support collections, unconditional	\$592		\$487				
Regular child support payment due, monthly	\$653	10632	\$161	10207	\$492 **	4702.36	<.0001
Arrears child support payment due, monthly	\$11	10632	\$5	10207	\$6 **	50.84	<.0001
Money judgment made in child support case	0.2%	10632	0.2%	10207	0.0%	0.93	0.3347
Any arrears owed	43.6%	883	9.8%	825	33.8% **	288	<.0001
Total arrears, among those who owe any	\$3533	385	\$5025	81	-\$1492	1.13	0.2891
Total arrears, unconditional	\$1531	883	\$503	825	\$1028 **	12.1	0.0005
Total arrears owed to the state	\$10	883	\$3	825	\$7	2.57	0.1090
Total arrears owed to the CP	\$1521	883	\$500	825	\$1021 **	11.96	0.0006
CP receiving SNAP (Food Stamp) benefits	7.6%	10632	8.4%	10207	-0.8% *	4.52	0.0335
Average monthly SNAP (Food Stamp) benefits, CP, among those receiving benefits	\$257	809	\$300	861	-\$43 **	19.17	<.0001
Average monthly SNAP benefits, CP, unconditional	\$20		\$25				
CP enrolled in Medicaid	3.4%	10632	4.8%	10207	-1.4% **	26.4	<.0001
CP employed	51.9%	2920	49.8%	2785	2.1%	2.48	0.1155
CP average quarterly earnings, among employed	\$9393	1515	\$10874	1388	-\$1481 **	29.29	<.0001
NCP employed	41.6%	2920	39.1%	2785	2.5% *	3.97	0.0464
NCP average quarterly earnings, among employed	\$16606	1216	\$13654	1088	\$2952 **	6.69	0.0098

Source: RMC analysis of Texas OAG and HHSC administrative records and El Paso County DRO data. *= $p < .05$; **= $p < .01$. Too few cases received TANF to allow TANF outcomes to be computed. Unconditional means were computed for some measures but no statistical tests were done.

Table B-5. El Paso Impact Estimates, Late Assignments Only, Detailed

Outcome	ICSS group		Control group		ICSS Impact	F-value	prob
	Adjusted mean	sample size	Adjusted mean	sample size			
Any FS child support collections made	67.2%	4372	10.7%	4439	56.5% **	4466.11	<.0001
Any RO child support collections made	1.3%	4372	40.1%	4439	-38.8% **	2595.3	<.0001
Any child support collections made, either type	68.5%	4372	50.6%	4439	17.9% **	299.39	<.0001
Total monthly child support collections, either type, among those paying	\$882	2993	\$973	2248	-\$91 **	21.64	<.0001
Total monthly child support collections, unconditional	\$604		\$493				
Regular child support payment due, monthly	\$682	4372	\$151	4439	\$531 **	2840.73	<.0001
Arrears child support payment due, monthly	\$16	4372	\$4	4439	\$12 **	56.08	<.0001
Money judgment made in child support case	0.2%	4372	0.2%	4439	0.0%	0.27	0.6053
Any arrears owed	48.9%	311	9.9%	312	39.0% **	138.6	<.0001
Total arrears, among those who owe any	\$4543	152	\$5052	31	-\$509	0.02	0.8813
Total arrears, unconditional	\$2195	311	\$527	312	\$1668 *	4.92	0.0269
Total arrears owed to the state	\$5	311	\$5	312	\$	0.04	0.8379
Total arrears owed to the CP	\$2191	311	\$521	312	\$1670 *	4.93	0.0267
CP receiving SNAP (Food Stamp) benefits	5.7%	4372	8.3%	4439	-2.6% **	23.4	<.0001
Average monthly SNAP (Food Stamp) benefits, CP	\$280	247	\$336	368	-\$56 **	8.89	0.0030
Average monthly SNAP benefits, CP, unconditional	\$16		\$28				
CP enrolled in Medicaid	1.7%	4372	4.9%	4439	-3.2% **	74.08	<.0001
CP employed	51.3%	1156	53.0%	1168	-1.7%	0.65	0.4201
CP average quarterly earnings, among employed	\$10467	593	\$11172	619	-\$705	2.25	0.1336
NCP employed	41.9%	1156	40.1%	1168	1.8%	0.79	0.3735
NCP average quarterly earnings, among employed	\$14236	484	\$15926	468	-\$1690	2.2	0.1381

Source: RMC analysis of Texas OAG and HHSC administrative records and El Paso County DRO data. *=p<.05; **=p<.01. Too few cases received TANF to allow TANF outcomes to be computed. Unconditional means were computed for some measures but no statistical tests were done.

