

The crown, the peerage and high politics 1689-1760.

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THE CROWN, THE PEERAGE AND HIGH POLITICS, 1689-1760.

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Abstract.

It is the contention of this thesis that the crown went through some rather marked change during the course of the period, starting with the Bill of Rights and effectively ending with the Act of Settlement in 1701. In 1689 the crown had an extensive prerogative and a limited executive, in 1702 it had a more limited prerogative (although it did come into operation until after Anne's 1714 death) and an extensive executive. Thereafter, there was no deterioration in the crown's position during the subsequent decades to the period's end. The importance of the crown has been underestimated because of the limited amount of direct research on it as a political entity.

This thesis makes advances in terms of both factual knowledge and historiography. Its body falls into two principal parts. The first of these are three structural analyses of crown patronage in relation to the peerage-titles, central office and local office. The second is a broad political narrative. The analyses show that the crown was a very definite presence in high politics. Over the period as a whole the crown defined the limitations that its political managers had to operate within these. As the period progressed crown prejudices, especially with relation to the peerage, grew more marked rather than declining in the Revolution Settlement's wake as has been the general interpretation previously. In the narrative, the reigns of William III, Anne and George I are principally innovative in terms of historiography. For George II's reign there is such advance but also a far higher share of new material, the latter part of the period having had far less research on it than the former

one. A notable example of this is the patterns of occurrence and general character of post-1727 tory tergiversation.

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1. Introduction.

1.1. The Subject.

Eighteenth-century British history has been perceived as the period in which the tumults of the seventeenth-century were recovered from and the groundwork for the changes of the nineteenth-century were laid. The period 1689-1760 was meant to have witnessed the alteration of the Stuarts' personal monarchy into the Hanoverians' limited one. By the 1740s George II was perceived as having only a limited scope in which to act in the political field; he was forced to part with the second earl Granville in both 1744 and 1746 and had two ministries of his own choice fail to be viable- the Granville-Bath one in 1746 and the Waldegrave one in 1757.

There is a level of truth in the assumption that George II was a politically passive monarch in comparison with his grandson and successor George III. The contrast between the two was articulated by Richard Pares in the 1951-1952 Ford Lectures. The amount of work that has been done on the politics of 1760-1790 contrasts markedly with the lack of such in the three decades that preceded it. The Pares view was principally an affirmation of what had gone before and because of the quality of his work on George III his remarks on George II were allowed to stand as good.

No challenge was mounted until John Owen's perceptive 1973 essay "George II Reconsidered." Owen decisively argued that the two reigns shared far more continuity than anyone had previously stated. In the sixteen years since the piece was published no one has sought to overturn

Owen's argument. If one accepts it one has to accept that either George III was a weaker monarch than has been assumed or that George II was a stronger one than Pares's work would suggest. This thesis seeks to make a case for the latter and to contend that Pares's dismissal of George II is fallacious.

In 1955 Ian R. Christie wrote an article in History Today which was in line with Pares's comments. The piece was entitled "The Personality of George II."¹ In it he used three contemporary authors on the politics of the reign - Chesterfield, Hervey and Waldegrave. None of these flattered the king although the last, Christie was careful to note, was sympathetic to the king. Christie went on to ascribe much of George II's troubles to the death of his spouse queen Caroline since she was an adept politician. The article was essentially sound; this thesis does not seek to contend that George II was necessarily a more able politician than his wife or that he had hidden cerebral depths.

However, the article did have two faults. The first is that it accepted a Paresian interpretation of the king as a politician and the second is that the article makes the mistake of extending its discussion of the 'personality' to the 'kingship.' It is to be accepted that the 'style of the kingship' would in large part be derived from the nature of the monarch's 'personality' but that the 'substance of the kingship' was derived principally from the contemporary state of the 'crown.'

The monarch is the individual who holds the crown at a given juncture, whereas the crown itself is an institution which exists quite independently of any person

who holds it. The three sources were writing in a contemporary political framework that was so self-evident to them that they felt no compulsion to articulate the framework in which the events they were describing happened. It is the historian's task to be aware of that framework when he/she uses those sources. Neither Pares nor Christie properly appreciated that framework, and if they had they would have seen that the contrast between George I and George II was in style and not in substance.

Irrespective of how one views George II the crown was the way it was in his reign as the result of changing during the period 1689-1760. In 1760 the annual meeting of parliament and the effects of the Act of Settlement were accepted facts of political life, in 1689 it was to be another five years until the passage of the Triennial Act, another twelve years until the Act of Settlement was passed and another twenty-five years until the latter came into full operation. Over the course of the period as a whole the prerogative became more limited. This thesis seeks to investigate- Whether that change can be detected in how the monarch who held the crown dealt with domestic politics and, if so, Whether that change can tell us anything about the nature of the crown's position in British politics.

The thrust of this work is not so much to comprehend how four separate monarchs (queen Mary has for this purpose been subordinated to her husband William) treated the peerage. Rather it is to see how a single institution dealt with change and how that process affected its relationship with the peerage as a consequence. As stated above the crown is an institution which is quite separate

from those who possess it. It existed 'before any of the four were monarchs and it existed after their deaths. The personalities of the four are not to be ignored but the emphasis of this work is to comprehend their actions in domestic politics and the forces which shaped those actions. The amount of primary material that exists on their attitudes to the peerage as such in English is small to the point of non-existence.

The landed aristocracy were all those who had an income, derived from estates, which was sufficient to maintain them in a manner that was recognized by contemporary society as putting them in a particular class. The nobility were those who were possessed of titles which were inheritable. The peerage were a sub-group of the nobility. They were those who possessed a title in either the English, the Scottish, the Irish or the British peerage. However, not all nobles or even peers necessarily had the financial means by which they could be classed as aristocrats in the economic sense of the word. But there is also a social connotation to the term whereby it is reasonable for them to be included.

The terminal dates of the period are October 23rd 1689, when the 1689-1690 session of parliament opened, and October 25th 1760, when George II died. The peerage that this thesis studies consists both of any man who prior to the Union with Scotland in 1707 held an English title and of any man after the Union who held an English title or a British one. Irish and Scottish titles are excluded unless the holder had either of the two mentioned varieties of title in addition. With the 1689 passage of the Bill of

Rights it became the practice for the privileges of peerage to be confined to those who had sworn the oaths. Where statistical work has been done, the peerage has been treated as a whole so that catholics and minors who were possessed of titles, but not the privileges of them, are incorporated.

The peerage form a good subject for study since they were a continuous element in the period's political life through their membership of the House of Lords. The Lords, through its smaller membership, was the more amenable of the two Houses of parliament to crown/governmental influence. This susceptibility was aided by the distribution of both places and honours. They were traditionally close to the crown. On the outbreak of the First Civil War the majority of them had sided with it rather than with parliament; during the Exclusion Crisis the susceptibility of the House of Lords to the blocking Commons at the crown's behest had proven a useful weapon for Charles II in his defeat of the First Whigs. This relationship stemmed from the peerage possessing an extra-parliamentary relationship to the crown, they were held to be its 'natural counsellors,' a force that might aid good government. Therefore, they are a good means of monitoring the crown. How it and they interacted in the wake of the Revolution Settlement is a good engine for trying to understand how the Settlement influenced the politics that followed it.

1.2. Historiographical Context of Thesis.

If a historian undertakes a study which touches on the seventeenth-century peerage an awareness of the work of Lawrence Stone is necessary. This thesis has been conducted with such an awareness. However, since it originates from someone whom he would probably term a "young antiquarian empiricist" awareness of his work does not mean that his work should be mentioned automatically if there is no reason for it to be cited or to be discussed. There are points of contact, e.g. titles, but the work is written from the point of view of someone who wishes to throw light on the British high politics of 1689-1760 whereas his work is intended to elucidate the nature of English high society of 1558-1641. His techniques could produce a rich harvest but there is no point in applying them if they are not pertinent to the problem under investigation.

In this thesis, in best stereotypical Namierite fashion, ideology and idealism have been lain aside as subjects for study in their own right. This is not because they are worthless but rather to make the subject a manageable entity with a reasonably coherent character. Their existence has been borne in mind during the initial research, during the primary analysis and during the writing up. The work of Elton, Russell and Kenyon was not done to belittle these factors but rather to allow them to be better understood through trying to place them nearer their own environment so that they might be given a fuller context.² Stone may rest assured that this thesis is happy to be perceived as a lesser tributary of the great stream of narrative. Among other things, it concludes that the

place of the crown has been misunderstood and therefore understressed. Ergo, the political comprehension of these years would be distinctly advanced by better appreciation of the personalities of the monarchs who reigned during it, ...if such is possible.

The distribution of secondary literature can be attributed firstly to the period having come to be seen by many political historians as something of a historical 'backwater.' It is only natural for such gad-fly creatures to be attracted to 'events.' The 1715 and 1745 Jacobite Risings have distinctly less appeal than the Civil Wars of the seventeenth-century. This is because the former were neatly contained by governmental forces whereas the latter ripped open the very chest of British society and politics.

For the years after the period there is an expansion in the amount of source material. The Aspinall and Fortescue edited letters of George III compare with the sparse jottings and sporadic annotations of his grandfather and predecessor George II. The grandson's reign contains such broad internationally important historiographical marvels as the American Rebellion and the French Revolution while on the domestic front there were the beginnings of the Reform movements. These last were to transform British society and politics where the English Revolution had failed. To underscore the period's lack of appeal, it is to be noted that John Wilkes was characteristically so perverse as not to start publishing 'The North Briton' until 1762.

Yet some political historians have felt able to ignore the bright lights of the early seventeenth-century

and later eighteenth-century. Since the Second World War the historical research conducted on comprehending post-Revolution politics has had a leaning towards understanding the politics of the Commons and its membership as a vehicle for advancing a wider understanding. This stems from the way in which particular historians, through their teaching, their research or both, have influenced a number of susceptible intellects so that some fields have been investigated disproportionately in comparison to the amount of work done on other ones.

The most important steering figure was Lewis Namier. Although his "The Structure of Politics at the Accession of George III" had been published in 1929, it was not appreciated as the historiographical milestone that it is until the 1950s.³ Once "Structure" had assumed its true place there occurred something of an intellectual snowball. There is a good reason for such- stimulating work stimulates. In 'The History Men' John Kenyon has identified at the heart of the Namier influenced group- John Brooke, John Owen and Romney Sedgwick with Ian Christie as a 'fourth man' figure. However, these made up just the core.⁴

There is a strong case that can be made for the transfer of approach from supervisor to supervised. From the fifties it is possible to identify a host of theses which were heavily indebted to Namier in terms of subject matter. In view of the subject matter of this thesis a particular pertinent surmizable case of this process is Jonathan Clark. Clark was supervised in the late seventies by 'fourth man' Christie. Namier, Christie and Clark have

all omitted full direct discussion of the peerage in their work: in "Structure" Namier confines them to an incidental position with the exception of the secret service chapter; Christie's culpability can be illustrated by his 1987 piece "The Tory Party, Jacobitism and the Forty-Five: A Note";⁵ Clark wrote in 1986 that "One of the shortcomings of "The Dynamics of Change" was its failure to attend more closely to the House of Lords, and although I am still not clear that such a study would be particularly revealing, the attempt should have been made."⁶

The influence of Namier was perpetuated in terms of subject matter by J.H.Plumb. The latter is said to have opined of the former that he was a "great research worker, no historian."⁷ Plumb was interested in an earlier part of the century than Namier but shared his interest in using the Commons and its members as an engine for investigating politics. There is more of the air of a bon mot about Plumb's opinion of Namier than there is of a considered assessment. In 1960 Plumb wrote that Turberville's "'The House of Lords in the Eighteenth Century" is a most unsatisfactory book. The Lords need to be studied as Sir Lewis Namier and his colleagues have studied the Commons."⁸ It would seem that 'great research workers' have their place in the order of affairs.

The publication of Plumb's "The Growth of Political Stability in England, 1675-1725" beautifully reaped the benefits of the 1965 Robbins Report. Through recommending that university education should be available to all those who could benefit from it there followed an enlargement in both the numbers of undergraduate students but also in the number of university lecturers who were employed. Linda

Colley has charted the liberal-socialist tradition of writing political history in which "Stability" can be placed in her 1986 article "The Politics of Eighteenth-Century British History."⁹

Colley suggests that part of the reason for the tradition's decline may lie in a correlation between the character of political history which is written and the political tone of the day; if times can be said to be inclined to the political left then it is elements of change that are examined and if they can be said to be inclined to the political right then it is ones of continuity. This may contain some truth but the principal reason for ignoring elements of continuity was that the literature of the period had, thanks first to "Structure" and then to "Stability", built up a momentum which led researchers to gravitate towards it.

Colley may have been a 'victim' of this in that her research work was supervised by Plumb and, as with Christie and Clark, the supervisor may well have limited the scope of the research. In terms of subject her book "In Defiance of Oligarchy" possesses the same failure to appreciate the place of the peerage as occurs in Clark's "The Dynamics of Change.

1.3. The State of the Secondary Literature, 1989.

Two years before the publication of Namier's "Structure" A.S. Turberville produced "The House of Lords in the XVIIIth Century." This was a chronological extension to his 1913 volume "The House of Lords in the reign of William III." Turberville's works are very much products of their age. The 1927 book is analytical but essentially pedestrian. It belongs to a lighter, less sophisticated epoch than does Namier's scholarship. Whereas Namier was labouring outside the academic fold, having to rely on the generosity of individuals who both trusted in his innate ability and who believed in the cultural value of his work, Turberville was inside. The difference is perhaps illustrated by the way in which Turberville's work was published by the Oxford University Press whereas Namier's was brought out by the commercial company MacMillan. Turberville's preface contains a thanks to Professor Walter Raleigh. Raleigh's chair at Oxford was in literature not history.¹⁰

The existence of Turberville's work has probably been a factor in preventing serious research on the matter until recently. There has been a need for a review of the subject since at least the 1950s, but the influence of Namier and Plumb in terms of subject matter has almost certainly prevented one. However, of late a rich secondary literature has begun to amass on the eighteenth-century peerage and aristocracy. 1977 saw the completion of P.C. Walters's Leicester University M.Phil.. The dissertation is a study of the House of Lords at the time of the Excise Crisis. It has some interesting material and is designed to try to allow us to understand the crisis.

However, because the study has no broader comprehension of either the politics that surrounded the event or of the peerage as a political entity. The work is limited to being an exercise in the 'history as change' school.

1978 witnessed the publication of Michael McCahill's "Order & Equipoise." The work shows the potential for studying the eighteenth-century peerage and presumably that of the nineteenth too. The book is firstly different from this thesis in being on a time-span a third of the same length. There is no overlap since it is the years 1783-1806 that are under consideration nor is the methodology particularly similar. It shows that there is room for a variety of research on the peerage in the eighteenth-century all of which can be original.

The mid-1980s was when the flood (or may be just its first wave) burst. 1984 saw the publication of John Cannon's "Aristocratic Century." Chapters one and four of Cannon's book are the items with which this thesis has most in common in the current literature in terms of time-span and subject. His other four chapters are nearer to Stone in subject. It is a pioneering work containing much fresh material. It is of importance both as a work of original scholarship and through its providing a framework which other historians can use in order to help construct their thoughts with respect to the peerage in the eighteenth-century and the centuries either side of it. One of the book's particular strengths is Cannon's breadth of reading which allows him to make thoughtful comparisons with the continental nobility.

Michael Bush's "The English Aristocracy" is a sister volume to his 1983 and 1988 works on the European

aristocracy. It has little direct bearing to this thesis but contains interesting material nonetheless. It is essentially pitched as an introductory survey to a literature that has a long way to go in terms of being written. An even more abstract work was also published in 1984- Jonathan Powis's "Aristocracy" which is an essay of the broadest variety.

1986 saw "The Aristocracy in England, 1660-1914" come out. Its author is the economic historian J.V.Beckett. It is a large interesting work which draws upon the literature which has come to exist in the socio-economic field in large part in the wake of H.J.Habbakuk's 1940 article "English Landownership, 1680-1740"¹¹ and which was stimulated further by two books published in 1963 G.E.Mingay's "English Landed Society in the Eighteenth-Century" and F.M.L.Thompson's "English Landed Society in the Nineteenth Century." Beckett's chapters two, eleven and twelve can be added to those recommended in Cannon's book although they show very clearly that they were written in its wake. Cannon concentrates more closely on the peerage than he does and therefore gains more in pertinency to this thesis whereas Beckett uses the aristocracy in its true broader sense and therefore is more diffuse.

The most recent work is Anita Rees's informative 1987 Ph.D. on "The practice and procedure of the house of lords, 1714-1784." The work is very much in the thematic mould of her supervisor P.D.G.Thomas, who produced "The House of Commons in the Eighteenth Century" in 1971.

1.4. Argument of Thesis.

This thesis seeks to make a successful case for an expansion of contemporary understanding of the British political history of 1689-1760. The period's high politics have been handled in such a way so that casual observers take a part of its character to be the whole. This dissertation seeks to contend that the period's overall framework should be appreciated and that any pertinent discussions of its high politics should take place with at least an appreciation of the existence of that structure. This dissertation is not meant to undermine the imbalanced concentration of historiography on party and electoral matters but rather to complement it; the scales are to be balanced not by seeking to dismiss the initial weight but rather complementing it with a counter-weight.

The author makes no claims to have advanced historical technique but merely to have applied it to a field which has long been overlooked. This work builds on the foundations of part of Cannon's "Aristocratic Century." Criticisms of his work are made with a full agreement of his right to use, as he should wish the 'broad in character and of a pioneering nature' loophole. The debt this work owes to Cannon is clearly illustrated in the heavy use of structural analysis, he having shown its potential for breaking new ground.¹²

Each of the four reigns studied here is capable of at least a partial re-interpretation in the light of this work. Work by the likes of Henry Horwitz, Geoffrey Holmes and even J.H. Plumb himself can be called into question. If changes are to be made to the insights that the work of such people have made, it is of a shift of emphasis and a

greater acknowledgement of context. This thesis is pitched to show the room for action rather than to engage in full on every front where revision is possible.

The words 'argument' and 'case' have been used above quite specifically. This is not so much an instance of taking advantage of the speculative license that research dissertations are allowed. Rather, it is because certain parts of the argument can be reached by the logical use of structural analysis but they are not additionally substantiated from literary sources. A principal reason for the lack of work on the crown in this period stems from none of the four sovereigns being given to writing about British political affairs or musing in a manner such as Frederick the Great of Prussia in his 1752 "Political Testament."

A central contention of this thesis is that there was preferential employment of peers who had inherited their titles over peers who had been recruited in them. The nearest that the primary sources come to supporting this is a remark by Hervey that George II preferred to award place according to the rank of a coronet rather than the merit of the head it sat upon.¹³ This was not literally true but it does point to George having prejudices as to the peerage and their employment which can be substantiated by structural analysis. This thesis seeks not necessarily to uncover unshakeable verity, although it would be sad to think that some of the ideas advanced will not permanently enter the secondary literature, but rather to advance a number of reasoned and logical conjectures, the forwarding of which will hopefully further understanding of the politics of these years.

The line of argument runs as follows. Through the medium of the Revolution Settlement the crown's prerogative was made smaller. The traditional assumption was that this meant that the crown had lost political ground. This assumption is too simplistic, which in turn means that the arguments built upon it tend to be erroneous in at least part. It is correct to assume that the technical scope for action became more restricted. However, there were positive gains. The scope that remained could be used far more effectively than it could be before. What was lost either could not be used at all or could only be used within strict limits.

In its nature the price paid was more abstract than material. That the crown had to meet regularly with parliament was innovative but the crown garnered extensive rewards for doing so. The pre-Revolution strength of parliament is to be held in mind, James II tried to remodel parliament because he was not able to ignore it. The post-Revolution lack of crown/parliament conflict was marked by the way in which the latter never totally refused to vote supply, nor failed to pass the Mutiny Act nor supply bills if they were critical (William III lost a few money bills but nothing that caused governmental finances to grind to a halt). The non-use of the royal veto by the early Hanoverians was a sign of the general harmony of their relations with parliament. It is to be remembered that the Settlement exacted a price from the political nation: it had to provide the means by which it could be defended which meant a considerable expansion of the executive and the provision of financial support for

that growth. Regular representation led to heavier taxation. In terms of having a larger executive and having it properly financed the crown indubitably benefitted from the Settlement.

The prerogative contracted and the executive expanded. The crown of the early Hanoverians did not have the same range of prerogative powers which that of James I and Charles I had enjoyed. However, the early Stuarts were unable to pull off distant military engagements such as Cape Passaro or Dettingen with the ease that the monarchy of the first two Georges could. Foreign policy was considered to be in the prerogative's sphere both before and after the Settlement. The early Hanoverians had to face some fairly hostile criticism of their conduct of it in parliament. But then so too had the early Stuarts. Because of what had occurred in the early seventeenth-century, by the early eighteenth it was accepted that whatever the de jure state of affairs on the topic might be parliament had a de facto right to be heard, such was an accepted fact of political life irrespective of the Revolution Settlement. The criticism never reached such a pitch under the two Georges where parliament itself sought to conduct the nation's foreign policy. At the same time the crown's position was such that it had to be aware of parliament's pertinent prejudices in the matter; however, the crown had never been able to consider an active foreign policy without parliament's concurrence. That there had been an improvement in the crown's position was witnessed by it having to make decisions about what sort of foreign policy to have rather than whether to have an active one or not.

The change wrought by the Settlement is demonstrated by the England of Charles II having been a pensioner of France, whereas the Britain of George II was the pension-master of European alliances against France.

If it is possible to view the crown as having positively gained from the Settlement, which it is, then such puts the traditionally received 'aristocracy as beneficiaries' concept into play. The aristocracy, and more specifically the peerage, it is generally agreed, came to enjoy more positions of power after the Revolution than they had had before it and that this was more true in the studied period's second half than in its first. The nature of that enjoyment is where a mistake in comprehension has been made. The aristocracy/peerage exercised power, they did not control it. They did not appoint themselves, the crown was not forced to appoint them, the crown chose to appoint them. Why the crown chose to appoint them is not evidenced by contemporary sources and this thesis then wanders into educated conjecture.

There were two complementary factors in operation with the supposed 'oligarchical' invasion of office. The first is that the Settlement largely ended the old court/country conflict over the prerogative which James I and the two Charleses had had to deal with. Oxford, the father of the Act of Settlement, was the last person who first rose to prominence through country hostility and who was then taken onto the court side in the way that Strafford had before the Civil Wars and Interregnum and Sir Richard Temple had after them. After the Settlement the crown no longer needed to raise its own servants to

additionally act with the turncoats as its defenders in parliament. Therefore, there was no longer the same pressing in of new men to hold senior offices, whether they were from country or court backgrounds. Under the Hanoverians, with a general lack of political pressure, the crown was freer to choose what it did than it had been before the Revolution. Under the two Georges such minor contretemps as it experienced occurred only during times of war, times when its financial needs made it more vulnerable than it would otherwise have been. In terms of international relations Britain was mostly at peace over the years 1714-1760.

The second factor in operation was that the two Hanoverians, especially George II, had an elevated concept of the standing of nobility. This is where the argument is at its least literary and is most based on structural analysis. An appreciation of the way in which Bedchamber lordships and senior offices were distributed to the peerage shows that the Georges had a bias in favour of conferring those offices on peers who had inherited their titles rather than ones who had been recruited to them. The data is too convergent for any other interpretation to be probable. Not only were new men no longer able to force their way in but the crown also positively sought to give honours and office to inheritors. By having peers, and especially inheritors, as its senior servants, the crown displayed its own assuredness, its power and its harmonious relations with the nation. The peerage's enjoyment of power was a by-product of the Settlement rather than the direct product of it.

1.5. Structure of Thesis.

This thesis has two principal parts- three thematic sections and a chronological narrative of the period, which has two offshoots. The purpose of the broad division is to allow for clarity of approach. The first of the thematic sections describes the distribution of recruitments and promotions, the second how Bedchamber places and senior offices were given out and the third the pattern of tenure of lord lieutenancies and custodes rotulorum and the character of departures from lieutenancies.

John Cannon's chapter on recruitment includes John Kenyon's observation that "Britain's rise to world power was matched by paralysis or deepening ossification at home."¹⁴ Kenyon's remark can be taken to refer to the broad stultification of British politics which occurred during the eighteenth-century and which only started to be altered in 1832. Cannon goes on to cite Harold Perkin's opinion that Britain was peculiar in Europe because its aristocracy was open to penetration by individuals with bourgeois backgrounds. In "Aristocratic Century" Cannon expresses himself unhappy with Perkin's view and seeks to test its unity with Kenyon's observation by means of investigating peerage creation. The particular methodology he uses is to see whether recruits possess 'peerage connections' of the kinship variety. The resulting conclusion that he comes to is that Kenyon's paradox stands intact and that "assertions of the uniquely liberal character of eighteenth-century English society should be treated with some reserve."¹⁵

Cannon's work is right in terms of the connections

but in terms of the broader argument it fails to penetrate. He perceives his recruits as being representative of Perkin's aristocracy. There is a definite difference between Cannon's 'peerage' and Perkin's 'aristocracy' which the former is rather strangely not taking into consideration. The sole cause of recruitment was not to act as a monitor to socio-political or socio-economic change during the period under consideration, rather it was indicative of the far more specific field of high politics and even then is something that has to be read carefully. The interesting problem over recruitment is how the immediate character of high politics was reflected through the individual creations of its participants, or those of their kinsmen and clients. Cannon sought to re-assess the verity of Kenyon's ossification paradox when it would perhaps have been more profitable to assess the reason for its existence.

Beckett's work deals with the aristocracy rather than peerage. His subject is large and his approach principally discursive rather than analytical. The work is not designed to illuminate early eighteenth-century high politics which is the purpose of this thesis, therefore, the connection between the two is superficial. However, the broader subject which Beckett chose to investigate gives more elucidation on those whom Perkin was discussing.

This thesis has arbitrarily excluded a number of offices and honours that peers received in this period. A systematic study which included them would considerably add to the number of trees without clarifying our perception of the political wood. The same is true of the

functions of the offices. Firstly, the material on such is rather uneven since a number had only very nominal duties while others had considerable power and influence. And secondly, for those offices which did have functions there already exists a great deal scattered about the secondary literature, notably in the work of Thomson, Beattie, Bucholz and the Webbs. Even if such did exist and it were original material it would only serve to create a slightly diverse and somewhat curved focus. For the same reason the influence of the peerage in the localities, notably as to their electoral influence there, has also been omitted.

Cannon opines that the influence that the peerage were able to wield in parliament palled "in comparison with the power they wielded directly as office-holders, in day-to-day charge of the country, with a firm grip on the executive."¹⁶ He goes on to argue that the level of peerage representation in the executive is in correlation to their control of it. This share did not start to decline until long after George II's death. Beckett sees no reason to contest this view and felt able to write that "By 1760 England was effectively an oligarchy."¹⁷ This misinterpretation grows from the political historians of the period having collectively agreed on a view which is wrong in its exclusivity. Such has happened because the primary evidence can be interpreted as supporting the oligarchy theory.

Consideration of the subject allows one to see that Cannon is barking up the wrong tree, the tree of oligarchy. Cabinets in both the early eighteenth-century and the mid-nineteenth-century were peer dominated. In the former, with the momentary and misunderstood exception of

1746, they did not resign en masse, in the latter they did. If the peerage domination is the constant there must be a variable elsewhere. The variable is crown influence, in the former period it was far stronger than it was in the latter one. Cannon overlooked it in the way that Pares and Christie had before him because it was so much of the background that it did not need looking at and unfortunately it was also so very much of the essence. He is correct in illustrating that the peerage held a high proportion of senior offices. Unfortunately, the logical question that an enquiring mind seeking to build on his work is liable to go on from this to ask is- Why did the peerage occupy such a high proportion? The real problem to be gone on to is- Whether they did so at will, and if not, Why did the crown let them?

The evidence supporting the oligarchy view can be used to also argue that the establishment of the Supremacy was not only beneficial to the whig party but that it was also beneficial to the crown's interests. The oligarchy was not a self-perpetuating one but rather it was a limited group who were appointed by two kings who purposefully selected their leading ministers principally from those magnate families which were pliant and admitted other people as they felt was appropriate. The evidence can be used in a systematic manner to support this.

There is hard material evidence that Walpole was careful to limit his influence in terms of having allies in senior offices and that he was perfectly prepared to promote the candidature of an individual who was not positively disposed towards himself. He did this because he realized that by doing so he was maintaining his own

overall relationship with George II even if he was also helping to promote as colleagues men who were politically antagonistic to himself. That such has not been appreciated before is in part the product of Plumb having chosen to terminate his biography of Walpole in 1734. Had he persisted he would have at least brought the matter into scholarly consideration.

Cannon touches on the Bedchamber in a broader argument which is a part of an argument to account for the increase of 'the party of the crown' in the Lords during the course of the eighteenth-century. In doing so he takes rather a restricted view of the subject. Bedchamber lords were not an innovation of George I, William III had had them.¹⁸ The growth of offices occurred because Anne did not have male Bedchamber, therefore, Oxford could not expand it, therefore, he dragged into peer tenure a number of offices which had previously been held by commoners, e.g. tellerships of the Exchequer and the mastership of the Buckhounds.

An interesting feature is the way in which the number of peers holding Bedchamber places increased during the course of the three reigns in which they occurred. The timing of these increases, especially under the two Georges, was indicative of a close relationship between the Bedchamber and the needs of the ministry in the Lords. The Bedchamber had at least a correlative relation with the ministry. The traditional view has been to see the Bedchamber as exclusively the king's preserve, Pares articulated such and it has remained accepted. There was clearly some form of connection since political historians are aware that Bedchamber lords were watched in the House

as a means of monitoring the crown's attitude on controversial issues. Cannon recites this.¹⁸

The dismissal of Clinton from the Bedchamber during the Excise Crisis for acting against Walpole in the matter is well known. Long overlooked and of equal importance is that the crown did maintain within the Bedchamber individuals who were occasionally politically idiosyncratic even though such behaviour was not necessarily in the contemporary ministry's best interests. The Bedchamber was a more complex beast than has previously been appreciated; it was closely connected with the crown's attitude to British politics. The crown shifted from a personal Bedchamber to a larger more impersonal one which accepted the kinsmen and connections of its leading members. Such could be argued to be a sign of a deterioration in the crown's position, paradoxically, it was one of its strengths.

The relationship of the lords lieutenant and the *custodes rotulorum* to one another has been somewhat misunderstood. In 1984 Cannon wrote "The justices were appointed by the Lord Chancellor on the advice of the Lord Lieutenant of the county." Had "Aristocratic Century" been published a year later he could have availed himself of Norma Landau's work "The Justices of the Peace." She more correctly covered the same ground with "In law, the *custos rotulorum* was head of the commission. But, in fact, the Lord Chancellor determined the composition of the peace." She goes on to astutely comment that the perceptions of the state of the the relationship of the lieutenancy to the *custos* in the late seventeenth- and early eighteenth-century may in large part have been derived

from evidence from the sixteenth- and nineteenth-centuries. 19

The way in which the two offices were held changed during the course of the period as a response to political developments over its course. That they were of political importance is not surprizing in view of the way in which the lieutenancies had been remodelled by James II during his reign. In addition, the expansion of the executive under William and Anne saw a large increase in the amount of patronage in the localities; by 1760 this was firmly integrated in the Old Corps political machine, whereas in 1689 only some of was in existence and the Old Corps lay distinctly in the future.

As with the Bedchamber, instances of the system under strain help to give insight into the changes that were taking place in politics. The frequency and manner of peers departing the lieutancies were indicative of the contemporary character of politics. A lot of sackings pointed to something different from a few resignations as did they both from a state where there were no departures from the office except by means of death.

The years 1689-1760 can be seen as having a theme in the lack of an aboriginal male sovereign. The country was ruled by an Englishwoman, a Dutchman and two Germans. All three men grew to political maturity outside of the British political enviroment. Anne as a woman had considerable social prejudice militating against her. This can be exemplified by the way in which William had commanded in the Low Countries in person whereas she had to delegate such responsibility to the first duke of

Marlborough. The absence of a male native monarch occurred in a time when the crown underwent a marked change in its relations with parliament.

William III's desire to engage in an ambitious foreign policy led him to compromise part of the crown's prerogative base in order that he might be allowed in return the financial means to conduct that policy. Parliament wished to avoid the threat of absolute monarchy that the Stuarts had seemed to threaten at times. Therefore, parliament was careful to ensure that it had possession of the legal basis for financing the executive. Thereby, when it felt that the crown's political behaviour was beyond the bounds of what was acceptable to the political nation as a whole, it could ensure that the crown heeded its opinion. If the crown refused to contain itself accordingly, the legal supports financing the executive could be withdrawn giving the crown the clear choice of either being inactive or financing its activities by what would indubitably be illegal means.

Relations between crown and parliament were not the only theme that exists to be understood in these years even if it is the one that this thesis will concentrate on. During the first half of the period a state of of political agitation can be said to have existed. This varied in intensity, reaching peaks both in the late 1690s and in the early 1710s. The second half of the period was quieter than the first. It had variants within itself, the years before the 1748 treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle being noisier than those after.

The study of the Commons has produced only a partial view. The two Houses of parliament had different

characters. The Lords was more sedate and reflective in nature than the Commons. The divisions in the Lords were not regularly re-underlined by general elections; the court had a proportionately larger presence there than in the Commons; there was never more than a token country element in the Upper House. Because the Commons's membership was determined by general elections it was far more influenced by the vehemence and the confrontational attitudes of low politics, in comparison the Lords acquired its membership via either inheritance or recruitment. The proportionately lower level of crown influence in the Commons meant that it was more open to being persuaded by force of argument, therefore, it was generally more tolerant of bluster and exclamation. A study of the Lords allows the structural elements in politics to be more easily perceived in relation to the eye-catching activities of inter-party warfare. If the battle is to be properly understood, the existence of the battlefield must first be duly acknowledged.

The narrative section does not concentrate exclusively on the proceedings within the Upper Chamber. Rather, it looks at the full range of high politics in which the peerage engaged- parliamentary, court and ministerial. These fora are used to construct a broad narrative. Chronology is not strictly adhered to, thematic structures are used within a broad linear form. The reigns of William and Anne each have a single united narrative whereas those of two Georges are split by party. This is because in the early Hanoverian period the tories were excluded from government virtually all of the time, therefore, non-integrated treatments are the clearest

vehicles for discussing politics.

The works of a number of political historians are touched upon. It is to be stressed that, with the exception of Turberville, there is no specific secondary literature on the peerage in high politics. Some dissertations are able to relate to quite a full literature of that type; a county study could be related to work of John Morrill, David Underdown, Andrew Coleby, Ann Hughes, Norma Landau, Alan Everitt, Clyve Holmes and Anthony Fletcher. There is a dearth of such material to relate to. Therefore, the points of contact with individual historians tend to be chronologically confined rather than systematically related to through the section.

Much of the material is well known to political historians. What gives it originality is that the raw information can be related to itself in a manner so as to give an original interpretation, one which is new in character. Fresh material is used to illustrate various matters which have largely been overlooked. This fresh material has been found largely in sources as commonplace as Hervey and Coxe. The reign of George II has received less scrutiny from political historians than those of William, Anne and George I. Therefore, the text contains proportionately more fresh material on the years after 1727 than on those before it.

That there were two parties is undeniable. They were both still extant at the end of George II's reign; indeed, this thesis contains fresh evidence to confirm Colley's contention that the tory party survived as an organized and coherent entity until at least 1760. What this thesis

seeks particularly to advance is that there has been a failure to appreciate the parties' relationships with the crown and that this had an important bearing on why the Supremacy came into being and what its true nature was.

With the departure of James II the pre-1679 elements in the composition of the two parties were free to surface. The tory party contained proportionately far more members of the Caroline country party than the whig one did. The Settlement stirred up the backwoods tories to try to guard against further encroachments on the old order. Defensive opposition became the party's principal attitude. However, the leadership that had formed as lieutenants to Charles II were unable to provide any alternative because James II had proved them wrong as to the merit of their previous principal political plank and because they had their own fierce internal divisions which the Stuarts had fostered as a means of controlling them.

The surviving whig leadership had weathered adversity and then seen itself vindicated in its aim of seeking to exclude James. Persecution had led the whig leaders to be better integrated with their membership than the tory leadership were with the tory rank and file. The original whig leaders and their lieutenants were like the tory leaders in being courtiers. The difference was that the whigs had found intolerable the prospect of a catholic James as king with respect to their own futures at court, although wider concerns did also play a part.

In the early 1690s the inter-party division was principally of a historical character, the past issue of Exclusion coloured contemporary stances. The court/country axis dominated during the later 1690s. It initially masked

the new party division which was born in the wake of the Triennial Act, one that was very much along the lines of the old party division. The virtually full continuity of personnel has masked the substantive variances between the parties' pre- and post-Revolution characters, variances that transformed the parties into new entities rather than leaving them as continuations of what had been before. The court/country axis was about whether the crown should be further limited, the new party axis was about whether active government should then be engaged in. The whigs were positively open to such, whereas the tories were far more equivocal. The whigs' openness aided their predisposition to pro-court stances over the conduct of foreign policy and occasional conformity.

This rather underplays the place of issues of principle, which is a charge long made at works that make heavy use of structural analysis. The reasons for such in this instance is firstly clarity and secondly that certain aspects of politics have been misunderstood about the character of the period's politics because of an undue stress on the independent nature of the two parties' respective characters. Overall, party has been given too much weight of its own when in fact the two parties were derived from the contemporary state of politics and the nature of past politics. Parties were never of a homogeneous nature, for some they were a career vehicle for others they were a means of expressing their opinions on a variety of issues; one persons heartfelt grievance was another person's posture of solidarity with the aggrieved. The issues which went to give the parties character were not continuously at the forefront of

politics, indeed, there were stretches of time when there was not much to distinguish the two parties other than their historical differences. If one reads the political correspondence of those who participated in high politics one finds that there is precious little material about the ideological variances of the two parties. Bolingbroke was the only major politician who mused extensively on politics and he did so not from any intellectual or philosophical compulsion but rather in the hope of helping to oust his enemy Walpole.

'Persona' issues were the political ideological characteristics which gave the two parties their separate and distinctive identities.¹⁹ It is a fully viable argument that in large part these issues followed on from attitudes taken with respect to the court and to the conduct of government. Plumb overlooked this in his eagerness to counter Walcott.²⁰ He was led to do this because the stances that the whigs and the tories took could be in part traced back to pre-Revolution attitudes on contemporary issues. He was just looking back when he should also have been looking for contemporary motivations.

The 'persona' issues can be seen essentially court/country in nature. Occasional conformity illustrates that it was this axis which principally fuelled post-Revolution politics, doing so often in the form of inter-party conflict. The Low Church identification with the whigs and the High Church one with the tories were real. However, this has tended to rather overshadow the fact that both parties were firmly and decidedly anglican. Occasional conformity was in large part a court/country

issue because it arose in part from William being unwilling to grant the whigs more than nominal access to the government's potential electoral strength to help them overcome their position as the minority party. Therefore, the whigs had to clutch at whatever means they could find to improve their position; thus there followed a broad alliance with the dissenting interests. The most recent example of a similar pact with the dissenting interest had been that of James II in his attempt to remodel parliament. Therefore, the tories' attitude towards dissent was in large part a response to the stance which was being taken by their historical enemies the whigs, who had been forced into it by the crown. The hostility was pre-Revolution but the issue was essentially post-Revolution and had a strong court/country context.

In the early sessions of Anne's reign the occasional conformity issue had a strong party context. As Dennis Rubini perceptively pointed out this stemmed from the recent passage of the Act of Settlement which incorporated most of the platform that had led many country whigs to work in cooperation with the tories over the last few years.²¹ Therefore, the country programme no longer acted as a binding agent. The war meant a return to active government. The whigs, with their proportionately lower content of former members of the Caroline country party, were more willing to accept the necessity of such.

Occasional conformity divided the parties into their respective camps but in doing so it created stresses in both of them. The measure was not welcomed by those tories who believed in the war's necessity since they viewed it as wasteful and distracting. They perceived it as an

attempt to deprive the court of a prop that they themselves might wish to avail themselves of in their own future dealings with their own party. Sturdy anglican, country whigs found occasional conformity distasteful but they appreciated that the issue was not being sought as an object in itself but rather that it was being exploited for partisan ends. The principal objects of the attack were the court whigs who might not be everything that country whigs could wish for but whose presence in office was preferable to that of the court tories, therefore, they put aside their support for the measure and expressed solidarity with their party colleagues. (The same is true of the later stages of the War of the Spanish Succession. There is no reason for believing that in the late 1710s the whig gentry positively liked paying heavy rates of land tax.)

At her accession and prior to the emergence of occasional conformity as a major issue, Anne sought to create a court party, consisting primarily of tories. Occasional conformity proved that the tories as a whole were incapable of serving as her court party. Her chosen ministers increasingly had to rely on the whigs, who as a party were able to serve the court with greater ease than the tories were able to. The queen's attitude to the tories in 1702 is a factor which has hindered a truer appreciation of how the whigs were identifying themselves as the court party. That she particularly disliked the Junto, the most influential group within the party, has aided the lack of comprehension as to the nature of the political situation and of how the factors present in it pulled the whigs and the crown towards one another. There

was a structural attraction; the queen wanted to have a court party, while the whigs were better able to act as one than the tories were, Anne's attitude was a result of her desire for an active crown policy. The factor which gave their mutual attraction a gravity, putting into motion their structural sympathy, was her desire for the war to be fought.

Anne has been misunderstood, she has been made into 'Anne the tory queen.' It is a reasonable contention that much of her initial favouring of the tories stemmed not so much from who they were as from whom they were not. They were not the whigs. Her dislike of the whigs was not from their party nature. Rather, it seems to have been from the way they had become her late brother-in-law's servants, a role that the tories had for the most part failed in. Over 1702-1705 the tories should have been working to secure their position rather than assuming that they were safe in it and going on the attack against the whigs. However, in the wake of the Act of Settlement the rank and file tories were too bloody-minded in their attitudes to allow themselves to be reharnessed by their leadership. While it would be wrong to wholly discount genuine religious concerns, there is a deficiency in our knowledge regarding the immediate political calculations that weighed with those tory leaders who sponsored the scheme.

In 1705 the High Church party were dismissed from office. Godolphin came increasingly to rely on the whigs for political support for the duumvir ministry. Anne became disenchanted with British participation in the War of the Spanish Succession, whereas her ministers did not. Therefore, there came the opportunity for Harley to become

her first minister in 1710.

There was considerable scope for Brian Hill and Angus McInnes to revive Harley's reputation because Feiling saw the man's ministry as having a party character rather than a court one. The two principal reasons for his doing so were that the inter-party conflict was at a new height at the time of the ministry and because he did not appreciate that there had arisen a generation of moderate court Tories who were different from both the Caroline leadership, that had by then in large part disappeared, and from the rank and file Tories who did not have their pro-court attitude. This arose from Feiling being both too literal and not analytical enough in his handling of primary sources. He failed to understand that 1710 was essentially a return to 1702 but then he had not appreciated the nature of 1702, when Anne had sought to have a court party serve her rather than the Tory one.

Feiling perceived Ormond as standing with Rochester "for the pure Tory creed" while he repeats that Jersey was rumoured to be a Jacobite and that he kept out for another year.²² This omits that both Ormond and Jersey were hearty Williamite courtiers during the years of the country party's height after Ryswick; Ormond was Rochester's son-in-law but he was also William's blood relative, while Jersey was brother to the countess of Orkney that king's mistress. Feiling's errors were repeated by Plumb. The last was so receptive to Feiling's work that he was even prepared to go to the length of applauding Walcott for regurgitating it.²³

On the Hanoverian Succession, George I opted to give the Whigs the lion's share of office. In the wake of the

1715 Rising they acquired a monopoly; the first that had occurred for a quarter of a century. The whigs were able to take advantage of this situation because their leadership and the majority of their rank and file were positively willing to serve the crown as a court party, firstly because they were generally more predisposed towards it and secondly because the crown, in the wake of the Act of Settlement coming into force, had a limited prerogative.

The Supremacy followed and then worked for over four decades. However, however large the degree of overlap between the court party and the whig party was during it they were always separate entities, the terms should never be used synonymously. The party's position was conditional- court power could only be used for court measures, these were limited to routine crown business rather than trying to recapture the lost parts of the prerogative. The conditional nature of the relationship worked both ways- if the crown sought to try to enlarge the prerogative whigs would rapidly fall away from supporting the court; such incidents as did occur were the result of misjudgements on the part of the crown's ministers rather than of any monarch seeking to enlarge the crown's prerogative.²⁴ Both George I and George II delegated most of the detailed and burdensome aspects of managing British domestic politics to native politicians.

The level of the crown's influence on the whig party -both ministerial and opposition- has been underestimated. The assumption that ministries were homogeneous oligarchies is an error; therefore, to map out the elements that went to make them heterogeneous is to

advance the literature. There has been little real systematic investigation of either aspect of the party. Foord's 1964 book is the best that the secondary literature has to offer. Its coverage of the Lords is small and its appreciation of the peerage's politics is minimal, although as a work in its own parameters it is both useful and well executed.

In Feiling's wake the Tories were viewed as an exhausted topic until Colley showed that there were considerable riches still to be uncovered. As her interest was to prove that the party continued to exist as a political entity over 1714-1760 it followed that she did not investigate the pattern of tergiversation away from the party. This thesis uses a study of that pattern as an engine by which to see if there are any proclivities to be detected in such and whether these, if they existed, bore any relation to the party's internal state.

After the 1715 Rising the Tory party continued to contain a substantial court element. However, this was made up of those people who had been prepared to serve in the Oxford ministry and who therefore had a rather limited identification with the mass of the party. The Caroline leadership at least had had a strong mutual identity with the Tory rank and file in the early and middle 1680s. Historians have unduly subordinated the Harleyites' courtiness to their Toryness. The career of Harley has been re-interpreted, such demands that his followers' fate after his fall also deserves to be reconsidered.

Post-1715 the Harleyites expressed solidarity with their party colleagues because they felt it to be in their

own best interests. Stanhope and Sunderland and then Townshend and Walpole knew it was easier to control a court party which drew exclusively on whig support than it was to control one which drew on the tories as well. The Harleyites were initially placed beyond the Pale because the treaty of Utrecht had deeply offended George I. The king chose to maintain such an attitude; therefore, he did not create a transparty court party which his ministers would have had to accept. The Harleyites aside, the other sections of the tory party were not likely to promote themselves as ministerial servants through holding either too Jacobite or too country attitudes.

The Harleyites' unity in opposition through George I's reign was impressive in view of their court inclinations. George II was content to retain the smooth ministerial machine that his father had left him. The frustration that the Harleyites felt led to a spate of defections from their section of the tory party. These defections only stopped because of a new use of the country agenda by cynical courtiers who had reached political maturity in an age when the Revolution Settlement had become political wallpaper. This occurred because Walpole, the court's chosen political manager, had realized that politics would be easier to manage if he lowered the occurrence of genuine inter-party confrontation. This had the effect of lowering the overall political temperature, such made transparty cooperation possible on a non-party platform.

After Walpole's fall the court soon re-asserted its control of politics. Neither had the relations between the various court groups been resolved nor had the question

been answered of who was going to be in the ministry when the the 1745 Jacobite Rebellion broke out. In its wake the surviving court-inclined Harleyites drew into the ministerial fold, followed for the first time by a significant number of mainstream tories. The political quiet of the early 1750s arose from the remaining tories being unwilling to be exploited again as they had been in the 1730s by careerist courtiers.

The recontroversialization of politics in the late 1750s is directly comparable to the 1620s. The expense of going to war made the political nation feel it had the right to criticize the conducting of that war. Excitement grew in part from the court having to reshuffle its ministerial line-up a couple of times before it had an appropriate team for the circumstances. There was an incorporation of a few tories as tories into the ministerial fold although other still stayed outside of it as did some whigs.

It would be in error to discuss a disappeared state of affairs without touching on the factor or factors that caused that state to pass on. This is done briefly and is restricted to where pertinent. Discussions of the Excise Crisis, the popularity of admiral Vernon and the repeal of the Jewish Naturalization Act all help to give a context for the narrative that precedes it.

2. Titles.

2.1. Introduction.

The power to make commoners peers and promote peers from one rank to another lay within the royal prerogative. The best known incident of recruitment policy in these years is the mass creation of the winter of 1711-1712. Cannon, through the broad nature of his canvas, chose only to look at whether peers were related to other peers, while Beckett chose to look at entry into the aristocracy rather than the more limited subject of entry into the peerage.

There were basic and universal assumptions about the peerage. What forms these ideas took is uncertain. This may have stemmed from their so generally being held that there was felt to be no need ever to refer to them. On the other hand, with the Dissolution being the foundation of many fortunes and the corruption of the early Stuart court the means by which those courtiers gained social distinction, it is unlikely that any lofty conceptions would have survived against a background of pragmatic realism.

The best hunting ground for views on the nature of the peerage should be found around about the Peerage bill of 1719.¹ However, despite the work of John Naylor, such material proves rather elusive. In part this may come from the fact that the bill never became an Act, such would have probably brought forth suitable bepamphleted tirades.

In the sections below recruitments and promotions are treated in an intertwined manner. This is because they were influenced by the same factors as one another. Were

they treated separately promotions would be dealt with at a disproportionate length since direct evidence on them is rarer than that on recruitments. Therefore, the two are treated together.

The first section deals with the material worth of the peerage. The second is a consideration of the question of rank within the peerage. It looks both at the rank at which peers were recruited and promotions from one rank to another. The third is a study of the size of the peerage and the way in which recruitment was not the only factor which added to it. The fourth section is where the meat of this chapter lies. It deals with the factors which promoted individual recruitments and promotions. Those with their own subsection are- the law, state service, continuity, corruption, the Scots and politics. The last is something of a coverall for all those instances that can not be neatly categorized under one of the other headings.

In both the early 1690s and the early 1750s the best means of being recruited was to be the friend or kinsman of someone important; therefore, on one level matters were fairly static over the period. However, in themselves descriptions of the operation of the factors show that it is possible to delineate the operation of political forces and thus advance our current understanding of the politics of the period 1689-1760. This is true in terms both of understanding the period as a whole and of allowing such an overview to give insight into particular incidents. Lists of the recruitments and promotions can be found in appendix A.

2.2. Estate.

Of Oxford's mass creation Peter Wentworth commented that "...som take offence, others laugh, tho' noe body can deny their being well chosen, at least most of them, for their estates and families."² There was a contemporary belief that if someone was seeking a peerage they should have the wealth to be able to support the dignity they aspired to; William III gave Somers the manor of Reigate to ensure that his title was properly supported.³ Not only was it thought that a peer should be an individual of a particular economic level but it was also thought that differentiations of economic levels between peers should be expressed where appropriate. Just as William III granted Somers Reigate so he gave the first earl of Warrington a £2000 p.a. pension out of the Post Office upon the man's promotion so that the dignity might be supported appropriately.⁴ The practice of adding a pension or giving a grant of lands had been widely used by Charles II but after the Revolution Settlement came into operation it was used sparingly.

With William's acceptance of the civil list, monarchs were no longer able to alienate crown lands at will. Rather, parliament's concurrence had to be sought. This discouraged alienations since parliament was disinclined to rid itself of a source of revenue which helped to keep down the need for taxes. William was made aware of this disinclination when he tried to grant some of the duchy of Cornwall's lands in North Wales to the earl of Portland. The opposition to this, which was led by the Denbighshire gentry, was such that he backed down.⁵

William's next attempt was estates that had been

confiscated in Ireland in the wake of the rebellion there. Although this was in his role as king of Ireland and therefore was not technically English business, this attempt also met with failure since the English parliament was happy to view Ireland as a source of revenue to be exploited whenever possible.⁶ Consequently, Albemarle and the Villierses were not territorially established in the way servants of the the Stuarts, such as the first earls of Clarendon and of Bristol (1622), had been earlier in the century.

Anne met with the most substantial success in this area. At the reign's opening the duke of Marlborough's spouse had been against his being promoted to a dukedom because their Hertfordshire estate was not capable of properly supporting such an honour. Consequently, they had been granted a limited pension from the Post Office Revenue.⁷ In 1705 the queen persuaded parliament to agree to the grant of the royal manor of Woodstock in Oxfordshire to the first duke in view of his spectacular military victory at Blenheim.

Baron Bingley is the last individual whom it is possible to identify as receiving some form of grant of alienated land- Bramham Moor in Yorkshire. He did not come from a great territorial background, his father having practised as a provincial lawyer. At the time of his recruitment there was some difficulty at the Heralds' office in finding the family's arms, which implies that they had only recently economically achieved armorial rank.⁸

Torrington is the only identifiable instance of an individual receiving estates under the Hanoverians. This

was as a commoner in the wake of his naval victory at Cape Passaro in 1718. His being raised to the peerage was the result of politics rather than of honouring his victory. Therefore, the grant was divorced from his title. The lands were in Ireland and the grant was for only thirty years at the end of which time the lands reverted to the crown despite the pleadings of the third viscount.⁹

2.3. Rank.

There are a number of points to be drawn about rank at recruitment. Barons always made up at least half of those summoned within any of the reigns. The proportion of barons to non-barons rose through the period, while there ceased to be any creations above the rank of earl after 1711. Just as there was a variance from one reign to another in how people were created, so there was variance from reign to reign as to which ranks of the peerage they were created at. In William's reign the non-barons were English and Dutch favourites and naval and military victors. In Anne's they were leading Scottish peers and her two final first ministers. In George I's they were a senior Irish peer, a user of corruption, two Scottish minors who were the prospective heirs to dukedoms, a first-rank politician and three second-rank ones of whom one was a naval hero of sorts. In George II's reign the first two of the previous set were repeated and joined by two first-rank politicians.

Factors from one reign to another could continue, change, appear or disappear. The broad trend that emerges is that the wealthy English gentry who were reaching the peerage were not doing so above the level of baron, unless they were politicians of the first calibre or ones in highly opportune circumstances. Those who were entering at the level of viscount or above, with the possible exception of Lonsdale, were Scots, Irish, naval, military, court favourites or users of bribery. From this it can be stated, in correlation with the growth in the share of the baronies, that the wealthy English gentry were increasingly successful in entering the peerage as a

proportion of the recruits.

Just as both the rank at which peers were summoned and the size of the peerage changed, so did the proportions of the five ranks to one another in the overall group of recruits and inheritors. The three most numerically occurrent were the dukes, the earls and the barons. Over 1690-1735 the number of dukes more than doubled and then went on to contract slightly. Because of Charles II's bastards and the careers of Schomberg, Marlborough and Leeds, the ratio of inheritors to recruits was not overwhelmingly in the former's favour for the first two reigns. However, with the 1743 death of Greenwich the rank came to be held exclusively by inheritors. But for Newcastle (1715) and Dorset outliving George II, dukedoms would have been held exclusively by people who had inherited the rank, rather than by people who had inherited peerage status and who had then been promoted to the rank.

The number of earldoms grew by nearly a quarter over the period, which, as with the dukedoms, meant that they comfortably outstripped the growth of the peerage proportionately. One in five of these occurrences happened to a recruit. The overall proportion of inheritors amongst the individuals to whom it occurred was over eighty-five per cent. The ratio of inheritors of earldoms to recruited ones and promoted inheritors was fairly stable. The most important period in this balance was again George I's reign. Before it occurrence was less than one in five and after more than one in five. The inheritors were increasing their share of the promotions at the recruits' expense.

Over the period the number of barons decreased by nearly ten per cent. In conjunction with the expansion of the peerage, this meant a decrease of nearly a fifth in their relative share of the peerage. A comparison of 1690 to 1760 reveals a similar ratio to the earls of inheritors to recruits, slightly over the eighty mark in the former's favour. The effect of the large creations of the 1710s was to maintain that share at approximately two-thirds until George II's active recruiting in the 1740s. The two lowest ranks came to largely be the preserve of the poor, the catholic, the recruited and the tory. Therefore, good whigs and courtiers positively desired to achieve the rank of earl or above. This continued to be even more the case in the 1740s and 1750s since George II had a policy of keeping recruitment and diminutions in a rough balance. The number of promotions was in key with the overall number of the losses to the peerage rather than being in parallel with the character of those losses.

2.4. Number of Peers.

To assess the change in the number of peers it is necessary to impose a scale on the period. This is done (arbitrarily so) with trans-sections at five year intervals. These are taken as of midnight on January 1st of each year and start in 1690 so as to fit the maximum number in the period. The results are displayed in appendix B. The 1690 figure is 160, which gives a point from which to draw a baseline through the fourteen other trans-sections. Comparison with it allows detection of whether there has been any growth or shrinkage in the number of peers. The 1760 figure was 171, which means that there was a numerical growth through the scale of eleven. However, the two figures are not a true reflection of the number of peerages at their given times and therefore their difference is not the true numerical change in the peerage. The figures include those peers who were sitting in the right of their fathers' baronies and¹⁰ whose peerages were additional to the true core of the peerages. Therefore, if the four such 1690 peers are subtracted and the none from the 1760 figure, the true numerical growth within the scale emerges as fifteen (9.6%)

The growth of fifteen from 1690 to 1760 was not an upwards progression. There were fourteen five year periods which could have seen growth (5), decline (6) or stagnation (3). Neither growth nor decline had a predominant occurrence among the periods. There was growth in only just over a third of all the periods. Growth occurred in spurts. The three periods 1695-1700, 1710-1715 and 1720-1725 were responsible for the growth of the peerage. It may be stated that growth occurred in the

first half, the pre-1725 period, of the framework.

There were a variety of factors which influenced the number of peerages besides title extinction and creations. These were baronies by writs, incorrect title recognition, attainders and reversals of attainders.

There were two types of title- those which were by writ and those which were by letters patent. The former created an individual in a title and then left it to descend according to English Common law. Therefore, just as a piece of property could pass to a female so could one of these titles. If there was not a single heir but rather a number of coheirs the title was the property of them all and fell into abeyance either until such time as there was only a single heir, not necessarily one of the original coheirs, or until the coheirs came to a voluntary agreement amongst themselves that one of them should receive it. Titles became extinct when all the possible coheirs were dead or they could effectively fall into permanent abeyance if there too many coheirs for it ever to possible for any agreement to be reached amongst them. Although used earlier in the seventeenth-century, e.g. Clifton, baronies by writ had stopped being used prior to the opening of the period. Letters patent were used exclusively for titles during the period both for recruitments and for promotions. In these the possible passages of inheritance which the patents laid out were not necessarily from father-to-son or even from one blood relative to another.

