

## **'Ceux de Guise': The Guise Family and their Affinity in Normandy, 1550-1600**

Carroll, Stuart Michael

The copyright of this thesis rests with the author and no quotation from it or information derived from it may be published without the prior written consent of the author

For additional information about this publication click this link.

<http://qmro.qmul.ac.uk/jspui/handle/123456789/1391>

Information about this research object was correct at the time of download; we occasionally make corrections to records, please therefore check the published record when citing. For more information contact [scholarlycommunications@qmul.ac.uk](mailto:scholarlycommunications@qmul.ac.uk)

**'Ceux de Guise': The Guise Family and their Affinity in Normandy, 1550-1600**

**Stuart Michael Carroll**

**Submitted for the degree of PhD**

**Queen Mary and Westfield College, University of London**



## Abstract

Despite their importance in France and Europe in the sixteenth century, the Guise have received little archival study from historians this century. This thesis overturns the myths that have surrounded the family as a result of this neglect, and re-evaluates the political aims of the Guise. They were not confined in their interests to eastern France; they possessed lands in provinces as diverse as Provence and Brittany. Moreover, they were a family with a truly European strategy with concerns in Scotland, Italy and the Empire. The Norman lands of the Guise were the wealthiest possessions of the family and provided an important base for Guise intervention in Scotland.

This thesis traces the development and dynamics of the Guise affinity in Normandy, composed of clients, servants and kinsmen. There was a volatile relationship between patron and client, and the Guise regularly sought the advice and opinions of their clients in council when formulating family strategy. This strategy was one primarily concerned with family interest and not blinded by devotion to religious dogma; the Guise protected their Calvinist kinsmen and employed Calvinist servants on their estates. The position of the Guise in the popular imagination and the relationship between elite politics and the masses was highly complex. The Guise manipulated religious passions in factional manoeuvring at court and as early as 1562 established a catholic peasant league in Normandy. However, the Guise could only exploit, not control, popular forces.

The research for this thesis was undertaken in Paris and Rouen over fifteen months. It attempts to construct the personnel and relationships that constituted an affinity by harnessing quantitative data drawn from gendarmerie musters, household accounts, legal and financial transactions to the more conventional sources of letters and memoirs. For example, the uncatalogued notarial records of Rouen demonstrate that the correlation between the heavy financial investment made by Guise clients in the city elite and the growth of the ultra-catholic faction in the city.

The ambitions of the Guise are still misinterpreted because research has been hindered the by the prejudices of monarchical apologists, liberal nationalist and protestant historians. This thesis uses new archival material to show that the Guise pursued strategies and defended their interests within the context of sixteenth-century noble culture and aspirations, challenging assumptions about the role of monarchical power and the rise of the 'state'.

## Table of Contents

A note on usage	p 6
Abbreviations	p 7
Chapter One - Introduction	p 11
Chapter Two - The Rise of the House of Lorraine in Normandy from the Fifteenth to the Mid-Sixteenth Century	p 20
Chapter Three - Servants and Clients	p 49
Chapter Four - Defending the Family Interest: Court Faction, Religion and International Dynastic Strategy, 1558-62	p 86
Chapter Five - Civil War and Blood Feud, 1562-74	p 117
Chapter Six - Malcontents and Defenders of the Faith: The Building of a Political Power Base	p 161
Chapter Seven - Holy Alliance: The Guise and the Catholic People	p 201
Conclusion	p 247
Appendix A - Income of the ducs d'Aumale	p 254
Appendix B - Income of the d'Elbeuf Family	p 255
Appendix C - Buyers of <i>rentes</i> from the ducs d'Aumale	p 256
Appendix D - Buyers of <i>rentes</i> from the duc d'Elbeuf	p 257
Appendix E - Muster Rolls Consulted	p 259
Appendix F - The Guise and the League of Péronne	p 261
Appendix G - Guise Clients and League Adherents at the Provincial Estates, 1584-8	p 264
Bibliography	p 265

## **Tables and Maps**

Sketch Map of Normandy	p 9
Genealogy of the House of Guise	p 10
Income from the Guise lands in Normandy, 1542	p 24

*for my parents*

## Acknowledgements

This project would not have been possible without the support and encouragement of many people. Those to whom I am most indebted deserve a special mention. Gayle Brunelle provided invaluable information on the financial dealings of the Guise in the Rouennais money markets. I am grateful to Gareth Prosser for information on fifteenth-century Normandy and for showing me the parallels between the fifteenth-century polity and sixteenth-century political society. Philip Catchpole kindly dedicated much of his time to proofreading and commenting on the text. Above all, my thanks go to Roger Mettam whose belief in this project and efforts on my behalf have been unstinting. His observations and reflections have been fundamental in developing and refining the arguments contained in this thesis.

### A Note on Usage

As far as possible French words have been left in the original and italicised. The exceptions being some familiar and easily recognisable words which have remained either non-italicised (e.g. parlement) or rendered in their English form (e.g. admiral). All titles and seigneurial jurisdictions have been left in the French and remain non-italicised whereas the names of most offices, institutions and royal administrative jurisdictions have been left in the French but italicised. The English form has been adopted for the names of French provinces. The punctuation and spelling of quotations has been left in the original form and all dates are in the new style.

### Abbreviations

ACR	Archives Communales de Rouen
ADC	Archives Départementales de Calvados
ADSM	Archives Départementales de la Seine-Maritime
AN	Archives Nationales, Paris
Anselme	Le P. Anselme, <i>Histoire généalogique et chronologique de la maison royale de France, des pairs, grands officiers de la couronne &amp; de la maison du roy</i> , 9 vols, Paris, 1726-33
BM	Bibliothèque Municipale de Rouen
BN	Bibliothèque Nationale, Paris
-Clair	Collection Clairambault
-Dupuy	Collection Dupuy
-Ms Fr	Manuscrits français
-Na Fr	Nouvelles acquisitions françaises
-PO	Pièces originales
-V <sup>e</sup> Col	Cinq Cents Colberts
Bouillé	R. de Bouillé du Chariol, <i>Histoire des ducs de Guise</i> , 4 vols Paris, 1849-50
Brantôme	Pierre de Bourdeille, sieur de Brantôme, <i>Oeuvres</i> , L. Lalanne (ed), 11 vols, Paris, 1864-82
Chenaye-Desbois	F. de La Chenaye-Desbois and Badier, <i>Dictionnaire de la Noblesse</i> , 19 vols, Paris, 1863-76
Cimber and Danjou	L. Cimber and F. Danjou (eds), <i>Archives curieuses de l'histoire de France</i> , 1st ser., 15 vols, 1834-7
CSPF	<i>Calendar of State Papers, Foreign Series, of the reign of Elizabeth</i> , J. Stevenson et al (eds), London, 1863-1950
CSPS	<i>Calendar of State Papers, Foreign Series, Spain</i> , G. A. Bergenroth et al (eds), London, 1862-99
D. B. F.	Dictionnaire de biographie française
Floquet	A. Floquet, <i>Histoire du Parlement de Normandie</i> , 7 vols, Rouen, 1840-2



**Frondeville**

**-Conseillers** H. de Frondeville, *Les conseillers du Parlement de Normandie au seizième siècle (1499-1594)*, Paris and Rouen, 1960

**-Présidents** H. de Frondeville, *Les présidents du Parlement de Normandie (1499-1790)*, Paris and Rouen, 1953


**Michaud and Poujoulat** J.-F. Michaud and J.-J.-F. Poujoulat (eds), *Nouvelle collection des mémoires sur l'histoire de France*, Paris, 1836-54

**De Thou** J.-A. de Thou, *Histoire universelle de 1543 jusqu'en 1607*, 16 vols, London, 1734

**Vindry** F. Vindry, *Dictionnaire de l'Etat major au seizième siècle, pt 1, La gendarmerie*, Paris, 1901

SKETCH MAP OF NORMANDY

PLACES UNDERLINED INDICATE GUYSE LANDS




# GENEALOGY OF THE HOUSE OF GUISE.

Claude de Lorraine, duc de Guise (1496-1550)

1513 m.

Antoinette de Bourbon (1494-1583).



## Chapter One

### Introduction

## Affinity and Clientage

During the last fifteen years historians have begun to re-examine the traditional view of early modern France, which emphasised the decline of the power of particularist interests in the face of the growing centralisation and bureaucratisation of the state. Political and institutional history has now been explored within its contemporary cultural and social context. Consequently a new understanding of political culture and structures of power has emerged, stressing the continued importance of personal power relationships over bureaucracy as a means of exercising authority. The new historiography emphasises the continuing vitality of particularist interests and especially the enduring preponderant role played by the nobility in France.<sup>1</sup> The power of the greater nobles was evident through their monopoly of patronage, and authority was exercised by means of the large clientage networks that they constructed.<sup>2</sup>

In simple terms clientage is "an unequal, vertical alliance between a superior and an inferior based on reciprocal exchange. The reciprocity of the exchange was an obligation."<sup>3</sup> This form of social organisation usually involved the exchange of service and loyalty in return for patronage and protection. This schema for understanding noble relationships has drawn heavily on the works of sociologists and social anthropologists who have studied social structures in developing societies.<sup>4</sup> The reliance of historians on models has led to the simplification of noble relationships in early modern France. Recently, Kristen Neuschel has admirably demonstrated that the strict model of clientage, stressing dependency and hierarchy, does not correspond to the actual behaviour patterns of sixteenth-century noblemen.<sup>5</sup> Her study of the prince de Condé and the Picard nobility emphasises the non-hierarchical and non-exclusive nature of noble relations and the high degree of autonomy shown by clients. Noble relationships were not characterised by patron-client relations

---

<sup>1</sup> For example, see R. Harding, *Anatomy of a Power Elite: the Provincial Governors of Early Modern France*, New Haven and London, 1978; W. Beik, *Absolutism and Society in Seventeenth-Century France: State Power and Provincial Aristocracy in Languedoc*, Cambridge, 1985; S. Kettering, *Patrons, Brokers and Clients in Seventeenth-Century France*, Oxford, 1986; R. Mettam, *Power and Faction in Louis XIV's France*, London, 1988.

<sup>2</sup> On the sixteenth-century nobility and especially their continuing economic power, see J. Wood, *The Nobility of the Election of Bayeux, 1463-1660: Continuity through Change*, Princeton, 1980; J. Dewald, *The Formation of a Provincial Nobility: The Magistrates of the Parlement of Rouen, 1499-1610*, Princeton, 1980; A. Jouanna, *Le devoir de révolte: la noblesse française et la gestation de l'Etat moderne, 1559-1661*, Paris, 1989; J. R. Major, "Noble Income, Inflation and the Wars of Religion in France", *American Historical Review*, 1981.

<sup>3</sup> S. Kettering, "Friendship and Clientage in Early Modern France", *French History*, 1992, pp 145-6.

<sup>4</sup> A good example is S. N. Eisenstadt and L. Roniger, "Patron-Client Relationships as a Model of Structuring Social Exchange", *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 1980.

<sup>5</sup> K. Neuschel, *Word of Honor: Interpreting Noble Culture in Sixteenth-Century France*, Ithaca and London, 1989, especially chapter one.

bonded by material exchanges but were distinguished by the daily exchange of honour, courtesy and mutual recognition. All nobles took part in these exchanges and there was no exclusiveness about the bonds and ties of personal relationships; there were no rigid, hierarchical and distinct clientage networks. It is clear from Neuschel's study that models have been too stringently applied, as they fail accurately to explain the behaviour of noblemen. Conversely, the autonomous behaviour of the noblemen that Neuschel depicts does not present an accurate picture of all noble relationships. Many of the noblemen whom she describes in her study are *alliés* in a common cause with Condé rather than clients in his service. Clearly Condé's clientèle was part of a faction made up of many elements and its composition was constantly shifting.<sup>6</sup>

This study argues that noble relationships were complex and that there were a multitude of links and bonds among noblemen that varied in strength over time and according to circumstance.<sup>7</sup> Relationships were founded on the basis of kinship, paid service, clientage and alliances in a faction. From this study it will become clear that it is impossible to categorise simply relationships among noblemen. Some links were ephemeral and based on opportunism while it is easy to find evidence of one family serving another faithfully over several generations. A new schema is needed to encompass the complexity of these relations and this study will employ the term affinity.<sup>8</sup> Affinities have most accurately been described as forming concentric circles, each ring representing a different strength of relationship.<sup>9</sup> At the core of an affinity the nobleman was surrounded by his most trusted friends, servants and kinsmen, who gave counsel and dominated the household. Outside this elite were the paid servants: the judicial and administrative officials who administered the patrimony and constituted the military retinue which followed the patron. The wider affinity of the patron was dynamic and fluid in its composition, consisting of clients, neighbours, vassals, *amis* and *alliés* who were largely autonomous of his control. Affinities varied in size, depending on the social status of the lord. He acted like a pole of attraction - a magnet for those seeking favours and service. Since there were a multitude of poles of attraction, each of varying strengths, loyalties were not constant but fluctuated in strength over time and according to circumstance.

By the fifteenth century in both England and France, feudalism, here meaning the organisation of military service based on tenure, had been replaced by a new form of social organisation, usually referred to as Bastard Feudalism, founded on payment for service. However,

---

<sup>6</sup> On the fluid nature of factions, see E. W. Ives, *Faction in Tudor England*, London, 1979.

<sup>7</sup> C. Carpenter, "The Beauchamp affinity: a study of bastard feudalism at work", *English Historical Review*, 1980, p 518, has argued that this "sea of varying relationships" was a more stable phenomenon than hitherto supposed.

<sup>8</sup> The term affinity has already been employed with regard to sixteenth-century France, see M. Greengrass, "Noble Affinities in Early Modern France: The Case of Henri I de Montmorency, Constable of France", *European History Quarterly*, 1986. However, the author fails to explain the terminology.

<sup>9</sup> G. L. Harriss, in K. B. McFarlane, *England in the Fifteenth Century*, London, 1981, p xi.

traditional loyalties based on tenure and locality remained and were not completely replaced by the cash nexus.<sup>10</sup> Long before the rigidly hierarchical model of clientage, as applied to sixteenth-century France, had come under attack, K. B. McFarlane had explored the diffuse nature of power in fifteenth-century England. He saw affinities as "loose and as yet unhardened by any organisation; they could clearly dissolve, not merely because a magnate couldn't find pasture enough for his clients, but because they didn't agree with the line he was taking".<sup>11</sup> It was evident to McFarlane that "clients are likely to have influenced the policy of their lords as much as he could influence theirs".<sup>12</sup> The local studies of noble affinities which McFarlane called for, in order to understand the structure of Bastard Feudalism have flourished and expanded our understanding. Kristen Neuschel's work on the prince de Condé and the Picard nobility remains the only substantial investigation into the relationship between a magnate and his clients in sixteenth-century France. The main flaw in her analysis is to be found on her reliance on letters as the prime source for the study of noble relationships.<sup>13</sup> A letter was a forum for the exchange of courtesies and a mutual recognition of honour. However, since the language of sixteenth-century letters was stylised and the exchange of courtesies was universal, letters alone cannot be accurate examples of the nature and strength of noble relationships. What a noble wrote and what he thought and did were often entirely different.<sup>14</sup> This study attempts to investigate noble relationships by illustrating the extent to which clients followed the wishes of and acted on behalf of their patrons, using letters in conjunction with other sources. Legal contracts provide an excellent means of tracing the involvement of clients and servants in the financial and administrative affairs of their patron. These documents, bereft of the formulas of address found in letters, reveal the nature of service and its rewards and the exchange of tangible benefits. Thus in 1555 Jean du Bosc, sieur d'Emendreville, *président* of the *cour des aides* in Rouen and future Huguenot leader of 1562, gave a house to the *connétable*, Anne de Montmorency, "reconoysans des bienfaictz receuz par ledict seigneur desmentreville dudit seigneur".<sup>15</sup> Important legal agreements, such as the sale of *rentes*, contracts of marriage and the creation of wardships, involved only the most trusted clients and kinsmen of the parties concerned. These documents provide much more trustworthy insights into the dynamics

---

<sup>10</sup> Regional variations and the absence of studies of affinities in fifteenth-century France makes generalisation difficult. For some preliminary considerations, see P. S. Lewis, "Decayed and Non-Feudalism in Later Medieval France", *Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research*, 1964. On England, see K. B. McFarlane, "Bastard Feudalism", in *England in the Fifteenth Century*.

<sup>11</sup> K. B. McFarlane, *The Nobility of Later Medieval England*, Oxford, 1973, pp 293-4.

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid*, p 294.

<sup>13</sup> Neuschel, *Word of Honor*, especially chapters three and four.

<sup>14</sup> The conventions of exchanges of honour in letters mirror the conventions of life at court in which dissimulation and role-playing were parts of everyday life, see S. Greenblatt, *Renaissance Self-Fashioning from More to Shakespeare*, Chicago, 1980, pp 12-15.

<sup>15</sup> ADSM, Tabellionage, 2E1, 310, 8 January 1555.

of the patron-client relationship than letters, since they involve more than exchanges of courtesies.

The analysis of military retinues is vital to establishing the composition of an affinity. In fifteenth-century England this is facilitated by the survival of contracts of service called indentures.<sup>16</sup> While maintained retinues declined as a feature of the Tudor polity, they remained an integral part of French society into the sixteenth century. Indeed, the companies of the *ordonnance*, established in 1445, soon evolved into armed retinues maintained by noblemen for royal service at the king's expense. The profession of arms in the companies became increasingly important to the furtherance of noble careers. During the sixteenth century French noble culture remained a warrior culture, contrasting with the de-militarisation of English society.<sup>17</sup> The muster rolls of the companies of the *ordonnance* and other units are therefore an important and still vastly under used source for a quantitative analysis of a lord's following.

Finally, this study attempts to portray the importance of collective decision making in family strategy. Historians of the early modern French nobility have ignored the importance of councils in the administering of family affairs. Councils and not individuals formulated all aspects of family strategy, from financial management to political calculation. The concept of giving counsel as a key element of noble culture and its importance as a means of binding an affinity has been ignored by the majority of historians of sixteenth-century France.<sup>18</sup>

Above all, the Wars of Religion afford an excellent opportunity to study how affinities functioned, since it is possible, by building a prosopography of an affinity and with detailed attention to the narrative of political events, to examine the behaviour and activities of clients, servants and *alliés*. The existence of a civil war in France enables the historian to study the dynamics of an affinity, and study the nature of a nobleman's following and the political support it provided. The relationship between the Guise family and their affinity in Normandy provides an excellent opportunity to explore the motives, interests and strategies of a great nobleman and his following.

### The Guise and Historians

Writing a history of the Guise family is complicated by the nature of primary sources which, in supporting their own sectional interests, are hostile to the Guise. The problem has been further exacerbated by generations of historians, judging the Guise according to the values and prejudices of their own times. After the fall of the Catholic League Henri IV tried to promote a policy of

---

<sup>16</sup> Non-feudal contracts for life service in later medieval France are discussed in Lewis, "Decayed and Non-Feudalism in Later Medieval France".

<sup>17</sup> The change of military service from an obligation into a profession is considered in P. Contamine, *Guerre, état et société à la fin du moyen age*, Paris, 1972, pp 550-1.

<sup>18</sup> For some preliminary work on noble councils in later medieval England, see C. Rawcliffe, *The Staffords, Earls of Stafford and Dukes of Buckingham, 1394-1521*, Cambridge, 1978, chapter eight.



reconciliation, expunging memories of the bitterness and hatreds of the civil wars.<sup>19</sup> The burning of League documents and pamphlets was a symbol of this process, but the destruction of evidence has hindered the understanding of the Catholic League and reinforced the tendency of historiography to represent the perspective and prejudices of the victors.

The Guise had numerous enemies during the Wars of Religion and it is important to read the works of monarchical and protestant propagandists with caution.<sup>20</sup> These works are inaccurate and tend to identify all their enemies and ultramontane catholics as 'Guisards'. By the mid-seventeenth century analogies were being made between contemporary political instability caused by aristocratic factionalism, and the history of the Guise family. Mézeray, writing at the height of the Fronde, saw all the present woes of the French polity as originating from the factionalism of the late sixteenth century.<sup>21</sup> Louis Maimbourg, in his *Histoire du Calvinisme* and *Histoire de la Ligue*, aimed to demonstrate to Louis XIV that religious militancy was a natural harbinger of rebellion. The pernicious nature of religious zeal was juxtaposed to the greatness of Henri IV who had found a *via media*.<sup>22</sup> The Guise were portrayed as working, with the connivance of Spain and the pope, to form a Catholic League from as early as 1563.<sup>23</sup> By the eighteenth century the sinister myth of the Guise family had gained wide acceptance.<sup>24</sup> The hero worship of Henri IV reached new proportions with Voltaire who drew heavily on the historical works of Maimbourg and Mézeray. To Voltaire, Henri IV represented the triumph of reason over both religious superstition and the self-seeking tyranny of aristocratic factionalism. In *La Henriade*, Voltaire imagined Henri contrasting his own magnificent exploits with those of the Guise:

Ces chefs ambitieux d'un peuple trop crédule,  
Couvrant leurs intérêts des cieux,  
Ont conduit dans le piège un peuple furieux,  
Ont armé contre moi sa piété cruelle.<sup>25</sup>

---

<sup>19</sup> M. Greengrass, *France in the Age of Henry IV: The Struggle for Stability*, London, 1984, pp 61-2.

<sup>20</sup> The best examples of history as propaganda are to be found in the works of Louis Regnier, sieur de La Planche, who was strongly pro-Montmorency and anti-Guisard, see his *Histoire de l'Etat de France tant de la république que de la religion sous le règne de François II*, 1576, and *La Légende de Charles, Cardinal de Lorraine et de ses frères de la maison de Guise, descrite par François de l'Isle*, Reims, 1576.

<sup>21</sup> W. H. Evans, *Mézeray et la conception de l'histoire de France au XVIII<sup>e</sup>*, Paris, 1930, pp 164-5.

<sup>22</sup> L. Maimbourg, *Histoire de la Ligue*, Paris, 1684, pp 3-5.

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid*, pp 13-15.

<sup>24</sup> Saint-Simon spoke of "cette ambition et cet esprit qui leur a été si terriblement propre", see, *Mémoires*, A. de Boislisle (ed), 43 vols, Paris, 1881-1930, vol III, p 61.

<sup>25</sup> Voltaire, *Oeuvres complètes*, W. H. Barber et al (eds), Geneva, 1968-, vol II, pp 392-3.

By the time of the Revolution, the Guise were valuable examples of the self-serving aristocrat, "toujours les ennemies de la Nation et des Rois".<sup>26</sup>

The notion of a family driven by unbridled ambition is one that had its roots in the anti-Guise propaganda of the late sixteenth century. It was also a factor prominent in the writings of liberal-nationalist historians of the nineteenth century who admonished the Guise for putting family interest before the integrity of the *patrie*. As one historian put it, "Henri de Guise voulut devenir maître de France en se plaçant au dehors dans la dépendance du roi d'Espagne."<sup>27</sup> Histories of the Guise since the mid-nineteenth century have gone a long way to illuminating their political strategy. More recently there has been a reassessment of the political role and religious beliefs of the cardinal de Lorraine, which has shown the complexity of family strategy and differences among individual family members.<sup>28</sup> However, the orthodox view of the family and the myths that surround it have failed to disappear. Every noble family in sixteenth-century France was fighting for survival in a harsh and competitive world. The honour of the family came before everything and all families strove to maintain their status and prestige. However, N. M. Sutherland reduces the complexity of family strategies into the naive portraits of admiral Coligny as a virtuous crusader for his faith, comparing him to the villainous cardinal de Lorraine, the "evil genius" of the House of Guise who is "cowardly, avaricious and mean and quite unscrupulous in the pursuit of restless ambition".<sup>29</sup> It will be argued here that such stereotypes are invalid as are such terms as 'ambition' used in its pejorative sense, since all nobles were primarily preoccupied with and aggressively pursued their family interest. Family strategy was formulated with the counsel of kinsmen and clients. Only by studying the interaction between the Guise and their clients can the political strategies and motives of the family be understood, compensating for the propaganda of its enemies and the prejudices of historians.

Studies of the Guise have usually centred upon their political and religious motives and role in court politics.<sup>30</sup> These works cover inadequately the relation between the Guise and the monarchy and there has been little discussion of their provincial power base, aside from simple lists

---

<sup>26</sup> *Des Crimes Commis par les Princes Lorrains Depuis leur établissement en France jusqu'aujourd'hui*, Lausanne, 1789, p 14.

<sup>27</sup> J. de Croze, *Les Guises, les Valois et Philippe II*, 2 vols, Paris, 1866, vol I, p 227.

<sup>28</sup> H. O. Evennett, *The Cardinal of Lorraine and the Council of Trent*, Cambridge, 1930; D. Nugent, *Ecumenism in the Age of the Reformation: The Colloquy of Poissy*, Cambridge Mass., 1974; S. C. Shannon, "The Political Activity of François de Lorraine, duc de Guise (1559-1563): From Military Hero to Catholic Leader", unpub. PhD thesis, Univ. Boston, 1988.

<sup>29</sup> N. M. Sutherland, *The French Secretaries of State in the Age of Catherine de Medici*, London, 1962, p 56. The malicious and overbearing nature of Guise power is a feature of all Sutherland's work and is discussed more fully in chapter five below.

<sup>30</sup> R. de Bouillé, *Histoire des ducs de Guise*, 4 vols, Paris, 1849-50; H. Fomeron, *Les ducs de Guise et leur époque*, 2 vols, Paris, 1877; J.-M. Constant, *Les Guises*, Paris, 1984; Croze, *Les Guises, les Valois et Philippe II*.

of the offices and seigneuries they possessed.<sup>31</sup> This reflects the preoccupation that historians have always had with the fortunes of the monarchy and the development of royal power at the expense of the nobility. Politics, as this thesis attempts to show, cannot be studied only with reference to the monarchy. Political society cannot be reduced simply to the grand events and great figures. In sixteenth-century France politics was a routine preoccupation, concerned with the protection and furtherance of family and particularist interests. A feature of early modern France was the ability of local conflicts to destabilise monarchical authority and become a focal point around which factions might coalesce. During the Wars of Religion inter-communal religious violence had a damaging effect on royal power.<sup>32</sup> However, little is known about the relationship between elite and popular politics and how factions at court involved themselves with provincial disputes.

Lucien Romier, writing earlier this century, divided France on the eve of the Wars of Religion into territorial spheres of influence: the Guise preeminent in the eastern provinces and the Montmorency in the Ile-de-France.<sup>33</sup> He makes no mention of any Guise presence in Normandy. Recent scholarship has overturned such simplification which designated a dominant role to the Guise in Champagne, the Montmorency around Paris and the Bourbon-Vendôme in the South-West. The Bourbon were, for example, considerable landholders in Picardy.<sup>34</sup> Anne de Montmorency was governor of Languedoc and was succeeded by his son, Henri. Nevertheless, some confusion remains in modern historiography.<sup>35</sup> When Claude I de Lorraine (1496-1550), comte de Guise and d'Aumale, established himself at the French court his landed interest was scattered. He installed his family seat quite naturally at Joinville in Champagne, close to the land of his birth and where he possessed many seigneuries. By the time of his death in 1550 Claude had lands in Picardy, the Ile-de-France, the Maine, Provence and Normandy, in addition to those in Champagne.<sup>36</sup> Claude's importance in Champagne was further enhanced by his position as governor from 1524 until 1543. Thereafter he was governor of Burgundy until his death in 1550.<sup>37</sup> The small town of Guise from which the family took its patrimonial name and which was raised from a comté to a duché-pairie in 1527 in favour of Claude, is situated in Picardy.<sup>38</sup> Claude's lands in

---

<sup>31</sup> Bouillé, I, pp 46, 219.

<sup>32</sup> P. Benedict, *Rouen during the Wars of Religion*, Cambridge, 1980.

<sup>33</sup> L. Romier, *Le royaume de Catherine de Médicis: La France à la veille des guerres de religion*, 2 vols, Paris, 1922, vol I, pp 206-18.

<sup>34</sup> Neuschel, *Word of Honor*, pp 26-8.

<sup>35</sup> R. Briggs, *Early Modern France 1560-1715*, Oxford, 1977 p 15, states without any reference that the Guise had considerable influence in Brittany.

<sup>36</sup> Bouillé, I, p 219.

<sup>37</sup> Harding, *Anatomy of a Power Elite*, p 222.

<sup>38</sup> Anselme, III, p 478. In the Thiérache to be precise.

the Maine - the baronies of Mayenne, L'Abbé, La Ferté Bernard and the châtelannies of Ervée and Portmain - were erected into a marquisate in 1514. Thus Claude's landholding concerns were not confined to a single province, but were truly those of a northern and eastern French magnate.

The approach of this study has been to outline in chapters two and three the growth, nature and composition of the Guise affinity in Normandy. The subsequent four chapters attempt to explain and describe family strategies and those of its clients during the Wars of Religion. A study of Normandy has many advantages over one of Champagne, traditionally seen as the power base of the Guise. Normandy had its own parlement and provincial Estates whose records permit the investigation of Guise clients acting on behalf of their patrons. Normandy was a key province for both the protestants and the monarchy. Calvinism was initially strong in the province and the existence of a Guise landed power base was to have adverse effects on the consolidation of the reformed faith. Normandy provided a disproportionately large share of royal income, and the financial importance of the province increased during the Wars of Religion as royal control of other provinces decreased. During the wars of the Catholic League the province had immense strategic and financial importance, and the strength of the Guise affinity in Normandy was vital to the success of the League. As *princes étrangers* the Guise had a truly European family strategy, and Normandy provided a base for the Guise in sustaining their dynastic interests in Scotland. Chapters four and six below demonstrate how the Guise affinity in Normandy facilitated the logistical support of family strategy in Scotland.

## Chapter Two

### The Rise of the House of Lorraine in Normandy from the Fifteenth to the Mid-Sixteenth Century

By 1570 the Guise were the largest landholders in upper Normandy. This is attributable to favourable marriages and eminence at the court of Henri II (1547-59). The family was able to create and maintain kinship and political alliances with other Norman magnates, thereby augmenting their own contacts and credit in the province. However, the Guise were not outsiders or newcomers. Well before the accession of Henri II in 1547 they could claim a strong territorial and historical interest in Normandy. Indeed, the relationship between the elder branch of the House of Lorraine and Normandy dates back to the early fifteenth century.

### The Harcourt Inheritance

In 1420 René I d'Anjou (1409-80), comte de Guise, the second son of Louis II king of Naples, Sicily and comte de Provence married Isabel (d.1453) duchesse de Lorraine, oldest daughter and heiress of Charles I, duc de Lorraine. When the duc de Lorraine died in 1430 Antoine, comte de Vaudémont, a cadet of the House of Lorraine, claimed the ducal title through the male line in opposition to the Angevin succession. This inheritance was of immense political importance - the Angevin claimant was naturally supported by the French and the Vaudémont had the support of the Burgundians. At Bulgnéville in 1431 the Angevins were defeated and René was captured. He was constrained to pay a huge ransom and had to marry Yolande, his daughter, to Ferry, the eldest son of the comte de Vaudémont. In 1473, when the last male descendant of René I died, the ducal inheritance passed to the comtes de Vaudémont, represented by the celebrated René II son of Ferry de Vaudémont and Yolande d'Anjou.<sup>1</sup>

The connection of the comtes de Vaudémont with Normandy began in 1417 when Marie d'Harcourt married Antoine, comte de Vaudémont, the victor of Bulgnéville. Marie's father, Jean d'Harcourt, represented the last of the direct male line of the greatest of all Norman families. On his deathbed in 1452, his lands in Normandy were divided between his two daughters, Marie and Jeanne.<sup>2</sup> This was a considerable inheritance, consisting of the comtés of Harcourt and Aumale, the châtellenies of Lillebonne and Gravençon, the baronies of Brionne, Elbeuf, Saussaye and Routout and the barony of Mayenne in the Maine.<sup>3</sup> Under Norman law Marie enjoyed possession of all these lands by *droit d'aînesse*, pending a *partage*. Her second son, Jean de Lorraine, took the title comte d'Harcourt and was active in Charles VII's reconquest of Normandy, playing a full part in Norman politics in the 1450s and 1460s. He supported Charles, duc de Berry, against Louis

---

<sup>1</sup> Anselme, I, p 231; Bouillé, I, pp 33-7. René was finally released from captivity in 1437 and, after unsuccessfully pursuing the Neapolitan crown, he retired from public life in 1452, leaving his lands to his sons.

<sup>2</sup> C.-M. Bost, *Les seigneurs de Lillebonne*, Luneray, 1987, p 99.

<sup>3</sup> Anselme, V, pp 130, 134. Harcourt was raised to a comté in 1338 and consisted of the châtellenies of Harcourt, Brionne, Boissay-le-Chatel, Elbeuf, Lillebonne and Gravençon. In the sixteenth century Lillebonne and Brionne are referred to as vicomtés or even comtés in their own right.

XI in the War of the Public Weal. For a brief time the leaguers were successful against Louis, Berry received the duchy of Normandy as an apanage and Jean de Lorraine was well rewarded for his support. He was an important member of Berry's ephemeral ducal court and was created *maréchal héréditaire* of Normandy. Jean's period in authority was shortlived as Berry's regime succumbed to a resurgent Louis. Although Jean had died childless and was buried at La Saussaye near Elbeuf in 1472, he was nevertheless the first member of the House of Lorraine to hold a position of power in Normandy. His inheritance was administered by his mother, who died four years later.<sup>4</sup> This prized inheritance now passed back to the ducal house of Lorraine, to Jean's nephew, René II, son of Ferry and Yolande d'Anjou. René II de Lorraine-Vaudémont became duc de Lorraine when the last Angevin heir to the duchy died in 1473, and was the means by which the duchy of Lorraine was reunited with the dynasty of Lorraine, having been in Angevin possession for fifty years.<sup>5</sup> However, René inherited not only substantial properties in Normandy, but also an inheritance complicated by a lawsuit over the partition between between his grandmother, Marie d'Harcourt, and her younger sister Jeanne, wife of Jean IV de Rieux. In 1493 the case was finally judged and in 1496 an accord was drawn up between the two families in which René gained the baronies of Elbeuf and Brionne and the comté of Aumale. The Rieux received the comté of Harcourt itself as well as *rentes* assigned on the revenues of René's portion. The title of the comte d'Harcourt was to remain indivisible and was subsequently used by both families.<sup>6</sup>

The duc de Lorraine's presence in Normandy had already been reinforced in 1471 when René married Jeanne d'Harcourt, comtesse de Tancarville. This marriage was designed to reinforce his links with France against the overbearing presence of Charles the Bold. Jeanne d'Harcourt came from a cadet branch of the family and was daughter of Guillaume and Yolande de Laval.<sup>7</sup> In 1485 René repudiated his wife because she was "petite bossue et incapable d'avoir des enfants" - he later remarried Philippe de Gueldres.<sup>8</sup> His abandoned wife died in 1488 and instituted as her heir François I d'Orleans, comte de Dunois. This added to his extensive Norman lands, which included the comté (later duchy) of Longueville. From the early sixteenth century, the Guise were to form a close kinship alliance with these other great Norman landowners.

The House of Lorraine was an ally of the Valois monarchy up to the end of the fifteenth

---

<sup>4</sup> G.-A. de La Roque, *Histoire généalogique de la maison d'Harcourt*, 4 vols, n.p., 1662, vol I, p 461; H.-M. Saint-Denis, *Notices historiques sur les communes des environs d'Elbeuf*, 8 vols, Elbeuf, 1885-90, vol II, p 33. I am grateful to Gareth Prosser for additional information on Jean de Lorraine.

<sup>5</sup> R.-L. Moulhierac-Lamoureux, *Le roi René, ou les hasards du destin, (1409-1480)*, Avignon, 1980, p 125. The last Angevin duc de Lorraine, Nicholas, grandson of René I, died on 27 July 1473.

<sup>6</sup> The dispute and its resolution can be followed in La Roque, *Histoire généalogique de la maison d'Harcourt*, I, pp 473-9.

<sup>7</sup> G. Martin, *Histoire et généalogie de la maison d'Harcourt*, St. Etienne, 1971, pp 90-1.

<sup>8</sup> Anselme, VIII, pp 450-1, V, p 138.

century and beyond. This relationship was strengthened further when René II sent three of his sons to the court of Louis XII in 1501. The Valois were particularly committed to this alliance as their conflict with the Habsburgs intensified. René's fourth surviving son, François, was sent to claim his father's lands in Provence, dying in French service at the siege of Pavia in 1524.<sup>9</sup> The third son Jean (1498-1550) was the founder of the Guise ecclesiastical dynasty, becoming archbishop of Reims and cardinal de Lorraine. The eldest brother, Antoine, became duc de Lorraine. However, it is the second son of René and Philippe de Geuldres, Claude I de Lorraine (1496-1550), who received the majority of the family's landed interest in France.

Claude I was raised at the French court, naturalised French in 1506 and inherited his father's French lands, scattered all over northern and eastern France in 1508.<sup>10</sup> He established his seat at Joinville in easy reach of both Nancy, ancestral seat of the House of Lorraine, and Paris. Claude's status grew steadily during the reign of François I since the Lorraine alliance was highly valued. Although Claude was not one of the king's intimates he was a favourite of the queen mother, Louise de Savoie and, following the disastrous defeat at Pavia, in which François was captured, he became a leading member of the regency council headed by his patron. He was well rewarded for his services, receiving the office of *grand veneur* and obtaining the elevation of the comté of Guise to a duché-pairie in 1527. The major offices Claude received reflected his ancestral links with the East and the desire of the Valois that the House of Lorraine should protect the sensitive eastern frontier. Thus he was governor of Champagne from 1524 until 1543 and subsequently of Burgundy from 1543 until his death in 1550.<sup>11</sup> Claude had already significantly augmented his own status by marrying in 1513 Antoinette de Bourbon (1494-1583). She was the eldest daughter of François de Bourbon, comte de Vendôme and de Saint Pol and Marie de Luxembourg, and the sister of Charles de Bourbon, duc de Vendôme (1489-1537).<sup>12</sup> By 1540 this cadet branch of the House of Lorraine had reached something of a peak, in terms of credit at court. Claude had, only two years previously, married his eldest daughter Marie to James V of Scotland. As Claude aged and his military capacities declined so his influence at court waned. Moreover, in the twilight years of his reign François I turned to new set of advisers, consequently Claude's sons moved closer to the Dauphin.<sup>13</sup>

The early 1540s is therefore a convenient time, with the Guise at a peak, to examine the family landholding interest in Normandy, reflecting its position in the first half of the sixteenth century before the great accumulation of influence on the accession of Henri II. We are able to

---

<sup>9</sup> Chenaye-Desbois, XII, p 395.

<sup>10</sup> Bouillé, I, p 46; Constant, *Les Guises*, p 21.

<sup>11</sup> Harding, *Anatomy of a Power Elite*, pp 221-2.

<sup>12</sup> Anselme, I, p 328. Charles duc de Vendôme was the father of Antoine de Navarre, Charles cardinal de Bourbon and Louis prince de Condé.

<sup>13</sup> Constant, *Les Guises*, p 22.



follow the pattern of Guise landholding through the extant accounts of 1542, which recorded all landed and extraordinary income for the year.<sup>14</sup>

<u>Seigneurie</u>	<u>Amount</u>		
	<i>livres</i>	<i>sous</i>	<i>deniers</i>
comté of Aumale	7,883	2	4
barony of Elbeuf	4,286	12	8
seigneurie of Quatremares	806	15	
seigneurie of Routout	771	15	
seigneurie of Groslay	455		
seigneurie of Beaumesnil	1,875	17	11
total	16,079	1	11

**Table 2.1 Income from the Guise lands in Normandy, 1542**

The overall income of the Guise in 1542, including extraordinary revenue like pensions, was 64,923/0s 8d.<sup>15</sup> This figure compares very favourably with the level of noble income in the sixteenth century. The average income of the major princely houses in the period 1589-1624 has been calculated at 73,000/.<sup>16</sup> If one accounts for sixty years of inflation, it is plain to see that Claude I, duc de Guise, possessed, not only the lineage, but the income to maintain himself in the highest caste of French society. Moreover, nearly 24 per cent of his income came from his lands in Normandy, representing 40 per cent of landed income - the comté of Aumale being the single most important title in terms of revenue.<sup>17</sup> Thus Normandy constituted an important part of Claude's total income, although his preoccupations and certainly his historical roots were in eastern France. He resided at Joinville and his governorships were in two eastern border provinces. Furthermore, in the same account of 1542 not a single Norman noble was in the household of the of the duke,

---

<sup>14</sup> BN, Ms Fr, 8182, fos 323-7; Bouillé, I, pp 536-45.

<sup>15</sup> BN, Ms Fr, 8182, fo 345.

<sup>16</sup> Neuschel, *Word of Honor*, p 139. Guise income compared favourably with Bourbon landed wealth in Picardy, see D. Potter, "The Luxembourg Inheritance: The House of Bourbon and its Lands in Northern France during the Sixteenth Century", *French History*, 1992.

<sup>17</sup> One must use this account with some caution. For example, the landed receipts do not tally to the figure shown in the document and some lands, notably those in Provence, do not figure in the account at all. Secondly, the total income includes 8,456/ for the upkeep and pension of the duc de Longueville, grandson and ward of the duc de Guise. A break down of the landed income by province as a percentage of total income would look like this, the figure in brackets represents the value in terms of landed income only: Picardy 4% (7%), Normandy 24% (40%), Champagne 13% (21%), duchy of Bar 12% (20%), the Maine 14% (23%).

nor pensioned by him.<sup>18</sup>

The paucity of evidence prevents a full exploration of the activities of the duc de Guise in Normandy during the early sixteenth century. Guise clients in Normandy were more likely to be involved in the management of estates and the protection of their patrimony in the law courts than to be prominent *moyenne noblesse* in the military retinues of the family. Claude Le Roux, sieur de Tilly, *conseiller* in the parlement from 1521 until his death in 1536, besides being a magistrate for the Guise in the comté of Aumale, handled their affairs in the parlement.<sup>19</sup> The best recommendation for employment always came from a trusted kinsman, and the Le Roux had a history of serving the House of Lorraine. Claude Le Roux's father, Guillaume, had been *vicomte* of Elbeuf, *procureur* of René II de Lorraine and *conseiller* in the *échiquier* of Rouen in 1499. His grandfather was titled *intendant* and *secrétaire* of Marie d'Harcourt and *vicomte* of Elbeuf, and he received a gift of 200 *écus* on her death.<sup>20</sup> René II inherited these Norman counsellors. Thus Guillaume de Franqueville, who was the beneficiary of 50 *écus* on the death of Marie d'Harcourt, was later a signatory of the accord of 1496, which ended the conflict over the Harcourt inheritance.<sup>21</sup> René himself had little time for Norman affairs and therefore delegated responsibility to Jean d'Orglandes (d.1515), *chambellan* and governor of his lands in Normandy.<sup>22</sup>

Continuity of service from father to son was maintained from the fifteenth to the sixteenth centuries, reinforcing loyalty and trust. The Le Roux, having served Marie d'Harcourt, provide the first of many examples of the Guise inheriting servants and clients from families with whom they were linked by marriage. The Le Roux proved faithful servants and were well patronised by the Guise. Guillaume Le Roux (d.1532), elder brother of Claude, was made abbot of Aumale in 1517. Another brother Nicholas (d.1561), also a *conseiller* in the parlement, was abbot in 1548.<sup>23</sup> The type of relationship that existed between this family and the Guise, is revealed by a letter from Claude Le Roux to Antoinette de Bourbon in 1524 in which he pleaded for a benefice in Aumale:

in favour of Master Martin Bretel, a lawyer in the parlement, who has employed himself and continues to employ himself in watching over your affairs in this province. For a long time he was a servant of the late lord Bourgetheroulde [Guillaume Le Roux], under whose direction he worked hard and diligently pursuing

---

<sup>18</sup> BN, Ms Fr 8182, fo 353.

<sup>19</sup> Dewald, *The Formation of a Provincial Nobility*, p 91. For the letters of Claude Le Roux to the Guise, see BN, Ms Fr, 20649, fos 166-9.

<sup>20</sup> Frondeville, *Présidents*, p 294; La Roque, *Histoire généalogique de la maison d'Harcourt*, I, p 458.

<sup>21</sup> La Roque, *Histoire généalogique de la maison d'Harcourt*, I, pp 459, 479.

<sup>22</sup> La Roque, *Histoire généalogique de la maison d'Harcourt*, I, p 479; Chenaye-Desbois, XV, p 206.

<sup>23</sup> E. Semichon, *Histoire de la ville d'Aumale*, 2 vols, Paris, 1862, vol II, p 53-4.

your lawsuits.<sup>24</sup>

The Le Roux were a conduit for Guise patronage in Normandy, and the means by which their influence was extended, aided by the Le Roux's local knowledge and contacts. After all, the Le Roux were perhaps the most important *noblesse de robe* family in late fifteenth and early sixteenth century Rouen.<sup>25</sup>

Control of ecclesiastical patronage was at the heart of Guise power throughout the sixteenth century. They enjoyed, like many lords, the right of appointment to church posts within their seigneuries. It was under Jean cardinal de Lorraine that the foundations of a formidable ecclesiastical empire were laid, which flourished under his nephew Charles de Lorraine (1525-75), second son of Claude duc de Guise. In 1550 Jean was in possession of six abbeys and six dioceses.<sup>26</sup> The most prestigious benefice in France was the archbishopric of Reims, which conferred the title *premier pair de France* and which Jean ascended to in 1533.<sup>27</sup> The Guise enjoyed the fruits of the two richest abbeys in Normandy. Jean was made abbot of Fécamp in 1523 and on his death it passed into the possession of his nephew, Charles. Louis (d.1578), the fourth son of Claude and Antoinette de Bourbon, was cardinal de Guise and abbot of Bec in Normandy from 1558 until 1572.<sup>28</sup> It was during the reign of Henri II that the empire was extended and consolidated. After his accession, Charles de Lorraine was raised to the cardinalate, became an important member of the *conseil du roi* and was made chancellor of the order of Saint-Michel. Charles's status on the highest royal council, the *conseil des affaires*, was second only to that of Anne de Montmorency.<sup>29</sup> In 1559 the abbey of Bec was valued at 19,500/ of revenue per annum.<sup>30</sup> There are no figures available for Fécamp, situated on the Channel coast between Le Havre and Dieppe, but it was one of the richest foundations in France. In the late seventeenth century it was estimated to be worth nearly double the annual revenue of Bec.<sup>31</sup> Therefore it would be no exaggeration to claim that the annual revenue of these two benefices combined touched on 50,000/ - a vast sum of money, almost equalling the entire income of the duc de Guise in 1542. Thus Bouillé was not exaggerating when he stated that the Guise, in the mid-sixteenth

---

<sup>24</sup> Quoted in Dewald, *The Formation of a Provincial Nobility*, p 89.

<sup>25</sup> Their wealth is attested to by the building of the renaissance hôtel de Bourgetheroulde.

<sup>26</sup> J. Bergin, "The Decline and Fall of the House of the Guise as an Ecclesiastical Dynasty", *Historical Journal*, 1982, pp 782-3.

<sup>27</sup> Anselme, II, p 70.

<sup>28</sup> A. A. Porée, *Histoire de l'abbaye de Bec*, 2 vols, Evreux, 1901, vol II, p 338.

<sup>29</sup> F. Baumgartner, *Henry II, King of France 1547-1559*, Durham and London, 1988, pp 50-2.

<sup>30</sup> Porée, *Histoire de l'abbaye de Bec*, II, pp 345, 354. This rose to 22,000/ in 1568 and 24,000/ in 1576.

<sup>31</sup> G. Hurpin (ed), *L'Intendance de Rouen en 1698*, Paris, 1984, p 45.

century, were worth collectively 600,000<sup>l</sup>, Charles cardinal de Lorraine accounting for half this figure.<sup>32</sup> Whatever the exact figures, the importance of ecclesiastical wealth to the fortunes of the Guise cannot be underestimated.

Within Normandy the administering of the estates of Bec and Fécamp and the patronage they afforded, provided the Guise with the opportunity to extend their influence. The continuing Guise domination of ecclesiastical patronage, established during the reign of Henri II, was maintained by resigning benefices to other family members or to faithful clients. Thus there was a continuity which enabled the same patronage structure and clientèle to remain. In 1572 Louis, cardinal de Guise, resigned Bec in favour of his nephew, Claude de Lorraine (1562-91), chevalier d'Aumale, the second son of Claude (1526-73), duc d'Aumale.<sup>33</sup> The chevalier d'Aumale was also abbot of Aumale and on the death of his uncle in 1578, received several other lucrative abbeys.<sup>34</sup> Fécamp also remained firmly in the grip of the Guise throughout the sixteenth century. It was resigned by the cardinal de Lorraine on his death to his nephew Louis II, cardinal de Guise. Guise monopoly of these lucrative abbeys only ended with the murder of Louis II at Blois by Henri III and the death of the chevalier d'Aumale at the battle of Senlis in 1591.<sup>35</sup> The patronage available to the abbot of Fécamp alone was formidable. The abbey possessed the right to appoint to the captaincy of the town and its jurisdiction extended over 12 priories and 29 churches of the diocese of Rouen, in addition it was patron of 43 churches in the diocese. The temporal of the abbey consisted of nine baronies, all with high justice appealing directly to the parlement of Rouen. Until the mid-seventeenth century most monks came from aristocratic families, thus "les familles nobles du Pays de Caux, empêchées de partager leur bien par coutume de Caux, trouveés là leurs cadets un "débouché" commode".<sup>36</sup>

As de facto heads of the French church the Guise became magnets, attracting offers of service from all over France and beyond. Before establishing a core of servants in Normandy, they were able to forge close links with the existing Norman ecclesiastical hierarchy. For example, the Le Veneur were an established ecclesiastical family well before the Guise reached their ascendant position in the church. Gabriel Le Veneur (1517-74), bishop of Evreux, had a close relationship with Charles, cardinal de Lorraine. Gabriel's great uncle, Jean IV Le Veneur (d.1543), became a cardinal in 1533, having been bishop of Lisieux and abbot of Bec and Mont Saint-Michel. Another uncle, Ambrose Le Veneur, bishop of Evreux from 1511 until 1531, was the last bishop to be

---

<sup>32</sup> Bouillé, I, p 223.

<sup>33</sup> Porée, *Histoire de l'abbaye de Bec*, I, p 354.

<sup>34</sup> See chapter six below.

<sup>35</sup> Bergin, "The Decline and Fall of the House of Guise as an Ecclesiastical Dynasty", pp 786-9.

<sup>36</sup> G. Lemarchand, "Le temporel et les revenus de l'abbaye de Fécamp pendant le XVII<sup>e</sup> et le XVIII<sup>e</sup> siècle", *Annales de Normandie*, 1965, p 525; A. Hellot, *Fécamp au temps de la Ligue: la légende de Boisrozé*, Yvetot, 1897, p 5.

elected by the chapter.<sup>37</sup> As these elections decreased and church appointments became the preserve of the elite, so local candidates depended increasingly on the favour of the mighty for advancement. This process was most evident during the reign of Henri II, when the king used episcopal appointments to reward his allies in Italy, undoubtedly with the approval of the Guise.<sup>38</sup> By 1560 Gabriel Le Veneur was closely associated with the cardinal de Lorraine, becoming, on the resignation of the cardinal, chancellor of the order of Saint-Michel.<sup>39</sup> It may have been through the good offices of the Guise that Gabriel received the abbey of Jumièges near Rouen in 1549, since the man who resigned was the cardinal of Ferrara, brother-in-law of François de Lorraine, duc de Guise.<sup>40</sup> At the funeral of Henri II Gabriel assisted the cardinal de Lorraine in the capacity of *sous diacre* and in 1562 he accompanied the cardinal to the council of Trent. At his death in 1574 he was the most important churchman in Normandy; bishop of Evreux and abbot of Jumièges, Nôtre-Dame de Lyre, Saint-Evroult and Saint-Taurin.<sup>41</sup> The fact that Gabriel's elder brother was reportedly "fort aimé du duc de Guise" was also a reason for the continued prosperity of the Le Veneur.<sup>42</sup>

Despite the prominence of the Le Veneur, the archbishop of Rouen was the most important prelate in Normandy. The see was held continuously from 1550 by Charles cardinal de Bourbon, until his death in 1590.<sup>43</sup> Charles de Bourbon-Vendôme was a prince of the blood, the younger brother of Antoine, king of Navarre, and some years older than Louis, prince de Condé. The alliance that was forged between the Guise and the cardinal de Bourbon was the product of years of cooperation and friendship, which later became the pivotal axis of the ultra-catholic faction. The role played by the cardinal in this faction cannot be overstated, chiefly because of his status as a prince of the blood. He was later hailed by the Catholic League as Charles X, king of France. In addition to being archbishop of Rouen, the cardinal possessed a number of other benefices in Normandy - he was abbot both of Jumièges (on the death of Le Veneur) and Saint-Ouen de Rouen. Thus the choicest abbeys in Normandy were reserved exclusively for himself and the Guise. Through this alliance the Guise extended their contacts with Normans and augmented their

---

<sup>37</sup> G. Bonenfant, *Histoire générale du diocèse d'Evreux*, 2 vols, Paris, 1933, vol I, p 131; D. B. F., II, p 1358.

<sup>38</sup> F. Baumgartner, "Henry II's Italian Bishops: A study of the use and abuse of the Concordat of Bologna", *Sixteenth Century Journal*, 1980, pp 49-58. In 1557, 25 per cent of bishops were Italian, many of whom were Florentines close to the queen. The Guise had their own Italian ambitions, having inherited the Angevin claim to the kingdom of Naples

<sup>39</sup> BM, Collection Leber, 5176, fo 4.

<sup>40</sup> L. Jouen, *Jumièges*, Rouen, 1925, pp 62-3.

<sup>41</sup> Bonenfant, *Histoire général du diocèse d'Evreux*, I p 133.

<sup>42</sup> BN, Dossiers Bleus, 661, fo 1.

<sup>43</sup> E. Saulnier, *Le rôle politique du Cardinal de Bourbon (Charles X.) 1523-1590*, Paris, 1912, p 9.

influence in the province. The cardinal de Bourbon had amicable relations with the cardinal de Lorraine. In their youth they had attended the Collège de Navarre together and it was through the good offices of Lorraine that Bourbon received his cardinal's hat. Bourbon always remained on good terms with the Guise and, unlike his brothers, never wavered in his faith. As the Wars of Religion dragged on, he moved further into open alliances with the Guise and by 1574 had severed contacts with his nephews Condé and Navarre.<sup>44</sup>

### The Brezé and Rieux Inheritances

Following the precedent of the Le Roux family, it is clear that the Guise drew on a pool of proven servants who in some cases had been in the service of the House of Lorraine since the fifteenth century. These fifteenth century foundations were built upon and strengthened in the mid-sixteenth century. Members of the Guise family married into substantial families, whose landholding base and power was firmly Norman in character. These marriages greatly enlarged Guise possessions in Normandy and subsequently their credit. None of this would have happened without the accession of Henri II in 1547. Their credit with the new king created the conditions in which the sons of Claude duc de Guise would prosper.

When Henri came to the throne there was a palace revolution. His father's most trusted councillors, the cardinal de Tournon and the admiral, Claude d'Annebaut (d.1552), were banished. One royal mistress, the duchesse d'Etampes, was replaced by another, Diane de Poitiers, duchesse de Valentinois. Henri recalled Anne de Montmorency, the *connétable* and put him *in charge of royal finances*.<sup>45</sup> As an individual, Montmorency had no equal as a confidant and intimate of the king. The Guise were also well rewarded. François de Lorraine, the eldest son of the duc de Guise, was admitted to the *conseil des affaires*, along with his younger brother Charles and made governor of Dauphiné. Before his father's death in 1550 François was known as the comte d'Aumale and this was raised to a duché-pairie soon after the new monarch's accession.<sup>46</sup> The collective influence of the brothers far surpassed that of their father who rarely appeared at court any more. Yet they never reached the same level of trust or intimacy that marked Montmorency's relationship with Henri. The duchesse de Valentinois also understood this special relationship and moved towards the Guise in order to bolster her own position with the king. By patronising the Guise she hoped to balance her lover's dependence on Montmorency.<sup>47</sup>

The relationship with Diane was to lead to a fundamental shift in the Guise position in Normandy. The duchess was the widow of Louis de Brezé (1473-1531), *grand sénéchal* and

---

<sup>44</sup> Ibid, p 86.

<sup>45</sup> Baumgartner, *Henry II*, pp 43-8.

<sup>46</sup> François became duc de Guise on the death of his father in 1550. The third son Claude II, formerly marquis de Mayenne, received the duchy of Aumale.

<sup>47</sup> Constant, *Les Guises*, p 23.

governor of Normandy from 1526 until 1531.<sup>48</sup> Since the 1450s the Brezé had been dominant figures in Norman society. During his lifetime Louis was the most important Norman nobleman reflected by his large affinity and landholding interest, which Diane preserved on his death.<sup>49</sup> Their marriage produced two daughters, Françoise and Louise. In 1539 the elder, Françoise, married Robert IV de La Marck, duc de Bouillon (d.1556).<sup>50</sup> The La Marck were, like the Guise, protégés of the duchess during the reign of Henri II. Included in the dowry was the barony of Bec-Crespin and the comté of Maulevrier in the pays de Caux.

In the same year that Henri II succeeded to the throne, Diane cemented her alliance with the Guise by marrying her other daughter, Louise, to Claude II de Lorraine, marquis de Mayenne and later duc d'Aumale, third son of Claude duc de Guise. D'Aumale's rapid rise from the third son of a princely house, to the establishment of his own branch of the House of Lorraine and elevated status at court, was largely due to the patronage of his mother-in-law. The dowry included the wealthy barony of Mauny, bordering the Seine just downstream from Rouen.<sup>51</sup> In June 1561, after the duchess retired from court, the remainder of the Brezé inheritance was partitioned amongst the daughters. This was achieved definitively after her death in 1566.<sup>52</sup> Louise and Claude received the largest share in the partition. This included the major prize of Anet with its magnificent renaissance château, the normal residence of the duchess. Anet was adjoined by the baronies of Ivry, Garennes, Breval and Montchauvet, which lie on the river Eure, separating Normandy from the Ile-de-France. Anet was to become the usual residence for the duc d'Aumale. When sold in the early seventeenth century these lands fetched the considerable <sup>sum</sup> of 500,000<sup>l</sup>, equal to an annual value of 20,000<sup>l</sup> which was nearly a third of the yearly income of a prince in the period 1589-1624.<sup>53</sup> In 1562 Claude II further extended his territories in Normandy when he purchased Bec Crespin from his nephew, Henri-Robert de La Marck, duc de Bouillon, son of Robert and Françoise de Brezé.<sup>54</sup> In 1564 Claude bought two small fiefs in the *bailliage* of Rouen for

---

<sup>48</sup> Harding, *Anatomy of a Power Elite*, p 225.

<sup>49</sup> D.B.F., VII, pp 258-9.

<sup>50</sup> J. de Chestret de Hanneffe, *Histoire de la maison de La Marck y compris les Clèves de la seconde race*, Liège, 1898, pp 175-6.

<sup>51</sup> BN, Na Fr, 21165, fo 70. Homage of Alain Bellebarbe to "haut puissant prince Claude duc d'Aumale, baron de Mauny à cause de sa femme Louise de Brezé", 1553.

<sup>52</sup> F.-J. Maudit, *Histoire d'Ivry-la-Bataille et de l'abbaye de Nôtre Dame d'Ivry*, Evreux, 1899, p 230.

<sup>53</sup> Maudit, *Histoire d'Ivry-la-Bataille*, pp 282-3; Neuschel, *Word of Honor*, p 139. D'Aumale also received the comté of Saint-Vallier in Dauphiné.

<sup>54</sup> A. Lechevalier, *Notice historique sur les barons et la baronnie du Bec*, Paris, 1898, p 12. D'Aumale also purchased the comté of Maulevrier from him in the 1550s, although the title was used by both families, see ADSM, J, 138, Documents concernant le comté de Maulevrier, 1468-1779.

23,000/.<sup>55</sup> Having inherited the duchy of Aumale on the death of his father in 1550 and acquired or purchased most of the Brezé inheritance, Claude was by 1566 one of the largest landowners in Normandy. Despite the extensive campaigning against the Habsburgs in the 1550s Claude spent a lot of time in his adopted province - the first member of the House of Lorraine to do so since Jean de Lorraine one hundred years previously. Claude's residence was at Mauny, transferring to Anet on the death of Diane de Poitiers.<sup>56</sup> Furthermore, from 1557 until 1559 Claude was *bailli* of Caen, again one hundred years since his predecessor had held office in Normandy. This office was sold for 21,780/, either to pay off debts incurred in the wars of the 1550s or to fund his purchase of Bec Crespin.<sup>57</sup>

Before the Wars of Religion d'Aumale made little effort to build up his power base in Normandy. His Norman residences were merely subsidiaries of the Guise family seat at Joinville. It was at Joinville that d'Aumale's children were raised by their grandmother, Antoinette de Bourbon, in the company of their cousins and Louise de Brezé herself rarely left Joinville.<sup>58</sup> D'Aumale was a great courtly figure who had little time to spare for affairs in Normandy. Indeed, as governor of Burgundy from 1550 until 1573, his preoccupations lay elsewhere, but even these affairs were largely looked after by his lieutenant-general, Tavannes.<sup>59</sup> In the 1550s d'Aumale was preoccupied by wars abroad and it was only in the 1560s that he began to make a conscious effort to expand his Norman affinity, when the problems of political instability and factionalism required magnates to strengthen their provincial power bases.<sup>60</sup> Nonetheless, the Brezé inheritance brought with it legal and financial officials to administer the lands and counsel the Guise; the family now became the focus for former servants of the Brezé. Pierre Rémon, who came from a Parisian background, was *premier président* of the parlement of Rouen from 1543 to 1553. He received many favours and offices from the duchesse de Valentinois.<sup>61</sup> At the accession of Henri II he was

---

<sup>55</sup> ADSM, Tabellionage, 2E1, 329, 19 February 1564.

<sup>56</sup> See for example BN, Ms Fr, 3121, fo 42, duc d'Aumale to duc de Nemours, Mauny, 25 March 1555; 4638, fo 42, d'Aumale to Saulx-Tavannes, Mauny, 26 November 1558; 4640 fo 39, Claude to Saulx-Tavannes, Mauny, 4 January 1559.

<sup>57</sup> ADSM, Tabellionage, 2E1, 323, 28 July 1561.

<sup>58</sup> G. de Pimodan, *La mère des Guises: Antoinette de Bourbon 1494-1583*, Paris, 1889, pp 159, 182, 373.

<sup>59</sup> H. Drouot, *Mayenne et la Bourgogne: Etude sur la Ligue, 1587-1596*, 2 vols, Paris, 1937, vol I, p 76. Gaspard de Saulx-Tavannes, *Mémoires*, Michaud and Poujoulat, 1st ser., VIII, p 205, states that "le gouvernement avoit esté donnée par la faveur de madame de Valentinois à M. d'Aumalle".

<sup>60</sup> See chapters three and five below.

<sup>61</sup> For help given by the duchess in seeking offices, see BN, Ms Fr, 20541, fo 70, Rémon to Guise, Paris, 24 February, 1551.



introduced to the *conseil privé*, almost certainly at the instigation of the duchess.<sup>62</sup> Rémon soon became closely involved with her protégés, assisting the Guise in the parlement of Rouen when the judges blocked alienations of royal domain to the Guise. Rémon's son joined the household of the duc de Bouillon as *gentilhomme ordinaire*.<sup>63</sup> Another parlementaire who found service with the Guise was *conseiller* Robert Raoullin (d.1565), who had been the *procureur* of Diane de Poitiers in 1546.<sup>64</sup> Thereafter he moved into the service of the duc d'Aumale and was among the more extreme catholics in the parlement.<sup>65</sup>

The Brevedent were another *noblesse de robe* family associated with the Brezé. According to one seventeenth-century commentator "this family grew wealthy from the protection of Diane de Poitiers, duchesse de Valentinois, and in their house...the arms of the Brezé are to be seen in several places."<sup>66</sup> Jacques de Brevedent (d.1580) was *conseiller* at the parlement (1537-60) and lieutenant-general of the *bailliage* of Rouen (1547-67). He was in the confidence of the Guise and was known and trusted by the duc d'Aumale for whom Brevedent helped to raise money in the 1550s.<sup>67</sup> Even after the death of Diane de Poitiers the links with the Brezé remained strong. Louis de Brézé was the nephew of Diane de Poitiers. Through the patronage of his aunt he became bishop of Meaux in 1553 and *grand aumônier* of France in 1556. Although stripped of the latter post by the Guise themselves in 1559 to appease the enemies of Diane de Poitiers (notably Catherine de Médicis), Louis later found high office as chancellor of the Catholic League in 1589.<sup>68</sup>

The d'Annebaut were another family which had originally been in the Brezé affinity. Claude d'Annebaut had been lieutenant of the *ordonnance* company of Louis de Brezé and had taken over the company on Brezé's death in 1531.<sup>69</sup> D'Annebaut's rise thereafter was meteoric, at the expense of the Montmorency. Although he was banished from the court at the accession of Henri II in 1547, he was not completely disgraced. He was made governor of Normandy, probably at the instance of Diane de Poitiers because, as an enemy of the Montmorency and a former servant of her family, he was a useful ally. D'Annebaut therefore returned to the position of a protégé of the Brezé and was part of a faction which included the Guise. His son, Jean, fought under the Guise

---

<sup>62</sup> Baumgartner, *Henry II*, p 46.

<sup>63</sup> Frondeville, *Présidents*, p 48; see also chapter three below.

<sup>64</sup> BN, Na Fr, 21165, fo 74.

<sup>65</sup> *Histoire ecclésiastique des églises réformées au royaume de France*, G. Baum and E. Caunitz (eds), 3 vols, Nieuwkoop, 1974, vol I, pp 858, 861.

<sup>66</sup> Quoted in Dewald, *The Formation of a Provincial Nobility*, p 88.

<sup>67</sup> They were also part of the ultra-catholic faction in the city, see chapter four below.

<sup>68</sup> D.B.F., VII, p 263; Anselme, VIII, p 269.

<sup>69</sup> Vindry, p 23.

in Italy in the 1550s and with the duc d'Aumale in 1562.<sup>70</sup> Families who had been in the Brezé-d'Annebaut affinity, for example the Clères, the Vieuxpont and the Le Veneur, became integral parts of the Guise affinity in Normandy.<sup>71</sup> The Le Veneur, for example, owed their importance as an ecclesiastical family to the d'Annebaut. Gabriel Le Veneur received the bishopric of Evreux on the resignation of Jacques, cardinal d'Annebaut. In turn Jacques owed his benefices (which besides the bishopric of Evreux included the abbey of Bec) to the resignation of his uncle Jacques IV Le Veneur, who died in 1543. As the fortunes of the d'Annebaut waned so the Le Veneur attached themselves to their natural successors, the Guise.

The growing Guise presence in Normandy during the reign of Henri II is no less striking when one considers the sixth son of Claude I de Guise, René de Lorraine, marquis d'Elbeuf (1536-66). When Claude I died in 1550 his Norman possessions were divided up between two of his sons. Claude II took the title and duchy of Aumale whilst René received the barony of d'Elbeuf and the seigneuries of Groslay, Criquebeuf, Quatremares and Beaumesnil.<sup>72</sup> In effect the partition of 1550 had created two exclusively Norman lords - the remainder of the Guise lands in the Maine, Picardy, Champagne and Provence went to the eldest son François.<sup>73</sup> Returning to the account of 1542 it is possible to see that, in terms of revenue, Claude and René divided up these Norman possessions equally.

René, like his elder brothers, was also able to contract a valuable marriage in 1550 to the much pursued heiress, Louise de Rieux (1531-66).<sup>74</sup> The dowry consisted of the large barony of Ancenis situated on the Loire in Brittany. In 1548 the last surviving male heir of the Rieux died and in 1557 there was a general partition of the Rieux lands.<sup>75</sup> The largest share of the inheritance, including the comté of Harcourt went to Renée de Rieux (1524-67), a Calvinist. When she died in 1567 the lands had to be partitioned between the heirs of her two surviving sisters; on the one hand Charles de Lorraine (1556-1605), marquis d'Elbeuf, son of René and Louise de Rieux, and on the other hand Paul de Coligny (d.1586), son of Claude de Rieux and François de Coligny (d.1569). As both these heirs were minors the lands were administered by their guardians until they

---

<sup>70</sup> D. B. F., pp 1356-9.

<sup>71</sup> These families will be dealt with in detail in succeeding chapters.

<sup>72</sup> Bouillé, I, p 219.

<sup>73</sup> One exception was the seigneurie of Boves near Amiens which went to Claude duc d'Aumale.

<sup>74</sup> The actual marriage took place in 1554, see E. Maillard, *Histoire d'Ancenis et de ses barons*, Nantes, 1881, p 81.

<sup>75</sup> Anselme, VI, pp 768-9. In 1540 the vicomté of Lillebonne, (often referred to as a comté) was detached from the comté of Harcourt for the dowry of Suzanne de Bourbon, mother of Louise de Rieux. On the death of Suzanne in 1570 Lillebonne passed to d'Elbeuf directly. The inheritance of Harcourt therefore primarily concerned the comté of Harcourt itself and the comté of Brionne, see ADSM, E, 3, 1 October 1540.

reached their majority and a partition arranged.<sup>76</sup> Suzanne de Bourbon and the cardinal de Lorraine acted for the young marquis and admiral Coligny was guardian of his nephew Paul.<sup>77</sup> Therefore political considerations impinged on this legal problem since the Huguenots were in danger of having their property seized during the religious wars, as happened to François de Coligny in 1567. But despite their political and religious differences it seems that the Guise and the Coligny were able to administer the lands jointly and effectively until the amicable partition of 1584. In this accord d'Elbeuf received the comtés of Brionne and Lillebonne, and Coligny the comté of Harcourt itself.<sup>78</sup> As in 1496 the title was to remain indivisible but Coligny was unable to enjoy his possessions, dying in 1586. D'Elbeuf was made *tuteur* of his son Guy de Coligny in 1588 and when he died in 1605 the entire Rieux inheritance passed definitively to the d'Elbeuf.<sup>79</sup>

In 1549, at the youthful age of thirteen, René, marquis d'Elbeuf, was soon involved in his affairs in Normandy: writing from Rouen to his older brother François he hoped to "mis ordre aux affaires que jay en ceste ville et incontinent seray prest de faire ce quil vous pleust me commander".<sup>80</sup> Notwithstanding this precociousness, it was his mother, Antoinette, who was made his guardian in 1550 and who administered his estates.<sup>81</sup> It was she who oversaw the elevation of d'Elbeuf from a barony to a marquisate in 1555. The parlement of Paris put up many objections to this and the whole process took at least five years.<sup>82</sup> Although Antoinette supervised the general affairs of René, she entrusted much of the upbringing of her son to a small number of long standing and trusted Guise *domestiques*. René's first tutor, appointed in 1550, was Etienne de Morainville, the former *maître d'hôtel* of his father.<sup>83</sup> The next tutor was Charles des Boves, sieur de Contenant, a young Champenois nobleman with a considerable landholding interest in the Vexin

---

<sup>76</sup> Coligny and d'Elbeuf collected their revenues and protected their rights together "chacun en leur partie comtes d'Harcourt", see ADC, E, 239, 5 March 1577 and 5 June 1582.

<sup>77</sup> For the letters establishing the *tutelle* of the marquis d'Elbeuf in 1567, see BN, Clair, 1204, fo 96. Suzanne de Bourbon may have been sympathetic to Calvinism, when Lillebonne was her dower a Calvinist chapel was allowed to flourish, see Bost, *Les seigneurs de Lillebonne*, p 111.

<sup>78</sup> ADSM, E1, 482, 1584.

<sup>79</sup> B. de Broussillon, *La maison de Laval, 1020-1605. Etude historique accompagnée du cartulaire de Laval et de Vitry*, 5 vols, Paris, 1895-1903, vol IV, pp 229-324.

<sup>80</sup> BN, Ms Fr, 20532, fo 11, d'Elbeuf to Guise, 11 May 1549. Note that in these letters 'Guise' always refers to François de Guise in order to avoid confusion. He was entitled duc d'Aumale until the death of his father in 1550.

<sup>81</sup> BN, Ms Fr, 20649, fo 144, Antoinette to Hauteville, her *trésorier-général*, Joinville, 15 June 1552.

<sup>82</sup> BN, Ms Fr, 20468, fo 83, Antoinette to d'Elbeuf, Joinville, 2 March 1551; P. Maille, *Recherches sur Elbeuf: Esquisses ou silhouettes de ses seigneurs de la maison de Lorraine*, 3 vols, Elbeuf, 1859-63, vol II, p 71.

<sup>83</sup> ADSM, Tabellionage, 2E1 304, 9 October 1550.

Français and belonging to a family with a history of loyal service to the Guise. According to one contemporary he governed his charge, "très bien et sagement".<sup>84</sup> He and other members of his family remained central figures in the d'Elbeuf household throughout the sixteenth century. Charles des Boves was, not only the commander of the legion of Champagne, but ensign in d'Elbeuf's company of the *ordonnance* (1555-60) and its lieutenant (1560-78). Other members of the family were also prominent servants. Charles des Boves, sieur de Rance, was ensign (1564-70) and Henri des Boves was *guidon* of the duc d'Elbeuf in 1588.<sup>85</sup> In 1542 and again between 1552 and 1562 François des Boves was *maître d'hôtel* and *conseiller* of the duc de Guise.<sup>86</sup> It was Charles des Boves under instruction from Antoinette, who saw to the details of René's marriage and to the erection of Elbeuf into a marquisate - several of his reports from Rouen to Joinville are extant.<sup>87</sup> The services of the des Boves were retained over the generations and thus continuity was established which engendered reciprocal loyalty. René was raised in an atmosphere that could only serve to reinforce kinship solidarity. Although he was almost exclusively a Norman lord, the major positions in his household and company of the *ordonnance* were filled by nobles from the traditional areas of Guise support in eastern France. This centred him firmly within a long standing geographical and historical context based in eastern France and partly explains the renowned family solidarity that the Guise achieved throughout the sixteenth century. René's lingering attachment to this region of France, despite his landed interest in Normandy, allowed patronage to be dispensed <sup>to</sup> regions traditionally associated with the loyalty to the Guise. Antoinette therefore used the offices at the disposal of her children specifically to reward clients and servants from the traditional areas of Guise power - there was no attempt to augment the affinity in Normandy.<sup>88</sup>

#### The Relationship between the Guise and other Norman Magnates.

It was not simply through individual members of their own family that the Guise became steadily more influential in Norman society. It was also facilitated by the strong associations that the Guise developed with the elite of Norman landholders. Such links furthered influence within the province in much the same way that the Brezé inheritance made the duc d'Aumale one of the most powerful men in the province. These links, brought about through marriage and *amitié*, had the effect of inducing Norman nobles to help in the international political strategy of the Guise. The strategic

---

<sup>84</sup> Brantôme, IV, p 280.

<sup>85</sup> Vindry, pp 294, 304; ADSM, Tabellionage, 2<sup>ème</sup> Héritage, 2E1, 2007, 27 August 1588.

<sup>86</sup> BN, Ms Fr, 8182, fo 353; BN, Ms Fr, 22429, fos 130, 136, 143, 150, 155, 161. Antoine de Boves was also in the household in 1542.

<sup>87</sup> BN, Ms Fr, 20532, fo 11, des Boves to Antoinette, 21 May 1549; 20517, fo 79, des Boves to Guise, 5 January 1554; Pimodan, *La mère des Guises*, p 385.

<sup>88</sup> For further discussion of René's affinity and particularly his company of the *ordonnance*, see chapter three below.

importance of Normandy, adjacent to the British Isles, figured ever larger in the dynastic and diplomatic plans of the Guise.

Undoubtedly the largest landholders in upper Normandy at the accession of Henri II were the d'Orléans-Longueville who were to figure so prominently in the province in the seventeenth century. In the pays de Caux alone they possessed the duchy of Longueville and the comté of Tancarville. They were descendants of Jean, bâtard d'Orléans, and were consequently cadets of the Valois, inhabiting a constitutionally grey area and were only recognised as princes of the blood in the seventeenth century.<sup>89</sup> Their lands were situated principally in the Loire valley, the ancestral home being at Châteaudun. They were also large landowners in the Beauce, where they possessed the comté of Dunois, and Picardy. In 1534 Marie de Lorraine, the eldest daughter of Claude I de Guise, married Louis II d'Orléans, duc de Longueville and comte de Dunois.<sup>90</sup> As with Claude's own marriage, the Guise aimed to marry into princely houses associated with the royal family. This was a means of assimilation, legitimising their own claims to be true born French princes and not foreigners. In 1536 Louis died, leaving Marie de Lorraine a widow with an infant son, François. Marie and her father managed to obtain "le bail garde noble gouvernement et administration" of the young duke.<sup>91</sup> Control of the young duke's vast landed wealth yielded substantial opportunities for patronage and financial rewards; both Marie and Claude took a keen interest in the accounts and administration of the duke's household.<sup>92</sup> Jacques Girard, *trésorier et receveur des finances* for the duc de Longueville, received a payment of 1,200/ by order of Marie de Guise in 1549.<sup>93</sup> In 1554 Marie was receiving 13,000/ per annum from her dowry alone.<sup>94</sup>

The ramifications of this inter-family relationship became apparent after Marie's second marriage in 1538 to James V, king of Scotland. In 1542 the unfortunate Marie was again widowed. James left a daughter, Mary Stuart, and a legacy that began fifty years of Guise involvement in Scottish and English politics. Marie de Guise remained queen of Scotland, acting as regent from 1554 until her death in 1560.<sup>95</sup> In the person of Marie de Guise the fortunes of the Houses of Stuart, Guise and d'Orléans-Longueville became interwoven. The household and followers of the Longueville now owed at least a nominal loyalty to the Guise, and the Guise reciprocally had to

---

<sup>89</sup> AN, M, 458, Longueville, fo 2; La Roque, *Histoire généalogique de la maison d'Harcourt*, I, p 763.

<sup>90</sup> Anselme, I, p 218.

<sup>91</sup> BN, PO, 2165, fo 1020.

<sup>92</sup> AN, Q<sup>1</sup>, 1374. The account of 1541 for the barony of Manéhouville was scrutinised by Guise himself. In their own accounts the Guise included money for the upkeep duc de Longueville.

<sup>93</sup> ADSM, C, 8182, Compte du duché de Longueville, 1549-50.

<sup>94</sup> M. Wood (ed), "Foreign Correspondence with Marie de Lorraine, Queen of Scotland, 1548-57", Scottish Historical Society, 3rd Ser., vol VII, Edinburgh, 1925, pp xviii, 1.

<sup>95</sup> G. Donaldson, *Scotland: James V-VII*, Edinburgh, 1978, pp 70, 80-131.

defend the interests of their kinsmen. The control of the Longueville household allowed the Guise to extend their own clientèle into the Loire valley, far from their traditional power base. Moreover, the regency in Scotland allowed for considerable patronage with which the Guise could reward men from their own retinue and that of the Longueville. As with the Brezé inheritance before, the Guise increased their following and credit through their ties with another established family.

We can follow this complex tripartite relationship through the career of one man in particular. Jacques de La Brosse (d.1562) was a middling provincial noble from Touraine, later made infamous by his role in the massacre of Vassy in 1562 and whom<sup>a</sup> contemporary called, "une des créatures le plus dévouées de la maison de Guise".<sup>96</sup> Jacques filled the highest positions in the household of the young duc de Longueville. He was tutor of the duke from 1547 until 1551 and lieutenant of his company of the *ordonnance*.<sup>97</sup> At the beginning of his career he was not a Guise client but appointed by Marie de Guise because his family were trusted and loyal servants of the Longueville. He was entrusted with the mission to bring back Mary Stuart from Scotland in 1548.<sup>98</sup> The blossoming career of La Brosse was cut short by the death of François duc de Longueville in 1551, shattering the dominant relationship established by the Guise over the Longueville. There was now no male heir and the inheritance passed to a cadet line of the d'Orléans family, which involved tortuous lawsuits between several families, including the Guise. This suit was partially settled in 1553, in favour of the new duc de Longueville, Léonor d'Orléans (1540-73) and his mother, Jacqueline de Rohan, marquise de Rothelin.<sup>99</sup> Although Guise control of this family was brought to an end, Léonor remained close to the Guise, their amity being a major restraint on Huguenot influence<sup>in</sup> Normandy and at court.<sup>100</sup> When the previous duc de Longueville died in 1551 his household was broken up and La Brosse was forced to look around for alternative forms of service. He was important enough to be offered the royal post of *maître des requêtes* but rejected this, hoping to be offered something by the Guise as he informed the dowager queen:

Madame, apres avoir seu la plus maleureuse nouvelle qui me povet avenir, qui est la mort de feu Monseigneur votre filz, pour lequel j'avois abandonne toustes auctres esperances, me suis en chemin pout m'an aler ver Messieurs voz freres entendre se que dois devenir.<sup>101</sup>

---

<sup>96</sup> De Thou, III, p 454.

<sup>97</sup> Vindry, p 98.

<sup>98</sup> A. Teulet, *Relations politiques de la France et de l'Espagne avec l'Ecosse au XVI<sup>e</sup> siècle*, 5 vols, Paris, 1862, vol I, p 159 n 1. See also G. Dickinson (ed), "Two missions of Jacques de la Brosse", *Scottish Historical Society*, 3rd Ser., vol XXXVI, Edinburgh, 1942.

<sup>99</sup> La Roque, *Histoire généalogique de la maison d'Harcourt*, I, p 735.

<sup>100</sup> See chapter four below.

<sup>101</sup> *Foreign Correspondence with Marie de Lorraine*, pp 100-101.

La Brosse solicited her intervention with irony:

si vous plest vous escripres effeccionement a Monsieur et Madame et Messieurs  
voz freres car ilon assez de moien, et tout homme qui a la barbe grise ne puit  
longuement actendre.<sup>102</sup>

La Brosse eventually received a position in the household of the duc de Guise, becoming one of its most important members. He was a *conseiller gentilhomme* and *maître d'hôtel* from 1552 until 1557 and thereafter lieutenant of the duke's *ordonnance* company (1556-8).<sup>103</sup> In 1558, the year of Mary Stuart's marriage to the Dauphin, he was appointed governor to the heir to the throne and was lieutenant of his *ordonnance* company in 1559. After the Dauphin was crowned François II, La Brosse received his own company employing François de Lorraine, *grand prieur*, fifth son of Claude I de Guise, as his lieutenant.<sup>104</sup> Throughout he remained closely involved with affairs in Scotland and was one of the councillors of the dowager queen sent to Scotland in 1559, to shore up the tottering regime.<sup>105</sup> The Guise attracted clients from the Beauce region, where the d'Orléans-Longueville were large landholders. Other officers of François, duc de Longueville, besides La Brosse went into Guise service. The *maître de logis* of the company was Jean de Brezolles (d.1562), who, after the death of the young duke, moved in 1556 to occupy the same position in the company of the duc d'Aumale.<sup>106</sup>

Of crucial importance to the Guise interest in Scotland was the need for good sea communications, especially for the rapid transportation of troops and provisions. Thus the position of François de Lorraine, *grand prieur*, as *capitaine-général des galères* had added significance; the post was no sinecure. François, with his younger brother René as lieutenant, was heavily involved in the seaborne support of Guise inspired operations in Italy. As early as 1554, the two young men commanded an expedition to Corsica.<sup>107</sup> In 1560 reinforcements were sent to bolster the regime of the queen dowager in Scotland, the land forces were commanded by René and the fleet by François.<sup>108</sup> They were reinforcing an expedition similarly full of Guise clients, La Brosse had

---

<sup>102</sup> Ibid, pp 290-1.

<sup>103</sup> BN, Ms Fr, 22429, fols 130, 136-7.

<sup>104</sup> Vindry, p 98.

<sup>105</sup> BN, Clair, 353, fo 156; Dickinson (ed), "Missions of Jacques de la Brosse", p 52.

<sup>106</sup> Vindry, p 284.

<sup>107</sup> BN, Ms Fr, 20467, d'Elbeuf to Guise, Toulon, 30 January 1554. His maritime exploits provide the theme for the poetry of Remy Belleau, in *Larmes sur le trespas de Monseigneur René de Lorraine, et de Madame Louyse de Rieux Marquis & Marquise d'Elbeuf. Ensemble le tombeau de Monseigneur François de Lorraine Duc de Guyse*, n.p., 1566.

<sup>108</sup> See chapter four below.

previously been sent with his son Gaston and was appointed governor of Leith.<sup>109</sup> There were plenty of captaincies available for the ambitious. Corbeyran de Cardillac, sieur de Sarlabous, a respected Gascon captain, first served in Scotland in 1549. In the early 1550s he was captain of Dumbarton, returning to France to fight under the duc de Guise at the siege of Thionville in 1558. He fought again in Scotland in 1560 as captain of Dunbar and *maître de camp* of the French forces and was later governor of Le Havre from 1563 until his death in 1584.<sup>110</sup>

Normandy and its seafaring community were crucial to Guise ambitions in Scotland. To maintain a viable presence there the transport of men and materials had to be undertaken by those with local expertise and credit. Thus the Guise began to employ Normans to aid them in their enterprises, extending to these servants the honour and patronage associated with such schemes. During the first Scottish expedition of 1548-9, Charles de Moy (d.1567), sieur de La Meilleraye, governor of Le Havre (1528-60) and vice-admiral of France (1532-60), was responsible for the organisation of the fleet sent to support Marie de Guise against the English.<sup>111</sup> The post of admiral was a collection of rights and jurisdictions; an administrative and judicial post rather than a military command.<sup>112</sup> It was the local vice-admirals and captains of ports who organised and sailed with the fleet; in 1544 Charles de Moy sported the title *chef de l'armée de mer* in the projected invasion of England.<sup>113</sup>

During the Scottish expedition Moy was responsible for hiring vessels, sending out commissions and supervising the logistics.<sup>114</sup> Throughout the preparations and voyage Moy kept in close contact with François de Guise. There was no communication with the disgraced admiral d'Annebaut. In March 1548 Moy wrote from Le Havre informing Guise of the readiness of the fleet for the voyage to Scotland.<sup>115</sup> In July he wrote again, informing the duke of the imminent departure of the fleet from Brest to Scotland, with the commander of the land forces, Pierro Strozzi. Two weeks out of port and with 400 leagues still left to go, Moy reported that some of the cardinal's ships had been in difficulty.<sup>116</sup> This suggests that the Guise put a great deal of their own money

---

<sup>109</sup> Dickinson (ed), "Two Missions of Jacques de la Brosse", p 52.

<sup>110</sup> E. Forestié, *Un capitaine gascon au XVI<sup>e</sup>: Corbeyran de Cardillac-Sarlabous*, Paris, 1897, pp 26-72.

<sup>111</sup> R. Rodière and E. Vallée, *La maison de Moy*, Le Mans, 1928, pp 75-6; BN, PO, 2078, fos 30-48.

<sup>112</sup> L. de Voisin, sieur de La Popelinière, *L'Amiral de France*, Paris, 1584.

<sup>113</sup> Rodière and Vallée, *La maison de Moy*, p 75.

<sup>114</sup> See for example, BN, Ms Fr, 3118, fo 15, "Estat des vivres qui ont esté fait chargé par Monseigneur de La Meilleraye dans les gallaires et navires pour porter en mer, tant pour la nourriture des soldars en mer que pour descendre en terre", 21 July 1549.

<sup>115</sup> BN, Clair, 341, fo 209, Moy to Guise, Le Havre, 24 March 1548.

<sup>116</sup> BN, Ms Fr, 20549, fo 141, Moy to Guise, Leith, 11 July 1548.



behind this expedition, making it vital to employ trustworthy clients. Whilst Scotland remained unstable, there was a serious revolt against the *gabelle* in Gascony. Having returned from Scotland, Moy was sent to help with the suppression of the revolt by blockading Bordeaux in September 1548. Once more it was to Guise, who along with Montmorency was directing operations, that his correspondence was directed.<sup>117</sup> While preparing ships at Brest, Moy relayed letters to the duke that he had received from the queen dowager and the French ambassador in Scotland. At the same time he implored Guise to pay mutinous troops who were awaiting embarkation.<sup>118</sup> Thus in affairs that concerned Scotland all enquiries, dispatches and demands for favours were channelled through Guise. The links forged at the beginning of the reign of Henri II were apparent nearly ten years later, for in March 1557 it was to François de Guise again that Charles de Moy solicited favour:

Jay par cy devant une assignation pour une armee de mer estatz a prendre sur le louvre laquelle na eu lieu a raison de lordonnance qui depuys a este rompue et daultant M. que cest tout le moyen que je puys...faire service au Roy et a vous. Que vous plaise commander que lad. assignation soit changee et mise sur la Recepte generale de Rouen. Ainsi quil ma este accoustume de faire paiable en tel temps quil vous plaira ordonner et encores que je ne laye sur ce premier quartier. Je ne laisseray pour cela dessayer den tirer quelque chose daucuns des mes amis pour subvenir a mesd. enfans lesquelz je desire pour jamais veoir employez en lieu ou ils vous puissent faire treshumble et tresagreable sevice.<sup>119</sup>

The Moy family was another which entered Guise service through a mutual association with the Longueville family. In June 1549 François duc de Longueville rewarded Moy's help in the Scottish expedition, as another member of the Moy family testifies in a letter to Guise:

ayant enendu par la Meilleraye que Monseigneur de longueville luy avoit faict cest honneur le retour de sa bande....il [Moy] sen va le trouver avec tout son equipage en esperance de luy faire service et a vous.<sup>120</sup>

The fortunes of the Guise were inexorably tied to the axis of the Longueville family and Scotland. The Guise relationship with the Moy reflects their growing fortunes during the reign of Henri II. The

---

<sup>117</sup> BN, Clair, 342, fo 43, Moy to Guise, Torigny, 24 September 1548.

<sup>118</sup> BN, Clair, 344, fo 226, Moy to Guise, Brest, 16 September, 1548.

<sup>119</sup> BN, Ms Clair, 348, fo 92, Moy to Guise, 27 March 1557.

<sup>120</sup> BN, Ms Fr, 20534, fo 43, unknown to Guise, 4 June 1549. The sender here is either Nicholas, baron de Moy (1506-49) the elder brother of Charles, or Nicholas's son, Anthoine (d.1555).

Moy possessed many lands in Picardy and they seem to have been originally clients of the Bourbon-Vendôme. Charles de Moy had been a man-at-arms in the company of François de Bourbon (1491-1545), comte de Saint-Pol and duc d'Estouteville (situated in upper Normandy), brother of Antoinette de Bourbon.<sup>121</sup> Nicholas de Moy (1506-49), elder brother of Charles, was a vassal of the comte de Saint-Pol and lieutenant of the *ordonnance* company of Charles de Bourbon, duc de Vendôme. In the marriage contract of Anthoine de Moy, son of Nicholas, to Charlotte de Chabannes in 1539, one of the signatories was Marie de Luxembourg, widow of François de Bourbon, comte de Vendôme and mother of Antoinette de Bourbon.<sup>122</sup> Allegiances fluctuated and the ascendancy of the Guise under Henri II - their international concerns and dominance of ecclesiastical patronage - made them more attractive patrons than the Bourbon-Vendôme.