Table B-6. Harris Short Term Quasi-experimental Impact Estimates, Detailed

Outcome	ICSS group		Comparison group		Difference associated with ICSS	F-value	prob
	Adjusted mean	sample size	Adjusted mean	sample size			
Any FS child support collections made	45.9%	92950	29.1%	115602	16.8% **	6442.95	<.0001
Any RO child support collections made	4.7%	92950	7.0%	115602	-2.3% **	464.12	<.0001
Any child support collections made, either type	50.4%	92950	35.9%	115602	14.5% **	4553.76	<.0001
Total monthly child support collections, either type, among those paying	\$661	46870	\$599	41545	\$62 **	183.87	<.0001
Total monthly child support collections, unconditional	\$333		\$215				
Regular child support payment due, monthly	\$394	92950	\$275	115602	\$119 **	4429.12	<.0001
Arrears child support payment due, monthly	\$15	92950	\$18	115602	-\$3 **	105.41	<.0001
Money judgment made in child support case	0.3%	92950	0.3%	115602	0.0%	0.22	0.6355
Any arrears owed	42.0%	3759	38.8%	2428	3.2% *	6.63	0.0100
Total arrears, among those who owe any	\$4339	1651	\$5335	868	-\$996 *	3.94	0.0473
Total arrears, unconditional	\$1809	3759	\$2057	2428	-\$248	1.45	0.2283
Total arrears owed to the state	\$50	3759	\$68	2428	-\$18	2.82	0.0934
Total arrears owed to the CP	\$1759	3759	\$1989	2428	-\$230	1.26	0.2620
CP receiving SNAP (Food Stamp) benefits	15.2%	92719	15.5%	115013	-0.3%	3.46	0.0630
Average monthly SNAP (Food Stamp) benefits, CP, among those receiving benefits	\$352	14080	\$370	17806	-\$18 **	75.9	<.0001
Average monthly SNAP benefits, CP, unconditional	\$53		\$57				
CP receiving TANF benefits	1.0%	92719	1.5%	115013	-0.5% **	89.11	<.0001
CP enrolled in Medicaid	8.9%	92719	9.7%	115013	-.8% **	35.81	<.0001
CP employed	65.3%	25697	60.6%	32014	4.7% **	131.9	<.0001
CP average quarterly earnings, among employed	\$9348	16776	\$8815	19413	\$533 **	23.59	<.0001
NCP employed	60.3%	25725	56.5%	31985	3.8% **	84.87	<.0001
NCP average quarterly earnings, among employed	\$12649	15501	\$11321	18057	\$1328 **	25.98	<.0001

Table B-7. Other ICSS Counties, Quasi-experimental Impact Estimates, Detailed

Outcome	ICSS group		Comparison group		Difference associated with ICSS	F-value	prob
	Adjusted mean	sample size	Adjusted mean	sample size			
Any FS child support collections made	38.0%	1482609	28.9%	1746746	9.1% **	29706	<.0001
Any RO child support collections made	3.9%	1482609	8.0%	1746746	-4.1% **	24144.1	<.0001
Any child support collections made, either type	41.8%	1482609	36.9%	1746746	4.9% **	8075.75	<.0001
Total monthly child support collections, either type, among those paying	\$598	617402	\$552	645650	\$46 **	1094.7	<.0001
Total monthly child support collections, unconditional	\$249		\$204				
Regular child support payment due, monthly	\$269	1482609	\$186	1746746	\$83 **	48225.4	<.0001
Arrears child support payment due, monthly	\$27	1482609	\$27	1746746	\$ **	7.53	0.0061
Money judgment made in child support case	0.3%	1482609	0.4%	1746746	-0.1%	1.88	0.1700
Any arrears owed	40.5%	110703	38.6%	108856	1.9% **	85.03	<.0001
Total arrears, among those who owe any	\$9229	45181	\$10150	41692	-\$921 **	88.08	<.0001
Total arrears, unconditional	\$3768	110703	\$3886	108856	-\$118 **	7.16	0.0075
Total arrears owed to the state	\$193	110703	\$380	108856	-\$187 **	530.05	<.0001
Total arrears owed to the CP	\$3574	110703	\$3506	108856	\$68	2.61	0.1060
CP receiving SNAP (Food Stamp) benefits	16.7%	1482239	19.9%	1744427	-3.2% **	5408.24	<.0001
Average monthly SNAP (Food Stamp) benefits, CP, among those receiving benefits	\$390	246676	\$409	347598	-\$19 **	1052.65	<.0001
Average monthly SNAP benefits, CP, unconditional	\$65		\$81				
CP receiving TANF benefits	0.6%	1482239	0.9%	1744427	-0.3% **	1373.22	<.0001
CP enrolled in Medicaid	12.8%	1482239	14.5%	1744427	-1.7% **	1832.79	<.0001
CP employed	58.7%	471468	56.5%	568782	2.2% **	517.17	<.0001
CP average quarterly earnings, among employed	\$9353	276708	\$8736	321453	\$617 **	620.65	<.0001
NCP employed	52.3%	471446	49.9%	568829	2.4% **	628.78	<.0001
NCP average quarterly earnings, among employed	\$11922	246656	\$10999	283845	\$923 **	149.37	<.0001