The two types could be held by a single individual. During the course of the period the earldoms of Derby,

Lincoln, Northampton, Ferrers and Peterborough and the barony of Ward, all of which titles were by letters patent, became respectively separated from the baronies by writ of Strange, Clinton, Compton, Ferrers, Mordaunt and Dudley. Other baronies by writ which were recognized during the course of the period were those of Wentworth, Berners, Dacre, Clifton and Willoughby de Broke. Not all attempts to be recognized were necessarily successful, the eleventh baron Willoughby de Broke only being recognized at his second attempt.¹¹ The complexities of inheritance were such that a couple of baronies were recognized when they were technically extinct- the seventh duke of Somerset was recognized as baron Percy on his mother's death, the title having previously become extinguished and baroness Cromwell had been recognized erroneously before the period opened.

A number of people were deprived of their peerages. This was a response either to treason or to what was held to be treasonous activity. The barony of Widdrington, the earldom of Derwentwater and the dukedom of Ormond were all permanently attainted in the wake of the Hanoverian Succession and the 1715 Jacobite Rebellion. The viscounty of Bolingbroke was attainted at the same juncture but its attainder was reversed in 1725 and the first viscount was restored in blood. Prior to the period's opening the first duke of Monmouth had lost that title along with the earldom of Doncaster and the barony of Scott in the wake of his unsuccessful rebellion. His patrilineal grandson the Scottish peer the second duke of Buccleuch was restored to the two junior titles in 1743.

The dukedom of Marlborough had had its letters patent changed by Act of parliament in 1706. This was to allow it to be transferred to the duke's daughters and their heirs because his eldest son had died and because a new title would have meant that his heirs would have a lower precedence than the two peers who had been promoted to dukedoms after he had.

A number of peers circumvented such lengths by having themselves recruited in titles in addition to those they already held. These would be remaindered on their chosen heir-general, who would otherwise have been a commoner without the transferable additional title. George II gave out most of these in the second half of his reign. This was in parallel with his greater liberality than with recruitments and promotions. This was appropriate since he was particularly partial to 'continuity' promotions and recruitments.

2.5. Factors Effecting Promotion and Recruitment.

2.5.1. Introduction.

There were a variety of factors which influenced both recruitment and promotion: politics, state service, corruption, Scottish politics, legal eminence, the pleasing of a third party, court favour and the continuing of an extinct title. For ease of handling, individuals are dealt with under these broad headings but it would be simplistic to say that an individual necessarily owed his title exclusively to that feature with which it is most easy to identify him. It is not the case that commoners could achieve titles through a single means at once, just as it can be hard to identify them with one means rather than another while others appear in more than one section. The selection is arbitrary in nature. Individuals are sometimes mentioned in more than one category.

'State service' is for those people who gained their titles through serving the state in one of the branches of the executive- the army, the navy and the diplomatic corps such as it was. 'Corruption' is the use of financial inducements to individuals such as royal mistresses in order to gain titles from the crown. The term is not meant to convey the idea of corrupting what was innocent before but rather that of operating a pre-extant aspect of court society. 'The Scots' refers to any peer who was Scottish but held a British title (and Greenwich whose initial earldom was English). 'The Law' are those who reached one or more of a specific group of senior legal positions. Some were recruited upon their appointment to one of the specific offices. 'Continuity' describes those who came

from a family that had had a title or who had inherited an estate which had previously supported one. Each of the five occurred in a political context. 'Politics' is the coverall for whatever does not fit into them neatly.

2.5.2. The Law.

The law provided several entrants during the period. There was a long stream of tradition that went back into the the Tudor era, the Egertons and the Montagus being only two of the many families that owed much of their wealth and prominence to having had a judicial ancestor. There were eleven recruits who held at least one of the offices of the two lord chief justices (Common Pleas and King's Bench) or the lord keepership or its alternative, and the height of any legal career, the lord chancellorship.¹² There was a series of reasons why lawyers were recruited. Junior lawyers were encouraged to aspire, thereby sharpening the standard of practice, the House of Lords was provisioned with additional expertise and the forensic skills provided the government with able debaters.

There was no set pattern by which a lawyer rose to be a candidate for elevation. It is clear that the entry of senior lawyers into ennoblement was not a smooth clockwork-like process but rather was something that was susceptible to contemporary political pressures including monarchical prejudice. All of them sat as M.P.s, although they could not be such if they became a judge. The offices of attorney general and solicitor general had to be held by M.P.s but not all of them served in either, just as others served in one rather than both. Achieving one of the three uppermost offices did not guarantee receipt of a title. There was variation between the senior legal offices. Of the two lord chief justiceships, that of King's Bench was a better base for gaining one than that of the Common Pleas was,¹³ only Trevor and King made it

from the latter.

All the legal recruits of the period died as court whigs. A predominance could be expected but a monopoly is indicative of there being some uniting operative factor. This was that senior lawyers were susceptible to making themselves amenable to the prevailing political trend. Somers and Cowper were recruited as court whigs, the party being generally more pro-court than the Tories. Trevor, Harcourt and Macclesfield (1721) were draftees sucked in during the 1710s. King and Raymond appear to have been fairly innocuous professionals drawn in by vacancies. The next four judicial recruits were whigs, however, they reflected the latest trend. George II disliked recruiting lawyers unless there were pressing circumstances for him to do so. In itself professional eminence was never enough and the four had to force their way to their respective titles.

In 1733 Lord Chief Justice Raymond died and Lord Chancellor King retired. Hardwicke was capable of filling either post, whereas Talbot was only suited for the chancellorship through his expertise being as a Chancery lawyer, therefore, both were able to extract titles. That the demise of one's senior colleagues was the best means of elevation was also borne out by Mansfield's succession to Ryder's Lord Chief Justiceship in 1756.¹⁴ Peerages could be given as carrots to reward good behaviour just as they could be withheld as sticks to induce better behaviour. As ever, circumstance was an important factor.

In 1756 Sir John Willes was one of those who was seeking to exploit the political situation in order to gain a peerage.¹⁵ The following year he was offered the

Great Seal but made his acceptance of it conditional on his becoming a peer. George II refused this and gave the post to Henley, who was prepared to hold it as a commoner even though he also desired to be recruited. The need for a lord high steward for the trial of the fourth earl Ferrers forced the king's hand in relation to Henley.

The dual entry of 1733 can give the impression that lawyers were able to enter with greater ease than before and that the general clamp down on new creations did not affect them. Such a view would be erroneous. If anything the opposite is true. The post-1741 difficulty that Willes and Henley faced was in part a product of that incident. In general, lawyers had to extort their peerages from George II and never received them in a vacuum.

2.5.3.State Service.

The diplomatic service and the army had an overlap from the latter to the former. In times of war it was often the case that a military commander was given scope for related diplomatic action. The experience of foreign politics that soldiers garnered in war-time could be efficiently exploited by it being applied to diplomatic uses in peace-time. There was no diplomatic corps per se, therefore, the penetration of the diplomatic service by outsiders was a prerequisite for its existence. Domestic politicians provided a number of the diplomats. The opportunities were curtailed because many ambassadors were drawn from the existing peerage.

Recruitments connected solely with with diplomatic service were rare. The lack of opportunities accounts for this in large part. Openings did not really come until after Utrecht. William had the Dutch diplomatic service, which he was long used to using, to undertake many of the tasks that he could have entrusted to Englishmen. During Anne's reign the alliances of William's reign were automatically revived. Spain was the only new area for intense diplomatic activity and there the postings were conferred on military commanders. The treaty of Utrecht was an important juncture for the conduct of British foreign affairs. The two wars had made the nation a far more powerful international entity. In 1714 Britain had the sort of international presence which it had not had since the Interregnum. It was necessary to have diplomatic relations through-out western and northern Europe in order to follow the flow of international relations and to counter any possible moves by foreign powers to try to

embarrass the nation through the sponsorship of Jacobite activity.

The period 1713-1716 saw two definite and one arguable service creations. The ending of the War of the Spanish Succession necessitated the sending of an ambassador to Madrid. Bingley was a close ally of the first earl of Dartmouth, who was Oxford's southern secretary. Therefore, Bingley was a good candidate and he was willing to give up the chancellorship of the Exchequer in order to hold the position. To reward him and to pay a courtesy to the Spanish the man was ennobled.¹⁶ By 1714 Cobham's European service had seen him reach the rank of lieutenant general. As such he was a good candidate to be sent to Austria, Britain's war-time ally.¹⁷ In addition, he was a whig and a substantial landowner in Buckinghamshire. He too was made a peer before departing on his mission.

Cadogan is the debatable instance. Like Cobham he was an experienced officer being sent to a country which had been a war-time ally but he was not made a peer, although he was made master of the Robes in 1714. While he was at The Hague the 1715 Jacobite Rebellion broke out in Scotland. He successfully negotiated for the loan of a body of Dutch troops to help suppress the revolt and returned to Britain in command of them. From February to May 1716 he was commander-in-chief in Scotland. For this service he was made a peer.¹⁸ It is arguable that had he not been serving as a diplomat he would not have been able to serve militarily with such distinction and so earn his title.

Harrington was another soldier who served as a

diplomat. The expertise he had acquired during his war service in Spain was channelled into various missions on behalf of the southern secretaryship. Despite being a younger son of a gentleman, he was aspirant to entering the peerage, because he had married the heiress-general of the Gerard earls of Macclesfield (1679). Finally, his accrued diplomatic experience made him central to the negotiation of the treaty of Seville, "His merits in that delicate negotiation, extorted the peerage from the king." The extorting being promoted by Newcastle (1715), who, as southern secretary, supervized the affair.¹⁹

In 1754 before the final deterioration in Franco-British relations Hyde was one of the candidates for the prospective posting as ambassador at Versailles. He would have received a title then had he been selected.²⁰ Like Harrington, he was a younger son of an aristocrat, executive service proving attractive to people in such a position. Hyde owed his title to politics and continuity.

Peers tended to be given important diplomatic work. Bestowing promotions on them was a means both of rewarding them for their willingness to serve the state and flattering those with whom they were going to treat. Jersey was made an earl before going to The Hague in 1697.²¹ Strafford (1711) had been working in Europe since 1701 but was given the earldom of Strafford before going to Utrecht. Cadogan had been ambassador at The Hague before being recruited. He was held in high regard by the Dutch and therefore was continued in his office after he had helped suppress the 1715 Jacobite Rebellion. That he was raised to an earldom in 1718 while still there can

only have pleased them. Waldegrave was ambassador at Vienna when he received his promotion in 1729.²²

The senior ranks of both the army and navy were to a large extent filled by aristocrats and their kinsmen, yet the army produced only a fraction of the number of recruits that the navy did. This divergence stemmed from the crown's attitudes towards its armed forces. War dominated the first two reigns. James II's journey to raise Ireland into revolt gave William a further excuse to expand the sizable army that his predecessor had left behind and which he had initially enlarged in the wake of England's May 1689 declaration of war on France. As soon as the rebellion was broken William was able to start deploying the army in Europe. He used the navy in a auxiliary role. William was happy to allow a level of parliamentary involvement in both forces in terms of personnel. However, he was careful to keep the two forces as part of the executive rather than allowing parliament to obtain a de jure right to be involved in them. Anne accepted the necessity of Britain contributing fully to the land war effort on the continent. Therefore, she continued her predecessor's respective treatment of the two services.

The Hanoverians were militarily experienced in Europe but had only minimal association with maritime affairs. The army which they inherited was had a strong character of its own and it took considerable efforts on their parts to stamp their authority on it by means of individually overseeing the distribution of regiments and the awarding of the rank of colonel. The Hanoverians' insistence on

keeping politicians out of army decisions stemmed from a determination to establish and then maintain control of it as an institution.²³

Schomberg and the earl of Torrington gained their titles as rewards for major contributions in the military aspects of the Revolution. The duke was William's military right-hand man during the course of it while the earl was one of the seven signatories of the Invitation and commanded the invasion fleet in 1688. The earl of Orford (1697) was commander-in-chief of the Channel fleet during 1696 and as such kept a potential invasion fleet penned in in Dunkirk and Calais. In addition, he was a member of the Junto, the whig parliamentary group which played an important part in enabling William to conduct his war policy. The second factor was the one that led to his being created.

Mountjoy, Boyle, the second earl of Cholmondley²⁴ and Cobham were all soldiers. However, they entered the peerage as political draftees of the 1710s rather than as victorious conquistadors. As the discussion of diplomatic peerages shows Cadogan's case is debatable. If it is appreciated that Cadogan was born an Irishman, it can be stated, if with a hint of perversity, that no Englishman achieved a peerage through army service.

Anson secured his title principally because of a naval victory at Cape Finisterre in 1747.²⁵ The nearest army equivalent in the War of the Austrian Succession was the 1743 battle of Dettingen, where George II had commanded in person, perhaps thus denying some soldier of a parallel title to the sailor's. In sharp comparison with Anson, Vere and viscount Torrington were clearly garnering

the fruits of the navy's comparative openness to outside political interference. The first viscount Torrington exacted his peerage as the price for his quitting the Admiralty peaceably and thereby yielding in his quarrel there with its first lord- the third earl of Berkeley. The first earl of Bristol recollected on the viscount's 1733 death that the man was "generally looked upon as kicked upstairs;..."²⁶ Vere rose to be an admiral of the Blue. He was recruited because his expertise had led him to become a lord of the Admiralty. There he quarrelled with a land lubber first lord, the fourth earl of Sandwich, and therefore resigned in anger in July 1749. In spring 1750 relations between Sandwich and the Pelhams were antagonistic and the latter solicited a peerage on Vere's behalf in order to slight the former.

The divide between the two branches of the executive was clearly reflected in how one remained directly associated with the crown while the other drifted into being subject to ministerial games, the one came to have no senior members recruited while the other did.

2.5.4. Continuity.

The previous existence of a title played a part in a number of recruitments. Both the 1694 recruitment of the first baron Herbert and the one of baron Lansdowne in the winter of 1711-1712 were in the wake of a patrilineal first cousin once removed having died. Both recruits were left as the senior male members of their branches of their respective families. Had the patents of the extinct titles been drawn wider then they would have inherited them: this was particularly true of Lansdowne because the earldom of Bath had been given to his uncle, the first earl, in order to commemorate the civil war victory of Sir Bevil Granville. Sir Bevil was the earl's father but he was also Lansdowne's grandfather.

Neither baron inherited the patrimonial estates of the person whose title they were continuing. Over the period there was a shift in emphasis as to the criterion for forwarding an individual for a continuity creation. This shift was from patrilineage towards possession. The period's final two recipients of continuity creations -Hyde and Sondes- were not patrilineally related to their 'predecessors,' but each acquired two sets of estates that had supported earldoms. Hyde married the heiress to the lands of the earls of Rochester and of Clarendon, while Sondes inherited those of the earls of Rockingham and of Feversham.²⁸ This shift can be seen as a reflection of the way in which the crown was no longer able to alienate royal lands in order to create an estate which territorially established an individual.

Among George II's accession recruits the first earl of Buckinghamshire was the heir to the second earl of

Stamford's (Maynard derived) west country estates and the first marquis of Rockingham inherited the Yorkshire ones of the earl of Strafford (1641). Conway inherited his lands from an elder brother who had in turn inherited them from a matrilineal relative.²⁹

Hyde was an example of the importance in some instances of recruitment of marriage to heiresses. Mountjoy married the heiress to the Glamorgan section of the 1683 split of the Pembroke Herberts' South Wales lands. Harrington married the heiress of the Macclesfield Gerards, however, she was not a blood relative of her benefactors but rather came to the lands by means of the peculiarities of inheritance which estate settlements were set up to avoid.³⁰ Sandys married the great-niece and coheiress of the earl of Orford (1697) and so became possessed of that peer's seat of Chippenham in Cambridgeshire. This may have eased Bath's (1742) procurement of a title for him.

Continuity promotions were being given out with a degree of liberality in times such as 1689, 1694 and 1714-1715 and after Walpole's fall. The most outstanding example in the period is the dukedom of Newcastle. In fresh creations, the title passed through the families of Cavendish (1665), Holles (1694), Pelham (1715) and in 1756 the last was created in the title again so that it might be inherited by the Clintons.³¹ The 1694 duke extracted some variety of promise from William very early in that king's reign. In 1691 with the death of the second 1665 duke, he felt he had the right to remind the monarch of it and was upset by the king's non-responsiveness to the

point where he resigned his lordship of the Bedchamber and his lord lieutenancies. ³² He was included in the 1694 promotions and died in 1711. Thomas second baron Pelham did not have to agitate in the same manner, in 1714 he was made earl of Clare and in 1715 duke of Newcastle.³³

In 1714 the second baron Ossulston became the first earl of Tankerville. In 1706 he had inherited some of the estates of the barons Grey of Wark on the death of the fourth baron. The third baron had been his father-in-law and earl of Tankerville (1695). The first earl of Halifax (1715) was to become a Privy Councillor but he owed his promotion to the fact that his uncle's earldom, which had created in 1714, had become extinct on the man's death whereas his barony had passed on as intended. The 1715 promotion was a correction of the 1714 one's defect.

The first marquis of Rockingham gained his second promotion in 1746. He was already earl of Malton, when he inherited the patrilineal barony of Rockingham in 1745. He sought a Garter and was fobbed off with a promotion to mark his recent inheritance.³⁴ In 1748 Herbert was raised to the earldom of Powis. Rockingham had inherited no lands with his title, whereas Powis had inherited no title but received the Welsh and Northamptonshire estates of the last Herbert marquis of Powis. The marquis was a distant patrilineal kinsman of the earl and a close one of his wife. The earl acquired his promotion by means of soliciting the support of Henry Pelham.³⁵

The earl of Hertford's 1750 title marked his connection with the family whose Irish and Warwickshire estates he held while his new one was associated with his patrilineal origins- the Seymours. The 1559 creation of

the earldom of Hertford became extinct on the death of the seventh duke of Somerset in 1750. The dukedom had thereupon passed to the eighth duke, who was the elder brother of Conway's father. Conway received nothing but, with his uncle's blessing, he was raised to a fresh creation of the family title.³⁶ George II had a good opinion of him and was aware of his having a good estate.³⁷

The second viscount Fauconberg was made an earl by that title in 1689. The earldom became extinct on his death in 1700 and the Belasyse viscounty passed on to his great-nephew. The fourth viscount was raised to an earldom in 1756 along with Ilchester. This lack of a positive link with one of the competing groups of politicians may indicate that Fauconberg was promoted at the behest of George II, as a reminder of who possessed the prerogative to promote within the peerage; he was promoted in precedence to Ilchester. It was in character with the king's peerage policy to restore the family to the rank of earl rather than to promote some other one virgin to the station to it.

2.5.5. Corruption.

Corruption is a subjective matter. It is a word that is a broad title rather than a precise entity. Here it will be used to describe gratuities that were used in trying to obtain services in a manner that was accepted by high political circles in the early eighteenth-century. These gratuities had no legal base. They were tolerated because they were endemic rather than original depravities of the body politic. There is no acid-test by which it is possible to discern whether they had been of any effect. William III and George II both became widowers during the course of their reigns, as did George I, except that he had imprisoned his divorced wife in 1694. All three kings had mistresses and would have been able to have subsidized their financial calls by means of making them into clearing-houses for honours.

That an individual was summoned by corrupt means did not mean that he was not of sufficient social status to be a peer; on the contrary, it inferred that he was. A favourite or mistress would not nominate a candidate for such an honour unless that person were capable of carrying it properly, otherwise he or she would be exposing the crown to attack and by extension himself or herself too. The capacity to be able to use corruption at court carried a clear label - good connections and wealth, two of the hallmarks of peerage. Corruption tended to break out in short bouts, rather than having a continuous perceptible presence.

It is slightly surprizing that William should allow the practice to have occurred when one considers that he

engaged in strong attempts to try to root out from the British army the practice of regimental purchase.³⁸ That he should allow it was probably in large part the acceptance of an extant, aboriginal, social system. Initially, he tolerated the custom until he had raised a force of the size that he wanted before trying to move against it. The only clear example of a 'corrupt' peerage in the reign is that of Barnard.³⁹ The date is 1698 the time at which the limitations of the financial settlement would have begun to display their peace-time workings. This, in combination with the pressure for grant resumptions, may account for why it is so hard to delineate probable factors behind the promotions and recruitments of the mid- and late 1690s.

George I came to the throne with firmly entrenched mistresses and female favourites, who quickly established themselves in the full potential that their positions had to offer. In 1714 the first duke of Chandos sought to procure a promotion for his father, the eighth baron; however, the old man died and he himself became the recipient of the promotion.⁴⁰ The 1716 recruits Romney and viscount St. John can be identified as owing their creations to this system of brokerage.⁴¹ The subsequent recruitments and promotions in the late 1710s probably owe something to the Germans. That the likes of Harborough and Coningsby should first be recruited and then go on to achieve earldoms in the space of only a few years can probably in part be attributed to the use of corruption.

The failure of the peerage bill politicized the question of the peerage and after the ending of the Whig Split George I was sparing in his use of this branch of

the prerogative, although a good case can be made for Pomfret's earldom in 1721. He was a Northamptonshire landowner, therefore, it is possible that he may have been a connection of Sunderland. However, in 1727 he was quite happy to use corrupt means to become master of the Horse to queen Caroline. It is reasonable to think that he may have used such means six years earlier.⁴²

George II broadly followed his father's (middle and late) restraint until the 1740s. Queen Caroline had been the principal contemporary influence on George II until her death in 1737. It is probable that her death left him in an emotional vacuum which in turn made him prey to the rapacity of the duchess of Kendal and the countess of Yarmouth, which could not be met otherwise because of the financial limitations imposed by the civil list. Montfort and Ilchester gained their titles by putting in the highest bids for the two creations, which George II gave the countess of Yarmouth rather than make her a gift of £30 000. Chronologically significant is that Ilchester had been clearly seeking a title since 1737, the year of queen Caroline's death.⁴³ Of the 1747 six it is possible to identify Folkestone as paying £12 000 to the duchess of Kendal for his honour.⁴⁴ There may well be an element of truth in such a line of conjecture. He was also demonstrating the crown's strength at a time of political agitation.⁴⁵

2.5.6. The Scots.

Prior to the Union the English and the Scots were able to hold titles in one another's peerages- both the earls of Ailesbury and the dukes of Leeds held pre-Revolution titles in both peerages. The July 1700 death of the duke of Gloucester opened up the possibility of the two kingdoms being ruled by separate monarchs. This was not acceptable to the English because of the strategic implications it would have on the nation's international position, while the Scots sought the economic benefits that a single market would bring. Therefore, the Union came into being.

Greenwich received his 1705 title as a reward for the efforts that he had been making towards that end. However, until the mid-1720s he was only one of a number of leading Scottish peers. The second duke of Queensberry and the fourth duke of Hamilton, both of the Scottish peerage, were respectively made duke of Dover in 1708 and duke of Brandon in 1711. While, in the first flush of post-Union harmony, Dover was allowed to occupy his seat in 1708 without any trouble, three years later Anglo-Scottish relations had soured somewhat. The House of Lords decided that any Scottish peer who held a British title (as opposed to an English one) did so in an honorary manner: otherwise the whole purpose of the sixteen peers would be undermined and the Scots receive disproportionate weight in the Upper House.

Oxford circumvented this state of affairs by recruiting Hay the heir-apparent to the Scottish earldom of Kinnoull. The House was unable to object to a Scottish

commoner being made a British peer. In 1719, when Hay inherited the earldom the House was unable to object to his remaining a member since it had already admitted his right to sit. This was taken note of and in 1722 the heirs-apparent of the Scottish peers the first dukes of Montrose and Roxburghe were summoned by George I in the respective British earldoms of Graham and of Ker. The earls were minors at the time but the ruse was conceded although it was not tried again and the three families were allowed to be exceptions. The 1711 decision was reversed in 1782.

However, the career opportunities that the Union had opened were beginning to be exploited within the period. Scottish peers and their kinsmen were eager to supplement their landed income by going south. Mansfield was a younger son of the fifth viscount Stormont. He trained in the English legal system and rose to become lord chief justice of the King's Bench.

2.5.7. Politics.

William's accession recruits were a mixture of favourites and minor politicians. Portland was made both groom of the Stole and first lord of the Bedchamber. Romney had been a Caroline courtier who had gravitated into William's orbit prior to the Revolution. He was made a Bedchamber lord as well as being recruited. He never sought to vie with Portland as to who should be foremost in the king's affections.

According to G.E.C., Ashburnham was a tory and Cholmondley a whig. William's 1689 promotions were more cross-party in character. The uniting factor being that the recipients had played a part in either opposition to James II or the Revolution. Scarborough was promoted a second time the following year along with a couple of minor figures. Warrington was like Romney in being a whig courtier who had joined William prior to the Revolution. He was to fall in the king's estimation as the reign progressed. The promotion may well have been the fulfilment of an old promise since 1690 saw William call a general election in order to lessen the pressure that the whigs could bring to bear on him in parliament. Longueville was even less distinguished. He was probably included as a balance to show that William wished to work more with the tories.⁴⁷

The Villiers were an archetypal court family. Jersey's connection with William was initially through his sister Anne being Portland's wife. She died in 1688 but the family soon proved able to promote itself, another sister, the countess of Orkney, becoming William's mistress. Jersey's 1691 recruitment was a testament as to

and Newcastle (1694)- while Buckingham was generally seen as being in her orbit.

Lonsdale and Haversham were recruited in 1696. The former was a magnate but again had a close and principal attachment to William.⁴⁹ The latter was not in the same material class as the viscount but was to prove an active member of the House. The creation of these two helped William maintain an interest of his own within the whig party. This was at a time when he was admitting the Junto to an increasing amount of power and influence. In 1695 Tankerville (1695) was promoted to an earldom. This was almost certainly the result of the personal opportunism that he harnessed for his political advancement. This trait had led Dryden to nickname him 'Cold Caleb.'⁵⁰ It was to take him to the very heights- he was first lord of the Treasury for a year, even if it was largely by default.

As the reign progressed the Villierses had grown away from their initial closeness to Portland to the point where they sought to oust him as an influence over the king. They successfully raised Arnold Joost van Keppel as a rival to the earl for the monarch's affections so that the young Dutchman was recruited as the earl of Albemarle in 1697. Two years later Portland acknowledged that he had been bettered by resigning his Bedchamber offices. Albemarle became its first lord but Romney became the groom. The earl of Grantham was another Dutchman. His father -Nassau d'Auverquerque- was still alive in 1698. However, like Jersey, Grantham went on to hold office during the reign so it is possible that he may have had some standing in William's eyes in his own right.

Both the Villiers and Albemarle aspired to grants of lands from the estates confiscated from rebel Irish landowners. However, as the Nine Years' War came to an end so the Country Reaction gathered the momentum and the pertinent grants had to be cancelled. The whig section of the country party was centred around the Harley-Foley group, who hailed from Worcestershire and Herefordshire. Coventry's 1697 earldom may have had a place in contemporary politics, it may have been a shot across the group's bows since he was a prominent landowner in the lower Severn valley. Either way, William seems to have ceased distributing new titles as a result of the Country Reaction. The earl of Halifax (1714) was the only other recipient during the rest of the reign. In 1700 he accepted recruitment in order to avoid further harrassment in the Commons.⁵¹ In doing so he was allowing Robert Harley in large part to re-arrange the existing political order. This pliability was to lead Harley to have hopes of retaining him in office in 1710.

The first beneficiary of Anne's accession was Marlborough who was promoted to a dukedom. The following year she recruited five accession peers. Aylesford was the younger brother of the eighth earl of Winchilsea, Conway was a younger son of Sir Edward Seymour 5th.Bt., while baron Granville was a younger son of the late first earl of Bath (1661). Winchilsea, Seymour and Bath were all Tories. All three peers had fallen foul of William which may have additionally promoted them in the queen's eyes. To what extent Anne's accession changes were indebted to her dislike of William's servants and to what extent they

were the result of a positive liking of the tories is uncertain; the relationship of the two factors at this juncture has not yet been appreciated, the latter having been presumed to operating in isolation.

However, Anne paradoxically felt bound to honour her late brother-in-law's commitments as titles. The fifth recruit was a tory- Gower. The duke of Rutland obtained his 1703 promotion also via some form of undertaking from the late king. His candidature was helped by Gower, who was his son-in-law.⁵² The inclusion of the first earl of Bristol in the accession batch, derived not from the earl's efforts but rather those of his father-in-law, Sir Thomas Felton 4th.Bt., the former comptroller of the late queen's household. Felton had obtained some variety of promise from William.⁵³ It was no accident that Bristol was a country whig and therefore it is unlikely that William had been enamoured of him.

Buckingham, or so at least he claimed, had been a beau of the queen. While she was prepared to promote him in 1703 she was equally prepared to dismiss him in 1705 for being obstinately High Church. Montagu's 1705 promotion was the consequence of his son and heir-apparent having married the Churchills' youngest daughter Mary.⁵⁴

The tories on the whole, through their espousal of the cause of occasional conformity, proved unwilling to place the necessity of financing the war before their own partisan goals. Therefore, the duumvirs began to look for alternative means of providing their ministry with a parliamentary support base. Therefore, they looked to the whigs. Those of William's associates who had not been accepted by Anne were not really viable because the queen

would object to them. Therefore, those court whigs, such as Newcastle (1694), who had been only loosely associated with the late king came to the fore. The 1705 recruitment of Pelham was almost certainly a sign of this shift.⁵⁵ The new baron's standing in his own right should not be underestimated since he had served as a lord of the Treasury.

The 1706 promotions illustrated how the whigs had advanced. Wharton was one of the lord lieutenants whom Anne had dismissed at her accession; she now promoted him to an earldom. Kingston was a Junto associate for whom the queen appears to have a fondness.⁵⁶ The other recruits were by no means ardent rank and file whigs. Cholmondley, Kent and Ancaster were all from the party's court wing and they all had tory backgrounds, a brother of Ancaster, Peregrine Bertie, having considerable influence at court through being vice-chamberlain.⁵⁷ Godolphin was a courtier through and through, his tory associations having melted away as his commitment to the necessity of the land war grew. He had refused offers of promotion in the previous reigns.⁵⁸ Poulett was another tory who had moderated his earlier ardency. The balance of the group was whig but its character was court.

As the war progressed Godolphin continued to believe in the necessity of the conflict whereas Anne changed her mind as to the worth of continuing British participation in it. Harley offered to construct an alternative Godolphin-less ministry for her. One of the first signs of Harley's work was to re-introduce the distinguished court whig the duke of Shrewsbury to senior office. In 1710 the lord chamberlaincy was made available to him by the far

less distinguished court whig Kent resigning it. Kent received a Garter and a dukedom as a reward for his pliancy.⁵⁹ Subsequently, Godolphin was ousted and Harley became the queen's first minister with the intention of fulfilling her desire that the war be ended.

Strafford (1711), Dartmouth and Poulett were promoted in 1711. They were all Harleyites who held or were to hold senior offices. The possibility of Harley being recruited had been discussed as early as 1700, when he first came to the fore as a power-broker. The factor that seemed to stimulate him to become a lord in 1711 was the death of Rochester which meant that his principal tory rival would not be present in the Upper House. He was careful to ensure that the session's money bills were through the Commons before taking out his title's patent.⁶⁰

The 1711-1712 batch of recruits had a number of connections to leading members of Oxford's ministry: Bathurst was Strafford's (1711) first cousin;⁶¹ Boyle was an associate of both Greenwich and Henry St. John (later first viscount Bolingbroke);⁶² Mansell and Lansdowne were old political allies of Oxford;⁶³ Hay was Oxford's son-in-law; Uxbridge was a kinsman of Foley who was himself a kinsman and old ally of Oxford; Middleton was a kinsman of the future first duke of Chandos who was a whig who was sympathetic to Oxford, the earl and future duke both being Herefordshire landowners. The inclusion of Masham was the nearest that Anne came to recruiting a favourite, he being the husband of the former Abigail Hill. He was a last moment inclusion, although in April 1711 there had been talk of his peerage aspirations being revived.⁶⁴

Only Mountjoy and Trevor do not have easily identifiable links. Indeed, Trevor had been a whig but then he was a lawyer. Mountjoy was someone whom it would be expected that Oxford would not promote. This was because in the course of promoting Mrs. Masham he orchestrated the removal of Mountjoy's regiment from him, so that it could be conferred upon the future baron Masham. This he did by making it seem to Godolphin that lord Dixie Windsor, Mountjoy's younger brother, had been working against the election of the future second earl of Godolphin as a M.P. for Cambridge. Mountjoy appears to have let bygones be bygones and had been seeking a title since the previous summer.⁶⁵

In 1710 Oxford had tried to make the whig Carleton a peer but the commoner had refused the offer. At the Hanoverian Succession Carleton was offered a secretaryship but turned it down and was recruited at his own request.⁶⁶ Carleton was the uncle of the third earl of Burlington. He did not owe his recruitment to his nephew's influence. It is virtually certain that Pierrepont did his title to his nephew- the first duke of Kingston. Pierrepont had not sat in the House of Commons since 1705 so it is improbable that he advanced himself towards the elevation. Kingston is one of those whigs who was a magnate in the second rank of the party leadership. It is probable that his importance has been underestimated. The contemporary influence of both the first and second earls of Scarborough has been quite unappreciated. The latter was not deemed worthy of an entry of his own in the D.N.B.. The recruitment of their kinsman Castleton was an instance of

their contemporary influence. Tadcaster was the son-in-law of the seventh duke of Somerset who has long been acknowledged as a sleeping leviathan of the period. Over thirty years later, having only broken his retirement to break the king's ministers, the sixth duke was able to have two earldoms created at his behest.^{66b}

The recruits were all whigs. George I's 1714 promotions were clearly balanced in the party's favour rather than being given to it exclusively. Uxbridge was a tory: he had been one of the 1711-1712 recruits but had subsequently been denied the lord lieutenancy of Staffordshire on his father's death. In June 1714 there was speculation as to why he was not taking up his diplomatic mission to Hanover, it being seen in the context of the Bolingbroke/Oxford power struggle.⁶⁷ Aylesford was the younger brother of the the eighth earl of Winchilsea, who had been a constant opponent of Oxford, even if the new earl had not always been.⁶⁸ The promotion was a sign that the king was happy to work with Hanoverian tories.

Newcastle (1715) was the age's greatest heir. Bristol was promoted because his eldest son was to have a place as a lord of the Bedchamber to the prince of Wales (the future George II). It was thought fit that the commoner Bedchamber lords should be the sons of peers with at least the rank of earl hence the promotion. Bristol, despite his close court connections, was still essentially a country whig.⁶⁹ The first earl of Rockingham was an impeccable party man. In 1712 there had been talk of Tankerville (1714) receiving an earldom, therefore, he had Harleyite leanings.⁷⁰ Chandos had been a member of the rather tory

council of the lord high admiral and had been retained as paymaster-general by Oxford as late as 1713. Halifax was a member of the Junto but was quite prepared to work with tories.⁷¹

1715 saw the Junto lord Wharton given a marquissate. The promotions of Ancaster and Kingston may have been connected to this in some way since, like him, they too had been promoted in 1706; the crown was signalling that it could promote court whigs as well as those figures who owed their prominence to their leadership of the party. The 1714 granting of the earldom of Halifax had been only to that earl and any descendants he might have had whereas his barony had been created so as to pass on to his brothers' descendants. The 1714 earl died in 1715. His nephew the second baron was promoted the same year. Newcastle's (1715) earldom having only ever been intended as an interim measure, he was made a duke.

The following year Wharton's son and successor was promoted to a dukedom. The patent's preamble made it clear that the award was for the services of the father.⁷² Portland's promotion may have been procured by corrupt means. Prior to the Bubble he was possessed of a large paper fortune,⁷³ therefore, he may have availed himself of the channels of corruption in order to achieve a dukedom. The summer of 1716 saw the dismissal of the duke of Greenwich from the future George II's household. Therefore, Castleton's viscountcy may have been linked with the Lumleys and the future second earl of Scarborough's presence in that household.

The 1716 recruits included a number of brothers of peers. The future second earl of Cholmondley was recruited

as baron Newburgh. He was the younger brother of the first earl of Cholmondley. The baron Torrington was the youngest brother of the second earl of Bradford. Both new barons were in large part recruited in their own right since they were prominent in their respective fields- Newburgh as a soldier while Torrington was a lord of the Treasury. Torrington's promotion complemented his brother the second earl of Bradford, who was an associate of the Marlborough connection, which had in large part metamorphosed into the Stanhope-Sunderland connection. Stanhope's 1717 recruitment was done as a sign of the ascendant position that the man and his supporters had achieved. The earl of Sussex's (1717) promotion may well have been an indicator of the influence of the third earl of Sunderland, who like the new earl was a Northamptonshire landowner.⁷⁴

In 1718 Stanhope was promoted to an earldom. Cadogan and Cobham, who were like him in being soldiers, were also promoted that year. Cowper's receipt of an earldom was a sign of the ministry wishing to demonstrate that his resignation from the lord chancellorship was not the result of ill-feeling. Despite taking the honour Cowper joined the opposition. This behaviour may be why he was not readmitted in 1720 and therefore continued in opposition. Some of the 1719 promotions may have been induced by bribery, however, the ministry was in political trouble. Sunderland needed to improve its support base otherwise the Townshend-Walpole group would have to be taken back in. Chandos was not only very wealthy, he was also well connected across the political spectrum. Greenwich was taken back into the political fold and both made lord steward and granted a British dukedom.

The re-admission of the Townshend-Walpole group in 1720 sparked off a round of titular bestowals. The group needed to be given a number of offices in order to mark its return to favour. Portsmouth, Falmouth and Ducie all resigned their places and were recruited as a result. Dorset was associated with the returned elements. However, he was a hanger-on of the prince rather than a member of the Townshend-Walpole group. He was distrusted by them because of his political conduct in Anne's final years.⁷⁵ Castleton was associated with the Lumleys and therefore with the prince and not the Townshend-Walpole group. The duke of Bridgwater was an associate of Sunderland, they both having married daughters of the first duke of Marlborough. These changes underline how the Townshend-Walpole group had been re-admitted as a junior partner to the ministry.

The following year Lechmere was recruited. This was as a result of a question-mark hanging over the propriety of his conduct as attorney general.⁷⁶ He was an associate of the Sunderland group, he being a brother-in-law of the third earl of Carlisle. The same year saw Macclesfield (1721) made an earl and Harcourt made a viscount. Neither man was a positive friend of the Townshend-Walpole group. However, the gesture may have been aimed in part as a snub to Cowper who was still in opposition, it being rare for a judicial recruit to pass the rank of baron.

The second earl of Orford was made a baron in 1723 as a mark of the trust that George I was now willing to put on the Walpole group, in the wake of the deaths of both Stanhope and Sunderland and then of the group's handling of the Layer plot. George I granted this positive sign and

then ceased to confer any further such honours (Townshend's eldest son being summoned to the Lords in a family barony at the same time).

George II's reign started with five accession recruits. Having failed to procure an adequate civil list Wilmington was kicked upstairs in order to ease Walpole's management of the Commons.⁷⁷ Both Buckinghamshire and the first earl of Leicester were fellow Norfolk landowners of Townshend and Walpole. Monson seems to have been their ally too, he being a neighbour in the regional sense being seated in Lincolnshire. His appointment as first lord of Trade in 1737 seems to have been a concession to Walpole. His lethargic exercise of the office shows that he is unlikely to have had it conferred on him through his own merits.⁷⁸ The first marquis of Rockingham was aligned with the group. This display of royal favour in relation to the two ministers and then to Walpole was never to be repeated. Indeed, the royal attitude in this area was to be like that of George I- rather frozen, a tool denied.

Townshend's 1730 resignation was marked by Wilmington, Ashburnham and Fitzwalter being promoted to earldoms. None of them had a strong connection with Walpole. Fitzwalter, with his European/courtier wife (the Schombergs' heiress), and Wilmington were the king's men. Ashburnham had been a Hanoverian tory. In 1730 he was a member of the prince of Wales's Bedchamber which he was to leave the following year to go to become captain of the Yeomen of the Guard. He was a Sussex landowner as was Wilmington.⁷⁹

The first marquis of Rockingham gained his first

promotion by claiming, erroneously if not falsely, that he could not accept the lord lieutenancy of the West Riding without being promoted to an earldom since all the previous recipients of the office had had the rank or above, otherwise he would lose face.⁸⁰ The king gave way in the matter because 1734 was the year of a general election and the marquis was central to the government's electoral interest in Yorkshire. George II, having just supported Walpole through the Excise Crisis, had no wish to lose his first minister.

Walpole was recruited after he fell from power. This was probably the result of a long-standing understanding between the king and his minister. It was also in George II's best interests, since the Commons would not be able to interrogate Walpole as to how he had maintained himself in power, which in turn meant that the system that he had run could be continued by his successors in the king's service. Mountedgcumbe, whose particular task had been to look after the government interest in the over-represented counties of Devon and Cornwall was recruited for the same reasons. Fitzwilliam had become very attached to Sir Robert prior to the prime minister's fall and Howe too was an associate of Walpole, one who had come in from earlier vociferous opposition to the Great Man to become his ardent supporter.⁸¹

William Pulteney turned down the offer of a title in 1730.⁸² He did this because he felt it would inhibit him in his quest to oust Walpole, a venture which he carried to success even though it took him another twelve years. With the minister's fall he felt able to take a place in the Upper Chamber, thus continuing to share the same forum

as his old adversary. Having accepted his patent for a title, Bath was careful not to take it out until the tory Gower, his old colleague in opposition, was safely installed as lord privy seal.⁸³ However, despite this tactical astuteness Bath had made a major, and irreversible, strategic error. His influence in parliament came from being able to place the government under pressure by influencing the opinions of those whig squires who sat in the Commons and who were politically independent of the ministry. Bath was no longer able to do this in the more staid and meditative atmosphere of the Lords. Walpole had long appreciated the difference between the two Houses and for this reason had remained in the Commons as long as he had in order to be able to act as the king's minister.⁸⁴

Bath's influence did not evaporate immediately upon his elevation although it did wane fast. In 1743 he was able to secure a title for Sandys as a 1720-style price for the man resigning as chancellor of the Exchequer.⁸⁵ The parallel recruitment of the solidly Old Corps Powis was probably a balance so that the limits of Bath's influence might be illustrated. Namier described the rivalry between Bath and Powis in "Structure" as a means of illustrating rivalries among the various factions of court whigs in 1760.⁸⁶ This incident may have been one of the causes of that rivalry or it may have been just one in a long line of its symptoms.

Harrington and Portsmouth both received compensatory promotions as the result of having to vacate offices in order that others might be accommodated in them as part of the re-arrangement of affairs. Neither man was a close

associate of the fallen minister. In 1744 Leicester was promoted to an earldom. He had been recruited as a result of Townshend and Walpole's influence and had long looked to the latter to have him raised from a barony but had not met with success. Discontent arising from this may have accounted for Leicester's flirtation with the opposition prior to Walpole's fall. The reason for his promotion is not clear it may have been the now Orford (1742) fulfilling an old promise that might not have been met from any other source amidst the uncertainty.⁸⁷

In 1746, in the wake of the suppression of the Jacobite Rebellion, George II conferred a number of promotions. Rockingham, Fitzwilliam and Buckinghamshire were all Old Corps whigs who had been associated with Walpole. Their promotion was a sign of George II's general approval for the Old Corps although there may have been a subtext in the choice of particular beneficiaries. This was because earlier in the year he had been forced to part with the second earl Granville as his 'behind the curtain' adviser. Brooke was far more the king's man, while Gower had tergiversated from torydom.

In 1747 there was a recruitment of a group of six. Ravensworth was a independently minded whig whose recruitment was greeted with apprehension by some within the ministry.⁸⁸ He was wealthy since there were highly productive mines on his county Durham estate. Feversham and Folkestone both had 'new money' backgrounds. The Old Corps hack Archer came from a family that had been established in Warwickshire for centuries.

Leinster, as the twentieth earl of Kildare, was Ireland's premier peer. In 1744 the second duke of

Richmond's oldest daughter lady Georgiana Caroline Lennox eloped with and married Henry Fox. Richmond was the grandson of Charles II whereas Fox was the son of Sir Stephen Fox, who had served as a clerk in that monarch's Household. Subsequently, Sir Stephen had gone on to create an immense fortune. Richmond's objections were to do with the ethos of nobility. Here he was on common ground with the prejudices of George II who provided a British peerage which Leinster was happy to accept in lieu of a dowry for Richmond's second daughter, thus saving the duke considerable expense.⁸⁹ However, the incident was not sparked off by the elopement or the Leinster marriage, but rather by the conferral of an additional barony on Ilchester which was remaindered to Henry Fox.

Another example of George II expressing good will followed two years later. In 1749 for family reasons it became necessary for the third duke of Devonshire to resign as lord steward. As a parting gesture the king created the Irish peer the second viscount Ponsonby, as a British baron. Ponsonby was the father-in-law of Devonshire's eldest daughter.⁹⁰

In 1749 Granville successfully manoeuvred into securing an earldom for Clinton. This meant that Granville had the new earl's thanks while the duke of Newcastle (1715) was put into the king's debt for the favour. The Foxes ascribed the authorship of the title not to Granville but rather to Chesterfield.⁹¹ Harcourt was promoted the same year and appears to have been the king's man. Hertford in 1750 and Cornwallis in 1752 appear to have fallen into the same category, whereas Guildford may have been the Pelham's. However, this is the result of

impressions. Contemporaries, varying with viewpoint, might well have described them in different terms at different junctures.

With respect to titles, the Pelhams' influence reached its zenith with the 1754 granting of earldoms both to their close ally Hardwicke and to their own kinsman Darlington.⁹² In the wake of Henry Pelham's death, as war became increasingly likely, it became clear that the ministry would have to take in one of the leading Commons men. William Murray chose to opt for a peerage and a place as a lord chief justice, leaving the running to Henry Fox and William Pitt. Fox was taken in because George II found him more acceptable than Pitt.

In 1756 there were a number of recruitments which reflected the various competing elements. Harwich was a client of Fox, Lyttleton of Pitt (although as with Clinton's 1749 promotion there was more than one perspective), Hyde of Granville⁹³ and Walpole of Wolterton of the fourth duke of Devonshire.⁹⁴ Ilchester was promoted to an earldom as a result of his brother Henry's prominence. The king was able to promote Fauconberg at the same time, giving him precedence over Ilchester.

In the 1760 the trial of the fourth earl Ferrers necessitated that lord keeper Henley be made a peer so that he might be able to act as lord high steward. This recruitment was used for Sondes, who was a relative by marriage of Newcastle (1715), and for Wycombe, who was a Wiltshire neighbour of the Foxes.⁹⁵

2.6. Conclusion.

Lawyers were susceptible to contemporary political currents. The resistance that the final four legal recruits faced in entering the peerage arose from that susceptibility. George II imposed restraints on the peerage as a whole- its size and the importance of continuity as a factor. In large part, the four had to exploit the political machine in order to extort their entries. It was not surprizing that when the Ferrers trial necessitated Henley's recruitment, the connection turned out to be a symbiosis and two political draftees were sucked into the peerage along with him.

State service was a poor route into the peerage. Changes of dynasty were the points at which it most advanced an individual. Otherwise, in all three services it was political circumstances which advanced an individual rather than the service that he rendered the state. Generally the army was an exceptionally poor means to achieving recruitment. After the Hanoverian Succession this was because it was virtually insulated from political interference. The navy and the diplomatic service were both more susceptible to such meddling and therefore proved better conduits.

Structural analysis points towards the Hanoverians having a high regard for the ethos of nobility even if it is hard to substantiate it with literary evidence. However, this did not mean that an individual's claim to nobility could be advanced in a vacuum in view of their family connection with an extinct title or inheritance of an estate which had previously supported a title. Rather,

nobility was a secondary feature which helped to advance a candidate who was principally forwarded on other grounds. Both Fauconberg's (1756) promotion and Leinster's recruitment were afterthoughts rather than titular events that would have happened of their own without there being corresponding political pressures for them to occur.

Somewhat paradoxically, in view of the ethos of nobility, corruption was another sign of court strength. It is no coincidence that George II should create both Leinster and Folkestone as viscounts when it was his usual practice to summon people at only the rank of baron. Under the Hanoverians corruption illustrated that there were channels other than the leading ministers to achieving court favour. This helped underscore to the ministers their limitations. However, the crown was careful to use it sparingly since otherwise its ministers' management of political affairs might have been irreparably damaged.

The political context of most recruitments and promotions is reasonably easy to identify. However, direct literary evidence is not always available, therefore, many have been ascribed circumstantially. Those incidents which involved several peers or involve historically well known figures are usually the most accessible. However, caution is advisable. 1694 shows that there was often a court subtext that has not been appreciated properly; i.e., the proportion of the whigs who were to prove acceptable to Anne at her accession, even though most members of their party were not.

The decypherings of those occurrences where the recipients were less distinguished politically are not always sure. It is not always possible to delineate what

the cause of the conferral was. It might be that the beneficiary was having an old promise to him fulfilled or it might be the result of a contemporary shift in high politics. The two could fuse so that to which the event was ascribed varied with an individual's perspective. It is clear that informed contemporaries did not always know who was responsible.

As said in the introduction, entry into the peerage did not change greatly from one end of the period to other- Pomfret was a kinsman by marriage of the first duke of Leeds and Sondes was one of the duke of Newcastle (1715). The only substantive change from one end of the period to the other was that William recruited European favourites whereas George II did not. The two kings differed in style too. William was fairly free with titles; however, this was only in the early and middle sections of his reign; the final one saw him exercise this aspect of the prerogative in a very limited manner. In contrast George II was restrained for most of Walpole's ascendancy; thereafter he became far freer. He tended to give out several honours in contrast to William's general style of dribs and drabs.

The principal differentiating factor between the two kings was the Act of Settlement. It strictly prohibited the recruitment of foreign nationals. One is hard pressed to think of any non-royal male Hanoverian whom he would have wished to recruit, certainly none of them had a good continuity claim. This lack of Hanoverian recruits was not necessarily the product of cowering under the Act of Settlement, which it should be remembered was not immutable. George II seems to have had a different style

of kingship than William and enjoyed and precisely modelled the nature of that style.

George II used titles as a far finer tool in domestic politics than did William. George, by withholding titles from Walpole as part of the minister's political arsenal, underscored whose power it was that the Great Man was directing rather than controlling. With Sir Robert's fall the king loosened up, perhaps never feeling that he had to hold this particular whip hand over Walpole's successors in quite the same manner. George used titles to show that there was more than one faction that sought to serve him. William did not use his broader titular powers in this manner, indeed, he virtually did not use them in the final years of his reign. This was because of the domestic political pressure he was under in the wake of the signing of the peace of Ryswick. In contrast, George's low usage in the Walpolean era had not been a sign of the king seeking to avoid causing offence but rather a sign of the crown's continuing strength.

3. Central Office.

3.1. Introduction.

In terms of the interaction of the peerage and politics, office is held to be important in terms of the ability of the government to control the House of Lords through the distribution, continuation and deprivation of places which it could bestow. These places varied in degrees and amounts of profit, honour, influence and power. The relationship of the peerage to office was different from that of M.P.s. As the monarch's supposed 'natural counsellors' they had a significant share of the better paid court positions. In addition, there were numerically far fewer peers than there were M.P.s. No office was technically in the exclusive preserve of the peerage,¹ although some offices were exclusively held by peers throughout the period. Other offices were held by both peers and commoners while still others existed for only part of the period rather than throughout its course and therefore were not necessarily held by either type exclusively throughout it.

Defined arbitrarily there were four broad categories of central office that the peerage held- senior, lesser, Bedchamber and service. This section will only look at the first and third of these. The first and second are rather multitudinous in character. The former will take priority because its holders were the more central to the exercise of power. The service categories will not be dealt with here because the peerage were always in a distinct minority in each of the services and such goes against the broad grain of this thesis's approach. The Bedchamber can

be seen as a part of the lesser central offices. However, the large number of peers involved makes it by the largest single type of the central offices that peers served in in this period, seventy-seven were members of it. Therefore, it deserves to be treated as an entity in its own right being obviously a suitable candidate for study in terms of the adopted criterion.

Senior office consists of three broad categories; the officers that headed the Household (the groom of the stole, the master of the horse, the lord steward, the lord chamberlain), the great executive officers (the northern and southern secretaries of state, the first lord of the Admiralty, the first lord of the Treasury and the first lord of Trade) and the basic central machinery (the lord privy seal, the lord chancellor and the lord president). The lord lieutenancy of Ireland is an additional member of the group. The Bedchamber was headed by the groom of the stole, therefore, the lords of the Bedchamber were technically members of the Household.² The two are grouped together with the lesser ones in order to see if there were any broad trends in the patterns of multiple holding of central office.

3.2.1. Senior Office.

John Cannon saw the influence of the peerage on parliament as paling "in comparison with the power they wielded directly as office-holders, in day-to-day charge of the country,..."³ Jonathan Clark has reached a similar conclusion. However, it is a sign of development that the author of "the ministry rather than the House of Lords was and remained the political arm of the peerage" has gone on to write of the effects of the Revolution that "the real power of the executive (and therefore of the Crown) steadily grew" and that "almost all the institutions of government ...were... strengthening: the institution of monarchy, and the individual monarch... retained their centrality in the daily business of government from William III to George II and beyond."⁴ His latter statement needs to be reconciled to his former, i.e. whose 'arm' was it. The contention of this part of the section is that the 'arm' distinctly belonged to the crown and that although individual members of the peerage were able to exert considerable influence through their official positions, they did so under the clear auspices of the crown. A study of the senior offices reveals that the crown's prejudices were what counted rather than an independent oligarchy acting as it chose to.

The cabinet, although well established by George II's reign, was in its infancy during this period and therefore was subject to changes in the size of its membership, the frequency with which it met and the nature of the business it handled. Therefore, a group of fourteen offices has been selected to provide a framework through which it is possible to study the interaction of the monarchy with

those politicians who staffed the senior offices of state. The offices that make up this group were not of a consistent importance with one another throughout the period. Notable exceptions to the group are the archbishop of Canterbury, the secretaryship of state for Scotland, the secretary at war and the lord chief justiceships. Nor are those people who were in the cabinet at times without portfolio included, such as the earl of Bath (1742) and baron Somers. The office of first lord of Trade was not created until 1696 and only in the time of the second earl of Halifax's possession of it did become a cabinet place.

The senior offices were not of equal importance; a transfer from one to another could be a promotion, a sideward shift or a demotion. They were the two secretaries of state, the lord chancellor (or lord keeper), the lord chamberlain, the lord steward, the lord president of the Council, the lord privy seal, the first lord of the Treasury, the first lord of Trade, the first lord of the Admiralty, the lord lieutenant of Ireland, the master of the horse, the groom of the stole and the master-general of the Ordnance. The offices were not always of the same nature, the first lords include both the lord high treasurers and the lord high admirals. This section will deal with the nature of the offices in terms of their political context. The political ramifications of a number of entrances into, shifts between and departures from office are dealt with in the political narrative section below.

Cannon chose to look at the senior offices of state in terms of whether they were held by a peer or not. A

more detailed approach gives a better level of understanding. Ninety-nine peers executed one or more of these offices during the period, although some of these were filled by commoners at times. A list of the peers is to be found in appendix C. Of the twenty-two privy seals John Robinson bishop of Bristol was not a lay peer, of fifteen treasurers Henry Pelham died a commoner, as did Henry de Nassau d'Auverquerque of the seven masters. Of the seven masters-general John Louis Ligonier was an Irish peer.⁵ Of the sixteen admirals neither the Scottish peer the fifth viscount Falkland nor Sir Charles Wager was ever either an English peer or a British one. Of the thirty secretaries eleven were either never peers or were not peers until after the period. At the Admiralty both the earl of Orford (1697) and the earl of Torrington were first lords prior to being made peers. In Torrington's case the brief difference occurred prior to the period's opening while in Orford's there was a gap of three years. There were five treasurers who held the office prior to creation- the first viscount Lowther and the first earls of Halifax (1714), Oxford, Stanhope and Orford (1742). None of the other offices had such a high proportion of commoners upon their entrance into it.

The peers who held these offices can be subdivided into recruits and inheritors. Sixty-three of them held inherited titles during the period and thirty-six were recruited to the peerage during it. At the Admiralty Anson and the first viscount Torrington became first lords after their creations while there were nine inheritors. Of the eleven stewards only Greenwich did not inherit an English title although he did inherit a Scottish dukedom. Of the

nine chamberlains the first earl of Jersey was the sole example of a recruit; of the privy seals the first marquis of Halifax, the first viscount Lonsdale, the first baron Trevor and the first earl Cowper were non-inheritors. Among the masters-general the fourth earl Rivers, the second duke of Montagu and the third duke of Marlborough were in a minority as inheritors compared to six recruits.⁶ Of the secretaries the first earls of Romney, Jersey, Stanhope and Harrington were all made peers prior to their receipt of one of the two offices compared to there being eleven inheritors. The first earl of Godolphin and the earl of Wilmington became treasurers in the period having already been made peers, while eight other treasurers were inheritors. There were twelve peers who were first lords of Trade but only the first viscount Weymouth and the first baron Monson were recruits. Of the eighteen presidents seven were recruits. The earls of Portland and of Romney were recruit grooms while their six male successors were all inheritors. The only non-peer to be master was in William's reign, his six successors were all inheritors. The earl of Romney and the first earl of Rochester were the only recruits to have Ireland.

At none of the fifteen cross-sections were more than twelve of the offices occupied by peers. For the first two cross-sections there was no first lord of Trade, the office was normally to be held by inheritors. In addition, for the first four cross-sections the number of offices averaged at 9.5 whereas for the other eleven it was over 11.5. The proportion of inheritors to recruits in possession of these offices did not remain constant. At the beginning of 1690 ten of them were occupied by peers,

five of each type. At the beginning of 1760 eleven were occupied, ten by inheritors and one by a recruit. Anson at the Admiralty made 9.1% of the total. The change was not one of steady decline; as early as 1715 the recruits' share was as low as 27.8% and as late as 1740 it was still as high as 41.7%. The recruits' high proportion in the first five cross-sections stemmed both from many of the Stuarts' creations still being alive and politically active -Leeds, Rochester, Marlborough, Godolphin and the marquis of Halifax- and from the recruitment of a number of William's own favourites- Portland, Schomberg and the earl of Romney. The final 9.1% was half of the size it could be expected to be because George II kept Henley as a commoner lord keeper until his hand was forced by the Ferrers trial during 1760.

The ninety-nine did not all hold their offices in the same manner- some held just one, others more, some held the same office more than once, and various combinations thereof. The duke of Dorset and the third earl of Sunderland held five separate offices each and the fourth duke of Devonshire, the eighth earl of Pembroke and the earl of Romney four apiece. Twelve held three, thirty-two two and fifty a single one. There were only three among the top seventeen who were recruits- Romney, Harrington and Wilmington. Twenty-three of the remaining thirty-three recruits were among the bottom fifty.

