IN SUBSIDIUM: THE DECLINING CONTRIBUTION OF GERMANY AND EASTERN EUROPE TO THE CRUSADES TO THE HOLY LAND, 1221–91

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Though for a short time the Lord had forsaken it [the Holy Land], with great mercy he gathered together his children and restored the whole land's people from men of different races and diverse languages and nations, so that therein the prophecy seemed to be fulfilled: 'Thy sons shall come from far, and thy daughters shall be nursed by thy side.' [As] he observed and drew [them] together, his heart wondered and he was glad when [many] had been directed to him across the great sea, especially those of Genoa, Venice and Pisa. The strength of the nations came to him, especially from France and Germany.¹

Thus wrote James of Vitry (bishop of Acre 1216–28) in his *Historia Orientalis* shortly after the Fifth Crusade, whilst describing the recovery of the kingdom of Jerusalem after the defeats of 1187–8. He then reflected on the strengths of the peoples who had contributed to this process, describing the Germans simply as 'men of war'.² He had good reason to praise their martial prowess. In the decades following the defeat of the kingdom of Jerusalem at the battle of Hattin 1187 both Frederick I and Henry VI had launched major campaigns in support of the Latin East. German magnates also took part in the Fourth and Fifth Crusades.³ In a later section James discussed the establishment of the Teutonic Order. This institution was founded in 1190 as a medical establishment during the Third Crusade, but as-

¹ James of Vitry, *Historia Orientalis*, ed. J. Donnadieu (Turnhout, 2008), 272–4. ² Ibid. 274.

³ James M. Powell, *Anatomy of a Crusade:* 1213–1221 (Philadelphia, 1990); J. Longnon, *Les Compagnons de Villehardouin: Recherches sur les croisés de la quatrième croisade* (Geneva, 1978); C. Naumann, *Der Kreuzzug Kaiser Heinrichs VI.* (Frankfurt, 1988); Reinhold Röhricht, *Die Deutschen im Heiligen Lande:* 650– 1291 (Innsbruck, 1894).

sumed a military role at the request of German crusaders in 1198.⁴ The very existence of this Order was an affirmation of the German nobility's commitment to the Holy Land. According to James, the Teutonic Knights did not merely buttress the Latin East's defences. They also helped to integrate German immigrants and travellers into the cultural milieu of the Levant.⁵

Despite this, as the graph on p. 40 demonstrates, in the aftermath of the Fifth Crusade the number of German nobles travelling to the Holy Land fell dramatically and did not recover. This was not the consequence of a lack of communication; contemporary German annals, chronicles, and poems contain many emotive accounts of the sufferings of the Holy Land. Nevertheless, even those families with long traditions of pilgrimage to Jerusalem ceased to take the road to the east during the mid to late thirteenth century. The purpose of this article is to provide the first detailed and quantitative investigation into this decline by looking at the changing fortunes of the Latin East, the development of the crusading movement, and the political situation in the Empire.⁶


1221-1230

By 1221 many German noblemen had returned home from Egypt, dispirited by the failure of the Fifth Crusade. Their sombre reports seem to have caused a short-term sense of apathy towards future crusading ventures, and in Frankfurt in 1224, when Hermann von Salza (master of the Teutonic Order, 1210–39) attempted to rally support

⁴ 'De Primordiis Ordinis Theutonici Narratio', in Theodor Hirsch, Max Töppen, and Ernst Strehlke (eds.), *Scriptores Rerum Prussicarum: Die Geschichtsquellen der Preußischen Vorzeit bis zum Untergange der Ordensherrschaft*, 6 vols. (Leipzig, 1861–74), i. 220–5. For further discussion on the origins of the Teutonic Knights, see Nicholas Morton, *The Teutonic Knights in the Holy Land*, *1190–1291* (Woodbridge, 2009), 9–30; Marie-Luise Favreau, Studien zur Frühgeschichte des Deutschen Ordens (Stuttgart, 1974), 64–94.

⁵ James of Vitry, *Historia Orientalis*, 268–72.

⁶ I am not aware of any other detailed study on this subject although Ashcroft refers briefly to this trend. See J. Ashcroft, 'Germany', in Alan V. Murray (ed.), *The Crusades: An Encyclopedia*, 4 vols. (Santa Barbara, Calif., 2006), ii. 525.



Methodology: this graph charts the changing patterns in German noble pilgrimage to the Holy Land during the period 1187 to 1291. As the name suggests, it is confined exclusively to Germans of noble or royal rank (for secular nobles, the rank of lord or above; for clergy, the rank of bishop or above). The decision to confine the graph to the upper ranks of society was driven by the consideration that pilgrimages made by noblemen are generally well documented, particularly at the upper end of the social scale, and therefore the changing frequency of such expeditions can be charted with some accuracy. For lesser pilgrims the sources are far more sporadic with occasional charters supplying a large number of names. Were these scattered references to be included in the above diagram, they would distort the graph's ability to show general trends because a single humble pilgrim would be accorded the same weighting as a nobleman or lord. The disadvantage of this approach is that popular expeditions to the Latin East or those which had no known noble leader, such as those of the Frisians or the pilgrimage of 1267, are not represented. Despite this, this graph is an attempt to display succinctly a wide-ranging trend. Only noblemen for whom a reliable reference exists have been included. This chart has drawn upon a wide range of primary and secondary sources but the following have been of particular value: Naumann, Der Kreuzzug Kaiser Heinrichs VI.; Röhricht, Die Deutschen im Heiligen Lande; Powell, Anatomy of a Crusade; Longnon, Les Compagnons de Villehardouin.

for a new undertaking led by Emperor Frederick II, he met with little enthusiasm.⁷ The papal legate, Conrad of Porto, dispatched to Germany on the same errand, fared no better.⁸ On the eve of Frederick's subsequent departure in December 1227, he claimed that his agents had initially been able to recruit only the *paucos vel infirmos.*⁹ Indeed, the poet Freidank, who took part in the crusade, stated explicitly that Frederick departed for *Outremer* without the support of the German princes.¹⁰ In the event, the only major secular German nobles to participate were Landgrave Ludwig of Thuringia and the count of Limburg.¹¹ Even so, the landgrave of Thuringia could not be persuaded to take the cross at Frankfurt and a second recruitment drive was necessary to secure his support; a scenario more indicative of persuasion than enthusiasm.¹² This lethargy has historical parallels and recalls the reaction of the French nobility in the wake of the Second Crusade to the prospect of a new campaign in 1149–50.

1230-1239

By the early 1230s, however, the German nobility had a number of strong reasons to wish to travel to the Latin East. Emperor Frederick II was the king of Jerusalem and he had restored the holy city to Christendom in 1229, re-opening the pilgrim roads to the Holy Sepulchre, which had been shut for forty years. The conflict between the pope and emperor, which began ostensibly because of Frederick's seeming reluctance to embark on crusade in 1227, had been concluded in the treaty of San Germano in 1230. As an additional incentive, Gregory IX launched a new crusade (commonly known as the Barons' Cru-

⁹ *Historia Diplomatica Friderici Secundi,* ed. J. L. A. Huillard-Bréholles, 7 vols. (Paris, 1852–61), iii. 42.

 ¹⁰ Ulrich Müller (ed.), *Kreuzzugsdichtung* (Tübingen, 1969), 102–9; Freidank, 'Bescheidenheit', trans. J. Ashcroft, in Murry (ed.), *The Crusades*, iv. 1310–11.
¹¹ Matthew Paris, *Chronica Majora*, ed. H. R. Luard, 7 vols. (RS, London, 1872–83), iii. 128, 148.

¹² Historia Diplomatica Friderici Secundi, iii. 36–48.

 ⁷ Chronica Regia Coloniensis, Monumenta Germaniae Historica Scriptores Rerum Germanicarum (hereafter MGH SRG), 18, ed. G. Waitz (Hanover, 1880), 253–4.
⁸ Ibid.

sade) in 1234 with the bull *Rachel suum videns*.¹³ One might imagine that in such favourable circumstances, the German nobility's interest might have revived.

