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Colombia's History of Modern Architecture Revisited Through the Housing Agency *Instituto de Crédito Territorial:* 1939-1965

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Colombia's History of Modern Architecture Revisited Through the Housing Agency *Instituto de Crédito Territorial:* 1939-1965

by

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Dedication

To Laura and José.

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Finally, I want to thank my daughter, Laura, and my husband, José, for their infinite love and patience. I want to acknowledge the courage of my daughter, who stood by my side throughout these years, despite the pain it meant for her to be away from her

home and friends in Colombia. José has fulfilled multiple posts during this shared experience of coming to the U.S.. Besides using this time learning new things and working, he has always been an open-minded, intelligent, and patient listener to and commentator on my findings, questions, and doubts. Through his comments and questions, he has helped me to stay focused on the important issues. He has not only kept me grounded, but he has also been my constant caregiver. His indestructible optimism and always-joyful commentary have made this process a pleasure. Most of all, his unconditional support and love have given me the energy and strength to accomplish this task. Thank you!

Abstract

Colombia's History of Modern Architecture Revisited Through the Housing Agency *Instituto de Crédito Territorial:* 1939-1965

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This dissertation examines the housing program of the Colombian state agency *Instituto de Crédito Territorial* (ICT) implemented in the mid-twentieth century. Three case studies of housing projects located in the city of Bogotá serve as a means to critically assess the agency's contributions to modern architecture in that country and the major transformations this agency and its housing program experienced during the period of the study: Muzú (1949), Centro Urbano Antonio Nariño - CUAN (1952) and Ciudad Kennedy (1961). This dissertation sheds light on the ideas and beliefs that animated the stakeholders—technicians, agency leaders, and politicians—intervening in the building of low-cost housing, as well as on the implications of their assumptions about the populations to be housed in the ICT projects, i.e. low income and middle class sectors. This exploration is based on minutes of the ICT's board of directors meetings, and supplemented by a wide range of additional primary sources, including, but not limited

to, blueprints, photos, publications, technical national periodicals, and regulations. A multidimensional analysis and interpretation of these sources emanating from different authors and stakeholders involves different fields of inquiry, such as politics, socio-economics, architecture, and urban planning.

Drawing from postcolonial theory, this dissertation revisits the visible, official narratives around concepts such as progress, modernity, and modernization, in order to question the emancipatory discourse of modern architecture. This dissertation argues that the ICT's housing program emerged as a significant contribution to the advancement of modern architecture in Colombia through unexpected and, until now, unexplored ways and actors. Simultaneously, this work illuminates the intersections of the housing program with the government's political agenda and with the geopolitical dimension of international cooperation programs promoted by the United States. These intersections, mediated by rationales of development and modernization's discourse, lay bare the power relations underlying the housing program and explain its social component. Through its social programs, the agency sought to "educate" and "civilize" the future inhabitants of the housing projects, in order to make them compliant with the logics and goals of policies nurtured by the discourse of development.

Table of Contents

List of Figures

xviii

xx

Chapter 1: Introduction

En innumerables casos, con angustiosa frecuencia, la moral puede ser, y es, cuestión de vivienda. Nada tan peligroso como la cohabitación de familias enteras en estrechos lugares, descuidados y pobres. Es ese un mal que es preciso eliminar, remediar, corregir, porque es causa de inenarrables desventuras.
Cooperar en esa tarea es obligación inexcusable de cuantos de algún poder dispongan, anhelo de cuantos se den cuenta de los problemas que trae la vida. Esa obligación hay que cumplirla, cada uno desde la posición que ocupe, como un deber de caracteres imperiosos e ineludibles.
Eduardo Santos
Bogotá, 30 de Septiembre de 1969

In innumerable cases, with anguished frequency, morality can be, and is, a housing issue. Nothing so dangerous as the cohabitation of entire families in narrow places, careless and poor. It is an evil that must be eliminated, remedied, corrected, because it is the cause of unspeakable misfortunes.
Cooperating in this task is the inexcusable obligation of those who have some power, yearning for those who realize the problems that life brings. That obligation must be fulfilled as a duty of imperious and inescapable characteristics.
Eduardo Santos [Colombian President from 1938 to 1942]
Bogotá, September 30, 1969[1]

In recalling the first days of the *Instituto de Crédito Territorial, ICT* (Institute of Territorial Credit) Carlos Lleras Restrepo, President Eduardo Santos' Minister of Finance, proudly related how he and "all members of the government, with President [Santos] at the head; as well as the members of the board of directors" often visited the first houses built in the surroundings of Bogotá under the agency's rural housing program. Lleras Restrepo referred to the "truly humanitarian interest" they put "in the development of the works" and how they "liked to interview each peasant and his family, to see their reactions."[2]

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[1] Instituto de Crédito Territorial, ed., *30 Años de Servicio* (Bogotá, 1969).
[2] Carlos Lleras Restrepo, *Reseña Historica Del ICT* (Instituto de Crédito Territorial, 1980), 14.

1

Although Lleras Restrepo was utterly convinced of the importance of facilitating access to housing by the "desheredados" (the disinherited or disenfranchised), he also knew this was only a partial, and not even the most relevant, solution to the many problems afflicting the rural population. The real problem, land tenure, was beyond the government's ability and willingness to solve. Hence, as Lleras Restrepo acknowledged, the housing campaign only addressed "questions of hygiene and sanitation, of popular education and the transformation of customs."[3] It was a pragmatic approach indeed, rooted in the assumption that would characterize the housing program throughout the period of this study: it was the people the housing program served who had to change. Arguments over how they had to change varied over time—overcoming backwardness, improving hygiene, learning rules of good citizenship, among others; but the expectation that the new built environments would help to bring these changes about was never left behind.

This dissertation tackles the agency's underlying assumptions about the groups it targeted and consider the implications of these assumptions for the housing program and the impact of the convictions of those participating in the construction of its housing projects—technicians, agency leaders, and politicians. Three case studies located in the city of Bogotá serve as a means to critically read the major transformations undergone by this agency during the period of the study: Muzú (1949), Centro Urbano Antonio Nariño - CUAN (1952) and Ciudad Kennedy (1961). By adding and analyzing the commentaries of those who participated in the agency, taken from the minutes of the Board of Directors, as source material, this dissertation broadens the current scope and

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[3] Ibid., 18.

understanding of existing research on the semiautonomous state agency *Instituto de Crédito Territorial*, ICT.

The ICT had an impact in each of the different levels in which it operated. First, the agency was crucial in shaping most of Colombia's urban centers during a period of rapid urban growth, through the construction and financing of more than half a million housing units throughout the national territory from 1939, when it was launched, to 1991, when it was liquidated through the enactment of the Law 3 of that year. Second, during the period considered in this study, 1939 through 1965, the agency operated as a space of convergence, in which various Pan-American events and initiatives consolidated.

Previous research has made the ICT's contribution to transforming residential architecture and residential areas in Colombia its main object of inquiry, giving its intersections with the political agenda of the national government scant attention. But since the period of this study coincides with a set of political events that profoundly marked the nation's history, the absence of such accounts is striking. In contrast, this dissertation argues that while the ICT's housing program made a significant contribution to the advancement of modern architecture in Colombia, through ways and actors until now unexplored, it also advanced the government's political agenda under the aegis of 'development' and 'modernization', which simultaneously informed the program's social component. Through its social programs, the agency sought to "educate" and "civilize" the future inhabitants of the housing projects, in order to make them compliant with the logics and goals of developmental policies.

Although historians have tackled Pan-American events and initiatives as part of other histories, I will tell the history of these events from the vantage point of the ICT. In doing so, the Pan-American and U.S. initiatives entwined with the agency's work will be

3

brought to the fore, alongside alternative spaces of encounter with other Latin American countries. The set of interactions that started during the Second World War, when the ICT's technicians were sent to the United States to get acquainted with the technical issues they would employ to minimize the construction costs of the agency's housing program, grew substantially more dense and complex in the Post War era. Among other initiatives, the Inter-American Center for Housing and Planning, or CINVA, was established in Bogotá in 1951 as a cooperative effort during the Cold War between the Pan-American Union, the Universidad Nacional of Colombia and the ICT. The apex of these interactions was the ambitious U.S. Cooperation Program with the Latin American countries, the Alliance for Progress. In Colombia, the ICT received significant loans from the Alliance to advance its housing program.

Drawing on postcolonial theory, I revisit the official narratives around modern architecture that emerged in the context of extreme political tensions, economic inequalities, and the exclusion of large parts of society from the construction of a modern country. In so doing, I question the emancipatory discourse presumed by modern architecture, in general, and the consolidation of a modern architecture imagined as clean and independent of those realities in Colombia, specifically. Within this framework, I do not draw on external sources circulating at the time to legitimize ICT's work, though I acknowledge their importance. Rather, I focus on works by actors in the ICT itself, to elucidate the extent to which the initiatives that converged in and emanated from the agency were framed by the discourse of development the United States propagated from the end of World War Two. This discourse corresponded to the basic principles by which the agency also operated, and its impact on the cooperation between the U.S. and Latin America that evolved during this period calls for a critical analysis that will evince the

4

invisible dimensions of these officially well-intentioned programs. I will take the ICT and its work as a case in point.

The aspiration of gaining some insight into the agency's inner workings led me to study its written records. Therefore, my main sources are the minutes of the board of directors' meetings, some still extant drawings from the case studies, historical photos of the projects, and an extensive number of works published by the agency but seldom used to study it. I also draw from national legislation governing the agency's work, publications of the Pan-American Union, and a series of papers elaborated by CINVA, the Pan-American Center for Housing and Planning located in Bogotá, and its students, and finally two technical national periodicals circulating during the period, "Ingenieria y Arquitectura" and "Proa."[4]

The documented minutes of the board of directors' meetings are an infinitesimal part of the indescribably large number of written records the agency produced. Since the agency operated nation-wide for 52 years, the sum total of the daily information produced is enormous. However, research tackling the agency in the 1990s has already exposed the precarious situation of the written documentation produced by the ICT. Several housing projects are documented with inexact information, lacking plans or pictures. Twenty years later, this situation is far worse and the documents are actually in danger of being lost. Since 2013, the Housing Ministry has had oversight of the agency's archives, which are stored in a factory ground due to their large number. While the Ministry has given extant footprints of the projects to the General National Archive for restoration and safekeeping, it declared vast amounts of material "of little interest," and foreseen its

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[4] Regulation's compilation on housing in Colombia, see: Olga Lucía Ceballos Ramos, Alberto Saldarriaga Roa, and Doris Tarchópulos Sierra, *Vivienda social en Colombia: una mirada desde su legislación, 1918-2005* (Editorial Pontificia Universidad Javeriana, 2008).

elimination as a measure to enable the storage of the still incoming documentation from the regions.

The different types of information this study draws on requires a multifaceted analysis. The minutes call for an almost ethnographic approach that gives answers to questions about the practices of, and discussions behind, the housing program. Simultaneously, I aim at elucidating the agency's accomplishments, challenges, and contradictions using the board of directors as an object of inquiry. Then, I connect this information with other levels of inquiry, such as politics, economics, architecture, and urban planning to lay out the basic structure of a network of initiatives, international experts, and policies that shaped the outcome of the agency's housing program.

I do not aim to construct a well-rounded narrative of the ICT with no fissures, edges and corners, but one that shows its multiple, sometimes contradictory stories, to understand and present it in its complexity. While the minutes facilitate what Arturo Escobar calls an "institutional ethnography," taking the agency as an object of anthropological study, they also set limits on our understanding.[5] They do not record the origination of several initiatives the board is known to have made, and their quality and quantity varied depending on the person transcribing them. Some conducted the job meticulously; others limited themselves to transcribing the basic points. Although the minutes reveal a soap opera-like account, another equally significant part of the story remains untold.

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[5] Arturo Escobar, *Encountering Development : The Making and Unmaking of the Third World* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), 106.

6

In order to unveil the rationales underlying the ICT's housing program, this dissertation tackles three aspects of it: first, its architecture, second the intersections between the agency and various geo-political agendas, and third the social component of the program. After presenting how these three aspects are interconnected and help to explain each other in the theoretical discussion of Chapter 2, each aspect is developed separately in the following chapters: Chapter 3 discusses "Housing as an architectural artifact," Chapter 4 considers "Housing as a tool to pacify and as a vehicle to consolidate power", and finally, Chapter 5 develops "Housing as a controlling tool."

Housing as an architectural artifact

Historiography has seen the agency's work in close relationship to the precepts of the *Congrès Internationaux d'Architecture Moderne*, CIAM (International Congresses of Modern Architecture), developed especially through the urban projects of Le Corbusier, Jose Luis Sert, and Paul Lester Wiener in Colombia. The ICT's housing projects have also usually been explained as evolving out of proposals on minimal housing developed in Europe between the two World Wars, which were presented in condensed form at the second CIAM meeting held in Frankfurt in 1929 under the motto *Wohnen für das Existenzminimum*. Chapter 3 argues that the ICT's contribution to modern architecture in Colombia through its urban housing program since the end of the 1940s forms part of a continuous, albeit nonlinear, development that started with the agency's inception in the rural housing program and, since 1942, in the urban areas. Ideas on minimal housing, standardization, modulation, and the prefabrication of building parts, typical for ICT's urban housing projects, derive from its experience developing a "rational" building

7

process for rural housing. This experience provided the ICT with a very specific knowledge of and expertise on local materials, building techniques and their possibilities. Hence, the first part of Chapter 3 addresses the rural housing program and the initiatives that served as a platform for the confluence of ideas about modern architecture and the aims of the ICT's work.

The second part of this chapter inquires about the elements of the "modern paradigm" that characterize the three case studies. In that context, the different plans and building types each developed offer an opportunity to scrutinize the assumptions on modern living pursued by the agency. These assumptions changed over the period of this study and with respect to the various targeted groups. High-rise multifamily housing and the urban configuration of the neighborhoods as "neighborhood units" offer a space for questioning underlying ideas on the modern shape of the ICT's housing projects. In this section, I argue that the ICT's housing developments are far more complex than a simple intention to build a local version of Le Corbusier's Unité d'Habitation, and to follow José Luis Sert's ideas on neighborhood units.

Housing as a tool to pacify and as a vehicle to consolidate power

Chapter 4 explores the intersections between the agency and Colombia's national politics, on the one hand, and the hemisphere's geopolitics, on the other. I argue that on the national level, the ICT's housing program operated as a tool to demonstrate the government's ability to deal with political conflict in times of extreme tensions, as a result of the civil war known as *La Violencia*, which hit the rural areas particularly hard. To maintain the status quo, different governments used the housing program to sustain a friendly relationship with the army, and joint efforts between it and the ICT were a

constant along the way, since the *Caja de Vivienda Militar* (Fund for Military Housing) was founded in 1947. The two institutions grew close alongside with the militarization of the government at the end of the 1940s.

This chapter also examines, using the ICT as case study, to what extent housing served as a vehicle to consolidate power. A *geopolitics of housing* found embodiment in the ICT's ties to the United States from the agency's establishment, which grew stronger after WWII and reached their greatest intensity in the 1960s with the Alliance for Progress program. In between, crucial events, such as the World Bank mission to Colombia, the agreement to receive technical assistance through U.S. President Truman's "Point Four Program," and the establishment of CINVA in Bogotá expose the U.S. offensive to consolidate its influence in Latin America as part of its Cold War geo-strategy. These encounters were manifold: through financial, educational, and public institutions, through private enterprises in the field of housing and the building industry, and through individual architects.

Housing as a controlling tool

Chapter 5 examines how the built environment acted as a tool of social control. I argue that social control was achieved through different methods and varied over time. The process of selecting future inhabitants, the guidelines for living in the new environment (printed or transmitted in workshops), and the social worker visits after the inhabitants occupied their houses were essential mechanisms through which control was executed.

The process of selecting inhabitants, guaranteed the ICT that residents would comply with the agency's moral expectations. It served as a tool for controlling the kind

of people who would inhabit the projects, implicitly prescribing the moral expectations required of the neighborhoods' inhabitants.

I also argue in this chapter that the ICT's housing projects were the physical expression of a hygienic and ordered environment, with the goal of molding the inhabitants in accordance with the assumptions of the agency's leaders. While the discourse of hygiene was initially limited to the houses' physical characteristics, it was eventually broadened to bodily and social hygiene as an essential part of the construction program.

THE AGENCY

The ICT was created under the Liberal presidency of Eduardo Santos as part of a series of measures to foster the rural economy in 1939. These measures aimed, among other things, at the creation of local *Bancos de Crédito Territorial* (Credit Territorial Banks) to provide loans for the construction of "hygienic dwellings for rural workers."[6] The ICT was planned as an autonomous central office to set up local agencies throughout the country and coordinate their activities.[7] Carlos Lleras Restrepo, minister of Finance and Public Credit, who convened its board of directors on March 8, 1939 for the first time appears as the driving force in the ICT's creation.[8] From the moment he called the first meeting until the end of President Eduardo Santos' term in 1942, Lleras Restrepo clearly supported the agency in his role as minister. Due to its purpose, the agency functioned

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[6] Decree 327 of 1938. Minute 3, March 1939, 11.
[7] Decree 200 of 1939 (January 28), Article 2th.
[8] Lleras Restrepo received the advise of Julio Eduardo Lleras Acosta, Manuel Mejía and Luís Angel Arango. In: Lleras Restrepo, *Reseña Historica Del ICT*, 7, 10. To understand the relevance of this program in the context of a modernization process as understood in Colombia at the end of the 1930s, see: Susana Romero Sánchez, "Ruralizing Urbanization: Credit, Housing, and Modernization in Colombia, 1920-1948" (Cornell University, 2015).

initially under the oversight of Lleras Restrepo's ministry of Finance and Public Credit. This changed in the mid 1950s, when the ICT operated under the jurisdiction of the ministry of Development.[9] This direct connection with the ministry and its head defined the nature and structure of the agency. The ICT was autonomous in its operations, but it responded to the minister and through him, to the president himself. However, major changes concerning the agency needed to be approved by congress. Thus, crucial decisions concerning its work are specified through regulations.

ICT's organization structure, which grew more complex over time, consisted primarily in a board of directors, the general manager, leaders of the different agency's departments, and their staff. ICT's maximal authority was the board of directors. Its role was to define the guidelines, according to which the ICT should work, to appoint the general manager and to approve the major decisions concerning ICT's financial, administrative and technical issues. The board of directors' composition varied throughout the period of this study. What remained constant was the fact that representatives of the national government and of different stakeholders' groups were part of the board.

Throughout the period of this study, the ICT went through a series of transformations, which evidence the evolving rationales behind the housing projects developed at each moment. I identify five phases over the span of this study: first, the beginning from 1939 to 1942; second, the transition from 1942 to 1947; third, the beginning of the official history from 1947 to 1953; fourth, working under a military government from 1953 to 1957; and finally, a new beginning under the National Front in 1958.

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[9] Decree 2956 of 1955. Article 3.

The beginning. 1939-1942

The decree 200 of 1939, which regulated ICT's inception, established the basic traits of ICT's organization structure. It determined, for instance, that the agency should be managed by a board of directors comprised by the minister of Finance and Public Credit, the minister of Labor, Hygiene and Welfare, a representative appointed by the President of Colombia and three representatives of banks that purchase ICT's shares (Article 6th). The minister of Finance and Public Credit (Lleras Restrepo) and a small committee should write the agency's statutes (Article 20th). In addition, the selected board of directors should appoint the general manager to lead the agency (Article 7th). The first general manager, José Vicente Garcés Navas, who previously worked at the ministry of Finance and Public Credit, led the agency until the end of the year 1947, but remained working at the agency until his dead in 1968.

A couple of months after ICT's inception, the board of directors' composition underwent its first significant change. Due to a change in the form of financing the agency (the National government would be the only financing source), three representatives of the *Banco Central Hipotecario, BCH* (Central Mortgage Bank) were replaced by one representative chosen by the board of directors of the *Caja de Crédito Agrario* (Agrarian Credit Bank) and of the *Banco Agrícola Hipotecario* (Agrarian Mortgage Bank), and two representatives of the "low-income peasants" chosen by the president.[10] With this composition, the agency operated the next years, until the Law 85 was passed at the end of 1946.

During this first phase, the agency's main task was the construction of rural housing. Its first specific undertaking was to build one thousand new "hygienic" houses

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[10] Law 46 of 1939, article 4th.

for the rural population affected by the spread of *bartonellosis epidemic* in various rural areas of the Nariño province, at the border with Ecuador to "radically change the living conditions of the peasants..."[11]

Figure 1.1. First house built by the ICT in Sandona, Nariño, 1939. In: Instituto de Crédito Territorial and Ministerio de Desarrollo Económico, *40 años. Construyendo vivienda para el pueblo colombiano*.

Despite the clear goals and the full support of the government through the Minister of Finance and Public Credit, the agency only began to show results very slowly. The daily difficulties and specific characteristics of the rural environment structured and shaped the agency's actions. Every new (or undesirable) event led to a change in the existing structure of the agency. This empirical approach, based on trial and error slowed the agency's consolidation considerably. The minutes mention no models from other countries being adopted during those first years, although in those same years

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[11] Lleras Restrepo, *Reseña Historica Del ICT*, 13.

Colombia had participated in the Pan-American Architecture Congresses as well as the crucial first Pan-American Congress of Low-Cost Housing held in Buenos Aires in 1939. The latter was attended by Julio Lleras Acosta, who was also a member of the ICT board of directors, representing the Central Mortgage Bank from the beginning.[12] By the end of 1940, the board meetings still focused on the question of how to broaden the agency's impact and under what kind of structure.

The transition. 1942 - 1947

The first important turning point came in 1942, a couple of months prior to the end of Eduardo Santos' presidential term.[13] Lleras Restrepo announced a law transferring the contracts between the national government and the various regional entities for urban workers' housing to the agency.[14] As a direct consequence of this decree, the ICT established the new department for urban housing, through which the new task could be accomplished.[15]

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[12] Three persons with the same last name appear in this story: the here mentioned Julio Lleras Acosta, director of the Central Mortgage Bank and member of ICT's board of directors (1939); Carlos Lleras Restrepo, liberal politician, ICT's initiator as Finance minister of president Eduardo Santos, and later himself president of the country (1966-1970); Alberto Lleras Camargo, was also a liberal politician and president of the country (1945-1946, and 1958-1962) and the first director of the Organization of American States, OAS. Julio and Alberto were cousins. Julio was Carlos' uncle (his brother, Federico Lleras Acosta, was Carlos' father). Leopoldo Villar Borda, *Alberto Lleras: El Último Republicano,* 1a ed, Colección Biografías (Santa Fe de Bogotá: Planeta, 1997).

[13] Thus, the Minister of Finance and Public Credit, Carlos Lleras Restrepo, and the representatives of the Minister of Labor, Hygiene and Welfare, Arturo Robledo and Gustavo Noguera Saa also ended their service time.

[14] The provinces specifically mentioned were: Boyacá, South and North Santander. In: Minute107, June 1942, p. 271. Furthermore, the decree 380 of 12 February 1942 intended that the national government's shares and stocks in the contracts for the construction of working-class ("popular" in Spanish) neighborhoods in the urban areas should be transferred to the agency.

[15] The creation of the new department, "Sección de la Vivienda Urbana" was established in the Decree 1579 of 1942 (Article 2th).

I define the period between 1942 and 1947 as a transitional phase in the ICT's work. The task of building urban housing marks the beginning of this phase, and the implementation of Law 85 of 1946 beginning in mid-1947, its end. It is the agency's transition from building exclusively rural housing to building, as the sole agent, a large number of urban neighborhoods that transformed the shape of many urban centers around the country.

This transitional period is characterized by the construction, in collaboration with the municipalities, of *Barrios Populares Modelo*, Model Working-class Neighborhoods, and by a constant pursuit of financial stability, which should have been granted by the new law that expanded its duties in 1942, but which was never completely implemented. The ICT's economic crisis during this transitional period reflects the economic crisis of the country as a consequence of, among other things, World War II. Also, as Francis Violich and Robert C. Jones discuss in their report on Low-Cost Housing in Latin America published in 1949:

> During the war period Colombia experienced the inflationary trends in rents and costs of building materials that were to be found in all Latin America. In Bogota, rents for dwellings under thirty pesos (The Colombian peso is currently valued at approximately US$ .57) per month rose 124.5 percent between the end of 1941 and the middle of 1945. During this same period, costs of building materials rose 90 percent. These increases indicate the difficulty of meeting the ever –expanding housing needs of that city.[16]

Those five years were defined by a series of political transformations, with continual changes in central political positions, which saw a number of politicians with different ideas about the way the ICT should be financed. All efforts to receive the necessary resources to work through this time of deep economic crisis did not come to an

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[16] Violich, Francis, and Robert C. Jones. *Low-Cost Housing in Latin America*. Edited by Solow, Anatole A. Washington: Pan American Union, 1949, 58.

end until the enactment of Law 85 in December 1946. This law was the result of Carlos Lleras Restrepo's proposal elaborated in collaboration with Colombia's National Industry Association (Asociación Nacional de Industriales, ANDI).[17] According to Francis Violich,[18] this constituted the "most important revision in Colombia's housing law" of the time.[19] Violich gives a precise summary of this law, which aimed to assure

> an increase in capital for the Instituto de Credito Territorial amounting to about 10,000,000 pesos for urban and rural housing for workers and middle class groups. This fund is to come from a five percent tax on the net income of private firms. The contribution may be made directly to the Institute, or individual housing loans may be negotiated with the employees. ... This law, requiring forced investment in housing, is to be in effect for a period of 10 years.[20]

Law 85 had enormous consequences for the agency's structure and activities. The first significant change affected the structure of the board of directors. Representatives of new associations were called in; others were excluded.[21] The new board included representatives of the Industry (ANDI), of the Colombian Farmer's Association, of the Chambers of Commerce, of the employees, and of the workers. Neither the poor peasant's representatives nor the representative of the *Caja de Crédito Agrario, Industrial y Miner*o (Bank of Agrarian, Industrial and Mining loans) were included in this new

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[17] In: Minute 255, December 9, 1946, p. 528-back – 531-back.

[18] Francis Violich, U.S. American Landscape architect and planner, was involved in several Inter-American initiatives and published a key book on Latin American planning and housing: Francis Violich, *Cities of Latin America: Housing and Planning to the South* (New York: Reinhold publishing corporation, 1944); Francis Violich and Robert C. Jones, *Low-Cost Housing in Latin America*, ed. Solow, Anatole A. (Washington: Pan American Union, 1949).

[19] I agree with Violich in the importance of this law as a key event in the development of the agency, unlike Saldarriaga, who does not present this law as a turning point for the work of the ICT. Violich and Jones, *Low-Cost Housing in Latin America*, 60; Alberto Saldarriaga Roa, *Instituto de Crédito Territorial. ICT. Medio Siglo de Vivienda Social En Colombia 1939-1989*, ed. Ministerio de Desarrollo Económico and Instituto Nacional de Vivienda de Interés Social y Reforma Urbana. INURBE (Bogotá: Inurbe, 1995), 14; Alberto Saldarriaga Roa, *Estado, ciudad y vivienda: urbanismo y arquitectura de la vivienda estatal en Colombia, 1918-1990* (INURBE, 1996), 39.

[20] Violich and Jones, *Low-Cost Housing in Latin America*, 60.

[21] Law 85 of 1946, Article 22th.

board of directors. This major transformation in the board's composition probably reveals changes in the economic structure of the country, but also the importance some social actors were gaining in the housing question.[22]

The new funding sources meant a significant capital increase that allowed the ICT to build housing at a different scale. The board members agreed the ICT was now able to build in one year the same number of houses they had built during the entire seven years before.[23] This required rearranging the agency's entire structure to cope with this new and immense responsibility of building urban housing with vastly increased capital.[24]

According to existing historiography, the agency's only task during this transitional period was to disburse loans to the municipalities, but in fact the agency performed a wide array of activities. First, rural housing still constituted an important part in the ICT's work. Furthermore, still lacking enough capital to tackle more building tasks on its own, the ICT offered its technical assistance principally to the Ministry of Labor and the Coffee Farmers' Federation during this period.[25] Finally, the results of some Model Working-Class Neighborhoods were already visible beginning in 1943, and during the last year of this phase, 1947, the board members spent much of their time preparing for a task that would come to fruition in 1948; the date to which historiography traces its first urban housing project. By 1947, though, the ICT had been able to build 3,000 rural

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[22] Minute 261, March 18, 1947, p. 545.

[23] Minute 276, August 2, 1947, p. 589-back.

[24] That also meant to solve all financial aspects related to the new means (bonds emission, investment of new capital, disbursement of interests, etc.), to refine the law through other decrees, to change the internal statutes of the agency, to define the new structure to work national-wide, to search for building materials, to begin negotiations with the different municipalities, industry and cooperatives to build the housing projects, and a great deal more.

[25] Minute 128, November 1942, P. 327-back, and Minute 132, January 1943, p. 335.

housing units and 1,450 urban housing units in twenty-two model working-class neighborhoods.[26]

The official history's origins. 1947 - 1953

Although the enactment of Law 85 in December 1946 and the subsequent appointment of the new board of directors opened this new period, the nomination of a new general manager, Hernando Posada Cuéllar, in December of 1947, constituted the ultimate turning point.[27] Posada Cuéllar was succeeded by Francisco Puyana Méndez in 1950.[28] Puyana Méndez remained in this post until the end of this period, 1953, when army General Rojas Pinilla seized power with the support of the country's elites.[29] This phase marks the beginning of the official history of the ICT's urban housing projects, which is characterized by the consolidation of modern ideas about urban housing against the backdrop of intense violence in the country.

This third phase constituted a crucial moment for the development of the agency. After the infrastructure was more or less in place, the new task was to execute the work plan arranged during the previous phase, using the new resources provided by Law 85 of

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[26] Minute 276, August 2, 1947, p. 589.

[27] Garcés Navas was gone, but he remained still in the agency, first as administrative advisor, then as the manager of the Barranquilla office. Organizational Committee, Minute 92, December 23, 1947. In: Minute 298, January 2, 1948, p. 664-back.
After a while his influence and knowledge on the institution were forgotten. Minute 493, November 6, 1951, p. 1253-back. Posada Cuéllar stayed at the agency until the end of 1949.

[28] A lawyer, Puyana Méndez previously worked at the Bank for Agrarian Credit, in the institutional portfolio department. In: Minute 411, January 26, 1950, p. 1004-back. He initiated his work at the ICT as the President's representative in the board of directors in 1949. In: Minute 405, November 10, 1949, p. 982-back.

[29] General Rojas Pinilla took power on June 13, 1953. However, the meeting of the board of directors, two days later, offers no evidence for this extreme event: the same participants, and there is no official comment about that in the meeting. Minute 561 (incorrectly numbered: 661), June 15, 1953, p. 0088.

1946.[30] Thus, the new board of directors created a number of technical committees, so that the different and numerous tasks could be managed in a more efficient manner. The meetings took place more frequently and the quantity of issues to be handled augmented significantly during the first years of this period.

The housing projects built in the urban areas through this phase served as a space for the ICT to deploy the experience it had accumulated in the rural areas and construct the "model working-class neighborhoods" in a joint effort with different municipalities in the transitional phase. The urban housing projects built in this phase also served as a space for experimenting with new ideas circulating around housing, which architectural historian Alberto Saldarriaga refers to as the "modern paradigm of social housing."[31]

During this period, an astonishing number of events ensued at all levels, which directly or indirectly affected the agency. First, the political conflict escalated to a new high after the Liberal politician and presidential candidate Jorge Eliecer Gaitán was murdered in April of 1948. This deepened the already existing political confrontation, known as *La Violencia*. Precisely as Gaitán was murdered, the ninth Inter-American Conference met in Bogotá, and the Organization of American States, OAS was established.[32] Second, interactions with the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, IBRD, (later renamed the World Bank) led to the launch of the "Mission Currie," which arrived in Colombia in July 1949 and conducted the first comprehensive assessment of the country. The mission's goal was "to formulate a development program

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[30] As specifically stated in a report for "La Superintendencia Bancaria." Minute 374, March 17, 1949. P. 884-back.

[31] Alberto Saldarriaga Roa, *Estado, ciudad y vivienda: urbanismo y arquitectura de la vivienda estatal en Colombia, 1918-1990* (INURBE, 1996), 28.

[32] Interestingly, high range representatives were present at this meeting: U.S. Secretary of State George Marshall, for instance. But also Fidel Castro. The latter attended however a "Latin American student conference," financed by the Argentinian government of Juan D. Perón. David Bushnell, *The Making of Modern Colombia: A Nation in Spite of Itself* (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1993), 203.

to raise the standard of living of the mass of the Colombian people."[33] It presented its results to the government one year later, in July 1950, elaborating a number of recommendations that, in turn, impacted the ICT's organizational structure.[34] Most importantly, it showed for the first time, in clear numbers, the dimensions of the social problems in the country as a whole. Third, the construction of the country's first steel mill, Paz del Río, was one of the Conservative government's most important projects for promoting the nation's industrialization. At the same time, Paz del Río was a political strategy to stimulate the economy in one of the zones most affected by *La Violencia*.[35] Fourth, the creation of the *Centro Interamericano de Vivienda*, CINVA (Inter-American Center of Housing) in Bogotá in 1951 was the result of a Pan-American Union initiative in collaboration with the National University and the ICT. Finally, during this period the national and international architectural scenes came into contact with the visits of Le Corbusier, Paul Lester Wiener and José Luís Sert to Colombia. Le Corbusier visited for the first time in 1947 at the invitation of Fernando Mazuera Villegas, Mayor in Bogotá, and later developed the city's Pilot Plan. The architects Paul Lester Wiener and José Luís Sert, in charge of its further development and of the Pilot Plans of other Colombian cities, also visited the country several times during this period.

Two conservative presidents governed the country during that period, Mariano Ospina Pérez (1946-1950) and the ultra-conservative Laureano Gómez (1950-1953), who, as a politician in Congress, and through his newspaper "El Siglo," had attacked the

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[33] Roger J. Sandilands, *The Life and Political Economy of Lauchlin Currie: New Dealer, Presidential Adviser, and Development Economist* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1990), 160.
[34] World Bank and Lauchlin Bernard Currie, eds., *Bases de un programa de fomento para Colombia*, 2. ed. [Traducción bajo la dirección del Dr. Jaime F. Córdoba] (Bogotá: Banco de la República, 1951). With this mission emerged in Colombia the paradigm of development, as discussed in: Escobar, *Encountering Development*.
[35] See: Decree 4051 of (December 20) 1949.

ICT as a work of the Liberal Party from the agency's establishment in 1939.[36] Interestingly, as Laureano Gómez took office in August 1950, he expressed his interest in the agency and his will to actively support it. However, the plural configuration of the board of directors might have been a thorn in his side.[37] Thus, a big turning point for the agency came under his government with the enactment of the decree 469 of 1951, according to which the board of directors should be reduced to 3 members appointed directly by the president.

Although the argument supporting this decree, which says: "…. that the experience suggests the necessity of performing some organizational reforms in the Institute of Territorial Credit, …," holds some true, the decision, which derived from it, expresses rather the changes in the political realm in the country at that moment.[38] In fact, many different groups of the society were represented in the board of directors from 1947 until 1951: the urban workers, employees, the cooperatives, the agricultural sector, industry and commerce, but also the representatives of the president, the ministries of labor, Hygiene, and Finance. Retrospectively, this board composition was probably more pluralistic and encompassed the interests of a broader part of the society, but it was indeed less efficient. The long and important discussions did not facilitate the process of decisions making in the agency. However, its members adjusted to each other, and by the beginning of 1951 it could be claimed that they worked optimally. This large group

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[36] One example mentioned in one board meeting was an editorial in the newspaper "El Siglo" of June 9, 1940, with the title "A Bolshevik Measure," attacking a decree (818 of 1940), which sought to facilitate the provision of loans to the peasants through "the constitution of mortgages through a private document." In: Minute 35, June of 1940. This measure was also explained and justified by Carlos Lleras Restrepo, in his role as Finance minister and leading force of the ICT, in his historical account of the agency. In: Lleras Restrepo, *Reseña Historica del ICT*, 57.

[37] Minute 462, February 1st., 1951, p. 1182-back. In this minute, the general manager reports that he met the President twice to discuss different aspects related to the agency, and to express his interest in supporting its work.

[38] Decree 469 of February 28, 1951.

generated some concern, and the board members were discussing some possible arrangements, through which all groups would be still represented in the board.[39]

Instead of having a diverse board of directors, president Gómez decided to have a three-members board appointed by him, in addition to the Minister of Finance. Two of the members were already part of the old board, but the third new member was Gabriel Serrano Camargo, one of the leading architects of Colombia at that moment.[40] One year later, the board of directors expanded again, including the general managers of the *Institute of Parcelaciones* (Institute of Land Subdivisions) and of the Bank of Agrarian Credit in order to achieve "a better coordination in the activities of these agencies."[41] According to this new decree, the president was also responsible for the general manager's appointment.[42] Under these conditions, the transformations introduced with this decree meant that now the ICT was under his direct command.

In addition, the transformation of the agency's funding during this period reflects the shifting interests of the national government regarding its social programs. It also gives account of the macro-economic rationales shaping the country's industrialization process. The significant legislation that was Law 85 of 1946 was updated and eventually eliminated through Decree 1465 of 1953, which allowed the ICT to emit bonds anew as it did prior to the enactment of Law 85 but with increased support from the national

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[39] The Decree 614 of 1950 added the Minister of Labor to the already large main board. Minute 416, February 23, 1950, p. 1015. Their discussions on possible arrangements are consigned in Minute 453, November 21, 1950, p. 1147.

[40] Serrano Camargo stayed only until 1953 though. Minute 464, March 8, 1951, p. 1193-back. This was the first session under the new decree, one month after the last session with the previous board composition. In this session are Roberto Salazar, previously the president's representative, Juan Pablo Ortega, previously the representative of the industrialists, and Gabriel Serrano Camargo, and the Finance Minister, Antonio Álvarez Restrepo.

[41] Minute 521, May 12, 1952, p. 1297-back.

[42] Minute 471, April 27, 1951, p. 1214.

government and with a new kind of bonds.[43] The "Housing and Savings Bonds" would facilitate credit for those who already had a savings account. This measure clearly sought to boost the country's credit system.[44]

Working under a military government. 1953 - 1957

The enactment of Decree 1465 of 1953 marking the end of the previous period also opened a new era for the agency, coinciding with the coup d'état through which army general Gustavo Rojas Pinilla seized power. Therefore, the period that commenced in 1953 is defined by work under a military government. Throughout this period, several army members were in leading positions at the agency. Admiral Rubén Piedrahita Arango led the agency between 1953 and 1954, and Colonel Alvaro Calderón Rodríguez replaced him as ICT's general manager from 1954 to 1956. I set the end of this phase in 1957, when Rojas Pinilla was driven from power. This event, again, coincided with a major transformation within the agency.

The military regime of Rojas Pinilla is thus the backdrop against which the agency's development during this period needs to be seen. His regime used populist measures to consolidate his mandate. After Rojas Pinilla gained some confidence, he decided to take a more independent path that he called the Third Power, for which Juan Perón's regime in Argentina served as a model.[45] As one can expect, "the systematic

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[43] Decree 4051 of 1949 had already replaced Law 85 of 1946, but the ground idea was still contained in this decree, unlike the mentioned Decree 1465 of 1953. The reasons behind this kind of decisions would require another study.

[44] Minute 559, June 7, 1953, p. 0084; Minute 562 (incorrectly numbered: 662), June 22, 1953, p. 0090-back.

[45] This was viewed with enormous distrust by the traditional parties and by the Church leaders. See, among others: Carlos H. Urán Rojas, *Rojas y La Manipulación Del Poder*, 1a ed (Bogotá: C. Valencia Editores, 1983), 89-102; Fernán E. González, *Poderes Enfrentados: Iglesia y Estado En Colombia* (Santafé de Bogotá, Colombia: Cinep, 1997), 299.

development of low-cost housing" and thus, the ICT, were quintessential to his political program.[46] However, the housing policies he advanced during this period did not result in a "systematic" search for solutions to the housing shortage as announced, but rather in a series of measures that sought to consolidate his power. These measures, so far as they relate to the ICT, included the use of its financial resources to support charitable initiatives, especially those coordinated by Rojas Pinilla's wife and daughter, and the country's major labor unions, through which the government sought to gain the workers' adherence to the "Army Government."[47] Rojas Pinilla's government also sought to make the ICT's work visible as part of the military government's achievements. Interestingly, the ICT received the support of other populist military regimes during this period, such as that of Marcos Pérez Jiménez in Venezuela, in the form of credits for building housing.[48]

Rojas Pinilla was a Catholic, who, in David Bushnell's words, "sincerely felt that close collaboration between church and state was essential for the moral regeneration he

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[46] As he "explicitly" expressed it in his presidential discourse in August of 1954. In: Instituto de Crédito Territorial, ed., *Una Política de Vivienda Para Colombia; Primer Seminario Nacional de Vivienda, 1955* (Bogotá, 1956), 11.

[47] ICT's board of directors authorized the support of the foundation "Amparo de la Joven" (the protection of the young woman) through scholarships. This foundation was created as an initiative of Rojas Pinillas' wife. In: Minute 577 (incorrectly numbered: 677), September 21, 1953, p. 0140. The agency SENDAS, "Secretariado Nacional de Asistencia Social," National Secretary of Social Welfare, was set up to carry out the Social Economic reform program under the direct of his daughter Maria Eugenia Rojas. SENDAS also received ICT's support. In: Minute 652 (incorrectly numbered: 752), December 9, 1955, p. 0305-back. Also: Donation of a house in Bogotá to the "Rehabilitation's Committee, recently created by the government." In: Minute 569 (incorrectly numbered: 669), August 3, 1953, p. 0115. Another request from his daughter, Maria Eugenia in: Minute 622 (incorrectly numbered: 722), December 6, 1954, p. 0272-back. Interestingly, the referred Unions were the CTC, supported by the Liberals, and the UTC by the Catholics. In: Minute 643 (incorrectly numbered: 743), September 1st, 1955, p. 0295-back.
One could thus read in this measure, the use of ICT's resources as a means to gain some control over the labor Unions historically dominated by the traditional parties. This measure ensued simultaneously with the consolidation of a third labor union, the CNT (Confederation Nacional de Trabajadores), which "was affiliated with the Latin America-Wide labor confederation that ... was in turn sponsored by the Perón regime in Argentina." In: David Bushnell, *The Making of Modern Colombia: A Nation in Spite of Itself* (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1993), 220.

[48] Offer of *Evidia* from Venezuela to build housing for the ICT. In: Minute 609 (incorrectly numbered: 709), May 31st, 1954, p. 0232-back; Contract with *Convensa* to build and finance 10,000 housing units for the ICT. In: Minute 624 (incorrectly numbered: 724), February 7, 1955, p. 0273.

had in mind.[49] He sought to attract a voting base through a populist "social and economic reform program," while simultaneously suppressing any demands for more democratic structures.[50]

Rojas Pinilla's government used the cult of personality built around him to seal his power.[51] The use of media to display his image and achievements were essential to this strategy, which included among other things the first comprehensive publication on the ICT's work, *Una Política de Vivienda Para Colombia; Primer Seminario Nacional de Vivienda, 1955* (A Housing Policy for Colombia; First National Housing Seminar). The agency intended this seminar to "clarify" for its employees the misunderstandings that led to much of the difficulties existing today in the daily practices, "especially in the regional offices." This seminar also aimed at "unifying and better directing the housing policy, which the ICT is intensely developing today."[52] The seminar also sought to "contribute a global vision of the housing problem in order to consolidate a housing policy for Colombia." These all-encompassing aims illustrate the government's grandiloquent tone in painting the picture of army general Rojas Pinilla in redemptive work, part of his cult of personality strategy for guaranteeing his government's success.

Furthermore, this publication introduced the more technocratic approach to housing that came to characterize the agency's work in the 1950s, emphasizing socio-economic planning over the technical innovations stressed in the 1940s, and diminishing the relevance of the architectonic considerations. The Lauchlin Currie mission's report, mentioned above, probably also played an important role in this transformation.

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[49] Bushnell, *The Making of Modern Colombia*, 215.
[50] Ibid., 217.
[51] Urán Rojas, *Rojas y La Manipulación Del Poder*, 91.
[52] Minute 633 (incorrectly numbered: 733), April 28, 1955, p. 0288.

Despite paying lip service to fixing the housing shortage, the ICT's work did not take any significant steps in that direction. On the contrary, the board of directors met less often than previously. The meetings from the first years of this period transmit the sense of a well-exercised routine that does not require external aid to function properly. Indeed, several of the requests the ICT's general manager and board of directors authorized during this time even suggest outright mismanagement of the agency.

Curiously, several firms that offered the agency building materials, requested advance payments. Since some of them were well known firms or members of the army, it remains questionable whether there was a clear strategy on the part of board members to promote national industry or if these concessions were only an expression of favoritism.[53] In general, a more lax management of agency's funds becomes evident.[54]

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[53] The firm "Prefabricaciones Ltda.," requested in 1954 advancement in money for the delivery of prefabricated elements, such as beams, lintels, floor slabs and stairs for the housing development in Quiroga, Bogotá. Gabriel Serrano Camargo was shareholder of this firm. He was a member of the most renowned architecture firms at that moment, "Cuéllar, Serrano, Gómez" and served as a member of ICT's board of directors from 1951 to 1953. Minute 595 (incorrectly numbered: 695), February 14, 1954, p. 0214; Minute 602 (incorrectly numbered: 702), March 31st, 1954, p. 0222. Hernando Posada Cuéllar, general manager of the agency from 1948 to 1949, offered the agency the fabrication and supply of cement blocks in 1953. However, he required to buy first the machinery to install the manufacture plant, for which end he requested a loan from the board of directors. He did receive it. In: Minute 567 (incorrectly numbered: 667), July 24, 1953, p. 0111. In 1954, the board of directors approved to sell Posada Cuéllar equipment for the fabrication of brick, for the price as defined in the inventory, and with no interests. The price would be paid back in a "prudential period" or in brick. In: Minute 592 (incorrectly numbered: 692), January 18, 1954, p. 0203-back. One month later, Posada Cuéllar, as general manager of the society "Macon Ltda." requested an advanced payment for the existing contract to supply brick to be paid back in form of brick or in a period of four to six months. The board of directors once more accepted this request. In: Minute 597 (incorrectly numbered: 697), February 23, 1954, p. 0216. The last time this contract was mentioned in the minutes was at the end of April of 1954. Posada Cuéllar asked to extend the period to supply the material and to lower the quantity. This time the board of directors only partially agreed to accept his requests. In: Minute 605 (incorrectly numbered: 705), April 29, 1954, p. 0225. The board authorized the study of a loan's request of Lieutenant Colonel Efraím Reyes Cubillos to explote stone, sand and clay in his property. In: Minute 602 (incorrectly numbered: 702), March 31st, 1954, p. 0222.

[54] As the board members discussed an offer to build the furniture for an entire working-class neighborhood in Bogotá, it came up with the alternative idea to invite the most important furniture fabricants of the city to present their proposals. The fact that the board did not question instead the logic of this offer regarding the costs such an initiative could have for the agency or for the final user, is one of innumerable situations in which the board of directors seems not to be guided by the principle of economy of the agency. Minute 609 (incorrectly numbered: 709), May 31, 1954, p. 232.

This reckless use of ICT funds was only possible because the extremely high price of coffee on the international market buoyed Colombia's economy until 1954. Coffee was the country's most significant resource during that period, and when prices declined again, resistance to Rojas Pinilla's regime grew stronger and the agency's financial situation worsened. As a result, the national government took the most radical decision concerning the agency since it was established in 1939 and merged it at the end of 1955 with the National Agency for Water Resource Use and Electricity Development and the National Agency of Municipal Development, forming the new National Corporation of Public Services.[55] This decision occurred in striking contrast to the military government's discourse during the "First National Housing Seminar" earlier that year, discussed above, which placed high importance on the ICT's function as the "coordinating organism of national housing policy." While it is not clear why this step in the contrary direction was taken, based on a later report of the then housing department's manager within the new corporation, this merger sought to expedite the commercial and technical procedures of the state agencies, apparently also part of Currie's mission proposal to reorganize the executive branch of the country.[56] The agency explained this step later in a more objective tone; "the reason for this measure was to offer the country, and more specifically, the municipalities, a comprehensive solution to their main problems through the linking of the three basic agencies in the development of the national cell: the municipality itself."[57]

It was a brutal decision to merge housing, water and electricity into a single agency. The scope of the three agencies' tasks was so different that water and electricity

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[55] Decree 2956 of (November 10) 1955. In: Minute 650 (incorrectly numbered 750), November 10, 1955, p. 0303.
[56] Minute 6, May 4, 1956, p. 0064.
[57] Instituto de Crédito Territorial, *30 Años de Servicio*, 25-26.

in effect had no connection to the housing. And one might understand this decision as logical if it was intended to develop a comprehensive bureaucracy, but this did not happen. The three issues were handled by separate committees with no relation to each other, and the Board of Directors meetings show no strategy for combining them. Housing was given short shrift in the meetings of this period, and issues having little in common with the ICT's cumulative experience over the previous 17 years seems almost to have been thrown away. Stunningly, some housing projects were still executed.

Until the three agencies merged at the end of 1955, the board of directors had maintained the structure introduced in March of 1951. In other words, three members appointed by the president, the ministers of Finance and of Development, as well as the general manager of the Bank of Agrarian Credit participated in the meetings.[58] Yet some board members occasionally changed for no apparent reason and at no specific moment.[59]

Under the figure of the National Corporation of Public Services that started operating in 1956, radical changes in the agency's leadership took place. From this moment, the agency operated "under the control" of the ministry of Development. ICT's general manager Colonel Alvaro Calderón Rodríguez became the new Corporation's general manager. The new Housing department (former ICT) had two managers during its short life. First, Rafael Suárez Guzmán, who led the Housing department from the corporation's establishment until September of 1956.[60] The second manager for the housing department, lieutenant colonel Gonzalo Díaz, was only appointed at the end of

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[58] However, the minutes only occasionally express whom the participants in the meetings are representing.
[59] Only the changes introduced in the board's composition after Colonel Alvaro Calderón Rodríguez was appointment as new ICT's general manager in 1954 makes some sense. Minute 619 (incorrectly numbered 719), September 8, 1954, p. 0268-back.
[60] Minute 1, April 5, 1956, p. 0002; Minute 22, September 6, 1956, p. 0287.

1956.[61] Lieutenant colonel Díaz led the housing department until the National Corporation of Public Services was liquidated in May of 1957.

The difficulties inherent in the sluggish dynamic of this merger were instantly evident. However, it took Rojas Pinilla being deposed from power in May 1957 to return autonomy to the three agencies.[62] The mismanagement, for which Rojas Pinilla's government is known, shone through the financial deficit within the corporation, which reached six million Colombian pesos in the housing department, even before the corporation could be dissolved.[63]

A new start under the National Front. 1958-1965.

After the National Corporation of Public Services was dissolved and ICT was an independent agency again, the decree 1368 of 1957 determined its general structure. The ministry of Development was still ICT's control instance. In addition, said decree determined that the board of directors should be comprised by the minister of Development, two representatives appointed by the national government, one representative of the Colombian Architects Association, and one representative of the National Associations of Industrialists and of Trade. According to this decree, the members of the board of directors, with exception of the minister of Development, were appointed for two years.

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[61] Minute 33, November 8, 1956.
[62] As the military junta transitorily assumed power, the board members of the corporation resigned. They signaled so their willingness to let the new government to set up a new board of directors according to their specific plans (Minute 16, May 16, 1957, p. 0771). However, the next meeting was the last meeting under the figure of the Corporation. (Minute 17, May 17, 1957).
[63] Minute 9, June 7, 1956, p. 0131.

The last phase of the agency considered in this study began with the meeting of a new board of directors in September of 1957 and its new general manager, Fabio Robledo Uribe.[64] This period is defined politically by an alliance between the two traditional political parties, which enabled the deposition of army General Rojas Pinilla from office and put a transitional military junta in place until a plebiscite decided the agreement known as the "National Front." The results of Rojas Pinilla's government in general, and of the experiment to merge the three state agencies specifically, were the object of several meetings of the board during the next phase of the agency. Diverse historians have shown how Rojas Pinilla and his family used the Presidency to come to an unprecedented wealth. Through the study of the ICT, it is possible to identify the extent to which this general assessment applied to the agency. The new board of directors discussed during several sessions the numerous loans to the former president and his family, which were never paid back.

This new period was marked by an accelerated urban growth with a concurrent growth of informal housing, and by a nation-wide fear that the revolutionary spirit following the Cuban Revolution in 1959 would spread to Colombia. Thus, during this period the U.S. presence through the aid program "Alliance for Progress" became central to the ICT's activities. Against this backdrop, and with an increasing number of persons unable to meet the requirements of the agency's existing housing program, the ICT deployed new self-help, mutual self-help, and incremental housing programs to build a many of the period's urban housing projects. Furthermore, slum clearance projects gained

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[64] Minute 1, September 11, 1957, p. 001.
Robledo Uribe only stayed until January of 1958 due to conflicts with one member of the military junta that replaced Rojas Pinilla, but he assumed the general manager post again in 1961, and held this position until 1965. In addition, Antonio Garcés Sinisterra led the agency from 1958 to1959 and Anibal López Trujillo led it from 1959 to 1961.

currency.[65] The ICT also introduced programs to attract private investment and supported the enactment of those policies, which sought to stimulate a culture of saving in order to increase the available resources for housing construction.[66] At the end of this period, in 1965, the financial means obtained through the Alliance for Progress came almost to an end, and the ICT's building activity drastically slowed. Moreover, the country's economic recession in 1963 had enduring consequences for the construction of low-cost housing in the following years. The lower number of housing units the agency built during those years reflects this situation. While in 1963, 12,367 housing units were built, there were only 2,339 in 1965.[67]

As the agency was able to reactivate its housing programs, and the number of housing units increased again in 1966 (9,069), there was a different moment for the agency, for the country, and in the architectural discussion. Carlos Lleras Restrepo, the ICT's initiator twenty-six years before, became President of the country (1966-1970) as the third president under the National Front agreement. At the same time, Colombian society grew more complex. Guerrilla organizations emerged and consolidated (FARC and ELN: 1964, EPL: 1967) in response to the impossibility for any political participation outside the two traditional political parties, student movements arose, and the Vatican II

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[65] A regulation regarding "slum clearance" in: Minute 11, November 6, 1957, p. 0068. Since then until the end of this period, it was a constant topic.

[66] The "Three Part Plan" (P-3) sought to stimulate private investment in low-cost housing. According to this plan, the private investor, the ICT, and the future dweller participated in the housing project. In: Minute 8, October 16, 1957, p. 0042-0046. This was a successful program until the end of this period. Several firms, some U.S. American firms among them, participated in the construction of housing throughout this period in the P-3 program. Another program consistently implemented during this period was the worker's program (P-T). Here, the employers participated in the funding of the housing projects. A list with the firmes participating in this program is in: Minute 37, June 24, 1963, p. 246-back.

[67] Instituto de Crédito Territorial, ed., *Vinculación de La Industria Constructora Privada En Programas Del Instituto de Crédito Territorial*, Vivienda y Desarrollo Urbano (Bogotá: Instituto de Crédito Territorial. Sección de Divulgación y Publicaciones, 1969), 16.

Council transformed the Church, leading to a Bishops' Conference in Medellin in 1968.[68] Urban growth was now central to the national discussion. The ICT's general manager introduced a series of reforms in the technical department, working with a new generation of architects who questioned much of the previous approach to housing, such as that at Ciudad Kennedy. They were working then in a decidedly urban country. The urban population was 59.6% in 1970, a significant increase compared to the 29.1% living in urban areas in 1938, one year before the ICT was launched.[69] Under these circumstances, the agency was ready to initiate a new period in which its accumulated knowledge could serve as a platform to consistently shape the nation's urban centers over the course of the next decades.

THE CASE STUDIES

Three case studies located in the city of Bogotá serve as a means to critically assess the agency's contributions to modern architecture and the major transformations the agency experienced during the period of the study. They shed light on some ideas that nurtured ICT's housing projects. Although using case studies solely located in the Bogotá prevents from showing the complexity of a nation-wide operating agency, it allows focusing the attention on the interactions and experiences in the center, from which the guidelines to other parts of the country emanated. The chronology of the three case

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[68] "The objective of the Medellín conference was to interpret the principles of the Second Vatican Council (Vatican II, 1962–1965) within the Latin American context, for their eventual application in Latin America. Vatican II redefined the Catholic Church's role in the world and in the lives of its adherents, emphasizing that God's grace and salvation were to be found everywhere, not only in the Church." In: Thomas Leonard, ed., "Bishops' Conference, Medellín, 1968," *Encyclopedia of U.S.-Latin American Relations* (Washington: CQ Press, 2018), 79–80, https://doi.org/10.4135/9781608717613. Accessed: April 19, 2018.

[69] Alberto Vásquez Restrepo, *Aproximación a Una Política Para Vivienda En Colombia. Ponencia Presentada a La XV Asamblea General de La Cámara Colombiana de La Construcción (Camacol), Barranquilla, Octubre de 1972* (Bogotá: Instituto de Crédito Territorial, 1972).

studies is reconstructed from the minutes. However, additional primary and secondary sources enabled me to gather the existing information about the case studies in one place. Consequently with the structure of the agency, whose central quarters were located in the capital of the country, the best-documented housing projects are in Bogotá. My case studies' final account is the result of putting different pieces of the puzzle together.

Muzú

Figure 1.2. Muzú's Location in the city. Proa, December 1949.[70]

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[70] The same image appeared in: Carlos Martínez and Jorge Arango, *Arquitectura En Colombia: Arquitectura Colonial 1538-1810,Arquitectura Contemporánea En Cinco Años 1946-1951* (Bogotá: Ediciones Proa, 1951). The legend remarks: "In this schematic plan of Bogotá, the location of the Neighborhood Unit of Muzú, to the south of the city is represented. Note the favorable location the new workers neighborhood will have, in relation to the industrial zone as soon as the J. J. Vargas Avenue, in project, is finished."

Muzú was one of the first housing projects the agency built with the financial means resulting from the Law 85 of 1946. This working-class neighborhood became the place in which prefabrication of building parts, produced by the ICT itself, and new urban configurations were deployed. On February 17, 1948, the ICT began to discuss building a working-class neighborhood in Bogotá.[71] Their only criteria for assessing possible locations were flood hazards, drainage possibilities, and distance to the city center.[72] Eventually, the Technical Department chose the site "in front of the Police School of Muzú .... within the Bogotá municipality" as the location for the planned working-class neighborhood.[73] This 358,079 m^2 site, slightly sloping east, was earlier part of the haciendas "la Planada" y "Buenos Aires."[74]

At the same time, in April of 1948, architect Jorge Gaitán Cortés was hired as the leader of Urban Housing. Gaitán Cortés was one of those emblematic young architects, who sought enthusiastically to shape modern architecture and spread the ideas of Le Corbusier and the CIAM in Colombia.[75] Almost three months later, in July of 1948, he presented the first urban master plan and plans for different housing types in the "working-class neighborhood Muzú."[76]

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[71] Minute 305, February 26, 1948, p. 685.
[72] Minute 313, April 8, 1948, p.708.
[73] Price: $0.50 la vara. Minute 315, April 22, 1948, p. 711.
[74] In: purchase promise contract between the ICT and the National Goverment. Minute 477, June 14, 1951, p. 1221-back.
[75] He worked not only in public posts, such as the ministry of Public Works and ICT, but he also participated in politics. In his role as city councilman of Bogotá at the end of the 1950s and subsequently as Mayor of the same city, he consistently advanced the project of the physical modernization of the city. An insightful biography of him in: Julio D. Dávila, *Planificación y Política En Bogotá: La Vida de Jorge Gaitán Cortés* (Bogotá: Alcaldía Mayor, 2000).
[76] Minute 330, July 12, 1948, p. 759-back.

By the beginning of November of 1948, the plans for Muzú were ready to start construction.[77] The board of directors decided to implement various operation systems in order to assess which of them was more advantageous for the ICT. The ICT itself would be in charge of the construction of 6 to 8 houses ("direct management"). The remaining houses were to be awarded to no more than four architecture firms, which would build the remaining houses through "delegated management" or for a fixed price.[78]

The architecture firms which sent proposals at the invitation of the ICT were mentioned in the minutes for the first time at the end of March of 1949: Constructora Colombiana, Trujillo Gómez & Martínez Cárdenas, Andina de Construcciones, Atuesta Guarín & Pombo, Asodeic, Tejeiro & Lezaca, H. Vargas Rubiano Herrera & Nieto Cano, Ingecom, Pizano Pradilla & Caro, Pardo Restrepo & Santamaría, Rocha Santander & Cía., Benjamín Villegas R., A. Manrique Martín e hijos, Esguerra Sáenz Urdaneta.[79] However, no further comments appear in the minutes on this initial process of construction of Muzú, and no firms were selected, or at least, it was not mentioned in the minutes.

In May 1949, Jorge Gaitán Cortés resigned. Thus, Muzú is indeed the result of his proposal, but he was not leading the technical department long enough to oversee the construction until the end. In fact, construction did not start before he left the ICT.

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[77] Minute 381, May 12, 1949, p. 904. Executive Committee, Minute 139, April 21, 1949, p. 909-back. In: Minute 384, June 2, 1949.
[78] None of the house groups in the original plan of Gaitán results in this amount of houses. It is not clear to which houses they refered here. Minute 345, November 4, 1948, p. 797.
[79] Executive Committee, Minute 138, March 24, 1949, p. 887-back. In: Minute 376, March 31, 1949.

Figure 1.3. Master Plan, neighborhood unit. Proa 30, December 1949.

In September of 1949, a model of a group of 8 houses was presented to the board of directors as a first attempt to evaluate the plans, construction costs, etc., before the ICT initiated the construction of the whole neighborhood. This first part of the project was to be executed by different contractors "under the direct and immediate direction and supervision of the agency."[80] It is not clear what happened between May and September of 1949. Why was a model of the project elaborated if the project was completed the previous year, in November, before the architecture firms were invited to participate? One of the reasons might be the absence of Gaitán Cortés. Nonetheless, construction finally began, and on November 10th, 1949, the general manager announced that after 40 days of work the first 8 houses were almost finished.

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[80] Minute 400, September 22, 1949, p. 961-back.

Figure 1.4. Housing type 58 F 3. Proa 30, December 1949.

On November 17, 1949, the new leader of Urban Housing, Bernabé Pineda Ropero, presented the current status of Muzú's general construction plan and recalled the antecedents of the project. He stated that the "plans necessary to initiate the construction of the neighborhood were practically finished, except for the detailed design of social services such as the church, schools, market, stadium and meeting hall."[81] The construction of another two groups of 24 houses each, denominated type 58-F-3, began in December of 1949 and in January of 1950. Muzú's inauguration was on August 5, 1950. At the end of July, the initial goal was almost achieved: 296 homes had been finished. However, construction of more houses had already started. 432 lacked only a roof, and 520 houses were in various phases of construction, for a total of 1248 houses.[82]

In addition to the basic housing type 58-F-3, two other housing types comprised the plans for Muzú: a 79m^2 two-story house, on a 124m^2 plot, for up to seven persons "in generous conditions," at a cost of 7,000 pesos. The third housing type was a 107m^2 two-

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[81] Minute 406, November 17, 1949, p. 986.
[82] A striking number of houses, for the total according to the original plan of Gaitán for the first phase were 574 houses. Minute 435, July 24, 1950, p. 1081.

story house on a plot of 127m^2 for up to nine persons at a cost of 10,000 pesos.[83] However, only type 58-F-3 (called "minimal housing type" in a Proa's article) seems to have been built. These houses were two stories high, with concrete floors, brick or cement blocks walls, *eternit* (asbestos cement) roof tiles, and an area of 58m^2 on plots of 89.40 m^2 (4.73 by 18.90 meters). The first floor contained the following services: a dining room, kitchen, and bathroom. The upper floor had a main bedroom and two small ones. The neighborhood had four blocks for commerce, with 16 stores in each block.[84]

In September 1950, architect Alvaro Ortega proposed to the ICT the construction of 80 houses in Muzú for 5.000 pesos each with the construction system "Vacuum" through his firm Inster Ltda. Since this proposal ensued a month after the inauguration of the first phase, in August 1950, Ortega's contract marks the beginning of the second phase of the construction process.[85] According to this contract, Ortega should build eight houses in 60 days in Muzú strictly following "the plans and specifications elaborated by both the agency and the contractor."[86] Thus, the houses built by Alvaro Ortega's firm with prefabricated walls and other major elements and assembled on site with the Vacuum Concrete system might have been applied in only one sector of Muzú.[87]

The process for awarding the first 1,056 houses began in March of 1951.[88] From this group, 32 houses were awarded to presidential palace workers.[89] Another part of the

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[83] Proa 30, December 1949.

[84] Minute 477, June 14, 1951, p. 1222-back.

[85] That means that the first phase of Muzú, already inaugurated before Ospina Perez left the presidency in August of the same year, had no buildings built with this system. Minute 443, September 14, 1950, p. 1108-back.

[86] The construction of one block with eight houses in Muzú. (Block 1, unit 6). In: Minute 446, October 5, 1950, P. 1119.

[87] Although, the prefabricated elements developed by Ortega and Vacuum Concrete are generally presented as the sole construction method deployed in Muzú. See for instance, Proa 44. February 1951.

[88] Minute 464, March 8, 1951, p. 1193-back.

[89] Minute 471, April 27, 1951, p. 1213-back. The supervising engineer reported the strategy to select the 32 applications from the workers of the presidential palace. Minute 475, May 29, 1951, p. 1219-back.

houses should be awarded to the municipal workers in return for the offer of Bogotá's Mayor, Santiago Trujillo Gómez, to install in Muzú the external electricity network, telephone and to plant the trees.[90]

In June of 1951, the neighborhood with its 1,056 houses (132 blocks with 8 houses each) was sold to the nation. The sum obtained from this sale was to be used solely in the construction of "a popular economic district in the city of Bogota." Construction continued until the mid-1950s.[91] When the military regime of Rojas Pinilla came to power, Muzú was transferred again to the ICT.[92]

Centro Urbano Antonio Nariño, CUAN

Although the complex Centro Urbano Antonio Nariño, or CUAN, appears as one of the ICT's housing projects, in reality, it went through several hands before the ICT received it from the national government. CUAN became the final manifestation of a long search by the Colombian state to construct residential high-rise buildings. The ICT was not excluded from this search. When CUAN finally was handed over to ICT in 1958, the agency had the opportunity to guide the first experience of living in a multifamily housing complex.

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[90] Minute 436, July 27, 1950, p. 1083-back.
[91] In: "Contratos en ejecucion+1954_57"(Archivo Fragua) Contrato con Jose Daniel Ospina para construccion de 38 casas en Muzu. Contrato de diciembre de 1955. Pagos inician en Febrero 1956.
[92] Decree 2476 of 1953. Minute 579 (incorrectly numbered: 679), September 28, 1953, p. 0142-back.

Figure 1.5. Centro Antonio Nariño. Siglo XX. Saúl Orduz. Fondo Saúl Orduz / Colección
Museo de Bogotá. MdB05181.

It was the Ministry for Public Works that initiated the construction of this
multifamily housing complex between 1950 and May of 1952 to supply public
employees, principally those of the Ministry for Public Works, with housing.[93] Located
along the newly opened *Avenida de las Americas*, its design was entrusted to a group of
young architects designated by the Minister of Public Works, Jorge Leyva. They were
Nestor C. Gutierrez, Juan A. Melendez de C., Daniel Suarez Hoyos, and Rafael Esguerra
G.[94] Some in this group had already been working as a firm, Esguerra, Saenz, Urdaneta,

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[93] Summary of the events related to the development of CUAN. Memorandum of the legal department of
the ICT of February 20th, 1967. Archive Ministerio de Vivienda, La Fragua, Fondo ICT, Caja 589.
[94] Carlos Niño Murcia, *Arquitectura Y Estado: Contexto Y Significado de Las Construcciones Del
Ministerio de Obras Públicas, Colombia, 1905-1960,* 1. ed, Colección Arquitectura En Colombia (Bogotá,
Colombia: Centro Editorial, Universidad Nacional de Colombia: Instituto Colombiano de Cultura, 1991),
313. The constitution of this designer group varies in the different sources. Silvia Arango and Ana Montoya
include Enrique Garcia M, and Juan is here Menéndez, not Melendez. Carlos Martinez differs even more
from the others. In his book on Colombian Architecture published in 1963, he stated that the architects of
the CUAN were Nestor Gutierrez B. and the firm Esguerra, Saenz, Urdaneta, Suarez & Cia.

Suarez. This firm begun in 1946 but producing its most important works in the 1960s. CUAN is its first building at this scale and part of its early oeuvre.

