

## Theobald Wolfe Tone and the Common Name of Irishman in 1960s Ireland

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In 1962, the working-class Dubliner Cathal Goulding was elected Chief of Staff of the Irish Republican Army. Following the failed Border Campaign, republicans, under the leadership of Goulding and the newly-elected President of Sinn Féin, Tomás MacGiolla, set about rethinking their fundamental assumptions about ideology and strategy, leading ultimately to a split in 1969/70 and the transformation from the Republican Movement to the Workers' Party by 1982.<sup>1</sup> This new departure, which saw a turn to socialism, political, social and economic agitation, secularism, and anti-sectarianism, was rooted in a re-examination of Irish history and the ideas of prominent republicans of the past, especially the Marxism of James Connolly and the foundational ideas of Theobald Wolfe Tone, particularly Tone's belief that overcoming sectarianism was the means to revolutionary change in Ireland. In this process, Goulding and others rethought not only what it meant to be a republican, but also their concept of Irishness, rejecting what they later termed narrow nationalism, and embracing a more pluralistic definition of what it meant to be part of the Irish people which aimed at mobilising support from workers of all religions and none.

1963 marked the bicentenary of Tone's birth. That year the Kilkenny man of letters Hubert Butler published 'Grandmother and Wolfe Tone', his review of the historian and journalist Brian Inglis's memoir, *West Briton* (1962), in the spring edition of the *Kilkenny Magazine*.<sup>2</sup> Butler, a liberal and a Protestant, used the review to reflect on the position of what he termed the Anglo-Irish in the southern state, and on their self-image and their interpretation of their experiences in a changing world. While mocking what he saw as their provincialism and class snobbery as they declined in status and importance, he also attacked what he saw as their moral cowardice in refusing to confront the nature of church/state relations, an ongoing theme in his writings.

Butler believed that 'the Anglo-Irish who wish to express themselves freely' had only two options. 'One is that chosen by Mr. Inglis: "Go to England!" The unpopular alternative still remains: "'Go back to Wolfe Tone!'"<sup>3</sup> Butler was explicit on the area 'where Tone's leadership is still needed': 'the absolute separation of Church and State', as identified by Tone in the American Revolution.<sup>4</sup> In Butler's eyes, this demand made Tone 'great'.<sup>5</sup> Butler raised the possibility that unless the question of church and state was addressed there would be bloodshed

in the future, especially in the light not only of the history of Protestant persecution of Catholics in Ireland but also the international history of Catholic oppression of other religions, most recently during World War II, when ‘countless Lost Sheep of Central Europe were driven back into the Fold with a Belsen-model crook’.<sup>6</sup> For Butler, ‘there is only one way out, the way of Jefferson and Tone. In the North, the Protestant Parliament for the Protestant people must go and in the South the separation of Church and State must be introduced and adhered to absolutely’.<sup>7</sup>

This was music to Goulding’s ears. A fundamental part of his new strategy was to form connections with progressives outside his movement, especially people who might have influence, such as trade unionists, artists, musicians, writers, academics, journalists, civil rights activists and the like, as well as members of left-wing parties. This strategy was inspired by national liberation struggles abroad. Goulding had coordinated the establishment of a Wolfe Tone Bicentenary Committee, with Directories established in Dublin, Belfast, Cork, Waterford and Newry, and composed of people from within and outside the Republican Movement.<sup>8</sup> The Directories included people of differing religious backgrounds, a deliberate decision designed to reflect Tone’s emphasis on the unity of Protestant, Catholic and Dissenter.<sup>9</sup> On the basis of his literary reputation, his Protestantism, and his recent praise of Tone, Butler was invited to deliver one of the Dublin Directory’s public lecture series, on the contemporary relevance of Tone, in the Mansion House in the last week of September 1963.