These inducements, however, were counter-balanced by a number of factors which either inhibited potential participants or diverted them away from the Levant. Frederick may have been ruler of Jerusalem, but his authority was vigorously resisted by a group of barons led by the Ibelin family.¹⁴ Potential German pilgrims may have feared that, if they made a pilgrimage to the east, they would become embroiled in a civil conflict. Attempts were made to end this dissent by both the emperor and the papacy but, despite a lengthy period of negotiations, they were ultimately unsuccessful.¹⁵ Furthermore, returning crusaders from both the Fifth Crusade and Frederick's crusade carried back stories highlighting the dissolute state of Acre and indicating a wider local hostility towards German visitors. The above-mentioned Freidank, for example, wrote:

I have heard many a man express the wish: 'If I might get to Acre, and just see the Holy Land, I would not care if I died there on the spot.' Now I see these folk glad to be alive and anxious to get back to their homeland.... Acre has gobbled up silver, gold, horses, and clothes, and whatever a man may possess, nothing eludes their clutches. Now they mock us and say, '*Allez* – off you go home across the sea.' And if thirty armies came to Acre, they would fare as we have fared.¹⁶

Although Freidank does not refer explicitly to Latin Eastern resistance to the Emperor's rule, he clearly believed that co-operative action in the east was futile and there is more than a hint of xeno-

¹³ Matthew Paris, *Chronica Majora*, iii. 280–7. For letters authorizing preaching in Germany, see *Les Registres de Grégoire IX*, ed. L. Auvray, 3 vols. (Paris, 1890–1918), ii. nos. 2586, 2786, 2790.

¹⁴ Peter W. Edbury, *John of Ibelin and the Kingdom of Jerusalem* (Woodbridge, 1997), 24–57.

¹⁵ Jonathan Riley-Smith, *The Feudal Nobility and the Kingdom of Jerusalem*, 1174–1277 (London, 1973), 198–207.

¹⁶ Trans. taken from Freidank, 'Bescheidenheit', in Murry (ed.), *The Crusades*, iv. 1310–11; Müller (ed.), *Kreuzzugsdichtung*, 102–9.

phobia in his account of local attitudes.¹⁷ In similar vein, James of Vitry in around 1217 described Acre as a monster with nine heads.¹⁸ Oliver, head of the cathedral school in Cologne and later bishop of Paderborn, presented Acre as a sinful city.¹⁹ The dissemination of such sentiments would have done little to encourage German nobles to take the cross.

By the mid 1230s relations between the papacy and Empire began to deteriorate, as did Frederick's fragile relations with the Lombard communes. Initially, Frederick's position as king of Jerusalem and Pope Gregory's interest in the defence of the Holy Land gave them a common goal, but this cooperation became increasingly strained when both parties were drawn into the struggle for northern Italy.²⁰ Frederick's son, King Henry of Germany, also challenged his authority and in this atmosphere of political tension many nobles may have deemed it prudent to remain in Germany to monitor developments. Historically, wars in Western Europe had often served as an obstacle for potential crusaders and during the Second, Third, and Fifth Crusades effective peace-making had been a vital requisite for many participants.²¹ In the 1230s, however, despite the best efforts of Hermann von Salza and other papal representatives, this controversy

¹⁷ Other authors similarly reflect the tension between German and French settlers and crusaders in the Holy Land. The pilgrim John of Würzburg commented bitterly that although Jerusalem had been captured by the imperial nobleman, Godfrey of Bouillon, the Franks had subsequently colonized the land and attempted to present the First Crusade as a Frankish venture. John of Würzburg, *Peregrinationes Tres*, ed. R. B. C. Huygens (Turnholt, 1994), 126. For discussion on attitudes towards German pilgrims see also Marie-Luise Favreau-Lilie, 'The German Empire and Palestine: German Pilgrimages to Jerusalem between the Twelfth and Sixteenth Century', *Journal of Medieval History*, 21 (1995), 335–7.

¹⁸ Lettres de Jacques de Vitry, ed. R. B. C. Huygens (Leiden, 1960), 83.

¹⁹ Oliveri Scholastici, 'Historia Damiatina', in *Die Schriften des Kölner Dom*scholasters, späteren Bischofs von Paderborn und Kardinal-Bischofs von S. Sabina, ed. H. Hoogeweg (Tübingen, 1894), 171.

²⁰ Björn Weiler, 'Gregory IX, Frederick II, and the Liberation of the Holy Land, 1230–1239', in R. N. Swanson (ed.), *The Holy Land, Holy Lands, and Christian History* (Woodbridge, 2000), 201–4.

²¹ It should be noted that war in Western Christendom did not always prevent participation in expeditions to the Holy Land. Marie-Luise Favreau-Lilie has shown that German law permitted warriors to evade military serv-

escalated; antagonisms ran too deep and diplomatic relations between Frederick, Gregory, and the Italian cities continued to decline.²² In the ensuing wars, many nobles fought in Italy and even those who were willing to venture east may have feared that the roads to the Italian ports – the key transit points for the Holy Land – would be blocked.

Gregory also launched a series of further crusades in 1233–4 against political enemies, heretics, and pagans which, intentionally or not, seem to have deflected any potential crusaders away from the Latin East. In 1234, for example, the people of Rome forced Pope Gregory to flee the city, posing a threat to the very core of papal power. However much Gregory may have wished to support the Holy Land, this challenge to his personal authority clearly took precedence and, almost immediately after issuing *Rachel suum videns* (Sept. 1234), he dispatched a series of letters (Oct.–Nov. 1234) requesting aid from the German nobility.²³ As Lower has argued: 'These appeals for military assistance against the Romans may have drawn potential recruits away from the Holy Land crusade.'²⁴

Another crusade was directed against the Stedinger peasants in northern Germany. In 1229 Gregory excommunicated the Stedingers for their continued resistance to secular and ecclesiastical authority.²⁵ By 1232 the threat they posed had become sufficiently acute for him to offer the local nobility a Jerusalem indulgence if they were prepared to take the field against them.²⁶ During the resulting expedition Count Burchard of Oldenburg-Wildeshausen, a regional land-

ice if they took part in a pilgrimage to the Holy Land instead. She has demonstrated that Welf VI, duke of Spoleto, utilized this clause during his expedition to Jerusalem in 1167. Favreau-Lilie, 'The German Empire and Palestine', 331.

²² Otto of Freising, 'Gesta Friderici Imperatoris', *MGH SRG*, 46 (Hanover, 1912), 47; *MGH Epistolae Saeculi XIII*, ed. G. H. Pertz et al., 3 vols. (Berlin, 1883–94), i. no. 657.

²³ Ibid. i. nos. 602, 607, 608.

²⁴ Michael Lower, *The Barons' Crusade: A Call to Arms and its Consequences* (Philadelphia, 2005), 39.

²⁵ Christoph T. Maier, *Preaching the Crusades: Mendicant Friars and the Cross in the Thirteenth Century* (Cambridge, 1998), 53; Weiler, 'Gregory IX, Frederick II, and the Liberation of the Holy Land', 195–6.

²⁶ Les Registres de Grégoire IX, i. nos. 1209, 1387, 1391, 1392, 1581.

owner, was killed in battle. The following year his son and successor Henry suffered the same fate.²⁷ In February 1234 a further crusading army assembled, led by Landgrave Henry of Thuringia, Duke Otto of Brunswick and Margraves John and Otto of Brandenburg.²⁸ The participation of these noblemen is significant for two reasons. First, they all came from families that had fought previously in the Eastern Mediterranean. The counts of Oldenburg had participated in the crusades of Frederick I²⁹ and Henry VI;³⁰ the landgraves of Thuringia in those of Frederick I,³¹ Henry VI,³² and Frederick II;³³ the dukes of Brunswick and the margraves of Brandenburg in the crusade of Henry VI.³⁴ Second, the expeditions against the Stedingers marked, in most cases (the margraves of Brandenburg being the exception), the first occasion on which these dynasties had participated in a crusade to any area other than the Holy Land. None of these dynasties ever returned to the Latin East. Although in hindsight this event marks a watershed in their crusading activity, it is unlikely that any long-term decision was taken at this time concerning their future crusading intentions. Gregory may even have hoped that with the suppression of such heresies, it would be easier to attract crusaders from these regions.³⁵ Nevertheless, whatever these noblemen's short-term motives, this event broke a chain of tradition and this alone may be significant.

²⁷ Maier, Preaching the Crusades, 53.