The selection of the architects for the construction of CUAN lay completely in Minister Leyva's hands. After the enactment of Decree 1953 of 1951, which enabled the construction of CUAN, the minister Jorge Leyva directly commissioned architect Nestor C. Gutierrez to conduct preliminary research on building multifamily high-rise buildings. The project's construction operated through "delegated management;" the oversight and audit of CUAN's building process remained however in the hands of the ministry of public works. Under the same scheme, other firms were selected to develop the construction of the structure. In July of 1952 a decree was enacted, through which the contracts related to the structure's construction were approved.[95]

While Nestor Gutierrez claimed that on April 9 of 1953 the project was practically complete, decree 873 of 1953 (March 26), three months prior to Rojas Pinilla coup d'etat in June of 1953, established special regulations for purchasing building materials in order to finish the residential buildings of CUAN for the middle class.[96] This measure was probably justified by the need to finish the project soon, but it also speaks to its incompleteness. After Rojas Pinilla came to power, Santiago Trujillo Gómez, an

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[95] The decree 1718 of 1952 (July 18) approved the contracts of May 28 of the same year to construct the structure of CUAN's buildings as "dwellings for the middle class in Bogotá" with following firms:
a) Pardo Restrepo & Santamaría Ltda.: three buildings, 13 stories high with a total built area of 34,500 m2.
b) Martínez Cárdenas & Cia. Ltda.: four buildings 13 stories high with a total built area of 26,552 m2.
c) Cuellar, Serrano, Gómez y Cia. Ltda.: two buildings 13 stories high with a total built area of 23,000 m2.
d) A. Manrique Martín e Hijos Ltda.: two buildings 4 stories high with a total built area of 5,127.20 m2.
e) Noguera. Santander & Cia. Ltda.: two buildings 4 stories high with a total built area of 5,127.20 m2.
f) Pablo Lanceta Pinzón: two buildings 4 stories high with a total built area of 5,127.20 m2.
The contracts included the construction of all complementary works according to the plans previously approved by the ministry of public works.
[96] Interview with Nestor Gutierrez in: Juan Carlos Aguilera Rojas, "Un Dialogo sobre la serie. El ICT como laboratorio de arquitectura 1948-1953." (Universidad Nacional de Colombia Facultad de Artes, 1998), 162.

architect, replaced Jorge Leyva as the new minister of public works.[97] In spite maintaining an architecture-minded minister, CUAN lost its relevance, and its completion and replication was no longer on the new military government's agenda. Nestor Gutierrez lamented that Laureano Gomez was deposed from power, for in his view this shift in the political realm led the ministry of public works to abandon this project as well as its plans to repeat this experience in Medellin, Cali and Barranquilla.[98]

In December of 1954, a new decree, number 3619 of 1954, arranged the sale of CUAN to the Banco Popular. The decree enabled the Banco Popular to subsequently sell the apartments through a system of "horizontal property," and it ran an ad campaign aimed "exclusively" at its own clients and those of its Caja de Ahorros (savings bank) who had opened accounts throughout the country prior to December 26, 1955. Although CUAN was presented as the ideal modern environment to live in ("the best access roads") with its amenities within the complex and different apartment types, these characteristics seem not to have been enough to attract the public.

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[97] Trujillo Gómez was trained as an architect. He partnered a firm from 1932 to 1949 with Martinez Cárdenas, a powerful developer, who was responsible for the construction of the structure of part of the CUAN and very close to the deposed president, Laureano Gómez. Trujillo Gómez left the firm to pursue a political carrier, and became Bogotá's Mayor from 1949 to 1952. Ibid.
[98] Ibid., 163. The rationales for abandoning these plans are not known.

Figure 1.6. Centro Urbano Antonio Nariño. 1955. El Espectador. Archivo Documental / Colección Museo de Bogotá. MdB014445

As the Banco Popular was unable to sell its apartments to individual families, it transformed two of the buildings, C1 and C2 (merged into one long building, as already visible in the advertisement of El Espectador), into a hotel. But in light of its inability to fulfill the agreement defined in decree 3619 of 1954, the military Junta that had replaced General Rojas Pinilla and ruled between May 1957 and August 1958, gave the complex over to the *Beneficencia de Cundinamarca* (Cundinamarca's Charity) and, after nine

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months, returned it to the national government, which finally sold CUAN to the ICT.[99] One of the members of the military Junta was Vice Admiral Ruben Piedrahita Arango, former ICT's general manager. He became minister of Public Works in 1954, and as a member of the Military Junta, participated in the conversations between the ministry of public works (Roberto Salazar Gómez, former member of the ICT's board of directors and later also Mayor of Bogotá) and the general manager of the ICT, Antonio Garcés, that defined the conditions of the agreement for the ICT to receive CUAN. Thus, the participants in this conversation knew the ICT well.[100] Decree 0261 of 1958 (July 11th) authorized the sale of CUAN to the ICT.[101] The deed that recorded this transaction between the national government and the ICT also specifies that the latter had developed a program to manage CUAN. This program comprised the definition of the management staff, and the criteria to choose the project's future tenants.[102]

The ICT finished some works still pending at CUAN before it initiated the process for selecting its future residents. By the end of 1958, every apartment had been leased. The lease contracts were initially for one year, but the tenants lobbied Congress to pass law 143 of December 24, 1959, aiming to become owners under the best possible conditions. Indeed, after this law passed, the ICT was able to sell the apartments to the

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[99] Summary of the events related to the development of CUAN. Memorandum of the legal department of the ICT of February 20th, 1967. Archive Ministerio de Vivienda, La Fragua, Fondo ICT, Box 589.

[100] Correspondence between the minister and general manager Garces. June 18 of 1958, Archive Ministerio de Vivienda, La Fragua, Fondo ICT, Box 589.

[101] CUAN was 30 million worth. This cost was to be paid to the national government in different modalities, among them: 1,900,000 pesos for "colonization's works" in the Vásquez region: schools, housing, Centers for hygiene, and other community services, also up to 2,500,000 in prefabricated wood houses to be installed in Tolima department, in the regions "affected by the violence." The ICT committed to building a road between Puerto Boyacá and Puerto Nare to foster the colonization's process in the region, and to build housing and community services. The total of payments added up to 20 million. The remaining 10 million were a contribution of the national government to the ICT. Archive Minvivienda, La Fragua. Box No. 0012. File 00001. Page 1-4.

[102] Archive Ministerio de Vivienda, La Fragua, Fondo ICT, Box 589.

tenants at production cost, with no down payment and an amortization period of 20 years.[103] The transformed buildings C1 and C2 then became student housing. Law 45 of 1959 ordered the assignment of those buildings to "the Corporation of University Housing and granted authorization to the National Government, aimed at Affordable housing for university students."[104] Thus, the buildings were still part of the complex when the ICT received it from the National Government. On May 15th of the same year, building A2 was sold to the National Army, probably as part of the agreement between the ICT and the *La Caja de Vivienda Militar*, the Housing program of the Army.

Although what happened between the years 1955 and 1958 is not clear apart from the transformations made by the *Banco Popular*, revising this chronology against the political background of the time helps us understand this void in the information. Rojas Pinilla came to power in 1953 with a populist program that took shape in the following years. Housing for the middle class was not his major preoccupation.[105] At the time CUAN was sold to the ICT in July 1958, the country was about to return to a civil government. Alberto Lleras Camargo, from the Liberal Party, was elected as the first president under the National Front. Thus, the final occupation of CUAN occurred under different circumstances than those of its initiation and development. The ICT had also undergone profound changes during that time.

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[103] Summary of the events related to the development of CUAN. Memorandum of the legal department of the ICT of February 20th, 1967. Archive Ministerio de Vivienda, La Fragua, Fondo ICT, Box 589. Although general manager Anibal Lopez Trujillo stated in a letter to the representatives of the residents on August 21 of 1960, that this law was the result of an ICT's initiative. Archive Minvivienda, La Fragua. Box No. 0012. File 00001, 6.
[104] This law considers the possibility of paying the ICT in money the value of the buildings, or in form of land owned by the government to develop housing programs in Bogotá. Nowhere is stated how the ICT received this payment.
[105] The first national conference on housing organized by the ICT in 1955 with the whole support of the military regime gives account of this. In: Instituto de Crédito Territorial, *Una Política de Vivienda Para Colombia; Primer Seminario Nacional de Vivienda, 1955*, 11.

Ciudad Kennedy

In Ciudad Kennedy converge different levels of inquiry through which housing emerges as a geopolitical tool and as a wide field of experimentation. The U.S. aid program Alliance for Progress and self-help housing are preponderant traits of this development.

Located southwest of Bogota's historic center, Ciudad Kennedy was built between 1961 and 1976. Its location on the grounds of the former local airport "Techo," gave the project its first name, "Ciudad Techo." Since President Kennedy laid the "first brick" as a symbolic act initiating the Alliance for Progress program, the neighborhood changed its name to Ciudad Kennedy after his assassination in 1963.[106]

Figure 1.7. Location. In: Instituto de Crédito Territorial, *Proyectos y Realizaciones En Vivienda*.

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[106] Construction was already ongoing at Kennedy's visit to Ciudad Techo on December 17, 1961.

The inception date for the plan of this megaproject can be traced back to 1957.[107] After General Rojas Pinilla was deposed from the Presidency, and a transitional military Junta took power, the ICT's newly appointed general manager presented the board of directors his plan to develop a "kind of satellite city," in which five neighborhood units with 1,000 houses each would be built, and where the ICT would be able to implement its various operational systems for housing construction. To this end, he analyzed various possible locations, among others, one at Techo owned by the firm Bavaria.[108] He initiated negotiations between Bavaria and the ICT for its purchase, which continued through the next year and involved, among other things, conversations with the office of the *Plan Regulador*.[109] For the ICT projects, the selection of land was constrained by the need to keep total costs low in the construction of low-cost housing, which was no longer availalbe within the city limits. Thus, the general manager's original plan for Cuidad Kennedy evolved into a more comprehensive five-year working plan for the city of Bogotá, presented to the ICT in March 1958 by René Caballero, manager of the Bogotá office. This plan posited the construction of a "satellite city" containing a large housing development, which the board of directors decided would be designed by competition. They commissioned two of their own members to set the rules and timeline for this competition, the architect Francisco Pizano de Brigard and the army captain architect Héctor Restrepo.[110] This competition was not mentioned ever again.

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[107] Although the possibility to buy land in Techo was already discussed in a board meeting in 1955. Minute 625 (incorrectly numbered 725), February 21, 1955, p. 0274.

[108] Minute 18, December 11, 1957. 0143.

[109] Bogotá's master plan of Paul Lester Wiener and José Luís Sert and based on Le Corbusier's Pilot Plan. Minute 9, February 26, 1958, 0281; Minute 12, March 11, 1958, 0306-0307; Minute 19, April 16, 1958, 0368; Minute 31, June 27, 1958, 0499; Minute 34, July 9, 1958, 0513; Minute 36. July 22, 1958, 0531.

[110] Minute 12, March 11, 1958, 0306-0307.

The ICT demarcated the Techo site as the definitive location for this "satellite city" in 1960, after the inauguration of the new airport Eldorado on December 10, 1959 rendered the old airport at Techo obsolete. The national government expressed the possibility to offer the Techo land to the ICT, ending negotiations with Bavaria over their adjacent property.[111] On April 7, 1960, the ICT purchased the old airport together with the *Caja de Vivienda Militar* (Military Housing Fund). Not everyone agreed on this site for the development of a satellite city, but in March of 1961 the general manager went ahead and presented a design for semidetached houses to the board of directors.[112] This is the first time the minutes mention a design for Techo. At that moment, it might still have been in a very early stage of design development.

In Le Corbusier's Pilot Plan, officially turned over to the municipal government in 1950, Techo was still an airport located outside the city limits. However, "Ciudad Techo" was already located within the city limits in an article by Gabriel Andrade Lleras published in *Escala* in 1963.[113] Figure 1.9 represents the open areas at the metropolitan scale. (The thin but dark lines represent the perimeter ring). The proposal to build a trolley-bus line for the project indicates its remote location, even after it became part of

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[111] One of the members of the board of directors recalled this event at the discussion about the price the airport Techo's owners were requesting in the negotiations that took place two years later. In: Minute 6, February 17, 1960, p. 025.

[112] While the Municipal Planning Office confirmed the possibility to develop a housing project on this site, based on the issue of the public services that could be provided by the city, the "Planning Junta" had several concerns, which it expressed to the board of directors through a communiqué that was discussed during a meeting of the board of directors. The concerns were not named in the minute. Minute 25, June 30, 1960, p. 335-back.
Minute 10, March 15, 1961, p. 0794-back. In this meeting, the board of directors suggested presenting the project to various "prestigious architect firms" that could assess it and if it was the case, to introduce recommended changes.

[113] Gabriel Andrade Lleras, "Ciudad Techo y El Diseño Urbano," *Escala*, no. 4 (1963): 8–10.

the city.[114] Ciudad Kennedy thus provides a good example of how the ICT's housing projects contributed to the expansion of Colombia's urban centers.

Figure 1.8. Pilot Plan. Le Corbusier, Wiener, Sert. 1950

Figure 1.9. "Bogotá and its future urban form." In: Andrade Lleras, "Ciudad Techo y El Diseño Urbano."

The project initially incorporated 20 "super-manzanas," or superblocks, in an area of 480 ha / 1185.6 acres. As the *Caja de Vivienda Militar* owned one fifth of the purchased land, developing some of those superblocks was its responsibility. Each superblock contained between roughly 400 and 1500 housing units with different housing types and with space for social facilities such as schools, sport fields, churches, shops, and health centers. According to ICT leadership, this spatial organization was intended to

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[114] Minute 18, 1963, p. 140-back. The general manager of the municipal enterprise for urban transportation (Empresa Distrital de Transportes Urbanos) asked for a loan to build the trolley bus's net to Ciudad Kennedy. The project was not rejected, but redirected to the national government to facilitate the means to build the transportation's facilities. Afterwards, the ICT sold to the institution a plot to build a terminal for trolley buses' garages and workshops. In: Minute 18, 1963, p. 137-back.

reinforce the relationships between the families participating in the project.[115] As per the contract on the official partition of the land, Superblocks 4, 9A, and 12 belonged to the Caja de Vivienda Militar.[116] The ICT developed the remaining superblocks under the name Ciudad Techo. Most of the site falls within a polygon defined by preexisting streets, with the two triangular superblocks 6A and 12A external to it.

Figure 1.10. General Plan of the neighborhood. In: Planchas Ciudad de Techo. Colección Centro Interamericano de Vivienda y Planeamiento –CINVA. Fondo Universidad Nacional de Colombia.

After the presentation of the first draft, the planning process wrapped up speedily using the already well-developed scheme repeatedly executed by the ICT. First, the *departamento de administracion* (administrative department) formulated an operating plan for the project, determining the number of applicants, the budget, and the system by which the housing units would be built. For Ciudad Techo, the board of directors then approved, in August 1961, a first phase of 550 housing units to be built through the

[115] Instituto de Crédito Territorial, *Ciudad Kennedy, Una Realidad* (Bogotá: Oficina de Relaciones Públicas del Instituto de Crédito Territorial, 1965), 17.
[116] Minute 5, February 7, 1962, p. 0123-back

individual aided self-help system and 300 to be built through mutual aided self-help.[117] The document presenting the planning process for Ciudad Techo states that these 850 plots would be provided with the utilities, and the site would have streets, sidewalks, trees, and free areas for parks and recreation. The agency also determined in this proposal the size of the available plots, the type of support it would provide, the total cost of each option, the eligibility requirements around applicant earnings and assets, and amortization period. Once the board approved the project, the ICT distributed the application forms.

Figure 1.11. Master plan, 1980. Archive Minvivienda, La Fragua.

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[117] Minute 30, August 02, 1961, p. 1079-back. The meaning of these two terms will be explained later. They were specifically defined in CINVA's "Self-Help Housing guide," and reproduced in: United States, and Harold Robinson, eds. *Aided Self-Help Housing, Its History and Potential.* HUD-427-1A(2). Washington: U.S. Dept. of Housing and Urban Development, Office of International Affairs: For sale by the Supt. of Docs., U.S. Govt. Print. Off, 1976.

The magnitude of the challenge of building a "satellite city" required a straightforward strategy, which the ICT certainly possessed. The first contract to build infrastructure in super-block 6 was awarded on September 20, 1961.[118] Simultaneously, the ICT started awarding the new apartments to residents. Although no specific date at which Ciudad Kennedy's construction began can be traced, by December 17th, 1961, when President John F. Kennedy laid its corner stone, the ICT had already formulated a plan to construct homes for another 3,500 residents, awarded contracts to build infrastructure for Superblocks 6, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15 and 16, and selected the participants for the self-help program in these blocks.[119] The order in which these different superblocks were developed is not clearly discernible in the minutes or other records, but one way to trace it, at least roughly, is by looking the order in which the bids and housing units were awarded to contractors and residents, respectively. Yet even these appear only fragmentarily in the existing information.[120] That being said, the construction process most probably started with the superblock 6, where the first self-help pilot project was put in place. Twenty-seven families started building their houses on block 11 on

[118] Minute 37, September 20, 1961, p. 1248-back.
[119] Minute 45, November 22, 1961, p. 1317-back / 1320-back. Awarding of 3,000 individual aided self-help system and 500 housing units through mutual aided self-help. Second group / phase.
Depiction of three alternatives in this program: 1) 2,000 120m2 large plots, plus a loan of $ 2,000 pesos for material purchase. In addition: technical help and social services. Price: $ 6.850 pesos. 2) 1,000 108m2 large plots, plus a loan of $ 3,700 pesos for material purchase. In addition: technical help and social services. Price: $ 10.000 pesos. 3.A) 226 120m2 large plots, plus a loan of $ 3,500 pesos for material purchase. In addition: technical help and social services. Price: $ 11.370 pesos. 3.B) 274 75m2 large plots, plus a 1,400m2 large communal area, plus material's supply for $ 4,800 pesos. Price: $ 11.370 pesos.
Minute 46, November 29, 1961, p. 1366-1367. Awarding of 300 aided self-help system and 50 housing units through mutual aided self-help for the national police. They are part of the second group / phase. 150 aided self-help in the first alternative ($6.850 pesos), 150 aided self-help in the second alternative ($10.000 pesos), and 50 mutual aided self-help, 3A and 3B alternatives, ($11.370 pesos). Minute 48, December 13, 1961, p. 1425-back: Contract awarding for construction of infrastructure (obras de urbanizacion) in the superblocks 10, 11, 13, 14, 15 and 16. One of the board members, Guillermo Gómez Moncayo, did not participate in this awarding process because some of the participating persons were relatives.
[120] There is no clear explanation as for why Ciudad Kennedy was developed in that specific order.

December 8, 1961.[121] A group of superblocks to be built through self-help followed.[122]

Almost one year later, in September 1962, the multifamily building in superblocks 2 and

7 began.[123] The second group of superblocks with single-family housing also began in

1962, and construction was finalized with the completion of superblock 8.[124] Ciudad

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[121] Instituto de Crédito Territorial (Colombia), ed. *Revista Ciudad Kennedy.* Vol. No. 01. Bogotá: Instituto de Crédito Territorial, Departamento deRelaciones Públicas, 1964.

[122] Minute 48, December 13, 1961, p. 1425-back. Superblocks 10, 11, 13, 14, 15 and 16.

[123] Probably similar to superblock 7. Minute 39, September ?, 1962, p. 0606. Contract awarding for superblock 7 infrastructure. Contract award to the firm Esguerra Urdaneta Suarez y OLAP to build the structures of the multifamily housing buildings within the first phase and the installation of the electricity net. Minute 42, October 9, 1962, p. 0641-back. Selection of families for 1,997 apartment units in both superblocks. Minute 51, November 19, 1962, p. 0829-back. For the construction of the new group of multifamily buildings' structures, the ICT awarded the firm Construcciones Sigma Ltda., and Brugues Estrada & Cia. Ltda., and the firm Borrero Zamorano Giovanelli. Minute 54, November 28, 1962, p. 0850. Contract awarding of finishes for multifamily buildings in superblock 2 to Vargas & Cia. Ltda., Copre Triana Vargas Rocha, Vasquez Peña & Cia. Ltda., and Garcia Osorio Ltda. Minute 21, 1963, p. 175. Contract awarding for electricity net in the superblock 7. Minute 23, 1963, p. 182. Contract for finishes in multifamily buildings of superblock 7 not awarded "due to the severe economic conditions of the last months." A new bidding process needs to be started. Minute 32, June 6, 1963, p. 227-back. Contract awarding for finishes in the multifamily buildings of superblock 7. Adjustment of contract for finishes in the multifamily buildings of superblock 2. Minute 47, August 23, 1963. Contract award for building 4 multifamily buildings in the superblock 7 for the "Educators' Plan."

[124] Minute 11, March 21, 1962, p. 0198-back. Contract awarding for infrastructure of super-block 15 (it is probably a typo. I think it refers to superblock 5). Minute 39, September ?, 1962, p. 0603. Contract awarding for Electricity net for superblock 6A. Minute 44, October 18, 1962, p. 0716. Contract awarding for 313 plots in superblock 1 infrastructure and utilities. Minute 49, November 8, 1962, p. 0822-back. Contract awarding for open spaces (plazas), commercial spaces and exterior hard-surface flooring (zonas duras) in the superblocks 2, 3, 5, 6, 6A, 7, 8, 13, and 15 to Jaime Nieto Cano, Manuel J. Melo Saenz and Pedro J. Herrera Acosta. Minute 50, November 15, 1962, p. 0827. Contract awarding for the electricity net in the superblocks 3, 5, 8, and 12A. Minute 52, November 22, 1962, p. 0834. Transfer of a piece of land in superblock 12A to the Empresa de Energia Electrica for the construction of an electricity sub-station. Minute 56, December 6, 1962, p. 0859-back. New contract awarding for the electricity net in the superblocks 3, 5, 8, and 12A, since one of the awardees did not accept the conditions of the contract. Minute 21, , 1963, p. 175. Contract awarding for electricity net in the superblock 7. Minute 27. 1963, p. 204-back. Contract awarding for the electricity net for 320 plots in the superblock 1. Minute 65. November 1963. 60 housing units CCDP-4 with all services as part of the "Educators' plan" in the superblock 1. Minute 46, November 26, 1965, 0342-back / 0343-back. Building materials purchase (list) and working force hired for the construction of 60 houses in the superblock 8 through "direct administration." Minute 47, December 3, 1965, p. 0350. Building materials purchase for the construction of 32 houses through aided self-help and additional $10.000 pesos in the superblock 8.

Kennedy was expected to house at least 100,000 inhabitants. "... [B]y the end of July, 1963, the total number of inhabitants was probably close to 63,000."[125]

In sum, Ciudad Kennedy offers crucial glimpses in the ICT's operating system that enabled the construction of housing on a large scale. This housing development, in which the most diverse institutions participated, allowed the ICT gathering essential knowledge that served as a guide for future developments. Ciudad Kennedy, as the last example of the period of this study reveals the level of complexity of ICT's housing projects, its management, and the different actors involved.

Throughout the next chapters, Housing as an architectonic artifact, as a geo-political tool, and as a means to educate the residents will be explained through these three case studies: Muzú, CUAN, and Ciudad Kennedy. The rationales behind them will slowly emerge and shed light on the ideas and beliefs that animated the stakeholders—technicians, agency leaders, and politicians—intervening in the building of low-cost housing, as well as on the implications of their assumptions about the populations to be housed in the ICT projects, i.e. low income and middle class sectors. The main arguments of this dissertation will be demonstrated through these three case studies.

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[125] William B. Rudell, "Community Development in Ciudad Kennedy: An Examination of the Existing Programs of Social Service with Proposals for Their Coordination and Expansion," CINVA Summer Research Fellow Yale University, School of Law, Escritos y Monografías (Bogotá: Centro Interamericano de Vivienda –CINVA, 1964), box 53, file 4, Colección Centro Interamericano de Vivienda –CINVA, Fondo Universidad Nacional de Colombia, 8.

Chapter 2: Reading ICT's work through the Postcolonial lens

The ICT's housing program was established in the context of Colombia's quest for modernization. This project of modernization needs to be read critically since it operated in a context of political violence and of extreme social and economic inequality and exclusion, and the ICT's housing program did not operate independent of this reality. Approaching the ICT's work through a lens of postcolonial theory permits a critical reading that helps reveal the ambiguous, concealed, or completely invisible rationales of the ICT's housing program. Postcolonial theory helps us assess modernization as a means to achieving "Development", and understand how building housing supports this goal. Taking this perspective should be seen, as Arturo Escobar claims, "as another way of thinking that runs counter to the great modernist narratives," to which the emancipatory power of modern architecture belongs.[126] The ICT's official discourse supported the building of housing for the low-income population as a way to achieve a more equitable society, while simultaneously the elites' national project did not include the "less favored classes," so oft invoked in ICT's publications.[127] A postcolonial reading exposes the inherent contradictions of such a discourse, defined by ideas such as civilization and justice.[128]

While postcolonial theory offers a useful method for reading the ICT's work, Latin American scholars have broadened the scope of the discussion, incorporating other elements particular to Latin American history. They critically address the invention of the

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[126] Arturo Escobar, "Worlds and Knowledges Otherwise," *Cultural Studies* 21, no. 2–3 (March 1, 2007): 179–210, doi:10.1080/09502380601162506.

[127] The "less favored classes" seem to encompass then all the people, who are not part of this privileged elite conforming the leaders of the ICT.

[128] Ashcroft 1998, 192. Quoted in: Felipe Hernández, *Bhabha for Architects*, Thinkers for Architects ; 04; Variation: Thinkers for Architects ; 04. (London ; New York: Routledge, 2010), 13.

Americas, the idea of Latin America, and the counterpart of modernity: colonialism.[129] In a form similar to the postcolonial authors, they deconstruct the narratives of modernity and progress. Of special relevance has been the work of Arturo Escobar, who has thoroughly deconstructed the different discourses that have had an impact in the so-called Third World. Escobar bases his understanding of discourse on Michel Foucault, whose work "on the dynamics of discourse and power in the representation of social reality, in particular, has been instrumental in unveiling the mechanisms by which a certain order of discourse produces permissible modes of being and thinking while disqualifying and even making others impossible."[130] Since Development, as a goal and as a strategy, defined the ICT's actions throughout the period of this study, and Escobar's work on development is seminal, the theoretical foundations of my research considerably rely on it.

With the project of transforming the built environment of those who lived in precarious conditions, the ICT transmitted the idea of progress, based on modern western "knowledge."[131] The ICT legitimized this vision though an "objective," scientific language regarding the living conditions of the targeted population. Extrapolating Escobar's definition of Development, ICT's housing program also followed a "top-down, ethnocentric, and technocratic approach, which treated people and cultures as abstract concepts, statistical figures to be moved up and down in the charts of 'progress'," and

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[129] Edmundo O'Gorman, *The Invention of America: An Inquiry into the Historical Nature of the New World and the Meaning of Its History* (Greenwood Press, 1972); Enrique Dussel, *The Invention of the Americas: Eclipse of "the Other" and the Myth of Modernity*, trans. Michael D. Barber (New York: Continuum Intl Pub Group, 1995); Walter Mignolo, *The Idea of Latin America*, Blackwell Manifestos (Malden, MA ; Oxford: Blackwell Pub, 2005); Walter Mignolo, *The Darker Side of Western Modernity: Global Futures, Decolonial Options*, Latin America Otherwise: Languages, Empires, Nations (Durham [N.C.]: Duke University Press, 2011); Escobar, "Worlds and Knowledges Otherwise. The Latin American Modernity/ Coloniality Research Program."
[130] In: Escobar, *Encountering Development*. 5, 10.
[131] In the same way development discourse did. Ibid., 13.

was conceived "as a system of more or less universally applicable technical interventions intended to deliver some 'badly needed' goods to a 'target' population."[132] Indeed, the agency worked as a hegemonic force, which contributed to disseminating the western paradigm of progress / development, and enabled—to Escobar's shock—the Third World countries themselves to become the strongest believers in this paradigm.[133]

Reading the ICT's work through a postcolonial lens shines light on two subjects: architecture and power relations, each of which can be read in two ways. Regarding architecture, the housing produced by the ICT becomes an account told from the fringes of modern architecture's official narrative, valid on its own, and independent of the models defined in western centers of power. On the other hand, these same architectural objects can be read as the materialization of the ICT's educational and civilizing aims. Likewise, power relations. On the one hand, the ICT becomes the "underdeveloped" object that requires financial and technical support. But on the other, the same agency becomes a subject that, in the national context, exerts power over the "less favored classes" through the control mechanism that was the educational component of its housing program. This dual circumstance is central to understanding the ICT's history. Postcolonial theory has criticized the implicit passivity of the colonized, or lack of "historical agency."[134] But –applying postcolonial terminology- the ICT is rather an active colonized subject, which is proactive and has its own agenda. Only recent scholarship has presented Inter-American relations from the perspective of a Latin

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[132] Ibid., 44.

[133] Ibid., 24.

[134] As discussed in the introduction of: Gisela Cramer and Ursula Prutsch, *¡Américas Unidas!: Nelson A. Rockefeller's Office of Inter-American Affairs (1940-46)* (Madrid, Spain: Editorial Iberoamericana / Vervuert, 2012), 7. http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/utxa/detail.action?docID=3226394. Also Escobar refers to Bhabha's attention to Said's seminal postcolonial work *Orientalism*, in which is suggeseted that "colonial power is possessed entirely by the colonizer, given its intentionality and unidirectionality." In: Escobar, *Encountering Development*, 11.

America as an active participant.[135] This study offers a contribution to enrich this perspective.

Through the lens of postcolonial theory, ICT's architecture appears as an object with its own value. The ICT's housing program operated as a field of experimentation, through which modern architecture advanced. However, scholarship has assessed ICT's architecture against its European counterparts in order to legitimate the agency's production. Even though models from the canonical repertoire of modern architecture certainly played a role, Colombia's complex and heterogeneous geography prompted the agency to develop strategies similar to those developed under the flag of modernism. The systematic use of building types, which varied according to the different regions and experiments with building materials to achieve a more rational and efficient building process were some of the most relevant strategies. Due to their sometimes-traditional appearance, much of ICT's housing projects have not yet been evaluated on their own. Most accounts focus on the most modern looking projects since they can be assessed in relation to canonical modern residential architecture.

At the same time however, the underlying political and educational aims of the housing program nurtured the architectural design. Modern architecture delivered the necessary framework to materialize the ICT's ideas about the right way of living. Technical aspects dictated by the premises of hygiene and functionality predominated in shaping the built environment through the construction of the ICT's housing projects. The ideal form of dwelling was always supported with a seemingly objective argument: the current unhygienic conditions of its future residents.

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[135] Cramer and Prutsch, ¡Américas Unidas!: Nelson A. Rockefeller's Office of Inter-American Affairs (1940-46).

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From the start, the agency offered what its leaders and technicians considered to be the better version of the existing housing conditions. The ICT represented its houses in the rural areas as the antithesis of traditional architecture: the ICT dwelling the expression of a civilized, hygienic and ordered environment; the traditional hut the maximal expression of backwardness. That the depicted dwelling references a vernacular architecture with indigenous roots is never mentioned. In the urban areas, the ICT offered an alternative to those living in overcrowded conditions, usually in the downtown areas, where the old houses from colonial times had been converted in *inquilinatos*, tenement houses, with each family living in a single room.

Another dimension postcolonial theory brings to the fore is the concept of power underlying the ICT's work. From the ICT's vantage point, there are two levels of narration. On the one hand, the ICT is influenced by the rationales of modernization, progress, and development defined in Western power centers. On the other hand, it replicates the structures of power at the local level, on the margins. I.e., it exercises power over those with no power in the country. Here, power relations are mediated by the interests of the elites, widely represented on the ICT's board. This dual position hints at, what Jyoti Hosagrahar accurately expresses, the ways in which "knowledge about the world is generated in specific relationships between those with power and those without as a way to justify and perpetuate those conditions of domination."[136] Internally, the agency underpinned existing power relations by creating an "objective" framework according to which it determined the right way of living, and by deploying the housing program to accomplish other goals in the quest to make Colombia an economically developed country, without diminishing the social inequalities.

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[136] Jyoti Hosagrahar, "Interrogating Difference: Postcolonial Perspectives in Architecture and Urbanism," in *The SAGE Handbook of Architectural Theory* (London: SAGE, 2008), 70–84, 82.

The ideas Escobar elaborates to explain the different "tales" around the discourse of development describe the same power relations that postcolonial theory has aimed to illuminate. Power relations start from the preconceived manner in which "the other" is described and assessed by those who wield the power to define them: the colonizer, the international organizations, the politicians, the agency's board members and general manager, the experts, the social workers, and so on. The same relations have defined the ICT from its inception. Poverty, illiteracy, and hunger are directly connected with ideas about the "underdeveloped" and the "backward". Those living in poverty are considered to lack the "spiritual and material traits to be developed" and civilized.[137]

Power relations also become evident when defining who has a voice. In this study, the history is told from the perspective of the ICT. It is a contradictory voice however, because it repeats the same "top-down, ethnocentric, and technocratic approach" of development discourse. The ICT replicates the same models, spread by the centers of power, at the next level down of power relations, the national realm. The ICT operated as one of the "local centers of power," to use Escobar's terms, through which, "people and communities are bound to specific cycles of cultural and economic production and through which certain behaviors and rationalities are promoted."[138] On the other hand, the future residents were never asked. Their knowledge was not consulted; on the contrary, it was denied, belittled. They had no voice. Only the experts were consulted. Advisors were constantly called in to help the agency's officials understand the situation and make decisions. The experts' privileged position allowed them to impose their views on those targeted by the housing program.

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[137] Escobar, *Encountering Development*, 53-54.
[138] Escobar, *Encountering Development*, 46.

The unequal power relations instantiated by the ICT shine through the consolidation of a center and a periphery. Through its practices at the national level, the center, the ICT defined who became part of this national project and on what terms. Since the headquarters were located in the capital and the key decisions were taken there, Bogotá appears as the center in the national context. By designing the houses and giving clear specifications on building methods and urban schemes, the ICT produced models in the center, Bogotá, which were transposed indifferently throughout the country as simplified ideal housing types. The concomitant simplified understanding of the country and its housing needs constitutes the base of one of the most significant effects of the ICT's work in Colombia. The ICT contributed from the start to the consolidation of a center and a periphery within the country.[139]

The term "periphery" refers here to those territories outside of Bogotá, where the ICT's ideas were introduced. However, this periphery was not homogenous. The economic and political periphery of the country (areas mostly inhabited by indigenous groups and Afro-Colombians) constitutes another level within the periphery. Due to its fragmented view of the country, the agency did not incorporate those peripheral territories where it is still only scarcely present today: the Amazonian region, in the East plains, the Pacific forest, the south of the Atlantic coast, the Urabá region, and the mid-Magdalena river region. These constitute the so-called "frontier," which according to Amparo Murillo did not enjoy the privileges of the central areas, and which were perceived as the unknown and the "savage," "the reverse of the nation," or the opposite of the ideal of civilization.[140] Furthermore, the disdain with which the agency approached

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[139] The impact of the execution of those models on the communities where the ICT built still needs to be studied.

[140] Amparo Murillo Posada, "La Modernizacion y Las Violencias (1930-1957)," in *Historia de Colombia: Todo Lo Que Hay Que Saber* (Bogotá, Colombia: Taurus, 2006), 268. The quotation "the reverse of the

the building task in the country's most neglected areas further reinforced this unequal power relationship.[141]

As the ICT introduced resident education in its housing programs, it advanced onto another terrain, the power over the resident's bodies. Hygiene and morality became instruments of colonization. Since these instruments were deployed mostly among women, this level of power relations reinforced disparities in gender relations too. This is also the only instance in which women appear in this history. Although they are otherwise absent as active role-players, in the realm of the residents' education programs, they appear as the ICT's social workers (they were the "visiting nurses" of the 1940s), which teach other women about hygiene and the moral virtues derived from hygienic habits. The ones receiving instruction were ascribed only a passive role. They were the main objects of the ICT's education's program.

Since a segment of the residents in the ICT's urban housing projects migrated from rural areas, the politicians and officials, as well as the board members, took it as an imperative to educate the residents to live in an urban environment, in which the "bad habits" developed in the rural environment and the *inquilinatos* (tenement houses) in the urban centers could be unlearnt. These education programs were the condition *sine qua non* for achieving the goal inherent to the housing program on the political level: educating the Other, not to liberate him/her, but to make him/her conform with the attitudes expected by the men leading the agency. The power gained over those bodies allowed the ICT's officials to inculcate wishes and values identical to those of the ones

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nation" is a citation in Murillo's text. Source: Margarita Serge, *El revés de la nación. Territorios salvajes, fronteras y tierras de nadie*. Bogotá, Uniandes-Ceso, 2005.

[141] Two cases in relation to the department of Chocó, located along the Pacific Ocean and inhabited mostly by African Colombians and indigenous groups, partly reveals ICT's relationship to those frontiers. In: Minute 471, April 27, 1951, p. 1216 – 1216-back; Minute 502, January 14, 1952, p. 1273.

wielding power. The expected result of this "civilizing mission" is what Homi Bhabha calls "mimicry." For him, "colonial mimicry is the desire for a reformed, recognisable other, as a subject of difference that is almost the same, but not quite."[142] The frustration expressed about this education process not always being successful (complete families inhabiting only one single room of the houses, or breeding domestic animals in the backyards) demonstrates resistance by the Others subjected to these education programs.

After presenting how postcolonial theory, and specially Arturo Escobar's work on development, enables to shine light on ICT's architecture and power relations, which the ICT created and was subjected to through the geo-political agendas of different actors, and the social component of the housing program; next section will discuss how existing literature tackles those topics and how a postcolonial approach broadens the scope of the discussion on the ICT.

THE MODERN CANON AND ICT

Tracing the historiography of the ICT's work, two surveys on Colombian architecture of the time covered by this research reveal the architectural profession's stance on the ICT. Both publications were written by Carlos Martinez, an emblematic figure in the architecture world as editor of the journal *Proa*, as professor at the *Universidad Nacional*, and as architect. The first, *Arquitectura En Colombia: Arquitectura Colonial 1538-1810, Arquitectura Contemporánea En Cinco Años 1946-1951*, published in 1951, and coauthored with Jorge Arango, includes two ICT housing projects, Muzú and Los Alcázares, both located in Bogotá. While it names the individual architects and engineers participating in the design process, whether they worked for

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[142] (Bhabha 1994: 86). Quoted in: Hernández, *Bhabha for Architects*, 64.

private firms or for the ICT, as in Muzú's case, the ICT itself was not mentioned. One possible reason for this omission was their wish to underscore the importance of the profession of the architect over the importance of official institutions.

Martinez and Arango developed two key theses in this canonical work on Colombian architecture. First, they recognized the "picturesque and complicated topography" of the country.[143] However, this characteristic seems not to be relevant to explaining the "contemporary architecture" the authors examined.[144] As I will show, the intricate topography indeed defined the core of the ICT's work methods during the 1940s, which constituted its major contribution to modern architecture. Second, for Martinez and Arango, the country's difficult transportation system had hampered its ability to become more "civilized."[145]

Carlos Martinez and Edgar Burbano published a second survey on Colombian architecture twelve years later, in 1963. The changes in the country during the intervening years are an important part of its content.[146] Despite the increase of "low-cost" housing built by the ICT and the BCH (*Banco Central Hipotecario* - Central Mortgage Bank),[147] the authors considered that "an adequate and prompt solution" to the

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[143] Martínez and Arango, *Arquitectura En Colombia*, 6-7. Although this assertion contradicts the narrative on modern architecture and nation building, and to the eight points developed by Hugo Mondragón, I refer here to its direct implications in the building materials and methods. See: Hugo Mondragón López, "La revista Proa*,"Departament de Projectes Arquitectònics. UPC,* DPA: Documents de Projectes d'Arquitectura, no. 24 (2008): 90–95.

[144] Martinez is a fascinating figure in the Colombian architecture realm of the mid' twentieth century. Scattered information about him is to find in the different sources. His formation in France, his role in introducing the work of Le Corbusier in Colombia, his lectures give account of a highly educated intellectual. He also recognized the complexity of the country when trying to explain Colombian "contemporary architecture." Yet, probably as most of the leading class of the country, he was also trapped in the images of "civilization" in so far as they related to the images developed in the centers of power, Europe and the United States.

[145] Interestingly however, he does not recognize the existing railroad as one of the transportation means.

[146] Although this is not central to this discussion, it is interesting that here again, the value of the train as a means of transportation is ignored.

[147] Martínez and Burbano, *Arquitectura En Colombia*, 10. Strikingly, next to housing projects such as La Fragua (built with ICT's support as a self-help project), other projects are for "employees with middle

existing housing shortage was difficult "due to adverse economic circumstances and unassertive urban and architectural approaches."[148] This "unassertiveness" probably refers to Ciudad Kennedy, which Martinez and Burbano did not mention. The problem posed by housing projects such as Ciudad Kennedy was the Authorship. Martinez was a consummate promoter of the profession. His attacks in the journal *Proa* against non-professional builders give account of this. Not having a well-known architect as its designer, Ciudad Kennedy did not fit into his narrative. In Ciudad Kennedy, the ICT's technical department, whit no apparent employment of well-known architects, was responsible for its design, planning and construction's oversight.[149] Conversely, Martinez included other ICT projects built with the collaboration of renowned local architects. The ICT's name is absent from this publication too.[150]

Carlos Martinez, as the leading architecture critic of the time, consolidated the official narrative on modern architecture in Colombia through his numerous writings on architecture.[151] For Martinez, Colombian architecture was defined through "honesty in design, the exaltation of building structure, and formal sobriety,"[152] and was to be appreciated precisely because of these qualities.[153] A last element in this official

income" appear under the same seal "low-cost." Martinez ample understanding of the term "low-cost" applied to the professional architects, and to ICT's officials. It seems that all those houses that were not luxurious were "low-cost."

[148] Ibid., 13.

[149] Despite some initial initiatives to do so. A early proposal to conduct a competition, which never took place, and the proposal elaborated for the superblock five by Arturo Robledo are some examples.

[150] La Fragua, a project developed with ICT's financial support, but designed by the well-known architect German Samper. Under the multifamily housing projects is the ICT housing project "Hans Drews." Again, without mentioning the ICT as the facilitator of this project, but its architects. Martínez and Burbano, *Arquitectura En Colombia*, 103.

[151] Hugo Mondragón has analyzed his contribution in his work on Proa. Mondragón López, "La revista Proa;" Hugo Mondragón López, "Arquitectura En Colombia 1946-1951, Lecturas Críticas de La Revista Proa. (Spanish)," *DEARQ: Revista de Arquitectura de La Universidad de Los Andes,* no. 2 (May 2008): 82–95.

[152] Martínez and Burbano, *Arquitectura En Colombia*, 12.

[153] Henry-Russell Hitchcock and Museum of Modern Art (New York, N.Y.), *Latin American Architecture since 1945* (New York: Museum of Modern Art, 1955).

narrative, as introduced by Martinez, is the idea that Colombian modern architecture was born in Bogotá, and thrived there. For him, modern architecture could not have developed anywhere else in the country as it did in Bogotá. This utterly ethnocentric view of the issue aligns perfectly with the discourse the ICT used to consolidate a center and a periphery in the development of housing.

Later accounts have explained the ICT's housing projects as a consequence of the proposals on minimal housing developed in Europe between the two World Wars, which were presented in condensed form in the second CIAM (*Congrès Internationaux d'Architecture Moderne*) meeting in Frankfurt in 1929 under the motto *Wohnen für das Existenzminimum*. Likewise, historiography has also seen the agency's work in close relationship to the precepts developed by the CIAM, especially from Le Corbusier's ideas on housing and those of Jose Luis Sert on the "neighborhood unit." But what does this mean? Does this comparison add to the value of the projects, or diminish it due to the fact that it can be read simply as a copy?

Sert (along with Paul Lester Wiener, his partner in the firm "Town Planning Associates") and Le Corbusier, were in Colombia between 1947 and 1953, following Felipe Hernandez' arguments, not only to attract some important contracts to their offices, but also to transmit their ideas on modern architecture and urbanism through their work.[154] They acted as agents of "legitimatization" of modern architecture and urban planning in Colombia. Colombian architects trained in the modern way of doing architecture, however, also had to deal with the local building industry, economic constrains, and their own ideas about the groups they were designing for, among many

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[154] Felipe Hernández, *Beyond Modernist Masters: Contemporary Architecture in Latin America* (Basel ; Boston: Birkhäuser GmbH, 2009); Felipe Hernández, Mark Millington, and Iain Borden, *Transculturation: Cities, Spaces and Architectures in Latin America* (Rodopi, 2005).

other things. Hence, what these architects did is more than a simple adaptation of European models. It was a translation of global ideas to the specificity of each place.[155]

Besides the ICT's own publications, historiography on the ICT rests predominantly on two seminal works published in the 1990s by INURBE, the agency that replaced it. Both were authored by Alberto Saldarriaga Roa, whose research produced a comprehensive compilation of the ICT's practices and oeuvre, published in "*Instituto de Crédito Territorial. ICT. Medio Siglo de Vivienda Social En Colombia 1939-1989.*" This information served as the basis for a second publication, "*Estado, ciudad y vivienda: urbanismo y arquitectura de la vivienda estatal en Colombia, 1918-1990,*" which in addition the ICT's work, included other state agencies that developed low-cost housing on national and municipal levels in three main cities: Bogotá, Medellín, and Cali.[156] This publication presents the inter-relationship between city, state, and architecture and connects the notions of minimal dwelling, rational building systems, and between state-built housing to the modernist paradigm in architecture. Because of its comprehensive and systematic approach to the ICT's work, as well as its emergence from a vacuum of comprehensive publications the state's work on housing; Saldarriaga Roa's work is the main reference for most later scholarship on the ICT.[157] Even a recent publication from

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[155] Arturo Escobar interprets the modernization discourse from a similar place as Nestor García Canclini does. Arturo Escobar, "Globalización, Desarrollo y Modernidad," in *Planeación, Participación y Desarrollo,* ed. Corporación Región (Medellín: Corporación Región, 2002), 9–32; Néstor García Canclini, *Hybrid Cultures: Strategies for Entering and Leaving Modernity* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1995).

[156] The Banco Central Hipotecario, BCH (Central Mortgage Bank), Caja de Crédito Agrario y Minero (Bank of Agrarian and Mining Credit), Caja de Vivienda Militar (Bank of Military Housing), Fondo Nacional de Ahorro (National Savings Fund) on a national level, and Caja de Vivienda Popular (Bank of working-class housing, Bogotá), Corporación de Vivienda y Desarrollo Urbano (Housing and Urban Development Corporation, Medellín), and Instituto de Vivienda de Cali (Housing agency of Cali) on the municipal level. Saldarriaga Roa, *Estado, ciudad y vivienda*, 49.

[157] The term "social" is the literal translation for the term used in Spanish; but it is also the way housing built by the State is coined in Europe. It compares with the concept of "public housing" in the United

the Housing Ministry used these works to describe the historical development of state-built housing in Colombia.[158]

Saldarriaga's account of the state agencies in his second publication, "*Estado, ciudad y vivienda*" (State, City and Housing) relies mostly on legislation governing changes to them.[159] While still relevant, this publication, has contributed to the enduring belief that the agency only started building urban housing at the end of the 1940s. In doing so, it ignores the ICT's extensive collaboration with local municipalities in constructing "model working-class neighborhoods" during the *transitional period* (1942-1947) of the agency.[160] He also did not account for the importance of Law 85 of 1946 for the construction of large urban housing developments.

According to Saldarriaga, "*Estado, ciudad y vivienda,*" was published at a moment when architects looked upon "social housing" with disdain for its apparently insignificant contribution to great urban and architectonic themes. Conversely, Saldarriaga argued that housing in fact did play a central role in the development of modern architecture in Colombia. The problem was, in his view, that the design of state-built housing projects had not been analyzed in relation to international standards, such as those produced by the CIAM. This is the reason why he set out to weave housing projects

States, although with the significant difference that housing built by the state in Colombia is to be sold, unlike the U.S., where housing will be rented.

[158] Ministerio de Vivienda, Ciudad y Territorio para el séptimo foro urbano mundial, *Colombia: 100 Años de Politicas Habitacionales. Colombia: 100 Years of Housing Policies* (Bogotá: Panamericana Formas e Impresos S.A., 2014).

[159] Saldarriaga Roa, *Estado, ciudad y vivienda*, 49-56.

[160] Saldarriaga Roa, *Estado, ciudad y vivienda*, 53, 66, 80,107. This unfortunate omission is grounded in the own ICT's publications, which assert that during this period ICT's work was limited to disburse loans to the municipalities (Instituto de Crédito Territorial and República de Colombia, *Informe Al Señor Ministro de Fomento Para Su Memoria Al Congreso Nacional* (Bogotá: Instituto de Crédito Territorial, 1962), 2, 31). Unlike him, even if only marginally, Silvia Arango recognizes ICT's work during that period, claiming that the ICT extended his work to the urban areas after 1942, where it built "more than 1000 housing units in different cities." In: Silvia Arango, *Historia de la Arquitectura en Colombia* (Centro Editorial y Facultad de Artes, Universidad Nacional de Colombia, 1990), 206.

by Colombian state agencies into the official narrative of modern architectural history.[161] Consequently with this goal, the houses of Muzú are for Saldarriaga a "rather literal translation of the *existenz-minimum* proposed in the CIAM of 1928 [sic]."[162] Saldarriaga also finds a major influence on state-built housing located in the "international centers of study and of professional training."[163] This effort to prove the influences of and relations to these international centers of study infuses the spirit of most historiography on the ICT.

In addition to Saldarriaga's publications, the ICT's historiography consists on articles and master theses produced at universities, particularly, the *Universidad Nacional de Colombia*.[164] Most of them have also studied the ICT's work mainly from the perspective of its formal contribution to modern architecture, which was undeniably considerable. In some cases, the ICT is part of the story but not the main object of inquiry. Many articles on the ICT only limitedly tackle specific issues. Typically, they are based almost entirely on Saldarriaga's information and Silvia Arango's survey on Colombian architecture, and on the authors' own fieldwork.[165] Their approach to architectonic topics is mostly aesthetic and/or related to urban development in Bogotá. The ICT's post-occupancy transformation is the central theme of Fabio Forero and Jenny Forero's research.[166] Finally, Saldarriaga collaborated with Olga Ceballos Ramos and Doris Tarchópulos Sierra to compile systematically the legislation regulated the

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[161] Saldarriaga Roa, *Estado, ciudad y vivienda*, 11.
[162] Ibid., 134.
[163] Ibid., 34.
[164] Aguilera Rojas, "Un Dialogo sobre la serie. El ICT como laboratorio de arquitectura 1948-1953."
[165] Arango, *Historia de la Arquitectura en Colombia*.
[166] Fabio Enrique Forero Suárez and Jenny Alexandra Forero Forero, *Vivienda social, modernidad e informalidad en Bogotá, 1911-1982: estudio de patrones habitacionales presentes en algunas urbanizaciones populares premodernas e incidencias en las transformaciones de las unidades vecinales del Instituto de Crédito Territorial ICT, Muzú y Quiroga* (Bogotá, D.C.: Universidad La Gran Colombia, 2009).

construction of state-built housing. The laws regulating the ICT's activities are compiled in this publication.[167]

Two other canonical works of architectural history appeared contemporaneously with Saldarriaga's publications: Carlos Niño Murcia's work on the ministry of public buildings and Silvia Arango's comprehensive survey of Colombian architecture, previously mentioned.[168] The latter presents mass-produced housing for low-income families as a place where modern architecture displayed much innovation, both in its achievements in Public Policy and its fortunate interactions with the state.[169]

When approaching the work of the ICT, Arango refers to the three case studies of this dissertation in mostly aesthetic terms. She associates Muzú with Le Corbusier's floor plans of Pessac and highlights its prefab walls and slabs.[170] CUAN is defined as "the housing complex that exemplifies more clearly the idea of achieving high density through isolated high-rise buildings on large green areas."[171] Finally, Ciudad Kennedy serves as an example for the transformation of mass produced housing. Arango acknowledges that despite Ciudad Kennedy's "less elaborated" design, it "has proven over time to have been a more acceptable solution than most of the contemporary housing developments."[172]

Recent scholarship has advanced in establishing relationships between the built environment and politics, or more specifically, between urbanization, modernization, and politics. From her perspective as an economic historian, Susana Romero tackles in her

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[167] Olga Lucía Ceballos Ramos, Alberto Saldarriaga Roa, and Doris Tarchópulos Sierra, *Vivienda social en Colombia: una mirada desde su legislación, 1918-2005* (Bogotá, D.C.: Editorial Pontificia Universidad Javeriana, 2008).

[168] Niño Murcia, *Arquitectura y Estado*; Arango, *Historia de la Arquitectura en Colombia*.

[169] Arango, *Historia de la Arquitectura en Colombia*.

[170] The closeness to Pessac is defined through the central location of the stairs and the dimensions of the facade's model. Ibid., 225.

[171] Ibid.

[172] Ibid., 227.

dissertation not only the ICT's role in Colombia's urbanization, but also how its function as purveyor of credit helped advance the country's modernization and economic development agendas. And in her master's thesis focused on Bogota, Adriana Suárez Mayorga provides an interesting analysis of the extent to which particular configurations of power boosted the city's modernization. Romero as well as Suárez establish necessary connections between the transformation of the built environment and the economic and political rationales behind them.[173]

Furthermore, two recent texts have given new readings on the goals of military regimes and their infrastructure and housing programs. Maria del Pilar Sánchez' dissertation on the "National Plan of Public Works" during Rojas Pinilla's military regime accurately exposes the imbrications of the political and the architectonic during the 1950s with the thorough analysis of a single building, the Naval College of Colombia.[174] In addition, Lisa Blackmore's work on Venezuela's "spectacular modernity" revises the forms in which military dictatorship used modernist aesthetics to convey an idea of progress, while at the same time putting all kinds of restrictions on democracy.[175] Both authors develop their topics from an analysis of military governments' symbolic use of architecture, going so far beyond aesthetic approach to architectural history.

In the Latin American context, works by Waisman, Eggener, Hernandez and Lara and Carranza, just to mention a few, question the architectural history given by canonical

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[173] Adriana María Suárez Mayorga, *La Ciudad de Los Elegidos: Crecimiento Urbano, Jerarquización Social y Poder Político, Bogotá (1910-1950),* 1. ed (Bogotá, Adriana María Suárez Mayorga, 2006); Adriana María Suárez Mayorga, "Los Juegos de Poder Detrás de La Modernización Capitalina: Bogotá, 1946-1948," *Anuario Colombiano de Historia Social y de La Cultura,* no. 33 (2006): 111–42.
[174] Maria del Pilar Sánchez Beltrán, "Tracing the Cold War in Colombian Architecture: A Disregarded Legacy" (The Bartlett School of Architecture - UCL, 2013).
[175] Lisa Blackmore, *Spectacular Modernity: Dictatorship, Space, and Visuality in Venezuela, 1948-1958* (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2017).

works produced in the power centers.[176] Their conclusions support the validity of addressing those topics, which are not included in the official "NATO-centric" narrative of modern architecture.[177]

The narrative of modern architecture in Colombia, as inaugurated by Carlos Martinez and to which the work of the ICT housing program belongs, has strongly centered on the work of the group of architects that produced most of the modern architecture during the 1940s and 1950s. According to this narrative, this small, select, privileged, and talented group of architects was faced with the immense task of building a *modern* Colombia. On this account, most of these architects were educated abroad and came very early into contact with the work of modern European and American architects.[178] What made them special was their ability to create a clean, sober, and very local version of this modern architecture, aided by the close relationship between architects and engineers in this period. This narrative excludes a series of events that do not fit in, such as some of the technical and architectonic innovations developed in ICT's technical department by architects and engineers, which did not belong to this select

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[176] Keith L. Eggener, "Placing Resistance: A Critique of Critical Regionalism," *Journal of Architectural Education* 55, no. 4 (May 1, 2002): 228–37, https://doi.org/10.1162/104648802753657932; Marina Waisman, *El interior de la historia: historiografía arquitectónica para uso de Latinoamericanos*, Colección Historia y teoría latinoamericana; Variation: Colección Historia y teoría latinoamericana. (Bogotá: ESCALA, 1990); Marina Waisman, *La arquitectura descentrada,* Historia y teoría latinoamericana; Variation: Colección Historia y teoría latinoamericana. (Bogotá, Colombia: ESCALA, 1995); Hernández, *Beyond Modernist Masters*; Luis E. Carranza and Fernando Luiz Lara, *Modern Architecture in Latin America: Art, Technology, and Utopia*, Joe R. and Teresa Lozano Long Series in Latin American AndLatino Art and Culture (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2014).
[177] As elaborated in: Fernando Lara, "Preface: Urbis Americana: Thoughts on Our Shared (and Exclusionary) Traditions," in *Urban Latin America: Images, Words, Flows and the Built Environment,* ed. Freire-Medeiros and O'Donnel (New York: Routledge, 2018).
[178] Martínez and Arango, *Arquitectura En Colombia*.

group. Therefore, the ICT's housing projects constitute an excellent canvas on which to add nuance to this picture.[179]

One of the ICT's central tasks was to provide solutions to the very modern problem of housing an increasing working-class population in the rapidly growing urban centers. Many of those involved have been recognized in architectural history as the creators of modern architecture in Colombia: Jorge Gaitán Cortés, Alvaro Ortega, Gabriel Solano and Hernando Vargas Rubiano; in addition, Gabriel Serrano, Herbert Ritter and Francisco Pizano de Brigard participated as members of the ICT's board of directors and constituted a bridge between the agency and the ideas circulating during the period of this study. Yet the scope of the ICT's tasks was too complex to be considered a mere field of experimentation for the preconceived ideas of renowned modern architects. ICT's contribution to the consolidation of modern architecture on its own terms remains a much-neglected theme in historiography. Unlike accounts in which the ICT's work appears as a space to apply or test the teachings of the "great masters", in this account the architect is only one player among many others who shaped the architecture the agency produced.

The ICT's work offers the opportunity to rethink the evolution of modern architecture in Colombia during the three decades covered by the dissertation. In a first phase, the ICT took regional differences into consideration, as is evidenced in the rural housing program. In the urban realm, this never worked really out, but it received the dividends of this first phase through the tools it was able to develop, such as a materials' experimentation workshop. This workshop was used in the urban housing program to

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[179] Silvia Arango's mentions that ICT was led basically by Jorge Gaitán Cortés during the first phase of the modern period, that for Arango starts in 1945 and lasts roughly until the 60s. In fact, he only stayed one year as leader of the urban housing department. He certainly stayed in close contact to the institution for a long time, but not within the agency. Arango, *Historia de la Arquitectura en Colombia*, 216, 225.

advance the standardization and prefabrication of building parts as required by "the rational paradigm of modern architecture." A second phase begins with the first large housing projects the ICT built in different urban centers throughout the country. Here, standards and prefabrication were constituent elements of the projects, but these standards were high.[180] Muzú is the case study through which much of the entanglement between the rural and urban housing program can be seen.

A technocratic approach to architecture characterizes the 1950s, reflecting the politics of the Cold War. U.S. experts through CINVA and President's Truman technical assistance Program "Point Four" vehemently nurtured the model for the developmental project analyzed by Escobar. Although CUAN, as the case study for this decade, was built prior to the military government, it serves as an example for housing as a stage to convey the idea of modernization.[181]

After a civil government returned to power in 1958, the accumulated housing shortage forced a more pragmatic and humble approach to modernism. Ciudad Kennedy is a key example for that. Planned to house 80,000 residents, the project was a significant milestone in building low-cost housing through the future-resident participation. U.S. prescriptions for implementing self-help methods to broaden the impact of state housing programs could finally be deployed on a large scale. The means to build Ciudad Kennedy stemmed partly from loans facilitated through the Alliance for Progress, a U.S. Foreign aid program, which aimed to halt the spread of Communism in Latin America.

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[180] It parallels somehow the work of the Public Works Administration (PWA) as part of the New Deal policies in the United States. Gwendolyn Wright, *Building the Dream: A Social History of Housing in America*, 1st MIT Press paperback ed. (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1983).
[181] In the same way as explained by Lisa Blackmore for the case of Venezuela in: Blackmore, *Spectacular Modernity*.

Postcolonial theory calls attention to histories created at the fringe, which as such are excluded from mainstream historiography. Thus, through postcolonial theory, we can read the ICT's work beyond its connections with and derivations from the official narrative of modern architecture. In this regard, a number of not yet discussed aspects of modernism in Colombia, previously considered irrelevant since they were unconnected to centers of power, come here to the fore. We can revisit the ICT's history from a different perspective. As Homi Bhabha expresses it, "a postcolonial reading of architectural history would place under scrutiny the authority of architectural history as another kind of Europeanising discourse; a discourse which, like colonial discourse, is characterised by a simultaneous operation of inclusion and exclusion."[182] However, the same relations of inclusion and exclusion operate in the history of the ICT by setting the rules by which housing has to be created. In doing so, the ICT repeated the same kind of relations within the country. This double condition of the ICT can be traced through the efforts to connect to the official narrative, and through its exclusion from it. The agency's work was not recognized as worthy of any modern architectural history, internationally nor locally, as in the case of Ciudad Kennedy. But at the same time, the agency maintained an ambivalent attitude towards Colombian traditional architecture; moreover, it further consolidated power relations within Colombia in terms of an architecture produced at the center, and transposed to the rest of the country.

Although aesthetic considerations remain on my radar, they are not my preponderant concern, and the postcolonial lens refracts my analysis in other directions. Some of the issues that arise with this focus are: the tension between building with traditional methods or introducing new ones, the methods developed to build rural

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[182] Hernández, *Bhabha for Architects*, 51.

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housing in a rational manner, the ambivalent stance towards traditional housing in the rural areas, and the application of knowledge acquired through experimenting with building parts in the first urban housing projects built by the agency without direct collaboration of the municipalities. This kind of analysis reveals ICT's architecture as a product of many deliberations and negotiations within the agency and with others (e.g., politicians, the building industry). In doing so, it becomes evident that the ICT's housing projects are the product of local and regional needs and ideas, but also a product of U.S. American-born ideas about how the state should approach building housing. Thus, I do not deny Colombian architecture's interactions with the modernism produced in power centers, but I broaden the scope of the elements involved in shaping its urban housing projects.

First, we can see the ICT's ambivalent attitude toward traditional building techniques and local materials and its technicians application of them in the rural areas until the end of the 1940s in contraposition to the agency's new, hygienic houses in the same period. In its early years, the ICT approved and implemented traditional building methods and materials as a valid way to solve the rural housing problem; however, its later publications show traditional housing as primitive and always in opposition to its more hygienic houses.

The ICT's first publication on rural housing in 1946 presents a vivid case in point. It depicts a traditional house as unhygienic.[183] Any practical considerations for building in this manner seem to have escaped notice; its otherness was recognized but dismissed. Nonetheless, it displays a profound knowledge of traditional building methods and materials in the same publication.

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[183] Alberto Wills Ferro and Gustavo Maldonado, *Cartilla de Construcciones Rurales* (Bogotá: Instituto de Crédito Territorial, 1946), 3.

In addition, the consequences of the agency's organizational structure, with its headquarters in Bogotá, the political and economic center of the country, further consolidated the power relationships relations of an architecture produced in the center, and transposed upon the rest of the country. The simplistic gaze upon the country, blurring regional differences, impacted both the rural and urban housing projects. This can be evidenced from the beginning of the 1950s by the employment of prefabricated elements throughout the country. In the urban areas, the board of directors proposed reusing the same plans in different cities, even if "adjustments" were necessary.[184] Another result of this generalized gaze was the use of basic housing types, which emerged from "private competitions between each city's architecture firms of each city", the designs of which served as models throughout the country with minor modifications for each climate and social group.[185] This principle of replicable models already applied to the first "neighborhood units" built by the ICT and widely publicized by Proa. As architectural historian Silvia Arango also identified, these ideal types did not recognize specific qualities of the site.[186]

The system based on plans developed in the Capital, far away from other cities and regions, did not always succeed. It caused negative reactions in the peripheral areas, which led in turn to countermeasures by the agency.[187] As a result, in 1955 the agency

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[184] Minute 477, June 14, 1951, p. 1222-back, 1223.
[185] Minute 530, July 7, 1952, p. 0010-back.
[186] Arango, *Historia de la Arquitectura en Colombia*, 225.
[187] At the end of 1951, a campaign against the housing project built by the ICT was initiated in Cali. This action induced the ICT to introduce some changes in the initial project. In: Minute 499, December 12, 1951, p. 1263. Also in Villavicencio, the agency recognized that the plans implemented initially for a bid, were not appropriate for the city. In: Minute 545, December 1st, 1952, p. 0043-back. Something similar happened in Nariño Department. The Chef Engineer recognized that some plans developed for the region were not appropriate and needed therefore to be readjusted. In: Minute 477, June 14, 1951, p. 1223.

publicly recognized the need to include "architects of the province" in its programs, in order to achieve a better acceptance of its work by the public.[188]

In sum, ICT's architecture gains profundity and complexity under the light of postcolonial thought. Questioning which histories are worth to be told permits to focus on those aspects neglected by historiography hitherto. Moreover, it exposes the ways the ICT on its part also exercises power over others and expands the circles of power through the implementation of architectonic models created in the center.

THE ICT AND ITS DIVERSE POLITICAL AGENDAS

Historiography has only partially answered the question of the extent to which the civil war, *La Violencia*, and the military regime of Rojas Pinilla informed the transformations of the built environment in the mid-twentieth century. The various publications typically but paradoxically acknowledge that during both the most acute period of conflict and the military regime, modern architecture flourished. Several authors have pointed out that high prices in the international coffee market provided the state with sufficient revenues to build the infrastructure needed to advance in its modernization projects. Those taking this stance, such as Niño Murcia, did not trace the reasons for this paradox.[189] Others, who attempted a more critical position, centered on the urban transformations following "El *Bogotazo*," the destruction of Bogotá after

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[188] Minute 647 (incorrectly: 747), October 20, 1955, p. 0299.

[189] Niño Murcia presents at the beginning of each chapter of his relevant work on the Ministry of Public Works a thorough summary of the political conflicts, the challenges of each period. However, this assertive information is totally disconnected from the content of the research. Niño Murcia, *Arquitectura y Estado*. Niño Murcia acknowledges the premodern conditions of the country by the time the state housing programs advanced, and modern architecture received a significant impulse, but he does not elaborates further on this. In: Carlos Sambricio, *Ciudad y vivienda en América Latina, 1930-1960* (Madrid: Sánchez Lampreave, Ricardo, 2012), 258.

Liberal politician Jorge Eliecer Gaitán was assassinated in 1948.[190] In other words, scant attention has been given to the intersection of architectural history and the political background against which it unfolded.

Working at the fringes of architectural, political, and social history and Cold War and Latin American Studies, the missing connections between the agency and its historical context, and the entanglements between the ICT's housing program and the society in which it was developed come to the fore. This research draws from an interesting research field consolidating in the Americas that attempts to illuminate the role the U.S. has played in Latin American housing and planning history in the context of Pan-American institutions and Cold War events. Considering ICT housing as a geopolitical tool, this work shows how the U.S. enhanced its relationships with Latin America through the work of U.S. technicians and foreign aid programs, such as the Alliance for Progress.[191]

The ICT contributed to the consolidation of a political project, on the national and on hemispheric level that was nurtured by the discourse of development and associated with the need for economic progress (in terms of the country as a whole, the inclusion of

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[190] Jacques Aprile Gniset, *El Impacto Del 9 de Abril Sobre El Centro de Bogotá* (Bogotá: Centro Cultural Jorge Eliécer Gaitán, 1983).

[191] Leandro Daniel Benmergui, "Housing Development: Housing Policy, Slums, and Squatter Settlements in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil and Buenos Aires, Argentina, 1948-1973" (University of Maryland, College Park, 2012), http://search.proquest.com.ezproxy.lib.utexas.edu/docview/1178987107/abstract. Patricio Del Real, "Building a Continent: The Idea of Latin American Architecture in the Early Postwar" (Ph.D., Columbia University, 2012). Leandro Benmergui, "The Alliance for Progress and Housing Policy in Rio de Janeiro and Buenos Aires in the 1960s," *Urban History* 36, no. 2 (August 2009): 303–26, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0963926809006300. Andrea Renner, "Housing Diplomacy: US Housing Aid to Latin America, 1949--1973" (Columbia University, 2011), http://search.proquest.com.ezproxy.lib.utexas.edu/docview/867677917/abstract; Adrián Gorelik, "Pan-American Routes: A Continental Planning Journey between Reformism and the Cultural Cold War," *Planning Perspectives* 32, no. 1 (January 2, 2017): 47–66, https://doi.org/10.1080/02665433.2016.1192002.

the "popular classes" in this project was not part of the equation). Development, understood as economic progress, implied, in words of the United Nations,

> painful adjustments. Ancient philosophies have to be scrapped; old social institutions have to disintegrate; bonds of cast, creed and race have to burst; and large numbers of persons who cannot keep up with progress have to have their expectations of a comfortable life frustrated. Very few communities are willing to pay the full price of economic progress.[192]

On both levels, national and hemispheric, housing served as a tool to contain upheaval and the spread of communism. The fear of communism was so entrenched in the national psyche that it constantly erupted in the political discussion. Even the ICT had to face accusations of Communism from political adversaries in the Liberal Party at the time the agency was established.[193] The discussion was nurtured by the constant fear of upheaval. Therefore, as Escobar explains, "The fear of communism became one of the most compelling arguments for development. It was commonly accepted in the early 1950s that if poor countries were not rescued from their poverty, they would succumb to communism."[194]

The ICT's double location, at the periphery of U.S. dominance and the center of power in Colombia, identified previously, amalgamated with the nation's various political agendas. Firstly, the ICT became one of the institutions through which the United States cemented its influence on the continent. Technical cooperation, loans, and military support all served to advance the development agenda in the relationship between Colombia and the United States during the period of this research. But, as

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[192] United Nations, Department of Social and Economic Affairs [1951], 15. Quoted in: Escobar, *Encountering Development*, 4.
[193] Lleras Restrepo, *Reseña Historica Del ICT*, 57.
[194] Escobar, *Encountering Development*, 34.

