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Ljubownikow, S. [orcid.org/0000-0002-7312-4050](http://orcid.org/0000-0002-7312-4050) and Crotty, J. (2020) The hybridisation of Russian non-profit organisations. In: Billis, D. and Rochester, C., (eds.) Handbook on Hybrid Organisations. Edward Elgar Publishing , pp. 332-347. ISBN 9781785366109

<https://doi.org/10.4337/9781785366116.00029>

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This is a draft chapter / article. The final version is available in Handbook on Hybrid Organisations edited by David Billis and Colin Rochester, published in 2020, Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd <https://doi.org/10.4337/9781785366116.00029>

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## Chapter 19

### Blurred Lines: The Hybridisation of Russian Non-profit Organisations

Sergej Ljubownikow and Jo Crotty

#### Introduction

In this chapter, we look at the impact of the system of 'managed democracy' on Non-Profit Organisations (NPOs) in the Russian Federation and focus on the way in which the lines between them and the agencies of the state have become increasingly blurred. This development is part of the widespread growth in the creation of hybrid organisations on an international scale (Billis, 2010). Hybridity is the result of organisations crossing sectoral boundaries (Pache and Santos, 2013) to form a combination of the characteristics of two or more sectors.

One of the more common forms of hybrid organisation blurs the boundaries between NPOs and the state as the former engages in the delivery of public services that had previously been the role of statutory agencies (Billis, 2010). This blurring of sectoral boundaries between NPOs and state is not simply a transfer of practices but involves more fundamental changes to the way organisations operate (Bromley and Meyer, 2014). It means that organisations attempt to adhere to different, if not competing, institutional logics - the 'rules' that govern the various sectors (Battilana and Lee, 2014; Brandsen et al., 2005; Doherty et al., 2014; Pache and Santos, 2010). NPOs might, for example, attempt to marry a third sector logic based on collective ownership, engaging constituencies, altruism, provision of free support and/or democratic leadership with a state bureaucracy logic based on centralised control, rule-based mechanisms for service provision and/or hierarchical structures.

As a result, the expectations that NPOs represent some kind of panacea that is able to offset neo-liberal inspired changes to welfare provisions and facilitate accountability and increased public participation in policy are increasingly questioned. In Russia, we found that its NPOs have integrated more closely with the public sector and this has led to blurred sectoral boundaries. The resulting hybridity is driven by – and is a key feature of - Russia's system of managed democracy. We find that, as a result, NPOs focus less on encouraging public participation, engagement in advocacy, or holding the state to account. We draw on qualitative data collected from health and education NPOs and environmental organisations in a variety of Russian industrial regions. We have focused on organisations in the regions because they operate in the industrial areas where the majority of Russians live. The data used have been collected via semi-structured interviews and observations in a variety of different research projects that have studied the activities of NPOs in the Russian context.

We draw on these data to explore how macro-institutional forces have encouraged these organisations to focus on building vertical ties with state authorities rather than with the public. We show how NPOs are involved in the blurring of boundaries both by engaging and building ties with state authorities and by accessing resources from the state. This has the

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result of turning NPOs into hybrid organisations – part agents of the third sector and part agents of the state. But we begin by establishing the context for the studies by presenting an overview of the development of the third sector in the Russian Federation.

### **The Development of NPOs in the Russian Federation**

The break-up of the Soviet Union and the establishment of the Russian Federation as an independent state led to a process of democratisation (Choudry and Kapoor, 2013) that stimulated the setting up and growth of NPOs. This development was not, however, the result of action by the Russian state. In the 1990s it largely ignored NPOs (Pickvance, 1998) and provided limited resources to them. Instead, NPOs relied on donations from overseas (Henderson, 2002). Much of this overseas funding was allocated through a process of competitive tendering which meant that, in order to be eligible to access these resources, Russian NPOs needed to adopt the agenda of donors rather than reflect the needs and demands of the Russian public (Jakobson and Sanovich, 2010; Javeline and Lindemann-Komarova, 2010). At the same time, NPOs also became adept at developing vertical ties (i.e. agency relationships) with their donors (Salmenniemi, 2008) rather than focusing on building horizontal ties with other organisations to form coalitions or collaborations.