The d'Este were another family which encompassed both the provincial and international aspects of dynastic alliances. In 1549 François de Lorraine, at that time the duc d'Aumale, married Anne d'Este, daughter of Ercole d'Este, duke of Ferrara and Renée de France, daughter of Louis XII. In November 1528 the royal *vicomtés* of Caen, Bayeux and Falaise were leased out to Alfonso d'Este and his son Ercole, duc de Chartres and comte de Gisors, for the duration of their lifetimes. The privileges of the incumbents included the right to farm out the revenues, collect all royal dues and nominate to all offices, except those of the *bailli* and captain of Caen and the governor of Falaise.<sup>123</sup> Although this was only a temporary grant it was continued by order of Henri III in 1577.<sup>124</sup> Ercole d'Este was already comte de Gisors in Normandy - part of the dowry given to Renée by François I at the time of their marriage in 1531.<sup>125</sup> Anne d'Este received the comté of Gisors in turn, as part of her own dowry, retaining it when she remarried to Jacques de Savoie, duc de Nemours, in 1566 and was still comtesse on her death in 1607.<sup>126</sup> The influence of the d'Este, so far away in northern Italy, could be felt only indirectly in Normandy, since the duke of Ferrara had little concern for affairs in provincial France. Their affairs in Normandy and the administration of their possessions were left to local officials and more important tasks such as the nomination of offices were entrusted to a council headed by the d'Este ambassador at court and the Guise.

There exists evidence to illuminate the workings of the council. The *procureur-général* of

---

<sup>121</sup> Rodière and Vallée, *La maison de Moy*, p 75. François was, along with Chabot and d'Annebaut, part of the anti-Montmorency faction, see Brantôme, III, p 205. It was therefore quite natural that on his death a client like Moy would find service with the Guise who, after 1547, were also ranged against the Montmorency.

<sup>122</sup> Rodière and Vallée, *La maison de Moy*, pp 49-58.

<sup>123</sup> BN, V<sup>C</sup> Col, 53, fo 121.

<sup>124</sup> ADSM, 1B, Registres Secrets, 92, 8 February 1577.

<sup>125</sup> *Journal d'un bourgeois de Paris*, L. Lalanne (ed), Paris, 1854, p 362.

<sup>126</sup> AN, 300 AP 1, 552.

the duke of Ferrara in his Norman *vicomtés* was an Italian named Giulio Ravilio Rosso.<sup>127</sup> He was a reviled figure who, during the first religious war, levied contributions on the locally strong and influential Huguenot community. The *lettres patentes* enabling him to raise these special taxes were obtained "à la recommandation du duc de Guise".<sup>128</sup> Rosso had committed a variety of sins in the eyes of the local population; he was not only a foreigner and a tax collector but also a servant of the Guise and their allies. Rosso was finally besieged by a Huguenot force in the château of Bayeux in February 1563, after capture he was taken to Caen and executed along with his men. Other officials of the d'Este also met a bloody end, including the hated *contrôleur du domain*, Thomas Noël, a repentant Calvinist.<sup>129</sup> Pierre Rémon, the *premier président* of the parlement of Rouen, solicited the duc de Guise about one of the viscomital offices in 1551:

Je vous ai supply me vouloir estre aydant a recouvrir loffice de lieutenant du bailly de Caen en son siege de Falaise par le moyen de lambassadeur duc de Ferrara pour ung des mes proches alliez.<sup>130</sup>

In effect, Guise acted as a broker of the patronage in the *vicomtés* - a vital link between those in Normandy and the d'Este.<sup>131</sup> Rémon had already written to the d'Este ambassador at court to little effect. The office was venal and Rémon wished it to remain in his family. The dispute centred around how much relief tax should be paid to the d'Este on the death of the incumbent. Rémon protested that the office was in the king's gift and that the 400 *écus* demanded as payment was excessive. In the end however he appealed to Guise's honour:

le feu pere du gendre de ma femme avoit tendu led. office et que les parens dud. deffunct desiroient lung des siens ou filz du gendre en ceste succession Jay mis en arrive mond. don pour lhonneur de vous et de vostres.<sup>132</sup>

He invoked the name of the duchesse de Valentinois to ensure an emotional response:

---

<sup>127</sup> Charles de Bourgeville, sieur de Bras, *Les Recherches et Antiquitez de Neustrie à présent duché de Normandie*, Caen, 1588, p 184.

<sup>128</sup> De Thou, IV, p 245.

<sup>129</sup> *Histoire ecclésiastique*, II, p 416.

<sup>130</sup> BN, Ms Fr, 20541, fo 70, Rémon to Guise, Paris, 24 February 1551. See also BN, Ms Fr, 20533, fo 17, Rémon to Guise, 11 October 1550.

<sup>131</sup> Guise showed an interest in appointments to offices in the comté of Gisors handled by the council of the duchess of Ferrara, see BN, Ms Fr, 20533, fo 83, Fumée to Guise, Paris, 6 January 1549.

<sup>132</sup> BN, Ms Fr, 20541, fo 70, Rémon to Guise, Paris, 24 February 1551.

Je vous supplie treshumblement non par la valloir dud. office mais pour lesd. causes me permectre avec vostre bonne grace poursuyvre la provision du don quil a pleu feu dud. Roy me faire a la requeste de madame de Valentinois.<sup>133</sup>

Rémon owed much to the duchess and through her he began to establish links with the Guise. This example further reveals the way in which provincial affairs were interwoven with wider supranational dynastic relationships.

The three *vicomtés* assigned to the d'Este were strongholds of Calvinism. In the *élection* of Bayeux 40 per cent of the nobility turned to the reformed faith at the height of its popularity in the early 1560s.<sup>134</sup> The absence of the d'Este from Normandy and lack of seigneurial authority created a vacuum of authority in which protestant vassals and tenants worshipped unmolested. Moreover, the identification of the d'Este with the unpopular regime of the Guise during the reign of François II (1559-60) and the presence of foreign officials like Rosso represented a source of discontent on which protestantism could thrive. Conversely it is clear that kinship relations, landholding and service were crucial factors in the transmission of the new faith.<sup>135</sup> The court of the d'Este at Ferrara was one of the most brilliant in Italy and they were among the early princely protectors of Lutheranism outside Germany. Renée de France (1510-75), the wife of Ercole d'Este, attracted reform-minded Frenchmen to her court and one of them, Marot, became her secretary. This tolerant policy ended in 1554 - Renée was even imprisoned by her husband for her faith during the subsequent backlash. In 1559 she returned to France on the death of her husband and continued to work for the reformed faith until her own death.<sup>136</sup> Thus the spread of protestantism in the three *vicomtés* was aided by the weakness of seigneurial authority and the knowledge that, until 1554, the d'Este were favourable to reform. As religious conflict intensified in the early 1560s protestants accused rapacious and hated seigneurial officials of being agents of the Guise. Anne d'Este was herself a product of the pre-1554 tolerant atmosphere. In the early years of the protestant upsurge and religious conflict she had no enmity towards the Huguenots and was horrified by the massacre of Vassy.<sup>137</sup> The d'Este did patronise Norman nobles. When the *ordonnance* company of admiral d'Annebaut was broken up on his death in 1552 many of the officers found service with the d'Este. François de Plainville, the former *guidon* of d'Annebaut, and Gabriel de Longuemare, the former *maître de logis*, found service in the company of the duke of

---

<sup>133</sup> Ibid.

<sup>134</sup> Wood, *The Nobility of the Election of Bayeux*, p 161.

<sup>135</sup> Neuschel, *Word of Honor*, p 32.

<sup>136</sup> *Biographie universelle ancienne et moderne*, Paris, 1843-, vol XXXV, pp 426-7.

<sup>137</sup> De Thou, IV, pp 167-8. An attitude which faded after the assassination of her husband in 1563.

Ferrara.<sup>138</sup>

The La Marck, princes of the Holy Roman Empire whose lands straddled the border with France, were also a part of the configuration of Diane de Poitiers designed to counter Montmorency's overwhelming influence on Henri II.<sup>139</sup> Like the Guise they were *princes étrangers* and fitted into the same model as the Houses of Lorraine and d'Este, being all anti-Habsburg allies of the Valois. In 1539 Robert IV de La Marck, duc de Bouillon, married Françoise de Brezé, and through the intervention of Diane de Poitiers was given the office of *maréchal* in 1547 and made governor of Normandy in 1552. Awarding this governorship to Bouillon was certainly a shift in royal policy since the *gouvernement* of the province had traditionally been reserved for a member of the royal family or a Norman.<sup>140</sup> A royal favourite, whose only link to Normandy was through his wife, thus became governor. On his death in 1556 he was followed by his son, Henri-Robert (1540-74). Neither was to have much influence in the province, a factor compounded by the sale of much of their share of the Brezé inheritance to the duc d'Aumale.<sup>141</sup> These sales were forced upon the family by misfortune. In 1553 Robert IV was captured by the Imperialists and ransomed for 60,000 *écus*.<sup>142</sup> The family was further damaged by the peace of Câteau-Cambrésis in 1559 when, as part of the treaty, Bouillon was divested of some of his lands and the promised compensation from the French king was never forthcoming.<sup>143</sup> It was to his uncle Claude, duc d'Aumale, that Henri-Robert sold the barony of Bec Crespin in 1562 to offset these debts.

By 1561 the family relationship has become complicated by Henri-Robert's conversion to Calvinism. During his lifetime Jametz and Sedan would become notorious safe havens for his co-religionaries.<sup>144</sup> His failure to receive compensation after Cateau-Cambrésis was symptomatic of his loss of favour at court after the disgrace of his patron, Diane, in 1559. In Normandy his credit was even lower, because he was an inexperienced youth forced to sell his lands and without influence at court. He visited the province only seldom: in 1558 he was sent to reorganise the defences of Dieppe, returning in 1561 and ordered to restrict the growth of heresy he seemed only

---

<sup>138</sup> Vindry, p 25.

<sup>139</sup> For this and following comments see, Hanneffe, *Histoire de la maison de La Marck*, Liège, 1898, pp 175-182.

<sup>140</sup> Harding, *Anatomy of a Power Elite*, pp 225. The preceding governors were Charles duc d'Alençon (1515-1525), Louis de Brezé (1526-31), François Dauphin (1531-6), Henri Dauphin (1536-47) and Claude d'Annebaut (1547-52).

<sup>141</sup> Benedict, *Rouen during the Wars of Religion*, p 33.

<sup>142</sup> BN, Dossiers Bleus, 426, fo 99.

<sup>143</sup> Hanneffe, *Histoire de la maison de La Marck*, p 178; BN, Ms Fr, 20646, fo 163, Jean de La Marck to Henri II, Jametz, 29 March 1559.

<sup>144</sup> C. Buvignier, *Jametz et ses seigneurs*, Verdun, 1861, p 26.

to tacitly endorse Calvinism.<sup>145</sup> Bouillon's power base remained in the Ardennes and he made little effort to build up a clientage network in Normandy. For example, not one of the officers in his company of the *ordonnance* was a Norman.<sup>146</sup> Despite the religious divide there was no animosity between the Guise and the La Marck families and this friendship and similarly the amity with the d'Orléans-Longueville, was to have adverse consequences for the consolidation of protestantism in Normandy.

The La Marck and d'Orléans-Longueville families were great magnate houses, tied by *amitié* and kinship to the Guise but never subservient. The Cossé-Brissac provide another example of the ability of the Guise to attach a great noble family to their own interest. This was not facilitated by marriage alliances, for the Brissac were not of princely status but nor were they ever lowly enough to be mere clients; instead it was a relationship based on mutual benefit. Charles I de Cossé (1506-63), comte de Brissac, was the son of Charlotte Gouffier who came from a family usually associated with the Montmorency, indeed Charles was raised in the Montmorency household.<sup>147</sup> By exploiting their links to the Montmorency the Brissac aimed to accumulate offices and raise their status. Charles I followed his father as *grand fauconnier* and *grand pannetier* of France.<sup>148</sup> The role of the duchesse de Valentinois was also crucial to his career; <sup>he</sup> became a *maréchal* at her recommendation in 1550.<sup>149</sup> The relationship with the Brezé went back even further, since the seigneurie of Brissac had been purchased from Louis de Brezé in 1502.<sup>150</sup> Brissac's landed interest was extended in 1542 when he married Charlotte d'Esquetot, a rich Norman heiress. This brought him the baronies of d'Estelan and Norville near the mouth of the Seine in the pays de Caux, making him a neighbour of the duc d'Aumale.<sup>151</sup> His brother, Artus (1512-82), received the captaincy of Harfleur in 1544 and more significantly was *bailli* of Caux (1540-1554).<sup>152</sup>

It was this service in Italy which was brought the Brissac closer to the Guise, although moves had already been made in this direction as Artus de Cossé had been lieutenant of the

---

<sup>145</sup> ACR, A, 17, 14 May 1558; Floquet, II, p 326.

<sup>146</sup> Vindry, p 318.

<sup>147</sup> Simon de Cossé, duc de Brissac, *Histoire des ducs de Brissac*, Paris, 1952, p 21.

<sup>148</sup> Anselme, VIII, pp 672-3, 756.

<sup>149</sup> Anselme, VII, p 205.

<sup>150</sup> Duc de Brissac, *Histoire des ducs de Brissac*, p 60.

<sup>151</sup> Ibid, p 69.

<sup>152</sup> ADSM, 6F, 11, Recueil des capitaines de Normandie; A. Hellot, *Essai sur les baillis de Caux de 1204 à 1789*, Paris, 1895. Artus was a moderate during the Wars of Religion and part of the *politique* faction.

company of François duc de Guise (1550-2).<sup>153</sup> As governor of Piedmont in the 1550's Charles de Cossé built a reputation as one of the most formidable captains of the day. From the point of view of the Guise, it was as important to have a trusted man in Piedmont as it was to have Norman nobles capable of preparing expeditions to Scotland to serve dynastic interests. Brissac served under the duc de Guise in the Italian campaign of 1556-7. The Guise needed to secure the trust and cooperation of Brissac to facilitate their own family strategy. In the same way as possessing the post of *capitaine-général des galères*, it was another piece of the jigsaw toward their own dynastic ambitions.<sup>154</sup> After the end of the Italian Wars in 1559 the relationship began to blossom, especially when the Guise recalled Brissac from Piedmont to bolster the regime of François II and he became a leading figure in the ultra-catholic faction until his death in 1563.<sup>155</sup> Prior to this, in 1558, Brissac had written to the cardinal de Lorraine requesting a see for his bastard son who eventually received the bishopric of Coutances.<sup>156</sup> The Brissac-Guise relationship endured until the end of the century, especially because Charles II de Cossé (1550-1621), son of Charles I and Charlotte d'Esquetot, maintained the friendship, being greatly "affected to the Duke of Guise".<sup>157</sup>

### The Wealth of the Norman Branches of the House of Guise

Having discussed the outline of Guise territorial ambitions in Normandy in the mid-sixteenth century, we can now compare the relative increase in income over our extant account of 1542. Unfortunately there exists no comparable document from a later period. Thus the data presented in appendices A and B should only be seen as an approximation to be used as a measure or yardstick against what is already know<sup>n</sup> about noble income in this period. The average income of a prince at the end of the sixteenth century was 70,000/ per annum, lesser court aristocrats such as ducs and comtes being worth half this figure and the elite of the provincial nobility averaged 10-15,000/ in mid-century.<sup>158</sup> The Roncherolles are a familiar example of the last category for during this period their income exceeded 10,000/ per year. Even by 1600 only a handful of the wealthiest parlementaires had achieved this high standard of living.<sup>159</sup> The jurisdiction of the duchy of

---

<sup>153</sup> Vindry, p 282.

<sup>154</sup> For Guise ambitions in Italy, see L. Romier, *Les origines politiques des guerres de religion*, 2 vols, Paris, 1913, especially, vol II, chap 1.

<sup>155</sup> For a fuller account of the activities of Brissac after 1559, see chapter four below.

<sup>156</sup> C. Marchand, *Charles I<sup>er</sup> de Cossé, comte de Brissac et maréchal de France 1507-1563: Etude sur la fin des guerres d'Italie et sur la première guerre de religion*, Paris, 1889, pp 434-9. Brissac was able to come to an arrangement with the incumbent - a relative of his wife.

<sup>157</sup> CSPF, 1579-80, p 150.

<sup>158</sup> Neuschel, *Word of Honor*, p 139.

<sup>159</sup> Dewald, *The Formation of a Provincial Nobility*, p 124.

Aumale extended over forty parishes but the appendices demonstrate the dominance of the estates grouped around Ivry and Anet and this became the seat of the ducs d'Aumale. The figures also underline the importance of marriage to a nobleman's status; the Brezé inheritance placed the duc d'Aumale in the wealthiest echelon of sixteenth-century French society. The fruits of royal office in terms of patronage, bribes and gifts cannot be adequately represented and the wages of offices were usually in arrears.

The fortune of the branch of d'Elbeuf follows a different pattern for, unlike the d'Aumale branch of the family, the son succeeded in surpassing the status of the father. René de Lorraine had an income far surpassing that of the leading provincial nobleman and his rank of marquis was easily supported by his income. However, the pension from the cardinal de Lorraine, amounting to 2,000/ per annum, was important to his income and he was heavily dependent on the influence of his brothers at the court. Like the rest of his brothers he greatly profited from marriage. Yet it was his son, Charles, who really reaped the benefits of the Rieux inheritance. The inheritance of the comtés of Harcourt and Lillebonne propelled the young marquis up the social ladder. His income matched that of his princely status and he made an excellent marriage in 1583 to an heiress, Marguerite de Chabot, the daughter of Léonor, comte de Charny, *sénéchal héréditaire* of Burgundy and *grand écuyer de France*.<sup>160</sup> Elbeuf was raised to a duchy in 1581, reflecting the rising status of this cadet of the House of Guise.

Both of these cadet branches belonged to a select group of aristocrats at the very top of French society and it is therefore fallacious to ignore them when discussing the Guise family. It is important to place their wealth in perspective and remember they were rivalled by the vast ecclesiastical fortune of the Guise in the province. Moreover, in 1570 Henri de Lorraine, the third duc de Guise, inherited the comté-pairie of Eu when he married Catherine de Clèves.<sup>161</sup> Eu was one of the oldest titles in Normandy and with a revenue of 28,000/ per annum in the later sixteenth century, its wealth was comparable to that of the abbey of Fécamp.<sup>162</sup> Unlike upper Norman duchies such as Longueville, Estouteville, Aumale and Elbeuf whose jurisdiction fell within the competence of the parlement of Rouen, the comté of Eu had the right of appeal directly to the parlement of Paris.<sup>163</sup> The jurisdiction of the comté covered a vast area between the pays <sup>de</sup> Caux and Picardy, consisting of 270 fiefs and *arrière fiefs*.<sup>164</sup> Thus by 1570 there was a vast increase in the Guise presence in Normandy. By then five members of the family had either a landed interest or ecclesiastical benefice in the province - they had become the largest landholders in upper

---

<sup>160</sup> BN, Cabinet d'Hozier, 216, fo 101.

<sup>161</sup> L. Estancelin, *Histoire des comtes d'Eu*, Paris and Dieppe, 1828, p 121.

<sup>162</sup> J. Boucher, *Société et mentalités autour de Henri III*, 3 vols, Lille, vol I, p 498.

<sup>163</sup> R. d'Estaintot, "Recherches sur les Hautes-Justices Féodales existant en 1789 dans les limites du département de la Seine-Inférieure", Academie des Sciences, Arts et Belles Lettres de Caen, 1892, pp 268-321.

<sup>164</sup> AN, KK, 1088, fo 36.



Normandy if not the whole province.

## Chapter Three

### Servants and Clients



This chapter attempts to outline the structure and composition of the Guise affinity in Normandy. The landed interest of the Guise in Normandy required many trained legal and administrative officials and their military retinues and status at the court made them a focus for the services of the *petite noblesse d'épée* and the Norman elites. The first section provides an example of the manner in which an affinity was built up and the benefits for the lord and his servants in this relationship.

### The Functioning of an Affinity: Administering the Royal Land Grant of 1548

The relationship between François duc de Guise and the parlement of Rouen in the late 1540s and 1550s provides an excellent example of how clients were employed and why factions formed within a particular institution. By the time the Wars of Religion began the duke had a small but politically important number of clients within the parlement.

In December 1548 François de Guise received letters patent from Henri II authorising the sale of royal domain in Normandy up to a value of 10,000*l* of *rente*. This grant was part of the conditions of the marriage contract drawn up between François de Guise (at this stage still duc d'Aumale) and Anne d'Este, drawn up in the same year. The alienation of royal domain was an element of the dowry provision to be paid by the French king to Guise as part repayment of 150,000*l* borrowed from Alfonso d'Este by François I in 1525.<sup>1</sup> This royal favour had followed the raising of the comté of Aumale into a duché-pairie in July 1547, not long after Henri's accession. The elevation of the comté did not occupy as much time and money as the pursuit of the royal grant. However, connected with the former is the beginning of a substantial corpus of manuscripts concerning Norman affairs, to be found amongst the Guise letters. Most notable is initial evidence of the existence of a council in Rouen conducting Guise affairs in Normandy. Witness the *bailli* of Aumale, Jean de Martimbosc, writing from Rouen concerning the jurisdiction of the *haute justice* of Aumale, "Nous en avons delibere avecq le conseil et advise aprez avoir parle a Monsieur le Premier President."<sup>2</sup>

This letter reveals the existence of a Guise council in Rouen and also confirms the close relationship that existed between the Guise and the *premier président*, Pierre Rémon.<sup>3</sup> In the years following this letter another senior magistrate, *président à mortier*, Louis Pétremol (d.1561), was to become closely involved in the affairs of the Guise. Pétremol, like Rémon, came to the attention of the Guise through their mutual links with the Brezé family, his father having been *receveur* of

---

<sup>1</sup> Bouillé, I, p 204; *Catalogue des actes de Henri II*, Paris, 1979-, vol II, p 457. The edict of alienation was registered in Paris on 4 March 1549 at "l'expres commandement du roi".

<sup>2</sup> BN, Ms Fr, 20548, fo 59, Martimbosc to Guise, Rouen, 23 March 1548. 'Guise' in these letters refers to François de Lorraine who did not take the title duc de Guise until his father's death in 1550 - I have reduced his name and title to Guise for the sake of clarity.

<sup>3</sup> See chapter two above.

the comté of Maulevrier in 1490.<sup>4</sup> It is no surprise to find Pétremol giving the oration at the entry of the cardinal de Lorraine into Rouen in September 1550. After the ceremonies and the official banquet he was reported to have consulted the cardinal on several matters.<sup>5</sup> He later formed part of the ultra-catholic faction in the parlement and his brother, Antoine (d.1556), being a *maître des comptes* in Paris, provided a convenient link with the Guise council in Paris.<sup>6</sup>

It would be misleading to regard the councils in Paris and Rouen as formal institutions with defined functions. Rather, they were *ad hoc* meetings and groupings of advisers and servants entrusted with the everyday affairs of the duke or specific tasks such as overseeing the erection of the comté of Aumale. These councils were primarily concerned with legal, administrative and fiscal affairs and therefore were comprised of men from the *noblesse de robe*. They should not be confused with the duke's council over which he personally presided.

The council based in Paris was more important than that in Rouen since it acted as a conduit or intermediary for correspondence and information emanating from Normandy. A crucial part of the Parisian council were Richet, Basdoulx and Brunet, secretaries of the duke. They handled the duke's correspondence and their role had great influence. Letters of 1549 and 1552 reveal some of the councillors in Paris; de Thou, Boucherat, Chartier, Baudry, du Chastellet, Marmagne and de Longeuil, many of whose letters to the duke still survive.<sup>7</sup> Christophe de Thou, father of the celebrated historian Jacques-Auguste, was the best known of these. He was *conseiller de ville* in Paris and from 1554 a *président* in the parlement of Paris and *procureur* of the Guise family in the same court.<sup>8</sup> However, the greatest bulk of correspondence from Paris to the duke, who was often away on campaign, in the early 1550s comes from Antoine Le Cirier (d.1575), dean

---

<sup>4</sup> Frondeville, *Présidents*, p 176.

<sup>5</sup> ADSM, 1B, Registres Secrets, 91, fo 49.

<sup>6</sup> *Histoire ecclésiastique*, I, p 859. Again, the crucial importance of the Brezé inheritance in the formation of the Guise affinity cannot be overstated. Another family associated with the Brezé, the Brededent, was also playing a role in the legal and administrative affairs of the Guise, see BN, Ms Fr, 20534, fo 45, Louis Pétremol to Guise, Rouen, 6 June 1549.

<sup>7</sup> The "gens de vostre conseil" are mentioned in BN, Ms Fr, 20543, fo 43, Richet to Guise, Paris, 24 September 1549; BN, Ms Fr, 20513, fo 134, Antoine Le Cirier to Guise, Paris, 20 November 1552. A messire Boucherat was *avocat* at the council of Mary Stuart in 1560, see L. Paris (ed), *Négociations, lettres et pièces diverses relatives au règne de François II*, Paris, 1841, p 747. Mathieu Chartier was a *conseiller* at the parlement of Paris in this period, see Frondeville, *Présidents*, p 31. Claude Baudry was a *président ès enquêtes* at the parlement, see ADSM, Tabellionage, 2E1, 304, 9 October 1550; Jean de Lallement-Marmagne was a *procureur* at the parlement of Paris and Jean de Longeuil a *président*.

<sup>8</sup> BN, PO, 1750, fos 207 and 209, 17 and 31 January 1578. In 1550 he and Baudry signed the papers creating a tutor for René de Lorraine, see ADSM, Tabellionage, 2E1, 304, 9 October 1550. See also R. Filhol, *Le premier président Christophe de Thou et la réformation des coutumes*, Paris 1937, pp 5-30.

of the cathedral of Nôtre-Dame de Paris and a *conseiller* at the parlement.<sup>9</sup> Judging by his letters he seems to have had a particular responsibility for affairs in Normandy. Le Cirier's entry into Guise service may have come through the d'Orléans-Longueville, since he had been a pensioner of the cardinal d'Orléans and the duc de Longueville. On their demise Le Cirier was compensated by receiving ecclesiastical benefices from the cardinal de Lorraine.<sup>10</sup>

The ample correspondence of Pétremol and Le Cirier provide excellent examples of clients at work. The burden of work was further increased in 1551 with the death of the young duc de Longueville and the complicated succession which ensued. Nevertheless, the major issue remained the sale of the royal domain, beginning in 1548 and ending in 1556, when the relevant correspondence comes to an abrupt halt.

As early as August 1548 Roland Trexot (d.1578) was commissioned, at the instance of the council in Rouen, to measure and record the lands and rights for sale in the *vicomté* of Bayeux, pertaining to the royal gift to Guise.<sup>11</sup> Trexot was a *conseiller-clerc* at the parlement of Rouen and his appointment was due to his local knowledge as he possessed lands near Bayeux. By November of the same year Louis Pétremol was receiving documents for the *procès-verbal*, concerning the sale of fiefs in the *bailliage* of Evreux.<sup>12</sup> It was also about this time, when the royal edict sanctioning the alienation of domain had to be sent for registration to the appropriate sovereign courts, that problems began to arise, forcing Guise to mobilise all his influence and resources in Rouen in order to achieve a satisfactory outcome. On 20 February 1549 Pétremol informed Guise that the *chambre des comptes* in Paris had refused to register the royal command "jusques a ce quelles soient veritees en ceste court de parlement a Rouen".<sup>13</sup> The objections of the parlement of Rouen were outlined in its "Remonstrance touchant le Domaine du Roy baillé a M. d'Aumale pour l'argent de son mariage."<sup>14</sup> The parlement put itself forward as the protector of the royal domain, which was inviolable since:

le Roy ne peut bailer les terres en son domaine appartenans à sa Dignité Royale, qui sont inalienables...ladite obligation [the debt towards the d'Este] est personnelle et n'a peu abstraire la Dignité Royale.<sup>15</sup>

---

<sup>9</sup> A. Le Canu, *Histoire du diocèse de Coutances et Avranches*, 2 vols, Coutances, 1877-8, vol I, p 439.

<sup>10</sup> BN, Ms Fr, 20470, fo 73, A. Le Cirier to Guise, Paris, 3 October 1551.

<sup>11</sup> BN, Ms Fr, 20542, fo 6, Trexot to Guise, Rouen, 26 August 1548.

<sup>12</sup> BN, Ms Fr 20553, fo 22, Pétremol to Guise, Rouen, 6 November 1548.

<sup>13</sup> BN, Ms Fr, 20538, fo 69, Pétremol to Guise, 20 February 1549.

<sup>14</sup> BN, V<sup>c</sup> Col, 54, fo 70, 8 February 1549.

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*

Another factor which troubled the parlementaires was the transfer of so many tenants from the king to the Guise and the consequent increased power of seigneurial over royal courts. In Paris opposition to the sale of land in the *prévôté* of Paris also needed to be overcome, and to achieve this secretary Richet, who undoubtedly had his own interests in mind, told the duke that "Il faudra faire quelque frais et despenses...je feray ceste advance et tout ce qui sera necessaire pour vostre dict service."<sup>16</sup> This suggests that the altruism and the principles of the parlementaires were not as uncompromising as their remonstrances to the king at first suggest.

The extent to which François de Guise became embroiled in the factional manoeuvring in Rouen is clear from his correspondence. Guise was able to build up support for the sale of the royal domain by outright bribery and by patronage involved in the lucrative contracts and commissions for the sale of the land. He was kept informed of developments but devolved details and appointments to men with local knowledge and contacts. Robert Vauquelin, for example, was made "procureur-general sur le faict des fiefs en Normandie".<sup>17</sup> Agents had to be appointed to every *bailliage* of the province. Vauquelin's kinsman, Antoine Caradas, bourgeois and *garde de la monnaie* of Rouen, was designated "procureur du roy pour le faict des fiefs au bailliage de Gisors".<sup>18</sup> In the same *bailliage*, Nicholas Caillot (d.1588), an *avocat* in the parlement and later a *conseiller*, was appointed as a commissioner. He must have been familiar to the Guise and trusted since he was involved in the financial affairs of Claude, duc d'Aumale.<sup>19</sup> Montague du Vivier supervised land sales in the Perche.<sup>20</sup> In Alençon the lieutenant-general of the duchy of Alençon was appointed and Trexot was already occupied in lower Normandy.<sup>21</sup>

These were lucrative offices and an important source of patronage. Caillot was advanced 200 *écus* on his appointment and Trexot received 6,000/ towards the costs of the *procès-verbaux* in his region.<sup>22</sup> The agents forecast that huge sums of money would accrue from the sales, exaggerations that were designed to maintain the duke's interest and entice him into spending more money with the sweet promise of fantastic returns. Caradas assured François in June 1555 that the land he was surveying in the *vicomté* of Rouen was worth 120,000/.<sup>23</sup> This crock of gold

---

<sup>16</sup> BN, Ms Fr, 20543, fo 43, Richet to Guise, Paris, 24 September 1549.

<sup>17</sup> BN, Clair, 347, fo 258, Vauquelin to Guise, Rouen, 2 July 1554.

<sup>18</sup> BN, Clair, 348, fo 136, Caradas to Guise, Rouen, 7 June 1555; Frondeville, *Conseillers*, p 551. Caradas was married in 1533 to Isabeau Vauquelin.

<sup>19</sup> BN, Clair 347, fo 264, Richet to Guise, Bellesaize?, 15 July 1554; Frondeville, *Conseillers*, p 509. On Caillot's position in helping d'Aumale to raise money see ADSM, Tabellionage, 2E1, 313, 7 September 1556; 2E1, 318, 25 November 1558; 2E1, 323, 12 August 1561.

<sup>20</sup> BN, Ms Fr, 20554, fo 132, du Vivier to Guise, 24 February 1556.

<sup>21</sup> BN, Clair, 347, fo 264, Richet to Guise, Bellesaize?, 15 July 1554.

<sup>22</sup> Ibid.

<sup>23</sup> BN, Clair, 348, fo 136, Caradas to Guise, Rouen, 7 June 1555.

obscured the problems posed by the many "opposantz" of the sales and the "subterfuges des contredisans" as Trexot called them.<sup>24</sup> Claims and counter-claims were made to pieces of land and to their rights and privileges, undoubtedly in the hope of being bought off by the duke and sharing in his bounty. Trexot found himself "bien empesche" by 120 *procès* he faced in lower Normandy.<sup>25</sup>

By this date the duc de Guise had been pursuing the affair for nearly seven years. The whole matter was starting to cause more trouble and expense than it was worth. As the year 1555 drew to a close the continuing problems were exacerbated by the Longueville inheritance which had dragged on for four years. In December of that year a worried secretary Richet wrote to the duke: "Monseigneur, jay entendu que luy vous a fere desgouter de ces deux affaires et questez sur le point de les quicter."<sup>26</sup>

Little is known about the nature of the lawsuits fought out in the courts of Normandy concerning the land sales. The level of chicanery, deals and bribery can only be imagined. In protecting the royal patrimony the petty royal officials in the localities may have been more immune to Guise influence than senior magistrates. After all they were, in a sense, protecting their own livelihood. Jean d'Erneville, *lieutenant des gardes de forêts* of Evreux, Conches and Breteuil, was one of many royal officials who brought cases against the sale. This lawsuit dragged on especially after the case was evoked to the *chambre des comptes* in Paris. Pétremol was left in a quandary about how to proceed.<sup>27</sup> Occasionally a letter hints at more sinister activities. Secretary Brunet was sent from Paris to the aid of Guise agents, including a Norman household officer of the duke, Nicholas d'Osmont, who was being held prisoner in the house of a *huissier* of the parlement of Rouen:

Jay veu le sieur d'osmont prisonnier en la maison d'un huissier. Quil pour le desire et affection quil a de vous faire treshumble service ma faict communiquer des faicts contenu en deux memoires...Et pour ce que ceulx qui les mont baillez craignent estre descouvertz de messieurs de la chambre des enquetes de Rouen...ils vous prient humblement...que lesdites memoires quilz mont baillez escripre de leur main ne viennent a la cognoissance de ceulz qui ont donne les arretz et jugements derniers.<sup>28</sup>

---

<sup>24</sup> BN, Fr, 20538, fo 43, Trexot to Guise, Caen, 10 February 1549.

<sup>25</sup> BN, Clair, 347, fo 258, Vauquelin to Guise, Rouen, 2 July 1554.

<sup>26</sup> BN, Ms Fr, 20554, fo 43, Richet to Guise, Rouen, 23 December 1555.

<sup>27</sup> BN, Ms Fr, 20519, fo 94, Petremol to Guise, Rouen, 18 February 1553.

<sup>28</sup> BN, Clair, 348, fo 141. Brunet to Guise, Paris, 9 June 1555. Nicholas d'Osmont was one of the *gentilhommes servans* in the household from 1552 until 1557, see BN, Ms Fr, 22429, fos 130, 136, 140. Pierre d'Osmont, listed in the *arrière-ban* of 1552, was also in the household of the duke, see E. Travers (ed), *Rôle du ban et de l'arrière-ban du bailliage de*

Nicholas d'Osmont had been an *écuyer* in the household of Jean cardinal de Lorraine in 1547.<sup>29</sup> He then joined the household of the duc de Guise, becoming one of the most important of the duke's representatives in Normandy and it was he who, in conjunction with Pétremol, had originally presented the letters patent to the parlement of Rouen in 1549.<sup>30</sup> He was released from captivity and lost no time in writing to illustrate to the duke the great expense that he had undertaken, telling the duke that recently:

il est vacque ung greffe des esleuz de bernay ou il ne y a que xxvi/ de gaiges. Je vous supplie treshumblement votre bonte me le faire donner du Roy pour rescompense despertes et despences que je ay toute ma vie faicte en son service.<sup>31</sup>

Guise had to employ a circle of expert counsellors and a large group of servants due to the complexities of the land sales and the multitude of lawsuits. Inevitably, he was the object of a host of requests for offices and favours. This was partly a reflection of Guise eminence at court after 1547. In addition, his need to employ agents directly in Normandy and the requirement to maintain a viable faction in the various law courts meant that he was especially vulnerable to appeals for favour. These solicitations came from those who were already in his service from those who sought to exchange their goodwill in return for concrete rewards. Louis Pétremol, Pierre Rémon and Antoine Le Cirier took every opportunity to lobby hard for favours. These three men were crucial to Guise fortunes in Normandy and the duke could ill afford to lose their good grace. In effect, they could use their position as leverage to extract rewards from their patron.

When *premier président* Rémon died in 1553 the king was eagerly solicited by courtiers over the successor. Guise found himself faced with two conflicting candidates from amongst his own close contacts. Antoine Pétremol wrote in support of his brother, Louis, asking Guise to intercede with the king.<sup>32</sup> Antoine Le Cirier advanced another candidate, an official at the court called Ranconnet.<sup>33</sup> In the event neither candidate was successful. The Guise themselves backed the candidature of Pétremol for which they were generously thanked with pledges of future loyalty and service. The Guise family did not present a united front on the issue; Antoinette de Bourbon and François de Guise backed Pétremol but the cardinal de Lorraine was committed to another

---

*Caen en 1552*, Rouen and Paris, 1901, p 110.

<sup>29</sup> T. Courtaux and marquis de Touchet, *Histoire générale de la maison de Touchet*, Paris, 1911, p 45.

<sup>30</sup> BN, Ms Fr, 20649, fo 147, d'Osmont to Guise, Rouen, 6 March 1549.

<sup>31</sup> BN, Ms Fr, 20529, fo 134, d'Osmont to Guise, 10 January 1558.

<sup>32</sup> BN, Ms Fr, 20544, fo 73, A. Pétremol to Guise, Paris, 1 June 1553.

<sup>33</sup> BN, Ms Fr, 20544, fo 75, Le Cirier to Guise, Paris, 1 June 1553.



candidate.<sup>34</sup> Antoine Le Cirier also desired an office in the parlement of Rouen. He put himself forward unsuccessfully for the office of *conseiller* at the parlement of Rouen; having previously received the support of Diane de Poitiers he solicited Guise.<sup>35</sup>

An analysis of the Guise correspondence demonstrates the symbiotic relationship between patron and client, evident from the tangible rewards accruing to both in the relationship.<sup>36</sup> The myriad obstructions facing the Guise meant that agents had to be directly employed.

Thus a large affinity was not simply the reflection of a magnate's power but essential for the execution of any task. The power of local decision making and appointment was devolved to a small group of *robins* in Paris and Rouen - counsellors and advisers who sat on *ad hoc* councils. Unfortunately, the correspondence dealing with the sale of land in Normandy ends in 1556 and it is not known what became of the royal gift, although after seven years the duke was beginning to despair. As late as February 1556 the parlement of Rouen was still blocking royal commands sponsored by the Guise, prompting Pétremol to ask the duke to seek more direct royal intervention.<sup>37</sup> Perhaps the duc de Guise was losing interest in the whole affair. After all, he was on the point of crossing the Alps to campaign in Italy (winter 1556-7). However, the status of the Guise at court and their close involvement with provincial Norman affairs raised the family's influence to new heights in the province.

#### Seigneurial Officials

The number of *procès* in which the Guise had an interest, in both the minor and higher courts in Normandy, necessitated a close degree of co-operation between their paid household servants and the magistrates who pursued their cases. It was, after all, the *bailli* of Aumale, Jean de Martimbosc, who wrote to François de Guise mentioning the meeting of a council to discuss the *haute justice* of the duchy in March 1548. The growing territorial influence of the Guise in the 1550s and 1560s brought with it an increase in the amount of patronage at their disposal. In the wake of this landed power came a greater administrative and legal burden in the higher sovereign courts, meaning that the Guise had to extend their influence and employ more lawyers to protect their rights. When the legal and administrative tasks had been much lighter the Le Roux family had been able to combine their duties as seigneurial officers of the Guise with those of *conseillers* in the *échiquier* or the

---

<sup>34</sup> BN, Ms Fr, 20544, fo 117, A. Pétremol to Guise, Paris, 1 August 1553. Louis Pétremol always professed his loyalty, see BN, Ms Fr, 20554, fo 40, Pétremol to Guise, Rouen 20 December 1555. He had spent "xxv ans au service du roy du vostre et de la justice."

<sup>35</sup> BN, Ms Fr, 20551, fo 9, Le Cirier to Guise, Paris, 15 June 1553.

<sup>36</sup> Antoine Le Cirier also hoped to receive something from the spoils of the Longueville inheritance, see, BN, Ms Fr, 20470, fo 73, A. Le Cirier to Guise, Rouen, 3 October 1551.

<sup>37</sup> BN, Ms Fr, 20554, fo 103, Pétremol to Guise, Rouen, 10 February 1556.

parlement of Rouen.<sup>38</sup> By the second half of the sixteenth century few *conseillers* were seigneurial officials but the *officiers* of the landed estates more often than not had a legal background. Those employed by the Guise often acted as *avocats* and *procureurs* for their patrons in the parlement or in the lesser courts of the *bailliage* or the *présidial*. For example, Jean de Martimbosc (d. 1561) was an *avocat* in the parlement of Rouen as well as *bailli* of Aumale. Like other servants of the Guise, Jean found his way into service through the Guise links with the d'Orléans-Longueville, having been a pensioner of and acted as *avocat* for the duc de Longueville. The family was not of lowly status since Louis de Martimbosc was abbot of Chartres and Marion (d.1614) was later abbot of Jumièges, *grand vicaire* of the cardinal de Bourbon in the archbishopric of Rouen (1575) and *conseiller* at the parlement of Rouen (1568-93).<sup>39</sup> It would be wrong to see the seigneurial office of *bailli* as in irrevocable decline in the face of the inevitable triumph of royal offices. A letter from Antoinette de Bourbon to her daughter Marie de Guise suggests how appointments took place:

I have had news with many requests for the [office of] vicomte de Longueville, who is dead. I have written as you told me...to the officers of the place, to inform me in your father's absence of the most sufficient and capable [person] to exercise the office conscientiously for the good of the duchy and the solace of the people. Many offer money for it, but this should not be allowed for a judicial office. The bearer said you made some promise to the controller Janot, and I would not hinder him, but give it for money I will not, and I think he would not offer it. The procureur of Longueville has asked for it, offering his office of procureur "pour faire proufit". A good procureur is indeed required, and if he were vicomte all the more.<sup>40</sup>

This letter dates from a time when venality had not yet become the norm or when offices had to be sold for financial expediency. It does show that offices were conferred after a collective process of consultation. Antoinette, who had a great influence in the administration of family affairs, co-operated with her own daughter and with their local servants.

Seigneurial officials did not just administer estates and oversee the running of local affairs. They were also heavily involved in borrowing money on behalf of the Guise. They not only defended the rights and jurisdiction of the Guise lordships in the courts but performed military functions as captains of châteaux. Above all, they provided the Guise with the local knowledge,

---

<sup>38</sup> See chapter two above.

<sup>39</sup> Jean de Martimbosc was *bailli* of Aumale from c1551 to c1561 see, ADSM, Tabellionage, 2E1, 304, 11 and 17 October 1550; 2E1, 305, 5 August 1551; 2E1, 323, 7 September 1556. René de Martimbosc was also in the service of the Longueville as *procureur-fiscal* of Gournay and La Ferté see, 2E1, 305, 5 August 1551; 2E1, 339, 22 August 1569. On Marion, see Frondeville, *Conseillers*, p 450.

<sup>40</sup> *Letters and Papers, Foreign and Domestic, of the reign of Henry VIII*, J. S. Brewer et al (eds), 21 vols, London, 1864-1932, 1538, p 49. Antoinette de Bourbon to the Queen of Scotland, 18 August 1538.

expertise and contacts which facilitated links with the commercial community in Rouen and the political elite of Norman society.

The most important offices at the disposal of the Guise would often go to a trusted and long standing family servant. Charles de La Chaussée was appointed governor of the comté of Eu in 1579 by Henri de Lorraine duc de Guise, having previously served in the household of the cardinal de Lorraine in the capacity of *pannetier* at the rate of 200/ per annum.<sup>41</sup> François de La Chaussée, father of Charles, had served as governor of Joinville and *surintendant des maisons* of Claude duc de Guise.<sup>42</sup> Such offices do not seem to be venal and were much coveted. In July 1552 René des Buaz, *conseiller* at the parlement of Rouen, wrote to Antoinette de Bourbon in favour of Jean Lambert, already a servant of the Guise:

Madame aiant sceu l'indisposition de vostre bailli d'elbeuf vous aye adverty pour vostre service et M. le marquis le personage lequel pour la provision dudict office luy est necessaire M. Jehan Lambert advocat en ce parlement procureur-general de monseigneur le cardinal de Lorraine en ce pays de normandie.<sup>43</sup>

Antoinette replied that such a decision would have to be taken in council with "ladvis de mes enfans que jattends bien tot icy".<sup>44</sup>

The posts of *bailli* or *vicomte* required legal knowledge and so those with such a background were preferred. Similarly, those with a commercial background were best suited to manage the financial affairs of the estates. Only merchants and bourgeois possessed the ready cash and expertise to accept the farm of a given revenue. They were also to be found heavily involved in the wider financial affairs of the Guise, lending money, constituting *rentes* and acting as proxies and guarantors in financial transactions. Nicholas Rogy, *bourgeois marchand* and *receveur* of Mauny, performed many other tasks for the duc d'Aumale outside the scope of his office, involving himself particularly in the financial transactions that the duke undertook. As a merchant Rogy had both the capital and the financial contacts to facilitate these deals. His name appears regularly in notarial records as a guarantor and witness for the duke.<sup>45</sup>

---

<sup>41</sup> ADSM, E1, 486/2, fo 83; BN, Clair, 1204, fo 84.

<sup>42</sup> Chenaye-Desbois, V, p 527.

<sup>43</sup> BN, Ms Fr, 20515, fo 73, des Buaz to Antoinette, Rouen, 16 July 1552. Lambert seems to have been successful as he qualified as *bailli* of Elbeuf in 1559 and 1560, see ADSM, Tabellionage, 2E1, 319, 4 august 1559; 2E1, 321, 26 May 1560. He was both *bailli* of Aumale and Elbeuf in 1561, see ADSM, Tabellionage, 2E1, 323, 12 August 1561.

<sup>44</sup> BN, Ms Fr, 20515, fo 74, Antoinette to des Buaz, n.d. The councils of Antoinette and the cardinal de Lorraine are also mentioned in connection with the administration of Elbeuf, in BN, Ms Fr, 20649, fo 157, Le Picart to Antoinette, Paris, 1 May 1551.

<sup>45</sup> Florimond Mallet, *receveur* of Aumale, also appears frequently, e.g. ADSM, Tabellionage, 2E1, 323, 12 August 1561; 2E1, 304, 11 October, 17 October, 6 November 1551.

There were also offices for the *petite noblesse d'épée*. Jean de Bellemare, of an ancient Norman family, was *bailli* of the comté of Harcourt for the marquis d'Elbeuf in 1575.<sup>46</sup> Guillaume de Franqueville, sieur de Gantrelle, was a *verdier* in the marquisate at the same time.<sup>47</sup> Jean de La Motte écuyer, sieur de Vimont, was *garde du scel* of the vicomté and duchy of Aumale in 1558.<sup>48</sup> His son, Jean, was, like several Guise servants and officials, a Huguenot.<sup>49</sup> Adrien Bridou (d.1580), *vicomte* and *receveur* of the duchy of Aumale in 1567 and *vicomte* of Neufchâtel-en-Bray for the king in 1559 and 1560, abjured catholicism in 1559.<sup>50</sup> In 1569 Bridou lost his royal office in an anti-Calvinist drive and probably also his seigneurial office. His replacement, Nicole Cherie, seems to have gained both offices and was titled *vicomte* of Aumale in 1574.<sup>51</sup> However, the purging of non-catholic servants was not a policy of the Guise. First, the Cherie family was local and well known to the duc d'Aumale, acting as guarantors for the duke in 1564 and 1565.<sup>52</sup> They received the office as faithful servants of the duke rather than for their religious zeal. Secondly, there were other Huguenots happy to serve the Guise. Eustache Trevache, a Rouennais merchant and Huguenot, became a financial adviser to the marquis (later duc) d'Elbeuf. He was *receveur-fermier* for the comté of Lillebonne from 1580, for which he paid the duke 2,350 *écus* per annum.<sup>53</sup> The duke was more concerned with the efficient running of his estates than the apparent contradiction between his employment of a Huguenot and his desire for the extermination of heresy, as his membership of the Catholic League required. Thus when Trevache had the foresight to flee the Catholic League in 1585, the duke's first concern was that Trevache had left without paying the money he owed.<sup>54</sup>

The strong catholic faith of the Guise was not always reflected by their servants. Similarly

---

<sup>46</sup> Chenaye-Desbois, II, pp 863-4; ADSM, Tabellionage, 2E1, 351, 24 July 1575.

<sup>47</sup> The Franqueville had been servants of Marie d'Harcourt in the mid-fifteenth century.

<sup>48</sup> ADSM, Tabellionage, 2E1, 316, 16 March 1558.

<sup>49</sup> The sieur de Vimont was part of the prince de Condé's army in 1562, see Public Record Office, London, SP 70/41, "Estat de parties...de l'association de Monseigneur le prince de Conde..."

<sup>50</sup> F. Bouquet (ed), *Documents concernant l'histoire de Neufchâtel-en-Bray*, Rouen, 1884, p 11.

<sup>51</sup> Bouquet (ed), *Documents concernant l'histoire de Neufchâtel-en-Bray*, p 21; ADSM, Tabellionage, 2E1, 348, 18 January 1574.

<sup>52</sup> Pierre Cherie, sieur de Fontenil, "demeurant audit lieu daubmalle" acted as a witness for the duc d'Aumale in 1564 see, ADSM, Tabellionage, 2E1, 329, 19 February 1564.

<sup>53</sup> G. K. Brunelli, *The New World Merchants of Rouen, 1559-1630*, Ann Arbor, 1991, pp 155-6; ADSM, Tabellionage, 2E1, 360, 13 June 1580; 2E1, 365, 14 February 1582; 1<sup>er</sup> meubles, 24 February 1586. Trevache had been *receveur-général en la province de Normandie*. see, ADSM, Tabellionage, 2E1, 351, 9 July 1575.

<sup>54</sup> ADC, E, 353, 13 November 1585. Trevache returned to Normandy between 1586 and 1588 but fled again as the political situation once more deteriorated.

it would be wrong to designate types of office too systematically into offices of justice, finance and police divided up among the *noblesse de robe*, merchants and *noblesse d'épée* respectively. Jacques Blondel, for example, *procureur fiscal* of the duc d'Elbeuf, was also captain of Lillebonne in 1590.<sup>55</sup> Mathieu de Montpellier was *verdier* of the same estate in 1580, becoming *bailli* and captain of the château in 1589. In 1575 Nicholas de Montpellier had been *receveur* of the comté of Lillebonne in 1575.<sup>56</sup> Jean Ameline was *receveur* of Mauny from 1556 until 1565 and Jean and Jacques Ameline pursued military careers as archers in the company of the duc d'Aumale (1572-5).<sup>57</sup> One family might receive patronage from different members of the Guise family. Jean Vion occupied the important office of *trésorier* and *receveur-général* of the duc de Guise in 1550 and again in 1552. Nicaise Vion qualified in the less prestigious position as an archer in the company of the ordonnance of René marquis d'Elbeuf (1565-9).<sup>58</sup> Even from the few examples provided, the close relationship between kinship and service is evident. Bonds of kinship and affection united those who served in the same household and shared a common patron.<sup>59</sup>

### The Mobilisation of Financial Resources

All nobles had to raise large sums of cash above and beyond their ordinary revenues, in particular for the purposes of marriage, war and the purchase of offices and land. There exists a large amount of data in the Rouennais notarial archives showing that land was mortgaged on a large scale and substantial amounts of capital quickly raised. The Norman cadet branches of the House of Guise raised huge sums on the Rouennais money markets by constituting *rentes* on their Norman lands.

Appendices C and D outline the borrowing undertaken by both the d'Aumale and the d'Elbeuf from the 1550s to the 1580s. Most noticeable is the division of borrowing patterns into two distinct phases. Unlike his son Charles, Claude duc d'Aumale was a heavy borrower in Rouen.

---

<sup>55</sup> ADSM, E1, 462, 28 March 1590.

<sup>56</sup> ADSM, Tabellionage, 2E1, 362, 8 October 1580; 2E1, 352, 14 February 1576; ADSM, E1, 462, 11 April 1589. The widow of Nicholas de Montpellier married Eustache Trevache, revealing the complexity of kinship links among servants of the Guise and suggesting that the Montpellier were Huguenots too.

<sup>57</sup> ADSM, Tabellionage, 2E1, 313, 7 September 1556; 2E1, 318, 25 November 1558; 2E1, 331, 16 July 1565; BN, Ms Fr, 21533, fo 2077, muster roll of 51 men-at-arms and 75 archers, Dreux, 6 October 1572; BN, Na Fr, 8630, fo 58, muster roll of 21 men-at-arms and 28 archers, Beaune en Brie, 14 October 1575.

<sup>58</sup> BN, Ms Fr, 24429, fo 130; BN, Clair, 261, fo 1719, muster roll of 40 men-at-arms and 60 archers, Montereau, 1 June 1565; BN, Ms Fr, 21529, fo 1930, muster roll of 33 men-at-arms and 39 archers, Chinon, 6 February 1569.

<sup>59</sup> On the importance of fraternity and artificial kinship bonding in service, see J. Davies, "Family Service and Family Strategies: The Household of Henri, duc de Montmorency, ca. 1590-1610", *Bulletin of The Society for Renaissance Studies*, 1985.

Conversely, Charles duc d'Elbeuf borrowed heavily in the 1580's whereas his father, René, never seems to have constituted *rentes* in Rouen. This financial pattern reflects the political strategy of each man. In the case of the ducs d'Aumale, the father was more concerned with Norman affairs and establishing a clientèle in Normandy than the son who pursued his political career almost exclusively within the confines of Picardy. René marquis d'Elbeuf was never a significant figure in the province but his son later became the commander of the Catholic League there in 1585.

The borrowing of money can be traced to distinct periods of activity (usually military). The constitution of *rentes* by Claude duc d'Aumale in 1550 and 1551 coincides with the preparations for the invasion of Metz, Toul and Verdun. The next spate of borrowing comes in 1556, prior to the Guise led campaign in Italy. Between 1580 and 1583 Charles d'Elbeuf borrowed heavily in order to finance his contingent in the expedition led by the duc d'Anjou into the Low Countries. Troops had to be raised and paid for in advance, thereafter recouping money from the royal treasury. If indebtedness rose and intervention by the king was not forthcoming land had to be alienated in order to meet obligations. Thus in 1559 Claude d'Aumale sold the office of the *bailli* of Caen in order to offset debts built up in the wars against the imperialists.<sup>60</sup> The advent of the Wars of Religion meant no respite from spiralling military expenditure for both crown and nobility. D'Aumale was forced to sell the seigneuries of Estouteville and Plainbosc in 1570 for 30,000/ to a creditor, Georges Langlois, and his son was compelled to sell the entire barony of Bec Crespin 1579 in order to ease the legacy of debt bequeathed to him.<sup>61</sup>

When a large amount of cash needed to be raised a legal document was drawn up empowering a chosen servant or client to act as a proxy. Armed with the *procuration*, which detailed the sum required, the servant would set off to Rouen to raise the *rentes*. In some cases the borrower had made preliminary contacts and was aware of whom to approach. In other cases the proxy would have used his own personal contacts and knowledge to find those willing to buy. Seigneurial officials usually acted as guarantors for the repayments; specific revenues often being assigned for this task in the contract.

A *procuration* was established by Charles duc d'Elbeuf in May 1588 at his château of Harcourt stipulating the alienation of 600/ of *rente*. Jacques Vernier was made proxy for the sale. Those pledging caution of all their chattels and goods included Mathieu Dupont *receveur* of the duchy of Elbeuf, Imbert Le Peinteur *receveur* of the comté of Harcourt, Pierre Le Danois *receveur* of the comté of Brionne and Jean Michel *adjudicateur* of the forests of Elbeuf.<sup>62</sup> The details of the financial transactions of Claude duc d'Aumale were usually left to his *maître d'hôtel* and *intendant*,

---

<sup>60</sup> ADSM, Tabellionage, 2E1, 323, 28 July 1561. The original agreement was reached in April of 1559 by which the purchaser agreed to meet the debts of the duke totalling 2,170/ of *rente*. The office was probably given by the king to *in lieu* of money he owed d'Aumale.

<sup>61</sup> ADSM, Tabellionage, 2E1, 341, 11 September 1570; Lechevalier, *Notice historique sur les barons et la baronnie du Bec*, p 12.

<sup>62</sup> ADSM, Tabellionage, 2<sup>ème</sup> Héritage, 2E1, 2003, 9 May 1588.

Charles de La Menardière.<sup>63</sup> The duke's own residence in the parish of Sainte-Croix in Rouen was a place where discussions and legal formalities took place. The duc d'Elbeuf made use of this residence in 1582 when conducting his own financial transactions.<sup>64</sup> Present at discussions and witnesses to contracts would usually be three or four seigneurial officers, who had legal and financial expertise. Sometimes a trusted client might figure among the signatures. In 1556 Jean de Brevdent, lieutenant-general of the *bailliage* of Rouen - a man associated to d'Aumale through their mutual links with the Brezé - acted as a witness for the duc d'Aumale. He was joined by Nicholas Caillot, a lawyer in the parlement of Rouen who had already been involved in land sales for the duc de Guise. Throughout the 1550s, Robert Raoullin, sieur de Longpaon, the *procureur* of d'Aumale in the parlement, was entrusted with the task of finding buyers of *rentes* and in 1561 he paid off arrears and outstanding debts.<sup>65</sup>

There were political as well as obvious financial implications of the constituting of *rentes* on landed estates. Visualising these transactions as purely financial and legal documents underestimates the personal bond of the contract. *Rentes* were either constituted by parties who were familiars or through the good offices of a mutually recognised third party. These personal links provided a greater degree of insurance and trust between both parties. The buying of *rentes* was not a purely individual decision or commitment. It was a family investment to provide an income for a wife and children in case of the husband's death.

Those who bought *rentes* from the Guise often had some personal contact with them, however tenuous. A large majority of those outlined in appendices C and D were also supporters of the ultra-catholic faction during the Wars of Religion. However buying *rentes* from the Guise did not automatically entail political support for the family and the elite of Rouennais society were quite capable of pursuing their own independent family strategies. Among the purchasers were Huguenots and others who opposed the Catholic League. Nevertheless, the established contacts between several of the biggest purchasers and the Guise were reinforced by mutual financial links - financial dependency contributed to the cohesion of an affinity.<sup>66</sup>

The personal and family ties involved in the constitution of *rentes* are revealed in the *procuracion* created by Charles d'Elbeuf in July 1581 in favour of Louis Le Mercier, sieur de La Bretesque, *vicomte* of Evreux and a *maître des requêtes* of the duc d'Anjou, younger brother of Henri III.<sup>67</sup> This was to facilitate the raising of money for d'Elbeuf's forces serving with the duc

---

<sup>63</sup> ADSM, Tabellionage, 2E1, 305, 4 September 1551; 2E1, 313, 7 September 1556; 2E1, 314, last of September 1556; 2E1, 323, 12 August 1561; 2E1, 341, 11 September 1570.

<sup>64</sup> ADSM, Tabellionage, 2E1, 365, 19 May 1582.

<sup>65</sup> ADSM, Tabellionage, 2E1, 304, 11 and 17 October 1550; 2E1, 305, 4 September 1551; 2E1, 313 7 September 1556; 2E1 314, last September 1556; 2E1, 323, 12 August 1561.

<sup>66</sup> Thus Guillaume Auber purchased *rentes* from both d'Aumale and d'Elbeuf and fought for the Catholic League.

<sup>67</sup> ADSM, Tabellionage, 2E1, 363, 12 July 1581.

d'Anjou in the Low Countries. Le Mercier sold the *rentes* among his own family and friends. Barbe and Anne Le Mercier bought 800/ between them. Pierre Le Comier, son of Barbe Le Mercier and a *conseiller* in the parlement of Rouen, acquired 1600/. A *quartenier* of the town of Rouen and future *conseiller* in the parlement, André Bonnissent, who was married to Louise Le Mercier, bought 150/. There was only a financial link between this kin grouping and the Guise; they were of the periphery of the Guise affinity and both the *conseillers* remained on the royalist side during the Catholic League.<sup>68</sup> Other religious moderates, such as *conseiller* Pierre du Quesne, and even some Huguenots such as Alonce de Quintadoines, François de Civille and Catherine Le Gras bought *rentes* from the the duc d'Elbeuf.<sup>69</sup> Again this demonstrates that d'Elbeuf was less interested in the complexities of faith than in raising cash. He was aided in his search for money in the Huguenot community because he <sup>was</sup> preparing to join the duc d'Anjou who was head of the *politique* faction and identified with religious compromise.<sup>70</sup>

There is a more significant group of families which consistently procured *rentes* from the Guise over a number of decades, seemingly not for some isolated enterprise or purpose. The most important family in this group, in terms of status, was the great parlementaire family, the Bauquemare, and its kinsmen the Le Febvre d'Escalles. Another family, the Puchot, were also an important source of money for the Guise. This family was split by religious divisions and it was the catholic branch which became the largest creditor of the Guise in Rouen.

Between 1556 and 1582 the Bauquemare bought 1,240/ of *rentes* from the d'Aumale and d'Elbeuf branches of the House of Guise. Jean Le Febvre d'Escalles (d.1571), a *conseiller* at the parlement of Rouen (1544-71) and brother-in-law of Jacques de Bauquemare (1518-84), *premier président* (1565-84), was the buyer of a further 630/.<sup>71</sup> Jacques de Bauquemare was a towering figure in Rouen during the Wars of Religion. A confirmed catholic but at the same time a moderate concerned with keeping order in the city, he was personally known to the Guise as early as 1551 when he solicited the duke for a favour.<sup>72</sup> In the years that followed he bought *rentes* off the Guise but also acted as witness, intermediary and guarantor in transactions between the Guise and other members of his family, suggesting close contact with the Guise.<sup>73</sup> Again, it would be misleading

---

<sup>68</sup> Frondeville, *Conseillers*, pp 561, 598-9.

<sup>69</sup> On the Quintadoines family, see Brunelle, *The New World Merchants of Rouen*, p 150, who demonstrates that confessional differences did little to hinder commercial relationships between families.

<sup>70</sup> See chapter six below.

<sup>71</sup> Frondeville, *Conseillers*, p 360; *Présidents*, p 54. Charles Le Febvre d'Escalles was a product of the marriage between Jean and Anne de Bauquemare, and maintained the family alliance by marrying Marguerite de Bauquemare, see Frondeville, *Conseillers*, p 528.

<sup>72</sup> Frondeville, *Présidents*, pp 54-5; D. B. F., V, pp 942-3; BN, Ms Fr, 20533, fo 108, Bauquemare to Guise, Rouen, 15 January 1551.

<sup>73</sup> See for example, ADSM, Tabellionage, 2E1, 334, 13 January 1567.



to suggest that this kin group were dependent clients of the Guise. There was, however, a relationship with the Guise built upon financial dealings over the decades. Such personal contacts were to be useful during times of political crisis. During the hegemony of the Catholic League in Rouen the sons of Jacques de Bauquemare, Jean-Pierre (d.1619) a *maître des requêtes* and Jacques (d.1616), a *conseiller* at the parlement of Rouen, sat on the local provincial council of the League.<sup>74</sup> They were joined in the League by their close cousin Charles Le Febvre d'Escalles.<sup>75</sup> A long standing relationship with the Guise should not be seen as synonymous with joining the Catholic League. Nevertheless there were further connections through mutual links with the Croismare Family. Jacques de Bauquemare the elder was married to Catherine de Croismare whose cousin, Charles de Croismare, sieur de Saint-Just, was "attaché à la maison de Claude de Lorraine, duc d'Aumale".<sup>76</sup> It is possible to come full circle since Charles de Croismare was married in 1550 to Anne Jubert, the younger sister of Jean Jubert *grand vicaire* of the cardinal de Lorraine for the abbey of Bec and also sister of Jacques, a *conseiller* in the parlement and a major creditor of the Guise.<sup>77</sup>

The other significant buyers of *rentes* from the Guise were members of the catholic branch of the Puchot family, which was a large and wealthy Rouennais bourgeois family. Vincent Puchot (d.pre-1575), *adjudicateur du tabellionage de la ville et de la vicomté de Rouen*, together with his wife, Marie de La Haye, and their sixth son, Charles, a lawyer in the parlement of Rouen, bought 5,200*l* of *rentes* from the ducs d'Aumale and d'Elbeuf.<sup>78</sup> This huge sum made them the most important creditors of the Guise in Rouen. This financial involvement with the Guise has two interesting facets. First, Pierre Puchot *conseiller* at the Parlement of Rouen from 1573 to 1619 and the second son of Vincent was yet another member of the League parlement of Rouen who had financial dealings with the Guise over many years. Secondly, the elder branch of the Puchot family were Calvinists and there was internecine feuding between the cousins. This feud may have been exacerbated by the catholic side of the family being linked closely to the financial affairs of the

---

<sup>74</sup> Frondeville, *Présidents*, p 65-6. For their involvement in the League, see chapter seven below.

<sup>75</sup> Frondeville, *Conseillers*, p 528.

<sup>76</sup> Frondeville, *Présidents*, p 206. It was due to Bauquemare's influence that Jean de Croismare was received as a *président* in the parlement in 1567. For Charles de Croismare as an agent of the Guise, see below chapter six.

<sup>77</sup> Frondeville, *Conseillers*, p 136. Jacques de Bauquemare married his nephew Jean du Bosc, sieur de Coquéreaumont, to Anne Jubert in 1581 at which a large gathering of both families was present, see ADSM, Tabellionage, 2E1 364, 25 October 1581.

<sup>78</sup> Frondeville, *Conseillers*, p 532. Interestingly, it was his son and nephew, Jean and Nicholas, both catholics who were elected as bourgeois captains of Rouen after the fall of the city to royalist forces in 1562 see, ACR, A, 18, 18 November 1562.

Guise.<sup>79</sup>

The correlation between personal contact, kinship and politics was complex but crucial to the understanding of how nobles mobilised financial resources and political support. In fact, political loyalty and financial dependence were closely interlinked - financial interdependence might create a political loyalty or reinforce an existing one. Although *rentes* were constituted on property or revenues the buyer was reliant on the creditworthiness of the seller to receive prompt payments. During a time of political and fiscal instability the buyer was relying on the future financial solvency and social success of the constitutor. Thus both parties preferred to deal with someone they could trust. Financial difficulties were common in forcing the ducs d'Aumale, d'Elbeuf and de Guise to sell land in the 1570s and 1580s.<sup>80</sup> Only bonds of trust could allow the debtor to re-schedule arrears of payment and be granted time to repay debts without recourse to the courts.

When property had to be sold to meet obligations a buyer was found who was trustworthy. Thus when the duc d'Elbeuf was forced to sell the seigneurie of Quatremares in 1584 for 80,000/ to meet debts incurred in the Netherlands campaign, he did so to a noble client, Jean de La Haye, in whom he had faith.<sup>81</sup>

### Household *Domestiques* and Military Retinues

The core of an affinity consisted of those physically closest to the patron; those who served at his table, gave counsel and were prepared to sacrifice their lives for their lord on the battlefield or in a duel. The two key institutions which supported these noble servants were the household and the military retinue, notwithstanding the fact that both were complementary and should not be seen as distinct entities. The major difference was that the household was supported by the lord and the military retinue, whether company of the *ordonnance*, light cavalry bodyguard or company of foot was funded primarily from royal coffers. In 1556 the formal paid household of the duc de Guise totalled some 159 persons, rising to 164 in 1561.<sup>82</sup> During wartime his company of *ordonnance* would have numbered 100 lances or some 250 men. Such a retinue would have been further swelled by those who had never appeared on any payment roll: hangers-on and the host of professions from pages to prostitutes which serviced the lord's retinue.

At the top of the hierarchy in the court of a magnate or prince were his closest advisers and

---

<sup>79</sup> BN, Na Fr, 23576, fo 101. In 1567 the *conseil du roi* demanded the family live in "une bonne et parfaict paix...finir et asoupir tous le proces et differends".

<sup>80</sup> See chapter six below for these financial problems.

<sup>81</sup> ADSM, Tabellionage, 2E1, 367, 28 October 1586. On Jean de La Haye, see chapter six below.

<sup>82</sup> Harding, *Anatomy of a Power Elite*, p 27. In 1561 there were 129 members of the household of the cardinal de Lorraine at a cost of 16,510/ to keep, see BN, Clair, 1204, fos 83-6. "Estat des Evesques abbez et protenotaires de la maison de Monseigneur Ill<sup>ms</sup> Cardinal de Lorraine et des gaiges des gentilshommes officiers et domestiques".

confidants. In the household accounts of the duc de Guise in the 1550s these men are referred to as *conseillers gentilshommes* and *chambellans*.<sup>83</sup> Among the closest counsellors should also be included the principal officers of the duke's company of the ordonnance. Little is known about the cultural concepts which determined the giving of counsel as well as the organisation and competence of noble councils. The emphasis political historians place on the individual is a legacy of the nineteenth century. There is a tendency to overlook the conciliar and collective in the political decision-making process and the search for consensus in sixteenth century politics.<sup>84</sup> The Guise governed their household and created institutions to manage their affairs on a pattern, smaller than, but similar to that of the crown. It has already been possible to demonstrate how the Guise councils oversaw business in Paris and Rouen. Another major upper Norman landowner, the duc de Longueville, also had a council in Rouen.<sup>85</sup> Councils were not bureaucratic institutions and, although there were often formal council meetings anyone who had the ear of a particular lord was in a position to give counsel - physical proximity was therefore of crucial importance. It is also possible to envisage conflicting counsel being given and the existence of a variety of opinions and factions within the council and household of a nobleman, just as in the court of the king. The household of the cardinal de Bourbon was certainly fragmented in this manner in the 1570s.<sup>86</sup> Councils not only tied clients closer to their patron by involving them in the decision-making process, but also allowed the lord to hear a variety of opinions and experiences - so crucial in an age of poor communications. Moreover, because ties of loyalty were notoriously prone to breakdown, a conciliar decision was a means of reaching a broad consensus on strategy and so facilitating the maintenance of loyalties. Councils provided a vital link in the uncoordinated and disparate web of contacts and information upon which the Guise family relied. In order to understand the remarkable solidarity of the Guise family we must appreciate the council as the means by which all family members shared in the formulation of family strategy. Family unity could be maintained only through consensus and not through the domination of the duc de Guise as an individual over the rest of his family and his servants.

Joinville was the seat of the ducs de Guise. Here resided, almost continuously until her death in 1583, the matriarch of the Guise family, Antoinette de Bourbon. It was here that the largest

---

<sup>83</sup> BN, Ms Fr, 22429, fos 130-8.

<sup>84</sup> This concentration on individuals and their personalities is a feature of the historiography. Even the most recent book on the Guise, J.-M. Constant, *Les Guises*, is not really about the Guise as a family but concentrates on Henri duc de Guise. The nobility as portrayed by Kristen Neuschel is highly individualistic - each noble intent on following his own individual strategy.

<sup>85</sup> Jacques Girard was paid 11/5s in 1550 for four journeys made from Longueville to Rouen "suivant le commandement des gens de conseil de monseigneur": ADSM, C, 8182, Comptes du duché de Longueville. The same document also reveals that the duke had his own *chambre des comptes* of which Jean de Rouvray, *vicomte* of Longueville, was *président*.

<sup>86</sup> Saulnier, *Le rôle politique du cardinal de Bourbon*, p 95.

and most important family conferences were held as well as more routine meetings. Given the secrecy and risks which surrounded family councils it is little wonder that there is insufficient documentation on the proceedings. The partisans of the Catholic League (most of the leaders of which were members of the Guise family) met at Joinville to discuss strategy in December of 1584 and again at Nancy early in 1588.<sup>87</sup> Both these meetings were succeeded by periods of heated political activity, culminating in open revolt against the crown. In January 1564 the entire family left court amid great tension for a conference at Joinville to discuss its future strategy in the pursuance of admiral Coligny for the murder of François duc de Guise.<sup>88</sup> The double marriage of Charles duc d'Aumale to his cousin, Marie de Lorraine, (daughter of the marquis d'Elbeuf) and of his sister, Diane, to François de Luxembourg, comte de Roucy, at Joinville in November 1576 would have provided an excellent opportunity to discuss the political crisis engendered by the Catholic League in Picardy and the impending convocation of the Estates-General at Blois.<sup>89</sup> Councils also decided on more mundane matters. The document which created Etienne de Morainville tutor of René d'Elbeuf in 1550 was made at Joinville in front of Christophe de Thou, Claude Baudry and the *bailli* Jean Roseuse. Morainville was nominated by Antoinette de Bourbon and the cardinal de Lorraine. The document was signed by the comte de Vaudémont and his wife, the duc and duchesse de Guise, the duc d'Aumale and the *grand prieur*, François de Lorraine.<sup>90</sup> This process therefore involved the whole family, legitimising the act and creating a consensus which lessened the opportunity for future dispute.

Due to the secrecy surrounding these occasions little is known about the councils and what transpired while they were in session. However, it is possible to reconstruct a picture of those who sat on them using the extant household records of the duc de Guise and the cardinal de Lorraine. Jacques de La Brosse was lieutenant (1556-8), *conseiller-gentilhomme* and *maître d'hôtel* of François de Guise (1552-7) on a pension of 400/ per annum. Even after he disappeared from the official pay roll he remained high in the esteem of the duke and in his council.<sup>91</sup> Unsurprisingly, Champenois families like the des Boves and the Choiseul appear regularly in the household accounts of the duke in the 1550s.<sup>92</sup> The des Boves family served the Guise over three generations. François des Boves served as the ensign of Claude duc de Guise (1547-50), Henri des Boves was *guidon* of the duc d'Elbeuf and Charles "capitain de cinquante hommes d'armes

---

<sup>87</sup> Constant, *Les Guises*, pp 128, 162.

<sup>88</sup> Pimodan, *La mère des Guises*, p 220.

<sup>89</sup> *Ibid*, p 261.

<sup>90</sup> ADSM, Tabellionage, 2E1, 304, 9 October 1550.

<sup>91</sup> On La Brosse see chapter two above.

<sup>92</sup> On the des Boves see chapter two above. Jean de Choiseul, baron de Lanques, and René de Choiseul sieur de Benapré were *gentilhommes servans* from 1552 until 1560, see BN, ms Fr, 22429, fols 130-161. Pierre de Choiseul, sieur d'Isché, had previously been *guidon* of Claude de Guise in 1544, see Vindry, p 282.

soubz la charge de mondict seigneur duc d'Elbeuf" in 1588.<sup>93</sup> Marriage and service were closely interwoven. The des Essars family, which provided several *gentilhommes servans* for the duc de Guise in the 1550s, was allied to the des Boves by the marriage of Antoine des Boves, sieur de Mazières, to Madeleine des Essars in 1546.<sup>94</sup> The des Essars also continued in the service of the Guise into the 1560s. François des Essars being first *guidon* of the company of Henri duc de Guise and then ensign from 1564 until 1569.<sup>95</sup>

The household of the young René marquis d'Elbeuf was a focus for many long standing Guise servants. The socialisation of the young prince took place in an environment dominated by the loyal familiars of his parents and elder brothers. Charles des Boves was his tutor and René de Choiseul, baron de Lanques (d.1564), progressed from the household of the duc de Guise in the 1550s to become the lieutenant of the company of the ordonnance of the marquis (1559-60).<sup>96</sup> Martin de Romencourt was *maître de logis* of the same company from 1559 until 1569, having been a *maître d'hôtel* of Antoinette de Bourbon.<sup>97</sup> D'Elbeuf's household thus supported and extended the traditional interest in eastern France. Indeed, his household and company of the *ordonnance* provided patronage opportunities for his mother and elder brothers.

René's son, Charles (1556-1605), was more independent and established his own council and household with Norman servants. A council was established in Rouen to pursue d'Elbeuf's rights in his lands and its workings can be seen in the prosecution of errant vassals from 1577 onwards.<sup>98</sup> Most of the councillors were lawyers at the parlement of Rouen, headed by Jacques des Bouletz *écuyer* "ayant la conduite des affaires de Monseigneur le duc d'Elbeuf".<sup>99</sup> He was assisted by Jean and Baptiste du Vivier and by d'Elbeuf's *procureur* in the parlement, Guillaume Valdory.<sup>100</sup> From the early 1580s Charles de Sarcilly, sieur d'Ernes, *premier maître d'hôtel* and *intendant* of the duc d'Elbeuf was the most important ducal representative in Normandy.<sup>101</sup> The

---

<sup>93</sup> BN, PO, 485, fo 64; Vindry, p 295; ADSM, Tabellionage, 2<sup>ème</sup> Héritage, 2007, 27 August 1588.

<sup>94</sup> BN, PO, 485, fo 19.

<sup>95</sup> Vindry, p 296.

<sup>96</sup> Ibid, p 294.

<sup>97</sup> Ibid, p 304.

<sup>98</sup> Particularly the prosecutions of the sieur de Saint-Bosmer and later Eustache Trevache, see ADC, E, 237, 238, 353.

<sup>99</sup> ADC, E, 237, 18 December 1584.

<sup>100</sup> The du Vivier were specifically referred to as *conseillers* of d'Elbeuf, see ADSM, G, 2176, 9 March 1588.

<sup>101</sup> ADSM, Tabellionage, 2E1, 365, 14 February 1582. He was especially important during the Catholic League and the reconstruction of the duke's estates after the Wars of Religion, see chapter seven below. He was supported by Jean de Bohier, sieur de Chandely, *maître d'hôtel* of the duke, see ADSM, Tabellionage, 2E1, 367, 28 October 1586.

Sarcilly were a Norman family closely tied to the House of Lorraine. Charles was himself a relation of the Guise since he was the son of Jean and Catherine, *batârde* de Lorraine.<sup>102</sup> The whole family was patronised by the House of Lorraine. The younger sister of Charles, Marguerite, was *fille d'honneur* and *dame d'atours* of Louise de Lorraine, daughter of the duc de Lorraine, and on her marriage at Nancy in 1573, she received 6,000 *florins* from the duc de Lorraine and a total of 10,000 *florins* from the cardinals de Guise and de Lorraine.<sup>103</sup>

Claude duc d'Aumale established an independent household in the 1550s, reflecting his position as a major landholder in Normandy. In 1571 he mentioned that, having received a memoir from Dauphiné, "jay incontinent envoyez a mon conseil pour y avoir advis."<sup>104</sup> One of his most senior Norman councillors was Charles de La Menardière, sieur de Montaigu, his *maître d'hôtel* from 1551 until 1568 and *intendant* in 1568.<sup>105</sup> The family were important landowners in lower Normandy and Charles' father, Bertrand (1459-1550), had been *bailli* and captain of Caen.<sup>106</sup> Other members of the La Menardière family appear in the musters rolls of the duke's company - Louis de la Menardière qualified as an archer in 1565 - and they continued to be important in the military retinues of the duc d'Aumale into the 1590s.<sup>107</sup> D'Aumale's residence in Rouen was a focus for financial discussions and in February 1565 he lodged in the house of his *procureur*, Robert Raoullin, whilst he completed the buying of some land.<sup>108</sup> The duke even had a treasury in Rouen overseen by Etienne Houdry "recepveur des deniers de mondict seigneur en la ville de Rouen", to whom tax farmers and the fiscal officers of the duke paid the seigneurial revenues.<sup>109</sup>

Charles de Lorraine, duc d'Aumale, on the death of his father Claude in 1573, was a minor and like René d'Elbeuf before him had his household run by Guise servants. His guardian was the cardinal de Lorraine who made the *bailli* of the bishopric of Metz (of which the cardinal was bishop) *gouverneur et surintendant* of the household of the young duke. In 1574 the household was small, comprising 32 persons which included two *gentilhommes de la chambre* and one *maître d'hôtel* - the total cost being 15,000 *francs*. The size of the retinue was perhaps small because the young duke was at the University of Pont à Mousson in 1575. Undoubtedly, the most important member of the household was his *valet de chambre* Charles de Lorraine, second son of the duc de

---

<sup>102</sup> ADC, 2E, 882, "Généalogie de la Maison de Sarcilly".

<sup>103</sup> Ibid.

<sup>104</sup> BN, Ms Fr, 3188, fo 60, d'Aumale to Gaspard de La Châtre, 16 October 1571.

<sup>105</sup> ADSM, Tabellionage, 2E1, 313, 7 September 1556; 2E1, 323, 12 August 1561; 2E1, 341 11 September 1570, November 1570.

<sup>106</sup> Chenaye-Desbois, X, 609-10.

<sup>107</sup> BN, Clair, 261, fo 1729, muster roll of 50 men-at-arms and 74 archers, Chalons-sur-Saône, 5 June 1565. See also chapter seven below.

<sup>108</sup> A. Héron (ed), *Deux Chroniques de Rouen*, Rouen and Paris, 1900, p 315.

<sup>109</sup> ADSM, J, 138, 1576, "Ferme du comté de Maulevrier".

Mercoeur.<sup>110</sup> This relationship had been cemented when Mercoeur took Catherine de Lorraine, daughter of Claude duc d'Aumale, as his third wife in 1569.<sup>111</sup>

Immediately associated with the core of senior counsellors and household servants and at the heart of the affinity was the military retinue. Companies of the *ordonnance* were recruited by a captain and paid for by the crown. Philippe Contamine, in his classic study of late medieval society and warfare, grasped the fundamental importance of the companies of the *ordonnance* in augmenting royal patronage and differentiating the medieval from the Renaissance monarchy.<sup>112</sup> The pivotal role of the companies in the patronage system of the French monarchy in the late fifteenth and sixteenth centuries has attracted much attention and controversy. Robert Harding saw the gendarmerie as the key institution of the French Renaissance state, maintaining the equilibrium between the crown and the magnates through patronage in return for loyalty. The breakdown of this harmonious relationship, especially the decadence of the gendarmerie was, according to Harding, a major factor in fuelling noble discontent during the Wars of Religion.<sup>113</sup> Harding's theory, exemplified by the section entitled "The demise of the gendarmerie", aims to demonstrate the failure of the clientage system upon which society was founded and which had, until the Wars of Religion, maintained some sort of equilibrium by acting as a hierarchical conduit for patronage and favour in return for service.<sup>114</sup>

Harding reaches his conclusions by making a study of the changing size and composition of the gendarmerie throughout the Wars of Religion. He states that the number of *ordonnance* companies declined to a meagre 12 in 1573, having reached the large number of 100 in 1569. More damaging to the ethos of the permanent nature of these companies was the edict of 1579 which provided for the adoption of a rota system, in which each company was operative for one third of a year only. Moreover, at the same time the traditional unit of the companies, the lance, (composed of three archers for every two men-at-arms) had become meaningless and now simply corresponded to the number of men in a company. By March 1585 there were a mere 12 companies of 400 lances. Thus he was able to conclude that "as an institution for the maintenance of noblemen, it was dead in 1579, when it ceased to provide them with permanent careers".<sup>115</sup>

The decline of patronage available to the nobility has also been echoed by Manfred Orlea

---

<sup>110</sup> BN, Ms Fr, 22441, fos 82-107, "Estat fait par nous Charles cardinal de Lorraine de nostre trescher et honnore nepveu Charles de Lorraine".

<sup>111</sup> Anselme, III, p 794.

<sup>112</sup> Contamine, *Guerre, état et société*, p 411.

<sup>113</sup> Harding, *Anatomy of a Power Elite*, pp 71-80.

<sup>114</sup> Ibid.

<sup>115</sup> Ibid, p 74.

in his work on the nobility and the Estates-General of 1576 and 1588.<sup>116</sup> The title of his particular chapter on the subject, "Une élite héréditaire en crise", explains Orlea's thesis. Paradoxically the excellent list of figures on the gendarmerie's strengths during the Wars of Religion provided by Orlea plainly contradicts both his own case and the piecemeal evidence offered by Harding.<sup>117</sup> These figures were used in conjunction with archival research based on 26 muster rolls held between 1559 and 1585 involving some 2,400 men. The conclusions of this research furnish a rather different picture than the one presented by Harding.<sup>118</sup>

Far from being in decline the gendarmerie maintained its strength, since the embattled monarchy, despite its edicts and good intentions, could not check the spiralling increase of military expenditure and the proliferation of units, including the maintenance of the number of *ordonnance* companies at high levels. A chronically weak crown could not afford to cut off the supply of patronage at will simply to ease its financial difficulties. Indeed, in order to maintain political stability it had to buy support with patronage. It is not possible that the widespread violence and indiscipline which characterise the gendarmerie companies in the reign of Henri III, and which Harding is right to emphasise, can have been the work of so few units. In reality there was a huge expansion of military patronage and offices during the Wars of Religion. The crown and the provinces were burdened with increasing military expenditure for which they simply could not pay. Honours and offices failed to bring financial reward and their very abundance devalued all honorific and virtuous worth.

This thesis can be supported by manuscript data. According to evidence from twenty muster rolls held from the 1560s to the 1580s, the lance maintained its numerical strength of three archers to every two men-at-arms.<sup>119</sup> During the same period many of the companies actually increased in size in terms of absolute numbers.<sup>120</sup> Rather than relying on estimates given by contemporaries or troop strengths contained in royal edicts, Orlea produced an impressive list of

---

<sup>116</sup> M. Orlea, *La Noblesse aux Etats généraux de 1576 et de 1588: étude politique et sociale*, Paris, 1980, pp 50-67.

<sup>117</sup> *Ibid*, p 57.

<sup>118</sup> For a list of muster rolls consulted, see appendix E.

<sup>119</sup> The lance was usually slightly under strength (on average 2 men at arms: 2.88 archers, according to my figures) but there is no significant change in the proportion of archers to men at arms over the decades. Care has to be taken when counting the number of men in a unit. Men who are paid and still in the company but not actually present on the day of the muster are included but, as not everyone was present at the muster, it is easy to underestimate real numbers.

<sup>120</sup> See appendix E. From 1560 to 1576 the company of the ducs de Longueville increased from 73 to 146 men. In 1579 the marquis d'Elbeuf had more men in his company than ever before. In 1581 the duc d'Aumale had only six fewer than in 1572. More surprisingly the two lieutenant-generals of in Normandy, Jean de Moy and Tanneguy Le Veneur increased the size of their companies consistently throughout the 1570s until their numbers rivalled the units commanded by the magnates.



figures, including manuscript data unused by Harding.<sup>121</sup> These figures give a different picture of troop strengths and concur with the archival research presented here. In 1567 there were 69 companies and 2,300 lances, in 1573, 81 companies and 3,220 lances and in 1578, 170 companies and 6,290 lances. Clearly there was a substantial increase in the size of the gendarmerie in the 1570s. Naturally, Harding's evidence would still have some credence if these same companies were being employed on a rota basis after 1579. But the political anarchy of the 1580s and the frequency of campaigns suggests that this policy was of temporary duration. Harding's assertion that there were a mere 12 companies in royal service in March 1585 fails to mention the nature of the civil war, involving three factions each of which could muster their complement of *ordonnance* companies. The gendarmerie was not dead but the control of patronage was out of the hands of the king because of political and fiscal decentralisation. Companies continued to exist without royal pay - employed by the Catholic League, the duc d'Anjou and the Huguenots and living off the land and expropriating royal revenues. It was the widespread extent of this anarchy <sup>that</sup> caused the outcry which Harding describes.

The expansion of military units is evident in other arms. Light cavalry and infantry commands proliferated in each locality and every small *bourg* had to have its garrison. From the late 1560s onwards important noblemen began to receive, in addition to the *ordonnance*, units of light cavalry paid for by the crown as a bodyguard and officered from among their own retinue.<sup>122</sup> The continuing tactical value placed on cavalry over infantry even in the 1590s was perhaps one reason why the gendarmerie survived into the wars of the Catholic League.<sup>123</sup> The effects of the expansion and devaluation of patronage were to have widespread political and fiscal implications. An early casualty was the chivalric order of Saint-Michel which became a virtually worthless dignity because it was awarded with reckless prodigality.<sup>124</sup> The expansion of office caused similar dissatisfaction and discontent within the ranks of a large proportion of the *noblesse de robe*.<sup>125</sup>

The stigma attached by nobles to serving in the army either as archers, infantry officers or light cavalymen declined throughout the sixteenth century. Social prejudice should never be confused with social reality. Most archers in the muster rolls were classed as *sieurs*, some as *écuyers* and even occasionally *chevaliers*. In 1579 Jean V, baron de Vieuxpont (d.1617), from an

---

<sup>121</sup> Orlea, *La Noblesse aux Etats généraux de 1576 et de 1588*, p 57; BN, Ms Fr, 3209, 21543.

<sup>122</sup> For example BN, Ms Fr, 21536, fo 2193, "Role de trente arquebusiers a cheval ordonne par le roy a M. la Meilleraye", 1 June 1576; BN, Ms Fr, 25809, fo 273, "Monstre a Rouen de trente arquebusiers a cheval sous Berthrand de la Braize estant pres de M. de Carrouges", 1577.

<sup>123</sup> C. Oman, *A History of the Art of War in the Sixteenth Century*, London, 1937, p 464.

<sup>124</sup> Orlea, *La Noblesse aux Etats généraux de 1576 et de 1588*, p 61.

<sup>125</sup> Benedict, *Rouen during the Wars of Religion*, pp 184-6, "The long-time members of the courts particularly resented the multiplication of their once select numbers and were thus more prone to oppose the king."

ancient Norman family, was an archer in the company of the marquis d'Elbeuf.<sup>126</sup> Thus it is not "raisonnable de présumer que tous les archers étaient roturiers", as Manuel Orlea does.<sup>127</sup> The patronage opportunities for noblemen in the infantry and light cavalry units during the Wars of Religion increased, as is recognised by Harding.<sup>128</sup> Two of the most important upper Norman noblemen, Adrien de Bréauté and Jean de Clères, had such commands in the 1550s before progressing on to command their own *ordonnance* companies in the 1560s, perhaps a reward for their loyalty to the crown.<sup>129</sup> One of the largest and most celebrated infantry regiments in France was that commanded by the comtes de Brissac. In time of war this regiment would have numbered in the thousands and provided many commands for the Brissac to fill.<sup>130</sup>

The continuing vitality of the *ordonnance* companies into the seventeenth century confirms their central role in the formation of affinities during the Wars of Religion. The military retinue of a nobleman was further strengthened by the proliferation of infantry, light cavalry and garrison offices. Political and fiscal decentralisation meant that local notables did not depend so heavily on the crown for the upkeep of their retinues. The Huguenots and the Catholic League, as well as a host of provincial potentates, were able to plunder localities or take over entirely the local royal fiscal machinery. If there was a failure of clientage it came not as a result of royal edicts but because the bonds of clientage were more complex and unstable than has hitherto been assumed. Moreover, local notables faced the same problems as the crown in terms of decentralised political authority and financial constraints when trying to control a province or even their own affinity or military retinue.

A company of the *ordonnance* reflected the regional base of a patron in terms of the offices he held and the estates he possessed. A patron thus made a clear choice as to where to recruit his military retinue, which would enhance his local status. Personal contacts were important in recruiting and men who enjoyed the physical proximity and the trust of their captain as neighbours, vassals or childhood companions were especially favoured. Closest and most important to a captain were his officers. The higher up the social scale a nobleman the more administrative responsibility was devolved to his officers. Captains shunned the more mundane tasks of military

---

<sup>126</sup> BN, Clair, 278, fo 5145, muster roll of 35 men-at-arms and 42 archers, Pontoise, 26 February 1579.

<sup>127</sup> Orlea, *La Noblesse aux Etats généraux de 1576 et de 1588*, p 58.

<sup>128</sup> Harding, *Anatomy of a Power Elite*, pp 76-7.