²⁸ Ibid. 57. For the participation of Henry of Thuringia see *Les Registres de Grégoire IX*, i. no. 1785; 'Ex Godefrido Coloniensi', in *Fontes Rerum Germanicarum*, ed. J. Boehmer and A. Huber, 4 vols. (Stuttgart, 1843–68), ii. 364–6.

²⁹ 'Historia de Expeditione Friderici Imperatoris', *MGH SRG, Nova Series*, 5, ed. A. Chroust (Berlin, 1928), 20.

³⁰ Naumann, Der Kreuzzung Kaiser Heinrichs VI., 238.

³¹ 'Itinerarium Peregrinorum et Gesta Regis Ricardi', in *Chronicles and Memorials of the Reign of Richard I*, ed. W. Stubbs, 2 vols. (London, 1864–5), i. 68. ³² This source is a list of the nobles who attended the militarization of the Teutonic Order in Acre in 1198. This meeting took place during the crusade of Henry VI and is therefore a good indicator of those who took part. 'De Primordiis Ordinis Theutonici Narratio', 224.

³³ See Morton, *The Teutonic Knights in the Holy Land*, 43–84.

³⁴ 'De Primordiis Ordinis Theutonici Narratio', 224.

³⁵ Weiler, 'Gregory IX, Frederick II, and the Liberation of the Holy Land', 196.

In addition to the campaigns against the Romans and the Stedingers, the mid-1230s also saw the beginning of a further offensive in the Baltic. In November 1230 Gregory gave his approval for the conquest of Prussia by the Teutonic Knights. Within months, under the leadership of Herman Balk, a small contingent began to develop the Order's position in this region at the expense of the native Prussians.³⁶ As the Knights pushed deeper into pagan territory, the papacy came under pressure to increase the level of assistance it rendered this frontier.³⁷

Previously, when pontiffs had permitted the recruitment of crusaders for this region, they had been careful to ensure that these undertakings did not detract from campaigns to the Holy Land. In 1204, Innocent III had allowed the archbishop of Bremen to gather troops for an expedition to Livonia, provided that they could not travel to the Latin East.³⁸ In 1217, Pope Honorius III allowed the bishop of Prussia to recruit crusaders for the struggle with paganism on condition that they had not already taken a vow to travel to the Holy Land.³⁹ Nevertheless, the perceived significance of this frontier grew and Fonnesberg-Schmidt has shown that as Pope Honorius's pontificate progressed, 'the Baltic campaigns were recognized as being on a par with the crusades undertaken in the East'.⁴⁰ Potential crusaders would have been aware of the advantages of Baltic crusading. Indulgences on this front could be won at a lower cost and in a fraction of the time necessary to complete a pilgrimage to Jerusalem. During the Second Crusade, Duke Conrad of Zähringen is thought to have chosen the Baltic campaign over Conrad's expedition to the

³⁶ Peter von Dusburg, 'Chronicon Terrae Prussie', in Hirsch, Töppen, and Strehlke (eds.), *Scriptores Rerum Prussicarum*, i. 49.

³⁷ Hermann von Salza is even reported to have asked that certain regions be set aside for the preaching of the cross for Prussia and Livonia. See *The Chronicle of Prussia by Nicolaus von Jeroschin: A History of the Teutonic Knights in Prussia,* 1190–1331, trans. M. Fischer (Aldershot, 2010), 65.

³⁸ Liv., Est- und Kurländisches Urkundenbuch (Abt. 1), 17 vols. (Aalen, 1967–81), i. no. 14.

³⁹ *Regesta Honorii Papae III*, ed. P. Pressutti, 2 vols. (Hildesheim, 1888–95), i. no. 389.

⁴⁰ Iben Fonnesberg-Schmidt, *The Popes and the Baltic Crusades:* 1147–1254 (Leiden, 2007), 138–144, 249.

Levant because he was reluctant to make the longer journey to the Holy Land.⁴¹

It comes as no surprise that when Gregory IX repeatedly instructed the friars to preach the crusade for this region during the 1230s, several established crusading dynasties turned their attention to this new theatre of war.⁴² The margraves of Meissen provide an instructive example of this transition. In 1197 Margrave Dietrich took part in Henry VI's crusade to the Holy Land and he was among those who advocated the militarization of the Teutonic Order. In 1219 he made a gift to the Order, citing his wish to support their work in the Holy Land. In 1234, however, when the Knights' primary need was for help against the pagans in the Baltic, Dietrich's son Henry (margrave of Meissen 1221-88, landgrave of Thuringia, 1247-88) travelled to support them in Prussia with a force of forty noblemen.43 Subsequently, in 1272, Henry's son Dietrich went on crusade to Prussia, even though Gregory X was actively seeking recruits for the Holy Land.⁴⁴ This pattern is highly suggestive because it raises the possibility that the margraves were prepared to link their crusading aspirations to the Teutonic Knights' immediate needs; thus, when the Order began to expand in the Baltic, they redirected their energies accordingly. It is well known that individual families became attached to particular military orders and it is possible that, as an order's strategic priorities changed, its supporters were also prepared to divert their energies.

A further instance of this trend can be seen with the Babenberg dukes of Austria. This dynasty had an incredibly strong crusading

⁴³ von Dusburg, 'Chronicon Terrae Prussie', 59.
⁴⁴ Ibid. 116.

⁴¹ Jonathan P. Phillips, *The Second Crusade: Extending the Frontiers of Christendom* (New Haven, 2007), 238; 'Casus monasterii Petrishusensis', *MGH Scriptores*, 20, ed. G. H. Pertz (Hanover, 1868), 674. Incidentally, this pattern was only temporary and his successor Berthold participated in the Third Crusade. For a discussion of the difficulties facing German pilgrims in their journeys to the Holy Land, see Favreau-Lilie, 'The German Empire and Palestine', 321–41.

⁴² Les Registres de Grégoire IX, i. nos. 754, 2098. For a discussion of Gregory's preaching, see Fonnesberg-Schmidt, *The Popes and the Baltic Crusades*, 196–200.

pedigree. Margrave Henry II⁴⁵ participated in the Second Crusade and his sons, Leopold V⁴⁶ and Frederick I,⁴⁷ took part in the Third Crusade and Henry VI's crusade respectively. Leopold V's son, Leopold VI, then took part in the Fifth Crusade.⁴⁸ During this time, the Babenberg family acted as major patrons of the Teutonic Order and made concessions of property in Austria and Styria. Frederick I was also among those who had advocated the militarization of the Order in 1198 and, during the Fifth Crusade, Leopold VI made a substantial contribution towards the Order's purchase of its first estate in the Latin East.⁴⁹ Leopold remained closely connected to the Order's master, Hermann von Salza, and in 1230 the two men helped to settle the disputes between Frederick II and Gregory IX.⁵⁰

It seems that, like the margraves of Meissen, the Babenberg family came to see crusading as an activity that was intrinsically linked to its support for the Teutonic Order. The next stage in this relationship occurred in 1234 when Pope Gregory IX asked Leopold's son, Frederick of Babenberg, to travel on crusade in support of the Order, but specified that he should render this aid in the Baltic rather than the Holy Land.⁵¹ This decision may have been driven as much by Leopold VI's frustrated ambitions towards the Cypriot throne as his relationship with the Order.⁵² Even so, Gregory was aware of the Babenberg family's close association with the Order and he referred to it explicitly in this letter. Admittedly, Frederick did not travel to Prussia immediately. His support for Henry, son of Emperor Frederick II, during the above-mentioned period of internecine strife,

⁴⁵ Phillips, *The Second Crusade*, 129.

⁴⁷ 'De Primordiis Ordinis Theutonici Narratio', 224.

⁴⁸ Powell, *Anatomy of a Crusade*, 233; Oliveri Scholastici, 'Historia Damiatina', 163. For the involvement of the Babenberg dukes in crusading to the Holy Land, see Morton, 'Leopold VI, Duke of Austria', 19–35; Morton, *The Teutonic Knights in the Holy Land*, 23–4.

⁴⁹ Oliveri Scholastici, 'Historia Damiatina', 207.

⁵⁰ Richard of San Germano, 'Chronica', *MGH Scriptores*, 19, ed. G. H. Pertz (Hanover, 1866), 359.

⁵¹ *MGH Epistolae Saeculi XIII,* i. no. 596.

