

## EVIDENCE FROM LAB AND FIELD EXPERIMENTS ON DISCRIMINATION<sup>‡</sup>

### Experimental Age Discrimination Evidence and the Heckman Critique<sup>†</sup>

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The “Heckman critique” of field experiments on labor market discrimination calls into question evidence from past studies, which generally point to discrimination in hiring. We use data on hiring of younger and older men from a new large-scale field experiment to assess this critique in the context of age discrimination. We find that correcting for the source of bias that this critique identifies can lead to different conclusions, in some cases eliminating evidence of age discrimination.

#### I. Evidence on Age Discrimination

Experimental audit or correspondence (AC) studies can provide compelling evidence on discrimination in hiring decisions. Both types of studies use fictitious job applicants. Audit studies use in-person applicants leading to actual job offers. Correspondence studies create paper or electronic applicants, and capture “callbacks” for job interviews, avoiding experimenter effects and making feasible the collection of very large samples.

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Existing field experiments on age almost always find substantial age discrimination in hiring. For example, Bendick, Jackson, and Romero (1997) find that in 43 percent of pairs only younger applicants (age 32) received positive responses, versus 16.5 percent for older applicants (age 57)—a “net discrimination” estimate of 26.5 percent.

Heckman (1998) argues, however, that differences in the *variances* of unobservables, which the study design cannot eliminate, can create biases in either direction. This problem could be important in studying age discrimination. In the model of human capital investment, earnings become more dispersed as workers age, as differences in unobserved investment accumulate, which could generate a larger variance of unobservables for older versus younger applicants.

To assess such bias in the context of age discrimination, we analyze data from a new, large-scale field experiment. The study design lets us use a method developed in Neumark (2012) to identify the effect of age discrimination when the variance of unobservables can differ between groups.

#### II. Addressing the Heckman Critique

We explain the analysis of data from AC studies, the Heckman critique, and how to address it. Assume that productivity depends linearly and additively on two characteristics: a measure  $X^I$  included on the resumes and standardized at  $X^{I*}$  across applicants in the study; and  $X^{II}$ , which is unobserved by firms. Let  $S$  denote older (“senior”) applicants and  $Y$  denote younger applicants. Define  $\gamma$  as an additional linear, additive term that reflects taste discrimination (undervaluation of productivity) or

statistical discrimination (an assumption that  $E(X_S^H) \neq E(X_Y^H)$ ) regarding older workers—both of which are illegal in the United States.

With the data from an AC study, we estimate  $\gamma$  from a model for callbacks as a linear function of  $X^I$  and an indicator for age. Suppose a callback results if a worker's perceived productivity exceeds a threshold  $c$  ( $>0$ ). Then the hiring rules for older and younger applicants are

$$(1) T(X^{I*}, X_S^H) | (S=1) = 1 \text{ if } \beta_I X^{I*} + X_S^H + \gamma > c$$

$$(1') T(X^{I*}, X_Y^H) | (S=0) = 1 \text{ if } \beta_I X^{I*} + X_Y^H > c,$$

where  $X_S^H$  or  $X_Y^H$  are the residuals.

If  $X_S^H$  and  $X_Y^H$  are normally distributed, with zero means, standard deviations  $\sigma_S^H$  and  $\sigma_Y^H$ , and distribution function  $\Phi$ , the callback probabilities are

$$(2) S = 1: \Phi[(\beta_I X^{I*} + \gamma - c)/\sigma_S^H]$$

$$(2') S = 0: \Phi[(\beta_I X^{I*} - c)/\sigma_Y^H].$$

Without a restriction on  $\sigma_S^H$  and  $\sigma_Y^H$ ,  $\gamma$  is unidentified—the basis of Heckman's critique. For example, if  $X^{I*}$  is standardized at a low level, then  $\beta_I X^{I*} < c$ , and  $\sigma_S^H > \sigma_Y^H$  implies that we can find  $\Phi[(\beta_I X^{I*} + \gamma - c)/\sigma_S^H] > \Phi[(\beta_I X^{I*} - c)/\sigma_Y^H]$  even when  $\gamma = 0$ , that is, spurious evidence of discrimination *in favor* of older workers. This example shows that the relative variances of the unobservables interact with the level of quality chosen for the resumes in a correspondence study. Thus, without knowing how resume quality compares to those that employers receive, we cannot sign the bias even if we know whether  $\sigma_S^H$  is greater or less than  $\sigma_Y^H$ . Note also that the relative variances of the unobservables only matter as an artifact of the AC study design using resumes from a narrow "slice" of the distribution of applicants (by making them virtually identical).