Inheritors were distinctly more likely than recruits to hold more than one of the offices under consideration in this section. The seventeen and the fifty were more likely to be found in some offices than in others, to the

disadvantage of one another. The former were far more likely to be lieutenants, stewards, secretaries, presidents and chamberlains, whereas the latter had a greater proclivity to be admirals, trade, masters-general and chancellors. The offices of the groom, the privy seal, the treasurer and the master all lean towards the seventeenth proportionately.

There is a strong bias for those offices that called on a strong background of professional knowledge -the navy, the army and the law- to be poor platforms for holding more than one office. A few lawyers did transcend their professional origins to become the holders of non-legal senior offices, although these were like the chancellorship in being in the central machinery of government. Cowper and Somers both served as presidents and Macclesfield as privy seal. Holders of the Household and executive offices were more likely to hold more than one office. Recruits to the peerage occur more often in the 'professional' group.

Peers who were new to the rank of office under consideration were more likely to hold some offices than others. If one excludes the changes at accessions- there were seven virgins in William III's reign, five in Anne's, six in George I's and eleven in George II's. All of the chancellors and all of the first lords of Trade were virgin to the senior level. The next highest proportionately were the first lords of the Admiralty, the secretaries, the grooms and then the master-generals. The last were two-thirds new. At or just above the fifty per cent mark are the chamberlains, the privy seals, the stewards, the treasurers and the masters. Because of the

executive nature of their office it would be reasonable to expect there to be more recruit treasurers. This stems largely from the obvious candidate in William's reign, the first earl of Godolphin, not continuously holding it. Therefore, at the end of the reign there were three holders of the office in four years.

No such concentration accounts for the masters-general. The office of privy seal was used pretty liberally in the early thirties and early forties. Less than a quarter of the lord lieutenants and less than an eighth of the presidents had not held one of the other offices in the group. Of the lieutenants, the second dukes of Ormond and Grafton and the marquis of Wharton had Irish possessions, while the last, the second earl Granville and the earl of Rochester (if they did not) were front rank politicians who were probably purposefully diverted from the other senior office.

The ninety-nine left office a total of two hundred and two times during the period and at its end. Eleven of the two hundred and two can be accounted for through their being in possession of office at the end of the period; a further twenty-nine died while in possession. Therefore, one hundred and sixty-two left or changed office either voluntarily or against their will. If there were proclivities in the particular occurrence of the vacating of office, these would be indicative of the interaction of crown and peerage and any change in that relationship be reflected therein.

People both left the offices under consideration and transferred from one to another. In William's reign there

were four transfers, in Anne's four,⁷ in George I's ten and in George II's twenty-six. People left office in a variety of ways, an initial subdivision is of those who did so on the death of a monarch and those who did so between such deaths. There were three changes of reign during the period. Nine people ceased to hold offices under consideration- two on Anne's accession (Romney held two offices), six on George I's and one on George II's. Fourteen people left office during William's reign, twenty during Anne's, seventeen during George I's and twenty-three during George II's.

By studying the distribution of this use of office it is possible to discover how patronage was used on the peerage. A first approach is to examine to what extent peers held other offices before they were raised to senior office and the second is to see to what extent they were continued, given additional ones either on receipt or subsequently office honours. In William's reign 37% of senior office-holders had held office previously (irrespective of whether they were continued in the office or not), in Anne's 45.2%, in George I's 47.1% and in George II's 51.2%. Senior officers were increasingly recruited from other offices. In William's reign the figure would be higher since the likes of the first duke of Leeds and the first marquis of Halifax had held senior office under the Stuarts but are excluded as being ex-period. In Anne and George I's reigns the tendency to recruit from the politically excluded led to there being fewer recruits from the other offices, although in George's later years this was not so much the case. In George II's reign the near monopoly by the whigs on royal

favour allowed a system to flourish in which internal recruitment to high office was from existing office-holders.

Indeed, once in senior office a peer was likely to be continued in it. The second earl of Godolphin disliked carrying out his duties as groom. Therefore, he asked to resign and was allowed to do so on a pension. However, shortly afterwards the privy seal became vacant. George II, ever mindful of the the financial limitations stemming from the size of the civil list, was persuaded to kill two birds with one stone. He saved himself the cost of Godolphin's pension by giving him the salaried post, the duties of which were largely honorific. Godolphin accepted this arrangement because his son had predeceased him and he wished to have a title to continue in the Godolphin family. The earl was created in an additional barony. Penny pinching was one of the roots of the growing inheritor share of the senior offices during the reign.⁸

Among those who entered senior office who were officeless prior to the bestowal in each reign are a proportion of lawyers and sailors who rose through their professions rather than through court office. If those who were holding other offices prior to the receipt of senior office are divided into creations and into inheritors and then made a percentage of the whole- the break-down is 18.5% each in William's reign, 12.9% creations and 32.3% inheritors in Anne's, 8.8% and 38.2% in George I's and 9.3% and 41.9% in George II's. If the first and last reigns are compared, over the period the number of recruits who held office prior to their receipt of senior office effectively halved whereas the number of inheritors

more than doubled. The two had started from an equality. Therefore, the growth in the number of Bedchamber lords and lesser office-holders who went on to become senior office-holders came exclusively from the inheritors, who not only did this but also made up for the shrinkage of the recruits' share. Although the share of the total held by previous office-holders increased minimally from Anne's reign to George I's, the difference, in terms of the inheritors-to-recruits did occur between those two reigns.

Honours, e.g. the Garter, and offices, e.g. Bedchamber places, could be held in addition to senior office. These varied with the reigns. In William's reign 59.3% were so favoured, in Anne's 51.6%, in George I's 35.3% and in George II's 37.2%. There was a decline from the first reign to the second, a steeper one from the second to the third and a slight recovery from the third to the fourth. If the figures are broken down into recruits and inheritors they are- 25.9% and 33.3%, 16.1% and 35.5%, 11.8% and 23.5% and 9.3% and 27.9%. When William and George II's are compared the recruits had shrunk to just over a third while the inheritors had only contracted by one-sixth. The recruits dropped successively as each reign progressed into the next, by far the steepest drop being between William and Anne's reigns. Then and between the two Georges' there were slight rises there being a distinct drop between those of Anne and George I. Patronage was being spread more widely as the period progressed. Those who held senior office in William's reign were nearly two-thirds more likely to receive additional marks in terms of office and honours or to be

allowed to retain offices they held already than those who did so in George II's.

3.2.2. Conclusion.

The recruits made up more than a third of those who held senior office during the period. However, the proportion of offices that they held changed very markedly if one compares the two terminal trans-sections. Entry into senior office improved for the inheritors at the expense of the recruits. If entry from offices outside of the group to ones inside of it are measured by comparing the reigns of William III and George II, the inheritors improved their likelihood of entry by half as much again over the recruits from the former reign to the latter one. If one looks at entry into the group from a position of officelessness, comparing the same two reigns, the inheritors' chances improved four times over the recruits'. Once in senior office the recruits tended to enter positions which required considerable technical knowledge and which were not good springboards to other offices in the group. George II's reign saw the highest number of transfers from one senior office to another, by which time the inheritors' position had been considerably advanced over that of the recruits.

By itself this shift from recruits to inheritors in terms of the possession of senior office does not mean much. However, if one inserts it in a broader context it does. The other sections show it to have a correlation with other movements in terms of the peerage tenure of office and receipt of honours; it is part of a broad shift that the crown came to exercise in favour of inheritors. The period saw conditions change from a small personal monarchy with a broad range of prerogative powers to a large executive one with a narrower prerogative. A manner

in which the crown was able to retain control of the government was to ensure that its prejudices were clearly followed where it chose that they should be. The two Hanoverian kings possessed an ideal about nobility which favoured inheritors over recruits. This ethos was given vent through the allocation of senior offices. Once the guide-lines had been laid down by the crown there was the need for it to be active at every opportunity in domestic politics since it had defined the circumstances. The peerage might exercise power through their possession of senior office but it was the crown which controlled access to such power and thus ultimately the power itself.

A large amount of research has been centred on the most novel aspect in the politics of these years- the emergence of the office of prime minister. That office did begin to become a clear entity in these years but it can not be understood unless its proper background is appreciated. The management of the Commons did require the presence there of one or more of the crown's leading ministers. Of the officers that could be there the first lord of the Treasury was the most appropriate in view of the House's power over money bills: hence Walpole, Pelham and Pitt all sat as M.P.s while in possession of that office. But these three all occupied such a position in George II's reign. They did so because his particular style for managing domestic politics leant towards a very high level of delegation; there was nothing either that had been pre-ordained or that was to be irreversible about the emergence or state of the office by the end of George II's reign. It was as much a symptom of the king's attitude to British politics as the heavy use of

inheritors was. It is clear that prime ministers did have a level of influence over who their senior colleagues were but it was not the uppermost one and it would have been at its most effective if operating firmly within their king's prejudices.

3.3.1. The Lords of the Bedchamber.

Within the basic structure of the Bedchamber, there were thirteen lords of the Bedchamber. The office could be held by Scots peers and commoners. Four times a year they would be in attendance for a week. It is clear that during the period that the number was exceeded. The additional lords would probably have been supernumerary and therefore would probably have received a lesser salary. However, since the office was used frequently as a means for rewarding ambassadors and since a number of lords were somewhat lax in performing their duties under the Hanoverians, it is probable that a larger Bedchamber emerged in part to ensure that were actually lords to exercise such functions as they were left.

The Bedchamber transcended the kings' role as kings of England, therefore, it included members of the Scottish peerage and commoners too. This section looks exclusively at those Bedchamber lords who were the holders of English or British peerages. The number of lords of the Bedchamber was subject to change.

There is a list of the Anglo-British Bedchamber peers in appendix D. Of the seventy-seven, nine were recruits. In the cases of the first dukes of St. Albans and of Richmond this was because they were royal bastards. The first earl of Scarbrough, the first baron Boyle and the first earl Fitzwilliam all inherited Irish titles before being given English or British ones, and became Bedchamber lords subsequently. The baron Weston and the earl of Romney were both younger sons of holders of English peerages. Only the earl of Portland and the first duke of Marlborough were not closely connected to an existing

patrilineal title before becoming peers themselves. Of the nine, four were in William III's 1689 batch. St. Albans and Weston were members in the same reign, while George I went on to employ Boyle and Richmond. George II employed only Fitzwilliam. This is probably indicative of there being an ethos operative which meant that inheritors came to have a far better candidature for the place. It is the contention of this section that this is in line with the Hanoverians' attitudes to recruitment and senior office.

It was practicable to have a degree of continuity of personnel of the Bedchamber from one reign to another. If nothing else they could proffer information concerning particular matters had been dealt with previously. The twentieth earl of Oxford had served as a Bedchamber lord to Charles II before doing the same for William III. The seventh earl of Lincoln, the sixth earl of Westmorland and the first duke of Bridgwater served as Bedchamber lords to the royal consort prince George of Denmark and then went on to serve George I. George II continued from his father's Bedchamber the lords the second dukes of Richmond and of Manchester and the groom the second earl of Godolphin. Under the two Hanoverians any lords who were not continued were deemed to have a good claim on any vacancies at court. Such continuation from William's reign to Anne's did not occur principally because in 1702 for a peer to have been associated with her late brother-in-law was a mark against the man rather than in his favour.

What makes Richmond and Manchester stand out from their fellow lords in George I's Bedchamber is that they both 'succeeded' de facto their respective fathers in their places. There seems not only to have been a

Hanoverian prejudice in favouring inheritors but preferably inheritors whose fathers who had held places in the Bedchamber. In George II's reign there are five further instances. Four of these occurred in the four year period of 1739-1741: the third duke of Manchester, the fourth earl of Holderness, the second earl Waldegrave and the ninth earl of Lincoln. The third duke of St. Albans was another one in 1751.⁹ The links can be extended even further if one choses to. For example, the third duke of Marlborough was the matrilineal grandson of the first duke of Marlborough.

Another element that seems to have been disproportionately favoured in the distribution of Bedchamber places were peers who had converted from catholicism to anglicanism. Scarbrough served William. The duke of Shrewsbury, the eighth baron Teynham and the first earl Waldegrave all served George I and the earl of Fauconberg (1756) George II. This may well have been "pour encourager les autres."

The first earl of Scarbrough, the twentieth earl of Oxford, the second duke of Ormond, the first duke of Marlborough, the third earl of Peterborough and the earls of Romney and of Portland were William's initial Bedchamber lords. This selection showed the king both to be grateful to those who had abetted him in the Revolution and to be a king in the Stuart style in both having people around him who had served his predecessors and others who were personally liked by himself. Those who joined subsequently were a mixture of courtiers and whigs. In the second earl of Essex and the second duke of Bedford he

acknowledged the strong link between the whig leadership and that party's court origins. The whigs did well for a number of reasons. Prior to their exclusion they had been engrained in court society. A number of them were young second generation members of the party who had only experienced political consciousness during the party's existence and therefore were susceptible to being pulled into the Bedchamber through their youthfulness since the post-1688 entrants into the Bedchamber tended to be in their twenties or thirties.

Many of the leading Tories were in opposition or in office outside the Household. Most of the leadership were Caroline recruits and therefore were a generation too old to be potential members of the Bedchamber, while their heirs were still commoners and therefore less likely to secure places. The second earl of Bath and the second baron Lexington were Tories who were admitted as responses to immediate situations, whereas none of the Whigs entered in such 'spontaneous' fashion.¹⁰

The Bedchamber lords were not continuously in the physical presence of any of the three kings. None of the three had their lords sleep in the same chamber as them. When Queen Mary died, William III shut out his Bedchamber lords from being with him during the first stages of his mourning, their re-admission being a sign of his beginning to return to public life.¹¹ In 1740 the Countess of Portland remarked on the subject of sleep-walking that the second earl of Albemarle "is always lockt into his room to hinder any bad accident."¹² The earl had been a Bedchamber lord to George II since 1722 and was to go on to become groom in 1751.

In 1683 Charles II laid down orders as to the right of entry to the Bedchamber. This sharpened the definition of what were its public and private aspects. In 1689 William further restricted the right of entry. George I took the situation a logical step further by continuing to have the same Bedchamber as he had had in Germany but grafting on to it as an outer formal shell a British one. George II enjoyed using his British Bedchamber for formal services such as dressing.¹³

Jonathan Clark felt able to write that the groom was the "most politically powerful Court office of the century..."¹⁴ A look at George II's four grooms disproves Clark's contention. The second earl of Godolphin was seen as a Jacobite, the ninth earl of Pembroke became an eccentric who ended his days "living upon vegetables", the second earl of Albemarle was notorious for his financial rapacity, while the fourth earl of Rochford was an exception to prove the rule, he could only mount to personal extravagance.¹⁵ Beattie was careful to point out how the third earl of Sunderland was an important figure in his own right rather than because he held the office.¹⁶ Bute was to be important not because of the office he held but rather because of his personal relationship he had with George III. The two early Hanoverians allowed their Bedchambers to develop institutional characters, grooms under George II rose to their position by means of 'Buggin's turn' rather than through the expression of personal preference. This was indicative of the early Hanoverians' remote style of kingship rather than because of disinterest.

The initial character of George I's Bedchamber was

different from what it was to become. In its first couple of years it included a number of senior politicians -the dukes of Shrewsbury and Kent and the first duke of Manchester- and also a few Tories and former Tories -the first baron Boyle and the second earl Granville. Subsequently, both the political calibre of those in it dropped and the partial heterogeneity turned into Whig/court homogeneity. Although it is possible to detect a level of continuity from the previous reign, it would have soon become evident that the new king had a different monarchical style from William. The Bedchamber became a shell to the inner, private court.

As the character of the outer layer had little bearing on the kernel beneath, George was not immutable on its being used for political purposes. There is virtually no evidence on how the change was wrought but the 1719 date and the third earl of Sunderland's becoming groom then points to his probably playing an important part in the process. It is a reasonable conjecture that the king retained a controlling say in the matter, which may have been expressed in part through having an 'inheritor' inheritor and former Catholics. If the king possessed preferences then his ministers' scope would have been limited by them and therefore their actions would have been more controlled. George's change of attitude allowed a new seam of peers to be brought into place or the hope of place- the undistinguished inheritor.

In the high Walpolean era George II maintained the peerage element in the Bedchamber at a fairly static size. In 1738 it was expanded from nine to thirteen. This may have been to help Walpole or it may have been to prod him

along in a direction that the king wanted. There then ensued frequent changes but as soon as the Pelhams tried to establish a new ministry these stopped. This may have been to stress whose sphere of influence it was and therefore it may be significant that in 1748 the Pelhams' kinsman the fourth duke of Leeds and the neighbour the second earl of Ashburnham can both be perceived as being connected with the brothers. If so, that was the high watermark of their influence on the Bedchamber. Had Pares browsed more thoroughly through "The Life of Lord Chancellor Hardwicke" he would have seen that George II felt that the duke of Newcastle (1715) should not try to interfere in Bedchamber appointments, which in turn implies that the duke felt that he could do so upon occasion.¹⁷ George may not have felt the same need to keep the brothers out of Bedchamber matters as he had with Walpole. Newcastle and Henry Pelham being capable of breaking off direct communication with one another at points when their mutual antipathy was out of hand.

3.3.2. Honours and Office.

Possession of a place as a lord of the Bedchamber did not exclude a peer from receiving honours or other offices. These will be defined here as any other than local offices. All of William's initial seven had a military aspect to their careers, as also did the second earl of Essex and baron Weston. The earl of Romney, the third earl of Peterborough, the third earl of Carlisle and the earl of Portland all held senior office. Portland, Carlisle, Romney, Burlington, St. Albans and Lexington all held lesser central offices in conjunction with their Bedchamber places.

Lexington, Portland and the first duke of St. Albans all served as ambassadors. Scarborough was the sole person to be promoted titularly within the reign while only grooms were given Garters. Only Bath and Bedford were without honour and office,¹⁸ they being the lords who saved for the shortest while. William's Bedchamber was in character with his style of monarchy. The activities of its members reflected his interests. The people who were about his person were often the instruments of his will, their offices reflecting this. Brevity of service was the only reason why individuals were not brought into a role that exceeded the strict functions of being a Bedchamber lord.

George I's Bedchamber had a proportionately less martial character than William III's: the first baron Boyle, the first duke of Richmond, the first duke of Portland, the seventh baron Delawarr and the second duke of Richmond. This largely stemmed from the reign as a whole having a far less warlike character than William's.

The third earl of Berkeley and the third earl of Sunderland held senior office. The second duke of Grafton, the seventh earl of Lincoln, the duke of Kent, the second earl of Godolphin, the first duke of Portland, the third viscount Lonsdale, the sixth earl of Leicester and the first earl of Sussex (1717) all held lesser offices in conjunction. The second earl Granville and the first earl Waldegrave both served as diplomats.

A number of them became knights of the Garter—Dorset, Berkeley, Sunderland, Lincoln, the third duke of Rutland and the second duke of Richmond. In 1725 the Order of the Bath was revived and was bestowed upon Leicester, the second duke of Manchester, Sussex and Delawarr. The first dukes of Manchester, Portland and Bridgwater were promoted in the peerage while Bedchamber lords. The sixth earl of Westmorland, baron Lucas, the seventh earl of Warwick, the eighth baron Teynham and the third viscount Townshend had no additional marks of favour while lords of the Bedchamber.

There was a change in character from William's reign to that of George I. Those Bedchamber lords who held additional offices of influence mostly did so in the first half of the reign. More people went into it and through it during the course of the reign than had been the case with William's. The Bedchamber also became less high-powered because it did not offer the same potential for intimacy with the sovereign that William's had. However, its members were given more honours proportionately than William's men had received. This was aided by there being no participation in a continental war which freed a number of Garters, the whig infighting meant that the competing

factions were prepared to distribute them more freely and the king was tolerant of a level of corruption among his German favourites which the Bedchamber would have had excellent access to.

There were seven soldiers in George II's Bedchamber: the future ninth earl of Pembroke, the second earl of Albemarle and the second duke of Richmond all in 1727, and the earl Harcourt, the third duke of Marlborough, the second duke of Kingston and the third duke of Ancaster subsequently. None of George II's Bedchamber lords held a major office of state while members of the Bedchamber. The third earl of Essex, the second duke of Manchester, the second earl of Albemarle, the second duke of St. Albans, the ninth earl of Lincoln, the second earl Waldegrave and the second earl of Ashburnham all held lesser office in conjunction. Fewer peers held minor court office proportionately in comparison with the previous reign.

The third earl of Essex, the third earl of Albemarle, the fourth earl of Chesterfield, the first earl Waldegrave, the fourth earl of Rochford and the fourth earl of Holderness all undertook diplomatic missions. In 1730 Chesterfield was the reign's first knight of the Garter, the third earl of Essex and the first earl Waldegrave did not follow until 1738. In 1741 the second duke of St. Albans, the third duke of Marlborough and the second duke of Kingston followed suit. The second earl of Albemarle was given his in 1749 and the ninth earl of Lincoln his in 1752. In 1756 the earl of Hertford, the second earl of Northumberland and the second earl of Buckinghamshire formed a second triumvirate, while in 1760 the second marquis of Rockingham brought up the end of the

reign. None of George II's Bedchamber lords was made a knight of the Bath. The earl Fauconberg (1756) was the only person to be promoted while serving in the Bedchamber. There were fourteen who ostensibly received no additional marks of royal favour.¹⁹

There was a shift away from Bedchamber lords being men of influence. This occurred between the reigns of William and George I, and it was continued further under George II. The key variance was that Bedchamber lords ceased to hold senior offices in conjunction with their Bedchamber posts. In addition, the number of honours that were bestowed upon them also decreased slightly. The Bedchamber had become a less important place because the intimacy it had afforded with the monarch had decreased. George II's revival of the monarch's public dressing was a display of political theatre and can not be seen as affording his Bedchamber lords any particular intimacy; the obverse is more likely to be true.

3.3.3. Departures.

There were four ways in which a peer could cease to be a lord of the Bedchamber: the monarch could die, the peer could die, the peer could be given an alternative employment or the peer could leave office without receiving such. The last of these could be either through dismissal or resignation. Of William III's- eight were still of the Bedchamber at the king's death and six had moved on without alternative employment. Of George I's- fourteen were of the Bedchamber at the monarch's death, eight had died, four had moved on to alternative employment and three had moved on without such. Of George II's- fifteen were still in service at his death, nine had died, seven had moved on to alternative employment and five had resigned or been sacked. The political character of the Bedchamber changed between the reign of William and those of the two Georges. In the former period people left without going on to another employment, whereas in that of the latter two, more people left to go into another employment than left not to do so.

The departures in William's reign were indicative of his style of monarchy. The moths were attracted to the flame of power but there was no institutional screen to stop them straying too near it. The first duke of Marlborough, the second earl of Bath, the third earl of Peterborough and the earl of Portland were either dismissed or departed on bad terms. Ormond did not go on positively good ones, his decision stemming from a question of military seniority in relation to his and the first earl of Albemarle's respective guards colonelcies.²⁰ Oxford is the only instance for whom there is no positive

suggestion that he may not have been disaffected. He was already exceptional in being an old man when he initially joined although it is quite possible that he may not have wanted to leave.

Under the Hanoverians there was effectively a screen, in the entity of the private German Bedchamber, that separated the crown from its Bedchamber. The reign of George I was approximately the same length as William III's, yet only three people left the Bedchamber during it. Boyle's dismissal for corresponding with the court of St. Germain's was not so different Marlborough's in 1692 except in the matter of scale, there being an invading Jacobite force in 1715. The establishment of the Supremacy saw politics cool a few degrees. The two dukes committed a far lesser sin than Boyle, of being members of the wrong faction. After them there were to be no more departures for over fifteen years.

George II's reign was well over twice as long as George I's, yet it saw only five exits to non-employment. In 1733 the last departure having been in 1717, this may have given Clinton something of an air of confidence that he could act and enjoy reasonable immunity, both Essex and Lonsdale having been granted a fair degree of toleration. He discovered that for himself it was otherwise. Tankerville almost certainly left without ill-feeling in 1738 since two years later he was made lord lieutenant of Northumberland. Marlborough's behaviour is rather equivocal. The resignation of Poulett can be seen as indicative of how the Bedchamber had changed. He was frustrated at his long service as Bedchamber lord not having led either to additional or to alternative

employment; a very different state of affairs from William's day. He was not the only instance in George II's reign. The second earl Cowper was similarly disenchanted before severe gout made him incapable of serving in the Bedchamber and therefore forced him to resign. The earl Harcourt was distinctly in want of a mark of recognition before he was promoted to being a major general in 1755.²¹

The Bedchamber was used as a platform to further office during the reigns of George I and George II. There were four instances in the former's reign: the duke of Shrewsbury became groom, the duke of Kent steward in 1716, the sixth earl of Westmorland a chief justice in eyre in 1716 and the second earl Granville a secretary of state in 1721. George II's pattern of moving his Bedchamber lords to other employments was different from his father's.

The first of George II's was the fourth earl of Chesterfield. In 1730 he was made lord steward. In 1735 the second duke of Richmond left to become master of the Horse and the second earl of Godolphin to become lord privy seal. The 1740 departure of the third earl of Jersey became a chief justice in eyre. The fourth of Leeds emulated him in this pattern to the extent of also becoming a chief justice in eyre. The fourth earl of Holderness left to become the southern secretary.

The two final instances of the reign involved the office of governor to the prince of Wales (and prince Edward). The office's importance lay in its supposed potential for shaping the future king. It was fit that the man selected to execute it should be one who had witnessed the current monarch's exercise of power at close hand,

therefore, the Bedchamber offered some candidate, the earl Harcourt in 1751 to 1752, and the second earl Waldegrave from 1752.

Many of the senior offices of state were held by William's Bedchamber lords. Therefore, the place did not act as a staging post for the great offices. George I did not have the same degree of integration of offices as the Dutchman had had, while George II did not have that kind of overlap. It is unwise to make any direct comparison between the father and son since the first three people to leave George I's Bedchamber seem to have looked on their places there as an interim mark of favour. That king's habit of giving additional offices to some of his Bedchamber lords may explain why more did not leave.

George II with his non-bestowal of additional places to Bedchamber lords had one which was far more of a route to other destinations. Some of those who tried to use it as a means to other ends succeeded while others did not. It is noteworthy that of the three who went through it to senior offices other than groom (Chesterfield, Richmond and Holderness), two were subsequently viewed by George disparagingly and the other formed an attachment to Walpole even though the minister had always viewed him as the king's man.²² George II did not have William's volatile relationship with his Bedchamber but then those whom he forwarded from it to high office did not have any close personal relationship with him.

3.3.4. Conclusion.

The Bedchamber was a flexible area of patronage distribution. The number of English peers in each reign always increased from its initial size at the accession. To some extent this was in response to ministerial needs. It is a reasonable proposition that if William III had had a reign as long as that of George II, his Bedchamber might have increased comparably to the size of the Hanoverian's. It is probable that George I's would have been larger than his son's because his rate of expansion was faster.

Clear signs of the ethos were both the establishment and the growth of 'inheritor' inheritors and the way in which the recruits contracted into non-existence. Bedchamber posts came to be inherited increasingly in a near de facto manner. Although William's reign was too short for this trait to emerge, its occurrence is in line with the Hanoverians' peerage policy in terms of maintaining a steady number. Even when the Bedchamber was expanded this factor was still allowed to occur, indeed, the expansions may have facilitated it to a degree.

The Act of Settlement had an important effect in changing the Bedchamber's nature from William's day to that of the Hanoverians. Unlike the Dutchman, the two Germans were unable to integrate their European courts by means of the offices of their British one. Therefore, from 1714 on there existed both an inner, private court and separately an outer, formal one; a distinct degree of structural homogeneity had been lost. Therefore, the Hanoverians may not have had the same immediate interest in the appointment of Bedchamber lords that William had had and therefore they may have been more susceptible to

outside politically determined candidates. To them the Bedchamber was a political tool that allowed them to impose the ethos of nobility on their ministers. Because of its size and association with the crown the Bedchamber was a necessary engine for the crown's ministers in managing the House of Lords. In either allowing ministers a say or depriving them of one the crown was able to express its importance to the running of domestic politics.

William III was a king who opened his reign in preparation for war and engaged in such for the majority of it. Therefore, it was sensible that a high proportion of his Bedchamber lords were officers in the rapidly expanding army. The variance of the martial element in 1714 from William's day was caused by the army having assumed an institutional character. It had been contracted partially since George I was not desirous of engaging in a prolonged international struggle. Therefore, the same circumstances were not in operation as had been in 1689. This was to an extent the situation through George II's reign too.

In 1714 patronage was being used on the English peerage more broadly than it had been before. Therefore, Bedchamber lords were more likely to serve solely as Bedchamber lords at a time when the office had lost some of its earlier intimacy. Additionally, they were less likely to receive other marks of honour. For a large proportion of Bedchamber lords the Bedchamber was an end in itself. However, for a minority it was a staging post to offices which had previously been more integrated into it. One feature that did remain steady was continuity of

some personnel from one reign to the next; to have been a Bedchamber lord in the previous reign forwarded a person to have a claim on royal favour.

3.4. The Number and the Pattern of Office-Holders.

It was possible for peers to hold more than one office at a time- holders of senior office, lesser office and Bedchamber lords all did so. The pattern of occurrence of peers holding more than one of the offices under consideration is a loose indicator as to the political tension; the more thinly office was distributed the more peers were being placated, the higher the occurrence of individuals holding more than one office the more relaxed political matters were liable to be. There were only two periods when there were no such double holdings- the early 1710s and the early and mid-1730s.

William III had never less than three such men. With the onset of the Country Reaction his response was not to redistribute the offices that various politicians resigned from but rather to retain them in the hands of sure men drawn mostly from both senior office and the Bedchamber, two groups that already overlapped. This involved a mixture of courtiers and non-Junto whigs.²³

Anne redistributed the held offices because of the lack of a monarchical Bedchamber. Her husband's was decidedly smaller than William's had come to be. Most of the double-holding was by whigs in senior offices prior to 1710- the first and second dukes of Devonshire being particularly successful. The Oxford ministry's need for places meant that double-holding disappeared until the ministry's final internecine arguments during which the duke of Shrewsbury held more than one senior office. This stemmed from his being a whig, therefore, he was not perceived as a contender in the ministry's leadership struggle which was being waged with increasing bitterness.

However, when he was finally made lord treasurer it was clear that Bolingbroke's bid had failed.

George I always had a persistently high level of double-holding. He rooted it in the Bedchamber. The ability to do so stemmed from the continuation in peerage tenure of those offices that Oxford has opened up for such. George II did not continue this policy choosing rather to have initially a smaller Bedchamber than his father had ended up with and to have those lords who would have been in the Bedchamber and in possession of an office outside of it just occupy the latter. From 1730 until 1738 there was no double-holding. This ceased because by the late 1730s the ministry had re-established its full grasp on the Lords. Thereafter, the numbers fluctuated but the ceiling never surpassed George I's floor.

Five yearly intersections in appendix E show that William III's reign was essentially static. There was a distinct drop to the first one in Anne's and then a further one. There was a very clear watershed between the 1710 and 1715 figures. The whole of George I's reign and the first figure in George II's are very much of a par. The final six show a moderate degree of volatility, the average of which was slightly higher than their four predecessors'.

Anne's reign is the only exceptional one. In it Harley's need to reaffirm his interest within the tory party, while not wishing to alienate by means of dismissal any whigs that he need not, led him to extend the very vocabulary of patronage- so that offices such as the tellerships of the Exchequer, the mastership of the Bloodhounds and joint vice-treasurerships of Ireland came

to be regularly held by peers, whereas before they had not been. The subsequent whig domination of the House was in large part fathered by a lapsed country whig.

4. The Lord Lieutenant and the Custos Rotulorum.

4.1. Introduction.

The two offices were only part of a whole array of offices that the central government had in the localities ranging from land tax commissioners, through to surveyors of the window tax and out on to the likes of filacers.¹ The custos's relationship to the other justices had originally been one along the lines of primus inter pares but it had a supervisory character in relation to them. In their turn the justices, in the various sessions, oversaw the implementation of a wide variety of social legislation: they monitored and where necessary controlled price levels for staple items such as wheat; they implemented the measures as to social conduct in matters such as gambling. Occasionally, they would also see that particular political matters were enforced in the localities, e.g. the Association of 1696. The duties of lieutenancy per se were restricted to the militia.²

The importance of the two offices lay beyond the nature of their immediate functions. The justices and deputy lieutenants were technically appointed by either the lord keeper or the lord chancellor (the chancellor of the duchy of Lancaster did the appointing for Lancashire), the custos and lieutenant only having the right of 'recommendation.' The two were weighty principally because of the way in which they usually gave their holders a special relationship with the central government which allowed them to steer much of the patronage available in a county even though many of the places involved had no direct connection with either of them.

The power to influence the distribution of patronage in the localities was not of a continuous nature during the period. In order to allow both the administering of and the financing of two wars there was a period of rapid growth in the executive, which in turn led to an expansion in the volume of patronage under William and Anne. Thereafter matters were fairly static, because it would have both engendered resistance and there was less positive need for such than there had been previously. The Excise Crisis grew in large part from fears of the political repercussions of the crown being able to expand its executive influence over both the political nation and parliament. William and to a lesser extent, Anne were careful to try to avoid partisan use of government patronage whereas the Georges were prepared to allow the whig party to use it in a partisan manner. Therefore, the political sway that a lieutenant-custos could command in this respect grew more marked from one end of the period to its other.

That there were changes in the monarchy and the broader central government over the period is evident. Therefore, it is probable that such change may have in some degree been reflected in the offices' patterns of tenure. That lieutenants were dismissed is well known- the High Church resignations of 1705, the Oxford ministry's remodelling which was followed by that of the Hanoverian Succession and the Excise Crisis sackings. These incidents have been viewed too simplistically. The last one has been looked at in a context of the whig opposition and the whigs in government being clearly delineated from one another. The other instances have suffered from being

looked at in too party-orientated a manner. There is fruit to be garnered from examining the overall pattern of departures from lieutenancies, not all of which were dismissals.

4.2.1. The Number of Lieutenants and Manner of Tenure.

Lieutenancies were not held in a singular fashion. There was no dictate that a county's lieutenancy could only be held by a peer or that it could not be held in conjunction with other lieutenancies. Counties could be divided just as they could be coagulated into pairs and larger groupings. That there should be chronological shifts in the pattern of how lieutenancies were held may well be indicative of shifts in politics. The peerage did not have a monopoly on the tenure of them, the office could be conferred on commoners or peers who had just Irish or Scottish titles.

There was no need for a peer to own estates in a county whose office they held. Often his property might be predominantly in an adjacent county, e.g. the marquis of Wharton and Oxfordshire. A peer could be seated in a county without having inherited his seat there, there was always the possibility of marrying an heiress to one, as was the case with the second earls of Godolphin, Orford and Stamford. A lieutenant could even be a purchaser of an estate:- Surrey was exceptional in having two successive purchaser-lieutenants in the mid-1710s- the earl of Halifax (1714) and the duke of Greenwich³. The flexibility that allowed commoners and peers whose territorial interests lay elsewhere to have a lieutenancy also allowed individuals to act as 'caretaker' lieutenants, occupying the office until a minor was of age and able to assume the office himself. Sometimes these caretakers would be seated in the county and on other occasions they would not. The duke of Shrewsbury, Carleton, Rochester and the fourth earl of Clarendon all acted as non-resident caretakers.

From the work of J.C.Sainty it is possible to see that two hundred and ten individuals held one or more lieutenancies during the period.⁴ Of the two hundred and ten, one hundred and seventy-five held an English peerage during the period. Of the one hundred and seventy-five fifteen were commoners when they first held a lieutenancy. Nearly eighty-five per cent of the people who held a lieutenancy in the period were either English peers, created peers within one of the four reigns or were the heirs-apparent to a title. The other fifteen per cent were drawn from the upper strata of the landed elite in their own localities. Seventy per cent of the lieutenancy holders in the period were at least second generation English peers.⁵

The lieutenancy existed in each of the forty English counties and the twelve Welsh ones.⁶ Some counties had strong sub-divisions within them; the most obvious example of this is Yorkshire with its three Ridings. In the 1670s Northamptonshire had been divided into two separate lieutenancies. Before accepting Kent in 1705 the first earl of Rockingham suggested that the shire also be divided into separate eastern and western portions, which were acknowledged already, and that he should have only one of these.⁷ The idea was not carried through and he received the county as a whole.

Both Kent and the pairing of Devon and Cornwall had two lieutenants at once in the early 1690s. The second lieutenants were the fourth earl of Westmorland and the second earl of Bath respectively. This was because, at a time when an invasion was a very real possibility, the former county was held by the earl of Romney, who had

pressing official duties in Ireland (as a lord justice of that kingdom), and the latter were held by the first earl of Bath (1661), who was well into his sixties and had an experienced and dynamic heir-apparent.

Of the one hundred and seventy-five, one hundred and thirty-six (nearly 80%) were only ever lieutenants of a single county. The other thirty-nine were lieutenants of two or more counties during the period. The twenty-nine 'doubles' and ten 'multiples' include North and South Wales as single lieutenantancies.

Of the 'multiples' the most extraordinary was that of the first earl of Macclesfield (1679). His association with the duke of Monmouth had impelled him to flee the country during James II's reign. By the time of the Glorious Revolution he had become sufficiently close to William to be in charge of the prince's bodyguard. In March 1689 he was given a bloc of five lieutenantancies. It was a unique grant in the period, a de facto revival of the lord presidency of the council of Wales.⁸ He was not a landowner in Wales being possessed of estates in only Cheshire and Lancashire. The earl did not gain any further marks of being regarded highly in royal favour after 1689. This was because William became disillusioned with him along with most of the other more radical and opportunistic whigs.

The earl's 1694 death led to his bloc being split three ways. Gloucestershire went to viscount Dursley, the future second earl of Berkeley. Herefordshire and North Wales⁹ went to the duke of Shrewsbury. He subsequently resigned the former to the duke of Kent in 1704 (the duke

had been prepared to resign the county to the eighth baron Chandos in 1700) and the latter to the second earl of Macclesfield (1679) in 1696. Shrewsbury owned land in many of the West Midlands counties but tried to be rid of North Wales since he owned no estates there. He forwarded the third baron Vaughan as an appropriate candidate in both respects. However, subsequently he learnt of the second earl's desire to be given it. He felt able to give Macclesfield priority in the matter because he had not informed Vaughan of his intention. The king complied with the duke's wish.¹⁰ The only lieutenancy he held continuously was Worcestershire from 1689 to 1718.¹¹ South Wales¹² and Monmouthshire went the eighth earl of Pembroke, who relinquished them to local landowners in 1715. Pembroke held Wiltshire without interruption from 1689 to 1733.

In terms of chronological distribution the occurrence of 'multiples' and 'doubles' as a pattern of lieutenancy tenure were distinctly weighted towards the first half of the period. Those which occurred in the second half were all repetitions of what had existed before. An exception to this was the fourth duke of Bedford.¹³ He came to enjoy both Devon and Bedfordshire, two counties which had not been held in conjunction prior to 1714 and which were physically separate whereas the other 'pairs' had come to be immediate neighbours.

There was a distinct shift towards the number of individual holders of lieutenancies being maximized.¹⁴ The office was more widely held in 1760 than in 1689. This is because of the breakdown in the occurrence of 'multiples' and the lessening of the frequency of occurrence of

'doubles.' The number of peers who held the offices would not have grown particularly since the prime beneficiaries of the process were the Welsh gentry. Such growth as there may have been amongst the peerage would probably have been in line with the expansion of the peerage. The expansion in the overall number of lieutenants led to their being territorially more closely associated with the counties they held. Caretakers would have been fairly constant although it is probable that as lieutenancies came to be more widely held so there was more likely to be a need for caretakers. The shifts are not of balance but rather of emphasis towards a numerical broadening of tenure and increased identification with the localities.

4.2.2. Custodes Rotulorum.

In 1689 approximately two-thirds of English counties had their offices of custos and lieutenant held by the same person.¹⁵ By the end of the period the only identifiable surviving separation was that of the North Riding of Yorkshire; its lieutenant was the fourth earl of Holderness and its custos was the second marquis of Rockingham.¹⁶ That the other counties should have combined was because of the factors above which can be reduced to individuals preferring their power to be unchallenged. Once the two were given to someone jointly it was unlikely that either of them would be accepted singly by another person since such a bestowal would mark the new recipient was of a lesser stature than his predecessor or was less trusted than him. The process by which the 'separate' counties had their offices joined was piece-meal, to describe it would give detail without giving any particular insight into the working of politics in these years.

One particular incident can give illumination as to why lieutenants should wish to be custodes of their counties too. The first concerns the second duke of Montagu. He was made lord lieutenant of both Warwickshire and Northamptonshire in 1715 but not custos of either county. The former ended up eventually in the possession of the second earl of Macclesfield (1721) and the latter came to be held by the sixth earl of Westmorland. Both were deprived of them in the mid-1730s because of their association with the opposition.¹⁷ Therefore, Montagu had to deal with two commissions of the peace which had been largely appointed by people who were hostile to the

ministry which he supported. The possibility for tension had been shown in 1732. Chief constables for a hundred were elected at leet courts summoned by the lord of the hundred. In this instance the hundred was the duke's and for his own purposes he did not wish a chief constable to be elected. The Northamptonshire commission took into its collective mind to appoint one against the wishes of its own lieutenant.¹⁸

The Welsh counties fall into a different pattern of tenure from the English ones. This is because of the Macclesfield (1679) conglomeration of lieutenancies. He did not hold all of the posts of custodes that were within his lieutenancies. The pattern has to be surmized but it seems that they were more likely to be held by local landowners in the south than in the north. This probably continued to be the case as the conglomeration thawed away since the Macclesfield Gerards and the Cholmondleys, who held North Wales after 1714, were both Cheshire landowners and therefore were more likely to have land and interests in the north. The lieutenancies fell to the local gentry (some of whom had Irish titles) whereas the offices of custos fell to landowners. The groups overlap but they are not identical. A number of those landowners were peers who principally resided in England. English peers continued to exercise direct power through much of Wales through the possession of local office.¹⁹

The expansion in the number of lieutenants over the period was roughly matched by the contraction in the number of custodes during the same. Therefore, the number of people who held the two offices in toto was fairly static. Where a change did occur was in the way in which

these officer-holders became both more powerful, through the expansion of the executive and the lessening of other individuals holding the other office, and more identified with the counties where they executed the offices.

Proportionately, there was probably a slight contraction of peers who were custodes and lieutenants when 1760 is contrasted to 1689.

4.3. Resignations and Removals from Lieutenancies.

Crown favour was the principal factor in the six departures from the office during William's reign. The departures occurred in an internal court context rather than in either an overt whig versus tory one or a court versus country struggle. The party element was a subtext to the matter. In numerical terms the whigs gained and the tories lost although the overall change was slight. Members from both parties left the offices but the whigs did better in terms of filling the subsequent vacancies. In addition, two of the whigs were subsequently re-appointed to their lieutenancies.

The Bath Granvilles had had considerable political weight prior to the Revolution and therefore felt that their past experience gave them the standing to be taken on their own terms. Therefore, they were prone to clashing with William. The second earl resigned in 1693 and the first earl (1661) was dismissed in 1696. The second earl of Abingdon was replaced in 1697, his kinsman and patron, the first duke of Leeds, having long fallen from the political pre-eminence he had possessed in the early 1690s. The duke himself was dismissed on the report of his death and was not re-instated when it emerged that he was both alive and wished to retain the offices.²⁰

The whigs were more adaptable because they had lost most of their original leadership. They had come into the political warmth after a number of years out in the cold and they were whole-heartedly in favour of the war. With James's departure for exile in 1688 the whigs had achieved their principal political objective whereas the tories after the Glorious Revolution felt that the values and

institutions which they cherished seemed subjectively to be under continuous assault. Within the context of court politics it was easier for the whigs to expand their position than it was for the tories to defend theirs.

In 1691 Newcastle (1694) resigned as the result of pique when William III refused to promote him from his earldom to a dukedom. Restoration to Nottinghamshire and Middlesex and the promotion were both secured in 1694. The third earl of Peterborough was opportunistic in his political stances. In 1694 he fell under William's suspicion as the result of a report that he had reconciled himself in the favours of the exiled James II. In 1697 the earl was dismissed when it was discovered that he was trying to exploit the Fenwick plot in a manner which the extant evidence could not validate. No one else was appointed to the office. There was no pressing need since the war was ending and the county had a separate custos in the person of the first viscount Hatton.

During Anne's reign party was nearer the surface than it had been in William's reign, but it is clear that these departures can not be understood solely in a party context. The accession alterations were not a straight-forward instance of pro-tory and anti-whig. There was an impairment of the whig position but this was small compared with what there would have been had the crown sought to use these alterations for the optimum partisan capital in favour of the tories. The changes were still occurring principally in a court context.

In 1702 Peterborough was restored. This was a result of having taken care to foster good relations with Sarah duchess of Marlborough. In addition, to have been held in

bad light by William was not necessarily a negative feature in the new queen's eyes, even though her relations with late brother-in-law were not bad in his final years.²¹

Buckinghamshire was given to the tory Irish peer the second viscount Newhaven who soon after resigned it to the whig first duke of Bridgwater on the latter achieving his majority.²² The whig ninth earl of Derby was restored to Lancashire. He had resigned the county in 1689 because William would not confirm it in tandem with Cheshire, as the earl had held it until 1687. Anne dismissed Wharton, the second earls of Stamford and of Radnor from their lieutenancies. What she disliked about them was not their being whigs per se but that they had been prepared to act as William's men, a tendency which was more common among whigs than tories.

The 1705 High Church resignations from the North Riding, Kent and Cornwall were a distilled instance of why the whigs had improved their share of the lieutenancies during William's reign: tories tended to behave as tories whereas the whigs tended to behave as courtiers. The acquisition of lieutenancies by Godolphin in 1705 and Marlborough in 1706 were not positive advances for the tory interest since both men were far more court orientated than they were party inclined.

By 1710 the whigs had gained a high number of the lieutenancies in proportion to their presence in the House of Lords. At the beginning of the period they had secured a good share and since then had capitalized by showing themselves as being willing to serve the crown, hence they reaped its benefits. Operating under this sentiment it was

not they who indulged in the grand gesture of the 1705 resignations.

The Oxford ministry of 1710-1714 was the time during which inter-party strife was at its most intense. It is clear that overall the remodelling of the lieutenancies during those four years benefitted the tories and did considerable damage to the whigs. The two statements are closely connected but it is wrong to say that the latter automatically followed on from the former. This is because to do so is simplistic; it looks at the disease and it looks at the symptom but it does not take any account of the body in which the condition is taking place. If the nature of the changes is to be comprehended the role of the court can not be omitted. If Oxford is seen as a court manager, which is where the body of recent historical opinion has come to rest,²³ it becomes clear that it was not in his interests to have a direct link between whig diminution and tory advancement. Had he allowed such it would have undermined his position as a power-broker. That there should be changes in the lieutenancies was to be expected in view of the ministry's intention to use the tory party as its principal support in parliament. However, the ministry also intended to use what whig support it could gather in the two Houses, therefore, there was unlikely to be any automatic whig proscription.

The degree of the changes in September 1711 stemmed from the deaths of the duke of Newcastle (1694), the second duke of Bedford and the first duke of Rutland, who held seven lieutenancies between them. In 1712 Marlborough and his associates, the second duke of Devonshire and the second earl of Bradford, were dismissed.²⁴ Neither

adjustment was as overtly anti-whig as it could have been had Oxford wished to exploit them for the maximum benefit of the tories. It is evident that overall the ministry's remodelling was not as pro-tory as it was anti-whig. The difference is explained by there still being the court as an active element in politics. After 1712 there were few changes and there remained a distinct number of whigs in office.²⁵

The cause of this is obscure. It probably lies in a balance of two explanations, either one of which is capable of accounting for the change. The first is that the ministry became too divided for either Bolingbroke or Oxford to be prepared to allow the other to make alterations in the lieutenancies and thereby garner an advantage over the other; the former was almost certainly the keener to do so, he having an equally ardent ally in the lord keeper viscount Harcourt. The second is that Anne was not prepared to give general backing to either party. Thus the general lack of changes showed how limited the ministers' scope for action was if the crown was not prepared to back their line of action. In 1713 the first earl of Cholmondley opposed the the treaty of Utrecht in the Privy Council. Anne desired the peace, therefore, the earl was dismissed from the lieutenancy of Cheshire.²⁶

The 1713 treaty of Utrecht took Britain out of the war but did not bring a stop to the wars so that the country's former allies, who included Hanover, had to make the best terms that they could in a circumstance that was disadvantageous when compared to that which had existed prior to the treaty's conclusion. A full reversal of the Oxford ministry's changes was the least that was expected.

Before the Hanoverian Succession, from Anne's perspective (she desiring the peace ardently), the whigs' opposition to the treaty was distinctly anti-court. After the Succession, from George I's view, all good courtiers should have been against it.

The lieutenancy adjustments that followed the Hanoverian Succession were not a straight-forward instance of 'tories out and whigs in.' It has to be appreciated that nine whig peers had retained office through the Oxford ministry. The changes that took place were either restorations of individuals or fresh bestowals. The counties affected had not necessarily been taken away from other people, counties such as Nottinghamshire and Staffordshire having been maintained vacant.

The first two years of George I's reign saw the whigs secure every lieutenancy with the arguable exception of Wiltshire, Pembroke is best seen as a courtier rather than a tory. However, it was a triumph created through the crown. The king made the positive decision that the whigs should enjoy a marked predominance among the lieutenancies. Initially, he was happy to have a tory minority. In the wake of the 1715 Jacobite Rising he made a second positive decision that such tories as remained should be removed. The whigs were advanced rather than advancing through their own efforts; they were advanced to act as the court party not as whigs. Party members might occupy all the lieutenancies but they never controlled the distribution of them.

After the two sets of alterations were made changes among the lieutenancies became rare. The second earl Granville resigned Devon in 1721. It is unlikely that he

left the office because of the return of the Townshend-Walpole group to the ministry the previous year because the third earl of Sunderland was still alive and influential. Granville's connection with the county was through his mother the first countess Granville. She was a coheiress of the Granville earls of Bath. It is probable that she was regularizing her inheritance by selling off her interests in Devon and that it was this that was his reason for departing the office.²⁷

The reign's other three departures were sackings. Greenwich's 1716 dismissal was the result of petty court machinations. The deprivation was the first clear instance of the part that the reversionary interest was to play in politics under the Hanoverians. The earl of Coningsby's 1721 dismissal was for social misbehaviour in the expression of his views as to the lord chancellor in the wake of prolonged litigation. As an associate of the third earl of Sunderland his departure would have been welcomed by the recently re-admitted Townshend-Walpole group. The first earl Cowper was dismissed in 1722 and the third earl of Essex appointed in his stead in October. This was because of Cowper's ardent opposition to the ministry.²⁸ His opposition was not just to Townshend and Walpole but had also been to their ministerial colleague third earl of Sunderland who had died in April that year. It is an open question as to whether Sunderland had guarded Cowper from being moved against as a means of antagonizing his fellow ministers.

From the early 1720s to the mid-1750s the exchange in the tenure of lieutenancies was fairly quiet. The age's essence was to allow affairs to continue as they were

unless there was an especially pressing reason for changing them. In terms of the general governmental policy of 'letting sleeping dogs lie' it may have in large part originated with George II. Lieutenancies were regarded as being in the crown's patronage sphere rather than ministers'.

There were two exceptions to the general peacefulness. The 1733 dismissals of Clinton and the third duke of Bolton have come to rather obscure those of Cobham and the third viscount Townshend in the late 1730s. However, it was in the latter that the seeds of Walpole's downfall were sown, whereas he managed to weather the earlier episode. Three of the four people, Townshend being excluded, who were removed from office in the 1730s can be easily perceived as the king's men rather than as Walpole's- two soldiers and a Bedchamber lord. George II felt able to dish out this form of punishment to the three because it was being received by people who were in his own spheres of interest. The viscount was master of the Jewels but his dismissal sprang from his father's death rather than his own conduct. The third viscount's brothers who occupied profitable offices, such as tellerships of the Exchequer in reversion, were left in their places undisturbed.²⁹

Bolton in the wake of Excise Crisis dismissal drifted back into the court orbit and in 1740 was made captain of the Gentlemen Pensioners. He and Walpole came to enjoy a positively friendly relationship with one another.³⁰ The amicable nature of these relations may have led to Portsmouth's being granted an earldom in return for resigning the office, but not until after the 1741 general

election which had led to Walpole's fall.

Lieutenants who were occasionally associated with the opposition retained their offices: viscount Tadcaster, the seventh duke of Somerset, the second earl of Scarborough and the fourth earl of Shaftesbury. The factor that allowed them to do so was because they did not necessarily transgress the king's direct interests, especially if those peers viewed themselves as courtiers who acted with the opposition to Walpole rather than with that to the court. None of these people were of the hardened systematic opposition.³¹

With Walpole's fall the removals stopped and the departures came to be caused solely by resignations. The second duke of Chandos attached himself to prince Frederick, who spent periods in a state of mutual antipathy with George II. The first duke of Chandos desired to be rid of his own lieutenancies at least as early as 1738. Therefore, the 1741 bestowal of Herefordshire on Sir Charles Hanbury Williams was not a slight to the first duke.³²

By the time of the 1756 outbreak of the Seven Years' War the militia had long been in a state of growing decay. The militia's original purpose had been for national defense. The Nine Years' War and the War of the Spanish Succession had shown that national interests could be advanced in terms both of international relations and of colonial concerns through participation in European conflicts. More importantly, the army had proved to be an excellent tool for suppressing the 1715 Jacobite Rising. Thereafter, the army was guaranteed a sizable presence in the national life since the Jacobite card was one that

hostile powers could play at will against Britain.

Therefore, the militia was no longer the principal means of national defence.

In 1745 the militia failed to provide any military block to the Jacobite army that advanced out of Scotland and it was again the army that quelled the menace. The militia had proven ineffective but at least it had tried to play a positive role and succeeded in doing so in terms of auxiliary functions, such as keeping a watch on the highways. It is probable that much of the decay can be attributed to the central government appreciating that its interference in the localities would excite the sort of fears that had been excited by the Excise Crisis.

It was not until the outbreak of the Seven Years' War that the militia issue was placed firmly on the political agenda. The conflict, with its tri-continental engagements, needed new levels of manpower. This posed a dilemma that either Britain should meet hostility in every theatre that it found such or the nation should husband its resources and only counter it selectively. The former approach was chosen. Therefore, there was a need for some form of adequate national defence to be provided in order to allow the army to be deployed abroad as extensively as possible. An example of what could be done was the Norfolk militia garrisoning Portsmouth in summer 1759 in order to make good the absence of the fort's normal regular occupants. That this was seen as important to the war effort was demonstrated by the militia being reviewed en route at Kensington Palace.³³ This instance of cooperation was exceptional. In September 1759 the Devon one rioted when it believed its members thought they were going to be

shipped abroad.³⁴ This attitude may well have been indicative of how the members of most militias felt about the effect of the war on their situation.

The problem loomed even before war had broken out, Pitt made political capital from Fox's close official connections with the military as secretary at war. He pointed out that only five of the proposed thirteen militia regiments had been raised. Two successive Acts were passed but neither was by any means popular and the militia issue was to remain contentious into the early years of George III's reign. All this led to a politicization of an office that had come to be regarded as a sinecure. This in turn led to resignations in the late 1750s by earl Brooke, the ninth earl of Lincoln, the second earl of Ashburnham, the second baron Ducie, the sixteenth baron Abergavenny, the second earl of Egremont the third earl of Cholmondley. This was a radical state of affairs in comparison with the lack of dismissals since the late 1730s.

4.4. Conclusion.

The functions of the two offices were specific. There was a range of other offices through which the centre also conducted its relations with the localities. Therefore, the prestige and the lack of burdensome duties that the two offices commanded made them attractive to the aristocracy and particularly to the peerage. The nature of political power shifted from the politico-military towards the politico-administrative. The immediate sub-patronage that each office commanded was useful in supporting an interest within a county. Additional influence was acquired through the offices having considerable, if not outright, influence on the distribution of many of the other centrally appointed offices.

The way in which the offices were held changed through the period. The number of 'double' and 'multiple' tenures decreased so that lieutenancies were being held by more people. Through the same span, there was a distinct decrease in the number of lieutenancies that were being held separately from the office of custos. While more people were holding the one office they were more likely to hold it in conjunction with the other. Therefore, the number of holders of these offices was roughly static. The exercise was not a straight-forward instance of maximizing patronage. Rather what happened was that the offices were made more efficient and making recipients became more influential. In view of the expansion of the peerage over the period, from 1689 to 1760 there may have been a contraction in the proportion of peers who were in possession of one or more of the two offices.

In the first two reigns and in the early years of

George I's reign there were some removals from office and a number of resignations. In William's reign these changes were rooted in the court. The whigs benefitted under him and Anne because they were prepared to behave as courtiers whereas the the tories tended to behave as party men. Initially, Anne was not as anti-whig as she could have been, her actions being court orientated rather than party geared. The remodelling by Oxford's ministry was distinctly less pro-tory than it was anti-whig, thereby restressing the earl's position as a court manager rather than as a party leader. Because of the retention of a large number of whigs it is clear that it was not a straight-forward partisan purge, indeed, it seems to have initially been aimed at a very specific court group. The deprivation of the lieutenancies of 1733 and 1739 was exceptional. After 1739 departures from lieutenancies stemmed from resignations rather than dismissals. Those who subsequently left lieutenancies did so because they chose to. The 1750s particularly witnessed a number of instances because of the Militia issue.

For the most part those whigs who had been given office in the localities and who engaged subsequently in opposition were allowed to retain those offices. This was because the ministry was able to by-pass them when it chose to. The whigs in power retained an party identification with the independent court whigs. This led to the former not wishing to undermine the party interests in the county along with those of the latter.

5. The Crown, the Executive, the Peerage and High Politics,
1689-1760.

5.1. Introduction.

Prior to the Exclusion Crisis, the post-Restoration high politics of Charles II's reign were conducted along a court/country axis. The former pole was identified with the crown and its prerogative and the latter with the broader political nation and resistance to assertive interpretation and outright abuse of the prerogative. From the Crisis until the middle of James II's reign politics was dominated by a whig/tory axis. The former pole sought to prevent the accession of a practising catholic to the throne and the latter one to maintain both the Stuart family on the throne and the broader socio-political order that had been re-established after 1660. These two axes both existed throughout the period 1689-1760.

