

ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT • OPEN ACCESS

A systematic review of the evidence on decoupling of GDP, resource use and GHG emissions, part II: synthesizing the insights

To cite this article before publication: Helmut Haberl *et al* 2020 *Environ. Res. Lett.* in press <https://doi.org/10.1088/1748-9326/ab842a>

Manuscript version: Accepted Manuscript

Accepted Manuscript is “the version of the article accepted for publication including all changes made as a result of the peer review process, and which may also include the addition to the article by IOP Publishing of a header, an article ID, a cover sheet and/or an ‘Accepted Manuscript’ watermark, but excluding any other editing, typesetting or other changes made by IOP Publishing and/or its licensors”

This Accepted Manuscript is © 2020 The Author(s). Published by IOP Publishing Ltd.

As the Version of Record of this article is going to be / has been published on a gold open access basis under a CC BY 3.0 licence, this Accepted Manuscript is available for reuse under a CC BY 3.0 licence immediately.

Everyone is permitted to use all or part of the original content in this article, provided that they adhere to all the terms of the licence <https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0>

Although reasonable endeavours have been taken to obtain all necessary permissions from third parties to include their copyrighted content within this article, their full citation and copyright line may not be present in this Accepted Manuscript version. Before using any content from this article, please refer to the Version of Record on IOPscience once published for full citation and copyright details, as permissions may be required. All third party content is fully copyright protected and is not published on a gold open access basis under a CC BY licence, unless that is specifically stated in the figure caption in the Version of Record.

View the [article online](#) for updates and enhancements.

A systematic review of the evidence on decoupling of GDP, resource use and GHG emissions, part II: synthesizing the insights

Article for the special issue on “Climate change mitigation & demand-side measures” in *Environmental Research Letters*, edited by Felix Creutzig et al.

Helmut Haberl^{1*}, Dominik Wiedenhofer^{1,**}, Doris Virág^{1,**}, Gerald Kalt¹, Barbara Plank¹, Paul Brockway², Tomer Fishman³, Daniel Hausknost⁵, Fridolin Krausmann¹, Bartholomäus Leon-Gruchalski⁴, Andreas Mayer¹, Melanie Pichler¹, Anke Schaffartzik^{1,7}, Tânia Sousa⁶, Jan Streeck¹, Felix Creutzig⁸

¹ Institute of Social Ecology, University of Natural Resources and Life Sciences, Vienna, Austria

² School of Earth and Environment, University of Leeds, UK

³ School of Sustainability, Interdisciplinary Center Herzliya, Israel

⁴ Institute of Safety and Risk Sciences, University of Natural Resources and Life Sciences, Vienna, Austria

⁵ Institute for Social Change and Sustainability, Vienna University of Economics and Business, Austria

⁶ Instituto Superior Técnico, MARETEC, Universidade de Lisboa, Portugal

⁷ Institut de Ciència i Tecnologia Ambientals, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona (ICTA-UAB), Spain

⁸ Mercator Institute for the Global Commons (MCC), Berlin, Germany

* Corresponding author: helmut.haberl@boku.ac.at; Institute of Social Ecology, University of Natural Resources and Life Sciences, Vienna, Schottenfeldgasse 29, 1070 Vienna, Austria

** These authors contributed equally to this article.

Social media abstract: This systematic literature review critically examines the evidence on past (de)coupling of economic activity (GDP), resource use and GHG emissions and highlights political strategies for promoting decoupling discussed in the literature.

Keywords: Decoupling; Economic growth; Degrowth; Green growth; Material flow; Energy flow; Energy use; Primary energy; Final energy; Useful energy; Exergy; GHG emissions; CO₂ emissions

Abstract

Strategies toward ambitious climate targets usually rely on the concept of “decoupling”; that is, they aim at promoting economic growth while reducing the use of natural resources and GHG emissions. GDP growth coinciding with absolute reductions in emissions or resource use is denoted as “absolute decoupling”, as opposed to “relative decoupling”, where resource use or emissions increase less so than does GDP. Based on the bibliometric mapping in part I (Wiedenhofer et al., [this issue](#)), we synthesize the evidence emerging from the selected 835 peer-reviewed articles. We evaluate empirical studies of decoupling related to final/useful energy, exergy, use of material resources, as well as CO₂ and total GHG emissions. We find that relative decoupling is frequent for material use as well as GHG and CO₂ emissions but not for useful exergy, a quality-based measure of energy use. Primary energy can be decoupled from GDP largely to the extent to which the conversion of primary energy to useful exergy is improved. Examples of absolute long-term decoupling are rare, but recently some industrialized countries have decoupled GDP from both production- and, weaker, consumption-based CO₂ emissions. We analyze policies or strategies in the decoupling literature by classifying them into three groups: (1) Green growth, if sufficient reductions of resource use or emissions were deemed possible without altering the growth trajectory. (2) Degrowth, if reductions of resource use or emissions were given priority over GDP growth. (3) Others, e.g. if the role of energy for GDP growth was analyzed without reference to climate change mitigation. We conclude that large rapid absolute reductions of resource use and GHG emissions cannot be achieved through observed decoupling rates, hence decoupling needs to be complemented by sufficiency-oriented strategies and strict enforcement of absolute reduction targets. More research is needed on interdependencies between wellbeing, resources and emissions.

1. Introduction

Many policy documents and scientific publications, including those of the IPCC, assume that economic growth will continue to be a cornerstone of thriving future societies. However, if economic growth is accompanied by increases of resource use and emissions (Hickel and Kallis, 2019; Steinberger et al., 2013), it may threaten chances of meeting future sustainability transformation goals. Achieving targets such as the SDGs (TWI2050, 2018) or the Paris climate accord to limit global heating to 1.5-2.0°C (IPCC, 2018) requires reducing emissions of greenhouse gases (GHG) to zero around 2050, and most likely also absolute reductions of the use of natural resources such as energy or materials in many world regions. In many scenarios, net negative emissions, achieved either through reforestation and other land-based “natural climate solutions” (Griscom et al., 2017) or negative emission technologies (Fuss et al., 2018; Minx et al., 2018; Nemet et al., 2018; Rogelj et al., 2019), are required after 2050 to bring the climate back from an overshoot over the climate-change mitigation targets to the specified target level. The need for “negative emissions” emerges in all scenarios that fail to achieve sufficient cuts in emissions in the first half of the century (IPCC, 2018).

If achieving ambitious climate and sustainability targets should be reconciled with continued GDP growth, an absolute decoupling (or “de-linking”; (Vehmas et al., 2003)) of GDP from the use of biophysical resources and/or emissions is a logical necessity (Hickel and Kallis, 2019; Jackson and Victor, 2019; Parrique et al., 2019; UNEP, 2011a; UNEP-IRP, 2019). In this set of two articles, we present a systematic review of the empirical literature on past (de)coupling of resource use and emissions and GDP. Part I has provided a bibliometric mapping of this literature and focuses on how decoupling is empirically analyzed in various strands of research (Wiedenhofer et al., [this issue](#)). Here in part II, we synthesize the evidence in this literature with respect to observed historical (de)coupling and discuss its implications for science and policy.

1
2
3 88 We analyze the scientific literature on the relationships between economic output (most
4 89 commonly measured as inflation-corrected GDP) and resource use or emissions and the
5 90 observed rates of relative and absolute decoupling. We aim at elucidating the potential
6 91 contribution of past and ongoing gains in economy-wide efficiency and productivity towards
7 92 absolute decoupling and zero carbon futures. The socio-ecological systems perspective of
8 93 socio-economic metabolism (Fischer-Kowalski, 1998; Haberl et al., 2019; Pauliuk and
9 94 Hertwich, 2015; Pauliuk and Müller, 2014) stresses that socio-economic systems continuously
10 95 require materials and energy for all economic activity and the reproduction of humans,
11 96 livestock, and all manufactured capital, which necessarily leads to emissions and waste. From
12 97 this perspective, materials, energy, waste and emissions are inextricably interlinked and
13 98 therefore need to be treated jointly, an idea sometimes denoted as “resource nexus” (Bleischwitz
14 99 et al., 2018b). The broad scope of this systematic review was motivated by the aim to capture
15 100 such systemic linkages, as they are increasingly acknowledged as important for both science
16 101 and policy (Haberl et al., 2019). The scale and patterns of socio-economic metabolism are also
17 102 directly entangled with past and future development pathways, as well as with socioeconomic
18 103 structures and policies. To capture such linkages, and to address the question to what extent the
19 104 resource/GDP relations might be amenable to active intervention, the review also aims to map
20 105 the key strategies discussed by the literature to achieve decoupling (Section 4).
21 106

22 107 It is important to distinguish resource decoupling (e.g. decoupling of GDP from energy or
23 108 material use) from impact decoupling (e.g. the decoupling of GDP from GHG emissions)
24 109 (Jackson and Victor, 2019; UNEP, 2011a). While reduction of resource use will – *ceteris*
25 110 *paribus* – always reduce impacts because fewer resources need to be extracted, processed or
26 111 disposed of, some (probably not all) impacts can also be reduced and redirected through
27 112 technological measures (e.g. flue gas treatment or substitution of low-carbon fuels for high-C
28 113 fuels such as coal or oil products), even if resource use is not reduced. For GHG emissions,
29 114 such options are intensively researched and may gain importance in the future (based on carbon
30 115 capture and sequestration or CCS technologies; (Fuss et al., 2014)). However, they are currently
31 116 not deployed and hence are not included in this review, which only covers studies of observed
32 117 past decoupling, and excludes all model-based studies on future scenarios. This focus is
33 118 supported by IPCC reports demonstrating that energy efficiency and demand-side measures
34 119 have less risks and are more benevolent to societies than technological fixes (Creutzig et al.,
35 120 2018, 2016; IPCC, 2014).
36 121

37 122 A key issue for decoupling and decarbonization, which plays a big role in this review, is global
38 123 trade and its role in connecting producers and consumers. There are three complimentary
39 124 perspectives (Steininger et al., 2015). (1) The production-based (territory-based) perspective
40 125 accounts for resources used in or emissions emerging from a territory. It underlies emission
41 126 accounts of the UNFCCC. (2) The consumption-based perspective accounts for resources used
42 127 or emissions emerging – no matter where in the world – along supply chains and required to
43 128 meet the final demand of a national economy. Such a perspective is required to account for
44 129 displacements and problem shifting through international trade, e.g. ‘improvements’ of energy
45 130 intensity (energy/GDP) resulting from increasing imports of embodied energy in imported
46 131 goods that help reducing the need to produce these goods domestically (Moreau et al., 2019;
47 132 Moreau and Vuille, 2018). (3) The income-based perspective accounts for resources used in or
48 133 emissions emerging in the generation of income for a given country (Marques et al., 2012;
49 134 Rodrigues et al., 2006). However, the difference between consumption-, production- and
50 135 income based accounts cannot simply be interpreted as “leakage” or “outsourcing” (Jakob and
51 136 Marschinski, 2013), as the attribution of responsibility along supply chains is complex
52 137 (Rodrigues et al., 2006; Rodrigues and Domingos, 2008; Schaffartzik et al., 2015; Steininger et
53 138 al., 2016). Recognition of this challenge has resulted in proposals of various methods to derive

1
2
3 139 displacement indicators (Jiborn et al., 2018; Kander et al., 2015). Data allowing the allocation
4 140 of resource use or emissions directly or indirectly occurring along international supply chains
5 141 to final consumers are recently becoming available through the development of multi-regional
6 142 input-output models (Domingos et al., 2016; Liang et al., 2017; Peters, 2008; Rodrigues et al.,
7 143 2010; Steininger et al., 2015, 2016; Wiedmann et al., 2015). The production-, consumption-
8 144 and income-based perspectives on resource use and emissions can result in widely diverging, if
9 145 not opposing, results when analyzing the relations between resources/emissions and GDP hence
10 146 both production- and consumption-based will be considered for a better assessment (see Section
11 147 5; Figure 2). We do not include the income-based perspective because studies with empirical
12 148 results at the national or global level are rare (Liang et al., 2017; Marques et al., 2013, 2012;
13 149 Rodrigues et al., 2010; Steininger et al., 2016)

14 150
15 151 In this evidence synthesis, we consider production- and consumption-based perspectives but
16 152 restrict ourselves to national- and international studies, acknowledging that substantial amounts
17 153 of work have been published on sub-national and city-level decoupling, as well as sectoral- or
18 154 raw material/energy carrier specific perspectives. Including these literatures would not have
19 155 been consistent with the comprehensive focus of this review. Moreover, studies with a narrow
20 156 geographical or thematic scope cannot provide the top-down perspective necessary to identify
21 157 problem-shifting and rebound effects in the global system in which we are particularly
22 158 interested. Specifically, we address the following research questions:

- 23 159 • What is the empirical evidence for relative or absolute decoupling of economic output
24 160 from resource use and emissions at the national-to-global level?
- 25 161 • Which strategies and policy recommendations are discussed by the literature
26 162 empirically investigating efficiency and decoupling trends? Do they point towards a
27 163 “degrowth” or “green growth” perspective?
- 28 164 • What can be learned from past decoupling trends for achieving future absolute
29 165 reductions in resource use and GHG emissions?

30 166 31 167 **2. Methods**

32 168 In this article, we conduct an evidence synthesis for a body of the 835 peer-reviewed journal
33 169 articles and book chapters identified in part I (Wiedenhofer et al., **this issue**). There, we describe
34 170 a search query to SCOPUS as well as ISI Web of Knowledge and an expert solicitation, yielding
35 171 11,609 references covering the time span between the first captured study from January 1972
36 172 until June 7, 2019. 8,455 articles remained after duplicate removal, which we screened first at
37 173 the level of titles and abstracts and second at the full-text level, eliminating all non-relevant
38 174 articles and yielding the final 835 papers for in-depth review. Part I describes these procedures
39 175 in detail, including criteria for exclusion as well as those applied at the coding stage. It also
40 176 presents a bibliometric mapping of this body of literature and comparatively discusses the
41 177 development of the identified research streams and their approaches to investigating decoupling
42 178 phenomena.
43 179

44 180 For part II (this paper), we proceeded as follows. Because the body of literature on primary
45 181 energy, territorial CO₂ and on the causality relations between energy use and GDP is very large
46 182 and recent reviews exist, we relied on these reviews and handpicked references to summarize
47 183 their implications for the overall topic of this article (section 3.1). We then present an in-depth
48 184 analysis of the following streams of literature: (1) Studies on useful energy and exergy, and a
49 185 part of the literature on final energy (section 3.2). (2) Studies on aggregate material and energy
50 186 flows following a social metabolism approach (section 3.3). (3) Studies on total GHG emissions
51 187 as well as studies on carbon emissions from fossil fuel combustion and industrial processes,
52 188 excluding studies only dealing with territorial CO₂ emissions (section 3.4).
53 189

In section 4, we focus on discussing the strategies adopted (explicitly or implicitly) in the empirical decoupling literature. Due to the scope of this systematic review, conceptually and theoretically oriented papers explicitly focusing on policy choices were mostly excluded by the search query. Therefore, our analysis is restricted to policy recommendations and strategies found in papers that have a focus on biophysical evidence rather than politics. For the qualitative mapping and synthesis of strategies and policy recommendations, we drew a random subsample of 15% from the 835 articles, yielding 125 articles for further qualitative content synthesis. We used widely accepted definitions of green growth and degrowth to interpretatively map the 125 papers according to these definitions:

- For green growth, we refer to three major international institutions (OECD, UNEP and the World Bank) that promote green growth (OECD, 2011; UNEP, 2011b; World Bank, 2012). Their definitions range from relative decoupling (World Bank, 2012) to absolute decoupling (OECD, 2011; UNEP, 2011b, p. 2011; World Bank, 2012). Articles were classified as “green growth” if their framing aimed at absolute or relative decoupling without impeding economic growth.
- Articles were classified as “degrowth” if their framing explicitly challenged the primacy of economic growth over the (absolute) reduction of resource use and emissions, or articles that were agnostic towards economic growth (van den Bergh and Kallis, 2012a). We included articles in this category, based on their empirical findings, if they at least challenged economic growth as a ‘taken for granted’ variable. That is, we included articles that either proposed an “equitable downscaling of economic production and consumption” (degrowth; quote on p.910) or adopted an “indifferent” (p.912) position towards the effects of certain policy measures on economic growth (a-growth) (van den Bergh and Kallis, 2012).
- Papers not meeting the above criteria were classified as “others”. This category mostly includes papers which were primarily concerned with the causality between GDP and energy use or GHG emissions without expressing any aim of reducing emissions or resource use.

We openly coded the subsample (based on abstract, introduction, conclusion, and, if applicable, policy recommendations) according to the strategies and policies they recommended. In a next step, we merged these open codes to derive manageable and meaningful findings. For example, we merged the recommendations “internalization of external environmental goods”, “regulate prices” and “environmental taxes” into the category “pricing”.

3. Synthesis of key insights and quantitative evidence on decoupling

In this section, we comparatively review the literature on the relation between economic growth and various resource-use and emission indicators, covering both production- and consumption-based studies. We critically examine the state and trajectory of these research streams and summarize their key insights and quantitative results on relative and absolute decoupling.

We start by summarizing the evidence on the coupling between GDP and primary energy respectively territorial CO₂ emissions, which are closely related because burning fossil fuels (which account for a large fraction of primary energy in most countries) is the dominant source of CO₂ emissions (section 3.1). In contrast to sections 3.2-3.4, this section does not undertake an analysis of all articles within this category; we instead rely on recent major reviews and selected studies. We then summarize the findings on the extent of decoupling between GDP and final energy as well as exergy (section 3.2), i.e. indicators that are much more closely linked to the actual functions, utility and services of energy for socio-economic activities (Haas et al., 2008; Kalt et al., 2019; Lovins, 1979). Section 3.3 presents the evidence on the (de)coupling

241 between GDP and comprehensive measures of social metabolism derived with the harmonized
 242 and internationally applied economy-wide material and energy flow analysis (MEFA)
 243 framework (Fischer-Kowalski et al., 2011; Haberl et al., 2004; Krausmann et al., 2017a). This
 244 comprehensive perspective covers combustible energy carriers such as fossil fuels, as well as
 245 non-metallic minerals, ores and metals and biomass, which are all required for socio-economic
 246 activities and are highly interlinked (Bleischwitz et al., 2018b; Krausmann et al., 2017a;
 247 Schandl et al., 2017). Section 3.4 summarizes the evidence on the coupling between GDP and
 248 emissions based on full GHG accounts (including agriculture, forestry, and other land use
 249 (AFOLU) and non-carbon greenhouse gases, consumption-based CO₂ emissions as well as
 250 territorial and consumption-based full GHG accounts).

251 3.1 Primary energy and territorial CO₂ emissions

252 Although neo-classical economic growth models (see Aghion and Howitt, 2009) do not include
 253 energy as a production factor, the relationship of energy use and economic growth has gained
 254 significant attention in recent research. Recognizing that standard regression methods are
 255 insufficient with regard to avoiding spurious correlation¹, cointegration and Granger causality
 256 tests have been the predominant approaches for time-series statistical analysis from the 1970s
 257 onwards (Stern, 2011). Cointegration testing identifies long-term equilibria between two or
 258 more non-stationary variables (Enders, 2014). Granger causality tests analyze the direction of
 259 causality, i.e. whether one time series is useful in forecasting another (Granger, 1969).

260 Using these well-established methods, this large body of literature finds that long-run primary
 261 energy-GDP cointegration exists across a wide range of temporal and geographic scales.
 262 However, the direction of the energy-GDP Granger causality is inconclusive, as directionalities
 263 differed according to the considered regions, timeframes and methods used (Kalimeris et al.,
 264 2014; Omri, 2014; Ozturk, 2010; Stern, 2011; Tiba and Omri, 2017). Besides the lack of
 265 directionality, energy-GDP Granger causality testing itself is somewhat controversial. For
 266 example, Bruns et al. (2013) suggest there is a prevalence of model misspecification and
 267 publication bias². Other scholars criticize the ‘speculative and exploratory’ nature of the
 268 Granger causality debate (Beaudreau, 2010) and that the same methodological approaches
 269 continue to be applied although they have proven to be inadequate for resolving the question of
 270 directionality (Kalimeris et al., 2014; Karanfil, 2009; Ozturk, 2010; Tiba and Omri, 2017).

271 Stern (2011, 1997) argues that regardless of whether econometric approaches find empirical
 272 evidence for causality in one or another direction, energy is always an essential factor of
 273 production. This viewpoint is corroborated by several studies reviewed in section 3.2 and has
 274 long been voiced by “biophysical economists” (Cleveland, 1987; Hall et al., 1986; Kümmel,
 275 2011). Based on a synthesis of energy-based and mainstream models of economic growth, Stern
 276 (2011) finds that energy scarcity imposes a strong constraint on economic growth. He also
 277 identifies factors that could affect the linkages between energy use and economic output, and
 278 are therefore key to gauging the extent of a possible decoupling of GDP from energy use:
 279 substitution between energy and other inputs such as capital and labor, technological change,
 280 and shifts in the composition of energy inputs and in the economic structure.

281 Around 80% of global GHG emissions originate from combustion of fossil fuels. Given the
 282 historical coupling between primary energy and GDP, we might expect a similar coupling
 283 relationship between territorial CO₂ emissions and GDP at the global level (Bassetti et al., 2013;
 284

285 ¹ Spurious correlation is where variables trending over time appear to be correlated with each other simply
 286 because of the shared directionality, but there is no true underlying relationship (Stern, 2011).

287 ² The “tendency of authors and journals to preferentially publish statistically significant or theory-conforming
 288 results” (Bruns et al., 2013).

288 Stern, 2017). The empirical evidence supports that assertion: global GDP (constant \$US2010)
289 grew at 3.5%/year from 1960-2014, while CO₂ emissions grew at 2.5%/year on average (World
290 Bank, 2019a); i.e., globally there is relative but no absolute decoupling. Between 2000 and
291 2014, the relationship was even tighter, as both CO₂ emissions and GDP (constant \$US2010)
292 grew at ~2.8%/year on average.

294 At the international level, studies examining the relationships between territorial CO₂ emissions
295 and GDP typically also find weak or relative decoupling (Longhofer and Jorgenson, 2017;
296 Sarkodie and Strezov, 2019; Stern et al., 2017; Vollebergh et al., 2009). A few studies find
297 absolute decoupling (Azam and Khan, 2016; Chen et al., 2018; Madaleno and Moutinho, 2018;
298 Roinioti and Koroneos, 2017), but these are usually relatively small, short-term reductions of
299 CO₂ emissions (Li et al., 2007). A few country-level GDP-CO₂ studies find empirical support
300 for an Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC) type relationship, whereby CO₂/capita rises and
301 then falls with rising GDP/capita, i.e. income (Stern, 2017). National-level studies (Azam and
302 Khan, 2016; Hardt et al., 2018; Kander et al., 2015; Moreau et al., 2019; Moreau and Vuille,
303 2018; Peters and Hertwich, 2008; Wood et al., 2019a) emphasize the role of ‘offshoring’
304 emissions (e.g. related to imported goods) and changes in economic structure (e.g. shrinking
305 carbon-intensive industry, larger contributions from service sectors) in distorting the GDP-CO₂
306 relationship in one or the other direction. Variability in primary energy composition and
307 different stages in renewable energy deployment are also seen as key reasons for differing
308 results regarding the existence of an EKC for CO₂ (Chien and Hu, 2007; Fang, 2011; Menegaki,
309 2011; Salim and Rafiq, 2012; Tiwari, 2011; Tugcu et al., 2012; Yao et al., 2019).

311 **3.2 Final and useful energy, as well as exergy**

312 Socioeconomic energy flow analyses trace the flow from primary energy extracted from the
313 environment (e.g. crude oil or solar radiation) to final energy put to use in production or
314 consumption (e.g. gasoline or electricity) to useful energy actually performing a specific
315 function (e.g. mechanical work or heat). While data on primary and final energy are readily
316 available from statistical sources in reasonably standardized manner (IFIAS, 1974, IPCC,
317 2014), data on useful energy (i.e. the energy actually performing useful work) must be inferred
318 and are only exceptionally reported. Exergy evaluates the thermodynamic quality of these
319 energy flows by quantifying the maximum amount of work (mechanical energy) that a given
320 amount of energy can provide. For example, as electricity can be completely converted into
321 work (i.e., it is equivalent to mechanical work), 1 kWh of electricity has an exergy of 1 kWh.
322 By contrast, the exergy of 1 kWh of heat at 80°C in an environment at 20°C is only 0.17 kWh.
323 Data on exergy are not reported by statistical bodies, therefore the community interested in the
324 relation between exergy and economic activity needs to calculate exergy equivalents of
325 primary, final or useful energy flows (Ayres et al., 2003).