Neumark (2012) shows that when the resumes in a correspondence study include skills that shift hiring for some applicants,  $\gamma$  can be identified. The intuition is that a higher variance for one group implies a smaller effect of observed characteristics on the probability that applicants from that group meet the hiring standard. Thus, information on how variation in observable qualifications is related to employment outcomes can be informative about the

relative variance of the unobservables, and this, in turn, can identify the effect of discrimination. The typical AC study does *not* include such characteristics because applicants are designed to be homogeneous. But if the applicants are made heterogeneous, this method can be used.

The critical assumption to identify the ratio of variances of the unobservables, and hence  $\gamma$ , is that  $\beta_I$  is equal for young and old applicants in the latent variable model for hiring. When there are data on many skills (like we build into this study design) there is an overidentifying restriction that the ratios of coefficients on skills of older and younger applicants are equal (to the inverse of the ratio of the standard deviations of the unobservable). The parameters of the model, including  $\gamma$ , can be estimated using a heteroscedastic probit model.

### III. The Field Experiment

The standard procedures for correspondence studies include: creation of data on artificial job applicants; applying for jobs; collection of data on hiring-related outcomes; and statistical analysis. The statistical analysis without quality variation in resumes is straightforward, and the extension to consider the Heckman critique follows the previous section.

As described in Neumark, Burn, and Button (2015), we grounded the creation of resumes as much as possible in empirical evidence on actual resumes posted by job seekers. We created job applicants aged 29–31, 49–51, and 64–66. Hiring of 64–66-year-olds is significant because policymakers are trying to induce working longer via Social Security reforms, and this is likely to require hiring in new jobs as older workers leave their main jobs for other jobs, for health or other reasons, before retiring. We report results only for the oldest versus the youngest male applicants, who applied for three types of jobs: retail sales, janitors, and security guards.

To explore the implications for the Heckman critique, we generated applicants of different skill levels for each job for which we apply.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup>Neumark, Burn, and Button (2015) report results for male and female applicants (with some females applying to different jobs), and provide a more extensive discussion of the experimental design, as well as discussion of how we use the data to explore a number of other issues relevant to field experiments on age discrimination, including the

We chose quality- or skill-related items based on extensive reading of actual resumes. High-skill resumes can include a post-secondary degree (B.A. for sales and security guard applicants, and Associate of Arts for janitor applicants), while all low-skill resumes only list a high school diploma. High-skill resumes can also include computer skills of some kind (appropriate to the job), fluency in Spanish as a second language, and other occupation-specific skills, such as licensing and CPR for security jobs, and certification for janitor jobs. The skills section can include one of three volunteer activities (food bank, homeless shelter, or animal shelter). All low-skill resumes include two typos, and some high-skill resumes do not. Finally, some high-skill resumes include recent “employee of the month” awards. We randomly assign five of seven possible skill indicators to each high-skill resume.

We assign all applicants to the same employer as either high skilled or low skilled, with 50 percent probability for each, so that random assignment of high-skill or low-skill resumes within a triplet does not dominate the effect of age. Other resume characteristics that are not supposed to affect hiring are randomized across resumes, as in other audit and correspondence studies.

Using a common job-posting website, over a period of approximately six months we sent out about 7,000 applications for male applicants aged either 29–31 or 64–66. Data on responses were collected by either e-mail or phone (voice-mail responses).

#### IV. Results

Table 1 reports callback rates and statistical tests of independence. In retail, the callback rate for older applicants was significantly lower—14.7 percent versus 20.9 percent for young applicants ( $p = 0.00$ ). For security jobs, callback rates were lower for older applicants—21.7 versus 24.3 percent—with a marginally significant difference ( $p = 0.12$ ). There were far fewer ads for janitor jobs. The callback rate differential is similar to security, but the difference is not statistically significant.<sup>2</sup>

puzzle of how to standardize experience of young and old job applicants.

<sup>2</sup>One issue we explore in the larger study is whether using resumes for older applicants with low experience equal to that of younger applicants generates a bias toward finding

TABLE 1—CALLBACK RATES BY AGE

		Young (29–31)	Old (64–66)
<i>Sales</i> ( $N = 3,570$ )			
Callback (%)	No	79.11	85.30
	Yes	20.89	14.70
Test of independence ( $p$ -value)		0.00	
<i>Security</i> ( $N = 2,746$ )			
Callback (%)	No	75.72	78.26
	Yes	24.28	21.74
Test of independence ( $p$ -value)		0.12	
<i>Janitors</i> ( $N = 845$ )			
Callback (%)	No	67.92	70.38
	Yes	32.08	29.62
Test of independence ( $p$ -value)		0.48	

*Notes:* The  $p$ -values reported for the tests of independence are from Fisher’s exact test (two-sided). For the janitor resumes, only older resumes with commensurate experience are used.

