




CRAWFORD JOURNAL

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EDITORIAL

The Crawford Journal of Business and Social Sciences (CLBSS) is one of the efforts of the College of Business and Social Sciences of Crawford University towards driving the vision of the University. It seeks to provide a benign forum for promoting scholarship and providing practical solutions and alternate policy choices to contemporary social, economic, political and strategic issues of national and international relevance.

To this end, CJBSS provides a medium for the exchange of ideas and dissemination of research findings in Business and Social Sciences. In addition to publishing articles in all fields of Business and Social Sciences, the journal welcomes book reviews and review articles.

We recommend this volume to public and private sector policy practitioners, consultants and researchers, students at all levels, and all who may wish to expand their frontier of knowledge in the field of Business and Social Sciences.

September 1, 2013

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Democratic Governance and Human Development Sustainability in Nigeria

By

Egharevba, E. Matthew and Chiazor A. Idowu

Abstract

This paper argued that the focus on human and social capital advancement which embodies development should form the basis upon which we appraise the success or otherwise of democratic governance in Nigeria since the return to civilian rule in 1999. This is borne out of the fact that the utility of democratic governance is measured by the values, concerns and priorities of the people as well as their active participation in the pursuit of development and economic transformation. As such, it is manifestly clear that over the past 14 years since the return to democratic rule in Nigeria, the nation's 'leadership' has consistently failed to deliver on the instrumental value of meeting the social needs of the people for improved quality of life. This is evidently manifested by its poor human development indicators which include widespread poverty, unemployment, poor health conditions; uneven income distribution, inadequate literacy rates, and low life expectancy.

Coupled with this is the realization that the policies of government are not pro poor policies that addresses the very foundational needs of the people in terms of access to qualitative education, healthcare, employment opportunities and security. Consequently, it is very disturbing that the governance process allows relative amount of political freedoms and little or no amount of economic freedoms. In fact, what we have as democracy is nothing more than the "democratization of disempowerment" characterized by poverty, inequality, and lack of government accountability and transparency. Today, public interests, well-being and empowerment of the people are not the measure of all things that underlie governance to the extent that government agenda and policies are undemocratic and have largely been an exercise in alienation. The paper sums with the conclusion that for democratic governance to thrive and be consolidated In Nigeria, it is essential to first address the state of the

material conditions of the people through aggregating their common interests and conscientiously strive for the attainment of these goals.

Keywords: Governance, Human Development, Social Needs, Public Policy.

Introduction

Throughout the world, the unevenness of economic development and the social change associated with it presents us with stark contrasts as it relates to the so-called developed and developing countries (Douglas and Alejandro, 1994:2). This divide becomes even more worrisome within each nation when we consider the political economic character of most sub-Saharan African states and their capacity to deliver quantitative and qualitative improvement in the quality of life for their citizenry (Soyombo, 2005, 209). Thus a critical examination of issues that border on human development dilemma in the global south reveal varied incidences of absolute poverty, uneven income distribution, unemployment, poor sanitation, infrastructure decay and gross inequality.

These occurrences have brought about a shift in current development discourse from the focus on economic growth to that of enhancing the quality of life of people anchored on democratic governance which emphasizes inclusive participation, the consent of the governed, non discrimination, transparency, rule of law, and accountability in the utilization of resources (UNDP 2010; Sen, 1999; Todaro and Smith, 2011). This realism becomes critical in that since the 1980s and 1990s, many countries in Africa have embraced democratic rule, believing that democracy and democratization process were better suited at providing human development and distributing the benefits of development. However, with more than two decades into the practice of 'democratic' rule, these countries are still bedeviled by growing inequality between the rich and the poor, uneven income distribution, human right abuses, massive corruption by public office holders, human deprivation, weak infrastructure, political conflict, election rigging and in some cases civil wars. For instance, since Nigeria's return to civil rule in 1999, the country has not fared better on the UNDP Human Development Index (HDI) ranking, such that today, over 70 % of Nigerians

live below the poverty line, infant/child and maternal mortality remains one of the highest in the world, unemployment has hit an all time high of 23.90% in 2011 from 5.6% in 2005 and life expectancy is less than 52 years (NBS, 2013; UNICEF, 2010). Thus, the continued prevalence of these challenges in the light of the practice of democratic governance have led to questions being raised as to whether democratic regimes are more conducive to promoting sustainable human development in Africa, including Nigeria which is not economically developed but struggling with a severe and protracted crisis of underdevelopment.

While evidence abound that many African countries are yielding to the surge of demand for democratization after over half a century of dictatorship of authoritarian regimes which has been abysmally disastrous (Ake, 2000), available records reveal that even among the ones that are supposedly democratizing, very few come anywhere close to being democratic indeed. Instead what we have happening is the 'democratization of disempowerment' characterized by the existence of weak political institutions, poor democratic culture, lack of commitment to democratic ideals and values of free, fair and competitive elections, corruption, nepotism, god-fatherism, electoral fraud and rigging, absence of healthy intra and inter party politics, imposition of candidates for elective positions, and suppression of opposition parties and opposing views against government policies and programmes. However, given the nuance of leadership at various tiers of government which display executive indiscipline and financial recklessness, abuse of office for self gratification including involvement in conduct of impunity which are inimical to development, many development scholars and policy makers have raised the question of whether democracy can lead to development in such a political environment. This is significantly so because the prosperity of nations has correlations to its kind of leadership which ultimately shapes the fate or fortune of the society. For instance, under Lee Kwan Yew, Singapore developed into one of the economically prosperous nation in Asia.

Similarly, Mahathir Mohammad led the transformation of Malaysia into an Asian economic tiger. In the United States, among its numerous leaders, Franklin Roosevelt stood out for successfully navigating America out of economic depression through the Second World

War, to mention but a few.

Underlying the issue of bad leadership is the nature in which politics is played that tendentially negates its essence and quality of governance. For instance, instead of politics and the quest for power being used as an occasion in which disparate interests are aggregated to define common good and pursue collective goals, it is perverted into a relentless war of all against all by the political elite and their gladiators. As politics therefore degenerate into warfare, it throws up government forms and leaders appropriate to its character. This has led to the existence of a state from colonial to post-colonial times, which had near-absolute control of society, polity and economy and yet remained the private property of rulers, appropriated by particular interests instead of rising above all interests in society. Given this character, the states in most of sub-Saharan Africa have consistently failed to express the corporate identity of its subject or engender it, as well as effectively mediate social conflict between contending private interests because it is itself a private interest. As such, the state has thus become a theatre of war, a war for the appropriation of its vast power and material resources. This occurrence has resulted in the emergence of various groups rather than a national community competing to capture and appropriate the state, which ultimately nullifies any prospect of evolving or carrying through a national project, including development.