<sup>129</sup> Clères was captain of 560 foot see, ADSM, 7J, 3, 23 June 1553 and 12 June 1554. Bréauté was captain of 300 foot in 1557, see BN, Ms Fr, 32369, fo 225.

<sup>130</sup> This regiment grew out of the Piedmont regiment commanded by the maréchal de Brissac in the 1550s. For a list of his lieutenants see in Piedmont see François de Boyvin, sieur de Villars, *Mémoires*, Michaud and Poujoulat, 1st ser., X, pp 389-90. In 1567 Pierre du Bosc sieur de Préaux was "enseigne-colonel de M. le comte de Brissac", see ADSM, Tabellionage, 2E1, 335, 21 August 1567.

life like musters and garrison duty.<sup>131</sup> It would be wrong to see a company as a monolithic entity or simply as a source of patronage for the captain alone. Companies were agglomerations of subgroups with their own complex relationships bonded by service, status and kinship.<sup>132</sup>

By analysing these subgroups and following the changes within a company a clearer picture of the changing composition of a clientèle emerges. A quantitative analysis of the geographic distribution of a company shows that the company of the d'Elbeuf was dominated by men from the Vexin Français and Champagne in the 1560s. This was because René's officers were from these regions. The des Boves family, elevated by René's mother, dominated his household and these two regions were precisely where their landholding base lay. In 1565, just before René's death, 45 per cent of those men identifiable came from Champagne, 32 per cent from the Vexin Français but a mere 13 per cent from Normandy, where all of René's lands were situated.<sup>133</sup> The lieutenant and ensign of the company, both from the des Boves family, seemed to have as much influence over the composition of the unit as the captain. In fact, they would have recruited men from among their own clients, servants and contacts.

René's brother, Claude duc d'Aumale, was older and certainly more independent than his sibling. In 1565 Claude could boast a company of the ordonnance which was composed of noblemen from all over northern and eastern France. There were men in his company from Picardy, Normandy, Champagne, the Beauce, Burgundy and the Bourbonnais.<sup>134</sup> By 1572 the diversity of d'Aumale's company was somewhat reduced. The contingent from Normandy had swelled, making up 40 per cent of the company, while only 5 per cent were now coming from d'Aumale's *gouvernement* of Burgundy.<sup>135</sup> The changing geographical composition was not without reason or political consequence. In the case of the company of the duc d'Aumale the changes were due to the elevation of a new lieutenant. François de Chabot, sieur de Brion, a Burgundian, was replaced in 1569 by Claude Vipart, baron de Becthomas, a Norman, who had previously been ensign.<sup>136</sup> One man would have taken his followers with him and they would have been replaced from among the kin and servants of his successor.

---

<sup>131</sup> Contamine, *Guerre, état et société*, p 481

<sup>132</sup> For subgroups in the fifteenth century see Contamine, *Guerre, état et société*, pp 481-7.

<sup>133</sup> BN, Clair 261, fo 1719, muster roll of 40 men-at-arms and 60 archers, Montereau, 1 June 1565.

<sup>134</sup> BN, Clair, 261, fo 1729, muster roll of 50 men-at-arms and 74 archers, Chalons-sur-Saône, 5 June 1565.

<sup>135</sup> BN, Ms Fr, 21533, fo 2077, muster roll of 51 men-at-arms and 75 archers, Dreux, 6 October 1572. This contradicts Harding's assertion that 90% of the men in a company originated in the *gouvernement* of the captain if he were a lieutenant-general or governor, see *Anatomy of a Power Elite*, p 23, n 15. Lower down the social scale (i.e. lieutenant-generals) captains had a more parochial interest and composition of companies reflects this.

<sup>136</sup> Vindry, p 285.

Subgroups were able to move easily between one company and another, between one patron and another. This happened within the affinity of the Guise family itself revealing another factor in the versatility of the Guise clientele. In March 1573 Claude duc d'Aumale died at the siege of La Rochelle. Since his children were minors, his company was left in the hands of its officers. These men were comparatively fresh-faced, a new lieutenant, ensign and *guidon* having made their appearance only a few months earlier at a muster in October 1572.<sup>137</sup> Most important among these was a new lieutenant, Jacques de Tiercelin, sieur de Possé, from a family with a strong power base in Picardy.<sup>138</sup> During the next few years an influx of Picards began to replace the Normans and Burgundians. The Burgundians were likely to find favour with the new governor of the province, Charles de Lorraine duc de Mayenne, nephew of d'Aumale.

A muster of another nephew, the seventeen-year-old Charles, marquis d'Elbeuf, demonstrates that he also absorbed men formerly with his uncle's company. Charles was a more forceful character than his father and was anxious to establish a more independent household, reflecting his landholding base. Fifty per cent of his company in a muster taken in October of 1573 had, only one year previously, been serving under the banner of his uncle.<sup>139</sup> Although the des Boves family continued to monopolise the officer's posts there were changes in the geographic composition of the company. The same muster shows that 24 per cent of the company now came from Normandy and 18 per cent from the Bourbonnais. Companies were thus not created or changed by recruiting individuals but by the exchanges and movements of different subgroups between companies. The contingent from the Bourbonnais appears to be one such entity. It was headed by several members of the des Gouttes family, who may have elicited more loyalty from their followers than was due to the captain. However, the ability of subgroups to move to different patrons but within the umbrella of the Guise as an extended kin network reveals one of their major strengths as a family.

The bonds among the noblemen in a company were complex and multifarious. The Norman, Pierre d'Aigrefeuille, was a long serving man-at-arms in the company of the marquis d'Elbeuf (1565-79) and a neighbour of the marquis. He was the brother-in-law of Louis de Silly, sieur de La Potenay, (man-at-arms of the marquis, 1573-9). Furthermore, both men were kinsmen of the Morainville family which had a long history of service with the Guise.<sup>140</sup> The continued importance of vassalage, not in terms of dues and services to be rendered but as a point of physical contact and mutual recognition, cannot be underestimated as a means of entry into service

---

<sup>137</sup> Ibid.

<sup>138</sup> On the Tiercelin family, see Orlea, *La Noblesse aux Etats généraux de 1576 et de 1588*, pp 131-7.

<sup>139</sup> BN, Na Fr, 8630, fo 27, muster roll of 21 men-at-arms and 34 archers, Mery-sur-Seine, 11 October 1573.

<sup>140</sup> ADSM, Tabellionage, 2E1, 304, 9 October 1550; 2E1 350, 19 February 1575. Etienne de Morainville had been the *maître d'hôtel* of the duc de Guise in 1550 and briefly tutor of René marquis d'Elbeuf.

or a reason for fidelity.<sup>141</sup> Olivier de Cartula écuyer, man-at-arms of the duc d'Aumale (1572-5) and *maître d'hôtel* of the duchesse d'Aumale in 1590, held the fief of Amaulry de Serez valued at 201 of *rente per annum* from the duke's barony of Ivry. Jacques Sabrevois was man-at-arms in 1565 whilst Marguerite Sabrevois some years later held the fief of Sabrevois from the same barony.<sup>142</sup>

Charles de Fouilleuse (1546-1612), sieur de Flavacourt, was the descendant of an important Vexin family which could claim a former *bailli* of Rouen among its number. His elevation into the company of the marquis d'Elbeuf as *guidon* (1573-5) and then ensign (1576-9) coincided exactly with the influx of Normans into the unit. Thus, although Charles d'Elbeuf was inclined to focus his household on Normandy, he was still a minor who had spent most of his life at Joinville. He therefore relied heavily on Fouilleuse for his Norman connections with which to begin the restructuring of his company. <sup>Fouilleuse</sup> L remained a faithful companion of d'Elbeuf, being present at his wedding in 1583 in the capacity of "capitain de cent hommes d'armes soubz le command du duc d'Elbeuf".<sup>143</sup>

Fouilleuse established his position in the company by arranging marriages into the families of his fellow soldiers. One of these was the de L'Isle family from Etampes which contributed several men to the household of the marquis d'Elbeuf. Toussaint de L'Isle was a man-at-arms in the company of the marquis d'Elbeuf (1565-9), ensign (1573-5) and one of his *gentilshommes ordinaires* in 1581. Guillaume de L'Isle was a man-at-arms in the same company (1573-9) and captain of d'Elbeuf's château of Harcourt in 1588. Philippe de L'Isle had been a man-at-arms for the marquis d'Elbeuf in 1565 but he was able to serve another member of the Guise, becoming a man-at-arms (1572-6) and *gentilhomme ordinaire* of the duc d'Aumale.<sup>144</sup> Charles de Fouilleuse was related to this family through the marriage of his younger brother, Louis, to Jeanne de L'Isle.<sup>145</sup>

Furthermore, Fouilleuse carefully arranged the marriage of his two step-daughters. In 1579 the elder was married to Jean V, baron de Vieuxpont, a companion in arms in the same company of the *ordonnance*. The younger was matched in 1585 with a cousin of Vieuxpont, Jean de Courtils (d. 1592).<sup>146</sup> In addition, Fouilleuse also claimed other links with the Guise as brother-in-law of François Buigny, sieur de Cornehotte, a leaguer lieutenant of the duc d'Aumale in Picardy. Families

---

<sup>141</sup> Neuschel, *Word of Honor*, pp 132-85.

<sup>142</sup> Maudit, *Ivry-la-Bataille*, p 499.

<sup>143</sup> Vindry, p 304; BN, Cabinet d'Hozier, 216, fo 101.

<sup>144</sup> Vindry, p 304; ADSM, 6F, 11, Recueil des capitaines de Normandie, 12 September, 1588; ADSM, J, 138, Documents concernant le comté de Maulevrier, 1468-1779, 1576.

<sup>145</sup> E. Morel, *Houdencourt: seigneurie et paroisse*, 2 vols, Compiègne, 1878-82, vol I, p 299.

<sup>146</sup> *Ibid*, I, p 100.

such as these, all inter-married, were to form the martial vanguard of the Catholic League.<sup>147</sup>

### The Guise and the Norman Elites

Apart from the household officers and the men of their direct military retinue there were others whom the Guise considered as within their affinity. Loyalties fluctuated but there always existed noblemen who would support the Guise politically and militarily. The strength and dependability of this support was not constant and varied with time and circumstance. The study of clientage is fraught with methodological problems, Kristen Neuschel shows that the patron-client relationship was not a symbiotic bond based on mutual interest. Clients were largely autonomous, self-interested and even disobedient.<sup>148</sup> No relationship between patron and client was ever in a state of harmonious equilibrium, being stronger or weaker according to the situation. The clients only formed one part of the affinity, which embraced a variety of relationships from dedicated household servants to opportunistic factional allies at court. Affinities were formed from a multiplicity of relationships and patrons acted as poles of attraction rather than masters of a rigid and hierarchical following.

In the 1550s the Guise family in Normandy was beginning to attract the Norman elites, a process which, as the Guise were forced to strengthen their local power base to counter their waning influence at court, became more noticeable during the Wars of Religion. This section is not a definitive exploration of this phenomenon or of Guise involvement in Norman political society.<sup>149</sup> Instead, the aim has been to outline the important Guise clients in Normandy and show how the Guise were able to expand their affinity at a provincial level through their rise at court and rivalry with the Montmorency.

The Guise had already augmented their influence in Normandy by taking most of the Brezé inheritance and by forging stronger links with the financial and legal sections of Rouennais society. Trusts and contacts built up over many years would one day lay the basis for political influence in the province; at the very least they provided local information and knowledge.

Physical contact with the Guise family may have come directly from its landholding interest. The Moy family, for example, held the seigneurie of Pierrecourt from the duchy of Aumale.<sup>150</sup> Close ties were established between François de Guise and Charles de Moy, sieur de la Meilleraye, during the Scottish expedition of 1548-9. Moy would have solicited many patrons at court but, interestingly, only letters written to Guise survive. In 1554 it was to Guise that Moy asks for a position to be found for his cousin Jacques de Moy, sieur de Vereins:

---

<sup>147</sup> For the importance of these marriage alliances, see chapter seven below.

<sup>148</sup> Neuschel, *Word of Honor*, chapter one.

<sup>149</sup> These developments can be followed in chapters four to seven below.

<sup>150</sup> Semichon, *Histoire de la ville d'Aumale*, I, p 25.

Monsieur le sieur de Vereins present porteur que vous cognoissez avoir esté lieutenant de ma compagnie [since 1548] a tres bien obey de remectre ceste charge entre les mains de mon filz suivant le commandement du Roy et daultant Monseigneur que led. Vereins a deslibere de la parte que sera led. seigneur pour luy faire service a vous. Je vous supplie treshumblement Monseigneur quil vous plaise lavoir pour recommande en estre moyen quil sen employe en lestat auquel led. seigneur la pourveu en vostre faveur vous assurant Monseigneur quil est homme de bien.<sup>151</sup>

It is no surprise that when the cardinal de Lorraine and the duc de Guise came to Rouen to take part in the entrance of the queen of Scotland, they stayed at two residences. One was at Mauny (at that time belonging to their brother the duc d'Aumale) and the other was Moy's residence at La Meilleraye.<sup>152</sup> The son of Charles de Moy, Jean (1528-91), maintained the influence of the family in Normandy as both vice-admiral, like his father, and lieutenant-general of Normandy (1563-91).<sup>153</sup> He became one <sup>of</sup> the most important Guise clients in Normandy and a bulwark of the ultra-catholic faction in Normandy. His position at the top of the local hierarchy was reinforced by other, more minor, offices. Unlike the magnates he drew recruits to his company of the *ordonnance* almost exclusively from his native province.

The geographic base of the clientèle of the provincial élites was much narrower than that of a great lord, being drawn largely from a single *pays* or *bailliage*. Thus nearly half the company of Tanneguy Le Veneur, *bailli* of Rouen, was drawn from the *bailliage* of Evreux.<sup>154</sup> Similarly, 20 per cent of the company of Pierre de Roncherolles in 1585 were natives of the *bailliage* of Gisors. In both cases these numbers were a reflection of their respective landholding strengths. Furthermore, 33 per cent of the Roncherolles company were identified as Picards since Pierre's major office was the governorship of Abbeville.

The parochial nature of these gendarmerie companies can be established more fully by analysing the composition of the Moy company between 1559 and 1581. On average nearly 50 per cent of this company came from the *bailliage* of Caux. More specifically they were concentrated in the west, in the area between Le Havre and Rouen, because Moy's lands at La Meilleraye were situated on the Seine in this region and most of his officers were both neighbours and kinsmen. The 45 men in his company who came from the Caux represented 11 per cent of the 398 nobles found to be holding fiefs in this region in 1575.<sup>155</sup> Of course this percentage would have been

---

<sup>151</sup> BN, Ms Fr, 20545, fo 3, Moy to Guise, La Meilleraye, 5 July 1554.

<sup>152</sup> Floquet, II, p 194.

<sup>153</sup> He was also one of the three governors of the province from 1575 until 1583.

<sup>154</sup> See appendix E.

<sup>155</sup> Orlea, *La Noblesse aux Etats généraux de 1576 et de 1588*, p 54.

much greater in the west, especially in the *vicomtés* of Caudebec and Montivilliers which bordered Moy's lands. The local nobility benefited both from his position as vice-admiral and as lieutenant-general. Men from his own retinue were granted minor local offices. Gaspard de Coullarville, was a neighbour and ensign in Moy's company (1570-1) and made by Moy a *commissaire extraordinaire des guerres* (1568-78) and lieutenant of Harfleur.<sup>156</sup> Pierre Le Doyen, a man at arms in 1570 and *maître de logis* in 1574, went on to become the lieutenant of Honfleur from 1581 until 1590.<sup>157</sup> Charles d'Ercambourg was a man-at-arms in the Moy company (1569-81) and his brother François was captain of the small town of Pont-Audemer.<sup>158</sup> The offices of captain of the gendarmerie and vice-admiral also appear to have been complementary: Pierre Sécard was firstly a man-at-arms in the Moy company (1580-5) and then *commissaire ordinaire en la marine du ponant* in 1588. His brother Michel occupied the office of lieutenant of the admiralty (1581-3).<sup>159</sup> Adrien de Filières, a man-at-arms from 1570 until 1581, occupied a position in the *armée navale* in 1588.<sup>160</sup> Likewise, Jean d'Osterel, sieur d'Antigues, who was also a gendarme during the same period, was appointed *capitaine ordinaire en la marine*.<sup>161</sup> These men were neighbours of Jean de Moy, highlighting the importance of community and physical and geographical proximity in establishing an affinity.

The Le Veneur were another family which played a prominent role in Normandy during the turbulent years of the civil wars and, like the Moy, were associated with the Guise from the beginning of the reign of Henri II, especially after the disgrace of their patron admiral d'Annebaut.<sup>162</sup> It was through the association of Gabriel Le Veneur, bishop of Evreux, with the

---

<sup>156</sup> Vindry, p 364; BN, Ms Fr, 25802, fo 219, 6 January 1568; BN, Ms Fr, 25808, fo 186, 22 October 1575; ADSM, 6F, 11, Recueil des capitaines de Normandie; ADSM, Fonds Danquin, carton 16, no 1, 5 April 1578; Esperit de Coullarville was a man at arms in the Moy company (1570-4).

<sup>157</sup> Vindry, p 364. Louis Le Doyen was a man-at-arms from 1570 to 1574. Jean de Moy's younger brother, Jacques, was captain of Honfleur from 1565 to 1589, see C. Bréard, *Archives de la ville de Honfleur, notes historiques et analyses de documents*, Paris, 1885, p xix.

<sup>158</sup> ADSM, 6F, 11, Recueil des capitaines de Normandie, 4 April 1573.

<sup>159</sup> H. de Frondeville, *Les conseillers du parlement de Normandie sous Henri IV et sous Louis XIII (1594-1640)*, Rouen and Paris, 1964, p 297; ADSM, C, 1239, 3 August 1588. Pierre also acted as proxy for Moy in financial matters see, ADSM, Tabellionage, 2<sup>ème</sup> Héritage, 2E1, 2013, 23 May 1590; 2E1, 2015, 24 November 1590.

<sup>160</sup> ADSM, C, 1116, 11 May 1588. Filières was related to the Goutimesnil family who provided a number of officers to the Moy company over the years. Charles de Goutimesnil, ensign (1567-70) and lieutenant (1571), another neighbour of Jean de Moy had married Madeleine de Filières in 1560, see Vindry, p 364; ADSM, Tabellionage, 2E1, 320, 12 January 1560.

<sup>161</sup> D'Osterel had acted as a proxy for Moy in 1574 and, although *bailli* of Ardres and the comté of Guines, he was a resident of Moy's household at La Meilleraye see, ADSM, Tabellionage, 2E1, 348, 18 February 1574; 2E1, 360, 21 December 1580.

<sup>162</sup> See chapter two above.



cardinal de Lorraine that his younger brother, Tanneguy, became a familiar of the Guise and entered their service around 1560. He remained in relative obscurity in the 1550s, qualifying as captain of Vire and Avranches in lower Normandy - both towns, if they can be so called, of little significance.<sup>163</sup> The last surviving member of the d'Annebaut family, Jean (d.1562), also like the Le Veneur, found service <sup>with</sup> the Guise family during the 1550s. An ardent catholic and somewhat unsavoury character, his relationship with the Guise was his only possible means of reaching the king's attention given the enmity existing between his family and the Montmorency.<sup>164</sup> He followed the Guise into Italy in 1557 and was wounded at the battle of Fossano the same year. Such is the negative side but also a common feature of affinity: your enemy's foe is your friend. This is not an isolated example of the Norman clients of Montmorency's former enemies, offended by the overbearing *connétable*, seeking alliance with another group of his adversaries. Lucien Romier, discussing Normandy on the eve of the Wars of Religion, alluded to this:

La noblesse normande, si active du temps de François I<sup>er</sup> paraissait disgraciée et même suspecte en raison des liens qui l'unissaient à la famille d'Estouteville, ancienne rivale des Montmorency. Le connétable, devenu maître du gouvernement sous Henri II, n'avait pas pardonné non plus aux d'Annebaut, aux Matignon et d'autres maisons leurs relations avec son ennemi, l'amiral Chabot. Son triomphe fut complet lorsqu'il eut obtenu pour son propre neveu Coligny, le charge d'Amiral, charge qui conférait au titulaire des pouvoirs effectifs sur les forces du Roi en Normandie.<sup>165</sup>

The fact that the Guise were able to attract the services of the enemies of the Montmorency is further illustrated by the relationship between the Guise and the Chabot. Philippe de Chabot (d.1543) was created admiral by François I in 1526 and was only equalled by the *connétable* in the affections of the king until his disgrace in 1538. Chabot was stripped of his offices, imprisoned in 1541 and ordered to pay a fine of 400,000/. He was rehabilitated soon thereafter by the favour of the new royal mistress, the duchesse d'Etampes.<sup>166</sup> Symbolically, Chabot was reinstated at the same time that Montmorency was banished, despised as he was by

---

<sup>163</sup> BN, PO, 2958, fo 47, April 1559. The captaincy of Avranches paid him 100/ p.a. He was exempted from service in the *ban* in 1552 as captain of Vire and Avranches, see Travers (ed), *Rôle du ban at l'arrière-ban du bailliage de Caen*, p 117.

<sup>164</sup> On the career of Jean d'Annebaut, see D. B. F., II, p 1359.

<sup>165</sup> Romier, *Le royaume de Catherine de Médicis*, I, p 215. The d'Estouteville refers to the duke not the family. Until 1545 the duke was François de Bourbon, comte de Saint-Pol, patron of the Moy family. This point is further reinforced by the example of Jacques de Matignon who became very closely attached to Catherine de Médicis, herself never a great friend of the *connétable*.

<sup>166</sup> D. B. F., VIII, p 134.

the duchess. The offspring of the admiral found favour with the Guise. François de Chabot, marquis de Mirabeau and comte de Charny, second son of the admiral, became *guidon*<sup>in the</sup> company of the *ordonnance* of Claude d'Aumale (1558-62) and was later lieutenant (1562-70).<sup>167</sup> In 1583 Charles duc d'Elbeuf married Marguerite de Chabot dame de Pagny, granddaughter of the admiral.<sup>168</sup> Another of his many children, Anne, was a dame in the household of Mary Stuart.<sup>169</sup>

Another man who experienced the wrath of the Montmorency was Odart du Biez, captain and *sénéchal* of the Boulonnais. In 1549 du Biez and Jacques de Coucy, his son-in law and lieutenant, were arrested for treason for their failure to prevent the fall of Boulogne to the English in 1544. In June of 1549 Coucy was condemned and beheaded. Du Biez was ordered to receive the same punishment in August 1551 but was saved by a timely pardon and lived out his remaining years in disgrace.<sup>170</sup> The early career of du Biez was closely connected with that of Montmorency but had blossomed during the latter's brief disgrace, <sup>when he</sup> replaced Montmorency's brother as governor of Picardy in 1541.<sup>171</sup> Increasingly tied to the men who had displaced Montmorency in the early 1540s, he soon found himself out of favour when Montmorency<sup>n</sup> returned to prominence in 1547. He began to lose his offices to the kinsmen of Montmorency, losing first his governorship and then command of troops in the Boulonnais to Coligny in 1548. When du Biez was stripped of all land and possessions, half of his confiscated company of the *ordonnance* was allocated to Adrien d'Humières, a protégé of the *connétable*.<sup>172</sup>

It was the Guise who made a conscious effort to resurrect the fortunes of the du Biez and Coucy families. It was they who solicited for the *lettres d'abolition* of 1575 and 1576, restoring the honour of the two families.<sup>173</sup> Long before this, however, Antoinette de Bourbon had made efforts to help the Coucy family to whom she was related. She donated the fief of Chemery-sur-Bar in 1550 to Jacques II de Coucy, the surviving son of the victim of the scaffold and grandson of du Biez. Antoinette also gave the seigneuries of Parvin, Voupaix and Lersis to damoiselle Claude de Coucy in same year.<sup>174</sup> Guise protection of du Biez had its repercussions in Normandy where one of their most faithful clients in Normandy on the eve of the civil wars in 1562 was Jean de Clères

---

<sup>167</sup> Vindry, p 285.

<sup>168</sup> Anselme, III, p 493.

<sup>169</sup> Ibid, IV, p 572.

<sup>170</sup> D. Potter, "A Treason Trial in Sixteenth Century France: the Fall of Marshal du Biez, 1549-1551", *English Historical Review*, 1990, pp 595-623.

<sup>171</sup> Ibid, p 598.

<sup>172</sup> François de Scépeaux, sieur de Vieilleville, *Mémoires*, Michaud and Poujoulat, 1st ser., IX, pp 66-7.

<sup>173</sup> Potter, "The Fall of Marshal du Biez", p 622.

<sup>174</sup> ADSM, Tabellionage, 2E1, 304, 4 October 1550.

(1520-63), a grandson by marriage and beneficiary of Odart du Biez in his will.<sup>175</sup>

### Prelates and Churchmen

A large proportion of the *conseillers* of the parlements of Rouen and Paris identified within the broad affinity of the Guise were *conseiller-clerics* with an ecclesiastical background. The position of the Guise family at the pinnacle of the French church attracted many of these men to Guise service because of the potential for the pickings of ecclesiastical patronage. Among those already discussed Louis Pétremol and Roland Trexot were both *conseiller-clerics*. Jean Jubert (1523-70), elder brother of *conseiller* Jean who was also a considerable buyer of *rentes* from the duc d'Elbeuf, was dean of the cathedral of Nôtre-Dame de Rouen (1561-7), prior of Mont-aux-Malades (near Rouen) and more significantly *protenotaire* and *grand vicaire* of the cardinal de Guise for his abbey at Bec (1558-70).<sup>176</sup> Two other families associated with Guise service also had close links to the church hierarchy in Rouen. René des Buaz was a *conseiller-clerc* at the parlement of Rouen, curate and prior of Cléville, a canon of the cathedral of Rouen in 1550 and vicar-general of the cardinal de Bourbon in 1557.<sup>177</sup> Denis Brevedent (d.1573) was abbot of La Trappe and also a canon of the cathedral.<sup>178</sup> Unsurprisingly, it was families like these that formed the small ultra-catholic faction in Rouen in the late 1550s and early 1560s. Later Charles de Bornes, *procureur* of the cardinal de Guise for his abbey of Fécamp, became one of the bourgeois members of the provincial council of the Catholic League in Rouen.<sup>179</sup>

The elevated position of the Guise within the French church afforded them a bounty of patronage. The Le Cirier, prominent counsellors of the Guise, were well rewarded with ecclesiastical benefices. Antoine Le Cirier, in addition to being a *conseiller* at the parlement of Paris, was dean of Nôtre-Dame de Paris. In 1561 he received the bishopric of Avranches, visiting his diocese briefly before heading off to the council of Trent with the cardinal de Lorraine.<sup>180</sup> On his death in 1573 he resigned the see to his nephew Augustin.

Even after the Le Cirier tenure of Avranches ended, the bishopric remained firmly in the hands of *fidèles* of the Guise. From 1583 until 1617 Avranches was occupied by successive

---

<sup>175</sup> ADSM, 7J, 2, 28 May 1553, "Testament d'Odart du Biez".

<sup>176</sup> ADSM, Tabellioange, 2E1, 316, 14 March 1558; 2E1, 364, 25 October 1581; Frondeville, *Conseillers*, p 137.

<sup>177</sup> ADSM, G, 2162, 2 June 1557; ADSM, 6F, 4, Recueil de l'archevêque de Rouen, 9 October 1550; Frondeville, *Conseillers*, p 268.

<sup>178</sup> Frondeville, *Conseillers*, p 244.

<sup>179</sup> ADSM, Tabellionage, 2 meubles, 25 July 1586.

<sup>180</sup> Le Canu, *Histoire du diocèse de Coutances et Avranches*, I, p 458.

members of the Péricard family - a minor ecclesiastical dynasty faithful to and created by the Guise.<sup>181</sup> There were four Péricard brothers, the offspring of Jean Péricard *procureur-général* of the parlement of Rouen from 1558 to 1570.<sup>182</sup> Jean Péricard had already served the Guise, although we know not in what capacity, for Henri duc de Guise granted him three seigneuries, "in consideration of the services which the said Pericard had rendered him and the late lord duc de Guise, his father".<sup>183</sup> His sons prospered due to Guise patronage, the key to this being the position of the eldest brother Nicholas, trained as a lawyer, as a secretary of Henri duc de Guise. This resulted in the elevation of his younger brothers. Guillaume, canon of the cathedral of Rouen, was a *conseiller-clerc* in the parlement of Rouen from 1571 to 1609 and was to play a leading role in the leadership of the Catholic League in Normandy. Georges also briefly held office in the parlement (1579-82) but resigned in order to become bishop of Avranches in 1583. The youngest brother, François, dean of the cathedral of Rouen, also resigned his office of *conseiller-clerc* to fill the see vacated by his brother's death in 1587. François is best known for his interest in reform of the catholic church and his valiant defence of Avranches against the royalists in 1591.

Ecclesiastical patronage might also be conferred on a family who provided military service to the Guise. Thus, Artus Damerval, from the Picard nobility, was grand prior of the abbey of Fécamp (1559-92) for the cardinals de Lorraine and de Guise, but his family was more associated with service at the side of the duc d'Aumale. Charles, Jean and Pierre Damerval all saw service as archers in the company of the *ordonnance* of Charles duc d'Aumale between 1576 and 1581.<sup>184</sup> Another Picard family, although originally from Touraine, and associated strongly with the duc d'Aumale and the Catholic League were the Tiercelin. Jacques de Tiercelin, sieur de Possé, as we have already discussed, was the lieutenant of the duc d'Aumale. His elder brothers Charles (d.1589) and Nicholas acquired an impressive list of benefices which can only have been achieved with the collusion of the Guise.<sup>185</sup> Minor posts could easily be found for families in Guise service. Louis de La Menardière, cousin of the servant of the duc d'Aumale, Charles, was a monk at the abbey of Bec, held by the cardinal de Guise and two of the younger sisters of Charles de Sarcilly, *intendant* of the duc d'Elbeuf, were provided with support as nuns in the convent of Renée de Guise at Reims. Thus service with the Guise offered the advantage of providing for younger sons and daughters; crucial to the maintenance of the family inheritance in the case of large families.

However the best known prelate of Norman descent who had a strong affiliation with the

---

<sup>181</sup> *Ibid*, I, pp 458-75.

<sup>182</sup> For this and following see Frondeville, *Conseillers*, pp 501, 565, 583.

<sup>183</sup> Dewald, *The Formation of a Provincial Nobility*, p 89.

<sup>184</sup> See appendix F.

<sup>185</sup> Charles was abbot of Nôtre-Dame des Fontaines-les-Blanches (Brittany), prior of Saint-Lô de Rouen, prior of Sainte-Marie Magdelaine des Deux-Amants (near Rouen) and archdeacon of the Vexin Français, see ADSM, *Tabellionage*, 2E1, 356, 14 February 1578.

Guise was the cardinal de Pellevé, a man who was powerful enough in his own right to be seen as a counsellor and equal of the cardinal de Lorraine and not a subordinate or *créature*. During the time of the League he even received the archbishopric of Reims which he occupied until his death in 1594.<sup>186</sup> Pellevé came from an ancient and important Norman *noblesse d'épée* house but began his early years in the parlement of Paris. In 1553 he was made bishop of Amiens and served on the council sent by the Guise to Scotland in 1559 to bolster the regime of Marie de Guise.<sup>187</sup> He was rewarded for his service to the family by being chosen as archbishop of Sens in 1563 on the resignation of the cardinal de Guise. Pellevé's status was clear to contemporaries, being an "un *nomme fort versé aux affaires et créature de ce grand cardinal de Lorraine*".<sup>188</sup> According to one contemporary

ce prélat ne parvint aux dignités ecclésiastiques que par un dévouement servile à la maison de Guise, & surtout au cardinal de Lorraine qui lui ouvrit le chemin de la fortune, en le nommant son intendant.<sup>189</sup>

Little is known about Pellevé's role in the counselling and affairs of the cardinal de Lorraine. He was no lackey as his enemies claimed since he came from one of the oldest Norman families and consequently enjoyed a high status. Nor was he the only member of the family to have served the Guise. His eldest brother, Jean (1510-58), had married Renée Bouvery, a close relative of chancellor Poyet, in 1540. Poyet was yet another of the ministers of François I who attracted the hatred of Montmorency. Thus it is not surprising that we find another Pellevé, a nephew of the cardinal, serving in Scotland and dying at the siege <sup>of</sup> Leith, in 1559. Another nephew laid down his life thirty years later defending Paris against Henri de Navarre. Several of the cardinal's sisters and nieces married into families which were also associated with Guise service. His sister Roberte married Robert Vipart the cousin of the lieutenant of Claude duc d'Aumale. Their son Guillaume was captain of Pont-Audemer for the League in 1589. The wardship of Guillaume, established in 1566, was signed in the presence of the cardinal de Lorraine himself and the young nobleman soon found a place in the household of Henri duc de Guise as *gentilhomme page*. Françoise and Roberte de Pellevé married two leaguer captains - Michel d'Estourmel governor of Peronne and Nicholas de Moy, sieur de Vereins.<sup>190</sup>

This complex example of marriage patterns underlines the web of kinship links which were

---

<sup>186</sup> Anselme, II, p 74

<sup>187</sup> Brantôme, VI, p 38.

<sup>188</sup> Ibid.

<sup>189</sup> Michel de Castelnau, *Mémoires*, Collection Universelle des mémoires particuliers relatifs à l'histoire de France, Paris, 1786-91, 67 vols, vol XLI, p 299.

<sup>190</sup> Anselme, II, pp 77-8; BN, PO, 3029, fo 46; BN, Dossiers Bleus, 674, fos 20-1.

crucial to the resilience of an affinity; Guise defence of catholicism was the defence of their patrimony and power. Their position at the top of the church hierarchy meant that they became magnets for those seeking ecclesiastical patronage. Moreover, their preponderant influence in the church meant that they were able to satisfy their clients and servants in myriad ways; from efforts to provide a bishopric for Pellevé to finding places in nunneries and abbeys for the younger children of the *moyenne* and *petite* noblesse. The defence of catholicism, which forms the essence of the following chapters, was not only a conflict of faith and ideology but also <sup>a</sup> struggle to maintain the Guise family at the pinnacle of society.

## Chapter Four

### Defending the Family Interest: Court Faction, Religion and International Dynastic Strategy, 1558-62

On the night of 15 April 1562 fighting erupted on the streets of Rouen between protestants and catholics. This was a response to tension within the city, inflamed by the massacre of Vassy and the dramatic political events which were unfolding in and around Paris. The Huguenots in Rouen were well prepared and the authorities taken completely by surprise. The strategically important convent of the Célestines was seized, shortly followed by the hôtel de ville itself. The following day the keys of the town were secured and the beleaguered *bailli*, Jean d'Estouteville, sieur de Villebon, forced to hand over the château. His lieutenant in the vieux palais, Louis de Bigars, sieur de La Londe, was compelled to do likewise. On the morning of April 17 the Huguenots found themselves in effective control of the third city of the kingdom.<sup>1</sup>

The motives of the Huguenots behind this successful coup de main are inextricably linked to their fears of an impending repression of their faith. Immediately following the massacre of Vassy, the Huguenots in Rouen mounted an armed guard to protect their assemblies. Vassy was seen, not as a horrendous misjudgment by the duc de Guise, but as the beginning of a pre-meditated plot to eradicate protestantism. The subsequent march of the Triumvirs on Paris and the virtual imprisonment of the defenceless Charles IX and his mother only lent further credence to this conspiracy theory. On the 19 April the duc de Bouillon, governor of Normandy, arrived in Rouen on a mission from court to pacify the rebels. The Huguenot leaders justified their actions in a remonstrance to Bouillon.<sup>2</sup> The events of 15 April were represented as a defensive measure to ensure the safety of 'the people' against the machinations of malevolent factions and more specifically to defend royal edicts protecting protestant worship. The remonstrance directly accuses the duc de Guise, not only because of Vassy and his seizure of the king's person, but also because of his attempts to mobilise catholic forces in Normandy.

The remonstrance and the fears it expresses were the product of local circumstances as much as a direct response to the massacre of Vassy and the events taking place in Paris. The apologia had nothing to say in favour of the prince de Condé but conversely voiced great anxiety about the Guise and suspicion about the local threat posed by a man like Villebon. This chapter identifies and discusses those catholics who constituted that local 'menace', the relationship they had to the Guise and consequently to factional politics at court.

---

<sup>1</sup> P. Benedict, *Rouen during the Wars of Religion*, pp 96-7; *Histoire ecclésiastique*, II, p 715; *Relation de troubles excités par les calvinistes dans la ville de Rouen depuis l'an 1537 jusqu'en l'an 1582*, publication of *La Revue de Rouen et de la Normandie*, Rouen, 1837, p 14; "Discours abrégé et memoires d'aucunes choses advenues tant en Normandye que en France depuis de commencement de l'an 1559, et principalement en la ville de Rouen", in A. Héron (ed), *Deux Chroniques de Rouen*, Rouen, 1900, pp 194-5. The Huguenot insurgents reportedly numbered 500 compared to the handful of men at the disposal of Villebon.

<sup>2</sup> *Histoire ecclésiastique*, II, pp 716-18.



### Court Faction and Family Strategy, 1558-9

The unforeseen death of Henri II on 10 July 1559 is a convenient yet artificial and misleading historical watershed. The date separates the glories of the Renaissance monarchy from the ignominy of the introverted and chaotic civil wars. The sense of dramatic change is heightened because it ushered in the weak rule of François II and because "the ultra-catholic Guise took control of the government".<sup>3</sup> It will be argued that, in terms of policy, there was little difference between the two reigns. Furthermore, the Guise, like other families, was more concerned with pursuing and defending its own family interests than adhering to a single religious ideology with blind devotion.

When the Guise came to power in the summer of 1559 there were significant changes of personnel at court because they now held the reins of patronage. The need to dominate the patronage network was essential because the virtual bankruptcy of the monarchy dictated that there were not sufficient offices to satisfy everyone. When considering this period of history it is important not to give uncritical credence to the memoirs and histories of protestant commentators. The constant mistreatment of the princes of the blood by the Guise in these accounts is often mere justification and an apologia for the later actions of the prince de Condé. The Guise were shrewd enough to realise the dangerous consequences of alienating too many important families. Thus there was no series of wholesale disgraces, with the calculated exception of Diane de Poitiers, such as happened on the accession of Henri II in 1547. Montmorency was deprived of the office of *grand maître* but this took place only after his eldest son François received the office of *maréchal* as compensation. The Montmorency were too powerful to be ignored and, moreover, the Guise had to take into account and accommodate the ambition of their new ally the queen mother and her antipathy to the *connétable*.

Far from altering the designs of the dead king the Guise showed themselves to be highly conservative in carrying out his wishes. Their policies did not herald the dawn of a new era. Indeed they implemented the policies of Henri and his most trusted and faithful friend Anne de Montmorency. This future strategy consisted of maintaining a viable peace with Spain while at the same time pursuing French dynastic claims in Scotland.<sup>4</sup> At home religious persecution was to be intensified.

In the weeks before Henri's accident and death, the Guise were present at council meetings but it was Montmorency who was the major power broker at court. The origins of his ascendancy began two years previously. In the 1550s the Montmorency-Guise rivalry increased as François, duc de Guise, sought to capitalise on his growing military reputation first gained at the defence of Metz in 1552. Montmorency, with one eye on the royal finances and the other on his

---

<sup>3</sup> J. H. M. Salmon, *Society in Crisis: France in the Sixteenth Century*, New York, 1975, p 118.

<sup>4</sup> *CSPF*, 1558-9, p 305. There was a council meeting to formulate a Scottish policy on 7 June 1559.

rival, increasingly represented a more pacific faction at court. The clear difference between the two men intensified with the humiliation of the *connétable* at the battle of Saint-Quentin in August 1557. While Montmorency languished in Spanish captivity, François de Guise embarked on a glorious campaign which resulted in the capture of Calais in January 1558.<sup>5</sup> Henri himself was becoming increasingly suspicious of the reputation of Guise, and Montmorency's return to France in October 1558 only stiffened his resolve to seek peace.<sup>6</sup> Henri's freedom for manoeuvre was hampered by the parlous state of the royal finances and the growing confidence and assurance of the protestants. In January 1558 an assembly of notables agreed to loans totalling 3 million *écus*, a figure which was still not forthcoming at the return of the *connétable*. In May of the same year Montmorency's own nephew, François de Coligny, sieur d'Andelot, was imprisoned on suspicion of heresy at the behest of the Guise. Factional political advantage rather than religious zeal was the motive of the Guise for this démarche. Their influence was at its peak at court and they were determined to capitalise on their ascendancy. The pinnacle of Guise influence came in April when Mary Stuart, niece of the duc de Guise, married the dauphin - a reward for the capture of Calais. Success breeds jealousy and thus Diane de Poitiers, the former mentor of the Guise, realigned herself with her old protagonist Montmorency by arranging a marriage between her granddaughter and Henri de Montmorency-Damville.

The winter of 1558-9, with Montmorency safely back at court, witnessed a more vigorous pursuit of peace and a colder royal attitude to the Guise. The request of the duke for further rewards for his victory at Calais, especially the office of *grand maître*, was refused and, realising his increased isolation, he left court on December 1 1558. The Guise family could therefore only rely on Catherine de Médicis at court who hated Montmorency and balked at seeing the French abandoning their Italian allies. Peace negotiations began in earnest in February 1559, six miles from Cambrai.<sup>7</sup>

At the same time another event of significance was unfolding. Mary Tudor died in November 1558 and immediately Mary Stuart sought to have the arms and titles of the sovereigns of England added to those of Scotland and emblazoned on her possessions and domiciles.<sup>8</sup> Thus, although peace was concluded with Philip II by the treaty of Câteau-Cambrésis in April 1559, it would be wrong to see this as a comprehensive renunciation of war. Montmorency and the treasury

---

<sup>5</sup> This victory was due to the cooperation between the duke and the cardinal de Lorraine at court, see D. Potter, "The duc de Guise and the fall of Calais, 1557-8", *English Historical Review*, 1983.

<sup>6</sup> For this and following, see Baumgartner, *Henry II*, pp 197-230.

<sup>7</sup> De Thou, III, p 350.

<sup>8</sup> *CSPF*, 1558-9, pp 314, 324, 346. The English ambassador Throckmorton became obsessed with this affront.

gained peace while the king, the Guise and thousands of other noblemen would be able to continue their martial feats on another front.<sup>9</sup>

The traditional depiction of Guise strategy by their opponents and subsequently by historians is that of the family using all its resources in the destruction of protestantism.<sup>10</sup> This is an inaccurate reading of the events of the period 1559-60. We should not see the 1560s through the perspective of the Catholic League of the 1580s. Guise family strategy became inextricably linked to the defence of catholicism in the intervening years but in 1559 there was nothing inevitable about this. The cardinal de Lorraine was the most powerful ecclesiastic in the French church and had a great stake in its future. However this was not the only determinant of family strategy, and Lorraine was certainly not a pro-papal ideologue created in the same mould as the hawkish cardinal de Tournon.

Ultra-catholicism itself was never the sole preserve of the Guise, even when the family became synonymous with the defence of catholicism in the 1570s and 1580s. The inquisition tribunal established by the edict of Compiègne in July 1557 was largely the work of the king himself when the Guise family were away campaigning in Italy. Henri needed to hold a *lit de justice* to enforce the publication of the edict. The inquisition was to be run by representatives from the three leading families in France: the cardinals de Bourbon, de Châtillon (nephew of Montmorency) and de Lorraine.<sup>11</sup> Diane de Poitiers and the maréchal Saint-André also had a significant influence on the king's hardline policy. The edict which reinforced measures against heresy after Câteau-Cambrésis was drawn up and signed at Montmorency's château of Ecoeu when the *connétable* was once again ascendant at court.

The dominant themes of the reign of François II - religion, finance and Scotland - were similarly the preoccupying issues for his father who had, to a large extent, set the agenda for his son's reign.<sup>12</sup> After Henri's death the Guise continued these policies. The real problem was that their dominance at court and of patronage made this seem like the policy of a single faction rather than the result of a consensus reached during the previous reign. The battle for supremacy at court between the princes of the blood and the Guise was to destabilise France. It was only natural for the princes of the blood to seek a constituency among those opposed to the policies of Henri, among them protestants and unpaid soldiers. The determination to pursue dynastic interests in Scotland would not go unhindered either. A major expedition to Scotland would require the expertise and co-operation of Normandy's seafaring community and her provincial notables. This

---

<sup>9</sup> De Thou, III, p 254, lamented this continuation of hostilities when France was exhausted.

<sup>10</sup> Injudicious reading of the "historical" works of Regnier de La Planche would certainly give this impression, see H. Hauser, *Les sources de l'histoire de France: Le XVI<sup>e</sup> siècle (1494-1610)*, 4 vols, Paris, 1912, pp 66, 82.

<sup>11</sup> *Histoire ecclésiastique*, I, pp 136, 163.

<sup>12</sup> *CSPF*, 1558-9, p 307. The council sat "very hard on matters of finance, whereof they have much lack, notwithstanding the great sums they have borrowed".

would have to be undertaken in a war weary province whose commercial wealth had already suffered from piracy, trading restrictions and taxation.

Before analysing Guise attempts to mobilise the war effort in Normandy, it is important to understand the major details of the reign of François II. From the summer of 1559 until the drama of the *Conjuration* of Amboise (March 1560), which severely shook the regime, the Guise managed to maintain a firm grip on the flow of royal patronage.<sup>13</sup> Montmorency was not in favour and had no means of access to the king's ear. He retired to his estates with all but the office of *grand maître* intact. This gave Guise control of the royal household; an office he had coveted for a number of years. In addition, Guise acquired the office of *grand chambellan*, wrested from his young kinsman Léonor d'Orléans, duc de Longueville.<sup>14</sup> These offices at the centre of the royal patronage structure complemented the preponderant role already played by the cardinal de Lorraine in the church. In the royal council Guise conducted military affairs while Lorraine looked after finance. Changes in the personnel of the royal office hierarchy soon resulted. François de Coligny, sieur d'Andelot, was ousted as colonel-general of the infantry and replaced by Sébastien de Luxembourg, vicomte de Martignes, a distant kinsman of Antoinette de Bourbon.<sup>15</sup> Obviously any invasion of Scotland would require the full co-operation of the officers involved. D'Andelot was suspect because of his religion and family ties.

Diane de Poitiers and her closest relatives also suffered at the hands of the Guise. Despite the protests of her son-in-law, Claude duc d'Aumale, she was sacrificed and forced to retire to her lands in an effort to appease the queen mother. Her nephew, Louis de Brezé, bishop of Meaux, was similarly disgraced and compelled to vacate his office of *grand aumonier*.<sup>16</sup> The daughter of Diane, Françoise de La Marck, was also banished from court and her husband the duc de Bouillon came close to losing his governorship of Normandy. Diane, a mistress without a king, had become a political liability. Guise relations with Bouillon soon thawed, but clearly he was dependent on them to maintain his governorship.

The problem of the Bourbon claim, as princes of the blood, for a leading role on the royal council made Catherine a very useful ally, and great efforts were made to accommodate her. Nevertheless the Guise attitude to both Montmorency and Antoine de Bourbon was one of deference and caution. The two Bourbon brothers, Antoine de Navarre, <sup>and</sup> Louis prince de Condé <sup>their cousin</sup> and Charles prince de La Roche-sur-Yon, were all offered seats in council. In addition, Condé, who had not been thought of as worthy of a governorship before, was offered that of Picardy in place

---

<sup>13</sup> Harding, *Anatomy of a Power Elite*, pp 34-5.

<sup>14</sup> La Roque, *Histoire de la maison d'Harcourt*, I, p 735; La Planche, *La légende de Charles Cardinal de Lorraine*, p 34.

<sup>15</sup> L. Romier, *La Conjuration d'Amboise*, Paris, 1923, p 4.

<sup>16</sup> CSPF, 1558-9, p 338.

of Gaspard de Coligny.<sup>17</sup> However, the Bourbons believed they had to uphold what they saw as the rights and honours due to them as princes of the blood. Navarre was under pressure from those discontented with the present regime. He was in contact with the English ambassador, Calvinist ministers and Montmorency who all counselled Navarre to press his rights which, of course, would benefit them. Young hot heads in the retinue of Condé, such as the vidame de Chartres, were eager to make their own reputation through action. However, on his return to the South from a family conference at Vendôme, Navarre reaffirmed his loyalty to the king and adherence to catholicism.<sup>18</sup> He was accused by Calvinists and has been by subsequent historians of indecision, and for being seduced by both the Guise and Philip II with the mirage of compensation for the loss of Spanish Navarre from his kingdom. This is an unfair accusation against a man whose family interests did not necessarily coincide with the aspirations of French protestants. Indeed, Navarre occupied an excellent bargaining position from which to extract favours from the Guise.<sup>19</sup> Poitou was thus added to his already large *gouvernement* of Guyenne. On 25 November 1559 Navarre, La Roche-sur-Yon and the cardinal de Bourbon began their mission to accompany Elisabeth de Valois to Madrid, there to wed Phillip II in accordance with the Franco-Spanish peace. Condé, furious at the inactivity of his brothers, began to plot against the Guise.

There was certainly sufficient scope and enough disaffection on which to base a conspiracy. Patronage emanating from court was sharply curtailed in desperate economy measures. Pensions were cut back or left unpaid and thousands of disbanded soldiers were added to the swelling ranks of the discontented.<sup>20</sup> The huge alienations made by Henri II were revoked by the Guise, "chose qui desplaet grandement à beaucoup de Princes, grandes seigneurs & personnes notables qui se voyoyent frustrez de leurs bienfaitz".<sup>21</sup> Religious tensions and violence now affected the stability of every province of France. In Paris the burning of parlementaire Anne du Bourg (a prosecution begun in the reign of Henri II) made the cardinal de Lorraine even more unpopular with the greater part of moderate opinion.<sup>22</sup>

---

<sup>17</sup> Romier, *La Conjuration d'Amboise*, p 20.

<sup>18</sup> Ibid, pp 20-3.

<sup>19</sup> For a traditional evaluation of Navarre's role see N. M. Sutherland, *Princes, Politics and Religion*, London, 1984, pp 55-72.

<sup>20</sup> Romier, *La Conjuration d'Amboise*, pp 6-8; La Planche, *L'Histoire de l'Etat de France...sous le règne de François II*, p 5.

<sup>21</sup> La Planche, *Histoire de l'Etat de France...sous le règne de François II*, p 39.

<sup>22</sup> De Thou, IV, pp 400-1.

Normandy was no different from the rest of the kingdom with regard to the problems it faced in 1559. A forced loan of 800,000/ levied on the province in the previous year still remained unpaid. Charles de Bourgeville, a royal *officier* in Caen writing twenty years after the event, recalled vividly the hardships that this particular tax caused.<sup>23</sup> In the region surrounding Rouen, peasants fled their villages in order to escape the exactions.<sup>24</sup> It is thus against a background of religious, political and economic uncertainty that the preparations of the Guise for the Scottish expedition must be considered.

The Guise had been responsible for organising the previous expedition in 1548-9, primarily because of their dynastic interests in Scotland. However by 1551 peace had been concluded with England and Marie de Guise became regent in April 1554. She was an able politician, like her mother Antoinette de Bourbon. She reconciled disaffected noblemen by pursuing a lenient policy towards protestantism. The strategy of reconciliation was hampered only by the presence of Frenchmen in her household and French troops on Scottish soil. The precarious position of Marie was such that she was never able to implement a policy of repression as favoured by Henri II.<sup>25</sup> The twin fears of repression and the loss of independence, following the marriage of Mary Stuart to the Dauphin, provoked open revolt against the regency government in Scotland. By August 1559 Marie de Guise was clinging to the strongholds of Dunbar and Leith, awaiting assistance from her brothers.

It is possible to reconstruct accurately the way in which the relief expedition was organised because there are surviving reports from the many English spies active in Normandy at this time. In the beginning the campaign had been perceived as beneficial and not as solely in the sectional interests of the Guise. When Henri II was still alive he had seen Scotland as a crown for his eldest son. As early as 29 June 1559 Throckmorton, the English ambassador, reported the imminent dispatch of Jacques de La Brosse, "accounted one of the best men of war in France", and Nicholas de Pellevé bishop of Amiens. Both men were among the most trusted servants of the Guise family. La Brosse had already served in Scotland in 1548-9 and held a position as one of the closest advisers to François duc de Guise. Pellevé was held in similar regard by the cardinal de Lorraine. La Brosse was to provide the military expertise and Pellevé, who was accompanied by three theologians from the Sorbonne, was clearly entrusted with the task of combatting heresy. The expedition force, numbering approximately 2,000 men landed in August 1559.<sup>26</sup>

---

<sup>23</sup> Bourgeville, *Les Recherches et Antiquitez de la province de Neustrie*, p 162.

<sup>24</sup> Floquet, II, p 277.

<sup>25</sup> Donaldson, *Scotland: James V-VII*, pp 80-99.

<sup>26</sup> *CSPF*, 1558-9, p 346; De Thou, III, p 454.

The Estates of Edinburgh demanded that Marie relinquish affairs of state and surrender Leith where she was sheltering. The arrival of the French reinforcements strengthened her hand against the Confederates. The subsequent campaign of the rebels was a fiasco and they were eventually compelled to evacuate Edinburgh on 6 November 1559. The Scottish rebel leaders were now forced to turn to the English for aid under the Treaty of Berwick (27 February 1560). The war now escalated for English troops crossed the border in March and laid siege to Leith. Peace was finally concluded in July 1560 due to the death of the regent, the failure of the siege of Leith and increasing turmoil in France.<sup>27</sup>

Interest lies less in the political narrative than in the effects of the logistics and preparations for the campaign and their specific relation to the Guise position in Normandy. The problem of supplying an army over such long distances, even one as small as 3-4,000 men, was a major problem for the early modern polity.<sup>28</sup> The logistical problem was enhanced by the hostility of the English who presented a threat to French shipping even before the Treaty of Berwick. The continuous difficulties of traversing the North Sea can be illustrated by the frustrated attempts to send René de Lorraine, marquis d'Elbeuf, and François de Lorraine, *grand prieur*, to Scotland with reinforcements. This expedition was first mooted in July 1559 but not realised until spring 1560. Indeed, the *grand prieur*, who was entrusted with the task of leading the Levant galley fleet from Marseille, was still in transit along the western seaboard of France when peace was eventually concluded.

The operation, of which the Guise had full control after the death of Henri II, not only had to deal with the perennial problems of distance, bad weather and corsairs but also the political instability in France, shortage of money and war weariness. Nowhere were these factors more evident than in upper Normandy where the major preparations for the Scottish campaign were sited. The previous expedition had largely been organised by the Guise through the good offices of the vice-admiral, Charles de Moy, sieur de La Meilleraye. The local credit of a man like Moy was vital for getting orders and plans speedily translated into action. His expertise was to be sadly missing in 1559 when, at around sixty years of age, he was incapacitated by infirmity.

Gaspard de Coligny, as admiral, had a role to play in these preparations. It is important to remember that Coligny was not yet the implacable foe of the Guise that he was later to become. Coligny was not stripped of his governorship of Picardy until early 1560. Thereafter he began to use the office of admiral to build up support in Normandy. He spent more time than ever before in the province, cultivating links with the reformed community. He was sent to Normandy by the queen mother to enquire into the state of religious feeling. This culminated in the celebrated petition signed by 50,000 Norman Huguenots, presented to the king at Fontainebleau in August 1560.<sup>29</sup>

---

<sup>27</sup> Donaldson, *Scotland: James V-VII*, pp 96-9; De Thou, III, pp 456-66.

<sup>28</sup> These troop figures include those men already based in Scotland before the arrival of reinforcements.

<sup>29</sup> Romier, *Le royaume de Catherine de Médicis*, I, p 215; De Thou, III, p 526.

Coligny, on the other hand, conducted himself in a seemingly diligent manner throughout the campaign and liaised with the Guise servant La Brosse.<sup>30</sup> Coligny may have seen the expedition as an opportunity to expand his credit and reputation in the province and increase his authority at the expense of the vice-admirals who were usually responsible for naval logistical organisation. In July 1560 Charles de Moy retired from public life but was unable to resign his offices to his eldest son Jean. The office of vice-admiral fell into temporary abeyance and the captaincy of Le Havre passed to Jean de Cros, a Languedocian client of Coligny.<sup>31</sup>

After the first expedition had departed in August 1559 the Channel ports were occupied with the victualling of ships and the constant arrival of fresh troops awaiting transport. In Normandy the main towns affected were Honfleur, Le Havre, Dieppe and Fécamp. The disruptions of war signified continuing hardship to these communities, dependent on fishing and commerce. These problems were exacerbated by the very nature of the Scottish campaign itself. The Guise had much to gain dynastically from victory in Scotland and the campaign could be seen as being solely in their factional interest. Moreover, the expanding Calvinist community in Normandy could only look on apprehensively at the attempts to suppress their religion in Scotland. The Huguenot communities in Le Havre and Dieppe would have been especially aware of this. A chapel was established at Havre as early as 1557. Dieppe became home to one of the largest Calvinist congregations in France. The first pastors had arrived in January 1558 and the town had strong trading links with Scotland. John Knox visited the town in February and March 1559, baptising several important noblemen. These included Jean de Senarpont, *bailli* of Amiens, and Charles de Martel, *sieur de Bacqueville*, a leading upper Norman nobleman. The expansion of the reform was facilitated by the Poitevin captain of Dieppe, Charles de Ponsard, *sieur de Fors*, yet another Coligny appointee.<sup>32</sup>

The Guise were able to call on their own clients with local credit and in whom they could have complete confidence. In September 1559 the English ambassador was "informed that M. de Carrouge, brother of the bishop of Evreux, a gentleman of the king's chamber and of the faction of the Guise, will be sent to England".<sup>33</sup> Tanneguy Le Veneur, *sieur de Carrouges*, would be entrusted with many sensitive missions by the Guise but he held no significant office in Normandy. He was a servant at court beside the duc de Guise rather than a provincially based contact. Thus there was no nobleman in Normandy, who had the requisite local credit and the complete trust of the Guise family, able to organise the expedition and maintain smooth relations between court and locality. The expedition was to be directed largely by the family itself. On 2 December 1559 René

---

<sup>30</sup> CSPF, 1558-9, pp 432-3, 454-5.

<sup>31</sup> H. Amphoux, *Essai sur l'histoire du protestantisme au Havre et dans ses environs*, Le Havre, 1894, p 44; A. Borély, *Histoire de la ville du Havre et de son ancien gouvernement*, 3 vols, Le Havre, 1880-1, vol II, p 24.

<sup>32</sup> Borély, II, p 18; G. and J. Daval, *Histoire de la Réformation à Dieppe*, 2 vols, Rouen, 1878, vol I, pp 7-17; ADSM, 6F, 11, Recueil de capitaines de Normandie; CSPF, 1559-60, pp 142-4.

<sup>33</sup> CSPF, 1558-9, pp 541, 570, 586.



marquis d'Elbeuf was created lieutenant-general of Scotland by the king. This was an appointment which protected the family interests of the Guise. As a Norman landowner René could expect to have some leverage in Norman society. If this was the rationale behind his appointment it was severely flawed. René himself was inexperienced and, as we have seen, his clientèle base was drawn largely from the traditional Guise strongholds in eastern France. Moreover, the commission was granted against a background of rising discontent among the townsfolk of Rouen and Dieppe:

They are not in good quietness; they grudge and murmur at the Cardinal of Lorraine's proceedings and his government of their King. They fear not so much the war, and think the Cardinal of Lorraine has cause to fear the people, who (as the voice is) does not lie far from the King, and has a guard for his more assurance.<sup>34</sup>

Reports like this from English spies are subjective and anecdotal. However they do provide unique eye-witness accounts of the preparations for the Scottish campaign. The contacts of the English agent probably included many Huguenots. They were obviously concerned more about the continuing policy of repression than the war at this time. This report is contemporaneous with the controversial trial of protestant magistrate Anne du Bourg in Paris. Indifference to the war in Scotland might have continued in Normandy, had d'Elbeuf's relief expedition been able to leave port. Instead the marquis was driven back by storms and only two vessels, one of which contained the vicomte de Marigues, completed the hazardous voyage.<sup>35</sup>

The misgivings of the Huguenot minority about the Guise were expressed by a wider section of the community for different reasons. Normandy now had to suffer an influx of idle soldiers and the re-fitting of storm damaged ships. Supplying and equipping the relief expedition in Normandy cost 166,454l.<sup>36</sup> The burden on the local population was great since billets and sustenance had to be found for the army in the depths of winter. On the 5 January 1560 the marquis d'Elbeuf established his residence in Dieppe, thus adding to the chagrin of the indigenous protestant community who found the public exercise of their religion proscribed for the next two months.<sup>37</sup> On March 13 Francis Edwards, an English agent, informed London about the sentiments of the Dieppois:

Arrived at this town of the 7th [March], and received a letter from a friend at Rouen, who wrote that he had seen a letter from Dieppe, mentioning that d'Elbouef

---

<sup>34</sup> *CSPF*, 1559-60, p 184.

<sup>35</sup> C. de La Roncière, *Histoire de la marine française*, 6 vols, Paris, 1899-1932, vol, IV, p 26.

<sup>36</sup> *Ibid*, p 28 n 1.

<sup>37</sup> Daval, *Histoire de la Réformation à Dieppe*, I, p 13.

had departed into the country. The merchants are glad of the same, for he was right noisome unto them; few men can say well by him or the Cardinal of Lorraine, and think there will be some stir before they bring their matters to pass. All men draw back and get themselves out of the way, in order not to go with him on this voyage [to Scotland]; some say they are sick and other[s] they lack money. There is much talk of the Queen. The poor merchants would be sorry to have war of her making; they say it is too great a price for them, they will not be able to wear it out; they will be content with peace, they have no money for war at present; "whishing the Cardinal of Lorraine were bound to a stake and all the dogs of the Pallis Garden were upon his back."<sup>38</sup>

Merchants were concerned about the continued effect of the war on trade. Amongst the Huguenot community hatred of the Guise was even more acute, especially in Dieppe where a member of the family was physically present in the town with troops. Soldiers like these antagonised the townsfolk of Le Havre: "they would have meat and drink without money, wherefore the townsmen and they can scant agree."<sup>39</sup> The tension inside Dieppe was only relieved when d'Elbeuf departed:

On the 26th [March] M. de Foesse [Fors], Captain of Dieppe, came to the castle of Dieppe and proclaimed that noone should call the people there Lutherans on pain of death. The people of Dieppe every night in the market-place and afterwards, going through the streets, sing the Psalms of David, and some days have sermons preached to them in the fields.<sup>40</sup>

This example demonstrates exactly the extent to which royal edicts could not be carried out when the local royal officers had no interest in the enforcement. Religious repression was thus largely a failure as the cardinal de Lorraine was beginning to realise. It was counter-productive because, far from ensuring religious uniformity and peace, it only served to de-stabilise the body politic. Moreover, the Scottish campaign was draining the royal treasury and further antagonising the seafaring communities of the northern coast. By April 1560 a policy was evolved which foresaw the dispatch of a large relief force in July, including the Levant galley fleet. Furthermore peace negotiations were instituted under the auspices of the queen mother. The Guise had no altruistic motive for this and thus it was simply a tactical political move.<sup>41</sup>

---

<sup>38</sup> CSPF, 1559-60, p 446.

<sup>39</sup> Ibid, p 493.

<sup>40</sup> Ibid, pp 493-4.

<sup>41</sup> Ibid, pp 521-2, 531.

In accordance with this plan a much larger force of noblemen gathered at Dieppe in early May to hasten preparations. This time the Guise called on men of local influence to make the preparations more efficacious. D'Elbeuf was now accompanied by the rehabilitated governor of Normandy, the duc de Bouillon, who, as a Calvinist himself, offered the hope of improved relationships with the Huguenots. Accompanying them were Jean d'Estouteville, *sieur de Villebon*, *bailli* of Rouen, and Claude de Lorraine, duc d'Aumale.<sup>42</sup> This 'organising committee' therefore comprised the two most important royal office holders in the province and two members of the Guise family who were also large landowners in upper Normandy. It was hoped these men would have the necessary influence, as the Venetian ambassador reported "M. d'Aumale has been dispatched to Normandy that his presence and authority may hasten the outfit of ships, and the supplies of ammunition and victuals."<sup>43</sup>

The peace negotiations dragged on, however, and the limit of Guise power in Normandy was evident as the fleet was still unable to sail. The problems with the relief expedition were not simply due to hostility in the ports. François d'Andelot, no friend to the Guise, refused to embark with troops under his command in Marseille, whereupon many other captains and soldiers followed his example.<sup>44</sup> He and his brother, Gaspard de Coligny, had little to gain from going to Scotland in person. Nevertheless, the admiral was party to the preparations taking place in Normandy in the spring and early summer of 1560, although, as has been discussed, these were not the only reasons for his presence. In June 1560 he was at Le Havre supervising the transport for the troops who were arriving daily. Five vessels were readied for the embarkation of 800 men, and stores were laid in at Caudebec, Harfleur and Le Havre itself for a long campaign.<sup>45</sup> Preparations continued on into July. All prospective voyages to Guinea, Brazil, Biscay and Canada were halted and the captains ordered to prepare for royal service. On 20 June Coligny held a council of war at Le Havre with all the sea captains.<sup>46</sup> These measures belied the continuing problems of the expedition. Even as they celebrated the peace treaty in Edinburgh it was clear to the English that the Guise had been forced into peace by internal circumstances:

The ten hulks stayed for the French king have been discharged, because the mariners would not serve...The Admiral having consulted all the captains for the sea at Newhaven, received answer that the ships were not meet for any enterprise and the men were not willing to serve....It is thought that [in Marseilles], as about

---

<sup>42</sup> *CSPF*, 1560-1, p 39.

<sup>43</sup> *Calendar of State Papers, Foreign Series, Venice*, R. Brown et al (eds), 9 vols, London, 1867-97, 1558-61, p 180.

<sup>44</sup> *Ibid*, p 105.

<sup>45</sup> *CSPF*, 1560-1, p 143; La Roncière, *Histoire de la marine française*, IV, p 27.

<sup>46</sup> *CSPF*, 1560-1, pp 166-7.

Dieppe the people and mariners are so evil satisfied that they dare not trust them.<sup>47</sup>

The Scottish campaign foundered on the inability of the Guise to mobilise the ports of Normandy into a sustained relief operation. There were a number of factors which contributed to this: primarily lack of money and the internal instability and unpopularity of the regime, which meant that Scotland was never the major interest of the Guise. The problems may well have been insurmountable but they also say something about Guise authority in Normandy. Despite their dominance at court and the help of the admiral, their influence was minimal. They needed provincial contacts and clients to get things done. This had been most successful in the campaign of 1548-9 when the Guise had liaised with La Meilleraye, the vice-admiral. Coligny's role in 1560 was ambivalent. He was more concerned with strengthening his own power base in the province, especially among members of the reformed community who were by no means partisans of the catholic government in Scotland. The governor of Normandy, Bouillon, had little credit in the province that could be of use to the Guise. More importantly, despite their landholding base in Normandy, René and Claude de Lorraine lacked a major office and thus the extensive affinity and power of patronage which would facilitate the speedy departure of the relief force, as their presence was expected to do.

In accordance with their upbringing and tradition, Claude and René maintained links with eastern France through clients drawn from the region. There were Norman parlementaires, nobles and merchants in the Guise affinity but this was based purely on the landed interest of the Guise in Normandy and had nothing to do with building up influence in the province. The Scottish campaign demonstrated the limits of Guise power even when maintaining control of the patronage resources of the monarchy.

#### The Guise and the Response to Protestantism In Normandy, 1559-60

After the death of François II in December 1560 there was a consequent decline in Guise influence at court. The Guise remedied this by cultivating their provincial links and by increasingly identifying themselves with ultra-catholic opinion. In Rouen there was already an ultra-catholic faction in the city which represented a wider constituency for the Guise in which to expand their credit.

The small cotérie of men who represented the ultra-catholics among the Rouennais city elites had maintained definite and traceable links to the Guise going back many years, a number were indeed paid servants. Nevertheless it would be wrong to see these men as the pawns of some higher authority. The Guise were more ambivalent towards ultra-catholicism than has been assumed hitherto and the people who moved into their affinity did so because of their own beliefs

---

<sup>47</sup> Ibid, p 182.

and strategies. Alliance and empathy with the Guise interest was one way of furthering an individual's own political and career ambitions.

Normandy had a long tradition of protestantism and its repression dates from 1528 when Pierre Bar was the first man to be put to death for heresy.<sup>48</sup> In 1531 an *inquisiteur de la foi* was established in the province.<sup>49</sup> This tribunal was installed in the convent of the Jacobins in Evreux in the diocese of Gabriel Le Veneur - a close fidèle of the cardinal de Lorraine. However, it functioned for only a short time, its prosecution record uneven and its efficacy questionable.<sup>50</sup> Philip Benedict, citing Paris and Toulouse as examples, argued that, despite the inadequacies of judicial repression, it did have an effect on the spread of heresy.<sup>51</sup> Evreux was to remain largely untouched by the growth of Calvinism in the 1550s. In Rouen, on the other hand, protestant cells became more deeply established and the institutionalisation of the reformed church began with the arrival of a Calvinist minister in 1557.<sup>52</sup> It was lower Normandy that led the way in the establishment of churches. The congregations of Saint-Lô, Vire and Bayeux had churches by 1557 and Caen followed suit in 1558.<sup>53</sup> Lower Normandy was far enough away from the surveillance of the parlement of Rouen and too jealous of its own autonomy to permit the efficient prosecution of royal edicts. In upper Normandy Dieppe had a church since August 1557 and the village of Luneray in the pays de Caux provided a centre of worship for Huguenots from the neighbouring bourgs and villages.

The most striking and politically dangerous aspect of the growth of Calvinism was its success in attracting the nobility. The rate of conversions was particularly noticeable in lower Normandy. Gabriel de Lorges (d.1574), comte de Montgomery, a man infamous for his accidental killing of Henri II, was the most important of these. Ostracised by society after his misfortune, Montgomery fled France and converted while staying in England in 1560.<sup>54</sup> His renunciation of catholicism was preceded by that of his equally important neighbour François de Briquerville (1535-74), baron de Colombières. The conversion of the elite of the local *noblesse d'épée* encouraged and influenced those of lesser status.<sup>55</sup> At its peak in the late 1560s Calvinism could claim to be

---

<sup>48</sup> Floquet, II, p 223.

<sup>49</sup> Ibid, p 224.

<sup>50</sup> Bonenfant, *Histoire générale du diocèse d'Evreux*, I, p 133.

<sup>51</sup> Benedict, *Rouen during the Wars of Religion*, p 49.

<sup>52</sup> Ibid, p 51; *Histoire ecclésiastique*, I, p 135.

<sup>53</sup> M.-S. Lamet, "Reformation, War and Society in Caen, Lower Normandy, 1558-1610", unpub. PhD thesis, Univ. Massachusetts, pp 144-54; *Histoire ecclésiastique*, I, p 252.

<sup>54</sup> A. Landurant, *Montgomery le régicide*, Paris, 1988, p 48.

<sup>55</sup> For a list of Protestant noblemen, see E. Laheudrie, *Recherches sur le Bessin: histoire du Bessin des origines à la Revolution*, 2 vols, Caen and Bayeux, 1930, vol II, pp 10-14.

the religion of 40 percent of the nobility of the *élection* of Bayeux.<sup>56</sup> The links of many of these Normans to the Calvinist leadership demonstrate the importance of marriage and clientage in the transmission of the reformed faith. For example, Colombières was related to Eléonor de Roye, the wife of the prince de Condé.<sup>57</sup>

In upper Normandy the strength of Calvinism within the nobility seems to have been modest in terms of numbers and status compared with lower Normandy. The paucity of work on this topic does not enable us to draw concrete conclusions. It is noticeable that more compact and larger temporal territories were to be found in upper Normandy than in lower Normandy. It was in the region on the right bank of the Seine that the lands of magnates were situated. The inability of noblemen such as these to support Calvinism openly and protect it in their jurisdiction must have inhibited its growth.

One of the largest landowners in Normandy, the majority of whose territories were situated in upper Normandy, was Léonor d'Orléans (1540-73), duc de Longueville. His mother, Jacqueline de Rohan, won a legal action against the Guise in 1554 which gave her sole wardship of the young duke when he succeeded his cousin, François d'Orléans, in 1551. The Guise were uncles and guardians of the late duke and despite the legal wrangles maintained an close interest in the affairs of his successor.<sup>58</sup> Thus in 1560 the cardinal de Lorraine was named as *curateur* for the administration of the young duke's estates until he attained his legal majority.<sup>59</sup> At the same time preparations were under way for the marriage of Longueville to the eldest daughter of François duc de Guise. However, the relationship between the duke and Jacqueline de Rohan was soured in the same year when Guise took the office of *grand chambellan* from his prospective son-in-law. Relations between the two families continued to deteriorate, as the English ambassador reported in May 1561:

The King [Charles IX] was sacred at Rheims on 15th....The Prince of Condé, the Admiral, the Duke of Longueville, the Mareschal of Montmorency and his brother Damville, were not at the sacre, because they would not assist at the Mass. The said Duke is clean fallen from the other side and from his marriage that was in hand with the Duke of Guise's daughter; he is now altogether on this side, which

---

<sup>56</sup> Wood, *The Nobility of the Election of Bayeux*, p 161.

<sup>57</sup> Laheudrie, *op cit*. Connections between Condé and these lower Normans were forged and maintained through his lieutenant-general in Picardy, Jean de Monchy, sieur de Senarpont, who was a landowner in both provinces.

<sup>58</sup> La Roque, *Histoire de la maison d'Harcourt*, I, p 735; BN, PO, 2165, fo 1053; ADSM, C, 8182, *Comptes du duché de Longueville*, 1549-50. The duc de Nemours was also close to the new duke even though only distantly related.

<sup>59</sup> BN, Ms Fr, 20176, fo 195, *Lettres Patentes de Charles IX*, 15 March 1562.

has greatly increased the Protestants, he being one of the greatest of this realm.<sup>60</sup>

This rupture with Guise over religion was not as obvious as it seemed. At this particular juncture the major influence over Longueville was his mother, who was a correspondent of Calvin. Nevertheless, Longueville's conversion was a major boost to the protestant cause, especially in upper Normandy where he had many tenants and because the chapel at Luneray was surrounded by his lands. Longueville's château at Tancarville on the Seine acted as a haven for Huguenots escaping persecution.<sup>61</sup> The captain of the château was Jean d'Aché, sieur de Serquigny. It is not certain whether Serquigny adopted Calvinism in the wake of his master. He was, however, related to other Norman Calvinists, like the *bailli* of Evreux, Jean d'Orbec (d.1565).<sup>62</sup>

Among the *moyenne noblesse* of upper Normandy the most important Calvinist was Charles de Martel (d.1566), sieur de Bacqueville. As early as 1534 Bacqueville was suspected of harbouring heretics. He held many of his lands from the duc de Longueville and like his lord his attitude to protestantism was equally ambivalent. He signed Condé's association for the defence of the Gospel in 1562 but never took up arms. He was a moderate, and his seven children were a mix of both protestants and catholics. His links to the catholic hierarchy were strong. One of his relations Etienne, perhaps a brother, was bishop of Coutances between 1552 and 1560 and a sieur de Bacqueville was a pensioner of the cardinal de Lorraine in 1561.<sup>63</sup>

Bacqueville's faith was therefore not necessarily the prime determinant of his political affiliations. The ducs de Longueville and de Bouillon, governor of Normandy, were also Calvinists but both followed highly individual strategies. Both men were kinsmen of the Guise and this, as much as their religion, coloured their strategy. Neither had much in common with the Calvinist faction except religion. Indeed in November 1561, when Coligny was ascendant at court, Bouillon was in danger of losing his office because he was "well affected to the house of Guise".<sup>64</sup> Bouillon did not find this relationship incompatible with his religious beliefs and during a sojourn in Normandy in July 1561 gave great heart to the reformed community with his sympathetic attitude to their plight.<sup>65</sup> The failure of magnates like Bouillon and Longueville to support the reformed faith, either politically or militarily, would prove a severe handicap to Norman protestantism. Normandy was a protestant stronghold in terms of numbers but it never had a leader of sufficient

---

<sup>60</sup> CSPF, 1561-2, p 121.

<sup>61</sup> A. Deville, *Histoire du château et des sires de Tancarville*, Rouen, 1834, p 260.

<sup>62</sup> M.R.N. Sauvage, "Les Troubles de 1562", *Etudes Lexoviennes*, 1915, p 53.

<sup>63</sup> A. Hellot, *Essai historique sur les Martels de Basqueville et Basqueville-en-Caux*, Rouen, 1879 pp 159-88; D. B. F., IV, pp 1128; BN, Clair, 1204, fo 83.

<sup>64</sup> CSPF, 1561-2, p 401-2.

<sup>65</sup> Floquet, II, p 363.

status to defend its early gains. The essentially egocentric mentality of both Bouillon and Longueville should not simply be seen as the lost opportunity of Norman protestantism. Rather, their strategies were perfectly logical within the context of noble culture; collaborating with the Guise to further their respective houses. Indeed, Bouillon was probably dependent on Guise support to retain his office as he lacked other means of support at court after the death of Diane de Poitiers.

Until 1559 Calvinism was the concern of a small, if growing, minority of the French elites. Likewise the repression of heresy and attempts to foster catholic piety was the domain of a few zealots. The catholic hierarchy made no concerted attempt to revive popular devotion to catholicism in the 1550s and 1560s.<sup>66</sup> Etienne de Bacqueville-Martel, bishop of Coutances since 1552, did not make any effort to visit his see until 1558, despite the growth of heresy. Seven months after arriving he fled because of the threat that the Calvinists posed to his person.<sup>67</sup> The response of the ecclesiastical authorities in the diocese of Rouen to the reform movement was languid and ineffectual.<sup>68</sup> The secular arm of repression was represented by the parlementaires in Rouen who were, by and large, catholic moderates with a distaste for harsh measures.

Not every magistrate in Rouen was so indifferent and it is this small group of men which is of most interest. It is also possible to trace the links between the Guise family and this clique. Nonetheless, it must be stressed that the Guise were not the sole family which was identified with ultra-catholicism, and that the relationship between the Guise and their Rouennais contacts was a complex alliance of ties rather than that of direct control implied by the traditional patron-client model. Moreover, the Guise association with ultra-catholicism has perhaps blinded historians to the fact that the family was primarily interested in protecting its own interests. It was not until the summer of 1561, when Guise influence at court was waning, that there are the first indications that François de Guise was becoming associated with the defence of catholicism in the Parisian popular imagination. At the same time the cardinal de Lorraine was as unpopular as ever and remained committed to seeking doctrinal reconciliation with the Calvinists.<sup>69</sup>

The most zealous inquisitors in Rouen in the 1550s included Robert Raoullin, sieur de Longpaon and *conseiller* in the parlement, and René des Buaz, canon of the cathedral of Nôtre-Dame de Rouen and *grand vicaire* of the diocese of Rouen. In the absence of the cardinal de Bourbon, the office of *grand vicaire* was regarded as the principal ecclesiastical office in the archbishopric of Rouen. In 1554 Longpaon accused *conseiller* Antoine de Croismare of heresy

---

<sup>66</sup> Benedict, *Rouen during the Wars of Religion*, p 192.

<sup>67</sup> D. B. F. IV, p 1128.

<sup>68</sup> D. Nicholls, "Inertia and Reform in the Pre-Tridentine French Church: The Response to Protestantism in the Diocese of Rouen, 1520-62", *Journal of Ecclesiastical History*, 1981.

<sup>69</sup> S. C. Shannon, "The Political Activity of François de Lorraine, duc de Guise (1559-1563): From Military Hero to Catholic Leader", unpub. PhD thesis, Univ. Boston, 1988. This thesis covers court politics and changes in family strategy during these years in greater detail than can be given justice here.



during a full session of the parlement.<sup>70</sup> Longpaon is a more interesting figure than des Buaz because of his long standing links with the Guise. His career in the service of Diane de Poitiers and then as the *procureur* of the duc d'Aumale has already been traced.<sup>71</sup> Longpaon was no mere puppet of the Guise; his zeal was genuine, and furthermore it is likely that the Guise had little interest in the detailed proceedings against heretics when they were at war in the 1550s. Longpaon's motives may have been altruistic, factional or designed to attract plaudits from his patrons. In November 1556 five *conseillers* were purged because their faith was dubious: Jean de Quievremont, Jérôme Maynet, Antoine de Civille (who later repented), Charles Le Verrier and Robert Le Roux.<sup>72</sup> Tensions in the city increased after this date especially with the establishment of the protestant church in 1557. The catholics made some moves to increase devotional activities and preaching. Chief among these was Claude Sécard curé of Saint-Maclou.<sup>73</sup> By the 1560s the Sécard family were increasingly important in the church hierarchy and would play a longrunning but unrecognised role in the defence of catholicism throughout the Wars of Religion in Rouen.

During the period 1560-1 there were no fewer than nine serious disturbances of public order in the city.<sup>74</sup> The *bailli* of Rouen Jean d'Estouteville, sieur de Villebon (c1492-1565), was an ultra-catholic who became notorious for his harshness towards the Huguenots. In 1560 he drew up a list of all those who did not openly take part in catholic rituals and processions.<sup>75</sup> Although Villebon was a catholic, that did not necessarily make him a Guisard. Despite service under the duc de Guise in 1558 in Picardy there is nothing to suggest that he was a partisan of the family.<sup>76</sup> Rather, Villebon consistently neglected the wishes of the Guise. In June 1560 the inhabitants of Dieppe, Le Havre and Rouen presented a confession of faith to the parlement of Rouen. This was publicly burnt in front of the cathedral on the 12th. The following day the religious procession of the *fête-dieu* turned into religious riot. Following this episode some 2,000 Huguenots marched on the parlement to demand justice. Not to be outdone by this show of strength Villebon rode through the streets of Rouen "en grande compagnie" demanding that all citizens celebrate the festival for the full eight days on pain of death.<sup>77</sup>

---

<sup>70</sup> Floquet, II, p 295-6.

<sup>71</sup> See chapters two and three above.

<sup>72</sup> G. Le Hardy, *Histoire du Protestantisme en Normandie depuis son origine jusqu'à la publication de l'édit de Nantes*, Caen, 1869, p 16.

<sup>73</sup> *Histoire ecclésiastique*, I, 229.

<sup>74</sup> Benedict, *Rouen during the Wars of Religion*, p 58.

<sup>75</sup> Floquet, II, p 297; *Histoire ecclésiastique*, I, p 348.

<sup>76</sup> Benedict, *Rouen during the Wars of Religion*, pp 96-7.

<sup>77</sup> *Histoire ecclésiastique*, I, 351-2.

Royal policy at this time, formulated largely by the cardinal de Lorraine, was designed to defuse religious tension as much as possible in order to stabilise the tottering Guise regime. The impending assembly of notables at Fontainebleau (21-26 August 1560) was the beginning of the search for some solution to instability. Lorraine had realised well before the unsettling and disruptive Conspiracy of Amboise that religious repression would only exacerbate dangerous factionalism.<sup>78</sup> Villebon was more concerned about his own authority than that of the Guise. Indeed, the activities of Villebon and other provincial zealots like him threatened Lorraine's attempts to secure the monarchy:

I am also told that the cardinal greatly complains of Villebon accusing him of too much zeal and inquisitiveness in having caused such great turmoil, and that he ought rather to have dissembled and pretended not to see what did not please him, than to proceed to such extremities for the discovery of what was kept hidden, whereby he has done nothing but place all his Majesty's Ministers in danger and anxiety.<sup>79</sup>

Far from being a Guise placeman, Villebon had risen in the service of Anne de Montmorency. It was Montmorency who protected him from royal disfavour after a humiliating defeat in a skirmish with Imperial troops in 1558. Villebon donated several pieces of territory to the *connétable* "pour la bonne amitié qu'il a à Monsieur Anne duc de Montmorency".<sup>80</sup> The ultra-catholics, in the 1560s especially, were at no time a monolithic faction. On July 7 1560 a general pardon was published at the parlement of Rouen and prisoners involved in the recent disturbances were released.<sup>81</sup> This was in line with Guise strategy at the time and could not have been instituted without their consent. Court directives had little effect on the tensions in the provinces. In August Rouen was again the scene of further violence. The lieutenant-general of the *bailliage*, Jacques de Brevédent (d.1580), found it increasingly difficult to pursue the functions of his office, since he "n'osait sortir de sa maison; craignoit tout de la haine de certains malveillants qui voulaient faire le contraindre à mettre en liberté un de leurs, détenu prisonnier."<sup>82</sup> Brevédent was an obvious target of anger because of his position of authority. His reputation was further tarnished, in the eyes of the reformed community, by his close connections with Diane de Poitiers and then the Guise. Along with Longpaon he was closely involved with the efforts of the Guise to sell *rentes*

---

<sup>78</sup> Romier, *Conjuration d'Amboise*, p 150.

<sup>79</sup> *Calendar of State Papers, Venetian, 1558-80*, p 226.

<sup>80</sup> P. des Forts, *Le Château de Villebon, Eure-et-Loire: Etude historique et archéologique*, Paris, 1914, p 32.

<sup>81</sup> Floquet, II, 314.

<sup>82</sup> ADSM, G, 2164, 15 August 1560.

in Rouen. Significantly, it was Brevedent who was deputed by the town council of Rouen to go to Paris and lobby the cardinal de Lorraine for a reduction of the town's tax contribution in 1555. The cardinal managed to get him an audience in front of the king and the *conseil privé*.<sup>83</sup> Brevedent had close ties to the local catholic hierarchy. His uncle had been a priest, and his son Denis (d.1573) was abbot of La Trappe and a canon of the cathedral of Rouen.<sup>84</sup> Denis, as a canon, would have been an associate of René des Buaz, canon and *grand vicaire*. Another priest singled out for his zeal, Claude Sécard, was to see his relative, Adam, appointed to the office of dean in the cathedral chapter in October 1560.<sup>85</sup> The cathedral chapter was thus home to a small number of the most zealous catholics. These were some of the men trying to defend catholicism in 1560. However, there was as yet no organisation and little that this handful of priests and lawyers could do. Moreover, there was little support at court for a policy of repression, in fact, more the opposite. However, the nucleus of ultra-catholics in Rouen would grow in the following year and the Guise, increasingly displaced at court, sought to activate and strengthen their affinity in Rouen and to reaffirm their commitment to catholicism.

#### The Guise and the Defence of Catholicism, December 1560-April 1562

Since the summer of 1560 the Guise had tried to bolster their regime by defusing the religious problem and pursuing the perceived threat of the prince de Condé. Two of the most prominent Norman clients of the Guise were involved in the last case. Tanneguy Le Veneur, sieur de Carrouges, would play a key role in Normandy in the next thirty years. He came to prominence at court with his kinsman and neighbour, Jean de Bailleul, sieur de Renouard, on the accession of François II. Both men had originally been close to the admiral Claude d'Annebaut until his death in 1552. Bailleul had served in Italy under the Guise as the lieutenant of the ordonnance company of Jean d'Annebaut. In 1560 they were jointly charged with the arrest of Madeleine de Mailly, Condé's mother-in-law and a stalwart of the reformed cause.<sup>86</sup>

Condé was himself finally arrested and tried following a summons from the king. The judgement was suspended on the death of François II on 5 December 1560, only eight days before the Estates-General was due to open at Orléans. The accession of a minor strengthened the hand of Catherine de Médicis and the princes of the blood at the expense of the Guise. A reaction of the

---

<sup>83</sup> ACR, A, 17, 14 August 1555.

<sup>84</sup> Frondeville, *Conseillers*, p 244.

<sup>85</sup> ADSM, G, 2164, 27 October 1560.

<sup>86</sup> La Planche, *Histoire de l'Etat de France...sous le règne de François II*, p 624; De Thou, III, p 569; D. B. F., IV, 1296; Travers (ed), *Rôle du ban et de l'arrière-ban du bailliage de Caen*, p 117. On the significance of the d'Annebaut-Brezé antecedents of the Guise affinity, see chapters two and three above.

Estates against the previous regime might have been expected, with the perennial problem of taxation and the religious question high on the agenda.<sup>87</sup> Delegates were concerned about these problems but the Guise were not used as scapegoats. Some enemies of the Guise accused them of a concerted effort to prevent the election of Calvinist deputies; *this is unlikely and hard to verify*. The Guise did have many of their own men as representatives. The deputies of Burgundy and Dauphiné, provinces governed respectively by the ducs de Guise and d'Aumale, demanded that the princes of the House of Lorraine enjoy the same rank as the princes of the blood at the Estates.<sup>88</sup> Although this request was rejected and despite widespread dissatisfaction with the reign of François and distrust of the cardinal of Lorraine, condemnation of the Guise was muted. The family showed it could still call on the voices of two provinces to speak up for it in the Estates.<sup>89</sup>

Other Guise clients were elected, particularly in Champagne. Jean de Choiseul, sieur de Lanques, lieutenant of the company of the marquis d'Elbeuf, was chosen to represent the Second Estate of the *bailliage* of Clermont. In Normandy Jean de Bailleul, sieur de Renouard, represented the nobility of the *bailliage* of Alençon.<sup>90</sup> The Estates-General of Orléans thus presaged the election of many Guise clients to the Estates of 1576 and 1588. There was therefore a caucus sympathetic to the Guise at Orléans. To what extent there was liaison and organisation it is impossible to gauge.

The problems for the Guise were not in the Estates but at court. The Guise and their kinsmen now found themselves out of favour. The ducs d'Aumale, de Longueville and de Nemours all took leave of the court in January 1561 and the cardinal de Lorraine departed on 1 February.<sup>91</sup> On 24 March 1561 Antoine de Navarre was made lieutenant-general of the kingdom, although Catherine was the real influence at court as regent. Catherine's attempt to manage court affairs on a Bourbon-Montmorency axis was doomed to failure. The ageing Anne de Montmorency was irked by the influence of the Calvinists at court and the behaviour of his own nephew, admiral Coligny. During Easter 1561 the formation of the Triumvirate for the defence of catholicism set the seal on the Guise-Montmorency rapprochement. Strictly speaking the Triumvirate was an association led by Guise, Montmorency and maréchal Saint-André. It resulted from their weakness and loss of

---

<sup>87</sup> De Thou, IV, pp 2-8; G. Picot, *Histoire des Etats-Généraux considérés au point de vue de leur influence sur le gouvernement de France de 1355 à 1614*, 4 vols, Paris, 1872, vol III, pp 24-32.

<sup>88</sup> De Thou, IV, p 16. The deputies were urged to "donnât aux princes de Lorraine, les mêmes titres qu'on donne aux Princes du sang".

<sup>89</sup> When the Estates reconvened in August 1561 the Huguenots were better organised and more effective in promoting their cause, see N. Valois, "Les Etats de Pontoise (Aout 1561)", *Revue historique de l'église de France*, 1943.

<sup>90</sup> Lacourcé and Duval (eds), *Recueil des pièces originales et authentiques concernant la tenue des Etats-Généraux*, 11 vols, Paris, 1789, vol I, pp 9-15.

<sup>91</sup> L. Romier, *Catholiques et Huguenots à la cour de Charles IX*, Paris, 1924, p 54; Shannon, "The Political Activity of François de Lorraine", p 245.

influence at court but its strength resulted from the range of opinions it embraced. The pro-papal cardinal de Tournon was no friend to the Guise. The Triumvirate encompassed important nobles in their own right like the duc de Montpensier and the comte de Brissac.<sup>92</sup> The Triumvirate was a proto-catholic League without ideology or popular elements. It had as much to do with court faction as religious loyalty.

