Future Agricultures

Feinstein International Center

'Responsible Companies' and African Livestock-Keepers: Acting, Teaching but not Learning?

By John Morton

Paper presented at the International Conference on the

Future of Pastoralism

21-23 March 2011

Organised by the **Future Agricultures Consortium** at the **Institute of Development Studies**, University of Sussex and **Feinstein International Center** of Tufts University

‘Responsible Companies’ and African Livestock-Keepers: Acting, Teaching but not Learning?

John Morton, Natural Resources Institute, University of Greenwich

March 2011

Abstract

There is some evidence that companies, both multinational and African, operating from motivations that can be very broadly labelled "Corporate Social Responsibility", can make real and significant contributions to pastoral development and that useful development dialogues can be held with them. But three case studies, from Uganda, Ethiopia and Senegal, also suggest that companies operating in "CSR" mode show a systemic tendency to attempt to teach proper engagement with markets, and remarkably little readiness to learn how pastoralists and other livestock-keepers wish to engage with markets, and what constrains them from doing so. When allied with the intrinsic complexity of livestock-keepers' objectives and constraints in production and marketing, this tendency to teach rather than learn severely limits the potential development contribution of CSR.

‘RESPONSIBLE COMPANIES’ AND AFRICAN LIVESTOCK-KEEPERS: ACTING, TEACHING BUT NOT LEARNING?[1]

DRAFT

Introduction

Much work in pastoral development in recent years has been around increasing pastoralist voice or representation and improving dialogues between pastoralists and other stakeholders in pastoral development: with the state at central and local levels, with NGOs and civil society, and with researchers. There has however been a relative absence of work that seeks to link pastoralists with the private sector, and increase private sector engagement in pastoral development. This is surprising for two reasons.

Firstly, if there has been any doubt, it is now clear that pastoralists are not “subsistence producers”, nor are they “isolated” from national and global trade (McPeak, Little and Demment 2006). The livestock trade has been an important feature of most pastoral societies in Africa for centuries (Kerven 1992), during which many factors, including the policies of colonial and post-colonial governments, have shaped it.

At the same time, pastoralists increasingly use purchased inputs for livestock production, most notably but not solely veterinary drugs, and are consumers of many goods and services purchased from the market. In a globalizing world, they are increasingly involved in global value chains involving the corporate private sector. Given all this, the lack of a body of understanding and practical experience on relations between pastoralists and the private sector is increasingly problematic.

Secondly, “Corporate Social Responsibility” (CSR), a concept that evolved in the context of the “developed countries”, has become an important idea in the programmes of development agencies and in debates on development. Jenkins (2005) cites several examples of CSR being incorporated in to development agency practice and rhetoric, including a quote from the UK Department for International Development: “by following socially responsible practices, the growth generated by the private sector will be more inclusive, equitable and poverty reducing” (DFID n.d. cited in Jenkins 2005). This is not to say that the idea of CSR in development is uncontested - Jenkins himself not only questions such claims, but also points that many international NGOs question them.

This paper examines three case studies of the private sector involving itself in the development of pastoralism and related livelihoods in Africa. In two of the cases there was decisive and effective action at scale by private-sector actors, and these cases clearly make the argument for expanded dialogue with the private sector by NGOs, CSOs, development donors and researchers. However the case studies also highlight more problematic

[1] Several acknowledgements are due. My reading on and analysis of CSR issues in development has been greatly influenced by Dr Anne Tallontire. The study in Ethiopia was funded under the Wellcome Trust’s Livestock for Life Programme and carried out in collaboration with Dr Mohammed Mussa, and in part by Dr Mohammed on his own according to a checklist we had agreed. I would like to thank all the exporters and other stakeholders who agreed to be interviewed and to attend workshops. The Ugandan study was funded under DFID’s Research into Use Programme. I would like to thank all who agreed to be interviewed, especially Anne Holm Rannaleet, Martin Mitchell and the “3V vets”. My understanding of the sleeping sickness campaign was greatly assisted by Dr Charles Waiswa and many other collaborators, as detailed in the acknowledgements to Morton 2010a. I would emphasise that the use made of these interviews in this paper is my responsibility alone.

tendencies of the private sector: to resist learning about pastoralism and pastoral rationality; to assume that the rationality of corporations can be relied on to design interventions in pastoral development; and to assume that pastoralists can and should be trained in that corporate rationality.

The three case studies have different origins and different foci. Two are drawn from my own work and that of close colleagues, a third from the published literature (Vatin 1996).[2] Two of the cases, from Ethiopia and Senegal, concern pastoralists in a classic sense, a third from Uganda deals with corporate behaviour in the context of an extensive mixed crop-livestock system[3], which as we shall see shares many aspects of complexity and uncertainty with pastoral systems. The Senegalese and Ugandan cases involve multi-national companies whereas the Ethiopian case-study concerns small (though formally-registered) indigenous firms. The Ethiopian example stems from a research project that was expressly intended to explore the issues of CSR in a pastoral development context, while the Ugandan case-study arose as part of a project aimed at learning lessons from the translation of research findings (in this case on the microbiology of trypanosomiasis and the behaviour of its insect vector the tsetse fly) into development action: private sector companies were only some of the actors involved.[4] The theme of the private sector teaching but not learning was not originally a hypothesis of any of these enquiries, but emerged independently in each of the case studies I was involved in and in my reading of Vatin's work.

Corporate Social Responsibility in Development

Before going on to the three case studies, I will set the scene in a bit more detail by surveying some of the ways that CSR has been discussed and analysed in a development context.

CSR is an evolving and contested concept. This is the case for business within developing countries and still more so in developing countries. One common definition in a development context is that used by the World Bank (Petkoski and Twose 2003):

> *"Corporate social responsibility is the commitment of business to contribute to sustainable economic development- working with employees, their families, the local community and society at large to improve the quality of life, in ways that are both good for business and good for development"*

This definition stresses the essentially voluntaristic nature of CSR – it is a "commitment" by business, rather than a compliance by business to external rules – and also stresses what has become known as the "business case" for CSR, that CSR benefits individuals companies in the medium- or long-term. Making either element central to a definition of CSR has been contested (Blowfield and Frynas 2005).

Blowfield and Frynas (2005:503) also point to the ambiguity about whether the term is applied to corporate practice, as the World Bank definition implies, or to a research agenda about broader business-society relationships. Their broader definition is:

> *An umbrella term for a variety of theories and practices all of which recognize the following: (a) that companies have a responsibility for their impact on society and the*

[2] Vatin's remarkable book, the second half of which concerns milk production and marketing by Peul (Fulani) pastoralists in Senegal, has received virtually no attention from the Anglophone world, or from researchers on pastoralism.

[3] That of the Teso and Lango systems, frequently labelled as "agro-pastoralist" or even "pastoralist".

[4] The issues of research-policy linkages within the case study are covered more fully in Morton 2010.

natural environment, sometimes beyond legal compliance and the liability of individuals; (b) that companies have a responsibility for the behaviour of others with who they do business (e.g. within supply chains); and (c) that business needs to manage its relationship wider society, whether for reasons of commercial viability or to add value to society.

Note here that the case for CSR can be based on either commercial viability *or* wider values, whereas the World Bank assumes both are always in play.

