A component-based approach for assessing reliability of compound software

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My main supervisor has been Associate Professor Rune Winther (former employee at the Faculty of Computer Sciences at Østfold University College). Professor Bent Natvig (Department of Mathematics at University of Oslo) and Senior Researcher Gustav Dahll (former employee at Institute of Energy Technology in Halden) have been my co-supervisors. This thesis consists of an introduction, six enclosed papers and a Statistical Research Report as an appendix. The papers address various issues related to the problem of assessing reliability of compound software (systems consisting of several software components), with special emphasis on failure dependencies between software components.

I wish to acknowledge the people who have contributed to this research. First, I want to thank my main supervisor Rune Winther, the person who has taken active part in all the discussions behind this research, for his enormous creativity, his guidance, his belief in me, support and understanding. Furthermore, I want to thank my co-supervisors Bent Natvig and Gustav Dahll for sharing with me their enormous knowledge and experience. A special thank goes to Bent Natvig for spending his time carefully reading through my papers and for always being helpful. This thesis would never have been finished without my fantastic supervisors.

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Halden, March 2011
Monica Kristiansen

Contents

1 Introduction

It is a well-known fact that the railway industry and the nuclear industry, as well as many other industries, are increasing the use of computerised systems for instrumentation and control (I&C). However, before computerised systems can be used in any kind of critical applications, evidences that these systems are dependable are required. Considering that most computerised systems are built as a structure of several software components, of which some might have been pre-developed and used in other contexts, there is a need for methods for assessing reliability of compound software [1]. The objective of this thesis is to report the work on developing a component-based approach for assessing reliability of compound software. Special emphasis is put on addressing failure dependencies between software components. The approach utilises a Bayesian hypothesis testing principle [2, 20] for finding upper bounds for probabilities that pairs of software components fail simultaneously. In the approach, both prior information regarding software components and results from testing are taken into account.
The following papers are in included in the thesis:

I. Finding Upper Bounds for Software Failure Probabilities - Experiments and Results. Published in Computer Safety, Reliability and Security, Safecomp 2005.

II. Assessing Reliability of Compound Software. Published in Risk, Reliability and Social Safety, ESREL 2007.

III. On the Modelling of Failure Dependencies between Software Components. Published in Safety and Reliability for Managing Risk, ESREL 2006.

IV. On Component Dependencies in Compound Software. Published in International Journal of Reliability, Quality and Safety Engineering, 2010.

V. The Use of Metrics to Assess Software Component Dependencies. Published in Risk, Reliability and Safety, ESREL 2009.

VI. A Bayesian Hypothesis Testing Approach for Finding Upper Bounds for Probabilities that Pairs of Software Components Fail Simultaneously. To appear in International Journal of Reliability, Quality and Safety Engineering, 2011.

[1] Software systems consisting of multiple software components.

2 Background

The use of computerised components in critical systems introduces a new challenge: how to produce dependable software. In many application areas it is therefore necessary to perform a thorough dependability assessment and to show evidences that the system, including its software components, is dependable [33].

The problem of assessing software reliability has been a research topic for more than 30 years, and several successful methods for predicting the reliability of an individual software component based on testing have been presented in Frankl et al. [7], Goel [8], Hamlet [14], Lyu [33], Miller et al. [34], Musa [35], Ramamoorthy and Bastani [40], and Voas and Miller [49]. However, there are still no methods proved fully successful for predicting reliability of compound software based on reliability data on the system's individual software components [9, 11, 50].

For hardware, even in critical systems, it is accepted to base the reliability assessment on failure statistics, i.e. to measure the failure probability of individual hardware components and then compute system reliability on this basis. This is applied for example in safety instrumented systems in petroleum [17]. However, the characteristics of software make it difficult to carry out such a reliability assessment. Software is not subject to ageing and any failure that occurs during operation is due to faults that are inherent in the software from the beginning. Any randomness in software failure is due to randomness in input data. It is also a fact that environments such as hardware, operating system and user needs change over time and that software reliability may change over time due to these activities [3].

Furthermore, having a system consisting of several software components explicitly requires an assessment of the software components' failure dependencies. This is discussed more thoroughly in, among others, Cortellessa and Grassi [1], Dai et al. [4], Gokhale and Trivedi [10], Guo et al. [13], Littlewood et al. [31], Lyu [33], Nicola and Goyal [37], Popic et al. [38], Popov et al. [39], and Tomek et al. [46]. In addition to the fact that software reliability assessment is inherently difficult due to software complexity and that software is sensitive to changes in usage, failure dependencies between software components represent a substantial problem.

Although different approaches to construct component-based software reliability models have been proposed in, among others, Cortellessa and Grassi [1], Gokhale and Trivedi [9], Gokhale [10], Goseva-Popstojanova and Trivedi [11], Hamlet [15, 16], Krishnamurthy and Mathur [19], Krka et al. [27], Kuball et al. [28], Popic et al. [38], Reussner et al. [41], Singh et al. [44], Trung and Thang [47], Vieira and Richardson [48], and Yacoub et al. [51], most of these approaches tend to ignore failure dependencies between software components [5, 18, 29]. In principle, the failure probability of a single software component can be assessed through statistical testing [6, 42]. However, since

critical software components usually have low failure probabilities [31], in practise the number of tests required to obtain adequate confidence in such probabilities becomes very large. An even more non-trivial situation arises when probabilities for simultaneous failures [2] of several software components need to be assessed, since they are likely to be significantly smaller than single failure probabilities.

The focus of this research has been to develop a practicable component-based approach for assessing reliability of compound software in which failure dependencies between software components are explicitly addressed.

3 The story behind the research

Based on the fact that software components rarely fail independently and that statistical testing alone (for assessing the probability for software components failing simultaneously) is practically impossible, our research started by analysing two interesting papers written by Cukic et al. [2] and Smidts et al. [45]. These papers present a Bayesian hypothesis testing approach for finding upper bounds for failure probabilities of single software components. The authors' idea is to complement testing with available prior information regarding the software components so that adequate confidence can be obtained with a feasible amount of testing.

In the approach, the null hypothesis (H_0) and the alternative hypothesis (H_1) are specified as: $H_0 : \theta \leq \theta_0$ and $H_1 : \theta > \theta_0$, where θ_0 is a probability in the interval $(0, 1)$ representing the upper bound for the failure probability θ of a software component. The upper bound θ_0 is assumed to be context specific and predefined and is typically derived from standards, regulation authorities, customers, etc. In this case, the null hypothesis and alternative hypotheses state that the probability of software component failure is lower and higher than the given upper bound θ_0, respectively.

Furthermore, the authors describe the prior belief in the failure probability ($\pi(\theta)$) of a single software component using two separate uniform probability distributions, one under the null hypothesis and one under the alternative hypothesis (see Figure 1). Based on this assumption, the authors show that the number of tests required to obtain an adequate confidence level (C_0) can be significantly reduced compared to the situation where no prior belief regarding the software component is described. By assuming that prior belief in the null hypothesis $P(H_0)$ is 0.01, the predefined upper bound θ_0 is 0.0001, and the confidence level C_0 is 0.99, the authors show that it requires 6831 fault-free tests to reach the confidence level by using Bayesian hypothesis testing compared to 46050 fault-free tests by using classical statistical testing. It is

[2] Simultaneous failure is defined as the event that several software components fail on the same system input. Component failures do not have to occur at the same instant; it is sufficient that they are all in a failed state at some point in time.



Figure 1: Prior probability distribution proposed by Cukic et al. [2] and Smidts et al. [45].

also demonstrated that the higher the prior belief in the null hypothesis is, the fewer tests are needed to obtain adequate confidence in the software component.

3.1 Paper I

Title: Finding Upper Bounds for Software Failure Probabilities - Experiments and Results.

Author: Monica Kristiansen

Although we think that the principles of the Bayesian hypothesis testing approach proposed in Cukic et al. [2] and Smidts [45] are usable, even for compound software, our main concern is related to the use of two separate uniform probability distributions to describe the prior belief in the failure probability of a single software component.

This concern is addressed in Paper 1 [20], in which an evaluation of the Bayesian hypothesis testing approach is performed. In this paper, three different prior probability distributions for the failure probability of a software component are evaluated, and their influence on the number of tests required to obtain adequate confidence in a software component is presented. In this evaluation, the first case is based on earlier work done by Cukic and Smidts et al. [2, 45] and assumes two separate uniform prior probability distributions, one under the null hypothesis and one under the alternative hypothesis (see Figure 1). In the second case, the effect of using a flat distribution under the alternative hypothesis is mitigated by allowing an expert to set an upper bound on the failure probability under H_1, i.e. to state a value θ_1 for which the probability of having a failure probability higher than θ_1 is zero (see Figure 2). In the third case, the effect of discontinuity in the prior probability distribution is mitigated by using a continuous probability distribution for θ over the entire interval $(0, 1)$. A beta



Figure 2: Prior probability distribution where the upper bound of the failure probability is set by expert judgement.

distribution is used to accurately reflect prior belief because this distribution is a rich and tractable family that forms a conjugate family to the binomial distribution. Figure 3 illustrates three possible prior probability distributions for θ for different choices of parameter values in the beta distribution.

The evaluation in Paper 1 clearly shows that using two separate uniform distributions to describe the failure probability of a software component does not represent a conservative approach at all, even though the use of a uniform probability distribution over the entire interval is usually seen as an ignorance prior. In fact, the number of tests required to obtain adequate confidence in a software component increases significantly when other more realistic distributions for the failure probability of a software component are used.

Moreover, it is shown that the total number of tests required by using this approach can both result in fewer and in even more tests compared to classical statistical testing. This means that in the Bayesian hypothesis testing approach, the number of required tests is highly dependent on the choice of prior distribution. It should therefore be emphasised that it is the underlying prior distribution for the failure probability of a



Figure 3: Beta distribution with (a) α and $\beta < 1$, (b) $\alpha < 1$ and $\beta > 1$ and (c) α and $\beta > 1$.



Figure 4: A component-based approach for assessing the reliability of compound software.

software component and underlying assumptions that lead to fewer tests rather than the Bayesian hypothesis testing approach.

3.2 Paper II

Title: Assessing Reliability of Compound Software.

Author: Monica Kristiansen and Rune Winther

In Paper II [21], a component-based approach for assessing reliability of compound software is proposed. In this approach, failure dependencies between software components are addressed explicitly. The idea behind the approach is to assess and include dependency aspects in software reliability models by finding upper bounds for probabilities that pairs of software components fail simultaneously and then include these into the reliability models. To find the upper bounds, the approach applies the principles of Bayesian hypothesis testing [2, 20, 45] on simultaneous failure probabilities. It is assumed that failure probabilities of individual software components are known. The approach is illustrated in Figure 4 and consists of five basic steps:

1. *Identify the most important component failure dependencies*: based on the structure of the software components in the compound software and information regarding individual software components, identify those dependencies between pairs of software components which are of greatest importance for the calculation of the system reliability [22]. Repeat steps 2-4 for all relevant component

dependencies in the system.

2. *Define the hypotheses*: let $q_{0,ij}$ represent an accepted upper bound for the probability (q_{ij}) that a pair (i, j) of software components fails simultaneously. The upper bound $q_{0,ij}$ is assumed to be context specific and predefined and is typically derived from standards, regulation authorities, customers, etc. Define the following hypotheses:

$$H_0 : a_{ij} \leq q_{ij} \leq q_{0,ij}$$

$$H_1 : q_{0,ij} < q_{ij} \leq b_{ij}$$

   where q_{ij} is defined in the interval $[a_{ij}, b_{ij}]$. The interval limits a_{ij} and b_{ij} represent the lower and upper limit for q_{ij}, respectively, and are decided by the restrictions the components' marginal failure probabilities put on the components' simultaneous failure probabilities [22].
3. *Describe prior belief regarding probability q_{ij}*: establish a prior probability distribution $\pi(q_{ij})$ for the probability that a pair of software components fails simultaneously [24]. Based on this probability distribution the prior belief in the null hypothesis $P(H_0)$ must be quantified.
4. *Update your belief in hypothesis H_0*: based on the prior belief in the null hypothesis $P(H_0)$ from step 3 and a predefined confidence level $C_{0,ij}$, the number of tests required to obtain an adequate upper bound for the probability of simultaneous failure can be found for different numbers of failures encountered during testing. The more failures that occur during testing, the more tests are required to reach $C_{0,ij}$. For further details on when to stop testing see Cukic et al. [2] or Kristiansen et al. [22].
5. *Calculate the complete system's failure probability*: information regarding failure probabilities of individual software components (which are assumed to be known) and upper bounds for the most important simultaneous failure probabilities (found in step 1-4) can finally be combined to obtain an upper bound for the failure probability of the entire system. This can be performed by various methods, e.g. by discrete event simulation when direct calculation becomes too complicated. To calculate the failure probability of the complete system, a simulator that mimics the failure behaviour of dependent software components has been developed [25].

In the component-based approach described above, there are two main challenges:

1. How to identify those dependencies between pairs of software components that are of greatest importance for calculating the system reliability. This is necessary since it is not realistic to handle all possible dependencies in compound software.
2. How to establish prior probability distributions for probabilities that pairs of

software components fail simultaneously.

The first challenge is investigated in Paper IV, whereas the second challenge is investigated in Paper V and in Paper VI.