Bhabha also points out in regard to the international support to the so- called third world, "the aim of such aid [was not] to alleviate the uneven distribution of power in the world. On the contrary, the practices of 'conditionality' with which economic, educational and technological assistance is offered to nations in the developing world guarantee that the First World nations retain their position of power."[195] The World Bank mission to Colombia in 1949 under the direction of Lauchlin Currie was, in Escobar's terms, "one of the first concrete expressions" of the type of development that "conformed to the ideas and expectations of the affluent West, to what the Western countries judged to be a normal course of evolution and progress."[196] According to Escobar, the tone of Currie's mission was that "only through development will Colombia become an 'inspiring example' for the rest of the underdeveloped world," and that "science, technology, planning, and international organizations" were the "adequate tools" to achieve that goal.[197]

Yet, the ICT replicated the same rationale that emanated from the United States and the international organizations inside Colombia. In doing so, the same assumptions underlying discourse of progress and development shaped the encounters with the Other, the rural population and urban poor. In addition, they provided a base to advance a national political project of contention and pacification, without resolving the pressing social and economic problems already identified by Currie and his group. Finally, and similarly to Bhabha's critique of international aid, the ICT's work did not seek "the eradication of poverty" in the country.[198]

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[195] Hernández, *Bhabha for Architects*, 15.
[196] Escobar, *Encountering Development*, 26.
[197] Escobar, *Encountering Development*, 25-26.
[198] Hernández, *Bhabha for Architects*, 15.

The development paradigm current in the 1950s helps to explain its engagement with the U.S., whose aim was to indicate a path to achieve the same development goals the U.S. deployed in Puerto Rico (clearly defined through the Truman administration's Point Four program), and with the international organizations.[199] The rationale of the ICT's housing program was clearly nurtured by the discourse of development, according to which "only through material advancement could social, cultural, and political progress be achieved."[200] Putting in first place material advancement, the category to which home ownership belongs, the ICT depoliticized the housing shortage. The agency reduced it to a technical problem of financial means and efficient building design and techniques. As happened with the "professionalization of development," the ICT diverted the housing shortage problem to the "apparently more neutral realm of science."[201]

The "housing problem" as defined in the ICT's writings, was not a political problem. It was a technical problem that was quantifiable. From 1957 to the end of my research period, the agency's general managers repeatedly presented reports on the country's missing housing units and the cost required to construct them based on a fixed price of each house.[202] This was a problem that could be solved with external financial aid, with the accompanying national and foreign professionals, and with the appropriate technical means. All except issues that questioned the status quo.

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[199] The relationship between the ICT and the U.S. serves as a case in point for what Escobar describes in his text on development. Escobar, *Encountering Development*, 45.

[200] Escobar, *Encountering Development*, 39-40

[201] Escobar, *Encountering Development*, 45.

[202] Instituto de Crédito Territorial, *Una Política de Vivienda Para Colombia; Primer Seminario Nacional de Vivienda, 1955*; Instituto de Crédito Territorial (Colombia), *El Problema de la vivienda en Colombia: planteamiento y soluciones.* (Bogotá: Instituto de Crédito Territorial, 1958).

HYGIENE, CIVILIZATION, EDUCATION AND ICT

Hygiene was an essential element in the development of ICT's housing program from its inception. Prior to the establishment of ICT, governmental measures to boost the rural economy included the construction of "hygienic dwellings for the rural workers," and the ICT's first task was to build "hygienic" houses for the population affected by the spread of *bartonellosis* epidemic.[203] The "hygienic shelter" in the rural areas was presented in contraposition to the "unhealthy ranch of dirt floor, wattle and daub walls, and straw roof," in a spatial configuration consisting of "a single room that serves as kitchen, bedroom, barn and that generally accommodated, not only human beings, but also domestic animals, where our modest peasants live since immemorial times."[204] Thus, 'hygienic' was the main descriptor for ICT houses—a house with covered walls (i.e. with the wattle and daub structure unexposed), asbestos-cement or ceramic tile roofs, and cement floors. More importantly, the hygienic house had separate rooms for parents and children, who were in turn separated by gender. Hygiene also thus implied "moral hygiene."

Although the physical structure of the ideal "hygienic house" varied over time and between the rural and urban areas, the meaning of moral hygiene remained more or less in place throughout the period of this study. In the urban areas, a single room for an entire family was also condemned for its effect on that family's moral well-being: "Overcrowding, it goes without saying, leads to a series of problems related to hygiene and morality, due to the improper mixing of gender and ages within a single bedroom."[205]

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[203] Decree 327 of 1938. In: Minute 3, March 1939, p. 11.
[204] Wills Ferro and Maldonado, *Cartilla de Construcciones Rurales*, 3.
[205] Instituto de Crédito Territorial (Colombia), *El Problema de la vivienda en Colombia*, 27.

Hygiene, as a central topic for the Colombian state at the time of the ICT's inception, emerged in several forms. In 1938, the Ministry of Labor, Hygiene and Welfare was established. Arturo Robledo represented this Ministry on the original ICT board of directors. He was a physician in the cadre of Colombian hygienists strongly influencing the housing conversation during the first half of the twentieth century.[206] Jorge Bejarano, who did not participate as a board member, but did collaborate a number of times with the ICT, was also an influential physician, who dominated a good part of the discussion. Since 1932, *Salud y sanidad* was the publication through which the National Department of Hygiene disseminated the current ideas on hygiene.[207]

A number of scholars in Colombia have shown the extent to which 'hygiene' permeated the country's politics in the first half of the twentieth century.[208] In most cases, they present "working class neighborhoods" as an example of hygienic environments for the working class.[209] Hygiene appears in this context as a field of action in which tensions between the "pueblo" and the elites as categories of analysis become manifest.[210] When trying to establish a direct relationship between hygiene and the built environment in Colombia, only one text, based on a master's thesis and published in a university journal, offers some insights. While this text is quite generic, the figures and their subtexts refer

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[206] María-Teresa Gutierrez, "Proceso de Institucionalización de La Higiene: Estado, Salubridad e Higienismo En Colombia En La Primera Mitad Del Siglo XX," Revista Estudios Socio-Jurídicos 12,(1) (June 2010): 73–97.

[207] Catalina Muñoz, Chapter 5. Transforming the Pueblo: Social Hygiene and "Healthy" Recreation. In: "To Colombianize Colombia: Cultural Politics, Modernization and Nationalism in Colombia, 1930--1946" (Scholarly Commons, 2009), http://repository.upenn.edu/dissertations/AAI3363572.

[208] Carlos Ernesto Noguera, Medicina y política: discurso médico y prácticas higiénicas durante la primera mitad del siglo XX en Colombia, Cielos de Arena (Medellín: Fondo Editorial Universidad EAFIT, 2003); Muñoz, "To Colombianize Colombia;" Gutierrez, "Proceso de Institucionalización de La Higiene: Estado, Salubridad e Higienismo En Colombia En La Primera Mitad Del Siglo XX."

[209] ICT in this context is only developed in: Noguera, *Medicina y política*.

[210] Regarding the elites, see: Darío Acevedo C., *La Mentalidad de Las Élites Sobre La Violencia En Colombia, 1936-1949*, 1. ed (Bogotá, Colombia: Instituto de Estudios Políticos y Relaciones Internacionales : El Ancora Editores, 1995). A key study on the working class: Mauricio Archila, *Cultura e Identidad Obrera: Colombia 1910-1945* (Bogotá: Cinep, 1991).

specifically to the case of Colombia, where the use of publications to disseminate technical knowledge and hygiene appear as part of the technologies of comfort within domestic space.[211]

While scholarship has not specifically addressed ICT's housing program in regard to its insistence on hygiene as part of its civilizing and moralizing aims, two studies that tackle the relationship between built environment, hygiene, and the latter's connections with discourse on morality, control, and civilizing ideas illuminate the intricacies of housing promoted by the state and the goals that go beyond supplying a dwelling: Nancy Stieber's *Housing Design and Society in Amsterdam: Reconfiguring Urban Order and Identity, 1900-1920* and Gwendolyn Wright's, *Moralism and the Model Home: Domestic Architecture and Cultural Conflict in Chicago, 1873-1913*. Stieber analyzes housing design in Amsterdam beyond its aesthetic aspects "as a product of modern social practices, that is, as the product of tensions within modernity."[212] Social hygiene, civilizing the working class, controlling the urban aesthetic, among other things, become central issues in her discussion. Wright on her part focuses on how domestic architecture "illuminates norms concerning family life, sex roles, community relations, and social equality."[213]

Lastly, hygiene, as it refers to the body, has received a lot of attention from critical and analytical history in the intersections of the history of science, medical knowledge, and practices of power. In Latin America, these perspectives, converging

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[211] The text gives special attention to Norbert Elias account on the Civilizing Process. In: Alirio Rangel Wilches, "Hágalo Usted Mismo: Arquitectura, Higiene y Moral (Segunda Parte). Popularización Del Saber Técnico y Medicalización Del Espacio Privado En Los Procesos Civilizatorios Del Siglo XX," Revista M . Ed. Universidad Santo Tomas 6, no. 2 (2009): 124–53.

[212] Nancy Stieber, *Housing Design and Society in Amsterdam: Reconfiguring Urban Order and Identity, 1900-1920* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998), 3.

[213] Gwendolyn Wright, *Moralism and the Model Home: Domestic Architecture and Cultural Conflict in Chicago, 1873-1913*, Paperback ed (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985).

around "body culture studies," has been enriched by gender, race, and cultural studies. Michel Foucault's notion of "biopower" is the central axis around which much of these studies orbit. Hygiene appears here as a clear strategy through which one group exerts power upon another.[214]

This analytical and critical approach has enhanced the answers to the basic question of this study, which asks about the rationales underlying the housing program. As the official narrative goes, the State, through the ICT's "apostolic" work, not only provided hygienic houses for those who could not finance them on their own, but also educated their inhabitants to transform them into new, civilized people.[215] According to this official narrative, "adequate housing" was the necessary support for re-educating the people and improving their living standards.[216]

By the end of the 1930s, at the time of ICT's establishment, the conversation on hygiene had mostly shifted to a more "scientific" level, in opposition to the discussions in the previous decades, which were still defined by race and eugenics. However, as Escobar demonstrates, "blatant racist views" persisted in the supposedly neutral scientific discourses of demographics and public health.[217] The triad "hygiene, progress and, civilization," as part of an official narrative appearing to distance itself from arguments of race and eugenics, remained current during the 1940s, as the agency already operated in both the rural and urban areas.[218] This shift was also evidenced by Daniel Pécaut, who

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[214] Hilderman Cardona Rodas, Zandra Pedraza Gómez, and Alexandre C. Varella, eds., *Al otro lado del cuerpo: estudios biopolíticos en América Latina,* Primera edición (Bogotá, Colombia : Medellín, Colombia: Ediciones Uniandes ; Sello Editorial Universidad de Medellín, 2014).

[215] The word appeared as a critic to the agency for not taking seriously its apostolic mission. Minute 98, February 1942, p. 239.

[216] Instituto de Crédito Territorial (Colombia), *El Problema de la vivienda en Colombia*, 25.

[217] Escobar, *Encountering Development*, 35.

[218] Gutierrez, "Proceso de Institucionalización de La Higiene: Estado, Salubridad e Higienismo En Colombia En La Primera Mitad Del Siglo XX."

recounts in his book Order and Violence 1930-1954, that, even though around 1945 the "elites" were skeptical about the possibility of integrating the "pueblo" (the peasant, the urban poor, the worker) into the civilizing project, race was no longer the driving argument, but rather arguments stemming from "medical knowledge." The resulting "medicalization of the political gaze," to use Pécaut's term, led to depoliticizing the catastrophic living conditions of the poor. In so doing, the "naturalized" social inequalities distinguished only between the "civilized and the sick and savage pueblo."[219]

Providing hygienic homes was not enough to solve Colombia's problems, as the ICT's initiator, Carlos Lleras Restrepo, explained. The ICT's "mission" was also to transform the habits of the people (the peasants, the poor, all those who did not belong to the ruling elite).[220] For Lleras Restrepo, unhygienic living conditions encompassed all aspects of human life, exerting "a disastrous influence on health and on the future of the race, also on customs and the popular morality, on the living standards and on the economic capacity of the peasant." They also engendered or reinforced "the customs of dirtiness, negligence, indolence... ."[221] Lleras' assertions on the poor correlate with the characteristics the ruling class associated the poor with, as quoted by Escobar: "rightly or wrongly, [pauperism was associated] with features such as mobility, vagrancy, independence, frugality, promiscuity, ignorance, and the refusal to accept social duties to work and submit to the logic of the expansion of 'needs.'"[222]

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[219] Daniel Pécaut, *Orden y violencia: Colombia 1930-1954*, vol. 1, 2 vols. (Bogotá: CEREC, 1987), 135, 351-352.

[220] Not only Lleras, the same statement appears in different ICT's documents as in: Instituto de Crédito Territorial (Colombia), *El Problema de la vivienda en Colombia*, 25.

[221] Lleras Restrepo, *Reseña Historica Del ICT*, 18.

[222] Donzelot 1979, 1988, 1991; Burchell, Gordon, and Miller 1991. Quoted in: Escobar, *Encountering Development*, 23.

These characteristics pointed to the backwardness of the poor. However, there were also subcategories in this characterization, nurtured by other rationales. The rural poor were considered better than the urban. For some agency board members, the rural poor were the worthy poor because of their "moral attributes," which were higher than those of the urban population, despite being the most "devoid of hygienic services." In fact, they were considered, as a member of the board of directors claimed at the beginning of the 1950s, and in the middle of the worst moment of *La Violencia*, "an element of order and the support of this regime."[223] Considering that this statement was made in 1953, six days prior to General Rojas Pinilla's coup d'erat, these words resonate differently. They hint to the implicit rationales of welfare policies.

Education was the means to transform those habits of the poor, with all their flaws, into those of responsible citizens. In general, as Escobar quotes, "the management of poverty called for interventions in education, health, hygiene, morality, and employment and the instilment of good habits of association, savings, child rearing, and so on..."[224] This is the context in which Lleras claims should be read. For him, "what the transformation of dwelling and social habits" represents as "an educational and civilizing work, as an effective increase in work performance, as moral improvement in customs, as hygiene and sanitation is easily perceptible."[225] Hence, the ICT's housing program could only accomplish its civilizing task through technical and educational means.[226] The ICT's general manager still shared these same views in 1956.[227]

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[223] Minute 559, June 7, 1953, p. 0084-back.
[224] Donzelot 1979, 1988, 1991; Burchell, Gordon, and Miller 1991. Quoted in: Escobar, *Encountering Development*, 23.
[225] Lleras Restrepo, *Reseña Historica Del ICT*, 49.
[226] Ibid., 50.
[227] Lieutenant Colonel Álvaro Calderón Rodríguez' introductory remarks. In: Instituto de Crédito Territorial, *Una Política de Vivienda Para Colombia; Primer Seminario Nacional de Vivienda, 1955*.

Yet the agency did not understand education as a liberating act, in the sense of Paulo Freire.[228] Rather, education forged a non-critical, obedient subject, who acknowledges authority. Words such as "indoctrination" to refer to the training required for those applicants participating in the self-help housing program in Ciudad Kennedy are illustrative. According to ICT's initiator Lleras Restrepo, through education, the future resident was to learn the value of a home, how to operate on a "more logical scale of needs," to aim for improvement, and to become a "more *nobly* nonconformist."[229] But a resident of an ICT home needed also to learn that he

> is not just another debtor on a long list, but a cell, which must be cared for, guided and directed toward the achievement of positive aspirations within the social set of the Colombian family. With this, the agency seeks not to abandon the residents, but to keep them closely united, to create a clear conscience that the social work of the housing program the government carries out through the Territorial Credit Institute, not only tries to protect them from the natural elements with a roof, but also shows them the path of responsibility that citizens have in society, and the obligations and duties they have before the State, before their fellow citizens, and before the family.[230]

The ICT's leaders expressed the goals of their educational work in the same terms. It was a work that

> not only benefits the resident, but also the agency. Through a *cultural uplift* of the group, living conditions would improve and a sense of responsibility would be awakened, with respect to the conservation and maintenance of the houses and of the facilities in the neighborhoods and neighborhood units.[231]

In the ruling class' terms, education meant "civilized" living. This implied to recognize the value of "home life," and to stay away from bars, where people "invest the

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[228] Paulo Freire, *Pedagogy of the Oppressed*, New rev. 20th-Anniversary ed. (New York: Continuum, 1993).
[229] Lleras Restrepo, *Reseña Historica Del ICT*, 51.
[230] Instituto de Crédito Territorial, *Una Política de Vivienda Para Colombia; Primer Seminario Nacional de Vivienda, 1955*, 135-136.
[231] Ibid., 140.

product of their work in the consumption of alcoholic beverages."[232] This moralizing task of home life was closely connected with the moral views also supported by the Catholic Church. The education of the residents was mediated by the ideas of hygiene and morality. The scientific community, physicians, sanitary engineers, and also the church were close to the agency's work and nurtured many of the ideas behind the educational process linked to the housing program. Finally, the government considered civilizing the people through education to be a necessary requirement to achieve their political project of appeasement and containment in order to avoid the spread of revolutionary ideas. Moralizing campaigns through the church and the elite aimed at control over customs and the containment of political upheaval.[233] They sought to "harmonize" the relationships between employer and employees and the "moral and material improvement" of the working class.[234] The ICT offered a unique field of operations to achieve this goal.

The ICT's representatives firmly believed that unhygienic living conditions also explained the lack of interest among the poor in having a "better life". For the agency's officials, this was something that also needed to be learned.[235]

> There were compatriots without an awareness of their own roof, who had not even thought of the need for a hygienic, low-cost home that was more appropriate for modern life. Accustomed for generations to occupying an undesirable place in the world, the possibility of dignifying their own home did not pass through their

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[232] Lleras Restrepo, *Reseña Historica Del ICT*, 18.
[233] Archila N. Mauricio, "Ni amos ni siervos. Memoria obrera de Bogota y Medellín, 1918-1945," Controversia No. 156-157, Cinep, Bogota, 1989, 61. Quoted in: Acevedo C., *La Mentalidad de Las Élites Sobre La Violencia En Colombia, 1936-1949*, 182.
[234] Luz Gabriela Arango, *Mujer, Religión e Industria: Fabricato, 1923-1982*, 1. ed, Colección Clío de Historia Colombiana 2 (Medellín, Colombia: Editorial Universidad de Antioquia : Universidad Externado de Colombia, 1989), 167. Quoted in: Acevedo C., *La Mentalidad de Las Élites Sobre La Violencia En Colombia, 1936-1949*, 184.
[235] Lleras Restrepo, *Reseña Historica Del ICT*, 51.

minds. Moreover, there are cases of humble people for whom a blackened and narrow ranch or urban overcrowding is preferable to decent housing.[236]

Considering this lack of interest, agency leaders shared with both the ruling class and the international organizations the conviction that the poor were incapable of doing anything on their own.[237] It was as if "the subaltern could not speak."[238] The residents were never asked what they needed or desired; their participation was limited to accepting the conditions imposed by the ICT. And even at Ciudad Kennedy, with the self-help program in place, the participants were only allowed to follow rules previously defined by the experts. Their point of view really did not matter.

Who had the authority to teach what? What did they need to learn? Why? The power Authority exercised over the Other enabled it to decide what residents had to learn in order to be able to live in a house built by the ICT. Despite its aim to improve the living conditions of a segment of society, power relationships and techniques of social control mediated the ICT's expectations towards the education of the inhabitants of its housing projects.

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[236] Instituto de Crédito Territorial, *Una Política de Vivienda Para Colombia; Primer Seminario Nacional de Vivienda, 1955*, 12.

[237] Minute 567 (incorrectly numbered: 667), July 24, 1953, p. 0112: A proposal to give the peasants the money, so that he could do the construction work on his own was rejected since the conviction that the peasant "has no capabilities to build on his own" predominated. This view was also shared by Lleras: Lleras Restrepo, *Reseña Historica Del ICT*, 56.

[238] To use the term coined by Spivak. In: Rosalind C. Morris and Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, eds., *Can the Subaltern Speak? Reflections on the History of an Idea* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010).

Chapter 3: Housing as an architectural artifact: Reflections on Modern Architecture in Colombia through the work of the ICT

The ICT built 154,949 housing units between 1939 and 1968 throughout the country.[239] Architectural historians have regarded some of its urban housing projects in particular as a significant field of action in which modern architecture has thrived in Colombia since the 1940s.[240] Clearly, the ideas circulating around modern architecture did inform the search for new building methods, materials and typologies in developing the housing projects; the "modern paradigm of social housing" is thus recognizable in the ICT's work.[241] Nevertheless, in addition to applying ideas produced in industrialized countries in a Colombian context, the ICT also had its own agenda, animated and nurtured by what was occurring in other parts of the world, but also responding to very specific and local challenges. To mention just a few: the agency operated nationwide in a country with an extremely diverse geography and a precarious road system, and had limited financial means to solve a housing deficit in the urban areas that accelerated throughout the period of this study due to the civil war predominantly afflicting the rural areas. In fact, according to the 1951 census, the country had a shortage of 117,222 housing units in the urban areas; which corresponded to 13,6% of the urban

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[239] Instituto de Crédito Territorial, *Vinculación de La Industria Constructora Privada En Programas Del Instituto de Crédito Territorial*, 16.

[240] Martínez and Arango, *Arquitectura En Colombia*; Arango, *Historia de la Arquitectura en Colombia*; Maria Pia Fontana et al., *Colombia Arquitectura Moderna*, 2nd ed. (Barcelona: ETSAB, 2006), http://en.calameo.com/read/000101630b2f75e4c6cec; Eduardo Samper Martínez and Jorge Ramírez Nieto, *Arquitectura Moderna En Colombia: Época de Oro*, 1. ed (Bogotá, Colombia : West Vancouver, B.C: Diego Samper Ediciones ; Noa Noa, 2000); Carlos Eduardo Hernandez Rodriguez, "Colombia, Urbanismo Moderno y Vivienda," in *Ciudad y Vivienda En América Latina, 1930-1960*, ed. Carlos Sambricio (Madrid: Sánchez Lampreave, Ricardo, 2012); Carlos Niño Murcia, "Colombia, Vivienda y Arquitectura Moderna. Acoger El Paradigma Moderno y Enriquecerlo Adaptándolo Al Medio," in *Ciudad y Vivienda En América Latina, 1930-1960*, ed. Carlos Sambricio (Madrid: Sánchez Lampreave, Ricardo, 2012).

[241] Saldarriaga pinpoints the basic components of this paradigm, as "the planned and pedestrian oriented neighborhood unit, in which principles of the garden city are combined with those of high-rise buildings and of mass-production of housing units; minimal dimensions and industrialization of construction." Saldarriaga Roa, *Estado, ciudad y vivienda*, 28.

population.[242] By 1968, the urban housing shortage had increased to 458,278 units, roughly 28%.[243] I argue that the remarkable contribution to modern architecture in Colombia through ICT's urban housing program since the end of the 1940s forms part of a continuous, albeit nonlinear, development that begins, at the agency's inception, with the rural housing program and then, beginning in 1942, in the urban areas. This early date challenges most accounts of the ICT, which claim the agency built its first urban projects in 1948. I argue, however, that the projects built prior to the construction of the "official" first urban housing projects offered the needed experience to be able to tackle those urban projects. Hence, the first part of this chapter addresses the rural housing program and the initiatives that served as a platform for the confluence of the ideas about modern architecture and the work of the ICT. The second part of the chapter inquires about the elements of the "modern paradigm" that characterize three the case studies: Muzú, Centro Urbano Antonio Nariño –CUAN- and Ciudad Kennedy.

The experiences collected from the agency's inception in rural areas, and since 1942 in urban areas, trickled into the housing projects built in the urban areas after the enactment of Law 85 in 1946. This law, as I mentioned in the introduction, opened a new period for the agency, after which it was able to develop housing projects on its own in the urban areas on a much larger scale than was possible previously, when the agency built a series of *barrios populares modelo* (model working-class neighborhoods) throughout the country in a joint effort with local municipalities and private contractors.

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[242] Instituto de Crédito Territorial, *El Problema de la vivienda en Colombia: planteamiento y soluciones.* (Bogotá: Instituto de Crédito Territorial, 1958), 16. This number is slightly different in: Alberto Vásquez Restrepo, *Aproximación a Una Política Para Vivienda En Colombia. Ponencia Presentada a La XV Asamblea General de La Cámara Colombiana de La Construcción (Camacol), Barranquilla, Octubre de 1972* (Bogotá: Instituto de Crédito Territorial, 1972), 8. Here the housing shortage is quantified in 111,845.
[243] Vásquez Restrepo, *Aproximación a Una Política Para Vivienda En Colombia. Ponencia Presentada a La XV Asamblea General de La Cámara Colombiana de La Construcción (Camacol), Barranquilla, Octubre de 1972*, 8.

Ideas about minimal housing, standardization, modulation and prefabrication of building parts—typical for the urban housing projects the ICT built as a result of the Law 85—derive from the agency's efforts to rationalize the building process in rural housing.[244] This experience provided the ICT with a very specific knowledge of and expertise in local materials and building techniques, and the possibilities these provided.

Various strategies connect the rural housing program with an expressly modern understanding of making architecture, despite the absence of formal traits that allude to Modernism. First, the agency constantly searched for replicable models in similar regions of a geographically diverse country. Also, it created the materials experimentation workshop, *El Tabor*, to find the materials best-suited for each region. This was where the prefabricated elements for the first urban housing projects were developed. The collected experience in the rural housing program was published in an extremely detailed book, *Cartilla de Construcciones Rurales* (Manual on Rural Buildings), in 1946. This publication is key to understanding the vision that guided the agency's work during this first period. It consisted in the implementation of housing typologies rooted in a deep understanding of regional differences and a profound knowledge of local building techniques. This allusion to traditional local building techniques and materials did not reflect a nostalgic attitude, but a forward-looking vision that was simply pragmatic. It was based on the guiding principle that modern suitable rural housing was only feasible through the improvement of existing building techniques and through a systematic approach to the building process.

However, in the same process of systematizing and rationalizing the building process, the ICT contributed to a loss of regional differentiation in the modern

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[244] Minute 164, October 1943, p. 387.

architecture that emerged at the end of the 1940s. While the earliest process of producing architecture reflected a conscious determination to incorporate local building materials and techniques, the *modus operandi* consolidated after the enactment of Law 85 of 1946 developed simplified models in the center that were reproduced throughout the country in the form of specific ideal housing types with slight variations. Even after the regional offices achieved more independence, a more generic approach to architecture and urban planning can be perceived in the whole country. The use of prefabricated structures in the rural program and of standardized building methods in the urban program play a significant role in that process.

RURAL HOUSING - AN ARCHEOLOGY OF ICT'S MODERN URBAN HOUSING PROJECTS: STANDARDIZED HOUSING TYPES, TECHNOLOGICAL EXPERIMENTS, AND PREFABRICATION

The ICT built 14,000 housing units in the rural areas between 1939, when the agency was established, and 1956, when the rural housing program was handed over to the Agrarian bank.[245] By its very nature, the rural housing program required large amounts of financial resources. Building single-family homes disseminated in rural areas of a land with a complex topography (the country is crossed by three ranges of the Andean mountains) and with a precarious road system challenged all intentions to make these houses affordable for the rural population. In that context, the agency continuously explored multiple avenues to reduce construction costs that oscillated between building houses with traditional building materials and methods and searching for new alternatives to facilitate construction and reduced building costs. Although this main goal was not

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[245] Decree 2114 de 1956; Instituto de Crédito Territorial, *Vinculación de La Industria Constructora Privada En Programas Del Instituto de Crédito Territorial*, 16.

achieved during the 1940s, standardization, systematization, and prefabrication became key words related to the building process in the rural areas and directly impacted the agency's urban housing projects. In fact, the material's experiment workshop, established on the site "El Tabor" in 1948, constitutes the bridge between the two programs. In this workshop, born from the need to explore new possibilities in construction methods for the rural housing program, eventually developed prefabricated building parts for the urban housing programs.[246]

Between Traditional Building Methods and Innovation

From its inception, the ICT started a process of scrutinizing all available techniques for building rural housing. The search for the most appropriate building materials and techniques in each of the different regions, the development of standardized housing typologies, and the gathering of a wide array of models for rural housing constituted the predominant activities during the agency's first years. It analyzed several alternatives in its exploration of building materials, and during the first year it focused primarily on the acquisition of building materials and of model houses.[247] Ideas related to building materials and techniques emerged rather arbitrarily during that first year. Finance minister Carlos Lleras Restrepo invited Hernando Gómez Tanco, for instance, who had been in Chile learning about a building technology in asbestos cement, which he presented to the board of directors.[248] This report probably led to the next step, in which

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[246] The Plan for Rural Housing of 1948 mentions experiments with new materials. In: Minute 306, February 27, 1948, p. 687 - 690.

[247] Minute 3, March 1939, p. 10.

[248] Minute 1, 1939, p. 3. Minute 7, 1939, p. 16. Gómez Tanco also participated in the 1950s as member of ICT's board of directors, and was simoultaneously member of the board of the firm Eternit, which produced asbestos cement roofs, broadly deployed in the ICT's housing projects.

the ICT spent a good part of the first year inquiring about the possibility of mining asbestos.

In spite of the apparent arbitrariness in the search for new building materials, the agency sought to organize and systematize the construction process of the rural housing program. Deploying standardized housing types was one strategy. Engineers from the Ministry of Labor's hygiene department developed the initial typologies used in the rural housing program. They followed the explicit wish of the board of directors to have different building types with different shapes, program and materials, according to the different climate conditions where the houses would be built.[249] The engineers, later hired to work directly for the ICT, further elaborated the development of standardized housing typologies, incorporating regional differences.[250] When the first architects were hired at the beginning of the 1940s, they were additionally tasked with a study of building materials that could take advantage of local resources in order to minimize transport costs.[251] The regional differentiation of building types the ICT developed during the first years responded to a very specific and clearly identifiable problem. It was a straightforward answer to the task of building rural housing in a vast country with a significant variety of climate zones. This task was approached by the state for the first time at this scale with the creation of ICT.

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[249] Minute 3, March 1939, p. 10. This idea was probably nurtured by the national school building program, which the Ministry of Public Works had been developing since the 1930s. With this program, the Ministry of Public Works built schools throughout the country based on a basic model, but with variations that responded to each climate and region. Silvia Arango presents this characteristic of the schools built under the direction of architect Ernest Blumenthal in the Ministry of Public Works. In: Arango, *Historia de la Arquitectura en Colombia*, 202.

[250] The assistant engineer in charge of the rural housing program in Antioquia, Arturo Orozco A., reported on "the study of a new type of construction for Antioquia, adapted to the living conditions of the peasants [in that area]." Minute 59, February 1941, p. 124.

[251] Minute 63, March 1941, p. 135 – 142.

Concurrent with the development of standardized housing types, the agency worked to gather a wide array of models for the rural housing program, experimenting with each in order to determine which ones performed most advantageously. During the first year, the agency received a series of proposals to initiate its program.[252] Hence, Model Housing was the key word in those first two years. Everything was viewed as a paradigm to experiment with before deciding if it was replicable in other parts of the country. However, by 1941, the possibility of implementing any of those model houses lost relevance, and this path did not have any major impact in the work of the ICT. A possible reason resides in the fact that World War II made all imports excessively expensive. However, the call to introduce prefabricated houses to solve the rural housing problem appeared intermittently throughout the 1940s, what eventually happened at the end of that decade.[253]

Despite the multiple experiments with different modern building methods and materials during the agency's first two years, traditional building techniques and local building materials clearly prevailed after 1941, and remained as a ruling principle in the

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[252] The proposals should be implemented as the base for model houses in the neighborhood "Restrepo" being built at the same time in Bogotá by the Central Mortgage Bank (Banco Central Hipotecario, BCH) in order to assess the quality of the model houses: a "Dutch house" in asbestos-cement, a model house from an "American Firm" in Wood, another from "Pyramid" in cement blocks, one from "J.M. Obando" in a "special paste made from the sugarcane bagasse," one from "Cement Plant Titán," one from "Armor Products, Inc.," from New York (Minute 9 of 1939, p. 22), a model house made in "homasote." (Minute 20, October of 1939, p.52. -Homasote is a brand name associated with the product generically known as cellulose based fiber wallboard, which is similar in composition to paper-mâché, and made from recycled paper compressed under high temperature and pressure and held together with an adhesive. Wikipedia-). The general manager also received the authorization to request the model house "Eternit" in asbestos-cement. (Minute 21, October 19, 1939, p. 55). A year later, in 1940, and in spite of some reluctance of the board of directors, the general manager, Garcés Navas, obtained its authorization to acquire an additional model house from "W. CH. Lamb." (Minute 37, July 1940).

[253] For example, after a period without mention of this topic, a new offer of prefabricated houses came to the board of directors; this time in "wood from the sawmills of Tumaco." This offer was made by Arturo E. Márquez. One of the members of the board of directors, Lobo Guerrero was commissioned to analyze and inform the board. This proposal did not succeed, at least immediately, due to the costs (higher than with brick or adobe) and uncertainty about the material over the long term. A few houses were purchased to test their behavior and real value over time. In: Minute 110, June 1942, p. 282.

construction of rural housing until at least 1947.[254] Rural housing was then predominantly built according to local building techniques: adobe, *tapia* (rammed earth walls), and *bahareque* (wattle-and-daub).[255] These techniques guaranteed the possibility of finding local craftsmen who could build high quality rural homes. In some regions only specific building technics worked appropriately due to topography and soil structure, as in Caldas, an important coffee region with an extreme stepped topography where a common building technic, partly still in use today, is made of bamboo or *bahareque*.[256]

Diverse circumstances resulted in high construction costs of rural housing, which posed serious challenges to the work of the ICT from the start. First, high transport costs of building materials due to a complex geography and a deficient road system were a constant complaint at least until the end of the economic crisis in the post war period.[257] Furthermore, the agency pinpointed several other problems to account for the high costs: the economic crisis derived from World War II, the traditional building techniques, and the costs of modern building materials (brick and cement).[258]

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[254] Interestingly, one of the goals of hiring a new engineer was to "study the constructions made of bahareque in order to acquire the exact cost and specifications for the general work of the technical department throughout the country." According to this statement, the construction based on local building traditions and expertise is worth being applied throughout the country. In: Minute 61, February 1941, p. 128.
Minute 267, June 2, 1947, p. 563.
[255] Minute 267, June 2, 1947, p. 563.
[256] Minute 197, November 06, 1944, p. 442.
[257] Minute 140, April 1943, p. 346-back. Minute 143, April 1943, p. 355. Minute 165, November 1943, p. 391. Minute 167, November 1943, p. 394-back. Minute 175, February 21, 1944, p. 408-back. Minute 205, January 15, 1945, p. 453-back.
[258] Traditional building techniques became too expensive due to the long periods needed to complete construction and the intensity of craftsmanship required. According to a general manager's report, building with brick would require at least two months, while bahareque (wattle- and-daub) would require four months, and adobe or tapia (rammed earth walls) six months or even longer. In: Minute 272, July 10, 1947, p. 578.

To offset the high transport costs seeking to reduce the construction costs, the agency continued to rely on local materials and traditional building technics.[259] But these same techniques kept costs high due to long construction periods. Hence, high construction costs in rural housing remained a dilemma throughout the agency's transitional phase.

Regardless of the continuous search for solutions in the rural housing program, after 1947 the agency's leaders seem to have dismissed the previous experience.[260] The general work plan the agency elaborated for the years 1948 and 1949, as well as later reports, ignored the earlier work of the agency in the rural areas. This obliviousness about the previous experiences survived in the historiography on the ICT. Alberto Saldarriaga's work does not establish any connections between the rural and the urban housing program. In spite of the contradictions, the obliviousness, the loss of local building technics, and countless other problems related to the housing program, the long and continued experience made the ICT an expert in the construction of rural housing; indeed, even the Ministry of Hygiene asked the agency for housing plans at the beginning of the 1950s to send them to the government of Venezuela.[261]

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[259] To mention only two examples: due to the soil, the transport and other factors, no other kind of construction than wood or bahareque is possible in Caldas. In: Minute 197, November 06, 1944, p. 442. For the work zones of Cúcuta y Pamplona, the architects consider that the only possible construction method is rammed earth, due to the high costs of transport and building materials. In: Minute 175, 21 February 1944, p. 408-back.
[260] Presenting the low quality of the rural houses previously built, all accumulated knowledge and successful experiences were simply ignored. In: Minute 366, February 21, 1949, p. 855-back.
[261] Minute 459, January 18, 1951, p. 1171-back.
The problems of rural housing built in the Department of Bolivar are mentioned in: Minute 491, October 25, 1951, p. 1247-back.

Technical experiments: Terra-concrete

Technical experimentation was inherent to the work of the ICT from its inception. Terra-concrete is an interesting case in point, insofar as it reveals the mechanisms through which such experiments emerged and evolved. Haphazard and contradictory at times, this process conveys the willingness of the ICT's leaders to apply any method through which the final goal of building houses for lower prices could be achieved. Terra-concrete was introduced and developed for the ICT by the architect Hernando Vargas Rubiano.[262] He worked for the ICT from 1941 on, after he obtained his degree in architecture from the Universidad Nacional de Colombia.[263] Initially, Vargas Rubiano was tasked with the design of rural housing. There, he was able to build rural houses at costs below the ICT average at that time.[264] His preoccupation with building materials, which made up 35 to 40% of the houses' total cost, led him to delve into the study of traditional building techniques such as adobe and rammed earth. In that process, he learned about Alfred Kastner's work in Washington DC, and became particularly interested in Kastner's work improving rammed earth walls with aggregating cement.[265] For Vargas Rubiano, the most interesting aspect of this technique was the possibility of using materials found on site.

In October of 1941, the Board of Directors discussed the possibility of Vargas Rubiano travelling to the United States to further his research. He had already received

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[262] Hernando Vargas Rubiano and Hernando Vargas Caicedo, "El Terraconcreto En Colombia: Apuntes Para Su Historia," Dearq. Revista de Arquitectura, no. 1 (January 2008): 120–145, https://doi.org/DOI: 10.18389/dearq1.2008.14. Accessed: March 14, 2015.

[263] Already mentioned in Minute 66, April 1941. Minute 67, April 1941. Minute 79, August 1941, p. 186.

[264] Luis Fernando Acebedo and Omar Moreno, "Hernando Vargas Vida y Obra: Brunner Era La Academia, Le Corbusier La Revolución Urbanística," Revista Bitácora Urbano Territorial 1, no. 7 (2003): 70–75. Accessed: January 3, 2018

[265] *Casner* in the original text. But, Vargas Rubiano and Vargas Caicedo, "El Terraconcreto En Colombia: Apuntes Para Su Historia" mention the correct name and expands on him.

support from the dean of the Architecture School to participate in an exchange program between the Universidad Nacional and the University of Pennsylvania on low-cost housing.[266] The board of directors was willing to further that support if they could be assured that the trip would be used to learn about "the building materials appropriate for the rural houses in Colombia, and specifically, rammed earth walls and adobe mixed with residues of oil and asphalt, as it is being used in the states of the south... with evident success, ..."[267] Although he did not follow this charge of the board of directors precisely, the Board welcomed his report on terra-concrete and hoped he would soon start with the necessary material experiments in order to begin applying terra-concrete in the construction of rural housing.[268]

After some experiments with terra-concrete near Bogotá, which resulted in cheaper houses than those built in brick, the material was used in other rural areas of the country as well, such as in the department of Nariño.[269] However, some technical difficulties emerged. In some cases, these required demolition of the houses, and the agency and the architect sought different solutions.[270] Consequently, the agency requested more rigorous soil analysis, using experienced master builders.[271] In addition, it requested more research that could clearly determine the advantages and final costs of houses built with this material, and even enlisted the laboratory of the School of Engineering of the Universidad Nacional. The assistant to the general manager, Alberto Wills Ferro, went so far as to request - and received the Board of Directors' approval- the

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[266] Minute 87, October de 1941
[267] Minute 86, October de 1941
[268] Minute 102, 26 March 1942, P. 252
[269] Acebedo and Moreno, "Hernando Vargas Vida y Obra: Brunner Era La Academia, Le Corbusier La Revolución Urbanística." Minute 130, December 1942, P. 331.
[270] Minute 157, August 1943, p. 379.
[271] Minute 159, September 1943, p. 380. Minute 160, September 1943, p. 382-back.

purchase of a laboratory to conduct the necessary soil studies so that optimal results with this building technique could be achieved.[272] Vargas Rubiano on his part, proposed and applied this building technique in the elaboration of terra-concrete blocks instead of walls, and developed the necessary wooden framework for the blocks.[273] This constitutes the antecedent of the famous technical development of CINVA, the CINVA-RAM.[274] The CINVA-RAM is a manual press widely used around the world to produce compressed earth blocks.[275]

The ideas that emerged in this process are crucial to the ICT's evolution and can be seen as an antecedent to establishing a workshop to experiment with building materials, which played a central role in developing some of the most emblematic modernist urban housing developments built by the ICT.[276] Thus, terra-concrete is an outstanding example of how a process that emerged from a very specific need later evolved into something more vast, and served divergent purposes. Even if the minutes do not convey a doubtless continuity between the different processes, the experience with terra-concrete already confronted the technicians and the leaders with technical issues that necessarily required technical answers. Once such difficulties emerged, it was easier for both the agency's technicians and leaders to grasp the missing elements. From this angle, the materials experiment workshop, established some years later, did not operate in an institutional vacuum. The agency had already confronted technical difficulties that

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[272] Minute 158, August 1943, p. 380.

[273] Minute 175, 21 February 1944, p. 408-back.

[274] Vargas Rubiano claimed in the earlier mentioned interview that when he sat in the board of directors of CINVA in 1955 as representative of the Colombian Society of Architects, he promoted the development of a machine to make those terra-concrete blocks. Acebedo and Moreno, "Hernando Vargas Vida y Obra: Brunner Era La Academia, Le Corbusier La Revolución Urbanística."

[275] Through international organizations its use was promoted in countries such as Ghana, Indonesia, Bangladesh, Peru and Mexico. In: Vargas Rubiano and Vargas Caicedo, "El Terraconcreto En Colombia: Apuntes Para Su Historia."

[276] Minute 173, 7 February 1944, p. 405.

needed to be addressed through such strategies as the establishment of its own center to experiment with building materials. There was no other path that could lead them to success, based on their accumulated experience.[277]

Cartilla de Construcciones Rurales - Manual on Rural Buildings

The ICT compiled its experience building rural housing based on standardized typologies, which sought to respond to regional differences, at least until 1947, in the manual of rural housing, *Cartilla de Construcciones Rurales*, published in 1946. The examples the ICT collected in this book shows with extreme clarity the most relevant aspects of its work during the first half of the 1940s. It was a differentiated reading of the variety of climate conditions of the country and its impact in the construction of housing. It is at any rate a seemingly contrasting approach to a generic interpretation of housing.

Its authors, Alberto Wills Ferro and Gustavo Maldonado, fulfilled an initiative that had emerged earlier with an opposing intent.[278] Former finance minister, Alfonso Araujo, complained in a board meeting in May of 1943 about the high administration costs of the ICT. In his opinion, the technical department had "an excess of architects and [he] suggested [creating] a construction manual, which would be enough [to co-ordinate future projects]."[279] During that meeting, general manager Garcés Navas passionately argued against the minister's proposals; yet a couple of months later, in July of 1943, he suggested the preparation of just such a booklet. This booklet would present each one of

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[277] The minutes do not offer information about the time when Vargas Rubiano left the ICT. But the agency presented terra-concrete extensively in its publication on rural housing.
[278] Alberto Wills Ferro was an architect from the *Universidad Nacional de Colombia* (1932) and held an M.S. in architecture from Columbia University. Gustavo Maldonado, engineer of the in the Universidad Nacional de Colombia, and of the University of Michigan, was "Technical Consultant of Materials and Control of Constructions." In: Minute 173, 7 February 1944, p. 405
[279] Minute 146, May 1943, p. 364-back.

the housing types' plans and complete details about the projects the agency had built in the different regions of the country. It would contain "particular specifications of construction, according to the materials used and the budgets with quantity and volume of materials."[280]

Figure 3.1. ICT's rural housing, *Cartilla de Construcciones Rurales*, 1946.

Several months later, in April of 1944, Alberto Wills Ferro was commissioned to write the manual of rural housing.[281] Wills Ferro (1906-1968) had been working at the

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[280] Minute 155, July 1943, p. 378.

[281] At the end of the same year, the general manager insisted on the urgency of elaborating the said manual in order to systematize the building process and the budget. In: Minute 168, December 1943, p. 396-back. Minute 180, April 3, 1944, p. 413. Minute 189, June 27, 1944, p. 425-back. Minute 195, September 24, 1944, p. 435-back.

agency since 1941.[282] After one year there, he went to New York, with ICT's support, to pursue graduate studies in architecture.[283] In 1943, he returned to the agency and became assistant to the general manager.[284] However, in November of 1945, before he had even finished the manual of rural housing, he resigned.[285]

Following the guidelines requested by the agency's leaders, the booklet was to work as a guide for "the master builder and simultaneously, as a compilation of practical knowledge for the architects and the engineers" working for the ICT.[286] Improved construction standards were the main goal the agency seemingly wanted to achieve with this publication. High technical quality was at the core of the rural housing program. The manual presented a depiction of all building materials used in the construction of rural housing in the first part. It tackled equally all materials typically used in the construction of the houses, such as cement, brick, concrete, terra-concrete, and traditional materials such as bamboo, wood, wattle and daub, and even lianas and pita cord in the same line with "iron galvanized wire."[287] The second part addressed the cost of different building elements. The third part contained practical instructions with drawings explaining the

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[282] Minute 64, March 1941, P. 144. The general manager consulted with former finance minister, Lleras Restrepo about this hiring, for what Wills Ferro asked for a salary as a condition to accept the position was out of the budget. The minister gave green light and offered as an argument to accede to his request that "he would be a valuable element for the widening of the work of the Institute, for his great experience in construction and his magnificent poster in Architecture, in addition to his experience in office management."

[283] The case of Wills Ferro is one of those cases in which some well-known architects used the agency as a means to advance in their own professional trajectories. Minute 99, February 1942, P. 247. Minute 139, March 1943, p. 344, back.

[284] Minute 144, May 1943, p. 356.

[285] Nonetheless, he promised to finish the booklet, and the general manager even suggested to maintain him as technical advisor for the housing projects in the "popular neighborhoods." Minute 223, November 12, 1945, p. 479.

[286] Wills Ferro and Maldonado, *Cartilla de Construcciones Rurales*, 3.

[287] Ibid., 3-11. Although *bahareque* is not a building material, the authors included it in the chapter on materials, clarifying that they would go into detail again in the chapter about building techniques, and that they just mentioned the essential aspects of this technique in the chapter on materials.

building process with different materials. The last part presented drawings of nine

housing types (a minimal house and types 1-8) with a short written description of each.

The text also specified the changes for each type in order to account for different climate

zones.[288] Emphasis was made on the interchangeability of materials between types. Only

housing types 6 and 8 were preferably to be built with bamboo and earth, *bahareque* or

wood.

Figure 3.2. Axonometric and section of minimal housing type, *Cartilla de
       Construcciones Rurales*, 1946.

While the value of this manual lays in its systematic approach to the building

process in rural areas and its equal treatment of all building techniques and materials, the

plans of the houses included in it clearly transmit ideas about rural housing as seen by

architects from the city. The insistence on the inclusion of a living room, and the absence

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[288] Most housing types (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 7) were intended for cold to mild climate zones. Only types 6 and
8 were specifically for warm climate zones. 1 and 2 were described as a small type. Types 4 and 5 were
variations of 3. Type 7 was the only two-story home.

of storage space for tools and other implements in most housing types (only the housing types 3, 6 and 7 have one) are only two examples hinting at this point of view. By the same token, the furniture seems to relate little to peasants' needs and lifestyles.

In addition, the manual's beautiful perspective drawings present an idyllic yet misrepresentative image of the countryside. The only color drawing shown in the book avoids depicting any tropical vegetation, and while this does not necessarily show an intention to deceive or mislead, it does seem to convey the wish to transmit the more manageable landscape of the mild and cold climate zones, and to leave unseen the exuberant tropical condition of the country.[289] The same ambiguity expressed in the perspective drawings can be found in the final section of the book. The images from traditional peasant homes are the same images presented later in the ICT publications of the ICT to establish a contrast between the archaic / primitive dwellings and the "hygienic" houses built by the ICT. Yet the housing types, construction methods, and building materials compiled do not deny the existence of traditional architecture; they simply aim to improve it. The most noticeable changes to the traditional, rural architecture are the replacement of thatched roofs, unfinished walls, and earthen floors with updated materials.

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[289] However, it also can be that the other perspectives are missing in the copy available to me. Since the pages with the drawings are not numbered, it is not possible to know with certainty if other colored drawings are missing.

Figure 3.3. Housing type 5 for cold and moderate weather, *Cartilla de Construcciones Rurales*, 1946.

Minimal housing

Additional strategies emerged in the effort to overcome the conundrum of the high costs of transport and building techniques; namely, minimal housing and prefabrication. Both alternatives were partially objected to by the agency's engineers, since they did not address the diverse local characteristics of the building culture. Both strategies remained part of the agency's repertoire, and even if these solutions only attained tangible results to a limited extent at the moment they were proposed, they certainly provided the technicians and the ICT leaders with the basic elements of modern architecture. They would show their full impact later, in the urban housing program.

The need to generate ideas on building housing for a minimal cost arose at the peak of the country's wartime financial crisis of the country. In March 1943, the general

manager of the ICT presented the idea of holding a competition among the agency's engineers and architects to develop a rural house prototype with a maximum cost of $500.00 Colombian pesos. He wanted to be able to offer a product for those who did not have access to one of the usual houses the ICT built due to their high costs.[290] The results of the competition were presented in August 1943, and its winner, Alvaro Hermina, began referring to his design as the "minimal house."[291] The term was already known to the agency, as the financial support on Alberto Wills Ferro's and Rubiano's 1942 travels to the U.S. aiming to learn about "minimal housing" attest.[292] Yet, the term made its way into the Board of Directors meetings and prevailed in the agency's architectonic vocabulary after this competition took place.[293]

The implications of this minimal house were discussed in a meeting in Bogotá in December 1943 in which all of the leading engineers and architects working in the different regions of the country participated. There, Luis Cano, one of the board members, explained that the rural "housing with a minimal cost does not mean a house of a single type, but a house with the minimal price, without losing its soundness, hygiene, relative comfort, and allowing future transformations."[294] At the same time, some architects expressed their concerns about this model minimal house, for it would not

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[290] Minute 138, March 1943, p. 344.

[291] Minute 164, October 1943, p. 387. The jury was: Alberto Wills, Manuel Samper and Ezequiel Sánchez, leading architects and engineer of the Institute. In: Minute 157, August 1943, p. 379.

[292] Minute 99, February 1942, P. 247. Minute 102, March 1942, P. 252. However, there is no evidence that any of them contributed in a concrete way to that issue. Only the interview, in which Rubiano states that he was able to develop low-cost rural houses. Acebedo and Moreno, "Hernando Vargas Vida y Obra: Brunner Era La Academia, Le Corbusier La Revolución Urbanística;" Vargas Rubiano and Vargas Caicedo, "El Terraconcreto En Colombia: Apuntes Para Su Historia."

[293] Although Vargas Rubiano as well as Alberto Wills, both remarkable architects, were in the U.S. studying the issue of "minimal housing" partially financed by the ICT, this topic was never discussed in the board meetings until this competition took place. However, the insights both architects brought with them could have influenced the general manager's views that led to this competition. There is no evidence for that, though.

[294] Minute 169, December 1943, p. 397 - back.

work everywhere, e.g. the Santander department, where people might consider it unsafe, and consequently, be constantly on guard against their possible enemies.[295] From that time on, the relation between minimal house and minimal cost remained a regular concern in the ICT's work.

The minimal house was evidently applied in the rural housing program, for it was also catalogued in Wills Ferro's publication of 1946. According to the depiction in this book, the minimal house had the advantage that it could be built similarly in all climate zones, with minimal variations in response to geographical differences. It was also adaptable to "any kind of building material such as brick, stone, cement blocks, rammed earth walls, and others." This aspect further ensured the ability to adapt the generic unit to different geographical conditions.[296]

Though the ICT's technical department was acquainted with the minimal house from its experience in the *rural* housing program, they linked the term later to the *urban* housing projects developed at the end of the 1940s and beginning of the 1950s in Bogotá, Muzú among them. Under the supervision of architect Jorge Gaitán Cortés, the technical department developed minimal housing type 58F3.[297] Yet in doing so, it exhibited a set of limitations derived from a particular understanding of how "minimal" was to be interpreted. One of the three rooms of the program was at the same time circulation space. It was necessary to cross one of the small bedrooms in order to enter the second one. Also, its dining space was seemingly insufficient to accommodate the number of

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[295] This is an assertion that shows the limits of standardized housing, and tangentially expresses the political context of the moment in the rural areas in 1943. Minute 169, December 1943, p. 398.
[296] Wills Ferro and Maldonado, *Cartilla de Construcciones Rurales.*
[297] Gaitán Cortés played a key role in the development of modern architecture. He interacted with ICT at different moments in different roles. He will be mentioned several times throughout this chapter. Essentials about him in: Dávila, Julio D. *Planificación y Política En Bogotá: La Vida de Jorge Gaitán Cortés.* Bogotá: Alcaldía Mayor, 2000.

inhabitants it was planned for. The only bathroom located on the ground floor is also strikingly small. Finally, the workspace in the kitchen is almost inexistent.

Figure 3.4. Muzú. Housing type 58F3. First and second floor. Proa 30, December 1949.

What ideas about the minimal house can be perceived in this context? Although Carlos Martinez expressed in an editorial of the journal Proa issue, in which Muzú was presented, that "minimal" was meant "according to functional concepts which can be achieved through a rational distribution," one can but wonder if this included a notion of a minimum to perform any specific activity.[298] Nonetheless, this minimal housing type had the approval of Martinez, for it was in any regard an improvement compared to the

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[298] Proa 30, December 1949.

112

previous living conditions of the targeted population. He claimed in the article on Muzú that

> [i]n the *inquilinatos* [tenement houses] for workers, the worker's family has a single room, where the residents cook, receive, chat, rest and sleep. The only shared toilet facility is unhygienic or does not work. There is no sun, no pure air, no light; nor the delight of a nearby playground. That is the overcrowding with its lamentable pathological consequences and its tremendous physical and moral decompositions.[299]

This is a well-known discourse of modern architecture that nurtured the development of social housing, even if at the end those discussed by Martinez were not necessarily the same awarded the right to live in Muzú.

The ICT sought to achieve a minimal house for a minimal cost through technological innovations and through the optimization of the program, for which Muzú was an important antecedent.[300] After a series of experiences with minimal housing, the board of directors proclaimed in 1952 that the agency only should build urban housing of a "minimal type, with a maximal cost of 4000 pesos." The board of directors considered that only so the agency could solve the "housing problem" with its "sparse resources."[301]

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[299] Proa 8, August 1947.

[300] A minimal housing type was finally developed in the Quiroga neighborhood after a good number of experiments, in which the Inter-American Center for Housing, Centro Interamericano de Vivienda, CINVA, was also involved. The third phase of Quiroga was awarded to the architects Pedro Helí Vega, Guillermo Melo, Esguerra & Herrera, and Álvaro Ortega for a price of 1.580.20 pesos each. (Minute 539, September 22, 1952, p. 0029.) This represented an enormous difference compared with some of the houses that were built in the last years of the 1940s, which were never less than 10.000 Colombian pesos.

[301] Furthermore, the main board decided to "eliminate the mixed financing system," that operates in some cities, since those who are able to give "more or less substantial contributions," can also solve their housing problem on their own. Which means that middle class housing loses some importance, at least during the rest of this period. What is interesting is that Juan Pablo Ortega, (former representative of the industrialists), the Institute of Parcelaciones general manager, and Gabriel Serrano Camargo, participated in this meeting. Minute 533, August 4, 1952, p. 0018.

The Materials Application Workshop "El Tabor"

The origins of a workshop in which experiments with materials could be conducted are directly connected with the never-ending search for a means to lower costs for the rural housing program. In this search program general manager Garcés Navas incessantly proposed housing prefabrication. Although he made several attempts to introduce prefabricated houses and to make prefabrication a priority for the agency throughout the time he served as general manager, his initiatives did not significantly impact the production of rural housing.[302] Toward the end of his term, in 1947, he still claimed that

> only when we can obtain a prefabricated rural house with all the necessary safety, soundness, hygiene and conditions of comfort, the Institute is going to be able to make an efficient work in improving the quality of rural housing. It will be able to build not hundreds but thousand housing units that could be built in a year in the Colombian rural areas with specialized equipment to assemble one house in only a few days.[303]

His views, very much in line with what was happening at the global level in this period after World War II, exemplify the faith in prefabrication as a way to solve once and for all the housing shortage, without considering the extremely high costs of this "specialized equipment."

Although prefabrication did not characterize the building methods implemented by the ICT during general manager Garcés Navas' term, it certainly became the initial reason for the establishment of a workshop to conduct technical experiments with building materials. The financial crisis during World War II probably nurtured in Garcés

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[302] For instance, in Minute 110, June 1942, P. 282. Arturo E. Márquez offers the ICT prefabricated houses in "wood from the sawmills of Tumaco." This offer does not have any positive response, since after evaluating it the board members came to the conclusion that it was more expensive than brick or adobe and that its performance over the long term was uncertain.

[303] Minute 272, July 10, 1947, p. 578.

114

Navas more reasons to assume that prefabrication was the path to follow, for he reinforced his vehement pledge to the board of directors to advance the development of prefabrication for the rural housing program with his request to establish a commission to study and develop prefabricated rural housing.[304] This technological commission, according to Garcés Navas' proposal, was to be comprised of engineer Ricardo Rodríguez, Leader of the Rural Housing section; the Industrial engineer Juan Consuegra de la Cruz, and the U.S. American architect John C. Knight, specialized in the construction of prefabricated houses for the US. Navy.[305]

The technical commission traveled to Puerto Rico, where it would be informed about the latest advances in prefabrication methods and materials.[306] Though these technologies would not be adopted into Colombia outright, the commission's visit did enable new and unexpected ideas to enter the agency, with far-reaching consequences for its future. Based on the commission's findings, Juan Consuegra de la Cruz concluded in a report on prefabricated housing that prefabrication would not work in Colombia as it did in other countries, due to Colombia's vast and irregular topography. But recognizing the difficulty in bringing materials from other places had always been the main argument for using local materials and building methods, he presented an intermediate path that could be followed in order to achieve a more effective building process. This report thoroughly

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[304] Minute 272, July 10, 1947, p. 578 - 578-back.
[305] Minute 272, July 10, 1947, p. 578. They all were working for the Institute at that point.
[306] Minute 280, September 10, 1947, p. 600. Jacob Crane, from the Federal Housing Administration (FHA), who was in Colombia at the beginning of 1946, (Minute 230, January 21, 1946, p. 489-back) and suggested, among others, "to contact the Institute for Tropical Housing in Puerto Rico, ... "to exchange ideas and to seek international orientation regarding the issue of housing..." In: Minute 231, February 4, 1946, p. 491. But also, Robert L. King, who also worked with the Inter-American Cooperative Service for Public Health, and John C. Knight, specialized in the construction of prefabricated houses for the US. Navy. (Minute 260, March 17, 1947, p. 541. Minute 272, July 10, 1947, p. 578) and provided their services to the ICT at least during 1947. Any of them might have contributed to this proposal. It does not exclude the possibility of other existing sources for this proposal.

informed the agency about all the extant possibilities for implementing efficient building systems, but it did not succumb to the belief that only foreign materials were worthy, in contrast to the general manager's idealization of prefabrication. Instead, the report gave a sensible understanding of how to use foreign construction elements without losing sight of the particular conditions of the country, and what this implied in terms of construction techniques.[307] The singular approaches required by the diverse geographic conditions is Consuegras' core argument for setting up a workshop to conduct experiments with building materials rather than introducing prefabrication methods that could not work in the country. His unique point of view was the basis in the search for alternatives, which in his view would need to combine traditional building methods and materials with improvements through new technologies and modern materials. In that context, technological experiments were required to ascertain the appropriate materials for each region. As a first step to accomplishing this, he presented a complete project, which included the establishment of a workshop to experiment with building materials.[308]

Consuegra's report, with its proposal to build a materials workshop, enabled two apparently contradictory aspects of the building processes at the ICT. On the one hand, the workshop should allow exploring the best way to increase the quality of rural housing by implementing the best possible building methods and materials in each region, according to its climate and customs. On the other hand, this was the place where experiments were conducted to advance the prefabrication process to be employed in the

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[307] Minute 280, September 10, 1947, 600-back– 602-back.

[308] In: Board Directive committee, Minute 76, September 26, 1947, p. 611 – 614. This proposal had an important antecedent within the agency in the earlier work of Vargas Rubiano with terra-concrete. Vargas Rubiano's curiosity about alternatives to improve local building materials and techniques persisted in Consuegra's proposal. In fact, when Consuegra presented a report on the activities and results of this workshop, he mentioned that the first experiments with terra-concrete had presented excellent results in Muzú. Yet, Vargas Rubiano's name and any reference to previous experiences in the agency with this material were not mentioned. Minute 378, April 11, 1949, p. 898-back.

urban projects that would be built in the next years: Los Alcázares (Bogotá, 1948), Muzú, (Bogotá, 1949) and Quiroga (Bogotá, 1951). The guiding principles of such a workshop were in tune with the statutes of the agency, which according to law 85 of 1946, established that "the agency will have a technical department in charge of the study of diverse rural as well as urban housing typologies, appropriated for diverse weather conditions and customs in the different regions of the country. This technical department will also have as a task the study of urban planning, the production of materials and the research on prefabricated housing."[309] Although the realization of the workshop was not mentioned in the remaining meetings of 1947, Consuegra's proposal was the basis for the materials workshop finally installed in the site "El Tabor" in 1948.

However, the inception of "El Tabor" was unrelated to Consuegra's proposal. Throughout the 1940s, different causes led to a decisive migration into the cities. While in 1938 the rural population represented 70.9% of the total, by 1951 it was 61.1%.[310] The increased housing shortage that resulted in the main cities became more evident as the 1940s advanced. This situation required quick actions that would enable the construction of more houses in a short time. It involved the search for additional sources for the industrialized production of building materials. As a response, the ICT's board members agreed on the need of producing building materials on its own. With this in mind, the ICT initiated a search for a site to produce brick and tile on a large scale, and to that end, the ICT sought advice from geologists at the Ministry of Mines and Oil (Ministerio de Minas y Petróleos) and the Institute of Industrial Development (Instituto de Fomento Industrial).[311] The ICT purchased a piece of land close to Bogotá in October 1946, El

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[309] Minute 261, March 18, 1947, p. 545. Article 45.

[310] Pécaut, *Orden y violencia*, 349-350.

[311] Minute 251, September 30, 1946, p. 522-back. Soon after, the geologist of the Institute of Industrial Development, Benjamin Alvarado, indicated in his reports of October 5 and 9 of 1946 that the sites offered

Tabor.[312] The initial project of a production plant for brick and tile expanded to include a quarry and a clay source.[313] Until the end of the term of general manager Garcés Navas in December of 1947, the ICT conducted a series of activities aimed at setting up the production plant.[314] Yet the plant never produced building materials at the scale envisioned when it was first established.

During the next years, from 1948 on, the relevance and purpose of the production plant and quarry at El Tabor changed to a "Materials Application Workshop." Two circumstances probably propelled this transformation. On the one hand, Juan Consuegra de la Cruz' project to establish a workshop to experiment with building materials, proposed in September 1947, had not yet materialized. On the other hand, despite studies undertaken under general manager Hernando Posada Cuéllar (1948-1949) to define the suitability of the site for the planned tasks, it was repeatedly claimed that El Tabor was not suitable for these tasks.[315] The materials application workshop operated then under

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to the ICT for purchase were appropriated. Minute 252, October 14, 1946, p. 525. In spite of the board of director's approval to continue the negotiations, he informed about a new site. In: Minute 253, October 21, 1946, p. 525-back.

[312] Minute 254, October 28, 1946, p. 526-back. In this meeting, the positive report by the geologist Alvarado was read, and the site's purchase approved. Although the site was not yet called "El Tabor" this nomination can be inferred from the request to build two or three houses for the site-keepers in "El Tabor," in the next meeting. Minute 255, December 9, 1946, p. 532. From that moment on, this site would always be referred as El Tabor.

[313] Board Directive Committee, Minute 57; January 17, 1947. In: Minute 259, February 24, 1947, p. 539.

[314] Report of Directive committee, Minute 62, 28 de June de 1947, p. 573. In: Minute 271, July 3, 1947. Minute 273, July 17, 1947.

[315] The general manager gave as an explanation for the inactivity of the brick kilns, that they were still expecting the results of a geologic study. The ICT technicians wanted to have a final report on the possibility to install a kiln for a steady production and the associated drying spaces. This was a paradoxical situation given the fact that it presumably had the capability of producing 60 thousand bricks, but with not enough space to dry them! Executive Committee, Minute 119, August 17, 1948, p. 774-back. In: Minute 338, September 16, 1948, p. 773-back. One year later, the general manager explained that they were not producing brick on a large scale as planned, for the lack of water and the limited resistance of the ground to support the installment of drying spaces and the Hoffman kiln. Minute 401, September 29, 1949, p. 970.

the supervision of Juan Consuegra de la Cruz, who worked in the ICT's technical department.[316]

Consuegra had a key role in the development of new materials through his experiments and expanded the work of the Materials Application Workshop with the elaboration of prefabricated elements. Consuegra introduced a system of prefabricated floors and walls, which were employed in Los Alcázares and approved for "Muzú and the whole national territory."[317] The ICT was indeed able to directly and efficiently use the products of these experiments in Muzú with great profit.[318] The close collaboration between the Technical Department and the material's workshop at El Tabor resulted in the design of houses based using prefabricated parts developed and produced there. Bernabé Pineda Ropero, director of the urban housing program, reported that the workshop was able to supply a large part of the building construction materials needed for these houses.[319] Eight houses of type 58-F-3 were almost finished in November of 1949 for a final price of 5,098.39 Colombian pesos each, and immediate construction of another 144 houses under the same scheme was planned.[320]

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[316] One of the members of the board of directors, Wiesner, one of the most devout advocates of Consuegra, was convinced of the benefits this workshop would give the ICT. Minute 327, July 5, 1948, p. 751-back.

[317] Minute 378, April 11, 1949, p. 897-back.

[318] In his 1950's report, the general manager specified that El Tabor offered great service to the ICT with the production of cement blocks, floor planks, ceramic bricks, hollow bricks, among others, for the buildings of Muzú. With those products, El Tabor not only sustained itself, but it produced additional profit. Minute 461, January 26, 1951, p. 1179.

[319] Minute 406, November 17, 1949, p. 987.

[320] This estimated cost was presented in the report of Pineda Ropero. Minute 406, November 17, 1949, p. 986-back.
In: Minute 405, of November 10, 1949, (p. 982-back) general manager Posada Cuéllar announced that the eight houses, used as a test, were almost finished after only 40 days of construction.

Figure 3.5. Materials Application Workshop, Proa 28. October 1949.

Consuegra's understanding of technology is quintessential for grasping a particular strand of modernism in Colombia, and coheres, I argue, with the sensitivity for regional differences in the rural housing program until the time El Tabor was established.[321] In a report in 1949, Consuegra, as the Chief Engineer of the Materials

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[321] This perspective faded in the next years and was first proclaimed by the architects several years later with the work of Martinez Sanabria or Rogelio Salmona.

Research and Application Section, provided an extensive presentation of the work in the El Tabor workshop. Consuegra defined Technique as "the employment of scientific knowledge with specific economic goals, based on a given place, time and circumstances." This definition is still similar to what he expressed earlier about the need to adjust all knowledge to the particularity of the place. He reinforced this idea with his views on transformations in the realm of the materials. He observed that the transformation of materials, essential in the "evolution of construction," should be one of local materials. He defended the use of the name "workshop" rather than "laboratory" for El Tabor because, for him, a workshop was closer to the "pilot plant" of the U.S. Americans. This was "a series of installations and machines with a relatively small or limited production but big enough to conduct technical experiments."[322] Consuegra was a definitively singular specimen within the agency, as his understanding of the particular characteristics of this diverse and complex country clear did not shine through ICT's official discourse at the time when Jorge Gaitán Cortés' was the leader of the urban housing program, between April of 1948 and May of 1949. However, Consuegra expressed his full gratitude to Gaitán Cortés, "without whom he would have not been able to move forward with his experiments."[323]

Despite the outstanding results of the experiments conducted in El Tabor, these new technologies were probably never applied in the rural housing program. As the workshop was established in 1948, the program of rural housing was still guided by the need of building low-cost and by the need of having building types that responded to the different geographic regions and customs of the country.[324] This changed soon. The

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[322] Minute 378, April 11, 1949, p. 897 – 897-back.
[323] Minute 378, April 11, 1949, p. 897-back.
[324] Minute 341, October 7, 1948, p. 791.

assistant to the general manager explained the high costs of the houses built during 1948 as the result of increased labor costs, and the use of "better materials."[325] He meant by that the use of brick instead of wattle and daub (bahareque) or rammed earth walls, and metal windows instead of wooded ones, among others. This is an unfortunate assessment, if one considers the kind of ideas that guided the work for several years in the rural areas, and Consuegra's arguments to maintain the local building techniques. After the establishment of the materials workshop at El Tabor, the rural houses did not become any less expensive, and it seems that the interactions between Consuegra and the rural housing program were not free of conflict.[326]

In sum, the Materials Application Workshop "El Tabor" certainly surged from the need to optimize the building process of the rural housing program through the improvement of local building technics and materials. This idea totally contrasted with the experience of prefabrication in Puerto Rico, which was the initial model for the plan in Consuegra's proposal. However, the agency eventually conducted experiments that enabled the production of a series of prefabricated elements, which were introduced in the construction of the most emblematic neighborhoods built by the ICT during the last years of the 1940s and the beginning of the 1950s. Although El Tabor only developed at the end of the agency's transitional period, when the interest in regional differentiation of architecture had started to fade, the concern that triggered this initiative was precisely the need to experiment with local materials for their improvement. And it arose in response to the dilemma of the high cost of rural housing, for which the optimization of regionally

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[325] Minute 383, May 28, 1949, p. 908-back.
[326] Consuegra did complain at some point about the lack of interest of the rural housing program in the experiments of El Tabor. This complaint was confronted by the assistant to the general manager, who claimed that the problem resided in the fact that the workshop was dedicated to the development of materials for the urban housing program. Minute 379, April 21, 1949, p. 900.

differentiated building techniques and materials seemed to be the most appropriate answer. Thus, contradictory circumstances led to the creation of one of the most important pieces of the ICT in the process of building houses, and one of the ICT's most interesting contributions to modern architecture in Colombia, even if not recognized as such by historiography.

