

The Immigration Agenda of the Knowledge-based Economy

A Regulationist Approach to Norwegian Immigration Policy

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1. Introduction

1.1 Main Issues

Sometimes the defence of an old answer may prevent one from seeing that the question itself is no longer the same – this is especially so in those cases when the old answer is applicable to the new question. Correspondingly, the demand for new answers may, in fact, aim at the elimination of old questions (Kettunen 1998: 33).

This quote goes right into the basic issues of this thesis. The background for this academic project is the contention that since the late 1990s, there has been a new immigration agenda in Norway. The predominant Norwegian immigration policy is based on the principle of ‘restricted and controlled immigration’. This principle is partly premised by the view that non-Western immigrants represent a burden on the welfare state. Allegedly, in the new immigration agenda non-Western immigrants are increasingly seen as producers of welfare. The trigger for the thesis was that while this contention has been put forward, there has not been made any significant alterations of the general Norwegian immigration policies. This may imply that while there is a change in the premises, the structuring of the general Norwegian immigration policies is relatively unaltered (Djuve and Rogstad et al. 1999, Brochmann [1968] 2003, Ringen 2004). Accordingly, this contradiction in the general immigration policies may indicate that the predominant Norwegian immigration policy may not be in coherence with the present immigration agenda.

This is why I want to critically explore the present Norwegian immigration agenda. This objective initiates the question of *how* to explain whether there is a change in the Norwegian immigration agenda. And, what does a ‘new’ Norwegian immigration agenda *mean*? Hence, the underlying issue, in the broad sociological sense, is how we are to indicate change in social structures.

First, it is necessary to obtain a perception of what is continuation and what is discontinuation within the present Norwegian immigration agenda. Secondly, as a corollary of the first issue, I will discuss the consequences of change in this agenda for the Norwegian immigration policy. Which tensions are implied, and where and why do they occur?

In order to frame the issues of continuation and discontinuation, I employ the regulationist approach to capitalism. This approach sees economic and social contradictions

as inherent in capitalism, and perceives capitalist expansion to be dependent on non-market actors, especially institutions. Accordingly, capitalism can be seen as a significant social relation, also in terms of immigration policy. Through the regulationist approach to capitalism, I construct the present social and economic agenda of the Norwegian immigration policy: the global transformations of the knowledge-based economy. Increasing competitiveness through a more knowledge-based economy has become one of the major political responses of Western European states to the challenges of globalization (Jessop 2002, Mjøset and Bohlin 1985). Accordingly, the main issue of the thesis may be broadly presented as:

How does the predominant Norwegian immigration policy cohere with the knowledge-based economy?

The general Norwegian immigration policies can be seen as the main object of research. It is within these policies that I will search for contradictions. Empirically, I have approached this object from the angles of two different institutions which are both significant to immigration policies and intertwined in the knowledge-based economy. The empirical relevance of these institutions is theoretically legitimized by the regulationist approach.

The first angle is that of the state as an institution. I will analyse how the Norwegian state relates to the transformations of the knowledge-based economy and how this involves immigration policies. The second angle is the perspective of international labour migrants. I will claim that international labour migrants may represent an institution. Further, I will analyse one particular migrant institution which has become crucially implicated in the knowledge-based economy – that of the so-called ‘international knowledge-migrants’. Categorized by Norwegian governments as ‘specialists’, this type of labour migrants also has a distinct position within the general Norwegian immigration policies (Goss and Lindquist 1995, Home Office and DTI 2002, Tjelmeland 2002). I then analyse the contradictions of the general Norwegian immigration policies based on these two institutional perspectives. Finally, I discuss the issue of the coherence of the Norwegian immigration policy in view of these contradictions.

Accordingly, this thesis can be seen as a constructivist, institutionalist approach to Norwegian immigration policies. The overall aim of the thesis is to expand the understanding of Norwegian immigration policies as a social phenomenon.

1.2 Narrowing and Specification of the Project

Obviously, the object of research – the general Norwegian immigration policies – is very comprehensive. In order to make the project feasible, I have therefore chosen to approach Norwegian immigration policies based on certain preconditions, which again will contribute to specify and narrow the topics of concern.

Since the ban on labour immigration in 1975, non-Western immigration in Norway has primarily been legitimized on humanitarian grounds while non-Western economic immigration has generally not been legitimate. Nevertheless, immigration has in general been non-Western. The immigration flow has predominantly consisted of refugees and asylum seekers, and family members of immigrants in Norway (Brochmann and Tjelmeland 2003). The political basis for the profile of immigration to Norway is what I call ‘the structuring of the general Norwegian immigration policies’. Structuring can be defined as “the reciprocal flow of action and structure” (Abrams 1982: 192).

This structuring is mainly premised by the intertwined and complex political concerns for the welfare state, the labour market and the nation. The principle of ‘restricted and controlled immigration’ of the Norwegian immigration policy has reflected the view on immigrants, or rather asylum seekers and refugees, as a predominantly economic burden on the welfare state. Accordingly, immigrants have not been seen as potential producers of welfare through participation on the labour market. Further there has been a prevalent view that too many foreign newcomers, especially from ‘distant’ cultures, would threaten the degree of state regulation and social cohesion of the Norwegian society. Accordingly, much of the Norwegian immigration policies have been legitimized by the aim to sustain the universal welfare state, even though the concern for the labour market and the nation has been implicated in this concern. Since the ban on labour immigration, the labour market premises have often been taken for granted. The immigration policies have generally been satisfactory for Norwegian industry and businesses and have not been very much in focus since the labour immigration ban. The national premises of Norwegian immigration policies, on the other hand, have been more controversial and often understated within politics and research (Brochmann [1968] 2003, Thorud 1998, Tjomsland 2002).

The issue of the coherence of the Norwegian immigration policy will be analysed mainly in terms of these premises. This is based on the theoretical framing of the thesis, in which the welfare state, the labour market, and the nation are assumed to be seriously affected by the transformations of the knowledge-based economy. I relate these transformations to the

social, economic and political crisis that has emerged in the wake of the decomposition of the post-WW II mode of capitalist production and accumulation regime – Atlantic Fordism. This crisis has been evident in Western Europe since the early 1970s. Shortly, the crisis implies that Western European states are increasingly facing problems in terms of financing and legitimizing their welfare state system. Further, that the previously more nationally based economies have to deal with more international and/or global markets and capital flows. In the labour market, the Fordist way of organization and production has been replaced by more flexibility, focus on innovation and new globally competitive actors. These transformations involve that the paradigm of Atlantic Fordism is gradually being supplanted by the potential paradigm of the knowledge-based economy (Jessop 2002). Accordingly, I employ the term ‘immigration agenda’ in order to point out present contradictions and issues within Norwegian immigration policies regarding the welfare state, the labour market and the nation that are imposed by these transformations of the knowledge-based economy.¹

Methodologically, I operationalize and analyse the impact of transformations of the knowledge-based economy on the Norwegian state by making a comparison of the Norwegian government’s and EU’s strategies which are launched to increase economic competitiveness in accordance with the knowledge-based economy. This comparison is based on documentary research of the EU ‘Lisbon Strategy’ and the Norwegian government’s action plan ‘From Idea to Value – The Government’s Plan for a Comprehensive Innovation Policy’ [hereafter ‘From Idea to Value’]. Further, I operationalize and analyse ‘international knowledge-migrants’ through the experiences of Indian IT-workers in Norway. India is the world’s largest exporter of IT-professionals and significant in the knowledge-based economy. Since the late 1990s, Indian IT-professionals have become attractive expertise in the IT-industry in Norway and many other Western countries. Correspondingly, I have performed interviews with a group of Indians working with IT in Norway (Mashelkar 2005, Nærings- og handelsdepartementet 2003, www.europa.eu.int/growthandjobs, Xiang 2001).

When it comes to the Norwegian immigration policies, the new immigration agenda can especially be seen in the light of the ban on labour migration. I will therefore concentrate on the Norwegian labour immigration policies. I will especially focus on the juridical

¹ The choice of the term ‘agenda’ rather than for example ‘discourse’ is also based on the aim to critically illuminate indications of transformations connected to the knowledge-based economy more than already established and/or pervasive social practices in institutions. Because of this analytical aim, the ‘agenda’ of the present Norwegian immigration policy should not be seen as fully juxtaposed to the ‘knowledge-based economy’. However, the indications of social transformations are perceived to occur on the discursive as well as on the empirical level and I do not aspire to make a strict analytical division between these two levels (Goss and Lindquist 1995, Neumann 2001).

arrangements for so-called 'specialists' since the specialist provision of the Norwegian immigration act is the most relevant arrangement for non-Western expertise like Indian IT-workers.

1.3 Labour immigration Policies in Post-war Western Europe

The intention of this section is to give a broad overview of the post-World War II history of labour immigration in Western Europe and especially Norway. In the end of the section, I will explain the historical background for the contention of a new immigration agenda in the Norwegian immigration context. This historic overview will also include the development of labour immigration policies.

1.3.1 Western Europe in General

The post-WW II period initiated the first era of non-Western immigration to Europe in newer history. Initially, the deficit of labour was covered by internal labour supplies from the economically more underdeveloped regions of Europe, mostly Southern Europe and the European peripheries. As internal European labour supplies became more and more insufficient, labour import from Asia, Africa and Latin- America became a structural feature of Western-European economies. The major recruitment strategy in such countries was the guest-worker system. The guest workers provided both flexible and cheap labour. Foreigners were invited to stay temporarily, as long as their labour was needed. Throughout Europe, guest workers had status as non-citizens and had limited work- and social rights (Castles 2000, Castles and Miller 1993).

In the 1970s this immigration scenario was to turn. Western European countries had so far showed little concern for providing for the social needs of the immigrants or assessing the possible large scale impact of immigration on society. There was now growing anxiety about the social and political costs of large numbers of immigrants. Further, many Western European countries began to realize that the majority of the immigrants would not repatriate and that the number of immigrants was increasing because of family reunions. In the wake of the oil-crisis and the beginning economic recession, most Western European governments stopped labour immigration in 1973/74. During the mid 1970s and the 1980s, the ban on labour migration did not contribute to significantly alter the actual stock of immigrants, but it changed the structure of immigration in Western Europe. The proportion of Southern-

European immigrants declined while immigration from non-Western countries increased. As a corollary of increased family immigration, there was also an increase in female immigrants and decrease in the average age of immigrants (Collinson 1993, Castles and Miller 1993).

The composition of immigrants after the ban on labour immigration has implied that the stock of labour immigrants has been reduced compared to the total immigration stock. During the 1990s political attempts were made to restore the balance between labour immigration and immigration in general. However, the actions taken to strike a balance were targeted on reducing the number of asylum seekers and refugees rather than increasing the number of labour immigrants. Labour immigration policies in Western Europe have continued to be aimed at immediate needs in the labour market and not on permanent immigration, even if the actual consequence of short-term labour contracts often has been permanent settlement (Djuve and Rogstad et al. 1999).

1.3.2 Norway

The new immigration era was introduced to Norway some years later than in most of Western Europe. In Norway, the incentive to labour immigration is very much related to the discovery of oil on Norwegian territory in the late 1960s. This was a significant turning point in the Norwegian economy and one of the first indications of an economic boost was the demand for foreign labour. Because of the recent discovery of oil on Norwegian territory, the economic boom prevailed in Norway even after the international oil crisis in 1973. The Norwegian economy thus differed from most of Europe in this period. Hence, as Europe restricted migration partly due to economic recession in the early 1970s, the Norwegian labour market became more attractive to foreigners as the economy boosted and many labour immigrants that otherwise would have gone to other European countries, came to Norway. The expansion of the economy also gave incentives to a restructuring of the domestic labour force in terms of enhanced opportunities for labour mobility. Less attractive jobs in parts of the industry and the service sector were now increasingly left by domestic workers causing the door to open more for foreign workers. The first foreign workers in Norway were mostly unskilled males. They predominantly came from Pakistan, but also from countries like Morocco, Turkey and Yugoslavia (Brochmann and Tjelmeland 2003).

In the 1970s, Norwegian authorities feared the consequences of implementing a different immigration policy than the rest of Europe. Even though Norwegian economy seemed solid and immigration to Norway hardly had begun compared to most of Europe,

Norway implemented immigration 'stop' in 1975. However, in reality this was not a stop, but rather a restructuring of the predominant immigration profile. Immigration to Norway still prevailed because of the exemptions that were made from the stop. Exemptions were made for asylum seekers, refugees and close relatives of established immigrants and, for so-called 'key-personnel'. The latter exemption was targeted on needs in the oil industry, and was thus issued for short-term, skilled workers from OECD countries. As a corollary, the immigration stop only affected general labour migration from outside OECD while other types of immigration to Norway from non-Western countries continued to increase, especially because of family reunions. Hence, the immigration stop may rather be defined as a general ban on labour immigration from non-Western countries (Brochmann and Tjelmeland 2003, Tjomsland 2002).

The labour immigration stop was supposed to be only preliminary on the reason given that it would ease the integration of the immigrants that had already arrived. The stop was officially abolished in 1981. The term 'immigration stop' was now changed to 'immigration regulation'. However, the general policy that had been established through the 'stop' period continued as the main principle of the following Norwegian immigration policies. The significance of that principle is reflected in that 'restricted and controlled immigration' has become a main objective of Norwegian immigration policies. Because of the stop, the structure of the immigration was reorganized. Similar to the rest of Western-Europe, one can refer to three so-called post-WW II waves of immigration to Norway: the first wave was composed of labour migrants, mostly young and single males. Shortly after the labour immigration ban, came the second wave – the families of the foreign workers. And, from the early 1980s there was a significant increase of refugees and asylum seekers which can be categorised as the third wave. However, family immigration has prevailed throughout the period (Brochmann and Tjelmeland 2003, Thorud 1998).

During the 1980s and beginning of the 1990s, much of the Norwegian immigration agenda was dominated by the social and economic problems of non-Western immigrants in the Norwegian society. The unemployment rates for non-Western immigrants as a group were significantly higher than for so-called ethnic Norwegians. In this scenario, there emerged a general perception of 'immigrants' as predominantly *receivers* of social welfare. In accordance with the initial 'immigration stop', immigration policies have generally been aimed at minimizing non-Western immigration to Norway (Brochmann and Tjelmeland 2003, Tjomsland 2002).

1.3.3 The New Immigration Agenda

From the mid-1990s Norway and Western Europe in general went into a new economic upswing. Along with the prevailing negative employment rates among non-Western immigrants, there was scarcity of labour supplies especially within building and construction, the ICT sector and the health sector. In Norway, parts of the labour shortages were reduced by a significant increase of internal European labour migration.² However, because of these economic conjunctures, Norway and several other Western European countries began to facilitate their strict labour immigration policies towards highly skilled labour migrants from countries outside the EEA/EU (Brochmann and Tjelmeland 2003). This latter shift was especially connected to the ICT sector in Western Europe. From the late 1990s, there was a cry for IT competence around the world and it was estimated that the need would increase in the coming years. In the European IT industry, it was assumed that there would be a lack of 1.7 million IT workers only in 2003. In 2001, the Norwegian government estimated that the Norwegian IT industry would need about 1500-2000 foreign IT-workers (www.digi.no 21.03.01 and 23.03.2003).

The actual number of non-Western labour migrants that have arrived in Western Europe in the after the entrance regulations have been adjusted has been very modest. When it comes to the ICT sector, this moderate number can partly be connected to the global recession in this sector in 2001. However, both Norwegian and other Western European governments have come to realize that Europe is not necessarily the most attractive region to non-Western highly skilled workers (Ringen 2004, Mahroum 2000, WITSA 2004).

Further, it has become evident that Norway shares many of the demographic features of Western Europe. The general population is ageing because birth rates are decreasing while life expectancies are rising. This means that Western European countries will face increasing future problems in terms of securing economic growth. Increased immigration has therefore been suggested as one of the means to mend this demographic development (Djuve and Rogstad et al. 1999, Brochmann and Tjelmeland 2003).

What can be called the new immigration agenda has several aspects. It is both connected to economy and demography. First of all, there is deficiency in Western European skilled and highly skilled labour resources. Secondly, it is being recognized that it will not

² The largest group of foreign labourers were Swedes, who especially went into the building- and construction sector. The Norwegian oil-sector attracted many British workers. In the health sector there was an increase of Danish, Swedish, Finnish and German labour (Brochmann and Tjelmeland 2003).

suffice to cover this deficiency through internal labour supplies. That means that Western Europe will also have to use labour from outside Europe and from non-Western countries. These two latter aspects of the new immigration agenda are relatively parallel to the immigration situation in Western Europe before the labour immigration ban. However, it can be argued that the third aspect of the new immigration agenda differs both from the one before and after the ban, because it can be connected to a new global, economic and social paradigm – the knowledge-based economy: Norway and Western Europe need to attract highly skilled, non-Western labour because the global economic scenario has shifted since the ban on labour migration in the 1970s. It can be claimed that this shift also can be seen as the reason why today's Western Europe, as opposed to the era before the immigration ban, is not getting hold of the most attractive non-Western labour migrants. The shift in the global scenario implies that Western Europe is no longer as competitive on international labour migration as previously (Mahroum 2000, Ringen (ed.) 2004).

The new immigration agenda does not imply that the principle of 'restricted and controlled immigration policies' has been altered. However, parts of the labour immigration policies have been adjusted. Those adjustments will be elaborated in the next section (Brochmann 2002, Brochmann 2003).

1.4 Norwegian Labour Immigration Policies

Since Norway became an EEA (European Economic Area) member in 1994, the Norwegian labour market has been open to labour migration from all the EEA/EU member states and EFTA (in practice Switzerland). In 2001, Norway joined the Schengen association. Through the membership in the EEA, EEA/EU citizens and their families have the right to entrance, residence and work in other EEA/EU countries. This means that they do not need a work permit and have permission to residence if they are able to get a job within six months. The European labour market does not allow any countries in the market to discriminate on the basis of citizenship when it comes to labour conditions. This means that in practice, the Norwegian immigration act is only relevant for labour immigration from outside EEA/EU (Brochmann and Tjelmeland 2003, OECD 2004).

In 1999 a working group appointed by the government, presented a report on the future requirements of labour and recruitment from abroad. The report came up with 11 proposals that were aimed at making Norway more attractive to labour migrants. Most of the proposals have been carried through. The so-called 'specialist paragraph' has been extended

in order to include skilled workers. Seasonal workers are permitted to work three months in the country without any restrictions in terms of season or type of industry. In January 2002 some amendments to the Immigration Act § 6 and the Immigrant Regulation came into force. The amendments are supposed to ease the recruitment of non-EEA labour migrants. The amendments in the Immigrant Regulation only concern the procedures for applying for a work permit, not the conditions for receiving a work permit (Kommunal- og regionaldepartementet 1999, OECD 2004, Tjomsland 2002).

Further, the procedures for issuance of work permits have been facilitated. Now the police may issue temporary work permits that allow foreign citizens to work while the application for a permanent work permit is being handled. Also consular or diplomat practices may issue work permits if the respective requirements are clearly fulfilled. From February 2003 employers having a site or business in Norway were allowed to apply for work permits on behalf of employees. The basic condition for obtaining a work permit is that the applicant holds a binding offer of employment from a Norwegian employer. Skilled workers or persons with special qualifications who are looking for work in Norway may be issued a three-month visa. Within this period it is also possible to apply for a work permit from the respective site. However, the general rule is still that all foreign nationals who intend to work in Norway must have a work permit. A working permission has to be renewed after one year. After three years of employment in Norway, the applicant can apply for permanent settlement (NOU 2004:20, OECD 2004).

Also, annual quotas for specialist workers have been introduced. At the time being, the quota is set at 5000 specialists. This regulation entails that in terms of being granted a specialist work permit, it is no longer required that domestic or EEA labour have the first claim to a respective position until the quota has been filled. After the quota is full, application for specialist work permits will be dealt with according to an 'economic needs test'. Work permits issued to specialists are significant because they can give the right to permanent settlement after three years of employment in Norway. Seasonal workers do not have the right to permanent residence based on their work permits (NOU 2004:20, OECD 2004, www.udi.no).

1.5 Significant Concepts and Terms

The Specialist Provision: The term refers to § 3a in the Norwegian foreigner regulation/provision [No: Utlendingsforskriften]. Paragraph 3 relates to foreigners who have the right to permanent settlement. A specialist is defined as “a person who has a trade or who has special qualifications” (<http://www.udi.no/templates/Page.aspx?id=4674> [05.08.2005]). Specialists make out the only category of labour immigrants which both have the right to renew their work permission and the right to permanent settlement (www.udi.no).

Visa: A visa can be defined as “an entry permit issued by the authorities of state to foreign citizens” (Bø 2002: 79). All aliens who are citizens of countries that are not exempted from the general visa requirement, must have a visa permit before being permitted to cross the border. Visa can be issued either on a three month tourist basis or for a more permanent stay. Aliens who can freely enter Norway without a visa encompass citizens from North-America, most of Latin America, several countries in South-East Asia and most of Europe. People who have a work permit in Norway automatically also get an entry visa for Norway (www.udi.no).

The Norwegian visa policies are based on foreign policy, security policy and immigration policy. The contents of so-called ‘immigration policy concerns’ (No: ‘innvandringspolitiske hensyn’) may be various. However, the general immigration policy connected to visa policies revolves around the consensus on ‘restricted and controlled immigration. Visa is systematically required from citizens of countries from which a significant number of immigrants or asylum seekers have arrived or are expected to arrive in the near future. In practice, the Norwegian visa policies are directed on nationals which Norwegian governments often have experienced will not leave once they have entered Norway. The visa policies are also based on calculations as to whether the general living conditions in the country of a visa applicant implies that he/she is likely to remain in Norway. Immigration regulation concerns are not to be taken into account in cases of work permissions for foreigners (Humlen 1998, NOU 2004: 20).

The knowledge-based economy: The term ‘knowledge-based economy’ is contested, and there are several conceptually related terms like the ‘knowledge-driven economy’, the ‘information society’, the ‘new-economy’. Here, the basis of the term is the increasing importance of knowledge in the economy, especially in terms of politics and in industrial

relations (Cappelen 2001, Coates and Warwick 1999, Jessop 2002). Accordingly, the knowledge-based economy may be defined as:

[...] an economy in which the generation and exploitation of knowledge have come to play the predominant part in the creation of wealth. It is not simply about pushing back the frontiers of knowledge; it is also about the more effective use and exploitation of all types of knowledge in all manner of economic activity (Coates and Warwick 1999:12)

International knowledge-migrants: This is a concept which I have constructed in order to refer to the international migration of knowledge-workers. In this thesis, the term ‘knowledge-workers’ is building on Drucker’s [1962] notion of the most significant category of workers in the 20th century (see Khadria 2001). This category would comprise the highly educated, intellectual, technocratic and managerial elite of the world. For the purposes of this thesis, ‘knowledge-workers’ generally refers to people occupied within the ICT sector (ICT = information and communication technology. ‘Migration’ in terms of knowledge-workers here refers to the movement of natural persons for the purpose of work in a foreign country (Home Office and DTI 2002, Jessop 2002, Khadria 2001). The migration could either be on a short-term or a longer term (see chapter 3).

1.6 Outline of the Thesis

The thesis consists of seven chapters. In chapter 2, I present the general theoretical framework of the thesis. This theoretical framework comprises the regulationist approach to capitalism, the role of human resources in globalized capitalism and theories on international labour migration. In chapter 3, I elaborate the methodological basis and process of the thesis. Chapters 4 to 6 make out the analysis. In chapter 4, I analyze the Norwegian Government’s ‘From Idea to Value’ and compare this with EU’s ‘Lisbon Strategy’. In chapter 5, I establish and analyse international knowledge-migrants as an institution. In chapter 6, I implement the findings from the two previous chapters of analysis in order to discuss various contradictions of Norwegian immigration policies. Through these three chapters of analysis, I have established a basis for discussing the issue of the coherence between the Norwegian immigration policy and the knowledge-based economy. This issue will be dealt with in chapter 7 which concludes the thesis as a whole.

2. Theoretical Framework

Theory may be applied in various ways in qualitative research. The use of theory reflects the acknowledgement that the immense complexity of empirical phenomena demands some tool of organization. A theory can be employed as a set of pre-conceptions that contribute to frame the objects of analysis. In other words, an object that is being analyzed will always become a theoretical construction to some degree and the theoretical approach will influence the structure of the analysis (Abrams 1982, Andersen 1997).

I have intended to employ theory that could capture as much as possible of my data material. According to that intention, the regulationist approach represented through Bob Jessop's 'The Future of the Capitalist State' is the main theoretical framework of the thesis. In addition to Jessop, I have added theory on human resources in globalized capitalism and on international labour migration that I will claim to be compatible with the regulationist approach.

2.1. The Future of the Capitalist State

In 'The Future of the Capitalist State' (2002), Bob Jessop seeks to analyse the role of the state in the reproduction of capitalism, especially during the postwar era. Jessop analyses the crisis of the postwar Keynesian welfare state in the relation to the rise, consolidation and crisis of Atlantic Fordism and discusses the rise of the Schumpeterian Competition State in the wake of these crises. He acknowledges the regulationist approach as one of his main theoretical perspectives.

One of the elementary perceptions of the regulationist approach to capitalism is that the market is not and cannot be the only contributing factor of capitalist expansion. In that regard, the term 'regulation' points out the way that non-market actors are involved in capitalist relations. 'Regulation' may be broadly defined as:

[...] the conjunction of economic mechanisms associated with a given set of social relationships, of institutional forms and structures (Boyer 1979 in Mjøset and Bohlin 1985: 45).

Theorists of the regulationist approach especially focus on the way that institutions relate to the contradiction between regulation implying factors securing long-term stability of economic growth, and regulation as determined by social struggles and compromises. The

institutionalist perspective holds that the market is not capable of stabilizing social and economic relations, and therefore needs to be stabilized by institutional forces.³ The state is one but several of these institutions. The state is historically and conceptually premised by the institutional separation of the economic and the extra-economic in capitalism (Mjøset and Bohlin 1985).

2.1.1 The Contradictions of Capitalism

In line with the regulationist approach, Jessop performs his analysis based on certain pre-conceptions of capitalism. These aspects are significant to capitalism as a mode of production and an object of regulation.

Drawing on Marx, Jessop argues that the most prominent characteristic of the capitalistic way of producing goods and services for sale is the way labour-power is being generalized into the form of a commodity. In the capitalist labour market, workers offer their labour-power for sale to capitalists. In exchange of wages, the capitalists get to control the workers' labour-power in the production process. Further, the capitalists obtain the right to make use of the profits from the sale of products and services. When the workers spend their wages on consumption means, they simultaneously contribute to reproduce the demand for their labour-power so that it can be sold again. This way, labour-power becomes incorporated in the production process in almost the same way as other means of production, like natural resources. However, as Jessop points out, labour-power will never be exactly compatible with a commodity. Labour-power will always be a fictitious commodity, because even if it can be bought and sold like a commodity it is not created in the profit-oriented labour process. Other fictitious commodities are nature, knowledge and money.⁴

Capitalism revolves around one general law – the law of value. In accordance with this law, capitalists tend to provide resources for production because they expect profit. The law of value is mediated through market forces and price mechanisms, but it is based on the

³ The theoretical tradition of the institutional approach must be seen in line with Karl Polanyi and his major classic work on the 'The Great Transformation' (1944). In this book, Polanyi seeks to describe the rise and fall of the market economy in Europe through a critique of liberalism. This critique is based on the liberal idea of organizing social relations purely according to the self-regulating market. Polanyi sees the liberal project to commodify all the three factors of production – land, labour and money as a threat to the very basis of society. Polanyi defies the idea that the market has developed as an autonomous institution throughout history. He points to the necessary interference initiated by powerful institutions like the state to protect society from some of the most anti-collectivist tendencies of the market. Without the protection systems provided by these institutions, the human and natural basis of society would have been destroyed (Mjøset and Bohlin 1985).

production process. New values can only be created through production, and hence, through labour power. The law of value implies that capitalism will entail contradictions:

In general terms, the law of value suggests that more time will be spent on producing commodities whose market price is above their price of production as measured by the socially necessary labour time involved in their creation. Conversely, less time will be spent on producing commodities whose market price is lower than their price of production (Jessop 2002: 17).