This early stage in the development of Russian NPOs was also influenced by the continuing mistrust between the public and governing elites that characterised Soviet culture (Howard, 2002). The Russian public extended this mistrust to NPOs, which saw their public support dwindle and resulted in persistently low rates of participation in NPOs (Kamerade et al., 2016). This was not helped by the continuing dominance of Soviet cultural values in political institutions (Hedlund, 2006) as well as in social organisations such as NPOs (Spencer, 2011), which meant that the majority of Russian NPOs remained parochial and inward-looking (Crotty, 2006; Mendelson and Gerber, 2007; Spencer, 2011) and were themselves uninterested in engaging the wider public.

The ascendance to power of President Putin has led to the emergence of a system termed managed democracy in which the state controlled all significant areas of societal activity (Wegren and Konitzer, 2007). As part of this process, the Russian state attempted to re-nationalise the third sector and its agents (Ljubownikow et al., 2013; Robertson, 2009) taking advantage of the propensity of NPOs to rely on vertical ties to their resource providers. Funding and other resources are now made available to NPOs via the Civic Chamber of the Russian Federation (Richter, 2009). Persistently low donations per head (only 6% of the Russian population made a donation to charity in 2013 (CAF Russia, 2014)) means that resources provided by the Civic Chamber are an important source of income for Russian NPOs.

In addition, the Russian state has adopted a regulatory framework that involves the scrutiny of NPO activity and membership (Crotty et al., 2014; Ljubownikow and Crotty, 2014), and it has placed restrictions on the receipt of overseas funds (Machleder, 2006). NPOs engaged in what can be loosely defined as political activity and receive overseas funding are now considered to be foreign agents (Bennetts, 2012). NPOs have also been affected by further regulatory changes including the imposition of heavy fines for unofficial demonstrations (Bryanski, 2012), the criminalization of libel and an increase in internet censorship (Lewis,

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2013). These changes have made it difficult for NPOs to access funding to foreign donors and have also limited their scope for playing the third sector's important role in representing and protecting the interests of their constituents.

At the same time, the Russian state paid more direct attention to NPOs (Salamon et al., 2015) and used the structures of the Civic Chamber to stimulate state-NPO interaction (Richter, 2009). The Civic Chamber and its regional and local offshoots were presented as an open but institutionalised platform on which NPOs could raise concerns and represent the interests of their constituencies (Ljubownikow and Crotty, 2016) and hence hold the state to account (Richter, 2009). The impact of this system was to control and constrain advocacy by NPOs and close down any attempts at open dissent. In this way, it encouraged Russian NPOs to build vertical ties with their new donor (the Russian state (Ljubownikow and Crotty, 2014)).

This 'stick and carrot' approach to the management of third sector agents has been termed (by Daucé, 2015) the 'duality of coercion'. On the one hand the state used regulatory powers to suppress NPO activity - in particular (horizontal) domestic or international cooperation for advocacy or protest purposes and for holding the state to account - and, on the other, simultaneously encouraged NPOs to contribute to what is presented as the amelioration of social ills (Krasnopolskaya et al., 2015; Salamon et al., 2015). Having been ignored by the state in the 1990s, NPOs were now taking up the more recent opportunities for interacting with the state and had become reliant on ties with ruling and governing elites to access resources and help to navigate this complex environment. As a result, they were becoming hybrid organisations that blurred the lines between the third sector and the state by becoming in part agents of the third sector and in part agents of the state. In the next two sections of the chapter, we explore empirical data from two kinds of Russian NPOs – those engaged in health and education on the one hand and those concerned with the environment on the other.

### **Blurring the Lines by Building Vertical Ties: Health and Education NPOs**

In this section, we draw on data collected from 80 non-profit organisations engaged in health and education related causes (from here on termed heNPOs) across three industrial regions in Russia - Yekaterinburg, Samara, and Perm. Details of the organisations included in this part of our study are set out in Appendix A. They were engaged in a wide range of activities relating to health and education such as the provision of health services or the provision of afternoon children clubs with an educational focus. The majority of them were small in size (for example in terms of members or staff) although some organisations listed in Appendix A had high levels of membership and staff. They tended to be led by middle-aged women in line with the feminine nature of Russian human service NPOs observed by Salmenniemi (2005). Many of these organisations operated on minimal financial resources or none at all and only a few of them had been able to gain funding from the Civic Chamber. Several of the older heNPOs, primarily the ones that existed in the 1990s, had received foreign funding in the past but this had dried up post-2006 (Ljubownikow and Crotty, 2014).