327 Research on the relationship between final energy and economic growth is often motivated by
328 questions on energy efficiency. Energy efficiency is usually defined as GDP per unit energy
329 used (see Borozan, 2018; Cunha et al., 2018; Hu and Kao, 2007; Jakob et al., 2012; Marcotullio
330 and Schultz, 2007; Moreau et al., 2019) or its inverse, energy intensity (see Ang and Liu 2006,
331 Liddle 2012, Mulder and de Groot 2012, Duro et al 2010). Some studies find strong linkages
332 between final energy use and GDP (e.g. Stjepanović 2018, Kim 1984), while others find
333 evidence for some degree of decoupling, mostly at the national scale (e.g. Naqvi and Zwickl
334 2017, Jakob et al 2012, Liddle 2012, Mulder and de Groot 2012). Several studies argue that the
335 observed decoupling can be attributed to structural changes in the economy and outsourcing of
336 energy-intensive activities (e.g. Moreau et al 2019). A recent scenario suggests that low primary
337 energy demand is compatible with staying well below 2°C and providing services that enable
338 wellbeing for all (Grubler et al., 2018).

339
340 Regarding the wealth of studies investigating the energy-GDP relationship applying cointegration and causality tests based on primary energy consumption (see section 3.1), it is somewhat
341 surprising that there are hardly any studies applying such methods to final energy or exergy and
342 GDP. Among the few exceptions are Antonakakis et al (2017) and Belke et al (2011). Both find
343 evidence for bi-directional causality, i.e. for final energy consumption being a driver for GDP
344 as well as vice versa.

346
347 The number of studies analyzing exergy flows is comparatively small (see Tab. 1b). Most
348 studies investigating exergy flows find relative decoupling of GDP from primary and final
349 exergy (e.g., Ayres et al., 2003; Warr et al., 2010, Serrenho et al., 2014, Guevara et al., 2016;
350 Jadhao et al., 2017). In contrast, no significant improvements in intensities or long-term
351 decoupling were found for useful exergy. Some studies even found increasing useful exergy
352 intensities, in particular during periods in which the contribution of industry to GDP
353 respectively industry's share in final energy use rise (e.g., Warr et al., 2008, Warr et al., 2010,
354 Guevara et al., 2016); others did not detect a clear trend (e.g., Serrenho et al., 2014, Serrenho
355 et al., 2016). Exergy studies found considerable gains in the conversion efficiency from primary
356 to useful exergy (exergy efficiency), but also a slowdown of efficiency gains since the 1970s
357 (Ayres et al., 2003; Warr et al., 2010).

358
359 Several macro-economic models use (useful) exergy in addition to capital and labor as factors
360 of production (Warr et al., 2008; Warr and Ayres, 2012; Sakai et al., 2019; Santos et al., 2018);
361 these models can generally explain past GDP growth very well, without resorting to residual
362 factors such as autonomous technological growth (Ayres and Warr, 2009; Warr and Ayres,
363 2012). This would explain the strong long-term coupling between useful exergy and GDP. Seen
364 from that perspective, the decoupling of primary or final energy/exergy and GDP can be
365 interpreted as an "economic growth engine" under conditions of scarce resources (Sakai et al.,
366 2019; Ayres and Warr, 2009). Raising the conversion efficiency of primary to final exergy or
367 final to useful exergy then results in relative decoupling for the former properties while the ratio
368 of useful exergy to growth does not improve substantially – in other words, increases in
369 conversion efficiency drive GDP growth rather than reducing energy use (Sakai et al., 2019;
370 Ayres and Warr, 2009).

371
372 **Table 1.** Analysis of the studies on final energy, useful energy and exergy. All studies with one exception reported
373 in the last column refer to production-based (territorial) accounting principles; very few report on the difference
374 between the growth rate of GDP and resource use, so these columns were omitted. Where available, quantitative
375 information on decoupling was integrated in the text in the last column. Acronyms: APEC... Asia-Pacific Economic
376 Cooperation; DEA...Data Envelopment Analysis; EU...European Union; IEA...International Energy Agency; EU-
377 KLEMS...Capital (K), labour (L), energy (E), materials (M) and service (S) inputs database of the EU; GHG...Greenhouse
378 Gas; ICT...Information and Communication Technology; LINEX...Linear-exponential production function; NUTS...
379 Nomenclature des unités territoriales statistiques; OLS...Ordinary Least Square analysis; STAN...Structural ANalysis
380 Database of the OECD; TPES...Total Primary Energy Supply; TFEC...Total Final Energy Consumption; UK...United
381 Kingdom; USA...United States of America

Reference	Country / region	Period	Indica-tor(s)	Method(s)	Conclusions regarding decoupling
(a) Final energy					
Kim, 1984	Asia-Pacific	1960-1980	Commer-cial energy	Pooled cross-country analysis	Finds strong association between GDP and energy consumption from 1960-1980; energy/GDP elasticities are: China 1.07, Japan 1.01, Korea 0.96
Ang and Liu, 2006	100 countries	1997	Final energy & CO ₂ intensity	Cross-sectional analysis	Final energy/GDP is smaller in countries with higher per-capita income. The relation between aggregate CO ₂ intensity and GDP approximates the EKC model, i.e. is highest at intermediate per-capita incomes.
Hu and Kao, 2007	17 APEC	1991-2000	Final energy from IEA	Data Envelop-ment Analysis (DEA)	DEA compares efficiencies among countries and thereby suggest energy-saving potentials; results

	countries				resemble an EKC between per capita energy-saving potential and GDP.
Marcotullio and Schulz, 2008	12 countries	1960-2000	TPES & TFEC	Cross-country comparison, trend analysis, OLS regressions	Energy supply and consumption patterns are more efficient in Asia-Pacific countries than in the USA.
Duro et al., 2010	OECD	1980-2006	Final energy intensity	Regression and decomposition analysis, econometric panel analysis	Finds that differences in GDP/cap are significant in explaining inequality in energy use per capita; reduction of energy intensity differences helped reducing the inequality in energy per capita.
Belke et al., 2011	25 OECD countries	1981-2007	Final energy	Econometric causality tests	Finds bi-directional causality between energy consumption and GDP growth in the long run, i.e. increases in energy use lead to increased GDP growth and vice versa; supports the feedback hypothesis.
Liddle, 2012	28 OECD countries	1960-2006	Final energy intensity	Cross-sectional analysis and descriptive trend analysis	OECD final energy intensity typically declines; finds trends towards convergence in final energy intensities among countries. Convergence is contingent on country-specific factors since differences in individual energy-GDP ratios persist.
Mulder and de Groot, 2012	18 OECD countries	1970-2005	Final energy intensity	Decomposition analysis and descriptive trend analysis	The average annual growth rate of final energy intensity was -2.6%/y (EU-KLEMS data) and -1.5%/y (IEA and STAN data) between 1995-2005.
Vlahinic-Dizdarevic and Segota, 2012	26 EU countries	2000-2010	Final energy (Eurostat)	Window analysis / DEA	Substitution among production factors and changes in the composition of energy use is possible in the medium run. Inefficient countries could improve by reducing some of the inputs.
Uwasu et al., 2014	100 countries	1970-2010	Final energy	Econometric panel data analysis	The paper finds that income growth induces increasing final energy consumption and that geophysical factors (e.g., climate) influence the relation. In countries in cold climates with high energy consumption further increase in income do not result in growing energy use.
Antonakakis et al., 2017	106 countries	1971-2011	Final energy use, GHG	Panel vector autoregression; impulse response function analyses	Causality between total economic growth and energy consumption is bidirectional; no evidence for renewable energy consumption promoting growth.
Naqvi and Zwickl, 2017	18 EU countries	1995-2008	Final energy use, air pollutants	Decoupling indices as defined by OECD; WIOD database	This paper uses a consumption-based approach. It found that in almost all sectors the median EU country had at least some (relative) decoupling.
Borozan, 2018	EU regions (NUTS 2)	2005-2013	Final energy use (Eurostat)	Data envelopment analysis; Tobit regression analysis	Regional differences in technical and energy efficiency are considerable; most of EU regions experienced declines of total factor energy efficiency in recession years.
Cunha et al., 2018	Portugal, UK, Brazil, China	1990-2012	Final energy	Index decomposition analysis	Overall energy efficiency (GDP/final energy) trends display different patterns between countries and sectors within countries; major drivers for energy efficiency improvements are the intensity and the affluence effect.
Stjepanović, 2018	30 European countries	1994-2016	Final energy (Eurostat)	Panel data analysis	Strong correlation between final energy consumption and GDP growth in all monitored countries; but no short-term link between these variable in developed countries.
Moreau et al., 2019	EU-28	1990-2014	Final energy use	Index decomposition analysis	Energy consumption reduction can largely be attributed to structural changes; an equally significant part is due to energy efficiency improvements; observed decoupling is largely due to outsourcing of energy intensive activities.
(b) Exergy					
Ayres et al., 2003	USA	1900-1998	Primary and useful exergy	Descriptive trend analysis	Finds relative decoupling of primary exergy from GDP; primary work per unit GDP peaks ~1970 and then declines. Resource input is seen as a driver of GDP. Finds a positive feedback between useful work and GDP growth ('growth engine').
Warr et al., 2008	UK	1900-2000	Useful exergy	Growth model using LINEX and	The LINEX function with useful exergy, capital and labor as inputs is able to describe the GDP trajectory

				Cobb-Douglas production functions; econometric time-series analysis.	well. The marginal productivity of useful exergy has decreased in the UK since 1900; the ratio of useful exergy to GDP decreased since 1960. (This study assumes a 100% final-to-useful conversion efficiency of electricity).
Warr and Ayres, 2010	USA	1946-2000	Useful exergy	Econometric causality tests	Variations in useful work have no short-run effect on GDP but exert a long-run influence causing GDP to adjust to a new equilibrium level. Final exergy (energy) consumption and GDP can be (relatively) decoupled to an extent determined by the ability to increase exergy efficiency.
Warr et al., 2010	4 countries	1900-2000	Primary and useful exergy	Descriptive trend analysis	Finds marked increases in exergy and useful work during industrialization as well as a common and continuous decrease in primary exergy intensity of GDP (relative decoupling). The trend of increasing useful work intensity of GDP reversed in the 1970s (thereafter: relative decoupling).
Warr, 2011	Japan	1900-2005	Primary and useful exergy	Descriptive trend analysis, Granger causality tests; LINEX production function	Increases in useful exergy raise GDP, hence increases in the conversion of primary energy to useful exergy drive GDP growth ('economic growth engine'). Efficiency gains are required for GDP growth if resources are scarce.
Warr and Ayres, 2012	Japan and USA	1950-2000	Useful exergy	Growth model using LINEX non-adjusted and adjusted ICT functions. Econometric time-series analysis.	The ICT-adjusted LINEX function using useful exergy, capital and labor as inputs is able to describe the GDP trajectory well. The marginal productivity of useful exergy has increased in the US only between mid-70s and late 80s, while it has increased in Japan between 1950 and 1990. After 1990, both countries show a stable marginal productivity of useful exergy.
Serrenho et al., 2014	EU-15	1960-2009	Useful exergy; final and useful exergy intensity	Econometric time series analysis	Final exergy intensity decreases faster in countries with higher intensities. Temporal trends are mainly explicable by efficiency improvements because useful exergy intensity shows no clear trend. Industrial high temperature heat and residential uses explain most of the variation in useful exergy intensities.
Serrenho et al., 2016	Portugal	1856-2010	Useful exergy, useful exergy intensity	Descriptive trend analysis	Finds no temporal trend of useful exergy intensity in Portugal, suggesting that further reductions in primary energy (or exergy) intensity may only be achieved by increasing exergy efficiency. However, recently efficiency stagnates and no decoupling was observed.
Guevara et al., 2016	Mexico	1971-2009	Final and useful exergy, useful exergy intensity	Descriptive trend analysis	Finds relative decoupling for final exergy, but an increasing useful exergy intensity of GDP (i.e. increasing coupling for useful exergy).
Jadhao et al., 2017	India	1970-2010	Final exergy intensity	Descriptive trend analysis	Final exergy intensity (final exergy per unit GDP) decreased throughout the period.
Arango-Miranda et al., 2018	10 countries	1971-2014	CO ₂ , TPES and primary exergy	Panel data analysis	The study finds a high correlation between CO ₂ emissions, energy use, primary exergy input and GDP. Neither an EKC type relation nor a causal relation between GDP and energy in the OECD was found.
Santos et al., 2018	Portugal	1960-2009	Primary energy, useful exergy	Econometric methods: cointegration analysis, Granger causality test	Finds relative decoupling of primary energy and GDP until the 1980s, followed by stronger growth of primary exergy than GDP. Overall, no decoupling between GDP economic output and useful exergy. Finds cointegration of economic output and energy (primary energy or useful exergy), and that energy Granger-causes GDP growth.
Sakai et al., 2019	UK	1971-2013	Final energy, useful exergy	Macroeconomic resource consumption model considering thermodynamic efficiency	Gains in thermodynamic efficiency are a key 'engine of economic growth' that contributes 25% to the observed increases of GDP. The tight coupling between global energy use and GDP is explained by investments into energy efficiency. Policy efforts to decouple energy from GDP are therefore challenging if not futile.

382

3.3 Comprehensive measures of material and energy flows

383 Studies analysed in this section are based on the social metabolism concept (Fischer-Kowalski,
384 1998); i.e. are studies that comprehensively trace flows of biomass, mineral resources, fossil
385 fuels and many other materials respectively energy sources (Wiedenhofer et al., **this issue**). In
386 addition to fossil fuels used for the supply of technical energy, biomass used as food and feed
387 also constitutes an important part of a society's energy metabolism (Haberl, 2001). Material
388 decoupling is also sometimes denoted as dematerialization (Bernardini and Galli, 1993;
389 Cleveland and Ruth, 1998; Schandl and Turner, 2009). We find very few dematerialization
390 studies prior to the 1990s (Table 2). As also discussed in part I, many of these studies are
391 concerned with compiling MEFA data (MEFA is an extension of MFA that consistently
392 accounts for material and energy flows; see part I) rather than with advanced statistical or
393 econometric analyses, and only 11 econometric dematerialization studies are in our sample of
394 835 articles.

396

397 Long time series of harmonized MEFA data now enable researchers to analyse the interplay
398 between political-economic and material development of countries. Especially at the national
399 level, this analysis commonly analyse how trajectories of material use relate to major phases of
400 socioeconomic or political development, including incisive political events such as the
401 dissolution of the Soviet Union (Krausmann et al., 2016) or China's admittance to the World
402 Trade Organisation (Velasco-Fernández et al., 2015). At the country level, decomposition
403 analyses (Muñoz and Hubacek, 2008; Plank et al., 2018a; Wenzlik et al., 2015) have identified
404 economic growth (of absolute or per capita GDP and/or monetary final demand) as the most
405 important driver of consumption-based measures of resource consumption. (Yu et al., 2013)
406 identified technological progress as the most important driver for China, while other drivers
407 were found to have no significant impact on resource use (e.g., Rezny et al., 2019 for
408 innovation). The links between GDP growth and material use are also the subject of global
409 studies, covering either aggregated world regions (Behrens et al., 2007; Schaffartzik et al.,
410 2014) or representative large (>100) samples of countries (e.g. Pothen, 2017; Steinberger et al.,
411 2013; Steinberger and Krausmann, 2011). At the global scale, a period of relative decoupling
412 after the 1970s was followed by a period starting ~2000 in which global material use accelerated
413 at a similar pace as GDP (Krausmann et al., 2018). While many of the studies analyzed in this
414 section apply production-based accounting principles, a substantial and rising fraction analyze
415 resource flows from a consumption-based (or 'material footprint'; Wiedmann et al., 2015)
416 perspective.

417

418 From country case studies based on simple data description to advanced statistical analyses of
419 global samples, relative decoupling has been identified mainly for regions or countries with
420 intermediate economic growth (e.g., USA, European countries) or in countries that experienced
421 socio-economic and political turmoil with corresponding restructuring of their economies
422 (Kovanda and Hak, 2007; Raupova et al., 2014). Absolute reductions of material flows are
423 generally only found in periods of very low economic growth or even recession (Shao et al.,
424 2017; Steinberger and Krausmann, 2011; Wu et al., 2019). Accelerated industrialization and
425 high rates of economic growth, as observable in China in the last decades, often coincide with
426 a growth of material use matching or even outstripping economic growth (Xu and Zhang, 2007).
427 The post-World War II boom in the world's wealthiest economies is not widely analysed, with
428 most studies relying on data that does not reach further back than 1970. Hence there is little
429 opportunity to compare the rapid growth phase in the 1950s found by long-term studies (e.g.,
430 Gierlinger and Krausmann, 2012; Infante-Amate et al., 2015; Krausmann et al., 2011) with the
431 currently similarly high growth rates in some countries. Better understanding the role of such

1
2
3 432 rapid growth phases for the following phase of slowed growth in domestic extraction and
4 433 production in the 1970s (Giljum et al., 2014b; Schaffartzik et al., 2014) would be beneficial.
5 434

6 435 At the same time, it appears that reductions or stagnation in the use of the domestic resource
7 436 base is often associated with rising importance of trade. In contrast to those measures of
8 437 decoupling based on territorial indicators, consumption-based perspectives unveil a reversal of
9 438 trends with efficiencies deteriorating instead of improving and no evidence even for relative
10 439 decoupling (Giljum et al., 2014a; Pothen and Schymura, 2015; Thomas O. Wiedmann et al.,
11 440 2015a). The integrated, more holistic perspective achieved by considering trade-offs over
12 441 longer periods as well as across spatial scales is important in assessing the possibilities of and
13 442 necessary conditions for any future (relative or absolute) decoupling. Currently, decoupling
14 443 appears to depend on prior use and accumulation of materials and on extractive expansion and
15 444 rising material flows elsewhere. As long as this is the case, decoupling cannot be achieved in
16 445 the long-term or universally.
17 446
18 447

Table 2. Analysis of the studies on material and energy flow indicators (MEFA). Production- vs consumption-based perspective is explicit through the definition of the indicators, the latter including RMC, MF, TMR, TMC. Acronyms: DE ... Domestic Extraction; DMI ... Direct Material Input; DMC ... Domestic Material Consumption; DMF ... Direct Material Flow; DPO...Domestic Processed Output; EE-IO...environmentally extended IO; GHG ... Greenhouse Gas emissions; IO... Input Output Analysis; IPAT...Impact=Population x Affluence x Technology; KEI ... Knowledge Economy Index; MF ... Material Footprint; MI ... Materials Intensity (e.g. DMC/GDP); MP... Material Productivity (inverse of MI); NAS ... Net Additions to Stock; PPC... Public and Private Consumption; PPP...Purchasing Power Parity; PTB ... Physical Trade Balance; RMC...Raw Material Consumption; RME...Raw Material Equivalents; RP...Resource Productivity (e.g. GDP/DMC); SDA...Structural Decomposition Analysis; TDO...Total Domestic Output; TEC... Technical Energy Consumption; TMC...Total Material Consumption; TMR ... Total Material Requirements; TPES ... Total Primary Energy Supply; USA...United States of America.

Reference	Spatial reference	Period	Indicator(s)	Method(s)	Distance of GDP and resource growth	Interpretation
Kelly et al., 1989	USA	1977-1987	Material consumption*	Descriptive	GDP grows 2.6%/y faster than consumption of energy & materials	Material consumption remained unchanged while GDP grew. Argued that efficiency of an economy is higher if its share of sectors extracting natural resources is lower.
De Bruyn and Opschoor, 1997	19 countries	1966-1990	Material consumption* (selected resources)	Descriptive	Varies by country	Material intensity decreases in almost all countries, but not as part of a development that can be expected to be persistent.
Picton and Daniels, 1999	Australia	1970-1995	Material consumption* (selected resources)	Descriptive, per capita and per GDP	Materials used per GDP rise +70%, consumption +15%	Material consumption and production increased faster than GDP.
De Marco et al., 2000	Italy compared with others	1994	TMR and DMI	Descriptive	n.a.	Japan requires least materials (TMR) per unit GDP, US most.
Hoffrén et al., 2001	Finland	1960-1996	DMI	Descriptive and decomposition	Material productivity (GDP/mass) rises by 75%.	Relative decoupling for total GDP, but decomposition by economic sectors and materials gives varying results, including rebound effects in some sectors.
Bringezu et al., 2003	EU and other countries	Variable	TMR, MI, DMC, NAS	Descriptive	Variable	Relative decoupling found in most reviewed countries. Detailed information on the differences between TMR and DMI.
Canas et al., 2003	16 industrialized countries	1960-1998	DMI	Panel regression with 15 different models	Differs between countries and regression model	Multiple model specifications provide good statistical fits for an inverted U-shaped EKC, but since most countries are still in the increasing stage, the evidence for an actual curve is lacking.
Ščasný et al., 2003	Czech Republic	1990-2000	DMI, DMC, TMR, TMC, DPO, TDO	Descriptive	DMC growth rate is smaller than that of GDP	Dissolution of Soviet Union and the Velvet Revolution in the Czech Republic led to a collapse and fundamental restructuring of the economy.
Bringezu et al., 2004	16 countries	Variable	DMI, TMR	Descriptive and panel analysis	Varies by country and time period	No evidence for EKC. Provides analysis of country-level differences, e.g. population density, economic structure or public policy.
Cañellas et al., 2004	Spain	1980-2000	DMI, DMC	Descriptive	DMI +85% DMC +79% GDP +74%.	Does not even find relative decoupling.
Krausmann et al., 2004	Austria	1960-2000	DMC	Descriptive	GDP +250% DMC +175%	Finds relative decoupling but total DMC grows by 175%.

