
The Role of Political Ideas in Multi-Party Elections in Tanzania: Refuting Essentialist Explanations of African Political Systems

David Nyaluke and Eileen Connolly

School of Law and Government, Dublin City University

ABSTRACT

Negative assessments of African democracy still dominate the literature, and Tanzania has been described as a ‘hybrid regime’—formally a multi-party democracy where the dominant party, Chama cha Mapinduzi (CCM), engages in non-democratic practices to ensure that it remains in power, including the manipulation of electoral processes, and in widespread neo-patrimonial practices to protect the position of the political elite. This article is a contribution to the criticism of neo-patrimonial and ‘hybrid-regime’ explanations of the capacity of dominant parties to retain political control in Africa (which rest on essentialist views of African society) and to the broader discussion of the nature of African democracy. It uses an analysis of CCM election manifestoes from the beginning of the multi-party era in 1995, contextualised in a discussion of political events and external perceptions of the party, to examine the emphasis that CCM has placed on the use of political ideas and on its responsiveness to public opinion, rather than using the manipulation of elections and other non-democratic political practices, as would be predicted by neo-patrimonial theory. It argues that CCM used political ideas to hold on to popular support from the beginning of the multi-party era to the 2010 elections, during which period its popularity has fluctuated, while the democratic standards that applied to the running of elections and other aspects of political life in Tanzania have continued to improve. During this time the party developed a legitimacy narrative of which the policies of the one-party state formed a key part, as the ideas that they contained continued to underpin concepts of political community in Tanzania.

Authors’ e-mails: daudi.nyaluke2@mail.dcu.ie and eileen.connolly@dcu.ie

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INTRODUCTION

The 1990s saw many African states introduce multi-party electoral systems, which in many cases resulted in a political system that was dominated by a strong party facing a much weaker and frequently fragmented opposition. Tanzania¹ is an example of such a state, as CCM, the ruling party of the country's single-party era, has dominated political competition since the introduction of multi-party elections, winning all four elections between 1995 and 2010. In the decade after the third wave of democratisation in Africa, assessments of the quality of democracy in dominant-party states tended to be negative. Following a flawed first multi-party election in 1995, Tanzania was described as a 'hybrid regime' whose political system was underpinned by neo-patrimonial practices, because although it was formally a multi-party democracy, it was also perceived to be engaging in non-democratic practices to ensure that the dominant party remained in power, including the manipulation of electoral processes,² and to be continuing neo-patrimonial practices to protect the position of the political elite.³ More recently, the literature has rehabilitated the idea of dominant-party systems,⁴ distinguishing between dominant-party systems that are democratic and those that are authoritarian, Tanzania being categorised as the former.⁵ This literature recognises that dominant parties can retain popular support without resorting to authoritarian practices. However, negative assessments of African democracy still dominate the literature, drawing on the work of Bratton and van de Walle, the leading scholars in this area, which suggests that neo-patrimonial personal relationships form 'the foundation and superstructure of political institutions in Africa and that neo-patrimonial practice is the core feature of politics in Africa'.⁶ As a result, all African states have been described as sharing 'a generalised system of patrimonialism and an acute degree of apparent disorder'.⁷ Neo-patrimonial practices have also been used to explain the prevalence of dominant parties in sub-Saharan Africa and the consequent weakness and fragmented nature of political opposition, as a clientelist state dominated by a strong president can

¹Although Tanzania is a united republic, this paper's analysis is based on the political dynamics of mainland Tanzania (formerly Tanganyika). In Zanzibar those dynamics are different, with CCM and the opposition almost equal in strength, whereas in mainland Tanzania CCM has been much stronger than the opposition.

²Andreas Schedler, 'Elections without democracy: the menu of manipulation', *Journal of Democracy* 13 (2) (2002), 36–50; Larry Diamond, 'Elections without democracy: thinking about hybrid regimes', *Journal of Democracy* 13 (2) (2002), 21–35; Steven Levitsky and L.A. Way, 'Elections without democracy: the rise of competitive authoritarianism', *Journal of Democracy* 13 (2) (2002), 51–65.

³Christopher Clapham, *Third World politics: an introduction* (London, 1985); J.-F. Bayart, *The state in Africa: the politics of the belly* (London, 1993); Michael Bratton and Nicolas van de Walle, *Democratic experiments in Africa: regime transitions in comparative perspective* (Cambridge, 1997); Patrick Chabal and J.-P. Daloz, *Africa works: disorder as political instrument* (Bloomington, Indiana, 1999).

⁴Stephanie Burchard, 'You have to know where to look in order to find it: competitiveness in Botswana's dominant party system', *Government and Opposition* 48 (2013), 101–26, doi:10.1017/gov.2012.1; Shumbana Karume, *Party systems in the SADC region: in defence of the dominant party system*, EISA Occasional Paper no. 16 (Johannesburg, 2004), available at: www.eisa.org.za/PDF/OP16.pdf.

⁵S.I. Lindberg and Jonathan Jones, 'Laying a foundation for democracy or undermining it, dominant parties in Africa's burgeoning democracies', in Matthijs Bogaards and Françoise Boucek (eds), *Dominant political parties and democracy: concepts, measures, cases and comparisons* (Abingdon, Oxfordshire, 2010), 196–218.

⁶Bratton and van de Walle, *Democratic experiments in Africa*, 63.

⁷Chabal and Daloz, *Africa works*, xix.

manipulate state resources to the detriment of the opposition.⁸ As neo-patrimonial practices are considered to rest on traditional African social norms,⁹ this analysis of African political systems has been criticised for being essentialist and thereby demeaning Africans without increasing knowledge of the social basis of African political systems.¹⁰ Consequently, a discussion of African regimes as political communities based on shared political ideas, rather than as ‘an assortment of individuals with only self interests’, is absent from neo-patrimonial analysis, and this impedes an understanding of the development of democracy and political systems in Africa.¹¹

This article is a contribution to the criticism of neo-patrimonial and ‘hybrid-regime’ explanations of the capacity of dominant parties to retain political control in Africa, which rest on essentialist views of African society, and to the broader discussion of the nature of African democracy. It uses an analysis of CCM election manifestoes from the beginning of the multi-party era in 1995, contextualised in a discussion of political events and external perceptions of the party, to consider the emphasis that CCM has placed on the use of political ideas and on its responsiveness to public opinion, rather than using the manipulation of elections and other non-democratic political practices, as would be predicted by the neo-patrimonial theory. It argues that CCM used political ideas to hold on to popular support from the beginning of the multi-party era to the 2010 elections, during which period its popularity has fluctuated, while the democratic standards that applied to the running of elections and other aspects of political life in Tanzania have continued to improve. The policies of the one-party state were an important legacy that formed a key part of the legitimacy narrative deployed by CCM, as the ideas they contained continued to underpin concepts of political community in Tanzania. During this time, even though the regime failed to live up to the values and ethics of the idealised Tanzanian political community that those ideas represented, and indeed to its own legitimacy narrative, it still positioned itself within the framework of those values and ideals. In each election campaign, CCM addressed its own failings and recalled its past contribution to building the Tanzanian state as a relatively peaceful and stable country. In doing this, it deployed a legitimacy narrative that, up to the 2010 election at least, neither opposition political parties nor oppositional NGOs were able to challenge successfully through the development of a more attractive counter-narrative.