Butler’s lecture, entitled ‘The Ideology of Tone’, focused on what he described as Tone’s ‘imperishable ideal’, the common name of Irishman.<sup>10</sup> Butler later published the lecture in the very different circumstances of 1985, as *Wolfe Tone and the Common Name of Irishman*, in an attempt to promote reconciliation (what he called ‘unity in diversity’) following the New Ireland Forum.<sup>11</sup> He added an introduction, but left the lecture itself intact on the grounds that ‘my argument has not been affected by the passage of time.’<sup>12</sup> As Robert Tobin has noted, Butler’s lecture discussed some of his ongoing concerns, ‘with Butler once again expounding upon the importance of diversity and neighbourliness in the construction of any humane society.’<sup>13</sup>

As noted above, ‘Grandmother and Wolfe Tone’ identified Tone’s greatness as lying in his commitment to the separation of church and state. In the lecture, Butler said that ‘what made Tone great was that he had no ideology. It was he who first used the famous phrase, “The

Common Name of Irishman”, a name with which he hoped to supersede all the ideologies with which the Ireland of his day was divided.’ Butler then asked whether this phrase had any relevance for today. He noted that in Tone’s hand it had had the power of gunpowder, and that with it, Tone had hoped to overturn the Irish parliament and the British connection, as well as to establish an independent republic with help from Revolutionary France. Butler lamented the havoc the explosion had wreaked in 1798, and its long-term negative consequences for Ireland. However, ‘like a great inventor, who blows up himself and his friends with the things he invents, [Tone] had discovered something, which nobody had observed before.’ What Tone had discovered, in Butler’s mind, was the power of a secular Irish identity to overturn the sectarian stasis of Irish society, and thus allow for communal efforts to forge a better future for all the island’s inhabitants.<sup>14</sup> For Butler, Tone had been somewhat successful in creating a common identity, and the need to finish this work remained urgent.

Butler identified Tone as ‘the father of Irish Republicanism and also I think of Irish nationalism’.<sup>15</sup> An ardent opponent of ‘the worst excesses of racialism’ as seen during World War II, Butler was keen to separate Tone, and Irish nationalism, from the Fascism that he felt caused liberal people in the 1960s to reject nationalism and forgo concentrating on improving their own situations in favour of what he termed ‘Broad Horizons’, ‘the fear of leaving a large world-wide community and becoming attached to a small and insignificant one’.<sup>16</sup> Broad Horizons, in Butler’s eyes, caused people to neglect their immediate surroundings and interests through a false cosmopolitanism that was a hindrance to the improvement of their native lands. Butler stressed that there was ‘no tincture of *racialism* in Tone’s idea of an independent Irish nation’, which helped explain why Irish nationalism had not gone Fascist in the twentieth century.<sup>17</sup> For Tone, said Butler, membership of a nation was defined by our country and not our blood. Therefore, membership of the Irish nation belonged to all those who thought themselves Irish, regardless of whether their ancestors had come from Britain, or their religion. Racial concepts that associated nationality with blood had nothing to do with nationalism, ‘which is comprehensive and based on neighbourliness and shared experiences and a common devotion to the land in which you live’.<sup>18</sup> For Butler the key to genuine nationalism lay in understanding one’s community and one’s history, and in cooperating with the people you shared your land with to improve all your lives.

Nationalism in the north, Butler said, was ‘very sick indeed’, and he asked whether it could, or should be revived. He noted that for Tone, uniting Protestant, Catholic and Dissenter behind

the common name of Irishman had been the means, with the end being breaking the British connection. ‘None of this has much relevance today’. Butler argued that given how many people emigrated from Ireland to Britain, and how many joined the British Army, if ‘fighting against England or the north we should be fighting against our own people with a bitterly divided mind.’ In the modern world, the true enemies were ideas, not countries, ideas like Broad Horizons. It was better to concentrate on ‘the real world, small, personal and concrete, into which we were born.’ With this approach, ‘The Common Name of Irishman, which Tone forged so successfully, may still have the same power which it always had.’<sup>19</sup>