The evidence of age discrimination in hiring based on the raw data is not as strong as in past studies. However, these conclusions can be misleading because of the problem of differences in variances of the unobservables—our main focus to which we turn next.

Table 2 reports estimates of models that include a dummy variable for older applicants, control variables including the skill indicators, and interactions between the skills and the old indicator. The interactions are informative because, under the identifying assumption that the underlying coefficients for the two age groups are equal, differences between the probit coefficients by age are informative about differences in the variances of the unobservables. For example, if the unobserved variance is larger for older workers, then, if the main effect of the skill variable is positive, the estimated interaction should be negative and reduce the overall effect toward zero.

For sales workers, the skill variables are relatively unsuccessful in predicting hiring. The only main effect with a  $t$ -statistic exceeding one is employee of the month, for which the estimated

age discrimination. For janitors, we found that it does, and hence in this paper only use the high (commensurate) experience resumes for older janitor applicants, to focus solely on bias from different variances of the unobservables.

TABLE 2—PROBIT ESTIMATES FOR CALLBACKS BY AGE, OLD VERSUS YOUNG, EFFECTS OF SKILLS AND INTERACTIONS OF OLD WITH SKILLS, MARGINAL EFFECTS

	Sales	Security	Janitor
Old (64–66)	–0.062 (0.085)	–0.037 (0.057)	0.073 (0.229)
<i>Common skills</i>			
Spanish	0.007 (0.025)	0.081* (0.045)	–0.022 (0.049)
Spanish × Old	–0.046 (0.032)	0.038 (0.060)	–0.083 (0.117)
Grammar	–0.017 (0.020)	0.025 (0.034)	0.002 (0.047)
Grammar × Old	0.041 (0.037)	–0.019 (0.045)	0.036 (0.124)
College	0.008 (0.023)	0.023 (0.038)	0.129** (0.053)
College × Old	–0.007 (0.031)	0.003 (0.049)	–0.055 (0.107)
Employee of the month	0.033 (0.028)	–0.071* (0.036)	–0.061 (0.045)
Employee of the month × Old	–0.017 (0.034)	0.024 (0.053)	0.171 (0.118)
Volunteer	–0.027 (0.024)	–0.019 (0.039)	–0.103** (0.048)
Volunteer × Old	0.053 (0.040)	–0.034 (0.051)	–0.042 (0.102)
<i>Occupation-specific skills</i>	<i>1: computer, 2: customer service</i>	<i>1: CPR, 2: license</i>	<i>1: technical skills, 2: certificate</i>
Skill 1	0.001 (0.024)	–0.064* (0.034)	0.135** (0.066)
Skill 1 × Old	0.034 (0.039)	0.111** (0.060)	–0.102 (0.091)
Skill 2	0.012 (0.024)	0.065* (0.039)	–0.009 (0.064)
Skill 2 × Old	0.008 (0.036)	–0.052 (0.044)	–0.053 (0.109)
Observations	3,570	2,746	845

Notes: Marginal effects computed as the discrete change in the probability associated with the variables, evaluating other variables at their means. Standard errors are computed based on clustering at the resume level. Other controls include city, order of resume submission, and employed/unemployed. All controls are interacted with “Old” so main effect of “Old” is not meaningful. See notes to Table 1.

\*\*\* Significant at the 1 percent level.

\*\* Significant at the 5 percent level.

\* Significant at the 10 percent level.

interaction is of the opposite sign and points to a diminished effect for older applicants, although there are also estimates pointing to a larger effect for older applicants (e.g., computer skills). Thus,

for sales workers, it is not clear how the estimate will change from accounting for differences in the variances of the unobservables.

For security workers, Spanish strongly predicts hiring, although the interaction suggests the effect is larger for older applicants, consistent with a lower variance of the unobservable for older workers. For some other skills the estimates point to positive effects for the young applicants but effects closer to zero for the old applicants, consistent with a larger variance of the unobservable for the older workers, larger variance of the unobservable for older workers.

Similarly, for janitors, college strongly predicts hiring, the interaction is negative, and the combined effect is closer to zero. The same is true of technical skills. These estimates are consistent with a larger variance of the unobservable for older applicants.