Prefabrication and the loss of regional differences

The introduction of prefabricated building elements in urban housing projects and prefabricated houses in the rural housing program throughout Colombia in the late 1940s slowly lost sight of conceiving an architecture that embraced local building materials and methods, and shows instead an increasingly simplified understanding of architecture, which ignores the complexity and the extreme heterogeneous geography of the country outside the capital. While Jorge Gaitán Cortés very likely supported the experimentation that began with the rural housing program, improvements in the prefabrication of building parts for the urban housing programs took precedence in the experiments under his leadership. The differentiated use of materials and building techniques that responded to the country's heterogeneous characteristics lost its relevance in the process. At the beginning of 1949, Gaitán Cortés tackled again the successful deployment of prefabricated elements in Los Alcázares as the basis for its broader application throughout the country, but a country that should be divided in six similar geographic zones.[327] Even if some members expressed their concern about Gaitán's plans to expand the experience with prefabricated elements to the whole country, these concerns were not related to those expressed previously by some ICT's engineers, namely the incapacity of

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[327] Minute 358, January 20, 1949, p. 837.

prefabricated elements to take account of the geographically extreme heterogeneous country. They were rather related to the risk of investing a considerable sum of money in a new project, in light of the instability and lack of continuity of many Colombian industries.[328]

When new general manager Francisco Puyana arrived in 1950, he introduced a series of changes to reduce the administration costs of the agency and the final cost of the houses. One of them, the simplification of the design process had the most far-reaching consequences for the architectural development of the rural housing units. In the same way Gaitán Cortés' proposal for the urban areas, building types for rural housing were now established for large geographical regions.[329] This approach advanced to a new stage of simplification, when the ICT started using prefabricated metal structures for the rural housing program throughout the national territory. First, Puyana proposed to purchase a prefabricated metallic structure from *Talleres Centrales* that could serve to test its usefulness in the rural housing program in May of 1950.[330] A series of purchases of iron structures to build prefabricated houses followed during the same year.[331] Thereafter, the rural housing program used this kind of structure exclusively.[332] Puyana's commitment to solve definitively the rural housing problem in this way implied the lack of space for any kind of experimentation or for a careful adaptation to any specific region. These metal structures constituted the central part of Puyana's rural housing program. Some of the board members shared his belief in the prefabricated house, as the one called to solve the

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[328] Minute 366, February 21, 1949, p. 855.
[329] The main board proposed to "adapt" the plans used in Cartagena and Barranquilla to develop a housing project in Magangé. Minute 498, December 5, 1951, p. 1262.
[330] Minute 425, May 16, 1950, p. 1042.
[331] Minute 431, July 7, 1950, p. 1066-back. Minute 442, September 7, 1950, p. 1104. Minute 450, November 3, 1950, p. 1133-back. Minute 456, December 5, 1950, p. 1157.
[332] Minute 452, November 16, 1950, p. 1144.

multiple problems associated with peasant housing.[333] Particularly, an earthquake in North Santander in the same year triggered the large-scale implementation of prefabricated houses in order to be able to respond quickly to the need of housing in that region.[334] Several firms offered prefabricated houses, but the ICT worked primarily with *Talleres Centrales*. The prefabricated rural houses were developed in a joint effort between the Technical Department of the ICT and this firm. These houses caused some fascination for the engineers due to their low cost, even after the firm was compelled to increase the price of the houses because of the price increase of iron.[335] Inspired by the possibilities it seemed to offer (low prices, and quick construction), the ICT also imported such structures from other firms.[336] Eventually, the ICT purchased a number of structures from a German firm, W. Mackeben & Co., and others structures from la *Societé Métallurgique d'Enghien St. Eloi*, from Belgium, which were even lower-priced than the Germans.[337]

Prefabricated houses were preferably used where there was a lack of materials and labor, and transportation was difficult.[338] But even there, they were not necessarily well received by the rural population. As in the case of the population affected by the earthquake in Santander, they wanted to have their houses in *bahareque* (wattle and daub), for this building technique permitted more economical and hence larger houses.[339] Strikingly, this situation did not spark any further discussion on the suitability of

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[333] Minute 446, October 5, 1950, p. 1118 – 1118-back. Camilo Gómez mentioned the prefabricated models as part of the strategies to improve the living conditions of the inhabitants of the Magdalena River's region.

[334] Minute 432, July 10, 1950, p. 1071-back.

[335] Minute 430, July 6, 1950, p. 1061-back. Minute 444, September 21, 1950, p. 1109-back.

[336] 200 structures purchased from the German firm W. Mackeben & Co. Executive Committee, Minute 153 (incorrectly numbered: 423), August 17, 1950, p. 1089-back. Minute 439, August 22, 1950.

[337] Minute 439, August 22, 1950, p. 1089; Minute 455, November 30, 1950.

[338] Minute 482, August 2, 1951, p. 1233-back. Minute 530, July 7, 1952, p. 0011.

[339] Minute 457, December 7, 1950, p. 1161-back.

prefabricated houses for the rural population. The strategy of using prefabricated structures for the rural housing program remained in place until the ICT handed it over to the Agrarian Bank in 1956.[340] Yet, the agency also introduced other forms of prefabricated buildings for the rural housing program, such as wooden prefabricated houses from Finland.

Figure 3.6. Talleres Centrales Advertisement. In: Vivienda, Nr. 2 of 1955.

What architectural historian Silvia Arango identified for Colombian architecture in general between 1945 and 1960, applies to the architecture produced in the ICT: "The

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[340] Instituto de Crédito Territorial, ed., *30 Años de Servicio*, 26.

centralization of decisions and technical efficiency determined an architectural homogenization that erased regional differences."[341] This change probably expresses the turning point in the understanding of a regional differentiated architecture, which goes hand in hand with the emergence of a discourse of modern architecture in its more schematic version with no regard for regional differences.[342]

URBAN HOUSING - INNER SPATIAL ARRANGEMENT

An analytic approach to the spatial arrangement of the three case studies evince the extent to which ideas on modern living permeated the ICT's projects. Thus, a comparison with some aspects of traditional housing plans will serve as a way to discuss Muzú. In the case of CUAN the identification of colonial residues, as discussed by Fernando Lara, are at the front of the discussion.[343] While a process of simplification in the rural housing program at the expense of a more nuanced view of local differences was evidenced, the evolution in the urban housing program shows new preoccupations that needed to be accommodated in the housing program. In Ciudad Kennedy, the transformations required by the different social conditions are expressed in a new space; a flexible space that could be converted in a room for commerce within the house or to maintain it simply as a bedroom. The possibility to transform the space in the future, according to the needs of those who dwell there, reacted to some of the critical points of

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[341] Arango, *Historia de la Arquitectura en Colombia*, 228.
[342] A parallel with the debate in the U.S. on regionalism led by Mumford and the MoMa leaders, aka Johnson and Hitchcock, comes here to mind.
[343] Fernando Luiz Lara, "Incomplete Utopias: Embedded Inequalities in Brazilian Modern Architecture," Arq: Architectural Research Quarterly 15, no. 2 (June 2011): 131–38, https://doi.org/10.1017/S1359135511000558.

modern housing. This strategy became better known with the experimental housing project PREVI, built in Lima, Peru from 1969 to 1973.

Figure 3.7. Muzú. Housing type 79F. Ground floor, second floor. In: Martinez, 1951.

In Muzú, the service area is the most interesting part of the house with respect to examining the transformation of domestic space in ICT's housing programs. The service areas, comprised of kitchen, bathroom, and laundry, constitute an organic whole associated with the backyard of the house. At first glance, the necessity of exiting the house to enter the bathroom seems a bit cruel; if one considers the constantly chilly weather in a city that is located at 8,675 feet (2,644m) above see level. However, it begins to make sense when one understands the bathroom as a unity with the laundry area (*lavadero*) and the backyard. The little covered open space between the entrance to the bathroom and the sink for the laundry includes, in the 79 F type plan, a space for a

mirror. This little space is thus an extension of the bathroom but outside the house. This makes the spatial distribution of Muzú housing units reminiscent of vernacular architecture, which despite the many regional differences commonly presents a direct connection of each room with the outer space. The spatial organization relates at least in two aspects to vernacular (pre-modern?) architecture; the service areas are in direct connection with the outer space, and the dual qualities of some spaces as bedrooms and circulation, as discussed in the section on minimal housing.[344] In other words, although the prefabricated elements certainly sped up the building process in Muzú, and the urban structure was indeed an innovation in the local context, the spatial organization of the spaces was not the realm of transformation where modern architecture flourished.

While the architects of CUAN intended the design of different apartment types that would cover a range of possible family configurations, the same versatility was not guaranteed within the apartments. In the booklet published in 1958, the ICT presented floor plans of seven apartment types, with the number of people each could accommodate. A lack of flexibility becomes evident in the two and a half bedroom apartments. Here, the main bedroom functions also as a circulation space, for it is necessary to cross it in order to enter into a smaller room. Presumably, this room was planned for a baby. Yet, this solution expresses a static view of the families, as the comments of the inhabitants seem to confirm. They did not see themselves living in CUAN for a long time. The apartments of CUAN simply did not offer the flexibility they inhabitants need in the changing configuration of their families.[345]

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[344] In this context, a possible further step to understand the new elements introduced in social housing consists in comparing the architecture built by the same architects for the workers or for those "most in need," and the houses they built for their private clients, where the budget did not posed the same limitations and they were able to design freely according to what they considered was modern architecture.

[345] Also, this probably reflects the abstract or idealized image of what a middle class family looks like. In: G. Triana and J. Vallejo, "Investigacion Individual. Encuestas," Publicaciones, XII Curso Regular de

APARTAMENTO Nº 2

alcoba · *alcoba* · *alcoba* · *comedor* · *salón* · *alc. servicio* · *cocina* · *corredor* · *entrada*

Figure 3.8. Centro Urbano Antonio Nariño, CUAN. Apartment type 2.

Except for the service bedroom and bathroom, the internal arrangement of the apartments of CUAN does not greatly differ from other floor plans developed during that period by the state. These apartments were designed for the middle class, for whom it seemed to be obvious to include at least one person in charge of the housekeeping living in the apartment. This residue from the colonial time found its way in the "modern" housing complex for the middle class. Interesting or ironically, the "service bathroom," the housekeeper's bathroom is only for one person, while the main bathroom is for three to eight persons. But this is just a minimal compensation for the fact that this person is confined in the small area between the kitchen and her bathroom. Moreover, in some of

the apartments, this service bathroom is used as the space to dry the clothes.[346] Thus, not even that minimal space is a private space for the housekeepers. The service areas constitute in all apartment types a completely segregated block from the social and private areas. In fact, none of these three areas have any relation to each other. The same differentiation works even in the smallest apartment units, in the one-bedroom studios.

This programmatic distribution of the apartments neatly aligns with the already existing housing typology in Colombia. Architectural historian Silvia Arango depicted its basic scheme in her book on Colombian architecture:

> Designing a house in any social sector will consist, from this moment [from the 1930s], in articulating within a restricted set of possibilities a series of independent and functionally specialized spaces: social area (living room, dining room, hall), services (kitchen, service rooms, laundry, etc.), and private area (bedrooms and family bathroom). .... Housing is now an isolated unit for a nucleated family.[347]

The interiors on the CUAN apartments need to be seen in this light. They are thus much more connected to the local housing developments than their architects would like to admit.

Several housing types were built throughout the extensive housing development Ciudad Kennedy. Some similarities to the spatial arrangement developed already in Muzú are here identifiable. Other traits of the spatial organization differ from previous projects, exemplified in Muzú. In the housing type A built through the program of self-help in the super-block 6A, the kitchen, the bathroom and the sink for the laundry are external to the house. It is necessary to exit the house in the back to access the service area. In the housing type B of the same super-block, the kitchen is accessible from inside the house, yet it still configures a unit with the bathroom and the laundry. This external location of

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[346] Triana and Vallejo, "Investigacion Individual. Encuestas."
[347] Arango, *Historia de la Arquitectura en Colombia*, 178.

the service areas seems rather awkward, until the parallel with rural housing can be established, as in the case of Muzú. In the rural areas, the spaces for the laundry, kitchen and bathroom are usually directly connected with the exterior of the dwellings.[348]

Figure 3.9. Ciudad Kennedy, housing type A, super-block 6A.

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[348] Alberto Saldarriaga Roa, ed., *Pasados Presentes: La Vivienda En Colombia*, 1. ed, Opera Eximia (Bogotá, D.C: Pontificia Universidad Javeriana, 2009).

Figure 3.10. Ciudad Kennedy, housing type B, super-block 6A.

The floor plan of housing type B in the super-blocks 5 and 8 presents again a new aspect, not developed until now. The space for the laundry is located to the front side of the house. It provides the kitchen with natural light and ventilation, for the kitchen is connected to the living / dinning room on the other side. This main space is connected to the free space in the back of the house. As in the housing type A, there is a multifunctional room next to the entrance that can be used either as a bedroom or as a commercial space. Upstairs, a terrace indicates the possibility of building later another bedroom there. The idea of incremental housing is also present here.

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
Figure 3.11. Ciudad Kennedy. Housing type B. Super-block 5, 8. First and second floor. Archive Minvivienda, La Fragua.

Housing type 3 was widely used in Ciudad Kennedy. Superblocks 1, 8, 8A and 11 contain such a housing type. It is so characteristic of this project that it was the housing type published in the architecture journal Proa 179 when it published this project in April of 1966. This housing type presents, again, the typical traits of minimal housing as developed by the ICT. The common areas are on the ground floor, and the kitchen and bathroom built as a constructive consecutive unit. The bathroom however, is more generous than the one in Muzú. Here, the bathroom is located towards the front of the house. The sink for the laundry is again in the back of the house, and it resembles rather an external element, very much disconnected from the main volume of the house.

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
Figure 3.12. Ciudad Kennedy. House type 3 in Super-blocks 1, 8, 8A and 11. First and second floor. Archive Minvivienda, La Fragua.

Another housing type A built in super-blocks 1, 3, 5 is interesting for its two rooms on the ground floor that provide alternative uses. The bedroom next to the entrance can also be used for commerce, and the small room to the other side of the entrance, accessible from the kitchen, can be used for different purposes, probably for the laundry, but the plan also foresees there a second bathroom in the future. The option in this housing type of transforming spaces or adding others in the future brings the meaning of its label closest to the nomination as *incremental houses*. The construction system identified for these same super-blocks is *casas de desarrollo progresivo*. A total of 1,209 housing units should be developed as incremental houses in Ciudad Kennedy.[349]

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[349] Instituto de Crédito Territorial, ed., Ciudad Kennedy Una Realidad, 1961-Diciembre-1965 (Bogotá, 1965), n.p.

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
Figure 3.13. Ground floor and second floor plans of House type A. SM 1, 3, 5. ICT. Archive Minvivienda, La Fragua.

Saldarriaga reports that this program was offered by the agency beginning in 1963, but that it equated to the program of *casas inconclusas* ("unfinished" houses). The *casas inconclusas* program was implemented in 1959. Under this program, families moved into a housing unit with the basic elements to make it habitable. The families could then gradually finish its construction. This program focused on families who were not able to pay the installments for a completely finished house, but could neither participate in the aided self-help programs.[350] The fact that the self-help program also indicated that the housing units should be finished by the dwellers is a hint to the broad

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[350] Saldarriaga Roa, *Instituto de Crédito Territorial. ICT. Medio Siglo de Vivienda Social En Colombia 1939-1989*, 35; Saldarriaga Roa, Estado, ciudad y vivienda, 67-68. However, the call to implement "incremental housing" in ICT's program had been considerably earlier discussed in a board of director's meeting as a strategy to lower the housing units prices through the contribution of the future dweller with its own work. In: Minute 638 (incorrectly numbered: 738), July 19, 1955, p. 0290-back.

understanding and implementation of the "unfinished" or incremental houses in Ciudad Kennedy.[351]

This floor plan with its bathroom on the second floor, close to the bedrooms, its living and dining rooms directly connected to the backyard and its kitchen completely integrated in the inner space, it is the most distant from the traditional rural housing type, which considers the service areas such as kitchen and bathroom external to the sleeping area. But also, this is the first time that a proposed housing type included one multifunctional room that could be used for commerce, as is often the case in informal settlements. Is this a response to the features recognized in the informally developed housing? Already in 1958, the Board of Directors engaged in intense discussions about the use of houses built by the ICT for commercial use. The agency tried to eliminate this situation through regulation, which obviously led to complaints from the inhabitants.[352] Consequently, the agency sought to implement a series of measures to lower the pressure for such activities in the ICT neighborhoods.[353] Including such rooms in the initial plan of the house in Ciudad Kennedy can be understood as part of these measures.

Self-help, incremental housing, and rooms that can accommodate functions that guarantee extra income for the family, or a place where they can practice their trade, are clear traits that reflect the moment the city was going through at the beginning of the 1960s. It evinces recognition that the final users were no longer the clearly defined

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[351] Elsa Gómez Gómez, "Evaluación Socioeconómica Del Proyecto de Ayuda Mutua de La Supermanzana 8A. Ciudad Kennedy. Bogotá. Estudio de Caso de 28 Viviendas.," Investigacion Individual. (Centro interamericano de vivienda y planeamiento –CINVA, November 1966), Colección Centro Interamericano de Vivienda y Planeamiento –CINVA. Box 28, Fondo Universidad Nacional de Colombia. 7, 26. If one may think that the backyard was intended as the space for future expansion of the house, as I do, the study of Elsa Gomez might surprise, then when she visited the homes a couple of years later, the study was published in 1966, she notes that the backyard conserves still its original "nature," namely, laundry, a space for drying clothes, vegetable garden, space for small domestic animals, and others.
[352] Minute 9, February 26, 1958, 0282.
[353] Minute 11. March 5, 1958, p. 0304.

"worker" of a firm, but a much more diffuse group of workers, for whom informality was part of the daily life, and who had come to predominate in the big cities beginning in the previous decade. This is a situation resulting from the fact that the existing formal economy was not able to accommodate the many new inhabitants of the cities.

Figure 3.14. Housing type A, in SM5. In: Instituto de Crédito Territorial, *Ciudad Kennedy. Una realidad*. 1965.

Despite the project's negative assessment by architects, this housing development offered a vast field of experimentation, which certainly explored, in various ways, the spatial configurations of different housing types. The experiments tested the formal aspects of design, but also the responses to a now clearly urbanizing country, whose inhabitants required floor plans more in accordance with their daily survival strategies.

A long discussion about the construction of multifamily housing buildings preceded the realization of the first high-rise building for multi-family housing built by the state, *Centro Urbano Antonio Nariño*, CUAN. The specific references for the projects planned prior to the construction of CUAN, and CUAN itself, derive from experiences in other parts of Latin America. Even if high-rise buildings for multifamily housing populate the plans, projects and ideas that the agency intended to realize beginning in the mid 1940s, what finally evolved as the ground type for state-promoted multifamily housing was not high- but middle-rise buildings. Much simpler in their structure and technical requirements, the ICT replicated mid-rises in Colombia's urban centers from the 1960s on, during which time Ciudad Kennedy was built. In the context of the discussions of the 1960s, the idea that prevailed was that it was more important to build according to the possibilities of the country than to import costly technology gained momentum.

CUAN: The long road to building the first multifamily building

Historiography refers to CUAN (Centro Urbano Antonio Nariño), inhabited since 1958, as ICT's first multifamily building. However, a long discussion about the construction of multifamily housing buildings preceded the realization of this project outside and within the agency. CUAN is in this context the manifestation of a series of ideas circulating in the city of Bogotá several years prior to its final construction. The different projects that emerged in this process are part of the same discussion, though they do not present a clear continuous narrative line. They offer a fragmentary picture of

different initiatives that might be connected but whose connections are not easily discernible from the diverse documents that tackle the issue.

The idea of building multifamily housing for leasing to the middle class was discussed for the first time in the meetings of the board of directors in April of 1946. Former general manager, Garcés Navas, suggested the development of "seven or eight multifamily seven-story buildings in San Diego," for leasing to the middle class (to official and private employees). According to this presentation, the buildings should have shops on the first floor, and apartments above, with all kinds of "modern amenities" such as electric stove, refrigerator, warm water, among others. The general manager imagined these apartments of good quality but not luxurious and for a maximum price of ten thousand pesos.[354] Although the general manager received a green light to pursue this negotiation, the project was not mentioned again in the board meetings. But, how did Garcés Navas develop such a detailed proposal with such divergent ideas from what was being developed in the middle of the 1940s? The architecture student Edgar Burbano proposed at that time a high-density housing project in San Diego as one of the constitutive elements of an urban plan for the transformation of the Avenue *Carrera 10th* (Number 1 in figure 3.15).

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[354] The project should be built on land owned by the Caja de Sueldos de Retiro del Ejército. This plan should be built with the collaboration of la Caja de Previsión Social Nacional. Minute 237, April 15, 1946. P. 502 – 502-back.

Figure 3.15. Bogotá 1944. Secretaria de Obras Públicas Municipales. Departamento de
    Urbanismo y Proyectos. (1): Location of the student's project (Edgar Burbano,
    1945) published in Proa 01, August of 1946. (2): Location of the project designed
    by Gabriel Solano Mesa for the Ministry of National Education, 1947. (3):
    Location of Unidad de Habitación. D.T.M. Ortega & Solano, 1951. Published in
    Proa 53, November of 1951.

Edgar Burbano belonged to a group of students of the Universidad Nacional,
whose proposals for the urban renovation of the traditional center of Bogotá were
published in the first issue of the journal Proa, in August of 1946. The importance of the
Avenue *Carrera 10th* for the development of the old city center was highlighted in the
article that accompanied the images of this student project. Burbano's project was part of
the broader urban renovation's proposal, which the students' group submitted as its thesis

in architecture at the Universidad Nacional in 1945 under the instruction of the professors Jorge Arango Sanin, Jorge Gaitán Cortés and Carlos Martinez.[355] Martinez and Arango, along with M. de Vengoechea, were simultaneously Proa's editors. Carlos Martinez, on his part, figured on the ICT's staff in October 1944 as an advisor in urban planning issues.[356] Thus, through Martinez the general manager possibly had contacts among the group of young architects around him and Proa. What is more, in this first issue of Proa, Garcés Navas also contributed an article on the housing crisis in Colombia.[357] The housing proposal Garcés Navas' had presented three months earlier to the board of directors closely resembled Burbano's proposal for the same city sector, San Diego, and it neatly fit into the spirit of this first Proa's issue, which clearly expressed the vision of a modern Bogotá.

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[355] Eduardo Angulo Flórez and Asociación de Arquitectos de la Universidad Nacional de Colombia, eds., *Cincuenta Años de Arquitetura, 1936-1986: Universidad Nacional*, 1. ed (Bogotá: Asociación de Arquitectos de la Universidad Nacional de Colombia, 1987), 93.

[356] Minute 196, October 02, 1944, p. 441.

[357] In this article, Garcés Navas presented his views on the problem of the rural and urban areas, and the possible solutions (following the format of the Chart of Athens). José Vicente Garcés Navas, "La Crisis de Las Habitaciones En Colombia," Proa: Urbanismo, Arquitectura, Industrias, no. 1 (August 1946): 13–14.

LA ARQUITECTURA DE LA FUTURA CARRERA 10a. ESTUDIADA POR EL ARQUITECTO

Figure 3.16. Edgar Burbano's project for the Carrera 10th in the San Diego area, 1945.
Source: Proa 1, august 1946.

In 1947, the Ministry of National Education commissioned the architect Gabriel Solano to design a high-rise building complex with six housing towers and a hotel in Bogotá. This complex was to be located in the Calle 15 and the Carrera 17, adjacent to the central rail station (Number 2 in figure 3.15).[358] Gabriel Solano's proposal echoes Edgar Burbano's. However, the author of the quintessential book on the Ministry of Public Works, Carlos Niño Murcia, argues that this project was inspired by all the modern architectural precepts the architect Gabriel Solano was acquainted with through his studies at Harvard University under Walter Gropius.[359]

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[358] Niño Murcia, *Arquitectura y Estado*, 312.
[359] Ibid.

Figure 3.17. Housing project for the Ministry of Education. Gabriel Solano. 1947.
Published in Niño Murcia, *Arquitectura Y Estado*. 1991.

The proposals of the Universidad Nacional student's group as well as Gabriel Solano's proposal for the Ministry of Education need to be seen in the context of a major discussion on the transformation of the city's traditional center during the 1940s, and to which the invitation of Le Corbusier to develop a pilot plan belongs. This discussion was widely promoted by the group around the journal Proa. Moreover, the initiative of ICT's former general manager Garcés Navas probably expressed the wish of the ICT to connect to this discussion and be part of the actors contributing to the modernization of the city. All these projects for high-rise multifamily buildings were still in the realm of the planning ideas for a near future, since at that point no law regulating the horizontal property existed. Such a law was enacted in 1948 (Law182 of 1948). However, it is important to recall that at that time multifamily buildings for rent were already built in Bogotá. As Silvia Arango claims, these "apartment buildings were conceived, as a small-scale business, so that 'they left the owner a rent proportional to the invested capital'... [such that] these rental apartments were designed for ... the professional middle class

144

(intellectual, but not economic minorities) ... "[360] Cite Restrepo, designed by the renowned "architect" Gabriel Serrano in 1939, was the most emblematic example of the period in Bogotá[361]. It consisted in 99 lofty apartments with services such as restaurant, apartment cleaning, and laundry service.[362] That said, Law 182 of 1948 was only relevant for high-rise buildings, which were intended to be sold to the future apartment dwellers.

Within the agency, the issue of multifamily housing emerged again in 1948, yet in a different context. Already at the beginning of the year, some firms, which were subjected to a tax defined by Law 85 of 1946, asked for permission to build multifamily buildings to lease to their workers.[363] The discussion was rather about the legal background of the law, which did not foresee housing for lease but explicitly defined that the houses built with this tax by the firms themselves should be sold to their workers or employees. Nonetheless, this discussion opened again the question about whether leasing or selling and whether single family or multifamily housing was the best option for the ICT. One year later, this topic was still being discussed.[364] Following the logic of those discussions, multifamily buildings were intrinsically for lease, while single-family homes were to be sold. Although the ICT was primarily concerned with selling the houses it produced, it eventually leased those houses, which were not instantly awarded for various

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[360] Arango, *Historia de la Arquitectura en Colombia*, 206.

[361] He was trained as an engineer, worked but as an architect in the firm he founded with Camilo Cuéllar, and the engineer José Gómez Pinzón in 1933. Ernesto Cuéllar and architect Gabriel Largacha joined later the firm. Their architectonic production greatly shaped modern architecture in Colombia during its consolidation phase, principally during the 1950s.

[362] Edificio Cité Restrepo. Ingeniería y Arquitectura, 14 y 15, 1940. p. 28-30. Serrano reflected on the implications of this new kind of housing in his article "Apartamentos modernos, "published in Ingeniería y Arquitectura No. 17, 1940.

[363] Minute 300, January 15, 1948, p. 670-back – 671.

[364] The textile factory Tejicondor built a multistoy building in Medellin to lease units to its single employees. Wiesner, one of the board members, declared that the issue of multifamily housing could not be defined in a general form, since some employees could prefer to live close to their work places even if they do not own them. Minute 401, September 29, 1949, p. 971.

reasons (high costs, animadversion against the ICT, and so on), in order to avoid remaining empty.[365] The implications of the question about single family homes versus multifamily buildings are best seen in the minutes of a meeting in which board members discussed building multifamily housing like that seen in Europe and Peru. One board member concluded that, at that moment, the agency should focus its attention rather on building the highest number possible of low-cost housing, although he did not reject the possibility to "apply these new theories on urbanizations" in the future.[366] Hence, in his view, low-cost housing was equal to single-family housing, and multifamily housing was associated with higher costs.

Although the Ministry of National Education did not pursue the plan developed by Gabriel Solano in 1947 any further at that time, in 1951 Solano presented with his partners Alvaro Ortega and Guillermo Gonzalez Zuleta another multifamily housing project, which was published in Proa 53, in November of 1951. The unauthored article, which may have been written by Carlos Martinez, titled *Unidad de Habitación. D.T.M.*, explained that the project's purpose was to fill newly vacant land resulting from the abolition of the streetcar. In this account, Bogotá's Mayor, Santiago Trujillo (1949-1952), an architect himself, "initiated the idea of erecting buildings in this area that, in addition to having a social content, would be a contribution to the embellishment of such an important sector."[367] This area was a block limited by the calle 26, the diagonal 29, the streets Carrera 13B and carrera 14 or Avenida Caracas, with and extension of 22,000 m^2

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[365] Since several houses in Altos del Prado en Barranquilla have not been sold due to their high price, the main board decided to lease them. Minute 413, February 6, 1950, p. 1009. The situation is the same in Armero, San Gil y Ocaña. In: Minute 460, January 23, 1951. In the case of El Cedro in Cali and in Los Libertadores, Medellín, two owners asked for permission to sell the houses, since they were not able to assume the mortgages. However, the main board did not authorize that; instead, they ordered to rent the houses and use the money to pay the mortgages. Minute 454, November 23, 1950, p. 1147-back.
[366] Minute 332, July 23, 1948, p. 761.
[367] Proa 53. November 1951.

(Number 3 in figure 3.15). As with the other projects, the reasons why Ortega and Solano's proposal from 1951 was never built are unknown.

Figure 3.18. Unidad de Habitacion D.T.M. Ortega & Solano. Published in Proa 53, November 1951.

The ICT was still discussing the prospect of building multifamily buildings, either for sale or for lease, in 1950.[368] Later, as Gabriel Serrano Camargo took his place on the ICT board of directors in 1951, Carlos Martinez explicitly expressed in the journal Proa that "such a distinguished professional [Serrano] demonstrates to his colleagues the economic, social and hygienic advantages offered by collective housing in multi-story buildings."[369] In May of 1952, Carlos Martinez' request seemed to finally have come to fruition when a meeting with the minister of public works, Jorge Leyva, took place. Even though the Ministry of Public Works, under Leyva's direction, was in the process of designing and building CUAN at this point, he presented yet another project to construct multifamily buildings for the middle class, to be located where the planned highway in the north of Bogotá met with Caracas Avenue. The minister offered the ICT part of this

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[368] Minute 411, January 26, 1950, p. 1004-back.
[369] Proa 46. April, 1951.

land to develop the buildings. The general plan was to be developed in a collaborative work between the Ministry and the Technical Department of the ICT.[370] One month later, the firms Ortega & Solano, together with the architecture firm Obregón & Valenzuela were invited to design the project.[371] With Serrano on the ICT's board of directors, this invitation was probably his initiative. In August 1952, the ICT signed the contract with those firms to collaborate with the Ministry of Public Works in drafting the multifamily housing complex.[372] However, nothing about this project was mentioned ever again in the minutes and no images about this project have been published.

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[370] Minute 523, May 26, 1952, p. 0001-back.
[371] Minute 528, June 19, 1952, p. 0009-back.According to Martinez in his 1951 publication on Colombian Architecture, the firm Obregón & Valenzuela was founded in 1944 with the architects Rafael Obregón, José M. Obregón and Pablo Valenzuela, as the general manager. They won the ICT's competition for "Economic Housing" [Los Alcazarez] in 1948. In addition, Martinez informs that Alvaro Ortega and Gabriel Solano founded the firm Ortega & Solano in 1945 with the engineer Guillermo Gonzalez Zuleta.
[372] Minute 535, August 18, 1952, p. 0020-back.

Figure 3.19. Pilot Plan for Bogotá. Le Corbusier, Wiener and Sert. Roadway plan, 1951.
The bubble shows the area where the planned highway towards the north of the
city meets with the Carrera 14 (Avenida Caracas).[373]

From this account, several questions come to the fore. First, why did the minister
Jorge Leyva seek the collaboration of the ICT to build another multifamily building
complex, when he already was leading the construction of the CUAN? Also, why was
Gabriel Solano not under the designers of CUAN or of its structure, although he was
working at the Ministry for Public Works at that time and was the designer of the most
relevant multifamily housing projects in the city until that time? Moreover, he was
chosen at the same time to develop the joint effort between the ICT and the ministry of
public works to build multifamily housing. The answers to these questions would
certainly constitute a different and interesting architectural story.

The significance of the previous unrealized projects consists not only in the fact
that they animated a necessary discussion about the rapidly transforming urban centers,

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[373] http://cartografia.bogotaendocumentos.com. Site managed by the Universidad Nacional de Colombia.

but also in the fact that they represent a different way of living in the city. This is not only expressed through the architectonic configuration but also through the location within the city. By comparing the location of the CUAN with the previous proposals for multifamily housing, one commonality comes to the fore. The multifamily housing projects prior to the CUAN are placed along or close to two important circulation arteries that run south-to-north: Carrera 14 (Avenida Caracas) and Carrera 10th. Only the CUAN lies outside of this growth dynamic towards the north, outside the traditional center of the city. CUAN's location thus can be seen as a keystone of the city's expansion to the west, along the newly inaugurated *Avenida de las Americas*.

Figure 3.20. Bogotá, 1954. Instituto Geográfico de Colombia, Agustin Codazzi. Location of CUAN and previous unrealized multifamily housing projects

Evidently, these projects were deemed appropriate in conjunction with the possibility of moving rapidly through the city. Hence, the ideal of modernization was not

150

only reduced to the shape of architecture and construction methods, but to the way of life they implied. Their location within the city's urban fabric complies with this idea. Furthermore, the images of the precedent projects highlight the importance of having a more urban program on the first floor. Consequently, the urban configuration of the predecessors of CUAN and of CUAN itself gives account of a less isolated view of these modern developments. Through the permeability of the open spaces but also through the first floor program, these platforms should constitute a binding element to the existing city.

Beyond these discussions, and after CUAN was completed through the ministry of public works, ICT still pursued the construction of high-rise multifamily buildings. In September of 1955 the general manager received the Board of Directors' authorization to negotiate the purchase of land close to the neighborhood Los Alcázares –built by the ICT- in Bogotá, to develop "a group of multi-family" buildings.[374] The project was so advanced, that it was even published in ICT's journal *Vivienda* in June of 1955, under the grandiloquent title "*Grupos Multifamiliares Serán Construidos*," (Multifamily buildings will be built). Its design was the product of the work of the "design section of the Technical department of ICT, interestingly, under the direction of Gabriel Solano.[375] Obviously, a very detailed depiction of the project appeared in this article.[376] Despite its approval by the board of directors, its greatly advanced stage of development, and the wide publicity it received, this effort also remained incomplete.

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[374] Landowner was the Beneficencia de Cundinamarca. Minute 645 (incorrectly numbered: 745), September 15, 1955, p. 0297.
[375] Instituto de Crédito Territorial (Colombia), ed., *Vivienda*, vol. 2 (Bogotá: Instituto de Crédito Territorial, 1955). The authorship of the project appears in the table of contents, p. 2.
[376] Instituto de Crédito Territorial (Colombia), *Vivienda*. 18-21.

Figure 3.21. Project for multifamily housing in Los Alcázares. Bogotá. Vivienda. Revista Ilustrada. Organo del Instituto de Crédito Territorial. Nr. 2. June, 1955.

What circumstances prevented the institution from bringing these projects to completion are not stated or even hinted at in the minutes. This hesitation regarding realizing the construction of multifamily buildings is all the more inexplicable, as the ICT's board members acknowledged CUAN as a relevant experience in the realm of housing, and did not seem to question the very idea of this typology.[377] According to

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[377] This acknowledgement came in the context of discussing a new decree, 1983 of 1955, which exempted the Banco Popular and the Caja Agraria from the emission housing and saving bonds to support the ICT in exchange of building rural housing. Since at that moment the Banco Popular already managed CUAN, the ICT board asked the president to wait and see how well they were able to do with this project before it was commissioned with the task of building rural housing. Minute 643 (incorrectly numbered: 743), September 1st, 1955, p. 0294-back, 295.

Silvia Arango, the reason why all these proposals never materialized is "not architectural or urban, nor was it due to professional polemics: the low cost of urban land prices meant that the large investments necessary to build high-rise buildings were not justified at that time."[378] It probably also relates to the circumstances of the agency at that moment. Almost two months after the board of directors authorized the negotiations to acquire the land adjacent to the neighborhood Los Alcázares, in which the multifamily housing project was supposed to be located, the launching of the new *Corporación Nacional de Servicios Públicos* (National Corporation of Public Services).[379] Under this new structure the ICT lost its autonomy, and its capability to develop new projects vanished. As the ICT recovered its autonomy in May of 1957, the political context was quite different.[380] On May 10th, General Rojas Pinilla was deposed from power and a military Junta assumed control until a civil government was elected one year later.[381] The new board of directors met in its new configuration first in September of 1957.[382] At the time of this meeting the proposal to receive CUAN was probably already looming, since the final purchase took place in July 1958. Under these circumstances, to reassume the multifamily housing project of Los Alcazares was probably not realistic.

CUAN and the regional models.

The theoretical models for the construction of multifamily building derive from the reflections on the modern city as developed by Le Corbusier and within the CIAM. Thus, Carlos Martinez and the architects around him promoted and supported Le

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[378] Arango, *Historia de la Arquitectura en Colombia*, 225
[379] Minute 650 (incorrectly numbered: 750), November 10, 1955, p. 0303.
[380] Decreto Legislativo 0094, 1957. (Mayo 29)
[381] Minute 16, May 16, 1957, 0771.
[382] Minute 1, September 11, 1957, p. 001.

153

Corbusier's invitation to Bogotá. However, specific references for CUAN, and CUAN itself, emanate from projects built in other Latin American countries. It would seem that the projects in Europe and the United States were too different in their technical requirements from those in Colombia, while projects being built in in other Latin American countries such as Venezuela, Brazil, Peru or Mexico shared more similarities with the circumstances there. In fact, the references presented in the article on the last multifamily housing project planned by the ICT in Los Alcázares before CUAN was acquired, included Pani's project in Mexico city as well as the Neighborhood Unit Nr. 3 in Lima, and the multifamily housing projects in Caracas.[383]

These housing projects in Mexico City and Caracas seem to have also been referenced in CUAN's design. In 1951 Nestor C. Gutierrez, one of the architects of the group responsible for the design of CUAN was sent to various countries in order to acquire the knowledge he needed to build the first multifamily building of this scale in the country.[384] He went to Venezuela, Mexico and to the United States. In Caracas he visited *El Silencio*, but, as he stated, the housing projects from which he could learn the most were the projects of Mario Pani in Mexico City, *Multifamiliar Presidente Miguel Alemán* (1948-50), and *Multifamiliar Presidente Benito Juarez*, (1950).[385]

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[383] Instituto de Crédito Territorial (Colombia), *Vivienda*.

[384] Aguilera Rojas, "Un Dialogo sobre la serie. El ICT como laboratorio de arquitectura 1948-1953."

[385] Ibid.,160. Afterwards, he visited some housing developments in the United States, which were not very helpful as a model, Gutierrez claimed, since they did not have any social services and were rather for the "wealthy typical American family." In this interview, Gutierrez referred to "Doctor Herrán," as the responsible for this research.

CONJUNTO DE APARTAMENTOS ● BOGOTA ● ARQUITECTOS: NESTOR C. GUTIERREZ B. Y ESGUERRA. SAENZ, URDANETA, SUAREZ & CIA.

Figure 3.22. CUAN, Bogotá. Published in: Martínez, Carlos, and Edgar Burbano. *Arquitectura En Colombia*. Bogotá: Ediciones "Proa," 1963.

Even though Pani's projects are rooted in Le Corbusier's ideas and CUAN is therefore also connected to these ideas, two significant differences to Le Corbusier's *Unité d'Habitation* in Marseille were already noted by Pani himself: the different building types and the fact that the corridors are on the buildings' exterior.[386] Furthermore, the services external to the housing buildings establish a significant difference to Le Corbusier's project. Those are also the characteristics that bring Pani's projects and CUAN closer together. In spite of Nestor Gutierrez' explanations, some authors highlight to a great extent its similarities with the *Unité d'Habitation*. The formal relation

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[386] Miquel Adrià, *Mario Pani: la construcción de la modernidad* (Consejo Nacional para la Cultura y las Artes, 2005).

155

established almost automatically between the buildings of the CUAN and the *Unité d'Habitacion* is also part of Ana Montoya's depiction of the complex. She mentions that this "Corbusian image" was adapted to the particular context of Bogotá. However, she moderates her assertion with the argument that CUAN did not follow the five points of Le Corbusier's architecture, and that conceptually there is no textual correspondence between the *Unité d'habitation* and CUAN.[387] Although Nestor Gutierrez did not deny the influence of Le Corbusier, he clarified that the architects who designed CUAN studied examples from "all over the world" and used what they considered would contribute best to the solution of each apartment typology they were planning.

Beyond any formal reference to other contemporary multifamily housing projects, CUAN enabled the implementation of some technical developments. From the firms appointed by the ministry of public works to build the structure of CUAN, "Cuellar, Serrano and Gomez" is of particular interest in this account.[388] The advertisement of the building method implemented by this firm is the most relevant hint to the construction of the structure of their buildings in CUAN. The firm deployed in CUAN its newly patented building system "*reticular celulado*," a grid system of concrete floor slabs with prefabricated elements, which reduced the use of material.[389] Whether this system was

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[387] Ana Patricia Montoya Pino, "El C.U.A.N.: La Modernización de Un Habitar" (2003), 112.

[388] As explained previously in the text: Decree 1718 of 1952 (July 18) approved the contracts of May 28 of the same year to construct the structure of CUAN's buildings as "dwellings for the middle class in Bogotá" with following firms:
a) Pardo Restrepo & Santamaría Ltda.: three buildings, 13 stories high with a total built area of 34,500 m2.
b) Martínez Cárdenas & Cia. Ltda.: four buildings 13 stories high with a total built area of 26,552 m2.
c) Cuellar, Serrano, Gómez y Cia. Ltda.: two buildings 13 stories high with a total built area of 23,000 m2.
d) A. Manrique Martín e Hijos Ltda.: two buildings 4 stories high with a total built area of 5,127.20 m2.
e) Noguera. Santander & Cia. Ltda.: two buildings 4 stories high with a total built area of 5,127.20 m2.
f) Pablo Lanceta Pinzón: two buildings 4 stories high with a total built area of 5,127.20 m2.
The contracts included the construction of all complementary works according to the plans previously approved by the ministry of public works.

[389] According to Silvia Arango, it was the engineer Domenico Parma, who developed the system "reticular celulado" around 1950. In: Arango, *Historia de la Arquitectura en Colombia*, 218. However, according to

156

implemented in all buildings or only in those of which this firm was in charge, is not clear. As I said previously, for unknown reasons, Proa did not publish anything about the construction of the CUAN. However, the journal had previously presented the material developed by the firm in a thorough article.[390]

Figure 3.23. Proa 33, March 1950. P. 24.

Alberto Mayor Mora et al, this was developed in house as teamwork between several divisions of the firm. Serrano brought from his trip to Brazil his observations of the system Lucio Costa was using to build concrete floor slabs. The firm developed then a grid system of concrete floor slabs with prefabricated elements, which reduced the materials and, consequently, achieved a reduction in the construction costs. The people involved in this process were, thus, many others besides Parma. As Proa presented the issue, they were Domenico Parma and Andrius Malko from the department of Engineering, Gabriel Serrano from the Department of Architecture, and Enrique Acosta from the department of construction of the firm. The general coordinator was the general manager from the firm engineer José Gómez Pinzón. In: Proa No. 33, March of 1950. P. 13. And Alberto Mayor Mora, Silvia Inés Jiménez Gómez, and Hugo Cardona Bueno, Inventos y patentes en Colombia 1930-2000: de los límites de las herramientas a las fronteras del conocimiento (Medellín: Instituto Técnológico Metropolitano, 2005), 126-131.
[390] Proa 33, March of 1950.

Some advertisements in the same journal give an account of various technical aspects of CUAN.[391] First, the firm highlighted the short time needed in the construction of the buildings: 50 workdays to finish the 11.500 m^2 of structure of the buildings they were responsible for.

Figure 3.24. Advertisement of Cuellar, Serrano, Gómez & Cia. Ltda., of its building method "Reticular Celulado." Published in Proa 65, November 1952.

Also, the firm "Prefabricated materials Moggio Ltda" promoted its prefabricated floors used in the six buildings type A (four stories high), which according to the ads were installed in 60 days. The names of the firms in charge of the construction of those buildings, Pablo Lanzetta Pinzon, A. Manrique Martin e Hijos Ltda., and Noguera

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[391] Interestingly, not even the monograph on Serrano's work authored by Germán Tellez mentions this project. Téllez, Germán. Cuéllar Serrano Gómez: Arquitectura, 1933-1983. Colección Arquitectura 11. Bototá: Fondo Editorial ESCALA, 1988.

Santander & Cia. Ltda., were likewise presented in the ad as a guarantee for the quality of the product.

15. 000 M² DE NUESTROS ENTREPISOS FUERON
COLOCADOS EN 6 EDIFICIOS DEL "CENTRO URBANO
ANTONIO NARIÑO", EN UN TIEMPO DE 60 DIAS.

C O N S T R U C T O R E S:

P A B L O L A N Z E T T A P I N Z O N
A. M A N R I Q U E M A R T I N E H I J O S LTDA.
N O G U E R A S A N T A N D E R Y C I A. LTDA.

MATERIALES PRE-FABRICADOS MOGGIO LTDA.

Figure 3.25. Advertisement of Prefabricated materials Moggio Ltda. Detail. Published in Proa 67. January 1953

Both advertised products were used in the fabrication of concrete slabs, one of the main components of the concrete frame. Both products were prefabricated and both firms presented the short construction times as an argument for the quality of the products. The use of these prefabricated elements in the structure offers a tangible vision of the way industrialized housing was conceived at that moment in Colombia.

Figure 3.26. Building type B's structure.[392]

Ciudad Kennedy and the generalization of a building type in the work of the ICT

Even if high-rise buildings for multifamily housing populate the plans, projects and ideas that the agency intended to realize in the mid 1940s, what finally evolved as ICT's model for multifamily housing was not high-rise but middle-rise buildings. Much simpler in its structure and technical requirements, this type was replicated with variations throughout the urban centers of the country, beginning in the 1960s, almost simultaneously with the superblocks two and seven in Ciudad Kennedy. In the 1960s, the idea of building according to the possibilities within the country rather than to import

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[392] Author unknown. https://html1-f.scribdassets.com/6d57t0ti8053t3es/images/4-0e802742d8.jpg. Accessed: May 15, 2017.

costly technology gained momentum. Grandiloquence of formal expression is absent here. The buildings look rather modest. The multifamily buildings in Ciudad Kennedy evolved into a kind of model of simplicity and economy while maintaining the advantages of multifamily buildings.

Figure 3.27. Ciudad Kennedy. 22/12/1964. Siglo XX. Saúl Orduz. Fondo Saúl Orduz / Colección Museo de Bogotá. MdB06083. Detail of SM7 and SM9B.

Ciudad Kennedy offered the ideal environment to test this building type. The architecture in Ciudad Kennedy was centered on technical aspects. But this did not necessarily mean the pursuit of innovation. The technique focused on efficient building methods that enable easy construction at low cost. Although well known architecture firms participated in the construction of the four-story multifamily buildings, no crucial innovations were introduced. The technical aspects seem to build on the experience in Quiroga (with Alvaro Ortega's prefabricated concrete slabs), rather than on the construction of CUAN. The differences to CUAN, are evident. The most prominent difference is the height, which at Ciudad Kennedy is limited to four stories to avoid the need for elevators as a way to keep costs low. Strikingly, one of the firms participating in

the construction of the buildings in Ciudad Kennedy, Esguerra, Saenz, Urdaneta, Suarez also built CUAN.[393]

The structure of this building typology in Ciudad Kennedy consists of 20cm thick concrete walls, cast on site, working as the vertical load bearing structural elements. Non-load bearing walls are brick or cement block. In addition, the 12 cm thick horizontal slabs (placas) are pre-stressed, and allow for spans of 7.20m. Stairs, windowsills and lintels are prefabricated.[394] The construction process does not evince the use of complex industrial machinery. Clearly, prefabricated elements and slabs for floors and walls predominated, piled up like a meccano.

Figure 3.28. SM2, in construction. Sin título (Sin catalogar). Siglo XX. Saúl Orduz. Fondo Saúl Orduz / Colección Museo de Bogotá. MdB26814. Detail.

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[393] Minute 27, 1963, p. 204. The same firm which designed CUAN ten years earlier. The architects Rafael Esguerra, Alvaro Saenz, Rafael Urdaneta and Daniel Suarez Hoyos were the partners of the firm based in Bogota since 1946. Suarez Hoyos acted as general manager. In: Martínez and Arango, *Arquitectura En Colombia*.
Aside from them, the firm OLAP built the structures for the multifamily buildings in the super-block two (SM2). The finishes were in charge of the firms Vargas & Cia. Ltda., Copre Triana Vargas Rocha, Vasquez Peña & Cia. Ltda., and Garcia Osorio Ltda. In: Minute 54, November 28, 1962, p. 0850.
The construction of the multifamily buildings in superblock 7 was in charge of the firms Borrero Zamorano Giovanelli and Construcciones Sigma y Brugues Estrada & Cia. Ltda. In: Minute 19, 1963, p. 150-back.
[394] "Ciudad Kennedy." Escala, no. 7 (1964): 8–17.

Figure 3.29. SM2 in construction. Sin título (Sin catalogar). Siglo XX. Saúl Orduz.
Fondo Saúl Orduz / Colección Museo de Bogotá. MdB26808. Detail.

When comparing Ciudad Kennedy with CUAN, several differences come to the fore. The main difference consists in the lack of a space for a housekeeper in Ciudad Kennedy floor plans. This feature clearly defines a difference between the targeted residents of each project. Ciudad Kennedy was not intended primarily for the middle class. At the same time however, the lack of space for a housekeeper can mean that ICT understood multifamily housing not only for the middle classes, but also a viable typology for groups with lower incomes. Secondly, if there is something the ICT learned from its experience of CUAN is the fact that apartments need a small laundry area in each unit. This work area occupies thus in Ciudad Kennedy at times a relatively large part of the apartments. Interestingly, this space is hardly noticeable in the facades. The door that separates this space from the kitchen also expresses that this is a more ventilated area. This space intends to bring some of the qualities of the single family housing types in the

163

apartments. Finally, there is still only one bathroom in the apartments. Even if the furniture in the floor plan drawings indicates the idea that quite a few persons should live in the apartments, the planners still considered one bathroom enough for the whole family. Although the dream to build high-rise buildings for multifamily housing never stopped, this simplified structure of the inner organization of the apartments is the base for the type replicated throughout the country in the next decades.[395]

Figure 3.30. Apartment type B-2. Detail of building Number 8, superblock 7. December 1962. Ministry of Housing Archive.

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[395] The agency's discourse in the 1970s tackled anew the need for industrializing the construction process in order to be able to solve the housing shortage. In: Instituto de Crédito Territorial, *Vinculación de La Industria Constructora Privada En Programas Del Instituto de Crédito Territorial*. The only multifamily housing project that went beyond the typical four to five stories is located in downtown Medellin: Marco Fidel Suarez 25-story towers, planned as part or a urban renewal /redensification of the traditional center in the mid 1970s. In: Saldarriaga Roa, Instituto de Crédito Territorial. *ICT. Medio Siglo de Vivienda Social En Colombia 1939-1989,* 157. Saldarriaga Roa, *Estado, ciudad y vivienda*, 298-300.

Figure 3.31. Apartment type B-2 and C-1. Building Number 8, superblock 7. December 1962. Ministry of Housing Archive.

Figure 3.32. Multifamily housing. In: Instituto de Crédito Territorial, *Ciudad Kennedy. Una realidad.* 1965.

Model working-class neighborhoods

The ICT was entrusted to build and grant loans to municipalities to finance *barrios populares modelo* (model working-class neighborhoods) through its simultaneously created department of urban housing in 1942. However existing accounts do not consider the model working-class neighborhoods as part of ICT's oeuvre. The general claim in these accounts is that the housing agency's sole role was to disburse the loans provided by the national government to the municipalities, while the municipalities built the "model working-class neighborhoods." This narrative created a blind spot in the

166

agency's history, since it further claims that it built the first housing projects in the urban areas in 1948 under the leadership of general manager Hernando Posada Cuellar (1948-1949).[396] Yet, evidence shows that the agency participated in the design and construction process of the "model working-class neighborhoods" with several municipalities from 1942 to at least 1947. Filling in this gap through the integration of these projects as part of ICT's oeuvre, allows considering the "model working-class neighborhoods" in a new light. First, it allows understanding that the period between 1942 and 1947 was not a void in the agency's history. Furthermore, the projects become the missing link between the housing developed by the municipalities and by private initiatives prior to 1942 and the ICT's supposedly first urban housing developments built after 1947. In this new light, ICT's modern housing projects are part of a continuous process within the agency. I argue that the model popular neighborhoods are relevant to ICT's history, for they are a preamble to the urban housing projects the agency built on its own after 1948. The joint development effort with the municipalities provided the agency with the necessary tools to be able to undertake the urban housing projects it was required to after Law 85 was issued in 1946.

The ICT's involvement in the construction of "model working-class neighborhoods" beginning in 1942 represents continuity with an existing process from the 1918 onwards, when the country's first regulation of social housing was enacted. "Model working-class neighborhoods," had already had a decisive impact on the construction of so-called low-cost housing in the country. The concept of "model" applied during the transitional phase of Colombian architecture derives from what the author of this periodization, historian Silvia Arango, explains as a "model architectonic

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[396] Saldarriaga Roa, *Estado, ciudad y vivienda*. But also Silvia Arango's account begins with the neighborhood Los Alcázares, inaugurated first in 1949. Arango, *Historia de la Arquitectura en Colombia*.

unit." This notion consists "in the execution of specific constructions that represent the correct way to physically organize a society."[397] For her, this notion was also associated with the design of low-cost housing.[398] In this light, ICT's urban housing projects are part of a process that sought to realize the ideal form of working-class housing in the model working-class neighborhoods.

Although in some cases the agency indeed only disbursed loans from the national government to the municipalities, its participation in the planning process and construction of the Model working-class Neighborhoods ranged widely. In December 1942 general manager Garcés Navas presented a report about the development and advancement of the Model Working-class Neighborhoods in the different cities he visited.[399] In the first place, the ICT had to approve the neighborhoods' sites, selected by the municipalities. While no urban general planning considerations were taken into account in this assessment, at least the question of distance to the work places or location in relation to a city or town center was discussed in approving or denying the permit to build on the selected site.[400] Furthermore, the agency's architects elaborated a series of design guidelines for the municipalities to follow; yet there is no information about their content or about the municipalities' attitude towards these guidelines.[401] Lastly, participation in the different planning stages of the Model Working-class Neighborhoods

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[397] Arango, *Historia de la Arquitectura en Colombia*, 202.
[398] Ibid., 203
[399] Minute129, December 1942, P. 328-back - 330.
[400] Minute121, September 1942, p. 311. Also the case of Cartagena as described in the general manager's report in: Minute 129, December 11, 1942. P. 329-back.
[401] Manuel Samper in: Minute 120, September 1942, P. 307. Later, in the Minute 173, from February 7, 1944, p. 405-back, the general manager announces that this architect finished his work as "consulting architect for Popular Urban Housing .... after concluding the elaboration of plans for the Popular Neighborhoods... "

168

is clearly stated in this key report.[402] Many of those Model Working-class Neighborhoods were completed and allocated already in 1944. In summary, the neighborhoods built in this transitional period were the product of a joint commitment between the ICT, the municipalities and private construction firms. In October 1947, at the end of this period, when the ICT participated in the VI Pan-American Conference of Architects in Lima, it was able to exhibit photos, plans and models of 22 Model Working-class Neighborhoods for workers and employees.[403]

In seeking to determine the reasons for historiography's silence about the ICT of this period, Law 85 of 1946 emerges as the turning point. This law quickly began to be seen within the institute itself as the inception of its work in urban areas, ignoring the

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[402] Minute 129, December 11, 1942. According to it, the cities of Tunja and Chiquinquirá were already provided with the necessary "urbanization's plans." Besides, in Chiquinquirá, "the plans for the dwellings were delivered." (P. 328-back) In the case of Medellin, the "urbanization's project" was approved, but the "dwelling's plan is still being examined" due to the Institute's Technical Section's serious observations on the plan the Municipality presented. (P. 329) This ambiguous formulation hinders to determine who elaborated first the plans. What is certain from the minutes is that the ICT's Technical Section had to approve the plans before the municipalities could begin the construction process, as in the mentioned case of Medellin and also in Pereira, in which case, the Institute was still waiting for the dwelling's projects so that its Technical Section could examine them. (P. 329-back) Moreover, the general manager reported that the construction firm "Robledo Hermanos" was doing a good job in the execution of the dwellings in the Model Neighborhood in Bucaramanga, and even that the neighborhood presented "an interesting aspect"; still he made some observations about elements that needed to be corrected. (P. 328-back.) The construction process was thus in charge of diverse firms, but the ICT had the control and supervision over it. In Barranquilla, "la Casa Parrish" (two U.S. American brothers, who settled in Colombia at the beginning of the 20th century, and began a series of business like the subdivision of the famous neighborhood "El Prado" in Barranquilla) offers the ICT "urbanized" lots (meaning: with the necessary infrastructure: aqueduct, sewage, and electricity) for the workers neighborhoods and even to build the houses under "the ICT's direction and control." (P. 328-back). The case of Bucaramanga, as well as San Gil and Socorro, all in the Santander's Department are explicit examples for this. In the case of Armenia, however, the "Barrio Popular Modelo" was finished with the ICT acting as the constructor. (Minute 216, July 2, 1945, p. 468-back).
[403] In addition to: the guidelines and results of the competition on the neighborhood Los Alcázares, located in Bogotá models, and plans, photos and a booklet of rural housing. In: Minute 274, July 24, 1947, p. 584. The information on ICT's accomplishments until that moment is more specific in the Minute 276, August 2th, 1947, p. 589: until 1946 the ICT has built 3000 rural houses and 1450 urban houses in 22 popular neighborhoods.

169

production of the previous period.[404] In a report in 1952, general manager Puyana presented the number of houses in the rural and urban areas built by the ICT from "its beginnings." Remarkably, it starts in 1948, when construction of the first projects to be produced under this law began.[405] This kind of reports likely contributed to the official narrative, to the myth of 1948 as the beginning of urban housing in the institution.[406]

Was the construction of the model working-class neighborhoods so different from the construction process the ICT started on its own after law 85 of 1946 was issued? The building process was not necessarily very different, since in both cases, the ICT played the role of auditor, supervisor, sometimes designer, and even contractor. The main difference seems to lie in land ownership. During the transitional period, the municipalities were the landowners. After the law 85 of 1946 granted the ICT increased financial means to pursue the construction of low-cost housing in urban areas, the ICT was made the owner of the land on which the projects were built.

A dialog with the city: ICT and the local planning agencies

The acquisition of urban land for ICT housing projects implicated a series of issues unknown to the agency until the enactment of Law 85. They were related to the means of finding appropriate sites for housing projects, their location within the city and their physical conditions. After the enactment of the law, the ICT generally searched for

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[404] It does not mean that Saldarriaga included the model popular neighborhoods in the production of the ICT. He simply states that the agency directly built the first urban housing projects in 1948. Saldarriaga Roa, *Estado, ciudad y vivienda*, 66. Saldarriaga Roa, Instituto de Crédito Territorial. ICT. *Medio Siglo de Vivienda Social En Colombia 1939-1989,* 34.

[405] Minute 506, February 4, 1952, p. 1276.

[406] Centro Estadístico Nacional de la Construcción (Colombia), ed., *Inversión y Construcciones Del Instituto de Crédito Territorial, 1942-1975* (Bogotá: Centro Estadístico Nacional de la Construcción, 1975), 63-64.

170

urban land with hints from the municipalities or with help from the local chamber of commerce to build its housing projects directly or through contractors. In some cases the municipalities offered the ICT land for purchase at lower prices, and in turn the ICT built housing for the working class and for employees there.[407] After the first large pieces of urban land were bought in Bogotá (Los Alcázares) and in Medellín (Los Libertadores), many other purchases followed in the main urban centers. In most cases, the municipalities sold the land for very low prices. According to supervising engineer Botero Isaza, these negotiations enabled the ICT to obtain large pieces of land to plan and develop "modern neighborhoods," for several years ahead. By the same token, he recognized that the ICT profited from the valorization of the land, whose value the agency itself increased with its urbanizations and buildings.[408]

A transformation in the negotiations to find suitable urban land becomes evident after 1950. Under Puyana's management a procedure predominated under which the municipalities offered the ICT a specific piece of land in their urban area for a specific price and the municipalities sometimes even added money to the offer to develop the housing program.[409] By the end of 1950, and in light of the financial struggles of the agency, selling parts of the previously acquired urban land was discussed as a way to improve the institute's finances.[410] After discussing the situation, the board of directors agreed that the ICT should preserve those segments of land that were previously defined

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[407] Already in September 1947 the municipality of Medellin offered the ICT the first large amount of urban land to build housing on its own. Minute 281, September 12, 1947. p. 604-back.

[408] Minute 346, November 15, 1948, p. 801-back. In this context, the agency's role as promoter of urban expansion's processes needs to be further analyzed.

[409] A possible explanation for this transformation lies in the fact that the houses built during the first years of this period with the resources granted by law 85 of 1946, were finished and awarded. A new process of land acquirement began; by then the municipalities were more aware of the available aid from the national government through the ICT, and they sought to attract this aid of the ICT through an ample offer that suited the ICT to invest the resources in these municipalities.

[410] Minute 417, March 2, 1950, p. 1017.

for working-class neighborhoods.[411] By 1953, the ICT began a new process of land acquisition, but the landowners were mostly private persons.

The aspects that helped to define the suitability of sites for ICT's housing developments were the site's topography, its location within the city, and its distance to main center. Flat topography was characteristic of most of the acquired urban land as a condition for developing low-cost housing. The ICT leaders sought in this way to avoid high urbanization expenses due to complex topography. In doing so, many areas of the country's urban centers did not qualify for the ICT projects at least during the first years after the enactment of Law 85. This had serious consequences for cities such as Manizales, shaped by its very steep topography.[412] Moreover, the central criterion to define the suitability of sites for neighborhoods developed by the ICT was the distance to the town / city center. Although this did not necessarily imply a lack of awareness of urban planning issues, or of the impact these housing projects would have on a city's growth, it foregrounds the existence of a mono-centric urban structure and the absence of any intention to change this structure with the housing projects.[413]

The process of finding adequate sites and planning future housing developments eventually required an increasingly complex relationship between the agency and the local planning offices. When the agency was first entrusted with building urban housing in 1942, it incorporated urban planning issues into its work, although in a very limited

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[411] Minute 418, March 16, 1950, p. 1020.
[412] Minute 363, February 11, 1949, p. 850. Discussion on the land for El Guamal neighborhood in Manizales. Executive Committee, Minute 122, September 3, 1948, p. 781. In: Minute 340, September 30, 1948, p. 780-back.
[413] Minute 327, July 5, 1948, p. 753-back.

way. In a first stage, an urban planner was hired simultaneously with the leader of the newly created urban housing section.[414]

However, urban planning as a key issue first appears in 1947. Law 85 consigns its relevance to the agency's inner statutes, according to which "this agency will be able to cooperate through its technical department in the study and elaboration of master plans and urban services through contracts with municipalities, with approval of the board of directors."[415] Although the interactions with local urban planning offices were limited to the selection of the best sites for housing projects, new aspects start appearing in the process of selecting land for the construction projects. In Cali, when considering purchasing the land for the neighborhood El Cedro, the board members discussed the possibilities of the city's future development, as well as the increase of the value of adjacent lots through the work of the ICT, and the subsequent need to buy them, in order to avoid speculation.[416]

Interactions between the ICT and the local planning agencies are best described with the case of the city of Bogotá. The agency interacted intensely with the department of urbanism of the office for public buildings in Bogotá during the planning process of Los Alcázares in 1947.[417] Later, the *Oficina del Plano Regulador* (Regulating Plan Office) was created to develop the urban Pilot Plan proposed by Le Corbusier, and further developed by Paul Lester Wiener and Jose Luis Sert.[418] The agency worked

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[414] In July 1942, Joaquín Martínez Alvarado became the leader of the "Section of Urban Popular Housing", and José Gregorio Olarte became the urban planner of the same section. Minute 113, July 1942, P. 291.

[415] Minute 261, March 18, 1947. P. 545 – back.

[416] Minute 304, February 19, 1948, P. 680-back.

[417] Departamento de Urbanismo de la Secretaría de Obras Públicas del Municipio de Bogotá. His director, Herbert Ritter developed the first drafts together with ICT's engineer Alfredo Ardila Oramas, leader of the project "Los Alcázares." Minute 257, February10, 1947, p. 536; Minute 259, February 24, 1947, p. 539.

[418] One of the most studied issues in Colombian urban history, I will refer here only to the interactions between the agency and this office, whose first director was Herbert Ritter. Some references: Maria Cecilia O'Byrne Orozco, ed., *LC BOG. Le Corbusier En Bogotá : 1947-1951. Precisiones En Torno Al Plan*

173

closely with this office during the first years of its establishment, and consulted with them on many specific issues related to the housing projects developed at that time—e.g., the future location of an avenue that could affect Muzú and the location of the working-class neighborhoods in compliance with the land uses proposed in the Plano Regulador.[419] The prominent architect Gabriel Serrano Camargo, who was a member of the board of directors, presented the Pilot Plan to the other members in April 1951.[420] Shortly after Serrano's presentation, general manager Puyana worked with the Mayor of the city to define which areas would be transferred to the ICT to build low-cost housing for the people displaced by the projects anticipated in the *Plano Regulador*.[421] Through 1952, these interactions between ICT and the *Plano Regulador* office grew closer. With the help of the Office, Serrano Camargo chose several areas of the city for the ICT's housing plans in compliance with the *Plano Regualdor*.[422] The interactions strengthened even more during the planning process of building the neighborhood Quiroga in Bogotá

Director, vol. Tomo II (Universidad de los Andes, Facultad de Arquitectura y Diseno, Departamento de Arquitectura, Ediciones Uniandes, Pontifica Universidad Javeriana, Facultad de Arquitectura y Diseno, 2010); Carlos Eduardo Hernández Rodríguez*, Las Ideas Modernas Del Plan Para Bogotá En 1950: El Trabajo de Le Corbusier, Wiener y Sert*, 1. ed (Bogotá: Alcaldía Mayor de Bogotá : Instituto Distrital de Cultura y Turismo, 2004); Fernando Arias Lemos, *Le Corbusier en Bogotá: el proyecto del "grand immeuble", 1950-1951* (Universidad Nacional de Bogotá, 2008); Patricia Schnitter Castellanos, *José Luis Sert y Colombia: de la Carta de Atenas a una Carta del Hábitat,* Colección monografías y tesis, 3; (Medellín: Universidad Pontificia Bolivariana, 2004); Hugo Mondragón López, "Arquitectura En Colombia 1946-1951, Lecturas Críticas de La Revista Proa. (Spanish)," DEARQ: Revista de Arquitectura de La Universidad de Los Andes, no. 2 (May 2008): 82–95; Carlos Iván Rueda Plata, Construyendo Identidades En El Lugar, Sendas de La Modernidad (Universidad Piloto, 2012); Doris Tarchópulos Sierra, "Las Huellas Del Plan Para Bogotá de Le Corbusier, Sert y Wiener," Scripta Nova. Revista Electrónica de Geografía y Ciencias Sociales X, no. 218 (86) (de agosto de 2006), http://www.ub.es/geocrit/sn/sn-218-86.htm.
[419] Minute 439, August 22, 1950.
[420] Minute 470, April 16, 1951, p. 1212.
[421] Minute 471, April 27, 1951, p. 1215.
[422] Minute 474, May 25, 1951, p. 1219-back.

in the first two years of the 1950s.[423] After the military government of Rojas Pinilla took power in 1953, the guidelines defined in the *Plano Regulador* ceased to be considered.

Although other cities like Medellín and Cali were also elaborating their urban pilot plans at the end of the 1940s, only the case of Bogotá is included in the minutes. Remarkably, despite the fact that Le Corbusier visited the city five times between 1947 and 1951 during the development of the Pilot Plan for Bogotá, and even ICT leadership planned to invite him to collaborate with the design of Los Alcázares, they neither mentioned this proposal again nor him in the board meetings after his first visit.[424] Jorge Gaitán Cortés and Gabriel Serrano Camargo certainly mentioned him when they introduced the ideas of the CIAM and the Pilot Plan, respectively, to the board, but the institution apparently was not directly involved in any of Le Corbuiser's visits, or in the development of the Pilot Plan.