Table B-8. Other ICSS Counties, Quasi-experimental Impact Estimates, Difference-in-Differences Model

Outcome	ICSS Counties		Non-ICSS Counties		ICSS Impact (diff. in diff.)	F-value	prob
	Pre (comparison)	Post (ICSS)	Pre	Post			
Any FS child support collections made	29.0%	37.9%	26.0%	27.6%	7.3% **	1174.2	<.0001
Any RO child support collections made	8.0%	3.9%	10.9%	11.2%	-4.4% **	1254.26	<.0001
Any child support collections made, either type	36.9%	41.8%	36.8%	38.7%	3.0% **	167.93	<.0001
Total monthly child support collections, either type, among those paying	\$552	\$598	\$569	\$540	\$75 **	172.2	<.0001
Total monthly child support collections, unconditional	\$204	\$249	\$214	\$218			
Regular child support payment due, monthly	\$186	\$269	\$173	\$172	\$84 **	3181.55	<.0001
Arrears child support payment due, monthly	\$27	\$27	\$22	\$23	-\$1 **	16.5	<.0001
Money judgment made in child support case	0.4%	0.3%	0.4%	0.4%	-0.1%	3.66	0.0558
Any arrears owed	38.4%	40.6%	34.8%	37.5%	-0.5%	0.32	0.5729
Total arrears, among those who owe any	\$10324	\$9406	\$8853	\$8345	-\$410	0.99	0.3202
Total arrears, unconditional	\$3895	\$3795	\$3187	\$3158	-\$71	0.16	0.6888
Total arrears owed to the state	\$377	\$198	\$347	\$299	-\$131 **	15.51	<.0001
Total arrears owed to the CP	\$3518	\$3597	\$2840	\$2860	\$59	0.12	0.7255
CP receiving SNAP (Food Stamp) benefits	19.9%	16.7%	17.7%	19.7%	-5.2% **	646.63	<.0001
Average monthly SNAP (Food Stamp) benefits, CP, among those receiving benefits	\$410	\$391	\$397	\$381	-\$3	2.45	0.1178
Average monthly SNAP benefits, CP, unconditional	\$82	\$65	\$69	\$73			
CP receiving TANF benefits	0.9%	0.6%	0.6%	0.8%	-0.5% **	163.7	<.0001
CP enrolled in Medicaid	14.5%	12.8%	10.5%	12.7%	-3.9% **	480.49	<.0001
CP employed	56.5%	58.7%	55.2%	55.5%	1.9% **	17.07	<.0001
CP average quarterly earnings, among employed	\$8,727	\$9,345	\$8,787	\$8,216	\$1,189 **	95.68	<.0001
NCP employed	49.9%	52.4%	49.9%	50.1%	2.3% **	21.3	<.0001
NCP average quarterly earnings, among employed	\$10,990	\$11,915	\$11,841	\$9,882	\$2,884 **	51.77	<.0001

Table B-9. Differential ICSS Impacts among Hispanics, Difference-in-Differences Model, Detailed

Outcome	Less Hispanic Counties		More Hispanic Counties		Hispanic Differential Impact (d.i.d.)	F-value	prob
	Pre (comparison)	Post (ICSS)	Pre (comparison)	Post (ICSS)			
Any FS child support collections made	26.0%	37.4%	32.8%	38.9%	-5.3%**	2396.66	<.0001
Any RO child support collections made	8.8%	3.9%	7.0%	3.8%	1.7%**	840.36	<.0001
Any child support collections made, either type	34.7%	41.3%	39.8%	42.7%	-3.7%**	1083.23	<.0001
Total monthly child support collections, either type, among those paying	\$551	\$578	\$553	\$634	\$54**	361.47	<.0001
Total monthly child support collections, unconditional	\$188	\$236	\$225	\$274			
Regular child support payment due, monthly	\$180	\$266	\$193	\$274	-\$5**	53.12	<.0001
Arrears child support payment due, monthly	\$23	\$25	\$31	\$30	-\$3**	372.31	<.0001
Money judgment made in child support case	0.3%	0.3%	0.4%	0.4%	0.0%**	48.97	<.0001
Any arrears owed	35.3%	40.8%	41.9%	40.2%	-7.2%**	279.78	<.0001
Total arrears, among those who owe any	\$10022	\$8976	\$10247	\$9693	\$492 *	5.81	0.0159
Total arrears, unconditional	\$3503	\$3690	\$4270	\$3931	-\$526**	32.83	<.0001
Total arrears owed to the state	\$195	\$137	\$565	\$307	-\$200**	143.42	<.0001
Total arrears owed to the CP	\$3308	\$3552	\$3704	\$3624	-\$324**	13.69	0.0002
CP receiving SNAP (Food Stamp) benefits	14.6%	15.8%	26.9%	18.3%	-9.8%**	12395.5	<.0001
Average monthly SNAP (Food Stamp) benefits, CP, among those receiving benefits	\$379	\$393	\$430	\$385	-\$59**	2517.51	<.0001
Average monthly SNAP benefits, CP, unconditional	\$55	\$61	\$117	\$71			
CP receiving TANF benefits	0.9%	0.7%	0.9%	0.3%	-0.4%**	270.16	<.0001
CP enrolled in Medicaid	11.0%	12.2%	19.0%	14.0%	-6.2%**	6206.87	<.0001
CP employed	57.7%	59.5%	54.9%	57.2%	.5%**	8.21	0.0042
CP average quarterly earnings, among employed	\$9,293	\$9,458	\$7,970	\$9,150	\$1,015**	393.4	<.0001
NCP employed	50.4%	52.7%	49.2%	51.6%	0.1%	0.1	0.7553
NCP average quarterly earnings, among employed	\$11,524	\$11,915	\$10,301	\$11,936	\$1,244**	63.66	<.0001