If unity were achieved, what would it mean? It would produce a ‘vigorous creative polemical’ society, like that from which Tone sprang, to replace the ‘subdued’, ‘often dull’ and moderate world of the 1960s.<sup>20</sup> Butler believed that partition, by disturbing ‘that equilibrium of forces necessary to a country’s happiness’, had contributed to ‘stagnation and emigration north and south’. As well as robbing the south of the ‘vigorous and rebellious element’ whence republicanism sprang in the eighteenth century, partition had caused the north to become ‘smug’, and obsessed with Broad Horizons. Partition had left the south, meanwhile, in the grip of an ‘authoritarian church’.<sup>21</sup> Butler, applying a dialectical model, believed that in a reunited Ireland, the disputes over matters like church/state relations, relations with Britain, and culture would ultimately be productive of both social harmony and a vital environment in which the country could flourish.

How could unity be achieved? By abandoning Broad Horizons, by returning to the personal world of Tone, by interacting with one’s neighbours, developing one’s relationships with them, by recognising what the people of Ireland had in common and working together for the good of all, and thus addressing the problems that affected people on both sides of the border. Respect and affection would grow, and the common name of Irishman would take root. ‘North and south we would apply ourselves to a thousand urgent problems, social and material and personal, which since the death of Tone we have been taught to regard as parochial and beneath our dignity, and which we have neglected for 150 years. One day we should find that almost without our knowing it the border had gone.’<sup>22</sup> The common name of Irishman thus offered a means of bringing Ireland into the modern era, by abolishing past dissensions and focusing minds on the here and now, while also avoiding its pitfalls. For Butler, unlike Goulding’s Bicentenary Committee, promoting the common name of Irishman was not linked to any specific political programme, but to a more general shift in social and cultural attitudes.

It might be tempting to interpret Butler's presence in the commemorative lecture series as mere window dressing designed to provide a veneer of intellectual sophistication and cross-denominational support to a traditional republican venture. In reality, it was much more than that. Goulding, drawing on Tone, was determined to break any link in the minds of republicans between Irishness and Catholicism. Goulding felt that both within the Republican Movement, and within Irish politics and society more generally, Tone's dictum about uniting Protestant, Catholic and Dissenter had been paid only lip service. The speech at the 1963 annual Wolfe Tone commemoration at Bodenstown, the first of the new leadership, stated, 'The main objective remains unaltered and the means of achieving that objective remain the same also ... It is our task to win the confidence and support of the descendants of the Presbyterian United Irishmen of Tone's generation.'<sup>23</sup> The choice of Butler for the lecture series should be interpreted as a statement of intent to take Tone's dictum seriously.

Not only had 'Grandmother and Wolfe Tone' been unambiguous in its call for complete separation of church and state, Butler himself had gained a certain amount of notoriety and clerical condemnation for his writings on Yugoslavia, his perceived insulting of the Papal Nuncio at a discussion of the treatment of Catholicism in Communist Yugoslavia in October 1952, and his intervention in the controversy over a football match between the Republic of Ireland and Yugoslavia in 1955. The powerful Archbishop McQuaid of Dublin had succeeded in having an invitation to the Yugoslavs to play in Dublin withdrawn in 1952, but another was issued in 1955. McQuaid called for a Catholic boycott of the match, citing the imprisonment of Cardinal Aloysius Stepinac, Archbishop of Zagreb. Butler had controversially exposed Stepinac's role in supporting the Croatian fascist Ustaše government and his participation in its forced conversion of members of the Serbian Orthodox Church to Catholicism during World War II.<sup>24</sup> In picking a man with Butler's reputation to speak on Tone on the bicentenary of his birth, Goulding and the Dublin Directory were sending a very clear message about their understanding of republicanism – faith and fatherland Catholic nationalism was not for them.