The transformation of an idea: ICT's Neighborhood Units

The notion of the neighborhood unit gained relevance for the future development of Colombia's residential areas through the pilot plan designed by Le Corbusier, in collaboration with Jose Luis Sert and Paul Lester Wiener for Bogotá, and the pilot plans

[423] Minute 485, August 23, 1951, p. 1237. The Technical Department of the ICT developed the bids for this neighborhood, using the parameters defined in the Plano Regulador as a guideline. The bidding process for sidewalks in Quiroga applied the recommendations of the Plano Regualdor. See: Minute 507, February 11, 1952, p. 1279. The two institutions even worked on two different alternatives for the second phase of this neighborhood. Although in the end the Technical Department's alternative was chosen for the development of this phase, it is an interesting case of collaboration. See: Minute 527, June 16, 1952, p. 0008-back, and Minute 532, July 17, 1952, p. 0013-back.

[424] Minute 282, September 25, 1947, p. 605. The board imparted the authorization to the general manager to "initiate conversations with the Mayor of Bogotá, Doctor Mazuera Villegas, with the aim to study a joint plan to bring a commission of the Institute ATBAT of Paris, led by the professor Le Corbusier to study the remaining part of the housing development "Los Alcázares" …" However, Le Corbusier' visit was from June 16 – 24, 1947. See: Tarchópulos Sierra, "Las Huellas Del Plan Para Bogotá de Le Corbusier, Sert y Wiener.").

designed by Sert and Wiener for other Colombian cities. The Pilot Plan as well as the neighborhood unit share ideas emanated from CIAM through the work of the authors of the pilot plan for Bogotá and of Jorge Gaitán Cortés. In his role as leader of the urban housing program, the latter introduced the concept of the *Unidad Vecinal* (neighborhood unit) in 1948 for the first time, bridging CIAM ideas and the work of the ICT. Gaitán Cortés presented this concept, as developed by Jose Luis Sert, in the context of a presentation to the board of directors on his plan for the city of Buenaventura.[425] While there is no information on the realization of this plan, in January 1950 the Muzú neighborhood in Bogotá is mentioned for the first time as a *neighborhood unit*.[426] Although the concept did not appear very often later, CUAN and Ciudad Kennedy offer insights into the transformed urban configuration grounded in the neighborhood unit. Ciudad Kennedy presents an extreme transformation of the initial idea, retaining only pieces of it. In all of them, the community facilities or rather the lack of them, constitute a further connection with the concept of the neighborhood unit.

Muzú

In December 1949, the journal Proa published the master plan of Muzú and one of the housing types developed for it, along with two other neighborhood units planned by the ICT in the cities of Cúcuta and Tuluá. This representation of the master plan of Muzú can be considered as the first version of the plan since all later versions present variations on this one. What stands out most is the "free" location of the houses upon a green ground, yet the composition is far from arbitrary.

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[425] Minute 325, June 25, 1948, p. 744-746-back.
[426] Minute 410, January 13, 1950, p. 998-back.

176

Figure 3.33. Neighborhood unit Muzú. Proa 30, December 1949.

A closer look allows one to perceive a hierarchy of open spaces: those isolating the neighborhood from the surroundings, those between the houses, and the central one, with the larger social services, such as schools, playgrounds, and so on. The isolating green areas work as a kind of invasive or growing plant that penetrates the built structures. The question here is why the neighborhood should be separated from its surroundings with green areas, and why did Gaitán choose the same response to all sides of the neighborhood? If beside the existing connection to the city, the "Carretera Sur," a large avenue (J.J. Vargas) was in construction, it is striking that the spatial response adopted to isolate the neighborhood through green areas is the same along these arteries as on the sides that later should form boundaries with other neighborhoods.[427] Noticeably, the surrounding green areas connect directly with the larger open space

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[427] As Martinez claimed in the article of Proa, that would run on the east side of the neighborhood.

dedicated to the social services. One could expect that this central open space is connected with the green areas in the inner parts of the neighborhood unit, but the central space connects with the small open spaces through the only street within the neighborhood unit. The inner open green spaces between the housing lines, which are not directly connected to the surrounding green areas, are twofold, depending on the kind of enclosure. Some of them are defined by the facades of houses, the second by an inner open space with only one main façade facing it. The other enclosing elements are dividing sidewalls between houses.[428]

Figure 3.34. Detail. Proa 30. December 1949.

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[428] In spite of these different characteristics of enclosing elements, the inhabitants judged positively generous green areas in front of the houses. See: Aguilera Rojas, "Un Dialogo sobre la serie. El ICT como laboratorio de arquitectura 1948-1953."

Figure 3.35. Picture of open space in front of one housing line. In: Martínez and Arango, *Arquitectura En Colombia*.

The different qualities of open spaces allow imagining that there is a smaller, more controlled open space in front of the houses, where little children can play while being attended by their parents / under the supervision of adults (even if its spatial quality is not identical in all the cases), and the larger open space not directly connected to the houses, for more organized activities. This is the place where, community could be fostered and the education of body and spirit could be promoted.

The structure of this neighborhood presented a breaking point with the traditional spatial organization of a housing block in the Colombian cities. The green areas in the traditional block are confined to the houses' inner spaces. Here, the green areas also surround the houses. The organization of the built structure seems also divergent from the traditional structure, yet some continuity remains. At a first glance, the configuration of houses seems to be one of freestanding structures, only loosely connected with each other. This impression is strengthened by a system of pathways.

Yet this representation of the general plan is misleading. On the one hand, the organic layout of sidewalks seems to serve merely formal design aims, for the different

179

paths do not connect specific buildings, entrances or areas of the neighborhood. On the other hand, the backyards of the houses are enclosed with a wall, the small private garden areas are not open, as it is the case in the German S*iedlungen*, but enclosed. This results in a very different spatial experience as the one suggested in the drawings. One walks through closed paths, which suddenly open into small public spaces. Although the structure of the superblock with only one main street which does not completely cross the neighborhood derives from Jose Luis Sert's conception of the neighborhood unit, the organization of the houses within the block is defined by a series of subgroups, which somewhat reminds one of the structure of a traditional block. Within this subgroup, and taking into account that the houses form a whole with the enclosed backyard, one can identify a kind of *exploding* traditional block with two, three or four facades.

Figure 3.36. Detail. Proa 30. December 1949.

CUAN

Differently to Muzú, CUAN only occupies a small part of the super-block, despite the large program. The footprint of the residential buildings is 11,874.10 m^2, 7.9% of the whole project area. CUAN is constituted by a series of slabs, which are labeled according to their typology. The six buildings of type A are four-stories high and contain the largest apartment types. The five buildings of type B are 13-stories high and contain mid-sized apartments. Lastly, the three buildings of type C –also 13-stories high- contain the smallest apartment units. Parking spaces are located perimeter to the super-block. The resulting spacious green areas and the red (brick walls) slabs are the most significant traits of CUAN.

The urban configuration of these fourteen buildings offers the possibility of a green transition between the *Avenida de las Americas* and the *Carrera 40*.[429] This continuous flow of green areas in the central part of the site is only interrupted by building B-2. At the same time, B-2 creates two spaces that are bounded by three high-rise buildings. The resulting spaces are clearer defined and easier to control. They are in any case no transitional spaces. They are spaces to linger. Simultaneously, buildings C1/C2 and C3, C4 build a wall towards the streets *Carrera 36* and *Calle 22 F,* in the same way as the buildings B-4 and B-5 constitute a wall to the west (expressed in grey in the diagram).[430]

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[429] Initially planned with 15 buildings, the complex was reduced to fourteen when two of the buildings of type C were consolidated into a single building slab.
[430] The street numbers have changed over time. The numbers shown here are those used as CUAN was built. They differ from today's street nomenclature.

Figure 3.37. CUAN's site plan. Plan provided by the Ministry of Housing, Colombia.[431]

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[431] The plans of the complex and of one building type (B) were provided by the Housing Ministry. They are original plans with the ICT as the author. However, since the buildings were designed earlier under the direction of the minister of public works, it is possible that older plans exist. Thus, the plans used for this analysis are those signed by the ICT and therefore probably from 1958, the year the building complex was given over to the ICT.

Figure 3.38. The aerial view in Martinez book exposes the permeability of the project from La Avenida de las Americas to the Carrera 40 and the enclosing effect of the slabs in the two other edges of the complex.

Figure 3.39. CUAN and surroundings. The green transition seems to build a corridor leading to the grounds of the fair's center "Corferias" and the Universidad Nacional. Source: Sin título (Sin catalogar). Siglo XX. Saúl Orduz. Fondo Saúl Orduz / Colección Museo de Bogotá. MdB26766.

Despite the aim of allowing a free pedestrian circulation through the CUAN as a way to connect to adjacent streets, a fence runs through the space. According to Aguilera Rojas, it was, there from the beginning, but both the testimony of a former resident and a picture in the Martinez book from 1963, which shows one edge of the CUAN with no fence visible, contradict this statement.[432]

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[432] Interview with Nestor Gutierrez. In: Aguilera Rojas, "Un Dialogo sobre la serie. El ICT como laboratorio de arquitectura 1948-1953."
Interviewed No.3 refers to the problem of people from outside damaging the furniture in the children's playground. In: Triana and Vallejo, "Investigacion Individual. Encuestas."

Figure 3.40. Photo CUAN. Martinez and Burbano, 1963.

Ciudad Kennedy

The ICT's technical department planned Ciudad Kennedy as a "satellite city" comprised by a series of super-blocks. To have an idea of its overall size, one need only imagine Ciudad Kennedy as sixteen Muzús.[433] Some clusters of super-blocks form neighborhoods in and of themselves, such as super-blocks 13 and 14, which forms the *Barrio Los Estados Unidos* (The United States), and super-blocks 11 and 15 constitutes

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[433] The equalization of neighborhood units and superblocks appears in: "Ciudad Kennedy." Escala, no. 7 (1964): 8–17. The text explains the criteria for the urban plan. The reason for this equal definition of the two terms is probably part of another discussion, and that -for now- is not going to be part of this text.

the *Barrio Gran Colombiano* (Great Colombian).[434] However, unlike at CUAN and, to some extent, Muzú, at Ciudad Kennedy it is possible to cross most of the super-blocks with a car. Although there are also exclusively pedestrian paths here, a good part of the circulation system is a shared system for cars and pedestrians. These internal streets are not straight lines that cross the super-block from one side to the other. They almost always end within the super-block. As a result, the person or car crossing the super-block needs to turn several times until coming to the other side. Even if the streets are orthogonal, the fabric of the super-block does not follow the traditional grid.

Figure 3.41. super-block 5. Master plan's Detail, 1980. ICT. Archive Minvivienda, La
 Fragua.

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[434] Superblock 13 contains 16 blocks, superblock 14, 21 blocks. 8000 inhabitants live in these two superblocks. Superblocks 11 and 15, which constitute the neighborhood Gran Colombiano, are comprised of 31 housing blocks and inhabited by 887 families (513 in superblock 11 and 374 in superblock 15). In: William B. Rudell, "Community Development in Ciudad Kennedy: An Examination of the Existing Programs of Social Service with Proposals for Their Coordination and Expansion," CINVA Summer Research Fellow Yale University, School of Law, Escritos y Monografías (Bogotá: Centro Interamericano de Vivienda –CINVA, 1964), box 53, file 4, Colección Centro Interamericano de Vivienda –CINVA, Fondo Universidad Nacional de Colombia. 28, 33.

Although the term "super-block" echoes Brasilia's model, Ciudad Kennedy's layout consists in an organizational system, a functional scheme. Its super-blocks are characterized by a central open space, which the ICT's technicians refer to as "Civic Center," with community facilities for the surrounding houses and a free area for the school. The super-blocks are actually constituted by a series of housing blocks, as they are commonly found in traditional neighborhoods. The difference between the housing blocks in most of Ciudad Kennedy's super-blocks and those in traditional neighborhoods is the external shape and the size of the blocks. Here, the housing blocks are smaller than in traditional housing blocks and rectangular, unlike the common square shape of the traditional block. The super-block is thus an artificial term. It is only discernible in the master plan due to the existence of wider streets that are longer than the other streets within the limit of each super-block. Furthermore, the open spaces do not provide a ground on which buildings pile up as single and separate elements. There are only sections where open space surrounds the buildings, which would make this urban configuration closer to the neighborhood unit, as elaborated in Muzú. In that sense, the only "true" super-blocks are number two and seven, those with four-story multifamily housing. These two super-blocks constitute roughly 30% of the housing area. They were planned with the aim of increasing density at Ciudad Kennedy.[435]

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[435] At least that is what is formulated by the ICT. In: "Ciudad Kennedy." Escala, no. 7 (1964): 8–17. Otherwise, there is no information on the densities, and it is not possible to establish it for the number of housing units varies from plan to plan. It fluctuates from 10,223 to 14,000 units.

Figure 3.42. Super-block 6, super-block 7. Master plan's Detail, 1980. ICT. Archive
        Minvivienda, La Fragua.

Ciudad Kennedy constitutes thus a mixture of urban configurations when
compared with Muzú and CUAN. Rather than an evolution in the concept of the
neighborhood unit, Ciudad Kennedy was the field in which ICT's technicians deployed
the different urban possibilities they had explored according to the principles of modern
urban planning.

ICT's neighborhoods - communal facilities

Before the neighborhood unit was introduced in the ICT's work, one element of
this concept was already part of the "model working-class neighborhoods" built between
1942 and 1947: the community facilities. The first model working-class neighborhood the
ICT and a municipality built was inaugurated in Bucaramanga in December of 1942.
Here, the design provided a series of community facilities following the law governing
the construction of these neighborhoods.[436] Decree 380 of 1942 specified the necessity to

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[436] Minute 129, December 1942, P. 328 –back.

equip those model neighborhoods with a Catholic Church, primary schools, school restaurants, daycare for babies and toddlers, social workers, sports fields, recreation centers, a cultural center, workers' restaurants, a marketplace, and a police station; a small city within the city, the same idea behind the neighborhood units. Since no graphic information is enclosed in the minutes, it is difficult to see if this regulation was fulfilled in all model working-class neighborhoods, but at least the community facilities were part of their ideal form. That this idea was not a utopia shines through Silvia Arango's depiction of one model working-class neighborhood built by the "Caja de vivienda popular" in 1942. The neighborhood, "Barrio Popular Modelo del Norte," cataloged by Arango as an "ambitious project," was comprised of 327 housing units and "an ample net of community amenities." Arango informs us that in 1944, 152 housing units and some amenities were already finished.[437]

When the ICT built the first large urban neighborhoods, it only partially implemented the idea of the *neighborhood unit*. Usually, the design of the urban plan for housing projects designated free areas as playgrounds, sidewalks, streets, and green areas. But in Muzú, for example, the first official neighborhood unit, the ICT only foresaw "ample free areas" intended as playgrounds for children, because the cost of funding social services limited their design.[438] Who should pay for these? If the ICT built them, they would need to be charged to the cost of the houses, which would increase their cost notably. But there were no dispositions to rule that issue. Even the law of 1942 only specified that the *model working-class neighborhoods* should provide those services, but not one word was said about how they should be funded, and who should undertake their

[437] Arango, *Historia de la Arquitectura en Colombia*, 206
[438] The report informs about the beginning of the Unidad Vecinal Muzu with the construction of 24 houses type 58-F-3. Executive Committee, Minute 149, December 15, 1949, p. 1000 in Minute 410, January 13, 1950.

construction. The ICT focused, then, on the task the law presented it with; namely, to employ its financial resources to build houses. When Gabriel Serrano first tackled that issue, after he became a member of the board of directors, the problem of the social services in Muzú was discussed. He noted that Muzú lacked in schools, a hospital, a health center, or a market, among other things. Thus, he asked immediately for collaboration with the municipality to build these social services as soon as possible.[439] In 1953 the minister expressed the need for having social services, such as schools and health centers.[440]

The case of CUAN was different. From its inception, the CUAN was intended as an autonomous urban center within the structure of the city. To respond adequately to its name *Urban Center Antonio Nariño,* the architects sought to include a set of services inside the complex. They also aimed to house young, recently married professionals. With this in mind, those young professionals could either bring their kids to the kindergarten or to the primary school, or take breakfast in one of the restaurants, and then go to work. Free time was to be spent, and basic needs were to be met, inside the complex.

Providing residents with social services was the main tactic the ICT deployed to achieve the goal of building an autonomous urban center. The largest services were located outside the housing buildings, the smaller on the first floor of certain buildings. The following services were located in independent buildings: an elementary school for girls (794.58 m^2), an elementary school for boys (794.58 m^2), a daycare / kindergarten

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[439] He pointed out to the crucial problem of funding when he also suggested that in case the municipality would not cooperate, the ICT itself should undertake this task. This would however mean that their cost would need to be added to the cost of the houses. It sounds realistic but in doing so, this would increase the costs of the houses in such a way that it would be then really impossible to call them low-cost housing. In: Minute 468, April 5, 1951, p. 1206.

[440] Minute 549, January 19, 1953, p. 0052.

facility (837.16 m^2), a movie theater –Teatro Cádiz- (659.76 m^2), a supermarket -El Ley-
(1082.95 m^2), a laundry (859.64 m^2), and a church. Among those buildings, the laundry is
the most striking service of all. On the one hand, only the largest apartments have a space
for the laundry. On the other, and in spite of the laundry's large size (larger than the
theater!) nobody seemed to make use of this service.[441] Concurrently, the residents
complained almost only about the lack of space to wash and dry their clothes inside their
apartments. Within the buildings, a set of services was located: a post and "telegraph"
office, commercial spaces, stores, a café, offices and storage for the complex's
management, administration's maintenance workshops (garden, wood, electricity and
plumbing), bedrooms and housing for watchmen and "skilled workers," and offices for
medical attention and for the CUAN's management.[442] The building with the smallest
apartment types, C1 and C2, which was converted into a hotel by the Banco Popular and
which later became apartments for students, were to contain services such as restaurants
and laundry, to replace the lack of space for the laundry in these apartments.[443]

Although ICT's primary mission was to build housing, in Ciudad Kennedy the
agency was confronted once again with the question of how to handle the facilities'
construction, which this new development required. Given the huge scale of this project,
the task became more complicated than in previously developed housing projects.

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[441] Triana and Vallejo, "Investigacion Individual. Encuestas."
[442] In building B-1: a post and "telegraph" office with an area of 195.41 m^2 and five additional commercial
spaces with a total area of 251.78 m^2—two for a bank (Banco de Comercio), one for a drugstore (Drogueria
Nueva York), and two additional stores. In building B-2: café (468.26 m2) and the complex's management
offices (252.6 m2). In building B-3: the administration's maintenance workshops (garden, wood, electricity
and plumbing) with an area of 182.86 m2. In building B-5: the management's storage (300 m2). In building
C4: bedrooms and housing for watchmen and "skilled workers" (173.62 m2), and finally, 10 offices in one-
bedroom apartments in C3 and C4 for medical attention and for the CUAN's management. In: Regulation
of co-ownership outlines the rights and obligations of the co-owners, and residents. Archive Ministerio de
Vivienda, La Fragua, Fondo ICT, Box 589.
[443] Interview with Nestor Gutierrez. Aguilera Rojas, "Un Dialogo sobre la serie. El ICT como laboratorio
de arquitectura 1948-1953."161.

Strangely, the planners set aside land within each superblock and the type of facility required, but they did not envision a strategy from the outset to realize these facilities. The planned Communal services were 8 theaters, 9 roofed outdoor markets, 2 general markets, 1 supermarket, 6 open markets, 11 commercial spaces, 9 churches, 8 community centers, 2 spaces for handcrafts, 15 schools, 36 children playgrounds, 1 fire station, 1 police station, 2 gas stations.[444]

The ICT planning team defined which social services and facilities were needed and located them in concordance with the hierarchy of the open spaces. As in Muzú, the open spaces were differentiated according to their size. This also determined the scope of groups who would use it and the accompanying services. The main open space for sports and schools is located in the northwest side of the satellite city, along the main connection axis with the city center, *La Avenida de las Americas*. Hierarchically, two civic centers follow. Those civic centers were intended to house general administrative activities, specialized retailers, educational institutions, cultural centers and health facilities of higher level. One is located along *La Avenida de las Americas* as well, but disconnected from the main open space. The second major civic center is surrounded by the superblocks 8, 10, 11, 14 and 16. Except for the superblock 8, none of them has an own civic center. Each superblock contained several open spaces: a civic center with community services, supermarkets, retail, churches, community rooms and health centers, usually located on one edge of the superblock, an open public space for the school of the superblock, kindergartens and daycare facilities; and finally, smaller scaled open spaces

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[444] Instituto de Crédito Territorial, ed. *Proyectos y Realizaciones En Vivienda: La Alianza Para El Progreso*. Colombia: Instituto de Crédito Territorial, 1962.

intended as meeting places or children playgrounds, which are probably only used by the immediate neighbors.[445]

The almost 11,000 housing units would house some 80,000 inhabitants in an area that was outside the city limits and thus far from all kinds of infrastructure.[446] As a consequence, the inclusion of a series of social services and facilities was essential to the planning process of Ciudad Kennedy. Its realization was complicated, and so this issue caused a great amount of criticism and conflict with other institutions after the first group of families started settling down.

The ICT was certain about the fact that it could not limit its work to building houses, but it needed to include social services and facilities. Although it was not part of ICT's agenda, the general manager, aware of this critical need, asked the board of directors for permission to build some communal buildings since a considerable number of families was about to settle down in the new development, lacking all basic services in the surroundings of Ciudad Kennedy.[447] The ICT thus built some of the primary schools, a commercial center, and an urban park with cultural and recreational facilities. This also was partly related to the fact that Ciudad Kennedy was a showpiece for the Alliance for Progress. However, most of the social facilities such as health centers, schools, hospitals, markets, or parks were delegated to other governmental agencies. This led to some delays in the construction of these facilities for they lacked the necessary funds. Some entities

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[445] Instituto de Crédito Territorial, *Ciudad Kennedy Una Realidad, 1961-Diciembre-1965*.

[446] This number differs in the different plans elaborated by the ICT and in the different articles written during the process of construction of Ciudad Kennedy. In the plan from Ciudad Kennedy, Una realidad: 10,223. In table from Andrade Lleras:10,574 (Escala 4), in "Instituto de Crédito Territorial. 25 Años." Escala, no. 7 (1964): 1–7.: 14,000 housing units. 10,789 housing units in the same journal, but in another article: "Ciudad Kennedy." Escala, no. 7 (1964): 8–17

[447] Minute 46, November 29, 1961, p. 1366. Interestingly, those community buildings are not primarily schools and health centers (they are probably included in the etc. mentioned after the listing of buildings), but markets, stores, banks, and police stations! He received the authorization to present a construction's plan.

expressed their willingness to support the construction of some facilities. Agencies such as the police offered their services to build facilities not directly connected to their work, such as supermarkets.[448] Moreover, the "worker's circle" (Círculo de Obreros) built a Cultural Integration's Center (Centro de Integracion Cultural, CICRAL) in a sector adjacent to Ciudad Kennedy, with the goal to provide education to 5,000 students from low-income families.[449]

The process of building the social facilities was not an easy one, especially in regard to the schools, and the involvement of outside agencies generated conflict when the was required to negotiate with them.[450] The root of this confrontation seems to be the lack of legal clarity as of who was responsible for the construction of the various supplementary facilities that were required in each new housing development to attain its proper performance. Bogotá's mayor, who at that moment was the architect Jorge Gaitán Cortés, believed that the construction of schools was ICT's task, and that it should charge its cost to the cost of the houses, especially to the multifamily buildings. However, as the general manager recalled, former president Lleras Camargo had forbidden charging the houses with the cost of the community services, since in his view it was the state's responsibility to provide these services.[451]

The demands of the new residents did not allow time for long negotiations to build the schools. Therefore, ICT's general manager expressed in a meeting with the minister of education and Bogota's mayor, the need to build schools in Ciudad Kennedy as soon as possible, since "by the end of December [of 1962] more than 5,000 families

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[448] Minute 15, 1963, p. 116-back. Authorization to sell a plot in the civic center of superblock four to the National Police with an amortization period of 15 years and interest of 6% yearly to build a supermarket, stores, and building materials from the rotary fund.
[449] Minute 52, November 22, 1962, p. 0836
[450] The meeting reported in this minute is a good example of this. Minute 48, November 5, 1962, p. 0819.
[451] Minute 48, November 5, 1962, p. 0819.

are expected to move to this housing development," from the 12,000 families that will be living in Ciudad Kennedy, once the construction phase is complete. This was an acute problem that in his view could lead to "disruptions" in the community.[452] The general manager conveyed the need to build at least 20 schools, beside the already existing school "Presidente Kennedy."[453]

During the negotiations over the construction of the schools with the ministry of education and the municipality, a third actor appeared, *La Caja de Vivienda Popular* (The Bank of Popular Housing). Once the ICT's general manager would arrive to an agreement with the ministry and the municipality, the board of directors approved to contract the construction of the schools for one million pesos, with *La Caja de Vivienda Popular*.[454] This decision to give the contract to *La Caja* to build the schools is probably related to Bogotá's Mayor, Gaitán Cortés' radical opposition to the idea that the ICT built the schools. He argued that *La Caja de la Vivienda Popular* was able to build the schools for much less money than the ICT.[455]

The dispute on whose duty it was to build the schools was finally resolved once it was possible to establish the funding for the schools through the national government, through the program for building schools of the Alliance. The National Government created a fund from the budget of the AID, BID and Point 4 loans to build 200 classrooms for primary schools and for secondary schools in Ciudad Kennedy.[456] With the decree 404 of February 27 1963, 4 million pesos for primary schools and 1 million for the secondary school in Ciudad Kennedy were guaranteed. At that moment, the ministry

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[452] Idem.
[453] Minute 48, November 5, 1962, p. 0818-back.
[454] Minute 56, December 6, 1962, p. 0860. Minute 5, 1963, p. 017, 017-back.
[455] Minute 32, June 6 de 1963, p. 228.
[456] Communication from April 18, 1963. In: Minute 19, 1963, p. 151.

of education assumed the construction of the schools through *La Caja de Vivienda Popular*. The ICT's only responsibility in this regard was the registration of the plots' deeds for the schools.[457]

Conclusively, when considering the housing projects produced by the ICT as an architectural artifact, a wide range of aspects to be pondered come to the fore. First, the rural housing program emerges as the source of a number of elements implemented later in ICT's modern urban housing projects through the initial search of standardized housing types, technological experiments with materials such as Terra-concrete, and the production of prefabricated elements in the Materials Application Workshop "El Tabor."

Second, the notion of "modern" in ICT's housing projects emerges as the result of a set of intricate flow of proposals. Globally well-known architects and current ideas of modern architecture blend with concrete questions and requests posed by the agency and other public institutions in the country. The result of these interactions can be traced in the inner spatial arrangement of the three case studies and in the development of multifamily high-rise buildings.

Lastly, the interactions between the ICT and the local planning agencies were complex and certainly determined much of the transformation of the urban centers in which the agency built housing. The fact that land acquisition also benefited private landowners hints to the need for more research on the economic impact of these housing developments. The complex interactions with local official planning agencies are also a hint to the intertwined net of relations between professionals, scholars and politicians in the work of the ICT and the impact of the projects in the cities. In this study, the intersections between the political level and the work of the ICT have been given special

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[457] Minute 32, June 6 de 1963, p. 228.

attention. The interactions between the agency and the architects and engineers and their economic implications certainly deserve further study.

Chapter 4: the Geo-Politics of Housing

NATIONAL REALM: HOUSING AS A TOOL TO PACIFY

When the ICT was established in 1939, the country was undergoing a period of deep transformation. After a devastating war at the beginning of the century, the so-called "Thousand Days' War" (1899-1902), the Conservative Party assumed power and governed the country for nearly 30 years. Then, Colombia's other significant party the Liberal Party was elected in 1930 and stayed in power until 1946, taking significant steps toward the modernization and secularization of the country.

However criticism of some conservative politicians and clergymen was continuous and intense throughout these years. This criticism was supported by a considerable segment of the church, which allied itself with the goals of the conservative party. These never-ending confrontations between the two main parties contributed significantly to the eruption of a new civil war that swept over some rural areas of the country for much of the period of this study, known as *La Violencia*. Its beginning is generally considered to be 1946, when the Conservatives won the presidency again, and its end to be 1964.[458] The assassination of Liberal presidential candidate, Jorge Eliecer Gaitán, in 1948 was a key turning point, from which moment the violence in the rural areas worsened.

My inquiries in this section center on points of intersection between the ICT's work and political events during the period of my research, as well as on both (1) the

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[458] This time frame follows: Williford, Thomas J. "Aspectos Del Debate Sobre La 'Cuestión Religiosa' En Colombia, 1930-1935." Revista de Estudios Sociales, no. 41 (December 1, 2011): 28–43. However, there is no consensus about an exact time frame due to the nature of the conflict. Moreover, unlike the specific event that can be pointed out for the start of the Violencia, the election of a conservative president and the following violent acts against Liberals on the rural areas, an end point is not clearly defined. Some speak about the death of the last leaders fighting in the rural areas, but the true is that at that point, different conflicts were already emerging with the founding of the guerrillas that defined the conflict with the state until today.

ways ICT developed these housing projects in the midst of such a violent environment, and (2) how this environment informed the housing projects they built. Historiography has had little to say about this, making it seem that the ICT operated in a political vacuum.[459] However, throughout the period of this study, significant events that inevitably had an impact on the ICT's work took place in many areas where it was asked to work. *La Violencia* was the canvas against which the agency acted, and against which its needs to be analyzed. In addition, World War II caused an economic crisis in the country that hindered work in rural areas. More importantly, the outcome of this war strengthened a set of unbalanced power relations in the hemisphere, which also played an important role in the agency's housing programs: namely, the housing program in urban areas was greatly shaped by the geopolitics of the Cold War. I argue that ICT's housing projects became a tool to display the government's ability to deal with political conflict, and as a strategy to counteract extreme political tensions. Moreover, they served as a way to promote the respective governments, and to maintain the status quo, in a time of acute political unrest. Fear of social upheaval and Communism influenced most state institutions and both of the traditional political parties, and drove many the actions of the politicians behind the agency.

Concurrently with the financial crisis, the country's political instability also impacted the ICT during WWII. Although politics are never specifically mentioned in the minutes of the board of directors' meetings, political turmoil is reflected in the constant changes in ministerial posts. Since the ICT was dependent on the Ministry of Finance and

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[459] Alberto Saldarriaga's key works on the ICT, but also Carlos Martinez and Silvia Arango's accounts on Colombian architecture and later works, such as Samper Martínez and Ramírez Nieto, *Arquitectura Moderna En Colombia*; Fontana et al., *Colombia Arquitectura Moderna*; Forero Suárez and Forero Forero, *Vivienda social, modernidad e informalidad en Bogotá, 1911-1982*; Patricia Eugenia Montes, ed., *Ciudad y Arquitectura Moderna En Colombia, 1950-1970. Presencia y Vigencia Del Patrimonio Moderno* (Ministerio de Cultura, Colombia, 2008).

Public Credit, changes in this ministry impacted it directly. In 1942, Alfonso López Pumarejo was elected as the new president of the country. However, he resigned in 1945 before he could complete his term and Alberto Lleras Camargo was designated as the new president.[460] With each new president, a different Finance Minister took office.[461] These constant changes made the continuity of any initiative almost impossible.[462] In spite of such instability and uncertainty, the institution preserved its structure and independence throughout those years.[463] Then, the election of 1946 produced a major change in the government, bringing Mariano Ospina Perez from the Conservative party to the presidency and ending a period of 16 years of Liberals in power in August of that year.[464] His new Finance Minister, Francisco de Paula Pérez, expressed his full support for the institution at the first ICT board of directors meeting he attended.[465] In spite of

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[460] Minute 223, November 12, 1945, p. 480. President Alberto Lleras Camargo, cousin of ICT's promoter Carlos Lleras Restrepo's, was in the Liberal party, and as such, -one would expect- he would stand very close to the working class; however, he did an odd observation in a meeting with the general managers of all banks working in Bogotá. He claimed that he did not agree with the extreme generosity loans have been given for the construction of Barrios Populares, for he considered it was a privilege for employees and workers.

[461] In 1942, Alfonso Araujo Gaviria succeeded Carlos Lleras Restrepo, ICT's co-initiator and former Finance Minister. As a response to the financial crisis that chased the agency as well, Araujo Gaviria brought to the board of directors at the end of the year 1942 the proposal of merging diverse Credit institutions with the ICT in one big institution. (Minute 126, November 1942, P. 323) The initiative had a basically economic perspective of the problem; entirely suppressing the social aspect of the work of the ICT (no matter how contradictory). No wonder his relationship was always confrontational with the board of directors and especially with the general manager. These constant discussions about the financial sustainability of the institution and the search for alternatives to this initial proposal absorbed the final months of 1942 and a good part of the year 1943. In August 1943 Araujo left office. A new Finance Minister stayed only a couple of months, and then Lleras Restrepo returned in October. Carlos Lleras Restrepo stayed just one more year, until President Lopez Pumarejo resigned in 1945.

[462] The general manager's role in this context was very often to explain and justify what the ICT had been doing during that period, and how. He was repeatedly asked to explain the high costs of the administration's operation and the high costs of rural housing—a role he played convincingly.

[463] Minute 213, May 14, 1945, p. 462-back.

[464] Mariano Ospina Perez, other member of the traditional elite families of the country, was one of the two owners of the still today operating real state and construction office "Ospinas y Cia." See: http://ospinas.com.co/en/about-us/history/. The firm continued being active during that period; however it did not contract with the government, as claimed in the firm's Internet web site. (It appears in a list of firms that applied for building housing directly for their workers. In: Minute 275, July 1947, p. 587).

[465] Francisco de Paula Pérez was the founder of the conservative newspaper El Colombiano.

this claim of support, 1946 was not a good year for the ICT. Its financial situation suffered throughout the year like a dying patient. By the end of the year, one can perceive the manager's exhaustion, as he submitted his resignation, which was rejected by the board of directors. Given the steady rise of materials, wages and transport costs on account of the serious economic crisis the country was facing at that moment, the ICT's work became increasingly difficult.[466] More than anything, this National Government's indecision on how to make the institution sustainable reveals the lack of a clear (rural and urban) housing policy in the country.[467]

The use of housing programs as a sign of the government's ability to handle political conflicts is one of the most conspicuous ways in which politicians' goals intersected with the agency's. This was especially true for the rural housing program. When presenting the plan for rural housing in 1948, the general manager referred explicitly to the plan as an answer to the political situation and its consequences in the countryside. He specifically mentioned the need to increase the budget for the department of North Santander, where in addition to the existing rural housing shortage, the "absurd and inexcusable destruction" of *La Violencia* had added even more to an already acute problem. In doing this, the general manager was certain to be acting according to "the desire of the national government to work with every means to repair the harm caused and to collaborate to the appeasement of sectarian passions, in that martyred and progressive Department."[468]

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[466] Things were still being done, loans were still approved, but all this was happening on a very small scale, considering the existing infrastructure and the accumulated experience of the ICT.

[467] As an example, the general manager asked Minister Araujo in a meeting in June 1943 about the reasons why it is so difficult to disburse the money the ICT is entitled to, and the Minister's answer was that the government and the congress still had to decide, "what should be done with this institution." In Minute 150, p. 370 – back. See also: Romero Sánchez, "Ruralizing Urbanization."

[468] Plan for Rural Housing. In: Minute 306, February 27, 1948. p. 687 - 690.

The same strategy surfaced frequently and was clearly implemented again after the assassination of Jorge Eliecer Gaitán in 1948. Political unrest exacerbated after Gaitán's murder. In a first meeting with the ICT's general manager after this tragic event, conservative President Ospina Pérez agreed to postpone the decision over a decree that was detrimental to the institution's financial resources. In return, the president asked the ICT to build 1,000 rural houses by the end of 1948. He clearly expressed that his wish was to do this in order to achieve, as soon and as efficiently as possible, the building of housing for the "most needy social classes," emphasizing the need to reduce construction costs to the minimum possible.[469] These housing projects constituted an excellent mechanism to promote the government in the least suspicious way, in a highly conflictive moment. Moreover, the president implemented a series of measures as a reaction to the escalating violence, after Gaitan's assassination.[470] By the end of 1948, the national government issued a new regulation supplemental to the rural housing program, which gave the peasants who received a loan for the construction of a rural house the right to apply for additional financial aid to buy tools and animals.[471] Apart from its populist nature, this regulation shows the abyss between the country of norms and laws and the real country.

A further measure to reestablish social order in rural areas after Gaitán's assasination was the creation of the *Instituto de Parcelaciones, Colonización y Defensa Forestal* (Institute of Subdivisions, Colonization and Forest Protection). The *Instituto de Parcelaciones* was responsible for the title of *baldios* (uncultivated, public lands). As other governmental initiatives seeking to create synergies between different agencies that

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[469] Minute 320, May 19, 1948, p. 727.

[470] He declared the state of siege in the whole territory of the country through the decrees 1239 and 1259, of April 10 and 16, of1948.

[471] Regulation of Decree 2241 de 1948. Minute 353, December 17, 1948, p. 829.

would lead, theoretically, to more comprehensive actions, the ICT was required to work with both this institute and the *Caja Agraria* (Agrarian Bank).[472] Therefore, the agency had a representative in that Institute at least until 1951.[473] Initially, their interactions were sporadic and the ICT was not fully committed to this collaboration.[474] Nevertheless, as the conflict in the rural areas gained more intensity, the two institutions were asked to work more closely together in those regions.[475]

While the minutes do not always specifically describe events resulting from political turmoil during this period, they do include other events that give an account of this untold story. The impact of *La Violencia* on rural housing built by the ICT is undeniable. First, in view of the upcoming elections of the House of Representatives on June 3th, 1949, general managers of all offices throughout the country were commanded to protect the agency's vehicles of the institutions, bringing them to a safe place. Clearly,

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[472] An historical elaboration on this topic in the context of agrarian land tenure in Colombia is presented in: Alvaro Ramírez and Instituto Interamericano de Ciencias Agrícolas, *Estudio histórico sobre las actividades de parcelación de tierras agrícolas en Colombia* (Bogotá: IICA, OEA, 1966), LTC-10-8.

[473] After the board of directors changed at the beginning of 1951, Wiesner quitted as representative of the ICT in the Instituo de Parcelaciones, and long after, Mario García y García, former member of ICT's board of directors as representative of the Minister of Finance, was selected as new representative for the ICT in the board of directors of the Instituto de Parcelaciones. Minute 494, November 13, 1951, p. 1254-back.
It is not clear until when a member of ICT's board of directors remained in this peculiar agency, which was replaced through the *Instituto de Colonización e Inmigración,* issued through Law 1894 of 1953 and ruled by the decree 2436 of 1953 under the military regime of General Rojas Pinilla.

[474] Minute 379, April 21, 1949, p. 901. The Instituto de Parcelaciones asked the ICT's to collaborate in the " construction of housing for the farms that the referred agency plans to award in the subdivision of Buena Vista, located between the municipalities of Cota and Funza." Although this project counts with the direct support of the president, they decided not to intervene due to conflicts with ICT's regulations (rural housing on suburban land)

[475] Specifically, in the area of the irrigation dam of Saldaña, in Tolima department. The three institutions (instituto de parcelaciones, Caja De Crédito Agrario and ICT) were asked by the national government to build 100 houses for the peasants, who received a piece of land in this area. Interesting here is the question, who were those selected peasants in this highly conflicted region. In: Minute 516, April 7, 1952, p. 1290, and in Minute 497, December 3, 1951, p. 1261. The interest to handle the rural housing program in association with the Institute of Parcelaciones is also discussed during the session transcribed in Minute 559, June 7, 1953, p. 0084. However, this process of land entitlement was not free of conflict and repeatedly was imposed over historical communal land tenure of peasants with strong indigenous roots.

violent events were expected as a result of these elections.[476] Second, reports of destroyed or abandoned peasants' houses in Cundinamarca, Santander, Cauca y Nariño, due to the political events at the end of 1949, posed the question of how to address this, for the victims were asking for aid either to rebuild and repair their destroyed homes, or to cancel the mortgages on them.[477] These cases occurred so regularly that the national government was asked to issue a general regulation.[478] Third, the stated difficulty about developing planned housing programs offers glimpses on the consequences to the ICT's work that violent outbursts in specific regions brought about. (In the minutes, these were euphemistically called "political events"). According to a general manager's report in December 1952, in Villavicencio, the capital of Meta Province and epicenter of the confrontation in the east part of the country, where Liberal guerrillas predominated, the housing program could not be developed as originally planned because of the "special circumstances of public order" in that region. Instead, the new housing program should be built with "the collaboration of the army."[479] After the military seized government power in June 1953, the extreme violence in the rural areas decreased momentarily. In this context, the general manager proposed to develop a plan to reconstruct destroyed houses in La Palma and Yacopi, two municipalities strongly affected by the war. Many peasants, who were displaced from their farms, were going back to their destroyed homes. As the general manager reported, all official agencies were contributing to the restoration of this region.[480]

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[476] Minute 382, May 25, 1949, p. 905.
[477] Minute 407, December 1, 1949, p. 991-back.
[478] Minute 416, February 23, 1950, p. 1016. Minute 507, February 11, 1952, p. 1278-back.
[479] Minute 545, December 1, 1952, p. 0043-back.
[480] Minute 563 (incorrectly numbered: 663), July 13, 1953, p. 0091.

Gaitan's assassination is mentioned in the minutes as the cause of subsequent violent outbursts in different parts of the country, which also affected the agency's work to some extent.[481] Yet a number of other significant events go unmentioned: the closing of Congress, of the Departmental assemblies, and of the city councils in November 1949; a series of restrictive measures that record a *de facto* dictatorship; the election of the ultra-conservative politician Laureano Gómez, a staunch adversary of any of the Liberal Party's reform initiatives; and the installation of the military regime in 1953.[482] At the same time, the specter of Communism, which was nurtured by politicians like Gomez,[483] clearly trickled into the board of directors' meetings and critically shaped the country's housing policies, finding its complement in the post WWII foreign policy of the United States. The apex of this encounter materialized in the ninth Pan-American meeting in Bogotá in April of 1948, where the anti-Communist Truman Doctrine was supported by all nations in attendance. Gaitán was murdered while this meeting, which gave birth to the OAS, was taking place.

Even technical journals subtly nurtured the relationship between housing and the fight against Communism. As the editor of the journal Proa, Carlos Martinez wrote in the editorial of the issue in which the first neighborhood units that had been built by the ICT, Cúcuta, Tuluá, and Muzú, were presented that "[i]n some countries such as the Netherlands and the Scandinavian countries it has been found that in addition to the

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[481] Minute 314, April 16, 1948, p. 710. Report that shows the violent events after this assassination had almost no impact on the ICT's infrastructure. But the board of directors expressed his wish to participate in the works of Removal of debris, cleaning and reconstruction of Bogotá. The board of directors also published a series of statements condemning the assassination of the liberal politician Gaitán, but also condemning the destruction of the "archbishop's palace." They also expressed their support to the president.

[482] See: Murillo Posada, "La Modernizacion y Las Violencias (1930-1957)," 296.

[483] See: Renán Vega Cantor and Eduardo Rodríguez Ruiz, *Economía Y Violencia: El Antidemocrático Desarrollo Capitalista de Colombia En Los Años Cincuenta,* 1. ed, Colección Cultura Universitaria 4 (Bogotá, D.E., Colombia: Fondo de Publicaciones, Universidad Distrital Francisco José de Caldas, 1990), 21-22.

hygienic, economic and social benefits to which good housing contributes they are an excellent stimulus for the anti-communist struggle."[484] In this editorial and in the article on the ICT's neighborhood units, one finds some of the common ideas behind social housing: an appropriate dwelling can ameliorate not only the living conditions of the workers but it can avoid social upheaval. This sentiment certainly also informed the Alliance for Progress, launched in 1961, which was firmly supported by liberal politicians like Alberto Lleras Camargo, president of the country for the second time between 1958 and 1962. But, this will be explained in depth later in this chapter.

Rural migration into the cities noticeably increased beginning at the end of the 1940s, worsening the existing urban housing shortage. Subsequently, the strategy applied in rural areas saw its urban counter-part emerge in working-class neighborhoods. These neighborhoods were used as a tool to demonstrate the state's capability to solve the social problems resulting from rural-urban migration. Shortly before president Mariano Ospina Pérez left office in 1950, he inaugurated the neighborhood Muzú, to "demonstrate his interest in the agency and his effective support."[485] But also, since this neighborhood was strongly associated with Ospina Perez, the ICT sought different ways to make visible this relationship. First, one of the board members proposed to change the name from Muzú to Unidad Vecinal Ospina Pérez, in response to the support received by the president.[486] In addition, the general manager proposed that a segment of the housing units of Muzú should be awarded to the employees of the presidential palace.[487] Mariano Ospina Pérez'

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[484] Proa 30, December 1949, 5.
[485] Minute 435, July 24, 1950, p. 1081.
[486] Minute 426, May 26, 1950, p. 1043-back.
[487] As a way to justify his proposal he explained that "the agreement focuses on the old and poor servants of the presidential palace, porters, sweepers, elevator men, etc., and on some non-commissioned officers of the presidential guard battalion, men with many family obligations, low salary and no clear future. There are members of both political parties, ... servants of 15 years the most and of 4 the less, ... nobody better than they have right and nobody better than the president can qualify those services. This is therefore the

206

successor, Laureano Gómez, also recognized from the beginning the "valuable collaboration that this institution offered him in his task of governing."[488] He did likewise use the work of the ICT as promotion and as a symbol of what could be presented as a social policy, and finally, to reinforce loyalties. That is the context in which Quiroga, in Bogotá was built. This low-cost working-class neighborhood was to be finished in the shortest time. Some of these homes were given to workers of the presidential palace and to the members of the Battalion of the presidential guard.[489]

The ICT sought political neutrality as a way to navigate and survive in a moment of highly polarized political convictions, especially in the regions where the bipartisan tensions were so fierce. Thus, the lack of comments on political events, their assessment, or how they would be able to shape institutional policies corresponded with this specifically stated aim. By the end of 1948, the institution forbade any kind of political activity or militancy under its employees, in order to "avoid by any means that the work of the agency can be influenced by political interests of any party, and by the personal ambitions of politicians."[490] This decision will be used constantly to confirm that the board did not represent the interests of any particular party. However, the ICT operated during this period under a conservative government, and many saw the agency as a conservative one, despite the support it received from liberal politicians from the time of its establishment. In fact, the agency was established under a Liberal government, and the

ultimate sense of this agreement and not with the purpose of flattery or the desire to ingratiate with a representative whose period expires in 15 days." In: Minute 435, July 24, 1950, p. 1081-back. Another part of the houses should be awarded to the municipal workers in return for the offer of Bogotá's Mayor, Santiago Trujillo Gómez, to install in Muzú the external electricity network, telephone and to plant the trees. Minute 436, July 27, 1950, p. 1083-back.

[488] Minute 441, August 31, 1950, p. 1102.

[489] Minute 524, June 2, 1952, p. 0003. Minute 529, June 30, 1952, p. 0009-back. The president asks for 26 houses of Quiroga for his close servants.

[490] Minute 354, December 20, 1948, p. 831.

liberal politician Carlos Lleras Restrepo was one of the initiators. He always supported the agency and guaranteed its survival as Finance Minister. He also developed, with the support of industrialists from Medellín and Bogotá, the project for the Law 85 of 1946. Yet this law was ultimately approved under the conservative President Mariano Ospina Perez. Since Ospina Pérez openly supported the agency's work, some interpreted this as proof of the ICT's political orientation. The newspapers reinforced this image. The conservative ones praised the ICT excessively, while the liberal ones criticized it.[491] Conversely, one could interpret this changing perception of the agency's political orientation as its ability to adapt to the interests of all political parties, independently of their orientation. As one of the board members reported in one meeting in May 1949, in the public's opinion, the ICT's work was indeed the result of official efforts and responded therefore to a specific political ideology. In addition, some employees in the regions had been participating in politics, against the explicitly stated indication to remain neutral.[492] As a result of this evidence, the board of directors released a statement declaring its absolute political neutrality, fearing otherwise the "total and definitive ruin of an entity dedicated exclusively to the service of the less favored classes of society."[493] They added, that people of both parties worked together in the agency, as an argument against the claim it would perform any kind of political activity.[494]

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[491] Minute 430, July 6, 1950, p. 1061-back. Article in the newspaper The Liberal of July 5, 1950. They criticized the ICT for an apparently disproportionate purchase of painting, "harming so the housing program" of the ICT.

[492] Minute 382, May 25, 1949, p. 906.

[493] I would add, to maintain the power of the political establishment. Interesting in this statement is also the stated conviction that the ICT work for the "less favored classes," which seem to encompass then all the people, who are not part of this privileged elite conforming the leaders of the ICT.

[494] Minute 383, May 28, 1949, p. 909.

Elites

The ICT's board of directors assembled Colombia's elites, whose knowledge and interests were strongly intermingled with the agency's. Guillermo Wiesner Rozo is an excellent example. Wiesner, owner and manager of the construction firm "Wiesner & Cia." was also one of the founders of the *Lonja de Propiedad Raiz* (Real Estate Association) in 1945. Wiesner offered to evaluate the bids the ICT received for the construction of a well in Muzú, in light of the bids his office had received for similar work.[495] Also the main arguments for selecting him to represent the ICT on the executive board of the *Instituto de Parcelaciones* (Agency for Subdivisions), were that he was conversant in matters of land subdivisions, that he knew all the country's departments and regions, and because he was a farmer and rancher.[496] He would remain the ICT's representative on that board until he left the ICT's board of directors, when it was transformed in 1951. In other words, his expertise favored the ICT, yet his knowledge on governmental policies and his proximity to particular political institutions certainly favored the development of his businesses. The case of Guillermo Wiesner demonstrates how the mechanisms of power work, how they form feedback loops and get reproduced. Generally speaking, the board members' thoughts and plans were always in compliance with the interests of the specific groups they represented.

The economic role played by another member of the board of directors sheds light of the intertwined net of relations between its members and local elites. Juan Pablo Ortega, general manager of *Cementos Samper*, the oldest and one of the largest cement production plants in the country, was able to propose very specific arrangements related to the supply of cement to the agency at the end of the 1940s, when the agency was

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[495] Minute 449, November 2, 1950, p. 1132.
[496] Minute 329, July 8, 1948, p. 756.

building its first large urban housing projects in different cities across the country.[497] This same Juan Pablo Ortega then participated on the agency's board of directors as the representative of the Industrialists (ANDI), eventually being directly appointed to the board by the president, from October 1950 to August of 1954.[498] His participation on the board must have been regarded as an essential asset for the agency, due to his varied connections.

Juan Pablo Ortega's economic power and social recognition come to the fore here. He was member of the board of directors of a major and powerful industry in Colombia, "Consorcio Cervecerias Bavaria" (beer production, still today a large emporium),[499] and director of the oldest and most important Colombian Airline, Avianca.[500] He was also a member of the board of directors of the Polo Club Bogotá, and his family owned the land that "Urbanizaciones Samper" at some point wanted to sell to the ICT.[501] Finally, he sat on a bipartisan committee convened by the conservative president, Mariano Ospina Pérez, to convert the recommendations of the Currie Mission into concrete policies.[502] His need to leave the meeting room when decisions related to the purchase of cement tiles from the firm "Manufacturas de Cemento," of whose board of directors he was a member as well, illustrates the conflict of interest caused by his participation in multiple arenas.[503]

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[497] Minute 336, August 26, 1948, p. 767.
[498] Minute 447, October 1950, p. 1120. Minute 464, March 1951, p. 1193-back. Minute 618 (incorrectly numbered: 718), August 16, 1954, p. 0268.
[499] Minute 531, July 1952, p. 0013.
[500] Sandilands, *The Life and Political Economy of Lauchlin Currie*, 171.
[501] Minute 576 (incorrectly numbered: 676), September 7, 1953, p. 0135. If the owners of "Urbanizaciones Samper" are the same persons who owned "Cementos Samper" is not part of this investigation, but it is certainly a necessary topic to develop further.
[502] Juan Pablo Ortega participated in this committee as one of the three liberal politicians. In: Sandilands, *The Life and Political Economy of Lauchlin Currie*, 169.
[503] Minute 600 (incorrectly numbered: 700), March 15, 1954, p. 0220.

The ICT's involvement in the country's politics was clearly mediated by the convictions of its leaders. That these convictions could clash with the interests of other groups became evident when Lleras Restrepo's successor at the Ministry of Finance and Public Credit, Alfonso Araujo, arrived as president of the board of directors and proposed that the ICT should merge with the *Caja de Crédito Agrario, Industrial y Minero* (Agrarian, Industrial and Mining Credit Bank). The general manager's comments about this proposal were very cautious, but nevertheless it was clear that he strongly disagreed with it. He made his case showing the different goals of the two institutions, the ICT having the small farmer in mind, the *Caja de Crédito Agrario*, the large-farm owners. The one non-profit, the other for-profit. To give an example, the general manager tackled the issue of rural housing in Nariño, where mortgages were issued even if to people who lacked the income to ensure payments, in order to disburse the loans to build the new homes. In his view, this way of proceeding was guided by "humanitarian criteria to defend the human race, rather than acting according to productive rationales," seeking "the protection of the physical and physiological integrity of the individual and his family."[504] Furthermore, in this key talk, the general manager expressed his open mistrust of those behind this proposal:

> "Those farmers and ranchers who have been working on incorporating all credit agencies into one single agency with the state's money are just considering this proposal from an economic point of view. None of them has ever considered improving the living conditions of their workers, or the value of the human factor as the fundamental aspect of the country's economy. None of them has sought the services of the ICT to improve the miserable ranches where their tenant famers and laborers live...."[505]

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[504] Minute 126, November 1942, P. 324-back.
[505] Minute 126, November 1942, P. 324-back.

211

This strongly worded exposition not only explains his argument against such a measure, but it also shows the historical conflicts in rural Colombia.

The ICT and the Army

The ICT's urban housing program channeled the amiable relationship between the civil governments and the army. When army general Gustavo Rojas Pinilla seized power in June of 1953, this close relationship only intensified. Even after a civil government returned to power in 1958, the deference to the army through the housing program remained. The joined effort with the army since the *Caja de Vivienda Militar* (Fund for Military Housing), founded in 1947, remained constant in the work of the ICT. The Fund for Military Housing was created as an independent institution, but it was in fact managed by the ICT.[506] From its inception until the end of the period studied in this dissertation, the Fund received a portion of the homes the ICT built throughout the country, according to the army's needs and preferences.[507] This was the most relevant trait in the collaboration between the agency and the Fund.[508] The closeness between them grew alongside the militarization of the political realm. From August 1951 on, the ICT's general manager became also the general manager of the *Caja de Vivienda Militar*.[509] And in 1952 the assistant general manager of the Fund, Captain Carlos

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[506] The Law 87 of 1947, through which the Bank for Military Housing was created. Minute 308, March 4, 1948, p. 695.

[507] Minute 334, August 19, 1948, p. 762-back. Minute 394, August 4, 1949, p. 936. J. Rico reported that in a meeting with the Bank for Military Housing committee, six housing units in Altos de Prado in Barranquilla were requested to be handed over to army officials.

[508] That meant that the Institute received an administration percentage, and it hired the employees required to attend this service within its organization Minute 374, March 17, 1949, p. 884-back. Executive Committee, Minute 147, November 8, 1949, p. 991-back. In: Minute 407, December 1st., 1949. Selling of 5 plots in El Cedro, Cali, to the army for sub-officials of Air Force, so that it can build for them through the Bank of Military Housing. Minute 380, April 28, 1949, p. 902.

[509] Minute 482, August 2, 1951, p. 1232-back.

Pacheco, and the Minister of War (!) requested the ICT to free part of its budget in order to be able to build more military housing in Bogota and other departments.[510]

The increasing inclusion of army members as part of the government and the military's subsequent influence on ICT programs beginning in the late 1940s contrasts with the idea that the army only intervened directly in politics in 1953 when army general Rojas Pinilla took power. The appointment of army members in some posts in the agency and as city mayors in regions where conflict roared, show that this infiltration was already taking place at the end of the 1940s.[511] During the military government, two army representatives were appointed as the ICT's general managers, Navy Captain Rubén Piedrahita Arango (1953-1954) and Colonel Alvaro Calderón Rodríguez (1954-1957). After the end of the military regime, the general manager of the Fund for Military Housing was on the ICT's board of directors.

The ICT's general manager reminded military president Rojas Pinilla in a meeting that the agency was "investing more than six million pesos per year in discounts to the Fund of Military Housing for buildings for officials of the Colombian army." Moreover, in the same meeting he acknowledged that the compromise to invest at least five million pesos in housing through the unions (UCT and CTC) would "induce and conduct the union forces toward a more effective support for the government of the armed forces" in addition to "greatly benefiting the proletariat."[512] Throughout Rojas Pinilla's presidency,

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[510] Minute 540, September 29, 1952, p. 0032-back.

[511] In January 1949, an army member was appointed in a leading position in the ICT for the first time. Major engineer José Bernardo Daste was appointed as the general manager of the Nariño Department office. Minute 356, January 11, 1949, p. 833-back. Also, in the same month another army member was appointed as engineer of rural housing in Santander Department, army captain and civil engineer Gerardo Hurtado. Minute 358, January 20, 1949, p. 837. Also, the Major of Buenaventura, a key city due to its condition as main port of the country in the Pacific, was also an army member: Captain Castellanos. Minute 361, February 8, 1949, p. 846-back.

[512] Minute 643 (incorrectly numbered: 743), September 1st, 1955, p. 0295, 0295-back.

the agency not only further committed part of its resources to the construction of housing for the army; it also used the housing program directly to gain the support of the working class. This measure adequately corresponds with a populist tone like that of Perón in Argentina.

In 1955, after a period of consolidating power, Rojas Pinilla decided to take a more autonomous path, developing what would be called a "third force." The elites did not forgive him this attempt to become more independent and their support began to crumble. Additionally, the economic downturn of 1956, caused by a decline in coffee prices, also contributed to the end of the Rojas Pinilla era of power.

The ICT and the Church

The ideological differences between the Catholic Church and the politicians of the Liberal Party in Colombia are well known. In reality, however, they met in at least one place: the ICT. Both institutions profited from each other through mutual cooperation. For the agency, the participation of the church on the board of directors facilitated its work in the rural areas, where the church had strong influence, mediating between the agency and the parish priests. During the first years, the church also served as a guarantor for farmers asking for loans there. On the other side, the church and a wide array of Catholic institutions requested the ICT's financial support to execute different works of beneficence, to which the agency, for its part, responded benevolently. Yet, the cooperation between the agency and the Catholic Church resulted from an apparently ideologically contradictory background.

The Catholic Church has had a prominent role in Colombia, heavily influencing the course of politics in the country since colonial times. Only with the Constitution of

1991 did Catholicism cease being the official country's religion, as religious freedom was recognized. In the rural areas, this influence was even stronger. Not a few civil wars after independence were nurtured by the stance of the two main political parties, the conservative and the liberal, towards the Catholic Church. During *La Violencia*, the Church played a significant role stoking the bipartisan hatred with a harsh rhetoric that condemned those who did not identified as "Catholics." Interestingly, the Colombian population was predominantly Catholic during that period. Even today, 70.9% of Colombians are Catholic.

The relation between church and state defined the most significant difference between the two traditional Colombian parties. The Conservatives sought to maintain the church's influence on the civil life, while the Liberals favored a clear separation of church and state affairs.[513] However, according to Helen Delpar, the Liberals consistently underscored "that they were not antagonistic to religion itself but to the political activity of some members of the Roman Catholic clergy and to their efforts to hinder the intellectual and spiritual enlightenment of the Colombian people."[514] Consequently, the *cuestión religiosa* (the religious question) played an important role in the ideological disputes between the two parties, with different intensities at different times over the years.[515] The *cuestión religiosa* was relevant not only at the level of debates, but also as fuel to strengthen political conflict. The church's actions were aligned with the political goals of the Conservative party; they shared the same worldview. But also the church "considered the Conservative party as the political agent by which the teachings of Christ

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[513] See Williford, "Aspectos Del Debate Sobre La 'cuestión Religiosa' En Colombia, 1930-1935."

[514] Helen Delpar, "Chapter 2. Liberalism and Anticlericalism: Red against Blue: The Liberal Party in Colombian Politics, 1863-1899," in *Problems in Modern Latin American History: Sources and Interpretations,* ed. James A. Wood, Fourth edition, Latin American Silhouettes. (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 2014), 72.

[515] Acevedo C., *La Mentalidad de Las Élites Sobre La Violencia En Colombia, 1936-1949,* 202.

and the interests of the church might best be protected and advanced in Colombia," and the Conservative party "regarded the Catholic church as the sole depository and interpreter of the divine truths of Christianity."[516]

If historically the Catholic Church in Colombia was radically opposed to all that the liberal party represented, how was this cooperation possible between two so dissimilar institutions? How was it possible that high range representatives of the clergy were called to participate on the board of directors? What is more, why did the Church accept such participation? I argue that despite their ideological differences, the Church and Liberals shared commonalities that enabled these interactions. To begin with, following Fernán Gonzalez' work, neither the Catholic Church nor the Liberal Party were monolithic institutions with a single, unified view of the country.[517] Moreover, the agency tackled social issues that were also the church's concern as a result of encyclicals produced at the end of the ninetieth century, which informed much of the social doctrine characterizing the church's work from that time forward. The preoccupation with the problems of farmers and the working-class became a priority—the same groups that Liberal governments' social policies targeted. Finally, I argue that the similarities in the goals pursued by the two institutions explain why this ideologically conflicted cooperation nevertheless did perform so well. First, both sought to relive the problems of the targeted population without changing the conditions that originated those problems. Second, the moral code that underlay the housing program did align with the Catholic moral doctrine. Lastly and most importantly, the housing program, as a social policy,

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[516] Delpar, "Chapter 2. Liberalism and Anticlericalism: Red against Blue: The Liberal Party in Colombian Politics, 1863-1899," 73.

[517] González, *Poderes Enfrentados*, 394; Williford, "Aspectos Del Debate Sobre La 'cuestión Religiosa' En Colombia, 1930-1935."

served as a tool to maintain the status quo. In doing so, the angst of social unrest could be circumvented.

Although the Liberal and Conservative parties stood on different sides of the ideological spectrum, both parties, as well as the church, each contained more moderate voices within their respective ranks. It was repeatedly evident that different forces were at work within these groups.[518] The joint action of the church and the agency is an example of this. Eduardo Santos, the liberal president governing at the time the agency was set up, was more conciliatory than other members of the party, who were decidedly "anticlerical." His Finance minister, Carlos Lleras Restrepo, the ICT's initiator, shared a similar conciliatory stance towards the church. As he later recalled, the church was also divided. On the one hand, where the parish priests "obeyed" monsignor Ismael Perdomo Borrero, the agency did not find any difficulties carrying out the rural housing program.[519] Monsignor Ismael Perdomo Borrero was simultaneously the archbishop from Bogotá and Primate from Colombia; thus, the maximal authority of the Catholic Church in Colombia. Different sources describe him as a moderate person who always intended to maintain a dialog with the Liberal party.[520] But if the parish priest followed the conservative politician Laureano Gómez, the work of the ICT became extremely difficult.[521]

The work of the state through the ICT was clearly oriented to the same group the Church was addressing: the peasants and the working class. Their problems became more evident through the papal encyclicals about the "so-called social doctrine of the

[518] Williford, "Aspectos Del Debate Sobre La 'cuestión Religiosa' En Colombia, 1930-1935."
[519] Lleras Restrepo, *Reseña Historica Del ICT,* 37.
[520] González, *Poderes Enfrentados*, 294; Williford, "Aspectos Del Debate Sobre La 'cuestión Religiosa' En Colombia, 1930-1935;" Acevedo C., *La Mentalidad de Las Élites Sobre La Violencia En Colombia, 1936-1949,* 154, 158.
[521] Lleras Restrepo*, Reseña Historica Del ICT*, 37.

Church."[522] Thus, the Vatican promoted the "Catholic Action" movement "as a way to mend the injustice of modern industrial society, in accord with the social teachings of the [Catholic] Church."[523] The Catholic Action had a deep impact on the work the Church was doing in the first half of the twentieth century. Several initiatives were born against this background, such as "workers and farmers groups," a labor union (*Unión de Trabajadores de Colombia, UTC*) led by the Jesuits, and the *Juventud Obrera Católica* (Catholic Working Youth).[524]

On the other hand, the ICT's establishment was not only a consequence of the liberal government's interventionist stance at the end of the 1930s, but also a channel to execute social policies intended to advance the project of modernizing the country. As Fernán Gonzalez explains in his key work on the relations between Church and State in Colombia, understanding social policies as part of the realm of the state was in fact already defined in the reform to the Constitution in 1936. One of the many reasons both Conservatives and the Catholic Church opposed this reform was that declaring "public beneficence as a task of the State" meant an "inadmissible intromission in the work of the Church."[525] This pronouncement illuminates the overlapping addressed groups.

The similarities between the Catholic Church and the ICT that emerged in the context of a mutually targeted population were strengthened by similarities in the rationales of their work. Some objectives of both the Church and the ICT met in state-built housing. It was about relieving the problems of the targeted population based on the Catholic moral doctrine without giving the tools to change the conditions that made their support necessary. Changing the causes of poverty and "unhygienic" living conditions

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[522] González, *Poderes Enfrentados,* 288.
[523] Williford, "Aspectos Del Debate Sobre La 'cuestión Religiosa' En Colombia, 1930-1935."
[524] González, *Poderes Enfrentados*, 290.
[525] Ibid., 287.

was not part of the programs of either institution. Furthermore, the fear of social unrest or of losing those peasants and workers to Communism underlay their actions.

Although the ICT was created under a liberal government, its impact was limited since it did not function as a tool to transform society, but rather as a tool to maintain the status quo. This correlates with the goals proclaimed by the Church, which -Fernán Gonzalez remarks- did not "seek any structural change that modified the conditions of the poor workers."[526] Somehow ICT's housing program did the same. Although in the long term the ownership enabled by the urban housing program did indeed help a part of society advance in its economic development, a housing shortage and unequal access to existing housing never ceased; to the contrary, these conditions rapidly increased with the country's urbanization.

To understand this static vision of Colombia's social structure, which greatly permeated the work of the ICT, it is important to understand first the ideas that informed the Catholic Church's work. As Fernán Gonzalez magnificently explains, the Church's awareness of the problems of the rural population and working class, as evidenced and condemned in the papal encyclicals of the late nineteenth century, did not lead to efforts to change the conditions causing these imbalances, but to "paternalistic" actions. According to Gonzalez, this was possible through "the abstraction of the structural conditionals of society and politics."[527] The initiative of Jesuit Jose Maria Campoamor serves as an example. He founded the *Círculo de Obreros de San Francisco Javier* (Workers group of San Francisco Javier) in 1911, with a *Caja Social de Ahorros* (Social Savings Fund) and a plan for the working-class neighborhood Villa Javier, initiated in Bogotá in 1913. Members of this group were prohibited from participating in politics,

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[526] Ibid., 289.
[527] Ibid., 288.

required to strictly follow the "commandments of God" and "the precepts of the Church," and prescribed a series of rules to make the neighborhood "a palace of poverty, proudly accepted, imitating poor Jesus Christ." As when discussing the problems of the rural housing program at the ICT, land tenure conditions were never discussed, in the same vein a Church "pastoral" to the rural population expressed their hope the state would be able "to provide cheap seeds, tools, and machinery."[528] This same framework could easily be ascribed to the work of the ICT, for the conditions that led to the incapability of an increasingly larger part of society to gain access to a house without the state's help were never discussed, nor were changing these conditions part of the agency's goals.

Furthermore, as Helen Delpar brings to light, many of the ideas at the core of the Conservative Party's ideology already after the Republic's emerged in nineteenth century, which remained current well into the twentieth century, were shaped by Catholic moral teaching that sought to relieve the problems of the poor working-class and rural population without changing the status quo. Delpar explains that while Conservatives affirmed "the right of all citizens to equality of treatment before the law, they were likely to express hostility to those who condemned economic inequality." Delpar further expressed that similarly, the newspaper

> *La Sociedad* of Medellin condemned "socialist equality," which it said was engendered by envy and based on injustice. "Its purpose is to level the human race, reducing all that is outstanding until it descends to the lowest, meatiest, and most brutish level in society." This kind of equality, the newspaper asserted, was totally incompatible with Christian equality, which rested on the oneness of the "human race and the universality of God's moral law."[529]

These ideas likely informed the social policies of the different governments through institutions such as the ICT, which was in fact imbued by Catholic moral rules.

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[528] Ibid., 289.
[529] Helen Delpar, Red against Blue: The Liberal Party in Colombian Politics, 1863-1899, 74-75.

The rationales behind the Catholic Church's beneficent actions resulting from its social doctrine derived from the encyclicals are the same ones behind the ICT's housing projects. Moreover, the goals of the housing program did not run against the moral precepts of the church. Indeed, the opposite was the case. The insistence on the moral suitability of the awardees, the selection of families who complied with the Catholic ideal, and the measures to guarantee that these moral standards prevailed after the agency had finished construction and the families had moved in, are only a few examples of ways the ICT's housing projects complied with the moral precepts of the church, and what the agency expected from their inhabitants. I will discuss further how these ideas developed in the case studies in the last chapter.

