

**STRONG MAYORS' LEADERSHIP CAPITAL: NEW YORK, LONDON & AMSTERDAM
(2000-2016)**

by

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Abstract

This thesis examines mayors and their interaction with their institutional limits. In particular, it considers, from the perspective of political leadership studies, how far mayors fitting the strong-mayor typology are able to assert their will in the face of these institutional limits. David Sweeting's expositions on the strong-mayor model, supplemented by those of other theorists, form the thesis' theoretical framework. This framework is applied to three original case studies (Michael Bloomberg in New York and Ken Livingstone & Boris Johnson in London). A fourth case study, of Job Cohen in Amsterdam, follows these and offers alternative perspectives (based upon the application a model of an appointed mayoralty). The analytical tool chosen – the Leadership Capital Index (LCI) – is a recent innovation in political leadership studies. The thesis' findings demonstrate that there was clear potential for all of the mayors within the systems examined to assert their political will. What varies is how far mayors in different forms of strong-mayor systems can do this and how they achieve it. With regard to the LCI, the study concludes that it needs further development if it is to achieve longevity in terms of its place in the field. The thesis ends by outlining the future research agenda emerging as a result of this study.

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List of Interviewees*

London

1. (Transcript A), Mayor's Office Liaison Manager, 2000-2001. Subsequently in range of senior roles, including at the GLA's Architecture and Urbanism Unit, the Olympic Delivery Authority and the Legacy Development Authority;
2. (Transcript B), House of Commons Researcher (Local Government specialist);
3. (Transcript C), Former Leader of the Labour Group on the GLA (during Ken Livingstone's mayoralty), subsequently board member at Transport for London;
4. (Transcript D), Former Deputy Mayor of London under Boris Johnson;
5. (Transcript E), Conservative Member of the GLA (2000-present);

Amsterdam

6. (Transcript F), Paul 't Hart, Professor of Public Administration at Utrecht University School of Governance;
7. (Transcript G), Niels Karsten, Assistant Professor, Tilburg Law School;
8. (Transcript H), Job Cohen, Former Mayor of Amsterdam (2001-2010);
9. (Transcript I), Sabine van Zuydam, PhD Candidate and Tutor, Tilburg Law School;
10. (Transcript J), Erik Gerritsen, Former City Manager for the City of Amsterdam.

New York

11. (Transcript K), Alan Greenblatt, Journalist covering American local and state government affairs;
12. (Transcript L), Douglas Muzzio, Professor of Politics at Baruch College, The City University of New York;
13. (Transcript M), Thomas Halper, Professor of Political Science at Baruch College, The City University of New York;
14. (Transcript N), former advisor to Mark Green's 2001 mayoral campaign;
15. (Transcript O), Joseph Viteritti, Thomas Hunter Professor of Public Policy and Chair of the Urban Policy and Planning Department at Hunter College, The City University of New York, formerly Executive Director to several New York City policy commissions and advisor to former New York City Schools Chancellors.

* NB: Where interviewees were happy to be named, the in-text reference reflects this (eg. 'Greenblatt, 2019'). Where anonymised, the transcript letter is used (eg. 'Transcript A, 2018').

1.0 Introduction: Literature and Research Questions

This PhD compares the political leadership of mayors. Using a recent innovation in the field (the Leadership Capital Index) to analyse its data, it will seek to offer original insights into how mayors exercise their leadership. In particular, it answers the question of ‘Can a strong mayor act according to their own will when constrained by the institutional limits of their office?’. This reflects evolving discussions upon the strong-mayor model and seeks to extend understanding through a detailed political leadership analysis. The selected case studies are Michael Bloomberg from New York (Mayor between 2002 and 2013), Ken Livingstone and Boris Johnson from London (Mayor between 2000 & 2008 and 2008 & 2016, respectively) and, finally, Job Cohen in Amsterdam (2001-2010).

The Literature Review and Methods chapter outline both how these case studies, and the research question, have been selected and how they will be analysed. The Literature Review also gives a detailed understanding of the theoretical framework which the thesis will draw upon. This is primarily drawn from the works of David Sweeting, an expert in urban political leadership, but includes consideration of wider forms that inform the framework’s development.

The Methods chapter gives consideration to the challenges of using a new analytical tool (the LCI) in an original manner. This study is the first to apply the LCI to leadership at the local level. Naturally, this provides both opportunities and challenges and the Methods chapter addresses these prior to the tool being applied to the case studies. It also outlines the intended use of the comparative method. It finishes with consideration of the ontological and epistemological positions of the researcher, particularly with regard to how these affect use of the LCI.

Following the Methods chapter, the thesis provides a brief outline of the governance contexts within each of the case studies examined. In particular, these outline: New York’s evolution into an archetypal strong-mayor system; London’s relatively recent creation and the affect that this had upon shaping its subsequent evolution; and a clarification of why Amsterdam’s mayoralty does not befit the strong-mayor typology and how this translates into a restricted leadership environment.

Having considered these institutional governance contexts, the thesis will then provide four detailed case study chapters – one for each mayor analysed – which use the LCI to develop understandings of leadership. These analyse the product of three years’ doctoral fieldwork and offer individually-focused perspectives with regard to how strong mayors exercise leadership in the face of

institutional limits. With regard to Cohen, this case study is an outlier, as it focuses upon an appointed, not strong-type, mayoral office-holder. The rationale for this variation is provided in the Literature Review and Methods chapter.

Finally, the thesis will then collate the product of its analysis, along with evaluative understandings arising from this, in a Findings chapter. This is structured into two parts. First, the chapter will offer observations that answer the thesis' central research question and sub-questions. Second, the chapter will reflect upon the experience of using the LCI and reflect upon any issues that have come to light through applying it to the case studies.

Overall, this thesis focuses around the political leadership of mayors. It seeks to analyse this in an innovative way, with the LCI, and revisits established theories within the literature (including consideration of the strong-mayor system). In doing so, it sets up an original comparison, with the Mayors of New York, London and Amsterdam never having been compared and analysed in this way before. The final chapter of the thesis offers indications as to where this work may go next.

1.1 Introduction to the Literature Review

This literature review provides an outline of the core body of works that this thesis will consult in the design and execution of its study. It is those contributions from the field of Political Science, especially with regard to political leadership studies (related to the increased attention given to mayors), that form the main body of this review.

The review's aims are to:

1. outline the core works to be considered and their main contentions;
2. establish a theoretical framework;
3. define key research questions;
4. and identify which literary gaps the thesis' contribution will resolve.

The review has been divided up into seven sections:

- (1) a section on the general context of the literature underlying the study and, specifically, the increased academic interest in mayors and their cities;
- (2) interdisciplinary perspectives (from the disciplines of Sociology, Economics and Economic Geography) on the increased importance of urban political leadership and its contexts during the present era of modern globalisation;
- (3) works focused upon mayoral leadership and its relationship to structural, institutional and agential factors;
- (4) the study's theoretical framework;
- (5) consideration of the evolving literature regarding the Leadership Capital Index (the analytical tool used to analyse the data within this thesis) and its contribution to the wider field of political leadership studies;
- (6) and a concluding section identifying both the theoretical space that this thesis will occupy and, also, the research questions it focuses upon.

The study's research question is: Can a strong mayor act according to their own will when constrained by the institutional limits of their office? Its chosen case studies are Michael Bloomberg (New York, 2002-2013), Ken Livingstone (2000-2008), Boris Johnson (2008-2016) and Job Cohen (2001-2010). This Literature Review, and the subsequent Methods chapter, elaborate on how this question and the case studies were selected.

1.2 Context

Academic opinion has begun to recognise and evaluate the growing impact of mayoral leadership, including finding solutions to a range of issues (such as economic development, transportation and public safety) (Acuto, 2009; Barber, 2013; Goldin, 2013). This thesis aims to do the same but in such a way as to critique and measure their leadership, through the analysis of a new body of data, using the Leadership Capital Index (LCI). Studies of, and commentaries upon, urban political leadership are not peculiar to Twenty-First Century scholarship. For instance, when Joseph Chamberlain, a former Mayor of Birmingham in the United Kingdom, died in 1914, George G. Dawson (the editor of *The Times*) wrote an obituary in which he mentioned and praised many of his leadership qualities (Dawson, 1914).

Likewise, in a review of recent literature on political leadership, Glyn Davis (2015) continually found the need to return to the legacy of Niccolo Machiavelli and the way in which it has framed much subsequent discussion. Writing that Machiavelli's *The Prince* still '...haunts discussions of political leadership...', he noted that there has since been a major growth in opinions regarding styles and understandings of, as well as methodological approaches to, leadership (Davis, 2015:746). Citing the potential benefits of comparative studies, Davis recommended such an approach as being a means to achieving wider conclusions on comparable offices (Davis, 2015). The particular benefits of this approach are explored in the thesis' Methods chapter.

Whilst earlier writings on cities' political leaders and understandings of their leadership might be considered as vaguely connected, through forming part of a wider historical body of literature, they are not central to this study, nor to its intended research process. It is more recent works on these matters that will form the main body of literature for this study.

Tony Travers (a local government expert, based within the London School of Economics' LSE Cities research centre) more recently described mayors as '...very much consistent with the spirit of the age - visible, figurehead urban leaders who are a much better fit in a world...' focused increasingly upon local solutions to global problems (Travers, cited in Geoghegan, 2013).

University College London's City Leadership Initiative (CLI) (led by Michele Acuto) is currently exploring the impact of increased political profiles for city leaders, including mayors. This has led to numerous publications aimed at both policy-makers (for instance, their 2015 report, *The future of city leadership in the United Kingdom*, commissioned by the United Kingdom's Government Office for

Science) and academics (including Acuto and Wendy Steele's 2013 work examining challenges faced by global cities) (Rapoport, Acuto, Chilvers, and Sweitzer, 2015; Acuto and Steele, 2013). The CLI has produced many relevant contributions to the literature and continues to do so, with funding from two major British research councils (the Economic and Social Research Council and the Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council). However, these are primarily focused upon mayors' impact upon international affairs, rather than extended theoretical consideration of their leadership.

The development and impact of mayoral leadership in various policy settings is therefore a topic which is slowly gaining recognition within contemporary academia. Forty years ago, David Baldwin wrote that power is '...situationally specific...', highlighting the importance of understanding it within the contextual situation under which it is being studied (Baldwin, 1978:169). This rule or tendency clearly holds true for studies of local political leadership, too. It is thus important to understand the current state of the existing academic works examining the body of work surrounding mayoral political leadership, the context in which it is evolving and theoretical frameworks which may be applied to it for the purposes of constructing a coherent analysis.

1.3 Interdisciplinary perspectives

This is not a cohesive body of literature. It encompasses contributions from various disciplines. Writing upon both political leadership and the case studies examined will form the majority of the literature for this thesis. Aside from those writing from political science perspectives, significant contributions to the literature have been made by sociologists, geographers and economists, too. Interdisciplinary contributions to this aspect of the literature must, therefore, be considered.

John Friedman's 1986 work on world cities (now termed global cities) established the idea that there are certain cities – according to their importance within the global economy (being hosts to major stock exchanges, centres for commerce and so on) and, in some cases, a historically-significant role within world affairs – that form vital international networks (Friedman, 1986; Curtis, 2011). Judd and Parkinson argued that this meant that the leadership of such cities '...finally has emerged as a relevant, even compelling topic for analysis' (Judd and Parkinson, 1990:14). Thus, disciplines such as International Relations and Geography have developed new interests in city leaders.

International Relations theorist Simon Curtis' work established the important implications of the rise of global cities for the mayors who lead them. These – given the repeated reference to it by Goldin, Curtis, Acuto and others – include the raised profiles of both the political leaders of those cities and also the institutions that they lead (Goldin, 2013; Curtis, 2011; Acuto, 2009; Acuto 2013a; Acuto, 2013b). However, though he makes early mention of the fact that this will have potential ramifications for the profile and agency of these city leaders, it is not his work's primary motivation to seek greater understanding of this factor. It is, therefore, not a major contribution to the field of political leadership.

Economic geographers have also made contributions of relevance to this thesis. In particular, the geographer David Harvey has spent much of his career critiquing urban economic issues. His most important contribution came in his 2012 book, *Rebel Cities: From the Right to the City to the Urban Revolution*. He regards cities as a key expression of the capitalist accumulation of wealth by a neo-liberal elite driving the economic expansion of cities in order to find investment opportunities (such as in infrastructure spending) for its capital (Harvey, 2012). Harvey believed this to be driving modern urbanisation (Harvey, 2012).

Within this conceptualisation of cities (including New York and London), Harvey offered some limited observations upon leaders. He criticised ‘...billionaire mayor...’ Michael Bloomberg, then Mayor of New York, for ‘...reshaping the city along lines favourable to the developers, to Wall Street and transnational capitalist class elements...thus turning Manhattan in effect into one vast gated community for the rich.’ (Harvey, 2012:23). Harvey previously argued that the need for opportunities for capital reinvestment led cities to prioritise infrastructure investments as a means for creating such openings (Harvey, 1973). This point is revisited in the chapter on Bloomberg. Harvey’s critique is, however, set within the context of exploring how urban political-economic structures affect socio-economic developments. Therefore, though it does offer some observations, such as the one mentioned, it is not his primary purpose to make a contribution to political leadership studies. However, the impact of leaders, as to their role and impact, is worthy of consideration.

Indeed, the growth of cities has been a major impetus behind re-examining urban leadership. Alongside the contributions made by geographers, economists have highlighted the need to better understand mayors and their leadership. Goldin (2013) has noted that rapid urbanisation has created a reality whereby cities’ leaders are often taking over from their national governments in relation to key challenges such as climate change. In a 2015 interview for *The Guardian*, Edward Glaeser asserted that the economic growth of cities around the world could be clearly linked to the actions of their political leaders (Jenkins, 2015). He highlighted how Mayors John Lindsay and Abraham R. Beame (Mayors of New York from 1966 to 1973 and 1974 to 1977 respectively) executed bad fiscal decisions that led to reduced economic growth (Jenkins, 2015). In this interview and his most significant contribution-to-date on urban economics, *Triumph of the City: How Urban Spaces Make us Human* (2011), he identified factors that have contributed to city growth since the 1980s (Jenkins, 2015; Glaeser 2011). These included the number of graduate jobs, the total capital spent on infrastructure and opportunities for fostering entrepreneurial creativity (Jenkins, 2015; Glaeser, 2011).

Glaeser expressed a common thread that connected interdisciplinary contributions on the rising importance of cities in a globalised world. This commonality is the importance attached to leadership and its centrality within the exploration of modern urban issues. In all three of the disciplines mentioned – International Relations, Economic Geography and Economics – leaders are dutifully noted as being linked to wider factors, including global urbanisation and related challenges.

1.4 Mayors and Leadership: Structural, Institutional and Agential Factors

1.4.1 The Recent Growth in Political Leadership Scholarship

Recent years have seen a growth in works on political leadership. This has covered a number of perspectives – from texts on the general state of the discipline through to ones which advocate particular research approaches (including comparative studies) (Rhodes and ‘t Hart, 2014a; Elgie; 2015; Foley, 2013; Strangio, ‘t Hart and Walter, 2013; Helms, 2012a). As Rod Rhodes and Paul ‘t Hart (2014b) outlined at the beginning of *The Oxford Handbook of Political Leadership*, interest in leaders and their relationship to the structures and institutions around them is not new. Similarly, other studies, such as Archie Brown’s (2014) *The Myth of the Strong Leader: Political Leadership in the Modern Age*, have sought to challenge pre-existing notions of what exactly constitutes leadership and the skills successful leaders required. They illustrate the multitude of approaches and methodologies deployed. These include the biographical and comparative (Bennister, 2012; Helms, 2012; Davis, 2015). As explored later in this review, evolutions in the field also include the creation of new analytical tools, too, not just theoretical approaches (Bennister, ‘t Hart and Worthy, 2015).

One theme that remains constant, however, is the debate regarding whether greater attention should be given to leaders’ skills and personal traits or to the context surrounding them (Rhodes and ‘t Hart, 2014b). As Rhodes and ‘t Hart (2014b) note, political leadership, as a research field, is firmly located within the social sciences and, so, debating of the structure-agency duality goes to the heart of its philosophical perspective, with tensions between competing views regarding whether individuals can substantially change their surrounding leadership environment.

This thesis’ overall perspective, gained from consideration of the relevant literature, concurs with ‘t Hart’s view that it is best, in studying mayors, to seek an accommodating ‘...middle-ground...’ on this point (‘t Hart, 2014:16a). This is explored further in Section 2.7.3. Though the literature in the field is far from reaching a settled consensus upon this point, and may never do so given the historical length of the debates, it is possible to use theories of institutionalism to demonstrate the importance of giving due consideration to *both* structure and agency when analysing mayors.

This thesis sits at a juncture between two evolving bodies of literature – political leadership and the increasing interest in mayor’s growing influence and profile. The first has considered some aspects of local leadership (see Steyvers, *et. al.*, 2012; Copus, 2008; and Greasley & Stoker, 2009), but has failed to account for the extent to which mayors’ profiles have expanded. Conversely, the second

(including that provided by Acuto, Bouteligier and Barber) has failed to rigorously apply the theoretical frameworks and tools on offer from political leadership studies (Acuto, 2013b; Bouteligier, 2013; Barber, 2013). This study, therefore, enhances and advances *both* fields simultaneously, by combining the promise and scholarship of both through rigorously-applied analysis of four case studies (Livingstone, Johnson, Bloomberg and Cohen). This is done by giving due consideration to the institutional, structural and agential factors surrounding them.

1.4.2 Elected Mayors

Whilst the Amsterdam Mayor is appointed, the Mayors of London and New York are both elected. Thus, the review must consider the wider body of literature covering leaders who come to hold office through election. Literature related to specific office-holders' environments is examined later in this review.

Steyvers, Reynaert and Valcke (2012) have argued that directly-elected mayors are a response to the growing desire for political accountability and policy choice amongst urban populations. This contention was previously expressed in the work of Colin Copus (2008). However, they likewise acknowledged that there is still a mix of various mayoral and municipal systems across Europe. This highlighted that the strong model has its geographic and cultural limitations, even at a time when the literature notes its gain in political currency.

The discourse on the increased prevalence of mayors does, of course, stretch further back. Gerry Stoker and Harold Wolman (1992) speculated about how a mayoral model from the USA could be adapted into the existing system of English local government. They noted implications in terms of the cultural transference of the model – not least the fact that the insertion of this new executive-focused system would be a distinct change from the committee form used throughout the majority of English councils at that time (Stoker and Wolman, 1992).

Stoker revisited this theme in 2009 (Greasley and Stoker, 2009). This contribution formed part of Jonathan Davies and David Imbroscio's edited collection on urban politics (Davies and Imbroscio, 2009). This was itself a revision of Stoker's 1995 edited collection (co-edited with Wolman and David Judge) and sought to update the first edition in light of the subsequent emergence of elected mayors within England (including in London) (Judge, Stoker and Wolman, 1995). Greasley and Stoker's article gave a more in-depth consideration of the leadership offered by elected mayors (having empirical English local governance examples available for case study, unlike Stoker and Wolman's earlier, more

speculative, approach) (Greasley and Stoker, 2009). Key conclusions included that the introduction of elected mayors had weakened party-political arrangements' impact at the local level (due to mayors being able to appoint individuals to key appointments on a non-partisan basis) (Greasley and Stoker, 2009). They highlighted that mayors' emergence had led to questions concerning whether formal structures affect leaders' ability to fulfill their roles and, consequently, if such structures could be reformed in such a way as to '...make viable and effective leadership more likely...' (Greasley and Stoker, 2009:135). Both authors had previously touched upon this theme when examining the construction of new local governance systems within England (Stoker, Gains, Greasley, John and Rao, 2004). This links to the thesis' core research question and, similarly, to the consideration of institutionalist theories, examined later in this review, that inform the study's analytical approach.

Greasley and Stoker (2008) considered the style of leadership elected mayors offer and how this adapts to particular contexts. Using James H. Svara's (2003a:157) definition of '...a facilitator who promotes positive interaction and a high level of communication among officials in city government and with the public who also provides guidance in goal setting and policy making...', they argued that this facilitative style was gaining currency in urban settings beyond America (Greasley and Stoker, 2008). This drew a more nuanced view than a "strong mayor vs. weak broker and consensus-seeker" dichotomy suggests, given its potential to be applied to both strong and appointed mayors. Copus and Steve Leach (2014) have argued that such a model could be applied across varied national governance settings for local leaders (what we might term multi-contextual), due to its being built around a pragmatic middle-ground between the strong mayor and original conceptualisation of an alternatively-termed "weak" model. This is given further consideration in the section of this review that outlines the thesis' theoretical framework.

Howard Elcock (2008) compared mayors from four countries (England, the USA, Germany and Greece). Collecting data during academic residencies (which he noted as a less-than-systematic way of selecting case studies), Elcock produced a matrix with which to analyse leaders (Elcock, 2008). He had a long-standing interest in this approach to comparison, having (in a 2012 paper co-authored with John Fenwick) considered how researchers might construct a tool which allowed for the comparison of leadership at both the executive and local levels (Elcock and Fenwick, 2012).

The matrix he published in 2008 was designed around what he believed to be three key aspects of mayors' positions: their formal governmental role; governance aspects of their leadership, with regard to networking and co-ordination; and mayors' consciousness of political allegiances (for

instance, within parties). He then considered how they use these in order to survive throughout terms of office (Elcock, 2008). These roles were analysed within three contexts. First, how they interacted with institutional structures (including constitutions and legislation). Second, their relationship to more informal attributes (such as relations with other leaders). Finally, how they interacted with individual factors (including relationships between mayors and key personnel).

The result was the creation of a matrix that was of use in executing qualitative comparative assessments of directly-elected mayors (Elcock, 2008). It could have been developed further by considering comparative analyses of unelected mayors. Elcock failed to consider unelected mayors, in order to create cross-referenced pictures of differing leadership experiences. In considering an unelected leader (The Mayor of Amsterdam) with elected ones (the Mayors of New York and London), this thesis will correct this omission within the existing literature (albeit that this is a lesser part of its analysis). Further rationalising of this, and the approach to be taken, is outlined in both the final sections of this review and, also, in the Methods Chapter of this study.

Donald McNeil (2001) has contended that elected mayors possess (if matched by charisma) considerable political capital – due to both their direct mandate and, also, their being urban figureheads. This, combined with ties to international networks, makes them a powerful force within local, national and international politics (mirroring global cities discourses) (McNeil, 2001). This raises an intriguing point. Whilst the Mayors of London and New York fit well into this analysis (both being directly-elected), Amsterdam does not. The Dutch mayoralty's leadership is structured in a way designed to limit the mayor's role and powers whilst removing the option of having the direct mandate McNeil attached such importance to. It is, therefore, relevant to consider such dimensions when analysing the differing leadership environments exhibited across all four case studies.

One of the more recent prolific contributions to the discussion regarding mayors' leadership came in Benjamin Barber's 2013 *If Mayors Ruled the World: Dysfunctional Nations, Rising Cities*. Barber's hypothesis was that city leaders offered the '...best hope...' in addressing global issues, such as climate change (Barber, 2013:3). He structured the book so that it was punctuated by biographical vignettes of specific mayors (including Bloomberg in New York and Boris Johnson in London) and explorations of how they tackled particular policy issues. These were constructed on the basis of interviews with these mayors and their advisors (Barber, 2013). Barber's purpose in writing the book was, as Helmut Philipp Aust has characterised it, to launch a '...frontal assault on the state as an embodiment of traditional structures of governance and politics...' (Aust, 2015:265). However, despite

its genesis as a work intended to disrupt existing bodies of academic opinion in the field of global governance, it remains a clear statement of faith in the role of mayors as facilitators in establishing new understandings of what it is to be an effective political leader in the modern world.

He drew wider conclusions about the adaptability of mayoral leadership to socio-economic and political challenges. Chief amongst these was his belief that mayors, as the political leaders of the majority of the global population (by virtue of more than fifty-percent of the world now being urbanised), are able to exercise a unique role as the expressers of what Barber termed ‘...our global conscience...’ (Barber, 2013:351; Cadena, Dobbs and Remes, 2012). By this he meant that mayors have a responsibility, due to the number of people they represent, to show a non-partisan, pragmatic and, ironically, globally-focused (rather than parochial) style of leadership.

His theorising strayed, however, into more of a political treatise than an academic work on the scope and agency of mayors’ leadership. He wrote that cities and their leaders ‘...lack an appetite for sovereignty...’ and that this is sufficient to ‘...enable them as agents of cross-border collaboration.’ (Barber, 2013:71). Apart from the fact that this was an overly-simplistic generalisation – one which seeks to conceive of all city leaders as enjoying this apparently ultimate level of freedom from state sovereignty and their own self-interest – it is also an assertion that shows ignorance of the different structural constraints placed on city leaders’ agency around the world.

Brief consideration of Kinnoyuki Yagi’s 2004 policy paper, ‘Decentralization in Japan’ illustrates this point (Yagi, 2004). With reference to the Japanese system, Yagi outlines two types of local administrations – combined-type and separate-type systems. The former involves a situation whereby the local and central government share certain policy and statutory functions, often collaborating (even integrating) in their efforts to achieve certain goals (Yagi, 2004). These include infrastructure projects, local security and other policy areas. In the latter system, which Yagi notes as being more descriptive of the situation in both the United Kingdom and The United States of America, the powers of local governments are ‘...specifically enumerated...’ – the separation of different policy spheres between local and central authorities being clearly defined (Yagi, 2004:9). As William de Soto wrote in 1995, it is important to examine whether local governments see their state-level government as a partner, dictating authority or ‘...detached supervisors.’ (de Soto, 1995:188). It is, thus, important to remember that local governments are ‘...legally, constitutionally, and politically subordinate to their state governments.’ (de Soto, 1995:188).

This leads to a substantial point which Barber's dismissal of the significance of sovereignty, and the structural constraints that it places on a leader, ignores. Within both separate- and combined-type systems, city leaders' agency is limited by the formal constitutional and structural relationships that they have with their domestic central governments. Criticism of similar views – in short, those too-easily dismissing these long-standing and relevant structural limitations – earlier led Porras to write, in 2009, that academics need to ensure that they do not fall into the trap of '...an easy romanticism...' that allows them to ignore such concerns for the sake of pursuing wider hypotheses (Porras, 2009:599).

More recently, David Sweeting has reconsidered the role of directly-elected mayors. In a 2017 edited collection, Sweeting brought together a compendium of articles which drew upon the theoretical insight of some of the most prolific academics working in this area (Sweeting, 2017a). These included Howard Elcock, Robin Hambleton, James H. Svava and Colin Copus (Elcock, 2017; Hambleton, 2017; Svava, 2017; Copus, Blair, Szmigiel-Rawska and Dadd, 2017). The collection offered a reappraisal of both theoretical constructs surrounding, and practical understandings of, mayoral leadership. From the perspective of this thesis, its publication date contained remarkable coincidences. These were that its publication occurred in the same year as a New York mayoral election, the election of new combined authority mayors in England and, finally, the year in which Amsterdam saw four holders of its mayoralty (following Eberhard van der Laan's death in October). Whilst this does not have a direct bearing upon the thesis (particularly given that the unelected Amsterdam mayoralty could not have been a case study for Sweeting's collection), it does illustrate that the scholarly research in this area has much to keep track of, given the speed of contemporary policy and electoral developments. As Sweeting (2017b:1) argued at the beginning of the collection, a key challenge for work in this area is to keep a track of policymakers' ongoing interest in the varieties and roles of directly-elected mayors.

1.5 Theoretical Framework

The theoretical framework for the thesis is drawn from the literature regarding both local political leadership and the institutional contexts surrounding its variations. In particular, it is drawn from the work of David Sweeting – in addition to the work of others (for instance, James H. Svara, Robin Hambleton and Niels Karsten), where this is relevant. Thus, the theoretical framework is chiefly concerned with Sweeting’s studies in this area but it is important to note the work of others that have informed this work (see Section 2.6.1). These are, thus, the *wider* theoretical context for Sweeting’s more specific framework.

1.5.1 The Strong-Mayor Typology

Svara and Mouritzen (2002:5) have argued that there are four broad typologies that local government can be categorised within:

1. The strong-mayor system – an elected executive being the central governance figure;
2. Committee-leader systems – where power is shared between a political leader and standing committees;
3. Collective – leadership is exercised collectively through a general council committee;
4. And the Council-Manager system – which is headed by a non-executive mayor, with an appointed executive (city manager) undertaking much of the governance and functional responsibilities.

This typology has, at its centre, a key delineation of two broad types of mayoral leader – the strong and weak models. Svara (1990) had drawn this distinction in his book *Official Leadership in the City: Patterns of Conflict and Cooperation*. In 1987, he began to outline some of the theoretical and practical differences between strong and weak mayoral models (Svara, 1987). His other work has used these terms (Svara, 1994; Svara, 2003b; Svara, 2008; Svara and Watson, 2010; Svara, 2017).

The terms strong and weak mayor can be misleading. They do not necessarily indicate a measurement of the merits of each system. Instead, they simplify the debates on a multitude of different local governance systems by dividing them according to broad alternative models (Hambleton, 1998). Table 1 gives a broad outline of these models’ characterisations. Table 1 is, however, merely a guide. For instance, the Mayor of London is a strong mayor in so far as they are directly-elected and, yet, their powers do not include substantive control over certain large policy

areas (including taxation, welfare and education) (Sandford, 2017). The term “weak” mayor has evolved largely as a logical linguistic alternative to “strong” (thus showing a differentiation between concepts). Yet mayors fitting this typology may subsequently prove to be highly effective, through resorting to a more facilitative leadership style (Karsten, 2013; Karsten, 2016). These are, then, theoretical terms which should not have too many preconditions and preconceptions applied to them (Svara, 1987).

Table 1: The Basics of the Strong and Weak Mayor Models

<u>Strong Mayor Model</u>	<u>Weak Mayor Model</u>
Substantial administrative powers	Limited administrative powers, often mostly delegated to a city manager
Directly-elected	May be elected (directly or indirectly) or appointed
Budgetary control	Limited, or no, budgetary powers
Power of appointments of council officers and public officials	Limited, or no, powers of appointment
Veto over council legislation	No veto

(Adapted from Hambleton, 1998:43).

The mix of these different types of mayor is widespread. As Svara argued (1987:207), the focus of literature upon executive mayors (perceived to have a larger political presence, due to their greater institutional powers) gives an unfair representation, as they are not necessarily the norm. Such assumptions can ‘...stand in the way of identifying the dimensions of the office and leadership roles that the mayor may fill...’ (Svara, 1987:207). However, outside of the work conducted by Svara, studies of mayors have not often directly compared strong and appointed mayoral systems in terms of their leadership capacity. More recently, works such as those on the Dutch mayoralities (by Niels Karsten) have begun to fill this space (Karsten, 2013; Karsten, 2016). Nevertheless, it remains the case that there appear not to be any notable extended comparative critiques of how a strong mayoral

institution and a supposedly-weaker (appointed) one may have impacted upon specific, case-studied, mayors' leadership.

The term weak belies a series of different characterisations. For instance, Svava has himself referred to this as the 'facilitative' mayoral model, reflecting a more collaborative style of leadership with regards to legislatures and stakeholders (Svava, 1994; Mouritzen and Svava, 2002; Svava 2017). This fits with Karsten's (2013; 2017) work suggesting that Dutch mayors often tend to adopt a more facilitative "first citizen" style of approach. As Svava has concluded, facilitative leadership does not rely upon direct election but, rather, the ability to connect with the public and use networks and policy initiatives (Svava, 2017:107). Recently he has highlighted that the key question which research into these two competing models must consider is '...not whether to have an elected mayor but rather about the institutional setting in which the mayor operates and the style of leadership associated with each setting.' (Svava, 2017:104). The structure and agency debates alluded to earlier continue, therefore, to have obvious relevancy when analysing mayors' leadership.

There may, however, be confusion for those approaching this field for the first time with regards to the use of the term facilitative. The term "facilitative" has been applied to mayors by several scholars, most notably Mouritzen and Svava (2002). It was intended as a description of the weaker model described earlier. Nevertheless, "facilitative" is a leadership *style* (indicating someone who builds consensus and cohesiveness between competing agendas and opinions), not a model of leadership. Thus, one might apply the term to strong mayors who exhibited such traits (creating potential confusions in the application of terminology). Therefore, this thesis will, for clarity, differentiate between the strong-mayor model (as applied to New York and London) and *appointed* mayors (with reference to Amsterdam). Indeed, wider application of this variation in terminology may assist future researchers in providing clearly differentiations between the models being applied and discussed.

Further definition of these concepts is needed, however. Hambleton (1998) provided further clarity regarding Svava's model – in particular, how it could be graduated according to the different kind of mayoral systems in operation (Hambleton, 1998). He argued that there are four key types of local government:

1. Mayor-Council Structure with a strong mayor;
2. Mayor-Council Structure with a weak mayor;

3. Council-Manager Structure (no mayor);
4. And Council-Manager Structure with a mayor

(Hambleton, 1998:43-45).

Under this understanding, the terms strong and weak mayor acquire new meaning. In Hambleton's theorising, the Mayor-Council structure denotes an authority whereby the mayor heads the council. In the strong mayor form, they are the executive head of the council and hold substantial administrative, budgetary and strategic powers (Hambleton, 1998:43). In the weaker model of the Mayor-Council structure, mayors may still be directly elected and give a definite strategic lead to the local authority concerned but they will be compelled to share power with officers and councillors (often with little power over appointments) (Hambleton, 1998:44). As Hambleton rightly noted, however, there is '...no sharp line between strong and weak mayors – rather there is a continuum.' (Hambleton, 1998:44). Thus, we again find terms which retain a fluidity of meaning, often mediated by context and individual agency. In these typologies, we might identify the New York system as a strong mayoralty and that of London as a weak mayor. However, they would both fit Svava's overall conceptualisation of a strong mayoralty, as the Mayor-Council form is itself a "strong" concept – allowing for a significant level of executive authority to reside within the mayoralty.

Hambleton's fourth typology befits the Amsterdam case study which this thesis will focus upon. In the Council-Manager structure, there is '...no separation of powers between a political executive and a legislative body.' (Hambleton, 1998:44-45). A city manager (conceived of as a chief executive officer) runs the council's operations. The lack of direct mandate for this role has frequently led to the introduction of a mayor, in order to provide a political lead (Hambleton, 1998:45). Hambleton refers to this person as though they are always directly-elected and, yet, in the case of Amsterdam this is not the case. Indeed, due to a desire not to over-politicise the role (regarding them as a '..."democratic guardian"'), Dutch mayors are not currently elected (Karsten and Hendriks, 2017:158). This, then leaves a gap in Hambleton's conceptualisation – a Council-Manager structure with an *unelected* mayor.

The ongoing relevancy of strong-mayor theories to the literature is proven by their continued application to scholarly examinations of various aspects of local government leadership. Steyvers, *et al.*'s (2012) provided a rigorous outline of the existing literature and approaches towards local comparative political leadership studies. Their study outlined differences between strong and appointed mayor models, noting that the latter is more commonly found in European countries such

as The Netherlands and Belgium (Steyvers, *et. al.*, 2012). Steyvers, *et. al.*'s (2012) discussions surrounding this model were rooted in Mouritzen and Svava's (2002) seminal book, *Leadership at the Apex: Politicians and Administrators in Western Local Governments*. As with Mouritzen and Svava, they concluded that the increased institutionalisation of leadership at the local level of governance was leading to a tendency towards the strong-mayor model (Steyvers, *et. al.*, 2012; Mouritzen and Svava, 2002). Steyvers, *et. al.* went some way towards outlining the different ways that these two types of model have been treated within Europe and some of the key differences between the two – for instance, strength through directness and assertion, rather than consensus-building. However, there is clearly room for such a study to be expanded to consider this variation on a more cross-national scale, with application to specific leaders. In short, there is room for this thesis – with its focus upon comparing the more Anglo-American strong mayoral model of London and New York with what we might term the more European model of a consensus-focused style of leadership (in this case, Amsterdam).

Greasley and Stoker, though not using the terms strong and weak, have similarly adapted theories pertaining to them (Greasley and Stoker, 2008). They, similar to Svava and Hambleton, found that mayors fitting the strong typology are held to be '...highly visible leaders...' who facilitate more direct executive control over resources and policy-making (Greasley and Stoker, 2008:727).

Karsten has written about how strong models of leadership do not relate well to other models, including the local European one. His work includes considerations of the capacity of appointed mayors, with less powers than those commonly found in the strong model, to adapt offices to changing political environments (Karsten, Cachet and Schaap, 2013). Similarly, Karsten has given consideration to other aspects that vary between the strong Anglo-American model and the more consensus-based appointed model (including how appointed leaders might seek accountability in different ways or relate to their respective legislative body in a manner at variance to elected mayors) (Karsten, 2015). He wrote, in 2016, that the differences – with the main one being a dislike of overly-muscular and dominant leadership – are underappreciated within existing political leadership studies narratives (Karsten, 2016). Reflecting Helms' (2012) earlier point regarding the importance of context in analysing leadership, Karsten outlined how even the term "leader" is something that is less settled in the Netherlands (due to an unfortunate association with earlier European dictatorships) (Karsten, 2016). This in itself offers interesting opportunities to question how strong and appointed mayors acquire leadership capital, and to what effect.

Karsten outlined how the variations have an impact upon differing understandings of structure and agency. Dutch mayors pursue political decisions in a collegiate way (institutionally sharing responsibilities with their respective assemblies and wider executives), a strong mayor has greater scope for the executive creation and piloting of new strategies and policies (Karsten, 2016). Dutch mayors are seen less as strong executives with elaborate mandates to pursue and more, to use Karsten’s term, as the exercisers of ‘...”democratic guardianship.”’ (Karsten, 2016:8). Thus, differing cultural understandings of leadership have, naturally, led to the creation of different institutional models (Hendriks and Karsten, 2014).

1.5.2 The Sweeting Typology

It is at this juncture that the work of Sweeting becomes relevant and helps to refine the framework further. In a 2003 article, Sweeting also outlined four types of mayors (Sweeting, 2003:470-471). Table 2 outlines these types and what they are comprised of. This table will be used to further consider the relevance of these typologies, and their applicability to the case studies, in the Findings chapter.

Table 2: Sweeting’s Four Mayoral Types

<u>Type</u>	<u>Description</u>
1	Strong in relation to council, high degree of control within municipal bureaucracy. Power extends well beyond formal confines of office. Strong in relation to council, influential in local governance and operate in autonomous environment.
2	Weak in sense they share control over council bureaucracy with other elected officials. Nevertheless, highly influential beyond walls of the authority and their authorities have autonomy from other levels of government.
3	Strong inside their authorities. However, do not operate in autonomous environment. Influence in local governance is slight.
4	Weak in terms of relationship with council. Low degree of ability to extend influence beyond council and have limited local autonomy.

(Adapted from Sweeting, 2003:470-471).

This offers further categories with, perhaps, rather more criteria. Indeed, it reflects upon how a mayor may make use of both formal powers and also informal influence, as well as how the institutional design of the mayoralty may place structural constraints upon them. However, Sweeting’s

article did not apply its propositions in a comparative or international context, which this thesis does (thus extending the framework and making an original use of it). Sweeting does, on the other hand, offer gradations of the concepts of strong and appointed (which he terms “facilitative”) mayors which may reflect the more nuanced, less absolute, reality within the examined case studies.

This thesis makes use of three case studies in such a way as may seem to offer a fundamental imbalance. In short, it will examine and evaluate two strong mayoralties and only one that is appointed. Such an approach would, indeed, be imbalanced were the thesis seeking to answer a question such as “Which is a better form of government, the strong or facilitative typology?” Testing of such a proposition would likely require inclusion of an equitable number of strong and appointed case studies, in order to achieve a balanced conclusion. However, this study examines the question: “Can a strong mayor act according to their own will when constrained by the institutional limits of their office?” The focus of the study is firmly upon the strong mayor typology and includes Amsterdam’s mayoralty as a “control” case study with which to contextualise findings from the London and New York examples. In relation to London, Sweeting’s 2002 and 2003 articles – which focussed upon the structure-agency issues within the GLA and the mayoralty’s development, respectively – provide clear examples of the application of Sweeting’s theories to empirical case studies.

This is a study of mayors, not mayoralties as institutions. The theories outlined here are largely concerned with the structure of mayoralties as institutions. However, mayoral leadership capital (as will be shown) is clearly affected by institutional contexts surrounding office-holders. Therefore, the framework outlined above retains relevance to the thesis’ hypothesis. Moreover, Sweeting’s (and Svava and Hambleton’s) work has so far not undertaken extended case-studied examination of how his theories are affected by direct application of the rational actor “individuals within institutions” approach outlined later. Testing of the following propositions will help to identify how far the agency of strong mayors can push against institutional constraints:

1. Do strong mayor systems offer individual leaders greater amounts of leadership capital?
2. Does more capital equate to greater potential for institutional stretch?

Hambleton and David Sweeting (2004), similarly, considered if there are points of transferable learning between different systems and styles of mayoral leadership (Hambleton and Sweeting, 2004). In 2004, they considered the introduction of directly-elected mayors to England and, more specifically,

whether this represented a tilting towards American-style strong executives (Hambleton and Sweeting, 2004). This was, in some ways, a precursor to Steyvers, *et. al.*'s (2012) later discussions about the spread of the strong-mayor model. However, Hambleton and Sweeting also noted that one still cannot discount domestic political cultures, and the conserving influence that they have upon reform. They concluded that the continued high level of centralisation in the UK (which they labelled as '...still one of the most centralized states in the Western world...' – a point which John Loughlin has concurred with) meant that mayors would not enjoy the same fiscal autonomy as American counterparts (Hambleton and Sweeting, 2004:485-486; Loughlin, 2004). Thus, though it is possible to use comparative approaches towards local leaders, it is important that studies remain conscious of the role different national governance cultures play in varying system designs. As Karsten and Hendriks outlined in relation to Dutch mayoralities, this is even more the case when comparing an unelected, appointed model with a strong one (Karsten, 2017).

Sweeting's ongoing relevance to discussions of the strong-mayor model continues to occupy the literature. In the 2017 collection on elected mayors that Sweeting edited, his work was cited numerous times. This included case studies ranging from New Zealand to the UK (Cheyne, 2017; Ismail, 2017; Sweeting and Hambleton, 2017) and, also, in chapters that gave consideration to the theories behind this aspect of urban governance (Hambleton, 2017). This showed the utility and transferability of Sweeting's (and, to a certain extent, Hambleton's) theories across a wide range of studies.

Sweeting has also considered how directly-elected mayors befitting the strong-mayor model might contribute to a depoliticisation of local governance (Sweeting and Hambleton, 2019). This offers interesting opportunities for the widening of the framework in a manner that could be applied to Cohen. This may seem unexpected, given the Dutch appointed, rather than strong, model. However, Sweeting's work here moves towards consideration of how mayors might be partly responsible for the depletion of informal institutional factors, such as party allegiance. This matches with the Dutch requirement for mayors to be politically independent. Of course, this point must be applied cautiously – the chapter cited here was concerned with a local English case study (Bristol) and not a European one. Similarly, Sweeting and Hambleton's study was still examining an elected mayor whose office gave them far greater resources and powers than the Mayor of Amsterdam possesses. Thus, the Cohen chapter is still likely to find the theories of those such as Karsten and Hendriks more applicable to that particular case study. Nevertheless, the fact that Sweeting and Hambleton have opened the theoretical narrative in this direction is obviously of interest.

1.5.3 The Theoretical Framework's Purpose

In short, by comparing three archetypal Anglo-American mayors (in New York and London) this thesis will determine whether the strong-mayor model offers the potential for institutional stretch. The inclusion of the Dutch model will allow for some theoretical counterpoints.

Overall, this theoretical framework offers a cohesive basis upon which to commence the thesis' analysis. The research question identified draws very directly upon this framework, placing its analysis within the concept of strong mayors (with the nuances that it brings). The case studies selected complement this approach. Two varied strong models (and three individual office-holders) will be analysed. By way of a relative consideration, the Amsterdam mayoralty will be evaluated, in order that the attention given to the strong mayor model can be set in its proper context. More directly, the framework is used to evaluate the analytical results derived from the application of the LCI to four specific case studies: Livingstone, Johnson, Bloomberg and Cohen. These provide empirical matter upon which to draw in testing the study's wider hypothesis.

1.6 Institutionalism

1.6.1 Placing institutionalism within the thesis

This is not a thesis that focuses primarily upon the evolutions and convolutions of institutionalist theory. It remains a comparative study of political leadership at the local level. It is informed, partially, by institutional analyses (as is set out in this section). The predominant theoretical basis, as detailed in the section on the theoretical framework, remains, however, those related to leadership.

Nevertheless, in seeking to assess how far strong mayors are able to implement their own will, despite institutional constraints, it is obvious that an element of institutionalism must be considered. Scholars have long considered the concept of how leaders may “stretch” their powers (formal and informal) beyond the constraints laid down by the conventions, rules and practices of their institutions (see Foley, 2000; Bennister, 2007; Kefford, 2016). In this thesis, the use of institutionalist theory is a means of enablement. It enables points of contextual comparison between strong mayoral systems and appointed ones, whilst retaining the focus upon how individuals (Bloomberg, Livingstone, Johnson and Cohen) sought to utilise leadership capital in pursuit of their aims. This further enables consideration of how much scope for agential institutional stretch these individuals were able to achieve.

Vivien Lowndes and Mark Roberts (2013) identified the tension that exists between institutionalist perspectives within political science research and those giving consideration to agency. They outlined how three different strands of institutionalism – sociological, rational choice and historical – struggled to accommodate concepts of agency. Sociological Institutionalism (SI) perceives of actors as contained ‘...within dominant norms and beliefs...’ in the operation of organisations. Rational Choice Institutionalism (RCI) concerns how far actors feel compelled to act in manners maximising self-interest and how institutions might affect of limits this. The final approach believes that path dependency left actors with no other choice than ‘...to pursue traditional policy preferences.’ (Lowndes and Roberts, 2013:44). Thus, these theories allowed for some reflexive and strategic basis to these actors’ agency but, simultaneously, placed conceptual limits upon it.

Schneiberg and Lounsbury (2008) explored similar ideas. Focusing upon social movements, they outlined how energetic actors can persistently seek institutional change and the way in which this can be accommodated or resisted by institutions (Schneiberg and Lounsbury, 2008). Lowndes and Roberts (2013) used contributions such as these to examine why, with specific reference to English

local government, some institutions are transformed whilst others are not. This work outlined the role of informal institutional factors, including historical contexts (a point previously made by Robert Elgie) (Lowndes and Roberts, 2013; Elgie, 1995). Lowndes' existing work concerned institutionalist theories' role in analysing urban governance (Lowndes and Wilson, 2001; Lowndes, 2005; Lowndes, 2009). This – along with Pierson (2004) and Crouch & Farrell's (2004) contributions – explored how inertia towards changing historical structures (and actors' placement within them) can slow progress towards change. Thus, it again offered a tentative look at individuals' impact upon institutions but did not do so from a political leadership perspective.

This point has subsequently been developed further by the late Robert Elgie. In his 2018 examination of institutionalist approaches to leadership, Elgie analysed the effects of different institutionalist approaches upon leadership research. This developed upon earlier works in which he advocated for a reappraisal of institutionalist theories, with regard to how a researcher applies them to different leaders and leadership traits (Elgie, 1995; Elgie, 2015). In 2018, he concluded that generalised prescriptions for how to conduct such research (in other words, advocacy for one approach towards institutionalist views of leadership) were fraught with pitfalls (Elgie, 2018:258). Chief amongst these was the high probability of this creating a culture-blind approach towards such research that ignored varying comparative dynamics and created rather blunt assessments (Elgie, 2018:258). In short, Elgie's conclusion was that a more nuanced or pragmatic approach (as detailed both here and in the Methods chapter) is not a weakness but a sign of more methodologically-sound research.

Karsten (2015; 2016), Steyvers, Reynaert & Valcke (2012) and Mouritzen & Svava (2002) all highlight the role that different models of leadership have in creating structural constraints upon mayors' agency. Both formal and informal institutional factors play a part in this. The work of Svava and Mouritzen is chiefly examined in the later section outlining the thesis' theoretical framework. However, literature comparing these differences is, in itself, not especially expansive. Where works do exist – such as that by Steyvers, Reynaert & Valke and Karsten – it often uses broad-based analyses without detailed individualised case studies. This thesis goes some way towards remedying this matter, providing considerations of mayoral leadership and its relation to the model used (strong mayor or consensus-based) whilst using detailed and illustrative case studies (London, New York and Amsterdam).

Regarding leadership studies, one can most clearly see this in works such as those of Catherine Althaus and John Wanna (2008). Discussion of the institutional approach towards whether leadership be implemented on a “top-down” or “bottom-up” basis was at the centre of their analysis. Top-down meant a ‘...command-and-control approach where strong individuals dominated through force of personality...’ and can, therefore, be applied to the mayor-council (strong-mayor) model (Althaus and Wanna, 2008:123). The bottom-up conceptualisation focused upon ‘...collective and team-based more than individual-reliant...’ understandings of leadership (Althaus and Wanna, 2008:123). This fits well with the more consensus-based appointed model (Karsten, 2016; Karsten and Hendriks, 2014). Lowndes and Roberts underlined this connection between institutions and their leaders when they noted the centrality of the symbiotic leader-agency relationship. Noting the potential for institutionalist concepts of agency, they argued that individuals ‘...are not simply constrained by institutions, they are also responsible for the crafting of these same constraints...’ and can, thus, shape the environments within which leadership is exercised. (Lowndes and Roberts, 2013:104)

Hence, it would be wrong to believe that institutionalism precludes giving credit to agency (Elgie, 2018). It is therefore necessary to incorporate theories of institutionalism, particularly where they interact with structural and agential factors. This has repercussions for the methodological approach towards the study’s comparative nature – especially with regard to how one addresses the “unevenness” arising from comparing culturally-different institutions. Such points are developed further within the Methods chapter. This review is concerned with institutional theory’s “place” within the thesis (a point further developed in the section regarding the theoretical framework used).

Historical Institutionalism and Sociological Institutionalism have been rejected, here, in favour of a Rational Choice approach. In the case of the former, its concern with large-scale (“broad-brush”) processes means that its focus mostly ignores the effects of individual actors (Thelen, 1999). Hence, in a thesis concerned with a focus upon individual leaders’ agency, it is of a lesser utility. At first glance, Sociological Institutionalism may appear to have a greater relevance. It concerns the approach to the running of organisations and could, therefore, potentially be applied to a mayor’s approach to their mayoralty. However, this remains more of a theory concerned with the more abstract organisational dimensions, rather than a specific leader’s agency within it (Soysal, 2012). Thus, Rational Choice Institutionalism is the most logical fit, given its greater focus upon both the role of individuals within, and also their relationship to, institutions.

1.6.2 Rational Choice Institutionalism

The perspective of rational-choice institutionalism is a logical fit. Indeed, rational choice has been ‘...a persistent, if not dominant, explanation of urban governance...’ for around sixty years (DiGaetano and Strom, 2003:361). Levy’s definition of how rational choice institutionalism affects actors is pertinent here. Levy (1997:23) suggested that it resulted in ‘...rational and strategic individuals who make choices within constraints to obtain their desired ends...’. This clearly places the actor within the wider context of their institution, whilst allowing explicitly for a certain amount of agency. Rational choice explanations accept cross-national ‘...differences as given rather than explaining how it is that they came to differ...’, thus enabling comparative studies that accommodate varying systems within their research design (a point picked up on in the Methods chapter) (DiGaetano and Strom, 2003:361). Rational choice approaches offer a nuanced approach to agency. Rather than falling down on either side of the agency-versus-structure debates, it agrees that agency can stretch institutions but that, likewise, actors are still ‘...conditioned to obey...’ some of the institutional norms (changeable institution-to-institution) that they encounter in implementing their agendas (Lauth, 2004:70). Lauth’s (2004:73) article on differing institutional types also furthered this point by arguing that the ‘...real actors...’ in institutions were individuals and that, thus, they shape the continuation and shaping of their respective institutional environments. This complemented March and Olsen’s (1989:10-11; 118-119) earlier argument that institutions required individual actors to develop and administer their agendas but that, if given sufficient scope, these self-same people will likely push their own issues onto these agendas (a process March and Olson called the promotion of self-interest).

This lends itself to a political leadership-based analysis, focusing upon the role of individuals pushing agendas, whilst showing awareness of situational contexts. Thus, an ‘...“individuals within institutions”...’ model of rational choice theory is used (Peters, 2012:55). This equates to the perspective of rational actors ‘...attempting to utilize institutions to fulfill his or her goals.’ (Peters, 2012:55). One might assume that this is then extended by capacity for institutional stretch – with an accompanying further assumption that those leaders embodying the strong-mayor model (for which, see the below theoretical framework) may have more room for this than those fitting the appointed typology. This hypothesis underlies much of the subsequent analysis within the case studies. Further, it matches to both the view of Rational Choice Institutionalism as more focused at the individual level whilst similarly reflecting the nuance alluded to by Elgie.

1.6.3 Definitions of Mayoral Agency

It is important to consider at this juncture how agency is to be defined. The focus in searching for such definitions has been upon the literature surrounding political leadership, given that the thesis is firmly positioned within that field.

The late Robert Elgie (1995) defined agency as leaders' ability and motivation to operate independently. What makes Elgie's definition particularly suited is his accompanying recognition that '...political leaders operate within an environment which will both structure their behaviour and constrain their freedom of action.' (Elgie, 1995:8). This fits well with rational choice institutionalism and supports the view that agency has to be contextualised by complementary considerations of structural factors. It is a more nuanced view of interactions between agential and structural factors, personal and systemic considerations (Burrett, 2016b). This view of agency was earlier reflected in Hidenori Nakamura, Mark Elder and Hideyuki Mori's (2011) argument that agency must be understood in relation to its parameters, constraints and, conversely, enablers. Elgie argued that '...institutional structures are the most important aspect of the leadership process, partly determining the ambitions and styles of political leaders...' (Elgie, 1995:14).

't Hart (2014a:16) also concluded that there is a '...middle ground...' to be reached in debates concerning the effect of agential and structural factors. Much earlier, Harold D. Lasswell (1948) gave much thought to the relationship between power and personalities. He too found the answer to be a more nuanced one than simply concluding wholly in favour of either agency or structure as the most influential factor bearing upon leaders and their decision-making. Lasswell (1948) made clear that he attributed much that made for a successful leader to their personal characteristics (and the agency associated with them). However, he was quick to remind scholars of the importance of institutions. Though not using the terms "agency" or "structure", he argued that democracy relied heavily upon leadership which could '...protect and perfect its values and institutions...', underlining the importance of formal (institutions) and informal (values) structural aspects (Lasswell, 1948:108). This has a direct relationship with institutionalism. As highlighted by Hargrove and Owens (2002:199), '...leaders use the institutional roles that they occupy to seek out and exploit with varying degrees of success opportunities for leadership...to exercise influence over the political context.'

Indeed, this emphasises Rational Choice's predisposition to placing high-value on the importance of rationality. Whilst Sociological Institutionalism may wish to primarily credit values as the key driver of change, decision-making and policy-creation, Rational Choice approaches suggest

that the individual carries a higher importance and should not be so easily disregarded. Of course, one may counter this by taking Elgie's (2018) arguments to their logical conclusion and suggesting that one cannot rely on any one form of institutionalism. However, Rational Choice Institutionalism's consistent focus upon the individual as leader (notwithstanding the influence of political dynamics and social environments, including values) and their potential for greater agency than otherwise assumed means that it remains the most appropriate for inclusion in a study of political leadership.

The centrality of considerations regarding agency to the research undertaken within this thesis is clear. There is a body of opinion that advocates for consideration of agency. The case studies examined within this thesis have varied institutional characteristics. This will lead to differing examples of how structural and agential aspects are evidenced within each.

1.7 The Leadership Capital Index

It is necessary to give due consideration to the concept of leadership capital and the LCI as it is this thesis' analytical tool. Detailed understanding of the theoretical underpinnings of the LCI is contained within the Methods chapter.

A recent innovation in political leadership studies, the LCI offers systematic series of metrics by which to measure and, if applied continuously across set time periods (for instance, terms of office), chart fluctuations in leadership capital (Bennister, *et. al.*, 2015). The LCI was first discussed in two 2014 conference papers and published in 2015 (Bennister, t'Hart and Worthy, 2014a; Bennister, t'Hart and Worthy, 2014b; Bennister, *et. al.*, 2015). It has been applied to current and historic executive leaders in the United Kingdom, Japan, the USA and Europe (Bennister, *et. al.*, 2015; Burrett, 2016a; Bennister, t'Hart and Worthy, 2017a). It is, therefore, gaining traction within the field and, increasingly, being applied in varied different national and institutional contexts.

Bennister, t'Hart and Worthy (2015) concluded that the LCI promised several future research opportunities. They noted that the LCI needed developmental theoretical testing, extending and refining through application to various new case studies, especially ones reflecting different institutional and situational contexts (Bennister, *et. al.*, 2015). Reflecting Helms' (2012b) view that comparative approaches offer methodological opportunities for testing and refining new theories and tools, they recommended that comparing leaders using the LCI offered '...interpretive possibilities in understanding, studying and comparing the political fortunes and legacies of diff political leaders.' (Bennister, *et. al.*, 2015). That these particular scholars should recommend comparative approaches in developing the LCI is not surprising. Each of them has previously taken a comparative approach towards political leadership research (Bennister, 2012; Strangio, t'Hart and Walter, 2013; Worthy, 2016).

A 2017 book, with inclusion of a range of case studies of leaders operating at various levels, expanded understanding of the tool (Bennister, *et. al.*, 2017a). Calling upon contributions from a range of academics who were active in political leadership studies research, the book examined case studies focused upon Britain, Europe, the USA, Australia and Canada (Helms and van Esch, 2017; Walter, 2017; Johansson, 2017; Malloy, 2017; Bynander and Daleus, 2017). The book used a variety of applications of the LCI, demonstrating its utility whilst acknowledging its limitations. For instance, whilst the LCI was applied at both national and sub-national levels, the book's editors were compelled to conclude that the contributions demonstrated that the LCI would require substantive adaptation were it to be

applied to non-democratic systems (having been applied to democracies in all of the case studies) (Bennister, 't Hart and Worthy, 2017b; Blondel, 2017).

This book has received some criticism, however. Most notable amongst this has been Archie Brown's (2018) strong criticism of the LCI as being overly-ambitious in its aims. In particular, Brown argued that the qualitative elements of the LCI were too subjective or arbitrary in terms of how it encouraged a researcher to subsequently assign scores. This is obviously a point which the Methods chapter must consider. Moreover, the Findings chapter will need to ultimately evaluate whether this has indeed been an issue and, if so, what affect this has upon the fallibility of judgements reached.

Burrett (2016b) used the LCI to compare Japan's prime ministers between 2006 and 2012. Though the unit of analysis was located at the executive level, Burrett's research offered some interesting points that are instructive for this thesis. Her study showed both that the LCI can be applied in different cultural contexts and also bears adaptation in its metrics in order to suit new situational factors. These points are discussed in greater depth in the Methods chapter of this thesis, especially regarding how the LCI can be adapted in order to be applied more successfully at the local leadership level. The fact that the LCI is able to bear adaptation enables accommodation of theoretical concerns already outlined (regarding institutional, structural and agential variables) into its conceptual application.

Charles F. Parker has provided another useful precedent. Analysing former California State Governor, Jerry Brown, Parker (2017) demonstrated the LCI's applicability at subnational levels. He showed that the LCI can be moved beyond original focuses upon executive-level leadership, gaining some of the nuance and varied institutional aspects Bennister, 't Hart and Worthy stated that they desired for it. Parker's study showed how leadership capital can fluctuate, in a case study of a leader whose capital varied over a decades-long period. Therefore, Parker's research showed the LCI's applicability to variables regarding informal institutional factors such as time, rather than just formal ones such as system surrounding offices.

The LCI is, therefore, appropriate for inclusion within this study. Though significant discussion, and problematising, of methodological implications is undertaken within the methods chapter, it is clear that there is a strong case for using it within this study. This case is underpinned by substantive and growing literature. Use of the LCI in a comparative study at the local level would be a new and original usage, meaning that using it is all the more appropriate and pressing.

1.8 Conclusion: The Literary “Space” for this Study and Resulting Research Questions

There is a growing amount of academic work concerning mayors and their leadership. The size of this body of literature has been increasing, now reflecting strong interdisciplinary interests in various aspects of mayors’ roles, policies and networking. It remains, however, a research area that political leadership studies have contributed less to than other disciplines (including Sociology, Geography and Political Economy). There remains a sizeable space for contributions from political leadership as a discipline. This thesis will not, in itself, resolve this issue. It can, however, address certain aspects of it by answering particular questions and provide theoretical space for further studies to extend research in this area.

Exploration of mayoral leadership’s relation to institutional, structural and agential factors within two different models (the strong-mayor and the appointed) provides opportunities for original application of long-established theories and concepts. There is, therefore, an apparent opening for this thesis to provide this analysis, whilst ensuring originality through examination of four case studies that have not been directly compared before. The works of Sweeting (and Svava, Hambleton, and Karsten) will prove useful here.

The case studies are, in themselves, further evidence of an original approach. When taken together, these four leaders and their offices have never been considered together, including with a view to assessing the cumulative lessons to be gained regarding mayoral leadership from doing so. Given the established importance of the comparative paradigm in political leadership studies and increased attention upon mayors, this is a glaring omission which this thesis is well-placed to correct.

Use of the LCI in the thesis’ research design and analysis of the collected data makes for another aspect of the work’s originality. Taking up Bennister *et. al.’s* (2017b) desire to see a growth in studies using it at different leadership levels and in varied situational contexts would advance understanding of its utility. It may allow for the creation of indexed measurements that substantially inform larger theoretical conclusions addressing those areas (the balance between institutional, structural and agential factors) that others have so far failed to consider. This work is, therefore, also partly an opportunity for the use of comparative research to extend and refine the LCI.

In summary, the work's originality stems from three core aspects:

- (1) Examination of *both* the mayoral offices and their holders (in terms of their mutual impact upon the development of their leadership capital and agency);
- (2) Use of a comparative approach; and
- (3) Application of the LCI in a new context.

As mentioned within the outlining of the study's theoretical framework, the study's research question is: Can a strong mayor act according to their own will when constrained by the institutional limits of their office? Following on from this literature review, the following sub-questions arise:

- (1) Do strong mayor systems offer individual leaders high levels of leadership capital?
- (2) Do the case studies of mayoralities of Amsterdam, London and New York offer useful theoretical insights into how mayors use agency as a tool for increasing leadership capital?
- (3) Does more capital equate to greater potential for institutional stretch?
- (4) How might the LCI be developed and refined in order to make it applicable to leadership at the local level, especially when used comparatively?

2.0 Methods

This thesis' approach is one of explanation-building, '...whereby initial theoretical propositions...' (in this case, how far strong mayors are able to push beyond institutional constraints) '...are compared with findings from the case and revised as appropriate...' in light of lessons to be drawn from the individual case assessments (Lowndes and Lempriere, 2018:231; Yin, 2009:141). This gives it the kind of interpretivist approach that Robert Elgie (2015:39) has noted as being prevalent within political leadership studies.

This chapter problematises the Leadership Capital Index (LCI), identifying aspects which work well in assessing local leaders' comparative leadership capital and highlighting those areas needing further refinement. Specific points covered within the chapter are:

- 1) the study's utilisation of the comparative method;
- 2) the selection of, and justification for, the case studies examined within this thesis;
- 3) the use of contextual analysis and policy case studies;
- 4) the LCI – including: its theoretical basis; and how it will be adapted and refined in order to make it applicable to local political leadership;
- 5) the ontological and epistemological stance of the researcher;
- 6) and concluding thoughts which summarise the approach to be taken by the study.

2.1 The Comparative Method

Ludger Helms' (2012a) *Comparative Political Leadership* extolled many benefits of comparative approaches, whilst acknowledging methodological challenges. He correctly identified that the comparative approach in political science has a long lineage, describing it as an '...indispensable method...' for testing and refining hypotheses (Helms, 2012b:6). This correlates well with this thesis' objective of refining existing understandings of strong-mayor leadership, through the comparison of data that has been analysed using the LCI. Glyn Davis (2015:755) has written that comparative analyses '...across similar systems allow study of individual traits...'. Doing so means that the LCI can be more consistently applied. More justifiable meta-conclusions can be drawn from data sets concerning consistent units of analysis. For instance, Davis outlines that the problem of inconsistency in comparative political studies is significant – citing studies which compare prime ministers with presidents, arguing that structural incompatibility limits these studies' potential (Davis, 2015). Structural compatibility makes for easier comparative analyses. This approach informs the methodological approach of this study, with its primary focus upon strong-mayor systems (treating Amsterdam as an outlier case study, which wider conclusions can be set against).

There are several recurring problems which any study using this methodology must confront (Beck, 2017:533). Giovanni Sartori (1991) identified the issue of deciding *why* to compare when undertaking research. He resolved that one reason could be that of control – that comparisons '...control (verify or falsify) whether generalizations hold across the cases to which they apply...' (Sartori, 1991:244). This study's comparative design meets this criterion. A comparative approach, analysing four case studies, has been selected in order that it can test existing assumptions about strong mayors and, consequently, make original observations regarding their capital. By comparing, not only are theories such as Sweeting and Svava's open to refinement but, moreover, the varied environments in which mayoral authority is exercised can be evaluated. This approach complements a common theme within political leadership studies – that case-studied analyses, when undertaken comparatively, allow for the generalisation of theory (Edinger, 1990:520). This, of course, is subject to the limits established by a smaller number of case studies. However, the mixed-methods data collected, and accompanying qualitative discussion, expands the subsequent opportunity for a developed evaluation.

Moreover, use of the selected theoretical framework answers a further challenge which is inherent to the comparative approach – namely, clear identification of *what* is to be compared. Failure to identify this, ensuring that case studies *are* comparable, can mean that researchers are forced '...to

make heroic assumptions about the comparability of concepts and causal relationships across the chosen cases...' (Gerring, 2004:348). This results in tenuous and challengeable conclusions. In the case of this thesis, mayors' leadership capital (and its limits) is the dependent variable. The independent variables are the individuals under examination and, secondary to this, the differing institutional contexts within which they operated. This reflects the hypothesis' concern with the strong-mayor system and whether it allows for greater agential stretch. Variables are, thus, all encapsulated within both a common theoretical conceptualisation (with Amsterdam as a control case) and the focus upon leadership capital. The specifics of individual case studies will not be cross-compared, due to systemic complications in trying to apply the LCI equitably and identically across varied jurisdictions (for which, see the below rationalisation of how the LCI has been calibrated). Nevertheless, the use of a common theoretical framework allows for a final meta-comparison.

The comparison of Bloomberg (New York) with Livingstone & Johnson (London), conducted in the Findings chapter, is based around the principle of a method of difference approach. This is defined by Hopkin (2010:291) as a comparison of very similar systems (in this case, mayoral offices) that vary primarily in terms of the independent variables selected. The thesis observes this formula, by examining offices where the key differences are those pre-selected as variables (the individuals examined and the institutional variations between their offices). Cohen (Amsterdam) is an anomalous case study, used to add the colour of differing theoretical observations on a divergent case, in order to contextualise the comparison of Bloomberg, Livingstone and Johnson. The broad points regarding the independent variables are true in his case, too. However, the Dutch case remains sufficiently "other" as to render it not part of the study's main focus on the strong-mayor model. Thus, it is not directly incorporated into the comparison or chosen comparative method. Rather, lessons that may be drawn from it will be treated as illustrative of the existence of other mayoral leadership systems and, more importantly, as the basis from which to make suggestions for future research.

There is also the risk that case studies may prove to be unrepresentative of wider truths and, thus, dangerous from which to extrapolate generalisations (Hopkin, 2010:300). Research design must, therefore, ensure that comparison does not obscure inherent flaws in the cases' overall viability. In this thesis, the case studies are stratified between one system-type (the strong-mayor model of New York and London), with variations, and its opposite (the appointed, befitting Amsterdam). The first two case studies fit the method of difference in their comparative natures, being varied only in so far as the independent variables examined. The latter, as a control case study, is an outlier to these and thus available to set generalisations about strong mayors against. Nevertheless, as no comparison

upon the specifics of each case study will take place on a cross-national basis (for instance, London with Amsterdam), due to the difficulties of using the LCI in this way, comparative generalisations will be cautious in scope and, thus, not claim to be absolute. As Locke and Thelen (1995) argued, the comparison of two dissimilar things (in this case, diverse mayoral models) can still enhance a study, by enabling the demonstration of how even dependant variables can be experienced in very different ways, according to context-specific factors (Locke and Thelen, 1995; Hancke, 2010:241).