Weisz et al., 2006	EU-15	2000	DMC, DE, PTB	Descriptive, cross-sectional	n.a.	Compares economic structures vs. levels of GDP as determinants of DMC of material groups.
Behrens et al., 2007	7 world regions	1980-2002	DE	Descriptive	Varies by world region	Rising DE despite improved efficiency; scale effects trump technology effects; highlights need for dematerialization in industrialized countries
Hoffrén and Hellman, 2007	Finland	1970-2005	DMF	Descriptive	DMF grows 1.7%/yr less than GDP	Private consumption more strongly drives GDP than public expenditure does, but private consumption is linked to far lower material flows than public expenditure.
Schulz, 2007	Singapore	1962-2003	DMI, DMC	Descriptive, correlation	DMI grows 0.6%/yr less than GDP, DMC -1.9%/yr	Argues that economic growth is not possible without material growth and that urbanization drives material use upwards.
Vehmas et al., 2007	EU-15	1980-2000	DMI, DMC	Decomposition	For EU-15, Δ PPC 49.8, Δ DMC per capita -3.1, Δ DMC/PPC -31.5	Weak decoupling of resources from GDP; DMC shows more de-linking than DMI.
Xu and Zhang, 2007	China	1990-2002	TMR, DMC	Descriptive	TMR/GDP +56%, DMI/GDP +24%	No decoupling, both TMR and DMC grow faster than GDP.
Citlalic Gonzalez-Martinez and Schandl, 2008	Mexico	1970-2003	DMC, DMI, PTB, DE, DMC/GDP	Descriptive, decomposition (IPAT)	DMC +194% GDP/cap +62%	No dematerialization; population growth and exports drive material consumption over whole period; no efficiency gains of DMC/GDP since 1970.
Hashimoto et al., 2008	Japan	1995-2002	DMI	Decomposition	Growth rate of DMI is 3%/y smaller than GDP	Material intensity could be reduced by final demand structure and recycling; decline in construction reduces material intensity.
Kovanda and Hak, 2008	Czech Rep., Hungary, Poland, EU-15	1990-2002	DMC, material productivity	Descriptive	Varies between countries	Relative decoupling resulting from structural and technological changes: material productivity (GDP/DMC) grew; absolute decoupling observed in the Czech Republic.
Kovanda et al., 2008	Czech Republic	1990-2002	DMC, DPO, NAS, TDO, TMR, TMC	Descriptive	Depends on indicator.	Indexed material intensity indicators decreased from 1 (1990) to 0.68-0.48, with a smaller decline of material outflow indicators.
Moffatt, 2008	G7	2000	DMC, many other indicators	Cross-country analysis	n.a.	GDP is strongly negatively associated with DMC among the G7 countries
Muñoz and Hubacek, 2008	Chile	1986-1996	DMI	Structural decomposition analysis	DMI grew by 127%, GDP by 10%/y	GDP mainly driven by primary commodities (copper); declining ore quality drove up material intensity.
Schandl et al., 2008	Australia	1970-2005	DMC, DE, PTB	Descriptive	Resource productivity stable at ~0.4 US\$ PPP/kg	Australia's resource productivity is stable; it is only half of other OECD countries due to large raw material sector and inefficient domestic supply systems
Takiguchi and Takemoto, 2008	Japan	2000-2005	GDP/DMI	Descriptive	GDP per DMI rises by 25%	Growth of real GDP accompanied by a decrease in DMI

Krausmann et al., 2009	Global	1900-2005	DE=DMC	Descriptive	GDP growth factor: 22.8 DMC growth factor: 8.4	Relative decoupling of DMC and GDP coinciding with large (factor 8) increase in material use.
Schandl and Turner, 2009	Australia	1950-2011	DMI	Descriptive	DMI growth factor: 10 GDP growth factor: 50	Finds relative decoupling but strong growth of total DMI.
Wood et al., 2009	Australia	1975-2005	TMR	Econometric time-series analysis	Variable sectoral trends in TMR intensity per \$ value added	Improvements in material intensity reduces growth of material flows.
Kovanda et al., 2010	Czech Republic	1990-2006	DMC, DMI, TMR	Descriptive	DMI -23% DMC -35% TMR -27% GDP +31%	Improved material productivity in this time period, related to accession to the EU but linked to increase in foreign trade, and less to transformations within the economy towards services
Schandl and West, 2010	Asia-Pacific and sub-regions (46 countries)	1970-2005	DE/cap, DMC, Material intensity (DMC /GDP)	Descriptive	Material intensity fluctuating around ~2.4 kg/US\$ until 1990, then rising over 3 kg/US\$.	Resource use of the Asia-Pacific region is steadily growing and shows no signs of slowing down; no decoupling.
Steinberger et al., 2010	175 countries	2000	DMC per capita, per area, per GDP for 4 material categories, Gini coefficient	Regression, STIRPAT	n.a.	Material consumption is unequally distributed, but less unequal than GDP. Material productivity is correlated with income, most strongly so for biomass.
OECD, 2011	China	1997-2007	RMC (MF)	Structural decomposition analysis	RMC +71%	Material intensity decreases until 2002 and increases afterwards.
Kovanda and Hak, 2011	Czech Republic	1918-2005	DMC	Descriptive	DMC grows 2.8%/y less than GDP	Material productivity development could allow achieving a level comparable to that of the EU-15 as a consequence of structural/political change.
Krausmann et al., 2011	Japan	1878-2005	DMC, DE, import, export, TPES	Descriptive	Overall GDP growth factor is 97, for DMC 49	Japans DMC peaked in 1973 and fell afterwards (absolute decoupling); 2005 one of the lowest DMC/cap among high income countries; but almost 50% of DMC from imports – MF likely much higher.
Steger and Bleischwitz, 2011	EU15/EU25	1980-1992-2000	DMC	Panel analysis	n.a.	The main drivers of resource use are energy efficiency, new dwellings and road construction.
Steinberger and Krausmann, 2011	~150 countries	2000	DMC	Regression	n.a.	Ratios of GDP:DMC vary between materials; biomass is independent of income, but use of fossils, minerals and ores depends on GDP.
Weinzettel and Kovanda, 2011	Czech Republic	2000-2007	RMC	Structural decomposition analysis	GDP grows by 36%; RMC by 9%	Technology-driven gains in resource efficiency cannot compensate for rising consumption due to GDP growth (crude oil, metal ores, construction materials, food crops, timber)

Haberl et al., 2012	>140 countries	2000	Various resource use indicators	Regressions	DMC correlates well with GDP; final biomass use even more strongly.	Shows that indicators such as biomass consumption and total DMC are strongly correlated with GDP ($r^2 \sim 0.7$).
Nita, 2012	Romania	2000-2007	Many resource use indicators	Descriptive	MI increased from 2.4 to 3.9 t/lei; RP decreased from 0.17 to 0.12 €/kg.	Romanian GDP grew on average by 2.2%/yr while material consumption increased at a faster rate; hence no decoupling. Energy use remained more or less constant.
Schandl and West, 2012	China, Australia, Japan	1970-2005	DE, PTB, DMC, MI	Descriptive, decomposition (IPAT)	MI decreased by 60% in Japan and 40% in China	No decreases in MI in raw material exporting Australia, but improvements in importing countries; picture would change when looking at MF.
Yabar et al., 2012	China, Japan	2000-2010	GDP/DMI	Descriptive	RP of DMI rises by 40%	Relative decoupling of GDP from DMI
Gan et al., 2013	51 countries	2000	DMC	Descriptive, cross-country	Resource productivities (dollar/kg) for all country-subgroups, from 0.25 to 1.5	GDP per capita, economic structure and population density are the three factors with the greatest contribution explaining resource productivity
Wang et al., 2013	China	1995-2008	TMR	Decomposition	TMR: 4.4%/yr, GDP 8.9%/yr	Relative decoupling of TMR from GDP.
West and Schandl, 2013	Latin America and Caribbean	1970-2008	DMC/GDP	Descriptive	MI increased from 2.6 to about 2.9 kg/\$.	Latin America and the Caribbean had a high MMI compared to the rest of the world in 1970; MI grew until 2008 while MI decreased globally. High intensities in Chile and Peru linked to non-ferrous metal exports.
Steinberger et al., 2013	38 countries	1970-2004	DMC, fossil CO ₂	Panel analysis, cluster analysis	Differs among countries.	Absolute long-term decoupling of DMC for Germany, UK, Netherlands and some others; EKC-like behavior observed for CO ₂ in "mature" economies, emerging countries have higher long-term coupling of GDP and materials
Yu et al., 2013	China	1978-2010	DE, TEC, CO ₂	Decomposition	Growth rates 1978-2010: GDP: *19.5, DE *4.5, TEC *4.7	Authors found relative decoupling between GDP and DE and GDP and TEC.
West et al., 2014	Eastern Europe, Caucasus, Central Asia	1992-2008	DMC, DMC/cap, PTB, PTB/cap, MI	Descriptive, decomposition (IPAT)	MI falls by 2.8%/y	Very high MI after dissolution of Soviet Union, strongly falling MI afterwards during high GDP growth.
Lee et al., 2014	South Korea	2000-2010	DMC	Descriptive	DMC increased by 8%, GDP by >50%	Absolute decoupling; DMC falls, and increases in resource productivity are very high; authors claim this was due to resource management policies.
Raupova et al., 2014	Uzbekistan	1992-2011	DMI, DMC, TMR, CO ₂	Descriptive	DMI +2.8%/yr TMR +2.3%/yr GDP: +4%/yr	Relative decoupling, material efficiency (GDP/DMI) increased.
Fishman et al., 2014	USA, Japan	1930-2005	DMC, Material Stock, Removal from Stock	Descriptive	Since 1960s, DMC productivity *2 in USA, *2.5 in Japan. Stock	Analyzed coupling of DMC, material stocks, and GDP from 1930 to 1970s. In US relative decoupling since 1970 for DMC and weaker decoupling for stocks.

					productivity *2 in USA, *6 in Japan	In Japan relative decoupling only for DMC, not for stocks.
Wang et al., 2014	Taiwan	1993-2012	DMC, DMI, DPO	Descriptive	DMI grew by 2.8%/y, DMC by 2.1%/y and GDP by 5%/y on average over period	Relative decoupling: DMI and DMC grew less than GDP.
Infante-Amate et al., 2015	Spain	1860-2010	DMC	Descriptive	Material intensity -86%	Relative decoupling; structural breaks in the rate of decoupling in 1880, 1940, and 1980, coinciding with historical events.
Maung et al., 2015	Myanmar, Philippines, Bangladesh	1985-2010	DMC	Decomposition (IPAT)	Material intensity falls in all three countries	Decreasing material intensities due to improved technological efficiency.
Pothen and Schymura, 2015	Global	1995-2008	DE	Decomposition	GDP +59% DE +56%	No evidence for global dematerialization; GDP growth is the strongest factor behind growing material use.
Wenzlik et al., 2015	AUT	1995-2007	RMC	Structural decomposition	n.a.	Generally, GDP growth drives RMC; during phases of low economic growth, the composition of consumption trends towards inefficient products and services.
Wiedmann et al., 2015	186 countries	1990-2008	Material footprint MF, DMC	EE-IO, descriptive trend analysis; cross-country regression	For 1% GDP growth, MF rises by 0.6%, DMC by 0.15%	No increases in resource productivity for developed countries in last decades ; relative decoupling of DMC and GDP, little or no decoupling of MF and GDP.
Krausmann et al., 2016	Russian Federation and its predecessors	1900-2010	DMC for material groups, MP	EW-MFA, descriptive	MP of biomass grew strongly, growth/decline phases for MP of fossils and minerals.	Overall, relative decoupling: GDP grew 10 times faster than DMC/cap early on, growth rates declined thereafter. Material productivity (GDP/DMC) grew fast in stagnation phase (1978-1991) and collapse phase (1992-1998).
Ward et al., 2016	6 countries	1990-2010	Total material use	Descriptive	Varies by country	Argue that growth in GDP cannot be decoupled from material and energy use.
Bithas and Kalimeris, 2017	World	1900-2010	DE for non-combustible materials	Descriptive	GDP/DE rises by 2%/y, GDP/(cap*DE) by 0.7%/y	Relative decoupling; decoupling rates are smaller when dividing per-capita DE by total GDP as a result of population growth.
Chiu et al., 2017	Philippines	1980-2008	DMC	Descriptive; decomposition (IPAT)	No significant change throughout the period.	Slight decoupling is due to recessions and economic crises, no robust decoupling.
Krausmann et al., 2017b	World	1900-2010	DE, material stocks	Descriptive	GDP grew 27-fold, DE grew 11-fold, stocks grew 23-fold	Finds relative decoupling between global material use and GDP but no decoupling between material stocks and GDP.
Kallis, 2017	Global	1980-2014	DE=DMC	Descriptive	DMC +110% GDP + 150%	Claims that the current economic system cannot lead to the required "radical" level of dematerialization.
Krausmann et al., 2017a	Global	1980-2010	DMC, MP	Descriptive	Growth factor of DMC was 8, that of GDP 20	Relative decoupling slowed after 2002; currently re-materialization due to fast industrial and urban transition in the Global South, shifts of economic activity

						to less resource efficient countries and growing levels of consumption.
Martinico-Perez et al., 2017	Philippines	1985-2010	DMC	IPAT	GDP +200% DMC +100%	Aggregate indicators (national DMC, GDP etc.) hide large inequalities between small elites and the majority of the population.
Pothen, 2017	Global and 40 countries	1995-2008	RMC (MF)	Decomposition (LMDI)	Global RMC rises by +44%	Material intensity decreases (relative decoupling).
Shao et al., 2017	150 countries	1970-2010	DMC for 4 material categories	Dynamic panel data model	DMC growth factor 2.9 GDP growth factor 3.8.	Relative decoupling at the global level until early 2000s, then GDP and DMC grow in unison until 2009. Short absolute decoupling 1990-1992.
Wang et al., 2017	China, provinces	2002-2012	Material use, similar DMC	Decomposition (LMDI)	n.a.	Two thirds of the Chinese provinces show no decoupling, 9 provinces relative decoupling, absolute decoupling in Shanxi and Shanghai. GDP growth strongest driver of material use.
Zhao, 2017	China	1978-2008	DMI	Descriptive	Growth factor of DMI 5.6, GDP 16.5, GDP/DMI 2.9	Material efficiency improved dramatically until 2000 but fluctuated around a flat line since then.
Bithas and Kalimeris, 2018	World	1900-2009	DE	Descriptive	GDP/DE grows by 3%/y; GDP/(DE*cap) by 0.7%/y	Relative decoupling of GDP from DE, but not on a per-capita basis.
Bleischwitz et al., 2018a	Germany, China, US, UK, Japan	Varied	Apparent Domestic Consumption	Descriptive	n.a.	Studied countries have achieved a saturation stage for key materials (steel, copper, cement); stock-building seems to saturate as well.
Martinico-Perez et al., 2018	Philippines	1980-2014	DMC	Descriptive	DMC grows 0.5%/yr less than GDP	Improved resource efficiency due to growing service sector, greater material efficiency of industry, and technology improvements.
Meyer et al., 2018	Global	1980/2015	DE (4 material categories)	Descriptive	Depends on indicator	Overall finds relative decoupling on a global level but fossil fuels rose in parallel to GDP since 2000s; ores and minerals rise faster than GDP.
Plank et al., 2018	Global and 9 regions	1990-2010	RMC, MF	Structural decomposition analysis (SDA)	global RMC +87%	Relative decoupling: material intensity decreases but raw material consumption keeps growing.
Schndl et al., 2018	Global, sub-regions	1970-2010	DMC, DMI, PTB, DE, RME of trade, MF, RMC, DMC/GDP	Descriptive, Decomposition (IPAT)	Material intensity remains largely constant.	Material intensity of global economy (kg/\$) almost stable from 1970 to 2010, global material footprint per capita has been growing from 1990 to 2010. Main drivers of growing material use are GDP and population growth.
Vuta et al., 2018	EU-28	2005-2016	GDP/DMC	Panel data analysis (level-level model)	Resource productivity growth of 1 unit leads to a change in GDP growth rate of 0.75%	Finds a positive relationship between real GDP growth and resource productivity.
West and Schndl, 2018	Global	1970-2008	DMC	Panel analysis, decomposition	n.a.	Besides population and affluence, other socio-economic variables do contribute little to explain DMC variations across countries – nation as inappropriate unit of analysis

Wood et al., 2018	Global	1995/2011	Global DE, GHG, others	Descriptive; IO; regional comparison	Global DE grows +36%, i.e. faster than GDP	No decoupling; material use grows fastest among all indicators (GHG, energy, blue water, land use); flows embodied in trade are growing and result in displacement to developing regions.
Fernández-Herrero and Duro, 2019	94 countries	1990-2010	DMC	Econometric time-series anal.	Material productivity increased by 31%	Material productivity increased over time, but also inequalities in MP growth between countries increased.
IEA, 2019	2 countries each from BRICS, OECD	2000-2007	DE	Decoupling indicators derived from IPAT	Differs between countries	Absolute decoupling in Japan and for some time in the US; relative decoupling in US, Russia and China. It is argued that absolute decoupling in OECD countries is due to their lower GDP growth rates.
Rezny et al., 2019	130-40 countries	1995-2012	MF, KEI	Descriptive	n.a.	No significant link between innovation (measured by the knowledge Economy Index KEI) and resource efficiency.
Wu et al., 2019	157 countries	1980-2011	DMC	Descriptive	DMC grows 1.25% less than GDP	Absolute dematerialization occurred only during periods of recession or low economic growth.

3.4 (De)coupling GDP from total GHG emissions

Reporting of territorial CO₂ emissions from fossil fuel combustion and industrial processes such as cement manufacture is rather straightforward because these emissions can be calculated stoichiometrically from fuel use respectively cement production data. These emissions have been reported for a long time, and are readily available from sources such as CDIAC (Carbon Dioxide Information Analysis Center, <https://cdiac.ess-dive.lbl.gov/>) for many countries and the global total. Hence, there is a large literature on the decoupling of GDP from territorial CO₂ emissions (section 3.1). By contrast, full GHG accounts also need to quantify emissions from land-use and land-cover changes (LULUCF) as well as highly uncertain and strongly context-dependent emissions such as those of CH₄ and N₂O. The quantification of “carbon” respectively GHG footprints (i.e., consumption-based accounts of carbon or GHG emissions) started a bit over a decade ago (Hertwich and Peters, 2009; Lenzen et al., 2013; Peters et al., 2011; Peters and Hertwich, 2008),³ and up to now these studies generally include only fossil-fuel and industrial-process related emissions, whereas LULUCF emissions of carbon (i.e. changes of the carbon balance of ecosystems resulting from land use, land-use change or forestry) are not systematically accounted for in these databases.

Five studies (Lozano and Gutiérrez, 2008, Valadkhani et al., 2016, Beltran-Esteve and Picazo-Tadeo, 2017, Bampatsou et al., 2017, Wang et al., 2019) use Data Envelopment Analysis techniques, a method providing efficiency rankings of countries, which show that most countries could reduce their emissions if catching up with the most efficient ones, but does not directly deliver insights on decoupling. Studies searching for an EKC often find no indication for the existence of a turning point (Li et al., 2007; Koirala et al., 2011), not even a large-scale study of 129 countries (Sanchez and Stern, 2016) as well as a global study (Fernandez-Amador et al., 2017). A study of 27 EU countries found differently shaped EKCs, but only four countries with an inverted U shape (Jesus Lopez-Menendez et al., 2014). A study on Australia 1970-2007 found some evidence for an EKC related to energy, and a declining trend for GHG per GDP (Sarkodie et al., 2019). Another study predicts an EKC for Russia (Yang et al., 2017), another

³ These studies were not found by the search query as they lacked keywords filtered by the query. We cross-checked elasticities between GHG footprints and GDP as reported in these studies (where available), which confirmed the results of the literature analyzed in Table 3.

489 an EKC for CH₄ for Sub-Saharan Africa (Zaman et al., 2017). Overall, however, there is little
490 support for the inverted U-shape hypothesis.

491
492 A considerable number of studies used descriptive trend analyses, generally finding relative
493 decoupling, for example for the OECD 1970-2001 (Guillet, 2010), the Czech Republic
494 (Solilová and Nerudová, 2015) and China (Cohen et al., 2019). A study of OECD countries
495 covering 1999-2012 found that GHG emissions were constant while GDP grew on considerably
496 (Gupta, 2015). A study for Greece (Angelis-Dimakis et al., 2012) found that GHG emissions
497 were highest around the year 2000 and then declined somewhat. Decomposition analyses
498 generally find GDP to be an upward driver of GHG emissions. For example, Duarte et al., 2013
499 find that GDP-induced demand growth overwhelmed technology-induced GHG emission
500 reductions in 11 industrialized countries 1995-2005; similar results were reported for the Baltics
501 (Streimikiene and Balezentis, 2016). Xu et al., 2014 show that in China 1996-2011, GDP
502 growth was the most important driver of rising emissions. By contrast, from 1999-2009 the EU-
503 27 overall slightly reduced energy use and CO₂ emissions through structural change and
504 improved energy/CO₂ efficiency; GDP growth counteracted but not annihilated these efficiency
505 improvements (Cruz and Dias, 2016). In Australia, total GHG emissions have been slightly
506 reduced, whereas industrial CO₂ emissions continued to increase, which was achieved by
507 reductions in LULUCF/agricultural emissions (Leal et al., 2019). Econometric studies are rare,
508 examples include Knight and Schor, 2014, Khan et al., 2017, Bader and Ganguli, 2019.

509
510 Footprint studies often find that territory-based emissions grow more slowly or even fall while
511 consumption-based emissions increase (e.g., UK 1992-2004, see Baiocchi and Minx, 2010;
512 global: Simas et al., 2017). There are, however, necessarily also countries where the situation
513 is reversed, e.g. Norway 1980-2000 (Faehn and Bruvoll, 2009). In 29 high-income countries
514 for the period 1991-2008, GDP was found to drive both territorial and consumption-based
515 emissions; relative decoupling existed for territorial but not for consumption-based CO₂
516 (Knight and Schor, 2014).

517
518 Decoupling was found to be insufficient for reaching climate targets in a study of 120 countries
519 for 2005-2015 (Fanning and O'Neill, 2019). Absolute decoupling is found in a footprint-study
520 of GHGs for Sweden 2008-2014 (Palm et al., 2019). Most noteworthy is a study of 18 countries
521 with declining CO₂ emissions (both consumption and production-based) that is discussed in
522 more detail in section 5 (Le Quéré et al., 2019). Overall, the studies summarized in Table 3
523 suggest that very recently, absolute decoupling between GDP and CO₂ or GHG emissions can
524 be found in some countries, but even in those cases decoupling is so far insufficient to address
525 stringent climate targets, and it is driven by policies promoting renewable energy and energy
526 efficiency (Le Quéré et al., 2019).

527
528 **Table 3.** Analysis of the studies on GHG emissions and CO₂ footprints. Acronyms: BRICS...Brasil, Russia, India,
529 China, South-Africa; DEA... Data Envelopment Analysis; EEA...European Environment Agency;
530 EKC...Environmental Kuznets Curve; EU...European Union; EXIOBASE...acronym of an multi-regional
531 environmentally extended input-output database; GHG...Greenhouse Gas; IDA...Index Decomposition Analysis;
532 IPAT...Impact=Population x Affluence x Technology; LMDI...Logarithmic Mean Divisia Index;
533 LULUCF...Land Use, Land Use Change, and Forestry; MARKAL...MARKet ALlocation model; MRIO...Multi-
534 Regional Input-Output Analysis; OECD...Organization of Economic Co-Operation and Development;
535 RoW...Rest of the World; UNFCCC...United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change; UK...United
536 Kingdom; USA...United States of America; WIOD...World Input Output Database.