In the same vein, the Catholic Church promoted the Catholic Action movement according to the "social teachings of the Church" to counteract "the Marxist socialism on the one side, and the liberal capitalism, on the other," ICT's leaders did not understand or define their work as being aligned with the goals of communism. On the contrary, their work contributed to the reinforcement of the goals the church sought to achieve through the principle of "Catholic Action."[530] As mentioned earlier, Carlos Martinez suggested in the architecture journal Proa to use housing as a tool to prevent the spread of communism in 1949. Housing development as part of the social agenda put in place as a strategy to stop the spread of communism gained even more traction after the Cuban Revolution in 1959. The same rationales were operative as the Alliance for Progress was launched in 1961 and Ciudad Kennedy was built.

Thus, Colombian society's fear of the spread of communism did not first appear with the Truman doctrine after World War II, and it did not disappear soon after.

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[530] Although, according to Williford, in theory, Catholic Action was not intended to participate in politics. Williford, "Aspectos Del Debate Sobre La 'cuestión Religiosa' En Colombia, 1930-1935."

(Strikingly, the same fear still infuses arguments in the extremely polarized political disputes of the present day). This fear is rooted in several papal encyclicals of the end of nineteenth century.[531] The encyclical *Quanta Cura*, issued by Pope Pius IX in 1864, condemned "the errors of modernity," and appended "a list of 80 unacceptable propositions, known as the *Syllabus Errorum*, which summarize a condemnation of a liberal conception of religion and society."[532] The encyclical *Rerum Novarum*, issued by Pope Leo XIII in 1891, explained the "eagerness for new things in the social realm, ... the new situations produced by the industrial development, as well as the *dechristianization*" as the reason for the "working-class problem."[533] These papal encyclicals give accounts of the dispute between Christianity and Modernity on a global level. On the local level they meant that the values of Christianity represented by the Catholic Church and the Conservative Party were at risk through the new, the modern, and the anticlerical in the form of liberalism, which very often was set together with socialism, communism, and even masonry. In Colombia, the Church's different initiatives based on the "Catholic Action" movement sought to undermine any effort of the communists to gain adherents under the workers and the peasants. For the Church,

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[531] Although an exact date as to when Gonzalez mentions that a segment of the clergy started to think about the social problems of the working class, without detaching themselves from the prevailing anticommunist and anti modern stance is not clearly stated. He then mentions the foundation of the *Juventud Obrera Catolica, JOC* (Working Catholic Youth) in 1932. In: González, *Poderes Enfrentados,* 394.
In the same vein, when he mentions monsignor Builes' accusation that the 'laws on unions present a "Sovietizing tendency," which provokes strikes that corrupt the masses and snatch their Christian spirit and open them to the communist control.'" Ibid., 288. Also, Acevedo speaks about the "references of communism as the responsible for the crimes inscribed in the agitated discourse since the first term of president Lopez Pumarejo [1934-1938]." In: Acevedo C., *La Mentalidad de Las Élites Sobre La Violencia En Colombia, 1936-1949,* 161.

[532] The encyclical is in: http://www.papalencyclicals.net/pius09/p9quanta.htm. Accessed on February 23, 2018; González, *Poderes Enfrentados*, 380.

[533] The encyclical is in: http://w2.vatican.va/content/leo-xiii/en/encyclicals/documents/hf_l-xiii_enc_15051891_rerum-novarum.html. Accessed on February 23, 2018; González, *Poderes Enfrentados*, 373.

222

communism expressed the downfall of Christian principles and values. This idea was reinforced by the fear that the working class in the cities, and the peasants in the rural areas, could be "infected" with the ideas of communism.[534]

Anti-communism was entrenched in the mentality of the church and of the country's elites, which included both Conservative and Liberal politicians. Nevertheless, it was used by both the church and the Conservative party as a way to discredit and fight against the Liberals. All social policies and measures of the liberal governments that sought to separate the church and state, were interpreted by the conservatives as well as the church as a proof that they were infiltrated by communist ideas and ideals. The *Conferencia Episcopal* (Episcopal Conference) in 1944 alerted against the "communist danger that inconspicuously works through the Liberal Party."[535] This was also the background for different initiatives consolidated by the Church during the 1940s. The fear of communist infiltration in the existing labor unions, such as the CTC, *Confederación de Trabajadores de Colombia*, (Workers Confederation of Colombia), led to the creation of an alternative union, the UTC, *Unión de Trabajadores de Colombia* (Workers Union of Colombia), with the guidance of the Jesuits and with a clear anti-communist perspective.[536]

At the time the anti-communist Truman doctrine received backing by the representatives of the American nations during the ninth Inter-American Conference in Bogota in 1948, several events took place simultaneously, which, perhaps by destiny or fate, strengthened anti-communist sentiment in Colombia.[537] At the time of this

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[534] The language that alludes to the other, to the Communists and Liberals as a sickness is tackled in Acevedo C., *La Mentalidad de Las Élites Sobre La Violencia En Colombia, 1936-1949,* 80-81.
[535] González, *Poderes Enfrentados*, 290.
[536] González, *Poderes Enfrentados*, 290
[537] "Closely related to the Truman Doctrine was the strategic policy of containment. In broad terms, containment sought to limit the spread of Communism and Soviet influence, and to promote more liberal

conference, Colombia already had a Conservative president, Mariano Ospina Perez, and his successor, Laureano Gómez, at that moment Foreign Minister of Colombia and President of the conference, was one of the most staunch anti-liberals and anti-communists in the country, as earlier mentioned. Moreover, while the treaty for hemispheric defense had already been agreed upon one year earlier during the Inter-American meeting in Rio de Janeiro, the riots that followed the assassination of Gaitán led to the enactment of a "strongly worded resolution" supported by "many Latin American delegations." This resolution "denounced the antidemocratic nature of communism as well as its interventionist tendencies as a threat to freedom in the region. It called on each nation to eradicate those groups who would collaborate with foreign governments to threaten the internal security of any Latin American nation."[538] The conservative government had explained Gaitán's assassination as the work of communists and external forces.[539] For the church, the events of April 9th were "a 'catastrophe,' [the] 'product of a communist conspiracy' and a 'diabolic act', ... the expression of 'satanic hatred' and 'communist brutality.'"[540] U.S. Secretary of State Marshall, present at the conference in Bogotá, also accepted this point of view of the Conservatives and the church.

Thus, although the fear of the emergence of communism in the country had been latent for a long time, Gaitán's murder and the events that followed made this fear more tangible, and gave Conservatives more arguments to criminalize social movements and

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economic and political systems around the globe." Mark Eric Williams, *Understanding U.S.-Latin American Relations: Theory and History* (New York: Routledge, 2012), 155.
[538] Thomas M. Leonard, ed., "Ninth International Conference of American States, Bogotá, 1948," *Encyclopedia of U.S.-Latin American Relations* (Washington: CQ Press, 2012), http://dx.doi.org/10.4135/9781608717613.n614. Accessed: February 17, 2018.
[539] Acevedo C., *La Mentalidad de Las Élites Sobre La Violencia En Colombia, 1936-1949,* 52.
[540] Ibid., 1936-1949, 160.

unions, continuing a process of suppressing any kind of social protest.[541] In this context, housing was a complementary tool. The working class in the urban areas and the peasants in the rural areas were subjected not only to the welfare of the state, but to the social controls implemented. This was a necessary measure to contain the emergence of communism, so much feared by the elites, and much more by Laureano Gómez, who assumed the presidency of the country in 1950.

The church, with its own fear of communism, was an important catalyst in this project of contention. Given the cruelty and aggravation of the civil war *La Violencia* after Gaitán's murder, one could affirm that neither the church nor the welfare programs of the state, to which the ICT's housing program accounted, were able to contain the slaughter. However a social revolution did not take place at that moment. In that sense, both institutions were successful in their efforts to stop a revolution that would overthrow the government. Despite the differences between the two traditional parties, which were aggravated by the extreme rhetoric of some conservative politicians such as Laureano Gómez, and some representatives of the church such as Monsignor Builles, bishop of Santa Rosa de Osos in the department of Antioquia, the ICT served them equally showing their capability to deal with the conflict, and to gain some support under the working class and rural population.

Fear of communism was the name for fear of social upheaval. Several sources agree that the country's elites did not want to acknowledge that the myriad social problems the country had accumulated over a long period required not only welfare and social programs, but also profound changes in the political and economic structure of the

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[541] Some bishops condemned the Liberal party as allied with Communism in the events of April 9th. González, *Poderes Enfrentados,* 297.

country.[542] It was easier to blame the risk of communist expansion than to tackle the country's real problems. Hence, after the two traditional parties achieved an agreement to end the year-long bloodbath in the rural areas, and the liberal politician Alberto Lleras Camargo came to power in 1958, the political conflict was dissolved—but not so the social unrest. This is what made the military support of the U.S. necessary, and this is the reason why Colombia backed so enthusiastically and helped to advance the U.S. proposal to launch the hemispheric cooperation's program Alliance for Progress in 1961. The Cuban Revolution intensified the fear, now seen as something concrete and possible in other Latin American countries. Communism became a real threat that needed to be confronted with more energy. The U.S. and the elites in the various Latin American countries understood this, and all were eager to participate in this program. The social work developed in neighborhoods such as Ciudad Kennedy sought to counteract the forces that animated the people to follow the example of Cuba. Thus, the social programs, which I discuss in the last chapter, were also animated from the same old fear.

The role of the Catholic Church within the agency can be traced through Bishop Emilio de Brigard Ortiz' and Monsignor José Joaquín Salcedo's participation on the board of directors. A couple of months after the ICT's inception, Finance Minister Carlos Lleras Restrepo proposed the inclusion on the board of two representatives for the rural population.[543] From that moment on, Bishop Emilio de Brigard Ortiz was part of the board of directors, acting as one of the peasant representatives during the first phase of

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[542] Acevedo C., *La Mentalidad de Las Élites Sobre La Violencia En Colombia, 1936-1949,* 162; Jack Davis, "The Bogotazo," 76, accessed February 20, 2018, https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/kent-csi/vol13no4/pdf/v13i4a07p.pdf.
[543] This proposal was accepted, and incorporated into law, which was sanctioned in December of the same year (law 46, 1939).

the agency.[544] De Brigard continued as representative of the president after the configuration of the board changed in 1942. Monsignor Salcedo joined the board during the military regime of General Rojas Pinilla, in September of 1954, and stayed on until Rojas Pinilla was deposed again from power in May of 1957.[545] Both outstanding figures of the Catholic Church, they offered important support to the agency at different moments. Monsignor de Brigard was auxiliary bishop of Bogotá until his death. His proximity to the archbishop from Bogotá and Primate from Colombia, Ismael Perdomo, facilitated the latter in writing a memo to the bishops and the parish priests asking them to collaborate with work the government was doing on the rural housing campaign through the ICT. Although archbishop Perdomo probably approved the ICT's work, the closeness of de Brigard must have played an important role by receiving his direct support. The board acknowledged de Brigard's work for "the intelligent way in which he had grasped this work of social redemption."[546] Having de Brigard on the board of directors was also a strategic measure for mediating any of the regional parish priests' hostilities towards the agency's work.[547] Monsignor José Joaquín Salcedo on the other hand, was already well known in the country when he joined the ICT's board of directors in 1954. Beginning in 1947, he coordinated an extraordinary program to educate the rural

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[544] Together with De Brigard, Luis Cano was called in to represent the peasants on the board of directors. (Although he is not identifiable from the minutes as such, Luis Cano was the director of the liberal newspaper, El Espectador). Unfortunately, the minutes do not reveal the background of this proposal. Minute 20, October 1939.

[545] Minute 619 (incorrectly numbered: 719), September 8, 1954, p. 0269. Minute 16, May 16, 1957, p. 0771. Six days after the military Junta had come to power.

[546] Minute 48, October 24, 1940, p. 101.

[547] As Carlos Lleras Restrepo later gratefully recalled in: Lleras Restrepo, *Reseña Historica Del ICT,* 37. In one case, de Brigard went to a small town and after meeting with the parish priest, the latter promised, "complete neutrality so that the agency could push forward its campaign to build hygienic houses in that municipality." To "elevate the enthusiasm" of the people, they likewise agreed that de Brigard would "bless the first finished *little house* in which an image of the Sacred Heart of Jesus" should be enthroned. In: Minute 38, July 1940.

population through radio broadcasting. The radio Station Radio Sutatenza constitutes a milestone in the popular education in the country. Salcedo did not have the same tasks that de Brigard had had in the past. But he certainly asked for help to consolidate his program before he joined the agency, and once there, it seems that the president, General Rojas Pinilla, appreciated his opinions.[548]

The Church's collaboration in the agency's work can also be traced in the rural areas through the creation of the *Ligas Municipales Pro-Habitación Campesina* (Municipal Leagues Pro- Rural Housing) right at the time the agency was established, in 1939. As a result, these *Ligas Municipales* were set up in order to combine "advertising and action," following a proposal by Carlos Lleras Restrepo. As part of this proposal, the Mayor and the priest of every small town interested in participating in the ICT's rural housing program would be represented in these leagues, which ended up certifying the small farmer's landownership when no deed existed, which occurred in most cases.[549] Simultaneously, this initiative elucidates the power of the parish priests and the dependence on them in carrying the program out in the rural areas of the country. Many parish priests in the different regions refused to sign the certificates needed by the peasants in order to be able receive the credits offered to get their houses built by the agency.[550] As discussed in one of the board meetings, this refusal was in part related to possible obligations towards the peasants, who asked for their signatures, and to the fact that the priests were asked to certify that they "personally visited the parcels," which was seldom the case. Although they were reassured through a memo from the agency that their signatures, which were necessary for the peasant's applications, did not imply any

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[548] He asked for a loan to build houses for the "foreign staff" to work at the "radio schools." Minute 569 (incorrectly numbered: 669), August 3, 1953, p. 0113-back.
[549] Minute 23, November 15, 1939, p. 58.
[550] Minute 107, June 5 1942, p. 269.

228

compromise with the peasants, and the part of the certificate with the claim that the priest personally visited the parcels was eliminated, this refusal elucidates another deeper problem in the relation between the agency and the clergy, namely, the distrust of the agency by the regional parish priests.[551] They might have seen the ICT's work as an instrument of the liberal party to gain influence in their parishes.[552] In this light, the joint work with the church was not a contradiction but a much needed and pragmatic strategy to overcome the hurdle raised by hostile parish priests.

Although the Catholic Church significantly contributed to the agency's expansion and consolidation in the rural areas during its first years of existence, this close relationship implied a number of services from which the Catholic Church greatly profited. They asked for loans to build houses on their land; applications, which were in most cases approved without any difficulty. The various boards of directors generally responded in a friendly manner to the requests of the clergy. This friendly stance became more evident during the military regime of General Rojas Pinilla. During that period, the Church's use of the ICT became more prevalent, taking advantage of the military's friendly stance. Hence, the Church also benefited from the agency.[553]

In sum, this joint work between the church and the agency was a win-win relationship, in which the presence of each helped the other achieve its own goals, which in the end never implied a change to the existing conditions of the country. During the

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[551] The reasons for this reluctance and the terms of the memo that should be sent to the parish priests was discussed in the same meeting at which the letter from archbishop Perdomo Borrero was read. Minute 48, October 24, 1940, p. 101.

[552] Fernandez refers to the "low range priests" who were "sectarianly anti-liberals." González, *Poderes Enfrentados,* 292.

[553] There are innumerable examples of requests from catholic institutions, beneficence institutions, parish priests, catholic orders, asking for money to execute all kinds of projects throughout the minutes, from the start. Here, only a few. Minute 141, April 1943, p. 350; Minute 568 (incorrectly numbered: 668), July 28, 1953, p. 0113-back. Loan to the bishop of Tunja to finish the *Casa del Campesino* ("The peasant house"). Minute 6, May 4, 1956, p. 0071.

First National Housing Seminar of 1955, in the middle of Rojas Pinilla's regime, the church's participation in the agency's work was associated with the need to stimulate the *country of the peasants*, "victims of the confrontation of political passions and its multiple pernicious consequences," with the "Social Catholic doctrine." This was the reason why the ICT "has not hesitated to ask the clergy to collaborate with its apostolic assistance by the construction of the 'houses for the peasantry,' located in the municipalities' urban centers, under whose influence rural life will achieve the civilizing dignity it needs."[554]

HOUSING AS A VEHICLE TO CONSOLIDATE POWER: THE INVOLVEMENT OF THE U.S. THROUGH TECHNICAL AND FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE. COLOMBIA AND THE ICT AS A CASE STUDY

The cooperation between the United States and the ICT started at the end of WWII, although U.S. interactions with the Colombian government were already active in the field of rural housing since the end of the 1930s. The interactions took shape through financial, educational, and public institutions, through cooperation agencies, private enterprises in the field of housing and building materials, and individual architects. These relations reached their climax in the 1960s with the program Alliance for Progress. Self-help programs then became a crucial tool in this cooperation, and were broadly implemented in the construction of Ciudad Kennedy. This section identifies the different settings in which these interactions took place. What comes to the fore at a first glance as

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[554] Instituto de Crédito Territorial (Colombia), ed. *Una Política de Vivienda Para Colombia; Primer Seminario Nacional de Vivienda,* 1955. Bogotá, 1956, 17. One can imagine that these houses, where the ICT offered social services to the rural population of the region, and which resulted from a decree issued by the government of Laureano Gómez, Decree 2483 of 1952. It follows very much the spirit of the worker and peasant circles, promoted by the church. In the case of these houses, they should operate under the control of a board of directors comprised by the mayor of the municipality, the parish priest, and a delegate determined directly by the governor of each province (article six).

support from the one participant in this cooperation program to the other reveals as a strategy for the U.S. to support itself, to serve its own interests. Lars Shoultz succinctly captures the essence of the rationale behind U.S. Cooperation programs:

> For nearly two centuries, U.S. policy has invariably intended to serve the interests of the United States -interests variously related to our nation's security, to our domestic politics, or to our economic development. As the challenges to those interests ebb and flow, U.S. Policy adjusts to meet them. What remains unchanged are the interests.
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> Although these three interests are central to any explanation of United States policy toward Latin America, there is more to a full explanation. Underlying these three interests is a pervasive belief that Latin Americans constitute an inferior branch of the human species.[555]

The technical and financial cooperation in the field of housing through the ICT served the economic interests of the United States and its security, using the cooperation program as a tool against the spread of communism on the continent. Although the resulting relationship was defined by a power imbalance between the U.S. and Latin America, some of the spaces created under the direct guidance of the U.S. promoted alternative spaces of deliberation, conversation, and of interactions between the Latin American countries. The regional Pan-American meetings and one of its major endeavors, the creation of the "Centro Interamericano de Vivienda," CINVA (Inter-American Center of Housing) are some of them. Furthermore, the ICT also had its own agenda, which is expressed in the constant search for additional financial resources and for external advisors to conduct its commended endeavor. Based on these ideas, I argue that the interactions between Colombia and the U.S. that took shape in the specific case of the ICT, served as a way to consolidate this imbalanced relationship between the two parties. Thus, the U.S., which declared itself as an example to be emulated, used housing

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[555] Lars Schoultz, *Beneath the United States: A History of U.S. Policy toward Latin America* (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1998), xv.

policy as a geo-strategic tool to strengthen its dominant position in Latin America. Its interactions with the ICT serve as a case study to observe and analyze the different forms this process unfolded. Yet the same case study serves as a way to understand the complexity of these interactions through the agency's own agenda and the unexpected spaces of interaction that strengthened the exchange of information with other Latin American countries.

Already by the ICT's inception at the end of the 1930s, interactions between the Colombian government and U.S. cooperation agencies ensued in the field of housing. The representative of the Ministry of Labor, Hygiene and Welfare on the ICT's board of directors, Arturo Robledo, reported in a board meeting in 1939 that this ministry sent a "Colombian engineer" to the U.S. with the *Bolsa Viajera* (Travel Scholarship) from the Rockefeller Foundation "to study all that related to the rural housing." Also, two other scholarships offered by the U.S. government through the *Union Sanitaria Panamericana* ("Pan-American Sanitary Bureau") were to be given to an engineer and a physician to study preferably the same topic.[556] The Rockefeller Foundation was active through hygiene campaigns in Colombia since 1916.[557] By the end of the 1940s, the education of professionals in the field of sanitation was supported by the Sanitary Pan-American Bureau and a series of U.S. NGOs and governmental health agencies: the Rockefeller Foundation, the Kellogg Foundation, and the Service of Public Health.[558] This cooperation program encompassed more than just sanitation issues, as Maria Teresa Gutierrez claims, the Rockefeller Foundation's "influence spread to other fields such as

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[556] Minute 3, March 1939, p. 10.
[557] Gutierrez, "Proceso de Institucionalización de La Higiene: Estado, Salubridad e Higienismo En Colombia En La Primera Mitad Del Siglo XX."
[558] World Bank and Currie, eds., *Bases de un Programa de Fomento Para Colombia,* 574.

the political, social and economic, as well as the scientific."[559] This close involvement of such diverse U.S. agencies in Colombia exposes the close relations between the two countries already by the time the ICT was established, and foretells the direction of the technical support the agency would take after WWII under Truman's Point Four policy and later in the 1960s through the Alliance for Progress.

Technical support was always backed by economic interests, which sought to promote U.S. industry. The Federal Housing Administration (FHA) sent a representative, Jacob Crane, to Colombia at the beginning of 1946 in order to get acquainted with its "building methods, architectonic building styles in the cities and in the rural areas, as well as building material's prices and transportation."[560] Crane, the same man who promoted self-help housing from within the U.S. housing authorities, expressed the possibility of offering loans to the ICT, "not in money but in building materials, toilets, zinc tiles, nails, etc." He also encouraged contacting the Institute for Tropical Housing in Puerto Rico, "to exchange ideas and to seek international orientation regarding the issue of housing..."[561]

Later, the consequences of the destruction produced by the assassination of Gaitán in Bogotá, known as "El Bogotazo", led to launching a *Junta de Reconstrucción* (Reconstruction Junta). Through this measure, a series of measures were taken, and the government received *support* from the U.S. government. The Export & Import Bank guaranteed a US$10 million credit that the Colombian government was to use in form of building materials purchased from U.S. firms.[562] That this was more than only *aid* for the

[559] Gutierrez, "Proceso de Institucionalización de La Higiene: Estado, Salubridad e Higienismo En Colombia En La Primera Mitad Del Siglo XX."
[560] Minute 230, January 21, 1946, p. 489-back.
[561] Minute 231, February 4, 1946, p. 491.
[562] Therefore, an ICT delegation traveled to the U.S. to buy materials. In: Minute 323, June 17, 1948, p. 738. The difficult process of acquiring the building materials was carried out over the whole year of 1948, as reported in: Minute 341, October 7, 1948, p. 790-back.

reconstruction of the city was clear from the start. But that this was a state-led strategy became evident when Thomas O'Keefe, Assistant to the Secretary of Commerce of the United States, visited the country in October 1948 "in order to get acquainted with the [country's] needs regarding the import of building materials, especially those for the reconstruction of Bogotá and the ICT's projects." In this context, O'Keefe planned to visit a number of ICT neighborhoods in different cities.[563] This agreement was still in effect as late as December 1949 and the arrival of materials bought with this credit coincided with the expansion of the ICT's endeavors in urban areas throughout the country.[564] Three years earlier the Colombian government had already considered using such a credit institution to accomplish some of its own goals. In October 1945, the president Alberto Lleras Camargo, discussed in a meeting with the general managers of the Banks of the city of Bogotá the possibility to consider this financial institution as a possible buyer of the bonds emitted by the ICT, and even to receive building materials and prefabricated houses produced in the United States from it.[565]

While this reciprocal interest received a decisive impulse in the wake of the reconstruction of Bogotá, the Currie Mission arrived in Colombia in 1949. The Currie mission was another result of the Colombian government's efforts to find external aid. This mission was sent by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (an earlier denomination of the World Bank). It was lead by the Canadian Lauchlin Currie and comprised merely of U.S. American technocrats. In September of 1950, they visited the ICT's general manager and gathered a vast amount of information about the

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[563] Minute 344, October 28, 1948, p. 796.
[564] It simultaneously caused an unexpected congestion at the different ports of the country and became a logistic challenge to the Institute. Minute 410, January 13, 1950, p.998-back; Minute 410, January 13, 1950, p. 1001-back.
[565] Minute 223, November12, 1945, p. 480.

institute.[566] The same year, they delivered their final report, which constitutes the first comprehensive assessment of different aspects of the country, and an action plan based on this diagnostic.[567] Unfortunately, the specific suggestions regarding the ICT are not part of this final report, only some general suggestions are included, which hint at the major transformations that characterize the course of the agency during the 1950s: stronger inclusion of private capital in the housing program and merging with other state agencies.

Since the 1950s, self-help housing programs were strongly supported by U.S. aid agencies. They envisioned these programs as a panacea to solving social problems in the *developing* world, and as a means to successfully solve the housing shortage in Latin America. The aim of the assistance based on self-help programs is related to what W.W. Rostow stated in his work *The Stages of Economic Growth*. For Rostow, the role of the United States consisted in supporting *developing* countries, by the promotion of "development through self-sustaining economic growth and industrialization."[568] "Self-sustaining economic growth" went hand in hand with self-help housing programs like those the U.S. housing agencies had already experimented with in Puerto Rico.[569] Probably due to the favorable assessment of this experience, official policies "on housing promulgated to the field missions gave emphasis to the concept of aided self-help" as "the

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[566] They requested information on the institute's organization, proceedings, and especially on the finance of the bonds for territorial credit, the transformation of this loan in tax, the structure of the board of directors and its tasks, its relationship with the general management and with the governing bodies. Minute 444, September 21, 1950, p. 1109-back. They seemed to be well informed, yet they did not shared the results of their research until they were able to process all the requested information, including the legal provisions and the ICT's regulations. Minute 444, September 21, 1950, p. 1110.

[567] World Bank and Currie, *Bases de un programa de fomento para Colombia.*

[568] Benmergui, "The Alliance for Progress and Housing Policy in Rio de Janeiro and Buenos Aires in the 1960s."

[569] Vázquez Calcerrada, P. B. *Housing in Puerto Rico under the Mutual Aid and Self-Help Program.* San Juan, P.R.: International Federation for Housing & Planning, 1960. The content of this text extremely resembles the guidelines followed by the ICT.

most promising modern approach to housing problems in the underdeveloped areas."[570] This same idea was part of the U.S. technical assistance program Point Four. Puerto Rico served as the model, which was taught and disseminated through the CINVA (Inter-American Center of Housing). CINVA, installed in Bogotá in 1951, educated an entire generation of Latin American professionals in housing. Thus, it impacted consistently the approach to solving the housing deficit in Latin America.

When the U.S. foreign aid program for Latin America the "Alliance for Progress" was launched in 1961, the idea of progress was only one of its components. The other, equally important and directly connected with the idea of progress, and an obvious component of the program, was U.S. Security, which was being threatened by the expansion of Communism. The Cuban Revolution sharply elucidated this threat, which was equally felt in Colombia.

As explained earlier, the specter of Communism had animated internal political confrontations at least since the 1930s. Thus, the Alliance was a two-sided program, but Colombia consciously embraced it with all its different components. Alberto Lleras Camargo, who was president of the country for the second time between 1958 and 1962, when the Alliance was launched, seems to have counted as one of the major Latin American supporters of the formation of the Alliance as a means to "pacifically" neutralize Cuban influence in Latin America.[571] The Alliance propelled the agency's low-cost housing construction program and made housing improvement a matter of high political priority in Colombia.

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[570] United States and Robinson, *Aided Self-Help Housing, Its History and Potential,* 16.
[571] See: Caballero Argáez, Carlos, Patricia Pinzón de Lewin, Eduardo Escallón, and María Natalia Marín Suárez. *Alberto Lleras Camargo y John F. Kennedy: amistad y política internacional: recuento de episodios de la Guerra Fría, la Alianza para el Progreso y el problema de Cuba.* Primera edición. Bogotá, D.C., Colombia: Universidad de Los Andes, Escuela de Gobierno Alberto Lleras Camargo: Ediciones Uniandes, 2014.

Since Ciudad Kennedy was developed to a large extent with financial support from the United States through the Alliance for Progress, the U.S. Americans were present, unsurprisingly, in the construction of Ciudad Kennedy through two different groups, the United States Peace Corps Volunteers and the United States Information Service (USIS).[572] The former lived and worked in Ciudad Kennedy. President Kennedy created the Peace Corps at the time the Alliance for Progress was launched, thus the volunteer's task was to support the achievement of the goals of this program. The latter operated a mobile unit, which was "equipped with a movie projector, screen, movies, etc., and staffed by a projectionist. Aside from "entertaining," its purpose was unknown even to the U.S. American CINVA summer research fellow, who is the source of most of the information about the institutions working in Ciudad Kennedy. He claimed in his report that "the full nature, scope and impact of its operations is unknown. .... However, this activity falls under the jurisdiction of the newly-created USIS Community Development Office, which might lead some to believe that there would be more of a rationale behind such programs than merely gratuitous entertainment for children."[573]

These series of events evidence the existence of a much broader structure, which involved technical support as well as financial help from the United States, who sought closer ties with the Latin American states through it. As many scholars in the U.S. have shown, this was not a naïve and altruistic intervention by the United States. It had clear political and economic goals, and all these events are part of its implemented strategies.

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[572] Rudell, "Community Development in Ciudad Kennedy: An Examination of the Existing Programs of Social Service with Proposals for Their Coordination and Expansion," 40, 50.

[573] He noted in a footnote to this suspicion that in "a more positive light, the USIS Community Development Office has provided valuable supportive services to the PCVs in Ciudad Kennedy. USIS helped to underwrite the costs of printing a newspaper (now defunct) in Super-block #8, it has printed comic books and pamphlets on such things as water purification, and it is a constant source of films..." In: Rudell, "Community Development in Ciudad Kennedy: An Examination of the Existing Programs of Social Service with Proposals for Their Coordination and Expansion," 40.

However, the spaces the U.S. helped to create through the Pan American Union had other unpredictable consequences. Regional conferences, served as a space of relevant exchange with other Latin American countries. The ICT was invited to participate in the Colombian Delegation to the Regional Conference in Quito, from May 28th to June 10th of 1950, and organized by the Pan-American Union to discuss topics such as cooperatives, workers education, social services, housing and urban planning.[574]

The omnipresence of the U.S. during this period spanned from the extensive proposals previously presented, to minor events such as the note of thanks the U.S. embassy sent to the ICT for the rural housing plans it made available to Ecuador to assist in the construction of the houses recently destroyed by earthquakes there.[575] Although the influence of the United States defending and enforcing its views and own interests is undeniable, the overwhelming presence of technicians of other Latin American countries sharing their experiences, contributed to a diverse body of thought on issues regarding housing.

Pan-American meetings and CINVA

In this section I develop the connections between the ICT and numerous Pan-American initiatives, which individually reveal subtle interactions between Colombia and both other Latin American countries and the United States, but become particularly

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[574] Minute 423, May 4, 1950, p. 1031.

One concrete result of this Pan American cooperation was the fellowship two of the ICT's technicians received to travel abroad and to specialize. The engineer and director assistant of the Technical Department, Eduardo Albornoz Plata, and the general manager of the Cali ICT's office, Gustavo Aristizabal. Minute 550, February 9, 1953, p. 0056.

In addition, the government of Ecuador sent a group of architects and engineers to visit the ICT's housing programs. Since the agency paid the expenses of the Ecuadorian delegation, one suspects that there was a special interest between those two countries. In: Minute 535, August 18, 1952, p. 0020-back.

[575] Minute 398, September 1, 1949, p. 951-back.

evident in the establishment of CINVA, the Inter-American Center for Housing and Planning, and its subsequent collaboration with the ICT. Although the ICT itself was not involved in the inception of this initiative, CINVA's establishment in Bogotá in 1951 and the cooperation between the two institutions had a lasting impact on the ICT's work during the 1950s and 1960s, enabling the agency to significantly advance its development of building technology. The CINVA students used the real projects of the ICT to acquire practical experience or apply the theoretical content taught at the Center. They conducted their fieldwork by experimenting directly with new materials and building methods in the housing projects built by the ICT, interviewing the residents at CUAN, and, in the case of students in the construction through self-help courses, accompanying the future residents of Ciudad Kennedy in the process of aided self-help during construction.[576] The close-knit set of relations between the ICT and the United States through the different Pan-American initiatives of the period of this study clearly materialized in CINVA. Some of the most significant ideas emanating from the U.S. government on technical cooperation with the Latin American countries, such as self-help, were channeled through this research and education center.

However, the process of establishing CINVA was not straightforward. Several meetings on a Pan-American level from the end of the 1930s were necessary to finally crystallize this initiative for the improvement of housing in Latin America. In this process, numerous meetings provided alternative spaces, in which the different Latin American countries were able to develop their own agendas as well, despite significant U.S. interference in the approach to housing. Thus, the Pan-American initiatives served not only as a platform to solidify U.S. American influence on the continent, but they also

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[576] At least in the super-blocks 6, 6A, 8, 8A, and 16.

constituted the space where other American countries met and learned from each other. Colombia participated in many of these meetings, and the ICT, being the main state agency responsible for building low-cost housing, participated likewise in some of these encounters. This section explores the various Pan-American meetings, which finally led to the establishment of CINVA, and how these meetings and CINVA itself informed the ICT's work.

The Inter-American Conferences promoted by the Pan-American Union and the Pan-American Conferences of Architects were the two different spaces in which the discussions on housing took place on a hemispheric level, and in which, eventually, the need to establish a Pan-American center for housing emerged. The origin of these meetings responded to separate rationales and occurred at different moments, but they converged several times throughout the period in which they operated. On the one hand, the Pan-American Union met for the first time in Washington from October 1889 to April 1890, under the denomination the "First International Conference of American States."[577] In these meetings "issues such as closer trade and smoother political relations" were discussed. The agreement on a "peaceful settlement of disputes" was also central aim of this first meeting.[578] On the other hand, the first Pan-American Congress of Architects was held in Montevideo, Uruguay, in 1920, as a space for reflection, exchange and consolidation of the profession.[579]

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[577] http://www.oas.org/en/about/our_history.asp. Accessed: March 8, 2018.
[578] Williams, *Understanding U.S.-Latin American Relations,* 127.
[579] The Architects' meetings still occur today, now under the name of La Federación Panamericana de Asociaciones de Arquitectos, FPAA (Pan-American Federation of Architect's Associations).

The architects' meetings, like the Inter-American Conferences, were simultaneously nurtured by and an expression of "Pan-Americanism."[580] This concept enabled the most diverse interpretations, from a completely idealized view according to which Pan-Americanism "is not a doctrine, in the true sense of the word, but a feeling, or better: an ideal," to the harsh verdict of the Peruvian politician Raul Haya de la Torre, who in his publication of 1935, "Where does Indo-America Go?", rejected the term Pan-American "for being an expression of Yankee imperialism."[581] The tensions that arose around this term spoke in the Inter-American Conferences reveal the competing interests of its members and especially, between the United States and Latin America. They also reflect the political and economic premises that had defined relations between the United States and Latin America as far back as the proclamation of the Monroe Doctrine. However, despite the real confrontations between the U.S. and Latin America, the Pan-American Union's well-known publication on "housing, architecture and urban planning issues" enabled a dissemination of Pan-Americanism among the professionals working on housing.[582]

The pressing need of housing that crystallized with the inclusion of Latin America in the logics of industrialization and subsequent urbanization processes, drove these two Pan-American interest groups to tackle the issue of low-cost housing. The discussions

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[580] The realization of this idea in the built environment is studied and presented in: Robert Alexander Gonzalez, *Designing Pan-America: U.S. Architectural Visions for the Western Hemisphere,* 1st ed, Roger Fullington Series in Architecture (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2011).

[581] The more idealistic opinion on Pan-Americanism was expressed by one of the speakers at the Pan American Conference of Architects in 1947 in Lima. In: *Actas Del VI. Congreso Panamericano de Arquitectos: Lima, 15 de Octubre de 1947, Cuzco 25 de Octubre de 1947* (Lima: s.n., 1953), 74.
The quotation from Raúl Haya de la Torre is in: Silvia Arango, *Ciudad y Arquitectura: Seis Generaciones Que Construyeron La América Latina Moderna,* Arte Universal (México: Fondo de Cultura Económica : Consejo Nacional para la Cultura y las Artes, 2012), 209.

[582] Ramón Gutiérrez, Jorge Tartarini, and Rubens Stagno, *Congresos Panamericanos de Arquitectos, 1920-2000: Aportes Para Su Historia* (Buenos Aires: CEDODAL, 2007), 9.

about the scarcity of low-cost housing in those meetings reflect the specific concerns of each country and the way in which each of them explored possible strategies to solve the problem. The meetings of the architects and of the Pan-American Union simultaneously reveal the search for collaborative solutions between the different countries through the exchange of experiences and through the development of Pan-American initiatives, such as the consolidation of the Inter-American Housing and Planning Center, CINVA. In these meetings, the need for the state's active participation in, and architects' active intervention in, the production of low-cost housing was also corroborated.[583]

Low-cost housing was addressed from the very first Pan-American Conference of Architects in 1920, though with significant transformations over time regarding content and focus. While the need to "promote the construction of hygienic and cheap spaces" was formulated during the first conference, it was at the 1960 Congress that housing was defined as the fulfillment of a human right, which can not be "dissociated from other human rights,..."[584] This definition clearly derived from the notion of the Right to housing that was embodied in Article 25 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948. Moreover, the transformation of the concept "low-cost housing" was mediated by the proportion of homes comprising the housing deficit in the continent. Whereas approximately 25 million homes were needed to be added or replaced in Latin America at the end of the 1940s, by 1960 40 million dwellings were already needed.[585] That said, the measures finally taken in the different countries to address this deficit also changed over

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[583] The call for architects to get more involved in social issues was made both in the Congress of 1927 and of 1955. In the latter, it was asserted that architecture and planning are "specifically linked to the living spaces," understanding this as the social function of architects. In: Gutiérrez, Tartarini, and Stagno, *Congresos Panamericanos de Arquitectos, 1920-2000,* 25.

[584] Ibid., 86.

[585] Violich and Jones, *Low-Cost Housing in Latin America*, 8; Marcia Koth de Paredes et al., *Housing in Latin America* (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1965), 36. A calculation prior to these dates is difficult given the precarious censuses and of the housing deficit calculation.

time in correlation with the recommendations made during the conferences. Although several countries had already implemented strategies aimed at the construction of low-cost housing prior to the first architects' meeting, it was only from the 1930s on that the state institutions consolidated. The establishment of the state institutions responded to the spirit of the "Official Commissions of Cheap Homes," recommended in the conference of 1927. The ICT's launch in 1939 clearly corresponds to this chronology.

The Pan-American conferences and institutions offered a space to "introduce North and South American technicians to one another and to stimulate sustained programs of contact by exchange of ideas, manpower, and students."[586] They also positively infused the work of the ICT with new ideas. At the beginning of 1947 the general manager presented a report of his participation in the 12th Pan-American Sanitary Conference in Caracas, where he also had the opportunity to visit *El Silencio*, other working-class neighborhoods, and hospitals, as well as the organization from *El Banco Obrero* (The Worker's Bank), from which he hoped the Institute could learn plenty in terms of administration, building methods, and materials.[587] The ICT members' visits to Puerto Rico and Venezuela created connections that led the agency to hire and receive guest architects from these two countries (and to get familiar with the body of thought on a Pan-American level, which was very fertile at that moment). In addition to extending an invitation to the "eminent Spanish architect Fernando Salvador, Chief of the Section of Architecture in the Sanitary Engineering Division of the Ministry of Health and Welfare

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[586] Violich, *Cities of Latin America,* 217.
[587] Minute 256, February 2 1947, p. 534 – back.

of the United States of Venezuela,"[588] the general manager received from the board the authorization to hire the engineer Adolfo A. Mussenden, from Puerto Rico.[589]

Technological cooperation in the spirit of Pan-Americanism gained relevance after WWII through the various Inter-American institutions. In Colombia, the government and, specifically, the ICT were in communication with different Inter-American organizations. In August 1946, the general manager met Mr. Charles val Polse during the inspection of a slum in the city of Popayán. Val Polse was from the *Servicio Cooperativo Interamericano* (Inter-American Cooperative Service), which was active in the area at the time.[590] Although slum clearance was not yet a major endeavor for the ICT, this meeting was indeed related to the clearance of a slum at the river Ejido constituted by 31 houses across three blocks. The representatives of the two agencies discussed relocating the families. Afterwards, the ICT directly sought the advice of the Inter-American Service for Public Health in developing the first large urban housing project in Bogotá.[591]

These crisscrossed interactions with both regional institutions and the United States present a more nuanced picture of the influences that nurtured the ICT at the end of the 1940s. The visits of some ICT members to Venezuela and Puerto Rico, as well as their participation in the Pan-American Conference of Architects in Lima in 1947, established distinct connections with other Latin American countries' experiences with housing development. Moreover, after the Conference in Lima, the board of directors

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[588] Minute 263, April 14, 1947, p. 550.
[589] Minute 282, September 25, 1947, p. 605
[590] Minute 247, August 19, 1946, p. 514 –back.
[591] Minute 250, September 23, 1946, p. 518-back.

proposed sending a commission representing the ICT to Santiago to "study what is being done in that nation in regard to working-class neighborhoods."[592]

While the recommendations regarding housing that emerged, on the one hand, from the Pan-American meetings of Architects and, on the other, from the Inter-American Conferences, seem to be the result of separate worlds, the establishment of the Inter-American Center for Housing and Planning, CINVA, indicates the existence of convergence points between them. The First Pan-American Popular Housing Conference in Buenos Aires in 1939 recommended the creation of a Pan-American Institute of Popular Housing.[593] This proposal was justified, among many other reasons, by the need for an entity that could both unify and lead efforts to turn the recommendations emanating from the various Pan-American conferences into action. The recommendations of that historic meeting were adopted at the Architects' meeting of 1940 in Montevideo. Despite the clear will of both groups to consolidate this institution, this proposal received a new impulse only after the Second World War. The Pan-American Union set up a program to recollect information on housing and planning issues in Latin America in 1945.[594] The architects, for their part, agreed during the sixth Pan-American Meeting of Architects in Lima in 1947 to hold a "Pan-American Conference on Housing" the following year, with the main goal being to establish "the Pan-American Institute of Housing."[595] That conference never took place. Instead, the Organization of American

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[592] Minute 284, October 2, 1947, p 618-back.

[593] Congreso Panamericano de la Vivienda Popular, Argentina, and Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores y Culto, eds., *Primer Congreso panamericano de la vivienda popular* (Buenos Aires: Tallares Gráficos del Ministerio de Obras Públicas, 1940).

[594] Anatole A. Solow and Rodrigo Masís, *Cooperación Interamericana En El Campo de Vivienda y Urbanismo; Documento Presentado Ante El VII Congreso Panamericano de Arquitectos, Habana, Cuba, Abril 10-16, 1950* (Washington: Sección de Vivienda y Planificación, Divisionde Asuntos Sociales y de Trabajo, 1950), 6-7.

[595] *Actas del VI. Congreso Panamericano de Arquitectos*, 189.

States, OAS, was established that same year, 1948, at the Inter-American Conference in Bogotá.

Within the OAS, a Housing and Planning Section was created in 1949 as part of the Division of Social Affairs and Labor. This section studied "different aspects of housing, such as production and building methods, design, codes, program administration, finance methods, housing inventories, housing needs, the elimination of unsanitary neighborhoods and rehabilitation." It also provided countries such as Costa Rica, Guatemala and El Salvador with technical advisory services on housing and urban planning.[596] In addition, and in compliance with the provisions of Point Four of the Truman policy of 1949, the Housing and Planning Section was in charge of the "establishment of a research center for the testing of building materials for the construction of low-cost housing..." In 1950, the Division of Social Affairs and Labor supported and organized a Regional Conference in Quito, in which one member of the ICT's board of directors, Efrain Fierro, participated with the Colombian delegation.[597] At this conference, Pan American cooperation was also extensively discussed. One of the most important proposals of the Pan American Union was a "tropical housing institute," the centerpiece of the envisioned cooperation. The proposed initiative also considered a group of [U.S.] advisers in housing and urban planning for the different American states, while the institute would be responsible for the design, development of materials, and practical research.[598] The proposal focused on training professionals in the field of housing and urban planning through a number of centers advised by Pan American technicians, the establishment of research institutions throughout the region, and

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[596] Solow and Masís, *Cooperación Interamericana En El Campo de Vivienda y Urbanismo; Documento Presentado Ante El VII Congreso Panamericano de Arquitectos, Habana, Cuba, Abril 10-16, 1950*, 8.
[597] Minute 428, June 19, 1950, p. 1058 - 1059-back.
[598] Minute 428, June 19, 1950, p. 1059.

strengthening the Pan-American Union's section of housing and urban planning, ostensibly with the support of Latin American technicians. Some of the proposals included aspects showing the other side of the coin of this magnificent proposal: that the advice given should help to "determine the potential of local resources," and that a strengthened section of housing and planning in the Pan American Union should set the establishment of commercial contacts in order to produce consumer goods in Latin America as a primary goal.[599]

Finally, one year later, in 1951, the oft-mentioned center ultimately became the longed-for Pan-American Institute for Housing. The Inter-American Center for Housing and Planning, CINVA, as it was finally named, initiated its activities under the direction of Leonard J. Currie in 1952 in Bogotá, basically as had been foreseen since the 1939 Conference. Currie worked previously at Harvard University, where he taught design, and was part of The Architects Collaborative with Walter Gropius.[600] The decision to establish this center in Bogotá responded to the advantages of its location. Relatively equidistant to the north and south of the hemisphere, the city offered a wide variety of climate zones in proximate distance.[601] Also, the willingness of the *Universidad Nacional* and the ICT to participate in this project played a major role. Interestingly, former Colombian president Alberto Lleras Camargo was Secretary General of the OAS (1947 - 1954) at the time Bogotá was selected as the seat of CINVA. He was the emissary of the good news[602].

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[599] Minute 428, June 19, 1950, p. 1059-back.
[600] Anatole Solow, "The Inter-American Housing Center-a Major Example of International Cooperative Effort," The American City 68, no. 1 (January 1953): 118–20.
[601] Ibid.
[602] Editorial of Proa 49, July of 1951.

The meetings convened for the establishment of the CINVA in Bogota took place in 1951. According to Gabriel Serrano Camargo, architect and former member of the ICT board of directors, representatives of the *Universidad Nacional*, of the Association of Architects, and one delegate each of the Ministry of Foreign Relations and the Bank of the Republic, and finally, of Anatole A. Solow as the representative of the Pan-American Union participated in these meetings. These conversations aimed to select Colombia as the seat for the *Centro Interamericano Experimental de Adiestramiento en Vivienda Económica* (Experimental Inter-American Center for Training in Low-Cost Housing). Serrano Camargo explained to the board of directors about the importance this center could have for the work of the ICT.[603] This was not the first time the importance of such a center was discussed in the board meetings. When the ICT received the invitation to participate in the Conference on Tropical Housing to be held in Caracas in December of 1947, one of the board members, Guillermo Wiesner, claimed that the ICT should participate in the conference and offer all its support. Furthermore, he noted the convenience of establishing a permanent office for tropical housing headquartered in Bogota; an office for which the ICT could offer its management, with the necessary staff being paid by all participating countries."[604] At the end of May 1951, the conversations between the ICT's general manager and the architect of the Bank of the Republic, Carlos E. Perez, indicate that the process to establish this training center in Colombia was ongoing at the highest governmental level.[605]   The agreement between the three cooperating institutions, Universidad Nacional de Colombia, the ICT and the OAS, was finally signed in October of 1951. The center appears as "Project 22" of the Technical

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[603] Minute 471, April 27, 1951, p. 1215.
[604] This conference, which was sponsored by the United Nations, took place on December 2, 1947. Minute 293, November 27, 1947, p. 644.
[605] Minute 474, May 25, 1951, p. 1218-back.

Cooperation Program of the OAS. In this agreement, a the responsibilities of each of the three participating institutions were defined, as well as the four main goals and tasks of the center: "experimentation and research on urban and rural housing, training of professionals of the different member states of the OAS in the different aspects of 'the housing problem', dissemination of knowledge on housing resulting from the studies and experiences conducted in the Center and outside, and finally, technical support on housing improvement."[606]

CINVA thus became a space for the production and transmission of knowledge, in which an entire generation of Latin American professionals met and received training on issues related to housing.[607] The training comprehended six courses of lectures on the "theoretical, physical, technological economic and social aspects of housing" and two interdisciplinary projects, during which the theoretical knowledge could be applied. In a second part of the program, issues related to project management, seminars on "the philosophy of housing, and research methods," two electives as well as two interdisciplinary projects were also taught.[608] An article on the Information Documentation's service of CINVA, which appeared in the journal *Ingenieria y Arquitectura* in 1954, describes the tasks fulfilled by this service, and how it contributed to the dissemination of information produced on housing.[609]

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[606] "Acuedo entre la Universidad Nacional de Colombia, el Instituto de Crédito Territorial y la Unión Panamericana, Secretaría general de la Organización de los Estados Americanos." In: Fondo Universidad Nacional de Colombia. Colección Centro Interamericano De Vivienda -CINVA. Publicaciones, Acuerdo, box 11, file 3.

[607] A comprehensive study on CINVA in: Jorge Alberto Rivera Páez, "El CINVA: Un Modelo de Cooperación Técnica: 1951-1972" (Universidad Nacional de Colombia Facultad de Ciencias Humanas, 2002).

[608] Pan American Union, ed., *Centro Interamericano de Vivienda y Planeamiento, 1952-1962* (Washington: Unión Panamericana, 1962), 8.

[609] The service of scientific interchange comprised the library, the exchange department, publications and bibliographic research. The publication of the results of the technicians at CINVA is part of the goals of this service. It also disseminated the information that arrives at the library through publications. The access

Figure 4.1. CINVAs library. *Ingenieria y Arquitectura* No. 119 (vol. 10) September - October 1954, 44.

Technical cooperation was the key word to overcoming Latin America's housing problems. The ICT acknowledged the importance of all American governments' participation in the various seminars and conferences organized by the Pan-American Union and other Inter-American institutions during the first National Housing Seminar it organized in 1955. They recognized the need to maximize the "general cooperation of all countries in solving, through technical and economic formulas, the horrific problem of the lack of low-cost housing, which threateningly darkens the social condition of the

of the fellows to this information certainly constitutes a space of exchange of ideas, through the accessibility to new and relevant information produced in other parts of the world. Circa 2500 institutions and persons from all over the world, but especially from Latin America, are registered in the program of exchange, which share with CINVA publications. Especially the fellows have contributed to this bank of information, sharing "unpublished material with information on plans and research works of their own countries." Luis Floren, leader of the Service for scientific exchange. In: *Ingenieria y Arquitectura* No. 119 (vol. 10) of September and October of 1954.

nations."[610] Indeed, as Francis Violich pointed out in his publication on Latin American cities, Latin Americans wanted "technical assistance in order to raise their standard of living so that they may achieve democratic freedom." In his view, not acting to alleviate the "low standards of living" in Latin America would "remain a threat to their democracy and to ours."[611] This cooperation was thus seen as an enterprise that would benefit both parties. Violich asserted that

> [t]ruly human objectives in hemisphere relations will be advantageous not to Latin America alone: benefits will accrue to both Latin America and the United States. We can learn as much from the Latin Americans as they can from us. Waldo Frank, in a public address given in San Francisco, spoke of the western hemisphere as two incomplete "half-worlds" that are essential to one another for complete maturity.[612]

The spirit that emanates from Violich's publication was still infused with the spirit of the good neighbor policy.

> Never before have we been in such close contact with our neighbors as now, during World War II, and never before have we sent North Americans in such large groups, or for such a varied number of reasons, to Latin America. And, as we have seen, we are now offering the kind of cooperation the Latins want of us.[613]

Although Violich foresaw some of the needs of the time at the end of the war with astonishingly clarity, this optimistic, egalitarian view of Inter-American relations became more uni-directional shortly thereafter. Truman's Point Four policy maintained the idea of offering technical support, but the idea that the U.S. could also learn something from Latin America was lost.

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[610] Instituto de Crédito Territorial (Colombia), ed. *Una Política de Vivienda Para Colombia; Primer Seminario Nacional de Vivienda, 1955*. Bogotá, 1956, 27.
[611] Violich, Cities of Latin America, 212.
[612] Ibid., 201.
[613] Ibid., 220.

251

Point Four and the University of Illinois

Technical cooperation between Colombia and the United States on one side and Latin America on the other, evolved within Pan-American institutions such as CINVA, but also in a more unidirectional strain executed directly by the U.S. Government in the various countries through the Point Four Program. The ICT received direct support from the U.S. through this program from 1954 through 1957, coinciding with most of the military government of General Rojas Pinilla (1953-1957). The program, stemming from the "Fourth Point of President Truman Inaugural Address of January 20, 1949," basically sought, as Anatole Solow informs us, "to help economically and technologically less-developed countries to apply technical know-how to all phases of social and economic life, to bridge the gap between prevailing practices and available knowledge, and to raise, in this manner, the standard of living for millions of people."[614] Harold Robinson, former chief of Housing and Urban Development at the Latin America Bureau of the (U.S.) Agency for International Development claimed that among the strategies to overcome underdevelopment, Truman included in this program the "production of materials for housing."[615] He further reported that

> [e]ven prior to the enactment of the Point Four legislation in June 1950, a State Department publication explaining the proposed technical assistance agreed that "adequate shelter is a fundamental objective of economic development, and is essential to progress in other fields of development. It is therefore, desirable to make housing experts available to countries requesting them, and to bring professionals and trainees to the U.S. for observation and education."[616]

Thus, cooperation with the ICT conformed to the basic lines of the program. Consequently, the U.S. and Colombia signed an agreement "for the initiation of a

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[614] Anatole A. Solow, "Urban Progress in Latin America. 'Point IV' Technical Assistance to Help People Help Themselves," The American City 66:2 (February 1951): 112–13.
[615] United States and Robinson, Aided Self-Help Housing, Its History and Potential, 16.
[616] Ibid.

technical cooperation project with the Instituto de Crédito Territorial in the field of housing to be carried out through a contract with the Small Homes Council of the University of Illinois."[617]

The Point Four Program was, however, embedded in a complex net of initiatives to strengthen the position of the U.S. in Latin America after WWII. The direct involvement in Latin America became most visible during the war with the creation of the Institute for Inter-American Affairs (IIAA) in 1942. This institute, with a colorful agenda, and directed by Nelson Rockefeller, changed its nature after the end of the war. Although this program did not conduct major assistance programs in Colombia during the war, it is relevant for this account since it became "the administrative agency for Point Four in Latin America."[618] In fact, the agreement for technical cooperation between the U.S. and Colombian government reads: "The Institute of Inter-American Affairs of the Foreign Operations Administration (hereinafter referred to as IIAA/FOA) will furnish a group of technicians and specialists to collaborate with the Inscredial [ICT] in carrying out a cooperative program of Housing in Colombia."[619] The IIAA remained in place after the war with a series of variations, and became part of the U.S. post-war foreign policy toward Latin America. The IIAA was transferred to the State Department in 1946, which, in 1947 "prepared legislation" according to which, "[t]he reorganized agency would continue its aid program" through June 1950.[620] However, President Truman introduced

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[617] Technical cooperation - Program of Housing. Agreement between the United States of America and Colombia. 1954. In: Department of State and United States of America, *United States Treaties and Other International Agreements,* vol. 5 (Washington, D.C.: United States Printing Office, 1954), 2296.
[618] Claude C. Erb, "Prelude to Point Four: The Institute of Inter-American Affairs," *Diplomatic History* 9, no. 3 (1985): 249–69.
[619] Department of State and United States of America, *United States Treaties and Other International Agreements,* 2296.
[620] "Legislation" in the original. It probably refers to an inner-State Department regulation. In: Erb, "Prelude to Point Four: The Institute of Inter-American Affairs."

the assistance program in his inaugural address as the Point Four Program. In 1953, under Eisenhower's presidency, the reorganization "of various foreign aid functions and agencies" took place, and the Foreign Operations Administration (FOA) was established. The Institute of Inter-American Affairs was thereby transferred to the newly established agency, whose purpose was "to bring together in one agency all of our foreign assistance and related activities so that they may be efficiently coordinated and planned on a worldwide basis."[621] The agency was abolished in 1955. Its functions were transferred to the International Cooperation Administration of the Department of State (ICA).[622] These mutating U.S. agencies constituted the interlude to the "creation of the Development Loan Fund (DLF), Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) and Social Progress Fund" at the end of the 1950s.[623] Both were directly involved in the development of Ciudad Kennedy through the Alliance for Progress program. Thus, Point Four is part of a continuous thread of development assistance through which very specific ideas found an uninterrupted path into the work of the agency through the 1950s and 1960s.

The Point Four Program allows us to envision two sides of 'technical cooperation' between the Unites States and Colombia. On the one hand, the program aimed to advance U.S. economic and security interests in Latin America. On the other hand, the Colombian government—and thus, the ICT—also had vested interests that shaped how the project finally materialized. The U.S.'s underlying interests in the program are not evident at a first glance, but analyzing the tacit reasons for the selection of the University of Illinois' Small Homes Council to carry out the technical cooperation contract is telling. According

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[621] United States, *Reorganization Plans Nos. 7 and 8 of 1953* (Foreign Operations Administration) (United States Information Agency) (Washington: U. S. Govt. Print. Off., 1953), 2-3, https://catalog.hathitrust.org/Record/001142244.
[622] https://catalog.archives.gov/id/10477107. Accessed on March 16, 2018.
[623] Thomas Leonard, ed., "Point Four Program," *Encyclopedia of U.S.-Latin American Relations* (Washington: CQ Press, 2012), https://doi.org/10.4135/9781608717613. Accessed on March 12, 2018.

to the ICT, the FOA commissioned the University of Illinois to send a housing expert to Colombia. However, given what Small Homes Council was designed to do, its selection for this task can be seen in a different light. The University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign established the Small Homes Council in 1944 to address "the [U.S.] small home problems, rural and urban." Small Homes Council's task also considered building of homes "on campus to demonstrate good homes to thousands of visitors to the campus." In sum, its target was the U.S. building industry, which it should support through research and information.[624]

Interestingly, the council's publications did focus on technical and spatial aspects of the small home in the United States. None of the publications seem to be informed by the experience in Colombia, if it ever had any consequences in council's work. Instead, a close relationship to the U.S. building industry is rather visible.[625] The 1954 publication "Homes From Pre-Assembled Wall Panels" for instance, was "part of a research project sponsored by the lumber dealers research council."[626]

For Truman the Point Four Program was "a 'bold new program' that extolled private corporate investment."[627] This was the basis for the agreements with other governments and became increasingly binding during the Cold War on the American continent. Based on the idea that "those countries that were the least developed economically were the most susceptible to the appeal of communism…. U.S. private investment would contribute to containment" through the promotion of economic

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[624] https://archives.library.illinois.edu/archon/?p=creators/creator&id=206. Accessed on March 12, 2018
[625] The publications of the council are available at:
https://www.ideals.illinois.edu/handle/2142/39968/browse?order=ASC&rpp=20&sort_by=2&etal=-1&offset=0&type=dateissued. Accessed on March 12, 2018.
[626] University of Illinois (Urbana-Champaign campus) and Small Homes Council-Building Research Council, *Homes from Pre-Assembled Wall Panels; a New Cost-Saving Concept of Home Construction,* (Urbana, 1954).
[627] Leonard, "Point Four Program."

development.[628] Housing was certainly one of the areas in which private investment could thrive alongside "technical cooperation".

Nonetheless, the grantee of this aid, the government of Colombia, was not a passive actor. It sought to establish synergies between the Point Four program and other programs, to make the most of this aid. To begin with, Lauchlin Currie, the leader of the World Bank mission for Colombia, was commissioned in 1950 "to act as adviser on technicians to be sent to Colombia under Truman's Point Four Program and the UN Technical Assistance Program, with a view to enlisting their support in the work of the public administration mission and the Economic Development Committee." Currie was to fulfill this task as part of a new contract he signed with the Colombian government "to perform a follow-up to the report," elaborated by the World Bank mission.[629] Moreover, the Institute of Inter-American Affairs of the Foreign Operations Administration (IIAA/FOA) provided an agreement for Technical Cooperation within the Point Four Program that was sufficiently general to allow the agency to impart its own guidelines for applying this technical assistance. While the agreement broadly defined as components of the program "technical assistance in a program of housing in Colombia in the fields of planning, designing, constructing, maintaining and operating projects" and "related training activities, both within and outside of Colombia," in words of an ICT's representative, these agreed upon activities looked much more aligned with and focused upon the needs of the agency.[630] These activities were discussed in ICT board meetings, the results of which were then published in "Housing Policy for Colombia: First National

[628] Kenneth J. Vandevelde, *The First Bilateral Investment Treaties: U.S. Postwar Friendship, Commerce and Navigation Treaties* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2017), 4.
[629] Sandilands, *The Life and Political Economy of Lauchlin Currie*, 167.
[630] Department of State and United States of America, *United States Treaties and Other International Agreements,* 2296.

Housing Seminar 1955." First, the U.S. government was to send a head of the mission, preceded by his résumé for ICT's approval, to work in the Socio-economic department. The head of the mission was to stay in the country for at least one month to get acquainted with the operation of the agency and the tasks of each department, and to visit some of the agency's main offices. The leader of the mission would then conduct a preliminary study on the "country's housing problems and analyze the agency's policies."[631] Once he finalized his tour, he would suggest to the general manager the number of technicians he considered necessary. These technicians were then to be selected in agreement with the ICT. The technicians sent through Point Four were assigned the same tasks as other employees of the agency and would serve the department they were assigned to as advisers to the permanent employees. The product of their work was to be in the form of a practical orientation for each department they were assigned to, and not a report on the general needs and conditions of housing in Colombia.[632] And finally, they were also tasked to conduct Research on economic and communal planning in general, construction problems, community and city planning, building methods and quality control, problems of the rural economy, and mutual self-help in the development of housing.[633]

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631 Instituto de Crédito Territorial, *Una Política de Vivienda Para Colombia; Primer Seminario Nacional de Vivienda,* 1955, 52.
632 Minute 630 (incorrectly numbered: 730), March 14, 1955, p. 0283-back – 0284.
633 The original word for "research" is "Estudios." It can be understood in various ways: as a study or as a draft. It is not clear way the authors were using it in this instance. In: Instituto de Crédito Territorial, *Una Política de Vivienda Para Colombia; Primer Seminario Nacional de Vivienda, 1955*, 52.

Colaboración: Técnicos del CINVA, y del Punto IV, con el Gerente del ICT, Teniente Co[...] ronel Calderón Rodríguez, tratan los problemas de la vivienda en Colombia.

Figure 4.2. Meeting between technicians of CINVA and of the Point Four Program and ICT's general manager. Instituto de Crédito Territorial, ed., *Una Política de Vivienda Para Colombia; Primer Seminario Nacional de Vivienda, 1955* (Bogotá, 1956), 232.

A number of events took place both in the United States and Colombia between the time the cooperation project under the Point Four Program was initially formulated in 1951 and the time it finally went into effect in 1954. These events greatly affected the program's execution. Nonetheless, the reason it took so long to put the initial proposal into concrete action is not stated in the minutes. In June 1951, one year after the enactment of the Point Four legislation, the U.S. initiated conversations with the Colombian Government, which led to a "[g]eneral Agreement for Technical Cooperation between the Government of Colombia and the Government of the United States of America effected by an exchange of notes signed at Bogotá, Colombia on March 9, 1951,

....."[634] The discussions to establish CINVA in Bogotá were going on simultaneously. Strikingly, no specific project was defined at that moment, possibly due to the major reconfiguration of the ICT's board that was taking place at precisely the same time.[635]

Under the newly established Foreign Operations Administration (FOA) in the United States, "conversations between the ICT and the U.S. Operations' Mission in Colombia about cooperation with the housing program" resumed under the military government, on December 14, 1953.[636] These conversations constituted the preamble to the "technical cooperation project with the Instituto de Crédito Territorial." The selection of "the Small Homes Council of the University of Illinois" as a "possible contractor" was approved by the ICT in the said meeting with the Institute of Inter-American Affairs of the Foreign Operations Administration (IIAA/FOA) in December of 1953.[637] Former U.S. American Ambassador to Colombia, Rudolf E. Schoenfeld, elaborated a note, which defined the terms of the agreement "entered into force" on June 30, 1954. Only when the agreement officially went into effect in 1954 did the ICT's board of directors first tackle the topic.[638]

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[634] From the footnote in the original: "the footnotes were dated Mar. 5 and 9, 1951, respectively." In: Department of State and United States of America, *United States Treaties and Other International Agreements,* 2296.

[635] As mentioned in the introduction, on March 8, 1951, one day before the agreement for technical cooperation was established, the board met for the first time under a new configuration: instead the previous board configuration, comprised by representatives of seven interests groups, only three representatives, directly appointed by the president, in concordance with the enactment of the decree 469 of 1951 were part of the new board of directors: Roberto Salazar, Juan Pablo Ortega, and Gabriel Serrano Camargo (the only new member). Minute 464, March 8, 1951, p. 1193-back.

[636] The general secretary of the agency read a memorandum on these previous conversations. The content of that memorandum was not transcribed in the minutes, but the board of directors approved it in all its parts. In: Minute 611 (incorrectly numbered: 711), June 14, 1954, p. 0233.

[637] Department of State and United States of America, *United States Treaties and Other International Agreements,* 2296, 2298.

[638] Minute 611 (incorrectly numbered: 711), June 14, 1954, p. 0233.

1955 was an intense year for both parties to the agreement, with direct consequences to the project. According to agreement, U.S. American and Colombian cooperation should end in June of 1955. However, a report read to the board of directors on March 14, 1955, stated that "two members of the North American government" had recently arrived in Colombia to work with the ICT, one of them being the architect R. Jones.[639] Thus, the process of regularizing "the technical assistance offered by the University of Illinois and Small Home Council" might have taken longer than initially planned. Although the Foreign Operations Administration, FOA, was presented in the National Housing Seminar as part of ICT's general structure, this same year FOA was transformed into the International Cooperation Administration, ICA.[640] Finally, at the end of this year, the ICT lost its autonomy when it was merged with the *Instituto Nacional de Aprovechamiento de Aguas y Fomento Eléctrico* (National Institute of Water Resource Use and Electricity Development) and with the *Instituto Nacional de Fomento Municipal* (National Institute of Municipal Development) into the new *Corporación Nacional de Servicios Públicos* (National Corporation of Public Services).[641]

The "organizational problem" generated by merging these three state agencies led the general manager to request authorization from the board to reorganize the Corporation's leadership. He noted, as the responsible for the "enterprise," that substantial difficulties hindered the agency's organization and effectiveness. To that end, he proposed hiring the experts Albert O. Hirschman and George Kalmanoff.[642] Due to

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[639] Minute 630 (incorrectly numbered: 730), March 14, 1955, p. 0283-back - 0284
[640] FOA and ICT in: Instituto de Crédito Territorial, *Una Política de Vivienda Para Colombia; Primer Seminario Nacional de Vivienda,* 1955, 51.
ICA in: https://catalog.archives.gov/id/10477107. Accessed on March 16, 2018.
[641] Minute 650 (incorrectly numbered: 750), November 10, 1955, p. 0303.
[642] On Hirschman in Colombia: Carlos Caballero Argáez, "Albert Hirschman En Colombia y La Planeación Del Desarrollo," Desarrollo y Sociedad, 2008, 165–202.

some concerns expressed about this request, the board agreed rather to solicit the Point Four technicians to collaborate in reorganizing the National Corporation.[643]

While according to the agreement, the cooperation project should "remain in force through June 30, 1955," it seems that the U.S. advisers remained in Colombia until 1957.[644] The circumstances under which this prolonged stay was determined are not stated in the sources that give account of this agreement. At any rate, 1957 can be seen as the end of this cooperation project between the two countries. Yet the aid through the Point Four Program continued. Fellowships, as a different facet of the cooperation, were awarded to four ICT professionals to study in the United States.[645] These fellowships responded strongly to Jacob Crane's proposal to broaden the view of technical cooperation.[646]

The outcome of the cooperation with the University of Illinois team was not discussed in the board of directors meetings, and no publication gives account of it; nevertheless, one concept crisscrosses most every conversation about the cooperation projects with the United States during the 1950s—namely, the implementation of self-help construction. This very principle of "self-help" fitted perfectly with the idea behind the Point IV program of offering "technical assistance to help people to help themselves."[647] Clearly, the economic side of self-help was also part of the calculation. As the International Cooperation Administration (ICA), the agency that set forth the work of the Foreign Operations Administration, FOA, expressed in a Manual Order of 1957,

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[643] Minute 4, April 18, 1956, p. 0014.
[644] Minute 18, 1957, p. 0144. Thanks note to the Point Four representatives through the University of Illinois, after two years as advisers in housing.
[645] Minute 10, October 30, 1957, p. 0058.
[646] United States and Robinson, *Aided Self-Help Housing, Its History and Potential*, 16.
[647] Solow, "Urban Progress in Latin America. 'Point IV' Technical Assistance to Help People Help Themselves."

"one of the activities falling within the purview of the International Cooperation Administration's program of technical assistance was the 'use of self-help to reduce costs and increase productivity.'"[648] In fact, "[t]echnicians were recruited for the Technical Cooperation Administration (TCA), Foreign Operation Administration (FOA) and International Cooperation Administration (ICA) largely for work in the relatively unexplored field of aided self-help housing."[649] One of the people who helped to promote the idea of self-help was Jacob Crane. Crane was essential in establishing this long-lasting connection. As mentioned earlier, he visited the ICT in the 1940s as a representative of the Federal Housing Administration (FHA). His experience in Puerto Rico with self-help projects had converted him into a convinced advocate of the advantages of self-help in developing low-income housing projects. CINVA also disseminated self-help and interacted with the Point Four Program in Colombia. The assistance through the Point Four program reached into the 1960s.[650] Part of this financial support went to the creation of a rotary fund with 10,000 pesos for the mutual self-help program in Ciudad Kennedy.[651] In addition, the Point IV Program financed the health center "Lorenzo Alcantuz" in the superblock 6, completed in February 1964, in a joint effort with the Junta committees from Superblocks 6 and 8, the *Servicio Cooperativo Interamericano de Salud Publica*, and the District's Ministry of Health.[652]

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[648] United States and Robinson, Aided Self-Help Housing, Its History and Potential, 16.