⁵² Morton, 'Leopold VI, Duke of Austria', 19–35.

⁴⁶ Nicholas Morton, 'Leopold VI, Duke of Austria, and his Claim to the Cypriot Throne', $E\Pi ETHPI\Delta A$, 34 (2008), 22.

made his position precarious.⁵³ Nevertheless, when Duke Fredrick finally embarked on crusade in 1244, it was to Prussia, not the Holy Land.⁵⁴ Clearly another major crusading dynasty had turned away from the Holy Land and, yet again, time would prove this change to be permanent. In these ways the connection between the Teutonic Order and many noble families seems to have provided a stimulus which diverted their attention to the Baltic. Of course, the Teutonic Knights continued to play an active role in the Eastern Mediterranean but between 1229 and 1239 the Latin East was covered by a peace treaty with the Muslims established by Frederick II. The Order therefore had little cause to demand support in the Holy Land, but had every reason to request it in the Baltic.

It was not merely the major noble families who were encouraged to focus their attention on the Baltic. The papacy was aware that many lesser magnates and knights wished to travel on crusade to the Eastern Mediterranean, but could not afford to do so. Responding to this need, in 1232 Gregory IX permitted the Dominicans in Bohemia to allow less affluent crusaders to commute their vows to the Prussian wars rather than the Eastern Mediterranean.⁵⁵ This issue of funding was clearly an important problem because in 1233 the pope authorized the dioceses of Mainz, Worms, and Speyer to absolve such pilgrims from their vows in exchange for funds to assist in the building of a church.⁵⁶ Reviewing this trend, it could be argued that these commutations represent a sensible use of resources given that such crusaders could not have afforded to reach the kingdom of Jerusalem. Even so, this policy does seem to have been yet another way that the idea of Jerusalem as an aspirational goal was blunted and diverted to serve more local ends.

As crusading to Prussia and Livonia gathered momentum, the Teutonic Order endeavoured to increase the appeal of these regions by styling them 'a new Holy Land'. Shortly after the arrival of their

⁵³ Alfred Haverkamp, *Medieval Germany: 1056–1273*, trans. H. Braun and R. Mortimer (Oxford, 1988), 251.

⁵⁴ von Dusburg, 'Cronica Terre Prussie', 76; Les Registres d'Innocent IV, ed. É. Berger, 4 vols. (Paris, 1884), ii. no. 711.

⁵⁵ Les Registres de Grégoire IX, i. no. 754; Fonnesberg-Schmidt, *The Popes and the Baltic Crusades*, 195.

⁵⁶ Les Registres de Grégoire IX, i. no. 1209.

main colonizing force in 1230, the brethren established a settlement on the Vistula named 'Toron'. It is no coincidence that there was a castle called Toron in the Holy Land, which the Order had tried to acquire the year before.⁵⁷ There were also times when the local pagans were described as 'Saracens', providing an obvious parallel to the wars of the Levant.⁵⁸ In time, the Order's chroniclers began to present the battles fought against the pagans in the language of the crusade to the Latin East. Figuratively, the Teutonic Knights were described as new Maccabees defending a new Jerusalem.⁵⁹ Although the characterization of Prussia in this way would have served a number of purposes, it is likely that such comparisons were designed to reassure the German nobility that expeditions to this region were equally meritorious.

With the establishment of so many crusades during the 1230s, several major crusading families received calls for assistance from multiple frontiers almost simultaneously. At different points during the years 1233-4, for example, Gregory asked the landgrave of Thuringia to fight against the Romans, the Stedinger peasants, and the Muslims in the Holy Land.⁶⁰ Obviously, the landgraves could not satisfy all of these demands and it is likely that these mixed messages would only have created an unnecessary level of confusion about the papacy's real objectives. Furthermore, the German nobility could now choose from a range of crusading destinations and, whilst Jerusalem was incontestably the most spiritually significant, the journey this entailed was also more expensive and time consuming than the alternatives. In addition, with war in Italy blocking the roads to the Mediterranean, civil war in the Holy Land itself and, by contrast, an absence of such impediments to expeditions against the pagans or heretics, it is hardly surprising that no major German nobleman is

⁵⁷ John of Ibelin, *Le Livre des Assises*, ed. P. W. Edbury (Leiden, 2003), 453–4.
⁵⁸ August Seraphim, M. Hein, E. Maschke et al. (eds.), *Preußisches Urkundenbuch*, 6 vols. (Aalen, 1961), i. pt. 1 no. 78.

⁵⁹ Mary Fischer, 'Biblical Heroes and the Uses of Literature: The Teutonic Order in the Late Thirteenth and Early Fourteenth Centuries', in Alan V. Murray (ed.), *Crusade and Conversion on the Baltic Frontier: 1150–1500* (Aldershot, 2001), 261–75; Mary Fischer, 'The Books of the Maccabees and the Teutonic Order', *Crusades*, 4 (2005), 59–71.

⁶⁰ Les Registres de Grégoire IX, i. nos. 1556, 1785; Matthew Paris, Chronica Majora, i. 280–7.

known to have participated in Gregory's crusade to the Holy Land (the Barons' Crusade).⁶¹

1240–1269

Should the short-term disincentives of the 1230s have ended it is perfectly possible that crusading to the Latin East would have resumed as normal. During the 1240s, however, Hohenstaufen policies continued to focus on the struggle with the papacy, while a new threat appeared on Christendom's eastern border. In 1240 the Mongols invaded Hungary and Poland, destroying every army sent against them.⁶² Shortly afterwards, the Prussians rebelled against the Teutonic Knights. With Christendom's eastern defences in tatters, the papacy needed to respond swiftly to prevent any possible invasion into central Europe. These crises were counter-balanced by those of the Latin East in 1244. In this year, Jerusalem fell to the Khwarazmians, who subsequently allied with the Egyptians and defeated the kingdom of Jerusalem's field army in the battle of La Forbie. Support was needed on multiple fronts. This section will explore the implications of these events and demonstrate that whilst various crises required many noblemen to remain in Germany, others were willing to devote themselves to the Holy Land but were then deliberately deflected by the papacy to make war on its political opponents.

Before 1240, eastern Europe had known times of crisis and defeat, but in general terms the overall trend had been one of progressive eastwards colonization. When crusades were launched in these regions they often had more in common with wars of expansion than those of defence. Nevertheless, the sheer ease with which the Mongols decimated Hungary and Poland's defences demonstrated that the eastern 'back-door' to Christendom was still open. When in 1243 the Prussians rose in revolt it must have seemed that the whole frontier zone was in jeopardy.⁶³ Furthermore, the Prussians and Mongols were not always viewed as separate threats but were fre-

⁶¹ Lower, *The Barons' Crusade*, 41.

⁶² Peter Jackson, 'The Crusade against the Mongols (1241)', *Journal of Ecclesiastical History*, 42 (1991), 1–18.

⁶³ von Dusburg, 'Cronica Terre Prussie', 66.

quently perceived as synonymous. For example, a number of chroniclers portray the Teutonic Knights in Prussia fighting the 'Tartars' in this region, even though the Mongol forces never reached this far north.⁶⁴ Also, in 1254 and 1265, when crusades were preached against the Mongols, they were executed against the Prussians.⁶⁵

Among the immediate consequences of these defeats was a rapid fall in the level of aid that could be rendered to the Levant, either by Poland or Hungary. Both regions had sent crusaders to the Holy Land in the past and King Andrew of Hungary led a large contingent on the Fifth Crusade.⁶⁶ When the Mongols invaded in 1241 they defeated King Bela IV, who had previously taken a vow to travel to Jerusalem (although this had been commuted to an expedition to the Latin Empire of Constantinople in 1235).⁶⁷ The kingdom of Poland had contributed troops to the Second Crusade, possibly under Władysław, prince of Silesia.⁶⁸ Prince Henry of Sandomierz then went on a pilgrimage to the Latin East from 1153 to 1154 and further knights joined subsequent expeditions, including the Third Crusade.⁶⁹ Nevertheless, after 1241, no major ventures were launched to the Latin East. Ironically, only one year previously, Gregory had ordered the provincial prior of the Dominicans to preach the cross in Hungary for the support of the Holy Land and Romania.⁷⁰

The papacy responded to these threats with a series of crusades against the Mongols in 1241 and the Prussians in 1243.⁷¹ In 1245, Pope Innocent IV declared that troops could be recruited for the

⁶⁴ For an example see 'Continuatio Sancrusensis Secunda', *MGH Scriptores*, 9, ed. G. H. Pertz (Hanover, 1851), 644.