CCM AND THE FIRST MULTI-PARTY ELECTIONS

Since 1995 CCM has won all four cycles of multi-party elections. During this period it benefited from the effort that had been put into party organisation in the one-party-state period, including the development of an electoral system with the result that, for many Tanzanians, multi-party elections were only a

⁸Nicolas van de Walle, ‘Presidentialism and clientelism in Africa’s emerging party systems’, *Journal of Modern African studies* 41 (2) (2003), 297–321.

⁹Chabal and Daloz, *Africa works*, xix; Göran Hydén, *African politics in comparative perspective* (New York and Cambridge, 2006).

¹⁰Abdul Mustapha, ‘States, predation and violence: reconceptualizing political action and political community in Africa’, Conference paper presented at the Panel on State, Political Identity and Political Violence, tenth general assembly of CODESRIA, Kampala, Uganda, 8–12, December 2002, 3.

¹¹Mustapha, ‘States, predation and violence’, 6.

continuation of the elections that had taken place since independence.¹² The one-party state's emphasis on party-building meant that the Tanzanian political system involved a relatively high level of public engagement in political meetings and rallies, and even at this time the political elites were not immune from criticism and the expression of discontent by the public.¹³ This is demonstrated by the fact that from the late 1980s, during President Mwinyi's¹⁴ administration, two interlinked policy concerns dominated public debate: first, the need to generate economic development that benefited all Tanzanians; and, second, the need to end corruption, which was seen to militate against poverty-reducing economic development. These issues still dominate Tanzania today; more than anything else, the failure to tackle corruption has been the biggest threat to public support for CCM and has undermined the legitimacy narrative used by the party.

The importance of corruption as a political issue in the one-party state was demonstrated in the last election under the one-party system, in 1990. In that election campaign the Mwinyi government made fighting corruption the key policy issue in its manifesto.¹⁵ This was in response to public opinion, for which 'corruption' had become the term that embodied all that was wrong with the government, including the failure to collect taxes,¹⁶ the endemic petty corruption among officials¹⁷ and the fact that the interests of ordinary people were disregarded.¹⁸ Corruption involving politicians and officials was widely reported in both the privately owned press and the public owned media.¹⁹ Although during the election campaign the Mwinyi administration²⁰ promised to return to the *ujamaa* ideals²¹ of the Nyerere period, the government was still perceived as corrupt. During its term of office it had not tackled corruption or attempted seriously to deal with the growing economic inequality in Tanzania.²² As a result, before the first multi-party election in 1995, the CCM leadership decided to distance itself from the unpopular Mwinyi government, even though Mwinyi, himself, could not run for election again.²³ The party strategy was to

¹²Joel Samoff, 'Single-party competitive elections in Tanzania', in Fred Hayward (ed.), *Elections in independent Africa* (London, 1987), 145–89; Horoub Othman, 'Succession politics and the Union presidential elections', in Rwekaza Mukandala and Horoub Othman (eds), *Liberalization and politics: the 1990 elections in Tanzania* (Dar es Salaam, 2004), 134–43.

¹³Göran Hydén, *Beyond ujamaa in Tanzania: underdevelopment and the uncaptured peasantry* (Berkeley, California, 1980); Samoff, 'Single-party competitive elections in Tanzania'.

¹⁴Ali Hassan Mwinyi succeeded Julius Nyerere as president of Tanzania in 1985. Before this, in 1984, a limit of two five-year terms was placed on the presidency.

¹⁵CCM, *Ilani ya uchaguzi mkuu wa mwaka 1990 [General election manifesto 1990]* (Dar es Salaam, 1990).

¹⁶Samuel Mushi, 'Patrimonialism versus institutionalisation of parties: some observations from Tanzania's 1995 general elections', in S.S. Mushi and R.S. Mukandala (eds), *Multi-party democracy in transition: Tanzania's 1995 general elections* (Dar es Salaam, 1997), 3–24.

¹⁷Max Mmuya and Amon Chaligha, *Towards multi-party politics in Tanzania* (Dar es Salaam, 1992); Julius Nyerere, *Our leadership and the destiny of Tanzania* (Harare, 1995); B.E. Heilman and P.J. Kaiser, 'Religion, identity and politics in Tanzania', *Third World Quarterly* 23 (4) (2002), 691–709.

¹⁸Michael Okema, *Political culture of Tanzania* (New York, 1996).

¹⁹N.R. Luanda, 'The role of the media in the transition to multi-party politics and the 1995 general elections', in Mushi and Mukandala, *Multi-party democracy in transition*, 117–48.

²⁰CCM, *Ilani ya uchaguzi mkuu wa mwaka 1990*, 1–2.

²¹Tanzania's African socialism and self-reliance ideology, ideas and policies.

²²I.G. Shivji, 'Electoral politics, liberalization and democracy', in Mukandala and Othman, *Liberalization and politics* (Dar es Salaam, 1994) 12–35; Mushi, 'Patrimonialism versus institutionalisation of parties'; Luanda, 'Role of the media in the transition to multi-party politics'.

²³T.L. Maliyamkono, *The race for the presidency: the first multi-party democracy in Tanzania* (Dar es Salaam, 1995), 21.

attempt to demonstrate the personal culpability of Mwinyi, which it did by treating the period of the Mwinyi government as an aberration and identifying the party with the previous President Nyerere, who was considered to be not personally corrupt and who had made fighting corruption a key party policy.²⁴ Nyerere played a leading role in the process of distancing CCM as a party from Mwinyi's government. This he did both by attacking the government's record towards the end of its term of office and by taking an active part in the selection of the party's presidential candidate,²⁵ Benjamin Mkapa, and subsequently in Mkapa's presidential election campaign.²⁶

The intervention by Nyerere was critical to CCM's capacity to stage a strong campaign against the opposition party, NCCR–Maguezi. From a weak position, that party had gained support after the defection of Augustine Mrema (a former CCM government minister and deputy prime minister who had taken a strong anti-corruption stance) from CCM to become its presidential candidate. Mrema claimed to have left the government and the ruling party after a disagreement with the Mwinyi government over the handling of corruption issues,²⁷ but his defection coincided with the anticipated passing of a rule requiring CCM presidential candidates to be university graduates, which would have ruled him out. The defection of Mrema gave the opposition a strong presidential candidate, and in these circumstances Nyerere's intervention in support of CCM was considered crucial: as leader of the independence struggle, he was the lynchpin connecting the idealistic past of Tanzania, and therefore the regime party, to the present. The period of Nyerere's presidency was frequently favourably compared to conditions in 1995,²⁸ and he, himself, made it a campaigning point that he had led a government that was tough on corruption.²⁹ CCM benefited from the fact that he was respected as *baba wa taifa*, the 'father of nation',³⁰ that he attracted large crowds whenever he spoke, and that both the private and the public media broadcast his speeches. During the election campaign the state radio station, Radio Tanzania Dar es Salaam, broadcast Nyerere's previous speeches in a programme called *Wosia wa baba wa taifa* ('The words of advice of the father of the nation') after the main evening news bulletin, ensuring a large audience.