3.3 Paper III

Title: On the Modelling of Failure Dependencies between Software Components.

Author: Rune Winther and Monica Kristiansen

To handle the challenges identified in Subsection 3.2, an improved understanding of the nature of software component dependencies is needed. For this reason, in Paper III [50] we take a deeper look at the meaning of software component dependencies and try to increase our understanding of the mechanisms that cause dependencies between software components.

In Paper III, we begin by presenting different component-based approaches for assessing compound software. Referring to Goseva-Popstojanova and Trivedi [12], three different classes of approaches can be identified:

- *State-based approaches* which describe compound software by applying Markov chains.
- *Path-based approaches* which compute reliability of compound software by considering all possible execution paths.
- *Additive models* which predict the time-dependent failure rate of compound software based on the components' failure data.

Within each class, only few methods make a serious attempt at treating dependencies between software components. In fact, Goseva-Popstojanova and Trivedi [12] conclude that all the models they reviewed assumed independence. However, some of the published papers discuss the problem of component dependency although usually limited to somewhat narrow problem definitions and consequently narrow solutions [50].

Paper III proceeds by reviewing research more explicitly related to understanding and modelling dependencies between software components. This work has primarily been done for parallel components typically related to diverse and redundant components in fault tolerant design and N-version programming [5, 10, 18, 29, 30, 31, 39]. Although previous work on software component dependencies is valuable, our review concludes that the scope of this work is too narrow. We argue that failure dependencies must be viewed more generally and that possible causes of dependent failure behaviour are more complex than any current method takes into account.

We conclude Paper III with a detailed discussion on the meaning of dependency between software components. In addition, we make a clear distinction between the *degree of dependency* between software components which can be expressed through

conditional or simultaneous failure probabilities, and the *mechanisms* that either cause or exclude events to occur together. We divide these mechanisms into two distinct categories:

- *Development-cultural aspects (DC-aspects)*:mechanisms which cause different people, tools, methods, etc. to make the same mistakes.
- *Structural aspects (S-aspects)*: mechanisms which allow a failure in one component to affect the execution of another component.

The first category can typically be assessed using component specific information sources, e.g. programming language, development team, specifications, etc. On the other hand, the second category cannot be completely assessed using only component specific information. Information sources on how components are used in a specific context or in the compound software is also needed, e.g. sharing of resources, structural isolation, structural relation, etc. All these underlying information sources can possibly indicate if two software components are likely to fail simultaneously or not and can be used to find prior probability distributions for probabilities that pairs of software components fail simultaneously [24].

3.4 Paper IV

Title: On Component Dependencies in Compound Software.

Author: Monica Kristiansen, Rune Winther and Bent Natvig

The first challenge of our component-based approach, i.e. how to identify the most important component dependencies for calculating the system reliability, is discussed in Paper IV [22]. In this paper, we introduce the following definitions:

Definition 1. ***Data-serial components****: two components i and j are said to be data-serial components if either i or j receives data (d), directly or indirectly through other components, from the other.*

$$i \xrightarrow{d} j \quad or \quad j \xrightarrow{d} i \tag{1}$$

Definition 2. ***Data-parallel components****: two components i and j are said to be data-parallel components if neither i nor j receives data (d), directly or indirectly through other components, from the other.*

$$i \overset{d}{\nrightarrow} j \quad and \quad j \overset{d}{\nrightarrow} i \tag{2}$$

These concepts contribute to a deeper understanding of how to include component dependencies in reliability modelling and are essential for identification of possible rules for selecting the most important component dependencies.



Figure 5: Possible values for the conditional reliabilities in a two components system when a) $p_1 = 0.999$ and $p_2 = 0.999$, b) $p_1 = 0.999$ and $p_2 = 0.9999$ and c) $p_1 = 0.9999$ and $p_2 = 0.999$.

Paper IV proceeds by illustrating how the components' marginal reliabilities directly restrict the components' conditional reliabilities in general systems consisting of two and three components. Examples of how the marginal reliabilities p_1 and p_2 influence the conditional reliabilities $p_{2|1}$ and $p_{2|\bar{1}}$ in a general two components system are illustrated in Figure 5. The graphs clearly show that the restrictions on the conditional reliabilities depend heavily on the values of the marginal reliabilities. In fact, in some cases the conditional reliabilities are restricted into narrow intervals. In the same way, it is shown how the marginal reliabilities p_1, p_2, and p_3 influence the conditional reliabilities $p_{2|1}$, $p_{2|\bar{1}}$, $p_{3|1}$, $p_{3|\bar{1}}$, $p_{3|2}$, $p_{3|\bar{2}}$, $p_{3|12}$ and $p_{3|\bar{1}\bar{2}}$ in a general three components system. It is also shown that the degrees of freedom are much fewer than first anticipated when it comes to conditional probabilities. For example if the components' marginal reliabilities and four of the components' conditional probabilities are known in a simple three components system, the remaining 44 conditional probabilities can be expressed using general rules of probability theory.

At last, a test system consisting of five components is investigated to identify possible rules for selecting the most important component dependencies (those dependencies that cannot be ignored without resulting in major changes in the predicted reliability of the system). The test system is basically a redundant system with a hot standby and forward recovery. The system switches to a "high-assurance" controller if the normal "high-performance" controller causes the system to enter states outside a predetermined boundary. This type of structure is often referred to as a simplex architecture [43] and is used for instance on software controllers in Boeing 777 aircrafts.

To investigate the test system, three different techniques are applied:

1. *Direct calculation*: since the marginal and conditional reliabilities of all components in the system are assumed to be known, it is possible to assess the system's "true" failure probability when all dependencies are taken into account. This

"true" failure probability can then be compared to the failure probability predictions one gets when various component dependencies are ignored.

2. *Birnbaum's importance measure*: Birnbaum's importance measure can be used to check if the importance of the software components in the system changes when various component dependencies are ignored. If this is the case, it may indicate that some component dependencies are more important than others.
3. *Principal Component Analysis (PCA)*: the predicted failure probabilities of the system when various component dependencies are ignored represent the variables in the PCA. By identifying the variables which explain the same type of variation in data as the variable in which all component dependencies are included may indicate which component dependencies are the most important ones.

Results from the analyses show that the three techniques identify the same component dependencies as the most important component dependencies in the compound software. The results can be summarised as follows:

- Including only partial dependency information may give a substantial improvement in the reliability predictions compared to assuming independence between all software components as long as the most important component dependencies are included.
- It is also clear that dependencies between data-parallel components are far more important than dependencies between data-serial components.

For a system consisting of both data-parallel and data-serial components, the results indicate that:

- Including only dependencies between data-serial components may result in a major underestimation of the system's failure probability. In some cases, the results are even worse than by assuming independence between all components.
- Including only dependencies between data-parallel components may give predictions close to the system's true failure probability as long as the dependency between the most unreliable components is included.
- Including additional dependencies between data-parallel components may further improve the predictions.
- Including additional dependencies between data-serial components may also give better predictions as long as the dependency between the most reliable components is included.

These rules are in accordance to the results achieved when other well-known software structures were investigated (see test cases 1 and 3 in the Statistical Research Report in Appendix A which presents the non-reduced version of Paper IV [22]).

3.5 Paper V

Title: The Use of Metrics to Assess Software Components Dependencies.

Author: Monica Kristiansen, Rune Winther, Meine van der Meulen and Miguel Revilla.

The second challenge of our component-based approach, i.e. how to establish prior probability distributions for probabilities that pairs of software components fail simultaneously, is discussed in Paper V [26] and in Paper VI [24]. In Paper V, the results from an experimental study which investigates the relations between a set of internal software metrics (McCabe's cyclomatic complexity, Halstead volume, program depth, Source Lines Of Code, etc.) and stochastic failure dependency between software components are presented. This experiment was performed by analysing a large collection of program versions submitted to the same specification in a programming competition on the Internet: the Online Judge [3]. For each program version, the following information was available:

- The source code which makes it possible to calculate a set of relevant internal software metrics for each program version.
- The performance of the program version (if it fails or succeeds) for a large set of possible input values.

The experimental study was divided into two groups. In the first group, premature program versions (where little debugging had been performed) were investigated. In the second group, mature program versions (where extensive debugging had been performed) were investigated. In both groups, pairs of program versions were investigated. To measure the probability that a pair of program versions fails dependently the study used the simultaneous failure probability of the program versions. If any relations between the probabilities that pairs of software components fail simultaneously and their difference in software metrics can be identified, one possible step forward will be to use this information as prior information in the Bayesian hypothesis testing approach for finding upper bounds for simultaneous failures between pairs of software components.

Results from univariate analyses show that if the difference between metric values of two program versions is small, it is impossible to decide the degree of failure dependency between those two program versions. However, given that the metric values for a pair of program versions differ significantly and the program versions are reasonable mature (from the second group), results indicate that the probability for simultaneous failure is less than the probability calculated if the metric values were similar. This is illustrated for two different internal software metrics (Halstead program volume and vocabulary) in Figures 6 and 7, respectively. We also observe that if the metric values for pairs of program versions differ significantly, the probability for simultaneous failure is close to

[3] `http://icpcres.ecs.baylor.edu/onlinejudge`

zero.



Figure 6: Relation between the probabilities that pairs of program versions fail simultaneously and their differences in metric values of the internal software metric Halstead program vocabulary.



Figure 7: Relation between the probabilities that pairs of program versions fail simultaneously and their differences in metric values of the internal software metric Halstead program volume.

3.6 Paper VI

Title: A Bayesian Hypothesis Testing Approach for Finding Upper Bounds for Probabilities that Pairs of Software Components Fail Simultaneously.

Author: Monica Kristiansen, Rune Winther and Bent Natvig.

In Paper VI [24], the theory on how to apply Bayesian hypothesis testing [2, 20, 45] to find upper bounds for probabilities that pairs of software components fail simultaneously is described in detail. This approach uses all relevant information sources which are available prior to testing and consists of two main steps:

1. Establishing prior probability distributions for probabilities that pairs of software components fail simultaneously.
2. Updating these prior probability distributions by performing statistical testing.

In Paper VI, the focus is on the first step of the Bayesian hypothesis testing approach.

The main motivation for establishing a prior probability distribution for q_{ij} is to utilise all relevant information sources available prior to testing in order to compensate for the enormous number of tests which is usually required to satisfy a predefined confidence level $C_{0,ij}$. In case reasonable prior information is available, the number of tests which must be run to achieve $C_{0,ij}$ can be greatly reduced.

Paper VI proposes two procedures for establishing a prior probability distribution for the simultaneous failure probability q_{ij}. Both procedures consist of two steps, the first step being common for both of them.

1. Establish a starting point for q_{ij} based on a transformed beta distribution.
2. Adjust this starting point up or down by applying expert judgement on relevant information sources available prior to testing.

In the first procedure, the prior probability distribution for q_{ij} is determined by letting experts adjust the initial mean and variance of q_{ij} in the transformed beta distribution based on relevant information sources. In the second procedure, the prior transformed beta distribution for q_{ij} is adjusted numerically by letting experts express their belief in the total number of tests and the number of simultaneous failures that all relevant information sources correspond to.

Both procedures assume that relevant information sources can be assigned values in the interval $[0, 1]$. A value close to 0 can for example indicate substantial difference in development methodologies, great diversity between development teams, or low complexity of the interface between software components. On the other hand, a value close to 1 can for example indicate use of identical development methodologies, extreme complexity of the interface between software components, or that components are developed by the same development team. The idea is that the larger (i.e. closer to 1) the values of the relevant information sources I_i are, the larger is the mean for simultaneous failure in the first procedure and the number of simultaneous failures in the second procedure.

A critical question is if experts are able to express their belief about relevant information sources using a numerical scale from 0 to 1. One possible simplification is to let experts express their beliefs on an ordinal scale first and then map this onto a numerical scale. For example, for a five point ordinal scale {very low, low, medium,

high, very high}, "very low" can be associated with the interval $[0, 0.2)$, "low" can be associated with the interval $[0.2, 0.4)$ and so on.

4 Summary, discussion and further work

The research presented in Section 3 has lead to the development of a component-based approach for assessing reliability of compound software. This approach applies well-based probabilistic models to explicitly handle failure dependencies between software components and has been elaborated through several experimental studies.

The approach is based on the following assumptions:

- The states of the software components are positively correlated.
- All data-flow relations between the software components are known.
- The reliabilities of the individual software components are known.
- The system and its components have only two possible states (functioning and failed).
- The system has a monotone structure [36].

Furthermore, the research is restricted to on-demand types of situations where the compound software is given an input and execution is considered to be finished when a corresponding output has been produced.

During development of the component-based approach, two major challenges have been tackled:

1. How to identify those dependencies between pairs of software components that are of greatest importance for calculating the system reliability.
2. How to establish prior probability distributions for probabilities that pairs of software components fail simultaneously.

The first challenge has been discussed in detail in Paper IV [22]. The main contribution of Paper IV has been to show that the difficult task of including component dependencies in reliability calculations can be simplified in three ways by accounting for the following facts:

1. The components' marginal reliabilities put direct restrictions on the components' conditional reliabilities in compound software.
2. The degrees of freedom are much fewer than first anticipated when it comes to conditional probabilities. For example if the components' marginal reliabilities and four of the components' conditional probabilities are known in a simple three components system, the remaining 44 conditional probabilities can be expressed using general rules of probability theory. This is proved mathematically in Paper IV.
3. Including only partial dependency information may give substantial improve-

ments in the reliability predictions compared to assuming independence between all software components as long as the most important component dependencies are included. In Paper IV, a set of rules for selecting the most important component dependencies have been proposed. It should be emphasised that these rules are based on an experimental study concerning different test cases [23] in which the reliabilities of the individual components are assumed to be known.