The institutionalisation of state-NPO interaction has resulted in the establishment of a myriad of roundtables (*kruglyye stoly*) or committees (Richter, 2009). Involvement in these

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can be seen as a means of reducing the ability of NPOs to challenge the activities of state authorities but it also provides them with access to state structures for the first time since the demise of the Soviet Union. This provided them with the opportunity to build 'vertical ties' with governing elites through the state's role as a key resource provider and provided key individuals or key organisational human resources in heNPOs with the incentive for services delivery and carry out other work on behalf of the state. This led to the development of an overlap between the roles and responsibilities of individuals active in heNPOs and those working within the agencies of the state that blurred the line between where the responsibilities of the state end and the work of heNPOs take over. In previous work, the authors had highlighted the role of the individuals at the centre of these developments who have the responsibility of managing the boundary between the third sector and the state authorities (Ljubownikow and Crotty, 2017). In effect, they are in responsible for negotiating, coordinating and/or filtering the logics (Lee and Lounsbury, 2015; Smets et al., 2015) governing these two different sectors. We term this process *sucking in* (Ljubownikow and Crotty, 2017). In order to explore these developments empirically, we now turn our attention to the ways in which individuals within heNPOs have built, understood, and utilised their ties with state authorities and/or governing and ruling elites.

Respondents from our dataset highlighted the fact that they had been *sucked in* to 'work for the state' as a consequence of attending roundtables and committees (Respondents 49, 51, 61, 62). Examples included the acquisition of 'a desk in the state administration' (Respondent 51); acting as regular consultants or as 'an expert with the department of education' (Respondent 52); providing 'advice as an expert' (Respondent 49); and working in close physical proximity with state agencies – 'our office is down the corridor from the department of social protection' (Respondent 75). A further benefit of these arrangements was the provision of access to resources such as 'office space' (Respondents 1, 2, 3, 14, 23). Respondents also highlighted their use of emerging vertical ties as a means of securing government 'support' (Respondent 60) without which 'it will be difficult for us to do our work' (Respondent 81) or 'talk to the people that could help [them do their work]' (Respondent 64). Similarly, respondent 52 told us that her government role meant that she could access premises from which to run her heNPO – 'many old nursery buildings were in decay, [and subsequently] we were given this building here [by the state], which we refurbished with money from sponsors and the state'. Her heNPO now used this building as a base for their work with children with mental health needs. Another respondent reported that her organisation had been unable to pay staff a wage. As a result of her participation in state-run committees, however, she had been able to convince state authorities to 'hire me and the organisation's other employees' (Respondent 65). Now all its staff were employed fulltime by the state to run their heNPO which promoted physical activity amongst children with learning difficulties. Both organisations were insistent that without these ties they would not have been 'helping all these children' (Respondent 52) or continuing the work of 'enabling such children to do physical activity' (Respondent 65). Respondents thus illustrated how they had been *sucked in* to work for the state through direct state access and resources.

In addition to direct support and resources, collaboration with state authorities was also considered to be an important benefit of these vertical ties. It enabled heNPOs to work

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'closely together with the government authorities' (Respondent 05) and find a 'good way to collaborate with the state' (Respondent 51). As a result, heNPOs had closer 'contact to the department' (Respondent 15) and an increased ability to 'cooperate with the state' (Respondent 3) or to 'work with state institutions' (Respondent 22). Respondents also felt that building cross-sector partnerships or collaborations were greatly aided by the *sucking in* of key decision makers within heNPOs.

Without between sector interactions, you would not survive a day, so we build good relations with the regional powers. These relations are constructive because we offer services and programs, which they [the state] accept and support (Respondent 1).