As well as harnessing the popularity and status of Nyerere as the first leader of independent Tanzania, CCM, in its 1995 election manifesto, drew strongly on what were widely seen as the positive achievements of the one-party state, exploiting Tanzanians' perceptions of what was positive about their country. The manifesto stated that CCM was a political party 'which unlike other parties in Africa has succeeded in fulfilling its historic mission of building national

²⁴R.S. Mukandala, 'Wither ujamaa: ideological premises of the 1990 elections', in Mukandala and Othman, *Liberalization and politics*, 54–65: 57.

²⁵Nyerere, *Our leadership and the destiny of Tanzania*, 15–22; C.K. Omari, 'Factors which influenced voters', in C.K. Omari (ed.), *The right to choose a leader* (Dar es Salaam, 1997), 5–96.

²⁶Tanzania Election Monitoring Committee (TEMCO), *The 1995 general elections in Tanzania: report of the Tanzania Election Monitoring Committee* (Dar es Salaam, 1995); Omari, 'Factors which influenced voters'.

²⁷Mwandishi Wetu, 'Mrema akimbia rushwa CCM' ['Mrema runs away from corruption in CCM'], *Mwananchi*, 3 March 1995.

²⁸I.G. Shivji, 'Electoral politics, liberalization and democracy'; Okema, *Political culture of Tanzania*.

²⁹Julius Nyerere, 'Nyufa' ['Cracks'], speech given on 13 March 1995, Kilimanjaro Hotel, Dar es Salaam, copy printed by the Mwalimu Nyerere Foundation, 15–22.

³⁰Okema, *Political culture of Tanzania*.

unity [*umoja wa kitaifa*] and of building peace and tranquillity [*amani na utulivu*].³¹ The manifesto emphasised that ‘the work of building national unity so that the citizens feel that they are people of one nation’ did not happen automatically but was achieved on the basis of policy choices made by the party and that, in contrast, there are ‘policies of political parties and governments which lead to the building of national unity and there are policies that build misunderstanding, hatred and mistrust in a state’.³² To underscore this point, it linked the policies of CCM to those of TANU (the Tanganyika African National Union) and ASP (the Afro-Shiraz Party), which it described as ‘seeds, which have grown unity, love, solidarity and trust among the men and women of Tanzania’.³³ Other policies focused on by the manifesto included *ujamaa na kujitegemea* (‘socialism and self-reliance’), and policies against tribalism, religious intolerance, racism, sexism and regionalism.³⁴ The analysis in the manifesto is very clear: ‘African countries whose party and government failed to have these correct CCM policies have failed until now to have national unity. The people in these countries still face conflicts based on ethnicity, religion, and regionalism.’³⁵ CCM also used the issue of national unity, described in the document as a state of peace and tranquillity (*amani na utulivu*), to attack the opposition, saying that its leaders advocated positions that would lead to ‘disunity in the nation, rupture and hatred in the country’.³⁶

CCM’s record of managing crises, major changes and times of uncertainty was emphasised in the manifesto, with two examples cited that had strong resonance in the public imagination: the 1974–5 famine and the war with Uganda in 1978–9.³⁷ It included the party’s handling of the 1980s economic crisis, which was not perceived as positive by the general public, pointing out that the crisis had affected the whole of Africa but that it was owing to CCM’s economic policies that the country was now experiencing economic growth.³⁸ In this context, the strength of the party structure was discussed because of the perceived advantage that it gave it over the opposition parties. It allowed CCM to criticise other parties for being dependent on a single prominent party leader,³⁹ while it could portray itself as the most capable organisation to entrust with running the country.

The party’s policy on fighting corruption that featured so prominently in the manifesto was linked to reform within the party, as CCM believed that the public’s perception of whether or not the party’s leadership was corrupt would be a major factor in the election. The manifesto stated that the issue of the ‘integrity and honesty of the party leaders’ was the main problem facing CCM and the government. It therefore promised that, if elected, it would in the next five years effectively implement section 18 of the CCM constitution, prohibiting corrupt practices, as well as the laws on the ethics of state leaders that had been passed by the parliament in 1995.⁴⁰ While promising reform, the party also recognised that some past leaders had not followed the party’s constitution and

³¹CCM, *Ilani ya uchaguzi ya CCM kwa ajili ya uchaguzi mkuu wa mwaka 1995 [Election manifesto of CCM for the general election 1995]* (Dodoma, 1995), 83.

³²CCM, *Ilani ya uchaguzi 1995*, 83.

³³CCM, *Ilani ya uchaguzi 1995*, 83.

³⁴CCM, *Ilani ya uchaguzi 1995*, 84.

³⁵CCM, *Ilani ya uchaguzi 1995*, 84.

³⁶CCM, *Ilani ya uchaguzi 1995*, 84.

³⁷CCM, *Ilani ya uchaguzi 1995*, 85–6.

³⁸CCM, *Ilani ya uchaguzi 1995*, 84.

³⁹CCM, *Ilani ya uchaguzi 1995*, 87–8.

⁴⁰CCM, *Ilani ya uchaguzi 1995*, 88–9.

that this had undermined the trust of CCM members and of the general public in the CCM leadership.⁴¹

The manifesto set the tone of the political content of CCM's election campaign. Campaign speeches by CCM leaders and the presidential candidate, Mkapa, highlighted the party's commitment to fighting corruption.⁴² The campaign also questioned the personal capacity of some opposition leaders to work as a team, especially the major opponent in the presidential race, Mrema. The CCM national newspaper, *Uhuru*, pointed to emerging problems in his party, NCCR–Maguezi, claiming that Mrema was violating joint decisions made by the party and that he could not take advice.⁴³ Another recurring argument made by CCM candidates was that the opposition was incapable of maintaining national unity, 'peace and tranquillity'. Related to this was the criticism that the opposition parties did not have nationwide support and could only carve out niche support either on a regional or a religious basis. The opposition was also attacked for being too dogmatic, which was seen not only as dangerous for peace but also as going against the collegiality, compromise and collective resolution of conflict that CCM argued had achieved national unity in Tanzania.⁴⁴

CCM's election campaign message was that it had been popularly responsive in the past and that, given a chance, it would refocus and be responsive and accountable to the people of Tanzania in the future. The campaign made tremendous efforts to distance CCM from the Mwinyi government, which had significantly reduced the party's legitimacy and popularity. Nyerere, with his unparalleled status as 'father of the nation', played a critical role in ensuring that the electorate received this message. In its election manifesto and the public campaign, CCM highlighted past successes and asked for public support based on this record and on its status as the heir of the national liberation movement.