It is the contention of this thesis that the inter-party conflict has been stressed unduly in the secondary literature. This had two roots- a general underestimation of the continuing strength of the crown and a concentration of research upon the Commons and especially the election of its members. This thesis does not seek either to downplay the importance of the inter-party conflict or to say that there was a previously ignored high level of court/country conflict. What it does seek to do is to add to the general appreciation of politics by examining the crown through the medium of its interaction with the peerage. Such an approach reveals that through trying to understand the period's politics solely by means of inter-party conflict, one does not gain

a full comprehension of the events of the four reigns. If one does so, but also stresses the due place of the crown during the period, a better understanding can be gained. The 'persona' issues, which separated the two parties from one another, did not emerge from thin air. Some of those issues had clear court/country roots. They became hardened away from these with the passage of time so that they came, only with time, to assume a life quite separate from their origins.

Politics existed on a number of different broad levels- court, ministerial, parliamentary and popular. These were not mutually exclusive but what happened in the court was not in direct parallel to what happened at the popular level. This thesis will concentrate on high politics at the centre. Therefore, it deals the first three areas, although the fourth will be touched upon briefly. The politics in which the peerage participated had a different character from that in which M.P.s engaged. It was not a case of each having a predominant axis to the other's exclusion from it. The Lords was more susceptible to court influence than the Commons, while the junior House in its turn was more susceptible to both party conflict and the country interest.

The difference can be substantiated by a comparison of the factors that worked on the membership of parliament's two Houses. At any given point the Lords had numerically approximately a quarter of the sitting members that the Commons had.¹ Its membership turned over at a slower rate than the Lower House's so that patronage could be dealt out in a more carefully considered manner than it could with the Commons where a large proportion of the

membership changed with each general election. Although many M.P.s were returned at their own behest or that of a patron, a majority had to face re-election where they were exposed to the prejudices of the the political nation in all but the very rottenest of boroughs. Peers, in contrast, either inherited their titles or received them from the crown.

Party politics is not to be ignored in the Lords but it was nearly always subordinate to ministerial needs. It is hard to identify instances when a party was effective purely as a party in the Lords. During the first two reigns as soon as either party tried to manipulate the ministerial interest in the House it was forced to rely on the strict support of its members only, and those members whose principal loyalty was to the court could prove distinctly ambivalent. The parties were too near to one another in size and the court's influence was too strong in its presence to allow easy partisan exploitation of the House. During the second two reigns there were very few instances where the whigs tried to behave as whigs. Much of their activity was essentially governmental and has come to seem whig because the government consisted of virtually no one but whigs. However, just as overt party activity was hard to conduct through to fruition so were overtly court measures. The politics of noise, where party labels are easily attached, has long been mistaken with the politics of achievement, where true party labels are very rare.

Over 1702-1760 it is possible to consider politics by means of narratives constructed to describe the factors which accounted for particular ministerial changes,

e.g. 1710, 1720 and 1746. The three reigns are dealt with by means of narratives which are designed to illustrate the forces underlying politics in the period. Each reign has a basic introduction to it. The politics of William's reign has a different character from that of the three reigns which followed it. There were no such incidents; Leeds was dismissed long after his power had waned, while the Junto left office in a piece-meal manner. There were two fundamental reasons for this. The first was that during William's reign the interaction of the crown and the political nation led to the size of the executive being expanded at the price of the scope of the prerogative being contracted. The framework in which politics was conducted was thus fundamentally reshaped. The Revolution Settlement was achieved and other matters were allowed to rise to the head of the political agenda. The second reason was that William was qualitatively more involved with day-to-day politics than the other three were. He had the prerogative to defend whereas the constitutional state of affairs was essentially agreed upon in their reigns.²

Anne showed marked decisiveness in her long-term goals- the fighting of the war and then its termination. However, she was susceptible to being bullied and could be manipulated by a series of short-term manoeuvres which could add up to make a considerable alteration, e.g. the admission of the Junto to office in the late 1700s. The two Georges were happy to delegate most of the menial business of running domestic British politics. All three of the monarchs at times positioned themselves so that their political managers could force them into certain

limited actions which they themselves had no positive wish to undertake- the 1708 dismissal of Harley, the 1744 and 1746 ones of Granville and to a lesser extent the 1720 re-admission of the Townshend-Walpole group.

William used managers but his participation in politics was such that he was never placed so that he had to undertake such an action. Leeds, Sunderland and Jersey were each aware that that they were always politically expendable, whereas Godolphin came to have quite a different perception of his situation by 1710. William was a highly determined individual who had distinct goals in changing circumstances, therefore, he engaged in politics in a decidedly purposeful manner. An important point of difference between him and the other three, which underlines the difference in mentality, is that he was the only one of the four who did not acquire the throne by inheritance but rather did so through personal assertion, in the politics that followed the Revolution. The 1694 passage of the Triennial Act and the 1701 one of the Act of Settlement could be used as axiomatic incidents around which narratives could be constructed but such would overstress the court/country conflict at the expense of the whig/tory one. Therefore, in order to try to incorporate the two themes, a broadly linear approach has been adopted.

Proxies, divisions and protests are mentioned frequently. This is done not so much as to provide an overall statistical framework through which the period can be discussed but rather to give flavour to the immediate point of discussion by allowing it to be compared with those before and after. A high number of divisions or

highly attended divisions is usually a sign of politics being heated at that particular point. If the size of the majorities was small in a full House then the ministry or a party was having trouble controlling the House and if they were small on a smaller division or large on a big one then the ministry/party was not having difficulty. Proxies were a means by which an individual could still make his vote effective in the House without necessarily being present. There were a number of technicalities restricting their use. Protests were a means by which a peer could register his dissension in a matter. As with divisions their frequent occurrences was usually indicative of a keen political temperature. Copies of these appear to have been circulated to interested parties outside of the House.³

5.2. William III, 1689-1702.

William and Anne's reigns are the years which saw the establishment of the Revolution Settlement. This was made up initially of the Bill of Rights and then a series of legislative Acts which included legislation such as the Triennial Act of 1694 and the Regency Act of 1709. The Settlement's effect, which was not fully operative until after the accession of George I, was to limit the scope of the prerogative in a number of fields and to make the crown dependent upon a parliamentarily granted financial settlement at the commencement of each reign and thereafter annually with army and navy estimates.

The four most important items of the Settlement were the civil list, the Triennial Act, the Act of Settlement and the practice of annually passing the Mutiny Act. The first and last became established in William's reign while the middle two were enacted in it. Therefore, however unwilling he may have been in the process, William was very much the father of the Settlement. For a man who was a Stuart both by descent and by marriage this was rather extraordinary. William may not have liked paying the price but, in order to gain an extended executive, he paid it voluntarily.

The king's willingness to contract the crown's prerogative stemmed from his being allowed to expand its executive to a degree that parliament would have positively feared with either Charles II or James II. The expansion was what enabled him to fight the Nine Years' War with English resources and to start the preparations for what became the War of the Spanish Succession. He subordinated high regard of the prerogative to his mission

to resist the expansion of French influence in Western Europe. Through parliament, the political nation was willing to support this military effort because Louis XIV positively identified himself with the cause of the restoration of James II to the throne and if such occurred it would return the nation to the avenue of political development that it had sought to avoid with the Glorious Revolution. Although parliament had a similarity of interest with William it was a parallel one rather than an identical one. Therefore, while granting the king the means with which to fight wars which both they and he wanted, they built in safeguards which were designed to prevent any further Stuart attempts at aggrandizement of the crown through the prerogative.

The process by which the Settlement came into being was not a foregone conclusion in 1689. What has been described above is the overriding logic of the situation. To contemporaries this would have been evident in retrospect but not so beforehand. The degree to which the monarchy should be restrained ran a wide gamut of opinion. This range meant that although it was probably expected that some form of change would occur it was not certain how far this would go or even what areas of the prerogative and the executive it would effect.

The situation was complicated by the Tories having a variety of attitudes towards the monarchy because of who was on the throne. At the same time the Whigs, who had been proscribed by the last two monarchs, were now brought back into many of the places of political power, by the grace of another Stuart thus undermining the opposition to the prerogative that they had come to enjoy. There were to

be further complications through the mutable nature of political stances, the whigs being particularly susceptible to this.

There is a debate as to which was the dominant axis for the politics of the reign. Dennis Rubini used his 1968 book to argue for a court/country predominance. His efforts brought upon him hostile commentary.⁴ The majority of political historians who have considered the reign seem to have felt that a party axis dominated. The principal arena for contention was the interpretation of a series of Commons division lists. However, the arguments presented have not led Rubini to retract his views nor have they made him seem obtuse for not doing so. This thesis's attitude is that he struck upon a broad truth as to the character of the reign's politics but that he is over extending it with respect to the lists themselves.

Rubini's detractors have made two mistakes with the reign's most volatile elements, the general elections which dominated its second half. The first was to read them far too retrospectively and thus gave the 1690s too much of a party interpretation, to the exclusion of the rival axis. This is not to say that party did not exist in the early 1690s but rather that it should not be turned into a homogeneous factor in politics when its nature varied during the reign. The second error is to assume that politics in the Lords was in an immediate parallel with that in the Commons.

The prime example of these faults is Henry Horwitz's 1977 book. At a level of primary scholarship on almost any given topic the work is more informative than Rubini's.

However, it is limited in itself; firstly, by its essentially being a reaction to Rubini and secondly by its being principally a study of the politics of the Commons. Its concentration on part of the political elite to the exclusion of the localities and the press was noted. The court, the ministry and especially the Lords were given only the roles of supporting players. It was hardly surprising that the tome was duly criticized in its turn.⁵

The belief in the necessity of restraining the executive crossed the party confines. The whigs might contain the more enthusiastic supporters of the programme but the measures were not party legislation. Whigs were involved in opposition activity in the Upper House. This was mounted in large part by the first duke of Bolton and the second earl of Stamford. They were sometimes joined by various members of the tory party and acted not so much as a country party as an anti-court one. It is noteworthy that the duke was not among those who shared in the fruits of the party's later good fortune. The earl did come into government but not as the Junto's client, rather he did so as his own man in an operation to cover the Junto's departure.⁶ They were not to be ignored lightly since both were landowners in the far south-west of England, where there were a large number of parliamentary seats.⁷

The tories had enjoyed a monopoly of office from the end of the Exclusion Crisis until James II set about his remodelling. In 1689 the tories had a numerical advantage over the whigs in the Lords. However, a number of their more extreme members excluded themselves from sitting by refusing to swear the oaths, e.g. the second earl of

Clarendon, whereas many of the more extreme whigs were still in parliament. The tories found that although they were the larger party they had to share office with the whigs, who gained a disproportionate number of places through William having initially believed that the two parties were of a comparable size. The whigs were most strongly represented in the Household, although there were tories there too.⁸

At the opening of the period the tories were keenly divided by rivalries that had their roots in the previous two reigns. The success of the tories in supporting the Stuart monarchy, until the middle of James II's reign, had sown the seeds of a number of internecine quarrels. These the kings had exploited in order to retain their influence over the party, Charles II doing so especially since he was temperamentally inclined towards such behaviour.⁹ In addition, although some tories did suffer under James they had not had the prolonged persecution that the whigs had undergone, therefore, they had not come to have the same sense of solidarity that the experience had engendered in the other party. The whigs, with their electoral expertise learned from the first earl of Shaftesbury, were far more of a party in the organizational sense of the word than the tories, who were more of one in the less sophisticated basis of having shared attitudes.

At the reign's start the three most prominent tories in office were the northern secretary the second earl of Nottingham (the seventh earl of Winchilsea), the lord president (the first duke of Leeds) and the lord privy seal (the first marquis of Halifax). The last two were

bitter enemies.¹⁰ Nottingham was considerably younger than them and did not have their experience although it was he who was put into the burdensome office whereas theirs were fairly honorific. He was inexperienced in high office and therefore, in theory, was more likely to prove pliant than his two companions, who were available to the king's counsels. The three were dominant in the ministry but they certainly did not have a stranglehold on the offices of power nor on the tory party itself. Outside this group the most influential tory in the Lords, and possibly in the party, was the earl of Rochester.

William soon realized that the whig party was smaller than he had at first thought and that he had therefore given it a disproportionate amount of interest in relation to its size. Also, many of the party's leaders were more interested in resolving old political conflicts than in coping with the new problems of government. He called a general election in order to lessen the party's strength in the Commons. The election was successful in engineering its intended result. This led to an increased tory presence. Consequently, Leeds found himself propelled to the political forefront. His importance was initially promoted by his being by far the most skilled, and for it notorious, parliamentary manager. The essential pre-condition for his earlier achievement had been that a given parliament did not have a set time-limit on its life. Although he had been in the Lords since 1673 there were additional tools for use on the Commons through the wartime expansion of the executive.¹¹ However, lack of a time-limit acted to promote internal disharmony since it played down the place of party, there not being frequent

general elections to re-insert a grass roots element into the rarified atmosphere of St. Stephen's.

Additionally, the duke came to prominence through a number of possible rivals to himself opting not to serve at that time but rather to wait on events. William's favour was shown in his allowing the Treasury commission to be remodelled to make it more tory.¹² However, there was one notable exception to the new commission- the first earl of Godolphin, who disliked Leeds.¹³ Halifax decided that his own career would best be advanced by going into opposition and seeking to exploit any mistakes or any failures made by Leeds.¹⁴

With the commencement of the 1690 session it quickly became apparent that parliament was not prepared to risk a financially independent crown and that therefore it was not prepared to make a lifetime grant of the customs. The session as a whole was business-like. This was because the crown was willing to make some concessions in order to secure various measures that it sought. In this, the session was a condensed version of the constitutional developments of the reign. The purpose of the Regularization of Proceedings bill was to give the force of law to the proceedings and legislation of the Convention. The crown saw this as limiting its potential scope for political manoeuvre. Therefore, it opposed this development. However, it swiftly became evident that the support for the bill was too broad for it not to be accepted in some form or other. This was because there was an underlying threat that if it were not enacted the crown would not obtain its desires over other items such as financing the war.

During the session it became fully evident that the king did not wish to accept an Act which would guarantee the frequent elections of parliament. The court whig the duke of Shrewsbury resigned on April 28th as southern secretary. For him the achievement of further constitutional safeguards took priority over serving the crown and he had no desire for his wish to do the latter to lead to his being compromised in obtaining the former.¹⁵

The session saw the court tories and whigs cooperate with one another for the most part. The only possible, rather than clear, exception was a modification to an amendment to the Abjuration bill. The bill saw Halifax working with Leeds but towards the end of the session he was backed by some whigs in trying to exclude Leeds from the Act of Grace.¹⁶

During the summer of 1690 there was an engagement off Beachy Head in which Dutch ships bore the brunt of the losses. In order to assuage political opinion in the United Provinces, William attempted to make a scapegoat out of the English commanding officer, the earl of Torrington.¹⁷ A look at the protests reveals that the matter was actually fought along the lines of court and opposition, the whigs being far more heavily represented in the opposition at that time than the tories were.¹⁸ The acquittal of the earl by a court-martial (made up of officers whom he had mostly appointed in his official capacity) put Leeds under pressure and made him generally more susceptible to attack.

The duke's position was eased through the timely uncovering of the Preston Plot by his son the second duke.

This unsettled Halifax, Rochester and even some whigs. Therefore, Leeds survived the attack. The danger of a simplistic party analysis in these years is beautifully illustrated by this instance of a tory using the taint of Jacobitism as a defensive weapon against fellow tories who had recently been his ministerial colleagues.¹⁹

Leeds was careful to never allow himself to be tainted with Jacobitism. In May 1692, three months after the session had finished, the first duke of Marlborough was found to be in correspondence with James II. Whether Marlborough can be classified as a tory after the Revolution is questionable. He and the first duke of Buckingham were prominent in the group which existed around Anne, Godolphin being a strong sympathizer. The princess disliked the way Marlborough had been treated; although she did not raise a serious reversionary interest herself during the reign, there was always the possibility that she might do so. For the next two years she was disaffected rather than overtly hostile. Marlborough went into opposition while Buckingham's continued support of the ministry was decidedly equivocal.²⁰ The session was like its predecessor in not being innovative. The expanding tory opposition in the Lords was largely hostile to Leeds.²¹

During the summer of 1693 Nottingham became exposed politically through the losses the Turkey Fleet sustained from enemy action. He was clearly the patron of the admirals involved in the debacle, therefore in November he chose to resign rather than face the full wrath of parliament.²² The tory opposition in the Lords had grown

still larger and now contained a clear majority of the party's leading members in that House. The 1694 promotions indicated both the party's weakening position and the dividedness that had aided that weakening.

The tories had begun to slip badly by the middle 1690s, especially in comparison with the advances that the whigs had begun to make. The emergence of a single predominant group or individual within the tory party was restrained by the high number of self-regarding politicians who already existed in its courtier reaches. William was careful never to favour anyone or any group to the extent where they could establish such a predominance. Leeds was always kept on a tight rein. Like Sunderland later in the reign, the duke, even though he had not associated with James, had too odious a past of manipulating-parliament for Charles II for him to dare to seek to become pre-eminent (in spring 1692 William was not yet heeding Sunderland's proffered advice that he should take the Junto into the ministry).²³ The duke was by no means able to dictate the character of the ministry in the early 1690s, even when the beneficiaries of appointments were often tories.

The whig party had the good luck to have its misfortune early in the reign. Had William continued to support them throughout the early 1690s their subsequent rise might not have occurred. As it was, a number of opportune deaths among the older generation of surviving First Whigs and the catharsis that they underwent in the wake of the 1690 general election, without there being another one in sight, left the party leadership both free

to adapt and with a reason for doing so, if it were to have a realistic prospect of power.²⁴ In the Commons a generation of young whigs were able to develop a line of constructive whiggery. They decided that non-confrontational methods were the best means of advancement.

There were a number of whig peers who were not adversely affected by William's dislike of the more radical whigs in the earlier years, men who made up the whig party but also whose retained presence guarded the king from being subject to the tories. The first duke of Devonshire was the most noticeable of them but other leading ones were the sixth earl of Dorset, who was lord chamberlain, and the first earl of Bradford, who was both comptroller and treasurer of the Household. Men like these were great territorial magnates. The duke of Newcastle (1694) can be loosely appended to this group although he spent most of the early 1690s in a sulk over not being granted a dukedom. The first duke of Ancaster had been part of the Osborne-Bertie clan but with the political eclipse of Leeds the association faltered and he began to drift towards whiggery. The first viscount Lonsdale was a territorial magnate but he became particularly attached to the king. In comparison the earl of Tankerville (1695) was a magnate who became so attached for his own careerist motives.

There were other varieties of court whig. The first earls of Warrington and Macclesfield (1679) along with the third earl of Peterborough were radical whigs of the variety with whom William had become disenchanted. The last was successful in continuing as a personage at court

through the reign and right through to that of George II. The first baron Haversham, whom William expressly recruited, was probably the king's man rather than a member of any faction within the whig party. He was associated with Peterborough at junctures during the reign but failed to emulate the earl's subsequent success. The earl of Romney, who was the scion of a magnate family, fits loosely into this category but was ultimately in quite a separate group since he both held senior office and was a royal favourite. He was brother to the whig martyr lord Algernon Sydney.

These different elements within the whig party all went to play a part in William's use of the Junto (the marquis of Wharton, baron Somers, the earl of Orford (1697) and the earl of Halifax (1714)), illustrating that that group was not his only point of contact with the party. Prior to 1695 the court whigs did not perform quite the same role in the king's relations with the tories. William had been careful to construct a whiggish court party for himself in order to avoid becoming too dependent on the tories in the Upper House and to counter tory strength in the Commons. However, it was principally a court party. He did not recruit it exclusively from the whigs, the first earl of Jersey was a courtier of a tory hue. Indeed, William did not recruit them exclusively from English parties, he also had his continental creations, e.g. the first earls of Portland and Albemarle

A more homogeneous strand of the court party were inheritors of titles who were probably courtiers even if they never obtained a high profile- the eighteenth baron Fitzwalter, the twentieth earl of Oxford, the sixth earl

of Warwick, the sixth baron of Delawarr and the first earl of Strafford (1711). Oxford was poor but for his various court incomes, Warwick was considerably poorer than his predecessors but better off than his successor, Delawarr was certainly poorer than his Tudor predecessors had been, while Strafford was a careerist of the weakest tory hue. For such people party was very much a secondary feature, there being little overt party warfare in the Lords

On balance in the wake of the Triennial Act, these people tended to act more in common with the whigs than with the tories and many of the whigs in their turn behaved in a far more court manner. For those who were either ambitious or temperamentally inclined to serve the court, which was natural for peers as the crown's 'natural counsellors', the whigs had shown themselves to be capable of acting as the crown's servants. A prime illustration of this was the way in which the second viscount Townshend became a whig even though he had initially been principally associated with the tories.

It became clear that the whigs were more whole-heartedly in favour of the war than the tories and that the mass of their party had a stance where they were willing to participate in constructive government. The Million Loan bill of December 1692 was the child of Charles Montagu.²⁵ It met with no opposition in the Lords. It had been the whigs who had been principally responsible for the early Revolution Settlement's enactment. Some tories shared this conviction while still others saw the potential for resisting the growth of whigs in office by underlining for the crown the incongruity of whigs being

in government. The Loan bill was followed in the session by a Place one. The purpose of this item was to prohibit certain categories of crown officer from sitting in the Commons, thereby making it harder for the crown to recreate the conditions of Charles II's high Danby era which would have been perfectly possible in view of the expansion of the executive. The bill passed the Commons. The crown was able to use the House of Lords as a fail safe, a means of preventing the enactment a measure which it did not want.²⁶

The politics of the 1693-1694 session revolved around the Triennial Act and the Place bill. Both items passed both Houses, the divisions in the Lords passed the one hundred mark for the first time in the period, an indication of the fierceness with which the court fought its rearguard action. On January 25th William finally accepted an amended Triennial bill. With the Place bill he acted as his own fail safe, using the royal veto to stop the bill. Along with the Place bill William lost two supply bills. However, later in the session the Tonnage bill was passed. This was intended to raise a loan of £1.2 million.²⁷ The threat that underpinned the concerted drive for limiting the prerogative came into operation, even if it was only partial.

The 1694-1695 session contained the first State of the nation debate of the period that ended in a division in the Lords. The Caroline tories Nottingham, Rochester and Halifax were joined by Torrington in venting their spleen at the king.²⁸ The session ended with attacks for corrupt practices against both Buckingham and Leeds, the latter being saved by William proroguing parliament. After

this Leeds was very much a spent force since he could no longer manipulate the Commons in the way that he had been able to do earlier. Shrewsbury and Sunderland were given the dissolution that they had been seeking from William and which would produce a more whiggish Commons.²⁹

However, William was temperamentally disinclined to have a minister forced out unless he wished that the man go, so Leeds remained in office. William's aversion to being dominated by either party seems to have been slipping in parallel with the whigs slipping towards becoming a court party. The tories who remained were either dead wood or were politically peripheral to the ministry.

In the wake of queen Mary's death in December 1694 William's relations with Anne improved. Despite this, William preferred to appoint lord justices rather than leave her as regent: the reconciliation had been rather recent and she was close to Marlborough, who was still in disgrace. Whereas previously the council appointed to advise queen Mary during William period's overseas had been markedly tory the lords regent were all whigs with the exception of Godolphin. He had the experience of being summoned only occasionally to their regular meetings. In addition, the previous year Sunderland had allowed him to be subjected by the Junto to questions on his use of Customs and Excise patronage. This might have been a matter on which he could have defended himself reasonably as his abuse of office was remarkable in its moderation but he was unable to appeal to either the broader party or the Carolines since he was no longer closely identified with either. Much of Godolphin's political standing in William's reign came not from himself but rather his being

Sunderland's pawn. That he was no longer a mainstream court tory was to have repercussions after 1702.³⁰

The First Whigs had initially been a court party that had gone on to take much of its strength from the country party that had preceded it.³¹ Therefore, there were always internal tensions inherent in the party's post-1689 composition. There was a paradox in that success brought out dissent within the party. The less party orientated the party leadership had appeared, the more power they had been admitted to; the group were happy with the Revolution Settlement, but that did not mean that those whose support they exploited were necessarily also satisfied with the subsequent state of affairs. The 1695 general election did not make the Commons become a whig House but rather the party's proportion of the seats there increased.³²

A group, centring on the Marcher families of Harley and Foley, appeared disillusioned with the increasingly court character of the party, after its firm country stance during its proscription less than a decade before.³³ To what extent the group was articulating genuine country sentiments and to what extent they were using it as the time-honoured ploy for self-advancement is not delineable. It is quite possible that the group's politics were not of a homogeneous character and that attitudes towards the court varied within it at different points in time.

The Junto and their allies found it increasingly hard to control the mass of their colleagues in the Commons. The war was beginning to wind down, therefore, many in the Lower House felt that there was no longer quite the same imperative to maintain party discipline so that many of

the beliefs that had been put into suspension in the early 1690s re-emerged.

Country values were not the exclusive preserve of the whigs. Therefore, there was a country wing to the tory party. In addition, court tories found the stance a useful engine for opposition. The coalition between the disconsolate country whigs and a large proportion of the tory party was felt primarily in the Commons. Its presence in the Lords was disproportionately through the tories there, the whigs there not seeing it to be to their advantage.

In the 1695-1696 session Rochester found political capital through cooperation with those whigs who were dissatisfied with the changes in their own party, there being as yet but a nascent country party and a long-term whig opposition in the Lords which had not tasted the fruits of its own party's recent success.³⁴ Something was needed that would re-emphasize shared common characteristics and thus persuade the party to follow collectively the leadership's line. As with Leeds and the Preston Plot, a very timely conspiracy turned up-Fenwick's. The Plot was discovered on February 14th 1696. The Northumbrian knight had been making plans for an assassination attempt on king William. The Junto seized upon it as a device, using it both to attack the tories and to maintain whig party discipline.³⁵

The Junto and the whigs sought to exploit it by creating the Association which was a document to be signed as an indication that an individual abhorred the plot. It held up to William the dangers of Jacobitism in terms of the English domestic threat more clearly than he had

hitherto had instance of. However, despite this, on the December 18th vote there was a defection by many of the whig party's court members. These were accompanied by the amenable court tories such as the second duke of Ormond, the eighth earl of Pembroke and Godolphin. It was seen as noteworthy that the likes of Bradford, the third earl of Peterborough and prince George of Denmark did not go over with them.³⁶ The effect of the switch was to show that there were clear limits on the group in that there were points beyond which the court element within their support would assert itself.³⁷

The forces of country opposition that the plot's discovery had ameliorated did not go into decline and broke out anew the following session. The Qualifications bill was principally a product of a tory reaction to the election. The party rank and file in the Commons felt that many of those who had been elected were not of sufficient means to be independent in their voting because the bestowal of a place or a pension would make a very considerable alteration to their income. The item had its roots in old suspicions as to the whigs but was probably in large part a child of the growth of the executive and the riches that were to be made from it; it echoed pre-Exclusion Crisis suspicions of the court.³⁸ That it was not altogether a party measure and the recentness of the whig admission to power probably accounts for its successful passage through the Lords. William had to use his veto to stop the measure.³⁹

The limited ability of the whigs in ministry to secure office was illustrated by the nature of those that

they did secure in these years. The lord lieutenancy of Devon which was given to Stamford was one of two taken from the first earl of Bath (1661), the Granville group having been peripheralized from the body of the tory party.⁴⁰ Leeds was now in a similarly outlying position. His being allowed to drift on as lord president was in part to allay tory arguments as to the king being surrounded by whigs, however, his lack of influence was illustrated by the humiliation of his kinsman the first earl of Abingdon, whose offices both as lord lieutenant of Oxfordshire and as a chief justice in eyre were taken from him and given to the Junto member Wharton; it was hardly the secretaryship that he had long aspired to.

As high political predators, the whigs were able to pick off the stragglers from the tory party but they were not allowed to make any serious inroads that might have threatened the body mass of the herd. William made a clear statement that it was with the crown that power lay by selecting from the peerage the toryish courtiers -Pembroke and the first earl of Jersey- as two of the joint plenipotentiaries to treat at Ryswick.

The factor that the Junto saw as imperilling their own political survival was the second earl of Sunderland. The earl had come to act as a political adviser to William and as such was not possessed of a personal party bias. He had been instrumental in the the group's ascent, however, just as he was prepared to help the Junto so he was ready to help any group that could provide control of the Commons for the king. By such behaviour he prolonged his own political usefulness to the crown and therefore his own political survival. This was not to say that he was

positively working for their dismissal but rather that he had the worrying habit of keeping his options open.⁴¹

William's attitude towards the country party had been ambivalent, he had no particular cause to have a high opinion of his English courtiers. Sunderland investigated the potential of the crown having a cooperative relationship with the alliance and came back with some positive responses. This is demonstrated by the way in which the king was happy to acquiesce to the land bank scheme in the hope of unlocking further capital to finance the executive.⁴²

In October 1696 Sunderland had secured the place of first commissioner of the Treasury for Charles Montagu by using the Fenwick Plot as a means of tricking Godolphin out of the office. This he did by saying that a voluntary resignation would be a means for the king to show his confidence in the man by reconferring the post upon him; the king did not do so. While the Junto had been glad that one of their members now had the office, the incident had underlined just how dangerous Sunderland could be.⁴³

Fortunately for the group's needs the earl was also a bogey figure for the tories. However, as events were to show, he was not the only royal servant to possess such a place in the tory/country demonology. Early in the 1697-1698 session an attack was mounted by the tories on Sunderland as the supposed author of the King's Speech. The Junto made it clear to William that they were not prepared to make any effort to defend the man. This refusal meant that the earl's position was hopeless, therefore, he resigned as lord chamberlain and withdrew into political retirement (for the time being).

However, the attack was only part of a campaign which included the Junto as its next targets. It is probable that Sunderland then helped steer the onslaught on towards Montagu. Whatever the exact circumstances, the Junto man responded to the development by attacking Charles Duncombe on similar grounds to the charges against Montagu, Duncombe being an associate of Sunderland. In this Montagu was backed by the mass of the party and by Anne's associates, while Nottingham, Leeds, Rochester and Peterborough successfully defended Duncombe. Again there were defections which indicate that the Junto's assault was not court-sanctioned. Bolton and Dorset were both with the tories. The question of fining those French merchants who had remained in London was a further instance of court whigs breaking off from the body of the party when its behaviour became too partisan. Devonshire, Stamford and Haversham all felt driven to sign a subsequent protest.⁴⁴

The Junto seem to have decided that there was no advantage to be had from their trying to raise a political controversy. Thereafter, there was quiet until the summer of 1699 when William refused to dismiss the tory admiral Sir George Rooke at Orford's (1697) request, so the earl resigned. The rest of the Junto remained in office not wishing to provoke the king further. Romney, as first lord of the Bedchamber, accompanied William to the continent, rather than Portland who had been becoming increasingly withdrawn from the court; Jersey was made a secretary, he was the ally of the new principal royal favourite Albemarle; Leeds was ousted in order that his place might be given to Pembroke, whose own was given to Lonsdale. Stamford and the second baron Lexington were brought into

junior positions. William was not faced with a straight choice of either the Junto or the tories. He was able to construct a less party-orientated ministry than that which had come to exist. The changes made the ministry more court and less party in character.

The government did not seek to engage in a positive line of policy. During the 1699-1700 session the country-/tory alliance attacked Somers over the questions of his fee-farms and the privateer William Kidd. The pre-court whigs defended the baron;⁴⁵ solidarity in defence was the norm, whereas there was no guarantee of it in attack. In the Commons, the opposition sought to exploit the need for supply in order to further its desire for grant resumptons. The Resumption bill was tacked to the Land Tax. Even Charles Montagu voted for the measure.⁴⁶ The Commons showed how determined its members were over the matter by killing a bill designed to facilitate a Union of England and Scotland, an item which William desired. The court then reversed its stance which it had defended by having the Lords stand on their privileges in the matter. Albemarle, Jersey and Romney were prominent in executing the re-adjustment.⁴⁷ In early 1700 Albemarle, Sunderland and the Villiers concurred with the tories to try to influence the king towards changing the character of the ministry. In May Somers was dismissed and Shrewsbury decided to resign.⁴⁸

It was noticed that Robert Harley and Rochester were growing friendly and the commoner was shortly to continue in the time-honoured careerist metamorphosis from country to court.⁴⁹ While there were points of difference between him and the Junto there were also strong similarities. He

shared their whig background, once the Revolution Settlement was established the group became positive crown servants, whereas he had clung to the country position coming in when they were undergoing attack for having done the same. These parallel paths went through the same terrain rather than through different landscapes. Robert Harley turned into a full courtier only after the Act of Settlement whereas they had been prepared to come in earlier. For the time being politics was drifting. Neither the court nor the whigs sought to engage in any line of action unless goaded into it.

Two deaths changed this state of affairs. On July 30th 1700 the duke of Gloucester died. He was Anne's last surviving child and it was generally agreed that she was not going to bear any more; therefore, the Succession question was opened up. If the Old Pretender was excluded the next claimants were catholic members of the French royal House of Bourbon. Therefore, the succession needed to be settled for when both William and Anne were dead, catholics having been excluded by the Bill of Rights.⁵⁰

The autumn general election saw substantial tory gains. However, international events soon undermined the result. On October 21st Carlos II of Spain also died. He willed his crown to Louis XIV's grandson the duke of Anjou. William was soon convinced that it would be necessary to go to war. However, the duke's acceptance of the crown in itself did not precipitate the War of the Spanish Succession. It took a series of incidents to convince English domestic political opinion as to the conflict's necessity. Louis provided these, for reasons

that are not clear. The duke's potential claim to the French throne was underlined in the parlement of Paris; the Barrier fortresses between the Spanish Netherlands and the United Provinces were surprised and occupied by French troops; it became apparent that French would enjoy a privileged status in relation to trade with Spain and the Spanish colonies which the English would not be accorded.⁵¹

In November and December 1700 a ministerial reshuffle took place. Harley was in large part responsible for these appointments, exacting it as the price for his cooperating in securing the Succession for the Lutheran House of Hanover, who had the next best claim and were seasoned members of the anti-French alliance. The more ardent tories did not profit from the Junto's decline, rather the court continued with a set of ministers who drew only partially on the pool of possible talent, although the set did have a tory bent.⁵²

On February 12th 1701 the King's Speech was delivered to the Lords. Peterborough and Haversham were maverick Williamite whigs, they used the Speech as an opportunity to draw notice to the recent actions by France. The Carolines Rochester, Buckingham and Nottingham were pacific in their sentiments, however, the following day a bellicose Address was passed by the House. The tories, in an act of decidedly bad judgement in view of William's attitudes on the matter, undermined this by having the House seek the Commons's concurrence on the matter, which was not obtained in view of the character of the Lower House.⁵³ The court was divided and it was improbable that William's sympathies were with either the tories or the

country party.

Public opinion had yet to be convinced of the necessity of war, therefore, it was possible for anti-court sentiment to be expressed in the actions of the Commons. The tories and the country whigs sought to exercise their resentment of the government's policies over the previous years by trying to impeach those whom it held to be responsible. Portland was clearly out of favour with William and therefore vulnerable. On March 29th 1701 the Commons found him guilty of a high crime and misdemeanour for his part in the negotiation of the Second Partition treaty. As the result of the earl's evidence Orford (1697), Halifax (1714) and Somers were impeached for knowledge of the same item on April 14th.⁵⁴

It was improbable that William would tolerate the impeachments succeeding; just as the Junto had lost by his high view of the crown so they now benefitted by it. However, there were grounds for worry perhaps caused by William taking his time to come out in their favour. Peterborough, Ancaster, Lexington, the first earl of Cholmondley, the duke of Kent, the second earl of Warrington and the ninth Derby all signed one or more of the protests relating to the treaty and the Impeachments between March 15th and June 17th (although it should be appreciated that none of them participated in systematic signing in the way that the tory protestors did). They were courtiers but all but the last can be classed as whigs.⁵⁵ The Junto might not be disliked as much as the country party but that did not mean that their court colleagues, even if whig, had to have a positive liking of the group.

The Junto's cause was backed in the Lords because the group were of use to William. The House postponed consideration of the Land Tax and Haversham infuriated the Lower House by clearly remarking on the partisan nature of the impeachments. The impeachments did not survive the cross-fire.⁵⁶ The supply bills were subsequently passed by the Upper House. The Lords were still capable of challenging the Commons' supremacy in financial matters if sufficiently antagonized into doing so.

The Act of Settlement was backed in the Commons by the country party because it contained further restrictions on the prerogative and in the Lords by the court party because it determined the matter as the crown wished. The bill passed the Lords without amendment. Had the duke of Gloucester not died then then this extension of the Settlement would not have occurred at this juncture, if at all. The Junto had felt no desire to push it further. Whether the court/country conflict would have died down as much as it was to do without the Act of Settlement passing into law is both an open and unanswerable question.

Two decisions affecting senior positions show that William was seeking to keep his own options open as to its disposal in view of what he decided to do with the ministry. In June 1701 the court whig Tankerville (1695) died and his office of lord privy seal was put into commission. During the same summer Marlborough was appointed general of the forces being sent to the Low Countries. The duke was neither the Junto's man or associated with the country opposition.⁵⁷

William felt that a parliament that had tried to

impeach former ministers of his for executing his foreign policy was not the best one that he could have for financing English involvement in another major European war. He ordered a dissolution, although the matter was only carried by three votes in the Privy Council. Among those who voted against it were the court tories Jersey, Godolphin and Pembroke, who had all been antagonized by the realization that it was the whigs who would benefit from these changes.⁵⁸ This does not mean that it was tory party solidarity that was being expressed. It is more likely to have signified their dislike of the re-advancement of the whigs that would follow.

The 1701 general election saw the tory gains reversed without there being a reaction in the whigs' favour.⁵⁹ Before the parliament met the ministry was again re-organized. The tories Rochester and Sir Charles Hedges were both dismissed from senior office. To make matters worse for the tories, Jersey and Albemarle had fallen out, so that the former's position was precarious.⁶⁰ In September 1701 Louis XIV recognized the Old Pretender as James III. The court was determined and the necessity of war was generally accepted, therefore, there was little domestic political activity in England. On March 8th William III died from a chill caught while recuperating from a bad fall from a horse.

Politics during the reign of William was fluid with the existence of a natural majority for the court in the Lords. It is a reasonable assumption that party was the primary political identification with parliament. However, it was not the principal framework through which politics

was conducted in the Lords. Rather, in the Upper House, politics took place along a court/country axis, the latter consisting principally of displaced courtiers. The politics of party flowed over the static presence of a determined and self-aware court. The day-to-day practice of politics could be acrimonious because of the endemic internecine rivalries that senior politicians were prone to.

The cutting back in the size of the army after Ryswick was very much against William's wishes. However, after nearly a decade of personal involvement in English politics he must have been fully aware that such would happen with the arrival of peace. Realism at the prospect of frustration must have underlain William's fury at its advent. William III found his will positively contravened over the crown grants in parliament. However, this opposition stemmed from the Commons. When the matter was in the House it was not a clear party matter. The Upper Chamber was as a whole prepared to do as William wished even if it could act cantankerously in the short-term.

The concessions that William made as to the prerogative meant that the crown was able to engage in prolonged land warfare on the continent on a scale that none of his Stuart predecessors had been able to seriously contemplate. William might lose the occasional minor political battle but he was able to wage real war. The political conflicts were lost on territory that he knew he had already ceded and they were lost in the Commons not in the Lords.

5.3. Anne, 1702-1714.

The analysis of this reign opens with a consideration of the way in which it has been treated by political historians. Its narrative splits in two portions- the duumvir years of 1702-1710 and the Oxford ministry of 1710-1714. The former consists of a series of interrelated treatments of various aspects of high politics. The first deals with the issue of Occasional Conformity and its effect on both the Tories and the strong position that party members initially had in the ministry. This thesis believes that the issue was not just one that divided Marlborough and Godolphin from the body of the party but was one which demonstrated that its courtier sections were only connected with its rank and file for purposes of political manoeuvre. The High Church party's actions may have had an ideological aspect to their conduct but they were principally seeking the measure's enactment for its political consequences. This divergence has been underplayed previously.

The next section deals with the other issues where there was ministry/opposition confrontation during the duumvir years. These are familiar to political historians but they can bear retelling. This is first because of the section's overall structural solidarity and because the behaviour of a number of individuals can be fitted into patterns which occurred on a broader canvas. The third section is a description of the nature of the ministry's support base and of how it changed in character prior to Harley's 1708 dismissal. This shows that Anne's supposed initial pro-Toryness was not just a partisan preference. It was tempered by a dislike of associates of her late

brother-in-law, a group which included a number of tories. Those Williamites who were excluded by her were largely associates of Marlborough, a sub-group which consisted mostly of whigs. The fourth group discusses the internal state of the whig party and shows that, as in William's reign, there were other parts of the party besides the Junto who were capable of providing the crown with servants.

The final section of the duumvir years builds on the previous ones to show how Harley was able to offer Anne the prospect of an alternative ministry and then put the blue-print into execution. This coup has been painted as the ousting of a, by then, predominantly whig ministry and it being replaced by a tory. Such is wrong. The duumvirs always remained the ministers who controlled both government policy and government actions, and they were courtiers. Their use of the whigs was as a support, not as partners. Oxford gathered together those whigs who either had not been drawn into the ministry or who had been but had subsequently become disenchanted with it. The tories were happy to comply with his plans since they meant both the ousting of the duumvir ministry and the ending of the war. The new ministry was like its predecessor in being court in character. Its nature was underlined both by the Junto being prepared to adjust to the situation and seeing what they might be able to salvage from it and by the duuvirs being its principal enemies for the first two years of its existence.

The four years of the Oxford ministry are dealt with in straight chronological order. The ministry had a dilemma in having to be court in character in order to

retain Anne's approval but having a Commons support base which was heartily country/tory. The ministry was an escape option for the queen, allowing her to slip the grasp of its predecessor. However, once at liberty it proved not to be an end in itself. She tolerated it for four years first because it provided her with a service and then because she could see no prospect of any new ministry that would suit her any better.

This reign has a well developed historiography. The most prominent of the monographs upon it is Geoffrey Holmes's "British Politics in the Age of Anne." This tome's high standing among political historians of the period tends to rather shade other works written on the reign; Edward Gregg's "Queen Anne" deserves appreciation as a solid book in its own right, even if the chapters on William's reign are somewhat shaky. However, despite Holmes's 1987 revision "British Politics" is very much a piece of work rooted in the scholarship of the 1960s. Both his initial research on electoral influence in the reign of Anne and his association with Bill Speck have left a legacy which revision did little to alter. The reign is too cut off from its predecessor and therefore certain forces are not given their due weight.

Two examples of this concern peers. The first earl of Jersey emerges as an "independent" and "undeviating" tory. This rather ignores the fact that in the previous reign he was principally a Williamite courtier. Such is not incompatible with his stance in Anne's reign, however, to fail to mention that the earl had previously had a different political character from the one which Holmes

seeks to project, one which does not allow him to be viewed properly. To say that Jersey was independent may be technically correct but it is rather misleading. His branch of the Villiers owned land in Kent but they were hardly in the class of the Sackvilles or the Sydneys in terms of estates in the county. The family's principal income was court derived, it was this factor which was to lead the second earl to become a supporter of the Supremacy.⁶¹ The second earl of Stamford is a figure whose career gives insight into the reign's politics but whom Holmes feels fit to give only two limited mentions.⁶²

When Holmes deals with the peerage in chapter twelve his treatment is somewhat Junto-centric, drawing on the influential but unpublished D.Phil. of Edward Ellis on the group. The importance of that group is not to be denied but there were other political forces operative within the whig party, the most notable of which will be discussed below. Holmes's interest in organization and in conflict, the foreground of politics, prevents him from taking full notice of the framework in which it occurred. This thesis seeks to make a case both for additional rather than alternative emphases and that it is omissions that have been made rather than outright errors. The 1967 work could have best been revisited by a series of complementary essays rather than by a revision. "British Politics" should not be belittled but it could still be improved. Party's place is not to be lessened but it can not be understood in isolation.

The story of the High Church party's fall and the Junto's rise during the Marlborough-Godolphin ministry is well known to the political historians. However, the tale

can bear retelling without much new material having come to light. This is because the previous perspective has always been from a position where inter-party conflict was what gave the matter its principal interest. This thesis hopes to insert further insight into the politics of the reign by showing the limitations of the inter-party conflict. These limitations have not been duly appreciated since there has previously been a general underplaying of the continued strength of the crown.

At her accession Anne favoured the tories markedly. Political historians have not previously considered either the displaced courtiers or contemplated whether they left a mark on the reign's politics. They have largely been categorized as Junto fodder yet the group only ever enjoyed fully harmonious relations with the court whigs over 1708-1710. The court whigs played an important part in Oxford's initial calculations as to the viability of a transparty ministry. The other side of William's court legacy was that a number of whigs were continued. Their survival has a bearing on the reign; Oxford's initial dismissal of whig lord lieutenants, Bradford and Devonshire, was not to do with their party allegiance but rather with their association with the duumvirs.

During William's reign Anne had, for the most part, remained on the political sidelines. On her accession it soon became evident that those who had been close to her were going to receive the highest offices, Marlborough being continued as captain-general. In terms of the distribution of office Anne opted primarily to follow her Stuart liking for the tories. However, the queen committed

herself to the necessity of engaging in a European war. Her desire that it be waged was stronger than that of many Tories. Therefore, Anne found herself in a situation of potential conflict with the party.

At Anne's accession Rochester had engaged in a short power struggle with Marlborough which the former lost. His acceptance of the lord lieutenancy of Ireland was a rather dubious consolation prize.⁶³ He and Sir Edward Seymour 5th.Bt.were the figures with the most influence over the mass of the party.⁶⁴ Both had spent the majority of William's reign if not in outright opposition then in a non-supportive attitude. Therefore, they were not temperamentally well equipped to lead the party into constructive support of the government and of the war. The Tories had the misfortune of not having been through a metamorphosis like that of the Whigs in the early and mid-1690s.

It was not a good sign for the party in their relations with Anne when a number of its more prominent members began to look for engines to attack the Whigs with as a means of making political capital in high politics in the hopes of gaining benefits at the grass roots level which in turn could be used on the upper plane. The Commons party was susceptible as a result of the recent spate of general elections and the passage of the Act of Settlement. An Occasional Conformity bill was promoted in the 1702-1703 session.⁶⁵ The campaign was aimed at the Whigs' supposed electoral prop- the votes garnered from Protestant dissenters. It became very much a party issue although it was not without its court subtext in that James II had tried to use Protestant dissent for political

ends and he was no whig.⁶⁶ Because the accession general election's result had seen a distinct swing to the tories the bill passed easily through the Commons.

Anne was initially prepared to support the measure.⁶⁷ In the House of Lords, at least, the whigs had an advantage in that it was the tories who had adopted a party stance and not themselves. Through death, tergiversation and creation the whigs had drawn close to a numerical equality with the tory party in the Lords since 1689. The difficulties of a number of tory Williamite peers are illustrated by the way in which Strafford (1711) changed sides on December 4th.⁶⁸ Even though he changed in favour of the bill his initial uncertainty points towards a factor that was occurrent in the the early 1700s. People who regarded themselves principally as courtiers did not wish to act as partisan party men. This addition to the whigs and the non-gain to the tories through abstentions were enough to defeat Occasional Conformity in the Lords.⁶⁹

The Occasional Conformity bill re-appeared at the start of the next session. The queen indicated her displeasure at the measure by having her husband prince George of Denmark absent himself from the proceedings on it. Court tories such as Pembroke and the first earl Ferrers felt able to speak out against the measure.⁷⁰ In the session after that Occasional Conformity was again re-introduced. The lack of court sympathizers led the tories to try to force the measure through by tacking it to the Land Tax. The Tack was defeated in the Commons after vigorous canvassing by Harley.⁷¹ The bill did not make a fourth appearance in the succeeding session.

The High Church party had created conditions in which the whigs could progress politically. The whigs advanced because they were prepared to do what the crown wanted—they behaved principally as crown servants and acted as party men only when goaded into doing so by tory attacks. By the time the tories had desisted from the issue the whigs had developed a momentum which they were able to maintain through a mixture of luck, skill and discipline.

In the 1702-1703 session the Prince of Denmark bill was to provide a fitting financial settlement for the possible circumstance of prince George outliving the queen. Initially, the bill included a clause to exempt him from a xenophobic provision of the Act of Settlement. The provision barred any naturalized foreigner from sitting in either the Privy Council or parliament after Anne's death. This could have been taken to include the continental favourites whom William III had created.⁷² The whig third earl of Sunderland led an opposition to this and the measure was passed only after the judges had given their opinion that those peers would not be barred by the Act of Settlement.⁷³ The Qualifications bill provided some contention (although not to the same degree) since it too strayed on to the subject of M.P.s who were born foreigners.

On these measures the main body of the whigs had their way. However, the last induced a protest signed by tories and courtiers of the Cholmondley-Ancaster variety, Townshend being among the signatories.⁷⁴ These people were to become more whig with the reign's progression. In December 1703, in the following session, the Lords

committee for investigating a Scottish Conspiracy was selected by ballot. It was composed almost exclusively of whigs, Townshend's membership of it was one of the first clear indicators of his alignment to the party.⁷⁵

In the 1704-1705 session the tories appeared to have a legislative success in passing the Alien Act. This was a response to the Scottish parliament's Security Act. The two parties' behaviour over this issue convinced Godolphin as to the necessity of securing the whigs' support for the ministry so that its war efforts might be properly backed. However, the Junto had engineered the item both to bring this response and to try to promote a Union of the kingdoms. The latter held the prospects for the group both of allowing greater political stability to come into being and of manipulating the susceptible Scottish political system for their own ends.⁷⁶

The Protestant Succession dominated the 1705-1706 session, although not with the same intensity as Occasional Conformity had the previous ones. The Act of Settlement arranged for the passage of the crown from one descendant of James I to another without providing any machinery for a provisional government in the event of the recipient being out of the country since Anne would not tolerate her heir-apparent being in the country while she herself was still alive. Any hopes that the Carolines Nottingham, Rochester and Buckingham may have had of making political capital out of the situation were stymied by Wharton and Somers bringing in a thoroughly prepared Regency bill which passed into law.⁷⁷

The whigs repealed the previous session's Alien Act, which in turn enabled the Scots to repeal their Security

Act without losing face. Godolphin was re-affirmed in his belief that further bestowals of office on the whigs were necessary if the war was to be properly managed. His attitude was reflected by the composition of the Union commissioners. Only tories in senior office were included whereas all the Junto were, although none of them had yet held a senior office in the reign.⁷⁸

The Union bill dominated the 1706-1707 session, becoming law on March 8th, the Union coming into being during the subsequent prorogation. The opening of the following session found clauses in the Regency and Union Acts being used by the whigs, in conjunction with the help of many of the Scots, to expel a number of tory office-holders.⁷⁹ The Junto then tried to embarrass the duumvirs and thereby make them more tractable to their own wishes by making an issue out of shipping losses. In this they received the cooperation of Rochester and Nottingham who, for their own ends, were also intent on embarrassing the ministry. When it became clear that the tories were seeking to exploit the matter as far as they could, the Junto allowed Godolphin to call for an investigating committee to be appointed.⁸⁰ Those whigs who had resisted the measure bound themselves to help the ministry in resisting any further unreasonable demands by the Junto.

In December 1707 the tory opposition sought to make capital out of Peterborough's removal from the Spanish theatre.⁸¹ The attack developed its own momentum so that the tactical error of assaulting Marlborough's conduct of the war in the Low Countries was made. Since the situation in the Low Countries was by no means comparable to the disorder that Peterborough had left in Spain, this allowed

the whigs to turn the situation over on itself and to have passed a motion that there should be 'No Peace without Spain.'⁸²

The Junto continued its general alliance with the tory opposition. The leading ministerialists found themselves in a minority on the unimportant technical issue of the timing of the dissolution of the Scottish Privy Council. The overall character of politics was quiet in these years, at least in comparison with Occasional Conformity and what was to follow. Therefore, the Junto felt able to toy with the ministry, which probably would not have happened in more stressed times.

Scottish matters were still contentious in the following session. The Scots had been expected to be receptive to the March 1709 Union Improvement bill since it was designed to strengthen the state of the Scottish law in that field by bringing it into line with current English treason law. It was thought this would act to disincline people to Jacobite activity. However, the Scots decided to take a nationalistic reverence for the separate character of their legal system (as guaranteed by the Act of Union) and to view the bill as an attempted intrusion upon it. However, the turn-outs were not high, therefore, the matter was not closely fought. A protest followed which was signed by Scots, tories and Williamite whigs of the like of Peterborough, Warrington and the first earl of Scarbrough.⁸³

The session's other high division was on the bill for the Naturalization of Foreign Protestants. The principal cause of the contentiousness was the use of the sacrament in the naturalization process. This gave the parties an

opportunity to vary on their religious fronts. Wharton's attempt to use the measure in order to benefit English dissenters found only limited support from his own party.⁸⁴ The whigs were an anglican party who were on the whole more tolerant of protestant dissent than the tories, but they had no party desire for such dissent to be encouraged. William had found the same to be true in March 1690, as was the first earl Stanhope to do so subsequently.⁸⁵

Scottish Treason and Naturalization had shown that the whigs had a limited ability to secure original legislation for which there was no pressing governmental need. If they displayed excessive zeal so as to go beyond their brief or sought to work outside of it, then, they could not expect to be as effective as when they were acting as the government's servants. This was because they could then only expect the support of those whose allegiance was primarily to the party rather than to the court. These two matters and the general tone of the politics at the time were not sufficiently grave for the more courtish whigs to adhere to the party in matters which were non-governmental. By the same score the government was exposed to the group's manoeuverings because they were performed on matters which were not of central importance to the government.

At Anne's accession most of the king's late servants were put to one side. Devonshire owed his continuation as lord steward in large part to his having supported Marlborough when that duke was imprisoned in William's reign. The same factor meant that Bradford was continued

as treasurer of the Household although his coffership was given to Seymour.⁸⁶ The sixth duke of Somerset was transferred from being lord president to become master of the Horse after Shrewsbury had refused it. Somerset stood on his own merits rather than through his connection with Marlborough: relations between the dukes were not bad prior to 1708. Peterborough was another Williamite with a Marlborough connection. However, his appears to have been principally with the duchess rather than her husband.⁸⁷

The problems that other associates of William could face are illustrated by the fate of the tory second baron Lexington. He had resigned as Anne's master of the Horse to become a Bedchamber lord to the king in 1692. In 1702, despite his being a tory, he was deprived of his place as a lord of Trade and had to wait until 1712 when again he served in office. He was then forwarded by his being one of the few tories who was a seasoned diplomat and there being the need for such for the negotiations at Utrecht. Lexington's problems were accentuated by his conduct in 1692 but they seem to have had a similarity with those of other tories who had been closely associated with William.⁸⁸ To be favoured by one monarch gave no guarantee of being favoured by the next.

It is to be considered that the Williamite Jersey was not promoted to be lord chamberlain at Anne's accession but rather was continued in the office, William having conferred the place on him in 1700. Additionally, in 1702 the earl underwent a diminution in his standing by his heir-apparent's tellership of the Exchequer being taken away in order that it might be bestowed upon Sir Christopher Musgrave 4th.Bt.. Even though compensation was

made the alteration showed that the earl's standing had been lessened. It can even be argued whether Jersey would have been continued in 1702 had he not quarrelled with Albemarle during the winter of 1701-1702. The quarrel must have damaged his standing with William and therefore it may well have raised Anne's estimation of him. It is noteworthy that Ormond, who became lord lieutenant of Ireland in 1703, had quarrelled with Albemarle in 1699.⁸⁹

Godolphin and Marlborough were courtiers first and Tories second. They and Harley sought to retain the crown's independence by relying on neither party. By February 1703 Marlborough and Godolphin felt that Rochester's use of Occasional Conformity and his hostile criticism of the war's management were intolerable in view of his membership of the ministry. They chose to make an issue of his neglect of his official duties in Ireland and insisted that the queen make an ultimatum to her uncle that either he should fulfil his official responsibilities or resign the office. The earl chose the latter option (he was succeeded by his son-in-law Ormond).⁹⁰

As it became clear that Occasional Conformity was going to fail a second time Nottingham tried to bully the queen into dismissing the remaining Whig office-holders as a sign of her preference for the Tories. However, she asserted herself by responding with the dismissals of Jersey and Seymour, which in turn prompted Nottingham's April 1704 resignation.⁹¹

The first person to feel the effect of Godolphin's post-Alien Act anti-High Church conviction as to party was Buckingham, who was dismissed in March 1705. The duke of Newcastle (1694) replaced him as lord privy seal.

Newcastle was a courtish whig, who had not previously attained high office. This may have stemmed from his quarrelling with William in the early 1690s, which may also have improved his candidature in Anne's eyes.

In September, she made Cowper lord keeper. He was always to be independently inclined. He was a legal counsel in the case of *Ashby v. White* where the Lords clashed with the Commons over the adjudication of electoral matters. However, rather than being ardently whig and standing up for the Lords position his stance was equivocal and confused. Cowper's appointment was not altogether a straight-forward gain for the whigs.⁹²

In December 1706 Hedges's secretaryship was transferred to the third earl of Sunderland. There was a distinct difference between the temperaments of William and Anne which meant that such a gambit would never have been tried on him. He was determined both in the long-term and in the short whereas she appears to have only been firm in the former and was in the latter rather susceptible to being edged piece-by-piece towards a stance she would never have taken outright. Sunderland had been a commoner during William's reign and had not served that monarch in any office.⁹³

There was to be a subtle shift in these changes of office from their being primarily means of dismissing Tories to their being principally means of placing whigs. This thesis does not see these changes as being simply whig. Instead they reflect the court influence of Sarah duchess of Marlborough rather than that of the whig party; she was a whig but one on her own idiosyncratic terms. Newcastle's period of disfavour in the early 1690s had in

part coincided with that of her husband; her own background was Hertfordshire just as was Cowper's; Sunderland was her son-in-law. Sunderland's appointment seems to be the point at which the Junto began to seek to advance themselves although they refrained from actively doing so until after the benefits of the Union and the 1708 general election (it followed a Jacobite invasion scare) improved their strength in parliament.⁹⁴

As the whigs' position improved, so they became increasingly susceptible to internal divisions. In June 1706 Stamford staged a brief one-man rebellion on not having been chosen to take the Acts over to Hanover;⁹⁵ in November 1707 Stamford mounted a defense on behalf of the duumvirs during the State of the nation debate;⁹⁶ in February 1708 the Scottish Privy Council issue saw Cowper, Townshend and the first duke of Kingston with Godolphin and Buckingham on one side, while the Junto, Rochester, the first duke of Richmond, the second duke of Grafton, the second earl of Essex, the first duke of Dorset and the fourth baron Cornwallis were on the other.⁹⁷ Most of the royal bastards were with the majority, they had been part of William's court party, and like much of it came down firmly on the whig side in Anne's reign since the whigs were behaving in a more 'court' fashion than the tories. However, this did not mean that they were Junto supporters.