Table 3 turns to the heteroscedastic probit estimates that correct for bias from differences in the variances of unobservables. Panel A reports the marginal effects from the standard probit model for each specification and sample. These estimates show significant evidence of age discrimination only in sales jobs, although all of the point estimates are in this direction.

The first row of panel B reports the overall effect from the heteroscedastic probit estimates, which are similar to the probit estimates. Next, we report the  $p$ -values from the overidentification test that the ratios of the skill coefficients between younger and older workers are equal across all of the skills. These  $p$ -values are uniformly high, indicating that we never reject the overidentifying restrictions.

We next report the ratio of the standard deviation of the unobservables for old relative to young applicants. For sales applicants, the estimated ratio of standard deviations is a bit below one (0.84)—in contrast to our conjecture, lower for older workers. The  $p$ -value for the test that the ratio equals one is above 0.1 (0.23), but still relatively low.

The last two rows of the table decompose the heteroscedastic probit estimates. “Old-level” is the unbiased estimate of the effect of age. The estimated level effect is near zero (–0.005), and nearly all of the effect comes from the variance (“Old-variance”)—interpreted as spurious evidence from the research design—although

TABLE 3—HETEROSCEDASTIC PROBIT ESTIMATES FOR CALLBACKS BY AGE, OLD VERSUS YOUNG (*Corrects for Potential Biases from Difference in Variance of Unobservables*)

	Sales	Security	Janitor
<i>Panel A. Probit estimates</i>			
Old (64–66, marginal)	–0.044*** (0.012)	–0.028 (0.017)	–0.032 (0.037)
<i>Panel B. Heteroscedastic probit estimates</i>			
Old (marginal)	–0.049*** (0.012)	–0.022 (0.020)	–0.031 (0.040)
Overidentification test: ratios of coefficients on skills for old relative to young are equal ( <i>p</i> -value)	0.88	0.85	0.97
Standard deviation of unobservables, old/ young	0.84	1.16	1.33
Test: ratio of standard deviations = 1 ( <i>p</i> -value)	0.23	0.35	0.59
Old-level (marginal)	–0.005 (0.039)	–0.058* (0.030)	–0.084 (0.094)
Old-variance (marginal)	–0.043 (0.040)	0.036 (0.035)	0.053 (0.086)
Observations	3,570	2,746	845

*Notes:* Marginal effects computed as the change in the probability associated with “Old,” using the continuous approximation, evaluating other variables at their means; the continuous approximation yields an unambiguous decomposition of the heteroscedastic probit estimates. *p*-values are based on Wald tests. See notes to Tables 1 and 2.

\*\*\*Significant at the 1 percent level.

\*\*Significant at the 5 percent level.

\*Significant at the 10 percent level.

these estimates are imprecise. Note also that the lower variance for older male sales applicants would predict that the standard probit estimates would overstate discrimination if the resumes were on average low quality, which is what we find. Indeed in this case the corrected estimate is most consistent with no age discrimination.

For security applicants, the ratio of standard deviations of the unobservables (1.16) points to a higher variance for older applicants. This leads, in the decomposition, to somewhat stronger evidence of age discrimination against older security workers (a marginal effect of –0.058, significant at the 10-percent level).

For janitor jobs, the estimated ratio of the standard deviation of the observable is above one by relatively more (1.33), although with the small sample not significantly different from one. In the decomposition, the point estimate of the unbiased effect of discrimination is larger (–0.084 versus –0.031), but given the large standard error, is not statistically significant. For both security and janitor jobs, the higher variance of the unobservable for older applicants coupled with an increased estimate of discrimination from the heteroscedastic probit estimates is consistent with lower quality resumes (as for sales), which in these cases biases downward (i.e., toward zero) the estimate of age discrimination.

## V. Conclusions

Our evidence points to more ambiguous evidence of age discrimination against older men than past research. For the three occupations we study—retail, security, and janitors—the point estimates always indicate age discrimination; but the standard evidence is only strongly significant for retail.

Moreover, the analysis indicates that conclusions are sensitive to accounting for the Heckman critique, adding to the ambiguity. The strongest evidence of age discrimination—in retail sales—disappears completely once the estimate is corrected for the bias identified by this critique. For security and janitor jobs, in contrast, the evidence of discrimination strengthens, although it is significant—and only weakly—just for security jobs.

The more demanding analysis of the data results, quite naturally, in less precise estimates. Nonetheless, the sensitivity of the conclusions demonstrates the need to design experimental studies of labor market discrimination to have the capacity to correct for biases from differences in the variances of unobservables across the groups studied.

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