CCM won the presidential election with 62% of the votes and the parliamentary elections with 59% of the votes; the next-largest party in mainland Tanzania (Mrema's NCCR–Mageuzi) got 28% and 22%, respectively. CCM won 186 constituency seats out of 232, and NCCR–Mageuzi 16. The Tanzania Election Monitoring Committee (TEMCO),⁴⁵ a local independent consortium of election observers set up to monitor the first multi-party election, considered the 1995 election to be free but not fair. The TEMCO report shows that, even though there was no evidence of widespread and systematic manipulation by the leadership of CCM, the administration of the election was faulty and various actions had been taken on a local and ad hoc basis to skew it in favour of CCM. Problems occurred at all stages of the election process, including registration of voters, nomination of candidates by the Electoral Commission, campaigning, voting, vote counting and announcement of results. Bratton and Posner pointed out that the opposition parties

⁴¹CCM, *Ilani ya uchaguzi 1995*, 88.

⁴²Kassam Kassam, 'Rushwa Mrema na Mkapa nani ataiweza?' ['Corruption: Mrema and Mkapa: who can handle it?'], *Wasaa*, 21–7 August 1995.

⁴³Mgogoro mkubwa wafukuta NCCR—yadaiwa Mrema haambiliki' ['Major crisis looming in NCCR—it is claimed that Mrema will not listen'], *Uhuru*, 18 September 1995.

⁴⁴Tarimo Magunisi, Ernest Kidulile and John Ngwalungwa, 'Barua kwa mhariri' ['Letters to the editor', with complaints about the opposition being divisive and too aggressive], *Uhuru*, 17 and 27 September 1995.

⁴⁵TEMCO is an independent initiative led by the Political Science Department, University of Dar es Salaam, and comprising a number of NGOs, which was established to observe and monitor elections and to issue independent reports; most members are academics. See: <http://www.temco.udsm.ac.tz/> (12 September 2013).

faced many hurdles and that the incumbent party manoeuvred to ensure its victory.⁴⁶ They highlighted that, for example, opposition parties could get only limited access to government-controlled electronic media, most notably Radio Tanzania Dar es Salaam, the only radio station with national coverage. They also noted that the polling was so chaotic in the capital that it had to be rerun, and they concluded that ‘the country’s first multiparty contest since independence dismayed many Tanzanians’.⁴⁷ TEMCO found that manipulation during the voter-registration stage included registering prisoners to vote in the Kilosa district constituency and under-age persons, mostly secondary-school students, in the Bagamoyo constituency. It also found that CCM representatives used the threat that services would be denied to those who registered to vote for the opposition in Ruvuma constituency, that non-citizens in border areas were registered as voters and that there were claims of widespread intimidation by CCM when conducting a voter-intentions survey in the Dar es Salaam and Songea Urban constituencies.⁴⁸ Officials put obstacles in the way of the nomination of opposition candidates, generating a large number of complaints about the rejection by returning officers of the nomination of opposition-party candidates. Opposition-party nominations were declined in at least twenty constituencies, and on no occasion was a CCM candidate objected to; however, none of these rejections involved the nominations of the main opposition party, NCCR–Mageuzi.⁴⁹

It is doubtful that the corrupt practices in the running of the 1995 election had a major impact on the level of support for CCM; it is more likely that the intervention of Nyerere was decisive. CCM had instituted multi-party elections in the absence of an organised civil society or political opposition, so going into the first election, it faced a weak and fragmented position until the defection of Mrema gave a boost to NCCR–Mageuzi. However, given the widespread public discontent with CCM and with the level of corruption in Tanzanian public life before 1995, it appeared likely that an opposition party would grow in strength after the first multi-party election.

IMPLEMENTING THE MANIFESTO AND THE 2000 ELECTIONS

After the election, one of the first actions of the Mkapa government, in January 1996, was to appoint a presidential commission on corruption, tasked with investigating the causes of corruption in Tanzania.⁵⁰ Judge and former prime minister of Tanzania, Joseph Warioba, who was a respected politician, was appointed chairperson.⁵¹ As a result of the details contained in the commission’s report (also known as the Warioba Report), published in 1996, the minister of public works and some of his staff were prosecuted for corruption in

⁴⁶Michael Bratton and D.N. Posner, ‘A first look at second elections in Africa, with illustrations from Zambia’, in Richard Joseph (ed.), *State, conflict and democracy in Africa* (London, 1999), 377–407: 383.

⁴⁷Bratton and Posner, ‘A first look at second elections in Africa’, 383.

⁴⁸TEMCO, *The 1995 general elections in Tanzania*, 48–9.

⁴⁹TEMCO, *The 1995 general elections in Tanzania*, 78–9.

⁵⁰United Republic of Tanzania, *Presidential Commission of Inquiry against Corruption: report of the Commission on Corruption* (2 vols, Dar es Salaam, 1996), vol. 1, 1 (the Commission is otherwise known as Warioba Commission).

⁵¹Economic and Social Research Foundation (ESRF) and Front Against Corrupt Elements in Tanzania (FACEIT), *The state of corruption in Tanzania* (Dar es Salaam, 2002), 7.

the awarding of road-construction contracts.⁵² The Prevention of Corruption Bureau was also strengthened,⁵³ and the government inaugurated the Ethics Secretariat with the mandate to oversee the actions of politicians and public servants.⁵⁴ In June 1996 the government *Gazette* published details of procedures that members of the public could follow to view records of the wealth and debts of politicians and senior public servants.⁵⁵ In 2000, before the second multi-party elections, the government established the Commission for Human Rights and Good Governance and a new ministerial post to coordinate good-governance activities. Although these could have been seen by the public as anti-corruption actions, they also reflected the priorities of donors and trends in international aid policies at that time. This commission replaced the Permanent Commission of Inquiry, established in 1965,⁵⁶ and was tasked with protecting the human rights of Tanzanians vis-à-vis public and private institutions. According to Judge Kisanga, its chairperson, the commission dealt with 10,315 complaints, 2,237 of which were inherited from the Permanent Commission of Inquiry; 99% of the complaints concerned issues of ‘good governance’, and only 1% related to human-rights violations.⁵⁷

These efforts to fight corruption, even though they did not eliminate it, demonstrated that the government appeared to be dealing with the issue and gave a sense that CCM was now filling the leadership vacuum that had existed at the heart of the Mwinyi government.⁵⁸ The donor community—and even, to some extent, opposition leaders—appreciated that Mkapa provided effective leadership during this period.⁵⁹

The other main policy area that the government dealt with was improving the economy in order to increase government funds to pay for social and economic services and to repay the national debt. Up to the 1995 elections, donors had reduced support for Tanzania, accusing the government of failing to collect taxes and allowing too many tax exemptions and evasions.⁶⁰ The Mkapa government introduced measures to improve tax collection and a number of reforms to ensure the country’s transformation into a market economy, with the result that the donor community began increasing aid to Tanzania.⁶¹ Improvements in tax collection also meant that the government was dealing with some of the corruption in this area, as evidenced by the fact that, in its the second year, the minister of finance had to resign because he authorised a tax exception for a cooking-oil importer.⁶²

⁵²Tanzania, *Presidential Commission of Inquiry against Corruption*, vol. 1, 269–70.

⁵³Robert Kissanga, ‘Haki za binadamu na utawala bora’ [‘Human rights and good governance’], in Research and Education for Democracy in Tanzania Project (REDET), *Serikali ya awamu ya tatu: tathmini ya utendaji wake* [*The third phase of government: evaluation of its implementation work*], REDET Book Programme 13 (Dar es Salaam, 2006), 294–304: 303.