Blowfield and Frynas also note that discussion of CSR in a specifically developing-country context is a relative latecomer to the field as a whole. When empirical research began on the impacts of CSR in developing countries, “certain conventions and orthodoxies had already been established”, voluntarism and the business case stayed centre-stage, and broader questions about the scope and nature of CSR were not asked. Jenkins (2005) also notes some of the implicit exclusions from CSR discussions: transfer pricing, tax avoidance and broader questions of the poverty impact of business.

Work on CSR in developing countries continues to grow, and some important critical surveys have been made (Blowfield and Frynas 2005, Blowfield 2005, Prieto-Carron *et al.* 2006). But empirically, this work still largely focuses on the work of northern companies in developing countries, or on CSR among indigenous companies in the larger “emerging economies” (Frynas 2006), with less on how it might be understood and played out by indigenous firms in smaller, poorer economies. This is unfortunate both because these firms may well view and act on CSR very differently and because indigenous corporate sectors can be, collectively, economically important. It is also unfortunate because there is a need to look at the importance of socio-cultural context of CSR. Blowfield and Frynas (2005) suggest that the publicity given to CSR in the Anglo-Saxon countries stems from cultural distinctions between the economic and the social, and that other societies may accept the social obligations of business as more natural and thus less noteworthy. Although there has been some research on the differing socio-cultural contexts even in a European context (Albareda et al 2007), this study is just beginning in developing countries.

Our own work in Ethiopia was intended to be inclusive in its approach, not to assume that “CSR” was a concept familiar to Ethiopian companies, or that if it was it necessarily indicated the same thing as in the North. Rather we tried to capture a range of perceptions and behaviour by Ethiopian companies that might loosely translate as CSR. For example, we were also careful to note examples of companies displaying “philanthropy” towards pastoral causes, such as corporate donations to fund-raising events. Recent writing on CSR and development has sometimes tended to exclude philanthropy, often defined as donations made post-profit (Jenkins 2005), or activities “not related to the core business strategies of companies” (Prieto-Carron *et al.* 2006). Prieto-Carron *et al.* implicitly exclude Indian companies engaging in philanthropy from those having a “policy or a formal programme on CSR”. By contrast, we felt it would be privileging culturally-specific views of CSR and limiting the understanding achieved by the study, if we did likewise.

Discussions of CSR in development raise the question of “the business case” for CSR. This idea has come under critique from various quarters: that it privileges the fundamental values of business, brackets out from discussion a whole raft of questions about the role (or not) of business in poverty reduction, with “downgraded expectations of what the actions of business should contribute to society” (Blowfield 2005: 524); that CSR activities based on the business case may simply not work (Blowfield and Murray 2008); and that there is no single or uniform business case, but a range from a long-term strategic business case to short-term defensive business cases (Zadek 2001, Fox 2004).

The case-studies here vary greatly in the ways in which CSR was conceived in terms of a business case. In Ethiopia companies were very much looking at their own advantages in terms of more predictable flows of livestock to the export trade, and a better reputation for Ethiopian meat in general in the export markets. In Senegal there is a suggestion that the project described was partially a defensive measure by Nestlé against bad publicity in other parts of its business. In Uganda the main corporate actor, Industri Kapital, was operating by the end of the project in philanthropic mode, having divested itself of the relevant businesses. The business case is an important, and rightly contested, issue for CSR in development, but the problem of teaching and learning described in this paper cuts across it.

Ethiopia: complexities of responsibility

This case-study is based on interviews with four meat export companies and six livestock export companies (out of five and twelve companies respectively then operating) carried out in Addis Ababa and Debre Zeit in 2007, and remarks made by company representatives in two workshops. The companies were all Ethiopian-owned, and all but one were small, sole-owned or family businesses. However, these companies are formally registered: we are not dealing here with "the informal sector".

The international meat and livestock trade is central to Ethiopian pastoralism, as well as providing two of the country's largest exports. Different government sources place 2002/03 national official livestock exports at $US606,437 and meat exports at $US2,896,782. The pastoralist population is variously estimated at around 7 million people, or 10-12 % of the national population (Morton et al. 2004). It is estimated that pastoralist-owned livestock account for 20% of the cattle population of the country, 25% of the sheep, 75% of the goats and almost 100% of the camels. However, they account for the great majority of the country's official meat and livestock exports (Greenhalgh and Orchard 2005). Pastoralists are also engaged in unofficial cross-border trades with Somaliland and Kenya, illegal or barely-tolerated, with volumes that dwarf official exports, but these are not further considered here.

The main market for both value chains are the Gulf States, although there is also export to other Arab countries such as Egypt and Jordan, and other markets are being actively sought. Ethiopian meat competes in these markets with meat from other East African countries, Australia, South America and India. The Arab markets (see Belachew and Hargreaves 2003) are characterised by personal relations between exporters and buyers, but also by the somewhat unpredictable, many would say arbitrary, impositions of live animal export bans based on animal health concerns, in particular the bans by the Gulf states, recurrently since the late 1990s, based on the supposed risk of Rift Valley Fever among Ethiopian livestock.

Government policy favours meat export over live animal export as it the former is thought to add value in-country and to create employment. It also enjoys a generalised aura of being a more "modern" sector of the economy. However, the meat export sector suffers from more of the constraints outlined above, and apply forcefully. The meat export sector is therefore currently characterised by an extreme underutilisation of existing abattoir capacity: it is estimated to operate at only 13-17% of available capacity (Foreman 2005). The livestock sector, though smaller for the last years where records were easily available appears to be growing faster, with more new entrants. As we shall see, the livestock exporters are at least arguably more likely to engage in "corporate responsibility" towards pastoral development.

There have been several studies of livestock and meat marketing in pastoral areas of Ethiopia (Solomon *et al.* 2003, Saperstein and Farmer 2006, Umar 2007, Aklilu and Catley 2009 among others). Value chains are clearly complex and distinguished by a range of actors, such as local traders and agents. Terminology used by exporters and observers to describe those actors is not always standardised: terms like “middlemen” may mean different things to different people. There is variation between value chains in different regions (co-operatives and similar groups are much more common in Borena Zone than in Somali or Afar Regions). Different exporters have different preferences for how they source livestock, but there is substantial overlap between the meat and formal livestock export trades, and some with the domestic livestock trade and with unofficial exports.

Most of the meat and livestock exporters operate mixed strategies for purchasing, using their own salaried staff, small traders and brokers. Both the meat and livestock exporters also use co-operatives and pastoral livestock marketing groups to some extent; such groups have sprung up in recent years, especially in Borena Zone (see Desta *et al*. 2006 and other refs). Exporters have mixed feelings about these co-operatives and their future in the export trade is unclear.

Attitudes to “Corporate Social Responsibility”

The exporting companies were generally, and not altogether surprisingly, unfamiliar with the concept of CSR. As the project explored perceptions and attitudes they held that might translate as CSR, these attitudes turned out to be complex and hard to summarise. Some direct quotes from exporters[5] will illustrate the complexity of the issues at stake:

- “Business is not a charity”
- “Creating an export market could be considered as social responsibility because the pastoralists benefit”
- “Our real competitors are not each other, they are India, Sudan, Australia”
- “As a company we have a responsibility: if the pastoralists do not survive, we do not survive”.