Party solidarity seems to have been established in the months that followed the vote but it was a solidarity that could easily disintegrate. In December 1708 the reason for Kent's continuance as lord chamberlain was ascribed only to the danger of giving it to someone else,

which would disoblige the multitude who felt able to fill it.⁹⁸ The Williamite Haversham was almost certainly one of that 'multitude.' The early fruits of the party's advance within the ministry stimulated his desire for a mark of recognition for his services to the party but it could not confer places at will, especially as he had a distinct Williamite past but, unlike Peterborough, had not been associated with Marlborough. Therefore, Haversham did not receive one. His response to this was to go into opposition and there to act in alliance with the High Church tories. However, in 1709 the Junto still saw him as someone whom they could call in if they wished.⁹⁹ (It would be interesting to know what his conduct under Oxford would have been. However, he died in November 1710.)

Harley was proving sympathetic to the queen in her desire to retain a ministry that was free of being dominated by either party. This probably became clearer after December 1706. In April 1707 he backed the queen in her proposal to use two vacant bishoprics to benefit the tory presence on the episcopal bench. During a summer conference the Junto decided on the necessity of removing Harley.¹⁰⁰ He did this not necessarily as a pro-tory gesture but rather as one to try to mitigate the growth of whig/Junto influence, since such would lessen the crown's political independence and therefore effect his own continuation in office. He had a motivation for doing such since the addition of the Scottish M.P.s and representative peers was perceived by contemporaries as benefitting the whigs more than the tories.

By the start of the 1707-1708 session Marlborough and

Godolphin were becoming convinced of the necessity of Harley's dismissal. It seemed probable to the duumvirs that in any reconstruction of the ministry's support base he might well try to exploit the fluidity of the situation in order to try to oust them. Anne was unwilling to withdraw from her support of the secretary. However, in December 1707 Harley was severely compromised when it emerged that a clerk in his office, William Greg, was in French pay. Then, in January his close associate Henry St. John admitted to the Commons that he himself had misled them as to strength of the forces in Spain and the numbers present at the battle of Almanza. On February 8th 1708 both Godolphin and Marlborough tendered their resignations. On the 9th Wharton set in motion the beginnings of a committee to gather information to see whether an impeachment was viable. On the 11th Harley resigned.

In the wake of the 1708 general election Townshend, the second duke of Devonshire and the M.P. Robert Walpole were won over by the Junto so as to further isolate Godolphin.¹⁰¹ With backing of this type the Junto then felt able to engage in a partial re-organization of the senior offices. Anne set herself against this. However, circumstances changed around her. On October 28th 1708 her husband prince George of Denmark died. The offices went as the whigs had wished- Pembroke became lord high admiral, Somers lord president and Wharton lord lieutenant of Ireland. It had been an exercise in brinkmanship that had succeeded through the occurrence of a factor of which there was no guarantee.¹⁰²

The late 1700s were the high-water mark of Junto

influence in Anne's reign. The likes of Townshend and Stamford, rather than fending off the Junto for the duumvirs' sake, had changed to being prepared to act with the group. However, this thesis feels that an overestimation of whig unity in the Lords should be avoided. The party had recently been divided in its attitudes; success gave it solidity but otherwise its members' loyalties could be fluid in character. The Junto never became the ministry and in the day-to-day business of government the duumvirs' influence remained predominant. There was always the danger of change which might undermine the Junto's support in the Upper House.

The September 1709 battle of Malplaquet had been a technical victory for the Allies but it showed that a thorough victory could only be achieved by means of attrition and neither monarch wanted to win at such a price.¹⁰³ The French were susceptible to entering negotiations. The financial and social strains of the war in the wake of the severe winter of 1708-1709 made their domestic situation one that was best handled with care. The seventy-one years old Louis XIV could only be expected to live for a few more years and there would then almost certainly ensue a long minority.¹⁰⁴ The actions that had caused the war to break out had stemmed from the king's personality and Britain could have stayed out of the conflict had he not insisted on inserting a Jacobite dimension into it.

Anne was content to have a peace without any major gains. Britain had suffered from the same winter. The duumvirs sought to continue a royal policy to its logical

end, even though it was defunct in terms of the crown's contemporary attitude. Therefore, they forfeited their role of acting as the crown's servants and effectively filled their offices for their own ends. They and the Junto were confident that they could continue because previously they had been so successful in gaining what they wanted from Anne in the past against her wishes there was no apparent reason why they should not continue to do so. The war made the crown, with its need to finance the executive, very exposed politically and therefore it might have to comply with their wishes.

In the wake of 1708 Harley found rich pickings among the disconsolate whigs, who were unhappy with the duumvirs and who were not enamoured with the Junto. Somerset had positively bad relations with the Junto, while those he had with Marlborough had distinctly deteriorated after Harley's dismissal. The duke felt that Kingston was being raised by the Junto as a rival to him. His isolation from the body of the whigs is indicated by a remark that had not the queen valued him then no one else would have. By September 1709 that duke was on a political limb as far as his fellow whigs were concerned. The soldier, the fourth earl Rivers, was antagonized by Marlborough's February 1710 decision to forward the court tory (and Anne's first cousin) the duke of Northumberland for the vacant Tower.¹⁰⁵ Therefore, the earl joined Somerset in being susceptible to Harley's advances, while Shrewsbury was not hostile to them. Harley himself was wary lest Somerset be too individualistic or too forward. The duke tried to obtain a pension for Rivers, although this was probably in concurrence with Harley. In 1710 Somerset was not the most

effective of allies. He compromised a wish to resign by deciding not to attend any further Privy Council meetings.¹⁰⁶

Peterborough had conducted himself poorly in Spain. The Junto duly took him to task upon his return. The Tories had backed him as a means of attacking the duumvirs who had subsequently moderated their handling of him. Therefore, the earl was not well disposed to his former associates even if it was his own poor conduct that was the principal root of their attitude towards him. Yet Harley had proposed his arrest in cabinet in August 1707. In 1710 the two were against a common object rather than of a shared outlook.⁸⁷

The Junto were not the party and had only limited support upon which they could depend in all circumstances. Harley envisaged securing other non-Junto whigs- the likes of Cowper, Haversham, the eighteenth baron Fitzwalter, the duke of Greenwich (a soldier whose dislike of Marlborough was of long standing), the fourth baron Mohun and the commoner Walpole.¹⁰⁷ There were already a number who would automatically follow through being courtiers. Those courtiers (such as Northumberland, Lexington, Pembroke, the sixth earl of Suffolk and the third baron Berkeley of Stratton) who were pro-Sacheverell (when as courtiers close to Anne they might have been expected to have voted against him), were all potential supporters of a cross-party non-Junto ministry.¹⁰⁸

In November 1710 Swift was to feel able to write of a celebration at court that there were no whigs near the queen's person when there were supporters of the previous ministry present such as Berkeley of Stratton and Pembroke

while Shrewsbury was clearly a whig.¹⁰⁹

Strafford (1711) had spent most of the reign in the undistinguished diplomatic posting at Berlin. He had had a decidedly court background under William and therefore was used to having worked with many of those who were being supplanted. The same month he was advised that if he replaced Townshend at The Hague he would become "a declared enemy to the juncto, and ruin'd with the Whigs for ever, and the Tories are not noted to stick so fast to their friends as th' others."¹¹⁰

Harley offered Anne an alternative- a mixed ministry which relied principally on tory support but which would try to manage from a stance whose first loyalty was to the crown. He held out the prospect of a form of return to 1702. The situation in which Harley sought to put his plans into operation was different from that of 1702 in two key ways. First, the crown was disengaging from a line of active policy, whereas in 1702 it had been engaging in one. The signing of a peace did not hold out the prospect of prolonged crown activity which the opening of the war had offered. The ministry would be principally serving the crown for a short-term purpose and therefore the crown would not have the same need of it as it would have had if it had been engaging in a long-term project, just what the Junto had been trying to avoid for themselves. And secondly, inter-party conflict had come to be far more central to politics than it had been in 1702. The Triennial Act had been one part of the country programme that had been implemented via the Revolution Settlement and the Act of Settlement. As Rubini has astutely pointed

out, this meant that the court/country axis became distinctly less important and therefore there had not been the same need for the crown to maintain or to develop a distinct court interest.¹¹¹ By 1710 the prolonged operation of the Triennial Act had come to aggravate party conflict. This was felt more in the Commons, however, the Lords would have been affected by the raising of the general political temperature.

The strains of war were beginning to tell upon the nation. One of the media through which this discontent was being expressed was the pulpits of high church clergymen. The Junto felt compelled to show whig strength which would illustrate the danger of antagonizing them and decided to make an example of Sacheverell. It was to prove as bad a political error for the Junto as Occasional Conformity had for the High Church party. A difference in 1710 was that success was achieved with the matter, but this was to prove hollow.

In early 1710 the Sacheverell impeachment passed through the whiggish Commons without difficulty. However, in the Lords it was fought. The likes of Scarbrough and Shrewsbury voted for the doctor's innocence, while Somerset and Greenwich helped soften his sentence. In terms of the overall party these people were numerically a small minority.

The impressive display of solidarity was being expended on the spoutings of an over-opinionated, minor cleric. It is quite improbable that such a display would have been possible had Anne ever positively disapproved of the prosecution. It was an expression of party solidarity which the Junto were manipulating rather than an

expression of solidarity with the Junto per se.¹¹²

On April 14th 1710 court whig Kent resigned as lord chamberlain. He was replaced by court whig Shrewsbury. The following month the peace negotiations that had been being conducted with the French broke down and a fresh season's campaigning began. On June 14th Sunderland was replaced in his secretaryship by the Harleyite tory Dartmouth.

The Junto had been forewarned of this. They thought that there was the potential for negotiating their way to an agreement, a belief Harley was happy to foster for his own ends. This possibility stopped any immediate cohesive response on their part. Wharton was tending to his official duties in Ireland and therefore was not able to inject his own particular brand of decisiveness into his colleagues' meditations: Halifax was restive since he had not been restored as first lord of the Treasury; he had had to pass up a diplomatic mission that Townshend had been given so that the viscount might be wooed away from Godolphin; he was trying to prepare for the oncoming session so that it would not be too fractious, his consequential susceptibility to accommodative arrangement made him a possible target for Harley.¹¹³

The Junto's members appreciated that, because of the Sacheverell trial and the general war-weariness, the new ministry would gain control of the Commons if a general election were called. Harley was not an avowed tory and was unlikely to want to be dependent on the tories for support in parliament. The Junto knew well that the mould of politics was being used for another cast and they assumed they would play a part in the new product. This would mean that they would have a position from which they

could exploit any opportunities for political leverage and so re-advance themselves. A single-party ministry was not in their world-view; they themselves had sought to work within the existing framework rather than to supplant it.

On August 8th 1710 Godolphin was dismissed. He was unable to offer any resistance because the crown could outmanoeuvre him by calling an election which would lead to a parliament which would not support him. He was replaced by a Treasury commission which was headed by Harley, and which contained the likes of the first earl Poulett and the future first baron Mansell. Marlborough was continued for the time being because his presence was necessary but not to the point where he could use it for political leverage against the queen as he had in February 1708.

It remained to be seen whether Harley could play his own financial card. Anne dissolved parliament in order to break the whig control of the Commons otherwise the House would probably not grant Harley supply in the forthcoming session. The ministry found itself with a tory-controlled Commons and not the balanced one that it would probably have preferred. The whigs had proven generally unresponsive to Harley's overtures and it was not a good sign that Somerset aimed to cooperate in electoral matters with his fellow party members even if he had not recently been doing so in in either court or parliamentary ones.¹¹⁴

In October 1710 Shrewsbury felt that Harley's whig adherents in the Lords would not necessarily be easy to handle. The centre-piece for the session was the State of the War in Spain. This was to allow the ministry to put the whigs on the defensive. Scarbrough botched an Address

of thanks to Marlborough through lack of preparation thus forcing his fellow whigs into a tactical retreat in order to avoid an outright defeat.¹¹⁵ An investigation into the defeat at Almanza came out in favour of the contemporary ministerialist Peterborough rather than James Stanhope (the future first earl Stanhope), who remained allied to the main body of the whig party.¹¹⁶

The former ministerial whigs supported the re-introduced Place bill in its passage through the Commons. This was to show the country members of both parties that Harley was not going to warm to country measures. They did not continue their support in the Lords since they thought it would not be in their own best long-term interest for it to be enacted.¹¹⁷ The Scottish judicial case of Greenshields v. the Edinburgh Magistrates caused a large turn-out. The matter revolved about the issue of the place of episcopal clergy in Scottish law and therefore brought to bear on the interests of both the representative peers and the bishops. Understandably, Harley found the matter a nuisance.¹¹⁸

It had yet to be seen whether Harley was capable of providing finance for the executive, if he could not he would have to resign or come to terms with the whigs. On May 2nd Harley unveiled his proposed South Sea Company. The company's supposed purpose was to benefit from the trading advantages that it was assumed that the nation would extract from Spain with relation to South and Central America. However, what it was principally designed for was to help service the National Debt, i.e. continue the sustenance of the government financially and therefore of the ministry politically. He now had an institutional

framework through which he could borrow against the security of the supplies voted by that Commons.¹¹⁹ The previously whig-orientated financial institutions had either to fall into line or to lose their government business.

In the new parliament tory sentiments had been catered for by the passage of the Fifty Churches and Property Qualifications Acts.¹²⁰ However, as the session had progressed the Commons became increasingly difficult to manage. The rank and file tories did not make Harley's management of themselves any easier, the tory bill for the repeal of the 1709 General Naturalization Repeal Act in February was not a ministerial initiative. As often before, it was an event outside of parliament that enabled ministerial control to be re-asserted over the Lower Chamber. On March 8th 1711 while interrogating the marquis de Guiscard, Harley was wounded by the Frenchman. According to Dickinson, the incapacity of Harley did not work to sharpen the distinction between him and his associate the secretary of state Henry St. John. The latter's ambition must have been additionally whetted by the incident.¹²¹ In cabinet St. John had used Harley's absence to force successfully through a proposal to send an expensive summer 1711 expedition to Quebec. He had been careful to make sure of Mrs. Masham's support first by having her brother John Hill as its commander.¹²²

In April 1711 the emperor Joseph I died. His heir was his younger brother Charles, who was the person whom the Allies were trying to make king of Spain. During the summer it became evident that Charles was unwilling to pass up on the Austrian inheritance.¹²³ The war became

somewhat purposeless from the British strategic viewpoint. Anne had no wish to be responsible for the emergence of a second emperor Charles V, a figure who would indubitably have the resources to dominate Europe in a way that Louis had only ever aspired to. Therefore, both her desire to end the war became stronger and the potential for domestic opposition to her wish was greatly decreased.

In May 1711 Rochester died. Harley opted to be elevated to the peerage, perhaps feeling that his presentation of himself as the queen's first minister would be less cramped in the Lords than it would have been were the earl still alive. In addition, the ministry was in need of able speakers there. This would make it easier to control the House and so counterbalance the Commons, which he could not hope to dominate.¹²⁴ However, in terms of control of the Commons this was not a politic move. St. John was active and becoming ever more independent, beginning to try to manipulate the tory party. Oxford sought to moderate St. John's influence in the Lower House by trying to appoint as its speaker the influential Hanoverian tory, Sir Thomas Hanmer 4th. Bt.; Hanmer refused. St. John's direct influence on the Commons was lessened by his own elevation to the peerage in July 1712 (Hanmer only became speaker when the Commons was more in sympathy with his own pro-Hanoverian views in the wake of the 1713 general election).¹²⁵

To conclude a peace was the principal *raison d'être* of the ministry. The negotiations with the French caused the simmering rivalry between Oxford and Bolingbroke to break out more nakedly. Shrewsbury was to start drawing away from his colleagues on the question of deserting the

Allies. In this he was reverting to the whig aspect of his political make-up rather than continuing to obey the court one. Oxford had some sympathy for the duke's view.¹²⁶

In the early part of the 1711-1712 session the behaviour of individual peers, e.g. Delawarr, Somerset and the fourth duke of Hamilton, became very important in the control of the House. As late as December 10th neither the second duke of Leeds nor the eighth baron Hunsdon had been secured for sure by the ministry.¹²⁷ The court's strength in the House was such that it did not feel it wise to push the point of Hamilton's British patent. Marlborough and Godolphin's ambivalence was displayed by their withdrawal from the House, they having not yet entered upon an opposition attitude.¹²⁸

The tory Nottingham had joined the opposition because he appreciated that Anne was unlikely to prove amenable to his influence if she had Oxford as first minister. He was careful to preserve his High Church image. This, in conjunction with the whigs' desire to cooperate with him, made it possible for Occasional Conformity to reach the Statute Book.¹²⁹ The control of business in the House was brief and it was not one of taking the mantle of government, it had been the tories' thunder that had been stolen rather than the ministry's; however, the move had succeeded in reflecting badly on Oxford. The last opposition triumph was over the Instructions to the Plenipotentiaries at Utrecht.¹³⁰ These votes put into doubt Oxford's ability to control parliament and therefore the practicality of his continuing in office.

The ministry used a mass creation in order to

re-assert control of the House. The politics that preceded the mass creation of winter 1711-1712 may possibly have been engineered expressly to give Oxford the excuse for it.¹³¹ Even this manoeuvre did not bring an end to dissent there. The opposition astutely moved against the earl with a Place bill. This move's effectiveness was shown by the way in which some of the summoned twelve defected temporarily over it.¹³² This was because the recruits mostly had some political sympathy with either the earl or his background, the latter type would still have had traces of country attitudes in their outlooks. The spoiling amendment that killed the measure was not a frontal assault on its contents but rather a proposal to postpone its activation until after the queen's death.¹³³

In April 1712 prince Eugene's perception was that Sunderland and the duumvirs made up the more violent section of the opposition while Somers, Halifax (1714) and Cowper were more pacific.¹³⁴ Godolphin died in September. The ministry then signified that they would proceed against Marlborough over the matter of a perquisite he received in relation to the Low Countries army bread contract. In November 1712 the duke went into voluntary exile thus absenting himself for the reign's final two sessions.¹³⁵ Therefore, the Junto became the opposition's front line whereas before it is possible that they had contemplated some level of cooperation with Oxford.

The difference between Oxford and Bolingbroke became more marked with the end of the session. Oxford joined Shrewsbury in being concerned as to the interests of the United Provinces. In September there was an open argument over the terms of peace in cabinet between the two with

the earl prevailing.¹³⁶ The ministry's internal frictions remained unresolved and as the war was effectively at an end there was no pressing need that they should be.

In March 1713 a series of treaties were concluded. These brought the war between France and Britain to an official end. This left the allies to do the best that they could for themselves in the new circumstances. This included the elector of Hanover (the future George I). The French commercial treaty was very much Bolingbroke's child. On April 7th 1713 Cholmondley and lord chief justice Parker (later first earl of Macclesfield (1721)) spoke against the scheme in the Privy Council.¹³⁷ Subsequently, they were both dismissed from office.

The ministry found its solidarity easier to maintain if it were not being frequently tested. The opposition appreciated that an end to the war was overwhelmingly popular and that they should not worsen their prospects at the polls additionally by opposing the peace, or by being a more general nuisance. Therefore, the 1713 session in the Lords was quieter than its two predecessors. However, it was by no means silent. Political urgency was distinctly present even if its form was predominantly latent.

It had not been in Oxford's best interest for control of the Lords to pack the representative peers with ardent Tories, otherwise he would not have been able to play one House off against the other. The Scots at Westminster thought the French commercial treaty would undo the positive economic benefits which the Scots believed that the Union gave their nation.¹³⁸ Therefore, on June 1st there was a vote on the Dissolution of the Union. The

whigs again showed themselves to be willing to sacrifice a cherished stance for an immediate tactical gain. On the 5th one hundred and fifty votes were cast on the Malt bill. The majority was two.¹³⁹

It was not just the Scots who disliked the treaty. On June 18th the bill was lost in the Commons by nine votes. In June and July Hanmer and Anglesey led the opposition in their respective Houses to the eighth and ninth articles of the treaty of commerce.¹⁴⁰ The opposition's success was marked further by Wharton's astute June 30th move for an Address requesting that the queen ask Lorraine to remove the Pretender from its soil; the motion passed with only the sixth baron North being so bold as to dissent.¹⁴¹

The ministry's internal situation was no more resolved than it had been a year before. The continuance of this conflict was to be a key reason of why it took so long for parliament to meet after the 1713 general election.¹⁴² The election improved the whigs' position qualitatively. Not on their part but rather on that of the Hanoverian element among the tories, which grew proportionately stronger within that party.¹⁴³

Swift's pamphlet 'The Public Spirit of the the Whigs' offended the representative peers.¹⁴⁴ While only eighty-eight votes were cast in the consequent division, it was noted that the pliable court whigs Kent and the first earl of Sussex (1717) voted with the main body of the party.¹⁴⁵ The votes on the Protestant Succession reached one hundred and forty-two. Despite the mass creation, the ministry's room for manoeuvre was minimal in the Upper House.

In early April the Hanoverian tories the fifth earl

of Anglesey, the first earl of Ashburnham, the second earl of Abingdon and the second baron Carteret either voted against the ministry or stayed out of the House.¹⁴⁶ This added an additional note of uncertainty and further destabilized the political situation. Anglesey was one of the people, like Bolingbroke and Oxford, who felt able to court Mrs. Masham in the hope of her furthering their political interests with the queen.¹⁴⁷

On April 14th the Hanoverian envoy in London applied to lord chancellor Harcourt for a writ so that the elector's son the future George II might take his seat in the House of Lords in his title as duke of Cambridge. This showed that the reversionary interest was watching the state of British politics with interest and was prepared if necessary to participate actively by some means or other, although the Hanoverians appreciated that Anne would not tolerate the elector's presence in Britain.¹⁴⁸

The re-introduced Place bill passed the Commons unopposed since it would have been useless and counter-productive for the ministry to oppose it there. There were seven votes on the measure in the Lords before the ministry killed it. On the 16th the peace was voted on- one hundred and forty-four votes and a majority of twenty. Its size was indicative of the mass creation having been designed to help end the war and the dislike of the conflict by the tories. Anglesey was with the court but mute.¹⁴⁹

In May the judicial case of Roper v. Hewet was politicized because the latter was a catholic, the association being with the Old Pretender's catholicism which in turn was supposed to be linked to the assumed

Jacobitism of the tories.¹⁵⁰ This stood in marked contrast with the previous session.

Bolingbroke introduced the Schism bill. Its purpose was to remind the tories that it was he who shared their views and values. It was on territory on which the whigs had recently compromised themselves over the Occasional Conformity Act. The votes reached one hundred and forty-nine. A protest was signed not only by the likes of Torrington, Sussex (1717) and the third duke of Schomberg but also Oxford's kinsman and long-time associate, the first baron Foley.¹⁵¹ In its immediate tactical purpose the bill was a fleeting success; the whigs had had their party identity re-affirmed, while the Hanoverian tories were still firm on the unrelated matter of the succession. The latter was logical in part since the Act of Settlement had been the child of the tory/country alliance.

The opposition targeted Bolingbroke for attack on the Spanish Commercial treaty. The reign's final divisions took place on July 8th. Foley and the others were joined in the protest by the second earl of Rochford.¹⁵² Most of the Dutch favourites and their sons had followed most of the royal bastards and their sons in siding with the whigs. Oxford unable to provide a positive ministerial line in the Lords because by doing so he might antagonize the tory dominated Commons. Therefore, 'natural' courtiers such as royal bastards and foreign recruits could either side with the tories, who were not acting in a court fashion, or with the whigs, with whom they were long used to working in the court's interests.¹⁵³

On July 27th Oxford was dismissed. On August 1st the queen died having made Shrewsbury lord high treasurer.¹⁵⁴

Therefore, at Anne's death three of the senior offices of state were in whig hands, even if they were the same pair of hands. By then all of the ministerial whigs had adhered to their party. As Oxford's late dismissal indicates, the queen vacillated. Therefore, the person of the monarch and the positive influence of the crown were mostly withdrawn. Even in these circumstances the two parties were not in outright opposition to one another.

Oxford fell principally because his ministry was a means of Anne being able to escape the duumvirs' grip. It had not come into being as an end in itself. What was remarkable about it was the length of its survival. The reason for this was that Anne was unable to find any alternative that looked like being viable. Almost certainly she had been open to one presenting itself since late 1711 when it had emerged that Oxford was unable to engage in any constructive government which ran against the wishes of the tory rank and file. These wishes were country orientated and therefore were not amenable to being manipulated outside of their set prejudices.

The situation was not solely the result of Anne's handling of it. The passage of the Act of Settlement had seen the two parties become more defined in their post-Revolution personas. Anne had harder materials to handle than her predecessor. However, one cannot but come back to the fact that she had the scope to handle her political concerns in a far more active manner than she did. Anne had in large part failed herself by taking such a passive attitude to politics. She had been prepared to be satisfied with the duumvir ministry because it worked.

When its members had started behaving in a manner that was against her wishes she had failed to assert herself, as William would have done, and thus control the situation. Rather, she let matters drift and turn sour on her. Her 1710 use of Oxford was an option that was presented to her rather than one which she had originated; she did not have either the political imagination or the perspective that had allowed her predecessor to toy with the Land Bank scheme.

She was of a rather singular political variety. In general she preferred tories to whigs because the former had supported the continuation of her family on the throne and were generally more in sympathy with her views on the Church of England. However, she also had a distinct, and previously underestimated, dislike of her predecessor's servants who were not connected to her or Marlborough prior to her own accession. Therefore, she automatically denied herself a ready running court party. It was through the prospect of largely reactivating that party that Oxford was able realistically to float the idea. A lack of basic pragmatism was a principal reason for her failing to handle what was a fairly strong crown position. Had she sought to play her situation for maximum effect she would have continued William's post-Triennial Act handling of the whigs- general cooperation tempered by the fostering a court party as a brake. Anne worked with whigs only when forced to and did nothing positive to foster a court party, relying on her managers to use whatever they could find rather than giving them the proper resources and support. Godolphin was a fine financier but he was limited as a politician; Oxford was an able politician but he was

not someone she would have chosen through free choice. However, it must be said in Anne's favour that she did have considerable tenacity in the long-term. She kept the war going until she believed that it was not in the nation's best interests and she then resisted the country ministry that would have occurred had she admitted Bolingbroke to power.

5.4.1. Introduction, 1714-1760.

What emerges from a study of the Lords over these years does not so much contradict what has become the view of the reign so much as to extend it in certain directions and to clarify certain broad assumptions which have led to erroneous conclusions. This thesis seeks to argue that the place of the crown has been underplayed because of the two Georges' remote style of dealing with domestic politics, that because of crown strength the internal state of the whig party was more complicated than has previously been shown and that the tory party's decline was not finished as a subject by Colley: the crown was again an important factor.

After minor alterations, such as removing the necessity of the monarch having to ask parliaments' permission before physically leaving Britain, George I was happy to accept the broad Revolution Settlement. Under the Hanoverians the crown had a more limited prerogative than it had had under William and Anne. The prerogative did not have any further limitations placed upon it during the remainder of the period under discussion. In 1746 and 1757 George II was persuaded into particular lines of action as a response to the mass resignations of the majority of his leading ministers. These incidents were viewed by whig historians as stepping-stones on the road to constitutional monarchy, but they were not.

There was no deterioration of either the crown's prerogative position or its political strength between 1714 and 1760. The incidents were principally the result of the crown being made to realize that its current style of kingship had to be consistent with its usual style.

George I did not run into the troubles that his son did because he was far less active with the crown's executive than George II- no full-scale wars were fought by Britain between 1714 and 1727. The less excited the executive the less likely the prerogative was to encounter its own limits.

Factionalism was to be a particular mark of the whig party after the accession of George III. It was something that had been present throughout the preceding four reigns. The whig party leadership was of a heterogeneous character in both 1689 and 1760. Factionalism was endemic because of pre-Exclusion Crisis diversity. It broke out with the Revolution's success and the disappearance from the domestic political scene of James II, their principal *raison d'etre*. In addition, personal antagonisms and career rivalries added fuel to party disunity.

One of the principal factors which tended to divide one whig from another was attitude towards the court interest. Under both William and Anne the whigs had only ever been permitted to hold a share of offices. When the size of that share was small then there would have been considerable competition among the whigs for such places as were available. In such circumstances to be unquestioningly obedient to the court was not necessarily the best means for a person to advance himself. The capacity to mitigate the hostility of those who were against the court could additionally promote an individual, over someone or a group who could not lessen such. Influence in such quarters was not acquired through subservience to the crown, influence was to be had by operating at the interface of the court and the potential

opposition to the court. The Junto were careful in the late 1700s to step over into opposition on occasion in order to stress their value.

Prior to the Succession there was a variety of opinions towards the court ranging from the hostile to the subservient. The establishment of the Supremacy after the 1715 Jacobite Rebellion identified the court interest with the whig party but the two were never identical, they never merged to become the same entity. There remained whig gentry whose attitude to the executive was such that they were not willing to be drawn into the court's orbit by allowing place to be conferred upon them.¹⁵⁵

It was the crown which led to the body of the whig party coalescing into a predominant consensus. Under the two Georges, it did this in part by allowing a single group or individual to steer most of the fruit of the cornucopia of domestic governmental patronage. Anne had allowed this more than William but not to the same extent as the Georges permitted it. She had not allowed it to happen within a single party context. However, just as the whigs never became the court party per se so the patronage always remained the government's and was never the party's. This was ensured by the crown always making sure that its first ministers knew that they were playing within limitations set by it. First, the ploy of employing 'non-friends' of their first ministers was used. Such reminded a first minister of how limited his personal sway would be if he were deprived of the fount of government patronage and the mass of his party remained pliant to the court. At the same time such divide and rule tactics were limited purposefully to the higher political reaches in

order that a broad unity and harmony might be maintained below.

In the upper reaches factionalism was extant but it was barred from being allowed to show itself too nakedly, lest the responsible party run the risk of being expelled for endangering the general political harmony. In the first half of George I's reign a fairly bitter faction war was waged. Through the 1720s and the 1730s factionalism was present but neither George used it as a tool to control Townshend and Walpole; it was the high period of the Hanoverian ethos of nobility. After the fall of Walpole in 1742 George II was more tolerant of factionalism, using it himself as a political tool. He put it aside when Henry Pelham proved able to provide a second period of quiet. However, after Pelham's death no one filled the same role in the reign's final years, therefore, George used factionalism again. It was continuously present, its symptoms being only mitigated at times by crown attitudes. The close association of the court with the whigs means that the two are best treated broadly together during the early Hanoverian period.

The Tories have proven somewhat problematical to historians of the two reigns, the principal reason being the scarcity of source material. Keith Feiling's 1924 and 1938 tomes were for a long time the principal works on the subject. Archibald Foord's 1964 study of the opposition did little to break new ground. Therefore, it was not surprising that research in the area veered towards the study of Jacobitism in the hope of finding enlightenment. A conclusion which particularly stimulated work in the side pasture was Eveline Cruickshank's 1970 remark in the

1715-1754 volumes of 'The History of Parliament' that up to 1745 the tory party was predominantly a Jacobite one.¹⁵⁶ However, Linda Colley had the perception to appreciate that much of Feiling's work could do with revisiting and that there were considerable areas related to the subject which he had not included within the boundaries of his work since he was principally interested in high politics and had little appreciation of the party's rank and file. Her 1982 book made a convincing argument for the continuation after the Hanoverian Succession of a cohesive and organized tory party. This thesis broadly agrees with her findings.

Colley dealt with the tory peerage of the early Hanoverian period in an incidental manner rather than a systematic one. Probably through having her work cut out in trying to prove the continued existence of the tory party, she tended to sketch over the question of departures from it. This thesis will try to determine whether it is possible to delineate any patterns in the way in which peers left the party and see if any such patterns can be implied to have a significance in interpreting the politics of these years. For the sake of clarity the field will be dealt with away from the interaction of the crown with the whig party.

There is a fourth theme which deserves to be included in this section. It does not add to understanding of the politics of the period through the interaction of the crown and the peerage. However, it does place that interaction in perspective and it did affect the interaction in the decades after the period's close. These two counts are reason enough for it being touched upon

briefly. The theme is what can be deemed 'low politics.' 'High politics' took place principally in Westminster, Whitehall and the other royal palaces and their precincts. It could occur in other physical locations but was essentially about the court and the ministry. 'Low politics' was what happened outside of this rarified atmosphere. It occurred at moments when the broader political nation felt agitated by the course of affairs or at the prescribed eventualities of elections. Its principal encroachment on parliamentary politics was through general elections. Many of the peerage did involve themselves in low politics through electoral activity but such is outside of this study's confines.

The two principal incidents when contact was made with low politics were the Excise Crisis and the Jew bill. Both were very short-lived intrusions on the business of the House. The Excise bill was dropped in the Commons so that the crisis in the Lords was not over it but rather the South Sea Company Stock bill, while the Jew bill had an uneventful initial passage through the House and a fairly swift repeal. Neither occurrence made any impact on the way in which the peerage engaged in politics during the period. However, they were indices of the existence of low politics.

Paul Langford's "The Excise Crisis" and T.W.Perry's "Public Opinion, Propaganda and Politics" will both be discussed in as far as they are relevant. There are a number of other works that could be drawn in, such as those of Gary De Krey, Nick Rogers and Bill Speck. However, with their concerns as to the City or to electoral matters none of these have quite the same

immediacy to this thesis as the two cited works. However, an article which is not bogged down in the same territories as Messrs. De Krey etc. is a 1988 piece by Kathleen Wilson on admiral Edward Vernon and popular politics, which will be included. As with the tory theme it will be treated separately from the court/whig narrative.

5.4.2. The Establishment of the Supremacy, 1714-1716.

The whig position in autumn 1714 was good but it was neither a monopoly nor guaranteed. Initially, there was extensive scope for political manoeuvre. Most of the Hanoverians Tories were admitted to government. The main body of their party had placed itself in a bad light by engineering an early peace and taking an ambivalent stance with respect to the Succession but it had not shown itself to be positively Jacobite. There were marked internal divisions among the whig party's senior members. The rank and file of the whig peers had had a natural stance of supporting the court for the last twenty years. It was reasonable to assume they would revert to their court stance rather than engage in overt partisan party politics at every opportunity; the Sacheverell trial had proven a painful and fruitless victory.

Nottingham was made lord president and Aylesford chancellor of the duchy of Lancaster. Other members of the Finch clan were provided for. Halifax did not play the part of an obdurate whig and was prepared to cooperate actively with Tories. That Tories other than the Finches were possible partners in future administrations led the whigs to care for some of their interests to a degree. Halifax gave some of the lesser patronage at his disposal to Tories. Townshend was careful to screen Dartmouth from impeachment and tried to retain a kinsman of baron Lansdowne in the Customs.¹⁵⁷

Bolingbroke and Oxford agreed with one another to cooperate on matters of broad mutual interest but they were unwilling to form any closer working relationship.

Each was prepared to leave the other to his fate in terms of their respective impeachments.¹⁵⁸ Through their association with Anne these two had provided the party with much of its effective coherence over the last four years, therefore, there was something of a gulf of leadership. However, like other tory leaders before them they had emerged not from the ranks of the party but rather from the court. Therefore, the tories were badly hit when the two failed to give any lead and, even more so, by the court no longer sanctioning any new such individuals.

In the 1715 general election the electorate swung generously in the whigs' favour. The major contemporary political issue was what to do with Oxford and Bolingbroke and their lieutenants Ormond and Strafford (1711).¹⁵⁹ In late March Bolingbroke decided it was expedient to flee the country. In June the Commons decided at Walpole's instigation to impeach Oxford and Bolingbroke without a division, although there was only a good documentary case against the earl. On the question of Ormond there was not such and a sizable minority voted in his favour. However, in July he panicked and decided that it would be in his best interest to withdraw himself abroad. Strafford stayed and was charged with high crimes and misdemeanours.¹⁶⁰

In July there were divisions on Oxford's Impeachment. The voting reached one hundred and thirty-eight, while the smallest majority was twenty-five, having shrunk with each division. The earl had some non-tory support. Cowper and Greenwich joined Nottingham, viscount Harcourt and the first baron Trevor in backing his cause;¹⁶¹ the first duke of Chandos could have exploited the impeachment with

respect to their both being Herefordshire men, instead he expressed solidarity with his neighbour and former patron;¹⁶² On the 18th the Ormond Attainder bill passed on a vote of eighty-two. Bolingbroke's did not cause a division.

Also in July George I had announced to parliament that a Jacobite invasion was being prepared. In August 1715 the Scottish peer the sixth earl of Mar raised the standard of revolt in Scotland. The Young Pretender did not arrive in Scotland until December, by which time the Rising had lost its momentum and was set to fail. The 1715-1716 session was dominated by the matter. The tories were cooperative in securing the measures to help fight the Rebellion, e.g. the higher rate of Land Tax. The assembly of the machinery for suppressing the Rebellion was easily accomplished but the judicial processing of the rebel lords was another matter. Nottingham was decisive in obtaining moderate support for an Address asking the king to be clement. The first earl of Uxbridge, the fourth earl of Clarendon, Anglesey, Nottingham and Aylesford were all deprived of their posts.¹⁶³

'The 1715' acted as a reason for both passing and implementing the legislation that became the engine for securing the Supremacy. In April 1716 the Septennial bill secured a total of one hundred and fifty-seven votes on one division. Shrewsbury, the architect of the Triennial Act, opposed the measure. Peterborough maintained his tergiversancy while Nottingham was again operating firmly in the tory fold.¹⁶⁴ The tories and the Hanoverian tories were joined by some of the more independently minded whigs such as Somerset, Somerset's son-in-law viscount Tadcaster

and the first earl of Bristol.

The bill would have the effect of taking down the political temperature because there would no longer be the near-constant electoral campaigning that there was in William's final years and through-out Anne's reign. Patronage could be used more effectively on M.P.s and peers if recipients knew they were going to have several years, rather than just a couple, in which to enjoy the fruits of their positions. The Bedchamber, with its flexible size, had returned and during Oxford's ministry there had been an expansion in the types of other offices that could be given to the peerage: peers were now regularly tellers of the Exchequer and masters of the Buckhounds.

It became increasingly certain that the whigs were going to retain royal favour for several years. What was immediately damaging for the tories was that the poor lords started to drift towards the whigs who occupied the court position that Oxford had had. The poor lords were usually prepared to follow whoever governed their pensions. Their adherence to the crown had been of help to both Godolphin and Oxford. Their post-1715 siding with the ministry meant that the tories became an even smaller minority in the Lords than they were after the mass creations of 1714 and 1716. The second earl of Yarmouth was clearly a poor lord. For several years he had sworn the oaths of Allegiance perhaps being driven into the political fold by poverty.¹⁶⁵ The likes of Hunsdon and the fifth viscount Saye and Sele were near automatic court supporters through their penury.

5.4.3.1. The Whigs and the Court, 1716-1720.

The problem which dominates the first half of George I's reign, after the establishment of the Supremacy is- Why was the Townshend-Walpole group taken back into the ministry in 1720, when it had taken a hostile stance towards the ministry during the previous sessions? This principal question has a subordinate primary one of- Why did the Townshend-Walpole group leave in the first place?

The Townshend-Walpole group's problems grew from the success of the whig party. The whigs had been used to struggling for a share of power. The party had not experienced ministerial domination on the scale that George I was willing to allow it in the wake of the Rising. However, just at the point when the whigs were admitted to an unprecedented share of offices the majority of their front rank figures disappeared from the political scene. By April 1716, of the original Junto only Orford (1697) was still alive. There were other senior politicians but neither Somerset nor Shrewsbury was able to build a working relationship with George;¹⁶⁶ the arch-courtier Marlborough, whom the king did hold in high regard, was permanently and severely disabled by two strokes during the course of 1716. Therefore, there was a power vacuum into which the second rank of the leadership was swept. There were no conditions of adversity for the party to unite in, therefore, internal tensions came to the surface.

The incentive to win was accentuated by the political scene itself changing. Having accepted the mass of the Revolution Settlement, George I was generally uninterested

in the detail of British domestic politics. This meant the prospect of the party being able to use the court interest, therefore, whoever predominated within the party would have an unprecedented sway in domestic politics. The passing of the Septennial Act in 1716 meant that the victors would have an easier task than Anne's ministers in managing domestic politics.

A number of the details of the party's power struggle are obscure. For example, Stanhope and Sunderland drew together but it is not clear when exactly they began to act as a unit. From an approximate equality with Townshend and Walpole, Stanhope and Sunderland pulled ahead. The two decisive factors were that Sunderland grew ever higher in George I's esteem and that Stanhope had a series of advantages over Townshend. The principal cause of Sunderland's rise was probably the friendship that he developed with the royal mistress Madame Schulenberg.¹⁶⁷ Stanhope was the son of a diplomat; he had had a cosmopolitan upbringing which allowed him to share much of the king's perspective; he was a distinguished soldier and therefore was able to relate to the sovereign's martial interests; and Townshend had the northern office which meant that he had to learn George's prejudices with respect to northern Europe from his own errors while executing the office whereas Stanhope, in the less sensitive southern secretaryship, could watch and learn from the viscount's mistakes.¹⁶⁸

George I spent the summer of 1716 in Hanover, leaving the future George II as lord regent in Britain. The prince's conduct, his association with Greenwich and the fact that Stanhope was with the king on the continent led

to Stanhope and Sunderland gaining an advantage at their rivals' expense. This advantage was marked by Townshend being made lord lieutenant of Ireland in December 1716. The office had immense political and financial clout but only within Ireland; in terms of domestic British politics it was a demotion, especially as he was not an Irish landowner.¹⁶⁹ The transfer allowed Stanhope to take over the now more important northern secretaryship. Townshend and Walpole had lost too much ground to their rivals to be able to achieve power within the ministry. They decided to go into opposition although there is no evidence as to precisely when they came to this conclusion.

There were a number of positive reasons as to why they should enter opposition. There was no guarantee that Stanhope's sophisticated and expensive foreign policy would be successful. If it failed then the ministry would be embarrassed and therefore susceptible to attack in the Commons where an active foreign policy was not popular in the wake of the cost of the War of the Spanish Succession, which was still being paid for. The policy might well run against the wishes of the German interest at court which therefore might oppose the ministers.

In 1716 the large majority of the whig party knew from recent experience what it was like to be positively excluded by the court, so the mass of the party was less likely to be subservient to the earl's wishes prior to 1722 than it would be afterwards. Prince George was clearly not happy with the way that he had been treated by either his father or Stanhope and Sunderland. He had considerable electoral strength in Devon and Cornwall and could, if need be, undermine Sunderland's

efforts there. Greenwich was similarly unhappy and he could make inroads into the government's efforts in Scotland.¹⁷⁰

There was no guarantee that the association of Stanhope with Sunderland would survive under the strain of having to sustain themselves against a prolonged domestic attack. On the dismissal of the impeachment against Oxford, Sunderland was with the Marlborough group in withdrawing in a dissentient manner while Stanhope was not. In late 1717 the first earl Cadogan's military interests were in conflict with those of Stanhope (and those of the second earl of Scarborough) and the former was clearly associated with Sunderland since he was Marlborough's client. In October 1718 it was regarded as newsworthy that Stanhope should be staying at Sunderland's apartments while his own were being put in order, since there had been a rumour of rift between the two.¹⁷¹

The Townshend-Walpole group waited through winter and spring to see who it could persuade to join it in opposition. By April it was ready. Townshend voted against the ministry on the Mutiny bill which led to his dismissal.¹⁷² His allies resigned in support; in the Lords this meant Orford (1697) and Devonshire. Both had followings in the Commons and were additionally important in that they came from different strands of the party -the earl from the Junto and the duke more from the court/Marlborough side- therefore they had broad points of contact within the party.

The identification of 'whig' with 'court' was never to come into being. There was a close correlation that had

only just begun to exist. When the ministry did try to advance its interests it did so in what were not whig ways. Therefore, it was only able to call on part of the support that it could have had had these matters been matters of party interest.

Stanhope and Sunderland put far too much pressure on the correlation. The ministers were caught in a paradox- if they failed to act they would lose the ability to engage in positive government and if they acted they then ran the risk of being unable to govern. Only time could rescue them, the link of court with whig growing stronger and therefore being able to bear more stress. Just as with Stanhope being able to benefit from Townshend's awkwardness as the king's first northern secretary so the Townshend-Walpole group were to benefit from the Stanhope-Sunderland group's awkwardness in being the first court/whig ministry to try to defend itself against a transparty opposition. Had the Townshend-Walpole group met with no success then their ability to oppose would have lessened since they would have lost political currency within the opposition.

The 1718-1719 session of parliament saw the ministry first score a positive success over the repeals of the Occasional Conformity and Schism Acts. However, they then became over-confident and failed to repeal partially the Test Acts. It was over four years since the Succession, so the former repeals were not of pressing urgency to the whigs as a whole. The failures 1690 and 1709 were precedents for the failure of the attempt to repeal the Test Act.

During the subsequent parliamentary break Stanhope

had a showdown with the king over the German courtiers and their influence over British foreign policy (while the Britons lost theirs over Hanoverian foreign affairs).¹⁷³ Then Greenwich was brought in from opposition. Both points improved the ministry's domestic position, so they felt confident enough to embark on a bold legislative programme in the 1719-1720 session, to show that they held the initiative in terms of the political agenda.

For the 1719-1720 session it was decided to act firmly within whig persona prejudices and attack the tory domination of the two English universities. This was coupled with two bills that were intended to alter the hardware of politics. The first was the Peerage bill. This was to allow the peerage to be expanded slightly¹⁷⁴ and then make it into a limited body with replacements being allowed to be created only as then existing titles fell vacant. The second was to repeal the Septennial Act which would have meant that the parliament would continue as long as George I wished it to exist or lived. The repeal was probably attractive to many whigs. The expense of elections had grown steadily and the ministry was a whig one. However, there must have also been other whigs for whom it was quite unacceptable, it bearing a strong parallel to the circumstances that had allowed Danby to act so effectively as Charles II's parliamentary manager. The bills were ministerial in character rather than whig.

Sunderland and Stanhope miscalculated badly in deciding to promote the Peerage bill. The measure was unacceptable to the mass of the gentry and it was the gentry who made up the large majority of M.P.s.¹⁷⁵ They were hostile to what was an overt court measure which

sought to markedly change the existing socio-political system. The bill's loss meant that there was no hope of passing the repeal. The ministry had lost its control of the Commons. The only sure means of controlling the Commons was to bring the Townshend-Walpole group back into the ministerial fold. Bernstorff and Bothmer were keen to promote this.¹⁷⁶ This was both because of the way they had been treated over foreign policy by Stanhope and because the Peerage bill would have effectively killed any lingering hopes that the Germans at court had of entering the British peerage.

The peerage were important as individual players at court. The House of Lords itself was always firmly with the ministry. It was a theatre in which the opposition was able to provide a shadow to complement its activities in the Commons and at court, which were where the principal struggles were being waged. The Townshend-Walpole group were careful in the Lords to show that they were capable of being selective in their opposition and that they believed in the continuation of sound governmental practice.

In February 1718 the highest division on the Mutiny bill involved one hundred and sixty-eight votes and although the smallest majority was eleven there was never any real danger of the ministry losing its control of the Upper House. Other high divisions followed but none reached the same intensity. In opposing the bill Townshend was joined by Devonshire, Bristol, Greenwich, Tadcaster, the second duke of Rutland, the earl of Castleton, and the second earl of Scarbrough.¹⁷⁷ It was a broad cross-section

of whiggery rather than being a homogeneous representation of the Townshend-Walpole group, although Rutland had gravitated towards it. Scarborough was a close associate of prince George, and Castleton a kinsman of Scarborough.¹⁷⁸

The previous December relations between the prince and the king had deteriorated sufficiently for the former to be expelled from his apartments in St. James's palace.

Townshend and Walpole were careful to try to keep the prince and the tories from becoming too friendly. Walpole advised the prince not to vote against the Mutiny bill. This lack of solidarity achieved its result of greatly upsetting the tories.¹⁷⁹

The attack in the 1718-1719 session opened with an assault on the Address in Reply. The Bedchamber lord the third viscount Lonsdale showed that despite his place he was determined to conduct his own independent political line.¹⁸⁰ Townshend and Walpole decided to shelve their whiggishness and opposed the repeal of the Schism and Occasional Conformity Acts.¹⁸¹ In the Lords the highest division on the matter involved one hundred and seventy-two votes while the smallest majority was sixteen. The Peerage bill crisis occurred in December in the Commons, where the government found that it would not be able to pass the measure through that House.

As the ministry lost the legislative initiative so the 1719-1720 session became quieter in the Lords than its predecessor had been. Late in the session there was a majority of sixty-three from a vote of ninety-seven on the South Sea Company Annuities bill. This was not the Townshend-Walpole group opposing but rather an indication that the company with its role in governmental finance

occupied a special place in the collective psyche of the Lords prior to the advent of the Bubble. It was less than a decade since the Company's establishment and it had had to metamorphose from its Harleyite origins into something that was more acceptable to the crown.

The unhappiness of the duke of Newcastle (1715) with his colleagues' proposed legislative programme was important. During the session it looked as though Newcastle and others of the ministry's young magnate backers were wavering in their support;¹⁸² the second duke of Bolton was happy to leave his proxy with the third earl of Burlington who was in turn involved with the proxies of the whig opposition.¹⁸³ If people of this type fell away the ministry would not be viable in either House. Therefore, there was another pressing reason for the ministry to accommodate the Townshend-Walpole group.

5.4.3.2. The Whigs and the Court, 1720-1733.

On May 24th 1733 the government was technically defeated on the South Sea Company Stock bill. This was the only occasion under the first two Georges that such occurred on a major governmental piece of legislation. It happened for a variety of reasons: the Excise Crisis was in full flight, although the Excise bill itself had been dropped; the ministry made the mistake of allowing a controversial bill into the Upper House before tempers had cooled properly; and there was a sizable opposition in existence. The Crisis had been avoidable.

The cause of ousting Sir Robert Walpole had come to be one behind which a sizable opposition had gathered. It was this that was the principal long-term reason for the defeat. In 1720 he had been one of a number of front rank politicians. He outlasted all of his colleagues so that in 1730 he became the first prime minister, the sole leader of a one party ministry. He survived because he continued to provide the crown with what it wanted while his colleagues either died, retired or went into opposition. Walpole's positive achievement was remaining at the centre while his contemporaries departed from it by one means or another.

Stanhope died in February 1721 and Sunderland in April 1722. Most of those who had supported them in the late 1710s were happy to sit back and collect the rewards of office, e.g. Cadogan. Many probably had only supported them as the crown's chosen ministers, rather than having any deeper commitment e.g. Bolton.¹⁸⁴ The second earl of Godolphin had been associated with the Sunderland group

but made a clean conversion into being a supporter of Townshend and Walpole but not until after Sunderland's death. Godolphin's son-in-law, Newcastle, who was also Townshend's brother-in-law, had been an important figure in the overthrow of the previous ministry working from the inside. Therefore, he was admitted into the inner workings of government, but again it was after Sunderland's death.¹⁸⁵ The second earl of Yarmouth, and presumably the other poor lords, retained his loyalty to the earl.¹⁸⁶

People who were positively hostile were slowly ousted as they provided opportunities through their own corruptness, incompetence or lack of political judgement. However, just because many of those who disliked the ministers departed, it would be wrong to assume that their replacements were strongly pro-Townshend and Walpole. Many of those who came into office would have done so had the two not been taken back into office in 1720. Therefore, they would not have felt a compulsion to be 'pro', which was acceptable just so long as they were not too positively 'anti.'

Under George I the third earl of Berkeley's continuation as first lord of the Admiralty was a sign of the pair's weakness. He was a leading member of the ministry, as his being consulted on the treaty of Hanover shows.¹⁸⁷ He was distinctly independent of the duumvirate. In 1727 he paid the price for that independence and was dismissed. George II was careful to retain the other ministers that George I used to control his principal ministers.

Secretary Carteret overextended his diplomatic abilities in trying to procure a French dukedom for the

prospective son-in-law of the countess von Platen in 1723. Failure embarrassed him with George I and consequently the baron was demoted to the lord lieutenancy of Ireland, which he resigned in 1730 because of the level of protests there over Wood's Halfpence scheme.¹⁸⁸ It should be held in mind that Carteret chose to resign and was not dismissed. He may well have seen resignation as being in his own best interest in view of the internal state of the ministry at that juncture.

William Pulteney (later earl of Bath (1742)) was another key member of the group who had gone into opposition in 1717 and returned with it in 1720. In early April 1725 he went into opposition over the meeting of new civil list debts. However, this seems to have been an excuse rather than a cause in itself. He later regretted not having waited and done so over the treaty of Hanover later in the year.¹⁸⁹

Walpole had learnt the lesson of the Stanhope-Sunderland ministry that it was dangerous to engage in a positive domestic political programme unless it was more dangerous not to. However, he did not just sit tight and have his colleagues and enemies disappear from the running. Rather he had to perform the duties that were required of him as first lord of the Treasury. The first of these was the South Sea Bubble Crisis. Largely through Walpole having the good judgement to implement Robert Jacombe's scheme the Bank of England was brought in to mount a rescue operation, so that a worsening of the situation was prevented and a retrenchment of the overall financial system was made possible.¹⁹⁰ His behaviour was

essentially a response and this was to be the hallmark of his successful politics- letting sleeping dogs lie.

The prospect of the accession of George II was a problem that there was no guarantee of the Townshend-Walpole ministry surmounting. The group weathered the event because the new king did not have any positive new views on how domestic politics should be run, because the new queen felt that Townshend and especially Walpole were the best men to do so and because Sir Spencer Compton (later the earl of Wilmington) was unable to obtain a suitably generous civil list from the Commons.¹⁹¹

1725 saw Townshend embark on his ambitious foreign policy. This started because neither the peace of Utrecht nor Cape Passaro had resolved the problems of Austro-Spanish conflict. The French proved unhelpful to their Spanish allies, because they were preoccupied with their own internal affairs. These necessitated that Louis XV have a son and heir. His betrothed Spanish infanta was too young to provide one in the short-term future. Therefore, she was returned and the king married an appropriately aged Polish princess. This turned the Spaniards against France and motivated them to try to set their own international affairs in order. The result was that the former enemies Austria and Spain signed the Alliance of Vienna in 1725. This development changed the whole nature of power relations in Europe.¹⁹²

Townshend was forced to respond to these developments, otherwise Britain and the electorate might well be left isolated and therefore their interests unguarded. If he failed he would lose his interest with George and no longer be a viable minister. The viscount

was caught out in his reaction because the causes of Austria and Spain's mutual antagonism were too deeply rooted to be overcome; their 'friendship' broke down and Europe started to move back to its pre-1725 state of affairs. The overall process took some five years and was brought to a conclusion by Walpole and the southern secretary Newcastle when they concluded the treaty of Seville with Spain in 1730. This was designed to forestall their clashing interests from causing a war rather than to conclude an alliance.

Relations between Walpole and Townshend had broken down for a number of reasons; by 1728 each was prepared to plot against the other.¹⁹³ Seville made it clear that the viscount had been outmanoeuvred by his erstwhile colleague. For Walpole to have been able to conclude the treaty meant that he had the support of the king in the matter, ergo, Townshend did not possess as close a relationship with George II as he had formerly had. As with 1717, Townshend chose to resign rather than to play a subsidiary role. He had paid the price for the nature of the office which he occupied. Neither the viscount's departure nor his subsequent political passivity were pre-ordained. It was Townshend's misfortune that the international situation was the way it was and that the Alliance of Vienna was concluded.

The opposition to Walpole in 1733 was made up of both whigs and tories and therefore could command large numbers in both Houses. This was because pre-conditions for such an opposition had come into being and then a vehicle for it to use had appeared. Cooperation was possible because

party differences had not been stressed for nearly a decade. Walpole wanted to make the management of domestic politics as untroublesome for himself as he could. A good means to bring down the political temperature was to immobilize the tory party as a legitimate medium for opposition. This in turn would make his chosen task easier.

The Layer plot effectively disabled the tories for several years. Walpole had agents scour Europe in search of Jacobite activity. This was to provide him with material to re-awaken the domestic fears that the plot had raised.¹⁹⁴ To engage in parliamentary dialogue with the tories as a party would have gone against his object since it would have suggested that they were an organization for legitimate political expression. Therefore, not only did he attack them as supposed Jacobites but he also made sure that they were given few opportunities to appear as a party. Therefore, politics was practised in an increasingly less inter-party manner. Therefore, Walpole, in order to make his political task easier, actually laid the groundwork for a new trans-party opposition to emerge.

Bolingbroke's past was too notorious to allow him to act other than as a consultant, but it was he who probably did the most to enliven the new opposition. He had used his skill at court manipulation in order to prepare the groundwork for his pardon and legal return to Britain. Walpole was presented with something of a *fait accompli* since the viscount had successfully bribed the duchess of Kendal, the royal mistress, into acting on his behalf, so there was a vested court interest working on his behalf. Harcourt and the third earl of Berkeley had also been

campaigning for his return.¹⁹⁵ The Bedchamber lord Essex temporarily defected to the opposition on this matter, his family having a close association with Bolingbroke.

Walpole did not feel it would be in his own best interests with the court to make a stand on the issue and therefore bent on the matter, although making it clear he was not happy. In the Lords votes on the Bolingbroke estates bill both Devonshire and Orford (1697) were in the minority.¹⁹⁶ That they were doing so was as a sign that the group viewed the viscount's return with distaste.

Among the whig opponents to Bolingbroke's return were Coventry, Bristol and Warrington.¹⁹⁷ Initially it might seem rather ironic that these three should object to the viscount's return to the British political scene, since he was to advocate successfully that the opposition adopt a country programme.¹⁹⁸ They saw him as what his past made career made him out to be- an arch-courtier. However, they themselves had solid court backgrounds. Bristol is the best candidate for a true country whig in the Lords, but he had a large number of relatives, including his wife and eldest son (baron Hervey) who held court office. Warrington's father had received a pension from William III, the arrears of which enabled both Oxford and Walpole to exert a degree of influence over the son. Finally, Coventry as a commoner had no objections to using corrupt means to secure office but felt that the rates that Walpole was charging were extortionate.¹⁹⁹

Just as the overall character of the opposition was not homogeneous, neither was that of its whig elements. There were three broad elements prior to 1733: the first

were the relics of Cowper's party, the likes of Warrington and Bristol; second the the young men who began to gather after 1730, many of them were magnates with distinctly whig backgrounds; and third Carteret who, along with his associates, felt himself to be a courtier unduly ousted. These three categories are loose and were by no means mutually exclusive. The middle one was separated from the other two by age while the other two were divided from one another by attitudes adopted in the mid 1720s.