⁵⁴Jaji W. Maina, ‘Maadili ya uongozi’ [‘Ethics of leadership’], in REDET, *Serikali ya awamu ya tatu*, 306–18.

⁵⁵Maina, ‘Maadili ya uongozi’, 311–12.

⁵⁶Kissanga, ‘Haki za binadamu na utawala bora’, 295–6.

⁵⁷Kissanga, ‘Haki za binadamu na utawala bora’, 300.

⁵⁸T.L. Maliyamkono, *Tanzania on the move* (Dar es Salaam, 1997).

⁵⁹Maliyamkono, *Tanzania on the move*, 27–8.

⁶⁰Kajubi Mkajanga, ‘TZ kukatiwa misaada kutokana na rushwa, kukusanya kodi’ [‘TZ to be denied aid because of corruption, tax collection’], *Heko*, 27 April–3 May 1995.

⁶¹Bruce Heilman and Laurean Ndumbo, ‘Corruption, politics, and societal values in Tanzania: an evaluation of the Mkapa administration’s anti-corruption efforts’, *African Political Science* 7 (1), 1–19.

⁶²Tim Kelsall, ‘Governance, democracy, and recent political struggle in mainland Tanzania’, *Commonwealth and Comparative Politics* 41 (2), 55–82: 65.

With the formation of opposition parties and the introduction of multi-party elections, women and young people became critical constituents in the 1995 election.⁶³ However, in spite of this, immediately after the election CCM accused women's NGOs, particularly BAWATA, the Tanzanian Women's Council, of mobilising women politically against CCM and in support of the opposition.⁶⁴ BAWATA's alleged involvement in politics during the 1995 election campaign resulted in its being banned under the law prohibiting NGOs from undertaking political activities.⁶⁵ This demonstrated CCM's intolerance for opposition, provided that it could take action against dissenting groups without risking wider public support.

Despite the limited policy space and dependency on external funds, the Mkapa administration managed to restore confidence in CCM and put it on a good footing for the 2000 elections. Demonstrating that the Mkapa government was aware of the need to at least appear to fulfil the promises it made in 1995, CCM in 1997 formed a party committee to evaluate the implementation of the 1995 election promises and recommend areas of focus for the 2000 election.⁶⁶ As a result, the CCM 2000 election manifesto, unlike that of 1995, focused more on the economy and the fight against corruption than on the historical record of the party. It still included what CCM considered the regime's long-term achievement of maintaining a peaceful and united nation, but its focus was more on the current policies and challenges of government.

In the 2000 manifesto, unlike that of 1995, the introduction dealt with the modernisation of the economy as the main challenge. The focus of the party and its government was 'to build the foundations of a modern economy', as 'the Tanzania economy currently is still backward and dependent'.⁶⁷ Also different from the 1995 manifesto was that the 2000 manifesto was keen to highlight successes in a range of policy areas since the CCM had come into government in 1995. To do this, the manifesto gave a separate section to each policy area and set out the successes achieved, the challenges remaining and the government's policy proposals for the next term, should it be elected. Using this format, the 2000 manifesto detailed the government's achievements against corruption. It claimed that the 'fight against corruption is the promise and policy of TANU, ASP and CCM...the Government has taken courageous steps to fight corruption inside CCM'.⁶⁸ In the next five-year period 'the government will continue to take legal, administrative and disciplinary measures against those that are discovered participating in corruption activities'.⁶⁹

The economy was perceived as CCM's most successful policy area since the 1995 election, and it was determined to make this the defining issue of the election campaign. The 2000 election manifesto highlighted that 'under CCM leadership the government has made major changes in policies dealing with the economy and social welfare' that resulted in higher economic growth, a major

⁶³C.K. Omari, 'Factors which influenced voters'.

⁶⁴M. Milinga, 'BAWATA yampigia debe Mrema' ['BAWATA campaigns for Mrema'], *Uhuru*, 23 September 1995.

⁶⁵C.M. Peter, *The state and independent civil organisations: the case of Tanzania Women's Council (BAWATA)*, Civil Society and Governance in East Africa Project (Dar es Salaam, 1999).

⁶⁶CCM, *Taarifa ya Kamati ya NEC kuhusu mikakati ya kusukuma utekelezaji wa ilani ya uchaguzi wa CCM wa mwaka 1995* [Report of the NEC Committee on strategies to push implementation of the 1995 CCM election manifesto] (Dodoma, 1997).

⁶⁷CCM, *Ilani ya uchaguzi ya CCM kwa ajili ya uchaguzi mkuu wa mwaka 2000* [Election manifesto of CCM for the general election 2000] (Dodoma, 1995), 1.

⁶⁸CCM, *Ilani ya uchaguzi 2000*, 94.

⁶⁹CCM, *Ilani ya uchaguzi 2000*, 95-7.

reduction in the rate of inflation and continued improvements in the rate of tax collection.⁷⁰ The manifesto also detailed achievements and challenges in adult education, health, water services in towns and villages, and the development of housing; given the importance of young people and women as strong constituents in the battle for votes, the two groups had sections devoted specifically to addressing their problems.⁷¹

An election study group from the University of Dar es Salaam summarised the issues that were detailed at the inaugural rally of CCM's 2000 election campaign as controlling inflation; the government's good record on managing the economy; the successful privatisation of some public enterprises; and what CCM described as the intensification of the war against corruption. Despite not giving it the exclusive prominence that it had in 1995, the party also drew on its historical legitimacy gained from building a society in Tanzania that was relative peaceful compared to the rest of Africa. To this achievement it added that the CCM government was the initiator of the political reforms that had led to the reintroduction of multi-party elections.⁷²

The opposition parties that contested the elections in 2000 were weaker and more fragmented than they had been in 1995. The response to CCM's political platform was an attempt to prove that less progress has been made in these areas than CCM claimed.⁷³ The result of the 2000 elections confirmed CCM's recovery, as it got 72% of the presidential vote and 65% of the vote in the general election, an increase of 10% and 5%, respectively. The party won 202 constituency seats out of 232. The largest opposition party of the 1995 election, NCCR–Mageuzi, had almost disappeared: it won only one constituency seat. The remaining votes were shared between three small parties. The independent election monitors of TEMCO concluded that the election was free but unfair. This time, however, the unfairness did not stem from any suspected acts of sabotage by CCM but mainly from incumbent advantages enabling CCM to use state resources:

Unfairness comes from the big state bias in favour of the ruling party, the heavy handedness of the police in campaign rallies of the opposition parties, and the incomplete separation of state resources from those of the ruling party.⁷⁴

Although these were all undesirable features of the political system, they were not sufficient to account for the weakness of the opposition and its poor showing in the elections.

ANOTHER NEW BEGINNING IN THE 2005 ELECTIONS

Unlike the first term of Mkapa's presidency, in his second term, although the government kept up the momentum of reforms in the economy and other policy areas, there were growing problems in managing the spending of national revenues, public assets and natural resources that implicated the government in an intractable web of corruption reminiscent of the Mwinyi era. For example, a major corruption scandal occurred in the provision of electrical power. To deal with power shortages, the government entered into a contract with Independent Power Transmission Limited (IPTL) to supply electricity, and the very high cost

⁷⁰CCM, *Ilani ya uchaguzi 2000*, 9.