These quotes show how within quite a small group, views range from a very orthodox view that business has no responsibilities, through views that by doing business the exporters benefit either pastoralists or the national economy, to a more nuanced view of the specific vulnerabilities of pastoralism, and consequent vulnerabilities of the sectors that depend on it.

In practical terms, several exporters had made philanthropic donations (in the range of ETB10,000 to ETB100,000 per year) to educational and other causes in pastoral areas: thge largest company, and the one that seemed to do this the most, referred to it as “corporate citizenship”. Some companies had engaged in two closely related activities within this general field that could be labelled CSR: drought-time destocking, and educating pastoralists on the requirements of the livestock market. Each of these is discussed in more detail below.

While the concept of CSR was generally new to exporters, they seemed in the interviews and workshops to accept some overall connection between their business and the issue of pastoral development, and willing to enter into a dialogue about the relationship between their survival as businesses and their responsibilities towards pastoralists. .

However, both meat and livestock exporters felt that if they were to implement responsible practices, this would be easier through their respective trade associations than as individual companies. They also took a strong view, reiterated forcefully by many of them both in interviews and in workshops that the livestock and meat industries were in an early stage of development, still dependent on government and donors for guidance and capacity-building. At this stage, government, not companies, needed to take the lead in pastoral development.

[5] Mainly spoken during the project workshops in May 2007

The livestock exporters had a specific angle on this, as they see government as favouring meat exporters in its general policy – one livestock exporter was vociferous in stating he had no reason to be concerned with pastoral development since the government has a discriminatory policy. The companies want government to take action on a number of pastoral development issues: improving animal health service delivery, providing livestock market infrastructure, providing businesses with soft credit. In these suggestions they were very much in line with current international orthodoxy on pastoral development. Some companies, however, supported further-reaching policies that are more controversial – sedentarisation of pastoralists and restructuring of land tenure in the direction of more fixed individual or small-group title.

Drought

The frequent droughts experienced in pastoral areas of Ethiopia have serious effects on the meat and livestock export companies, but also present an opportunity to examine the way these companies are engaging with pastoralists in ways that might be considered to show "corporate responsibility". As a generalisation, one of the most important responses of pastoralists to drought is to sell more livestock than usual. However, during drought animals are likely to be in poorer condition, and prices are likely to be lower because of the glut on the market caused by large numbers of simultaneous distress sales. The poor condition of animals also makes it more difficult for them to be trekked to markets or roads, and pastoralists are thus more dependent on livestock traders who come with their own transport. In Ethiopia, there is good evidence that pastoralists wish to sell more animals during drought than they currently do.

For meat-exporting companies (at least in Ethiopia), droughts affect the quality of meat and may disrupt supply and therefore long-term market share. Drought also seriously affects live animal export through the declining condition of animals, and consequent need for extra fattening before they can be exported. However the business impact for both groups is generally one of a reduction in profit rather than an actual loss.

In Ethiopia and neighbouring countries, there have been attempts in recent years by NGOs and international donors to involve private companies in purchasing livestock during drought that would otherwise go unsold, a practice variously referred to as "destocking", "commercial destocking" or "emergency livestock marketing interventions" (Morton 2006).[6] During the 2005-2006 drought in Southern Ethiopia these took the form (Abebe *et al*. 2008) of a) the organisation by the Livestock Marketing Department and Save the Children-US, a major international NGO of familiarisation tours of the rangelands for meat and live animal exporters, and b) availability of soft credit.

From interviews and comments made in our workshops, it seems that Ethiopian *meat export companies* assisted pastoralists during drought by buying marginally more livestock than they would have done based only on short-term profits, temporarily overstocking their holding grounds to do so. Two of the four companies interviewed told us they had bought 2000 cattle and 2000 smallstock respectively in excess of their holding ground capacity. Any additional buying has been limited by a) the lack of fattening facilities, and the fact that pastoralists, at least in the Borana area, are mainly concerned with selling cattle during drought, while the meat export companies deal mainly in smallstock carcasses. Representatives of the only large company in the sample[7] told us that they had bought

[6] The practice is often discussed alongside a very different mode of destocking, where outside agencies buy surplus animals from drought-stricken pastoralists, and return the meat to selected members of these or neighbouring communities as a relief good.

[7] Part of a well-known conglomerate with interests in several branches of agri-business and beyond.

additional stock during the 2006 drought that they had then sold into domestic meat markets, but this does not appear to have been the case for other companies.

The livestock export companies by contrast became involved on a larger scale, with at least two companies buying 20,000 head of cattle.[8] A thorough impact assessment has concluded on the basis of this experience that "commercial destocking is a viable and useful drought intervention" (Abebe *et al*. 2008). Companies bought more animals than they would otherwise have done, bought from communities more distant from tarmac roads, and bought animals in worse condition. It appears that the tours organised by SC-US, and continuing discussions between SC-US and the traders, were the triggers – loans were only taken after the purchasing was underway. The companies most involved freely admit they were able to build their reputations among pastoralists to their long-term commercial advantage. The manager of the most active company said "we did it to strengthen our relationships with the pastoralists: now everyone in Borana knows the name of [the company owner]". But it is clear from outside observers (such as the responsible officer at SC-US) that something more than even long-term commercial motives were involved.

Training pastoralists for export markets

Exporters also show a strong desire to influence the supply of livestock for sale by pastoralists, and change the lower levels of meat and livestock value chains. In practice this has taken, and is likely to continue taking, two overlapping forms: hosting, in conjunction with development agencies, "study tours" of export abattoirs; and encouraging certain sorts of "well-performing" co-operatives.

All four of the meat exporters we interviewed and one of the livestock exporters had been involved in hosting study tours of abattoirs and other locations associated with the export trade. Participants were variously identified as "clan leaders", "tribal elders", leaders of co-operatives or pastoral marketing groups or ordinary pastoralists. These tours have been organised in recent years by several different aid programmes. However, it is important to note that exporters saw their hosting of the tours as collaborating with the aid projects rather than being beneficiaries of them, of fitting into the category of "responsibility for pastoral development" we were exploring with them, and being of a piece with both destocking activities during drought and with philanthropic donations. Exporters made small monetary outlays to host the pastoralists.

Project reports and publications by those involved give a sense of the objectives and underlying assumptions of the tours. ACDI-VOCA reports on tours in early 2006 under the Livestock Marketing Component of USAID's Pastoral Livelihood Initiative:

> *"Over the course of these trips and meetings, seller groups...obtained information on buyers' requirements in terms of weight, sex, age and other parameters, and buyers were informed of the timing frequency and market days"* (ACDI-VOCA:6)

This is referred to as an "exchange of information" but the information *imparted to pastoralists* appear to have been fuller and more fundamental than the information *obtained from them*: the buyers' requirements structure the export trade, the timing of market days is a contingent detail.

Similarly, Desta et al. (2006) write of earlier tours organised by the PARIMA programme, in which they were involved:

[8] Abebe et al. report two companies buying 20,000 head. Our own interviews suggest five livestock export companies were involved – the two that gave us figures claimed purchases of 23,000 and 3,000 head.