Furthermore, the paper defines two new concepts: data-parallel and data-serial components. These concepts contribute to a deeper understanding of how to include component dependencies in reliability modelling and they are essential in the identification of possible rules for selecting the most important component dependencies.

The second challenge has been discussed in detail in Paper VI [24]. The main contribution of this paper amounts to two procedures for establishing a prior probability distribution for the probability q_{ij} that a pair of software components fails simultaneously. In the first procedure, the prior probability distribution for q_{ij} is determined by letting experts adjust the initial mean and variance of q_{ij} in the transformed beta distribution based on relevant information sources. In the second procedure, the prior transformed beta distribution for q_{ij} is adjusted numerically by letting experts express their belief in the total number of tests and the number of simultaneous failures that all relevant information sources correspond to.

Both procedures consist of two main steps, the first step being common for both of them.

1. Establish a starting point for the probability of simultaneous failure between a pair of software components based on a transformed beta distribution.
2. Adjust this starting point up or down by applying expert judgement on relevant information sources available prior to testing.

By covering the second and last challenge of our approach in Paper VI, we finally come to the definition of a complete component-based approach for assessing reliability of compound software in which failure dependencies are explicitly addressed. However, it should be emphasised that the procedures in Paper VI represent only proposals on how to find prior probability distributions for probabilities that pairs of software components fail simultaneously. The validation of these procedures has not yet been performed and is one of the main tasks for further work. Furthermore, testing the complete component-based approach on a realistic case will be prioritised.

It should also be emphasised that the goal of this research has been to include dependency aspects in the reliability calculations of critical systems and not to handle component dependencies in systems consisting of a very large amount of components.

With regard to the assumptions which forms the basis of the developed approach, positive correlation between two software components is normally expected essentially because some inputs are more difficult (more error-prone) than others. Even if two

diverse software components are developed "independently", failures are more likely to happen on certain inputs than on others. Assuming positive correlation is therefore rather realistic in many cases and far more conservative than assuming independence between software components when it comes to predicting the system's reliability. In addition, recent calculations have shown that assuming positive correlation has only minor influence on the restrictions that the marginal component reliabilities put on the conditional reliabilities in a simple two components system. However, more research on systems consisting of more than two components is needed and will be carried out as further work.

It is natural to assume that some design documents defining the architecture, component interfaces and other characteristics of the system are available when a compound software is assessed. Structure charts which graphically show the flow of data and control information between components in a compound software are of special interest. They give an overview of the software structure and are fundamental for identifying the most important component dependencies in the system, i.e. those dependencies that influence the system reliability the most.

Although the issue on how to predict reliability of individual software components is by no means trivial, our approach assumes that these probabilities are already known. How to assess these probabilities has been studied by several researchers over the years and an overview of different techniques for predicting the reliability of a particular software component based on testing can be found in, among others, Littlewood and Strigini [32], Lyu [33] and Musa [35].

Assuming that the compound software is a monotone system and that the compound software and its components have only two possible states represents a limitation made to simplify our approach. Software components and compound software do usually have a number of possible failure modes and more research on how to include multiple failure modes is needed.

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Papers I - VI and Appendix A

I

II

III

IV

V

VI

Appendix A

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ON COMPONENT DEPENDENCIES IN COMPOUND SOFTWARE

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Predicting the reliability of software systems based on a component approach is inherently difficult, in particular due to failure dependencies between the software components. Since it is practically difficult to include all component dependencies in a system's reliability calculation, a more viable approach would be to include only those dependencies that have a significant impact on the assessed system reliability. This paper starts out by defining two new concepts: data-serial and data-parallel components. These concepts are illustrated on a simple compound software, and it is shown how dependencies between data-serial and data-parallel components, as well as combinations of these, can be expressed using conditional probabilities. Secondly, this paper illustrates how the components' marginal reliabilities put direct restrictions on the components' conditional probabilities. It is also shown that the degrees of freedom are much fewer than first anticipated when it comes to conditional probabilities. At last, this paper investigates three test cases, each representing a well-known software structure, to identify possible rules for selecting the most important component dependencies. To do this, three different techniques are applied: 1) direct calculation, 2) Birnbaum's measure and 3) Principal Component Analysis (PCA). The results from the analyses clearly show that including partial dependency information may give substantial improvements in the reliability predictions, compared to assuming independence between all software components.

Keywords: Compound software; component dependencies; Birnbaum's measure; Principal Component Analysis (PCA); system reliability; probability of failure on demand (pfd).

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1. Introduction

The problem of assessing reliability of software has been a research topic for more than 30 years, and several successful methods for predicting the reliability of an individual software component based on testing have been presented [23,25]. There are, however, still no really successful methods for predicting the reliability of compound software (software systems consisting of multiple software components) based on reliability data on the system's individual software components[9,29,32].

1.1. *Motivation*

For hardware components, even in critical systems, it is accepted to base the reliability assessment on failure statistics, i.e. to measure the failure probability of the individual components and compute the system reliability on the basis of this. This is for example applied for safety instrumented systems in petroleum [11].

The characteristics of software, however, make it difficult to carry out such a reliability assessment. Software is not subject to ageing, and any failure that occurs during operation is due to faults that are inherent in the software from the beginning. Any randomness in software failure is due to randomness in the input data. It is also a fact that environments, such as hardware, operating system and user needs change over time, and that the software reliability may change over time due to these activities [3].

Furthermore, having a system consisting of several software components, explicitly requires an assessment of the software components' failure dependencies [22]. So in addition to the fact that assessing the reliability of software is inherently difficult due to the complexity of software, and that software is sensitive to changes in its usage, failure dependencies between software components is a substantial problem.

Although several approaches to construct component-based software reliability models have been proposed [10,15,20], most of these approaches tend to ignore the failure dependencies that usually exist between software components, in spite of the fact that previous research shows that this is often unrealistic [5,14,21].

In principle, a single software component's failure probability can be assessed through statistical testing. However, since critical software components usually need to have low failure probabilities [22], the number of tests required to obtain adequate confidence in these failure probabilities often becomes practically very difficult to execute. An even more difficult situation arises when the probability for simultaneous failure of several software components need to be assessed, since these probabilities are likely to be significantly smaller than single failure probabilities.
Based on the fact that:

- software components rarely fail independently, and that
- using statistical testing alone to assess the probability for software components failing simultaneously is practically impossible in most situations

the main focus has been to develop a component-based approach for assessing the reliability of compound software, which is practicable in real situations, and

where failure dependencies between the software components are explicitly addressed [16,17,18,19].

This paper starts out by defining two new concepts: data-serial and data-parallel components [a]. These concepts are illustrated on a simple compound software, and it is shown how dependencies between data-serial and data-parallel components, as well as combinations of these, can be expressed using conditional probabilities. Secondly, this paper illustrates how the components' marginal reliabilities put direct restrictions on the components' conditional probabilities. It is also shown that the degrees of freedom are much fewer than first anticipated when it comes to conditional probabilities. If the components' marginal reliabilities and four of the components' conditional probabilities are known in a simple three components system, the remaining 44 conditional probabilities can be expressed using general rules of probability theory. At last, this paper investigates three test cases, each representing a well-known software structure, to identify possible rules for selecting the most important component dependencies [b]. To do this, three different techniques are applied: 1) direct calculation, 2) Birnbaum's measure and 3) Principal Component Analysis (PCA).

The results from the analyses clearly show that including partial dependency information may give substantial improvements in the reliability predictions, compared to assuming independence between all software components. However, this is only as long as the most important component dependencies are included in the reliability calculations. It is also apparent that dependencies between data-parallel components are far more important than dependencies between data-serial components. Further the analyses indicate that including only dependencies between data-parallel components may give predictions close to the system's true failure probability, as long as the dependency between the most unreliable components is included. Including only dependencies between data-serial components may however result in predictions even worse than by assuming independence between all software components.

1.2. *Notation*

In this paper, capital letters are used to denote random variables and lower case letters are used for their realizations.

To indicate the state of the i th component, a binary value x_i is assigned to component i [1].

$$x_i = \begin{cases} 0 \text{ if component } i \text{ is in the failed state} \\ 1 \text{ if component } i \text{ is in the functioning state} \end{cases} \tag{1}$$

Similarly, the binary variable ϕ denotes the state of the system.

[a] See Definitions 3 and 4 in Section 1.3.
[b] See Definition 1 in Section 1.3.

$$\phi = \begin{cases} 0 \text{ if the system is in the failed state} \\ 1 \text{ if the system is in the functioning state} \end{cases} \tag{2}$$

It is assumed that the state of the system is uniquely determined by the states of the components, i.e. $\phi = \phi(\mathbf{x})$, where $\mathbf{x} = (x_1, x_2, \ldots, x_n)$ and n is the number of components in the system. ϕ is usually called the structure function of the system. A serial structure functions if and only if all the components in the system function. The structure function of a serial structure consisting of n components is given in Equation 3.

$$\phi(\mathbf{x}) = x_1 \cdot x_2 \cdots x_n = \prod_{i=1}^{n} x_i \tag{3}$$

A parallel structure functions if and only if at least one of the components in the system functions. The structure function of a parallel structure consisting of n components is given in Equation 4.

$$\phi(\mathbf{x}) = 1 - \prod_{i=1}^{n} (1 - x_i) \tag{4}$$

The reliability of component i are given as follows:

$$p_i = P(X_i = 1) \tag{5}$$

In addition, a simplified notation is used to describe conditional reliabilities. An example is given in Equation 6.

$$p_{3|1\bar{2}} = P(x_3 = 1 | x_1 = 1, x_2 = 0) \tag{6}$$

The main task of this paper is to find the system reliability $h(\mathbf{p})$, where $\mathbf{p}$ includes both the component reliabilities as well as their conditional reliabilities.

1.3. *Definitions*

Definition 1. The most important component dependencies are those dependencies that influence the system reliability the most, i.e. those dependencies that cannot be ignored without resulting in major changes in the predicted reliability of the system.

Definition 2. A dependency combination (DC) is a subset of the actual component dependencies in a compound software.



Fig. 1. An illustrative example.

Definition 3. Two components i and j are said to be data-serial components if either: 1) i receives data, directly or indirectly through other components, from j, or 2) j receives data, directly or indirectly through other components, from i.

$$i \overset{d}{\rightarrow} j \quad or \quad j \overset{d}{\rightarrow} i \tag{7}$$

Definition 4. Two components i and j are said to be data-parallel components if neither i or j receives data, directly or indirectly through other components, from the other.

$$i \overset{d}{\nrightarrow} j \quad and \quad j \overset{d}{\nrightarrow} i \tag{8}$$

To explain the concepts of data-serial and data-parallel components, the compound software given in Figure 1 is used as an illustrative example. The system consists of four components, and in Table 1 different pairs of data-serial and data-parallel components are listed. In addition, possible conditional reliabilities which can be used to express the dependency between these components are given.

Table 1. Different pairs of data-serial and data-parallel components.

data-serial component pairs	**stochastic dependence**
C1 and C2	$p_{2\|1}$ or $p_{1\|2}$
C1 and C4	$p_{4\|1}$ or $p_{1\|4}$
C2 and C4	$p_{4\|2}$ or $p_{2\|4}$
C3 and C4	$p_{4\|3}$ or $p_{3\|4}$
data-parallel component pairs	**stochastic dependence**
C1 and C3	$p_{3\|1}$ or $p_{1\|3}$
C2 and C3	$p_{3\|2}$ or $p_{2\|3}$

To express dependencies for sets of data-serial and data-parallel components, different conditional reliabilities can be used. For example, to express the dependency between the data-serial components 1 and 4 and the data-serial components 2 and 4, the conditional reliability $p_{4|12}$ can be used. In the same way, to express

the dependency between the data-parallel components 1 and 3 and between the data-serial components 1 and 4, the conditional reliability $p_{1|34}$ can be used.

1.4. *Assumptions*

In this study, a software component is considered to be an entity that has a predefined and specified boundary and which is atomic, in the sense that it can't or won't be divided into sub-components. It is made no special assumptions whether the component is available in binary format or as source code. The context is essentially an Off-The-Shelf (OTS) situation, where custom developed and previously developed software (PDS) components are combined to achieve a larger piece of software.

In this paper, only on-demand types of situations are considered, i.e. situations where the system is given an input and execution is considered to be finished when a corresponding output has been produced.
The following assumptions are made:

- All structural relations between the components are known.
- The individual component reliabilities are known.
- The components, as well as the system, only have two possible states, a functioning state and a failure state.
- It is assumed positive correlation between the software components.
- The system has a monotone structure [27].

1.5. *The structure of this paper*

In Section 2, some of the work that has been done with regard to understanding the nature of failure dependency between software components is reviewed. Section 3 illustrates how the software components' marginal reliabilities put direct restrictions on the components' conditional reliabilities and failure probabilities. It is also shown that the degrees of freedom are much fewer than first anticipated when it comes to conditional probabilities. Section 4 describes the methods and analysis techniques used to identify possible rules for selecting the most important component dependencies. Section 5 presents the selected test cases, and Section 6 presents the results from the analyses. Section 7 summarizes the results and tries to come up with possible rules for selecting the most important component dependencies. Section 8 concludes and presents ideas for further work.