It is these concerns that underline this study which is to interrogate how democratic governance can advance human development in a society which is not already economically developed, and for which it is struggling with little success for democratic consolidation against a legacy of authoritarianism which has been decidedly abysmal. Of particular interest here is that while we live in an environment where the critical elements of the political and economic systems are in a stage of transitionality, the society is also driven by the simultaneity of democratization and economic development without bothering about the material condition for their realization. This is very critical because the existence of socioeconomic equality constitutes the fundamental condition for the successful functioning of democracy (Monshipouri, 1995:15). Thus, this paper seeks to further interrogate how the values of transparency, accountability, public participation, rule of

law and consensus-building have been entrenched in the democratic process and institutions in Nigeria in order to drive sustainable human development. To achieve this objective, the paper will be organized into five sections. Section two looks at the concept of democratic governance and human development with a view to establishing a nexus between them. Section three examines the feasibility of democratic governance in Nigeria, its prospects and challenges. Section four provides the theoretical base for understanding the state of democratic governance and human development sustainability in Nigeria and its consequences for achieving economic, social and political development. Section five ends with the conclusion.

The Concept Of Democratic Governance And Human Development

History has shown that no nation of the world grew and enjoyed steady development in virtually all spheres of its national life without experiencing good and selfless leadership. This is largely so because qualitative growth and development has always been an outcome of effective governance. Thus good governance is perhaps regarded as the single most important factor in tackling poverty, inequality and promoting all round development. This fact makes the question of governance a critical matter of inquiry for countries in Africa where the lack of development in the continent has been traced to poor governance.

The governance crisis is evident in widespread corruption, inefficient public services and a host of other failures. Accordingly, the World Bank (1989:60-61) argued that deteriorating quality of governance epitomized by bureaucratic obstruction, pervasive rent-seeking, weak judicial systems and arbitrary decision-making by those in position of leadership seriously hampers socio-economic and political development in Africa. Commenting on the experience of the Nigerian nation, the renowned novelist, Chinua Achebe, insisted that the root cause of the Nigerian predicament lay squarely at the foot of bad leadership. In his book, "The Trouble with Nigeria," Achebe argued that the challenge of Nigeria's development is:

simply and squarely a failure of leadership. There is nothing basically wrong with the Nigerian character. There is nothing wrong with the Nigerian

land, climate, water, air or anything else. The Nigerian problem is the unwillingness or inability of its leaders to rise to their responsibility, to the challenge of personal example, which is the hallmark of true leadership (1984:1)

Consequently, the state of Nigeria's pitiable socio-economic development has been a direct consequence of the actions and the inactions of the leadership class that has managed the affairs and wealth of the country since independence. Since the return to civilian rule in 1999, progress towards democratic governance has been made through the holding of multiparty elections and change of power from one civilian government to another, but the key problem now revolves around how to successfully drive the democratic project and the development project at the same time. A more people-centred approach to development still remains a dilemma as reflected in the poor quality of life of the citizenry. While Nigeria may boast high economic growth rates, human development still lags behind. As a result, millions of Nigerians are trapped in conditions of poverty and unemployment and poor quality of living. It is ~~a~~^{not} contesting the reality in Nigeria that democracy cannot take root under conditions of socio-economic deprivation, insecurity, conflict and instability. Development requires the establishment of good institutional structures, while peace and security are vital components for the attainment of democracy and sustainable human development.

Conceptually, governance for human development is partly about having efficient institutions and rules that promote development by making markets work and ensuring that public services live up to their name. It is also about protecting human rights, promoting wider participation in the institutions and rules that affect people's lives and achieving equitable economic and social outcomes. Governance must also be democratic in substance and form-by the people and for the people. In general terms, development has been viewed from political, economic and social dimensions.

Sen (1999:3) provided a useful theoretical and empirical formulation

of development “as an integrated process of expansion of substantive freedoms that connect with one another”. He identified five distinctive types of freedom, seen in an instrumental perspective as “(1) political freedoms, (2) economic facilities, (3) social opportunities, (4) transparency guarantees and (5) protective security; concluding that, freedoms are not only the primary ends of development, they are also among its principal means.” He further point out that, focusing on human freedoms contrasts with narrower views of development, such as identifying development with the growth of Gross National Product (GNP), or with the rise in personal incomes, industrialization or with social modernization. While growth of GNP or of individual incomes can, of course, be an important means to expanding the freedoms enjoyed by members of the society, freedom depends on other determinants such as social and economic arrangements (for instance, facilities for education and health care) as well as political and civil rights (which includes the liberty to participate in public discussion and scrutiny (Sen, *op cit*). Todaro (2000) conceptualizes development as a multidimensional process involving major changes in social structures, popular attitudes, and national institutions, as well as the acceleration of economic growth, the reduction of inequality and the eradication of absolute poverty. Similarly, Rodney (1972) sees beyond the individual or people's perception of development and conceived development whether economic, political or social to imply both increase in output and changes in the technical and institutional arrangement by which it is produced. In other words, development is a multi-dimensional concept and in spite of the various conceptions, it is basically about the process of changes which lies around the spheres of societal life.

Human-centred definitions of development emerged in the 1990s and focused on values and capabilities. For instance, Todaro (1997:16-18) specified three core values of development: 1) sustenance (the ability to meet basic needs), 2) self-esteem (the ability to be a person), and 3) freedom from servitude (the ability to choose). The shift to people is also reflected in the UNDP (1990, 2010) definition of human development as: expanding capabilities and enlarging the choices people have to live fulfilling lives (UNDP, 2010:5). In both cases, the definitions are concerned with the conditions under which individuals can flourish, meet

their needs, make choices about their lives and make progress in their own development free from structural or other constraints.

Democracy and democratic principles follow naturally and inescapably from the vision of human development. The word *democracy*, from the Greek, means "rule by the people". It sums up well the human development approach to governance because it expresses the idea that people come first: governance must conform to the needs of the people and not vice-versa. Whether there can be such a thing as "will of the people" in a disparate and competing world is another issue for debate. But the basic democratic principles of one man one vote, periodic, free and fair elections, well functioning political parties and electoral systems, functional institutions (effective legislature that represent the people, independent judiciary that enforces the rule of law with equal concern for all people), respect for human rights, free media and a vibrant civil society and equal concern for all people in the formation of governance structures captures the key part of what human development should be (see Fukuyama, 1992; Adedeji, 2006; Adekola, 2010). Thus, any democratic system or institutions is deemed meaningful when underlined by the principles of openness, representation, accountability and protection of individual and group rights, and judged according to the degree of its commitment to the indicators for measuring democracy outlined below:

- Voice and accountability: political, civil and human rights.
- Political stability: control of political instability and violence; likelihood of threat to, change in government, including terrorism.
- Government effectiveness: competence of the bureaucracy and the quality of public service delivery.
- Regulatory quality: incidence of market unfriendly policies.
- Rule of law: quality of contract enforcement, the police, and the courts as well as the likelihood of crime and violence, and
- Control of corruption: exercise of public power for private gain; including both petty and grand corruption and state capture (see Kaufmann *et al*, 2005).