The logic of this law is based on the contradiction inherent in the exchange- and use-value aspects of the commodity form. The exchange-value means the commodity's monetary value for the seller. This value is mediated through the market. The use-value means the commodity's material and/ or symbolic value to the purchaser. The contradiction lies in that without exchange-value, commodities would not be produced for sale and without use-value they would not be purchased. Based on this, Jessop claims that:

all forms of the capital relation embody different but interconnected versions of this basic contradiction and that these impact differentially on (different fractions of) capital and on (different strata of) labour at different times and places (Jessop 2002: 16).

What can be derived from these contradictions of capital, is that capital is never simply a means of production. Capital relations are a complex mixture of economic and extra-economic mechanisms. As a corollary, it can be claimed that capitalism depends on other systems and the lifeworld. Capitalism cannot be reproduced only through the value form. This is an important point to be made in terms of the issue of ecological dominance. Transferred to social systems the term of ecological dominance refers to:

structural and/or strategic capacity of a given system in a self-organizing ecology of systems to imprint its development logic on other systems' operation far more than these systems are able to impose their respective logics on that system (Jessop 2002: 25).

Based on the inherent limits of capitalism, it can be stated that the development of a capitalist economy never follows a purely economic logic. However, because of its internal complexity and flexibility, a capitalist economy does have the capabilities necessary to obtain ecological dominance. Nonetheless, even if economic capitalism becomes ecological dominant, its development should not be seen as deterministic. Other systems and their actors will be relatively capable to influence its path. The eventual ecological dominance of capitalism is always contingent and historically variable.

Because of its contradictions, capitalism will be prone to so-called 'market-failure'. Market failure occurs when the capitalist system does not function efficiently according to its

⁴ See Polanyi (1944): *The Great Transformation*.

basic cycle of production and sale. Further, these contradictions will influence the rest of the society and be reproduced as capitalism is being reproduced. This entails that capital does not or cannot govern itself. Market forces within capitalism will need to be regulated and governed by non-market actors. This is where the capitalist state comes in.

Jessop approaches the capitalistic state as a social relation. The role of the capitalist state is to balance the inter-relation between the capitalist drive to commodification and non-commodity forms of social relations. The division between the capitalistic and the non-capitalistic is not a fixed border, but shifts according to various accumulation regimes and as ways of capitalist regulation change through history.

The state and state power is essential to these alterations, both in the shaping of capitalist accumulations systems and in being shaped by them. In order to illuminate the dual relationship between capitalism and the state, Jessop applies the postwar type of state as the main focus of analysis. According to Jessop, the relation between the postwar state and capitalism is quite distinct:

I interpret this form of state as a historically specific political regime that corresponds with a historic specific stage of capitalist accumulation in a particular economic and political space within the world economy (Jessop 2002: 2).

In the postwar era there can be traced three main stages in the relation between the basic features of capitalism and the state. These are, broadly: 1) the early post-war years to the beginning of the 1970s. This was the 'heydays' of the Keynesian Welfare National State, or the KWNS, and the Atlantic Fordist mode of capitalist production and accumulation, 2) mid-1970s which involved decomposition of the Atlantic Fordist regime and the beginning of a crisis in the KWNS, and 3) the late 1970s to the present, implying the development of the knowledge based economy and the corresponding emergence of the Schumpeterian Competition State.

Underneath, the ideal-type characteristics and dynamic of these three stages will be described more thoroughly:

2.1.2 The Keynesian Welfare National State and its Crisis

The 'Keynesian Welfare National State' (KWNS) refers to the form and function of the capitalist state of Atlantic Fordism. Jessop defines Atlantic Fordism as:

an accumulation regime based on a virtuous autocentric circle of mass production and mass consumption secured through a distinctive mode of regulation that was discursively, institutionally

and practically materialized in the Keynesian welfare national state (or KWNS) (Jessop 2002: 55).

The dynamic of Atlantic Fordism was based on the Fordist labour process which spread from the US to other Atlantic Fordist economies and on mass production and mass consumption within this whole economic area.⁵ The Atlantic Fordist states comprise the economies of postwar USA, Canada, North-Western Europe, Australia and New Zealand.

The KWNS aimed to secure full employment within a rather closed national economy. The KWNS' focus on welfare was evident on several areas. Collective bargaining was regulated according to the aims of full employment. Further, the surplus of economic growth was to be distributed among all citizens, not predominantly between the male workers. Patterns of mass consumption were now generalized to all full citizens.

The economic and social policies of the KWNS were closely connected to the nation. Citizenship was the criteria that coordinated the state's expanding institutionalization of economic rights, and the primary area of Keynesian welfare responsibility was the territorial nation state. Replacement rates for unemployment benefit, sickness benefit and pensions were all increased within the frames of the nation state. These institutional arrangements may be seen as preliminary alleviations to the contradictions of capitalism:

[...] the distinctive contribution of the KWNS to the regulation of Atlantic Fordism was its capacity to manage, displace or defer, at least for a while, the contradictions in different forms of capital relation and their strategic dilemmas as these were expressed in Fordist accumulation regimes (Jessop 2002: 75).

During the 1970 and the 1980s, the Keynesian welfare state went into a crisis. The crisis was evident on several areas. It can be seen as an economic, a financial, political and social crisis. Part of the crisis was caused and/or enhanced by the continued growth of the KWNS *per se*.

On the economic area, there were domestically generated crisis-tendencies and mechanisms that gradually undermined the closure of the national economies. Fordist firms began to expand into foreign markets and to resort to foreign credit to reduce costs and tax bills. Further, the Fordist production system was decreasingly functional in many branches of production, like services. There was increasingly more capital intensive production and continuing search for ways to increase productivity. In the wake of this, there were attempts to restructure the labour process and restrain labour costs, like wages. The Atlantic Fordist accumulation regime depended heavily on oil supplies. As this regime began to expand, the

⁵ The regulationist theory on post-war Fordism and the era of mass-consumption has especially been developed by French theorists like Aglietta, Benassy, Boyer and Lipietz during the 1970s. The agenda of these pioneers of the regulationist school was to find a way to relate the institutionalist orientation to the contemporary era (Mjøset and Bohlin 1985).

need for oil increased and also altered the underlying structural balance of the regime. The oil crisis in the 1970s can be seen as a reflection of this.

Further, the effectiveness of KWNS in terms of economic and political regulation was weakened because of the increased complexity of domestic and international economic relations. The typical policy objectives of the KWNS like full employment, economic growth, stable prices and 'sound' balance of payments became increasingly more difficult to maintain. Regional and local economies increasingly found that their problems could not be solved by the usual national macro-economic policies or centre-oriented, standardized industrial policies. Instead, interventions and policies were sought for that would allow local, regional or national economies to operate more effectively in the global economy. This was connected to a crisis in the US economic hegemony and struggles over the shaping of new international regimes. It was also linked to a shift in the paradigm of the Fordist growth model and its accumulation strategy to one of more flexible production, innovation, scope economies, innovation and rapidly shifting and differentiated patterns of consumption.

The crisis of Fordism had severe consequences on KWNS finances. Much of the expansion of the KWNS had depended on increasingly high levels of taxes both from the private sector and the working class. Now state revenues began to decrease as unemployment began to increase and capital flows became more international and often escaped national taxes. At the same time, demands for state expenditure increased because of the various social repercussions of the crisis. The general fiscal crisis of the state was followed by conflicts and hostility towards the general financial system of the KWNS, especially in terms of welfare costs.

The general effect of the changes has been to erode the KWNS. The worst scenario, in Jessop's view, is that they have caused not only a crisis, but produced an organic crisis in the KWNS. An organic crisis implies a progressive loss of state unity, declining effectiveness, representational crises and a legitimacy crisis.

2.1.3 The Schumpeterian Competition State

According to Jessop (2002), the result of various economic, political and social responses to the crisis-tendencies described above, is the tendential shaping of a new type of state – the competition state. This state is supposed to promote economic and extra-economic conditions that are more appropriate to the post-Fordist accumulation regime:

Competition state is used here to characterize a state that aims to secure economic growth within its borders and/or to secure competitive advantages for capitals based in its borders, even where they operate abroad, by promoting the economic and extra-economic conditions that are currently deemed vital for success in competition with economic actors and spaces located in other states (Jessop 2002: 96).

Part of the significance of the competition states is that their strategies always are meditated through the operation of the world market as a whole. There are various forms of competition states, but the dominant type is the Schumpeterian Competition State. The term 'Schumpeterian' stems from this state's engagement with "technological change, innovation and enterprise and its attempt to develop new techniques of government and governance to these ends" (Jessop 2002: 96).

The tendential emergence of the Schumpeterian Competition State is linked to the paradigm of the knowledge-based economy that has partly replaced Atlantic Fordism:

This paradigm has gradually become hegemonic as a rationale and strategic guide for economic, political and social restructuring, resonates across many different systems of the lifeworld, and reflects the general importance attributed, rightly or wrongly, to knowledge as a 'factor of production' in the post-fordist labour process, accumulation regime and mode of regulation (Jessop 2002: 97).

This paradigm implies that economy is seen as knowledge-based and/ or knowledge-driven. Implied in this is that the knowledge is being commodified. As a corollary, states are increasingly involved in promoting and spreading the commodified forms of knowledge.

The post-Fordist labour process is characterized by flexible production like flexible machines and systems. This requires a flexible workforce, where multi-skilled and unskilled workers are combined in flexible ways. ICT and software is crucial to the flexibility of the post-Fordist labour process. Within the post-Fordism labour process application of knowledge is being pre-supposed by production of knowledge.

An important aspect of the transition to the knowledge-based economy is that the primary discourses on competitiveness and strategies of competitiveness have changed significantly since the heydays of Atlantic Fordism. Here, Jessop makes a distinction between static comparative and dynamic competitive advantages. Having a static comparative advantage, means being superior in control over natural resources, or so-called natural factor endowments, compared to trading partners or competitors. Dynamic competitive advantages imply a clearer aspect of socially created factors that can be socially transformed and become objects of strategic intervention. Because factor-based advantages usually are difficult to sustain, Jessop suggests that longer-term competitiveness should be based on dynamic advantages. The more broadly dynamic competitive advantages are understood, the more

competitiveness has become structural or systemic.

The works of the political economist Joseph Schumpeter (1883-1950) is very significant to the social creation of competitive advantages. The Schumpeterian approach to competitiveness emphasizes the importance of long waves of technological innovation and capital to economic growth. What characterises the Schumpeterian competition approach is that it incorporates a wide spectre of extra-economic factors of competition compared to traditionally economic competitiveness approaches. The Schumpeterian approach can be seen as a social mobilization program aimed to raise the aggregate level of innovation and hence economic growth and effectiveness in the capitalist society. In the Schumpeterian perspective, entrepreneurship is not predominantly an individual characteristic, but a superstructural, collective mentality of society. This mentality further transcends into the individuals, and say, areas like politics and culture (de Vecchi 1995, Jessop 2002, Swedberg (ed.) 1991). The Schumpeterian approach is opposed to the Keynesian approach to competitiveness which presupposes relatively closed national economies. Within the Keynesian approach, full employment of national resources, including labour, is assumed to increase economic efficiency.

Within post-Fordism, the economic competitiveness of the most advanced economies is increasingly attached to structural/systemic competitiveness and to enhancing the knowledge-base as the main source of dynamic competitive advantage. A matter of significance is that this entails that economic competitiveness increasingly depends on extra-economic factors:

Discourses and strategies of structural and systemic competitiveness emphasize not only firm- and sectoral-level factors but also the role of an extended range of extra-economic institutional contexts and sociocultural conditions in which economic actors compete (Jessop 2002: 109).

Competition is a driving force behind capital accumulation and a core to capitalist contradictions. Competition contributes to the search for new ways and areas of profit. In that regard, competition is an incentive to and inherent in globalization processes. Globalization is further significant to accumulation regimes, modes of regulation and the state. According to Jessop:

[...] what globalization involves both structurally and strategically is the creation and/or restructuring of scale as a social relation and as a site of social relations (Jessop 2002: 116).

Jessop perceives globalization as “the complex emergent product of many different forces operating on many scales” (Jessop 2002: 114). Structurally, globalization implies processes where actions, organizations and institutions obtain increasingly global interdependence

within various functional subsystems like economy, law, politics, science etc. and within various spheres of the lifeworld. Strategically, globalization implies that actors attempt to coordinate their activities globally within these functional subsystems and the lifeworld without having to be physically present at all places in the globe. The condition is that the aim of their activities is to create global effects.

In the wake of globalization, new scales emerge as well as new mechanisms and actors to coordinate them:

Thus, far from producing homogenized global economic space, the many and varied processes involved in globalization actually involve the reordering – across a wide range of economic spaces on different spatial scales – of differences and complementarities as the basis of dynamic competitive advantages (Jessop 2002: 117).

This implies that an increasing number of actors, among them the state, focus on the global as the horizon of action and relate to the implications of changing scalar divisions. Because of the continuing decomposition of Atlantic Fordism and the emerging economic and extra-economic tendencies:

[...] the principal political response can be summarized briefly as the attempt by state managers, officials, economies and other forces to transform the Keynesian full employment state into a Schumpeterian competition state, to rescale and rearticulate activities, and to develop new forms of government and governance to address the emerging problems of the state as well as market failure (Jessop 2002: 123).

As Jessop emphasises, post-Fordism does not suspend the contradictions and dilemmas of capitalism. Rather, incorporation of extra-economic factors into the expanding logic of capitalism and economic competitiveness contributes to enhance these contradictions and dilemmas and spread them more fully into social relations.

2.2 Human Resources in Globalized Capitalism

Jessop's emphasis on labour-power as a fictitious commodity is important to the way workers may be perceived. It implies that workers are not wholly an aspect of capitalism. Rather, their labour-power can be seen as a generated human capacity (Jessop 2002):

Employees do not systematically orient their entire lives to opportunities for increased income (despite growing pressures on us all to become enterprising subjects and to welcome the commodification of our entire lives) at the cost of other social relations. In short, although most people must sell their labour-power to be able to live and to participate fully in social life, they are not actually commodities – merely treated as if they were (Jessop 2002: 14-15).

This perspective can be argued to be compatible with certain theoretical approaches to 'human resources' within globalized capitalism. This is especially relevant in terms of the emphasis on 'competence' and 'flexibility' in contemporary working life. Pauli Kettunen (1995) connects the focus on competence and flexibility to what he terms 'the discourse on competitiveness' which permeates contemporary working life agenda. The focus on economic competitiveness is often seen as an imperative of the drastic challenges caused by globalization.

Kettunen's mission is to draw attention to the way power is being concealed within this working life agenda. By the term 'discourse' Kettunen refers to "the process of defining and circumscribing the field of legitimate questions" (Kettunen 1998: 35). Having the power to define an agenda is compatible with having a hegemony. According to Kettunen, economic competitiveness has an overwhelming power in defining the agenda of working life. Hence, the discourse on competitiveness may contribute to making research on working life compatible with the given agenda. Based on this, Kettunen addresses the necessity of critical researchers who can "take reflexive distance from the discourse in which he or she participates" (Kettunen 1998: 36). As a corollary, the discourse *per se* should become the object of research. Such research should be based on the understanding that "the discourse on competitiveness, knowledge, innovation, communication and participation *is*, indeed, an aspect of the very same phenomenon as its references: increasing *reflexivity*" (Kettunen 1998: 36). Here it is important to be aware that reflexivity is a crucial aspect of competitiveness *per se*. Reflexivity can be defined as "the continuous and conscious self-monitoring of organisations and actors" (Kettunen 1998: 36).

Kettunen's second argument for doing research on the discourse on competitiveness is that the notion of 'new challenges' in this discourse tends to preclude both aspects of continuity as well as aspects of discontinuity. This especially concerns continuities and discontinuities connected to the national 'us' and the 'human factor' within the discourse on competitiveness.

Kettunen claims that the most significant problem about accounts on globalization is the ways in which the national 'us' is reproduced and modified in the context of globalization. In terms of the national economy, it is rather evident that globalization implies that the meaning of national 'home base' has changed:

The thought according to which "our" national economy is represented by "our" enterprises in the world markets has certainly not lost all of its analytical nor political power but, however, in the time of globalised financial markets and transnationalised corporations the struggle for

competitiveness shapes “us in a different way. “Our” *national* competitiveness means “our” ability to attract domestic or foreign companies with *global* competitiveness (Kettunen 1998: 58).

It may be assumed that the notion of the national ‘us’ is ideologically strengthened as national policy-making focus more on external conditions. Anyhow, communities now need to be ‘imagined’ to a stronger degree than earlier (Kettunen 1998, Papastergiadis 2000). The comparison between ‘us’ and ‘others’ which is inherent in competition is a strong incentive to imagining. This entails that because of globalization, reflexivity in the form of comparison will be more vital to all who are involved in industrial relations. Comparative practices can be seen as an aspect of competence both of managers and employees. It is required that both managers and employees have “the ability to monitor one’s own work from the point of view of the competitiveness of the company or the production unit” (Kettunen 1998: 64).

Various communities’ search for competitive advantages has resulted in a strong ‘model consciousness’. International comparison has become an integral part of political and economic practises:

“We” within a given national or local framework are supposed to make ourselves more attractive and competitive than “others” in the face of those who compare national and local conditions from a transnational perspective in their decision-making regarding the flows of money, investments, and the location of production and jobs (Kettunen 1998: 34).

However, Kettunen notes that communities tend to express their particular competitive advantages in rather the same way. Knowledge and innovation are both the basis of ‘our’ competitiveness and for local and national competitiveness strategies. In Nordic discussions, the Nordic social model is often argued to be saved by modifying it to serve various strategies of competitiveness. Competitiveness is to be promoted through innovation, training, increased competence and stronger emphasis on ‘human capital’⁶.

2.3 International Labour Migration

From a sociological perspective, my aim has been to develop a ‘holistic’ approach to international labour migration. The contents of such an approach are not obvious. For the purposes of this thesis, it is based on the perception that labour migration from developing countries often is the victim of reductionist analyses. In accordance with the regulationist

⁶ According to Gary s. Becker’s classic theory on human capital, investment in the education and training of individuals is directly compatible with business investment in equipment. Becker’s study hence focuses on the measurable economic effects of education on employment and earnings (Becker [1964] 1993).

critique of mainstream economic theories on capitalism, migration research is often reduced to the circulation of labour power, while the social, cultural, political and institutional aspects of migration often are subordinated to an economic logic (Brettel and Hollifield (eds.) Fuglerud 2001, Hollifield 1992).

According to Goss and Lindquist (1995), this kind of reductionism stems from the failure to integrate macro and micro scales of analysis. They claim that the core of this issue is how to coherently articulate structure and agency within labour migration theory. Their contribution to the issue is to apply Anthony Giddens' [1984] theory of structuration on international labour migration.

2.3.1 Conventional Approaches

According to Goss and Lindquist migration literature has traditionally concentrated on two distinct approaches that both have an economic basis. The two approaches are the functionalist and structuralist approaches. These approaches have different starting points, but both end up with the same assumption about the labour migration process that it should be viewed as a response to wage differentials or socioeconomic inequalities between the source and host country.

One of the main differences between the two approaches is that functionalism focuses on microeconomic processes, while structuralism focuses on macroeconomic processes. In functionalist theory it is assumed that the migration process starts out with individuals who want to improve their lives by taking account of what they perceive as inequalities in the distribution of economic opportunities. The structuralist perspective focuses on the specific macroeconomic processes that cause the sociospatial inequalities that give incentive to migration.

While the functionalist perspective assumes that the aggregate effect of the individual migration processes will eventually reduce the spatial inequalities and reduce the migration stream, the structuralist perspective does not expect an economic equilibrium because of migration, but rather enhanced inequalities due to the loss of human capital in the sending migration countries

Functionalist approaches to migration build on modernization theory and neoclassic economic development theory. The modernization theory and neoclassic development theory both perceive migration as a corollary of the transition of surplus labour in rural economies to urban, industrialised economies. Migration is conceived as either an aspect of modernization

and/or economic progress. And, both of these theories have a micro-social approach to migration which sees migration as being initiated by rational individuals who seek to utilize their social or economic potential.

Within the structuralist approach migration is a result of the receiving countries' political and economic exploitation of the sending countries. Drawing on Marx, people are assumed to become victims of migration because of their class position. Migration patterns here are not mainly seen from the individual micro perspective, but from social and spatial structures that provide the necessary conditions for labour migration. An example of this macro level perspective is the historical-structuralist perspective. Within the historical-structuralist approach the context of migration is the global economy, core-periphery relations, and the development of underdevelopment. The perspective is significantly inspired by Marxism but also on dependency theory and world system theory. Migration is according to the historical-structuralist perspective a result of the unequal distribution of the proletariat between labour exporting, low-wage countries and labour importing, high-wage countries. So-called 'development' in poor or underdeveloped societies increases economic and social inequalities, but also awareness of the inequalities. Migration is hence encouraged by development. The historical-structuralist perspective analyses the global market and national and international economic or political policies and their relation to local population. The focus is therefore not the individual migrant *per se* (Wood 1982).

2.3.2 The Structuration Perspective

Goss and Lindquist (1995) employ Giddens' theory of structuration as a tool to develop a more coherent approach to labour migration theory. Many theorists assume that a coherent approach to labour migration would entail an integration of the functionalist and structuralist perspective, and have called for an integrated approach that connects different levels of social organization. Goss and Lindquist claim that even the different previous attempts of integrating the approaches have principally failed because of the inability to coherently articulate structure and agency.

According to Goss and Lindquist, Giddens proposes to transcend the classic 'structure-agency' problem of the social sciences with the concept of a 'duality of structure' through which structures are perceived as rules and resources which both enable and constrain the actions of human agents as they are drawn upon in their everyday lives: "Our goal is to demonstrate the feasibility of linking institutions with aggregate flows of migrants and

individual decisionmaking" (Goss and Lindquist 1995: 336).

Social practices are reinforced and integrated in institutions because individuals regularly and repeatedly invoke rules and exploit resources in everyday social action and interaction. When individuals act or interact they draw upon the institutional modalities and as a result reproduce the structures of society. Giddens' structuration model of human agents implies that individuals are knowledgeable relatively to the constraints and opportunities presented by social structures. The knowledge of the individuals can be divided into three levels of consciousness. Firstly, on the unconscious level motivations cannot be articulated, secondly, on the level of practical consciousness knowledge of personal motivations and institutional rules/resources can be exploited to provide a rationale for action but not be verbalized, and thirdly, on the level of discursive consciousness knowledge can be employed and communicated in verbal explanation. The individual can discursively account for and justify action because of reflexive monitoring or habitual examination of action and motivation. However, this account is limited because of the involvement of unconscious motivations and because most knowledge exists at the practical level. Therefore, social knowledge is always limited and an individual's actions are normally influenced by the actions of other individuals. I will argue that the view of international labour migrants as knowledgeable agents accounts well with Kettunen's description of reflexive employees. Like the knowledge of migrants, the capacity for reflexivity is both structuring other social structures as well as being constrained by them.

Social action is a complex product composed of the unacknowledged conditions of action and the unintended consequences of actions. Goss and Lindquist argue that the basis of Giddens' non-functionalist conception of social reproduction, is the 'mix' of unconscious with reflexive, goal-oriented action, and the unacknowledged and unintentional dimensions of all action.

The guidelines provided by Giddens as to the further application of the structuration theory in empirical research are according to Goss and Lindquist rather limited. From a sketch based on Giddens theory of structuration, they have tried to develop an alternative approach to international labour migration. Goss and Lindquist focus on migrant networks, claiming that what has previously been identified as migrant networks should rather:

[...] be conceived as migrant institutions that articulate, in a nonfunctionalist way, the individual migrant and the global economy, 'stretching' social relations across time and space to bring together the potential migrant and the overseas employer (Goss and Lindquist 1995: 335).

Based on this, potential migrants can be seen as knowledgeable agents who:

[...] employ their understanding of the rules of interaction and exploit their access to allocative and authoritative resources within the migrant institution in order to obtain overseas employment (Goss and Lindquist 1995: 335).

In Goss and Linquist's approach, international labour migration is tightly interconnected with processes of globalization. They claim that the increased scale and diversity of international labour migration both is caused by and reflect globalization:

International labour migration can thus be conceived as a process whereby individuals transcend the limits to presence-availability and negotiate their way across boundaries between locales in order to establish presence and control over resources in a distant place (Goss and Lindquist: 335).

Defying both functionalist and structuralist perspectives on the relation between globalization and labour migration, Goss and Lindquist suggest international and national institutions as the core of this relation. The complexity of international and national institutions enables them to transcend the boundaries of states and locales and to link employers in the developed or rapidly developing economies with more peripheral and less developed economies. One of Goss and Lindquist's main points is that there is an ongoing institutionalization of migration:

An international migrant institution is a relatively permanent feature of social life that results from the regularization of social interaction for the purposes of overseas employment and which in turn regulates interaction and structures access to overseas employment through the operation of institutional rules and resources (Goss and Lindquist 1995: 336).

Accordingly, this model allows that the phenomenon of international labour migration may be analysed as a complex combination of individual actions and social structures. I will approach international labour migration not only in the context of market relations but also in the context of other social relations. The structuration perspective on international labour migration in which migrant networks are perceived as institutions, allows that the actions of migrants are perceived as implicated in the international labour migration phenomenon.

2.4 Summary

The choice of theories in this chapter is not based on an attempt to develop a fully coherent or intertwined theoretical approach. However, I will emphasise that the choice of theories stems from the aim of developing a holistic, sociological approach to international labour migration. Further, I will point out some of the eminent compatible aspects of the different theories that I have presented. The first aspect is the regulationist view of capitalism as a complex economic and social phenomenon. This perspective's emphasis on labour as a fictitious commodity,

leads on to Kettunen's elaboration on human resources in globalized capitalism in which the lifeworld of reflexive workers extends that of merely professional concerns. Finally, the structuration perspective on international labour migration accords with the regulationist approach on capitalism and especially its focus on institutions. The structuration perspective on international labour migrants as 'knowledgeable agents' is also compatible with the understanding of employees in globalized capitalism as reflexive human resources. These interconnected aspects can be seen as the main theoretical keys to the further empirical analysis.

3. Methodology

The starting point for reflecting on methodology is that all social phenomena are complex phenomena. The issue of method is how to capture the complexity of the phenomena of research and how to make sense of it in a sound way (Corbin and Strauss 1990). In this chapter, I will elaborate the methodological basis and process of the thesis.

3.1 The Choice of Data

Scientific research needs to be grounded in data. The choice of data in research should be based on their suitability to illuminate the object of research. The data that I have employed in the analysis are predominantly qualitative. In contrast to more quantitative data, that means that the data in this research are not numerical or categorised in quantitative measurements. The choice of data can also be seen as a question of generalization, reflecting the ambition that data and data analysis should be relevant beyond the specific empirical context in which data are collected. This can be achieved by making links between the data collected, and a wider, relevant empirical context, in such a way that the data and the analysis of data can be used to say something positive about this broader context. But it may also be achieved by connecting the analysis of data to a more general, analytical framework, in such a way that the analysis may contribute to the elaboration of (parts of) that framework (Kvale 2001, Flick 1999, Holter and Kalleberg (ed.) [1982] 1996, Corbin and Strauss 1990), and this is how generalization is conceived of here. More specifically the analysis may contribute to our understanding of the relationship between the competitive state, the knowledge-based economy, and immigration policy. In this section, I will therefore substantiate the empirical relevance of the respective documents of the Norwegian government/ministries and the EU Commission/Council, and the use of interviews with Indian IT-workers, by relating them to the broader, analytical framework I have chosen.

3.1.1 The State and Governmental Documents

The competitiveness strategies of the Norwegian government and the EU Commission are seen as empirically relevant because they are part of the continuous political and institutional

reforms established at the national level of European countries as a response to international and global transformations during the last three decades. These reforms have generally been associated with 'New Public Management' (NPM) (Larbi 1999). NPM seeks to make the public sector more efficient and profitable by enhancing its management. NPM can be seen as management ideology or thought strongly inspired by the private sector. Accordingly, NPM emphasizes the need for market based public services rather than public administration. This is to be performed through de-centralization of management, less bureaucracy and through exposing the public sector to market based competition (Christensen og Læg Reid 2001, Larbi 1999). The transformations of the knowledge-based economy are in this thesis seen as the driving force of these reforms (Christensen and Læg Reid 2002, Jessop 2002). It is my aim to show that immigration is one of the policy areas that are significantly related to and affected by such reforms. Of course, whether the EU Council and Commission directly represent the governments of the EU member states may be questioned. For the purposes of this thesis and as long as there has not been implemented a supra-national EU constitution I choose not to take this issue into concern. Again, it shall be noted that the issues of this thesis are more focused on the discursive relevance for research on these documents (www.europa.eu.int/growthandjobs, Christensen and Læg Reid 2002, Neumann 2001). I will therefore concentrate the document analysis of the competitiveness strategies on the discourse on the concept of 'competitiveness' rather than NPM reforms as such.