Sartori identified four key “traps” to be avoided when designing a comparative methodology. These were: parochialism, misclassification, degreeism and concept-stretching (Sartori, 1991:247-249). Parochialism – ‘...the use of single-country studies *in vacuo*...’ – is patently not of concern here, given the multiple, cross-national, case studies (Sartori, 1991:247). Misclassification – whereby one only orders case studies according to a single criterion – is similarly irrelevant here. This thesis compares case studies according to the *varied* extent to which mayoralties exhibit the strong-mayor form (or, conversely, the appointed form).

Degreeism refers to the ‘...abuse...of the maxim that differences in kind are best conceived as differences of degree, and that dichotomous treatments are invariably best replaced by continuous ones.’ (Sartori, 1991:248). However, such an approach can be useful if it is not abused but, rather, treated cautiously. When examining case studies using theoretical concepts which themselves exhibit an element of gradation (from strong to appointed), it seems wiser to allow for the conceiving of mayoral authority and power on a continuum, rather than an “either-or” scenario.

Finally, concept-stretching bears relevance here. Sartori’s meaning here was that studies can end up reaching false or weakened conclusions if they fail to clearly define the concepts applied between case studies. It is therefore imperative that the thesis’ comparative approach is based upon a sound understanding of both its theoretical framework, from which its hypothesis is drawn, and also its analytical tool, the LCI. Firm conceptions of each of these allows for a more structured analysis that remains both consistent in its application of terms and able to adapt to the circumstances of each case study (in such a way as to gain a deepened understanding of the data), whilst maintaining a dependent variable that is rooted in a central hypothesis.

2.2 Case Study Selection and Justification

The selected case studies are well-suited to pursuing this thesis' objective of assessing mayors' leadership. Together, they provide a sample of the two typologies of mayoral office (as defined within the Literature Review) – the strong and appointed mayors (Mouritzen and Svava, 2002:5). British and American mayors fit the strong mayoral model, both being directly-elected and tasked with the strategic implementation of their electoral mandates. Dutch mayors are aligned with the other key mayoral typology: appointed leadership. As identified in the thesis' research question, in the literature review and, also, in the introductory outlines of the different mayoralities examined, the study's focus is upon the ability of strong mayors to exert agency in the face of institutional limits.

The Mayors of London and New York are often cited as the leading examples of the model (Mouritzen and Svava, 2002; Elcock, 2008; Purnell, 2012; Geohegan, 2013; Karsten, 2016). This means that they are well-suited to a study, such as this one, which aims to compare and contrast mayoral capital. They are directly-elected and have wide policy purviews (though the Mayor of London's is more restricted than their American counterpart's). Their power and influence within each respective institution is also significant, with them frequently being able to project a sense of dominance over the accompanying legislatures.

When seeking mayors exercising the collective leadership style, studies such as Mouritzen & Svava's and Karsten's frequently cite Belgium and The Netherlands as some of the remaining examples of this. Belgian and Dutch mayors thus offer an opportunity to compare and contrast the strong model with a collegiate one. In this study, the Dutch example has been selected as, whilst it is similar to the Belgian model (treating mayors as Crown appointments), there remains a key difference (Mouritzen and Svava, 2002). In Belgium, the mayor is appointed from amongst the largest political grouping on the council whilst in The Netherlands political concerns are even further removed from consideration through constitutionally treating the role as a '...professional position...' and selecting someone from '...typically...outside the municipality.' (Mouritzen and Svava, 2002:72). This leaves it as being the closest to the "weak" model outlined by Svava, Hambleton and Sweeting in their various studies.

Amsterdam's mayoralty was chosen as it is the Dutch mayoral office which has received the most attention to date from scholars. Its mayors have often gone on to hold high offices of state (including Job Cohen becoming Leader of the Labour Party, having also previously been State Secretary for Justice) (Shorto, 2010). Mayors of Amsterdam clearly, therefore, command a high profile.

2.2.1 Selection Bias

It is necessary to briefly note the importance of considering the issue of selection bias within this study's research design. This is because comparative studies may be regarded as particularly-susceptible to this fault as they, by their nature, select two or more specified components to analyse (to the exclusion of other alternatives) (Geddes, 1990). Burrett also highlighted how the LCI's reliance upon application to specific leaders in clearly-defined circumstances is no less susceptible to this (Burrett, 2016b).

Selection bias can be defined as the process by which certain examples, phenomena or other subjects for study are selected in a way that deliberately excludes others and may lead to a choice that reinforces a hypothesis or researcher's prejudices (Geddes, 1990). It is, in essence, a discussion of an investigation's objectivity. This work is firmly rooted within an Interpretivist epistemological paradigm and is thus informed by the assumption that the world is socially constructed through the interaction of individuals (Grix, 2010:82-84). In this case, those individuals are political leaders.

This study has selected leaders of cities that share certain consistencies in their characteristics (as global cities) and which offer different models of leadership (the Anglo-American strong-mayor system and that of consensual democracy). Schaap, Daeman and Ringeling's two-part 2009 study into the mayors of seven countries gave a precedent for selecting case studies based upon their different leadership models or traditions (Schaap, Daeman and Ringeling, 2009a; Schaap, Daeman and Ringeling, 2009b). The design of their study – centred upon a hypothesis concerned with comparing differing leadership systems – demonstrated the success of such an approach (Schaap, *et. al.*, 2009a; Schaap, *et. al.*, 2009b).

Similarly, Elcock's 2008 comparison of mayors (in Greece, England, the United States of America and Germany) drew together data that had been obtained in a manner that he himself describes as '...opportunistic...'. (Elcock, 2008:797) This referred to use of coincidental periods of visiting academic residencies and a data-scoping exercise for a funding proposal, between 1993 and 2005, to obtain data sets on each mayor (Elcock, 2008). His case study design and selection were, therefore, rather randomised and subject to few objective selection processes. Instead, this thesis has selected case studies that allow it to directly address its hypothesis.

2.3 Contextual Analysis and Policy Case Studies

The case studies selected cover a large period of time – collectively, sixteen years, with the shortest mayoralties being eight years in length (Livingstone and Johnson). The broad scope of events, decisions and policies that could be covered far outreach the potential coverage of this thesis. This leads to a fresh imperative – finding an approach that can focus each case study on more closely-specified areas whilst still providing sufficient overviews of the leaders under consideration. The answer to this comes in two parts – through an analysis that focuses upon specific data metrics (as outlined in the LCI design) and an accompanying thematic emphasis upon policy case studies.

The policy case study approach is a means to an end and not an end in of itself. In other words, the thesis is not concerned with an examination of a specific policy area across the whole study. Instead, the policy case studies merely serve as a means to illustrate each leader’s style, focus and institutional relationships. To this end, the policy case studies vary between the mayoralties examined. For Bloomberg, his focus upon city development and planning is used. This was not only the area which he most concerned himself with during his tenure but, more importantly, it was the one which was most used by commentators and fellow leaders in order to make personalised critiques of his leadership. The case studies of Livingstone and Johnson focus upon transportation. This was originally the policy portfolio over which the Mayor of London had the most direct authority and is one which both mayors expended much personal capital over. The final case study (Cohen) focuses upon security and public safety. This is the only policy area over which the Mayor of Amsterdam has direct control.

These policy case studies do not “tie up” across all four leadership case studies but this is simply addressed. The focus of the thesis – leaders’ ability to assert their will, despite institutional constraints – remains consistent throughout and the variation in the independent variable of policy focus merely reflects both differing situational contexts and the amount of data available. It may be that another researcher would either choose different policy case studies or, indeed, focus upon the same policy area across the case studies. This thesis does not suggest that these are not legitimate approaches. Rather, it is that the study’s focus is so closely linked to the leaders’ individual experiences within their systems that the localised policy environments are very much secondary considerations. Each policy area offers a deep richness to the data’s context whilst the overarching research question (and sub-questions) allows for extrapolations to be drawn. Conclusions are based upon the wider leadership lessons to be learnt.

Indeed, the study is partially rooted in a contextual analytical approach. As 't Hart (2014b) has outlined, contextual analysis has some complementary overlaps with studies that consider institutional dynamics surrounding leaders. These include '...interest in penetrating how these institutional parameters in various jurisdictions shape, and are being interpreted by, individual office-holders' ('t Hart, 2014b:214). This lends itself to a comparative study considering how mayors from different jurisdictions shape and deploy the agency obtained from their leadership capital to pursue their will in the face of institutional constraints. Policy case studies, therefore, fit into the methodological approach of using rational choice theories and conceptualisations of mayoral leadership models in order to gain a clearer understanding of how mayors deploy such agency. The policies are a lens through which to focus upon specific institutional realities in order to assess how, where and why leaders' agency is both shaped and posited. As 't Hart argued (2014b:215), institutional realities leaders face '...are contextual in that they act as incentive structures constraining some and enabling other policy preferences and behaviours on the part of actors.' Leaders concerned are shaped by these contexts. They are at the head of institutions that influence the shaping and refining of their agency and agendas. Bloomberg led the archetypal strong mayor system, Livingstone was the first mayor of a brand new institution (which Johnson then sought to both simultaneously stretch and use as a means of delegating much of his responsibility) and Cohen oversaw a formally-limited institution that, nevertheless, placed much value upon the presence and convening power of the mayor.

Finally, these elements are combined through the application of rational choice theories. As outlined in the Literature Review, the '..."individuals within institutions"...' model of rational choice theory has been selected (Peters, 2012:55). This enables the inclusion of a linking point of analysis (related to the independent variables) around which to base consideration of any findings. Though the theoretical framework is drawn from Sweeting, Hambleton, Svava and others' work on the strong-mayor model, use of institutionalist perspectives helps to add further focus to the work by drawing the hypothesis' attention to the specific point of how strong mayors push against, or work with, structural limitations.

2.4 The Leadership Capital Index

2.4.1 The LCI's Theoretical Basis

The LCI is one aspect of an ongoing trend within contemporary political studies. Specifically, this is the desire to answer the issues of whether it is possible to measure leadership and, if so, how this might best be achieved. Helms (2012), Elgie (2015), Weller (2018) have all called for a means to track, measure and compare leadership & authority. In calling for this, they argue that such an evolution would help to further answer the more fundamental questions of what leadership itself is and, subsequently, how it is exercised in different contexts. As outlined further within this section, the LCI was designed with the idea of its being applied to case studies (and, consequently, for use in comparative research) and has received a favourable reception amongst leadership scholars (Elgie, 2015; Elgie, 2018; Weller, 2018). Thus, when added to its having been designed by those involved directly in leadership research, it is a pertinent tool for application within this study.


Mark Bennister, Paul t'Hart and Ben Worthy first published the LCI, in *West European Politics*, in 2015 (Bennister, t'Hart and Worthy, 2015). Subsequently, a 2017 book provided a range of case studies applying the LCI in varied contexts (national and subnational; comparative and individual) (Bennister, t'Hart and Worthy, 2017a). Designed for systematically indexing leaders' capital – its gains, falls and nuances. It was built around the concept that leadership capital may be regarded as informal authority (Bennister, *et. al.*, 2015).

Stanley Renshon defined the concept of capital as '...a surplus, something that you have beyond sufficiency that enables you to do something else of value.' (Renshon, 2000:203). Pierre Bourdieu previously discussed whether it had political dimensions (Bourdieu, 1986; Bourdieu, 2005). Possession of such capital was essential to the wielding of political power, enabling actors to accumulate '...capital of belief, of specific authority.' (Bourdieu, 2005:39). Holders of political capital would find others (peers and followers) conferring upon them the very powers and values that they purport to recognise in them (Bourdieu, 1986; Bourdieu, 2005). It is self-reinforcing and, for as long as it is held in sufficient quantity, perpetuates its holders' authority (Bourdieu, 2005). Bourdieu's conceptualisation of this form of capital '...is best understood as creditworthiness and not as a stash of cash of some symbolic currency in the political field.' (Jentges, 2017:263).

It is at this theoretical juncture that we encounter the progression from political capital to leadership capital. As the study uses the LCI, it makes most sense here to use the definition settled

upon by Bennister, *et. al.* (2015) in their article. They developed Bourdieu and Renshon’s ideas to identify three core pillars of leadership capital: *skills, relational* aspects and the *reputational* cycles surrounding leaders (see Fig. 1). The skills mentioned are those required in order to acquire, then maintain, leaders’ profile and status. As Davis and Seymour noted, this coincides with leaders’ need to win places within, then progress through, political hierarchies and institutions which they desire to join or change (Davis and Seymour, 2010). The concept of relational elements comes from Bourdieu’s assertion that trust is credited to leaders by constituencies and leaders, in turn, use it to mobilise others behind agendas (Bourdieu, cited in Bennister, *et. al.*, 2015). Bourdieu believed that leadership studies should not focus merely upon the specific actor being examined but also go beyond this and reflect the wider contexts in which leadership is exercised (Jentges, 2017:265). This supports the design of a study that includes reflections upon the institutional contexts within which leadership capital is exercised. The reputational cycle is that via which leaders enact agendas, seeking to further their reputation amongst stakeholders and followers (Bennister, *et. al.*, 2015).

Figure 1: Components of Leadership Capital



(Adapted from Bennister, t’Hart and Worthy, 2015)

As outlined below, the LCI has since been applied to leadership case studies across a range of research by many academics, including those working within non-Anglo-American settings. Indeed, the fact that the LCI has been taken up in this way (with the 2017 book containing chapters by authors from Hungary, Sweden, The Netherlands and elsewhere) demonstrates the traction that it is gaining within political leadership studies. This is, in a manner of speaking, another way by which to track the tool’s “evolution”, as it continues to cross linguistic and cultural barriers into new settings. Whilst still representing a small proportion of the current literature on measuring political leadership, it has certainly gained some traction in both comments on its place within the field and, similarly, its selection for use by researchers.

As Jentges (2017) outlined, the LCI's original iteration was designed to be applied to heads of government and state (in liberal democracies). Indeed, the initial publication of the LCI used a case study of Tony Blair (Bennister, *et. al.*, 2015). Thus, the original LCI calibration was, literally, a product of its designers (two of whom – Bennister and Worthy – have predominantly studied leadership at the executive/national level). Additionally, Frederik Byander and Par Daleus (2017) both acknowledged that the LCI takes some account of contextual factors but that it remained (as might be expected of a tool that remains in earlier developmental stages) in need of '...finetuning...' of some of its indicators, in order to make it more applicable to different levels of leadership.

In her 2016 use of the LCI Tina Burrett offered a case for adapting the LCI (Burrett, 2016). She adapted its ten existing indicators (Table 3) in order to make it more applicable to Japanese leadership cultures (Burrett, 2016). This demonstrated both the need to adjust the LCI, according to individual political cultural dynamics, and the tool's capacity to be applied in differing contexts.

Similarly, Marij Swinkels, Sabine van Zuydam and Femke van Esch (2017) have since provided further evidence of the need to adapt the LCI, with reference to The Netherlands. They noted that the Dutch system's unease with less consensual political approaches meant that the LCI's original conceptualisation made it less applicable to their case study. They adapted it to the circumstances at hand (for example, reflecting the fact that the Dutch system places greater value on possessing prior cabinet experience than length of time in office) (Swinkels, *et. al.*, 2017:168-169). Swinkels *et. al.*'s case study of Dutch leadership demonstrated that the Netherlands is substantively different to the Anglo-American context in which the LCI was created (despite one of its designers – 't Hart – being Dutch). As one of this thesis' case studies is Dutch, there is clearly a precedent and *need* for adapting the LCI in order to show appreciation of these methodological considerations.

Nevertheless, these developments still applied the LCI merely at the level of executive/national government. Whilst not critical of this approach (which has still, to-date, demonstrated the LCI's flexibility across cultures), this thesis has applied it at the local level. As discussed in the Findings Chapter, this established new points of learning with regard to the LCI's adaptability and need for further development. However, within this chapter the focus is upon the tool's malleability for application at the local level, prior to application to the specified case studies.

Skills, relational considerations and reputational cycles are, together, the basis upon which the LCI's conceptualisation of leadership capital is founded. These are the LCI's "core" characteristics. Adaptations of the LCI must reflect this and not seek to change them. To do so would be to create something that could not legitimately be argued to be an LCI formulation. Therefore, whilst there is precedent for adaptation, these elements will be preserved within this study's approach to the tool.

Table 3: The Original Indicators of the LCI

Criteria	Indicator	Measurements	Measurement/Data Type*
S1	Political/policy vision	(1) Completely absent (2) Unclear/inconsistent (3) Moderately clear/consistent (4) Clear/consistent (5) Very clear/consistent	Soft (expert)
S1	Communicative performance	(1) Very poor (2) Poor (3) Average (4) Good (5) Very good	Soft (expert)
S2	Personal poll rating relative to rating at most recent election	(1) Very low (<-15%) (2) Low (-5 to -15%) (3) Moderate (-5% to 5%) (4) High (5% to 15%) (5) Very high (>15%)	Hard (polling)
S2	Longevity (time in office)	(1) <1 year (2) 1-2 years (3) 2-3 years (4) 3-4 years (5) >4 years	Hard (chronology)
S2	(Re-)election as party leader (margin)	(1) Very small (<1% of relevant electors, ie. caucus, party members) (2) Small (1-5%) (3) Moderate (5-10%) (4) Large (10-15%) (5) Very large (>15%)	Hard (vote count)
R1	Party polling relative to most recent election result	(1) <-10% (2) -10% to -2.5% (3) -2.5% to 2.5% (4) 2.5%-10% (5) >10%	Hard (polling)

R1	Levels of public trust in leader	(1) 0-20% (2) 20-40% (3) 40-60% (4) 60-80% (5) 80-100%	Soft (expert)
R1	Likelihood of credible leadership challenge within next six months	(1) Very low (2) Low (3) Moderate (4) High (5) Very high	Soft (expert)
R2	Perceived ability to shape party's policy platform	(1) Very low (2) Low (3) Moderate (4) High (5) Very high	Soft (expert)
R2	Perceived parliamentary effectiveness	(1) Very low (2) Low (3) Moderate (4) High (5) Very high	Soft (expert)

(Adapted from Bennister, *et. al.*, 2015)

2.4.2 Adapting the LCI and Applying it at the Local Level

As outlined below, it has been necessary to adapt the LCI in order to make it applicable to the specified case studies. These adaptations reflect the necessity to take account of cross-national and cultural factors in the analysis of leaders from different countries. This is most prevalent with regard to the Cohen case study. The chapter now turns to consideration of the precise adaptations incorporated.

2.4.2.1 Timeframes

The research design must be consistent, in order to ensure a fair application of the LCI. This reflects Jonathan Hopkin's (2010) point that comparative studies must be consistent, in order to maintain a scientific analysis of the relationship between variables.

May 2000 has been selected as the beginning of the timeframe as this marked the point at which all three mayoralities were in concurrent existence (with the London Mayor's office being created that year). In order to ensure that there is consistency between each of the case studies, only mayors who have served full terms within this timeframe will be included. Thus, there will be no "part-sampling" of mayoralities or inclusion of mayors who continue to hold office at the time of writing (for instance, Sadiq Khan in London). Keeping this criterion consistent means that, whilst each mayor may

have served a different length of time in office (for example, Livingstone’s eight years or Bloomberg’s twelve), it will remain possible to analyse whole tenures. It also means that the inequity of comparing a full mayoralty with a partial one is avoided.

This means that the mayoralties of Ken Livingstone (2000-2008) and Boris Johnson (2008-2016) will be considered, with regards to London, whilst only the mayoralty of Michael Bloomberg (2002-2014) will be examined with regard to New York. Finally, the Amsterdam case study will analyse Job Cohen’s mayoralty (2001-2010). The end of the timeframe has thus been established as May 2016, the end of Johnson’s mayoralty.

Table 4: Case Study Timeframes and Specified Mayors

Case Study	Timeframe in relation to which LCI to be applied	Mayors to be analysed	Policy Case Study
London	May 2000 – May 2016	Ken Livingstone (2000-2008) Boris Johnson (2008-2016)	Transport Transport
New York	Jan. 2002 – Dec. 2013	Michael Bloomberg	Economic redevelopment
Amsterdam	Jan. 2001 – Jul. 2010	Job Cohen	Safety and Security

However, this reveals a further issue with regard to using the LCI as an analytical tool. With its attachment to dates as data points – in particular, very specific points – the LCI becomes problematic when used to analyse whole-term issue case studies. For example, the Livingstone LCI is applied in 2004 and 2008 but the contextual issues selected are each four-year long concerns. However, the answer to this – whilst not necessarily simple in application – is easily clarified. As the LCI is a relatively new tool, it will naturally come to be modified as it moves into more common usage. The 2017 book covering its evolutions over just its first two years of publication was evidence of this (Bennister, *et. al.*, 2017a). Consequently, in applying the tool, one should expect to identify issues that need problematising. This point was further underlined in an interview with one of the LCI’s creators – Paul ‘t Hart – in 2018 (‘t Hart, 2018). Whilst the LCI was not originally envisaged as a tool which would be used in conjunction with policy case studies, he conceded that it could be possible to do so with the kind of problematising that this chapter seeks to offer (‘t Hart, 2018).

This is to be handled by acknowledging the LCI's nature as a new tool, which remains open to development and interpretation. Though originally conceived of as a very date-orientated tool, this study proposes to adopt an experimental approach of assessing capital with reference to specified years (for instance, 2005, 2009 and 2013 in the case of Bloomberg), whilst allowing for reflections upon the accumulation of capital up to that point (Bennister, *et. al.*, 2015). This, then, allows for the combination of more date-specific metrics – such as those concerned with polling – with those that offer reflective measures of longer-term capital development (including interviewees' qualitative comments on how mayors had handled specific issues across a term). Consequently, the qualitative interviews undertaken take on a new significance, as they will need to offer a detailed understanding of how each mayor's capital trajectory rose and fell over the period prior to the LCI's application date and, consequently, how this contributed towards their capital. Lessons arising from the issues raised here are considered in the Findings chapter.

2.4.2.2 Application within Timeframes

In addition to considerations of adaptation, researchers must decide how often they apply it. The case of Burrett's 2016 study is instructive here. Two distinct potential approaches emerged from her article. The LCI can be applied once to a leader's time in office, creating a "snapshot" of their capital at that point. Alternatively, one could undertake this exercise repeatedly, creating a series of snapshots from which a cumulative account of leadership capital can be obtained. Burrett undertook the former approach but noted the merits of the latter. These were that a continuous understanding of a leader's capital would show development over time (Burrett, 2016). This allows researchers to use the index to track fluctuations and, hopefully, relate them to causal events and decisions. This matches better with the tool's creators' vision of an index that encompassed the means for plotting capital over a set time period (Bennister, *et. al.*, 2015). Moreover, single applications require researchers to outright select specific points within leaders' tenures to analyse. This leaves applications open to negative criticism, on the grounds of selection bias (Burrett, 2016).

In 2017, an edited collection of articles was published and it contained arguments supporting a number of different approaches towards using the LCI (Bennister, *et. al.*, 2017a). It offered perspective regarding the frequency of LCI applications. Andras Korosenyi, Peter Ondre and Andras Hajdu (2017) proposed the use of a "milestone approach", whereby researchers focus upon pre-defined key points in leaders' careers and apply the LCI at these junctures. These milestones could be

based on notable events (including elections or leadership challenges) or regulated intervals (with Korosenyi, *et. al.* using six-monthly periods) (Korosenyi, *et. al.*, 2017:83-86).

Bennister, *et. al.* (2017a) also acknowledged the difficulties of precise use of the LCI. Writing more generally of its limitations, they stated that choice over the evidence used (for example, pre-selecting specific polls from which to extrapolate data) has two problems. First, it creates a “snapshot” of leadership capital at that specific moment (meaning that findings may not be open to comparison across longer time periods due to intervening events) (Bennister, *et. al.*, 2017b:8). Second, the *choosing* of when to sample data from, and from which sources to acquire it, highlights the tool’s ‘...inescapably...’ subjective nature (Bennister, *et. al.*, 2017b:8). This issue of subjectivity clearly needs due consideration and this is provided in Section 3.5.0 (‘The Ontological and Epistemological Stance of the Researcher’).

Thus, deciding when to apply the tool is clearly subjective. However, this can be mitigated by the fact that the tool relies upon selecting points which allow for comparative data analysis. The act of using the LCI therefore becomes an automatic and implicit methodological acceptance of its inherent subjectivity. This subjectivity can be justified by choosing to use readily-available “milestones” – therefore allowing the case studies to dictate how the tool is applied. Here, the LCI is applied to the Livingstone, Johnson and Bloomberg case studies in the years when they faced either elections or the end of their terms (see below for further details). With regard to Amsterdam, the milestone approach becomes more problematic, due to the fact that mayors do not face elections. This issue is resolved in the following section.

Such considerations highlight that application of the LCI requires much forethought in relation to how it is calibrated. This demonstrates that the LCI naturally requires researchers to give careful consideration to case studies’ suitability for robust and repeated measurement. On the issue of how frequently the tool is to be applied, there are clearly factors here that both dictate this (as outlined above) and which mitigate against a charge of selection bias. The need to ensure overall consistency regarding the time period covered, and the desire to only analyse mayors whose full time in office fell within this, dictated which mayors were selected.

The LCI will be applied to Bloomberg at the end of each term of office. This ensures that consistent points are chosen regarding the timing of the application – the end of each term. This will allow for the systematically-structured approach of timing each application. It is therefore proposed

to apply the LCI to Bloomberg's mayoralty three times (2005, 2009 and 2013 – the year in which he left office). The method described utilises the natural structure of the office itself, following the four-yearly election cycle. This provides opportunities for subsequent reflections upon how the office itself (its structure and design) influences the accruing, maintaining and losing of leadership capital. This equitable treatment of data collection and analysis allows for methodologically-consistent sets of research data to be created.

The Livingstone and Johnson case studies serve as an extension of considerations of the Anglo-American model. The two mayoralties (New York and London) share many similarities, as outlined in the individual context sections at the beginning of this thesis. The Livingstone and Johnson case studies will apply the LCI twice – once at the end of each mayor's separate terms. This means applying it in 2004 & 2008 (Livingstone) and 2012 & 2016 (Johnson). Case study design would, therefore, be consistent with the approach taken towards Bloomberg. This fits with the milestone typology identified by Korosenyi, *et. al.* (2017).

The case study of Cohen requires a different judgement to be made. As the Mayor of Amsterdam is a Crown appointment (and, thus, unelected), it is not possible to apply the alongside electoral terms. There is not an institutionalised structure, as with the New York and London examples, which can be used to base the frequency of application upon. Indeed, many of the metrics assigned to the Bloomberg, Livingstone and Johnson case studies (see Table 5) simply do not apply in the Dutch context. For example, the Dutch do not have the same tradition of conducting polling as their Anglo-American counterparts. Initial scoping exercises revealed a scarcity of polling. Further conversations with Dutch researchers who study leadership, including at the mayoral level, confirmed that there is a distinct lack of such data within the Dutch political system (Transcript G, 2018; Transcript F, 2018; Transcript I, 2018). This lack of quantitative data for the trust, popularity and election/re-election metrics means that it is impossible to apply the same LCI to Cohen.

This makes it impossible to maintain the principle of consistency. The same metrics should be applied across all case studies or not at all. This is so that the case studies can be equally compared, on the basis of having been through the same analytical process. However, the fact that the case study of Cohen is different to the other three was inherent to its inclusion in the first place.

As earlier mentioned, the Amsterdam mayoralty is substantially different to the others included here, with its fitting the appointed model of leadership. It is, thus, an outlier or control case

study which merely allows for further contextualising comparisons to be drawn when discussing the leadership of the three strong mayors examined. There is, thus, space to include Cohen if any examination still retains methodological links to the other case studies. Such a link can be found within the theory underpinning the LCI itself. The LCI is built around the three pillars of skills, relations and reputational elements. These are the core of the LCI. In light of this, the thesis will examine Cohen's mayoralty using these three areas as meta-metrics. This allows for treating Cohen's mayoralty in a way which acknowledges the methodological issues the nature of the *office* presents, whilst continuing to treat the *individual* in a manner consistent with the others explored. Whilst this will not allow for the kind of detailed assessment that the ten more specific metrics allow for in the other case studies, it does retain a certain cohesion between the case studies overall and will, in turn, allow for links to be made between them when reaching final conclusions. It also ensures the continued equity of metrics across the other cases.

Moreover, Karsten and van Zuydam themselves have previously made clear that much of the existing body of leadership theory and its related analytical tools is largely unsuited to Dutch contexts, due to the differences in data availability and more consensual leadership styles (Karsten and van Zuydam, 2014). In light of this, they have advocated for adapting theories and typologies to reflect this unique nature, whilst still using them to seek to identify what lies at the core of leaders' authority (Karsten, *et. al.*, 2014:7). Morgan and Watson (1996:114) have also cited Svava as a precedent for treating appointed mayors differently. The Cohen case study has further relevance here, providing the opportunity to consider precisely how appointed mayors may, by comparison, seek to develop and deploy capital. Thus, the case study still maintains consistency with the theoretical propositions and variables under examination, essentially also justifying the difference in methodological approach.

Some LCI studies undertaken to date have used a comparative methodology (Bennister and Worthy, 2017; Burrett, 2016; Malloy, 2017). The use of a comparative approach towards the LCI is, therefore, not, in itself, an original application of the tool. However, the LCI has yet to be applied either at the local leadership level or within a study that involves cross-national case studies. Comparative use of international case studies does, therefore, make this study an original use of the LCI that draws upon a growing precedent for incorporating it within a comparative methodology. The issues arising from this, drawn from the experience of applying it to the case studies, are discussed in the Findings chapter.

This is, therefore, a clearly-structured approach to analysis, with carefully-managed stages. The final stage will be to draw the meta-conclusions obtained from each stage of this analysis together in order to see what, if any, synthesised and over-arching observations can be reached with regards to mayoral leadership capital.

2.4.2.3 LCI Metrics

The final point to consider is the construction of the LCI metrics. Table 3 noted the original ten metrics selected by Bennister, *et. al.* (2015) in their original study (Bennister, *et. al.*, 2015). This chapter has already problematised some of the points to be considered – consistency, frequency and timing of application.

Metrics must match to the core underlying theoretical foundation of the LCI – its reliance upon skills, relational aspects and reputational factors. One could outline other ways in which to measure political leadership. Howard Elcock and John Fenwick have discussed whether a matrix could be devised that would assess and quantify political leadership at both the executive and local levels (Elcock and Fenwick, 2012). However, the LCI is distinguishable by its focus upon the three key elements mentioned and revisions of it must, therefore, consistently adhere to these.

When comparing multiple case studies, each with their own differences, it is important to devise a set of metrics that give a breadth of variables. It is therefore proposed that – in relation to the Livingstone, Johnson and Bloomberg case studies – the metrics should be those which are detailed in Table 5. Metrics have not been created for Cohen, for the reasons detailed earlier.

Table 5: LCI Metrics (Bloomberg, Livingstone and Johnson)

Criteria	Indicator	Measurements	Measurement/Data Type*
S1a	Political/policy vision	(1) Completely absent (2) Unclear/inconsistent (3) Moderately clear/consistent (4) Clear/consistent (5) Very clear/consistent	Soft (expert and documentary analysis)
S1b	Communicative performance	(1) Very poor (2) Poor (3) Average (4) Good (5) Very good	Soft (expert and documentary analysis)
S2a	Personal poll rating relative to rating at most recent election	(1) Very low (<-15.5%) (2) Low (-5 to -15.4%) (3) Moderate (-5% to 5.4%) (4) High (5.5% to 15%) (5) Very high (>15%)	Hard (polling)
S2b	Longevity (time in office)	(1) <1 year (2) 1-2 years (3) 2-3 years (4) 3-4 years (5) >4 years	Hard (chronology)
S2c	Selection or re-selection as party candidate (margin)	(1) Very small (<1%) (2) Small (1-5.4%) (3) Moderate (5.5-10.4%) (4) Large (10.5-15%) (5) Very large (>15%)	Hard (vote count)
R1a	Party polling relative to most recent election result	(1) <-10% (2) -10% to -2.4% (3) -2.5% to 2.4% (4) 2.5%-10.4% (5) >10%	Hard (polling)
R1b	Levels of public trust in leader	(1) 0-20.4% (2) 20.5-40.4% (3) 40.5-60.4% (4) 60.5-80.4% (5) 80.5-100%	Soft (expert) and hard (polling)
R2a	Ability to work on a cross-partisan/consensual basis	(1) Very low (2) Low (3) Moderate (4) High (5) Very high	Soft (expert)

R2b	Perceived ability to shape party's policy platform	(1) Very low (2) Low (3) Moderate (4) High (5) Very high	Soft (expert)
R2c	Perceived ability in legislative effectiveness and achieving outcomes relative to the declared policy programme	(1) Very low (2) Low (3) Moderate (4) High (5) Very high	Soft (expert)

Eight of the original metrics have been retained unchanged (S1a, S1b, S2a, S2b, S2c, R1a, R1b and R2b), as they all offer insights into the general leadership environment and are transferable both to a local level of analysis and, also, between each of the three aforementioned case studies.

Finally, two metrics have been replaced (R2a and R2c). These were concerned with the likelihood of leadership challenges within six months of the LCI's application and a leader's parliamentary effectiveness. These more closely relate to analyses focused upon executive leaders who have dealings with national parliaments. Regarding the mayoral case studies chosen, there is almost no likelihood (with no such occurrence having previously been recorded) of party leadership challenges (for which we might substitute "change of mayor") occurring. London and New York's mayoralties were constituted so as to guarantee a popularly-elected office-holder a four-year term. Scope for leadership challenges is therefore negligible. Within the specific case studies selected, no such leadership challenges occurred. Therefore, a new metric (R2a) has been introduced to assess cross-partisanship).

None of the mayoralties selected for examination have a parliament, though there are accompanying legislatures. Metric R2c has therefore been reconfigured to account for how each mayor worked with this body and, subsequently, their skill in instituting their official programmes.

The revisions outlined here are made on the basis that the LCI remains a relatively new tool and, as acknowledged by its creators, continues to need adapting in order to make it applicable to a wider range of case studies (Bennister, *et. al.*, 2017b). As the LCI is moved to being applied to new leaders, at various leadership levels (in this case, the local) and cross-nationally, the tool itself must change in order to retain a methodological "fit" to the case studies examined. Failure to undertake such revisions would lead to the anachronistic application of a tool that could not sufficiently discern the necessary information for evaluation. For instance, the metric-specific alterations and substitutions outlined above ensure that the tool remains both relevant and able to provide clearer

assessments of the leaders analysed. Further, the local level of leadership remains underexamined when compared with the number of studies exploring comparisons at the national level. This has, so far, been the case with applications of the LCI, too. Thus, the LCI's adaptation facilitates its being applied to a wider range of leadership case studies – filling a gap that it would otherwise ignore. Finally, the flexibility of its metrics (provided that they follow the Skills, Reputational and Relational capital pattern) means that the tool inherently encourages adaptability. This means that it offers the kind of utility that enables it to provide a more credible answer to the earlier-mentioned questions posed by Helms, Elgie, Weller and others.

As discussed following the tool's application to the thesis' case studies, the adaptation of the tool for the purpose of this study reveals further issues that will need to be problematised in future research. However, the revisiting of non-Anglo-American case studies (including those by Burrett, Swinkels, *et. al*, and the Cohen case study within this thesis) demonstrates both the tool's potential and limitations – a further avenue for future research.

2.4.2.4 Data Collection

These metrics require the collection of a range of data and some indication as to the nature of this is given in Table 5. To briefly summarise and clarify this, the key data sources will be as follows:

1. Expert (Interviews)

A full list on interviewees is available at the beginning of this thesis. In order to contextualise findings, it is necessary to give adequate consideration to qualitative perspectives. This will be achieved through a small number of semi-structured interviews with key figures within each respective case study (including senior officials, deputy mayors and journalists). These will obtain context, through perspectives on issues such as mayoral effectiveness in cross-party co-operation and their success in the communication of a policy vision. They offer the opportunity to cautiously (given the nature of the interviewees and their potential personal histories with the subjects discussed) include a richer level of observational detail and opinion.

“Expert” data also includes non-interview-based assessments, through the consideration of those works that exist in relation to each mayoralty – from the more academic in nature through to those that offer commentary or auto/biographical accounts of each office holder – and consideration of political commentaries and media reports regarding each office holder.

In the Dutch case, the chapter also draws upon the fact that Cohen himself was available for an in-depth semi-structured interview and that this, in turn, provided a unique opportunity for having one of the case-studied mayors themselves informing the thesis. Naturally, this data must be treated with considerable caution, given the potential for Cohen to misrepresent (deliberately or unwittingly) events and decisions. This will be addressed through both cross-referencing the interview data with secondary sources and other documentary evidence. Overall, this provides a further reason as to why this case must be treated as more of an outlier when considered in relation to the others.

The sample of interviewees was arrived at by seeking the contribution of those who had either worked closely within the mayoralities themselves or were themselves expert observers of the mayors in question. On occasion, participants were recommended by other interviewees. Therefore, the interviewees were partially self-selecting, meaning that they were not an entirely unbiased (though broad) selection. Their willingness to participate was, however, a fact in common between them. This meant that the range of interviewees varied from one actual mayor and deputy mayor through to journalists who had spent their careers covering mayoral policies and decisions. In one particular case (Transcript F), the interviewee was also able to offer observations on the application and development of the LCI, due to having been one of its creators. The interviews were semi-structured and, thus, no two were identical. However, an example schedule of questions is set out at the end of this subsection.

Interviews were transcribed by the researcher and then coded, manually, in order to make extraction of relevant data easier. For instance, each interview was coded (by hand and using a simple colour key) according to:

- a. General comments on the mayor in question's leadership;
- b. Details related to the specified policy case study;
- c. Broader points that related back to points connected with either the theoretical framework or institutionalism; and
- d. Aspects that reflected specific metrics of the LCI applied.

This was used to assist in constructing both the background segments at the start of each case study chapter and, similarly, the development of the metric-by-metric analysis sections following them.

2. Documentary

Each mayoral office publishes a range of reports, debate transcripts, budget sheets and similar documents that are of relevance in seeking to assess the mayors' influence over policy processes. These allow for consideration (when speeches and transcripts are accounted for) of their communicative abilities and cross-party appeal. Such documents include, for example, but are not limited to: press releases from the Office of the Mayor of New York regarding Bloomberg's emerging vision for post-9/11 economic redevelopment; the 2000 Report on the Road Charging Options for London (ROCOL), which led to Livingstone implementing the Congestion Charge (CC); the 2016 Public Accounts Committee Report on Johnson's proposed Garden Bridge; and *Plan 1012* in Amsterdam (which outlined the basis for some of Cohen's safety and security intentions).

3. Polling

The regularity of polling exercises in the UK and USA means that the tradition of collating poll-based data for analysis is an acknowledged practice. Polling organisations whose data will be used include IPSOS-Mori, YouGov, Opinium, Survation and Quinnipiac University Polls. The lack of a Dutch polling culture meant that poll-based evidence does not feature in the Cohen chapter.

Table 6: Example Schedule of Interview Questions

1. Could you give an outline of the role(s) you held at [relevant mayoralty] and your initial thoughts on the evolution of the institution during your time there?
2. Did you form any impressions of [case study mayor's] personal approach to leadership? If so, what were they?
3. What were your impressions of [case study mayor's] ability to work in a consensual/non-partisan basis?
4. How would you describe [case study mayor's] political and policy visions?
5. How would you describe [case study mayor's] communicative performances?
6. What would you argue were [case study mayor's] greatest successes/failures?
7. Are there any further thoughts or reflections that you would like to add?
8. Is there anyone else that you would suggest that I might like to consider interviewing or contacting?

2.5 The Ontological and Epistemological Stance of the Researcher

As a tool, the LCI relies on researchers' judgements in both deciding the scores associated with each metric (for instance, rating a trust rating of less than 20% as being awarded "1") and, also, in then judging which scores to confer. Where quantitative measures exist, this in part resolves itself, as the chosen weighting is matched to percentages dictated by the index, published in peer reviewed work. However, for qualitative measures assigning a score is much more subjective: the tool relies on the researcher's judgement, once they have considered the collected data, as to whether a leader's communicative performance was "good" or "very good". Furthermore, this judgement decides the scores that are then used within discussions of findings. This stance is not for everyone: assigning a numerical value to a qualitative measure is considered impossible by some. However, this is a central aspect of the LCI, and one which this study must therefore accept. Thus, this section turns to consideration of this subjective assignment of values, with reference to Paul Furlong and David Marsh's exposition on researchers' ontological and epistemological realities (in Marsh and Stoker's *Theory and Methods in Political Science*)

There is an implicit relationship between researchers' own understandings of knowledge acquisition and the data collected: is all quantitative data objective?; is all qualitative data subjective?; can the two mix? For this use of the LCI, the author notes that yes, the two can and must combine. Moreover, as noted in the findings, cultural understandings impact on all facets of research, including leadership. What is meant by leadership varies, as do conceptions of good leadership. However, although the LCI is a relatively new tool, it *is* peer reviewed and published. Whilst criticisms of its subjectivity are valid, the index does provide an established and tested framework through which to carry out further analysis.

At this juncture, it is appropriate to make brief comment upon my own ontological and epistemological reality. Constructivist ontology fits with my view of research as a process that, though seeking to be scientific, contains a certain element of subjectivity. In a Constructivist understanding, '...reality is not discovered...rather it is actively constructed...' (Furlong and Marsh, 2010:190). Thus, '...no actor...' (for which, we here mean researcher) '...can be objective of [a] value-free actor.' (Furlong and Marsh, 2010:190). This is where epistemology – the concern of *how* we can know of our social reality – becomes relevant. Interpretivism – the branch of epistemological thought that contends that '...the world is socially or discursively constructed...' – is the natural epistemological position which flows from this (Furlong and Marsh, 2010:199). This means that there is an implicit relationship between a researcher's own understandings of knowledge acquisition and the data collected.

Researchers' interpretations of social and political realities studied thus affect the findings, through their ontological and epistemological stance setting the "lens" through which analysis takes place (Furlong and Marsh, 2010:199). Thus, the thesis contains explicit acceptance of the aforementioned subjectivity and its impact upon the research process.

From this perspective, use of a subjective tool is not prohibitive of the goal of high-quality social science research. A researcher's impact upon their social study logically renders the research conducted to be subjective, to a certain extent. What matters is both that this is acknowledged (as is the case both here and in the Findings chapter) and that it should, also, lead to a more cautious tone in the presentation of findings. Overall, then, the LCI's subjective nature, and the subjectivity of the researcher applying it, are explicitly acknowledged at the outset of this study and what follows throughout the rest of the thesis should be understood in that context.

2.6 Conclusion

Colin Copus and Steve Leach, in their contribution to Rhodes and t'Hart's 2014 *The Oxford Handbook of Political Leadership*, highlighted that one of the key issues in comparative approaches is that concern regarding the varied constitutional arrangements of subnational governments in different countries has overshadowed potentially useful consideration of other comparable aspects (Copus, 2014:558). These could include those targeted in this study – how strong mayors deploy capital in extending their agency beyond their institutions.

The methodological approach of the study is one which reflects a consciousness of the limitations placed upon it by the realities of research design. Throughout the literature on case study-based comparative research, there is general consensus that such studies might illustrate specific points (Renshon, 2014; Bennett and George, 2005). It is possible to use this approach in order to test existing hypotheses and constructs. Helms (2012b) argued this very point in his 2012 edited collection on comparative political leadership studies and, more pertinently, Bennister *et. al.* (2015) explicitly outlined a hope that it would be used in this way in order to test and refine it. As Burnham, Gilland, Grant and Layton-Henry (2004) have argued, the cross-referencing of the results of multiple case studies can reveal common learning points that offer these wider reflections. Conversely, one must not over-generalise in the determination to reach, over-arching, conclusions. This desire can resort in a loss of nuanced reflection and a lack of clarity regarding findings. However, it is possible to use findings to reflect overall *suggestions* of where existing knowledge and theoretical frameworks may be critiqued and extended. Consistent application of the LCI's core pillars means that the findings will be tied to the same analytical "root" around which to build reflections. As John Gerring (2004:341) argued, case study-based approaches are methodologically useful, precisely *because* they allow for '...in-depth study of a single unit (a relatively bounded phenomenon) where the scholar's aim is to elucidate features of a larger class of similar phenomenon...'.

Overall, the following rules must be followed throughout the application of the LCI:

1. The LCI can be adapted to suit application at different levels of leadership. However, any adaptations must be constructed around the tool's three core pillars: skills, reputational aspects and relational factors.
2. Only office holders who have served full terms in office should be analysed. Partial consideration of partial terms could potentially lead to uneven analysis and, thus, a less scientific approach.

3. The tool must be applied with consistent frequency across all case studies, in order to create equitable indexes around which to build wider, comparative, conclusions.

To conclude, the LCI is still in its early development. The fact that it has already been adapted and applied in many different national and leadership contexts, demonstrates its utility and adaptability. These make it well-suited for use within a growing number of studies. With regards to this study, it offers the means around which to structure the proposed comparative analysis whilst providing methodological boundaries. Findings with regard to its utility, and the experience of adapting it for use within this study, will be considered alongside the case study-specific conclusions in the final chapter of the thesis.

3.0 Case Study Contexts

This first half of this chapter provides an overview of the context to each of the mayoralties examined subsequently. The second half concludes the contextualisation by providing a brief review of the literature specific to these case studies.

3.1 The Office of the Mayor of New York and its Relationship to the City Council

There have been Mayors of New York City since 1665, when Captain Thomas Willett became the first (Yale Smith, 1940:407). The office has changed substantially since then, with both the gradual growth of the office's powers and the introduction of a system of popular direct election in 1834 (*New York Times*, 1861; Dodge and Koed, 2005:1425). Michael Bloomberg, then, was the one-hundred-and-eighth Mayor of New York (2002-2013). He oversaw a city of more than eight million people, with a budget '...larger than all but four state governments in the United States...' (California, Texas, Florida and the State of New York) (Fine and Caras, 2013:120). His purview included economic development, policing, schools (added under Bloomberg), public health and the environment (Geoghegan, 2013).

Some policy priorities have been consistently on mayors' agendas since the 1950s, when a post-war population boom left a need for greater public delivery of services (Judd, 2000; Cohen, 2004). These priorities have included economic growth, planning, poverty, policing, public health, sanitation and education (Cohen, 2004:67). One example of this is the ongoing struggle over the affordability of housing in New York. A post-war shortage of housing led to rent regulations being expanded at a time when public finances were unable to keep up with the demand for construction (Transcript M, 2019:4). Simultaneously, the rapid growth of New York's financial sector led to increased demand for luxury housing, with the result being a long-term disparity between the provision of affordable housing and the expansion of high-end properties (Transcript M, 2019:4). Similarly, the issue of balancing the city's budget has been a constant issue for the government, with fiscal deficits and the need to tackle them having been the norm (due to the higher level of public service provision) since 1945 (Holli, 1999:84-96). The theme of economic development is picked up in greater detail within the chapter exploring Bloomberg's mayoralty.

Whilst several of the policy challenges have remained persistent, the office of Mayor itself has seen several changes. These vary from the constitutional to more mundane aspects regarding the Mayor's policy remit. The Mayor is, in effect, seen as the city's foremost problem-solver; an office-holder who is expected, by virtue of their extensive remit, to address multiple complex problems using

the resources available to them (Dahl, 1961; Fuchs, 1992; Morgan and Watson, 1993). These resources have been shaped by the constitutional and structural changes affecting the office.

Most significant in these was the 1989 revision of the New York City Charter. This is, in effect, the constitution of the city and it is regularly revised in attempts to retain its relevance to political and cultural developments. Though formally assigning the Mayor and City Council as 'co-equal' partners in government, the 1989 revisions embedded the Mayor as the key budgetary proposer in the city (and, consequently, gave them greater resourcing power than the council). The City Council passes laws, adopts the budget (proposed by the Mayor) after scrutiny and approves mayoral plans for projects requiring planning relation to major land use (Fine and Caras, 2013:120-121). In return, the Mayor is charged with running the executive, implementing laws managing government officials and agencies (Fine and Caras, 2013:121). The former Chair and Executive Director of the commission which designed the City Charter in 1989 subsequently stated that their desire for this relationship was driven by the previous reality that '...the Council sometimes did historically seem to see its role as a junior partner of the mayor...' (Schwarz and Lane, 1998:781). Likewise, the earlier experience of the 1970s, when New York City's government was brought to the brink of insolvency, drove a similar push for the Mayor to have a strengthened position following 1989. The result was a council with enhanced abilities to scrutinise and amend mayoral budgets but, also, a mayor's office which retained the ability to both set that budget and, further, become the prime initiator of planning development (Fine and Caras, 2013:124-125). This matched to a time when, due to a need for lower spending at the federal-level, local governments were required to assume greater levels of responsibility for their own finance and, thus, local policy priorities (DiGaetano and Strom, 2003:369). Collectively, this is the context in which mayors holding office since the 1989 City Charter was introduced (from David Dinkins onwards) have operated.

The abolition of the Board of Estimate was one of the 1989 revision's most important changes. The Board was the body which helped set the city's annual budget. It was comprised of the Mayor, Comptroller, Speaker (then known as the President of the City Council) and the five borough presidents (elected individuals who serve as advocates for the boroughs) (Weikart, 2009:160n). The Supreme Court ruled the Board unconstitutional in 1989, as it contravened the one-member-one-vote principle by affording equal votes to each of the borough presidents, despite variance in their respective areas' populations (Weikart, 2009:80). Thus, the Board's powers to modify and approve budgets (along with similar powers over proposals for large-scale land usage) were transferred to the

Council (Fine and Caras, 2013:125). However, the Mayor is the proposer of the budget and can, thus, control much of the initial shaping of budgetary priorities and economic development proposals.

The Mayor is compelled to work with the council over the budget, through negotiations with the Speaker. The Speaker is, as noted by McNickle, the ‘...second-most powerful elected official in New York City government...’ and is elected by the fifty-one member Council (in the same manner as state speakers and the Speaker of the federal House of Representatives) (McNickle, 2017:54; Doctoroff, 2017:173). Their power lies in their position as *de facto* leader and spokesperson of the legislative branch of government, overseeing and selecting the legislation to be brought in front of the Council. In this respect, they hold significant power as the “gatekeeper” of mayoral budgets and regulations, in that they control when and how it comes to before the Council. Bloomberg proved that this was not necessarily an obstruction if the Mayor is skilled in politically navigating this area (McNickle, 2017:62). His 2006 discussions with Speaker Christine Quinn were protracted but, ultimately, resulted in budget proposals that remained consistent with his desire to see tighter fiscal rules imposed upon budgets, in order to avoid the historic problem of city governments running large deficits (McNickle, 2017:62).

The Mayor can, of course, face other constraints. The most obvious of these is the term limit placed upon office-holders. As discussed in the Bloomberg chapter, this became one of the key points of contention under Bloomberg’s mayoralty. Prior to Rudy Giuliani’s mayoralty (1993-2001), mayors were limited to three terms of office (McNickle, 2017:254-255). However, public referenda in 1993 and 1996 (the second used as a confirmatory referendum) favoured a move to a two-term limit (by 59% to 41% and 54% to 46%, respectively) (McNickle, 2017:254-255). This public expression of the electorate’s preference for direct limits on mayor’s longevity is both a reminder to office-holders that they are constrained by time but, similarly, that they must act quickly if they are to see through larger-scale agendas.

3.2 The Strong-Mayor System in New York

The New York mayoralty is a strong-mayor system. The Mayor is both powerful in relation to the City Council and able to control much of the resourcing power that their institution affords them. Similarly, their office provides a platform for the articulation of wider urban political issues. This comes as a consequence of New York being both a global city and America's largest city, as well as the nation's media capital (Transcript K, 2019:1; The United States Census Bureau, 2018). This adds an informal dimension to their power – one of being able to convene other major interests in the city's government (including the police, fire services, public works department, planners, teachers, business community and others) to seek solutions.

Its structure is the archetype of the model (referred to as the mayor-council form) Sweeting and Svava (Sweeting, 2017; Svava, 2017:104) have described. In short, New York City's government is based around a separation of powers between an executive mayor and a corresponding legislature, with the former as the initiator and deliverer of policy innovations and the latter as scrutineer (Svava, 2017:104). Separation is not, however, synonymous for balance. As Clarence Stone has argued, the strong-mayor model vests much power in an incumbent, through their monopolisation of the executive function, and, therefore, '...is in some ways a miniature presidency.' (Stone, 1995:110; Hambleton, 2017:249). This runs against the norm in US urban politics, with Svava (2017:109) estimating that 58% of US cities have pursued a council-manager (weaker) model, preferring to entrench the separation of powers in such a way as to limit executive function (so that individual mayors cannot become over-mighty). In New York, however, the inherent potential weakness in the legislature, when compared to the executive's ability to dictate policy and how it is implemented, has remained unchanged, particularly since 1989.

It is noteworthy to consider how the government has addressed one of the greatest potential dangers of the strong-mayor model. As Svava noted (2017:115), the mayor-council form has an inherent potential for impasse between the mayor and council, with the latter potentially seeking to block the former's major initiatives (such as a budget), as this remains their most apparent check-and-balance against a strong executive. However, to take just one example, Bloomberg's success in getting new fiscal rules introduced in 2006, despite Quinn's extension of the negotiation period, demonstrated that the Mayor's legal position as the initiator and implementer of policy continues to hold sway¹.

¹ For more detail on this, please see the Bloomberg case study chapter.

Overall, then, New York possesses one of the governance institutions most frequently cited as an exemplar of the strong-mayor system. It has even led to commentators seriously asking whether it is the strongest mayoralty in the world (Geoghegan, 2013). In this context, the potential political scope for a mayor, in terms of both formal and informal powers, is substantial.

3.3 The London Mayor: A Political Innovation (Pre-2000 Context)

Prior to commencing an examination of the mayoralty of Ken Livingstone (2000-2008), it is necessary to first provide a brief contextual outline of the establishment of both the Office of the Mayor of London and also the accompanying Greater London Authority (GLA). This is because Livingstone was not only *a* Mayor of London but, in fact, the *first* holder of that office. The period of his mayoralty was, therefore, also the time in which this new tier of city-wide governance was being embedded. Livingstone's part in this, through the evolution of the mayoral office (both formally and informally), and the Greater London Assembly's concurrent development as scrutineer of the executive, is thus also a reflection of the early years of this political innovation.

The London Assembly is a non-legislative body with relatively few powers – with its main focus being upon scrutinising the Mayor of London. Though it has policy-orientated committees, these have no power to impose their view upon a Mayor, nor to commission public agencies to formally respond to their findings (Sandford, 2017). Those powers which it does possess are limited to being able to vote down the Mayor's annual budget and, since 2011, the ability to do the same regarding the statutory strategies that are published by the Mayor's office (Sandford, 2017). However, this can only be achieved if voted for by a two-thirds super-majority of the Assembly (with it being necessary, in the case of the budget, to have an alternative proposal already presented) (Sandford, 2017). Given the proportional nature of the Assembly (with this meaning that no one party is ever likely to have sufficient numbers to achieve these majorities on their own), they are thus very tightly constrained. Their lacking the function to legislate further limits their role and has, as several interviewees reflected, left them both weak in relation to the Mayor and without sufficient purpose to properly justify their existence. (Transcript A, 2018; Transcript B, 2018; Transcript C, 2018; Transcript E, 2018).

3.4 Governance Proposals Prior to the 1997 General Election

By 1997, the topics of both how best to govern London and also whether mayoral leadership might be an idea whose time had come had received an increasing level of attention from senior national politicians. In 1991, Michael Heseltine (Secretary of State for the Environment) introduced one of the first policy papers, *Local government review: The internal management of local authorities in England, a consultation paper*, to speculate about the possibility of mayoral leadership in England (Department of the Environment, 1991). This was prompted by Heseltine's review, a year earlier, of the general structure of English local government (following the public debate arising from the attempted Poll Tax reform) (Wood, 1995).

Following Heseltine's paper, the Labour and Liberal Democrat manifestos for the 1992 election contained a commitment to consider what might be the best method of establishing a city-wide government that would replace the multiple bodies and "quangos" which were running London at that time and were answerable to the central government (Whitton, 2014). This system of government offices and public bodies was furthered in 1994, when John Major's administration created the Government Office for London (GOL) (Office for National Statistics, 2016). GOL brought together the central government's interests, with regard to key policy areas, within London – from oversight of London schools through to the city's economic development (The National Archives, 2010). GOL endured throughout the first ten-and-a-half years of the London Mayor's existence, only finally closing following the 2010 Comprehensive Spending Review (HM Treasury, 2010). This was an example of the continued complications in the evolving story of British devolution.

As one interviewee has commented, the pattern of central government running public bodies within London has continued, despite the establishment of the GLA and London Mayor in 2000 (Transcript B, 2018:6-7). For instance, they cited the fact that the Home Secretary retains a great deal of control over policing within London, despite it being a partially-devolved area of competence (Transcript B, 2018:7). This signified that the tradition of London's governance being overseen from central government appeared to be continuing, nearly twenty years after the introduction of the Mayor was supposed to create a sizeable change in the capital's executive administration.

The Department for the Environment's 1991 paper raised interest in the idea of directly-elected mayors in English local governance, though did not mention London (Pimlott and Rao, 2002:59). Instead, it was in 1995, when the independent Commission for Local Democracy (CLD)

published a report which repeated the case for introducing directly-elected mayors, that the idea received its most significant proposal to-date (Commission for Local Democracy, 1995).

The nine-member commission included individuals from policy, governance and commercial backgrounds, including former leader of the London Borough of Lewisham (and future directly-elected mayor of the same borough) Steve Bullock and Professor Gerry Stoker, then Co-ordinator of the Economic and Social Research Council's (ESRC) Local Governance Research Programme (CLD, 1995). The CLD's core focus had been to investigate English local government's '...definition and purpose; its institutional structure; ...new forms of democratic participation; and lessons from other countries.' (CLD, 1995:iii). In particular, the CLD identified this focus as having emerged from the belief that British political administration had become '...too exclusively national', with the reduction of governance capacity at the local level, in favour of more executive action from the centre (CLD, 1995:1). This, they believed, had occurred due to an increasing reliance by local government on central government for funding, through block grants, and the passing of no fewer than fourteen Acts of Parliament (between 1976 and 1995) which sought to restrict the amount of revenue local government could demand from Her Majesty's Treasury, as governments sought to gain greater control over local government spending (at a time of national economic deficits) (HMT) (CLD, 1995:6). It argued that 'Nothing but radical change...' could '...halt the drain of democratic activity from British local government...' (CLD, 1995:iv). The CLD recommended that a system of directly-elected mayors would reinvigorate local politics by advancing greater direct involvement of the electorate and policy autonomy for councils. (CLD, 1995:54-57).

The CLD's recommendations were not acted upon by the national government (as Heseltine was unable to persuade the Prime Minister, John Major, of the need for reform), but were noted by the opposition – Tony Blair's Labour Party (Edwards and Isaby, 2008:1). In 1996, Labour published *A Voice for London* – a consultation document which represented the first time that a mayor *specifically* for London had been proposed (Labour Party, 1996; Edwards and Isaby, 2008:1; Carvel, 1999:253). Indeed, Simon Jenkins later claimed that Blair had been persuaded of the case for an accountable single leader for London by the CLD's report (Jenkins, cited in Hosken, 2008:290).

A Voice for London argued for the creation of both the GLA and also the mayoralty. The GLA would not provide services *directly* but would operate some public services (for instance, the fire and police services) via accountable boards, whilst formulating city-wide strategies in a number of areas (transport, policing, the economy, the environment and planning) (Pimlott and Rao, 2002). Benjamin

Pimlott and Nirmala Rao (2002) have rightly described the case put forward for a mayor as tentative. Speaking in 2017, Peter Mandelson argued that Labour's approach towards a mayor for London (and the powers that they would have) was a '...cautious fudge...' because, though Tony Blair was in favour of the reform, John Prescott (Labour's Deputy Leader) represented '...a resistance movement...' to mayors (Mandelson, 2017). This was, in Mandelson's view, due to Prescott's tendency to want to focus governance reforms at the regional level in England (Mandelson, 2017). However, Mandelson did argue that Labour's focus, both prior to winning government in 1997 and also when beginning to implement the reform afterwards, was chiefly upon the Mayor and less so on the surrounding institution of the GLA, despite this internal disagreement about policy (Mandelson, 2017).

One of the reasons for the '...cautious fudge...' described may well be New Labour's desire that any new London-wide institution would not be a replication of the former Greater London Council (GLC) (Mandelson, 2017). One interviewee, who worked within the Mayor's Office during its early years, commented '...the set up of the GLA had always been deliberate in that it wasn't going to be a successor to the GLC... So it was very much required to "keep in its box", I suppose.' (Transcript A, 2018:4). This institutional design had been driven by memories of the recent history of the GLC, which had, under Ken Livingstone (1981-1986), become a platform from which to oppose the Conservative government of the day. Indeed, when the GLC was abolished by Margaret Thatcher's government (in 1986), Livingstone held a ceremony for the lowering of the flag over the building (to mark the end of an institution which he had led in opposition to the government) (Livingstone, 2011:266). It is perhaps not surprising, therefore, that Blair's Labour Party (even before they began to grow concerned at the prospect of a Livingstone candidacy) were anxious about creating an alternative power base, with the potential to voice publicly-visible criticisms, in London.

However, their success in doing so is very much open to question. Despite the aforementioned interview evidence suggesting that central government was keen to retain at least partial control over large areas of policy, others have suggested that Livingstone was still able to leave a personal impression on the GLA. He was still able to shape it to the extent that another interviewee, who was very much involved in the establishment of the Mayor's Office, underlined the point that '...the GLA as it is...is still very much the Ken Livingstone structure of the GLA, and the Ken Livingstone operating model.' (Transcript A, 2018:4). Whether one supports this contention or not, it remains clear that Livingstone was so personally associated with the institution as to leave insiders in little doubt as to his strong impact upon it.

3.5 1997-2000: Election to Election

The period between the 1997 General Election and the 2000 Mayoral Election were marked by a number of events. Together, these set the context for the mayoralty that Livingstone commenced in 2000. These events can be placed into two broad categories:

- i. The referendum regarding whether London should have a mayor and city-wide government;
- ii. The selection of Labour's candidate for mayor and the election itself.

3.5.1 The Referendum

Labour's manifesto for the 1997 General Election included the commitment to '...a new deal for London, with a strategic authority and a mayor...' who would '...speak up for the needs of the city and plan its future.' (Labour Party, 1997:34). As David Wilson and Chris Game (2011:79) have noted, the government's aim was to '...produce a novel and unique set of institutions: a mix of strategic local government and embryonic regional government...' that was entirely new and without comparable precedent in UK history.

After Labour had won the 1997 General Election, they moved quickly to introduce a mayor for London. On July 3 1997, the government used a green paper, entitled *New Leadership for London*, to propose the idea of a London-wide referendum on whether or not to adopt the mayoral system on May 7 1998 (Hosken, 2008:290; Sandford, 2017:4).

Initially, Livingstone was cynical of the idea of an elected mayor, arguing instead for Londoners to be governed by a structure more closely matched to the GLC (Livingstone, 2011:379; Whitton, 2014). Hosken argued that Livingstone's ongoing opposition to the modernisation programme within the Labour government meant that he was keen to find a platform from which he could criticise New Labour more prominently than the backbenches (Hosken, 2008:291-294; Alderman, 2000:752). A new, city-wide mayoralty of the capital clearly offered an opportunity for this. Livingstone himself has offered other reasons for both his scepticism and subsequent conversion. Writing in 2011, he recalled thinking that the idea of a mayor was '...barmy, just another example of New Labour's obsession with all things American.' (Livingstone, 2011:378). He believed that Labour's leadership would never allow him to run as their candidate, given that his history as a left-wing GLC leader (who openly opposed any central government policies that he disagreed with) had strongly associated him with more left-wing, anti-modernisation, factions within the party (Livingstone, 2011:378-379). Frequent requests

from media outlets for Livingstone to comment (from the perspective of being the last leader of a London-wide authority) on the government's plans led to him often debating and discussing the idea with Jeffrey Archer (widely assumed to be an eventual Tory candidate for mayor). It was these meetings between the two, alongside Livingstone's place on Labour's National Executive Committee (which would go on to oversee the candidate selection), that gave the future mayor a sense of the powerful voice he could gain by running and made him become a proponent of the policy (Livingstone, 2011:378-383).

Indeed, it was fear of Livingstone using the mayoralty's high-profile in this way that motivated Labour's leadership to try to block him from standing. The desire to stop Livingstone was due to Blair's desire not to allow "Old Labour" figures to reverse the party's modernisation programme and the policy shifts which had taken place since the mid-1980s (Alderman, 2000; Price, 2005; Whitton, 2014). The ensuing contest between Livingstone and the Labour Party's leadership resulted in an acrimonious dispute that Keith Alderman noted became known in inner Labour circles as the "Ken conundrum" (Alderman, 2000). In short, this first comprised how to first stop Livingstone being adopted as the Labour candidate and, second, how to try to defeat him once he subsequently stood as an independent candidate (Mandelson, 2017; Price, 2005). In short, the Blair Government was keen that the new London-wide authority would not become '...a GLC Mark II...' (Wilson and Game, 2011:79).

The May 1998 referendum delivered a strong "Yes" vote in favour of a mayor. The overall vote share was 72% in favour and 28% against, with every London borough voting in favour (Pimlott and Rao, 2002:70; Travers, 2004:62). However, the low turnout of 34%, despite the poll taking place on the same day as the local elections, suggested that the idea of a mayor and city-wide government had yet to engage the electorate (Travers, 2004:62). This need to build interest regarding, and trust in, the role of the Mayor and their place in London's governance is a point which is returned to later in the Livingstone case study chapter.

Following the referendum, in November 1998 the government introduced an Act to Parliament with the purpose of creating the GLA. The Greater London Authority Bill was the largest single piece of legislation since the Government of India Act (1935) and was, initially, comprised of 277 clauses and 21 schedules over 213 pages (Edwards and Isaby, 2008:4). The final Act, after parliamentary amendments, contained 425 clauses and 34 schedules, running to nearly 500 pages (Travers, 2004:65; HM Government, 1999; D'Arcy and MacLean, 2000:31). It gave legislative effect to the creation of a directly-elected mayor and separately-elected assembly of 25 members.

The Mayor of London would be responsible for establishing city-wide strategies in the environment, planning, transport, culture and economic development (Travers, 2004; Sandford, 2017). He or she would also set the budget for Transport for London (TfL), the London Fire and Emergency Planning Authority (LFEPA), the Metropolitan Police Authority (MPA) and the London Development Agency (LDA) (Sandford, 2017). The London Assembly, as a scrutinising but not legislating body, would have the power to veto the Mayor's budget (with a two-thirds majority required) in favour of their own proposals and would seek to ensure the transparency of the Office of the Mayor of London with regard to its holder's policies and leadership (Sweeting, 2003; Travers, 2004). The Assembly would comprise twenty-five members – fourteen constituency representatives and a further eleven from a London-wide list (intended to give greater proportionality) (Copus, 2006). The Mayor would then be obliged to appoint one of these members as their statutory deputy mayor (with the portfolio decided by the executive) (Sandford, 2017). The Mayor would also either chair, or appoint the chair, of TfL the LDA, the LFEPA and the MPA (Committee on Standards in Public Life, 2010:6). Similarly, the Mayor and the London Assembly had the power to nominate members of each of these four bodies (Travers, 2004; Sandford, 2017). As Colin Copus has highlighted (2006:14), the new governance arrangements were intended to provide '...visible political leadership...' and decision-making that was '...transparent, inclusive and responsive...' with '...clear lines of political accountability.'

Peter Mandelson's 2017 words are of interest here as they also encompassed comment upon the inherent weakness of the GLA and Mayor from their initial implementation onwards. This, he argued, was due to their being rendered structurally weaker than Labour had intended, when publishing *A Voice for London* in 1996, due to the subsequent legislation not granting them fiscal powers (Mandelson, 2017). This meant '...HMT [Her Majesty's Treasury] can put the break on whenever...' and a mayor might be particularly susceptible to this if they were of a different party allegiance or ideological outlook to the national government (Mandelson, 2017). Tony Travers has been similarly critical of this institutional weakness in the GLA, arguing that, according to its original conception, it left key budgetary areas (including health, social security and the arts) as the responsibility of central government (Travers, 2004:80). From 2000 until the present day, notwithstanding piecemeal devolution of powers across this period, the majority of the GLA and London Mayor's funding has come from central government and a precept paid by Londoners through their Council Tax (Whitton, 2014:17n). The Congestion Charge, introduced in February 2003, augments this revenue (Whitton, 2014; Sandford, 2017). The views such as those held by Mandelson and Travers

exemplify Sweeting's (2003; 2002) concerns regarding inherent weaknesses within the mayoralty and London Assembly^{2 3}.