Reference	Country	Period	Territorial or footprint	Indicator(s)	Method(s)	Interpretation, including quantitative measures of decoupling (if available)
Li et al., 2007	77 studies, 588	1992-2005	Presumably	CO ₂ , full GHG	Meta-analysis of EKC studies	No reliable EKC observed regarding CO ₂ and/or GHG emissions; specifically no

	observa- tions		territo- rial			income turning point identified, even though studies report EKC.
Lozano and Gutiérrez, 2008	USA, compared to Kyoto protocol Annex I	1990-2005	Territorial	Primary energy, total GHG emissions excluding LULUCF	Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA)	DEA compares different countries and estimates GHG reductions that would result from application of "best practice"; e.g., GHG emissions of the USA could be lowered by ~60% even at 3% GDP growth rates by adopting the best efficiency in the country sample.
Faehn and Bruvoll, 2009	Norway	1980-2000	Foot-print	GHG emissions excl. LULUCF	Calculation of emission "leakages" using emission coefficients	Finds relative decoupling between GDP and GHG emissions. Net leakages (GHG related to export subtracted) declined.
Baiocchi and Minx, 2010	UK	1992-2004	Territorial, foot-print	CO ₂	MRIO, decomposition	Territorial improvements in CO ₂ emissions overcompensated by supply-chain emissions; local decoupling, but not at global scale.
Guillet, 2010	OECD countries	1970-2001	Territorial	Primary energy, GHG emissions	Graphical analysis of trajectories	Plots data showing that GHG emissions rose by a factor of ~1.4, primary energy ~1.5 and GDP ~2.5 in the OECD.
Koirala et al., 2011	878 observations, 103 studies	1992-2009	Various	CO ₂ and others	Meta-analysis of EKC studies	Turning point at ten times current world GDP/cap, i.e. outside observational space, concludes that there is no EKC for CO ₂ .
Angelis-Dimakis et al., 2012	Greece	1960-2007	Territorial	Primary and final energy, GHG emissions	Sustainability analysis relating trajectories of various indicators	GHG emissions rose over the entire period with declining growth rates towards the end of the period. GHG/GDP was highest ~1990-2000 and declined somewhat thereafter
Duarte et al., 2013	11 industrial countries	1995-2005	Foot-print	CO ₂ emissions	MRIO, decomposition	Technological efficiency improvements are overcompensated by growing demand.
West et al., 2013	China	1979-2008	Territorial	GHG emissions	Trend analysis	CO ₂ intensity of GDP more than halved between 1970 and 2005, still much higher than in many other countries
Arto and Dietzenbacher, 2014	Global	1995-2008	Territorial and footprint	GHG	Structural decomposition analysis	Consumption is the main driver of global GHG emission increase.
Knight and Schor, 2014	29 high-income countries	1991-2008	Territorial and footprint	CO ₂ emissions excluding LULUCF	Various econometric panel analysis methods	GDP growth has a positive effect on both territorial and consumption-based emissions. Relative decoupling exists for territorial but not for consumption-based CO ₂ .
Xu et al., 2014	China	1996-2011	Territorial	GHG from fossil energy use	LMDI decomposition analysis, 5 sectors	GHG emissions more than doubled, and GDP growth was the most important driver; energy intensity improvement was the most important counteracting factor.
Jesus Lopez-Menendez et al., 2014	EU27	1996-2010	Territorial	GHG emissions from Eurostat	Panel analysis based on the EKC concept	Finds different shapes of the EKC; the inverted U shape is only found in 4 out of 27 countries
Gupta, 2015	OECD member countries	1999-2012	Territorial	Primary energy, CO ₂ emissions, GHG emissions	Descriptive trend analysis	Descriptive study analyzing the relations between a multitude of environmental or biophysical indicators and GDP in the OECD. Nominal GDP rose 4% faster than GHG emissions. GHG remained largely constant despite noticeable GDP growth.
Robaina-Alves et al., 2015	EU 27	2000-2011	Territorial	Total GHG emissions from EEA	Stochastic frontier and max. entropy models	Benchmarks countries in terms of their eco-efficiency (GPD/GHG), considering inputs such as capital, labor, fossil & renewable fuels
Solilová and	Czech Republic	1990-2011	Territorial	GHG emissions	Descriptive trend analysis	Finds relative decoupling (falling emission-intensity and energy-intensity) of the Czech economy

Nerudová, 2015				from Eurostat		
Cruz and Dias, 2016	EU-27	1999-2009	Territorial and footprint	Unspecified CO ₂ and energy indicators	Index decomposition analysis (LMDI) using WIOD data	EU-27 overall slightly reduced energy use and CO ₂ emissions by moving into less energy/CO ₂ -intensive structures and improving sectoral energy/CO ₂ efficiency; GDP growth did counteract but not annihilate efficiency improvements.
Gazheli et al., 2016	Denmark, Germany, Spain	1995-2007	Territorial and footprint	Sectoral CO ₂ emissions (unclear definition of processes)	Input-output analysis (WIOD data); correlation analysis	Analyses efficiency, structural effects and consumption on a sectoral level; finds no robust trends towards green growth (e.g. technological change or structural change in demand); stresses the need for systemic solutions.
Grand, 2016	Argentina	1990-2012	Territorial	Full GHG emissions	Trend analysis based on a systematic distinction of different meanings of decoupling	The main contribution of this paper is to clarify various meanings of weak and strong decoupling; argues for a focus on absolute reductions of emissions instead of decoupling, which is no robust concept for unstable economies. GDP grew ~1.9%/y faster than GHG
Fan et al., 2016	14 countries and RoW	1995-2009	Territorial and footprint	CO ₂ from fossil fuels & industrial processes	Multi-Regional Input-Output analysis based on WIOD	Production-based accounts of CO ₂ emissions reveal large variation of CO ₂ /GDP ratios (all countries plotted in one graph); consumption-based accounts reveal a monotonously positive relation of CO ₂ /GDP ratios, with some national-level exceptions.
Lenzen et al., 2016	Australia	1976-now (2050)	Footprint	GHG emissions (system boundary not clearly specified)	Structural decomposition analysis of past data and scenario studies	Commentary-style article presenting a reanalysis of published past and scenario data; questions whether technological change can suffice to realize these scenarios.
Liang et al., 2016	USA	1995-2009	Territorial, consumption, income	GHG	Structural decomposition analysis	Absolute decoupling of territorial GHG emissions: found a 3% reduction in emissions while GDP increased by 42%
Liobikienė et al., 2016	Baltic states	1990-2012	Territorial	GHG	Decomposition analysis (Divisia IDA)	Collapse of GHG emissions after 1990. Since then slow increase of GHG emissions with economic recovery. Investments of RE correlated with relative decoupling.
Kerimray et al., 2016	Kazakhstan	1990-2010 (scenarios 2030)	Territorial	GHG emissions (UNFCCC), Total primary energy supply	Data analysis for past trajectories, MARKAL for future scenarios	Main focus of the paper are future scenarios. Analysis of data for 1990-2010 is mainly focused on the crisis caused by the breakdown of communism in the Former Soviet Union. GHG intensity of GDP fell from 3.4kg/\$ to 2.0kg/\$
Sanchez and Stern, 2016	129 countries	1971-2010	Territorial	CO ₂ from fossil fuel & cement; non-industrial GHG	Nested statistical model combining EKC, IPAT and convergence approaches	No support for EKC hypothesis. GDP growth drives both industrial CO ₂ and other GHGs, but its effect on industrial CO ₂ is twice that of other GHGs. The time effect is negative for both industrial CO ₂ and other GHGs, but the former effect is stronger than the latter.
Streimikienė and Balezentis, 2016	Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg	2004-2012	Territorial	GHG emissions (no clear definition)	Index decomposition analysis using the Kaya identity	Energy intensity and economic growth are the main drivers of GHG per capita. GHG emissions per capita increased despite improved energy efficiency, among others due to higher C intensity of energy.

Valadkhani et al., 2016	45 countries	2002, 2007, 2011	Territorial	Primary energy, CO ₂ , CH ₄ and N ₂ O	Multiplicative environmental data envelopment analysis (ME-DEA)	Efficiency scores rise over time for most countries. There is a positive relation between energy efficiency and economic efficiency. Abundant natural and energy resources result in inefficient use.
Bampatso u et al., 2017	EU (11 countries)	1990-2011	Territorial	GHG emissions	Data envelopment analysis	Relative decoupling in some countries, absolute decoupling in others.
Beltran-Esteve and Picazo-Tadeo, 2017	EU	2000-2014	Territorial	GHG emissions	Data Envelopment Analysis	Provides efficiency rankings; emphasizes the role of technological innovation, and catch-up in technology adoption in East Europe for reducing GHG emissions.
Drastichova, 2017	EU-15	2000-2013	Territorial	GHG	Decomposition with Log-Mean Divisia Index	Absolute decoupling, as GHG intensity reduced faster than increase of economic activity (scale)
Fernandez-Amador et al., 2017	Global	1997-2011	Territorial and Foot-print	CO ₂	Threshold models	Finds no support for EKC with up-to-date database. Income elasticity of production-based emissions was ~0.6; of consumption-based emissions ~0.8
Liobikienė et al., 2017	Lithuania, EU-27	2000-2012	Territorial	GHG	Elasticity coefficient methods	Relative decoupling in Lithuania; absolute decoupling in EU-27 in some sectors
Mi et al., 2017	China	2005-2012	Territorial and Foot-print	CO ₂ emissions	Structural decomposition analysis	No decoupling; in different years varied contributions of emissions growth from consumption, production, etc.
Khan et al., 2017	36 countries	2001-2014	Territorial	GHG emissions	Granger causality	Investigates multi-causalities also with trade and urbanization; finds that GHG emissions are positively influenced by financial development, urbanization, trade openness and energy consumption.
Shuai et al., 2017	Global	1960-2011	Territorial	GHG emissions	Panel analysis of EKC hypothesis for all countries worldwide	Predicts that the global economy will reach its turning point around 2050 and will absolutely decouple thereafter
Simas et al., 2017	Global	2007	Territorial and Foot-print	GHG emissions	EXIOBASE	Decoupling found for production-based emissions, not for consumption-based emissions
Yang et al., 2017	Russia	1998-2013	Territorial	GHG	Fitting detailed emissions data with EKC	Predicts an EKC-turning point for Russia in about 2027; absolute decoupling from thereon.
Zaman et al., 2017	Sub-Saharan Africa	2000-2014	Territorial	CO ₂ and GHG emissions	Panel random effect	EKC confirmed for CH ₄ ; emphasis on relevance of food sector.
Bluszcz, 2019	8 EU countries, specifically Poland	2006-2015	Territorial	GHG emissions	Descriptive trend analysis, Pearson correlation	Absolute decoupling observed
Cohen et al., 2018	20 largest emitters	1990-2014	Territorial and footprint	GHG emissions	Estimation of trends elasticity, Hodrick-Prescott filter	Absolute decoupling in European countries, not in emerging economies; absolute decoupling weaker but still existent from consumption perspective; renewable policies support decoupling.
Bader and Ganguli, 2019	Gulf cooperation council countries	1980-2006	Territorial	GHG emissions	Granger causality and other statistical tests	Mostly lack of EKC in gulf states; reduced fossil fuel consumption recommended to improve health. Oil rentier states may work categorically different than other countries [interpretation added].
Bampatso u and	G7 countries	1993-2016	Territorial	GHG emissions	Non-parametric	Calculate elasticities of GDP to changes in various variables, including GHG

Halkos, 2019				(not clearly specified)	Data Envelopment Analysis	emissions, and evaluate trends in efficiencies.
Cohen et al., 2019	China	1950-2012	Territorial and Foot-print	GHG emissions	Descriptive trend analysis	Kuznet elasticity 0.6 for production-based emissions, a bit lower for consumption-based emissions. Emissions in China result partially from being a pollution haven; long-term trend indicates potential for absolute decoupling.
Fanning and O'Neill, 2019	120 countries	2005-2015	Foot-print	GHG emissions	Descriptive data analysis	Decoupling insufficient; either decouple more strongly, or decouple happiness from consumption.
Leal et al., 2019	Australia	1990-2015	Territorial	Sectoral GHG emissions from national inventory	LDMI decomposition, decoupling and efficiency indices	GHG emissions decrease and increase throughout the period in waves while GDP grows. At the end of the period, GHG are slightly lower than in the start year (absolute decoupling), largely explained by reduced emissions in agriculture.
Le Quéré et al., 2019	79 countries	2005-2014/15	Territorial, footprint	CO ₂	Spearman's rank, LMDI	18 countries show absolute decoupling of industrial CO ₂ and GDP in both territorial and footprint accounts (see text).
Liu et al., 2019	40 countries	1995-2009	Foot-print	GHG emissions excl. LULUCF	WIOD and structural decomposition analysis	Rising consumption generally drives up emissions, while reductions of emissions intensities somewhat counteract that trend (relative decoupling). Finds rising volumes of GHG "embodied" in products exported from developing countries.
Palm et al., 2019	Sweden	2008-2014	Foot-print	Fossil-fuel CO ₂ , CH ₄ , N ₂ O, F-gases	Hybrid MRIO, descriptive trend analysis	Absolute decoupling: consumption-based GHG emissions decreased in absolute terms, mainly due to reduced emission intensities of households, while consumption-based value added increased.
Sarkodie et al., 2019	Australia	1970-2017	Territorial	GHG emissions (World Bank)	Autoregressive Distributed Lag simulations	Finds an inverse U-shaped relationship between energy use and GDP and declining GHG intensity of GDP.
Wang et al., 2019	China, G20	2000-2014	Territorial	GHG emissions	Hybrid Malmquist-Luenberger index, meta-frontier technique	Efficiency increase larger in BRICS countries than in G20 advanced group.

537

538

4. Strategies for decoupling – green growth versus degrowth

539

540

541

542

543

544

545

546

547

548

549

550

551

552

553

554

555

In order to elucidate the perspective on economic growth adopted in empirical decoupling studies, we assessed a random sub-sample of 15% of the 835 articles in terms of their political or strategic assumptions and/or conclusions, as visible in their introduction and conclusions sections respectively the policy-recommendations given (if available). Due to the search query, this body of literature contained only quantitative, empirical studies of decoupling and excluded qualitative policy analyses. Hence almost none of the 125 selected articles focused primarily on strategies or policies for a zero-carbon society and the strategic conclusions or policy recommendations drawn from the quantitative analyses are often rather formulaic. 31% of the articles mentioned no strategies or policy recommendations at all, while 69% provided policy recommendations or strategic conclusions in varying detail.

With regard to their overall framing and aims, 64% of the analyzed articles followed a *green growth* perspective, that is, they aimed at analyzing absolute or relative decoupling in a given period and territory, and provided policy recommendations in this direction. In line with the literature, a green growth perspective is mainly concerned with “making growth processes resource-efficient” (Hallegatte, 2011, p.2) and “stimulating demand for green technologies, goods, and services” (OECD, 2011, p.5), but presents economic growth (measured as increase

556 of GDP) as a set variable. Interestingly, this framing was also common in articles that did not
 557 find empirical evidence for absolute decoupling, implying that these studies at least implicitly
 558 valued continuation of GDP growth higher than achieving set environmental goals. Only 3% of
 559 the articles adopted a *degrowth* perspective and were open to question the primacy of economic
 560 growth. These “degrowth” studies usually did not explicitly argue in favor of reducing GDP
 561 growth; they rather questioned to what extent it would be possible to sustain GDP growth when
 562 aiming to reduce resource use or emissions and might hence be classified as “growth agnostic”,
 563 i.e. a-growth (van den Bergh and Kallis, 2012). A striking number of one third of the analyzed
 564 literature was concerned only with the correlation or causality between energy or resource use
 565 and economic growth without explicitly addressing the challenge of decoupling or
 566 decarbonization. Policy recommendation in this literature, if at all given, follow a standard
 567 green growth repertoire. Some studies which found that growth in energy use Granger-causes
 568 GDP growth even argued that saving energy should be viewed cautiously as a policy goal, as it
 569 could threaten GDP growth (Belloumi and Alshehry, 2015; Yu, 2012).

570
 571 Figure 1 summarizes the strategies and policy recommendations given in the articles according
 572 to their frequency. Most interestingly, although many articles conclude that absolute
 573 decoupling is empirically rarely found, the recommendations to a large extent stick to a green
 574 growth repertoire of increasing efficiency, promoting renewable energy and introducing
 575 technological solutions and market-based mechanisms (e.g., internalizing or increasing
 576 environmental costs through pricing, attract foreign direct investments, financialization or
 577 emission trading). Many articles furthermore call for a restructuring of the economy that turns
 578 from fossil-energy intensive industrial production towards the service sector. The figure also
 579 shows that policy recommendations hardly contain any “demand-side measures” (not even
 580 environmental awareness). Absolute reductions of resource use and emissions (as opposed to
 581 relative improvements) are mentioned in <2 % of the subsample.

582



583
 584 **Figure 1.** Strategies and policy recommendations visualized according to their frequency (own compilation).
 585

586 The analysis shows that the large majority of this literature does not question the GDP growth
 587 paradigm, even if the empirical evidence suggests that it contradicts officially committed
 588 climate policy goals. Policy recommendations point towards a standard repertoire (i.e.,
 589 efficiency, technology, innovation) that is not further discussed or questioned. Given the focus

of the review on studies that quantitatively analyze the relationship between resource use, emissions and economic growth, a less substantive focus on political strategies is not necessarily surprising. However, the separation of quantitative decoupling analyses and more qualitative investigations into the political barriers and potentials towards zero-carbon futures or reduction of energy and materials use may present a problem in itself because it prevents discussion of more effective and realistic strategies based on empirical analyses.

5. Discussion and conclusions

At least since the publication of the seminal “Limits to growth” report (Meadows et al., 1972), a debate is ongoing between scholars who hold that unlimited economic growth is impossible on a finite planet, and other scholars who believe that human ingenuity will eventually overcome all potential limitations to economic growth. The emergence of the notion of “sustainable development” has suggested that economic development and respect for planetary boundaries (Steffen et al., 2015), to use a modern word, can be reconciled. Claims that a decoupling of GDP from resource use and environmental pressures would be possible were already formulated very early on (United Nations, 1987).

To contribute to this debate, we deliberately designed this pair of review articles broadly, as we aimed to incorporate a variety of indicators to comprehensively assess the use of biophysical resources (materials and energy) as well as a key class of outflows, namely GHG emissions (Jackson and Victor, 2019). GHG emissions are dominated by CO₂, i.e. the compound resulting from the combustion of most fuels that humans currently use, and hence a quantitatively dominant outflow of all dissipative use of materials (as opposed to stock-building materials such as concrete or steel; Krausmann et al., 2018). This focus on social metabolism in its entirety (Haberl et al., 2019) has shown that different patterns can be discerned by focusing on different aspects of resource use, and that the perspectives and results of communities looking at various aspects of resource use differ considerably.

5.1 Synthesis of insights into past decoupling

The large body of literature focused on the causal interrelations between energy and GDP uses econometric time-series and causality testing methods, for example Granger causality, but often shows little interest in the energy indicators analyzed or in actual thermodynamic basis of their hypotheses (see part I, Wiedenhofer et al., [this issue](#)). While no robust conclusion can be drawn on the direction of causality, these studies show that energy and GDP are strongly related. Stern (2011) has argued that energy is an important factor of production, hence energy scarcity imposes restrictions on economic growth, which supports results from biophysical economics (Kümmel, 2011). We found no evidence in the reviewed literature that would question this assertion.

The second group of articles (section 3.2) pays a lot of attention to the meaning of the energy indicators used. Many of the authors in this community come from energy analysis and regard themselves as analysts of “biophysical economics” (Cleveland, 1987; Hall et al., 2001; Kümmel, 2011). Their conviction is that energy use is a key factor of production (Ayres, 2016), and that the quality of energy is hence crucial for assessing the role of energy in the economy (Giampietro, 2006; Haberl, 2006; Hall et al., 1986). The main conclusions are that useful exergy and GDP are tightly coupled and that at the useful stage of energy use there is no evidence for relative decoupling. However, this does not mean that decoupling is not possible between primary energy and GDP, which is important because GHG emissions and extraction of energy resources are linked to primary energy, not useful exergy (Haberl, 2006). The conclusion from this literature is that primary energy use can be decoupled from GDP only to the extent to which conversion efficiency from primary energy to useful exergy can be increased.

641
642 The review of social metabolism studies based on MEFA methods (Fischer-Kowalski et al.,
643 2011; Haberl et al., 2004; Krausmann et al., 2017a) exemplifies the richness of measures of
644 resource use and their different specific meanings (section 3.3). This community is well aware
645 of the importance of a rich set of indicators, in particular of the difference between production-
646 based and consumption-based accounts. This literature suggests that production-based relative
647 decoupling is frequent, although countries exist in which use of physical resources grows faster
648 than GDP. This seems to happen especially at early stages of the agrarian-industrial transition
649 when large stocks of infrastructures and buildings are accumulated, as well as in export-oriented
650 countries where production of raw materials and early processing stages are dominant. Absolute
651 decoupling is rare and generally only occurs during periods of low GDP growth (Steinberger et
652 al., 2013). At the global level, only relative decoupling can be observed (Krausmann et al.,
653 2017b). In recent years several global multi-regional input-output models have been established
654 which allow allocating extracted primary resources to final demand of any economy (Inomata
655 and Owen, 2014; Wiedmann and Lenzen, 2018). Consumption-based analyses suggest that
656 decoupling of production-based material flows is often contrasted by increases of material
657 footprints that are similar to those of GDP (Giljum et al., 2014a; Pothen and Schymura, 2015;
658 Thomas O. Wiedmann et al., 2015b).

659
660 Current trajectories of material and energy use, whether suggesting decoupling of resource use
661 from economic growth or not, cannot be correctly interpreted without considering past material
662 and energy flows on which they are also based. Current stagnation in per capita
663 territorial/production-based resource use (Bleischwitz et al., 2018a; Fishman et al., 2016), for
664 example, depends on past material flows (Mayer et al., 2017) and entail a substantial legacy for
665 the future (Krausmann et al., 2017c). Since some materials enter the socio-economic system to
666 be consumed for their energy content while others are for building up stock (manufactured
667 capital) (Haas et al., 2015), it may well be that different strategies are needed to observe,
668 analyse, and set targets for decoupling material use of these two streams. Therefore, more
669 insights can be expected by moving from studies of the decoupling of GDP from one resource
670 or emission indicator to analysing interdependencies between GDP and multiple resources
671 flows, respectively material stocks and resource or emission flows (Haberl et al., 2017;
672 Krausmann et al., 2017c).

673
674 In recent years, a hypothesized S-shaped curve of material growth suggesting a notion of
675 “saturation”, i.e. a stable level of materials use, has gained prominence. In the MEFA
676 community, the idea of saturation has recently attracted more attention than the EKC. This
677 would imply sustenance of a stable, perhaps high, level of materials use coinciding with a
678 continued growth of GDP and perhaps other socioeconomic indicators, in accordance with the
679 “steady state economy” discourse (Daly, 1973; O’Neill, 2015). However, so far, no consensus
680 could be achieved on many important conceptual questions. It remains unclear whether
681 saturation should be defined as country totals or per capita, whether consumption- or
682 production-based flows (or material stocks) should be stabilized, and whether saturation should
683 be achieved at the same level for all countries (Bleischwitz et al., 2018a; Cao et al., 2017; Chen
684 and Graedel, 2015; Fishman et al., 2016; Müller et al., 2011; Pauliuk et al., 2013). Moreover,
685 stabilization at a high level may fall short of achieving many sustainability and climate targets.

686
687 The literature on CO₂ and other GHG emissions is large and growing fast (Wiedenhofer et al.,
688 this issue). Most of the studies on territorial CO₂ use econometric methods, and many are based
689 on the EKC framework (section 3.1). Empirical support for the existence of an EKC-type
690 inverted U-shape of the relation between CO₂ emissions and GDP is seldom found (Sarkodie
691 and Strezov, 2019). This also holds for total GHG emissions (section 3.4). Even when the data

1
2
3 692 seem to suggest such a curve, the downward-bent part of the curve is usually too far in the
4 693 future to be of use in reaching ambitious climate targets such as the Paris accord. The GHG
5 694 emission literature reviewed in section 3.4 suggests a similar pattern as for material use: relative
6 695 decoupling is the norm rather the exception, but cases of absolute decoupling are rare. A recent
7 696 study, however, has identified and analyzed 18 “peak-and-decline” countries in which CO₂
8 697 emissions are falling in both territorial and consumption-based system boundaries (Le Quéré et
9 698 al., 2019). The study concludes that emissions in these 18 countries fell by a median -2.4%/yr
10 699 (25-75 percentile: -1.4 to -2.9%/yr) over the period 2005-2015. Almost half of that reduction
11 700 has been due to a decline in the share of fossil fuels in final energy use. A bit over one-third
12 701 resulted from reductions of energy use. The study provides evidence that these reductions were
13 702 a result of targeted policies to promote renewables and raise energy efficiency, but also profited
14 703 from relatively low GDP growth rates between 1-2%/yr, which is similar to decoupling rates
15 704 observed in MEFA studies (Steinberger et al., 2013). It also noted that rates of CO₂ reduction
16 705 achieved so far fell short from those required to comply with stringent CO₂ reduction targets as
17 706 those implied by the Paris climate accord.
18
19
20
21

22 708 **5.2 Current state of decoupling in the last decade**

23 709 Because the analysis of the literature has yielded only limited aggregate insight into elasticities
24 710 between GDP and resource/emission indicators due to the variety of measures used in the
25 711 literature to describe (de)coupling, we summarize some information on the last decade in Figure
26 712 2. Elasticities were calculated as OLS log regressions over 10 years using the formula
27 713 $\log(\text{resource/emission}) = \alpha + \beta \log(\text{GDP}) + \varepsilon$. A median elasticity of CO₂ of 0.4 in the higher
28 714 income class (top panels in Fig. 2) means that for 1% of GDP growth, production-based CO₂
29 715 emissions grew by 0.4%. Elasticities below zero indicate absolute decoupling and elasticities
30 716 >1 that resources/emissions grew faster than GDP. Results should be interpreted with caution
31 717 in particular for those parts of Figure 2 where data were only available for few countries (see
32 718 sample sizes in blue font color). Median values of elasticities are close to one for most of the
33 719 indicators in the low-income class, while they are often substantially lower than one for the
34 720 higher income class. For the higher income class, elasticities of consumption-based (CB)
35 721 indicators are highest for material use and substantially lower for CO₂ and GHG. For the lower
36 722 income class, the highest median values are found for production-based emissions. Negative
37 723 elasticities, indicating absolute decoupling, are most frequent for production-based GHG
38 724 emission accounts and consumption-based TPES and CO₂ accounts for high income countries.
39 725 For other indicators, instances of absolute decoupling also exist in the group of high-income
40 726 countries, but are very rare for lower income countries. Thus, the results from our regression
41 727 analysis over a 10-year timeframe are largely consistent with the main findings from our
42 728 literature review.
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60




Figure 2. Resource and emission elasticities of GDP in two classes of higher income and lower income countries in the last 10 years. Box plots show medians, quartiles and ranges of elasticities (% change in resource use or emissions per % change in real GDP). Sample sizes are given at the top of the graphs in blue and median values in green font color. Production-based (PB) and consumption-based (CB) figures are shown separately. “Lower income” refers to the “low” and “lower middle” income categories of the World Bank (2019b) classification; “higher income” is the sum of “upper middle” and “high” incomes. Data were extracted on November 19, 2019 from the following sources: Domestic material consumption (Material PB) & material footprint (Material CB) from UNE IRP (2019) material flow database for 2004-2013. Total primary energy supply (TPES PB) & Total final energy consumption (TFC PB) from IEA (2019) energy balances for 2008-2017. Territorial CO₂ emissions from fossil fuels and industrial processes (CO₂ PB) from the Global Carbon Budget 2018 (Le Quéré et al., 2018) for 2008-2017. CO₂ footprint from fossil fuel combustion (CO₂ CB) from Wood et al. (2019b) for 2007-2016. Total territorial greenhouse gases with LULUCF in CO₂eq (GHG PB) from UNFCCC (2019) for 2008-2017; Total GHG footprint except LULUCF (GHG CB) & TPES footprint (TPES CB) & TFC footprint (TFC CB) from Exiobase 3 (Wood et al., 2018b) for 2003-2012; GDP (constant 2010 US\$) from UN national accounts (2019).