Table B-10. Differential ICSS Impacts among Military Members, Difference-in-Differences Model, Detailed

Outcome	Less Military Counties		More Military Counties		Military Differential Impact (d.i.d.)	F-value	prob
	Pre (comparison)	Post (ICSS)	Pre (comparison)	Post (ICSS)			
Any FS child support collections made	27.5%	36.9%	31.3%	41.7%	1.0% **	81.3	<.0001
Any RO child support collections made	8.2%	4.0%	8.1%	3.5%	-0.4% **	35.06	<.0001
Any child support collections made, either type	35.7%	40.8%	39.4%	45.2%	0.7% **	32.87	<.0001
Total monthly child support collections, either type, among those paying	\$556	\$585	\$555	\$645	\$61 **	415.41	<.0001
Total monthly child support collections, unconditional	\$196	\$236	\$225	\$297			
Regular child support payment due, monthly	\$191	\$264	\$176	\$295	\$46 **	2893.36	<.0001
Arrears child support payment due, monthly	\$24	\$27	\$31	\$27	-\$7 **	1333.21	<.0001
Money judgment made in child support case	0.3%	0.3%	0.5%	0.4%	-0.1% **	44.57	<.0001
Any arrears owed	36.4%	41.3%	41.2%	38.6%	-7.5% **	273.31	<.0001
Total arrears, among those who owe any	\$10020	\$9192	\$10248	\$9202	-\$218	1.03	0.3106
Total arrears, unconditional	\$3639	\$3828	\$4173	\$3536	-\$826 **	73.1	<.0001
Total arrears owed to the state	\$222	\$173	\$597	\$261	-\$287 **	263.86	<.0001
Total arrears owed to the CP	\$3417	\$3655	\$3576	\$3275	-\$539 **	34.07	<.0001
CP receiving SNAP (Food Stamp) benefits	15.8%	16.7%	27.6%	16.3%	-12.2% **	16947.7	<.0001
Average monthly SNAP (Food Stamp) benefits, CP, among those receiving benefits	\$386	\$396	\$433	\$372	-\$71 **	3255.02	<.0001
Average monthly SNAP benefits, CP, unconditional	\$60	\$66	\$121	\$62			
CP receiving TANF benefits	0.9%	0.6%	1.0%	0.3%	-0.4% **	360.74	<.0001
CP enrolled in Medicaid	12.2%	13.0%	18.7%	11.8%	-7.7% **	8398	<.0001
CP employed	57.3%	58.6%	54.9%	58.8%	2.6% **	150.28	<.0001
CP average quarterly earnings, among employed	\$9,124	\$9,368	\$7,996	\$9,313	\$1,073 **	387.53	<.0001
NCP employed	50.7%	51.9%	48.1%	53.3%	4.0% **	351.36	<.0001
NCP average quarterly earnings, among employed	\$11,318	\$11,802	\$10,396	\$12,352	\$1,472 **	78.78	<.0001