3.5.2 Selecting (and electing) a Candidate

Following the passing of legislation, the campaigns to elect a mayor and accompanying assembly then began in earnest⁴. After being shortlisted for the ballot by Labour's NEC, Livingstone eventually lost to the leadership's preferred nominee, Frank Dobson MP, by 51.5% to 48.5% (once second preferences had been taken into account) on February 20 2000 (Alderman, 2000:750; Whitton, 2014:8). Having previously committed to not standing as an independent if Dobson won, Livingstone now used the ballot's result to reverse his commitment and, two weeks later, announced that he would now run for the London mayoralty outside, against the Labour Party's selected candidate (Alderman, 2000; Livingstone, 2011; Whitton, 2014:8n).

He ultimately won the mayoralty (with nearly 58% of the votes on the second round of the ballot) three months later (Travers, 2004:76). The first lines of Livingstone's manifesto contained the sentence 'I am standing as an independent candidate because I believe the job of the Mayor will be to stand up for London.' (Livingstone, 2000:1). This, of course, was largely an exposition of the very purpose of a mayor but it was also open to interpretation as a pointed warning to Blair's government. In short, Livingstone was signalling that the former GLC leader who had confronted the Thatcher government of the 1980s was likely to have the potential to be what Timothy Whitton has described as a '...thorn in the Labour Party's side...', too (Whitton, 2000:4).

² For further details, in addition to Sweeting's work, see Greer and Sandford (2003).

³ In Financial Year 2020/2021 will see the Council Tax precept amount to a figure of £960,569,108. The Congestion Charge's net income between 2003 and 2017 was £1.7bn. (GLA, 2019; TfL, 2017).

⁴ The selection of the Conservative Party's candidate (first Jeffrey Archer and, subsequently, Steven Norris) also involved notable public difficulties and further detail on this can be found in either of Alderman's (2000) or Pimlott and Rao's (2002) accounts.

3.6 The Subsequent Context for the London Mayoralty

As a politician with a long standing in London politics (dating back to his days at the GLC), Livingstone was always highly likely to hold a strong opinion on the creation of a new tier of government for the capital. The way in which this came to be articulated, as a vocal critic of the then government and their political priorities, only served to raise the profile of the mayoralty yet higher still. Indeed, Mandelson, a close ally of Blair, subsequently commented that opposing Livingstone's candidacy had been '...a big mistake, as Ken had become the inevitable and obvious guy to do the job in the eyes of the [party] membership.' (Mandelson, 2017). It is a point with which Blair has concurred (Blair, 2010). Livingstone himself also clearly knew that the city he served was aware of his past attitudes and city-wide authority (from his time leading the GLC during the 1980s) and made a passing allusion to them by beginning his acceptance speech upon winning the mayoralty with the words "As I was saying before I was rudely interrupted 14 years ago..." (Hosken, 2008:316-317).

3.7 The Dutch Mayoralty

The Dutch mayoralty is substantially different to the others examined within this thesis. In the case of Job Cohen's mayoralty, it will become apparent in the chapter exploring his tenure that the institutional environment he inhabited directly impacted his leadership.

Amongst the differences that most distinguish the Dutch mayoralty from those of London and New York is the practice of being appointed to office by the Crown (Schaap, Daemen and Ringeling, 2009:104). Though councils write role profiles for mayors and indicate a preference for a specific candidate to King's Commissioners (provincial executives who represent the King and liaise between municipalities and the central government), it is ultimately the monarch's decision as to who becomes Mayor (Schaap, Daemen and Ringeling, 2009:104).

Dutch mayors also face different roles in their institutional relationships. For example, whilst the Mayors of London and New York are designated as executives who do not sit in the legislature, the Mayor of Amsterdam chairs meetings of both the Board of Mayor and Aldermen (the executive) and the Council (the legislature) (Karsten, 2018). However, Dutch mayors do not take a broad-ranging policy role. Despite councils having responsibility for an increasing number of policy areas (including '...health care, social work, culture, sport and recreation...', as well as local economic regeneration), mayors are restricted to the governance of public safety and security (Kolthoff, Erakovich and Lasthuizen, 2010:600; Prins, 2016:15). This restriction, as outlined below, is intended to enable politically-controversial powers in this field to be held by those in a largely depoliticised office (due to its being without a popular mandate). It is also a by-product of the Dutch desire to avoid over-mighty leaders emerging and, thus, to see the restriction of mayors to narrow policy concerns (with a view to limiting their ability to gain dominance over broader agendas) (Karsten, 2013:16-17).

It should be noted that mayors, whilst called upon to act in a non-partisan fashion in their chairmanships, are termed "independent" in much of the relevant literature and policy documentation covering their remits. However, this does not denote an independence of party affiliation – they retain party memberships, despite having conduct their duties in a non-partisan manner. This independence is, therefore, more of a functional leadership style and not indicative of political allegiances. This independence does, though, hold potential for mayors to advance their own political position, within these strict structural limitations. For example, their status as *appointed* independents gives them the theoretical potential to appear to stand apart from decisions and offer alternative perspectives (due to having become council members by a different route). As Job Cohen

stated in interview, the distance between a mayor and the more politicised executive may limit formal power but it does lend an informal authority that enables mayors to ‘...do a lot...’, due to the opportunity for them to appear as a “wise advisor” to both the executive and legislature (Cohen, 2018:2).

This lack of electoral mandate and restriction of formal powers can, of course, hold the potential for mayors to experience frustrations of their authority. Linze Schaap (2009:150), has identified the possibility for mayors to suffer from ‘...“role asymmetry”...’. In this situation, mayors’ lack of mandate and powers conflicts with an apparent desire, on the part of the public, for strong leadership. However, as the Dutch do not undertake regular polling of public attitudes towards local government (especially with regard to individuals), it is difficult to assess the extent to which such a concept is borne out.

3.8 The Consensual Approach to Local Leadership in The Netherlands

The consensual model of decision-making has varied roots within The Netherlands. However, it is instructive to consider Niels Karsten's (2013) contribution. Karsten (a Dutch academic studying local government) argued that '...a political decision is designed to be the endpoint of a conflict between people with differing opinions, which means that not all those involved get what they want' (Karsten, 2013:16). Though those of a more Anglo-American persuasion might argue that this is an underlying feature of the principle of collective responsibility in decision-making, Karsten concluded that this situation led to a dilemma of overly-authoritative leadership (Karsten, 2013:16-17). It was, he argued, a major reason as to why the Dutch system discourages mayors from gaining the '...stronger, more directive leadership styles...' that we see in Anglo-American contexts (Karsten, 2013:17). Therefore, if one follows the logic of this argument, one can see further politico-cultural underpinnings for the existence of a less authoritative and more consensual system.

Kane, Patapan and 't Hart (2009a:299) noted that the focus upon the Anglo-American strong-mayor model means that those who are more consensual can appear to be less of a leader. Hendriks and Karsten (2014) have argued that this symbolises the paradox of democratic leadership – a leader wishes to appear authoritative and, thus, risks their democratic credentials (and vice-versa). These theoretical propositions are resolved through the adoption, in practice, of what has been termed 'consensus democracy' (Hendriks and Karsten, 2014:44). This utilises the kind of "bridging-and-bonding" leadership that Dutch scholars frequently allude to when discussing mayors (Hendriks and Karsten, 2014; Karsten and Hendriks, 2017; van Zuydam, 2018).

The particular brand of leadership undertaken by Dutch mayors actually goes so far as to eschew the term "leader". Schedlitzki, Case and Knights (2017:129) have noted that terms such as *burge vader* ("city father") reflect the wider Dutch aversion to strong or heroic notions of leadership. They argue that what they refer to as '..."softer"...' linguistic terms – including *burge vader*, *begeleiderschap* ("guiding leadership") and *procesbegeleider* ("process manager") – reflect the Dutch desire for a more consensual urban figure (Schedlitzki, *et. al.*, 2017:129). This is furthered by the concept of *verbinder* (meaning "connector", a liaison figure who seeks to bring people together), which is often used in conjunction with that of *burge vader* (Karsten, *et. al.*, 2017:62). These linguistic euphemisms reflect traditional Dutch aversion to an idea of leadership as over-mighty individuals at the centre of powerful institutions. This can be dated back to negative events in their history when powerful leaders emerged and caused economic, social or political harm. Prime amongst these is the

Dutch experience of being conquered by Adolf Hitler's Germany in 1940, with Barbara Kellerman having asserted that this left The Netherlands fearful of the concept of leadership itself (Kellerman, 2014).

However, two interviewees who have specialised in Dutch leadership traditions – Paul 't Hart and Niels Karsten – were both clear that it is possible to overrate the impact of this aspect of history ('t Hart, 2018:3; Karsten, 2018:4). Instead, they have used their research to point to the longer-term precedent of pillarisation – the practice by which key state institutions and their respective communities (including the church, government and army) were historically encouraged to remain “siloes” from each other ('t Hart, 2002; Shorto, 2013). This meant that no one individual was able to obtain a dominance of Dutch public affairs through the control of multiple sources of power. This is, in part, reflected in the institutional arrangement that consigns mayors to chiefly one policy area – safety and security – whilst making them largely devoid of direct statutory powers with regard to others.

Consensual democracy has matured from earlier pillarisation (which is, after all, not encouraging of integrative governance). As Hendriks (2010:28) described, the character of Dutch government and governance practices is ‘...co-producing, co-governing and coalition-oriented...’, with a view to maximising ‘...consensus and broad-based support.’ This matches to the broad characteristics of Svava's concept of the facilitative (appointed) mayor. In particular, at the specifically local level, the institutional format outlined thus far clearly reflects Svava's sketch of the nature of the appointed mayor as someone who ‘...does not execute (or directly promote the accomplishment of tasks)... The facilitative mayor leads by empowering others...rather than seeking power for himself or herself...’ (Svava, 1994:6). It also matches Lijphart's (1999:2) portrayal of consensual democratic leadership as a model that ‘...tries to share, disperse and limit power in a variety of ways.’

3.8.1 Burge vader

Though the Dutch for “mayor” is “*burgemeester*”, citizens often refer to mayors as a “*burge vader*”. This translates, variously, to either “city father” or “citizen father” (Karsten, 2018:10). This conveys the idea that a successful mayor will have an almost pastoral connection with their citizens. Cohen himself mentioned the importance of portraying himself as a ‘...“city father”...’ to Amsterdammers in order to create trust in those who governed (Cohen, 2018:5).

Dutch mayors face a clear expectation that they will inhabit this characterisation as *burge vader* in order to better respond to public need. This is especially apparent during crises, when mayors are expected to “be there” in a physical sense, as alluded to by Cohen (Cohen, 2018:6; Jong, Duckers and van der Velden, 2016b:290). This leaves them appearing both better-connected to events as they unfold and, also, able to articulate the concerns of the wider population. Boin, ‘t Hart, Stern and Sundelius have made clear that this is not peculiar to the Mayor of Amsterdam but, rather, a concern for Dutch mayors in general (Boin, ‘t Hart, Stern and Sundelius, 2009:99). They highlighted the example the Mayor of Uithoorn, who miscalculated his response to a major factory fire – appearing on TV to declare the fire to be under control as smoke began to re-emerge from the site – and instantly faced a perceived diminution in his credibility (Boin, *et. al.*, 2009:99). Similarly, Jong, Duckers and van der Velden have undertaken several research projects (2016a; 2016b) which reveal public expectations of mayors following crises. These centre around the idea of becoming a “city father” and taking on a range of tasks – from visiting bereaved relatives (and sometimes becoming their spokesperson) to bridging community divides (Jong, *et. al.*, 2016b). This matches with Karsten and Hendriks’ (2017) assertion that one of Dutch mayors’ key responsibilities is to adopt a style that facilitates bridging and bonding.

3.9 The Mayor of Amsterdam

Safety and security policy is the only area in which the mayor has an executive-style autonomy over its strategic direction and resourcing (Karsten, 2018:6; Coenen, Denters and Klok, 2006:162). Karsten and van Zuydam (2014:6) have argued that this makes it the most notable of Dutch mayors' powers. Moreover, the mayoral responsibility for this policy area has been in place since the Local Government Act of 1851 (Prins, 2016:15). Since 2000, the beginning of this thesis' chronological focus, there has been a steady increase in Dutch mayors' powers regarding public safety (including regarding banning perpetrators of domestic violence from entering their own homes) (Prins, 2016:15-16). This has been driven by the desire of mayors from larger cities to be able to tackle what were often both complex and local problems in a more coherent way (Prins, 2016:16).

Indeed, such is the Dutch desire to remove the mayor from entrenched politicisation, some of the powers used by Dutch mayors have been devolved to them in the hope of neutralising any controversy surrounding the powers themselves. For instance, powers to prohibit individuals from entering specified areas of a municipality or to strip-search people have been given to mayors in the hope that their constitutional position of political independence and neutrality will remove the desire to challenge the acceptability of the powers themselves (Karsten, 2018:7).

The Mayor's role in this matter is typified by their membership of the so-called "Security Triangle". This is comprised of the Mayor, the Chief of Police and the Chief Prosecutor (Hajer and Uitermark, 2009:78). The Chief Prosecutor during Cohen's tenure, Leo de Wit, described the Triangle as '...“the most trust generating symbol that the city can show”...’ (de Wit, cited in Schulte, 2005). As noted by Hendriks and Schaap, the Triangle symbolises what they refer to as '...the three C's...' of Dutch governance – consultation, consensus and compromise (Hendriks and Schaap, 2012:98; Hendriks and Toonen, 2001). This, in turn, expresses itself at the local level, '...where joint policy-making and interactive planning are the modern equivalents of persuasion and consultation...' (Hendriks and Schaap, 2012:98). The Security Triangle is, therefore, one example of a governance culture that places a high value on cooperation and integrated decision-making.

The Triangle's composition compliments the Mayor's responsibility for urban public safety and security, giving them an institutional base from which to act and enabling them to be the key representative of the municipal government in these matters. The precise extent of their powers covers '...public order, the police, the fire departments, and the coordination of government actors in case of a calamity.' (van Ostaaijen, 2010:69). In theory, the Mayor could be granted other policy

responsibilities but this is rarely done as the municipality's aldermen prefer to retain these within their own portfolios (citing the Mayor's lack of direct election as a reason for legitimising this choice) (van Ostaaijen, 2010:69). It should also be noted that the Security Triangle's main focuses are upon the day-to-day safety of the public and *crisis* management. Crises are differentiated from *disaster* management in The Netherlands (the former being defined as public order breaches and acts of terrorism, the latter as natural occurrences such as floods) as the disasters statutorily require greater co-operation with national-level government agencies (in the interest of ensuring sufficient cross-regional collaboration) (Scholtens, 2008:195).

This is consistent with every other Dutch city, where mayors are required to ensure that the council possesses a clear policy addressing local public safety issues (Prins, 2016:17). As Ruth Prins (2016:17-19) has noted, an increased awareness of public security and safety issues (which is a consequence of higher crime rates being in evidence since the 1970s) has led to greater public focus upon Dutch mayors, as the key political figure addressing these issues. Therefore, though not elected (and, thus, unable to cite a popular mandate for their policy decisions), Dutch mayors are faced with the need to appear more pro-active in this policy area (especially given that they lack substantial strategic, constitutional or political power in relation to any other area). The 1985 Disasters and Major Accidents Act explicitly states that "...the Mayor has supreme authority..." in addressing urgent situations which compromise public safety and security (Government of The Netherlands, cited in Scholtens, 2008:197). This adds pressure upon mayors to give this policy area significant attention. Additionally, mayor is well-placed to be not only a key third component of the Security Triangle but, also, the liaising figure between the municipal council (as the representative legislature) and the Board of Mayor and Aldermen (as the executive) (Prins, 2016:25).

However, mayors are still obliged to maintain a close liaison with both the aldermen (through the Board of Mayor and Aldermen – effectively, the municipality's governance executive) and the Council (which fulfils the role of the local representative legislature). This fits with the collective, consensual, model of Dutch local government. This is so inherent to the Dutch system that it is not only mayoral decisions that have to be presented, for formal approval, to the Board – aldermen have to obtain this agreement, too (Coenen, *et. al.*, 2006:169). These are not merely votes to note reports of actions taken. They are a constitutional check-and-balance on executive power. This practice is replicated at the regional level, too, as mayors are chairs of both local and regional crisis-management teams (Jong, Duckers and van der Velden, 2016a:287). For instance, mayors contribute to regional safety plans (covering the urban conglomerations surrounding big cities, such as in the Amsterdam-

Amstelland Region) (Prins and Devroe, 2017:279). However, they share this responsibility equally with the region's chief prosecutor, mayors and aldermen from the region's other municipalities and, also, with the relevant police forces (Prins and Devroe, 2017:279). As argued by Schedlitzki, Case and Knights (2017:129), this reflects a desire to reflect the Dutch desire for consensual approaches to leadership within the design of its institutional structures. It also contradicts Scholtens' (2008:199) suggestion that mayors addressing crises or disasters can act in a manner akin to a military command-and-control approach.

This is, of course, all in addition to the Mayor's other statutory powers and obligations. These include the conducting of civil marriages, leading the city's public celebrations (such as the monarch's annual birthday parade) and being accountable for the overall integrity of the municipality's executive (Karsten, 2018:3). Karsten, who has spent his career-to-date examining reforms and leadership within Dutch local government, commented in interview that this latter responsibility is rather confusing (Karsten, 2018:3). Calling upon mayors to be an ombudsman-like figure within the executive, the power (introduced in legislation in 2001) runs counter to their continued position as an independent chair of the executive who, nevertheless, must maintain the support of the wider council (lest they be denied a renewal of their term) (Karsten, 2018:3).

3.10 The Relevant Literature To-Date

3.10.1 London

The Mayor of London and The Greater London Assembly have existed since their creation by Act of Parliament in 1999. Subsequently, there have been studies addressing the role and introduction of mayors, and other institutional variations, within English local governance (see Sweeting, 2003; Stoker, 2004; Hambleton and Sweeting, 2004; Copus, 2008; and Davies and Imbroscio, 2009 for examples of this).

Likewise, there are a handful of peer-reviewed studies that examine the evolution of London's governance from the 1990s onwards. These include Travers' (1991; 2002; 2004) elaborations on how London's governance changed between the late 1980's and the end of Livingstone's first term and a similar works by Ben Pimlott & Nirmala Rao (2002) and Stephen Syrett & Robert Baldock (2001a). Though useful in providing contemporary academic accounts of governance reform, they are now rather dated. Of course, these authors have continued to revisit this work in their later publications and these offer some basis for consideration, though they are chiefly embedded within local governance studies, and not political leadership, perspectives (see Rao, 2006 and 2014, for examples).

Consequently, there are relatively-few studies which directly analyse the Mayor of London from a political leadership perspective, and even fewer which seek to set the office within contexts outside of Anglo-American comparisons. Some undertake research along these lines – for instance, Bottom and Reiser's (2014) study of party allegiances upon English and German mayors. These studies are relatively few, with none seeking to undertake a direct comparison between London and New York, as examples of mayor-council offices, and the consensus-based model of Amsterdam. Some researchers have undertaken studies of specific mayoral elections or the evolution of the Greater London Authority's (GLA) power over the period since 2000 (Alderman, 2000; D'Arcy and MacLean, 2000; Greer and Sandford, 2003; Edwards and Isaby, 2008; Crines, 2013; Sandford, 2017). Naturally, given the thesis' theoretical framework (for which, see the subsequent section of this review), Sweeting's (2003) analysis of how "strong" the London Mayor would prove to be is of significant interest.

One of the few which considers the mayoralty's political leadership elements is Worthy, Bennister and Stafford's (2019) comparison of Ken Livingstone and Boris Johnson's mayoralties. Using Hambleton and Sweeting's (2004) prior consideration of how a mayor might exercise leadership,

Worthy *et. al.* offered a rare example of a comparison that both reflected the limitations of the mayoralty as an institution whilst also examining the two men's leadership style (with the latter being its primary purpose). Nevertheless, this thesis differs from that article in that it both more rigorously applies the theories of Sweeting (and, to a lesser degree, Hambleton) and, also, sets the examination in a wider, cross-national, context.

Published works regarding Livingstone and Johnson offer some insights into the office. Livingstone's (2011) autobiography, *You Can't Say That: Memoirs*, provided some details on how the office was developed during its early days and the ways in which he sought to expand its influence in the face of various formal and informal structural constraints (including a government that initially opposed his transportation vision, with regard to how the London Underground was operated). There are also earlier accounts of Livingstone's political career – including John Carvel's (1984) *Citizen Ken: Biography of Ken Livingstone* and a biography by Andrew Hosken (2008), *Ken: The Ups and Downs of Ken Livingstone*. Donald McNeil's (2002) study outlined how Livingstone sought to establish a personal and political vision for London from early in his mayoralty. Timothy Whittion's (2014) examination considered how this created conflict in his relationship with the Labour Party.

In relation to Johnson, a number of studies exist. Johnson has not, to date, written an autobiography but there are biographies. The most extensive of these are Sonia Purnell's (2012) *Just Boris: A Tale of Blond Ambition – A Biography of Boris Johnson*, Nigel Cawthorne's (2015) *Blond Ambition: The Rise and Rise of Boris Johnson* and Andrew Gimson's (2016) *Boris: The Adventures of Boris Johnson*. These are supplemented by Johnson's 2011 *The Spirit of London*, which he used to praise various historic figures that he felt had contributed to the evolution of London life, though this was chiefly used as a "pre-manifesto" advertisement of the Mayor's purported vision for London if he won a second term in 2012.

The ex-Mayor's communications and performative leadership style have also received attention. Peer-reviewed work on this include Katharine Dommett's (2015) examination of how Johnson created an unconventional public persona (and to what effect), whilst Wood, Corbett and Flinders (2016) concluded that this all contributed to a celebrity-style status for the Mayor. These critiques offer much in the way of both evidence and theorisation on the matter of Johnson's communications that are useful when applying the LCI's metric concerning this aspect.

Others have given consideration to aspects of Johnson's policies. These include Douglas Murphy's (2017) *Nincompoopolis*, which gave a highly critical account of some of the architectural decisions Johnson took as Mayor. However, despite occasional hyperbole, the book did offer some understandings of Johnson's method of decision-making as Mayor. Similarly, some of those who came into contact with Johnson as Mayor have subsequently recounted the experience. An example of this is, former Metropolitan Police Commissioner, Lord Ian Blair's (2009) memoir, which discussed his interactions with Johnson, prior to the Mayor sacking the Commissioner in 2008. This is considered further in the subsequent case study chapter.

There are some works that set the policy case study (transportation) within both the Livingstone and Johnson chapters into its context⁵. These range from historical accounts of evolutions in London's transportation system (Godson, 2005; Blacker, 2008) through to examinations of how specific elements of that system were designed around the time that Livingstone was elected (Hodge and Greve, 2007; Currie and Teague, 2015; Jefferies and Rowlinson, 2016).

3.10.2 New York

New York's mayoralty is much older (dating from 1665) and, thus, more established than that of London (Yale Smith, 1940:407). Whilst Sadiq Khan is only the third Mayor of London, current Mayor of New York City, Bill de Blasio, is the one-hundred-and-ninth holder of his office (NYC.gov, 2017).

Former mayors have made notable contributions to the literature. John V. Lindsay (1966-1973) wrote several accounts related to his political career, the most notable being *The City* (Lindsay, 1970). This detailed some of the issues he faced (including financial and budgetary concerns) and the way in which he used his office's powers to address them (Lindsay, 1970). This was complimented by Vincent J. Cannato's (2002) book *The Ungovernable City: John Lindsay and His Struggle to Save New York*. Together, they provided a classic case study of the difficulties that a mayor may face and the institutional barriers that must be confronted in resolving them. These and other works, including the extensive publications of former mayor Ed Koch (1978-1989), form a body of literature charting the evolution and establishment of what Tom Geoghegan (2013) described as one of the world's most high-profile mayoralties (Paisner and Koch, 1992; Koch, 1999). Rudy Giuliani (2002) published a book entitled *Leadership*. He divided his book up into a series of "lessons" for leaders and it is, therefore, easy to discern from this his own approaches towards leadership.

⁵ For details regarding how policy case studies are used, please see the Methods chapter.

Bloomberg, too, has received attention. John Richardson's (2011) *Esquire* piece detailed Bloomberg's vision of a managerial and pragmatic form of leadership that was task-orientated, rather than ideological. Richardson summarised Bloomberg's approach thus: 'He dreams of creating an alternative to the political system as we know it, a coalition of...politicians and businesspeople who are good managers and who are focused on the most important problems of our time -- a coalition of the practical.'

Bloomberg himself has written a book about his political work. Though not a biography, *Climate of Hope: How Cities, Businesses, and Citizens Can Save the Planet* (co-authored with Carl Pope) outlined how his work (both whilst and after being Mayor) on tackling climate change shaped his politics (Bloomberg and Pope, 2017). Of less import is Bloomberg's (1997) book offering a mixture of autobiographical content and business advice. Though pre-dating his mayoralty, it does offer some account of how he approached decisions and gave some insight into the corporate mindset that others have suggested he sought to bring into City Hall when elected (Viteritti, 2017).

Similarly, others who either worked for Bloomberg at City Hall or who are long-standing observers of the mayoralty have published accounts. These include the deputy mayor who oversaw Bloomberg's economic redevelopment strategy (which is the policy-based focus of this thesis' examination of Bloomberg), Dan Doctoroff. In 2017, he gave an account of his time at City Hall and sought to reach conclusions which offered evaluations of the success achieved. Overly self-congratulatory in tone, Doctoroff's account must be treated very cautiously. However, it does offer some useful insights into how Bloomberg related to other key figures, such as the city council's Speaker, Christine Quinn.

Others, such as Susan Fainstein (2010), Christopher McNickle (2017) and Joseph Viteritti (2017), have offered more nuanced and critical accounts. Writing from more academic backgrounds, they seek to set Bloomberg's decisions, dilemmas and legacy into a wider historical context. Together, they offer a more detailed and evidenced picture than that provided by Doctoroff.

The mayoral office itself is frequently referenced in various works. From Barber's (2013) labelling it as an archetype of the new profile that he advocated for urban leaders through to Geoghegan's (2013) examination of whether it could be regarded as the world's '...most powerful...' mayoralty, the office has received much attention. These studies, particularly Geoghegan's, make

some effort to compare it to the offices of other city leaders – such as the Mayor of London. However, they do not offer academic, in-depth, discussions of the comparable nature of the institutional structures involved. Nor do they demonstrate adequate appreciation of the extent to which, however dominant the office may be in the conceptual image of mayors, it is merely indicative of one type of mayoral model (the strong-mayor model).

There is, therefore, again clear justification for including New York within this study. The holders and office have been researched many times before, yet there are large omissions in these studies. This thesis, with its commitment to adequate comparison and evaluation of structural, agential and institutional factors, offers an original opportunity to fill this theoretical space. Previous studies have failed to both show enough appreciation of the cultural political dimensions that make comparisons nuanced and, also, to reflect different mayoral models.

3.10.3 Amsterdam

The lack of much biographical information on Dutch mayors reflects the nature of their office. Appointed by the monarch, with a preceding nomination from the municipal council, they are expected to act in a more consensual, less executive, fashion (Karsten, 2016). They have, therefore, received less attention than better-known, more personality-driven, office-holders. Mayors are, instead, seen less as leaders and more as custodians of public trust and local administration – in line with Dutch cultural attitudes that have, as is explored in the chapter on Amsterdam’s governance context, historically evolved to be distrustful of the term “leader” and its associations (’t Hart, 2005; Cerfontaine, 2005; Karsten, 2016). This provides this thesis with an opportunity to analyse an under-explored office-holder in seeking to reach a view on their style of, and approach towards, leadership.

However, there is a small amount of work that either considers Cohen or relates to the context of his mayoralty. For instance, Logtenberg and Wiegman (2010) have written the only biography of Cohen. Though written in Dutch, sufficient translation can be undertaken by the researcher as to render the book of interest in offering insights into Cohen’s character and pre-mayoral career. van Zuydam (2014) has considered Cohen from a political leadership perspective, giving an account of his leadership style and authority in a 2014 conference paper. As the conference concerned was part of a gathering where the LCI was first discussed, this is clearly of particular interest.

More contextually, Vellenga (2008) offered a comparison of Cohen’s response to the 2004 murder of Theo van Gogh (discussed within the case study chapter) and Livingstone’s immediate

actions in the wake of the 2007 London bombings. This is especially useful, as it offers contexts surrounding both mayors' use of pro-multicultural narratives in seeking to regain control of critical situations. Likewise, Hajer and Uitermark (2009) offered a further detailed account of the van Gogh murder and Cohen's subsequent leadership, whilst Shorto's (2013) history of Amsterdam also touched upon these themes.

Given the Cohen case study chapter's focus upon safety and security policy, it is necessary to consult sources which offer detail and context for this. Prins has written much on this topic. In particular, she wrote an extended account of mayors' role in security policy and, subsequently, contributed to an edited collection that further developed understandings of the governance realities and institutions of Dutch policy in this area (Prins, 2016; Prins and Devroe, 2017). Resodihardjo, van Eijk and Carroll (2012) have also written an article which offers an example, external to Amsterdam (Rotterdam), of how another Dutch mayor was compelled to respond to a safety and security crisis. Together, this work outlines significant aspects of the challenges facing appointed mayors.

Conversely, there is an increasing amount of scholarship surrounding the nature of governance in Dutch cities. Karsten has published notable contributions on the role, evolution and perception of Dutch mayors. He co-authored a journal article that problematised the capacity of appointed (rather than elected) mayors to adapt to changing demands upon their offices and leadership skills (Karsten, Cachet and Schaap, 2013). His 2014 chapter in Rod Rhodes and Paul 't Hart's (2014a) seminal *The Oxford Handbook of Political Leadership* offered cultural insights into theorising the democratic accountability of leaders who hold office within structurally-differing institutions (including comparing elected leaders with appointed ones) (Hendriks and Karsten, 2014). Finally, Karsten addressed the differing implications for elected and appointed leaders seeking to be scrutinised (Karsten, 2015; Karsten and Hendriks, 2017). His 2015 conference paper, and subsequent 2017 journal article drawing upon this, concerning the differing understandings of leadership and mayors' roles that must be applied when studying Dutch local government was deeply influential in the selecting of the Amsterdam case study. Its outlining of how different the leadership culture is, and the effect that this has upon how decisions are taken, clearly demonstrated the different-system nature of the Cohen case study and, it is hoped, consideration of this difference will offer a more nuanced evaluative tone in the Findings chapter.

Frank Hendriks has provided similarly-relevant scholarship – from international comparisons of urban governance through to being the co-editor of *The Oxford Handbook of Local and Regional*

Democracy in Europe (Hendriks, van den Dool, Gianoli and Schaap, 2015; Hendriks, Lidstrom and Loughlin, 2011). His work has focused much on the concept of what makes for “good” governance in European contexts and is therefore clearly relevant to consideration of the leadership of the Mayor of Amsterdam. His work has had a particular focus upon Dutch local government – potentially providing much theoretical analysis of interest to this thesis (Hendriks, Duyvendak and van Niekerk, 2009).

Similar work has been provided by a number of other scholars whose work will be consulted, in order to better understand both the leadership environment mayors operate in and how more restricted, appointed, mayors might utilise their institution, in order to meet their aims. These include Heinelt *et. al.*'s edited collection on understandings of mayors and local democracy in Europe, both its 2006 edition and the subsequent 2018 one (Back, *et. al.*, 2006; Heinelt, *et. al.*, 2018).

Steyvers, Reynaert & Valke's (2012) and Mouritzen & Svava's (2002) theoretical models and conceptualisations are of relevance to the European aspect of the study, too. Their investigations of the concepts of different models of local leadership provide this thesis with reflections on institutional and structural differences. This offers analyses from which it is possible to construct understandings of how the Amsterdam mayoralty differs from those of London and New York.

4.0 Billionaire Builder: Michael Bloomberg (2002-2013)

4.1 Introduction

Michael Bloomberg has been described as America's most influential mayor of the century so far and his approach has been referred to as that of '...a philosopher king.' (Greenblatt, 2013; Transcript N, 2019:3). Five years prior to Donald Trump's election as US President, Esquire magazine described Bloomberg as '...certainly the most successful executive-cum-politician in American life...' (Richardson, 2011:92). His tenure was the longest of this thesis' case studies (2002 to 2013). His mayoralty divided opinions. The *New York Times* was not unique when they described his approach as one of '...tireless coddling of the overclass...' and commentators made accusations of gentrification against him (Bellafante, 2013). Meanwhile, this thesis has uncovered perspectives that are more willing to credit him with substantial investment in redevelopment (Transcript K, 2019:5-7; Transcript M, 2019:2).

Bloomberg governed a city of more than eight million people, with a budget '...larger than all but four state governments in the United States...' (California, Texas, Florida and the State of New York) (Fine and Caras, 2013:120). The Mayor of New York City's remit includes economic development, policing, schools (added under Bloomberg), public health and the environment (Geohegan, 2013). The city which Bloomberg inherited faced substantial political, economic and social challenges. These included taking office just over three months after the September 11th 2001 terrorist attacks (9/11) (with the economic devastation that these had caused), long-term racial and income inequality between its five constituent boroughs (Manhattan, Queens, The Bronx, Brooklyn and Staten Island) and the need to address crime rates.

As one interviewee commented, there are simply too many dimensions through which to evaluate Bloomberg (Transcript L, 2019:1). In light of this breadth, this thesis will focus upon Bloomberg's economic redevelopment policies. This choice is influenced by the themes chosen both by those who largely reflected upon redevelopment policies when asked about his leadership (Transcript K, 2019:3; Transcript L, 2019:1; Transcript N, 2019:3). Portrayals of Bloomberg as a '...master builder...' who was determined to run City Hall as though it were a wealthy corporation was one that he, too, encouraged in his desire to portray mayors as innovative deliverers (Transcript L, 2019:1; Fainstein, 2010:105; Katz and Bradley, 2013:6). It therefore suits an examination of his leadership.

This chapter is divided up into sections. The contextual background to Bloomberg's policies is presented before the Leadership Capital Index (LCI) is applied. The points for application are 2005, 2009 and 2013. The concluding section evaluates the LCI-based findings in order to assess Bloomberg's ability to stretch beyond his institution.

4.2 Economic Redevelopment: Background

4.2.1 The 2002 Landscape

Bloomberg took office on January 1 2002, less than four months after 9/11. His predecessor, Rudy Giuliani had originally sought an emergency three-month extension to his term, in order to address the attack's immediate aftermath (citing Article 3 of the New York State Constitution) (*New York Times*, 2001; New York Department of State, 2019). Giuliani failed in this bid, with New York's State Assembly (dominated by Democrats, with Giuliani a Republican) expressing a desire to see the continuation of normal democratic processes (Pooley, 2001; Purnick, 2009:100-101). Interestingly, Giuliani himself had overseen legislation to reduce the prior limit of three terms down to two (McNickle, 2017:15). Despite Bloomberg having expressed support for the State Assembly's assessment, Giuliani backed the Republican candidate, using his own high name-recognition to counter views of Bloomberg as a political novice who lacked experience (Dreier, Mollenkopf and Swanstrom, 2014:227).

Bloomberg faced the challenge of addressing the city-wide effects of a post-9/11 national recession. Joseph Viteritti, previously a member of many mayoral policy commissions, recently documented the scale of the challenges facing the incoming administration in 2002 (Transcript O, 2019:1-2; Viteritti, 2017). The attack had either destroyed or damaged \$30billion-worth of office space and led to up to 100,000 associated corporate job losses (Viteritti, 2017:138). By June 2002, economic activity within all five boroughs had fallen by approximately \$17.6billion (Gotham and Greenberg, 2008:1042; Viteritti, 2017:138). Lost tax revenues meant that Bloomberg inherited a \$2.4billion deficit (Chernick, 2005:296; Viteritti, 2017:138). There was, therefore, a need for economic redevelopment and the Mayor consequently undertook a range of projects targeting economic growth. This was not born of mere economic necessity but was also due to the new mayor's team feeling '...emboldened...' by the opportunity to implement widespread urban redesign (Fainstein, 2010:105).

4.2.2 Key Projects

Bloomberg's desire to reinvigorate the economy was marked by a pursuit of innovation and construction projects. His desire to push projects to quick completion is captured by Susan Fainstein's comment that they '...represented the imprint of a master builder rather than community-based planning.' (Fainstein, 2010:105). This quote encapsulates much of the commentary on Bloomberg's approach to development, with critiques highlighting both the ambitious scale of the projects undertaken and the sense that they offered opportunities to a financial elite (at the apparent expense

of those on lower incomes). Moreover, it relays an image of Bloomberg as a major power within his institutional environment (a portrayal which is analysed later).

4.2.2.1 Hudson Yards

Today, Hudson Yards' corporate website claims to be '...the cultural center of Manhattan's New West Side.' (Hudson Yards, 2019). It is a 12million square foot development that by 2020, '...will include office towers, high-rise apartments, retail stores, a luxury hotel, and upscale restaurants, all subsidized by city tax breaks, including \$106million in property tax exemptions just for the first office tower and retail areas.' (Dreier, *et. al.*, 2014:229). Though the proposals for what the site may contain have changed continuously, ideas for developing Hudson Yards (disused railway storage facilities) have been under discussion since Mayor Robert F. Wagner first announced plans in 1963 (Horne, 1963). These proposed a convention centre, docks and residential blocks (Horne, 1963). Thus, the Hudson Yards project is similar to the Thames Estuary Airport (TEA) project in the United Kingdom (UK). It has been most associated with one particular mayor (Hudson Yards with Bloomberg and the TEA with Boris Johnson) yet it has its roots in proposals long pre-dating them.

Bloomberg became keen early on in his mayoralty to see Hudson Yards brought to fruition – seeing it, due to its potential size, as the best way in which to deliver major urban redevelopment post-9/11 (Brash, 2011:18). He also saw it as an opportunity to amalgamate competing proposals. These included the long-standing issue of finding sites for a new stadium for the New York Jets (New York's largest American football team) and an Olympic stadium (supporting an ongoing bid for the 2012 Games). Dan Doctoroff (hired as Deputy Mayor for Economic Development because he had been leading the city's Olympic bid prior to Bloomberg's election) triggered Bloomberg's interest in Hudson Yards through his advocacy for its Olympic potential (Doctoroff, 2017:26; McNickle, 2017:161). The two projects were eventually removed from the proposals in 2005. The Speaker of the New York State Assembly (Sheldon Silver) vetoed the Jets' bid (citing concerns that they had been treated leniently in tendering processes) in June 2005 whilst, in July, the Olympics were awarded to London (Bagli, 2005; Levy and Chiwaya, 2016). Nevertheless, Bloomberg encouraged Doctoroff to continue pursuing substantial development at Hudson Yards (Doctoroff, 2017:26). This meant that it became the mayoralty's longest-running development project, with construction beginning in December 2012 (Grant, 2017).

City Hall's financially-assisting the project led to criticisms of Bloomberg's efforts to encourage corporate investment in New York City, particularly in Manhattan. Costs funded directly by City Hall

included: \$2.3billion for extending the trainlines serving the neighbourhood (to facilitate tourists' and residents' visits); \$200million to buy the air rights from the Metropolitan Transportation Authority (MTA) (allowing multi-storey towers to be built on MTA land); and tax breaks of \$1.36billion (funding exemptions on taxes liable for multi-storey commercial properties) (David, 2019). \$1.1billion in funding was also provided for both a new school and parks in the vicinity (David, 2019). This made a total of approximately \$5billion by the time that funding, proposed to the New York City Council in 2006, was agreed (2009). It was, in total, \$2billion more than the \$3billion originally-estimated by the New York City Independent Budget Office (IBO) in 2002 (Weikart, 2009:123).

With the tax breaks and air rights outlays set aside, one might see the costs as directly serving residents, given the size of the project and the amenities provided. The main developer, Related Companies LP, secured a far greater share of the capital required than that provided by the Mayor by leading a corporate consortium that invested \$18billion (Grant, 2017). This meant that the city government's investment in the building work was thus less than 25% of the total (Grant, 2017). Bloomberg argued that this still-not-inconsiderable investment by City Hall would be recouped through tax receipts once shops and residential units opened (Transcript N, 2019:3). Bloomberg and Doctoroff's own 2005 calculations predicted that the city's initial spend would result in a return of \$67billion in '...the long-term...' (though this period's length was left undefined and it remains too early, as construction is not yet completed, to assess the claim's accuracy) (McNickle, 2017:168).

Nevertheless, the project faced criticisms which included pointing out that residential units were unaffordable for average citizens (two-floor apartments rented for \$5,200 per month and sold for \$32million) (Haag, 2019). This was concurrent with the national average income being still yet to recover by the end of Bloomberg's first term (2005) to pre-recession levels (Cay Johnston, 2007). This '...was \$55,238, still nearly 1 percent less than the \$55,714 in 2000, after adjusting for inflation...' and the situation had not improved by the end of Bloomberg's tenure (2014), when New York's per capita income was \$35,761 and the median monthly rental cost \$1,340 (Cay Johnston, 2007; United States Census Bureau, 2018). Bloomberg sought to justify high costs by highlighting the predicted tax receipts and what he suggested would be an enhanced appeal for corporate investment (revitalising the post-9/11 economy) (McNickle, 2017:168). He underlined this sentiment when, in 2006 (the year that the funding package was submitted to council), he stated: "We have a tax structure in this city that's more dependent than ever on high-income businesses and individuals.'" (Bloomberg, cited in Chan, 2007).

Bloomberg's political cost-benefit analysis was, therefore, that the city's taxpayers should '...take one for the New York City team...' and accept disruption in return for assurances that thousands of construction and office jobs would be the result (McNickle, 2017:168). Commentators such as Julian Brash (2011), Chris McNickle (2017) and Joseph Viteritti (2017) retrospectively expressed criticism of these arguments (viewing them as either arrogant or tone-deaf, due to their failure to reflect the more diverse reality of incomes). However, contemporary polling data would suggest that the Mayor was actually in touch with a reasonable number of constituents' concerns. Archived surveys (with an average sample of 1,500 respondents), conducted by Quinnipiac University Polls, record that, between February 2006 and November 2008 (when the majority of the funding package was receiving council scrutiny), voters consistently rated unemployment as a greater concern than housing market and real estate values (Quinnipiac University Poll, 2008). The highest rating for real estate as a cause for concern was 1% (November 2008 – the same survey saw a peak 21% of respondents citing unemployment) (Quinnipiac University Poll, 2008). With the exception of an April 2006 poll (when the cost of living was rated as higher), unemployment polled as New Yorkers' greatest concern when asked 'What do you think is the most important problem facing New York City today?' (Quinnipiac University Poll, 2008). Concurrent polling showed that by the time that the council were reaching the final phases of scrutiny in late 2008 Bloomberg achieved his highest approval rating to-date (75%) (Quinnipiac University Poll, 2010).

Whether Bloomberg and Doctoroff's dismissals of commentators' concerns about both the amounts of public financing for Hudson Yards were arrogant is thus of secondary importance when considering how the Mayor's leadership was perceived. The polling data suggests that, in fact, his communications over the project were reflective of the wider population's major concerns and, also, that his standing with the public was not harmed by the controversy. For commentators to consistently focus on Bloomberg would almost suggest that he was unique in pursuing policies that were designed to attract and incentivise real estate projects in this manner. In reality, he is but one example amongst many. For example, once the idea for a stadium for the Jets failed to come to fruition in 2005, New Jersey successfully bid to become the team's new "home" state, using similar tax and construction incentives to the Hudson Yards project (Dreier, *et. al.*, 2014:253). Bloomberg's rhetorical justifications echoed Ed Koch (Mayor between 1978 and 1989), who, in 1984, wrote that 'I speak out for the middle class. You know why? Because they pay taxes; they provide jobs for the poor people.' (Koch, 1984:221). The economist Edward Glaeser has also noted that Bloomberg was merely continuing the existing goal of his three immediate predecessors by seeking to '...make the city as attractive as possible to employers and middle-class residents.' (Glaeser, 2011:58). Thus, whatever

moral position one may take in relation to such sentiments, to portray Bloomberg as a *uniquely* business-focused leader is simply inaccurate. Instead, he was reflecting a certain amount of the history of his institution's executives. Thus, whilst he was pursuing his own policies, Bloomberg may be regarded as reflecting Lauth's (2004:70) model of an office-holder who is '...conditioned to obey...' certain institutional norms or precedents.

4.2.2.2 The Yankee Stadium

The proposed stadium for the Jets was not the only sports facility that Bloomberg sought to promote. The New York Yankees (baseball) had a history of seeking city investment in construction. In both 1972 and 1998, the team, based in The Bronx, had threatened to move out of New York if their stadium was not rebuilt in Manhattan (Fainstein, 2010:106). City Hall and the Yankees remained in discussions when Bloomberg assumed office. The case for a new stadium was strong, given that the existing building was approaching being condemned. In 1998, a 500lb metal girder fell into the public seating (Doctoroff, 2017:256). After Doctoroff listed it in the city's Olympic bid as a potential venue, attempts to get a deal for a new stadium accelerated (Doctoroff, 2017:255-256). A fresh deal was agreed by the council in 2006, with groundworks beginning in August of that year, and the stadium opened in April 2009 (Associated Press, 2006; Fainstein, 2010:107).

The budget totalled \$1.3billion (\$500million more than the deal had predicted) due to escalating costs, derived from the city government's construction of two new parks (to replace the one used for the build site) and transport links (Fainstein, 2010:107). City Hall's share was comprised of \$458million direct investment (originally forecast at \$281million) and a further \$480million in tax breaks (shared with the state government) (Fainstein, 2010:107).

4.2.2.3 The Applied Sciences Initiative (NYCEDC)

The financial recession of 2008/09 occurred halfway through Bloomberg's tenure. A New York State Department of Labor report (2009) anticipated cumulative job losses in the states of New York, Connecticut and New Jersey peaking at 125,000 in 2011. This was the estimate for the financial sector alone and Manhattan (heavily focused upon financial services) would account for 80% (New York State Department of Labor, 2009:2). This had consequences for neighbouring states, as the majority of financial workers commuted daily from Connecticut and New Jersey (New York State Department of Labor, 2009:2). The Federal Reserve Bank of New York used an index of four coincident economic indicators (CEIs) (nonfarm payroll employment, real earnings, the unemployment rate and average weekly hours worked in the manufacturing industries) to measure the downturn's impact (Bram, Orr,

Rich, Rosen and Song, 2009:1). Across all three states, the index showed a contraction of 5.7% between February 2008 and June 2009 (Bram, *et. al.*, 2009:2). For New York City, the contraction was both lesser (4.9%) and for a shorter period (June 2008-2009) (Bram, *et. al.*, 2009:2). This mitigation was in large part due to the lag effect of economic growth during the prior six years (Bram, *et. al.*, 2009:2). Barring a four-quarter recession in 2002/2003 (following 9/11) of 0.3%, economic growth had been above 2% for all but the year most immediate to the financial recession (when the housing market deterioration of 2007/08 began) (Statista, 2019). Though the 2008/09 recession lasted for four quarters in New York (reaching a -2.1% low at the end of 2008), the economy had recovered all of its lost growth within eighteen months of the recession's ending (June 2009) (Statista, 2019). In 2010/11, the city posted its second-highest growth figure (3.5%) of Bloomberg's mayoralty (the highest was 3.8% in 2005/06) (Statista, 2019). The city closed the gap between the national unemployment rate and its own localised rate during this period (though this was largely due to an overall increase in the nation-wide percentage during the recession) (Stringer, 2016:5).

Contractions in economic data and unemployment rates notwithstanding, the key question must, therefore, be to ask how did the city's economy return to positive growth so quickly. Bloomberg's answer was to pursue a theme that he had often spoken about – the need for entrepreneurial innovation. This began, immediately after the collapse of Lehman Brothers (one of the largest American investment banks, based in New York) in October 2008, with training and business loan programmes aimed at those who had lost financial sector jobs (Katz and Bradley, 2013:18). These efforts at retaining existing corporate expertise led to the creation of initiatives aimed at seeking new cross-sectoral business innovations. These were led by the New York City Economic Development Corporation (NYCEDC), an organisation attached to the Mayor's Office and charged with the responsibility '...to catalyse economic growth.' (Katz and Bradley, 2013:18). Founded in 1991, its remit covers five priorities: infrastructure investment; employment and skills development; using city assets to promote innovation; support start-up companies; and to make New York City '...the global capital for innovation.' (NYCEDC, 2019).

The NYCEDC were already active in the field of job creation. Following a request from Bloomberg, they successfully outbid Secaucus (a town in New Jersey) for the hosting of a new warehouse (connected to online retailers) in Queens in November 2006 (Marshall, 2006:17). This brought 250 new jobs to the area, aiding Bloomberg's claim that he was not focused merely on Manhattan's (Marshall, 2006:17). Prior to this (October 2006), Bloomberg demonstrated that his message of multi-borough investment was global in its ambition. Deputised for by Doctoroff, City Hall

hosted a Spanish business delegation for a day of NYCEDC presentations expounding investment opportunities across New York (Weinstein, 2006:18). The Real Estate Board of New York and the New York Building Congress (developers' and planners' trade bodies) presented on similar themes (Weinstein, 2006:18). At the end, Felix Llorente (a director from Spanish real estate firm Wilcox) commented that '...“What was really interesting was how much is going on outside of Manhattan — in Queens, Brooklyn and the Bronx”...’, revealing that Bloomberg’s message of a “beyond Manhattan” vision was reaching new audiences (Llorente, cited in Weinstein, 2006:18).

From 2009, Bloomberg tasked the NYCEDC with a new remit – to test his hypothesis that the crisis could lead to innovation which would encourage growth and ‘...be a path to reinventing the city’s overall economy.’ (Katz, *et. al.*, 2013:19). This was intended to enable diversification of the economy, boosting sectors outside of financial services whilst using expertise at risk of being lost through the closure of financial firms. Bloomberg made this a long-term goal for his third term and, in July 2011, called for ‘“...any person with any dream, any entrepreneur with any idea, any company with any capital, and any university with any proposal”...’ to submit suggestions for how the city could make better use of economic resources and talent (Bloomberg, cited in Office of the Mayor of New York City, 2011a). This project was called the Applied Sciences Initiative and was targeted at universities around the world, who were required to submit a 129-page application form outlining how their idea would benefit economic sustainability and innovation (Katz, *et. al.*, 2013:24). Its scope, and the manner in which Bloomberg personally directed NYCEDC to assume this new remit demonstrated the “command and control”-style, reflecting his business mindset, that he brought to City Hall and gives an illustration of the powerful executive image traditionally attached to the strong-mayor model.

In December 2011, Bloomberg announced that the joint-winners of this quasi-competition were Cornell University and the Technion-Israel Institute of Technology (Ju, 2011). He deemed the winning bid, to build a technology-focused graduate school on Roosevelt Island (Manhattan), had met his three stipulated criteria that a proposal must ‘...spur economic growth, job creation and high-tech entrepreneurship.’ (Ju, 2011). Bloomberg’s selecting a new higher education institution (HEI) was astute. It avoided criticism for using city budgets to subsidise further high-end residential real estate whilst also creating opportunities for fresh finance (tax revenues and research funding) being introduced into the economy. This was in accord with existing evidence that suggested HEI’s had ‘...long been important economic anchors for New York City...’ (O’Grady and Bowles, 2009:2). In 2009, a report by researchers at New York’s Center for an Urban Future had publicly argued that ‘With analysts predicting that the financial sector will never return to its 2007 job levels, New York’s

universities and nonprofit [sic] research institutions could provide a crucial economic spark in the near term and become a reliable job generator in the long run.’ (O’Grady, *et. al.*, 2009:2). The Cornell Tech development embodied this vision, pledging to create 600 ‘...spin-off...’ companies, ‘...30,000 well-paying jobs...’ within five miles of the site and use private capital (\$1billion) to build the facility (NYCEDC, 2011). The Mayor’s Office underwrote the project’s construction (Katz, *et. al.*, 2013:26). It was due to be completed on the last day of Bloomberg’s mayoralty, creating a clear final legacy for the Mayor (actually opening, due to construction delays, in September 2017) (Harris, 2017).

4.2.3 Bloomberg’s ‘Luxury Product’ – A Billionaire’s Ambition? Gentrification Allegations

In examining Bloomberg’s wider politico-economic vision, it is useful to briefly consider his own perception of the city that he governed. As noted above, some commentators have evaluated Bloomberg as having promoted gentrification. Much of this is, however, based upon two aspects – the idea of a Manhattan-centric approach and Bloomberg’s description of New York as a ‘...luxury product...’ in a 2003 speech (Cardwell, 2003; Brash, 2011:18-19; Greenblatt, 2013).

Bloomberg’s allusion to a luxury product has spawned much writing on how he perceived of New York and how this might have influenced his political vision. Purnick (2009), Brash (2011) and Viteritti (2017) have all given consideration to this incident and tried to draw conclusions about how much insight it gives researchers into the mayors. Viteritti (2017:xiv) felt that Bloomberg’s image became one of ‘...a mayor of the privileged class...’ and Purnick (2009:70) concluded that he had not ‘...avoided tin-eared remarks and insensitive observations...’. Brash (2011), meanwhile, dedicated his book to an in-depth discussion of how Bloomberg approached his luxury city vision. Interviewees were keen to highlight this perspective and allege that it was, at least partially, symptomatic of the mayor’s being ‘...tone-deaf to the lots of people being priced out of the city.’ (Transcript K, 2019:5; Transcript L, 2019:1; Transcript N, 2019:7; Transcript O, 2019:8). More contemporaneously, commentators were still recalling the quote when seeking to characterise his whole mayoralty when it drew to a close in 2013 (Greenblatt, 2013). Similarly, just one year after the speech itself, some city officials and third-sector partners to City Hall were remarking to journalists that communicative slips such as these had been somewhat of a baptism-of-fire for a mayor who “‘...was so politically tone deaf in the beginning that he was surprised by how vehement the opposition was.’” (Cohen, cited in Swope, 2004)⁶.

⁶ The communicative ramifications of moments such as this are returned to in the LCI analysis later.

Given this tranche of commentaries and criticisms, it is important to consider the context of Bloomberg's remark. The quote ran thus: "If New York City is a business, it isn't Wal-Mart -- it isn't trying to be the lowest-priced product in the market," ... "It's a high-end product, maybe even a luxury product. New York offers tremendous value, but only for those companies able to capitalize on it." (Bloomberg, cited in Cardwell, 2003). He made these remarks in a wider speech about how New York could close the inherited budget deficit whilst continuing to realise the potential of economic strengths – consumerism, business growth and real estate investment (Cardwell, 2003). Referring to his background, Bloomberg argued (to an audience of corporate executives) that "...the more I learn about this institution called New York City, the more I see the ways in which it needs to think like a private company..." concluding that this meant maximising opportunities for the kinds of investment that would increase revenues (Cardwell, 2003). This seemed likely to include real estate firms being courted for investment into redevelopment projects, including Hudson Yards. Bloomberg's speech came after he had used the 2003 budget to raise taxes on incomes, corporations and those working in financial services (Weikart, 2009:123). Property and income tax revenues subsequently rose by 11.1% and 17.1%, respectively (New York City Independent Budget Office, 2003:2). These contributed, in no small part, to the return to a budget surplus of over \$1billion by the end of the 2003/04 Financial Year (New York City Independent Budget Office, 2004:1).

In this context, one can appraise the "luxury" label so often hung upon Bloomberg's mayoralty in an entirely different manner. For instance, Bloomberg's audience of corporate executives is one which we may safely assume that he felt at ease amongst, given his business background. Perhaps he was still not used to the scrutiny that elected office brings to leaders' remarks. As interviewees attested to, his communicative abilities often lacked perceptions of how different audiences would view his phrasing (Transcript K, 2019:6; Transcript L, 2019:1; Transcript O, 2019:7). Though they agreed that this improved, they observed that he remained most comfortable when addressing corporate audiences (Transcript L, 2019:1). Viewed in this light, one can argue that occasions such as the 2003 speech illustrated a tone-deafness to others' perceptions but they do *not* fully corroborate claims that they can be used as almost-incontrovertible proof of an overriding bias towards gentrification. On the other hand, ten years later Bloomberg commented '..."If we could get every billionaire around the world to move here, it would be a godsend that would create a much bigger income gap"...' and that this would benefit the whole city through boosted tax receipts (Bloomberg, cited in Chronopoulos and Soffer, 2017:855). So, it would appear as though – if a broader perspective, than *one* dated quote, is taken – one *can* identify a trend in terms of a tone that was disconnected from the majority's wider economic reality.

This connects with allegations that Bloomberg was a gentrifying mayor who pursued Manhattan-centric policies (as this was where the wealthiest citizens lived and, thus, generated tax revenues) and made New York substantially more unequal. This narrative was seized upon by Bloomberg’s successor, Bill de Blasio (Democrat), who focused his mayoral campaign upon a constant depiction of ‘...“a tale of two cities”...’ – referring to two distinct social classes, one (real estate developers, financiers and corporate directors) substantially wealthier than 2002 and the other (low and middle-incomes) significantly poorer (de Blasio, cited in Ahmed, Angotti, Jones Austin, Blumberg and Steinberg, 2014:158). In many senses, this is an accurate narrative. Table 6 provides a sample of the situation facing two different neighbourhoods (fifteen minutes apart on the subway) and allows us to see the inequality facing some of New York’s citizens (Ahmed, *et. al.*, 2014:159).

Table 7: Upper East Side and the South Bronx (2014)

Neighbourhood District	Median Household Income (\$)	Unemployment rate (%)	Median Housing Sale Price (\$)
Upper East Side (Manhattan)	100,000	7	1,000,000
The South Bronx (The Bronx)	20,000	16	280,000

(Adapted from Ahmed, *et. al.*, 2014:159).

It is apparent that a significant economic reality existed across these neighbourhoods and a 2014 panel discussion, held by City University of New York (featuring economists and social reform campaigners) made clear that these statistics were representative of wider socio-economic divides between Manhattan and the remainder of New York (Ahmed, *et. al.*, 2014).

The question is whether this represented a failure of political leadership that resulted from Bloomberg’s policies or, alternatively, it reflected wider trends. Even brief consideration indicates the latter to be the case. Koch’s earlier comments about focusing upon middle-class-focused wealth generation indicated that the narrative surrounding Bloomberg’s policies was merely the re-emergence of earlier discourses about where mayors’ priorities should lie (Koch, 1984:221; Chronopoulos, *et. al.*, 2017:855). On the other hand, individual measures of economic affluence provide a mixed picture. For instance, Bloomberg finished his first term (2005) with a city that had a

per capita income of \$35,431 but this fell to a low of \$33,469 in 2012 post-recession (rising to \$34,301 by the end of his mayoralty) (New York Department of State, 2017). However, the pattern of this trend matched to the national economic picture and New York City still maintained a higher income level by comparison (with corresponding nation-wide figures being \$31,501, \$29,221 and \$29,942, respectively) (New York Department of State, 2017).

New York's wider gentrification debate matched to similar ones in other global cities at this time. London (as the other strong-mayor system included in this study) is a good comparator. Numerical data from Trust for London (a think-tank focused upon poverty and inequality) showed that income inequality was high there, too (Trust for London, 2017). In 2002, the top 10% of earners received eight times more than the bottom 10%, remaining the same in 2014 (Trust for London, 2017). The peak during this period (2011) saw the figure at ten times more (Trust for London, 2017). Thus, the income inequality witnessed in London in 2014 (when Bloomberg left office) was worse than that experienced in New York, if we take the figures in Table 6 as indicative. Boris Johnson, like Bloomberg, also received notable criticism for his views on this topic in 2013. In a speech to the Centre for Policy Studies, he argued that '...economic inequality was useful because it encouraged people to work harder.' (Dominiczak and Kirkup, 2013; Johnson, 2013).

Therefore, Bloomberg is not somehow unique in terms of his attraction of criticisms regarding both inequality and his controversial remarks upon certain aspects of it. Former mayors and international contemporaries have made similar remarks and received comparable disapproval for them. Whilst his background lent itself to portrayals of him as the '...businessman-mayor...' (supposedly out of touch with the reality facing his city's dwellers), use of this and some select quotations does not, in itself, *prove* that his personal perspective favoured gentrification (Swope, 2004). Evidence presented in Sections 7.2.2.2 and 7.2.2.3 regarding his seeking investment in areas beyond Manhattan mitigate against this charge. It is true that much of the development undertaken during his mayoralty was built in Manhattan (from Hudson Yards and the new Penn Station through to the Jacob Javits Convention Center extension) (Viteritti, 2017:139). However, those alleging that this somehow made the '...billionaire mayor...' guilty of creating '...one vast gated community for the rich...' are themselves compelled to acknowledge other factors' influence (Harvey, 2013:23). For instance, Viteritti (perhaps Bloomberg's most virulent critic in this respect) acknowledged that the recovery of Lower Manhattan in the four years post-9/11 was '...something of a miracle...' that required substantial effort by the Mayor and Doctoroff (Viteritti, 2013:139). He also acknowledged that gentrification debates had long dogged the city's history (with all recent mayors having had to

confront the issue) (Viteritti, 2017:224-227). Purnick, meanwhile, labelled him ‘...one of the most effective mayors in the city’s history...’ who ‘...succeeded anyway in a tough political environment, guiding the city through both bad economic times and good ones.’ (Purnick, 2009:3).

As discussed earlier, this did, to some extent, reflect a wider historical trend of New York Mayors who focused their institutional economic policy outlook on those with higher levels of disposable wealth. Thus, it could be argued that this was merely an example of an office-holder being conditioned, in the sense suggested by Lauth (2004), to reflect certain historical precedents. However, to accept this view would be to absolve Bloomberg of any responsibility for association, positive and negative, with his own policies. Ultimately, he still had to take decisions and, as seen with his desire to initiate the Applied Sciences Initiative, this could sometimes mean a very “hands-on” style of leadership. Thus, though Bloomberg’s actions and policy choices do reflect a historical pattern within the New York mayoralty, his agency in developing these strategic themes (including in taking a direct interest in their development) cannot be denied. Here, then, is an example of a strong-mayor who much more reflected Peters’ (2012:55) ‘...individuals within institutions...’ concept of an executive whose own agency takes advantage of institutional norms to pursue their own ends.

4.2.4 Notable Non-Economic Issues and Policies

Though this chapter has focused upon Bloomberg’s economic redevelopment policies, it is worth noting other areas that he sought to extend his leadership into. This reflects that, though economic policy has this chapter’s focus, other aspects that are of interest were raised by interviewees.

Bloomberg’s communicative abilities were regarded as uninspiring by interviewees. However, there were occasions where his communicative abilities indicated a more astute and in-touch mayor. In August 2003 the city suffered an electrical blackout that lasted for several hours. It was part of a power outage that began in Canada and ran down the Eastern Seaboard into several US states. In all, it lasted for two days and affected 50,000,000 people, costing the economies of both nations \$6billion (Minkel, 2008). Blackouts are not uncommon in North America (due to outdated and overheated power lines) and similar incidents occurred in New York in 1965 and 1977 (Gottlieb and Glanz, 2003; Minkel, 2008). Bloomberg seized upon the opportunity as one in which to demonstrate proactive leadership. Appearing on CNN, he moved quickly to reassure New Yorkers that it was not the result of terrorism before giving radio interviews where he explained ‘...the inner workings of the electric grid...’, giving residents the sense of a mayor who was in command of the detail (Swope, 2004;

Gottlieb, *et. al.*, 2003). This was motivated by a desire to avoid the widespread looting that had occurred when a lack of coherent leadership led to public distrust and rioting during the 1977 blackout (Gottlieb, *et. al.*, 2003). Bloomberg's response was a "coming of age" for his leadership, with commentators such as Christopher Swope and Alan Greenblatt (New York political correspondents) claiming that it suited the mayor's rational, plain-speaking style of delivery (Swope, 2004; Transcript K, 2019:6-7). When a report Bloomberg had commissioned after the incident, to investigate alleged managerial failings, offered criticisms of the apparent lack of contingency planning, the Mayor '...sold it as a chance to learn from the faults and get better.' (Transcript K, 2019:6-7). By the time that the next major outage (July 2006), Bloomberg was prepared, subsequently quickening upgrades to the electricity generation infrastructure (delivering two refurbished and more efficient power stations in 2011) (McNickle, 2017:193). This sense of a crisis-manager mayor who was prepared to fight back against his image of being disconnected from the public's concerns served him well in such moments and was, as one interviewee observed, '...one of his strengths as Mayor.' (Transcript K, 2019:7).

Policies on both schools and public health also illustrated his inclination towards extending the institutional basis of his powers. He brought the city's schools under the Mayor's direct control (Transcript K, 2019:6). They had previously been run by independent school boards. Bloomberg was persuaded, after receiving anecdotal evidence at public events during the 2001 campaign, that the system was under-performing and insufficiently accountable (Transcript K, 2019:6; Purnick, 2009:122). Addressing this had been an intention of his three immediate predecessors (Purnick, 2009:122). They failed to tackle the issue early enough (distracted by crime rates, the economy and racial tensions) so, Bloomberg chose to '...do it fast, while the public still relished the idea of a new leader...before resistance congealed...' (Purnick, 2009:122).

In 2002, Bloomberg persuaded the State Assembly to review schools' accountability and they were subsequently placed under mayoral oversight (Vander Ark, 2011). He also experimented by replacing some with the pre-existing "charter" system, whereby schools were given greater control of budgets but remained ultimately accountable to the Mayor (McNickle, 2017:119). This innovation was only minimally successful, with only 183 out of 1600 schools being charters by 2014 (7% of pupils) (McNickle, 2017:119). Nevertheless, the model of mayoral control received its largest plaudits when other cities (including Chicago and Boston) chose to replicate the idea (Vander Ark, 2011). Meanwhile, President Barack Obama's first Secretary of Education, Arne Duncan (2009-2015), cited Bloomberg's reforms as a model that other cities should consider (Vander Ark, 2011; Duncan, 2018:111). By 2014, students were 21% more likely to go to university, whilst 15% more were finishing high school (every

demographic group showed improvements on these metrics) (McNickle, 2017:129). Bloomberg also kept a first-term pledge to increase education funding in real terms. This translated to a per-pupil funding increase from \$7,646 (2000) to \$12,153 (2014) (New York Independent Budget Office, 2014).

Overall, the reforms were well-received, though appointments for School Chancellor (the official overseeing the system) proved controversial. Joel Klein, a former Assistant US Attorney with not professional experience of the education system, served in the role (2002-2011). Bloomberg wished to continue a trend of falling crime rates in poorer neighbourhoods and was impressed by Klein's publicly-expressed view that good quality schools lowered levels of youth offending (City of New York, 2008). Klein proved successful in implementing the reforms described above but his replacement proved less accomplished. Cathie Black succeeded Klein, resigning just six weeks later (Gootman, 2011). She was a publishing executive who '...possessed neither education nor government experience...' and her appointment reflected Bloomberg's preference for corporate candidates (Viteritti, 2017:138).

However, there was no subsequent call for mayoral control itself to be abandoned. Instead, this was further entrenched when Bloomberg subsumed the Schools Chancellor's role into a Deputy Mayorship when replacing Black (Viteritti, 2017:138). He had successfully won the debate about who should control schools, to the extent that it was adopted by other mayors. In 2009, the State Assembly commissioned a review of the reform to-date. Its author (Viteritti) concluded that its success made mayoral-oversight logical (Vander Ark, 2011).

This represented a significant expansion of the mayoralty's institutional remit, through extension of its formal powers. The subsequent conclusions of individuals such as Viteritti illustrate how major institutional reform (including extension of a policy remit) can be successfully achieved, in terms of its subsequently being accepted. This is a prime example of a strong mayor who did not merely, to use Peter's (2012:55) model, expand individual power *within* and *over* their institution. Instead, Bloomberg used his agency to stretch it further by expanding the remit of the institution itself.

Whilst this expansion of institutional power was successful, Bloomberg's efforts regarding public health received a more mixed reception. In 2003, Bloomberg successfully passed the Smoke Free Air Act – banning smoking in public spaces such as bars, restaurants and offices from January 2003 onwards (City of New York, 2002). Initially, this was heavily opposed by many restaurateurs and hotel owners, who claimed that their incomes would be affected by decreased footfall (Cazentre,

2013; Transcript K, 2019:3-4; Transcript N, 2019:5). However, this resistance dissipated when predicated business closures failed to materialise (Cazentre, 2013; Transcript, K, 2019:4; Transcript N, 2019:5). Consequently, the ban was expanded to parks, beaches and properties controlled by the New York City Parks Department (2011) (Pilkington, 2011). This, then, was a victory for Bloomberg in his first and third terms, representing substantial expansion of powers (beyond public health advice and air quality and into having direct, non-real-estate-related, effects upon retail and leisure sectors).