Related to the concept of democracy is public participation which has become central to contemporary development thinking. Accordingly,

Blackburn (1998:2) defines participation as the commitment to help create conditions which can lead to a significant empowerment of those who at present have little control over forces that condition their lives. The World Bank (2001:3) defines participation as a process through which stakeholders influence and share control over development initiatives and the decisions and resources that affect them. The World Bank's view on participation has essentially emphasized its instrumental role in poverty alleviation. Here, the ultimate goal of participation is increased accountability, transparency, and efficiency of those governance structures in promoting development and reducing poverty.

In democratic societies, public participation involves engaging in deliberate processes that can bring people's concern to the fore. Open space for free political debate and the diverse ways in which people can express their views are the essence of democratic life, and are what makes decision-making work in democracies. In representative system of government, decision-making is delegated to officials. But informed decisions require input from the people affected by them and cannot rely on "expert knowledge". Democracies take different shapes and forms—because political systems vary, and they may be "differently democratic" on many fronts. However, democracy is the only political regime compatible with human development in its deepest sense, because in democracy political power is authorized and controlled by the people over whom it is exercised. The most benign dictatorship imaginable would not be compatible with human development because human development has to be fully owned. It cannot be granted from above.

It is within this context that governance comes to fore, which deals with the process through which group decision-making are made to address shared problems. Governance refers to the exercise of power through a country's economic, social and political institutions in which institutions represent the organizational rules and routines, formal laws, and informal norms that together shape the incentives of public-makers, overseers, and providers of public services (UNDP, 2007). Court (2002:5) defines governance as the 'formation and stewardship of the formal and informal rules that regulate the public realm, the arena in which state as well as economic and social actors interact to make decisions.' The OECD (1995) used the term governance to denote 'the use of political authority and exercise of control in society in relation to the management of its

resources for social and economic development.' The UNDP (2010:14) defines governance as 'comprising the mechanisms, processes and institutions that determine how power is exercised, how decisions are made on issues of public concern, and how citizens articulate their interests, exercise their legal rights, meet their obligations and mediate their differences.'

The UNDP developed the concept of democratic governance to incorporate a political dimension that includes government legitimacy, government accountability, government competence, and the protection of human rights through the rule of law. The concept is more expansive and people centred to include vital principles and processes. The adjective 'democratic' comes from the most fundamental principle of democracy- that people should govern themselves through the systems they choose through open and transparent participatory processes (UNDP, 2008). Moreover, democratic governance means that people have a say in the decisions that affect their lives and that they can hold decision-makers accountable. It further entails that the rules, institutions and practices that govern social interactions are inclusive and fair, that women are equal partners with men in private and public spheres of life, that people are free from discrimination based on race, ethnicity, class, gender or any other attribute, and that the needs of future generations are reflected in current policies. It also means that economic and social policies are responsive to people's needs and their aspirations that these policies aim at eradicating poverty and expanding the choices that all people have in their lives, and that human rights and fundamental freedoms are respected.

Democratic governance, therefore exists when the authority of the government is based on the will of the people and responsive to them. It is open when, democratic institutions allow full participation in public affairs and when human rights protection guarantees the right to speak, assemble and dissent; when government institutions pursue pro-poor policies that promote sustainable development of all citizens. While many countries such as Nigeria is becoming democratic today, the quality of governance is attracting more and more attention within and among countries, and as such, good governance has become a vital criterion for determining a country's credibility in the practice of democracy. Thus,

good governance must promote equity, participation, transparency, accountability, pluralism and the rule of law. It must be rooted in the principle to move society towards greater human development through poverty eradication, environmental protection and regeneration, gender equality and sustainable livelihoods. From the human development perspective, good governance is democratic governance. Democratic governance means that:

- People's human rights and fundamental freedom are respected, allowing them to live with dignity.
- People have a say in decisions that affect their lives.
- People can hold decision-makers accountable.
- Inclusive and fair rules, institutions and practices govern social interactions.
- Women are equal partners with men in private and public spheres of life and decision-making.
- People are free from discrimination based on race, ethnicity, class, gender or any other attribute.
- The needs of future generations are reflected in current policies.
- Economic and social policies aim at eradicating poverty and expanding the choices that people have in their lives (Human Development Report, 2010).

Since its early formulation in the 1990 Human Development Report where it laid emphasis on democratic processes and institutions as well as principles drawn from human rights based approaches such as equality, non discrimination, participation and inclusion, accountability and the rule of law, the idea of democratic governance has expanded to include a role for civil society alongside more classic understanding of governance that focus on state institutions (UNDP, 2010). Besides, international discussions of the means through which sustainable human development is to achieved has included a significantly role for democratic governance. The assumption is that more inclusive, participatory and accountable governance is important for achieving sustainable human development. The 1987 Bruntland Report of the World Commission on Environment and Development defines sustainable development as

... a process of change in which the exploitation of resources, the

direction of investments, the orientation of technological development and institutional change are in harmony and enhance both current and future potential to meet human needs and aspirations.

The combination of human development with sustainability is anchored on the premise that while human development focuses on expanding capabilities and enlarging the choices people have to make to live fulfilling lives (UNDP 2010:5), sustainability emphasizes accountability in the management and exploitation of resources such that expansion does not have an adverse impact on future generations. While human development is measured using the UNDP Human Development Index (a combined measure of per capita GDP, levels of educational attainment and life expectancy), sustainability indicators uses indices found in the UNDP's 2011 Human development Report which include organic water pollution emission, fossil fuel energy consumption, CO₂ emissions, ecological footprint (consumption, production and bio capacity and calorie intake (total and animal caloric intake per year).

Each of the indicators measures different aspects of sustainable human development. Some are more human-centred and some are more consumption related, but together they give a good sense of changes in sustainable human development over time, and are used alongside measure for democratic governance to test for the different relationships between them. Consequently, political freedom and participation are part of human development, both as development goals in their own right and as means for advancing human development. That political freedom and participation are crucial to human development is not well understood. Indeed, there is widespread misconception that human development is only about economic and social outcomes such as reducing poverty, income inequality and improving health and education. Though these are important for human development, its aim extends broadly to include promoting the freedom, well-being and dignity of people everywhere.