These closer ties provided individuals with opportunities to engage with policymakers which highlighted not only how they were *sucked in* or co-opted but also how they were able to negotiate and manage the boundary between the state and the third sector. HeNPOs could thus utilise vertical ties with the state to support their work. They also perceived being *sucked in* as a way of engaging with the state; the state now 'listen(ed) to our problems' (Respondent 15) and showed 'appreciation' (Respondent 19, Respondent 9). Hence, collaborative work enabled heNPO to 'make friends in the administration' (Respondent 79) as well as delivering services, helping constituencies, or more generally engaging in day to day activities. Engaging in these activities was seen as 'always a win-win' situation (Respondent 52). HeNPOs, therefore, were able to utilise emergent vertical ties for their advantage as well as successfully redrawing/managing the boundary between state and their sector.

Not all respondents, however, took such a positive view of the blurring of the boundaries between the state and NPOs. One perceived disadvantage of this development was the nature of the relationship between a heNPO and the state. Rather than being seen as a genuine collaboration between the two parties this was restricted to the targeted co-option by the state of specific individuals who possessed some specific human capital or expertise.

They [the authorities] look for the key decision makers in the third sector and then work with us to develop the third sector so it can do what it needs too. (Respondent 45)

This was a sentiment shared by respondents that had not been *sucked in*. Their view was that 'the administration only works with the organisations they like' (Respondent 31), and it specifically targeted those organisations that did not explicitly challenge the state. As a result, some respondents feared that the third sector would be divided into two groups – those organisations which were able to interact with the state and the others that would be sidelined.

I think the danger is that an elite of HENPOs is emerging. As a result, the state will only interact with them and other organisations will have no chance to work with the state. (Respondent 37)

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The views of other heNPOs resonated with this statement. They feared that *sucking in* was a double-edged sword, positive for those that were able to establish vertical ties and access resources but negative for those that missed out on them.

Our informal probing of the respondents tended to suggest that heNPOs working with children or disabled people were more likely to benefit positively from their contacts with state organisations and were more likely to be *sucked in* than those which dealt with HIV/AIDS or drug abuse (Respondents 25, 30, 37, 43, 45, 48). The organisations that had access to the state tended to be viewed as part of the state structure and so had lost their 'connection with the public' (Respondent 42). This division of agents into what the state considered to be appropriate third sector actors and what they did not is important as it was the former that was undergoing hybridisation. The boundary between the state and the Russian third sector became even more blurred when the respondents highlighted the extent to which they observed the overlap between how they defined the role of the government and the way they identified the objectives of their organisation. Respondent 51's role, for example, included the responsibility for overseeing on behalf of the local state the regulations for accessibility to public buildings throughout the city. This overlapped with the key objective of her organisation to promote and ensure accessibility to public buildings and spaces. Similarly, respondent 19 was responsible for the implementation of the city's youth programme and policies as part of her role as an agent of the state.

I do not work here [in this heNPO] all the time. I work for the state and I focus on the development of youth policy. (Respondent 19)

The mission statement of her organisation was to 'improv[e] the life of children'.

As key *sucked in* individuals from third sector organisations played these kinds of roles they became supporters or legitimisers of state policy (Cook and Vinogradova, 2006) and lost their ability to criticise or oppose it. In the process, these heNPOs had become hybrid organisations with characteristics of both the third sector and the state. Thus, as observed in other similar contexts, this contributes to the legitimacy of current power arrangements rather than challenging them (Hsu, 2010; Lewis, 2013). Hence hybridisation on NPOs in the Russian context is as much an outcome of organisational necessities (as elsewhere) as it is an outcome of current power arrangements.

### **Blurring the Lines through Resource Provision: Environmental NPOs**

For this part of the chapter, we draw on data from 26 environmental NPOs (eNPOs) situated in the Samara and Volgograd Oblasts and in Stavropol Krai. Like the heNPOs discussed above, these organisations tended to be small in size, but, unlike them, had in the main a longer history. Their activities included the preservation of a local national park; the protection of animals; and environmental education of the public (fuller details are set out Appendix B). They operated on minimal or no existing financial resources; many of the organisations had received foreign funding in the past but had yet to find a way to offset its disappearance by securing replacements from domestic sources.