2. Earlier Work Related to the Problem of Component Dependency

The dominating case for discussions on software component dependency is multi-version designs, typically the N-version approach where output is decided by a voter using the results from N components as input. The idea behind N-version programming is that by forcing various aspects of the development process to be

different, i.e. development team, methods, tools, programming languages etc. the likelihood of having the same fault in several components would become negligible.

The hypothesis that independently developed components would fail independently has been investigated from various perspectives. A direct test of this hypothesis was done in [14] where a total of 27 components were developed by different people. Although the results can be debated, this experiment indicated that assuming independence should be done with caution. The experiment showed that the number of tests for which several components failed was much higher than anticipated under the assumption of independence. While there are many different mechanisms that might cause even independently developed components to fail on the same inputs, it doesn't seem implausible that the simple fact that programmers are likely to approach a problem in much the same way would cause them to make the same mistakes, and thus cause dependency between the components' failure behavior.

A more theoretical approach on the same issue was presented in Eckhardt and Lee [5] and elaborated on a few years later in Littlewood and Miller [21]. Although Eckhardt and Lee present several interesting results, our primary interest is related to the considerations regarding whether independent development processes produce software components that fail independently. Note that a more comprehensive discussion is provided in [22].

The key variable in the Eckhardt and Lee model is the difficulty function $\theta(x)$, defined to be the probability that a component version chosen at random will fail on a particular input demand, x. The more difficult an input x is, the greater we would believe the chance that an unknown program will fail.

The main result in the Eckhardt and Lee model is that independently developed components do not imply independent components. The key point is that as long as some inputs are more difficult to process than others, even independently developed components will fail dependently. In fact, the more the difficulty varies between the inputs, the greater is the dependence in failure behavior between the components. Only in the special situation where all inputs are equally difficult, i.e. the difficulty function $\theta(x)$ is constant for all $x \in \Omega$, independently developed components will fail independently.

The Littlewood and Miller model [21] is a generalization of the Eckhardt and Lee model in which the different component versions are developed using diverse methodologies. In this context, the different development methodologies might represent different development environments, different types of programmers, different languages, different testing regimes etc.

The main result in the Littlewood and Miller model is that the use of diverse methodologies decreases the probability of simultaneous failure of several component versions. In fact, they show that it is theoretically possible to obtain component versions which exhibit better than independent failure behavior. So while it is natural to try to justify an assumption of independence, it is worthwhile noting that having independent components is not necessarily the optimal situation with regard

to maximizing reliability.

Other relevant work on how to include component failure dependencies are summarized below.

Gokhale and Trivedi [8] look into problems associated with assuming independence in path-based approaches. The problem they address is that assuming independence of successively executing components is likely to produce pessimistic results, especially considering that the same component may be executed several times in a single path due to loop structures. The knowledge that a component did not fail on the previous loop iteration is likely to be a good indication that it will not fail on the next iteration either. This is an interesting observation and it indicates that thinking in terms of reliability block diagrams when it comes to software components is not straightforward. As a possible way to overcome the problem of a pessimistic estimate, the authors propose to treat multiple executions as a single execution. Their solution relies on 1) time-dependent notation of reliability and 2) time-dependent failure intensities of the individual components.

Zavala and Huhns [33] present an initial empirical study on the correlation of code complexity measures and coincident failures in multi-version systems (when two or more program versions are identically incorrect). Their study is based on 28 Java implementations and clearly shows a correlation between software metrics and coincident failures. At the current state the results cannot be generalized, however the authors have shown that the use of software complexity metrics as indicators of proneness to coincident failures in multi-version systems is worth exploring further.

In Popic et al. [28], the authors extend their previous work on Bayesian reliability prediction of component based systems by introducing the error propagation probability into the model. Like most other component-based reliability models, their old model assumed that system components will fail independently. The authors define the error propagation probability as the probability that an erroneous state generated in one component propagates to other components instead of being successfully detected and masked at its source. To describe error propagation, the model of Nassar et al. [26] is applied. Based on a case study, the authors conclude that error propagation may have significant impact on the system reliability prediction and argue that future architecture-based models should not ignore it.

Fricks and Trivedi [7] study the effect of failure dependencies in reliability models developed using stochastic Petri nets (SPN) and continuous-time Markov chains. Based on a set of examples, the authors conclude that failure dependencies highly influence the reliability models and that failure dependencies therefore never should be ignored. Of special interest is the authors classification of different types of failure dependencies that can arise in reliability modeling. The authors then illustrate how several of these failure dependencies can be incorporated into stochastic Petri net models.

Vieira and Richardson [31] argue that component dependencies should be treated as a first class problem in component-based systems (CBSs). They discuss issues related to component-based system dependencies and present a conceptual model for

describing and analyzing dependencies in a CBS. To describe component dependencies, the authors use denotational semantics of partial-order multi-sets(pomsets).

In Huang et al. [12], the authors combine analytical models with simulation techniques for software reliability measurement. The authors present two failure-rate simulation techniques, which both take the functional dependency and error correlation among the components in a software system into account. In the first technique, the authors use a dependency coefficient to include dependencies between the components. This coefficient is based on test data from each component in the system. In the second technique, the transition probabilities between the components in the system are used. The authors do however not suggest any approaches to find these probabilities. The main contribution of their work is demonstrating an architecture-oriented simulation framework to analyze reliability measures for software systems with dependent components.

Reliability block diagrams (RBDs), fault trees (FTs) and reliability graphs (RGs) are all limited in their modelling capability, due to the assumption of stochastic independence among the system's units. Dynamic reliability block diagrams (DRBDs), presented in [4], extend RBDs with elements specific for representing dynamic behaviors. Examples of dynamic-dependent behaviors that can be handled in a DRBD include dependent, cascade, on-demand and/or common cause failures, as well as interferences between the system's units such as load sharing and inter/sequence-dependency. The DRBDs are based on the concept of dependency. The authors consider a dependency as the simplest dynamic relationship between two system units. A dependency is a unidirectional, one-way, dynamic relationship, which represents and quantifies the influence of one unit on another unit. More complex dynamic behaviors are than expressed as compositions of these simple dependencies. In [4], the authors investigate the reliability in two case studies and show that dynamic aspects and behaviors, usually not analyzable by other methodologies, can be handled in DRBDs.

Although previous work on software component dependencies is valuable, it was in [32] concluded that the scope of this work is too narrow. In [32], the authors take a deeper look at the nature of software component dependencies and try to increase the reader's understanding of the mechanisms that cause dependencies between software components. In the paper, the authors differ between degree of dependence between software components, which can be expressed through conditional or simultaneous failure probabilities, and the mechanisms that either cause or exclude events to occur together. These mechanisms are divided into two distinct categories:

- Development-cultural aspects (DC-aspects): Includes factors that cause different people, tools, methods, etc. to make the same mistakes, e.g. identical programming language, compiler, etc.
- Structural aspects (S-aspects): Includes factors that allow a failure in one component to affect the execution of another component, e.g. through shared resources, structural relation, etc.



Fig. 2. Possible values for the conditional reliabilities in a two components system when a) $p_1 = 0.999$ and $p_2 = 0.999$, b) $p_1 = 0.999$ and $p_2 = 0.9999$ and c) $p_1 = 0.9999$ and $p_2 = 0.999$.

The main conclusions in [32] are that inter-dependencies between software components are more complicated than any existing methods consider.

3. Prior Information from the Software Components' Marginal Reliabilities

In the following, it will be shown how single components' marginal reliabilities, as well as the assumption of positive correlation, put directly restrictions on the components' conditional reliabilities. These restrictions may be used as direct input into a Bayesian belief net for establishing prior probability distributions for the probabilities that sets of software components will fail simultaneously. It may also be used as guidance for the experts as to which conditional reliabilities it is easiest to make any decisions about.

3.1. *Two components system*

Consider a general system consisting of only two software components. Assume further that the two components' marginal reliabilities p_1 and p_2 are known. In addition, positive correlation between component 1 and 2 is assumed ($p_{2|1} \geq p_2$). This means that information that component 1 is functioning cannot reduce the reliability of component 2. This is a reasonable assumption when the components are in series with each other. However, when the components are in parallel, this may not always be a natural assumption. If the components have been developed by different development teams, using different development methods and languages, it might in fact be natural to assume negative correlation. This means that if one component fails, this increases the reliability of the other component and visa versa. However, the consequences of assuming independence between all software components in a compound software are far more severe than by assuming positive correlation.

In a simple two components system, there are eight possible conditional probabilities between component 1 and 2 ($p_{2|1}$, $p_{2|\bar{1}}$, $p_{1|2}$, $p_{1|\bar{2}}$ etc.). If one of these con-

Table 2. Restrictions on the conditional reliabilities $p_{2|1}$ and $p_{2|\bar{1}}$ in a simple two components system for different combinations of the marginal reliabilities p_1 and p_2.

Marginal reliabilities		Conditional reliabilities
C1	C2	
$p_1 = 0.9$	$p_2 = 0.9999$	$p_{2\|1} \in [0.9999, 1]$ $p_{2\|\bar{1}} \in [0.999, 0.9999]$
$p_1 = 0.99$	$p_2 = 0.9999$	$p_{2\|1} \in [0.9999, 1]$ $p_{2\|\bar{1}} \in [0.99, 0.9999]$
$p_1 = 0.999$	$p_2 = 0.9999$	$p_{2\|1} \in [0.9999, 1]$ $p_{2\|\bar{1}} \in [0.9, 0.9999]$
$p_1 = 0.9$	$p_2 = 0.999$	$p_{2\|1} \in [0.999, 1]$ $p_{2\|\bar{1}} \in [0.99, 0.999]$
$p_1 = 0.99$	$p_2 = 0.999$	$p_{2\|1} \in [0.999, 1]$ $p_{2\|\bar{1}} \in [0.9, 0.999]$
$p_1 = 0.999$	$p_2 = 0.999$	$p_{2\|1} \in [0.999, 1]$ $p_{2\|\bar{1}} \in [0, 0.999]$
$p_1 = 0.9999$	$p_2 = 0.999$	$p_{2\|1} \in [0.999, 0.9990999]$ $p_{2\|\bar{1}} \in [0, 0.999]$
$p_1 = 0.99999$	$p_2 = 0.999$	$p_{2\|1} \in [0.999, 0.99900999]$ $p_{2\|\bar{1}} \in [0, 0.999]$
$p_1 = 0.999$	$p_2 = 0.99$	$p_{2\|1} \in [0.99, 0.99099099]$ $p_{2\|\bar{1}} \in [0, 0.99]$
$p_1 = 0.9999$	$p_2 = 0.99$	$p_{2\|1} \in [0.99, 0.990099]$ $p_{2\|\bar{1}} \in [0, 0.99]$
$p_1 = 0.99999$	$p_2 = 0.99$	$p_{2\|1} \in [0.99, 0.9900099]$ $p_{2\|\bar{1}} \in [0, 0.99]$

ditional probabilities is known, the others can easily be expressed by using general rules in probability theory. See proof in Appendix A.

Based on the law of total probability, the linear relationship between $p_{2|1}$ and $p_{2|\bar{1}}$ is given in Equation 9.

$$p_{2|1} = \frac{p_2}{p_1} - \frac{(1 - p_1)}{p_1} p_{2|\bar{1}} \tag{9}$$

Equation 9 is used as basis for investigating the relation between the marginal reliabilities p_1 and p_2 and the conditional reliabilities $p_{2|1}$ and $p_{2|\bar{1}}$. In Table 2, different sets of marginal reliabilities and their restrictions on the components'

conditional reliabilities are given. Restrictions on the conditional reliabilities $p_{2|1}$ and $p_{2|\bar{1}}$ for three different sets of marginal reliabilities p_1 and p_2 are also illustrated graphically in Figure 2.

The results in Table 2 and Figure 2 clearly shows that the marginal reliabilities p_1 and p_2 put direct restrictions on the conditional reliabilities $p_{2|1}$ and $p_{2|\bar{1}}$. In fact, in some cases the conditional reliabilities are restricted into small intervals. The restrictions depend heavily on the values of the marginal reliabilities.

3.2. *Three components system*

Let's move a step forward and look at a simple system consisting of three components. As for the two components system, it is assumed that the components' marginal reliabilities p_1, p_2 and p_3 are known. In addition, positive correlations are assumed.

In a simple three components system there are 48 possible conditional probabilities between components 1, 2 and 3 ($p_{3|1}$, $p_{3|\bar{1}}$, $p_{3|2}$, $p_{3|\bar{2}}$, $p_{3|12}$ etc.), including the eight possible conditional probabilities between components 1 and 2. If four of these conditional probabilities are known, the others can easily be expressed by using general rules of probability theory (see proof in Appendix A). In a three components system, one therefore for instance needs to know one conditional probability between components 1 and 2 and three conditional probabilities between components 1, 2 and 3 to find all the remaining conditional probabilities. One possible set of conditional probabilities may for example be: $p_{2|1}, p_{3|1}$, $p_{3|2}$ and $p_{3|12}$. However, this is only one possible selection of conditional probabilities that can be chosen. Another set may for example be: $p_{2|\bar{1}}, p_{3|\bar{1}}$, $p_{3|\bar{2}}$ and $p_{3|\bar{1}\bar{2}}$. Which set to choose should be considered thoroughly, since some conditional probabilities may be easier for an expert to determine than others.