Efforts to implement the so-called Soda Tax were far less successful. First proposed in 2008, its intention was to limit the size of cups used for high-sugar content soft drinks to sixteen ounces (Transcript K, 2019:3; Weiner, 2013). This was mocked, during Summer 2008, by Sarah Palin (Republican Vice-Presidential nominee) as a ‘...“tax on a big gulp.”’ (Palin, cited in Transcript K, 2019:3). Formally called the Portion Cap Rule, the measure was introduced in May 2012 and instantly suspended, when litigation (on behalf of affected businesses) was registered with the New York Supreme Court (NYSC) (Weiner, 2013; Grynbaum, 2014). The NYSC ruled the regulation unconstitutional (March 2013), due to its limits upon freedom-of-choice and, despite an appeal by the Mayor’s office, the New York Court of Appeals eventually upheld the ruling (June 2014) (Grynbaum, 2014). On this occasion, a strong mayor who had previously expanded his public health remit could still face significant legal obstructions to their policy agenda.

4.3 Analysis: The Leadership Capital of Michael Bloomberg

4.3.1 Political and Policy Vision

Bloomberg actively pursued his own vision of the phenomenon known as placemaking. Post-9/11, Bloomberg had much scope for placemaking (the reshaping of a locality according to economic, social, cultural and/or political imperatives) (Foo, Martin, Wool and Polsky, 2014:176; Katz and Nowak, 2017:25). His response naturally took advantage of New York's individualised circumstances (for instance, efforts to redevelop Hudson Yards and build a new stadium for the Yankees). These are akin to the place-based leadership contexts referred to by Robin Hambleton (2019:2). In continuing to pursue projects such as Hudson Yards, even after the failure of the Olympic bid, Bloomberg achieved consistency in the targeted nature of placemaking activities. McNickle dedicated much of his examination of Bloomberg's tenure to arguing his placemaking activity was intended to foster urban entrepreneurialism (McNickle, 2017:133-170). Given his aforementioned comments about corporatising government and attracting investment, this characterisation seems apposite.

As Foo, *et. al.* (2017:175) mention, high-investment regeneration efforts tend to focus upon high-income neighbourhoods, due to a hyper-localised focus for the redevelopment efforts pursued by private sector businesses already based there. Journalist Michelle Goldberg made this point by appraising de Blasio's victory as being a '...backlash against the failures of an urban policy...' which prioritised wealth creation over equality of access to public services (Goldberg, 2014:14). However, she failed to cite evidence for this claim – merely expressing scepticism towards Bloomberg's (2012) assertion that a city "...being cool counts...", believing that it attracted residents (Bloomberg, cited in Goldberg, 2014:14). Conversely, Katz and Nowak (2017:25-26) credit Bloomberg with using the idea of placemaking to enhance the quality of life for residents. They include, as examples of this, reforms of the education system and engagement with research communities in seeking new investment (as with the Applied Sciences Initiative) (Katz, *et. al.*, 2017:25-26).

The construction of the Yankees' stadium offers interesting insights regarding Bloomberg's approach to economic redevelopment. Viteritti passionately argued that Bloomberg spent his mayoralty prioritising Manhattan. He claimed that, as Manhattan had the highest per capita income of all five boroughs, this was evidence of Bloomberg's elitist focus on high-income neighbourhoods (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2007; Viteritti, 2017:139-140). However, whilst Bloomberg did construct many projects in Manhattan (for which, see below), one cannot deny that the Yankees' stadium was both a major development and in The Bronx. Moreover, the method of financing was identical to that

used in Hudson Yards (comprising a mixture of a public bond issue scheme, tax breaks and direct capital) (Fainstein, 2010:107). Whilst one can argue that the financing was on a far lesser scale than Hudson Yards, the amount provided was not insignificant and does, at least, prove that significant investment took place beyond Manhattan. This runs counter to the narrative that Viteritti and some interviewees suggested (Viteritti, 2017; Transcript N, 2019; Transcript O, 2019). It is too early to judge whether Bloomberg's legacy is one of gentrification, given that several of these projects (including Hudson Yards and the Applied Sciences Initiative) are not yet completed. Bloomberg and Doctoroff's predictions regarding financial returns cannot, therefore, be judged for accuracy. However, Bloomberg's did proactively pursue tax breaks as a means to make New York competitive with other cities in pitching for infrastructure projects. He was a consistent advocate of these strategies during his tenure and made his image '...master builder...' image key to all of his elections (Fainstein, 2010:105). In this respect, he remained consistent in his vision throughout.

According to Greenblatt, a journalist covering much of American state and local government, Bloomberg actively sought to make New York '...the new California.' (Transcript K, 2019:7; Greenblatt, 2010). This alludes to California's historical reputation as a state where, largely due to the presence of Silicon Valley, policy innovations are piloted and, if successful, extended across America (Greenblatt, 2010). Greenblatt, in interview, highlighted Bloomberg's policy legacies – including the smoking ban, public health initiatives and reform of the schooling system – as proof that New York City was now assuming this mantle (Greenblatt, 2019:67). Given the short timespan since Bloomberg's mayoralty ended, it is too soon to assess the apparent longevity of these innovations. However, as suggested in Section 2.4, some reforms have been adopted more widely. More crucially for this case study, they have led to portrayals of him, however hyperbolic, as the most influential American mayor of the century so far (Greenblatt, 2013). It is perceptions such as these that led other interviewees to assess Bloomberg's policy legacy being that of a '...philosopher king.' (Transcript N, 2019:3).

Bloomberg is an obvious example of a mayor who embodied Levy's concept of '...rational and strategic individuals who make choices within constraints to obtain their desired ends...' (Levy, 1997:23). He actively extended the mayoralty's policy purview to not only include oversight of schooling but, moreover, to instigate far-reaching systemic reform. He also manipulated his relationship with another key political office, that of Speaker of the City Council of New York, to achieve major constitutional reform. Not only did this run against the course of recent history, regarding earlier public rejections of extensions, but it also allowed him to extend his will into the deliberations of the legislature (acting vicariously through the Speaker). This contributes to an

illustration of Lauth's (2004:73) assertion that individuals remain the key actors within institutions, using their agency to shape the form and context of them. The Applied Sciences Initiative represented Bloomberg at his most business-like as mayor – using the convening power and high-profile of the institution, combined with his own corporate background, to seek solutions to problems posed by the 2008-2009 downturn. Unlike with his schools policy, Bloomberg was able to pursue all of these ends without needing to extend his remit.

It is notable that many people have written much (some academic but, mostly, journalistic) about his legacies. Much of this uses the kind of hyperbolic language mentioned. This makes it hard to remove the observational and partisan and condense the evidence to a point where reasoned assessment may be given regarding the clarity and consistency of the mayor's policy vision. This is further demonstrated in the chapters concerning Livingstone, Johnson and Cohen. However, the interview data and the policy case studies suggest that Bloomberg's purpose and application in support of that vision were clear. He is therefore accorded a score of 5 for each terms.

4.3.2 Communicative Performance

Interviewees' assessments of Bloomberg's communicative abilities were mixed. They interpreted the question of 'How would you characterise Michael Bloomberg's communicative abilities?' in quite different ways. Whilst some chose to focus upon rhetorical performance and the engaging of different audiences, others saw his communications as having been more concerned with portraying a personalised brand (Transcript K, 2019:6-7; Transcript L, 2019:1; Transcript N, 2019:4-5).

Bloomberg's speeches and public appearances were not always successful. Interviewees used phrases such as 'tone-deaf' and 'not very inspiring, flat' to describe his presentational style (Transcript K, 2019:6; Transcript L, 2019:1). This reflected a pre-mayoral narrative, established during the 2001 campaign, that presented him as someone who was '...impatient with small talk, and preferred to focus his energy on getting things done.' (Viteritti, 2017:123). This style was, by the end of his mayoralty, more frequently described as being symptomatic of his transactional, business-like, approach (Brash, 2011:16; Transcript O, 2019:7). Indeed, managerialism could serve the Mayor well. For instance, his desire to seize the initiative and appear well-versed in '...the inner workings of the electric grid...' during the 2004 blackout helped him to quickly take control of a large-scale problem (Swope, 2004). He managed to convey this sense of authority in his radio broadcast and enhanced his crisis-manager image (Swope, 2004). This contributed to re-election in both 2005 and 2009, when pollsters found that the public most often described him as '...intelligent, expert, and determined.'

(Weikert, 2009:132). However, he clearly also failed to translate his managerialism into more empathic or audience-sensitive dialogues. References to the city as a luxury product which needed more billionaires, concurrent to pursuing substantial luxury developments (Hudson Yards), hindered efforts to rid himself of an image as being distant. This failure to avoid ‘...tin-eared remarks and insensitive observations...’ led to ironic criticism that, though a businessman, he lacked the salesman-like quality required in order to further enamour himself with citizens (Purnell, 2009:70;132).

Conversely, this lack of salesmanship did not hinder him in the establishment of a brand that served him well in pursuing his vision. One interviewee described this as ‘...a phenomenal job...’, characterising his brand as ‘...non-partisan, non-vitriolic, even-tempered, middle-of-the-road...’ (Transcript N, 2019:4). It should be noted that this interviewee is a trenchant critic of Bloomberg, having run Mark Green’s campaign against him in 2001. Indeed, though he stressed the strength of the Bloomberg brand, they were quick to describe this as ‘...fake and disingenuous...’ (due to the Mayor’s use of his own private capital in controlling his image in election campaigns) (Transcript N, 2019:4). Nevertheless, this brand was sustained throughout his mayoralty. When John Richardson wrote his 2011 *Esquire* profile, he summarised the brand as being focused upon managerial and practical, pragmatic, solutions to urban issues (Richardson, 2011:90). He summarised Bloomberg as ‘...the ultimate independent, the calm modern technocrat rooted in metrics...’ and this fits with the ‘...middle-of-the-road...’ managerial portrayal of him emerging from interview data (Richardson, 2011:90; Transcript N, 2019:4). The brand’s reflection of reality can be questioned (Purnick has written of his characterisation as a ‘...control freak...’ with a fiery temper). However, it was used to good effect by Bloomberg (Purnick, 2009:49). It was a major contributor to both securing the term limits extension (see below) and his crisis management-style response (including the 2004 blackout and the push for economic innovation following the 2008 financial recession).

Together, these two varying aspects – successfully maintaining a public brand and detached, gaffe-prone, rhetorical presentation – left citizens with mixed views of Bloomberg. Halfway through his tenure, in 2007, a poll found that his business-like style and perceived effectiveness in delivery were his most admired qualities (coming top with 26% of respondents) (Quinnipiac University Poll, 2007). This was compared to the highest-polling net negative perception, that he was ‘...arrogant, cold and too rich to care about people...’, at 17% (Quinnipiac University Poll, 2007). Despite this, his net approval rating (examined in Section 7.3.3) was recorded at 70%, which, as the pollsters concluded in their own analysis, indicated that New Yorkers were broadly content with ‘...a Mayor who's effective, not lovable.’ (Carroll, cited in Quinnipiac University Poll, 2007).

Overall, Bloomberg's communicative abilities waxed and waned across his mayoralty. Beginning from a low ebb, having received a negative press (including from the *New York Times*) throughout the 2001 election, he recovered to a point where gaffes had little impact upon favourable public perceptions (Viteritti, 2017:131). By his second campaign, he had received plaudits for individual instances of carefully-managed communication strategies (including the 2004 blackout), whilst also suffering from building perceptions of him as distanced from the majority of citizens' economic reality (largely down to his 'luxury product' comment). It is fair, therefore, to score him a 3 on the LCI. Interview data suggests that, by 2009, his general ability at reading audiences and tackling his propensity towards insensitive throwaway comments had improved. In the light of this, a score of 4 on the LCI seems justified. By 2013, he had still not managed to lose the label of being a mayor associated with gentrification. However, he continued to solidify his personal outward branding by pursuing post-recession themes of innovation and economic growth. These fitted well with his almost-certainly-deliberate pursuit of the modern technocratic and managerial image described by Richardson. The fact that his successor ran so heavily on a policy platform that played on Bloomberg's communicative issues around the luxury product association does, however, suggest that this was a problem that his communications never succeeded in ridding him of. A score of 3, again, seems justified.

4.3.3 Personal poll rating relative to rating at most recent election⁷

Approval ratings have been used as a means of gauging the mayor in question's personal polling score at each LCI point. Net approval ratings (the approval minus disapproval ratings) is provided⁸. These offer an overall sense of a mayor's public esteem or perception, rather than issue-specific (regarding particular policies) data. The rating at their most recent election reflects vote shares.

⁷ Quinnipiac University Polls have been used throughout this chapter wherever possible due to their status as the largest non-partisan survey organisation covering New York City politics. They are also one of the largest polling organisations in America, with an average accuracy rating of 85% (Lieberman, 2007; Thibault, 2018).

⁸ It should be noted that this data, taken from polls, represents the weighted overall average recorded by Quinnipiac University Poll. The figures provided do not, therefore, represent a breakdown of the various approval ratings accorded to Bloomberg by various demographics. Consideration of this variable with regard to New York Mayors can be obtained from Douglas Arnold and Carnes (2012).

Table 8: Michael Bloomberg Vote Shares and Poll Ratings

Election Year	Vote Share	Year of Approval Rating	Net Approval Rating	LCI Score
2001	50.3%	2005	58%	4
2005	58.4%	2009	36%	1
2009	50.7%	2013 ⁹	40%	2

(Board of Elections, 2001; Board of Elections, 2005; Board of Elections, 2009; Quinnipiac University Polls, 2005a; Quinnipiac University Polls, 2009a; Quinnipiac University Polls, 2014).

This aspect of his capital proved volatile. His capital scored high in 2005, despite the communicative difficulties outlined earlier. His approval rating translated almost directly across into the vote share subsequently achieved. This suggests that the luxury product label had not caused sufficient damage to deny him what would prove to be his best result in terms of vote share. It is clear from interview data that Bloomberg was a more passionate and politically-astute campaigner in 2005. He had picked up on 2001 disillusionment with the New York Democrats on the part of the African-American community. This had been largely down to a gaffe made by the Democratic candidate, Mark Green, who told African-American community leaders that "...I need you to govern, I don't need you to win'..." (Green, cited in Transcript N, 2019:2). Bloomberg thus proactively cultivated this demographic constituency more in 2005. This included public appearances with David Dinkins, the only black former mayor (1990-1993) (Transcript N, 2019:2). Also, the 2005 Democrat nominee, Fernando Ferrer, suffered heavy criticism following the shooting of Amadou Diallo. The 1999 shooting saw Diallo killed by police officers who believed him to match the description of a serial rapist (Cardwell, 2005). This led to a high-profile civil action by Diallo's family (who eventually reached a \$3million out-of-court settlement) (Cardwell, 2005). Ferrer's had suggested that police officers were being over-criticised regarding the case (Cardwell, 2005).

This was compounded by Bloomberg exceeding his previously record-setting 2001 campaign spend (\$73.1million) funding his 2005 campaign with \$85million of his own money (Viteritti, 2017:132,

⁹ For the 2013 approval rating, a January 17 2014 poll has been used. Whilst Quinnipiac University Polls has been consistently used (due to its status as a non-partisan pollster), they did not collect data on Bloomberg's approval rating during this period, focusing on the candidates for the 2013 Mayoral Election instead. Thus, the 2014 poll is used as a form of proxy data and justified on the basis that it was conducted less than one month after Bloomberg left office.

134). This was much to the detriment of his opponents who were, by comparison, able to draw upon public funds of between \$10-20million (Viteritti, 2017:132, 134).

By 2009, Bloomberg's capital had waned to the extent that we must accord him an LCI score 3 points lower. A net fall of 22% in his approval rating is significant. Though the causes may well be myriad, two key potential reasons arise from interview data. Interviewees suggested that Bloomberg's push for a third term had divided public opinion, leaving him vulnerable (Transcript N, 2019:3, 7). Polling evidence is supportive of this conclusion. In 2007, the year before he first floated the idea of extending the term limit, his rating was 70% (Quinnipiac University Poll, 2007). His net approval of 36% in 2009, after the extension was agreed, was the lowest of his second term (Quinnipiac University Poll, 2009b). In the interim, voters polled notable displeasure at the extension, registering disapproval by a margin of 14% (42% to 56%) (Quinnipiac University Poll, 2009c). The fact that previous term limits proposals had required confirmatory referenda may have played a role here (with Bloomberg, benefitting from the support of City Council Speaker Christine Quinn, convincing the council of the case for extending without a referendum) (Viteritti, 2017:134; Transcript O, 2019:11). Also, his 2009 opponent (William "Billy" Thompson) managed to campaign free of the previous demographic and electoral issues faced by Mark Green and the 2005 opponent. As one interviewee who had worked on Green's campaign commented, the two big factors that helped Bloomberg overcome these hurdles were that Thompson received much criticism for a 'lacklustre performance' and the Mayor's repetition of his heavy campaign spending (Transcript N, 2009:2-3). He again broke his previous record – spending \$108million on re-election (Viteritti, 2017:134).

In 2013, his capital recovered slightly. Interviewees' comments offer some reasons why this might have been the case but these are not altogether convincing. They argued that Bloomberg's own media enterprise (Bloomberg News) was offering employment opportunities to previously-critical journalists and, thus, 'chilling' the impact of negative criticism (Transcript N, 2019:4). However, as previously mentioned, it was largely unfavourable portrayals in the media that had led to negative perceptions of his rhetorical abilities. Also, Bloomberg News was founded more than a decade prior to his first election and this had not stopped these examples of a negative press (Winkler and Sondag, 2014:3). Even those journalists who had offered positive critiques of his style did not shy away from negative criticism too (from Christopher Swope's comments on presentational difficulties to Greenblatt's highlighting of the Mayor's failures in public health) (Swope, 2004; Greenblatt, 2013). These journalists had spent their time outside of Bloomberg News throughout his tenure. The argument about a supposed 'chilling effect' does not, therefore, bear scrutiny (Transcript N, 2019:4).

The improvement in Bloomberg's approval rating was only 4% and still 18% below his 2005 percentage. Placed in this perspective, it demonstrates only a modest recovery. Whilst it is inadvisable to speculate, it may be that introducing budget cuts, to rebalance the city's finances (2010) contributed. Bloomberg's approval rating slumped to 24% halfway through the term (whilst his handling of fiscal matters received a score of -2%) (Quinnipiac University Poll, 2010). Polling from 2011, as the cuts took effect, left him with a net approval rating of just 5% - his lowest recorded (Quinnipiac University Poll, 2011). When set alongside the additional context of a subsequent 2013 de Blasio campaign that portrayed Bloomberg as out-of-touch, relative stagnation in this aspect of his leadership capital is unsurprising.

4.3.4 Longevity (time in office)

Bloomberg's longevity is particularly notable, given the manner in which he extended its constitutional limit from eight years to twelve. As noted earlier, he had opposed Giuliani's 2001 attempt to seek an emergency extension, on the grounds of a professed desire for constitutionality and the chance to regenerate New York (McNickle, 2017:30; Purnick, 2009:100-101). This makes his eventual tenure of twelve years even more intriguing.

In 2009, the term-limits reform was a factor in voters' perceptions of the Mayor's longevity. Interviewees suggested that this left a '...bad taste in the mouth...', due to the lack of public balloting over the proposal, but that this was only really palpable come the latter half of his third term, as commentators reflected on the longest mayoralty since Koch left office (1989) (Transcript N, 2019:7; Transcript O, 2019:11). Many of Bloomberg's reforms were yet to be either enacted or completed. For instance, the extension of the smoking ban, the beginning of work at Hudson Yards and the initiation of the Applied Sciences Initiative were all notable third term issues. Nevertheless, the strong public expectation had been that the Mayor would leave after eight years. Bloomberg promoted this perception (leaving it unclear as to whether he had always intended to seek a third term) by installing a clock in his office, counting down his remaining days as Mayor, in the hope of motivating his staff (McNickle, 2017:249).

Though Bloomberg cited the economic downturn as a reason for seeking an extension, arguing that his business career made him the best-placed politician to lead New York, the issue of a lack of public consultation on the extension remained live (Quinnipiac University Poll, 2009c; Transcript O, 2019:11). He was able to convince Christine Quinn, Speaker of the City Council, that there

was not a need for a referendum by the Speaker (as demanded by the Charter of the City of New York (McNickle, 2017:254). Interviewees have suggested that, though the reasoning on this decision was unclear, Quinn may have been motivated by wanting to seek Bloomberg's endorsement when running for the Democratic mayoral nomination in the future (which she subsequently failed to secure in 2013) (Transcript K, 2019:9; Transcript N, 2019:7). This was despite the results of two previous referenda (1993 and 1996) having been in favour of a two-term limit (supported by 59% to 41% and 54% to 46%, respectively) (McNickle, 2017:254-255). Ultimately the change was approved by a vote of the Council, (twenty-nine votes to twenty-two) (Kramer, 2008).

McNickle (2017:254) contended that Bloomberg's seeking to change term limits was symptomatic of an entrepreneurial mindset that assumes that wealth and privilege enable them to do that which others believe to be impossible. This is a myopic view of the situation. The historical path of the Office of the Mayor of New York City is one that has seen swings between two or three terms. In 2010, voters decided in a referendum (74% to 26%) to revert to the two-term limit (Board of Elections, 2010).

The predictions of some of Bloomberg's advisors (including deputy mayors Ed Skyler and Patti Harris) that a third term would exhaust an incumbent's remaining energy seem to have been at least partially borne out (McNickle, 2017:255). Interviewees from more than one case study contained within this thesis have suggested that they have observed (from the varied perspectives of journalists, advisors or elected office-holders) that there is a difficulty maintaining momentum beyond eight years in office (Transcript C, 2018:1; Transcript K, 2019:8; Transcript N, 2019:7). As one commented, 'You run out of steam and there's a bit of you've done so many things and it's coming round again.' (Transcript C, 2018:1). For Bloomberg, the "it" that could be argued to have been coming around again was budget cuts and debates around gentrification. Thus, though the LCI scores leaders' longevity on a straight chronological weighting (giving higher scores for longer periods in office), a better future revision of its design might be to allow for a more qualitative assessment that scores according to perceptions of whether a longer period in office was beneficial or detrimental to the individual in question.

What is clear is that this was a prime example of institutional stretch. Bloomberg was able to not only extend his period in office but to create a precedent that by-passed existing legal requirements as to the process for doing so. This has led interviewees to saying that he '...owned...' the Council and, thus, made them subservient to his political strategy (Transcript L, 2019:2). This does

indeed seem indicated given that a majority of the Council acquiesced to his desire and that the decision was not subsequently legally challenged on the grounds of unconstitutionality. On this occasion, a mayor acting within a strong-mayor system was able to stretch the basis of their power, with significant consequences.

4.3.5 Selection or re-selection as party candidate (margin)

When Bloomberg ran for re-election in 2005, he could, potentially, have faced a Republican primary challenger. This would mean that a Republican who expressed dissatisfaction with his leadership could have challenged for the nomination. Occurrences of this are common and Bloomberg's successor, de Blasio, had to contest a primary in his 2017 re-election bid (Lee and Bloch, 2017). No-one chose to primary Bloomberg in 2005. We must, therefore, accord Bloomberg the highest score possible (5) for, though the index measures margin of re-selection percentages, we may safely argue that a lack of need for re-selection denotes a high level of capital in this area.

In 2007, Bloomberg changed his political affiliation to Independent. This was largely motivated by his exploration of the possibility of running as a third-party candidate in the 2008 Presidential Election (Weikart, 2009:134). Though he failed to subsequently run in that election, suggesting that he was unlikely to win in a dominant two-party system, the Mayor chose to retain his independence, arguing: '...“Any successful elected executive knows that real results are more important than partisan battles and that good ideas should take precedence over rigid adherence to any particular political ideology.”' (Bloomberg, cited in Weikart, 2009:134). This is consistent with the non-partisan, “middle-of-the-road” image of Bloomberg mentioned earlier.

However, the Republican Party still chose to endorse Bloomberg in 2009, by “adopting” him as their preferred candidate. This was a result of polling, nine months beforehand, that demonstrated that Bloomberg was likely to win as an independent (Quinnipiac University Poll, 2009b). Suggested Republican candidates, including Time Warner's chairman (Richard Parsons), refused to run – describing Bloomberg as having been sufficiently successful to merit a third term (Goldstein, 2008). The polls showed him ahead of both putative Democrat candidates (yet to be selected) by margins of at least 12% (Quinnipiac University Poll, 2009b). As analysed in greater detail in Section 3.6, this came at a time when federal Republican politicians faced a net 28% disapproval rating (with even Republican voters recording an 8% net disapproval rating for the party) (Quinnipiac University Poll, 2009d; Quinnipiac University Poll, 2009e). This adoption was, therefore, similar to the 2005 election (in that it was uncontested). A score of 5 is again registered.

The 2013 score for this element of the LCI of Bloomberg is problematic. Bloomberg was not seeking re-election, having reached his final term limit. Thus, the metric ceases to be applicable in this scenario. This is resolved in this case by scoring Bloomberg 5 on the index. As with the case study of Johnson, the maximum score is awarded given that the incumbent, had they been running, would not have needed to face reselection procedures. Thus, they were in a position of strength, with regard to this metric.

4.3.6 Party polling relative to most recent election result

The Republican Party’s poll result is compared to its result at the most recent election (in short, 2005 with 2001, 2009 with 2005 and 2013 with 2009) in New York City. As Bloomberg was endorsed by the Republicans in 2013, we can still use the party’s polling for the application of the LCI at that date point. Table 8 summarises the results. The most recent election result used, in each case, is the party’s overall share of the vote in the elections to the New York City Council (held concurrent to the mayoral election). The vote share is purely for the Republican Party and not those who ran as independents and subsequently caucused with the party. The below table clearly indicates that Bloomberg far outpolled his party and, so, this was not a great source of his capital. It does, however, indicate that interviewees who suggested that New York is electorally heavily inclined towards the Democrats were correct (Transcript K, 2019:2). However, to suggest that this somehow made Bloomberg’s victories particularly impressive or unique is erroneous, given the large number of Republicans to previously hold the same office (including predecessor, Rudy Giuliani).

Table 9: Republican Party Polling Relative to Most Recent Election Result

LCI Date	Party Vote Share	Most Recent Election Date	Party Vote Share	% Change	LCI Score
2005	12%	2001	10%	+2%	3
2009	12%	2005	12%	-	3
2013	16%	2009	12%	+4%	4

(Board of Elections, 2001; Board of Elections, 2005; Board of Elections, 2009; Board of Elections, 2013).

4.3.7 Levels of public trust in leader

This metric has been measured on the basis of proxy data. This is because American pollsters do not regularly ask questions regarding public trust in local politicians, preferring to focus upon

overall approval. This became apparent after a wide-ranging search of independent and commercial polling organisations – including Quinnipiac University Poll, Gallup, Rasmussen Reports, the Pew Research Center, Marist Poll and YouGov (all of whom have a large presence within the American public opinion industry). This lack of metric-specific data reflects a key issue in applying the LCI cross-nationally (in short, that certain metrics will be either less relevant or less data-rich in different political cultures). This is discussed in the findings chapter.

The approval ratings have been used as a proxy but this raised a significant issue. This was that one can approve of how leaders perform in office without necessarily trusting them. However, proxy data can, if treated cautiously, still give an indication of potential trust in a leader. This is more useful than available polling on perceptions of Bloomberg's personability (which uses versions of the question "Would you go for a beer with this leader?"). These include questions such as 'Would you like Mayor Bloomberg to have Thanksgiving dinner with you or not?' and 'Regardless of how you intend to vote, whom would you rather chat with at a July 4th picnic – William Thompson or Michael Bloomberg?' (Quinnipiac University Poll, 2005b; Quinnipiac University Poll, 2009f). These indicate perceptions of Bloomberg's personal likeability but they do not offer a sense of respondents' view of his leadership, whereas approval ratings do (due to questions being directly pitched in relation to approval of a mayor's performance in office). Moreover, the use of approval ratings for judging levels of public trust has a precedent in Charles Parker's (2017:109-111) LCI of former California Governor Jerry Brown. Though this data has already been used in Section 7.3.3, the LCI's scoring system for trust is applied and this offers a slightly different outcome. Table 9 summarises the results, which reveal only low to moderate levels of trust. Without direct data on trust, it is unwise to over-evaluate causality regarding how such scores have been achieved. However, it suggests an indicative finding that a mayor can manage to continue in office for a long period of time with relatively low levels of trust.

Table 10: (Proxy) Trust Ratings for Michael Bloomberg

Year of Approval Rating	Net Trust (Approval) Rating	LCI Score
2005	58%	3
2009	36%	2
2013 ¹⁰	40%	2

(Quinnipiac University Polls, 2005a; Quinnipiac University Polls, 2009a; Quinnipiac University Polls, 2014).

4.3.8 Ability to work on a cross-partisan/consensual basis

Many of Bloomberg’s senior appointments, throughout his tenure, were drawn from his pre-existing employees at Bloomberg LP. In his 1997 book on Bloomberg LP, he outlined his philosophy on employment was to value loyalty as the highest-desirable characteristic in employees and that he liked to work with people whom he had known for a long time (Bloomberg, 1997:48, 165-166). This was reflected in his choice of mayoral staff. Appointing deputies who he felt a synergy with, Bloomberg was able to ‘...utilize institutions to fulfill his or her goals.’ (Peters, 2012:55).

Patricia “Patti” Harris had been Head of Bloomberg LP’s corporate communications team (and, before that, an advisor to Koch) (Viteritti, 2017:132). She has been described as Bloomberg’s ‘...closest confidante...’ and ‘...alter ego...’ and began at City Hall as the Deputy Mayor for Administration before quickly becoming First Deputy Mayor (Smith, 2010; Viteritti, 2017:133). She continued to hold a role as Chief Executive Officer of Bloomberg Philanthropies (Bloomberg’s non-profit funder of third-sector causes). The Mayor successfully petitioned the Conflicts of Interest Board (COIB) that she would avoid contact with projects affected by Bloomberg Philanthropies. Her holding of both positions led Viteritti to cite Harris as proof of a corporate atmosphere to Bloomberg’s mayoralty (Viteritti, 2017:134). Kevin Sheekey was another former corporate communications director who joined City Hall. He was first appointed to be a political strategist in Bloomberg’s private office before becoming Deputy Mayor for Government Affairs (largely a position that required him to continue his previous work) in 2004 (Smith, 2004). Ed Skyler was the final member of Bloomberg LP’s communications team to join the Mayor’s

¹⁰ For the 2013 approval rating, a January 17 2014 poll has been used. Whilst Quinnipiac University Polls has been consistently used (due to its status as a non-partisan pollster), they did not collect data on Bloomberg’s approval rating during this period, focusing on the candidates for the 2013 Mayoral Election instead. Thus, the 2014 poll is used as a form of proxy data and justified on the basis that it was conducted less than one month after Bloomberg left office.

private office. He served first as Secretary to the 2001 campaign before joining City Hall and serving as Deputy Mayor for Administration (later Deputy Mayor for Operations) until 2010 (Barbaro, 2010). Together, Harris, Sheekey and Skyler represented the “Bloomberg-isation” of City Hall (the corporatising of internal operations, giving Bloomberg an atmosphere with which he was familiar).

There were external appointments, too. Doctoroff, appointed to head the Olympics bid under Giuliani, and Nathan Leventhal (Ed Koch’s former deputy mayor) were examples of pre-existing officials who continued under Bloomberg. Whilst Doctoroff took on the economic development portfolio, Leventhal first headed Bloomberg’s transition team and, subsequently, advised on appointments (Viteritti, 2017:132). Stephen Goldsmith was appointed as Skyler’s replacement in 2010, serving until 2011 (responsible for fire, construction and sanitation matters) (Office of the Mayor of New York City, 2011b). Goldsmith had previously been the Mayor of Indianapolis (1992-2000). Together, these three appointments showed that not all senior appointments came from within Bloomberg’s immediate corporate circle. Each brought experience beyond the private. Some of this was used by Bloomberg to tackle allegations that he was filling City Hall with cronies. For instance, his first Deputy Mayor for Policy (Dennis Walcott) had headed the New York Urban League (a public forum for debating residents’ concerns) and a member of the Board of Education (McNickle, 2017:49). Bloomberg announced his appointment by saying that he had selected him in order ‘...“to make sure we understand who we are here to serve”...’ (Bloomberg, cited in McNickle, 2017:49).

Collectively, these individuals formed the Mayor’s private office. Inevitably, some had greater influence than others. Doctoroff was clearly central to Bloomberg’s regeneration of Lower Manhattan, whilst Harris was quickly placed near to him in his office. Bloomberg’s office layout is instructive. He adopted an open-plan trading-floor style layout, nicknamed the “bullpen” due to its cubicle formation sitting himself at the centre (Smith, 2010). This added to the sense of a mayor who wished to run City Hall in a style reminiscent of a CEO responding to residents as stakeholders (Brash, 2011:17).

This demonstrated Bloomberg’s desire to adopt the persona of a management-focused executive who deployed trusted individuals to undertake key tasks within his mayoralty. Some questions may be raised about those appointed straight from Bloomberg LP (including Harris’ conflicts of interest) and whether there were better alternatives available had he been willing to widen his field of appointments. Counter to this is the evidence of the appointments of those such as Doctoroff and Walcott. They represented both existing expertise within New York City’s political establishment and, importantly, Bloomberg’s willingness to reach out beyond his immediate circle. Doctoroff’s centrality

to the redevelopment policy programme made him a rival to even Harris. Whilst, as stated, she was regarded as speaking for Bloomberg, her portfolio was largely more akin to a senior administrator or chief-of-staff, whereas Doctoroff was delegated to handle one of the key policy portfolios.

Richardson's (2011) comments on Bloomberg's non-partisanship in policymaking is further instructive regarding attempts to reach beyond ideological divides. As interviewees commented, though he pursued set ideas in his economic development policies, his personal brand was very much associated with a "middle-of-the-road" and pragmatic approach towards policymaking.

Nevertheless, Barbara Ferman (1985:96-97) argued, in her study of American mayors, that the wider the pool mayors appoint from, the greater their chance of enhancing the capacity for delivery (due to city government having a larger number of perspectives available to it). By appointing so many Bloomberg LP employees, Bloomberg gave a distinctly corporate atmosphere to his mayoralty, potentially excluding the opportunity to widen his advisory pool. Later appointments, including Stu Loeser's replacement of Skyler as Press Secretary (2006), sought to address this (Gaskell, 2006). Loeser was previously Chuck Schumer's (Democrat senator for New York) press secretary and his appointment demonstrated Bloomberg reaching out to opposition politicians. However, the sense of Bloomberg favouring more corporate and personal acquaintances remained constant throughout his mayoralty. This limited his opportunity to reach more consensual relationships beyond his team. In this light, we must score him 3 for each term.

4.3.9 Perceived ability to shape party's policy platform

This metric has been partially addressed by consideration (Sections 7.2.4 and 7.3.1) of how certain policy innovations spread to other cities. This is not to suggest that this occurred through internal party structures. Bloomberg's political allegiance was always fluid. A Democrat supporter until 2001, he switched to the Republicans (believing that he could win the latter's primary, and not the former's, due to his neoliberal economic message being more consistent with them) (Transcript K, 2019:2). As Viteritti (2017:123) argued, his time as an independent was the most apt, in terms of according him a formal political identity. Thus, though Bloomberg is alleged to have significantly influenced other mayors, through his precedent-setting innovations in public policy, it is hard to find suggestions regarding how he directly inputted into Republican policy development. An advocate for several causes – from climate change to gun control, Bloomberg supported most of these causes through a sense of his own personal ideological views. The closest that we might get to assessing his impact upon policy platforms is the rebuttal received for his sugar tax.

Therefore, with regard to his time as a Republican, we must score him a 2 for 2005. The lowest-possible score is not awarded simply because Bloomberg was able to push through a smoking ban that was subsequently adopted by other cities, including Republican-controlled ones. However, this came after 2005 and, so, the impact at this time was one is garnered more through hindsight. In 2009 and 2013, Bloomberg had no allegiance. If one takes this to mean that his proxy for a party was his own office and campaign organisation then we can deduce a high level of influence, based upon the analysis contained within Section 3.8. Thus, we can accord him a score of 5 for both 2009 and 2013.

4.3.10 Perceived ability in legislative effectiveness and achieving outcomes relative to the declared policy programme

Throughout Bloomberg's mayoralty, Democrats dominated New York City Council (Board of Elections, 2001; Board of Elections, 2005; Board of Elections, 2009). This compelled him to work with them when passing legislation, such as enacting smoking bans and budgets (including for specific projects, including the Yankees' stadium). Nevertheless, his attitude may be best described less as consensual and more as domineering. Perhaps most pertinent to consider is his working relationship with the two Speakers of the New York City Council with whom he worked¹¹. These were Gifford Miller (2002-2005) and Christine Quinn (2005-2013), both Democrats.

Miller had a difficult relationship with Bloomberg. He assumed the Speakership with support from each of the boroughs' Democrat representatives and was given vocal support by high-profile councillors, including a newly-elected de Blasio (Viteritti, 2017:62). He was, therefore, in a strong position as Speaker, able to claim a mandate from across New York City, and advocated for varied causes. These ranged from opposition to stadium propositions (including the Jets – in part, contributing to their eventual decision to relocate), on the grounds that they represented poor value for taxpayers whilst the city's budget was finely balanced, through to criticising Hudson Yards for lacking affordable housing (Brash, 2011:208; Sargent, 2004). This opposition to redevelopment projects, making public statements against Hudson Yards, led Doctoroff to describe Miller as the '...one member of the City Council I would never trust...' (Doctoroff, 2017:169). This culminated in Miller running, unsuccessfully, for the 2004 Democratic mayoral nomination (Sargent, 2004). He presented himself as the candidate most likely to reverse Bloomberg's first term policies (Sargent, 2004). Bloomberg responded by briefing the press on previous complaints, from within the Council, about

¹¹ The importance of the Speaker, and their relationship to the Mayor, is outlined more fully in Section 4.0: The Context of New York City Government.

Miller's alleged poor handling of sexual harassment accusations against councillors (Sargent, 2004). This made a difficult relationship directly antagonistic and, though Miller subsequently left the Council in 2005 (due to term limits), left a troubled legacy for the next Speaker (Humm, 2006).

Quinn's relationship with Bloomberg was largely the opposite of Miller's. Interviewees were keen to underline that they believed her to have been *too* close to the Mayor (some suggesting it contributed to her losing the 2013 Democratic mayoral primary) (Transcript K, 2019:9; Transcript L, 2019:2; Transcript N, 2019:7; Transcript O, 2019:11). However, her record upon assuming the Speakership was little different from Miller's, in terms of her prior relationship with Bloomberg. Whilst she supported the 2003 smoking ban (as had Miller), she had confrontations with Bloomberg over her support for legislation extending salary rights and in-work benefits for lower-paid workers (Cardwell, 2002; Saltonstall, 2006).

Nevertheless, her Speakership saw her behave far more acquiescently to the Mayor's programme. This was largely due to Bloomberg instructing his team to build stronger relationships with the Speaker, reflecting first-term difficulties with Miller. Quinn offered Bloomberg support over several initiatives that she argued would benefit her constituents, supporting the 2007 creation of a Food Policy Task Force focused upon the Sugar Tax (McNickle, 2017:176). When Bloomberg sought to deliver the Yankees' stadium and Hudson Yards projects during his second term, he appointed Quinn to a Sustainability Advisory Board (SAB) (Doctoroff, 2017::324). The SAB's remit was to publicly advise the Mayor on proposals for ongoing redevelopment projects. Doctoroff has since made clear that Bloomberg's motivation for this reflected earlier contact with her, during his first term, where she revealed that she was open to supporting these proposals if they delivered sufficient affordable housing (Doctoroff, 2017:177). Though opposed to Hudson Yards for the same reason, in 2004 Quinn praised Bloomberg for seeking to engage with communities affected by rezoning efforts (Brash, 2011:169). This was at odds with the official Democrat narrative that he was out-of-touch with residents' concerns over the development and unwilling to listen (Viteritti, 2017:140). This created a sense in the Mayor's Office that the Speaker was open to supporting their large-scale projects (and giving a Bloomberg-favouring lead to the Council's Democrat majority). It demonstrated a change in strategy by Bloomberg, reflecting a maturing of his political skills between the first and second terms. Whilst he had failed to seek common ground with Miller, his relationship with Quinn exhibited the reverse. Securing Quinn's tacit support for proposals that received the SAB's approval reduced her ability to outrightly oppose them.

Quinn gradually offered more support to Bloomberg's planning proposals. Starting muting her criticism of Hudson Yards and the Yankees' stadium (believing that sufficient affordable housing would be built), she moved towards supporting initiatives such as PlaNYC (Viteritti, 2017:140). This was Bloomberg's initiative to build a more environmentally-sustainable city over the twenty-five years following its launch (2012) (Viteritti, 2017:140). Its 127 pledges ranged from planting one million trees through to delivering carbon-efficient affordable housing for one million residents (Viteritti, 2017:140). It passed through the SAB and Quinn subsequently became a major proponent (Doctoroff, 2017:327). In 2017, Doctoroff wrote of his sense of surprise that Quinn not only gave her support but allowed her name to be listed as one of its key endorsers in a mayoral brochure outlining the scheme (Doctoroff, 2017:327). It is acquiescence such as this that led interviewees to comment that Quinn was '...owned lock, stock and barrel...' by Bloomberg (Transcript N. 2019:7).

The most surprising aspect of this relationship, though, is the endorsement Quinn gave three years earlier, when Bloomberg sought his term extension. The City Charter required that such a proposal be first put to the Council and then the public in a referendum, unless the Speaker used their discretion to cite circumstances indicating that only council approval was needed. Quinn pressed the case for the latter, arguing that the change merely reflected the earlier term limits (though failing to account for the fact that the change to two terms had been secured through a referendum) (McNickle, 2017:256). There have also been suggestions that her change of position reflected personal ambition. In 2007, she had stated that her '...“firm and final position” ...' was that the city should stick with a two-term limit (Quinn, cited in McNickle, 2017:256). This assisted her in starting her 2008 bid for the Democratic nomination. However, in April 2008, the *New York Post* alleged that Quinn had amended budgets to redirect funds to her own constituency (Purnick, 2009:185; McNickle, 2017:256). This claim was eventually dismissed but public scrutiny forced her to withdraw from the primary (Smith, 2013). Though Quinn has refused to comment on the allegations, it has since been suggested (by McNickle (2017:256-257) and Purnick (2009:185)) that her move towards supporting a third-term resulted from this change of circumstances. If the Council approved altering term limits (as it eventually did by twenty-nine votes to twenty-two), Bloomberg would leave in 2013 and Quinn could be assured of a fresh bid without facing an incumbent opponent (Kramer, 2008).

Whatever Quinn's reasoning, the fact remains that it was a remarkable victory for Bloomberg. He stretched his direct constitutional power, through the means of a Council vote, and allowed himself the opportunity for an extra four years in office. That the second-most senior elected office-holder in

the city was willing to risk her own leadership capital in enabling this was not only significant but, also, gave Bloomberg a shield against criticism that might otherwise have been directed at him.

Bloomberg's relations with the legislature were not always successful. Quinn continued Miller's practice of seeking lengthy budget negotiations with Bloomberg (opening herself up to the 2008 allegations). In her first budget negotiation (2006), Quinn extended the deadline for agreement by three weeks so that she could seek higher levels of welfare spending (something Bloomberg was reluctant to do after recently closing the deficit) (McNickle, 2017:62). The negotiation had been taken as a predictor of future relations between the two, with the Speaker claiming victory for her concessions at a press conference (McNickle, 2017:62). However, subsequent negotiations favoured the Mayor, as he established a better working relationship with Quinn (Weikart, 2009:132). In 2008, Bloomberg worked together with Quinn to get a statute binding the Mayor and Council to balancing future budgets passed unanimously (Weikart, 2009:132).

The Mayor managed legislation and relations with the legislature very effectively in his final two terms. There were some occasions where this was not the case (the Sugar Tax and issues over initial budget negotiations) but there were equally-notable victories (from term limit extensions through to getting high-profile projects, such as the Applied Sciences Initiative and PlaNYC accepted). He can, therefore, be scored a 4 for both 2009 and 2013. However, difficult relations with Miller soured early relations with the Council, affecting legislative fluency. He is, thus, scored a 2 for 2005.

4.4 Conclusion

Michael Bloomberg's LCI scores offer much to consider with regard to how he exercised leadership. His strongest areas of capital were in political and policy vision, longevity, selection and reselection margins and the ability to influence his party's policy agenda. These metrics are not, however, merely reflective of high scores. They require a more nuanced consideration.

His scores for political and policy vision reflect an executive who consistently advocated a policy, despite communicative difficulties, of widescale redevelopment. Likewise, he stood by school reforms and public health policies, even when faced with major setbacks (such as the difficulties in appointing Schools Chancellors or having his "Sugar Tax" ruled unconstitutional).

However, the high scores for longevity, (re)selection margins and policy influence require a more considered evaluation. His longevity score increased in a linear fashion between 2005 and 2009, reflecting his progression from a first to second term. However, the score remains static for the third LCI point, due to the metric's measurement ending at merely four years. Thus, mayors whose tenures were longer than twelve years see no increase in score. This may be a point to consider with future calibrations of the LCI. Conversely, a long period in office does not necessarily enhance capital. Bloomberg's 2013 total score was the lowest of all and suggests some truth behind one interviewee's claim that the third term left '...a bad taste in the mouth...', given that it had been achieved through controversial constitutional reform (Transcript N, 2019:7). Thus, Bloomberg's case demonstrates that a numerical scoring system such as the LCI requires the kind of qualitative analysis that accompanied Section 7.3.4's quantitative measurement, in order to more fairly reflect the reality underlying the score. We may surmise, therefore, that the fact that Bloomberg's longevity score was amongst his highest within the LCI, it does not suitably reflect (unless accompanied by the analysis provided) fluctuations in capital by 2013.

His margin of selection and reselection indicates a position of increasing strength. He did not undergo reselection battles in 2005 or 2009. The former indicated a position of reassured dominance at the end of his first term, whilst his status as an independent removed the potential for any form of internal challenge in 2009. Finally, the 2013 score reflects that, though he was not seeking re-election, he would have faced the same reality as 2009 (being a political independent) if he had done.

His policy influence score is also problematic. As mentioned in Section 7.3.9, Bloomberg was an independent in 2009 and 2013, without a party to (though endorsed by the Republicans in 2009). However, if we take his wider mayoral team and campaigns infrastructure as indicative of a proxy party, then we can assess his influence. In this sense, he was always likely, as a very dominant executive at the heart of his own organisation, to have high potential influence. Therefore, though the approach to the metric is not incorrect, the title of the metric could be deemed slightly. This, again, highlights the importance of in-depth analytical discussion when using the LCI.

Areas receiving lower capital scores are also instructive. Bloomberg's lowest-scoring metrics were communicative performance, his personal poll rating, levels of public trust and his ability to work in a cross-partisan or collaborative style. His communicative performance was mediocre, despite the high-profile attention that his office brought him. There was, as some interviewees suggested, some improvement over time but he remained reasonably gaffe-prone and, on occasion, '...tone-deaf...' (Transcript K, 2019:6).

His score for cross-partisanship and consensual working also reflects certain. His inability to forge a working relationship with Speaker Miller was most illustrated by the acrimony that characterised their relationship once the latter sought the Democrat nomination. However, Miller must bear some of the responsibility here for, though Bloomberg failed to make suitable overtures to Miller in order to improve their relationship, the Speaker used his office to publicly criticise some of Bloomberg's most high-profile policies. Similarly, Bloomberg's relationship with Quinn reflected not a consensual leadership approach but, rather, an over-powerful office-holder who was able to manipulate his accompanying legislature's leadership. In some ways, this represented skill on the part of Bloomberg – not least in his using the strategy to overturn the relevant term-limit in a controversial but, ultimately, successful manner. However, it was certainly not a relationship that demonstrated any real attempts by Bloomberg to make concessions to the Speaker and his dominance cannot be described as an illustration of consensus.

Personal approval ratings afforded to Bloomberg reflect one of the largest fluctuations in Bloomberg's capital. The 2009 score is a full three points lower than his 2005 one. This is reflective of both his 2009 poll rating being the lowest considered in the metric and his 2005 vote share being the highest he achieved during his period in office. This, combined, makes for a substantial slide in capital between 2005 and 2009, though the 2013 score, when he faced a sizeable recovery in his approval rating, led to a modest recovery.

The score for public trust in Bloomberg, drawn from the same data as the previously-discussed metric, offers a low score. The use of personal poll ratings as proxy data may be responsible here, though (if this proxy is accepted) it could also reflect issues around both his portrayal as a gentrifying elitist and the third term extension controversy.

Overall, Bloomberg's leadership capital waxed and waned in an interesting pattern. Its trajectory was not one of beginning with a high starting point and then following a graduated decline towards a point of low capital. Instead, he saw a modest gain in his capital across his tenure. However, the nuanced picture previously discussed – of some metrics seeing substantial increases and other losses of capital over time – reflects a much more complex reality regarding where he drew his capital from. Bloomberg's agency was of much greater influence upon his capital than more structural factors. For instance, his average scores for communicative performance consistently reflect an executive who struggled in his personal communications, despite trying to push a more moderate brand-based image. Similarly, his move towards an independent candidature from 2009 onwards gave him much greater scope for influence over "party" policy and this was reflected in a direct positive impact upon capital, resulting from his decision. Institutional factors, as explored below, did impact upon capital. His sustained high score for longevity flowed from his achievement of the third term extension and, whilst this reflected his agency in the relationship with Quinn and his winning of an election, it was ultimately facilitated by structural change in constitutional provision.

There were many areas where Bloomberg was unable to utilise his agency. The most obvious example of this was his failure to implement the "Sugar Tax". This was due to wider institutional pressures beyond those within city government. In particular, it reflected a failure to convince external legal institutions of the constitutionality of the proposal. Thus, though Bloomberg generally managed to achieve his aims within those institutions directly overseeing city government (the mayoralty and council), this case study demonstrates that even inhabitants of strong mayor systems can be constrained by other structures beyond their control.

Bloomberg is a prime example of a strong mayor with substantial stores of leadership capital in key areas, including policy vision. In many of the aspects discussed, he exemplified the '..."individuals within institutions" ...' model Peters (2012:55) outlined. However, his occasional failures and weaker capital areas served as a reminder of Lauth's view that, whilst agential factors can allow

for institutional stretch, actors remain ‘...conditioned to obey...’ some institutional norms (Lauth, 2004:70).

Table 11: The Leadership Capital of Michael Bloomberg

Metric	Measurements	2005	2009	2013
Political/policy vision	(1) Completely absent (2) Unclear/inconsistent (3) Moderately clear/consistent (4) Clear/consistent (5) Very clear/consistent	5	5	5
Communicative performance	(1) Very poor (2) Poor (3) Average (4) Good (5) Very good	3	4	3
Personal poll rating relative to rating at most recent election	(1) Very low (<-15.5%) (2) Low (-5 to -15.4%) (3) Moderate (-5% to 5.4%) (4) High (5.5% to 15%) (5) Very high (>15%)	4	1	2
Longevity (time in office)	(1) <1 year (2) 1-2 years (3) 2-3 years (4) 3-4 years (5) >4 years	4	5	5
Selection or re-selection as party candidate (margin)	(1) Very small (<1%) (2) Small (1-5.4%) (3) Moderate (5.5-10.4%) (4) Large (10.5-15%) (5) Very large (>15%)	5	5	5
Party polling relative to most recent election result	(1) <-10% (2) -10% to -2.4% (3) -2.5% to 2.4% (4) 2.5%-10.4% (5) >10%	3	3	4
Levels of public trust in leader	(1) 0-20.4% (2) 20.5-40.4% (3) 40.5-60.4% (4) 60.5-80.4% (5) 80.5-100%	3	2	2

Ability to work on a cross-partisan/consensual basis	(1) Very low (2) Low (3) Moderate (4) High (5) Very high	3	3	3
Perceived ability to shape party's policy platform	(1) Very low (2) Low (3) Moderate (4) High (5) Very high	2	5	5
Perceived ability in legislative effectiveness and achieving outcomes relative to the declared policy programme	(1) Very low (2) Low (3) Moderate (4) High (5) Very high	2	4	4
Total		34	37	38

5.0 ‘Ken’s Den’: Ken Livingstone (2000-2008)

5.1 Introduction

Ken Livingstone either championed or challenged a number of policy initiatives and causes. These included the Public-Private Partnership (PPP) for renovating and operating the London Underground system, the Congestion Charge (CC) and his efforts to celebrate the global and diverse nature of London as a city (particularly when backing the bid to host the 2012 Olympic Games and in the aftermath of the July 7 2005 terrorist attacks) (Hosken, 2008; Crines, 2013). He also proved controversial. Policy initiatives attracting critical comments included the CC (prior to its successful launch in 2003), his diplomatic relations with then-leader of Venezuela Hugo Chavez (whom he signed an oil-trading deal worth £16million with in August 2007) and his decision to share a platform with the radical Islamic cleric Yusuf al-Qaradawi in July 2004 (Hosken, 2008; *Financial Times*, 2007; Johnson, 2013). However, despite this, his mayoralty saw the successful establishment of the GLA as an institution, with one interviewee commenting that Livingstone was so associated with this process that tourist guides took to describing City Hall as ‘...“Ken’s Den”..’ (Transcript E, 2018:3).

The eight-year mayoralty was filled with myriad events, policies and controversies. A case study chapter such as this can hardly be expected to give a full analysis of it in its entirety. However, it is possible to garner sufficient evidence and critical perspective by focusing upon select areas. This chapter examines Livingstone’s leadership through an emphasis on his transport policies. This policy area has been chosen as, other than the establishment of the GLA itself, transport policy clearly absorbed most of Livingstone’s time during his first term. This is borne out by an interview carried out with a former Mayor’s Office Liaison Manager (who also served in other positions within the GLA, including as Head of the Urbanism and Architecture Unit) (Transcript A, 2018). They stated that, other than the publication of the first London Plan (the Mayor’s overarching strategic vision for London), the only things to occupy Livingstone’s time (other than establishing the GLA) during the first term were the PPP and CC (Transcript A, 2018:12). Indeed, the same interviewee was clear that the fight over the PPP contributed to Livingstone’s being ‘...a bit slowed down...’ with regards to executive policy direction during this period (Transcript, A, 2018:12). Similarly, the CC, the oil deal with Hugo Chavez and the removal of the Routemaster buses all occupied his second-term transport policies. Other aspects, such as Livingstone’s leadership style (including the alleged emergence of a “Kenocracy”) are commented on where relevant.

5.2 Transport – Background

Table 12: Timeline of Key Events

<u>Date</u>	<u>PPP</u>	<u>CC</u>	<u>Other</u>
Mar. 01 2000		Review of Charging Options for London (ROCOL) recommends CC for London	
May 04 2000	Livingstone elected first Mayor of London		
Jul. 30 2001	High Court ruling denies Livingstone a judicial review		
Feb. 7 2002	Government signs PPP agreements		
Jul. 26 2002	Livingstone drops legal challenge		
Feb. 17 2003		CC introduced	
Apr. 01 2003	PPP agreements come into force		
Jul. 15 2003	Transport for London (TfL) transferred to Mayor's remit		
Feb. 16 2004		First consultation on Western Extension	
Jun. 10 2004	Ken Livingstone re-elected as Mayor of London		
May 09 2005		Second consultation on Western Extension	
Dec. 09 2005			Final Routemaster taken out of service
Feb. 19 2007		Western Extension introduced	
Feb. 20 2007			Oil deal signed with Venezuela
Feb. 12 2008			Livingstone proposes bicycle-hire scheme

5.2.1 The Public-Private Partnership

The PPP was an agreement¹², initiated by the central government in negotiation with the private sector, which aimed to repair the London Underground whilst establishing how it would operate for the following thirty years. (National Audit Office, 2004). PPPs are often associated with ‘...infrastructure projects and are institutional arrangements for cooperation expressed through the establishment of new organizational units...’ designed to run public services or projects, usually including the provision of private-sector capital in order to finance them (Hodge and Greve, 2007:546).

By the 1990s, London’s underground Tube network was greatly in need of repair and functioning at a capacity not sufficiently able to meet demand (Waugh and Clement, 2001; Currie and Teague, 2015). By the time New Labour won the election in 1997, a total of £1.5billion was required to address these issues (Hosken, 2008:293). Private companies were asked to finance this cost and, in return, they received 30-year leases to operate the track, signalling and station infrastructure (National Audit Office, 2004:1).

Livingstone was a strong critic of the proposals, which he felt were an attempt at privatisation, and attacked them as ‘...an awful lot of Thatcherite nonsense...’ (Livingstone, 1998). Donald McNeill (2002:76) assessed that the ‘...battle over reorganization of London Underground has been, without doubt, the key event of Livingstone’s first year or so in office.’ London’s transport (including the buses, Docklands Light Railway, London Underground and Overground, the Croydon Tramlink, major roads, taxis, London River Services and traffic signals) all fell under the remit of TfL (being transferred to the GLA on July 15 2003) (Greer and Sandford, 2003:12). This, in turn, was run by a mayor-appointed board (with the Mayor setting the agency’s budget) and headed on a day-to-day basis by the Transport Commissioner (Greer and Sandford, 2003:12). For his part, Livingstone used the optional provision given to him by the GLA Act 1999¹³ and became TfL’s first chair – something which subsequent Mayors of London have replicated

¹² The PPP relating to the London Underground actually comprised three separate agreements with different consortia. However, the term of “the PPP” in the singular was used as common parlance for referring to all three together. This thesis uses this approach.

¹³ A clear summary of the GLA Act (1999) can be found in Wood (1999).

(Livingstone, 2011; TfL, 2017a). Livingstone would therefore be closely-connected to Kiley's remit through this close institutional relationship.

He continued his opposition to the policy as Mayor. He appointed Bob Kiley as London's new Transport Commissioner (from January 2001). Kiley was a former advisor to municipal governments in America (including in Boston and New York) who had specialised in upgrades to metro-rail systems, eventually becoming Deputy Mayor of Boston during the 1970s (McNeill, 2002:76; Hosken, 2008:330). Kiley's appointment was not without controversy – he was employed on a salary of £2million over four years (Tempest, 2007). Livingstone was later criticised, prior to the 2008 election, for publicly supporting Kiley (who was no longer Transport Commissioner but, instead, retained as a consultant on £3,200 per day), despite media accusations of alcohol-induced incapacity (Tempest, 2007). Kiley's value to an independent mayor who wanted to oppose one of the most publicised central government policies related to London came in his trenchant support of Livingstone's position. Peter Hendy (the GLA's first director of the bus network and, later, Kiley's replacement) has since commented: "He used to encourage Ken to be bold and radical and not settle for crap from government." (Hendy, cited in Hosken, 2008:330).

Livingstone and Kiley called for judicial review of the GLA Act 1999. Not only did the act detail both the Mayor and Assembly's role and functions, it also outlined how the PPP would operate (HM Government, 1999; McNeill, 2002). The entirety of Part IV of the act, containing sixteen chapters, focused merely on the development and governance of London's transport (with Chapter VII focusing upon the PPP) (HM Government, 1999; Wood, 1999). The Act mandated that at least one of TfL, a subsidiary of TfL (for instance, London Underground) or London Regional Transport (TfL's precursor) should be a partner to the PPP contract agreements (HM Government, 1999: Part IV, Ch. VII, Clause 210, Section 2). The formulation and implementation of PPP agreements were, thus, a statutory requirement by the time that Livingstone and Kiley came to oversee London's transport system. Livingstone was unable to block the PPPs themselves, despite this institutional structure, as their enforcement had originated with the central government. Tony Travers (2004:66), a local government expert has since observed that the '...mammoth piece of legislation bears...the deep markings of extraordinary confusion as between a desire to devolve and a desire to retain central control...', with Livingstone effectively

“squashed” and compromised in the resulting structure. Thus, though the direct mandate of the Mayor of London indicated that the GLA was constituted with the kind of executive leadership befitting of a regional government, the reality of tight central fiscal control retained an atmosphere ‘...more like local government.’ (Wilson, 2005:169).

Livingstone put forward an alternative policy proposal regarding the funding of the Tube. Instead of private sector financing, he called upon the government to grant the GLA the power to issue bonds, secured against the value of ticket sales (Kiley estimated that they could raise £3.8billion this way) (Butcher, 2012:17). He sought to bolster his case by arguing that tragedies such as the Hatfield rail accident (in which four people were killed and thirty-three injured, with the private operator, Railtrack, blamed for poor safety management procedures) would be at risk of repetition if the Tube operated under multiple PPP agreements (due to the lack of city-wide integration and safety regulation) (Cobain, Harvey and Bird, 2000; Murray, 2001; Butcher, 2012:17). Livingstone’s proposals were rejected by the government, to maintain consistency with their advocacy for the PPP as a core aspect of the legislation establishing the GLA, and the Mayor was left to continue without such financial powers and abilities (Travers, 2004:72).

In 2001, Syrett and Baldock (2001b:157) argued that one of the new mayorality’s key functions would be to provide a strong institutional basis for lobbying central government to affect a transformative vision for London. However, the PPP issue led to subsequent scepticism regarding the Mayor’s ability in this regard. Writing in 2003, Scott Greer and Mark Sandford (then both of University College London’s Constitution Unit) wrote that it left the following lesson for the Mayor: ‘The Golden Rule of politics is that “he who has the gold makes the rules.” Patently, the GLA isn’t making the rules in London.’ (Greer and Sandford, 2003:15). As Travers (2004:67) has noted, this was the first real test of where power over London would lie – with the institution of Mayor or the central government – and Livingstone lost.

The Mayor therefore took the only step left available to him and applied for judicial review of the Act’s provisions, arguing that the PPP arrangement made it unclear as to who was responsible for the Tube (McNeill, 2002). The Act meant that the government had the final decision in signing PPPs and could then hand them over to the GLA (Greer and Sandford, 2003:12). The Mayor could not exercise direct control over the governance of the agreements as the detail

had been finalised by the central government and tied the GLA to them for 30 years (Greer and Sandford, 2003:12). Livingstone contended that the implementation of PPPs moved the governance and scrutiny of the operation of the Tube, including with regards to safety, outside of public accountability (such as through the GLA itself) (McNeill, 2002; Livingstone, 2011). This contradicted, in his view, the statutory responsibility of the Mayor for Tube safety (McNeill, 2002; Waugh and Clement, 2001). He cited his 2000 manifesto, which outright denounced the PPP, arguing that his election victory gave him a mandate to oppose it (Livingstone, 2000; *Financial Times*, 2000; Waugh and Clement, 2001). A poll, cited in *The Guardian* on July 31 2001 indicated that 90% of Londoners were opposed to the PPP (Wintour, 2001).

On July 30 2001, Mr. Justice Sullivan of the High Court denied Livingstone his judicial review (Marston, 2001). Furthering the GLA Act's undermining of Livingstone's autonomy in this policy area, the judge's ruling included a legal opinion that it was the central government, and not the Mayor, who should have the ultimate decision-making power (Marston, 2001). Sullivan assessed that the structure of the legislation introducing the GLA and the Mayor's respective powers was "fatal" to his case (Sullivan, cited in Marston, 2001). As with Bloomberg's unsuccessful attempt to pass the "Soda Tax" in 2013, Livingstone's policy agenda was directly constrained by an external, legal, body. This reflects the wider reality that it is not merely central, regional or state governments that can limit mayoral agency and that, actually, non-political bodies can be similarly curtailing in this regard. Whilst Sweeting (2002), Sandford (2017) and others have given consideration to the role that other *governance* tiers have had in this regard, there is clearly space for further research into how non-governmental bodies exercise this influence.

PPP agreements thus came into force in April 2003 (Travers, 2004:54; Gannon, 2016). London Underground, the public agency running the Tube, was finally transferred to the Mayor's remit on July 15 2003¹⁴ (Butcher, 2012; TfL, 2003). The episode demonstrated the government's ability to limit the Mayor's agency when faced with policy propositions to which they were opposed.

¹⁴ One of the main private sector partners for PPP, Metronet, when into financial administration in 2007 and all of the PPPs had been dissolved, with TfL, under the Mayor, given responsibility for operating London Underground. For further information, see Butcher (2012) and House of Commons Transport Committee (2010).

5.2.2 Congestion Charge

The Congestion Charge (CC) was introduced on February 17 2003 (Tempest, 2003; Morton, Lovelace and Anable, 2017). With the Mayor controlling London's major roads (local streets remaining within the remit of the boroughs) and traffic-management measures, the CC was one of Livingstone's manifesto promises (Livingstone, 2000; Greer and Sandford, 2003).

In brief, the CC meant establishing a zone in the centre of London which drivers would be charged £5 per day for entering an eight-mile-square area between Park Lane in the west and Tower Bridge in the east (Hosken, 2008:344). Livingstone saw the CC as an opportunity to demonstrate a mayor's purpose (Hosken, 2008:344). This came at a time when several journalists, including Simon Jenkins, were attacking him for not being visible enough (Hosken, 2008:344). Travers, similarly, contended that Livingstone's first year in office had been short on major policy achievements, due to the need to establish the mayoralty (Travers, 2004:112).

The CC was first proposed by the Review of Charging Options for London (ROCOL), transport experts commissioned by the central government (1998) to consider road-pricing powers for the anticipated GLA (ROCOL, 2000). ROCOL's report, presented to TfL in 2000, argued that introducing a £5-per-day charge would deliver '...substantial transport improvements in London...', with regard to both congestion and the generation of revenues that would augment the Mayor's existing £1billion transport budget (ROCOL, 2000:v). ROCOL established that the additional income could be £270million per annum (ROCOL, 2000:v). Moreover, the GLA Act 1999 thus provided the Mayor with the power to introduce such charging (Travers, 2004:66).

Unlike with the PPP, Livingstone was the policy's main proponent and Hosken has described this, rather than Livingstone's opposition to the PPP, as his '...greatest risk.' (Hosken, 2008:342). Steven Norris (Conservative candidate in 2000 and 2004) proposed abolishing it during his 2004 campaign, arguing that the cost put the delivery of supplies to small businesses within Central London at risk (O'Connor, 2004:48). Boris Johnson, meanwhile, partially designed his ultimately-successful electoral strategy in 2008 around targeting voters in the areas which Livingstone proposed expanding the CC-zone to (Cawthorne, 2015:100). Prior to the CC's implementation, Jenkins (formerly editor of the *Evening Standard* and chair of the Commission

on Local Democracy) argued that it would be so unpopular as to cause Livingstone difficulty in 2004 (Jenkins, 2001). Noting that the CC had been ‘...Mr Livingstone’s one big manifesto idea...’, he concluded that the controversy over its implementation required ‘...a tough Mayor to make it work. It has found a weak one.’ (Jenkins, 2001).

Though it took until 2004 to be realised, the policy was developed from early in Livingstone’s mayoralty. Minutes from the Transport and Spatial Development Policy Committee (TSDPC) (the Assembly committee scrutinising transport) reveal that they were requesting details on the CC’s proposed implementation in 2001 (TSDPC, 2001a; TSDPC 2001b). Livingstone’s determination over the CC was clear. This is suggested by the fact that the TSDPC felt obliged to raise with him that his public consultation over the proposal was being undermined by simultaneously negotiating contracts for its implementation (TSDPC, 2001b:ii). Jenkins also underlined this point in a November 2001 *Evening Standard* article. Noting Livingstone’s commitment to spend Christmas to consider the consultation results, Jenkins sceptically observed that the Mayor had arranged implementation of the necessary traffic cameras with the Driver and Vehicle Licensing Agency (Jenkins, 2001). This may, however, be considered an example of forward-planning by the Mayor’s Office. As noted above, Jenkins was hardly an impartial observer, having previously criticised both Livingstone and the CC. He was a frequent critic of Livingstone’s transport policies, even writing the foreword to a 2005 Policy Exchange book condemning removal of Routemaster buses (Jenkins, 2005).

It is interesting to note that the TSDPC’s analysis was an example of effective scrutiny of the Mayor during the institution’s early years. Committees were able to employ expert advisors to guide them in choosing which aspects of a policy to probe (Travers, 2004:119). They were able to hold lengthy evidence sessions, compel officials from the relevant public agencies and bodies (in this case, the Mayor’s Office and TfL) to attend hearings and require the Mayor to give formal written responses (Travers, 2004:119; TSDPC, 2001b). In the case of the TSDPC’s scrutiny of the process before the CC’s introduction, it was demonstrated that the GLA had some capacity to hold the Mayor accountable and, if necessary, give voice to criticisms of more prominent policy objectives.

ROCOL's recommendation that the CC be implemented quickly, in order to be active prior to the 2004 mayoral election, was seized upon by the Mayor in order that he could be seen to have fulfilled a core pledge (Hosken, 2008:345). He pushed ahead without initial piloting of the scheme and consequently, just prior to its introduction, *The Times* noted that he was "...taking a huge risk; ...he said recently that he would be finished as mayor if congestion charging fails. He could well be doomed anyway." (*The Times*, 2003). Livingstone's own advisors warned him that it was too politically risky, as any failure of the policy would be personally associated with him (Hosken, 2008:347). Luke Blair, one such advisor, commented "All the way through, we got this message – look, Ken wants this to happen, just bloody fix it and get on with it – and people did. But there are very few politicians who are so over-committed to such risky projects in that way." (Blair, cited in Hosken, 2008:347). Livingstone was staking a great deal of personal authority upon the policy's success.