⁷¹CCM, *Ilani ya uchaguzi 2000*, 100–4.

⁷²Mmuya and Chaligha, *Towards multi-party politics in Tanzania*.

⁷³Ernest Mallya, 'Campaign issues in the 2000 general elections in Tanzania', *African Review* 28 (1–2) (2001), special issue on the 2000 general elections in Tanzania, 35–54.

⁷⁴TEMCO, *The 1995 general elections in Tanzania*, 48–9, 198–9.

of this contract was assumed to be evidence of corruption.⁷⁵ Another scandal surrounded the purchase of radar from British Aerospace (BAE). The move was highly disputed not only because Tanzania had bought military radar for civil use but also because corruption was involved, with inflated prices and political representatives receiving personal payments.⁷⁶ Although the Tanzanian government avoided dealing with the latter case, investigations were conducted in the UK by an anti-corruption agency, which found BAE officials guilty of corruption and ordered the company to pay compensation to Tanzania.⁷⁷

These and other instances of corruption were the subject of public debate, and accusations of corruption on the part of politicians and government officials came from a diverse range of sources, including parliamentarians, civil-society organisations and the media.⁷⁸ The national radio station, Radio Tanzania Dar es Salaam, as well as other public and private broadcasters, was broadcasting parliamentary proceedings, making the public aware of the parliamentary responses to these accusations of corruption. Corruption was a topic frequently discussed on talk shows on television and radio and covered in the newspapers, with religious leaders being among those who condemned the government.⁷⁹ Despite this pressure, the Mkapa government was slow and unwilling to deal with the allegations of corruption that emerged during its second term,⁸⁰ and no significant progress was achieved in investigating and prosecuting any corruption case that had been the subject of public debate⁸¹—for example, the Warioba Report had named 70 corrupt officials and political leaders, but there were no prosecutions.⁸² As a result, there was a strong public perception that corruption had not been dealt with.⁸³ There was also dissatisfaction with the extent to which improved macro-economic stability and growth had been translated into benefits for Tanzanians en masse.⁸⁴ The Mkapa government's failures in fighting corruption and extending economic benefits to a majority of Tanzanians set the tone for the 2005 election. This meant that, as in 1995, CCM had to recover from a reduced level of public support.

In the 2005 election CCM rebounded, thanks to a presidential candidate who, in the eyes of the Tanzania political community, embodied many of the desirable properties of the leader that the country needed after the failures of

⁷⁵Kelsall, 'Governance, democracy, and recent political struggle', 55–82, 70.

⁷⁶Kelsall, 'Governance, democracy, and recent political struggle', 71.

⁷⁷BBC, 'BAE Systems fined for Tanzania accounting offence', 21 December 2010, available at: <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-12049723> (14 September 2012).

⁷⁸Tanzania had permitted private media from 1986.

⁷⁹Benson Bagonza, 'Uzoefu wa viongozi wa dini katika kujenga imani ya jamii na amani' ['The experience of church leaders in building community trust and peace'], in REDET, *Ujenzi wa imani ya jamii na amani Tanzania* [*Building community trust and peace in Tanzania*] (Dar es Salaam, 2005), 67–84; Method Kilaini, 'Uzoefu wa viongozi wa dini katika kujenga imani ya jamii na amani' ['The experience of church leaders in building community trust and peace'], in REDET, *Ujenzi wa imani ya jamii na amani Tanzania*, 172–94.

⁸⁰Kelsall, 'Governance, democracy, and recent political struggle', 70.

⁸¹ESRF and FACEIT, *The state of corruption in Tanzania*.

⁸²Kelsall, 'Governance, democracy, and recent political struggle', 70.

⁸³ESRF and FACEIT, *The state of corruption in Tanzania*; Joseph Warioba, 'Ujenzi wa mwafaka wa kitaifa' ['Building national consensus'], in REDET, *Ujenzi wa imani ya jamii na amani Tanzania*, 210–26.

⁸⁴'Economic growth too small to reduce poverty', *Guardian* (Tanzania), 15 June 2000; Joyce Mkinga, 'Open policies and privatisation not solution to poverty—opinion', *Guardian* (Tanzania), 16 March 2000, 2; Kelsall, 'Governance, democracy, and recent political struggle'; Servacius Likwelile, 'Tathmini ya mkakati wa kupunguza umasikini wakati wa serikali ya awamu ya tatu' ['Evaluation of the poverty reduction strategy of the third phase of government'], in REDET, *Serikali ya awamu ya tatu*, 65–83.

both Mwinyi and Mkapa. In the 2005 CCM primaries,⁸⁵ Jakaya Kikwete emerged as the presidential candidate. For the previous ten years, he had been seen as a presidential candidate in waiting. In 1995 he had been a candidate in the presidential primaries, supported by the party's youth wing, which was seeking a generational change of leadership. In the first round of the 1995 primaries Kikwete was the frontrunner, with Mkapa taking second place. In the second round Mkapa came in ahead of Kikwete. Mkapa then chose Kikwete as foreign minister for both terms of his government. During this time Kikwete built a network that would facilitate his election campaign both within and outside the party.⁸⁶

Kikwete was a popular choice with the general public, as well as the party. He was comparatively young and energetic, with an attractive public persona and a good political track record in the party and in government positions. In the Mwinyi government he had been a junior minister in the Ministry of Energy and Minerals and later became minister of finance. He avoided being tarnished with the poor reputation of that government, as he was perceived to have personally taken an anti-corruption stance and had removed corrupt officials and introduced financial-management reforms in both ministries in which he served. In fact, he was brought in to the Ministry of Finance specifically to cleanse it of corruption in order to restore the faith of donors and of Tanzanians in the government's financial control of the state.⁸⁷ In the Foreign Ministry in Mkapa's government Kikwete enhanced his reputation through his involvement in the key role that Tanzania played in conflict resolution and peace-building in East Africa and the Great Lakes Region.⁸⁸ There was euphoric support for Kikwete when he announced his candidacy in 2005.⁸⁹ Religious leaders also supported him, including Christian churches: for example, Bishop Kulola proclaimed that Kikwete (a Muslim) was 'the choice of God'.⁹⁰

The 2005 CCM manifesto highlighted the key election message from Kikwete, stating in bold letters covering two pages: 'A better life for every Tanzanian, with new zeal, new strength and new speed a Tanzania of plenty is possible'.⁹¹ The manifesto, in a similar style to that of 2000, highlighted the party's promises for the next five years. It stated that the achievements of the Mkapa years had laid the foundations for the fight against corruption, claiming that there had been many successes that resulted in increased government revenue and that many corrupt officials had been dismissed.⁹² However, as fighting corruption was still an important unfinished agenda for the legitimacy

⁸⁵CCM holds primary elections to select its candidates for presidential and parliamentary elections.

⁸⁶P.M. Bagenda, *Jakaya Mrisho Kikwete: Tumaini lililorejea* [*Jakaya Mrisho Kikwete: The hope that has returned*] (Dar es Salaam, 2006).