3.1.2 Indian IT-workers

Indian IT-professionals may represent empirically interesting linkages between international labour migration, immigration policies and the knowledge-based economy. As I will elaborate underneath, the significant Indian knowledge-revolution has entailed that Indian IT-professionals have become one of the most sought after categories of workers in the world. This has also led to adjustments of Western European labour immigration policies (Khadria 2001, Xiang 2001). Before the recession in 2001 in the IT-market, there was also much focus on retaining Indian IT-personnel in the Norwegian IT-industry (www.digi.no 21.03.2001).⁷

⁷ While only 15 came in 2001, around 50 Indians came to Norway on a specialist provision each year from 2001 to 2003. In 2004 the number had decreased to 35 (www.udi.no). I do not have any statistics on how many of these specialists were IT-workers. From mid 2001 there was a severe global recession in the IT-market, and the demand for personnel in the Norwegian IT-industry was largely cut off. There has been a gradual upsurge in the market from 2002 (WISTA 2004, www.computerworld.no 11.2 2003).

The development of the IT-industry can be divided into three stages – hardware before the 1970s, software from the 1970s to the mid-1990s and internet/e-commerce technologies from the mid 1990s. From the late 1990s the migration of IT professionals became a global issue. This issue was connected to later stages of the IT-industry, in which software became widely applied in various businesses and the internet was commercialized. During this period, the IT industry became a major global sector of capital. The implementation of the new ICT technology made it possible and practical for businesses to increasingly ‘de-territorialize’ production and management. Hence, because the use of ICT now significantly enhanced the development of global capital flows and markets, a huge demand for IT professionals arose in many of the developed countries in the world. Indian IT professionals have especially been in focus (Xiang 2001).

The more eminent signals that India was emerging as a major actor in the knowledge-based economy became evident in the international media from the late 1990s. The stories in the media suggested that Western countries were increasingly losing competitiveness on highly skilled jobs in favour of India. These jobs were predominantly related to IT and science-based firms. Since year 2000, more than 100 high-tech companies within the fields of IT and science have established themselves in India. Since the early 1990s, when the country was literally ‘bankrupt’, the impact of IT on the Indian economy has been tremendous. In 1999, the IT industry made up 1.3 % of India’s GDP. In 2004, it had increased to 3 %. The beginning of the Indian knowledge-‘revolution’ can be traced back to the early 1960s. The development of an indigenous Indian software sector is very much part of a process in which the Indian state and local companies have been significantly involved. One of the major contributions of the Indian government is the establishment of a huge number of educational institutions within IT. India has increasingly internationalized its economy and is competing with China to become the leading Asian country in the global economy (Chandrasekhar 2001, Lakha 1994, www.newscientist.com 19.02. 2005, www.innovasjon Norge.no).

3.2 Collecting the Data

3.2.1 Documents

The documents that I have employed have predominantly been published on the official websites of the Norwegian government and ministries and the EU Commission

(www.odin.dep.no, www.europa.eu.int/growthandjobs). These websites include a number of documents that may have been relevant for the analysis. For practical reasons, I have only used some of these documents. I have not picked these documents according to strict criteria of selection. Rather, the selection of documents can be seen as part of the process of research and analysis. I have searched for documents in the process of finding core aspects and keys related to the topics of the thesis. However, as the issues of the thesis have evolved and become more specific, I have increasingly sought for documents that could illuminate official perspectives on national competitiveness and innovation. Further, I have searched for documents that could establish a link between national competitiveness and innovation and immigration.

Throughout the process of document analysis, it has been necessary to keep updated on political changes connected to the competitiveness strategies that would need to be taken into consideration in the analysis. During the work on the thesis I have therefore tried to be aware of potential changes in the empirical context of the documents that I have employed.

3.2.2 Interviews

Getting access to respondents and informants:

As respondents for the interviews, I wanted Indian IT-professionals who were working in Norway on a relatively short term, and who had come to Norway on a specialist basis.⁸

In order to get hold of respondents, I contacted a Norwegian company that recruited IT-personnel from India to Norway. Through this company, I was connected with an Indian specialist who was working in Norway. This specialist can be seen as the door-opener to the respondents. He contacted and gave a name- and e-mail list of other Indian IT-workers that he knew of in Norway. They all lived in the Oslo region. Out of these, 15 persons seemed to be relevant according to my criteria. I contacted these via e-mail in which I presented my project and asked them to be respondents.

In the inquiry, I only required the potential respondents to be “Indian IT- professionals working in Norway” (see Appendix 1). This rather open inquiry was intentional, because I hoped it would encourage more people to volunteer, than if I set stricter criteria from the start. I figured that it would be better if I got too many potential respondents and would have to

⁸ I have categorised these respondents as ‘international knowledge-migrants’ during the process of analysis, after the interviews had been performed.

reject some of them, than too few. When people contacted me and wanted to join the project, I also required that they would have to have come to Norway on a specialist basis, and that they needed to be working with IT in Norway at the time when I would do the interviews. Based on these inquiries and according to my requirements, I got 7 positive answers. Later on, during the period of interviewing, one more of the persons from the inquiry list contacted me and joined as an interview source. Through the interviews I was also connected with one female interview source.

It turned out that not all of those who wanted to be interviewed were strictly IT-professionals in terms of having a formal education within IT. However, they were all occupied within IT in some way or another, and all but one of them had obtained work permit in Norway on a specialist basis. Hence, I decided that it was sensible to accept all of them as interview sources. According to whether they were IT-professional or 'just' had an occupation within IT, they can be referred to as either 'respondents' or informants'. The persons whom I term 'respondents' are those that fit directly to my criteria of selection. These respondents are people who can be categorized according to my definition of 'international knowledge migrants'. 'Respondents' can be perceived as actors who are directly involved in the phenomenon of research. Those that I term 'informants' are the persons who do not fit directly into the category of international knowledge migrants. 'Informants' can be seen as persons who are not directly involved in the phenomenon but still have a position in the empirical context which can give valuable information in terms of the phenomenon of research (Thagaard [1998] 2002). I finally ended up with 6 respondents and 3 informants. Because they are not all professionals, I refer to the respondents and informants in general as 'IT workers'.

Selection criteria:

As we see here, the degree of selection of respondents and informants was flexible. First, it depended on how many persons my contact person would come up with. Then, it depended on how many of these that would contact me. After I had started doing interviews, I got one more informant through tips from a respondent. The selection process can thus be seen as following the 'snowball-effect' (Repstad [1987] 1998). I wanted primarily specialists, because I did not want 'regular' immigrants, but people who had come to Norway in the context of their IT-profession. Another point was that I wanted 'fresh' impressions of Norway from people who had not lived in Norway for a very long time. Further, the objective to avoid 'regular' immigrants was also motivated by the fact that specialists are not very much in focus, neither

in the general public debate on immigration, nor in immigration research in Norway (Tjelmeland 2002). I hence wanted to be able to present a relatively different empirical angle.

None of the respondents are women. This can be seen as a reflection of international migration of IT-workers as a phenomenon. Many of the characteristics of working life within the international IT industry – like long working hours and frequent travelling – are difficult to combine with the primarily female responsibilities of reproduction and family care (Devi 2001). There were a few women of those that I asked to be interviewed, but none of them responded. Hence, during the first interviews I asked if the respondents/informants knew of any female Indian IT-professional in Norway. This way, I got in contact with one Indian woman who was working within the Norwegian IT-industry. However, she was not an IT-professional and did not come to Norway on a specialist basis. Because of that, I will not categorize her as a respondent. Nevertheless, I see it is an objective *per se* to aspire to enhance the complexity of the data-material also according to gender. Further, I consider this woman as a significant informant because of her position as an Indian in the Norwegian IT-industry. However, both practically from the performance of the interview and analytically, I have learned that in this project the division between data from respondents and data from informants is artificial. I did interviews with the informants in the same way and according to the same questions that I did with the respondents. And, during parts of the interview with the respondents, they also came up with more general or external information which could be seen as ‘informant’ data. Hence, I will hereafter refer to all of the persons that I have interviewed as respondents. This is also done for the sake of anonymity of the interview sources.

Coding and protection of the respondents’ identity:

I have made the respondents anonymous by categorizing them as either on a short-term or a long-term in Norway. Those that have stayed in Norway for one year or less, have been categorized as ‘short-term’. I have coded ‘short-term’ as ‘A’. There were two short-term workers. Hence, these are coded as A-1 and A-2. The other respondents were hence on a longer term in Norway. ‘Long-term’ is coded as ‘B’. The seven long-term workers are hence coded as ‘B-1’, ‘B-2’, ‘B-3’ and so forth. I have coded myself as an interviewer as ‘Q’.

The categorization is very rough, because I want to protect the anonymity of the respondents as much as possible. Because there are so few respondents, I do not want to categorize them according to too many and specific factors. However, I will present some general information on the respondents. The categorization of short-term and long-term could

be issued, since none of the respondents had stayed in Norway for more than 6 years (Mahroum 2000). However, I have made these categories according to the assumption that it will take about one year to become relatively familiar with a working and living in Norway. Hence, I want to indicate that the respondents may have different perceptions and experiences from living and working in Norway based on whether they have lived in Norway for one year or not. Six of the respondents were employed in a Norwegian company. The other three respondents were employed in Indian companies. All of the respondents had education on a bachelor, master or Ph. D. level, but this was not necessarily in IT. Three of them had their main education within other fields, but had gained considerable experience or taken secondary education within IT. The six others were educated directly within software. Two of the respondents had obtained permanent settlement permission in Norway. The respondents were between 25 and 40 years old – most of them were in their 30s. All but one of them were married, and five of them had children.

The interview guide:

When I started the project, I had some key issues of research but they were in general rather provisional. Further, I had limited knowledge in the areas that I was to research. For example, I was not familiar with the IT-industry. Hence, it can be claimed that this phase of research was rather exploring. According to this, it was appropriate to use semi-structured interviews. These would allow me to keep some kind of thematic direction in the interviews while at the same time they allowed me to incorporate new empirical aspects. The semi-structured interview was also based on my conviction of a more balanced relation between the researcher and the respondent. Through a semi-structured interview, I figured that the empirical data would be less ‘dictated’ by me as a researcher, and more influenced by the respondents. Before the first respondent interview, I had a meeting with my door-opener who had set me in contact with the respondents. I talked with him as a preparation before the interviews to get a bit more insight in the research area before the interviews started. The interview guide was shaped according to this conversation.

The interview guide was based on three sections (see Appendix 2): personalia, profession and work, and identity. The interview was hence based on a certain dynamic. It started out with rather formal questions, which should not be too controversial, private or complicated to answer. As the ‘ice’ between me and the respondent had started to break, I went on to working life issues, which would demand a bit more reflections from the respondent, but would generally not be of the private kind. After this section, it is likely that

the respondent would feel more ‘familiar’ with me and free to speak about relatively more personal issues (Kvale [1997] 2001).

Performing the interviews:

When I made closer appointments in front of the interviews, I asked the respondents where they preferred to do the interviews. I had figured that it would be best to do the interviews either where the respondent was working or at a café. Some of the first interviews were done in a café/restaurant. However, I soon experienced that this could be rather noisy and disturbing surroundings, so in preparing the next appointments I asked if we could do them at an office where the person was working. Hence about half of the interviews were done in café/restaurants and half in the office. One interview was done in the respondent’s home. I did all the interviews during July 2002 and February 2003. Most of them were done before November 2002.

The interviews were taped, so that I would avoid having to take notes and could concentrate fully on the conversation. Having interviews taped is also practical for getting more precise quotes and the tape is available for repeated listening after the interview has been recorded. When I made the interview appointments I asked if I could tape the interview, and under the very interview I also repeated this question before I started the recording. None of the respondents rejected the interview being taped. The interview situation lasted from about half an hour to three hours.

During the very interview, I tried to turn it into more of a conversation. One reason for this was that I thought that a more ‘conversation’-like setting would make both me and the respondents feel more relaxed, and therefore make them speak more openly. As I began to learn the interview guide by heart, the aims of a conversation-like setting became easier to achieve. After I had done the three first interviews, I made a few changes to the interview guide, but I predominantly kept to the original script. However, I also talked to the respondents and asked about things that were not integrated in the interview guide. In the beginning, I especially asked them about IT and the IT-industry. Since the research had an explorative profile, I hoped that a more conversation-like setting might accelerate new issues that I had not caught in the interview guide. This also showed to be the actual interview scenario. Several things that have become relevant in the analysis are issues that the respondents came up with when I ‘allowed’ them to speak freely beyond what they were strictly questioned about.

A more conversational approach also became necessary because several of the interview questions turned out to be too theoretical and literary shaped to be directly transferred to an oral setting. Especially the application of the term ‘identity’ in the interview guide should be seen as more relevant for the researcher than the respondent. In other words, I had not fully considered the distinction between research questions on the one hand, and interview questions on the other (Kvale [1997] 2001). This recognition implied that while I tried to broadly follow the interview guide, I would also have to reformulate some of the questions during the very interview situation.⁹

The problems of communication during the interview were also related to language. None of the respondent knew Norwegian language sufficiently to do the interview in Norwegian. Hence, all the interviews were done in English. English is an official language in India, but it was not the mother tongue of any of the respondents and neither for me. The use of English during the interviews generally worked well. However, it shall not be understated that there was an aspect of language difficulties which scope would vary from interview to interview. These were partly compensated for, by both me and the respondents reformulating and asking things over again. However, because of the social dynamics that often will be implicit in such interview settings and the time available during the interview, there often was a prevalent aspect of lacking communication.

After the interviews were taped, I began to transcript them. Transcription of interviews involves a degree of manipulation of the data material which is relevant in terms of its reliability. Obviously, all the visual and social aspects of the very interview situation cannot be taped. Accordingly, a transcription is a literal construction of oral communication (Kvale [1997] 2001). In that regard, I think the problems with language should be emphasised. The language problems were repeated during the transcription of the interviews. I often faced semantic problems when trying to transcript what the respondents were saying.

This means that I did not get the precise meaning of a word or of sentences. Even if I have missed out on a word from time to time I have predominantly been able to understand the general contents of the interviews. Hence, I do not think that this problem severely influences the general validity of the thesis. In the analysis of this thesis, I have marked single words that I have not been able to catch with ‘[?]’.

⁹ For example I often experienced that the respondent did not understand what I meant when I asked the question under the ‘identity’ section: “Do you have something you feel especially connected to/dependant on (person, place, religion, interests, principles), in the way that it influences the choices you make in life?”.

The respondent quotes that I have used in the thesis have also been transformed into relatively standardized English. This is partly because of the semantic concerns for the reader and also in order to preserve the anonymity of the respondents. In the transcription I have tried to avoid manipulating the interviews more than necessary. However, I have focused on what the respondents have expressed in actual words. Hence, I have let out other aspects of oral communication like laughter, sighing etc. This is because I have not wanted to go too far into psychological factors.¹⁰

3.3 Analysis of the Data

‘Analysis’ means a way of interpreting and systemizing data. Shortly, the analysis is performed through dividing the data material into smaller fractions and then linking them together according to some sort of analytical framework. However, there is still a number of different ways to perform an analysis. A prevalent issue of analysis is the relation between the use of empirical data and theory. The question is how the respective empirical and theoretical aspects are to structure the analysis. Shall the analysis be grounded in the empirical or in theory? For the purposes of this thesis, it has been my aim that the empirical data should be the predominant guide of the analytical process. This objective implies that I have tried to adjust theory according to empirical findings, rather than the other way around. However, I do not perceive the empirical and the theoretical as neatly separated, but rather reciprocal aspects of the analysis and of research in general. Often, these aspects cannot be clearly separated from each other. A researcher may not be able to make empirical observations without the influence of theoretical perceptions and vice versa. Nevertheless, the analysis of this thesis has been generated through an ongoing oscillation between the empirical and theoretical perspectives (Andersen 1997, Kvale [1997] 2001, Corbin and Strauss 1990).

Because of the provisional starting point of my project, the analysis posed severe challenges. The core of the analytical problems was that I was uncertain of which phenomenon I actually was researching. Accordingly, it was difficult to construct a basic analytical framework. In other words, I did not exactly know *what* to look for in the analysis (Andersen 1997, Holter and Kalleberg (eds.) [1982] 1996).

When I started the project, I knew that I wanted to do research on a group of immigrants which was not too much in focus. Hopefully, such research would contribute to

¹⁰ For the sake of the reader, I have also let out interruptions between words and sentences and also spoken interjections like “eh” or “uh” etc.

bring up a bit different perspectives on the immigration scenario in Norway. In that regard, Indian IT-professionals in Norway caught my attention. At the time being there was quite a lot of media focus on the need to get Indian IT-professionals to Norway (www.digi.no 21.03.2001). I was curious to know more about why these Indians had ‘ended up’ in a relatively unknown country like Norway and what they thought about working and living in Norway. Hence, the interviews with the Indian IT-workers became my first source of data.

I had initially thought that my project would ‘only’ deal with labour immigration and Norwegian immigration policies. However, I experienced that compelling new issues were generated already from the first stage of analysis. These issues were very much generated by the respondents themselves. Many of them had asked me questions about the economic and political system in Norway that I could simply not answer. They wanted to know about things like the Norwegian tax system, why the Norwegian government did not simplify the visa regulations, why there were so few specialists in Norway, why Norway did not focus more on IT, etc. Further, I became increasingly aware that many of them were unsatisfied with their social situation in Norway, and that many of them connected this to their ethnicity. When I studied the interviews, I also became aware that the term ‘competition’ was often mentioned in various ways. As I tried to figure whether there was a potential link between the issues that the respondents had brought up, I began to realize that the potential scope of research was much larger than I had imagined.

I first tried to find some framework of analysis through immigration theory. However, I gradually got the perception that most immigration theory could not be used as general framework to systemize the data material. Further, I also realized that since these respondents were mostly specialists, the general Norwegian immigration policies were not directly relevant to them. I hence became interested in what Norwegian governments in general were doing in order to attract specialists. This is how the document data came into being. As I searched through the Norwegian government and ministries’ web-site (www.odin.dep.no) for more information on policies towards specialists, I became aware of the ‘Lisbon Strategy’ and later ‘From Idea to Value’. Here, I noticed the frequency of the terms ‘competitiveness’ and ‘knowledge-based’ in these documents. As I began to search for theory on competition and competitiveness, an analytical framework gradually emerged. This framework was based on the links between competitiveness, labour immigration/immigration policies and the knowledge-based economy. These links were enhanced as I discovered more and more economic and sociological theories that could support them. Then, I again tried to substantiate and scrutinize these links through the data material. Throughout the analysis, this cycle of the

empirical and the theoretical has been continuously repeated. The main issues of this thesis have been developed through a creative process in which analytical progress has been accelerated by the very lack of an analytical framework.

3.4 Validity

The issues of validity can be related to the whole process of research. Validity is here seen as various aspects of the soundness and integrity of the research. The issue of validity concerns whether the project actually researches the object/issue that it aims to research. This question hence implies the extent as to which the researcher performs what he/she thinks or claims to be doing. Here, I will constrict the issue of validity to the coherence between empirical and theoretical aspects of the analysis (Kvale 2001, Flick 1999). I aim at coherence in the way that the connection between the empirical and theoretical has to be accounted for according to a relatively consistent logic.

The view that the competitiveness strategies of EU and the Norwegian government are applicable to illuminate the issues of this thesis is presupposed by the perspective that “moral values and legal procedures are integrally connected in the systems of surveillance and social control that are responsible for official record-keeping” (Scott 1990: 61). I hence assume that the present institutional ideology/discourse of the state will be reflected in its official documents. That way, the methodological starting point is compatible with the regulationist approach to institutions as permeated by and connected to the general historical and structural context. These assumptions about the state as an institution also legitimize the use of these documents in the analysis of Norwegian immigration policies. This methodological acknowledgement calls for a critical and reflexive approach to these documents. They should not be seen as ‘neutral’ publications. On the other hand, it legitimizes that these documents are fit to explore the broader issues of the state concerned by this thesis (Jessop 2002, Kettunen 1998, Neumann 2001, Scott 1990).

The quotes from the respondents make out the bulk of the data in the analysis. According to the structuration perspective, the international labour migrants as an institution can be seen as a link between the global and local, the institutional and individual. I therefore insert the respondents as ‘international knowledge-migrants’, as a link between the knowledge-based economy and the national, and between the Norwegian state’s immigration policies and the individual migrant. It may be issued whether these respondents should be categorized as ‘migrants’ since many of them are short-time workers and not even included in

the official migration statistics (Kommunal- og regional departementet 1999, www.ssb.no). However, in accordance with the issues of this thesis, I aim to substantiate their relation and relevance to the general Norwegian immigration policies by terming them ‘migrants’. In chapter 6, which is the main chapter of the analysis of Norwegian immigration policies, I have only used empirical quotes from the respondents. I will account for this based on the claim of the significant position of international knowledge-migrants in this thesis. This emphasis on the relevance of individual perspectives in analysis of immigration policies is also based on the lack of focus on this type of migrants in general migration research (Findlay 1995, Tjomsland 2002).

4. The Competitiveness Strategies of EU and Norway

The starting point of this chapter is the Norwegian state's engagement as a competition state in the knowledge-based economy. The intention of the chapter is to relate the Norwegian competitiveness policies to immigration policies. I will perform this by comparing the Norwegian Government's strategy 'From Idea to Value' with EU's 'Lisbon Strategy'. The comparison will be based on the Schumpeterian concept of competitiveness.

4.1 The Lisbon Strategy

During the last decades European birth rates have been continuously falling while life expectancies are rising. Working together, these two demographic forces cause a severe result: the general European population is ageing. EU expects that by year 2050 the average ratio of persons in retirement will be almost equal to the working-age population in Europe. Further, the EU economy as a whole is considered to be less dynamic than other comparable economies. Since the 1990s, Europe's economic productivity growth has been declining, especially compared to the US' more innovation-driven economy and increasingly compared to many Asian economies (ERT 2003, Report from the High Level Group 2004, Yssen 2004):

Throughout the 1990s the US raced ahead with its domination of new areas of technology, greater acceptance of market forces. Closer link between higher education and business, its ability to retain the highest calibre researchers, its relatively youthful population and its active policy of immigration of the best and brightest (ERT 2003: 3).

According to EU documents, the decline of the European productivity rates is largely connected to a lower investment per employee and to a decrease in the rate of technological progress. There has been an increase in the employment rate within EU, but too many jobs are low-productivity jobs. Low productivity growth is associated with the EU member states' insufficient priorities in knowledge-intensive sectors. The low productivity growth within EU is connected to lacking investment in R & D and education, low capability to commercialize scientific research and relatively low performance in ICT industries and services: "The evidence is overwhelming that the higher research and development expenditure, the higher

subsequent productivity growth” (Report from the High Level Group 2004: 19). In the EU it is feared that if this economic situation prevails, the general level of welfare in Europe will be difficult to maintain. Based on this scenario, the Lisbon Strategy was launched on an EU summit in Lisbon in March 2000 (Report from the High Level Group 2004):

The Lisbon European Council rightly recognised that Europe’s future economic development would depend on its ability to create and grow high-value, innovative and research-based sectors capable of competing with the best in the world (Report from the High Level Group 2004: 19).

Shortly, the Lisbon Strategy can be seen as a comprehensive framework established to achieve one principal and strategic aim within the year 2010. The main objective was that EU should become (Report from the High Level Group 2004, Yssen 2004):

[...] the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world, capable of sustainable economic growth with more and better jobs and greater social cohesion for all (COM (2000) 567 final: 4)

The Commission is here anticipating that being in the lead in terms of competitiveness and a knowledge-based economy are the new preconditions for sustaining the more traditional main priorities of Western European policies like having a stable economy, high labour market participation and a high level of social integration. Accordingly, the economy of EU member states is to be reformed in compliance with the demands of economic globalization and the knowledge-based economy (Yssen 2004, ERT 2003):

In a global economy, Europe has no option but radically to improve its knowledge economy and underlying economic performance if it is to respond to the challenges of Asia and the US (Report from the High Level Group 2004: 12).

The Lisbon Strategy is based on the perception that both increased cooperation and competition between the EEA/EU member states will enhance the general economic competitiveness of EEA/EU as an economic region. This implies that the Lisbon Strategy is both an external and internal competitiveness strategy. It is external, because its main object of competition is outside the EU/EEA area, and mainly the US. On the other hand, the strategy is internal because its external objectives are to be achieved through increasing the internal competition (COM (2003) 336 final, COM (2003) 704 final). The Lisbon Strategy can be seen as an essentially economic reform because it is first of all aimed at the European economy, which transition to a knowledge-based economy is regarded as the only option. However, the next quote, claiming that the transformations must be consistent with the “values and concepts of society” indicates something more:

The European Union is confronted with a quantum shift resulting from globalisation and the challenges of a new knowledge-driven economy. These changes are affecting every aspect of people's lives and require a radical transformation of the European economy. The Union must shape these changes in a manner consistent with its values and concepts of society and also with a view to the forthcoming enlargement (Lisbon European Council 2000)

Traditionally, most of the modern Western European states have been structured according to a complex compromise between capitalistic and social concerns. In much of European politics, these concerns have become interconnected and presupposed by each other through the development of the welfare state (Barth and Moene et. al (eds.) 2003, Esping-Andersen 2000, Jessop 2002). Therefore, the juxtaposition of economic and social concerns in the main objective of the Lisbon strategy can be seen as a continuation of traditional European politics. It seems likely that this is part of the reference of the EU Commission when it is stated that the reforms have to be "consistent with the values of the Union". This is also substantiated by the claim that:

The Lisbon strategy is not an attempt to become a copy-cat of the US – far from it. Lisbon is about achieving Europe's vision of what it wants to be and what it wants to keep in the light of increasing global competition, an ageing population and the enlargement (Report from the High Level Group 2004: 12).

When the EU is distancing the Lisbon Strategy from the US, it is reasonable that this is partly because the US economy represents a different social model than Europe (Hall and Soskice (ed.) 2001). This quote seems to suggest that the Lisbon Strategy attempts to transform the EU member states into the knowledge-based economy not only without giving up the comprehensive social model of Europe, but as a *the* way to preserve it (Lisbon European Council 2000).

Enhanced innovation is seen by the EU Commission as one of the preconditions for achieving the main objective of the Lisbon Strategy (COM (2000) 567).

Innovation must permeate our economy and be embraced by society for the Lisbon goal to be achieved: Innovation is essential for European enterprises to be competitive, and is therefore a major component of enterprise policy, as well as one of the main objectives of research policy (COM (2000) 567 final: 4).

In this quote, the EU Commission has prospects in terms of making innovation into a significant social structure of the member states. This is seen as a basic condition in order to fulfil the Lisbon objective. This extensive, innovation-based approach to competitiveness is largely in accordance with the Schumpeterian competitiveness approach. The Lisbon Strategy may therefore not only be seen as an innovation strategy, but a program for social transformation of society. The perception of the Lisbon Strategy as being aimed at broader

social transformation is substantiated by looking at the various policy areas that are incorporated in the Lisbon Strategy. Initially, the programme of the Lisbon Strategy was to build knowledge infrastructures, enhance innovation and economic reform, and modernise social welfare and education systems (Lisbon European Council 2000). Later on environmental issues were added to the programme (Nærings- og handelsdepartementet 2004).

A significant aspect of the Lisbon Strategy is the strategic coordination of the implemented policy areas. The Council claims that it is necessary to "ensure more coherent strategic direction and effective monitoring of progress" (Lisbon European Council 2000). This is to be achieved through what the EU Council terms "a new open method of coordination" (Lisbon European Council 2000). The performance of the member states on the various areas of the strategy are to be compared through so-called structural indicators. The present 5 main categories of structural indicators are employment, innovation and research, economic reform, social cohesion and environment, as well as the general economic background (EU Commission 2004). One of these policy areas, 'employment', also includes immigration concerns. Following, I will analyse and discuss how immigration has been integrated in the Lisbon Strategy.