⁶⁵ Preußisches Urkundenbuch, i. pt. 1, no. 289; Les Registres de Clément IV, ed. É. Jordan, 4 vols. (Paris, 1893–1904), i. no. 113.

⁶⁶ James R. Sweeney, 'Hungary and the Crusades, 1169–1218', *International History Review*, 3 (1981), 479–81.

⁶⁷ Les Registres de Grégoire IX, ii. no. 2872.

⁶⁸ John Kinnamos, Deeds of John and Manuel Comnenus (New York, 1976), 70.

⁶⁹ Rafal Witkowski, 'Poland', in Murray (ed.), *The Crusades*, iii. 968–9.

⁷⁰ Les Registres de Grégoire IX, ii. no. 5123. Further preaching was authorized in 1243, Les Registres d'Innocent IV, i. no. 30.

⁷¹ Bullarium Franciscanum, ed. J. H. Sbaraleae (Rome, 1759), i. 296–7; Preußisches Urkundenbuch, i. pt. 1, no. 146. For further discussion see Fonnesberg-Schmidt, *The Popes and the Baltic Crusades*, 225–7; Jackson, 'The Crusade against the Mongols (1241)', 1–18.

Prussian frontier without papal authorization.⁷² This effectively created what Riley-Smith has described as a 'perpetual crusade' with a recruitment zone encompassing the whole of Germany.⁷³ Such measures made Prussia the permanent crusading target, although preaching continued to be authorized against Islam and heretics. In the same year, when Louis IX of France began to rally troops for a much needed campaign in the Eastern Mediterranean, Innocent ordered that recruitment drives conducted in Germany should not interfere with preaching for the Baltic crusade.⁷⁴ Clearly, in Germany at least, the papacy was not prepared to allow the Holy Land crusade to jeopardize campaigns in Prussia and Livonia.

In later years the papacy's fears of a second Mongol invasion, linked with the Teutonic Knights' ongoing struggle to maintain and extend their position in the north, drove pontiffs to support a series of further offensives. During the 1250s there was a very real prospect of a new Mongol offensive and grave reports carried by envoys and missionaries returning from the Mongol armies only heightened these concerns.⁷⁵ To combat this threat, the Church strove to form alliances between frontier rulers and in 1254 Pope Alexander IV preached the above-mentioned crusade against the Mongols.⁷⁶ In 1257 Alexander IV permitted the Teutonic Order to allow crusaders who had promised to travel to the defence of the Levant to redeem their vows in return for a cash payment of 500 marks (to be spent on the defence of Prussia).⁷⁷ Many nobles with traditions of crusading to the Levant and patronage for the Teutonic Order responded to these appeals and marched against the Mongols and pagans. Margrave Otto of Brandenburg set out for Prussia in 1251 and again in 1266.78

⁷² Preußisches Urkundenbuch, i. pt. 1, no. 168.

⁷³ Jonathan S. C. Riley-Smith, *The Crusades: A History* (2nd edn. London, 2005), 197.

⁷⁴ Preußisches Urkundenbuch, i. pt. 1, no. 169; Fonnesberg-Schmidt, *The Popes and the Baltic Crusades*, 229–30.

⁷⁵ Salimbene de Adam, Cronica, ed. G. Scalia, 2 vols. (Bari, 1966), i. 298–9, 580–1; Johannes Giessauf, Die Mongolengeschichte des Johannes von Piano Carpine: Einführung-Text-Übersetzung-Kommentar (Graz, 1995).

⁷⁶ Preußisches Urkundenbuch, i. pt. 1, no. 289.

⁷⁷ Ibid. i. pt. 2, no. 25.

⁷⁸ 'De Primordiis Ordinis Theutonici Narratio', 224; von Dusburg, 'Chronicon Terrae Prussie', 88, 114.

In 1265 the landgrave of Thuringia set off for the Baltic. In 1254–5 and 1267–8 King Otto II of Bohemia assembled a large army to support the Teutonic Knights' wars against the pagans.⁷⁹ In general, therefore, it can be seen that further crusading dynasties began to turn away from the Mediterranean and towards the Baltic.

The crusade to the Holy Land continued to be preached in Germany throughout the thirteenth century with a persistence which suggests that it met with some response. In 1261, for example, when Urban IV, former patriarch of Jerusalem, became pope, crusading policy changed dramatically. He launched a new campaign to the Levant the following year, commissioning preaching across Germany.⁸⁰ Nevertheless, by the 1260s, the crusade to the Baltic seems to have become so entrenched that attempts to gather forces for the Latin East were actually resented by local recruiters. In 1263 and 1265 the papacy responded to complaints that preachers were attempting to persuade crusaders to commute their vows away from Prussia and towards the Holy Land.⁸¹ This practice was repeatedly forbidden, providing an interesting benchmark for the relative importance attached by the papacy to these two frontiers.

While the papacy showed considerable support for Prussia and Livonia, those crusaders who still chose to serve in the Latin East were often re-directed to fight against Frederick II and his descendents. In 1245 the conflict between the papacy and the Hohenstaufen entered a new phase when Innocent IV excommunicated Frederick.⁸² The following year Innocent IV launched a crusade against the emperor which he sustained until 1249 (precisely the period when Louis IX was trying to raise troops for a campaign against Egypt).⁸³ He coupled this with instructions that those German crusaders who were eager to go to the Holy Land should campaign instead against

⁷⁹ Ibid. 90, 113.

⁸⁰ Maier, Preaching the Crusades, 80.

⁸¹ *Preußisches Urkundenbuch*, i. pt. 2, nos. 198, 214, 239.

⁸² This section has drawn upon, *The Seventh Crusade*, 1244–1254: *Sources and Documents*, compiled and trans. Peter Jackson (Aldershot, 2007), 49–52.

⁸³ Les Registres d'Innocent IV, i. nos. 1993, 3002, 4060, 4068; ii. nos. 4265, 4525, 4681; 'Menkonis Chronicon', *MGH Scriptores*, 23, ed. G. H. Pertz (Hanover, 1874), 540.

the emperor.⁸⁴ Given that Innocent had already ordered that preaching for the Latin East should not interfere with expeditions to the Baltic, it is not surprising that Louis received very little support from Germany. Admittedly, this diversion of crusaders seems to have been confined to Germany because Innocent was generally careful to ensure that French nobles remained committed to the French crusade.⁸⁵

An example of this policy in operation can be seen with the dukes of Brabant. In 1246 Duke Henry II announced his intention to join the Holy Land crusade.⁸⁶ Presumably he wished to follow the example of his father, Henry I, who had participated in the Third Crusade and had led Henry VI's campaign.⁸⁷ Even so, by 1247 and with Innocent's full support, he was serving in defence of the papacy against Frederick II.88 This seems to have been a source of regret for Henry looking back years later, because on his deathbed he made a second crusading vow to travel to Jerusalem. This was intended to be redeemed with a cash payment.⁸⁹ Henry was not the only crusader to be guided in this way and the Frisians, who had been encouraged to embark for the Holy Land in 1246, were told to commute their vows in November 1247 and April 1248 to the service of the new anti-king, William of Holland.⁹⁰ Frisia was an area with a strong crusading pedigree and had contributed to both the Third and Fifth Crusades.⁹¹ In June 1248 and again in November 1250 Innocent clearly changed

⁸⁶ *MGH Epistolae Saeculi XIII*, ii. no. 229; Jackson, *The Seventh Crusade*, 51.

⁸⁷ Preaching was authorized in Brabant in November 1246, *Les Registres d'Innocent IV*, i. no. 2229.

⁸⁸ MGH Epistolae Saeculi XIII, ii. nos. 425, 468. In 1241 he had been asked to go on crusade against the Mongols. Matthew Paris, *Chronica Majora*, iv. 109.
⁸⁹ MGH Epistolae Saeculi XIII, ii. no. 523.