Economic growth is a means to these broader ends. From the beginning, the Human Development Report (1990) states that "people are the real wealth of a nations". People are not only the beneficiaries of

economic and social progress; they are also its agents, both as individuals and by making common causes with others. The strategies for promoting human development have traditionally emphasized investing in education and health and promoting equitable growth. These are two pillars of development that mobilize individual agency by strengthening productive capacities. However, there is a third pillar which is to promote participation through democratic governance.

Participation promotes collective agency as well as individual agency. This is vital because collective action through social and political movements has often been a motor of progress for issues central to human development: protecting the environment, promoting gender equality, fostering human rights. In addition, participation and other human development gains can be mutually reinforcing. Political freedom empowers people to claim their economic and social rights, while education increases their ability to demand economic and social policies that respond to their priorities. Human development strategies emphasized the need to reallocate public investments in favour of human development priorities especially primary healthcare and education and promoting pro-poor growth. And in this era of rapid globalization, markets and political liberalization, human development has also shifted priorities and made political freedom, participation and collective action much more important as public policy issues.

Alongside the entrepreneurship that drives markets; social entrepreneurship now drives policy debates on issues that matter for people. In addition, consensus is emerging on the importance of collective action by people and civil society groups in shaping the course of human development. Democracy is always a work in progress, a state or condition constantly perfectible, sustaining democracy means nurturing and reinforcing a democratic culture through all means that education has at its disposal. Furthermore, democracy may become consolidated at any level of quality so long as politicians and citizens come to accept the rules of democratic competition. Scholars on democratization generally believe that when citizens recognize democracy as the only rule of the game, they will also accept it as a universal belief and value (Schmitter, 2005; Norris, 2011). When this happens, democracy will be able to endure social or economic crisis. When democratic legitimacy is deepened within society

and widely accepted by the vast majority, most people will be willing to actively defend the democratic system. Thus, a necessary condition for the consolidation of democracy is met when an overwhelmingly proportion of the citizens believe that democratic regime is the right and most appropriate for their society, and better than any other alternative (Diamond, 1999:65).

For a democratic regime to thrive, it must be assessed on its capacity to meet three main goals of an ideal democracy such as political and civil freedom, popular accountability and political equality, as well as the broader standards of good governance such as transparency, legality and responsible rule (Diamond and Leonardo, 2005). However, if the perceived quality of democracy fails to live up to people's expectations, democracy will not be able to win over the heart of the people in the long run. The conventional wisdom holds that popular commitment to democratic regime will gain strength if the characteristics as well as the performance of the democratic regime can be perceived to be superior to the old regime on some important indicators of good governance such as political liberty, equality, rule of law, accountability and responsiveness. On the other hand, symptoms of bad governance such as rampant corruption, electoral fraud and protracted gridlock corrode people's trust in democratic institution.

Thus a look at the years of democratic practice in Nigeria since 1999 reveal that the country is intrinsically characterized by political instability, economic quagmire resulting in unprecedented youth unemployment, hunger and indescribable poverty among the citizenry in the midst of huge crude oil revenue windfall, increases in crimes such as kidnapping, terrorism, armed robbery, sexual slavery, pen robbery, and electoral fraud as manifested in the 2003, 2007 general elections. Since 1999, there has been seemingly endless grand debate about the future direction of governance and development in the country. The crisis of governance and development in Nigeria result from the glaring disconnection of Nigeria's political and legal culture as well as its political institutions from the moral and cultural impulses and the material conditions that should propel democratic politics or governance and development as a public interest project rather than a private enclave for a minority elite who find themselves in power. Tied to this is the structural character of the Nigerian state which serves as the site for booty

capitalism. Politics and invariably governance in Nigeria has turned into a huge business enterprise where competition rules and institutional processes are openly and crassly violated with impunity, and where regulators in government institutions have become active collaborators in the grand larceny of democratic politics as a public interest project.

The Nigerian state at the three tiers of government has virtually retreated from what should be its statutory developmental role of effectively managing the resources of the nation to tackle issue of poverty, inequality and infrastructural decay. Subsequently, the retreat of the Nigerian state in the face of its implementation of the neo-liberal economic reform policies has contributed massively to development related governance deficits in the area of policy measures to promote the social welfare and well-being of the citizenry. Even more worrisome is the continued persistence of massive structural underdevelopment in the country in spite of the unprecedented windfall from the country's foreign exchange earnings from crude oil sales where it has garner over US\$1 trillion since 1960. For instance, for over two decades now, Nigeria has consistently occupied the low ranking position in the UNDP Human Development Index. Budgetary allocation in the key sectors of the economy such as education and healthcare has never has never attracted more than 13% and 5% respectively (Vanguard Newspaper, 2012). This is far less than what other African nations such as Botswana (19%), Swaziland (24.6%), Lesotho (17%), South Africa (25.8%), Cote D'Ivoire (36%), Ghana (31%), Burkina-Faso (16.8%) and Kenya (23%) spent on education; and a far cry from the UNESCO recommendation to national government to allocate 26 % of their annual budget to education.

Besides, the unemployment rate in Nigeria has increased from 12.3% in 2006 to 23.90% in 2011. Similarly, Nigeria has one of the highest child/infant mortality and maternal mortality rates in the world. In the same vein, the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) (2009) Country Review Report for Nigeria on her capacity to engender and improve socioeconomic development through policies such as National Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy (NEEDS), which was replicated as SEEDS and LEEDS in the state and local government level, revealed that the policy has been ineffective due to lack of strong political will, weak accountability mechanisms, absence of monitoring and

evaluation, weak political, civil and administrative leadership endemic corruption at all levels of government and in society at large, the lack of an established participatory approach to development, absence of national ownership of the country's development agenda and lack of necessary skills among officials (APRM, 2009:259).

On the political sphere, the involvement of the political elite in politics in order to advance people oriented socioeconomic programmes has been relegated to secondary considerations, in outright violation of the spirit and letter of chapter II, Fundamental Objectives and Directive Principles of State Policy enshrined in the 1999 constitution and the country's obligations under the African Charter on Human and People's rights and the United Nations Millennium Development Goals. The Nigerian politics is devoid of a partnership or social contract between critical stakeholders on the basis of their collective or intersecting social responsibility to protect and advance the public interest. The leadership of the nation since independence appears to be worsening as shown by the rapidly deteriorating state of the polity. Only very few of the leaders if any, work for the common good. Top public servants and government officials are very few because they harbor the mentality that public money belongs to no one.