After the 1722 general election the duke of Wharton summarized the situation as being "that Lord Cowper is at the head of the Tories and Lord H(arcour)t at the a--- of the Whigs."²⁰⁰ Cowper's ability, and therefore his importance to the opposition, is testified by there being thirty-seven divisions during the session. The basic relationship of divisions to protests in this session was that the latter followed on from the former. He had the process snowball on itself so that there ended up being divisions about protests which in turn promoted still further protests. The body of the signatories was made up of tories but its heart was made up of whigs.²⁰¹ This activity was engineered with respect to the approaching general election which was due under the Septennial Act in 1722.

Cowper had success in exploiting individual issues to make some of the government's non-core supporters defect temporarily. In appreciation of how fluid the political situation could be, the ministry was careful to look after the likes of Somerset and the second duke of Montagu.²⁰² In May 1722 Somerset and Cowper had been approached by Carleton and Carteret. However, a full-blown cooperation

was not to develop, the Layer Plot and Cowper's death ending that brief era of whig opposition.

In January 1725 the future second earl of Oxford *²⁰² copresented a petition to parliament on behalf of deranged, doddering, double dowager duchess of Albemarle and Montagu (and empress of China to herself). This was manipulated by the ministry and turned into an investigation into the practices in Chancery, which in turn led to the impeachment of the first earl of Macclesfield (1721), who had been a Stanhope-Sunderland supporter. Both Bridgwater and the second earl of Scarborough voted on the earl's behalf in some of the divisions.²⁰³ There were protests that were signed by opposition whigs such as Lechmere and Wharton and government ones like Greenwich, Sussex (1717), the first earl of Halifax (1715), the fourth earl of Carlisle, the first earl of Pomfret,²⁰⁴ the first earl of Harborough and the second duke of Manchester.²⁰⁵ The impeachment was a partisan action by the ministry: it was not a crown action. Therefore, there was no compulsion for government supporters to act with the Townshend-Walpole group.

The opposition rumbled on, unable to make any advance, waiting upon either the crown or the ministry's internal condition to change the overall state of politics. Scottish affairs were occasionally sensitive: the Malt bill was contentious in 1725 and in January 1727 there was a turn-out of one hundred and nineteen on the earl Graham's case. The Malt bill had caused sizable divisions. Relations between Britain and Spain remained bad during the 1720s although Passaro acted as a deterrent to their deterioration into outright war. The conduct of

foreign affairs gave the prospect of opportunities for future agitation. In 1724 and 1726 there were divisions on Spain.

In February 1726 the prince's associate Scarbrough complimented Strafford (1711) on the part he had played in making the treaty of Utrecht. Whether this was a sign of how close Strafford was to the prince or the prince was to Strafford is unclear.²⁰⁶ Bristol was the only whig who voted with the minority.²⁰⁷ The existence of a reversionary interest was always a destabilizing feature in Hanoverian politics (it would probably have been over 1689-1714 but for Anne's determination choosing to prevent it from doing so). What degree it would be was indeterminable prior to the event and it thus hung as a sword of Damocles over the political situation.

When the sword dropped in 1727 its effect was to quieten politics as no one wished to antagonize the new king. Therefore, the 1728 session was very quiet. The 1729 session was livelier because those hopes were not met and because of the unsettled state of relations with Spain. The number of topics on which there were high divisions grew. The following session was similar because there was the treaty of Seville to debate. In addition, there emerged the staples of the Lords political divisions for the decade- the passage of the Mutiny Act and the defeat of the Pension bill.²⁰⁸

During the 1730 session the whig opposition regulars found themselves joined on the Pension bill by some younger whigs- the fourth duke of Bedford, the ninth earl of Huntingdon, the third duke of Marlborough and the first earl Kerr. Bridgwater joined them. Their motives are

obscure, but they are unlikely to have been country inspired idealism. In March Lonsdale and the second baron Cadogan were against the ministry on the question of the Pension bill, the two having usually acted previously as court supporters. In the 1731 session the Pension bill protest was signed afresh by the fourth earl of Gainsborough, the second duke of Ancaster and the sixteenth baron Abergavenny. In the 1732 session the Mutiny bill saw the fourth earl of Shaftesbury with the opposition. New protestors to the Mutiny bill were Carteret, his crony the eighth earl of Winchelsea and the seventh earl of Suffolk.²⁰⁹ A number of whigs in opposition followed Carteret in regarding themselves as loyal courtiers who were in adverse circumstances. Despite its composite character the opposition was expanding rapidly in the Lords. The young peers were more prone to being systematic in their opposition.

The 1732 session's one new measure to generate a large number of divisions was the Salt Duties bill. This was designed to improve the Excise revenue. It gave political capital to the opposition because it left the ministry open to the suggestion that it was trying to expand the number of revenue men for its own ulterior motives; the addition of new Excise votes in certain key boroughs would have helped the ministry in its Commons strength. In itself the scheme was a sensible measure which allowed due money to be collected far more efficiently, there having been a number of minor precursors relating to other goods. The bill passed into law and the ministry decided to try to extend the

system.²¹⁰ This played into the hands of the opposition. Christmas 1732 saw its leaders gather at Cassiobury, Essex's seat. The organizer of this meeting was almost certainly Bolingbroke, since he had close relations with the Capels.²¹¹

There were Mutiny and Pension divisions in the 1733 session and opposition was expected on the Excise bill. Surprise came in the number and the calibre of the whig defections on the measure. Scarborough, Burlington, the first earl Clinton, the third duke of Bolton, the fourth earl of Chesterfield and viscount Cobham were all prominent court whigs.²¹² There was a distinct danger that other senior ones would follow and that then the rank and file would be drawn after them and a snowball effect acquired from which recovery might not be possible. Wilmington and Dorset were watched, although neither did defect in the event.²¹³ The previous session Scarborough had supported the Salt Duties bill and in this one he had been a warm advocate of the Mutiny bill.²¹⁴ That he and the others should act in this way had probably been encouraged by the tolerance shown in the previous sessions. That they felt able to act in this manner in the short-term probably derived from the measure appearing to be Walpole's child and that George II was not seen as being connected with it. Whether the intention of these courtiers was to bring down the minister or not is unclear. There is no evidence as to their precise motives. It is probable that the crisis had roots in the conduct of foreign policy and possibly in old whig suspicions as to the power of the prerogative. There were no divisions on the issue in the Lords. On April 22nd Walpole withdrew the

measure from parliamentary consideration.

The general state of political crisis continued in the Lords. This was because of the South Sea Company Stock bill. This affair has been obscured by the Excise bill when in fact they were two separate matters that happened to occur in close chronological proximity to one another. Paul Langford has written of their conjunction "when the excise was dropped without coming to the upper House, a new target had to be selected."²¹⁵ This carries an air of an immediate swop being made and suggests that had the South Sea Company Stock bill not been handy a White Herring or Paving bill would have sufficed. Although there was almost without doubt a considerable transfer of 'momentum of opposition,' Langford's handling of the matter overlooks that the company touched a particular nerve in Westminster politics and especially so with the Lords; this had been so prior to the Bubble. The post-Bubble session had been the crisis that never broke. There had been no great divisions then, but this masked the very high attendance that occurred that session. Although Walpole had handled that affair well, this adeptness appeared only after the gravity of the matter was fully evident. Plumb's work on the Great Man's pattern of share purchasing has shown that he was by no means financially omniscient with respect to the company.²¹⁶ In 1733, when legislating with relation to it, Walpole may have allowed his blind spot to obscure the probable political repercussions. In addition, he did not run the day-to-day affairs of the House of Lords, this having been Townshend's preserve until 1730 and then Newcastle's.²¹⁷ The short-term mistakes were not necessarily Sir Robert's.

The crisis peaked on May 24th, when the two sides drew seventy-five apiece in the Lords and the government lost its only post-Succession division in the period on a technicality relating to drawn votes.²¹⁸ Greenwich, Falmouth, Somerset, Kent, Fitzwalter, St. Albans, Manchester, Macclesfield (1721), Pomfret and Cornwallis all voted with the opposition, while Onslow spoke for it but did not divide.²¹⁹ The ministry soon re-asserted its control of the House. This may have been in part through material concessions on the item. The vote on June 5th was won by a majority of five. St. Albans, Manchester, Harborough, Falmouth, Cornwallis and Onslow had all previously either voted against the court or abstained.²²⁰ This time they voted with it, while Greenwich withdrew. Cobham and Chesterfield were new protestors that session. On June 2nd they signed one relating to the company.

By 1733 a fairly sizable opposition had come together. What made it so dangerous was that a band of courtiers suddenly started to cooperate with it. That Walpole was not liked by many of his colleagues was well known, but that they should actually act in outright opposition to him does not seem to have been expected by contemporaries. Foreign policy was a major factor in Walpole's relations with other senior office-holders there.

The crisis had been predated by the February 1733 death of king Augustus II of Poland. That event signalled the start of another Franco-Austrian conflict. Walpole disliked the idea of another European war because such would make the Commons harder to manage and in the event of either any setback or it having a prolonged length the

crown would be susceptible through its financial needs to a potentially hostile Commons and with such a state of affairs he himself would be in an exposed position. However, within the ministry there were a number of elements that almost certainly desired British involvement in the War of the Polish Succession.²²¹ It is to be noted that a number of the Excise defectors held military positions- Cobham, Bolton and Scarborough, and of the defectors later in the 1730s Greenwich was an officer.

In 1730 Townshend had isolated himself by veering away from what had come to be accepted as the whig foreign policy of supporting Austria against France. In 1733 Walpole was not keen on going to war as doing so would mean having to raise taxes and thereby make the Commons harder to handle. Therefore, probably with the Alliance of Vienna still in mind, he decided to avoid having even a whig foreign policy, evading the Austro-British alliance by means of the technicality that the relevant treaty termed itself a defensive one and that the Austrians had actually initiated the military phase of the conflict and therefore could be held to be the aggressors, so that the document had no bearing in the circumstance.²²²

The soldiers and their associates were probably aware of what drift Walpole's policy would take, if it was not then already clear. Therefore, they may have sought to isolate, if not necessarily oust, him and force a return to a 'traditional' whig policy. The Excise bill would have been seen as an extension of the prerogative by earlier whigs. Therefore, Scarborough's espousal of the Mutiny bill and his opposition to the Excise one were facets of a consistent approach to politics. His and his associates'

miscalculation was that they underestimated the degree to which George II would back his minister if driven to it and that Walpole's non-interventionism at that time would provide the king with a foreign policy which the king found acceptable.

In the Excise bill the ministry made a bad choice of measure. For over a decade Walpole was careful not to engage in a programme of positive domestic legislation. The bill was a limited technical item which was intended to make the collection of revenue more efficient. It had been preceded by similar bills in previous sessions. His own previous success in this area of legislation was probably the factor which caused Walpole to introduce the measure. There was no necessity for introducing it. There was no way in which it could be viewed as a whig piece of legislation. Therefore, it was a court measure. However, it was not one in which George II had any positive interest, ergo, it appeared solely as a Walpolean bill devoid of redeeming feature. It was highly susceptible to being manipulated for propaganda purposes. Bolingbroke, with his long residence in France, was brilliantly placed to point out the parallels that could be made between the scheme and the hated gabelle across the Channel.

5.4.3.3. The Whigs and the Court, 1733-1742.

Walpole fell in 1742. This was because of disaffection within the system that he had so long been manipulating in order to maintain himself on power. However, such disaffection would have been ineffective unless there had been considerable external pressure against the Great Man's continuation in power. Without the two working in collusion he might well have continued in office until death. The character of disaffection, both inside and outside the ministry, and their interaction, is the principal tale of the Lords in these years.

The Crisis had a detrimental effect on the ministry's performance in the 1734 general election, however, it retained a working majority even if it was a smaller one than in the previous parliament.²²³ However, the opposition had its own problems. In 1735 Bolingbroke opted to go into voluntary retirement in France. By the mid-1730s Pulteney and the opposition whigs had absorbed all that he seemed likely to produce and he had given no indication that he would engage in innovatory activity. The Great Man was aware that his enemy was now regarded as a peripheral figure by the opposition. Therefore, he started a concerted campaign against his old enemy by means of the press and by working on the fears of the independents in the Commons.²²⁴ The eight years that followed it lacked any innovative political conduct, which meant that Walpole was able to conduct his defense by drawing upon his past experience.

Divisions centring on Mutiny Acts and Pension bills were regular features of the opposition's activity against

Walpole. The Mutiny Act was one of the means by which parliament retained a check on the activities of the crown. It was the successful passage of the Mutiny Act which enabled the crown to have a legal basis for maintaining discipline within the armed forces, otherwise its actions to retain such would have been arbitrary and illegal. To have stopped one would have proven that the ministry had lost the confidence of parliament. In contrast the Pension bill was a positive action by the opposition which sought to curtail the crown's influence on the Commons by limiting the number of placemen who could sit in it. Again, for it to have passed parliament would have shown that the ministry was incapable of continuing. Both lines of attack fed off old country fears of the court- an extended executive perpetuating its own existence at cost to both British liberties and purses. The principal point of these attacks was to act as a focus for the opposition and to try to skim some support from the government benches.

The confrontations took place principally in the Commons where many whigs still clung on to some country beliefs even if they saw support of Walpole as being normally the best means of aiding whiggery. The Excise Crisis aside, Walpole was prepared to act well within the Revolution Settlement. In the early 1730s Pension bills regularly appeared in the Upper House. This was because the ministry let them through the Commons since it felt that to quash them there would be detrimental to the long-term management of the Lower House. However, the Excise Crisis changed Walpole's management style so that he had such bills halted there. Mutiny Acts had been

contested prior to the Crisis and became the great regular rallying point of opposition in the Lords after Pension bills ceased to reach the House.

Opposition rallying points did not necessarily have the same effectiveness in both the Houses due to the differences in the two Chambers' respective characters. There was a sizable element in the whig opposition in the Upper House who regarded themselves as displaced courtiers. Such people, of whom a substantial further minority had held army commands, were loath to so directly oppose the court.

The whig opposition's heterogeneous nature led it to have a tendency to splinter. Those who had the greatest tendency not only not to vote with the opposition but actually change sides and do so with the ministry were the courtiers such as Carteret and Scarbrough. Although Scarbrough was with the opposition on the question of the Augmentation of the Forces in March 1734, the previous month he had been careful to leave his proxy with the ministry for a vote on the Officers' Commissions bill.²²⁵ In February 1735 the opposition tried to make political capital out of the government's manipulation of the elections for the sixteen representative peers from Scotland. Somerset came especially to parliament in order to vote in the matter. However, Carteret voted with the government.²²⁶ In 1736 Carteret, Cobham, Winchelsea and Chesterfield were all in the defeated Walpolean minority on the Mortmain bill.²²⁷ In 1737 Scarbrough voted with the government on the civil list, while young whigs of the likes of Shaftesbury and the eleventh baron Clifton abstained.²²⁸

The 1737 session was dominated by the Porteous Riots. The ministry was unsure as how to introduce the matter of an inquiry into the House. Although Carteret disapproved of the ministry's response to the event, his social sensibilities were such that he felt unable to make political capital out of the matter and therefore raised the matter in tones which condemned the riots, thereby defusing any opposition attack that might have been planned.²²⁹ Being a courtier by nature he would have been well aware of how George II's social sensibilities would have been affected by the matter. In 1738 Scarbrough helped the ministry squeeze its Privileges bill through by a majority of one.²³⁰ The same session saw Marlborough change over to the ministry. He accepted a regiment in March and a place in the Bedchamber in August.

The flirtation with the ministry that some of the courtier opposition had been engaging in largely ceased in the late 1730s. First, the adhesion of Greenwich, Falmouth and prince Frederick to the opposition lent it a new seriousness.²³¹ Many M.P.s would have followed them over the divide and it was probable that they would be joined by many more at the next election. The other factor was the war. Walpole had been forced into it, clearly against his will, so he was now positively perceived as vulnerable. Also it was no longer practical to oppose measures such as the Mutiny Act, so the opposition was quieter than it might otherwise have been.

In the Lords the ministry did not run into trouble on the scale on the South Sea Company Stock bill again. The principal factor that accounted for this was that the

crown's behaviour had spelt out the lesson that even if its support for its chosen minister was latent it was still support until an indication was given otherwise. This message was clear but it left the question- Was the private politician, who was the king's minister, to be supported when he was not acting as the king's minister?

In the Excise Crisis retribution occurred before the session's end. The dismissals were partial rather than wholesale. Bolton and Cobham were removed from their regiments, while Clinton and Chesterfield were dismissed from the Household. The departures of Burlington and Scarbrough from office were both voluntary. The former had known aspirations to become lord privy seal. These were clearly ignored when the office was conferred upon Lonsdale, a person who had independently-inclined voting habits. Scarbrough resigned as master of the Horse in February 1734 because of the king's sustained coldness towards him. Neither man could claim to have been dismissed.²³² During the summer Scarbrough had expressed gladness that Somerset was using the Petworth electoral interest on behalf of the Pelham interest in Sussex. This echoed the way in which Somerset had remained resolutely whig in electoral matters in 1710 so the earl was a ministerial whig in the general election of 1734.²³³

Departure from government and entry into full, outright hostility were frequently connected but are not directly comparable. These six were clearly associated with the Excise bill rather than the South Sea Company Stock one, an indication of there being layers to the crisis rather than it being of just one singular character. The limited number of actual dismissals was a

sign that the crown did not wish to push too many courtiers towards opposition. The choice of snubbing Burlington via the likes of Lonsdale was indicative that the crown was still willing to tolerate heterogeneity, even if the overriding message was that it would not allow its overall running of affairs to be questioned. These gave the clear message that although the king might not appear to be actively interested in everything that his first minister did, Walpole was his chosen minister until matters were signified otherwise.

Tolerance was to be shown in later distributions of office. After the 1735 session the sixth earl of Westmorland was dismissed as first lord of Trade, although he was allowed to retain his regiment. His replacement was Fitzwalter, who had voted with the opposition on the question of the Scottish Peers' Petition in the same session.²³⁴ The bestowal may have been intended to keep Fitzwalter in line. Perhaps he had promoted himself through displaying his nuisance value. However, this should not rule out that the crown sought to maintain a breadth of attitude among its senior office-holders. Even if he had allowed himself to be converted into a supporter of the ministry that did not necessarily mean that the man had become a Walpolite. The factor that was probably uppermost in his favour was that he was the husband of the daughter of the late third duke of Schomberg, who was a considerable court favourite in her own right. The ancient origins of Fitzwalter's barony may have given him a lustre in George's eyes in the way the Norman ones of the twentieth earl of Oxford's helped promote him to successive royal Bedchambers. Fitzwalter is best seen as

the king's man.²³⁵

Another change among the senior offices in 1735 was caused by Lonsdale's resignation from the privy seal. Egmont, the opposition diarist, ascribes this to a dislike of the general management of public affairs, although he admitted there was no particular incident that promoted the action, whereas Hervey the memoirist of the ministry saw it as being indicative of a general inclination towards retirement.²³⁶ The precise reason for the decision can not be ascertained. The differing contemporary perspectives of the two sources probably gave rise to the variance between their perceptions. Contemporaries did not always see political actions in a singular light and indeed people could change their justification to suit the prejudice of their audience.

The place went to Godolphin, who was to prove a loyal lieutenant to Walpole. However, Sir Robert's first choice was Scarbrough, to whose return he sought and obtained the queen's approval. The proposal foundered on the man's refusal to be brought back in. It was only after this initiative had failed that Godolphin was selected as successor to the viscount. However, the king was suspicious of Godolphin because he had been a page-boy to James II. George's prejudice was largely neutralized by the assurance that while the earl had had some personal attachment to that king it was not of a political variety and that he possessed neither sentiment for the person of the Old Pretender. The monarch overrode his own prejudices when it was pointed out that the appointment would save him the considerable pension that he granted the earl on his retiring as groom earlier that year.

That Pension bills were no longer reaching the Lords can be seen as indicative of Walpole's having become more intolerant of political divergence after the Crisis. However, it is clear from incidents of Lonsdale's receipt of the privy seal and Fitzwalter's becoming first lord of Trade that even after the Excise Crisis Walpole did not dominate the appointments to senior office with his nominees and that he was prepared to have as colleagues men who held distinctly ambivalent attitudes towards him if such helped in his overall management of political affairs. In the long run it was better that he have some dissentient colleagues and the crown be happy than he have congenial colleagues and the crown be dissatisfied.

The key variable in this instance was queen Caroline. That she supported him politically is clear¹⁹¹ but if she was capable of coming to a decision that he was good for the dynasty she was also probably capable of assessing what limitations should be placed upon his behaviour. The prime minister may have been seeking to defuse any objections she might have had as to his becoming too comfortable. There is no evidence to delineate her exact influence on senior ministerial appointments in these years. It may well have been her influence that had kept Britain out of the War of the Polish Succession. She died in 1737 and Britain entered into the War of Jenkins's Ear in 1739.

The South Sea Company had ostensibly been created for trading with the Spanish possessions in South America. In the wake of the Bubble, this aspect was able to emerge. In the late 1730s relations with Spain began to deteriorate markedly again, notably over the conduct of this colonial

commerce. For the same reasons that Walpole had sought to avoid involvement in the War of the Polish Succession, he was against any line of policy that would take the nation into open conflict. However, George was now willing to accept such and a number of the knight's close colleagues positively believed in its necessity.²³⁷ The behaviour of Newcastle with respect to the treaty of Seville had shown that the duke was capable of trying to pursue what he felt was the best line for the ministry even if his superior was not. The duke was joined on this by his brother Henry Pelham, by his fellow secretary the first earl of Harrington and by the chancellor the first earl of Hardwicke.²³⁸ The four, in conjunction with those senior office-holders who had no particular loyalty to Walpole, effectively isolated the minister. Rather than resign, as Townshend had, the Great Man stayed on, heading his ministry rather than leading it. The colonial War of Jenkins's Ear turned into the full-blown European conflict of the War of the Austrian Succession, which meant that both the crown and its first minister moved nearer towards being placed in situations where they might have to be politically malleable against their wishes.

Against such a background it was to be expected that the state of Walpole's relations with the Pelham group experienced considerable stress when Godolphin declared his desire to stand down from being lord privy seal. It was a long-standing wish which had been deferred through the man's loyalty to Walpole; this postponement had been reciprocated by an understanding not to question the earl's decision when he decided to go through with it. In 1739 Godolphin stated that he wished to resign. This

raised the question- Who was going to succeed him? Both the king and the Pelham group were happy that it should be a Walpolite, but the latter found that this view of theirs was conditional when Sir Robert selected baron Hervey. The baron had a record of acting as a loyal lieutenant to the prime minister; they had had a shared patroness in the late queen. However, Hervey had not found his position incompatible with regularly antagonizing some of their colleagues. One of his particular victims had been Newcastle. Therefore, it was the duke, in a state of near hysteria, who led the group's opposition to the appointment. The affair reached a point where the four seriously contemplated a collective resignation. Matters were eventually smoothed down so that Hervey's receipt of the office was accepted.²³⁹ If Walpole gained any benefit from the episode, it was more than nullified by the resultant trauma that had been caused to the internal state of the ministry.

In his new position Hervey was not to prove the most reliable of lieutenants. In June 1739, by which time it had become clear that Walpole was on the wane, he combined successfully with Henry Fox in advocating that his intimate friend Stephen Fox (the future earl of Ilchester) become the junior secretary to the Treasury even though the prime minister did not want the man in the office. The success of this manoeuvre was another sign of Sir Robert's decline.²⁴⁰

When George II went to Hanover in the summer of 1740, the lord justices quarrelled amongst themselves. As John Owen noticed, Hardwicke remarked that when George was present he "was a kind of centre of unity, at least his

final opinion concluded everybody else..." The remark carries the air that George tended to influence ministerial discussions by ending them rather than by leading them, that the then internal state of the ministry was decidedly fractious and that the fractiousness was not necessarily anything other than the standard state of relations between the senior office-holders. Walpole's disinclination to have large or frequent cabinets is understandable, as the cabinet, with its fractiousness, was a tool for the Georges. ²⁴¹

The way in which Walpole's cabinet colleagues did not necessarily owe their places in it to him was illustrated by his surprise at the second duke of Richmond's offer after his fall. This was to resign in solidarity even though the duke had not come to the position through the prime minister's influence. ²⁴²

The fact that Walpole was not at one with his colleagues on the issue of entry into the War of Jenkins's Ear has long been known. ²⁴³ Through the means of printed sources it has long been possible to show that there a broader situation of having colleagues who were independent of him and that he was prepared not only to tolerate it but to positively encourage it upon occasion. Through Plumb deciding to stop his monograph on Walpole in 1734 modern historiography has been denied a most interesting treatment of this matter. In the wake of the Excise Crisis it would have been evident that having a cabinet packed full of Walpoleans was not in the minister's best long-term interests. Manipulation of the political situation rather than domination of it was the best means of prolonged survival. The toleration of

heterogeneity enabled the ministry to appeal to those court whigs who did not feel a particular debt to the private politician. However, Walpole was not safe in perpetuity. He had to act as the king's minister and such necessitated at times going against the general tone of his political conduct. He was caught out by the general desire for war (a desire which he may have created in large part because he had helped take war and its immediate economic consequences out of the recent experience of the political nation). This meant that he had to engage in activity and thus go against his policy of general inactivity, which the Excise Crisis had underlined, since war meant that he was exposing himself to political risk. The danger of such a situation had always been inherent in his position. Had Townshend been able to boast a positive success from his foreign policy in 1730 it would have been the viscount who would have been in the stronger political position.

On 30 May 1738 Walpole spent a large amount of effort in defeating Pulteney's Commons motion on the searching of Spanish ships, only to see his victory made redundant by a stronger motion being easily passed in the Lords the same day.²⁴⁴ Although foreign affairs were not his principal concern, it was clear that the minister was out of step with both his colleagues and the king on that area of government. As the Treasury minister and overall manager of domestic political affairs he was secure in not having failed in either of his own principal areas of concern. In this way the situation was different from that of Townshend in 1730, therefore, he felt able to continue in

office. Townshend lived to see the discomfiture of Walpole before dying in June 1738.

The 1739 session saw a number of recent inheritors join the opposition- the second baron Raymond, the second earl Stanhope, the second baron Talbot, the seventh earl of Westmorland and the Scottish representative peer the second duke of Buccleuch.²⁴⁵ Greenwich assumed a position as near-leadership as the whig opposition ever gathered behind. Chesterfield was happy to act as a lieutenant to the duke while Carteret preferred to stand apart.²⁴⁶ (The hardening of the political lines in the Lords may have weighed heavily on the likes of Carteret. It was possibly a contributory factor to Scarborough's January 1740 suicide.)

The session was dominated by relations with Spain, the Augmentation of the Forces, the South Sea Company and the Sugar Colonies bill. The four were connected with one another. There was some distinct wavering. Such could be reasonably be expected from the likes of Scarborough, Lonsdale, Essex and Greenwich, but these were joined by usually passive courtiers such as the earl of Portsmouth and the first earl of Leicester (1744). Montagu gave some concern since he was seen as a figure whose defection would be the signal for others to follow.²⁴⁷ Although very wealthy his danger was not so much from his standing in the party but rather that he held attitudes that reflected those of many of his fellow court whigs. However, the potential effectiveness of the opposition had been rather undermined by the overall drift of the ministry, which led the actual debates on the Convention of Pardo to be something of an anti-climax. Had Walpole's views

predominated the session would have probably been far more confrontational.²⁴⁸ The 1739-1740 session did not see the opposition make any new advances. This was because the war was generally popular and no serious gaffes had been made in its management.

The 1740-1741 session opened in the late autumn as an indicator of the seriousness that was given to parliament's participation in its management, there being an imminent general election. Among the new waverers were the earl Brooke and the fourth earl of Sandwich. The session's big turn-out came on a vote that the House should address George II that he remove Walpole from his "Presence and Councils forever." The government won with a majority of forty-nine from one hundred and sixty-seven votes being cast.²⁴⁹ Walpole, having acquiesced to the general desire for war, was securely backed in the Lords.

At Westminster the political temperature was higher. The information on high society rather than on high politics is somewhat ambivalent. The collapse of the scheme for a weekly subscription ball shows this. The subscribers were to have the right to invite outsiders to the dances. However, the duchess of Queensberry was vehement that an undertaking be given by all the subscribers that no one would invite Walpole whom she detested. This was felt by many of them to be unreasonable behaviour on her part and therefore the scheme disintegrated. It is clear that she had strong feelings on the matter but that they were extreme.²⁵⁰ That Walpole could have been invited shows that the opposition and the ministry were not rigidly separated in their social lives.

5.4.3.4. The Ministry, 1742-1746.

The reason why George II had to part with Granville in 1746 has two parts- Why was the second earl Granville (Carteret) in power in the first place? and Why was he not acceptable to his colleagues in 1746? Both have the same root answer which is that George wished it to be so. The whole matter was a case of the king made to face up to the paradox that he had created for himself.

George found the earl acceptable because of the man's person and because of his general conduct. The earl was a German speaker and was personable in character.²⁵¹ His behaviour during the 1730s had shown that he had always remained a courtier at heart. He was clearly in no manner beholden unto any of the Old Corps and therefore would act as a useful brake upon them. The Old Corps and the other senior office-holders were used to having to tolerate one another so that he was not an anomalous figure amongst them. Therefore, when Granville became northern secretary in February 1742 he was acceptable to his colleagues.

The reason why the earl had to be ousted in November 1744 and February 1746 was that he was felt to be incompatible with effective government. He was seen as encouraging George to take political attitudes which were not realistic. Had the nation been at peace then the politician would have had a better chance of surviving in office. It is to be remembered that there were members of the ministry who wished that Granville remain their colleague, e.g. Chesterfield.²⁵² However, parliament had to be treated with particular care since Britain was at war.

George II had allowed the country to become involved

in the European conflict. The principal figures in the movement to banish Granville and his advice were the Pelham group. Their influence had increased with Henry Pelham being appointed first lord of the Treasury in the wake of Wilmington's July 1743 death. However, the king clearly wanted the group to be in the ministry. They had helped push the ministry towards war although it had been clear that Walpole did not want such. The Pelhams were in power because George II wanted them to be there.

The two Georges, through their desire for political security, broadly aligned the court interest with the whig one: the capacity for whig ministers to be able to disagree with one another led the kings be able to do this with a fair degree of impunity. The form of political identification of interests was neither pre-ordained nor was it irreversible. That it was not reversed stemmed from the king's desire that it should not be. Just as the Revolution Settlement and the Act of Settlement occurred at times of international tension, times when the crown was in need of a viable ministry, so both the mass resignation of 1746 and the threatened one of 1744 occurred during the War of the Austrian Succession.

That the king was unable to engage in a particular positive action did not mean the crown's overall position had not deteriorated since the establishment of the Revolution Settlement. The Settlement had made the crown financially dependent on parliament, ergo, parliament could not be contravened in the practice of government, otherwise it might deprive the crown of its means of having an extended executive. William had brought about a fundamental political change, as a result the crown was

more exposed in times of war than it was when the nation was at peace.

Granville, as the old chestnut goes, had not sat in the Commons, having inherited his father's title as a minor. Therefore, he had a proclivity to give advice which encouraged George to engage in a foreign policy which did not take into due consideration the prejudices of the Commons and for the king to receive advice which did was a necessity for the smooth running of contemporary political life. It was not a question of Granville either originating or directing the policy, the principal objection was that the earl's advice had encouraged George II to think that policies which were unrealistic in domestic political terms were otherwise. Initially, the king did not face up to the logic of the situation that he himself had created. Those who resigned did so as a means of having him realize the basic logic of that situation when the earl of Bath (1742) and Granville were unable to form a ministry to replace them.²⁵³ The debacle underlined the point that was being stressed. In the long-term he created the Old Corps, if only passively, and in the short-term he chose to take advice from Granville.

What the ministers were trying to do was to make it possible for them to be able to conduct the business of government, which was the task which he had appointed them to do. There was no question of their trying to foist a first minister on the king:- Pelham was already the foremost figure in domestic politics. He emerged even more prominently in the 1746 incident's wake because the king now recognized the fuller character of what Pelham had been appointed to do. This was to manage British domestic

politics on the day-to-day level.

In 1746 the war still had over two years to run and therefore the end would not have appeared to be in sight. It was clear that land war on the continent was not popular with the political nation. This was because it both committed resources that could be applied profitably elsewhere, e.g. in imperial activity in the West Indies, and because it had a strong overtone of being engaged in on behalf of interests which were not British even if the expense was borne at home. It is probable that had it been peacetime there would not have been the same imperative to oust Granville and that other politicians might have been more willing to fill the breach the resignations created.

1744 and 1746 were not trials of strength between the monarchy and the development of cabinet government, rather they were frictions in the relationship of George II and the group of politicians whom he himself had allowed to assemble over the years. The group can only be termed an oligarchy in a limited sense of the word- they were numerically few and they were involved in the governing of the state. They were an appointed oligarchy, not a self-selecting one, and while they exercised government they did not control it.

John Owen's essay "George II Reconsidered" is perhaps the most important work in the current secondary literature on the place of that king in relation to the politics of his reign.²⁵⁴ This thesis agrees with his conclusions. The only major criticism that it has is that he only compares the reign with that of George III, whereas it is also possible to draw a comparison between

the instances that he cites in George II's reign and two previous incidents which were like 1746 in there only being the threat to resign. In February 1708 the Marlboroughs and Godolphin persuaded/forced Anne to dismiss Harley and in 1739 the Pelham group threatened to resign if Hervey were made lord privy seal. This failure presumably stems from the essay being in large part a response to Richard Pares's 1951-1952 Ford lectures on "George III and the Politicians." 255

After the savaging that Walcott's 1956 book received it is to be half expected that an old Namierite should be wary of the far end of the eighteenth-century. 256 The 1708 incident can be compared with those that Owen deals with. The duumvirs acted in such a manner because they knew that Anne was committed to the the war being waged and that it had to be waged with parliament's support. However, only the whigs were willing to provide consistent active support for it in parliament. Therefore, the whigs had to be placated to a degree and the means which the whigs selected on was the sacrifice of Harley. Anne was to become disillusioned both with the necessity of waging the war and with Marlborough, but in 1708 such feelings were only beginning to form in the queen's mind and were certainly not known to the three, who consequently felt that they were acting in the queen's best interests, even if she was not immediately aware of such. A feature which historians have found particularly striking about 1746 is the large number of resignations tendered; initially it was just an inner group but the process snowballed so that over forty offered to resign. It is a reasonable contention that had Marlborough and Godolphin resigned in

1708 they would have been followed by a similar number.²⁵⁷

The 1739 incident varies from 1708 and 1744 in that it was never a formal proposal but rather just suggested as a possible line of conduct and that the matter that had allowed its possibility was carried through anyway. However, the incident has a continuity of personnel with 1744. In 1739 there was clearly a deep animosity on the part of Newcastle, it was the same a few years later. In both cases the person who was objected to was an able, eloquent and personable courtier who had no positive reason to view the duke highly. In 1739 the proposal was for a limited group to resign, in 1746 that was what happened. In 1739 there was no constitutional question at stake. With so many points of comparison between it and 1744 and 1746 one should be careful in firmly concluding that there were truly constitutional questions at stake on either of those occasions. Rhetoric can not be dismissed but it should not be allowed to obscure the structural reality of a period's politics.

5.4.3.5. The Ministry, 1746-1757.

The problem of why George II admitted Pitt to power lies in part with the person of Pitt but principally it was the result of the king's own conduct. George II wanted to take Britain into the Seven Years' War. The Pelham ministry had provided him with a perfectly sufficient ministry in the years of its existence, but Henry Pelham died in March 1754. Newcastle then stepped into his late brother's place as first lord of the Treasury. The new secretary was the seasoned diplomat Sir Thomas Robinson.

For the war effort to be viable the ministry had to be capable of convincing the independent M.P.s that it was a worthwhile enterprise. As a result of his long years abroad Robinson was inexperienced in terms of domestic politics and was not up to the task of convincing the Lower House.²⁵⁸ The number of politicians who had the oratorical powers needed to control the Commons was therefore rather limited- William Murray, William Pitt and Henry Fox.

Murray, who was a Scot, did not feel any desire to try. This was probably because of the Stone-Murray scandal of 1752, which had shown that he had not dissociated himself firmly enough from his Jacobite family background as a young man.²⁵⁹ Therefore, Fox and Pitt both sought to promote themselves to some place in the ministry by exposing the hapless Robinson's limitations as a parliamentarian. This they did via the election petitions which followed on from the 1754 general election. Robinson prepared to stand down. George II had no liking for either man, Pitt having offended his sensibilities on both Hanover and the army whereas Fox had offended only those

on the nobility. It should be remembered that George did not take a liking to many Britons although he had a distinct capacity for developing working relationships with them. The king chose Fox as the less objectionable of the pair.²⁶⁰

The summer of 1756 saw the war go badly from the British perspective, notably with the loss of Minorca in June. Both Fox and Newcastle panicked and resigned.²⁶¹ Devonshire was made first lord of Treasury and Pitt was drafted in as the southern secretary. Pitt was still not liked by the king, nor was George necessarily fond of the fourth duke of Devonshire who had initially opposed the Hessian and Russian treaties that George had had concluded in December 1755.²⁶²

In April 1757, George II, having been egged on both by his son the duke of Cumberland and by Fox, dismissed the ministry and tried to form one around the second earl Waldegrave. The effort was even less realistic than trying to have Robinson as a wartime secretary of state. The attempt failed and the king had to face the fact that if he wanted to be able to finance the war now he had to come to terms with Pitt.²⁶³ Devonshire was happy to stand down in favour of Newcastle, who was a proven war minister. The new ministry was in a strong position and was further improved by Cumberland's September humiliation at Klosterseven.

Paradoxically, the king caused the man's rise. George desired that domestic political affairs were run with his being minimally troubled. Therefore, he did not create alternative options for himself which more active participation in British politics would have made

possible. Instead, by the mid-1750s politics had congealed somewhat so as to present the king with a very limited number of candidates who were capable of controlling the Commons. There had come to be strong forces that induced such a state of affairs but they were neither inevitable nor necessarily irreversible.

The king exposed himself politically by entering the Seven Years' War. Colonial rivalries and the problems of the balance of power in Europe made British involvement probable but they did not make it pre-ordained. He had felt able to stay out of the War of the Polish Succession. At the same time, he had supported Walpole through the Excise Crisis. In 1746 George had been involved in the War of the Austrian Succession and had been forced to abandon Granville; therefore the king should have known that he would be politically exposed.

Lastly, in the short-term the king was unfortunate. Boscawen's St. Lawrence conduct and Minorca both exposed the ministry to potential political assaults. Had the war's early events been more successful neither Newcastle nor Fox would have resigned, therefore, the opportunity for Pitt to rise would not have existed. It was also George's misfortune that Murray felt unable to take a position at the very forefront of politics. He was an able man whose very elevation to the Lords indicated the influence he was probably capable of exerting over the Commons.

Therefore, if the crown sought to engage the executive in positive lines of conduct, i.e. go to war, it had to accept that it would therefore be vulnerable in terms of its domestic political position; George created

the pre-conditions for Pitt's rise. War made the crown susceptible to being politically vulnerable; it was failures and non-successes which made it positively vulnerable in politics. The executive's conduct had to be called into question for the people who served to be politically exposed. Pitt's rise was not inevitable, rather it followed from events and factors over which he had no control and that were themselves possibilities rather than certainties in their occurrence.

5.4.3.6. The Opposition, 1742-1757.

The opposition presented a major force in the politics of the House of Lords for the first couple of sessions after Walpole's fall but soon thereafter diminished into a rump. The principal cause of this was the 1745 Jacobite Rebellion. After 1746 whenever the opposition began to look as though it might become dangerous it could be neutralized by the practice of bringing into office a few of its leading members. This had the immediate effect of making the current opposition less potent, and there was also an accumulative one of making opposition an activity which careerists could engage in in order to try to forward their claims to ministerial office in an almost cyclical manner. The death of prince Frederick accentuated the Rebellion's effect.

Newcastle was not the predominant voice in the final years of Walpole's administration nor was he during those of his brother's ascendancy. However, in both ministries, in the years between them and in those after 1754 he was continuously at the centre of power even if he was not always central to its exercise. The character of his relations with the other major politicians of the time was a continuous and important strand in the high politics of these years. Horace Walpole disliked the duke because he felt that he had betrayed his father. Walpole chose to interpret Newcastle's handling of his fellow secretaries as the central theme of "Memoirs of the Reign of George II." In them Granville was perceived as being betrayed by Chesterfield and Sandwich, the latter, who was ambassador to The Hague, being introduced to Newcastle by the former. Harrington had played his part in this and was

consequently rewarded with the vacant office. He in turn resigned it when he appreciated that his position would be no better than his predecessor's in relation to the duke. Chesterfield was in his turn sacrificed to the fourth duke of Bedford.²⁶⁴ This could have been extended back to his treatment of Stanhope and Sunderland in 1720 and Townshend in 1730.

There continued to be large divisions in the Lords in the 1741-1742 session even after Walpole had resigned: a Pension bill, a Place bill, a Standing Order on Strangers in the House and the Orford Enquiry Indemnity bill. This was because there was still a sizable whig opposition which was working in close alliance with the tories. The New Whigs, Bath (1742) and Granville's supporters had been taken into office but it was clear that they did not give the ministry a safe majority in parliament. During the prorogation some Hanoverian troops were taken into British pay. This caused an uproar in the subsequent session since British taxes were perceived as being used to finance Hanoverian purposes.²⁶⁵ Cobham did not feel confined by his re-acquisition of a regiment to keep to the ministerial line.²⁶⁶

In February 1743 the divisions on the Gin bill peaked at one hundred and thirty-seven. While the effects on the social order of cheap alcohol were felt to be in need of remedy, the proposed measure touched on the same nerve as the Excise bill, it being intended to tax spiritous liquors out of the common people's reach (and to raise some additional revenue). The officials needed to enforce the legislation would seem an intrusion of central government into the localities and the rights of these

officials as undermining the liberties of private citizens. This was perhaps why Sir Robert Walpole had not sought to deal with the problem. Hervey's interests had naturally not been looked after by the Pelhams during the general political accommodation. This had led to his being expelled from office so that it might be conferred upon the first earl Gower, therefore, the baron was to be found delivering a fine oration attacking the bill.²⁶⁷

During the summer the efforts of the third duke of Devonshire and the Pelhams to try to bring the Cobham group back into the ministerial fold did not meet with success since the group were insistent on both the expulsion of Bath and his cohorts and the inclusion of some tories.²⁶⁸ In January 1744 there was a further division on the Hanoverian troop issue. Among those who put his name to the protest that followed the January vote on the matter was the second earl of Bristol (he had succeeded his father as baron Hervey in August 1743). His behaviour two months later was to be important in allowing us to comprehend the end of large scale opposition in the Lords. In March 1744 the first earl of Bristol, as a good whig, applauded his grandson for not opposing the suspension of Habeas Corpus because of the serious worsening of the international situation.²⁶⁹ On April 27th there was another cross-party protest, on the subject of the Young Pretender. However, subsequently a message came from the king on his being in France "whereupon the House of Lords voted nem. contradicente to address his Majesty that they will stand by him, but the earl of Chesterfield proposed to add thereto desire that his Majesty would enquire why our fleet under Sir Jo. Norris was not more

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opposition was denied the war as a means of encouraging parliamentary opposition to the ministry.

In the wake of the Rebellion there were no whig opposition groups for the tories to engage in active opposition with since they and the New Whigs had a strong mutual dislike. However, there was the prince of Wales. By January 1747 the basis of a working relationship had been formulated: he would not contradict them in domestic affairs, as they would not him on foreign ones. However, full discussions were postponed by the general election and did not start until June. Finally, in February 1748, a formal relationship was publicly agreed upon. However, the prince was politically promiscuous and went on to entertain the attentions of Newcastle rather than follow the advice of Egmont.²⁷⁴ The prince's behaviour undermined the opposition's efforts which in turn encouraged him to flirt with the ministry.

The cycle was broken by the prince's March 22nd 1751 death. His widow opted to take an apolitical stance. She was rewarded for this by being named as regent-apparent in the subsequent Act, which was to cover the possibility of George II dying while his heir was still a minor. The reversionary interest, but for a few rumblings in the late 1750s, was to be silent for over three decades.

On May 10th one hundred and eighteen peers divided on the Regency bill for the only vote of the 1751 session. The minority of twenty-four was made up of a mixture of tories and whigs- Stanhope, Talbot, Shaftesbury, the seventh earl of Thanet, the third earl of Oxford, the third earl of Lichfield, the eleventh viscount Hereford, the third viscount Townshend, the sixth baron Ward, the

sixth baron Maynard, the second baron Foley and the second baron Romney.²⁷⁵ They had an anti-court stance rather than a positively country one. Their make-up was too diverse for them to be deemed a coherent party; this is true of opposition in the Lords in George II's final years.

Newcastle started to press for the departure of Bedford and Sandwich. This was because with the death of Frederick he was safe in the knowledge that they could not team up with the late prince in opposition. Newcastle's change in attitude was an example of the potency of the reversionary factor in the politics of the period. Henry Pelham was less ardent than his brother in the matter. The deciding factor for him is meant to have been that one of his own daughters had an affair with one of Bedford's Leveson Gower brothers-in-law. At the end of May 1751 Sandwich was dismissed, which induced Bedford's resignation.²⁷⁶

Granville came in as lord president, disclaiming his connection with Bath.²⁷⁷ There had always been an inner tension in the New Whigs because of the way in which the two leaders had had different early political careers—Granville the tory turned Stanhope-Sunderland whig and Bath the Walpolite who had followed his master's lesson of opposition being a means for self-advancement. He was to exert definite, if limited, influence on the conduct of foreign policy. The New Whigs had ceased to be a cohesive unit.

Court politicians could use the Lords to delineate their personal variance from the government line. This behaviour became increasingly occurrent after Henry Pelham achieved his ascendancy. It was using the House both as a

means through which to define their particular variance to their fellow court whigs and as a means to broadcast it to a wider audience.²⁷⁸ It probably acted as succour to their allies in the Commons where opposition may have been practised more actively. On a number of occasions it is quite literally a single individual who is arguing a point. The isolation was not always voluntarily. In January 1752 almost all of the previously existing opposition absented themselves from supporting Bedford and the second earl of Halifax in the pertinent debate.²⁷⁹ (The treaty was to keep the elector of Saxony from allying with France.)

The September 1755 formation of the Fox-Newcastle ministry spurred Pitt and his supporter the second earl Temple into parliamentary activity. Associated with them in this were the second earl of Pomfret and to a lesser extent Talbot. Stances were taken on the use of British resources in order to defend Hanover militarily, the employment of foreign protestants in America, and on the Russian and Hessian treaties. On the last, ninety-seven peers divided and there was a majority of seventy-three. It was the first pre-Christmas division since 1743-1744. A subsequent protest was signed only by Talbot. On November 15th Temple and Halifax opposed an Address relating to the treaties (Halifax was then first lord of Trade). Talbot opted for neutrality upon this occasion, while Bedford was with the ministry.²⁸⁰ On March 31st Temple found himself backed by only Pomfret:- Winchilsea verbally lacerated the isolated earl.²⁸¹ With Pitt's return to office in late 1756, Temple ceased his opposition activities, he himself having become first lord of the Admiralty.

Before the war opposition had centred on a number of disparate bills. In March 1752 ninety-two peers divided on the Scottish Forfeitures bill. The majority was sixty-eight. Since William's reign estate forfeitures had been a continuous theme in politics, although its prominence varied somewhat. Then, it had been to do with Ireland and the prerogative, whereas after the 1715 Rising it grew to be about the presence of central government in the localities and Scottish interests. In the minority were Bedford, Bath (1742), Chesterfield, Sandwich, Macclesfield (1721), Lichfield, Oxford, Ward, Maynard, the second duke of Kingston, the fourth duke of Beaufort and the ninth baron Wentworth. The group was distinctly cross-party and now contained Bath, who as a New Whig had formerly held aloof.²⁸²

On February 2nd 1753 sixty-seven voted on the Game bill, the majority was three. The issue was a social one that peers as solid country landowners could be expected to agree upon. However, the banning of fire-arms to the lower orders was a political question. The bearing of arms touched on the freedom of the common man, the Bill of Rights, the power of central government and the role of the militia.²⁸³ On May 4th there was a predictable government victory on the Clandestine Marriages bill with only fifty-five peers dividing. The king's elevated view of nobility (especially that of the royal family), led him to be interested in the bill. The opposition to it in the Lords was weak and can not really be construed as being of a concerted nature.

The following session saw a division over the repeal

of the Jewish Naturalization Act. The repeal was caused by the popular outcry against the original Act. There was a majority of forty-six from sixty-six votes being cast. The minority were all whigs. Naturalization had traditionally been an area of party conflict because of the place that the sacramental test played in the process of naturalization, any attempt to make the process easier for foreigners to go through could be interpreted as undermining the place of the Church of England within English society. Even though the vote was on a personal issue it was not a party matter since the mass of the whigs were with the government; times had changed. It can be seen as a case of the tories and the court being against the purist whigs, except that the likes of Halifax and Temple were not exactly purists in their awareness of the advantages in forwarding their careers as court whigs by being seen by the party's rank and file to take such a stance.²⁸⁴

With the general dropping of the intensity with which politics was fought a number of the higher divisions in the Lords had come to be over local legislation. High politicians began to spar more frequently over low political issues. There had always been this sub-text (e.g. the Cornwall Assizes bill in 1738 which touched the political interests of both prince Frederick and the second viscount Falmouth), but now it became far more prominent because the flesh of opposition activity in the Lords had largely withered away. With most of these post-1747 instances it is fairly easy to connect them with the interests of a prominent politician. Presumably these

arguments were a means of trying to score points in various rivalries, sometimes the combatants being within the ministry, although some of them may have been primarily the result of other tensions.

In March and April 1748 the Buckingham Assize bill touched on the interests of Cobham who was seated in the county. In June 1749 there was a protest on the Worcestershire Roads. It was signed by Foley, who was a Worcestershire landowner, Oxford, who was a landowner in the neighbouring county of Herefordshire, and Shaftesbury, who was a tested political ally of Foley. During the 1749-1750 session it was clear that was tension within the ministry. The chief conflict was between the Pelhams and Bedford. Early in the session the duke was dissimulatively baited via a Bedfordshire Roads bill, the county being the one with which he was principally associated. The Pelhams ostensibly sided with the duke but had their supporters gather in opposition behind the banner of the second duke of Grafton.

In February 1755 the Bristol Watch bill may have touched on the interests of Beaufort or his allies in Gloucestershire. In April 1756 the earlier antagonism over the Bedford turnpike was revived with a vengeance on the Islington Roads bill,²⁸⁵ which affected their respective urban Middlesex estates to the south of the road.²⁸⁶ In March 1758 the Cirencester Road bill caused a minor division. The interests of Bathurst were almost certainly touched upon as he was seated near the town. He had gravitated towards court politics in the wake of the deaths of Oxford and Beaufort.²⁸⁷

5.4.3.7. The Pitt-Newcastle Ministry, 1757-1760.

The central question of the politics of these years is- Why did Pitt back contentious domestic legislation? The work of Richard Middleton gives a picture of Pitt not as the great leader but rather as a member of a team; his role was to cater for particular needs of the ministry- keeping the domestic political scene as quiet as possible.²⁸⁸ What makes Pitt interesting in terms of the study of domestic politics is the idiosyncrasy of his previous political record and that he continued this behaviour in part into office: he represents in a single person the meeting of conflicting courses. Pitt was on the periphery both of the court and of the independents, so he was central to their interaction. That he moderated himself is clear- he accepted the king's wish for commitment to land warfare on the continent. However, at the same time, he was associated with the promotion of political interests that questioned the arrangement of affairs that had been allowed to stand since the mid-1710s.

It is to be remembered that he was a secretary of state and not the first lord of the Treasury as Walpole and Pelham had been.²⁸⁹ Also his secretaryship was the southern one which had been the less prestigious of the two for over forty years. Therefore, he was not as bound to work within the same political confines as Pelham and Walpole had been. He was different from Walpole and Pelham in having circumstantially forced his way into senior office, whereas they had been more 'products of the system' who had risen to the premiership from within it.

This in relation to the circumstantial large decline

in the party barrier in the wake of 1745 and the deaths of Oxford and Beaufort in the mid-1750s meant that he was able to extract a broader degree of support than a more conventional court politician could have; had Fox been in his place it is probable that the opposition would have been better defined. Pitt's uniqueness, however, put him in a dual firing-line. Once the extraordinary conditions of war ceased or if its course took a turn for the worse it was probable that he would be isolated in a way that neither Walpole or Pelham had ever had to face.

On May 24th 1756 there was a division on the Militia bill introduced by the M.P. George Townshend, lord Lynn; Pitt was then in opposition and Fox in power.²⁹⁰ Eighty-two peers voted and the majority was thirty-six. The militia issue was placed in the limelight by the war, national defence reassuming a central place on the political agenda. The measure attracted country support and was an item which Pitt genuinely desired rather than sought to exploit for its nuisance value. Once it was in play he was prepared to lend the bill support not least because it might embarrass Fox. However, it is questionable whether Pitt necessarily wanted the matter brought up in the first place. It is to be noted that it was not he who initially raised the issue.

The Fox-Newcastle ministry had the Lords stop the bill in the way they had the country measures of the 1730s opposition. Newcastle and Hardwicke were hostile to it for two reasons. Firstly, they were aware of the strong preference that George II and Cumberland had for conventional troops. A revitalized militia would almost certainly cut into the financial provision for these. And

secondly, the two ministers believed Townshend's bill to be that only of a disgruntled courtier and therefore to have only limited genuine support in the nation at large.²⁹¹

The whigs Stanhope, Talbot and Shaftesbury were for it along with the likes of Lichfield, Westmorland, viscount Folkestone and the second baron Mountjoy. The majority of the item's supporters were government regulars- some fifteen can be positively identified. For the most part they were not Old Corps regulars. Bedford, Temple, Halifax and Bath (1742) were all politicians independent of the group. The second baron Bruce, the seventeenth baron Dacre, the second duke of Chandos and the second earl Poulett all had elements in their background which meant that they then had an inclination towards opposing the Old Corps.²⁹² Romney was to be one of the few peers who subsequently took a militia command, while the second baron Ducie was to resign a lord lieutenancy. As courtiers and soldiers Kingston and the earl Harcourt are surprising figures to find. However, some toleration had frequently been shown within the royal circle. Kingston had been with the opposition over Forfeitures in March 1752. A more surprising find is Cadogan, who was Fox's uncle by marriage.²⁹³ There is no strong linking factor to unite these people. The opposition and government camps were even less clearly defined than they had been pre-1754. The character of politics appears new.

With the November 1756 establishment of the Pitt-Devonshire ministry Pitt backed a new Militia bill. The issue had been firmly re-inserted into political

debate and would not go away until something was done about it in one form another, so he could not ignore it. Being a senior member of an unproven ministry it is unlikely that he would have wanted the matter on the political agenda if it had not been there already. On April 27th 1757 there was a division, eighty-five peers voted and the majority was five. On May 9th there was a second division on the subject. The majority was thirty-six. On the May 26th division just fifty-two votes were cast.

The composition of the opposition was indicative of how there had been a considerable change in the possession of power. Newcastle and Hardwicke had not been banished from the exercise of it but rather they were no longer the principal people who had a reasonable expectation of using it. The effect of seeing the pair on the side which was bound to lose the vote would have been something of a change for the political psychology of many peers, the two having almost become the House's stamp of ministerial business. On the 26th there was a third division on it. Fifty-two peers voted and the majority was two. There was a intercameral interchange on the matter and it was passed into law. The matter was not being fought over with great ardency.²⁹⁴

During the prorogation the Militia Act proved generally unpopular both with the gentry, who were expected to provide the officers, and with those who were expected to serve under them in the ranks.²⁹⁵ The issue needed to be dealt with. Therefore, in the 1757-1758 session the now Pitt-Newcastle ministry responded even though its two leaders had been opposed to one another on

the previous bill. The Corps as a whole recognized the need for something further to be done in relation to the militia and while they did not like the new bill they felt unable to do anything other than add some amendments. The measure commanded considerable country support.²⁹⁶ The Corps had drawn considerable ire onto themselves through their disposal of a Habeas Corpus related bill earlier in the session. The Corps's composition was ultimately heterogeneous, therefore, there was usually going to be some sympathy within the group towards a doomed measure. In killing a bill its internal discipline was put under stress. Therefore, it could only be used a limited number of times before its discipline would begin to be severely strained and disintegration be risked.²⁹⁷

Pitt had a desire to extend the state of the English Militia bill to Scotland. Newcastle opposed this because it was contrary to Old Corps sentiments- the memory of armed Scotsmen crossing over the border was not yet fifteen years old. In March 1759 a Scottish militia bill was killed in the Commons by the Old Corps. This was not a direct test of strength with Pitt since the pro-militia elements were divided amongst themselves.²⁹⁸ Those present at a meeting over the Militia bill in early April 1759 included Temple, Chandos, Shaftesbury, Cholmondley, Bruce, Folkestone and the second earl Cowper, the second baron Romney and the tenth earl of Pembroke.²⁹⁹ Again, they were a diverse group. Despite these efforts the militia was not settled at the period's end. In October 1760 Newcastle, Devonshire and Mansfield decided to oppose any further Pittite reform on the matter.

In late April 1759 Pitt faced trouble on the Judges'

Salaries bill. This related to fears of the executive being able to influence the judiciary. In the Lords the eleventh earl of Derby opposed it. The earl had been a long time member of the the opposition to Walpole, receiving the lord lieutenancy of Lancashire only on the Great Man's fall. The earl's commoner heir-apparent was the politically idiosyncratic whig M.P. lord Strange. Strange was one of those people who had been willing to have a lord lieutenancy in 1757 at a time when many peers were choosing to resign rather than face the contention of being active in the office. Indeed, the earl had resigned in his favour.³⁰⁰ This exposed Pitt's rather ambiguous position as someone who had acted as a critic of government now being one of its chief servants. It showed that he could not necessarily be counted on to bring in the support of all those whigs who had stayed outside of the Old Corps fold.