⁸⁷Bagenda, *Jakaya Mrisho Kikwete: Tumaini lililorejea*.

⁸⁸Mohabe Nyirabu, 'Mambo ya nje na ushirikiano wa kikanda wakati wa awamu ya tatu' ['Foreign affairs and regional cooperation during the third phase', in REDET, *Serikali ya awamu ya tatu*, 319–39.

⁸⁹Leonard Shayo, 'Mawazo sanifu' ['Cutting-edge ideas'], unpublished book draft given to the authors during an interview with Professor Shayo in 2006. Professor Shayo was a lecturer in mathematics and computer science, and founder and chairperson of Chama cha Demokrasia Makini (Party of Cutting-edge Democracy); he passed away in 2008.

⁹⁰Moses Kulola, 'Pamoja na matatizo yanayoindama nchi, Askofu Kulola asisitiza Kikwete ni chaguo la Mungu' ['Despite the problems that the country faces, Bishop Kulola insists Kikwete is a choice of God'], *Nyakati*, 5–11 November 2006. Many Christian religious leaders supported Kikwete's candidacy for the presidency even though he is a Muslim.

⁹¹CCM, *Ilani ya uchaguzi ya CCM kwa ajili ya uchaguzi mkuu wa mwaka 2005* [*Election manifesto of CCM for the general election 2005*] (Dodoma, 2005), 2.

⁹²CCM, *Ilani ya uchaguzi 2005*, 3.

of any CCM government, Kikwete promised, both in the manifesto and in his inaugural presidential address to parliament, to consolidate the war against corruption.⁹³ Apart from implementing existing policies, the manifesto promised to follow up accusations from ordinary people of suspected corruption and to deal more vigorously with complaints of corruption in state institutions, including the police, hospitals, schools and courts⁹⁴. Kikwete promised to 'continue to increase openness in government decision-making processes, especially in procurement and contracts'.⁹⁵

As in the 2000 manifesto, the economy was seen as the major policy area, and it was one in which CCM felt that it was on strong ground. The party's economic message was very similar to that of 2000, defining the problem facing the government in terms of the fundamental tasks of developing the economy (including moving Tanzania to a position where it was not dependent on the international donor community), providing employment for all Tanzanians and eradicating poverty.⁹⁶

The way in which the Kikwete campaign framed the main policy areas focused on in the campaign (the economy and the fight against corruption) was a direct response to the successes and failures of the Mkapa government. The focus of the Kikwete campaign on bringing prosperity to all Tanzanians responded to the fact that the Mkapa government, despite doing well economically, had been criticised for failing to translate the economic success into reduced inequality and poverty. This failure was demonstrated by the word that Tanzanians had given to a situation of economic growth accompanied by growing inequality, *ukapa*, derived from Mkapa's name.⁹⁷ On corruption, the promise in the manifesto to act on the complaints of ordinary people and to be more open about government decisions was a reply to the criticism that the reforms of the Mkapa government had dealt with petty corruption but had left serious corruption by those in leadership positions untouched.⁹⁸

Kikwete proved to be an extremely popular candidate who captured the public imagination with a promise of effective leadership that would enable him to implement the key election promises.⁹⁹ As a result, the decline in CCM support was reversed, and it won 80% of votes in the presidential race, 10% more than in 2000, and 70% in the general election, winning 206 constituent seats out of 232. In addition to this, TEMCO declared the 2005 elections free and fair.¹⁰⁰

CORRUPTION AND THE 2010 ELECTIONS

On the question of corruption, external assessments of the performance of the Kikwete presidency during its first term in office found that the government had failed to live up to its election promises. This negative assessment was a feature of public debate from the end of the first year of his government and included criticism of the government's failure to implement the promise to

⁹³Jakaya Kikwete, 'Speech by the president of the United Republic of Tanzania, His Excellency Jakaya Mrisho Kikwete, on inaugurating the fourth phase parliament of the United Republic of Tanzania', Parliament Buildings, Dodoma, 30 December 2005, available at: http://parliament.go.tz/docs/pspeech_en.pdf.

⁹⁴CCM, *Ilani ya uchaguzi 2005*, 8–9.

⁹⁵CCM, *Ilani ya uchaguzi 2005*, 38.

⁹⁶CCM, *Ilani ya uchaguzi 2005*, 8–9.

⁹⁷Kelsall, 'Governance, democracy, and recent political struggle', 65.

⁹⁸Kelsall, 'Governance, democracy, and recent political struggle'.

⁹⁹Bagenda, *Jakaya Mrisho Kikwete: Tumaini lililorejea*.

¹⁰⁰TEMCO, *The 2005 general elections in Tanzania: report of the Tanzania Election Monitoring Committee* (Dar es Salaam, 2005).

review all major government contracts, which Kikwete had made in his inaugural address to parliament in 2005. By the end of the first year of Kikwete's presidency, there were calls in the media and parliament for a review of contracts and for stronger anti-corruption measures.¹⁰¹ The Kikwete government not only failed to review government contracts made during the Mkapa government but also entered into new contracts that were also corrupt. One such contract was particularly damaging for Kikwete's credibility in that it had a significant and direct impact on the public and on the economy of Tanzania. The contract involved an American company, Richmond Development Corporation (RDC), contracted to supply supplemental electrical power to Dar es Salaam. The company had failed to supply the power after the minister concerned had extended several deadlines. The result of this failure was power-rationing that continued even after a deadline negotiated with the president to supply power by October 2006,¹⁰² and it was not until early 2007 that the company actually started to supply power. Members of parliament and opposition-party leaders called for all of those implicated in the scandal to be held accountable, but the government prevented a full parliamentary inquiry until November 2007. The findings of this inquiry implicated the prime minister and two ministers in the corrupt practices that resulted in awarding the contract to RDC¹⁰³ and forced their resignation in February 2008, making Edward Lowassa the first prime minister, and the first political leader of significance, since the founding of the Tanzanian state to resign because of corruption.

Despite the resignation of the prime minister and two ministers, the media and opposition parties continued to pressure the government to deal with all corruption scandals. The government did not respond with significant measures and was perceived to have failed to reduce levels of corruption substantially or even to ensure that the government, itself, was free from corruption.

The self-perception of CCM at the end of Kikwete's first five-year term was that its economic policy had been relatively successful. Even though there was an acute shortage of power in the first year and a drought in the second year, the government managed to achieve an economic growth rate of 7.1%, and inflation was reduced from 12% in 2009 to 4% in 2010.¹⁰⁴ In spite of the positive spin that CCM put on its economic policy, economic growth had not been seen to improve the living standards of the majority of Tanzanians or to reduce poverty—in fact, increasing inflation reduced living standards for most of Kikwete's first five years in government, even though it fell in the final year—and this reduced the support for CCM and weakened Kikwete's position of before the 2010 elections. In an address to the parliament at the end of his presidential term, Kikwete explained the failure to fulfil the promises on economic policy made in the 2005 election campaign as being the result of the drought conditions that had affected the country in this period, the increase in

¹⁰¹For example see, Mutekanga Isidory, 'Serikali inalipa IPTL pesa nyingi mno' ['The government is paying IPTL too much money'], *Tanzania Daima*, 12 November 2006, 12; Joyce Kisaka and Lukas Lukumbo, 'MPs demand to know more about Alex Stewart', *Sunday Citizen*, 12 November 2006; Commonwealth Secretariat, *Report of the Commonwealth Observer Group: Tanzania general elections 31 October 2010* (London, 2011).