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The data collected from eNPOs identifies a different kind of hybridisation from that experienced in the heNPOs discussed earlier. Rather than developing vertical ties that led to boundary crossing between state and third sector hybridisation was driven by access to the resources which influenced the kinds of activity undertaken by eNPOs. The majority of them had orientated their campaigning activity to that which was perceived as acceptable to the state and they had now focused on non-confrontational, apolitical activities. By focusing on activities such as environmental education and conservation eNPOs have supplemented the work of the state even if they have stopped short of crossing the boundary into it. Discussions with eNPO leaders revealed just how closely linked organisational identity had become to the prevailing funding context. The presence of the Civic Chamber and the need for groups to align their objectives to those of the state in order to secure funding dominated the data. ENPOs were split into two groups, those at risk of being institutionalised (Tarrow, 1989) who felt it was necessary to have a strong public image in particular vis-à-vis the state (in order to access funding), and those risking isolation who tried to remain independent (rejecting state funding).

Public image and reputation were perceived by many groups as paramount if their organisation and activities were to have both 'influence' (1.9) and access to state funds. It was important for them to have a 'good reputation' (1.10)... to ensure 'more chances to cooperate' (1.10). Interviewees also spoke of the need to have 'acceptance in the funding community' (1.7), to 'prove' (1.2) themselves, and to be 'well known' (1.6) in order to 'collaborate with the authorities' (1.6). Given the lack of anonymity within this process (Richter, 2009), the better the image of the eNPO then the greater chance that funding applications to the Civic Chamber would be viewed favourably. Those eNPOs working with the Civic Chamber described groups outside of this structure as 'amateurs' (1.7) or 'not professional' (2.2) because they did not have the capabilities to develop a relevant public image and reputation. The requirement to align organisations with state priorities was the major driver of hybridisation amongst eNPOs.

Within the prevailing political environment (McCarthy and Zald, 1977; Tarrow, 1988) eNPOs faced a funding dilemma (Melucci, 1989). Seeking state funding via competitive grants from the Civic Chamber and thus adopting the state's 'interests' required some degree of institutionalisation (Tarrow, 1989) and involved the development of a hybrid form of organisation. The alternative strategy - to attempt to raise money themselves and set their own campaigning agenda - would lead them to remain a more 'pure' third sector actor. Many groups recognised that the former approach would result in the subjugation of individual group interests to those of the state, as indicated by the following extracts:

If you want to win grants and be active then you can win these grants, but your actions will be totally controlled by the powers that be. (3.1)

The state will only provide financing for 'their' NPOs, groups of people who have surrendered their independence and simply carry out the orders of their political masters ... Now the grants are simply 'bought' for those organisations which are willing to play the game and will allow the grant-giving bodies to 'dictate' the frameworks in which they will operate. (3.3)



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Those which had secured funding also acknowledged the tension between individual and state interests, but – unsurprisingly - viewed relationships with the state in a positive way:

When we carry out a project using the government financing, and if the Ministry is interested in business participating in the project, it may become a joint project, and thus it strengthens the project and minimizes the expenditures. (1.7)

Without guaranteed sources of income outside of those provided by the state, the primary concern of the Russian environmental movement had become finance (or the lack of it). Funding, rather than environmental concerns, had become the key issue. This reflects the work of Piven and Cloward (1977) who asserted that, over time, groups might become more concerned with their survival than with their original goals. The prioritisation of funding goals is also frequently associated with the hybridisation of NPOs in other contexts (Billis, 2010).

As a result, the experience of eNPOs was similar to that of the heNPOs discussed above. Although eNPOs lacked the close integration with state structures displayed by heNPOs, most of the eNPOs in our dataset engaged in activity that could be described as co-operational or 'safe', focusing on educational and children's projects (1.3; 1.6; 1.11; 1.12; 1.14; 1.16; 2.2); conservation (1.12; 1.14; 2.3); and hosting or attending conferences and exhibitions (1.2; 1.6; 1.8; 2.1; 3.1). Thus, while not crossing the boundary into activity undertaken by the state, many groups were supplementing it by their work, particularly in the spheres of education and conservation, and took on some of the aspects of hybridisation as a result. Those in receipt of state funding were unlikely to engage in activity that was not supportive of the state. Similarly, eNPOs that had close links and funding from industrial enterprises (1.13; 1.16; 3.4) were also unlikely to engage in critical or oppositional relationships with them.