François de Guise left court in April, not wishing to be seen to condone tolerant attitudes to worship. Guise also broke off the engagement of his daughter to the duc de Longueville following his refusal to attend mass at the *sacre* of Charles IX. The cardinal of Lorraine however pursued a more tolerant line in the summer, culminating in the colloquy of Poissy in September. Whether this was part of the process of mere political manoeuvring or a sincere desire for doctrinal reconciliation is not at issue here. The fact is however that the Guise family was not presenting a monolithic ultra-catholic front bent on the destruction of protestantism.<sup>93</sup> In defence of family interests the Guise were politically flexible and in regard to the religious question they were not united in their search for a solution. The duc de Guise stood firm against any concessions that would undermine the position of the catholic church but did not interfere with his brother's plans. Guise perhaps had more to lose. His image as a popular military and catholic hero had begun to take root in the imagination of the Parisian *menu peuple*. This is illustrated by the rapturous reception he received during the procession of the *fête-dieu* in Paris (5 June 1561).<sup>94</sup>

The queen mother sought to defuse religious and factional tensions, thus stabilising the regency. The edict of 30 July 1561 was the result.<sup>95</sup> This edict endeavoured to stop the escalating violence in the provinces in order to lay the groundwork for an accommodation at Poissy. Most significantly it proscribed all leagues and associations. On the surface the edict only recognised catholicism but it ended the death penalty for heresy, and governors, like the duc de Bouillon in Normandy, were told privately to show leniency in its application.<sup>96</sup> The new mood of conciliation was crowned when, at the reopening of the Estates-General at Pontoise in August, a formal public reconciliation was staged between Guise and Condé. On 9 September 1561 the first debates of the colloquy of Poissy began.<sup>97</sup>

---

<sup>92</sup> Romier, *Catholiques et Huguenots*, pp 104-5.

<sup>93</sup> For a discussion of the religious question in 1561 see, Shannon, "The Political Activity of François de Lorraine", pp 286-299; Evennett, *The Cardinal de Lorraine and the Council of Trent*, London, 1930; Nugent, *Ecumenism in the Age of Reformation: The Colloquy of Poissy*.

<sup>94</sup> Romier, *Catholiques et Huguenots*, pp 136-7; De Thou, IV, p 67.

<sup>95</sup> Romier, *Catholiques et Huguenots*, p 159; De Thou, IV, p 71.

<sup>96</sup> Romier, *Catholiques et Huguenots*, p 163.

<sup>97</sup> Romier, *Catholiques et Huguenots*, p 180; De Thou, IV, pp 72-3.

The colloquy failed but this did not prevent Catherine searching for a solution, and she summoned an assembly of notables to convene at Saint-Germain in the coming winter.<sup>98</sup> The failure of Poissy undoubtedly damaged the credit of the cardinal de Lorraine and probably convinced his brothers that moderation was a failure. Moreover, the Huguenots were beginning to dominate the *conseil du roi*. Condé's rising star was crowned with the acquisition of the governorship of Picardy in place of the Triumvir and Guise nominee, the comte de Brissac. The duc d'Aumale was the first to leave court on the 9 October rapidly followed by the cardinal de Lorraine and his companion Gabriel Le Veneur, bishop of Evreux. Ten days later the duc and cardinal de Guise, accompanied by the ducs de Longueville, Nemours and "other great personages" in a train including 700 men, departed.<sup>99</sup> Longueville's presence in this cortège suggests that religion was not the sole motive for this exodus. Rumours of plots circulated and both Catherine and Antoine pleaded for Guise to return to the court where they could be watched more closely. When Montmorency left court two days after Guise, the *conseil du roi* assumed the character of being in the control of one faction. The council was dominated by Catherine, chancellor Michel de l'Hôpital, Navarre, Condé and Coligny. The former favourites of Henri II were away from the centre of royal patronage but all the more dangerous for it. The projected assembly of notables would have little authority as it would be bereft of the most powerful men in the kingdom.

The Guise family remained in eastern France from October 1561 until March 1562; Catherine's persistent appeals to return to court were ignored. Unfortunately we know little about their movements. The Guise were plotting to frighten Catherine into acceding to their wishes or by taking more direct action to seize power. Consequently, a good opportunity to hold counsel was during Christmas which was spent at Joinville. Thence the duc de Guise and the cardinal de Lorraine moved on to Nancy where they were entertained by their cousin the duc de Lorraine. From here the two brothers, accompanied by the duc d'Aumale, travelled to Saverne to discuss doctrinal reconciliation with the duke of Württemberg and his Lutheran theologians. Apprehension at court was understandable as an English commentator wryly noted "the Court fears the Guise more than the Guise fear the Court".<sup>100</sup> From Saverne, where the Guise hoped to neutralise Lutheran opinion or even create an anti-Huguenot alliance, they returned to the family seat at Joinville.

D'Aumale returned to court by 6 March, perhaps as a means of facilitating the gathering of information.<sup>101</sup> It is impossible to know if either he or d'Elbeuf spent any time at their Norman residences that winter or whether there was any Guise contact with the growing ultra-catholic faction in Rouen. Attempts at reform and reconciliation at court were in stark contrast to the escalating violence in the provinces; here Catholics and Huguenots dispensed their own justice. In

---

<sup>98</sup> De Thou, IV, p 128.

<sup>99</sup> CSPF, 1561-2, pp 360-2, 396-403.

<sup>100</sup> CSPF, 1561-2, p 479; Shannon, "The Political Activity of François de Lorraine", p 326.

<sup>101</sup> CSPF, 1561-2, p 547.

Normandy in August the great equine fair at Guibray was the scene of further disorders.<sup>102</sup> In the same way that the Triumvirate was formed as a reaction to the growing influence of the Huguenots at court, steps were being taken in the same direction in the provinces. In Rouen the *Confrérie du Saint-Sacrement* was founded in 1561 and quickly gained a large membership.<sup>103</sup> Growing catholic activism was forming out of the kernel of the minority of zealots of the 1550s. The plotting of the Guise in the winter of 1561-2 and the renewed vigour of ultra-catholics in Normandy, culminating in the raising of catholic forces in March 1562 by Guise clients, shows a remarkable correlation.

On 19 September 1561 Pierre Quitard of Bourges was executed in Rouen for possessing papers listing the names and detailing the wealth of the four hundred leading Rouennais Huguenots.<sup>104</sup> The activities of this man give credence to the not unbiased claims of the *Histoire ecclésiastique* that there was an anti-protestant plot being hatched in Rouen. The *Histoire* also states that the Guise were implicated because Quitard was a servant of the sieur de Fizes, *secrétaire d'état*, who owed his position to Guise patronage. This assertion is not without foundation, for Fizes was in the service of the cardinal de Lorraine between 1559 and 1563, only attaching himself to Catherine de Médicis thereafter.<sup>105</sup>

Quitard's links to the Guise are a possibility. On his arrest he was reported to be in possession of correspondence from the cardinal de Lorraine and Catherine. This does not prove their complicity in a plot and Catherine denied any knowledge of the man. The duc de Bouillon was sent with a special commission to try Quitard in the *présidial courts* and justice was quickly dispensed. The *Histoire ecclésiastique* implicated a number of local men who seem far more likely candidates for a projected *démarche* in Rouen. These included Richard Papillon, *conseiller* at the *hôtel de ville*, Robert Raoullin, one of the stalwarts of ultra-catholicism, Nicholas Damours, *avocat du roi*, Louis Pétremol, *président à mortier* in the *parlement* of Rouen, Claude Sécard, by now *grand vicaire* of the diocese of Rouen, Jean Péricard, *procureur du roi*, and Raoul Yon, *avocat*.<sup>106</sup> The author of the *Histoire* may have been expressing his prejudices in compiling this list of miscreants. Nevertheless, these names contain men at the forefront of repression in the 1550s and men whose service to the Guise goes back further still.

Jean Péricard was a faithful servant of the Guise and both he and his three sons did not go unrewarded, attaining major offices in the legal and ecclesiastical hierarchy through Guise patronage.<sup>107</sup> By autumn 1561 Péricard was identified with ultra-catholicism but as early as 1559

---

<sup>102</sup> Benedict, *Rouen during the Wars of Religion*, pp 56-7.

<sup>103</sup> *Ibid*, 68-9.

<sup>104</sup> *Ibid*, p 67.

<sup>105</sup> *Histoire ecclésiastique*, I, pp 858-61; D. B. F., XIII, p 1427.

<sup>106</sup> *Ibid*.

<sup>107</sup> See the preceding chapter.

he had served as a commissioner to supervise the repression of Calvinism in the Cotentin.<sup>108</sup> Nicholas Damours (d.1585) had been *avocat-général* in the parlement since 1558 and was sent on a similar commission to Caen in January 1560. Both he and Péricard have no identifiable link to the Guise before 1561. They seem to have gravitated towards the Guise affinity because of common religious beliefs. Damours also remained closely identified with the Guise interest during the Wars of Religion. He counselled the duc d'Aumale on campaign Normandy in 1562, and his house was destroyed by the Huguenots in retaliation. His elder brother Pierre would join the Catholic League in 1589.<sup>109</sup>

It is important to stress the sincere catholic faith these men shared. Richard Papillon was later arrested for his part in the murder of a Huguenot *officier*.<sup>110</sup> Their motivation was not loyalty to the Guise but a common interest in the defence of catholicism. Naturally the furnishing of favours and services was also part of involvement in the Guise affinity. Each noble served his own interest in working towards a common goal. The growth of those men involved in the Guise affinity was aided by the existence of Guise servants in Rouen, such as Longpaon, who had ready access to the Guise family. Similarly, Louis Pétremol (d.1563) had been in Guise service, enjoying their patronage since at least 1549.<sup>111</sup> Pétremol was a senior magistrate and a figure of authority who symbolised everything the Huguenots feared. The Guise lands were to become easy targets for the Huguenot troops in 1562 and ultra-catholic magistrates had their property ransacked. As early as July 1561 Pétremol, perhaps identified in the popular imagination with the Guise family, was the subject of threats and attacks and suffered "des injures et voyes de faict commises contre luy et ses domestiques en sa maison située au faubourg Cauchoise".<sup>112</sup>

The names provided by the *Histoire ecclésiastique* fail to mention Jean de Lallement, sieur de Marmaigne, who served on the Guise council in Paris. In August 1553 he resigned his office of *conseiller* in the parlement of Paris to another Guise client, Antoine Le Cirier, in order to take a similar post in Rouen. He later went on to become *président à mortier* in the parlement where he was recognised as being particularly "fort sévère et exacte à faire la recherche et punition de ceux de la R. P. R."<sup>113</sup> More importantly it was he who would rally the demoralised parlement in May 1562 after the Huguenot coup. Saint-Anthot, the moderate *premier président*, fled to his home in Burgundy, leaving Lallement to preside over the radicalisation of the parlement in relation to the problem of heresy.

---

<sup>108</sup> Le Hardy, *Histoire du Protestantisme en Normandie*, p 30.

<sup>109</sup> Floquet, II, pp 397-410; Frondeville, *Présidents*, p 238.

<sup>110</sup> Benedict, *Rouen during the Wars of Religion*, p 116.

<sup>111</sup> See chapter three above.

<sup>112</sup> Frondeville, *Présidents*, p 176.

<sup>113</sup> Frondeville, *Présidents*, pp 182-5.



Potential Guise support in the winter of 1561-2 was not only confined to a small cot rie of *robin* servants and sympathisers among the elite of Rouennais society. In the remonstrance presented to the duc de Bouillon in April 1562 the Huguenots explained their rebellion as a defensive measure against an all-encompassing catholic attack. They specifically referred to the raising of troops for Guise:

Est aussi notoire, que ledit sieur de Guyse, par les commissions qu'il a fait expedier sous le nom du Roy, a fait lever gens en plusieurs & en divers lieux, afin d'estre le plus fort a executer son entreprinse & de saccager ceux de la religion, voire jusques   envoyer   ceste fin capitaines en ceste ville de Rouen.

Davantage on fait de certain que le sieur de Clere & le sieur d'Ozebost & autres gentilhommes de ce pa s levent & font amas de gens de guerre, pour aller trouver ledit sieur de Guyse & ceux de sa ligue.<sup>114</sup>

Unfortunately this passage only reveals two names: Jean baron de Cl res (1520-63) and his nephew Fran ois de Bricqueville, sieur d'Auzebosc (d.1563).<sup>115</sup> The baron de Cl res was an experienced captain, having commanded an infantry company in 1554 and then progressing to become captain of 100 *chevaux-legers* in 1557.<sup>116</sup> Cl res was the grandson of the mar chal du Biez. As was outlined in the previous chapter, it was the Guise who protected the du Biez family from the wrath of the king and the vindictiveness of Montmorency after the betrayal of Boulogne to the English in 1544. It may be that Cl res became part of the Guise affinity as a result of these links. He was an important local nobleman and played an active role in Norman affairs, representing the second estate of the *bailliage* of Rouen in 1549 and 1556.<sup>117</sup> Well before the spring of 1562 he was a familiar of the ducs d'Aumale and de Guise. D'Aumale was in the process of buying horses from Cl res in January 1558 while recuperating from illness at his residence of Mauny near Rouen.<sup>118</sup>

The Bricqueville were one of the oldest and most famous Norman families, although there were many different branches. Fran ois de Bricqueville, sieur d'Auzebosc, qualified as captain of

---

<sup>114</sup> *Histoire eccl siastique*, II, p 717.

<sup>115</sup> Fran ois is often replaced by Georges in some documents. Furthermore he should not be confused with his namesake, protestant captain Fran ois de Bricqueville, sieur de Colombi res. The barony of Cl res was situated just north of Rouen.

<sup>116</sup> ADSM, 7J,3, Charrier de la famille Martel, 23 June 1553, 12 June 1554; BN, Clair, 1087, fo 134.

<sup>117</sup> F. Farin, *Histoire de la ville de Rouen*, 6 vols, Rouen, 1738, vol II, pp 400-2.

<sup>118</sup> BN, Ms Fr, 20536, fo 113, Claude duc d'Aumale to Fran ois de Guise, Mauny, 8 January 1559.

Saint-Lô in 1553.<sup>119</sup> D'Auzebosc had, along with his uncle, links with the Guise that went back a number of years. It seems that both men, like so many others, came to the attention of the Guise through their acquisition of the Brezé inheritance and all the many historical and traditional mutual ties that it entailed. Georges de Brezé (d.1539), baron de Clères, was the father of Jean. He had married Anne de Brezé, daughter of the comte de Maulevrier, and had been lieutenant of the company of Louis de Brezé (husband of Diane de Poitiers) in 1525.<sup>120</sup> It is likely therefore that both men would have been familiars of Diane de Poitiers and the duc d'Aumale. Indeed, d'Auzebosc was held in the highest regard by Diane, of whom it was said that, "ladict dame a telle affection".<sup>121</sup> In 1557 she wrote to the chapter of Rouen cathedral in order to plead for the privilege of Saint-Romain which empowered the chapter to pardon a single convicted murderer each year. Diane petitioned in favour of one of d'Auzebosc's companions "pour le désir que j'ay de faire plaisir en ce que me sera possible, à mon nepveu d'Ozebosc".<sup>122</sup> This supplication was successful and d'Auzebosc thanked the canons personally. Clearly these ties of kinship, however tenuous to modern eyes, could be activated at any time as part of a reciprocal relationship. When the duc d'Aumale married Louise de Brezé he became part of this complex Norman kinship network, which could be exploited when need arose.

Clères and d'Auzebosc were more likely to aid the Guise in 1562 because of their historical kinship links rather than their religious zeal. Both men also possessed strong affiliations to the Norman Huguenot nobility. D'Auzebosc was a first cousin to the leading Huguenot captain, François de Bricqueville, sieur de Colombières. These ties were not ruptured by the civil war. D'Auzebosc and Clères were both murdered in the aftermath of the first war of religion in 1563. This had nothing to do with religion and was the result of a long running feud. The records pertaining to the wardship of their children strongly suggest that both men were married to women, either protestant themselves or from families strongly identified with the reformed faith. Adrien de Bréauté, tutor to the young Jacques de Clères (1548-1616), petitioned the king in 1565:

d'ordonner jusques a...ledit sieur de Clere ait atteint son age porté par la loy, il ne sera mis presche selon la Religion pretendue reformée ès terres et seigneuries dud. sieur de Clere...eu esgard que ses predecesseurs ont tousjours vescu suivant les statutes de l'eglise Romaine Catholique.<sup>123</sup>

---

<sup>119</sup> ADSM, 1B, 547, 3 March 1553.

<sup>120</sup> BN, Cabinet d'Hozier, 97, fo 5; BN, Clair, 1087, fo 134. Georges married twice - the first time to Anne de Brezé. Their grandson was François d'Auzebosc. Jean de Clères was the issue from a second marriage - d'Auzebosc was not literally the blood nephew of Jean de Clères.

<sup>121</sup> A. Floquet, *Histoire du privilège de Saint-Romain*, 2 vols, Rouen, 1833, vol I, pp 270-4.

<sup>122</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>123</sup> BN, Clair, 1087, fo 140.

The seventeen-year-old baron's adherence to catholicism was obviously perceived as being tenuous, although he fought on the catholic side in the ensuing years. Bréauté was most concerned about the influence of the other tutors on the impressionable young man. These included Huguenots like his uncle, Guy de Bricqueville, sieur de Sainte-Croix, and his step-mother, Marguerite de Louvigny.<sup>124</sup> D'Auzebosc and his wife, Françoise de Cheveulles, had a son christened Isaac, an Old Testament name popularised by Calvinists.<sup>125</sup>

Having established the close ties of both men to the Huguenot community, it seems highly unlikely, as the *Histoire ecclésiastique* and the Rouennais Huguenots claimed, that d'Auzebosc and Clères saw their mission as a part of a premeditated offensive against the reformed church. It is clear that the two nobles were dispatched into Normandy in order to elicit support from their friends and kin and others in the Guise affinity for the Guise family in the expected military confrontation with the prince de Condé. The rigid division of parties into protestant and catholic obscures the reality of loosely constructed factions built around kinship, affinity and religion. The ultra-catholics, like all factions, were a broad church built on the constantly shifting foundations of individual and family interests. Appeals to religious belief and attempts to control the royal patronage network were different ways of strengthening and broadening support. Religious and political ideology, especially in the short term, gave identity to what were volatile and dynamic entities. The very diversity of interest within a faction or affinity meant that control from above, in a hierarchical manner, was extremely difficult. The support that the Guise family received in March and April 1562 was that based on common interest born of the bonds of service and patronage, religion and kinship.

On 7 April 1562 two catholic recruiting captains of Norman origin, Nicholas Le Gras and a man called Maze, marched through the streets of Rouen drumming up recruits. This was provocation to the Huguenot community and the recruiters were promptly set upon; Maze was wounded and Le Gras slain.<sup>126</sup> These captains had a similar mission to that of the baron de Clères to raise forces for the Triumvirs in Paris. Maze may well have been commissioned by Clères himself. A Nicholas de Maze was lieutenant of the two companies of foot raised by the baron for service against the Imperialists in September 1554.<sup>127</sup> Thus in 1562 even the mobilisation of catholic troops in the provinces was executed through contacts, who could be trusted to be reliable. However, the Guise affinity in Normandy was small; there existed no populist element in the catholic forces as would be the case in the 1580s. The affinity consisted of a handful of nobles, *robins* and bourgeois, linked to the Guise personally through kinship and service.

---

<sup>124</sup> Ibid.

<sup>125</sup> ADSM, Tabellionage, 2E1, 360, 2 March 1575.

<sup>126</sup> *Histoire ecclésiastique*, II, pp 714-15.

<sup>127</sup> ADSM, 7J, 43, Chartier de la famille Martel, 25 September 1554.

The motivation behind the subterfuges of the Guise in the winter of 1561-2 was the political domination of the court by the Huguenots and their allies. The imbalance in royal counsel was soon manifested in the liberal interpretation of royal commands, originally designed to prevent large assemblies. The new interpretation effectively sanctioned public worship of Calvinism in provinces like Normandy and Guyenne.<sup>128</sup> By November 1561 the Huguenots of Rouen were sufficiently confident of immunity from the authorities to be holding services publicly in the Halles.<sup>129</sup> On 3 January 1562 the assembly of notables convened at Saint-Germain to discuss solutions to the religious question. Considering the absence of the greatest catholic magnates, the atmosphere was more favourable to the Huguenots. The result was the edict of Toleration (17 January 1562). Theodore de Bèze could even contemplate the conversion of the royal family.<sup>130</sup> However, the lack of urgency that the parlements showed in registering the edict revealed the widespread catholic despair at such a measure. The crown had little chance of enforcing the edict without the support of the parlements. Paris was the most recalcitrant of all the law courts, waiting until 6 March and a royal *lettre de jussion* before complying with the wishes of the royal council. Conversely the parlement of Rouen was the most amenable of all the sovereign courts, being the first to register the edict. In Rouen the ultra-catholic faction only consisted of a few magistrates, often personally linked to the Guise. The vast majority remained, until the outbreak of the civil wars, part of a moderate catholic and essentially Erasmian elite.<sup>131</sup>

As the duc de Guise approached the village of Vassy on 1 March 1562, on his way from Joinville to Nanteuil, he had no premeditated notion of perpetrating a massacre. Guise had been summoned to Paris by Antoine de Navarre who was leading the vocal opposition against the edict of Toleration. Tension in Paris was running high and as a consequence the Châtillon brothers had already considered it wise to retire from the capital.<sup>132</sup> Catholic anxiety in Paris was something the Triumvirs could exploit politically. Guise himself would have been well informed of all developments because the duc d'Aumale had been in attendance at court at Saint-Germain and was still there on 6 March.<sup>133</sup> Guise would have been fully aware, when he joined his Triumvirs at his residence of Nanteuil on 13 March, of the ecstatic greeting he could expect to receive upon entering Paris. The triumphal procession was nonetheless impressive:

---

<sup>128</sup> Romier, *Catholics et Huguenots*, pp 264-6.

<sup>129</sup> Benedict, *Rouen during the Wars of Religion*, p 52.

<sup>130</sup> Romier, *Catholics et Huguenots*, p 286.

<sup>131</sup> Dewald, *The Formation of a Provincial Nobility*, p 48; Benedict, *Rouen during the Wars of Religion*, pp 78-9.

<sup>132</sup> Romier, *Catholics et Huguenots*, pp 311-15; Shannon, "The Political Activity of François de Lorraine", pp 344-72; De Thou, IV, 166-9.

<sup>133</sup> *CSPF*, 1561-2, pp 525, 547.

the duke de Guise, accompanied by his brothers, (except the cardinal de Lorraine and the marquis d'Elbeuf) came to Paris on the 16th inst., conducted by the Constable, his sons, the four Marshals of France, and twenty-one knights of the Order, which train amounted to 3,000 horse....Having arrived at his house the Provost of the merchants of Paris, accompanied by many of the principal merchants here, there made an oration testifying to his joyful welcome, with an offer of two million of gold to serve him in defence of the Catholic religion and the quietness of Paris, where they desire him to reside.<sup>134</sup>

Guise had come as a saviour and the queen mother was denuded of support. Condé remained in Paris with about 1,000 men but he rejected her calls for assistance and left the capital on 23 March 1562.<sup>135</sup> The way was now open for the Triumvirs to take control of the king. Condé eventually raised his standard at Orléans and called on all of France to sign his Treaty of Association (11 April 1562) in defence of the edict of Toleration and against the unjust imprisonment of the king. Four days later Rouen was seized by the Huguenots. This was a coup mounted by local residents who were profoundly disturbed by the events that had taken place in Paris. However these conflicts were not their immediate concern. Not without some justification they were anxious about the intrigues and plans of the ultra-catholics in Normandy guided by the hand of the duc de Guise himself.

---

<sup>134</sup> Ibid, p 558. The Guise had some support and clients among the catholic hierarchy in Paris but the extent to which they had truly popular support in Paris is questionable, see chapters five and seven below.

<sup>135</sup> Romier, *Catholics et Huguenots*, p 322-5.

## Chapter Five

### Civil War and Blood Feud, 1562-74

The Guise were not the only magnate House to represent themselves as champions of catholicism. However, unlike their counterparts the Montmorency, the Gonzague-Nevers and the Montpensier, they possessed a unique position of influence in the French church. The Montmorency, for example, were divided in their religious loyalties hindering family solidarity. The Guise brothers, on the other hand, were remarkably harmonious in their religious convictions and acted in a more unified manner regarding factional politics.<sup>1</sup> They were thus in the unique position of being able to take advantage of the resurgence of catholicism in the 1560s. In Normandy this process was aided by the contacts made and patronage dispensed in the previous two decades. The martyrdom of François de Guise for the catholic cause in 1563 only served to strengthen the popular image of the Guise as saviours of the faith; most significantly it hardened the attitude of the cardinal de Lorraine who bitterly abandoned the ecumenism of 1561.

### Civil War In Normandy 1562-3

The task of establishing the composition of the respective catholic and Huguenot adherents in Normandy during the first war of religion is complicated by several factors. First, a consideration of the ease with which lesser nobles acted independently of any higher authority or overall strategy is required. Allegiance was often ephemeral and military activity carried out for no other purpose than pillage and plunder. The fluidity of noble relationships was a product of noble culture; noblemen changed sides or remained neutral in accordance with individual strategies. It did not mean however that there were not distinct factions in Normandy, based on religious faith and around identifiable affinities. Secondly, the Calvinist governor of Normandy, the duc de Bouillon, endeavoured to assemble a third party in the province. It has been suggested that this was an early attempt to form a party composed of both religions, thus reconciling them in the political sphere along the same lines as the *politiques* were to attempt later.<sup>2</sup> In fact Bouillon had no concern other than to bolster his own flagging authority.

It is not necessary to give a detailed account of the military campaign in Normandy in 1562-3. The narrative of events can however be divided easily into a number of distinct phases. From the fall of Dieppe on 22 March until late August 1562 the Huguenots took control of the major urban centres in the province. Claude de Lorraine, duc d'Aumale, was dispatched thither with a special commission as lieutenant-general of Normandy to rectify the breakdown in royal authority. He was supported by Jacques de Matignon as his lieutenant in lower Normandy. Bouillon, furious that his own position was being undermined, established his own base at Caen. He co-operated

---

<sup>1</sup> This is not to say that having members of a family on different sides in wars or identifying with opposing factions was neither beneficial nor indeed a part of family strategy. This was a common occurrence in the Wars of Religion and the reasons for fluidity of family loyalties and vindications for 'betraying' the family are little studied by historians.

<sup>2</sup> De Thou, IV, p 240.

with the local Huguenot forces and succeeded in effectively besieging Matignon in Cherbourg. The catholic nobility was surprised, unorganised and often indifferent to the tide of protestant success.

The next major development witnessed the arrival of a large royal army in Normandy and the subsequent seizure and sacking of Rouen on 26 October 1562. A few weeks earlier Breton troops had entered lower Normandy and the short-lived Huguenot hegemony began to crumble. The final phase of the war took place in February and March 1563. Admiral de Coligny marched from Orléans to Le Havre in order to secure English subsidies for his mutinous reiters. During this brief campaign he was able to retake several key strongholds, including Caen.<sup>3</sup>

The Norman nobles who flocked to join the standard of Condé at Orléans in spring 1562 - or who alternatively assembled for his cause in Normandy - had neither unity of motive nor unhesitating allegiance. The most militant Calvinists among their number possessed a solidarity and zeal formed by faith and a fear of repression. The audacious exploits of the *robins* Jean du Bosc, sieur d'Emendreville, *président* of the *cour des aides*, and Noël Coton, sieur de Berthonville, leaders of the Rouennais insurgents, contrasted sharply with the caution of the protestant captain of Le Havre, Jean de Cros, who was keen to prevent a repetition of events in the provincial capital.<sup>4</sup> A surviving manuscript detailing those who joined Condé in Orléans in May of 1562 shows that only five out of the seventy-one noblemen listed therein were Normans.<sup>5</sup> An English document, dated September 1562, gives a more detailed illustration of the Huguenot party in Normandy.<sup>6</sup>

These noblemen fall into a number of different categories. There was a strong contingent from lower Normandy, led by the comte de Montgomery and the baron de Colombières, both of whom had ties of marriage with the Huguenot leaders. A smaller group was particularly identified with Coligny - like Ponsard, the captain of Dieppe, and Antoine d'Alègre (1523-77), sieur de Meilhaud, ensign of the company of Coligny and captain of Boulogne through the nomination of the admiral.<sup>7</sup>

The Huguenot cause in upper Normandy was less well served by men who had links to the Calvinist hierarchy. In the list of Condé's followers drawn up in September 1562 the sieur de Rouville joined Condé "avec cens gentilshommes Normans". This refers to one of the many

---

<sup>3</sup> The best accounts of the first civil war in Normandy are: *Histoire ecclésiastique*, II, pp 712-884; Michel de Castelnau, *Mémoires*, Michaud and Poujoulat, IX, pp 462-8; "Discours abrégé", pp 712-884; Daval, *Histoire de la Réformation à Dieppe*, I, pp 22-46.

<sup>4</sup> Borély, *Histoire de la ville du Havre*, II, p 28.

<sup>5</sup> *Correspondence de Theodore de Bèze*, H. Meylan et al (eds), 5 vols, Geneva, 1960-, vol IV, appendix VII.

<sup>6</sup> Public Record Office, *State Papers, Elizabeth*, SP 70/41 no 436; "Estat des parties....qui ont resolu de vivre et mourir ensemble pour maintenir l'Evangille en France".

<sup>7</sup> P. de Vaissière, *Récits du "temps de troubles", XVI<sup>e</sup> siècle. Une Famille: les d'Alègre*, Paris, 1914, pp 32-9. Antoine's landed interest was in the Auvergne but the family possessed considerable lands in Normandy through his mother, Marie d'Estouteville. His father had been *bailli* of Caen until his death in 1539.



members of the Rouville family, although it is not certain which one.<sup>8</sup> The Rouville and d'Alègre families represented the elite of Norman society and had great credit in the province. Nevertheless, both the d'Alègre and Rouville families remained predominantly catholic; individual noblemen had less impact than a united family.<sup>9</sup>

From the remaining names on the muster rolls the outstanding figures, all from the *moyenne noblesse* are: Jean de Moy (1528-91), sieur de La Meilleraye, Charles de Martel (d.1566), sieur de Bacqueville, and his two sons Nicholas sieur de La Vaupalière and François sieur de Lindboeuf; and finally there are some unidentified members of the Fouilleuse-Flavacourt family. The fate of the protestant cause in upper Normandy and the reason why it failed to consolidate in one its original heartlands is complex. An understanding of the strategies of these families provides some clues. The Moy and the Martel were rivals for power in the pays de Caux. Moy had changed sides and joined the catholics as early as July 1562. The Martel were moderate and, despite appearing on the register of Huguenot captains, remained loyal to the crown. Charles de Martel was instituted as the new royalist governor of Dieppe after its composition. He was ousted after another Huguenot plot and later imprisoned by the comte de Montgomery.<sup>10</sup> The Fouilleuse, an important family in the Vexin, never distinguished itself in the Huguenot struggle. Charles II de Fouilleuse became an officer in the company of Charles marquis d'Elbeuf in 1573 and one of the marquis' most trusted servants thereafter.<sup>11</sup>

There was no leadership in upper Normandy for the large numbers of Calvinists. The Bacqueville-Martel family were vassals of the duc de Longueville. They shared his faith and benefited from the protection he could provide for exercising their religion. It is perhaps not surprising that they were circumspect about joining Condé when the leading Calvinist magnate in Normandy was a close companion of the duc de Guise. The lieutenant of Longueville for the château of Tancarville declared for the Calvinists. This was contrary to the wishes of the duke and, after some months of resistance to the royalists, he ordered his servant and his men to surrender.<sup>12</sup>

Outsiders without local credit were thus forced to play a key role in the protestant cause in upper Normandy. It was the vidame de Chartres who secured Le Havre and a Picard, Jean de Morvillier, who was appointed by Condé as captain of Rouen. Morvillier did not remain at his post

---

<sup>8</sup> Anselme, VIII, p 709; Chenaye-Desbois, XVII, p 828.

<sup>9</sup> The Rouville were related to the ultra-catholic Le Roy family and Philippe de Rouville served in the company of the comte de Randan, a close friend of the duc de Guise, see ADSM, Tabellionage, 2E1, 320, 19 October 1559.

<sup>10</sup> Hellot, *Essai sur les Martels de Basqueville*, p 166.

<sup>11</sup> It possible that the followers of Condé were the father and an uncle of the figure mentioned here, for in 1562 Charles II de Fouilleuse was only sixteen years old, see Morel, *Houdencourt: seigneurie et paroisse*, I, pp 100-1, 299.

<sup>12</sup> Deville, *Histoire du château et des sires de Tancarville*, pp 263-4.

long and was replaced by Montgomery. The failure to hold Rouen after a short siege, even with English support, further revealed the qualitative and quantitative weakness of protestant support among the upper Norman nobility. In 1592 the Catholic League was able to call on a more substantial section of the local nobility in its successful defence of Rouen against Henri de Navarre.

The upper Norman Huguenots thus lacked the effective leadership which could have overcome some of the difficulties posed by families dedicated to pursuing their own interest. Noble strategy might marry religious faith to financial gain. On 5 May 1562 Louis baron d'Orbec, *bailli* of Evreux, and his kinsman Jean d'Aché, captain of Tancarville for the duc de Longueville, seized and pillaged the cathedral town of Lisieux.<sup>13</sup> This sort of localised violence and iconoclasm had very little to do with the plans and aims of the prince de Condé.

The Wars of Religion were more the product of these local acts of violence and the virtually autonomous depredations of bands of soldiery rather than of grand campaigns. Moderates like Charles de Bacqueville-Martel and the duc de Bouillon had little success in tempering their more zealous co-religionaries. Bouillon arrived at Rouen on 19 April 1562 to treat with the rebels but, realising his own impotence, was forced to retire leaving Martel there as his lieutenant. Martel was himself forced to withdraw early on 14 May in response to the increasing level of iconoclasm which he was powerless to prevent.<sup>14</sup> Superseded by the duc d'Aumale as the principal royal officer, and with few links to the Calvinist leadership, Bouillon tried to establish his own power base in Caen which he entered in June 1562. He co-operated with the Huguenots who were strong in the locality and tried to prevent the outbreak of religious violence which would further destabilise his position. The seizure of church plate was useful for supporting a small army but not enough to offset the loss of financial support from the crown, which Bouillon estimated at 35,000l.<sup>15</sup> An officer in Bouillon's army, like Guillaume de Hautemer, sieur de Fervacques, had a large degree of autonomy, facilitated by the general breakdown of authority. On 31 May he was sent to curb the activities of the Huguenots in Lisieux. In the following month he took the opportunity to suspend all catholic services and expel all priests. In early July he went on to sack the nearby *bourg* of Montfort and made an unsuccessful assault on the monastery of Saint-Philibert-sur-Risle. Subsequently, Fervacques changed sides on the eve of the battle of Dreux, thus beginning a career which, after serving the Catholic League, was crowned by the bestowal of the office of *maréchal* by Henri IV.<sup>16</sup>

On 5 May 1562 Claude de Lorraine, duc d'Aumale, was created lieutenant-general of Normandy, giving him widespread powers of authority. This followed the inability of the duc de

---

<sup>13</sup> M. Sauvage, "Les troubles de 1562", *Etudes Lexoviennes*, 1915, pp 53-4.

<sup>14</sup> Hellot, *Essai historique sur les Martels de Basqueville*, pp 166-72.

<sup>15</sup> BN, Ms Fr, 15876, fo 245, 14 July 1562; Le Hardy, *Histoire du Protestantisme en Normandie*, pp 91-131.

<sup>16</sup> Sauvage, "Les troubles de 1562", pp 55-62; D. B. F., XIII, pp 1190-1; "Histoire contenant le vain effort des Huguenots assiégens le prieuré de Saint-Philibert en Normandie", Cimber and Danjou, VI, p 35. The defender of Saint-Philibert was the younger brother of Jean du Bosc, leader of the Rouennais Huguenots.

Bouillon to reason with the rebels in Rouen and the deterioration in the political situation in Normandy. D'Aumale was an obvious choice. He was an experienced soldier and, as a large landowner in the province, could be expected to possess more local political and financial influence than Bouillon. Moreover he was Bouillon's uncle and was thus less likely to offend his nephew's honour and drive him openly into the arms of his fellow Calvinists.

The problem faced by d'Aumale was the need to contain an increasingly successful revolt in Normandy with limited resources. The main catholic-royalist army, gathering in and around Paris, took priority in resources and the local elites were completely unprepared to deal with the Huguenot threat. In May, Saint-Lô, Bayeux, Falaise, Vire, Lisieux, Carentan, Pont de l'Arche and Le Havre all followed Rouen and Dieppe in falling under the control of the Huguenots. The captain of Caen, Philippe de Roncherolles, found himself isolated and surrounded in the town's château.<sup>17</sup> Jacques de Matignon was dispatched from court to lower Normandy in order to rectify the situation. He was a locally important man but also a fidèle of Catherine de Médicis, and was expected to act as a counter-balance to d'Aumale's extensive powers in Normandy.<sup>18</sup>

It was immediately apparent that neither man had the resources to conduct a vigorous offensive campaign. Local credit and the ability to raise money in Normandy were at a premium. Matignon, like his protestant counterparts, relied heavily on church plate and contributions from local churches to maintain his troops.<sup>19</sup> Nevertheless he remained on the defensive, strengthening Cherbourg and awaiting the arrival of reinforcements. D'Aumale complained strongly about his lack of money and his weakness was revealed by an abortive attack on Rouen. He summoned the city on 28 May 1562 but, after a few days of ineffectual bombardment, he was compelled to break camp and withdraw when the garrison inside Rouen was reinforced by the sieur de Morvillier. D'Aumale's army numbered no more than 3,000 men and he possessed no siege guns.<sup>20</sup> To combat the strong protestant forces in Normandy the duke mobilised the local catholic nobility using the patronage he had at his disposal, and by summoning his own clients and *amis* to serve him. At the same time he employed the unconventional tactic of attempting to utilise the catholic peasantry as an armed militia against Huguenot troops.

When d'Aumale entered Normandy he was able to give leadership to a small band of disorganised catholic noblemen, already in arms. Most notable of these was the displaced *bailli* of Rouen, Jean d'Estouteville, sieur de Villebon. D'Estouteville was accompanied by the two Guise agents in Normandy, Clères and d'Auzebosc, who had been actively recruiting in Normandy for

---

<sup>17</sup> *Histoire ecclésiastique*, II, p 219; Borély, *Histoire de la ville du Havre*, II, p 28; De Thou, IV, p 192.

<sup>18</sup> J. de Caillières, *Histoire du mareschal de Matignon*, Paris, 1666.

<sup>19</sup> BM, Y, 102, fo 32, Charles IX to Matignon, 27 May 1562.

<sup>20</sup> *Lettres de Catherine de Médicis*, H. de La Ferrière and Comte Baguenault de Puchesse (eds), 9 vols, Paris, 1880-99, vol I, p 317; *Journal de ce qui est passé en France durant l'année 1562*, M. François (ed), Paris, 1950, pp 25-50.

some time. These men were supported by Yves d'Alègre (1523-77), baron de Blainville, Louis Le Pellerin (d.1594), sieur de Gauville, Adrien sieur de Bréauté (d.1595) and Antoine de Vieuxpont, sieur de Saussay. From July 1562 Jean de Moy, sieur de La Meilleraye, was also part of this army.

In order to galvanise these forces, and provide the offices these men expected for their service, commissions were quickly dispatched by d'Aumale. Adrien de Bréauté, captain of Gisors, was invited to raise 100 mounted arquebusiers and 200 foot.<sup>21</sup> Jean de Moy, who had originally joined Condé in May 1562, was made captain of Honfleur, Lisieux and Pontaudemer by the duke on 22 July.<sup>22</sup> Moy's movement between opposing camps was opportunist and brought high rewards. His subsequent shift to ultra-catholicism in the mid-1560s indicates that Moy was not primarily motivated by religious faith. When his father retired from public life in July 1560, he was divested of his offices of vice-admiral of France and captain of Le Havre, which had placed the family among the elite of Norman society.<sup>23</sup> Jean de Moy found himself disinherited from these offices, which he expected to receive on his father's resignation. The fluid political situation of 1562 was an ideal time to offer his services to the highest bidder. There is no evidence to suggest that Moy was ever a protestant. He had little reason to admire admiral Coligny who took over the captaincy of Le Havre from his father and who was, in addition, increasingly preoccupied with Norman maritime affairs once the office of vice-admiral had lapsed.<sup>24</sup> Nevertheless, he profited from Condé's shortlived ascendancy at court, becoming knight of the order of Saint-Michel in December 1561.<sup>25</sup> Open revolt the following May immediately raised his bargaining position. His rapid return to the catholic party was a reflection of the satisfactory accommodation of his wishes. It is significant that, when d'Aumale handed out the captaincies to Moy, the original core of catholic nobles were passed over in preference for their former opponent. He did not have to wait much longer to regain the family patrimony: he was given the office of vice-admiral on 1 September 1562 and was further rewarded with the post of lieutenant-general of Normandy in July 1563. He was not a half-hearted turncoat and in early September 1562 attacked the advancing comte de Montgomery near Dives. Satisfied for the time being with the honours of royal service, Moy remained loyal to the monarchy and began to cement a relationship with the Guise and the ultra-catholic faction, in order to consolidate and build on his recently accumulated offices.<sup>26</sup>

---

<sup>21</sup> BN, Ms Fr, 32369, fo 227.

<sup>22</sup> Sauvage, "Les troubles de 1562", p 64.

<sup>23</sup> BN, PO, 2078, fos 47-8; *Catalogue analytique des chartes, documents historiques composant les archives du collège héraldique*, 2 vols, Paris, 1866, vol II, p 191.

<sup>24</sup> Borély, *Histoire de la ville du Havre*, II, p 24.

<sup>25</sup> *CSPF*, 1561-2, p 430.

<sup>26</sup> BN, PO, 2078, fo 50; De Thou, IV, p 245. On the Moy family, see Rodière and Vallée, *La maison de Moy*.

Moy was not the only man to benefit from the patronage of the duc d'Aumale. After the duke's appointment Louis Le Pellerin was made captain of 200 foot, governor of Harfleur and captain of the *arrière-ban* of the *bailliage* of Evreux.<sup>27</sup> Antoine de Vieuxpont, sieur de Saussay, was made captain of 300 foot, in turn filling the company with his own clients and servants. The ensign of the company, Guillaume Bernard, was wealthy enough to lend his captain 500/, presumably towards the upkeep and pay of the company.<sup>28</sup> Le Pellerin and Vieuxpont, along with others like Martin du Bosc, the defender of the monastery of Saint-Philibert against Fervacques, had a common history of service with the comte de Brissac and the Guise in the 1550s. Le Pellerin and du Bosc had served as men-at-arms in the *ordonnance* company of Brissac, while Antoine de Vieuxpont and his elder brother Jean had both commanded infantry units in Piedmont under the comte.<sup>29</sup> Brissac's lands and clientèle in Normandy were extensive and his connections to the Guise and the ultra-catholic faction are well documented.

Many of Brissac's old comrades turned out to support the duc d'Aumale in 1562 and the Vieuxpont family was one of the first to take any open action against the Huguenots. On 21 April 1562 Jean IV, baron de Vieuxpont (d.c1563), and Antoine, sieur de Saussay, gathered at the house of their sister Nicole, dame d'Ouille-la-Rivière, in the pays de Caux, and proceeded to organise an abortive attack on the nearby Huguenot chapel and stronghold at Luneray.<sup>30</sup> This seems to have been an autonomous action by the family and an early demonstration of the activity which made the Vieuxpont one of the staunchest catholic families in Normandy. The baron had originally been a man-at-arms of admiral d'Annebaut and in the 1550s he had entered the service of the comte de Brissac.<sup>31</sup> The Vieuxpont had their own esoteric motives for supporting the catholic party. In 1553, on the death of d'Annebaut, the baron de Vieuxpont had been stripped of the governorship of Dieppe by the new admiral, Coligny.<sup>32</sup> The new incumbent, Charles de Ponsard, was a Huguenot and it is therefore not surprising that the Vieuxpont had an antipathy to the reform and were eager to aid the Guise against a mutual enemy. This laid the foundation for the Vieuxpont to become one of the most faithful followers of <sup>the</sup> both Brissac and the Guise throughout the entire Wars of Religion.<sup>33</sup>

---

<sup>27</sup> Sauvage, "Les troubles de 1562", p 63; Vindry, p 501.

<sup>28</sup> ACR, A, 19, 26 July 1562; ADSM, Tabellionage, 2E1, 327 *bis*, 31 May 1564. This document was witnessed by Jean Lambert, *avocat-général* of the cardinal de Lorraine.

<sup>29</sup> François de Boyvin, baron du Villars, *Mémoires*, Michaud and Poujoulat, 1st ser., X, p 389.

<sup>30</sup> *Histoire ecclésiastique*, I, p 796.

<sup>31</sup> Travers (ed), *Rôle du ban et de l'arrière ban du bailliage de Caen*, p 120.

<sup>32</sup> D. Asseline, *Les Antiquitez et Chroniques de la ville de Dieppe*, 2 vols, Dieppe, 1874, vol I, p 250.

<sup>33</sup> The eldest son of Jean IV became a major servant of the duc d'Elbeuf, see chapters three and seven.

Similarly, the Moy family could boast strong links to the Guise going back to the 1540s. Moreover Jean de Moy was closely related to Bréauté who figured as the ensign of Moy's company of the *ordonnance* in October 1561. Bréauté was also a servant of the duke of Ferrara, father-in-law of the duc de Guise. Ferrara, in his capacity as comte de Gisors, had made Bréauté captain of the town in 1557.<sup>34</sup>

D'Aumale could rely on a measure of support from the local catholic nobility but he was severely short of the money to conduct a campaign. The Huguenots held the urban centres and they did not hesitate to expropriate local revenue or extort money from the inhabitants. In August 1562 Montgomery received a commission from the prince de Condé to pay his gendarmerie companies out of the *taille* collected in the *élections* of Carentan and Saint-Lô.<sup>35</sup> Montgomery had no reservations about levying large sums upon his co-religionaries. His troops committed acts of indiscipline and violence against the friendly population of Dieppe and imposed a forced loan of 15,000/ on the inhabitants. As a lower Norman Montgomery was an outsider; townsfolk complained to Coligny and clamoured for the reinstatement of a moderate local man, Charles de Bacqueville-Martel.<sup>36</sup>

D'Aumale also had considerable powers to expropriate local sources of revenue. The *décime* from the diocese of Rouen was used for the payment of troops. D'Aumale would have been able to raise loans on the strength of the anticipated revenue of these taxes and the administration of finance would have given him further opportunities to dispense patronage. Thus Jean de La Vache, *procureur* of the *bailliage* of Gisors, and Jacques Bellier, *élu* of Rouen, received commissions for the collection of the *décimes* from three deaneries in upper Normandy to pay the gendarmerie of the duc d'Aumale.<sup>37</sup> In a financial transaction such as this the commissioners would have advanced cash to d'Aumale and his subordinates in return for his farming out of such a potentially lucrative contract. For example, in July 1562 d'Aumale directed these men to forward 1,200/ to the sieur d'Alègre.<sup>38</sup>

Temporal revenues were also assigned for the upkeep of specific units. After the end of the first war of religion the troops of Adrien de Bréauté were maintained from the *grenier à sel* of Saint-Valéry-en-Caux.<sup>39</sup> During the second religious war the same captain was "charge de prendre les deniers du Roy qui se severoient a l'arriere-ban pour payer les troupes quil avoit levées."<sup>40</sup>

---

<sup>34</sup> Rodière and Vallée, *La maison de Moy*, p 59; BN, Ms Fr, 32369, fo 255; BN, PO, 496, fo 17. It is difficult to ascertain what precise kinship tie united Moy and Breauté.

<sup>35</sup> BN, V<sup>c</sup> Col, 24, fo 4.

<sup>36</sup> Daval, *Histoire de la Réformation à Dieppe*, I, pp 41-6.

<sup>37</sup> ADSM, G, 5670, Chambre du clergé, 27 May 1562.

<sup>38</sup> ADSM, G, 5668, Chambre du clergé, 13 July 1562.

<sup>39</sup> BN, Ms Fr, 32369, fo 227, May 1564.

<sup>40</sup> BN, Ms Fr, 32369, fo 229, 7 October 1567.

D'Aumale made the baron de Clères, already the captain of 100 mounted arquebusiers, not only *colonel du ban et arrière-ban* but also *receveur du ban*. As a result he was involved in the collection and distribution of royal revenues. He received a wage for his office as well as handling cash that came from the *aides* of the *arrière-ban*. Between 25 October and 14 November he received 1450/ from his subordinate *receveur* responsible for the *bailliage* of Caux.<sup>41</sup> The alienation of royal revenue at source in the localities in order to finance troops in the provinces was a feature of the Wars of Religion. The interdependence between provincial elites and the local royal fiscal administration became ever stronger and was the cause of an increasing decentralisation of power. Local elites were able to circumvent the royal will effortlessly and act independently of authority because they were able to use provincial patronage and revenues to reinforce their own power bases.

Wartime expediency determined that the duc d'Aumale was able to employ more unorthodox methods to raise cash. He seized cloth belonging to Rouennais merchants which was at Brionne waiting to be fulled:

Aumale, auquel la Royne avoit refusé argent pour mal executé sa commission, cottisoit les villes au plus haut qu'il pouvoit, n'oubliant son proufit particulier, delibérant de faire transporter par charroy à Amyens les toiles susdites des marchans de Rouen, pour les vendre si les marchands ne vouloient racheter à haut prix, pour à quoy les attirer, il leur promettoit pardon & sauvegarde, dont Péricard, Procureur du Roy, faisoit les despeches moyennant un escu pour sa signature.<sup>42</sup>

It is not clear if Jean Péricard was in the Guise affinity before the civil wars, although he can certainly be identified as an ultra-catholic. The Péricard family was loyal to the Guise throughout the Wars of Religion and was well recompensed for its services. In the summer of 1562 Péricard, who was *procureur-général* in the parlement of Rouen, accompanied by the *avocat du roi*, Laurent Bigot (1497-1570), liaised closely with the duke. They seemed to have counselled the duke and functioned as his main link with the parlement of Rouen, which had reconvened at Louviers on 22 July 1562.<sup>43</sup> One major consequence of the Huguenot coup d'état in Rouen and the unleashing of iconoclasm in May was the subsequent radicalisation of the attitudes of the parlementaire community towards protestantism. The flight of leading moderates in the parlement, such as *premier président* Saint-Anthot, who spent the duration of the troubles at his residence in Burgundy,

---

<sup>41</sup> BN, PO, 781, fos 66-70. Another Guise client to enjoy a command was François de La Menardière, elder brother of the *maître d'hôtel* of the duc d'Aumale, who was given a commission to muster the *ban* of Alençon, Caen and the Cotentin, see BN, Dossiers Bleus, 442, fo 3, 22 May 1562.

<sup>42</sup> *Histoire ecclésiastique*, II, 738.

<sup>43</sup> *Histoire ecclésiastique*, II, pp 724-5, 733 n 3; Floquet, II, pp 410, 415.

and the trauma of the flight of the parlement from Rouen, only served to raise the profile and credit of the minority ultra-catholic faction. Leadership of the parlement now passed to men like Jean de Lallement, an old servant of the Guise, and Nicholas Damours who had been long associated with the defence of catholicism.<sup>44</sup> It was no surprise that the residence of Damours in Rouen was ransacked by the Huguenots. These attacks on vacant property were targeted at the most hardline *conseillers* in the parlement. Other victims included Jean Le Febvre d'Escalles (d.1571), a buyer of *rentes* from the Guise, and *conseillers* Claude Auvray (d.1566), Jacques de Centsols (d.1566) and Pierre du Four (1506-1569). The house of Raoullin de Longpaon was demolished and the destruction was sufficient to ruin du Four financially.<sup>45</sup> In this atmosphere of bitterness it was hardly surprising that attitudes would harden and the *arrêts* of the parlement became more severe towards heretics. A number of laws sanctioned the detention of all Huguenots and their summary execution should they resist. In August there occurred a spate of hangings of ordinary and harmless Huguenots. Michel de Castelnau had to be despatched by the royal council in order to mollify the new found zeal of the parlement of Rouen.<sup>46</sup>

D'Aumale thus utilised his contacts both among the *noblesse de robe* and the *noblesse épée* in his campaign. He also called on assistance from a more surprising quarter: the Norman peasantry. He urged local peasants to defend themselves against attack and where possible to harass and hinder Huguenot troops and worshippers. The evidence available to us on this subject has to be carefully examined; to accuse an opponent of appealing to the peasantry to take up arms was a common literary device for denigrating opponents. Nevertheless, reports from English spies verify the claims made in the *Histoire ecclésiastique*. Moreover, the large bands of peasants who assembled to confront admiral Coligny at Bernay in February 1563 came from exactly the same region where peasant insurrection was strongest in the 1570s and 1580s: the pays d'Ouche.<sup>47</sup> The organisation of the peasantry, which later facilitated open armed revolt, began during the violent summer of 1562:

Ces assemblées de paysans avoient continuée depuis le siege mis devant Rouen par Aumale, tellement que chaque paroisse avoit son capitaine, qui contraignoit les paysans d'acheter des armes, lesquels se voyans ainsi enbastonnés, traittoient ceux de la religion fort inhumainement, jusques à piller les maisons de leurs propres seigneurs.<sup>48</sup>

---

<sup>44</sup> *Histoire ecclésiastique*, I, p 858.

<sup>45</sup> Floquet, II, p 397; Frondeville, *Conseillers*, p 327.

<sup>46</sup> Michel de Castelnau, *Mémoires*, Michaud and Poujolat, 1st ser., IX, pp 462-5.

<sup>47</sup> The correlation between the peasant leagues of 1562-3 and the those of the 1570s and 1580s is strong. The Catholic League summoned the peasantry to its aid in 1589 in much the same way as did the duc d'Aumale in 1562, see chapter seven below.

<sup>48</sup> *Histoire ecclésiastique*, II, p 334; De Thou, IV, p 509.



The author of the *Histoire ecclésiastique* undoubtedly exaggerates the degree of control exercised by the duke over the rural population. D'Aumale was only encouraging what the peasantry had done for centuries: protecting itself against rapacious soldiery. Inter-communal religious violence was not exclusively confined to the larger urban centres. Thus in June 1560 priests from neighbouring parishes, leading a confraternity from the pays de Caux, launched an unsuccessful attack against the Huguenot community of Luneray. This centre of protestant worship faced similar threats in 1562.<sup>49</sup> The Huguenots of Dieppe invaded the hinterland to protect their more isolated co-religionaries. They attacked the settlements of Cany, Veules and Saint-Valéry-en-Caux, on hearing that 2,000 armed catholic peasants had gathered in the region.<sup>50</sup> The similar convocation of peasants at Bernay in February 1563 was easily scattered by the veteran troops of admiral Coligny. The prejudices of the author of the *Histoire ecclésiastique* are evident: he wanted to represent the Huguenots as the party of social order and high social status. Despite this bias and impartiality, there is good reason to believe that there is much truth behind the polemic. In June 1562 an English agent writing from Dieppe noted, not only the arrears of pay owed to the troops of d'Aumale, but also the number of peasants in the train of his army.<sup>51</sup> Another English informant reported to London the following month:

Last Thursday arrived at Dieppe and spake with M. De Force [de Fors], the captain here, concerning his coming and going to the Prince [de Condé], who doubted the same, considering the dangers abroad from men of war, and the peasants, whose disorders are increased. This proceeds from the Duke D'Aumale, who has promised them not only the sack of their Lords, but also to enfranchise them from all tasks and taillages for ever.<sup>52</sup>

No evidence exists to suggest that the duc d'Aumale was intending to establish a catholic league organised at parish level. It is important to realise that the reports of English spies were a mixture of truth, rumour and speculation. It is also unlikely that d'Aumale made specific promises to abolish taxation and he did not have complete control over the movements of the Norman peasantry. Nevertheless, d'Aumale was in a position to sanction and encourage the resistance of the peasantry to their heretical lords. Moreover, the duke, like his elder brother François de Guise and his nephew Henri de Guise, realised the political and military possibilities of popular movements. The duc d'Aumale was no different from other members of his family in attempting to harness the potential of popular discontents to the service of his own strategy. The unique position of the Guise

---

<sup>49</sup> Ibid, I, p 355; II, p 830-2.

<sup>50</sup> Ibid, II, p 801.

<sup>51</sup> *CSPF*, 1562, pp 91-2.

<sup>52</sup> Ibid, p 178.

family as catholic military heroes in the popular imagination, crowned with the martyrdom of François duc de Guise in 1563, afforded the family a unique opportunity to exploit the increased catholic militancy and fervour of the 1570s and 1580s.<sup>53</sup>

#### Pursuing a Blood Feud: 1563-74

The edict of Amboise brought the first religious war to an end on 19 March 1563. The swift campaign of admiral Coligny in lower Normandy retrieved the Huguenot losses sustained there the previous autumn. The assassination of François duc de Guise on 24 February suspended indefinitely the coup de grâce about to be delivered to the beleaguered Huguenot forces in Orléans. The removal of Guise, the deaths of Saint-André and Antoine de Navarre and the capture of both Montmorency and Condé left Catherine ascendant at court. Furthermore the cardinal de Lorraine was absent at the council of Trent. Consequently, the Guise suffered a relative decline in their influence at court which was to last, with some exceptions, until the accession of Henri III in 1574.

It is important to stress that the Guise were far from being politically impotent, but they could not wield the same authority or enjoy the favour they had experienced under Henri II, under François II and more recently during the first religious war. One reason for this was the trauma that affected the family in the aftermath of the first war of religion. The death of the duc de Guise was rapidly followed in the same year by that of François de Lorraine, the *grand prieur*, and that of René marquis d'Elbeuf in 1566. The next generation of the Guise family, whose hopes were chiefly represented by Henri, the new duc de Guise, were mere youths who possessed only the potential of high birth, combined with the residual credit and honour that radiated from the late duke's glorious reputation. These young men were not in a position to make an impact at court, and thus leadership of the family devolved to the cardinal de Lorraine and the duc d'Aumale, both of whom possessed ability but lacked the charisma of their illustrious brother.

The political strategy of the Guise family between the death of the duke and the Saint Bartholomew's Day Massacre was dictated, less by an all encompassing desire for the eradication of heresy, than by a quest for justice against admiral Coligny, accused by the Guise of ordering the assassination. The murder of the duke had a significant impact on the psyche of the family. It had the profoundest effect on the cardinal of Lorraine who completely abandoned his moderation over religion and began to display the ultramontanist previously associated with men like the cardinal de Tourmon.<sup>54</sup> However, the Guise did not compromise their own family interests for the catholic

---

<sup>53</sup> B. Diefendorf, *Beneath the Cross: Catholics and Huguenots in Sixteenth Century Paris*, Oxford, 1991, 70, 179-80, rightly questions the extent of Guise influence in Paris and shows how autonomous popular attitudes were from elite politics - the Guise became a symbol for popular passions and the family were able to exploit this.

<sup>54</sup> E. Lavissee, *Histoire de France*, vol VI, pt 1, *La Réforme et la Ligue*, by J. H. Mariéjol, Paris, 1904, VI, pt 1, p 82.

cause; religion and family strategy had a complex interdependent relationship and were not always reconcilable.

François de Guise was praised throughout Europe for his martial abilities and chivalric deeds. After the prince de Condé was captured at the battle of Dreux, Guise had offered his own apartments and bed to his prisoner. His penitential behaviour after the massacre of Vassy and the death bed pardoning of his assassin had lent further mystique to his legend, contrasting sharply with the public delight expressed by Coligny on hearing news of the assassination.<sup>55</sup> This could have done little to assuage the seething hatred of the Guise family for the admiral.

Attempts to entreat the king for redress over the murder were hampered by the presence of the cardinal de Lorraine at Trent.<sup>56</sup> It was not until 26 September that the king was formally petitioned for justice.<sup>57</sup> The petition itself would have been drawn up after considerable counsel had been taken and support solicited from allies and kinsmen. The signatures attached to the petition give a good indication of Guise supporters at court. The document was signed by all of the surviving members of the family except the cardinal de Lorraine. In addition to these signatures were those of Louis II de Bourbon (1513-82), duc de Montpensier, and his eldest son François (d.1582). Louis was well recognised for his hardline, even cruel, stance towards protestantism, despite the fact that his daughter had converted from catholicism and was married to the duc de Bouillon. Montpensier strengthened his connections with the Guise family in 1570 when he married the eldest daughter of François de Guise.<sup>58</sup> The cardinal de Bourbon was another sponsor of the petition, once again signalling his long standing affection for the Guise. Finally came two kinsmen: Jacques de Savoie, duc de Nemours, who married the widowed Anne d'Este in 1566, and Léonor d'Orléans, duc de Longueville.

Longueville had abjured Calvinism before July 1563 for in that month he married the catholic heiress, Marie de Bourbon, duchesse d'Estouteville. This marriage greatly increased Longueville's landed interest in Normandy. It was a match engineered by the Guise as a reward for Longueville's loyalty to the catholic cause and as a means of building a rapprochement with the prince de Condé. Marie was the niece of Antoinette de Bourbon and a first cousin of the Guise

---

<sup>55</sup> Ibid, p 72.

<sup>56</sup> Ibid, p 82. Lorraine was a reformer, advocating the primacy of the council and sceptical of the pope's sincerity about reforming abuses. However, by the summer of 1563 he forged a more conciliatory line with the pope in order to ensure that a reform programme was decided upon, see L. von Pastor, *The History of the Popes from the close of the Middle Ages*, 40 vols, London, 1891-, vol XV, pp 303-35.

<sup>57</sup> *Mémoires-journaux de François de Lorraine duc d'Aumale et de Guise, 1547 à 1563*, Michaud and Poujoulat, 1st ser., VI, pp 538-9.

<sup>58</sup> Anselme, I, p 355-6.

brothers; surviving correspondence shows the two families to have been in regular contact.<sup>59</sup> Originally, François de Lorraine, the *grand prieur*, had been offered by the Guise as a suitable husband until his untimely death. The Longueville-Bourbon alliance was part of a wider Guise plan to attract Condé's support and isolate admiral Coligny. Thus Condé, the prince de La Roche-sur-Yon, the cardinal de Bourbon, the duc de Montpensier and the duc de Nemours were all witnesses to the marriage contract and they were entitled counsellors of the betrothed.<sup>60</sup>

Charles IX's reply to the petition of the Guise and their supporters was to evoke the lawsuit under way in the parlement of Paris to the jurisdiction of the royal council and furthermore to suspend any judgement for three years. This was an attempt to defuse the heated political situation. Shortly afterwards the king in council rejected the demand of the cardinal de Lorraine, who had recently returned to court, that the Tridentine decrees be implemented in France.<sup>61</sup> And yet, the main interest of the Guise family lay not in the reforms promulgated at Trent but in their pursuit of Coligny. The cardinal was interested in catholic religious renewal; he encouraged the Jesuits, strengthened ecclesiastical discipline in his diocese of Reims and founded a University at Pont à Mousson in 1571. However, it was the 1580s which saw the dawn of a catholic religious revival. Implementation of the decrees of Trent was not seriously on the political agenda in the 1560s and Lorraine was surely well aware that the many catholics, especially the sovereign courts, were as suspicious of the council of Trent as they were of the Jesuits.<sup>62</sup>

The Guise had a greater desire to pursue admiral Coligny and this is what most occupied their interest. Of course, the fact that Coligny was one of the leaders of French protestantism served only to reinforce the religious convictions of the Guise. Moreover, the feud threatened to destabilise the uneasy peace that Catherine de Médicis had brokered. The main enemy of peace at court was not religion but the feud. This can be seen by the fact that Coligny was a member of the Montmorency clan and the feud rekindled the enmity between the Guise and the Montmorency. At the end of the first civil war Anne de Montmorency saw his opportunity to regain some of his former influence. Navarre and Guise were dead and Catherine's antipathy to her former rival had abated since she was desperately in need of support. Not surprisingly the whole Montmorency family rallied to the defence of their kinsman:

---

<sup>59</sup> For example, see BN, Clair, 346, fo 303, Marie de Bourbon to François de Guise, 10 October 1553; BN, Clair, 351, fo 119, Adrienne d'Estouteville to François de Guise, Gaillon, 13 October 1557.

<sup>60</sup> G. de La Morandière, *Histoire de la maison d'Estouteville*, Paris, 1903, pp 623-31; BN, Clair, 726, fo 67. The marriage hugely increased the wealth of Longueville and, after his minority ended, he became more independent and was able to distance himself politically from the Guise as their influence waned at court.

<sup>61</sup> *CSPF*, 1564-5, pp 39-40; Lavissee, *Histoire de France*, IV, pt 1, p 84.

<sup>62</sup> For the religious beliefs and political manoeuvres of the cardinal see, Evennett, *The Cardinal of Lorraine and the Council of Trent*.

Here is no bruit so great as the demanding of the death of M. de Guise, which M. D'Aumale purchases against the Admiral. The Constable is a friend to the Admiral, who has great propos with M. d'Aumale.<sup>63</sup>

Catherine's attempts to alleviate the Guise-Montmorency dispute, with a series of magnificent entertainments at Fontainebleau in the winter of 1563-4, failed against a background of rising tension in Paris. In November 1563 Coligny had journeyed to court in order to defend himself against the charges levelled against him. His arrival, accompanied by 5-600 men, was a demonstration of his strength. Many catholics, like the comte de Brissac, were infuriated by the reinstatement of Coligny's brother, d'Andelot, as colonel-general of the infantry. One of the more troublesome catholic infantry captains, Charry, was simply murdered by some of Coligny's retainers.<sup>64</sup> The rehabilitation and influence of the Montmorency-Châtillon was plain for all to see. In contrast the Guise failed utterly in their quest to obtain satisfaction over the death of the late duke or the implementation of the Tridentine decrees. The outcome was the public reconciliation of Henri duc de Guise and Coligny on 5 January 1564. More significant than this sham was the retirement of the Guise family to Joinville soon afterwards. Louis cardinal de Guise was the only member of the family to remain in regular attendance at court on its celebrated tour through the Midi. Henri de Guise was in attendance briefly in June 1565 for the festivities with the Spanish plenipotentiaries at Bayonne, thereafter departing to fight against the Turks in Hungary. The cardinal de Lorraine spent most of 1564 at Reims overseeing the enforcement of diocesan reform, culminating in a provincial synod in November.<sup>65</sup> Guise political impotence at court and indeed their absence from the heart of patronage and influence does not equate with the preponderant role in politics assigned to the cardinal de Lorraine.<sup>66</sup> Between 1563 and 1567 the attendance of the Guise on the *conseil du roi* declined dramatically. Councils were dominated by the resurgent Montmorency-Châtillon and especially the chancellor, Michel de L'Hôpital.<sup>67</sup> It was the duc d'Aumale who took the leading role in aggressive action. He personally quarrelled with the

---

<sup>63</sup> CSPF, 1563, pp 552.

<sup>64</sup> Bouillé, II, p 318; Lavissee, *Histoire de France*, VI, pt 1, pp 79-80, 87; *Mémoires du prince de Condé*, Michaud and Poujoulat, 1st ser., VI, p 705.

<sup>65</sup> Bouillé, II, pp 318-9, 339-40; CSPF, 1564-5, pp 35-6; V. Graham and W. McAllister Johnson (eds), *The Royal Tour of France by Charles IX and Catherine de' Medici: Festivals and Entries 1564-6*, Toronto, 1979, pp 35, 77.

<sup>66</sup> Sutherland, *The Massacre of Saint Bartholomew and the European Conflict, 1559-72*, p 32. Sutherland's misunderstanding stems from her reliance on and uncritical reading of protestant texts and her failure to understand noble aspirations within their cultural context.

<sup>67</sup> N. Valois, *Le conseil du roi au XIV<sup>e</sup>, XV<sup>e</sup>, et XVI<sup>e</sup> siècles. Nouvelles recherches suivies d'arrêts et de procès-verbaux du conseil*, Paris, 1888, p 192. During these years the cardinal de Guise appeared 90 times on different councils and the cardinal de Lorraine a mere 24. He was surpassed by L'Hôpital (196), Anne de Montmorency (128) and admiral Coligny (41).

*connétable* towards the end of 1563 and left court well before his siblings. When the royal cortège reached Champagne (of which d'Aumale was temporarily governor in place of his late brother) at the beginning of its tour, he quarrelled with the prince de Porcien, a leading Huguenot.<sup>68</sup>

Retirement from court did not mean an end to political intrigue: loss of favour at court could be offset by the cultivation of allies, safe from the malicious gossip and public glare of court life. The death of the princesse de Condé in August 1564 provided the cardinal de Lorraine with the opportunity to offer a marriage alliance with the prince. Condé was jealous of the status now enjoyed by the admiral and was eager to expand his political and social contacts. Consequently, Lorraine travelled to meet Condé at Soissons at the end of 1564.<sup>69</sup> Such a marriage alliance would bind those unfavoured at court against the Montmorency. Lorraine suggested a number of candidates: his nieces, Mary Stuart and Catherine de Guise, and Anne d'Este, widow of the late duke. Despite the many obstacles to such a union the preliminary talks were enough to alarm the maréchal de Montmorency.<sup>70</sup> Nothing came of these plans but amity between Condé and the Guise continued for some time because this unholy alliance was in the interests of both families. In September 1565 the English ambassador noted the amicable relations that existed between the prince, the cardinal de Guise and the marquis d'Elbeuf.<sup>71</sup> Moreover, the marriage of Condé to Françoise d'Orléans-Longueville, the sister of Léonor, only served to improve this amity. Family networks thus easily traversed the religious divide. At a time of civil war these networks could permit a Calvinist like Jacqueline de Rohan, mother of Françoise and Léonor d'Orléans, to appeal directly to the Guise for help. In 1569 she appealed as "vostre tante" to Anne d'Este to exert her influence in obtaining a *mainlevée* on the dower lands of her daughter, presumably confiscated along with all other lands belonging to those outlawed by the crown.<sup>72</sup>

In terms of blood relations Condé was much closer to the Guise family than to the Montmorency; Antoinette de Bourbon was his aunt and François de Guise had been his first cousin. Condé's departure from court in July 1567, which precipitated the Huguenot attempt to seize the king at Meaux and the outbreak of the second civil war, was the result of the perceived threat to Huguenots from French catholics and from the arrival of the duke of Alva in the Low Countries. However, Condé was also under pressure at court from ultra-catholics. This had nothing to do with the Guise but revolved around the rivalry between Condé and the great hope of ultramontane catholics, the sixteen-year-old Henri duc d'Anjou. In response to the turmoil in the Low Countries France needed to prepare an army. Condé and d'Anjou, both coveting the title of lieutenant-general of the kingdom, traded insults and threats. Catherine had been willing to accommodate the

---

<sup>68</sup> CSPF, 1564-5, p 121.

<sup>69</sup> Ibid, p 248; Lavissee, *Histoire de France*, VI, pt 1, pp 89-90.

<sup>70</sup> Brantôme, III, 356-7; De Thou, V, p 12.

<sup>71</sup> CSPF, 1564-5, p 465.

<sup>72</sup> BN, Ms Fr, 3237, fo 37, Jacqueline de Rohan to Anne d'Este, 27 July 1569.

Huguenots in 1563 but there was no doubt that she would support her favourite son in this dispute.<sup>73</sup> The antipathy between the two princes would not abate and it is likely that d'Anjou ordered the murder of Condé after his capture at the battle of Jarnac in 1569. Significantly, it would be the duc de Longueville who reclaimed possession of the mutilated corpse which had been put on public display by the victorious d'Anjou.<sup>74</sup>

Having established cordial relationships with Condé in the winter of 1564-5, the cardinal de Lorraine returned to Paris. He travelled with a very large retinue of armed men, having been dispensed from the royal prohibition on carrying arms. However, this was a highly provocative move because François, the maréchal de Montmorency, was governor of Paris and the Ile-de-France. He hated the Guise even more than his father and was in charge of a volatile capital city. In the light of subsequent events it seems that the interview between Lorraine and Condé was designed to ensure the neutrality of the latter in any potential Guise-Montmorency conflict.<sup>75</sup>

The cardinal's purpose in entering Paris with a large armed retinue was to show his strength and influence in Montmorency's *gouvernement*.<sup>76</sup> To this end he summoned his *amis* and called on the duc d'Aumale, nearby at his residence at Anet in Normandy, to join him. The two brothers joined forces at Nanteuil, a Guise estate situated between Paris and Soissons. Henri de Guise was at Nanteuil but played only a minor role in the affair. We know very little about the composition of this retinue. Undoubtedly, there was a substantial number of Champenois *moyenne noblesse*.<sup>77</sup> These included Nicholas Durand, sieur de Villegagnon, the famous explorer and reformed Huguenot; brother of the *bailli* of Provins and himself the *commandeur de l'ordre du Temple de Paris* and a *chevalier de Saint-Jean de Jérusalem*, wounded at the siege of Rouen in 1562, he was captain of Sens in 1567.<sup>78</sup> Gautier de Foissy, sieur de Crenay (1513-69), was the *premier maître d'hôtel* of the duc de Guise from 1550 to 1562 and renowned in Champagne for his militant Catholicism. He was the *maître des eaux et forêts* of Chenoise and Sourdun and in 1568 became captain of a regiment of twelve ensigns of foot.<sup>79</sup> The other identifiable member of the

---

<sup>73</sup> D. B. F., IX, pp 444-6; Lavissee, *Histoire de France*, VI, pt 1, p 95; P. Erlanger, *Henri III*, Paris, 1948, p 58; P. Chevallier, *Henri III: roi shakespearien*, Paris, 1985, p 143.

<sup>74</sup> Brantôme, IV, 348.

<sup>75</sup> De Thou, V, p 19.

<sup>76</sup> For the narrative of events, see De Thou, V, 12-19; Michel de Castelnau, *Mémoires*, Michaud and Poujoulat, 1st ser., IX, pp 512-3; Agrippa d'Aubigné, *Histoire Universelle*, A. de Ruble (ed), 9 vols, Paris, 1886-97, vol II, pp 214-7.

<sup>77</sup> "Lettre de M. le mareschal de Montmorency à M. le duc de Montpensier, prince de sang au sujet de la querelle avec le cardinal de Lorraine", Cimber and Danjou, VI, pp 256-7. This source also mentions de La Vallée, Fossé "et autres".

<sup>78</sup> Claude Haton, *Mémoires 1568-82*, F. Bourquelot (ed), 2 vols, Paris, 1857, vol I, pp 33, 36, 170, 448, 622-4.

<sup>79</sup> ADSM, Tabellionage, 2E1 304, 4 October 1550; Bouillé, II, p 584; Claude Haton, *Mémoires*, I, pp 35, 507, 534, 547, 560.

retinue is Antoine des Essars, sieur de Lignières, a vassal of the duc d'Aumale. A number of the des Essars family, who originated from Normandy and Picardy, had been servants of the Guise family over several generations. Antoine's father, Jacques, had been a pensioner of Claude duc de Guise in 1542 and their relative, François des Essars, was an officer in the company of Henri de Guise from 1564 until 1569.<sup>80</sup>

Montmorency went to the parlement of Paris on 8 January 1565 to declare that he could not ignore the cardinal's flouting of royal edicts banning the carrying of arms (he later claimed to have no knowledge of the cardinal's dispensation) and he forbade the Guise to enter Paris. Lorraine ignored this order and proceeded to enter Paris through the porte Saint-Denis. D'Aumale was separated from his brother because he took a different entrance. Consequently, the cardinal faced Montmorency, and the Calvinist prince de Porcien, alone. In the ensuing skirmish one or two of Lorraine's men were killed and the cardinal and his nephew forced to take refuge ignominiously in a nearby house. Eventually, they reached the safety of the hôtel de Cluny near the Sorbonne, where the duc d'Aumale awaited them. Lorraine thought himself safe in this strongly catholic quarter, some distance from the governor's residence.<sup>81</sup> Instead, Montmorency surrounded and menaced the cardinal in his refuge; tension spread throughout Paris and the parlement was desperately anxious to prevent an escalation of the violence. On the parlement's intercession the Guise and their men withdrew from Paris. This retreat contrasted with the rapturous reception received by the Guise in 1562. If the cardinal had expected to receive popular acclaim when he entered, he was sorely misguided. Both sides did try and appeal to a popular audience. The incident in Paris sparked off a furious pamphlet war. In one Guisard tract the Montmorency were blamed for the episode and, furthermore, identified as enemies of catholicism and secret supporters of the Huguenots (not without credence given the maréchal de Montmorency's links to the Calvinist hierarchy). Clearly, Guise propaganda was aimed at a catholic constituency, identifying the family as the one true defender of the faith.<sup>82</sup> By the 1570s, with Anne de Montmorency dead and the maréchal imprisoned for his role in *politique* plots, Guise propaganda had even greater claims to authenticity.

The appeal to a wider public was only part of the continuing Guise-Montmorency feud. Both families began to petition the court for a redress of their grievances. The cardinal retired to his château at Meudon outside Paris and thence to Champagne. D'Aumale did not consider a dishonourable retreat and remained on the outskirts of Paris with a large force of men. Montmorency felt threatened enough to call on the support of his cousin, admiral Coligny, who arrived in Paris on 22 January accompanied by 70 gentlemen. With the court hundreds of miles

---

<sup>80</sup> BN, Ms Fr, 8182, fo 353; Anselme, VIII, pp 559-60. For the importance of the des Essars to the Guise household, see chapter three above.

<sup>81</sup> De Thou, V, p 16.

<sup>82</sup> De Thou, V, p 19. For a list of these pamphlets, see Hauser, *Les sources de l'histoire de France: Le XVI<sup>e</sup> siècle*, III, pp 207-11.



away in Guyenne because of the royal tour, civil war threatened to break out in Paris over an issue that had nothing to do with religion.

Claude d'Aumale was openly preparing for action by attempting to form a league.<sup>83</sup> Leagues and associations were not new phenomena in 1565. Royal troops were used to disperse a catholic defence association in Guyenne the previous year.<sup>84</sup> The duke had already tried to establish a local peasant militia in Normandy in 1562. A letter from d'Aumale to René marquis d'Elbeuf, intercepted and printed for propaganda purposes by the Huguenots, demonstrates the extent and purpose of the league:

J'en ay par plusieurs fois cydevant escript à Messieurs de Montpensier, d'Estampes, Cehavigny: par où ils avoyent peu juger la volonté que j'ay tousjours de nous venger, et combien je desirerois l'association que vous dites prevoyant assez combien elle estoit necessaire non seulement pous nous, mais aussi pour tous les gens de bien à qui l'on en veut plus que jamais.

Et pour ceste cause, mon frere, je trouverois merueilleusement bon que les dicts Sieurs y voulsissent entendre, laissant les villes, d'autant qu'il n'y a nulle assurance en peuple, comme je l'ay dernièrement encore cogneut. Mais avec la Noblesse, de ma part je suis tout resolu et prest.<sup>85</sup>

The absence of an original signed letter could mean that this document is a Huguenot concoction. Nevertheless, the letter makes no specific mention of Calvinists or religion at all and it is known that d'Aumale did try to establish a league. The reference to the people seems to suggest that the Guise were expecting some show of popular support when they entered Paris. Thus it is too easy to exaggerate the extent of Guise penetration into the popular consciousness, or indeed their claim to be the sole upholders of catholicism, in the 1560s. It is more likely that the popular image of the Guise family was only really strongly developed after the Saint Bartholomew's Day Massacre and indeed during the religious and economic crisis of the 1580s. The Guise did not begin to exploit populism until this later date. In the 1560s d'Aumale placed his faith entirely in the nobility.

Many other nobles were canvassed besides those mentioned in the letter. One of these was Blaise de Montluc who, although an ultra-catholic, firmly rejected the overtures and immediately informed Catherine de Médicis. He counselled the crown to take counter-measures, having no motive for becoming entangled in the Guise-Montmorency feud.<sup>86</sup> The duc de

---

<sup>83</sup> De Thou, V, p 32.

<sup>84</sup> Agrippa d'Aubigné, *Histoire Universelle*, II, p 213.

<sup>85</sup> J. W. Thompson, *The Wars of Religion in France 1559-1576: The Huguenots, Catherine de Medici and Philip II*, Chicago, 1909, p 225, n 4.

<sup>86</sup> A. de Ruble (ed), *Commentaires et Lettres de Blaise de Monluc Maréchal de France*, , 5 vols, Paris, 1864-72, vol III, pp 80-82.

Montpensier was an obvious candidate for an anti-Montmorency alliance, having been a party to the attempts to have Coligny indicted. François Le Roy (1519-1606), sieur de Chavigny, was his lieutenant-general in the *gouvernement* of Anjou, Touraine and the Maine. Contemporaries identified him as a Guise client, and this seems likely because it was he who arrested the prince de Condé in 1560 and was captain of the *archers de la garde* during the reign of François II.<sup>87</sup> The inclusion of Jean de Brosse, duc d'Etampes, governor of Brittany, is slightly more surprising. He was a catholic but not essentially a Guisard. However, he was the husband of Anne de Pisseleu, mistress of François I and bitter enemy of Montmorency. Moreover his nephew and lieutenant-general in Brittany, Sébastien de Luxembourg, vicomte de Martigues, was also a party to the negotiations, and his services to the Guise and his ultra-catholic connections are apparent from at least 1560 when he was briefly colonel-general of the infantry and a captain in the Scottish expedition.<sup>88</sup> De Thou, in his history, also adds the name of Charles d'Angennes, bishop of Le Mans. D'Angennes was introduced to the royal council by the Guise in 1559 and received the office of *aumônier du roi*. D'Angennes accompanied the cardinal de Lorraine to Trent in 1563 and was rewarded with the abbey of Savigny by Charles IX for his services.<sup>89</sup>

The geographical spread of the offices of these men is too concentrated in the North-West - the Maine, Anjou, Touraine and Brittany - to be a coincidence. A regional component of a larger structure was thus being discussed in the correspondence. This would explain d'Aumale's presence in the Ile-de-France (by 17 February he was in Rouen), Lorraine's withdrawal to Champagne and d'Elbeuf's presence in the provinces, all of them concerned with organising support in a specific locality. The existence of a royal list of noblemen expressly forbidden by the king from entering Paris, aimed at preventing further disorder, permits speculation about the other members of the league. The Guise family, Coligny and his followers all appear on the list. The duc de d'Orléans-Longueville and the ultra-catholic, although not essentially pro-Guise, Louis de Gonzague, duc de Nevers, who also featured, were both suitable candidates for the anti-Montmorency league.<sup>90</sup> The king also proscribed all leagues and associations. In January 1566 a reconciliation between Coligny and the cardinal de Lorraine was staged at the assembly of notables at Moulins.<sup>91</sup> Coligny was also formally exonerated from any complicity in the assassination of the duc de Guise. The real sentiments of both parties were unmistakable; d'Aumale refused to acknowledge the admiral and

---

<sup>87</sup> Harding, *Anatomy of a Power Elite*, p 43; Brantôme, IV, p 341, VI, p 40. However, he was more loyal to the Montpensier and like them was a royalist in the 1580s and 1590s.

<sup>88</sup> D. B. F., XIII, pp 170-1; De Thou, V, p 32. D'Etampes died soon after these events took place and Martigues was the chief beneficiary of his estate. 'D'Etampes' in the letter may be a mistake and refer to the vicomte de Martigues.

<sup>89</sup> D. B. F., II, 1087-8; De Thou, V, p 32.

<sup>90</sup> *Lettres de Catherine de Médicis*, II, p 288.

<sup>91</sup> De Thou, V, p 184.

Henri de Guise was not even present at the ceremony. When he eventually arrived at court the admiral symbolically departed.<sup>92</sup>

Sutherland insists that the cardinal de Lorraine was gaining influence at court in 1566, but fails to explain why the designs of the Guise were so easily thwarted. She further unravels the conspiracy which began by ensnaring the duc d'Anjou into the ultra-catholic faction, of which Lorraine was the master and which culminated in an attempt to assassinate all the Huguenot leaders in the summer of 1568. D'Anjou was ultramontane but he was not the tool of the cardinal. Lorraine was not the Machiavellian puppet master that ill-informed protestant observers, both English and French, believed. It was a natural and a common literary device to portray the heir to the throne as misled by evil counsel rather than to openly attack a royal prince. It is unlikely that an individual in early modern society could have been "able to mount a nationwide campaign of harassment and violence against the Protestants".<sup>93</sup> In fact, the Guise were only part of a larger ultra-catholic faction, composed of families that had widely differing strategies and the main feature of the later 1560s was, not the return to power of Lorraine, but the rise at court of new personalities patronised by Catherine, many of whom gathered around the heir to the throne - a catholic prince of better health and more potential than the other sons of Henri II.

The rise of this faction at court took place against the breakdown of Spanish authority in the Low Countries and the bloody repression instituted by Alva. Lorraine may have empathised with Alva and supported the decline of Huguenot magnate influence at court but he was neither dominant in council nor did he have a European strategy. Indeed when Tavannes arrived at court in early 1567, the Guise family was conspicuous by its absence.<sup>94</sup> Lorraine's impotence was most obvious in Scotland where he failed to persuade his niece to choose the husband of his choice or to aid her during her difficulties in the period 1564-8.<sup>95</sup>

The Guise had no monopoly as champions of catholicism and in the provinces the religious parties needed no prompting from the cardinal to engage in violence; royal authority was ineffective in preventing plots, assassinations and massacres. In this atmosphere it was not only the protestant leaders who feared for their safety; the Guise too feared assassination.<sup>96</sup>

The dominance of the religious moderates on the royal councils between 1564 and 1567 forced provincial catholics to defend themselves and a number of local catholic defence leagues came into existence. The most celebrated of these was the *Confrérie du Saint-Sacrament* organised by Tavannes in Burgundy. Leagues were especially strong in Guyenne, Languedoc and

---

<sup>92</sup> Bouillé, II, p 373-4; Salmon, *Society in Crisis*, p 151.

<sup>93</sup> Sutherland, *The Massacre of Saint Bartholomew and the European Conflict*, p 76.

<sup>94</sup> Gaspard de Saulx, sieur de Tavannes, *Mémoires*, Michaud and Poujoulat, 1st ser., VIII, p 291.

<sup>95</sup> Donaldson, *Scotland: James V-VII*, p 117-59.

<sup>96</sup> Bouillé, II, p 385-6.

Provence, where protestantism was most entrenched.<sup>97</sup> The leagues were alliances of bourgeois, ecclesiastics and nobles and thus seem far removed from the purely noble association envisaged by the duc d'Aumale - a league aimed more against the Montmorency than the protestants. The cardinal de Lorraine favoured these associations and, as Tavannes claimed, may have dreamed of something grander, along the lines of the Schmalkaldic League. However, these leagues were highly localised, autonomous and certainly not bent to the will of the cardinal.

The Guise were not the leaders of a vast catholic conspiracy and furthermore it is difficult to gauge their influence at court in the mid-1560s and effect on royal policy. The events which led to the third civil war in September 1568 are confusing. The conspiracy theory put forward by Sutherland, in which civil war was the consequence of the failed attempt by the cardinal de Lorraine to eliminate the protestant leadership, places too much stress on protestant sources and uncorroborated English reports, eager to defend their resumption of the conflict.<sup>98</sup> If there was an attempt to eliminate the Huguenot leaders in 1568 both Catherine and her acolyte Birague had as much responsibility as Lorraine.<sup>99</sup>

The complexity and lack of knowledge about factional politics in the mid-1560s is compounded by the nature of the evidence. The paucity of the data means it is very hard to follow the movements of the Guise. Protestant propaganda has to be treated with caution as it was much easier to attack and accuse the Guise than the crown directly. This propaganda was for the ears of the English especially and Condé had to justify his resort to arms by showing that he was protecting the crown against evil counsel.

The protestant démarche at Meaux in 1567 and the third civil war which began in 1568 discredited the moderate catholics represented by the chancellor, L'Hôpital. Catherine was furious with her protégé and he was forced to leave court in May 1568. The influence of the cardinal de Lorraine at court was resurgent and the duc d'Aumale received important military commands. However, the young duc de Guise achieved a seat on the *conseil privé* only after his stirring defence of Poitiers between July and September 1569.<sup>100</sup> Attempts to portray the politics of the 1560s simply in terms of the struggle of catholic, Huguenot and *politique* parties confounds reality. The *politique* faction would be a natural progression from the pro-Coligny, anti-Guisard feelings of François de Montmorency. It is too simplistic to see the Guise as "chefs du catholicisme

---

<sup>97</sup> Gaspard de Saulx, sieur de Tavannes, *Mémoires*, Michaud and Poujoulat, 1st ser., VIII, pp 289-94; J. de Serres, *Recueil des choses memorables avenues en France sous les regnes de Henri II, François II, Charles IX, Henri III et Henri IV, contenant infinies merveilles de nostre siècle*, n.p., 1599, p 297; Lancelot du Voisin, sieur de La Popelinière, *L'Histoire de France...depuis l'an 1550 iusques à ces temps*, 2 vols, n.p., 1581, vol II, pp 10-15.

<sup>98</sup> Sutherland, *The Massacre of Saint Bartholomew and the European Conflict*, pp 75-105. For a critical evaluation of her sources, see G. Griffiths, "Saint Bartholomew Reappraised", *Journal of Modern History*, 1976, pp 499-500.

<sup>99</sup> *Mémoires de Gaspard de Saulx, sieur de Tavannes*, Michaud and Poujoulat, VIII, p 303.

<sup>100</sup> Bouillé, II, p 445.

intransigent.<sup>101</sup> By discrediting moderation they did not ensure their ascendancy at court. Henri d'Anjou was already aiming to establish himself as the leading defender of catholicism, witnessed by his great antipathy to and rivalry with Condé, which precipitated Condé's departure from court in July 1567. D'Anjou was made lieutenant-general of the kingdom in November 1567 following the death of Montmorency. His fame was spread as the new hero of the catholic cause after his two crushing victories over the Huguenots at Montcontour and Jamac. The discrediting of the politics of moderation did not see the victory of the Guise but the elevation of a new group of Catherine's protégés. Protestant propaganda saw as much evil in these 'Italians' as in the ambitions of the Guise.<sup>102</sup> Catherine was careful to check the aspirations of the Guise, and the war council established to guide d'Anjou consisted of friends of the Guise like Nemours and Montpensier but also *politiques* like the maréchal de Cossé.<sup>103</sup> A wider group of counsellors appointed by Catherine included only one Guise kinsman, the duc de Longueville, along with members of the Montmorency family and a number of men from d'Anjou's own household.<sup>104</sup> The duc d'Aumale, who coveted command of the vanguard of the main royal army, was overlooked and, refusing to accept a subordinate position, took an independent command in Champagne.<sup>105</sup>

The 'new men' at court were united by their Italian ancestry, mistrust of the Huguenots and loyalty to Catherine. René de Birague (1506-83) was only naturalised in 1565. He entered the royal council in 1568, was made *garde des sceaux* in 1570 and became chancellor the following year.<sup>106</sup> The Florentine, Albert de Gondi, comte de Retz, was a longstanding servant of Catherine and had been in her entourage since it left Italy. His star waxed with his patron and he was named a governor of the king in 1566.<sup>107</sup> Louis de Gonzague (1535-95), duc de Nevers, also began to receive an increasing amount of favour in the mid-1560s. This was evident from his marriage to the heiress Henriette de Clèves, duchesse de Nevers, in 1566. A special royal dispensation allowed the title of the duché-pairie of Nevers to pass through the female line and he was made governor of the marquisate of Saluces, followed by Piedmont in 1567 and the Nivernais in 1569.<sup>108</sup>

---

<sup>101</sup> Lavissee, *Histoire de France*, VI, pt 1, p 133.