⁹⁰ Ibid. ii. no. 453; *Les Registres d'Innocent IV*, i. nos. 2054, 3779. For the papal authorization to preach the cross in favour of William and against Conrad, son of Frederick, see *Les Registres d'Innocent IV*, ii. nos. 6304–5; see also ibid. no. 5037.

⁹¹ J. Mol, 'Frisian Fighters and the Crusade', *Crusades*, 1 (2002), 89–110.

⁸⁴ It should be noted that these instructions were rescinded a few months later. Fonnesberg-Schmidt, *The Popes and the Baltic Crusades*, 229–30; Haver-kamp, *Medieval Germany*, 257; *Les Registres d'Innocent IV*, i. nos. 2935, 4269.

⁸⁵ Ibid. i. nos. 3054, 3384. There were some minor exceptions to this. See ibid. no. 4060.

his mind for a second time because he wrote to the Frisians encouraging them once again to travel to the Holy Land.⁹² Jackson has shown that these changing demands seem to have been linked to the fluctuating fortunes of war both in the Egyptian campaign of Louis's crusade and the struggle against Frederick in Germany. But from the Frisian perspective these contradictory instructions would have been rather confusing and it must have been very difficult to know what the papacy actually wanted.⁹³ In the event, many served with William of Holland at the siege of Aachen in 1248, but they did not set out for the east.⁹⁴

Other major families chose voluntarily to involve themselves closely in the struggle between papacy and Empire. Henry Raspe, landgrave of Thuringia, set himself up as an anti-king in 1246 and during his subsequent attempt to usurp Frederick's power he cut a swathe across Germany in a series of encounters with Hohenstaufen forces.⁹⁵ After Henry's death in 1247 the papacy found a new champion in the form of the above-mentioned William II, count of Holland (1234–56). Both of these men had a substantial crusading pedigree. As has been shown, the landgraves of Thuringia were devoted crusaders and Henry Raspe's brother, Conrad, had been the master of the Teutonic Order (1239-40).96 William of Holland's great grandfather, Florent III (count of Holland, 1157-90), and grandfather, William (count of Holland, 1203-22), fought during the Third and Fifth Crusades respectively.97 Naturally these magnates' determination to oppose the Hohenstaufen prevented them from travelling to the Eastern Mediterranean whilst drawing other families into the conflict. This process was encouraged by Innocent IV who, on 2 January and 11 May 1249, permitted German crusaders to commute their crusading vows if they were prepared to fight with William

⁹⁷ Ansbert, 'Historia de Expeditione Friderici Imperatoris', *MGH SRG*, NS 5 (Berlin, 1928), 19; 'Gesta Crucigerorum Rhenanorum', in *Quinti Belli Sacri: Scriptores Minores*, ed. Reinhold Röhricht (Geneva, 1979), 29.

⁹² Les Registres d'Innocent IV, ii. no. 4927.

⁹³ Jackson, The Seventh Crusade, 52.

⁹⁴ 'Menkonis Chronicon', 540.

⁹⁵ Les Registres d'Innocent IV, i. nos. 1969, 1989.

⁹⁶ Hartmut Boockmann, 'Konrad von Thüringen', Die Hochmeister des Deutschen Ordens 1190–1994 (Marburg, 1998), 17–20.

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against Frederick.98 As Maier has argued, at this time 'Germany was expected mainly to supply the crusades against the Hohenstaufen and in the Baltic'.99 The consequences of these policies and re-directions were clearly felt in the Holy Land. In 1254 Peter of Koblenz, marshal of the Teutonic Order in Acre, wrote to King Alfonso X of Spain describing the Holy Land's perilous situation in the wake of Louis IX's defeat in Egypt. He complained that because of the war between the papacy and Empire, it had been years since his Order had last received any support from the German Empire.¹⁰⁰ Later commentators were also aware that these conflicts had diminished the assistance the Holy Land had received from Germany, and when Pierre Dubois in 1306 offered suggestions for the recovery of the Holy Land, he wrote: 'we have seen that the Germans and the Spaniards, although renowned as warriors, have on account of the incessant wars of their kings long ceased to come to the aid of the Holy Land.'101

The papacy's injunctions were, however, not altogether successful and some German pilgrims still set off to fulfil their pilgrim vows in the Levant. As Kedar has shown in his study of the list of passengers who embarked on the *St Victor* in 1250, many of the pilgrims' names contain German or eastern European toponyms or titles.¹⁰² The largest party of thirty-six passengers was led by Lord Markwald of Bohemia. There was also *dominus* Ulandus Mane and *dominus* Theoderic of Windberg, who had a following of three *socii*.¹⁰³ None of these noblemen led contingents of much military importance, but their presence on this list demonstrates that some imperial subjects did manage to set off for the Holy Land. The survival of this docu-

⁹⁸ Les Registres d'Innocent IV, ii. nos. 4269, 4525.

⁹⁹ Maier, Preaching the Crusades, 72.

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¹⁰⁰ Biblioteca de la Real Academia de la Historia, Colección Salazar, 'Carta de la Orden Teutónica a Alfonso X' (G49, fo. 453, Sig. 9/946. Index Number 33005).

¹⁰¹ Pierre Dubois, *The Recovery of the Holy Land*, trans. Walther I. Brandt (New York, 1956), 71.

¹⁰² Benjamin Z. Kedar, 'The Passenger List of a Crusader Ship, 1250: Towards the History of the Popular Element on the Seventh Crusade', *Studi Medievali*, 13 (1972), 267–79.

¹⁰³ *Historia Diplomatica Friderici Secundi*, vi. 785; Kedar, 'The Passenger List of a Crusader Ship', 270.

ment also highlights an inherent limitation of the sources for this investigation. Whilst letters, references in chronicles, and witnessed documents permit a reconstruction of the movements and crusading activities of the more important imperial nobles, our knowledge concerning the expeditions of the lesser nobility and knightly classes is far more reliant on chance survivals.¹⁰⁴ Thus this passenger list produces valuable, if isolated, examples of crusaders/pilgrims from the lower levels of German noble society.

An interesting indication of the general feeling among German nobles towards crusading occurred in 1266. In this year, after heavy losses inflicted in the Holy Land by Sultan Baybars, Clement IV proclaimed a crusade to the Holy Land across Germany. He approached the king of Bohemia, the margrave of Brandenburg, the duke of Bavaria, the lord of Brunswick, and the margrave of Meissen individually to ask for support.¹⁰⁵ They had evidently already expressed some enthusiasm for such a project because in 1265 Clement IV responded to a letter from Otto of Brandenburg in which the margrave stated his intention of journeying to Jerusalem.¹⁰⁶ Clement also expressed a hope that his example would rally other great nobles to support the Latin East.¹⁰⁷ In the event, in 1266 the rulers of Bohemia, Meissen, Brunswick, and Brandenburg all went on crusade as Clement had requested, but they carried their swords to Prussia, not the Holy Land.¹⁰⁸ For Otto of Brandenburg at least, this chronology seems to suggest that he had considered and then deliberately rejected the idea of a crusade to the Holy Land before travelling to the Baltic.

There were others who still desired to go to the Eastern Mediterranean at this time and they marched south, presumably to take ship from the Italian ports. The *Chronica Minor Auctore Minorita Erphordiensi* describes their fate:

¹⁰⁵ Les Registres de Clément IV, i. nos. 842, 845.

¹⁰⁷ Les Registres de Clément IV, i. no. 828.

¹⁰⁸ von Dusburg, 'Cronica Terre Prussie', 113; 'Chronica Minor Auctore Minorita Erphordiensi', *MGH Scriptores*, 24 (Hanover, 1879), 204.

¹⁰⁴ Kedar, 'The Passenger List of a Crusader Ship', 270; Favreau-Lilie, 'The German Empire and Palestine', 322–3.

¹⁰⁶ Otto had been encouraged to go on crusade to the Baltic in 1260. See *Preußisches Urkundenbuch*, i. pt. 1, no. 112.