Over the years a wave of reform programmes particularly SAPs have been undertaken but the society lacks political leadership committed to implement them to address the problems facing the economy. The leaders of Nigeria appear good at prescribing solutions to economic problems without providing the institutional framework to solve them (Acemoglu, 2003; Dike, 2003; Edison, 2003). And more often than not, their policies are hastily put together and poorly executed. The political landscape is littered with wreckage of unreasoned policies and those involved in such activities appear to enjoy the nation's underdeveloped status. The activities of the leaders shape the reality the nation faces today because there is a glaring contradiction in their words and their deeds. They fail to understand that performance is the only standard by which leaders are judged.

With respect to the failure of attaining democratic governance in Nigeria, the major issue lies in the process of electing public officers into leadership positions. The electoral process and political party system are

all corruption ridden and not sufficiently participatory (Azinge, 2004). The elections are not only flawed but warped. The political parties are dominated by god-fatherism, money bags, and ex-military leaders, and their party primaries if ever conducted are mostly selective, , non-participatory and undemocratic; thus resulting in the corruption of the leadership, loyalty to god-fathers and patrons and indifferent to the electorate and citizens in their style of governance. Similarly, electoral corruption is prevalent. This manifest in situation that include the purchase of votes with money, promise of office or special favours, coercion,, intimidation, and interference of election processes, sale of votes, killing and maiming of people in the name of election and a situation where losers end up as the winners in elections as was flagrantly displayed in the 2003 and 2007 general elections. Apart from the above, Nigeria clearly manifests the prevalence of prebendalism (client patronage) and all these have combined to collectively undermined democratic governance in the country.

The Nexus Of Democratic Governance And Sustainable Human Development

While Nigeria has experienced a transition from one civilian government to another in the last fourteen years of practicing democratic rule, the country is still faced with multiple challenges to achieving internationally agreed development goals, including the MDGs. Moreover, although the argument that democratic governance is good for sustainable human development is intuitively attractive and widely acknowledged; its empirical foundations are little explored and so is the causal connection between democratic governance and sustainable human development. Some existing statistical analysis has suggested that democracies are better at providing human development and other measure of human welfare; distributing the benefits of development (measured through income distribution), and promoting human capital formation through direct public expenditure on health and education which in turn has positive impact on economic growth (Blaydes and Kayser,2011; Norris, 2012). Related analyses also showed that democracies lower the probability of inter and intra-state conflict; uses less repression in the face of domestic conflict, protect human and political

rights (Landman and Larizza, 2009).

Furthermore, in establishing connection between democratic governance and sustainable human development, it is critical to examine the relationship between democracy and development. In examining the nexus between democracy and development, there exist two broad contradictory trends have existed in the context of this discourse for years. One side posits a correlation between democracy and economic growth, another sees a trade-off between democratization and economic development. On one hand, those who advocate that democracy leads to development hold the view that the wealthiest countries in the world are democracies. One of the earliest instances of this position is Adam Smith's *Wealth of Nations*. Smith argued that the existence of political liberalism was a necessary condition for the operation of the market, which he considered the engine of efficiency and economic growth (see Ake, 2000:76). For Smith, the government that governs least, govern best; minimal government is more conducive to individual freedom, competition, efficiency and prospect for growth.

Accordingly, Lipset (1959) produced the most systematic scholarly argument regarding the correlation between democracy and economic development. For him, findings from a sample of countries studied from different regions of the world reveal a correspondence between democracy and economic development. For instance, he opined that economic development is associated with more education, assertiveness and a push for participation; it tempers the tone of politics and creates cross-cutting interests and multiple affiliations which facilitate democratic consensus-building and political stability. However, Lipset thesis was to emphasize a causal relationship that flows from development to democracy rather than the other way round. In other words, countries with higher levels of development (typically measured as income) tend to also have higher levels of democracy. However, the exact specification of the relationship remains a matter of continued debate. As for Grossman and Noh (1988), democracy ensures accountability of rulers to the ruled with the result that rulers are motivated to allocate resources efficiently and productively in order to be allowed to stay in power. In similar vein, Dahl (1971) argued also that democracy ensures that rulers limit their extraction of resources to what is

optimal for growth and productivity. Olson (1991) contends that democracy commits the rulers to avoid pursuing selfish interests rather than policies which optimize growth and collective well-being.

Also, Mazrui (2002) opined that democratization and development share certain basic virtues such as popular participation, capacity expansion as well as freedom. Democratization is an independent variable that explains the level of economic development of any society. Furthermore, the idea of popular participation according to Adedeji (1997) is crucial to both democratization and development. In its comprehensive usage, popular participation is the empowerment of the people to involve themselves in the regulating structures and in designing policies and programmes that serve the interest of all, and contribute optimally to the development process. In the same vein, Zack-Williams (2001) argued that democracy is an essential requisite for economic development, in that it empowers the general population to control decision-making. As such, the governed are presumed to have all it takes to hold governments accountable by insisting on transparency, openness, and other measures of control. Thus the absence of these virtues is considered as inimical to the pursuit of economic development. However, it is important to emphasize the point that while democratization may engender development, much of it depends to some extent on the context within which the analysis is carried out (Osaghae, 1995).

Moreover, the impact of democratization could be a reflection of its time-spell as well as the depth of the democratization process itself. It could also be a spectral in the short run, giving the fact that development is a multi-dimensional concept. However, in looking at the direct relationship between democracy and economic development, analyses show that democracies are no better than non-democracies, but they also show that democracies are not worse off (see Przeworski *et al*, 2000). In all, for democratic practice to lead to desirable outcomes from the human development perspective, the requirement of a minimum level of equality needs to be fulfilled, for a fair distribution of power is a basic requirement of democracy.

Consequently, Bhalla (1994) offers a different approach to the relationship between economic development and democracy. He argued

that democracy is a form of government strongly associated with freedom, and proceeds to test the relationship between economic development and freedom (both political and economic) rather than the relationship between democracy and economic development. He contends that because they did not control for economic freedom, past studies may not have estimated appropriately the relationship between economic development and political freedom. He hypothesizes that freedom is conducive to greater economic development, which in turn leads to greater freedom also. Bhalla further opined that 'no matter how freedom is measured, and no matter how welfare change is defined, there is a strong and positive relationship between the two' (p, 6). On the other hand, there are those who subscribe to the idea of endogenous democratization that posits that economic development causes democracy (Boix and Stokes, 2003). They argue that the changes brought about by higher levels of economic development merely enhance the probability that new democracy will survive (Przeworski *op cit*). In this case, many other factors may explain the advent of democracies across countries, but once it is established, the probability of its survival increases in countries with higher levels of economic development. In either case, development is seen as a key driver for sustainable democracy.