5.3 Implications for future decoupling research and policies

What, then, are the conclusions for the prospects to achieve absolute decoupling in the future? The analyzed literature provides ample evidence that a continuation of past trends will not yield absolute reductions of resource use or GHG emissions. So far, environment and climate policies have at best achieved relative decoupling between GDP and resource use respectively GHG emissions (Haberl et al., 2019; Kemp-Benedict, 2018). Exceptions include a group of 18 countries that have reduced CO₂ emissions in the last decade (Le Quéré et al., 2019), and a few national cases, most of which are due to specific circumstances that probably should not be generalized (e.g., when falling resource use stems from economic crises; Shao et al., 2017). This observed absolute decoupling, however, falls short from the massive decoupling required to achieve agreed climate targets (Jackson and Victor, 2016). Of course, rare occurrence of absolute decoupling in the past does not represent proof that it cannot become more common

1
2
3 758 in the future – and perhaps intensifying the policies implemented in 18 peak-and-decline
4 759 countries could yield sufficient decoupling of GDP and GHG emissions to achieve climate
5 760 targets. Even if rapid deployment of renewable energy could be achieved, however, the world’s
6 761 addiction to material resources would likely not wane, as harnessing renewables also requires
7 762 substantial investments into large-scale buildings (e.g. hydropower plants), machinery (e.g.
8 763 wind turbines, photovoltaic power plants) and infrastructures (e.g. expansion and reinforcement
9 764 of electric transmission grids; Beylot et al., 2019; Watari et al., 2019).

10 765
11 766 In any case, meeting the goals of the Paris Agreement will require new and more effective
12 767 policies than those deployed so far. These need to be based on absolute – not relative – reduction
13 768 goals for GHG emissions, which could strongly benefit from curbing growth of resource use
14 769 (Krausmann et al., 2020). The IPCC 1.5°C report (IPCC, 2018) shows that even if high hopes
15 770 are placed in future deployment of negative emission technologies, fast and deep cuts in global
16 771 GHG emissions are required in order to address the 2.0°C target agreed upon in the Paris climate
17 772 accord, and even more so for reaching 1.5°C. Currently, targets for reducing resource use or
18 773 emissions are commonly framed as improvements of e.g. energy/GDP ratios. For example,
19 774 SDG 7.3 aims at doubling the rate of energy intensity (energy/GDP) reduction, from approx. -
20 775 1.5%/year to -3.0%/year. However, such targets allow substantial increases of resource use in
21 776 absolute numbers if GDP growth is sufficiently fast (Heun and Brockway, 2019). Hence,
22 777 absolute GHG reduction goals can only be achieved if absolute goals for emission reductions
23 778 are agreed upon. The analysis of policies and strategies (section 4) shows that decoupling
24 779 research is so far poorly equipped to deal with this challenge. Only a tiny fraction of the
25 780 decoupling literature in our random sample adopted a “degrowth” perspective, which we have
26 781 defined very broadly as a worldview allowing to question the priority of GDP growth over
27 782 environmental goals. Whether one follows the viewpoint that a decoupling of GDP from
28 783 environmental impacts is impossible (Hickel and Kallis, 2019; Ward et al., 2016) may be less
29 784 important than accepting the need to achieve absolute reductions of emissions regardless of
30 785 GDP trajectories. Similar considerations apply to the use of many other biophysical resources
31 786 (Green and Denniss, 2018; Lazarus and van Asselt, 2018).

32 787
33 788 A recent review suggest that strategies towards efficiency have to be complemented by those
34 789 pushing sufficiency (Parrique et al., 2019), that is, “the direct downscaling of economic
35 790 production in many sectors and parallel reduction of consumption” (p. 3). Although concrete
36 791 political strategies towards sufficiency – or degrowth – are still fragmented and diverse, they
37 792 may include restrictive supply-side policy instruments targeting fossil fuels (instead of relative
38 793 efficiency improvements), redistribution (of work and leisure, natural resources and wealth), a
39 794 decentralization of the economy or new social security institutions (that complement the
40 795 growth-oriented welfare state). Recently suggested policies include moratoria on resource
41 796 extraction and new infrastructures (e.g. coal power plants, highways, airports), bans on harmful
42 797 activities (e.g. fracking, coal mining), the reduction of working hours and redistributive
43 798 taxation, instead of just putting a price on resources and emissions (Green and Denniss, 2018;
44 799 Hickel and Kallis, 2019; Jackson, 2016; Kallis, 2011; Koch, 2013; Schneider et al., 2010;
45 800 Sekulova et al., 2013). A new study suggests, however, that even energy sufficiency actions
46 801 may be associated with rebound effects and negative spillovers (Sorrell et al., 2020).

47 802
48 803 In any case, recent research suggests that states have so far refrained from strategies of
49 804 sufficiency as these may contradict their claimed structural dependence on economic growth
50 805 for the generation of tax revenue, employment and consumption-based political legitimacy. A
51 806 strategic turn towards sufficiency that involves reductions in overall consumption levels and
52 807 may lead to a degrowing economy might therefore pose a fundamental challenge to
53 808 contemporary states – and liberal democracies (Hausknot, 2019; Koch, 2019; Pichler et al.,

1
2
3 809 2018). Studies in sustainable consumption increasingly argue that a decisive turn towards
4 810 “strong sustainable consumption governance” (Lorek and Fuchs, 2013), that is, a clear focus on
5 811 reducing the volume of the materials and energy resources consumed while maintaining levels
6 812 of well-being, will be a key required for deep decarbonization.
7 813

8 814 Another recent strand of literature is focused on overcoming GDP as key target indicator of
9 815 economic policy (Hoekstra, 2019). This debate suggests that GDP may be becoming an
10 816 increasingly irrelevant measure of welfare, as it was only loosely coupled with wellbeing in
11 817 OECD countries over the last 40 years (Hoekstra, 2019). In this view, GDP should be replaced
12 818 or at least complemented by measures of wellbeing and planetary health, as suggested in the
13 819 dashboard approach of the Sen-Stiglitz-Fitoussi-report (Stiglitz et al., 2009), and in the
14 820 Sustainable Development Goals. Scholars increasingly focus more on improving social
15 821 wellbeing rather than GDP growth. One conceptual angle is the “stock-flow-service” nexus
16 822 approach (Haberl et al., 2019, 2017) suggesting that designing currently resource-intensive
17 823 systems to provide for key contributions to social wellbeing (e.g. access/transport,
18 824 housing/shelter, provision of food) in a resource-sparing manner in the first place can deliver
19 825 these services at much lower levels of resource inputs than now. An example would be spatial
20 826 patterns of settlements and work places that minimize the need for commuting, and foster
21 827 commuting by environmentally friendly means such as walking, cycling or use of public transit.
22 828 Such a focus on demand-side measures consistent with provision of services that are vital for
23 829 social well-being is at the core of a currently emerging research community (Brand-Correa and
24 830 Steinberger, 2017; Carmona et al., 2017; Creutzig et al., 2018, 2016; Cullen et al., 2011; Lamb
25 831 and Steinberger, 2017; Vita et al., 2018). Perhaps the question to what extent GDP can be
26 832 decoupled from resource use or emissions will turn out to be less important than the question
27 833 how a good life for all on the planet can be organized within the planet’s environmental limits
28 834 (O’Neill et al., 2018). Reductions in resource use and emissions commensurate with climate
29 835 and sustainability goals (IPCC, 2018; TWI2050, 2018) may still be achieved by turning towards
30 836 sufficiency and other transformative strategies.
31 837

32 838 **Acknowledgements:** This research has received funding from the European Research
33 839 Council (ERC) under the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme
34 840 (MAT_STOCKS, grant agreement No 741950) and the Austrian Science Funds (FWF, grant
35 841 MISO P27590). Paul Brockway was funded by the UK Research Council under EPSRC
36 842 Fellowship award EP/R024254/1. Anke Schaffartzik acknowledges financial support from the
37 843 Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness, through the “María de Maeztu” program
38 844 for Units of Excellence (MDM-2015-0552). We gratefully acknowledge help in managing
39 845 references by research assistants Andrea Gutson, Lisa Laßnig, Vivianne Rau, Anna Unterstei-
40 846 ner, by Nicolas Roux for calculation of elasticities in Fig 2, and the constructive comments of
41 847 two anonymous reviewers.
42 848

43 849 **Data availability statement**

44 850 Any data that support the findings of this study are included within the article.
45 851

46 852 **References**

- 47 853 Aghion, P., Howitt, P., 2009. The Economics of Growth. The MIT Press.
48 854 Ang, B.W., Liu, N., 2006. A cross-country analysis of aggregate energy and carbon
49 855 intensities. *Energy Policy* 34, 2398–2404. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2005.04.007>
50 856 Angelis-Dimakis, A., Arampatzis, G., Assimacopoulos, D., 2012. Monitoring the
51 857 sustainability of the Greek energy system. *ENERGY Sustain. Dev.* 16, 51–56.
52 858 <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.esd.2011.10.003>

- 1
2
3 859 Antonakakis, N., Chatziantoniou, I., Filis, G., 2017. Energy consumption, CO2 emissions,
4 860 and economic growth_ An ethical dilemma. *Renew. Sustain. Energy Rev.* 17.
5 861 Arango-Miranda, R., Hausler, R., Romero-Lopez, R., Glaus, M., Ibarra-Zavaleta, S.P., 2018.
6 862 Carbon Dioxide Emissions, Energy Consumption and Economic Growth: A
7 863 Comparative Empirical Study of Selected Developed and Developing Countries. “The
8 864 Role of Exergy.” *ENERGIES* 11. <https://doi.org/10.3390/en11102668>
9 865 Arto, I., Dietzenbacher, E., 2014. Drivers of the Growth in Global Greenhouse Gas
10 866 Emissions. *Environ. Sci. Technol.* 48, 5388–5394. <https://doi.org/10.1021/es5005347>
11 867 Ayres, R., 2016. *Energy, Complexity and Wealth Maximization*, The Frontiers Collection.
12 868 Springer International Publishing, Cham. <https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-30545-5>
13 869 Ayres, R.U., Ayres, L.W., Warr, B., 2003. Exergy, power and work in the US economy, 1900
14 870 – 1998. *Energy* 28, 219–273. [https://doi.org/10.1016/S0360-5442\(02\)00089-0](https://doi.org/10.1016/S0360-5442(02)00089-0)
15 871 Ayres, R.U., Warr, B., 2009. *The Economic Growth Engine: How Energy And Work Drive*
16 872 *Material Prosperity*. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK ; Northampton, MA.
17 873 Azam, M., Khan, A.Q., 2016. Testing the Environmental Kuznets Curve hypothesis: A
18 874 comparative empirical study for low, lower middle, upper middle and high income
19 875 countries. *Renew. Sustain. Energy Rev.* 63, 556–567.
20 876 <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.rser.2016.05.052>
21 877 Bader, Y., Ganguli, S., 2019. Analysis of the association between economic growth,
22 878 environmental quality and health standards in the Gulf Cooperation Council during
23 879 1980-2012. *Manag. Environ. Qual. Int. J.* 30, 1050–1071.
24 880 <https://doi.org/10.1108/MEQ-03-2018-0061>
25 881 Baiocchi, G., Minx, J.C., 2010. Understanding Changes in the UK’s CO₂ Emissions: A
26 882 Global Perspective. *Environ. Sci. Technol.* 44, 1177–1184.
27 883 <https://doi.org/10.1021/es902662h>
28 884 Bampatsou, C., Halkos, G., 2019. Economic growth, efficiency and environmental elasticity
29 885 for the G7 countries. *Energy Policy* 130, 355–360.
30 886 <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2019.04.017>
31 887 Bampatsou, C., Halkos, G., Dimou, A., 2017. Determining economic productivity under
32 888 environmental and resource pressures: an empirical application. *J. Econ. Struct.* 6, 12.
33 889 <https://doi.org/10.1186/s40008-017-0071-1>
34 890 Bassetti, T., Benos, N., Karagiannis, S., 2013. CO2 Emissions and Income Dynamics: What
35 891 Does the Global Evidence Tell Us? *Environ. Resour. Econ.* 54, 101–125.
36 892 <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10640-012-9583-1>
37 893 Beaudreau, B.C., 2010. On the methodology of energy-GDP Granger causality tests. *Energy*
38 894 35, 3535–3539. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.energy.2010.03.062>
39 895 Behrens, A., Giljum, S., Kovanda, J., Niza, S., 2007. The material basis of the global
40 896 economy: Worldwide patterns of natural resource extraction and their implications for
41 897 sustainable resource use policies. *Ecol. Econ., Special Section - Ecosystem Services*
42 898 *and Agriculture Ecosystem Services and Agriculture* 64, 444–453.
43 899 <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ecolecon.2007.02.034>
44 900 Belke, A., Dobnik, F., Dreger, C., 2011. Energy consumption and economic growth: New
45 901 insights into the cointegration relationship. *Energy Econ.* 8.
46 902 Belloumi, M., Alshehry, A.S., 2015. Sustainable Energy Development in Saudi Arabia.
47 903 *SUSTAINABILITY* 7, 5153–5170. <https://doi.org/10.3390/su7055153>
48 904 Beltran-Estevé, M., Picazo-Tadeo, A.J., 2017. Assessing environmental performance in the
49 905 European Union: Ecoinnovation versus catching-up. *ENERGY POLICY* 104, 240–
50 906 252. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2017.01.054>
51 907 Bernardini, O., Galli, R., 1993. Dematerialization: Long-term trends in the intensity of use of
52 908 materials and energy. *Futures* 25, 431–448. [https://doi.org/10.1016/0016-3287\(93\)90005-E](https://doi.org/10.1016/0016-3287(93)90005-E)
53 909

- 1
2
3 910 Beylot, A., Guyonnet, D., Muller, S., Vaxelaire, S., Villeneuve, J., 2019. Mineral raw material
4 911 requirements and associated climate-change impacts of the French energy transition
5 912 by 2050. *J. Clean. Prod.* 208, 1198–1205.
6 913 <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jclepro.2018.10.154>
7
8 914 Bithas, K., Kalimeris, P., 2018. Unmasking decoupling: Redefining the Resource Intensity of
9 915 the Economy. *Sci. TOTAL Environ.* 619, 338–351.
10 916 <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.scitotenv.2017.11.061>
11 917 Bithas, K., Kalimeris, P., 2017. The Material Intensity of Growth: Implications from the
12 918 Human Scale of Production. *Soc. Indic. Res.* 133, 1011–1029.
13 919 <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11205-016-1401-7>
14
15 920 Bleischwitz, R., Nechifor, V., Winning, M., Huang, B., Geng, Y., 2018a. Extrapolation or
16 921 saturation – Revisiting growth patterns, development stages and decoupling. *Glob.*
17 922 *Environ. Change* 48, 86–96. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2017.11.008>
18 923 Bleischwitz, R., Spataru, C., VanDeveer, S.D., Obersteiner, M., van der Voet, E., Johnson, C.,
19 924 Andrews-Speed, P., Boersma, T., Hoff, H., van Vuuren, D.P., 2018b. Resource nexus
20 925 perspectives towards the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals. *Nat.*
21 926 *Sustain.* 1, 737–743. <https://doi.org/10.1038/s41893-018-0173-2>
22
23 927 Borozan, D., 2018. Technical and total factor energy efficiency of European regions: A two-
24 928 stage approach. *Energy* 152, 521–532. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.energy.2018.03.159>
25 929 Brand-Correa, L.I., Steinberger, J.K., 2017. A Framework for Decoupling Human Need
26 930 Satisfaction From Energy Use. *Ecol. Econ.* 141, 43–52.
27 931 <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ecolecon.2017.05.019>
28 932 Bringezu, S., Schütz, H., Moll, S., 2003. Rationale for and Interpretation of Economy-Wide
29 933 Materials Flow Analysis and Derived Indicators. *J. Ind. Ecol.* 7, 43–64.
30 934 <https://doi.org/10.1162/108819803322564343>
31
32 935 Bringezu, S., Schütz, H., Steger, S., Baudisch, J., 2004. International comparison of resource
33 936 use and its relation to economic growth: The development of total material
34 937 requirement, direct material inputs and hidden flows and the structure of TMR. *Ecol.*
35 938 *Econ.* 51, 97–124. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ecolecon.2004.04.010>
36
37 939 Bruns, S., Gross, C., Stern, D.I., 2013. Is There Really Granger Causality between Energy
38 940 Use and Output? *Crawford Sch. Res. Pap.* 13–07.
39 941 <http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2232455>
40 942 Canas, A., Ferrao, P., Conceicao, P., 2003. A new environmental Kuznets curve? Relationship
41 943 between direct material input and income per capita: evidence from industrialised
42 944 countries. *Ecol. Econ.* 46, 217–229. [https://doi.org/10.1016/S0921-8009\(03\)00123-X](https://doi.org/10.1016/S0921-8009(03)00123-X)
43 945 Cañellas, S., González, A.C., Puig, I., Russi, D., Sendra, C., Sojo, A., 2004. Material flow
44 946 accounting of Spain. *Int. J. Glob. Environ. Issues* 4, 229–241.
45 947 <https://doi.org/10.1504/IJGENVI.2004.006052>
46
47 948 Cao, Z., Shen, L., Lovik, A.N., Müller, D.B., Liu, G., 2017. Elaborating the History of Our
48 949 Cementing Societies: An in-Use Stock Perspective. *Environ. Sci. Technol.* 51, 11468–
49 950 11475. <https://doi.org/10.1021/acs.est.7b03077>
50 951 Carmona, L., Whiting, K., Carrasco, A., Sousa, T., Domingos, T., 2017. Material Services
51 952 with Both Eyes Wide Open. *Sustainability* 9, 1508. <https://doi.org/10.3390/su9091508>
52 953 Chen, J., Wang, P., Cui, L., Huang, S., Song, M., 2018. Decomposition and decoupling
53 954 analysis of CO₂ emissions in OECD. *Appl. Energy* 231, 937–950.
54 955 <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.apenergy.2018.09.179>
55
56 956 Chen, W.-Q., Graedel, T.E., 2015. In-use product stocks link manufactured capital to natural
57 957 capital. *Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci.* 112, 6265–6270.
58 958 <https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1406866112>
59
60

- 1
2
3 959 Chien, T., Hu, J.-L., 2007. Renewable energy and macroeconomic efficiency of OECD and
4 960 non-OECD economies. *Energy Policy* 35, 3606–3615.
5 961 <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2006.12.033>
6 962 Chiu, A.S.F., Dong, L., Geng, Y., Rapera, C., Tan, E., 2017. Philippine resource efficiency in
7 963 Asian context: Status, trends and driving forces of Philippine material flows from
8 964 1980 to 2008. *J. Clean. Prod.* 153, 63–73.
9 965 <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jclepro.2017.03.158>
10 966 Citlalic Gonzalez-Martinez, A., Schandl, H., 2008. The biophysical perspective of a middle
11 967 income economy: Material flows in Mexico. *Ecol. Econ.* 68, 317–327.
12 968 <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ecolecon.2008.03.013>
13 969 Cleveland, C.J., 1987. Biophysical economics: historical perspective and current research
14 970 trends. *Ecol. Model.* 38, 47–73.
15 971 Cleveland, C.J., Ruth, M., 1998. Indicators of Dematerialization and the Materials Intensity of
16 972 Use. *J. Ind. Ecol.* 2, 15–50. <https://doi.org/10.1162/jiec.1998.2.3.15>
17 973 Cohen, G., Jalles, J.T., Loungani, P., Marto, R., 2018. The long-run decoupling of emissions
18 974 and output: Evidence from the largest emitters. *ENERGY POLICY* 118, 58–68.
19 975 <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2018.03.028>
20 976 Cohen, G., Jalles, J.T., Loungani, P., Marto, R., Wang, G., 2019. Decoupling of emissions
21 977 and GDP: Evidence from aggregate and provincial Chinese data. *ENERGY Econ.* 77,
22 978 105–118. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.eneco.2018.03.030>
23 979 Creutzig, F., Fernandez, B., Haberl, H., Khosla, R., Mulugetta, Y., Seto, K.C., 2016. Beyond
24 980 Technology: Demand-Side Solutions for Climate Change Mitigation. *Annu. Rev.*
25 981 *Environ. Resour.* 41, 173–198. [https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-environ-110615-](https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-environ-110615-085428)
26 982 [085428](https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-environ-110615-085428)
27 983 Creutzig, F., Roy, J., Lamb, W.F., Azevedo, I.M.L., Bruine de Bruin, W., Dalkmann, H.,
28 984 Edelenbosch, O.Y., Geels, F.W., Grubler, A., Hepburn, C., Hertwich, E.G., Khosla,
29 985 R., Mattauch, L., Minx, J.C., Ramakrishnan, A., Rao, N.D., Steinberger, J.K., Tavoni,
30 986 M., Ürge-Vorsatz, D., Weber, E.U., 2018. Towards demand-side solutions for
31 987 mitigating climate change. *Nat. Clim. Change* 8, 260–263.
32 988 <https://doi.org/10.1038/s41558-018-0121-1>
33 989 Cruz, L., Dias, J., 2016. Energy and CO2 intensity changes in the EU-27: Decomposition into
34 990 explanatory effects. *Sustain. CITIES Soc.* 26, 486–495.
35 991 <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.scs.2016.03.007>
36 992 Cullen, J.M., Allwood, J.M., Borgstein, E.H., 2011. Reducing Energy Demand: What Are the
37 993 Practical Limits? *Environ. Sci. Technol.* 45, 1711–1718.
38 994 <https://doi.org/10.1021/es102641n>
39 995 Cunha, J., Nunes, M.L., Lima, F., 2018. Discerning the factors explaining the change in
40 996 energy efficiency. *Environ. Dev. Sustain.* 20, 163–179.
41 997 <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10668-018-0148-5>
42 998 Daly, H.E., 1973. *Toward a Steady-State Economy*. W.H. Freeman, San Francisco.
43 999 De Bruyn, S.M., Opschoor, J.B., 1997. Developments in the throughput-income relationship:
44 1000 Theoretical and empirical observations. *Ecol. Econ.* 20, 255–268.
45 1001 [https://doi.org/10.1016/S0921-8009\(96\)00086-9](https://doi.org/10.1016/S0921-8009(96)00086-9)
46 1002 De Marco, O., Lagioia, G., Mazzacane, E.P., 2000. Materials flow analysis of the Italian
47 1003 economy. *J. Ind. Ecol.* 4, 55–70. <https://doi.org/10.1162/108819800569807>
48 1004 Domingos, T., Zafrilla, J.E., López, L.A., 2016. Consistency of technology-adjusted
49 1005 consumption-based accounting. *Nat. Clim. Change* 6, 729–730.
50 1006 <https://doi.org/10.1038/nclimate3059>
51 1007 Drastichova, M., 2017. Decomposition Analysis of the Greenhouse Gas Emissions in the
52 1008 European Union. *Probl. EKOROZWOJU* 12, 27–35.