The linear relationships between $p_{3|1}$ and $p_{3|\bar{1}}$ and between $p_{3|2}$ and $p_{3|\bar{2}}$ are parallel to the linear relationship between components 1 and 2 in Equation 9. The relations between the conditional reliabilities $p_{3|12}$, $p_{3|1\bar{2}}$, $p_{3|\bar{1}2}$ and $p_{3|\bar{1}\bar{2}}$ are shown in Appendix A to be:.

$$p_{3|1\bar{2}} = \frac{p_{3|1} - p_{3|12}p_{2|1}}{1 - p_{2|1}} \tag{10}$$

$$p_{3|\bar{1}2} = \frac{p_{3|2}p_2 - p_{3|12}p_{2|1}p_1}{p_2 - p_{2|1}p_1} \tag{11}$$

$$p_{3|\bar{1}\bar{2}} = \frac{p_3 - p_{3|1}p_1 - p_{3|2}p_2 + p_{3|12}p_{2|1}p_1}{1 - p_2 + (p_{2|1} - 1)p_1} \tag{12}$$

Equation 9 and the corresponding ones for $p_{3|1}$ and $p_{3|2}$, and Equations 10 - 12 are used as basis for investigating the relation between the marginal reliabilities p_1, p_2 and p_3 and the conditional reliabilities $p_{2|1}$, $p_{3|1}$, $p_{3|2}$ and $p_{3|12}$. In Tables 3 - 5,

Table 3. Restrictions on the conditional reliabilities $p_{2|1}$, $p_{3|1}$, $p_{3|2}$ and $p_{3|12}$ in a simple three components system when $p_1 = 0.9999$, $p_2 = 0.999$ and $p_3 = 0.99$.

Example 1	
First assumption:	
$p_1 = 0.9999$	
$p_2 = 0.999$	
$p_3 = 0.99$	
Results in:	
$p_{2\|1} \in [0.999, 0.9990999]$	$p_{2\|\bar{1}} \in [0, 0.999]$
$p_{3\|1} \in [0.99, 0.990099]$	$p_{3\|\bar{1}} \in [0, 0.99]$
$p_{3\|2} \in [0.99, 0.99099099]$	$p_{3\|\bar{2}} \in [0, 0.99]$
$p_{3\|12} \in [0.99, 0.99099999]$	$p_{3\|\bar{1}\bar{2}} \in [0, 0.99]$
Second assumption:	
$p_{2\|1} = 0.99905$	
$p_{3\|1} = 0.990085$	
Results in:	
$p_{3\|2} \in [0.990043, 0.990964]$	$p_{3\|\bar{2}} \in [0.026468, 0.947503]$
$p_{3\|12} \in [0.990085, 0.990999]$	$p_{3\|\bar{1}\bar{2}} \in [0, 0.140085]$
Third assumption:	
$p_{3\|2} = 0.9903$	
Results in:	
$p_{3\|12} \in [0.990336, 0.990342]$	$p_{3\|\bar{1}\bar{2}} \in [0, 0.140085]$

three different sets of marginal reliabilities and their restrictions on the components' conditional reliabilities are given. These tables should be read as follows:

- In the first assumption, it is assumed that the components' marginal reliabilities are known. Knowing these reliabilities put direct restrictions on all the remaining conditional reliabilities in the system. In some cases they limit the conditional reliabilities into small intervals.
- In the second assumption, it is assumed that the conditional reliabilities $p_{2|1}$ and $p_{3|1}$ are known, in addition to the marginal reliabilities. This put more strict restrictions on the remaining conditional reliabilities $p_{3|2}$ and $p_{3|12}$.
- In the third assumption, the conditional reliability $p_{3|2}$ is also assumed to be known and it can easily be seen that the more information that is available, the more strict are the restrictions on the remaining reliabilities.

4. Methods and Analysis

In this section, the techniques used to identify possible rules for selecting the most important component dependencies are described in detail. The techniques are applied on three test cases, each representing a well-known software structure. For detailed descriptions of the test cases and the sets of marginal and conditional reliabilities used see Section 5.

Table 4. Restrictions on the conditional reliabilities $p_{2|1}$, $p_{3|1}$, $p_{3|2}$ and $p_{3|12}$ in a simple three components system when $p_1 = 0.99$, $p_2 = 0.999$ and $p_3 = 0.9999$.

Example 2	
First assumptions:	
$p_1 = 0.99$	
$p_2 = 0.999$	
$p_3 = 0.9999$	
Results in:	
$p_{2\|1} \in [0.999, 1]$	$p_{2\|\bar{1}} \in [0.9, 0.999]$
$p_{3\|1} \in [0.9999, 1]$	$p_{3\|\bar{1}} \in [0.99, 0.9999]$
$p_{3\|2} \in [0.9999, 1]$	$p_{3\|\bar{2}} \in [0.9, 0.9999]$
$p_{3\|12} \in [0.9999, 1]$	$p_{3\|\bar{1}\bar{2}} \in [0, 0.9999]$
Second assumptions:	
$p_{2\|1} = 0.9999$	
$p_{3\|1} = 0.99999$	
Results in:	
$p_{3\|2} \in [0.9999081, 1]$	$p_{3\|\bar{2}} \in [0.9, 0.9918081]$
$p_{3\|12} \in [0.99999, 1]$	$p_{3\|\bar{1}\bar{2}} \in [0.9, 0.99099]$
Third assumptions:	
$p_{3\|2} = 0.99995$	
Results in:	
$p_{3\|12} \in [0.99999, 0.999995]$	$p_{3\|\bar{1}\bar{2}} \in [0.94446, 0.94995]$

4.1. *Direct calculation*

In the "direct calculation", the effects of including only a subset of the actual component dependencies when assessing the failure probability of compound software are examined. In this analysis, all marginal and conditional reliabilities are assumed to be known. This makes it possible to assess the system's "true" failure probability when all dependencies are taken into account. The system's "true" failure probability can then be compared to the failure probability predictions one gets when various component dependencies are ignored.

4.2. *Birnbaum's reliability importance measure*

Birnbaum's measure [2] for the reliability importance of component i, I_i^B, is defined by:

$$I_i^B = \frac{\delta h}{\delta p_i} \tag{13}$$

Hence, Birnbaum's measure is found by partial differentiation of the system reliability with respect to p_i. This approach is well known from classical sensitivity analysis and assumes independence between the components. If I_i^B is large, a small change in the reliability of component i will give a relatively large change in system reliability.

Table 5. Restrictions on the conditional reliabilities $p_{2|1}$, $p_{3|1}$, $p_{3|2}$ and $p_{3|12}$ in a simple three components system when $p_1 = 0.99$, $p_2 = 0.9999$ and $p_3 = 0.999$.

Example 3	
First assumptions:	
$p_1 = 0.99$	
$p_2 = 0.9999$	
$p_3 = 0.999$	
Results in:	
$p_{2\|1} \in [0.9999, 1]$	$p_{2\|\bar{1}} \in [0.99, 0.9999]$
$p_{3\|1} \in [0.999, 1]$	$p_{3\|\bar{1}} \in [0.9, 0.999]$
$p_{3\|2} \in [0.999, 0.9990999]$	$p_{3\|\bar{2}} \in [0, 0.999]$
$p_{3\|12} \in [0.999, 1]$	$p_{3\|\bar{1}\bar{2}} \in [0, 0.999]$
Second assumptions:	
$p_{2\|1} = 0.99999$	
$p_{3\|1} = 0.9999$	
Results in:	
$p_{3\|2} \in [0.9990802, 0.9990999]$	$p_{3\|\bar{2}} \in [0, 0.918808]$
$p_{3\|12} \in [0.9999, 0.99990999]$	$p_{3\|\bar{1}\bar{2}} \in [0, 0.9099]$
Third assumptions:	
$p_{3\|2} = 0.999085$	
Results in:	
$p_{3\|12} \in [0.9999, 0.9999085]$	$p_{3\|\bar{1}\bar{2}} \in [0.0556, 0.149085]$

Pivotal decomposition gives that:

$$\begin{aligned} h(\mathbf{p}) &= p_i h(1_i, \mathbf{p}) + (1 - p_i) h(0_i, \mathbf{p}) \\ &= p_i (h(1_i, \mathbf{p} - h(0_i, \mathbf{p})) + h(0_i, \mathbf{p}) \end{aligned} \tag{14}$$

Birnbaum's measure can therefore be written as:

$$I_i^B = \frac{\delta h}{\delta p_i} = h(1_i, \mathbf{p}) - h(0_i, \mathbf{p}) \tag{15}$$

Since $h(\cdot_i, \mathbf{p}) = E[\phi(\cdot_i, \mathbf{X})]$, the Birnbaum's measure can be written as:

$$\begin{aligned} I_i^B &= E[\phi(1_i, \mathbf{X})] - E[\phi(0_i, \mathbf{X})] \\ &= E[\phi(1_i, \mathbf{X}) - \phi(0_i, \mathbf{X})] \end{aligned} \tag{16}$$

When $\phi(\mathbf{X})$ is monotone, it can only take the values 0 and 1. I_i^B can therefore be given by:

$$\begin{aligned} I_i^B &= P(\phi(1_i, \mathbf{X}) - \phi(0_i, \mathbf{X}) = 1) \\ &= P(\phi(1_i, \mathbf{X}) = 1) - P(\phi(0_i, \mathbf{X}) = 1) \end{aligned} \tag{17}$$

Birnbaum's measure is therefore the probability that the system is in such a state that component i is critical for the system. If the components are dependent, which often is the case for software systems, the probability in Equation 17 can be used as the definition of the Birnbaum's measure.

In the experimental study, the idea is to use Birnbaum' measure to check if the importance of the software components changes when various component dependencies are ignored. If this is the case, it may indicate that some component dependencies are more important than others.

In Section 6, the results from using Birnbaum's measure are presented as one or more of the following measures:

- Original Birnbaum's measures.
- Standardized Birnbaum's measures.
- Squared difference between the true Birnbaum's measures and the measures one gets when various component dependencies are ignored.
- Squared difference between the true standardized Birnbaum's measures and the standardized measures one gets when various component dependencies are ignored.

4.3. *Principal Component Analysis (PCA)*

A principal component analysis is concerned with explaining the covariance structure or the correlation structure of a set of variables through a few linear combinations of these variables [13]. These linear combinations are called the principal components (PC).

The objective of a principal component analysis is usually data reduction. Although p variables are required to reproduce the total system's variability, often much of this variability can be explained by a small number of k uncorrelated principal components ($k \leq p$). If this is the case, the k principal components can replace the p variables, and the data set can be reduced.

Let's assume that the system's predicted failure probabilities under different dependency combinations[c] represent the variables in a PCA. For example; variable 1 can be the system's failure probability when all dependencies are included, variable 2 can be the system's failure probability when all components are independent and so on. All these variables are than calculated for n unique observation vectors. These observation vectors represent different variations in the values for each of the test cases' conditional reliabilities and are identified using a "factorial design" [24].

One of the main results from a PCA analysis is a graphical representation of the data. These graphs should be studied in detail. Score plots express graphically the variation in data and loading plots express the original variables contribution to describe this variation. To get a better understanding of the variation in data, score plots and loading plots should be examined simultaneously. Especially, points that

[c]See Definition 2 in Section 1.3.



Fig. 3. Minimal path set representation of test case 1.

fall close together in the loading plots are of special interest. This indicates that the variables are highly correlated and therefore explain the same type of variation in data.

A good starting point would therefore be to try to identify the variables that load equally to the variable where all component dependencies are included. In this way the most important component dependencies may be identified.

5. Test Cases

To identify possible rules for selecting the most important component dependencies, this paper investigates three test cases, each representing a well-known software structure. In all test cases, the components are assumed to execute sequentially according to their numbers.

5.1. *Test case 1*

Test case 1 is a typical recovery block structure and consists of two independently developed, functionally identical software components that receive the same input data (see Figure 3). The first component is a super component consisting of sub components 1 and 2. Both the super component and component 3 receive the same input data, but they are not run in parallel like in N-version programming. First, the super component is run and its output is checked using an acceptance test. An acceptance test is a program specific fault detecting mechanism, which checks the results from a program execution. If the super component passes the acceptance test, its outcome is regarded as successful and the recovery block can be exited. If the test fails or if any errors are detected by other means during execution, an exception is raised and backward recovery is invoked. This restores the state of the system to what it was at entry, and component 3 is executed. Then the acceptance test is applied again. If both the super component and component 3 fail the acceptance test, the system fails.

Figure 3 only illustrates the redundant and diverse software components in the system. This is done to simplify the analysis. It should, however, be emphasized that the system is not complete without an additional component giving the redundant components inputs and an acceptance test validating the operation of the software components.

Table 6. The selected marginal and conditional reliabilities for test combinations 1.1 and 1.2.