In the year of our Lord 1266, Pope Clement sent out letters throughout the kingdom of Germany commanding the Dominicans and Franciscans to preach the cross faithfully and urgently against the Sultan of Babylon, who is the Pharaoh of Egypt, and against the Saracens overseas, so that the suffering of the Christians [there] might be alleviated and for the support of the Holy Land. Pope Clement, having gathered a huge army, appointed for them a general of the army and captain namely Count Charles of Anjou, brother of King Louis of France, a worthy man. He proceeded to Tuscany and towards Apulia against Manfred, prince of Apulia, son of Frederick, former emperor, who he attacked and overcame with a glorious triumph.¹⁰⁹

Once again, the continued struggle against the Hohenstaufen took precedence, even at a time of crisis in the Eastern Mediterranean. Other sources similarly reflect the ongoing prioritization of the struggle against the Hohenstaufen over the Latin East and in 1265 a Templar knight, writing about the fall of Arsuf and Caesarea, accused the papacy of using crusading monies to support the wars of Charles of Anjou.¹¹⁰ In the event, one group of about 500 pilgrims from the Rhineland, which set off in 1267, did reach Acre. Perhaps the death of Manfred in the previous year had persuaded Clement that he could afford to allow this small group at least to reach their intended destination.¹¹¹

1270-1291

By 1270 it had been over forty years since a sizable expedition had left Germany for the Holy Land. For some families it seems that the tradition of the Jerusalem crusade had been broken and other committed crusading families had simply died out. The Babenberg dy-

¹¹¹ 'Annales Colmarienses', in J. Boehmer (ed.), *Fontes Rerum Germanicarum*, 4 vols. (Aalen, 1795–1863), ii. 4–5; R. Bleck, 'Ein oberrheinischer Palästina-

¹⁰⁹ 'Chronica Minor Auctore Minorita Erphordiensi: Continuatio I', 204.

¹¹⁰ V. De Bartholomaeis (ed.), *Poesie provenzali storiche relative all'Italia*, 2 vols. (Rome, 1931), ii. 222–5; P. A. Throop, *Criticism of the Crusade: A Study of Public Opinion and Crusade Propaganda* (Amsterdam, 1940), 105–14.

nasty, which had governed Austria for over a hundred years, ended when Duke Frederick II was killed in 1246.¹¹² The Ludowinger line of the landgraves of Thuringia failed with the death of the Thuringian anti-king, Henry Raspe in 1247.¹¹³ The Hohenstaufen family had previously provided a rallying point for Germans wishing to take part in the Second Crusade, the Third Crusade, the Crusade of Henry VI, and, to a lesser extent, the Crusade of Frederick II. By 1268 this family had, of course, long been the target rather than the instigator of crusading; nevertheless in earlier years it had demonstrated how the presence of a reigning monarch could act as a magnet for recruitment. By 1269 such a figure had been conspicuously absent for many decades.

With the extinction of the Hohenstaufen line, rule in Germany increasingly passed into the hands of the leading princes. German opportunities to intervene in the Mediterranean also began to fade in the face of growing French and Angevin power in Italy. The mix of nationalities involved in the ongoing game for the Mediterranean had shifted to exclude the Empire. It seems likely that this new distribution of political power would have reduced both the willingness and ability of German nobles to travel to the Holy Land. Even so, after his election in 1271, Pope Gregory X was determined to win German recruits for the Latin East and to this end he wrote to Bishop Bruno of Olmütz, requesting advice about the crusade. The choice of corresponding with Bruno on this matter would not have been coincidental because his master, King Otto II of Bohemia, had considerably increased his territorial power in recent years and, although there had been several contenders for the imperial throne, many saw him as the power in Germany.¹¹⁴ Accordingly, when Bruno replied to this request, it was seemingly to outline Otto's position. In two letters issued in 1273 Bruno described the condition of Bohemia and the surrounding territories.¹¹⁵ He argued that no expedition to the Holy

Kreuzzug 1267', Basler Zeitschrift für Geschichte und Altertumskunde, 87 (1987), 5–27; 'Annales Basileenses', MGH Scriptores, 17, ed. G. H. Pertz (Hanover, 1861), 193.

¹¹² 'Annales Frisacenses', MGH Scriptores, 24 (Hanover, 1879), 66.

¹¹³ Matthew Paris, Chronica Majora, iv. 611.

¹¹⁴ Throop, *Criticism of the Crusade*, 105–14.

¹¹⁵ *Preußisches Urkundenbuch*, i. pt. 2, no. 315; C. Höfler, 'Analecten zur Geschichte Deutschlands und Italiens: Bericht des Bishof Bruno von Olmütz an

Land could be attempted while the German nobility continued to fight amongst themselves and pagan peoples threatened Christendom's borders. Only with the eradication of these threats could the needs of the Latin East be considered. Schein has shown that Bruno's ideas were not isolated and that other contemporaries saw the need to wage the *crux cismarina* to establish the necessary conditions for the *crux transmarina*.¹¹⁶ Bruno claimed that only the king of Bohemia could protect the region against such threats, a statement clearly designed to support Otto's candidature for the imperial throne.¹¹⁷ He wrote:

Behold the queen of Hungary is a Cuman, her nearest kin were and are gentiles. The two daughters of the king of Hungary are promised to the Russians, who are schismatics. . . . The Letts and Prussians like many gentiles have already utterly destroyed the bishoprics of Poland. . . . We do not intend to be silent about the princes of Germany, who to this point have been so divided among themselves, since they do not intend to have one ruling above the others, that one is seen to expect the desolation and destruction of his land by the others. Accordingly they are unfit to defend Christianity in our regions or to repulse the defeats in the lands overseas. Only the king of Bohemia is seen to aspire to the defence of the Christian faith in our parts. Certainly through his lands did the Tartars invade and they are expected a second time.¹¹⁸

Bruno (and by extension Otto) was well placed to comment on the defensive needs of this area. As shown above, Otto had twice travelled to Prussia to support the Teutonic Knights, who by 1270 were engaged in the suppression of a second major Prussian rebellion.

By 1275, however, Otto II was sufficiently interested in the crusade to the Holy Land to take a crusading vow. Whether he honestly intended to embark, or whether this was a piece of diplomacy linked

¹¹⁶ Sylvia Schein, *Fideles Crucis: The Papacy, the West, and the Recovery of the Holy Land,* 1274–1314 (Oxford, 1998), 64.

¹¹⁸ Preußisches Urkundenbuch, i. pt. 2, no. 315.

Papst Gregor X.', Abhandlungen der Historischen Classe der Königlich Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften (1846), 1–28.

¹¹⁷ Throop, *Criticism of the Crusade*, 1–25.

to his bid for the German crown is unclear, but either way he never fulfilled his oath. In 1273 the German electors appointed Rudolph of Habsburg as king of Germany.¹¹⁹ Rudolph, like Otto, took a crusading vow in 1275. Initially neither man could stage an expedition because between 1276 and 1278 they were at war with one another. In later years, although Rudolf managed to establish a degree of peace over the Empire, he did not set off for the Holy Land, despite receiving an appeal from Acre in 1285.¹²⁰ Perhaps by this stage, with the passing of so many years since the last major campaign, the general will for such a venture had simply evaporated. Housley has shown that 'enthusiasm for the crusade varied enormously from country to country, and . . . instead of forming a straightforward pattern of growth followed by decline, it waxed and waned over the generations'.121 The only major German prince to visit the Levant during this period was Duke Henry of Mecklenburg. Henry departed in 1272 and was subsequently captured and imprisoned by Muslim forces.¹²² Although his pilgrimage met with disaster, his crusading vow is remarkable because, as Bartlett notes, in the twelfth century his family had been the 'targets of crusades'.¹²³

While the number of noblemen to travel to the Holy Land fell dramatically, crusading taxes were still exacted for its support.¹²⁴ In 1246, for example, Innocent IV levied the *vicesima* for three years in Lotharingia and Brabant for the support of Louis IX.¹²⁵ This followed the agreement at the Council of Lyons 1245 that the *vicesima* would

¹²⁰ *Patrologiae Latina*, xcviii, cols. 820B-821B.

¹²¹ Norman Housley, *The Later Crusades: From Lyons to Alcazar*, 1274–1580 (Oxford, 1992), 376.

¹²² William Urban, *The Baltic Crusade* (DeKalb, Ill., 1975), 224, 256; Röhricht, *Die Deutschen im Heiligen Lande*, 128–9; *Meklenburgisches Urkundenbuch*, 28 vols. (Schwerin, 1863-1977), iii. no. 1934.

¹²³ Robert Bartlett, *The Making of Europe: Conquest, Colonization and Cultural Change*, 950-1350 (London, 1993), 268.