> *"The pastoral participants, overall, were selected based on their potential to serve as community mentors and role models to increase the chance they could pass knowledge on to others… the two tours allowed the pastoralists to better grasp what an export market network entails and exposed them to various events along a marketing chain from production and processing to final sale of a wide variety of products. The tour members learned about required quality, size (i.e. 6-10kg dressed carcass weight), and health criteria that export markets demand, associations between grading and pricing, and the growing demand for specific grades of small ruminants for export"* (Desta *et al.* 2006: 114).

While the article goes on to note that pastoralists also were able to express their concerns (distances to markets, their lack of marketing skills and market information, and their lack of capital), the language used ("mentors", "pass on knowledge") and the very specificity of the knowledge passed on ("6-10kg dressed carcass weight") suggest a process where the balance of real communication was distinctly uni-directional.

The representative of a professional association for exporters showed how pastoralist concerns could be bracketed out of such processes. Pastoralists on such tours could raise their concerns – over veterinary services and general livestock development - *so these questions could be passed to government*: the abattoir owners "just listened".

From our own interviews there were similarly revealing comments. The manager of one export abattoir stated: "VOCA brought the pastoralists here – we gave them our specifications". In response to a question on whether he felt responsibility for pastoral development, one livestock exporter replied emphatically that he did. Pastoralists, he said, do not want to sell old animals and replace them with younger animals in order to be "business-oriented"; he himself was prepared to contribute to the costs of communicating to them that they should do so.

A related strand of thinking was the desire by exporters to intervene at the producer end of the value chains, to cut out middlemen and lower overall costs. Exporters had concerns about collusion among lower-level traders and brokers, who they saw as "urban people" and external to pastoral communities, infiltrating and exerting undue influence over co-operatives and marketing groups. Even where they did not share this diagnosis of outside influence, exporters saw the co-operatives as "weak" and slow", and adopted a tone of disappointment over them. A representative of the largest company said they "had not given up hope" of supporting pastoral livestock marketing groups, and were ready to help by increasing the flow of cash advances to co-operatives they judged to be strong.

Overall, the Ethiopian study revealed a knot of cross-cutting attitudes of exporters to what might be called "corporate social responsibility". It cast further light on a real and significant exercise of that responsibility in the commercial destocking of 2006, but it also showed that this emerging sense of responsibility was caught up in a desire to mould pastoralist marketing behaviour, chiefly by educating them in market requirements for livestock. What was significantly absent during all the interviews and workshops was any sense that the exporters themselves needed educating on pastoralists herd accumulation and offtake strategies: why pastoralists need to sell the animals they do at the times they do. The assumed information deficit was entirely one way: pastoralists being ignorant of business.

Senegal: a multinational lost in the bush

In 1990-91 the well known Swiss dairy multinational, Nestlé, established a collection system for fresh milk based at Dahra, in a pastoralist area of Northern Senegal. The experience of the first two seasons of this project is recounted and analysed at length by François Vatin. Vatin places Nestlé's initiative in the context of the company's global policy of "development partnership" with third-world countries, assisting them in gradually substituting domestic milk production for imports of milk powder. He also characterises the initiative as "mécénat", a French word meaning patronage or sponsorship, as in private patronage of the arts. "Industrial patronage is never totally disinterested, but its interest for the firm is indirect: brand image, establishment of relations of trust with certain partners, etc. Here it was definitely a case of implanting a positive image of the company in matters of development, aimed firstly at the governments of third-world countries where it invested, and perhaps secondarily at broader international public opinion" (1996: 165). In this connection Vatin notes the problems Nestlé had had with its international public image following controversies of marketing of baby milk formulas in the 1970s.

The project involved the building by Nestlé of five refrigerated collection centres at locations on tarmac roads, whose ownership was then turned over to local communities. Nestlé would buy milk in large quantities from these centres and transport it chilled to Dakar. In addition, Nestlé would sell cattle-owners, at cost and on easy repayment terms, modern steel containers for milking and storing milk (the traditional calabashes were known to favour bacterial contamination) and high quality dairy feed (while groundnut cake was readily available, much of what was on the market was contaminated with aflatoxins: Nestlé could provide detoxified cake).

While the aim was for year-round collection, it was accepted that most milk would be collected during the wet season, between September and January. During the first such season 82,000 litres was collected from 689 producers. In 1992 collection dropped by around 70%, and the number of producers dropped to 385. This meant a very poor utilisation of the refrigerated lorry, in turn leading to an extremely high unit cost of getting Dahra milk to Dakar, and a negligible degree of achieving the long-term import substitution objective: milk from Dahra represented less than 1% of sales of reconstituted milk powder.

Drought was undoubtedly a factor in the decline of milk sales in 1992, but Vatin sees it as a crisis that revealed some of the profound tensions and misunderstandings between Nestlé and the Fulani pastoralists.

The Dahra region was one where pastoralists had long traditions both of selling milk directly to their farming neighbours and of using the railway network to sell curdled milk (*lait caillé*) and clarified butter. Indeed, Livestock Department officials had argued at the beginning of the project that Nestlé would be better advised to work in more distant pastoral areas with poorer market access. Nestlé was prepared to pay, presumably in the name of its "development partnership", prices for milk in Dahra that resulted in prices at Dakar several times those for reconstituted milk powder (which were kept artificially low by European subsidies). But it was still not prepared to pay prices which came near those prevailing in Dahra for fresh milk, *lait caillé*, and butter (taking fresh milk equivalents). Some Nestlé staff rationalised this as a need to educate Fulani in the ways of the world market:

> *"raising the price of milk above the current price (already higher than the international price) would amount to "deceiving" the Fulani, deluding them over the "real" value of their product. In its "educational" concern, the company wishes to uphold a language of truth in establishing a "fair", or in other words "realistic," price in the context of the world market for milk.* (Vatin 1996:192 – my translation).

But as Vatin points out, the low prices in reality derived from low demand in Dakar and competition from imported milk powder: they were artificial effects of support to producers in the west, trade negotiations and the vagaries of international food aid. Other Nestlé staff rationalised the low prices as deliberately not encouraging Fulani to sell more than their residual milk after calf and human consumption needs had been met. A proportion of the Fulani appeared loyal to Nestlé: they were attracted by Nestlé's guarantee that milk would be bought, and by the element of forced savings represented by fortnightly payments. A majority clearly were not, and continued to sell into more traditional systems, achieving higher prices and probably putting less pressure on calf and family consumption.

Nestlé had not factored into its plans the fact that much of the milk sold into traditional systems was sheep and goat milk, which Fulani prefer not to drink themselves. Nestlé would not accept sheep and goat milk, but had basically failed to realise how small a marketable surplus of cows' milk there would be after it was used for calves and in its traditional role as a valued source of family food.

Nestlé's idea that it could divest itself of all responsibility for getting milk to the collection centres, relying instead on "community cooperation", proved to be illusory. It provoked tensions between the company and the pastoral community, involving the constant renegotiation of responsibilities (generally in Nestlé's disfavour). It also provoked tensions within the community between the women who traditionally milked animals and sold milk, and the men who were assumed to be suited to manage that cooperation and the recording and payment systems for milk marketing. Attempts to sell high quality feed against deductions from milk sales ran into similar problems: women were positively opposed to seeing what they regarded as their money from milk sales used up in the male responsibility of feeding cattle.