4.1.1 The Lisbon Strategy and Immigration

In a white paper from 2000, which is not part of the Lisbon Strategy, the EU Commission argues that immigration is taking on a new profile due to the globalisation of the economy, the skill shortages and the demographic changes and projections in the EU. On this background, the Commission calls for a 'fresh' approach to immigration in the EU. The Commission notes that the EU member states' immigration policy the last 30 years has been based on the premise that Europe does not need economic immigration (COM (2000)757 final):

There is a growing recognition that, in this new economic and demographic context, the existing "zero" immigration politics which have dominated thinking over the past 30 years are no longer appropriate (COM (2000)757 final: 6).

When the Commission refers to the "thinking over the past 30 years", it probably refers to the immigration scenario that initiated the European ban on labour migration in the mid- 1970s. The so-called immigration stop meant that humanitarian based immigration became the only legitimate form of immigration from countries outside OECD (Brochmann and Tjelmeland 2003. What the Commission here points to when referring to "this new economic and

demographic context” is the scenario compatible with what has been described as the new immigration agenda in this thesis. The Commission is concerned about the labour shortages in certain sectors in many European countries. As we have seen, this situation became increasingly prevalent in Europe from the late 1990s. Another interesting remark in this white paper is the notion that:

In particular the Commission proposes to examine how the complex issues related to the admission of economic migrants, which were only touched on briefly in the Tampere Council, should be developed within a Community immigration policy (COM (2000)757 final: 6).

The Tampere Council in 1999 agreed on the development of a common EU immigration and asylum policy. As we see from this quote, economic migration was not especially in focus at Tampere. The council rather sought to establish some key elements in order to handle the general migration flows of EU. Some of the main issues at the council were a common system for asylum seekers and to improve the cooperation with migration-sending countries, especially in terms of the problem of brain-drain (COM (2000) 757). The aim of common EU asylum- and refugee policy is part of the development of a more common policy of EU in general. The period of time when the Commission calls for increased “management of immigration flows” in EU occur is not coincidental. It is related to the preparation of an enlarged EU in 2004, which supposedly would cause increased pressure on EU governance and require more firm and effective common policies. Accordingly, immigration has been included in what can be seen as NPM reforms of EU. NPM inspired reforms have been launched in Western European for a couple of decades. However, according to the EU Commission, it is only during the recent years that immigration and asylum matters have been recognized and perceived as a separate policy area at the EU level. Hence, the aim of a common EU immigration policy is not only the result of the EU states under strain, but also a new political attitude to immigration (COM (2000) 757, CDMG (2000) 11 rev, Larbi 1999).

Since the publishing of this white paper in 2000, immigration *has* become included as a policy area of the Lisbon Strategy. According to the EU Commission, the inclusion of immigration in the Lisbon Strategy can be seen as a continuation of the development towards a common European immigration and asylum policy (Com. (2003) 336 final: 9). Considering its inherent focus on cooperation and coordination, the Lisbon Strategy seems like a reasonable instrument in terms of developing a common immigration policy. However, the new issue in the Lisbon Strategy compared to the Tampere Council, is not internal cooperation on immigration in general, but rather the enhanced external competition on economic and in particular highly skilled labour migrants:

In an overall economic and social context characterised by a number of skill and labour shortages, competition for the highly skilled in a globalised economy and accelerating demographic ageing, immigration is taking on a new profile in the EU (COM (2003) 336 final: 9).

Hence, if we move from the topics at Tampere in 1999 to the communication above from the EU Commission in 2000, we see a gradual enhanced focus on economic migration. Within migration theory 'economic migrants' is often referring to the motivation for migration of the individual immigrant. However, the EU Commission's notion on 'economic migrants' seems to reflect the motivation for encouraging immigration of the EU member states. Therefore, the new profile on immigration in EU means that this motivation is increasingly based on European economic concerns (Fuglerud 2001). The new immigration profile is hence linked to many of the economic and social issues of EU which make out the back cloth of the whole Lisbon Strategy. As a corollary, immigration is employed as a complex instrument in the effort to increase EU's economic growth through innovation based competitiveness:

While immigration should be recognised as a source of cultural and social enrichment, in particular by contributing to entrepreneurship, diversity and innovation, its economic impact on employment and growth is also significant as it increases labour supplies and helps cope with bottlenecks (COM (2003) 336 final: 10).

The perception of immigration as contributing to entrepreneurship and innovation is compatible with the Schumpeterian approach to human resources. Following, it can be argued that immigration is viewed as an extra-economic factor of competitiveness which may enhance EU's economic competitiveness in general. However, this perspective should be seen as only relatively new considering the whole postwar-immigration history in Western Europe. During the 1950s and 1960s foreign workers and immigrants were implemented in the state strategies of economic growth in several European countries like France, Germany and Switzerland. In France and Germany, foreign supplies of labour were used to avoid inflation caused by relatively full employment (Hollifield 1992). This illustrates that immigration as a key to competitiveness is not initiated by knowledge-based economy, but is an aspect of modern capitalism (Cohen 1987, Jessop 2002). Accordingly, what the 'fresh' approach to immigration in the Lisbon Strategy might involve needs to be discussed more thoroughly.

In the previous quote, the economic impact of immigration is seen as a positive factor in terms of the labour market. This is interesting since it is here just referred to 'immigration'. However, the next quote shows that the category of immigrants is not random in the Lisbon Strategy:

The migrants most likely to match demand and supply are those adaptable enough to face changing conditions, in the view of their qualifications, experience and personal abilities. The selection mechanisms must be geared towards these would-be migrants and offer them sufficiently attractive conditions. This is likely to result in increased competition within the Union and between OECD countries. Such a competition calls for co-ordination to secure a level playing field (COM (2003) 336 final: 16).

What we see here, is the conception of immigrant selection of the Lisbon Strategy. However, any implementation of immigration policies will involve a mechanism for selecting immigrants (Brochmann and Tjelmeland 2003). The issue here is therefore not immigrant selection *per se*, but the criteria of immigrant selection. According to the wish for them to be 'adaptable' it seems like the migrants sought for here will need to be reflexive persons. This aim accords with the requirements of human resources in the globalized economy described by Kettunen (1998). However, in this quote the Commission itself also seems to be reflexive in terms of the need for EU to be attractive to these migrants. Hence, it can be claimed that the EU is here signaling an increased aspect of institutional reflexivity on immigration (Kettunen 1998, Jessop 2002).

The EU's so-called new immigration profile can also be considered as a change in the perception of Western Europe's pull factors. The existence and complexity of various 'pull' and 'push' factors is part of the main frameworks of migration theory and research. Push factors are conditions in a country that give incentive to emigration of individuals. The 'pull' factors refer to the specific conditions in a country that attract individual immigrants. Deficiency in labour market supplies has been considered as one of the most significant pull factors (Fuglerud 2001).

Before the labour immigration ban, Western European governments considered the labour market as the major pull factor of Western European countries. The ban on labour immigration was partly based on the fear that Western European countries would function as welfare 'magnets'. This can be seen as the view that immigrants are more attracted by the welfare states of Western European countries than their labour markets (Borjas 1999). This perception was also enhanced as a consequence of the ban because refugees and asylum seekers now became a larger component of the total immigrant stock. Refugees and asylum seekers will generally require more welfare services than many other categories of immigrants. After the ban on labour migration, the pull factors have represented what Western European governments wanted to protect from immigration. In the Lisbon strategy we see that this tendency is about to turn again. There seems to be an increased awareness on that Western European labour markets need to obtain factors which may *attract* immigrants. However, it shall be noted that this perspective is most relevant for the categories of

immigrants that are most likely to create to economic growth. According to the discourse on competitiveness in the knowledge-based economy these immigrants would be the highly skilled immigrants. This type of immigrants are one of the means to sustain welfare, and can therefore be described as welfare ‘magnets’ for the Western European countries. Western European governments, here represented through EU, have begun to draw their attention to these migrants for the sake of the sustaining welfare. However, the ‘pull-factors’ of today’s EU are weak, and hence the capability to attract the right human resources will be difficult (Borjas 1999, Brochmann and Tjelmeland 2003, Fuglereud 2001):

The main challenge will be to attract and recruit migrants suitable for the EU labour force to sustain productivity and economic growth. In the context of increasing skills gaps and mismatches, which require time to overcome, it is becoming recognised that economic migration can play a role in tackling labour market imbalances, provided the qualifications of immigrants are appropriate (COM (2003) 336 final: 15).

This quote illustrates that the significance of the emphasis on economic and highly skilled migration in the Lisbon Strategy is that it is linking immigration to the transition in the discourse on human labour generated by the knowledge-based economy (Gudmundsson 1998, Jessop 2002). This discourse can be argued to have become more evident in the revised version of the strategy:

4.1.2 The Revision of the Lisbon Strategy

Since the launching of the Lisbon Strategy in 2000, there is a rather mixed picture in terms of the progress of the strategy’s objectives. All in all, however, the competitiveness gap between Europe and US on one hand and Asia on the other has continued to increase. In terms of the knowledge-based economy it is stated that “The US threatens to consolidate its leadership” (Report from the High Level Group Nov. 2004: 12). In February 2005, the original version of the Lisbon Strategy was revised and its objectives moderated. The revision is based on the recognition that the initial aggregate objectives of the Union that were to be achieved within 2010 will not be possible to reach (COM (2005) 24, SEC (2005) 622/2). According to the EU Commission: “We are now half-way through the process and the results are not very satisfactory. The implementation of reform in Member States has been quite scarce” (http://europa.eu.int/growthandjobs/index_en.htm [Aug.5. 2005]).

The main elements of the Lisbon Strategy – the maintenance of the European social model and the environment within the frames of the knowledge-based economy – are continued in the revision. However, in the revised Lisbon Strategy there are no longer

prospects for EU to be “the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world”. Rather, there is now to be implemented more realistic objectives and the focus of the strategy has been tightened. The main effort is to be directed mainly on economic productivity and employment (http://europa.eu.int/growthandjobs/index_en.htm). This is signalled in the next quote, by President of the EU Commission Jose Barroso: “Our clear aim is to create more and better jobs in a more dynamic, innovative and attractive Europe. With this strategy I believe we now have the right tools to achieve our goals” (http://europa.eu.int/growthandjobs/index_en.htm [Aug. 5. 2005]).

The implementation of the revised Lisbon Strategy proposes an ‘integrated approach’ to economic and employment policies. It entails re-organization and simplification of the coordination of these policies. However, by re-focusing on economic productivity and employment, the Lisbon Strategy can be argued to be back where it started at the Lisbon Council in 2000. Initially, the intention of Lisbon Strategy was to make EU focus on two policy strands. These were:

- Pursuing economic reform to prepare the knowledge economy
- Strengthening the European social model by investing in people (COM (2000/7): 11).

These two pillars can be claimed to comprise one of the major premises of the Lisbon Strategy – the relation between economic growth and investment in so-called ‘human capital’. The concept of human capital is very broad, and in the case of the Lisbon Strategy, “investing in people” is obviously encompassing the whole spectre of human resources concerned by the European social model. For the purposes of this thesis, I will focus on links between human capital and human labour that are implicated in the Lisbon Strategy. According to a Lisbon Strategy document, human capital “has to do with the knowledge and skills embodied in people and accumulated through schooling, training and experience that are useful in the production of goods, services and further knowledge” (de la Fuente and Ciccone 2000: 9). The coupling between ‘knowledge’ and ‘skills’ in this quote illustrates the discursive transition concerning human labour as the key to economic competitiveness which is being reflected in the Lisbon Strategy. Again, it shall be noted that according to a regulationist perspective, human labour as an aspect of economic competitiveness is not a new trait of contemporary capitalism. Hence, the ‘new’ aspect of the knowledge-based economy is the particular way that human resources are approached to in the present discourse on competitiveness (Jessop 2002).

From the end of the 1950s many economists began to suggest that economic growth is not only a question of quantitative growth and improved allocation of labour and capital.

Instead, the importance of a 'third factor' was increasingly considered. What the 'third factor' actually is was contested, but it was often related to technical progress and education. However, there was a broad consensus that production is increasingly depending on science. Accordingly, the 'skills' of workers within traditional craft and mechanical industries needed to be more rationalized by science. This involved that the "knowledge structure of the skilled trade was to be penetrated by scientific rationality, which was to rearrange the structure of qualification in a radical manner with the aid of educational reforms and rationalization manners" (Gudmundsson 1998: 182). The decreased emphasis on practical training in favour theoretical training during the process of education involved that there was referred to the 'qualifications' of workers rather than their 'skills'. Hence, it can be argued that this discursive change on human labour has involved that 'knowledge' increasingly is being perceived as a separate source to economic growth. Further, knowledge is also viewed to be a more relevant key to the 'third factor' than skills.

The division between skills and knowledge may further be connected to the undergoing transition in the discourse on competitiveness since the 1950s. 'Skills' are required from human labour within the more traditional, manufacturing industries. As we have seen, such industries signify competitiveness based on natural factor endowments. This approach to competitiveness may also be seen as a more quantitative approach to competitiveness. It reflects the idea that competitiveness is based having more of a physically, measurable factor than other competitors. 'Knowledge' is the required of human labour within knowledge-based industries. Knowledge as a key to economic growth is a more qualitative approach, in the way that competitiveness is less based on physically measurable factors and more on immaterial and social factors. The quantitative approach can be seen as most characteristic to the discourse on competitiveness of the Atlantic Fordist regime. The 'third factor' can be seen as more in coherence the more qualitative approach to competitiveness in the knowledge-based economy (Gudmundsson 1998, Jessop 2002). However, in the Lisbon Strategy both of these approaches to competitiveness are relevant in terms of human resources as a matter of economic growth. This shows that there is a relatively reciprocal relation between 'old' and 'new' forms of competitiveness in the knowledge-based economy.

The quantitative part of the issue can be seen as the matter of demography. It concerns increasing economic productivity by utilizing the full potential of the European work force. This is related to improving the EU employment rate both because of the demographic prospects of Europe and the employment gap between Europe and the US. The decline of the European work force is to be reduced through higher labour market participation of the total

working age population. This involves enhancing employment rates for women, immigrants and other groups. Further, the aggregate number of employment years could be increased. This means enhancing the labour market participation of both the younger and the older working age population. The US employment rate is higher than EU on all of these areas. In 1997, the US employment rate was 74 % of the working age population while EU's rate was 60.5% (Employment in Europe 2004).

The 'third factor' in the Lisbon Strategy can be claimed to be 'knowledge'. This part of the issue involves increasing the economic productivity per employee by transmitting a larger part of the work force into more knowledge-intensive production like high-tech manufacturing and ICT. As we have seen, knowledge-intensive industry is assumed to have more impact on economic growth than manufacturing/capital-intensive industry.

The available empirical evidence suggests that the importance of human capital as an input has grown over time as production processes have become increasingly knowledge-intensive (de la Fuente and Ciccone 2000: 10).

Labour productivity growth is assumed to be significantly generated by increased R & D spending, and R & D spending is assumed to have significant spillover effects into other areas of the economy. However, EU has not succeeded in the Lisbon objective to boost spending of R & D to 3 % percent of GDP (Report from the High Level Group 2004):¹¹

One of the most disappointing aspects of the Lisbon strategy to date is that the importance of R & D remains so little understood and that so little progress has been made (Report from the High Level Group 2004: 19).

Increased spending in R & D is crucial in order to attract researchers to Europe:

Europe needs to dramatically improve its attractiveness to researchers, as too many young scientists continue to leave Europe on graduating, notably for the US. Too few of the brightest and the best elsewhere in the world choose to live and work in Europe (Report from the High Level Group 2004: 20).

Accordingly, increasing R & D spending can be seen as a significant way of enhancing the 'pull' factors of Western European labour markets. Western Europe needs to attract the most 'highly skilled' in terms of the most highly *educated* people in the world because they are perceived to represent the most eminent source to knowledge (Becker [1964] (1993). Hence, it can be argued that how Western Europe is to attract highly skilled people like international

¹¹ At the present, the EU R & D spending represents 1.96% of GDP, as against 2.59% for United States, 3.12% for Japan and 2.91% for Korea (http://europa.eu.int/growthandjobs/areas/fiche05_en.htm, [05.08.2005]).

knowledge-migrants has become an issue of how to establish the ‘third factor’. It can further be claimed that the ‘new thinking’ on immigration in the Lisbon Strategy, is compatible with an increased focus on the need for immigrants with the right ‘knowledge’ rather than the right ‘skills’. Hence, I will argue that while the era of post-war non-Western immigration to Western Europe was imposed by the demand for human labour with the right ‘skills’ the ‘new’ immigration agenda reflected in the Lisbon Strategy is characterised by the demand for ‘knowledge’.

4.2 From Idea to Value

As an EEA member, Norway is not directly committed to the Lisbon Strategy. Nevertheless, the Norwegian government has in general subscribed to the Lisbon Strategy. The subscription is related to Norway's EEA agreement. Through the EEA, Norway is especially concerned by the Lisbon Strategy policies in terms of internal market issues (Yssen 2003). However, the Norwegian government has also launched its own national innovation strategy, called ‘From Idea to Value’. ‘From Idea to Value’, was launched in October 2003. The main goal of this action plan is this:

Norway shall be one of the most innovative countries in the world, where resourceful and creative enterprises and people are given opportunities for developing profitable business. Norway shall be in the lead internationally in important areas, in terms of knowledge, technology and wealth creation [My transition] (Nærings- og handelsdepartementet 2003: 5).

There is a competitive spirit in this quote – “Norway shall be one of the most [...]” and “Norway shall be in the lead [...]”. Part of this vision for Norway is in starker contrast to reality than in other similar Western European countries. Many parts of Norwegian industry rely on innovation, technology and knowledge. However, Norway is one of the advanced countries that still relies more on capital-intensive rather than knowledge-intensive industries. It can be maintained that energy production has been the structural basis of modern Norwegian economy. It started out with hydroelectric power in the early 1900s and continued with petroleum in the 1970s (Andersson et al. 2004, Furre 1992).

Through the launching of ‘From Idea to Value’, it is clearly signalled by the Norwegian government that the Norwegian economy is to be transformed according to the international demands of innovation and entrepreneurship:

In Norway, as in many other western countries, innovation and entrepreneurship are priorities to the Government. Since we have traditionally been a primary goods-producing country, with fish, aluminium, and in the last decades oil and gas as main commodities, we have not been forced to be as innovative as many of our trade partners. We now realise that petroleum reserves will not last

forever. And we have an expensive welfare state to maintain. Thus exploring other ways of securing our future has become a matter of necessity (Speech by Helle Hammer, State Secretary, 27 May 2004).

The state secretary is here describing the economy of Norway as traditionally relying on natural resources, or so-called natural factor endowments. Most of Norwegian industrial exports consist of raw materials and semi products. The petroleum sector has had a tremendous impact both on the economy and the society of Norway in general. It has provided growth in other industrial sectors and secured the expansion of the public sector. The oil sector makes out about 10 % of GDP and has provided a tremendous surplus in the Norwegian state. Since 1990, this surplus has been infused into the Norwegian state's petroleum fund. The profitable returns from the petroleum sector entail that the Norwegian society does not face an immediate economic crisis. This is also what seems to be implicated in the remark "we have not been forced to be as innovative as many of our trade partners". Norwegian governments have been able to rely on the country's relatively exclusive economic situation without being compelled to find new ways of economic growth and public financing. However, this remark also seems to suggest that there is a connection between relatively low national level of innovation and a high level of national wealth. This indicates that relying on the petroleum sector may be risky both for the economy and the welfare (Andersson et al. 2004). The main concern of the government in this quote is that the petroleum resources are limited. The prospect of the petroleum sector means that the cornerstone of Norwegian economy is diminishing. As we see from this quote, this is worrying in terms of the expensive financing of the welfare state. Like many other Western European countries, the demographic scenario of Norway is falling birth rates and an ageing population. And, it is estimated that in the years to come, the petroleum fund will not suffice to finance the pensions of the ageing population. This means that there has to be found another way of compensating for increased public expenditures. When it is uttered that "exploring other ways of securing our future has become a matter of necessity" it is referred to the search for a new economic basis in order to finance future welfare costs (Jessop 2002, Reve and Jacobsen 2000).

An intensifying factor of the state's declining revenues from petroleum is that natural resources based industries are becoming less competitive and are calculated to be permanently decreasing in the future. This is part of a general tendency of manufacturing in all OECD countries (Andersson et al. 2004, Jessop 2002, Langeland et al. (ed.) 1999, Moen 2002):

Countries that are already industrialised must increasingly focus on the development of innovative and knowledge-intensive industry, in order to remain capable of financing a high level of welfare (Nærings- og handelsdepartementet 2003: 6).

The Norwegian government's focus on innovation and knowledge can be seen as being in accordance with new economic growth theory. Joseph Schumpeter can be seen as one of the theoretical pioneers of such theory. Within new economic growth theory economic growth is perceived to be innovation-driven and the limits of innovation are endogenous, or only relative to the degree of human creativity (Jessop 2002, Reve and Jacobsen 2000, Romer 1990). This view is also shared by Norwegian authorities:

Human capital in the forms of manpower and competency makes up the main part of the national wealth in Norway, and how it is used is of decisive importance to our ability to innovate and create wealth (Nærings- og handelsdepartementet 2003: 7).

This statement is interesting, because it indicates that the Norwegian government is moving away from the traditional basis of wealth creation in Norway. According to this statement, the government does not perceive economic growth to be based on natural factor endowments, like petroleum, but to be based on human capital. And the next quote makes it evident that Norwegian authorities view the competence of people as the main factor of national wealth: "Labour and competence make out the bulk of Norway's national fortune. The capital of brains has much more value than the capital of the petroleum fond [My translation]". (Børge Brende, Minister of Trade and Industry, in Dagens Næringsliv 30.7. 2004.

As in EU, the problem of Norway seems to be how to retain and attract valuable human capital:

The key is competent people. We have to provide the favourable conditions so that **competent - highly educated and enterprising** people wish to live in Norway, in the regions, in the districts and in the cities [My translation] (Speech by Ansgar Gabrielsen, [the preceding] Norwegian Minister of Trade and Industry, 2004).

It is demonstrated here that the government is aware that Norway has to appear as an attractive nation, or "We have to provide the favourable conditions [...]". This is in order to be competitive towards the right kind of people who are compatible with the competent, highly educated and enterprising human capital in the knowledge-based economy. According to the Schumpeterian account, innovation based competitiveness is presupposed by individual initiative of so-called entrepreneurs. However, it also depends on the cohesion between individual entrepreneurs and institutions. This perspective is reflected by the government here:

Innovation starts with individuals, businesses and institutions. One of our main challenges is the creation of a culture for innovation, which will motivate us and enable us to achieve pre-eminence within certain areas (Nærings- og handelsdepartementet 2003: 5).

Again, the ‘culture for innovation’ is necessary to achieve the main objectives of the action plan:

The overarching objective of the Government's innovation policy is to facilitate increased wealth creation across the country - which wealth creation shall provide society with the resources needed to provide overarching welfare policy objectives (Nærings- og handelsdepartementet 2003: 14).

Like in the Lisbon Strategy, the social objectives of the Norwegian government's competitiveness strategy seem to override the objectives of innovation. However, this point also illustrates where the Norwegian innovation strategy departs from the Lisbon Strategy. As showed above, the six categories concerned by the structural indicators of the Lisbon Strategy were not only connected to industry. So far, however, all the six underlying objectives that the Norwegian government have constructed in order to achieve the so-called overarching objective are pointing only and directly towards the Norwegian industry sector:

- 1] Favourable and predictable conditions for trade and industry, offering a good overall foundation for innovation and wealth creation
- 2] An outstanding system for learning and education, offering industry access to people with relevant knowledge of a high quality
- 3] More research-based industry
- 4] More new start-ups with a potential for growth
- 5] An electronic and physical infrastructure promoting effective interaction between businesses, markets, knowledge centres and public authorities
- 6] A new administrative practice that facilitates the development of an effective, dynamic and comprehensive innovation policy (Nærings- og handelsdepartementet 2003: 14).

According to the government, the objectives above are those that have directed which areas that are incorporated in the policy. These areas are:

1. General conditions for trade and industry
2. Knowledge and competency
3. Research, development and commercialisation
4. Entrepreneurship – starting up new businesses
5. Electronic and physical infrastructure (Nærings- og handelsdepartementet 2003: 14).

Based on this, it can be claimed that the competitiveness approach of the Lisbon Strategy has a more comprehensive character than that found in ‘From Idea to Value’. The social policy objectives of the Norwegian strategy are not directly implemented as extra-economic factors

of competitiveness. Social issues are included, but they are not factors of competitiveness *per se*.

The Norwegian government claims that innovation policies must be comprehensive and have a long-term perspective. This is also one of the overarching objectives of the strategy. The following quote from the action plan may indicate that the action plan will be more comprehensive in the future:

Developing a comprehensive innovation policy is demanding, and is considered to be a pioneering effort, also in an international context. The presentation of this plan must thus be seen as a first step in the Government's work on developing and implementing such an innovation policy (Nærings- og handelsdepartementet 2003: 14).

The Norwegian government here appears to be rather uncertain and searching in terms of the contents and comprehensiveness of its innovation strategy. There is, according to the government, to be appointed a specific committee with the mandate to develop a more comprehensive innovation policy. This prospective innovation policy will be coordinated across policy areas and ministries (Nærings- og handelsdepartementet 2003). This may indicate the development of a politically super-structural Norwegian innovation policy. Currently, the coordination of policy areas concerned by 'From Idea to Value' is predominantly the responsibility of the Norwegian Ministry of Trade and Industry. In accordance with the 'sector principle' of Norwegian governmental administration, each department has the final responsibility of pursuing research and innovation concerning its own sector and on behalf of its own sector. The Norwegian Research Council is to communicate and give advice across the government departments, but it does not have the authority to make decisions overriding them (Christensen and Lægreid 2002, Moen 2002, St. meld. 20 (2004-2005)):

Implementation of a comprehensive policy requires new working styles. At present, different policy areas are managed more or less on a stand-alone basis at their respective political and administrative levels, based on their own objectives and values. There is today not sufficient scope for approaching the various areas as part of a larger context, and to take into account how these affect conditions for innovation and wealth creation (Nærings- og handelsdepartementet 2003: 14).

Many of the Norwegian government departments are dealing with tasks that may be related to the development of a Norwegian approach to the knowledge-based economy. However, when it comes to the Department of Immigration which has the overall responsibility of refugee and immigration policies there is not developed a strategy for handling issues concerning the knowledge-based economy (www.odin.dep.no). The revision of Norwegian specialist provision in 2002 can be seen as an aspect of the generally increased demand for expertise in

Western Europe. This revision may also be seen as a contribution to enhance the competitiveness of Norway, like in IT. The alteration of this provision was also partly generated by the demands of highly skilled expertise Norwegian IT-industry (Kommunal- og regionaldepartementet 2000, Tjomsland 2002). However, considering the report that provided much of the basis for the revision, I will argue that the revision of this provision is far from a specific policy aimed to adjust immigration in Norway to the knowledge-based economy. The report generally focused on the long-term labour market needs related to demographic aspects in Norway. Further, the revision of the specialist provision seems to be very much based on the need to facilitate entrance regulations for skilled workers as well as highly skilled. In general, knowledge-based sectors are not in focus in this report. This probably reflects that 'knowledge' was yet not a significant term in the political discourse on competitiveness at the time being. However, it also implies that there is not a Norwegian version of the Lisbon Strategy's approach to immigration on any political level (Kommunal- og regionaldepartementet 1999).

4.3 Comparison of the Strategies

The demands for enhanced economic competitiveness that spur the EU and Norwegian strategies are based on relatively similar conditions. Norway and Europe are experiencing worrying demographic changes. Further, both Norway and Europe are perceived to be lagging behind according to the development of a knowledge-based economy. And, both Norway and EU argue that the aim of the strategies is to sustain the present welfare level. However, it shall be noted that as a petroleum-producing nation Norway has a significant position in the European economic context. Nevertheless, this aim is interesting, because it implies that the traditional welfare state model of Western Europe is to be maintained at the same time as there is to be developed a new basis of economic growth. This aim hence contradicts the view that the contemporary discourse on competitiveness implies that the economy in the North "seems to have increasingly lost any source of purpose" (Petrella 1995: 11). However, whether the aim is achievable is a different question.