¹²⁴ This paragraph has drawn upon Norman Housley, *The Italian Crusades: The Papal-Angevin Alliance and the Crusades against Christian Lay Powers*, 1254–1343 (Oxford, 1982).

¹²⁵ Les Registres d'Innocent IV, i. no. 2048.

¹¹⁹ 'Annales Colmarienses', 9. See also. J. Guiraud (ed.), *Registres Grégoire X* (Paris, 1892), no. 669.

be levied across Christendom for three years.¹²⁶ In 1274, at the Second Council of Lyons, Pope Gregory X imposed an annual tax of onetenth of ecclesiastical revenues upon the entire church for six years.¹²⁷ Like the crusaders themselves, however, these taxes were often diverted to support the needs of other frontiers. As early as 1213 the German poet Walter von der Vogelweide voiced concern that monies raised for the Holy Land would be wasted by the papacy without reaching the Levant.¹²⁸ In time, the diversion either of crusading taxation or funds raised through vow redemption became relatively common practice. As Housley has shown, Pope Nicholas III 'had to rebuke some of the German clergy in January 1278 for displaying reluctance to pay the Lyons tenth because of their suspicion that it had been and would be converted "into other uses"'.129 Describing the collection of crusading taxation in 1274, the author of the Annales Altahenses did not claim that the papacy misused these funds, but stated that he was unsure what useful purpose these monies could serve in the Latin East.130

Other taxes were also introduced to fund the papacy's other crusading endeavours. Although this was not technically a crusade, in 1228 Gregory IX ordered new taxes to support his struggle with Frederick II.¹³¹ In later years, further revenues were raised across Christendom for crusades against, among others, Frederick II, the Sicilians, and the Aragonese.¹³² These seem to have been unpopular and in 1265 Clement IV complained that the German nobility tended to be disobedient in fulfilling its tax obligations.¹³³ Evidently, as the thirteenth century progressed, papal crusading taxation policy

¹²⁶ Decrees of the Ecumenical Councils, ed. Norman P. Tanner (ed.), 2 vols. (London, 1990), i. 298.

127 Ibid. 310.

¹²⁸ Walther von der Vogelweide: Leich, Lieder, Sangsprüche, ed. C. Cormeau (Berlin, 1996), 64–5; Walter von der Vogelweide, 'Ahi wie kristenliche nu der babest lachet', trans. J. Ashcroft, in Murray (ed.) *The Crusades*, iv. 1309.
¹²⁹ Housley, *The Italian Crusades*, 107.

¹³⁰ 'Annales Altahenses', *MGH Scriptores*, 17, ed. G. H. Pertz (Hanover, 1861),410.

¹³¹ Housley, The Italian Crusades, 97–106, 184; Les Registres de Grégoire IX, i. no. 251.

¹³² Housley, The Italian Crusades, 174-6.

133 Ibid. 205.

became increasingly opaque to contemporaries, provoking concerns about its true destination.

In addition to this hostility there was ongoing criticism of the Latin East itself. For many, the defeats of the Holy Land were God's judgement on the inability of the local magnates to work with one another. Menko, abbot of Werum in Frisia, also blamed the disputes of the military orders, as did the annalist of Regensburg.¹³⁴ In later years, Peter von Dusburg (a member of the Teutonic Order) blamed the internal squabbling of the barons in the kingdom of Jerusalem.¹³⁵ These complaints are reminiscent of the comments made by the German poet Freidank, mentioned earlier, and they would only have reinforced the conviction that sending aid to the Holy Land was futile.

Conclusion

In 1290 Burchard von Schwanden (master of the Teutonic Knights, 1283–90) led a contingent of troops and pilgrims to the Holy Land. Before his departure he visited King Rudolph, but gained little support, either from the king or from the German nobility.¹³⁶ It seems likely that, with the collapse of the imperial position in Italy, the Eastern Mediterranean had come to be viewed as a remote and chaotic place. Between the demands of the Baltic and the frequent wars of the past decades, the former dynastic links with the Latin East had been broken. Burchard's operation was a fiasco.¹³⁷ Soon after his arrival in Acre he quarrelled with the local nobility and then resigned his position as master.¹³⁸ Tales of this disaster would presumably have served only to confirm contemporaries in their opinion that political conditions in the kingdom of Jerusalem were too anarchic for anything of value to be attempted. This conviction seems to be confirmed in *Ottokars Österreichische Reimchronik*, a fictional recre-

¹³⁴ 'Eberhardi Archidiaconi Ratisponensis Annales', *MGH Scriptores*, 17, ed.G. H. Pertz (Hanover, 1861), 594; 'Menkonis Chronicon', 555.

¹³⁵ von Dusburg, 'Chronicon Terrae Prussie', 208.

¹³⁶ K. Militzer, 'Burchard von Schwanden', in Udo Arnold (ed.), *Die Hochmeister des Deutschen Ordens* 1190–1994 (Marburg, 1998), 38–41.

¹³⁷ The Chronicle of Prussia by Nicolaus von Jeroschin, 207.

¹³⁸ Cronaca del Templare di Tiro (1243–1314), ed. L. Minervini (Naples, 2000), 204.

ation of the fall of Acre 1291. Here, the master of the Teutonic Knights states his wish to take his revenge for this disaster through campaigns in the Baltic, rather than expeditions to the east.¹³⁹ This episode marks the final conclusion of German crusading to the Holy Land before the fall of Acre.

In this article I have suggested why, in the wake of the Fifth Crusade, the number of German crusaders to the Holy Land fell and did not recover. Although initially this seems to have been the result of the disappointments and expenses of the Fifth Crusade, the consistently low level of crusading to the Eastern Mediterranean in subsequent decades was the result of a variety of issues which, when combined, formed an effective barrier even to those who were determined to visit the Holy Land. The growing importance attached to the crusade against Paganism, along with ongoing fears of a second Mongol offensive, ensured that Jerusalem indulgences were available for targets that could be reached in a far shorter time and at far less expense than by an expedition to the Levant. Meanwhile, the papacy's ongoing conflict with the Hohenstaufen drew other warriors into political crusades in Western Christendom, whilst simultaneously compelling many others to remain in Germany in order to guard their estates. Several pontiffs clearly gave the struggle against Frederick higher priority than the affairs of the east and were prepared to divert both crusaders and crusading taxation to this end. Presumably the argument would have been made that the suppression of the Hohenstaufen family was merely a prelude to a major campaign in the Levant. Even so, this conflict took a long time to conclude and no new German crusade to the Holy Land ever took place. Although this cannot be satisfactorily proved, it seems likely that, after decades of crusading in Western Christendom and the Baltic, the general will to intervene in the Holy Land had declined whilst the crusading traditions forged by major families in the twelfth century had largely evaporated. Certainly the decline of German interests in Italy would have served as a discouragement.

No single cause can account for the fall of the kingdom of Jerusalem in 1291, but the decline in German pilgrimages to the Levant must be numbered among the contributory factors. German pilgrims had formerly played an important part in the building, rebuilding,

¹³⁹ 'Ottokars Österreichische Reimchronik', *MGH Deutsche Chroniken*, v. pt. 1 (Hanover, 1890), 689–90.

and ongoing defence of the Latin East, but during the mid to late thirteenth century, their contribution was negligible. The Teutonic Knights continued to serve there until the fall of Acre; indeed Favreau has shown that they even sought to increase their landholdings in Acre and the seigniory of Scandalion after the loss of their major fortress of Montfort.¹⁴⁰ Even so, whereas during the first quarter of the century they had acted primarily as a base for newly arrived German knights, in later years it appears that they were increasingly thrown back on their own resources. Furthermore, the Order itself was heavily committed in both Prussia and Livonia; a struggle which served only to draw more established crusading dynasties away from Jerusalem.

¹⁴⁰ Marie-Luise Favreau-Lilie, 'The Teutonic Knights in Acre after the Fall of Montfort (1271): Some Reflections', in Benjamin Z. Kedar, H. E. Mayer, and R. C. Smail (eds.), *Outremer* (Jerusalem, 1982), 272–84; Marie-Luise Favreau, 'Die Kreuzfahrerherrschaft Scandalion (Iskanderūne)', *Zeitschrift des Deutschen Palästina-Vereins*, 93 (1977), 12–29.

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