Table B-11. Opt-Outs vs. those Remaining in Full Service, All Sites, Detailed

All cases, demographics	Opted Out		Remained Full Service		t-value	df	prob	
	N=2,343		N=27,574					
	Mean	Std	Mean	Std				
NCP age (years)	36.9	9.553	34.3	9.267	**	-10.45	25119	<.0001
NCP is female	27.1%	0.444	10.4%	0.305	**	-17.72	2519	<.0001
NCP is Hispanic	13.1%	0.337	31.2%	0.463	**	24.18	3148	<.0001
NCP is black	5.3%	0.225	27.3%	0.446	**	40.98	4128	<.0001
NCP race/ethnicity unknown	64.8%	0.5	14.4%	0.4	**	-50.00	2561	<.0001
NCP is current or former military	1.0%	0.099						
CP age (years)	37.9	9.62	32.9	9.49	**	-18.98	25103	<.0001
CP is Hispanic	9.6%	0.295	31.0%	0.463	**	32.00	3413	<.0001
CP is black	3.6%	0.186	24.5%	0.430	**	45.21	4872	<.0001
CP race/ethnicity unknown	74.1%	0.438	16.2%	0.368	**	-62.24	2631	<.0001
CP is current or former military	0.6%	0.077						
Number of children	1.0	0.866	1.2	0.810	**	11.28	2702	<.0001
Age of youngest child, years	8.2	5.716	6.1	5.416	**	-14.34	1882	<.0001
Age of oldest child, years	9.5	5.918	7.3	5.992	**	-14.36	25477	<.0001
Non-custodial Parent, employment and benefit history								
NCP employed at case opening	52.3%	0.500	59.7%	0.490	**	7.02	29915	<.0001
Percent of time NCP employed over prior 8 quarters	51.7%	0.451	58.3%	0.419	**	6.83	2697	<.0001
NCP average quarterly earnings over prior 8 quarters	\$8,053	25324.3	\$6,554	13867.2	**	-2.83	2463	0.005
NCP experienced earnings dip of at least 20% within prior 8 quarters	20.4%	0.403	26.3%	0.440	**	6.83	2840	<.0001
Time since first observed NCP earnings (quarters)	25.7	17.16	28.3	14.72	**	7.23	2643	<.0001
NCP earnings history sufficient to qualify for UI	50.4%	0.500	57.4%	0.494	**	6.59	29915	<.0001
NCP filed for unemployment within prior year	3.5%	0.2	6.6%	0.2	**	7.56	3117	<.0001
NCP receiving SNAP (Food Stamps) benefits at case opening	3.6%	0.186	4.6%	0.210	*	2.57	2874	0.010
Percent of time NCP received SNAP benefits in prior year	5.4%	0.18	5.8%	0.19		1.11	29915	0.269
NCP receiving TANF benefits at case opening	0.3%	0.051	0.1%	0.036		-1.18	2549	0.239
Percent of time NCP received TANF benefits in prior year	0.2%	0.025	0.2%	0.030		0.34	2983	0.731

All cases, demographics	Opted Out		Remained Full Service		t-value	df	prob	
	N=2,343		N=27,574					
	Mean	Std	Mean	Std				
Percent of time NCP enrolled in Medicaid in prior year	5.1%	0.183	5.0%	0.177		-0.28	2728	0.779
Custodial Parent, employment and benefit history								
CP employed at case opening	54.5%	0.498	64.0%	0.480	**	8.88	2725	<.0001
Percent of time CP employed over prior 8 quarters	51.9%	0.459	61.0%	0.416	**	9.33	2680	<.0001
CP average quarterly earnings over prior 8 quarters	\$5,978	8747.0	\$5,039	6402.1	**	-5.08	2560	<.0001
CP experienced earnings dip of at least 20% within prior 8 quarters	15.2%	0.359	24.2%	0.428	**	11.55	2941	<.0001
Time since first observed CP earnings (quarters)	24.7	17.61	27.3	14.99	**	6.93	2638	<.0001
CP earnings history sufficient to qualify for UI	52.1%	0.500	60.7%	0.489	**	8.11	29914	<.0001
CP filed for unemployment within prior year	2.6%	0.2	5.8%	0.2	**	9.00	3278	<.0001
CP receiving SNAP (Food Stamps) benefits at case opening	4.7%	0.212	18.4%	0.388	**	27.74	3844	<.0001
Percent of time CP received SNAP benefits in prior year	4.1%	0.16	18.8%	0.33	**	37.90	4208	<.0001
CP receiving TANF benefits at case opening	0.0%	0.021	1.1%	0.103	**	13.65	16420	<.0001
Percent of time CP received TANF benefits in prior year	0.1%	0.027	1.4%	0.087	**	17.29	7588	<.0001
Percent of time CP enrolled in Medicaid in prior year	5.7%	0.200	23.3%	0.360	**	37.59	3790	<.0001