The CC's introduction proved successful. During its first six months, traffic within the CC-zone dropped by 30% and a TfL survey suggested that over two-thirds of Londoners viewed the scheme positively (O'Connor, 2004:48). Its success in achieving substantial reductions in traffic meant that Capita (the contractor employed to collect the revenue) had to have their contract renegotiated in order to allow them to remain profitable, or else have faced a loss of approximately £65million (Hosken, 2008:350). The policy was a "...quick win"...' for Livingstone (Travers, 2004:135).

His subsequent desire to see the zone expanded was more controversial. An *Evening Standard* poll (December 22 2003) showed that support for the CC was 57%, up from 48% in 2002 (Reiss and Leapman, 2003). Livingstone's proposal to double the zone and include the Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea was, however, opposed by 64% (Reiss and Leapman, 2003). This emboldened Norris to propose the CC's abolition during the 2004 election (O'Connor, 2004; Hosken, 2008). Therefore, Livingstone's personal association with the CC could both strengthen his position and undermine it, following his failure to comprehend that public support for its original geographic basis was not sufficient to sustain expansion.

The proposition for extension led to concern that the boutiques and independent restaurants serving the area would be hit by a reduction in custom entering the area (Clark, 2004).

Westminster City Council published a poll showing that sixty-six percent of residents and eighty-four percent of businesses opposed the planned extension, leading Angie Bray (a Conservative member of the GLA and transport spokesperson) to comment that Livingstone had lifted “...two fingers to two-thirds of the local people.” (Clark, 2004). Compounding this criticism, the following year, Livingstone was forced to backtrack on pre-election statements that he did not expect the CC’s daily rate (£5) to rise – a press release on April 1 2005 revealed that the new cost would be £8 (Mayor’s Press Office, 2005).

Johnson made reviews of the CC, particularly a removal of the Western Extension a key part of his 2008 manifesto, hoping that this would reap electoral dividends in affected areas (Edwards and Isaby, 2008:76, 111). He labelled such proposals as “...the same old out-of-date solutions from a Labour Mayor who has run out of ideas...” (Edwards and Isaby, 2008:111). A 2008 review, commissioned by Johnson, recommended that the Mayor stand by his commitment to abolish it (with indications of substantial public support for this) and, by Christmas 2010, the Western Extension had been removed (TfL, 2008:14; TfL, 2010).

Perhaps the greatest benefit to Livingstone from the CC, however, was the role that it played in his adoption by Labour as its 2004 mayoral candidate. Labour had selected Nicky Gavron (Livingstone’s Deputy Mayor and an Assembly member) (Hosken, 2008; Whitton, 2014:12). Polls increasingly indicated that Livingstone would win whether he stood for Labour or as an independent (Whitton, 2014:12). His success with the CC, and the government’s desire to have a closer working relationship with the GLA as it prepared its bid for the 2012 Olympic Games, gave Labour’s leadership the opportunity to propose his readmission to the party (January 2004) (Whitton, 2014:12; Blair, 2010:502). Gavron supported the move, having previously written ‘...Ken has increasingly shown good sense and steadiness of purpose. One cannot fail to be impressed by his encyclopaedic knowledge and understanding of London’ (Gavron, cited in Hosken, 2008:355).

Shortly after re-election, Livingstone told *The Guardian’s* Hugh Muir “There have been two dominant political figures of the last two decades: Blair and Thatcher. Both have tried to crush me – and both have failed.” (Livingstone, cited in Muir, 2004). Livingstone has subsequently credited the CC’s introduction as a major factor in his re-election (Livingstone, 2011:477). He noted that Richard Littlejohn of *The Sun* dismissed the CC as having been “...drawn up by sexually

inadequate, Lycra-clad, *Guardian*-reading, cycle-mad control freaks at TfL” (Littlejohn, cited in Livingstone, 2011:477). Such hyperbolic critiques did not stop his personal ratings rising by 10% (Livingstone, 2011:477). Commenting to Derek Turner, one of the TfL officials responsible for the CC’s introduction, Livingstone commented ““You’ve won me the next election...”” (Livingstone, 2011:477).

The Western Extension proposal was particularly damaging to Livingstone. TfL consulted on it immediately prior to the 2004 election (TfL, 2004). This was followed by a second consultation, designed to seek the public’s view of a scheme that had been revised following the first (TfL, 2005). These revisions included an extension of the area for resident exemptions and a shorter daytime for when the CC would be operational (TfL, 2005). However, Livingstone undermined these efforts at public engagement by declaring them a ‘charade’ and suggesting that his 2004 win gave him a mandate for the change, despite the earlier evidence of 64% of those affected being opposed (Barney, 2005; Reiss and Leapman, 2003). Given the Mayor’s direct association with TfL, and the personal capital Livingstone had previously staked on the CC’s inception, this was a surprising statement. It risked a fall in support for the policy overall and added to the contested politicisation of the Western Extension, in particular. In addition, Livingstone suffered from a further risk to his credibility when, in November 2004, he announced that the £5 daily rate would rise to £8, despite six months earlier having run on a manifesto pledging not to increase the charge (Blitz, 2004). The Western Extension took effect from February 2007 and was removed, by Johnson (after 62% of responses to a public consultation backed its removal), in December 2010 (TfL, 2010). This intensification of Livingstone’s personal association with, post-2004, such a controversial policy (added to his less-than-positive public relations regarding it) eventually gave Johnson the kind of easy electoral opportunities for exploitation mentioned earlier. It also exemplified the kind of hubris and detachment from Londoners’ concerns that interviewees attested to with regard to Livingstone and how it could undermine his policy focus (Transcript E, 2018:4).

5.2.3 Other Transport Considerations

Livingstone’s second term saw other transport initiatives. These included an oil deal with the Venezuelan leader, Hugo Chavez, the removal of Routemaster buses and the agreement of a scheme to introduce public hire bicycles.

Of these, the Chavez oil deal proved the most controversial. In February 2007, Livingstone announced that the Venezuelans would provide TfL with approximately £16million-worth of oil per year, enabling the subsidisation of public transport for up to 250,000 Londoners (targeted at those receiving income support) (*Financial Times*, 2007; Livingstone, 2011:564). In return, Livingstone agreed to send GLA officials to advise Venezuelan mayors on ‘...modernising their cities...’, including with regard to transportation systems (Livingstone, 2011:564; Edwards and Isaby, 2008:42). However, Venezuela had a poor record on human rights under Chavez – including allegations of violent repression of opponents to the government (Amnesty International, 2004). This was furthered, shortly after Livingstone signed the deal, by a damning Human Rights Watch report that found evidence of the erosion of judicial independence and the censoring of journalists in Venezuela (Holland, 2008:2). This led to Livingstone’s opponents using the Chavez deal to criticise the Mayor, with Johnson referencing it frequently after his 2007 selection as Conservative candidate (Edwards and Isaby, 2008:42). Johnson made particular use of the suggestion that Livingstone was pursuing a deal that reflected his own ideology more than it benefited London (seeking to underline his key electoral narrative of an out-of-touch incumbent) (Edwards and Isaby, 2008:42). Ultimately, the deal left little legacy for London, as Johnson had both cancelled it and returned £7million to Venezuela by August 2008 (Carroll, 2008).

The removal of the Routemaster fleet of buses was also controversial. The Routemaster double-decker bus was first introduced to London in 1956 (Routemaster Association, 2019). In the intervening period, they became so famous that they were regarded as ranking ‘...with the red telephone kiosk, the black cab and the pillar box as icons of Britain’s capital city.’ (Jenkins, 2005:7). In 2001, Livingstone went so far as to suggest that ““Only some ghastly dehumanised moron”...“would want to get rid of the Routemaster.”” (Livingstone, cited in Gilligan, 2005:16). As recently as 2003, Livingstone had repeated a pledge not to abolish it (Gilligan, 2005:16). However, government legislation required that the buses be replaced with alternatives that allowed greater accessibility for wheelchair users (the Routemaster’s boarding height was deemed too high for easy access) (Blacker, 2008:157; Routemaster Association, 2019). The response to this was very negative for Livingstone. Journalists and politicians opposed to the removal (from Simon Jenkins to London Labour MP Kate Hoey) contributed to a Policy Exchange pamphlet attacking the decision (Jenkins, 2005; Hoey, 2005; Godson, 2005). Indeed, Jenkins’ criticism was particularly

noteworthy as, at the time, he was serving as a member of TfL's management board (Godson, 2005:6). Thus, the incident presents a more nuanced picture than interviewees portrayed with regard to Livingstone's grip on the GLA as an institution. Whilst he retained sufficient capital to be able to push through the decision, in the face of public backlash, he nevertheless faced the embarrassment of other high-profile figures feeling able to challenge his authority from within the institution.

Livingstone's decision to replace with the Routemaster (which was finally removed in December 2005) with "bendy buses" also, like the Chavez deal and the Western Extension, proved to be a failed legacy (Singh, 2008). In February 2012, Johnson replaced them with 600 new Routemasters (TfL, 2013).

Finally, Livingstone introduced a bicycle-hire scheme that, unlike the Chavez deal or the decision to abolish Routemasters, survives to this day, though Livingstone was unable to reap the rewards of this. In February 2008, Livingstone announced that he wished to cut air pollution through the promotion of cycling (Russell, 2008). To this end, he proposed the introduction of public bicycles, available for hire from on-street stands, that commuters and tourists could hire by the hour (Russell, 2008; Livingstone, 2011:645-646). However, as the election occurred before the scheme's introduction, Livingstone's defeat meant that the bicycles were actually introduced under Johnson (in 2010), eventually being dubbed "Boris bikes" (*The Guardian*, 2010). This association with Johnson left Livingstone being deprived of public recognition, despite the scheme's aim being consistent with the environmental credentials he had been keen to exhibit with the CC. This proved to be the same with Crossrail (for which, see the next chapter). This created the lesson that, even if recorded as the initiator of a public policy innovation, Mayors of London be denied the credit for policies which they originated but which were delivered under a successor.

5.2.4 London and the "Kenocracy"

Interviews, published accounts and also Livingstone's autobiography make clear that he exercised a highly personalised style of leadership. The term "Kenocracy" was formed as a portmanteau of "Ken" and "democracy". The fact that this became a common characterisation of his mayoralty (with multiple examples of biographers and journalists using the term) offers

intriguing insights. (Hosken, 2008; Hope, 2008; Waugh, 2002a). It reflects Livingstone's dominance of a new institution (the GLA). Trevor Phillips, the first Chair of the Assembly, opened his first session in 2000 with the following warning to the Mayor: "This is a democracy – not a Kenocracy. If you decide to use your position to advance policies that are not in the interests of Londoners, or if you choose to use the platform for other political ends, we will, I promise, kick your ass." (Phillips, cited in Pimlott and Rao, 2002:98). This highlights some of the challenges alluded to by Sweeting (2002:3), early in the evolution of the London mayoralty. In particular, it shows anticipation of a conflict between the agency of a mayor with an anticipated strident personal style and the structural element of an institution that was seemingly determined to curtail this.

Most of Livingstone's advisors were people who he had known, through left-wing political fringe groups (such as Socialist Action), or worked with previously (Transcript A, 2018:5). John Ross (appointed as Livingstone's Director of Economic and Business Policy), Redmond O'Neill (Deputy Chief-of-Staff, with responsibility for public relations), Simon Fletcher (Chief-of-Staff), Lee Jasper (Senior Advisor on Race Relations and Policing) and Neale Coleman (a senior advisor with a fairly wide-ranging remit) were all figures Livingstone had encountered previously, including at the GLC (Transcript A, 2018:5; Livingstone, 2011:421). A single-person executive can reasonably be expected to seek to surround themselves with those whom they trust, especially when they are faced with the challenge of being the first holder of their office (with the resultant need to also establish the machinery of the institution's governance). Only Neale Coleman (previously Leader of the Labour Group on Westminster City Council) and Livingstone had experience of local government leadership (Transcript A, 2018:5). This left him and Livingstone as the two political figures most preoccupied with establishing the Mayor's Office.

There is an extent to which this left advisors malleable to the Mayor's personal political will. As noted by one interviewee, '...if one of them said something (and, of course, it's never that neat) you could assume the Mayor was saying it.' (Transcript A, 2018:5; Transcript C, 2018:3). This matched Livingstone's desire to put his administration to work on his agenda from the outset. When asked, early on, by an official if he was enjoying being Mayor, he responded "I love doing stuff" (Livingstone, cited in Transcript A, 2018:7).

This was compounded by initial mistrust of the GLA's staff. Upon his arrival, Livingstone commented to an official "I'm given to understand that I've been given a load of drongos and deadbeats." (Livingstone, cited in Transcript A, 2018:7). However, though this might not appear to have been the basis upon which to found a constructive relationship with the wider GLA institution, two other observations may offer some explanation of this. One interviewee commented that Livingstone's underlying sentiment may not have been entirely misplaced. The interviewee, a former official in the Mayor's Office, noted: '...they weren't really used to being in a political/politically-directed organisation... They were quite happy being good ecologists and saying "I'm a good ecologist" to "I'm delivering the Mayor's environment strategy", those are two different things.' (Transcript A, 2018:8).

Livingstone showed an aptitude for working with the institution in order to ensure sufficient capacity for assisting the Mayor's Office's. By 2008, the GLA had around seven-hundred staff, having originally been expected to total 300 (Transcript A, 2018:12). Moreover, his desire to ensure that he was not being given "...a load of drongos and deadbeats..." may be regarded as reflecting his key objective, as the *first* Mayor of London, that the GLA was established as an institution with '...the capacity to be taken seriously by other tiers of government.' (Transcript A, 2018:7; Transcript B, 2018:8). Indeed, this highlights the link between institutional considerations and leadership styles. With Livingstone, we can observe an explicit intention to shape the GLA, as an institution, into something that was designed to deliver upon his political agenda. Despite the lack of success in accomplishing this with the PPP, the fact that observers have since sought to highlight this indicates the overall impression given. In short, this is the impression of a leader who was actively seeking to utilise the opportunity of being the inaugural holder of an office in order to shape it to their priorities. Whilst it is not surprising that a leader should do this, it does exemplify Peters' (2012) point regarding the impact of an agency-conscious leader, in expanding their influence over a given institution.

One interviewee, a government expert in London's governance, asserted that '...a lot of what Ken Livingstone did was targeted towards demonstrating competence, building up democratic capacity...' and, in doing so, seeking to ensure the continuation of the GLA institution (Transcript B, 2018:8). Of course, this may have been something that Livingstone was personally sensitive to, given his experiences of the abolition of the GLC in 1986. His personal concern with

the evolution of the GLA is reflected in another interviewee's comment that, with its *continued* reliance upon a system of advisors and multiple deputy mayors who remain close to the Mayor and focussed upon policy delivery, '...the GLA as it is, and as it is still under Sadiq Khan, is still very much the Ken Livingstone structure of the GLA, and the Ken Livingstone operating model.' (Transcript A, 2018:5).

Conversely, this might suggest that there is a slightly anomalous nature to this aspect of the Livingstone case study. This is to say that interviewees' indication that Livingstone's shaping of the GLA has since changed little might indicate that this governance system restricts a mayor's capacity for change, with Johnson and Khan having largely adopted a similar governance model. It is, of course, true to say that Livingstone's successor did implement some changes. Most notably, this included the expansion of the number of deputy mayors (for which, see the following chapter) – but these essentially built upon the legacy left by London's first mayor and were, in effect a remodelling of Livingstone's existing policy advisor set-up. Also, one might argue that Livingstone was largely following the stipulations of the legislation that detailed the GLA's institutional design – for instance, in having a deputy mayor drawn from the Assembly and in relying upon a cabinet of policy advisors. However, he clearly used the opportunity offered to shape the structure, in terms of its working practices, relations between the Mayor and Assembly and reliance upon the advisors. In that sense, he created a pattern which was followed by Johnson and created an element of path dependency about the mayoralty and its relationship with the wider institution. In this sense, Livingstone used a unique opportunity as the *first* Mayor to create a certain approach to governance that matches with Lauth's idea of agents being conditioned into obeying the norms and practices of their institution.

Another element of Kenocracy, was his inclination to stand by advisors and related public figures, even if that brought the mayoralty into politically-fragile territory. In 2016, he stated that his engaging of Kiley was partly motivated by his belief that London Underground would prove '...hopeless...' in helping him meet his intent to modernise the Tube without recourse to PPP (Livingstone, 2016:36).

The closeness with which he wished these individuals to be associated with his mayoralty can be seen by the physically-close nature of them to him once the GLA moved into City Hall (July

2002). The vast majority of the building had been created as a modern open-plan space (Transcript C, 2018:7). However, Livingstone ensured that the eighth floor, where the Mayor's Office was redesigned to house separate office spaces, commenting to one official 'My advisors will need places to plot and scheme.' (Transcript A, 2018:13). Though perhaps a somewhat tongue-in-cheek throwaway remark, this comment does reveal Livingstone's conscious pursuit of a tight operation within the Mayor's Office.

The cases of Sir Ian Blair and Lee Jasper leave Livingstone's judgement in a more questionable light. The former, then-Metropolitan Police Commissioner, became embroiled in controversy following the shooting of Jean Charles de Menezes (July 22 2005) at Stockwell Tube Station. Armed officers had been wrongly informed that he was a suspected terrorist (IPCC, 2007). Blair claimed that a warning had been issued to de Menezes prior to the shooting but an Independent Police Complaints Commission report later found this to be false (IPCC, 2007). There were subsequent calls for Blair's resignation but Livingstone became one of his foremost supporters and made public statements to this effect. Asked in 2016 about whether this was a difficult thing for him to do, Livingstone replied that Blair's apology following the shooting was sufficient (Livingstone, 2016:146). Liberal Democrat and Conservative members of the Assembly voted (following the report) through a non-binding motion of no confidence in Blair. Livingstone responded in bullish fashion and backed Blair "...to the hilt..." decrying Assembly members as "...second-rate politicians who no one has ever heard of." (Livingstone, cited in Hosken, 2008:427). Livingstone's ability to work harmoniously with the Assembly was not absolute and could suffer when he was pressed over supporting others.

His support for Lee Jasper (his Advisor on Race Relations and Policing) would prove more serious. An interviewee offered a very frank assessment of Jasper. They were compelled to have frequent contact with him, due to their policy interests surrounding policing being related, they commented that he would often prove antagonistic and difficult (Transcript C, 2018:6). They often had to appeal to the Mayor to remonstrate with Jasper over this behaviour (Transcript C, 2018:6). Jasper pressed for co-option onto the Metropolitan Police Authority (MPA) but had been rejected when its members chose to assert their independence of the Mayor's policy agenda (Livingstone, 2011:434). Livingstone had wanted an increased say in policing, arguing that comparable city

mayors (including Rudy Giuliani in New York) were able to set policing targets and appoint management boards (Livingstone, 2011:434).

This, then, was another area where Livingstone felt that the GLA's original design restricted his ability to pursue his agenda. In this respect, the institution fulfilled early fears that its design had been intended to place the Mayor at the heart of an influential network (formed of the different agencies running the economy, security and transportation) whilst ensuring that the institution remained sufficiently weak to avoid the creation of an executive able to "go-it-alone" (Syrett, 2006:300). Alongside the reliance upon the central government for the majority of the GLA's funding, this ensured that mayors were compelled to maintain a level of continuity with national governmental themes (Sweeting, 2002:11; Syrett, 2006:300). This wielding of influence but not power (as Copus has described it) in this regard, is evidence of a strong mayoral system that lacks some of the agency of its New York counterpart (Copus, 2006:15). In a sense, this is a key variation between the New York and London models. In the first, an office-holder was able to circumvent constitutional requirements, through direct personal cultivation of key institutional partners (the Speaker of the Council), to extend their tenure. In the latter, the Mayor's relationship with the functional bodies (such as the MPA) remained weak enough that key allies, such as Jasper, were able to have their appointments blocked.

Livingstone's response was not sufficient to dispel the atmosphere of his having questions to answer about the conduct of advisors within the Mayor's Office. In total, Gilligan alleged that Jasper needed to account for up to £2.5million of funding (Edwards and Isaby, 2008:79). Channel 4's *Dispatches* programme made a series of further allegations about how Livingstone ran his operation. It made similar assertions to Gilligan regarding LDA funds and also alleged that Livingstone's advisory staff had campaigned for his 2004 re-election during working hours (thus, effectively, being paid by the GLA whilst undertaking party-political campaigning) (Edwards and Isaby, 2008:89-90). It is perhaps unsurprising, therefore, that multiple media outlets revised and redistributed stories that had previously built a controversy surrounding Livingstone's second-term mayoralty. These included: likening a Jewish *Evening Standard* reporter to a concentration camp guard in February 2005 and criticism for the Chavez deal (Edwards and Isaby, 2008:90; Hosken, 2008:421; *The Scotsman*, 2005). Despite eventually having to dismiss Jasper in March 2008 (after evidence emerged of Emails of a sexually-inappropriate nature having been sent to a

colleague), Livingstone continued to publicly declare support for him, commenting that he would reappoint him once he was cleared of any wrongdoing (Purnell, 2012:333-334). In so doing, Livingstone can perhaps be regarded as having sought to defend the mayoralty's right to make and defend their own appointments in the face of a hostile Assembly. However, we cannot assess whether the ultimate test of this defence (the reappointment of Jasper) would have enhanced Livingstone's capital, as the Mayor's 2008 loss denied him this opportunity.

The emergence of a "Kenocracy" presented mixed results for the Mayor and his leadership. On the one hand, the evidence suggests that he adopted a sceptical but still workable attitude towards the institution. In many respects, this is not at all surprising. The GLA was Britain's newest political institution and, given the city-wide scale of its responsibilities, was going to take time to establish. Though Livingstone expressed reservations as to the quality of the staff he inherited, interviewees' comments suggest that he was nevertheless aware of the need to adopt constructive attitudes towards them if he was to achieve his policy agenda. On the other hand, the label of a "Kenocracy", with negative undertones, was one applied to his mayoralty right from the beginning. In the second term, this characterisation was deepened by specific instances of poor relations between the Mayor and both external and internal institutional partners (from the media to the Assembly). His attitude in addressing these issues – such as delaying suspending Jasper, whilst continuing a public disagreement with *Evening Standard* journalists – ensured that they received attention for longer than they might otherwise have done, furthering the sense of a mayoralty with questions to answer regarding its internal operations. Travers (2008) somewhat presciently commented at the time, "Martyr status has worked for Livingstone in the past, but one day it won't." The result of the Kenocracy rhetoric was the creation of an image of Livingstone as '...lording over London...' and, thus, '...waning popularity...' (Whitton, 2014:14, 15).

5.3 Analysis: The Leadership Capital of Ken Livingstone

5.3.1 Political/policy vision

All interviewees were consistent in their belief that Livingstone had a discernible vision for his mayoralty. As one, who worked first within the Mayor's Office and, later, in some of the partner agencies commented: "Sustainable world city, keeping growth within its boundaries, using the proceeds of growth to fuel environmental and social improvement". Most people in the GLA, by the end of his first term, could more or less give you a version of that.' (Transcript A, 2018:10).

His commitment to achieving the Congestion Charge in the first term was a factor in the policy being initiated. The evidence of his proceeding with the policy when even some of his advisors thought that he should either delay or not proceed with it attests to his determination to see even risky decisions through if they lay at the heart of his vision (Blair, cited in Hosken, 2008:347). His deliberate association of himself with the policy also underlines his intention to see it firmly identified as a personal achievement if it worked. Indeed, his post-election proposal for the zone to be extended in 2004 served merely to further emphasise his role as the CC's most vocal public proponent.

Of course, one can call this into question. Though the CC was achieved under his mayoralty, interview evidence collected strongly suggests that Livingstone was '...very inclined to delegate...' once he was assured of having the correct officials and advisors in place across the GLA (Transcript A, 2018:9). Therefore, one must call in to question how fair it is to ascribe responsibility for the charge to Livingstone without acknowledging the significant contribution others made. In this regard, Livingstone was not too dissimilar with the other case studies examined within this thesis. Bloomberg and Johnson both delegated key policy responsibilities to a series of deputies and advisors, enabling them to focus their attention chiefly upon those areas that they were most invested in, whilst Cohen's institutional position compelled him to eschew explicit involvement in a broad range of policy areas (instead allowing the aldermen to take the lead).

However, it is not unexpected that Livingstone should prove so successful at associating himself with policies as a “figurehead”. One interviewee, who had served both as an Assembly member (2000-4) and also as chair of one of the GLA’s functional bodies, made a point of noting how the mayoralty lent itself to this kind of policy ownership. They remarked that single-person executives (particularly, those who have been legitimised by large personal mandates) ‘...should have tremendous authority towards the city.’ (Transcript C, 2018:3). Jean Blondel noted (2017:257) that, whether or not they possess direct electoral mandates, single-person executives are, by definition, the focus of attention within governance systems and can thus be perceived as having greater influence over policy vision. When accompanied by an assembly that can scrutinise but not directly challenge and amend specific policy implementations (for which, the London Assembly is a prime example), the Mayor is well-positioned to be definitively associated with policy innovations such as the CC. The GLA’s institutional design placed the Mayor in a position whereby they both appoint TfL’s board and also set its budget, thus being seen as an overall authority in transport matters (Greer and Sandford, 2003:12).

Livingstone deliberately cultivated an image for himself as a transport policy expert – both in public and in private. Several interviewees commented upon how they were impressed by his clear grasp of details in formulating policy. One mentioned how he went to an away-day held by TfL’s management board and participated in the discussions as though he knew, intricately, the various bus routes and challenges that they each faced (Transcript C, 2018:5). Livingstone has also since commented that he believes this depth of knowledge of the relevant details is integral to making policies work, citing the Congestion Charge as an example (Livingstone, 2016:130). As one official commented, the ultimate lesson of Livingstone’s desire to be aware of the detailed workings of policy was key to the new mayoralty demonstrating that ‘...you can push through and deliver things if you don’t get yourself tied up in knots.’ (Transcript A, 2018:15).

The disagreement over the PPP might also be regarded as having strengthened perceptions of Livingstone regarding policy vision. His prior experience in London governance, as Leader of the GLC, and his subsequent time as a backbench Member of Parliament (MP) (1987-2001) would have left him politically aware he was unlikely to win the dispute. After all, Livingstone was an MP in the parliament that considered the GLA Act (1999) and the act clearly stated that the Mayor’s powers in this regard would only be transferred *after* the PPP became

operational. As one interviewee commented, 'He had no choice, as it was essentially laid down in the legislation and the government was pushing it through.' (Transcript C, 2018:11). Another's characterisation of Livingstone as '...tactically clever...' and '...very, very astute...' in his political positioning may, therefore, lead one to question *why* he would wish to enter into such a protracted battle (Transcript A, 2018:7, 14).

This seems simply answered. Whilst Livingstone has never stated this to have been the case, it seems reasonable to conclude, on the balance of the evidence presented, that Livingstone went into the dispute quite prepared for a loss. This is not to suggest that Livingstone wished to be unsuccessful – his subsequent statements are consistent with the opposition expressed contemporaneously (Livingstone, 2011:397-8; Livingstone, 2016:36). Nevertheless, by opposing the government, Livingstone heavily underlined the mayoralty's democratic right (contextualised by its direct mandate) to publicly oppose central government policy affecting London. The dispute's institutional lessons underlined that the Mayor can expect to demur if he or she feels that, in doing so, they are better articulating Londoners' interests. Livingstone's position, as a maverick who was not only the first Mayor but also an *independent* one only added to the opportunity to send this political signal. By maintaining opposition to the PPP, he managed to uphold the sense of independence that the GLA surely needed in order to demonstrate its status as a legitimate institution. A former London Assembly member (who led one of the Assembly's political groups at the time) commented that the fight was a *triumph* for Livingstone (Transcript C, 2018:12). They argued that Livingstone was pragmatic enough to accept that he could not successfully oppose the system being imposed yet still managed to use his responsibility for TfL to begin renewing and upgrading the Tube, demonstrating the Mayor's Office's inherent flexibility (Transcript C, 2018:12).

It created an atmosphere that would continue to be an intractable issue for Livingstone, even in his 2012 contest against Johnson, and which was summed up by the pollster Peter Kellner. Reflecting on why Livingstone had begun to struggle to put across his political vision to the electorate, Kellner observed: "They tend to think that Ken has lost touch with ordinary Londoners, and that Boris is decisive and sticks to what he believes in" (Kellner, cited in Gimson, 2016:339). The controversy over the extension of the Congestion Charge may well have set the

tone for this early in the second term, with Johnson later capitalising upon this by targeting his manifesto pledge to repeal it at those areas affected.

Finally, the strength of Livingstone's policy vision, though attested to by many interviewees, did perhaps suffer in the second term by being compared to the success of the first. Other than the controversial plans to extend the Congestion Charge zone and the successful bid for the Olympics (a policy outcome which he could hardly claim ownership of in the same way), his second term seemed short on tangible political or strategic achievements. Indeed, Livingstone seems to have implicitly offered a partial acknowledgement of this himself by spending much of the 2008 campaign discussing the Congestion Charge – definitively a *first* term success (Edwards and Isaby, 2008; Livingstone, 2011). When set alongside Johnson and Paddick's strategy of highlighting the perceived problems London faced in the present, and how they would be tackled in the future (such as through a focus on knife crime and removing the Congestion Charge Zone extension), the appearance of Livingstone as out of touch with Londoners' concerns only seemed further compounded.

Whilst Livingstone inhabited a strong-mayor system (directly-elected and with executive function in a range of policy areas), he was required to adhere to many predetermined demands upon his capacity. These included the inability to truly oppose (beyond public campaigning), even less revoke, the PPP agreements. Indeed, the transferring of TfL, to under the Mayor's remit, only once the PPP's had taken effect was an exemplar of how central government was able to constrain the Mayor's manoeuvrability and effectiveness. On the other hand, his successful lobbying of the government over agendas such as the Olympics and his agreement with Gordon Brown on housing suggest that this was not a reality without nuance. Livingstone demonstrated that an effective Mayor could still secure concessions from government if they were able to gain sufficient political leverage (for instance, the need for his support for the Olympic bid). However, this finding is still consistent with Sweeting's (2003:466) earlier conclusion that a Mayor of London would need to rely on '...the informal resources of legitimacy, authority and profile...' if they were to extend their political programme.

In light of this, it seems pertinent to score Livingstone a 5 for his policy vision in 2004. This reflects both a high accumulation of capital with regard to his success in the calculated risk of introducing the CC but also accounts for his failure to win the fight over the PPP. On balance, however, his first term proved more successful than unsuccessful, with the Mayor able to use the CC as evidence that the GLA could deliver as an institution and the PPP still serving as an opportunity to demonstrate the mayoralty's desire to signal its independence from central government (even if the reality was much more nuanced). In this respect, Livingstone was consistent throughout his first term.

With regard to 2008, the score is lower. This reflects the growing contentions surrounding Livingstone's policy vision. Not only did he fail to find a consistent policy on the removal of Routemasters, whilst pursuing an unforeseen and controversial oil deal, he also failed to profit politically from those initiatives that would come to be judged more positively. Whilst the public-hire bicycle scheme has now become established in London, it had not yet been delivered and, though a Livingstone legacy, cannot be regarded as a major aspect of his vision, given its appearance only three months prior to the election. On the other hand, despite its eventual reversal, he did succeed in driving through the Western Extension to the CC, embedding further his perhaps most-established policy legacy from across the eight years. Consequently, he is accorded a score of 3.

5.3.2 Communicative performance

Interviewees consistently praised Livingstone's communicative abilities. One former official commented (making similar remarks for Johnson) that they felt that Livingstone's charisma left him '...capable of reaching out over the heads of the media to the population.' (Transcript A, 2018:19; Transcript E, 2018:3, 7). Given that Livingstone lacked the support mechanism of a large mainstream political party during his first term, this observation is interesting.

Livingstone proved adept at giving engaging speeches. One former GLA member commented that he was especially skilled in demonstrating his deep knowledge on the issues being addressed, and that this made his rhetoric persuasive (Transcript C, 2018:14). His speeches were frequently driven by an intention to demonstrate London's multi-culturalism and to appeal for unity amongst different ethnic groups. After the July 7 2005 terrorist attacks, Livingstone

labelled the attack an assault aimed ‘...at ordinary, working-class Londoners, black and white, Muslim and Christian, Hindu and Jew, young and old...’ and, calling for solidarity, declared that ‘...London is the greatest in the world, because everybody lives side by side in harmony’ (Livingstone, 2005). He later recounted how he was given police protection because they deemed that the strong unity message of his speech made him a terrorist target (Livingstone, 2011:528).

Livingstone’s response to the 7/7 bombings was an example of his ability to pursue clear and consistent narratives within his rhetoric. Livingstone feared a backlash against Muslim communities. He opened a press conference with: ““All races and creeds and colours have come to this city where you can be yourself as long as you do not harm anyone else.”” (Livingstone, cited in Livingstone, 2011:529). At a July 14 2005 memorial in Trafalgar Square (attended by 25,000 people), Livingstone repeated these sentiments. Calling upon London’s Second World War “Blitz spirit”, he told the crowd: ““There are some people who want to talk about a clash of civilisations but that is a false choice... Come to London and see the world together in one city, living in harmony as an example to us all...”” (Livingstone, cited in Livingstone, 2011:533). The *Evening Standard* reprinted the speech and some Londoners placed it in their windows in support (Hosken, 2008:374). The private sector responded by contributing ‘...£3million worth of free advertising...’ for displaying the speech (Hosken, 2008:374).

Livingstone’s communicative performance was marred by frequent controversies. Alwyn Turner has commented, when analysing Livingstone’s statements from the 1980s, that he is a ‘...gifted communicator and self-publicist...’ who often falls into controversy due to a ‘...mischievous sense of humour.’ (Turner, 2013:79). Others may well disagree as to whether this tendency was humorous, given his history of making anti-Semitic remarks. These included: a description of the government’s asylum policy as ‘...like putting the yellow star on Jews...’ in 2000; another 2000 assertion that the ‘...international financial system kills more people than World War Two...’; and the Finegold incident in 2005 (Ward, 2000; *Sunday Times*, 2000; *The Scotsman*, 2005). This latter incident related to an occasion, in 2005, when he told a journalist (Oliver Finegold, from the *Evening Standard*) that he regarded his questioning style as being akin to a concentration camp guard, despite Finegold being Jewish (*The Guardian*, 2006). He often refused to acknowledge fault. Following the Finegold incident, he was called before the Assembly. Refusing to apologise, and with Holocaust survivors in the public gallery, he said: ““If I could in

anything I say relieve any pain anyone feels I would not hesitate to do it but it would require me to be a liar. ...I cannot say to you words I do not believe in my heart.” (Livingstone, cited in Press Association, 2005). This is a prime example of the issue alluded to when Livingstone’s biographer wrote: ‘He seemed not to have been fitted with the restraining bolt which most politicians have installed...’ (Carvel, 1999:102).

His communicative performance, and the judgement underlying it, was, therefore, debatable. He pursued narratives that engaged many Londoners in a positive way. He won *Brandweek’s* (the trade publication for professional marketers) ‘Marketer of the Year Award’ in 2006, as a response to his articulation of London as a global city following its successful Olympic bid (2005) (*Brandweek*, 2006). He had success in ensuring that his voice was heard as Mayor and that he was able to use rhetoric to reach beyond often-hostile media, appealing directly to voters. He was also beset by many controversies that were largely of his own making – built upon his tendency towards offensive soundbites that had the potential to undermine his other rhetoric’s focus upon unity and diversity. As one interviewee who concluded, ‘I think Ken’s weakness is his tendency to sort of overstate and use hyperbole for effect, which lands him in hot water. He likes a catchy phrase.’ (Transcript A, 2018:14).

Therefore, it is apt to score Livingstone a 5 and 3, respectively, for his two terms. In 2004, he was a mayor who very much dominated the London political landscape (as indicated by Labour’s desire to readopt him) and who communicated a clear narrative of London as a global city with increasing concern for the environment, even when faced with fierce criticism. By 2008, however, he had continued to be a forthright communicator but this had led him into much more divisive territory. Whilst he could still communicate clear narratives on key themes, as with his efforts to create unity post-7/7, he undermined this with both anti-Semitic incidents and deteriorating public relations with the Assembly.

5.3.3 Personal poll rating relative to rating at most recent election

Table 13: Ken Livingstone Vote Shares and Poll Ratings

Election Year	Vote Share	Year of Approval Rating	Net Approval Rating	LCI Score
2000	50.3%	2004	18%	1
2004	58.4%	2008	27%	1

(Ipsos-MORI, 2005; Ipsos-MORI, 2007)

As with the Bloomberg and Johnson chapters, the *net* satisfaction rate has been used. The data used is drawn from Ipsos-MORI polls. It is difficult to find replicable data for this metric with regard to 2008. Despite extensive searches, the most recent ratings found relate to a poll conducted by Ipsos-MORI in November 2007, six months prior to the election (Ipsos-MORI, 2007). After this date, no further satisfaction polling was undertaken, with the attention instead being upon polls that directly sampled voting intentions¹⁵. The date of the poll means that it fails to account for possible fluctuations arising from the allegations regarding Jasper. Nevertheless, it post-dates most of the issues discussed in the second half of this LCI.

Livingstone won 57.9% of the overall vote in 2000 (London Elects, 2000a). He thus started from a relatively strong electoral base. The vote was ‘...the highest ever won by a British politician – a significant mandate for an office with deliberately limited direct powers’ (Wilson and Game, 2011:80). Despite his vote share falling by 2.5% in 2004, Livingstone still topped the poll in both of the ballot’s first and second rounds (London Elects, 2000a; London Elects, 2004a). In 2008, Livingstone’s proportion of the vote fell to 46.8%, from 55.4% in 2004 – though his actual vote count went up by nearly 400,000 (London Elects, 2004a; London Elects, 2008a).

Johnson’s victory margin in 2008 was slimmer, at 6.4%, than either of Livingstone’s 2000 and 2004 totals had been (at 15.8% and 10.8%, respectively). (London Elects, 2000a; London Elects, 2004a; London Elects, 2008a). This suggests that it was the higher turnout in the 2008

¹⁵ Verified via Email correspondence with Glenn Gottfried (Research Manager, Ipsos-MORI) March 03 2018 (Gottfried, 2018).

election (45%), particularly in boroughs that voted for Johnson, that cost Livingstone (London Elects, 2008a). Johnson's campaign team, led by Lynton Crosby, had targeted these boroughs, in order to take advantage of dissatisfaction with policies such as the Western Extension (Cawthorne, 2015:98-9).

Livingstone's approval ratings showed more fluctuation. Between 2000 and 2004, the only low point came around the time of the initial outlining of plans for the CC in 2002. Here, his net ratings were tied at 27% satisfied and 27% dissatisfied (Ipsos-MORI, 2005). Thus, though facing a significant leap in dissatisfaction (when at its 2002 peak), from 8% to 27%, Livingstone still never achieved a net dissatisfied score during his first term.

Despite the aforementioned difficulties of Livingstone's second term, it is notable that his net satisfaction rating was 9% higher just prior to the election campaign. Without contemporaneous data regarding satisfaction polling at the time of the Jasper scandal, it is not possible to definitively evaluate the extent to which this impacted upon Livingstone's personal ratings. One can tentatively expect a dip nearer the election in light of the Jasper scandal, with an April 2008 YouGov poll finding that 61% of Londoners felt that 'Ken Livingstone has made some extremely bad appointments in picking his closest advisors' (only 9% disagreed) (YouGov, 2008). However, Livingstone's personal ratings were still notably high (indeed the highest of those examined within this analysis) within six months of the end of his term. This indicates a certain durability to his ratings until near the end of his tenure.

5.3.4 Longevity (time in office)

The quantitative nature of this metric gives Livingstone scores of 4 and 5, respectively. However, it is worth undertaking a brief qualitative assessment of the reality behind these numbers, too.

Livingstone was able to sustain his mayoralty through a number of notable events – both personal and policy-based. Included amongst these was the need to devote a reasonable amount of his time to establish the GLA as an institution (Transcript E, 2018:1-3). One interviewee commented, '...a lot of what Ken Livingstone did was targeted towards demonstrating competence, building up of democratic capacity and showing that this was an institution to be

taken seriously. And whenever a new political institution is created...it's by no means obvious that an institution is going to last.' (Transcript B, 2018:8).

Another interviewee remarked that '...the GLA as it is...is still very much the Ken Livingstone structure of the GLA and the Ken Livingstone operating model.' (Transcript A, 2018:5). This suggests a longer-term impact upon the GLA. This includes the way in which he operated the Mayor's office. One former Assembly member characterised this as an '...old-style Papal court...' (Transcript C, 2018:3). Several interviewees agreed that Livingstone's model of having key advisors around him (speaking on his behalf and delegated to run GLA agencies) remains an aspect of the institution (Transcript A, 2018:5; Transcript B, 2018:5; Transcript C, 2018:8). The roles of both Deputy Mayor and advisors had been left '...ill-defined by the statute...' with the Greater London Authority Act (1999) having been largely focused upon both the PPP and the GLA's extended agencies (HM Government, 1999; Transcript C, 2018:8). It was somewhat inevitable that Livingstone would therefore have the opportunity to set the governance pattern in this area and, consequently, allowed the Mayor to extend his institutional influence in a way used by his predecessors, too. Livingstone himself commented that his greatest legacy '...is broadly that Boris has not dismantled the structures I left for him.' (Livingstone, 2016:50).

Gimson argued that Livingstone's independence (first as an independent and, then, maverick Labour Party candidate) was a factor in his continued electoral success, with his anti-establishment image making him stand out (Gimson, 2016:283). This argument has merit. Livingstone's re-adoption by Labour can surely only be seen as an admission that they expected any other candidate to be beaten by him. Livingstone has claimed that his support for the Olympics was also a factor, as it meant that the government would have a powerful ally in its bid (Livingstone, 2011:488-90).

However, this would also be central to his eventual defeat in 2008. One interviewee, another former council leader, observed: 'I suspect, by the time you get to 8 years, anything that goes wrong in the city is now your fault. So, it becomes increasingly difficult to win reelection [sic], even if you're still fresh and reasonably popular.' (Transcript C, 2018:2). Livingstone made similar remarks in his losing speech, commenting: 'You can't be mayor for eight years and then if you don't get a third term say it was somebody else's fault.' (Livingstone, cited in Sparrow and

Summers, 2008). The historic rebel characterisation of Livingstone, one which he encouraged through his controversial statements, endured (Worthy, Bennister and Stafford, 2018). It had now transitioned too far towards a controversial and embattled mayor who faced questions over potential cronyism and who spent 2008 defending his internal operations (rather than setting out a fresh vision). Livingstone's 2008 campaign was too heavily focused upon trying to '...get the public to hate...' his opponent and not enough on addressing his own difficulties (Gimson, 2016:281). He consequently failed to cut through with the electorate.

5.3.5 Selection or re-selection as party candidate (margin)

The London Labour Party held a ballot of its members in order that Livingstone would receive a formal endorsement after his readoption. The result of this was revealed on February 2 2004, with an overall "Yes" vote of 93.9% (Quinn, 2016). His overall selection margin was, thus, 87.8%. Given Livingstone's difficult relationship with Labour (having been rejected for readmission in 2002), this was a remarkable margin. It is accounted for by three factors. Labour was keen to be associated with him. Second, Livingstone had long been popular with the London party membership. In 2000, Livingstone received 54.9% and 71% of members' and affiliated supporters' support, respectively (Quinn, 2016). Thirdly, no other candidates contested the vote (Quinn, 2016).

In 2008, members were not balloted (as it was not constitutionally required for continuing candidates). Livingstone was adopted unopposed on May 3 2007 (Quinn, 2016). As he was not formally reselected and, therefore, essentially able to continue as their candidate since the ballot of members in 2004, these figures are used again for the application of the LCI to Livingstone's capital in 2008. His score is, therefore, 5 for both terms.

5.3.6 Party polling relative to most recent election result

The figures used for the comparison are Labour's result in the 2004 election, compared with the 2000 poll results. For the 2008 election, the poll result is compared with the 2004 result. Use of the 2004 figures is slightly problematic. Whilst Livingstone was an official Labour candidate in 2004, he was independent in 2000 and this makes the comparison rather asymmetrical.

Nevertheless, the figures remain methodologically-sound, in so far as they create common reference points and can also be set within the context of the Labour’s wider performance.

Table 14: Labour Party Polling Relative to Most Recent Election Result

LCI Date	Party Vote Share	Most Recent Election Date	Party Vote Share	% Change	LCI Score
2004	25%	2000	30%	-5%	2
2008	27.5%	2004	25%	+2.5%	4

(London Elects, 2000b:3; London Elects, 2004b:3; Copus, 2006:15; London Elects, 2008b:3).

Both the 2004 and 2008 local elections were bad results for the Labour Party. In 2004, the share was even worse than the party’s previous low-point of 1982 (29%), with voters expressing increasingly negative reactions to the Iraq War (Wilson, *et. al.*, 2011:261; Mellows-Facer *et. al.*, 2004:9). Livingstone believed that this was another motivation for adopting him as Labour’s candidate (hoping that a high-profile Labour win in London would partially offset wider losses) (Livingstone, 2016:35). Labour’s performance in the Assembly elections was also poor. Having achieved a 30% share of the vote and nine Assembly members in 2000, they received only 25%. Overall, Labour’s polling relative to their most recent election was down by 5%.

In 2008, Labour were faced with a similarly poor outcome. Livingstone lost and the party suffered another fall in its vote. This was largely due to both a national economic downturn and also an unpopular proposal to remove the 10% tax rate (Rallings and Thrasher, 2009:53). In London, the Labour Party’s share of the vote rose to 27.5%. Therefore, despite Livingstone’s loss, the Labour Party’s relative polling at this election was up 2.5%.

5.3.7 Levels of public trust in leader

Available data on trust in Livingstone is inconsistent. It is therefore difficult to calculate how this changed over time. A 2008 figure is available but not one for 2004 (Ipsos-Mori, 2008b). A precedent for using the LCI in such an eventuality can be found in Bennister and Worthy’s (2017) examination of the leadership capital of Margaret Thatcher and Tony Blair. Commenting on the similar lack of data for Thatcher prior to 1983, they proposed that proxy data

and commentaries be used (Bennister and Worthy, 2017:133).¹⁶ Taking a similar approach, this thesis has therefore determined an estimate of Livingstone’s trustworthiness rating in 2004 by taking both his most recent net satisfaction rating prior to the election. As in the Bloomberg chapter, approval/satisfaction ratings have been used as a proxy.

Table 15: (Proxy) Trust Ratings for Ken Livingstone

Year of Approval Rating	Net Trust (Approval) Rating	LCI Score
2004	18%	1
2008	27%	2

(Ipsos-MORI, 2005; Ipsos-MORI, 2007).

5.3.8 Ability to work on a cross-partisan/consensual basis

Until the final months of his first term, Livingstone was an independent and thus compelled to be pluralist in his approach. This may seem rather surprising, however, given the institutional relationship between the Mayor and the Assembly. The latter’s only real power (beyond scrutiny) being the ability to vote down mayoral budgets (requiring a two-thirds majority in favour of an alternative proposal), Livingstone was not especially beholden to them (Sandford, 2017:7).

The legislation specified that the statutory Deputy Mayor must be an Assembly member (HM Government, 1999). Not having a party of his own to draw upon, Livingstone was compelled to maintain reasonable relations with the Assembly in order to receive this support. The Conservatives and Liberal Democrats rejected his offer of a Deputy Mayor’s position that was rotated through the Assembly’s parties but Labour and the Greens both agreed to supply him with one (Nicky Gavron, 2000-2003, and Jenny Jones, 2003-2004) (Transcript C, 2018:9).

Another factor that drove him to make his approach consensual was his desire to ensure that the GLA, as an institution, proved its worth as soon as possible (Transcript B, 2018:8). It was

¹⁶ This use of proxy data is discussed in greater detail within the methods chapter.

therefore sensible for him to pursue an open and constructive strategy. This does not mean that the attitudes of the Assembly complemented this strategy. With scrutiny a closely-governed exercise (each party was given proportional time allocations for questioning witnesses that limited how far they could pursue queries), members clearly felt the need to exercise a certain muscularity in their relationship with Livingstone as a means to try to define their role (Transcript C, 2018:4). Hence, one can set remarks such as Phillips' acerbic Kenocracy comments into context whereby it is clear that members felt a need to almost justify their existence within a structurally-constrained institution that had few powers. Much critical rhetoric regarding the Mayor was attributable to seeking consistency in officially-hostile party lines. Many members had previously criticised Livingstone in advance of his winning, with Labour Group leader, Toby Harris, having written an *Evening Standard* article entitled 'London Deserves Better' (Transcript C, 2018:5).

Conservatives' criticisms were more sharply focused. When the CC was introduced, Angie Bray (Conservative transport spokesperson) criticised it as an opportunity for Capita (the company collecting the payments) to make money at Londoners' expense (Bray, cited in Clark, 2003). The timing of this attack was suggestive as to its true motivation, however. Steven Norris had recently been reselected as the Conservative's mayoral candidate and opposed the CC, because of his desire to win votes amongst those business whose supply lorries might be affected (Waugh, 2002b). Bray's efforts can be seen as a bid to boost Norris' policy profile. Livingstone's consensual approach during the first term is perhaps best epitomised by his inclusion of Norris on TfL's board, wanting to bring a range of perspectives to bear, and in light of Norris' background as a transport minister (Livingstone, 2011:425). Norris was only dismissed in 2003 when it emerged that he had become chairman of the construction firm Jarvis (which had admitted corporate responsibility for the earlier Potters Bar train accident) (Livingstone, 2011:495).

Livingstone's transport policy was a prime example of a non-partisan and reasonably consensual approach. Driven both by a desire to demonstrate the efficacy of the GLA and also to deliver his policy priorities, the Mayor worked reasonably well with all political groupings on the Assembly and appointed members of all parties, except for the Liberal Democrats (who declined offers), to positions either on management boards or within the executive itself (Livingstone, 2011:424-6). Others have commented that Livingstone's determination to put policy into effect as quickly as possible, in order to give effect to his political vision for London, meant that he was

prepared to avoid tribalism if it conflicted with this desire. One interviewee, in particular, recalled that Livingstone could often go ‘...out of his way...’ to be approachable for members of the Assembly if he felt that working together would ensure his wider political vision being met (Transcript C, 2018:12). The same interviewee commented that Livingstone would even informally discipline his advisors, such as Lee Jasper, if he felt that they were not being suitably cooperative with Assembly members (Transcript C, 2018:6, 9-10).

There was more evidence of division between Livingstone and other parties during the second term. This was, to a certain degree, inevitable, given his now being a direct representative of one of its two largest parties. However, the reduction in consensual attitude was more on the Mayor’s part than the Assembly’s. He inserted himself into the debate surrounding Sir Ian Blair’s future in 2005. His response to the Assembly’s motion of no confidence was remarkable and undermined much of his previous openness (Livingstone, cited in Hosken, 2008:427). However, though indicating a diminishment in his later inclination towards consensus, Livingstone’s attitude towards them maintained a fairly constructive tone throughout. Interviewees told of how the Mayor’s advisors would often approach Assembly members and ask them to lobby him, sometimes feeling that the latter’s relationship with Livingstone was more constructive (Transcript C, 2018:10). The overall conclusion of interviewees was that Livingstone could prove difficult at times but was generally consensual and non-partisan in his outlook.

In this respect, Livingstone was not unusual with regards to an observed consensual trend in mayoral leadership. Many studies stress their consensual governance. It is reminiscent of John Richardson’s (2011) characterisation of Michael Bloomberg’s desire to see a less ideological style of leadership emerge. Notwithstanding the different leadership culture concerned, Niels Karsten *et. al.* (2017) have observed that mayors can often be key to creating a consensus-based atmosphere. Livingstone’s apparent willingness to adopt a degree of consensus makes further sense when placed within this context. He may have been the first Mayor of London, and thus in a position to shape the institution’s establishment, but he followed a pattern that was, in this regard, not inconsistent with mayoral attitudes elsewhere. As one interviewee observed, ‘...I think there’s maybe something about urban politics that maybe makes people play to their opposites.’ (Transcript A, 2018:19).

Nevertheless, this does not negate the fact that Livingstone's case demonstrates the power of the Mayor *within* the GLA. The Assembly was (and remains) a very weak body and presented little by way of a check on mayoral power. Though much in-depth scrutiny of Livingstone's actions was undertaken (including through both the transport committee and general meetings of the Assembly), there is little to suggest that this held him back from achieving key policies, such as the CC and the Routemaster's removal. Likewise, when the Assembly did seek to censure him or those he supported (as with the debates regarding Blair and Finegold), Livingstone's response was not merely confrontational but also illustrative of the lack of regard that he needed to pay them. The Assembly could criticise the tone of these responses but they could not bring sanctions to bear. Similarly, Livingstone's freedom to appoint up to twelve advisors, key agency heads and a Deputy Mayor, and then delegate key areas of responsibility to them (such as Kiley at TfL), left him with substantial capacity for driving an agenda in a range of policy areas.

This is perhaps no better articulated than one interviewee's observation that some tour guides took to referring to City Hall as 'Ken's Den' (Transcript E, 2018:1). Whilst this reflects more of a casual observation than a grounded critique, it is interesting to consider these contemporary conceptions of an executive's dominance within their institution. When set alongside interviewees' aforementioned view that the GLA's operating culture was largely established by Livingstone (and subsequently maintained in this fashion), it indicates towards aspects of Peters' '...“individuals within institutions”...’ model (2012:55).

He can, thus, be accorded a score of 4 for the first term (not obtaining the highest-possible score due to his fight over the PPP leading him into policy confrontation with Labour, despite the wider repairing of this relationship by the time of the election). For the second term, the score is lower (3), in indication of the marked deterioration in his relations with Assembly members (as indicated in the Blair case), though credit is still afforded for a degree of consensual working, in the light of interviewees' testament to this effect.

5.3.9 Perceived ability to shape party's policy platform

Mayoral candidates are able to shape their platforms (albeit in consultation with their parties, if relevant) before elections. They can then supplement this platform through creating

their own version of the strategies that the Mayor must publish. These ‘...set a direction of travel for London as a whole...’ but – outside of housing, transport and economic development – the Mayor has no direct power in forcing public bodies’ adherence (Sandford, 2017:21). This exemplifies what Copus’ contention that the Mayor ‘...wields influence not power...’ (Copus, 2013:814).

This was the context within which Livingstone operated, as both creator and enforcer of policy. His ability to shape *party* policy during the first term was almost irrelevant, being independent of any party for all but the last months. Successfully introducing the CC (with Labour having introduced the power to implement it) assisted in his readmission (HM Government, 1999). This shows increased openness towards Livingstone’s agenda. Whilst Labour did not subsequently implement it within other local authorities, this high-profile policy influenced Labour’s attitude.

It is much easier to identify the policy interplay between him and the central government during his second term. The Mayor successfully lobbied Gordon Brown (when he was Prime Minister – 2007-2010) for funds to initiate council-house building within London (at odds with Labour’s national housing strategy) (Livingstone, 2016:42). £5billion of funding was pledged (though never delivered, as Johnson overturned the policy in 2008, in line with Conservative policy) (Livingstone, 2016:42). This comes in addition to implied (by virtue of not opposing) support the government continued to offer for policies such as the Western Extension and the bicycle hire scheme.

Livingstone was similarly successful, across both terms, in shaping Labour’s attitude towards the Olympics. He supported Tessa Jowell’s (then Culture Secretary) bid, making clear that “...the mayor was prepared to do whatever was needed...” (Lee, cited in Hosken, 2008:362). As the government became convinced that the bid was viable, Livingstone used his position to exert promises that the legacy would include redevelopment of Stratford (including housing, sports facilities and transport infrastructure) (Livingstone, 2016:42).

Therefore, Livingstone was clearly able to exert a degree of influence on party policy. Restricted during his first term, he was still able to appeal to Labour through initiatives such as

the CC and the Olympic bid. Following his re-election, he was able to further this through greater access to government figures who he needed dialogues with in order to alter policy on transport, housing and the Olympic legacy. He can thus be scored a 2 for the first term and a 4 for the second.

5.3.10 Perceived ability in legislative effectiveness & achieving outcomes relative to the declared policy programme

Greer and Sandford (2003:20) concluded that the Assembly's lack of legislative powers, being consigned to merely a scrutiny role, left it unable to have notable policy impacts. Interviewees, meanwhile, remarked that this left the Assembly with '...a very low profile...' (Transcript B, 2018:3; Transcript E, 2018:2). One former Assembly member, who also felt that its sole function as scrutineer was not fulfilling its potential if it had greater powers, stated that he felt that the primary fault lay in the legislation establishing the GLA (Transcript C, 2018:4). This had left the role of Assembly members too ill-defined and without a vision for how they might sufficiently occupy themselves in addressing London-wide issues (Transcript C, 2018:4).

This, according to a former Mayor's Office official, left Livingstone in a position where '...he slightly wondered what they were for...' (Transcript A, 2018:10). He was, thus, in the curious position where he was perceived by officials as not having great regard for the Assembly and yet still willing to work with them politically in delivering his agenda (Transcript A, 2018:10).

In the light of this, Livingstone was able to pass his legislative programme relatively easy. He secured all of his budgets and, similarly, saw all of his major policy initiatives, such as the CC and its extension, take effect (with the Assembly lacking the capacity to vote them down). Likewise, the successful extension of the CC (notwithstanding its eventual removal under Johnson) was an example of his ability to fulfil on manifesto pledges.

Across both terms, then, he scores well for implementing his declared policy programme, working well (overall) with the Assembly where and when needed. Despite his rhetoric-led deteriorations in this relationship, the CC, its extension and the removal of the Routemaster all indicated a Mayor able to largely drive through their agenda without need to substantially consult the legislative branch of his institution. He can thus be scored a 4 for both terms.

5.4 Conclusion

Livingstone is unique amongst this thesis' case studies in that he is the only mayor to have been the first executive of their respective institutions. Livingstone's existing, post-GLC, profile gave the mayoralty the kind of visibility that the government sought for the GLA (DETR, 1998:9; Hambleton and Sweeting, 2004:475). Much of what this chapter has presented has confirmed Sweeting's (2003:466) conclusion that the Mayor '...is "strong" in the context of the GLA...' but weaker in the '...broader arena of London governance.' Nevertheless, internally, the Mayor demonstrated a partial dominance of the GLA's structure (including in his relations with the Assembly and, after the PPP challenges, functional bodies such as TfL) that enabled the mayoralty to emerge as the senior partner in the relationship with the Assembly. Whilst there were the kind of clashes that Sweeting (2002) argued would occur, given the agential and structural tensions built in to the GLA's institutional design, Livingstone largely emerged as the victor in these (even if his personal communicative controversies marred some of these moments).

Livingstone was a well-known public figure prior to becoming Mayor. One could argue that these aspects of his capital were only more enhanced by his becoming the politician with the third-highest direct mandate in Europe (Worthy, *et. al.*, 2019:6; Parker and Sullivan, 2016). As indicated in Table 15, his levels of leadership capital were very varied.

His highest capital scores were achieved in relation to his longevity, his (re)selection margin and his legislative effectiveness. As noted with Bloomberg, longevity being scored on a linear metric does not necessarily indicate more nuanced realities. By 2008, Livingstone had come to be much less dominant in London politics. Whilst in 2004 his likely longevity (through a widely-expected win) seemed to enhance his profile, by 2008 he received far more criticism indicating a disconnection between him and sections of London's communities. Though one may argue that this can be countered by the apparent increase in his approval ratings, it is notable that this still scored as one of his lowest areas of capital. Furthermore, of course, this apparent depreciation in dominance was confirmed by his 2008 loss. Thus, though the LCI may accord him a strong score for longevity, this was not a wholly-positive area for Livingstone.

Similarly, the score for (re)selection margin is problematic. Whilst it records a true position in his capital trajectory in 2004, the fact that Livingstone did not have to face a vote means that the 2004 score is replicated. However, this does still suggest a position of strength – the fact that he faced no rival selection candidates justifies a judgement that this remained a substantial capital store for the Mayor.

In legislative effectiveness, Livingstone was the beneficiary of an institutional design that left him able to frequently disregard the Assembly (despite its elected nature). He managed to pursue his declared policy programme, with notable successes (including the CC, its extension and the proposed bicycle-hire scheme). Had he been in office when the bicycle-hire scheme came into effect, he could have benefited from an even higher capital score.

Particularly weak areas of capital included his approval rating and levels of public trust. The public trust score must, of course, be treated with the same caution as in the Bloomberg chapter (and for the same reasons – in short, the use of proxy data). However, the overall score for Livingstone’s personal poll rating is interesting. His overall poll rating compared to the previous election result was consistently low (hence the bottom LCI score) but his rating remained one of net satisfaction across both terms (Ipsos-MORI, 2005; Ipsos-MORI, 2007). Moreover, there was a net gain of 9% in this rating, indicating that he managed to maintain a steady growth in capital in this area, despite the lack of gain in score.

Livingstone articulated a clear policy vision that encompassed numerous elements – from reforming transportation systems through to raising London’s profile as a global, multicultural, city. The articulation of this was aided, in part, by his abilities as a communicator.

However, his communicative abilities could also lead to difficulty. Use of controversial soundbites was not accidental. It helped to differentiate him from other politicians but was an aspect of his leadership that fed the negative Kenocracy legend. Combined with his being surrounded by other second-term controversies (including the Jasper allegations), it left him weak to critiques of cronyism and being distant from Londoners’ concerns.

Overall scores (32 and 36, respectively) not only indicate a slight rise in his capital over his two terms but, also, that maintaining of a fairly consistent level throughout this period. Some of this can be attributed to being the first holder of his office. Interviewees, when asked if Livingstone was restricted in capacity by needing (particularly in the first term) to establish the GLA as an institution, were consistent in their responses. They acknowledged that he was required to devote attention to this but was still able to mark notable achievements, including the CC (Transcript A, 2018; Transcript C, 2018; Transcript E, 2018). When these views are set alongside one official's observation that the GLA '...is still very much the Ken Livingstone structure of the GLA...', then the lesson is enlightening (Transcript A, 2018:5). Livingstone quickly established the GLA as the kind of institution that he felt that it should be, statutory restrictions from the Greater London Authority Act (1999) notwithstanding, delivering high-profile policy successes. Readoption by Labour was both an explicit endorsement of him and an implicit acknowledgement that the GLA had earned a place in London's governance.

Livingstone, then, led a much more restrictive institution than Bloomberg but shared similarities with him in terms of exemplifying Levy's portrait '...rational and strategic individuals who make choices within constraints to obtain their desired ends...' (Levy, 1997:23). Thus, he too is an example of strong mayor who was able to pursue much of his desired agenda and achieve notable outcomes whilst remaining beholden to pre-established institutional norms. These did not, however, stem from a strong legislative counterpart but, rather, from the strictures of the legislation that brought both the Mayor and Assembly into being. In this sense, Livingstone was thus able to stretch his institution in a manner consistent with Peters' model, in so far as revealing the reality of a poor institutional design that left few internal checks on his authority, whilst remaining '...conditioned to obey...' the wider context in which he was compelled to operate (Lauth, 2004:70). Here, then, we have a strong-mayor system which, in theory, fitted the typology established by Svava but reflected the more institutionally-nuanced realities predicted for it by Sweeting (2002; 2003).

Table 16: The Leadership Capital of Ken Livingstone

Metric	Measurements	2004	2008
Political/policy vision	(1) Completely absent (2) Unclear/inconsistent (3) Moderately clear/consistent (4) Clear/consistent (5) Very clear/consistent	5	3
Communicative performance	(1) Very poor (2) Poor (3) Average (4) Good (5) Very good	4	3
Personal poll rating relative to rating at most recent election	(1) Very low (<-15.5%) (2) Low (-5 to -15.4%) (3) Moderate (-5% to 5.4%) (4) High (5.5% to 15%) (5) Very high (>15%)	1	1
Longevity (time in office)	(1) <1 year (2) 1-2 years (3) 2-3 years (4) 3-4 years (5) >4 years	4	5
Selection or re-selection as party candidate (margin)	(1) Very small (<1%) (2) Small (1-5.4%) (3) Moderate (5.5-10.4%) (4) Large (10.5-15%) (5) Very large (>15%)	5	5
Party polling relative to most recent election result	(1) <-10% (2) -10% to -2.4% (3) -2.5% to 2.4% (4) 2.5%-10.4% (5) >10%	2	4

Levels of public trust in leader	(1) 0-20.4% (2) 20.5-40.4% (3) 40.5-60.4% (4) 60.5-80.4% (5) 80.5-100%	1*	2
Ability to work on a cross-partisan/consensual basis	(1) Very low (2) Low (3) Moderate (4) High (5) Very high	4	3
Perceived ability to shape party's policy platform	(1) Very low (2) Low (3) Moderate (4) High (5) Very high	2	4
Perceived ability in legislative effectiveness and achieving outcomes relative to the declared policy programme	(1) Very low (2) Low (3) Moderate (4) High (5) Very high	4	4
Total		32	36

* Based on proxy data, using approval ratings.

6.0 Figurehead Mayor: Boris Johnson (2008-2016)

6.1 Introduction

Boris Johnson has been variously described as a ‘...shambolic persona wrapped around the rapier intellect...’, ‘...brilliant at reaching the wider public...’ and ‘...recklessly ambitious...’ (Purnell, 2012:49; Gimson, 2016:261; Cawthorne, 2015:15). Livingstone described him as ‘...a complete waste of space...’ and, yet, still declared that he would be “...the most formidable opponent I will face in my political career.” (Livingstone, 2016:52; Livingstone, cited in Edwards and Isaby, 2008:67). Steven Norris, said that Johnson’s 2008 candidature “...smacks of a certain desperation...” and that “...he couldn’t run a whelk stall...” (Norris, cited in Livingstone, 2011:583). One of Boris’ future deputy mayors described how he was ‘... certainly an unknown...’ in 2008, in terms of his ability to run a city (Transcript D, 2018:4). He did not have the background in the capital’s politics that Livingstone had. Expectations of Johnson as Mayor were not, therefore, particularly high in 2008.

Nevertheless, in 2008 he beat an incumbent who was described as ‘...one of the greatest survivors of modern British politics...’ (Gimson, 2016:287). He went on to gain global recognition, including through his association with the Olympics, and was frequently touted as a potential future Prime Minister (Worthy, *et. al.*, 2019; Purnell, 2012)¹⁷. Keen to signal a break with the “Kenocracy” image of the mayoralty, he sought to give the sense of a new atmosphere at City Hall. Johnson’s desire to achieve this was signalled by his early cancellation of a deal the previous mayor had signed with Venezuela’s Hugo Chavez (which exported a regular supply of cheap oil to London, to enable the running of lower-cost buses) (Livingstone, 2016:48). His first action was to commission Pricewaterhouse Coopers to audit City Hall’s finances, giving the signal that he intended to address some of the atmosphere created by the claims levelled at Lee Jasper, under Livingstone. Moreover, he was able to dominate the GLA itself as an institution, having inherited the same weak Assembly and related structures experienced by Livingstone.

¹⁷ He became Prime Minister on July 24 2019.

His mayoralty saw many challenges – from overseeing the Crossrail project through to more abstract or outlandish proposals (including the Garden Bridge and the Thames Estuary Airport (TEA), “Boris Island”, proposal). Other events included becoming the first Mayor to orchestrate the departure of a Metropolitan Police Commissioner (Sir Ian Blair), in December 2008, and direct criticism of his leadership regarding his response to the 2011 London Riots. Throughout, his public profile increased to such an extent that there was constant speculation regarding whether he would subsequently seek the premiership. Some commentators have maintained that he increasingly came to see the mayoralty as a platform for achieving this ambition (Worthy, *et. al.*, 2018; Transcript C, 2018:12-13; Transcript E, 2018:5).

This chapter focuses upon a thematic case study of Johnson’s approach to transport policy. It then applies the Leadership Capital Index (LCI) to Johnson. The date point at which the LCI is applied is, as with Livingstone, the end of each mayoral term (2012 and 2016). Conclusions are then considered in relation to the findings reached about Johnson’s leadership capital and what insights his mayoralty offered with regard to strong mayors and institutions.

6.2 Transportation: Background

Interview evidence suggests that Johnson was very much concerned with transport as a means to show that he was able to deliver for Londoners (Transcript D, 2018:5-6). He inherited the plans for Crossrail (as well as the cycle-hire scheme) from Ken Livingstone and successfully advocated for the continued funding of the scheme by the government. On the other hand, Johnson became associated with several projects which received substantial public criticism, including his plan for a new airport in the Thames Estuary (dubbed “Boris Island” by both the press and the scheme’s critics). Similarly, he successfully implemented key policy pledges, such as the removal of the Congestion Charge’s (CC) Western Extension and cancelling the oil deal with Hugo Chavez’s Venezuela.