The linkage between social objectives and economic growth is sensible according the much of the contemporary discourse on economic competitiveness. Generally, it can be argued that both the EU and the Norwegian competitiveness strategy is compatible with a Schumpeterian competitiveness approach. This is because they reflect a broad, social

understanding of innovation as the key to economic growth. This perspective also involves a shift in the understanding of the importance of human resources to economic growth in which 'knowledge' as a commodity has gained increased significance. The social and economic background of the Norwegian and the EU strategy accords with the breakdown of the Atlantic Fordist accumulation regime and its structural implications on the Keynesian Welfare State. Further, Norway and the EU member states' engagement in these strategies is compatible with the general imperatives of the Schumpeterian Competition State. However, the respective approaches to competitiveness in the strategies also represent discursive and structural differences.

In the Lisbon Strategy, social policies are incorporated as extra-economic factors of competitiveness. In 'From Idea to Value', social policies are an overarching objective of the strategy, but they are not included as means of competitiveness *per se*. This demonstrates the flexibility of the Schumpeterian competitiveness approach. Extra-economic policy areas may both be included or excluded within this approach: "[...] competitiveness as an argument has shown the remarkable ability of broadening its meaning in such a way that it incorporates various highly appreciated issues into itself" (Kettunen 1998: 65).

The political convenience of the Schumpeterian competitiveness approach is related to the incorporation of extra-economic factors in the concept as the key to enhance innovation based competitiveness. The broad variety of extra economic factors is making the concept of Schumpeterian competitiveness flexible and dynamic in a political context. The concept is an applicable political tool in terms of legitimating competition state policies:

[...] it shall not be ignored that much of the ideological power of knowledge and innovation stems from the promise that competitiveness and its preconditions in global economy can – or even must – be seen from a wider perspective than that of neo-liberalist deregulation (Kettunen 1998: 67-68).

This may contradict Jessop's claim that extra-economic factors primarily become subordinated under economic factors in the present Schumpeterian discourse on competitiveness. If the EU Commission and the Norwegian government had employed a purely economic competitiveness strategy, it is likely that it would have been perceived as a break with the social democratic tradition. On this background, the Schumpeterian approach legitimizes the role of political institutions within the knowledge-based economy. However, I will argue that the Lisbon Strategy represents a more structural form of competitiveness than 'From Idea to Value'. The Lisbon Strategy can be seen as more structural both because it represents a broader understanding of, *and* incorporation of extra-economic factors of

competitiveness. The implementation of immigration in the Lisbon Strategy illustrates this. In the Lisbon Strategy, immigration is directly incorporated as a factor of competitiveness in the knowledge-based economy. Accordingly, this approach to competitiveness may legitimize that immigration policies become subordinated to more super-structural political reforms like the Lisbon Strategy. Norway has generally subscribed to the Lisbon Strategy. However, it does not exist a direct strategy aimed to integrate immigration in the development of the knowledge-based economy in Norway.

Building on the regulationist perspective, it may be issued whether it is possible to make significant alterations in the system of accumulation without influencing other social structures like the welfare system at the same time. The significance of this issue becomes further enhanced considering the interconnected relation between capitalistic and social concerns that the European welfare-states represents. Hence, the aim of juxtaposing the development of a knowledge-based economy with the social model of Western Europe may be achievable on the discursive political level, but encounter problems when it comes to political and practical implementation. The revision of the Lisbon Strategy can be seen as an acknowledgement of the difficulties connected to achieving this aim. The vast discourse on the concept of competitiveness can be seen as a core as to why comprehensive political strategies like the Lisbon Strategy may prove to have less internal consistency valuable for practical implementation (Christensen and Læg Reid 2002).

An interesting suggestion in terms of explaining the variety in the Norwegian and in the EU strategy's approach to social policies is that it may illustrate that the competition state is operating in a scenario of political crisis. According to advocates of the hyper-globalization the hyper-globalization thesis¹² the enhancement of global and international structures result in a weakening of the nation-state as an actor (Held and McGrew et al. (1999)). The theory on the competition state rather anticipates an ambivalent revival of the nation state within the frames of globalization and internationalization. On the one hand, the emergence of the competition state can be seen as a result of the threatened position of the state form of Atlantic Fordism. The competition state may then be seen as a response to a state crisis. On the other hand, the competition state can also be associated with loss of state autonomy, because the transition to the competition state implies that the state, by becoming a promoter of globalization and internationalization, becomes part of these state-'threatening' processes itself. In any case, as a promoter of competition, the state is an actor in the discourse of

¹² Defenders of this thesis hold that globalization basically has an economic logic and that there will emerge a global market in which competition will be the very key to human progress (Held and McGrew et al. (1999)).

competitiveness, and accordingly the EU member states and the Norwegian state can be seen as actors in the construction of the discourse on competitiveness. That way, the state contributes to alleviate the threat and revitalize itself as an institution (Held and McGrew et al. 1999, Jessop 2002).

This shows that the flexibility of the Schumpeterian competitiveness approach does not mean that this approach is completely relative in its scope of interpretation. Such a perspective would undermine the approach as a guide for political action. Indeed, I have pointed to the scope of social construction inherent in the predominant discourse on competitiveness. This aspect of social construction is what allows non-economic actors to act as units of competition (Kettunen 1998):

Can cities, regions or nations achieve competitiveness in similar ways to firms, and, if not, do they at least pursue economic competitiveness in the same way as each other? The answer clearly depends on how broadly one interprets competition and capacities of action (Jessop 2002: 187-188).

A Schumpeterian Competition State's political challenge is to find a way to handle the crisis of Atlantic Fordism. As long as the crisis prevails, the political actions of the Schumpeterian Competition State can be seen as crisis-management in times of general political uncertainty. What a 'comprehensive' innovation policy implies is therefore not obvious in the present political context of the Norwegian state. Neither is the way to achieve the Lisbon Strategy objectives politically pre-given. This situation again emphasises that there does not exist or probably will not exist an ideal-type of the Schumpeterian Competition State. The form and function of such a type of state will be the result of continuous political construction (Jessop 2002).

4.4 Conclusion

The analysis in this chapter leaves some fundamental issues regarding immigration policies and the knowledge based economy. As we have seen from the comparison of the Norwegian government's and the EU Commission's strategy, the contemporary discourse on competitiveness in the state allows a broad variety of possible political approaches to the relation between economic and social objectives, including the approach to immigration policies. At the same time I have suggested that seen from a regulationist and institutional perspective, it may be difficult to alter economic structures without influencing social structures. Further, there may be various contradictions between the discursive political level

of competition strategies and the political practical level. This contradiction is indicated by the practical problems of implementing the Lisbon Strategy which have resulted in a revision of the strategy. The sector-principle of Norwegian government departments can be seen as an example of the potential practical obstacles connected to implementing a supra-structural strategy of competitiveness in the Norwegian state.

In this chapter, I have opposed a relativistic approach to the concept of competitiveness and argued for a constructivist perspective. Hence, how the knowledge-based economy is to be politically related to social areas should not be seen as indifferent. However, I have also argued that competition state policies should not be seen as pre-given or absolute. These statements still broache the question as to how the Norwegian immigration policy is to be dealt with considering the knowledge-based economy. According to the analysis of this chapter it might be reasonable to assume that there is no direct political evidence of a new immigration agenda in the Norwegian state. However, I partly will contradict this assumption by pointing out the discursive link between immigration and the knowledge-based economy in the Lisbon Strategy. The 'new' aspect of the immigration agenda showed in the Lisbon Strategy is the approach to human resources and economic growth. I will argue that this discursive link is also implicated in the Norwegian government's approach to human resources, even if it is not clearly expressed. In the next chapter, I will substantiate the relevance of this link by analysing the structural relation between the competition state policies on human resources and the institution of international knowledge-migrants.

5. The Institution of International Knowledge-migrants

In this chapter I analyse Indian knowledge-migrants as partaking in an institution in the knowledge-based economy. I carry this out by focusing on the significant position of Indian knowledge-workers in this economic context. I argue that their significance is connected to the enhanced juxtaposition of knowledge and labour as fictitious commodities in the contemporary transformations of the global economy (Jessop 2002, Mahroum 2001).

5.1 The Reflexivity of Knowledge-workers

A consequence of the winding up of traditional industry of Western Europe in the 1970s was new requirements and power relations in the labour force. The production system of the knowledge-based economy involves that the need for unskilled workers in Western Europe has decreased while skilled workers have become more attractive to employers.

This development is reflected in that the term ‘skill’ predominantly has been replaced by ‘competence’ within the present working life agenda. ‘Skills’ is connected to the early stages of industrialization in which the capacity of workers were measured by concrete tasks. The term ‘competence’ is employed by theorists in an attempt to “connect the complexities of learning to the growing complexities of modern work” (Gudmundsson 1998: 211). On the one hand ‘competence’ reflects the increased emphasis on education and learning within working life. On the other hand, it may also comprehend more individual capacities like ‘reflexivity’ which I will come back to underneath. As in the case of ‘competence’, the concept of flexibility may have various meanings. Often it is used to designate dynamic production strategies or workforce organization. In this thesis, ‘flexibility’ in working life is related to the new ways of production implicated in the transition from Fordism to post-Fordism:

The post-Fordist labour process also requires an appropriately flexible workforce that often combines multiskilled and unskilled workers in flexible ways in contrast to the dominant role of relatively inflexible semi-skilled labour in Fordist mass production (Jessop 2002: 98).

The increased emphasis on ‘competence’ along with the concept of ‘flexibility’ can be seen as rather clear imperatives of the shift in the global discourse on competitiveness in working life.

The agenda of working life has been adjusted to a more dynamic model of competitiveness (Gudmundsson 1998, Jessop 2002).

An imperative of the social forms of competitiveness is the connection between ‘competence’ and comparison. As we have seen in the previous chapter, comparative practices can be seen as an inherent part of competition as a social structure: “[...] comparative practices are a component of competence, not only of management, but also of employees” (Kettunen 1998: 65). This is partly what the reflexivity of knowledge-workers is about. In order to promote themselves as attractive workers, they need the ability to act strategically towards other actors in their professional environment. In my opinion, the term ‘reflexivity’ is capturing the comprehensive capacities that are required of workers in the contemporary discourse on competitiveness within working life relations. I will argue that within knowledge-based industries, the complex capacity of reflexivity stems from the juxtaposition of ‘knowledge’ and ‘worker’. However, the reflexivity of workers again influences the way that workers may face the new requirements:

It is important to note that the economic demands for reflexivity even shape the life-world of employees (and those who are unemployed) with a new power. People in working life are not only supposed to develop such reflexive capacities, as those of communication, “direct participation”, commitment (combined with flexibility), and innovation. They are also supposed to conceive of their work, living and “competence” in the wider context of a competitive local, or perhaps even European, community. “We have to make ourselves attractive (Kettunen 1998: 19).

We see in this quote that ‘reflexivity’ implies that employees in the contemporary working life agenda need to appear as ‘attractive’ in a complex working life context. This shows that today’s employees have become incorporated as ‘knowledgeable agents’ in the discourse of working life. I will claim that a key to understand the changing role of employees within the contemporary discourse on competitiveness is the perception of human resources as an extra-economic factor. This entails that the difference between the worker as ‘labour’ and ‘individual’ has become more blurred within the discourse on competitiveness on the labour market (Gudmundsson 1998, Jessop 2002, Kettunen 1998).

This perception is even more eminent within working life in knowledge-based industries like those of the ICT sector. Within the knowledge-based industries, the focus on competence expresses the interconnection between human resources as a factor of competitiveness and knowledge as a fictitious commodity within the knowledge-based economy. In this regard, knowledge-workers have a special position, because they are such an incorporated part of the knowledge-based economy. Further, the developments within the ICT sector have been a significant incentive to the alterations of working life. ICT is characterized

by new means of technology and communication which again will involve enhanced globalization and flexibility within industrial relations (WITSA 2004, Xiang 2001).

Knowledge is the most significant commodity of the knowledge-based economy, and this commodity is relatively compatible with knowledge-workers as individuals. In the case of knowledge-workers, the demands of reflexivity involve being able to enhance their attractiveness as an extra-economic factor of competitiveness. In accordance with this, it can be argued that the special position of knowledge-workers establishes them as some of the most competitive workers, or examples of 'reflexivity-winners', within the knowledge-based economy (Gudmundsson 1998, Kettunen 1998, Jessop 2002, Xiang 2001). This view is reflected in this respondent's description of the IT industry:

This is an industry where you get paid more, and it is a more talent based industry, knowledge based industry. If you want to learn, study, improve your skills – it is a very good industry (A-2).

Being a 'reflexivity-winner' requires the ability to initiate and sustain individual competitiveness as an attractive 'commodity' within the knowledge-based economy (Kettunen 1998). A way of interpreting what this respondent is expressing, is that if a knowledge-worker is able to meet with the requirements connected to knowledge as a commodity within the IT market he/she will be successful. It can be argued that a reflexive employee's key to power within the knowledge-based economy first of all is – knowledge. This way, the requirements of competence makes the knowledge-based industry differ from more traditional industries:

In industry, the shift towards a knowledge based economy involves a shift in organization away from top-down hierarchical structures to flatter structures such as networks of semi-autonomous teams. Tayloristic vertical structures were designed to enforce and coordinate certain physical behaviours while knowledge based work organization involves greater recognition of the autonomy and self-direction of the mind (Stiglitz 1999: 41).

This is showed in the next quote, in which the respondent describes the premises of career progression, or more specifically of becoming a team leader, within the knowledge-based industry:

In this way, basically I feel it is a knowledge based industry. You have more knowledge – and you will be demanding more. It is not like normal industry where...manufacturing industry if you look at...it is manual work, it is not a knowledge-based industry, whereas the IT-industry – it is a knowledge-business. You have more knowledge, and then you be considered the leads. You will have command of the whole groups (A-2).

However, the focus on competence in working increasingly entails that the knowledge needs to be formalised. A higher degree of international standardization of education within

knowledge-based fields may lead to a more common international or global way of professional ‘thinking’ or reflexivity within the knowledge-based industries. This may again facilitate international migration of knowledge-workers, because a more common way of professional thinking would contribute to facilitate cooperation on working projects between knowledge-workers with different international background (Carmel 1999, Gudmundsson 1998). Part of this perspective seems to be reflected by the respondent in the next quote, in which he is commenting the educational background of IT-workers in Norway versus India:

B-3: I found that many people – like they are not degree holders like we are. In India most of the Indian IT people are engineers. But I do not find such educational background for IT people here. I have met a few cases – they are not that, so I feel that if you have like more educational qualifications, much would be better.

Q: Do you think that is a problem when you work here?

B-3: Not a problem. I told you like they are already experts in that area – I am not feeling any problem. But maybe it affects the way of thinking. If they are degree holders, if they have good educational background, it will help more.

According to the respondent underneath, the basic competence requirement of a knowledge-worker is having a formal education within IT:

You need to have some kind of a master’s degree, or a bachelor degree or a Ph.D. to get into the IT scenario, where you have to prove oneself what you are, what kind of technical skills that you have to meet the client requirement and make yourself, you know - the more competitive person in the industry (A-1).

Formal education is according to this respondent only the ‘entrance ticket’ to a further professional career within IT. In the era of mass-education, especially in a country like India, having a formal IT education may far from suffice in order to ‘prove’ yourself professionally as an attractive ‘commodity’ on the IT market. Being a ‘reflexivity winner’ or “the more competitive person in the industry” requires that a knowledge-worker is generally aware and updated on the various demands of individual competitiveness within the IT industry (Becker [1964] 1993, Kettunen 1998, Gudmundsson 1998, Goss and Lindquist 1995). In that regard, I found the respondents to be both aware and updated on the working conditions in Norway. Some of the respondents commented that there was a more ‘relaxed’ or lower working tempo in Norway than what they were used to from India. This short-term knowledge-migrant feared that adjusting to the slow Norwegian tempo would become a problem for his career when he was back in India:

No, it is not a good thing to be more relaxed. One should be more efficient and more competitive to survive in this business. If I want to grow in my career, then I should be fast and competitive (B-1).

In other words, this respondent feared that the stay in Norway would harm his/her professional attractiveness in the Indian IT market. Another respondent's professional frustration in Norway was connected to not being able to work on a professionally satisfying technological level:

I am working on the main frame. This is degraded from a technology point of view, because earlier I was working on the client server and the new technology and now I am working on the main frame (B-2).

This respondent told me that he/she tried to keep technologically updated during spare time in stead. Both of these latter quotes show that the interconnectedness between a knowledge-worker as labour and individual also may imply personal vulnerability. In this case, knowledge as a fictitious commodity involves that if the knowledge-worker fails to present this 'commodity' of his/her as attractive, he/she as an employee and following as a person will feel the consequences (Gudmundsson 1998, Jessop 2000).

This latter point is leading on to the international knowledge-migrants as an institution. On a macro level, the institution of international knowledge-migrants can be seen as a driven by global, capitalistic structures of the knowledge-based economy. On the individual level, this institution can be seen as the reflexive actions of knowledge-workers. Knowledge-workers migrate because they strive to become or remain attractive employees. And, within knowledge-based industries like IT, labour mobility can be seen as implemented in the character of the industry. The significance of IT is largely connected to the transferability of knowledge. As representatives of this knowledge, knowledge-workers are therefore expected to be mobile. The quality of the knowledge-worker is connected to his/her quality of knowledge. The more transferability the knowledge of the knowledge worker is, the more valuable is this knowledge as a commodity. As this respondent is saying, working in different places of the world may be crucial in order to be competitive as a knowledge-worker (Cappelen 2001, Coates and Warwick 1999, Jessop 2000):

In terms of career - I feel that I have a career both in Norway and India. There is a requirement in both places – there is a growing technology, a growing world, people are required to work different places in a different environment, so the more knowledge and technical skills that you gain - you are more competitive and you are more required in the market (A-1).

What has so far been argued about the migration of knowledge-workers is also interesting in view of the connection between the knowledge-based economy and processes of globalization. Much of the global success of ICT is based on its capacity of geographical transferability. Often, this means that the knowledge of an IT-worker can be transferred

overseas without the IT-worker having to relocate. Some companies which are based in high-cost countries use this advantage to out-source their industry to more low-cost countries like India. A company can be based in Norway and its services targeted on Norwegian customers, while the services that the company offer are mostly performed in India (Bergens Tidende 20.01. 2005, Walsham 2001). Still, working physically overseas has great value for many IT-professionals:

I felt great, because I was selected for this project and I am going abroad, and it is...I do not say 'great chance', but it is a good opportunity to work opportunity to work abroad, so I feel great (B-3).

Even if ICT dramatically has improved the possibilities of communicating over distances, distance is not an irrelevant issue within the IT business. The degree of distance between collaborating software-teams, clients and project managers etc. still affects all manners of coordination, control and communication. Communication skills are important in terms of the reflexivity requirements of working life in general (Carmel 1999, Kettunen 1998). However, in terms of knowledge-migrants the ability to communicate may be one of the most important aspects of reflexivity:

To survive abroad, you should have more communication skills. Communication skill, then technical skills, because when you interact with your client, you should be able to communicate with him properly: what you are doing, what the people under you are doing. If you can communicate with him, almost 90 % of your job has been done. That is all (A-2).

Without being able to communicate properly, much of the knowledge that the knowledge-worker is holding will not be transferable, but rather be 'stuck' with the knowledge-worker. This is also connected to the character of 'immaterial' knowledge. This knowledge may be so-called 'tacit' knowledge which is only transferred through face- to face contact between people (Coates and Warwick 1999). The assumptions above in terms of the value of direct contact or communication for knowledge-workers are emphasised in this quote:

[...] basically, for soft-wear industry, your value increases when you go to on-site. You interact more with the clients, your value will increase (A-2).

In other words, if the value of the knowledge attached to the knowledge-worker increases, the attractiveness of the knowledge-worker will increase. This may explain my impression that for short-time contract workers in the IT industry, going abroad *per se* matters perhaps just as much for the career as which country one goes to. This way, ICT contributes to relativization of geographical scale and ICT may therefore enhance globalization processes. This is substantiated in the following quote (Jessop 2002, Walsham 2001):

Q: So is it a disadvantage for you to work in Norway?

A-2: I can say a 70 to 30 ratio - 70 % advantages. It is on-site – it is not Norway – anywhere.

However, it should be noted that the value of working abroad or ‘on-site’ [where your client is situated] is only initial. The value of working abroad *per se* is relative to the durability of the stay. The importance of the work quality – being able to increase competence as a knowledge-worker – increases throughout the stay. The country of destination will then not be indifferent, because various countries will offer different opportunities in terms of enhancing the career depending on their position in the knowledge-based economy. I will discuss this point further underneath.

5.2 The Knowledge-based Economy and Globalization

The shift in the discourse on competitiveness implies that a traditionally economic giant like the US has increased its global competitive advantage within the knowledge-based economy. However, several OECD countries that once were leading Fordist nations, especially in Europe, have not managed to adjust sufficiently to the new logic of competitiveness. On the other hand, a number of former less-economically developed countries have during the last decades gone through a significant economic transformation which has made them a severe competitive challenge to a region like Europe. This is especially relevant for India and the so-called ‘Tiger-nations’ in South-East Asia. This development is indicating that the global scenario of economic competitiveness is altered. These global economic changes are also what the term ‘transformation of scale’ here refers to. The knowledge-based economy has contributed to a redefinition of the geo-economic organization of power in the world (Hall and Soskice (eds.) 1999, Held and McGrew et al. 1999, Jessop 2002).

The key component of recent large-scale international migration, largely neglected in literature, is the complex of international and national institutions that transcend the boundaries of states and locales, linking employers in the developed or rapidly developing economies with individuals in the furthers peripheries of the Third World (Goss and Lindquist 1995: 335).

The structure of the flow, or the migrant institution, of Indian knowledge-migrants can be seen as a mirror of the transformations of the knowledge-based economy. The US was *the* dominant economic actor within the Fordist era, and can be seen as the initiator and leading country of the knowledge-based economy. As it is argued by the respondent in the next quote, IT-migrants first of all seek to the US, but also Canada and the UK. However, during the

1990s, some countries in Europe (Germany, France, Belgium, Italy and Denmark), Australasia (Australia and Asia), East Asia (Japan and South-Korea) and South East-Asia (Singapore and Japan) became significant destinations of Indian IT-workers. These latter countries of destination show that the migration of IT-professional is decreasingly connected to the traditional post-war economic and/or migration structures of the Western countries, but increasingly diffused by the structures of the knowledge-based economy (Jessop 2002, Khadria 2001, Cervantes and Guellec 2002). Hence, when it is remarked in this quote that Norway is not among the main countries of destination for international IT-professionals, it is also illustrated that Norway is not one of the predominant actors of the knowledge-based economy:

Q: What do you think is important to know about Norway for a foreign IT-professional?

A-2: Very good question. Norway is actually not in this IT-wave scenario – not in the radar. People look at USA, UK, Germany, Japan to some extent, whereas IT-professionals in India will try to go to US first, then UK if it is not possible to go to US, otherwise Germany, otherwise Japan. These are the major four. Now people are spreading, because of recession in the US, people are more looking at the Scandinavian market and all others. Basically my perception is, when I told my friend that I was going to Norway what he asked me was...whether it is in Africa. Norway is like a neighbouring town in India – people say US is the only foreign country.

An interesting point here is that this respondent connects knowledge-migration to Norway to economic recession in the US. According to this quote, it seems like the economic recession is forcing knowledge workers to lower their professional demands. And, according to this quote, knowledge-migration to Norway may be the consequence of such reduced professional demands.

In order to capture what it implies for a nation to be leading or lagging behind in the knowledge-based economy, it is necessary to look at the predominant forms of competitiveness in the knowledge-based economy. As we have seen, national competitiveness in the knowledge based economy is linked to institutional reflexivity and the capacity to dynamic competition on a local, regional or global scale.

One of the most significant aspects of competitiveness in the knowledge-based economy is the flexibility of knowledge as a commodity. Knowledge can be standardized and made non-material and is therefore globally transferable more than any other commodity, except capital (Cappelen 2001, Jessop 2002). For a country like Norway to be competitive in the knowledge-based economy, the products or services Norwegian companies/institutions offer on the global IT market need to be globally negotiable. The following statement from a respondent, suggests that the Norwegian IT market is not competitive as a commodity

knowledge-based economy. Further, it shows the link between having a competitive IT industry and being an attractive nation for international IT-professionals:

The service is oriented typically for a Norwegian type of company. It will fit here [in Norway] very well, but my feeling is that it will not hold competition with another service provider, so in the long run it might be a difficult thing for an IT professional – if somebody wants to grow within an IT company (B-4).

According to this respondent, ‘small market’ means that the knowledge to be acquired in the Norwegian market is not sufficiently transferable. The ICT service that is offered in this company is targeted on a Norwegian, but not a regional or global market. This means that the professional knowledge that a knowledge-worker will attain in this company is inferior in terms of enhancing the knowledge-migrant's competitiveness outside the Norwegian IT market.

This also reflects that, in contrast to the era of Atlantic Fordism, being a nation with a ‘small market’ in the knowledge-based economy is relatively disconnected from having a small economy. As it has been stated above, this is because national competitiveness in the knowledge-based economy is less dependent on natural factor endowments than in the Atlantic Fordist era. A relatively small economy may well be competitive in a knowledge-based economy. The difference between the competitiveness of the Norwegian and the Finnish economy may illustrate this point.

It should not be ignored that the technological competence implicated in the Norwegian oil-industry is absolutely competitive within the knowledge-based economy. However, Norway’s heavy dependence on oil and fishery also labels the country’s economy as generally based on raw materials. Accordingly, it can be assumed that the national competitiveness model of Norway is less dynamic than other more knowledge-based economies. Finland can be seen as a knowledge-based economy. The country has transformed from a predominantly raw-material economy to one of the global leaders of the knowledge-based economy. The national innovation system can be seen as the strategic core of Finnish economic politics. However, the success of this system is linked to a long tradition of science and technology in the whole Finnish society. The comprehensive national culture for innovation can therefore be seen as the basis of Finland’s technological lead in the knowledge-based economy (Moen 2002). Finland has both found a way of adjusting to the knowledge-based economy and becoming a global winner of competitiveness. This latter point may be very significant because the character of knowledge implies that a range of countries may be capable of adjusting to the knowledge based economy:

Knowledge is considered to be non-rivalrous in that use of it by one country or individual does not prevent its use by another country or individual (Arrow 1962). In addition, the use of knowledge is not a zero-sum game: if all used knowledge all would be better off. However, there are advantages to being ahead, thus having a technological lead i.e. either using later knowledge or using knowledge more effectively than rivals means extra advantages whatever the level of technology (Stoneman 1999: 59).

India may in this case be seen as an even more interesting example than Finland. Since the 1990s, the country has transformed from being an industrial developing country to one of the global leading nations of the IT-industry (Bergens Tidende 22.01. 2005, Chandrasekhar 2001, WISTA 2004):

This phenomenon started only ten years back. This whole globalisation of IT thing....people started talking around ten years time about the software thing. The boom started, actually, ten years back. So, since ten years only, this infrastructure has been...before that it was not a normal thing. Only elite people, or highly competent people, used to go abroad then. After this IT-thing came, it has become a common phenomenon in South India (A-2).

In this thesis, the national advantages of being ahead in the use of knowledge are focused on the international competition on knowledge-workers. As has been argued in the previous chapter, immigration has become an “inseparable segment of national technology policies” (Mahroum 2001: 23). In that case, the US may be a more relevant example. In the US, the development of a leading knowledge based economy and extensive immigration of knowledge-workers are very much interconnected. Both of these factors have been presupposed by each other. It is for example hard to imagine the technological development of Silicon Valley without the influence of Indian software engineers and the possibilities of technological exposure (and of course economic opportunities) have in the next round made the place more attractive to new flows of Indian knowledge-migrants (Saxenian 1999).

It can be asserted that part of the American success in terms of ICT is connected to reflexive business management. The US’ government’s involvement in the recruitment of Indian knowledge-workers from the late 1960s can be seen as an expression of national reflexivity of the value of foreign expertise in terms of global competitiveness. This can be seen as part of the American business’ ‘forefront’ attitude within IT:

Q: So you think that Norwegian companies are extra sceptical in comparison with for example American companies?