Be that as it may, since the end of the cold war and the successive 'waves' of democracy were accompanied by the rising expectation about the tangible benefits of democratic rule for development. Citizens and policy makers in the developing countries that have democratized after 1974 (third wave democracies) and those that have done so after 1989 (fourth wave democracies) had expected that the stability and voice made possible under democratic rule would provide a better system for long term economic development. Despite this optimism around democracy, the life experiences of the people in Nigeria and Africa in general over the past two decades reveal any little empirical support for the argument that democracy is a better political system for promoting development. The lived experiences during the 'lost decade' in the 1980s in Africa, Latin America and the post-Communist new democracies in Eastern Europe created worries that democracy was not able to deliver economic benefits as expected. This occurrence therefore has today awakened the debate to seek for an alternative comprehensive approach to development and

governance.

Theoretical Framework

The issue of democratic governance and human development sustainability in Nigeria has not been very encouraging given the various socioeconomic indicators that paint a worrisome picture with respect to the state's promotion of the social welfare and advancement of the capabilities of the citizenry. The rise in the incidence of poverty, unemployment, inequality and insecurity in the Nigerian society raises the question of whether democratic governance can actually advance the promotion of human development talk less of its sustainability. The crux of the matter is that since the return to civil rule in 1999, the established powers in the Nigerian state with only a few exceptions faces a crisis of legitimacy based on economic failing and their autocratic rule. The most important factor leading to the deep crisis of political legitimacy which undermine democratic governance results from the poor management of the economy, political repression, lack of respect for human rights and the failure of the leadership to meet up to their promises of improving the material welfare of the citizens.

The challenge of democratic governance which results in legitimacy crisis in Nigeria as well as other countries in Africa has an ideological component. As Schatzberg suggests, many Africans perceive modern-day rulers in terms of the fatherly authority prevailing within the Africa extended family. In this perception the authority of the father is absolute and thus largely unimpeachable. Ultimately, however, certain limitations are imposed upon this authority. The father of a family has the obligation to support his children and show respect to the women who are near him. These relations can be seen as African version of the social contract described in western political theory. Regrettably, in the past fourteen years in Nigeria, the political leaders in government have clearly failed to fulfill these obligations. With the dissipation of state resources by unaccountable rulers and the growing competition for increasing scarce essential commodities coupled with the failing performance of the political elites to assume responsibility for the welfare of their citizenry, the state has become a major obstacle to development. Thus leadership weaknesses, penchant for one-party rule, pervasive corruption along with

lack of transparency and accountability in governance has been adduced as the failure of the Nigerian economy to play host to those growth-induced forces that have transformed the situation in a number of southeast Asian countries.

As such, to provide a theoretical foundation for the parlous situation that the nation has found itself, we must focus on the nature of the state formation, its structure and processes, the character of its custodians, the politics and power balances that influence public policy formulation and implementation in order to understand the challenge of democratic governance in Nigeria which ultimate impact on the country's economic, social and political development. This is critically so because social phenomena are primarily the consequences of social processes and structures over which the individuals have little control and which runs contrary to their desires. However, to a large extent, individual beliefs, values and wants influence and are by themselves influenced by these structures and processes.

Clearly, we cannot meaningfully ^{talk} about democratic governance if the citizens do not take active part in policy making on issues that directly affect them. Public policy making in Nigeria is said to be a sphere captured by vested interests, many of which are still embedded in neo-patrimonial modes of accumulation, dependent on the state and on privileged access to state resources as a way of consolidating their power and influence. This is precisely the situation of Nigeria which has been described as a case of having choice-less democracy, where policy on key issues in the economy and society or society are completely out of the realm of public discussion and left to a technocratic policy elite very much tied to a transnational power structure basically around the anti-democratic Washington consensus with all its difficulties.

Be that as it may, the nature of governance and development of a society lies within the context of the historical role that the state plays in the pursuit of development goals and strategy aimed at advancing or undermining human welfare and nation building. This is important because at different periods in the history of a society, the institutions are established appropriate to the prevailing societal objective and preoccupation

(see Mabogunje, 2000). When this objective and preoccupation change to favour wealth creation, increasing productivity and development (as distinct from simple quantitative growth), the major institutional framework of the society is usually transformed from within (or from its roots, radicalization) such that the majority of the population concerned can still relate to the transformed institutional structure. This is where the state becomes a critical tool for driving such a transformation especially in its role as institutional designer, regulator and sustainer. According to Evans (1995:3), states count and do play highly critical roles in national development. The state lies at the centre of providing solutions to the problems of social and economic order. For him, states are the result of complex historical forces and relationships, acting as actors or agents capable of shaping and influencing the ongoing process of historical development. Furthermore, Evans contends that:

states are the historical products of societies, but that does not make them pawns in the social games of other actors. They must be dealt with as institutions and social actors in their own right, influencing the course of economic and social change even as they are shaped by it (1995:13).

In looking at the institutional approach to development in order to examine the nature and character of the state, Evans outlined three typologies of the state to include the developmental, predatory and intermediate states. These typologies define state in terms of how they affect development. However, within the context of this paper, our emphasis will be focused on discussing the developmental and predatory state. A developmental state thus is one that is able to foster long-term entrepreneurial perspectives among private elites by increasing incentives to engage in transformative investments and lowering the risks involved in such investments. They may not be immune to 'rent-seeking' or to use some of the social surplus of the society for the ends of their incumbents and friends rather than those of the citizens as a whole, but on the balance, the consequences of their actions promote rather than impede transformation (Johnson, 1982; White and Wade, 1988). On the other hand, a predatory state is one that extract such large amount or otherwise investible surplus and provides so little in way of 'collective goods', in return that they do impeded economic development. Those who control

state apparatus seem to plunder it without any more regard for the welfare of the citizenry. The developmental state has its internal character an autonomous make-up that makes it stand alone, above the fray and beyond the controlling reach of vested interests in formulating its own independent economic policy. Such a state also incorporates the Weberian ideals of meritocracy, discipline and is immune to corruption. In addition, such a state must be able to develop the capacity to implement its own vision of indigenous economic transformation without collecting handouts from any external body or institutions as it has been the case of political leaders since independence. Also, the state's vision must be driven by a highly competent group of state managers who have achieved their power and authority via proven performance and professional competence.