The bicentennial lectures, especially the invitation to Butler, therefore represent one of the earliest manifestations of the path which the Goulding-MacGiolla leadership was set on following, one aimed at addressing the religious complexities in Irish society and the class nature of political and social power, north and south. They aimed to end the focus on the simplistic notion of "Brits Out", and to challenge those who viewed unionists as colonists

removed from the Irish people. As Tone had aimed to forge a common identity among the people of Ireland to overturn the native elite and the connection with Britain, so Goulding, MacGiolla and their supporters hoped to use the same means to overturn both states in Ireland, achieve full independence, and revolutionise the social and economic system, by establishing a socialist republic.

It was no accident that a lot of the innovative thinking that shaped this new departure was carried out under the aegis of the Wolfe Tone Societies that had been formed from the Wolfe Tone Directories. They were named after Tone not just because of the cachet his name had in republican and left-wing circles, but also because the Goulding-MacGiolla leadership conceived its programme as a return to the fundamental principles established by Tone, updated for the modern era. Where Butler stated Tone's greatness stemmed from having no ideology, republicans located it in his founding a new one. The commitment to Tone's strategy of uniting Protestant, Catholic and Dissenter shaped the approach of the Goulding-MacGiolla leadership in the 1960s, and its response to the crisis that erupted in Northern Ireland in 1969. The elaboration of what this programme meant in detail, and of the strategy necessary to implement it, took time, and was far from straight forward, especially given the resistance within the Republican Movement to this new departure. Nevertheless, its progress can be tracked in the orations given at Bodenstown in the decade or so after 1963.

The 1964 oration, amidst much traditional matter, contained prominent elements of the shifting understanding of what constituted freedom for the Irish people, with increasing emphasis on control of the economy and natural resources. Tone was described as 'undoubtedly the most original, persistent, buoyant and selfless patriot that ever led the national liberation forces in Ireland', placing him not just in the Irish context, but also that of the contemporary anti-imperial struggle of the Communist-led Vietnamese National Liberation Front. The speech offered a new emphasis on the history of republicanism, citing writings from Tone and the United Irishmen, and from Connolly and Pearse, to argue that the republicans had fought not only for independence but also 'to establish a reign of social justice in which the finance, land and industry of all Ireland would be controlled and utilised by the Irish people for their own and their children's welfare'.<sup>25</sup> The same year, the Army Convention of the IRA agreed to discuss new proposals on organisation in 1965. The ten proposals, which had Goulding's support, stressed the need for political, social and economic agitation, to cooperate with others on the question of control of economic resources, and to consider ending abstentionism.<sup>26</sup>

Although the proposal on abstentionism and others were defeated at the subsequent Convention and Sinn Féin Ard Fheis, the proposals demonstrated clearly the direction Goulding wished to take.

A month before Bodenstown 1966, the *Irish Independent* printed an internal IRA document outlining a strategy for revolution that had been found by Gardaí on Seán Garland earlier that year. The ultimate aim of the plan was to build sufficient support north and south for a situation of dual power to emerge through the establishment of an alternative all-Ireland parliament, supported by radicalised trade unions and cooperative movements and a military force, and thus displace the existing state structures and effect the socialist revolution. To build such support, the open political wing must become the dominant part of the revolutionary movement, building its influence through agitation on a ‘radical social and economic programme’, and especially work in the trade union movement. IRA volunteers should receive training primarily in politics and agitation rather than the use of arms, and prioritise ‘a lot of unromantic and possibly boring’ day-to-day political work. The IRA would gradually reduce in influence and importance within the movement as the political organisation grew, while continuing to recruit from the ‘most conscious’ members; its focus would be planning for the ultimate point when force might be needed.<sup>27</sup> The plan to create a dual power situation was clearly influenced both by Irish history in the period 1919-21, when the Dáil and supporting organisations had rendered the existing regime unsustainable, and the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917, when the Soviets had first effectively shared power with the Provisional Government and then replaced it.<sup>28</sup>