6.2.1 Overturning Livingstone: Chavez and the Western Extension

Johnson’s campaign included pledges to reverse the Western Extension and Livingstone’s deal with Chavez. Whilst criticising Chavez’s record on human rights and describing the oil deal as “crackers”, he made much of the unpopularity of the Western Extension in his electoral strategy (Edwards and Isaby, 2008:42).

The deal with Chavez was worth approximately £16million a year to London. However, cancelling the deal, which only took effect less than a year prior to the 2008 election, was relatively easy for Johnson (*Financial Times*, 2007). By August, £7million, to cover the cost of deliveries-to-date, was returned to Venezuela and the deal had been terminated (Carroll, 2008). This, as with the subsequent firing of Sir Ian Blair (see Section 9.2.5), represented an early victory for Johnson and fulfilled his desire to be seen as making a decisive break with his predecessor’s eight years heading the GLA. As Boris had availed himself of the Mayor’s right to chair TfL, the ability to execute the decision was all the easier and showed an office-holder who was confident in using the powers available to them (unlike with the Blair firing).

The removal of the Western Extension of the CC was not as quickly enacted. In 2008, Johnson was able to capitalise on his opposition to it and gain votes from the boroughs affected by its February 2007 implementation. In Westminster, the Conservative vote share rose from

40.5% in 2004 to 54% (Democratic Dashboard, 2019a). In Kensington and Chelsea, it rose to 65%, having been 49% (Democratic Dashboard, 2019b). Johnson could, therefore, point to a direct mandate in those areas and, given his commitment to remove the extension, claim that it made enacting the policy a priority. However, it was not removed until December 2010 (TfL, 2010). This was despite Johnson having tasked Peter Hendy (Transport Commissioner) with immediately establishing proposals for how the extension could be removed (Purnell, 2012:353). This was due to Johnson's pledge having failed to establish how the budgetary shortfall (£55million per year) resulting from its removal would be offset (Purnell, 2012:390-391). Eventually, this was covered by a rise in bus fares, allowing for the 2010 abolition (Purnell, 2012:390-391).

These two policies offer insights into Johnson's early momentum. Whilst he was able to move quickly to cancel the Chavez deal, given its only being in its infancy when he assumed office, he was less able to follow through with his scrapping of the Western Extension at the speed desired. In part, this indicates an individual who led a high-profile campaign and then was suddenly faced with the budgetary realities of enacting his pledges. As some interviewees attested to, this reflects a broader theme of Johnson's first term – he had not expected to win in 2008 and, therefore, had done little preparation for the reality of governing (Transcript C, 2018:12; Transcript E, 2018:5). It also signifies that, whilst he was actively stretching his institutional authority in the dismissal of Blair, he was more broadly aware of the need to rely upon internal expertise (in this case, Hendy) when seeking to progress objectives.

6.2.2 Benefitting from Livingstone? "Boris bikes"

Despite these examples of Johnson's desire to reverse key Livingstone decisions, there were examples of where he was able to capitalise on his predecessor's legacy. This included the cycle-hire scheme that Livingstone had proposed immediately prior to the 2008 election. Johnson seized upon the scheme as an opportunity to deliver a transport innovation for the city. Indeed, one interviewee suggested that they may yet prove (if Crossrail 2 does not occur) to be Johnson's longest-lasting legacy (Transcript C, 2018:8).

The bicycles would be available for hire (by-the-hour) from pavement stands across Central London (Russell, 2008; *The Guardian*, 2010). By 2010, Johnson had managed to find a sponsor to help with meeting the cost of the scheme and it was launched in July (*The Guardian*,

2010). By October, national newspapers were already praising the scheme's success (claiming that the target of 20% of all journeys through London being by bicycle was achievable) and using the common nickname "Boris bikes" (*The Guardian*, 2010). Indeed, this nickname has gained a certain longevity. In 2017, when Sadiq Khan was seeking to implement a scheme for the gradual replacement of the existing bicycles with newer models, the *Evening Standard* (London's largest newspaper) continued to report the story under a headline referring to "Boris bikes" (*Evening Standard*, 2017a). Similarly, when Purnell released her biography of Johnson in 2012, she chose a photo of Johnson on one of the bicycles for the front cover (Purnell, 2012).

Here, then, was an example of Johnson making good use of his institutional and policy inheritance to form his own legacy. Though a first term initiative, it continued throughout his mayoralty and Johnson's public backing of the scheme not only gave it its commonly-known name but also gave him a further opportunity to claim that he had delivered for Londoners.

6.2.3 Crossrail

The Crossrail project was another endeavour inherited from Livingstone. It is a £14.8 billion infrastructure project – the largest in Europe – connect localities in West London, including Maidenhead and Heathrow, with East London (including Shenfield) (Crossrail, 2018a; Thomas, 2013). It is expected to boost employment within London and the South East by 30,000 jobs by 2030 (Butcher, 2017:3).

It was first proposed in 1989 (as a solution to Tube overcrowding) and a project-management company (Cross London Rail Links Ltd) was formed, under TfL, in 2001 (Butcher, 2017:4). Livingstone and the Labour Government sponsored the Crossrail Bill (2005-2008) through Parliament and it was passed in July 2008 (Butcher, 2017:6). The GLA's primary financial expenditure for the project will be £900 million towards the cost of the train carriages (with the remaining funding coming from private sector capital and central government infrastructure budgets) (HC Deb. 6 January 2014). Though, as Livingstone secured the government's support for the project, it has been argued to be his legacy, proposals for Crossrail 2 (running through London, North to South) were raised by the mayoralty in 2013 and became associated with Johnson as its advocate – though the scheme is yet to receive parliamentary approval (Transcript A, 2018:20).

As the building of Crossrail began in 2012, he was also the Mayor who (to date) oversaw most of the construction (Crossrail, 2018b).

Crossrail symbolised a wider trend within Johnson's mayoralty – luck in profiting politically from Livingstone's legacy. Nevertheless, the scheme still required a public advocate – to assure the public that the scheme represented value-for-money and would meet its objective (easing cross-city travel congestion) when introduced. To this end, Johnson was an effective figurehead. He successfully made the case for the line to be named the Elizabeth Line (after Queen Elizabeth II) (Jobson, 2016). He also advocated for the tunnel-boring machines being named after famous women historically-associated with London (following a public nomination process) (Lawson, 2012; Crossrail, 2013). Johnson was at the forefront of these campaigns, using his profile to both promote the scheme and ensure his association with it, in the hope of its successful completion.

His greatest contribution to Crossrail was the promotion of Crossrail 2. At each event he attended for Crossrail, the Mayor was careful to also promote the North-South route (Cecil, 2015). He argued that Crossrail represented an historic boost of thousands of engineering jobs (MacLennan, 2015). He advocated for these jobs not being subsequently lost (when Crossrail was completed) and that the expansion of the project would ensure continued employment for years to come “...not just in the capital, but all around our great nation”. (Johnson, cited in MacLennan, 2015).

These comments reflect a Mayor who wished to be seen as the initiator of another large-scale infrastructure project and also showed his increasing desire (with the end of his final term approaching) to build a political base beyond London. Recognising that the High-Speed Rail 2 (HS2) project (running from London to Manchester and Leeds) was divisive amongst the public, with polls (published during his second term) regularly showing that a majority of people either opposed it or felt that its expense should make it a lesser priority (ComRes 2013; ComRes 2014; ComRes 2015). Johnson declared that Crossrail 2 would be a far greater boost to national economic growth than HS2 (though failed to provide detailed reasoning for this view) (Collins, 2014). Such rhetoric seemed designed to appeal to an electorate beyond London and which also

had a need for more engineers and other high-skilled workers (UK Commission for Employment and Skills, 2013).

However, the extent to which Johnson truly applied himself to promoting this policy can be doubted. In 2015, he used his role as Chair of TfL to post letters, announcing a public consultation on Crossrail 2, to those householders and business-owners whose property lay along its route (Neilan, 2015). He was left embarrassed when he himself received a letter stating that the tunnel would pass 20 metres below his house (Neilan, 2015). He later admitted insufficient knowledge of the route (Neilan, 2015). He continued to advocate for Crossrail 2 but it was an embarrassing episode that highlighted the distance between his public rhetoric and his actual knowledge of the scheme. As earlier noted, Johnson ‘...operated by delegation...’ rather than getting involved in the detail of policy (as Livingstone had done with projects, including the Congestion Charge) and this may have been a factor here (Transcript C, 2018:13). However, this is not a sufficient excuse for his lack of knowledge, especially when one compares his institutional position with that of Livingstone. Johnson was ignorant of key details whilst serving as TfL’s Chair (effectively, alongside the Transport Commissioner, its most senior executive). Livingstone, by contrast, delegated TfL’s operations to Kiley and Hendy and, yet, interviewees were clear that he continued to be an avid believer in detailed understanding of policy (with one even commenting that this stretched as far as an encyclopaedic knowledge of bus routes) (Transcript C, 2018:5; Transcript A, 2018:18).

Whilst Johnson’s promotion of Crossrail 2 suggested a sincere desire to pursue the project, his lack of grasp of the detail calls his motivation into question. The project, especially the public consultation’s launch (2015), coincided with his 2015 return to Parliament and one can surmise as to these motives (Cawthorne, 2015:119). After returning to Parliament, there was speculation as to Johnson’s chance of succeeding David Cameron as Prime Minister (especially given that the latter had earlier named him as a contender for the post) (Asthana, 2016; Transcript C, 2018:14). Indeed, many commentators, such as Gimson (2016:143), have long contented that the premiership was the only job that Johnson really wanted. Johnson’s adoption of rhetoric appealing to a wider electoral base than just London, and his highlighting of national issues (including skills shortages) becomes contextualised in attempts to maximise his political appeal. This reflection compliments Worthy, *et. al.’s* (2019:9) view that Johnson was using the mayoralty

as a springboard to the premiership. Crossrail 2 can be seen as a strategic move to raise his profile, rather than a desire to place the mayoralty at the heart of further key infrastructure decisions.

6.2.4 “Boris Island”: The Thames Estuary Airport

Lack of sincerity in Johnson’s application to projects was noted by interviewees. One former assembly member alleged that the TEA proposal (“Boris Island”) exemplified this. They described the project as ‘Rubbish. Nonsense. Never going to happen but it enabled him to create...pazazz about that.’ (Transcript C, 2018:13). It allowed Johnson to participate in another infrastructure debate –South Eastern England’s aerospace capacity – and, consequently, raise his profile.

The issue of increased airport capacity dates back to the 1950s, when debates about the need to meet increased consumer and commuter demand became prevalent (Helsey and Codd, 2014). The Coalition government, elected in 2010, cancelled proposals for a third runway at Heathrow Airport, due to Liberal Democrat opposition (Aldred, 2012; Butcher, 2014:3). Johnson, opposed to a third runway (largely on the grounds that it might affect his electoral support in affected Outer London suburbs) supported this policy but remained adamant that increased capacity was still needed (Butcher, 2014). In 2011, he gave his support to architect Lord Foster’s plans for the creation of a four-runway airport in the Thames Estuary (Halcrow, 2011). This was not a new idea but, rather, the revising of proposals (dating back to the 1940s) for the building of an airport on this site (Helsey and Codd, 2014). Johnson supported Foster as it avoided considering expansion at Heathrow but still addressed the need for increased capacity. His reasons for ignoring Gatwick (which was the remaining of three options considered by the Government’s Airports Commission, led by Sir Howard Davies and established in 2012) were unclear (*Gov.uk*, 2012). He first proposed the TEA during the 2008 Mayoral Election, arguing that Heathrow should be gradually closed, due to contributions to high pollution levels in its immediate locality (*The Sunday Times*, 2008; Mayor of London, 2008). He subsequently instructed GLA officials to further explore the idea (*The Sunday Times*, 2008; Mayor of London, 2008).

Johnson was so closely associated with the project that its popular nickname became “Boris Island”. He appointed Douglas Oakervee, a civil engineer responsible for a similar project in Hong Kong, to conduct a feasibility study (Butcher, 2017:8). In August 2009, the Oakervee

Report concluded that further consideration of the TEA be undertaken but noted considerable physical impediments to the project (including the wreckage of the SS Richard Montgomery being located on the site) (Butcher, 2017:8). Johnson subsequently formed the Thames Estuary Steering Group (under the chairmanship of the former Chief Scientific Advisor, Sir David King) in October 2009 (Butcher, 2017:10). He used the opportunity of the Airports Commission to further his case, founding the Thames Estuary Research and Development Company (Testrad) (led by Oakervee and Bridget Rosewell, an economist) in July 2013 (Helsey and Codd, 2014:43). Through these formalised bodies and their subsequent reports, he continued to publicly make the case for the airport, arguing that its creation would avoid the need to buy sites on the mainland for its creation and that, thus, no homes would need to be demolished (Helsey and Codd, 2014:43).

The project remained controversial, not least on the grounds of the financial commitment required. Whilst the cost of a third runway at Heathrow was estimated to be £17.6billion, the funding required for “Boris Island” has been estimated at £40billion (Butcher, Ares, Midgley, Smith, 2017:52; Butcher, 2017:11). Also, Johnson’s *raison d’etre* for the airport – easing air traffic congestion and capacity – was questioned by Richard Deakin (CEO of the British air traffic control service (Nats)) in 2012. He argued that “Boris Island” was, in fact, in the ‘...“very worst spot”...’ that it could be in, as it would conflict with the flight paths serving Heathrow, Gatwick and Amsterdam’s Schiphol Airport (Deakin, cited in Topham, 2012). He criticised the Mayor for having failed to engage with the air traffic control sector in order to test the scheme’s viability (Topham, 2012). Eventually, when the Airports Commission published its proposals in 2014, the TEA was omitted (Butcher, 2017:14).

Such failure brings Johnson’s sincerity in proposing the project – and allowing his name to be directly associated with it – in to question. A former Assembly member, who was subsequently a TfL board member, commented that the TEA was a ‘...completely bonkers idea, articulated very clearly and effectively by someone Boris just delegated it to.’ (Transcript C, 2018:13). The person it was delegated to was Daniel Moylan (former Deputy Leader of Kensington and Chelsea Council), who Johnson appointed as Deputy Chairman of TfL in 2009 and, in 2012, his Chief Aviation Advisor in 2012 (Transcript C, 2018:13; Osborne, 2012). He was instructed to focus upon the airport as his main preoccupation (Transcript C, 2018:13; Osborne, 2012). Moylan’s other project was (from 2014 onwards) to oversee City Hall’s lobbying for Crossrail 2 (GLA, 2014).

Johnson's use of public rhetorical commitments to large infrastructure projects whilst, in reality, delegating the responsibility to officials and deputies fits with an interviewee's observation that he was more inclined towards the media attention attached to them than he was to ensuring that they actually came to fruition (Transcript C, 2018:13). Indeed, they suggested that Johnson never expected "Boris Island" to be a success and that his appointment of the '...skilled operator...' Moylan was motivated more by his desire for the appearance of progress than allowing the Mayor to attach his name to an ongoing public issue (Transcript C, 2018:13).

Of course, this point can be stretched too far. Bloomberg and Livingstone also demonstrated a willingness to delegate portfolios and responsibilities to deputy mayors and advisors. Indeed, this would seem logical, given the size of the cities in question and the competing demands upon mayors' time. However, it is significant that interviewees were often keen to highlight this aspect of Johnson's mayoralty and, along with incidents such as the Crossrail 2 letter, it leaves an impression of an executive with an amount of detachment from the daily realities of policy and governance.

6.2.5 Non-Transportation Issues: Policing

Policing and crime reduction were a large part of Johnson's policy platform in the 2008 election. Johnson focused upon this aspect of his mayoralty from early on. Within just days of winning the mayoralty, he banned the consumption of alcohol on the Tube network (Dawar and Sparrow, 2008). He believed that he could make public headway on law and order issues and did not shy away from seizing headline-grabbing opportunities such as these (Dawar and Sparrow, 2008). He was not without his critics. The Rail and Maritime Transport Union (RMT) publicly opposed the ban on the grounds that they had not been consulted and that, also, it left their members vulnerable to abuse when ejecting inebriated passengers (Dawar and Sparrow, 2008). The lack of consultation was an early sign of Johnson's occasional failure to adequately consider how to engage stakeholders when undertaking policy decisions with wider repercussions.

These policy decisions were, however, merely initial experiences of the Mayor seeking to establish himself and give a sense of early delivery upon manifesto pledges. Far more significant than these was his decision (again in line with a campaign pledge) to invoke the Mayor's power to chair the Metropolitan Police Authority (MPA). He chose to chair the 23-member MPA (with

statutory power to appoint 12 of its members) from the beginning of his mayoralty (HM Government 1999; HM Government 2007; Greer and Sandford, 2003:11). The MPA oversaw London's policing, setting policy priorities, whilst operational matters remained the Metropolitan Police's concern (with the Home Office having oversight) (Greer and Sandford, 2003:11). The Mayor also set the police's budget, in consultation with the MPA (Greer and Sandford, 2003). In 2012, the MPA was abolished (in line with the Police and Social Responsibility Act, 2011) and the Mayor's Office of Policing and Crime (MOPAC) established (Sandford, 2017:9). This, in effect, made Johnson London's Policing and Crime Commissioner, in line with wider national policing reforms at that time (MOPAC, 2018; Sandford, 2017:9, 19).

Johnson effectively forced out the Metropolitan Police Commissioner, Sir Ian Blair. The Mayor does not have the authority to remove commissioners (which remains the Home Secretary's responsibility). Johnson was able to systematically undermine Blair's position through a media campaign intended '...to make the Commissioner's position untenable' (Worthy, *et. al.*, 2019:19-20). He eventually told Blair that he would request a vote of no confidence, by the Assembly, in Blair in him if he did not resign (Purnell, 2012:377). This has been argued to be evidence of '...Johnson's most serious flexing of institutional power...', given that he went beyond his statutory remit and informally made it difficult for commissioners to continue without mayoral confidence (Worthy, *et. al.*, 2019:19). This is a prime example of a mayor using their agency to indulge in the kind of institutional stretch that Glenn Kefford (2016:512) and Michael Foley (2000:348) have argued strong leaders are able to undertake. Such leaders determine to find ways of moving beyond their formal powers in such a way as to acquire new authority that their predecessors did not possess (Foley, 2000:348). Whilst they may not enhance the *formal* power of the institution (in this case, Johnson did not succeed in subsequent devolution of the ability to appoint and dismiss commissioners), they do demonstrate the *informal* power of their institution (through showing how a strong office-holder might use their profile to influence areas where they lack statutory resources. This is a key example of what Sweeting (2003:466) referred to when he argued that a Mayor would need to rely '...on the informal resources of legitimacy, authority and profile in order to extend influence...').

Johnson's sacking of Blair followed the Commissioner's association with a number of controversies. These included the political fallout from the 2005 shooting of Jean Charles de

Menezes (IPCC, 2007). Following a subsequent 2007 ruling finding the Office of The Commissioner of the Metropolis guilty of health and safety breaches, the Conservatives called for Blair's removal (IPCC, 2007; Purnell, 2012:320). Johnson stated that Blair's position was "...untenable" (Purnell, 2012:320). Other controversies surrounding Blair included his informing the MPA that the operational costs for the removal of a peace protestor's placards were far less than had been the case and doubts over his suggestion that he had been involved in the 1975 Balcombe Street Siege (between the police and the Irish Republican Army) (Muir, 2006; Katz, 2007).

Blair was, then, a weak target for Johnson to undermine and use as a means to demonstrate his "muscularity" as Mayor. Ten days after his election, the MPA suggested that they would press the Home Office not to renew Blair's contract once it expired (2010) (Adams, 2008). On October 2 2008 Blair resigned, saying that "Without the mayor's backing I do not think I can continue in the job" (Blair, cited in Sturcke, Percival and Mulholland, 2008).

This creates an interesting precedent for the relationship between the Mayor and Commissioner. The Mayor still does not have formal power to dismiss them (Sandford, 2017). Nevertheless, the Commissioner being, effectively, forced to resign by the Mayor (the first such occasion in the Metropolitan Police's history) was a powerful image. Blair's implication that the Mayor's backing was essential to continuing in post underlined the relationship between the two institutions and the growth of significant informal institutional authority, on the part of the Mayor.

Blair himself stated this was a key step in Johnson's early desire to "...stamp his authority on the Mayoralty." (Blair, cited in Purnell, 2012:380; Blair, 2009:270-271). At the first MPA meeting following Blair's departure, Johnson apologised and indicated agreement with a motion suggesting that he had over-reached himself in relation to his statutory powers (Purnell, 2012:379). Given that this was strictly true, one may regard such a response as unsurprising. His apology was subsequently debased by his office continually referring to him as having fired Blair, even though this was not the case. The overall outcome was positive for him as it enabled him, at least in the medium-term, to convey a different image to the "Boris is a bumbler" portrayal that had dogged him prior to his election and, instead, appear proactive and decisive (Purnell, 2012:379).

6.2.6 Non-Transportation Issues: The Garden Bridge

The Garden Bridge proposal became a notable part of Johnson's legacy to the built environment that was both controversial and, also, failed to come to fruition. It was proposed by Johnson in 2013 and would have crossed the River Thames (from Arundel Street on the north bank to Queen's Walk on the south bank) (Hopkirk, 2016). The idea was first suggested by actress Joanna Lumley (McIntyre, 2017). Johnson responded positively to the idea and has since been described as one of the '...driving forces behind it...', carrying out the negotiations which led to a £200million funding package being agreed for the project (McIntyre, 2017). The funding comprised £140million from private donors and £60million supplied jointly by the central government and TfL (Stafford, 2017). The Mayor agreed that the GLA, through TfL, would meet the bridge's maintenance costs and cover funding shortfalls, in addition to paying £3million per year towards operational costs (Public Accounts Committee, 2016:4; Stafford, 2017a).

The Mayor failed, however, to adequately explain why the bridge (pedestrianised) was needed, given that it was located within 300 metres of both Waterloo Bridge and Blackfriars Bridge (Clark, 2017). In 2014, Johnson failed to answer media questions about the bridge, stating that he "...wasn't really sure what it...was for..." (Johnson, cited in McIntyre, 2017). This lack of positive vision may have been expected to leave it in jeopardy. However, later that year, Johnson used his planning powers to approve the bridge and suggested that its purpose was to "...provide a fantastic new landmark for London..." and encourage economic growth by connecting the south and north banks (Johnson, cited in *BBC News*, 2014). This was a flimsy argument given that Waterloo and Blackfriars bridges were already providing these links. The claim that the bridge would encourage economic growth also did not bear scrutiny, given that bicycles (including those used by commuters) were to be banned and, also, that the bridge was to be closed between midnight and 6am (thus obstructing any benefit towards the night-time economy) (McIntyre, 2017). This inconsistency of vision was further elaborated when Lister gave evidence to a 2017 enquiry (chaired by Dame Margaret Hodge MP), noting that "...it didn't start its life as a means of transport. It really came in more as a cultural idea." (Lister, cited in McIntyre, 2017).

A former Deputy Mayor identified the bridge as a failure for precisely these reasons – that Johnson had failed to sufficiently explain its rationale (Transcript D, 2018:10). They credited him with a genuine vision and desire for more green space in London that would provide leisure space. However, they argued that his lack of clear advocacy for the bridge, including by communicating its purpose and postulated public benefits, meant that it ‘...all got rather bogged down.’ (Transcript D, 2018:10).

Hodge’s review, commissioned by Khan, was damning regarding the lack of vision for a project that would have seen so much public money spent upon it. She concluded that decisions lacked clarity and ‘...were driven by electoral cycles rather than value for money...’ and that inconsistency of decision-making meant that ‘...the risks to the taxpayer have intensified.’ (Hodge, 2017:1). Hodge (a former Chair of the Public Accounts Committee) aligned herself with those who saw the bridge as ‘...a Johnson vanity project...’ which had been poorly-managed from its inception (Stafford, 2017a). Consequently, the scheme was finally abandoned in August 2017, after Khan withdrew the mayoral guarantee to underwrite the costs (*Evening Standard*, 2017b).

Without the bridge having actually been constructed, one cannot determine how much of any subsequent praise or blame (depending upon its outcome) would have been attached to Johnson. Nevertheless, the fact that it received such trenchant and consistent criticism – meant that the termination of the project was ‘...not a huge surprise...’ (Stafford, 2017a). Before Johnson left office, there was significant protest against the proposal – not least because of the fact that it would mean the loss of significant greenfield landscape and trees (Hopkirk, 2016). Douglas Murphy, an architecture journalist and author of *Nincompoopolis: The Follies of Boris Johnson*, has labelled this as ‘...ironic considering the whole raison d’etre of the bridge’ (Murphy, 2017:124). In 2015, a judicial review of Johnson’s planning decision (taken in conjunction with Lambeth Council) was granted (Wainwright, 2015). Though ultimately unsuccessful, the judge’s ruling was highly critical. Stating that the Mayor’s answers on the project were intelligible “...neither in terms of English, nor of what Mr Johnson intended...”, Mr. Justice Ouseley commented that Johnson had been potentially misleading when promising that the project’s public funding would not exceed £60million (when, in fact, they would also have to meet the £3million annual running costs) (Ouseley, cited in Wainwright, 2015).

6.3 Analysis: The Leadership Capital of Boris Johnson

6.3.1 Political/policy vision

Five individuals were interviewed for this case study – one expert observer of local government and four people who experienced the GLA under either Livingstone or Boris (or both). They represented various political opinions (two Conservatives, one Labour and two non-affiliated). It is therefore remarkable how broadly consistent they were regarding their assessments of Johnson's political and policy vision. With the exception of Johnson's former Deputy Mayor, all interviewees were either negative or, at least, sceptical about his vision's strength.

They were asked how they assessed Johnson's policy vision for London. Some were relatively succinct in dismissing the idea that he even had a vision. A local government expert commented 'I didn't think that Boris Johnson had any vision for London, particularly' (Transcript B, 2018:8). A long-serving Conservative Assembly member, suggested that Boris had no distinct vision and was happy to merely preside over '...the gentle flowing milk-and-honey...' of value-for-money and trying to enhance the GLA's profile in planning (Transcript E, 2018:5, 7). A former Labour group member (who served on the MPA and TfL's board during Johnson's mayoralty) formed the opinion that Johnson was using the mayoralty to demonstrate national leadership credentials and, thus, '...wasn't interested in most of the things the GLA does and so he didn't change it very much.' (Transcript C, 2018:8). This led to perceptions that Johnson's favouring of delegation was due to this lack of interest.

The other two interviewees were nuanced on this aspect of Johnson's leadership. A former GLA official summarised Johnson's vision as '...a bit more small-c conservative. ...So, a bit more focus on the quality of life but London was booming very heavily by 2008 and that's the stage...then you start worrying about presentation.' (Transcript A, 2018:19). This suggested that Johnson had no major challenges to confront during his tenure, being able to focus instead upon communicative aspects of his leadership. However, as already examined, the transport challenges facing the city during this time were significant. Therefore, it is not fair to say that because London

was ‘booming’ that it was also a city which Johnson could afford to govern at distance. On the other hand, the same interviewee commented that Johnson’s interest in quality-of-life issues, such as his environment-related comments surrounding Heathrow, may have been driven by a need to maintain electoral support in Outer London. Johnson successfully carried Outer London suburbs near to Heathrow in both 2008 and 2012 (London Elects, 2008b, London Elects, 2012b). There are grounds, therefore, to suggest that his political strategy, at least as far as Heathrow, had a certain astuteness to it, even if it lacked vision in terms of having identified realistic alternatives.

Johnson could be credited with slightly more than others were willing to concede as regards what he actually delivered. For instance, certain projects were begun under Livingstone but, nevertheless, delivered under Johnson – including “Boris bikes” and Crossrail (Transcript A, 2018:20). He similarly terminated some of the projects he inherited, including both the Chavez oil deal and the Western Extension. Johnson was successful in gaining new powers for City Hall (including those delivered in the Police and Social Responsibility Act, 2011) and, also, in shaping the Olympic Legacy in such a way as to continue to incorporate East London (Transcript A, 2018:20). However, all of these projects demonstrated Johnson’s reliance upon delegation. For instance, the policing powers granted to City Hall in 2011 (which were delivered nationally and not unique to London) were immediately delegated to Kit Malthouse (Deputy Mayor for Policing and Crime) (Transcript D, 2018:7). Large parts of the Olympics plan had been established under Livingstone. Johnson, delegated them to Neale Coleman (one of the few Livingstone-era policy advisors to be retained) and Paul Deighton (CEO of the London Organising Committee of the Olympic and Paralympic Games) (Transcript C, 2018:11; Transcript D, 2018:10). Another interviewee suggested that this reflected Johnson’s belief in establishing strong delivery teams and then not interfering in their work but it was very far removed from Livingstone’s desire to be intricately-aware of the details (Transcript D, 2018:10).

Johnson’s First Deputy Mayor argued that he *did* have a clear vision for London (Transcript D, 2018:9). Naturally, one would expect a former key member of the Mayor’s team to be likely to support him. The only potential criticisms of Johnson’s vision came in the form of suggestions that he would sometimes need to be informed of reasons why policies would not work in practice (Transcript D, 2018:2). This, they suggested, was one of the primary responsibilities of a Deputy

Mayor and they indicated that Johnson was receptive to this (Transcript D, 2018:2). Aside from this, criticism of Johnson's policy vision was limited. At variants with other interviewees, they were able to identify several areas where they felt that the Mayor was politically invested— with especial emphasis upon his efforts to both reduce knife crime and increase house-building (Transcript D, 2018:4-5).

In 2010, Johnson called for further devolution of powers, requesting increased '...control over franchising of suburban rail services, and the devolution of the Royal Parks Agency and the Port of London Authority.' (Sandford, 2017:9). It was not clear as to precisely why Johnson felt that these powers in particular should have been devolved. The Chancellor-of-the-Exchequer, George Osborne seemed receptive to this appeal, commenting that Johnson could also be '...helpful as a figure head in leading...' projects such as Crossrail and the management of the Olympic legacy (Transcript A, 2018:17). Thus, he listened to Johnson make the fiscal case for further devolution to the GLA.

Ultimately, the government merely gave him the power to make appointments to the Royal Parks Agency's executive board (Sandford, 2017:9-10). This reflected historic pattern of central governments not wishing to create over-mighty fiscal and political rivals within London (Sandford, 2017:9-10). The transfer of power retained the GLA's essential nature – a local authority whose remit was tightly controlled by central government. One interviewee, who worked in the Architecture and Urbanism Unit under Livingstone, commented that the GLA would be '...very much required to "keep in its box" ...' (Transcript A, 2018:4). Another suggested that this '...exemplified the distance between rhetoric and reality.' (Transcript B, 2018:6). The outcome was a prime example of what Copus alluded to when he argued that the Mayor must rely on influence, with few powers to enact a vision (Copus, 2006:14). With their role limited to producing official strategies in most policy areas (with only transport and aspects of policing and planning offering greater scope), the Mayor must be able to sufficiently leverage influence with external stakeholders if they are to achieve stated aims. Stakeholders include the national government, boroughs and police. Again, this highlights the accuracy of Sweeting's (2003) reflections upon how strong a London Mayor would be and their more nuanced revisions that they could thus offer, when viewed through the lens of this case study, of Svava's broader concept. This is picked up further in the Findings chapter.

Johnson's sacking of Blair is a case-in-point. He had no power to remove the Commissioner and yet used initial capital as an election winner with a large mandate to undermine Blair. By comparison, his failure to get government commitment to Crossrail 2 during eight years of office shows the extent of reliance upon stakeholder buy-in if visions are to be delivered. Therefore, mayors need clear visions from the outset if they are to successfully bridge gaps between influence and power. His dismissal of Blair was an early sign of Johnsonian moves towards asserting his authority over the institution. Nevertheless, the episode left a strong indication that Johnson's early desire was to demonstrate a keenness for early delivery (having criticised Blair in the 2008 election but lacking much policy vision, beyond removing the Western Extension and wanting to reduce crimes rates). By (mis)using mayoral power in this manner, he signalled a break with the Livingstone mayoralty and brought himself a greater profile with regard to how he might seek to insert himself into wider London issues.

On balance, the account that emerges is a varied one. Unlike with the LCI of Livingstone, it is not possible to identify a clear consensus around either the existence or nature of Johnson's vision. It is true to say that he was invested in Crossrail, the removal of the CC extension and, to at least a superficial extent, the TEA by either his rhetorical association with the projects (as with the TEA) or through the GLA's direct policy and budgetary powers (in the case of Crossrail and the CC extension). He also published strategies that indicated a vision. These included his 2013 publication of *2020 Vision: The Greatest city on earth – Ambitions for London* (Mayor of London, 2013b). This called for a range of investments and changes – from a '...neo-Victorian surge of investment in mass transport...', spear-headed by Crossrail, through to making London a leader in technology-based start-up businesses (Sandford, 2017:10). Indeed, the document covered various policy areas (education, transport, business, culture and infrastructure), some of which (such as education) lay outside of the Mayor's remit (Sandford, 2017:10). It was so broad in its scope that it is difficult to assess what the common theme of the vision – the linking "thread" that joined these aspects into one cohesive plan – was. As its title suggested, Johnson wished to portray London as the greatest city on earth but this hardly seems like something that any other Mayor would dissent from and is, therefore, not unique to him.

What is notable, however, is the extent to which he used opportunities to insert himself into debates that went well beyond his institutional remit. For instance, his 2012 speech on immigration (given whilst on a trade mission to India) was heavily critical of the government's proposed inclusion of non-European Union (EU) students within the migrant cap (Crerar, 2012; Swinford, 2013; Warrell and Parker, 2015). This would risk vastly reducing the number of non-EU attending London's universities (with a correlated reduction in money being spent within the city, as a result). Johnson saw this as a major issue and used his platform as Mayor to publicly advocate against his own party's policy in this area. In some sense, this is an example of what Sweeting (2003:466) meant when he predicted Mayors of London using their profile to extend their informal influence, to counterbalance the smaller number of policy areas for which they had a formal responsibility.

The use of this rhetoric to extend his vision beyond the statutory policy areas is another indication of his continued efforts to stretch his informal institutional influence. However, *2020 Vision: The Greatest city on earth – Ambitions for London* did not subsequently trigger further devolution in the areas outlined. For instance, where Bloomberg succeeded in bringing schools under the Mayor's remit, Johnson failed with this in regard to London. This leads to the question of *why*. Put briefly, it alludes to the earlier-mentioned tendency towards centralisation and a habit of "reluctant devolution" on the part of the central government. This, then, was clearly a major barrier to a Mayor's attempts to formally stretch their policy purview and, consequently, further proves Sweeting's (2003:466) point that *informal* institutional stretching would remain their best option.

It is not true to say, as three interviewees indicated, that Johnson failed to deliver any vision for London. His advocacy for Crossrail was notable, despite failing to get commitments regarding expansion. His 2013 publication of a strategic vision showed some capacity to identify key challenges facing London and make proposals for addressing them. His singular inability to create a cohesive commonality between these statements, however, meant that it is hard to condense this down to a clear, definable, vision. Tellingly, another interviewee (a long-standing Conservative Assembly member) remarked that '...I couldn't put my finger on a single event...' when asked what the Mayor's greatest achievement had been (Transcript E, 2018:7). This came from a member who seemed to hold no particular political grudge against Johnson (indeed, they

praised his ability to resonate with the public). They commented that Johnson had not expected to win either mayoral election and, thus, ‘...there was no great plan...’ for what he wanted to achieve and how he would run City Hall (Transcript E, 2018:8). This runs counter to Peters’ (2012:55) ‘...individuals within institutions...’ model as, though Johnson held office within a strong-mayor system, he lacked the political vision that would have inspired or driven an imprinting of his personality upon the machinery of government (as seen with Livingstone).

Connected to this are critiques of Johnson as lacking vision because of a disinterest in the mayoralty. This could be indicated by his habit of delegating. However, Johnson’s delegation reflected a certain savviness in terms of the specific people he appointed. Gimson has written (2016:xxx) that the Mayor was ‘...aware of what he lacked...’, including working a knowledge of local government planning, and so sought out individuals (including Sir Edward Lister) who could enable him to meet objectives (Transcript C, 2018:14). For instance, Lister (the Deputy Mayor for Policy and Planning) had a background in local government housing projects within London and was appointed by Johnson to oversee house-building (*Gov.uk*, 2018). He was one example of Johnson’s increasing number of deputy mayors, hiring people with expertise to oversee policy. Indeed, Johnson had, during his second term, up to three deputies at any one time – primarily with briefs to work on areas such as planning and enterprise (Gimson, 2016:xxx; *Gov.uk*, 2018; Mayor of London, 2013b).

He used his profile to good effect in advocating for large-scale projects (including Crossrail). Hubristic attachment to more controversial proposals meant that he was vulnerable to criticism for supposedly behaving ‘...as though politics is just a game...’ and being distanced from the realities of governance (Murphy, 2017:137). Such realities included detailed attention to managing projects – rather than just rhetorically advocating for them and delegating decision-making to a series of deputies and advisors. Benefitting from Livingstone’s legacy, his vision for Crossrail was sufficient to make a credible and well-supported case for introducing a second phase (even if this has yet to come to fruition). Other proposals, including the TEA and Garden Bridge, failed to advance further than ‘...whimsical follies stunning...for the shallowness of their conception...’ (Murphy, 2017:3). Interviewees’ consistent view that the Mayor lacked sufficient vision or interest in most aspects of mayoral governance – being instead preoccupied by an ambition to become Prime Minister – reveals concerns about how seriously Johnson applied

himself to governing, particularly during his second term. In light of this analysis, Johnson is awarded scores of 3 and 2 for each of his respective terms.

6.3.2 Communicative performance

All interviewees spoke highly of Johnson's ability to engage given audiences. One described him as '...inspirational...' and spoke of how he drew large crowds to public events, even in larger venues such as the O2 Arena (Transcript D, 2018:6-7). Another described him as skilled in using humour to reach '...out over the heads of the media to the population.' (Transcript A, 2018:19). An example of this includes his speech to the Conservative Party's 2014 annual conference. Focused heavily upon house-building, the speech was punctuated by Johnson producing a brick from under the podium and, addressing the brick directly, promising it 'You will not be alone' (Swinford, 2014). Such moments appeared to fit with Johnson's brand of unconventionality (see Dommett, 2015) and, yet, demonstrated a skilled communicator addressing one of his key challenges. Using humour and an unexpected prop to good effect, he ensured that this short excerpt would likely feature in news bulletins. He thus ensured that Londoners and the wider public were likely to see him discussing one of the key issues that the capital faced. Such tactics were common to Johnson's communicative strategy – with other examples, such as his appearance with a broom during the 2011 Riots, demonstrating this habit (Davies, Topping, Ball and Sample, 2011).

On the other hand, one can be a skilled and humorous engager of an audience without also being a good persuader. Two other interviewees (either current or former Assembly members) touched upon this. One agreed with the sentiment about being able to reach out beyond the media and acknowledged that Johnson was 'Bloody good...' at this (Transcript, E, 2018:7). However, when it came to the effectiveness of this, he concluded that 'You'd be entertained – possibly informed, but probably not...' (a point which he applied to Livingstone, too) (Transcript E, 2018:7). The other interviewee was more critical and suggested that Johnson's communicative success was based upon '...just the grand gesture, and so on...' but that he '...never saw Boris trying to persuade people. Whereas I did see Ken trying to persuade people. Boris let other people do it for him.' (Transcript C, 2018:14). Whether this perception was formed from observations that the Mayor's deputies (each with their own policy portfolio) were more effective at this kind of communication – informing and persuading – or due to a view of him as

disinterested in the mayoralty is less clear. These two perceptions do, however, suggest that the popular view of Johnson as a skilled communicator does not automatically translate into him as a successful negotiator or persuader. Indeed, when aligned with gimmicks such as the brick and the broom, they are highly suggestive of a superficiality.

A brief case in point would be the famous incident involving a zipwire during the 2012 Olympic Games. The Mayor, only recently re-elected, attended an event in Tower Hamlets and took part in a supposedly spontaneous glide down a zipwire, whilst brandishing two Union Jack flags (Purnell, 2015). Even Purnell was forced to revise her earlier opinions slightly and acknowledge that, with the world's media focused upon London at that time, this was the day that Johnson '...became a global brand...' (Purnell, 2015). However, she did caveat this point by speculating about, given what she believed to be the Mayor's disingenuous nature, whether the event was another staged photo opportunity (Purnell, 2015). It is now possible, as a result of an interview undertaken in pursuit of this thesis, to confirm that the zipwire incident *was* entirely staged and completely unspontaneous. One interviewee, a former member of the London Assembly and council leader, confirmed that the Mayor's staff had been present for ninety minutes before Johnson arrived (Transcript C, 2018:13). They suggested that this was evidence of Johnson's desire to get around a general disinterest in the minutiae of governing and, instead, focus upon self-promotion of his image and public appeal (Transcript C, 2018:13).

Dommett (2015:169) has highlighted how Johnson often used the "we" pronoun and language seeking to place himself alongside his audience in order to appear more connected with them. This links to Wood *et. al.*'s (2016:582) point regarding a key characteristic of celebrity politicians. By wishing to appear '...ordinary, imperfect, "everyday" and "normal"...' celebrity politicians seek to break down barriers between them and their constituents. In doing so, they are able to eschew more usual set-piece media events (such as interviews) and favour '...a rawer and less predictable mode of engagement.' (Wood, *et. al.*, 2016:582).

Johnson's motivations for pursuing such a strategy may have been two-fold. First, his background suggested anything other than the everyday – he had been educated at Eton, edited *The Spectator* and been an MP (Wood, *et. al.*, 2016:589-590). He needed a strategy that would help him to seem less of an establishment figure and, instead, as a "common touch" leader.

Second, his habit of delegating meant that he had to be able to engage with the electorate in a reasonably policy-light manner and, instead, portray himself as a likeable figurehead. Whilst he delegated much of the Mayor's responsibilities regarding the Olympics to Coleman and Deighton, he gave a much-lauded speech in Hyde Park immediately prior to the Games. Whilst 80,000-strong crowd chanted his name, Johnson used the rhetorical device of repetition by appealing to the crowd with words such as "we" and "we've" whilst recounting the preparations undertaken (Johnson, cited in Burdett, 2012). The speech was made in a supposedly impromptu fashion. However, Johnson had been invited to address the crowd and was, thus, well-prepared to make his speech (Burdett, 2012). It has since been dubbed his "Olympomania" speech, due to the way that it skilfully captured the mood of the crowd and their excitement for the Games (Burdett, 2012). Purnell (2015) described his performance as being akin to a '...revivalist preacher..' whose genius in communicating managed to excite the masses.

On the other hand, Johnson proved to be less skilled in more formal set-piece media events. He was often troubled by structured interviews. An example of this is his interview with the journalist Eddie Mair on March 24 2013. Johnson was repeatedly challenged on controversial aspects of his past. These included whether he had been sacked from *The Times* (who he worked for between 1987 and 1988) for falsifying a quotation, his lying to then-Leader of the Conservative Party Michael Howard about an extra-marital affair and an allegation that he had supplied a journalist's address to a friend who wanted to assault them (*The Andrew Marr Show*, 2013:4-6). He was challenged with a barrage of questions that ended with "'You're a nasty piece of work, aren't you?'" (Eddie Mair, cited in *The Andrew Marr Show*, 2013:6). Johnson failed to answer questions, frequently hesitating and trying to change topics (*The Andrew Marr Show*, 2013). Nevertheless, though Johnson was clearly discomforted by the interview, his satisfaction ratings remained high (see Section 9.3.3).

Overall, Johnson's communicative performance was notable for its ability to cut through to his audience. An appearance of a lack of conventionality appealed to a wide-ranging cross-section of society and gave him higher levels of popularity than may have otherwise been the case. He was the fortunate beneficiary of timing in this regard. As Flinders (2015:252) observed, this period was marked by growing disenchantment with the main political parties (whose long-term occupation of the top of British politics gave them the appearance of an entrenched political

establishment). The public were, consequently, giving increased attention to maverick figures who seemed at variants to this. Johnson’s ability to craft an image suiting this mood gave him opportunities to widen his appeal (based upon a less-structured media style) (Flinders, 2015:252). This allowed him to establish an image that was simultaneously unconventional and yet which also appeared to discuss issues of concern to voters (including transport, housing and crime). This gave him the unpredictability that Marsh, ‘t Hart and Tindall (2010:324) argue allows celebritised politicians to often resonate with a variety of voters. It would, also, explain why one interviewee characterised the 2008-2016 mayoralty as a ‘Boris Johnson mayoralty’ and not an ordinary or conventional Conservative one (Transcript E, 2018:6). Generally, Johnson’s communications were effective in achieving what this thesis argues was their key aim – to focus *primarily* upon creating strong followings for him personally and, *secondly*, policy developments.

He is, thus, scored a 5 for his first term and a 4 for his second, with the slightly-lower score being attributed to issues such as his outburst at the Assembly in 2013 (see below) and the criticisms of the judge hearing the case regarding the Garden Bridge.

6.3.3 Personal poll rating relative to rating at most recent election

Table 17: Boris Johnson Vote Shares and Poll Ratings

Election Year	Vote Share	Year of Approval Rating	Net Approval Rating	LCI Score
2008	53%	2012	30%	1
2012	55%	2016	29%	1

(London Elects, 2008a; London Elects, 2012a; Ipsos Mori, 2012a; YouGov, 2016a)

In 2008, Johnson’s margin of victory over Livingstone had been 6%, whilst it grew to 10% in 2012 (London Elects, 2008a; London Elects, 2008b; London Elects, 2012a; London Elects, 2012b). His ratings, barring the 1% fall between LCI points, remained relatively stable. Unlike Livingstone in 2008, Johnson was not seeking a third term in 2016 and, thus, poll respondents could reflect, when asked about their satisfaction with his performance, upon what they knew to be a completed mayoralty. In total, his first term ratings were significantly higher than those

obtained by Livingstone (18% in 2004), though only 2% higher at the end of his second term than Livingstone's had been in 2008.

The 2012 election came within nine months of the 2011 Riots. When polled at the time, 80% of Londoners felt that the city's image had been damaged by the riots and 40% indicated that Johnson's election prospects had suffered (Opinium, 2011). Johnson thus faced criticism regarding his handling of this issue heading into his re-election bid. Meanwhile, a poll just six weeks prior to the election asked voters which issues they identified as the most important (Ipsos-MORI, 2012b). Transport was deemed the most important (38%) (Ipsos-MORI, 2012b). 35% of the public chose Johnson as their preferred candidate on transport (with Livingstone on 31%) (Ipsos-MORI, 2012b). Whether Johnson's 2012 performance *did* suffer due to the impact of the Riots, it is difficult to tell. However, if this was a factor it did not have the overall effect of denying him re-election (including by a greater margin than in 2008). Both the fact that transport was deemed the most important issue and that Johnson polled higher in this area are significant. These two factors, together, indicate that Johnson was both ahead on the issue of greatest importance to voters and that he was not suffering from his predecessor's legacy in this area (such as with the introduction of the CC). One may tentatively (acknowledging the risk of over-extrapolation) suggest that this was indicative of support for Johnson's removal of Livingstone's legacies (Western Extension) and, also, that his assumption of the mantle of later-Livingstone projects (the bicycle-hire scheme and Crossrail) had been a success.

By 2016, Johnson was still held in high-enough esteem that a *Telegraph* poll suggested that he would beat Sadiq Khan (Labour) by 2% and Zac Goldsmith (Conservative) by 14% if running (Bennett, 2016). A deputy mayor (second term) commented that his communicative abilities gave him the kind of added charisma that engaged the public with his mayoralty (Transcript D, 2018:6-8).

Of course, Johnson's satisfaction ratings were almost identical to Livingstone's by 2016. In this regard, then, his ratings were not exceptional. This does offer some interesting insights into the standing of the mayoralty itself. In many senses, it relies upon an office-holder's capacity to connect with the electorate. For instance, the institution itself does not endow a mayor with communicative abilities – though statutory events, such as Mayor's Question Time, may aid this.

However, it is possible to argue that direct-election *does* offer potential for them becoming a notable figurehead. Given that the Mayor has the third-largest mandate of any politician in Europe, their institutional potential to be a prominent figurehead is well-advanced (Parker and Sullivan, 2016). This lends the office a key strength that seems inherent to the strong mayor typology. It combines prominence in public affairs with a strategic opportunity to deliver in key policy areas (including transport). As with Johnson's dealings with the Commissioner during his first term and regarding the Thames Estuary Airport during his second, this may well require institutional stretch in order to be seen as a more powerful figurehead than may otherwise be the case. Nevertheless, Johnson's final poll ratings indicate that this kind of stretching can be accommodated favourably within public opinion and enhance a mayor's political standing as a leader.

6.3.4 Longevity (time in office)

Johnson managed a full two-terms in office. Given the level of support for the idea that he was disinterested in most aspects of being Mayor, this may seem surprising. The fact that he sought a second term somewhat countermands the idea. Certainly, Johnson managed to find big projects and policy objectives with which to occupy the GLA during both terms – from Crossrail to the TEA. One Conservative interviewee commented that Johnson went on a personal journey, as regards his interest, during his time in office. They argued that he did not expect to be elected and started with a firm sense of excitement for the unexpected opportunity but that this then diminished as his second term moved into its latter half (with relatively little time left for new big projects) (Transcript E, 2018:5-6). The alternative view suggests that Johnson was not interested in the mayoralty but saw value in investing eight years into building his political profile away from Westminster, making him seem set apart from political contemporaries (Transcript C, 2018:12-14).

A long-serving leader may have time to both initiate and fully-implement the kind of longer-term projects that Crossrail exemplified. They will, thus, have a greater chance of their name being associated with the project. However, a leader who stays in office too long runs the risk of a diminished supply of leadership capital, having steadily eroded it through past negotiations and possible failures.

Johnson, however, does not fit either of these patterns. The projects that he saw come to fruition during his tenure (including Crossrail and “Boris Bikes”) were not initiated by him. The bicycles certainly bore his name in popular parlance, but were Livingstone’s legacy. Likewise, leaving office in 2016, Johnson left prior to Crossrail’s (then-anticipated) 2018 opening. Equally, Johnson did not need the benefit of a long background in the city’s politics to enable his undermining of Sir Ian Blair to the point of resignation. It was one of the earliest of his more notable actions.

As Crines (2013:1) has observed, Johnson’s ability to sustain decent popularity ratings using his rhetorical skill meant that he was far from exhausting his capital in 2012. Though temporarily threatened by the 2011 riots, Johnson managed to secure a strong mandate for a second term.

It is interesting to note the comments of one interviewee, themselves a former leader of a London borough council with regards to 2016. In office for twelve years, they reflected that they had begun to exhaust their leadership capital by ten years in (Transcript C, 2018:1). He remarked: ‘...you sort of run out of ways of taking things forward. ...You run out of steam and there’s a bit of you’ve done so many things and it’s coming round again.’ (Transcript C, 2018:1). He had been involved in the debates (in 1999) regarding whether the London Mayor ought to have a term limit. Though he agreed with the principle that there should not be – in case there were circumstances where it was prudent for a mayor to continue – he concluded that ‘...by the time you get to 8 years, anything that goes wrong in the city is now your fault.’ (Transcript C, 2018:2). This might well account for why Johnson was so distant from several key projects – for instance, stepping back from direct oversight of the plans for the Thames Estuary Airport. By doing so, he was avoiding the need to take potentially difficult or unpopular decisions (like backing extension of Heathrow) and, thus, preserving his capital sufficiently in order to be able to see out a second term. The fact that he achieved a rating ahead of even the frontrunner in the 2016 Mayoral Election suggests that his longevity would not necessarily have been a barrier to a third term (Bennett, 2016). On the other hand, his advocacy for the Garden Bridge did receive fairly trenchant criticism and there can be little doubt that this cost him some capital as regards perceptions of his judgement. To this end, his travails over the bridge during the final days of his

office may indicate that his hubristic support for the project had continued for too long. He is accorded scores of 4 and 5 for each of his respective terms.

6.3.5 Selection or re-selection as party candidate (margin)

Johnson was selected to be the Conservative candidate in 2008 (over Victoria Borwick, Andrew Boff and Warwick Lightfoot – all Conservative councillors within London) by a margin of 58%, with an individual 79% share of the vote (Siddique, 2007; Edwards and Isaby, 2008:53; Quinn, 2016). Given the Conservative’s difficulties in finding a candidate – even asking public figures who were not party members (including former Metropolitan Police Commissioner Lord Stevens and former Director-General of the BBC Greg Dyke) – this was a notably-large margin (Edwards and Isaby, 2008:45-53). It remains the largest individual share ever won by a candidate seeking the Conservative nomination (Quinn, 2016).

Under Conservative Party rules, he was not required to be re-selected provided that the party’s London membership did not call for a trigger ballot (Quinn, 2016). As such, his ability to stand in 2012 was not dependent upon a re-selection process. Likewise, he did not seek re-election in 2016 and, thus, no margin can be directly discerned here, either. In this light, it is sensible to afford him a score of 5 for each term, signifying the strength accorded by not being required to face a reselection ballot (consistent with the Livingstone LCI).

6.3.6 Party polling relative to most recent election result

Table 18: Conservative Party Polling Relative to Most Recent Election Result

LCI Date	Party Vote Share	Most Recent Election Date	Party Vote Share	% Change	LCI Score
2012	32%	2008	35%	-3%	2
2016	29%	2012	32%	-3%	2

(London Elects, 2008b:3; London Elects, 2012a; London Elects, 2016).

2008 was a good year for Conservative local government results. They finished 20% ahead of Labour (Tetteh, 2008:11). A national economic downturn and the government’s unpopular removal of the 10% tax rate left the Conservative opposition with much to exploit (Rallings and

Thrasher, 2009:53). This gave the Conservatives a strong electoral result, completed by Johnson's own success in winning the mayoralty (London Elects, 2008b:3).

In 2012, the turnout had fallen back to 38% the Conservatives' vote share fell 3%, to 32% (London Elects, 2012a). By comparison, Johnson's poll (51.5%) was nearly 20% higher (London Elects, 2012b). This matches what one interviewee, a Conservative member of the London Assembly, noted regarding Boris' loose public association with the Conservative Party's wider brand. They commented: '...we didn't have a Conservative mayoralty, we had a Boris Johnson mayoralty. ...Boris was running streets ahead of the party. So, people were voting for Boris Johnson, not the party.' (Transcript D, 2018:6).

Such observations match observations within the local government literature suggesting that mayors can partially detach themselves from party affiliations, due to the highly-personalised nature of running for directly-elected office. Indeed, London had already established a notable precedent by voting for an independent candidate for its first Mayor (Elcock, 2008:807). Elcock (2008:807) noted that such elections allow voters to rebel against entrenched party machines, given their primary concern with identifying the candidate who they feel will best-suit the city. This can mean that they encourage mayors to adopt individual styles that furthers perceptions of looser affiliations. Indeed, one Assembly member also reflected that 'Boris, of course, had no political hinterland. ...I do not believe that Boris had any kind of ideological vision, other than the simple Tory vision of less government.' (Transcript D, 2018:5). More recently, Bottom and Reiser (2014) have made similar observations. Arguing that direct election encourages informal consensuses to appear between mayor and citizen, they suggested that the need for institutionalised party structures diminished and change-driven dialogue could emerge (Bottom and Reiser, 2014:339-340). The size of the difference between party and mayoral candidate's vote shares, in both Livingstone and Johnson's elections, suggests that this may be true. Not discounting the difference in vote types (in short, one being a direct vote for a Mayor and the other a wider performance by a party at the national level), Livingstone's 2004 vote share was 30% ahead of his party's and, in 2008, Johnson's was 18% ahead (London Elects, 2004; London Elects, 2008b).

In 2016, the Conservatives were dividing into alternate campaigns in anticipation of the forthcoming EU Referendum (June 23 2016). Labour were themselves divided over issues of party leadership and allegations of anti-Semitism (Plunkett, 2016; Taylor, 2016). The Conservative's share fell by 3%. This was, in part, due to criticisms of the Johnson's Conservative successor's (Goldsmith) campaign as racist and divisive, due to its religiously-focused attacks on Khan (Hill, 2016). More broadly, the party's fall in share matched to its subsequent loss of the mayoralty.

6.3.7 Levels of public trust in leader

Table 19: Trust Ratings for Boris Johnson

Year of Approval Rating	Net Trust (Approval) Rating	LCI Score
2012	31%	2
2016	-36%	0

(Ipsos-MORI, 2012a; YouGov, 2016b).

In 2012, Johnson's levels of trustworthiness did not give him any distinct advantages over Livingstone. An Ipsos-MORI poll (published 6 weeks prior to the election) put Johnson on a rating of 31% and Livingstone 30% - well within a normal 2-3% margin of error (Ipsos-MORI, 2012b). 20% of voters said that neither was more trustworthy than the other (Ipsos-MORI, 2012b). Johnson's public image suffered in other areas, with only 22% of male respondents saying that they would trust the Mayor to take their partner out for dinner (Survation, 2012).

By 2016, controversies such as the Garden Bridge Project seem to have greatly affected perceptions of him. He is the only mayor covered within this thesis whose trustworthiness dropped so much as to be unrateable on the existing LCI index (hence the score of 0 awarded). This could also reflect other contemporary factors, such as his role in leading the Vote Leave campaign within the EU Referendum period, at a time when London was indicating a heavily pro-European character. However, this drop in trust is remarkable and suggests that, whilst his approval ratings had remained steady, the underlying picture was much less even.

Moreover, this offers considerations that need to be reflected within the LCI's design and, more acutely, with regard to the use of proxy data within this metric. Explored more fully within the Findings chapter, the specific question here is about how far it is wise to use approval ratings as the proxy for trustworthiness (when data is unavailable for the latter), given that Johnson presents an example of a figure whose 2016 ratings across these metrics were so far apart.

6.3.8 Ability to work on a cross-partisan/consensual basis

As with Livingstone, interviewees concurred that Johnson felt a certain level of '...contempt for the Assembly...' and largely paid it '...lip-service...' as regards its work (Transcript, E, 2018:5). Nevertheless, Johnson continued Livingstone's habit of seeking constructive relations with Assembly members, accomplishing this through two methods. The first, required by statute, was to continue the practice of drawing a Deputy Mayor from the Assembly. He actually extended the number of deputies by including others, such as Kit Malthouse (Assembly member), Sir Eddie Lister and Sir Simon Milton (former council leaders who also became Chiefs-of-Staff). This enabled him to delegate projects to more than one person. As the former Deputy Mayor interviewed commented, '...there was a great deal of...going out and representing the Mayor, frankly, seven days a week. You can never do enough, basically.' (Transcript D, 2018:2). It also allowed Johnson to move away from Livingstone's habit of operating with a mayoral cabinet that was staffed by just one deputy and a large retinue of policy advisors. Whilst Johnson certainly retained the use of advisors (such as Deighton and Moylan), his appointment of key personnel to roles which included the word "Mayor" was a shrewd move, as it allowed him to appear to be increasing transparency by more clearly associating these individuals with his office. As the deputy interviewed stated, this matched with Johnson's desire, dating from the beginning of his tenure, to see greater transparency at City Hall, following the cronyism allegations levelled at Livingstone over Jasper (Transcript D, 2018:9).

He seemed to acknowledge the importance of links with the Assembly by never challenging the Assembly member who became Deputy Mayor's status as the First Deputy Mayor. This person was the one who would have succeeded him as Mayor should he at any point have become unable to discharge his duties. To have challenged this would have required amending the 1999 Act's outline of the role of a deputy. However, he demonstrated willingness to alter the

functions and structure of the Mayor's Office with regard to other aspects (such as supporting the 2011 Act granting him status equivalent to that of a Police and Crime Commissioner). Thus, he *was* interested in altering the office's operations. Despite this, he chose to retain the strength of the link with the Assembly by never challenging the status of the First Deputy Mayor in this way. In some senses, it would be wise to do this, as an Assembly member serving in this capacity has multiple conflicting roles. They may, for instance, be one of the fourteen constituency members, serve on several policy committees and hold positions on the boards of some of the associated functional bodies (such as TfL). The Deputy Mayor interviewed for this research certainly concurrently served on multiple committees, which were often involved in scrutinising the Mayor's policy initiatives (including health, the Olympics and policing) (Transcript D, 2018:1-2). Given his declared desire to run the GLA on principles of efficiency and transparency, it is thus rather surprising that Johnson did *not* seek to at least dilute the status of the Assembly-member deputy. One can only conclude that he either found the chosen individuals to be indispensable or that he wished to retain the status of this close link (or, indeed, that both are true). Of course, this also ensured that he gained members of the Assembly who could be guaranteed to vote for his programme. This "payroll vote" included both Kit Malthouse (MLA for West Central and Deputy Mayor, 2008-2016) and Victoria Borwick (MLA, list member, 2008-2015 and First Deputy Mayor, 2012-2015).

Second, Johnson sought to maintain a constructive relationship with Assembly members, on a cross-partisan basis, by nurturing links with the individual parties. Whilst this thesis has not been able to ascertain whether this was true of his relationship with smaller parties, interview evidence strongly suggests that he made efforts to build relationships with the Assembly's two largest groups (Conservatives and Labour). Two of the three former members interviewed commented upon this, highlighting how he continued Livingstone's practice of making either himself or a senior individual from the Mayor's Office (usually a deputy) available to attend their monthly meetings (Transcript D, 2018:12; Transcript E, 2018:3). A former Deputy Mayor noted how Johnson was both challenged by the Conservatives to deliver his manifesto and also scrutinised by Labour regarding any areas where he was perceived to be hesitant (Transcript D, 2018:12). Such an approach offered the opportunity to engage with those who were hearing problems from constituencies across the city. They also allowed him to seem more in touch with

the daily workings of the GLA – especially useful when one considers the cited accusations of disinterest.

Johnson's working style was not averse to cross-partisanship if it allowed him to meet objectives, including when partnering with other tiers of government. On the Olympics, Johnson was observed as having worked well with both the Labour and Coalition governments (Transcript A, 2018:18). He was praised for investing in establishing '...good personal chemistry...' with both Tessa Jowell (Gordon Brown's Olympics Minister) and Neale Coleman (the former Livingstone advisor who he commissioned to oversee the preparations for an Olympic Legacy project) (Transcript A, 2018:18; Transcript C, 2018:11).

On the other hand, his non-partisanship could also betray an occasionally less consensual relationship with the Assembly. In 2013, Johnson came the closest any mayor to-date has done to having his budget rejected. Conservative member Victoria Borwick (also First Deputy) failed to arrive on time for the debate and, so, the Assembly momentarily had the numbers required for the two-thirds majority needed to reject or amend the budget (*The Telegraph*, 2013). They voted to avoid the scrutiny debate and move to a vote. However, Borwick arrived in time and, thus, a defeat was avoided (*The Telegraph*, 2013). In response, Johnson labelled members '...“great supine protoplasmic invertebrate jellies”...' in a an uncharacteristically-public display of bad temper. Consequently, he was asked by the Assembly to leave, though no further action was taken (*The Telegraph*, 2013).

Johnson was capable of working constructively and cross-partisan fashion when it came to engaging the Assembly with his objectives. He showed them a certain private respect by making himself accountable to their party caucuses and also ensured that the value attached to the Assembly-member deputy was upheld. However, this did not mean that he avoided displaying contempt for them on occasions. In light of this, he is scored a 4 for each of his terms.

6.3.9 Perceived ability to shape party's policy platform

Contrary to what criticisms suggesting that he lacked an interest in setting political agendas and then delivering upon them – his mayoralty saw him frequently venture into discussion of Conservative policy at the *national* level. He had previously been a frontbench

spokesman for both Higher Education and, so, had experience of policy machinery (Gimson, 2016; Purnell, 2012). Throughout his time as Mayor of London, he was able to use this to good effect and raise numerous policy issues, especially ones outside of his remit.

In terms of where he *did* have an interest, his advocacy regarding the Heathrow problem is a clear example of his having sought to influence policy. His opposition to Heathrow expansion was matched by a belief that London and the South East still needed increased airport capacity. Though the “Boris Island” proposal was not the most credible (in terms of cost or logistics), Johnson’s support of a highly-publicised and controversial alternative gave him a prolific voice in the debate. His name becoming attached to it further associated him with ongoing discussions – in particular, through ensuring that strong opposition to the Heathrow option remained in the government’s collective consciousness. David Cameron’s 2015 appointment of an apparently pro-Heathrow cabinet committee on aviation suggests that this opposition was limited in its overall effect (Gosden and Martin, 2015). Similarly, the opposition of the Liberal Democrats to any proposals incorporating expansion at Heathrow and the fact that the Conservatives needed to win seats surrounding Heathrow at the 2015 General Election (such as Putney) were as big a set of factors in pushing any decision on the matter beyond 2015 (Pickard, 2014; Topham, 2015). Nevertheless, Cameron ensured that Johnson was invited to Political Cabinet, after the General Election, to hear his views upon the matter (Gosden and Martin, 2015). Indeed, the final decision on Heathrow was delayed until after the 2016 Mayoral Election (with Johnson’s successor as Conservative nominee, Zac Goldsmith, equally opposed), in order not to cause an embarrassing clash between the Mayor and government (Moreton, 2015; Pickard, 2016).

Johnson similarly pushed for greater government attention on devolution long before George Osborne announced initiatives such as the Northern Powerhouse project. He appealed for more powers in 2010, though was largely rebuffed. However, he continued to make the case for the Mayor of London to receive greater powers. These included requests for powers over schools, the courts and property taxes (Hill, 2012; Crerar, 2012; Watts, 2014; Neville and Pickard, 2015). He was adept at using his profile as Mayor to raise this issue repeatedly throughout his time in office – particularly once his own party occupied government from 2010 onwards. Nevertheless, each of his appeals for these powers was rebuffed and his largest gains remained the replacement of the MPA with MOPAC during his first term and the awarding of a minimal

increase in patronage for the Royal Parks Agency during his second. Therefore, this section scores him 3 for each of his terms.

6.3.10 Perceived ability in legislative effectiveness & achieving outcomes relative to the declared policy programme

As with Livingstone, the institutional weakness of the Assembly left Johnson able to pursue his agenda with little hindrance. Though he seemed to be without much clarity in his vision, he was able to give effect to those areas that he did identify as priorities. A former Deputy Mayor was keen to stress the extent to which housing preoccupied Johnson during his second term. Commenting that he would use his weekly meetings to underline how central he saw housing as being to his strategic vision for London, they recalled him repeatedly asking ““How many more starts? How many more starts? I don’t just want to hear that you’ve done the deal. I want to know when the turf is being cut...”” at these meetings (Transcript D, 2018:8). This was, as the interviewee commented, ‘...a side of Boris that no-one ever sees...’ and somewhat counters arguments portraying him as *completely* without sufficient interest in pursuing a legislative agenda and policy delivery. (Transcript D, 2018:8).

Admittedly, Johnson ran City Hall by delegating responsibilities to Deputy Mayors and officials, who he then expected to run projects. The former Deputy Mayor called this, however, his ‘...“Make it work”...’ style, whereby he was not interested in being brought problems without also being presented with a report of actions already being taken to solve them (Transcript D, 2018:7). Another former Assembly member commented that, conversely, this was just evidence of disinterest in the detail (at variants with Livingstone) and that the delegation indicated two key points (Transcript C, 2018:12). First, that Johnson was not genuinely interested in the mayoralty but, instead, in raising his profile. Second, and consequential to this first point, was that his lack of interest left him without a ‘...real concept of what he wanted to do as Mayor and no real interest in the detail.’ (Transcript C, 2018:12). This meant that he actually needed others whom he could delegate to in order to ensure that his mayoral responsibilities were met.

Whatever the reality of this, Johnson did manage to achieve aspects of his declared policy agenda – from removing the Western Extension in his first term to continuing a strong advocacy for Crossrail throughout his eight years. It is harder to identify specific policies which were

delivered in the second term, though many projects were proposed (from the still-potentially-successful Crossrail 2 bid through to less realistic or praised ideas, such as the Garden Bridge or TEA). Thus, actual *delivery* declined during the second term, though this was due to a lack of sufficient policy content and a declining mayoral agenda and not because of conflicts with the legislature. Thus, Johnson is scored a 5 for his first term and a 3 for his second.

6.4 Conclusion

Boris Johnson's mayoralty undoubtedly brought him greater public attention and, if it had indeed been his ambition, gave him the vastly increased profile several interviews suggested had been his desire. Though not particularly connected with London in the public mind prior to his election in 2008, by the time that he left office, Johnson was one of London's figureheads and his leadership capacity owed much to this association.

His highest scores were with regard to his communicative abilities, longevity and reselection margin. His communicative abilities were a clear source of capital for him, with his adopting a habit of unconventional public appearances (zipwires, his 2014 conference speech and so on) in order to achieve the kind of connection-beyond-the-media that interviewees attested to. Whilst this came at the expense of better performances in formal settings, such as the interview with Eddie Mair, it gave Johnson a certain distinctiveness that allowed him to ensure high public recognition.