<sup>102</sup> Salmon, *Society in Crisis*, p 172-3; Erlanger, *Henri III*, p 67; Constant, *Les Guise*, p 63; Thompson, *Wars of Religion in France*, p 367; De Thou, V, p 521.

<sup>103</sup> *Lettres de Catherine de Médicis*, III, p 79.

<sup>104</sup> Chevallier, *Henri III*, p 97.

<sup>105</sup> Michel de Castelnau, *Mémoires*, Collection Universelle des mémoires particuliers relatifs à l'histoire de France, XLV, p 60.

<sup>106</sup> D. B. F., VI, pp 509-10.

<sup>107</sup> Ibid, XVI, pp 549-54. Sutherland is wrong to suggest that the Gondi were especially pro-Guise, see *The Massacre of Saint Bartholomew and the European Conflict*, p 70.

<sup>108</sup> Ibid, pp 606-7. Allowing the duché-pairie to pass through the female line was vital to the status of Nevers and was also highly contentious. There ensued a spate of disputes over precedence at court stemming from this royal decision, see Anselme, III, pp 667-711.

The influence of the Guise on the royal council which had increased after 1567 was soon dissipated. In June 1570, Charles IX discovered the amorous attentions displayed by Henri de Guise towards his younger sister, Marguerite de Valois. Charles became so furious at the thought of such a union that the life of Guise was in danger. D'Anjou's relations with the Guise became frosty. The family was in disgrace and hurriedly left court. The departure of the Guise facilitated the conclusion of peace between Catherine and admiral Coligny. A new edict of pacification was signed at Saint-Germain (8 August 1570) and the talks begun on the marriage between Marguerite de Valois and the heir to the Huguenot leadership, Henri de Navarre. Even the duc de Montpensier, a staunch catholic and recently married to the sister of the duc de Guise, found it expedient to be "pas plus ami des Guises".<sup>109</sup>

The impending return of Coligny to court and the policy of conciliation threatened to push the Guise further into the political wilderness.<sup>110</sup> Indeed, one of the preconditions of peace may have been the removal of the Guise. This alone did not ensure the safety of the admiral and he was forced to leave court, a mere one month after his return in 1571. The agitated condition of Paris was undoubtedly the cause; the catholic population was furious at the pacification.<sup>111</sup> The cardinal de Lorraine made no attempt to return to court and in May 1572 he departed for Rome to attend the election of a new Pope. He was thus absent during the dramatic summer of 1572. On 31 January 1572 Henri de Guise unsuccessfully tried to petition the king to rescind the *arrêt* of 1566 declaring Coligny's innocence. The alternatives now consisted of open revolt or reconciliation with Coligny. The Guise shrewdly chose the latter path. In May 1572 Guise, Mayenne and d'Aumale formally recognised Coligny's innocence. This was a part of Catherine's wider policy of reconciliation and the admiral was able to return to court on 6 June. It was a humiliating climbdown after nine years of bitterness, and Henri de Guise, still only 22, received little in the way of influence at court as compensation. The indignity of his position increased as Coligny reached the zenith of his power in the summer of 1572. The admiral encouraged Charles IX's fantasies of military glory against the Spanish in the Low Countries. D'Anjou was also horrified by the influence of the Huguenot leader with his brother, and his friendship with the Guise healed rapidly. Those who had most influence on the royal council were the appointees of Catherine: Gaspard de Saulx-Tavannes, the duc de Nevers, Jean de Morvillier, bishop of Orléans, the comte de Retz and the chancellor,

---

<sup>109</sup> De Thou, VI, pp 62-3; Lavissee, *Histoire de France*, VI, pt 1, p 113; Erlanger, *Henri III*, p 90; Chevallier, *Henri III*, p 143-5.

<sup>110</sup> *CSPF*, 1569-71, pp 263, 291.

<sup>111</sup> Tensions were running high in Paris well before the massacre, see Diefendorf, *Beneath the Cross*, pp 84, 88-92.

Birague. Coligny's plans for French involvement in the Low Countries met with unanimous disapproval.<sup>112</sup>

On 17 July 1572 French protestant troops, acting on their own initiative in the Low Countries, were crushed by Spanish forces near Mons. Coligny was prepared to leave Paris and march north with or without royal consent. The royal council had a clear choice between eliminating Coligny, thus precipitating civil war, or allowing the admiral to depart, inviting war with Spain. This is the origin of the Massacre of Saint Bartholomew.

On 23 August 1572 there was an unsuccessful attempt on Coligny's life.<sup>113</sup> The Guise were probably responsible because the assassin was in the service of the duc d'Aumale. The Guise had received royal sanction to carry out the murder of the admiral. To the Guise family this was the justice that they had been in search of for so long. This attack was motivated by revenge and had little to do with religious passion. Indeed, a successful murder would have negated the need for a more general armed attack and thus massacre. The massacre destroyed the trustworthy reputation of Catherine de Médicis and, despite royal attempts to blame the Guise for the massacre, the family only found their reputation heightened in the eyes of the masses. Ironically, the Guise became heroes to a large proportion of the catholic population when their only intention had been to pursue their political enemies.

The Guise would find it expedient in the future to exploit their image as champions of catholicism, but this image was different from the reality. After the initial attempt on Coligny's life there was a howl of protest from the Huguenots, who demanded an inquiry. This could only have led to the complicity of Catherine in the plot. On the evening of the 23 August a secret royal council was summoned, where it was decided that Coligny had to be killed. However this would entail the deployment of larger forces as the wounded admiral was heavily guarded. It is not clear who was present at this midnight council - certainly it was dominated by men close to Catherine and d'Anjou: Nevers, Retz, Tavannes and Birague. The ducs d'Aumale and de Guise were either party to the deliberations or called in by the council to be personally informed of the plan.<sup>114</sup>

The following morning three members of the Guise family set out with retainers to kill Coligny. They included Guise, d'Aumale and the young Charles marquis d'Elbeuf.<sup>115</sup> They were accompanied by the duc de Nevers and the duc d'Angoulême, bastard son of Henri II. Having completed the deed, the duc de Guise rode to Saint-Germain where he hoped to apprehend the vidame de Chartres and the comte de Montgommery. In Paris, the ducs de Montpensier, de Nevers and the sieur de Tavannes, all known for their hatred of protestants, rode through the narrow

---

<sup>112</sup> Sutherland, *The Massacre of Saint Bartholomew and the European Conflict*, pp 251-9; Bouillé, II, p 488.

<sup>113</sup> De Thou, VI, pp 384-5.

<sup>114</sup> Constant, *Les Guises*, pp 317-38.

<sup>115</sup> The marquis de Mayenne had left France to join the Holy League against the Turks.

streets of Paris exhorting the populace to butcher the Huguenots.<sup>116</sup> Guise returned from his unsuccessful mission to Saint-Germain to find a scene of horrific carnage. He immediately headed for the hôtel de Guise (in the Marais) which "servit de refuge à un très grand nombre de huguenots, qui, sans cette resource, auroient été assassinés comme les autres."<sup>117</sup> An English report, a source hardly biased in the Guise favour, clearly identified the main culprits of the massacre as Catherine, d'Anjou, Nevers and Tavannes:

The Duke of Guise himself is not so bloody, neither did he kill himself, but saved divers; he spake openly that for the Admiral's death he was glad for he knew him to be his enemy, but for the rest the King had put to death such as might have done him very good service.<sup>118</sup>

Thus Guise proved himself to be no catholic fanatic and indeed was careful to differentiate between his duty to his father's memory and the aftermath of the murder of Coligny which was not his responsibility. While many protestant *amis* of the Guise were saved, their catholic enemies in the Montmorency clan, like Montmorency-Thoré and the maréchal de Cossé, went in fear of their lives.<sup>119</sup> It was the crown rather than the Guise which suffered the full fury of protestant propaganda. The tract *Alarm Bell or Reveille* shows no hostility to the Guise, perhaps demonstrating that some protestants believed the Guise to have justified grievances, for the text suggests that the Guise would be better rulers than the Valois!<sup>120</sup> The situation was to be interpreted differently by protestants, catholics and generations of historians. The Guise were perfect scapegoats for the beleaguered monarchy, incarnations of the anti-Christ to protestants or defenders of the faith to catholics.<sup>121</sup> Henri de Guise would later exploit the last of these myths to strengthen his position of power in relation to the crown. The Guise, even though they had little to do with the popular fury, were able to capitalise on the increased militancy and fervour of the

---

<sup>116</sup> De Thou, VI, p 400.

<sup>117</sup> Bouillé, II, p 508; De Thou, VI, pp 411-12. See also Diefendorf, *Beneath the Cross*, pp 104-5.

<sup>118</sup> *CSPF*, 1572-4, p 185.

<sup>119</sup> De Thou, VI, p 411.

<sup>120</sup> Salmon, *Society in Crisis*, p 195, n 31.

<sup>121</sup> On the Guise as scapegoats, see "Lettres du Roy au gouverneur de Bourgogne, par lesquelles il charge ceux de Guise du meurtre commis en la personne de monsieur l'amiral et de la sedition advenue à Paris, et mande qu'il veut que l'édict de pacification soit entretenu", Cimber and Danjou, VII, p 137.



catholic populace from the 1570s.<sup>122</sup> However, the Guise were never the prisoners of religious principle and conviction. Family solidarity came above religion. For example, the constant aggravation caused by the duc de Bouillon and Calvinists from his territory of Jametz was a cause of great concern to the bishop of Verdun and his tenants. This affair was serious enough to reach the royal council in December 1572. The case was evoked through the good offices of the duc de Guise in favour of his kinsman, Bouillon, despite the protestations of the bishop who argued that he was defending the catholic religion.<sup>123</sup>

Henri de Guise may have boosted his popularity in Paris but he was hated more than ever by Charles IX. The extent of Guise popularity with the masses (and thus the increased danger to the monarchy) is hard to assess. François de Guise was the object of admiration during processions in Paris. If contemporaries are to be believed, the cardinal was never loved. A juxtaposition is usually made between the glorious and honourable military hero and a scheming and greedy prelate - a stereotype which requires the historian to read the sources circumspectly. However, it is noticeable that at the height of Guise popularity in 1559 it was residences of the cardinal at Meudon and Marchais which were the object of the anger of rioters and not the hôtel de Guise itself.<sup>124</sup> When Lorraine entered Paris in 1565 there was no ecstatic welcome and seemingly no popular support against the maréchal de Montmorency. The Guise could also claim popularity for negative reasons. With the exception of the cardinal de Lorraine their influence on the royal council was minimal. They represented neither the distastefulness of compromise with the Calvinists nor did they belong to the circle of Italian courtiers, increasingly blamed for the woes of the kingdom. The Guise were perceived as being outside government and therefore remained irreproachable in the face of political and economic disintegration in the 1570s and 1580s. The Guise could on the other hand always provide reminders of their ability to achieve victories for catholicism, as Henri de Guise had done in 1569. The contrast of military vigour with court corruption would be an even more powerful image during the reign of Henri III. Nonetheless, it would be a mistake to see the Guise family as the ducal house supported by insignificant cadets. The strength of the Guise lay in their remarkable solidarity. Claude duc d'Aumale was a major political figure in his own right. In March 1573 he became the second member of the family to be killed by the Calvinists, this time in action at the siege of La Rochelle. Charles IX, in a letter to the hôtel de ville in Paris, revealed his own suspicion of the Guise and their popularity in Paris:

---

<sup>122</sup> Recent scholarship has emphasised the difference between the elimination of the Huguenot leaders and the general massacre which was unforeseen and uncontrollable act of popular violence, see Diefendorf, *Beneath the Cross*, pp 159-71; D. Crouzet, *Les guerriers de Dieu: la violence au temps des troubles de religion (vers 1525 - vers 1610)*, 2 vols, Paris, 1990, vol II, pp 15, 80-106.

<sup>123</sup> Buvignier, *Jametz et ses seigneurs*, p 32. This is even more striking when it is considered that Guise's father had been "the protector" of the bishopric of Verdun, see Evennett, *The Cardinal of Lorraine and the Council of Trent*, p 414.

<sup>124</sup> In April 1560 the cardinal was hanged and burnt in effigy, see *CSPF*, 1559-60, p 534.

considerans que sur la nouvelle de la mort de feu nostre cousin le Duc d'Aumalle, le peuple pourra prendre occasion de se esmouvoir...a ceste cause, nous avons advisé vous faire ceste lettre pour vous dire et mander que vous regardiez et tenir la main de vostre part qu'il ne se face aucun esmotion populaire en nostre dite ville.<sup>125</sup>

The Guise remained out of favour at court until the death of Charles IX in May 1574 and were not fully restored to the centre of power until the return of Henri III from Poland in September 1574. The Guise-Montmorency feud remained unabated. When François de Montmorency had arrived at court in December 1573, the duc de Guise promptly retired. The influence of the cardinal de Lorraine on Catherine reached a low point as the authority of the comte de Retz increased.<sup>126</sup> As the king's health declined, both the cardinal and the duke left court fearing the complete ascendancy of the queen mother and her favourites.<sup>127</sup> She was delighted to hear of the death of the cardinal in December 1574. This date marks the end of the first generation of the Guise. Only the cardinal de Guise remained of the male offspring of the first duke. The fortunes of the family now rested in the hands of a new generation watched over as ever by Antoinette de Bourbon. The despondency which had been cast over the family by the death of François de Guise had faded by the time of the cardinal's death. His nephew, Louis II de Guise (1555-88), was an ideal successor to the Guise ecclesiastical empire. Moreover, the arrival of the new king at Lyon in September 1574 gave the family great cause to hope that they would once again be the most important of royal councillors. Henri III had a military reputation, was considered an indomitable foe of heresy and had been close friends with the duc de Guise for many years. All members of the Guise family were present at the council meetings that took place in Lyon and were held in high regard by the king. The Montmorency were in disgrace. Damville was in open alliance with the Huguenots and the maréchal Montmorency had been imprisoned for his part in plots hatched by the *politique* faction. When Henri decided to prosecute the war against the rebellious Damville and his Huguenot allies it seemed that the Guise would have an opportunity to press home their advantage against their old enemy.<sup>128</sup>

#### The Foundations of a Local Power Base: Normandy 1563-74

The landowning presence of the House of Lorraine in Normandy, created by marriages from the mid-fifteenth century onwards, was sharply increased in the 1560s, largely by dynastic accident.

---

<sup>125</sup> Histoire générale de Paris, *Registre des délibérations du bureau de la ville de Paris*, Bonnardot et al (eds), Paris, 1883-, vol VII, p 54.

<sup>126</sup> Bouillé, II, pp 529, 554.

<sup>127</sup> Ibid, p 555.

<sup>128</sup> De Thou, VII, pp 136-52.

The good fortune of the family in the province was also reinforced by the definitive establishment of the branches of d'Elbeuf and d'Aumale in the province. As Guise influence at court was in relative decline after 1563, recompense was found in the strengthened position of power in two strategically important provinces: Champagne, where the Guise were major landowners and held the governorship from 1563, and Normandy.

On the death of Diane de Poitiers in 1566 the duc d'Aumale collected the last of the Brezé inheritance, establishing his residence at Anet and he increasingly began <sup>to</sup> recruit Normans for his company of the *ordonnance*.<sup>129</sup> The best evidence there is to show that d'Aumale now considered himself a Norman was his burial at Aumale, becoming the first member of the House of Lorraine to be buried in Normandy since Jean de Lorraine, comte d'Harcourt, in 1472.<sup>130</sup>

When René marquis d'Elbeuf died in 1566 he had reached the pinnacle of his status, possessing the offices of *capitaine-général des galères* and *grand prieur* of France. The proximity of his lands at Elbeuf to Rouen must have been a source of great anxiety to the reformed community. In the same way that the property of leading ultra-catholics was attacked during the Huguenot interregnum in Rouen, d'Elbeuf's lands were subjected to pillage in May 1562.<sup>131</sup> He was clearly <sup>a</sup> less important figure than his elder brothers but soon after his death his son obtained the Rieux inheritance. Charles, marquis d'Elbeuf, inherited the comtés of Brionne and of Harcourt at the age of eleven in 1567, followed by the comté of Lillebonne in 1570.<sup>132</sup> There is no doubt that Charles was now one of the greatest lords. Moreover, it is significant that these lands formerly held by Calvinists (Brionne and Harcourt had belonged to Renée de Rieux and Lillebonne had possessed a Calvinist congregation since 1561) now passed to the Guise - another blow to the reformed faith in Normandy. This was neither the most important nor significant shift of land from a protestant to a catholic. In August 1570 Henri duc de Guise married Catherine de Clèves, comtesse d'Eu. This was an immensely important, wealthy and compact territory in upper Normandy, located between the *bailliage* of Caux and the provincial boundary with Picardy. It was one of the oldest and largest seigneuries in Normandy, comprising some 270 fiefs and *arrière* fiefs and had in the 1580s an annual revenue equal to that of the duchies of Elbeuf and Aumale combined.<sup>133</sup> By 1570 only François duc d'Alençon and the duc de Longueville could rival the Guise as landowners in Normandy.

The acquisition of the comté of Eu by the duc de Guise also had ramifications for protestantism in upper Normandy. Guise married a repentant Calvinist who had turned her back

---

<sup>129</sup> See chapters two and three above.

<sup>130</sup> N. Potin de La Mairie, *Recherches historiques et biographiques sur les possessions des Sires Normands de Gournay, Le Bray Normand et Le Bray Picard*, 2 vols, Gournay, 1852, I, p 307.

<sup>131</sup> Saint-Denis, *Notices historiques sur les communes et environs d'Elbeuf*, IV, p 52.

<sup>132</sup> See chapter two above.

<sup>133</sup> See chapter two above.

on catholicism for at least ten years. The male issue of the Clèves family had died out in 1564 but had until then been sympathetic to protestantism. Her first husband had been Antoine de Croy, prince de Porcien, one of the most celebrated Calvinist captains. Porcien vigorously pursued the rights granted to him by the edict of Amboise in 1563 to establish a chapel on his lands. He founded a *prêche* at Roumare, a seigneurie held from the comté of Eu but situated near Rouen. This caused great bitterness because the chapter of the cathedral of Rouen had bought Roumare, save for the high justice which remained with the comte. Porcien was legally within his right according to the pacification but it was provocative and revealed the difficulties of enforcing the peace. Stalwarts of the ultra-catholic faction in Rouen like Péricard, Bigot and Damours complained strongly to the king.<sup>134</sup> Porcien's death in 1565 ended the controversy and in 1570 the comté came into Guise possession, laying the foundations of Guise ascendancy in upper Normandy.

Opportunities to dispense patronage came with these lands. André de Bourbon-Rubempré (d.1579), a cadet of the House of Bourbon had briefly fought for Condé in 1562 but had, by the later 1560s, acquired the status of counsellor to the cardinal de Bourbon. In 1572 Guise trusted him enough to sell him land to the value of 18,000/ in the comté d'Eu, "pour les urgens affaires", and make him governor of the comté at the same time.<sup>135</sup> Rubempré was a natural choice because of his credit in the region. He was closely linked to the Roncherolles family and they moved into Guise service in the 1570s. Rubempré's position of influence on the council of the cardinal de Bourbon provided the Guise with an ally in their attempts to maintain their friendship with the prelate, despite the opposition of other counsellors. On Rubempré's death in 1579 Charles de La Chaussée, a longstanding Guise servant, was promoted to be governor of Eu, becoming one of the leaders of the Catholic League in the pays de Vimeu and the comté de Ponthieu in Picardy, bordering the comté d'Eu.<sup>136</sup>

The growth of the Guise affinity in Normandy in the 1560s was also a product of the growth of catholic militancy. The shift of the parlement and city council away from moderation after the Huguenot coup was of most benefit to the Guise.<sup>137</sup> When the moderate catholic *premier président*, Saint-Anthot, returned to Normandy after the first civil war he found himself under attack from his more radical co-religionaries for supporting the return of refugee Huguenots to the town. He was threatened by a large mob on 18 January 1563 which went on to kill three Huguenots unlucky enough to be in the vicinity, including the *avocat du roi au bailliage*, Mustel de

---

<sup>134</sup> Floquet, III, pp 23-5.

<sup>135</sup> BN, Ms Fr, 8182, fo 277.

<sup>136</sup> E. Prarond, *La Ligue à Abbeville, 1576-1594*, 2 vols, Paris, 1873, vol II, p 184-5. On the La Chaussée, see chapter three above.

<sup>137</sup> This did not mean however the domination of the ultra-catholics. In April 1570 the parlement turned down requests to expel Huguenots who failed to observe Easter, see BN, Ms Fr, 15551, fo 176, Bauquemare to the sieur de Morvillier, Rouen, 9 April 1570.

Boscroger.<sup>138</sup> The mob, as the author of the *Histoire ecclésiastique* claimed, was not the pawn of the parlement. However it is true that the *bailli*, Jean d'Estouteville, did nothing to prevent the killings and the mob may have been encouraged by the attitude of ultra-catholic magistrates like the *président à mortier* Lallement, and magistrates Raoullin de Longpaon, Péricard and Bigot, to the reformed faith. Longpaon addressed the agitated crowd which was baying for revenge, remarking "qu'il souffriroit point que les lettres de pardon fussent interinées".<sup>139</sup> The maréchal de Vieilleville, who was sympathetic to the protestants, was infuriated by this killing. He accused Villebon d'Estouteville of complicity and in the ensuing duel severed the hand of his adversary. The omnipresent Raoullin de Longpaon was also the object of the wrath of Vieilleville.<sup>140</sup> The duc d'Aumale still kept in close contact with Longpaon, who acted as his *procureur* in the parlement. On 16 February 1565 d'Aumale visited Longpaon at his residence in Rouen in order to help his client, who was in financial difficulty. It is unlikely that this was the only reason for the visit, at a time when d'Aumale was organising his noble association for the furtherance of his dispute with the Montmorency. His lodgings were busy with the comings and goings of local dignitaries: "se presentent par devers luy plusieurs de la ville pour luy faire la reverence et le saluer de la part tant de l'eglise que de l'hostel de ville et autres particuliers".<sup>141</sup>

These salutations would have been accorded to any visiting prince. Yet, with so many good contacts among the Rouennais elites and at such a sensitive time it is unlikely that this intercourse was purely honorific. At the very least this was an opportunity to take counsel and solicit support. The reason for his visit was still ostensibly to help his bankrupt *procureur*, Raoullin Longpaon. Consequently d'Aumale paid off the huge debts that Longpaon had incurred and provided him with an annual pension in return for inheriting Longpaon's lands when he died.<sup>142</sup> This financial transaction was undertaken with the help of others in the ultra-catholic hierarchy in Rouen. D'Aumale raised 6,000/ during the same visit from a bourgeois (later ennobled), Georges Langlois, sieur de Canteleu, in order to acquit the debts. Langlois had been part of the delegation, headed by Nicholas Damours the *avocat-général*, which was sent to court to request legal sanctions against Rouennais Huguenots and the maintenance of an armed force in Rouen.<sup>143</sup>

The Norman provincial Estates also became an arena for protest against royal religious policy. The Estates were not, as has been claimed, institutions in which the elite of Norman society

---

<sup>138</sup> Benedict, *Rouen during the Wars of Religion*, p 113.

<sup>139</sup> *Histoire ecclésiastique*, II, pp 789-92.

<sup>140</sup> François de Scépeaux, sieur de Vieilleville, *Mémoires*, Collection Universelle des mémoires particuliers relatifs à l'histoire de France, XXXII, p 112.

<sup>141</sup> "Discours abrégé", p 315.

<sup>142</sup> ADSM, Tabellionage, 2E1, 329, 19 February 1565.

<sup>143</sup> "Discours abrégé", p 297; Frondeville, *Présidents*, p 450.

had little interest.<sup>144</sup> The Estates vigorously defended Norman privileges, most notably in 1578-9 when the Norman charter was invoked to show that the relationship between crown and province was contractual. Consequently the *taille* could not be raised without the consent of the Estates. During the deliberations of November 1578, deputies were accompanied by a "grand nombre de barons at gentilshommes signalez".<sup>145</sup> This year might have been exceptional in the interest it aroused but every meeting of the Estates was an important social event in the calendar of the Norman nobility. Before the first civil war representatives to the Estates, in common with the parlementaires, showed little interest in the persecution of heretics. By 1567, at the beginning of the second civil war, a more radical outlook is discernible. In this year the *cahiers* of the three upper Norman *bailliages*, as well as that of the Cotentin, called for a profession of faith for all royal officers.<sup>146</sup> In 1570 there were objections to many of the clauses contained in the peace of Saint-Germain (in comparison to the decision of the parlement which ratified the edict swiftly). The Guise would have known directly about the concerns and opinions of deputies because many of their own clients and servants were present as representatives. After his acquisition of the comté of Eu in 1570, the duc de Guise took a much closer interest in the deliberations of the Estates, for it was this body which voted on the level of the *taille* and the proportion that each *bailliage* was liable to contribute. However, Eu was outside the jurisdiction of the Estates and Guise fought a continual battle to maintain the status quo. Taxes levied : on Eu were better apportioned from the court, where Guise could expect to have more bargaining power and spend less money in bribes, than by a large elected body like the Estates which would have been difficult and more expensive to influence.<sup>147</sup>

Thus it was not uncommon to see Guise servants and their relatives participating at the Estates.<sup>148</sup> Extant documents pertaining to the deliberations and election process for the *bailliage* of Rouen reveal that in the First and Second Estates, whose members are more easily identifiable than the deputies of the Third, there were an increasingly large number of electors and deputies linked either directly to the Guise or connected by the same involvement with the ultra-catholic faction. In this way the Estates were, like the parlement, taking a more active role in politics. Adam Sécard (d.1577), dean and later *grand chantre* of the cathedral, was deputy for the First Estate of the *bailliage* of Rouen between 1562 and 1565 and again in 1571.<sup>149</sup> Adam was from a family

---

<sup>144</sup> H. Prentout, "Les Etats Provinciaux de Normandie", *Mémoires de l'Académie Nationale des Arts et Belles-Lettres de Caen*, 3 vols, Caen, 1925-7, vol II, 59-62.

<sup>145</sup> *Cahiers des Etats de Normandie sous le règne de Henri III*, C. de Robillard de Beaurepaire (ed), 2 vols, Rouen, 1887-8, vol I, p 310.

<sup>146</sup> Prentout, "Les Etats Provinciaux", I, pp 291-8.

<sup>147</sup> Ibid, II, pp 38-41.

<sup>148</sup> See chapter six below.

<sup>149</sup> For a list of deputies to the provincial Estates, see F. Farin, *Histoire de la ville de Rouen*, 6 vols, Rouen, 1738, vol III, p 381.

in the forefront of the battle against heresy, his relative Claude having been involved in persecution since at least 1557. Antoine de Vieuxpont sieur de Saussay, who had served as a captain under the duc d'Aumale during the first civil war, was returned for the Second Estate in 1562 and again in 1568. Nicholas de Vipart, the younger brother and heir of Claude, the lieutenant of the duc d'Aumale's gendamerie company (1565-70), appeared for the Second Estate in 1573, 1578, 1586 and 1588. Unsurprisingly, the families of these men were staunch supporters of the Catholic League in 1589. The Guise would thus have been party to the information, opinions and gossip that circulated both during the sessions of the Estates and the social engagements and meetings that accompanied them.

The seeds of mistrust of royal religious and fiscal policy were sown in the 1560s, discontent only reaching its apogee in the 1580s. During this decade the conditions existed for the Guise to attract other malcontents of the regime, in order to join them in their bid for power. The Catholic League in Normandy cannot be understood without reference to the existence of the Guise affinity in the 1560s. During the first religious war the men who fought on the catholic side under the duc d'Aumale were well rewarded. Men who had been employed by the Guise received their due reward from the crown. For example, in 1563 Jean baron de Clères was made captain of fifty lances of the *ordonnance* and François, sieur d'Auzebosc, became the *colonel de légionnaires de Normandie*.<sup>150</sup> The rewards of royal office and the relative decline of the influence of the Guise at court made the benefits of loyalty to the crown more attractive. This was obviously the theory behind the inflation of royal honours during the Wars of Religion. In the 1570s and 1580s the dissatisfaction of local elites with the devaluation in the value of office, both financially and honorifically, was a crucial factor in the crumbling authority of the monarchy. Moreover the control of patronage devolved, more than ever, into the hands of the local elites. This decentralisation of power, allied to existing discontent with the crown, undermined monarchical authority and contributed to political instability.<sup>151</sup>

In Normandy the increased importance of the office of lieutenant-general was symbolic of this decentralisation. Moreover, the relationship between the lieutenants-general in Normandy and the Guise go a long way to making the concept of affinity comprehensible. Two of these men, Jean de Moy, sieur de La Meilleraye and Tanneguy Le Veneur, sieur de Carrouges, owed their rise during the first civil war to Guise patronage, thereafter becoming loyal servants of the crown before each took a different path during the hegemony of the Catholic League. They were loyal to more than one patron but the strength of loyalty depended on specific circumstances - it was never constant. For example, their relationship to the Guise is complex and reveals that the links of affinity remained latent, awaiting potential activation at any time.

Like many clients of the Guise, Carrouges also found service with the comte de Brissac. It was in the capacity of lieutenant of the comte that Carrouges was sent to Rouen to quell

---

<sup>150</sup> ADSM, 7J, 8, Chartier de la famille Martel, 26 July 1564

<sup>151</sup> This is more fully discussed in chapter three above.

disturbances in February 1563. He remained there and, on the death of Villebon d'Estouteville in 1565, fulfilled the functions of *bailli* with the support of the city council. From 1563 he was a lieutenant-general in Normandy, responsible for the *bailliages* of Rouen and Evreux.<sup>152</sup> On his appointment Carrouges was in possession of the best ultramontane credentials which, allied to his ability to keep order in the city, endeared him to all shades of catholic opinion. Over the next twenty-nine years he played a shrewd and ultimately dangerous game of remaining loyal to the crown but maintaining and reinforcing his historic links to the Guise.<sup>153</sup> In a time of peace and stability having more than one patron was highly beneficial, but during a time of crisis it became perilous when a particular side had to be chosen or it was decided to remain neutral.

Carrouges did not immediately have complete authority in his new jurisdictions. In June 1564 the duc de Bouillon was reinstated as governor of Normandy.<sup>154</sup> Bouillon's Calvinism, and his dubious record in the war, made this decision controversial at a time when anti-protestant feeling was so high. However, the appointment was not made at the insistence of the Huguenots, but rather at the behest of the ultra-catholic ducs d'Aumale and de Montpensier. Kinship was again the motive behind their lobbying: d'Aumale was the uncle and Montpensier the father-in-law of Bouillon. His reinstatement did not pass without complaint from catholics. Tension in Rouen was further increased during Bouillon's sojourn in the city from 18 June to 12 July 1564. Huguenot residents flocked to the duke to demand redress for the tribulations that they had suffered since the fall of the city to catholic forces. Bouillon was accompanied by a retinue almost exclusively consisting of protestants and he was accused of favouring them in the city. Furthermore he displayed little tact in reopening the case of the murdered *avocat*, Mustel de Boscroger. Bouillon, recognising the growing opposition to his authority, left Rouen on the 5 September 1564 and, although he remained governor of the province, real power now lay with the three resident lieutenants-general of Normandy.

Philip Benedict has found little evidence to suggest that Tanneguy Le Veneur, sieur de Carrouges, was a Guisard client and then demonstrates how Carrouges was loyal to the throne and scrupulous in carrying out royal commands.<sup>155</sup> This is only partly the picture but was probably the one that Carrouges would have chosen for his funeral eulogy when France was being consumed by the Catholic League. However, like all noblemen, Carrouges was egotistic in pursuing his own family interests and highly opportunist in his relations with both the crown and his other major patrons, the Guise. He had originally risen in Guise service but, having gained significant royal office, his strategy was aimed at protecting his precarious position by maintaining order in the

---

<sup>152</sup> Floquet, II, p 512; Benedict, *Rouen during the Wars of Religion*, p 32. The office of *bailli* was reactivated in 1576 to provide his son, the comte de Tillières with an office.

<sup>153</sup> For this relationship see chapters two and three above.

<sup>154</sup> For this and following, see Benedict, *Rouen during the Wars of Religion*, p 116; "Discours abrégé", pp 307, 315; *CSPF*, 1564-5, p 184.

<sup>155</sup> Benedict, *Rouen during the Wars of Religion*, p 118.



volatile city and cultivating links at court. Above all, this meant stabilising the volatile religious situation in Rouen. Thus royal edicts which were designed to keep the religious peace also reinforced his own grip on power. Furthermore, he bolstered his own position of authority by rewarding his servants and expanding his affinity. Carrouges ensured that men from his own company of the *ordonnance* monopolised the military offices in Rouen and filled many of the captaincies in the surrounding *bourgs*.<sup>156</sup> He also pursued a policy of marrying his children into the local elite. His daughter, Diane, was married in 1573 to Jacques de Rouville, lieutenant-general of the *bailliage* of Rouen from 1575 until 1583. Through this alliance Carrouges also kept in contact with the ultra-catholics. Rouville was lieutenant of the *ordonnance* company of the sieur de Chavigny, a notorious ultramontane and subscriber to d'Aumale's league of 1565.<sup>157</sup> In 1564 Carrouges chose Louis Le Pellerin, a catholic stalwart who had served under the duc d'Aumale in 1562, as the ensign of his *ordonnance* company and he was later promoted to lieutenant (1568-90).<sup>158</sup> His eldest son, Jacques Le Veneur (d.1596), comte de Tillières, became captain and *bailli* of Rouen on the resignation of his father in 1576.<sup>159</sup> In October 1578 Jacques married Charlotte de Chabot, niece of François de Chabot, who was first the *guidon* and later the lieutenant of the duc d'Aumale. Links with the Guise continued and strengthened; they did not diminish in the face of royal service and increased royal patronage. In 1577 and 1578 Tillières was the *guidon* of Charles duc de Mayenne and in 1583 his wife's half-sister married the duc d'Elbeuf. Finally, Carrouges married his remaining daughter to Paul comte de Salm, *chambellan* of the duc de Lorraine.<sup>160</sup>

Carrouges' desire to maintain his links to the Guise, even though the crown was now his major patron, was due only partly to affection for and a historical identification with the Guise. These sentiments were an element of sixteenth-century noble culture but they were not crucial in determining strategy. By maintaining his links to the Guise, Carrouges ensured that he retained a number of patrons and thus a multiplicity of options and channels of communication. Moreover, the influence of the duc d'Alençon (duc d'Anjou from 1576) in Normandy was another good reason for amity with the ultra-catholics. D'Alençon, leader of the *politiques*, had a large clientèle in Normandy and an *échiquier* at Alençon. He had the potential to impinge on the authority of the lieutenants-general. In February 1570 Catherine de Médicis had to write to reassure Matignon and Carrouges that the authority of d'Alençon to appoint to office only extended to his appanage, and that the duke only had authority:

---

<sup>156</sup> For example, Nicholas de Pommereul was the ensign of his company of the *ordonnance* (1569-76) and captain of the château and vieux palais of Rouen in 1576, see Vindry, p 501; BN, Ms Fr, 25809, fo 250.

<sup>157</sup> La Roque, *Histoire de la maison d'Harcourt*, II, p 1180; Anselme, VIII, p 259; Vindry, p 480.

<sup>158</sup> Vindry, p 501.

<sup>159</sup> ACR, A, 19, 14 May 1576.

<sup>160</sup> Vindry, p 301; La Roque, *Histoire généalogique de la maison d'Harcourt*, II, p 1180.

pour commander en ce qui est de son domaine et sans toucher à ce qui est de votre autorité; et pour ce il ne faut pas que vous craigniez qu'il ait voulu aucunes choses entreprendre en vos gouvernemens, lesquels tant s'en fault que je voulisse conseiller de diminuer ou en distraire aucune chose, que je les voudrois accroistre et augmenter; et vous pouvez assurer que je tiendrai toujours la main que vous soiez favourablement traictez non seulement en ce qui concerne l'auctorité de vos charges, mais en toutes autres choses.<sup>161</sup>

In his relations with the crown Carrouges was interested in improving his bargaining position. His correspondence with the monarchy was dictated by two themes: the maintenance of peace in Rouen and complaints about money. It seems unlikely that these complaints reflected his true financial health. They do reveal the growing importance of provincial governors and lieutenants-general, and the need for the crown to appease their grievances in order to maintain stability. Brantôme was a personal friend of Carrouges and commented at some length on Carrouges' resentment of the favourable treatment accorded to one lieutenant-general, Jacques de Matignon, at the expense of himself and Jean de Moy, in 1574:

madame, respondit Carrouges, mais à l'un vous luy donnez du bon foing et bonn' avoyne, et aux autres deux vous ne leur donnez que de la paille, et les traictez à coups de fourche.<sup>162</sup>

Brantôme is a storyteller and not a historian and consequently it is vital to treat his works circumspectly. However, this narration corresponds with many of Carrouges' surviving letters. In April 1567 he complained to one of the secretaries of state for finance that he was receiving a pension totalling a mere 200 *francs* per month, while Matignon was in receipt of 300. In the same letter he went on to say that he was maintaining a household that included twenty gentlemen at a cost of 1000 *francs* per month.<sup>163</sup> During the third civil war Carrouges was forced to advance from his own pocket the pay of his company of mounted arquebusiers because royal finances were so stretched.<sup>164</sup> It was no wonder that men like Carrouges were eager to maintain their links to the Guise. Their influence at court and the royal fear that the loyalty of their *officiers* was not absolutely certain was more likely to induce the royal treasury to pay. The need for the crown to satisfy the patronage aspirations of local elites, in order to maintain stability, was the major cause of decentralisation. Loyalty was conditional upon reward. In Normandy this led to the establishment

---

<sup>161</sup> *Lettres de Catherine de Médicis*, III, p 299.

<sup>162</sup> Brantôme, V, p 164.

<sup>163</sup> BN, PO, 2958, fo 58, Carrouges, Rouen, 8 April 1567.

<sup>164</sup> BN, Ms Fr, 15548, fo 51, Carrouges to Charles IX, Rouen, 16 September 1568.

of three governorships in 1575, after the death of the duc de Bouillon, facilitated by the promotion of the three lieutenants-general. There was a further expansion of office as lieutenants-general and lieutenants were now created under each of the three new governors. The decentralisation of authority meant increased power for the new governors. However, as offices increased and the ability of the economy to support those offices decreased, so the traditional competitiveness of the nobility for honours was heightened. In the 1580s this was bound to fuel the political and religious crisis.

The most dangerous effect of decentralisation was the ability of the local elites to control the royal tax administration. As early as 1562 local commanders had simply expropriated royal taxes. In the 1570s the Huguenots established an independent taxation system in the South-West. In 1567 Carrouges was a commissioner appointed by the crown to oversee the farming out of the *aides* of the *bailliages* of Rouen and Evreux. Carrouges asked Catherine de Médicis that the arrears of his pension be paid out of the increase in the farm. He added that he had already spent 400 *écus* and hoped to recoup his money when further transactions were concluded, assuring the queen mother that the profits of the tax farmers would be "fort petit". Catherine readily agreed to all these demands.<sup>165</sup> Thus there was a great potential for taking money out of the royal taxation system at source and bypassing official accounting procedures and, of course, this only concerned the money that Carrouges was prepared to 'declare'.

Jean de Moy, sieur de La Meilleraye, enjoyed the same opportunist relations with the crown and the Guise, both of them patrons of his father. Jean changed sides very early on in the first civil war and was rewarded for his loyalty by the duc d'Aumale with a number of captaincies. By the end of 1563 he was lieutenant-general of Normandy and vice-admiral of France, and by the beginning of the third civil war in 1568 he had made the complete transformation from supporter of Condé to nascent leader of the most immoderate elements of the upper Norman catholic nobility. None of Moy's actions demonstrate the traits of a man primarily motivated by faith; there is no evidence to suggest he was a protestant when he joined Condé. It is likely that his own growing ultramontane catholicism was born of his desire to strengthen his position in upper Normandy with appeals to religious solidarity. It is no coincidence that many of his potential rivals for hegemony in the pays de Caux were Huguenots. A symbol of Moy's nascent religious fervour was the papal authority he received (which must have been expensive in itself) in 1569 to build a chapel at La Meilleraye, in honour of the soul of his late brother. A chaplain was paid to say a mass every day on behalf of the deceased.<sup>166</sup>

---

<sup>165</sup> *Lettres de Catherine de Médicis*, III, p 2; BN, Ms Fr, 23193, fo 7, Carrouges to Catherine, Rouen, 12 January 1567.

<sup>166</sup> Rodière and Vallée, *La maison de Moy*, p 80.

Moy, like the other lieutenants-general, was jealous of his status. He fought to maintain his authority, trying to prevent the dismemberment of the comté of Gisors from his jurisdiction in 1567.<sup>167</sup> He was particularly suspicious of the potential strength of Charles de Bacqueville-Martel, a major landowner in his *gouvernement* and a former lieutenant in the province for the duc de Bouillon. Bacqueville died in 1566 but was succeeded by his son Nicholas, a protestant, and also like his father loyal to the crown. The best way for Moy to distance himself from his rival was to espouse a more aggressive catholic creed. Conflict came to a head between Moy and Nicholas de Bacqueville-Martel over a dispute regarding the exemptions from paying the *aides* of the *arrière-ban* given to some of Bacqueville's gendarmes. Moy alleged that a deception had been perpetrated because there was no record of their service in the *ordonnance* company of Bacqueville. The king was forced to:

mande audit sieur de la Meilleraye faire entendre aux Juges qu'ils ayent a faire cesser les empeschements qui setoient donnez a ceux de lad. compagnie pour la taxe du ban et arriere-ban.<sup>168</sup>

When Charles IX summoned Bacqueville's company out of the pays de Caux the following month, Moy dryly commented to the king:

Quant a celle du sieur de Bacqueville Jay entendu que vostre maiestie a ordonne quelle sachemine en vostre camp la ou a la verite pour beaucoup de raisons sera trop mieulx que par deca.<sup>169</sup>

There were other reasons for supporting a more vigorous anti-Huguenot stance, not least the opportunities to gain credit with catholic popular opinion. Moy was lobbied by the catholics of Dieppe and he echoed their concerns to the king:

il sera remonstre a sad. majestie que les manans et habitans catholiques de la ville de dieppe font tres grande instance au sieur de la meilleraye de ne permectre l'exercise de la religion pretendue reformee.<sup>170</sup>

Moy's radicalism was thus mirrored, indeed spurred, by local catholic feeling. As *bailli* of Rouen, Carrouges was responsible for protecting an increasingly threatened religious minority. The anti-

---

<sup>167</sup> BN, Ms Fr, 23193, fo 67, Moy to Charles IX, La Meilleraye, 31 January 1567; BN, Ms Fr, 23193, fo 71, Moy to Villeroy, La Meilleraye, 31 June 1567.

<sup>168</sup> BN, Ms Fr, 26291, fo 396, 26 January 1568.

<sup>169</sup> BN, Ms Fr, 15554, fo 176, Moy to Charles IX, Caudebec, 4 February 1568.

<sup>170</sup> BN, Ms Fr, 15608, fo 123, Moy to Charles IX, Dieppe, 7 April 1568.

Huguenot riots engendered by the peace of Longjumeau, which brought the second civil war to a close in April 1568, were particularly serious. The greatest threat to Moy's authority came from Dieppe, which was dominated by a Huguenot elite, and from the Huguenot nobility of rural upper Normandy. Immediately following the resumption of civil war in 1567 Moy met with the captain of Dieppe, René de Beauxoncles, sieur de Sigognes, to discuss ways of preventing another protestant uprising.<sup>171</sup> Subsequent attempts by the garrison of the château to secure the town on 26 and 27 October 1567 were humiliating failures. The irate townsfolk soon turned the tables and placed the garrison under siege. When order was finally restored Moy was determined to repair his damaged honour. Soldiers were billeted on Huguenot residences, houses were burnt and pillaged and a tax of 16,000/ was levied on the town. Destruction was not carried out at random by the soldiery but ordered directly by a vengeful Moy; among the victims was a prominent Huguenot *conseiller* at the parlement of Rouen, Jérôme Maynet.<sup>172</sup>

In common with his counterparts Moy was deeply involved in the problems of collecting royal revenue. After the peace of Longjumeau large numbers of troops had to be disbanded and thus paid their arrears, units that were to be retained also clamoured for their pay. Moy estimated the cost of troops in his jurisdiction (principally for the defence of Le Havre and Dieppe) to be 12,000/per month, payable from contributions levied on the countryside. The crown was in financial chaos and Moy's pension had remained unpaid for five months. More seriously the pay of the garrison of Dieppe had been in arrears for the same length of time.<sup>173</sup> Moy asked permission to use revenue from loans made to the crown:

Jay advise de faire prendre quelque somme de deniers sur les empruntz que le sieur de Vialar et moy faisons sur les habitans sur les habitans du bailliage de Caux en vertu de nostre de commission de laquelle toutefois il ne faut en attendre grand effect attendu la Royne que tout le pays souffre a locquasion de la quavellerie de vostre armee.<sup>174</sup>

Thus revenue was raised and spent by Moy, siphoned off in the localities without passing under the scrutiny of a royal fiscal official. The reason why Moy, and others like him, were given such great powers was because only they had the local resources and credit to sustain the war effort financially. As Moy had feared, there were few people prepared to lend money to the crown and

---

<sup>171</sup> Daval, *Histoire de la Réformation à Dieppe*, I, p 69.

<sup>172</sup> ADSM, C, 1228, Registres du Bureau des Finances de la Généralité de Rouen, 26 November 1585.

<sup>173</sup> BN, Ms Fr, 15608, fo 87, "Instruction envoyee au Roy par monseigneur de la meilleraye pour les affaires de son gouvernement", 24 March 1568.

<sup>174</sup> BN, Ms Fr, 15608, fo 143, Moy to Charles IX, Dieppe, 11 April 1568.

so Charles asked his lieutenant-general to forward 20,000/ of his own money to pay troops.<sup>175</sup> A shrewd nobleman could raise money locally, speculate in his financial dealings with the crown and reap substantial rewards. By August 1568 there was little improvement in the financial situation and Moy pointed out that few captains were prepared to follow the king's wishes: "Je ne voy personne qui veuille resider ordinairement aux places et entrer en ceste despence sans y attendre aucune recompense."<sup>176</sup> At the height of the third civil war Moy, in his capacity as vice-admiral, requested that he be able to raise his own extraordinary tax on salt vessels arriving in his marine jurisdiction.<sup>177</sup>

In his efforts to support the local war effort Moy was sent royal commissions to raise revenue and loans in conjunction with the *président à mortier* in the parlement, Michel de Vialar (d.1576). Both worked closely together during the third civil war (1568-70). The seventeenth-century historian of the parlementaires, Bigot de Monville, tells us that Vialar "s'attacha aux intérêts de la Maison de Guise et exécuta plusieurs commissions contre ceux de la R.P.R."<sup>178</sup> It is easy to dismiss this non-contemporary source because many commentators regard people as Guisards simply because they were ultra-catholic - a false premise. In fact, Vialar was a signatory of the will of Claude duc de Guise in 1550 and was later a financial agent for the family in Italy in 1557.<sup>179</sup> Thereafter he succeeded to the office of *président* in the parlement of Rouen, formerly held by Jean de Lallement - a man long associated with the Guise. Vialar in his turn resigned the office in 1573 to Nicholas Damours, also a constituent of the ultra-catholic faction from its very inception. Vialar's religious zeal is unquestionable and he was a close friend of the cardinal de Bourbon. Both Moy and Vialar displayed a particular antipathy towards Huguenot *conseiller*, Jérôme Maynet; Moy destroyed his property and Vialar urged the cardinal de Bourbon to ensure that he could not be readmitted to the parlement once peace was established in 1570.

Vialar was therefore the perfect choice to receive the commission for the seizure and sale of Huguenot goods and property, outlined in the edict of Saint-Maur (September 1568). By May 1570, 40,000/ had been raised in this manner.<sup>180</sup> Moy also became involved in this dubious method of raising revenue and clearly both men acquired a major financial stake in the catholic cause. Despite continual appeals of poverty, Moy was able to invest in land in 1569 and 1570 to

---

<sup>175</sup> BN, Ms Fr, 15546 fo 122, Charles IX to Moy, Paris, 29 May 1568.

<sup>176</sup> BN, Ms Fr, 15547, fo 308, Moy to Charles IX, La Meilleraye, 24 August 1568.

<sup>177</sup> BN, Ms Fr, 15550, Fo 130, Moy to Charles IX, Caudebec, 15 November 1569.

<sup>178</sup> Frondeville, *Présidents*, p 221.

<sup>179</sup> Bouillé, I, p 584; BN, Ms Fr, 20529, fos 17-18, Vialar to Guise, Venice, 3 October 1557.

<sup>180</sup> BN, Ms Fr, 15551, fo 256, Vialar to Charles IX, Dieppe, 1 May 1570. Vialar hoped to raise another 40,000/ in the same way but was furious that peace negotiations were hindering his activities, see BN, Ms Fr, 15551, fo 258, Vialar to Catherine, Dieppe, 1 May 1570.

the value of 3,800/.<sup>181</sup> A letter from Vialar to Moy on the eve of peace in August 1570 displays deep pessimism. Vialar spoke in favour of an end to hostilities but was anxious that peace would only strengthen his enemies:

Je vous advertis daultre chose si non que je vous faictz bancqueroute et lession [lésion] de biens et vous prie ne fonder a ladvenir aucune esperance sur les deniers procedans de mesdites commissions. Vous savez quelle inimitie me portent deux grandes seigneurs de la court de parlement [Jérôme Maynet was perhaps one] qui ne cessent pour chacun jour de mapeller 'galant' et dire quil me faut tuer dont lexecution sera facile puy que je nay receu aucun accroissement en honneur et autorité pout avoir tant de foys exposé ma vie pour le service de leurs Maiesties.<sup>182</sup>

During the third war of religion Moy had further alienated himself from moderate opinion and attracted the wrath of Huguenots. In February 1569 three Cauchois Huguenot noblemen, Jean de Canouville, sieur de Raffetot, and Louis and Pierre Blondel de Moissonière, plotted to seize Le Havre. Moy was informed of the conspiracy, captured the château of Raffetot and hanged the defenders. The leading plotters were then condemned to death *in absentia* for treason.<sup>183</sup> Moy had clearly signalled his intentions and, when another plot was hatched against Dieppe, he acted ruthlessly. The ringleader, Jacques de Malderée, sieur de Cateville, was arrested together with forty suspect bourgeois of Dieppe. Other noblemen were soon implicated including François de Bacqueville-Martel, sieur de Lindboeuf, brother of Moy's main local rival. It is difficult to know to what extent these plots were the products of scares and rumours rather than actual conspiracies. Moy acted with exemplary zeal, especially because these nobles posed a threat to his authority. The sieur de Lindboeuf had, according to de Thou, always been good friends with Moy. When indicted by the parlement Lindboeuf turned up to the trial, unlike those accused over the Le Havre affair. He was implicated only indirectly in the conspiracy against Dieppe and believed he could count on the protection and testimony of his friend Moy. Instead he was condemned and decapitated on 5 March 1569 and his possessions forfeited to the governor of Dieppe, Beauxoncles.<sup>184</sup> The parlement was obviously taking a harsher line against rebellious noblemen. However, the role played by Moy's sacrifice of a friend was widely acknowledged:

---

<sup>181</sup> BN, Ms Fr, 15550, fo 81, Moy to Charles IX, Caudebec, 26 October 1569; BN, Ms Fr, 26414, fo 153.

<sup>182</sup> BN, V<sup>c</sup> Col, 7, fo 247, Vialar to Moy, Rouen, 24 July 1570.

<sup>183</sup> "Discours abbregé", p 356; Daval, *Histoire de la Réformation à Dieppe*, I, p 100.?

<sup>184</sup> Daval, *Histoire de la Réformation à Dieppe*, I, p 126.

L'action de la Meilleraye fut interprétée différemment: bien de gens condamnèrent sa sévérité, comme outrée; mais le plus grand nombre le loua, d'avoir eu assez de vertu, pour sacrifier un ami particulier aux intérêts de la République.<sup>185</sup>

In serving the interests of the commonweal Moy served his own cause and dealt a severe blow to a rival family in the pays de Caux. Moy's increasingly ultramontane stance was mirrored by his relatives. His cousin, Jacques de Moy (1520-88), sieur de Riberpré, governor of Abbeville, pillaged Huguenots indiscriminately in the jurisdiction of Moy's *gouvernement*.<sup>186</sup> The Moy family, with the authority of royal office, was able to build a substantial clientèle in upper Normandy.<sup>187</sup> They became one of the leading ultra-catholic noble families in Normandy and founders of the Catholic League in Normandy. Marriage was the means by which the Moy became linked to the ultra-catholic hierarchy. In 1565 Nicholas de Moy married the niece of the cardinal de Pellevé, chief counsellor of the cardinal de Lorraine.<sup>188</sup>

Both Moy and Carrouges had long-standing links to the Guise and their success in achieving royal office did not put an end to the vitality of these links. They had good reason to cultivate the Guise in order to increase their potential influence at court. Consequently, they were never dependent upon the monarchy and royal patronage. In 1570 Moy simply refused to obey a royal command that ordered his *ordonnance* company <sup>of</sup> out Normandy because this would mean a decline in his authority.<sup>189</sup> Neither Moy nor Carrouges felt stable enough in their respective posts and sought the protection of more than one patron. The crown failed to buy complete loyalty despite the bestowal of offices and honours, such as the creation of three governorships in 1575. The crown and its officers had great difficulty in maintaining the financial value of offices and patronage. In March 1569 the garnisons of Tancarville, Pont de l'Arche, Château Gaillard, Honfleur and Fécamp had received no pay for six months and no one was prepared to advance the necessary cash.<sup>190</sup> The burden of office, caused by the upkeep of troops and large clientèles, was exacerbated in Normandy by the open favouritism displayed by the queen mother to Jacques de Matignon. Carrouges' address to Catherine in 1574, recorded by Brantôme, captures this sense of bitterness:

---

<sup>185</sup> De Thou, V, p 566

<sup>186</sup> Daval, *Histoire de la Réformation à Dieppe*, I, p 105.

<sup>187</sup> See chapter three above.

<sup>188</sup> BN, Cabinet d'Hozier, 252, fo 3.

<sup>189</sup> BN, Ms Fr, 15552, fo 71, Moy to Charles IX, La Meilleraye, 23 June 1570.

<sup>190</sup> BN, Ms Fr 15549, fo 90, maréchal de Cossé to Charles IX, Rouen, 13 March 1569; fo 180, maréchal de Cossé to Charles IX, Rouen, 27 March 1569.



Madame, je pense que M. de la Mayleraye et moy l'avons mieux servy; car nous luy avons très bien conservé ses places, que nul n'y a osé attenter ny prendre; et Matignon a laissé perdre et prendre vilainement les siennes; et puis, pour les reprendre, il a ruyné tout le pays, et fait despendre au roy pour son armée combien de cent mill' escus, qui lui fairoient bien besoin ailleurs; et ast' heure, pensez donc madame, à qui le roy a plus obligation, ou à luy ou à nous.<sup>191</sup>

Their growing landed interest and attempts to recruit more Normans into their military retinues, were indicators of the expansion of the Guise power base in Normandy in the 1560s. However, the ultamontane faction remained small, especially in the parlement and those with ultamontane sympathies, such as Jean de Moy, had their own parochial reasons for supporting the repression of heresy. Similarly, the populace of Paris idolised the Guise but the family had little influence over popular forces.

However, the rise of popular catholic militancy was evident at the anger with which the peace of Saint-Germain was greeted in Paris and in provincial cities like Rouen. Dissatisfaction with the failure of the monarchy to protect catholicism, already evident in the early 1570s, would grow during the reign of Henri III as <sup>the</sup> scale of taxation and the proliferation of offices reached unprecedented heights. The Guise, with their great landed interest and sizeable affinity and their identification with the catholic cause, were ideally placed to take advantage of discontent and the growth of catholic radicalism which began to destabilise France in the 1570s.

---

<sup>191</sup> Brantôme, V, p 164.

## Chapter Six

### Malcontents and Defenders of the Faith: The Building of a Political Power Base

The situation of the monarchy was desperate by spring 1574 as Huguenot-*politique* plots led by Henri de Navarre, François duc d'Alençon and François de Montmorency, aimed at seizing power, had been foiled only recently. When Charles IX died in May the heir to the throne, Henri duc d'Anjou, was out of the kingdom, having been elected king of Poland. In the interim the queen mother acted as regent. The authority of the crown was further undermined when the Huguenots established a republic in the South and then formed a military alliance with Henri de Montmorency-Damville.<sup>1</sup> The return of Henri III from Poland did little to ameliorate the desultory performance of the royalist armies in the fifth civil war. The South had been practically abandoned to Damville and his Huguenot allies. The only reason that peace had not been concluded by the crown was that the demands of the Huguenot-*politique* alliance were too high, notably unlimited demands for freedom of worship and the trial of those responsible for the Saint Bartholomew's Day Massacre.<sup>2</sup> The Guise had very good reasons for wanting to prosecute the war more vigorously. Peace would ensure the return of the Huguenots and the Montmorency to court at the expense of the Guise who, despised by Catherine and, before his death, Charles IX, had regained their prominence at court only recently on the return of Henri III. The campaign of late summer 1575 was therefore crucial to the security of the Guise family and the battle of Dormans (10 September 1575) was not the inconsequential skirmish claimed by Pierre de L'Estoile.<sup>3</sup>

The duke left court in early September 1575 to organise the defence of his *gouvernement* against an invading Huguenot and *reiter* army, numbering 4-5,000 men and led by Guillaume de Montmorency-Thoré.<sup>4</sup> Guise's own lands were threatened; Antoinette de Bourbon was forced to flee Joinville for the safety of Saint-Dizier. The penury of the crown meant that the duke had to rely heavily on the family resources and his local credit. He borrowed heavily and his army was constituted largely from his own family, including Mayenne, d'Aumale, Mercoeur and d'Elbeuf. Commissions were dispatched to his own clients. Charles des Boves, sieur de Rance, the former ensign of the marquis d'Elbeuf, raised two companies of foot. Heralds were dispatched all over Champagne summoning the duke's *amis* to the standard. The battle which defeated Montmorency-Thoré was only a minor action but it was a credit to Guise's organisational and military abilities. The wound he received in the battle, earning him the sobriquet *le balafré*, only served to increase his prestige in the popular imagination - a reputation which had grown since the Massacre of Saint Bartholomew.

---

<sup>1</sup> Salmon, *Society in Crisis*, pp 191-3.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid, p 197.

<sup>3</sup> Pierre de L'Estoile, *Journal du règne de Henri III*, L.-R. Lefèvre (ed), Paris, 1943, p 84.

<sup>4</sup> On this and following, see Bouillé III, pp 13-17; A. d'Aubigné, *Histoire Universelle*, IV, pp 380-1, puts the Guise army at 10,000 men, although this included units raised by the crown and other nobles. The depredations of this army can be followed, in Claude Haton, *Mémoires*, II, pp 779-800.

Guise was regrouping the royal army at Melun when news reached him that peace had been concluded.<sup>5</sup> The king, facing overwhelming odds, had little choice but to meet the demands of his adversaries at the Peace of Monsieur, the tolerant religious provisions of which were enshrined in the edict of Beaulieu (6 May 1576).<sup>6</sup> Understandably, Guise felt aggrieved by this surrender after his feats the previous autumn and now had to be concerned about his status and personal safety at the court. Catholics everywhere were dismayed at the concessions and the adverse reaction to the new religious settlement was manifested by the formation of the Catholic League in Picardy. The peace confirmed the prince de Condé as governor of Picardy, and handed over Péronne to him as a surety against the fulfilment of this and other conditions. Traditionally, the League has been seen as the creation of Jacques d'Humières (d.1579), lieutenant-general of Picardy and governor of Péronne, Roye and Mondidier, who succeeded in galvanising the local catholic nobility. Historians have seen the League as a largely parochial movement which had little impact in other provinces, including Normandy.<sup>7</sup>

The opponents of the Guise saw their 'Machiavellian' designs behind the crisis.<sup>8</sup> Subsequently historians have seen the sinister intentions of the family behind the League and the historiographical tradition of the nineteenth century stressed the danger to the *patrie*, since "Henri de Guise voulut devenir maître en France, en se plaçant au dehors dans la dépendance du roi d'Espagne."<sup>9</sup> Although the Guise made no secret of their disappointment at the edict of Beaulieu, there is no evidence to suggest that the Catholic League was either formed or led by the family. Negative reactions to the peace came from diverse quarters and were strongest among those likely to lose their offices as a result of the articles of pacification. Thus Philippe de Voluire (d.1586), sieur de Ruffec, captain of Angoulême and one of the earliest of Henri III's *mignons*, was quick to adhere to the League. He was joined by Claude de La Châtre, captain of Bourges and until recently a supporter of François duc d'Alençon.<sup>10</sup> It has even been suggested that the peace of Beaulieu was simply a tactical move by the king to detach his younger brother from the Huguenot-*politique* alliance.<sup>11</sup>

---

<sup>5</sup> Bouillé, III, pp 26-8.

<sup>6</sup> Lavissee, *Histoire de France*, VI, pt 1, p 171.

<sup>7</sup> Benedict, *Rouen during the Wars of Religion*, p 153; Dewald, *The Formation of a Provincial Nobility*, p 48 n 1.

<sup>8</sup> E. C. Davila, *Historie of the Civill Warres of France*, London, 1647-8, p 445.

<sup>9</sup> Croze, *Les Guises, les Valois et Philippe II*, I, p 227.

<sup>10</sup> Constant, *Les Guises*, pp 81-2.

<sup>11</sup> Chevallier, *Henri III*, pp 330-4.

The Catholic League of 1576 (or perhaps more appropriately the League of Péronne) had little in common with the populist Catholic or Holy League which became a major force in 1588. It was primarily a noble association and therefore similar to the leagues of the 1560s. It shared the same aristocratic philosophy as the Holy League formed by the Guise in 1584. Although many noblemen were active in both leagues, the Holy League became a much broader movement because it used religion to provide the ideology and win popular sympathy for a princely revolt. According to L'Estoile a number of towns quickly adhered to the League of Péronne, including Amiens, Abbeville, Saint-Quentin and Corbie.<sup>12</sup> In fact, he exaggerated the rapid spread of the League, reinforcing the point that contemporary observers were ignorant of the League and historians too anxious to accept contemporary accounts without verification. Amiens, for example, was solicited by the leaguers but did not sign the Declaration of Péronne.<sup>13</sup>

Jacques d'Humières was the scion of a family noted for its loyalty to the monarchy. This is not surprising since the fortunes of the family had initially been tied to the Montmorency. However the influence of the Montmorency, once so pervasive in Northern France, was in decline. Damville remained powerful in Languedoc but his elder brother, the maréchal de Montmorency, had seen his influence at court damaged by involvement in malcontent plots and subsequent imprisonment. Moreover, d'Humières was locked in a bitter legal dispute with his brother-in-law, Guillaume de Montmorency-Thoré.<sup>14</sup> D'Humières probably felt that he now lacked the influential contacts at court he once had enjoyed. He was concerned about his authority in Picardy on Condé's return and pleaded with the king to reject the peace. D'Humières provided respectability and a focus for discontent but he was not in control. On May 13 1576 an assembly at Péronne gathered to discuss the terms and implications of the peace and a delegation was dispatched to the king with a letter of recommendation from the lieutenant of Péronne, Michel d'Estourmel.<sup>15</sup> After the return of this unsuccessful mission it was d'Humières who, as the man most likely to receive some form of compensation, counselled acceptance of the royal will. Moreover, it is clear from the surviving correspondence with d'Humières that it was d'Estourmel and another local nobleman, Jacques d'Applaincourt, who were held responsible for defying the king. The Péronnais held firm and refused to give up the keys to the town or the magazine. A group of noblemen then gathered at the residence of Jacques d'Applaincourt, five kilometres from the town, to sign the articles of association on 5 June. D'Applaincourt had drawn up the articles the day before, which were later signed by nearly 200 nobles, soldiers and leading inhabitants of Péronne. D'Humières

---

<sup>12</sup> L'Estoile, *Journal du règne de Henri III*, p 117.

<sup>13</sup> *Inventaires des Archives Communales de la ville d'Amiens antérieures à 1790*, P. Durand (ed), Amiens, 1894, série BB, Délibérations de l'Echevinage; 27 June 1576, 20 July 1576, 24 July 1576, 16 August 1576.

<sup>14</sup> De Thou, VII, p 425.

<sup>15</sup> For this and following, see J. Dournel, *Histoire de la ville de Péronne*, Péronne, 1879, pp 213-16.

signed the document but tactfully retired to his château at Becquincourt. On 8 June Henri wrote both to d'Humières and to d'Applaincourt, demanding that royal orders be carried out and that d'Estourmel and d'Applaincourt leave Péronne immediately.<sup>16</sup> The role of the lesser nobility was greater than hitherto assumed.<sup>17</sup> It was they who journeyed throughout the towns of Picardy, urging adherence to the League; d'Applaincourt went to Abbeville and the sieur de Sainte-Marie to Amiens.<sup>18</sup> The Péronnais stood firm against royal threats and overtures and the king was soon forced to rescind his promise to Condé and offer him Cognac and Saint-Jean d'Angely instead as places of surety. By then the League had spread to Ham and Doullens.<sup>19</sup>

An analysis of the signatories of the League of Péronne demonstrates the links of these adherents with the Guise family.<sup>20</sup> Appendix F attempts to show that these men had close kinship connections and that a substantial number were in the Guise affinity or were patronised by the Guise as a matter of policy in the succeeding years. The network of relationships tightened as marriages were contracted within the leaguer fraternity. The duc d'Aumale, in particular, attempted to cultivate and find servants among the leaguers. Jacques d'Applaincourt had been one of the most prominent servants of the young duc d'Aumale since at least 1575, serving as ensign in the duke's company of the *ordonnance*. By 1581 he had risen to the office of lieutenant and was captain and governor of the town of Guise from 1580 to 1588.<sup>21</sup> His career had begun as a *pannetier* in the household of the cardinal de Lorraine but, like several others who signed the Catholic League, he had followed Condé in 1562.<sup>22</sup>

The numerical strength of the Guise affinity in the League was the result of the adherence of families like the Tiercelin, the Bourbon-Rubempré and the Roncherolles. Adrien de Tiercelin (1521-93), sieur de Brosses, was a senior member of the Guise affinity. He had been involved in their service for many years, having participated in the campaigns of 1556-7 in Italy and in Scotland in 1560. He was lieutenant-general to Henri de Guise in Champagne and governor of Mouzon since

---

<sup>16</sup> *Lettres de Henri III*, P. Champion (ed), Paris, 1959-, vol II, pp 444-5.

<sup>17</sup> De Thou, VII, 426-7, is among those who saw the League as a conspiracy led by d'Humières and the Guise, but was nevertheless unable to provide any real evidence of collusion.

<sup>18</sup> E. Prarond, *Histoire de la Ligue à Abbeville, 1576-1594*, 3 vols, Paris, vol I, p 147; *Inventaire-Sommaire des Archives de la ville d'Amiens*, BB, Délibérations de l'Echevinage, 24 July 1576.

<sup>19</sup> Dournel, *Histoire de la ville de Péronne*, pp 216, 219-21. The sieur de Sainte-Marie was governor of Doullens and Louis de Moy governor of Ham.

<sup>20</sup> The original signatories of the League can be found in BN, Ms Fr, 3329, fos 17-18; Prarond, *Histoire de la Ligue à Abbeville*, I, p 148.

<sup>21</sup> Vindry, p 285; M. de Sars (ed), *Inventaire-Sommaire des Archives de la ville de Guise antérieurs à 1800*, Laon, 1833, p 18.

<sup>22</sup> This could conceivably refer to his father or another relative, see BN, Clair, 1204, fo 84; *Correspondence de Theodore de Bèze*, IV, pp 266-71.

1562.<sup>23</sup> Appendix F shows the considerable importance that the Tiercelin had in the leadership of the League - a role which would continue for the next twenty years. Jacques de Tiercelin (1549-78) was the younger brother of Adrien. It was during his tenure of the office of lieutenant (1572-5) of the company of the ducs d'Aumale that an influx of Picards changed the composition of the ducal retinue, ensuring that the present duke was quickly embroiled in the League because of his substantial Picard following.<sup>24</sup>

The second crucial link between the League and the Guise came through the Bourbon-Rubempré and Roncherolles families. André de Bourbon-Rubempré remained loyal to the senior branch of the Bourbon during the Wars of Religion, but he moved from service with Condé in 1562 into the household of the cardinal de Bourbon, where he became the most staunchly Guisard of the councillors of the prelate.<sup>25</sup> In 1572 Henri de Guise acknowledged his importance to the Guise family by making him governor of the comté of Eu.<sup>26</sup> In 1560 Rubempré married Anne de Roncherolles, a family entitled *premier barons* of Normandy. Rubempré patronised his brothers-in-laws. Pierre de Roncherolles succeeded him as the governor of Abbeville and *sénéchal* of the comté of Ponthieu.<sup>27</sup> Rubempré was also in an ideal position to find positions for this staunchly orthodox family in the service of the catholic branch of the Bourbons. Pierre's younger brother, François de Roncherolles (1551-89), sieur de Maineville, became infamous as a member of the Paris Sixteen in 1589 but he began his career as a servant of the cardinal de Bourbon and was then lieutenant of the company of the *ordonnance* of François de Bourbon, comte de Soissons, from 1578 until 1582. Maineville was also one of the most important Guise clients in Normandy.

The Roncherolles were among the provincial elite and the strength of the League in Normandy was dependent on their credit in Norman political society. Where family papers and the correspondence remain silent, the tabellionage records demonstrate the interplay between the Roncherolles and other ultra-catholic families. In July 1570 the Roncherolles family gathered to draw lots for the inheritance of the deceased head of the family, Philippe.<sup>28</sup> André de Bourbon-Rubempré was present as *tuteur honoraire* of Pierre and François de Roncherolles. Likewise their step-brothers were represented by ultra-catholic tutors who included Jacques de Tiercelin and

---

<sup>23</sup> Orlea, *La Noblesse aux Etats-généraux de 1576 et de 1588*, pp 133-5. He was also the governor of Reims and Doullens, although between what dates is unclear.

<sup>24</sup> See chapter three above. Jacques was also a significant landowner in the *bailliage* of Gisors, captain of Argentan and Domfront, see Vindry, p 285.

<sup>25</sup> Saulnier, *Le rôle politique du Cardinal de Bourbon*, p 97.

<sup>26</sup> Rubempré was also a vassal of the comte, see ADSM, E1, 486/3, fo 126, 21 August 1579.

<sup>27</sup> Vindry, p 415; J. Dewald, *Pont-St-Pierre 1398-1798: Lordship, Community and Capitalism in Early Modern France*, Los Angeles and London, 1987, p 170. Rubempré signed the League using his family name. Therefore it is likely that the signature of "le seneschal de Ponthieu" refers to Roncherolles, his successor in that office.

<sup>28</sup> ADSM, Tabellionage, 2E1, 341, 20 February 1570.

Charles d'Espinay bishop of Dol, a future League stalwart in Brittany and friend to the pedagogue and poet Remy Belleau (d.1577) who had been patronised by René, marquis d'Elbeuf, and was *precepteur* of the young Charles d'Elbeuf.<sup>29</sup> The following year Pierre de Roncherolles married Charlotte de Moy thus uniting the two senior ultra-catholic families of upper Normandy.<sup>30</sup>

The Catholic League was above all an alliance of closely interrelated families from the *moyenne* and *petite noblesses*. This was its strength and the reason why it was able to survive clandestinely after its proscription by the king in September 1577. It was not the instrument of d'Humières or the Guise and was therefore not so vulnerable to the swings of factional politics as other noble associations had been. Solidarity was reinforced by the clear threat of the return of Condé and his followers to Picardy, monopolising local patronage and resurrecting once more the spectre of religious friction in the region. The adherence of so many Guise clients to the Catholic League testifies to growing influence of the family in Picardy, especially that of the duc d'Aumale. Noblemen like d'Applaincourt, who were pursuing their careers mainly through the patronage of the Guise, faced a stark choice at the return of Condé. The chances of gaining office in Picardy meant either attempting to gain the favour of the returning prince or preventing his return altogether.

It is clear from appendix F that there was a remarkable complexity of personal relationships that bonded the leaguers. The *ordonnance* companies of Rubempré and Roncherolles drew their recruits from a common network of noble families. The d'Amerval family provided men for the companies of other League families and for the duc d'Aumale.<sup>31</sup> Clients and their kinsmen were thus in a position to act as the bonds which cemented links between their different patrons and assured still further the obligations of personal relationships. The Guisencourt family were *petite noblesse* from the *bailliage* of Gisors. Pierre de Roncherolles was the son of Suzanne de Guisencourt. Louis de Guisencourt was a man-at-arms of the duc d'Aumale in 1581 and performed services for other Guise clients. He took part in financial transactions acting as a witness for Charles de Roncherolles in 1585. He was either the son or brother-in-law of Perrette de Gaillardbois. The Gaillardbois were from the same region of Normandy and vassals of the duc d'Aumale, furnishing a number of men-at-arms for the duke's company.<sup>32</sup>

It is also evident that the Guise made strenuous efforts to recruit servants from this sympathetic constituency and find offices for leaguers in the years following 1576. Ponthus de Bellefourrière, son of the governor of Corbie, thus appears as the ensign (1577-80) of the marquis d'Elbeuf. However, it was the duc d'Aumale who strove most to reinforce his Picard affinity. Antoine du Hamel, who filled the position of *guidon* of d'Aumale's company in 1575 and the post of ensign

---

<sup>29</sup> D. B. F., V, p 1322.

<sup>30</sup> BN, PO, 2539, fo 126.

<sup>31</sup> See chapter three above for the changes in the complexion of d'Aumale's company.

<sup>32</sup> ADSM, Tabellionage, 2E1, 348, 12 March 1574; 2<sup>ème</sup> Héritage, 2E1, 1986, 29 November 1589. Georges and François were both men-at-arms of the duc d'Aumale (1575-81).



in 1581, is only one of many examples of leaguer nobles who were patronised by the duke.<sup>33</sup> Not every signatory of the League was a Picard. Charles de Fouilleuse, at that time ensign of d'Elbeuf's company, had to travel to Péronne from his residence in the Vexin. The presence of Fouilleuse did not signal the orchestrating influence of the Guise at Péronne, but rather his response to calls for support from his own kinsmen and *amis*. Nevertheless, it is evident that since many of their senior servants were involved in the League the Guise cannot be represented as a disinterested party. The role they played in the summer of 1576 remains ambiguous because of the paucity of evidence, but was one of concealed sympathy.

The close relationship between the family and the cardinal de Bourbon is crucial to an understanding of the strength of the League. The Bourbon still had a great deal of influence in Picardy and the cardinal was the senior representative of the catholic branch. He was, moreover, archbishop of Rouen and soon came under pressure from his diocese to prevent enforcement of the edict of Beaulieu. The liberal edict had also been badly received by the *échevins* of Rouen, who asked the king for an exemption from its tolerant clauses.<sup>34</sup> Likewise the cathedral chapter petitioned the cardinal to use his influence in order to prevent the return of protestant worship. A delegation was dispatched to urge the cardinal to "venir en ceste ville et y estre quelque temps pour en expedier les hereticques et faire ce qui sera necessaire".<sup>35</sup> In contrast, the parlement was more accommodating and registered the edict quickly, but fears about the return of protestantism to Rouen were not assuaged and a special assembly of the parlement was convened in July 1576.<sup>36</sup> Among those present were fifteen senior magistrates and two *maître des requêtes*, Jean-Jacques de Baucquemare (d.1619) and Jacques Pétremol (d.1605) also a *conseiller* in the parlement of Paris. Also present were opponents of the edict: the cardinal de Bourbon, Claude de Saintes (d.1591), bishop of Evreux, and Pierre de Roncherolles who, as *conseiller-né* of the parlement, had the right to sit in the court. Bourbon failed to persuade the assembled judges to contravene the edict and interfere with the exercise of protestant worship. He was forced to act on his own initiative, confronting the protestant congregation during worship on 23 July.<sup>37</sup>

Bourbon's attempt to emulate the League in defying the royal edict was made against a background of continued fear and uncertainty in Normandy. Before peace was signed there were reports that hostile soldiery had been sighted in the vicinity of Rouen.<sup>38</sup> On 11 August Carrouges

---

<sup>33</sup> Vindry, p 156, atlas edition.

<sup>34</sup> ACR, A, 19, 12 May 1576.

<sup>35</sup> ADSM, G, 2171, 26 June 1576; Floquet, III, pp 160-1.

<sup>36</sup> ADSM, 1B, Registres Secrets, 93, 22 May 1576.

<sup>37</sup> Floquet, III, p 165; Benedict, *Rouen during the Wars of Religion*, p 148; ADSM, 1B, Registres Secrets, 93, 16 July 1576.

<sup>38</sup> ACR, B, 2, 9 February 1576; ADSM, 1B, 93, Registres Secrets, 14 March 1576.

informed the *grand chambre* of the parlement that the king had sent him warning of a conspiracy against the city. The king:

vouloit qu'il fust pourveu a ce que ses subjects ne se distraissent de son obeissance sans entrer en quelconque ligue et que de luy lier la corde de dessus la teste si ils entreprennent telle ligue.<sup>39</sup>

Soon after elections for the Estates-General took place in October 1576 Carrouges reported more troop movements, although he was unsure whether these were protestants or catholics.<sup>40</sup>

During the tense summer of 1576 the Guise had ample opportunity to take counsel and discuss the crisis in which their clients were directly involved. On 6 August Charles duc de Mayenne was married to the comtesse de Tende at Meudon. The whole family then repaired to Joinville where a double marriage was celebrated in November: Charles duc d'Aumale married his cousin Marie de Lorraine, daughter of the marquis d'Elbeuf, and Diane de Lorraine, sister of the duc d'Aumale, wedded François de Luxembourg, comte de Roucy.<sup>41</sup> The first marriage was clearly an attempt to reinforce family solidarity. Any misgivings that d'Aumale may have had about the suitability of the bride were dispelled by the gift of 100,000/ provided by the duc de Guise.<sup>42</sup> The second marriage provides another example of the Guise strategy of strengthening alliances with families which were territorially strong on the eastern frontiers of the kingdom and in the empire itself. Antoinette de Bourbon was also delighted that "son mari est fort riche et sans debte: il est bien logé et meublé."<sup>43</sup> The nuptials over, the family departed for Paris to assist at the Estates-General.

Considering the depth of resentment felt in Normandy against the edict of Beaulieu, it came as no surprise when so many ultramontane catholics and Guise clients were elected to represent the seven *bailliages* of the province. The king had made vain attempts to ensure the election of sympathetic delegates. On 15 November 1576 he ordered the replacement of Emery Bigot in the Third Estate because:

quelque soupçon seroit intrevénu entre aucuns de ses subjectz mal affectionnez au bien de son service iceulx voyans de nos principaux officiers, desquelz la

---

<sup>39</sup> ADSM, 1B, Registres Secrets, 93, 11 August 1576.

<sup>40</sup> ACR, A, 19, 28 October 1576.

<sup>41</sup> Anselme, III, pp 491-2.

<sup>42</sup> Guise still owed the sum to his cousin two years later, see Bouillé, III, p 50, n 3.

<sup>43</sup> BN, Ms Fr, 3338, fo 38, Antoinette to the duchesse de Nemours, Joinville, 22 November 1576.

fonction n'a autre esgard que a desirer et a recherer, ce qui nous est de plus particulier, estre employez à faire les plainctes et dolléances de son peuple.<sup>44</sup>

Marion de Martimbosc, a leading counsellor of the cardinal de Bourbon, vicar-general of the diocese of Rouen and chancellor of the cathedral chapter, was returned for the First Estate of the *bailliage* of Rouen.<sup>45</sup> The Second Estate elected Antoine de Bigars (d.1594), sieur de La Londe, who would become a mainstay of the League in upper Normandy. His father was a kinsman and *guidon* in the company of Villebon d'Estouteville, having defended the vieux palais against the Huguenot insurrection in 1562.<sup>46</sup> Antoine had close links to the League hierarchy, marrying in 1575 Anne de Tiercelin the daughter of Adrien sieur de Brosses, himself elected to the Estates for the *bailliage* of Amiens.<sup>47</sup> Tiercelin was joined by Rubempré, elected for the Second Estate of the comté of Ponthieu. François de Roncherolles was chosen to represent the *bailliage* of Gisors and his elder brother, Pierre, sat in the provincial Estates of that year in the same capacity.<sup>48</sup> The result in the *bailliage* of Caux was more contentious:

le catholique Charles Martel sieur de Fontaines, élu sans doute grâce aux voix protestantes, est écarté et même injurie par le gouverneur parce qu'il parlait librement et résistoit aux contraventions qui se faisoient en l'assemblée contre la loy ancienne.<sup>49</sup>

The governor involved in this case, Jean de Moy, was sympathetic to the League, fearing that an emboldened protestant force in the Caux would undermine his power base. He therefore secured the election of Charles de Goutimesnil, the former ensign (1567-70) and lieutenant (1571) of his company of the *ordonnance*.<sup>50</sup> It was therefore among the upper Norman delegates that the League had its strongest supporters. This is not surprising given the close family ties that Picard leaguers enjoyed in upper Normandy. The upper Norman and Picard nobility was the dominant axis

---

<sup>44</sup> ACR, A, 19, 10 November 1576. The royal will was ignored and Bigot pursued a hawkish line at Blois before his support was eventually bought by the king, see Picot, *Histoire des Etats-Généraux*, II, p 365.

<sup>45</sup> Frondeville, *Conseillers*, p 450. He was nephew of a former *bailli* of the duchy of Aumale. For a list of delegates, see *Recueil des pièces originales concernant la tenue des Etats-Généraux*, III, p 3.

<sup>46</sup> Vindry, p 202.

<sup>47</sup> BN, Carrés d'Hozier, 93, fo 45.

<sup>48</sup> Farin, *Histoire de la ville de Rouen*, II, p 406.

<sup>49</sup> La Popelinière, quoted in Orlea, *La Noblesse aux Etats généraux de 1576 et de 1588*, p 92.

<sup>50</sup> Vindry, p 366.

of the League - demonstrated by the fact that when the king wished the Second Estates to vote him money it was Tiercelin, Bigars and Roncherolles who were prevailed upon to use their influence.<sup>51</sup>

Transcriptions of the debates of the Estates-General of Blois do not survive, compounding our ignorance of the political fortunes of the Catholic League. However, the diary of the duc de Nevers provides important eyewitness information.<sup>52</sup> By using his evidence in conjunction with the surviving correspondence, the historian is able to analyse the strategy and political manoeuvres of the League hierarchy. The most important conclusion reached is that, despite the royal attempt to sanction the existence of the League on 2 December 1576 and co-opt it by demanding that all subjects swear an oath to its articles, it remained a well organised, secretive and localised noble association independent of royal control.

Henri III, assuming he had placed himself in control of the League and effectively drawn its fire, opened the Estates-General on 6 December 1576.<sup>53</sup> The overwhelming preponderance of catholics at the Estates ensured that there was unanimous pressure for action to permit only the exercise of catholicism in the kingdom. Conflict in the Estates arose over the means by which this was to be achieved. Obviously the League and other ultramontane elements, including the duc de Nevers, favoured another war. However, this would entail the imposition of further burdens on the already financially troubled realm and the raising of new taxes, making an inquiry into the royal finances essential. Normandy was one of the seven provinces which voted for the renewal of hostilities.<sup>54</sup> It was the First and Second Estates which were the most vociferous in favour of a new offensive. They had most to gain from a catholic triumph and the nobility could expect military commissions and offices. The Third Estate had more to lose as it would have to meet the cost of a new campaign. When the disastrous state of the royal finances became clear in January 1577 their scepticism turned to obduracy. They now called for fiscal retrenchment and balked at voting for taxes.

Meanwhile the catholic nobility, strengthened by the local organisation of the League, prepared for a new campaign. As soon as the king gave his blessing provincial officers not previously associated with the League seized on the opportunity to dispense commissions:

Sa majestie me dit que elle avoit envoyé en plusieurs endroits, pour continuer l'association que l'on avoit commencée en Picardie, & Monsieur de Carouge lui

---

<sup>51</sup> Picot, *Histoire de Etats-Généraux*, II, p 348.

<sup>52</sup> Printed in the *Recueil des pièces originales concernant la tenue des Etats-Généraux*, vol III.

<sup>53</sup> For this and following, see Picot, *Histoire des Etats-Généraux*, II, pp 322-40.

<sup>54</sup> Opposition to the war was strongest in the South where peace had never been established and there was growing war-weariness, see M. P. Holt, "Attitudes of the French Nobility at the Estates-General of 1576", *Sixteenth Century Journal*, 1987.

avoit mandé qu'il l'avoit faite en son Gouvernement, auquel l'on lui bailloit 200 chevaux pour [y estre employé] et 1500 hommes de pied et autant qui demouroit en Pays pour la garde d'icellui.<sup>55</sup>

In Normandy the ultramontane nobility cooperated closely. Jean de Moy recommended to the king that Pierre de Roncherolles be made the *maître de camp* for all League forces in Normandy.<sup>56</sup> The League hierarchy also worked closely together at Blois. Adrien de Tiercelin and André de Bourbon-Rubempré, acted as spokesmen for the three Estates of Picardy and reported back to d'Humières on 20 December that, following meetings they had attended with the king, Henri was no longer an obstacle to the expansion of the League.<sup>57</sup> Above all their correspondence demonstrates that, despite the shift in the royal position, the League still remained "nostre association".<sup>58</sup> Perceptively they did not entirely trust Henri's overtures of good faith. In order to maintain local control of the League and ensure that its true purpose was retained, royal officers in Picardy and Moy in Normandy made sure that the oath sworn to uphold the articles of the League recognised them as leaders in their own right, and did not reduce them to the role of mere royal appointees.<sup>59</sup>

The main hindrance to the success of the League now came from the towns who feared the cost, should they swear to uphold the articles of association. Although on 28 December it was reported that Amiens "ne feront nulle difficulté de se joindre avec les associez et contribuer".<sup>60</sup>

Resistance was <sup>stronger</sup> in Normandy. When Carrouges presented the oath of association to the *échevins* of Rouen there was no compliance.<sup>61</sup> The magistrates of the parlement declared that "ils ne pouvoient signer sans expres commandement du roy...et sur la deliberation...il fut aresté que l'on attendroit."<sup>62</sup> In the event the parlement was not forced to sign as a corporate body, and the choice was left to the conscience of the individual. Even the cathedral chapter, which had been strongly against the return of protestantism to Rouen, was now circumspect. On 27 December the cardinal de Bourbon ordered the chapter to meet and swear the oath. Instead they preferred to

---

<sup>55</sup> *Recueil des pièces originales concernant la tenue des Etats-Généraux*, III, p 2.

<sup>56</sup> *Lettres de Henri III*, III, pp 174-5.

<sup>57</sup> BN, Ms Fr, 3329, fo 117, Tiercelin to d'Humières, Blois, 20 December 1576.

<sup>58</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>59</sup> Orlea, *La Noblesse aux Etats-généraux de 1576 et de 1588*, p 41; Harding, *Anatomy of a Power Elite*, p 90.

<sup>60</sup> BN, Ms Fr, 3329, fo 119, Tiercelin to d'Humières, Blois, 28 December 1576.

<sup>61</sup> Benedict, *Rouen during the Wars of Religion*, p 153.

<sup>62</sup> ADSM, 1B, Registres Secrets, 92, 13 February 1577.

defer a decision until they had consulted their colleagues in Amiens and Beauvais.<sup>63</sup> They found themselves under pressure to conform from Moy, Carrouges and Bauquemare, the *premier président*. The last of these also urged them to choose deputies to attend an assembly of the clergy, convened to discuss means of providing money for the war.<sup>64</sup> Here was the crux of the problem for the First Estate. They wanted to defeat the protestants on the battlefield but, along with the towns, it was they who would have to bear the cost. The equivocation of the chapters of Paris, Chartres, Le Mans and Amiens over signing the leaguer covenant bore witness to the doubts the clergy now harboured.<sup>65</sup>

The creeping resentment against the fiscal demands of the crown meant that the noble leaders of the League had to co-operate even more closely to achieve their ideal of establishing a powerful army. They were also extremely wary of the continuous negotiations being conducted between the queen mother and the Huguenot leadership in the South.<sup>66</sup> The continued failure of the Third Estate to vote money at Blois led the king to abandon plans for a new offensive and place his faith in negotiating a new, more acceptable, peace in early March 1577. This followed the conversion of the ultramontane duc de Montpensier to religious toleration and the collapse of support for war at the Estates, now supported by only three provinces: Picardy, Champagne and the Orléanais.<sup>67</sup>

As the political situation became more unfavourable, so the clandestine and conspiratorial nature of the League becomes more evident. Unified action between the League hierarchy in upper Normandy and Picardy was facilitated by the close kinship ties that existed. These were enhanced by regular and secret meetings and a constant exchange of letters, often in cipher, which betrayed the sensitivity of the contents and the desire to plan strategy without royal interference. Pierre de Roncherolles acted as an intermediary between Jean de Moy and Adrien d'Humières, both of whom were important royal *officiers* and had a number of local responsibilities. At the end of January 1577, when the difficulties of financing a League army were becoming apparent, a meeting was arranged between the two men at Neufchâtel in upper Normandy.<sup>68</sup> What took place at the meeting is not known and much of the correspondence is vague on details of political strategy because oral communication was much safer. Another council meeting, this time at Abbeville and in the presence of Tiercelin and Rubempré, is alluded to in a letter of 9 April 1577 - Moy writing

---

<sup>63</sup> ADSM, G, 2171, 4 and 12 January 1577.

<sup>64</sup> Ibid, 24 January 1577.

<sup>65</sup> Ibid, 25 and 26 January 1577.

<sup>66</sup> Picot, *Histoire des Etats-Généraux*, II, p 325. Rubempré was part of the embassy dispatched to the South and was thus in a good position to keep his fellow leaguers informed.

<sup>67</sup> Picot, *Histoire des Etats-Généraux*, II, pp 369-71.

<sup>68</sup> BN, Ms Fr, 3329, fo 131, Roncherolles to d'Humières, Pont-Saint-Pierre, 26 January 1577.

to d'Humières apologising for his absence.<sup>69</sup> Roncherolles attended as his representative. Under discussion was the worrying failure of Amiens to provide 8,000/ for the maintenance of League forces. On 18 April Tiercelin referred to the same council before his impending meeting with the mayor of Amiens. Preparation for Tiercelin's encounter with the mayor was aided by a memoir drawn up for him by François de Roncherolles, sieur de Maineville, who had emerged as the main link between the League hierarchy and the court.<sup>70</sup> Everyone now feared a re-negotiated peace and it was Maineville's task to follow developments. He wrote with great hope in cipher to d'Humières after receiving secret assurances from the king, who had:

luy mesmes baille une particuliere et secret instruction a l'archevesque de Vienne [one of the royal negotiators in talks with the Huguenots] par laquelle il exprimoit sa demiere resolution quil n y eust de la Loire aucun presche depuis il luy avoit mande par le sr descars deja les picards et les normans...ne lundureroient pas.<sup>71</sup>

Clearly Henri felt himself specifically under pressure from a section of the Norman and Picard nobility. Maineville provided the link to the king as the emissary of these malcontents.<sup>72</sup> His information was relayed back to Picardy and Normandy and subsequently discussed in council. Thus Moy, Tiercelin, d'Humières and François de Gouffier (d.1594), sieur de Crèvecoeur and lieutenant-general of Picardy, among others agreed to meet on 28 May to deliberate over the drafting of a formal letter to the king, presumably on the subject of the peace. The letter of convocation was again written in cipher, but more significantly the three senders also appended their names in cipher, suggesting the danger of their activities.<sup>73</sup> A letter from Moy to d'Humières in the same month conveys an example of the business being conducted:

Je n'eusses tant differe a vous faire reponse a la lettre que mavez escripte d'Amiens du xiv<sup>e</sup> [May] conferer ce quavez faict a Monsieur de Carrouges qui nest a Rouen ayant ny avoir presance plus propre taster sur sa volonte. Que M. de Hugueville [Pierre de Roncherolles] auquel jay pryé de prendre la peine daller vers

---

<sup>69</sup> BN, Ms Fr, 3329, fo 154, Moy to d'Humières, La Meilleraye, 9 April 1577.