Table B-12. Apparent Opt-Outs, El Paso, Outcomes Comparison, Detailed

Outcome	Opted Out		Remained Full Service		Difference Associated with Opt-out	F-value	prob
	Adjusted mean	sample size	Adjusted mean	sample size			
Any FS child support collections made	10.2%	578	66.3%	9560	-56.1% **	794.38	<.0001
Any RO child support collections made	14.7%	578	0.4%	9560	14.3% **	1058.02	<.0001
Any child support collections made, either type	24.7%	578	66.6%	9560	-41.9% **	433.57	<.0001
Total monthly child support collections, either type, among those paying	\$1210	143	\$921	6368	\$289 **	19.29	<.0001
Total monthly child support collections, unconditional	\$299		\$613				
Regular child support payment due, monthly	\$503	578	\$663	9560	-\$160 **	35.02	<.0001
Arrears child support payment due, monthly	\$1	578	\$11	9560	-\$10 **	11.08	0.0009
Money judgment made in child support case	0.0%	578	0.2%	9560	-0.2%	1.39	0.2378
Any arrears owed	7.3%	41	45.0%	803	-37.7% **	23.09	<.0001
Total arrears, among those who owe any	\$7686	3	\$3467	361	\$4219	0.34	0.5598
Total arrears, unconditional	\$562	41	\$1559	803	-\$997	0.55	0.4569
Total arrears owed to the state	\$	41	\$5	803	#VALUE!	0.39	0.5322
Total arrears owed to the CP	\$562	41	\$1554	803	-\$992	0.55	0.4591
CP receiving SNAP (Food Stamp) benefits	3.8%	578	7.2%	9560	-3.4% **	9.49	0.0021
Average monthly SNAP (Food Stamp) benefits, CP, among those receiving benefits	\$336	22	\$267	685	\$69	3.34	0.0678
Average monthly SNAP benefits, CP, unconditional	\$13		\$19				
CP receiving TANF benefits							
CP enrolled in Medicaid	6.7%	578	3.0%	9560	3.7% **	24.2	<.0001
CP employed	46.5%	159	51.0%	2628	-4.5%	1.21	0.2720
CP average quarterly earnings, among employed	\$9403	74	\$9387	1341	\$16	0	0.9830
NCP employed	20.8%	159	43.1%	2628	-22.3% **	31.12	<.0001
NCP average quarterly earnings, among employed	\$18652	33	\$16808	1133	\$1844	0.08	0.7753

Table B-13. Apparent Opt-Outs, Harris, Outcomes Comparison, Detailed

Outcome	Opted Out		Remained Full Service		Difference Associated with Opt-out	F-value	prob
	Adjusted mean	sample size	Adjusted mean	sample size			
Any FS child support collections made	1.0%	8717	50.7%	75442	-49.7% **	8594.21	<.0001
Any RO child support collections made	30.5%	8717	2.1%	75442	28.4% **	15512.4	<.0001
Any child support collections made, either type	31.0%	8717	52.6%	75442	-21.6% **	1494.69	<.0001
Total monthly child support collections, either type, among those paying	\$860	2700	\$662	39720	\$198 **	245.63	<.0001
Total monthly child support collections, unconditional	\$266		\$349				
Regular child support payment due, monthly	\$282	8717	\$416	75442	-\$134 **	667.51	<.0001
Arrears child support payment due, monthly	\$1	8717	\$13	75442	-\$12 **	810	<.0001
Money judgment made in child support case	0.0%	8717	0.3%	75442	-0.3% **	23.75	<.0001
Any arrears owed	4.5%	287	46.4%	3289	-41.9% **	199.42	<.0001
Total arrears, among those who owe any	\$1416	13	\$3832	1527	-\$2416	0.66	0.4181
Total arrears, unconditional	\$64	287	\$1779	3289	-\$1715 **	14.72	0.0001
Total arrears owed to the state	\$0	287	\$47	3289	\$0 **	12.97	0.0003
Total arrears owed to the CP	\$64	287	\$1732	3289	-\$1668 **	14.02	0.0002
CP receiving SNAP (Food Stamp) benefits	2.7%	8717	15.8%	75254	-13.1% **	1100.87	<.0001
Average monthly SNAP (Food Stamp) benefits, CP, among those receiving benefits	\$335	237	\$350	11923	-\$15	1.61	0.2051
Average monthly SNAP benefits, CP, unconditional	\$9		\$55				
CP receiving TANF benefits	0.1%	8717	1.1%	75254	-1.0% **	77.68	<.0001
CP enrolled in Medicaid	1.7%	8717	9.2%	75254	-7.5% **	570.4	<.0001
CP employed	60.3%	2540	65.8%	20718	-5.5% **	30.01	<.0001
CP average quarterly earnings, among employed	\$13834	1532	\$9150	13632	\$4684 **	211.85	<.0001
NCP employed	49.8%	2540	62.0%	20736	-12.2% **	141.8	<.0001
NCP average quarterly earnings, among employed	\$19340	1266	\$12399	12863	\$6941 **	59.16	<.0001

Table B-14. Apparent Opt-Outs, Other ICSS Counties, Outcomes Comparison, Detailed