The 1966 Bodenstown speech argued that both the British government and the local capitalist class understood that if the people rejected sectarianism, their next demand would be ‘a just share of the wealth they create’. Both therefore worked hard to sustain it. To be true followers of Tone, present-day republicans must provide a realistic alternative to the status quo. That alternative was implementing the 1916 Proclamation, giving the people ownership of the country’s resources, civil and religious liberty, and equal rights and opportunities. Those present were told that although this might not be ultimately effected until the creation of an all-Ireland government, they had a duty to advance this aim by encouraging agricultural cooperatives, by working in trade unions, and by becoming ‘active, hard working members of each and every organisation that is working for the welfare of all the people’. The oration also called for the nationalisation of key industries and large estates of absentee landlords. It ended

by reassuring those made nervous by all this talk of social and economic agitation and what they saw as plans to run down the IRA that achieving this goal would ultimately require the force of arms.<sup>29</sup>

The speech outlined a strategy in line with the captured political plan, using some of the exact same language. The concluding part of the speech reflected how Goulding, MacGiolla and their supporters were trying to keep as many people as possible on board by reaffirming their commitment to certain verities while seeking to change the nature and emphasis of the Republican Movement as a whole. They hoped that over time many members would accept their programme as it began to bear fruit, while new members attracted by the socialist policies and agitation would replace discontented members expected to drift off.<sup>30</sup> The formation of the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association in January 1967 following a plan agreed at a meeting of the Wolfe Tone Societies attended by Goulding in August 1966, was one example of how the new strategy involved republicans in a wider range of issues in cooperation with a broader range of forces.

By Bodenstown 1968, the Goulding programme was much clearer, and support for it much stronger within the Republican Movement. Seán Garland's oration displayed the confidence of the leadership in its position and the extent to which the re-examination of the history and ideology of republicanism had recast its politics. Tone was presented as 'a Republican, a democrat, above all a revolutionary'. To Tone, revolution meant overthrowing monarchy and aristocracy and establishing a republic embodying 'the essential human rights recognised in republican doctrines'. Tone also wanted 'an end to the senseless religious bitterness between Irishmen, [and] that we all should recognise that irrespective of religion, we are brothers'. The United Irishmen had stated in 1791 that their aim was 'the Greatest Happiness of the Greatest Number' through political institutions based on the rights of man. Republicans today, said Garland, sought the same goal through the socialist republic, where the workers and small farmers, the mass of the Irish people, would control the means of production, distribution and exchange.<sup>31</sup>

This Marxist language was not 'glib phrases trotted out from some textbook': 'This is our definition of Irish Republicanism in 1968. It is the same definition as that of Tone, Lalor, Pearse Connolly and all the other countless men and women who sought to free the Irish people. We seek as they did to smash the suffocating stranglehold of both a native and foreign class over



our political and economic affairs.’ Addressing the internal opposition to the new departure, he stated that rejecting the fact that previous generations were social as well as political revolutionaries meant rejecting republicanism itself. The Republican Movement was not sacrosanct, but a weapon in the hands of the Irish people to attain its freedom. If it were not fit for purpose, ‘then we must ruthlessly scrap it and forge a new weapon to do the job’, whatever the ‘mealy-mouthed sentimentalist’ might say about adhering to traditional forms of organisation. He pointed out that in all successful revolutions, ‘the civil wing’ had acted as the ‘mass organiser of the people’ through its agitations. The task for republicans was to lead the people in their struggles against ‘their enemies’, ‘their landlords, their bosses and their gombeen exploiters’, i.e. ‘the Establishment’. The oration concluded by citing Tone’s words about achieving independence by relying upon ‘that most numerous and respectable class of the community, the men of no property’.<sup>32</sup>