<sup>70</sup> BN, Ms Fr, 3329, fo 156, Tiercelin to d'Humières, Amiens, 18 April 1577.

<sup>71</sup> BN, Ms Fr, 3329, fo 164, Maineville to d'Humières, Chenonceaux, 7 May 1577.

<sup>72</sup> Maineville was aided by Marion de Martimbosc, see BN, Ms Fr, 3329, fo 171, Roncherolles to d'Humières, Pont-Saint-Pierre, 26 May 1577.

<sup>73</sup> BN, Ms Fr, 3329, fo 167, Moy, Tiercelin and the sieur de Sainte-Marie to d'Humières, 14 May 1577. Some of these leaguers had already held preliminary discussions at Blagny.

luy et masseurant quil vous fera bien amplement entendre sa negociation. Je fera le tous pour le service de dieu du Roy et particulièrement pour notre repos.<sup>74</sup>

Little evidence exists to suggest that the Guise were involved in these activities beyond the fact that some of these men were familiars or were in direct service with the family. However, it was around this period that Maineville moved into Guise service. He had already made his reputation at Blois, where his call for non-catholic princes of the blood to be stripped of their accession rights earned him the hatred of Condé in particular. When the peace of Bergerac was signed in September 1577, proscribing all leagues and associations, Maineville was resident at the duc d'Aumale's château at Anet. He was provided with an early copy of the treaty by the duke and then communicated its contents to his colleagues:

Il n'est pas question sinon d'aviser a ce coup si Péronne leur [the Huguenots] demeura et si nous logerons parmi nous nos ennemis desia [deja] tout offencés contre nous mais surtout si nous confesserons dieu devant les hommes ou si le renierons, dieu nous face la grace de tenir mieux nos serments.<sup>75</sup>

Maineville thus appealed to religious sentiment in his call for the maintenance of the League. The League was founded on a principle and was not concerned with the details and specifics of a pragmatic religious pacification. Although there was little opposition to the new peace, which was less lenient to the protestants, Maineville's call had wide appeal and the League did not entirely disappear as the king had desired.

One reason for Henri's willingness to keep the channels of communication open with Damville and the Huguenots in 1577 was his growing mistrust of the Guise. At the opening of the Estates-General the king made changes to the traditional order of precedence, in order to diminish Guise's prominence in the ceremony.<sup>76</sup> This was no manner in which to treat the victor of Dormans and it is no surprise that the duke failed to appear.<sup>77</sup> The diary of the duc de Nevers demonstrates that, during the royal sojourn at Blois, Guise was rarely present at the most secret councils of the king. Once Henri had legalised the League and placed himself at its head, Guise asked leave to go and begin its organisation in his *gouvernement*. Henri refused, fearing the dominance of Guise in Champagne and a consequent diminution of royal authority.<sup>78</sup> On 27

---

<sup>74</sup> BN, Ms Fr, 3329, fo 169, Moy to d'Humières, La Meilleraye, 24 May 1577.

<sup>75</sup> BN, Ms Fr, 3329, fo 171, Maineville to unknown recipient, Anet, October 1577, in cipher.

<sup>76</sup> Bouillé, III, p 42. The duc de Montpensier was elevated in status, see below.

<sup>77</sup> De Thou, VII, p 448.

<sup>78</sup> *Recueil des pièces originales concernant la tenue des Etats-Généraux*, III, p 32. Guise finally left court on 7 March 1577.



December 1576 the king frankly confided his suspicions to his closest advisers.<sup>79</sup> He obviously felt it safer to have the duke at court where he could better observe his activities. Guise found his position at court increasingly untenable as even his brother-in-law, Montpensier, had joined the *politique* faction. Montpensier had much to gain from his political break from the ultra-catholics. He was elevated in the order of seniority at court ceremonies, having being recently triumphant in his battle over precedence with Guise, which had been under way since 1575.<sup>80</sup> More serious was the continued hatred that the queen mother harboured for the Guise:

la Royne courroussa contre Monsieur de Guise, qui'il vouloit la guerre, et qu'il y en avoit beaucoup qui la desiroient, et qu'il ne la falloit faire.<sup>81</sup>

While negotiations sponsored by Catherine continued with the Huguenots and their allies, a desultory campaign was fought in the South, which both sides lacked the necessary resources to prosecute effectively. On returning to Champagne Guise was once again forced to borrow money in order to pay his troops, using his own plate as a guarantee.<sup>82</sup> This only compounded his already serious debt problem. He owed, among other obligations, 100,000/ to the duc d'Aumale and a further 24,000/ to his friend and mercenary captain, Christophe de Bassompierre.<sup>83</sup> When peace was finally signed Guise made little protest, partly because the terms were favourable to the catholics but also because of his own financial plight. In July 1577 Antoinette de Bourbon complained that his rights were so extensively alienated that he "ne peut tirer un sol de son revenu".<sup>84</sup> The pragmatic attitude to the peace of Bergerac was also prevalent throughout France. The humiliating peace of Beaulieu had been expunged and once more protestantism north of the Loire remained weak and beleaguered.<sup>85</sup> Guise's own interest now turned to international affairs.

#### The Search for a Cause 1578-84.

In July 1577 Don John seized Namur with the aim of organising a new campaign against the States-General. In November he sent emissaries to Guise, who was stationed on the frontier,

---

<sup>79</sup> Ibid, p 31. Nevers was himself not overtly hostile to the Guise as he too favoured a warlike policy.

<sup>80</sup> Ibid, p 60.

<sup>81</sup> Ibid, p 53.

<sup>82</sup> Bouillé, III, p 62.

<sup>83</sup> Ibid, p 50.

<sup>84</sup> BN, Ms Fr, 3338, fo 86, Antoinette de Bourbon to the duchesse de Nemours, Joinville, 1 July 1577.

<sup>85</sup> Benedict, *Rouen during the Wars of Religion*, pp 152-3.

asking for troops - Guise was glad to oblige.<sup>86</sup> Likewise, the States-General of the Low Countries appealed for outside help. D'Anjou was approached and he promised to do his best to prevent Guise from aiding the Spanish further.<sup>87</sup> By November 1577 Guise had returned to Paris, where he set about reinforcing his links with the city hierarchy. He arranged the huge festivities at the hôtel de Guise for the marriage of his servant, Louis de Hacqueville, sieur de Vicourt, to the daughter of Claude Marcel. The Hacqueville and Marcel families were representatives of the ultramontane faction of the Parisian elite.<sup>88</sup>

Spanish attempts to stir up factionalism in France and divert French attention from the revolt in the Netherlands are well documented. The duc de Guise, far from being a traitor to the *patrie*, acted in the same way as other princes - with the good of his own house in the forefront of his mind, and not tied to the interest of either Valois or Habsburg. The Spanish made approaches to Henri de Navarre, and paid pensions to noblemen in Guyenne and to the protestant mercenary captain, John Casimir.<sup>89</sup> Henri de Montmorency-Damville courted both Spain and Savoy in the 1580s out of financial necessity.<sup>90</sup> Indeed the Spanish hoped to create a catholic malcontent alliance between Guise and Montmorency. The Spanish ambassador, Juan de Vargas Mexia, reported to Madrid in March 1578 that Guise would make an ideal ally since he was out of favour at court and heavily in debt. Following the excitement of Don John's crushing victory at Gembloux (January 1578), there was even talk of an invasion of England supported by Guise, discussed when Guise met Vargas again in April. However, these talks had no political consequences. It was d'Anjou's flight from the French court in February and the danger that he would raise an army to assist the Dutch that made an alliance with Guise even more imperative for Philip.<sup>91</sup>

The duke found the offers of Spanish assistance welcome because his status was under increasing pressure at the court. Tensions came to a head on 27 April 1578 when three of the

---

<sup>86</sup> P.O. de Törne, "Philippe II et Henri de Guise: Le début de leurs relations", *Revue historique*, 1931, p 324; Constant, *Les Guises*, p 103; Bouillé, III, pp 63-5. These soldiers may have simply deserted the French army because of arrears of pay and in any case their transfer relieved Guise of the problem of unpaid troops remaining in his own *gouvernement*. The Spanish were desperate for help as they had reached the financial and military nadir in the autumn of 1577, see G. Parker, *The Dutch Revolt*, London, 1985, p 187.

<sup>87</sup> M. P. Holt, *The duke of Anjou and the politique struggle during the Wars of Religion*, Cambridge, 1986, p 93.

<sup>88</sup> On the magnificence of this occasion, see Bouillé, III, p 65; L'Estoile, *Journal du règne de Henri III*, p 157. On the Marcel family, see B. Diefendorff, *Paris City Councillors in the Sixteenth Century: the Politics of Patrimony*, New Jersey, 1983, pp 95-111.

<sup>89</sup> Constant, *Les Guises*, pp 105-110.

<sup>90</sup> J. Davies, "Neither Politique nor Patriot? Henri de Montmorency and Philip II, 1582-1589", *Historical Journal*, 1991.

<sup>91</sup> Törne, "Philippe II et Henri de Guise", pp 326-9.

king's *mignons* were slain in a duel with a group defending the honour of the duc de Guise.<sup>92</sup> Henri was mortified by the deaths of his favourites and the entire Guise family, accompanied by the duc de Lorraine, left court on 3 May in great disaccord with the king. The violence did not stop there and on 21 July another *mignon*, Saint-Mégrin, was attacked and killed by thirty assailants in the rue du Louvre. The duc de Mayenne was immediately suspected of a revenge attack for improper advances that Saint-Mégrin had made towards the duchesse de Guise.<sup>93</sup>

Guise was *persona non grata* at the court and he did not return until March 1579.<sup>94</sup> Without access to the king's ear his *crédit* fell and his financial affairs became pressing. The whole question of noble finances and indebtedness is complicated and fraught with difficulty, as Denis Crouzet has shown.<sup>95</sup> Clearly political and economic fortunes were closely intertwined. As Guise lost favour it is likely that he found it increasingly difficult to satisfy his creditors or raise new loans. In August 1578 the comté de Nanteuil had to be sold to Gaspard de Schomberg for 120,666 *écus* and a further two seigneuries were sold to the duc de Lorraine in November 1581 for 288,000.<sup>96</sup> Moreover the duc de Guise was not the only member of the family forced to alienate land. Charles d'Aumale, who had reached his majority in 1579, was immediately forced to sell the barony of Bec Crespin to Nicholas Romé, a major creditor, because he was "pressé par les creanciers que feu monsieur son pere luy a laisse".<sup>97</sup> D'Aumale's position was especially acute as he was failing to achieve the same status that his father had enjoyed, most significantly lacking his own *gouvernement*. This was within the king's patronage and Henri was not foolish enough to allow the Guise to possess too many key posts. Excepting the spectacular rise of Joyeuse and d'Epemon, Henri was a shrewd and subtle manipulator of royal patronage. He had already demoted the duc de Guise in ceremonies. In 1579 the duc d'Aumale lost a precedence case against the duc de Nevers in the *conseil privé*, which would have been inconceivable ten years before.<sup>98</sup> Henri III also subverted the entrenched Guise position at the court by undermining the rights and jurisdiction of the offices they held. Henri de Guise had inherited the office of *grand maître* from his father. The

---

<sup>92</sup> Bouillé, III, p 70; L'Estoile, *Journal du règne de Henri III*, p 186. Strictly speaking these men were neither champions of the duc de Guise nor in his retinue. He was acquainted with them and offered his protection after the duel.

<sup>93</sup> L'Estoile, *Journal du règne de Henri III*, pp 190-1.

<sup>94</sup> Constant, *Les Guises*, p 108.

<sup>95</sup> D. Crouzet, "Recherches sur la crise de l'aristocratie en France au XVI<sup>e</sup> siècle: les dettes de la Maison de Nevers", *Histoire, économie et société*, 1982.

<sup>96</sup> Bouillé, III, p 50. As usual if land had to be alienated it was sold to trustworthy acquaintances. The son of the purchaser, Georges de Schomberg, had been one of the pro-Guise duellists in May 1578.

<sup>97</sup> BN, Ms Fr, 18246, fo 161. See also, Lechevalier, *Notice historique sur la baronnie du Bec*, p 12.

<sup>98</sup> BN, Ms Fr, 18246, fols 116-61.

king managed to lessen the importance of this office, and the power of the duke in the court hierarchy still further by increasing the status and competence of the *prévôté de l'hôtel*, and by creating the new office of *grand maître des cérémonies*. When the duc d'Elbeuf became *grand écuyer* on the resignation of his father-in-law, Henri simply created a rival office to limit the patronage available to him.<sup>99</sup> Henri was not intent on an open break with the Guise but he did want to restrain their influence.<sup>100</sup> The king seems to have <sup>had</sup> a more affectionate relationship with the duc de Mayenne than with the duc de Guise. This was either out of genuine affection or an attempt to undermine family solidarity by fostering fraternal jealousy. Thus it was Mayenne who received major commands between 1577 and 1586 against the Huguenots in the South, and Henri was glad to consent to his accession to the office of admiral in 1578.<sup>101</sup>

The prospects of attaining honour through royal service were bleak. Guise therefore, like thousands of other noblemen, looked elsewhere for opportunities to further his career. Service with another prince would raise Guise's stature and demonstrate his power and merits to what he perceived as an ungrateful and poorly counselled monarch. Guise, like d'Anjou, who felt stifled by his role at court, saw military glory and prestige abroad as a means of raising his status in France and improving his bargaining position with the king. Guise also began to show greater interest in international affairs after the peace of Bergerac, while always keeping his political options open. He now, rather belatedly, turned his attention to the plight of his aunt, Mary Stuart. He was encouraged in his interest by her emissary, John Leslie, bishop of Ross, who had arrived on the continent in 1574 to secure aid for Mary and her party in Scotland. He was given the office of suffragan and vicar-general of the diocese of Rouen by the cardinal de Bourbon in 1579.<sup>102</sup> Guise was sincerely interested in helping his cousin and her son, James VI, but he was never committed to projects outside France to the detriment of his status in the kingdom. Similarly, a Spanish pension did not make him a puppet of Spanish policy and, in addition, it not only raised his financial credit but also made him more dangerous in the eyes of the monarchy, and thus improved his bargaining power with the king. The dynastic and historical links of the Guise meant that they favoured intervention in Scotland while Philip was more concerned with England. The Spanish monarch's relations with England were complicated, wanting to avoid war while at the same time preventing English intervention in the Netherlands. Similarly he was ambivalent in his motives in giving pensions to French noblemen. He was perfectly happy to have someone like Guise as another 'carte française', capable of diverting Valois attention away from the Low Countries but he

---

<sup>99</sup> J. Boucher, *La cour de Henri III*, Rennes, 1986, pp 59-60.

<sup>100</sup> The king continued to be generous. Mayenne and d'Elbeuf received 100,000/ and 100,000 *écus* respectively on their marriages. Guise received a gift of 500,000 *écus* in 1582 at a time when the king was especially frightened about his dealings with Spain - see Boucher, *Société et mentalités autour de Henri III*, I, p 283.

<sup>101</sup> L'Estoile, *Journal du règne de Henri III*, p 187.

<sup>102</sup> *Dictionary of National Biography*, vol XI, p 975.

would have been horrified at the prospect of a successful Guise invasion of the British Isles, regardless of whether this was designed to restore catholicism. Such an attack was under discussion and was fully supported by Don John, who hoped to marry Mary Stuart and thereby acquire a kingdom, until his death in October 1578. This only served to increase Philip's jealousy of his half-brother, fostered by Antonio Pérez.<sup>103</sup>

The proposals for a joint venture against England inevitably drew the duke to his extensive possessions in Normandy. During the summer of 1578 he paid his first visit to Eu. The town organised a magnificent entry for the duke and his large retinue, and during his stay he pledged to build a new family residence.<sup>104</sup> Seeing the strategic importance of Eu as a port on the Channel coast, the duke would strive in the coming years to improve its anchorage, enabling it to receive vessels of up to 300 *tonneaux*.<sup>105</sup> At the beginning of 1582 he met the bishop of Ross and a number of Jesuits in the town, where he granted them permission for the establishment of an English Jesuit college, donating £100 towards the cost. Eu served as a training centre for priests destined for England and acted as a magnet for English catholic exiles.<sup>106</sup> In order to finance these diverse projects Guise obtained royal permission to begin a *réduction* of the custom and privileges of the comté, enabling him to rationalise and reassert his rights and dues.<sup>107</sup> He further provided for the defence of Eu in 1583 by replacing the *robin*, Charles de La Chaussée, as governor, with Nicholas de Lannoy, sieur d'Améaucourt, *gentilhomme de sa chambre*.<sup>108</sup>

The time that Guise spent at Eu fuelled speculation that he was behind the resistance mounted by the Estates of Normandy in 1578 and 1579, against royal attempts to increase the *taille*. Jean-Marie Constant has rejected any Guise involvement in the defiance of the royal will, manifested by the Estates of Brittany, Burgundy and Normandy.<sup>109</sup> The Guise were always convenient targets for suspicion in time of crisis, especially for their enemies and the crown. Undoubtedly, the Guise did play a role in the disputes in 1578-9 but their political goals and the

---

<sup>103</sup> Constant, *Les Guises*, pp 108-10. Törne, "Philippe II et Henri de Guise", pp 333-4, also notes that Philip's attitude to the projected invasion depended heavily on Spanish success in the Low Countries. The pension given to Guise has been estimated at 10,000 *écus* per quarter.

<sup>104</sup> Bouillé, III, p 74 n 2. Building began almost immediately but was interrupted in 1588 and even by 1661 only half of the château was complete, see P. Seydoux, *La Normandie des châteaux et des manoirs*, Paris, 1989, p 108.

<sup>105</sup> J. Darsel, "L'Amirauté en Normandie: I - Amirauté d'Eu-Le Tréport", *Annales de Normandie*, 1969, p 269.

<sup>106</sup> F. Fabre, "The English College at Eu, 1582-1592", *Catholic Historical Review*, 1951.

<sup>107</sup> AN, KK, 1088, fo 170.

<sup>108</sup> ADSM, E1, 486/1, fo 35, 29 October 1583. Lannoy had credit and lands in Normandy through his marriage to Madeleine Muterel, grand-daughter and beneficiary of Jacques, a *conseiller* in the parlement of Rouen (1544-60), see Frondeville, *Conseillers*, p 362.

<sup>109</sup> Constant, *Les Guises*, p 87.

extent of their involvement is ambiguous. Clearly, the governor of Burgundy, the duc de Mayenne, had much to gain from supporting the Estates of Burgundy. His open support of the province against the crown largely compensated for the low credit and status he had enjoyed there.<sup>110</sup>

The conflict with Burgundy in May 1578 provided a warning to the king of the problems he was likely to face when the Norman Estates gathered in the autumn. Moreover, the Burgundians had dispatched emissaries to urge the Normans to join them in forcing the king to reduce taxation. These entreaties found a receptive audience because taxes levied without the consent of the Estates, undertaken in 1574 and 1576 as an emergency financial measure, threatened to become habitual.<sup>111</sup> Before the opening of the Estates there was considerable unrest in lower Normandy against tax officials and, as a result, the king decided to send secretary of state, Pomponne de Bellièvre, in order to placate the assembly.<sup>112</sup> The threat of an increased tax burden and the continuing infringement of provincial rights made the elections for the Estates of 1578 more than usually important. The election of Guise clients and servants to the assembly is clear evidence of Guise influence in the province. It was also an acknowledgement that these men had the protection of powerful malcontents, making them more effective deputies in the face of intense royal pressure. The convocation of the Second Estate of the *bailliage* of Rouen was dominated by clients of the duc d'Aumale.<sup>113</sup> The first elector present was Marc, sieur de Vaudesart, the *maître d'hôtel* of André de Rubempré.<sup>114</sup> Also attending was Charles de Croismare, sieur de Saint-Jean, who had progressed from being a man-at-arms for the baron de Clères in 1563 to an appointment in the household of the duc d'Aumale.<sup>115</sup> The other elector was Barthélemy de Limoges, sieur de Saint-Just and *maître des eaux et forêts* of the *bailliage* of Rouen.<sup>116</sup> The Limoges were long standing servants of the Guise, and once again provide a reminder of the importance of the remnants of the following of the Brezé to the construction of the Guise affinity. Barthélemy had married Jeanne Pétremol in 1565, thus allying himself with one of the most senior families in Guise service.<sup>117</sup> He possessed more direct links with the Guise, serving as an archer in the company of Claude duc

---

<sup>110</sup> Drouot, *Mayenne et la Bourgogne*, I, p 103.

<sup>111</sup> On this and following, see J. R. Major, *Representative Government in Early Modern France*, New Haven and London, 1980, pp 213-15.

<sup>112</sup> *Lettres de Henri III*, IV, pp 92, 97

<sup>113</sup> *Cahiers des Etats de Normandie sous le règne de Henri III*, I, p 297.

<sup>114</sup> BN, Ms Fr, 21534, fo 2129, 16 July 1574.

<sup>115</sup> Frondeville, *Présidents*, p 206; BN, Ms Fr, 5467, fo 247.

<sup>116</sup> Frondeville, *Conseillers*, p 620.

<sup>117</sup> Frondeville, *Présidents*, pp 177-9.

d'Aumale, in 1565.<sup>118</sup> Etienne de Limoges, sieur de Prunas, an archer of the marquis d'Elbeuf in 1569, was noted in the muster roll as "demeurant pres d'Ivry", suggesting that he was a vassal of the duc d'Aumale.<sup>119</sup> No evidence exists to suggest that these two electors were present to do the bidding of the duc d'Aumale. They elected Nicholas de Vipart, baron de Becthomas, younger brother of Claude who had been the most important Norman in the duc d'Aumale's military retinue in the 1560s. The Vipart were a key family in the d'Aumale affinity and Claude de Vipart, as an officer in the company of the duc d'Aumale, recruited from among his own clients men like Barthélemy de Limoges to serve as *gendarmes*. The role of Vipart as both patron and client is confirmed by the fact that when Vipart was unable to represent the *bailliage* of Rouen at the provincial Estates in 1586, it was Limoges who took his place.<sup>120</sup> D'Aumale was not in control of the election of deputies or behind the defiance of royal commands but because his affinity was so deeply involved he had an interest in and information about the outcome of the Estates. The prominence of Croismare, Vipart and Limoges in the Holy League in Normandy during the 1580s demonstrates that these men had a long history of opposition to the policies of Henri III and further suggests the high degree of political activity in which members of the Guise affinity in Normandy were engaged.

When the Estates of Normandy finally met in Rouen on 17 November 1578, the representatives of the upper Norman *bailliages* could claim strong affiliation with the ultramontane faction in the province.<sup>121</sup> Charles de Goutimesnil represented the nobility of the Caux, a function he had fulfilled at the Estates-General of Blois on the intercession of Jean de Moy. François de Fumechon, sieur de Guerneville, representing the nobility of the *bailliage* of Gisors, was a member of the Roncherolles affinity and had been present as a *tuteur* to the children of deceased Philippe de Roncherolles at the *partage* of 1570.<sup>122</sup> The Guise had clients elected for the Third Estate. Mathieu Dupont, the *greffier* and later *receveur* of Elbeuf, represented the *vicomté* of Pont-Audemer.<sup>123</sup> The *vicomté* of Neufchâtel returned Christophe Cherie, who came from a locally important family which performed a number of services for the duc d'Aumale.<sup>124</sup>

---

<sup>118</sup> BN, Clair, 261, fo 1729, muster roll of 50 men-at-arms and 74 archers, Châlons-sur-Saône, 5 June 1565.

<sup>119</sup> BN, Ms Fr, 21529, fo 1930, muster roll of 33 men-at-arms and 39 archers, Chinon, 6 February 1569.

<sup>120</sup> Farin, *Histoire de Rouen*, II, p 410.

<sup>121</sup> For a list of deputies, see *Cahiers des Etats de Normandie sous le règne de Henri III*, I, pp 310-13.

<sup>122</sup> ADSM, Tabellionage, 2E1, 341, 20 July 1570.

<sup>123</sup> ADSM, Tabellionage, 2E1 360, 11 June 1580; 2E1 362, 5 May 1581.

<sup>124</sup> Nicole Cherie was *vicomte* of Neufchâtel in 1569 and of Aumale in 1574. Pierre, who lived at Aumale, acted as a guarantor in the financial transactions of Claude duc d'Aumale, see chapter two above.

Ultra-catholic candidates did exceptionally well in upper Normandy, reflecting the strength of catholicism in the region and reinforcing the impression that those already associated with political activity in opposition to royal policy were perceived as more capable of withstanding royal pressure. The Guise were out of favour with the king and Mayenne had already indicated his support for provincial institutions. Candidates from the Guise affinity or supporters of ultramontanism could be relied upon to resist royal pressure. Similarly, Huguenots and servants of the duc d'Anjou provided a rallying point for the discontented. Like the ultra-catholics they could in no way be accused of being "king's men". In lower Normandy protestantism remained strong and the duc d'Anjou possessed the duchy of Alençon and a large clientèle. The Huguenot, Jacques du Pont-Bellanger, was elected for the Second Estate of the *bailliage* of Caen.<sup>125</sup> Jean de La Haye, sieur de Chantelou, representing the nobility of the *bailliage* of Evreux was another malcontent and a member of d'Anjou's household. He was raising troops in the summer of 1578 for service with the duke in the Low Countries.<sup>126</sup>

Despite the presence of Bellièvre at the Estates and the special address he delivered, the *cahier* of remonstrances presented to the king was strongly worded. Deputies were particularly angered by royal violations of the privileges of the province enshrined in the fourteenth-century Norman Charter. They demanded the reduction of taxation to the levels set under Louis XII.<sup>127</sup> Henri made small concessions in his demands for money and ordered the Estates to reconvene in March 1579 for an extraordinary session. On this occasion the king sent the maréchal de Montmorency as a special commissioner to accompany Bellièvre. Meanwhile, Antoine Séguier, a *maître des requêtes*, was dispatched to lower Normandy to explain the royal position to local notables.<sup>128</sup> Here, urgent action was essential because opposition to tax increases was more violent and threatened to develop into peasant revolt. Jacques de Matignon, governor of lower Normandy, reported to Bellièvre on 25 November 1578 about:

les menees et praticques...qui se faisoit par nos voisins qui ont monstre le chemin aux autres...les deputez des bailliages de Caen et de Cotentin ont este ceulx qui ont donne coeur et persuade les autres de prendre la resolution...Je fuz adverty

---

<sup>125</sup> For preliminary information on the Pont-Bellanger, see Chenaye-Desbois, XVI, p 114; ADSM, Tabellionage, 2E1 334, 11 and 12 March 1567.

<sup>126</sup> By 1582 he was a *chambellan ordinaire* of the duke, see ADSM, Tabellionage, 2E1 365, 4 June 1582. The depredations of the 6,000 troops who marched through Normandy only added local discontent, see Bouquet (ed), *Documents concernant l'histoire de Neufchâtel-en-Bray*, p 25.

<sup>127</sup> Major, *Representative Government*, p 214; *Cahiers des Etats de Normandie sous le règne de Henri III*, I, pp 6-8. The destruction caused by d'Anjou's troops was also mentioned.

<sup>128</sup> M. Foisil, "Harangue et rapport d'Antoine Séguier, commissaire pour le Roi en Basse-Normandie (1579-1580)", *Annales de Normandie*, 1976; *Lettres de Henri III*, IV, pp 99-100.



quils estoient avoir beaucoup de bonnes instructions de la coste de la Bretagne.<sup>129</sup>

In December Henri wrote to his officers in the strife torn province ordering them to apprehend all trouble makers. He thanked Matignon for preventing a disturbance at Coutances and wrote to him again concerning more serious trouble:

Je croy que vous avez bien peu entendre ce qui est advenu à Caen d'un nombre de six ou sept cens païsans qui se sont presentez aux esleuz, ausquelz ilz ont remis et rejecté desdaigneusement le mandemens qui leur avoient esté envoieez pour l'assiette des tailles...disant qu'ilz n'avoient aucun moien de payer...empescher de toute votre pouvoir telles desobeissances en donnant ordre [à] ceux de ma noblesse qui semblent les favoriser, et donner ceste hardiesse au peuple.<sup>130</sup>

Henri was fearful that Normandy would provide a bad example to other provinces and he was determined to avert any large scale unrest. In order to ensure that royal commands were effectively enforced, trusted lieutenants were dispatched from the court. Matignon was promoted to the office of *maréchal* and Henri replaced him as governor of lower Normandy with one of his *mignons*, François d'O, the *surintendant des finances*. In March 1579, Nicholas de Grimouville, baron de Larchant, the captain of the *gardes françaises*, was sent to garrison Le Havre.<sup>131</sup> Henri's concessions at the Norman Estates of March 1579 - a small reduction in the *taille* and a confirmation of the Norman Charter - failed to put a stop to all the disturbances.<sup>132</sup> The king increasingly blamed rogue elements in the Norman nobility. He was delighted and surprised to discover that one potential suspect, François de Roncherolles, sieur de Maineville, was innocent in this respect. Instead, his suspicions fell on servants of his brother, particularly on Jean de La Haye, sieur de Chantelou, and Henri de Silly, sieur de La Roche-Guyon. Both men were involved in raising troops for d'Anjou's abortive campaign the Low Countries. The presence of these ill-disciplined troops further inflamed the anger of the peasantry, and the king saw them as a potential threat to the stability of the province. La Roche-Guyon was raising troops in the vicinity of Rouen in December 1578 and compelling them to swear an oath of loyalty to d'Anjou, an act which was widely interpreted as an attempt to form a new league in Normandy rather than as part of the

---

<sup>129</sup> BN, Ms Fr, 15905, fo 199, Matignon to Bellièvre, 25 November 1578.

<sup>130</sup> *Lettres de Henri III*, IV, p 140.

<sup>131</sup> *Lettres de Henri III*, IV, p 170. Both d'O and Larchant were Normans.

<sup>132</sup> Major, *Representative Government*, p 214.

requirements for service in Flanders.<sup>133</sup> La Roche-Guyon was a protestant and suspected of subterfuges in collusion with the representative for the Second Estate of Coutances in March 1579, Simon de Piennes, sieur de Grainville, "qui est de la nouvelle religion et recogneu avoir manyé beaucoup de factions en ceste partie là".<sup>134</sup> Above all, the king feared the controlling hand of his brother who had returned to his duchy of Alençon in January 1579, after the collapse of his expedition to the Low Countries. Bellièvre was immediately dispatched by the king to obtain assurances of d'Anjou's loyalty and question his links with the troubles in Normandy. The English ambassador who, because of the projected marriage of d'Anjou to Elizabeth I, had a close interest in the affairs of the duke, reported that:

the Duke of Guise and Maine have no part in these popular emotions...Those of the best credit in Normandy resort daily to Monsieur, and the king is informed that they desire his protection.<sup>135</sup>

D'Anjou had thus acquired an ideal pretext for another revolt. That he did not seize it was due to the fact that much of his princely ambition had been satisfied by the generous provisions of the Peace of Monsieur. Above all he was intent on pursuing a kingdom for himself and he needed the king's blessing to marry Elizabeth. In August 1579 he departed for England but his troublesome Norman servants did not accompany him and rural violence failed to diminish. Henri issued orders for the arrest of La Haye, La Roche-Guyon and Pont-Bellanger:

pour grandes fautes commises contre depuys la tenue desdictz Estatz, qui n'ont rien en communs avec le faict d'iceulx Estatz combien qu'ilz essaient de le faire croire autrement affin de couvrir leur faulte particuliere par l'auctorité d'une grande compagnie.<sup>136</sup>

La Roche-Guyon was in great danger, not only being accused of plotting to seize Rouen but also charged with plotting to poison the king.<sup>137</sup>

---

<sup>133</sup> ACR, B, 4, 11 December 1578.

<sup>134</sup> *Lettres de Henri III*, IV, pp 164-5, 177.

<sup>135</sup> CSPF, 1578-9, p 431. D'Anjou admitted that an association was formed for the purpose of service in the Netherlands and he was certainly solicited by the local nobility for his protection. However, he complained that the disobedience of the Estates prevented him receiving his pension, which was assigned on the revenue of the *généralité* of Caen, see BN, Ms Fr, 15811, fos 35-7, Bellièvre to Henri III, Caen, 10 March 1579.

<sup>136</sup> *Lettres de Henri III*, IV, p 268.

<sup>137</sup> ACR, A, 20, 22 August 1579.

Declared outlaws and bereft of the protection of their patron these men feared for their lives. Indeed, it is possible that d'Anjou disavowed their actions and abandoned them to their fate. La Haye and La Roche-Guyon, realising the danger they were in, fled Normandy and headed east to offer their services to the ducs de Lorraine and de Guise. This might seem an odd decision considering that La Roche-Guyon was a leading Calvinist nobleman. However, it is no surprise to see strict religious divisions once again confounded and also provides some clues as to why so many of d'Anjou's "politique party" found it easy to join the ultramontane Holy League in 1584. The ability to change patrons did not mean that loyalty was so weak as to have been completely cynical. On close inspection the flight to Lorraine was logical, both men knowing they would receive refuge and a sympathetic welcome. La Roche-Guyon's younger brother, the comte de Rochepot, was a favourite of Charles III, duc de Lorraine. The outlaws were soon receiving support from two protestant clients of the Guise, Robert Heu, sieur de Malleloy-en-Lorraine, and Pierre de Momay, sieur de Bruhy and brother of Duplessis-Mornay.<sup>138</sup> Efforts by Guise, who remained *persona non grata* at court, to attract Huguenot and *politique* malcontents to his service seemed to be succeeding. With this end in mind he had been in contact with protestant leaders, and was prepared to guarantee their freedom of worship. Senior Huguenot figures like Navarre, La Noue and Duplessis-Mornay were not inclined to trust their old adversary.<sup>139</sup> Similar moves to interest d'Anjou in an alliance of malcontents also foundered.<sup>140</sup> But La Haye's reason for making the journey to Lorraine had nothing to do with his position in the household of d'Anjou. He had his own links with the Guise affinity which facilitated a smooth transfer to Guise service. He was the son of Louise de Tiercelin and therefore the nephew of Adrien de Tiercelin. His marriage to Louise Le Picart made him the brother-in-law of Christophe de Bassompierre, close friend of the duc de Guise.<sup>141</sup>

This unholy alliance of malcontents, which included the Guise family and John Casimir, was invited by the duc de Lorraine to spend carnival at Nancy in 1580 and conspirators hoped to receive financial assistance from Spain.<sup>142</sup> The desperate need of Guise for allies demonstrates his search for a cause with which to augment his honour, and to show that the king could continue to ignore him only at his peril. Guise faced a series of dilemmas which would only <sup>be</sup> relieved by the constitutional crisis created by d'Anjou's death in 1584. To help his aunt, to pay off his debts and <sup>to</sup> maintain his status he had to regain influence at court by making his absence a source of distress for the crown. To do this he searched for alliances both at home and abroad. Personally

---

<sup>138</sup> Constant, p 111, remains vague on their motives and their Guise connections.

<sup>139</sup> *Mémoires et Correspondence de Duplessis-Mornay*, 12 vols, Paris, 1824-5, vol I, pp 122-3.

<sup>140</sup> *CSPF*, 1578-9, p 414.

<sup>141</sup> *ADSM*, Tabellionage, 2E1, 351, 5 September 1575, 25 September 1575.

<sup>142</sup> An attack on Strasbourg was mooted, although the purpose of this strategy is unclear, see Constant, p 112; L. Davillé, *Les prétensions de Charles III duc de Lorraine à la couronne de France*, Paris, 1909, pp 24-31.

he had no qualms about talking to his former enemies, whether catholic moderates or Huguenots. However, he had to be very careful about alienating his own ultramontane clients who formed the backbone of his following and therefore of his power.

It was no surprise when Guise eventually returned to court on 16 March 1580. Undoubtedly, Henri was increasingly concerned by Guise's plotting and needed his support as conflict was once again imminent in the South-West. Contact between the two men had been helped by the presence of Louis II cardinal de Guise, in Paris. It was a triumphant return for Guise, who was accompanied by 1,500 horsemen.<sup>143</sup> He was happy to return to the centre of power and was immediately named as deputy to the duc d'Anjou, recently created lieutenant-general of the kingdom.

### Diverging Interests: The Building of New Family Relationships

The decline in the confessional aspect of politics after the Peace of Bergerac in 1577 diminished the opportunities for noble youth to forge a career in arms.<sup>144</sup> Indeed, well before this date Guise hatred and anger at individual Huguenots had been satisfied by the assassination of Coligny in 1572. The Guise family was now represented by a new youthful generation, many of whom were too young to remember the paranoia and insecurities of the family in the 1560s. Complete solidarity in the pursuit and defence of family interest was no longer so necessary. The creation of distinct but related branches of the same house was inevitable as blood ties weakened and the political situation demanded more independent strategies. While the duc de Guise was out of favour at court it was even more essential for d'Elbeuf, d'Aumale and Mayenne to pursue their individual careers.

Charles de Lorraine, duc d'Aumale, had more reason than his older cousin to be dissatisfied with his treatment by the king. Although he had inherited the office of *grand veneur* from his father, he was given no *gouvernement* even though he was twenty-three in 1579 and had reached his majority. The growth of his affinity in Picardy in the 1570s and the efforts he had made to patronise leaguers inevitably made the province the ideal prize of his ambition. Granting such a wish would have been the height of royal folly. The continuing interest of the duc d'Anjou in aiding the revolt in the Netherlands meant that this was more than ever a key royal office. There is some evidence to suggest that d'Aumale was either more pious than other members of his family or strove more cynically to exploit ultramontane feeling. His education at the University of Pont à Mousson, founded by Charles cardinal de Lorraine, certainly contributed to his rigid orthodoxy. His hopes of advancement must have been high on reaching his majority since his cousin and close

---

<sup>143</sup> Bouillé, III, p 82.

<sup>144</sup> The decline in the confessional aspects of high politics after 1577 was first elucidated by J. W. Thompson earlier this century, in *The Wars of Religion in France 1559-1576: The Huguenots, Catherine de Medici and Philip II*, Chicago, 1909.

friend, Philippe-Emmanuel de Lorraine, duc <sup>de</sup> Mercoeur, was the brother-in-law and *confidant* of the king.<sup>145</sup>

In November 1579 the prince de Condé, frustrated by the failure of his peaceable efforts to regain effective control of the governorship of Picardy, seized La Fère. The king did little to force his withdrawal, sending the queen mother to negotiate his submission.<sup>146</sup> Condé infuriated the local population by ravaging the countryside and attempting to seize Doullens. The prince complained to Henri that d'Aumale was trying to resurrect the Picard League in contravention of the Peace of Bergerac.<sup>147</sup> This claim is difficult to substantiate and Henri seems to have ignored it. On the 15 June an army finally left Paris to reduce La Fère after Condé had gone to the Empire to recruit mercenaries. The royal army was commanded by the maréchal de Matignon and contained the flower of Henri's court favourites: Jean-Louis de La Valette (d.1642), later duc d'Epemon, and Anne de Joyeuse (d.1587).<sup>148</sup> This force was joined by a significant number of Picard leaguers, such as Rubempré and Tiercelin. Condé's suspicions about the resurrection of the Catholic League seem to have been justified, and according to the Tuscan ambassador it was d'Aumale who led this contingent:

Il duca di Aumale ha mandati a chiamare i suoi amici, e massime delle leghe di Normandia e Piccardia, delle quali è capo; credesi per il più non avrà gran seguito, per essere la più parte delle dette leghe di ordinanze degli uomini d'arme, le quali sono comandate di andare a quel campo; e quanto ai voluntarii, non sono troppo caldi.<sup>149</sup>

The English ambassador confirms in his dispatches that d'Aumale was at the head of the League, and further speculated that he was likely to receive the governorship of Picardy in recognition of his exploits at La Fère.<sup>150</sup> The siege went well but d'Aumale was furious when Matignon, perhaps as a means to prevent the leaguers making political capital out of storming La Fère, offered the

---

<sup>145</sup> Anselme, III, 793-5. D'Aumale's sister, Catherine, was the third wife of Nicholas de Lorraine (d.1577), comte de Vaudémont and duc de Mercoeur, and therefore step-mother of Philippe-Emmanuel. Philippe-Emmanuel's younger brother, Charles, future cardinal de Vaudémont, had been the *valet de chambre* of the duc d'Aumale and his companion at university in 1574, see BN, Ms Fr, 22441, fo 82.

<sup>146</sup> De Thou, VIII, pp 394-5. Condé had received other places of surety in lieu of Peronne at the Peace of Bergerac but had not given up hope of taking Picardy.

<sup>147</sup> *Lettres de Catherine de Médicis*, VII, p 250, n 1; De Thou, VIII, p 395.

<sup>148</sup> L'Estoile, *Journal du règne de Henri III*, p 249, adds that this departure of the *mignons* to war was a cause for mockery in Paris.

<sup>149</sup> *Négociations diplomatiques de la France avec la Toscane*, G. Canestri and A. Desjardins (eds), 5 vols, Paris, 1859-86, vol IV, p 333.

<sup>150</sup> *CSPF*, 1579-80, pp 384, 428.

beleaguered garrison generous terms. The enraged duke left camp without taking his leave of the royal commander, irate that he had been stopped from striking a blow to the pride of a rival.<sup>151</sup>

D'Aumale must have realised that he had little chance of being offered the governorship of Picardy. Henri showed throughout the La Fère crisis that he preferred to come to an accommodation with Condé than allow d'Aumale to augment his reputation with the Picard nobility. The absence of royal favour did not engender a sharp decline in the fortunes of the d'Aumale. The Guise still maintained a great deal of influence over church patronage. By using this shrewdly it enabled them to provide for the younger brother of the duc d'Aumale, Claude II de Lorraine (1562-91), the chevalier d'Aumale, without dividing the inheritance of their father and financially weakening the ducal house. In 1572 the cardinal de Guise resigned the abbey of Bec to the chevalier d'Aumale, his nephew. This abbey was worth 24,000/ a year in 1576, twice the value of the revenue of the duchy of Aumale.<sup>152</sup> He was able to acquire smaller abbeys in commendam such as the abbey of Auchy at Aumale itself. On the death of the cardinal de Guise in 1578 he inherited the abbey of Trois-Fontaines in the diocese of Châlons and that of Bourges-en-Deols near Bourges.<sup>153</sup> The d'Aumale branch remained influential by virtue of the financial power it could wield, but it lacked the honour of major royal office. By building up his clientèle among the discontented Picard nobility, d'Aumale was partially able to offset his political misfortune at court by strengthening his provincial power base.

The career of Charles de Lorraine, marquis d'Elbeuf, took an entirely different direction from that of his cousin and brother-in-law. While d'Aumale failed to make an impression at court, the fortunes of the marquis improved immensely in the same period. His status and wealth were increased by the inheritance of the Rieux lands in Normandy. Moreover, the options he had for finding allies were greater than his cousin because he was related to families among the protestant elite, the Rieux, the Laval and the Coligny, through his mother Louise de Rieux. As he straddled the religious and political divide so clearly, it was no surprise that he entered the service of the duc d'Anjou. When the envoys of the States-General arrived at Tours on 6 September 1580 to discuss once more a treaty with d'Anjou, the marquis d'Elbeuf was present on the duke's council.<sup>154</sup> When the duke agreed to provide an army to assist the rebels, it was d'Elbeuf who was chosen as his lieutenant-general.<sup>155</sup> D'Anjou had a little military experience but d'Elbeuf, three years his junior

---

<sup>151</sup> De Thou, VIII, p 397.

<sup>152</sup> See chapter two above.

<sup>153</sup> *Lettres de Henri III*, III, p 499, IV, p 70.

<sup>154</sup> Holt, *The duke of Anjou*, p 134.

<sup>155</sup> *Documents concernant les relations entre le duc d'Anjou et les Pays-Bas*, P. Muller and A. Diegerick (eds), 5 vols, Utrecht, 1889-99, vol IV, pp 101-2.

at the age of twenty-four, was a complete novice.<sup>156</sup> D'Elbeuf's elevation was not made on purely military considerations. As a prince he would command respect but more importantly as a member of the Guise family with protestant connections he could expect to add viability to the concept that this army would be a 'union sacrée'. He could gather a substantial following from among Guise clients, while fighting alongside the large protestant contingent would create no problems. Paul de Coligny, comte de Laval, who commanded a large force of Bretons, was his relative. The two enjoyed revenues of the Rieux lands in Normandy jointly and amicably in anticipation of a *partage*.<sup>157</sup>

D'Anjou ordered the army, which was coming from all over France, to assemble in June 1581 at Château-Thierry, part of his *appanage*. The duke and the marquis were both in their respective territories in Normandy in the spring of 1581, agreeing to rendezvous at Evreux in May. D'Elbeuf was accompanied by 500 gentlemen, and although this figure includes his own company of the *ordonnance* of about 75 men, it still represents a substantial following.<sup>158</sup> D'Anjou raised his own troops by handing out commissions to his household officers, recruiting was therefore intense in Normandy from where many of these men originated. Prominent among them was Guillaume de Hautemer (d.1613), sieur de Fervacques, the governor of the duchy of Alençon, *président du conseil* and *premier gentilhomme de la chambre* of the duc d'Anjou.<sup>159</sup> Another Norman captain was Jacques de Rouxel (1528-1607), sieur de Médavy, and lieutenant-general of the duchy of Alençon.<sup>160</sup> Along with the large Norman and protestant contingents there were more surprising participants, such as Claude de Bauffremont (1546-96), baron de Senecey, captain of Chalon and Auxonne, and a major servant of the duc de Guise.<sup>161</sup> Unfortunately, nothing is known about the following of the marquis. Recruitment would have been handled in the same way as by d'Anjou, through awarding commissions to trusted clients and household officers. The officers of his company included notable signatories of the Catholic League, like the lieutenant,

---

<sup>156</sup> Admittedly the *conseil de guerre* included more experienced captains, such as the maréchal de Cossé, Guillaume de Hautemer, sieur de Fervacques, and Claude de La Châtre.

<sup>157</sup> On the death of Coligny in 1586, d'Elbeuf became *tuteur* and *curateur* of his son, see Broussillon, *La maison de Laval*, IV, pp 324-6.

<sup>158</sup> *Documents concernant les relations entre le duc d'Anjou...et les Pays-Bas*, IV, pp 65, 74.

<sup>159</sup> D. B. F., XIII, p 1191.

<sup>160</sup> V. des Diguères, *Etude historique et généalogique sur les Rouxel de Médavy-Grancey*, Paris, 1870, p 36.

<sup>161</sup> He had signalled his support of the League as representative at the Estates of Blois in 1576 and was first the *guidon* and then the lieutenant (1584) of the company of the duc de Guise, see D. B. F., V, p 918; F. Vindry, p 295.

Charles de Fouilleuse, and the *guidon*, Ponthus de Bellefourrière.<sup>162</sup> The idea that it was d'Anjou alone who had the ability to create a 'union sacrée' uniting the French nobility has some validity.

D'Elbeuf's retinue was not a feudal levy and he was compelled to raise considerable funds in order to finance the expedition. Between June 1580 and June 1583 he sold *rentes* at Rouen constituted on his lands in Normandy for a capital value of 152,800l.<sup>163</sup> In order to meet his mounting obligations, the marquis was forced to sell the seigneurie of Quatremares for the sum of 80,000l in December 1583.<sup>164</sup> Land sold by a magnate was usually alienated to trusted clients. In this case the purchaser was Jean de La Haye, sieur de Chantelou, who was now a servant of both d'Anjou and the Guise. La Haye was wise to have more than one patron, because it was clear by the date of this transaction that d'Anjou was unwell and could not be expected to live much longer.

The expenses that d'Elbeuf incurred on the expedition were not compensated by glory or the bestowal of lucrative offices. After the euphoria over the relief of Cambrai (18 August 1581) evaporated, it became clear that many of d'Anjou's army had not intended to serve for long and the duke lacked the resources to keep the army together. D'Elbeuf left the army soon after the fall of Cambrai, ostensibly because of illness but, if the Tuscan ambassador is to be believed, due to serious disagreements with d'Anjou:

il detto marchese ne partì molto sdeganto, e di tal sorte, che, dopo aver preso licenza, uscendo della camera di Sua Altezza [d'Anjou], disse sì che tutto il mondo presente l'intese, e ella ancora la potè udire: che egli aveva otto mila uomini a sua devozione, i quali menerebbe al servizio del re di Spagna; e che, se avesse saputo, quando partì dal Chatelet per andare a Cambrai, quello che aveva saputo dipoi, sarebbe ito a trovare il principe di Parma, dove si assicurava che el metà delle forze di Sua Altezza lo arebbono seguito. E, oltre di lui, molti atri ne sono partiti con poca volontà di tomarlo a servire di un anno; di sorte che bene gli servirà di avere di quelli che fanno cantare i ciechi.<sup>165</sup>

Relations between the two men never improved thereafter and the French campaign proved to be a disaster after the early success of Cambrai. When d'Elbeuf offered his services again in March 1582, d'Anjou was "content to have once made trial of him, without going that way again".<sup>166</sup>

---

<sup>162</sup> Vindry, p 304.

<sup>163</sup> See chapter three above and appendix D.

<sup>164</sup> ADSM, Tabellionage, 2E1, 367, 28 October 1586.

<sup>165</sup> *Négociations diplomatiques de la France avec la Toscane*, IV, p 396.

<sup>166</sup> CSPF, 1581-2, p 583.



On the marquis' return to court in late 1581, the supremacy of La Valette and Joyeuse in the affections of the king was apparent. In September the vicomté of Joyeuse had been created a duché-pairie, with the added proviso that it superseded all non-princely pairies because of Joyeuse's marriage to Marguerite de Vaudémont, sister of the queen.<sup>167</sup> La Valette had been made duc d'Epéron in November 1581, and the following June Joyeuse was presented with the office of admiral, bought by the king from Mayenne for 120,000 *écus*.<sup>168</sup> The king, although he esteemed Mayenne "to be of a more settled nature than his brother", was determined to allocate the major royal offices to men whom he could trust.<sup>169</sup> In order to appease the Guise, Mayenne was well reimbursed for surrendering the admiralty and on 29 March 1582 letters which created the marquisate of Elbeuf into a duché-pairie were finally published "a la requête et instance de ceux de la maison de Guise, déplaisants de voir les ducs de Retz, de Joyeuse et d'Epéron, précéder en honneur, grade et qualité, le marquis d'Elbeuf."<sup>170</sup> However, this show of favour was far surpassed by the gift of 100,000 *écus* and the office of *premier gentilhomme de la chambre*, bestowed upon d'Epéron at the end of February 1582.<sup>171</sup> Guillaume de Saulx-Tavannes even mocked the elevation of the marquis:

poste qu'il n'aurait pas recherché si vite, s'il eut attendu et se fut soucie d'être grand d'être élevé, et que, comme personne incapable et de peu de moyens, il n'aurait jamais obtenus, si on considéré les degrés qui l'y avaient conduit et si on eut voulu, pour lui conférer cette dignité, que l'âge l'en eut rendu quil l'eut meritée par ses services.<sup>172</sup>

D'Elbeuf lacked high office and credit at the court but he was a prince and did have the landed wealth to support his new dignity. His status was greatly increased by his marriage in February 1583 to Marguerite de Chabot, dame de Pagny, daughter of the aged and ailing Léonor, lieutenant-general of Burgundy. The dowry consisted not only of Pagny and its château but also lump sum payments totalling 12,000/, and the rights to a capital value of 8,000/ per annum in *rentes*. The contract also stipulated that Chabot would resign his office of *grand écuyer* to his new son-in-law.<sup>173</sup> The marriage thus provided d'Elbeuf with the office he coveted and once again

---

<sup>167</sup> L'Estoile, *Journal du règne de Henri III*, pp 273-4.

<sup>168</sup> Ibid, pp 281, 301.

<sup>169</sup> Davila, *Historie of the Civill Warres*, p 490.

<sup>170</sup> L'Estoile, *Journal du règne de Henri III*, p 297.

<sup>171</sup> Ibid, pp 294-5.

<sup>172</sup> Quoted in Maille, *Recherches sur Elbeuf*, p 85

<sup>173</sup> BN, Cabinet d'Hozier, 216, fo 101.

reinforced the bonds between the Guise family in Normandy and their ancestral roots in eastern France.<sup>174</sup>

The king did not try openly to alienate the Guise for he must have sanctioned the transfer of this office and he continued to make money gifts to the Guise, even if not on the same scale as to the *mignons*.<sup>175</sup> It is easy to exaggerate the financial and political difficulties of Guise in the early 1580s. Once in receipt of his Spanish pension he did little to fulfil his obligation to prevent the continuing incursions of d'Anjou into Flanders, showing that he had not become a Spanish pawn. He was able to purchase land. In May 1582 he bought five-sixths of the comté of Courtenay valued at 160,000*l*, from Philippe and Jean de Rambures and Perceval de Boullainvilliers. The following month he purchased the seigneurie of Argillières in exchange for 3,000*l* worth of *rentes*.<sup>176</sup>

After the collapse of the catholic-protestant malcontent alliance in early 1580 the attention of the duc de Guise was directed to the British Isles. Guise felt better able to aid Mary and James because the situation in Scotland had become more favourable. First, Philip II was willing to aid any malcontent party which would divert the attention of both France and England from the Netherlands.<sup>177</sup> Secondly, the grip of the protestant and anglophile earl of Morton was weakening and was further undermined by the return from France of Esmé Stuart, sieur d'Aubigny, created earl of Lennox in 1580.<sup>178</sup> In January 1581 Guise received a commission from Mary to form an 'association' in her name, both inside and outside Scotland.<sup>179</sup> Negotiations to effect such a league involved the pope and the king of Spain too. Mary remained hopeful of military intervention, telling Guise in September 1582 that he could easily seize Stirling with 500 men.<sup>180</sup> Guise was undoubtedly more realistic and he had different aims from his fellow conspirators. As a letter from John Leslie in October 1580 to the general of the Jesuits demonstrates, the strategy of Guise was primarily concerned with events in Scotland and ensuring that the catholic party gained control of James VI.<sup>181</sup> He was suspicious of becoming involved in Spanish plans to destabilise the

---

<sup>174</sup> The Chabot had a long association with the Guise. During the War of the Holy league, Chabot remained nominally loyal to Henri III and Henri IV. In reality he was simply too decrepit to leave the château of Pagny where he had retired. He was thus a marginal figure in Burgundian politics and was deprived of his office of lieutenant-general by Henri III in 1588, see D. B. F, VIII, p 133; Drouot, *Mayenne et la Bourgogne*, I, pp 103, 157-8.

<sup>175</sup> Boucher, *La cour de Henri III*, p 60.

<sup>176</sup> Bouillé, III, p 312, n 1. Jean de Rambures was a Picard client of the duc d'Aumale and was made governor of the duchy of Guise in 1588.

<sup>177</sup> Davillé, *Prétensions de Charles III duc de Lorraine à la couronne*, pp 30-54.

<sup>178</sup> Donaldson, *Scotland: James V-VII*, pp 165-180.

<sup>179</sup> *Letters, instructions et mémoires de Marie Stuart*, A. I. Labanoff (ed), 7 vols, London, 1845, vol V, p 185.

<sup>180</sup> *Ibid*, p 301.

<sup>181</sup> *Ibid*, VII, pp 153-4.

English polity and therefore disrupt aid to the rebels in the Netherlands. Leading an attack on England would be hazardous and not in his own interests since, as Ross commented, Guise believed such an action was more likely to result in Mary Stuart's execution.

Jesuit missionaries were an important part of attempts to recruit malcontents throughout England and Scotland between 1581 and 1583, and Guise had shown his commitment to the spread of the political and religious message by founding the English Jesuit college at Eu. It would take much more than this to help Mary Stuart. Military help from France for the Marian party in either England or Scotland would require the substantial support of the Norman nobility and officers of the admiralty. It is now clear why Henri III was so eager to relieve Mayenne of this office. Despite the secrecy of negotiations and preparations in Normandy, the reports of the well-informed English spies in the province shed some light on the activities of the Guise and their supporters. Naturally, the English were worried about the conspiracy and kept a close eye on the the movements of John Leslie, bishop of Ross, now installed in the diocese of Rouen as vicar-general and suffragan of the cardinal de Bourbon.<sup>182</sup> It was he who strove to interest the Norman nobility in Mary's cause. In December 1581 an English agent reported:

It has been given me to understand that the Bishop of Ross has of late had secret conferences with sundry gentlemen of Normandy, such as M. 'Angevil', Pont-Saint-Pierre, Pierrecourte, Breaulté, Vergennes [Vereins]; meeting sometimes at Rouen and sometimes at Pont-Saint-pierre,<sup>[sic]</sup> So those gentlemen being known to be of troublesome dispositions and enterprisers of actions, I have thought it necessary to send this advertisement; the rather because this bishop continues to take hold of every occasion wherein he may show his factious mind.<sup>183</sup>

The English spy recognised that these troublesome noblemen represented the core of the ultra-catholic faction in Normandy built around the Moy and Roncherolles families. The first mentioned, François Le Myre, sieur d'Angerville, was Moy's personal emissary at the meetings. He was a man-at-arms in Moy's company in 1581, in which he was noted as living at La Meilleraye. He was one of the most senior members of Moy's household, since he was present at important financial transactions on behalf of his master.<sup>184</sup> He was also the son-in-law of Pierre Le Doyen, sieur d'Autou, former *maître de logis* (1570) of Moy and lieutenant of Harfleur (1581-9) under the sieur

---

<sup>182</sup> He was an active figure in Rouen in the 1580s, see ADSM, G, 2173, 23 October 1580; 2175, 21 September 1583, 11 October 1583, 8 May 1584.

<sup>183</sup> *CSPF, 1581-2*, p 399.

<sup>184</sup> BN, Ms Fr, 21537, fo 2261, muster roll of 54 men-at-arms and 78 archers, Houdan, 28 February 1581; ADSM, Tabellionage, 2E1, 348, 18 and 19 February 1574.

de Pierrecourt.<sup>185</sup> Jacques de Moy (d.1590), sieur de Pierrecourt, was the younger brother and lieutenant of the *gouvernement* of Jean de Moy as well as captain of Honfleur and Harfleur. Also present was his cousin, Nicholas de Moy (d.1589), sieur de Vereins, the *guidon* (1570-74) and later lieutenant (1574-81) of the *ordonnance* company of Jean de Moy. He was an important figure in Normandy in his own right, having acquired the office of *grand maître des eaux et forêts* of the province for 10,000/ in 1578. As the nephew of the cardinal Pellevé he had his own links to the ultra-catholic hierarchy.<sup>186</sup> Adrien de Bréauté (d.1597) was a veteran of the catholic army in the first civil war and also an *ami* of Jean de Moy. He had served as lieutenant of Moy's company in 1561 and was a guarantor for the family in legal transactions in 1567 and 1572. He held a succession of offices in Moy's *gouvernement*: captain of Le Havre (1573), governor of Vernon and Les Andelys (1574-76) and captain of Saint-Valéry-en-Caux (1576).<sup>187</sup> Finally, the joint host of the conference was Moy's relative and comrade from the early days of the Catholic League in 1576-77, Pierre de Roncherolles, baron de Pont-Saint-Pierre.

Ross was hopeful of gaining the support of these men in the Guise affinity who were also veterans of the Catholic League. A successful expedition depended upon their help, especially since Jean de Moy was vice-admiral. The preliminary discussions with the local nobility went well and the duc de Guise spent large parts of 1582 and 1583 in upper Normandy. In summer 1582 it was reported that he was preparing ships, while the duc de Mayenne lodged with the cardinal de Bourbon at the archiepiscopal residence at Gaillon. Spies reported that in July all the Guise family were assembled in Normandy for special consultations.<sup>188</sup> Presumably this meant that they were counselled by their local clients. The outcome of these meetings was the decision to send François de Roncherolles, sieur de Maineville, as an envoy to James VI to urge on him a plan of joint action.<sup>189</sup> These plans were immediately wrecked by the unstable political situation in Scotland. Morton and his faction regained his grip on power in August 1582 when the young king was seized and Lennox forced to flee.<sup>190</sup> Henri III could not ignore the control now exercised by the English and their supporters over the traditional ally of France. In October 1582 therefore a royal embassy departed to secure the release of James, Maineville being officially attached to this mission.<sup>191</sup>

---

<sup>185</sup> Vindry, p 377.

<sup>186</sup> On the Moy family, see chapter three above.

<sup>187</sup> Vindry, p 93; ADSM, 6F, 11, Recueil des capitaines de Normandie; ADSM, Tabellionage, 2E1, 334, 14 March 1567; 2E1, 344, 14 May 1572.

<sup>188</sup> CSPF, 1582, p 141.

<sup>189</sup> *Calendar of State Papers, Foreign Series, Scotland*, M. J. Thorpe et al (eds), London, 1858-1969, 1581-3, p 123.

<sup>190</sup> Donaldson, *Scotland: James V-VII*, p 178.

<sup>191</sup> A. Teulet (ed), *Papiers d'état...relatifs à l'histoire de l'Ecosse au XVI<sup>e</sup> siècle; tirés des bibliothèques et des archives de France*, 3 vols, Paris, 1851-60, vol II, p 531; *Lettres de Catherine de Médicis*, VIII, pp 64, 67.

Maineville spent the winter in Scotland using the 4,000/ he had borrowed on the Rouennais money market to galvanise the anti-Morton forces:

Maineville...labours likewise to entertain the king, the nobles, and persons of credit to the French course, offering purses full of French crowns and also pensions to several persons of quality.<sup>192</sup>

In May 1583 he returned home, having completely failed to form a strong pro-Guise, anti-Morton, faction. Moreover, the Guise also faced a crisis in France, being accused of plotting to seize the throne. The councils held in the summer of 1582 would have had to consider the serious allegations levelled at the family by Nicholas Salcède. While in Flanders the duc d'Anjou became paranoid about an assassination attempt. These fears seemed to be founded when, in July 1582, some suspects were arrested and confessed under torture that they were Spanish agents hired to murder both d'Anjou and William the Silent.<sup>193</sup> One suspect, Nicholas de Salcède, hoped to save himself from a terrible death by inventing a grand conspiracy, organised by the Guise to seize the throne. He was therefore brought to Paris to face a special judicial tribunal. Some details of Salcède's story are plausible because his father had briefly served the duc and cardinal de Lorraine and he himself had done some minor services for the Guise.<sup>194</sup> However, much of his story was fantasy and most, including the king, disbelieved him.<sup>195</sup> Once condemned to death he recanted the entire confession.

Salcède had been transported from Flanders to Paris because there were grains of truth in his story. In order to save himself, he embellished common knowledge of Guise movements in 1581 and 1582 with snippets of information he had acquired while running errands for them, thus creating the plot to topple the Valois. His testimony was especially concerned with the adherents of the conspiracy in Normandy.<sup>196</sup> Evidently, he was confusing Guise plotting in Scotland with the French internal situation, either out of ignorance or guile. When he states that Bréauté and Moy

---

<sup>192</sup> *CSP, Scotland, 1581-3, p 301.*

<sup>193</sup> Holt, *The duke of Anjou*, pp 175-6, is confused about some of the details.

<sup>194</sup> The plot can be followed in the pamphlets collected in Cimber and Danjou, X, pp 139-69.

<sup>195</sup> Among those who believed him was Christophe de Thou, one of the magistrates to interrogate him, see De Thou, VII, pp 633-34. See also Sutherland, *The French Secretaries of State in the age of Catherine de Medici*, p 238.

<sup>196</sup> Salcède would have been especially knowledgeable about Normandy. He had lands there and had been a resident before being sentenced to death by the parlement of Rouen, *in absentia*, for counterfeiting. His confiscated property was granted to the duc de Lorraine, see BN, PO, 2166, fo 1093, the dowager duchesse de Longueville to Charles, duc de Lorraine, Trie, 28 November 1582.

had secured towns for the plotters in the event of an attack on the crown, it is clear that this refers to help that was to be given to the Guise for their invasion of Scotland.<sup>197</sup>

Although Henri III did not take heed of this testimony, the strengthening relations between the Guise and their clients in Normandy meant that the king could no longer trust his own *officiers*. Henri III felt more confident than ever before because he was at last able to enjoy the fruits of religious peace and greater control over the flow of court patronage and office. In February 1583 he therefore asserted his authority in Normandy, ordering the reunification of the province into a single governorship under his *fidèle*, the duc de Joyeuse.<sup>198</sup> The former governors were compensated with a payment of 6,000/ and two lieutenants-generals were retained, Carrouges for the *bailliages* of Rouen, Evreux and Caen and Moy for those of Caux, Gisors and the Cotentin.<sup>199</sup> In turn their own lieutenants retained their posts, and Carrouges was even able to ensure that his son would inherit his office.<sup>200</sup> Such measures were designed to alleviate the dishonour of demotion, but the installation of a man who was neither a prince nor a Norman was an unprecedented move and fears about the growth of royal power seemed justified because Joyeuse was already admiral. The appointment of Joyeuse and attempts to introduce royal favourites upset the Norman political classes, as would be clearly demonstrated when the dynastic crisis swept France in 1584. Nevertheless, even at the beginning of Joyeuse's tenure loyal officers, such as Hervé de Longuanay, openly protested at their demotion.<sup>201</sup>

While the king strengthened his position in Normandy, Guise persevered with efforts to aid Mary Stuart. During 1582 Guise resolved to aid the earl of Lennox and the Marian party in Scotland but this was ended by the fall of Lennox.<sup>202</sup> This project, like all the other Guise attempts to help Mary, were beset by many practical difficulties and perhaps also by the lack of real political conviction. Guise demanded 100,000 *écus* from the Spanish before he would make any move against England. He had received a paltry 10,000 *écus* by September 1582 - enough, as Philip

---

<sup>197</sup> Cimber and Danjou, X, pp 159-61. However, the accusation of Matignon, now based in Bordeaux and not a friend of the Guise, reveals his lack of knowledge. Attempts to implicate La Rocheguyon, Chantelou and "ceux des estatz de Normandie" demonstrate his desperation.

<sup>198</sup> BN, Ms Fr, 3306, fo 74. In a parallel move d'Epemon was granted the strategic captaincies of Metz and Boulogne.

<sup>199</sup> Harding, *Anatomy of a Power Elite*, p 124. François d'O therefore lost his post altogether, although he retained the captaincy of Caen.

<sup>200</sup> BN, Ms Fr, 3306, fos 76-7. Among the lieutenants retained were Jacques de Rouville (d.1589), sieur de Grainville-la-Teinture; Jacques Le Veneur (d.1596), comte de Tillières; Hervé de Longuanay (1510-90), was a lieutenant in lower Normandy; and finally, Jacques de Moy, sieur de Pierrecourt.

<sup>201</sup> BN, Ms Fr, 3306, fo 65, Henri III to d'O, Paris, 1 February 1583.

<sup>202</sup> These plans lacked substance, see *CSPS*, 1580-6, pp 363, 373, 378.

intended, to trouble the English but inadequate and too late in the season to launch a seaborne invasion.<sup>203</sup>

Soon after Maineville returned from Scotland in May 1583 he had an interview with Guise, probably at Eu.<sup>204</sup> His report confirms that Guise had been planning to help Mary primarily by aiding the catholic faction in Scotland rather than with a direct invasion of England.<sup>205</sup> However, the failure of Maineville's mission and the evident lack of enthusiasm among the Scottish nobility for his cause forced the duc de Guise to consider military intervention in England, a project originally favoured by Mary, Philip and the pope. Nevertheless, there were still differences between the allies. Guise wanted substantial Spanish aid and Philip, wanting to avoid open warfare with England, preferred Guise to take responsibility for the invasion.<sup>206</sup> The problems of organising such an expedition that involved different interests hampered the planning and efficacy of the operation.<sup>207</sup> The English exiles and catholics were nervous about the designs of the Guise and desired greater Spanish involvement. They were supported by Mendoza, the Spanish ambassador in London, who also counselled more direct involvement believing that the Guise were apt to put "the question of religion into second place, as a mere accessory to politics".<sup>208</sup> Despite telling the Spanish otherwise, Guise preferred to concentrate his attention on Scotland. In early November the catholic plotters in England involved in the conspiracy were discovered and divulged the entire plan. Well before this Guise was once again hoping to achieve his ends by collaborating with James VI. His hopes of joining with James were raised when the Scottish king evaded his anglophile captors in June 1583. Soon after the escape, Guise wrote to James proposing a joint expedition.<sup>209</sup> In November 1583 the Spanish ambassador in Paris wrote with concern to Philip II that Guise was once more placing the emphasis on Scotland.<sup>210</sup> Thereafter Guise continued to hope for help and support from his kinsman, the king of Scotland.<sup>211</sup>

---

<sup>203</sup> Croze, *Les Guises, les Valois et Philippe II*, I, p 266. In May 1583 he received a further 20,000 *écus*, see Törne, "Philippe II et Henri de Guise", p 333.

<sup>204</sup> *CSPF*, 1583, pp 358, 373.

<sup>205</sup> For this and following, see *CSPS*, 1580-6, pp 479-86.

<sup>206</sup> *Ibid*, pp 482-3. The Spanish ambassador in London was also concerned that attention of the Guise was being diverted by domestic politics.

<sup>207</sup> For the plans and the problems involved, see *CSPS*, 1580-6, pp 492-5, 503-5. It was also noted that the Guise were liable to be distracted by domestic politics, see *CSPS*, 1580-6, pp 485-6.

<sup>208</sup> *CSPS*, 1580-6, p 492.

<sup>209</sup> Donaldson, *Scotland: James V-VII*, pp 179-80.

<sup>210</sup> *CSPS*, 1580-6, pp 502-3, 509.

<sup>211</sup> *Ibid*, pp 527, 589, 595.

English agents maintained a watch on the movements of the duke during the summer. He spent most of July at Eu where he was surrounded by English exiles, obviously pleading for his help.<sup>212</sup> Evidence pertaining to the preparations of the invasion force is scant. D'Elbeuf was reportedly readying three ships at Harfleur and in August 1583 an army was assembling at Honfleur, Le Havre and Fécamp, commanded by Mayenne and the comte de Brissac.<sup>213</sup> Such an operation would have needed the co-operation of the local vice-admiral, Jean de Moy. Ports were made available to the Guise because Jacques de Moy was captain of Harfleur and Honfleur. Fécamp was another obvious choice for embarkation because the abbey of Fécamp had a preponderant influence in the port, including the right to appoint to offices. Antoine de Fiesques, sieur de Coquéraumont, had been confirmed as captain by the abbey on the death of the cardinal de Guise in 1578.<sup>214</sup> Jean de Moy was a key figure on the Guise council now. English spies traced the duc de Guise, Mayenne and the cardinal de Bourbon, who were visiting Moy at "La Milleraye, where they stayed five or six days, holding council every day."<sup>215</sup>

It was during these meetings that the comte de Brissac arrived from Le Havre to inform his fellow conspirators that the sailing had to be called off. This took place before their contacts in England were arrested and the delay of the invasion was probably due to lack of money and doubts about the objectives of the operation. Guise immediately withdrew the money he had advanced and the expedition had to be postponed.<sup>216</sup> Moreover, the commitment of the duke to building his new residence at Eu can only have served to divert his own resources and the Spanish subvention away from the expedition. Although, the duke was able to lay the foundations of an invasion and attract some support among the Norman elites, he lacked the finances to carry his plans through. The position of 1559-60 was reversed. This time local co-operation had been forthcoming due to the expansion of the Guise power base in Normandy, but without control of the royal finances the project was bound to founder, even with Spanish aid. The English realised they had little to fear, and the assessments of their spies are more sober than those of 1559-60. They understood that the duc de Guise did not wield the same authority at the court as had his father formerly. As the English ambassador reported in May 1584:

---

<sup>212</sup> *CSPF*, 1583-4, pp 36-7.

<sup>213</sup> *Ibid*, p 57. This force was to join with Spanish paid mercenaeries at Dunkirk, sailing to England to rendezvous with English catholic forces, see *CSPS*, 1580-6, pp 503-4, 505-6.

<sup>214</sup> Hellot, *Fécamp au temps de la Ligue*, p 5. It is likely that the governor of Le Havre, Corbeyran de Cardillac, sieur de Sarlabous, was also sympathetic to the Guise. He served in Scotland in the 1550s, took part in the murder of Coligny and refused to implement the edict of Beaulieu, see Le Hardy, *Histoire du Protestantisme en Normandie*, p 283; De Thou, VI, p 398.

<sup>215</sup> *CSPF*, 1583-4, p 57.

<sup>216</sup> By October all preparations had been halted, see *CSPF*, 1583-4, pp 57-8, 185.



I do not doubt the duke of Guise's good will and promises to help the King of Scots, but see no reason to fear his performing anything, for his means are small and his credit smaller...those of that house come but very seldom to the court and when they come there is no good countenance given to them.<sup>217</sup>

---

<sup>217</sup> *CSPF*, 1583-4, p 493.

## Chapter Seven

### Holy Alliance: The Guise and the Catholic People

After the failure of the planned invasion in 1583, Philip II began to lose patience with the Guise. He had always been suspicious of their reliance on James VI and he now resolved to flatter them while taking English affairs into his own hands. From 1584 he was much more concerned to promote conflict in France, paralysing attempts by Henri III and the Huguenots to aid Elizabeth and rendering Guise powerless to promote the interests in England of his cousin James VI.<sup>1</sup> As early as 1582 Philip urged Guise to give French affairs priority, pointing out that since Henri III was ill and childless Guise would "incur great danger when the realm falls into the hands of his enemies".<sup>2</sup> When the heir to the throne, d'Anjou, died on 10 June 1584, Guise was forced to abandon his immediate hopes of allying with James and concern himself with the threat that the new heir to the throne, Henri de Navarre, posed to his family.

### The Rebirth of the Catholic League and the Revolt of the Guise, 1584-8

The Holy League was essentially an alliance of princely ambition and popular piety. Recent studies of the radical Sixteen in Paris have demonstrated that the Guise did not control the ultra-catholic forces in the capital - there was instead a coalition between the ultramontane members of the bourgeoisie and the discontented princes of the House of Lorraine.<sup>3</sup> A wave of popular piety and eschatological anxiety was discernible in northern France from the early 1580s, parallel to but autonomous from the dynastic crisis.<sup>4</sup> The Guise enjoyed far greater popularity in Paris than any other noble family and were a focus for the aspirations of the catholic masses. Nevertheless, historians have over-estimated the extent to which the population of Paris understood and supported the aspirations of the Guise. Robert Descimon has convincingly argued that the Day of the Barricades on 12 May 1588, which saw the revolt of Paris and the subsequent flight of the king, was the result, not of the dynastic crisis or socio-economic tension, but of the defence of municipal liberties against the insensitive government of Henri III, characterised by his introduction of large numbers of foreign mercenaries into the city.<sup>5</sup> Descimon has rightly argued that the rise of the League in urban areas and its subsequent history cannot be explained by divisions and struggles

---

<sup>1</sup> CSPS, 1580-6, pp xli-xlvi.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid, 1580-6, p 402.

<sup>3</sup> E. Barnavi, *Le parti de Dieu: étude sociale et politique des chefs de la Ligue parisienne*, Louvain, 1980; J. H. M. Salmon, "The Paris Sixteen, 1584-94: The Social Analysis of a Revolutionary Movement", *Journal of Modern History*, 1972. See also M. Greengrass, "The Sixteen, Radical Politics in Paris during the League", *History*, 1984.

<sup>4</sup> D. Crouzet, *Les guerriers de Dieu*, II, pp 287-342. For evidence of this in Normandy, see *Relation de troubles excités par les Calvinistes dans la ville de Rouen*, pp 50-1. See also J. Bossy, "Leagues and Associations in Sixteenth Century French Catholicism", *Studies in Church History*, 1986.

<sup>5</sup> R. Descimon, *Qui étaient les Seize ? : mythes et réalités de la Ligue parisienne (1585-1594)*, Paris, 1983; "La Ligue à Paris (1585-94): une révision", *Annales ESC*, 1982.

between different strata of the bourgeoisie.<sup>6</sup> He sees the League as a mosaic of different interest groups, often with different political and social backgrounds; the clients of the Guise represented only one faction in this alliance.

The alliance of interests is also discernible in Normandy. In early 1585 the Paris Sixteen sent an envoy called Ameline to Normandy to open communications with sympathisers.<sup>7</sup> There was a clandestine League faction in the province well before the revolutionary events of 1589. Evidence about the composition of this group and its relationship to the Guise is meagre. Little is known about its activities, and a full prosopography of the League in Normandy can be compiled only for the period after the seizure of power by the League in Rouen in February 1589. However, tentative steps can be made in this direction for the period before 1589 by analysing the events leading up to the overthrow of Valois authority. First, the much neglected revolts of the duc d'Elbeuf in 1585 and 1588 provide some clues. Secondly, there was a popular movement in Normandy which expressed its discontent with royal fiscal and religious policy in two ways: through the established representative institutions and the medium of peasant revolt.

Fearful of the growing Guise influence in Normandy Henri III had made his brother-in-law and *mignon*, the duc de Joyeuse, governor of Normandy in 1583. There was a number of factors in this appointment which could only have pleased Normans, if Joyeuse had acted astutely. He was recognised for his unflinching support of catholicism, unlike his fellow *mignon* and rival d'Épernon. Joyeuse could thus expect few complaints from the ultramontane Norman nobility, and when he made his entrance into Rouen on 25 March 1583 he was accompanied by the elite of the Norman nobility.<sup>8</sup> His tenure of the governorship began auspiciously when the office of *receveur de la ville* was suppressed by the king, "grâce à l'inter vention du duc de Joyeuse".<sup>9</sup> He later managed to prevent the garrisoning of Rouen by royal troops in 1585, and in July 1587 it was at his behest that town representatives were able to plead for tax reductions directly before the *conseil du roi*.<sup>10</sup> However, Joyeuse could never dissociate himself from the unpopular royal fiscal measures in which he was deeply implicated. Moreover, he immediately began to aggravate the local notables by assigning major offices to his entourage. Joyeuse was fortunate that both the governorships of Le Havre and Dieppe fell vacant soon after his accession. In 1584 André de Villars-Branças (d.1595),

---

<sup>6</sup> The thesis that the urban League was the product of malcontents, whose access to social advancement had been inhibited by the growth of hereditary venal office, was first propounded by Henri Drouot. For an analysis of the historiographical debate, see Benedict, *Rouen during the Wars of Religion*, pp 182-3. Dijon was the object of Drouot's enquiry and his thesis is not corroborated by events in either Rouen or Paris, where those already in positions of authority led the League.

<sup>7</sup> Benedict, *Rouen during the Wars of Religion*, p 169.

<sup>8</sup> ACR, A, 20, 25 March 1583.

<sup>9</sup> ACR, A, 20, 11 June 1583.

<sup>10</sup> Benedict, *Rouen during the Wars of Religion*, pp 171-2; ACR, A, 20, 1 July 1587.

a Provençal nobleman and relative of Joyeuse, was made governor.<sup>11</sup> In the previous year command of Dieppe had been granted to another relative, Aymard de Clermont (d.1603), sieur de Chatte.<sup>12</sup> The possession of the office of admiral and these two ports was enough to end any aspirations that the Guise might still have about a cross-channel invasion. This new power in Normandy was a serious challenge to the authority of Jean de Moy in the pays de Caux and could only affect the Moy family and its affinity adversely. The appointment of Claude Groulard (1551-1607) as *premier président* of the parlement of Rouen (April 1585) was a more serious blunder. Although a Norman, Groulard was a repentant Calvinist, a protégé of Joyeuse and did not fulfil the age requirement for such a senior office.<sup>13</sup> The obvious fear was that Groulard would represent the interests of Joyeuse and the king rather than the corporate body he now headed. Such concerns seemed founded when a series of innovative fiscal measures were presented to the parlement for registration between 1585 and 1587.<sup>14</sup> Consequently, a faction grew up in the parlement which had antipathy towards Groulard and this further swelled the number of malcontents in the parlement.<sup>15</sup>

The Norman affinity was at the heart of the League. As soon as it was clear that the duc d'Anjou, heir to the throne, was dying, the House of Lorraine and its most senior counsellors gathered at the residence of Christophe de Bassompierre in Nancy. Among those present was François de Roncherolles who, after the death of d'Anjou, signed the secret treaty of Joinville (31 December 1584) on behalf of the cardinal de Bourbon. This treaty stipulated the extirpation of protestantism inside and outside France and the displacement of Henri de Navarre as heir. The association was supported by Spain with a subvention of 50,000 *écus* per month.<sup>16</sup> Although the aims of the League seem quite straightforward, the strategy of the Guise family is hard to define. The wild claims that the family were intent on seizing the throne are the products of protestant propaganda and have never been substantiated.<sup>17</sup> The <sup>major weakness</sup> of the League became clear after the death of the cardinal de Bourbon, the leaguer king Charles X, in 1590. Thereafter the

---

<sup>11</sup> Borely, *Histoire de la ville du Havre*, II, pp 178-9.

<sup>12</sup> D. B. F, VIII, pp 1495-6. He was also a relative of the duke.

<sup>13</sup> Floquet, III, p 181-4; Frondeville, *Présidents*, pp 68-9.

<sup>14</sup> These edicts were consistently rejected, see Floquet, III, pp 230-2.

<sup>15</sup> The *procureur général*, Georges de La Porte, was a fierce opponent of Groulard. Antagonism between the two men continued after the defeat of the League, see Frondeville, *Présidents*, p 275.

<sup>16</sup> On these events, see Bouillé, III, pp 125-8.

<sup>17</sup> The arguments are outlined in Constant, *Les Guises*, pp 193-200.

League failed to find a suitable candidate.<sup>18</sup> Dynastic security rather than religious fervour or ascending the throne was the major motive. The family wanted to regain its lost ascendancy at court and use this to secure its troubled dynastic status; intervention in Scotland and England was an obvious example of where the crusade against heresy would benefit it directly.<sup>19</sup> Conversely this would not apply to the many Calvinist servants of their cousin, the duc de Lorraine. The Manifesto of Péronne (30 March 1585), issued by the princes, was a clear attempt to appeal to the popular imagination. It called for fiscal retrenchment, highlighted the dangers the catholic faith was now facing and demanded the convocation of regular Estates-General. This popular appeal only partially masked the fact that the House of Lorraine was undertaking armed revolt in order to regain its position of authority in the royal councils, displacing the hated d'Epemon and Joyeuse.<sup>20</sup>

It was during the meetings at Nancy and Joinville that plans were drawn up and support solicited. Local leadership came from three main areas. First, there was the Guise and their kinsmen: the duc de Guise was given the task of securing Champagne, Mayenne Burgundy, Mercoeur Brittany, while d'Elbeuf and D'Aumale would raise Normandy and Picardy respectively. The second group consisted of disgruntled noblemen who, on the death of d'Anjou, had lost their major patron and who were denied access to royal patronage because of the dominance of d'Epemon and Joyeuse at court. Veterans of d'Anjou's ill-fated campaigns in the Low Countries were much in evidence - Biron rebelled in Guyenne, Claude de La Châtre became colonel-in-chief of Guise's infantry, and the sieur de Monluc-Balagny held Cambrai for the League.<sup>21</sup> In Normandy, where formerly d'Anjou had a large following, the duc d'Elbeuf could rely on the support of Jean de La Haye, sieur de Chantelou, and Silly de La Rocheguyon, both of whom had been implicated in previous Guise conspiracies. Other Norman malcontents included the disgraced former *mignons* François d'Espinay, sieur de Saint-Luc, and François d'O, governor of Caen.<sup>22</sup> Charles II de

---

<sup>18</sup> Charles III duc de Lorraine had the best claim to the throne, <sup>among all the members of his house</sup> but he failed to press it effectively. Mercoeur, Mayenne and the new duc de Guise each had their own strategies and were divided by rivalry, see Lavissee, *Histoire de France*, VI, pt 1, pp 333-5.

<sup>19</sup> Constant, *Les Guises*, p 207, asserts that Guise never desired to seize the crown and only wanted to secure the office of *connétable*, reinforcing his position at the centre of the royal office hierarchy.

<sup>20</sup> Lavissee, *Histoire de France*, VI, pt 1, p 244. The manifesto was entitled "Declaration des causes qui ont meu Monseigneur le cardinal de Bourbon et les Pairs, Princes, Seigneurs, villes et communautez Catholiques de ce royaume de France: de s'opposer à ceux qui pour tous moyens s'efforcent de subvertir la religion catholique et l'Estat". The choice of Péronne, cradle of the League, was highly symbolic.

<sup>21</sup> Constant, *Les Guises*, p 122.

<sup>22</sup> Chevallier, *Henri III*, pp 424-7. Saint-Luc was governor of Brouage and son-in-law of Charles II de Cossé-Brissac.

Cossé, comte de Brissac, was another notable leaguer who co-operated with d'Elbeuf in Normandy.<sup>23</sup> The final bastion of League support was in the towns, alienated by economic decline and increased taxation, and fearful of the threat that the succession posed to catholicism. An alliance was forged between the Sixteen in Paris and the princes. Arms and money were clandestinely collected by sympathisers and dispatched to Champagne.<sup>24</sup>

Little of substance has been written about the princely revolt of the duc d'Elbeuf in Normandy. Unfortunately, as the tabellionage records in Rouen relating to the first half of 1585 do not survive, it is therefore difficult to ascertain information about attempts by the League to raise funds. There is a sole contract referred to in a later volume, pertaining to the sale of 49623 *écus* of *rente* sold by Marin Varnier, *fermier*, and Jacques d'Avenel, *maître d'hôtel* of the comte de Brissac, on behalf of the comte to Pierre Ygou, bourgeois.<sup>25</sup> This exceptionally large transaction, signed on 27 March 1588, undoubtedly enabled Brissac to advance money to his captains. Brissac had already established his camp somewhere in lower Normandy. Meanwhile the duc d'Elbeuf, accompanied by 500 men-at-arms, escorted the cardinal de Bourbon from the archiepiscopal residence at Gaillon, where he had been rallying the support of the Norman and Picard nobility, to Péronne in order to issue the Manifesto - the signal to revolt.<sup>26</sup> D'Elbeuf left the cardinal and returned to Normandy but his movements are unclear. He seems to have made an attempt to seize the château of Arques near Dieppe and then returned to lower Normandy.<sup>27</sup> Nevertheless, it is evident that no attempt was made by royal *officiers* to prevent his progress across Normandy, despite the publishing of the royal edict against taking up arms (28 March).<sup>28</sup> This is not surprising considering the sympathies of the Moy family and that d'Elbeuf was assured of the support of powerful Normans like François de Roncherolles.<sup>29</sup> It does not indicate a wave of noble support for the League in Normandy, reflecting instead the predatory and neutralist tendencies of the politically active class, unsure and uneasy about what the future would hold if unconditional

---

<sup>23</sup> Brissac had been disgraced by the disastrous expedition to the Azores in 1582, aimed at aiding the Portuguese against Spanish domination. He was especially annoyed that d'Eperon should have the office of colonel-general of the infantry which had once belonged to his brother. Guise stood by his old friend during his dishonour, see Brantôme, VI, 146-7

<sup>24</sup> Barnavi, *Le parti de Dieu*, p 62.

<sup>25</sup> ADSM, Tabellionage, 2<sup>ème</sup> Héritage, 2E1, 1986, 11 August 1585. A later contract mentions the sale of part of 500 *écus* of *rente* in March by d'Elbeuf to Marie de La Haye, see ADSM, Tabellionage, 2<sup>ème</sup> Héritage, 27 June 1600. Brissac also sold *rentes* to prominent Rouennais leaguers, Jacques de Bauquemare and his younger brother, Charles, see ADSM, Tabellionage, 2<sup>ème</sup> Héritage, 2E1, 2004, 11 February 1588.

<sup>26</sup> Bouillé, III, p 135.

<sup>27</sup> *Négociations diplomatiques de la France avec la Toscane*, IV, p 567.

<sup>28</sup> C. Valois (ed), *Histoire de la Ligue, oeuvre inédite d'un contemporain*, Paris, 1914, p 91.

<sup>29</sup> *Ibid*, p 88.

support were given to either side. If the monarchy were unable to call on the local nobility to fight for it, there would be little chance of containing the revolt, for the crown lacked the finances to pay for a large mercenary army. The activities of Jacques de Moy, sieur de Pierrecourt, one of the royal lieutenants in upper Normandy and a Guise sympathiser, demonstrate the paralysis of royal government. Ordered by the king to rendezvous with Carrouges to prevent the concentration of League forces, he preferred to wait at Gisors and use the crisis to bargain with the king, complaining that it was not possible to gather his men in time. Furthermore he demanded the pay for the *crue* of his *ordonnance* company and an additional bodyguard of thirty mounted arquebusiers. Not only did he neglect his duty in failing to arrest Brissac's lieutenant at Harfleur but he was also unable to prevent the gathering of League troops at La Ferté-en-Bray. When he called on the assistance of the town notables:

Ils m'ont faict response que de sortir hors leur ville quicter leurs femmes et enfans quilz ne le pouvoient faire... sy [nous] ne sommes promptement secourez quilz [the League] se feront maistres de la campagne.<sup>30</sup>

D'Elbeuf established his operational base in lower Normandy because the adherence of d'O, governor of Caen, was already assured. In the first days of April the duke was in the vicinity of Argentan.<sup>31</sup> On Saturday 3 April he left Caen, where he had been the guest of d'O, and marched on Bayeux. This town was also likely to fall to the League because the offices of the *vicomté* of Bayeux were in the gift of the d'Este family, whose affairs in France were administered by a council dominated by the Guise.<sup>32</sup> As Carrouges reported to the king, the governor of the château, captain Clément, came out to meet the advancing duke and then sent word to the inhabitants that they should open their gates, "leur disant quil estoit son [d'Elbeuf's] serviteur et que ne luy denyoit lentrer par le chasteau."<sup>33</sup> D'Elbeuf remained in Bayeux at least until 9 April, garrisoning the château with fifty men and leaving them six months pay. Captain Clément's adherence to the League seems to have been organised well in advance, since he now joined the duke's army with four companies of foot. Bayeux became an assembly point for troops arriving from all over Normandy, it was expected that the duke would have 6,000 men within a few days. It was also reported that these men were paid by expropriating local royal revenues: "Il [d'Elbeuf] avoit prins et faicte mener avecques luy deux mille esceus de la Recepte de Carentan."<sup>34</sup> The League

---

<sup>30</sup> BN, Ms Fr, 3395, fo 52, Pierrecourt to Henri III, Gisors, 10 April 1585.

<sup>31</sup> BN, Ms Fr, 3395, fo 34, Carrouges to Henri III, Rouen, 8 April 1585.

<sup>32</sup> See chapter two above.

<sup>33</sup> BN, Ms Fr, 3358, fo 39, Carrouges to Henri III, 10 April 1585. This report was compiled from the eyewitness statement of an *échevin* of Bayeux.