Outcome	Opted Out		Remained Full Service		Difference Associated with Opt-out	F-value	prob
	Adjusted mean	sample size	Adjusted mean	sample size			
Any FS child support collections made	0.4%	218786	45.5%	1055708	-45.1% **	178933	<.0001
Any RO child support collections made	18.8%	218786	1.3%	1055708	17.5% **	152185	<.0001
Any child support collections made, either type	19.1%	218786	46.6%	1055708	-27.5% **	59092.7	<.0001
Total monthly child support collections, either type, among those paying	\$703	41784	\$606	492405	\$97 **	697.89	<.0001
Total monthly child support collections, unconditional	\$134		\$283				
Regular child support payment due, monthly	\$118	218786	\$311	1055708	-\$193 **	38398.3	<.0001
Arrears child support payment due, monthly	\$5	218786	\$24	1055708	-\$19 **	14872.8	<.0001
Money judgment made in child support case	0.0%	218786	0.4%	1055708	-0.4% **	840.18	<.0001
Any arrears owed	0.7%	16604	46.3%	78580	-45.6% **	13784.9	<.0001
Total arrears, among those who owe any	\$7866	118	\$8212	36366	-\$346	0.09	0.7585
Total arrears, unconditional	\$56	16604	\$3801	78580	-\$3745 **	2700.7	<.0001
Total arrears owed to the state	\$	16604	\$137	78580	#VALUE! **	496.31	<.0001
Total arrears owed to the CP	\$56	16604	\$3663	78580	-\$3607 **	2601.95	<.0001
CP receiving SNAP (Food Stamp) benefits	5.3%	218783	18.3%	1055362	-13.0% **	23091.5	<.0001
Average monthly SNAP (Food Stamp) benefits, CP, among those receiving benefits	\$336	11628	\$395	193240	-\$59 **	851.61	<.0001
Average monthly SNAP benefits, CP, unconditional	\$18		\$72				
CP receiving TANF benefits	0.1%	218783	0.7%	1055362	-0.6% **	1198.9	<.0001
CP enrolled in Medicaid	3.7%	218783	14.6%	1055362	-10.9% **	19668.7	<.0001
CP employed	50.7%	69774	60.8%	335571	-10.1% **	2459.98	<.0001
CP average quarterly earnings, among employed	\$12102	35394	\$9161	204168	\$2941 **	2965.35	<.0001
NCP employed	44.5%	69774	55.0%	335545	-10.5% **	2555.53	<.0001
NCP average quarterly earnings, among employed	\$16355	31058	\$11674	184466	\$4681 **	871.65	<.0001

Table B-15. Opt-Ins vs. Mandatory Full Service, Other ICSS Sites, Detailed

All cases, demographics	Opted In to Full Service		Mandatory Full Service		t-value	df	prob	
	N=10,958		N=4,126					
	Mean	Std	Mean	Std				
NCP age (years)	32.1	8.562	36.4	9.195	**	20.89	3441	<.0001
NCP is female	12.0%	0.325	19.9%	0.399	**	11.32	6256	<.0001
NCP is Hispanic	39.6%	0.489	12.7%	0.333	**	-38.52	10844	<.0001
NCP is black	25.7%	0.437	6.9%	0.253	**	-32.74	12597	<.0001
NCP race/ethnicity unknown	7.4%	0.3	68.7%	0.5	**	80.28	5148	<.0001
NCP is current or former military	3.9%	0.193						
CP age (years)	31.1	9.17	35.7	9.11	**	21.90	13222	<.0001
CP is Hispanic	40.8%	0.492	9.7%	0.297	**	-47.20	12169	<.0001
CP is black	22.7%	0.419	5.0%	0.217	**	-33.79	13665	<.0001
CP race/ethnicity unknown	7.8%	0.268	76.4%	0.425	**	96.72	5406	<.0001
CP is current or former military	0.9%	0.096						
Number of children	1.4	0.716	1.2	0.907	**	-15.17	6160	<.0001
Age of youngest child, years	5.0	4.798	7.7	5.290	**	25.37	4872	<.0001
Age of oldest child, years	6.2	5.405	9.2	5.612	**	27.20	5094	<.0001
Non-custodial Parent, employment and benefit history								
NCP employed at case opening	57.9%	0.494	53.3%	0.499	**	-5.03	15082	<.0001
Percent of time NCP employed over prior 8 quarters	57.6%	0.415	53.5%	0.451	**	-5.14	6917	<.0001
NCP average quarterly earnings over prior 8 quarters	\$4,836	8313.0	\$8,658	20886.0	**	11.42	4626	<.0001
NCP experienced earnings dip of at least 20% within prior 8 quarters	29.0%	0.454	20.1%	0.401	**	-11.70	8335	<.0001
Time since first observed NCP earnings (quarters)	28.2	14.50	26.2	17.07	**	-6.83	6489	<.0001
NCP earnings history sufficient to qualify for UI	56.1%	0.496	52.9%	0.499	**	-3.51	15082	0.001
NCP filed for unemployment within prior year	7.3%	0.3	4.8%	0.2	**	-6.16	9004	<.0001
NCP receiving SNAP (Food Stamps) benefits at case opening	8.2%	0.275	3.0%	0.171	**	-13.97	11847	<.0001
Percent of time NCP received SNAP benefits in prior year	8.5%	0.23	3.1%	0.14	**	-17.60	11892	<.0001
NCP receiving TANF benefits at case opening	0.1%	0.036	0.1%	0.031		-0.52	8449	0.603
Percent of time NCP received TANF benefits in prior year	0.3%	0.035	0.3%	0.034		-0.65	15082	0.516