¹⁰²Deogratias Kishombo, 'Power rationing: who will compensate poor Tanzanians?', *Hill Observer*, November 2006.

¹⁰³Harrison Mwakyembe, 'Report of the select committee formed by the parliament of the United Republic of Tanzania on 13 December 2007 to investigate the tendering process for emergency power supply which awarded the tender to Richmond Development Company LLC of Houston, Texas, USA, in 2006', available at: <http://ebookbrowse.com/tanzania-select-cttee-hmwakyembe-richmond-execsummary-eng-feb08-doc-d112761644> (12 September 2013).

¹⁰⁴Kikwete, 'Speech by the president'.

oil prices and the global economic crisis.¹⁰⁵ It is probable that, had it not been for the problems of corruption affecting Kikwete's government, he and the CCM would have weathered the discontent with the results of their economic policy. However, corruption became the main political issue, especially with the resignation of the prime minister and two other members of government; economic failures became inseparable from corruption, and corruption was identified as the main problem.

In response to this prevailing situation, the CCM 2010 election manifesto restated the regime's commitment to fighting corruption, proclaiming that corruption was an obstacle to national development and that the damage done by 'those who give and receive bribes can spread in all sectors of the society and cause a major erosion of accountability and undermine the ethics of leaders'.¹⁰⁶ The manifesto outlined the measures that the party would take in government from 2010 to 2015, which included improving the system of investigation, educating citizens and public servants, and enhancing the capacity of state instruments to fight corruption.¹⁰⁷ CCM also promised to improve performance in all other policy sectors. On corruption, the regime claimed that it had made progress, and it promised to do more. It pointed to resignations, convictions and the number of corruption cases filed by the government in the courts, but this also had negative consequences for the campaign, as some of the cases involved CCM politicians who were contesting the 2010 general election. In its defence, CCM argued that it did not bar these candidates from contesting the election because they had not yet been found guilty in law.¹⁰⁸

Opposition parties within and outside parliament argued that CCM was the party of *mafisadi* ('thieves of public property'), who were protecting each other and had failed to fight corruption.¹⁰⁹ Given the public's anger at corruption, these messages struck a chord with voters. The failure to fight corruption was responsible for a drop in Kikwete's electoral support. As presidential candidate, he polled 64% of the votes in 2010, in contrast to 80% in 2005. The party also got fewer seats in parliament, winning just 186 of 232—a significant drop from the 206 it won in 2005. The opposition party CHADEMA, whose members of parliament had taken a strong anti-corruption stance both in parliament and during the election campaign, increased the vote for its presidential candidate from 6% in 2005 to 27% in 2010. Its seats in parliament also increased, from 5 in 2005 to 23 in 2010, with the result that the party presented the strongest opposition challenge to CCM since the first multi-party elections.

In his inaugural speech to parliament after winning his second term, President Kikwete responded to the impact that the issue of corruption had had on the popularity of CCM, in spite of the actions his government had taken:

in the past five years we took steps to build the legal, systemic and institutional capacity to fight corruption in this country. We enacted new, stronger laws, which have a broader capacity to fight the problem of

¹⁰⁵Kikwete, 'Speech by the president'.

¹⁰⁶CCM, *Ilani ya uchaguzi ya CCM kwa ajili ya uchaguzi mkuu wa mwaka 2010* [Election manifesto of CCM for the general election 2010] (Dodoma, 2010), 26.

¹⁰⁷CCM, *Ilani ya uchaguzi 2010*.

¹⁰⁸CCM, *Ilani ya uchaguzi 2010*.

¹⁰⁹'Wabunge wakomalia mabilioni ya Dowans' ['MPs query Dowans's billions'], *Uhuru*, 11 December 2010, 1, 4; 'Richmond probe team gets down to business', *This Day*, 16 November 2007; 'Dr. Salim azungumzia ufisadi' ['Dr Salim talks about corruption'], *Kulikoni*, 19 October 2007, 1, 2; Mkombe Zanda, 'Sasa wataka tume huru kuchunguza ufisadi' ['An independent commission to investigate corruption is now wanted'], *Majira*, 8 October 2007; Commonwealth Secretariat, *Report of the Commonwealth Observer Group*.

corruption. Also we have enacted a law on election funds. We have created a new instrument to prevent and fight corruption, PCCB [Prevention and Combating of Corruption Bureau], with more legal powers and more resources to carry out its responsibilities. It is an open truth that in this period [2005–10] many allegations have been put forward, investigated and brought to court. Many of the accused have been found to be guilty and have been convicted. Major corruption has been dealt with and many important people have been held accountable. Despite that there is a need to do more because the problem of corruption is still significant. I have heard the demand of our country men and women that we have to do much better. We shall increase our efforts in this fight.¹¹⁰

CONCLUSION

Since the introduction of multi-party elections in Tanzania in 1995, CCM has won both the presidential elections and the parliamentary elections by a comfortable majority. However, as CCM had emerged from the regime party of a single-party state that enjoyed widespread legitimacy and popular support, any drop in electoral support is seen as a threat to its traditional position and an indication of the danger that an opposition party may emerge that could mount an effective electoral challenge and replace it as the government. To date, no single opposition party has provided an effective challenge over more than one electoral cycle, and CCM has fought its political battles mainly against public opinion. During the multi-party period the conduct of elections has improved, to the point where they were considered free and fair in 2005. Also during this period, CCM has continued to place the emphasis of its election campaigns on its political response to public concerns, even though it failed to fulfil the public's expectations after the elections. Through the four cycles of multi-party elections, the capacity of CCM to deliver on its manifesto has influenced party fortunes, with its success fluctuating from one election to the next. CCM has built on its legacy as the founding regime party, but the extent to which this legacy has been used has diminished over time, with the previous government's performance becoming a much more important part of the political ideas and rhetoric used to persuade voters to support the party. The fact that corruption has remained such a dominant political issue in Tanzania, and has proved so difficult for CCM to tackle effectively, indicates that a level of corruption is endemic in the state, but this does not mean that there is a link between Tanzania's having a dominant party and the current levels of corruption. CCM, as the dominant party, has been increasingly forced by high levels of public awareness, strong public criticism and strenuous political debate to take effective action on corruption. However, the complexity of CCM as an organisation and the factionalism within it make tackling corruption more difficult, as the party has multiple centres of power and influence. To date, however, Tanzania's dominant-party system has existed alongside an improvement in democratic practice and an increasingly free political debate. The high level of political debate during election campaigns and the importance that CCM places on the use of political ideas and policy in the context of its legitimacy narrative during elections indicate a political system in which there is a complex relationship between the dominant political party and the electorate. This relationship demonstrates that the political system is based on a definite political community with shared ideas and expectations, even if those expectations frequently remain unfulfilled.

¹¹⁰Kikwete, 'Speech by the president'.