The Goulding project, then, was founded upon a re-examination of Tone and his relevance for contemporary society. From the start, it had involved a commitment to forging the unity of Protestant, Catholic and Dissenter to subsume sectarian divisions under the common name of Irishman. By 1968, by looking at Tone anew from a Marxist perspective, the Republican Movement under the Goulding-MacGiolla leadership had reached the same conclusion as Connolly nearly sixty years before: ‘only the Irish working class remain as the incorruptible inheritors of the fight for freedom in Ireland’.<sup>33</sup> Whereas Butler had argued that Tone ‘did not idolize the “toiling masses”’, the Republican Movement was now of the opinion that not only had Tone placed his trust in them, but he wanted a social revolution that would greatly benefit them as well as the bourgeoisie.<sup>34</sup> Goulding et al saw socialist revolution as the modern incarnation of Tone’s revolutionary thought. When they spoke of uniting Protestant, Catholic and Dissenter, they now meant uniting workers north and south by raising their class consciousness through agitation and propaganda.

The Republican Movement’s commitment to this new secular, socialist politics was severely tested by the sectarian conflict that broke out in Northern Ireland in 1969, and some members and ex-members, aided by elements within the Fianna Fáil government, established the Provisionals with an explicit commitment to act as a Catholic defence force. The majority of the Republican Movement, however, remained loyal to the Goulding-MacGiolla leadership. Its strategy throughout the Troubles would to a large extent be dictated by its emphasis on Tone’s belief in the unity of Protestant, Catholic and Dissenter, and thus the need to combat

sectarianism and build unity among workers of all religions and none. Having engaged in what it had described as a campaign of ‘defence and retaliation’ since 1969, on 29 May 1972, the Official IRA called a ceasefire ‘in view of the growing danger of sectarian conflict’ and in recognition of the fact that the “overwhelming desire of the great majority of all the people of the North is for an end to military actions by all sides’.<sup>35</sup> It was argued that regardless of its intentions, violence objectively fed sectarian division. The next month, the Bodenstown oration denounced terrorism and announced the intention to transform the Republican Movement into a revolutionary party along Marxist-Leninist lines.<sup>36</sup> Chairing Bodenstown 1973, MacGiolla described sectarianism as among the most potent allies of international capitalism in Ireland, and stated that ‘sectarianism cannot be and is not practised by anyone who truly follows Tone and it is a mockery of Tone’s philosophy for anyone to come here to Bodenstown and mouth phrases of pious resolution over his grave while preventing by their actions the very unity which Tone saw as essential’.<sup>37</sup> The abandonment of the structures of the Republican Movement, the change of name from to Sinn Féin to Sinn Féin The Workers’ Party in 1977 and to simply The Workers’ Party in 1982 reflected the embrace of socialist politics, but also a desire not to be associated with sectarian violence.<sup>38</sup> While support in Northern Ireland ebbed away, the rejection of sectarianism and violence and the transformation from movement to party were essential to the electoral progress made in the south in the 1980s.<sup>39</sup>

This electoral progress was also based on the political programme and practical activity that flowed out of the rethink of the 1960s. By the late 1960s, the *United Irishman* had become a campaigning newspaper, supporting republican agitation in the civil rights campaign, housing action, the Gaeltacht rights movements, and the ground rent and fish-in campaigns against the remnants of feudal property rights; in elections; in opposing entry into the European Economic Community; and in exposing the corruption associated with Fianna Fáil’s An Taca fundraising machine. In the 1970s, as well as campaigns for peace, a bill of rights, devolution, police reform, and against sectarianism in the north, major efforts were put into the daily political activity of the any electioneering party on the ground, as well as the Resources Protection Campaign, and the study of political economy. This work exposed the profits foreign companies made from Irish natural resources and produced a number of detailed plans for state-led industrialisation, and ultimately the *Irish Industrial Revolution* (1977). Women from Official Sinn Féin were prominent in foundation of the Irish Feminist Movement and its activities in later years. The *Irish People* as a focus for weekly activity and propaganda. The slogan ‘Working for Peace, Planning for Progress’ encapsulated the sense of providing an

alternative vision for Ireland. The leading role played by SFWP in the tax marches of 1979 reaped electoral benefits in subsequent years. By the early 1980s, Peace, Work, Democracy and Class Politics were the main themes of the political programme. The first TDs were elected to Dáil Éireann, where they made a point of speaking for workers and against the farming and big business interests they said ran the country, and of pushing for secularisation during debates on divorce and abortion. Political activities ranged widely but were always subsumed under the central theme of the interests of the working class.<sup>40</sup>