Finally, the company had not factored drought itself, which is recurrent in Northern Senegal as in other pastoral areas, sufficiently into its plans. Not only did drought cause production to crash, but it also presented Nestlé with an acute dilemma over whether to continue to levy repayment for feed and equipment during the drought. Not to do so would have been seen by the company as a retreat from the business principles it upheld towards a charitable role, which, however, it was finally forced to adopt with free distribution of concentrate.

Vatin draws lessons from this story for sociological theory: that the case-study blurs Max Weber's distinction between "value rationality" and "means-end rationality": in the end the supposedly "traditional" Fulani showed a readiness to search out the best price for their product, while the supposedly rational Nestlé found itself caught between its mission to bring development to the Fulani, its desire to enhance its image, and the demands of a complex and still very locally-segmented market. For the current study, these lessons could be put in other ways. Firstly, the drive for responsibility failed because of the international trade context, in this case subsidised imports of milk powder from Europe, a context Nestlé should have understood. Secondly, Nestlé's "patronage" failed to understand, or even to try to understand, pastoral society, its existing assets and adaptations, and the tensions within it.

In more recent years, Nestlé has closed down its operations in Dahra and donated the remaining physical plant to the AfDB-funded, government-implemented PAPEL project.[9] The factory had never succeeded in offering pastoralists a better incentive than that offered under traditional systems (Alex Ickowicz, pers. comm.). One question to be asked is why Nestlé spent over 10 years coming to this conclusion.

---

[9] It is not quite clear when this happened, but certainly post-2004. As of February 2007, Nestlé headquarters in Switzerland had had no contact with the factory "for several years" and were unable to provide any further information (Eduard Bruckner, pers.comm.).

Uganda: creating new channels for veterinary drug supply[10]

Southeast Uganda is an endemic zone for acute human sleeping sickness, a disease caused by the parasite *Trypanosoma brucei rhodesiense*, and transmitted by tsetse flies. Cattle populations in southeast Uganda form the major reservoir for *T.b.rhodesiense*, allowing it to persist and be transmitted to humans; the parasite is asymptomatic in cattle, but other species and sub-species of trypanosome, also transmitted by tsetse, cause the cattle disease nagana.

Starting in 1998 there was an outbreak of acute sleeping sickness in Soroti, northwest of the traditional endemic zone. National and international concern increased, not only because of the human suffering involved, but also as it was felt that there was a risk that acute sleeping sickness would spread further and "merge" with foci of chronic sleeping sickness, *Trypanosoma brucei gambiense*, in northwest Uganda, greatly complicating the work of correct diagnosis and drug treatment.

Various strands of scientific research, carried out among others by the Faculty of Veterinary Medicine of Makerere University, the University of Edinburgh, and the Natural Resources Institute, provided possible solutions to the outbreak. Modelling results showed that a mass synchronised treatment of cattle with injectable trypanocides, Veridium and VerebinB12, would clear the cattle reservoir of trypanosomes, while a recurrent programme of spraying (or painting) cattle with a pyrethroid insecticide would prevent reinfection by killing the tsetse fly. Spraying would work at a population level rather than protecting individual cows or households and would require a high proportion of cattle owners to spray most of their cattle on a regular basis to be effective, potentially raising issues of farmer fatigue and problems of collective action. On the other hand the same insecticides control ticks and tick-borne diseases, which are a major constraint on livestock production, and do so at the level of individual cows and in a visible way. A suitable formulation for this task is an insecticide marketed as Vectocid.

In 2006 the "Stamp Out Sleeping Sickness Campaign" was planned and agreed for five districts immediately northwest of Soroti: Kaberamaido, Dokolo, Amolatar, Lira and Apac. These districts, inhabited mainly by Teso and Lango people, are characterised by mixed farming, including cotton cultivation using draft cattle, cattle also being extensively grazed at some distance from villages. The partners for the campaign were a coalition including the government of Uganda represented by the Co-ordinating Office for Control of Trypanosomiasis in Uganda (COCTU), Makerere and Edinburgh Universities, and two private companies. One was the French-based multinational veterinary drug company Ceva, manufacturers of Veridium and Vectocid, the other was the Swedish-based private equity company Industri Kapital (IK), at that time the majority shareholder in Ceva. Both saw their engagement as fitting within the umbrella of "corporate social responsibility".

IK saw itself as contributing more than funding by bringing private sector management expertise to the projects it funds. Its representative has also emphasised that IK would not have been interested if only emergency intervention (without subsequent institution-building) had been planned, and that it had a strong interest in "education and training".

The chief Ceva executive involved describes its involvement at this stage as "pure altruism", with an additional element of building their own staff morale, and points out that the company did not seek publicity. Ceva saw the control of sleeping sickness in the new areas as something it could and should do. It was keen to get government blessing for the initiative

[10] The research and policy background is set out in much more detail, and with full references, in Morton 2010a.

through COCTU. However, as the project developed, Ceva grew more interested in exploring whether there was a market and in seeking a return “at some point”. [11]

The agreement was that Ceva and IK would donate stocks of Veridium, VerebinB12 and Vectocid, and significant funds for implementing and monitoring the programme. Makerere would make final year veterinary students available for the trypanocidal treatment and the first rounds of spraying, which fitted well with a new teaching philosophy within the veterinary faculty. Edinburgh would be responsible for monitoring trypanosome prevalence in the cattle population.

The campaign achieved a major drop in trypanosome prevalence, but by late 2007 levels were increasing again. The conclusion was drawn that cattle-owners needed to be encouraged to spray their own animals regularly, using the preferred formulation Vectocid, rather than relying on mass treatment campaigns. Attempts up till then of spreading brand awareness of Vectocid had failed. A second phase of the programme was therefore agreed by the same parties (except that IK had by now divested itself from Ceva, and now funded the operation essentially as philanthropy, through IKARE, a UK-registered charity set up to channel donations from IK’s partners). Alongside one further round of block mass treatment, five fresh veterinary graduates would be sponsored by IK to establish themselves in the programme areas, both to raise the awareness of cattle-owners on the importance of regular spraying, and specifically to build sustainable market channels for the sale to farmers of Vectocid. They became known as the “3V Vets” after Veridium, VerebinB12 and Vectocid.

The 3V Vets were employed (for convenience through HHS, the private company of a Makerere staff member) on a good salary of $US500/month, with a loan to purchase a motorcycle. They were set up with initial stocks of the three products for sale, with guideline prices for wholesale and retail. New stocks could be sent as required. The cost element of proceeds from sales was to be recycled within the project, with the 3V Vets keeping the margin. It is therefore easy to assume that the 3V Vets were from the beginning intended to become self-sustaining businessmen[12], and given initial support while they built up their business, but the objectives in the eyes of those who established the programme were more multiple and complex.

The contract for HHS gives a key objective: “to initiate and co-ordinate the establishment of a commercial logic for livestock owners to purchase [the three products and] to ensure the products are widely available at all key points in the SOS area”. The job description for the 3V Vets runs to almost two pages, with the headline items being:

- Interaction with government and NGOs
- Maintaining high visibility at main markets
- Developing contact and sales through all local traders in agro-veterinary products
- Community work (demonstrations of spraying with Vectocid and training of community sprayers)
- Work with local media.