[649] United States and Robinson, Aided Self-Help Housing, Its History and Potential, 16.

[650] Although the nomination Point Four had been abolished in the United States since the establishment of FOA, the ICT continued referring to the U.S. aid agencies as Point Four.

[651] Jorge La Rotta, self-help coordinator assistant of Ciudad Kennedy, was in charge of managing this fund. Minute 8, February 28, 1962, p. 0156-back.

[652] "Shortly after its construction, several faculties of the Universidad Javeriana took responsibility for program development and implementation." A considerable number of physicians offered services throughout the day, but they may not have been sufficient, since at that point this was the only health facility serving "the needs of the population of Ciudad Kennedy." The staff and institutions working in this specific institution were listed in: Rudell, "Community Development in Ciudad Kennedy: An Examination of the Existing Programs of Social Service with Proposals for Their Coordination and Expansion," 38.

Despite the big plans and exaggerated rhetoric of the many institutions involved, the visibility of the results was rather limited. Their presence is recorded, as well as the tasks they were charged to accomplish, but if their work contributed to any changes for the ICT, it is not stated anywhere. "Truman considered Point Four to be one of his most constructive programs. The results, however, were meager. Although popular and well-intentioned, Point Four did not result in increased U.S. aid to Latin America. Its announcement raised expectations for increased aid, however, and thus increased tensions when that aid did not materialize."[653]

The Alliance for Progress and Self-help programs

In the 1930s and 40s, U.S. interest in Latin America was directed by its Good Neighbor Policy, which sought to create and maintain hemispheric unity and solidarity. Increased Axis presence in some Latin American countries during World War II, especially in South America, prompted Roosevelt to accept the initiative of Nelson Rockefeller, to redirect the relations with Latin America against the Fascist threat. Rockefeller's proposal led to the formal establishment of the Office for Coordination of Commercial and Cultural Relations between the American Republics in 1940 with him at its head. It was

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Mornings: one dentist from the Universidad Javeriana, one Doctor (provided by the District Ministry of Health), one Doctor (who volunteers his services), 7 Medical students from the Javeriana University, 9 Students from the Faculty of Dietetics and Nutrition at Javeriana University, one Peace Corps Volunteer, one Sanitation Engineer, one Director of the Javeriana Health Program in Ciudad Kennedy (Dr. Henry Simonds, Universidad Javeriana), one Dentist's Assistant (volunteer from U.S.A.) one attendant at the Health Center's Dispensary. In the afternoons: one Program Director (Dr. Serpa, Secrataria de Salud Publica del Distrito), one Dentist (from Secretaria de Salud Publica del Distrito), 2 Pediatricians (from Secretaria de Salud Publica del Distrito). Full-time: 5 Auxiliaries (Nurses, Nurses' Aides—supplied by the District), 2 Inspectors (provided by the District), one attendant at the Health Center's Dispensary.
[653] Leonard, "Point Four Program."

later renamed as the Office of Inter-American Affairs (OIAA).[654] The Institute for Inter-American Affaires, or IIAA, one of OIAA's five supporting agencies to conduct the programs of the office, was established in 1942.[655] As developed in the previous section, a rebranded IIAA after the war became direct antecedent of Truman's Point Four Program.[656] Since Truman's Point Four Program was an antecedent on its part of President John F. Kennedy's "Alliance for Progress" continuity in U.S. foreign policies can be evidenced throughout the period of this study. However, some differences between them come to the fore. Still aligning with the principles of economic progress that had nurtured Truman's Point Four Program, Kennedy maintained that social justice was equally indispensable. To develop specific initiatives that allowed achieving the missing social aims of previous interactions, Brazil's President Juscelino Kubitschek proposed "Operation Pan-America." This proposal is the base for the "Act of Bogotá," after which the program *Alliance for Progress* was launched in 1961.[657] This program for foreign aid and regional co-operation aimed to stimulate the Latin American economies through technical and economic assistance in order to impede the advance of communism, but the program also offered options to advance some of the ICT's previously stated interests.

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[654] André Luiz Vieira De Campos, "The Institute of Inter-American Affairs and Its Health Policies in Brazil during World War II," *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 28, no. 3 (1998): 523–34. On the economic interests behind this initiative see also: Benmergui, "The Alliance for Progress and Housing Policy in Rio de Janeiro and Buenos Aires in the 1960s;" Patricio Del Real, "Building a Continent: The Idea of Latin American Architecture in the Early Postwar" (Ph.D., Columbia University, 2012); For further reading on Rockefeller's initiative: Gisela Cramer and Ursula Prutsch, *¡Américas Unidas!: Nelson A. Rockefeller's Office of Inter-American Affairs* (1940-46) (Madrid, Spain: Editorial Iberoamericana / Vervuert, 2012).

[655] Thomas Leonard, "Institute of Inter-American Affairs (IIAA)," *Encyclopedia of U.S.-Latin American Relations* (Washington: CQ Press, 2012), https://doi.org/10.4135/9781608717613. Accessed on March 12, 2018; The Institute of Inter-American Affairs, "The Program of the Institute of Inter-American Affairs," 1949.

[656] Erb, "Prelude to Point Four: The Institute of Inter-American Affairs."

[657] For further reading on the Alliance for Progress' political background: Williams, *Understanding U.S.-Latin American Relations,* 199-200.

This account of events allows for a different reading than that of the prevailing narrative on the Alliance for Progress and Ciudad Kennedy. Specifically, it was not the program itself that enabled the development of Ciudad Kennedy. The ICT had already been an active force long before the inception of the Alliance for Progress. Moreover, Ciudad Kennedy was part of a larger plan the agency had initiated to respond to the acute housing shortage in the urban areas under a new political context at the end of the 1950s. In 1958, the first civil government after five years of military rule assumed power, representing a kind of new beginning for the country under the National Front. The Alliance originated in the Pan-American context and was an expression of the Cold War. While the ICT was certainly seeking financial aid from the U.S., the U.S. itself was searching for allies to develop a containment program against Communism's expansion on the continent. The confluence of the Alliance for Progress and the housing project Ciudad Kennedy can be read as the point where two forces, coming from different directions and with different expectations, met. At that intersection point, the two forces nurtured each other, helped each other to achieve their different goals. The Ciudad Kennedy housing project thus became a symbol of the U.S. strategy to combat communism on the continent, and of the efforts of the Colombian government to overcome years of violence and sectarianism. Ciudad Kennedy is the embodiment of political interplay in the Pan-American context.

The search for the financial means to develop Colombia's much-needed housing projects was a constant throughout the period in which the ICT operated. The ICT leaders were persistently searching for alternative financial resources that would allow it to overcome the limits imposed by the national government's allotted budget; a budget, which had constantly increased since the agency's launch, but which had never been

enough to cover the country's even more rapidly increasing housing shortage. The ICT invested $4,778,972 pesos between 1942 and 1945 and $129,353,136 pesos between 1946 and 1956. By comparison, in 1957 alone, the ICT built housing for $33,843,924 pesos and in 1960, $68,049,648 pesos.[658] Meanwhile, the country's housing shortage grew from 87,716 housing units in 1951 to 294,322 in 1963, over three times the shortage of the previous decade.[659]

The mid-1950s was a moment of realization about how immense the task of solving the housing shortage was.[660] The purchase of Techo, the old airport on the outskirts of Bogotá where Ciudad Kennedy was to be located, was a direct answer to this realization. The general manager presented a report in June of 1960 about the existing housing shortage and the financing required solving the devastatingly large housing deficit the country had accumulated over the past decades.[661] According to this report, this financial need surpassed the ICT's then-current income by far. Consequently, the Minister of Development offered different alternatives to increase the agency's financial support. One of them was the always-present idea to seek loans abroad. In fact, the ICT had conversations with the Moore Lopier Corporation at the time of this meeting.[662] Thus, when the proposal to obtain credits for the housing program through the Alliance for Progress finally became tangible, the ICT was more than prepared to receive them.

In the same vein, the ICT had already long-considered the strategy of self-help by the time it emerged as one of the Alliance's preferred means to support Latin American

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[658] Minute 15, April 19, 1961, p. 0855-back.
[659] Instituto de Crédito Territorial (Colombia), ed., *La Demanda de Viviendas En Los Programas Del ICT y Las Condiciones Socio-Económicas de Los Solicitantes* (Bogotá: Sección de Publicaciones del Instituto de Crédito Territorial, 1964), 27.
[660] Instituto de Crédito Territorial, *Una Política de Vivienda Para Colombia; Primer Seminario Nacional de Vivienda, 1955;* Instituto de Crédito Territorial, *El Problema de la vivienda en Colombia.*
[661] Minute 21, June 1, 1960, p. 274-back.
[662] Ibid.

housing programs and was finally introduced in the 1950s on CINVA recommendation. Already in 1942, the former general manager had proposed a structure by which henceforth the agency would only work as the "auditor or controlling agent in the building process and the farmer would build his own house, with the technical advise of the agency ...." Although the Board of Directors discussed the idea of implementing self-help programs, it had no further impact at that moment. Yet by 1955, the board authorized the execution of a plan to develop a mutual self-help housing program for "shoeshine workers" and lottery ticket vendors in Bogotá.[663]

On July 1, 1958, the general manager presented the board of directors a proposal developed by Yolanda Martinez de Samper, which she would execute with her husband, architect Germán Samper Gnecco, and which they approved.[664] They gathered a group of 12 families who were seeking ways to build their own houses despite their low incomes. Martinez and Samper Gnecco were initially advised by CINVA's Chilean architect and professor, René Eyheralde Frías, who also became their permanent collaborator during the project's first phase.[665] Architect Francisco Pizano de Brigard, member of the ICT's board of directors at that time, indicated the best way to utilize the ICT's support was through loans for building materials and the purchase of land in La Fragua, Bogotá.[666]

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[663] Minute 640 (incorrectly numbered: 740), August 4, 1955, p. 0293.

[664] Minute 32, July 1, 1958, p. 0504.

[665] Germán Samper. "Primer Ensayo de Construcción de Viviendas Por Ayuda Mutua y Esfuerzo Propio. Barrio 'La Fragua', Bogotá." *Proa: Urbanismo, Arquitectura, Industrias,* no. 147 (July 1961): 8-?. Other collaborating architects were Enrique Cerda and Jesus Useche. The firm Esguerra Suarez – Urdaneta Suarez led the construction's administration. (The same architects of CUAN, and the firm in which Samper Gnecco also became partner). Yolanda Martinez appears here as the promoter and coordinator, and Germán Samper as the leading architect and designer of the project.

[666] After Samper Gnecco returned from Paris, where he worked in Le Corbusier's atelier, he collaborated with Francisco Pizano de Brigard on the design of a project for a market and a community center in Muzu. In: Samper, German. "Proyecto Para un Centro Comercial En El Barrio de Muzu. Bogotá." *Proa: Urbanismo, Arquitectura, Industrias* 78 (January 1954): 25–27.

Through this proposal, the ideas developed in CINVA found their way into a concrete project now adopted by the ICT.[667]

While it is not certain if the mutual self-help project with the shoeshine workers and lottery ticket vendors in Bogotá ever materialized, the experience of La Fragua was the first time the ICT participated in a self-help program. It coincided with a series of events that enhanced its impact and guaranteed its further implementation in other ICT projects. First, self-help was one of the main tools established by the technicians working at CINVA, which had been nurtured by the previous experience in Puerto Rico. The policies implemented in Puerto Rico served guidelines for future technical interventions in Latin America.[668] In this context, Jacob Crane had already published, in 1944, an article on the experience in Puerto Rico. Crane apparently coined the term "self-help" and promoted this system even earlier than Turner.[669] Second, the development of La Fragua coincided with the creation of *Juntas de Acción Communal* (Communal Action Committees) in Colombia. Jorge Gaitán Cortés, the same architect who a decade earlier had worked with the ICT and designed the neighborhood Muzú, was a councilman in

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[667] To better understand the connections during this complex period, see: Jorge Alberto Rivera Páez, "El CINVA: Un Modelo de Cooperación Técnica: 1951-1972" (Universidad Nacional de Colombia Facultad de Ciencias Humanas, 2002). Martha Liliana Peña Rodríguez, *El Programa CINVA y La Acción Comunal: Construyendo Ciudad a Través de La Participación Comunitaria*, Colección Punto Aparte (Bogotá: Universidad Nacional de Colombia, Sede Bogotá, 2010): it explains, though not completely clearly, that CINVA focused the first years more on the technical aspects of housing with the ICT in Quiroga. Progressively, the community involvement in the planning process gained relevance. The presence of sociologist Orlando Fals Borda played a relevant role in this change. In 1957, CINVA uses this approach in Siloé, Cali for the first time. The experience further developed in CINVA and originally developed in Puerto Rico (unlike Martha Peña, who emphasizes the experience of the TVA, and following Bermengui, Puerto Rico, as a poor country and good example of the way a poor country could overcome underdevelopment, was the antecedent to the introduction of this construction system in the ICT).

[668] On the connections between CINVA, the planning ideas current at that moment that favored this type of approach, and the Inter-American institutions, see: Rivera Páez, "El CINVA." and Peña Rodríguez, El Programa CINVA y La Acción Comunal, 101-118.

[669] Rivera Páez, "El CINVA," 51. Further reading on the role of Crane previous to Turner: Harris, Richard. "Slipping through the Cracks: The Origins of Aided Self-Help Housing, 1918-53." *Housing Studies* 14, no. 3 (May 1, 1999): 281–309; Richard Harris, "The Silence of the Experts. Aided Self-Help in the Developing World, 1939-1954," *Habitat International* 22(2) (1998): 165–89.

Bogotá from 1958 through 1961. He was convinced of this strategy of action, and, as councilman, introduced into the municipality the regulations on communal action.[670] For him, the principles of self-help were directly connected to the work developed in community action.[671] Finally, in November of 1958, the ICT implemented the system of *ayuda mutua* (mutual self-help) in Aguablanca, Cali.[672] The ICT probably used Samper's and his wife's proposal to solve an enormous problem in a different context.[673] Toward this end, the ICT developed a financial strategy that would be used in the numerous projects the agency built over the next years under this system.[674] Thus, under the transformed housing policies, which introduced self-help methods to build significantly more houses with the available means, planning for Ciudad Kennedy was already ongoing when the ICT initiated the process of applying for loans made available through the Alliance for Progress.

The interactions between CINVA and the ICT intensified after this encounter reaching common ground around the importance of promoting self-help projects, which were completely in line with the ideas CINVA was trying to develop and which

[670] Although Dávila claimed that it was the experience in La Fragua that gave a decisive impulse to the practical implementation of this concept. Dávila, *Planificación y Política En Bogotá*, 123, 185, 186; Gaitán Cortés, Jorge. Exposición de motivos. Acuerdo No. 4 de 1959 Orgánico de la Acción Comunal en el Distrito Especial de Bogotá. Bogotá: Fundación Universidad de América. 1959.
[671] Dávila referenced an article published by Jorge Gaitán on this topic in the Revista de America, vol. XXV, No. 81, 1957: 51-58. He also presented the success of La Fragua as a further reason for Gaitán to support the basic ideas on mutual help and on community action in general. Dávila, *Planificación y Política En Bogotá,* 186.
[672] In: "Instituto de Crédito Territorial. 25 Años." *Escala*, no. 7 (1964): 1–7.
[673] On the other hand, Germán Samper wrote in a Proa article on la Fragua that they asked the ICT to meet the same quality conditions in La Fragua as in Aguablanca, Cali. In other words, both experiences influenced each other.
[674] Although Saldarriaga coincides with Samper in claiming that Aguablanca was the first project in which the ICT implemented the system of self-help housing, in the chapter on the Cali case, the authors claim that the first project was La Floresta. They do not mention Aguablanca in this context at all. In: Saldarriaga Roa, Estado, ciudad y vivienda, 53-54 (Saldarriaga pledges for Aguablanca). P. 218, 255 (La Floresta as first housing development through self-help); Germán Samper, "Primer Ensayo de Construcción de Viviendas Por Ayuda Mutua y Esfuerzo Propio. Barrio 'La Fragua', Bogotá."

contributed strongly to widening the ICT's reach.[675] In fact, over 50% of the housing units built by the ICT between 1958 and 1963 were built through self-help.[676] The general manager was able to present to the board of directors a great achievement as a consequence of implementing this program. According to the general manager's report, while the ICT had built 13,771 housing units in the decade between 1946 and 1956, it built 8,471, or nearly 2/3's that number, in the three years between 1957 and 1959.[677] Thus, when the general manager asked for authorization to entering into a contract with CINVA in order to educate technical staff on housing through scholarships offered by the OAS, to receive the technical assistance sought by the ICT, and to publish materials on the ICT's housing programs, the board of directors gladly gave their authorization.[678]

One of CINVA's first goals was "the development of self-help methods of construction," and its understanding of self-help guided the implementation of this program in Ciudad Kennedy.[679] CINVA defined self-help as

> that system in which the members of a group help each other reciprocally, each one of the participants benefitting from an amount of work equal to that which they themselves contribute. And, they are aided self-help methods because, to be put in practice, aid from some entity outside the group is required –whether it comes from national or municipal government, or more often, from official or semi-official organizations specializing in low-cost housing.[680]

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[675] Against Rivera Paez, who argues that CINVA lost its independence once it became the institution through which the Alliance for Progress developed its program, I would argue that CINVA aimed to comply with the policies the U.S. was trying to carry out in Latin America through the Pan-American institutions, to which CINVA clearly belonged.

[676] "Of the 79,651 housing units constructed by the ICT between 1958 and 1963, aproximately 49,971 (over 50%) were built using these methods of "autoconstrucción."" In: Rudell, "Community Development in Ciudad Kennedy: An Examination of the Existing Programs of Social Service with Proposals for Their Coordination and Expansion," 15 (4).

[677] Minute 15, April 19, 1961, p. 0855-back.

[678] Minute 16, April 26, 1961, p. 0898.

[679] Anatole A. Solow, "Urban Progress in Latin America. 'Point IV' Technical Assistance to Help People Help Themselves," *The American City* 66:2 (February 1951): 112–13.

[680] CINVA's "Self-Help Housing guide," reproduced in: United States and Robinson, *Aided Self-Help Housing, Its History and Potential,* 3. Harold Robinson was "formerly, Chief, Housing and Urban Development, Latin America Bureau, Agency for International Development."

This basic definition facilitates understanding the primary actors in the self-help building process. In addition to a participating family or families, the support of an outside "entity" was seen as essential to conducting a self-help program. That said, even if the term self-help evokes an idea of self-empowerment, it did not work without the aid, guidance and support from an external participant.

Therefore, both mobilizing "domestic resources for private home ownership" and implementing self-help programs became essential requirements for receiving loans through the "Social Progress Trust Fund," the institution responsible for disbursing the aid given through the Alliance for Progress program, administered by the United States aid agencies and the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB). The Social Progress Trust Fund had additional requirements for receiving aid as well: adequate national housing policies and programs, state and private home financing institutions with efficient operations, and the creation or expansion of homebuilding and home-financing industries.[681] These requirements were the basis for the cooperation between Colombia and the U.S. through the Alliance for Progress, and Ciudad Kennedy its realization.[682]

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[681] Timothy Atkeson, "Aid for Latin American Housing," *George Washington Law Review* 31, no. 3 (March 1963): 547–86. Content retrieved from HeinOnline (http://heinonline.org), November 25, 2013.
[682] Alliance for Progress, ed., *Resumen de La Ayuda de Los Estados Unidos a Colombia; Informe Sobre La Asistencia Económica de Los Estados Unidos* (Bogotá, 1966).

Figure 4.3. http://perspecmun.blogspot.com/2017/06/la-visita-de-kennedy-
      colombia.html.[683]

Colombian President Alberto Lleras Camargo (1958-1962) warned in his speech before Congress on July 20, 1960 about the danger that tensions between Cuba and the U.S. represented for Colombia's progress and continental security.[684] He was not alone in his concern, and especially, with its possible implications. Under Soviet threat in the tensions of the Cold War, the United States soon found it necessary to strengthen its ties to Latin America at both the political and economical levels. Within this political context, Colombia became one of the closest allies of the U.S. in Latin America.

The U.S. initiative to strengthen ties with Latin American governments developed through several encounters. In September of 1960 the Organization of American States, OAS, met in Bogotá, which resulted in the Bogotá Act, in which:

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[683] Accessed: august 7, 2017.
[684] Caballero Argáez et al., *Alberto Lleras Camargo y John F. Kennedy,* 156.

the United States committed itself formerly to (1) the position "that the preservation and strengthening of free and democratic institutions in the American republics requires the acceleration of social and economic progress in Latin America adequate to meet the legitimate aspirations of the peoples of the Americas for a better life and to provide them the fullest opportunity to improve their status," and to (2) aid to improve housing and community facilities as an important aspect of social progress. At the same time, the United States committed itself to seek an initial appropriation of $500 million in support of projects in the social development field, much of which was to be directed to housing improvement.[685]

After taking office on January 20, 1961, President Kennedy presented his proposal for the Alliance for Progress program, for which he asked Congress to appropriate the finances prescribed in the Bogotá Act.[686] More specifically, he claimed that "the most promising means of improving mass housing is through aided self-help projects"[687] Next, he composed a study group, known as the "Task Force on Latin America," to study hemispheric relations and move the Alliance for Progress forward.[688] Almost simultaneously, the ICT board of directors was discussing the need to activate U.S. government loans with the general manager, instead of pursuing loans with private banks. The risks associated with loans in dollars were too high to be assumed by the agency due to the extreme fluctuations in currency exchange rates.[689]

Subsequently, President Kennedy announced in March 1961 at the White House, "before Latin American diplomats and Members of Congress", that the Alliance for Progress was "a vast cooperative effort, unparalleled in magnitude and nobility of purpose, to satisfy the basic needs of the American people for homes, work and land,

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[685] In: Atkeson, "Aid for Latin American Housing."
[686] Caballero Argáez et al., *Alberto Lleras Camargo y John F. Kennedy,* 158.
[687] The quotation continues: "and this sentiment was supported with AID dollar loans, in addition to those made by the Inter-American Development Bank, ..." since AID was launched on May 26, 1961. See: Caballero Argáez et al., *Alberto Lleras Camargo y John F. Kennedy*, 161; United States and Robinson, *Aided Self-Help Housing, Its History and Potential*, 17.
[688] On February 2, 1961. Caballero Argáez et al., *Alberto Lleras Camargo y John F. Kennedy,* 159.
[689] Minute 3, February 1, 1961, p. 0737-back.

health and schools – *techo, trabajo y tierra, salud y escuela.*"[690]   According to his proposal, this program should be developed as a ten-year plan to "transform the 1960´s into an historic decade of democratic progress." He stressed especially the need to work on economic and social development.[691]   Kennedy´s speech was embedded in a discourse of modernization and progress and emanated optimism and confidence. In this narrative, the construction of housing projects as part of this immense program enabled the improvement of the inhabitants' living conditions. It operated simultaneously as a strategy to impede the expansion of communism.

Concurrently, the Colombian government had already started the process of applying for loans through the IDB (Inter-American Development Bank). In March of 1961 the Minister of Development communicated to the board of directors the need to present the U.S. government with a housing plan to justify the loan. Ciudad Kennedy was one of the ongoing housing plans included in this application.[692] Thus, at the moment the Alliance of Progress was taking shape, the ICT already had a number of plans that could be used to apply for loans. Shortly after, the general manager announced $500,000 had

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[690] In: John F. Kennedy, *President Kennedy Speaks on the Alliance for Progress: Addresses and Remarks, the First Year* (Washington: Agency for International Development, U. S. Dept. of State, 1962), 5.
[691] "Our continents are bound together by a common history-the endless exploration of new frontiers. Our nations are the product of a common struggle-the revolt from colonial rule. And our people share a common heritage-the quest for the dignity and the freedom of man.
....
Our Hemisphere´s mission is not yet completed. For our unfulfilled task is to demonstrate [...] that man´s unsatisfied aspiration for economic progress and social justice can best be achieved by free men working within a framework of democratic institutions.
....
As a citizen of the United States, let me be the first to admit that we North Americans have not always grasped the significance of this common mission, just as it is also true that many in your own countries have not fully understood the urgency of the need to lift people from poverty and ignorance and despair. But we must turn from these mistakes-from the failures and the misunderstandings of the past-to a future full of peril but bright with hope." President Kennedy. Address at the White House before Latin American diplomats, and Members of Congress, March 13, 1961. In: Kennedy, *President Kennedy Speaks on the Alliance for Progress*, 3-4.
[692] Minute 8, March 3, 1961, p. 0778-back.

been donated through the Point IV Program of the U.S. government. The ICT intended to use the money to purchase building materials for the self-help projects in Bogotá, but also in Medellín, Cali and La Dorada.[693] Grateful for the augmented resources, the board of directors sent a note of thanks to president Lleras Camargo for his support, and expressed the agency's wish "to work with determination and enthusiasm to achieve the ambitious housing plan defined by the national government through the ICT."[694]

On May 26, 1961, the U.S. launched the Agency for International Development (AID), through which the funding for the Alliance for Progress program would run.[695] On July 8th of that year, Kennedy's "Task Force on Latin America" delivered its final report on the Alliance for Progress, "United States Policy Toward Latin America."[696] Finally, and as a result of the Inter-American Economic and Social Council meeting between all the countries in North and South America led by the United States in Punta del Este, Uruguay, in August 1961, the "Declaration of Punta del Este" was signed.[697] This declaration formalized the program's initiation and committed the U.S. government to provide one billion dollars in aid during its first year.[698] With its stated goal of developing "urban and rural housing programs to provide decent homes for all our people," housing policy and improvement became a central point of the Alliance program.[699] Further, the signatory countries "proclaimed their decision to 'increase the construction of low-cost houses for low-income families in order to replace inadequate and deficient housing and

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[693] Minute 10, March 15, 1961, p. 0794-back - 0795. Two months later, the ICT was still "formalizing the negotiations" for the disbursement of this donation. But the general manager also expressed his confidence that the contract would be soon signed. Minute 19, May 17, 1961, p. 0954 - 0954-back.
[694] Minute 28, July 19, 1961, p. 1056-back – 1057.
[695] Caballero Argáez et al., *Alberto Lleras Camargo y John F. Kennedy,* 161.
[696] Ibid.
[697] At the same time the Berlin wall was built.
[698] Caballero Argáez et al., *Alberto Lleras Camargo y John F. Kennedy,* 162.
[699] Alliance for Progress, ed., *Resumen de La Ayuda de Los Estados Unidos a Colombia; Informe Sobre La Asistencia Económica de Los Estados Unidos* (Bogotá, 1966).

to reduce housing shortages.'" Aided self-help was the method selected to provide such housing.[700] Also during this meeting, the Inter-American Commission for the Alliance for Progress was established as the program's directing body, and the IDB was chosen as the institution in charge of the financial its aspects.[701] Before that meeting, the U.S. government handed $349 million over to the IDB for the Alliance for Progress.[702]

When the Alliance for Progress was finally launched in 1961, President Kennedy appointed Teodoro Moscoso as its Coordinator and as Regional Administrator for Latin America for AID.[703] The Alliance for Progress required the implementation of self-help programs. The Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), as the institution responsible for administering the financial assistance for the Alliance for Progress program, recognized a number of benefits in the implementation of self-help housing programs:

> ...the social values of families cooperating with others in creating housing with their own hands, and lower construction costs, ... reduce the initial cash down payment, increase the participant's equity by the value of his labor, and permit the acquisition of new skills which might eventually be employed in other sectors of the country's development.[704]

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[700] United States and Robinson, *Aided Self-Help Housing, Its History and Potential,* 22.
[701] Caballero Argáez et al., *Alberto Lleras Camargo y John F. Kennedy,* 162.
[702] Ibid., 161.
[703] https://www.jfklibrary.org/Asset-Viewer/Archives/JFKWHP-1961-11-14-D.aspx. Accessed: September 28, 2017.
[704] United States and Robinson, *Aided Self-Help Housing, Its History and Potential,* 22.

En la gráfica aparece el señor TEODORO MOSCOSO Coordinador de la Alianza para el Progreso saludando un grupo de Adjudicatarios, en la Ciudad KENNEDY.

Figure 4.4. Teodoro Moscoso, Coordinator of the program Alliance for Progress, in Ciudad Kennedy. In: Instituto de Crédito Territorial (Colombia), ed. *Revista Ciudad Kennedy*. Vol. No. 01. Bogotá: Instituto de Crédito Territorial, Departamento de Relaciones Públicas, 1964.

As administrator of the Economic Development Administration in Puerto Rico, Teodoro Moscoso developed and led Operation Bootstrap on the island.[705] Operation Bootstrap was seen, as scholar Leandro Benmergui maintains, "as the exemplar of how a

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[705] This was an economic plan for modernizing the island through industrialization under the leadership of Luis Muñoz Marín, governor of Puerto Rico from 1949 through 1965.

poor country could progress economically."[706] Concomitantly with this program, a housing program commenced in 1949 in Puerto Rico. Self-help and mutual aid methods played an important role in its development, which increased its pace throughout the 1950s.[707]

Shortly after the Declaration of Punta del Este was signed, a commission of experts met in Washington on August 18, 1961, to initiate the program and define its implementation in each country.[708] Colombia was selected as one of the first countries where the Alliance would be active, and Ciudad Kennedy became an example of how U.S. support could be understood. The work the ICT was already doing at Ciudad Kennedy was a major factor in favor of the project receiving a substantial amount of the initial aid. "This preparedness was a major point in favor of the project, and represented the intent of the Colombian Government."[709]

Thus, Colombia became a kind of showcase of the Alliance for U.S. policymakers, who "saw it as one of the countries having the best chance for rapid economic and social development." The country was most likely to become, as one of them put it, "an anchor point of stability in the unsettled Caribbean." Furthermore, "American foreign policy badly needed a success story in Latin America ..., and Colombia led the polls as the most likely to succeed."[710] Colombia needed some help

[706] Benmergui, "The Alliance for Progress and Housing Policy in Rio de Janeiro and Buenos Aires in the 1960s."

[707] Vázquez Calcerrada, *Housing in Puerto Rico under the Mutual Aid and Self-Help Program.*

[708] Caballero Argáez et al., *Alberto Lleras Camargo y John F. Kennedy,* 162.

[709] George A. Mcbride, "A Description of Proyecto Ciudad Techo – and an Analysis of Some of Its Economic Aspects," CINVA Summer Research Fellow. Harvard University (Bogotá: Colección Centro Interamericano de Vivienda – CINVA, September 1962), Publicaciones, Box 61, file 4, Colección Centro Interamericano de Vivienda – CINVA, Fondo Universidad Nacional de Colombia, 10.

[710] Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate and the Comptroller General. *Survey of the Alliance for Progress. Colombia –a Case History of U.S. Aid.* Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office. 1969, 10.

too. President Lleras Camargo explained Vice President Nixon in a conversation with him during his trip to Latin America in 1958 that "if a better way of life could not be available to the people, an 'explosion' was inevitable."[711] In fact, on October 12, 1961, a state of siege was declared in Colombia. President Lleras Camargo had already asked the U.S. to train the military to fight insurgency.[712] A month later, Kennedy announced that the U.S. would provide help for internal security.[713] Despite the clear deference to Lleras Camargo, Kennedy's visit to Colombia in December of 1961 was hastily planned.[714] In fact, the board of directors only mentioned his visit on December 6, 1961, two weeks prior to his arrival, and only to approve the contribution of one million pesos for the construction of the first school in Ciudad Kennedy in his honor.[715]

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[711] Williams, *Understanding U.S.-Latin American Relations,* 201.
[712] In October, 1960. Caballero Argáez et al., *Alberto Lleras Camargo y John F. Kennedy*, 157.
[713] Ibid., 163.
[714] Ibid.
[715] Minute 47, December 6, 1961, p. 1388.

Figure 4.5. Colombian President Lleras Camargo, the US President´s wife Jacquelyn Kennedy, and US President John F. Kennedy in the inauguration of Ciudad Kennedy, during their official visit on December 17, 1961, Bogotá, Colombia. Foto: Daniel Rodríguez. Fondo Daniel Rodríguez. Colección Museo de Bogotá. MdB16395.

As a result of this cooperation, the Government of Colombia received, on behalf of the ICT, substantial loans with long-term amortizations and low interest rates throughout the 1960s, including $12 million from the Development Loan Fund (DLF) between 1961 and 1970 to "assist programs of aided self-help housing, with an amortization of 20 years and 4% interest, repayable in dollars."[716] In July of 1961, the ICT's general manager wrote a report on a trip to Washington to negotiate this loan,

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[716] Atkeson, "Aid for Latin American Housing."

stating that the loan "was secured and the proposed investment program accepted: $6 million for the self-help program, $3 million for the three-part program, and $3 million for the program of loans for lot owners."[717] The same month, the contract for this loan was signed,[718] and with it, the construction of houses through self-help programs in Ciudad Kennedy were financed: 971 houses type B through aided self-help with utilities, totaling $5,592,700 pesos and 453 houses type B plus $3,500 pesos through aided mutual help with utilities, totaling $1,585,500 pesos.[719] Furthermore, from 1962 to 1973 Colombia also received two loans for the ICT from the Inter-American Development Bank through the Social Progress Trust Fund. The first was for $15.2 million US dollars, and the second was for 25.2 million US dollars. These monies were to be applied to the "Assistance in financing program of low-cost housing (some built by public bidding, some aided self-help housing, some mortgage lending)." The first IDB loan had an amortization of "20 years, 1 1/4% interest, and 3/4% service charge, repayable in local currency."[720] The second had the same amortization period, but with an interest rate of 2.75%.

Although the ICT had already begun its application for an IDB loan at the beginning of 1961, as stated earlier, by July of 1961 no decision about the application had yet been made, neither at the time the general manager was in Washington in October of

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[717] Minute 26, July 5, 1961, p. 1042-back – 1043.

[718] Minute 27, July 12, 1961, p. 1053: The president and the finance minister sent the contract for a 12million loan with the Development Loan Fund. Minute 28, July 19, 1961, p. 1056-back: Signature of the contract (#207) for the 12 million loan from the Development Loan Fund.

[719] Minute 5, February 7, 1962, p. 0124: In the same minute, following financing plan was listed: 300 houses type A and $4.750 through aided mutual help within the first phase for 930,000 pesos. Material purchase for 280 houses type plan through aided self-help (previous denominations were actually only self-help. This is the first time it really means aided self-help: EPD, Esfuerzo Propio Dirigido) -4 plus $ 2,500 pesos in the first phase for $700.000 pesos. 302 houses type aided self-help – 4 plus 1,500 pesos in the first phase for $453,000 pesos.

[720] Atkeson, "Aid for Latin American Housing." The initial interest rate was 3 ¼%, and was then lowered to 2%; Minute 51, November 19, 1962, p. 0829-back.

1961.[721] At this time, however, the secretary of the Ministry of Development announced that the National Government communicated to the IDB its intention to assume the debt of the loan the ICT was applying for with the IDB. The aim of this decision was to increase the ICT's capital through the Finance Ministry.[722] The loan was finally approved in November of 1961, and the contract signed in December of 1961, shortly before President Kennedy's visit.[723] Even so, in April of 1962, documents for receiving the first disbursement of the IDB loan were still being signed.[724] The disbursement of the IDB loans was not an easy issue. Several times, the ICT's general manager asked for authorization to seek short term loans to bridge the financial gaps produced by delays in loan disbursements.[725] In spite of this, the Colombian government was already preparing the application for a second loan of $25 million dollars. At the beginning of 1963, the general manager reported that the application was presented to the Department of State, "with special recommendation to Doctor Fosum," and that it had a good chance to "be approved in the short term."[726]

From the portion of these loans assigned to the ICT, the agency allocated the following resources for Ciudad Kennedy:

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[721] Minute 26, July 5, 1961, p. 1042-back/1043. "The $ 129 million pesos loan requested by the Inter-American Development Bank is most likely to succeed." This amount corresponds roughly to the first loan granted to Colombia of 15,2 million dollar, to a exchange rate of 8,5.

[722] Minute 42, October 25, 1961, p. 1293-back.

[723] Minute 45, November 22, 1961, p. 1318. Minute 48, December 13, 1961, p. 1425.

[724] Minute 15, April 25, 1962, p. 0279-back.

[725] Minute 56, December 6, 1962, p. 0860-back. The disbursement of the US loans had some delays, thus an extension to pay back the debts contracted with commercial US banks was necessary. Also, other short term loans are necessary to cover the delay until the final disbursement of the US loans. Otherwise, the ICT would need to suspend or delay the construction program. Minute 6, 1963 / 024-back: Need to seek a short-term loan of $1 million US dollars to pay the immediate expenses for the projects, for the IDB has taken longer to disburse the payment for which the bills were already sent. There is an offer from the French-Italian Bank to give this short-term loan, 5 months, with annual interest of 9%. The board approves the request.

[726] Minute 1, 1963, p. 002-back.

DLF	$14,000,000 pesos (US$1,400,000)
IDB	$56,000,000 pesos (US$5,600,000)
Export-Import Bank	$10,000,000 pesos (US$1,000,000)
Aid for International Development	$1,200,000 pesos (US$120,000)[727]

The ICT's building activity was greatly shaped by these loans. From 1939 to 1964 the ICT built ca. 118,000 housing units in the country. But the period with the highest construction activity was 1961 to 1964, when the ICT built 71% of all their housing projects.[728] Beginning in 1961, all systems of operation were implemented at the same time. With the U.S. and the IDB´s loans, the ICT built 73,400 housing units in that period. The economic crisis of 1963 showed its effects in the following years. After that, the agency's construction activity decreased enormously.

Ciudad Kennedy met nearly exactly the guidelines and requirements defined by the U.S. aid agencies, and represented the measure by which the success of U.S. American foreign policy in Latin America could be assessed. Similarly as in other Latin American cities, U.S. American technical and financial support converged in Ciudad Kennedy. The self-help programs operated in Ciudad Kennedy differentiate, however, between individual aided self-help and mutual aided self-help. Although the ICT implemented and supported both, the latter prevailed.[729] In the former, "each family works on its own house only," and no down payment was necessary. In the latter, "a group of families works as a team."[730] Because hiring experienced "construction labor for

[727] Mcbride, "A Description of Proyecto Ciudad Techo – and an Analysis of Some of Its Economic Aspects," 16. According to same author, "the rate of exchange in terms of US dollars is approximately 10 to 1, as of September, 1964," 7.
[728] Instituto de Crédito Territorial, ed., Ciudad Kennedy Una Realidad, 1961-Diciembre-1965 (Bogotá, 1965).
[729] Gómez Gómez, "Evaluación Socioeconómica Del Proyecto de Ayuda Mutua de La Supermanzana 8A. Ciudad Kennedy. Bogotá. Estudio de Caso de 28 Viviendas," 7.
[730] United States and Robinson, *Aided Self-Help Housing, Its History and Potential,* 4.

the ordinary five-day work week" was nonetheless necessary, the program implemented in Ciudad Kennedy was referred to as a "modified mutual-aid housing program."[731] In Ciudad Kennedy, after agreeing upon the design and financial arrangements, the participating families were assigned to a specific work team, which included the other families of one and the same housing block. The families agreed to work at least ten hours per week, usually during hours outside of their regular work hours, often on "Saturday afternoons, Sunday mornings, and [during] vacations."[732] The ICT, in turn, provided "an urbanized plot, sold in rates, and a credit in building materials for each participant family." Both social workers and technicians from ICT and CINVA provided technical assistance in the construction of the houses and coordinated participants' teams "to work together in the construction of the houses, under a series of rules."[733] From the 567 housing units that were planned in superblock 6A (Figure 4.6.), at least 342 houses were built under the self-help program as part of the course "Training in self-help housing," taught for the first time at CINVA. The course, in which housing professionals from different American countries and disciplines participated, took place from September 1962 to February 1963.[734] Two types of houses were built in this superblock, House type A and B.

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[731] Mcbride, "A Description of Proyecto Ciudad Techo – and an Analysis of Some of Its Economic Aspects," 9.

[732] Ibid.

[733] Gomez Gomez, "Investigacion Individual. Evaluación Socioeconómica Del Proyecto de Ayuda Mutua de La Supermanzana 8A. Ciudad Kennedy. Bogotá. Estudio de Caso de 28 Viviendas." 6.

[734] Colección Centro Interamericano De Vivienda –CINVA, Publicaciones, 342 casas A.M.D4MAS Losa 3500 Tipo A/B, 1962, box 22, files 85/86/87, planchas. Ciudad de Techo. And: Colección Centro Interamericano De Vivienda –CINVA, Planchas, Trabajo de campo en ciudad Kennedy, September 1963 - February 1964, Box 42, file 73, curso 002 CAA, II Curso de adiestramiento en autoconstruccion, Practicas de construcción por Rubén Donath, Planchas Ciudad de Techo.

Figure 4.6. Ciudad Kennedy. 24/12/1963. Saúl Orduz. Fondo Saúl Orduz / Colección
Museo de Bogotá. MdB05613

Since this superblock was built in collaboration with the students of CINVA's
course on self-help construction, there is detailed information on the plans of each block.
The block was the planning and building basic unit. Every block, except for one reserved
for a group of journalists, was built by the families assigned to it and supervised by a
group of professionals participating in the course. Ideally, different nationalities should
be represented in each small CINVA student's group.[735] Each group had four
professionals in two different areas: the social and the technical. Corresponding to the
former, the most common profession was the social worker, and to the latter, the
architect. Many groups had a member with a more practical background, such as a master

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[735] In this course specifically, the countries participating were: Argentina, Brazil, Ecuador, Colombia, El
Salvador, and Honduras.

builder (maestro de obra).[736] The ICT in general took responsibility for the employment of the workforce needed to construct the houses.[737] CINVA seems to have been working on prefabricated elements to be implemented in the SM 16, and was in charge of developing the technical aspects of the construction and of training the staff. CINVA also advised the ICT on the technical issues that emerged during the process. The building materials were disposed in a previously determined place in each block.[738]

The Alliance for Progress had remarkable consequences in Colombia. With the program, in some cities the ascendant housing deficit was halted, as happened in 1962. In others, the social tensions deriving from the lack of a home were reduced, "a definitive step has been taken towards social balance."[739] Despite this positive impact on the housing shortage, it had to be acknowledged that under this scheme, the available financing would not suffice to accomplish such ambitious goals, the main reason being the sheer immensity of the urban housing deficit in Latin America.[740] The United Nations estimated the existing deficit at that time to be twelve to fourteen million homes, not

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[736] Planchas, Trabajo de campo en ciudad Kennedy. sep 1963-feb 1964, box 42, Carpeta 73, curso 002 CAA, II Curso de adiestramiento en autoconstruccion, Practicas de construccion por Rubén Donath., Planchas Ciudad de Techo. Colección Centro Interamericano de Vivienda y Planeamiento –CINVA. Fondo Universidad Nacional de Colombia. Sheet 2-4.

[737] However, some restrictions applied. In: Field visit report. Planchas, Trabajo de campo en ciudad Kennedy. September 1963-February 1964, box 42, Carpeta 73, curso 002 CAA, II Curso de adiestramiento en autoconstruccion, Practicas de construccion por Rubén Donath, Planchas Ciudad de Techo. Colección Centro Interamericano de Vivienda y Planeamiento –CINVA. Fondo Universidad Nacional de Colombia. Sheet 84.

[738] Memorandum from Rafael Mora Rubio, fieldwork director, to the engineer Eduardo Guzmán Bravo, leading professor of this course in CINVA. In: Planchas, Trabajo de campo en ciudad Kennedy. Sep. 1963-Feb. 1964, box 42, File 73, course 002 CAA, II Curso de adiestramiento en autoconstrucción, Prácticas de construcción por Rubén Donath., Planchas Ciudad de Techo. Colección Centro Interamericano de Vivienda y Planeamiento –CINVA. Fondo Universidad Nacional de Colombia. Sheets 78, 79.

[739] The acute housing deficit nurtured the rising social unrest in the cities, and building housing rapidly, was a way to avoid worse unrest. Instituto de Crédito Territorial (Colombia), ed. Proyectos y Realizaciones En Vivienda: La Alianza Para El Progreso. Colombia: Instituto de Crédito Territorial, 1962.

[740] U.N. Demographic Yearbook (1961). In: Atkeson, "Aid for Latin American Housing."

including the almost one million new additional homes that would be needed for an urban population expanding at the rate of five per cent (5%) annually.

Although initially planned to operate for at least ten years, the Alliance only lasted from 1961 to 1969. Diverse factors, which contributed to its untimely end, give account of the different levels playing a role in this program.[741] However, the assassination of president Kennedy in 1963 marked a shifting moment. Although the new president, Lyndon B. Johnson expressed his commitment to sustaining the Alliance for Progress, the selection of Thomas Mann, an Alliance skeptic, to replace Teodoro Moscoso as the new coordinator of the program, initiated a reduction of its importance in U.S. government affairs.[742] In Colombia, the 1962 election of the conservative politician Guillermo Leon Valencia also contributed to a less committed effort by the Colombian Government to seek financial means for the construction of low-cost housing.

Evaluating the impact of US financial assistance on the construction of Ciudad Kennedy, different reports agree on that despite the enormous help, the proposed goals, as specified in the Program Alliance for Progress, have not been achieved. In its Survey of the Alliance for Progress, the Committee on Foreign Relations stated in 1969 that "the U.S. foreign assistance program in Colombia has achieved a basic political objective, but it has fallen far short of the economic and social goals."[743] One indication of this failure is the per capita gross national product, which "increased only from $276 to $295 a year, an annual average rate of 1.2 percent, compared to the Punta del Este goal of 2.5 percent."[744] Additionally, the high devaluation and extreme inflation in several Latin American

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[741] From the Vietnam War to the demographic and social transformations in Latin America, the complex interaction of those different factors is pedagogically explained in: Williams, *Understanding U.S.-Latin American Relations,* 190-214.
[742] Ibid., 205.
[743] Committee on Foreign Relations and United States Senate, *Survey of the Alliance for Progress, 3*.
[744] Ibid.

economies in the late 1960s and early 1970s diminished the hopes expressed in Kennedy´s speech. The Colombian peso depreciated from 8.5 to the dollar in 1961 to 16.45 in 1968, and this had negative consequences for the agency's financial stability.[745] Lastly, the ICT states in its final report concerning U.S. aid through the Alliance for Progress, that despite its best efforts, the housing shortage had continued at an ascendant rate, except for the year 1962, during which the housing deficit remained stable after building 55,000 new housing units.[746]

U.S. aid through the Alliance for Progress and its application to social housing projects like Ciudad Kennedy leave a bitter aftertaste. First, the hope that the aid would activate the economy to a level at which the country could abandon the label *underdeveloped country* never came to pass. Second, as the U.S. government stated in its evaluation of this experience, many factors hampered the achievement of the programs initial goals. These factors correlate with the Colombian government and elites' failure to carry out the necessary policy reforms and to diminish income differences. These concerns led to he U.S. government to pose the following question:

> The aid program in Colombia has bought time for Colombian political institutions to work out the changes which almost everybody in a position of responsibility in either country agrees must come. But Colombians have used this time at their leisure. The question which this study raises but cannot answer is: Would they have moved more expeditiously if they had had less time, or would the pressures have been so great that the whole structure of the country would have collapsed into anarchy or dictatorship?[747]

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[745] As saldarriaga noted: "[T]he cost of debt had a high influence on the decapitalization of the agency. It repaid the debt as well as the interest in dollars, while it granted soft loans in the increasingly devalued national currency. In: Saldarriaga Roa, *Instituto de Crédito Territorial. ICT. Medio Siglo de Vivienda Social En Colombia 1939-1989,* 33.

[746] Instituto de Crédito Territorial and United States, eds., *Programa de Vivienda de Interés Social Dentro de La Alianza Para El Progreso; Préstamo D.L.F. No. 207, Informe Final* (Bogotá, 1966), 10.

[747] Committee on Foreign Relations and United States Senate, *Survey of the Alliance for Progress*, 5.

Finally, the aid was a loan, and though the conditions of the loan were favorable, this situation would change over time owing to steadily higher interest rates and strong inflation rates. Consequently, by the time the loans came due in the seventies, the debt was much higher than the money received ten years before.

To conclude, the development of Ciudad Kennedy played out at both national and international levels. Internationally, U.S. aid to Colombia during the Cold War, against a broad and complex political backdrop, heavily shaped relations within and between Latin American countries. Nationally, through the projects of the ICT, and especially Ciudad Kennedy, multiple actors came together at different levels. Many politicians were heavily involved in the development of Ciudad Kennedy, its very name being just a little hint.

Chapter 5: Housing as a controlling tool. Civilizing and educating the people. Morality and Hygiene in the work of the ICT

While the ICT certainly ameliorated living conditions for its targeted population with its modern houses in spacious neighborhoods, those housing projects also served as a tool to civilize and promote the moral integrity of their inhabitants. Even the task of providing housing itself can be seen as a moralizing one: Carlos Lleras Restrepo emphasized in a speech in 1942 that the transformation of housing and social habits was an educational and civilizing work.[748] The civilizing character of the ICT's housing projects applied to both rural and urban populations. Offering ICT-built housing in the different parts of the country, the board of directors brought "the consolations of Christian civilization...."[749] On the other hand, seeking to promote moral integrity, the ICT enforced social control in several ways, which varied over time. The process of selecting residents, the guidelines for living in the new environment (printed or transmitted in workshops), and visits by social workers after the houses were occupied

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[748] Speech held in June of 1942 by the inauguration of the first model popular neighborhood in Bogotá. In: Instituto de Crédito Territorial, *30 Años de Servicio*, 7.

[749] This assertion is part of a broader report by board member Camilo Gómez, on the living conditions of the Magdalena River region. In this report he also stated "this is a problem that official entities are required to resolve in a way that prevents the depletion of the population and the destruction of the race..." Having established clear "statistics" on the population, Gomez' proposal insisted that it was necessary "to elaborate a plan of colonization, technical, hygienic and of easy execution..." In: Minute 446, October 5, 1950, p. 1118 – 1118-back. Camilo Gómez moved forward with the housing proposal for the residents living on the banks of the Magdalena River, asking the general manager to designate the necessary staff to elaborate a plan with the necessary number of dwellings and their location, building types that could be constructed methodically and according to the needs of each part of the region. In: Minute 448, October 26, 1950, p. 1126. Interestingly, Carlos Martinez, PROA magazine's editor, also brings the three terms together: Christianiaty, civilization and the Magdalena River in his Book on Colombian architecture: "The Magdalena River has rightly been called 'the father of the nation.' It is the great road. The great navigable road through which all that was related to industries, commerce and wars traveled for 400 years in slow and painful pilgrimage. Christianity and civilization moved on its back. Today airplanes are snatching its excellence." In: Martínez and Arango, *Arquitectura En Colombia*, 8.

are some of the mechanisms through which social control was exercised. Thus, social control refers to the different measures the ICT took to maintain order in their newly created neighborhoods and to the provision of means to learn how to "adequately" use the new houses. This meant educating the inhabitants, which was the core of social component of the housing projects the ICT built.

Social control started with the selection of future inhabitants. The process of selecting residents was intended to be as objective as possible, but it also served as a tool for controlling what kind of inhabitants could populate the projects. The selection criteria went beyond the families' financial means, and included questions such as family composition and the nature of marital relationships. Such questions served to assess the families' moral integrity. There were not few applications rejected by the agency because the partners were unmarried or due to adultery. Moral integrity was a required characteristic for the targeted population of ICT housing projects. Even when the selected families became homeowners, the fact that the state made this ownership possible subjected them to state control in its different forms.

Because the agency was convinced that their task went beyond merely providing housing, the social component of the urban housing projects in Colombia, so far as it is described in ICT publications, aimed to alleviate the shocks of migration from rural areas and to support future residents in learning the rules of good citizenry—among other things, becoming reliable clients of the agency by paying back their loans.[750]

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[750] "The objectives of the program, difficult to fulfill, are to achieve a change of attitudes and values in order to adopt a way of life not practiced before. The goal is that in a short time families adopt the proposed

The recognition that residents' previous living conditions were not only conditions of poverty, but also of "ignorance and instability," demonstrates the rationale behind the ICT's social programs.[751] This departs from the preconception that the new residents were previously in a state of both material and spiritual need. This scarcity is what the different agencies, not only the ICT, tried to address through education in the period of this study.[752] Ciudad Kennedy is an interesting case in point. There, different agencies attempted "to assimilate the new residents … into the urban system..."[753] through a wide array of educational programs. In doing so, Ciudad Kennedy became a vast field of experimentation for "social engineering."[754]

This perceived state of moral scarcity is associated with the debate on eugenics that took place from the beginning of the 20th century in Latin America. In Colombia, this discussion focused on the means to overcome disadvantages derived from being mixed race.[755] In that context, the country's elites saw in education and hygiene appropriate strategies for achieving progress. Thus, politicians and physicians alike shared the notion that the "moral and physiological restoration" of the low-income population could be achieved through teaching basic rules of hygiene and education in

changes, after overcoming the instability that they suffer in every order, and especially in the psychological one, when they suddenly are transplanted to a new environment, without traditions, without history, without known neighbors, without established organization. They are also committed to new economic, social and administrative responsibilities." In: Instituto de Crédito Territorial, *Ciudad Kennedy Una Realidad, 1961-Diciembre-1965*, 15.

[751] Rudell, "Community Development in Ciudad Kennedy: An Examination of the Existing Programs of Social Service with Proposals for Their Coordination and Expansion." 8.

[752] "On the fields of Colombia, ignorance and illness still reign in a disconcerting way: Millions of Colombians and vast extensions of the national territory suffer the consequences not only of the tropical climate, but also of those inherent to the absolute lack of health and hygiene." Jorge Bejarano, National Director of Health and Vice Director of the Pan American Sanitary Bureau of Washington. Bejarano, Jorge. "La Higiene En Colombia." *La Reforma Médica* 32 (468) (February 1946): 96–99.

[753] Rudell, "Community Development in Ciudad Kennedy: An Examination of the Existing Programs of Social Service with Proposals for Their Coordination and Expansion." 8.

[754] Ibid., 9.

[755] Noguera, Medicina y política. Parte II: La Politización de la Medicina, Evolucionismo y movimiento eugenésico en Colombia.

new habits and customs.[756] The educational aspects of the social component in the ICT housing program respond to this notion.

Consequently, the underlying idea of the ICT's housing projects was to create an ordered environment with hygienic housing. Order and hygiene were instruments to achieve the moral restoration of low-income residents. This principle accounts well for the goals that the country's elites, represented in the agency's leaders, tried to achieve with the provision of housing and the education of its residents. Order and hygiene are thus the connectors between architecture and moralism. The aims of social housing in Colombia, as architects, politicians and bureaucrats proclaimed, were related to the provision of an immaculate environment where families could conduct a healthy and moral life. As president Eduardo Santos expressed in a note for a publication commerating ICT's thirtieth anniversary, "[i]n many cases, ..., morality can be, and is, a matter of housing. Nothing is so dangerous as the cohabitation of entire families in tight places, neglected and poor. That is an evil that must be eliminated…"[757] These dwellings, then, were built to create an environment able to foster a new kind of citizenship, one that would transform society itself. In terms of the ICT, it meant: "And if someone asks what does the ICT aim at? It could be simply answered: to shape citizens, to make with this housing policy a factory of citizens for the Republic of Colombia."[758] Hygiene, as a way to transform a society the elites considered to be backward, was crucial in the project to transform the built environment of those living in precarious conditions. Improving the

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[756] Discussed in depth by: Noguera, Medicina y política. Parte II: La Politización de la Medicina, Evolucionismo y movimiento eugenésico en Colombia. p. 102; Muñoz, "To Colombianize Colombia;" Gutierrez, "Proceso de Institucionalización de La Higiene: Estado, Salubridad e Higienismo En Colombia En La Primera Mitad Del Siglo XX."
[757] Instituto de Crédito Territorial, *30 Años de Servicio*.
[758] Instituto de Crédito Territorial, *Una Política de Vivienda Para Colombia; Primer Seminario Nacional de Vivienda,* 1955.

housing conditions of the poor was also seen as a strategy to increase the performance of the labor force, to "elevate the moralism in customs," and to enhance the "hygiene and health" of its inhabitants.[759]

HYGIENE AND THE BUILT ENVIRONMENT AS AN EDUCATIONAL TOOL

In colonial America, the city was a place to realize a rational idea of social order.[760] The house, as the city's fundamental cell in the logic of modern urban thinking, reflects the same ideas that once were held about the city as a whole. Thus, the housing projects built by the ICT were the physical expression of a hygienic and ordered environment.

Hygiene was an essential part of the housing programs from the agency's inception. In the institutional discourse, houses needed to be hygienic; they were the bearer of the message of hygiene. Rural housing was defined by this main characteristic from the start. When the board of directors met for the first time on March 8, 1939, one of the initial issues Carlos Lleras Restrepo, former Minister of Finance and Public Credit and the main representative of the board, discussed was the necessity to fight the spread of *bartonellosis* in Nariño Department. According to the authorities, this disease could only be eradicated through tearing down the "infected houses," and building new [hygienic] ones. This was seen as a sanitation emergency that needed to be addressed as soon as possible.[761]

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[759] Instituto de Crédito Territorial, *30 Años de Servicio*, 11.
[760] Angel Rama, *The Lettered City*. Translated by John Charles Chasteen. Durham, NC: Duke University Press Books, 1996; Richard M. Morse and Jorge Enrique Hardoy, eds. *Rethinking the Latin American City*. Washington, D.C. : Baltimore: Woodrow Wilson Center Press ; Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993.
[761] The general manager informed that the bartonellosis infection was more alarming every day, and that it required more attention and ten times more resources to those currently employed, otherwise the infection would spread to other departments causing immense problems. Minute 11, 21 June 1939, p. 29.

Hygiene also defined the urban housing projects. After visiting the first Urban Working-class Model Neighborhood finished in Bucaramanga, in the Santander department in 1943, the general manager emphasized the great benefits these neighborhoods would bring to the country when it became evident to the national government "how little money is necessary to build a "nice, confortable, hygienic house," and not the "monstrosities that are usually built in the towns with a high cost but with no comfort and even without hygiene."[762] Through this hygiene campaign, which was part of a larger phenomenon in the country, the ICT received the support of diverse state institutions, especially the Ministry of Labor and Hygiene, whose engineers worked very closely with the ICT from the start, and until 1943 still gave direct advice when referring to issues related to hygiene. At that point, the discourse of hygiene was still limited to the physical characteristics of the houses.[763]

While in Alberto Saldarriaga's fundamental publications on the ICT and housing built by the state, the "hygienic period" of social housing in Colombia ended in 1942; the notion of hygiene was consistently present in ICT discourse during the entire decade of the 1940s.[764] As a matter of fact, according to Maria Teresa Gutierrez, the hygienic period in Colombia "ended in 1953, with the creation of the Ministry of Health, when the hygienist ideology transformed into a public health ideology."[765] Some events give account of the importance of hygiene in the ICT's housing programs during the 1940.

[762] Minute 159, September 1943, p. 382.
[763] Minute 166, November1943, p. 393 - back. The Ministry of Labor and Hygiene sent engineers to evaluate the first house built following the winning model for a "Minimal House" competition under hygienic aspects, for they considered that even if it was a "minimal house" it still had to comply with minimal requisites posed by the rural life dynamic, and by the hygienic norms.
[764] This periodization has been broadly accepted and used by later publications on Social Housing in Colombia. Saldarriaga Roa, *Instituto de Crédito Territorial. ICT. Medio Siglo de Vivienda Social En Colombia 1939-1989;* Saldarriaga Roa, *Estado, ciudad y vivienda.*
[765] Gutierrez, "Proceso de Institucionalización de La Higiene: Estado, Salubridad e Higienismo En Colombia En La Primera Mitad Del Siglo XX."

First, the ICT introduced nurses into its housing programs to teach the inhabitants the essentials on hygiene.[766] In addition, Dr. Jorge Bejarano, "National Director of Health in Colombia," planned an exhibition on hygiene in December 1945, to which the ICT contributed a presentation of the models of the rural housing types, and with information booklets on the same topic so that "large land owners could see options to improve the living conditions of their workers."[767] Bejarano, whose role was essential in the discussion on hygiene in Colombia, was very close to the agency during that decade. Also, the central goal of Law 85 of 1946 was precisely to build "hygienic houses for the rural workers" and "low-cost hygienic urban housing for the middle class, employees and workers," (article 3th.). Finally, the Ministry of Hygiene was established in 1947, as an independent ministry from the Ministry of Labor.

Even though hygiene was a basic principle in the development of the ICT's housing programs, it seems that the agency was not only concerned about the hygiene of physical space but about the moral hygiene of its residents. Certainly, hygiene referred mostly to the physical characteristics of space, insofar as the houses were equipped with basic services like water, sewage, and electricity, and a private bathroom, and were built with "clean" building materials: no earth walls and floors, and no roofs made of plants. In Muzú however, the concern with moral hygiene becomes evident through its imprint on the physical space. Muzú housing units had three bedrooms in the upper level. Since it was necessary to cross one bedroom to enter the second one, no privacy was guaranteed for these smaller bedrooms. There is at least a clearly differentiated space that could be further isolated from the rest of the house through a door, however: the master (parent's) bedroom. Accounts of the overcrowded living conditions among the workers before their

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[766] Minute 205, January 15, 1945, p. 454-back.
[767] Exhibition in the "Sociedad de Agricultores de Colombia." Minute 221, October 10, 1945, p. 476 - back.

move into ICT housing projects demonize promiscuity as one of the most malignant habits of the working class' traditional way of living, one that necessarily led to a loss of morality. [768] Consequently, a clearly isolated space for the parents became one of the most important parts of the new houses. Children, or at least some of them, seem to have no need for or right for privacy in this context; yet girls and boys were to sleep in separated bedrooms, but open to surveillance.[769] Furthermore, the areas for activities related to physical hygiene are remarkable meager. The bathrooms of the two minimal housing types, the 57-F-3 and the 79-F are 2.3 m^2 and 1.92 m^2 respectively. Not only is the size too small for conducting the necessary hygienic activities, but also for the number of occupants who were to inhabit the homes and use this one space: seven persons. Thus, when the planners referred to hygiene, they probably had moral hygiene in mind. The space in its different scales turns into a vehicle through which its occupants become acquainted with the precepts of physical and moral hygiene as promoted by the ICT. Consequently, the housing projects perform as an instrument for educating the population, and overcoming its flaws.

The educational aims of the ICT's housing projects are clearly portrayed from the beginning. Not fortuitously, most of the projects the ICT built in the 1940s in different municipalities throughout the country were called "Model Working-class neighborhoods." They were part of a process that had started already at the end of the

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[768] Minute 306, February 27, 1948, p. 688-back – 689. At the meeting on Tropical Housing in Caracas, "it was agreed to recommend three bedrooms as a minimum dwelling, which allows to live comfortably and provide the means for a proper separation of children by sex, whose promiscuity brings such dire consequences…"

[769] Both housing types in Muzú present a similar distribution. However, for the type 79F there are no original plans for the second floor; therefore, the drawings of this housing type were published in: Martínez and Arango, *Arquitectura En Colombia*.

1930s, and which derives from what architectural historian Silvia Arango refers to as " architecture as model."[770] According to her, the model architectural unit

> …. consisted in the execution of specific constructions that represented the correct way to physically organize a society. An example can clarify the concept: as part of the celebration of the Fourth Centenary of the foundation and Bogota in 1938, an exhibition was set up where two workers' houses were shown; one of them traditional, with a single space, without windows or furniture, where everything was disorganized and dirty. This represented the tradition that it was necessary to abolish, while the other house, with small separated spaces for the social area, bedrooms, and services, with windows and furniture, tidy and clean, dimmed the right and desirable way to live. It expressed, with a paternalistic spirit and through demonstrative cases, the intentions of an ideology that tried to break the ancestral backwardness and replace it with a new ideal of organization and progress. This way of thinking about architecture through exemplary models was applied fundamentally to the design of schools and the housing of peasants, workers and employees.[771]

In that sense, these popular model housing projects were built as an educational tool that aimed at overcoming "ancestral backwardness" to achieve a state of progress.

Housing as a means to educate residents can be evidenced in the projects' different scales. Examining the three case studies from this perspective sheds light on other aspects of housing not specifically stated anywhere. In that sense, the extensive green areas, while indeed an accomplishment of modern urban thought, expose another dimension of Jorge Gaitán Cortés' proposal for Muzú. Were the ample green areas a strategy to offer inhabitants open spaces for socializing to strengthen their commitment to society through an increased sense of community? Perhaps. In a statement, the ICT tackled the issue of open spaces in its neighborhoods. According to the municipal codes, the ICT explained, every developer needed to transfer at least 35% of the total of the land

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[770] Based on the periodization that she elaborates on Colombian architecture, this concept emerged during the transitional period of architecture in Colombia, between1930 and 1945. Silvia Arango, Historia de la Arquitectura en Colombia.
[771] Ibid., 202.

to the municipality for streets, parks, and other public services—a percentage that was, in its eyes, adequate for a residential area, "where a large number of children would need spaces of sufficient size for their recreation." It also stated that the "modern tendency" was to increase free areas in neighborhoods as much as possible. In Muzú, 70% of the land was open space, double the amount demanded by the municipality.[772] In his book *Urban Masses and Moral Order in America, 1820-1920*, Paul Boyer developed the idea that positive-environmentalist work in tenement reform, the park and playground movements, and city planning, are interconnected with a "larger urban moral-control movement."[773] It is possible that the way these open spaces could shape the project's inhabitants runs parallel to Boyer's description of the parks and playgrounds movement in the U.S., especially if one considers the image proceeding the presentation of Muzú in the Proa publication of December 1949.

El desequilibrio moral y material de un grupo de individuos se traduce directamente en el trastorno de la comunidad. ¿Podremos esperar un equilibrio de individuos alojados en casas como ésta en Bogotá?

Figure 5.1. Proa 30, December 1949.

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[772] In this statement, the ICT responded to questions raised by the banking superintendent about the high costs of land for the neighborhood Los Alcazares, a housing project built in Bogotá in 1948. Minute 410, January 13, 1950, p. 1000.

[773] Paul S. Boyer, *Urban Masses and Moral Order in America, 1820-1920* (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1978). Chapter 16: Housing, Parks, and Playgrounds. Positive Environmentalism in Action, 234, 237.

Figure 5.2. Proa 30, December 1949.

Examining the content of these images, the authors of the article (Martinez and the ICT's Technical Department?) established a clear connection between the lack of adequate "housing, schools, hospitals, nurseries, recreation areas, and urban transportation" with "degeneration, abandonment, irresponsibility, crime, insecurity, speculation, rickets, tuberculosis, child delinquency." Interestingly, their account intermingles attributes of "wrong conduct" and physical illnesses. Furthermore, they claimed that "men badly housed was the cause of social disorder," and that "the moral and material imbalance in a group of individuals converts directly into the disorder of the community." With this information in mind, it is possible to conclude that the adequate built environment was thought to contribute to eliminating "degeneration, abandonment, [and] irresponsibility," and incidentally, to restraining the "disorder of the community," i.e., to preventing social unrest.

300

The rationale behind ample open spaces and social services might also have applied to CUAN. Here, an additional argument for social services and green communal areas was the new experience of living in "community." One image that people have of living in a multifamily housing complex is the idea that the residents depend on each other. And in fact, the co-ownership of such a project requires making decisions for the whole community. The guiding idea of the proposal to have an urban center with most all the needs of day to day life met inside it was thought to promote a closer community life. However, as the interviews conducted in 1964 show, people did not develop a stronger sense of "community" than would have happened in other forms of living. This group was too diverse and by far less open to get engaged in any substantial kind of communal life.[774] The residents only seem to have congregated around the Catholic Church, as in any other traditional neighborhood. Similarly to Muzú, where the social services were in place not only to serve the neighborhood's inhabitants, but also to promote a very specific attitude among them, CUAN served as an educating tool. With CUAN, the ICT included the middle class into the project of educating the population. Yet, the aim was different: to teach people how to live in a multifamily housing project.

ICT PROJECTS AS SOCIAL EXPERIMENTS

The three case studies provided the ICT with enough opportunities to explore new measures that would assure social cohesion in the new neighborhoods. Each of them was pioneer in a specific area; hence, all three case studies can be understood as experiments. Muzú was one of the three neighborhood units the ICT initiated in 1949. Here, the project's scale, its technical innovations introduced by Alvaro Ortega and Gabriel Solano,

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[774] Based on the information compiled in Triana and Vallejo, "Investigacion Individual. Encuestas."

and finally its architectural and urban configuration, designed by Jorge Gaitán Cortés, defined the scope of experimentation implemented in Muzú. In CUAN, the ICT's task to promote a new way of living appropriate to the "modern" housing complex was as important as providing homes at accessible prices to a segment of the urban workers. The ICT understood the experience with the CUAN residents as a social experiment. Lastly, Ciudad Kennedy was built as the first satellite city around Bogotá, and its scale turned it into the largest housing development built at that time through self-help. The project's scale posed a challenge to the city that had not been seen before. Ciudad Kennedy was planned for roughly 80,000 new inhabitants, who probably did not know each other before moving into this more or less isolated location. This required that the ICT tackled all aspects of its development as a major experiment. While in past ICT projects some architects had used these projects as a field of technical experimentation, as in Muzú, a series of agencies and private initiatives converged in Ciudad Kennedy to execute social programs. Since the experiments at Muzú are associated with the physical space and those in Ciudad Kennedy are further explained later, I focus only on CUAN in what follows here.