B-5: Yes, I think so, very much. I think that American companies are maybe more business oriented. That is what actually really surprises me, because in IT you really have to be in the forefront, especially if you have to be in the world market. So the decision-making is very slow in Norway. By the time they make the decisions the products are already out from the rest of the world, and the products are on the market.

As we see from this quote, being on the global forefront within the knowledge-based economy is considered as an advantage by this respondent. Based on what has been stated above on the reflexivity of knowledge-workers, it can be assumed that this kind of perception of the Norwegian and American IT companies will be taken into consideration when for example this respondent is deciding in which country to work.

When some of the respondents expressed that they were not happy about the technological exposure they were getting in Norway, I got the impression that the general problem about the Norwegian IT-industry was not the technological quality, but rather the technological range:

And the solutions are very local – and I am talking about the technical side now – the Norwegian way of IT. Companies in Norway are very local. They do not extend to the customer outside (B-4).

Again, this quote shows that in order to be competitive according to the demands of the knowledge-based economy, the products and services provided by companies in Western European countries will need to be increasingly targeted on a global market. This can be seen as a rather changed scenario of competitiveness compared to the era of Atlantic Fordism in which economies were more national and the major economic competitors were other Western countries (Jessop 2002). According to many of the respondents' perspective it can be argued that if Norwegian companies do not adjust to these new global structures of competitiveness, they will not be attractive to international knowledge-workers.

Q: What about the Norwegian IT business or market in general – what could make it more attractive for foreigners?

B-7: There are few things there as well: the language, because a lot of companies have Norwegian as a working language – so foreigners can not come here. It is hard for them to get job. And the second thing is: the service sector is quite low, compared to other countries.

In Norway, there is a high penetration of ICT per capita. However, Norway lags behind internationally when it comes to the importance of ICT for employment (Andersson et al. 2004). If Norway aims to be attractive international IT-professional there has to be available and suitable jobs for foreign workers. Like the respondent remarks in the previous quote, the relevant jobs for international IT-professional will often be connected to the service sector, especially if they are software-experts. Further, this quote leads on to the issue local language. It has often been pointed out that one of the problems of European countries in terms of competitiveness in the ICT-sector, is local language. It shall not be ignored that some of the global competitive advantages of countries like the US, UK, Australia and India in the IT industry, is English as official national language (Home Office and DTI (2002):

Q: Do have any ideas about what the Norwegian government could do to improve the conditions for foreign IT-professionals in Norway?

B-1: One thing I feel is that maybe it is the language, because now we are moving towards globalization. It is such a small country and they should not expect the others to learn their language! So maybe it would be wise to have a more formal working language, and maybe we can move to English – all the documentation and all official language – that means [?], what you talk. I think that would be better for foreigners.

This respondent, a short-time contract worker, here connects the necessity of using English in stead of Norwegian to globalization. This respondent expects Norway to adjust to globalization, not the opposite. Another short-time contract worker who neither had started learning Norwegian, commented that it would take almost one year to learn the Norwegian language. The respondent saw this as a disadvantage of working in Norway compared to working in the US:

I would recommend to go to Norway from India, but not to Norway from the US. It's not Norway it's Europe. Everywhere in Europe it is like that, because if you go to Germany you have to learn the local language. If you go to the US, you gain more compared to this. That is what I look at in the software industry – why should I invest one year sitting here learning language? ... It is a regional thing. It is just applicable to Norway – small market (A-2).

This indicates that investing time and effort in a language like Norwegian, which is not useful almost anywhere else in the world, is rather a waste of competence in terms of enhancing one's professional competitiveness in the knowledge-based economy. This quote further shows that the language problem of this IT-professional is first of all connected to the character of his profession. The essence of the IT-industry is the degree of transferability of knowledge. If the transferability of the professional knowledge of an IT-worker is 'disturbed' by being attached to a non-international language, the value of the professional knowledge will be reduced. That also means that value of the IT-worker as a professional (outside the market in which the language knowledge is applicable) will be reduced.

The respondents who were in Norway for a longer time or on more permanent basis, told me that they had started to learn Norwegian. For international knowledge-migrants who are staying in Norway for a relatively longer period of time, the value of learning the local supersedes pure investment in the knowledge economy. They have not only started to invest in Norwegian language as a type of personal competence which is necessary to compete in the relatively local, Norwegian knowledge business, but also as a personal competence which is necessary to be integrated in the Norwegian society in general. Short-time workers who do not want to learn the local language, may see themselves in Norway mainly on a professional basis, and their rationality of action will be mainly structured by the business they are in. The actions of the foreign workers on a longer stay in Norway, will be more structured by the

social factors are necessary to be somewhat integrated in the Norwegian society. As we have seen above, settling in Norway rather than the US may imply a reduction of the professional ambitions as an international knowledge-migrant:

Q: What is it like to live in Norway?

A-2: It depends on your personal aims. If you want to work on different technologies and the latest technologies and hi-fi things – you prefer go the US. But if you prefer to settle in life, have a cool life, work at slow pace with technological improvement, you would like to stay in Norway.

Shortly, we can say that the knowledge-migrants who start to learn the Norwegian language have changed from a more international mentality to a local or Norwegian oriented mentality. Another way of seeing this is that the respondents who had started to invest themselves more as persons in the Norwegian society are shifting identity from ‘transients’ to ‘immigrants’. They are no longer just on a professional ‘cross-country trip’ to Norway but have started the process of becoming a more permanent inhabitant of the Norwegian society. However, settling more permanently in Norway as a foreign knowledge-worker may be based on a change in the professional reflexivity, since Norway may not be the most obvious country in the global IT context.

Accordingly, none of the respondents came to Norway because they specifically intended to. Many of them referred to it as a matter of coincidence. The degree of ‘coincidence’ should be seen as relative here, since all but one of them came here through some kind of professional IT connection. For instance, this connection could be their Indian company having made a contract with a Norwegian company. All but one of the respondents came here because they were directly involved in the exchange of knowledge as a commodity in the knowledge-based economy. However, when several of the respondents said that coming to Norway was coincidental it should rather be seen according to the position Norway had in their professional reflexivity before they were offered the job opportunity here. Norway was not in their ‘mental maps’ of professionally attractive or eminent IT work sites (Malmberg 1997).

This illustrates that the processes through which international knowledge-migrants are relocated within the knowledge-based economy are not random, but based on capitalist market relations (Hollifield 1992):

The structural conditions for international labour migration are created at the level of the global economy and *longue duree*, essentially beyond the control of individual agents if not beyond the influence of some formal institutions that have sufficient capacity for time-space distanciation (such as large MNCs and nation states) (Goss and Lindquist 1995: 336).

These respondents' arrival in Norway is therefore not coincidental but structured according to the predominant geographical axes of which international knowledge-migrants are being exchanged. According to the general international streams of IT-professionals, it would be more 'plausible' that these respondents were relocated in say, the US. Here, it should be noted that one of the respondents came to Norway exactly because Europe was not in the usual IT scenario, and this respondent wanted to try something 'different' besides professional concerns. This illustrates that a country's attractiveness to knowledge-migrants may be based on more than just professional concerns. Globalization also involves that many people in the world increase their interest in getting cultural exposure and therefore are more likely to seek out remote countries. People will travel more because they have incorporated in their mind-set, or reflexivity, that they can do so (Fuglerud 2001, Papastergiadis 2000):

Q: So the normal thing – I guess that depends on where you are going – is there like a big economic motivation among people for going abroad, or has it more to do with the general career possibilities?

B-7: Mainly it is economic.

Q: Because they can also get the same experiences and challenges by working within India?

B-7: Yeah, that is quite possible, but again our cultural differences also means a lot, so people want to go out to meet different people, to see a different technological environment, because most of the people have been for the economical reasons, but there are a few percent of the people who just want try something new, something different.

This quote illustrates that there are limits to the knowledge-based economy as an explaining factor of international labour migration. Increased globalization initiated by the knowledge-based economy is a significant incentive to international labour migration. However, the emphasis on knowledge-based economy should not overshadow other explaining factors to professional labour migration. That would reduce the complexity of international labour migration as a phenomenon, and exaggerate the knowledge based economy as a structural explanation to international labour migration. Here, it shall be noted that there is an economic aspect connected to the international migration of knowledge-workers. Knowledge-workers migrate because there are considerable economic opportunities abroad. This latter point was also stated by several others of the respondents. Further, knowledge-migrants are economically privileged compared to many other international labour migrants. However, I will argue that the economic motivation is not specifically significant to international knowledge-migrants, but rather an aspect of economic migration in general (Fuglerud 2001, Fischer et al. 1997, Goss and Lindquist 1995).

Nevertheless, the structures of the knowledge-based economy increasingly implies that countries' and regions' participation in the international competition on highly skilled labour-

migrants will not be a matter of choice, but “impose itself as a global de facto” (Mahroum 2001: 27). Further, whether a country or region is economically competitive may also be indicated by the capacity to retain and attract human resources. The global transformations of the knowledge-based have involved a relative change in the factors of competitiveness that influence this capacity (Mahroum 2001). In the next section I will connect the national and regional capacity to retain human resources in the knowledge-based economy to the issue of brain drain.

5.3 The Issue of Brain-drain

For many years India has been a sending country of doctors, nurses, engineers, scientists, teachers etc. and students being educated within these fields. As a corollary, India has been considered as an example of brain drain:

The brain drain is of particular concern for developing countries who can least afford to lose the investments which they have made in education and training particularly of those who benefited from tertiary education. The problem is increasing for a number of countries, notably in Africa and in India, and it is likely to grow as shortages in Europe and other parts of the world in certain highly skilled sectors, together with important wage differentials, continue to attract qualified people from the developing world to emigrate (COM (2000) 757 final: 9) .

Brain drain theory focuses upon the negative effects on the sending countries in terms of highly skilled emigration. Large scale emigration of highly skilled from developing countries is assumed to reduce economic growth and increase the level of poverty and inequality among the population who remain in the country (Khadria 2001, Findlay and Lowell 2001).

Some economic theories suggest that economic emigrants are more resourceful as human capital than people who stay put in the country of origin. In terms of migration of knowledge-workers, this perspective has a further dimension. Until the 1970s most of the skilled (and unskilled) Indian migrants sought for the UK. In the late 1960s the US governments actively began to welcome Indian knowledge-workers. Gradually, the US has evolved as the recipient of 80-90 percent of Indian highly skilled migrants. This has been estimated to make out 100 000 Indian professionals every year. And, it has been asserted that the hundreds of thousands of Indian knowledge workers who have migrated, mostly to the US, during the last decades have not only been among the country’s most highly skilled but also the most talented among India’s highly skilled (Chiswick 2000, Khadria 2002, Mashelkar 2005).

This leads to another dimension about the migration of highly skilled. As we have seen above, a dominant perspective is that the key to economic growth and welfare in the knowledge-based economy is human capital. However, the value of knowledge-workers as human capital supersedes purely economic measures. For example, it is hard for a nation to make an exact estimate of its loss of knowledge through knowledge-migration, because knowledge is a fictitious commodity. Again, this illustrates that a significant aspect of national competitiveness in the knowledge-based economy is the increased value of extra-economic factors. That is a core to the understanding of brain drain issues in the knowledge-based economy. As the value of labour decreasingly is a purely economic concern, the more comprehensive are the extra-economic losses that need to be considered in terms of highly skilled migration (Becker [1964] (1993), Jessop 2000, Gudmundsson 1998). According to R.A. Mashelkar, director general of the Indian Council of Scientific & Industrial Research: “[...] the bulk of scientific and technological creativity lies in the minds and abilities of a small number of highly talented individuals” (Mashelkar 2005: 1416). This entails that in a global knowledge based economy, the cutting edge as to whether a nation is winner of competitiveness may be based on the intellectual driving force of its most exceptionally talented (Findley and Lowell 2001, Mashelkar 2005).

When I asked the respondents about the influence of the IT-industry on the Indian society, they all described it in positive terms. The rather rhetorical question of mine in the next quote also conveys a suggestion to the respondent to bring reflections on potentially negative implications of the migration of IT-workers from India. However, the respondent did not see any problems in that regard:

Q: But it is not a problem that so many people go abroad – because you educate so many, like hundreds of thousands...

B-7: We have like one billion people!

Whether or not Mashelkar’s view is valid, this respondent’s statement may illustrate that if there is a problem of brain drain connected to the migration of Indian knowledge-workers, it is not necessarily because of their large numbers. This number will nevertheless be relative to the total number of the Indian population. Based on Mashelkar the issue is rather the quality in terms of talent of those who leave India. Shortly, the question may not be how many, but *who*.

Further, the very term of ‘brain-drain’ may be questioned. Some scholars are instead using the term ‘brain-gain’, ‘brain-circulation’ or brain-exchange’. Like the respondent in this quote points out, contemporary migration of professionals does not always mean that when a

person goes overseas, he/she is permanently lost in terms of the country of emigration. The person may come back to the country of origin after a period overseas. The competence that the professional has acquired overseas may then be possible to transfer to the country of origin, especially in a knowledge-based sector (Saxenian 1999, Mahroum 2001):

I think India is the biggest exporter of IT- professionals in the whole world. And that helps India a lot. India becomes a better place. Both economically and also people-wise, because people have been like going out and learning new things. Seen things in a different manner and going back to India and implementing the good things about it. So I think it has helped a lot (B-7).

In the quote above, the respondent is describing the migration of Indian knowledge-workers as a type of investment for the country. The knowledge-workers who return to India contribute to the country's positive development.

Broadly, it can be argued that it is the transformation of scale within the knowledge-based economy that makes the former South-North bias of the brain-drain debate more complex. In terms of the international flow of professionals it is no longer inevitable that the stream has a South-North direction. In this regard, it has become a serious issue of European governments that Europe is both facing problems in terms of attracting international highly skilled labour and there is also the perception that the region is losing considerable parts of its own highly skilled human resources, especially to the US (Employment in Europe 2004, www.europa.eu.int/growthandjobs).

As has been stated, many Southern countries have become attractive working sites, so that that many professionals may actually go from North to South, North to East, or South to South-East, etc. Since the end of the 1990s there has been an increasing trend in which India has partly transformed from a purely sending country of knowledge-migrants to a receiving country of knowledge-migrants. This development is described by a respondent here:

Q: And how is it with Indian IT- people who work in India – is it really attractive to go abroad? Is that something you need for your career or something?

B-7: Actually it depends, and it is quite different from now and from before. Because a lot of people, what they want is intellectual exposure, like try something different, and then they work abroad for five/six years, and then come back. And then work in India. Because in India right now there are lot of interaction companies, a lot of multi-nationals, who have their big offices and big wall. And they are paying extremely much to Indian IT people in India right now, so what I think people want do is – they want to live abroad for a few years, and then come back.

Many of the fresh graduates from Indian universities and elite technology institutes that previously would have gone to US or Europe are now staying in India to work. Simultaneously, Indian overseas knowledge-workers are increasingly returning to India: “There is a silent scientific repatriation taking place in India” (Mashelkar 2005: 1416). This is strongly connected to the tremendous growth in the country's IT industry, especially the last

five years. On the one hand, it implies that due to the economic success of the Indian IT-industry Indian salaries within certain IT-areas are rising to a level more similar to those of the US or Europe. On the other hand, the increased attractiveness of the Indian IT industry is not linked to purely economic factors, but to the access to knowledge as a commodity. Accordingly, an important incentive for foreign companies and MNC's to locate in India is the country's great competitive advantage in terms of its abundance of knowledge through cheap highly skilled human capital. As we have seen, the attractiveness of knowledge-workers on the labour market is based on his/her professional knowledge. A career-oriented knowledge-worker will therefore seek to places where his/her knowledge-development has the better conditions. The improvement of quality of the Indian IT industry which has occurred the recent years may therefore be an important explanation to the turning of the knowledge-worker tide. (Chandrasekhar 2001, Jessop 2002, Mashelkar 2005). Again, this might suggest that in terms of the knowledge-based economy, the driving force of potential brain drain of a country's knowledge-workers is not only better economic opportunities in other countries. Brain drain may also be based on the opportunities to improve professional knowledge.

5.4 Conclusion

The main issue of this chapter has been the global transformations connected to the transition to the knowledge-based economy, especially the use of human resources. On the one hand, it is a matter of significance that the mobility of certain human resources have become a 'de facto' in the knowledge-based economy. This is very much connected to the enhanced juxtaposition of knowledge and labour as fictitious commodities. This juxtaposition has also contributed to the relative re-organization of the geo-economic power in the world. A country's or region's capacity to retain or attract the 'right' human resources according to the demands of the knowledge-based economy can also be seen as a reflection of this country's or region's competitiveness in the knowledge-based economy. In that regard the institution of international knowledge-migrants is predominantly structured by the global economy. On the other hand, the individual level of the institution of international knowledge-migrants is an important aspect of the knowledge-based economy. This institution is consisting of reflexive professionals who will act as individual promoters of competition according to the demands

of the knowledge-based economy. It can hence be argued that in this regard, the influence of individual actors has increased through the transformations of the knowledge-based economy.

The reflexivity of individuals will be an aspect that nations or regions of competitiveness will need to consider when they compete on human resources. I have argued that this individual reflexivity first of all will be based on professional concerns, and especially on enhancing professional knowledge. However, there are other aspects than professional concerns that will be of importance. In the next chapter, I will connect the issue of national and regional competitiveness on human resources in the knowledge-based economy to immigration policies.

6. The Contradictions of the Norwegian Immigration Policies

The regulationist approach perceives contradictions between economic and social factors to be inherent in capitalism as a social relation. Such contradictions will also spread into and affect other connected social relations. I hence presuppose that present contradictions and dilemmas of Norwegian immigration policies may be imposed by the knowledge-based economy. Here, the starting point of illuminating such contradictions of the Norwegian immigration policies is labour-power as a fictitious commodity (Jessop 2002).

Building on the two previous chapters of analysis, the contradictions are two-folded. Firstly, we have seen that the importance of human resources as a key to national and regional competitiveness has been enhanced within the knowledge-based economy. This is because of the enhanced juxtaposition between labour-power and knowledge as fictitious commodities. It can therefore be argued that labour-power has become increasingly commodified in the knowledge-based economy. However, an aspect of this commodification is that employees in the knowledge-based economy will need to be reflexive in order to be attractive 'commodities'. I hence assume that the reflexivity of international knowledge-migrants will first of all be guided by their professional concerns as a human 'commodity'. However, since they do represent a fictitious commodity, their reflexivity will also be influenced by the lifeworld in general (Jessop 2002). Accordingly, I will search for contradictions in the basis of reflexivity of international knowledge-migrants. Secondly, the other aspect of the contradictions is evident in the concept 'knowledge-migrant'. While the 'knowledge' of international knowledge-migrants has become increasingly globally liberalized in line with capital, the 'migrant' is still strongly controlled by the nation (Hollifield 1992). This basically means that non-Western knowledge-migrants, like Indians, will need to relate to Norwegian immigration policies. Their relation to Norwegian immigration policies can also be seen as an aspect of their reflexivity on the general lifeworld. Accordingly, the contradictions are interconnected.

I will predominantly relate the contradictions of the Norwegian immigration policies to the welfare state, the labour market and the nation. I see the relation between these three

premises of the Norwegian immigration policy as complex and intertwined. Hence, I will not structure the following analysis according to a strict division between these premises.

6.1 International Knowledge-migration and the Nation

Within globalization theory it is often pointed to the significant global de-regulation of capital movements. Global and international restrictions on labour mobility on the other hand, have been more complicated to liberalize. People are for various reasons more difficult to transfer across the globe than capital. One reason for this contradiction between the mobility of capital and labour, is that labour migration is still strongly regulated by the nation (Held and McGrew et al. 1999, Hirst and Thompson [1996] 2000):

A world market for labour just does not exist in the same way that it does for goods and services. Most labour markets continue to be nationally regulated and only marginally accessible to outsiders, whether legal or illegal migrants or professional recruitment (Hirst and Thompson [1996] 2000: 29).

According to the UN Declaration of Human Rights, article 14, people are free to depart from their country of origin (<http://www.un.org/Overview/rights.html> [05.05.2005]). However, they may not freely cross the borders of another country. This paradox is based on the sovereignty of the nation (Hollifield 1992). In other words, capitalism is implemented in the modern nation state (and the modern/world system of nation states) and vice versa, and yet there are continuous struggles in this relationship (Hollifield 1992, Kettunen 1998, Jessop 2002). “Thus the national state is still the most significant site of struggle among competing global, triadic, supranational, national, regional and local forces (Jessop 2002: 211).

Jessop (2002) claims that the crisis of the KWNS neither entails the gradual dissolution of the nation state, nor that its power is simply being taken over by market forces. Rather it is the KWNS that has been eroded. The crisis of the KWNS implies that the boundaries of the nation state are being maintained in other ways and/or other forms of politics are emerging. However, Jessop does acknowledge that as rule- and decision-making powers are transferred to supranational bodies, there is some loss of the nation state’s sovereignty.

Jessop’s argumentation on the nation must be seen in relation to the regulationist perspective, in which the nation is a significant institutional site and discursive framework of the contradictions of capitalism. As an aspect of capitalism, international labour migration is in my view simultaneously implicated in both global and national structures, as these

structures are intertwined in each other. Based on the regulationist approach, I will hence see international labour migration as a reflection of, rather than a cause *per se* of capitalist controversies on the nation state and the global. In the light of this perspective, there is nevertheless an issue whether international labour migration should be perceived to verify the prevalence of national sovereignty or whether it is rather a disturbance of the idea of the nation (Joppke 1999, Brochmann and Borchgrevink et al. 2002): “Immigration strikes at the heart of controversies over the sovereignty and autonomy of the democratic state” (Hollifield 1992: 227). Issues connected to Norwegian visa-regulations may on this background be seen as an illustrating aspect of the continuous contradiction between mobility of capital and the mobility of labour. India is one of the countries from which a visa is generally required (www.udi.no).

Many of the respondents uttered frustration in terms of the Norwegian visa policy. Several of them argued that Norway should facilitate the visa regulations for foreign IT-professionals. However, generally they were not frustrated because they personally had faced visa problems, but mostly because visa for their spouse and/or children had taken too long time, or visa for their parents had either taken too long time or been rejected. According to the Norwegian immigration act, the immediate family (spouses and children under age 18) of a person having a work permit, normally has the right to work and settlement in Norway. However, Norwegian visa policies require that also the immediate family of a specialist staying in Norway has to apply for visa before being able to enter Norway (NOU 2004: 20, www.udi.no).

All the respondents who came to Norway as specialists first came without their immediate family, if they had one. And all but one of those who had an immediate family had later brought it to Norway:

Q: Is there something that the Norwegian Government could do to improve the conditions for foreign IT-professionals in Norway?

B-3: Almost all Indians are family related, they would like all their family to be here, that means where they work or where they stay. If I come here for work, I expect my family also to be here, but there are some problems with getting visa for family.

What this respondent is indicating here, is that he, like most of the respondents with a family, had experienced a period of time in Norway where they waited for visa being issued to their spouses and children. It is my impression that for most of them the length of this period of time extended far beyond what they had expected: “I am quite irritated, and I don’t know why it takes such along time to get a visa” (B-7).

The respondents' frustration has at least three explanations. Firstly, the frustrating visa-experiences of the respondents stem from the uncertain life situation, emotional strain and practical problems connected to being geographically separated from spouse, children or elderly parents while the time waiting for the visa to be issued or rejected drags on:

I waited for six months to get visa for my family. Six months is a very long time, and I faced some problems there – not only me – even my wife and my kid faced [?], and even my parents also started asking me “when are you taking them?!” It was like personal problem for me! (B-3).

Secondly, the difference in time it took to get a visa issued for a specialist versus for his/her family:

[...] but one thing I don't understand is why it takes such a long time to issue the visa, the person who wants to work – he gets it quite quickly – maybe after two months, but his wife gets up to 8 to 10 months, and that is very sad. In other countries it is different – I mean like if you are married to somebody, it is already a visa for the two to US, you get all the bench and you can travel with your husband....I think they should do something about it (B-5).

In other words, it seems unreasonable to this respondent that a specialist can get a visa issued after relatively short time while the specialists' family has to wait considerably longer. Thirdly the respondents' frustration can be connected to the respondents' experience of unreasonable long time to get an application for visa treated by Norwegian authorities, compared to the time they assumed it would take in other countries, especially the US:

So even if I was here, and my wife should come here, then it would take nine months. So that is not very good. Even in the USA it would take one week. So within one week you could go to the USA. So that is a lot of difference. So that is another reason why most of the people prefer the US. So over there everything is fine – there is no problem (B-1).

If it is hard to bring the immediate family to Norway, it seems to be even more difficult to get a visa for other family members like the parents of specialists or their spouses:

Q: Is it hard to bring your family to another country?

B-7: If you talk about Norway, I think it is almost impossible, because a few of my friends they moved to America, or Canada, or Australia, because they did not manage to bring their old parents here. And it is almost impossible for their parents to live alone in India, so one thing I heard was that if one of your – like father or mother – if one of them die, then it might be possible to bring them over, but that is not a very...nice excuse! So I think it's almost impossible to have your parents come over and live with you.

In the case of India, it seems like while the specialist and their immediate family are exempted from immigration policies, other family members are not. This respondent had tried to get his wife's parents to Norway, but found that their application for visa was being rejected:

[...] we found it was bit silly also, no reason, why this should be rejected. We have a valid visa, and everything is there, and we will be going back in a year (B-1).

Obviously, I do not know the exact reason why this respondent's parents-in-law were rejected a visa. However, it may be assumed that for one reason or another, Norwegian authorities asserted that it would be too risky to give them entrance to Norway. In any case, this quote shows the scenario that may occur when certain individuals from countries that are required visa in order to enter Norway are being exempted from immigration regulation while visa for the nationals in general will be evaluated according to immigration policy concerns. Because of its rapid knowledge-based economic development in the recent years, India is an interesting example here. In certain areas, India is very highly economically and socially developed, while on other areas it is still a developing country. This means that while some Indians, like knowledge-workers, are well adjusted to live in a Western country, many Indians live in deep poverty and are feared to be an economic burden as immigrants in the West. The general Norwegian visa requirements for Indians, still seems to be based on the latter scenario (Bø [2001] 2002, Chandrasekhar 2001, www.undp.org). Accordingly, the respondents' visa-experiences can be seen in line with the political controversies that emerge in the wake of globalization and the transformations of the knowledge-based economy. This illustrates the contradictions between the global and the national inherent in the term 'knowledge-migrant'. While the 'knowledge' of knowledge-workers has become increasingly globalized like in the case of capital, the 'migrant' is still strongly controlled by the sovereignty of the nation.

Much of Norwegian immigration policies towards people from NICs are based on the presumption that they are likely to become a burden on the welfare state. However, because of labour market concerns, Norway and many other Western-European countries have made 'loopholes' in the general immigration policies. The Norwegian specialist provision represents such a loophole (Brochmann 2002, Thorud 2002). Building on Jessop (2002), it can be argued that some of the inflexibility of Norwegian visa-policies reflects that parts of the general immigration policy is not in accordance with the socio-economic transformations in certain countries and regions of the world. While there in the Norwegian government's competitiveness policies is focus on the need for human resources in accordance with the shift in global economic scales, the Norwegian immigration policy still seems to focus on the 'burden' on the welfare state.

In the next section, I will argue that this contradiction may be partly reduced by not only approaching the international migration of knowledge-workers as an institution, but also the family members of these migrants as part of this institution.

6.2 The Family as a Migrant Institution

In terms of working issues, the respondents often mentioned the slow tempo they had experienced in Norway as having a potential negative influence on their career. However, when it came to family issues, the feeling of ‘slowness’ often had a positive signature:

Before I was married I wanted to move out of Norway, because the rhythm was very slow, but after you have a family you feel like you want to spend more time with your family (B-7).

In a society like India, where paid work often is the most direct social security a person can have for his/her family, giving prior to work will feel like a matter of necessity. A person will have to spend time at work in order to secure his/her family. Therefore, taking care of family implies spending time at work. It can be argued that many of the respondents had been socialized into a more ‘Scandinavian’ family life during their time in Norway (Devi 2001, Esping-Andersen [1999] 2000, Hochschild 1997):

The whole thinking process has changed, because there are so many different things which are happening in England or in Norway which are good about the way of working, the way of thinking, and giving prior to the family, understanding the rules and regulations. In India it is like people do not have time! So it has changed a lot (B-7).