Many organisations also failed to express their core environmental *interests* through their activities. It was commonplace for them to engage in broad activities such as the education of children, conservation and attending conferences without addressing any prescribed environmental purpose or objective. As a result, there were very few instances of confrontational mobilisation on environmental issues and the Russian environmental movement did not aspire to become a mass movement (Weiner, 2002), focusing instead on 'safe' campaigning issues with a view to maximizing agency within the restrictions of the new Russian political landscape. This, in turn, shaped the scope and content of groups' networks (Tilly and Wood, 2013). Those working with the state described the networks that included the 'Governor, the vice-Governor' (1.6), 'presidents of big companies' (1.7) or 'a wide range of relationships in different economic and political spheres' (2.2). These offered a direct channel to networks that were both formal and resource-rich (Eesley and Lenox, 2006).

A small minority of eNPOs sought to maintain their independence and their ability to express their concerns by looking for other sources of funding and resources. Those eNPOs, usually smaller, grassroots organisations, were keen to stress their 'independent' (1.1; 1.8; 1.9; 3.2; 3.3; 3.6) nature. They asserted their independence of Civic Chamber funding in

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order to give them the freedom to pursue interests of their own choosing, as one participant articulated:

There are many who think it's vital to support the authority and they are well financed. [1.1] is not sponsored (funded by the state) but on the other hand, we are not afraid to express our attitude. (1.1)

In demarcating themselves from the majority of eNPOs that aligned themselves with the state, eNPOs in this group described the former as 'puppet' organisations (1.9) or 'not real' (3.1). The difference was also reflected in their description of the networks they maintained to realise their work as 'friends' (1.3) that had come together because they had 'similar opinions' (1.3) and 'similar objectives' (1.3). Only one respondent (1.16) mentioned their access to industrial and regional elites while the rest of them described their relationship with elites as non-existent, as 3.3 and 3.6 explained:

Previously, we had positive relations with many of the major factories in Volgograd region. Now these relations are very strained. We have virtually no interaction with them now. They are not interested in listening to us and co-operating with us. (3.3)

We have spoken or tried to speak to the local councillors on numerous occasions, but our efforts fell on deaf ears. (3.6)

With limited access to both industrial and governing elites, independent eNPOs had little access to resources that could be secured through such networks and this further entrenched the disparities and inconsistencies between eNPOs and their ability to mobilise (Routledge 2003). They gained access to resources by engaging with the logic of state bureaucracy. This took place at the expense of the logic of the third sector as hybridisation facilitated institutionalisation and favoured organisational survival as the priority for NPOs in Russia's managed democracy. While eNPOs had stopped short of becoming boundary crossers in the way that their heNPOs counterparts had, their organisational goals had become more focused on the acquisition of resources and this had, in turn, brought them closer to the state's environmental objectives than their own. At the same time, many of their activities supplemented the work of the state in areas like education and conservation. Our study of the two kinds of organisation - heNPOs and eNPOs – has highlighted how they followed two different paths towards becoming hybrid organisations. In the concluding section of the chapter, we discuss the commonalities of the trends and pressures that led them in this direction.

## **Discussion and Conclusion**

In this chapter, we have highlighted two different paths that hybridisation has taken in the context of the Russian Federation. The eNPOs had experienced comparatively indirect and informal drivers to hybridity. The curtailment of political opportunity (McCarthy and Zald, 1977) and restricted access to resources had made the Civic Chamber the primary funding source for the Russian Environmental Movement (Crotty et al., 2014). In turn, eNPOs had limited their aims and activities to ensure that they were perceived to be eligible for obtaining resources. Groups not wishing to engage with the Chamber could only rely on only

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their own personal resources or the funds those they could raise in a difficult philanthropic environment (Sundstrom, 2005). As a result, eNPOs were forced to make a choice between 'institutionalisation [or] isolation' (Tarrow, 1989: 138) which in turn determined the scope and nature of their activity. Many eNPOs pursued 'safe', apolitical activities and chose not to engage with the more contentious socio-economic environmental consequences of both Soviet and Russian economic policy. We did not see the Russian Environmental Movement making strategic decisions about changes to policy, cultural codes or ways of thinking about contentious environmental issues on a wider scale (Melucci, 1989). Instead, the great majority of the eNPOs we studied had presented themselves in ways that made them acceptable to the state and located them as hybrids between the third sector and the state.