	Opted In to Full Service		Mandatory Full Service					
All cases, demographics	N=10,958		N=4,126					
	Mean	Std	Mean	Std		t-value	df	prob
Percent of time NCP enrolled in Medicaid in prior year	4.5%	0.165	2.5%	0.125	**	-7.81	9689	<.0001
Custodial Parent, employment and benefit history								
CP employed at case opening	61.7%	0.486	56.3%	0.496	**	-6.08	15082	<.0001
Percent of time CP employed over prior 8 quarters	58.9%	0.419	54.1%	0.457	**	-5.88	6890	<.0001
CP average quarterly earnings over prior 8 quarters	\$4,067	4756.7	\$5,667	8798.2	**	11.09	5060	<.0001
CP experienced earnings dip of at least 20% within prior 8 quarters	24.4%	0.430	14.3%	0.350	**	-14.89	9043	<.0001
Time since first observed CP earnings (quarters)	26.4	15.28	24.6	17.48	**	-5.97	6633	<.0001
CP earnings history sufficient to qualify for UI	57.9%	0.494	54.4%	0.498	**	-3.82	15082	0.000
CP filed for unemployment within prior year	6.0%	0.2	3.5%	0.2	**	-6.59	9435	<.0001
CP receiving SNAP (Food Stamps) benefits at case opening	23.0%	0.421	4.3%	0.204	**	-36.44	14214	<.0001
Percent of time CP received SNAP benefits in prior year	20.3%	0.33	3.9%	0.16	**	-41.16	14363	<.0001
CP receiving TANF benefits at case opening	0.1%	0.033	0.0%	0.000	**	-3.47	10957	0.001
Percent of time CP received TANF benefits in prior year	1.2%	0.079	0.2%	0.026	**	-12.42	14915	<.0001
Percent of time CP enrolled in Medicaid in prior year	9.8%	0.241	2.9%	0.135	**	-22.20	12926	<.0001

Table B-16. Apparent Opt-Ins, Other ICSS Counties, Outcomes Comparison, Detailed

Outcome	Opted In to Full Service		Mandatory Full Service		Difference Associated with Opt-In	F-value	prob
	Adjusted mean	sample size	Adjusted mean	sample size			
Any FS child support collections made	36.5%	986947	1.1%	396350	35.4% **	209455	<.0001
Any RO child support collections made	3.6%	986947	25.1%	396350	-21.5% **	164503	<.0001
Any child support collections made, either type	40.0%	986947	26.2%	396350	13.8% **	23838.3	<.0001
Total monthly child support collections, either type, among those paying	\$527	394972	\$783	103831	-\$256 **	8064.05	<.0001
Total monthly child support collections, unconditional	\$211		\$205				
Regular child support payment due, monthly	\$251	986947	\$14	396350	\$237 **	227379	<.0001
Arrears child support payment due, monthly	\$24	986947	\$2	396350	\$22 **	35442.9	<.0001
Money judgment made in child support case	0.4%	986947	0.0%	396350	0.4% **	1612.66	<.0001
Any arrears owed	44.5%	62173	2.9%	23876	41.6% **	16051.7	<.0001
Total arrears, among those who owe any	\$8643	27694	\$9775	694	-\$1132	3.74	0.0531
Total arrears, unconditional	\$3850	62173	\$284	23876	\$3566 **	2424.71	<.0001
Total arrears owed to the state	\$190	62173	\$23	23876	\$167 **	821.62	<.0001
Total arrears owed to the CP	\$3660	62173	\$261	23876	\$3399 **	2257.09	<.0001
CP receiving SNAP (Food Stamp) benefits	23.4%	985761	5.0%	396346	18.4% **	67429.2	<.0001
Average monthly SNAP (Food Stamp) benefits, CP, among those receiving benefits	\$409	230517	\$358	19882	\$51 **	1082.68	<.0001
Average monthly SNAP benefits, CP, unconditional	\$96		\$18				
CP receiving TANF benefits	1.1%	985761	0.3%	396346	0.8% **	2355.41	<.0001
CP enrolled in Medicaid	17.5%	985761	3.8%	396346	13.7% **	46904	<.0001
CP employed	58.7%	321298	52.4%	129395	6.3% **	1501.98	<.0001
CP average quarterly earnings, among employed	\$8076	188498	\$12131	67749	-\$4055 **	7136.33	<.0001
NCP employed	52.0%	321361	47.3%	129374	4.7% **	818.66	<.0001
NCP average quarterly earnings, among employed	\$9444	167129	\$17662	61195	-\$8218 **	2807.75	<.0001