For Ceva the main objective was to “fully test whether there was a viable market” for the insecticide. The IK representative has stated that at the beginning there was “no clear vision”, but that the main tasks were “messaging and mapping”, mapping that is the complex

[11] Others interviewed during the study variously rank long-term marketing above or below corporate responsibility as a motivation for Ceva. Ceva’s involvement can best be seen in terms of the differentiated “business cases” for CSR as described by Zadek (2001): it contains elements of three of Zadek’s four cases: a long-run hope of building a market; an interest in contributing to the education of consumers and traders; and a desire to learn what works.

[12] They were all men.

landscape of small businesses and NGOs that might act as channels for sales.[13] For the 3V Vets, interviewed in October 2008, the task they spent most time on was "sensitisation". They saw themselves as fundamentally different from the existing drug shops, as "people educators" and "preachers of the gospel". The importance of mapping and sensitisation for the 3Vs can be seen in the pro-forma reports they wrote on their activities over May-July 2008, detailing NGOs and government bodies contacted, weekly markets visited, and local media contacts. Existing markets and drug outlets were also recorded using GPS and marked on maps of the area.

By October 2008, the 3V vets identified various problems they faced: large areas to cover, lack of cooperation from local leaders, high expectations of handouts, fluctuating availability of the key drugs, rivalry with local traders, limited collaboration from the District Veterinary officers and lack of business training. One interesting point is that nobody objected to the fact that they only sold the products of one drug company. Rather there were some complaints that they did not sell drugs unrelated to trypanosomiasis control – antibiotics and antihelminthics.

At this point they were passing messages to farmers about spraying more or less in accordance with research findings. The 3Vs were doing some spraying themselves, for nominal payment, as a demonstration, but trying to train farmers in the longer term. Some were making use of fliers, poster and brochures provided by the project.

In October 2008, with all the work they were doing on "messaging" (a favourite campaign term), the margin they were making on drug sales by October 2008 was in the order of only 10% of the amount they received as salary from HHS, something of which the 3Vs were aware. They were however fundamentally optimistic over the quality of the product, farmers' reception of it, and their own future. At that stage discussions were commencing with HHS, Ceva and IK about changes to the project that would enable them to set up as independent veterinary drug dealers.

Evolving the Model[14]

In late 2008, IK and Ceva came to commit themselves more fully to longer-term support and a vision of the 3Vs as self-sustaining businesses. As we have seen, this had been until then a possible outcome of the initiative, but not a certain one. One reason it materialised was the 3Vs themselves identifying untapped markets. IK and Ceva agreed an initial extension of the salary until February. They also agreed to reimburse the 3Vs for payments they needed to make to village and parish leaders to facilitate their work. At around the same time, they initiated a scheme whereby the 3Vs would provide simple handpumps on interest free credit to farmers willing to be trained as sprayers. These moves confirmed the view of the 3Vs and other stakeholders that IK and Ceva were keeping themselves well-informed about progress and obstacles, and responding with real flexibility.

In early 2009, IK arranged for the 3Vs to receive basic business training from a trainer recruited from INSEAD (the internationally-renowned business school near Paris). This person's African experience, in fact a single visit to Mozambique, was referred to later in presentations by IK. The training involved the 3Vs drafting individual business plans, which showed them breaking even within 12 months. Following this, more far-reaching changes were effected.

[13] Interview with Anne Rannaleet, December 2008

[14] This section is based mainly on a group interview with the 3Vs in May 2009, and comments by various people at the validation workshop in July 2009.

Funds were made available to the 3Vs, between January and March 2009, as advance payment for them to rent small shops to set up as general veterinary drug traders. In the meantime they were to continue to receive $350/month salary from IK at least until August 2009. They also received free laptops, though they would also pay for their own fuel, motorcycle maintenance and phone airtime.

The new shops were started not in the larger towns of the area but in relatively remote locations. In them the 3Vs sold a full range of veterinary drugs including antibiotics, de-wormers and anti-theilerials alongside Vectocid and trypanocides. Not only did these shops look like enhancing the 3Vs' businesses, they also gained the favour of local leaders, particularly at sub-county level, who could use them as examples of successful political operation. Relations with the District Veterinary Officers remained good.

In October 2008 the 3Vs had originally sold their drugs mainly to other traders and to paravets already trained by various NGOs. Over the following months quantities sold increased, and by July-August 2009 were dealing with a large and diversified customer base, of at least 100 direct and indirect customers, including at least 17 drugstores and 39 private sprayers. Many of the latter had been encouraged to go into business and form groups of farmers by the 3Vs. But despite the establishment of the shops, the 3Vs in May 2009 faced several serious problems and were notably pessimistic about their future. One issue was the perceived high costs of running their businesses: rent, registration as drug dealers, and trading licenses.

Ceva representatives had announced major increases in the prices at which the 3Vs could obtain Vectocid through their local agents. A lot of this increase was due to devaluation of the Ugandan shilling against the US dollar, but this only explains some of the increase. Ceva justified the new prices by emphasising that Vectocid was a high-quality product, and that they continued to support the 3Vs and the marketing chain as a whole, and to pay for marketing materials. Ceva's practical response to the 3Vs' protests was to offer franchises by which the 3Vs would sell no rival products to Vectocid, while no-one else would be allowed to wholesale Vectocid in the five districts. In May 2009 they were distrustful of this offer and had not accepted it. This price hike meant the 3Vs began to see a distinction between IK, whose representative continued frequent visits and continued to be flexible, and Ceva, who they saw as more profit-oriented and "tightening everything".

At the same time, the management arrangement between IK/Ceva and HHS ended in January 2009. The 3Vs apparently rejected the proposed new arrangement and chose to procure drugs themselves from Kampala. The result was that they could only buy for cash in small quantities and became trapped in a vicious circle of not obtaining bulk discounts, and spending disproportionate amounts of time and money on travel to and from Kampala, as often as twice a month. By July 2009 the 3Vs were informally collaborating by taking it in turns to purchasing drugs for each other from Kampala, which decreased some transaction costs, but did not affect the bulk discount issue. There were discussions among the partners about setting up fundamentally new supply chains for Vectocid.

Most fundamentally, the ability of cattle-owners to purchase insecticides and drugs was declining. Farmer livelihoods, always precarious and seasonally variable, had for many been devastated during the brutal insurgency carried out by the Lord's Resistance Army. Much of the population had been displaced to camps guarded by the Ugandan army (in some cases sleeping in the camps and travelling back to their villages to farm by day, but still with grave impacts on their livelihoods). People in the camps had only began to return properly to farming in 2006, and the task of rebuilding livelihoods had not been easy.

The 2008-09 long dry season was unusually long, and described by many as a drought. In late 2008, strict quarantine regulations to restrict an outbreak of Foot and Mouth Disease were imposed across the region, closing down all legal trade in livestock and livestock products. Farmers could not sell smallstock, as they had been used to, to meet cash needs, but had to sell food and use food stores. By May 2009 they had very little money to buy animal drugs.

These factors have been described as "unforeseen" relative to the drafting of the 3Vs' business plans in early 2009. However, the FMD quarantine had been in place for several months, and drought has to be regarded as a structural feature of farming in these environments, so it is probably fairer to say that these factors of smallholder vulnerability were bracketed out of the business-planning process, rather than unforeseen by it.