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

- Duarte, R., Mainar, A., Sánchez-Chóliz, J., 2013. The role of consumption patterns, demand and technological factors on the recent evolution of CO₂ emissions in a group of advanced economies. *Ecol. Econ.* 96, 1–13.
<https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ecolecon.2013.09.007>
- Duro, J.A., Alcántara, V., Padilla, E., 2010. International inequality in energy intensity levels and the role of production composition and energy efficiency: An analysis of OECD countries. *Ecol. Econ.* 69, 2468–2474. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ecolecon.2010.07.022>
- Enders, W., 2014. *Applied Econometric Time Series*, 4th Edition, 4th ed. Wiley.
- Faehn, T., Bruvoll, A., 2009. Richer and cleaner-At others' expense? *Resour. ENERGY Econ.* 31, 103–122. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.reseneeco.2008.11.001>
- Fan, J.-L., Hou, Y.-B., Wang, Q., Wang, C., Wei, Y.-M., 2016. Exploring the characteristics of production-based and consumption-based carbon emissions of major economies: A multiple-dimension comparison. *Appl. ENERGY* 184, 790–799.
<https://doi.org/10.1016/j.apenergy.2016.06.076>
- Fang, Y., 2011. Economic welfare impacts from renewable energy consumption: The China experience. *Renew. Sustain. Energy Rev.* 15, 5120–5128.
<https://doi.org/10.1016/j.rser.2011.07.044>
- Fanning, A.L., O'Neill, D.W., 2019. The Wellbeing-Consumption paradox: Happiness, health, income, and carbon emissions in growing versus non-growing economies. *J. Clean. Prod.* 212, 810–821. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jclepro.2018.11.223>
- Fernandez-Amador, O., Francois, J.F., Oberdabernig, D.A., Tomberger, P., 2017. Carbon Dioxide Emissions and Economic Growth: An Assessment Based CrossMark on Production and Consumption Emission Inventories. *Ecol. Econ.* 135, 269–279.
<https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ecolecon.2017.01.004>
- Fernández-Herrero, L., Duro, J.A., 2019. What causes inequality in Material Productivity between countries? *Ecol. Econ.* 162, 1–16.
<https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ecolecon.2019.04.007>
- Fischer-Kowalski, M., 1998. Society's metabolism: The intellectual history of material flow analysis, Part I: 1860-1970. *J. Ind. Ecol.* 2, 61–78.
<https://doi.org/10.1162/jiec.1998.2.1.61>
- Fischer-Kowalski, M., Krausmann, F., Giljum, S., Lutter, S., Mayer, A., Bringezu, S., Moriguchi, Y., Schütz, H., Schandl, H., Weisz, H., 2011. Methodology and Indicators of Economy-wide Material Flow Accounting: State of the Art and Reliability Across Sources. *J. Ind. Ecol.* 15, 855–876. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1530-9290.2011.00366.x>
- Fishman, T., Schandl, H., Tanikawa, H., 2016. Stochastic Analysis and Forecasts of the Patterns of Speed, Acceleration, and Levels of Material Stock Accumulation in Society. *Environ. Sci. Technol.* 50, 3729–3737.
<https://doi.org/10.1021/acs.est.5b05790>
- Fishman, T., Schandl, H., Tanikawa, H., Walker, P., Krausmann, F., 2014. Accounting for the Material Stock of Nations: Accounting for the Material Stock of Nations. *J. Ind. Ecol.* 18, 407–420. <https://doi.org/10.1111/jiec.12114>
- Fuss, S., Canadell, J.G., Peters, G.P., Tavoni, M., Andrew, R.M., Ciais, P., Jackson, R.B., Jones, C.D., Kraxner, F., Nakicenovic, N., Le Quéré, C., Raupach, M.R., Sharifi, A., Smith, P., Yamagata, Y., 2014. Betting on negative emissions. *Nat. Clim. Change* 4, 850–853. <https://doi.org/10.1038/nclimate2392>
- Fuss, S., Lamb, W.F., Callaghan, M.W., Hilaire, J., Creutzig, F., Amann, T., Beringer, T., de Oliveira Garcia, W., Hartmann, J., Khanna, T., Luderer, G., Nemet, G.F., Rogelj, J., Smith, P., Vicente, J.L.V., Wilcox, J., del Mar Zamora Dominguez, M., Minx, J.C., 2018. Negative emissions—Part 2: Costs, potentials and side effects. *Environ. Res. Lett.* 13, 063002. <https://doi.org/10.1088/1748-9326/aabf9f>

- 1
2
3 1059 Gan, Y., Zhang, T., Liang, S., Zhao, Z., Li, N., 2013. How to Deal with Resource Productivity
4 1060 Relationships Between Socioeconomic Factors and Resource Productivity. *J. Ind.*
5 1061 *Ecol.* 17, 440–451. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1530-9290.2012.00547.x>
6 1062 Gazheli, A., van den Bergh, J., Antal, M., 2016. How realistic is green growth? Sectoral-level
7 1063 carbon intensity versus productivity. *J. Clean. Prod.* 129, 449–467.
8 1064 <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jclepro.2016.04.032>
9 1065 Giampietro, M., 2006. Comments on “The Energetic Metabolism of the European Union and
10 1066 the United States” by Haberl and Colleagues: Theoretical and Practical Considerations
11 1067 on the Meaning and Usefulness of Traditional Energy Analysis. *J. Ind. Ecol.* 10, 173–
12 1068 185. <https://doi.org/10.1162/jiec.2006.10.4.173>
13 1069 Gierlinger, S., Krausmann, F., 2012. The Physical Economy of the United States of America.
14 1070 *J. Ind. Ecol.* 16, 365–377. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1530-9290.2011.00404.x>
15 1071 Giljum, S., Bruckner, M., Martinez, A., 2014a. Material Footprint Assessment in a Global
16 1072 Input-Output Framework. *J. Ind. Ecol.* 19, 792–804. <https://doi.org/10.1111/jiec.12214>
17 1073 Giljum, S., Dittrich, M., Lieber, M., Lutter, S., 2014b. Global Patterns of Material Flows and
18 1074 their Socio-Economic and Environmental Implications: A MFA Study on All
19 1075 Countries World-Wide from 1980 to 2009. *Resources* 3, 319–339.
20 1076 <https://doi.org/10.3390/resources3010319>
21 1077 Grand, M.C., 2016. Carbon emission targets and decoupling indicators. *Ecol. Indic.* 67, 649–
22 1078 656. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ecolind.2016.03.042>
23 1079 Granger, C.W.J., 1969. Investigating Causal Relations by Econometric Models and Cross-
24 1080 spectral Methods. *Econometrica* 37, 424–438. <https://doi.org/10.2307/1912791>
25 1081 Green, F., Denniss, R., 2018. Cutting with both arms of the scissors: the economic and
26 1082 political case for restrictive supply-side climate policies. *Clim. Change* 150, 73–87.
27 1083 <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10584-018-2162-x>
28 1084 Griscom, B.W., Adams, J., Ellis, P.W., Houghton, R.A., Lomax, G., Miteva, D.A.,
29 1085 Schlesinger, W.H., Shoch, D., Siikamäki, J.V., Smith, P., Woodbury, P., Zganjar, C.,
30 1086 Blackman, A., Campari, J., Conant, R.T., Delgado, C., Elias, P., Gopalakrishna, T.,
31 1087 Hamsik, M.R., Herrero, M., Kiesecker, J., Landis, E., Laestadius, L., Leavitt, S.M.,
32 1088 Minnemeyer, S., Polasky, S., Potapov, P., Putz, F.E., Sanderman, J., Silvius, M.,
33 1089 Wollenberg, E., Fargione, J., 2017. Natural climate solutions. *Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci.*
34 1090 114, 11645–11650. <https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1710465114>
35 1091 Grubler, A., Wilson, C., Bento, N., Boza-Kiss, B., Krey, V., McCollum, D.L., Rao, N.D.,
36 1092 Riahi, K., Rogelj, J., Stercke, S., Cullen, J., Frank, S., Fricko, O., Guo, F., Gidden, M.,
37 1093 Havlík, P., Huppmann, D., Kiesewetter, G., Rafaj, P., Schoepp, W., Valin, H., 2018. A
38 1094 low energy demand scenario for meeting the 1.5 °C target and sustainable
39 1095 development goals without negative emission technologies. *Nat. Energy* 3, 515.
40 1096 <https://doi.org/10.1038/s41560-018-0172-6>
41 1097 Guevara, Z., Sousa, T., Domingos, T., 2016. Insights on Energy Transitions in Mexico from
42 1098 the Analysis of Useful Exergy 1971-2009. *ENERGIES* 9.
43 1099 <https://doi.org/10.3390/en9070488>
44 1100 Guillet, R., 2010. ENERGY AND ECONOMICAL GROWTH: OVERVIEW AND
45 1101 GLOBAL CHALLENGES. *Environ. Eng. Manag. J.* 9, 1357–1362.
46 1102 Gupta, S., 2015. Decoupling: a step toward sustainable development with reference to OECD
47 1103 countries. *Int. J. Sustain. Dev. WORLD Ecol.* 22, 510–519.
48 1104 <https://doi.org/10.1080/13504509.2015.1088485>
49 1105 Haas, R., Nakicenovic, N., Ajanovic, A., Faber, T., Kranzl, L., Müller, A., Resch, G., 2008.
50 1106 Towards sustainability of energy systems: A primer on how to apply the concept of
51 1107 energy services to identify necessary trends and policies. *Energy Policy* 36, 4012–
52 1108 4021. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2008.06.028>

- 1
2
3 1109 Haas, W., Krausmann, F., Wiedenhofer, D., Heinz, M., 2015. How Circular is the Global
4 1110 Economy?: An Assessment of Material Flows, Waste Production, and Recycling in the
5 1111 European Union and the World in 2005. *J. Ind. Ecol.* 19, 765–777.
6 1112 <https://doi.org/10.1111/jiec.12244>
7
8 1113 Haberl, H., 2006. On the Utility of Counting Joules: Reply to Comments by Mario
9 1114 Giampietro. *J. Ind. Ecol.* 10, 187–192. <https://doi.org/10.1162/jiec.2006.10.4.187>
10 1115 Haberl, H., 2001. The Energetic Metabolism of Societies Part I: Accounting Concepts. *J. Ind.*
11 1116 *Ecol.* 5, 11–33. <https://doi.org/10.1162/108819801753358481>
12 1117 Haberl, H., Fischer-Kowalski, M., Krausmann, F., Weisz, H., Winiwarter, V., 2004. Progress
13 1118 towards sustainability? What the conceptual framework of material and energy flow
14 1119 accounting (MEFA) can offer. *Land Use Policy* 21, 199–213.
15 1120 <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.landusepol.2003.10.013>
16 1121 Haberl, H., Steinberger, J.K., Plutzer, C., Erb, K.-H., Gaube, V., Gingrich, S., Krausmann, F.,
17 1122 2012. Natural and socioeconomic determinants of the embodied human appropriation
18 1123 of net primary production and its relation to other resource use indicators. *Ecol. Indic.*
19 1124 23, 222–231. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ecolind.2012.03.027>
20 1125 Haberl, H., Wiedenhofer, D., Erb, K.-H., Görg, C., Krausmann, F., 2017. The Material Stock–
21 1126 Flow–Service Nexus: A New Approach for Tackling the Decoupling Conundrum.
22 1127 *Sustainability* 9, 1049. <https://doi.org/10.3390/su9071049>
23 1128 Haberl, H., Wiedenhofer, D., Pauliuk, S., Krausmann, F., Müller, D.B., Fischer-Kowalski, M.,
24 1129 2019. Contributions of sociometabolic research to sustainability science. *Nat. Sustain.*
25 1130 2, 173–184. <https://doi.org/10.1038/s41893-019-0225-2>
26 1131 Hall, C., Lindenberger, D., Kümmel, R., Kroeger, T., Eichhorn, W., 2001. The Need to
27 1132 Reintegrate the Natural Sciences with Economics. *BioScience* 51, 663–673.
28 1133 [https://doi.org/10.1641/0006-3568\(2001\)051\[0663:TNTRTN\]2.0.CO;2](https://doi.org/10.1641/0006-3568(2001)051[0663:TNTRTN]2.0.CO;2)
29 1134 Hall, C.A.S., Cleveland, C.J., Kaufmann, R., 1986. Energy and resource quality: the ecology
30 1135 of the economic process. John Wiley & Sons, New York, NY.
31 1136 Hallegatte, S.H., Geoffrey Fay, Marianne Treguer, David, 2011. From Growth to Green
32 1137 Growth-A Framework, Policy Research Working Papers. The World Bank.
33 1138 <https://doi.org/10.1596/1813-9450-5872>
34 1139 Hardt, L., Owen, A., Brockway, P., Heun, M.K., Barrett, J., Taylor, P.G., Foxon, T.J., 2018.
35 1140 Untangling the drivers of energy reduction in the UK productive sectors: Efficiency or
36 1141 offshoring? *Appl. Energy* 223, 124–133.
37 1142 <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.apenergy.2018.03.127>
38 1143 Hashimoto, S., Matsui, S., Matsuno, Y., Nansai, K., Murakami, S., Moriguchi, Y., 2008.
39 1144 What Factors Have Changed Japanese Resource Productivity? *J. Ind. Ecol.* 12, 657–
40 1145 668. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1530-9290.2008.00072.x>
41 1146 Hausknost, D., 2019. The environmental state and the glass ceiling of transformation.
42 1147 *Environ. Polit.* 1–21. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09644016.2019.1680062>
43 1148 Hertwich, E.G., Peters, G.P., 2009. Carbon Footprint of Nations: A Global, Trade-Linked
44 1149 Analysis. *Environ. Sci. Technol.* 43, 6414–6420. <https://doi.org/10.1021/es803496a>
45 1150 Heun, M.K., Brockway, P.E., 2019. Meeting 2030 primary energy and economic growth
46 1151 goals: Mission impossible? *Appl. Energy* 251, 112697.
47 1152 <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.apenergy.2019.01.255>
48 1153 Hickel, J., Kallis, G., 2019. Is Green Growth Possible? *New Polit. Econ.* 1–18.
49 1154 <https://doi.org/10.1080/13563467.2019.1598964>
50 1155 Hoekstra, R., 2019. Replacing GDP by 2030. Towards a Common Language for the Well-
51 1156 being and Sustainability Community. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK.
52 1157 Hoffrén, J., Hellman, J., 2007. Impacts of increasing consumption on material flows over
53 1158 time: Empirical results from Finland 1970-2005. *Prog. Ind. Ecol.* 4, 463–483.
54 1159 <https://doi.org/10.1504/PIE.2007.016354>

- 1
2
3 1160 Hoffrén, J., Luukkanen, J., Kaivo-oja, J., 2001. Decomposition analysis of Finnish material
4 1161 flows: 1960-1996. *J. Ind. Ecol.* 4, 105–125.
5 1162 <https://doi.org/10.1162/10881980052541972>
6
7 1163 Hu, J.-L., Kao, C.-H., 2007. Efficient energy-saving targets for APEC economies. *Energy*
8 1164 *Policy* 35, 373–382. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2005.11.032>
9 1165 IEA, 2019. World Energy Balances [WWW Document]. Int. Energy Agency. URL
10 1166 <https://www.iea.org/statistics/balances/> (accessed 11.19.19).
11 1167 IFIAS, 1974. Energy analysis workshop on methodology and conventions. International
12 1168 Federation of Institutes for Advanced Study (IFIAS), Stockholm.
13 1169 Infante-Amate, J., Soto, D., Aguilera, E., García-Ruiz, R., Guzmán, G., Cid, A., González de
14 1170 Molina, M., 2015. The Spanish Transition to Industrial Metabolism: Long-Term
15 1171 Material Flow Analysis (1860-2010): The Spanish Transition to Industrial
16 1172 Metabolism. *J. Ind. Ecol.* 19, 866–876. <https://doi.org/10.1111/jiec.12261>
17
18 1173 Inomata, S., Owen, A., 2014. COMPARATIVE EVALUATION OF MRIO DATABASES.
19 1174 *Econ. Syst. Res.* 26, 239–244. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09535314.2014.940856>
20 1175 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Edenhofer, O. (Eds.), 2014. Climate change
21 1176 2014: mitigation of climate change: Working Group III contribution to the Fifth
22 1177 Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Cambridge
23 1178 University Press, New York, NY.
24
25 1179 IPCC, 2018. Global warming of 1.5°C [WWW Document]. URL
26 1180 <http://www.ipcc.ch/report/sr15/>
27 1181 Jackson, T., 2016. Prosperity without growth: foundations for the economy of tomorrow.
28 1182 Routledge.
29 1183 Jackson, T., Victor, P.A., 2019. Unraveling the claims for (and against) green growth. *Science*
30 1184 366, 950–951.
31 1185 Jackson, T., Victor, P.A., 2016. Does slow growth lead to rising inequality? Some theoretical
32 1186 reflections and numerical simulations. *Ecol. Econ.* 121, 206–219.
33 1187 <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ecolecon.2015.03.019>
34 1188 Jadhao, S.B., Pandit, A.B., Bakshi, B.R., 2017. The evolving metabolism of a developing
35 1189 economy: India's exergy flows over four decades. *Appl. ENERGY* 206, 851–857.
36 1190 <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.apenergy.2017.08.240>
37
38 1191 Jakob, M., Haller, M., Marschinski, R., 2012. Will history repeat itself? Economic
39 1192 convergence and convergence in energy use patterns. *Energy Econ.* 34, 95–104.
40 1193 <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.eneco.2011.07.008>
41 1194 Jakob, M., Marschinski, R., 2013. Interpreting trade-related CO2 emission transfers. *Nat.*
42 1195 *Clim. Change* 3, 19–23. <https://doi.org/10.1038/nclimate1630>
43
44 1196 Jesus Lopez-Menendez, A., Perez, R., Moreno, B., 2014. Environmental costs and renewable
45 1197 energy: Re-visiting the Environmental Kuznets Curve. *J. Environ. Manage.* 145, 368–
46 1198 373. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jenvman.2014.07.017>
47
48 1199 Jiborn, M., Kander, A., Kulionis, V., Nielsen, H., Moran, D.D., 2018. Decoupling or
49 1200 delusion? Measuring emissions displacement in foreign trade. *Glob. Environ. Change*
50 1201 49, 27–34. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2017.12.006>
51 1202 Kalimeris, P., Richardson, C., Bithas, K., 2014. A meta-analysis investigation of the direction
52 1203 of the energy-GDP causal relationship: implications for the growth-degrowth
53 1204 dialogue. *J. Clean. Prod.* 67, 1–13. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jclepro.2013.12.040>
54
55 1205 Kallis, G., 2017. Radical dematerialization and degrowth. *Philos. Trans. R. Soc. -Math. Phys.*
56 1206 *Eng. Sci.* 375. <https://doi.org/10.1098/rsta.2016.0383>
57 1207 Kallis, G., 2011. In defence of degrowth. *Ecol. Econ.* 70, 873–880.
58 1208 Kalt, G., Wiedenhofer, D., Görg, C., Haberl, H., 2019. Conceptualizing energy services: A
59 1209 review of energy and well-being along the Energy Service Cascade. *Energy Res. Soc.*
60 1210 *Sci.* 53, 47–58. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.erss.2019.02.026>

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

- Kander, A., Jiborn, M., Moran, D.D., Wiedmann, T.O., 2015. National greenhouse-gas accounting for effective climate policy on international trade. *Nat. Clim. Change* 5, 431–435. <https://doi.org/10.1038/nclimate2555>
- Karanfil, F., 2009. How many times again will we examine the energy-income nexus using a limited range of traditional econometric tools? *Energy Policy* 37, 1191–1194. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2008.11.029>
- Kelly, H.C., Blair, P.D., Gibbons, J.H., 1989. Energy Use and Productivity: Current Trends and Policy Implications. *Annu. Rev. Energy* 14, 321–352. <https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.eg.14.110189.001541>
- Kemp-Benedict, E., 2018. Dematerialization, Decoupling, and Productivity Change. *Ecol. Econ.* 150, 204–216. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ecolecon.2018.04.020>
- Kerimray, A., Baigarin, K., De Miglio, R., Tosato, G., 2016. Climate change mitigation scenarios and policies and measures: the case of Kazakhstan. *Clim. POLICY* 16, 332–352. <https://doi.org/10.1080/14693062.2014.1003525>
- Khan, M.T.I., Yaseen, M.R., Ali, Q., 2017. Dynamic relationship between financial development, energy consumption, trade and greenhouse gas: Comparison of upper middle income countries from Asia, Europe, Africa and America. *J. Clean. Prod.* 161, 567–580. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jclepro.2017.05.129>
- Kim, Y.H., 1984. Interactions among economic activity, energy use, and electricity use. *Energy* 9, 717–725.
- Knight, K.W., Schor, J.B., 2014. Economic Growth and Climate Change: A Cross-National Analysis of Territorial and Consumption-Based Carbon Emissions in High-Income Countries. *SUSTAINABILITY* 6, 3722–3731. <https://doi.org/10.3390/su6063722>
- Koch, M., 2019. The state in the transformation to a sustainable postgrowth economy. *Environ. Polit.* 1–19. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09644016.2019.1684738>
- Koch, M., 2013. Welfare after growth: theoretical discussion and policy implications. *Int. J. Soc. Qual.* 3, 4–20.
- Koirala, B.S., Li, H., Berrens, R.P., 2011. Further Investigation of Environmental Kuznets Curve Studies Using Meta-Analysis. *Int. J. Ecol. Econ. Stat.* 22, 13–32.
- Kovanda, J., Hak, T., 2011. Historical perspectives of material use in Czechoslovakia in 1855–2007. *Ecol. Indic.* 11, 1375–1384. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ecolind.2011.02.016>
- Kovanda, J., Hak, T., 2008. Changes in Materials Use in Transition Economies. *J. Ind. Ecol.* 12, 721–738. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1530-9290.2008.00088.x>
- Kovanda, J., Hak, T., 2007. What are the possibilities for graphical presentation of decoupling? An example of economy-wide material flow indicators in the Czech Republic. *Ecol. Indic.* 7, 123–132. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ecolind.2005.11.002>
- Kovanda, J., Hak, T., Janacek, J., 2008. Economy-wide material flow indicators in the Czech Republic: Trends, decoupling analysis and uncertainties. *Int. J. Environ. Pollut.* 35, 25–41. <https://doi.org/10.1504/IJEP.2008.021129>
- Kovanda, J., Weinzettel, J., Hak, T., 2010. Material Flow Indicators in the Czech Republic in Light of the Accession to the European Union. *J. Ind. Ecol.* 14, 650–665. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1530-9290.2010.00253.x>
- Krausmann, F., Gaugl, B., West, J., Schandl, H., 2016. The metabolic transition of a planned economy: Material flows in the USSR and the Russian Federation 1900 to 2010. *Ecol. Econ.* 124, 76–85. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ecolecon.2015.12.011>
- Krausmann, F., Gingrich, S., Eisenmenger, N., Erb, K.-H., Haberl, H., Fischer-Kowalski, M., 2009. Growth in global materials use, GDP and population during the 20th century. *Ecol. Econ.* 68, 2696–2705. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ecolecon.2009.05.007>
- Krausmann, F., Gingrich, S., Nourbakhch-Sabet, R., 2011. The Metabolic Transition in Japan. *J. Ind. Ecol.* 15, 877–892. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1530-9290.2011.00376.x>