During 1759 the annus mirabilis took place. It did not stem directly from Pitt. It can be reasonably argued that his continuation in government grew from achievements which he had little part in creating. This gave Pitt the ministerial security to act in a manner more attractive to the likes of lord Strange and perhaps in part lessen their growing complaints as to the war's cost. He backed the wish for the 1711 Qualification Act to be strengthened. This was an attempt by the minister to assuage hostile criticisms of his conduct from those who might otherwise have been his supporters had he been in opposition. That the measure had country/tory overtones is true in retrospect but it is to remembered that there had been a sizable whig opposition in the Commons for over quarter of

a century which had been using such sticks with which to attack the court.

The Elder Pitt duly occupies an important place in the development of British politics but it is a disservice to both him and his achievement to make him into something he was not. Pitt is important because he was a senior minister who wanted a 'country' programme whereas such was usually manipulated as a tool by the opposition, who when they attained office dropped it. He represents the re-awakening of the power of the political nation, something that had been latent since Anne's reign. He re-inserted an element to counter the ossification which Kenyon perceived, even so the politician did this in a political vocabulary that would have been fully comprehensible to the early eighteenth-century and most of the seventeenth-century: bills on judges' salaries, the militia and property qualifications for M.P.s.

That he was the willing father of such legislation is not altogether true. The militia was inserted into politics by George Townshend and Pitt's handling of it by no means resolved the issue. Pitt was to a large extent forced into acting upon it because had he failed to do so he would have alienated much of his own political constituency in the Commons, the independents, perhaps to the point where he would no longer have been of any political weight. When he did seek to advance a measure -judges salaries- he was by no means able to secure full automatic support from that constituency. As Middleton has shown Pitt's input into the annus mirabilis was at a non-immediate political level, he was also in distinct

need of it. Had there been a situation akin to the fall of Minorca Pitt would have indubitably fallen himself. The year guaranteed him a place in the pantheon of Whig history but it did not materially alter his political position, hence the attempt to strengthen the Qualifications Act.

5.4.4. Tory Tergiversation, 1716-1760.

The tory party came into being in order to protect the status quo in church and society, James II's succession being seen as indicative of the desired continuity, he being the next legitimate heir to the throne even if a catholic. The party was not possessed of a homogeneous character. It was made up of people who had been members of the pre-existing and mutually opposed court and country parties. They left a legacy in one of the party's major divisions, between those tories who were principally concerned with the advancement of the party's interests at the centre, at court and in parliament, and those ones who were principally concerned with the implementation of 'tory' policies in the localities. For the sake of argument these two arbitrary types can be deemed 'central' and 'grass roots.'³⁰²

At the period's end the Lords was more amenable to the crown because Charles II and James II had specifically worked to create a monarchical interest in the House. There had been an initial susceptibility to this manipulation there because the peerage were seen in the seventeenth-century world-view as crown's 'natural counsellors.' However, James II ended up trying to use means other than the party to advance his political plans, while William's accession to the throne was not liked within the party. These two developments did not permanently alienate 'centrally' orientated tories from the crown. Charles II had died in 1685 so that in 1689 the effect of his peerage policy was still very extant within the House. A high proportion of the party there had either been recruited by him or had received promotions from him.

The Commons party had never had the same effort concentrated upon it: it being far larger than the Lords; it had been the principal home of the country party in the 1660s and 1670s; it was influenced by the way in which its M.P.s had to seek re-election. Ergo, in 1689 there was a basic difference in the character of the party in the two Houses.

Charles II had left the party with two unfortunate characteristics- a rich crop of internal rivalries and the comparative youth of much of its leadership. Charles II had fostered rivalries within the party in order to allow him to possess a larger measure of control over it than he would otherwise have had- a process of divide and rule: if one tory politician was not pliant to a particular line of policy then another one might be. These rivalries were accentuated by the way in which some tories were prepared to cooperate with James II in trying to attain toleration while others were not prepared to.³⁰³ Many of the tory leaders had been raised to prominence by Charles fairly early in their political careers; the king, while alive, had been able to use his superior political experience in his dealings with them.

A new generation might have been able to rise as lieutenants had the party been allowed to dominate under either William or Anne but it was not given the opportunity to do so. Admissions to power under these two sovereigns were always partial, many senior places being retained by court managers or their clients. Therefore, those tories who were prominent were often competing against one another for such vacancies as did occur, so they were unlikely to encourage any additional rivals from

within their own party for those vacancies. It is to be noted that Oxford achieved his initial prominence from a whig background not from a tory one.

The fate of the central aspect of the tory party in the period's first twenty-five years was not a slow continuous decline. In large part this was because much of the leadership of Charles's reign was still alive throughout the first two reigns of the period. Rochester, Leeds and Godolphin did not die until the early 1710s. Buckingham and Nottingham both survived the Succession and its ensuing decade comfortably, however, the first was a self-interested and idiosyncratic in his general political conduct while the latter was a haughty individualist.

In the ranks below the leadership a new generation of tories appeared. They were people of a different hue from the Carolines. They were in character with William and Anne's shared general desire to keep the crown out of the clutches of either party. In their desire to serve the crown they were more willing both to take only partial admissions to office than the Caroline central tories were and to work with whigs where it was desired that they should. The political careers of the new central tories reached maturity in an age of toleration whereas those of the Caroline ones had done so at a time of excluding and persecution. Before 1710 this new generation were not breaking through into the party's leadership.

However, in 1710 Anne no longer wanted to continue British participation in the War of the Spanish Succession. Harley did not seek to fulfil the wants of the grass roots tories but rather to try to manipulate those desires in the service of the crown. Because of the long

association of the whigs with constructive government that party had built up an operative majority in the Lords. It was this which Oxford sought to circumvent with the mass creation of winter 1711-1712. It was not in the earl's interests to wrest power in the Lords from the whigs in order to hand it to the grass roots tories. Therefore, the new recruits mostly reflected his own attitudes, they were new central tories, people who sought to serve the crown and who would not necessarily be averse to working with whigs. The new central tories were not just confined to that batch of creations. Oxford had built up a group on the foundations of the existing new generation of central tories in the Lords. The group included people who had been recruited previously, inheritors and the eldest sons of inheritors. Many of these people had been alienated first by the grass roots tactics early in the reign and then by the duumvirs' increasing use of whigs in preference to tories such as themselves.

Just as Charles II had left a legacy that was present in the House long after he was dead, so the influence of the earl's actions was felt long after his fall. Bathurst continued to be politically active into the reign of George III and he had been one of the 1711-1712 recruits. Not all new central tories were necessarily pro-Oxford. He filled a gap which others felt that they could have done just as well and therefore, these people felt no compulsion to become his subordinates. Such people hung on the wings of the Harleyites waiting for the earl's eclipse to see what they could make of the circumstances that would then come about. Most of these people were to become Hanoverian tories.

The new centrals were not the majority of the tory party in the Lords at the time of the Succession. However, they were a sufficiently substantial proportion of it that if they were to defect en masse the party remaining there would very definitely be a rump, which would alter the whole character of politics in the Upper House since the whig/court party would be able to pass business without the slightest worry. It was ominous for the party that most of the Hanoverian tories continued with the court and therefore went over into at least token whiggery early in George I's reign.

Understanding of the nature of toryism has been slowed up by the Jacobitism debate.³⁰⁴ The two aspects of Jacobitism which need to be stressed more are how in the early part of the period it was as much a court phenomenon as it was a party one and how in the later part of the period it was often principally a covert form of anti-central social protest rather than a genuine desire to place a foreign catholic on the throne. The debate has been conducted in far too party-orientated a manner.

The first earl of Jersey can be used to illustrate this. He has been seen as an ardent tory because of his Jacobite connections. However, he was not the same as a catholic Highland chieftain who supported the cause during the 1715 Rising. Obviously, Jacobites came in more than one form. The earl's Jacobite tag stemmed not from his being a keen member of the tory party but rather from his family background being endemically court he being the great-nephew of the great early Stuart favourite the first duke of Buckingham and the son of the knight marshal of

the Household. This example should not lead to the view that all former Stuart courtiers had a Jacobite element to them, it was just that some had a proclivity to have one and that if they were so it did not necessarily mean that they were ardent tories too. If the earl was the last it would almost certainly have been through opportunism rather than through conviction. As has been seen above, the second earl of Godolphin, a whig lord privy seal, can be classed as a Jacobite. Either way, Oxford wished to use Jersey. It is improbable that he did so primarily in order to placate grass roots tories but rather because he wished to make good use of an experienced and amenable courtier.

There is a particular need for arbitrary means with a subject as elusive as toryism in these years. The methodology which will be used here is to investigate the way in which individuals changed sides, principally using the receipt of pre-1714 honours and offices to identify probable central tories. With the increasing shrinkage in the number of tories who gained such honours with the passage of time it can be argued that the method is flawed. Therefore, the discussion, while being centred on such, has been stretched to include anyone who is pertinent to it. The hope is first to detect whether there was tergiversant activity among the peerage, and if so when it occurred, and then to see if that tergiversation was of a consistent or a varying nature.

A label for a certain type of tory will be used because it allows a degree of distinction within the party and therefore the possibility of a degree of insight. The label will be 'Harleyite.' It is reasonable to assume that

these people were supporters of Harley rather than being fervent High Church tories. They were people who sought to have a court ministry with tory support rather than a tory ministry. It is to be assumed that Harleyites received some mark of favour such as being recruited, promoted or summoned in their father's barony. Harleyite is not a substitute for Hanoverian. Nor should it be assumed that all Harleyites held aloof from Jacobite activity. It is a reasonable surmise that people who had the ambition to try one course for advancement and who subsequently found that it did not work were as likely to try another avenue as to continue with the first. And lastly, because an individual changed to supporting the court did not mean that he had metamorphosed into a fervent 1689-style whig: many whigs of the 1750s were very different political creatures from their predecessors at the period's beginning.

George I did not find the idea of a mixed ministry a truly inimical one. If he had there would not have been much contemporary incentive for the tories to cooperate with the Townshend-Walpole group. When it became evident that the Stanhope-Sunderland ministry was in need of additional support in parliament, Sunderland was given leave to approach some of the more likely candidates for inclusion. The earl himself was not exclusively whig in his associations; during the attempted impeachments he had commiserated with Strafford (1711) over the length of time his was taking.³⁰⁵

There was little tergiversation in the reign. Of those who did go over viscount Harcourt and the first baron Trevor were the most prominent. "For as these two

men were too knowing in their trade to swerve from the established principles of their profession, they acted like most lawyers, who generally look on princes like other clients, and, without regard to right or wrong, the equity or injustice of the cause, think themselves obliged to maintain whoever fees them last and pays them best."³⁰⁶ That both were 'feed' and held senior office under George I was no mean achievement in view of their both having been raised to the peerage by the hated Oxford. Because of this, their behaviour is worthy of particular monitoring prior to their defections.

In February 1718 Harcourt was with the opposition on the Mutiny bill.³⁰⁷ In December 1718 both the Occasional Conformity and the Schism Acts were repealed. Harcourt was noted to vote for repeal although he had helped enact the measures originally.³⁰⁸ In April 1719 Harcourt and Trevor signed a protest on the Common Council of London with their fellow tories.³⁰⁹ During 1720 the former was taken into the ministry and made lord privy seal with a pension. Beyond convenience, it is uncertain how whole-hearted his conversion to whigdom was, but then it is unlikely that his toryness had ever been heartfelt. Neither Townshend nor Walpole can have warmed to his presence in the ministry although both were aware how it was beneficial in the government's overall management of politics. In 1725 he was to vote for Macclesfield (1721) in some of the divisions during the earl's impeachment.³¹⁰ While the negotiations on the re-admission of the Townshend-Walpole group was being conducted, he was used as a channel by which the likes of William Bromley, the former secretary of state, were approached. However, there were no positive

responses to these soundings.³¹¹

Colley has written "The extent of the tory party's decline by 1723 must have suprised even those who had worked to achieve it."³¹² The principal cause of this was the Layer plot which dominated the 1722-1723 session. In December 1721 North, Strafford (1711), baron Weston and Francis Atterbury bishop of Rochester had signed a letter to the Pretender. They soon lost any faith that they had had in the project. However, Christopher Layer, a Norfolk attorney, had been conducting his own fanciful correspondence. The two elements combined made a potent concoction which Walpole was able to force down the opposition's throat.³¹³ The plot was a severe blow to the tory party but it was only one of a number in the early 1720s. The March 1723 death of Cowper was important to the tories. The earl had shown himself a superb political tactician in the House of Lords. He had appeal among the court and moderate whigs.

Perhaps a more important death than Cowper's was that of Oxford in May 1724. A mould had been broken that may well have been holding a considerable portion of the tory party in the Lords. The yoke of Harley was gone. Up until that point very few of his former associates had gone over to the court. Trevor's defection seems to have followed on from it. Despite having been active with the opposition during the time of the plot the baron succeeded Kingston as lord privy seal in 1726. During the treaty debates of 1726 the second earl of Aylesford expressly took Dartmouth to the House because of the expertise the latter had acquired in Anne's reign. However, to Aylesford's consternation, the earl divided with the ministry.³¹⁴

There is minimal direct evidence on George II's attitude towards the tory party prior to his accession; during the late 1710s any hopes that the tories had banked on the prince of Wales were destroyed in February 1718 when he followed Walpole's suggestion to abstain from voting against the Mutiny bill.³¹⁵ Upon the accession a number of tories who had avoided George I's court attended George II's. This, in association with the new king's general political behaviour through his reign, suggests that he had probably been occasionally passively tolerant of their presence, in much the same way that George I had allowed catholics such as the eighth duke of Norfolk to come to court.³¹⁶ George II would only give positive encouragement to tories as individuals and not as representatives of their party.

Some tories did seek to be accepted individually. Bathurst had hopes placed on the efforts of Mrs. Howard (later the countess of Suffolk) and the duke of Dorset acting as his intermediaries. Neither proved fruitful as a conduit. He turned one of his brothers out of a seat at the general election in the hope of pleasing the king and in 1729 there was a report of his being given over by the tories.³¹⁷ During the treaty of Seville debates Bingley was prepared to speak on the ministry's behalf, although he was distinctly less keen to vote for it.³¹⁸

The first baron Hay was appointed as ambassador to Constantinople in 1729. Because of his unsuitable conduct he was recalled in 1734. In order to be able to execute the office in due state he had had to lay out considerable expenditure. At the time of his return he had not yet

recouped his outlay and therefore had lost money through the office rather than gained it. However, rather than return to opposition he tried to obtain a further governmental appointment in the hope of making good the deficit. As late as 1740 he was seeking to have himself appointed as governor of Barbados.³¹⁹

In 1731 the fifth earl of Denbigh aspired to be sent as ambassador to The Hague. The Feildings had undergone heavy financial losses both in the South Sea Bubble and subsequently. The family's overall poverty may have additionally driven the earl to try to seek the post. However, the general stance which led him to sign a protest with the opposition over Macclesfield (1721) in 1725 may have contributed his failure to achieve the post.³²⁰ In the early years of the reign the Jacobite first baron Boyle lapsed into pensionerdom.³²¹ He was not a Jacobite of the ardent tory kind.

After the Excise Crisis the second earl Poulett was summoned in his father's barony, the honour being paid for by the father's adherence to the ministry. In March 1734 when the first earl joined Scarborough and Greenwich in voting against the ministry on the Augmentation of the Forces, it was a sign that he had become a court supporter rather than a Walpolean whig. However, the elder Poulett was to return to his retirement in Somerset, sending up his proxy to his courtier son. The first earl had been one of the hard line tories who had not been immediately receptive to William's accession, he had not take his seat in the period until the 1696-1697 session because of his continuing loyalty to the Stuart cause.³²² He was showing a form of consistency being pro-court both in the 1680s

and in the 1730s.

In 1732 Lansdowne returned from the self-imposed exile that he had gone into after his 1717 release from the Tower. He chose not to sit in the House again but he did send up his proxy to the court whigs Wilmington and Dorset.³²³ These tories had been all either recruited or promoted during Oxford's ministry. Denbigh was an exception in having been both a commoner and a minor in the early 1710s. Harleyite creations were to prove important in the control of the House after Anne's reign as well as in it. Where Harcourt and Trevor had led others had now begun to follow.

The tory party had originally come into existence for the purpose of supporting the crown and the church, so it was reasonable that its latter-day members should still gravitate towards the crown, especially those who had served it and profited from it under Anne. The ministry was able to sell itself to potential tergiversants as the court party, the attitude that many of the older tories had been brought up in. Insisting on full and utter apostasy to 1689-style whiggery would not have been the best means of persuading an individual to change sides when he could have the easier option of retiring from politics, therefore, many conversions were a shifting of emphases rather than revelations of 'the road to Damascus' variety.

The tory tergiversations of the reign's early years largely dried up in the early 1730s as the opposition became increasingly active. This was because a distinct prospect seemed to grow that Walpole might be overturned and the king be persuaded to accept a mixed ministry.

However, in the the wake of the Excise Crisis Walpole secured firm control of the House so that hopes of further returns did not bear fruit. Therefore, many tories must have asked themselves whether they would be able realistically to advance themselves in their party colours. This was probably especially so in the Harleyite section of the party from which the past defections, full and temporary, had mostly come. The change was too recent and too marked for people to wish to go over for fear of accusations of opportunism from their former colleagues; it was easier to be inactive.

The first baron Chedworth was an M.P. when he tergiversated in 1735 from the tories to the ministry, although subsequently he did act independently upon occasions. He was the son of Jack Howe, the author of a number of bills the purpose of which was to make parliament more independent of the crown. Jack, a.k.a. lord John Grubham Howe, had only embarked on this career of opposition after he had been denied a grant he sought, he feeling able to ask for one since he had been queen Mary's vice-chamberlain. Being an angry courtier was the cause of his becoming Plumb's "blistering-tongued orator of the squirearchy,..." In 1702 Anne was happy to take him back into the court fold as paymaster-general, an office which he occupied throughout her reign. He and Harley had been natural associates during much of William's reign. If Howe was not a Harleyite in Anne's, since he did not resign in 1708, then he was certainly a central tory. When his son tergiversated it would not have been from the grass roots section of the tory party.³²⁴ Chedworth's rarity value in 1735 may have given him much of the prominence that was to

lead Walpole to forward for recruitment in 1741. In the early and middle 1730s other potential tergiversants preferred to wait on events rather than change their active political stances. Ideally, tories would like to have been taken into government as tories and not by having to shift their political emphases so that they became court whigs.

In the 1737 session the Civil List vote showed both the fifth earl of Northampton and the second earl of Oxford to be with the ministry on that issue, while Mountjoy abstained. On the Porteous Riots, Oxford and Northampton were joined in their positive support of the government by Strafford (1711) and Northampton, while Mountjoy abstained with the second baron Foley.³²⁵ In the short-term, the Riots improved the court's overall position by helping to promote what looked like becoming a Harleyite split from the rest of the tories. In January 1738 Foley was noted to be not only attending Frederick's court but also George II's.³²⁶

The danger to the tory party of a large-scale Harleyite defection in the Lords was probably averted by the worsening of the international situation. This led the opposition's collective fortune to pick up in the 1738 session: it was evident that Walpole had not wanted Britain to go to war, making his isolation within the ministry more evident than before; ministries were always politically more exposed in times of war than in times of peace; the parliament's life was over half-way through and there was the coming general election to be worked for. The presence of Greenwich (a long-term effect of the Porteous Riots), Falmouth and prince Frederick improved

the possibility of the Great Man being turned out.

Not all of the Harleyite section re-integrated back into the body of the party. The 1741 death of the second earl of Oxford, the son of Harley himself, was to be seen as a loss to the ministry, especially as he was succeeded by his stridently tory cousin. The second earl was courted in a number of ways. These were particular to him rather than aimed at the tory party (as Hill has contended).³²⁷ In December 1737, Oxford was making a tour of East Anglia. When the second earl of Orford, Walpole's eldest son, heard of his presence in the neighbourhood of Houghton, he not only bid him stay at the house that night but personally conducted Oxford around it and the estate the following day. Such behaviour was in large part aristocratic courtesy, but it may also have reflected a growing political closeness. The earl had financial difficulties; since estates could take several years to sell he was considerably helped by Hardwicke's 1739 purchase of Wimpole in Cambridgeshire. In a reign in which the Garter was increasingly given to undistinguished courtiers its most undistinguished recipient was Oxford's whig son-in-law the second duke of Portland in 1741. And lastly, the earl's sister lady Kinnoul, the wife of Hay, was provided with a pension.³²⁸

This case of tergiversation has been rather ignored because he has come to be seen as a person who can be overlooked easily, being in the shadow of his father. However, he was an instance of a trend that extended beyond himself, the effort being directed at converting not just the earl. In 1742 Sir Robert Walpole had offered dukedoms to both Northampton and the third earl of

Ailesbury but they had both turned them down on the grounds that they did not have sons to inherit them. Both men had been summoned to the Lords in their fathers' baronies by Oxford's father, the first earl.³²⁹

Both Gower's becoming lord privy seal in 1742 and his later change is well known, however, it has been overlooked that the earl was made a lord justice during the summer of 1740 (no mean achievement for a tory, however central, at the time.) Both Colley and Hill bemoan the 1740 death of Sir William Wyndham 3rd.Bt. as a great loss to the tory party at a critical time; what neither appreciates is that he had only achieved his position because of his association with prince Frederick; the tories were not used to producing their own leaders: they had to have them identified for them by the crown, or in this case its reversionary interest. The party could only have leaders emerge if they were prepared to moderate their views into a form of Hanoverian centralism; the higher an individual rose he became both less representative of his support-base and more likely to tergiversate. This paradox, which holds for both Gower and Wyndham, accounts for the lack of leaders for Feiling to study in the early Hanoverian period.³³⁰ In October 1749 the seventh duke of Somerset was given the additional earldom of Egremont which was remaindered on his nephew Sir Charles Wyndham 4th.Bt., the eldest son of Sir William. Young Wyndham consequently became the second earl of Egremont the following year.

The fall of Walpole in 1742 did not bring the tory party any lasting tangible gains. The whigs remained

unsettled because George II chose not to recognize any of them as his first minister. Without there being a settled state of affairs there was little reason for any tory to tergiversate since he did not know what sort of a court/whig party he was going over to: Gower did not go over until after the '45. As the Pelhams became established in the late 1740s there was a policy of crown favour to certain tories notably through titles. The ministry would have been grateful for the effect that this had in helping quieten the Lords. It is obscure to what extent this originated with the king and to what extent with his ministers.³³¹

Before the 1745 Rebellion a decline had been occurring in the party's numerical strength in the Lords. After the Rebellion's suppression the rate of that decline grew markedly. Gower may not have taken forty M.P.s³³² into the ministry but there were other peers who went across at much the same time as he did for much the same reasons, some of whom may have been holding themselves back first because of the prospect of Walpole's fall and then because of the ministerial instability that had followed it, while still others would have gone into full or partial retirement. The last fourteen years of the period saw no large-scale opposition in the Upper House. Opposition might be noisy and vehement there but it was always small. The tory party was finished as a major force in the contemporary political set-up. However, it did continue as a group. A number of tories were to be admitted to office as tories in the late 1750s as part of a drive to minimalize the friction in domestic politics.

Colley has written "What was novel in high politics

in the late 1740s and 1750s was not so much the emphases of parliamentary argument, as the number of up-and-coming politicians who were compelled into trumpeting whiggery because their own origins were tory."³³³ She is describing only one dimension of what was happening and describing it only in terms of party attitudes. The likes of Fox, Legge, Pitt, Dupplin (the second baron Hay) and William Murray (Mansfield) were all in the Commons. It was easier for them to disavow the politics of their fathers' generation than it was for other members of that generation. The peers were changing from the pro-court politics of one era to the pro-court politics of another: it was the same journey but by a different vehicle.

In 1747 Sir Francis Dashwood 2nd.Bt. compiled a list of the opposition in both the Commons and the Lords. The latter were twenty-four in number. Using the references gathered together by Clyve Jones and David Hayton,³³⁴ it is possible to differentiate between those who stayed in persistent opposition until either the period's end or their own deaths and those who were prepared to cooperate with the ministry, if only occasionally. The consistent tories were the third earl of Abingdon, the third earl of Oxford, the fourth baron Craven, the eleventh baron St. John, Beaufort, Lichfield, Foley, Mountjoy, Maynard, Wentworth and Ward. Peripheral to the eleven were nine others who at one time or another were to vote with the government- the fifth earl of Denbigh, the fifth earl of Northampton, the eleventh earl of Suffolk, viscount Folkestone, the second baron Masham, Aylesford, Boyle, Westmorland and Thanet.³³⁵ One should not overstress the division, the Hayton/Jones material being largely derived

from Newcastle's (1715) lists for pre-sessional meetings. There were tories not in either group, e.g. Bathurst. Also there are clearly a number of sons of central tories among the consistents who are unlikely to have had the tory politics of the rank and file of the early 1710s. However, the groups can be used in a rough manner to distinguish the core of the party in the Lords from those who were generally more willing to cooperate with the ministry.

In the Lords politics was engaged in in a different style from that of the Commons. With the passage of time a coaxing approach would have met with less results as the tory party in the Upper Chamber was steadily reduced towards its grass roots strand. The character of the tory party there was affected by members with experience of party warfare in the Commons inheriting family titles, who seem to have injected touches of dynamism and militancy which the Lords party would have lacked otherwise. Lord Noel Somerset had been elected to the House of Commons in 1731. He had emerged as a considerable force among the tories there. In February 1745 he inherited the family dukedom of Beaufort. He was happy to act on his own account and take whoever would follow him from Gower's banner.³³⁶ Chesterfield did not take this development too seriously, although he viewed the third earl of Oxford's involvement in it as being that of a man of weight. Oxford had also been a leading member of the Commons tory party while an M.P..³³⁷ The 1748-1749 session ended with Oxford, Beaufort and some other lords meeting at the St. Albans Tavern.³³⁸ Who those 'other lords' were could tell us a great deal about the state of the tory party at that juncture.

In the Lords, in the period's final years there were still Harleyites tergiversating although there were an increasing share who came from other strands of the party. Those who did not cross over were increasingly people who had come to their political maturity in the wake of the establishment of the Supremacy. Those did come into the government ranks did not necessarily do so unconditionally and could stray, or threaten to do so, back into quasi-opposition. This may have been a sign of a change in the political complexion of those who were tergiversating. Even though one must take into account that patronage is the principal tool of this section's methodology, it seems that it had to be used in order to bring people over. There was no scope for using local office as inducement since such would have offended whig sensibilities at the grass roots level.

The third earl of Ailesbury was one of two to whom Walpole had offered dukedoms. The earl was wooed with a barony in 1746 which his nephew and intended heir, who was not a patrilineal relative, could inherit. Otherwise, the second baron Bruce would have acquired the Wiltshire and Yorkshire estates as a commoner. The earl had both been summoned to the Lords in his father's barony by the first earl of Oxford and offered a dukedom by Walpole. The fifth earl of Northampton, having in 1743 inherited the Eastbourne estate of his uncle Wilmington, became a Sussex landowner. He was paid courtesies by the Pelhams over local county matters, such as road legislation. Like Ailesbury he had been summoned in 1711 and offered a dukedom in 1742. 339

The Mansells were another family who drifted into whiggery. Margam Abbey decayed severely during the seventeen-year minority of the second baron Mansell. The family metamorphosed from Welsh tories into Sussex whigs. The fourth baron as an M.P. had been pliable to the ministry upon occasions. His fuller change as a peer was aided by the acquaintance that he struck up with Newcastle (1715) after the duke's offer to help stock the park of his Sussex seat, Newick Place, with deer.³⁴⁰

Among the 1747 recruits was the former tory M.P. Anthony Bouverie (Folkestone).³⁴¹ In January 1748 Henry Rolle, another former tory, was recruited. During the 1730s, as an M.P., he had frequently brought in Qualification bills. Neither appears to have been a Harleyite. Folkestone, like Northampton, was one of the peripheral nine, as Rolle might well have proved to be had he not died in 1750.³⁴²

In July 1749 Bruce's brother, the fourth earl of Cardigan, was to feel able to forward himself for his late father-in-law's lord lieutenancy of Northamptonshire. He was unsuccessful but it was indicative of there being a change since the man may have been seen previously as a tory. The tory element may be the reason why the office went to the second earl of Halifax, who had the advantage of being a certain whig, even if he was a rather factious one who had a relatively unimportant territorial presence in the county in comparison with Cardigan.³⁴³

In February 1747 the third earl of Ailesbury died. The barony and his estates passed to the now second baron Bruce. Included among these was the valuable Wiltshire property of Savernake which the earl's mother had brought

as dower on her 1676 marriage, it having been previously the property of her family, the Somerset Seymours. In February 1750 the eighth duke of Somerset inherited that family's title. He was of a milder tory disposition than his father Sir Edward Seymour 5th.Bt.. In April 1751, in the post-Rebellion political climate, the duke felt able to ask for the lord lieutenancy of Devon, he having inherited the paternal estates of Berry Pomeroy there and of Maiden Bradley in Wiltshire. However, the fourth duke of Bedford was then in favour and was unimpeachably a whig so that Somerset's wish was not met with. Prince Frederick had died only the previous month and therefore the Pelhams had not yet agreed between themselves on the removal of Bedford.

In July 1752 Somerset let it be known that he was going to law against Bruce over the Savernake estate. How serious he was in this can not be ascertained. What is certain that is that it demonstrated his nuisance value; two court tories whom the ministry could have had reasonable expectations of accommodating would be implacably opposed to one another and that branch of political rapprochement would have been destabilized in large part.³⁴⁴ This is not proven positively but it is chronologically tidy. He was almost certainly bought off with an interim pension. In 1752 the duke was made chief justice in eyre north of the Trent, although the office was usually given to someone who had estates north of the river, which he did not have.³⁴⁵

In January 1751 the tory heir-apparent of the fourth earl of Clarendon had been summoned by the ministry in his father's barony, the man having long been seen as a member

of the party who might turn into a ministerialist. 346

The third earl of Oxford died in April 1755 as did the fourth duke of Beaufort in October 1756. The two had had a major influence on the party in the Lords since the early 1740s. It is possible that their weight can be illustrated by the way in which Bathurst was prepared to accept employment in the same month that the duke died.³⁴⁷ However, even at this late juncture the depth of tergiversation should not be overestimated. Both the first baron Boyle and the fifth earl of Denbigh had shown themselves to be clearly amenable to the ministry at the beginning of George II's reign. The second baron had opposition associations and was forwarding himself as someone who should be bought off with a place. In December 1757 he sought to succeed Somerset, on the duke's death, as a chief justice in eyre, while in May 1758 he was giving his proxy to the ministerial Devonshire.³⁴⁸ He may well have been already in receipt of a pension.

The sixth earl of Denbigh was involved in protracted negotiations in the late 1750s over pensions for himself and his sisters. During these negotiations his financial affairs improved and, as he was already involved in talking to the ministry, he felt himself to have the right to extract something and therefore sought a mark of honour. As late as February 1760 he was able to extract a place of the Privy Council by audibly muttering the words "cocoa tree."³⁴⁹ 'The Cocoa Tree' had long been one of the coffee houses where tories in the Hanoverian age had gathered in order to consult with one another on parliamentary tactics.³⁵⁰ This incident proves that, despite both the marked decline in the tory party's

strength in parliament and the way in which a number of the remaining tories had been brought into office, there was still a tory opposition extant at Westminster. It was not active in the Lords but it did exist and the earl's remark, even if was made in a calculated manner, was considered to be worth taking seriously in order to preserve as high a level of political harmony as possible at a time of marked political stress caused by the heavy burden of war taxation.³⁵¹

In 1759 the second earl of Egremont resigned the lord lieutenancy of Cumberland to Sir John Lowther 5th.Bt.(N.S.). Sir John was the heir-general of the third viscount Lonsdale and it had been the wish of the family Lowther that a caretaker be given the viscount's lieutenancies of Cumberland and Westmorland. However, in 1756 only Westmorland had been given to Sir John Lowther 3rd.Bt.of Holker. On his death the lieutenancy was given to Sir John Pennington to act in the interests of his nephew, the fifth baronet. Egremont did not regard himself as a caretaker. Therefore, his resignation probably derived from wishing not to continue in an office made contentious by the Militia Acts.

The haste of the 1756 transferral to Pennington was in marked comparison with the treatment of county Durham in the early 1750s, when that county's lieutenancy had not been conferred for a number of years. This was because the moderate tory the eighth earl of Thanet wished to secure the office for himself and felt able to realistically forward himself as a candidate for it. Since the 1745 Rebellion party divisions had rapidly grown less important in high politics. This meant that court-inclined tories

had reasonable hopes of securing rewards, if they kept in line. However, in this instance party differences at the level of low politics were more keenly felt than on the high one, so that party considerations influenced the outcome of the matter.³⁵²

The Harleyite predilection to serve the court was still being evidenced twenty years after the man's death and thirty years after his fall. It was only after the Rebellion that the Harleyites were in a minority of the tory lords who engaged in pro-court behaviour. The predominance of the section among those that so changed their politics demonstrates two things. Firstly, that its members originally had been predisposed towards serving the court and that this trait was continuous. And secondly, that the continuing strength of the grass root tory party is underlined.

Before 1727 very few other than Harleyites tergiversated while before 1745 non-Harleyite tory families changed to court support through different members of the family having different politics rather than a single individual converting. However, that mainstream tories did not change did not necessarily mean that they continued as active tories, there was always the choice of making their support latent. The government could pass business without worry but it was concerned to keep things as quiet as possible, a situation which the eighth duke of Somerset and the sixth earl of Denbigh exploited since the duke of Newcastle (1715) had known the heady days of the Oxford ministry and was therefore susceptible to a degree of manipulation.

5.5. Low Politics, 1727-1760.

Langford's 1975 monograph on the Excise Crisis fills an important place in the current historiography of the period even though its immediate bearing on this thesis is slight. The study goes a long way towards explaining why after nearly two decades of the Supremacy the ministry should try to legislate a rather small technical bill into law and bring such a welter of opposition upon itself that it withdrew the measure. The Crisis was the most important instance since the Sacheverell in Anne's reign of a popular protest breaking through into high politics. It is clear that there were bounds to the political nation's patience beyond which the government trod at its own risk. The ministry could conduct public affairs how it liked just so long as did so within generally accepted confines. If it sought to go beyond those limits, e.g. war, it needed to have public assent, passive or active. If it met with public dissent it could expect severe electoral repercussions, as occurred in the 1710 general election. The Crisis was different from Sacheverell in not being a church cry but rather it saw the novel joining together of the expanding trading interests with a more ancient country fears of abuse of the executive.

The Excise Crisis of 1733 and the Jew bill of 1753 were the two great interruptions of low politics onto the plain of high politics. In her cogent 1988 article Kathleen Wilson has discussed that same vein of political life can be seen in the popular lauding of admiral Vernon in the wake of news reaching England in March 1740 of his victory over the Spanish at Porto Bello in the West Indies. The War of the Spanish Succession was principally

fought on the European continent and the Seven Years' War was fought on three continents- North America, India and Europe. The War of the Austrian Succession was a point on the route from to the other. Indeed, the war had a second name underlining its dual character- the War of Jenkins's Ear. The name being given to describe the early colonial conflicts in which Vernon was so prominent.

Wilson points out that a variety of factors adjoined in order to make the admiral a popular focus for rejoicing in anti-ministerial sentiment. The ministry had been most wary of being drawn into conflict with Spain, hence the Convention of Pardo. With the advent of war it was most wary of giving the admiral adequate resources to allow him to follow up his initial successes. In addition, Vernon had been associated with the opposition when he had formerly sat in the Commons. Those who traded with the West Indies and North America were not collected in a chartered monopoly, therefore, their political wishes could not be curbed with the same ease as those of the other trading lobbies could. These all led to a conjunction of radical domestic politics with colonial trading interests.

This link was to have repercussions, after the period ended. The unsuccessful attempt of Britain to quell the American Rebellion was to lead to severe domestic political strain. This, in its turn, was in large part to lead to the reforms which began to undermine the political state of affairs that had come into being in the wake of 1688, although it is made clear that these long-term ramifications do not allow the incident to climb into the Excise Crisis-Jew bill league of populist politics. The

article is a good piece of work although it ignores both the fact that Walpole would have easily survived the election had it not been for dissentient court elements working against him and the fact that ultimately George II was happy for the country to go to war and it was he who ultimately directed how military resources were applied.

There had been no divisions in the Lords on the Jewish Naturalization bill which passed into law. The bill was of a limited technical nature and did not naturalize anyone in itself. What it did do was make it possible for a professing Jew to be naturalized. Like the Quakers' Tithes bill before it the Act was meant as a thanks. Whereas the Quakers's one had been of an electoral character this measure was a mark of thanks to the Jewish financial community, notably Samson Gideon. There was moderate opposition to the Act as a bill but instead of subsiding with its passage this opposition began rather to grow. When parliament met again the bill was repealed. On March 4th 1754 sixty-six peers voted on the repeal of the Jew Act and the majority was forty-six. The popular campaign subsided.

While it is clear that there was anti-semitic feeling in eighteenth-century feeling. T.W.Perry's 1962 monograph makes it clear that the principal reason for the opposition was because of the old whig/tory divide on naturalization which centred on the sacrament. As Perry makes clear G.M.Trevelyan's assumption that religious and political passions in the 1750s were "stone-cold" was clearly wrong. Nearly half a century after Sacheverell a religious matter could force a supposedly "supreme" court/whig ministry to retract a piece of legislation. It

is clear that the ministry was not immune from popular pressure.

The Jew bill struck rather a different chord from the Excise Crisis and the Vernon cult but it nonetheless showed the way in which there was a whole seam of socio-political reality during the period under discussion. This reality can be said to have come out to a degree in elections and all three of these incidents occurred just prior to a general election- 1734, 1741 and 1754. It is arguable that had there not been elections shortly to come that these 'campaigns' would not have acquired the potency that they did. The politics in which the peerage engaged themselves at the centre was mostly of a rarefied character. It took place within a narrow band of high politics and there was a whole political reality beyond it. The religious issue had largely been placed to the side of politics in the wake of the Succession because of the effect it was capable of having on politics. The character of British society was changing fundamentally. There had always been a middle class but this was both growing numerically and growing wealthier. These changes to it made it inclined to be more politicized. In time it would want to have its voice heard.

The Excise Crisis had shown that trade, of which the middling sort were the principal practitioners, could be linked with the old country suspicions of the court, which had been principally held by the broader aristocracy since the Restoration. The Vernon cult did not reach the same intensity but it did show the adding of an imperial/colonial dimension which was to be important domestically after the establishment of American

independence. The Jew bill showed how political issues could long lie latent in British politics and then emerge with immense vitality. The linking of the old liberty with the new property was to prove a powerful blend after the period's end. In the meantime the existing system ossified overhead.

6. Conclusion.

As a whole the politics of the period 1689-1760 have been only partially understood. There has been a failure in approach, research has been directed only at the period's supposed dynamic parts, something that is rather unfortunate in view of the general political torpor of the early Hanoverian period. When conclusions of the four reigns have been reached they have been the result of analyses of only selective areas rather than as a result of a broader comprehension. It is history of the victors, or rather it has sought to be the history of the victors.

This thesis has successfully contended that the Revolution Settlement benefitted not just parliament but also the crown. It is indubitable that the Settlement wrought a major change on the British constitution. However, that change has been unduly transferred to politics too. Both the hardware and the practice of politics change but the latter has had subsequent developments transposed on to it, changes that can not be justified in terms of the hardware.

In harnessing the crown, through the Settlement, the political nation made it a far more powerful creature. At the same time it bound itself to provide for the crown's financial appetites- the price for a lack of friction over the prerogative was regular taxation. Both sides lost and gained as a result of the transformation, the crown was itself a victor, even if under the early Hanoverians a general political lethargy has long masked the fact.

The crown was a considerable force in politics overall and especially so on high politics. Such has been a long accepted truism but it has not been demonstrated in

a systematic manner before. Its presence has been seen as part of the political background rather than as the principal political factor of the era. The 'oligarchy' that came into being in the early Hanoverian period has for too long a time taken to be the captors of the crown whereas in fact they were literally what they were- its courtiers. The true beneficiary of the Settlement was the political nation as a whole not a particular part of it, that the 'oligarchs' came to enjoy their positions of profit and influence was a by-product of the Settlement, a sign of how secure the crown felt.

Interparty conflict has long been seen as a factor of the first importance. It was taken that the character of that conflict was different from its modern counterpart but analyses of it assumed that it occurred in some form of vacuum, the crown being something that was inert. The party variances of low politics were taken to be of equal worth throughout politics. Rather, high politics occurred in a separate environment and there was cross-infection both ways.

The analysis which was orientated towards interparty conflict recognized that the two parties were not comparable to modern ones in organizational terms. The whigs were generally regarded as the more coherent of the two, having weathered persecution. However, paradoxically they were less of a party in terms of having a set agenda to achieve; in the departure of James II the party had attained its central objective, whereas the tories conduct was called into question by that king's conduct. The whigs were better able to serve the crown as a court party, this being evidenced even in the early 1690s. After 1714 when

the Supremacy was established, it was the Supremacy of the whigs acting as the court party rather than of the whigs acting as the whig party.

By 1760 there had been considerable changes in attitude from 1701 as to the place of the crown in politics. However, there had been no parallel material constitutional change since the Act of Settlement. In large part, this accounts for the difficulties that George III underwent in the 1760s. This thesis has very much been constructed in the 'material' vein. It has not sought to overturn the previous general perception of the period's politics, rather it has sought to complement that 'attitude' perception. In the latter, the crown was not seen in a light that resulted from a systematic study of it as a subject. Rather it was seen in the reflected glory of supposed constitutional progress.

Indeed, one should be careful with the material that has been used to build this thesis's argument. There are a number of incidents which can be read in a broader fashion than they have previously been viewed, e.g. 1746. However, to counter this tendency, some of the evidence that shows a strong crown under the early Hanoverians can be read in more than one way, e.g. the employment of kinsmen and clients of the Pelhams as Bedchamber lords in the late 1740s.

I. Notes and References.Abbreviations.

Add.	Additional Manuscripts
B.L.	British Library
C.U.L.Chol.H.	Cambridge University Library Cholmondley Houghton Papers
D.N.B.	Dictionary of National Biography
G.E.C.	Cockayne's Complete Peerage
H.M.C.	Historical Manuscripts Commission
V.H.C.E.	Victoria History of the Counties of England

1. Introduction.

1. Christie, Ian "The Personality of George II." History Today v (1955), pp.516-25
2. Stone, Lawrence "The Revival of Narrative." Past and Present 85 (1979), pp.20-21
3. Kenyon, John The History Men p.260
4. Kenyon The History Men p.265
5. Christie, Ian "The Tory Party, Jacobitism and the 'Forty-five: a Note.'" Historical Journal 30 (1987), p.921
6. Clark, Jonathan C.D. Revolution and Rebellion p.164
7. Kenyon The History Men p.283
8. Plumb, John H. Sir Robert Walpole ii p.247n
9. Colley, Linda "The Politics of Eighteenth-Century British History." Journal of British Studies 25 (1986), p.359
10. Who Was Who ii p.866
11. Habakkuk, H.J. "English Landownership, 1680-1740." Economic History Review 1st series 10 (1940), pp.2-17
12. Cannon Aristocratic Century p.vii
13. Hervey, John Some Materials Towards Memoirs of the Reign of George II (ed.) Sedgwick, R.Romney i p.251
14. Cannon p.viii
The Spectator 230 (1973), p.269
15. Cannon p.33
16. Cannon pp.115-16
17. Beckett, J.V. The Aristocracy in England, 1660-1914 p.406

18. Cannon p.96
19. Plumb The Growth of Political Stability in England, 1675-1725 p.153
20. Plumb Stability pp.133-60
21. Rubini, Dennis "Party and the Augustan Constitution, 1694-1716: Politics and the Power of the Executive." Albion 10 (1978), p.207
22. Feiling, Keith The History of The Tory Party, 1640-1714 p.424
23. Plumb Stability p.154
24. At George I's accession there were some minor concessions made by parliament. Clauses which had been intended principally as snubs to William were repealed, e.g. that the sovereign could not travel overseas without parliament's permission.

2. Titles.

1. Naylor, John F. The British Aristocracy and the Peerage Bill of 1719.
2. The Wentworth Papers p.242
3. Luttrell, Narcissus A Brief Historical Relation of State Affairs iv pp.214-15
H.M.C. Bath iii p.112
4. B.L. Portland Loan 29/127. Second earl of Warrington to first earl of Oxford. April 10th, 1714
5. Luttrell iv pp.5 and 8-9
6. Luttrell iv p.207
7. A Selection of the Papers from the Earls of Marchmont (ed.) Rose, G.H. ii March 24th 1733.
8. Wentworth pp.133 and 347-48
9. B.L.Add.32710 f.501
B.L.Add.32724 f.332
10. G.E.C. The Complete Peerage i, appendix G, pp.492-93
11. B.L.Add.29564 f.417
B.L.Add.29565 ff.518 and 545
The Lexington Papers (ed.) Sutton, John H.T. Manners p.27
12. There could be thirteen but Aylesford and Lechmere owed their elevations to political factors, neither of them ascending in their careers beyond the Commons' legal offices.
13. However, neither Sir John Holt nor Sir John Pratt gained a title, while Sir Dudley Ryder was granted one but died before he could kiss the king's hand for it.
The Yale Edition of Horace Walpole's Correspondence (ed.) Lewis, W.S. 20 pp.556-57
14. Life and Correspondence of...Hardwicke (ed.) Yorke, Philip ii p.300
15. B.L.Add.32685 f.53
B.L.Add.32868 f.162
16. This can be interpreted as a victory for Bolingbroke and his client Sir William Wyndham, who was earmarked as Bingley's successor at the Exchequer.
Oldmixon, John The History of England During the reigns of King William ... George I p.529
17. Oldmixon p.578
18. The Diary of Mary, Countess Cowper (ed.) Cowper, S. p.120
19. Coxe, William Memoirs of the Life and Administration of Sir Robert Walpole i pp.331 and 333

20. B.L.Add.32734 ff.348-49
B.L.Add.32737 f.514
21. Luttrell iv p.258
Macky, John Memoirs of the secret services of John Macky p.27
22. Coxe Sir Robert Walpole i p.349
23. Bruce, Anthony The Purchase System in the British Army, 1660-1870 pp.27-28
24. The second earl of Cholmondley was initially created an Irish baron in 1715, in 1716 he was recruited into the British peerage and in 1725 he inherited his brother's earldom.
25. Walpole Correspondence 19 p.414
26. Letter-Books of John Hervey, first earl of Bristol (ed.) Hervey, Sydenham iii p.92
B.L.Add.32686 f.202
27. Walpole Correspondence 20 p.135
B.L.Add.32720 f.133
28. B.L.Add.35419 f.170
29. V.H.C.E.Warwickshire iii pp.28-29
Luttrell ii pp.331, 374, iii p.60 and iv p.715
30. Ormerod, George History of Cheshire iii p.551
31. The previous title was located at Newcastle-upon-Tyne whereas this one was sited at Newcastle-under-Lyme.
32. H.M.C.Portland ii pp.165-66
B.L.Add.29596 f.108
33. The 1665 and 1715 dukes held no estates in common.
34. Walpole Correspondence 9 p.39 and 19 p.24
35. B.L.Add.51418 f.44
36. Walpole Correspondence 20 p.167
37. B.L.Add.32703 f.341
38. Bruce p.18
39. H.M.C.Frankland p.93
40. Hatton, Ragnhild George I. Elector and King p.147
41. Coxe Sir Robert Walpole i pp.201-02
Mary Cowper p.113
42. Walpole Correspondence 17 pp.276-77
43. H.M.C.Egmont Diary iii pp.259-60
Hervey iii pp.667 and 740

44. Walpole Correspondence 19 p.419
45. As a point of detail it is worth noting that Barnard, St. John and Romney were all from long established territorial families. In comparison, Folkestone, Ilchester and Montfort were all of a single generation away from being 'new money.' There is a clear chronological split between the two types although it is probable that some of Romney's cash was probably derived from his having married one of Sir Cloudesley Shovell's daughters and co-heiresses. Onslow, with his multitudinous City connections, would be a good candidate.
Vulliamy, C.E. The Onslows. pp.24-34
46. Challinor, P.J. The Structure of politics in Cheshire, 1660-1715. C.N.A.A.Ph.D. pp.8-9
47. Just as it is possible to regard Fauconberg's promotion the previous year as a compliment to Leeds, because they were both Yorkshire landowners, so it may be possible to see this instance as a sign of William being prepared to work with Sunderland, who like Longueville was a Northamptonshire landowner.
Kenyon Robert Spencer earl of Sunderland, 1641-1702 p.245
48. H.M.C. Portland iii p.487
49. D.N.B. John Lowther first viscount Lonsdale (1655-1700)
50. Dryden, John Absalom and Achitoptel, line 574
51. Macky p.53
52. H.M.C. Rutland ii pp.168 and 172
53. B.L.Add.61426 ff.229-30
54. Coxe Memoirs of John, Duke of Marlborough i p.112
Luttrell v pp.531-32
55. Coxe Memoirs of ... Henry Pelham i p.3
56. Anne liked Kingston. Later in the reign the Junto were to try to raise him as a rival to the sixth duke of Somerset.
H.M.C. Downshire 1.2 p.867
57. Coxe Marlborough iii p.113
58. Macky p.24
Bristol Letter-Books i p.194
Luttrell v pp.277, 328 and 443
The Verney Letters of the Eighteenth Century (ed.)
Verney, Margaret i p.108
59. Coxe Marlborough iii p.61
Wentworth p.132
Burnet, Gilbert The History of My Own Time v p.453

60. H.M.C. Portland iii p.637
Wentworth p.197
Oldmixon p.461
61. They were both matrilineal grandsons of Sir Allen Apsley.
62. Wentworth p.165
63. Oldmixon p.330
64. Wentworth p.193
Luttrell vi p.709
Burnet vi p.94
65. D.N.B.Thomas Trevor first baron Trevor (1658-1730)
Wentworth pp.132 and 203
66. Coxe Sir Robert Walpole ii p.48
- 66b. B.L.Add.32703 ff.460 and 477
67. Wentworth p.387
68. Oldmixon p.480
69. Wentworth p.431
70. H.M.C. Portland v p.246
71. Hill Parties, 1689-1742 p.152
72. Oldmixon p.654
73. H.M.C. Laing ii pp.207-08
B.L.Add.32687 f.190
George I seems to have liked the first duke of Portland, allowing the duke to remain a Bedchamber lord while he went to Jamaica in order to try to repair his fortune.
74. See this thesis pp.240-46
75. Walpole, Horace Memoirs of King George II (ed.)
Lewis, W.S. i p.67
76. History of Parliament 1715-1754 ii p.203
77. H.M.C. Egmont Diary iii pp.259-60
78. Dickerson, O.M. American Colonial Government, 1696-1765 pp.35-36
79. Ashburnham may have been connected with the duke of Newcastle (1715) who had played a leading role in undermining Townshend in the conduct of international relations. Newcastle was another Sussex landowner.
80. B.L.Add.32688 f.265
81. History of Parliament 1715-1754 ii pp.3, 38 and 155

82. Coxe Sir Robert Walpole i p.360
(H.M.C. Egmont Diary ii p.366)
83. Coxe Sir Robert Walpole i p.716
Walpole Correspondence 17 pp.467 and 484-85
84. Coxe Sir Robert Walpole i pp.408 and 737
B.L.Add.35352 f.2
85. Coxe Pelham i p.111
86. Namier, Lewis The Structure of Politics at the
Accession of George III p.257
87. Walpole Correspondence 18 p.441
H.M.C. Egmont Diary i p.10
88. B.L.Add.32711 f.254
89. Walpole Correspondence 19 pp.241 and 371
B.L.Add.32709 f.333
B.L.Add.32710 f.201
B.L.Add.51418 ff.9 and 25
90. Walpole Correspondence 20 pp.66-67
91. Walpole Correspondence 9 p.36
B.L.Add.51418 f.9
92. Horace Walpole agreed as to Hardwicke's worth,
comparing him a returning imperator who was paraded into
Rome. He completed the analogy by remarking as to the
presence of a slave in the chariot to act as a reminder of
humility, a.k.a. Darlington.
Walpole George II ii p.11
(The Political Journal of George Bubb Dodington (ed.)
Carswell, John pp.251-52)
93. Walpole George II ii pp.191
Walpole Correspondence 21 pp.26-27
B.L.Add.32865 f.87
94. Walpole was the father-in-law of the fourth duke of
Devonshire's youngest sister.
Coxe Memoirs of Horatio, Lord Walpole ii pp.372 and
429
Walpole Correspondence 19 p.469
Walpole George II i p.93
B.L.Add.32860 f.150
95. B.L.Add.51420 f.18
B.L.Add.32854 f.112

3. Central Office.

1. The lord great chamberlain, the lord high steward and the earl marshal are the only arguable cases.
2. They had originally been under the lord chamberlain's auspices.
3. Cannon pp.115-16
4. Clark Revolution and Rebellion p.89
Clark The Dynamics of Change p.449
5. Although post-1760 Ligonier was made a British peer.
6. The first duke of Marlborough had distinct connections with three people who held the office after him during the period. The third duke of the same title was his matrilineal grandson, the second duke of Montagu was a son-in-law and the earl Cadogan a client.
7. The eighth earl of Pembroke transferred twice in the reign and on the second occasion it was from two offices to a single one.
8. Hervey ii pp.406-07
9. It is possible that the high degree of interest continuity in the passage of lord lieutenancies was a further symptom of whatever attitude shaped this occurrence in the Bedchamber.
10. Macky p.101
11. Lexington pp.41-42
12. B.L.Egerton 1715 f.191
13. Beattie, John M. The English Court in the reign of George I pp.54-55
14. The Memoirs and Speeches of James 2nd earl Waldegrave, 1742-1763 (ed.) Clark, J.C.D. p.4
15. Hervey ii p.407
Walpole George II i p.58
D.N.B.William Henry Nassau de Zuylestein, the fourth earl of Rochford (1717-1781)
Walpole Correspondence 20 pp.109 and 112
16. Beattie p.57
17. The Life of...Hardwicke ii p.223
18. Although both had lord leutenancies and Bedford was earmarked for a Garter.
H.M.C.Portland iii p.487

19. The earl Clinton, the second earl of Godolphin, the second earl Poulett (if his being summoned in his father's barony and being given the Somerset lord lieutenancy are excluded), the second earl Cowper, the sixth baron Lovelace, the second earl of Tankerville, the third earl of Jersey the third duke of Manchester, the fourth duke of Leeds, the third duke of St.Albans, the first earl Fitzwilliam, the sixth earl of Coventry, the fourth earl of Essex and the third earl of Orford.

20. Luttrell ii p.343 and iv pp.175, 480, 501, 505, 511, 513-14, 516, 584 and 659

H.M.C.Portland iii p.604

The Diary of John Evelyn (ed.) de Beer, E.S. v pp.86 and 320-31

21. H.M.C.Carlisle p.111

B.L.Add.32688 f.3

B.L.Add.27732 f.154

H.M.C.Egmont Diary iii p.278

Walpole Correspondence 18 p.350, 19 pp.397 and 420

B.L.Add.32711 f.88

The Letters of Spencer Cowper, dean of Durham, 1746-1774 pp.ix-x

The Harcourt Papers (ed.) Harcourt, Edward iii p.40

B.L.Add.35414 f.241

B.L.Eg.1716 f.177

22. Walpole Correspondence 17 p.319

23. The first duke of St.Albans, the second earl of Burlington, the second earl of Stamford, the eighth earl of Pembroke, the third earl of Carlisle, the second baron Lexington and the earl of Romney.

4. Local Office.

1. The office of vice admiral in the coast counties would be a contender to join but evidence on it was scarce in the sources consulted. In addition, it was an office which the peerage did not often hold.
2. Webb, Sidney and Beatrice English Local Government
3. H.M.C. Portland v p.460
4. Sainty, J.C. Lists of the Lieutenants of the Counties of England and Wales, 1660-1974 Lists and Index Society
5. Charles II's ducal bastards are excluded from it but the first marquis of Rockingham, the second earl of Cholmondley and the second earl of Orford are included.
6. There were approximately fourteen areas of land that were independent of the lieutenancy system. These were called liberties. In the cases of Tower Hamlets and Peterborough peers did serve as lieutenants for them but they have been left out of this study.
Glasse, Lionel Politics and the Appointment of Justices of the Peace, 1675-1720 p.3
7. H.M.C. Portland ii p.189
Luttrell ii pp.397, 419, 429 and 433
8. B.L. Portland Loan 29/85 Misc.22 Petition to king William III
9. Anglesey, Caernarvonshire, Denbigh, Flintshire, Merionethshire and Montgomeryshire
10. Coxe Shrewsbury pp.37, 39-40, 89 and 93
Luttrell iv p.26
B.L.Add.57861 f.52
11. The other peers who held multiples were the fourth earl Rivers, the seventh duke of Norfolk, the first two dukes of Bedford, the first duke of Leeds, the duke of Newcastle (1694) and the third duke of Bolton.
12. Breconshire, Caermathenshire, Cardiganshire, Glamorgan, Pembrokeshire and Radnorshire.
13. Luttrell iii p.275
14. Those involving divided counties and wives' interests are numerically too small in incidence to justify being dealt with at this stage.
15. Counties in which the two counties were adjoined during the period- Somerset, Leicestershire, Nottinghamshire, Herefordshire, Worcestershire, Warwickshire, Northamptonshire, Surrey, Kent, Cornwall, Wiltshire, Westmorland and possibly Cumberland.
16. The Court and City Kalendar 1761 p.184

17. Macclesfield may have lost his at the same time as Bolton was deprived of Hampshire and Dorset and thus be a previously overlooked victim of George II's anger.

18. B.L.Add.32687 ff.503-04

19. Peers who were custodes in Wales during the period: Caermarthenshire- the third baron Vaughan and the second duke of Bolton; Caernarvonshire- the earl of Orford (1697) and the second duke of Ancaster; Cardiganshire- the third baron Vaughan; Flintshire- baron Archer (caretaker) and the fourth earl of Plymouth; Glamorgan- the eighth earl of Pembroke and the fourth earl of Plymouth; Montgomeryshire- the fourth baron Herbert, the second earl of Macclesfield (1679) and the earl of Powis; Pembroke- the eighth earl of Pembroke; Radnor- the first earl of Oxford, the earl of Coningsby and the first duke of Chandos.