Test combination 1.1	Test combination 1.2
$p_1 = 0.999$	$p_1 = 0.9999$
$p_2 = 0.999$	$p_2 = 0.999$
$p_3 = 0.9999$	$p_3 = 0.99$
$p_{2\|1} = 0.9999$	$p_{2\|1} = 0.99905$
$p_{3\|1} = 0.99999$	$p_{3\|1} = 0.990085$
$p_{3\|2} = 0.999985$	$p_{3\|2} = 0.9903$
$p_{3\|12} = 0.999992$	$p_{3\|12} = 0.99034$

The system in Figure 3 is evaluated in two different ways, representing test combination 1.1 and test combination 1.2. In test combination 1.1, it is assumed that component 3 is the "high-assurance" component, whereas the super component constitutes the "high-performance" component. In test combination 1.2, it is assumed that the super component is the "high-assurance" component, whereas component 3 is the "high-performance" component. In both combinations, it is assumed that the "high-assurance" component is more reliable than the "high-performance" component.

Based on the system's minimal path sets, the system reliability of test case 1 is given in Equation 18.

$$P(\phi(\mathbf{x}) = 1) = p_{2|1}p_1 + p_3 - p_{3|12}p_{2|1}p_1 \tag{18}$$

Since the main point of this paper is to investigate and evaluate the effect of including only partial dependency information when assessing a system's reliability, all the essential marginal and conditional reliabilities must be defined. Based on the assumptions made for test case 1 and the restrictions from the marginal reliabilities (see Section 3), a valid set of marginal and conditional reliabilities for test combination 1.1 and test combination 1.2 are given in Table 6.

The system's failure probability was assessed for the following dependency combinations[d]:

1. Including all software component dependencies.
2. Assuming independence between all software components.
3. Including only the dependency between data-serial components 1 and 2.
4. Including the dependencies between data-parallel components 1 and 3, and between data-parallel components 2 and 3.
5. Including only the dependency between data-parallel components 1 and 3.
6. Including only the dependency between data-parallel components 2 and 3.
7. Including the dependencies between data-parallel components 1 and 3, and between data-serial components 1 and 2.

[d]See Definition 2 in Section 1.3.



Fig. 4. System drawing of test case 2 and test case 3.

8. Including the dependencies between data-parallel components 2 and 3, and between data-serial components 1 and 2.

5.2. *Test case 2*

The second test case represents a more complex fault tolerant system capable of switching between two redundant components in case of failure. This type of structure is referred to as a simplex architecture [30], and are for instance used on software controllers in Boeing 777. The system consists of five components and includes both data-serial and data-parallel components (see Figure 4).

The test system is basically a redundant system with a hot standby and forward recovery. This means that the system switches to a "high-assurance" controller (component 4) if the normal "high-performance" controller (component 3) causes the system to enter states outside a predetermined boundary.

In this system, the sensor manager (component 1) receives data from the sensors that are monitoring the equipment under control (EUC). This information is collected by the manager and sent to the monitor (component 2) and the two controllers (components 3 and 4). Based on the information sent from the sensor manager, the monitor selects which controller to be used. The switch (component 5) will receive input from the monitor as to which controller to take its input from. Notice that both controllers continuously receive data and send output. It is only up to the monitor to decide which of the controllers that actually will be allowed to control the system. Data from the selected controller will be sent to the actuators which in turn control the EUC.

For simplicity, two assumptions are made. First of all, it is assumed that the switch does not fail. Secondly, it is assumed that the controllers are independent of the monitor. The system will function as long as the sensor manager functions in combination with either both controllers or with at least one controller and the monitor.

A minimal path set representation of the simplified system is illustrated in Figure 5. Based on the system's minimal path sets and the assumptions that are made, the system's reliability is given in Equation 19.



Fig. 5. Minimal path set representation of test case 2.

$$P(\phi(\mathbf{x}) = 1) = p_{3|1}p_{2|1}p_1 + p_{4|1}p_{2|1}p_1 + p_{4|13}p_{3|1}p_1 - 2p_{4|13}p_{3|1}p_{2|1}p_1 \tag{19}$$

Based on the assumptions made for test case 2 and the restrictions from the marginal reliabilities (see Section 3), a valid set of marginal and conditional reliabilities for test case 2 is given in Table 7.

The system's failure probability was assessed for the following dependency combinations:

1. Including all software component dependencies.
2. Assuming independence between all software components.
3. Including only the dependency between data-parallel components 3 and 4.
4. Including only the dependency between data-serial components 1 and 2.
5. Including the dependencies between data-serial components 1 and 2, and between data-parallel components 3 and 4.
6. Including the dependencies between data-serial components 1 and 3, and between data-parallel components 3 and 4.
7. Including the dependencies between data-serial components 1 and 4, and between data-parallel components 3 and 4.
8. Including the dependencies between data-serial components 1 and 3, between data-serial components 1 and 4, and between data-parallel components 3 and 4.
9. Including only the dependency between data-serial components 1 and 3.
10. Including only the dependencies between data-serial components 1 and 4.
11. Including the dependencies between data-serial components 1 and 3, and between data-serial components 1 and 4.
12. Including the dependencies between data-serial components 1 and 2, between data-serial components 1 and 3 and between data-serial components 1 and 4.
13. Including the dependencies between data-serial components 1 and 2 and between data-serial components 1 and 3.
14. Including the dependencies between data-serial components 1 and 2 and between data-serial components 1 and 4.

Note that we somewhat imprecisely use the characterizations data-serial and data-

Table 7. The selected marginal and conditional reliabilities for test cases 2 and 3.

Test case 2 and 3
$p_1 = 0.99999$ $p_2 = 0.999$ $p_3 = 0.99$ $p_4 = 0.9999$
$p_{2\|1} = 0.999005$ $p_{3\|1} = 0.990005$ $p_{4\|1} = 0.999905$ $p_{4\|3} = 0.999995$
$p_{4\|13} = 0.9999965$

parallel also in the simplified system. The same is done in test case 3.

5.3. *Test case 3*

Test case 3 is equal to test case 2, except that a failure of component 1 does not necessarily cause system failure. This is counterintuitive since component 1 is in series with the rest of the system, i.e. all other components are downstream of this component. To see that failure in component 1 doesn't necessarily cause the system to fail, what is meant by failure in component 1 must be defined.

It must be remembered that the context is a system consisting of multiple software components. For each of these components it is assumed that reliability data are available. This means that the reliability assessment of these components must have been done with reference to a given specification. It will in many cases, however, be uncertain whether this specification is completely in accordance with the requirements of the system the component is put into. Thus, what constitutes a failure, according to the component's specification, is not necessarily a failure in the context of the system. Limited accuracy of outputs is one example of "failures" that might not constitute a failure in a given context. As can be seen from the reliabilities in Table 7, failures in component 1 are considered to be serious. E.g., the reliability of component 3 is 0.990005 when component 1 is OK and 0.490005 when component 1 fails.

By assuming that a failure of component 1 does not necessary cause system failure, the assumption in Section 1.4 on binary component states is violated. If the system is robust to a failure in component 1, the component has two possible failure modes instead of one: 1) component 1 fails and leads to system failure and 2) component 1 fails but does not lead to system failure.

Birnbaum's measure assumes binary component states and can therefore not be calculated for components having multiple failure modes. One possible way to overcome the problem of multiple failure modes in component 1, is to treat component 1 as an environmental factor and not as a regular component in the system.

Another way is to redefine what is meant by a failure of component 1, and say that component 1 only fails if it leads to system failure as well. In test case 3, component 1 is treated as an environmental factor and Birnbaum measures are only calculated for components 2, 3 and 4.

The system in test case 3 will function as long as either both controllers function, or if at least one controller and the monitor function. Based on the simplified system's minimal path sets, the assumptions that are made and the law of total probability, the system reliability is given in Equation 20.

$$\begin{aligned} P(\phi(\mathbf{x}) = 1) = &(p_{3|1}p_{2|1} + p_{4|1}p_{2|1} + p_{4|13}p_{3|1} \\ &- 2p_{4|13}p_{3|1}p_{2|1})p_1 \\ &+ (p_{3|\bar{1}}p_{2|\bar{1}} + p_{4|\bar{1}}p_{2|\bar{1}} + p_{4|\bar{1}3}p_{3|\bar{1}} \\ &- 2p_{4|\bar{1}3}p_{3|\bar{1}}p_{2|\bar{1}})q_1 \end{aligned} \tag{20}$$

The system's failure probability was assessed for same dependency combinations as in test case 2.

6. Results

For each test case described in Section 5, the following procedure was applied:

1. Direct calculation was performed using a selected set of marginal and conditional reliabilities.
2. Birnbaum's measures were studied assuming the same marginal and conditional reliabilities.
3. PCA was performed by varying the values of the test case's conditional reliabilities.

The results from the analyses are summarized below.

6.1. *Test case 1.1*

6.1.1. *Direct calculation*

Using the marginal and conditional reliabilities in Table 6, the system's failure probability in test case 1.1 was calculated assuming the eight dependency combinations listed in Section 5.1. The results are summarized in the line plot in Figure 6 and clearly show that the system's failure probability divides into four different groups depending on the dependency combination used. The groups are summarized below.

- Group 1 consists of dependency combinations 1 and 4. Both these dependency combinations result in the system's exact failure probability (0.000092). This indicates that dependency combination 4, which includes the dependencies between data-parallel components 1 and 3 and between data-parallel components 2 and 3, can replace the true dependency combination in test case 1.1 without significantly underestimating the system's failure probability.



Fig. 6. Results from direct calculation in test case 1.1.

- Group 2 consists of dependency combinations 5 and 7, which both include the dependency between data-parallel components 1 and 3. Using one of these dependency combinations results in a minor underestimation of the system's failure probability (0.00009).
- Group 3 consists of dependency combinations 6 and 8, which both include the dependency between data-parallel components 2 and 3. Using one of these dependency combinations results in a minor to average underestimation of the system's failure probability (0.000085).
- Group 4 consists of dependency combinations 2 and 3. Common for these two dependency combinations is that none of them include any dependencies between data-parallel components. Dependency combination 2 assumes independence between all software components whereas dependency combination 3 only includes the dependency between data-serial components 1 and 2. Using one of these dependency combinations results in a major underestimation of the system's failure probability (0.0000001).

6.1.2. *Birnbaum's measure*

Based on the original Birnbaum measures in Table 8, it can easily be seen that dependency combination 4 is the dependency combination that alters the Birnbaum measures the least. This is especially apparent for the Birnbaum measures of components 1 and 2. While dependency combination 4 has the same Birnbaum measures for components 1 and 2 as the correct dependency combination, the remaining dependency combinations significantly overestimate these measures. Dependency

Table 8. Original Birnbaum measures and standardized squared difference for components 1, 2 and 3 in test case 1.1.

DC	I_1^B	I_2^B	I_3^B	st. sqrd. diff.
1	8.0×10^{-6}	8.0×10^{-6}	1.1×10^{-3}	0
2	1.0×10^{-4}	1.0×10^{-4}	2.0×10^{-3}	8.8×10^{-3}
3	1.0×10^{-4}	1.0×10^{-4}	1.1×10^{-3}	2.9×10^{-2}
4	8.0×10^{-6}	8.0×10^{-6}	2.0×10^{-3}	6.1×10^{-5}
5	1.0×10^{-5}	1.0×10^{-5}	2.0×10^{-3}	2.9×10^{-5}
6	1.5×10^{-5}	1.5×10^{-5}	2.0×10^{-3}	2.9×10^{-7}
7	1.0×10^{-5}	1.0×10^{-5}	1.1×10^{-3}	1.9×10^{-5}
8	1.5×10^{-5}	1.5×10^{-5}	1.1×10^{-3}	2.2×10^{-4}



Fig. 7. Loading plot for test case 1.1.

combinations 2 and 3, which are the combinations that overestimates the Birnbaum measures the most, are also the dependency combinations that underestimates the system's failure probability the most.

6.1.3. *PCA*

Variables that fall close together in a PCA loading plot indicate that the variables are highly correlated and that they explain the same type of variation in data. The loading plot in Figure 7 shows that the different dependency combinations in test case 1.1 divide into four different groups based on their PCA loadings. The groups are summarized below.

- Group 1 consists of dependency combinations 1 and 4, since these dependency combinations fall close together in the loading plot. The results from the PCA analysis show that using dependency combination 4 results in the exact or a minor overestimation of the system's failure probability. Using all other dependency combinations will in almost all cases underestimate the system's failure probability, however to varies degrees.
- Group 2 consists of dependency combinations 5 and 7. The results from the PCA analysis show that using one of these dependency combinations mainly results in a minor underestimation of the system's failure probability. However, in some special cases these dependency combinations may result in a major underestimation of the system's failure probability.
- Group 3 consists of dependency combinations 6 and 8. The results from the PCA analysis show that using one of these dependency combinations mainly will result in a minor underestimation of the system's failure probability. However, in some special cases these dependency combinations may result in a major underestimation of the system's failure probability.
- Group 4 consists of dependency combinations 2 and 3, which constantly



Fig. 8. Results from direct calculation in test case 1.2.

result in a major underestimation of the system's failure probability. Results from the PCA analysis show that these dependency combinations may underestimate the failure probability by a factor of 1000 compared to the system's true failure probability. In addition, the results show that by only including the dependency between data-serial components 1 and 2 may result in even worse results than by assuming independence between all components.