This socialization can also be seen as a change in this respondent’s reflexivity on the relation between work and family.

For other knowledge-migrants, family considerations may be the reason why they decide not to become migrants on a longer term. The respondent in the next quote had made a type of compromise between an international labour migrant’s tricky issue of having job possibilities in one country and family obligations in another:

Q: What do you think about staying in Norway on a more permanent basis?

B-1: No, actually, I do not have any plans, so even if my company asked me to stay here I do not think I would...Because it is not because Norway is not...it has nothing to do with the work culture here, because I have some responsibilities in my place, actually, I will take care of my parents, for example, I have to spend some time with my relatives. So one or two years will be okay, but stay in long term – no. For me it is not possible, but it is a nice place to work.

Some of the respondents told me that they wanted to leave Norway after a while because of their children’s education. They explained that they did not think that the Norwegian school system was good enough.

¹³Others mentioned the concern for their spouse as a consideration as to whether they would leave or stay in Norway. One of the relatively short time workers mentioned that his wife who was not working, felt lonely in Norway. Among some of the married couples it had been agreed that the male's career would be prior while the female would take care of the family. For others it was important that the female spouse had career possibilities of her own in Norway. My general impression from the respondents, however, was that most of them gave most priority to the male's career.

It seems like the favourable conditions for these knowledge-migrants are associated with being able to spend more time with their family when they were working abroad. The concerns for their family seemed often to be decisive for whether they wanted to stay in Norway or not. Some of them wanted to leave Norway because of family considerations while others decided to stay. Family considerations can thus be argued to be some of the relevant factors for these respondents in terms of Norway's *attractiveness* as a job country. It was often remarked by the respondents that Indians are very family oriented people. Nevertheless, the family is also a common human concern, not just for Indians. This means that family considerations could be seen as an extra-economic factor of competitiveness for a reflexive, competitive state. Because the family is often involved in aspects concerning individual, international labour migrants, it could even be seen as part of the 'migrant institution'.

The discussion of this section therefore shows that a strict concept of knowledge migrants as single, individual transients could be rather misleading. If a reflexive state incorporates the family considerations of potential knowledge-migrants as a factor of competitiveness, it could increase the respective nation's attractiveness as a job country to the knowledge migrants. To decrease the difference of mobility between labour and capital, could therefore imply to increase the mobility of labour by treating it more like an extra-economic factor compared to capital. Paradoxically, decreasing the difference between labour and capital could in this case be achieved by increasing the difference (Findlay 1995, Hollifield 1992). This paradox is based on family concerns as an aspect of the capitalist contradiction between the social and economic relations in contemporary working life. Since most knowledge workers are men and family regards still are generally considered a female concern, increased emphasis on the family considerations of knowledge migrants could also

¹³ It was claimed that the Norwegian school system does not keep a high enough level of quality, that there is not sufficiently focus on science subjects, and that there is lack of discipline and competition between the pupils. This view partly accords with various public reports and research on the education system in Norway (see St.meld 30 (2003-2004). However, one of the respondents wanted to keep the children in Norwegian schools *because* there was less stress on pupils.

contribute to compensate for gender inequalities, by improving the situation for their female partners or female knowledge workers (Devi 2001). Some of the respondents commented that they perceived Norwegians to be less family oriented than Indians. In the following section I will argue that such perceptions may be based on the different basis of societal trust between Norway and India.

6.3 International Knowledge-migrants and the Welfare State

As we have seen, generous welfare states have been perceived to work as immigration 'magnets'. In this section I will discuss the relevance of this argument for Indian knowledge-migrants. I will connect the discussion to various national systems for securing social risks. These systems may be seen as different institutional approaches to alleviating so-called 'market failures' caused by modern capitalism (Borjas 1999, Jessop 2002)

In the Norwegian welfare state system, it is a public responsibility to secure its citizens against social risks. This is further perceived to support people's trust in interactions and transactions. This can be an incentive to private economic investment and boost the economy as a whole. Norway can be seen as a 'high-trust society' because the population strongly relies on the social welfare system to take care of social risks (Andersson et al. 2004, Barth and Moene et al. 2003).

In countries without a universal welfare system, social security is primarily a private responsibility of the family or market (Esping-Andersen [1999] 2000). It is likely that there is a difference between professional reflexivity in countries that have a universal welfare system and those countries that do not. Because employees in India do not have a social security 'ventilator' through the public system, work becomes the most important factor of social security. In terms of the social welfare system, India can be termed a 'low-trust society'. It can therefore be argued that Indian knowledge-migrants are unlikely to have a welfare state 'mentality' which can make them perceive a foreign welfare state as an attractive immigration factor (Andersson et al. 2004, Barth and Moene et al. 2003). On the contrary, it can be argued that the respondents primarily had a professional reflexivity when they entered Norway. This implies that the Norwegian welfare state system may be attractive to knowledge-migrants who are in Norway, but not to potential knowledge-migrants in India. One can see this logic in the quote from one of the respondents who had tried to persuade other Indians to come to Norway to work:

But I can not manage to convince many people, because of the severe weather conditions and the language, and the cold society, and the low pay scales compared to the US in that field, and higher taxes, high costs of living. So an Indian will always think how much he will be able to save at the end of the day, and I do not think that is the wrong way to think, because in India you have to save for everything, because you do not have any kind of security, so you have to secure yourself, which means that you have to save money for your security, so naturally they are oriented to think that way. And I see that thinking in many Indians that come in the beginning, until they really understand the culture and after a while they realize that they are secure because of the system (B-5).

Based on this quote, it can be argued that Indian knowledge-migrants have to be relatively well socialized into the Norwegian culture before they can obtain a welfare state 'mentality'. The lack of welfare state mentality may illuminate other competitive advantages of the US in terms of attracting Indian IT professionals. The US can be seen as the symbolic hallmark of capitalism (Cappelen 2001). To people who have not embodied a welfare state 'mentality', the US social system may be seen as attractive because of the US market's prominence as the primary area of social risk management. For IT professionals in particular, it is also likely that the US market will be found attractive in terms of social risk management. As employees, these professionals are already part of a capitalistic market. Secondly, because of their degree of professional competence it is plausible that they will have a fair chance of succeeding in this market. However, this logic presupposes that their professional competence is attractive in the US market. In times of economic recession in the US economy, there will be less demand for IT-professionals in the market, and knowledge as the key to market based risk management will reduce its value. At the time when the interviews were taped, there was a recession in the US market. The respondent underneath can therefore be claimed to express the personal ambivalence between whether to live in a society based on welfare state risk management (Norway) or in society based on market risk management (the US).

Q: So would you like to still stay in Norway, or would you like to go somewhere else?

A-2: That depends on the market. As up now, people are saying from August the market should improve. Since almost one and a half year the market has been under recession. When it is still under recession we can not go. And feedback from people is that it is improving [in Norway]. But if you compare Norway to the US, here you have more social security. Social security means that after three years of work, you have got a permanent work permit. If you loose your job, the government will pay your [?]. Whereas in the US, if you loose your job, they will kick you. So Norway is more socialistic type of society.

This shows that because this respondent has lived in Norway for a while, he is both familiar with the welfare state and the market as different keys to personal risk management. Because of the recession in the US economy at the time being, he calculated that the Norwegian society would be more secure at the moment. In the end, however, he seems to prefer market based risk management:

Q: If you could choose, would you like to stay here on a more permanent basis, or would you like to go somewhere else?

A-2: As up now, in this recession market I would like to stay here...because now Norway is better than the US, but from people I have got feedback – you will be paid more, you can add more in the US compared to here. So if you look at the income, I would feel for the US. If you look at the peaceful life, more secure life, you like to stay in Norway. So as up now, I would like to stay in Norway.

Q: US – is that the next country you are going to apply for?

A-2: Absolutely.

This respondent may seem rather opportunistic at first sight. He prefers to live in a 'socialistic market' only as far as it is to his advantage. On the other hand, this may be understandable for a person who is not fully socialized into a welfare state society. He may not actually trust the Norwegian welfare system but rather that 'everyone is the architect of his own future'. In this respondent's view the basic key to that future is personal talent:

A-2: [...] Now, basically all the IT- people will like to go to the US. Our ultimate gain is, when you have come to Norway, you will be going to UK, you finally end up in the US

Q: So that is their ultimate goal- is it yours too?

A-2: As up now – it is not, because the US economy is worse affected, so Norway is better than the US. It depends. If the US improves further, we will like to go to the US...because you have more liberalism, a more competitive market there. In Europe you see more socialistic markets. In US you see more a liberal – if you are talented, you will be paid more. It depends on your talent.

Q: So it is based basically on the liberal economy, the things that make people want go to the US?

A-2: yes, basically, because it is based on your talent [...]

When I ask the respondent here whether the competitiveness of the US in terms of international IT-professionals is based on its 'liberal economy' he confirms the competitiveness of the US economy by connecting it to the role of 'talent'. The perspectives of this respondent shows that the issue of the attractiveness of welfare states and national systems for securing social risks and can be associated with the complex relation between types of welfare states and types of political economies. Obviously, a country's social policy is embedded in its political economy. This perspective is also in accordance with regulationist theory. A more controversial issue is whether the coordinated market economies with their rather expansive welfare systems are as competitive as the liberal market economies and their 'liberal' social policies within the knowledge-based economy. In other words, the issue is whether the European welfare states contribute to decrease the European competitiveness in the knowledge-based economy. This question is compelling, since both the Norwegian and the EU competitiveness strategies seem to presuppose that the welfare state can and is to be sustained through the transition to the knowledge-based economy (Hall and Soskice (eds.) 2001, Barth and Moene et al. 2003).

6.4 The ‘Competitiveness’ of the Welfare State

The US can be seen as a liberal market economy. In liberal market economies, firms rely more on market mechanisms than on non-market institutions to regulate their activities. Liberal market economies are usually accompanied by residual welfare states. This type of welfare states emphasises means-testing and low levels of benefit which again contribute to reinforce the fluid labour markets of the liberal market economy (Hall and Soskice (eds.) 2001).

The labour markets of liberal market economies have few restrictions on layoffs, which is an incentive to high labour market mobility. This implies that companies that are interested in economically risky production can hire qualified personnel which will be easy to release if the production proves unprofitable, or in case of market failure. Because of the relatively low labour market security, employees in liberal market economies are inclined to invest less of their effort in the company, and more in their personal career. This means that career success will depend on the employee’s capacity to enhance personal training and to switch jobs relatively often in order to acquire general skills that can be used in many different firms (Hall and Soskice (eds.) 2001).

[...] start-up software companies in the USA take advantage of a highly flexible labor market with university-educated people combining excellent general skills with valuable knowledge about the industry acquired from switching from one job to another (Hall and Soskice (eds.) 2001: 149).

Accordingly, the US market is more likely to offer employees significant career possibilities and rather high wages, on the condition that they accept relatively high social risks. The relation between the market and employees is organized quite differently in coordinated market economies. Here, the expansive social policy arrangements can be argued to function as a compensation of workers for their disadvantaged position in the labour market (Mares 2001, compares Jessop 2002). This perspective is compatible with the following respondent quote, in which the social security is perceived to be the main advantage of working in Norway. However, this advantage is seen as relative, since the respondent would first of all recommend other Indian IT-professional to go to the UK or US rather than Norway:

Q: What do you think you would tell another Indian from the IT-area who were considering coming to Norway to work- would you recommend or not recommend the country?

B-7: If he has another option, like go to the UK or go to America, I would say “do not come to Norway – go there first”. But if he has come to Norway, then you should be prepared for working environment and then weather. Because the best part about Norway is job security, so that is an advantage.

Q: Because you cant just get fired...

B-7: No, you can get that also, but the social security, Aetat or [?] they take care of you. Because if you are alone and you are not married, then it's no problem. But when you have a family with you, that makes a difference.

In so-called coordinated market economies like Norway, the labour market is regulated through centralized, nation-wide and co-ordinated bargaining. Especially in Nordic countries, this bargaining on wages and working conditions contributes to produce relatively homogeneous and egalitarian labour markets. Firms in coordinated market economies have been inclined to offer longer-term employment contracts and the existence of corporate institutions provides workers with rather secure employment (Esping-Andersen [1999] 2000, Hall and Soskice (eds.) 2001).

In Norway, the welfare state interacts strongly with industrial relations actors in the shaping of the institutional framework of labour market behaviour. The Scandinavian welfare state model and employment policy has been directed by 'productivism'. Productivism is guided by the objective to maximize the productive potential of the population. This objective is premised by the welfare state's obligation to secure that all people obtain the necessary resources and access to work (Esping-Andersen [1999] 2000).

According to the ambivalence that the respondents show on the relation between the professional opportunities of the US and the welfare of Europe, the welfare state may represent a Gordian knot for Western European countries. Many Western European countries have established regulations for specialists to facilitate immigration of highly skilled people from non-Western countries. As we have seen, these regulations have been established in order to adjust labour immigration to the economic conjunctures of Western Europe (Brochmann 2002). However, in a globalized economy, these conjunctures will increasingly be connected to global conjunctures. That implies that economic recessions and upswings in Europe will often be parallel to the economic situation in other parts of the world, and especially in the economic giant US (Held and McGrew et. al. 1999). In the case of international knowledge-migration, this parallel is disturbed by the differences in the socio-economic systems between Europe and the US. In times of economic upswing, international knowledge-migrants who are sited in Europe are likely to be attracted to the more competitive markets in the US. In times of economic recession they are likely to remain in the European markets, because of the European social protection system. This indicates that the European social policies entail that the specialist arrangements are not as feasible to adjust to shifting economic conjunctures as they are supposed to be. However, as we have seen from some of the respondents, the social policies of Europe may also give incentive to long-term settlement.

Long-term settlement may work as a positive compensation or reduction of potential welfare state losses if the negative economic conjunctures are relatively short-term. Further, Mares (2001) argues that many scholars have focused too much on the role of labour in welfare state research. Mares claims that such labour-centred views ignore the significance of social policies to employers. Mares' suggestion is that "social policies can offer distinct institutional advantages to employers [...]" (2001: 211). These advantages include wage indexation, lower risks connected to balancing the relation between long-term and short term investments, such as the opportunity to give priority to enhance employee skills in favour of continuously intensive production. Further, more equal conditions of competition between firms, because social policies will entail that risks are more equally redistributed among firms. The European welfare systems may therefore work as an indirect 'means' of competitiveness in terms of international knowledge-migration (Barth and Moene et al. 2003, Brochmann 2002).

Hall and Soskice propose a solution to this question of comparative institutional advantages in the spirit of the classic Heckscher-Ohlin theorem. What they suggest, is a 'labour'-division of innovation between coordinated and liberal economies (Wood 1982). Hall and Soskice argue that more coordinated market economies are better suited to support so-called 'incremental' innovation, while liberal market economies are better at providing the frameworks for so-called 'radical' innovation. Incremental innovation is "marked by continuous but small scale improvements to existing product lines and production processes" (Hall and Soskice (eds.) 2001: 39). The challenge of incremental innovation is how to maintain high quality of the products and provide consumers' loyalty and trust in the products. Further, the problem is to secure continuous improvements of the quality of the products and to keep down costs. Radical innovation on the other hand, "entails substantial shifts in product lines, the development of entirely new goods, or major changes to the production process" (Hall and Soskice (eds.) 2001: 38-39). Radical innovation requires a capacity for taking risks on new product strategies and that these strategies are rapidly implemented by large-scale and tightly coupled organizations with diverse employees.

Nevertheless, the US' leading position in the knowledge-based economy may seem as a major explanation for the country's competitiveness in terms of international knowledge-migration. As we have seen, many of the respondents had the impression that the US was more attractive than Europe in terms of professional concerns, but they also acknowledged the welfare advantages of Europe. Accordingly, the reflexivity of employees is not limited to working life issues, but to the lifeworld in general. Reflexivity can be seen as a common human capacity, which is being changed or enhanced by globalization processes (Kettunen

1998, Jessop 2002). It can be argued that international labour migrants are likely to obtain an especially strong capacity of reflexivity. Like showed by many of the respondents, these migrants are inclined to make comparisons and reflections based on the complexity of their international experiences. Part of this reflexivity may be based on the experience of cultural differences between nations (Papastergiadis 2000). The respondent in the next quote seemed to have the understanding that the Norwegian work culture is different from the Indian:

Q: The occupational part of it – what are disadvantages and advantages about working here?

B-1: Working here? If I am India, if I work for eight hours, I have more work to do. But here, the people are relaxed and the work culture – the working time is kind of relaxed, so everything will take some time

Further, the same respondent reflected on how one is to compare which country is the better:

So when you compare the facilities in Norway and the facilities in India, if you are looking for something better the actual truth is – if the importance is to be here and earn some money, then you will be fine. If you want to have friends and talk to everyone, I do not think this one is best (B-1).

Again, this respondent confirms that knowledge-migrants may not only consider professional aspects when they consider which country to go to. Another respondent commented that he had experienced more racism in England than in Norway:

[...] if I you compare with England, there is a lot of racism. That I do not like. That was the main reason I did not go back to England – I could have (B-7).

According to the conversation in general which I had with this respondent, he appeared to be quite career oriented. For instance, he had a clear intention to go into management and be in the lead in terms of his professional competence. It can be assumed that from a professional perspective, it would be more sensible for this respondent to stay in England than in Norway. As we have seen above, many of the respondents would consider the Norwegian IT-market to be less attractive compared to the English, as it may offer better professional opportunities. However, when this respondent chose to work in Norway, he also evaluated other aspects of Norway than its professional possibilities, like the degree of racism. Hence, this quote shows that a country's competitiveness in terms of knowledge- migration is based on more than its attractiveness from a professional point of view. Further, it may be argued that these respondents' professional reflexivity is broader than just 'purely' professional concerns. It can be assumed that in order to fully develop one's professional potential in a knowledge-based industry, it is favourable to be in a generally positive life situation. Hence, whether they are seen as subordinated to the professional reflexivity or not, many areas in life can be assumed to influence professional reflexivity.

Building on Hall and Soskice's suggestion it seems that the issue of national competitiveness in the knowledge-based economy depends on how the notion of 'efficiency' is being approached (Barth and Moene et al. 2003). As in the case of innovation, there may be various ways of estimating whether a nation is organizing its economy 'efficiently' considering the scope of social policies. Again, I will argue that the answer to this latter issue of competitiveness, shows that the contents of 'competitiveness' is dependent on political ideology.

Finally, I will argue that the distinctive profile of this embeddedness seems to have further cultural and social repercussions connected to the keys to inclusion and exclusion of 'strangers' like immigrants in society (Bauman [1990] 2001, Brochmann [1968] 2003, Longva 2003). One potential area of social exclusion is the Norwegian labour market:

I think US is a very commercial society, I mean you can go to any heights in the US, depending upon your personal capabilities, but in Norway, no matter how capable you are, still other factors play a role in determining where you reach (B-5).

The respondents was here pointing out the difficulties that foreign workers may face in Norway, because many of the career possibilities in Norway depend on having the right social network (Aftenposten 26.06.2005). One possible reason for this is that many foreign workers have stayed in Norway for a relatively and have therefore not been able to establish the same social network as many Norwegian employees. However, an interesting aspect is that the respondent in this quote is not connecting this problem to being an immigrant *per se*, but seemingly to differences between the Norwegian and the US society. Accordingly, I will relate the discussion on the social exclusion versus inclusion of immigrants to the relation between socio-economic models and immigration regimes, especially in terms of the differences between US and Norway.

6.5 The Welfare State and Inclusion of Immigrants

USA, Canada and Australia can be termed 'settler nations'. In all of these three countries, the role of immigration as part of nation-building is stated in the national constitutions. Immigration can therefore be assumed to play a different role in the collective national identity of these three nations than in Europe, where most countries have been reluctant to define themselves as immigration countries (Meyers 2004).

During the two last centuries, the US has admitted more immigrants than any other country in the world. Speaking on broad historical lines, there has been large-scale

immigration of dissimilar ethnic composition to the US, even if US immigration policies periodically have strongly favoured Western immigrants. In contrast to welfare state regimes like Norway, the regulation of immigration in US is predominantly external. This means that in the US, immigration control is focused on entrance to the country, while having been admitted to the country immigrants are treated more or less equal to the rest of the population. In other words, immigrant integration is not an eminent aspect of US immigration policies. Rather, economic and political debates on immigration in the US have centred on the tension between legal and illegal immigration (Brochmann and Hammar (eds.) 1999, Hollifield 1992, Meyers 2004).

US administrations have been relatively absent in immigration regulation in favour of the labour market. The strong market influence on US immigration regulation has contributed to the often harsh conditions of immigrant life. Because of this, there have been intense political struggles to develop and secure immigrant rights. In the US, immigrants now obtain full rights of employment, settlement and citizenship rather shortly after entrance (Djuve and Rogstad et al. 1999, Hollifield 1992).

What I see as a difference between Norway and the US is that in Norway there are more immigrant societies. In the US everyone is an immigrant (A-1).

Compared to many other Western countries, immigration to Norway has been relatively low. Immigration has been regulated according to the principle of 'restricted and controlled immigration'. This principle is significantly based on the universal Norwegian welfare model. According to this model, settlement in Norwegian is compatible with full welfare rights. If the welfare state is not to be overloaded, this practically implies that immigration to Norway is rather strictly regulated and limited. The existence of a comprehensive welfare state also entails that Norwegian authorities are expected to preserve Norway as a relatively economically egalitarian society.

The equality norm of the Norwegian welfare state accounts for the rather strong focus on integration in Norwegian immigration policies. In the Norwegian context, integration policies mean that immigrants are expected to be absorbed into the general Norwegian living standards (Brochmann 2002, Brochmann and Tjelmeland 2003).

It is not easy to be a foreigner. And especially in countries like Norway and Scandinavia where it is more homogenous – see – you have your origins here and Norwegians have like...like in the US everyone is an immigrant, that is different. But here you are a homogenous, indigenous people, so naturally there is a difference between the indigenous and foreigner people (B-5).

Longva (2003) remarks that in Norwegian language the notion of 'equality' (No: 'rettferd') is often confused with the notion of 'equity' (No: 'likhet'). This mixing-up may have various expressions in the Norwegian society. In terms of immigration policies, it can be argued that the equality norm of the Norwegian welfare state is often associated with ethnic equity. Accordingly, the maintenance of welfare state is assumed to rely on an ethnically homogeneous population. Further, the mixing-up may involve that only immigrants who are culturally similar to ethnic Norwegians are perceived to be truly integrated (Brochmann and Tjelmeland 2003, Esping-Andersen [1999] 2000).

The conviction about going to the US was not clearly shared among all of the respondents. Some of them wanted to go to the US for a shorter time period, while others wanted to stay in Norway on a more permanent basis or return to India. However, many of the respondents had the opinion that most other Indian IT people would prefer the US. As one of the respondents told me – “the US is the promised land” (B-3). The reality of the US as the 'promised land' may be more mixed in the contemporary complex global migration scenario (Papastergiadis, 2000). Nevertheless, many of the respondents seemed to have the perception that in the US they would have been more respected because of their professional competence and not been stigmatized as 'immigrants' like they often were in Norway:

Like in US you are respected and you are...So my cousins and uncles living in the US never complain about being an outsider (B-5).

The general restrictive Norwegian immigration policies have been largely legitimized by the equality norm of the Norwegian welfare state. However, the universalism of the Norwegian welfare model seems to imply certain imperatives of exclusion of immigrants which has a further scope than merely the external immigrant selection mechanisms (Longva 2003).

My impression of Norway is that they see every coloured guy as a refugee. We feel the pinch of that. They will not look at me as a software-professional, highly demanded guy who is wanted in Norway (A-1).

According to this quote, the respondent seems to have the understanding that a person is judged on a fairer basis in the US than in Norway because in the US you are judged by your talent whilst in Norway you are judged by the colour of your skin. This difference may be partly based on the structure of Norwegian immigration policies, which again is strongly connected to the Norwegian welfare state.

In Norway, being an immigrant is generally associated with being 'coloured'. This means that the term 'immigrant' is mostly connected to non-Western immigrants. Further,

non-Western immigrants are often associated with asylum seekers and refugees, since non-Western labour immigration has been relatively minimal since the labour immigration ban in 1975. As we have seen, refugees and asylum seekers have often been considered to be a burden on the welfare state (Rogstad 1998, Tjomsland 2002). It can be assumed that these perceptions linked to ‘innvandrere’ in Norway also will be transmitted to most non-Westerners who live in Norway. This latter scenario on ‘innvandrere’ seems compatible with the way that most of the respondents told me that they were perceived in Norway. Only one of the respondents told me that he had *not* had any negative experiences in Norway because of the colour of his skin.

It has been argued that since the late 1990s there has been some change in the common perception of immigrants in Norway. However, according to the respondents, it seems to be difficult for many Norwegians to associate non-Western people with anything else than asylum seekers and refugees. This may be based on the fact that even if there has been more political and public attention on immigrants in the Norwegian labour market and the need for foreign labour, the actual number of labour immigrants has not increased and Norwegian labour immigration policies have been rather stable since the ban on labour immigration (Brochmann and Tjelmeland 2003, Tjomsland 2002). Correspondingly, there may be certain obsolete perceptions on today’s Indian labour migrants in Norway:

Q: so you are generally happy with your experience here or...?

B-1: It is fine, yeah, but there are some small things, that I think will be there, I guess, in every foreign, Western country. Because people have a kind of...because in the 70s and the 60s some people came here because of war between India and Pakistan, some kind of refugees. People still think that if they see some kind of Indians and Pakistanians, they are some kind of refugees and working in low class labour.

In other words, the reflections made by the respondent in this quote are indicating that Indians in Norway are generally not associated with the contemporary knowledge-based transformation in India. The same perception seems to be shared by the respondent in the next quote: “I think they always will think of you as either a political refugee or an economic refugee” (B-5). This suggests that principles of immigration control and regulation will influence the way immigrants are being perceived in society:

If non economic motives dominate the selection of migrants, it is less likely that they perform well in the economy. Their skills may be less transferable to the host country, and consequently labour market assimilation is more difficult. This all implies that the choice of migration policy should be expected to have an impact on the sentiments of natives and foreigners (Boeri and Hanson et al. 2002: 106).

This view is also supported by Tjomsland (2002) who maintains that taking in more highly skilled, non-Western labour migrants would have a positive effect on the general attitudes towards non-Western immigrants in Norway. In the next section, I will discuss how Norway could select immigrants according to the demands of the knowledge-based economy.

6.6 Selection of Immigrants in a Knowledge-based Economy

Attractive knowledge-workers from non-Western countries may only be permitted to work in Norway through the specialist provision. After the ban on labour immigration in 1975, the specialist provision can be seen as the most explicit tool of the Norwegian immigration policies for recruiting labour from non-Western countries. However, in perspective of the general immigration stock, the annual number of specialists during the last years has been very modest.¹⁴

[...] like there have been 350 specialist taken in in year 2000, and the number of 'innvandrere' , it's in order of 10 000, then what the common man faces...his experience will be based on that, well, I do not blame it, but it will take a while for me to get used to that!" B-4).

Based on the analysis so far of this thesis, it can be stated that the specialist provision is only one among many conditions that will influence Norway's attractiveness to international knowledge-migrants. It can also be argued that in terms of knowledge-migrants, the issue of Norwegian immigration policies is more how to *attract* rather than how to *select* the 'right' kind of immigrants. This shows that in this area the Norwegian immigration policies are increasingly being intertwined with the discourse on competitiveness on the labour market. Accordingly, Norwegian immigration policies will need to be more reflexive in order for Norway to appear as an attractive 'immigration market'. This alteration may also be seen as a significant aspect when it comes to identifying a potential new immigration paradigm in Norway (Borjas 1998, Brochmann 2002 and [1968] 2003, Kettunen 1998, Ringen 2004). Following, I will argue that the specialist provision has to be seen in accordance with the general immigration policies. Like the respondent in this quote remarks, it may be reasonable that specialists will generally be perceived according to stereotypes on 'innvandrere' or immigrants, because specialists make out such a small fraction of the general immigrant stock. This tendency may also be enhanced because many specialists, like some of the

¹⁴ The quota for specialists is 5000, but since year 2000 annual number of specialists has never been more than 1700 (www.udi.no).

respondents, are short-time contract workers who are not officially categorised as immigrants. Highly skilled specialists may therefore be claimed to make out an 'invisible' fraction of immigration to Norway (Findlay 1995). However, Indian specialists may also be 'invisible' because they come from a non-Western country and immigrants from non-Western countries generally come to Norway on a humanitarian and not a labour market basis.