Furthermore, the state bureaucracy must be characterized by the values of "embedded autonomy" wherein it forges collaborative links with key actors in the civil society by stimulating their entrepreneurial energies through active involvement in tax policy, control over credit and influencing the prices of raw materials and production so as to sway economic activities for the benefit of all its citizenry. The autonomy of the state allowed it to institute pro-poor policies on education, healthcare, infrastructural development and industrialization since it insulated itself from inter and intra-class competition within the country. This kind of developmental state model has been reported as responsible for stimulating the economic growth and development of South East Asia economies of Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore and Malaysia, even though some scholars would argue that these countries were run by authoritarian leadership without the trappings of democratic structures (Wade, 1990). But the emphasis in this paper is to emphasize the veracity of how well structured institutions can ultimately help to advance development ultimately.

On the other hand, a predatory state is wherein the appropriation of unearned income via rent-seeking has become endemic. In such a state, political office are not held for the reason of providing service to a nation and its people, but for the purpose of individual gain in a society which may offer few alternatives for wealth creation. Thus, Bardhan (1990) asserts that in this kind of state, governance and government is all too often hi-jacked by predatory oligarchy that siphons the national treasury

and transforms government bureaucracy into bribe collection agencies which impede legitimate business, governance process and socio-economic development. In this kind of state, everything is for sale, from the courts, the legislature, positions in government, state business and parastatals among others.

Furthermore, a predatory state also exhibit a vitriolic mixture of traditionalism and arbitrariness characteristic of a pre-capitalist societies. In such a state, there is absence of the values of meritocracy and entrenched rules that governed behavior throughout the state apparatus. The state operates under the whims of a 'leader' who functions in the "patrimonial tradition" of an absolutist ruler clustered by presidential clique who control and use state apparatus for their own ends rather than for the benefits of the citizenry (Kohli, 1999:99). This idea of a state are aptly exemplified by most states in Africa as represented by kleptocratic government and state institutions such as those of the Abacha and Babangida regimes in Nigeria, including the political elites that have assumed leadership positions in the current democratic dispensation since 1999.

It is within this framework, therefore, that the process of democratic governance in Nigeria and its impact on human development sustainability is appraised. For as Ake (2000:160) argued that development of Africa has to be about the transformation of the state before it can bring about the introduction of new socio-economic and political processes that will positively impact on the living conditions of the citizenry. This is so because the state constitutes the central framework from which public policies are formulated and implemented by members of the political elites (Oyovbaire, 1987). As such, the actions and inactions of the political elite who occupy positions of state control clearly underscore the dimension of socio-economic and political transformation of such nations.

In Nigeria, democratic governance has an embattled history, in that it is struggling to survive in an environment in which support for it was ever more lukewarm and invariably ambivalent, opportunistic, and opposition to it powerful, resourceful and unrelenting (Ake, *op cit* 28). As such, the celebration of the triumph of democracy is more apparent than real. In assessing the emergence of democratic governance in Nigeria,

there are certain fundamental variables that shaped the content and context of our polity which have grave consequences for the style of governance it exhibits and the implications they bring to bear in her drive to promote sustainable human development. For instance, the post-colonial state has been privatized and used only as instrument for rapid primitive accommodation, and its instruments of coercion were frequently deployed to settle private disagreements and to secure the control of power by political tyrants. In the same vein, the abandonment of the state by the custodians has not only weakened it, but has also made it irrelevant to meeting the basic social needs of the people. As such, there are certain fundamental variables that shaped the content and context of our polity which have grave consequences for the style of governance it exhibits and the implications they bring to bear in her drive to promote sustainable human development. For instance, the post-colonial state has been privatized and used only as instrument for rapid primitive accommodation, and its instruments of coercion were frequently deployed to settle private disagreements and to secure the control of power by political tyrants. In the same vein, the abandonment of the state by the custodians has not only weakened it, but has also made it irrelevant to meeting the basic social needs of the people. As such, the state is now seen and treated as an enemy by the people and a force to be avoided, cheated, attacked and subverted as opportunity permitted.

Thus, given the nature of the Nigerian state which is ultimately predatory in nature by its characterization, its respect for the preservation of the rule of law, social justice, human rights, and constitutionalism is subverted on the altar of political expediency and the greed for power. The political elites have become obsessed with the "power project" not for promoting growth and development, but for inflicting pain and misery on the people of Nigeria. This construct of post-colonial politics in Nigeria is the greatest bane of her development and democratic governance. Given the inability of the state from the origin to emerge as a relatively autonomous force, free from the fray and controlling reach of vested interests emanating from the 'Washington Consensus' and their collaborators in formulating her public policy through the adoption of SAPs and other economic reforms, it has become the instrument of accumulation for the weak post-colonial elite. Thus struggle for state power through the institution of democratic apparatus by these greedy

and self-centred elite has become how to penetrate the governance structures and use them to support all forms of dubious primordial claims rather than promote the well-being of the people. The resultant struggles have contributed to the fragility and instability of the state to drive the process of development.

Today, the Nigerian state and its apparatuses have lost all forms of respect and dignity in the eyes of the people, such that the people have withdrawn their loyalties and support from its custodians. In the same vein, the poor performance of the political elite in governance and economic development over the last three decades has eroded its legitimacy on all fronts. Rabid populism, intimidation of civil society and political opponents, and the manipulation of primordial loyalties employed by the elite are no longer sufficient to buy or guarantee the support of the people. Those who captured the state, its instruments of force and resources in Nigeria's democratic dispensation simply personalized it, rather than use it to mobilize the people to develop a collective nationalistic consciousness that drive the processes and goals of national development.

Challenges Of Democratic Governance In Nigeria

The challenge of development in Nigeria today lies at the root of governance and the leadership question. This is clearly underlined by the nature of the institutional framework within which the country has been organized from historical times. As such, it will be fool hardy to assume that socioeconomic development and democracy, peace and progress can thrive if the political economic nature of the Nigerian state and its custodians are not resolved. To begin with, the socio-cultural context within which the people of Nigeria function has serious implications for the success of the nation's development aspirations. As sociologists would say culture is a vital component in driving social change. Thus any development analysis that ignores the internal "cultural" variables between and even within nations will fail to provide complete answers to the question of why the different parts of the world is moving at varied levels of development. As such, it is the position of the authors of this paper that any development strategy or model that pays little heed to the historical specificity of a nation and treats it as something in no way connected to its cultural, political and institutional context is a costly mistake to undertake. This is fundamentally the bane of Nigeria's democratic processes since independence and particularly the present democratic experiment.

Thus, in Nigeria today, the approach to governance by most of our political elites and their collaborators is not characterized by the clear ideological premise or ideals to instill profound attitudinal and behavioural changes in the psyche of the people with a vivid sense of vision and mission that will leave the society better than they met it. Majority of the elites in power are comfortable with maintaining the status-quo and therefore do not see the need to alter the lopsided political structure left behind by the colonialists which has left the country and its people more fragmented than united. For them, the practice of democratic governance is seen as a convenience of deradicalization by accommodation, a mere racial integration of the political elite into power (Ake, 2001:4).