The experience of heNPOs, on the other hand, suggests that hybridisation in the Russian context is not only a response to resource dependency which is indirect or informal in nature but also takes on more formalised ways of organising. The *sucking in* narrative of heNPO respondents and their lack of engagement with the emerging vertical ties for dissent represented a formal route to hybridisation for this part of the Russian third sector. Significantly, respondents did not regard this process as *co-option* but as *collaboration* – a way of aligning the objectives of their organisations with those of the state. They understood themselves as occupying a dual role – spanning and indeed managing the boundary between the aspirations of the third sector and the responsibilities of the state – rather than achieving full insider status by shaping state policy. While organisations were enabled to engage with the state and thus create potential opportunities for influence this approach reduced the potential for NPOs to criticise the activities of the state or oppose formal power arrangements (Ray, 1999). It was difficult for a Russian heNPO to protest openly about a state policy it had been a part of delivering. The possibility of raising questions or issues about the actions of the state was also constrained by the way in which hybridisation took place. It tended to be driven by individuals rather than by organisations and their causes. The process of *sucking in* increased the opportunities for individuals to undertake informal advocacy for causes at the same time it reduced the opportunities for organisations to protest formally. The quiet (or silent) and private approach to protest conducted by the *sucking in* narrative has also been observed elsewhere as part of the professionalization and institutionalisation of social action that has been termed NGOization (Alvarez et al., 1998; Choudry and Kapoor, 2013; Lang, 1997).

Our findings reveal that the drive towards the institutionalisation of access to state authorities and power holders has been largely the result of the development of incentives for key individuals from within Russian NPOs to deploy their activities within state agencies and for the NGOs to tailor their activities to those which are seen to be acceptable to the state and those that supplement state activity. These key individuals play the role described by Lewis as 'boundary crossers' who, while engaged in one sector (State or NPO) at a time, move 'backwards and forwards across [sector] boundaries' (Lewis, 2008: p.572) Their frequent movements between sectors enables them to 'oil the relationship between government and third sector [NPOs]' (*ibid*). In the Russian context, individuals are responsible for managing the boundary between the third sector or what their organisation does and the activities of the state in their organisation's area of activity. Many of them still consider themselves (and the NPOs with which they work) as agents of the third sector but they have increasingly also become seen as agents of the state. Those who manage the

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boundaries of the two sectors may now find opportunities for NPOs to be heard by the government; to access resources from the state, and to achieve the kind of legitimacy that they were missing during the political and economic turmoil of the 1990.

We argue that the effects of *hybridisation by integration with the state* changes the third sector logic of activism or holding the state to account into one as serving the greater social good as determined by the state. In the short-term, the managed democracy of the Russian Federation means that, although NPOs may become varying forms of hybrid, they tend to be aligned closely with the state's logic of control and minimising dissent. But in the longer term, their role of managing the boundary between third sector and the state may lead them to become institutional entrepreneurs who can stimulate change from within. Thus boundary managers may in future be able to carve out broader campaigning opportunities for their organisations (Newman, 2012). This is, of course, speculative; what we can say with any certainty at the moment is that the boundaries between the state and the third sector in Russia have become increasingly blurred and the future lines between them will continue to shift over time as the processes of hybridisation continues to develop.

Please cite as appropriate. Appendix not attached.

## Acknowledgements

For parts of this chapter, we draw on our previous published work. In particular, we draw on our publication 'Managing Boundaries: The Role of Non-profit Organizations in Russia's Managed Democracy' (Ljubownikow, S., & Crotty, J. 2017) in *Sociology*.

<http://doi.org/10.1177/0038038515608111>, to illustrate the blurring lines by heNPOs. For teNPOs we draw on data collected for the UK Economic and Social Research Council Grant RES-061-25-0002-A extracts from which were published in Crotty J and Hall S M (2013) 'Environmental Responsibility in a Transition Context', *Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy*, 31 (4): 667-681.

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