As a result of all these problems, by May 2009 the 3Vs were highly uncertain about their future, and could not envision become self-sustaining businesses without the salaries from IK (which were only guaranteed until August). Some mentioned two or three years as the time horizon within which they would need support. The possible alternative of taking commercial loans to build their businesses appeared to be closed because all available credit lines had stringent requirement for collateral such as buildings. One response of the 3Vs was to sell increasing amounts of other cheaper acaricides, especially Amitix (amitraz) which is not effective against tsetse.[15] More generally, the 3Vs were concerned with the need for better communication, and increased "clarity and transparency" within the initiative.[16]

The leading role of both IK and Ceva in the Stamp Out Sleeping Sickness Campaign has had two important implications, one positive and one negative, and possibly a second. Firstly, the way the campaign was run was striking in its flexibility. Stakeholders were unanimous in agreeing that the campaign was very different in this respect to what it would have been like under traditional donor funding – with logframes and the like. Activities could be improvised as needs arose and understandings became clearer. Especially in the phase of supporting the 3Vs, fundamental objectives were left hazy until the 3Vs had been in the field almost six months.

This flexibility was definitely a strength in allowing a period of "testing the market", followed by a switch to promotion of the 3Vs as businessmen. But the apparent lack of a long-term commitment to that promotion (and the apparent divergence of the aims of IK and Ceva) has been perceived by the 3Vs themselves as a serious source of uncertainty, which is itself constraining the development of their businesses in ways that also foster trypanosomiasis control.

The second implication of the leading role of the private sector reiterates a theme form the other two case studies, about teaching and learning. Discussion of the SOS campaign has been shot through with the ideas of educating, training or teaching farmers, and that of expertise. The IK representative[17] and Maudlin (nd) have both referred to the distinctiveness of the fact that IK has brought its own private-sector expertise to the campaign. IK is also proud to have introduced the private-sector expertise of INSEAD to the campaign, and plans to build further links with INSEAD. The *IK News* article on the campaign (Issue 17, Autumn 2006) uses the terms "training" and "teaching" eight times in around 1500 words. A key passage reads:

[15] In fact, if used at the correct concentrations, Amitix is *more* expensive per cow treated than Vectocid (Alex Shaw pers.comm.), but it still appears to be regarded as a cheaper alternative by farmers and the 3Vs alike.
[16] Comments by Emmanuel Isingoma at the validation workshop, July 2009.
[17] In interview

"This project has a big teaching and training element. We want to build awareness and transfer knowledge on the interaction of human and animal health as well as sickness prevention techniques. Ultimately it is about helping people to do it for themselves."

The Ceva representative also referred to the education of consumers and traders in interview. Education of farmers was raised in the case-study validation workshop and became one of three break-out themes. Allied to this has been the concept of messaging, a key term of campaign rhetoric, and the subject of a separate but linked research project led by the University of Edinburgh, "Assessment of optimal channels of communication for effective message delivery on nagana and human sleeping sickness in Uganda" funded by the Wellcome Trust.[18]

This education, training and messaging has overwhelmingly been conceived as education and training *of* farmers, or messaging *to* them. There is undoubtedly much to teach farmers, and much thought needed on how to do so, but what has been a lot less apparent has been any idea of learning *from* or *about* farmers.[19]

This point is not made in order to introduce a discussion of "indigenous knowledge" of trypanosomiasis or its treatment. Where the absence of learning seems to have been important is in not understanding farmers' *objectives* in keeping cattle – some very surprising statements were made in the validation workshop about farmers keeping cattle only for status and not caring about their quality or productivity – and not understanding farmers' *constraints*. The business plans drafted by the 3V vets with assistance from IK and an INSEAD trainer seem to have failed to take into account either farmers' gross pre-existing vulnerability stemming from a history of displacement, or the closure of livestock markets due to Foot and Mouth Disease, which was already in force, or the possibility of drought, which is well known to be not so much an unpredictable disaster as a structural condition of agriculture in a semi-arid region. Not taking account of such constraints on farmers' ability to pay for drugs may yet have profound implications for the sustainability of the 3Vs' businesses and of trypanosomiasis control.

Conclusions

A number of conclusions can be drawn from the three case studies. Firstly, and this should not be obscured by the critical tone of much of this paper, there is a real potential for engaging the private sector in pastoral development, in ways that go beyond companies' short-term business interests, and appeal to what could be called "corporate social responsibility". The destocking activities of the Ethiopian livestock exporters, and the generous funding by IK and Ceva of trypanosomiasis control in Uganda, were both at the end of the day very positive interventions on a considerable scale. Both stories demonstrate the decisiveness of the private sector at its best, and also its flexibility, to respond to circumstances and try new approaches in ways that development donors would find difficult. NGOs, CSOs, development donors and researchers can and should look for dialogue with the private sector.

These activities are, and dialogues about new activities will be, undertaken from a mixture of motives, not of all of which will be articulated clearly by companies. This should be neither surprising nor an obstacle to dialogue. The literature on CSR, and the debates on "the

[18] This project aimed to look at education and awareness programmes targeting "poor livestock keepers, medical and veterinary practitioners, and policy makers" (project summary), but its major output has been a survey of the farmers' information sources and thus the best media through which to transmit information to them (Steadmans 2006).
[19] Or any presence in the SOS team of people with the skills to promote this approach.

business case" (or differentiated business cases – Zadek 2001) provide ways of understanding these mixed motives.[20]

It will be important not to assume that there is any straightforward or obvious relation between the prospects for useful CSR-type activities and the size, origin or level of formality of companies. Our case studies above include two multinationals, a private equity company, and indigenous companies in two subsectors, one labelled progressive by the government, the other not. The most effective action came from the "unprogressive" Ethiopian livestock exporters, small family firms who put cattle on trains rather than "add value", and from the private equity company. One of the world's best-known multinationals, by contrast, made elementary errors about supply chains and became mired in failure.

However, all three case studies point to a tendency for the private sector to engage in one-way, top-down communication processes, to educate, train and teach but resist the idea of *learning*. The Ethiopian exporters took opportunities presented by development programmes to instruct pastoralists in the ways of international meat markets. Nestlé tried to mould Fulani pastoralists into commercial dairy producers. Neither showed any interest in trying to understand the rationality of pastoralists as they fitted livestock and milk sales into the task of maintaining multi-functional herds over cycles of drought. The private sector players in Uganda taught and trained the 3V vets, and indirectly Teso and Lango cattle owners, trying to make them conscientious practitioners of scientific preventive animal health and modern business practices, but not acknowledging the profound vulnerability to shocks that made that so difficult.

Suggestions that CSR activities are generically prone to these sorts of blindnesses are found in the literature. Prieto-Carrón *et al.* (2006:984) ask whether "corporations are sufficiently equipped to take on community development roles that require 'soft' social science skills of the kind normally used in aid management". Blowfield and Frynas (2005:507) claim that "stakeholder engagement" – a key concept of the private sector and CSR - "presents particular challenges in a developing-country context where factors such as language, culture, education and pluralistic values can all affect the process of negotiation and decision-making". As a result, companies may fall back on "learning" only from market signals and in other tightly-defined ways.

These are very general questions, but they may become sharpened when private-sector bodies attempt to deal with developing-country livestock-keepers, pastoralists or others, who balance multiple and complex objectives when they keep livestock – direct consumption, the possibility of sales for cash, long-term security and insurance, and draft power (Kitalyi *et al. 2005)*. The intersection of what is possibly an intrinsic trait of CSR with the complexity of pastoral systems severely limits the potential development contribution of CSR.