To this group of elites, the problems of choice-less politics, bad governance, the national question which include matters of true federalism, resource control, corruption, poverty, unemployment, insecurity, terrorism, accountability, transparency and electoral fraud etc which endanger the building of democratic institutions are handled with levity, assuming that they will resolve themselves or be resolved with time. These unresolved issues have led to the fragmentation of the people along ethnic, class, communal, religious, regional, and other lines, and this has over time deepened and militated against the ability of the people of Nigeria to collectively insist on demanding accountability, transparency, economic empowerment, good governance and provision of basic needs from the leadership in government at all levels. This fragmentation of the society has made it vulnerable to predatory rule, appropriation of the state and its resources by the elite, total disrespect for order, social justice, democratic principles and respect for human rights by the political elites.

Furthermore, the Nigerian state lacked the human face orientation in governance as the public policy of government are void of pro-poor centred policies that impact positively on human welfare and development. The 'leaders' at the various levels of governance are wont to telling the people what they want to do and not what the people want them to do. Thus, state power and its exercise are not only arbitrary, totalistic and centralized in principle, but also in practice. This position clearly explains why the various development programmes that the Nigerian state have adopted over the past three decades such as Import

Substitution Industrializations (ISI), SAPs and the present Neo-liberal (free market enterprise) model has had little or no solution to the nation's state of poverty, unemployment, infrastructural decay and social inequality. Evidence abound that the most notable features of these development experience in Nigeria during the past two decades is that poverty and human development deficiency remain widespread as manifested in government policy of subsidy removals on essential goods, privatization, cut-back spending in the social sectors particularly in education, healthcare and infrastructure (Oyinlade, 2005:2).

Regrettably, Politics in Nigeria from inception has always been reduced to a zero-sum game where the winner takes all. As such, the quest for power is seen as a do-or-die affair where all forms of illicit measures, including subverting the will of the electorate through electoral fraud and the power of incumbency has become the order of the day. In opposition to the pursuit of democracy and good governance built on the principles of social justice, transparency, accountability, popular participation, human rights, politics in Nigeria is characterized by political grandstanding, opportunism, massive corruption, over personalization of issues, making institutions of persons in power, proliferation of political parties and movements which are manned by 'leaders' bereaved of vision and ideological standing. Good governance has been thrown overboard and leaders busied themselves with the construction of dubious ideologies and the looting of treasuries at all tiers of government.

Besides, even the fractions of the political elites have created parallels structures of power and opportunities. This is evidenced in the use of foreign schools for their children, reliance of foreign hospitals for medical attention, use of foreign banks, ownership of airplanes, the use of private security in place of the police, the reliance on private water boreholes and private electricity generators in place of publicly provided utilities and investments abroad rather than in the local economy. The Nigerian state appears to be designed to reproduce the contradictions that undermine it and erode its already tenuous legitimacy. These conditions are evidenced in the character and behaviour of the leadership. Thus, Ake (1989) perceptively articulated this dilemma in the larger African context thus:

The lack of autonomy of the African state and the style of

politics that is associated with it produce governments that are lacking in legitimacy. Given the Hobbesian character of politics, only a limited range of social forces articulate as constitutive elements of the state, and the government which emerges from the political struggle is necessarily based on very narrow range of interests. It becomes extremely difficult to endow the government with any veneer of legitimacy. The high incidence of political violence in the political struggle and the heavy reliance of the government on coercion reveal starkly the nature of the political system as a form of domination. This is underlined by the absence of even the liberal façade of democratic choice, the lack of institutionalization of accountability, the lack of any meaningful form of popular participation and of any prospects of changing governments by peaceful means. Without a veneer of legitimacy, the government is delinked from the society and alienated from it. This makes the mobilization of the society for development impossible (p24).

Consequently, the tenuous relation of the Nigerian elite to productive activities is partly responsible for its subservience to foreign capital interests and reliance on the state for accumulation. Its fixation on primitive accumulation has prevented it from developing powerful constituencies, forging a vision for the country, and developing an ideological context for growth and development. The bourgeois class that bestrode our democratic environment today is highly factionalized and fractionalized and has been unable to significantly operate beyond the narrow confines of its ethnic and regional claves. This has made it impossible for the elite to construct consensus national constituencies needed to build a new politics for democracy and development. Furthermore, democratic governance in Nigeria has not been feasible, even though we have a civilian government in the saddle of governance. For instance, the constitution which constitutes the ground norm upon which representative democracy is anchored has never really emanated

from the people with whom sovereignty resides. All the constitutions that have been used to midwife the various republics (1979-83, 1991-93, 1995, and 1999) have come from the military. Its construction has always been driven by appointed elite, with the state playing a critical role in determining the content of the final document. It is no wonder that the constitutions have hardly served as coherent compacts for determining the relationship between the ruled and the rulers, and none has been able to ensure the rule of law and popular participation, much less transparency, accountability, social justice and good governance that is driven by people-oriented policies.

Conclusion

From the foregoing, It is clear that evolving a human development approach to governance exhibits relatively greater support for citizenship empowerment which is a vital tool for sustaining an enduring democracy in Nigeria. For democratic governance to thrive in Nigeria, the leadership must display humaneness and selflessness in their actions and orientations. Humane governance entails setting up structures and processes that support the creation of a participatory, responsive and accountable polity embedded in a competitive, non discriminatory, yet equitable economy. This requires that the resources of the nation must be efficiently harnessed to serve their basic human needs and aspirations of the citizenry, which will in turn expand the capabilities and opportunities open to them. Also, the people must be given the opportunity to self organize such that the processes or rules of decision making are bounded by actions that are truly in the public interest, rather than favouring the private exploitation of the public interest.

Furthermore, for the Nigeria state to make progress in the advancement of democratic governance that will propel the processes of development, the leadership in government must address itself to such sensitive issues of human rights, judicial reforms, corruption, electoral reforms and institution building. In addition, there must be continued emphasis on integrating economic and social welfare into the bundle of public goods that the society must have. For human development cannot function in an environment that suffer from ineffectiveness in systems of accountability, transparency and lack of public participation on critical issues that directly impact on their quality of life. In all, the pursuit of democratic governance in Nigeria will remain an illusion when it fail to

develop a democratic political culture that involves deeper participation at the local levels, less concentration of power at the centre, institutionalization of the rule of law and respect for human rights, including social rights.

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