20. Luttrell iv pp.540, 543, 545, 559 and 574

21. H.M.C.Frankland Shirley Russell i p.139

22. Bridgwater's candidature was probably aided by the prospect of his 1703 marriage to one of the daughters of the first duke of Marlborough.

23. Holmes, Geoffrey British Politics in the Age of Anne p.193

24. The duke of Kent, the third earl of Carlisle, the second duke of Bolton (Dorset), the first duke of Manchester, the first earl of Rockingham, the first duke of Ancaster, the first earl of Scarborough (Northumberland), the second duke of Grafton and the seventh duke of Somerset.

25. The second duke of Devonshire and the second earl of Bradford were both the sons of associates of Marlborough who had retained court office at Anne's accession because of their connection with the first duke of Marlborough. It can be logically deduced that the second duke and second earl were removed from their lieutenancies because of this connection that they both had with Marlborough (although it would be pleasant to have substantiating contemporary literary evidence).

26. Swift, Jonathan Journal to Stella ii p.656

27. The Leveson Gowers were the other major inheritors of the Bath Granville estate. They sold their portion and it is probable that settlements forced the two families to divest themselves in tandem. Therefore, the earl may have felt it improper to retain the office if he was not intending to have any territorial interest in the county. However, in the long-term the Carterets did maintain a territorial presence in the region (in 1876 Granville's heir general possessed over 10 000 acres in Cornwall and only 20 in Devon).

Wordie, James Ross Estate Management in eighteenth-century, the building of the Leveson Gower fortune. p.83

Lysons, Daniel and Samuel Britannia iv pp.lxxxiv, 165, 243, 270, 296 and 321, vi pp.51 and 409

Bateman, John The Great Landowners of Great Britain and Ireland p.441

28. See this thesis p.259

29. In 1741 Sir Robert Walpole successfully resisted the first earl of Harrington's subsequent attempt to displace Thomas Townshend from his tellerships. That year Walpole had his own brother, the first baron Walpole, appointed to one of the four offices.

H.M.C.Eglintoun p.275

30. C.U.L.Chol.H.3110 December 5th, 1741. Third duke of Bolton to Sir Robert Walpole

31. That it would have been hard to find a whig replacement may also be another important factor. It was seen as better to have an opposition whig in office than a tory. Essex was one of the counties that had a very high number of interests occupy its lieutenancy over the period and therefore may have been hard to fill, while Dorset was a county in which very few peers resided. In addition, Shaftesbury's opposition was selective rather than systematic.

32. B.L.Add.35600 ff.167 and 287

33. B.L.Add.35418 f.206

Walpole George II iii pp.58-59

Walpole Correspondence 21 p.300

34. B.L.Add.35352 f.118

5. High Politics, 1689-1760.

1. Its membership was roughly a third of the Commons but a proportion were unable to take their seats in the Lords either through catholicism or youth.
2. Anne saw some minor skirmishing, e.g. the 1709 Regency Act. However, there was never any successful encroachment against her executive range of action, the efforts being designed to come into effect after her death, as was the case with the Act of Settlement.
3. For more data and some discussion of it see Thorold Rogers, Maurice Bond, Sainty and Dewar, Sainty, the H.L.R.O. Proxy Books and Anita Rees's 1987 Ph.D., especially chapters 12, 13 and 14.
4. Holmes, Geoffrey. Review of Dennis Rubini's Court and Country, 1688-1702. History 54 (1969), pp.104-05
5. Colley, Linda and Goldie, Mark. "The Principles and Practice of Eighteenth-Century Party." Historical Journal 22 (1979), pp.239-40
6. Bolton had a regiment throughout the Nine Years' War, although he did not command it in person. Therefore, he was not without profit from the crown. It was posted in the West Indies for part of the conflict and was disbanded in 1698. Whether his attitudes and its treatment were connected is open to question.
Luttrell ii p.557 and iv p.698
7. History of Parliament 1715-1754 i pp.204, 218 and 226
8. Horwitz, Henry Parliament, policy and politics in the reign of William III p.18
Hill The Growth of Parliamentary Parties, 1689-1742 pp.35-36
9. Miller, John James II: a study in kingship pp.38-39
10. It is arguable whether Halifax was a tory. It is certain that he was not a whig.
11. There had been growth in the 1680s of the revenue service.
12. Horwitz Parliament p.96
13. Lever, Tresham Godolphin. His Life and Times p.86
14. Feiling Tory Party, 1640-1714. p.281
Hill Parties, 1689-1742 p.48
Foxcroft, H.C. A Character of the Trimmer p.306
15. Nicholson, Thomas C. and Turberville, Arthur, S. Charles Talbot, duke of Shrewsbury pp.48-49
Horwitz Parliament pp.57 and 59
16. Horwitz Parliament p.56

17. Hill Parties, 1689-1742. p.51
Horwitz Parliament p.64
Baxter William III p.267
18. However, there are a couple of additional twists in that William was later to be reconciled to Torrington and therefore may have borne him no personal antipathy at all, and that in the later part of Anne's reign the earl was to act with the whigs in opposition to Oxford's ministry.
Luttrell iv p.600
Lords Journals xiv p.536
19. Feiling Tory Party, 1640-1714 p.281
Horwitz Parliament p.65
20. Buckingham had been a beau of Anne. The connection of him and Marlborough was through her rather than with one another, as 1705 was to demonstrate.
Gregg Queen Anne pp.27 and 196
21. As an issue Treason Trials re-appeared in both the 1694-1695 and 1695-1696 sessions of parliament. In the former it was still attracting a cross-party protest. However, the effect of the 1695 general election meant that the crown had to build a working relationship with a new Commons and the tories were keen for the bill to be enacted. The court and tories gave ground on the bill so that the now more whig Commons was prepared to concede to the Lords their spoiling amendment.
22. Horwitz Revolution Politics, the career of Daniel Finch second earl of Nottingham, 1647-1730 pp.139 and 142-46
23. Browning, Andrew Thomas Osborne, earl of Danby and duke of Leeds i pp.146-329
Kenyon Sunderland pp.167-223 and 250-51
24. Horwitz Parliament p.210
Hill Parties, 1689-1742 p.50
25. Hill Parties, 1689-1742. p.58
26. Hill Parties, 1689-1742. pp.56-58
27. In addition, this founded the Bank of England.
28. Hill Parties, 1689-1742. p.62
Horwitz Parliament p.145
29. Browning Danby i pp.519-22
Kenyon Sunderland p.272
30. Kenyon Sunderland p.265
31. Jones, J.R. The First Whigs pp.13-14 and 18
32. Hill Parties, 1689-1742 p.65
33. Hill Parties, 1689-1742 pp.65-67
Horwitz Parliament p.158
Feiling Tory Party, 1640-1714 pp.308-15

34. This centered on whether Sir Richard Verney should be recognized in the barony. The matter touched both on the royal prerogative with its powers of creation and recognition and on the interests of those peers who were possessed of similar baronies (even if they might hold other titles) which might be affected by the outcome of the matter.

35. Horwitz Parliament pp.183-87
 Hill Parties, 1689-1742 p.70
 Baxter William III p.337

36. Coxe Shrewsbury pp.448-49 and 452
 H.M.C. Buccleuch 2.2 pp.439-40

37. Even more keen to exploit the Fenwick plot was the third earl of Peterborough. With his background of radical turned turned court whig, he had not been associated as closely with the group's rise as he could have been. With Fenwick he saw an opportunity to advance his career. He sought to wring all that could be wrung. He was discovered to be trying to manipulate the evidence unduly which led to his dismissal both from the Bedchamber and the lord lieutenancy of Northamptonshire.

38. Horwitz Parliament p.177

39. It is clear that some of the Junto's associates did very well out of the war, e.g. George Dodington, who was treasurer of the navy.

Horwitz Parliament. p.177

40. Horwitz Parliament p.116

41. Kenyon Sunderland p.303
 Horwitz Parliament pp.229-31
 Hill Parties, 1689-1742 p.75

42. Kenyon Sunderland p.285

43. Hill Harley pp.44-45
 Hill Parties, 1689-1742 p.69
 Kenyon Sunderland p.278

44. Lords Journals xvi p.318

45. Sachse, William L. Lord Somers pp.161-66

46. Hill Parties, 1689-1742 p.82

47. Horwitz Parliament p.267

48. Somerville, Thomas The History...to the death of King William p.524

Nicholson and Turberville p.142

Sachse p.166

49. Somerville William p.524

50. Hill Parties, 1689-1742 p.83
Horwitz Parliament pp.276-77
51. Wolf, John B. Louis XIV pp.613 and 620-25
52. Horwitz Parliament p.278
53. Horwitz Parliament p.281
54. Sachse pp.177-79
Horwitz Parliament pp.287-88
55. Lords Journals xvi pp.623-755
56. Horwitz Parliament p.291
57. Horwitz Parliament p.294
58. Hill Parties, 1689-1742 p.88
59. Speck, Bill Tory & Whig p.110
60. Horwitz Parliament p.299
Hill Parties, 1689-1742 pp.88-89
61. Greater London Council (residuary body, thereof)
Record Office, Islington. Account Book of the third earl
of Jersey.
62. Holmes British Politics pp.15, 48, 312 and 390n.
See this thesis pp.210 and 213
63. Hill Parties, 1689-1742 p.92
64. Holmes British Politics p.73
65. Gregg pp.162-63
66. Miller p.179
67. Gregg pp.162-63, 177 and 194
68. Although the bill was a major party delineator not
everyone voted as might have been predicted to do so. The
dangers of dogmatic use of lists are illustrated by the
tory Feversham being against it while the whig second duke
of Bedford was for it.
Calamy, Edmund A historical account of my own life...
i p.466 and ii p.16
69. He was rescued from further such instances by being
posted to Berlin the following year.
The Diary of William Nicolson, archbishop of Cashel
(eds.) Holmes, Geoffrey and Jones, Clyve p.139
70. Oldmixon p.623
71. Ansell, Patricia M. "Harley's Parliamentary
Management." Bulletin of the Institute Historical Research
34 (1961), pp.92-95

72. Feversham had led James II's army during the Revolution and his general sympathies lay with the Tories. That he should not be with them on this matter becomes more comprehensible since he had been born a Frenchman.
Gregg p.166

73. The second earl died in September 1702. It is probable that he would have prospered in Anne's reign to some degree, since in 1700 he astutely married his heir-apparent, the third earl, to one of the first duke of Marlborough's daughters.
Gregg pp.166-67

74. Lords Journal xvii p.300

75. Luttrell v p.371
Lords Journal xvii p.352

76. Holmes British Politics p.394

77. Hill Parties, 1689-1742 p.106

78. Lords Journals xviii p.212

79. Hill Parties, 1689-1742 p.113

80. Oldmixon p.395
Coxe Marlborough ii pp.179-80

81. On February 17th 1703 there had been two votes on the Journals of the duke of Ormond and others. The 1702 expedition had been an attempt to make a raid on Cadiz. Previous investigations into service operations had concentrated on the sea war. William III had been able to screen the Flemish theatre from open scrutiny by his personal command of it. While Marlborough's stock remained high with the queen his Low Countries command enjoyed the same immunity from interference from parliament and the ministry that it had had under the late king. This was indicated by the way in which the ministry felt able to interfere in Spain but left him alone.

Scouller, R.E. The Armies of Queen Anne p.57

82. Coxe Marlborough ii pp.180-85

83. Warrington was the second earl. This thesis sees him as initially following his father in being a court whig, who only metamorphosed into a country one after 1720. Oxford tried to exploit the money due on the first earl's pension, which had been given in order that he might be supported in a manner fitting the dignity, but did not meet with any sustained success.

B.L.Portland Loan 29/127 April 10th 1714. Second earl of Warrington to first earl of Oxford

84. Hill Parties, 1689-1742 p.121

85. Hill Parties, 1689-1742 p.39

86. Bucholz, R.O. The Court in the Reign of queen Anne.
Oxford D.Phil.p.89
Horwitz Parliament p.235
Lords Journals xv p.729
It is possible that Somerset and Bradford may have additionally promoted themselves in Anne's eyes through their behaviour on matters where she had views, possibly such as the Wrought Silks bill in the 1695-1696 session. They were the only two protestors to it.
87. D.N.B.Charles Mordaunt third earl of Peterborough
(1658-1735)
88. D.N.B.Robert Sutton second baron Lexington
(1661-1723)
89. H.M.C.Portland iii p.604
90. Hill Parties, 1689-1742. p.96
Feiling Tory Party, 1660-1714. p.370
91. Hill Parliament p.99
Gregg p.180
Horwitz Nottingham pp.197-99
Feiling Tory Party, 1640-1714 pp.373-74
92. Hill Parties, 1689-1742 pp.103-05
Gregg p.206
D.N.B.William Cowper first earl Cowper (d.1723)
93. Gregg pp.229-30
94. Speck Whig & Tory p.111
95. H.M.C.Portland ii p.193
96. Coxe Marlborough ii p.179
97. The Letters of Joseph Addison (ed.) Graham, Walter
p.89
98. H.M.C.Portland iv p.491
H.M.C.Downshire 1.2 p.867
(Wentworth p.219)
99. Duchess of Marlborough Correspondence p.270
100. Gregg p.241
Hill Harley p.110
Hill Parties, 1689-1742 p.111
101. Hill Parties, 1689-1742 p.119
102. Gregg p.284
Hill Parties, 1689-1742 pp.119-29
103. Gregg p.289
Hill Parties, 1689-1742 p.122
Hill Harley pp.123-24
104. Wolf pp.674-77

105. In February 1711 lord Quarendon, the heir-apparent of the first earl of Lichfield, was given a company of foot guards and in October the fourth earl of Clarendon was made caretaker lord lieutenant of Cornwall (on behalf of the third earl of Bath). The beneficiaries were both tories and the bestowals can be perceived as Oxford seeking to warm that party to his ministry. However, such a view would be wrong. The two were both blood relations of Anne. The royal kinship factor accounts for the whig second duke of Grafton being made ranger of Whittlebury forest in August that year against the wishes of leading tories in Northamptonshire.

H.M.C. Portland v p.75

Boyer The Political State of Great Britain 1 p.159

Luttrell vi pp.625 and 693

106. Coxe Marlborough ii pp.489-90

Coxe Sir Robert Walpole i p.32

Duchess of Marlborough p.252

H.M.C. Downshire 1 2 p.867

H.M.C. Portland ii p.208

107. Holmes perceives Mohun as a loyal Junto lieutenant. In this he is broadly correct. Oxford thought that the baron was susceptible to being made into a supporter of his own ministry because the man had been active in the House on the whigs' behalf but had never received any mark of recognition for his work. However, the baron had no objection since he had never sought any such sign. Yet both Rivers and Shrewsbury were to consider him as a potential fellow member of the ministry. Therefore, being a Junto lieutenant did not mean that an individual was subservient to the group but rather allied to it.

H.M.C. Portland iv pp.571-72 and 648

H.M.C. Bath i pp.199-200

State Tracts (ed.) Yorke, Philip- second earl of Hardwicke ii p.487

The Private Diary of Lord Chancellor Cowper (ed.) Hawtrey, E.C. pp.47-48

108. Coxe Marlborough iii p.27

109. It should be appreciated that the dean was by no means a straight-forward, dogmatic tory himself.

Swift Stella i p.84

Nokes, David Jonathan Swift, a hypocrite reversed: a critical biography pp.108-09 and 119

110. Wentworth pp.156-57

111. Rubini, Dennis "Party and the Augustan Constitution, 1694-1716." Albion 10 (1978), p.207

112. Anne was a staunch anglican (as befitted the head of the Church of England). However, it is to be appreciated that she had approved of the original sermon, which Sacheverell chose to attack, to the extent of ordering that it be printed. In addition, she is said to have sanctioned the sentence on the doctor.

Holmes The Trial of Doctor Sacheverell pp.95 and 228

113. H.M.C. Portland iv pp.571-72, vii pp.3 and 5

114. Horwitz Parliament p.89
Hill Parties, 1689-1742 p.301
115. Wentworth pp.159-60
In the Union debates Scarbrough had shown himself to be apart from the mass of the whig party by his being apprehensive as to the measure and its potential for detrimentally effecting the burgeoning trade of West Yorkshire (i.e.the early Industrial Revolution can be sited in the 1700s).
Nicolson pp.419-20 (and 136)
116. On January 24th 1711 Buckingham voted with the opposition against the censure of Galway- the soldier, Irish peer and continental favourite of the late king. This was because of an idiosyncratic position that the duke felt himself compelled to take for semantic reasons.
Luttrell vi pp.674-77
Wentworth p.179
Nicolson p.537
117. Dickinson Bolingbroke p.78
Hill Parties, 1689-1742 p.131
118. Szechi, Daniel Jacobitism and Tory Politics, 1710-1714 pp.86-87
119. Gregg p.338
Hill Robert Harley. Speaker, Secretary of State and Premier Minister pp.144-45
120. Hill Parties, 1689-1742 p.131
Hill Harley p.148
121. Hill Harley pp.144-50
Dickinson pp.81-88
122. D.N.B.Abigail lady Masham (d.1734)
D.N.B.John Hill (d.1732)
Dickinson p.85
123. Hill Harley p.151
Hill Parties, 1689-1742 p.132
Gregg pp.337-38
124. Hill Harley pp.152-53
125. Hill Harley p.155
126. Hill Harley p.177
Nicholson and Turberville pp.186-96
127. Lords Journals xix p.339
The Diary of Sir David Hamilton, 1709-1714 (ed.)
Roberts, Philip pp.32-33
128. Wentworth pp.229-30

129. The dissenting interest did not find itself automatically drawn to the whigs but rather to the crown servant Harley, especially since the whigs were happy to sacrifice them for party ends.

Hill Harley pp.143n and 170

130. Somerville, Thomas The History...of queen Anne p.460

131. Wentworth pp.220-21

132. One of the reasons that the crown was able to use the House in this way was because of the amount of patronage it had for use on peers. Holmes has made the observation that none of the Place bills or Acts ever sought to affect the lords. The principal reason for this is that the general purpose of these items was to act as a bar against the expansion of the number of placemen in the Commons rather than to eradicate their presence there, where they acted as a useful and important link between the legislature and the executive. The peerage were not being given the new places that came into being with the expansion of the executive (if the armed forces are excluded) and the major growth of their House occurred after the broader Revolution Settlement had ceased in 1709.

Holmes, Geoffrey "The Attack on 'The Influence of the Crown' 1702-16" Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research 34 (1966), p.68

133. Swift Stella ii p.501

Wentworth pp.276-77

134. H.M.C. Portland iv p.158

135. Churchill, W.S. Marlborough: His Life and Times. iv pp.967-76

Gregg pp.360-61

136. Dickinson p.93

137. Swift Stella ii p.656

138. Hill Parties, 1689-1742 p.139

139. Lords Journals xix p.567

140. Hanmer was encouraged by economic factors in Suffolk, the county for which he sat.

Bolingbroke ii p.437

The Correspondence of Jonathan Swift (ed.) Williams, H. i p.368

141. The sixth baron North was additionally rare and paradoxical in being a tory soldier, who had lost his right hand at Blenheim.

Wentworth p.340

142. Dickinson p.106

143. Hill Parties, 1689-1742 pp.141-42

144. Nokes pp.196-98

145. Wentworth p.360
Boyer 7 pp.71-72
146. H.M.C.Polwarth 1 p.17
Wentworth pp.366-67
147. Wentworth p.371
148. Hill Harley p.213
149. Wentworth p.368
150. Wentworth p.380
151. Lords Journals xix p.717
152. Lords Journals xix p.756
153. In June 1710 there was the report that Beaufort had 'bought' Albemarle for £12 000. This probably meant that the duke had tried to secure the man and his vote by offering to pay off his debts. Whatever it did mean, the earl's politics were such that Bolingbroke was not to feel sure of them until January 1711. This was against the trend of behaviour of William's continental recruits.
H.M.C.Rutland ii p.190
Bolingbroke i p.47
Lords Journals xix p.756
154. Nicholson and Turberville p.211
155. These would have been proportionately fewer in the Lords than in the Commons because the crown's interest was greater in the Upper Chamber than in the Lower one. This was because there was proportionately more patronage that could be applied per member the former House being considerably smaller than the latter one and the slow change-over in its membership meant it could be applied with fuller consideration as to its effect. In addition, both the episcopal bench and the representative peers were highly susceptible to ministerial remodelling.
156. History of Parliament 1715-1754 i pp.62-78
157. H.M.C.Portland vii p.206
Oldmixon p.595
Colley, Linda In Defiance of Oligarchy p.179
158. Colley p.185
159. It was no accident that none of the four can be categorized as a straight-forward tory; Oxford and Bolingbroke had both been whigs in their early political careers, while Ormond and Strafford (1711) had been Williamites.
160. Hill Parties, 1689-1742 p.156
161. Nicolson p.627
162. H.M.C.Portland v p.530

163. Clarendon was to be one of the lords who had supported the Oxford ministry who went on to serve George I's whig ministers, becoming the first identifiable chairman of committees

H.L.R.O. Memorandum 52 (1974), p.3

164. Horwitz Nottingham pp.250-51

165. The first earl Poulett had a similar political journey although he was far better off financially than Yarmouth.

B.L.Portland Loan 29/153 July 29th 1711. Second earl of Yarmouth to first earl of Oxford

Lords Journal xvi pp.16-17

The Letters of Humphrey Prideaux (ed.) Thompson, E.M. p.165

Luttrell iv p.144

166. Hatton pp.121 and 127

167. Plumb Sir Robert Walpole i p.223

168. Williams, Basil Stanhope pp.230-52

169. At the start of the reign Sunderland had occupied the post and his subsequent move to be lord privy seal can be adjudged a promotion.

170. Plumb Walpole i pp.226, 231 and 259
Hatton pp.198-99

171. H.M.C. Portland v pp.536 and 543

172. Plumb Walpole i p.241

173. Hatton p.243

174. The sixteen Scottish representative peers being replaced by twenty-five hereditary ones selected from the existing Scottish peerage.

Plumb Walpole i p.276n

Naylor, John F. The British Aristocracy and the Peerage Bill of 1719.

175. Hill Parties, 1689-1742 pp.176-77

176. Plumb Walpole i p.283

177. Oldmixon p.656

178. Summerson, John Georgian London pp.99 and 105
Summerson appears to have been unaware of the connection.

179. Colley p.194

180. H.M.C. Portland v pp.570-71

The Complete Works of Sir John Vanbrugh (ed.) Webb, Geoffrey and Dobree, Bonamy iv p.109

181. Plumb Walpole i pp.244-45, 249 and 266

182. Coxe Sir Robert Walpole i pp.138 and 327-28
183. H.L.R.O.Proxy Books 1719-1720
184. Coxe Sir Robert Walpole i pp.327-28
185. Plumb Walpole i pp.377-78
186. B.L.Add.61650 f.102
187. Coxe Sir Robert Walpole. i p.246 and ii p.474
188. Plumb Walpole ii pp.63, 70 and 103
189. Hill Parties, 1689-1742 p.194
190. Plumb Walpole i p.329
191. Hervey i pp.26-34
192. Langford, Paul The Eighteenth Century, 1688-1815
pp.93-96
193. Plumb Walpole ii p.196
194. Plumb Walpole ii pp.298-99
195. Dickinson p.152
The Complete Letters of Lady Mary Wortley Montagu
(ed.) Halsband, Robert ii p.155
196. H.M.C.Portland vi pp.5-6
197. Lords Journals xxii pp.551 and 553
198. Dickinson pp.196-97
199. H.M.C.Egmont Diary ii p.453
B.L.Portland Loan 29/127 April 10th 1714. The second
earl of Warrington to the first earl of Portland.
C.U.L.Chol.H.Box 6 1716 May 1st 1730. The second earl
of Warrington to Sir Robert Walpole.
200. H.M.C.Portland vii p.308
201. Lords Journals xxi pp.604-703
202. B.L.Add.35686 ff.280 and 301
203. H.M.C.Portland vi pp.6 and 8
204. Caroline made the first earl of Pomfret her master of
the Horse. Although the earl had to bribe his way to the
office the overall gesture would not have been lost on
Walpole.
205. Lords Journals xxii pp.557-58
206. H.M.C.Portland vii p.424
207. H.M.C.Portland vii p.426

208. See this thesis pp.268-70
209. H.M.C.Carlisle p.70
Lords Journals xxiii p.629 and xiv pp.23 and 42
Annals of ... Earls of Stair (ed.) Graham, J.M. ii
p.202
210. Langford Excise Crisis pp.34-35
Plumb Walpole ii pp.238-39
211. Collinson, John The history and antiquities of the
county of Somerset i p.207 and ii p.156
Colley p.213
Hervey i pp.96-97
212. H.M.C.Egmont Diary i pp.357-58
H.M.C.Carlisle p.107
213. H.M.C.Egmont Diary i pp.359-60 and ii p.14
214. H.M.C.Carlisle p.103
215. Langford Excise Crisis p.99
216. Plumb Walpole i pp.306-07
217. H.M.C.Egmont Diary i p.50
Jones, Clyve and Jones, David Lewis (eds.) Peers,
(Politics and Power pp.212-13
218. H.M.C.Carlisle p.116
H.M.C.Egmont Diary i p.380
219. The Onslows had multitudinous City connections.
H.M.C.Carlisle p.118
Vulliamy pp.24-34
220. H.M.C.Carlisle p.119
221. Plumb Walpole ii pp.284-94
222. Langford The Eighteenth Century pp.106-07
223. History of Parliament 1715-1754 i p.43
224. Dickinson pp.243-47
225. H.M.C.Carlisle p.135
226. H.M.C.Carlisle p.148
H.M.C.Egmont Diary ii p.152
227. H.M.C.Egmont Diary ii p.269
H.M.C.Carlisle p.161
228. H.M.C.Carlisle p.179
229. Coxe Sir Robert Walpole i p.492

230. B.L.Add.32691 f.63
 B.L.Add.32692 f.456
 Coxe Sir Robert Walpole iii p.516
 H.M.C.Buckinghamshire p.247
 H.M.C.Buckingham p.36
231. Owen, John The Pelhams pp.8, 9 and 19-33
 B.L.Add.9200 f.74
232. Coxe Sir Robert Walpole i pp.405-06
 H.M.C.Egmont Diary i p.363 and ii p.33
 H.M.C.Carlisle pp.115 and 131-32
233. B.L.Add.32688 f.155
 H.M.C.Portland iv p.592
234. H.M.C.Egmont Diary ii pp.152 and 178
235. This line of logic can be extended, but not proven, to perversely contend that for a person in senior office to be anti-crown was in the crown's interests just so long as that person was also anti-Walpole. The first earl of Harrington and the fourth earl of Holderness were two individuals who George II viewed as being his men, however, they respectively joined the mass resignations of 1746 and 1757. Subsequently, he snubbed both in minor ways, Harrington the more markedly. It is evident that the king did not take care to foster his own party.
The Court and City Kalendar (1761) p.184
 B.L.Add.32722 f.24
236. Hervey ii p.450
 H.M.C.Egmont Diary ii pp.175 and 178
237. Langford The Eighteenth Century p.112
 Speck Stability and Strife p.234
238. Hervey iii p.659
239. B.L.Add.35406 ff.164 and 168
 H.M.C.Egmont Diary iii p.141
240. Walpole George II i p.138
241. Statesmen, Scholars and Merchants (eds.) Whiteman, Anne, Bromley, J.S. and Dickson, P.G.M. pp.125-26
The Life of...Hardwicke i p.239
 Plumb Stability p.110
242. Walpole Correspondence 17 p.319 (and 18 p.451)
243. Langford The Eighteenth Century p.114
244. Coxe Sir Robert Walpole i pp.583-84

245. Buccleuch was piqued at Walpole not agreeing to recognize him in any of his paternal grandfather's attaindered titles- the dukedom of Monmouth, the earldom of Doncaster and the barony of Scott. After the Great Man's fall he was recognized in the latter two.

C.U.L.Chol.H.2849 March 17th 1739. Second duke of Buccleuch to Sir Robert Walpole

Lords Journals xxv p.470

The seventh earl of Westmorland is the only instance of a whig metamorphosing into a tory in the early Hanoverian period.

246. Memoirs ... of George, Lord Lyttleton (ed.)

Phillimore, Robert pp.152-53 and 158

Coxe Sir Robert Walpole i pp.583-84 and 669

Coxe Pelham i pp.28-29

The Orrery Papers ii p.156 (ed.) Boyle, Emily Charlotte- countess of Cork

(H.M.C.Buckinghamshire p.247)

247. H.M.C.Egmont Diary iii pp.24 and 28 (and 249)

Orrery ii p.156

B.L.Add.35406 f.111

248. H.M.C.Buckinghamshire p.244

249. Coxe Sir Robert Walpole i p.669

Walpole Correspondence 17 pp.221 and 254

Maty, Matthew Life of Chesterfield i p.111

250. This was because in 1729 she had been collecting subscriptions for the anti-Walpolean musical play "Polly", which was by John Gay who was then a member of the Queensberry household. Consequently, Walpole had her banned from the court.

Correspondence of the countess of Hartford and the countess of Pomfret (ed.) Bingley, William ii pp.239-41

251. Owen The Pelhams p.126

252. H.M.C.Polwarth v p.180

253. Owen The Pelhams p.296

254. Statesmen, Scholars and Merchants pp.113-34

255. The summer of 1719, when Stanhope banished the influence of Bernstorff over the conduct of British foreign affairs. This would perhaps be over-extending the point. 1708 and 1739 are not meant to be fully analogous to 1746 and 1757, however, there are too many points in common between the four for them not to be compared.

Hatton p.243

Williams Stanhope pp.362-72

256. Plumb Stability pp.10-11

Plumb, J.H. Review of Walcott's English Politics. English Historical Review lxxii (1957), pp.126-29

257. Gregg p.258

258. Hill Parties, 1742-1832 pp.80-81
 D.N.B. Sir Thomas Robinson (1695-1770)
History of Parliament 1754-1790 iii pp.366-67
259. Walpole Correspondence i pp.207-14
260. Clark The Dynamics of Change pp.244-45
261. Hill British Parliamentary Parties, 1742-1832 p.82
262. H.M.C. Carlisle p.210
263. Clark The Dynamics of Change pp.416-22
264. Walpole George II i pp.107-09
265. Owen The Pelhams p.200
 Hill Parties, 1742-1832 p.61
266. Coxe Pelham i p.53
267. Walpole George II i p.47
268. B.L.Add.32701 ff.118 and 148
269. Orrery ii p.177
 Bristol Letter-Books iii p.294
270. H.M.C. Egmont Diary iii p.285
271. Hill Parties, 1742-1832 p.66
272. H.M.C. Polwarth v p.180
 H.M.C. Egmont Diary iii pp.314-15
 Coxe Pelham i p.295
273. History of Parliament 1715-1754 i p.57
274. Hill Parties, 1742-1832 pp.74-76
 Colley pp.254-55
275. Walpole George II i pp.78-79
276. Walpole George II i p.2
277. Walpole Correspondence 20 p.259
278. Paradoxically, this may mean that interest was being taken in the Lords debates at a time when the House's political intensity was low but this is a separate tale.
279. H.M.C. Sackville p.181
280. Walpole Correspondence 37 p.416
 (B.L.Add.32866 f.148)
 (B.L.Add.35416 f.29)
281. Lyttleton p.507
 B.L.Add.32864 f.105
282. Walpole George II i p.186

283. The matter was a feature of eighteenth-century life. In March 1707 a Game bill had led to the House dividing. Although then there had been a war on, which may have given the matter additional overtones of guarding against the armament of an insurrection.

Munsche, P.B. Gentlemen and Poachers

284. Perry, Thomas Whipple Public Opinion, Propaganda and Politics in Eighteenth-Century England pp.183-84

285. Walpole Correspondence 20 pp.112, 120-21 (124), and 549

B.L.Add.32864 f.411

286. Grafton's grandson and heir, the third duke, was to prove a crony of Bedford.

B.L.Add.35352 f.28

287. B.L.Add.32868 f.54

288. Middleton, Richard The Bells of Victory p.212

289. This is illustrated by the way in which Namier researched Structure principally from Newcastle's papers not Pitt's.

290. George Townshend lord Lynn was the eldest son of the third viscount Townshend. His wife was Charlotte Compton suo jure baroness Ferrers and Compton. She was the era's greatest heiress, therefore, his wealth and standing were both immense. He had been an officer in the army until 1750, when differences with Cumberland had led him to resign. This hatred of the duke was extended to his associate Fox. Therefore, the measure was introduced in large part in order to try to embarrass Fox and therefore Cumberland. The measure was in large part the action of a courtier against other courtiers.

B.L.Add.32865 f.102

B.L.Add.35877 f.305

Western, J.R. The English Militia in the Eighteenth-Century pp.131 and 135

D.N.B.George Townshend the first marquis of Townshend (1724-1807)

291. Western p.121

292. B.L.Add.32865 f.102

293. B.L.Add.35412 f.104

B.L.Add.35414 f.259-60

294. Western pp.138-39

295. Western p.140

296. Western pp.144-45

Middleton pp.63-64

297. Western pp.144-45

298. Western pp.162-67

Middleton p.157

299. B.L.Add.32889 f.398

300. Western p.176

301. H.M.C.Sackville p.54

History of Parliament 1754-1790 iii p.453

302. 'Court' and 'country' are now too precisely established in the technical jargon of the period to allow for the appropriate speculative air that this part of the discussion seeks to have. The two terms have come to convey a set of responses to specific political issues rather than a general political mentality.

303. Miller pp.173-74

304. There is a brief discussion of the state of the debate in Jonathan Clark's Revolution and Rebellion pp.174-77

305. Oldmixon p.617

306. Hervey i p.85

307. D.N.B.Simon Harcourt viscount Harcourt (1661?-1727)

308. Walpole George II i p.241

309. Lords Journals xxi p.149

310. H.M.C.Portland vi p.8

311. Hill Parties, 1689-1742 p.177

312. Colley p.201

313. Colley pp.198-99

Plumb Walpole ii pp.43-49

314. H.M.C.Portland vii p.424

Coxe Sir Robert Walpole iii p.518

315. Colley p.194

316. Bristol Letter-Books iii p.30

317. Letters to and from Henrietta, Countess of Suffolk...
(ed.) Croker, John Wilson i pp.281-82

H.M.C.Portland vii pp.401 and 426

History of Parliament 1715-1754 i p.246

318. Over two decades later, in the early 1750s, Bingley's widow felt able to ask George II for a barony for her grandson upon his coming of age. Therefore, it is near certain that some form of promise had been made.

B.L.Add.32732 f.588

H.M.C.Egmont Diary i p.11

H.M.C.Carlisle p.67

Wentworth p.133

319. B.L.Add.32691 f.284
 B.L.Add.32695 f.529
 Horn, David British Diplomatic Service, 1689-1789
 p.63
 Hartford-Pomfret iii p.313
 (B.L.Add.35411 f.173)
320. H.M.C.Eglinton p.248
 Wortley Montagu ii p.78
 (Defoe, Daniel Tour Through the Whole Island of Great Britain i p.383)
321. Colley p.209
322. Lords Journals xvi p.17
 H.L.R.O.Proxy Books 1735-1743
 Hervey i p.242
323. H.L.R.O.Proxy Books 1730-1734
324. Chedworth was a landowner in both Wiltshire and Gloucestershire. He inherited these estates from kinsman after his father's death. This further underscores how much Jack Howe's country stance was a pose.
History of Parliament 1715-1754 ii p.155
 Macky p.117
 Plumb Stability p.145
 D.N.B.John Grubham Howe (1657-1722)
325. H.M.C.Carlisle p.179
 H.M.C.Carlisle p.161
 H.M.C.Egmont Diary ii p.360
326. H.M.C.Carlisle p.192
327. Hill Parties, 1689-1742 p.215
328. H.M.C.Portland vi p.66
The Life of...Hardwicke i p.252
 B.L.Egerton 1715 f.255
329. Walpole Correspondence 21 p.26
 Coxe Sir Robert Walpole iii p.575
 (B.L.Add.32696 ff.434 and 438)
 (B.L.Add.32697 f.188)
 (B.L.Add.32705 f.22)
330. Hill Parties, 1689-1742 p.219
 Colley p.227
331. It is possible that in part that George II was toying with the Pelhams showing them that he was prepared to work with moderate tories, thus showing that he knew he was not dependent upon the Old Corps.
332. Colley p.252
333. Colley pp.266-67
334. Hayton, David and Jones, Clyve A register of parliamentary lists, 1660-1761 pp.56-58
 Bodleian MSS.Dashwood c.12

335. The whigs in opposition whom Dashwood included- the second viscount Bolingbroke, the second baron Talbot, the fourth earl of Shaftesbury and the second earl Stanhope.
336. Walpole Correspondence 19 p.26
History of Parliament 1715-1754 ii p.431
337. The Letters of Philip Dormer Stanhope, 4th Earl of Chesterfield (ed.) Dobree, Bonamy ii pp.594-95
History of Parliament 1715-1754 ii p.111
338. Walpole Correspondence 20 p.50
339. B.L.Add.32734 ff.251, 253 and 255
B.L.Add.32861 f.277
340. B.L.Add.32702 f.403
B.L.Add.32703 ff.42 and 376
B.L.Add.32704 f.525
H.M.C.Dartmouth iii pp.163-64
C.U.L.Chol.H.. Viscount Wallingford to Sir Robert Walpole. March 11th, 1739.
341. To add to the Bruce link, he was a Wiltshire landowner, although this is perhaps taking it too far. Henry Fox may have played a part in this because his family was seated at Redlynch in the south of the county. Ilchester had started his political career as a tory, during the early 1730s. Brother Henry may well have undergone a similar change before entering parliament in 1735.
342. History of Parliament 1715-1754 ii p.391
343. B.L.Add.32718 f.335
B.L.Add.32854 f.167 (and f.206)
344. B.L.Add.32728 f.232
345. B.L.Add.32724 f.227
B.L.Add.32728 f.232
B.L.Add.35412 f.4
B.L.Add.51419 ff.143 and 146
(B.L.Add.32734 ff.239 and 316)
346. Orrery ii p.174
History of Parliament 1715-1754 ii p.165
347. B.L.Add.32868 f.54
348. B.L.Add.32876 f.303
B.L.Add.32880 f.60
349. B.L.Egerton 1719 f.92
B.L.Add.32864 f.105
B.L.Add.32880 f.60
B.L.Add.32889 f.416
Walpole Correspondence 20 pp.408-09
350. Colley The Loyal Brotherhood and the Cocoa Tree
Historical Journal xx (1977), p.77

351. The Feildings had been affected badly first by the Bubble and then their broker absconding with their remaining funds. The income from their estates was probably earmarked for servicing the debt they may well have incurred. Hence the fifth earl's pliability. (It is to be remembered that they had achieved their title through being Leicestershire kinsmen of the first Villiers duke of Buckingham rather than through being magnates or wealthy gentry who bribed the duke.) In 1757 Denbigh married the coheiress of a wealthy Huntingdonshire baronet. This may well have largely restored the family's finances. His 1760 independence may have stemmed from his 1759 inheritance of Stoke Golding in Leicestershire from his first cousin once removed Sir Cordell Firebrace 3rd.Bt.. The Boyle Boyles' finances were probably healthier than the Feildings. The second baron married a great Irish heiress as his second wife in 1738. She died in 1758 and, although he had an heir by his first wife, her wealth would have remained in the family since she had borne her husband a son- the fourth baron. However, a pension might have been useful to the second baron himself.

352. B.L.Add.32864 ff.292, 349 and 358
 B.L.Add.32882 ff.37 and 257

II. Appendices.A. Number of Peers.

	a	b	c	d	e	f	g	h
1690	160		4	156		25	16.0	
		+2			.			+1.3
1695	162		6	156		27	17.3	
		+2			+5			+ .7
1700	164		3	161		29	18.0	
		-2			.			+ .6
1705	162		1	161		30	18.6	
		-1			-2			- .4
1710	161		2	159		29	18.2	
		+15			+14			+2.0
1715	176		3	173		35	20.2	
		+1			-3			- .2
1720	177		7	170		34	20.0	
		+3			+6			-1.3
1725	180		4	176		33	18.7	
		-3			-1			-1.0
1730	177		2	175		31	17.7	
		+2			.			-4.0
1735	179		4	175		24	13.7	
		-6			-5			-1.9
1740	173		3	170		20	11.8	
		+3			+5			+1.3
1745	176		1	175		23	13.1	
		+1			+1			+2.2
1750	177		1	176		27	15.3	
		-2			-2			-2.1
1755	175		1	174		23	13.2	
		-4			-3			-3.3
1760	171		.	171		17	9.9	

average

27.1 16.1

a number of peers on January 1st at five yearly intervals

b differences between 'a's

c number of sons summoned in baronies within 'a'

d 'a' minus 'c'

e difference between 'd's

f number of recruited peers within 'a' and 'd'

g 'f' divided by 'd' as %

h difference between 'g's

B. Recruitments and Promotion.

() Title given to male peer of a lower precedence or rank than his own. In some instances could pass to female.
 *() Title given to a woman, which could subsequently pass to a man.

d duke
 m marquis
 e earl
 v viscount
 b baron

(i) First instance of a single individual being promoted within the period.

(ii) Second instance of a single individual being promoted twice within the period.

Promotions.

	<u>Date</u>	<u>Rank</u>	<u>Title</u>	<u>Surname</u>
1689	April 9th	m d	Bolton	Powlett
		v e	Fauconberg	Belasyse
		v e	Peterborough	Mordaunt
		b e	Montagu	Montagu (i)
		b e	Marlborough	Churchill (i)
	April 10th	b v	Lumley	Lumley (i)
	April 20th	e m	Caermarthen	Osborne (i)
1690	April 15th	v e	Scarborough	Lumley (ii)
	April 17th	b e	Warrington	Booth
	April 21st	b v	Longueville	Yelverton
1694	April 30th	e d	Shrewsbury	Talbot
	May 4th	m d	Leeds	Osborne (ii)
	May 10th	e m	Normanby	Sheffield (i)
	May 11th	e d	Bedford	Russell
		v e	Bradford	Newport
	May 12th	e d	Devonshire	Cavendish
	May 14th	e d	Newcastle	Holles
		v e	Romney	Sydney
1695	June 11th	b e	Tankerville	Grey
1697	April 26th	b e	Coventry	Coventry
	October 13th	v e	Jersey	Villiers
1702	December 14th	e d	Marlborough	Churchill (ii)
1703	March 23rd	m d	Buckingham	Sheffield (ii)
	March 29th	e d	Rutland	Manners
1705	April 14th	e d	Montagu	Montagu (ii)
1706	November 14th	e m	Kent	Grey (i)
	December 21st	e m	Lindsey	Bertie (i)
	December 23rd	e m	Dorchester	Pierrepoint (i)
		b e	Wharton	Wharton (i)
	December 24th	b e	Poulett	Poulett
	December 26th	b e	Godolphin	Godolphin
	December 29th	b e	Cholmondley	Cholmondley
1710	April 28th	m d	Kent	Grey (ii)
1711	June 29th	b e	Strafford	Wentworth
	September 3rd	b e	Ferrers	Shirley
	September 5th	b e	Dartmouth	Legge

1714	October 19th	b e Uxbridge	Paget
		b e Chandos	Brydges (i)
		b e Rockingham	Watson
		b e Tankerville	Bennet
		b e Halifax	Montagu
		b e Aylesford	Finch
		b e Bristol	Hervey
		b e Clare	Pelham Holles
(i)			
1715	February 15th	e m Wharton	Wharton (ii)
	June 14th	b e Halifax	Montagu
	July 26th	m d Ancaster	Bertie (ii)
	August 10th	m d Kingston	Pierrepoint (ii)
	August 11th	e d Newcastle	Pelham Holles
(ii)			
1716	July 2nd	b v Castleton	Saunderson (i)
	July 16th	e d Portland	Bentinck
	December 16th	m d Wharton	Wharton
1717	September 26th	v e Sussex	Yelverton
1718	March 18th	e b Cowper	Cowper
	April 14th	v e Stanhope	Stanhope
	May 8th	b e Cadogan	Cadogan
	May 23rd	b v Cobham	Temple
	October 31st	b v Sherard	Sherard (i)
1719	April 27th	e d Greenwich	Campbell
	April 28th	e d Manchester	Montagu
	April 29th	e d Chandos	Brydges (ii)
	April 30th	b e Coningsby	Coningsby
	May 8th	v e Harborough	Sherard (ii)
1720	June 17th	e d Dorset	Sackville
	June 18th	e d Bridgewater	Egerton
		v e Castleton	Saunderson (ii)
1721	September 11th	v e Harcourt	Harcourt
	November 15th	b e Macclesfield	Parker
	December 27th	b e Pomfret	Fermor
1729	September 13th	b e Waldegrave	Waldegrave
1730	May 14th	b e Fitzwalter	Mildmay
		b e Ashburnham	Ashburnham
		b e Wilmington	Compton
1731	December 8th	b e Effingham	Howard
1734	November 19th	b e Rockingham	Watson (i)
1742	February 9th	b e Harrington	Stanhope
1743	April 11th	v e Portsmouth	Wallop
1744	May 9th	b e Leicester	Coke
1746	April 19th	e m Rockingham	Watson (ii)
	July 7th	b e Brooke	Greville
	July 8th	b e Gower	Leveson Gower
	September 5th	b e Buckinghamshire	Hobart
	September 6th	b e Fitzwilliam	Fitzwilliam
1748	May 27th	b e Powis	Herbert
1749	July 5th	b e Clinton	Fortescue
	December 1st	v e Harcourt	Harcourt
1750	August 3rd	b e Hertford	Seymour Conway
1752	April 8th	b e Guildford	North
1753	June 30th	b e Cornwallis	Cornwallis
1754	April 2nd	b e Hardwicke	Yorke
	April 3rd	b e Darlington	Vane
1756	June 16th	b e Fauconberg	Belasyse
	June 17th	b e Ilchester	Fox

Recruits.

1689	April 9th	e Portland	Bentinck
		v Romney	Sydney
	April 10th	b Cholmondley	Cholmondley
	May 9th	d Schomberg	Schomberg
	May 29th	e Torrington	Herbert
	May 30th	b Ashburnham	Ashburnham
1691	March 20th	v Villiers	Villiers
1692	April 11th	b Capel	Capel
	April 12th	b Pomfret	Fermor
1693	January 23rd	b Weston	Butler
1694	April 28th	b Herbert	Herbert
1695	May 10th	e Grantham	Nassau de Z
	June 13th	(b Howland	Russell)
1696	May 4th	b Haversham	Thompson
	May 28th	v Lonsdale	Lowther
1697	February 10th	e Albemarle	Keppel
	May 7th	e Orford	Russell
	December 2nd	b Somers	Somers
1698	July 25th	b Barnard	Vane
	December 24th	e Grantham	Nassau d'A
1700	December 13th	b Halifax	Montagu
1703	March 13th	b Granville	Granville
	March 15th	b Guernsey	Finch
	March 16th	b Gower	Leveson Gower
	March 17th	b Conway	Seymour Conway
	March 23rd	b Hervey	Hervey
1705	November 26th	e Greenwich	Campbell
1706	December 14th	b Cowper	Cowper
	December 16th	b Pelham	Pelham
	December 30th	e Bindon	Howard
1708	May 26th	d Dover	Douglas
1711	May 23rd	e Oxford	Harley
	September 3rd	b Harcourt	Harcourt
	September 5th	b Boyle	Boyle
	September 10th	d Brandon	Hamilton
	December 31st	b Hay	Hay
1712	January 1st	b Mountjoy	Windsor
		b Burton	Paget
		b Mansell	Mansell
		b Middleton	Willoughby
		b Trevor	Trevor
		b Lansdowne	Granville
		b Masham	Masham
		b Foley	Foley
		b Bathurst	Bathurst
	July 7th	v Bolingbroke	St. John
1713	July 21st	b Bingley	Benson

1714	October 19th	v Tadcaster	O'Brien
		b Saunderson	Saunderson
		b Harborough	Sherard
		b Pierrepont	Pierrepont
		b Carleton	Boyle
		b Cobham	Temple
1715	January 1st	* (e Granville	Carteret
1716	March 10th	b Parker	Parker
	June 18th	b Coningsby	Coningsby
	June 19th	b Onslow	Onslow
	June 20th	b Torrington	Newport
	June 21st	b Cadogan	Cadogan
	June 22nd	b Romney	Marsham
	July 2nd	v St. John	St. John
	July 10th	b Newburgh	Cholmondley
1717	July 3rd	v Stanhope	Stanhope
1718	May 8th	(b Cadogan	Cadogan)
1720	June 9th	v Falmouth	Boscawen
		b Ducie	Moreton
	June 11th	v Lymington	Wallop
1721	September 4th	b Lechmere	Lechmere
	September 21st	v Torrington	Byng
1722	May 23rd	e Graham	Graham
	May 24th	e Ker	Ker
1723	June 1st	b Walpole	Walpole
1725	May 29th	b King	King

1728	January 8th	b Wilmington	Compton
	May 28th	b Hobart	Hobart
		b Monson	Monson
		b Malton	Watson
		b Lovel	Coke
1730	January 6th	b Harrington	Stanhope
1731	January 15th	b Raymond	Raymond
1733	November 15th	b Hardwicke	Yorke
	December 5th	b Talbot	Talbot
1735	January 23rd	(b Godolphin	Godolphin)
1740	May 19th	(m Grey	Grey)
1741	May 9th	b Montfort	Bromley
	May 11th	b Ilchester	Fox
	May 12th	b Chedworth	Howe
1742	February 6th	e Orford	Walpole
	April 19th	b Fitzwilliam	Fitzwilliam
	April 20th	b Mountedgcumbe	Edgcumbe
	July 14th	e Bath	Pulteney
1743	December 20th	b Sandys	Sandys
	December 21st	b Herbert	Herbert
1746	April 17th	(b Bruce	Bruce)
1747	January 12th	(b Ilchester	Fox)
	February 21st	v Leinster	Fitzgerald
	June 13th	b Anson	Anson
	June 23rd	b Feversham	Duncombe
	June 29th	v Folkestone	Bouverie
		b Ravensworth	Liddell
	July 14th	b Archer	Archer
1748	January 8th	b Rolle	Rolle
1749	June 12th	b Ponsonby	Ponsonby
	July 5th	(b Fortescue	Fortescue)
	October 2nd	(e Northumberland	Seymour)
	October 3rd	(e Egremont	Seymour)
	October 16th	(b Herbert	Herbert)
	October 18th	*(e Temple	Grenville)
1750	March 28th	b Vere	Beauclerk
1756	June 3rd	b Hyde	Villiers
	June 4th	b Walpole	Walpole
	November 8th	b Mansfield	Murray
	November 17th	(d Newcastle	Pelham Holles)
		b Harwich	Hill
	November 18th	b Lyttleton	Lyttleton
1759	November 13th	(e Warwick	Greville)
1760	March 27th	b Henley	Henley
	May 2nd	b Sondes	Watson
	May 20th	b Wycombe	Petty
	May 21st	*(b Stawel	Bilson Legge)

C. Senior Office-Holders.

Recruits are marked by _____

3e Sunderland	secretary Ireland privy seal treasury groom president
1d Dorset	president horse groom steward Ireland
4d Devonshire	treasury horse chamberlain Ireland
7e Pembroke	president privy seal Ireland admiral
<u>1e Romney</u>	secretary Ireland groom master-general
1d Shrewsbury	treasury secretary Ireland chamberlain
2e Granville	president secretary Ireland
3d Devonshire	privy seal Ireland steward
<u>1e Wilmington</u>	treasury president privy seal
1d Kent	privy seal steward chamberlain
1d Newcastle (1715)	chamberlain secretary treasury

4d Bedford	secretary admiral Ireland
1d Buckingham	president steward privy seal
3d Marlborough	privy seal master-general steward
4e Chesterfield	secretary Ireland steward
<u>1e Harrington</u>	president Ireland secretary
2v Townshend	president Ireland secretary
2d Ormond	Ireland master-general
<u>1d Greenwich</u>	master-general steward
2d Devonshire	president steward
3e Bridgwater	trade admiral
7e Winchilsea	secretary president
2d Grafton	chamberlain Ireland
2e Godolphin	privy seal groom
2e Temple	privy seal admiral
1e Tankerville (1695)	treasury privy seal
<u>1e Rochester</u>	president Ireland
1e Dartmouth	privy seal secretary
2e Gower	privy seal horse

1d Kingston	president privy seal
1e Poulett	steward treasury
2d Bolton	chamberlain Ireland
6d Somerset	president master
<u>1b Somers</u>	chancellor president
<u>1e Stanhope</u>	treasury secretary
<u>1b Trevor</u>	president privy seal
<u>1e Jersey</u>	chamberlain secretary
1m Wharton	privy seal Ireland
<u>1b Anson</u>	admiral
<u>1e Portland</u>	groom
3e Berkeley: Berkeley	admiral
4b Berkeley: Stratton	trade
<u>1b Carleton</u>	president
<u>1d Brandon</u>	master-general
<u>1v Torrington</u>	admiral
<u>1e Cadogan</u>	master-general
1d Devonshire	steward
3e Cholmondley	privy seal
<u>1d Marlborough</u>	master-general
3b Cornwallis	admiral
<u>1e Cowper</u>	chancellor
3e Holderness	trade
4e Holderness	secretary
6e Westmorland	trade
4e Winchilsea	trade

8e Winchilsea	admiral
<u>1e Godolphin</u>	treasury
2e Stamford	trade
<u>1v Harcourt</u>	chancellor
<u>1e Oxford</u>	treasury
<u>1b Henley</u>	chancellor
8e Pembroke	groom
<u>1e Torrington</u>	admiral
b Hervey	privy seal
1d Newcastle (1694)	privy seal
3e Carlisle	treasury
6e Suffolk	trade
3e Albemarle	groom
<u>1b King</u>	chancellor
2d Richmond	horse
1e Gower	privy seal
<u>1v Lonsdale</u>	privy seal
3v Lonsdale	privy seal
2e Scarborough	horse
3d Rutland	steward
1e Fitzwalter	trade
<u>1b Monson</u>	trade
<u>1e Halifax (1714)</u>	treasury
2e Halifax	trade
1d Manchester	secretary
2d Montagu	master-general
4e Sandwich	admiral
3e Peterborough	treasury
4e Rochford	groom
2b Guildford	trade
1d Leeds	president

<u>1e Macclesfield</u> (1721)	chancellor
<u>1e Bath</u> (1742)	treasury
<u>1e Orford</u> (1697)	admiral
<u>1v Bolingbroke</u>	secretary
6e Dorset	chamberlain
3e Rivers	master-general
<u>1m Halifax</u>	privy seal
<u>1d Schomberg</u>	master-general
2e Sunderland	chamberlain
<u>1b Talbot</u>	chancellor
2e Waldegrave	treasury
1e Strafford (1711)	admiral
<u>1e Hardwicke</u>	chancellor

D. Bedchamber Lords.

* Recruit.

R Convert from Roman catholicism.

___ Son of Bedchamber lord who held office within the period.

- 1d St. Albans Beauclerk
- * 1e Portland Bentinck
- 2e Burlington Boyle
- 2d Ormond Butler
- * 1b Weston Butler
- 2e Essex Capel
- * 1d Marlborough Churchill
- 2e Bath Granville
- 3e Carlisle Howard
- *R 1e Scarbrough Lumley
- 3e Peterborough Mordaunt
- 2d Bedford Russell
- 2b Lexington Sutton
- * 1e Romney Sydney
- 20e Oxford Vere

- 1d Portland Bentinck
- 3e Berkeley Berkeley
- 2d Ancaster Bertie
- * 1b Boyle Boyle
- 2e Granville Carteret
- 7e Lincoln Clinton
- 3e Holderness Darcy
- 3d Bridgwater Egerton
- 6e Westmorland Fane
- 2d Fitzroy Grafton
- 1d Kent Grey
- b Lucas Grey
- 3v Lonsdale Lowther
- 3d Rutland Manners
- 1d Manchester Montagu
- 7e Warwick Rich
- R 8b Teynham Roper
- 1d Dorset Sackville
- 3e Sunderland Spencer
- 6e Sydney Leicester
- R 1d Shrewsbury Talbot
- 3v Townshend Townshend
- R 1e Waldegrave Waldegrave
- 7b Delawarr West
- 1e Sussex Yelverton

- 2e Godolphin Godolphin
- 2d Richmond Lennox
- 2d Manchester Montagu

2e Ashburnham Ashburnham
2d St-Albans Beauclerk
3d St-Albans Beauclerk
 R 1e Fauconberg Belayse
 2e Tankerville Bennet
3d Ancaster Bertie
 4e Essex Capel
9e Lincoln Clinton
 6e Coventry Coventry
 2e Cowper Cowper
4e Holderness Darcy
 * 1e Fitzwilliam Fitzwilliam
 1e Clinton Fortescue
 1e Harcourt Harcourt
 9e Pembroke Herbert
 2e Buckinghamshire Hobart
 2e Albemarle Keppel
 6b Lovelace Lovelace
3d Manchester Montagu
 4e Rochford Nassau de Z
 4d Leeds Osborne
 2e Northumberland Percy
 2d Kingston Pierrepont
 2e Poulett Poulett
3d Marlborough Spencer
 3e Jersey Villiers
2e Waldegrave Waldegrave
 3e Orford Walpole
 2m Rockingham Watson

E. Number of Office-Holders.

Number of peers employed in the Bedchamber and lesser central offices, at five year intervals.

1690	36
1695	33
1700	40
1705	27
1710	22
1715	40
1720	44
1725	43
1730	38
1735	41
1740	40
1745	45
1750	44
1755	41
1760	47

Offices included the chief justices in eyre, the constable of Tower, the lieutenant constable of the Tower, the constable of Windsor, the captain of the Gentlemen Pensioners, the captain of the Yeomen of the Guard, the tellers of the Exchequer, the master-general of the Irish ordnance, the lord justices of Ireland, lord treasurers of Ireland, the lesser lords of the Admiralty, the Treasury and Trade, the joint paymasters of the forces, the joint postmasters, the treasurer of the navy, the chancellor of the Exchequer, the treasurer of the chamber, the vice chamberlain, the cofferer of the Household, the treasurer of the Household, the comptroller of the Household, the masters of the Buckhounds, the Foxhounds and the Staghounds, the master of the Robes, the master of the Jewels, the keeper of the privy purse, the chancellor of the duchy of Lancaster and the lord wardens of the Stannaries and the Cinque Ports.

Offices which are excluded are colonial governorships, Irish governorships, grooms of the Bedchamber, the master of the Great Wardrobe, members of lesser royal households, the rangership of royal parks, chases and forests.

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