The scores for longevity and reselection need to be treated more cautiously. As reflected upon in the preceding two chapters, the score for longevity is based upon a hard chronology and, on its own, thus fails to offer a more nuanced understanding. In Johnson's case, this would require setting the high score against the reality of his notably low score for trust in the second term. This would indicate that a long period in office did not necessarily enhance Johnson's leadership capital. Indeed, the overall 2016 score is five points lower than the one registered for 2012.

The issue with reselection margins has, similarly, been discussed in the two previous chapters. The same broad points apply here. In short, though not facing reselection procedures which can be used to calculate a score in 2012 and 2016, Johnson had gone through a process in 2008. Subsequently, his lack of requirement to face a trigger ballot for reselection indicates a position of strength for him.

Johnson achieved his lowest LCI scores with regard to his personal poll rating, the Conservative Party's own polling and public perceptions of his trustworthiness. Whilst his approval rating was higher than Livingstone's at similar points, it remained low in comparison to each of his vote shares. In part, this reflects the more nuanced reality of a winning candidate

naturally gaining a 50%+ share of the vote in a second ballot of a direct-election system. However, both of the London Mayors examined within this thesis scored lower than Bloomberg (who averaged a score of 3) in this metric. This offers consideration for whether the London system hinders mayors in some way or, conversely, whether the Bloomberg, Livingstone and Johnson happened to all have individual factors that were the sole cause of this pattern. This is given consideration within the Findings chapter.

The Conservative Party's polling within the second of these metrics could actually be used to demonstrate a strength for Johnson. Whilst it leads to a poorer result for him when using a linear quantitative assessment, further consideration raises the question of whether this vindicates interviewees' assertion that London witnessed a Boris Johnson mayoralty and not a *Conservative Party* one. If this is the case, then it indicates that Johnson was able to reach beyond the negative effects of his party and connect with the electorate in such a way as to secure success. This, then, would show a core strength for Johnson, partially attributable to his communicative abilities and, likewise, perhaps a vindication of Wood *et. al.*'s (2016) hypothesis about the abilities and effects of celebrity politicians.

This, however, is to be considered alongside his poor showing in the trust metric. Whilst he may well have connected with Londoners in a way that by-passed his own party's showing, he remained dogged by low levels of trust. His 2016 score was so low as to require a new score of 0 (which further highlights changes that could subsequently be required within the LCI). Due to the use of proxies in the other case studies, it is not possible to state whether this would have been unique to Johnson. However, it remains a clear deficit in his capital and leaves the sense of a mayor whose connection with the public was sufficient to win two consecutive terms but which did not lead him to become the kind of figurehead who was regarded wholly favourably.

Johnson's capital has the largest range of this thesis' case studies. Whilst Bloomberg's had a range of 3, and Livingstone's 4, Johnson saw a fall of 5 points between 2012 and 2016. As alluded to earlier, this may have been affected by other contextual factors, such as the divisiveness of the EU referendum campaigns occurring in 2016. However, his most significant capital falls were in the areas of legislative capabilities and trust. Whilst trust may be accounted for by the referendum, the fall in legislative capital indicates, instead, a mayor whose programme was

becoming exhausted by 2016, with a slowing of his delivery rate when compared to the high-intensity of the first two years. This, in part, suggests a vindication of those interviewees who argued that he lacked real and sustained interest in the mayoralty. The fact that his highest score (discounting the longevity and reselection margins, for the reasons discussed above), was obtained in relation to his unusual communicative abilities furthers this. It suggests an office-holder who saw his mayoralty, primarily, as a profile-raising opportunity, with policy vision and delivery coming lower in his order of priorities.

Johnson's mayoralty inherited much from his predecessor. This included the GLA itself, which (as discussed in the previous chapter) Livingstone had been central to shaping. Johnson was, thus, not merely the legatee of certain Livingstone policies but, similarly, a whole model of governance. In this light, one might expect his capacity for institutional stretch to have been constrained by this dynamic, yet Johnson was able to move beyond this in key ways.

Nevertheless, Johnson's style might be best characterised as that of a chairman-of-the-board figure who set store by being more of a figurehead than the leader of a specific institution. For instance, he regularly wrote books and journalistic pieces, as well as giving speeches, praising the city (Johnson, 2011). This, in itself, is not particularly surprising for a mayor who wished to promote their city. Though serving variously as Chair of both TfL and the MPA, Johnson's lack of detailed knowledge of either his powers or the specifics of policy (for instance, suggesting that he was unclear regarding his powers over Blair and his lack of knowledge about Crossrail 2's route), suggests that he used the posts as ways to merely connect himself with general oversight in these areas. As stated repeatedly elsewhere in this chapter, his habit of substantial delegation (including through increasing the number of Deputy Mayors) suggests a frequent disinterest in the kind of detailed daily focus upon policy that Livingstone had exhibited. Johnson interpreted the mayoralty more as a platform than a job. This is not to suggest a lack of serious application upon occasion – the evidence of his routinely challenging officials over the number of houses being built attests otherwise. What it does reveal, however, is an individual who sought to use the title of Mayor of London as a means through which to expand his profile and political commentary, with a view (particularly later) to returning to national politics, rather than someone who was highly-invested in specific London issues. This offers support to interviewees who felt that Johnson did little to

change the GLA's structures, largely retaining the '...Livingstone operating model.' (Transcript A, 2019:5, 13).

In this light, Johnson was certainly an example of a leader who exemplified the rational choice model of agency in so far as he used his public profile to expand his influence in key policy areas. However, the fact that he remained distant from the *internal* concerns of the GLA, and given that this meant that he did little to alter its structures and operations, leaves this thesis forced to conclude that he was not an exemplar of Peters' individuals-within-institutions model. Rather, Johnson "piggy-backed" on the platform that the mayoralty gave him to expand his personal capital, whilst leaving key governance matters largely to trusted deputies. From this perspective, the GLA was merely a means-to-an-end and he expended very little time and capital on asserting his authority through it directly.

Table 20: The Leadership Capital of Boris Johnson

Metric	Measurements	2012	2016
Political/policy vision	(1) Completely absent (2) Unclear/inconsistent (3) Moderately clear/consistent (4) Clear/consistent (5) Very clear/consistent	3	2
Communicative performance	(1) Very poor (2) Poor (3) Average (4) Good (5) Very good	5	4
Personal poll rating relative to rating at most recent election	(1) Very low (<-15.5%) (2) Low (-5 to -15.4%) (3) Moderate (-5% to 5.4%) (4) High (5.5% to 15%) (5) Very high (>15%)	1	1
Longevity (time in office)	(1) <1 year (2) 1-2 years (3) 2-3 years (4) 3-4 years (5) >4 years	4	5
Selection or re-selection as party candidate (margin)	(1) Very small (<1%) (2) Small (1-5.4%) (3) Moderate (5.5-10.4%) (4) Large (10.5-15%) (5) Very large (>15%)	5	5
Party polling relative to most recent election result	(1) <-10% (2) -10% to -2.4% (3) -2.5% to 2.4% (4) 2.5%-10.4% (5) >10%	2	2

Levels of public trust in leader	(1) 0-20.4% (2) 20.5-40.4% (3) 40.5-60.4% (4) 60.5-80.4% (5) 80.5-100%	2	0*
Ability to work on a cross-partisan/consensual basis	(1) Very low (2) Low (3) Moderate (4) High (5) Very high	4	4
Perceived ability to shape party's policy platform	(1) Very low (2) Low (3) Moderate (4) High (5) Very high	3	3
Perceived ability in legislative effectiveness and achieving outcomes relative to the declared policy programme	(1) Very low (2) Low (3) Moderate (4) High (5) Very high	5	3
Total		34	29

* Reflects net-negative score.

7.0 Tea-drinker: Job Cohen (2001-2010)

7.1 Introduction

Job Cohen was the Mayor of Amsterdam from January 15 2001 until March 12 2010. Unlike Bloomberg, Livingstone and Johnson, he worked within a system that does not welcome strong, individualist, leaders of the kind alluded to by Svava, Hambleton and Sweeting (Svava, 1994; Mouritzen and Svava, 2002; Hambleton, 1998; Sweeting, 2003; Sweeting, 2017). Nevertheless, he too achieved high levels of recognition and even finished as runner-up in a 2006 poll (held by the World Mayors organisation) to find the globe's most popular mayor and was also one of *Time's* "European heroes" in 2005 (World Mayor, 2006a; World Mayor, 2006b).

Cohen's mayoralty was focused upon establishing political and cultural unity in a multi-ethnic city (one with over one-hundred-and-eighty different nationalities present) (Cohen, 2018:4). In an interview with journalist Russell Shorto, Cohen described his love of the city's international reputation for liberalism and freedom of expression, stating that "In Amsterdam, craziness is a value" (Cohen, cited in Shorto, 2013:14). He continually used the phrase 'keeping things together'¹⁸ to describe his efforts to achieve this. Many interviewees highlighted this phrase as emblematic of his leadership style (Cohen, 2018:4; van Zuydam, 2018:3; Gerritsen, 2018:3). This approach often led to criticisms which sought to portray him as inactive and, consequently, ineffective (van Zuydam, 2018:3-4; Gerritsen, 2018:4). However, with the Dutch mayoral system valuing a non-partisan and almost depoliticised office, Cohen's style was one which matched to the political norms of the institution. As one interviewee, who researches Dutch leaders' credibility, commented, '...Cohen was the prototypical Dutch mayor, in probably every aspect.' (van Zuydam, 2018:5).

This chapter seeks to understand how the restrictions placed upon Cohen, given the peculiarities of the Dutch system, affected his leadership capital. These restrictions, as outlined in the chapter delineating the thesis' case studies, include: being limited to the safety and security policy sphere; chairing the Board of Mayor and Alderman, without being able to choose the

¹⁸ Where quotations were originally in Dutch, the English translation is provided.

aldermen forming this body (which is, essentially, a cabinet); and not being encouraged to set a wider political “vision” for the municipality (as a means to containing their authority). In particular, it asks whether his relation to the office (with its stark differences from those occupied by Livingstone, Johnson and Bloomberg) affected his ability to accumulate and sustain capital. As with the other case studies, a consistent focus across his nine years in office is found through attention to a policy-based case study. In this case, the mayor’s responsibility for public safety and security has been selected. Cohen’s mayoralty did, of course, see him oversee a number of other issues – from conducting the first same-sex marriage through to attempts to render the red-light district (De Wallen) safer for sex workers (*The Guardian*, 2001; *Pink News*, 2008). These policies were continued by his successor, Eberhard van der Laan (Rhodan, 2014). Though mentioned here, in order to highlight aspects of his leadership and their effect upon his capital, they remain secondary to the focus upon public safety and security.

The chapter begins with a brief outline of public safety and security policy, including Cohen’s response to Theo van Gogh’s murder in 2004. Much attention is given to van Gogh’s murder precisely because it was afforded so much discussion by both interviewees and accounts of Cohen’s mayoralty. Cohen’s response to van Gogh’s murder was, however, selected by interviewees as *the* most notable major challenge (and subsequent success). The chapter concludes with an analysis of his capital.

7.2 Background to Job Cohen: Safety and Security Policy

7.2.1 Job Cohen's Background and Preparedness

Job Cohen's pre-existing legal expertise was of relevance to his role in safety and security policy. Prior to becoming Mayor, he had been Deputy State Secretary for Justice (1998-2001) (Cohen, 2018:1). He had been an academic lawyer and was the first Dean of the Faculty of Law at The University of Maastricht (Cohen, 2018:1). He therefore possessed certain cognate knowledge that complemented his mayoral responsibilities. As Karsten and van Zuydam (2014:6) have commented, such expertise can lend authority to mayors who (due to their lack of both election and wider-ranging powers) might otherwise seem restricted. This kind of authority is more often '...associated with technicians or scientists...' (due to its reliance upon pre-existing knowledge) and is, thus, an apt conceptualisation when used to contextualise Cohen's pre-mayoral expertise (Karsten and van Zuydam, 2014:6).

This background gave him a technocratic style as mayor and two interviewees – Sabine van Zuydam and Erik Gerritsen – both highlighted this. The implications of this are evaluated in the chapter's analysis section but it is worth noting that van Zuydam felt that this left him less able to connect with the public (Gerritsen, overall, felt that it enabled him to become a more reflective and assured decision-maker) (van Zuydam, 2018:4-5; Gerritsen, 2018:3-7).

On the other hand, Cohen entered office with a deficit in his knowledge of economics. Though van Zuydam argued that this '...was not the dominant framing of his mayoralty...', it is instructive to consider Gerritsen's alternative view. He highlighted Cohen's response to an inquiry into the over-running costs of building a metro line (the North-South Line). When pressed upon what role he had played in the project's financing, Cohen responded "'I left it to the aldermen and, after all, we are all amateurs in the end.'" (Cohen, cited in Gerritsen, 2018:7). On first glance, this was not an unreasonable response – Cohen was not especially-responsible for the project (his responsibility lay, in equal part, with the other members of the Board who formally approved decisions as required). The apparent artlessness of his answer betrayed a perhaps greater naivety – that, as municipal figurehead, he would be expected to seem accountable for issues of such importance. So, though Cohen was frequently described in interviews as a typical Dutch mayor (remaining above party-political matters and firmly contained within the limited boundaries of his

formal powers), he sometimes lacked a wider awareness of how to present limitations in a way that did not seem like an abdication of responsibility. In interview, he commented ‘...I’m not a professional politician...’ (Cohen, 2018:1). This was a surprising remark from a former cabinet minister, mayor and leader of a major political party. It may lead a researcher to conclude that he was a modest man. However, when I asked what his greatest failure had been as mayor, he answered that he could not think of one (Cohen, 2018:5). Such contradictions served as a warning that there are limitations upon how far one can accredit interviewees’ responses as clear and unmarred by subjective hindsight.

7.2.2 Job Cohen’s Attitude towards the Mayoralty and its Powers

Cohen was absolute, in interview, regarding his desire for the job. He commented: ‘...it’s one of the most beautiful posts you can get. Your political power is not that much but, if you acquire the authority, you can do a lot.’ (Cohen, 2018:4). This attitude towards the potency of informal power mirrored Sweeting’s (2003:466) earlier assertion about London Mayors relying upon their own ‘...informal resources of legitimacy, authority and profile...’ to extend their leadership and is referred to later in the chapter. Cohen referred to Amsterdam as ‘...a magnet that attracts people with talents of all kinds...’ and as one of the world’s most well-connected and diverse cities (Cohen, 2018:4). Most telling amongst his remarks during interview was his comment that ‘...if you have a chance, you try to become Mayor of Amsterdam.’ (Cohen, 2018:4). This suggests that Cohen was very motivated to seek the mayoralty. His comment about the restrictions of mayoral powers are interesting, showing awareness that his position was constitutionally restricted but still open to the building of personal capacity. His legal expertise gave him additional potential to build authority regarding safety and security policy. As van Zuydam commented, ‘...there is room for agency...’ to be developed by Dutch mayors and it is ultimately attitude of the individual office-holder that decides whether they can stretch their authority beyond institutional limitations (van Zuydam, 2018:5). Again, this reflects the bearing out of Sweeting’s argument, as established in the previous case studies, regarding the capacity (and often necessity, if agency is to be achieved) of mayors to seek their own opportunities for stretching their powers. In this case, it would seem that there is at least an indication of this point replicating itself within the appointed model.

Nevertheless, Cohen approached the mayoralty in a collegiate manner that was consistent with the Dutch system’s belief in consensus. Cohen was an example of precisely this type of

“bridging-and-bonding” leadership (Karsten and Hendriks, 2017). Indeed, it is notable that, during interview, he frequently eschewed the pronoun “I” in favour of “we” when discussing policy initiatives (Cohen, 2018). He was an exemplar of the ‘cooperative leader’ discussed by Getimis and Hlepas (2006:181) – mobilising wider civil society whilst conscious of the structural limitations placed upon him. This includes his working with the Security Triangle to introduce street coaches (mentors for anti-social young people) (Cohen, 2018:7). Cohen made clear that their introduction enabled him to seek greater involvement in daily life in Amsterdam, whilst remaining aware of the need to work within the existing framework of the Triangle (Cohen, 2018:7).

Cohen was conscious of the public’s apparent desire to have a closer connection with him, arguing that key to achieving this was ‘...being there if it’s necessary.’ (Cohen, 2018:6). This referred to the importance of being present when citizens faced difficulties (with his giving the example of visiting a condemned apartment block to convince the occupants to leave) (Cohen, 2018:6). He went so far as to name this as ‘...the most important...’ part of his leadership (Cohen, 2018:5).

As explored later in this chapter, Cohen most embodied his role-orientation *burge vader* in responding to van Gogh’s 2004 murder. As Hajer (2009:78) argued, Cohen’s objective (as part of the Triangle) was to respond to media pressure for authorities to react and be present within the community. Cohen positioned himself as *burge vader* by encouraging the populace not to react to the murder through seeking a repression of free speech and, thus, challenging the liberalism that Cohen felt Amsterdam embodied (Hajer, 2009:81). This matched to his desire to lead a harmonious city, where the Mayor set a vision of cultural tolerance that was symbolised by his slogan of ‘...“keeping things together”...’ (Cohen, cited in Hendriks, 2010:78). This was symbolic of Cohen’s crisis management, in which he sought control of rhetorical politics surrounding multiculturalism and public safety. This was what Boin, *et. Al.* (2005:69) alluded to when asserting that crises present leaders with opportunities to undertake ‘...a symbolic contest over the social meaning of an issue domain.’

7.2.3 Safety and Security: Context of Challenges in Amsterdam

Many priorities confront Mayors of Amsterdam in keeping the city safe. For instance, the capital frequently hosts football games attracting thousands of visitors and hosts an annual celebration for the monarch's birthday (often resulting in twice as many visitors as residents) (Cohen, 2018:7). The mayor bears partial responsibility for maintaining public order, including through planning for sufficient street control for highly-pedestrianised areas (Cohen, 2018:7). However, Amsterdam's main security issue is a direct result of one of the city's defining characteristics – its ethnic diversity.

Amsterdam has long been occupied by a variety of nationalities and ethnicities. In 2006, midway through Cohen's mayoralty, its 750,000 residents were drawn from 170 nationalities (Cohen, 2006). These multicultural differences do not always result in harmony. Just two years after van Gogh's murder (examined in Section 10.2.4), Cohen commented that '...it clearly caused much distrust...' amongst different groups (Cohen, 2006). It took action from the Mayor, aldermen and city officials (as well as the police and Public Prosecutor) to control the situation. This enforced Boin and 't Hart's (2003:547) view that '...crisis-response efforts depend on many people in several networks.' Keeping order is, therefore, difficult. As Prins and Devroe (2017:279) have commented, mayors' overall security objective is '...a secure, social and liveable city for all Amsterdam inhabitants.' This remains true today, with current Mayor, Femke Halsema, using her inauguration speech (July 12 2018) to highlight the need for multicultural cohesion (Halsema, 2018).

The Netherlands has, for many years, experienced a polarising debate surrounding community integration. As Uitermark and Duyvendak (2008) have commented, this unease has been heightened by a perception, promoted by far-right political parties, of migrants as rival economic workers. At the time of van Gogh's murder, far-right politicians such as Pim Fortuyn and Geert Wilders had begun to denounce migration, especially that from Islamic-majority countries (*de Volkskrant*, 2002; Tyler, 2008). Fortuyn, who had recently labelled Moroccans as 'hooligans', was assassinated in May 2002, whilst Wilders survived an attempted assassination on November 10 2004 (eight days after the van Gogh's murder) (*de Volkskrant*, 2002; Smith, 2004).

Though these incidents took place outside of Amsterdam (in Hilversum and The Hague, respectively), the capital, with its multicultural society, was a focal point for discussions regarding the politics of migration and integration. Van Gogh's attacker was a member of Amsterdam's Moroccan-Dutch community. This particular community has continued to be highlighted as one which presents policymakers with challenges regarding integration (including being subjected to racial stereotyping by the police) (de Koning, 2017:537). Since 1998, Amsterdam has operated a programme of Moroccan "community fathers" (*Marokkaanse buurtvaders*), who mentor Moroccan young people at risk of police action regarding anti-social behaviour (van Steden and Huberts, 2006:24). Nevertheless, Ian Buruma (2006), a historian of human rights who wrote an account of van Gogh's murder, detailed conversations in which Amsterdammers made comments reflecting the racial and political stereotypes perpetuated by those such as Fortuyn and Wilders, revealing the potency and reach of their politics. Cohen often spoke of the need to challenge such rhetoric and pursue a more pragmatic tolerance of diversity. In 2005, when interviewed about his response to the murder, he commented that "Islam is here to stay, in this country, in this city," "...We have to deal with Islam as a fact, not whether we like it. So the real question is how to get on with each other." (Cohen, cited in Simons, 2005).

This brief contextual background is included here as it highlights some of the context surrounding Cohen's response to van Gogh's murder. As the key political leader addressing public security within the city, he was responsible for articulating policy within this environment.

7.2.4 The Murder of Theo van Gogh

Van Gogh was a Dutch filmmaker and journalist, nicknamed '...the Netherlands Michael Moore...' (due to his penchant for producing political films) (Coughlan, 2004). His work focused upon The Netherlands' increasing multicultural diversity, frequently asserting that it was the root of social turmoil (Coughlan, 2004; Cottee, 2014). He alleged that Muslims were a '..."fifth column"...' (van Gogh, cited in Buruma, 2006:2). Logtenberg and Wiegman (2010:72), Cohen's biographers, have described him as '...het enfant terrible onder de nederlandse columnist en erkend criticaster van de islam...' ('...the enfant terrible among the Dutch columnists and recognized critic of Islam...'). He furthered the political nature of his work by associating with Pim Fortuyn. This led to him receiving frequent death threats but, despite Fortuyn himself being murdered, van Gogh dismissed them. Ayaan Hirsi Ali, a writer and politician who supported van

Gogh, recorded him as saying, “Nobody kills the village idiot.” (van Gogh, cited in Hirsi Ali, 2008:314; van Gogh, cited in Buruma, 2006:185; Foner, 2008:408).

Cohen was prominent amongst those who criticised both van Gogh’s work and its motivations. He has been noted as one of The Netherland’s most pro-multicultural voices (Vellenga, 2008:450). At the end of his mayoralty *The New York Times Magazine* profiled him (under the headline “The Integrationist”) and pointed to his support for multiculturalism as one of his defining policies (Shorto, 2010). On November 8 2002, he was asked about his attitude to van Gogh’s anti-multiculturalism and replied “I constantly lose the concept of respect” (Cohen, cited in Logtenberg *et. al.*, 2010:73). van Gogh responded “...respect is the stop-gap of the multicultural society, of which you are the anointing man. Everyone calls respect, as a legitimation to censor. I am an angel of innocence compared to the people I attack.” (van Gogh, cited in Logtenberg, *et. al.*, 2010:73).

In August 2004, van Gogh (collaborating with Hirsi Ali) released *Submission*, a film which used shock tactics to offer a negative critique of conservative Islamic attitudes towards women’s rights (Jusova, 2008). It contained imagery that was quickly condemned by community leaders (Buruma, 2006). Buruma summarised the most contentious images thus:

The first shot in *Submission* shows a woman about to kneel on a prayer mat. The camera slowly pans from her head down to her toes, revealing her naked body under the diaphanous material of her burqa. Later...we see texts from the Koran projected onto the skin of several naked women, texts that point to the submission of women, submission to their fathers, brothers, husbands, and to Allah. For many Muslims, this was a deliberate provocation. (Buruma, 2006:176).

On November 02 2004, van Gogh was murdered by Mohammed Bouyeri, a Dutch citizen with Moroccan heritage who had founded the Hofstad Netwerk (a Dutch radical Islamist group which Interpol defined as terrorist) (Hajer, *et. al.*, 2009:76-77; Sageman, 2008:39). Table 20 offers a chronology of events between van Gogh’s death and Cohen’s appearance on the *Barend and van Dorp* television show, when he was questioned about his support for multiculturalism and actions after the murder. It is unclear as to why Bouyeri chose this point in time, though it has

been suggested that it may have been intended to coincide with the holy month of Ramadan (Buruma, 2006:117).

Bouyeri attacked van Gogh as he cycled to work (Hajer, *et. al.*, 2009:79). The murder was brutal. Bouyeri shot van Gogh and then used a machete to cut him across the throat (Buruma, 2006:2). He stabbed the machete into van Gogh's chest before using a smaller knife to attach a note to the body (Buruma, 2006:2; Finseraas, Jakobsson and Kotsadam, 2011:396). Bouyeri was arrested later that day (Finseraas, *et. al.*, 2011:396). The note denounced Western governments' intervention in Middle Eastern countries, making explicit threats against the lives of politicians (Finseraas, *et. al.*, 2011:396; Cottee, 2014:981-2). In particular, Hirsi Ali and Cohen were singled out – the former due to her collaboration with van Gogh and the latter as the result of Bouyeri's belief that he represented an anti-Muslim '...Jewish cabal that ruled the Netherlands.' (Buruma, 2006:5). Ahmed Aboutaleb, an Amsterdam alderman who oversaw the city's diversity policy portfolio (himself of Moroccan descent), was subsequently reported to be on a death list, along with Cohen and Hirsi Ali (Hajer, *et. al.*, 2009:76).

Table 21: Chronology of the Theo van Gogh Murder

<u>Date</u>	<u>Event/Details</u>
November 02 2004	<p>AM</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Van Gogh murdered • Mohammed Bouyeri arrested by police <p>PM</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Press conference – Mayor, Chief of Police and Chief Prosecutor • <i>Lawaaimanifestatie</i> (manifestation of noise) demonstration in Dam Square
November 03 2004	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Alderman Aboutaleb speech in Al-Kabir mosque • Job Cohen speech to City Council
November 05 2004	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Representatives from “Friends of Theo” read an open letter to Mohammed Bouyeri on <i>Barend and Van Dorp</i> TV programme
November 08 2004	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Aboutaleb appears on <i>Barend and Van Dorp</i>
November 09 2004	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Theo van Gogh’s cremation
November 11 2004	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Cohen appears on <i>Barend and Van Dorp</i>

(Adapted from Hajer, *et. al.* (2009:79).

There followed a series of attacks on mosques and Islamic schools, which the media reported as reprisals for the murder (Castle, 2004; European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia, 2006; Cottee, 2014). The European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia

(2006:78) reported that there were 174 violent racist incidents during November 2004 – 61% of these involved anti-Muslim actions and 47% targeted mosques (European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia, 2006:78). Less violent actions included verbal slurs at public events and the distribution of Islamophobic leaflets by far-right parties and anti-immigration organisations throughout The Netherlands (European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia, 2006:78). Remarkably, however, with the exception of leaflets being distributed and reports of verbal abuse, there was little backlash in Amsterdam itself (with no schools or mosques attacked) (Gerritsen, 2018:6; World Mayor, 2006c). Though this point is returned to in the subsequent analysis of Cohen’s leadership, it has been cited by commentators and interviewees alike (as well as Cohen himself) as a key indicator of his successful drive for cross-cultural cohesion following the murder (Gerritsen, 2018:5-6; Karsten, 2018:11; Cohen, 2006; Logtenberg, *et. al.*, 2010:177-182; Simons, 2005).

Some of van Gogh’s supporters formed a group named “Friends of Theo”. It contained other prolific writers, journalists and film producers (including Max Pam, Gijs van de Westelaken and Theodor Holman) who shared van Gogh’s anti-multiculturalist perspective (Logtenberg, *et. al.*, 2010:157). This group sought to use their profiles as a means to pursue media opportunities after the death, issuing pronouncements that ‘...continued Theo van Gogh’s battle against “political correctness” ...’ (Hajer, *et. al.*, 2009:78). They directed much anger at Cohen, repeating van Gogh’s criticisms of him as a figurehead for diversity-supporting policies (Hajer, *et. al.*, 2009:78). Following the murder, Friends of Theo representatives appeared on national media. They appeared once on the *NOS Journaal* news channel on the day of the murder, twice on *Nova* (a “hard news” investigative journalism programme) and three times on *Barend and van Dorp* (a popular talk show) (Hajer, *et. al.*, 2009:79, 85-89). They became a focus for the “respectable” face of anti-immigrant and Islamophobic sentiment during this time (Hajer, *et. al.*, 2009:79-89). Their dominance by household names from artistic industries meant that their views gained a large public audience. Nevertheless, in December, over 1,300 public dignitaries signed an open letter calling for an end to insults directed at Muslims and suggesting that the murder was a direct reaction to this (Vellenga, 2008:457; *Open Letter to the Friends of Theo van Gogh*, 2004). The letter highlighted the need for greater community cohesion and how divisive rhetoric, such as that used by van Gogh, undermined this objective (Vellenga, 2008:457). Moreover, Muslim

community leaders condemned the attack (pointing out that its occurrence during Ramadan was deemed an unholy act) (Buruma, 2006:117).

The key reaction from residents came on the night of the murder. Cohen announced, at a joint press conference with the Chief of Police and Chief Prosecutor, that a “*Lawaaimanifestatie*” (“manifestation of noise”) would take place at Dam Square later that night, enabling a vocal outpouring of grief and in support of freedom-of-speech (Hajer and Uitermark, 2008:9). Speaking alongside Rita Verdonk (the national Immigration Minister, whose conservative immigration policies van Gogh supported), Cohen offered an alternative response to the murder. Whilst Verdonk recalled van Gogh’s support for her desire to see migration reduced, Cohen recalled Voltaire’s call to protect others’ freedom of speech (Hajer, 2009:81; Cohen, 2004:2). For Cohen, freedom-of-speech was part of the Dutch tradition of the rule-of-law and this appealed to his legal background (Buruma, 2006:246). In this case, he was using the previously-mentioned expertise to lend authority to his pronouncements. In this sense, his personal background augmented the institutional platform that he spoke from. He began his speech by underlining that, though disagreeing with van Gogh’s politics, he felt a responsibility towards, and civic affinity with, him in death. He stated ‘An Amsterdam citizen was murdered today’ (Cohen, 2004a:1).

Cohen furthered this sentiment in his address to the full Council the following day. Updating them on the investigation’s progress, he underlined his policy of supporting cohesion (Cohen, 2004b:4). He repeated his mantra of “keeping things together” and called for community cohesion (Cohen, 2004b:4). Commentators and interviewees alike have since highlighted the speech as a major achievement in setting the narrative after the murder, due to repetition of his “keeping things together” mantra (Hajer, *et. al.*, 2009:85; Cohen, 2018:6; Gerritsen, 2018:5-6; van Zuydam, 2018:6). Cohen outlined a range of policy proposals aimed at making Amsterdam safe for all communities. These included new strategies such as “Tough Approach to Youth” (aimed at reducing anti-social behaviour), depleting criminal infrastructure and financing security on public transport (Cohen, 2004b:4-5). Cohen summed up his approach thus: ‘Keeping things together by acting hard, yes, but not only. Keeping things together is, in the second place, a dialogue with the city.’ (Cohen, 2004b:5). The speech was not given much contemporary prominence, being seen as directed at council officials (Hajer, *et. al.*, 2009:85). This is consistent with a contemporary view of him as a mayor who spent most of his time with administrators (seeing them as the people he

needed to work with in order to fulfill objectives) (Karsten, 2018:11). It is remembered today as one of the key post-murder events in attempts to keep the peace, precisely because of its strong advocacy to “keep things together” (Hajer, *et. al.*, 2009:85-6).

7.2.5 Other Contextual Background (safety and security-related)

Cohen’s primary safety and security-related concerns were not those surrounding political murders. The wider problem of promoting harmonious living was a constant issue. Though he adopted his “Keeping Things Together” catchphrase from former Prime Ministers Wim Kok and Joop den Uyl, this was necessitated by the requirement to find a slogan under which to place his policies. (Gerritsen, 2018:3; Hendriks and Karsten, 2014:50). This was not just an issue of multiculturalism. It also encompassed substantial levels of anti-social behaviour, disorder and crime.

This was highlighted both during interviews and when examining Cohen’s speech to the Council chamber. Erik Gerritsen recalled an incident where Cohen was informed that many young people were causing anti-social disturbances within the suburbs. (Gerritsen, 2018:6-7). One family was ‘...driven out...’ by this behaviour (Gerritsen, 2018:7). Cohen faced media criticism for this – amplified when he issued a statement saying ““Yes, it’s terrible what happened to this family. But let’s not make it greater than it is because the numbers say, even in this suburb, crime rates are going down (objectively and subjectively).”” (Cohen, cited in Gerritsen, 2018:7). Gerritsen (city-manager under Cohen) recalled that this may have been statistically-accurate but it left Cohen open to allegations of being out-of-touch (Gerritsen, 2018:7). Resodihardjo, van Eijk and Carroll (2012:236) have detailed (regarding the Hoek van Holland Riot of August 2009) how one misguided comment – in their case, by the Chief of Police – can exacerbate situation causing deterioration in relations between civic authorities and citizens. In this case, Cohen’s rhetoric failed to reflect his theme of cohesion (undermining his belief in the importance of ‘...being there...’ for Amsterdammers) and risked causing new divisions (though the media backlash was short-lived) (Cohen, 2018:6; Gerritsen, 2018:7).

Cohen also took high-profile actions in regulating the sex trade. Amsterdam has a long-established sex industry. One of the first by-laws passed by the City of Amsterdam authority (in 1413) stated, in language very much of its time, that ““...whores are necessary in big cities and

especially in cities of commerce such as ours.... ...because the holy church tolerates whores on good grounds, for these reasons the court and sheriff of Amsterdam shall not entirely forbid the keeping of brothels.” (City of Amsterdam, cited in Brants, 1998:621). Though the Dutch only legalised prostitution formally in 2000, legal permissiveness such as this earlier statute embodied what Brants (1998:621) called ‘...the fine art of Dutch pragmatic tolerance.’ (Shorto, 2013:339). There are approximately 5000-7,500 licensed prostitutes working across the city’s red-light districts and is a major tourist attraction within the city (worth \$100million per year) (Shorto, 2013:14; Simons, 2008). Shorto (2013:5) records how most Amsterdammers treat it much in the way as they do any ‘...storefront business.’ This liberal tolerance is classified as “*gedogan*” (“technically illegal but officially tolerated”) (Shorto, 2013:15).

However, for decades the city’s government had been concerned about links between prostitution and organised crime, especially about the effect that this had upon Amsterdam’s reputation (Brants, 1998:621). The issue of low-level crime and public nuisances (‘...littering, urinating in public, producing noise...or driving in circles in the area...’) associated with high-street brothels had become a larger-scale issue which mayors were beginning to confront internationally (Kantola and Squires, 2004:77-78; Boels and Verhage, 2016:44). Cohen introduced reforms aimed at making red-light districts both safer and less open to organised crime and human-trafficking.

In 2004, he launched the “I Amsterdam” campaign, essentially an effort in political and economic rebranding of the city (City of Amsterdam, 2004). This was to be achieved by investing time, human resources and public finance into projects aimed at regenerating areas of the city that both attracted tourists but, also, contained vulnerable workers and residents (Neuts, Devos and Dirckx, 2014:38). This included thousands of sex workers. The campaign had plans for the economic, cultural and justice-related redevelopment of Amsterdam (which continued long after Cohen left office) (Neuts, *et. al.*, 2014:38-39). In the final full year of his mayoralty (2009), the Mayor and aldermen introduced *Plan 1012*, which focused upon the historic city centre, where most of the red-light districts were located (City of Amsterdam, 2009a). Its aims were:

1. Remove criminal infrastructure (including criminally-owned clubs and narcotics “cafes”);
2. Reducing the ‘...concentration of criminogenic and low-quality enterprises...’; and

3. 'realising a qualitative and diverse entry area' (aimed at controlling the flow of tourists into the district).

(Neuts, *et. al.*, 2014:39; City of Amsterdam, 2009b).

Plan 1012 was a further stage in Cohen's efforts to regenerate the district. In 2007, Cohen began to revoke licenses for brothels which police suspected were part of criminal infrastructure (Hawley, 2007; Simons, 2008). This was facilitated by the stricter enforcement of a 2002 Act of Parliament (Public Administration Probity in Decision-Making Act) that came into effect in June 2003 and which required businesses to submit detailed records in renewing trading licences (*Dutch Amsterdam*, 2003; Hawley, 2007). Cohen approved replacing them with non-sex industry-related shops, including clothing stores and restaurants (Simons, 2008). In 2008, he commented "We're not banning prostitution, but we are cutting back on the whole circuit: the gambling halls, the pimps, the money laundering." (Cohen, cited in Simons, 2008). He raised concerns that women were being trafficked and a council member (Karina Schaapman, who had previously worked as a prostitute) published a report claiming that up to 75% of women working in the district were both from abroad and highly likely to have been trafficking victims (Simons, 2008). Within the first year of the policy's operation, 52 brothels were closed (one third of the total), after the revoking of their licence was revoked (Hawley, 2007; Asthana, 2007; Simons, 2008).

The policy was not universally-acclaimed. Aalbers and Sabat (2012) have written about how several residents saw the policy as gentrification. This seems to have arisen after the city struck a multi-million-Euro deal with the existing owner of shop fronts – real estate owner Charlie Geerts – in order to close them (Hawley, 2007). Geerts originally opposed the planned closures but subsequently signed a deal allowing him to sell the premises to a publicly-owned housing corporation for €25million (Hawley, 2007). As Aalbers *et. al.* (2012:126-7) concluded, policies aimed at helping vulnerable workers can sometimes become rebranding exercises that gentrify cities and marginalise those self-same workers. Cohen's policy was also criticised by those working in the sex trade. Whilst many were reported as looking favourably upon his desire to reduce criminality and increase safety, they felt that the Mayor had missed a key issue. This was that reducing the number of brothels served to increase prices (following the reduced supply), meaning that criminal gangs received higher premiums from the remaining workers (Asthana, 2007; Simons, 2008).

Other challenges addressed by Cohen in relation to safety and security included increasing urban accessibility for the disabled and managing large public events. He claimed in 2005 that he had become aware of how much the former was an issue when attempting to push his wife's wheelchair around Amsterdam (Simons, 2005). The city had more than 1,200 bridges and was described, due to its narrow canal-side streets (laid out in concentric semi-circular patterns) as '...a pokey place...' by Shorto (2013:353). Cohen thus used *Plan 1012* to require developers to consider accessibility (including through widening pavements) when undertaking projects (City of Amsterdam, 2009b).

Local safety policies are now created and enacted in an almost horizontal relational hierarchy that brings together various '...public, private and societal actors...' who '...dominate the governance of the local public safety scene.' (Prins, 2016:27). This is apparent in the management of large public events, where physical access and the maintenance of law-and-order are essential to ensuring that critical incidents (including fights, people being crushed against one another and the trapping of groups in unsafe localities) are avoided (Martella, Li, Conrado and Vermeeren, 2017). For Cohen, the majority of this issue centred around events such as the Queen's annual birthday celebration, the annual Gay Pride festival and football matches (Cohen, 2018:7-8).

7.2.6 Other Contextual Background (non-safety and security-related)

Brief consideration is given here to issues drawn from interviewees' comments regarding their perceptions of major successes or failures for Cohen. Not all of these are considered. For instance, Erik Gerritsen and Sabine van Zuydam both highlighted his acceptance of the leadership of the Labour Party (which triggered his leaving office as Mayor) as a key failure, given that he went on to lose an election that he was expected to win (Gerritsen, 2018:6; van Zuydam, 2018:4). This was, however, not a failure of judgement that directly impacted upon his mayoralty (other than ending his tenure) and is not considered here. Other issues were raised which are of relevance. They included the North-to-South metro line through Amsterdam and the conducting of gay marriage ceremonies.

The Noord-Zuid Lijn (North-South Line) metro rail has long been discussed within Amsterdam. The proposed line runs for ten kilometres, allowing passengers to cross the city in fifteen minutes

(iamsterdam, 2018). Work began in 2002, with completion intended for 2011 (eventually finished in July 2018) (DutchNews.nl, 2018; Halsema, 2018). The project's costs rose from €1.4billion to €3.1billion and it was delayed eight times (iamsterdam.nl, 2018). The delays resulted from difficulties in the tunnelling phase and two incidences of subsidence (2008) (Metro Report International, 2018). The project was criticised as lacking ambition – with Coen Teulings (head of the government's macro-economic analysis unit) arguing that its coverage of merely the centre of the city, not outer suburbs (Buitenveldert and Amstelveen), left it representing poor value-for-money (Teulings, cited in DutchNews.nl, 2018). The service's regularity was also criticised. Whilst London Underground's central-zone trains stop every two minutes, the Noord-Zuid Lijn only achieves one every fifteen minutes (DutchNews.nl, 2018).

Whilst Cohen, as Mayor, was not responsible for the project's oversight (with this being the concern of aldermen and officials), it led to one of his more apparent failures of communication. Cohen appeared before a 2009 inquiry held to establish the cause of delays and cost overruns (Gerritsen, 2018:7; *Het Parool*, 2009a). The inquiry discovered that project managers, in collaboration with civic authorities, had budgeted for a mere 4% overrun (with the eventual figure transpiring as more than twice the original allocation) (*Het Parool*, 2009b). The 4% figure was totally anomalous when compared to average cost overruns for similar-sized projects. A study by Cantarelli, Molin, van Wee and Flyvbjerg (2013:49) found that the average was actually 16.5%. Though these statistics and cost were not available at the time of the inquiry, its report was deeply critical of what it deemed to be a poorly-managed project that would continue to face financial escalations as its team worked to resolve construction issues (*Het Parool*, 2009b). In this context, one can see how Cohen's excusing project's failures with "I left it to the alderman and, after all, we are all amateurs in the end" was received badly by the media (Cohen, cited in Gerritsen, 2018:7; *Het Parool*, 2009a; *Het Parool*, 2009b). This continued to be the case when, in the months following the inquiry, several residences collapsed due to ongoing subsidence (ten Wolde, 2009).

More positively, Cohen was the first office-holder anywhere in the world to conduct a same-sex marriage (*The Guardian*, 2001). Whilst civil same-sex partnerships had been available for some time, legislation passed through the Dutch parliament (with Cohen being one of the responsible ministers at that time) was the first to permit marriage (*New York Times*, 2000;

Trandafir, 2014). On April 2 2001, Cohen married 4 same-sex couples in the council's chambers, telling them "There are two reasons to rejoice: you are celebrating your marriage and you are also celebrating your right to be married" (Cohen, cited in *The Guardian*, 2001). Cohen was, thus, not merely concerned with the economic and political benefits of amplifying Amsterdam's international liberal reputation but was, also, keen to associate himself with the related social and cultural aspects (Kollman, 2017).

7.3 Analysis

The following section analyses Job Cohen leadership capital by examining his skills-based, relational and reputational capital. This keeps it in line with the theoretical underpinnings of the LCI in its original conceptualisation, whilst adapting it in order to remove the focus on metrics (for the reasons outlined in the Methods chapter) (Bennister, *et. al.*, 2015).

7.3.1 Skills Capital

Cohen's background in the law and public administration placed him in a promising position. His time in government (as a justice minister who had considered questions of migrant integration and gay rights), also left him with experience of some of issues that he would need to address. His interview responses gave some sense of this, highlighting that he regarded himself as a non-politician (Cohen, 2018:1). From 1993 until 1994, he was an education minister in Ruud Lubbers government but soon returned to academia (Logtenberg, *et. al.*, 2010:55). By the time that he became Mayor, he had returned to politics, full-time, for 6 years (holding national-level ministries). Despite his own retrospective view, we may thus confidently regard him as someone whom the public would have recognised as a professional politician by 2001. Moreover, his interview responses were not always consistent with this self-evaluative perception that he was a non-politician. When asked to suggest what his greatest failure might have been, he replied that he did not know and must thus '...have to answer like a politician.' (Cohen, 2018:5).

This leads to consideration of Cohen's adaptability. As was discussed in the Introduction's consideration of the context of each mayoralty under examination, Dutch mayors are required to approach their role in a more consensual way than many of their international counterparts. This institutional restriction means that there is no room for the almost command-and-control authority of Bloomberg or the potentially assembly-circumventing London Mayors. Cohen was compelled to undertake a more collaborative style of leadership that placed him in close partnership with not just internal stakeholders (the aldermen and council) but external ones, too (including the Police Chief and Office of the Chief Prosecutor). This is the '...consensual democracy and organistic relationships between levels of government...' that Schaap (2009:149) referred to. Thus, one of Dutch mayors' key skills is also relational in its composition – the ability to collaborate in implementing policy and providing leadership when responding to events. This does not mean

that American or English mayors are without the need for this skill (Johnson's need to engage stakeholders when advocating for Crossrail is a case in point). The difference with Dutch mayors is that they are not the *centre* of such efforts. Even in safety and security policy, mayors are required to act within institutional structures (the Security Triangle) that force them to dilute and share power.

Cohen's strategy for navigating this was alluded to in a 2006 online article that accompanied his award from World Mayor. An Amsterdammer asked him about whether he thought that his office would gain greater authority if directly-elected (World Mayor, 2006c). Cohen answered that, whilst direct election would give mayors greater power (due to having a popular mandate), such a reform would not increase individual authority (Cohen, cited in World Mayor, 2006c). He argued that "Power is formal, authority informal" and that a person possessing authority "...is trusted, someone people think is the right person in the right place, who will mostly take the right decisions." (Cohen, cited in World Mayor, 2006c). This offers an interesting conceptualisation of authority (as a characteristic or attribute coming from informal sources) that can be accommodated within the theoretical underpinnings of Bennis, *et. al.*'s (2015) view of leadership capital's origins. For Cohen, it comes from the three key pillars – skills (someone who will take the correct decisions), relational aspects (a trusted person) and reputational elements (a leader who followers think is right for the time). This, therefore, is an insight into Cohen's understanding of leadership capital as something that can be used to facilitate greater levels of authority. In his view, this draws from more informal sources. It follows that this may be an area where he was able to adapt to obtain authority within given contexts.

The greatest *individual* example of Cohen seeking to exemplify was his response to van Gogh's murder. It is one of the most frequently-discussed events of his tenure and demonstrated how appointed leaders could utilise unexpected events to further their visions. Of course, "political vision" must be taken as a more informal term – whilst Dutch mayors are required to set security policy agendas, expanding this into personalised formal visions is outside of the constraining governance culture. Nevertheless, Cohen's response to the murder exemplified mayors' capacity for informal "visioning". He was able to use meaning-making in order to reassert his well-known concept of Amsterdam as liberal and tolerant. Here, meaning-making is defined as the process whereby leaders shape '...people's understanding of a crisis...' in order to obtain

support for policies (Boin, *et. al.*, 2005:69). As Boin, *et. al.* (2005:70) revealed, leaders undertaking meaning-making frequently seek to ‘...coalesce and compete with other political actors in shaping the public’s view of the crisis.’

Cohen’s earlier advocacy of pluralist attitudes towards integration served as a base from which to build his rhetoric and gave his appeal to keep things together the feel of authenticity. A more authentic air is a booster to authority – as followers are more likely to trust leaders who appear to have higher integrity (*European University Institute*, 2008).

Cohen furthered this by being willing to both coalesce and compete with other politicians and governance partners in his response. The press conference (4 hours after the murder) with the other Security Triangle representatives was the first aspect of this. Motivated by needing “‘to be seen’”, matching Cohen’s comments regarding the importance of ‘being there’, they took the risk of holding a press conference ‘...when not all information was available or verified.’ (Hajer, 2009:78; Cohen, 2018:6). Cohen left the Police Chief and Chief Prosecutor to answer factual questions and, instead, focused on providing an emotive response. He emphasised his role as *burge vader* (Hajer, 2009:79). His comments upon being asked to reflect about this strategy were revealing:

...there was information in the press conference that we had to correct later. That is always very complicated. ...the press conferences contributed to a feeling of trust that we were on the case and that we showed leadership after this shocking incident. It determined in large part the success of our approach. (Cohen, cited in Hajer, 2009:80).

These comments reveal an element of strategic meaning-making. Also, the division of roles is not entirely surprising (law enforcement agencies being expected to give the facts of a live investigation), yet Cohen’s approach was clearly differentiated from his colleagues’. His emotive response that empathised with Amsterdammers’ feelings and, in announcing the manifestation of noise, placed himself at the head of the first major opportunity for public grief. However, the press-conference was not a totally-successful event. Information regarding Bouyeri’s previous contact with police had to be corrected, undermining the impression of a Security Triangle that was fully in control (Hajer, 2009:80).

Cohen further inhabited into his role as the leading voice of civic grief (drawing upon his *burge vader* role) at Dam Square. Hajer (2009:82) has suggested that Cohen's differentiating of himself from Rita Verdonk's more sceptical discourse was unwitting. However, the impression to be drawn from interview data is that Cohen was aware of the narrative that he was taking (Gerritsen, 2018:5-6; Cohen, 2018:6). Cohen commented that, in pursuing an approach focused upon liberal tolerance, he was aware that there was '...tension between the government in The Hague...and the policy in Amsterdam.' (Cohen, 2018:5). This suggests a Mayor who was not acting unwittingly but, rather, as a focal point for a narrative in favour of *both* free speech and tolerance. Given the subsequent backlash against Muslims, this was an apt approach. Though it is difficult (given the lack of public opinion sampling) to identify any causal link between Cohen's meaning-making and the lack of violence within Amsterdam, it is not unfair to surmise that his widely-reported Dam Square speech *may* have played some role. As Scholtens (2008:201) argued, when discussing Dutch crisis responses, the role of mayors as *burge vaders* is frequently under-rated in terms of its capacity to unify and reassure.

Cohen furthered his meaning-making in the speech to the Council (see Table 20). This, in particular, showed his ability to adapt situations to the benefit of his wider vision. In so doing, he displayed the potential for agency within the Dutch system. The speech ranged over a host of themes – including anti-social behaviour, integration and safety on public transport (Cohen, 2004b). These themes echoed his "I Amsterdam" campaign. The speech's focuses upon reducing low-level criminality and promoting multiculturalism directly complemented the campaign's objectives (City of Amsterdam, 2004). Recognition of this successful messaging and his embodiment of the *burge vader* persona came not only in his World Mayor's runner-up award in 2006 but, also, through being named "European Hero" by *Time* magazine (2005) (Shorto, 2010). The wider question of how Cohen's strategy interacted with Alderman Aboutaleb's own messaging (see Table 20) is considered in the section regarding relational capital.

However, the Theo van Gogh murder was not the only opportunity for drawing conclusions regarding Cohen's adaptability. Cohen's apparent lack of empathy for the family forced to move neighbourhoods by anti-social behaviour shows limitations in Cohen's leadership – particularly with regard to self-perception. Missteps of this nature were rarely noted by interviewees (with the exception of van Zuydam's criticism of Cohen's communicative

performances in 2010, when seeking the premiership) (van Zuydam, 2018). Whilst not surprising that such sentiments should be omitted from Cohen's own answers (especially given that he claimed to be unable to identify his failures), it is interesting that Erik Gerritsen commented on some of the Mayor's shortcomings. His role as city manager (the local authority's chief executive officer) placed him in an institutionally-close working relationship with mayors, was by no means antagonistic towards Cohen. Indeed, he used words such as 'brilliant', 'proud' and 'egoless' to describe him (Gerritsen, 2018:4-8). Nevertheless, Gerritsen offered insightful critiques of where Cohen *did* suffer from errors of judgment – the incident with the expelled family and his comments to the Noord-Zuid Lijn inquiry being examples. This evidence indicates that the rational-choice approach taken within this study remains relevant here, despite the lack of a strong-mayor system. Altogether, it demonstrates the extent to which the mayoralty as an institution shaped Cohen's response, and the extent to which his personality shaped both his office and his response to the murder in return.

Cohen was, then, no more able to avoid criticisms due to misjudged comments than Livingstone or Johnson. Generally, accounts of his leadership suggest a leader who was skilled in the use of empathy to make appeals beyond the media, communicating directly with target audiences (be they the public at Dam Square or officials and elected representatives implementing *Plan 1012*). The accounts provided by van Zuydam (2018), Gerritsen (2018), the World Mayor's (2006b) profile, Logtenberg, *et. al.* (2010) and Buruma (2006) all give this impression, to varying degrees. However, the occasions when Cohen did open himself to criticism were self-inflicted and undermined his role as *burge vader*. Unfortunately, the lack of a Dutch polling culture means that there is reduced quantitative data from which to draw more acute conclusions. One may use qualitative commentaries to supplement for this omission but these cannot be counter-weighted by numerical data. In the case studies of Bloomberg, Livingstone and Johnson, it was possible to set interviewees' criticisms against raw numerical data and reach methodologically-triangulated conclusions. It is only possible to comment that Cohen's failures in communication seemed lesser in the minds of both interviewees (who may as with Gerritsen, have been motivated to preserve their own reputations by association) and commentators. Plaudits won from World Mayor and *Time* (the former based upon an online poll) give some indication of a wider willingness to accommodate failings favourably. However, this finding must be treated as of minimal influence, as both awards were based upon perceptions of non-

Amsterdammers and, thus, cannot be considered as indicative of citizens' assessment (Shorto, 2010; World Mayor, 2006a; World Mayor, 2006b).

Cohen's capacity to give wider-reaching, strategic, steers in public safety and security, reveals a leader who was not afraid to target previously-untouched aspects of city life but who remained able to work cohesively within existing structures. An example of this was the attention given to tackling the criminality surrounding sex work. He commented that "...we have to acknowledge that the aims of the law have not been reached..." when calling for an end to the trafficking that had been an unintended consequence of the earlier decriminalisation (Cohen, cited in Pizarro, 2018:83). Thus, he once again used language seeking to reinforce policy with pre-existing authority (reflecting his prior careers as a jurist and Justice minister).

Whether it was through subtext-based references to his background or explicit citing of fellow politicians who he felt had relevant experience (including Karina Schaapman's report into prostitution in Amsterdam), Cohen set store by approaching problems in a considered and authoritative manner (Simons, 2008). Given his comments about authority as an informal characteristic that is attributed to leaders, this provides insight into how he saw it best to deploy capital within the Dutch system.

Retaining a collaborative attitude (through drawing upon the expertise of others), he developed capital to use both specific events (the van Gogh murder) and longer-term opportunities ("I Amsterdam") to find ways in which to extend his vision. Cohen's advocacy of the "I Amsterdam" policy was an example of his skill in increasing capital through trading on his reputation as a *burge vader*. Naturally, this is a relational and reputational aspect of leadership capital but it is included for analysis here precisely because it required Cohen's skill in using these elements to further policy success. "I Amsterdam" was partly within his purview (where it related to aspects of public safety and security, including removing criminal activities from red light districts) but much of it lay outside of it (for instance, where it touched upon themes of economic regeneration). Cohen trod a fine line between areas where he was responsible and intervening in ways that could have significantly damaged his relationship with the Council. Karsten, drawing upon his research into mayors' relations with councils, commented in interview how mayors are '...completely dependent on the support of the council...' as councils arbitrate on the legitimacy

of mayors' activities (Karsten, 2018:3). The council's role in authorising executive decisions achieves this (Coenen, *et. al.*, 2006:169). The expectation that mayors avoid from acting in a manner requiring councils to intervene is widespread, with Karsten commenting that his own interviewees (mayors, aldermen and councillors) stated that "A real mayor doesn't propose any solutions." (Karsten, 2018:3).

This restrictive institutional environment might be assumed to leave mayors fearing operating beyond these confines. In many cases, this is frequently the pattern followed and Karsten, van Zuydam, Hendriks and Schaap have found evidence of this (Karsten and Hendriks, 2017; Karsten and van Zuydam, 2014; Schaap, 2009). However, Cohen serves as an example of a mayor who did manage to negotiate this complexity and emerge able to pronounce authoritatively upon wider agendas. Key to this was recouring to his *burge vader* image – seeking to appear as the independent first citizen, commenting authoritatively on issues through apparent concern for the wider good of the city.

In interview, Gerritsen gave an indication of how this was achieved. Rather than directly seeking to interfere in, or challenge, decision-making, Cohen would frequently identify a political concern that the wider council was discussing and profess not to have a decisive view upon the topic (Gerritsen, 2018:4). Given the system's dislike of mayors who over-politicise what Karsten and Hendriks term bridging-and-bonding leadership (one coalescing different interests around solutions), this is not surprising (Karsten and Hendriks, 2017). Cohen would use his chairing of the Board of Mayor and Aldermen (where decisions were finalised) to summarise discussions and present them in the way he saw best (Gerritsen, 2018:4). The effect of this, according to Gerritsen (who was the senior official servicing such meetings) was that Cohen identified how to move others towards his own preferences (Gerritsen, 2018:4). In taking the decision, he was then able to leave aldermen feeling as though they had each been listened to and had their viewpoint accepted. Thus, Cohen was able to give a sense of '...ownership of the decision in execution...' to the aldermen, councillors and officials, whilst ensuring that they had agreed a strategy consistent with the one he advocated (Gerritsen, 2018:4). Through this method, the Mayor was able to have a strong input into "I Amsterdam", *Plan 1012* and other strategies that aimed to reform and regenerate the city.

The importance of this as a method of capital generation cannot be over-rated. Other mayors have acted in ways that have put them at risk of dismissal and expressions of no confidence from their councils for doing less. Ahmed Aboutaleb (who became Mayor of Rotterdam in 2009) was at genuine risk of this following the Hoek van Holland Riots in 2009 (Resodihardjo, *et. al.*, 2012). His failure to be seen as suitably repentant for policing failures (one rioter was shot and others injured), whilst seeking to blame Police Chief Meijboom, led to severe criticism (Resodihardjo, *et. al.*, 2012:231). It was only his being new to the office, and thus deemed as having not been given sufficient time to prove himself, that saved him from dismissal (Resodihardjo, 2012:236). This occurred in relation to an area where the mayor had legitimate grounds for influencing policy. With “I Amsterdam” and *Plan 1012*, Cohen was extending his influence into aldermen’s portfolios and doing so publicly. That this did not draw criticism shows the success with which it was achieved. This is precisely the kind of institutional stretch described by Foley (2000), Bennister (2007) and Kefford (2016). Moreover, it exemplifies the flexibility alluded to by Sweeting (2003) when arguing that London Mayors would have to find ways to extend their influence if they were to avoid being hemmed into a restricted portfolio. It thus, directly contradicts assumptions that appointed mayoralities deny incumbents opportunities for personally expanding their authority. Rather, it goes towards demonstrating that they are just as able (albeit, through different methods) to use individual agency in manipulating leader-follower interactions when pursuing policy aims (Hendriks and Karsten, 2014:52).

7.3.2 Relational Capital

Though analysis of Cohen’s skills demonstrated that he was able to stretch his authority, if not his formal powers, beyond institutional boundaries, he only managed this through utilising relations with others. These included the Security Triangle, aldermen, councillors and the public. His attempts to portray himself as not merely a *burge vader* (itself a highly relational concept, due to its appealing to the public to be recognised as such) but also someone who was well-placed to unify a city that was uneasy with migration relied upon these relationships. It was not merely reflected in his style of managing meetings but, also, in his continual referral to his “Keeping Things Together” mantra.

Cohen was encouraged by the system to lead *through* relational capital. Dutch mayors are effectively constrained into situations where they must always act in partnership with at least

one other actor – unlike London Mayors (who can take actions, such as the drafting of official strategies, without being compelled to first consult the Assembly) or New York Mayors (who can range across a variety of policy areas without needing to see these actions initiated elsewhere, first). Even in relation to public safety and security, they are compelled to work within the institutional framework of the Security Triangle and to get approval for strategic-level decisions from the Board of Mayor and Aldermen & Council (Coenen, *et. al.*, 2006:169). These constraints represent the Dutch mayoral institution's ‘...long traditions of cooperative relations and consultation.’ (Denters and Klok, 2005:81).

As discussed earlier, this reality did not, however, serve to remove Cohen's capacity to utilise relationships to expand capital. Despite his protestations that mayors cannot impress their will upon councils (the legislature) or aldermen (the executive), his contrary practice of agential authority enabled him to subtly navigate relationships in such a way as to ease these constitutional requirements. To be clear, this was not Cohen working around or contravening his institutional environment – it was him making it work in a manner that widened his authority in order to cover broader policy interests. He did not achieve extension of his authority through either contravening statutory limitations (as with Johnson's 2008 undermining of the Metropolitan Police Commissioner) or reforming the constitution (as with Bloomberg increasing his term limit). Instead, he obeyed the letter of the legal framework whilst developing ways to use its spirit to go further.

However, he did not always act in ways that strengthened the relationships which he so relied upon in deploying his leadership. The most obvious example of this is his 2009 appearance before the Noord-Zuid Lijn inquiry. His comment that he had left the project to the aldermen – shifting blame – and that politicians must be considered as amateurs only had the potential to weaken his relations with both aldermen and the public. As the Dutch do not undertake polling, it is difficult to measure the extent of how far this might have distanced them from Cohen. In terms of Cohen's relations with officials, Gerritsen was very critical of this remark, suggesting that it added tension to a project that was already poorly managed (due to cost overruns) (Gerritsen, 2018:7). Cohen's own interview responses revealed that he was keen to see the line built (Cohen, 2018:10). He was interested in this from the beginning of his tenure (Cohen, 2018:10). However, once the issue of costs emerged, he was quick to distance himself from it (‘...this was not a

question for the mayor, this was a question for the aldermen...') and used his lack of election to claim that he was unable to assume responsibility (Cohen, 2018:10). This is factually-correct but it is also inconsistent with his concurrent interests in redeveloping red-light districts, given that he had no greater institutional authority over this latter policy but still keenly involved himself in promoting it. The resulting impression is of a mayor who was willing to use the governance structure to bring influence to bear upon key policy areas but who was also ready to shield himself behind constitutional reality when faced with contentious problems. The evidence of Gerritsen and van Zuydam (who suggested that Cohen failed to be as modest or charming when under pressure) underscores this (Gerritsen, 2018:7; van Zuydam, 2018:7).

Conversely, his leadership style could also grow relational capital. Faced with van Gogh's murder, Cohen showed the coalescing leadership discussed by Boin, *et. al.* (2005:69), through cooperation with Alderman Aboutaleb (and not in his vying with Verdonk for control of the narrative). This took place across the period of the Council's initial reaction to the murder (Table 20). The day after the murder, Aboutaleb gave a speech at the Al-Kabir Mosque (the largest in Amsterdam) calling on Muslims to integrate (Peck and Dickinson, 2009:97). A Muslim who was himself of Moroccan descent (like Bouyeri) and who was responsible for the Council's integration portfolio, Aboutaleb was well-placed to be the public face of a political reaction by Amsterdam's Islamic community. He struck a more combative tone than Cohen – calling for those Muslims who did not wish to integrate to move elsewhere – but mirrored much of the Mayor's rhetoric from Dam Square (Hajer, *et. al.*, 2009:83). This included appeals for tolerance of diversity and paraphrasing Cohen's "Keeping Things Together" mantra (calling for "...reciprocal..." appreciation of shared values between communities) (Aboutaleb, cited in Hajer, *et. al.*, 2009:83; Peck and Dickinson, 2009:97-98). Aboutaleb explicitly supported Cohen's calls for unity in an appearance on the *Barend and van Dorp* talk show (see Table 20) on November 8 2004. Here, he rejected portrayals of Cohen as a '..."weakling"...', due to his stressing a preference for peaceful protest, and instead insisted that there was '..."no alternative"...' to Amsterdam being '..."kept together by the mayor, it is his constitutional duty, assisted by us as his aldermen."' (Aboutaleb, cited in Hajer, *et. al.*, 2009:87).

Cohen's narrative noticeably strengthened following Aboutaleb's calls for integration. It was after the alderman's speech at the mosque that Cohen made his speech to the council. This

was noticeably firmer on law-and-order challenges than his Dam Square speech. His expansion of his focus to tackling anti-social behaviour and public transport safety were his most concrete proposals (Cohen, 2004b). In short, Cohen and Aboutaleb built a narrative that complimented each other's meaning-making, whilst allowing each other latitude in the manner of its expression.

This was reflected on a wider scale, too. The Noord-Zuid Lijn inquiry notwithstanding, Cohen set much store by maintaining strong relational capital. Though the institutional factors were different, the reality of how he cultivated these relationships was not dissimilar to Bloomberg, Livingstone and Johnson. It took various forms – from empathic appeals to specific communities to more administrative-focused aspects, such as his style of managing meetings. He used cross-institutional collaboration, such as the Security Triangle and “I Amsterdam” project, to embed relationships outside of the government. This exemplified the cross-institutional collaboration that Metze and van Zuydam (2015:129) argued was required in order to ensure that governance incorporated a range of perspectives.

One example of his deployment of empathy again relates to attempts to integrate the Moroccan community. Nadia Bouras, Professor of History and Urban Studies at The University of Amsterdam has commented that ““He’s beloved in the Moroccan community. He’s of Jewish descent, but he calls himself a secular Jew. A lot of Moroccans can relate to that — being an outsider but a part of society.”” (Bouras, cited in Shorto, 2010). Cohen moved quickly to establish contact with Moroccans following the terrorist attacks in America on September 11 2001, believing that the city could only remain united if government had positive relations with all of its communities (Shorto, 2010). He regularly visited mosques and community groups, often drinking tea with those he met whilst seeking to understand their view of socio-cultural divides (van Zuydam, 2018:3; Gerritsen, 2018:4). This way of relating to the wider polity came with both positive and negative connotations. van Zuydam (2018:3) and Buruma (2006:4-5) found it to be broadly positive (being a determined and sustained effort to find peaceful means for tackling the entrenched problem of inter-community distrust). Cohen summarised this aspect of his leadership as ““...two important skills: the ability to listen to people and the ability to use inclusive language.”” (Cohen, cited in World Mayor, 2006c).

Conversely, Gerritsen (2018:4) highlighted that Cohen's strategy, whilst well-intentioned, served to divide perceptions between those agreeing with van Zuydam & Buruma and those who felt that it represented inaction. Friends of Theo blamed Cohen for the murder (claiming that his '...cowardly...' strategy of cohesion-focused tolerance had been a politically-correct attempt at ignoring extremism) (Buruma, 2006:16). When *Time* magazine nominated him as European Hero in 2005, some Amsterdammers wrote anonymous letters suggesting that Cohen's strategy should leave him '...known for his prevarication and tardy approach to very real problems that affect this city.' (Anon, 2005). This use of empathy to connect with Amsterdammers was, therefore, something of a divider of opinions. Whilst it embodied Cohen's "Keeping Things Together" mantra (with none of the interview or documentary evidence suggesting that he approached this with anything other than sincerity), it failed to unify broad sections of society (with critics remaining sceptical of the potential for this in such a diverse city).

This leads to the heart of Cohen's relational capital – his portrayal as a *burge vader*. That Cohen – or Dutch mayors in general – should seek to cultivate this aspect of their relational capital is unsurprising. As Kopic, Hlynisdottir, Dzinic and Borghetto (2018:166) found, mayors without direct mandates both often *appear* less democratically valid to their citizens and, also, *feel* less legitimate in themselves. The cultivation of an image as a *burge vader*, which Karsten and Hendriks (2014) suggest can also be envisaged as a democratic guardian who seeks consensus across their city, is thus key in seeking to legitimise oneself in office without holding a mandate. Karsten and van Zuydam (2014:4) have demonstrated – through surveying mayors' perceptions of their role orientations – that mayoral authority is created, chiefly, '...in the interaction between individuals.'¹⁹ This has served to underscore the significance of the relational aspects to mayors' institutional leadership. Their study also demonstrated that mayors place their role as "first citizen" (*burge vader*) as the most essential in this institutional design (Karsten, *et. al.*, 2014:12). Together, this offers interesting institutional learning. It exemplifies Peters' (2012:55) concept of individuals within institutions, using the informal authority of personal relations (both with internal partners, including aldermen, and externally, with citizens) to expand their authority. Simultaneously, the Mayor is encouraged to use the *burge vader* imagery as a vehicle to ensure

¹⁹ Based upon survey 243 (60%) Dutch mayors' responses (Karsten, *et. al.*, 2014).

that this is accomplished in a way that reflects the traditions of their institution (in short, the greater limiting of power than found in strong-mayor systems).

Burge vader role orientation is, thus, not a significant aspect of mayoral capital but (based upon the survey results and also Cohen's constant appeals to this characterisation) *the* most important element of relational capital. This is a powerful status for an unwritten, cultural, norm to have. For Cohen, this was complimented by the principle of *verbinder* (Karsten, *et. al.*, 2017:62). This means "connector" and Karsten (Karsten, *et. al.*, 2017:62) has referred to this in arguing that much of Dutch mayors' capacity to govern, given the lack of mandate, relies upon the establishment of legitimacy through connecting with citizens. These concepts form the theoretical and performative aspects of his relational capital. These are not just considerations of leadership style but, more fundamentally, issues of leadership *purpose*. For a system limiting mayors' capacity to establish visions, the question of how they identify a purpose to their mayoralty may seem innocuous. However, the institutional design and historical expectations of mayors offers the answer here – by providing them with a depoliticised role that rests upon ability to connect with citizens in an almost-paternalistic fashion (Karsten, *et. al.*, 2017:62).