- 1
2
3 1261 Krausmann, F., Haberl, H., Erb, K., Wackernagel, M., 2004. Resource flows and land use in
4 1262 Austria 1950-2000: using the MEFA framework to monitor society-nature interaction
5 1263 for sustainability. *LAND USE POLICY* 21, 215–230.
6 1264 <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.landusepol.2003.10.005>
7
8 1265 Krausmann, F., Lauk, C., Haas, W., Wiedenhofer, D., 2018. From resource extraction to
9 1266 outflows of wastes and emissions: The socioeconomic metabolism of the global
10 1267 economy, 1900–2015. *Glob. Environ. Change* 52, 131–140.
11 1268 <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2018.07.003>
12 1269 Krausmann, F., Schandl, H., Eisenmenger, N., Giljum, S., Jackson, T., 2017a. Material Flow
13 1270 Accounting: Measuring Global Material Use for Sustainable Development. *Annu.*
14 1271 *Rev. Environ. Resour.* 42. <https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-environ-102016-060726>
15 1272 Krausmann, F., Schandl, H., Eisenmenger, N., Giljum, S., Jackson, T., 2017b. Material Flow
16 1273 Accounting: Measuring Global Material Use for Sustainable Development. *Annu.*
17 1274 *Rev. Environ. Resour.* 42, 647–675.
18 1275 Krausmann, F., Wiedenhofer, D., Haberl, H., 2020. Growing stocks of buildings,
19 1276 infrastructures and machinery as key challenge for compliance with climate targets.
20 1277 *Glob. Environ. Change* 61, 102034. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2020.102034>
21 1278 Krausmann, F., Wiedenhofer, D., Lauk, C., Haas, W., Tanikawa, H., Fishman, T., Miatto, A.,
22 1279 Schandl, H., Haberl, H., 2017c. Global socioeconomic material stocks rise 23-fold
23 1280 over the 20th century and require half of annual resource use. *Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.*
24 1281 *S. A.* 114, 1880–1885. <https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1613773114>
25 1282 Kümmel, R., 2011. *The Second Law of Economics, Energy, Entropy and the Origins of*
26 1283 *Wealth*. Springer, New York.
27 1284 Lamb, W.F., Steinberger, J.K., 2017. Human well-being and climate change mitigation:
28 1285 Human well-being and climate change mitigation. *Wiley Interdiscip. Rev. Clim.*
29 1286 *Change* 8, e485. <https://doi.org/10.1002/wcc.485>
30 1287 Lazarus, M., van Asselt, H., 2018. Fossil fuel supply and climate policy: exploring the road
31 1288 less taken. *Clim. Change* 150, 1–13. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10584-018-2266-3>
32 1289 Le Quéré, C., Andrew, R.M., Friedlingstein, P., Sitch, S., Pongratz, J., Manning, A.C.,
33 1290 Korsbakken, J.I., Peters, G.P., Canadell, J.G., Jackson, R.B., Boden, T.A., Tans, P.P.,
34 1291 Andrews, O.D., Arora, V.K., Bakker, D.C.E., Barbero, L., Becker, M., Betts, R.A.,
35 1292 Bopp, L., Chevallier, F., Chini, L.P., Ciais, P., Cosca, C.E., Cross, J., Currie, K.,
36 1293 Gasser, T., Harris, I., Hauck, J., Haverd, V., Houghton, R.A., Hunt, C.W., Hurtt, G.,
37 1294 Ilyina, T., Jain, A.K., Kato, E., Kautz, M., Keeling, R.F., Klein Goldewijk, K.,
38 1295 Körtzinger, A., Landschützer, P., Lefèvre, N., Lenton, A., Lienert, S., Lima, I.,
39 1296 Lombardozzi, D., Metzl, N., Millero, F., Monteiro, P.M.S., Munro, D.R., Nabel,
40 1297 J.E.M.S., Nakaoka, S., Nojiri, Y., Padin, X.A., Peregón, A., Pfeil, B., Pierrot, D.,
41 1298 Poulter, B., Rehder, G., Reimer, J., Rödenbeck, C., Schwinger, J., Séférian, R.,
42 1299 Skjelvan, I., Stocker, B.D., Tian, H., Tilbrook, B., Tubiello, F.N., van der Laan-
43 1300 Luijkx, I.T., van der Werf, G.R., van Heuven, S., Viovy, N., Vuichard, N., Walker,
44 1301 A.P., Watson, A.J., Wiltshire, A.J., Zaehle, S., Zhu, D., 2018. Global Carbon Budget
45 1302 2017. *Earth Syst. Sci. Data* 10, 405–448. <https://doi.org/10.5194/essd-10-405-2018>
46 1303 Le Quéré, C., Korsbakken, J.I., Wilson, C., Tosun, J., Andrew, R., Andres, R.J., Canadell,
47 1304 J.G., Jordan, A., Peters, G.P., van Vuuren, D.P., 2019. Drivers of declining CO₂
48 1305 emissions in 18 developed economies. *Nat. Clim. Change* 9, 213–217.
49 1306 <https://doi.org/10.1038/s41558-019-0419-7>
50 1307 Leal, P.A., Marques, A.C., Fuinhas, J.A., 2019. Decoupling economic growth from GHG
51 1308 emissions: Decomposition analysis by sectoral factors for Australia. *Econ. Anal.*
52 1309 *Policy* 62, 12–26. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.eap.2018.11.003>
53 1310 Lee, I.-S., Kang, H.-Y., Kim, K., Kwak, I.-H., Park, K.-H., Jo, H.-J., An, S., 2014. A
54 1311 suggestion for Korean resource productivity management policy with calculating and

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

- analyzing its national resource productivity. *Resour. Conserv. Recycl.* 91, 40–51.
<https://doi.org/10.1016/j.resconrec.2014.07.012>
- Lenzen, M., Malik, A., Foran, B., 2016. Reply. *J. Clean. Prod.* 139, 796–798.
<https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jclepro.2016.08.037>
- Lenzen, M., Moran, D., Kanemoto, K., Geschke, A., 2013. Building Eora: A Global Multi-Region Input–Output Database at High Country and Sector Resolution. *Econ. Syst. Res.* 25, 20–49. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09535314.2013.769938>
- Li, H., Grijalva, T., Berrens, R.P., 2007. Economic growth and environmental quality: a meta-analysis of environmental Kuznets curve studies. *Econ. Bull.* 17, 1–11.
- Liang, S., Qu, S., Zhu, Z., Guan, D., Xu, M., 2017. Income-Based Greenhouse Gas Emissions of Nations. *Environ. Sci. Technol.* 51, 346–355.
<https://doi.org/10.1021/acs.est.6b02510>
- Liang, S., Wang, H., Qu, S., Feng, T., Guan, D., Fang, H., Xu, M., 2016. Socioeconomic Drivers of Greenhouse Gas Emissions in the United States. *Environ. Sci. Technol.* 50, 7535–7545. <https://doi.org/10.1021/acs.est.6b00872>
- Liddle, B., 2012. OECD energy intensity: Measures, trends, and convergence. *Energy Effic.* 5, 583–597. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s12053-012-9148-8>
- Liobikiene, G., Butkus, M., Bernatoniene, J., 2016. Drivers of greenhouse gas emissions in the Baltic states: decomposition analysis related to the implementation of Europe 2020 strategy. *Renew. Sustain. ENERGY Rev.* 54, 309–317.
<https://doi.org/10.1016/j.rser.2015.10.028>
- Liobikiene, G., Mandravickaite, J., Krepstuliene, D., Bernatoniene, J., Savickas, A., 2017. LITHUANIAN ACHIEVEMENTS IN TERMS OF CO2 EMISSIONS BASED ON PRODUCTION SIDE IN THE CONTEXT OF THE EU-27. *Technol. Econ. Dev. Econ.* 23, 483–503. <https://doi.org/10.3846/20294913.2015.1056278>
- Liu, D., Guo, X., Xiao, B., 2019. What causes growth of global greenhouse gas emissions? Evidence from 40 countries. *Sci. TOTAL Environ.* 661, 750–766.
<https://doi.org/10.1016/j.scitotenv.2019.01.197>
- Longhofer, W., Jorgenson, A., 2017. Decoupling reconsidered: Does world society integration influence the relationship between the environment and economic development? *Soc. Sci. Res.* 65, 17–29. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ssresearch.2017.02.002>
- Lorek, S., Fuchs, D., 2013. Strong sustainable consumption governance – precondition for a degrowth path? *J. Clean. Prod.* 38, 36–43.
<https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jclepro.2011.08.008>
- Lovins, A.B., 1979. *Soft Energy Paths: Towards A Durable Peace*. Friends of the Earth International, San Francisco, Calif., Cambridge, Mass.
- Lozano, S., Gutiérrez, E., 2008. Non-parametric frontier approach to modelling the relationships among population, GDP, energy consumption and CO2 emissions. *Ecol. Econ.* 66, 687–699. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ecolecon.2007.11.003>
- Madaleno, M., Moutinho, V., 2018. Effects decomposition: separation of carbon emissions decoupling and decoupling effort in aggregated EU-15. *Environ. Dev. Sustain.* 20, 181–198. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10668-018-0238-4>
- Marcotullio, P.J., Schultz, N.B., 2007. Urbanization, increasing wealth, and energy transitions: comparing experiences between the USA, Japan and rapidly developing Asia Pacific economies (Working Paper 07-03), UGEC International Working Paper Series.
- Marcotullio, P.J., Schulz, N.B., 2008. Urbanization, Increasing Wealth and Energy Transitions: Comparing Experiences between the USA, Japan and Rapidly Developing Asia-Pacific Economies, in: *Urban Energy Transit*. Elsevier, pp. 55–89.
<https://doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-08-045341-5.00003-7>

- 1
2
3 1362 Marques, A., Rodrigues, J., Domingos, T., 2013. International trade and the geographical
4 1363 separation between income and enabled carbon emissions. *Ecol. Econ.* 89, 162–169.
5 1364 <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ecolecon.2013.02.020>
6
7 1365 Marques, A., Rodrigues, J., Lenzen, M., Domingos, T., 2012. Income-based environmental
8 1366 responsibility. *Ecol. Econ., The Economics of Degrowth* 84, 57–65.
9 1367 <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ecolecon.2012.09.010>
10 1368 Martinico-Perez, M.F.G., Fishman, T., Okuoka, K., Tanikawa, H., 2017. Material Flow
11 1369 Accounts and Driving Factors of Economic Growth in the Philippines: MFA and
12 1370 Driving Factors in the Philippines. *J. Ind. Ecol.* 21, 1226–1236.
13 1371 <https://doi.org/10.1111/jiec.12496>
14
15 1372 Martinico-Perez, M.F.G., Schandl, H., Fishman, T., Tanikawa, H., 2018. The Socio-Economic
16 1373 Metabolism of an Emerging Economy: Monitoring Progress of Decoupling of
17 1374 Economic Growth and Environmental Pressures in the Philippines. *Ecol. Econ.* 147,
18 1375 155–166. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ecolecon.2018.01.012>
19 1376 Maung, K.N., Martinico-Perez, M.F.G., Komatsu, T., Mohammad, S., Murakami, S.,
20 1377 Tanikawa, H., 2015. Comparative studies on the driving factors of resource flows in
21 1378 Myanmar, the Philippines, and Bangladesh. *Environ. Econ. Policy Stud.* 17, 407–429.
22 1379 <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10018-014-0087-9>
23
24 1380 Mayer, A., Haas, W., Wiedenhofer, D., 2017. How Countries' Resource Use History Matters
25 1381 for Human Well-being – An Investigation of Global Patterns in Cumulative Material
26 1382 Flows from 1950 to 2010. *Ecol. Econ.* 134, 1–10.
27 1383 <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ecolecon.2016.11.017>
28 1384 Meadows, D.H., Meadows, D.L., Randers, J., Behrens, W.W., 1972. *The Limits To Growth.*
29 1385 A Report for the Club of Rome's Project on the Predicament of Mankind. Universe
30 1386 Books, New York.
31
32 1387 Menegaki, A.N., 2011. Growth and renewable energy in Europe: A random effect model with
33 1388 evidence for neutrality hypothesis. *Energy Econ.* 33, 257–263.
34 1389 <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.eneco.2010.10.004>
35 1390 Meyer, M., Hirschnitz-Garbers, M., Distelkamp, M., 2018. Contemporary Resource Policy
36 1391 and Decoupling Trends Lessons Learnt from Integrated Model-Based Assessments.
37 1392 SUSTAINABILITY 10. <https://doi.org/10.3390/su10061858>
38
39 1393 Mi, Z., Wei, Y.-M., Wang, B., Meng, J., Liu, Z., Shan, Y., Liu, J., Guan, D., 2017.
40 1394 Socioeconomic impact assessment of China's CO₂ emissions peak prior to 2030. *J.*
41 1395 *Clean. Prod.* 142, 2227–2236. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jclepro.2016.11.055>
42 1396 Minx, J.C., Lamb, W.F., Callaghan, M.W., Fuss, S., Hilaire, J., Creutzig, F., Amann, T.,
43 1397 Beringer, T., de Oliveira Garcia, W., Hartmann, J., Khanna, T., Lenzi, D., Luderer, G.,
44 1398 Nemet, G.F., Rogelj, J., Smith, P., Vicente Vicente, J.L., Wilcox, J., del Mar Zamora
45 1399 Dominguez, M., 2018. Negative emissions—Part 1: Research landscape and synthesis.
46 1400 *Environ. Res. Lett.* 13, 063001. <https://doi.org/10.1088/1748-9326/aabf9b>
47
48 1401 Moffatt, I., 2008. A preliminary analysis of composite indicators of sustainable development.
49 1402 *Int. J. Sustain. Dev. WORLD Ecol.* 15, 81–87.
50 1403 <https://doi.org/10.1080/13504500809469772>
51 1404 Moreau, V., Neves, C.A.D.O., Vuille, F., 2019. Is decoupling a red herring? The role of
52 1405 structural effects and energy policies in Europe. *Energy Policy* 128, 243–252.
53 1406 <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2018.12.028>
54
55 1407 Moreau, V., Vuille, F., 2018. Decoupling energy use and economic growth: Counter evidence
56 1408 from structural effects and embodied energy in trade. *Appl. Energy* 215, 54–62.
57 1409 <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.apenergy.2018.01.044>
58 1410 Mulder, P., de Groot, H.L.F., 2012. Structural change and convergence of energy intensity
59 1411 across OECD countries, 1970–2005. *Energy Econ.* 34, 1910–1921.
60 1412 <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.eneco.2012.07.023>

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

- Müller, D.B., Wang, T., Duval, B., 2011. Patterns of Iron Use in Societal Evolution §. *Environ. Sci. Technol.* 45, 182–188. <https://doi.org/10.1021/es102273t>
- Muñoz, P., Hubacek, K., 2008. Material implication of Chile's economic growth: Combining material flow accounting (MFA) and structural decomposition analysis (SDA). *Ecol. Econ.* 65, 136–144. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ecolecon.2007.06.010>
- Naqvi, A., Zwickl, K., 2017. Fifty shades of green: Revisiting decoupling by economic sectors and air pollutants. *Ecol. Econ.* 133, 111–126. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ecolecon.2016.09.017>
- Nemet, G.F., Callaghan, M.W., Creutzig, F., Fuss, S., Hartmann, J., Hilaire, J., Lamb, W.F., Minx, J.C., Rogers, S., Smith, P., 2018. Negative emissions—Part 3: Innovation and upscaling. *Environ. Res. Lett.* 13, 063003. <https://doi.org/10.1088/1748-9326/aabff4>
- Nita, V., 2012. A Threefold Assessment of the Romanian Economy's Eco-Efficiency. *Romanian J. Eur. Aff.* 12, 59.
- OECD, 2011. Towards green growth. A summary for policy makers.
- Omri, A., 2014. An international literature survey on energy-economic growth nexus: Evidence from country-specific studies. *Renew. Sustain. Energy Rev.* 38, 951–959. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.rser.2014.07.084>
- O'Neill, D.W., 2015. What Should Be Held Steady in a Steady-State Economy?: Interpreting Daly's Definition at the National Level: What Should be Held Steady in a Steady-State Economy? *J. Ind. Ecol.* 19, 552–563. <https://doi.org/10.1111/jiec.12224>
- O'Neill, D.W., Fanning, A.L., Lamb, W.F., Steinberger, J.K., 2018. A good life for all within planetary boundaries. *Nat. Sustain.* 1, 88–95. <https://doi.org/10.1038/s41893-018-0021-4>
- Ozturk, I., 2010. A literature survey on energy–growth nexus. *Energy Policy* 38, 340–349. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2009.09.024>
- Palm, V., Wood, R., Berglund, M., Dawkins, E., Finnveden, G., Schmidt, S., Steinbach, N., 2019. Environmental pressures from Swedish consumption – A hybrid multi-regional input-output approach. *J. Clean. Prod.* 228, 634–644. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jclepro.2019.04.181>
- Parrique, T., Barth, J., Briens, F., Kerschner, C., Kraus-Polk, A., 2019. Decoupling Debunked. Evidence and arguments against green growth as a sole strategy for sustainability. European Environmental Bureau.
- Pauliuk, S., Hertwich, E.G., 2015. Socioeconomic metabolism as paradigm for studying the biophysical basis of human societies. *Ecol. Econ.* 119, 83–93. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ecolecon.2015.08.012>
- Pauliuk, S., Müller, D.B., 2014. The role of in-use stocks in the social metabolism and in climate change mitigation. *Glob. Environ. Change* 24, 132–142. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2013.11.006>
- Pauliuk, S., Wang, T., Müller, D.B., 2013. Steel all over the world: Estimating in-use stocks of iron for 200 countries. *Resour. Conserv. Recycl.* 71, 22–30. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.resconrec.2012.11.008>
- Peters, G.P., 2008. From production-based to consumption-based national emission inventories. *Ecol. Econ.* 65, 13–23. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ecolecon.2007.10.014>
- Peters, G.P., Hertwich, E.G., 2008. CO2 Embodied in International Trade with Implications for Global Climate Policy. *Environ. Sci. Technol.* 42, 1401–1407. <https://doi.org/10.1021/es072023k>
- Peters, G.P., Minx, J.C., Weber, C.L., Edenhofer, O., 2011. Growth in emission transfers via international trade from 1990 to 2008. *Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci.* 108, 8903–8908. <https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1006388108>

- 1
2
3 1462 Pichler, M., Brand, U., Görg, C., 2018. The double materiality of democracy in capitalist
4 1463 societies: challenges for social-ecological transformations. *Environ. Polit.* 1–21.
5 1464 <https://doi.org/10.1080/09644016.2018.1547260>
6
7 1465 Picton, T., Daniels, P., 1999. Ecological restructuring for sustainable development: evidence
8 1466 from the Australian economy. *Ecol. Econ.* 29, 405–425.
9 1467 [https://doi.org/10.1016/S0921-8009\(98\)00068-8](https://doi.org/10.1016/S0921-8009(98)00068-8)
10 1468 Plank, B., Eisenmenger, N., Schaffartzik, A., Wiedenhofer, D., 2018a. International Trade
11 1469 Drives Global Resource Use: A Structural Decomposition Analysis of Raw Material
12 1470 Consumption from 1990–2010. *Environ. Sci. Technol.*
13 1471 <https://doi.org/10.1021/acs.est.7b06133>
14 1472 Plank, B., Eisenmenger, N., Schaffartzik, A., Wiedenhofer, D., 2018b. International Trade
15 1473 Drives Global Resource Use: A Structural Decomposition Analysis of Raw Material
16 1474 Consumption from 1990–2010. *Environ. Sci. Technol.* 52, 4190–4198.
17 1475 <https://doi.org/10.1021/acs.est.7b06133>
18 1476 Pothen, F., 2017. A structural decomposition of global Raw Material Consumption. *Ecol.*
19 1477 *Econ.* 141, 154–165. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ecolecon.2017.05.032>
20 1478 Pothen, F., Schymura, M., 2015. Bigger cakes with fewer ingredients? A comparison of
21 1479 material use of the world economy. *Ecol. Econ.* 109, 109–121.
22 1480 <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ecolecon.2014.10.009>
23 1481 Raupova, O., Kamahara, H., Goto, N., 2014. Assessment of physical economy through
24 1482 economy-wide material flow analysis in developing Uzbekistan. *Resour. Conserv.*
25 1483 *Recycl.* 89, 76–85. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.resconrec.2014.05.004>
26 1484 Rezny, L., White, J.B., Maresova, P., 2019. The knowledge economy: Key to sustainable
27 1485 development? *Struct. Change Econ. Dyn.* S0954349X18302200.
28 1486 <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.strueco.2019.02.003>
29 1487 Robaina-Alves, M., Moutinho, V., Macedo, P., 2015. A new frontier approach to model the
30 1488 eco-efficiency in European countries. *J. Clean. Prod.* 103, 562–573.
31 1489 <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jclepro.2015.01.038>
32 1490 Rodrigues, J., Domingos, T., 2008. Consumer and producer environmental responsibility:
33 1491 Comparing two approaches. *Ecol. Econ.* 66, 533–546.
34 1492 <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ecolecon.2007.12.010>
35 1493 Rodrigues, J., Domingos, T., Giljum, S., Schneider, F., 2006. Designing an indicator of
36 1494 environmental responsibility. *Ecol. Econ.* 59, 256–266.
37 1495 <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ecolecon.2005.10.002>
38 1496 Rodrigues, J., Domingos, T., Marques, A., 2010. Carbon Responsibility and Embodied
39 1497 Emissions: Theory and Management. Routledge.
40 1498 Rogelj, J., Huppmann, D., Krey, V., Riahi, K., Clarke, L., Gidden, M., Nicholls, Z.,
41 1499 Meinshausen, M., 2019. A new scenario logic for the Paris Agreement long-term
42 1500 temperature goal. *Nature* 573, 357–363. <https://doi.org/10.1038/s41586-019-1541-4>
43 1501 Roinioti, A., Koroneos, C., 2017. The decomposition of CO2 emissions from energy use in
44 1502 Greece before and during the economic crisis and their decoupling from economic
45 1503 growth. *Renew. Sustain. Energy Rev.* 76, 448–459.
46 1504 <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.rser.2017.03.026>
47 1505 Sakai, M., Brockway, P.E., Barrett, J.R., Taylor, P.G., 2019. Thermodynamic Efficiency
48 1506 Gains and their Role as a Key “Engine of Economic Growth”. *ENERGIES* 12.
49 1507 <https://doi.org/10.3390/en12010110>
50 1508 Salim, R.A., Rafiq, S., 2012. Why do some emerging economies proactively accelerate the
51 1509 adoption of renewable energy? *Energy Econ.* 34, 1051–1057.
52 1510 <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.eneco.2011.08.015>
53 1511 Sanchez, L.F., Stern, D.I., 2016. Drivers of industrial and non-industrial greenhouse gas
54 1512 emissions. *Ecol. Econ.* 124, 17–24. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ecolecon.2016.01.008>

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

- Santos, J., Domingos, T., Sousa, T., St Aubyn, M., 2018. Useful Exergy Is Key in Obtaining Plausible Aggregate Production Functions and Recognizing the Role of Energy in Economic Growth: Portugal 1960-2009. *Ecol. Econ.* 148, 103–120. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ecolecon.2018.01.008>
- Sarkodie, S.A., Strezov, V., 2019. A review on Environmental Kuznets Curve hypothesis using bibliometric and meta-analysis. *Sci. Total Environ.* 649, 128–145. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.scitotenv.2018.08.276>
- Sarkodie, S.A., Strezov, V., Weldekidan, H., Asamoah, E.F., Owusu, P.A., Doyi, I.N.Y., 2019. Environmental sustainability assessment using dynamic Autoregressive-Distributed Lag simulations-Nexus between greenhouse gas emissions, biomass energy, food and economic growth. *Sci. TOTAL Environ.* 668, 318–332. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.scitotenv.2019.02.432>
- Ščasný, M., Kovanda, J., Hák, T., 2003. Material flow accounts, balances and derived indicators for the Czech Republic during the 1990s: Results and recommendations for methodological improvements. *Ecol. Econ.* 45, 41–57. [https://doi.org/10.1016/S0921-8009\(02\)00260-4](https://doi.org/10.1016/S0921-8009(02)00260-4)
- Schaffartzik, A., Haberl, H., Kastner, T., Wiedenhofer, D., Eisenmenger, N., Erb, K.-H., 2015. Trading Land: A Review of Approaches to Accounting for Upstream Land Requirements of Traded Products: A Review of Upstream Land Accounts. *J. Ind. Ecol.* 19, 703–714. <https://doi.org/10.1111/jiec.12258>
- Schaffartzik, A., Mayer, A., Gingrich, S., Eisenmenger, N., Loy, C., Krausmann, F., 2014. The global metabolic transition: Regional patterns and trends of global material flows, 1950–2010. *Glob. Environ. Change* 26, 87–97. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2014.03.013>
- Schandl, H., Fischer-Kowalski, M., West, J., Giljum, S., Dittrich, M., Eisenmenger, N., Geschke, A., Lieber, M., Wieland, H., Schaffartzik, A., Krausmann, F., Gierlinger, S., Hosking, K., Lenzen, M., Tanikawa, H., Miatto, A., Fishman, T., 2018. Global Material Flows and Resource Productivity: Forty Years of Evidence. *J. Ind. Ecol.* 22, 827–838. <https://doi.org/10.1111/jiec.12626>
- Schandl, H., Fischer-Kowalski, M., West, J., Giljum, S., Dittrich, M., Eisenmenger, N., Geschke, A., Lieber, M., Wieland, H., Schaffartzik, A., Krausmann, F., Gierlinger, S., Hosking, K., Lenzen, M., Tanikawa, H., Miatto, A., Fishman, T., 2017. Global Material Flows and Resource Productivity: Forty Years of Evidence. *J. Ind. Ecol.* <https://doi.org/10.1111/jiec.12626>
- Schandl, H., Poldy, F., Turner, G.M., Measham, T.G., Walker, D.H., Eisenmenger, N., 2008. Australia's resource use trajectories. *J. Ind. Ecol.* 12, 669–685. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1530-9290.2008.00075.x>
- Schandl, H., Turner, G.M., 2009. The Dematerialization Potential of the Australian Economy. *J. Ind. Ecol.* 13, 863–880. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1530-9290.2009.00163.x>
- Schandl, H., West, J., 2012. Material Flows and Material Productivity in China, Australia, and Japan. *J. Ind. Ecol.* 16, 352–364. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1530-9290.2011.00420.x>
- Schandl, H., West, J., 2010. Resource use and resource efficiency in the Asia–Pacific region. *Glob. Environ. Change* 20, 636–647. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2010.06.003>
- Schneider, F., Kallis, G., Martínez-Alier, J., 2010. Crisis or opportunity? Economic degrowth for social equity and ecological sustainability. Introduction to this special issue. *J. Clean. Prod.* 18, 511–518.
- Schulz, N.B., 2007. The direct material inputs into Singapore's development. *J. Ind. Ecol.* 11, 117–131. <https://doi.org/10.1162/jie.2007.1200>
- Sekulova, F., Kallis, G., Rodríguez-Labajos, B., Schneider, F., 2013. Degrowth: from theory to practice. *J. Clean. Prod.* 38, 1–6.