<sup>34</sup> *Ibid.*



troops naturally used the method of levying *subsistances* on the local population, a regular feature of medieval and early modern warfare. Since the mustering of troops by the duc d'Anjou for his campaigns in the Low Countries, this had become a serious burden on the inhabitants of lower Normandy. This problem was exacerbated by the revolt of the League and made even worse by harvest failures. Whilst d'Elbeuf was at Bayeux "trois ou quatre mille personnes des villages se plaindre a luy que l'on les contraignes de paier" - peasant disturbances which had taken place in 1578-9 threatened to recur.<sup>35</sup> D'Elbeuf also attempted to augment his forces by attracting royal *officiers*, not neglecting to entice them with "de belles promesses et beaux pretextes".<sup>36</sup>

D'Elbeuf's forces were officered largely from his own household and from the wider Guise affinity in Normandy. The deposition by Valentin de Vallée, sieur de Blancfossé, made in 1589 provides a unique insight into the methods of raising troops for a revolt. His confession was for the purpose of gaining remission for murder, an annual liberty accorded under the *privilege* of Saint-Romain and administered by the cathedral chapter of Rouen.<sup>37</sup> At the time of his deposition Vallée was a minor nobleman calling himself an *écuyer* and a long-serving professional soldier who was in the household of Adrien des Buaz, sieur des Noyers.<sup>38</sup> His military career began in the garrison of Metz at the age of fifteen, and he had then served in the regiment of des Buaz for the duc d'Anjou in Flanders and for Brissac in the Azores. In 1585 and 1588 the regiment was recruited by the League. In 1585 des Buaz was persuaded by his cousin, Jean d'Hémery-Villiers, to join the League. Villiers himself advanced the cash in order to facilitate recruitment.<sup>39</sup> The regiment, raised locally and 800 men strong, was a French mercenary unit prepared to serve anyone willing to pay. The des Buaz had many fiefs in lower Normandy and were originally from the region of Falaise. In 1585 Vallée was a sergeant in the company of the sieur des Noyers and by 1588 had risen to the post of ensign in one of the other companies. The regiment was large and consisted of multiple and separately raised companies. It was thus constituted by a system of subcontraction - a commission was handed from Brissac to des Buaz, he in turn commissioning contacts and clients. Des Buaz was a small time military contractor and veteran soldier, but his links with the League hierarchy meant that he was more than a mere mercenary and was therefore more trustworthy. Brissac had already used his services in the Azores, and his close links to ultramontaniam suggest that his service in Flanders was under d'Elbeuf. The father of Adrien des Buaz, Nicholas (d.c.1586),

---

<sup>35</sup> Ibid.

<sup>36</sup> Ibid.

<sup>37</sup> The deposition is to be found in ADSM, G, 2176, fols 307-11. Some of it has already been printed, see Floquet, *Histoire du privilège de Saint-Romain*, I, pp 378-80, II, pp 439-40

<sup>38</sup> Vallée's social status was undoubtedly lower than he claimed but shows how easy it was to enter the ranks of the lowest stratum of the nobility.

<sup>39</sup> Villiers had served under François de Guise in 1562, joining the League in 1585 because he had been replaced by d'O as captain of Caen. In 1588 he sided with the royalists in gratitude for a remission for murder granted to him by Henri III, see D. B. F. XVII, pp 889-90.

had been captain of Toucques; one uncle had been *receveur-général* in the *généralité* of Caen and another uncle, René, had been vicar-general of the cardinal de Bourbon and a leading member of the ultra-catholic faction in Rouen in the 1550s and 1560s.<sup>40</sup> Moreover, Adrien had ties with other adherents of the League and particularly with the Longchamps family. Guy de Longchamps, governor of Lisieux, acted as the *procureur* of Adrien in a financial transaction in 1566, and in 1574 Adrien was present at the marriage treaty of Longchamps' daughter and paid the dowry of 2,000.<sup>41</sup> In 1561 Nicole de Buaz, sister of Adrien, married Philippe de Montaigu (d.1612), a former *conseiller* of the duc d'Anjou at the *échiquier* of Alençon and later a member of the League rump parlement in 1589.<sup>42</sup> Such marriage links were the very bonds of the League.

Brissac was governor of Angers, and d'Elbeuf soon moved to join him with his Norman troops (in mid-May he was at Alençon). The League forces operated with impunity since the neutralism of the local nobility rendered royal orders impotent. Jacques Le Veneur, comte de Tillières, moved no further into lower Normandy than Bernay, where he complained of his lack of supplies and money.<sup>43</sup> By mid-June the League force at Angers was reported to number 3,500 men and the duc de Joyeuse was sent down the Loire valley to combat this threat, resulting in a skirmish near Beaugency at which the royalists had the advantage.<sup>44</sup>

Peace was signed between the leaguers and the king at Nemours on 7 July 1585, where Henri swore to uphold the religious clauses of the League covenant and pay for a new war against the Huguenots.<sup>45</sup> The Guise were also allocated troops paid for by the crown and given towns as surety, but Henri made great efforts to retain control of the crucial provinces of Picardy and Normandy. During the peace negotiations d'Aumale had demanded the governorships of Péronne, Ham, Montdidier, Corbie, Roye and Montreuil; in the event he had to be satisfied with Rue. The duc d'Elbeuf became the first member of his branch of the family to become a governor when he was appointed to the Bourbonnais, a move which advantageously kept him away from Normandy.<sup>46</sup>

---

<sup>40</sup> See chapters three and four above.

<sup>41</sup> AD SM, Tabellionage, 2E1, 332, 22 June 1566; 2E1, 348, 26 June 1574.

<sup>42</sup> Frondeville, *Conseillers*, pp 443-4.

<sup>43</sup> BN, Ms Fr, 3408, fo 77, Tillières to Henri III, Bernay, 8 April 1585.

<sup>44</sup> *Négociations diplomatiques de la France avec la Toscane*, IV, p 580; L'Estoile, *Journal du règne de Henri III*, p 382.

<sup>45</sup> These negotiations led by the queen mother had been in progress since April and the strategy of the princes was not to defeat the royalists in open battle but use revolt as a bargaining counter in these talks. A peace accord was reached as Guise and his Champenois forces reached Montargis on 20 June, see Bouillé, III, pp 151-7. The royal capitulation seems to have been due to the inevitability of Guise and d'Elbeuf joining forces on the Loire.

<sup>46</sup> Compare the demands made by Guise on the 2 June and what he actually received. He, Mayenne and Mercoeur received the best settlement, see Bouillé, III, pp 151, 155-6.

The history of Henri III's attempts to undermine the League is familiar. First, the army sent against the Huguenots in Guyenne under Mayenne was ill-supplied and ended in failure. In 1587 a new army was more lavishly equipped under Joyeuse and sent against Navarre, while the duc de Guise was left without resources and <sup>with</sup> the certainty of defeat against Navarre's German mercenary reinforcements.<sup>47</sup> In Normandy Caen was assured when, in return for his re-entry to the *conseil du roi* and elevation as a *chevalier du Saint-Esprit*, François d'O handed over the command of the town to another Languedocien client of Joyeuse, Gaspard de Pelet, sieur de La Véruine.<sup>48</sup> D'O was also made lieutenant-general in Normandy which was a direct threat to the authority of the existing royal *officiers* of this rank. Normandy was in political turmoil and, despite the existence of a holy war against the protestants, religious divisions are not an accurate indication of the complexion of the opposing factions. For example, it was difficult to pursue Calvinist troops when "une bonne partie d'entreulx se sont refuggiez avec leurs chevaulx et armes en maisons de leurs parens et amys catholiques".<sup>49</sup> The problems of peasant revolt and the depredations of the soldiery were compounded by the suspicions of the provincial elite. Fear of royal power in the shape of Joyeuse's clients galvanised royal *officiers* into open defiance of the crown. Jean de Moy, not for the first time, refused to allow his company of the *ordonnance* to leave his *gouvernement*.<sup>50</sup> The most serious opposition arose over the creation of d'O as lieutenant-general. In February 1586 Henri wrote to Tanneguy Le Veneur, sieur de Carrouges, having been warned that "vous faictes amas et assembler de voz amis, pour empescher et vous opposer aud. sieur d'O", and Henri had to promise that he would not diminish Carrouges' authority "sans recompense".<sup>51</sup> Catherine de Médicis had to inform both him and Pierrecourt that the decision to elevate d'O was not hers and that she would do nothing prejudicial to their honour.<sup>52</sup> It seems at this stage that Henri made an attempt to divide the Moy and the Le Veneur families, a policy he was to revive two years later.<sup>53</sup> On 27 February he wrote a similar letter to Pierrecourt which was more curt than that sent to Carrouges and which made no mention of any recompense.<sup>54</sup> In July 1586 Jean de Moy was

---

<sup>47</sup> Chevallier, *Henri III*, pp 602-10.

<sup>48</sup> L'Estoile, *Journal du règne de Henri III*, p 441; Chevallier, *Henri III*, p 442

<sup>49</sup> BN, Ms Fr, 3309, fo 77, Henri III to Carrouges, Paris, 18 November 1585.

<sup>50</sup> BN, Ms Fr, 15571, fo 148, Moy to Henri III, Rouen, 6 December 1585. Villars had already refused his brother entry to Le Havre.

<sup>51</sup> BN, Ms Fr, 3310, fo 48, Henri III to Carrouges, Paris, 27 February, 1586.

<sup>52</sup> *Lettres de Catherine de Médicis*, IX, pp 6-7.

<sup>53</sup> See below.

<sup>54</sup> BN, Ms Fr, 3310, fo 48, Henri III to Pierrecourt, Paris, 27 February 1586.

passed over for the command of a naval task force in favour of the governor of Dieppe, Aymard de Chatte.<sup>55</sup> Clearly Henri saw the Moy as a threat to his authority and too close to the Guise.

At the end of 1587 Henri's plans for victory against the protestants and the destruction of the Guise were in ruins. Joyeuse was defeated and killed by Navarre at Coutras in October and Guise went on to defeat the protestant German *reiter* army at Vimory and Auneau; the military prowess of the duc de Guise had reached new heights. Just as in 1575, he had managed to achieve these victories largely with the help of his own forces and those of his kinsmen. Having concluded peace at Nemours, Guise realised that the only way he could maintain his position of strength was to keep his army in the field. This was an expensive proposition and would only serve to alienate the population of his *gouvernement*. Thus the duke undertook a campaign on the borders of Champagne against the town of Jametz, which belonged to the Calvinist duc de Bouillon, and thus his army was able to quarter and provision itself. This was a successful ploy and he was able to turn down 20,000 *écus* offered him by the king to leave the region.<sup>56</sup> The army of the duc d'Aumale also remained in the field and he used the peace of Nemours to extend his control in Picardy. In March 1587 he seized Le Crotoy, Doullens and Pont-Remy, aided by veterans of 1576 like Antoine du Hamel, sieur de Belleglise and Jean de Rambures, in addition to long standing Guise clients like the governor of Montreuil, François des Essars, sieur de Maigneux.<sup>57</sup> These activities also ignited a feud between d'Aumale and d'Epernon. D'Aumale made an unsuccessful attack on Boulogne, of which d'Epernon was governor, killing one of d'Epernon's servants.<sup>58</sup> The *mignon* was even more furious when d'Aumale defeated troops that he had sent to reinforce Boulogne. According to L'Estoile it was the king, who believed that only subtle manoeuvring would defeat the League, that prevented the situation becoming critical.<sup>59</sup> For his part d'Aumale complained of a plot against him engineered by d'Epernon's lieutenant, when "deux des siens trouve en ma maison desguisez y estoient venus en intention de me tuer ainsi quil ont

---

<sup>55</sup> BN, Ms Fr, 3310, fo 81, Henri III to Moy, Saint Maur des Fosses, 3 July 1586. This despite Moy being vice-admiral and having been offered the command by Joyeuse.

<sup>56</sup> Bouillé, III, p 196.

<sup>57</sup> Bouillé, III, p 207; Prarond, *La Ligue à Abbeville*, I, pp 270-6. Abbeville was not inclined to let in d'Aumale, despite the fact that Pierre de Roncherolles was governor. Des Essars had married Charlotte du Hamel-Belleglise and had been ensign of Adrien de Tiercelin (1572-5), see R. Rodière, *Les Gouverneurs de Montreuil de la maison de Maigneux, 1581-1620*, Abbeville, 1900, pp 4-5; Vindry, p 230.

<sup>58</sup> The assassin was the sieur de Forceville, yet another veteran of 1576, see De Thou, X, p 640.

<sup>59</sup> L'Estoile, *Histoire du règne de Henri III*, pp 488, 490. The strategic importance of Boulogne must be remembered considering the recent execution of Mary Stuart and the sailing of the Spanish Armada.

confesse par leurs propres bouches".<sup>60</sup> Henri's only response was to appoint the duc de Nevers, who had initially flirted with the League, as governor of Picardy.<sup>61</sup>

As the duc de Guise began to prepare for the defence of the frontier in the summer of 1587, he could not count upon the assistance of the duc d'Aumale who was occupied in Picardy. The king offered the paltry sum of 12,000 *écus* and 10 companies of foot. However, the duke had maintained his army throughout the winter of 1586-7 and was now able to call on the help of his *amis* and clients.<sup>62</sup> The nucleus already contained some relatives, such as the chevalier d'Aumale and Louis de Moy, comte de Chaligny.<sup>63</sup> Also present were long-serving clients of the Guise like Claude de Bauffremont, sieur de Sennecy, the comte de Randan-Rochefoucauld and Anne de Tiercelin, sieur de Sarcus.<sup>64</sup> The Norman contingent was led by the duc d'Elbeuf, which included the 150 men led by another veteran leaguer, Antoine de Bigars. D'Elbeuf also raised his own infantry regiment commanded by Claude de L'Isle (1552-98), sieur de Marivaux, formerly *chambellan* and captain of the duc d'Anjou's bodyguard, who had served alongside d'Elbeuf in Flanders.<sup>65</sup> The resounding defeat of the *reiters* raised the credit of the duc de Guise to new heights. Guise was furious when the Germans were accorded generous terms by the king to leave France and were escorted to the frontier. He also believed that some reward was due to him for his services and, since the duc de Joyeuse was dead, the offices of admiral and governor of Normandy were now vacant.<sup>66</sup> The governorship would only serve to increase the already extensive power wielded by the Guise in the province, while the king's power base would have been effectively confined to the Ile-de-France. Henri therefore made d'Epemon governor of Normandy and admiral of France. The feud between d'Epemon and the duc d'Aumale intensified and two attempts on the life of the *mignon* were made in the early months of 1588.<sup>67</sup> In January 1588 the House of Lorraine gathered at Nancy to formulate its strategy. D'Aumale was to increase his efforts in Picardy, Guise to seize Sedan and Jametz, d'Elbeuf and Brissac were to raise Normandy against d'Epemon. It also seems that intelligence and contacts with urban sympathisers

---

<sup>60</sup> BN, V<sup>c</sup> Col, 10, fo 197, d'Aumale to Henri III, Aumale, 21 August 1587.

<sup>61</sup> Prarond, *La Ligue à Abbeville*, I, p 280.

<sup>62</sup> On the composition of the army and the campaign, see Bouillé, III, pp 221-38.

<sup>63</sup> Henri de Lorraine, comte de Chaligny, was the younger brother of the duc de Mercoeur. In 1585 he married Claude de Moy (1572-1627), she was the only surviving child of Charles, baron de Moy. Her engagement to the duc d'Epemon had been called off at the last moment, infuriating the Moy family, see Rodière and Vallée, *La maison de Moy*, p 61.

<sup>64</sup> BN, Dossiers Bleus, 634, fo 29.

<sup>65</sup> Vindry, p 348.

<sup>66</sup> Constant, *Les Guises*, pp 163-4.

<sup>67</sup> Chevallier, *Henri III*, p 618; L'Estoile, *Journal du règne de Henri III*, p 545.

were to be strengthened.<sup>68</sup> The duc d'Aumale and his lieutenant, Rambures, undertook secret negotiations with the pro-Guise faction in Abbeville. When d'Aumale seized a suburb of Abbeville, to prevent the entry of a royal garrison "et empescher que les Gascons que y vouloit mettre monsieur d'Epernon n'y entrassent", the governor, Roncherolles, and other leaguers prevented the town cannon being fired but opinion was hopelessly divided and the majority was against a garrison, whichever side it represented.<sup>69</sup>

Considering events in Paris and Abbeville it is likely that the same process was going on in Normandy. On 26 April d'Epernon left Paris to take possession of his *gouvernement*, entering Rouen on 3 May. He left with a small army in case he would have to do this by force - four companies of *ordonnance* and 22 *enseignes* of foot.<sup>70</sup> These preparations were necessary because the duc d'Elbeuf had been recruiting in Normandy for over a month. This time he had no obvious base but he had the confidence to raise his standard at his château of Harcourt, just south of Rouen. According to d'Elbeuf's lieutenant, Antoine de Bigars, their forces numbered 5-6,000 foot and 6-700 horse.<sup>71</sup> The infantry consisted of the regiments of captain Perdriel, Jacques Le Conte, baron de Nonant, and Adrien des Buaz, sieur des Noyers. Other officers in the army can be deduced from the presence of Guise clients raising money in Rouen at the same time as the duc d'Elbeuf. He sent agents into the city on 9 May 1588 to arrange for the sale of 600 *écus* of *rente*.<sup>72</sup> This would have provided a good opportunity for the duke to make contact with sympathisers in Rouen, and he was certainly in communication with the cathedral chapter at this time.<sup>73</sup> Others selling *rentes* in Rouen and possible officers in the rebel army included Anne de Tiercelin, sieur de Possé, and Philippe de Tiercelin, sieur de la Ferté-Villeneuve.<sup>74</sup> Louis de La Menardière, sieur de Cuverville, was present in Rouen on the last day of April. His family furnished

---

<sup>68</sup> This was the case in Paris in March and April, see Barnavi, *Le parti de Dieu*, pp 76, 119. The spy Poulain informed the council of the planned insurrection in Paris on 26 April, following which d'Epernon counselled the death of Guise. Poulain's testimony must be used with caution; there were contacts between the Guise and the Sixteen but the Day of the Barricades had little to do with this conspiracy. It was a spontaneous mass action against the introduction of troops into Paris, see Descimon, "La Ligue à Paris (1585-94) : une révision". Poulain's testimony is to be found in Cimber and Danjou, XI, p 290.

<sup>69</sup> Prarond, *La Ligue à Abbeville*, I, pp 311-40.

<sup>70</sup> L'Estoile, *Journal du règne de Henri III*, p 548.

<sup>71</sup> *Mémoires d'Antoine de Bigars, sieur de La Londe*, Société de l'histoire de Normandie, Mélanges, 5th ser., Rouen and Paris, 1898, p 18. The figures are almost certainly an exaggeration.

<sup>72</sup> ADSM, Tabellionage, 2<sup>ème</sup> Héritage, 2E1, 2005, 9 May 1588.

<sup>73</sup> ADSM, G, 2176, 9 March 1588. A present of bread and wine was voted and deputies dispatched to the duke ostensibly to discuss "le proces des alluvions de la seigneurie de petit ville".

<sup>74</sup> ADSM, Tabellionage, 2<sup>ème</sup> Héritage, 2E1, 2005, 27 April 1588, 9 May 1588.

several long-serving clients of the Guise.<sup>75</sup> Robert de La Menardière (d.1622), cousin of Louis, tried to establish the Jesuits in Caen and left his priory of Sainte-Barbe-en-Auge to the Society; he was a representative at the leaguer Estates in 1593. Another relative, Hugues, would die fighting at the battle of Ivry in 1590.<sup>76</sup> Another problem for monarchical authority was that royal *officiers* were also compromised by the revolt. D'Epemon wrote to Hervé de Longuanay, lieutenant-general, to prevent the gathering forces and wrote again a few days later to inform his subordinate that his son, Antoine de Longuanay, was one of the rebels, and indeed Antoine was also present in Rouen borrowing money.<sup>77</sup> Nothing was done to attack the rebel army and similar letters written by the king ordering the intervention of Carrouges and the Moy went unheeded.<sup>78</sup> Nevertheless, the elite of the Norman nobility did not fail to turn up to the *joyeuse entrée* of the new governor on 3 May.<sup>79</sup> Thus in the first days of May the capital of Normandy was swarming with noblemen, including large contingents of leaguers and the retinue of their indomitable foe, d'Epemon.

The League was not yet the popular movement it became in early 1588; it was still dominated by a few activists. Revolt was confined to Guise clients and malcontent nobles, not 'the people'. The paralysis of royal government in Normandy occurred because, without the money to pay for a mercenary army, it relied on its provincial *officiers*. They often sympathised with the Guise and others were not inclined to chance their lives and fortunes when the risks involved were so great. On 12 May 1588 the population of Paris rose up in revolt in a fierce reaction to the entry of royal troops to the capital, a flagrant breach of the city's privileges.<sup>80</sup> The king was forced to flee to Chartres, leaving Paris in the hands of the Sixteen and the duc de Guise. Both sides now made great attempts to win the support of towns and royal *officiers* in the provinces. Most importantly this meant Normandy, and for the royalist cause this province now took on an immense strategic significance. During his sojourn in Normandy, d'Epemon made efforts to ensure the loyalty of the former clients of Joyeuse. In February an English agent reported from Dieppe that *premier président* Groulard had been dispatched to ensure the loyalty of Villars, governor of Le Havre. The same agent reported that La Meilleraye and Pierrecourt "both hold for the League".<sup>81</sup> This is not surprising given their relationship with the Guise and, although they did not openly join d'Elbeuf,

---

<sup>75</sup> See above chapter three above.

<sup>76</sup> Chenaye-Desbois, X, pp 609-10; BN, Dossiers Bleus, 442, fo 3.

<sup>77</sup> *Papiers de Hervé de Longuanay, Gouverneur de la Basse-Normandie (1575-1589)*, St. Lô, 1897, pp 19-20.

<sup>78</sup> BN, Ms Fr, 3394, fo 54, Henri III to Carrouges, Paris, 28 March 1588; fo 55, Henri III to Moy, Paris, 28 March 1588; fo 63, Henri III to Pierrecourt, Paris, 20 April 1588.

<sup>79</sup> ACR, A, 20, 3 May 1588.

<sup>80</sup> The argument of Descimon is followed here, although the organisation of the League and the vital participation of students and clerics from the left bank show that there were other factors involved besides the defence of the commonweal against royal 'absolutism'.

<sup>81</sup> *CSPF*, 1586-8, p 515.

their inactivity was a blow for the monarchy. Moreover, after the Day of the Barricades, they became more heavily implicated in the League because their cousins Louis de Moy, sieur de Gomméron and François de Moy, sieur de Richebourg, were Guise agents in Paris prior to the events of 12 May.<sup>82</sup>

Rouen itself remained neutral but the king could depend on the support of the *premier président* and he began to make big efforts to win over the Rouennais.<sup>83</sup> Taxes were abolished, offices suppressed and the unpopular d'Epemon replaced by a prince of the blood, the duc de Montpensier. The city Council of Twenty Four was eventually convinced by these gestures and the king was invited to the city, making his entry on 13 June 1588. Philip Benedict is rather generous in attributing much of this to Carrouges' loyalty. Davila, who was present at court, believed that both father and son "dépendoient en quelque façon du duc de Guise et de la ligue".<sup>84</sup> Carrouges, as lieutenant-general of the *bailliages* of Rouen and Evreux, had done little in terms of action to stop the League in the previous years. The king now bought his loyalty with the offer of a *brevet* for the office of *maréchal* when a vacancy arose. In the meantime he was accorded a pension of 3,333 *écus*.<sup>85</sup> He now began to argue with his son, the comte de Tillières, *bailli* of Rouen, who remained more closely tied to the Guise. In April 1588 an English agent had already reported that:

M. la Carewge, captain of Rouen, who serves the King, and his son, on the third of this month are fallen in great discord in the city, and [a] procession [has been] sung throughout the city upon the Guise's side, whose part M. de Carewge's son doth serve.<sup>86</sup>

This split in the family is confirmed in the memoirs of *premier président* Groulard, who noted that:

"le comte de Tillières ayant espousé la belle-soeur de M. d'Elboeuf, avoit secrettement, encore qu'il n'en fait semblable, faict profession de la ligue; de sorte qu'ayant entendu que le roy venoit à Rouen il se fascha fort."<sup>87</sup>

---

<sup>82</sup> De Thou, X, p 248.

<sup>83</sup> For this and following, see Benedict, *Rouen during the Wars of Religion*, pp 174-5.

<sup>84</sup> Quoted in C. de Robillard de Beaurepaire (ed), *Séjour de Henri III à Rouen*, Société des Bibliophiles Normands, Rouen, 1870, p xxiv.

<sup>85</sup> AN, M, 458, Le Veneur, July 1588.

<sup>86</sup> *CSPF*, 1586-8, p 589. The procession probably refers to either a penitential procession or a thanksgiving for the victory at Auneau.

<sup>87</sup> Claude Groulard, *Mémoires*, Michaud and Poujoulat, 1st ser., XI, p 554.



If he had originally opposed the coming of the king, his reservations were eased with a royal gift of 15,000 *écus*.<sup>88</sup> Elsewhere in Normandy Jacques-Auguste de Thou was dispatched by Henri, when the court was still at Chartres, to gauge the mood of local notables and ensure the loyalty of royal *officiers*.<sup>89</sup> Pierrecourt was at the court and advised de Thou on his itinerary. The royal emissary first went to Evreux where the bishop, Claude de Saintes, was a leaguer. He then headed off to Rouen, where he gave an address to the parlement and the *échevins*, and then to Dieppe which, with its strong reformed community, was fiercely against the Guise. At Le Havre the governor, Villars, had already been won over by the Parisians with 30,000 *écus* and de Thou received a cold welcome. At Lisieux, Jean de Longchamps also supported the League - his father, who had been the previous governor, had owed his position to the duc d'Aumale and the family was close to the ultramontane des Buaz. At Caen, de Thou received a warm welcome and he finally journeyed to La Meilleraye for discussions with the Moy family, which gave nothing away except its surprise at the position of Villars and suspicion of his ambition.

The delicate discussions with Rouen paid off and the king was able to enter the city on 10 June, staying until 21 July. Although Rouen had been lost the League could count on the neutrality of the Moy and the comte de Tillières, as well as the adherence of Lisieux and Le Havre. Moreover, the king's sojourn in Normandy did not go unopposed. As soon as he entered Rouen the duc d'Elbeuf went off to Paris for talks with the duc de Guise, leaving his wife, Marguerite de Chabot, to oversee the conduct of his lieutenants. The army was large enough not to have to withdraw with the royal retinue so close, and there were a number of skirmishes with the royal *garde du corps*.<sup>90</sup>

The problem of allegiance is clearly shown in the case of the deposition of Valentine de Vallée for remission for murder. According to this testimony his captain, Adrien de Buaz, was persuaded to join the League in 1585 by a relative, Jean d'Hémery-Villiers. By 1588 Villiers was a royalist, he was made a *maître des requêtes*, was part of the fugitive court and was a leading figure in the king's negotiations with the Rouennais.<sup>91</sup> In the summer of 1588, after Henri had made his peace with the League and agreed to abide by the terms of the edict of Union, des Buaz and Villiers met by chance (at least according to the testimony) at a tavern near Argentan.<sup>92</sup> In the ensuing argument Vallée, while protecting his master, killed Villiers. The story had a bizarre ending because the duc de Mayenne and the comte de Brissac both wrote to the cathedral chapter of Rouen supporting opposing sides. Each used religion as the central foundation of their argument;

---

<sup>88</sup> Beaurepaire (ed), *Séjour de Henri III à Rouen*, pp xxxiv, xxxix

<sup>89</sup> For this and following, see De Thou, X, pp 305-10; *Mémoires de Jacques-Auguste de Thou, depuis 1553 jusqu'en 1601*, Michaud and Poujoulat, 1st ser., X, pp 326-7.

<sup>90</sup> *Mémoires d'Antoine de Bigars*, p 18.

<sup>91</sup> Beaurepaire (ed), *Séjour de Henri III à Rouen*, pp xxiv-v

<sup>92</sup> Villiers was killed between July and October 1588 and therefore the d'Hémery-Villiers still alive in 1589, referred to in D. B. F, XVII, p 890, must be a relative.

Mayenne pleaded against clemency for des Buaz and Vallée, offered under the *privilège* of Saint-Romain, thus:

Messieurs Je croy que vous n'ignorez point ny la facon de laquelle a esté assassiné le feu sieur de Villiers ny la condition de ceux qui ont commis ceste meschanetté lesquelz encores quilz feussent ses nepveuz sont toutefois recogneuz pour huguenots...Vostre privilege est trop saint et sacré pour estre mis en mains de personnes tant indignes et si contraires a nostre religion...empeschez que ses huguenotz jouissent le privilege de leglise dont ils ne sont pas.<sup>93</sup>

The favourable letter written by the comte de Brissac is completely different:

Jay tousjours recommande le sieur des Noyers [des Buaz] tres zelé a nostre religion...Il mayant assisté en plusieurs expeditions...contre les ennemys de la foi.<sup>94</sup>

These letters were written in a highly stylised way in order to appeal to the deepest religious prejudices of the canons of the cathedral. The support of Mayenne for the condemnation was because Villiers' brother was one of his servants, but the argument of the duke seemed so dubious and ill-considered that Brissac's letter was successful. Apart from the complexities of personal relationships in this case it is evident that Mayenne, future leader of the League, was capable of trying to manipulate religious emotions, often in the crudest and most cynical manner. He was certainly not unique in pursuing such a strategy for his own ends.

### The Guise and Popular Revolt In Normandy

The historian has to be careful when considering terms like 'popular support' since the relationship between elite and popular politics is ambiguous.<sup>95</sup> One historian has suggested that the Day of the Barricades in May 1588 was another piece of the jigsaw of the master diplomacy of Philip II.<sup>96</sup>

---

<sup>93</sup> ADSM, G, 3498, 24 May 1589. The inventory of the Archives Départementales wrongly attributes this letter to the duc d'Elbeuf and the date of the letter was 1589 and not 1588, see Floquet, *Histoire du privilège de Saint-Romain*, I, pp 378-9, II, 439-40.

<sup>94</sup> ADSM, G, 3498, Brissac to the cathedral chapter, Argentan, 1589.

<sup>95</sup> By popular here I mean the *menu peuple* and not the wider political class.

<sup>96</sup> D. L. Jensen, *Diplomacy and dogmatism: Bernardino de Mendoza and the French Catholic League*, Cambridge Mass., 1964, pp 131-52. In fact the popular vitality of the Catholic League made Guise less dependant on Spain and his effectiveness was not seriously damaged by the defeat of the Armada. Conversely the defeat of the Armada made it imperative for Philip to maintain his alliance with the Guise.

Certainly in early 1588 Philip II gave Henri de Guise 300,000 *escudos* with orders to attempt something to occupy France while the Armada sailed. This reasoning overestimates the control exercised by Spanish agents on both the Guise and the Parisian masses. The Guise were not as 'popular' in Paris during the Wars of Religion as conventional wisdom suggests, although the Guise had their clients and supporters.<sup>97</sup> The Saint Bartholomew's Day Massacre and the Day of the Barricades were events in which the Guise participated but which they did not control. Robert Descimon has shown how the Sixteen were only a faction within the League and were not its leaders.<sup>98</sup> Thus the Guise and their clients represented one strand of ultra-catholicism and the resurgence of popular piety in the 1580s could benefit the Guise but only in the sense of creating a climate of opinion in which they could operate; popular forces were autonomous from the control of elites. A shrewd politician could however exploit and capitalise on popular anger.

The image of the duc de Guise as military hero, which became a legend after his murder in 1588, was popularised in pamphlets and iconography.<sup>99</sup> This image was disseminated in the provinces and was neither simply based in Paris nor the work of private individuals. The town of Rouen had a commemorative *jeton* struck in honour of the duke's victory at Auneau in November 1587. The medal had the legend "Civitas Rothomagensis" and on the reverse an eagle was portrayed ready to tear its prey apart with the device "Lartifice est detruict par la vertu."<sup>100</sup> Considering the events of Guise's struggle against the *mignons*, the symbolic nature of these words would have been clear to all.

The origins of the peasant disturbances in Normandy had nothing to do with the political struggles of the Guise family but show the way in which such revolts could be exploited for sectional interest. The raising of troops by d'Anjou and the increased fiscal burdens on the peasantry had made life intolerable by the mid-1580s. As royal government became paralysed in the rest of France, so it became increasingly important to maximise the revenues of Normandy. The war against the Huguenots in 1586-7 saw the imposition of new levies and a variety of fiscal expedients; tax collectors had to resort more frequently to violence in order to fulfil their quotas. This burden was made worse by economic slump and harvest failure: in 1587 there was a subsistence crisis.<sup>101</sup> After the edict of Nemours in July 1585 the disbanded troops of the League

---

<sup>97</sup> The traditional view is elaborated in Jensen, *Dogmatism and diplomacy*, p 224, believing that the Spanish ambassador, Mendoza, was able to "guide the strategy of the Council of Sixteen, and with it much of the League, in accordance with the desires and plans of the king of Spain".

<sup>98</sup> Descimon, *Qui étaient les Seize ?*, especially p 66.

<sup>99</sup> An example being "Sommaire Discours De Toutes Des Deffaictes Des Reistres", printed in Cimber and Danjou, XI, pp 266-75.

<sup>100</sup> BN, Clair, 1204, fo 123.

<sup>101</sup> Benedict, *Rouen during the Wars of Religion*, pp 172-4.

became a serious menace in lower Normandy.<sup>102</sup> At a very early stage the king was aware that the peasantry was well organized, as he wrote to his lieutenant-general, Longuanay in October 1586:

ung nombre de villaiges et paroisses de Normandie, dont plusieurs sont dedans le destroict du gouvernement de la Basse Normandie, soubz umbre qu'ilz se plaignent d'estre quelques foys travaillez du tenement de champs des gens de guerre, se font unys ensemble pour avoir une commune intelligence et s'entre secourir les ungs les autres, à l'encontre des dictes troupes de gens de guerre...et s'opposer a eulx de toutes leurs forces et moiens.<sup>103</sup>

This peasant revolt was termed the revolt of the *gautiers* because it supposedly began in the village of Chapelle-Gauthier, about five kilometres south of Orbec. The revolt was geographically centred on the region around Orbec and Vimoutiers. This region is not one of productive farmland but is wooded and hilly *bocage* country characterised by dispersed settlement - a poor and backward region of Normandy.<sup>104</sup> Its position at the epicentre of revolt was due to the passage of troops to and from upper Normandy and the fact that as a poorer region it was less able to support the increased tax burden.<sup>105</sup> Obviously certain *élections* were better at avoiding taxation than others as can be seen in records of the *bureau des finances*, and money simply could not be raised to pay troops because of the poverty of certain districts.<sup>106</sup> Unpaid troops were therefore forced to live off the land, further exacerbating the problem. The activities of the League soldiery are illuminated by the testimony of Valentine de Vallée:

Estant aux troupes du capitaine Thomas, voulant passer par Orbec, les habitantz féirent résistance, où il y en eut quelques-ungs des ditz habitans, jusques au nombre de trois ou quatre, de tuéz.<sup>107</sup>

In July 1588 the peasants were better organised, as the troops of the sieur des Noyers:

---

<sup>102</sup> BN, Ms Fr, 3309, fo 15, Henri III to the parlement of Rouen, Limours, 3 August 1585; fo 20, Henri III to Carrouges, Paris, 10 August 1585.

<sup>103</sup> *Papiers de Hervé de Longuanay*, p 14.

<sup>104</sup> A. Frémont, *Atlas et géographie de la Normandie*, Paris, 1977, pp 184-5, 193; Nicholls, "The Origins of Protestantism in Normandy", pp 23-5.

<sup>105</sup> There is some evidence to suggest that the *généralité* of Caen was overtaxed by the provincial estates compared to Rouen; for the complaint of the *trésorier-général* of Caen in 1579, see BN, Ms Fr, 15905, fo 33, Novince to Bellièvre, Caen, 15 March 1579.

<sup>106</sup> See for example ADSM, C, 1116, fos 20, 56-7, 137.

<sup>107</sup> Floquet, *Histoire du privilège de Saint-Romain*, II, p 439.

passant par un village nommé la petite haye il [Vallée] feu poursuivi par plusieurs paisantz estantz du nombre de quatre ou cinq mil qui voudroient deffaire led. sieur des Noyers et ses troupes lequel ayant été poursuivy prez de huit ou neuf lieux et que tousjours le nombre desd. paisantz croissoit ne taschant a l'encercler pour faire un carnage de lui et des siens feu contraint par leur importunite de se mectre en deffence dont y en eu quelques uns tuez et blessez et n'en ne peut dire le nombre.<sup>108</sup>

In March 1588 Longuanay was ordered to arrest the ringleaders of the resistance movement with "prompte justice et pugnacion".<sup>109</sup> However, political events in Paris ended any hope of firm government, and anarchy continued to prevail in lower Normandy, as was recognised by secretary of state Brulart in July:

L'affaire le plus urgent en Normandie, c'est de rompre les troupes de M. d'Elbeuf, dont si le plus estoit nettoyé, 'le peuple qui en a souffert infiny dommaige n'en appellerait pas'.<sup>110</sup>

The revolt was eclipsed by the turbulent events of 1588 and the *gautiers* next appear in the texts in April 1589. By this time both the duc and cardinal de Guise had been murdered at Blois and the League had seized control of Rouen. Falaise also held firm for the League and was now directly threatened by the royalist army under the duc de Montpensier, who invested the town on 20 April.<sup>111</sup>

The comte de Brissac resolved to relieve the town. To this end he was able to join forces with the *gautiers*. How this was achieved is not clear, especially since it was his troops who had been among the worst pillagers of lower Normandy, but two reasons are feasible. First, the *gautiers* were motivated partially by religion as they were supported by their own priests and clerics from the episcopal town of Sées, and it is important to note that the royalist army included prominent local Huguenots like the comte de Montgommery.<sup>112</sup> The second clue to the allegiance of the *gautiers* seems to lie in the fact that, having originally been a popular defensive force, they were now led by the lesser nobility of the region, who were sympathetic to the League. Brissac was desperate for reinforcements because he had only 300 cavalry at his disposal while Montpensier

---

<sup>108</sup> ADSM, G, 2176, fos 307-11.

<sup>109</sup> BN, Ms Fr, 3394, fo 53, Henri III to Longuanay, Paris, 19 March 1588.

<sup>110</sup> *Papiers de Hervé de Longuanay*, p 20.

<sup>111</sup> R. d'Estaintot, *La Ligue en Normandie*, Paris, 1862, p 21.

<sup>112</sup> For this and following, see Davila, *Historie of the Civill Warres*, pp 748-9.

had 4,000 men. De Thou claimed that the *gautiers* brought him 5,000 peasants.<sup>113</sup> Brissac had prominent leaguers with him like Jacques de Moy, sieur de Pierrecourt, and Jean de Longchamp, governor of Lisieux; he could also count on a number of the local *petite noblesse*: the sieurs de Beaulieu, de Mailloc, de Tubeuf, de Roquenal and d'Effauchour.<sup>114</sup> It was these men who seem to have led the peasants into battle. Having advanced towards Falaise the League army was attacked and crushed in a defensive position at the village of Pierrefite. Brissac retired to Argentan and left the peasantry to its fate. Montpensier began a mopping-up operation, smashing the association and seizing Bernay, Vimoutiers and the fortified village of Chapelle-Gauthier itself. Unlike the local lesser nobility, Brissac never seems to have taken part in the fight at Pierrefite. A number of these men were captured at Pierrefite and in subsequent skirmishes.<sup>115</sup> It is important to differentiate between these local men and the League forces led by Brissac, Pierrecourt and Longchamps. Little is known about these lesser nobles except that they were landholders in the region of *gautier* resistance. Hamon, baron de Mailloc, remained in the League and fought to defend Rouen in 1592. The baron d'Echauffour was Félix Le Gris (or his descendant), *guidon* of the company of the *bailli* of Alençon in 1567.<sup>116</sup> François de La Vigne, baron de Tubeuf, had been the *guidon* of the *ordonnance* of the sieur de Carrouges (1565-7) and Pierre de La Vigne was *bailli* of Mortain in 1568.<sup>117</sup> The arming of the peasantry was not uncommon. It had happened in 1562, and in 1585 the provincial Estates complained that in the *vicomté* of Caen:

Loys du Touchet, sieur de Beneauville,...combien qu'il n'ait auctorité ny commission de ce faire, contraint les gens du pays d'achapter et avoir armes, faisant faire monstre de six sepmaines en six sepmaines, combien qu'il ne soit nécessaire: et sous couleur, ledit du Touchet fait encourir au pauvre peuple de grands fraiz, peines et travaux.<sup>118</sup>

---

<sup>113</sup> De Thou, X, p 601.

<sup>114</sup> Floquet, III, p 241.

<sup>115</sup> Palma Cayet, *Chronologie Novenaire*, Michaud and Poujoulat, 1st ser., XII, p 126; L. Boivin-Champeaux, *Bernay et La Ligue*, Bernay, 1889, pp 13-20.

<sup>116</sup> Vindry, p 375; BN, PO, 1413, fo 6. Félix may well have formerly been a protestant since the captain of the company in which he had served, Jacques de Renty, was a former lieutenant of the company of the king of Navarre. Félix was also the nephew of Jacques du Merle, lieutenant of the comte de Tillières from 1581 to 1587.

<sup>117</sup> Vindry, p 501; BN, PO, 2994, fo 5; BN, Dossiers Bleus, 668, fo 1. François married Jacqueline Le Moyne, making him a relative of prominent ultra-catholic Martin du Bosc, who had married Isabeau Le Moyne in 1571.

<sup>118</sup> *Cahiers des Etats de Normandie sous le règne de Henri III*, II p 131.

This report confirms the involvement of Guise clients in the peasant resistance movement. Louis II de Touchet, sieur de Bénéauville, was the nephew of Nicholas d'Osmont, a Guise household servant in the 1550s. In 1580 Louis married Marie de L'Estendart, granddaughter of Adrien d'Humières. Witnesses to the marriage contract included senior adherents of the Catholic League. Jean V, baron de Vieuxpont, at that time an archer in the company of the marquis d'Elbeuf, was present. He was accompanied by Anne du Sart, former lieutenant of Philippe de Roncherolles and relative of Robert du Sart, man-at-arms of the duc d'Aumale (1565-9) and the marquis d'Elbeuf (1573).<sup>119</sup> There seems to have been a desire to defend the locality against further incursions of troops and the small force of Brissac was not as much of a threat as the armed strength of the duc de Montpensier. This defensive mentality was reinforced by a genuine desire to uphold catholicism. The motives of another *gautier* leader are more easy to distinguish. Jacques Le Conte, baron de Nonant, had previously been an officer in the army of the duc d'Elbeuf. His mother, uncles and aunts were all protestants and, after the death of his father in 1581, his mother erected a chapel in the barony. Huguenots came to worship from all over the *bailliage* of Alençon which only caused disturbances and conflict, no chapel having stood there before, and soon the:

gendarmes du roi ou du duc d'Alençon [d'Anjou] vinrent bien à Nonant pour rétablir l'ordre, mais leur rôle semble d'être borné à lever impôts et à pratiquer les requisitions.<sup>120</sup>

Losses caused by the protestants and the soldiery amounted to 10,000/. The adherence of the baron to the League can be seen only in the light of the despair at the breakdown of order and the reign of anarchy - religion seems to have been a contributory rather than a decisive factor.

According to de Thou, the resistance of the *gautiers* had been broken forever by the duc de Montpensier.<sup>121</sup> However, when the duc de Mayenne arrived in the region during the following month there were still peasants under arms eager to join him.<sup>122</sup> By 1590 the captain of Essay, Jean Malard, sieur de La Motte, was leading a peasant force known as the *Lipans* who operated in the region of Domfront, Bellême and Sééz.<sup>123</sup> The *gautiers* posed no military threat to royalist

---

<sup>119</sup> Courtaux, *Histoire généalogique de la maison de Touchet*, pp 45-9.

<sup>120</sup> C. Vérel, *Le marquisat de Nonant*, Alençon, 1908, p 46, see also "Une paroisse rural du duché d'Alençon: Saint-Germain de Clairfeuille", *Bulletin de la société, historique et archéologique de l'Orne*, 1893, pp 297-8.

<sup>121</sup> De Thou, X, p 603.

<sup>122</sup> BN, Ms Fr, 23296, fo 22.

<sup>123</sup> M. Odolant-Desnos, *Mémoires historiques sur la ville d'Alençon et sur ses seigneurs*, 2 vols, Alençon, 1787, vol II, p 353. Other groups were known as *Francs-Museaux* and *Châteaux-Verts*, see Salmon, *Society in Crisis*, p 279.

dominance in lower Normandy but their presence made collecting taxes difficult. In 1594 "la recette des tailles de l'Election de Bernay n'a pu se faire à cause de la revolte des gaultiers".<sup>124</sup>

In urban areas increased religious fervour was certainly a major factor in the success of the League.<sup>125</sup> It is also clear that on the one hand there was spontaneous action by the masses, exemplified by the Day of the Barricades, and on the other hand there was a group of highly organised and committed leaguers among the urban elites throughout France before 1589. Work done by Barnavi and Descimon on Paris has gone some way to explaining relationships between the Guise, the activists and the masses. As early as 1585 the Sixteen in Paris sent an envoy to Normandy.<sup>126</sup> There is no available evidence to show who were the activists in the province. Yet it is possible to build up a list of the clandestine supporters of the League, by investigating those involved in the coup of February 1589 and those who espoused leaguer sentiments and were opponents of royal policy at the provincial Estates and at the Estates-General of Blois in 1588.<sup>127</sup>

According to a memorandum from Carrouges to the king in April 1585, large sections of the town were suspected of being pro-League. The Council of Twenty Four remained loyal but the parlement, the clergy and the city's Spanish community were untrustworthy.<sup>128</sup> The accuracy of this report was confirmed when in July the edict of Nemours, proscribing protestantism, was greeted with joy by the populace and rapidly registered by the parlement.<sup>129</sup> However, the parlement was not prepared to register measures designed to pay for the war against the Huguenots and repeatedly blocked fiscal innovations presented to them by the king. In August 1587 the king wrote in the strongest terms to Carrouges after:

le premier president et conseillers fizet et pericard ayant me venir trouver pour me rendre raison dun arrest qui a donne par mad. court sur le fait de la reappreciacion...ne pouvant me contenter des remonstrances quilz mont envoyees sur larrest que jay dernièrement donne en ce fait avis quil soit son plain et entier effect, sans avoir aucun esgard a icelles, daultant quelles ne tendent a autre but

---

<sup>124</sup> C. de Robillard de Beaurepaire (ed), *Inventaire-Sommaire des Archives-Départementales de la Seine-Inférieure, antérieurs à 1790*, ser. C and D, Paris, 1864, vol I, p 197.

<sup>125</sup> Benedict, *Rouen during the Wars of Religion*, pp 190-208; Crouzet, *Les Guerriers de Dieu*, II, pp 361-450.

<sup>126</sup> Benedict, *Rouen during The Wars of Religion*, p 167.

<sup>127</sup> Because of the lack of evidence Benedict concludes that little of certainty can be established about the League before 1589, see *Rouen during the Wars of Religion*, p 168.

<sup>128</sup> BN, Ms Fr, 3358, fo 42, discussed in Benedict, *Rouen during The Wars of Religion*, p 171.

<sup>129</sup> Floquet, III, p 230.



de monstrez quilz sont jaloux de la conservacion de leurs autorité aux despens et diminution de la mienne.<sup>130</sup>

As the most senior magistrate in the parlement the *premier président*, Groulard, could have expected to be in this deputation. His fellow emissaries were opponents to royal policies within the parlement. *Conseillers* Jacques Fizet and Guillaume Péricard sat in the rump League parlement at Rouen after 1589. Indeed Péricard was a leading member of the League hierarchy. His commitment to the church was unquestionable since he was abbot of Saint-Taurin and *grand chantre* of the cathedral of Rouen. He was one of those who counselled the cardinal de Bourbon to join the League.<sup>131</sup> The relationship between the Péricard and the Guise was close and has been discussed at length above. Jean Péricard, elder brother of Guillaume, was the secretary of the duc de Guise and deeply involved in the affairs of the League. In January 1588 he was present in Rouen, at precisely the same time as the duc d'Elbeuf was organising a revolt in the province.<sup>132</sup> The League in Normandy was therefore closely associated with the Guise affinity.

Opposition to royal policies and the voicing of discontent can also be followed in representative assemblies. The *cahiers de doléances* of the provincial Estates became increasingly vociferous and at the Estates-General of Blois the king was surrounded by malcontents. The Norman Estates complained about the burdens of taxation, the excessive sales of venal office and the spiralling costs of justice.<sup>133</sup> Appendix G outlines those Guise clients and leaguers present at the Estates between 1584 and 1588. Families long associated with Guise service, such as the Vieuxpont, the Limoges, the Vipart and the Bigars, are prominent. Others had a long tradition of support for ultramontanism, like the Sécard and the Goutimesnil. A third group had once been in the household of the duc d'Anjou, such as Jacques du Bosc (d.1614), sieur de Coquéreaumont, and François de Cormeilles, sieur de Tendos.<sup>134</sup> These men took a leading role in the Estates; for example in 1585 Antoine de Bigars was elected to present the *cahier de doléances* to the king. Its first article offered congratulations on issuing the edict of Nemours and for ensuring the unity of the faith, but also urged him "garder, entretenir et inviolablement observer" its clauses.<sup>135</sup>

---

<sup>130</sup> BN, Ms Fr, 3394, fo 65, Henri III to Carrouges, August 1587.

<sup>131</sup> Saulnier, *Le rôle politique du cardinal de Bourbon*, p 97.

<sup>132</sup> ADSM, Tabellionage, 2<sup>ème</sup> Héritage, 2E1, 2003, 4 January 1588.

<sup>133</sup> Benedict, *Rouen during the Wars of Religion*, pp 162-3.

<sup>134</sup> Jacques du Bosc had been a *gentilhomme ordinaire* of the duc d'Anjou in 1578 and again in 1581. As the husband of Anne Jubert he was the beneficiary Jean Jubert, formerly *grand vicaire* of the abbey of Bec for the cardinal de Guise, see Frondeville, *Conseillers*, p 27; ADSM, Tabellionage, 2E1, 356, 2 June 1578; 2E1 364, 25 October 1581. François de Cormeilles was *gentilhomme ordinaire* of the duke in 1578 and captain of Fontaine-le-Bourg in 1586, see ADSM, Tabellionage, 2E1, 357, 12 July 1578; 2E1, 367, 10 October 1586.

<sup>135</sup> *Cahiers des Etats de Normandie sous le règne de Henri III*, II, pp 108, 303.

By 1588 criticism of the regime (although not directly aimed at the king) had become quite open. When the duc d'Epemon came to Rouen to take up his governorship, the usually honorific and formulaic address to the governor by the cathedral chapter was turned into an extraordinary attack on the duke by the *pénitencier* of the cathedral, Jean Dadré. Dadré's main concern was that the promise made in 1585 to combat heresy was being undermined by "politiques" and "machiavellistes". In the war against heresy Dadré placed the onus on d'Epemon:

"C'est à vous d'y remédier, si voulez faire l'office d'un bon Gouverneur. Vous en avez la puissance, pour avoir l'oreille, la faveur, le credit, le coeur et l'auctorité du Roy en main. Il ne reste que la bonne volonté, de laquelle vous ferez paroistre les effects quand vous voudrez."<sup>136</sup>

It was the complaint of the League and the Guise that the king had failed to do this. The edict of Union (July 1588) and the Estates-General of Blois were supposed to ensure that protestantism was crushed and that Henri of Navarre was excluded from the throne. There was intense competition at the elections for the Estates-General. In Picardy the duc d'Aumale exercised a preponderant influence over the elections and his client, Adrien de Tiercelin, was returned for the *bailliage* of Amiens.<sup>137</sup> The League also dominated elections in Normandy and the list of electors for the *bailliage* of Rouen still exists.<sup>138</sup> Of the twelve noblemen who appeared for the election at least two were in the Guise affinity. Martin du Bosc, sieur d'Emendreville, was a veteran of the catholic army in Normandy in 1562.<sup>139</sup> Barthélemy de Limoges was a client of the duc d'Aumale and the Vipart family, who stood in for Nicholas de Vipart at the provincial Estates of 1586. It is therefore no surprise that Nicholas de Vipart, baron de Becthomas, was elected to represent the *bailliage* at Blois. There were other electors who favoured a pro-Guise candidate. Jean de Gaillardbois came from a family who provided a number of men-at-arms for the duc d'Aumale, and likewise Claude de Hérès, sieur du Fay, another elector, since Adrien de Hérès had been an archer of the marquis d'Elbeuf in 1579.<sup>140</sup>

The representatives from Normandy were dominated by League leaders and Guise clients.<sup>141</sup> The cardinal de Bourbon exerted a great deal of influence and was himself elected for

---

<sup>136</sup> *Remonstrance Faicte A Monsieur d'Espemon, Entrant En l'Eglise Cathedrale de Rouen, le 3 de may 1588*, Rouen, 1588, pp 5-7.

<sup>137</sup> Orlea, *La Noblesse aux Etats généraux de 1576 et de 1588*, pp 98-9.

<sup>138</sup> ACR, A, 20, 27 July 1588.

<sup>139</sup> See chapter five above.

<sup>140</sup> See appendix E. François de Gaillardbois was a man-at-arms from 1575 until 1581 and Georges was an archer during the same period.

<sup>141</sup> *Recueil des pièces originales concernant la tenue des Etats Généraux*, IV, p 3.

the First Estate of Rouen, and another prominent clerical leaguer, Claude de Saintes, was returned at Evreux. Among the lesser clergy, two men, Jean de Vieuxpont (d.1612), abbot of Saint-Jean de Falaise, and Etienne de Vion, curé d'Auzebosc, had appeared recently at the provincial Estates. Vieuxpont was a cousin of the barons de Vieuxpont, major clients of the Guise, and his brother, Gabriel, was the ensign of the comte de Brissac.<sup>142</sup>

Although Caen was generally an area of royalism, a future League captain of Bayeux, Jean d'Escajeul (1520-93), sieur de La Bretonnière, was elected. He had fought for the catholics in Normandy in 1562 and had been lieutenant of the *ordonnance* company of Philippe de Roncherolles (1567-9). In the *bailliage* of Caux the comte de Brissac was preferred to the local candidate, Jean de Moy, who, according to a contemporary, "ayant fait choses qui estoient au mécontentement de tout le monde aux dites estates."<sup>143</sup> The Cotentin was represented by Charles Martel, sieur de l'Honneur de Montpinçon, nephew of Adrien, a future leader of the rump League parlement of Rouen.<sup>144</sup> His cousin, François, was to become an important League captain. In the *bailliage* of Gisors Charles de Roncherolles, sieur de Heuqueville, completed the list of League successes. The only exception was in the *bailliage* of Alençon where the royalist *bailli*, Jacques de Renty, used illegal methods to overcome his opponent, Gabriel de Vieuxpont, sieur de Chailloué.<sup>145</sup> The League was strong among members of the Third Estate, although the evidence available is insufficient. Certainly Guillaume Colombel, a *conseiller-échevin* of Rouen, elected for the Third Estate of the *bailliage* of Rouen, was a League sympathiser.<sup>146</sup>

On 23 December 1588 Henri duc de Guise was murdered at Blois on the orders of the king, and his brother the cardinal was killed the next day. To the Catholic League, Henri III had been an unpopular king who increased taxes, sold offices as never before and was misguided by evil counsellors, but he now revealed himself as a tyrant; municipal revolutions followed in Paris, Amiens, Reims, Dijon, Orléans and Marseille. In Rouen there was great anger but Carrouges quickly acted to stifle unrest, stationing troops at strategic points throughout the city.<sup>147</sup> Solicited

---

<sup>142</sup> AD5M, Tabellionage, 2<sup>ème</sup> Héritage, 2E1, 2007, 27 August 1588. This branch of the Vieuxpont had become recently very wealthy through the inheritance of Madeleine d'Annebaut.

<sup>143</sup> Bouquet (ed), *Documents concernant l'histoire de Neufchâtel-en-Bray*, p 62. Brissac also had greater status than Moy and was elected as the president of the Second Estate at Blois.

<sup>144</sup> Frondeville, *Conseillers*, p 481. The father of Adrien was Olivier, lieutenant of Charles I de Cossé, maréchal de Brissac.

<sup>145</sup> *Recueil des pièces originales concernant la tenue des Etats-Généraux*, IV, p 45; Orlea, *La Noblesse aux Etats généraux de 1576 et de 1588*, p 98.

<sup>146</sup> He was present at the provincial Estates held by the League in 1589 as well as the League Estates-General at Melun in January 1590, see Farin, *Histoire de la ville Rouen*, II, p 411. He was related to the League parlementaire, Guillaume de Paixdecoeur.

<sup>147</sup> For this and following see Benedict, *Rouen during the Wars of Religion*, pp 177-81.

by both sides Rouen remained neutral, the governor making every effort to maintain stability: religious processions were banned. Carrouges thus followed the same path as in 1588, trying to maintain control of the city while at the same time using his position as governor to bargain with the parties. There were again splits in the civic hierarchy. Jacques Le Veneur, the *bailli*, leaned towards the League and the fiercely royalist Groulard felt the Le Veneur were less concerned about the possibility of unrest than he was.<sup>148</sup> It seems likely that both Carrouges and <sup>his</sup>son were solicited by the two sides while maintaining a precarious neutrality. Indeed, it was the rumour that the father was negotiating with the royalists that became the signal for the well organised League coup in Rouen. On 5 February 1589 Carrouges was isolated with his men in the abbey of Saint-Ouen and forced to yield to the League. In the preceding twenty-five years Carrouges had proved above all else to be a political survivor, and he now attempted to become the head of the League. On 7 February a council of twelve was established to direct the affairs of the town and three days later Carrouges swore an oath to work with the League in Paris and ensure the adherence of local administrative bodies.<sup>149</sup> However, Carrouges was seen as a vacillating moderate; after popular agitation he was imprisoned and then expelled.<sup>150</sup> His family had lost its power base and neither he nor his son played a role in the ensuing conflict.

The council of twelve was divided evenly among the church, the judiciary and the town bourgeoisie. They came from the elite of the city and so the advent of the League was no social revolution, and their commitment to catholicism was beyond reproach.<sup>151</sup> They were also activists in the ultramontane cause. Pierre Sécard, curé of Saint-Maclou, and his brother, Claude, canon of the cathedral were among the church representatives. The involvement of this family in the ultra-catholic cause can be traced back to the 1560s.<sup>152</sup> Their relative, Pierre, sieur de Saint-Arnoult, was a servant of Jean de Moy and a League captain.<sup>153</sup> Another representative of the church, Jean Dadré, had already proved his zeal in admonishing the duc d'Épernon. Among representatives for the magistrature were Jean and Jacques de Bauquemare, both of them bitter enemies of the *premier président*, Groulard, who was forced to flee the city. They were also major creditors of the Guise.<sup>154</sup> Among the bourgeois representatives there was at least one Guise servant. In 1586

---

<sup>148</sup> Floquet, III, p 283-4.

<sup>149</sup> H. A. LLOYD, *The Rouen Campaign, 1590-1592: Politics, Warfare and the Early Modern State*, Oxford, 1973, pp 127-8.

<sup>150</sup> Floquet, III, pp 292-3.

<sup>151</sup> Benedict, *Rouen during the Wars of Religion*, pp 180-2.

<sup>152</sup> See chapter four above.

<sup>153</sup> See chapter three above and G. Valdory, *Discours du siège de la ville de Rouen au mois de Novembre mil cinq cens quatre vingt onze*, E. Gosselin (ed), Rouen, 1871, p 7. Valdory was a familiar of the duc d'Elbeuf, acting as his lawyer in the parlement and giving counsel.

<sup>154</sup> See chapter three above.

Charles de Bornes acted as *procureur* in a legal transaction for the cardinal de Guise, abbot of Fécamp.<sup>155</sup>

In the early months of 1589 the parlement divided into two, the royalists convening at Caen. The only major statistical difference between the two groups lies in the variation of their ages. The eldest members supported the League, infuriated by the increased sales of office which had devalued the prestige and financial value of their own offices.<sup>156</sup> Many of those in the League parlement were also clients of leaguer magnates. There was a number of different groupings in the rump parlement which explains the clashes of personalities and the factionalism within the parlement, even after moderates had been purged or left willingly. Guillaume Péricard was a client of the Guise but constantly clashed with the *conseiller*, Michel de Monchy, nephew of the cardinal de Pellevé. In 1592 Péricard, despite the support of Mayenne, failed to be nominated as a *président*. The two magistrates were both part of the extremist faction of the League but they fought over possession of the archdeaconry of Rouen.<sup>157</sup> There were other factions in the parlement. The cardinal de Bourbon could rely on his vicar-general, Marion de Martimbosc, a *conseiller* in the parlement, to hold firm for the League.<sup>158</sup> The Bauquemare could count on the support of their kinsmen who remained in Rouen. The *conseiller*, Charles Le Febvre d'Escalles (d.1613), was married to Marguerite Bauquemare and his father was a creditor of the Guise.<sup>159</sup> The *procureur-général*, Georges de La Porte, who like so many other leaguer parlemenaires was an enemy of Groulard, was the older brother of an official of the comtesse of Gisors, Anne d'Este, former duchesse de Guise.<sup>160</sup> Other leaguer magistrates had closer links to the Guise. The grandfather of Louis Garin, a *conseiller* since 1582, had been *bailli* of Elbeuf and the family continued to be patronised by the Guise. One brother of Louis became a monk at the abbey of Bec and the other two were men-at-arms in the company of the duc d'Elbeuf.<sup>161</sup> Obviously the ties of kinship were important in the decision on which side to take and the examples are numerous. For example, Louis Garin was the son-in-law of the *conseiller*, Guillaume de Paixdecoeur who played an important role in the defence of Rouen in 1592 as captain of the bourgeois militia.<sup>162</sup> Moreover, other *robins*, such as the *conseiller*, Philippe de Montaigu, were related to the leaguer *noblesse d'épée*.

---

<sup>155</sup> ADSM, Tabellionage, 2<sup>ème</sup> Meubles, 25 July 1586.

<sup>156</sup> Benedict, *Rouen during the Wars of Religion*, pp 183-5.

<sup>157</sup> Frondeville, *Conseillers*, pp 485, 501; Lloyd, *The Rouen campaign*, p 133.

<sup>158</sup> *Ibid*, p 450.

<sup>159</sup> See chapter three above.

<sup>160</sup> Frondeville, *Présidents*, p 277. This office had been held by the La Porte family since 1552.

<sup>161</sup> Frondeville, *Conseillers*, p 357.

<sup>162</sup> Frondeville, *Conseillers*, p 341; Valdory, *Discours du siège de Rouen*, p 6.

In late February the duc de Mayenne arrived in Rouen and on 4 March at a general assembly of the town a *Conseil de l'Union* was formally established. This was constituted by adding prominent *robin* and *noblesse d'épée* representatives to the standing council of twelve.<sup>163</sup> The addition of Guillaume Péricard, a Guise client, was an obvious move by Mayenne to improve his own authority. Péricard's elder brother, formerly the secretary of the duc de Guise, was now one of the four secretaries of state of the League. Mayenne also promoted two other Guise clients to the council: Nicholas de Moy, sieur de Vereins and Antoine de Bigars, sieur de La Londe. Vereins had his authority reinforced when he was given the office of *grand maître des eaux et forêts* of Normandy for the League.<sup>164</sup> The other *noble de robe courte* to sit on the *Conseil*, Antoine de Bigars, was a key figure in the Guise affinity, precipitating his arrest and temporary detention by the king, after the murder of the Guise at Blois.<sup>165</sup> Bigars became one of the most important League captains in Normandy. His brother, Guillaume, sieur d'Oissel, was ensign of the duc d'Aumale and he expanded his own clientèle through manipulation of military patronage.<sup>166</sup> Finally the two most important *officiers* in upper Normandy, Jacques de Moy and André de Villars-Brancas had the *droit de séance* on the *Conseil*. Thus Guise clients were rewarded with a predominant role in the running of League affairs in Normandy.

#### The Apogee and Decline of the Holy League, 1589-94

The major problem faced by the League in Normandy was not the lack of adherents but the absence of a recognised leader of sufficient status. In 1589 the Norman affinity of the Guise turned out in substantial numbers but, in order to galvanise this support and to make sure that it was not ephemeral, the presence of a prince of the House of Lorraine was crucial - his court acting as a focus for the aspirations and the desire of the nobility to serve and be rewarded. Unfortunately, the prime candidate for the governorship, the duc d'Elbeuf, was arrested at Blois and held to ransom, not gaining his liberty until 1593.<sup>167</sup> Without an obvious princely candidate, like d'Aumale in Picardy, positions of authority were always likely to be the object of factional squabbling. Moreover, serious weaknesses were soon apparent in the ranks of the *moyenne noblesse*. The Moy and Roncherolles families had been the mainstay of the Guise affinity in Normandy for many

---

<sup>163</sup> Benedict, *Rouen during the Wars of Religion*, p 188.

<sup>164</sup> ADSM, C, 1231, 4 March 1589. He had previously occupied the post from 1578 to 1582 and his younger brother François, sieur de Richebourg, was lieutenant-general of the League artillery, BN, PO, 2078, fo 102.

<sup>165</sup> *Mémoires d'Antoine de Bigars*, p 19.

<sup>166</sup> He became captain of 100 men-at-arms. His ensign was François de Mascarel, younger brother of Antoine, League commander of Neufchâtel, see ADSM, 1B, Registres Secrets, 103, 20 November 1592.

<sup>167</sup> Maille, *Recherches sur Elbeuf*, I, p 88.

years. However, Pierre de Roncherolles was governor of Abbeville and François de Roncherolles sat on the *Conseil Général de l'Union* in Paris and was lieutenant-general of the Ile-de-France.<sup>168</sup> The Moy family was devastated by untimely deaths: Nicholas, sieur de Vereins, died in 1589; Jacques, sieur de Pierrecourt, in late 1590 and Jean, sieur de La Meilleraye, in the late summer of 1591.

The Moy family filled the power vacuum in the early days, before their mortality crisis. When Mayenne established the *Conseil de l'Union* it was noticeable that he was accompanied by Jacques, sieur de Pierrecourt, and Henri de Lorraine, comte de Chaligny, heir by his wife to the elder line of the Moy.<sup>169</sup> Jean de Moy fulfilled the functions vacated by Carrouges in the city, presiding over the *Conseil de l'Union* on 25, 27 and 29 May 1589 and presenting Mayenne's demands for money.<sup>170</sup> However, Moy's tenure in office was at a time of disaster: the League was defeated three times in Normandy and lost ground to the royalists. The defeat of the *gautiers* was followed by the victories of Henri de Navarre at Arques (21 September 1589) and Ivry (14 March 1590). These reverses were compounded by royalists plots to seize Rouen.<sup>171</sup> In fact the major problem with Moy seems to have been his age (he was sixty-two in 1590). Michel de Monchy later recalled that he often had to preside over the *Conseil*, "duquel estoit chef le sieur de la mailleraye mais ny pouvoit le plus souvent vacquer a cause de son indisposition".<sup>172</sup> After the defeat at Ivry, a siege of Rouen became increasingly likely and so Mayenne dispatched his trusted Burgundian lieutenant, Jean de Saulx-Tavannes, to command there. This proved to be disastrous because Tavannes was an outsider and viewed suspiciously by all Normans, "disans quil est estranger et quil ne respecte assez la noblesse".<sup>173</sup> As the fortunes of the Moy family waned so those of the governor of Le Havre, Villars, waxed, since he had no rival in the pays de Caux. In 1591 he quarrelled sharply with Tavannes and threatened to change sides unless his rival was removed. Realising the position of authority Villars now had and the general dislike of Tavannes, Mayenne acceded to this demand, and thus in July 1591 the League had its first effective governor of Normandy.

---

<sup>168</sup> For a list of those on the *Conseil*, see Palma Cayet, *Chronologie Novenaire*, Michaud and Poujoulat, 1st ser., XII p 101.

<sup>169</sup> ACR, A, 20, 4 March 1589.

<sup>170</sup> ACR, A, 20, 25 May, 27 May, 29 May, 1589.

<sup>171</sup> Benedict, *Rouen during the Wars of Religion*, p 210; Floquet, III, pp 346-60.

<sup>172</sup> ADSM, 1B, Registres Secrets, 103, fo 196. Moy was in command of Rouen in April 1591, in the absence of Villars. By May he was ill and he died between June and September 1591 and was buried at Rouen, see ADSM, 1B, Registres Secrets, 100, 4 and 16 April 1591; Rodière and Vallée, *La maison de Moy*, p 80.

<sup>173</sup> ACR, A, 20, 23 April 1591. For the conflicts in Rouen, see Lloyd, *The Rouen campaign*, pp 132-7.

The strength of the infant League was derived not from its leadership but from its appeal to urban communities and also from the strength and size of the Guise affinity in Normandy. The extent of the Guise power base in Normandy ensured the Catholic League would have a number of strongholds - places which were unable to withstand a serious siege but from which the surrounding *plat pays* could be controlled. The lands of the Guise provided bases at Lillebonne, Eu, Aumale and Harcourt, commanded by trustworthy servants. Guillaume de L'Isle, *gentilhomme ordinaire de la chambre* of the duc d'Elbeuf, was captain of the château of Harcourt in 1588.<sup>174</sup> Jacques Blondel, *procureur fiscal* of the comté of Lillebonne, was also the captain of that château. In February 1589 Jean de Moy asked Blondel to maintain Lillebonne for the League but he did not appeal to religious sentiment or to the authority of the *Conseil de l'Union*; instead he spoke against the "ennemys de la patrie et de Monsieur le duc d'Elbeuf".<sup>175</sup> D'Elbeuf's affairs in Normandy were handled by a council headed by Charles de Sarcilly, sieur d'Emes, *intendant* and *maître d'hôtel* of the duke. He exercised his powers in March 1590 by replacing Blondel as captain of Lillebonne with Mathurin de Montpellier.<sup>176</sup> Fécamp was also assured since the abbey, of which the cardinal de Guise had been abbot, had the right to appoint to the captaincy of the town.<sup>177</sup> Elsewhere Guise clients declared for the League, such as Jean de Longchamp at Lisieux. The sieur de Pierrecourt was captain of Honfleur and Philippe d'Ercambourg was lieutenant of the comte de Brissac at Harfleur.<sup>178</sup>

Other clients were rewarded with the patronage available to Mayenne. Charles de Fouilleuse, lieutenant of the *ordonnance* company of the duc d'Elbeuf, was provided with the office of *bailli* of the town of Gisors by Mayenne.<sup>179</sup> His younger brother Philippe, another veteran of the League in 1576, was part of the garrison of Pontoise.<sup>180</sup> Nicholas de Moy became governor of the *bailliage* of Gisors, an office formerly held by his cousin Jacques de Moy - revealing how power was becoming devolved and perhaps giving an indication of why Fouilleuse defected to Navarre.<sup>181</sup> Other clients gained even higher office; by 1592 Antoine de Bigars was lieutenant-

---

<sup>174</sup> ADSM, 6F, 11, Recueil des capitaines de Normandie, 12 September 1588.

<sup>175</sup> ADSM, E1, 462; Moy to Blondel, 23 February 1589.

<sup>176</sup> ADSM, E1, 462, 28 March 1590.

<sup>177</sup> Hellot, *Fécamp au temps de la Ligue*, p 5.

<sup>178</sup> ADSM, 6F, 11, Recueil des capitaines de Normandie, 18 May 1588. Charles d'Ercambourg was a man-at-arms of Jean de Moy from 1574 to 1581, see appendix E.

<sup>179</sup> ADSM, 1B, Registres Secrets, 94, 15 June 1589; BN, Dossiers Bleus, 278, fo 68.

<sup>180</sup> H. Le Charpentier, *La Ligue à Pontoise et dans le Vexin Français*, Pontoise, 1878, pp 71-2; BN, Dossiers Bleus, 278, fo 5.

<sup>181</sup> ADSM, 1B, Registres Secrets, 94, 1 July 1589.



general of the *bailliages* of Rouen, Evreux and Gisors and Jean V, baron de Vieuxpont, was governor of Dreux, Houdan, Montfort-L'Aumaury and Hurepoix.<sup>182</sup>

The League could also rely on many of the malcontents who had formerly supported the duc d'Anjou. Jean de La Haye, sieur de Chanteloup, became a captain of its field army in Normandy. Antoine de Mascarel, sieur de Hermauville, former *chambellan ordinaire* of d'Anjou was governor of Neufchâtel, and his younger brother, François, was ensign of Antoine de Bigars and captain of Fontaine-le-Bourg.<sup>183</sup>

In lower Normandy, where the Guise landholding interest and clientèle were small, the former adherents of the duc d'Anjou were important to the League. Pierre de Rouxel (1562-1618), sieur de Médavy, was the son of a major servant of the duke. He was governor of Argentan and Verneuil, and *bailli* of Alençon.<sup>184</sup> Elsewhere in lower Normandy support was weak because of the strength of protestantism and the lack of Guise influence. Yet Jean d'Escajeul, a veteran ultra-catholic, was able to seize Bayeux and hold out until January 1590.<sup>185</sup> In the Cotentin a successful campaign was waged by François de La Morvissière, sieur de Vicques, until his death in August 1590, supported by François de Péricard, bishop of Avranches, who held out against the siege of the duc de Montpensier in his episcopal town until February 1591.<sup>186</sup>

The success of the royalists in Normandy under Montpensier and Henri de Navarre himself in 1589 and 1590 put the League under intense pressure. As positions became indefensible or a royalist victory seemed inevitable so defections occurred, and thus Charles de Fouilleuse was captain of Gisors for the royalists by March 1590.<sup>187</sup> There are a number of reasons why the League did not collapse after so many setbacks. These included aid from the duke of Parma and the weaknesses of the royalist cause after the assassination of Henri III (August 1589) when many catholic nobles refused to recognise as king the protestant, Navarre. A number of local minor commanders also showed a remarkable degree of loyalty to the League and to the Guise. Jean de Longchamps was forced to yield Lisieux to Navarre in December 1589 and was confined and

---

<sup>182</sup> Vindry, p 73; *Mémoires d'Antoine de Bigars*, p 25.

<sup>183</sup> ADSM, 1B, Registres Secrets, 103, 20 November 1592; ADSM, 6F, 11, Recueil des capitaines de Normandie, 6 February 1591; Bouquet (ed), *Documents concernant la Neufchâtel-en-Bray*, p 65.

<sup>184</sup> Diguères, *Etude...sur la Rouxel de Médavy-Grancey*, p 57. His father-in-law, the sieur de Fervaques, loved by d'Anjou and hated by Henri III, was lieutenant-general for the League in Burgundy.

<sup>185</sup> Wood, *The Nobility of the Election of Bayeux*, p 92.

<sup>186</sup> Péricard was aided by Charles, Antoine and François d'Orglandes all distant relations of Jean d'Orglandes, who had managed the affairs of the duc de Lorraine in Normandy in the late fifteenth century, see Chenaye-Desbois, XV, p 206.

<sup>187</sup> See above - his brothers remained with the League: Philippe died at the siege of Pontoise and Louis fought at Ivry.

given a month to decide which side he should join. He refused service with Navarre and joined the garrison of Rouen.<sup>188</sup>

Explaining the bonds that held the League together is difficult. Religion was certainly important, but many noblemen proved to be, at the final victory of Henri de Navarre, both opportunist and equivocal concerning matters of faith. The bonds of loyalty and kinship had been formed and strengthened by marriage and common service within the Guise affinity in the preceding decades. During the crisis of the civil war comradeship and kinship were even more important to the survival of a noble house. In the late 1580s and early 1590s there were numerous marriages which attempted to use kinship to reinforce the bonds that already united adherents of the League and some of the most important marriages between Guise clients took place during this period.

In March 1588, at the height of the political crisis, a marriage contract was drawn up on behalf of Philippe de Montaigu, future *conseiller* in the League parlement and brother-in-law of the leaguer captain Adrien des Buaz, for the marriage of his daughter, Barbe, to Fulcran de Houetteville.<sup>189</sup> The contract brought together League sympathisers in the parlement with Guise clients. Fulcran was guided by the counsel of his *amis* and *parens*, which included men in the process of revolt against the crown:

Gabriel de Vieupont sieur de chailloue cappitaine de cinquante hommes d'armes  
soubz la charge de Monseigneur le conte de brissac...Messire henry des  
boves...guidon de la compagnie monseigneur le duc d'Elbeuf et haulte et puissante  
dame charlotte de givry veufve de feu haut et puissant seigneur charles des  
boves...lieutenant pour sa maiestie au vexin français et cappitaine de cinquante  
hommes d'armes soubz la charge de mond. seigneur duc delbeuf.<sup>190</sup>

This is not an isolated example of a leaguer *robin* and leaguer *épée* family inter-marrying. In April 1588 the marriage treaty of Marie du Fay, daughter of the *conseiller* in the parlement Jean du Fay (d.1562), and André de Fautereau, baron de Cretot, was drawn up.<sup>191</sup> The Fautereau were vassals of the duc de Guise and a leaguer family: François, younger brother of André, was a

---

<sup>188</sup> R. B. Wernham (ed), *List and Analysis of State Papers, Foreign Series, Elizabeth I*, London, 1964-, vol I, p 266.

<sup>189</sup> ADSM, Tabellionage, 2<sup>ème</sup> Héritage, 2E1, 2007, 27 August 1588. The dowry was 10,000/- a sizeable sum.

<sup>190</sup> Ibid.

<sup>191</sup> ADSM, Tabellionage, 2<sup>ème</sup> Héritage, 2E1, 2005, 21 May 1588. For this and following, see Frondeville, *Présidents*, p 399. The dowry was a mere 1,100/- but Marie had been married once before.

representative at the League Estates-General at Paris in 1593.<sup>192</sup> Kinship links reinforced political connections. The elder brother of Marie, Jean du Fay (d.1615), was ensign of the company of Jacques de Moy and husband of Madeleine de Jubert - one of whose uncles was the former *grand vicaire* of the cardinal de Guise and another was a major creditor of the duc d'Elbeuf.<sup>193</sup> Finally the youngest daughter, Anne du Fay, was married to Robert Deschamps (d.1592), sieur du Réel, a *conseiller-échevin* who remained in Rouen during the League.

The most important marriage to take place between members of the Guise affinity (or more precisely between servants of the duc d'Elbeuf) was that of Gabriel de Vieuxpont, sieur de Chailloué, and Catherine des Boves, daughter of Charles, sieur de Contenan. This marriage almost certainly took place in the 1580s or early 1590s. Gabriel was an integral part of the retinue of the comte de Brissac in 1588. His younger brother, Auffay, was an archer of the marquis d'Elbeuf in 1579 and his distant cousin, Jean V, baron de Vieuxpont, was ensign of the duc d'Elbeuf in 1587.<sup>194</sup> The des Boves were even more important clients of d'Elbeuf. Charles, sieur de Contenan, had been *tuteur* of René, marquis d'Elbeuf, and ensign, later lieutenant, of the d'Elbeuf *ordonnance* company (1555-78).<sup>195</sup> His eldest son, Henri, continued the tradition, and was the *guidon* of the duc d'Elbeuf in 1588.<sup>196</sup> The Vieuxpont were also the focus of other marriages within the League community. For example, in 1586 Christine de Vieuxpont married Gedéon de Monchy, a League captain.<sup>197</sup>

The historiography of the League has always tended to stress the internal contradictions between radical bourgeois elements and self-serving aristocrats, and between particularism and the need for a centralised war effort, and finally the failure to find a suitable alternative to Henri de Navarre. Certainly the unhappy tenure of Tavannes in Rouen was a microcosm of the first two of these problems. Yet by the end of 1592 the League seemed to have recovered from the defeats of 1589-90, especially after the successful defence of Rouen which left the royalists exhausted. The aid offered by the duke of Parma was important for the survival of the League but without the continuing efforts and sacrifices on a local level there would have been no League. This necessitates a discussion of the strengths of the movement at a local level.

The defence of Rouen between November 1591 and April 1592 by the new governor, Villars, was successful because he was able to work with the authorities in the city to prepare for

---

<sup>192</sup> D'Estaintot, *La Ligue en Normandie*, p 275.

<sup>193</sup> ADSM, *Tabellionage*, 2<sup>ème</sup> Héritage, 2E1, 2009, 7 december 1588. On the Jubert, see chapter three above.

<sup>194</sup> The Vieuxpont are discussed in chapters three and five above.

<sup>195</sup> The des Boves are discussed in chapters two and three above.

<sup>196</sup> ADSM, *Tabellionage*, 2<sup>ème</sup> Héritage, 2E1, 2007, 27 August 1588.

<sup>197</sup> Chenaye-Desbois, XIX, p 730.

its defence.<sup>198</sup> Military operations meant that the power of the governor grew in relation to the *Conseil de l'Union* and Villars came to dominate the League as governor and admiral of Normandy after the siege.<sup>199</sup> However, the rise of Villars was due to his ability to build up a sizeable affinity in Normandy, beginning as League governor of Le Havre and the pays de Caux. Like Tavannes he was an outsider, but unlike his rival he chose to employ and patronise the local nobility rather than to antagonise them. Thus Normans like Hamon, baron de Mailloc, feature in his household.<sup>200</sup> In the summer of 1591 when Mayenne visited Rouen, Villars was stationed outside the city with 15 ships and 1,500 men, threatening to defect if Tavannes was not removed.<sup>201</sup> In the Caux Villars had proved himself a good commander and therefore became a natural focus for the local nobility. As an outsider and a professional soldier he was prepared to disregard particularist interests. Thus as early as June 1589 he was complaining of the carelessness of the garrison at Lillebonne: "vous faictes si peu destat de vous employer a la garde des passages de la riviere" [Seine], and he unceremoniously told the captain: "je vous asseure que au moindre inconvenience qui adviendra Je le feray tomber sur vos testes."<sup>202</sup> Immediately after the disaster at Ivry he sent his lieutenant Charles de Goutimesnil, sieur de Boisrozé, to garrison the château. This not only assured the château but also provided Villars with patronage, since Boisrozé would now claim the wages and privileges pertaining to that office. The Goutimesnil were neighbours and clients usually associated with the Moy, but as the Moy family was suffering a mortality crisis Villars was perfectly placed to fill the power vacuum.

In Rouen itself, Villars did not wield absolute authority. Antoine de Bigars had been captain of the fort Saint-Catherine since September 1589 and Mayenne made him lieutenant to Villars.<sup>203</sup> Jacques de Bauquemare was captain of the vieux palais. There were about 6,000 men in the town who included, beside the bourgeois militia, 5-600 light cavalry, 200 mounted arquebusiers and 1,200 French foot; a predominantly indigenous force supplemented by 300 *landsknechts*.<sup>204</sup>

Analysis of the relative importance and composition of different followings that made up the defenders of Rouen is possible with reference to Guillaume Valdory's *Discours du siège de la ville de Rouen*.<sup>205</sup> The garrison fell into four major groupings. First, the most striking feature about the

---

<sup>198</sup> For Villars' efforts to galvanise the defenders and the siege itself, see Lloyd, *The Rouen Campaign*, pp 139-163.

<sup>199</sup> Benedict, *Rouen during the Wars of Religion*, p 215. By 1593 the *Conseil* was redundant and its leader Michel de Monchy in exile.

<sup>200</sup> Valdory, *Discours du siège de Rouen*, p 12.

<sup>201</sup> Benedict, *Rouen during the Wars of Religion*, p 216.

<sup>202</sup> ADSM, E1, 462, Villars to the inhabitants of Lillebonne, 19 June 1589.

<sup>203</sup> *Mémoires d'Antoine de Bigars*, p 23

<sup>204</sup> Lloyd, *The Rouen Campaign*, p 141.

<sup>205</sup> A list of noblemen is to be found on pp 2-12.

defenders of Rouen was the presence of so many families associated with the Moy affinity, despite the fact that the last surviving adult member of the family had died well before the city was besieged. These men were largely from the Cauchois *petite noblesse* and, as Villars was already governor of Le Havre and the pays de Caux, it seems likely that he was able to attract the loyalty of large sections of the Moy affinity, especially since, as in the case of the Goutimesnil, he had patronage to dispense. These former Moy clients included Pierre Sécard, sieur de Saint-Arnoult, man-at-arms of Jean de Moy in 1581 and a member of his household; Etienne de Rouil, sieur de La Rouillière, man-at-arms (1581); Jacques du Tot, man-at-arms (1574-81); Pierre Calmesnil, man-at-arms (1570); Charles Sevestre, archer (1574) and man-at-arms (1581); Jacques d'Argence, man-at-arms (1581); Jean du Corde, man-at-arms of d'Elbeuf (1579) and Moy (1581); and finally Louis de Braques, sieur de Biennais, a man-at-arms of the sieur de Pierrecourt in 1569. In addition two members of the Goutimesnil family, the sieur de Coutances and the baron de Courcy, governor of Caudebec, appear in Valdory's list - each family associated with the Moy and appearing regularly in the musters of their companies of the *ordonnance*.<sup>206</sup>

The second group of noblemen was composed of major servants of the Guise. Charles de Sarcilly, sieur d'Emes, was head of the council of the duc d'Elbeuf in Normandy and Henri des Boves was ensign of the duke's company. There was also the sieur de La Chambre, "ancien serviteur et domestique de Mons. le duc d'Elleboeuf".<sup>207</sup> Also present at the siege were clients of the duc d'Aumale from the pays de Caux: Robert de Baillieul (1539-1601), sieur de Blangués, and his younger brother Nicholas, sieur de Drumare.<sup>208</sup> Their distant relative, Jean de Bailleul, was a veteran of d'Aumale's army in 1562, and on their mother's side the Hervieu family had provided a number of servants for the Guise.<sup>209</sup> It seems probable that the sieur d'Anserville, listed as a *maître d'hôtel* in the household of the duc d'Aumale in 1575, was from the Bailleul family and was possibly Robert himself.<sup>210</sup>

The third grouping of noblemen consisted of magistrates not usually associated with military service. In fact *robins* often had experience of military affairs. Thus Jacques de Bauquemare was captain of the vieux palais and Guillaume de Paixdecoeur, a *conseiller* in the parlement, was

---

<sup>206</sup> For a list of muster rolls consulted and a discussion of the Moy affinity see appendix E and chapter three above. It should be pointed out that Valdory often only gives the family name, making identification of individuals difficult. This list is certainly an underestimate of true numbers.

<sup>207</sup> Valdory, *Discours du siège de Rouen*, p 26. Claude and Philibert de La Chambre were gendarmes in the company of the duc d'Aumale in 1565, see appendix E.

<sup>208</sup> Valdory, *Discours du siège de Rouen*, pp 34-6.

<sup>209</sup> Louis de Hervieu was man-at-arms of d'Aumale (1565) and d'Elbeuf (1569-79), and Pierre de Hervieu was a man-at-arms of d'Elbeuf in 1579, see appendix E.

<sup>210</sup> BN, Ms Fr, 22441, fo 82. The seigneurie of Anserville is the old form of Angerville-la-Bailleul and the family were vassals of the barony of Bec Crespain held by d'Aumale from 1562 until 1579.

captain of the city bourgeois militia. In defending Rouen he was joined by other magistrates like Georges de La Porte, the *procureur-général*, and Jean Le Doux, the *président* of the *présidial* of Evreux. Jean was the nephew of Guillaume Le Doux, brother-in-law of the leaguer bishop of Evreux, Claude de Saintes.<sup>211</sup>

The fourth identifiable group consisted of important League captains and the *refugiez*, such as Longchamp, the governor of Lisieux, and Martin d'Espinay (d.1609), sieur de Boisguérout, governor of Louviers, as well as field captains who commanded their own units. The followers of the duc d'Elbeuf had their own commands: Antoine de Bigars was captain of fifty men-at-arms, Jacques Le Conte of twenty-six light horse, Jean de La Haye of fifty lances and his son Philippe of 100 light horse - all were present inside Rouen.

The Guise and Moy affinities therefore played an important role in the defence of Rouen. In 1562 the city of Rouen had fallen swiftly because the Huguenots lacked the full support of the protestant nobility of upper Normandy. Quite simply, in 1591 the leaguer nobility turned up in sufficient numbers with their retinues to save their provincial capital, after it seemed that the League in Normandy, riddled with internal divisions, was close to collapse. Certainly the English forces aiding Navarre were supremely confident about the prospects of a quick victory.<sup>212</sup> The continuing strength of the League in upper Normandy was partly due to the fear of a heretic as king. The fact that the League did not collapse in upper Normandy in the face of successful royalist campaigns, was also due to the strength of particularist feeling and the necessity of defending the *patrie* against outsiders - a factor previously ignored by historians. The League in urban areas was often a reaction against the encroachment of royal power upon local privileges. Localities everywhere dreaded the presence of foreign troops, and the Rouennais feared that Tavannes was going to introduce a foreign garrison.<sup>213</sup> Indeed, disillusion with the League was increased by its use of Spanish troops.<sup>214</sup> The army of Navarre consisted of large contingents of German, English and Gascon protestants, and the defence of Rouen was therefore a defence of catholicism and the *patrie* against foreigners. This particularist feeling and Norman separatism are accurately captured by the contemporary memoirs of an ultra-catholic Rouennais cleric who talks of "la Normandie" and the "pays de France" thus:

*Je laisse maintenant à penser lequel c'est de France ou de la Normandie lequel est redevable et le plus tenu l'un à l'autre. Et toutefois, de ce peuple de France, il ne peut sortir une gracieuse parole de sa bouche, qui dise bien des Normands.*

---

<sup>211</sup> Frondeville, *Conseillers*, p 649.

<sup>212</sup> Wernham (ed), *List and Analysis of State Papers, Foreign Series, Elizabeth I*, III, p 214.

<sup>213</sup> ADSM, 1B, Registres Secrets, 100, 19 March 1591.

<sup>214</sup> Prarond, *La Ligue à Abbeville*, III, p 96.

ni de Normandie. Si est-ce qu'elle est assez grande pour estre mariée à un roi; si elle estoit réduite en royaume; elle croistroit encore.<sup>215</sup>

Thus particularism, usually seen as a hindrance to the effectiveness of the leaguer military effort, was a very strong factor in the survival of the League despite many setbacks, and contributed to stalling the advance of Henri de Navarre.

### Submission, Defeat and the End of the Guise Affinity In Normandy ?

Rouen was relieved by the duke of Parma on 21 April 1592. Although conditions had become intolerable in the city and Villars had only just held out, it was a major victory for the League especially since the disaffected army of Henri de Navarre had suffered terrible privation.<sup>216</sup> The new duc de Guise, Charles, and his kinsmen, Mayenne and d'Aumale, basked in the appreciation of the Rouennais.<sup>217</sup>

This however proved to be the high point of League fortunes and it was soon faced with a crisis when the inconclusive Estates-General of 1593 failed to find a suitable candidate for the throne. In the background was economic disaster and mistrust of growing Spanish influence, reinforced by Philip II's attempts at the Estates to overturn the Salic Law and secure the succession of his daughter to the throne. Navarre was able to capitalise on this malaise and war-weariness by ceasing the military campaign, attempting to win the support of moderates by abjuring Calvinism (July 1593) and making a virtue of conciliation and negotiation.