In the decades after 1963, Goulding and Butler both articulated the necessity of completing Tone's work of uniting the whole people under the common name of Irishman, but their interpretations of what that involved were radically divergent. The Goulding interpretation of Tone received its fullest ideological expression in Des O'Hagan's *The Concept of Republicanism*, written for the bicentenary of 1798.<sup>41</sup> For O'Hagan, whose militant Communism earned him a permanent moniker when denounced as 'The Devil' from the pulpit of a Belfast cathedral, genuine republican ideology since the time of Tone had been democratic, secular, socialist and internationalist. Where Butler saw Broad Horizons as damaging and something that Tone had avoided, O'Hagan celebrated Tone as a product of the French Revolution, and an international revolutionary. As they now identified republicanism with socialism, Goulding and his comrades believed that staying true to Tone's republican ideals meant breaking completely with nationalism. Internationalism had become central to the politics of the Workers' Party because it embodied the need for the workers of the world to unite, and because it helped to distinguish republicanism as understood by the Workers' Party. The Workers' Party regarded nationalism and unionism, whether constitutional or violent, as adhering to a fundamentally sectarian concept of politics at odds with Tone's basic principles. Whereas Butler regarded the New Ireland Forum, which brought together the major southern parties and the SDLP, as a positive development, the Workers' Party boycotted it, branding it an attempt to restore the primacy of the national question, from which approach flowed the 'reactionary politics' that dominated both north and south.<sup>42</sup> However, the commitment to the secularisation of Irish society which both took from Tone meant they still sometimes ended up on the same side. A few months before his death, Butler voted for Mary Robinson, the joint Labour-Workers' Party candidate, whose election as President revealed the extent of social change in the Republic.<sup>43</sup> The dynamism that Butler saw in Tone's politics propelled the Goulding project forward until the world-historical overturning of the socialist states in Europe produced a traumatic split in 1992 from which it has not recovered.

Half a century after Goulding's invitation to Butler, society north and south is much more accepting of varieties of Irishness than it was then, as the recent referendum in the Republic legalising gay marriage demonstrated. However, in both Irish states, the law and education provision still reflect to a great extent a religious vision of society. The number of peace walls in Belfast has risen significantly since the Agreement of 1998. The people of the island remain deeply divided. It seems safe to assume that were they alive today, both Butler and Goulding would continue to call for the people to adopt what Roy Foster has described as the 'admirable and still relevant' principles of Tone and the United Irishmen.<sup>44</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> For differing interpretations of republicanism in the 1960s, see H. Patterson, *The Politics of Illusion* (2<sup>nd</sup> revised edition, London, 1997); R. English, *Armed Struggle* (Basingstoke, 2003); S. Swan, *Official Irish Republicanism: 1962-1972* (np, 2006); B. Hanley & S. Millar, *The Lost Revolution* (Dublin, 2009); M. Treacy, *The IRA 1956-69* (Manchester, 2011). For Gouldingite accounts of some relevant issues, see the Workers' Party pamphlets: *Aspects of the History and Ideology of the Workers' Party* (Dublin, nd); *Cathal Goulding, 1923-1998* (Dublin, 1999); *Civil Rights – Reform or Revolution?* (Dublin, 2008); *The 1970 Sinn Féin Ard Fheis - An Analysis* (Dublin, 2010).