- 1
2
3 1563 Serrenho, A.C., Sousa, T., Warr, B., Ayres, R.U., Domingos, T., 2014. Decomposition of
4 1564 useful work intensity: The EU (European Union)-15 countries from 1960 to 2009.
5 1565 ENERGY 76, 704–715. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.energy.2014.08.068>
6 1566 Serrenho, A.C., Warr, B., Sousa, T., Ayres, R.U., Domingos, T., 2016. Structure and
7 1567 dynamics of useful work along the agriculture-industry-services transition: Portugal
8 1568 from 1856 to 2009. *Struct. CHANGE Econ. Dyn.* 36, 1–21.
9 1569 <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.strueco.2015.10.004>
10 1570 Shao, Q., Schaffartzik, A., Mayer, A., Krausmann, F., 2017. The high ‘price’ of
11 1571 dematerialization: A dynamic panel data analysis of material use and economic
12 1572 recession. *J. Clean. Prod.* 167, 120–132. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jclepro.2017.08.158>
13 1573 Shuai, C., Chen, X., Shen, L., Jiao, L., Wu, Y., Tan, Y., 2017. The turning points of carbon
14 1574 Kuznets curve: Evidences from panel and time-series data of 164 countries. *J. Clean.*
15 1575 *Prod.* 162, 1031–1047. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jclepro.2017.06.049>
16 1576 Simas, M., Pauliuk, S., Wood, R., Hertwich, E.G., Stadler, K., 2017. Correlation between
17 1577 production and consumption-based environmental indicators The link to affluence and
18 1578 the effect on ranking environmental performance of countries. *Ecol. Indic.* 76, 317–
19 1579 323. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ecolind.2017.01.026>
20 1580 Solilová, V., Nerudová, D., 2015. Evaluation of Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Related
21 1581 Aspects: Case of the Czech Republic. *Acta Univ. Agric. Silv. Mendel. Brun.* 63,
22 1582 281–292. <https://doi.org/10.11118/actaun201563010281>
23 1583 Sorrell, S., Gatersleben, B., Druckman, A., 2020. The limits of energy sufficiency: A review
24 1584 of the evidence for rebound effects and negative spillovers from behavioural change.
25 1585 *Energy Res. Soc. Sci.* 64, 101439. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.erss.2020.101439>
26 1586 Steffen, W., Richardson, K., Rockstrom, J., Cornell, S.E., Fetzer, I., Bennett, E.M., Biggs, R.,
27 1587 Carpenter, S.R., de Vries, W., de Wit, C.A., Folke, C., Gerten, D., Heinke, J., Mace,
28 1588 G.M., Persson, L.M., Ramanathan, V., Reyers, B., Sorlin, S., 2015. Planetary
29 1589 boundaries: Guiding human development on a changing planet. *Science* 347, doi:
30 1590 10.1126/science.1259855. <https://doi.org/10.1126/science.1259855>
31 1591 Steger, S., Bleischwitz, R., 2011. Drivers for the use of materials across countries. *J. Clean.*
32 1592 *Prod.* 19, 816–826. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jclepro.2010.08.016>
33 1593 Steinberger, J.K., Krausmann, F., 2011. Material and Energy Productivity. *Environ. Sci.*
34 1594 *Technol.* 45, 1169–1176. <https://doi.org/10.1021/es1028537>
35 1595 Steinberger, J.K., Krausmann, F., Eisenmenger, N., 2010. Global patterns of materials use: A
36 1596 socioeconomic and geophysical analysis. *Ecol. Econ.* 69, 1148–1158.
37 1597 <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ecolecon.2009.12.009>
38 1598 Steinberger, J.K., Krausmann, F., Getzner, M., Schandl, H., West, J., 2013. Development and
39 1599 Dematerialization: An International Study. *PLOS ONE* 8.
40 1600 <https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0070385>
41 1601 Steininger, K.W., Lininger, C., Meyer, L.H., Muñoz, P., Schinko, T., 2016. Multiple carbon
42 1602 accounting to support just and effective climate policies. *Nat. Clim. Change* 6, 35–41.
43 1603 <https://doi.org/10.1038/nclimate2867>
44 1604 Steininger, K.W., Lininger, C., Meyer, L.H., Muñoz, P., Schinko, T., 2015. Multiple carbon
45 1605 accounting to support just and effective climate policies. *Nat. Clim. Change* 6, 35–41.
46 1606 <https://doi.org/10.1038/nclimate2867>
47 1607 Stern, D.I., 2017. The environmental Kuznets curve after 25 years. *J. Bioeconomics* 19, 7–28.
48 1608 <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10818-017-9243-1>
49 1609 Stern, D.I., 2011. The role of energy in economic growth: Energy and growth. *Ann. N. Y.*
50 1610 *Acad. Sci.* 1219, 26–51. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1749-6632.2010.05921.x>
51 1611 Stern, D.I., 1997. Limits to substitution and irreversibility in production and consumption: A
52 1612 neoclassical interpretation of ecological economics. *Ecol. Econ.* 21, 197–215.
53 1613 [https://doi.org/10.1016/S0921-8009\(96\)00103-6](https://doi.org/10.1016/S0921-8009(96)00103-6)

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

- 1614 Stern, D.I., Gerlagh, R., Burke, P.J., 2017. Modeling the emissions–income relationship using
1615 long-run growth rates. *Environ. Dev. Econ.* 22, 699–724.
1616 <https://doi.org/10.1017/S1355770X17000109>
- 1617 Stiglitz, J., Sen, A., Fitoussi, J., 2009. Report of the Commission on the Measurement of
1618 Economic Performance and Social Progress (CMEPSP).
- 1619 Stjepanović, S., 2018. Relationship between energy consumption and economic growth in 30
1620 countries in Europe - Panel. *Ekon. Pregl.* 69, 43–57. <https://doi.org/10.32910/ep.69.1.3>
- 1621 Streimikiene, D., Balezentis, T., 2016. Kaya identity for analysis of the main drivers of GHG
1622 emissions and feasibility to implement EU “20-20-20” targets in the Baltic States.
1623 *Renew. Sustain. ENERGY Rev.* 58, 1108–1113.
1624 <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.rser.2015.12.311>
- 1625 Takiguchi, H., Takemoto, K., 2008. Japanese 3R policies based on material flow analysis. *J.*
1626 *Ind. Ecol.* 12, 792–798. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1530-9290.2008.00093.x>
- 1627 Tiba, S., Omri, A., 2017. Literature survey on the relationships between energy, environment
1628 and economic growth. *Renew. Sustain. Energy Rev.* 69, 1129–1146.
1629 <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.rser.2016.09.113>
- 1630 Tiwari, A.K., 2011. A structural VAR analysis of renewable energy consumption, real GDP
1631 and CO2 emissions: Evidence from India. *Econ. Bull.* 31, 15.
- 1632 Tugcu, C.T., Ozturk, I., Aslan, A., 2012. Renewable and non-renewable energy consumption
1633 and economic growth relationship revisited: Evidence from G7 countries. *Energy*
1634 *Econ.* 34, 1942–1950. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.eneco.2012.08.021>
- 1635 TWI2050, 2018. Transformations to Achieve the Sustainable Development Goals. Report
1636 prepared by The World in 2050 initiative. International Institute for Applied Systems
1637 Analysis (IIASA), www.twi2050.org, Laxenburg, Austria.
- 1638 UN, 2019. National Accounts - Analysis of Main Aggregates (AMA) [WWW Document]. U.
1639 N. Stat. Div. URL <https://unstats.un.org/unsd/snaama/> (accessed 11.19.19).
- 1640 UNE IRP, 2019. Global Material Flows Database [WWW Document]. URL
1641 <https://www.resourcepanel.org/global-material-flows-database> (accessed 11.19.19).
- 1642 UNEP, 2011a. Decoupling natural resource use and environmental impacts from economic
1643 growth. United Nations Environment Programme, Nairobi.
- 1644 UNEP, 2011b. Towards a green economy: pathways to sustainable development and poverty
1645 eradication – a synthesis for policy makers. United Nations Environment Programme
1646 (UNEP), Nairobi, Kenya.
- 1647 UNEP-IRP, 2019. Global Resources Outlook 2019. Natural resources for the future we want.
1648 United Nations Environment Programme, Nairobi, Kenya.
- 1649 UNFCCC, 2019. GHG data from UNFCCC [WWW Document]. URL
1650 https://di.unfccc.int/time_series (accessed 11.19.19).
- 1651 United Nations, 1987. Our Common Future. Report of the World Commission on
1652 Environment and Development. UN Document, Online at
1653 http://conspect.nl/pdf/Our_Common_Future-Brundtland_Report_1987.pdf.
- 1654 Uwasu, M., Hara, K., Kobayashi, H., Center for Environmental Innovation Design for
1655 Sustainability (CEIDS), Osaka University, 2-1 Yamadaoka, Suita 565-0871, Japan,
1656 2014. Analysis of Energy Consumption Patterns and Climate Effects Using Panel
1657 Data. *Int. J. Autom. Technol.* 8, 626–633. <https://doi.org/10.20965/ijat.2014.p0626>
- 1658 Valadkhani, A., Roshdi, I., Smyth, R., 2016. A multiplicative environmental DEA approach
1659 to measure efficiency changes in the world’s major polluters. *ENERGY Econ.* 54,
1660 363–375. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.eneco.2015.12.018>
- 1661 van den Bergh, J.C.J.M., Kallis, G., 2012a. Growth, A-Growth or Degrowth to Stay within
1662 Planetary Boundaries? *J. Econ. Issues* 46, 909–920. [https://doi.org/10.2753/JEI0021-](https://doi.org/10.2753/JEI0021-3624460404)
1663 3624460404

- 1
2
3 1664 van den Bergh, J.C.J.M., Kallis, G., 2012b. Growth, A-Growth or Degrowth to Stay within
4 1665 Planetary Boundaries? *J. Econ. Issues* 46, 909–920. [https://doi.org/10.2753/JEI0021-](https://doi.org/10.2753/JEI0021-3624460404)
5 1666 3624460404
- 6 1667 Vehmas, J., Kaivo-oja, J., Luukkanen, J., 2003. Global trends of linking environmental stress
7 1668 and economic growth. Total primary energy supply and CO₂ emissions in the
8 1669 European Union, Japan, USA, China, India and Brazil. *Finland Futures Research*
9 1670 *Center, Turku.*
- 10 1671 Vehmas, J., Luukkanen, J., Kaivo-oja, J., 2007. Linking analyses and environmental Kuznets
11 1672 curves for aggregated material flows in the EU. *Mater. Flow Anal. Mater. Flow*
12 1673 *Manag.* 15, 1662–1673. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jclepro.2006.08.010>
- 13 1674 Velasco-Fernández, R., Ramos-Martín, J., Giampietro, M., 2015. The energy metabolism of
14 1675 China and India between 1971 and 2010: Studying the bifurcation. *Renew. Sustain.*
15 1676 *Energy Rev.* 41, 1052–1066. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.rser.2014.08.065>
- 16 1677 Vita, G., Hertwich, E., Stadler, K., Wood, R., 2018. Connecting global emissions to
17 1678 fundamental human needs and their satisfaction. *Environ. Res. Lett.*
18 1679 <https://doi.org/10.1088/1748-9326/aae6e0>
- 19 1680 Vlahinic-Dizdarevic, N., Segota, A., 2012. Total-factor energy efficiency in the EU countries.
20 1681 *Zb. Rad. Ekon. Fak. U RIJECI-Proc. Rij. Fac. Econ.* 30, 247–265.
- 21 1682 Vollebergh, H.R.J., Melenberg, B., Dijkgraaf, E., 2009. Identifying reduced-form relations
22 1683 with panel data: The case of pollution and income. *J. Environ. Econ. Manag.* 58, 27–
23 1684 42. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jeem.2008.12.005>
- 24 1685 Vuta, Mariana, Vuta, Mihai, Enciu, A., Cioaca, S.-I., 2018. ASSESSMENT OF THE
25 1686 CIRCULAR ECONOMY'S IMPACT IN THE EU ECONOMIC GROWTH.
26 1687 *AMFITEATRU Econ.* 20, 248–261. <https://doi.org/10.24818/EA/2018/48/248>
- 27 1688 Wang, H., Hashimoto, S., Yue, Q., Moriguchi, Y., Lu, Z., 2013. Decoupling Analysis of Four
28 1689 Selected Countries: China, Russia, Japan, and the United States during 2000-2007. *J.*
29 1690 *Ind. Ecol.* 17, 618–629. <https://doi.org/10.1111/jiec.12005>
- 30 1691 Wang, P.-C., Lee, Y.-M., Chen, C.-Y., 2014. Estimation of Resource Productivity and
31 1692 Efficiency: An Extended Evaluation of Sustainability Related to Material Flow.
32 1693 *SUSTAINABILITY* 6, 6070–6087. <https://doi.org/10.3390/su6096070>
- 33 1694 Wang, X., Zhang, M., Nathwani, J., Yang, F., 2019. Measuring Environmental Efficiency
34 1695 through the Lens of Technology Heterogeneity: A Comparative Study between China
35 1696 and the G20. *SUSTAINABILITY* 11. <https://doi.org/10.3390/su11020461>
- 36 1697 Wang, Z., Feng, C., Chen, J., Huang, J., 2017. The driving forces of material use in China: An
37 1698 index decomposition analysis. *Resour. POLICY* 52, 336–348.
38 1699 <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.resourpol.2017.04.011>
- 39 1700 Ward, J.D., Sutton, P.C., Werner, A.D., Costanza, R., Mohr, S.H., Simmons, C.T., 2016. Is
40 1701 Decoupling GDP Growth from Environmental Impact Possible? *PLOS ONE* 11.
41 1702 <https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0164733>
- 42 1703 Warr, B., 2011. Resource efficiency as a driver of growth: The case of Japan. *Fuel Effic.* 35–
43 1704 66.
- 44 1705 Warr, B., Ayres, R., Eisenmenger, N., Krausmann, F., Schandl, H., 2010. Energy use and
45 1706 economic development: A comparative analysis of useful work supply in Austria,
46 1707 Japan, the United Kingdom and the US during 100 years of economic growth. *Ecol.*
47 1708 *Econ.* 69, 1904–1917. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ecolecon.2010.03.021>
- 48 1709 Warr, B., Ayres, R.U., 2012. Useful work and information as drivers of economic growth.
49 1710 *Ecol. Econ.* 73, 93–102. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ecolecon.2011.09.006>
- 50 1711 Warr, B., Schandl, H., Ayres, R.U., 2008. Long term trends in resource exergy consumption
51 1712 and useful work supplies in the UK, 1900 to 2000. *Ecol. Econ.* 68, 126–140.
52 1713 <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ecolecon.2008.02.019>

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

- 1714 Warr, B.S., Ayres, R.U., 2010. Evidence of causality between the quantity and quality of
1715 energy consumption and economic growth. *ENERGY* 35, 1688–1693.
1716 <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.energy.2009.12.017>
- 1717 Watari, T., McLellan, B.C., Giurco, D., Dominish, E., Yamasue, E., Nansai, K., 2019. Total
1718 material requirement for the global energy transition to 2050: A focus on transport and
1719 electricity. *Resour. Conserv. Recycl.* 148, 91–103.
1720 <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.resconrec.2019.05.015>
- 1721 Weinzettel, J., Kovanda, J., 2011. Structural Decomposition Analysis of Raw Material
1722 Consumption: The Case of the Czech Republic. *J. Ind. Ecol.* 15, 893–907.
1723 <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1530-9290.2011.00378.x>
- 1724 Weisz, H., Krausmann, F., Amann, C., Eisenmenger, N., Erb, K.-H., Hubacek, K., Fischer-
1725 Kowalski, M., 2006. The physical economy of the European Union: Cross-country
1726 comparison and determinants of material consumption. *Ecol. Econ.* 58, 676–698.
- 1727 Wenzlik, M., Eisenmenger, N., Schaffartzik, A., 2015. What Drives Austrian Raw Material
1728 Consumption?: A Structural Decomposition Analysis for the Years 1995 to 2007. *J.*
1729 *Ind. Ecol.* 19, 814–824. <https://doi.org/10.1111/jiec.12341>
- 1730 West, J., Schandl, H., 2018. Explanatory Variables for National Socio-Metabolic Profiles and
1731 the Question of Forecasting National Material Flows in a Globalized Economy. *J. Ind.*
1732 *Ecol.* 22, 1451–1464. <https://doi.org/10.1111/jiec.12671>
- 1733 West, J., Schandl, H., 2013. Material use and material efficiency in Latin America and the
1734 Caribbean. *Ecol. Econ.* 94, 19–27. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ecolecon.2013.06.015>
- 1735 West, J., Schandl, H., Heyenga, S., Chen, S., 2013. Resource Efficiency: Economics and
1736 Outlook for China (Chinese Version).
- 1737 West, J., Schandl, H., Krausmann, F., Kovanda, J., Hak, T., 2014. Patterns of change in
1738 material use and material efficiency in the successor states of the former Soviet Union.
1739 *Ecol. Econ.* 105, 211–219. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ecolecon.2014.06.013>
- 1740 Wiedmann, T., Lenzen, M., 2018. Environmental and social footprints of international trade.
1741 *Nat. Geosci.* 11, 314–321. <https://doi.org/10.1038/s41561-018-0113-9>
- 1742 Wiedmann, T. O., Schandl, H., Lenzen, M., Moran, D., Suh, S., West, J., Kanemoto, K.,
1743 2015. The material footprint of nations. *Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci.* 112, 6271–6276.
1744 <https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1220362110>
- 1745 Wiedmann, Thomas O., Schandl, H., Lenzen, M., Moran, D., Suh, S., West, J., Kanemoto, K.,
1746 2015a. The material footprint of nations. *Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U. S. A.* 112, 6271–
1747 6276. <https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1220362110>
- 1748 Wiedmann, Thomas O., Schandl, H., Lenzen, M., Moran, D., Suh, S., West, J., Kanemoto, K.,
1749 2015b. The material footprint of nations. *Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci.* 112, 6271–6276.
1750 <https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1220362110>
- 1751 Wood, R., Grubb, M., Anger-Kraavi, A., Pollitt, H., Rizzo, B., Alexandri, E., Stadler, K.,
1752 Moran, D., Hertwich, E., Tukker, A., 2019a. Beyond peak emission transfers:
1753 historical impacts of globalization and future impacts of climate policies on
1754 international emission transfers. *Clim. Policy* 0, 1–14.
1755 <https://doi.org/10.1080/14693062.2019.1619507>
- 1756 Wood, R., Lenzen, M., Foran, B., 2009. A Material History of Australia: Evolution of
1757 Material Intensity and Drivers of Change. *J. Ind. Ecol.* 13, 847–862.
1758 <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1530-9290.2009.00177.x>
- 1759 Wood, R., Moran, D.D., Rodrigues, J.F.D., Stadler, K., 2019b. Variation in trends of
1760 consumption based carbon accounts. *Sci. Data* 6, 1–9. <https://doi.org/10.1038/s41597-019-0102-x>
- 1761
- 1762 Wood, R., Stadler, K., Simas, M., Bulavskaya, T., Giljum, S., Lutter, S., Tukker, A., 2018a.
1763 Growth in Environmental Footprints and Environmental Impacts Embodied in Trade:

- 1
2
3 1764 Resource Efficiency Indicators from EXIOBASE3. *J. Ind. Ecol.* 22, 553–564.
4 1765 <https://doi.org/10.1111/jiec.12735>
5 1766 Wood, R., Stadler, K., Simas, M., Bulavskaya, T., Giljum, S., Lutter, S., Tukker, A., 2018b.
6 1767 Growth in Environmental Footprints and Environmental Impacts Embodied in Trade:
7 1768 Resource Efficiency Indicators from EXIOBASE3. *J. Ind. Ecol.* 22, 553–564.
8 1769 <https://doi.org/10.1111/jiec.12735>
9 1770 World Bank, 2019a. World Bank Open Data [WWW Document]. URL
10 1771 <https://data.worldbank.org/>
11 1772 World Bank, 2019b. World Bank Country and Lending Groups [WWW Document]. World
12 1773 Bank. URL [https://datahelpdesk.worldbank.org/knowledgebase/articles/906519-](https://datahelpdesk.worldbank.org/knowledgebase/articles/906519-world-bank-country-and-lending-groups)
13 1774 [world-bank-country-and-lending-groups](https://datahelpdesk.worldbank.org/knowledgebase/articles/906519-world-bank-country-and-lending-groups) (accessed 11.19.19).
14 1775 World Bank (Ed.), 2012. Inclusive green growth: the pathway to sustainable development.
15 1776 World Bank, Washington, DC.
16 1777 Wu, Z., Schaffartzik, A., Shao, Q., Wang, D., Li, G., Su, Y., Rao, L., 2019. Does economic
17 1778 recession reduce material use? Empirical evidence based on 157 economies
18 1779 worldwide. *J. Clean. Prod.* <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jclepro.2019.01.015>
19 1780 Xu, M., Zhang, T., 2007. Material Flows and Economic Growth in Developing China. *J. Ind.*
20 1781 *Ecol.* 11, 121–140. <https://doi.org/10.1162/jiec.2007.1105>
21 1782 Xu, X., Zhao, T., Liu, N., Kang, J., 2014. Changes of energy-related GHG emissions in
22 1783 China: An empirical analysis from sectoral perspective. *Appl. ENERGY* 132, 298–
23 1784 307. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.apenergy.2014.07.025>
24 1785 Yabar, H., Hara, K., Uwasu, M., 2012. Comparative assessment of the co-evolution of
25 1786 environmental indicator systems in Japan and China. *Resour. Conserv. Recycl.* 61,
26 1787 43–51. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.resconrec.2011.12.012>
27 1788 Yang, X., Lou, F., Sun, M., Wang, R., Wang, Y., 2017. Study of the relationship between
28 1789 greenhouse gas emissions and the economic growth of Russia based on the
29 1790 Environmental Kuznets Curve. *Appl. ENERGY* 193, 162–173.
30 1791 <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.apenergy.2017.02.034>
31 1792 Yao, S., Zhang, S., Zhang, X., 2019. Renewable energy, carbon emission and economic
32 1793 growth: A revised environmental Kuznets Curve perspective. *J. Clean. Prod.* 235,
33 1794 1338–1352. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jclepro.2019.07.069>
34 1795 Yu, H., 2012. The influential factors of China's regional energy intensity and its spatial
35 1796 linkages: 1988-2007. *ENERGY POLICY* 45, 583–593.
36 1797 <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2012.03.009>
37 1798 Yu, Y., Chen, D., Zhu, B., Hu, S., 2013. Eco-efficiency trends in China, 1978-2010:
38 1799 Decoupling environmental pressure from economic growth. *Ecol. Indic.* 24, 177–184.
39 1800 <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ecolind.2012.06.007>
40 1801 Zaman, K., Shamsuddin, S., Ahmad, M., 2017. Energy-water-food nexus under financial
41 1802 constraint environment: good, the bad, and the ugly sustainability reforms in sub-
42 1803 Saharan African countries. *Environ. Sci. Pollut. Res.* 24, 13358–13372.
43 1804 <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11356-017-8961-1>
44 1805 Zhao, J.-L., 2017. Analysis of eco-efficiency based on material flow. *J. Interdiscip. Math.* 20,
45 1806 649–658. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09720502.2016.1259857>
46 1807