It has long been recognised that the victory of Navarre was achieved by buying off individual League commanders, with both cash and the confirmation of the offices they held. The devastation of the seigneurial economy and the huge debts that captains had run up in order to pay troops meant that, by 1593, only the king could meet the burdensome financial obligations accumulated by the League captains. The extent of devastation can be quantified.<sup>218</sup> In 1577 the *ferme* of the barony of Manéhouville, part of the duchy of Longueville, was worth 1,000/ per annum. In 1594, the lease of the farm for nine years was for only 850/ p.a. In 1586 the seigneuries of Ry and Vascoeuil had a revenue of 1,100/ but in 1597 were valued at only 650/. The barony of

---

<sup>215</sup> *Relation des troubles excités par les calvinistes dans la ville de Rouen*, p 43.

<sup>216</sup> Benedict, *Rouen during the Wars of Religion*, p 221.

<sup>217</sup> LLoyd, *The Rouen Campaign*, p 183. Misgivings about the Spanish were great and Parma camped outside the city.

<sup>218</sup> For the economic crisis, see Benedict, *Rouen during the Wars of Religion*, p 226. Upper Normandy suffered heavily for the first time in the Wars of Religion, see "Documents Historiques: pillages de gens de guerre (1589-93)", *Bulletin de la société de l'histoire de Normandie*, 1909, pp 242-6.

Longueil, farmed out for 3,519/ in 1586, had fallen to 3,180/ in 1599, six years after the end of hostilities.<sup>219</sup> In 1592 François de Fontaine-Martel claimed to have incurred 30,000 *écus* of damage to his land.<sup>220</sup>

By the summer of 1592 Villars had reinforced his position in Normandy when Mayenne made him governor and admiral. Fears about Villars' hegemony were not unfounded since he was able <sup>to</sup> overrule the *Conseil de l'Union*. However, control of his subordinates eluded him for, as the plight of the League worsened, they wanted to strengthen their own positions and put themselves in a better bargaining position with the king. If Villars were to reach a secret accommodation with Navarre, minor nobles could be left with nothing but debts and devastated lands. Thus in November 1592, Villars' lieutenant, Charles de Goutimesnil, sieur de Boisrozé, seized Fécamp for himself.<sup>221</sup> The two men then began to fight a private war for control of the pays de Caux. When Villars signed a truce with the royalists in Dieppe the local League commanders ignored it, intent on building up their own spheres of influence.<sup>222</sup> In December 1592 the disintegration of the League forces into petty baronial armies was such that the parlement had to write to its captains to:

"les inciter de se voyr et avoyr correspondance les ungs avec les autres, quite toutes partialites et divisions qui peuvent estre entre eulx et se joindre de mesme vollonté et affection avec led. seigneur de villars."<sup>223</sup>

When Bernay came under attack in May 1593 no leaguer captain could be induced to move from his own base in order to mount a relief operation.<sup>224</sup> Whilst Villars was in Paris with Mayenne, the League captain of Neufchâtel, François de Fontaine-Martel, broke the truce with Dieppe and fighting recommenced. There is no doubting the original zeal of this man and his family. In 1588 his cousin, Charles Martel, went to the Estates-General of Blois. Two of his younger brothers died fighting for the League, he himself was captured at the battle of Ivry and his uncle, Artus, who

---

<sup>219</sup> These figures are collated from the assorted papers of the House of Longueville, in AN, Q<sup>1</sup> 1374, Comptes des baux et fermages du duché de Longueville (1573-1615). See also AN, Q<sup>1</sup> 1371, 1375 and ADSM, 1ER, 1954, Compte...de la terre de Mannouville pour neuf années.

<sup>220</sup> ADSM, J, 437, 17 June 1592.

<sup>221</sup> He was not a turncoat and remained a leaguer because the election for the Estates-General took place there and the *Conseil de l'Union* considered him a leaguer, see Hellot, *Fécamp au temps de la Ligue*, p 37.

<sup>222</sup> D'Estainot, *La Ligue en Normandie*, pp 303-5.

<sup>223</sup> ADSM, 1B, Registres Secrets, 103, 22 December 1592. The parlement was also concerned about the pillaging and robberies committed by these troops.

<sup>224</sup> ADSM, 1B, Registres Secrets, 103, 8 May, 12 May 1593.



would prove a useful ally against Villars, sat in the rump parlement in Rouen.<sup>225</sup> Villars was furious with the disobedience of his subordinate, especially since Martel had the support of radicals in the parlement.<sup>226</sup> Yet, Martel's show of force was not the action of a radical who was intent on defeating heretics, but more an effort to extend his own influence. Martel had bought the governorship of Neufchâtel in August 1592 for 8,000/ and was determined to get a good return for his investment by increasing the area under his authority.<sup>227</sup> In May 1593 he seized the château of Bacqueville, which belonged to his distant protestant cousins and in February 1594 he attacked the manor of a fellow League captain at Argueil.<sup>228</sup> Thus when he finally came to an accommodation with Henri IV in October 1594 he retained the governorship of Neufchâtel and was paid 16,000 *écus*. Even for handing over such a minor place as Vernon the sieur de Rouxel-Médavy was accorded, besides a pension, the offices of *bailli* of Alençon, lieutenant-general of the *bailliage* of Evreux and the governorship of Verneuil, while his father retained the governorship of Argentan. The most serious problem for Médavy was the pressing need to pay his troops and followers. He received 12,000 *écus* to pay the garrison of Vernon, in addition to provision for the payment of his company of gendarmes and other troops directly from the *aides* of the *élection* of Verneuil.<sup>229</sup> The price that had to be paid to Villars was consequently colossal and it must have been of some relief to Henri when he died in 1595.<sup>230</sup>

Nevertheless, loyalties were not always so easily undermined. Antoine de Bigars, sieur de La Londe, left documents on his death that were collated by his son in 1626, with the help of eyewitnesses who had served under Bigars during the League. This was at a time when the League was viewed as pernicious and families preferred to forget or fabricate the role that they had played. Although the memoirs at times exaggerate the role of Bigars in a stylised manner, they glorify and do not try to hide the hero's military prowess in the service of the League, perhaps because they were for private consumption. The narrative dwells on the fact that Bigars felt it dishonourable to sell himself to Henri IV and only submitted when he was totally isolated. He believed:

Villars qui estoit grandement plein d'ambition, et avoit recogneu que le seigneur de la londe n'avoit faict la guerre que pour la zele de sa religion et qu'au contraire

---

<sup>225</sup> Frondeville, *Conseillers*, pp 481-2. Fontaine-Martel was a vassal of the duc d'Elbeuf, see ADSM, E1, 445, 12 March 1604,

<sup>226</sup> Especially Michel de Monchy who was expelled in June 1593 by Villars, see ADSM, 1B, Registres Secrets, 103, fos 103-4; Benedict, *Rouen during the Wars of Religion*, p 213.

<sup>227</sup> Bouquet (ed), *Documents concernant l'histoire de Neufchâtel-en-Bray*, p 89.

<sup>228</sup> Ibid, p 97.

<sup>229</sup> For these terms see, ADSM, C, 1237, fos 65-8.

<sup>230</sup> For the benefits accruing to Villars, see Benedict, *Rouen during the Wars of Religion*, p 228.

qu'il y avoit dependu une partie de son bien et que tous les autres ne faisoient la guerre que pour leur utilité et profict.<sup>231</sup>

La Londe had thus rejected the overtures of Henri since: "Je ne tracterez jamais avec mon Roy l'espee a la main" and "qu'il manqueroit jamais de foy a M. de Mayenne et a sa religion". He felt loyalty to the Guise and preferred to wait for news of Mayenne's disposition "de n'estre point acúsés de trahison". In the meantime Villars made his peace and secured the city for the crown. Bigars left Rouen but was contacted by the king and pressed by his relatives at the court. Asked to provide troops for service against the Spanish in Flanders he relented and received a commission to raise a company of 100 men-at-arms and 24 companies of foot.<sup>232</sup>

After the death of Villars the governor of Normandy, Montpensier, became the undisputed major focus for patronage in Normandy. His status as a prince and a landowner in the province helped this process.<sup>233</sup> The disintegration of the League forces in Normandy in 1593 and 1594 into competing bands of warlords was indicative of the increasingly diffuse nature of loyalty and the devolution of power. Seemingly the Guise affinity was thus shattered along with the League - the ultra-catholic faction was now in disarray, weakened by the growing cynicism towards religious extremism. The ideological justification for Guise resistance to the monarchy had now been taken away and the family could no longer satisfy the aspirations of its clients as the League began to collapse. In fact, this sudden decline of the Guise is as much a myth as the smooth transition to "stability", "autocracy" and "absolutism" introduced by Henri IV.<sup>234</sup> The new king was an extremely shrewd politician since he had learnt to be conservative. He realised during his campaigns that he could not defeat discontented magnates in battle but would have to bargain with them and keep a balance between factions. His predecessor had been much more of an innovator and reformer but change generated conflict by impinging on particularist interests. Henri IV was a warrior-king, in contrast to his predecessor whose inability to fight for his crown and whose fanatical personal piety were alien to noble culture. Henri IV's relations with the ducs d'Aumale and d'Elbeuf go some way to explaining his triumph and also the fate of Guise power in Normandy.

---

<sup>231</sup> *Mémoires d'Antoine de Bigars*, p 34.

<sup>232</sup> *Ibid*, p 38.

<sup>233</sup> The Montpensier had been granted the revenues of, and the right to appoint to offices in the royal comté of Mortain and the vicomté of Auge.

<sup>234</sup> These words are taken from Salmon, *Society in Crisis*, p 321. A tentative attempt to divorce the reality of Henri IV from the myth has been made in M. Greengrass, *France in the Age of Henri IV: The Struggle for Stability*, London, 1984. The myths that surround Henri IV still hold wide currency, see R. Bonney, *Society and Government in France under Richelieu and Mazarin, 1624-61*, London, 1988, p 158, "the exclusion of the great nobility from government had been the work of Henri IV".

Charles de Lorraine, duc d'Aumale, was the most unrepentant leaguer in his family. Ever since 1576 he had built his reputation as head of the League in Picardy and cultivated his affinity accordingly but the zenith of his authority came after 1589 when he was governor of the province for the League. He spared no expense in pursuit of this important office. As early as April 1588 it was reported that he was running out of money and that all his lands were mortgaged.<sup>235</sup> Whilst he campaigned in Picardy his wife, Marie, looked after the finances as "sa procuratrice speciale de faire et negocier les faictz et affaires de leur maison".<sup>236</sup> This included the provision of all offices, the establishment of the *fermes* and the sale of land. At first small parcels of land were sold to placate creditors.<sup>237</sup> In April 1590 Marie borrowed 2,000 *écus* in Rouen.<sup>238</sup> By 1594 the financial situation was acute and parts of the seigneurie of Boves near Amiens had to be sold.<sup>239</sup> For the duke war meant a serious loss of revenue from his estates, compounded when he sacked Aumale itself as a punishment for submitting too easily to the royalists.<sup>240</sup> His younger brother found that the revenue from his ecclesiastical benefices was eroded away and when he was killed in action in 1591 the abbey of Bec, which was in the hands of the royalists, was given by Henri IV to one of his supporters.<sup>241</sup> The losses incurred through warfare could be offset by the patronage available to a League governor. Ecclesiastical benefices were extremely important and between June and November 1589 d'Aumale appointed to five abbeys and one priory.<sup>242</sup> Clients such as Charles de La Chaussée, a member of the council for the defence of Vimeu and Ponthieu, received land confiscated from protestants in the region.<sup>243</sup>

The strains of war affected d'Aumale's affinity. In 1591 Pierre de Roncherolles, governor of Abbeville, was accused by the townsfolk of collaborating with his turncoat nephew, Charles de Bourbon-Rubempré. Although Roncherolles was proved innocent after an enquiry, the duke felt

---

<sup>235</sup> CSPF, 1586-8, p 601.

<sup>236</sup> ADSM, Tabellionage, 2<sup>ème</sup> Héritage, 2E1, 2003, 13 November 1587.

<sup>237</sup> ADSM, Tabellionage, 2<sup>ème</sup> Héritage, 2E1, 2003, 16 November 1587. The fief of Guehauville was sold to Christophe Cherie, whose family was closely associated with Guise service, for 1,100 *écus*.

<sup>238</sup> ADSM, Tabellionage, 2<sup>ème</sup> Héritage, 2E1, 2013, 3 April 1590.

<sup>239</sup> A.Janvier, *Boves et ses seigneurs: Etude historique sur la commune de Boves*, p 172.

<sup>240</sup> Semichon, *Histoire de la ville d'Aumale*, I, p 308.

<sup>241</sup> Porée, *Histoire de l'abbaye du Bec*, II, p 355.

<sup>242</sup> BN, Ms Fr, 3977, fo 353, "Benefices donnez par le duc de Mayenne depuis le moys de juin 1589 jusques au moys de novembre audict an".

<sup>243</sup> BN, Ms Fr, 3979, fo 135, "Extraict d'un article contenu aux deliberations faictes par M. le duc d'Aumale...tenue à Amyens pour pourveoir aux affaires de lad. province...Faict à Amyens, le second jour de novembre...1590".

obliged to remove him in order to placate the town.<sup>244</sup> There was a high mortality rate among senior clients of the duke and veterans of the League of 1576. In the space of few days in 1589 François de Roncherolles was killed and in a separate engagement three members of the Tiercelin family died.<sup>245</sup> By January 1594 d'Aumale still had in the field men like Antoine du Hamel, sieur de Belleglise, but it was now noticeable that he was commanding Spanish troops.<sup>246</sup> Abbeville and Amiens refused to countenance the introduction of foreign troops and when Paris succumbed to Henri IV the Picard towns decided to treat with the king, making d'Aumale's position untenable. When his Picard power base collapsed he fled to the Spanish Netherlands, entering Spanish service and dying in Brussels in 1631.

D'Aumale's exile has been ignored by historians but it provides a good example of how Henri IV was able to impose his authority. While the rest of the Guise were handsomely rewarded, d'Aumale was made an example. There was no *via media* between accommodation and defiance. Charles duc de Guise reached an agreement with the king in November 1594 and Mayenne agreed on a cessation of hostilities on the 22 September 1595. Both received generous terms and Guise was granted the governorship of Provence, a province in which he had a landed interest. This was not only a victory against the incumbent and family enemy, d'Epemon, but also provided a useful base for the pursuit of Guise dynastic interests in Italy. D'Aumale was offered generous terms by the king but he still refused to submit and was therefore declared guilty of *lèse majesté* and condemned to death *in absentia*. D'Aumale soon realised his error and spent the rest of Henri's reign trying to get himself rehabilitated. He and his wife wrote many letters to the king and Montmorency-Damville, the *connétable*.<sup>247</sup>

Henri IV realised the value of this example to potential malcontents but this does not demonstrate that the Bourbons had 'absolutist' tendencies. First, in 1595 the parlement of Paris refused to register the royal command calling for the execution of d'Aumale.<sup>248</sup> By 1602 the king could still not enforce the condemnation, since the *cour des pairs* failed to meet: "l'un se disant son allié et ami; les autres alléguaient quelques querelles qui étaient passées entre eux; d'autres mettaient en avant leur indisposition".<sup>249</sup> In fact, Henri showed fortitude in withstanding the pressure he was under to grant a pardon. It was the financial crisis of the d'Aumale that ruined the

---

<sup>244</sup> Prarond, *La Ligue à Abbeville*, II, pp 345, 378-86. Roncherolles was paid 3,680 *écus* in compensation by the town but he only resigned when the money was paid in May 1593.

<sup>245</sup> De Thou, X, p 640.

<sup>246</sup> Wernham (ed), *List and Analysis of State Papers, Foreign Series, Elizabeth I*, V, p 414.

<sup>247</sup> For example, BN, Ms Fr, 2945, fo 77, d'Aumale to Henri IV, 1596; BN, Ms Fr, 3574, fo 84, d'Aumale to Damville, Brussels, 15 September 1598; BN, Ms Fr, 3832, fo 83, duchesse d'Aumale to Damville, n.d.; BN, Ms Fr, 4766, fo 240, d'Aumale to Henri IV, n.d.

<sup>248</sup> Pierre de L'Estoile, *Journal pour le règne de Henri IV*, L.-R. Lefèvre (ed), 2 vols, Paris, 1948, 1958, vol I, pp 461-2.

<sup>249</sup> L'Estoile, *Journal pour le règne de Henri IV*, II, p 71.

family rather than the king's displeasure. In February 1594 Sully paid a visit to the duchesse d'Aumale, remarking upon the dilapidated state of the once magnificent château of Anet.<sup>250</sup> The seignury of Boves was seized in 1606 on behalf of creditors.<sup>251</sup> In 1609 the barony of Ivry was also handed over to the administration of creditors, adjudging it to Marie de Luxembourg, widow of the duc de Mercoeur who had leant heavily to d'Aumale. Financial disaster was compounded by the failure to produce a male heir.<sup>252</sup> In order to accomplish the destruction of d'Aumale Henri only had to bide his time and undermine the family by quartering troops on its lands.<sup>253</sup>

Nevertheless it should not be presumed that the destruction of the d'Aumale was inevitable. The duke simply exchanged one master for another, becoming a pensioner of the Spanish king, attending the court of the archdukes in Brussels and leading troops at Amiens against Henri IV in 1597 and at Nieuwpoort against the Dutch in 1600.<sup>254</sup> He remained in contact with his friend and relative the duc de Mercoeur, who wrote a letter to d'Aumale in 1599 expressing the defiant attitude of the House of Lorraine. Mercoeur alluded to the descent of their family from Charlemagne such that:

personne ne doibt plus doubter ce que vous et les vostres pourrez bien en qualité de ses successeurs remonter sur la mesme throsne...

and reconfirmed his commitment to catholicism, demonstrating that his submission to Henri was temporary, and regretting that he had been forced:

me departir pour quelque temps de l'apparence de mes pretentions sur la Bretagne plustot forcé par le bon sens des envieux de nostre maison que par la justice de leurs armes...je me resolus de remettre a une saison plus oportune de reprendre de ce qui m'appartient.<sup>255</sup>

---

<sup>250</sup> Sully, *Les Oeconomies Royales*, D. Buisseret and B. Barbiche (eds), Paris, 1970-, vol I, pp 405-6.

<sup>251</sup> Janvier, *Boves et ses seigneurs*, p 172.

<sup>252</sup> The elder of his two daughters married Henri de Savoie, duc de Nemours and the younger wedded Ambrosio Spinola, see Anselme, III, p 492.

<sup>253</sup> According to the duchesse d'Aumale the damage at Ivry was 8,000 *écus*, see BN, Ms Fr, 10239, fo 54, duchesse d'Aumale to Damville, n.d.

<sup>254</sup> In 1608 he was governor of Binche and Mariemont, see H. Lonchay et al (eds), *Correspondance de la cour d'Espagne sur les affaires des Pays-Bas au XVII<sup>e</sup> siècle*, 6 vols, Brussels, 1923-37, vol I, p 298.

<sup>255</sup> BN, Dupuy, 88, fo 340, Mercoeur to d'Aumale, La Roquette, 14 July 1599.

In fact Mercoeur died in 1602, thus removing another thorn from Henri's side. Nonetheless the danger from the Guise family had already diminished because the family could never be united as it once had been. In Normandy the decline of the d'Aumale inevitably had a more serious impact than elsewhere. This was partially offset by the ability of Charles, duc d'Elbeuf, to establish his branch of the family on an equal footing with that of his cousins. In 1593 he escaped the captivity in which he had been held since the murder of Henri de Guise at Blois. D'Elbeuf was made governor of Poitiers but he did not take part in any offensive actions and remained on good terms with the royalist governor of Poitou, coming to an agreement with him for the division of the *taille*.<sup>256</sup> Negotiators from the town were sent with the consent of the duke to parley with Henri IV, and in June 1594 Poitiers submitted, d'Elbeuf becoming the first member of his family to yield. He was well rewarded; remaining as governor of Poitiers and, according to Davila, receiving a pension of 30,000/ p.a.<sup>257</sup> The d'Elbeuf continued to be well treated by the Bourbons. The duke was confirmed in the office of *grand écuyer* and, since d'Aumale had preferred exile, he was granted the forfeited office of *grand veneur* and he also obtained the governorship of the Bourbonnais. In 1619 his son married the illegitimate daughter of Henri IV and was made governor of Picardy, demonstrating the confidence placed in the family.<sup>258</sup> D'Elbeuf's close links to the protestant hierarchy were undoubtedly of great benefit in his rehabilitation.

Joseph Bergin has already shown that historians ignore the continuing power and influence of the Guise in the early seventeenth century at their peril.<sup>259</sup> In Normandy the decline of the branch of d'Aumale was a severe blow but it was in stark contrast to the resilience of their d'Elbeuf cousins. In 1605 the duc d'Elbeuf inherited the entire comté of Harcourt on the death of his nephew, Guy de Coligny, comte de Laval.<sup>260</sup> When the dynastic wars of the 1590s came to an end, d'Elbeuf no longer had the need for a large military retinue and in any case Henri IV was forced to reduce standing companies because of the penury of the crown.<sup>261</sup> The reconstruction of the shattered Norman economy needed local expertise and a standing council to oversee administrative, financial and judicial decisions. This council in Normandy was headed by the duke's wife, Marguerite de Chabot, who became the first member of the family to reside continuously at Elbeuf.<sup>262</sup> She was aided in her task by Charles de Sarcilly, sieur d'Ernes, *maître d'hôtel* and

---

<sup>256</sup> A. Thibaudeau, *Histoire de Poitou*, 3 vols, Niort, 1839-40, vol III, p 121.

<sup>257</sup> Ibid.

<sup>258</sup> Anselme, III, p 493.

<sup>259</sup> Bergin, "The Decline and Fall of the House of Guise as an Ecclesiastical Dynasty".

<sup>260</sup> The comté had been divided between the two families in 1584 and since 1588 d'Elbeuf had administered the lands since 1588 as *tuteur* of Guy, comte de Laval, see Broussillon, *La maison de Laval*, V, p 324; ADSM, E1, 482, 1584.

<sup>261</sup> Greengrass, *France in the Age of Henri IV*, pp 182-3.

<sup>262</sup> Maille, *Recherches sur Elbeuf*, II, p 53.

*intendant* of the duke. His prominence as a counsellor reveals the links between families that can continue over generations - he was the son of Jean de Sarcilly and Catherine, *batârde* de Lorraine, who were married before the Wars of Religion began.<sup>263</sup> The younger sister of Charles was *lille d'honneur* and *dame d'atours* to the queen, Louise de Lorraine. As the political situation in France became less confrontational so the need for the affinity as a symbol of military power and prestige temporarily declined. Affinities now consisted of smaller military retinues and centred upon the management of the family fortune and the household, as they had before 1562. After the disruption of war, in which documents detailing rights and privileges had been destroyed or their enforcement neglected, seigneurial power had once again to be asserted. Marie ordered her agents to pursue all reliefs owed on noble fiefs "à toute diligence sans intermission".<sup>264</sup> Eustache Trevache, the Huguenot *fermier* of Lillebonne, was subject to legal proceedings for having the temerity to flee the Catholic League without having paid the agreed total for the lease, and all his property was confiscated, including a grainhouse he owned at Bolbec.<sup>265</sup> Accords were reached with the *fermiers* about reducing the sums they had to pay since the war had lowered the expected level of revenue. Eloi Perdrix, the *fermier* of Elbeuf received 900/ of compensation because of the "abbeuses desd. terres quil y a esté pillé et robbé par les gens de guerre le nombre de vingt deux chevaux qui sont estimez valoir plus de cinq cents escus".<sup>266</sup> In 1596 the piece of land called the prairie d'Estelan produced nothing because the "sieur de boisrozé estant en garnison du chasteau de Lillebonne a toujours jouy de lad. prairie pour l'usage de ses chevaux sans avoir paye".<sup>267</sup> The reclaiming and enforcement of rights meant building up and maintaining a judicial clientèle in the parlement of Rouen and lesser courts. The duke was soon embroiled in scores of cases. If a vassal did something as simple as to refuse to hand in an *aveu* for his lands, detailing the dues and obligations he owed, a lengthy court case would ensue.<sup>268</sup>

This reconstruction would have needed a large clientèle - a process aided by the duke's position as a provincial governor, and his position as *grand veneur* and *grand écuyer*, which augmented his status and increased the patronage he could dispense. In 1605 he died and was buried at La Saussaye near Elbeuf, a ceremony which placed him beside his ancestor, Jean de Lorraine, comte d'Harcourt, buried there in 1472. D'Elbeuf thus realised and reinforced the relationship between the House of Lorraine and Normandy. Despite the defeat of the Catholic League d'Elbeuf represented the continuation of the House of Lorraine as Norman magnates.

---

<sup>263</sup> The composition and activities of the duke's council are discussed in chapter three above.

<sup>264</sup> AN, T, 199/22, fo 87.

<sup>265</sup> ADC, E, 353, 13 November 1585; AN, T, 199/22 fo 87.

<sup>266</sup> AN, T, 199/24, Compte, 7 October 1597.

<sup>267</sup> ADSM, E1, 446, Compte de Lillebonne pour 1596.

<sup>268</sup> ADSM, E1, 445, 12 March 1604. The defaulters in this case were former leaguer captains, Antoine de Canouville and François de Fontaine-Martel.

## Conclusion



By neglecting the Guise landed interest and affinity in Normandy, historians have misunderstood many things about the family and overlooked one of the most important elements of sixteenth-century Norman society. For example, the influence of the Guise affinity cannot be omitted from the exploration of the reasons for the failure of protestantism in Normandy. This study questions the conclusions of those historians who have sought to minimise the role of the nobility in both the initial success and growth of protestantism and the resurgence of catholicism.<sup>1</sup> The relationship between elite politics and popular forces was complex and interdependent, and has been little studied by historians. As early as 1562 the duc d'Aumale was capable of forming a catholic peasant defence association. Similarly the passing of the comtés of Brionne, Harcourt and Eu from the hands of Calvinist lords to the Guise family between 1567 and 1570 was a crucial blow to the strength of Calvinism in upper Normandy and for its failure to consolidate; Calvinist tenants, churches and pastors would not only lack future protection but persecution would become more likely.<sup>2</sup> Similarly those Calvinist lords, like the duc de Longueville, who could have provided leadership to the faithful, preferred to remain on the side of their kinsmen the Guise. The protestant masses in Rouen were bound to become an isolated and powerless minority unless they could find the protection of a locally powerful lord. The Calvinist governor, Bouillon, was another hope, but he vacillated too often. Although he made his lands in the East into protestant havens, he lacked the credit in Normandy to be effective and was too dependent on the Guise at court to use his governorship effectively. The protestants in the 1560s, unlike the Catholic League in the 1580s, lacked the leadership that could make effective use of popular passions.

This study has attempted to demythologise the Guise family. The Guise were not a monolithic entity; indeed it is clear that members of the family had different personalities and beliefs. The unity of the family did not arise from a uniform and rigid obsession with the defence of catholicism or total dedication to a religious cause. Individual members of the family had more complex views of religion, witness the cardinal de Lorraine's ecumenism in 1561 and attempts by the family to form factional alliances with Condé in 1564, Navarre in 1578 and Calvinist malcontents in 1580. Charles d'Elbeuf was not bothered by the employment of Calvinist servants or the borrowing of money from the elite of the Rouennais protestant community. Attitudes to religion were both sincere and opportunist but always depended on circumstances; there was never a constant fixed perspective towards faith and the Guise were not religious dogmatists. Conversely, since family interest and the defence of catholicism became analogous in the minds of the Guise, religion was always viewed with the family interest in mind. These examples of apparent Guise hypocrisy towards the catholic faith are all related to the furtherance of family interest. This is why Longueville

---

<sup>1</sup> On the nobility and protestantism, see Benedict, *Rouen during the Wars of Religion*, p 242; D. Nicholls, "The Origins of Protestantism in Normandy". Certainly the repressive royal edicts of 1567-8 and the massacres of 1572 were disasters for the protestant community. Denis Crouzet in *Les guerriers de Dieu*, eschews an analysis of the interaction between elite and popular politics in favour of the study of the popular imagination, *mentalités* and the clash between opposing systems of belief.

<sup>2</sup> This point is also made in G. Hurpin (ed), *L'Intendance de Rouen en 1698*, p 175.

and Bouillon could trust the Guise, since kinship was above religion. Yet because the Guise were the symbols of catholicism and because they fashioned an image of themselves as defenders of the faith, the furtherance of the family by any means was also the advancement of the catholic religion.

It has long been established that the cardinal de Lorraine was a much more complex character than contemporary propaganda had portrayed him. His commitment to ecumenism in 1561 may have been political but he was not the only member of the Guise family to have been exposed to more tolerant religious currents, in which hope of conciliar reform and reconciliation flourished. Anne d'Este was certainly educated in this Erastian atmosphere. It is noticeable that both she and the cardinal became more inflexible after the death of her husband in 1563. This event is crucial in understanding Guise strategy thereafter since this was a terrible blow and the frustrating attempts to obtain justice only exacerbated the bitterness. This hatred was not aimed at all protestants in general but specifically at the Châtillon and their catholic allies the Montmorency; naturally an attack on protestantism was also a blow to the Châtillon. Even in this more religiously hostile atmosphere the Guise could employ the poet Remy Belleau at Joinville as tutor to Charles future marquis d'Elbeuf. A few months previously Belleau had been a protestant, writing in defence of Condé after the *conjuraton* of Amboise. Belleau provided a humanist education and it did not matter that he was "assez indifférent pour la cause catholique".<sup>3</sup> In contrast to the marquis d'Elbeuf, his cousin Charles de Lorraine, the future duc d'Aumale, was educated at a Jesuit-run college established in the post-Tridentine era. Generalisations about the family should be attempted with caution. D'Elbeuf, with protestant kinsmen and servants, proved himself to be more tolerant in his religious attitudes and d'Aumale more ultramontane. They both fought alongside each other in the Catholic League but this unity came not from a shared militant faith but a common belief in the pursuit of family and dynastic interest. Likewise, their kinsman Charles III duc de Lorraine supported his cousins financially and politically during their struggles. He did not see any contradiction between his support for them and his own toleration of protestantism; his chief minister, the comte de Salm was a Calvinist. Charles' support of the Catholic League was purely one of dynastic ambition rather than of pious scruples.<sup>4</sup>

The centrality of the family in political calculations, and the role played by Antoinette de Bourbon at its apex, cannot be underestimated. After the death of her husband in 1550 she spent the rest of her life at Joinville, leading a religiously orthodox lifestyle and shunning the court. She devoted herself totally to the running of family affairs, concerning herself with family finances and estate management. The upbringing of her grandchildren was undertaken at Joinville under her auspices with the help of her daughters and daughters-in-law. In this atmosphere the bonding of the kin group began away from the court, fostering the close relationships that characterised the Guise family. Historians of politics and institutions in sixteenth-century France have usually

---

<sup>3</sup> A. Echhardt, *Remy Belleau: sa vie - sa Bergerie*, Budapest, 1917, pp 53-9, 71.

<sup>4</sup> Davillé, *Prétensions de Charles III duc de Lorraine à la couronne de France*, p 3.

concentrated on individuals. In doing this they have failed to grasp the principles of political culture. Political strategy was above all based on the family and within the kin grouping women had a crucial role to play in politics and family strategy. Thus the fortunes of the d'Elbeuf branch, which flourished in the early seventeenth century, could not have been possible without Charles duc d'Elbeuf at court and his wife, Marguerite de Chabot, playing an equally important role in reviving the family estates in Normandy.

This study has attempted to view the monarchy from the perspective of one family in contrast to the traditional preoccupation with seeing the nobility only in terms of the state and the monarchy. The Guise served the monarchy to further their own family and both king and family had prospered from the alliance of interests before 1559. However, during the Wars of Religion the Guise - in contrast to the reigns of Henri II and François II - did not rank among the intimates of the king. Charles IX and Henri III were heavily influenced by their mother and had their own favourites and, as their reigns progressed, they came to fear Guise power. This fear came because of the realisation that the Guise, through their dynastic eminence, wished to be the most prominent of royal counsellors. In this way dynastic ambition and religion became so intertwined they cannot be separated. The appeals made by the family to the catholic imagination and its ability to capitalise on popular feeling gave the family its power base.

The defence of catholicism was not part of a one-dimensional religious struggle. It was both a defence of the faith and a factional badge around which support could rally. The Guise were on the one hand capable of employing Huguenot servants and helping Huguenot kinsmen and on the other hand portraying themselves as the only saviours of catholicism. Thus the Guise family were able to project a public image aimed at the catholic people which exactly fitted the perceptions of the masses, who in the economic turbulence and religious anxieties 1580s awaited a godly and martial saviour to deliver them. The duc de Guise was able to portray himself as the defender of the faith even if his actions were always in the dynastic interest - there was a deliberate formation and expression of identity.<sup>5</sup> In the final analysis the dynastic interest became synonymous with the religious cause. The ultramontane ideology, however much at odds it was with the actual activities of the moderate duc d'Elbeuf, could not be abandoned since popular support had by the 1580s, in alliance with the extensive Guise affinity, become the foundation of dynastic power.

It was popular forces and not Spanish money which brought the Guise to the pinnacle of their success in 1588, especially since Philip II's *crédit* was badly damaged by the destruction of the Armada. Since the Guise were virtuous symbols of catholicism, untainted by the failures and mistakes of the monarchy, they were bound to be the the ideal focus for popular discontent. There was a gap between elite and popular mentalities. On the one hand the Guise were concerned with their dynastic interests and on the other hand the masses were driven by other forces, whether in defence of communal liberties or religious anxiety. The Catholic League was clearly an alliance of different interests but the problem remains of how the Guise were able to exploit popular passions.

---

<sup>5</sup> Greenblatt, *Renaissance Self-Fashioning from More to Shakespeare*, p 1.

First, the Guise were a symbol - a focus for the discontents of the masses and one way of legitimising popular protest. Secondly, because after 1563 the Guise remained relatively out of favour at court, they were thus forced to augment their power base in the provinces and make alliances with provincial malcontents. They did this in precisely those regions where the League was to have most impact - Normandy, Picardy and Champagne. For example, in Picardy the duc d'Aumale realised the potential for restructuring his affinity after 1576 around the newly formed Catholic League.

The existence of a large affinity was not tantamount to the control of a province. Thus in Picardy d'Aumale was not able to take any significant town by force. However, when the municipal revolutions swept Picardy in 1589 he was in a perfect position to capitalise on the disintegration of monarchical authority. The Guise affinity in Paris was numerically small but it gave the family a link with and information about popular feeling in Paris. Thus affinities were the crucial bridge between elite and popular politics. In 1589 the *gautiers* joined the League to make common cause because of the relationship between Guise clients and the noble leaders of the peasants. In Normandy, popular support for the Catholic League was effectively galvanised into a major political force by the existence of the large Guise affinity in the province.

The strength of an affinity came not from a hierarchical structure and control from the centre. The foundation of an affinity was not control but consensus, counsel and devolvement of power. The provincial council, as much as the lord's household, was a forum in which clients and servants could participate in the running of the lord's affairs and the formulation of family strategy: taking decisions and enjoying the financial and honorific benefits of service. Strategy formed in council had the benefits of drawing upon a wide body of information and advice and of achieving consensus within the lord's following. If a revolt was to be raised the support of clients had to be forthcoming. Affinities were not therefore bent to the will of a single magnate but were dynamic structures in which the decisions and strategies of clients were vitally important. Ideology, in the form of religion, was a means of galvanising an affinity and expanding the size of a following with an appeal to faith.<sup>6</sup> The maintenance of a large affinity was crucial to the power of a magnate. However, to maintain support during the Wars of Religion the Guise not only had to provide benefits for and extend protection to their clientèle they also had to ensure that they were seen to be defending the faith of their clients. By using religion to augment their following they were also bound to maintain that support by continuing to symbolise the catholic cause. In this manner the opportunity for factional manoeuvring, by forming factions across the religious divide, although often attempted by the family, was limited and usually ineffectual. The Guise were both strengthened and imprisoned by their appeal to populism.

This study has focused upon one family in a single province during a limited period of time. Above all it has demonstrated the need for more studies of the composition and dynamics of affinities in late medieval and early modern France. Further study will illuminate not only the

---

<sup>6</sup> Thus Condé was able hugely to expand his following in the 1560s.

strategies of the magnates and their international family interests, but will also reveal the importance of the lesser nobility and other social groups within political society. Politics was not the preserve of a few magnates, and historians must begin to explore the connection between elite and popular politics and the interaction between the court faction and provincial power structures. Affinities are crucial to the understanding of early modern political society. This thesis has attempted to outline the parameters for future study and indicate the areas which future research needs to explore.

## Appendices

**Appendix A: Income of the ducs d'Aumale under Claude de Lorraine (1526-73) and his son Charles (1556-1631).**

<u>Seigneurie and date of acquisition/sale</u>	<u>Value in livres per annum and date</u>
<u>Normandy</u>	
duchy of Aumale (1550)	9,800 (1583) <sup>1</sup>
barony of Mauny (1550s)	4-5,000 (1580s) <sup>2</sup>
comté of Maulevrier (1547)	1,000 (1568) <sup>3</sup>
Anet and Ivry (1566-1612)	20,000 (1614) <sup>4</sup>
barony of Bec Crespin (1562-79)	2,075 (1604) <sup>5</sup>
Longpaon/Geole (1565)	900 (1564) <sup>6</sup>
<u>Other lands</u>	
comté of Saint-Vallier (1566)	n/k
seigneurie of Boves (1550)	n/k
<u>Offices and Pensions</u>	
captain 50 lances	1,800 (1551) <sup>7</sup>
100 lances	2,800 (1572) <sup>8</sup>
50 lances	2,200 (1573) <sup>9</sup>
captain <i>chevaux-légers</i>	3,600 (1551) <sup>10</sup>
royal pension	16,000 (1564) <sup>11</sup>
	12,000 (under Henri III) <sup>12</sup>
<i>grand veneur</i>	4,400 (1563) <sup>13</sup>
	3,750 (1581) <sup>14</sup>
governor of Burgundy	n/k

- 
- <sup>1</sup> BN, PO, 1750, fo 235, 24 March 1583, *bail à ferme* of the duchy of Aumale for six years commencing 1 January 1584.
- <sup>2</sup> Extrapolated from the figure given for the 1670s, in G. A. Prevost (ed), *Notes du premier président Pellot sur la Normandie (1670-83)*, Rouen and Paris, 1915, p 160.
- <sup>3</sup> ADSM, J, 138, Documents concernant le comté de Maulevrier, 1469-1779, 29 April 1567.
- <sup>4</sup> Maudit, *Histoire d'Ivry-la-Bataille*, p 282-3.
- <sup>5</sup> Dewald, *Formation of a Provincial Nobility*, p 208.
- <sup>6</sup> ADSM, Tabellionage, 2E1, 326, 19 February 1564. The price of these lands was 23,000*l*.
- <sup>7</sup> BN, PO, 1749, fo 78, 25 April 1551.
- <sup>8</sup> BN, PO, 1749, fo 93, 6 October, 1572.
- <sup>9</sup> BN, PO, 1750, fo 175, 15 October 1573.
- <sup>10</sup> BN, PO, 1749, fo 80, 28 October 1551.
- <sup>11</sup> BN, PO, 1750, fo 157, 29 February 1564.
- <sup>12</sup> J. Boucher, *Société et mentalités autour de Henri III*, 3 vols, Lille, 1981, vol I, p 283.
- <sup>13</sup> BN, PO, 1750, fo 158, 25 May 1564.
- <sup>14</sup> BN, PO, 1750, fo 228, 31 December 1581.

**Appendix B: Income of the d'Elbeuf Family under René de Lorraine (1536-66), marguis d'Elbeuf and his son Charles (1556-1605), duc d'Elbeuf**

<u>Seigneurie and date of acquisition/sale</u>	<u>Value in livres per annum and date</u>
<b><u>Normandy</u></b>	
duchy of Elbeuf (1550)	13,000(1595) <sup>1</sup>
comté of Lillebonne(1570)	3,339(1540) <sup>2</sup>
	7,300(1581) <sup>3</sup>
comté of Brionne (1567)	2,884(1540) <sup>4</sup>
comté of Harcourt (1567/1586)	4,218(1540) <sup>5</sup>
<b><u>Other Lands</u></b>	
barony of Ancenis (1554-99)	24,000 (1599) <sup>6</sup>
barony of Pagny (1583)	n/k
<b><u>Offices and Pensions</u></b>	
captain 50 lances	2,200 (1573) <sup>7</sup>
60 lances	2,800 (1579) <sup>8</sup>
<i>capitain-général des galères</i>	5,540 (1564) <sup>9</sup>
<i>grand écuyer</i>	n/k
governor of Bourbonnais (1586-8)	n/k
pension from cardinal de Lorraine	2,000 (1561) <sup>10</sup>

<sup>1</sup> AN, T, 199/24, last december 1595. Elbeuf was only created a duché-pairie in 1581.

<sup>2</sup> ADC, E, 3, 10 October 1540.

<sup>3</sup> ADSM, Tabellionage, 1<sup>er</sup> meubles, 24 February 1586.

<sup>4</sup> ADC, E, 3, 10 October 1540.

<sup>5</sup> ADC, E, 3, 10 October 1540.

<sup>6</sup> Maillard, *Histoire d'Ancenis*, p 589.

<sup>7</sup> BN, PO, 1750, fo 191, 15 October 1573.

<sup>8</sup> BN, PO, 1750, fo 192, 27 February 1579.

<sup>9</sup> AN, K, 92<sup>B</sup>, fo 29, 30 October 1564.

<sup>10</sup> BN, PO, 1749, fo 130, 22 April 1561.



**Appendix C: Buyers of *rentes* from the ducs d'Aumale, according to the Rouennais Notarial Archives**

<b>Buyer</b>	<b>Amount <i>livres</i></b>	<b>Date of Purchase</b>	<b>ADSM Tabellion- age, 2E1</b>
Gilles Gasquerel, bourgeois:	700	11.10.50	304
Jean de Saldaigne: <sup>1</sup>	250	17.10.50	304
Robert de La Masure: <sup>2</sup>	400	06.11.50	304
Gilles Gasquerel:	300	04.09.51	305
Jean Le Febvre d'Escalles: <sup>3</sup>	210	07.09.56	313
Simon Baudouin, bourgeois:	100	07.09.56	313
Chapter of Rouen Cathedral:	360	30.09.56	313/314
Jesse de Bauquemare:	20	06.10.56	323
Nicholas Romé: <sup>4</sup>	200	25.11.58	318
George Langlois, bourgeois:	600	19.02.64	329
Jesse de Bauquemare:	360	10.01.65	334
Jacques Declainville:	400	10.01.65	334
Jean Le Febvre d'Escalles:	420	10.01.65	334
Nicholas Romé:	400	16.07.65	330
Catherine Le Gras:	100	17.11.65	331
Vincent Puchot:	400	28.11.65	331
Children/wife Vincent Puchot:	1000	17.09.66	332
Marie de La Haye: <sup>5</sup>	600	14.09.70	341
Guillaume Auber: <sup>6</sup>	600	14.09.70	341
Marc-Antoine Bigot: <sup>7</sup>	300	14.09.70	341
Jean Bethencourt, <i>docteur</i> :	200	14.09.70	341
Charles Puchot: <sup>8</sup>	300	25.09.79	359
Charles Puchot:	200	1583	2.Hér.-02.03.84
<i>Procuration:</i>	6000	03.04.90	2.Hér.-03.04.90

<sup>1</sup> A Huguenot merchant, see Brunelle, *The New World Merchants of Rouen*, p 150

<sup>2</sup> A *conseiller* in the parlement of Rouen (1520-56), see Frondeville, *Conseillers*, p 197.

<sup>3</sup> A *conseiller* in the parlement (1544-71) and husband of Anne Bauquemare, see Frondeville, *Conseillers*, p 360.

<sup>4</sup> *Conseiller du ville* and *secrétaire du roi*, see Frondeville, *Présidents*, p 422.

<sup>5</sup> Wife of Vincent Puchot.

<sup>6</sup> Son of a *conseiller* in the parlement and an adherent of the Catholic League, see Frondeville, *Conseillers*, p 276.

<sup>7</sup> Captain of the bourgeois militia in Rouen for the Catholic League, see Frondeville, *Présidents*, p 246.

<sup>8</sup> Son of Vincent Puchot.

**Appendix D: Buyers of *rentes* from the duc d'Elbeuf, according to the Rouennais Notarial Archives**

<b>Buyer</b>	<b>Amount <i>livres</i></b>	<b>Date of Purchase</b>	<b>ADSM Tabellion- age, 2E1</b>
Marguerite Romé:	600	11.06.80	360
Catherine Le Gayant:	600	13.06.80	360
Jacques de Bauquemare:	360	12.08.80	361
Barbe Le Mercier:	600	05.05.81	363
Alonce Quintadoines:	900	05.05.81	363
Jacques Jubert:	1200	5.5/27.12.81	363/4
Pierre Le Cornier: <sup>1</sup>	1600	05.05.81	363
Anne Le Mercier:	200	05.05.81	367
Marie de La Haye:	1200	12/15.07.81	363/7
Pierre du Quesne: <sup>2</sup>	300	08.12.81	364
Jean Hallé: <sup>3</sup>	600	08.12.81	364
Nicholas Cabreuil, bourgeois:	300	27.05.82	365
Pierre Roque: <sup>4</sup>	300	13.02.82	2.Hér.-05.05.1600
Baptiste Le Chandelier: <sup>5</sup>	300	14.02.82	365
François de Civile: <sup>6</sup>	120	29.05.82	365
André Bonissent: <sup>7</sup>	150	29.05.82	365
Marie de Bauquemare:	500	19.05.82	365
Robert Le Roux: <sup>8</sup>	300	23.01.83	2.Hér.-17.08.85
Antoine Premierasni: <sup>9</sup>	400	16.04.83	2.Hér.-16.04.1600
Anne du Moucel:	950	29.05.83	2.Hér.-13.05.1600
Jean de Vey:	300	17.06.83	2.Hér.-06.05.1600
Claude Le Gendre, bourgeois:	2000	27.06.83	2.Hér.-12.05.1600
Marie de La Haye:	1500	27.03.85	2.Hér.-27.06.1600 <sup>10</sup>

<sup>1</sup> A *conseiller* in the parlement (1579-93) and a royalist during the Catholic League, see Frondeville, *Conseillers*, p 561.

<sup>2</sup> A *conseiller* in the parlement (1572-1603) and a royalist during the period of the League, see Frondeville, *Conseillers*, p 503.

<sup>3</sup> *Trésorier-général en Normandie* and wealthy merchant closely linked to the Puchot, see Brunelle, *The New World Merchants of Rouen*, p 77.

<sup>4</sup> A *conseiller* in the parlement (1576-83) and husband of Marie Le Chandelier, see Frondeville, *Conseillers*, p 533.

<sup>5</sup> A *conseiller* in the parlement and (1556-92), see Frondeville, *Conseillers*, p 418.

<sup>6</sup> A Huguenot, see Frondeville, *Conseillers*, p 396.

<sup>7</sup> A *conseiller* in the parlement (1586-1620) and royalist during the League, see Frondeville, *Conseillers*, p 598.

<sup>8</sup> A *conseiller* in the parlement (1554-83) and son of a servant of the Guise (chapter two above), see Frondeville, *Conseillers*, p 298.

<sup>9</sup> *Procureur* and *receveur* for the chevalier d'Aumale, abbot of Bec, see Brunelle, *The New World Merchants of Rouen*, p 67.

<sup>10</sup> The figure is made up of two transactions, the second was dated 7 July 1586.

**Appendix D continued**

Jacques Fizet: <sup>11</sup>	150	30.06.86	2.Hér.-17.06.1600
Marie Gombault:	300	07.07.86	2.Hér.-03.05.1600
Robert Hanivel:	300	08.07.86	2.Hér.-05.02.1608
Christophe Eude:	300	23.07.86	2.Hér.-10.05.1600
Jean de Rouen, bourgeois:	250	09.05.88	2.Hér.-09.05.88
Berthelemy Hallé:	1200	09.05.88	2.Hér.-09.09.88
Jean Deudemare, bourgeois:	660	25.09.88	2.Hér.-09.05.1600
Guillaume Auber:	500	1580s	2.Hér.-03.05.1600
Antoine Premierasni	45	06.09.89	2.Hér.-19.04.1608

---

<sup>11</sup> A *conseiller* in the parlement (1568-96) and supporter of the League, see Frondeville, *Conseillers*, p 437.

**Appendix E: Muster Rolls Consulted**

<b>Captain</b>	<b>Date</b>	<b>Place</b>	<b>M-at-A</b>	<b>Archers</b>	<b>BN,Ms</b>
Charles de Moy, sieur de La Meilleraye	06.01.59	Pontaudemer	37	56	Fr 25800
Jacques de Moy, sieur de Pierrecourt	22.04.69	Beningne-sur- Seine	29	43	Fr 21529
Jean de Moy, sieur de La Meilleraye	12.01.70	Auffay-sur- Scie	30	40	•
	12.01.74	Auffay-sur-	30	34	•
	28.02.81	Houdan	54	78	Fr 21537
Adrien, sieur de Bréauté	01.05.68	Grainville- la-Teinture	47	41	Clair 264
Philippe de Roncherolles	20.11.67	Pontoise	20	29	Clair 264
Pierre de Roncherolles	01.09.85	Abbeville	30	45	Na Fr 8833
Jean de Clères	1564	unknown	23	33	Fr 5467 fo 247
Claude duc d'Aumale	05.06.65	Chalons-sur Saône	50	74	Clair 261
	06.10.72	Dreux	51	75	Fr 21533
Charles duc d'Aumale	14.10.75	Beaune-en- Brie	21	28	Fr 21535
	28.08.81	Saint Quentin	42	89	Fr 21538
René marquis d'Elbeuf	01.06.65	Montereau	40	60	Clair 261
	06.02.69	Chinon	33	39	Fr 21529
Charles duc d'Elbeuf	1573	Mery-sur-Seine	21	34	Na Fr 8833
	26.02.79	Pontoise	35	42	Clair 267
Léonor d'Orléans, duc de Longueville	24.07.60	Caen	29	49	Fr 21525
	04.11.66	Caen	40	60	Fr 21527
	29.05.69	Berry	60	70	Fr 21530
	11.03.76	Cosne-sur-Seine	51	76	Clair 276
Tanneguy Le Veneur, sieur de Carrouges	05.06.65	Lisieux	30	45	Clair 261
	26.04.72	Lisieux	30	45	Clair 271

29.02.76	Brezolles (Bourbonnais)	29	42	Na Fr 8532
02.08.81	Noyon	57	86	Clair 278

•

Printed in Rodière and La Vallée, *La Maison de Moy*, pp 256-69.

## Appendix F: The Guise and the League of Péronne

<b>Signatory</b>	<b>Kinship Links and Guise Connections</b>
d'Acheu:	Paul d'Acheu m. Gabrielle d'Estourmel.
Pierre d'Ameray:	man-at-arms of the duc d'Aumale (1572-5).
Pierre d'Amerval:	archer of the duc d'Aumale (1581), brother Godefroy was lieutenant for the League in Montreuil in the 1590s, another brother, Simon, m. Adrienne de Lameth. Geoffrey d'Amerval was the ensign of André de Bourbon-Rubempré (1574-8) and lieutenant of Pierre de Roncherolles (1585). Charles d'Amerval was archer (1575) and later man-at-arms (1581) of the duc d'Aumale. Jean d'Amerval was archer of the duc d'Aumale (1565). Artus d'Amerval was prior of Fécamp.
Jacques d'Applaincourt:	ensign (1572-5) and lieutenant (1581) of the duc d'Aumale, governor of the duchy of Guise (1580-8).
Ponthus de Bellefourrière:	<i>guidon</i> of the marquis d'Elbeuf (1577-9) and governor of Corbie.
Jean de Belleval:	man-at-arms of the marquis d'Elbeuf (1565). François de Belleval was ensign of André de Bourbon-Rubempré and his son Jacques a <i>gentilhomme servant</i> of the cardinal de Bourbon.
A. de Biencourt:	Florimond de Biencourt was in the company of Claude I de Guise, governor of the duchy of Aumale and councillor of François de Guise (1552-62). His son Jacques m. Renée de Fumechon who was close to the Roncherolles and his daughter was attached to the household of Mary Stuart.
Jean de Biencourt:	<i>écuyer</i> of the duc d'Aumale (1581).
A. de Blottefière:	husband of Marguerite Picquet (see below).
André de Bourbon-Rubempré:	councillor of the cardinal de Bourbon, governor of Abbeville, <i>sénéchal</i> of the comté of Ponthieu and governor of the comté of Eu (1572-9).
Michel d'Estourmel:	nephew of the cardinal de Pellevé and lieutenant for the Catholic League in Picardy from the 1580s.
A. d'Estourmel:	brother of Michel.
Louis d'Estourmel:	brother of Michel.
Jean d'Estourmel:	cousin of Michel.
Charles de Fouilleuse:	sieur de Flavacourt, <i>guidon</i> (1573-5) and later ensign (1576-9) of the marquis d'Elbeuf.
Captain Flavacourt:	younger brother of the above.
J. de Forceville:	Charles was a man-at-arms of d'Humières and m. Marguerite du Hamel. Adrien was ensign of Jean de Rambures.

Antoine du Hamel: ensign (1575) and *guidon* (1581) of the duc d'Aumale. Barbe du Hamel m. Paul de Belleval.

Adrien de Lameth: m. Anne d'Estourmel.

Nicholas Le Prevost: daughter m. Jean Picquet.

Noël Le Roy: archer of the marquis d'Elbeuf (1565-9). François Le Roy was *écuyer* of the duc d'Aumale and André was leaguer lieutenant of Abbeville under Pierre de Roncherolles in the 1590s.

de Ligny: probably Jean de Rambures, younger brother of Philippe. Married the dame de Ligny in 1571, niece of André de Bourbon-Rubempré. Leaguer lieutenant in Picardy from the 1580s and governor of the duchy of Guise (1588).

Jean de Marcheville: archer of the duc d'Aumale (1572).

Jacques de Milly: man-at-arms of the marquis d'Elbeuf (1565-9).

Antoine de Monchy: son Gédéon m. Christine de Vieuxpont, sister of the ensign of the marquis d'Elbeuf.

Sidrac de Monchy: son of Antoine.

Robert de Monchy: colonel of foot for the League from the 1580s and younger brother Michel, *conseiller* in the parlement of Rouen and leader of the League in Normandy.

Jean de Mons: related to the Picquet.

Louis de Moy: m. Claire d'Amerval, governor of Ham (1577-84) and a relative of Jean de Moy, sieur de La Meilleraye.

Adrien Picquet: vassal of the comte d'Eu and assisted at the *grands jours* of the comté. His son Gédéon was lieutenant of Adrien de Tiercelin and captain of Aumale.

Jean Picquet: father of Adrien.

Charles Picquet: relative of the above.

Le seneschal de Ponthieu: perhaps Pierre de Roncherolles who succeeded Rubempré as *sénéchal* and as governor of Abbeville.

Philippe de Rambures: see de Ligny.

Rouvroy: Either René de Rouvroy, archer of the duc d'Aumale (1581), or André, a man-at-arms of the marquis d'Elbeuf (1579), or Jean, archer of the marquis d'Elbeuf (1579).

Saint-Blimond: François, *guidon* of Rubempré, see also Saveuse.

Regnault de Saint-Martin: man-at-arms of the duc d'Aumale (1581).

Josse de Saveuse: m. a) Marguerite des Essars and b) Suzanne d'Acheu. Sister Françoise m. André de Saint-Blimond.

François de Saveuse: brother of Josse.

Adrien de Tiercelin: major client of the Guise whose younger brother was lieutenant of the duc d'Avmale.<sup>1</sup>

---

<sup>1</sup> The essential basis for this biographical information can be found in Anselme, Chenaye-Desbois and Vindry. Also useful were the works on the Picard nobility, particularly R. de Belleval, *Nobiliaire de Ponthieu et de Vimeu*, 2 vols, Amiens, 1861 and *Les fiéfs et les seigneurs du Ponthieu et du Vimeu*, Paris, 1870; L.-E. de La Gorgue-Rosny, *Recherches généalogiques sur les comtés de Ponthieu, de Boulogne, de Guines*, 4 vols, Boulogne-sur-Mer, 1874. For a full list of the muster rolls consulted see appendix E.



**Appendix G: Guise Clients and League Adherents  
at the Provincial Estates, 1584-8<sup>1</sup>**

<b>Year</b>	<b>Name</b>	<b>Estate</b>	<b>Bailliage</b>
1584:	Claude Sécard, curé of Saint-Maclou	1st	Rouen
	Guillaume Vipart, sieur de Silly	2nd	Rouen
1585:	Gilles de Goutimesnil	2nd	Caux
	Antoine de Bigars, sieur de La Londe	2nd	Rouen
1586:	Jean de Vieuxpont, abbot of Saint-Jean de Falaise	1st	Alençon
	Etienne Vion, curé of Auzebosc	1st	Caux
	Barthélemy de Limoges	2nd	Rouen
1587:	François de Corneilles, sieur de Tendos	2nd	Rouen
	Antoine de Canouville, sieur de Raffetot	2nd	Caux
1588:	Jacques du Bosc, sieur de Coquéraumont	2nd	Rouen
	François de La Morvissière, sieur de Vicques	2nd	Cotentin <sup>1</sup>

1. The records for every *bailliage* do not exist; only those for Rouen are complete, see Farin, *Histoire de la ville de Rouen*, II, pp 407-11; *Cahier des Etats de Normandie sous le règne de Henri III*, vol II.

## Bibliography

Manuscript Sources

**Archives Nationales, Paris**

Série K            92<sup>B</sup>, KK 1088,  
Série M            458  
Série Q<sup>1</sup>           1371, 1374, 1375  
Série T            199/22, 199/24

**Bibliothèque Nationale, Paris**

Cabinet d'Hozier; 97, 216, 252

Carrés d'Hozier; 93

Cinq Cents Colberts; 7, 10, 24, 53, 54

Collection Clairambault; 261, 264, 267, 271, 276, 278, 341, 342, 344, 346, 347, 348, 351, 353, 726, 1087, 1204

Collection Dupuy; 88

Dossiers Bleus; 426, 442, 634, 661, 668, 674,

Manuscrits français; 2945, 3118, 3121, 3188, 3237, 3306, 3309, 3310, 3329, 3338, 3358, 3394, 3395, 3408, 3574, 3832, 3977, 3979, 4638, 4640, 4766, 5467, 8182, 10239, 15546, 15547, 15548, 15549, 15550, 15551, 15552, 15554, 15571, 15608, 15811, 15876, 15905, 18246, 20176, 20429, 20467, 20468, 20470, 20513, 20515, 20517, 20519, 20529, 20532, 20533, 20534, 20536, 20538, 20541, 20542, 20543, 20544, 20545, 20548, 20549, 20551, 20553, 20554, 20646, 20649, 21525, 21527, 21529, 21530, 21533, 21534, 21535, 21536, 21537, 21538, 22441, 23193, 23296, 24429, 25800, 25802, 25808, 25809, 26291, 26414, 32369

Nouvelles acquisitions françaises; 8630, 8632, 8633, 21165, 23576

Pièces originales; 485, 496, 781, 1413, 1749, 1750, 2165, 2078, 2166, 2539, 2842, 2958, 2994, 3029

**Archives Départementales de Calvados**

Série E            3, 237, 238, 339, 353  
2E; 882

**Archives Départementales de la Seine-Maritime**

Série B  
1B; 547  
1B, Registres Secrets; 91, 92, 93, 94, 100, 103

Série C            1116, 1228, 1231, 1239, 8182

Série E  
1ER; 1954

E1; 445, 446, 462, 482, 486

2E1, Tabellionage:

Registres sur parchemin; 304, 305, 313, 314, 316, 318, 319, 320, 321, 323, 326, 327 *bis*, 329, 331, 332, 334, 335, 339, 341, 344, 348, 350, 351, 352, 356, 357, 359, 360, 361, 362, 363, 364, 365, 367.

2<sup>ème</sup> Héritage; 1986, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2007, 2009, 2013, 2015, O2.03.84, 17.08.85, 09.05.88, 09.09.88, 03.04.90, 16.04.1600, 03.05.1600, 06.05.1600, 09.05.1600, 10.05.1600, 12.05.1600, 13.05.1600, 17.06.1600, 27.06.1600, 27. 07.1600, 05.02.1608, 19.04.1608.

1<sup>er</sup> meubles; 24.02.86,

2<sup>ème</sup> meubles; 25.07.86,

#### Série F

6F; 4, 11

#### Série G

Délibérations Capitulaires; 2162, 2164, 2171, 2173, 2175, 2176

3498

Chambre du Clergé; 5668, 5670

#### Série J

138

7J, Charrier de la famille Martel, 2, 3, 8, 43

Fonds Danquin carton 16.

#### **Archives Communales de Rouen**

Série A Délibérations de la ville; 17, 18, 19, 20

Série B Journaux des Délibérations; 2, 4

#### **Bibliothèque Municipale de Rouen**

Collection Leber, 5176

Y, 102

#### Printed Sources

Anselme, Le P. *-Histoire généalogique et chronologique de la maison royal de France, des pairs, grand officiers de la couronne & et de la maison du roy, 9 vols, Paris, 1726-33.*

Asseline, D. *-Les Antiquitez et Chroniques de la ville de Dieppe, 2 vols, Dieppe, 1874.*

- Aubigné, Agrippa d' -*Histoire Universelle*, A. de Ruble (ed), 9 vols, Paris, 1886-97.
- Belleau, Remy -*Larmes sur le trespas de Monseigneur René de Lorraine, et de Madame Louyse Marquis & Marquise d'Elbeuf. Ensemble le tombeau de Monseigneur François de Lorraine Duc de Guyse*, n.p., 1566.
- Bouquet, F. (ed) -*Documents concernant l'histoire de Neufchâtel-en-Bray*, Rouen, 1884.
- Bréard C. -*Les Archives de la ville de Honfleur, notes historiques et analyses de documents*, Paris, 1885.
- Bourgeville, Charles de, sieur de Bras. -*Les Recherches et Antiquitez de la province de Neustrie à présent duché de Normandie*, Caen, 1588.
- Boyvin, François de, baron du Villars -*Mémoires*, Michaud and Poujoulat, 1st ser., X.
- Brantôme, Pierre de Bourdeille, sieur de -*Oeuvres*, L. Lalanne (ed), 11, vols, Paris, 1864-82.
- Calendar of State Papers, Foreign Series, of the reign of Elizabeth I*, J Stevenson et al (eds), London, 1863-1950.
- Calendar of State Papers, Foreign Series, Scotland*, M. J. Thorpe et al (eds), 1858-1969.
- Calendar of State Papers, Foreign Series, Spain*, G. A. Bergenroth et al (eds), London, 1862-99.
- Calendar of State Papers, Foreign Series, Venice*, R. Brown et al (eds), London, 1867-97.
- Castelnau, Michel de -*Mémoires*, Collection Universelle des mémoires particuliers relatifs à l'histoire de France, XLI.  
-*Mémoires*, Michaud and Poujoulat, 1st ser., IX.
- Catalogue des actes de Henri II*, Paris, 1979-.
- Catalogue analytique des chartes, documents historiques composant les archives du collège héraldrique*, 2 vols, Paris, 1866.
- Chenaye-Desbois, F. de La and Badier -*Dictionnaire de la Noblesse*, 19 vols, Paris, 1863-76.
- Cimber L. and Danjou, F. (eds) -*Archives curieuses de l'histoire de France*, 1st ser., 15 vols, 1834-7.
- Collection Universelle des mémoires particuliers relatifs à l'histoire de France*, 67 vols, London, 1785-91.
- Correspondence de Theodore de Bèze*, H. Meylan et al (eds), Geneva, 1960-.
- Davila, E. C. -*Historie of the Civill Warres of France*, London, 1647-8.
- De Thou, J.-A. -*Mémoires, depuis 1553 jusqu'en 1601*, Michaud and Poujoulat, 1st ser., X.  
-*Histoire Universelle de 1543 jusqu'en 1607*, 16 vols, London, 1734.
- Dickinson, G. (ed) -*"Two Missions of Jacques de la Brosse"*, Scottish Historical Society, 3rd ser., vol XXXVI, Edinburgh, 1942.

"Documents Historiques: pillages des gens de guerre (1589-93)", *Bulletin de la société de l'histoire de Normandie*, 1909.

Durand, P. (ed) -*Inventaire-Sommaire des Archives de la ville d' Amiens antérieures à 1790*, série BB, Délibérations de l'Echevinage, Amiens, 1894.

Groulard, Claude -*Mémoires*, Michaud and Poujoulat, 1st ser., XI.

Haton, Claude -*Mémoires 1568-82*, F. Bourquelot (ed), 2 vols, Paris, 1857.

Héron, A. (ed) -*Deux Chroniques de Rouen*, Rouen and Paris, 1900.

"Histoire contenant les vains effort des Huguenots assiégens le prieuré de Saint-Philibert en Normandie", Cimber and Danjou, VI.

*Histoire ecclésiastique des églises réformées au royaume de France*, G. Baum and E. Caunitz (eds), 3 vols, Nieuwkoop, 1974.

*Histoire générale de Paris, Registre des délibérations du bureau de la ville de Paris*, Bonnardot et al (eds), Paris, 1883-.

Hurpin, G. (ed) -*L'Intendance de Rouen en 1698*, Paris, 1984.

*Journal de ce qui est passé en France durant l'année 1562*, M. François (ed), Paris, 1950.

*Journal d'un bourgeois de Paris*, L. Lalanne (ed), Paris, 1854.

Lacourcé and Duval -*Recueil de pièces originales et authentiques concernant la tenue des Etats-Généraux*, 9 vols, Paris, 1789.

La Planche, Louis  
Regnier, sieur de -*Histoire de l'Etat de France tant de la république que de la religion sous le règne de François II*, 1576.  
-*La Légende de Charles, Cardinal de Lorraine et de ses frères de la maison de Guise, descrite par François de l'Isle*, Reims, 1576.

La Popelinière,  
Lancelot de Voisin,  
de -*L'Amiral de France*, Paris, 1584.  
-*L'Histoire de France...depuis l'an 1550 iusques à ces temps*, 2 vols, sieur n. p., 1581.

L'Estoile, Pierre de -*Journal du règne de Henri III*, L.-R. Lefèvre (ed), Paris, 1943.  
-*Journal pour le règne de Henri IV*, L.-R. Lefèvre (ed), 2 vols, Paris, 1948, 1958.

*Letters and Papers, Foreign and Domestic, of the reign of Henry VIII*, J. S. Brewer et al (eds), 21 vols, London, 1864-1932.

"Lettre de M. le mareschal de montmorency à M. le duc de Montpensier, prince du sang au sujet de la querelle avec le cardinal de Lorraine", Cimber and Danjou, VI.

*Lettres de Catherine de Médicis*, H. de La Ferrière and Baguenault de Puchesse (eds), 9 vols, Paris, 1880-99.

*Lettres de Henri III*, P. Champion (ed), Paris, 1959-.

"Lettres du Roy au gouverneur de Bourgogne, par lesquelles il charge ceux de Guise du meurtre commis en la personne de monsieur l'amiral et de la sedition advenue à Paris et mande qu'il veut que l'édict de pacification soit entretenu", Cimber and Danjou, VII.

*Lettres, instructions et mémoires de Marie Stuart*, A. I. Labanoff (ed), 7 vols, London, 1845.

- Lonchay, H. et al (eds) -*Correspondance de la cour d'Espagne sur les affaires des Pays-Bas au XVII<sup>e</sup> siècle*, 6 vols, Brussels, 1923-37.
- Mémoires d'Antoine de Bigars, sieur de la Londe*, Société de l'histoire de Normandie, Mélanges, 5th ser., Rouen and Paris, 1898.
- Mémoires du prince de Condé*, Michaud and Poujoulat, VI.
- Mémoires et Correspondence de Duplessis-Mornay*, 12 vols, Paris, 1824-5.
- Mémoires-journaux de François de Lorraine duc d'Aumale et de Guise, 1547 à 1563*, Michaud and Poujoulat, VI.
- Michaud, J. F. and Poujoulat, J.-J.-F. (eds) -*Nouvelle collection des mémoires sur l'histoire de France*, Paris, 1836-54.
- Négociations diplomatiques de la France avec la Toscane*, G. Canestri and A. Desjardins (eds), 5 vols, Paris, 1859-86.
- Palma Cayet, P. V. -*Chronologie Novenaire*, Michaud and Poujoulat, 1st ser., XII.
- Papiers de Hervé de Longuanay, Gouverneur de la Basse-Normandie (1575-1589)*, St. Lô, 1897.
- Paris, L. (ed) -*Négociations, lettres et pièces diverses relatives au règne de François II*, Paris, 1841.
- Prévost, G. A. (ed) -*Notes du premier président Pellot sur la Normandie (1670-83)*, Rouen and Paris, 1915.
- Relation de troubles excités par les calvinistes dans la ville de Rouen depuis l'an 1537 jusqu'en l'an 1582*, publication of *La Revue de Rouen et de la Normandie*, Rouen, 1837.
- Remonstrance Faicte A Monsieur d'Espernon, Entrant En l'Eglise Cathedrale de Rouen, le 3 may 1588*, Rouen, 1588.
- Robillard de Beaurepaire, C. de (ed) -*Inventaire-Sommaire des Archives Départementales de la Seine-Inférieure, antérieurs à 1790*, ser. C and D, Paris, 1864.  
-*Séjour de Henri III à Rouen*, Société des Bibliophiles Normands, Rouen, 1870.  
-*Cahiers des Etats de Normandie sous le règne de Henri III*, 2 vols, 1887-8.  
-*Cahiers des Etats de Normandie sous le règne de Charles IX*, Rouen, 1891.
- Ruble, A. de (ed) -*Commentaires et lettres de Blaise de Monluc Maréchal de France*, 5 vols, Paris, 1864-72.
- Sars, M. de -*Inventaire-Sommaire des Archives de la ville de Guise antérieurs à 1800*, Laon, 1833.
- Saulx-Tavannes, Gaspard de -*Mémoires*, Michaud and Poujoulat, 1st ser., VIII.
- Serres, J. de -*Recueil des choses memorables avenues en France sous les regnes de Henri II, François II, Charles IX, Henri III, Henri IV, contenant infinies merveilles de nostre siècle*, n. p., 1599.

"Sommaire Discours De Toutes Des Deffaictes Des Reistres", Cimber and Danjou, XI.

- Sully, Maximilien de Béthune, duc de -*Les Oeconomies Royales*, D. Buisseret and B. Barbiche (eds), Paris, 1970-.
- Teulet, A. (ed) -*Papiers d'état...rélatifs à l'histoire de l'Ecosse au XVI<sup>e</sup>; tirés des bibliothèques et des archives de France*, 3 vols, Paris, 1851-60.  
-*Relations politiques de la France avec et de l'Espagne avec l'Ecosse au XVI<sup>e</sup> siècle*, 5 vols, Paris, 1862.
- Travers, E. (ed) -*Rôle du ban et de l'arrière-ban du bailliage de Caen en 1552*, Rouen and Paris, 1901.
- Valdory, G. -*Discours du siège de la ville de Rouen au mois de Novembre mil cinq cents quatre vingt onze*, E. Gosselin (ed), Rouen, 1871.
- Valois, C. de (ed) -*Mémoires de la Ligue, oeuvre inédite d'un contemporain*, Paris, 1914.
- Vieilleville, François de Scépeaux, sieur de -*Mémoires*, Michaud and Poujoulat, 1st ser., IX.  
-*Mémoires*, Collection Universelle des mémoires particuliers relatifs à l'histoire de France, XXXII.
- Vindry, F. -*Dictionnaire de l'Etat major au siezième siècle*, Paris, 1901.
- Wernham, R. B. -*List and Analysis of State Papers, Foreign Series, Elizabeth I*, London, 1964-.
- Wood, M. (ed) -*Foreign Correspondence with Marie de Lorraine, Queen of Scotland, 1548-57*, Scottish Historical Society, 3rd ser., vol VII, Edinburgh, 1925.

#### Secondary Sources

- Amphoux, H. -*Essai sur l'histoire du protestantisme au Havre et dans ses environs*, Le Havre, 1894.
- Barnavi, E. -*Le parti de Dieu: étude sociale et politique des chefs de la Ligue parisienne, 1585-1594*, Louvain, 1980.
- Baumgartner, F. -*Henry II's Italian Bishops: A study of the use and abuse of the Concordat of Bologna*, *Sixteenth Century Journal*, 1980.  
-*Henry II, King of France 1547-1559*, Durham and London, 1988.
- Benedict, P. -*Rouen during the Wars of Religion*, Cambridge, 1980.
- Beik, W. -*Absolutism and Society in Seventeenth-Century France: State Power and Provincial Aristocracy in Languedoc*, Cambridge, 1985.
- Belleval, R. de -*Nobiliare de Ponthieu et de Vimeu*, 2 vols, Amiens, 1861.  
-*Les fiefs et les seigneuries du Ponthieu et du Vimeu*, Paris, 1870.
- Bergin, J. -*The Decline and Fall of the House of Guise as an Ecclesiastical Dynasty*, *Historical Journal*, 1982.
- Boivin-Champeaux, L. -*Bernay et la Ligue*, Bernay, 1889.
- Bonnenfant, G. -*Histoire générale du diocèse d'Evreux*, 2 vols, Paris, 1933.



- Bonney, R. -*Society and Government in France under Richelieu and Mazarin, 1624-1661*, London, 1988.
- Borély, A. -*Histoire de la ville du Havre et de son ancien gouvernement*, 3 vols, Le Havre, 1880-1.
- Bossy, J. -"Leagues and Associations in Sixteenth Century French Catholicism, *Studies in Church History*, 1986.
- Bost, C.-M. -*Les seigneurs de Lillebonne*, Luneray, 1987.
- Boucher, J. -*Société et mentalités autour de Henri III*, 3 vols, Lille, 1981.  
-*La cour de Henri III*, Rennes, 1986.
- Bouillé du Chariol, R. de -*Histoire des ducs de Guise*, 4 vols, Paris, 1849-50.
- Briggs, R. -*Early Modern France*, Oxford, 1977.
- Broussillon, B. de -*La maison de Laval, 1020-1605: Etude historique accompagné du cartulaire de Laval et de Vitré*, 5 vols, Paris, 1895-1903.
- Brunelle, G. K. -*The New World Merchants of Rouen, 1559-1630*, Ann Arbor, 1991.
- Buvignier, C. -*Jametz et ses seigneurs*, Verdun, 1861.
- Caillières, J. de -*Histoire du mareschal de Matignon*, Paris, 1666.
- Carpenter, C. -"The Beauchamp affinity: a study of bastard feudalism at work", *English Historical Review*, 1980.
- Chestret de Hanneffe, J. de -*Histoire de la maison de La Marck y compris les Clèves de la seconde race*, Liège, 1898.
- Chevallier, P. -*Henri III: roi shakespearien*, Paris, 1985.
- Constant, J.-M. -*Les Guises*, Paris, 1984.
- Contamine, P. -*Guerre, état et société à la fin du moyen age*, Paris, 1972.
- Cossé, Simon de, duc de Brissac -*Histoire des ducs de Brissac*, Paris, 1952.
- Courtaux, T. and Touchet, marquis de -*Histoire généalogique de la maison de Touchet*, Paris, 1911.
- Crouzet, D. -"Recherches sur la crise de l'aristocratie en France au XVI: les dettes de la maison de Nevers", *Histoire, économie et société*, 1982.  
-*Les guerriers de Dieu: La violence au temps des troubles de religion (vers 1525 - vers 1610)*, 2 vols, Paris, 1990.
- Croze, J. de -*Les Guises, les Valois, et Philippe II*, 2 vols, Paris, 1866.
- Darsel, J. -"L'Amirauté en Normandie: I - Amirauté d'Eu Le-Tréport", *Annales de Normandie*, 1969.
- Daval, G. and J. -*Histoire de la Réformation à Dieppe, 1557-1657*, 2 vols, Rouen . 1878.

- Davies, J. -"Family Service and Family Strategies: The Household of Henri, duc de Montmorency, ca. 1590-1610", *Bulletin of the Society for Renaissance Studies*, 1985.  
 -"Neither Politique nor Patriot ? Henri de Montmorency and Philip II", *Historical Journal*, 1991.
- Davillé, L. -*Les prétensions de Charles III duc de Lorraine à la couronne de France*, Paris, 1909.
- Descimon, R. -"La Ligue à Paris (1585-94): une revision", *Annales ESC*, 1982.  
 -*Qui étaient les Seize ? : mythes et réalités de la Ligue parisienne (1585-1594)*, Paris, 1983.
- Des Diguères, V. -*Etude historique et généalogique sur les Rouxel de Médavy-Grancey*, Paris, 1870.
- Des Forts, P. -*Le Château de Villebon, Eure-et-Loire: Etude historique et archéologique*, Paris, 1914.
- Deville, A. -*Histoire du château et des sires de Tancarville*, Rouen, 1834.
- Dewald, J. -*The Formation of a Provincial Nobility: The Magistrates of the Parlement of Rouen, 1499-1610*, Princeton, 1980.  
 -*Pont-St-Pierre 1398-1798: Lordship, Community and Capitalism in Early Modern France*, Los Angeles and London, 1987.
- Diefendorf, B. -*Paris City Councillors in the Sixteenth Century: The Politics of Patrimony*, New Jersey, 1983.  
 -*Beneath the Cross: Catholics and Huguenots in Sixteenth-Century Paris*, Oxford, 1991.
- Donaldson, G. -*Scotland: James V-VII*, Edinburgh, 1978.
- Doumel, J. -*Histoire de la ville de Péronne*, Péronne, 1879.
- Drouot, H. -*Mayenne et la Bourgogne: Etude sur la Ligue, 1587-1596*, 2 vols, Paris, 1937.
- Eckhardt, A. -*Remy Belleau: sa vie - sa Bergerie*, Budapest, 1917.
- Eisenstadt, S. N and Roniger, L. -"Patron-Client Relationships as a Model of Structuring Social Exchange", *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 1980.
- Erlanger, P. -*Henri III*, Paris, 1948.
- Estaintot, R. d' -*La Ligue en Normandie*, Paris, 1862.  
 -"Recherches sur les Hautes-Justices Féodales existant en 1789 dans les limites du département de la Seine-Inférieure", *Académie des Sciences, Arts et Belles Lettres de Caen*, 1892.
- Estancelin, L. -*Histoire des comtes d'Eu*, Paris and Dieppe, 1828.
- Evans, W. H. -*Mézeray et la conception de l'histoire de France au XVII<sup>e</sup>*, Paris, 1930.
- Evennett, H. O. -*The Cardinal of Lorraine and the Council of Trent*, Cambridge, 1930.
- Fabre, F. -"The English College at Eu, 1582-1592", *Catholic Historical Review*, 1951.
- Farin, F. -*Histoire de la ville de Rouen*, 6 vols, Rouen, 1738.

- Filhol, R. -*Le premier président Christophe de Thou et la réformation de coutumes*, Paris, 1937.
- Floquet, A. -*Histoire du Parlement de Normandie*, 7 vols, Rouen, 1840-2.  
-*Histoire du privilège de Saint-Romain*, 2 vols, Rouen, 1833.
- Foisil, M. -*Harangue et rapport d'Antoine Séguier, commissaire pour le roi en Basse-Normandie (1579-1580)*, *Annales de Normandie*, 1976.
- Forestié, E. -*Un capitaine gascon au XVI<sup>e</sup>: Corbeyran de Cardaillac-Sarlabous*, Paris, 1897.
- Fomeron, H. -*Les ducs de Guise et leur époque*, 2 vols, Paris, 1877.
- Frondeville, H. de -*Les présidents du Parlement de Normandie (1499-1790)*, Rouen and Paris, 1953.  
-*Les conseillers du Parlement de Normandie au seizième siècle (1499-1594)*, Rouen and Paris, 1960.  
-*Les conseillers du Parlement de Normandie sous Henri IV et sous Louis XIII (1594-1640)*, Rouen and Paris, 1964.
- Frémont, A. -*Atlas et géographie de la Normandie*, Paris, 1977.
- Gorgue-Rosny, L.-E. de La -*Recherches généalogiques sur les Comtés de Ponthieu, de Boulogne, de Guines et Pays circonvoisins*, 4 vols, Boulogne-sur-mer, 1874.
- Graham, V. and McAllister Johnson, W. (eds) -*The Royal Tour of France by Charles IX and Catherine de' Medici: Festivals and Entries 1564-6*, Toronto, 1979.
- Greenblatt, S. -*Renaissance Self-Fashioning from More to Shakespeare*, Chicago, 1980.
- Greengrass, M. -*France in the Age of Henri IV: The Struggle for Stability*, London, 1984.  
-*"The Sixteen, Radical Politics in Paris during the League"*, *History*, 1984.  
-*"Noble Affinities in Early Modern France: The Case of Henri I de Montmorency, Constable of France"*, *European History Quarterly*, 1986.
- Griffiths, G. "Saint Bartholomew Reappraised", *Journal of Modern History*, 1976.
- Harding, R. -*Anatomy of a Power Elite: The Provincial Governors of Early, Modern France*, New Haven and London, 1978.
- Hauser, H. -*Les sources de l'histoire de France: Le XVI<sup>e</sup> siècle (1494-1610)*, 4 vols, Paris, 1912.
- Hellot, A. -*Essai sur les Martels de Basqueville et de Basqueville-en-Caux*, Rouen, 1879.  
-*Fécamp au temps de la Ligue: la légende de Boisrozé*, Yvetot, 1897.  
-*Essai sur les baillis de Caux de 1204 à 1789*, Paris, 1895.
- Holt, M. P. -*The duke of Anjou and the politique struggle during the Wars of Religion*, Cambridge, 1986.  
-*"Attitudes of the French Nobility at the Estates-General of 1576"*, *Sixteenth Century Journal*, 1987.
- Ives, E. W. -*Faction in Tudor England*, London, 1979.

- Janvier, A. -*Boves et ses seigneurs: Etude historique sur la commune de Boves*, Amiens, 1877.
- Jensen, D. L. -*Diplomacy and dogmatism: Bernardino Mendoza and the French Catholic League*, Cambridge Mass., 1964.
- Jouanna, A. -*Le devoir de révolte: la noblesse française et la gestation de l'Etat moderne (1559-1661)*, Paris, 1989.
- Jouen, L. -*Jumièges*, Rouen, 1926.
- Kettering, S. -*Patrons, Brokers and Clients in Seventeenth-Century France*, Oxford, 1986.  
-*"Friendship and Clientage in Early Modern France"*, *French History*, 1992.
- Laheudrie, , E. -*Recherches sur le Bessin: histoire du Bessin des origines à la Revolution*, 2 vols, Caen and Bayeux, 1930.
- Lamet, M.-S. -*"Reformation, War and Society in Caen, Lower Normandy, 1558-1610"*, unpub. PhD thesis, Univ. Massachusetts, 1980.
- La Morandière, G. de -*Histoire de la maison d'Estouteville*, Paris, 1903.
- Landurant, A. -*Montgomery le régicide*, Paris, 1988.
- La Roncière, C. de -*Histoire de la marine française*, 6 vols, Paris, 1899-1932.
- La Roque, G.-A. de -*Histoire généalogique de la maison d'Harcourt*, 4 vols, n.p., 1662.
- Lavisse, E. -*Histoire de France*, VI, pt 1, *La Réforme et la Ligue*, by J. H. Mariéjol, Paris, 1904.
- Le Canu, A. -*Histoire du diocèse de Coutances et Avranches*, 2 vols, Coutances, 1877-8.
- Le Charpentier, H. -*La Ligue à Pontoise et dans le Vexin Français*, Pontoise, 1878.
- Lechevalier, A. -*Notice historique sur les barons et la baronnie du Bec*, Paris, 1898.
- Le Hardy, G. -*Histoire du Protestantisme en Normandie depuis son origine jusqu'à la publication de l'édit de Nantes*, Caen, 1869.
- Lemarchand, G. -*"Le Temporel et les revenus de l'abbaye de Fécamp pendant le XVII<sup>e</sup> et le XVIII<sup>e</sup> siècles"*, *Annales de Normandie*, 1965.
- Lewis, P. S. -*"Decayed and Non-Feudalism in Later Medieval France"*, *Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research*, 1964.
- Lloyd, H. A. -*The Rouen Campaign, 1590-1592: Politics, War and the Early Modern State*, Oxford, 1973.
- Maillard, E. -*Histoire d'Ancenis et de ses barons*, Nantes, 1881.
- Maille, P. -*Recherches sur Elbeuf: Esquisses ou silhouettes de ses seigneurs de la maison de Lorraine*, 3 vols, Elbeuf, 1859-63.
- Maimbourg, L. -*Histoire de la Ligue*, Paris, 1684.

- Major, J. R. -*Representative Government in Early Modern France*, New Haven and London, 1980.  
-*"Noble Income, Inflation and the Wars of Religion in France"*, *American Historical Review*, 1981.
- Marchand, C. -*Charles 1<sup>er</sup> de Cossé, comte de Brissac et maréchal de France, 1507-1563: Etude sur la fin des guerres d'Italie et sur la première guerre de religion*, Paris, 1889.
- Martin, G. -*Histoire et généalogie de la maison d'Harcourt*, St. Etienne, 1971.
- Maudit, F.-J. -*Histoire d'Ivry-la-Bataille et de l'abbaye de Notre Dame d'Ivry*, Evreux, 1899.
- McFarlane, K. B. -*The Nobility of Later Medieval England*, Oxford, 1973.  
-*England in the Fifteenth Century*, London, 1981.
- Mettam, R. -*Power and Faction in Louis XIV's France*, London, 1988.
- Morel, E. -*Houdencourt: seigneurie et paroisse*, 2 vols, Compiègne, 1878-82.
- Moulierac-Lamoureux, R. L. -*Le bon roi René, ou les hasards du destin, (1409-1480)*, Avignon, 1980.
- Muller, P. and Diegerick, A. (eds) -*Documents concernant les relations entre le duc d'Anjou et les Pays-Bas*, 5 vols, Utrecht, 1889-99.
- Neuschel, K. -*Word of Honor: Interpreting Noble Culture in Sixteenth-Century France*, Ithaca and London, 1989.
- Nicholls, D. -*"The Origins of Protestantism in Normandy: A Social Study"*, unpub. PhD thesis, Univ. Birmingham, 1977.  
-*"Inertia and Reform in the Pre-Tridentine French Church: The Response to Protestantism in the Diocese of Rouen, 1520-62"*, *Journal of Ecclesiastical History*, 1981.
- Nugent, D. -*Ecumenism in the Age of the Reformation: The Colloquy of Poissy*, Cambridge Mass., 1974.
- Odolant-Desnos, P. -*Mémoires historiques sur la ville d'Alençon et sur ses seigneurs*, 2 vols, Alençon, 1787.
- Oman, C. -*The Art of War in the Sixteenth Century*, London, 1937.
- Orlea, M. -*La Noblesse aux Etats généraux de 1576 et de 1588: étude politique et sociale*, Paris, 1980.
- Parker, G. -*The Dutch Revolt*, London, 1985.
- Pastor, L. von -*The History of the Popes from the close of the Middle Ages*, 40 vols, London, 1891-.
- Pimodan, G. de -*La mère de Guises: Antoinette de Bourbon 1494-1583*, Paris, 1889.
- Picot, G. -*Histoire des Etats-Généraux considérés au point de vue de leur influence sur le gouvernement de France de 1355 à 1614*, 4 vols, Paris, 1872.
- Porée, A. A. -*Histoire de l'abbaye de Bec*, 2 vols, Evreux, 1901.

- Potin de La Mairie, N. -*Recherches historiques, archéologiques et biographiques sur les possessions des Sires Normands de Gournay, Le Bray Normand et La Bray Picard*, 2 vols, Gournay, 1852.
- Potter, D. -"The duc de Guise and the fall of Calais, 1557-1558, *English Historical Review*, 1983.  
 -"A Treason Trial in Sixteenth Century France: the Fall of Marshal du Biez", *English Historical Review*, 1990.  
 -"The Luxembourg Inheritance: The House of Bourbon and its Lands in Northern France during the Sixteenth Century", *French History*, 1992.
- Prarond, E. -*La Ligue à Abbeville, 1576-1594*, 3 vols, Paris, 1873.
- Prentout, H. -"Les Etats Provinciaux de Normandie", *Mémoires de l'Académie Nationale des Arts et Belles-Lettres de Caen*, 3 vols, Caen, 1925-7.
- Rawcliffe, C. -*The Staffords, Earls of Stafford and Dukes of Buckingham, 1394-1521*, Cambridge, 1978.
- Rodière, R. -*Les Gouverneurs de Montreuil de la maison de Maigneux (1581-1620)*, Abbeville, 1900.
- Rodière, R. and Vallée, E. -*La maison de Moy*, Le Mans, 1928.
- Romier, L. -*Les origines politiques des guerres de religion*, 2 vols, Paris, 1913.  
 -*Le royaume de Catherine de Médicis: la France à la veille des guerres de religion*, 2 vols, Paris, 1922.  
 -*La Conjuration d'Amboise*, Paris, 1923.  
 -*Catholics et Huguenots à la cour de Charles IX*, Paris, 1924.
- Saint-Denis, H. M. -*Notices historiques sur les communes des environs d'Elbeuf*, 8 vols, Elbeuf, 1885-90.
- Salmon, J. H. M. -"The Paris Sixteen, 1584-94: The Social Analysis of a Revolutionary Movement, *Journal of Modern History*, 1972.  
 -*Society in Crisis: France in the Sixteenth Century*, New York, 1975.
- Saulnier, E. -*Le rôle politique du Cardinal de Bourbon (Charles X) 1523-1590*, Paris, 1912.
- Sauvage, M. R. N. -"Les Troubles de 1562", *Etudes Lexoviennes*, 1915.
- Semichon, E. -*Histoire de la ville d'Aumale*, 2 vols, Paris, 1862.
- Seydoux, P. -*La Normandie des châteaux et des manoirs*, Paris, 1989.
- Shannon, S. C. -"The Political Activity of François de Lorraine, duc de Guise (1559-1563): From Military Hero to Catholic Leader", unpub. PhD thesis, Univ. Boston, 1988.
- Sutherland, N. M. -*The French Secretaries of State in the Age of Catherine de Medici*, London, 1962.  
 -*The Massacre of Saint Bartholomew and the European Conflict, 1559-72*, London, 1973.  
 -*Princes, Politics and Religion*, London, 1984.

- Thibaudeau, A. -*Histoire de Poitou*, 3 vols, Niort, 1839-40.
- Thompson, J. W. -*The Wars of Religion in France: The Huguenots, Catherine de Medici and Philip II*, Chicago, 1909.
- Tôme, P. O. de -"Philippe II et Henri de Guise: Le début de leurs relations", *Revue historique*, 1931.
- "Une paroisse rural du duché d'Alençon: Saint-Germain de Clairefeuille", *Bulletin de la société, historique et archéologique de l'Orne*, 1893.
- Vaissière, P. de -*Récits du "temps des troubles", XVI<sup>e</sup> siècle. Une Famille: les d'Alègre*, Paris, 1914.
- Valois, N. -*Le conseil du roi au XIV<sup>e</sup>, XV<sup>e</sup> et XVI<sup>e</sup> siècles. Nouvelles recherches suivies d'arrêts et de procès-verbaux du conseil*, Paris, 1888.  
 -"Les Etats de Pontoise (Aout 1561)", *Revue historique de l'église de France*, 1943.
- Vérel, C. -*Le Marquisat de Nonant*, Alençon, 1908.
- Wood, J. -*The Nobility of the Election of Bayeux, 1463-1660: Continuity through Change*, Princeton, 1980.