6.1.4. *Results test case 1.1*

The results from the analyses performed on test case 1.1 show that:

- Since the data-parallel components 1 and 3 and the data-parallel components 2 and 3 have equal reliabilities, both dependencies should be included in the reliability prediction. In fact, including only one of the dependencies may result in a major underestimation of the system's failure probability.
- Including only the dependency between the data-serial components 1 and 2 results in a major underestimation of the system's failure probability. In some cases, the results are even worse than by assuming independence between all components.

6.2. *Test case 1.2*

6.2.1. *Direct calculation*

Using the marginal and conditional reliabilities in Table 6, the system's failure probability in test case 1.2 was calculated assuming the same dependency combinations as in test case 1.1. The results are summarized in the line plot in Figure 8 and clearly show that the system's failure probability divides into four different groups depending on the dependency combination used. The groups are summarized below.

- Group 1 consists of dependency combinations 1 and 4. Both these dependency combinations result in the system's exact failure probability (0.00035). This indicates that dependency combination 4 can replace the true dependency combination in test case 1.2 without significantly underestimating the system's failure probability.
- Group 2 consists of dependency combinations 6 and 8. Using one of these dependency combinations results in a minor underestimation of the sys-

Table 9. Original Birnbaum measures and squared difference for components 1, 2 and 3 in test case 1.2.

DC	I_1^B	I_2^B	I_3^B	sqrd. diff.
1	0.0097	0.0097	0.001	0
2	0.01	0.01	0.0011	2.3×10^{-7}
3	0.01	0.01	0.001	2.3×10^{-7}
4	0.0097	0.0097	0.0011	2.5×10^{-9}
5	0.0099	0.0099	0.0011	1.3×10^{-7}
6	0.0097	0.0097	0.0011	5.7×10^{-9}
7	0.0099	0.0099	0.001	1.4×10^{-7}
8	0.0097	0.0097	0.001	3.2×10^{-9}

tem's failure probability (0.00031).

- Group 3 consists of dependency combinations 5 and 7. Using one of these dependency combinations results in an average underestimation of the system's failure probability (0.0001).
- Group 4 consists of dependency combinations 2 and 3. Using one of these dependency combinations results in a major underestimation of the system's failure probability (0.00001).

6.2.2. *Birnbaum's measure*

Based on the original Birnbaum measures and the squared differences in Table 9, it can easily be seen that dependency combinations 4, 6 and 8 are the dependency combinations that alter the Birnbaum measures the least. This is especially apparent for the Birnbaum measures of components 1 and 2. While dependency combinations 4, 6 and 8 have the same Birnbaum measures for components 1 and 2 as the correct dependency combination, the remaining dependency combinations overestimate these measures. Dependency combinations 2 and 3, which are the combinations that overestimates the Birnbaum measures the most, are also the dependency combinations that underestimates the system's failure probability the most. In addition, it can easily be seen that dependency combinations 2 and 3 have the highest squared difference between their Birnbaum measures and the Birnbaum measures calculated including all component dependencies.

6.2.3. *PCA*

The loading plot in Figure 9 shows that the different dependency combinations in test case 1.2 can be divided into four different groups based on their PCA loadings. The groups are summarized below.

- Group 1 consists of dependency combinations 1 and 4, since these dependency combinations fall close together in the loading plot. This indicates that dependency combination 4 can replace dependency combination 1 in test case 1.1 without any serious consequences. In fact, the results from the PCA analysis show that using dependency combination 4 results in the



Fig. 9. Loading plot for test case 1.2.

exact or a minor overestimation of the system's failure probability. Using all other dependency combinations will in almost all cases underestimate the system's failure probability, however to varies degrees.

- Group 2 consists of dependency combinations 6 and 8. Since, principal component 1 explains 99.2% of the variation in data in test case 1.2, dependency combinations 6 and 8 also load closely to dependency combinations 1 and 4. The results from the PCA analysis show that using one of these dependency combinations mainly results in a minor underestimation of the system's failure probability. In fact, the results show that using dependency combinations 6 or 8 may underestimate the failure probability by a factor of 9 compared to the system's true failure probability.
- Group 3 consists of dependency combinations 5 and 7. The results from the PCA analysis show that using one of these dependency combinations may underestimate the system's failure probability by a factor of 78 compared to the system's true failure probability.
- Group 4 consists of the dependency combinations that constantly result in a major underestimation of the system's failure probability. Results from the PCA analysis show that these dependency combinations may underestimate the failure probability by a factor of 86 compared to the system's true failure probability. In addition, the results show that by only including the dependency between data-serial components 1 and 2 may result in even worse results than by assuming independence between all components.

6.2.4. *Results test case 1.2*

The results from the analyses performed on test case 1.2 show that:

- Including the dependency between the most unreliable data-parallel components 2 and 3 gives predictions close to the system's true failure probability.



Fig. 10. Results from direct calculation in test case 2.

Ignoring this dependency may, however, result in a major underestimation of the system's failure probability.

- Including the additional dependency between data-parallel components 1 and 3 may improve the predictions even more.
- Including only the dependency between data-serial components 1 and 2 results in a major underestimation of the system's failure probability. In some cases, the results are even worse than by assuming independence between all components.

6.3. *Test case 2*

6.3.1. *Direct calculation*

Using the marginal and conditional reliabilities in Table 7, the system's failure probability in test case 2 was calculated assuming the fourteen dependency combinations listed in Section 5.2. The results are summarized in the line plot in Figure 10 and clearly show that the system's failure probability divides into three different groups depending on the dependency combination used. The groups are summarized below:

- Group 1 consists of dependency combinations 1, 7 and 8. All these dependency combinations result in the system's exact failure probability (0.000111). This indicates that dependency combinations 7 and 8, which both include the dependencies between data-parallel components 3 and 4 and between data-serial components 1 and 4, can replace the true dependency combination in the system, without significantly underestimating the system's failure probability.
- Group 2 consists of dependency combinations 3, 5 and 6, which all include the dependency between data-parallel components 3 and 4. Using one of these dependency combinations results in a minor overestimation of the system's failure probability (0.000115).).
- Group 3 consists of dependency combinations 2, 4, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13 and 14. Using one of these dependency combinations results in a major underestimation of the system's failure probability (0.000021). Common for these dependency combinations is that none of them include the dependency between data-parallel components 3 and 4. Dependency combination 2 assumes independence between all software components, whereas the other combinations only include dependencies between data-serial components.

Table 10. Standardized Birnbaum measures and squared difference for components 1, 2, 3 and 4 in test case 2.

DC	I_1^B	I_2^B	I_3^B	I_4^B	st. sqrd. diff.
1	0.9786	0.0097	0.001	0.0107	0
2	0.9783	0.0099	0.0011	0.0107	1.3×10^{-7}
3	0.9786	0.0097	0.001	0.0107	5.0×10^{-10}
4	0.9783	0.0099	0.0011	0.0107	1.2×10^{-7}
5	0.9786	0.0097	0.001	0.0107	1.0×10^{-10}
6	0.9786	0.0097	0.001	0.0107	1.0×10^{-10}
7	0.9786	0.0097	0.001	0.0107	5.0×10^{-10}
8	0.9786	0.0097	0.001	0.0107	1.0×10^{-10}
9	0.9783	0.0099	0.0011	0.0107	1.2×10^{-7}
10	0.9783	0.0099	0.0011	0.0107	1.2×10^{-7}
11	0.9783	0.0099	0.0011	0.0107	1.2×10^{-7}
12	0.9783	0.0099	0.0011	0.0107	1.1×10^{-7}
13	0.9783	0.0099	0.0011	0.0107	1.1×10^{-7}
14	0.9783	0.0099	0.0011	0.0107	1.2×10^{-7}

6.3.2. *Birnbaum's measure*

Based on the standardized Birnbaum measures and squared differences in Table 10, it can easily be seen that dependency combinations 3, 5, 6, 7 and 8 are the dependency combinations that alter the standardized Birnbaum measures the least. In addition, it can easily be seen that dependency combinations 2, 4, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13 and 14 have the highest squared difference between their standardized Birnbaum measures and the standardized Birnbaum measures calculated including all component dependencies.

6.3.3. *PCA*

The loading plot in Figure 11 shows that the different dependency combinations in test case 2 can be divided into three different groups based on their PCA loadings. The groups are summarized below.

- Group 1 consists of dependency combinations 1, 7 and 8, since these dependency combinations fall close together in the loading plot. This indicates that dependency combinations 7 and 8 can replace dependency combination 1 in test case 2 without any serious consequences. In fact, the results from the PCA analysis show that using dependency combination 7 or 8 results in the exact or a minor overestimation of the system's failure probability.
- Group 2 consists of dependency combinations 3, 5 and 6, which all fall close together in the loading plot. Since, principal component 1 explains 99.9% of the variation in data in test case 2, dependency combinations 3, 5 and 6 also load closely to dependency combinations 1, 7 and 8 .The results from the PCA analysis show that using one of these dependency combinations mainly results in a minor overestimation of the system's failure probability.
- Group 3 consists of the dependency combinations that constantly underestimate the system's failure probability, and includes dependency combi-



Fig. 11. Loading plot for test case 2.

nations 2, 4, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13 and 14. Results from the PCA analysis show that these dependency combinations may underestimate the failure probability by a factor of 5 compared to the system's true failure probability. In addition, the results show that by only including dependencies between data-serial components may result in even worse results than by assuming independence between all components.

6.3.4. *Results test case 2*

The results from the analyses performed on test case 2 show that:

- Including the dependency between data-parallel components 3 and 4 gives predictions close to the system's true failure probability. Ignoring this dependency will have major consequences on the system's failure probability.
- Including the additional dependency between the most reliable data-serial components 1 and 4 results in even better predictions.
- Including only dependencies between data-serial components results in a major underestimation of the system's failure probability. In some cases, the results are even worse than by assuming independence between all components.

6.4. *Test case 3*

6.4.1. *Direct calculation*

Using the marginal and conditional reliabilities in Table 7, the system's failure probability in test case 3 was calculated assuming the same dependency combinations as in test case 2. The results are summarized in the line plot in Figure 12 and clearly show that the system's failure probability divides into two major groups depending on the dependency combination used. The groups are summarized below.



Fig. 12. Results from direct calculation in test case 3.

- Group 1 consists of dependency combinations 1, 3, 5, 6, 7, and 8. Using one of these dependency combinations only results in a minor underestimation of the system's failure probability (0.000103, 0.000105). This indicates that all these dependency combinations can replace the correct dependency combination in test case 3 without any major consequences on the system's failure probability.
- Group 2 consists of dependency combinations 2, 4, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13 and 14. Using one of these dependency combinations results in a major underestimation of the system's failure probability (0.000011).

6.4.2. *Birnbaum's measure*

Based on the standardized Birnbaum measures and squared differences in Table 11, it can easily be seen that dependency combinations 3, 5, 6, 7 and 8 are the dependency combinations that alter the standardized Birnbaum measures the least. In addition, it can easily be seen that dependency combinations 2, 4, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13 and 14 have the highest squared difference between their standardized Birnbaum measures and the standardized Birnbaum measures calculated including all component dependencies.

Table 11. Standardized Birnbaum measures and squared difference for components 2, 3 and 4 in test case 3.

DC.	I_2^B	I_3^B	I_4^B	st. sqrd. diff.
1	0.4527	0.0458	0.5014	0
2	0.4553	0.0496	0.4951	6.1×10^{-5}
3	0.4526	0.0459	0.5015	2.7×10^{-8}
4	0.4553	0.0496	0.4951	6.1×10^{-5}
5	0.4526	0.0459	0.5015	2.7×10^{-8}
6	0.4526	0.0459	0.5015	2.7×10^{-8}
7	0.4527	0.046	0.5014	2.2×10^{-8}
8	0.4526	0.046	0.5016	4.4×10^{-8}
9	0.4553	0.0496	0.4951	6.1×10^{-5}
10	0.4553	0.0496	0.4951	6.1×10^{-5}
11	0.4552	0.0496	0.4952	5.9×10^{-5}
12	0.4554	0.0494	0.4952	5.7×10^{-5}
13	0.4554	0.0496	0.4950	6.3×10^{-5}
14	0.4554	0.0494	0.4952	5.8×10^{-5}



Fig. 13. Loading plot for test case 3.

6.4.3. *PCA*

The loading plot in Figure 13 shows that the different dependency combinations in test case 3 can be divided into four different groups based on their PCA loadings. The groups are summarized below:

- Group 1 consists of dependency combinations 1, 3, 5, 6 and 8, since these dependency combinations fall close together in the loading plot. This indicates that these dependency combinations can replace dependency combination 1 in test case 3 without any serious consequences. The results from the PCA analysis show that using one of the dependency combinations in group 1 may result in the exact or a minor underestimation of the system's failure probability.
- Group 2 consists of dependency combination 7. Since, principal component 1 explains 99.7% of the variation in data in test case 3, dependency combination 7 also load closely to the dependency combinations in group 1. The results from the PCA analysis show that using dependency combination 7 may result in the exact or a minor underestimation of the system's failure probability.
- Group 3 consists of dependency combinations 11, 12, 13 and 14. The results from the PCA analysis show that using one of the dependency combinations in group 2 may underestimate the system's failure probability by a factor of 9.
- Group 4 consists of the dependency combinations 2, 4, 9 and 10. Since, principal component 1 explains 99.7% of the variation in data in test case 3, dependency combinations 2, 4, 9 and 10 also load closely to the dependency combinations in group 3. The results from the PCA analysis show that using one of the dependency combinations in group 4 may underestimate the system's failure probability by a factor of 10.