<sup>2</sup> H. Butler, *The Sub-Prefect Should Have Held His Tongue* (London, 1990), pp.71-77. On Butler, see Roy Foster's introduction to *The Sub-Prefect*, and Robert Tobin's excellent *The Minority Voice: Hubert Butler and Southern Irish Protestantism, 1900-1991* (Oxford, 2012). I would like to thank Robert Tobin for very helpful discussions on Butler.

<sup>3</sup> Butler, *Sub-Prefect*, p. 75.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, p.74.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, p.73.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, p.76.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>8</sup> R.H.W. Johnson, *Century of Endeavour* (Dublin, 2004), p. 174.

<sup>9</sup> *Limerick Leader*, 7 September, 1963.

<sup>10</sup> *Irish Independent*, 25 September, 1963; *Irish Press*, 25 September, 1963.

<sup>11</sup> H. Butler, *Wolfe Tone and the Common Name of Irishman* (Dublin, 1985), kindle edition, location 26.

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*, location 9.

<sup>13</sup> Tobin, *Minority Voice*, p. 178.

<sup>14</sup> Butler, *Wolfe Tone*, location 45.

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*, locations 112, 203.

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*, location 67.

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*, locations 90-112.

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*, location 134.

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*, location 157.

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid.*, location 203.

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*, location 392.

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<sup>23</sup> *United Irishman*, July, 1963, p. 1.

<sup>24</sup> On the Papal Nuncio incident, see Tobin, *Minority Voice*, pp. 136-139 & 154-159. Appendix I of *Minority Voice* lists all Butler's writings on Yugoslavia.

<sup>25</sup> *United Irishman*, August, 1964, p. 5.

<sup>26</sup> See Swan, *Official Irish Republicanism*, pp. 411-414 for the proposals.

<sup>27</sup> *Irish Independent*, 14 May, 1966.

<sup>28</sup> While much subsequent activity over the next few years strongly suggests the political plan reflected the leadership's strategy, the same cannot be said for the immensely ambitious military plan captured at the same time, which no steps were taken to implement. The political plan has not been accorded its due significance in the historiography of republicanism in the 1960s.

<sup>29</sup> *United Irishman*, July 1966., p. 6.

<sup>30</sup> See the comments of Roy Johnston and Tomás MacGiolla, J.F. Morrison, *The Origins and Rise of Dissident Irish Republicanism* (London, 2013), pp. 62-3, 73.

<sup>31</sup> *United Irishman*, July 1968, p.9.

<sup>32</sup> *United Irishman*, July 1968, p. 9; T.W. Moody, R.B. McDowell & C.J. Woods (eds.), *The Writings of Theobald Wolfe Tone* (Oxford, 1998-2007), ii, p. 107.

<sup>33</sup> J. Connolly, *Labour in Irish History* (Dublin, 1910), Foreword.

<sup>34</sup> Butler, *Wolfe Tone*, location 368.

<sup>35</sup> *Irish Times*, 30 May, 1972.

<sup>36</sup> *Irish Times*, 19 June, 1972.

<sup>37</sup> *United Irishman*, July 1973, p. 9.

<sup>38</sup> Hanley & Millar, *Lost Revolution*, p. 336.

<sup>39</sup> By 1989, the Workers' Party had 7 TDs and an MEP in Dublin.

<sup>40</sup> A full treatment of such activity is needed, though the broad outlines are covered in the *Lost Revolution*.

<sup>41</sup> Originally published in N. Porter, *The Republican Ideal* (Belfast, 1998), it was produced separately by the Workers' Party in 1998, and again with a new introduction following O'Hagan's death in 2015.

<sup>42</sup> *Irish Times*, 30 April, 1984.

<sup>43</sup> Tobin, *Minority Voice*, p. 233.

<sup>44</sup> R.F. Foster, 'Remembering 1798', in R.F. Foster, *The Irish Story: Telling Tales and Making It Up in Ireland* (London, 2001), p. 212.