Further, as Indians these respondents come from South Asia – a region from which Norway has received many low skilled immigrants as well as refugees and asylum seekers. However, this picture is mixed, because since the 1970s many highly skilled and middle-class people have arrived from India. This is also relevant for the immigrant and minority population as a whole. Even if the political criteria of immigrant selection have a certain bias and imply categorization of foreigners, it does not mean that these tendencies and categories may be empirically transferable to individuals in the relatively multicultural context of the Norwegian society. The term 'immigrant population' employed in official Norwegian statistics comprise an endless social and cultural complexity of individual factors attached to people with a more or less foreign background. At the same time, it seems like the empirical repercussions of these categories may be interconnected, because stigmas attached to one category of immigrants may cause prejudices towards the whole immigrant population (Brochmann and Tjelmeland 2003, Fuglerud 2001, www.ssb.no).

This discussion on the selection mechanisms of immigrants boils down to what it takes for immigrants to be included in the Norwegian society or what can be termed the national 'us'. As stated above, international migration may both confirm and disturb the perceptions on what a nation 'is' (Hollifield 1992, Joppke 1999, Kettunen 1998). Would Norwegian perceptions of 'innvandrere' be altered if Norwegian immigration policies had a stronger focus on adjusting the immigrant selection to the government's aims of a more knowledge-based economy?

Kettunen (1998) argues that the discourse on competitiveness in working life implies that various national actors increasingly need to perceive themselves from an international or global perspective in order to be economically competitive. This involves a re-orientation of the national 'us' into the national 'us' of competitiveness. Hence, it is possible that increased use of foreign knowledge-workers either on Norwegian territory or in an out-sourcing setting may enhance the common public understanding of the contribution of foreign human capital for competitiveness of Norway. In other words, a more knowledge-based economy may enhance the inclusion of foreigners in the national society in the way that it may extend the

feeling of social cohesion beyond the nation (Brochmann and Borchgrevink et al. 2002, Reich 1991):

What do we owe one another as members of the same society who no longer inhabit the same economy? The answer will depend on how strongly we feel that we are, in fact, members of the same society (Reich 199: 303).

Jessop predicts that the Schumpeterian Competition State will entail the development of Schumpeterian Workfare Postnational Regimes (hereafter SWPR). As an ideal-type the SWPR involves a workfare regime in which social policies are subordinated to economic policies. Accordingly, accumulation strategies and state projects will be organized under the knowledge-based economy. In line with the contradictions of capitalism, Jessop's predictions may imply that the present competitiveness policies in the Norwegian state will imply an undermining of the welfare-state bias of Norwegian immigration policies concerns in favour of labour market concerns. This could entail that non-Western knowledge-migrants would be increasingly accepted in the Norwegian society because they would be seen as more suitable to the knowledge-based economy than many other non-Western immigrants. On the other hand, a potential negative affect could be that immigrants who are not seen as 'right' according to the knowledge-based economy would accordingly be less accepted in Norway than earlier. However, I will argue that this represents yet another example of the question of how broadly competitiveness is to be perceived. Nevertheless, based on the discussion above, it can be claimed that immigrant selection should not and can not be based only on strictly economic concerns.¹⁵

It shall not be understated that highly skilled labour immigration may have different implications on the Norwegian society than for example humanitarian based immigration (Borjas 1989, Chiswick 2000, Saxenian 1999). At the same time, this distinction should not be exaggerated, since humanitarian based immigration policies may not be strictly opposed to economic based immigration policies. This perspective is reflected in the Lisbon Strategy. For example, many asylum seekers and refugees may be highly educated when they arrive in Norway. Utilizing the knowledge of the immigrant population in a better way, could contribute to the enhancement of a more knowledge-based Norwegian economy. As we have

¹⁵ This is a relatively matter of fact because Norwegian immigration policies are also based on international commitments like the UN Declaration of Human Rights and the ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work (www.un.org, www.ilo.org).

seen, the competitiveness issue of Europe is not only connected to developing a more knowledge-based economy, it also involves making use of Europe's full labour force potential. This means that there has to be made an increased effort to include immigrant groups in Norway, like refugees, in the Norwegian labour market. This could again emancipate knowledge resources that would enhance the knowledge-based economy. This effort also entails working with the attitudes of Norwegian employers towards job seekers with an immigrant background. Based on this it can be argued that the Schumpeterian notion of a 'culture for innovation' in 'From Idea to Value' is compatible with a 'culture for immigration' (Fjeldstad 1994, Ringen (ed.) 2004, Rogstad 1998). At least, there seems to be a link between the US' knowledge-based economy and certain aspects of the country's immigration policy.

However, since humanitarian based immigration has been a predominant aspect of Norwegian immigration policies, it is reasonable to expect that for instance refugee and asylum seeker issues often are associated with immigrations in the common public. This seems to be the one of the respondents' excuse on behalf of Norwegians, or 'them', on the negative experiences he had because of being coloured: " [...] but I do not blame them, because if you go to Grønland [Oslo] you see only refugees" (A-2).

It can be assumed that a stronger input of say, non-Western knowledge-migrants in the Norwegian society would make the associations about what it is to be an 'innvandrер' more complex:

It has been shown that the success of immigration policies selecting migrants on the basis of their skills, such as in Canada and New Zealand, seem to be successful, not primarily because they attract the most skilled migrants from a given country, but because they alter the mix of immigrants which immigrants come from (Boeri and Hanson et al. 2002: 121).

Nevertheless, it is likely that some of the 'innvandrер' notions stem from prejudices or even racism towards people in Norway with a darker skin colour *per se* rather than the social mix of the immigrant population. Racism is a prevalent feature in Norway like in all the various immigration regimes in Western-Europe. It can therefore be assumed that prejudices that for example Indian specialists experience in Norway may be partly based on their 'invisibility' as specialists but paradoxically also on their 'visibility' in terms of ethnicity (Rogstad 1998, Castles 2000).

6.7 Conclusion

Throughout the analysis of this chapter both complex and compelling contradictions of the present Norwegian immigration policies have been exposed. I will argue that the welfare state has emerged as the Gordian knot of Western European competition states in the knowledge-based economy. As we have seen, the Western European states legitimize their competition policies through the aim of preserving welfare.

The concern for the welfare state significantly accounts for the strict restrictions on non-Western labour immigration in Norway. However, when it comes to non-Western knowledge-migration, the welfare state is not an incentive to immigrate to Norway. This is because this kind of migration primarily is structured by the capitalist structures of the labour market. International knowledge migrants will be guided by professional concerns when they evaluate the attractiveness of a country in terms of migration. As we have seen, this logic can partly be explained by how people have been socialized in terms of personal risk management. It is likely that people from India will find the US attractive as a country of immigration because of this country's eminence in market based social risk management. It can also be assumed that for reflexive Indian knowledge-migrants this incentive to migrate will be even stronger because they stress to promote themselves as 'commodities' in the knowledge-based economy. In that regard, the political economy of the US is attractive because of its emphasis on market and competition.

The key issue is whether the European welfare states contribute to decrease the European competitiveness in the knowledge-based economy. According to the analysis of this thesis, it seems like the discourse on competitiveness in the knowledge-based economy implies that the labour market is gaining increased significance within immigration policy. As has been stated, this is connected to the enhanced importance of human resources as a factor of economic competitiveness. This may imply that the welfare state will have decreasing importance within immigration policy. However, whether welfare state policies should be perceived to contradict the knowledge-based economy more than in the previous forms of modern capitalism is indeed a difficult issue. I have indicated that the political economy of the US economy seems to be more competitive than the European when it comes to attracting international knowledge-migrants. On the other hand, this point made on competitive institutional advantage does not properly capture the more indirect and extensive competitive institutional advantages of the European social model. I have hence suggested that how this

issue of competitiveness is perceived may boil down to political ideology. Further, it may be assumed that in the contemporary discourse on competitiveness, the importance of the broader, extra-economic competitive advantages is enhanced. This latter point may both entail advantages and disadvantages to Western Europe. The social model of Western Europe contributes to social and economic stability for employers. If one perceives international knowledge-migrants to be especially reflexive workers, it may be assumed that they will evaluate such extensive national institutional advantages as the welfare state system as well as professional concerns. This illustrates that the institutional advantage of the social model of Western Europe also is based on its capacity to alleviate capitalist contradictions connected to labour as a fictitious commodity. However, it can be argued that because the comparative advantages of social policies are more indirect or blurred in the knowledge-based economy, international knowledge-migrants will first of all be attracted to countries which can offer the most obvious favourable professional conditions.

Further, in the case of Norway, the analysis has pointed out certain negative effects of the universal welfare state model. I have argued that the way that social and economic concerns are politically embedded in a nation, may have wide cultural and social repercussions. The political economy of the US is more inclusive to immigrants in the juridical sense because social welfare rights for the population in general are less prioritized. In Norway, the general population has rather strong welfare rights, but in order to preserve these rights there are more juridical restrictions in terms of entrance to Norway. Somewhat schematically, it can be argued that while the US is a country of immigration, Norway is a country of welfare.

A further issue is whether the apparently fixed political opinion that there is a choice between either a high degree of immigration or a high welfare state level, will be enhanced or alleviated if the Norwegian economy becomes more knowledge-based. As we have seen, the welfare level of Norway was generally appreciated by the respondents who had lived in Norway for a while, and it partly worked as an incentive to stay more permanently in Norway. On the other hand, the universal welfare state may contribute to social exclusion of immigrants in Norway. Because of these welfare state concerns, non-Western immigrants are often perceived to be a burden on the welfare state, rather than productive workers. According to the respondents, it seems like in the more market based US, immigrant are more appreciated and socially included because of their contribution to the economy than in Norway. I have discussed whether adjusting the selection of immigrants more in accordance with the demands of the knowledge-based economy will change the public attitudes towards

immigrants in Norway. If the basis of social cohesion is becoming more adjusted to the discourse on competitiveness in the knowledge-based economy, non-Western knowledge-migrants may be increasingly included into a potential national 'us' of competitiveness. This may also entail more positive association connected to immigrants in general. On the other hand, it may also entail that some immigrants are being further excluded because they are not perceived to be 'right' according to economic demands. However, what these demands are, will again depend on the perception of the concept of 'competitiveness. At the same time, a more international/global oriented national 'us' in accordance with the knowledge-based economy may contradict immigration policies, because they are basically rooted in the nation. Some of these contradictions may be alleviated if Norwegian immigration policies are being more adjusted to some of the global transformations of the knowledge-based economy, while others may be prevalent, because contradictions are inherent in capitalism.

7. Concluding Remarks

In this chapter, I will summarize some of the general findings of the analysis. These findings will revolve around the new immigration agenda. Then I will go back to the starting point of the thesis – the issue of coherence between the predominant Norwegian immigration policy and the knowledge-based economy. Both of these sections will be framed by the regulationist approach. Finally, I will raise some further principal issues about the Norwegian immigration policy that have been generated by the regulationist approach.

7.1 Key Findings

The analysis of this thesis has generated some basic findings on what the ‘new’ immigration *is* and what it is *not*. The relevance of these findings will need to be critically seen in accordance with the concept of competitiveness. I have stated in the analysis that the importance of competitiveness should not be seen as a new aspect of the knowledge-based economy. The new way that this concept is being discursively perceived by political actors is human resources as *the* key to competitiveness. This is connected to the enhanced juxtaposition of labour and knowledge as fictitious commodities in the knowledge-based economy. The importance of these fictitious commodities also illustrated the increased emphasis on extra-economic factors of competitiveness in the knowledge-based economy.

The significance of international knowledge-migration in the knowledge-based economy can partly be seen as a reflection of the increased commodification of knowledge. Because knowledge is a fictitious commodity, this commodification is also the source of the contradictions of the knowledge-based economy. Following, international knowledge-migration is on the one hand structured by contemporary capitalism. On the other hand, the institution of international knowledge-migrants should not be seen as totally structured by capitalism. Firstly, the degree of reflexivity of employees in the knowledge-based economy can be seen as a structuring force on the individual level. According to the analysis of the Indian respondents, I will claim that the reflexivity embodied by these respondents certifies them as ‘knowledgeable agents’ who are able to cope with the demands of working life. Secondly, it can be argued that reflexivity is not only an aspect of the knowledge-based economy, but a common human trait. This implies that part of the reflexivity that international

knowledge-migrants draw on, neither is based or targeted on the demands of the knowledge-based economy. Accordingly, it can be argued that these ‘external’ reflexive aspects will be incorporated in the knowledge-based economy through the actions of these international knowledge-migrants. Hence, international knowledge-migrants may contribute to expand the extra-economic aspects of the discourse on competitiveness in the knowledge-based economy.

This latter point is relevant to Norwegian immigration policies. What I have so far argued on international knowledge-migrants implies that the individual level of this institution can be seen as part of the reason why international knowledge-migration has become a global *de facto*. The individual level is part of the increased relevance of this institution which competition states have to relate to. I have also shown that the new immigration agenda is discursively and structurally connected to the transformations of the knowledge-based economy. Human resources as a key to economic competitiveness comprise immigrants. This means that when Norwegian governments try to attract non-Western knowledge-migrants, they will need to consider which factors about Norway that these migrants themselves will find attractive or not. Accordingly, it can be argued that the state and international knowledge-migrants as institutions are being increasingly inter-connected in the knowledge-based economy.

The new immigration agenda should not yet be seen as a new immigration *paradigm*. At the present, the knowledge-based economy has not imposed a general alteration of the Norwegian or the Western European immigration policies. At the time being, the new immigration agenda implies that Norway and other Western European countries will need to relate to international labour migration in a different way. This is based on the predominant discourse on competitiveness. As we have seen, the approach to economic growth in this discourse entails that access to the right kind of human resources is crucial to enhance competitiveness. International knowledge-migrants can be categorized as some of the ‘right’ human resources in this case. Following, it is sensible that Norwegian immigration policies will need to be further developed according to the aim of attracting international knowledge-migrants. However, according to international knowledge-migrants as reflexive professionals, Norway is not one of the most attractive countries to the international labour migrants of the knowledge-based economy.

Hence, it is a significant aspect of the new immigration agenda that Norway and many other Western European countries are not among the most competitive nations when it comes to the most attractive international labour migrants. As it has been stated in this thesis, this is as a change compared to the immigration agenda that led to the ban on labour immigration in

the 1970s. It can be claimed that the Western European governments of that period tended to take their countries' attractiveness to non-Western labour migrants for granted. The new immigration agenda implies that this taken-for-granted-ness needs to be re-considered by Western European governments. The complex, global shift in the geo-economic scales of competitiveness imposed by the knowledge-based economy both implies that Western Europe will need to relate to other forms of competitiveness and other actors of competitiveness.

The migration flows of the most attractive human resources of the knowledge-based economy will be generated and structured by knowledge as a commodity. Hence, these flows will be drawn to the countries that will offer the best conditions in terms of enhancing their professional knowledge. Further, knowledge as a key to competitiveness has also implied that a new range of countries has emerged as competitive, global actors. This relatively new global scenario is what Norwegian governments will need to relate to in the shaping of immigration policies in a more knowledge-based economy. Labour migrants from Southern countries increasingly see knowledge-based economies in the South and South-East parts of the world as attractive work sites. However, the US can still be seen as the most attractive country of the labour migrants of the knowledge-based economy. In line with other actors of competitiveness in the knowledge-based economy, the Norwegian governments will have to be *reflexive* in accordance with the demands of this economy. This reflexivity also includes international knowledge-migrants as an institution.

'Reflexivity' can be seen as the key word to understand the way that the transformations of the knowledge-based economy have contributed to alter the basic premises of the Norwegian immigration policy. The Norwegian government's concerns for the welfare state, the labour market and the nation in the shaping of the immigration policies will now have to be dealt with according to a different social and economic scenario in which global structures will increasingly be part of the general political agenda. It can be argued that the increased discursive and structural influence of globalization, will force national and regional actors to look at themselves – 'us' – from the view of the global 'others'. This reflexive capacity will be necessary in order to act strategically towards other competitors on the global level. However, the new requirements of reflexivity should not only be seen as a reflection of a more globally challenged state power. It could also be perceived as an enhancement of the scope to legitimize state policies. By becoming more reflexive, the state may enhance its competitiveness on international human resources like international knowledge-migrants.

7.2 The Issue of Coherence

I will argue that the most crucial issue that has been generated through the analysis of this thesis, is whether the competitiveness policy of the Norwegian government coheres with the present immigration policy. This issue is based on the assertion that the knowledge-based economy may contain aspects that are not compatible with the welfare state model of Western Europe. Hence, the transformation to the knowledge-based economy may imply that a significant basis of social cohesion in Western Europe will be eliminated.

This issue can be seen in line with the classic sociological issue as to whether modernity contains the elements capable for destruction of its own idea of society. Schumpeter's notion on 'creative destruction' can be seen in accordance with this classic issue. Compatible with the regulationist approach to capitalism, Schumpeter sees capitalism as a social relation and institutional intervention as significant to capitalist reproduction. However, in Schumpeter's perspective institutions are subordinated in the way that individual entrepreneurs are the basic driving force of capitalist development. The function of institutions is to facilitate the innovative actions of entrepreneurs, especially in terms of providing and regulating the necessary credit. Crucial to Schumpeter's theory is that economic recessions are not only inherent in, but also necessary to innovation based capitalist development. This point is what is implied in the notion of 'creative destruction'. This notion implies that the process of innovation will go through certain stages causing inflation and reduced revenues, until there begins a new face of innovation. Accordingly, such economic cycles should not be seriously disturbed by institutional intervention (de Vecchi 1995, Kettunen 1998).

As we have seen, Schumpeter would be hostile to the perception of the regulationist approach that institutions have an essential role in capitalist development. The way that institutions have appeared analytically in this thesis contradicts Schumpeter's perspective. While Schumpeter can be argued to perceive the role of institutions within capitalism in a rather functionalist way, institutions are more structurally embedded according to the analysis of this thesis. Hence, there is no question of institutional intervention or not, because I already presuppose this 'intervention' in terms of institutional embeddedness (Hollingsworth and Boyer (eds.) [1997] 1998 Mjøset and Bohlin 1985). My regulationist approach to institutions does not exclude the importance of individual actions within capitalism as a social relation. I agree with Schumpeter that institutions are basically consisting of individuals. However, my

point is that acknowledging the structural aspects of institutions does not necessarily reduce the possibility for individual action.

When I have perceived international knowledge-migrants as an institution, it is in order to illuminate the prevalence and extensity of international knowledge-migration as a phenomenon. It has been important to emphasise the significance of this phenomenon in order to be able to illuminate the key aspects of the new immigration agenda. Further, it may be assumed that because international knowledge-migration has developed into an institution, the individuals that this institution comprises may obtain increased value. By this I mean that because the importance of international knowledge-migrants in general has increased, the social and economic acknowledgement of individual knowledge-migrants may be enhanced. This latter point may imply that non-Western knowledge-migrants will be increasingly more accepted in Western European societies. However, because the institution of international knowledge-migrants is so little evident in the Norwegian society at the time being, it is not likely that knowledge-migrants like the Indian respondents of this thesis will appear as a significant aspect of the Norwegian economy. I will hence argue that the way that immigration is connected to the knowledge-based economy is severely understated in Norwegian immigration policy. In the analysis, I have shown that immigration is both discursively and structurally implemented in the transformations of the knowledge-based economy. It can therefore also be seen as a problem that immigration is not incorporated in the Norwegian government's competitiveness strategy. I have argued that international knowledge-migrants may be seen as some of the most structurally incorporated institutions of the knowledge-based economy. Which other categories of immigrants that are to be perceived as structurally significant to the knowledge-based economy, depends on the conception of 'competitiveness'. In the analysis, I have sought to substantiate that other categories of immigration, including humanitarian based, are significant to development of a knowledge-based economy in Norway. However, to which extent immigration in general may be seen as a factor of competitiveness, will eventually depend on political ideology.

Nevertheless, according to what I have found in the analysis on the new immigration agenda, it is relevant to ask whether the transformations imposed by the knowledge-based economy may imply a version of 'creative destruction' of the Norwegian society. As we have seen, the welfare state as a premise for the structuring of Norwegian immigration policies may also be seen as part of the reason why humanitarian and not economic based immigration has become the legitimate form of immigration. Further, this welfare state concern may implicate that non-Western immigrants in general are socially excluded in the Norwegian society. This

latter factor may entail that Norway becomes a less attractive work site to non-Western knowledge-migrants.

According to this logic, the welfare state may work as a bottleneck to the development of a more knowledge-based economy. Hence, the Norwegian state's competition policies should seek to decrease the concern for the welfare state, and rather focus more on the labour market concerns of the knowledge-based economy in the structuring of immigration policies. This scenario could imply that the requirements of a universal welfare state were alleviated in favour of a more globally oriented labour market. Decreasing the egalitarian based welfare state model would also imply that an important aspect of Norwegian immigration policy – integration – would be less emphasized. In other words, these immigration policies would be more equal to the US' immigration policies. The aspect of creative destruction lies in that the Norwegian government's political effort to become more competitive according to the knowledge-based economy would entail that the social policy concerns that initially premised this effort would be weakened. Instead, the political economy of Norway would be more juxtaposed to that of the US. This transformation of the basis of social cohesion in Norway could hence be seen as 'creative destruction' of the national 'us'. As it has been indicated in the analysis, the US political economy may contribute to the leading position in the knowledge-based economy.

However, I will argue that the approach to institutions as embedded in capitalism, contribute to legitimize extra-economic factors of competitiveness. This aspect is important because it means that the Norwegian state does not necessarily need to perceive social policies as opposed to the competitiveness strategies. Further, it implies that immigration in general, and not only knowledge-based labour immigration may be seen as relevant to the development of a knowledge-based economy in Norway. However, the relevance of this perspective presupposes a broad approach to extra-economic factors of competitiveness. In other words, this perspective on institutions implies that the market will not be the only structural force of capitalism as a social relation. Reflexive competition states will need to consider a wide spectre of extra-economic factors in the global competition on human resources. This argument has also been supported throughout the analysis, in which we have seen that the Indian knowledge-migrants consider many social aspects when they relate to Norway as an attractive country to work in or not.

At the same time, fictitious commodities are an inherent aspect of capitalist market relations. That means that even if there should be political consensus on the need to alter the structuring of Norwegian immigration policies, changing immigration policies will not suffice

to enhance national competitiveness on international knowledge-migrants. The most attractive immigrants will primarily not come to Norway because of immigration policies, but because of job opportunities (Borjas 1989). If Norway aims to attract international knowledge-migrants like Indians, the Norwegian government should seek to increase Norway's prominence in the global, knowledge-based economy. However, the competition on international knowledge-migrants will cause political controversies, because these migrants are and will represent a fictitious commodity.

7.3 Further Issues

A starting point of this thesis was the aim to expand the understanding of Norwegian immigration policies as a social phenomenon. Accordingly, I have in line with the regulationist approach to capitalism connected Norwegian immigration policies to the social and economic context of certain significant institutions. The social and economic context has been the knowledge-based economy.

The regulationist approach has traditionally mostly dealt with the state as an institution (Mjøset and Bohlin 1985). I have inserted the institution of international knowledge-migrants as an institution in the knowledge-based economy. Because of its significant embeddedness in both market and social relations, the institution of international knowledge-migrants has proved to be empirically most interesting. However, I have also taken the state as an institution into consideration in terms of this embeddedness. Accordingly, I have tried to expand the scope of capitalist regulation. However, the analysis of the relationship between these two institutions in contemporary capitalism has only briefly been dealt with in this thesis. This relationship should be further researched in order to get a more valid understanding of the present immigration agenda in Norway. As a corollary, this could contribute to improve the Norwegian immigration policy.

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Appendix 1

The attachment in the e-mail which I sent to the respondents/informants called: 'Inquiry from a master student':

Hello!

I am a female master student at the Institute of Sociology, University of Bergen. My master project is on the relations between globalisation of the labour market and international migration, and is part of a larger research program on globalisation and internationalisation at the Rokkan Centre in Bergen. In connection with this project, I want to do interviews with Indian IT- professionals working in Norway.

I have already been in contact with an Indian IT-professional; [Name anonymous]. He is the one who has given me your e-mail address and a bit of information about you. Now I hope that it would be possible for you to have an interview with me, as it can give me very interesting information for my master project.

A prospective interview will not be very comprehensive, and limited by the amount of time you can afford. My starting point is that it should not last more than two hours. I will be flexible on both time and place for the interview. I live in Bergen, but I will of course come to Oslo to interview. I can interview in both English and Norwegian.

As a matter of form, I can inform you that if you choose to join in an interview, all information given off will be made *anonymous*, in accordance with the strict Norwegian legal regulations on personal data that the project must adhere to. You can *withdraw at any time*, even after the interview is done. If you withdraw, all the information from the interview will be deleted and not used in my project. All information you give me will be *kept confidential* to everyone but me, and *the interview will be deleted when my project is finished*.

I hope you can respond to my inquiry as soon as possible, even if your answer is negative. If you have any questions, or my information so far is insufficient, you can just contact me through e-mail or on mobile number [....].

I really hope you can participate in an interview!

Friendly regards

Ingunn Kvamme

Appendix 2

Interview Guide:

Part one: Personalia.

- Age
- Citizenship
- How long have you stayed in Norway
- Temporarily or permanent basis in Norway
- Contemporary Profession and Employment
- Family
- (Language)

Part two: Profession and work

1. Education and occupational experience before coming to Norway

- What is your education?
- Why did you take this kind of education?
- How is the Indian recruitment system for IT-professionals going abroad
- Past occupation from India and/or other countries
- What do you think about your profession; advantages/disadvantages
- How are your career possibilities in India and/or Norway/ and/or other countries (considering your work experiences from abroad)

2. Work in Norway

- How and why did come to Norway
- Past occupation in Norway
- What do you think about the place you work now?
- What do you think about working in Norway; advantages/disadvantages
- Permanent: What made you stay in Norway
- Temporarily: Why do you stay in India/other country.
- What do you think are advantages/disadvantages by staying in Norway. Both for professional and non-professional life.
- What can Indian/foreign IT-professionals contribute with in the Norwegian IT- area/market
- What do you think are important personal abilities for a someone who wants to work in a foreign country.

- What do you think are important to know about Norway for a foreign IT-professional who wants to come to Norway to work.
- What would you tell an IT- professional from India who was considering going to Norway to work? Recommend/ not recommend? Why/ why not
- Would you like to work and live in other countries than Norway. Why and/or which
- What could the Norwegian government do to improve the conditions of foreign IT-professionals in Norway
- (What is your impression of the Norwegian migration politics)
- What could make the Norwegian IT-business more attractive to foreign IT-professionals

Part three: Identity and non-professional life

1. Non-professional life and background from India .

- Area,
- city/village,
- family,
- (religion)
- Do you miss anything important about India
- How do you think the growth in the IT-industry influences the Indian society (esp. the IT-migration to foreign countries)

2. Non-professional life in Norway

- What do you do in your free time
- Do you have many friends or acquaintances in Norway/
 - a)From where do you know your friends – Work or outside work
 - b) Indian or non-Indian, Norwegian or non-Norwegian
- How is it to get in contact with Norwegians or getting Norwegian friends
- What is your experience with the attitudes of Norwegians toward Indian IT-professionals
- What do you think it takes for a foreigner to get into the Norwegian society.
- Things you like /dislike about Norway and Norwegians

3. Identity

- Do you think being Indian or a foreigner has an influence when you interact with Norwegians in professional/non-professional work. Advantage/disadvantage.

- Do you have something you feel especially connected to/ dependant on (person, place, religion, interests, principles), in the way that it influences the choices you make in life?
- How important to you is your non-professional life compared to your professional life
- What is important to you to feel content in your professional life/non-professional life.
- Do you think working and living outside India has changed you as a person

4. Future plans and hopes

- Profession and private life