This as a common theme throughout Cohen's mayoralty. *Verbinder* was much in evidence in his appeals for calm and a re-energised tolerance following van Gogh's murder. At the more over-arching level, this pattern remained. His reference to the importance of '...being there...' for people in crises (and, also, during regular occurrences, such as memorials), supported by Gerritsen's observations regarding the significance attached to this, reflect Cohen's awareness of this aspect of his role (Cohen, 2018:6; Gerritsen, 2018:8). Jong, Duckers and van der Velden (2016a; 2016b) previously revealed that mayors' visual and vocal presence in local and national emergencies is one of the public's key expectations. Cohen's ability to do this, including through using institutional relationships to enter into decisions beyond his remit (*Plan 1012*) enabled him to be ever-more present. Most revealing is interviewees were unanimous in noting of Cohen as a prototypical mayor in this regard (Karsten, 2018:4-5; van Zuydam, 2018:3; 't Hart, 2018:6).

Finally, Gerritsen described Cohen's decision-making style as '...let everybody have their say so that everyone feels heard and then "I summarise and together we made the decision"' (Gerritsen, 2018:4). He asserted that this was how Cohen approached meetings, whoever he was

addressing – including aldermen, his staff, police and citizens (Gerritsen, 2018:4). This was accompanied by Cohen’s desire not to reach decisions earlier than necessary – which, conversely, fed his “tea-drinker” image (someone who postulated but was averse to deciding) (Gerritsen, 2018:5). However, this complemented Cohen’s appreciation of his lacking a mandate and, thus, being compelled to consider a wide variety of perspectives before advocating specific positions. Cohen described this as being motivated by a desire to operate the mayoralty ‘...“for everyone and of everyone”...’ (Cohen, cited in Karsten, 2018:4; ‘t Hart, 2018:7). In interview, Cohen showed much consciousness regarding his role as a mediator between aldermen (the executive) and the council (the legislature). This is a rather unusual situation amongst the case studies presented here, with London and New York mayors being situated wholly within the executive. Cohen indicated that he found it possible to ‘...steer a little bit...’ within the Board of Mayor and Aldermen but only in so far as to remind aldermen of the need to consider the Council’s view as issues arose (Cohen, 2018:3). This presents obvious potential for tension, with the Mayor conflicted between legislature and executive and, potentially, unable to fully-satisfy either. Cohen, however, identified his status as an “independent” in office (not without party affiliation but unable to draw upon it in support of arguments) as the key aspect that enabled him to facilitate consensus (Cohen, 2018:2).

Cohen’s position as Mayor left him unable to make the kind of unilateral declarations of political intent demonstrated by Bloomberg. However, there was a clear expectation upon him to do so. Gerritsen recalled Cohen’s sometimes poor media reception, with headlines of “Mr. Mayor, do something!” not uncommon (and similar calls for action evident in pressure groups’ appeals, including Friends of Theo) (Gerritsen, 2018:4; Buruma, 2006; Hajer, *et. al.*, 2009). Nevertheless, he was unable to step outside of the aforementioned restrictive institutional environment that prevented this. The earlier-alluded-to habit of subtle manoeuvrability in his decision-making style did not pacify his harshest critics. They wrote critical letters following his being declared one of *Time’s* European Heroes. One labelled him a ‘...refugee from the political establishment who needed a place to hide...’ and whose defining leadership feature was ‘...prevarication.’ (Anon., 2005). Though such aspects are arguably reputational aspects of the waxing and waning of Cohen’s leadership capital, they also illustrate issues in his ability to relate to alternate audiences at different times. Much of this can be causally linked to his institutional reality. However, certain aspects – such as his failure to sufficiently communicate these restrictions to citizens – are

attributable to the Mayor. In this light, Cohen's more nuanced attempts to negotiate the complexities of his institutional environment were not sufficient to counter occasional criticisms that reflected public ignorance of *why* he was sometimes able to "...do something..." (Gerritsen, 2018:4).

To conclude, Cohen's relational capital enabled him to stretch his institutional capacity as Mayor in order to influence policies that were beyond his remit. This had both positive and negative consequences. He was able to come as close as practicably possible (given the institutionalised distrust of mayors displaying strong-mayor characteristics) to establishing an economic vision through "I Amsterdam" and *Plan 1012*. Conversely, he was faced with a depletion of capital following the relational damage done when responding to the Noord-Zuid Lijn inquiry in 2009. Nevertheless, Cohen's fulfilment of his mayoral role as an executive spokesperson in this matter, however critically received, demonstrated the importance of his view on a range of matters. His attempt to avoid responsibility was so badly received because he was, in part, expected to be accountable for varied areas of city life and it was this factor that enabled the extension of capital in endeavours such as "I Amsterdam".

7.3.3 Reputational Capital

As discussed in the Methods Chapter, it is difficult to assess Dutch politicians' reputational capital. As Swinkels, van Zuydam and van Esch (2017:169) noted, the varying degrees of importance attached to popularity ratings between consensus and majoritarian democracies means that these aspects are measured differently ('t Hart, 2018:9). The lack of public polling makes it difficult to assess how the public perceive individual Dutch leaders and their policies (Karsten, 2018). This is one of the main reasons for assessing Cohen's capital using the three pillars (skills, relational and reputational) at the core of the LCI, rather than seeking to make use of specific metrics. With these reservations in mind, it is possible to provide brief analysis of the identifiably reputational elements of Cohen's capital.

This chapter has given much focus to Cohen's response to van Gogh's murder. This underlined his existing commitments to tolerance and a vision of Amsterdam as a multicultural city. As recounted by Shorto (2010), Buruma (2006), Cohen's World Mayor profile (2006) and interviewees' comments, he had a long-standing reputation for liberal, pluralist politics. This

predated his mayoralty, with his having been instrumental in introducing legislation providing for same-sex marriage. Despite these perceptions coinciding with Cohen's desire to be portrayed in this way – a representation he was keen to underline in interview, 14 years later – they did not necessarily aid him in developing his public image. For instance, Aboutaleb was forced to rebut criticisms of Cohen's "tea-drinker" image after the murder, in response to a press label of '...“weakling”...' being attached to him (Hajer, *et. al.*, 2009:87). Such criticisms revealed a lack of media knowledge regarding the restrictions placed upon Dutch mayors and their compulsion to react collaboratively. On the other hand, it reveals a strong vein of negative responses (led by Friends of Theo) towards Cohen's "keeping things together" mantra. Indeed, Aboutaleb's response came *after* Cohen's speech to the Council. Thus, one can see that Cohen's contemporary meaning-making (though retrospectively lauded by interviewees) was not without limits in seeking to establish a narrative beyond the murder (Hajer, *et. al.*, 2009:87). Overall, though remembered as a leader who sought unity, the "tea-drinker" aspect of his image is remembered more negatively. Geert Wilders habitually referred to him as the "...eternal tea-drinker..." in speeches during the years following van Gogh's murder (Wilders, cited in *Dutch Amsterdam*, 2010).

Qualitative evidence – drawn from interviews and contemporary media commentaries – indicates that Cohen's presentation of a modest persona was not always well-received outside of the political sphere, either. His remark about amateurism to the Noord-Zuid Lijn inquiry was much-criticised (contemporarily and subsequently) for its disconnection from citizens' expectations (Gerritsen, 2018:7; *Het Parool*, 2009a; *Het Parool*, 2009b). Far from embodying any potential benefits of more consensual systems, the remark appeared to suggest both a disconnect between himself and the aldermen and a lack of coherence in the accountability for decisions. Away from political parties, *Dutch Amsterdam* (the leading travel journal) reflected a much-vaunted critique when, in assessing his legacy in 2010, it commented that '...many Amsterdammers have not been enamored [sic] with Cohen's lackadaisical approach to serious problems.' (*Dutch Amsterdam*, 2010).

Nevertheless, he was asked to renew his term in 2006 (Shorto, 2010; *Dutch Amsterdam*, 2010). Karsten's research has recognised that this is, effectively, a vote of confidence in incumbents (Karsten, 2018:7). For instance, Bas Verkerk (formerly Mayor of Delft) found that his

council was not intending to propose him to the Queen's Commissioner for reappointment in 2011 (Karsten, 2018:7). Though the Queen's Commissioner overruled the council, it was a notable example of the increased muscularity that municipalities are seeking in influencing mayoral appointments. The Delft example is but one example amongst the evidence of councils' seeking to have greater choice in who becomes Mayor – with Amsterdam's own council refusing the twenty-three submitted applications for the mayoralty during a similar process in 2018 (*Binnenlands Bestuur*, 2018). Thus, Cohen's reappointment was not guaranteed. This may thus be taken as a proxy guide to the strength of his reputation midway through his mayoralty.

Notwithstanding already-analysed criticisms of his political agenda and rhetoric, his tenure does not seem to have altered public perceptions of Cohen as a unifier – serving, if anything, to enhance it. For instance, Shorto's (2010) profile of Cohen, following his return to national politics, referred to him as 'European Muslim's Jewish Friend'. Commenting upon the 2018 search for a new Mayor of Amsterdam, Cohen summarised his view of what a successful candidate needed as “The most important thing is you have to love people. You should like to go into the city and listen to the people. You have to have a political feeling and management experience is damn useful if you have that” (Cohen, cited in Belinfante, 2018). A 2016 Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations (2016:13) report offered a similar definition, describing the ideal mayor as impartial, an integrator and responsive.

The positive reception at Dam Square, and the retrospective admiration with which his Council speech is remembered, are examples of attempts to use his reputation as a liberal unifier to engender tolerance. Later appeals for regeneration traded subtly (given institutional restrictions) upon this image and the project saw fifty-two brothels closed. However, the critical allegations of gentrification undermined his social cohesion rhetoric. Conversely, conducting same-sex marriages solidified his reputation for this. Similarly, interviewees consistently recalled his “keeping things together” mantra and his embodiment of the *burge vader* persona (noting him as proto-typical of Dutch mayors in this sense) (van Zuydam, 2018:5; Gerritsen, 2018:5; 't Hart, 2018:7).

In this light, it is fair to conclude that Cohen's reputational capital was steadily maintained throughout his tenure, though contemporary events and perceptions portraying him in a more

negative light cannot be ignored. We should, however, be careful as to how far one relies upon this finding, given that much of it draws upon limited qualitative and no quantitative measurements (some of which is retrospective).

7.4 Conclusion: The Leadership Capital of Job Cohen

This case study has examined the leadership capital of a mayor who operated within a very different system to Bloomberg, Livingstone and Johnson. Contextual information and analysis presented clarified that this had definite effects in terms of varying both where capital was drawn from and how it was spent. Moreover, Cohen was himself somewhat different in his persona to the other three mayors considered. Unlike Bloomberg, he was not an outsider to the political establishment, having previously held several offices at national level. Also, he cannot, as with Livingstone and Johnson, be regarded as a maverick, with his approach to politics having been more modest and also in line with the air of liberalism that he felt that Amsterdam embodied.

The differences in institutional and statutory reality made applying the LCI difficult. Attempts to construct suitable metrics were obstructed by both a lack of data (especially with regard to reputational measures) and, also, the range of those which *were* suitable being at variance to those used in the other case studies. As mentioned in the Methods chapter, the study was keen to only apply metrics if they matched exactly those used in other cases (in order to maintain a consistent approach to the LCI). Consequently, the study used the broader Skills, Relational and Reputational approach, by-passing the use of specific metrics in relation to Cohen. This assessment has, therefore, been an analytical discussion of Cohen's leadership capital, rather than a mixed-methods measurement allowing for numerical tracking of its waxing and waning. This demonstrates the issues that exist in adapting a tool that was originally focused upon Anglo-American contexts (Bennister, *et. al.*, 2017). Nevertheless, by focusing analytical considerations upon the LCI's main theoretical underpinnings, it has still been possible to ascertain understanding of the composition and evolution of Cohen's capital. This point, regarding the methodological implications of using the LCI comparatively, is returned to in the Findings chapter. Here, it is sufficient to state that the different approach used in this chapter has been beneficial. It has enabled both the highlighting of limitations in the LCI's design and, also, the use of a richly-detailed qualitative discussion around an alternative mayoral system.

Examination of Cohen's capital contains important findings. Not only is it possible, with methodological adjustments, to assess local leader's capital within an appointed model but it is

also helpful to do so. It allows for consideration of the agency and institutional stretch of those operating within more constrained institutions than Anglo-American counterparts. Similarly, Cohen's example provides encouraging avenues for future research – from consideration of whether the findings related to his case contain commonalities with other appointed mayors through to how the LCI may need to be refined in order to broaden its applicability.

Overall, Cohen's capital was largely relational in composition. Without due testing, it is not possible to say with any certainty whether this would hold true for all Dutch mayors – one case study of a single mayor, in a country containing 405 mayors, is not a representative sample (Karsten, *et. al.*, 2017). However, discovery of the extent to which Cohen relied upon relational capital to support and extend his leadership provides grounds to justify undertaking future research to test, given the similar-systems design across Dutch mayoralities, how normative this is.

The centrality of relational elements to his overall leadership capital might lead one to underrate the value of considering skills and reputation. However, this case study has demonstrated that, though it is difficult to assess reputational elements, these remained important to the evolution of capital across his tenure. Skills in adaptation and communication enhanced his reputation as a unifier who wished to “keep things together” at a time of multicultural unrest, whilst also allowing him to further relational elements that facilitated agency in stretching beyond institutional limits. Simultaneously, there was evidence of waning capital, too. Reputationally, Cohen was unable to mount effective rebuttals against critics who saw him as inactive and who, consequently, utilised his “tea-drinker” image. This seems to have been inherent to his general political persona, with others observing that he experienced similar issues when leading Labour after leaving office (Gerritsen, 2018:6; van Zuydam, 2018:7). His communicative abilities were also not infallible –misplaced remarks regarding the family forced to relocate due to anti-social behaviour and his response to the Noord-Zuid Lijn inquiry being examples.

Finally, the chapter has unearthed how capital is not drawn equally from its three components of skills, relational aspects and reputational elements. It may, instead, rely more on one element (in this case, relational) than others, according to the system that it is deployed

within. Though it is not surprising that appointed and consensual systems encourage mayors to focus upon relational elements, this finding is an example of the original contribution that this thesis seeks to make to political leadership studies' attempts at better understanding evolutions and variations in mayors' leadership.

Overall, there is some evidence here of an individual who was able to effectively use the opportunities afforded by their institution to accomplish the kind of stretch theorised about by Peters. Though frequently done in ways differing with the strong-mayor case studies examined earlier, and in a more restricted capacity, this enabled Cohen to grow his profile. In so doing, he was able to then use his role-orientations as *burge vader* and *verbinder* to develop the capital stemming from his status as an institutional figurehead. Though achieved through different means, the end result is partially reflective of the stretch exhibited by Bloomberg, Livingstone and Johnson. Here, too, we find a mayor whose informal authority was leveraged in order to widen his purview. Though inhabiting a appointed system that may, as argued by Karsten, Schaap and Hendriks, seem far-removed from Svava's concept of a strong-mayor model, Cohen's example suggests that appointed mayors can also deploy the kind of resources alluded to by Sweeting (Karsten, 2017; Schaap, 2009; Karsten and Hendriks, 2017; Sweeting, 2003).

8.0 Findings and Conclusions

8.1 Introduction

This chapter collates and evaluates the findings from the case studies. Reflecting upon the central research question, and related sub-questions, it identifies the thesis' main conclusions. These are presented in the following order: evaluation of the leadership capital of strong mayors (and the related lessons to be drawn regarding those within appointed systems); how the use of the LCI has incorporated into the study, including related lessons for future adaptations; and proposed avenues for future research.

As noted in the Methods chapter, the difference between some of the case studies (in particular, the lack of applicability of the LCI to Cohen) means that an in-depth evaluative comparison must focus upon the tool's core pillars (skills, relational and reputational capital). However, with regard to the strong-mayor systems presented, more metric-specific comparisons are offered. Across all of the first three case studies, the broad theoretical framework concerning the strong-mayor model is used, whilst the more consensual nature of the Dutch case is set against this. Throughout all four, the question of how capital is deployed in agential stretching beyond institutional limits is reflected upon. The thesis is using Sweeting's typologies and Table 2 serves as a reminder of his different mayoral typologies and their relationship to their institutional limitations.

To repeat, the research question and four sub-questions being answered here is 'Can a strong mayor act according to their own will when constrained by the institutional limits of their office?'. The four sub-questions are:

- (5) Do strong mayor systems offer individual leaders high levels of leadership capital?
- (6) Do the case studies of mayoralities of Amsterdam, London and New York offer useful theoretical insights into how mayors use agency as a tool for increasing leadership capital?
- (7) Does more capital equate to greater potential for institutional stretch?
- (8) How might the LCI be developed and refined in order to make it applicable to leadership at the local level, especially when used comparatively?

Table 2: Sweeting's Four Mayoral Types

<u>Type</u>	<u>Description</u>
1	Strong in relation to council, high degree of control within municipal bureaucracy. Power extends well beyond formal confines of office. Strong in relation to council, influential in local governance and operate in autonomous environment.
2	Weak in sense they share control over council bureaucracy with other elected officials. Nevertheless, highly influential beyond walls of the authority and their authorities have autonomy from other levels of government.
3	Strong inside their authorities. However, do not operate in autonomous environment. Influence in local governance is slight.
4	Weak in terms of relationship with council. Low degree of ability to extend influence beyond council and have limited local autonomy.

(Adapted from Sweeting, 2003:470-471).

8.2 Leadership Capital of Strong Mayors

As is to be expected when engaging in a comparative study of different leaders' capital (including their institutional contexts, styles and personal backgrounds), there are areas where those studied are at variance to each other. For instance, to take just one example, whilst Livingstone and Johnson scored relatively well with regard to their ability to work in a cross-partisan or consensual fashion, Bloomberg received a lower outcome within this metric. Broader observations are offered, with regard to what these case studies indicate regarding strong-mayors ability to stretch their agency beyond institutional limits. Then the comparisons and discussions presented here focus upon those areas where the mayors concerned (with Cohen examined separately, due to the differences inherent to the Dutch system) *collectively* scored well or poorly. Finally, all four case studies are discussed, together, in order to answer sub-questions 1, 2 and 3.

8.2.1 Broad Conclusions

Having considered the exercise of, and fluctuations in, leadership capital across the four case studies and two systems concerned, some broader observations are now made with regard to the thesis' core research question.

It is apparent that there is significant interaction between elements of skills, relations and reputation within the mayoralities concerned. These are exercised differently within each system and according to institutional limits and imperatives. Thus, not only do the institutions shape the office-holder's agency and ability to generate capital but, as importantly, the core elements of leadership capital help to condition leader's attitudes towards their own institutions. Thus, both Peters' (2012:55) model of leaders as able to '...utilize institutions to fulfill his or her goals...' and Lauth's (2004:70) idea that actors remain '...conditioned to obey...' some institutional norms, are not mutually-exclusive conclusions.

At this juncture, it is pertinent to revisit the existing theorisation around the concept of strong-mayor systems. In one sense, the creation of the GLA and the evidence of agential motivations on the part of both Livingstone and Johnson (from the former's desire to shape a new institution according to his own vision through to Johnson's attempts at continued further devolution) are testimonials in support of Sweeting and Hambleton's suggestion that the strong-

mayor typology is spreading (Hambleton and Sweeting, 2004). New York's mayoralty is much older and, yet, London's incumbents behaved in a similar fashion to Bloomberg on multiple occasions. For instance, whilst Bloomberg called for expansions of his powers (such as with regard to schools), Livingstone sought the power to overturn the PPP and implement an alternative financing arrangement, whilst Johnson continuously sought to expand his powers. This was also pursued in less formal ways. Livingstone supported the Olympic bid on the understanding that it would enable him to pursue an agenda around regeneration, whilst Johnson sought to expand his authority early on by undermining the Metropolitan Police Commissioner.

Comparatively, Cohen pursued agential stretching of his institutional power (through devices such as *Plan 1012* and his style of chairmanship) whilst retaining a respectful commitment to some of the most traditional concepts within the Dutch system (*verbinder* and *burge vader* status). This, then, is an example of a mayor who realised the inherent informal authority of his office (suggesting that authority could be a subtle substitute for election), without moving the institution towards the characteristics of the strong-mayor system (for instance, direct-election) (Transcript H, 2018:2). This does not, together, mean that Sweeting and Hambleton were wrong in their conclusions. They only explored whether the model was spreading from the US to England. However, a cross-national study such as this one provides the chance to make observations regarding this trend. Whilst it has been demonstrated that the model has transferred, albeit with a different local institutional design, to London, there is evidence to suggest that Amsterdam presents a significant anomaly to this trend at a wider geographic level.

Here, Sweeting's (2003:470-471) formulations of different mayoral models are of use (see Table 2). The case study of Bloomberg suggests that New York fits firmly within the Type 1 model. Whilst certain barriers to Bloomberg's agency and policy programme were encountered (such as the legal challenge to the "Sugar Tax"), the pattern of his mayoralty was one of delivering his desired policy propositions and reforms (from Hudson Yards through to control of the school system) despite occasionally critical responses. Indeed, he even managed to change both the constitutional term-limit of his office and, in doing so, the manner in which term-limit reform could be done. This, then, was a powerful example of an incumbent exercising notable influence over an already-strong office. In the New York case, then, a strong mayor was able to both accrue

significant capital and, deploying it mostly effectively (notwithstanding difficulties in communication), stretch *both* their informal agency and formal powers to a large extent.

Johnson and Livingstone, by contrast occupied a mayoralty that was more of a hybrid of Types 1, 2 and 3. Whilst the London Mayor is substantially more powerful than the London Assembly, they lack the wide policy purview of a New York Mayor. Moreover, the institution began life as one which faced significant curtailing of its powers by national government. With the exception of the creation of MOPAC and the other, more minimal, devolution achieved under Johnson, this position has remained broadly the same. However, the Mayor's large personal mandate has given incumbents an enhanced profile within the national conversation around issues such as infrastructure, transport and the post-Olympics legacy. Thus, though the Mayor may be regarded as being institutionally constrained by external layers of government, as well as the (largely continued) remit established by the 1999 Greater London Authority Act, Livingstone and Johnson both demonstrated significant capacity to communicate their wider policy priorities beyond these limits. London Mayors possess the strength in relation to the council and informal authority defined within Type 1. However, this is accompanied by the weakness of needing to share their powers with other officials within Type 2 (though, unlike Sweeting's conceptualisation, this *is* borne of a need to split their powers with other layers of government). Finally, they exhibit the internal strength and need to share influence with other stakeholders outlined in Type 3.

Unlike Bloomberg's use of formal mechanisms (policy and constitutional reform) to achieve a similar effect, Johnson and Livingstone relied upon informal resources (communicative abilities and attaching themselves to national debates around policy issues) to achieve institutional stretch. Their communicative abilities (including the capacity to reach out beyond the media alluded to by interviewees), cultivation of key relationships and overall legislative effectiveness were important aspects of their capital. Collectively, they helped enhance their agency and turn them into more prominent leaders than their institution's more restrictive design might have predicted.

Cohen's case study demonstrates that Mayors of Amsterdam are another hybrid of Sweeting's typologies. On first glance, one might assume that the appointed and highly-restrictive Dutch system would tend considerably towards Type 4. In part, this is true, as mayors are

rendered weak in both their place within the council and, more specifically, in their relations with the aldermen. Even their key area of responsibility, safety and security, is one which is shared with external stakeholders (via the auspices of the Security Triangle). However, whilst this is certainly true, the more comprehensive picture reveals a less clear-cut reality. Cohen's authority stemmed a great deal from his prior experience but it also reflected his capacity to reach beyond the confines of the Board of Mayor and Alderman and connect with Amsterdammers. His *verbinder* and *burge vader* role orientations were central to this and demonstrated how agency can be subtly extended in ways that do not conflict with the context, design and traditions of more consensual governmental institutions. This empowered Cohen as a municipal figurehead without the need for election or the wider policy remit of his English and American counterparts. In this regard, he also embodied elements of Sweeting's Type 2 model.

Thus, the above typology creates logical and evidenced differentiations between mayoral systems but does not fully explain the more nuanced realities of how such theoretical concepts translate into the practical exercise of leadership (though this was not necessarily Sweeting's objective). Research such as that provided within this thesis both offers the chance to revisit such differentiations and provides the justification for doing so.

On the other hand, the thesis' case study analysis has provided evidence in support of the conclusion that strong mayors are more obviously able to generate and deploy leadership capital. Bloomberg, Livingstone and Johnson all enjoyed greater institutional freedom for the exhibiting of their agency (in decision-making, the setting of wide-ranging political visions and profile) than Cohen. This is not a surprising finding; the design of strong-mayor systems, whichever typologies they characterise, inherently offer more capacity for leaders to operate. As Levy (1997:23) wrote, leaders are '...rational and strategic individuals who make choices within constraints to obtain their desired ends...'. It thus follows that individuals with fewer constraints over policy and ability to comment on numerous political challenges are able to manipulate their institutional realities more in the pursuit of their ends.

Mayors within appointed systems, however, must give constant consideration to how any attempts at institutional stretch must be either resisted or given lesser priority in order to continue to enjoy the confidence of other internal and external stakeholders. This does not mean

that Lauth (2004:70) was correct in his assertion that actors' agency is severely limited by structures that compel them to observe some institutional norms. Cohen's examples of agential action actively used these norms in order to stretch his informal power. This was as much an example of a mayor using their informal resources to '...utilize institutions to fulfill his or her goals...' as Bloomberg's formal constitutional reforms were an illustration of a strong mayor taking advantage of institutional structures to extend his own agency (Peters, 2012:55).

Nevertheless, the above conclusions enable confident answers to be given to the first and third sub-questions. Firstly, strong-mayor systems *do* offer leaders to accrue high levels of leadership capital. This is not without its challenges and can frequently depend upon factors located more at the individual than institutional level (for example, failures in communication or a lack of cross-partisanship). However, the case studies presented here firmly suggest that the strong-mayor system does at least offer significant potential for individuals to build up stores of capital that can then be deployed at times and in ways largely at the discretion of the office-holder.

Secondly, the accruing of more capital does offer opportunities for institutional stretch. For example, Livingstone's re-adoption by the Labour Party was a tacit affirmation of his introducing the CC and it contributed to his subsequent extension of the scheme. However, this is not to say that larger stores of capital are the *only* means by which agential stretching can occur. Appointed mayoral systems may also be manipulated to provide greater profile and authority for the office-holder, according to the traditions and informal resources available. Thus, greater capital levels are but one way in which agential stretch of institutional limits may be achieved.

In short, it is the view of this thesis that strong mayors can use agency, built upon the various constituent parts of leadership capital, to exert their political will. This includes frequent stretching of their institutional limits, occasionally bypassing them altogether and reaching beyond formal structures to directly engage stakeholders. As an aside, the case study of an appointed system has revealed key similarities and differences that serve to illustrate that it is not, however, only strong-mayor systems that allow for this. Yet strong-mayor systems do provide more myriad and explicit opportunities to do so and a leader who understands this potential can often pursue this aim and, as a consequence, enhance both their profile and policy agenda.

8.2.2 Strong Mayors: Bloomberg, Livingstone and Johnson

There were clear areas where the mayors concerned all scored highly. These were: longevity, (re)selection margin, influencing their party's policy agenda and legislative effectiveness. Similarly, there were common areas of weakness. These included: personal poll ratings and public perceptions of trustworthiness.

The issue of longevity is, of course, problematic. Whilst the LCI scores leaders higher for the longer that they continue in office, a linear scoring system does not reflect that a leader may suffer reputational damage the longer that they continue (as was the case with Bloomberg and Livingstone). Thus, a nuanced analysis is required. However, it is interesting to consider the fact that all three mayors managed at least two full terms (three, in Bloomberg's case) despite significant challenges to their authority. For Bloomberg, the continued criticisms he received regarding perceived elitism (and, later, surrounding the controversial term extension) could easily have been used to undermine his efforts in each re-election attempt. It should, of course, be noted that interviewees and commentators all gave much credit to both the poor quality of opponents and Bloomberg's large financial resources when assessing factors behind his victories. However, it remains the case that he did secure re-election and, additionally, underscored his second re-election with a remarkable revision of the constitution. There was, thus, considerable agency in evidence in each of his victories, especially in 2009.

Similarly, Livingstone's 2004 introduction (and subsequent proposed extension) of the Congestion Charge (CC) could have reaped the electoral punishment that advisors and journalists alike predicted. The fact that it failed to do so not only paid dividends for Livingstone – boosting his authority in the Greater London Authority's (GLA) most visible policy purview – but also underscored a new political institution's image as a policy deliverer. Whilst he lost his battle over the Public-Private Partnership agreements governing the London Underground, his determination to pursue the CC gave him the appearance of a policy innovator who was prepared to take risky (in terms of his reputation, if the CC had failed) decisions to push his policy agenda. Thus, securing a second term (as Labour's official candidate) was the continuation of a remarkable political comeback. His becoming embroiled in several controversies during the second term did, however, affect this image and, ultimately, contributed to his loss to Johnson. Despite his overall capital

score rising by four points between 2004 and 2008, Livingstone's inability to convince the electorate to vote for him sufficiently in 2008 shows that a simple linear LCI score for longevity does not necessarily reflect the reality of a leader's fortunes.

Much of the post-mayoral commentary regarding Boris Johnson has played heavily upon his desire to be seen as having left a positive legacy. Indeed, in his 2019 bid for the leadership of his party, his campaign team frequently characterised his mayoral record as a form of curriculum vitae in support of his effort (Hill, 2019; Walker, 2019; Glover, 2019). Johnson himself frequently referred to it during the key debates and interviews that punctuated this campaign (Swinford, 2019). Nevertheless, the LCI score here suggests that though he too achieved eight years as London's most senior elected politician, this longevity did not translate into being held in consistently-high esteem. For instance, his trust ratings plummeted from a moderately low score on the index to one which the LCI did not have an existing score for.

Thus, though longevity was a high-scoring aspect for all three mayors, one must be more discerning in how it is assessed than to take the LCI score at face-value. All three secured a not-inconsiderable period in office but still faced challenges and ratings that were more tumultuous and which could have overwhelmed them (succeeding, in Livingstone's case). So, whilst this may appear as a common area of strength, when set against the index, it is instead a less certain indicator of relatively-high leadership capital for strong mayors and researchers should be cautious before declaring it as such.

In a sense, the point of not taking the indicated LCI score at face-value holds true in relation to (re)selection margins. However, in this case, the reality may be that the cause of each individual's high score *was* an indicator of strong capital. In short, though each mayor scored the highest-possible score available on this metric at each point capital was assessed, their reasons for doing so were varied. Livingstone did face selection procedures in 2004 and received an overwhelming endorsement from it. Thus, his score on the metric *is* reflective of high capital in precisely the way the LCI's creators assumed that it would be calculated. However, Livingstone did not face a trigger ballot to force him to face the same procedure in 2008 – a tacit form of endorsement that suggested a position of considerable strength regarding his standing within his party. The same was true for Bloomberg in 2005 and Johnson in 2012. In 2009, Bloomberg again

faced no need to undergo a primary contest (this time, due to standing on an independent ticket with Republican endorsements). Johnson, meanwhile, did not stand for re-election in 2016. However, if he had, his party's internal rules meant that he would, as in 2012, not have been forced into a reselection ballot.

This reality will, of course, vary from case study to case study. For instance, Bloomberg's successor, Bill de Blasio, did face a primary contest when standing for re-election in 2017 (Lee and Bloch, 2017). Thus, the thesis' finding in this regard should not be taken as a generalised judgement on all strong mayors' internal party strength with regard to reselection. However, it does illustrate the situational nature of strong mayors' capital and, consequently, the need for detailed research into the institutional structures within which they operate when seeking to evaluate the extent of their authority.

The final two metrics where there were commonalities in terms of the strength of scores achieved were the ability to influence party policy agenda and mayors' legislative effectiveness. These were qualitative, not quantitative metrics. Thus, though more subjective in the awarding of scores, the numerical value selected was able to better reflect the sense of waxing and waning capital obtained from interviews, commentaries and documentary evidence.

As problematised in the Methods chapter (in terms of the awarding of scores), the subjective nature of the LCI is its greatest challenge. However, if accepting the ontological and epistemological positions outlined in the Methods chapter, this subjectivity can gain justification and, thus, enable continued use of the LCI (albeit a tool that needs continued development, as outlined below).

Unlike their Dutch counterparts, who are required to avoid setting explicit political visions for fear of over-politicising their office, English and American mayors are encouraged to set their own policy agendas. Indeed, due to their seeking of electoral mandates, they are required to do so every four years. This, in turn, leads them to seeking a voice in wider political debates, including within their party. In both New York and London, the high focus afforded to the office of Mayor, with its national profile, allows for the creation of a potentially very influential platform.

All three of the strong mayors analysed influenced their parties' agendas. Bloomberg managed to do this in a number of areas – from advocating for more gun controls through to pushing ideas such as the Sugar Tax. Perhaps his most notable impact was in education – as demonstrated within the chapter covering his mayoralty, Obama's Secretary for Education was quick to advocate for the replication of Bloomberg's reforms. Despite the controversies surrounding his economic redevelopment policies, he showed decided ability to influence key figures within his party (such as Quinn) to move towards more favourable positions. Moreover, his move to a position of partisan independence for his final term meant that the influence he could have over his "party" (his own personal campaign organisation) was even greater. The fact that commentators such as Greenblatt openly discuss him as the most influential American mayor that they can think of (despite having also criticised his flat communicative style), indicates the possible extent of this policy influence (Greenblatt, 2013).

Livingstone and Johnson similarly pushed their parties to adopt some of their own policy initiatives. Though the power to introduce the CC was devolved to the GLA by central government, Labour cautiously refused to give it much prominence beyond London, with no other authorities pursuing it at that time. However, the data collected here suggests strongly that the party's readoption of Livingstone was an implicit acknowledgement of the policy's success (as they would arguably have been less likely to have taken this step if the CC had been a public relations disaster). Thus, though Livingstone was not the idea's originator and had inherited the power along with the rest of the GLA, his leadership in pursuing the policy led to a more favourable reception within his own party. Likewise, his supporting of Tessa Jowell's proposal for an Olympic Games bid and his desire to see a project such as Crossrail delivered were major factors in making his party more inclined towards both ideas.

Johnson had a similar impact. He was able to raise a range of issues surrounding infrastructure, policing and the Olympic legacy throughout his tenure. Though he inherited projects such as the CC, bicycle-hire scheme and Crossrail from Livingstone, the fact that the Conservative continued to advocate for these in London (albeit with Boris' removal of the CC's Western Extension), demonstrated the Mayor's influence. Similarly, those outbursts which went beyond his brief, such as the comments he made about immigration and the non-European Union

migrant cap, were a further example of his capacity to stretch his commentary into non-mayoral policy agendas. Nevertheless, the fact that he achieved little devolution of policy areas and powers to the mayoralty in his tenure suggests that influence did not necessarily translate into more formal forms of power.

As an aside, it is interesting to note that two of these three individuals had a term where they were without formal party affiliation. Whilst Bloomberg finished his mayoralty (2009-2013) as an independent, Livingstone began his (2000-2004) as one. Notwithstanding the key difference of the former having chosen to be independent, whilst the latter was expelled by Labour immediately prior to the election, this offers a further possible avenue for future research. Most Anglo-American mayors have some kind of party affiliation, however loosely-defined, and yet individuals such as Livingstone and Bloomberg offer the chance to consider mayors' strength of leadership when they lack such structures. As discussed below, this is a theme that I intend to pick up in a later study.

All three mayors enjoyed success in their legislative effectiveness. Bloomberg was able to get his policy priorities agreed, despite the controversy surrounding the vision for redevelopment that they embodied, despite antagonistic relations with his first Speaker. This was made yet easier when he established a domineering relationship with the second (for his middle and final terms). He faced relative ease in getting budgets passed, including in regard to his principle of limiting local government borrowing and deficits. All of this was achieved because the 1989 Charter revision had moved the burden of policy initiation to the Mayor, not the Council. Though the latter retains the ability, through voting down proposals, to disrupt a Mayor's agenda, Bloomberg cultivated the Council carefully, through its Speaker, to ensure that there was significant support for his proposals. Nowhere was this more apparent than in the Council's agreement to a term-limit extension without a confirmatory referendum. The most obviously-successful form of opposition Bloomberg faced with regards to his legislative programme came from the legal arena, not the City Council, and concerned his Sugar Tax proposal. The fact that the courts, and not the Council, overturned a policy that Bloomberg expended much personal agency on advocating suggests that the greatest threats to this mayor came from outside his institution. Within it, he was increasingly secure, the longer his tenure progressed (despite the growing external criticisms regarding elitism and disquiet about his term-limit extension).

Johnson and Livingstone were aided by having a very weak assembly as the other half of the institution of the GLA (with the Assembly being concerned purely with scrutiny and not legislation). In a more cynical sense, they were able to stretch their institutional reach by essentially placing an Assembly member on the “payroll” as a deputy mayor. Begun under Livingstone, as a condition of the 1998 legislation establishing the GLA, the practice was extended by Johnson’s augmenting of the number of deputy mayors. The Assembly could seek to undermine mayors indirectly (including the embarrassment of Livingstone supporting Sir Ian Blair when the Assembly was active in criticising him). They could, also, make antagonistic comments towards the Mayor (with Phillips’ Kenocracy comments being but one example) but that was, essentially, the limit of their potential impact. Thus, though structurally a weaker mayoralty than that of New York (due to the smaller policy remit), the Mayors of London face similarly-enhanced potential for agency in their legislative affairs. Indeed, the fact that they, unlike New York’s Mayor, do not have to negotiate with the Assembly over their admittedly-smaller budget (merely needing enough votes to stop the two-thirds majority required for the Assembly to overturn it) indicates that there are some areas where they are stronger.

On the other hand, there were also areas of weaker capital in common between the mayors. Chiefly, these concerned their personal poll ratings and the question of public trust. With the latter of these, there is some reservation in expressing conclusions formed from the result, given the use of proxy data within the case studies of Bloomberg and Livingstone. This has been discussed within the Methods chapter and is also returned to below, with regard to what this means for future usage of the LCI.

Personal poll ratings were notably lower for all three leaders, despite their different challenges and institutional contexts. Partially, this is an issue resulting from the LCI’s design. The metric measures the relative difference between their rating at the time assessed and the one which they received at the last election. Thus, as all three mayors faced systems of direct election that require the winner to achieve over 50% of the final vote, their approval ratings appeared less favourable when set against this. There may, thus be a case for considering approval ratings in comparison with vote shares obtained in the first round of voting. Of course, this would make comparison between cases more difficult when a system that uses transferable voting and

another straight plurality are selected (as is the case here). However, it is possible to observe fluctuations in this area of capital for each leader. Livingstone actually saw a net rise of 9% in his capital between 2004 and 2008. Johnson scored higher than Livingstone's at comparable points but remained much lower than the vote shares he accrued. Bloomberg's, meanwhile, began at a relatively high level before falling midway through his tenure (due, in part, to dissatisfaction over the term-limit extension). His rating had, however, recovered by the time that he left office in 2013. This suggests that the story of a leader's capital is not necessarily a linear depletion over time but that, rather, it can fall *and* return, according to context and leaders' actions.

Interestingly, Bloomberg's poll ratings were consistently higher than those obtained by either Livingstone or Johnson. Whilst the number of cases presented here is small (meaning that it would be unwise to over-generalise with regard to whether this reflected a wider contrasting pattern between American and English mayors), the point alone merits further investigation. Again, this is an aspect that I would like to pursue further in future research.

What is suggested by this data is that, when measured in the manner prescribed by the LCI, mayors consistently fare worse in approval ratings than their eventual vote shares suggest. Thus, a strong mayor may face significant falls in public approval but still succeed in obtaining re-election (as demonstrated by Bloomberg in 2009). Likewise, a mayor may be subject to growth in their personal rating but still lose office (as Livingstone found in 2008). Thus, the LCI proves to be too blunt an instrument here, too, and this can only be mitigated against if accompanied by an explanatory qualitative analysis.

The above-noted caveats notwithstanding, public trust in all three mayors was strikingly low. Bloomberg received the highest individual score in this metric (3, in 2005) and this was still only deemed "moderate" upon the index. From there, his trustworthiness fell in 2009, remaining at this low level until the end of his tenure. Likewise, Johnson saw his trustworthiness fall across his time in office, becoming the only individual examined here to obtain a net negative score. Livingstone's scoring reversed this trend, but only in so far as to see trustworthiness grow from "very low" to "low".

Thus, the study can tentatively suggest that strong mayors, despite their direct electoral mandates, do not necessarily enjoy widespread public trust. This area of leadership capital seems much weaker in comparison to the nine others examined. However, the study has undertaken case study analysis of just three mayors. Clearly, continued study of a much larger number must be undertaken before any more generalised conclusions can be formed. This study is aware of those critiques suggesting that comparisons with fewer case studies often fall into the danger of over-generalisation. What can be ascertained here is that there was a common trend of low trust levels across all three case studies and that each mayor recorded this metric as amongst their lowest. Situational factors, such as Bloomberg's move on term limits or Johnson's advocacy of exiting the European Union whilst leading a largely Europhile city seem to play a part in this.

Nevertheless, other contextual and agential factors could have equal impact. For instance, a mayor may be in office at a time of general distrust in politics. Livingstone came closest to this when his public support of Lee Jasper led to criticisms of him, too. However, as polling of trustworthiness was not carried out following Jasper's resignation, we cannot conclusively ascertain whether this had a detrimental effect. Perhaps a more useful overall measure for the LCI to use in future would be a metric measuring the trust in a mayor compared with general trust in politicians at the national level. This, then, could give a clearer understanding of how to situate any evaluative conclusions regarding this aspect of capital.

8.2.3 Appointed Mayors: Cohen

Before moving towards a more theoretical discussion of the broader conclusions reached about strong mayors and their ability to follow their own will in the face of institutional limits, it is necessary to make some observations based upon the analysis of the Cohen case study. Whilst very much an outlier when considered alongside the other case studies, due to the pronounced institutional and cultural differences, it is presented here as a sample alternative system against which subsequent observations and conclusions can be set. Given that a normative use of the LCI was not used, due to the unviability of metrics, the broad composition of leadership capital (skills, reputation and relations) is considered.

Cohen had skills which benefited him. Other than Livingstone (with his background as a local government leader), he was the mayor within this study who had the most relevant

experience prior to assuming his post. Not only did he have a functional knowledge of the constitution, stemming from his time as a jurist, he also possessed significant cabinet-level experience. As Swinkels, *et. al.* (2017:168-169) suggested, the Dutch system places great value on experience in politics. Indeed, several other Dutch mayors have had prominent either national or local government roles prior to assuming their posts. For instance, Ahmed Aboutaleb (who became Mayor of Rotterdam in 2009) was previously the alderman with responsibility for social cohesion in Amsterdam and had also held a cabinet post (Hajer *et al.*, 2009:83; Reimerink, 2015). Similarly, Cohen's successor, Eberhard van der Laan, had likewise held national ministerial office prior to taking up municipal office (NOS, 2017).

This situation is the reverse of the other case studies examined. Bloomberg had no prior experience of political office. Livingstone had been a local government leader but had, more recently, been a Member of Parliament. Johnson left Westminster, after seven years, to take up the mayoralty. Conversely, some other European leaders often seem to look to municipal office as an initial political role, before moving on to the national level (with Navarro and Sanz's (2018) case study of Spanish mayors demonstrating but one example of this).

The issue of experience offers one other consideration. As Dutch mayors are appointed, their status as an experienced public official helps to offset any depletion in authority that may stem from their lack of election. This feeds into more relational aspects of capital. For instance, the *burge vader* role orientation can only succeed if citizens have faith in a mayor's basic competency to be the municipal figurehead. The high value placed on prior experience goes towards creating this reassurance, thus directly enhancing what might otherwise be a much weaker aspect of Dutch mayoral leadership capital.

However, such value being placed upon experience does underline the either naivety or disingenuous intent behind Cohen's 2009 comment about seeing politicians as amateurs, when appearing before the Noord-Zuid Lijn Inquiry. Not only does this show how perceptions of authority may wax and wane upon specific instances, it also illustrates issues in Cohen's communicative abilities.

Overall, his communication skills were strong and he proved adept at continuously pressing his message of a liberal and tolerant city. This was no more evident than in his response to van Gogh's murder. His consistent repetition of his "keeping things together" mantra not only created an over-arching narrative for the policy prescriptions that he subsequently outlined in his speech to the Council but, also, enhanced his own image. Here, he moved to bolster his image as a unifier with passionate beliefs about both the advantages of multiculturalism and, as importantly, creating a harmonious urban environment. This theme was repeated at other junctures, such as in his conducting of the first same-sex marriage and his expressed desire to see *Plan 1012* used to increase accessibility for disabled pedestrians.

Nevertheless, instances such as his comments to the Noord-Zuid Lijn inquiry and his tone-deaf remarks about the family forced to move due to anti-social behaviour diluted these efforts. Here, instead, he risked appearing as a mayor who was out-of-touch with the needs and concerns of residents. Not only did this challenge his efforts to cultivate his status as a *burge vader* but, as importantly, it undermined the connective (*verbinder*) elements that he sought to exemplify in his leadership. In this, we can see the connections between skills capital (communications), relational capital (*verbinder*) and reputational (*burge vader*).

As discussed in the case study chapter examining Cohen, relational capital was paramount in his creation of a position of confidence and trust in office. It enabled him to implicitly steer political visions beyond his remit (such as "I Amsterdam" and *Plan 1012*) whilst continuing to appear as the independent and de-politicised figure required of Dutch mayors. Interviewee evidence concerning his careful chairing of meetings underlined this point. Indeed, the fact that some interviewees described him as the prototypical mayor when it came to exercising what Karsten and Hendriks have called 'bridging-and-bonding' leadership demonstrates how successfully Cohen achieved this persona (Transcript I, 2018:3; Karsten, *et. al.*, 2017). In this appointed system, therefore, concepts such as *verbinder* and *burge vader* are not merely cultural concepts concerned with the performance of leadership styles but are both a requirement of, and potential for, enhanced agency. This may be regarded as having some similarity to the other mayors examined. Bloomberg inhabited a "*burge vader*" when seeking to reassure citizens after the 2004 blackout. Livingstone's efforts to reassure the public in the light of the 7/7 attacks can be seen in a similar light – as can Johnson's "broom response" to the 2011 riots.

Though this exhibited the use of skills capital, it was chiefly a question of how Cohen chose to both relate himself to internal and external stakeholders, as well as how he sought to use his role as a figurehead to get other actors to relate to each other. For instance, in his Dam Square speech, he used his own reputation as an espouser of liberal values to counteract the rhetoric of the government minister present and, instead, seek to move Amsterdammers and their local government closer together in their response to van Gogh's murder. Similarly, his comments to the Noord-Zuid Lijn inquiry could be read as merely a rather clumsy attempt at seeking understanding (on the part of citizens), amid a public controversy, regarding the pressures faced by decision-makers. Though this would therefore comprise a point when Cohen's reputational capital suffered due to a failure of relational tactics, it is illustrative of how different issues called for the mayor to exert different aspects of his capital in seeking to achieve specific ends.

8.2.4 A Note on Cultural Dynamics and the Language of Concepts

Finally, these conclusions should end with a brief but important observation. Cultural unease with "leadership", as found in the Dutch system, may inherently weaken the position of mayors if the term "leadership" is approached from an Anglo-American understanding. However, this underlines a key cultural message. This study has frequently encountered instances of leadership being shaped by political culture and context, both derived from the institutional environment within which mayors operate. Thus, a mayor in one country may well face similar problems (transport infrastructure, economic growth and security concerns, for example) to one in another country. However, their approach in dealing with them will likely be different. This is apparent enough when examining strong-mayor systems but when moving to consider leaders within appointed environments we must change our mindset as observers and researchers. In short, though we may have been educated in Anglo-American understandings of concepts such as structure, agency and institutions that continue to dominate the current literature, appointed models require us to adapt our thinking if comparisons are to provide rich and reflective furthering of knowledge.

8.3 Developing the LCI

This thesis was designed with the LCI in mind. As a point of originality, it seemed a prime opportunity to be the first to both apply the LCI to mayors and, also, to use it in a cross-national comparison. Indeed, it is also only the second time (following Burrett's 2016 examination of Japanese prime ministers) that it has been applied to three or more case studies. A by-product of this original use of the LCI is that it is, therefore, an experimental application. This requires reflections upon how successful it has been in this case and what this means for future use. The following reflections are in addition to those made earlier in this chapter about reconsidering the design of the metrics regarding personal poll ratings and levels of public trust (with these not being needlessly repeated, here).

First, however, it is appropriate to briefly reflect upon the evolutionary journey that the LCI has been on concurrent to the writing of this thesis. When I first began to design my study in 2016, there were only two publications (including the original 2015 article in *Western European Politics*) and three conference papers which used the LCI (Bennister, *et. al.*, 2014a; Bennister, *et. al.*, 2014b; Bennister, *et. al.*, 2015; Burrett, 2016a). Subsequently, the LCI has been used in conference papers (Burrett, 2016b; Worthy and Bennister, 2017) offering case-studied applications (with my own 2017 paper at both PUPOL and the PSA offering an early attempt at problematising the methodological implications of seeking to adapt and revise it for use at the local level) (Stafford, 2017b; Stafford, 2017c). More importantly, there have been an increase in referenced uses of the tool. The 2017 publication of an edited collection of chapters exploring both specific case studies and, also, how it may subsequently evolve was central to this (Bennister, *et. al.*, 2017a). This allowed for a wider basis of practical applications of the tool than had previously been the case. Currently, this remains the chief reference point for those who would wish to familiarise themselves with it. As explored in the 'Further Research' section of this chapter, this is an area of the methodological literature that I wish to expand on in the future.

Others, however, have begun to show interest in the LCI's evolution. Whilst Elgie (2015:161) merely noted its existence in 2015 (with little in the way of studies available to chart its progress), Weller (2018) has, more recently, offered some thoughts on how it might be further developed. Weller (2018:23) noted that, whilst the LCI's complex design makes it '...the most

developed process so far devised...’ for charting authority, it is too early to decide whether it ‘...can (or should) move to explicit comparisons of performance that can be both persuasive and valid...’. This thesis, with its direct comparison of four mayors (three on a set of specific metrics), has sought to do precisely this. It is, therefore, pertinent to now turn to the study’s fourth sub-question: How might the LCI be developed and refined in order to make it applicable to leadership at the local level, especially when used comparatively?

Inherent in answering this question is one over-arching further enquiry: how adaptable did the LCI prove when applied to the case studies within this thesis? The two key issues encountered in this regard were its applicability to cross-national comparisons (with the contextual effects of varied cultures and institutions) and the need for occasional use of proxy data.

Its applicability within cross-national comparisons is the most significant issue. The tool was originally designed with *elected* office-holders from liberal democracies in mind. Indeed, the first case study that its creators applied it to, in order to demonstrate its practical function, was Tony Blair (Bennister, *et. al.*, 2015). Archie Brown, in his review of Bennister *et. al.*’s 2017 edited collection on the LCI, noted that strict contextualisation required in the undertaking any cross-national comparison, given the potential for cultural incompatibility of case studies (Brown, 2018:743). However, this contextualisation still did not make the LCI any less amenable in its application to the Dutch case study (Brown, 2018). The key issues here were chiefly around relational (the lack of election) and reputational (the absence of a polling culture) capital. This meant that the same ten metrics could not be applied to Cohen as had been the case with the other case studies, thus creating the potential for an asymmetrical methodological approach between case studies.

The only manner in which to address this problem was, in this case, to take a step back and apply the principles underlying the LCI – its “pillars” of skills, relational and reputational capital. Whilst this meant that a strictly like-for-like analysis could not be conducted, due to the lack of metrics, it ensured that the same theoretical approach informed all four case studies. In a sense, this served to underline the Dutch case study’s differences and to make the point that this is a very different leadership culture.

However, does this mean that the LCI cannot, therefore, be applied to Dutch case studies (or, at least, in so far as Cohen's mayoralty of Amsterdam is concerned). The 2017 study by Swinkels, *et. al.*, proves this not to be a justified assumption. Instead, this issue is much more connected to the application of the LCI at the Dutch *local* level. The lack of election and absence of polling for mayors is a direct hindrance for using the tool. It will take longer to tell if this is indictive of a wider issue in applying the LCI or whether the Dutch system is anomalous in this regard. Either way, this study's experience suggests that the LCI has elements within its originally-conceived approach that serve to limit its applicability. This is an area which I would like to publish on further in a post-PhD methods paper critiquing the first five years of the tool's development. Moreover, one must be careful not to over-generalise, by extrapolating conclusions out to the whole nation level. In order to reach further conclusions in this area, further studies of Dutch mayors would be required, to see if the lessons from the Cohen case study apply to other leaders (including beyond Amsterdam).

The challenge of using proxy data was touched upon within the relevant case study chapters but now receives deeper consideration of the issues that this raises for researchers assessing whether the tool is appropriate for their studies. It remains a weakness of this study that the scores for Bloomberg and Livingstone involve the use of proxies for the public trust metric. Though done for justifiable reasons (the lack of available data) it does mean that greater caution should be taken in relation to subsequent scores awarded. Bennister and Worthy (2017) set a precedent for this in their comparative LCI analysis of Margaret Thatcher and Tony Blair.

However, it does serve to undermine the full rigour that the LCI might otherwise enjoy and leads to greater caution in the conclusions formed based upon this specific data. First, it affects the accuracy of the metric affected, as it becomes only loosely indicative, rather than garnered from substantive and directly-relevant data. As noted in the affected case study chapters, this increases the need for a qualitative analysis to accompany the quantitative metrics (as it allows for greater explanatory contextualisation and interpretation). Second, there is the issue of the subjectivity that the use of proxy data involves. A researcher must actively choose what they feel to be a suitable proxy. Whilst I have tried, here, to offer developed explanations

for the proxies used, it does nevertheless require the accompaniment of a cautionary self-awareness that this partially reduces the individual LCIs' objectivity.

This issue of subjectivity is one which was apparent prior to using the LCI. The fact that a researcher must make a personal, if informed, judgement as to whether a leader had very poor or very good communications skills makes its subjectivity inherent to operationalising the tool. However, the experience of using the LCI in the study has confirmed that this is a concern that should not be underestimated. Brown's (2018) comments on the LCI are partially borne out, here. He argued that the LCI was on '...firmer ground...' when using quantitative data (such as that based upon polling), as it allowed more apparent links between the data and their corresponding capital scores (Brown, 2018:744). However, he suggested that the qualitative nature of those metrics drawn from non-numerical data was so subjective as to be a major weakness.

This study has acknowledged, in its Methods chapter, the need for researchers to have considerable self-awareness when it comes to their own ontological and epistemological biases when considering using the LCI. The subjectivity required to operate the tool is, as Brown suggests, considerable. However, I do not find that this negates its usefulness. Rather, critiques such as Brown's are rendered only partially fair by their lack of consideration of precisely where the qualitative data is drawn from. Certainly, the actual act of scoring required for the thesis to make a judgement but this was based upon the rich evidential base of extended semi-structured interviews and documentary research. These do not provide mere "colour" to the observations presented but, rather, offer insights (albeit ones borne of their own subjectivity) from other informed observers. Together with the quantitative evidence (where such data was available), any judgements reached have, therefore, been achieved through careful consideration of a large array of testimonies. In short, future users of the LCI must be very careful to approach the tool with caution and ensure that there is a reasonably large evidence base which they can rest their judgements regarding scoring upon. Such data could include further reliance upon semi-structured interviews, which may provide opportunities for greater contextualisation, and greater consideration of how the LCI is calibrated to incorporate this data. This, of course, means that greater thought should be given to how researchers can gather this increased amount of data (without dropping semi-structured interviews in favour of an easier-to-scale data source, such as surveys). This might, consequently, actually lead to a loss of precisely the "colour" sought. So,

clearly, this is an area that a future methodological study of the LCI must give adequate consideration. However, this is particular lesson, on the need for a wider evidence base, is surely true of any other method which one may conceive of applying.

Perhaps the greatest lesson to be obtained from this particular application of the LCI regards adapting it to suit research design purposes. As discussed in the Methods chapter, it can be adapted to a certain point but may then, eventually, be so “adapted” that it has actually morphed into something else entirely. This, in itself, indicates that the LCI is not universally applicable (for instance, it has proved much harder to use with regards to appointed leadership systems). Collectively, this means that the LCI is a flexible tool (for instance, with regard to swapping certain metrics for others) but it is not totally malleable. Unsurprisingly, given the range of possible institutional settings and individuals which it may be applied to, it has limits. Moreover, any research design must retain the three pillars at the tool’s core, else it will cease to be the LCI.

Despite these cautions and reservations, this study has demonstrated the potential for continued use of the LCI in future studies. In interview, one of the tool’s creators expressed the desire to see the tool develop further, becoming a form of analysis that could offer explanations for capital fluctuations (rather than tracking them) (‘t Hart, 2018:8). Having now applied the LCI to different case studies, it is the view of this thesis that the tool still needs further development in this regard. Whilst the data presented in formulating the LCI offers the aforementioned tracking capacity, as might be expected of an index, it is a researcher’s own qualitative interpretations that provide the explanation. The same interviewee expressed reservations about using policy-focused case studies (believing that this could complicate the research design) but concurred that it could provide for a more explanatory approach. This thesis has demonstrated that use of a policy-based focus provides opportunities to make connections between capital growth and leaders’ decisions, thus making the explanatory link desired.

This thesis also suggests two more minor adjustments that will help to adapt the LCI for future use. First, the measurements contained within the original calibration were poorly designed. For instance, the range for personal poll ratings had scores of “Low” for -15% to -5 % and “Moderate” for -5% to 5% (Bennister, *et. al.*, 2015). In this situation, a researcher presented with a leader whose rating was -5% would have to choose between the two metrics in a seemingly

arbitrary fashion, with implications either way on the resulting score. This study has, therefore, adjusted the scores to include rounding to one decimal place (see Table 5 in Methods) to address this issue. This is regarded as a finding, rather than an issue of methodological rigour as it underlies the point that future users of the LCI should use caution and careful attention-to-detail when adapting or applying the original calibration.

Second, as demonstrated when seeking to calculate Johnson's 2016 score for trust, there is a need to recalibrate the numbering system so that it reflects net negative results. Some of the metrics (for instance, regarding poll ratings) afford this within their range but others do not and this affects the tool's consistency. With the trust rating, it assumes a net positive score will be achieved. It may be that the tool's original designers merely anticipated future users recording the top-line trust figure, and not the *net* one. However, this study has used the net figure, in order to give a fairer reflection of the overall trust ratings (including when using proxy data), accounting for those who registered distrust to also be reflected within the tool. Both this and the issue of rounded numbering of measures are easily fixed and would allow for the kind of honed development that the LCI will need to continue to undertake in order to better serve future research.

Other amendments to the tool may, of course, be required, according to the focus of future studies. For instance, other studies that include a metric examining longevity would benefit from considering this thesis' own experiences. Sufficient qualitative analysis to accompany this quantitative metric can alleviate this particular problem. It remains, nevertheless, a point which researchers using the LCI must be conscious of when adapting its linear method of scoring.

This, in turn, goes further towards the root of this thesis' original contribution. By identifying issues such as those discussed, both here and in the Methods chapter, this thesis has made a significant contribution to the evolving literature on the LCI. If this tool is to gain traction within the political leadership studies literature, it must continue to be given acute evaluation – especially within studies such as this one, which makes it a central point of its approach. To date, this study remains the longest extended examination of the tool's utility. Thus, future users of the LCI should ensure to read its recommendations in order to be aware of some of the challenges they will face when seeking to incorporate it into their own studies.

Overall, the study has benefitted from use of the LCI. It has allowed for a distinct means of comparison between four individual office-holders who faced differing policy priorities and who also had varied leadership styles. It has similarly allowed for an evaluative discussion around segmented aspects (metrics) of these mayors' skills, reputations and relations in such a way as to discern the effect of their institutions upon their leadership. It has enabled the pinpointing of particular cases of agency (Bloomberg's dominant relationship with his tenure's second Speaker and Johnson's ability to influence party policy being just two examples). Moreover, the inability to fully apply the tool to Dutch mayors served, strangely, to underline the different institutional imperatives and constraints exhibited within this non-Anglo-American system. Though the LCI will need further refinement if it is to achieve a permanent place in the palette of methods available to scholars of political leadership, it has demonstrated potential for successful application at the local level.

In return, the LCI has benefitted from this study. The thesis' research has shown the utility of using policy-focuses within case studies. Similarly, the identification of issues in seeking cross-national comparisons (particularly beyond Anglo-American contexts) has raised lessons for future researchers. The minor changes to the LCI's calibration, discussed above, do likewise. Overall, the greatest benefit that the thesis can offer is to prompt others to continue its initiation of a discussion around how the LCI is applied to local leaders and, just as importantly, how adaptable the tool may be within these differing contexts.

8.4 Key Points

This chapter has identified many key points of original knowledge that have emerged from this thesis. In particular, these focus upon: the role of mayors (as detailed, more fully, above); the LCI; institutionalism; and leadership capital.

Regarding the LCI, the work has identified that this new tool may be regarded as remaining very much in its developmental phase. These include those set out in greater detail earlier in this chapter. However, it is fair to cautiously conclude that the LCI is gaining some traction within political leadership studies. So far, this has amounted to one edited book and several journal articles (including those reviewing and critiquing it). Together, this still represents a modest impression upon current debates. This is to be expected, given its relatively recent initial publication. This notwithstanding, it is attracting critiques and attention from major scholars within the field (including Elgie, Weller and Brown). This indicates its being able to claim that it is developing a reputation and contribution that addresses the ongoing question of precisely how one measures or quantifies leadership (and, indeed, whether this is even possible).

The lessons on institutionalism reflect some of the earlier debates regarding the role of agency and its relationship to structure. As mentioned in the Literature Review, scholars including 't Hart have long since established this as a "chicken-and-egg" question for leadership studies. This study did not seek to resolve such a major contention. However, its analysis has indicated further just how far this links political leadership studies with research into institutionalism. The thesis has demonstrated that, as argued in the Literature Review's examination, it is possible for analyses to prove that institutions both shape actors and, in return, are shaped by them. Thus, the actors-within-institutions model's arguments on this point, along with its accompanying acknowledgement of the institutional limitations that actors find, are vindicated. The range of case studies analysed here prove that, though the contextual application and exhibiting of the model's characteristics may vary, the broad tenets of the proposition have capacity to be applied to both strong and appointed mayors.

Finally, with regard to leadership capital, the key findings here are somewhat more nuanced. As outlined in the Methods Chapter, leadership capital is a social construct (as with

Bourdieu's arguments surrounding social capital, upon which the LCI's creators drew). Of course, this all relies upon acceptance of the basic belief in leadership capital's very existence. To such a rebuttal, one might argue that it is possible to take that view one step further and question whether leadership itself exists. Is it not, after all, a social framing of an observed phenomenon regarding the interactions of people and groups in society? Given the epistemological position of the author, one must concede such a point. Nevertheless, this does not mean that leadership is somehow unworthy of examination and, as a logical extension to this, the concept of leadership capital (conceived of as a key resource deployed by leaders) is thus also open to analysis.

The LCI is but one way in which to examine and measure leadership capital. Indeed, the 2017 book's varied calibrations of the LCI reflected the variety of approaches it is possible to take to leadership capital, according to the cultural contexts within which it is exercised. Though all such approaches must use the skills, reputational and relational elements discussed under and LCI view of this capital, the variety of calibrations also reflects the dynamic ways in which it is possible to understand it. Here, the strong-mayor case studies demonstrated leaders who relied heavily upon a close relationship with those who they governed, exhibited often through polling cultures and a resort to the ballot box. In the fourth case study, neither of these factors applied and, instead, the appointed mayor had to rely upon relations with other elected officials, as well as their own prior experiences, to deploy leadership capital.

8.5 Further Research

Unsurprisingly, the extended studying of local leadership - across four dynamic case studies and using a new analytical tool – has provided much impetus for future research focuses. I have outlined, below, those which I wish to pursue. In both number and scope, they may at first seem to present an ambitious list of priorities and focuses. However, it is hoped that they will provide the foundation of my post-doctoral early career research agenda.

8.4.1 Mayors

First, much has been written about the institutional elements of local political leadership and the cultural considerations pertaining to this. This thesis has revealed that certain assumptions – for instance, that appointed mayors lack significant potential for agency in restrictive systems – should be urgently revisited. Consequently, I would like to give further consideration to this, with regard to both challenging this thinking’s prevalence and also any implications that it might have for the research design of future studies.

Second, the relationship between mayors and their council’s speaker or presiding officer seems to offer a distinct and rich vein of research endeavour. At the time of writing, there is growing interest in the role of the Speaker of the House of Commons, with prominent political leadership specialists keen to offer new observations on the role’s agency, power and institutional context (for instance, see Bennister, 2018). This will result in a December 2019 workshop considering this issue. It thus seems a pertinent time to seek to offer observations about the relationship between mayors and presiding speakers/officers. This thesis has already touched upon such matters in its discussion of both the relationship between Bloomberg and his two Speakers of the New York City Council and, also, Livingstone’s description by the GLA’s first chair (Trevor Phillips). These figures seem to have the potential to, supportively or critically, establish perceptions of mayors. This, then, gives an opportunity to further research the relational and reputational elements of mayors’ leadership capital.

Following on from the Bloomberg case study’s analysis of his failure to get the “Sugar Tax” implemented and, similarly, Livingstone’s legal travails over the PPP, there is an opportunity to consider the legal sphere’s potential to curtail mayoral leadership and agency. Much has already

been written about how mayors face their plans being opposed by internal and external political stakeholders. However, there is now a chance to consider how far external legal structures impact upon mayors' decisions and agendas. It is proposed to carry out a further case study research design that can compare cases, with a view to offering further understanding of this dimension.

More minor, but specific, research priorities raised within the thesis include the points highlighted regarding the relative capacity of mayors lacking party affiliations and a more quantitative study of whether mayors do receive higher trust ratings than their English counterparts. Though the above priorities would form the initial research agenda arising from this thesis, these latter two points remain of interest and it is proposed to keep them under consideration for future studies.

8.4.2 LCI

Despite the challenges encountered in adapting and applying the LCI within this study, I remain keen to further explore the tool's potential and capacity for development. Indeed, it is some of these issues – for instance, the question of adapting it in order to make it relevant to different leadership cultures and institutional contexts – that lead me to want to pursue this theme within my early research developments. As noted in the literature review and methods chapters, the field of political leadership studies remains alive with debates around how best to measure and evaluate leaders and their authority. Thus, the LCI faces a field of study which continues to present opportunities for consideration of the tool's utility and longevity.

Specifically, I would like to pursue two interests. First is reflecting upon the tool's development-to-date. In 2020, the LCI will mark five years of featuring in peer-reviewed research. This would be a logical point at which to review the lessons learnt so far regarding the tool's applicability at different leadership levels, its use in comparative approaches and its place within the field of leadership studies. To this end, I will submit, for publication, a journal article covering these points (targeting journals concerned with either methodologies within political science or the study of political leadership).

Second, I feel that it is incumbent upon me, as someone who has argued in favour of the overall effectiveness of the LCI to raise awareness of its utility for other researchers. This would

be best achieved by my continuing to use it within my post-doctoral research. Whilst I will, of course, pursue work outside of the LCI (as mentioned above), I would like to continue to develop my thinking in this area and to further test some of the issues raised within this study (such as the tool's adaptation across varied cultural contexts).

8.6 Final Conclusions

In conclusion, this thesis has examined the extent to which strong mayors can pursue their will or agenda in the face of institutional limits. In doing so, it has used a new analytical tool in an original way and provided four detailed case-studied examinations. These case studies have never been compared in this way before. In short, this is an original study that provides many questions for future research.

Throughout, consideration of the strong-mayor model and its applicability to case studies of varied individual office-holders, and their institutional environments, has been the thesis' main focus. The result has been a series of conclusions that offer original insights which are intended to encourage a revisiting of the academic discussion surrounding strong-mayors, especially with regard to observations upon political leadership.

This thesis has used the LCI as a tool, to provide a new form of analysis, one which can be applied to any leadership situation, as illustrated by the application to mayoralities in this work. The thesis concludes by expressing several reservations about the tool's development and methodological underpinnings. Nevertheless, the tool has been useful in structuring the analysis provided and does have promise for future usage, if the concerns expressed can be addressed.

Further to this, this thesis has three main conclusions. First, the thesis concludes that strong-mayors *can* exercise their own will in the face of institutional limits. This agency is not absolute; institutional elements remain a significant restriction, on occasion. Second, institutional limitations are not to be treated without qualification, either. Finally, all of the case studies demonstrated the capacity to extend their agency, including in the case of Cohen's particularly restrictive environment.

These conclusions do, however, open the way for further research. Though varied in focus, this research has common themes – political leadership; mayors and their institutional environments; cultural issues in the examination of leadership; and the continued development of the LCI. In this light, the end of this work marks the basis of a new, early-career, research agenda.

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