6.4.4. *Results test case 3*

The results from the analyses performed on test case 3 show that:

- Including the dependency between data-parallel components 3 and 4 gives predictions close to the system's true failure probability. Ignoring this dependency will have major consequences on the system's failure probability.
- Including only dependencies between data-serial components results in a major underestimation of the system's failure probability. In some cases, the results are even worse than by assuming independence between all components.

7. Summary of the Results and Discussion

The results from the analyses performed in Section 6 show that the three techniques "direct calculation", Birnbaum's measure and PCA in most cases identify the same dependency combinations as the "best" dependency combinations. The results can be summarized as follows:

- Including only partial dependency information may give a substantial improvement in the reliability predictions, compared to assuming independence between all software components. However, this is only as long as the most important component dependencies are included.
- It is also apparent that dependencies between data-parallel components are far more important than dependencies between data-serial components.

For a system consisting of both data-parallel and data-serial components, the results indicate that:

- Including only dependencies between data-serial components may result in a major underestimation of the system's failure probability. In some cases, the results are even worse than by assuming independence between all components.
- Including only dependencies between data-parallel components may give predictions close to the system's true failure probability, as long as the dependency between the most unreliable components is included.
- Including additional dependencies between data-parallel components may improve the predictions further.
- Including additional dependencies between data-serial components may also give better predictions, as long as the dependency between the most reliable components is included.

One of the key results in [6] is the following theorem:

Theorem 1.

Let $X_1 \dots X_n$ *be associated random variables such that* $0 \leq X_i \leq 1$ *for* $i = 1 \dots n$. *Then*

$$E\prod_{i=1}^{n} X_i \geq \prod_{i=1}^{n} EX_i \tag{21}$$

$$E\coprod_{i=1}^{n} X_i \leq \coprod_{i=1}^{n} EX_i \tag{22}$$

By using this theorem on components having binary states, the theorem says that falsely assuming independence between components in a series structure will overestimate the system's failure probability. The theorem also says that falsely assuming independence between components in a parallel structure will underestimate the system's failure probability. The author of [27] therefore concludes that for an arbitrary component structure, the consequence of assuming independence will be impossible to predict.

The results in Section 6 do, however, indicate that it may in fact be possible to say something about the consequences of assuming independence between some components in an arbitrary system structure. For a system where there are dependencies between both data-serial and data-parallel components, it is quite clear that the effect of falsely assuming independence between data-serial components is greatly diminished as long as the dependencies between data-parallel components are included. In the opposite case, when wrongly assuming independence between data-parallel components and including the dependencies between data-serial components, the system's failure probability may however be underestimated even more than by assuming independence between all software components in the system.

8. Conclusions and Further Work

In this paper, it is shown that the difficult task of including component dependencies in the reliability calculations can be simplified in three ways:

1. The components' marginal reliabilities put direct restrictions on the components' conditional reliabilities in a compound software.
2. The degrees of freedom are much fewer than first anticipated when it comes to conditional probabilities. If the components' marginal reliabilities and four of the components' conditional probabilities are known in a simple three components system, the remaining 44 conditional probabilities can be expressed using general rules of probability theory. This is shown mathematically in Appendix A.
3. Including only partial dependency information may give substantial improvements in the reliability predictions, compared to assuming independence between all software components. However, this is only as long as the most important component dependencies are included.

It should be emphasized that the rules for selecting the most important component dependencies are based on case studies, where the individual component reliabilities

are assumed to be known. It is also assumed that all components in the test cases, as well as the system, only have two possible states. In addition, the research is restricted to on-demand types of situations.

It should also be emphasized that the objective of this research is to include dependency aspects in the reliability calculations of critical systems, and not to handle component dependencies in systems consisting of a huge amount of components.

To follow up on these results, a more analytical approach should be considered. In addition, an evaluation of the proposed rules by studying other well-known software structures is essential.

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Appendix A. Theorems and Proofs

Theorem 1. *Consider a general system consisting of two components. Assume further that the components' marginal reliabilities* p_1 *and* p_2 *are known. In such a system there are eight possible conditional probabilities between components 1 and 2:* $p_{2|1}$, $p_{\bar{2}|1}$, $p_{2|\bar{1}}$, $p_{\bar{2}|\bar{1}}$, $p_{1|2}$, $p_{\bar{1}|2}$, $p_{1|\bar{2}}$ *and* $p_{\bar{1}|\bar{2}}$. *If one of these conditional probabilities is known, the remaining seven can be found using general rules in probability theory.*

Proof. This proof uses Bayes theorem, the rule of complementation and the following rule of total probability:

$$p_2 = p_{2|1}p_1 + p_{2|\bar{1}}p_{\bar{1}} \tag{A.1}$$

Assume that the conditional probability $p_{2|1}$ is known. As shown in Equations A.2-A.8, the seven remaining conditional probabilities can be expressed as functions of p_1, p_2 and $p_{2|1}$.

$$p_{\bar{2}|1} = 1 - p_{2|1} \tag{A.2}$$

$$p_{2|\bar{1}} = \frac{p_2 - p_{2|1}p_1}{1 - p_1} \tag{A.3}$$

$$p_{\bar{2}|\bar{1}} = 1 - \frac{p_2 - p_{2|1}p_1}{1 - p_1} \tag{A.4}$$

$$p_{1|2} = \frac{p_{2|1}p_1}{p_2} \tag{A.5}$$

$$p_{\bar{1}|2} = 1 - \frac{p_{2|1}p_1}{p_2} \tag{A.6}$$

$$p_{1|\bar{2}} = \frac{(1 - p_{2|1})p_1}{1 - p_2} \tag{A.7}$$

$$p_{\bar{1}|\bar{2}} = 1 - \frac{(1 - p_{2|1})p_1}{1 - p_2} \tag{A.8}$$

□

Theorem 2. *Consider a general system consisting of three components. Assume further that the components' marginal reliabilities* p_1, p_2 *and* p_3 *are known. In such a system there are 48 possible conditional probabilities between components 1, 2 and 3:* $p_{2|1}$, $p_{\bar{2}|1}$, $p_{2|\bar{1}}$, $p_{\bar{2}|\bar{1}}$, $p_{1|2}$, $p_{\bar{1}|2}$, $p_{1|\bar{2}}$, $p_{\bar{1}|\bar{2}}$, $p_{3|1}$, $p_{\bar{3}|1}$, $p_{3|\bar{1}}$, $p_{\bar{3}|\bar{1}}$, $p_{1|3}$, $p_{\bar{1}|3}$, $p_{1|\bar{3}}$, $p_{\bar{1}|\bar{3}}$, $p_{3|2}$, $p_{\bar{3}|2}$, $p_{3|\bar{2}}$, $p_{\bar{3}|\bar{2}}$, $p_{2|3}$, $p_{\bar{2}|3}$, $p_{2|\bar{3}}$, $p_{\bar{2}|\bar{3}}$, $p_{3|12}$, $p_{\bar{3}|12}$, $p_{3|\bar{1}2}$, $p_{\bar{3}|\bar{1}2}$, $p_{3|1\bar{2}}$, $p_{\bar{3}|1\bar{2}}$, $p_{3|\bar{1}\bar{2}}$, $p_{\bar{3}|\bar{1}\bar{2}}$, $p_{2|13}$, $p_{\bar{2}|13}$, $p_{2|\bar{1}3}$, $p_{\bar{2}|\bar{1}3}$, $p_{2|1\bar{3}}$, $p_{\bar{2}|1\bar{3}}$, $p_{2|\bar{1}\bar{3}}$, $p_{\bar{2}|\bar{1}\bar{3}}$, $p_{1|23}$, $p_{\bar{1}|23}$, $p_{1|\bar{2}3}$, $p_{\bar{1}|\bar{2}3}$, $p_{1|2\bar{3}}$, $p_{\bar{1}|2\bar{3}}$, $p_{1|\bar{2}\bar{3}}$, $p_{\bar{1}|\bar{2}\bar{3}}$. *If four of these conditional probabilities are known, the remaining 44 can be found using general rules in probability theory.*

Proof. This proof uses Bayes theorem, the rule of complementation and the following rules of total probability:

$$\begin{aligned} p_3 = {} & p_{3|12}p_{2|1}p_1 + p_{3|1\bar{2}}p_{\bar{2}|1}p_1 \\ & + p_{3|\bar{1}2}p_{2|\bar{1}}p_{\bar{1}} + p_{3|\bar{1}\bar{2}}p_{\bar{2}|\bar{1}}p_{\bar{1}} \end{aligned} \tag{A.9}$$

$$p_{3|1} = p_{3|12}p_{2|1} + p_{3|1\bar{2}}p_{\bar{2}|1} \tag{A.10}$$

$$p_{3|2} = p_{3|12}p_{1|2} + p_{3|\bar{1}2}p_{\bar{1}|2} \tag{A.11}$$

Assume that the conditional probabilities $p_{2|1}$, $p_{3|1}$, $p_{3|2}$ and $p_{3|12}$ are known. As shown in Theorem 1, $p_{\bar{2}|1}$, $p_{2|\bar{1}}$, $p_{\bar{2}|\bar{1}}$, $p_{1|2}$, $p_{\bar{1}|2}$, $p_{1|\bar{2}}$, $p_{\bar{1}|\bar{2}}$ can be expressed as functions of p_1, p_2 and $p_{2|1}$. In the same way $p_{\bar{3}|1}$, $p_{3|\bar{1}}$, $p_{\bar{3}|\bar{1}}$, $p_{1|3}$, $p_{\bar{1}|3}$, $p_{1|\bar{3}}$, $p_{\bar{1}|\bar{3}}$ can be expressed as functions of p_1, p_3 and $p_{3|1}$, and $p_{\bar{3}|2}$, $p_{3|\bar{2}}$, $p_{\bar{3}|\bar{2}}$, $p_{2|3}$, $p_{\bar{2}|3}$, $p_{2|\bar{3}}$, $p_{\bar{2}|\bar{3}}$ can be expressed as functions of p_2, p_3 and $p_{3|2}$.

The conditional probabilities $p_{\bar{3}|12}$, $p_{3|\bar{1}2}$, $p_{\bar{3}|\bar{1}2}$, $p_{3|1\bar{2}}$, $p_{\bar{3}|1\bar{2}}$, $p_{3|\bar{1}\bar{2}}$ and $p_{\bar{3}|\bar{1}\bar{2}}$ can further be expressed as functions of p_1, p_2, p_3, $p_{2|1}$, $p_{3|1}$, $p_{3|2}$ and $p_{3|12}$. This is shown in Equations A.12 - A.18. Especially, to express $p_{3|\bar{1}\bar{2}}$ in Equation A.17, Equations A.9, A.13, A.15, A.3 and A.4 are used as basis (the equations are listed in the sequence of their usage).

$$p_{\bar{3}|12} = 1 - p_{3|12} \tag{A.12}$$

$$p_{3|1\bar{2}} = \frac{p_{3|1} - p_{3|12}p_{2|1}}{1 - p_{2|1}} \tag{A.13}$$

$$p_{\bar{3}|1\bar{2}} = 1 - \frac{p_{3|1} - p_{3|12}p_{2|1}}{1 - p_{2|1}} \tag{A.14}$$

$$p_{3|\bar{1}2} = \frac{p_{3|2}p_2 - p_{3|12}p_{2|1}p_1}{p_2 - p_{2|1}p_1} \tag{A.15}$$

$$p_{\bar{3}|\bar{1}2} = 1 - \frac{p_{3|2}p_2 - p_{3|12}p_{2|1}p_1}{p_2 - p_{2|1}p_1} \tag{A.16}$$

$$p_{3|\bar{1}\bar{2}} = \frac{p_3 - p_{3|1}p_1 - p_{3|2}p_2 + p_{3|12}p_{2|1}p_1}{1 - p_2 + (p_{2|1} - 1)p_1} \tag{A.17}$$

$$p_{\bar{3}|\bar{1}\bar{2}} = 1 - \frac{p_3 - p_{3|1}p_1 - p_{3|2}p_2 + p_{3|12}p_{2|1}p_1}{1 - p_2 + (p_{2|1} - 1)p_1} \tag{A.18}$$

In the same way as shown above,

$$p_{2|13} = \frac{p_{3|12}p_{2|1}p_1}{p_{3|1}p_1} \tag{A.19}$$

gives $p_{\bar{2}|13}$, $p_{2|\bar{1}3}$, $p_{\bar{2}|\bar{1}3}$, $p_{2|1\bar{3}}$, $p_{\bar{2}|1\bar{3}}$, $p_{2|\bar{1}\bar{3}}$ and $p_{\bar{2}|\bar{1}\bar{3}}$.
Furthermore,

$$p_{1|23} = \frac{p_{3|12}p_{2|1}p_1}{p_{3|2}p_2} \tag{A.20}$$

is leading to $p_{\bar{1}|23}$, $p_{1|\bar{2}3}$, $p_{\bar{1}|\bar{2}3}$, $p_{1|2\bar{3}}$, $p_{\bar{1}|2\bar{3}}$, $p_{1|\bar{2}\bar{3}}$ and $p_{\bar{1}|\bar{2}\bar{3}}$. □

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