I close on a theoretical and methodological point, but one important for further work on this topic. Elsewhere (Morton 2010b) I have written of the advantages of taking an expanded view of "power" and "government" and the way they are exercised over pastoralists, quoting Dean and Hindess (1989: 8) on:

> *a whole host of mundane and humble practices, techniques, and forms of practical knowledge which are often overlooked in analyses that concentrate on either political institutions or political thought.*

The study tours, incentives, training courses and business plans described in the above cases are just such "mundane and humble practices", and the ways they are spoken about

[20] Although as indicated above, the exclusion of "philanthropy" from some discussions of CSR appears problematic.

are such “forms of practical knowledge”. Detailed attention to these practices and discourses can help reveal what is happening when companies act in the name of CSR or development or both, and thus identify options for other forms of development based on dialogue and mutual respect, in which pastoralists can teach as well as being taught.

REFERENCES

Abebe, D., Cullis, A., Catley, C., Aklilu, Y., Mekonnen, G. and Ghebrechirstos, Y. (2008) 'Impact of a Commercial Destocking Relief Intervention in Moyale District, Southern Ethiopia', *Disasters* 32(2):167-189.

ACDI-VOCA (2006) Pastoralist Livelihoods Initiative Livestock Marketing Project: Second Quarter Report (January-March 2006) submitted to USAID Ethiopia.

Aklilu, Y. and Catley, A. (2009) *Livestock Exports from the Horn of Africa: An Analysis of Benefits by Pastoralist Wealth Group and Policy Implications.* Feinstein International Centre, Tufts University.

Albareda, L., Lozano, J.M. and Ysa, T., (2007) 'Public Policies on Corporate Social Responsibility: The Role of Governments in Europe', *Journal of Business Ethics*, 74(4):391-407.

Blowfield, M (2005) 'Corporate Social Responsibility: reinventing the meaning of development?' *International Affairs*, 81(3): 515-524.

Blowfield, M. and Frynas, J. (2005) 'Setting New Agendas: Critical Perspectives on Corporate Social Responsibility in the Developing World' *International Affairs*, 81(3): 499-513.

Blowfield, M. and Murray, A. (2008) *Corporate Responsibility: A Critical introduction*, Oxford University Press, Oxford.

Dean, M. and Hindess, B. (eds.) (1998) *Governing Australia: Studies in Rationalities of Government*. Cambridge University Press, Melbourne.

Desta, S., Gebru, G., Tezera, S. And Coppock, D.L. (2006) "Linking Pastoralists and Exporters in a Livestock Marketing Chain: Recent Experiences from Ethiopia", pp.109-128 in P Little and J McPeak (eds.) *Pastoral Livestock Marketing in Eastern Africa: Research and Policy Challenges*, ITDG Publications, Bourton on Dunsmore.

Foreman, D. (2005) Feasibility Study for Systems to Improve the Animal Health Status of Ethiopian Exports of Livestock and Livestock Commodities, Working Document, FAO Project TCP/ETH/2907.

Fox, T. (2004) 'Corporate Social Responsibility and Development: In Quest of an Agenda' *Development* 47(3):29-36.

Frynas, J (2006) 'Corporate Social Responsibility in Emerging Economies: Introduction' *Journal of Corporate Citizenship* 24:16-19.

Greenhalgh, P. and Orchard, J. (2005) Establishing Quality Control and Certification Systems of Agricultural Export Products in Ethiopia, Volume 2: Commodity Profiles, NRI Consultancy report for JICA, Chatham.

Hurrissa, B. and Hargreaves, S. (2003) Livestock Export Zone Study 1st September to 13th October 2003. AU-IBAR CAPE and FAO.

Jenkins, R. (2005) 'Globalization, Corporate Social Responsibility and Poverty' *International Affairs* 81(3):525-540.

Kerven, C (1992) *Customary Commerce: A Historical Reassessment of Pastoral Livestock Marketing in Africa*, ODI Agricultural Occasional Paper 15, ODI, London.

Kitalyi, A., Mtenga, L., Morton J., McLeod, A. Thornton, P., Dorward, A. And Saadullah, M. (2005) 'Why Keep Livestock if You are Poor?' pp.13-27 in E. Owen, A. Kitalyi, N. Jayasuriya and T. Smith (eds.) *Livestock and Wealth Creation: Improving the Husbandry of Animals Kept by Resource-Poor People in Developing Countries* Nottingham University Press, Nottingham.

McPeak, J., Little, P. and Demment, M. (2006) 'Conclusion: The Policy Implications and Future Research Needs" pp. 247-256 in P Little and J McPeak (eds.) *Pastoral Livestock Marketing in Eastern Africa: Research and Policy Challenges*, ITDG Publications, Bourton on Dumsmore.

Maudlin, I. (nd) Case study analysis of the public private partnership to control sleeping sickness and related PPS in the agriculture and health sectors. Research into Use Programme, East Malling.

Morton, J., Mussa, M. and Tedla, J. (2004) Ethiopia Pastoral Livelihoods Development Programme: Findings of the Feasibility Mission. NRI Consultancy Report for the European Commission, Chatham.
Morton, J. (2006) 'Pastoralist Coping Strategies and Emergency Livestock Market Intervention' pp. 227-246 in P Little and J McPeak (eds.) *Pastoral Livestock Marketing in Eastern Africa: Research and Policy Challenges*, ITDG Publications, Bourton on Dumsmore.
Morton, J. (2010a) *The Innovation Trajectory of Sleeping Sickness Control in Uganda: Research Knowledge in its Context*. Research Into Use Discussion Paper No.8, East Malling.
Morton, J. (2010b) 'Why Should Governmentality Matter for the Study of Pastoral Development?' *Nomadic Peoples* 14(1):6-30.
Petkoski, D. and Twose, N. (eds.) (2003) *Public Policy for Corporate Social Responsibility*, World Bank Institute, Washington.
Prieto-Carrón, M., Lund-Thomsen, P., Chan, A., Muro, A. & Bhushan, C. (2006) 'Critical perspectives on CSR and development: what we know, what we don't know, and what we need to know', *International Affairs*, 82(5):977-987.
Saperstein, A. and Farmer, E. (2006) Livestock Value Chain Analysis Report for Afar and Northern Somali Regions of Ethiopia. Report by ACDI-VOCA for USAID Pastoralist Livelihoods Initiative, Addis Ababa.
Solomon, A., Workalemahu, A., Jabbar, M.A., Ahmed, M.M. and Hurrissa, B. (2003) *Livestock Marketing in Ethiopia: A Review of Structure, Performance and Development Initiatives*, Socio-Economics and Policy Research Working Paper 52, International Livestock Research Institute, Addis Ababa.
Umar, A with Baulch, B. (2007) *Risk-taking for a Living: Trade and Marketing in the Somali Region of Ethiopia*, Pastoralist Communication Initiative, Addis Ababa.
Vatin, F. (1996) *Le Lait et la Raison Marchande*, Presses Universitaires de Rennes, Rennes.
Zadek, S. (2001) *The Civil Corporation*, London, Earthscan.