After the country returned to a civil government in1958, the ICT received CUAN with the goal of rapidly renting apartments to middle class families. CUAN enabled the ICT to finally experiment with the provision of housing in a multi-family housing project. The ICT was able to fulfill the aim it had pursued since the mid-1940s, when its first general manager, Garces Navas, presented a plan to build a multi-family housing project to lease to official and private employees in San Diego, north of Bogotá's traditional center. Incidentally, Garces Navas was the first manager of CUAN on behalf of the

ICT.[775] From the time he presented his proposal for San Diego, the members of the ICT's board of directors discussed the question about whether or not to build high-rise buildings to house the targeted population. The discussions focused, however, on the alternative between renting and selling its houses, rather than on the implications such new building typologies might have for the city and its future residents.

As the booklet "Centro Urbano Antonio Nariño" published in 1958 by the ICT acknowledged, CUAN was the "first official experience in multifamily housing."[776] The ICT was aware of the importance of a strict process of selecting residents to guarantee the success of this experiment. The ICT's role was therefore to select appropriate residents and guide them through an educational process, after which they would have learned how to behave in their new environment. That is why CUAN is so important to the narrative of the ICT's efforts to provide housing to different population groups in spite of not resulting from its own design efforts.

The experiment of CUAN was complex, in the same way that the relationship between the ICT and CUAN's residents was. The ICT was the owner, the institution providing the loans, and the administrator. Several functions devolved to the same institution. Probably in response to this multiplicity of roles, the ICT sought to work with representatives of the residents to tackle administering CUAN together. While this collaboration was also intended as a means to facilitate interactions with residents, the results of this joint effort was not very successful. The tense relations between the ICT and the representatives are best conveyed in a letter written in August 1960 by the

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[775] Through a letter signed by Flavio Jaramillo Mejia, director of CUAN, on July 21 of 1965, it is possible to learn that at that point, Garcés Navas was not the director of CUAN anymore. Archive of the Ministry of Housing, La Fragua, Fondo ICT, Box 589.
[776] Instituto de Credito Territorial, *Centro Urbano Antonio Nariño* (Bogotá, D.E., Colombia: Litografia Inscredial, 1958).

general manager to the residents' representatives. The representatives voiced a series of complaints that were apparently very confrontational, to which ICT's general manager, Anibal López Trujillo (1959-1961), responded in an equally harsh tone.[777] This confrontation resulted eventually in the sanction of Decree 1234 of 1963 that mandated the ICT reassume sole management of CUAN. According to a letter from another ICT general manager, Fabio Robledo (1957-1958, 1961-1965), sent on June 4 of 1963 to all apartment owners, the government made this decision due to the negative results of the joint administration between the ICT and the owners' board. This measure was understood as a transitional one. The ICT wanted first to resolve the multiple problems accumulated over previous years. The final goal however, was to "prepare the community" undertake the complete and independent management of CUAN in a short period of time.[778] The residents' association, URAN (Union de Residentes de CUAN), was eventually eliminated after the passing of decree 1234 of 1963. What consequences its elimination had is not clear, but it certainly reduced the residents' spaces for participation in administrative decisions. The decision to manage CUAN in collaboration with residents' representatives was probably based on an idea of a society the ICT dreamed of.[779] Clearly, this part of the experiment was the least successful. What seemed a space for democracy and participation was not one. The residents did not feel well represented by the residents' association, who seems to have built a group with its own internal dynamics, independent of the other residents' participation.

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[777] Letter from The ICT's general manager, Anibal López Trujillo, to URAN representatives. August 21, 1960. Archive Ministry of Housing, La Fragua. Box No. 0012. File 00001. Page 5-13.

[778] "It is and has been the desire of the Board to prepare the community so that, hopefully in a short time, it can fully assume the administration of CUAN, as it is customary in this kind of multifamily buildings." In: Archive Ministry of Housing, La Fragua, Fondo ICT, Box 589.

[779] G. Triana and J. Vallejo, "Investigacion Individual. Encuestas."

Despite this failed collaboration between the residents' representatives and the ICT, the experiment with CUAN was successful. All apartments were leased and then awarded in a relatively short period of time. In fact, general manager López Trujillo claimed in a letter to the residents' representatives in 1960 that the first tenants having priority in purchasing the apartments was justified, since they were the ones who "contributed to a successful experience in this kind of housing, about which many were so skeptical."[780] The residents accepted the complex and despite some complaints regarding storage or laundry spaces, did like the apartments they were living in.[781] However, the experiment of spurring community through community services was not so successful. It would seem that they were not the kind of services the people needed. They had a supermarket and schools but not all residents used them because they preferred others in other parts of the city for various reasons. On the one hand, the schools they preferred were not necessarily those in CUAN, and in the case of supermarkets, the residents went where they could get fresher, cheaper, and more varied food. In other words, the residents did not confine their lives to the urban center. They looked for the best options of the many available in this rapidly growing city.

THE PROCESS OF SELECTING RESIDENTS

The process of selecting residents was one of the main tools the ICT possessed to guarantee that the inhabitants of their neighborhoods complied with their expectations. From its inception, the laws and decrees governing the ICT's work specified the ideal characteristics of the targeted population, mostly in terms of income. After the agency

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[780] Letter from The ICT's general manager, Anibal López Trujillo, to URAN representatives. August 21, 1960. Archive Minvivienda, La Fragua. Box No. 0012. File 00001, 7.

[781] Triana and Vallejo, "Investigacion Individual. Encuestas."

assumed the task of building urban housing in 1942 and before it started to build its own housing projects, the process of selecting residents laid in the hands of municipalities and cooperatives. This procedure did not always result in the kind of inhabitants the ICT expected. When general manager Hernando Posada Cuéllar visited the "Carlos Lleras Restrepo" neighborhood developed with the municipality in Pamplona, Norte de Santander Department, he discovered a family who connected three adjacent houses without anyone noticing. This led him to observe that the "conditions of morality demanded of the inhabitants of those neighborhoods were not fulfilled."[782] Consequently, after Law 85 of 1946 was passed, the agency developed a precise and thorough procedure to select future residents. Law 85 was one of the turning points for the agency since it enabled it to build urban housing projects on its own. It also ordered the agency to define the norms for awarding the houses built under this law (article 11). According to this law, the applicants should be dependent or independent workers, and their assets should not exceed $30,000 Colombian pesos (article 11.1). The law also stated that among the applicants who met the basic requirements, "parents would be preferred, and of these, those with a greater number of children." (article 11.1). It stated that applicants be asked to conduct an "honest home life." (article 11.5), and in addition to requirements framing applicants' income level, also defined the type of families it wanted to support: a family model typical for the major urban centers in the Andean areas, with marked patriarchal bias and a strong emphasis on the nuclear family.[783] Furthermore, the law referred to the

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[782] Minute 312, April 3, 1948, p. 707.

[783] Virginia Gutiérrez de Pineda, *Familia y Cultura En Colombia: Tipologías, Funciones y Dinámica de La Familia: Manifestaciones Múltiples a Través Del Mosaico Cultural y Sus Estructuras Sociales,* Biblioteca Básica Colombiana (Bogotá: Instituto Colombiano de Cultura, Subdirección deComunicaciones Culturales, 1975); Virginia Gutiérrez de Pineda, *La Familia En Colombia: Trasfondo Histórico,* 2. ed (Medellín: Ministerio de Cultura : Editorial Universidadde Antioquia, 1997).

306

moral suitability of applicants by posing an "honest home life" as a requisite for the acceptance of the application.

The document regulating the ICT's process of selecting residents was finally issued as Decree 898 of 1949. These regulations were thus the response to the mandate of law 85 of 1946, and as such, followed the basic requirements defined in the law. However, the final form of the regulations was the result of a series of discussions among the members of the board of directors that lasted at least one year.[784] The goal was to elaborate a procedure through which the selection of awardees would happen in the most objective manner. The final form the board members agreed on was indeed very clear and sought to dispatch any suspicion of not being fair with all applicants.[785] In that sense, the procedure was objective. Yet, the preconceptions about the ideal family and the moral suitability of the applicants, as previously defined in Law 85 of 1946, are present here again. The limits of the family model at the core of the process of selecting residents are best seen in the board's concern that, in many regions of the country and "especially among the working class," it was not uncommon to be unmarried and have illegitimate children, which could hamper the awarding process in those regions.[786]

In the process of selecting residents, applicants were given points for the various characteristics of their family. Although this decree did not exclude singles, the point index increased with the number of "legitimate children" in the household (article 5). This would give larger families more chances to be awarded a house in the drawing that usually took place when the number of applicants surpassed the number of houses

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[784] Minute 337, September 2, 1948, p. 772-back. Minute 338, September 16, 1948, p. 779-back. Minute 339, September 20, 1948, p. 780 - 780-back. Minute 351, December 13, 1948, p. 822-back. Minute 364, February 15, 1949, p. 851-back. Minute 366, February 21, 1949, p. 853. Minute 369, March 3, 1949, p. 872. Minute 371, March 8, 1949, p. 874-back.
[785] Minute 383, May 28, 1949, p. 909.
[786] Minute 339, September 20, 1948, p. 780-back.

available in a project (article 3.b.). The extended family was also considered, by granting a small number of additional points for each extra member (parents, siblings, and adult children with disabilities or unable to work for themselves). But an extended family was not the primary familial form the ICT wanted to serve through the housing programs. An "honest home life" was also part of this decree (article 4), and this could be proved "by means of a certificate sworn before a judge, of two capable, honorable and suitable persons, who know the applicant and his family."[787] The question here is who, in turn, did certify them?

After this regulating document was finally issued as a decree in April 1949 and implemented by awarding the housing units that had been completed during that year, further discussion that aimed to transform this regulation continued to take place. Several conflicts were identified during the first year of operation.[788] Guillermo Wiesner, as a representative of the Chamber of Commerce on the board of directors, but also, as he himself claimed, as a representative of the industrialists, on whose board of directors he also served, defended the idea that it was better to award dependent workers than independent ones. His arguments were related to the financial support an employer could provide his employees, and the moral control he could exercise over them to further guarantee "faultless conduct," and the timely payment of mortgages. By contrast, the independent workers were not subject to any kind of control.[789] In addition, the initial requisite of having an "honest home life" was transformed into an "honest life and good customs."[790] The insistence on this requisite persisted during this revision process and

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[787] Minute 369, March 3, 1949, p. 872.
[788] The regulations were implemented for the first time in Barranquilla, and they seemed to have worked well. Minute 381, May 12, 1949, p. 902-back.
[789] Minute 438, August 3, 1950, p. 1088-back.
[790] Minute 463, February 8, 1951, p. 1192-back. In the original form even in capital letters.

further.[791] In fact, this had been used as an argument to reject applications well into the 1950s.[792]

During these meetings, the proposal to assign illegitimate children the same number of points as legitimate children caused an interesting discussion. On February 8, 1951, Norberto Diaz, possibly the last member that joined the board as representative of the Ministry of Labor (though this is nowhere expressly stated), expressed his strong disagreement with the decision to award legitimate and illegitimate children the same number of points.[793] His reasoning was based on the argument that with these kind of measures the "unity of marriage is attacked, incorporating the children of incest, the adulterous, the sacrilegious and those from damaged and punishable unions." Even after Miguel Escobar, another member of the board of directors, let him know "that these abusive denominations have been disappearing in the law as the human person has gained greater equality and has complied with the Christian principle of equality of people," Diaz insisted "because this was a matter that seriously affected the position of Catholic marriage in terms of the acceptance of *illegitimate* children similarly to the legitimate ones within an institution, such as the ICT, which should contribute to the social welfare, and due to the fact that Catholic marriage, following the principles of the concordat, was the only one recognized as such in Colombia and the only one that effectively produces the well-being and the progress of the peoples."[794] Although Diaz seems to be alone in his views, and in spite of the fact that members of the two political parties were represented on the board of directors, the moral virtues of the future inhabitants expressed

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[791] Minute 454, November 23, 1950, p. 1147-back.
[792] Minute 524, June 2, 1952, p. 0003.
[793] The selection of the applicants considered a series of issues to award them with a specific number of points. The number and the gender of the children were among them.
[794] Minute 463, February 8, 1951, p. 1192-back - 1193.

the expectations of the elites, of the ruling class, clearly represented in this board. These expectations seem to be less associated to a specific religious position or to one specific party affiliation. The exceptional case of Norberto Diaz reminds rather the voice of some extreme polemic voices during this period: the president himself, Laureano Gómez, and one of his most staunch supporters, the bishop of Santa Rosa de Osos, Monsignor Builes.

The basic procedure for resident selection changed relatively little over the period of this study. The main exception was CUAN. In this multifamily housing project, the information booklet specified income and household size as the criteria for the first part of the process of selecting residents,[795] The required income placing the targeted population in the middle class, i.e. the income group the ministry of public works had in mind when it initiated the project 7 years before it began taking applications.

According to an ICT statement published in the same booklet, the final process of selecting residents would take place at the end of the first phase of experimentation. During this period, the apartments would be leased to the families selected, then their "behavior toward this new housing system and the[ir] general collaboration in the project's development," would inform any final decisions.[796] This statement explains why the apartments were not sold immediately. Architect Nestor Gutierrez stated that the housing board would select the residents they deemed apt for the complex at the end of this first phase, and then offer those families an apartment to purchase.[797] Nevertheless, the majority of apartments were sold to the first selected group.[798]

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[795] Instituto de Credito Territorial, *Centro Urbano Antonio Nariño*.
[796] "Based on the results obtained in this period of the intial lease, the ICT will decide on the possibility of handing over the apartments, under the conditions and for the people that those same experiences advise. The behavior of families towards this new housing system and the general collaboration in the development of the project, are fundamental for the possible determination to be attained." Ibid.
[797] Interview with architect Nestor Gutierrez. In: Aguilera Rojas, "Un Dialogo sobre la serie," 164.
[798] Law 143 of 1959. (December 24). With this law, the government authorized the ICT to award apartments to the tenants already living in CUAN.

Unlike the stricter family composition requirements in other ICT projects, there were no kinship requirements for families awarded an apartment at CUAN through the advantageous ICT financing program. Nonetheless, moral standards were set for those living there. As article 9 of CUAN's community regulations states:

> The owner, or one who represents or may substitute for him, may inhabit [the apartment] with the persons he desires, provided they are not persons of misconduct, or of dissolute or disarrayed life, or who habitually disturbs the tranquility of other inhabitants or scandalizes with their habits or actions, nor that they exceed in number the hygienic dwelling standards inside the apartments.[799]

The limitations stated in this article clearly articulate the ICT's fears regarding the future inhabitants of CUAN. It would be of greatest interest to know what the authors meant by a person of "misconduct, or dissolute or disarrayed life." Unfortunately, this is not further explained in the regulations.

The process of selecting residents played a central role in the development of Ciudad Kennedy. Because of its scale, of the number of homes to be filled, a publicity strategy of letters, radio broadcasts, and talks with "civil and religious leaders" was set in place from the beginning.[800] The sheer number of applications issued and received— 7,697—shows the huge demand for low-cost housing,[801] which may reflect two things. On the one hand, the cost at which the homes were offered might have been more affordable to a broader group of people than in the past. On the other hand, the acute housing shortage surely plays a role. 1,998 of the received applications were not accepted. The agency did not eliminate only those applications that did not comply with basic requirements, such as age and income. Its social workers also interviewed first, and

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[799] Archive Ministry of Housing, La Fragua, Fondo ICT, Box 589. Deed of Registration of co-ownership regulations of CUAN by the ICT. December 20, 1960.
[800] Rudell, "Community Development in Ciudad Kennedy: An Examination of the Existing Programs of Social Service with Proposals for Their Coordination and Expansion." 13.
[801] Minute 42, October 9, 1962, p. 0671.

then visited, the applicant families applying through the self-help program. The interview aimed to assess the "true interest" and capability of each family to participate in the program, and the visit set out to confirm the truthfulness of their application (the number of family members, their socio economic status, probably even their address) and the 'moral' suitability of the applicants themselves, as set out in the regulations.[802]

Whereas the procedure to select future housing project residents did not significantly change from its first implementation in the late 1940s, the requisites did. These changes express some of the economic and social transformations the country endured between the 1940s and 60s, and to which the agency was not immune. What is more, given the basic issues it worked on, the agency itself can be considered a mirror of those same social, political and economic transformations. Thus, the requirements that were used in the process of selecting residents in Ciudad Kennedy at the beginning of the 1960s correlates only somewhat with those originally set in 1949. As discussed above, the first significant change was granting illegitimate children the same number of points as legitimate children. In addition, decree 1465 of 1953, passed on June 11th, two days before the military regime took power, sought to prioritize those families with personal savings held in banks (article 8).[803] Furthermore, the procedure, updated through internal document Number 1 of 1961 and implemented in Ciudad Kennedy's process of selecting residents, reveals significant social changes through the way the agency positioned itself toward the ideal urban family model.[804] Although the "married couple" (cónyugues) is at the core of this regulation, the definition of the family does not specifically correspond with the nuclear family evidenced in the original version from 1949. Here, those

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[802] Rudell, "Community Development in Ciudad Kennedy: An Examination of the Existing Programs of Social Service with Proposals for Their Coordination and Expansion." 13.
[803] To understand these changes in the economic context, see Romero Sánchez, "Ruralizing Urbanization."
[804] Minute 11, March 22, 1961, p. 0813-back – 818.

applicants with a higher number of dependents were preferred, with no specific categorization of the applicant or the dependents in terms of gender or relationship (article 3). The difference in the family configuration probably reflects the effects of the civil war, *La Violencia*. Now widows with children, dependent orphans (grandchildren, nieces or nephews), or dependent widowed daughters were also counted in the assignation of points in the point index. This updated version of the selection regulations also included more diverse family types: unmarried mothers with dependent children, couples and single persons without children, though with dependents. The children of either partner could be legitimate, legally adopted, or illegitimate. It also included adult daughters "abandoned" by their husbands and their children, parents, and minor siblings of the heads of the family as possible dependents. Each of these was worth one point each.[805] In the case of the self-help programs, a family's capacity to contribute its own labor weekly for a set amount of time was a plus in favor of being selected.

Despite the evident broad understanding the ICT held of "the family" in the 1960s, some remnants of the past, unstated in the referred regulating document, reveal a particular image of the family morality still expected from applicants. Aside from disqualifying age and income factors, unmarried cohabitation ("union libre") and adultery were also reasons to reject applications.[806]

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[805] The only exception was widows, widowers and single mothers with dependent children, who received two points. Minute 11, March 22, 1961, p. 0814-back – 815.
[806] Minute 42, October 9, 1962, p. 0679-back. This question if the rejected applicants found a place to live among the rapidly spreading squatters in the urban centers would be worth approaching.

Who is who in this play - The working and middle urban Class-

The ICT targeted blue- and white-collar workers, cooperative-members, the middle class, and official employees to inhabit their urban housing projects. Among these, a preference for some groups over others varied over time, though the selection of official employees remained constant.[807] The model neighborhoods built with ICT support between 1942 and 1946 aimed to house factory workers or managerial and (mostly) official employees. Though the municipalities were encouraged to build housing for both of these groups, they mostly decided to build only for white-collar workers and official employees during that period. Law 85 of 1946 allowed them to broaden their range of client, especially to the middle class.

Although the ideology underlying the terminology used to categorize these targeted groups is a complex issue, the ICT's leaders considered them in primarily economic terms. They defined each group by their average earnings and subsequent repayment capability. Accordingly, the housing type suitable for each group was defined by its final price, which varied considerably throughout the country. Once Law 85 began specifically targeting the middle class, newer, more specified terminology was required. Just who was the middle class? Roughly defined categories of work activities began to be with connected each category of inhabitant. For example, an ICT report from 1948 focussing on possible sites for future housing projects differentiated between the upper middle class, "reduced but in need," [one imagines "in need of a house," for those who did not have the capability to use the loans of private banks, with higher rates and shorter mortgage terms], an intermediate group with middle income, in which group the authors white-collar-workers, craftsmen, small industrialists, small businessmen, and skilled

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[807] If this was a strategy to consolidate the state needs to be further studied.

workers with an income between $8.00 and $10.00 pesos a day,[808] and the working class earning less than $4.00 pesos a day.[809] In order to get a broader understanding of this group, Roberto Salazar, the board's representative of the president in 1950 and 1951, proposed elaborating upon an a socioeconomic study of the families living in Muzú to better understand middle class living conditions in regard to the housing problem.[810] However, nothing about this study has been found.

As stated earlier, the targeted group at CUAN was the middle class. Unlike other housing projects, CUAN required a minimal income, but there was no limit for the maximal income. The required monthly income ranged from $750.00 pesos for apartments whose monthly rent was $181.00 pesos to $1,500.00 pesos for a $520.00 monthly rent.[811] The limit was set by the family's assets, which could not exceed $100,000.00 pesos. Moreover, the family could not own a house in Bogotá.

By the time Ciudad Kennedy was built in the 1960s, the ICT built projects targeting the middle class, white- and independent or dependent blue-collar workers; yet different programs were put in place to serve these various groups in different ways. In addition, these programs sought to attract private capital to build the homes. In Ciudad Kennedy, self-help housing overwhelmingly predominated, at roughly 60%. Nonetheless, P-3 (Three Part system), P-T (Workers Program), incremental housing and direct

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[808] The Colombian peso was valued at that moment approximately US$ 0.57. So, 10.00 pesos were US$ 5.7 In: Violich and Jones, *Low-Cost Housing in Latin America*, 58.The equivalence in todays terms would be roughly US$ 59.0 per day. http://www.usinflationcalculator.com
[809] Minute 313, April 8, 1948, p. 708-back.
[810] An interesting proposal, that permits us to see that the working class did not find refuge even in Muzú.
[811] In between, different minimal income amounts were required for different apartment types with different rental rates. In: Instituto de Credito Territorial, *Centro Urbano Antonio Nariño*.

management (construction, financing and awarding of the housing units by the ICT itself) types were also executed.[812]

The self-help housing program aimed at targeting a segment of the population that did not have access to other housing projects previously built by the ICT. A large part of Ciudad Kennedy's roughly 80,000 inhabitants were not necessarily the poorest of the poor, for a steady income was still needed to be considered for the process of selecting residents. Nonetheless, they certainly belonged to the working class. This can be corroborated through a demographic study a CINVA student conducted on 28 families of block 38 in super-block 8A.[813] The results of this study do not necessarily transfer to the super-block, let alone to the whole housing development. Yet, they certainly allow partial illumination of who the first inhabitants of Ciudad Kennedy were. Most of the block's residents were aged fifteen and under. The maximum age was 59 years old. On average, the families who moved into this block comprised 9.6 members.[814] The nuclear family predominated, and only in two cases was the father completely absent.[815] 15.4% of the residents were illiterate, and most had not finished primary school.[816] The residents were predominantly from rural areas around Bogotá, in the departments of Cundinamarca and Boyacá. Notably, only a very small minority came originally from Bogotá. Thus, migration was one important component in Ciudad Kennedy's demographic

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[812] In the Three Part program, the total costs of the housing program were allocated through the capital provided equally by the private investor, the participating family and the ICT. Minute 8, October 16, 1957, p. 0042-0046. In the P-T program, firms that underwrite ICT's bonds could obtain up to 60% financing for their workers through the ICT. The remaining 40% was to be financed between the firm employer (30%) and the participating worker (10%). In: Instituto de Credito Territorial and Saldarriaga, Medio siglo de vivienda social en Colombia, 1939 - 1989. 36.

[813] Gómez Gómez, "Evaluación Socioeconómica Del Proyecto de Ayuda Mutua de La Supermanzana 8A. Ciudad Kennedy. Bogotá. Estudio de Caso de 28 Viviendas."

[814] Ibid., 9.

[815] Ibid., 11.

[816] Ibid.

composition.[817] Finally, the average monthly income of these families was $1,114.00 pesos in 1964.[818]

Theoretically, the ICT sought to address those more in need. In reality, most of the projects covered those with a steady job, and even the middle class. Only after the military regime of General Rojas Pinilla came to an end in 1957 did programs to eradicate slums become a more pressing task.[819] The high growth rates of the urban population, and the unequal growth of affordable housing, even less the increase in available jobs, contributed definitively to making the long latent reality of a high number of urban inhabitants living as squatters undeniable.

EDUCATING THE INHABITANTS

The built environment alone was considered the tool through which residents could be educated until the 1950s, when ICT leaders became clear that their work did not end in awarding a house, but required educating the people in the task of living in these new environments. The agency began using social workers to educate the residents after they had moved in, in everything from furniture acquisition," to the complex net of social support implemented in Ciudad Kennedy.[820]

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[817] Ibid., 12-13.

[818] The rate of exchange was 10:1 (Colombian pesos to U.S. dollars) in September of 1964. As stated by Rudell, "Community Development in Ciudad Kennedy: An Examination of the Existing Programs of Social Service with Proposals for Their Coordination and Expansion." 18 (7). Gomez Gomez, the author of this report, compared this salary in 1964 with the salary two years later, in 1966, when the study was conducted. She determined that this salary decreased on 6%, from 1,114.00 in 1964 to 1,069.00 in 1966. Ibid., 15.

[819] During the transitional Military Junta this was ascribed as one of the tasks of the ICT in the decree 1368 of 1957 (July 1st), after the agency recovered its autonomy. The board of directors discussed this topic, and included this task as part of the regulations of the ICT: Agreement 0006 of 1957 (November 6th). In: Minute 11, November 6, 1957, p. 0068, 0073.

[820] "The general manager notes that, once the house has been awarded, the agency abandons the beneficiary without teaching him how to use the property or how to maintain it. It is necessary for an educational work

CUAN constitutes an interesting case in point. Here, the idea of being able to live in this new housing typology is persistent. The new typology implied a new way of living in relation to the city and to others. According to the ICT's leaders, a special educational process of future middle class residents was therefore a key aspect of CUAN. Educating the population was not restricted to the working class; with this project the ICT extended the project of educating the population to the middle class. Yet, the difference is the aim of the educational task: to learn how to live in a multifamily housing project. CUAN served the ICT as a way to introduce the inhabitants in a new way of urban living.

In Ciudad Kennedy, the daunting number of new residents, with their rural background, brought the ICT's educational practices to a new level. Indoctrination became part of the self-help housing programs, and social workers further developed a high number of new strategies to "educate" the residents. The role of CINVA and its fellows was crucial in this process. They also contributed to the formation of future social workers and to the production of written materials to reach out to the inhabitants of Ciudad Kennedy.

Nurses, social workers, housing educators

Once the selected families moved into their homes, different mechanisms to guarantee adequate use of the space were discussed. Toward that end, the ICT sought to maintain some kind of presence in the neighborhoods after the homes were awarded through its social workers. While these social workers contributed to the new inhabitants'

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in all the agency's neighborhoods, through bodies of social assistance" In: Minute 564 (incorrectly numbered: 664), July 17, 1953, p. 0108. The recognition was that the "peasant, the employee, the worker who received a really nice house had to furnish it with the old and inadequate furniture they had before. In: Minute 405, November 10, 1949, p. 982-back.

successful incorporation into the neighborhoods, their role as rule-prescribing forces from above is undeniable. These rules, aimed at achieving the well-being and empowerment of the community, reveal the expectation of a candid, well-behaved, reliable urban citizen. In light of politicians' acknowledgment that state-housing projects were a tool for preventing revolution in an era of high social tensions, these rules appear as subtle strategies to achieve this primary goal. In that sense, educating the residents of the ICT's housing projects worked also as way to control the targeted population and maintain the status quo.

The ICT's understanding of social work changed over time. It was initially characterized by the discourse of hygiene, which was limited to the physical aspects of the houses.[821] Beginning in 1945, however, this message was reinforced through the introduction of "visiting nurses" in the rural housing program to teach the peasants how to preserve a clean house and to follow the basic rules of hygiene.[822] Although these visiting nurses played an inconsequential role within the agency, they would later become its social workers, responsible not only for teaching about physical but also social hygiene as an essential part of ICT's the construction program.

By the time Muzú was inaugurated and the first residents moved in, a group of agency representatives were inserted into the neighborhood to maintain order, resolve conflicts, and control the residents' behavior as a subtle form of education. The main figure in Muzú was an administrator appointed by the ICT who lived in the neighborhood. He also acted as a supervisor, and in this role, was responsible for

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[821] The Ministry of Labor and Hygiene sent engineers to evaluate the first house built following the winning model for a "Minimal House" competition under hygienic aspects, for they considered that even if it was a "minimal house" it still had to comply with minimal requisites posed by the rural life dynamic, and by hygienic standards. In: Minute 166, November1943, p. 393 - back.
[822] Minute 205, January 15, 1945, p. 454-back.

maintaining "order" in the neighborhood and for intervening in resident disputes. This administrator - supervisor ("contestable") was a member of the national army, and through his office, attended to resident' complains.[823] In addition, a watchman at the entrance of the neighborhood assured that alcoholic beverages and other goods were not brought in[824]. Finally, ICT's "visitors" entered the homes to supervise the state in which they were maintained, and as one former resident remembered, the residents were obliged by contract to allow this entry.[825]

The experience in Muzú probably led the general manager to propose to the board of directors having an office in all ICT neighborhoods to conduct surveys on social issues and educate the inhabitants.[826] In 1956, the ICT published a booklet presenting a maturing vision of its social programs, which refocused its "self-help" vision for the individual, group, or community through the lens of the social services it dispensed. These it described as an "essentially educational and democratic process, based on the dignity of the human being and on the confidence that each individual has the capability to solve his / her own problems, and that if he / she does not do so, it is due to the lack of orientation and encouragement." It stated that the agency applied the social service to the family, the group, or the community to encourage their betterment.[827] According to this document, the offices of social services were in charge of developing neighborhood programs defined by the social service department of the ICT.[828]

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[823] Interview with one former dweller. In: Aguilera Rojas, "Un Dialogo Sobre La Serie," 157; Marco Fidel Piñeros Arango in: http://muzulmanesenelmundo.blogspot.com. Accessed: February 25, 2015.

[824] Interview with one former dweller. In: Aguilera Rojas, "Un Dialogo sobre la serie. El ICT como laboratorio de arquitectura 1948-1953." 157.

[825] Ibid., 158.

[826] Minute 553, March 9, 1953, p. 0064-back.

[827] Corporación Nacional de Servicios Públicos and Instituto de Crédito Territorial (Colombia), eds., *El Servicio Social En Los Programas de Vivienda Del Instituto de Crédito Territorial, Manuales y Cartillas,* no. 1 (Bogotá: Corporación Nacional de Servicios Públicos, 1956), 1.

[828] Ibid.

In CUAN, the ICT exerted its presence through an administrator who answered to the general management.[829] This post was mandated by law 143 of 1959, (December 24), which stated that "as long as the value of the apartments had not been fully paid back, the ICT would continue managing and administrating the CUAN." Since the mortgages had an amortization period of 20 years, this would mean that the ICT would stay in this role for at least during period of time.

Some CUAN residents interpreted the ICT's role as administrator as intransigent and harsh,[830] in its attitude towards residents who fell behind in their installment payments. For these residents, the ICT quickly initiated a legal process that sometimes ended with eviction.[831] Obviously, the ICT did not share this assessment. In a 1967 memorandum, it explained to the CUAN residents that awarding houses to receive them later back did not represent the agency's aims. However, given the low monthly rates and the loan's favorable conditions, the ICT did not have any sympathy for late payments or no payments at all. Even more, the ICT argued that this late recovery of payment happened at the expense of the resources it had to tackle the housing shortage, which affected others with far less financial means.[832] Its paternalistic role stands out clearly in the requests the first CUAN administrator sent to the board of directors, for the agency's intercession in conflicts with residents.[833]

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[829] Article 40 of Deed of Registration of co-ownership regulations of CUAN by the ICT. Archive of Ministry of Housing, La Fragua, Fondo ICT, Box. December 20, 1960; A letter of July 21 of 1965 shows that CUAN was still under the management of ICT and that Flavio Jaramillo Mejia was the director of CUAN.

[830] Triana and Vallejo, "Investigacion Individual. Encuestas."

[831] Some of the recovered apartments were offered again to the public, as the request from CUAN's then director to publish newspaper ads in 1965 gives account. Archive of Ministry of Housing, La Fragua, Bogotá. Fondo ICT, box 589. Memorandum, July 27 of 1965.

[832] Memorandum of the legal department of the ICT of February 20th, 1967. Page 3. Archive of Ministry of Housing, La Fragua, Fondo ICT, Box 589.

[833] But this also might stem from this first CUAN's administrator being José Vicente Garcés Navas, the agency's first general manager of the agency (and probably as CUAN's director/administrator until the end

The social component also played a key role at Ciudad Kennedy, which was based on the structure of the social component already developed in the 1950s. The ICT assigned a team of social workers to assist at the housing program, making the presence of social workers and "housing educators" ubiquitous; their methods interacting with the residents becoming much more sophisticated. Various ideas spreading within sociology questioning the one-sidedness of development theories left an imprint on relations between the social workers and the resident—at least in theory. The courses for housing educators conducted through CINVA, which taught the social staff working at Ciudad Kennedy, were nurtured by the principles of "contemporary sociology," according to which, the imposition of practices was neither appropriate nor effective for a democratic state. Rather, the educational processes implemented here were to be based on persuasion, and the social worker's attitude was essential in achieving the programs' goals.[834] Against this background, the social workers home visits served to control the adequate use of the dwellings. In addition, they coordinated and accompanied a series of courses that provided residents with basic resources for conducting a decent life in their new homes, but they also served as a intermediary between residents and the ICT.

Consequently, with the social component's increasing relevance, the structure of the social program itself also grew more complex. The social component of the program was coordinated by one person, who looked after the convergence of all the department's programs on "the social integration of its inhabitants." In addition, this person was in charge of coordinating the work of the social department with the agency's other

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of 1961, since he appears as the new director of the awarding department from the beginning of 1962). Two examples in: Minute 5, February 15, 1961, p. 0749. Minute 29, July 26, 1961, p. 1060-back.
[834] Carmen Sofía Torres Medina, "Curso de Educadores En Vivienda. Curso 02 CFEV, Mejorando El Hogar y Uso Adecuado de La Vivienda" (Centro Interamericano de Vivienda –CINVA, 1964), Colección Centro Interamericano de Vivienda –CINVA, Escritos y Monografias, box 63, file 4, file 57, Fondo Universidad Nacional de Colombia, Bogotá.

departments, and with external official and private entities.[835] The main work, however, was delivered by the team of social workers in the field. The agency foresaw one social worker for every 500 families (!), and in 1964, 17 social workers were active in Ciudad Kennedy.[836] Their task was to achieve the agency's educational goals through research, social work on the individual and group level, and through community development.[837] Furthermore, the ICT assigned 10 "housing educators," whose role was to "instruct" and guide the families of the self-help and core-housing programs in the "appropriate use and improvement of the home." They all were supposed to stay at Ciudad Kennedy until at least the end of 1965.[838] In addition, students of Social Work School of Colegio Mayor de Cundinamarca, interned at Ciudad Kennedy under the supervision of the ICT's staff. Finally, a series of volunteer groups participated in the realization of many of the social programs.[839] Peace Corps Volunteers, voluntary social workers, educators, health officers, social service agencies, such as the Instituto Familiar y Social de Bogotá (also called "Nina Reyes"), the Jesuits, the Red Cross, and even "three women from the National Institute of Nutrition were at one time coming to the health center (Superblock 6) to present demonstrations and talks."[840]

The social workers played an important role as the communicators of institutional policies to the public. They served as bridges between the families and the agency, getting acquainted with the families' socio-economic situations and communicating the characteristics of the program and the mutual obligations between the agency and the

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[835] "Aspectos Sociales En Los Programas de Vivienda Del Instituto." *Escala*, no. 7 (1964) 18–19.
[836] Ibid., and Rudell, "Community Development in Ciudad Kennedy: An Examination of the Existing Programs of Social Service with Proposals for Their Coordination and Expansion,"48.
[837] Ibid.
[838] Ibid.
[839] Ibid., 33.
[840] Ibid., 25, 26, 33, 39.

participants extensively. The social workers were to be informed about "the resources and capabilities of the families that can be used by the agency in the development of the programs."[841] The social workers' reports occasionally sought to lower costs or to defend a person in conflict with the agency. They ranged from a most picturesque report, according to which a wife had not been unfaithful to her husband, to a request to give more time until people would make their first payment.[842]

The housing educators were crucial to the program since they gave special attention to the improvement of the physical space, was the frame, at each level, through which the individual and the community were to be molded by the ICT's ideals. The spatial ideal encompassed both private and public space. On the private level, the house was the field of action. On the public level, public spaces, such as front yards, walkways, and the neighborhood's common green areas, were the focus. Women were the means through which the goal of an ordered environment was to be accomplished. Practically all programs regarding space improvement were aimed specifically at women, whom the housing educators guided in acquiring the tools for appropriate and optimal use of the home, and for the improvement of the common areas.

As one of the most cited concepts when discussing the housing educators' main tasks, 'improvement' refers to a space that cannot stay in its original state; it has to change in a specific direction: for the better, as defined by agency representatives. Since the houses were unfinished when the ICT officially turned them over to the residents, there was the expectation that they would be completed over time. But did the word "improvement" have the same meaning for the ICT as for the residents? To ensure that

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[841] "Aspectos Sociales En Los Programas de Vivienda Del Instituto." *Escala*, no. 7 (1964) 18–19.
[842] Minute 37, September 20, 1961, p. 1248. Although this case is from another project, it clearly shows the range of tasks of a social worker. Minute 18, 1963, p. 136. The participants of the self-help program asked for an additional period of three months, during which they did not need to start paying back the loan.

improvement took place "in a decorative and economic manner," the housing educators were assigned by the ICT to work in the different superblocks.[843] There was in fact the fear that, as one of CINVA's fellows put it, "due to the lack of funds, and probably good taste too, the simple appearance of the community may very well get destroyed by over-enthusiasm."[844]

In addition, activities promoting "good habits" aimed at the conservation and "proper use" of the houses, public spaces, and new facilities were essential to the work of the housing educators.[845] Such activities were manifold. They organized and supervised "cleanliness brigades" (brigadas de aseo), which executed "gardening, street-cleaning, window-washing, and other improvement activities related to the homes' exteriors." These brigades met almost every morning and were comprised of the women living in the superblock. They also organized meetings "each week in a different house" in the housing block, in which the educators demonstrated the "care and use of the kitchen and other rooms, cooking, care of facades, gardening, tree planting, furniture arrangement, etc."[846] Finally, classes on home decoration, arts and crafts, and on construction of rustic furniture were offered.

The housing educators were trained at CINVA, which administered a course for "housing educators" tackling different topics such as the "improvement of the home and the adequate use of the house." Under this main topic, different educational campaigns

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[843] Rudell, "Community Development in Ciudad Kennedy: An Examination of the Existing Programs of Social Service with Proposals for Their Coordination and Expansion." 47.
[844] Mcbride, "A Description of Proyecto Ciudad Techo – and an Analysis of Some of Its Economic Aspects."
[845] "Aspectos Sociales En Los Programas de Vivienda Del Instituto." *Escala*, no. 7 (1964) 18–19. Rudell, "Community Development in Ciudad Kennedy: An Examination of the Existing Programs of Social Service with Proposals for Their Coordination and Expansion," 15, 47.
[846] Rudell, "Community Development in Ciudad Kennedy: An Examination of the Existing Programs of Social Service with Proposals for Their Coordination and Expansion." 30, 30A.

were considered: improvement of diet, dressing, health, culture, family finances, and familial and social relationships. Another course topic was "improvement in the political and religious behavior of the population," administered as part of the course "management of the home." Lastly, the course on "adequate use of the house" tackled practical aspects such as the cleaning and the conservation of the house.

In sum, the social component as implemented in Ciudad Kennedy went beyond the boundaries of the agency itself and offered a space for different kinds of institutions to advance their various social theories. Their involvement in the residents' everyday life was more pervasive than it had been ever in the past.

Indoctrination and social programs

Specifically at Ciudad Kennedy, the social workers interacted with the residents at three different times: prior to construction, during construction, and after completion. These constitute the three phases the residents went through in the process of being selected, controlled, and educated to become the ideal resident the ICT imagined for the housing projects. The first phase was already discussed in the "process of selecting residents. The second phase took place during the construction process, specifically through the self-help program. The process of educating while construction was ongoing implied not only guidance through the intricacies of the self-help program, such as helping to build the juntas of community action, but also teaching a set of rules for working in a group of mutual self-help. This orientation process followed a very specific procedure clearly defined by the ICT as "Indoctrination." The third phase of education began after the housing units were complete and the owners had moved in. At that point,

the ICT stayed in Ciudad Kennedy with its "highly organized social service program."[847] The program required that the social workers stay in Ciudad Kennedy for two and a half years after completion of the construction process,[848] during which time they led a series of social programs to "stabilize the development of the community right from the outset."[849]

Indoctrination was part of the ICT's educational strategy to create housing projects through self-help.[850] Shortly before construction started, the families participating in the aided mutual self-help program went through an educational process that ensured the final goal of completing the houses planned. The participating families not only learned the practical aspects of constructing a house; they also became acquainted with a set of rules for participating in the construction of the houses of the entire work group. This procedure involved ICT staff and the construction journeymen and foremen required to complete the work the families were not able to provide through their own participation. In two specific superblocks at least, CINVA professors and fellow course participants were also involved. In those superblocks where CINVA was demonstrably engaged, fellow students coordinated their work with the participating families on site, but also conducted other kinds of research activities. Finally, this procedure involved the selected families, who were organized in groups corresponding to

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[847] Mcbride, "A Description of Proyecto Ciudad Techo – and an Analysis of Some of Its Economic Aspects," 12.

[848] Rudell, "Community Development in Ciudad Kennedy: An Examination of the Existing Programs of Social Service with Proposals for Their Coordination and Expansion," 14-15.

[849] Mcbride, "A Description of Proyecto Ciudad Techo – and an Analysis of Some of Its Economic Aspects," 12.

[850] The term is already presented in this document from 1961: Inter-American Housing and Planning Center, *Housing Institutions in Bogota. Development and Administration* (Bogotá, Colombia: Pan American Union, Department of Social Affaires, 1961), 9.

each housing block as a basis for the construction process under the mutual aided self-help scheme.[851]

A "good indoctrination" was the precondition for the success of the organization and development of the aided mutual self-help program. The conditions that favored a good indoctrination were, among others, working in small groups, meetings taking place at predetermined times, dates, and places for the sake of "discipline, order, and method", and that the weekly meetings with each group were at a time that allowed most participants to attend. Successful indoctrination was measured by the participants demonstrating several things: a grasp of the program's characteristics and conditions, an understanding of the program's administrative structure such that compromises between them and the ICT could be successfully reached, respecting and strictly following regulations, understanding and accepting that the loans and technical assistance offered by the ICT were only the beginning of the solution to the housing problem they faced, and that they accepted the design of the houses.[852]

Indoctrination took place during four meetings, which the participants were required to attend.[853] At each, "a film on mutual aid prepared by the United States information Agency" was screened.[854] During an initial organizational meeting, a social worker and an architect presented an overview of procedures to the selected families. The participants provided their available schedules for working on the project. With this information, and considering the age, sex, family size, occupation and income of each

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[851] Gomez Gomez, "Investigacion Individual. Evaluación Socioeconómica Del Proyecto de Ayuda Mutua de La Supermanzana 8A. Ciudad Kennedy. Bogotá. Estudio de Caso de 28 Viviendas," 7.

852 Instituto de Credito Territorial, Subgerencia Juridica Social, and Departamento de Servicio Social, *Autoconstruccion. Como Asegurar Un Buen Adoctrinamiento* (Bogota, 1963).

[853] Inter-American Housing and Planning Center, *Housing Institutions in Bogota. Development and Administration,* 9.

[854] Ibid.

program participant, the social workers divided them into work groups.[855] Their size "corresponded to the number of units planned for construction in a particular [housing block]."[856] Each work group was assigned one social worker and one architect to conduct "a full program of construction and community development."[857]

During the first meeting, the two professionals in charge explained "the meaning of mutual aid work as an unpaid cooperative enterprise," and each member's responsibilities toward the ICT and the other members of the group."[858] In addition, they showed the group the project's location within the superblock, the house's architectonic features, and a model dwelling. Specifically, in the construction of the superblock 16, the CINVA teachers and the participating families met on site with ICT staff.[859] The CINVA's course fellows also explained the possible uses of the house, "the location of the furniture," and issues such as cleaning, illumination, ventilation, materiality, the construction system (slabs and foundations), wall construction, roof construction, and other construction details. These issues were explained through plan drawings and at the model house on site.[860] "At the second meeting, work assignments were made and an explanation [was] given of the building procedure and the materials to be used."[861] The

[855] Ibid.

[856] Rudell, "Community Development in Ciudad Kennedy: An Examination of the Existing Programs of Social Service with Proposals for Their Coordination and Expansion," 14.

[857] Mcbride, "A Description of Proyecto Ciudad Techo – and an Analysis of Some of Its Economic Aspects."22.

[858] Inter-American Housing and Planning Center, Housing Institutions in Bogota. Development and Administration, 9.

[859] The depiction of this proceeding is based on the fieldwork report of the "Second Training Course in Self-Help Construction," of CINVA, from which the procedure in the superblock 16 is documented. In: Rubén Donath, Prácticas de construcción, Trabajo de campo en ciudad Kennedy. Curso 002 CAA, II Curso de adiestramiento en autoconstrucción. September 1963- February 1964, Planchas Ciudad de Techo, box 42, File 73. Colección Centro Interamericano de Vivienda y Planeamiento –CINVA. Fondo Universidad Nacional de Colombia.

[860] Rubén Donath, Prácticas de construcción, Trabajo de campo en ciudad Kennedy, 41.

[861] Inter-American Housing and Planning Center, Housing Institutions in Bogota. Development and Administration, 9.

group was also informed that the meetings were mandatory and that they would eventually "choose a leadership committee of [its] own," consisting of "a president, secretary, treasurer, and coordinator." These leaders would represent the work groups in their "dealings with the agency."[862] The third meeting was devoted "to explanations of material loans, technical assistance, and the social service program, with extensive attention given to the terms of the loan and to the regulations governing construction work." At the last training session, the contractual obligations of the deed were presented, and a description was given of "how materials would be delivered and work be performed under the supervision of an architect and foreman."[863]

The reasons for explicitly naming this process "indoctrination" are not stated anywhere. However, the term denotes a wish to go beyond the simple process of transmitting a set of rules or proceedings. Although the boundary between educating and indoctrinating is thin and easily blurred, the way these training meetings were used in this concrete case implies a wish to mark people in a more profound way. It presupposes that there are two parts to the equation. The one part has the authority to impart the content to be taught, the other receives "teaching" uncritically, accepts it, and does not question it. In a broader sense, even if the indoctrination meetings sought to activate the participant's skills for working in a group, they also can be understood as a tool to pacify the latent unrest in the low-income group targeted by the self-help programs. Once the participating families of the aided mutual self-help program had gone through Indoctrination, many were more akin to become the "worthy poor," those who were low-income, but well

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[862] Ibid.
[863] Ibid.

330

behaved, amiable, approachable, able to be further shaped into the model of the ideal dweller.[864]

The social programs developed by the contingent of social workers of all proveniences aimed at the development of skills on the individual (which also implied the familial) and communal level (which implied both the group -neighborhood / housing block, and at a larger scale, the superblock and the entire housing development). They also sought to help shape the use of the free time with "beneficial activities", such as recreational and cultural events. Finally, they worked to create in the residents a "conscious and ordered desire to improve in the different areas of their lives."[865] The implementation of these programs was part of the broader goal of educating the residents of Ciudad Kennedy. Education needs to be seen here as the cultivation of certain skills the new residents lacked. The kind of programs offered thus reflects the agency's broader educational goals.

On an individual level, the social programs' goals seemed to empower the families trying to recognize their potential and to access the resources available to them, but at the same time, the proposed guidelines are ruled by the principle of efficiency. The programs aimed, at this level "to foster self-help, self-care, and rehabilitation,"[866] and to guide the residents in the acknowledgment and inquiry of their needs and in the attainment and good use of the physical, human and economic resources." They also sought "to stimulate and canalize each family's resources for their social improvement through an 'organized and methodic development of the family work'", and develop

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[864] The "worthy poor" as developed by Vale in: Lawrence J. Vale, *From the Puritans to the Projects: Public Housing and Public Neighbors* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000).
[865] "Aspectos Sociales En Los Programas de Vivienda Del Instituto." *Escala,* no. 7 (1964) 18–19.
[866] Rudell, "Community Development in Ciudad Kennedy: An Examination of the Existing Programs of Social Service with Proposals for Their Coordination and Expansion."

'useful abilities' by overcoming those existing previously." This would however imply that the older abilities were not so useful anymore.

The programs offered on the individual level were strongly gendered. The women of Ciudad Kennedy were the targeted population of the educational programs that focused on skills on the individual and family level.[867] Since they were in charge of the house, the food, and the children, it seems that the responsibility of having a livable environment devolved upon them. This image well corresponds with the prevailing family ideal, a nuclear family with the woman at home. Under this framework, it was her duty to keep the family healthy and neatly dressed, and the environment of the house hygienic. Hence, programs on nutrition, preventive medicine, dental care, and physical fitness, were related to self-care, but also to family care. Some basic skills were to provide women with tools to take care of their family; therefore programs on first-aid, pre-natal and childcare, and cooking, were offered. To that end, "audio-visual and demonstration program for housewives" on these issues were conducted.[868] In addition, programs for acquiring skills to enhance their role as family caregivers were offered to women, as well as on sewing by hand and machine, women's dressmaking and tailoring, weaving and knitting, and on beauty.[869]

Social programs less defined by gender encompassed English and literacy classes. However, the latter was aimed at children not enrolled in school due to lack of space in the superblock's primary schools, at least in the superblock that served as the basis for this survey on social programs. The literacy program targeted therefore children between

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[867] Ibid., 26-34.
[868] Idid.
[869] Idid.

332

6 and 10. Thus, no adult literacy classes were offered, despite the high analphabetism rate among residents.

The social workers participated in various programs to achieve goals at the community level, but the most important process was the constitution of the Juntas of Communal Action. Representatives from each housing block comprised these Juntas— the same leaders "discovered,"[870] selected, and educated during the indoctrination phase to carry out specific construction duties in the aided mutual self-help groups. The duality of the ICT's presence in this process becomes evident when the ICT's social workers attended the meetings of the Juntas, and dominated the sessions, as some accused them.[871]

Written Materials: Booklets and guides

The ICT produced a series of materials to explain to the dwellers of the housing projects their duties towards the community and the agency. These documents were very much focused on the obligations and prohibitions. This aspect of the materials produced by the agency is the very opposite to the materials produced to show the work of the ICT in the neighborhoods it built. To this group belongs the nicely documented booklet on the social services of the ICT published in 1956.

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[870] "Aspectos Sociales En Los Programas de Vivienda Del Instituto." *Escala*, no. 7 (1964) 18–19.
[871] Rudell, "Community Development in Ciudad Kennedy: An Examination of the Existing Programs of Social Service with Proposals for Their Coordination and Expansion," 49.

Madre de familia recibe instrucciones de la Asistencia
Social sobre higiene y cuidado de los hijos.
Barrio Quiroga, Bogotá.

Figure 5.3. Corporación Nacional de Servicios Públicos and Instituto de Crédito
Territorial, eds., *El Servicio Social En Los Programas de Vivienda Del Instituto
de Crédito Territorial*, Manuales y Cartillas, no. 1 (Bogotá: Corporación Nacional
de Servicios Públicos, 1956).

Conversely, the materials for the dwellers presented simple drawings or were

simply in text format. I will refer here to two kinds of documents. The first one is a

booklet for dwellers of multifamily buildings, the second one are the regulations for

living in CUAN and participating in the aided mutual self-help programs in Ciudad

Kennedy.

The booklet "Manual Basico para Adjudicatarios" (the basic manual for

awardees) was developed in 1964 in CINVA, but it is based on a similar document

developed in Costa Rica ten years earlier. This document on its part was the result of a

research elaborated by a Costa Rican social worker during her formation at CINVA in

1952.[872] It was written in a simple language and with very basic graphics. It seems that this was the kind of language that, according to the agency, the dwellers were able to understand. The basic idea of this manual was to provide "some practical advice," that could be beneficial once occupying the new house.[873] In the first chapter, the manual emphasized the rules to live in a multifamily housing project. Each advice was reinforced by a traditional proverb. "The master's eye makes the horse fat," served, for instance, to explain why renting rooms of the apartment was not in the owner's own interest.[874]

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[872] Maria de los Angeles Cavallini Quirós went back to Costa Rica and became the head of the Social Service of the Departamento de la Habitacion de la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social. This booklet was reprinted with the permission of the Departamento de la Habitacion by CINVA in 1954. Departamento de la Habitacion de la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, Modelo de Manual de Adjudicatarios, Traducciones, Adaptaciones y Reimpresiones No. 3 (Bogota: Centro interamericano de vivienda. Centro de Intercambio Científico, 1954). The students of CINVA probably used this model for the booklet discussed in this part. In: Paul Campbell and José A. Villegas, Manual Básico Para Adjudicatarios. Proyecto Interprofesional 114. V Etapa. Diseño Arquitectónico y Programa Educacional (Bogotá: Centro interamericano de vivienda y planeamiento. XII Curso Regular., 1964).
[873] Campbell and Villegas, *Manual Básico Para Adjudicatarios*. Introduction.
[874] Ibid., 3.

Figure 5.4. Campbell, Paul, and José A. Villegas. *Manual Básico Para Adjudicatarios. Proyecto Interprofesional 114. V Etapa. Diseño Arquitectónico y Programa Educacional*. Bogotá: Centro interamericano de vivienda y planeamiento. XII Curso Regular, 1964.

In addition, a series of guidelines were indicated in regard to the physical appearance of the apartments, for which the duty to maintain the apartment "always clean and ordered" was the backdrop. Here the proverb claimed, "Where the sun comes in, the doctor does not."[875] The second part of the manual focused on the "human relations." In this chapter, the importance of the development of good relations for the development of

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[875] Ibid., 12.

the community was explained. In that context, the importance of a well functioning family, with a "boss that is a responsible and hard working man, with a hard working, ingenious mother, dedicated to her children..." was presented.[876] Finally, the third part tackled an important topic for the agency, which was always intermingled with the well-minded advice: the obligations of the awardee with the agency. The punctual payment of the mortgage rates was an enormous preoccupation for the agency. The message was wrapped in the positive sounding message of "dream of the own house" and how the punctual payment of the rates was part of accomplishing this dream. Again, a series of proverbs helped to reinforce the message.

The document with the regulations of co-ownership of CUAN outlined the rights and obligations of the co-owners; hence, the residents needed to observe certain limits defined and imposed by the agency itself.[877] These regulations were inherent to the contracts with the former tenants and later owners of the apartments. They were in force as long as the institute was in charge of CUAN. The regulations can be understood as part of the education process provided by the agency. This process was permeated with a view of the served group as uninformed of the principles according to which people live in this new environment; principles that resemble rather the high culture in opposition to the popular culture.

The long list of forbidden actions in the regulations reflects the wish to control and to propel an image of a "modern society" in CUAN. Through this list, one can sense a way of life that clearly differs from that in traditional settlements or in the popular culture. In addition to the list of forbidden actions that could put the whole structure of

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[876] Ibid., 20.
[877] Deed of Registration of co-ownership regulations of CUAN by the ICT. Archive of the Ministry of Housing, La Fragua, Fondo ICT, Box 589. December 20, 1960.

the buildings at risk, the list also considered customs that are typical for any traditional residential environment but that were seen as absolutely unacceptable in a modern complex; things that would diminish the image of modernity in the form of social progress. For instance, the use of the windows to "dry clothes, rugs, blankets and others in the sun" was prohibited. But also, subleasing single rooms of the apartments without previous permission of the management was forbidden.[878] To control the residents' obedience of these rules, one of their duties was to "allow employees, with a written permit from the administration, visiting periodically the apartment[879] ..."

CUAN's architecture expresses physical asepsis; its co-owner regulations sought a moral asepsis in conduct of life. The regulation of daily life encompassed all possible aspects, from the appropriate use of circulation areas to how to live in the apartments. The use of the circulation areas as meeting places, or any other use that made them "noisy or uncomfortable" was forbidden, as was their use as places for selling or storing products. In the apartments, noise produced by high volume radios or TVs, and in general, any kind of noise that could disturb the neighbors was not allowed. Pets were not allowed, "for the apartments were only to house human beings." Finally, the use of community areas for political meetings was forbidden.[880]

In Ciudad Kennedy, the awarded families received a document with the "most important compromises" connected to participation in the superblock's self-help construction program and with the sanctions in the case of not complying with the compromises.[881] This document, which was thoroughly discussed in one of the first

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[878] Deed of Registration of co-ownership regulations of CUAN. Article 10.
[879] Deed of Registration of co-ownership regulations of CUAN. Article 46.
[880] Deed of Registration of co-ownership regulations of CUAN. Article 6.
[881] Instituto de Credito Territorial, "Reglamento de Autoconstruccion. Planchas, Trabajo de Campo En Ciudad Kennedy. September 1963 – February 1964," n.d., Colección Centro Interamericano de Vivienda y Planeamiento –CINVA.Box 42, file 71, course CAA., Fondo Universidad Nacional de Colombia, 42-44.

meetings with the families, was a central part of the formative indoctrination process. Simultaneously, this document also sheds light over the proceedings in the mutual aided self-help program. Furthermore, these regulations, contained in the document as a sort of contract within the contract, express a methodology aimed at converting a segment of the population into a group of persons able to participate in communal endeavors. Concurrently, they should be able to conform to certain rules through obedience, discipline and even self-sacrifice. These were all characteristics the institutions working with the families were required to cultivate; the final goal being the building of houses, but the same characteristics undoubtedly contributed to the formation of obedient, conformed, uncritical, and reliable residents. Not only did the general document includ a series of rules to be followed, but the individual contract also contained "responsibilities that each participating family must assume for the maintenance of their home and surrounding open spaces. It is expected that the family will develop sufficient pride in their new home during the time of construction and the supervised period after occupancy to guarantee the future up-keep of the project."[882] The convincing power of these documents was reinforced through information flyers such as the one clearly indicating that "the participating family, which does not satisfactorily fulfill the conditions and exigencies of the self-help program, will be eliminated from the program, and thus will lose their house;" a clear warning and blunt threat.[883]

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[882] Mcbride, "A Description of Proyecto Ciudad Techo – and an Analysis of Some of Its Economic Aspects,"23.
[883] From: "Informacion para familias participantes en el programa de autoconstruccion de viviendas de la manzana 16, de Ciudad Techo. In: Rubén Donath, Prácticas de construcción, Trabajo de campo en ciudad Kennedy. curso 002 CAA, II Curso de adiestramiento en autoconstrucción. September 1963- February 1964, Planchas Ciudad de Techo, box 42, File 73. Colección Centro Interamericano de Vivienda y Planeamiento –CINVA. Fondo Universidad Nacional de Colombia. Sheet 137.

The obligations stated in this document spanned from following basic rules such as accepting the assigned group and agreeing to the mandatory precondition to contribute personal work and cash to the program. The participants of each team were compelled to build the entire number of houses required of the team in no more than six months. The participants had to accomplish a mandatory ten working hours per week, for which they could not request any retribution. Other obligations consisted of accepting the team representative's decisions on matters such as the approval of bills elaborated by the ICT and the use of building materials specified by the ICT, and of attending all meetings called by the project or group coordinator. When a member was not able to attend a meeting, a designated responsible representative had to attend in his place, and the member had to accept the decisions agreed to. In sum, the members had to "rigorously" follow the technical, social, and administrative rules and instructions conveyed by the program directives.[884]

The sanctions for not following the regulations were mostly financial in nature. For instance, if the missing hours of work were not paid in cash the week after the absence, the fine doubled. When a participant became an "undesirable element" for the program's execution as well as for his/her community, or due to any other behavior against the interests of the group could eventually lead to his/her expulsion from the

[884] Instituto de Credito Territorial, "Reglamento de Autoconstruccion. Planchas, Trabajo de Campo En Ciudad Kennedy. September 1963 – February 1964,"42-44.

program[885] Finally, the group members were required to define an agreement, signed by all members of the team, that would aid in meeting the regulations.[886]

The series of regulations the ICT developed throughout the period of this study reveal a twofold understanding of the social aspects of the housing program. On the one hand, they provided a series of indications to guarantee the positive development of a community, and other hand, they traced clear guidelines on how to adequately use the space. More importantly, the regulations always included the importance of paying their debts to the agency on a timely manner.

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[885] Expulsion is cause for the termination of the contract, with no right of the participant to any recognition or recompense for the labor contributed. In case of voluntary withdrawal, and if the contract was terminated by mutual agreement, the contribution in labor was to be paid, based on the minimal wage in the region. Reglamento de Autoconstruccion. Instituto de Credito Territorial. In: Trabajo de campo en ciudad Kennedy. September 1963 – February 1964, box 42, file 71, course CAA. Colección Centro Interamericano de Vivienda y Planeamiento –CINVA. Fondo Universidad Nacional de Colombia. P. 42-44.
[886] Idem.

Chapter 6: Conclusions

ICT's significance for current scholarship

Although the agency operated nation-wide and contributed to the transformation of a good number of urban centers during a period of rapid urban growth, the current level of scholarship does not reflect this. Compared to other topics, little has been written about the ICT. Nonetheless, its significance can be evidenced not only in the number of units built during the 52 years of its existence (roughly 550,000 units), but in the many persons who claim to have lived in an ICT home.[887] When mentioning my dissertation's topic to Colombians, there have been more than a few people—today middle clas, professionals—who claim to have parents or grandparents who owned an ICT home. This anecdotal experience expresses fulfillment of one of the agency's goals: to advance and strengthen of the middle-class. However, current state of housing expresses its failure to solve the country's housing shortage. Informal settlements rapidly grew during the period of maximal urban expansion throughout Colombia. Between success and failure, the ICT created a wide array of housing projects, which are the materialization of a highly complex, contradictory, and fascinating body of thought and practices. Furthermore, the agency offers a bottomless pit for research. An extensive number of interesting strands have not been explored yet. One limitation is the state of primary sources. However, alternative spaces for research open up when considering the magnitude of this agency's

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[887] The total number of housing units, which according to the author, Alberto Saldarriaga, is incomplete due to the unavailable information, is in: Alberto Saldarriaga Roa, *Instituto de Crédito Territorial. ICT. Medio Siglo de Vivienda Social En Colombia 1939-1989*, 239.

work. One might be the unexplored period between 1942 and 1948, when the ICT worked in a joint effort with multiple municipalities and local construction firms. Also, reconstructing the building process of important projects in smaller cities or uncovering/analyzing the intricacies of the building industry at the local level and the impact of the housing projects in other regions than the main cities are certainly of interest.

The three case studies today

Although the ICT no longer survives, many of its housing projects still do. The three case studies are worthy examples of how the different forces in play during their construction continue to shape their development, even as their dynamics continue to evolve, particularly for the groups for which each of the projects was built. Thus, Muzú, even after multiple architectonic transformations at the level of the housing unit, is still recognizable in its original shape. The green areas are still part of the urban configuration and the main open spaces fulfill their original function. However, along the main connection to the city center, a vital and vibrant alternate and specialized commerce center has developed. Thus, the houses located along its main axis have been transformed for commercial use.

Figure 6.1. Muzú, 2014. Photo by V. Sanchez H.

CUAN is well conserved and still inhabited by the middle class. Its enclosure, typical for this kind of housing development, still defines its shape. Its privileged location has certainly played a crucial role in its preservation.

Figure 6.2. Centro Urbano Antonio Nariño, CUAN, 2014. Photo by V. Sanchez H.

Ciudad Kennedy, built for the most part through self-help and incremental processes, evolved in a fashion similar to many of the more informal urban developments around/throughout the country. Extreme densification through additions to most of its houses has had the effect of almost obscuring its original building typologies, and its general configuration resembles that of an informal settlement. The main streets that once separated the different "super-blocks" are now covered with commerce of all kinds. If at the time of its construction, experts already criticized the scant green areas, they would be shouting even louder today. However, the small playgrounds scattered through the various super-blocks, still exist and open the space to some degree.

345

Even if at the time of the construction of these housing projects, the agency changed the shape of the cities, in which these projects were located, over time they have become part of the urban fabric. Their once alien looking shape intermingles now with different morphologies surrounding them.

Figure 6.3. Ciudad Kennedy, 2014. Photo by V. Sanchez H.

The ICT and the industrialization of the building process

In 1970, the ICT's general manager, Luis Alberto Villegas, lamented that the agency was still using artisanal building methods, which precluded its implementation of

mass-produced housing to reduce construction costs.[888] Interestingly, much of what he expressed in that publication resembles the same complaints the agency's technicians had made previously—that the industrialization of the building process, deploying construction elements across many projects to create an economy of scale, is restricted in Colombia by its great geographical differences—and that Juan Consuegra de la Cruz had identified even earlier. Indeed, this is the reason the ICT's first general manager, Garcés Navas, could not implement the prefabrication model developed at that time in Puerto Rico and recommended for Colombia by the U.S. technicians working there. Despite the prefabricated elements developed at El Tabor, the experiments conducted later in collaboration with CINVA (and partly implemented in Ciudad Kennedy), and the use of prefabricated steel structures in the rural housing program, the industrialization of the building process was not significantly discussed within the agency during the period of this study. However, the ICT saw housing as important to keep people employed and to help reduce social tensions resulting from the large number of people industry had drawn into urban centers that were not able to absorb them. The absence of a high-tech building industry was thus not seriously lamented.

Rereading the "unhygienic" house

The ICT's publications and minutes contain the rationales politicians and ICT leaders used to carry out their housing programs, consistently describing "hygienic"

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[888] Instituto de Crédito Territorial (Colombia), ed., *Vivienda y Desarrollo Urbano* (Bogotá, 1970), 37, 38, 41.

housing in opposition to the homes the residents previously inhabited. In what terms did

the agency understand "unhygienic" housing? It did differentiate between rural and urban

housing. The ICT's publications and journals relish showing shacks in the urban context

as the most powerful contrast to its own housing program, even when residents in these

urban slums were not those who moved into ICT's housing projects.

Figure 6.4. Image of shack in front of Quiroga neighborhood, Bogotá. In: Instituto de
  Crédito Territorial, *Una Política de Vivienda Para Colombia; Primer Seminario
  Nacional de Vivienda, 1955*.

When agency documents discuss the overcrowded dwellings in which most of the

people who inhabited its housing developments had lived prior to moving, it was

probably referring to the tenements of Bogotá. However, no images of these tenements appeared in its publications. The traditional rural house was the preferred type depicted to display the contrast with the "hygienic" houses offered by the ICT. This traditional, vernacular architecture that had been built since pre-Columbian times seems to express exactly what ICT's bureaucrats understood as the epitome of backwardness.

In trying to eliminate the image of a traditional home, the agency contributed to a comparable process of "racial whitening," which was also taking place in more radical ways in other Latin American countries at the beginning of twentieth century. In holding to the idea that the "hygienic" and ordered built environment served as an educational tool, the housing program aimed to improve "the race" through health and education, the house being the material expression of this goal. Thus, by replacing the old, "extremely unhygienic" traditional house with a new, modern ICT house, the indigenous and those with black ancestry, who produced this new architecture, could be tamed. In annihilating the traditional architecture, much of the undesired "backwardness" could be, if not eliminated, at least reduced by architectonic means.

Rereading the modern functional housing unit

The ICT's understood housing in terms of functionality, hygiene, and economy—thus as a material unit. This materialistic understanding established the housing program on the basic principles of modern architecture. Yet the agency's bureaucrats could not grasp or take into consideration the need to maintain family bonds beyond the nuclear

family, nor the wish to stay in place, even under substandard conditions. When agency representatives wondered why people in some cities did not aspire to own one of the ICT's homes, they concluded that people needed to be taught to aspire to more than what they had. But the people themselves were never asked. The agency arrived to its own conclusions, very much based on one and the same model: development. They permitted no other way of living, and any discrepancy with this model meant the Other was unable to grasp the better living conditions of an ICT house. This was probably especially true of those slums residents scheduled to be cleared in the central areas of major cities, such as Barranquilla and Cartagena, beginning in the 1950s. A song from the Cartagena neighborhood Chambacú, expresses its inhabitants resistance and lamentation:

> "Chambacú, Chambacú, Chambacú....
>
> La historia la escribes tú [You are the one who writes the story]
>
> .....
>
> Chambacú, Chambaculero,
>
> De aquí no me sacas tú [You won't push me out of here]"
>
> *Totó La Momposina (Afro-colombian singer)*

This dissertation spoke very much from the perspective of the agency, I gave the agency a voice, its voice, which shines through the minutes. But the postcolonial reading allows us to broaden the simplistic interpretation of the content of that voice. Seen from the agency's bureaucrats' perspective, they did believe they were doing the right thing. They surely believed that if the poor did not want an ICT house, it was because they did

not understand or know the significance of a nice home. Our contemporary postcolonial approach, 70 years later, understands that the problem of this failed communication resided in the fact that the agency was convinced of its own models, and did not deem it necessary to ask for the Other's perspective, since for them, the Other was unable to speak for itself. The Other, the poor, non-male, non-white, non-urban, who populated the cities, became increasingly visible and threatening to those who had spoken in the name of all.

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